Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 0313386102, 9780274987429

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Covert Relationship

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Covert Relationship American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988

Bryan R. Gibson

PSI Reports

Copyright 2010 by Bryan R. Gibson All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gibson, Bryan R. Covert relationship : American foreign policy, intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980– 1988 / Bryan R. Gibson. p. cm. — (PSI reports) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–313–38610–7 (hardcopy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–313–38611–4 (ebook) 1. Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988—United States. 2. Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988—Diplomatic history. 3. United States—Foreign relations—1981–1989. 4. United States—Foreign relations—Persian Gulf Region. 5. Persian Gulf Region—Foreign relations—United States. 6. Persian Gulf Region—Strategic aspects. I. Title. DS318.85.G53 2010 955.050 4220973—dc22

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ISBN: 978–0–313–38610–7 EISBN: 978–0–313–38611–4 14 13 12 11 10

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Praeger An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Part I: Introduction Introduction 1. A History of Deceit 2. The War of Subversion Part II: Strict Neutrality 3. Setting the Stage Part III: Strict Neutrality? 4. Strict Neutrality? 5. The Tilt 6. The Internationalization of the War 7. Turning a Blind Eye 8. A Sophisticated Strategy Part IV: The Policy Collapses 9. The War of the Cities 10. The Policy Collapses Part V: The Collapse of Neutrality 11. The Aftermath of Deception 12. The Collapse of Neutrality

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13. Forcing the War to an End Part VI: Conclusion Conclusion Notes Selected Bibliography Index

206 225 227 239 279 285

Part I

Introduction

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Introduction

Neutrality is perhaps one of the most ambiguous concepts in international relations. In layman’s terms, neutrality means that the neutral third party does not take sides during a conflict. But in practice, this concept is far more complicated. For instance, from 1914 to 1917, during the First World War, the United States was officially neutral, but in practice, the Wilson administration tilted heavily toward Great Britain and France by directly providing economic assistance and indirectly offering military aid through British colonies, like Canada. But after slowly whittling down resistance to the war, the United States dropped any pretext of neutrality and entered the war in 1917 on the side of its allies. During the lead-up to the Second World War, the United States adopted a policy of isolationism, and Congress passed a series of neutrality acts that barred the Roosevelt administration from officially taking sides during the war. The Neutrality Act of 1935 prevented the United States from providing arms or war-related material to all parties engaged in a war. The following year, a second Neutrality Act was passed that included the banning of providing financial credits to either belligerent in a military conflict. As the world edged closer towards a second world war, Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1937 that affirmed the views of the earlier acts and extended neutrality to cover civil wars. Of greater importance, there was no expiration date for the act, meaning that Congress would not have to continuously readdress the issue. When Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in 1939, Roosevelt successfully lobbied Congress to remove these restrictions, allowing the United States to once again provide support for its close ally, Great Britain, while officially staying neutral in the war.

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In early 1941, Roosevelt managed to force through the Lend-Lease agreements in Congress, which effectively nullified the neutrality acts. Once again, the ambiguity of neutrality became apparent in the face of a direct threat to American interests. Following the end of the Second World War, as the United States faced an unprecedented strategic challenge posed by the Soviet Union, the concept of neutrality only became more ambiguous. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union fought numerous proxy wars throughout the globe, while managing to avoid direct military confrontation with each other. Faced with such ambiguity, the United States continuously sought to check Soviet advances in the third world. Ultimately, this led to a number of major military conflicts in Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan, and the proxy wars in South America. In each of these cases, the United States stood firmly behind one nation, while the Soviet Union supported the other. In a sense, the world was, as Zbigniew Brzezinski described it, a grand chessboard, with the rest of the world’s nations playing the role of pawns.1 But because of the ambiguous nature of the Cold War, there was never really a need for the United States to declare itself officially neutral during these conflicts, mainly because it never was, and Congress was fine with that. The Iran-Iraq War, however, was the great anomaly of the Cold War. Unlike other conflicts during this period, the war between Iran and Iraq had nothing to do with superpower rivalry and everything to do with historical animosity and geostrategic considerations vis-a`-vis the Persian Gulf. Most uniquely, both the United States and the Soviet Union declared themselves neutral in the war— the only such declaration during the Cold War. In fact, the policies of the two superpowers closely mirrored each other, with both parties begrudgingly working together to prevent an Iranian victory, while tilting toward Iraq. Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, the American policy closely reflected the policies of Wilson and Roosevelt during their respective world wars. Similarly, the Reagan administration faced a reluctant Congress that was not particularly interested in openly supporting Iraq, though cognizant of the danger posed by an Iranian victory in the war. Nevertheless, the official policy of the United States toward the Iran-Iraq War was that of neutrality, but the actions of the Reagan administration hardly reflected an adherence to any understanding of the concept. In fact, the United States contributed significantly toward Iraq’s defeat of Iran in the summer of 1988, including diplomatic efforts at the United Nations to force Iran to agree to end the war, the use of Operation Staunch to block Iran’s access to arms, overt naval engagements in the Persian Gulf, and a top-secret operation to assist Iraq’s air force in destroying Iran’s military infrastructure, which ultimately forced it to

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end the war. In light of these factors, the United States was most certainly not a neutral party during the Iran-Iraq War. Throughout the war, the United States strove to achieve five fundamental policy objectives. The first goal was to end the war with neither side emerging victorious, a return to the status quo. This objective underscores why the United States tilted toward Iraq during most of the war, as the Reagan administration had no desire to see Iran emerge victorious in the war. Certainly, Iraq’s acceptance of all United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and Iran’s continual rejection made it easier for the White House to justify its support for the Iraqis, even when Iraq was using chemical weapons on an almost daily basis. The second objective of American policy was preventing a regional escalation of the war. There were legitimate fears, particularly at the start of the war, that Iran would attack the Gulf States in retaliation for American financial support for Iraq. In the event that Iran did attack, the United States would be forced to respond. In response to these fears, the Reagan administration dramatically expanded its Rapid Deployment Force in the region, eventually forming the Central Command (CENTCOM). This goal relates closely to America’s third objective, which was to protect its regional allies, the Gulf States. Throughout the course of the war, the Carter and Reagan administrations worked hard to bolster the defenses of these vulnerable nations. This included providing Saudi Arabia with the highly advanced Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), conducting military operations near the Strait of Hormuz, and regularly passing on intelligence. The culmination of this process was Reagan’s decision to reflag Kuwait’s tankers after Iran began targeting its vessels in the Gulf in 1986–1987. The fourth goal of American policy was to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf. Certainly the perceived expansion of Soviet influence in the Gulf following the exposure of the IranContra affair in November 1986 contributed significantly to the reflagging of Kuwait’s vessels. The final—and arguably the most important goal—was to maintain the free navigation of the strategically significant Strait of Hormuz. Throughout the course of the war, the American government explicitly stated that it viewed the closure of the strait as a fundamental threat to its interests. In early 1987, when Iran began deploying its Silkworm missiles in the Strait, the Reagan administration dramatically increased its naval forces in the Gulf, which ultimately brought it into direct conflict with Iran. Ultimately, these five policy considerations drove the American decision-making processes throughout the course of the war. A great deal of confusion surrounds American policy toward the Iran-Iraq War. Part of the problem is that the general public’s understanding of the war

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has been greatly distorted by American propaganda during the 1990–1991 Gulf War and the lead-up to America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. The objective of this book is to provide clarity about America’s intentions, objectives, and decisions during the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq war. This book is undoubtedly a study of American foreign policy that seeks to weave the decision-making process in Washington with the events on the battlefield. There are a number of excellent books on the Iran-Iraq War that have proven to be valuable resources on the war. These include Edgar O’Ballance’s meticulous narrative, The Gulf War (New York: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988), Gary Sick and Lawrence Potter’s Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), Christopher C. Joyner’s The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), and Joost Hiltermann’s A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007). However, because this work focuses on the American decisionmaking process, this book draws extensively on primary documents obtained from the American National Archives, the Carter and Reagan presidential libraries, the CIA’s online reading room, and the National Security Archive, a nongovernmental research organization located at George Washington University that focuses on obtaining primary documents through Freedom Of Information Act requests. Adding to the information obtained from these sources are hundreds of newspaper articles obtained through Lexus Nexus, mostly from The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Miami Herald, Canada’s The Globe and Mail, and England’s The Guardian and the Times. I also contacted a number of American officials including Rick Francona, Bobby Ray Inman, W. Patrick Lang, Steven Pelletiere, Gary Sick, and Wayne White. In retrospect, I wish I had been able to interview more participants. However, in spite of this limitation, I believe I have constructed an accurate picture of American policy toward the Iran-Iraq War. Ultimately this book seeks to answer a number of important questions and dispel many of the myths surrounding the Iran-Iraq conflict. The most direct question posed by the research asks what was the American policy toward the Iran-Iraq War? This question broadly defines the parameters of the research and limits the scope to understanding the American policy toward the war. A major problem with producing a book on a subject as complicated as the Iran-Iraq War is that it is very easy to get sidetracked by secondary issues. Beyond American policy then, it is necessary to understand the military strategies adopted by Iran and Iraq during the war and to question their effectiveness. It is well known that during the Iran-Iraq War, the United States tilted heavily toward Iraq, but to what extent? What did the American tilt consist of ?

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Did the United States ever provide Iraq with weapons? Iraq’s extensive use of chemical weapons during the war also raises the question of American knowledge and complicity in the matter. Did the United States truly care that Iraq was using chemical weapons against Iran? Did the United States provide Iraq with chemical weapons or actively work against its acquisition of such destructive weapons? In light of the American tilt toward Iraq throughout the majority of the war, why did the Reagan administration provide Iran with weapons and intelligence as part of the Iran-Contra scandal? Did the provision of weapons and intelligence to Iran have a significant impact on the outcome of the war? Following the exposure of the Iran-Contra scandal, the Reagan administration embarked on a massive show of military force in the Persian Gulf, largely to rebuild influence with the disenfranchised Gulf States. Did the United States intentionally build up its forces in the Gulf as a means of checking Iran’s expansionist tendencies, or was it simply to bolster its allies? Furthermore, did the policy of the United States compliment or diverge from its regional allies? Finally, at the end of the war, the American navy fought several naval engagements with Iran. Was this part of a grander strategy to force Iran to end its intransigence and agree to end the war or was this the byproduct of America’s need to rebuild its influence in the region after the Iran-Contra scandal? Only through an examination of the facts can these questions be adequately answered. My interest in studying American policy toward the Iran-Iraq War can be traced to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. At the time, I was an eight-year-old boy in the third grade who watched the news with my parents every evening and traded my Gulf War trading cards at school with my fellow students, hoping to get my hands on the coveted Stealth Bomber. As the conflict escalated—and my interest in the war increased—my thirdgrade teacher approached my mother and sternly explained her concern that I had developed “an unhealthy obsession with the Gulf War.” At the time, my mother did not think much of my teacher’s concerns, thinking that there was nothing wrong with her son developing an early interest in world affairs. Years later, as I embarked on this study, she told me of this conversation, commenting that she was proud that my unhealthy obsession had grown into something constructive. The attacks against New York on September 11, 2001, occurred only six days after my first day at the university, where I had enrolled to study criminology as I wanted to be a lawyer. Like many, this act of profound violence resonated deeply with me and ultimately redirected my interests away from law and toward history. The following year, as the Bush administration began rattling its sabers about Iraq and its alleged possession of weapons of mass

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destruction (WMD), I rekindled my interest in the pariah state of the Persian Gulf. As I watched President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz whip the United States up into a frenzy about the threat posed by Iraq, I resolved to examine the issue more closely. In particular, I was interested in studying the seemingly worst-case scenarios being drawn by the administration that I found difficult to believe. After all, how could Iraq, which suffered horribly for years under embargo, have managed to maintain, improve, and expand its chemical weapons program, while building a nuclear bomb and devising unmanned drones capable of attacking the United States? After the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, I enrolled in a course on American foreign policy taught by the esteemed Dr. Brian Loring Villa. A Harvardeducated military historian who had taught at West Point during the Vietnam War, Villa encouraged us to think outside the box. For our major assignment, Dr. Villa tasked the class with analyzing all of the major conflicts of American history up to the present conflict in Iraq as they related to the congressional prerogative to declare war, assigning me to study the invasion of Iraq. As I researched the Bush administration’s systematic manipulation of public perception toward Iraq during the lead-up to the invasion, I found myself looking more and more into the Iran-Iraq War. What immediately became apparent was the absence of a thorough analysis of American policy toward this war. With Dr. Villa’s support and encouragement, thoroughly impressed I began to research and write on this topic, ultimately forming the foundation for this book. This book could not have been accomplished without the help of others. First and foremost, I thank my mother, Marlene Gibson, to whom this book is dedicated. Without her never-ending support, encouragement, careful eye, thoughtful suggestions, and her determination to keep me on track, this book might never have been completed. I also appreciate my father, Glenn Gibson, for his encouragement, arguments, and uncanny ability to help me organize my thoughts. I also greatly appreciate the support and encouragement of Jiwon Kang. I want to thank Dr. Galen Perras at the University of Ottawa who served as an excellent mentor and brilliant editor. He pushed me to dig deeper into this interesting, though understudied subject. I am thankful for his meticulous attention to detail and his determination to keep me on course. My gratitude also extends to Professor Nigel Ashton for his incredible patience, his support and confidence in my research, his thoughtful guidance, and his encouragement to push through difficult challenges.

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In addition to my parents, Dr. Perras, and Professor Ashton, I have to thank Dr. Brian Loring Villa for encouraging me to dig deeper into the Iran-Iraq War. Had it not been for his early support in my research I cannot say with certainty that I would have written this book. Another source of support came from Dr. Donald Davis who taught me a great deal about writing and about thinking outside the box. Although we did not see eye-to-eye on everything, he served as an excellent source of intellectual debate. I would also like to thank a close colleague of mine at the University of Ottawa, Jeffery Brideau, who always made himself available to debate ideas and arguments, while providing excellent insight into American foreign policy. A number of institutions were also very helpful, notably, the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan presidential libraries that provided incredible information for my research. In particular, I want to recognize the help of Keith Shuler at the Jimmy Carter Library, Jennifer Mandel at the Reagan Library, and James Yancy at the National Archives (NARA). Another incredible institution was the National Security Archive (NSA) at George Washington University that has extensive holdings of American foreign policy documents. In particular, Malcolm Byrne has been very helpful in providing documents, transcripts, and advice on my research of this complex subject. I appreciate him taking the time to help me and look forward to working with him in the future. Finally, I need to thank Steve Catalano at Praeger Security International. When I proposed this subject to Praeger in the summer of 2009, I was amazed at how positive his response was. Since then, he has been incredibly patient with me; without his support and encouragement, Covert Relationship would not be what it is today.

1

A History of Deceit

At the end of the First World War, when the defeated and collapsed Ottoman Empire was carved up between the British and French, the Iraqi mandate was awarded to the British Empire. After some initial unrest, the British decided to rule Iraq indirectly through an Iraqi monarch and selected Faisal Bin Hussein, who had been forced out of Syria by France in 1920, to be king. By 1932, at the urging of Faisal, the British declared Iraq’s independence. Faisal died only a year later on September 7, 1933, and was replaced by his young son Ghazi. Faisal’s death had a great impact on Iraq, as from 1936 to 1941 the country underwent a series of destabilizing coups as different groups vied for power in the weak parliamentary system. In 1939, the tenuous situation was further complicated when King Ghazi died. Soon thereafter, in April 1941, a military coup d’e´tat led by Rashid Ali al-Kaylani paved the way for the second British occupation of Iraq in 1941, which was initiated when the new regime established close ties with Nazi Germany. 1 When Britain left Iraq in October 1947, it restored the Hashemite monarchy under King Ghazi’s young son, Faisal II, who was only twelve at the time. The return of the Hashemite monarchy ushered in a decade of relative stability, thanks to the tutelage of the authoritarian Nuri al-Said who, although not continuously in office, “influenced the political life of his country to an unprecedented level.”2 But the postwar political environment in the Middle East prevented any prospects for long-term stability. Following Israel’s crushing defeat of the Arab states in 1949, and the subsequent loss of Palestine, Arab nationalist sentiment heightened throughout the region. Evidence to this effect was the Egyptian Revolution of 1954 that

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had ousted Egypt’s corrupt monarch Faruk and brought to power a staunch Arab nationalist, Gamal Abdel Nasser. In an increasingly bipolar world, Nasser promoted an alternative to the East-West confrontation known as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Devised in 1955, this organization of states declared that it did not want to become embroiled in the escalating Cold War. At the same time, Nasser began calling upon all Arabs to unite into one nation, a prospect that did not sit entirely well with Israel. In late October 1956, France, Great Britain, and Israel colluded together to rid themselves of the mutually problematic Nasser, but their failure to achieve their objective only served as a greater catalyst for Arab nationalism while seeming to prove Israel’s imperialistic designs. Nasser, who had resisted the invasion and found support in global public opinion, quickly became the champion of Arab nationalism and inspired many young Arabs to follow his lead, including a young Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti (herein referred to as Saddam Hussein). Born in 1937 to a Sunni family in the small, impoverished village of Al-Ouja, approximately 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) north of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein had a troubled childhood. Aspects of his early life remain unclear. For instance, official accounts report that his father died before he was born,3 while other accounts indicate that his father left his mother before his birth.4 In either case, at an early age Saddam, without a father figure, was sent to live with relatives. Understandably, his troubled youth had a deep impact on his life. As biographer Con Coughlin points out, the “shame of his humble origins was to become the driving force of his ambition, while the deep sense of insecurity that he developed . . . left him pathologically incapable in later life of trusting anyone—including his immediate family.”5 Indeed Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi’s biography supports this conclusion: In the permanently beleaguered mind of Saddam Hussein, politics is a ceaseless struggle for survival. The ultimate goal of staying alive, and in power, justifies all means. . . . Nobody is trustworthy. Everybody is an actual or potential enemy. . . . This stark worldview can be explained in part by Saddam’s troubled childhood, which seldom afforded him the trusting bonds of close, family relationships, but taught him instead the cruel law of survival of the fittest, a law he was to cherish throughout his political career. In his teenage years, Saddam found strong ideological influences in his uncle, Khairallah Tulfah, an ardent Iraqi nationalist, and from his older cousin, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. Born in the village of Tikrit in 1914, from a young age Bakr was a militant Arab nationalist. In fact, al-Bakr’s nationalist aspirations were evident in the fact that he participated in the Ali Rashid

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movement in 1940 and later became a senior member of the Ba’ath Party. With such a role model, it was unsurprising that Hussein joined the Ba’ath in 1957.6 The next year saw a number of regional developments that had a profound impact on the politics in Iraq. First, on February 1, Nasser took a major step toward his goal of a unified Arab state when Syria joined Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). The joining of two staunchly Arab nationalist countries did not sit well with King Faisal II and the ever-present Nuri al-Said. Meanwhile, a coalition formed among Arab nationalists that were opposed to the pro-Western policies of Said, who, in turn, responded by increasing the benefits offered to the military to maintain loyalty. The creation of the UAR only aggravated the internal tensions within Iraq. Arab nationalists wanted to remove the monarchy and have Iraq join the UAR. Then, on February 14, two weeks after the formation of the UAR, in a half-hearted effort to consolidate Faisal’s tenuous position, Iraq and Jordan announced that they would unite the two Hashemite kingdoms and form the Arab Federation.7 The tensions between the royalists and the Arab nationalists came to a head on July 14 when a coalition of nationalists and military officers launched a coup d’e´tat that resulted in the deaths of Faisal II and Nuri al-Said.8 The coup was led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim, an indistinct military officer “near the lower end of the social scale of the Free Officer membership.”9 According to Urial Dann’s detailed study of Qasim’s regime, the coup was . . . military in conception, planning, organization and execution; the military character of the conspiracy was preserved, though contacts had been made with certain civilian circles opposing the monarchy, and a minimum number of politicians was informed of the date of the coup a day or two in advance. But unlike Nasser’s closely knit Free Officers’ Movement, “the revolution in Iraq had become a one-man job, effected by Qassem with Col. Abd as-Salam Arif acting as his trusted personal aide.”10 In the ensuing power struggle among the members of this group, Qasim immediately consolidated his rule by offering his support for powerful segments of Iraqi society, namely the Kurds and the communists, in order to counter-balance the Arab nationalist forces that wanted Qasim to let Iraq join the UAR. The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was “fundamentally opposed to joining the Nasser-sponsored union of Arab states: the only union Iraqi communists supported was with Moscow.” Qasim’s drift greatly upset many Nasserites who had supported the coup but also wanted Iraq to join the UAR.11 As it became evident that

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Qasim’s regime was not likely to follow through with this key promise, a large underground resistance network developed. Nevertheless, Qasim countered internal dissidence with repression, and, over the course of the following five years, Iraq became a military dictatorship. The Qasim regime’s failure to satisfy its followers resulted in significant opposition from nationalists in 1959. Frustrated with the growing totalitarian nature of Qasim’s regime, by early October 1959 the leadership of the Ba’ath Party, an Arab nationalist group, concluded that more extreme measures would be required to remove him. Consequently, on October 7, 1959, a group of young Ba’ath Party members attempted, but failed, to assassinate Qasim. A key perpetrator of the assassination attempt was Saddam Hussein, who managed to escape Qasim’s security forces and then fled to Syria upon learning that Qasim had survived.12 In response to the assassination attempt on his life, Qasim ruthlessly lashed out against the Ba’ath Party and drove it further underground, where it would continue to plot his demise.13 This brief period of time shows that Qasim constantly played one powerful group in Iraq off of one another, indicating that Qasim was playing a haphazard form of balance-of-power politics, which ultimately led to his undoing, thanks to the Kurds. For centuries, the Kurds that inhabit northern Iraq had been fighting for independence from Iraq’s central government, as “the Kurds are an ethnic minority distinct from Arabs. They speak a different language and have different habits and customs.”14 According to a CIA study, “the Kurds are the descendants of Indo-European tribes that settled in the Kurdish areas perhaps up to 4,000 years ago.” Estimates placed their population in the range of 9.65 to 12.4 million people, with 2.5 million Kurds living in Iraq, constituting 20 percent of its population.15 In August 1920, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, the Allied powers signed the Treaty of Sevres with Turkey, which called for the “provisional recognition of an independent Kurdistan made up of territory that today composes part of southeastern Turkey.” But this was not to be. Hopes for a Kurdish state were dashed in 1923 when Turkey refused to ratify the treaty and instead negotiated the Treaty of Lausanne, which ignored the Kurd’s nationalist aspirations. Thereafter, the Kurdish question was ignored until the Second World War, when the British and Soviets partitioned Iran in August 1941, with the Iranian Kurds falling in the virtual no-man’s-land between the two zones. In 1946, after the war had ended, the Soviets allowed Kurdistan to declare itself an independent of Iran, but this freedom lasted only a year. Kurdish independence greatly upset Iran. “Only the presence of Soviet troops prevented the Iranians from reasserting their control over the district.”16 The Americans

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exploited the Soviet presence in Kurdistan—and neighboring Azerbaijan—to shore up influence with the young Shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who had been installed by the Allies after forcing his father Reza Shah Pahlavi to abdicate in September 1941. As a token of support, the United States denounced Soviet support for Kurdish independence as an act of encroachment on Iranian sovereignty. When the Soviet troops withdrew from Iran in May 1946, it did not take long before Iranian forces forcibly suppressed the Kurdish republic. Since that time, Kurdish nationalism emerged as a strong ideology, but it was easily prone to external manipulation. Due to Soviet support for the republic, after its collapse the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) fell under Moscow’s influence. Given the widespread perception among Kurds that the West sold them out to the Iranians in 1946, the KDP viewed the Soviets as a natural source of support.17 Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the historical leader of the KDP who was integral in the formation of the Mahabad Republic, had a complex relationship with Qasim. Upon his triumphant return from his eleven-year exile in the USSR in October 1959, Barzani arrived in Baghdad greatly disenfranchised with communism. In spite of the KDP’s relationship with Moscow, Barzani immediately “expelled a pro-Communist faction from the party and moved the orientation of the party to the right.”18 Meanwhile, Qasim hoped to utilize Barzani’s position as leader of the KDP in his balance-of-power political game. He provided Barzani with a house (apparently Nuri al-Said’s former residence), a chauffeur and a limousine, as well as bodyguards and a sizeable monthly allowance. But this relationship did not last very long; by 1961 Qasim was acutely aware of Barzani’s growing influence among the Kurds and began to quietly arm the historical enemies of the Barzani tribe, namely Zibaris, Herkis, and Baradosts, after realizing that he could no longer keep him under heel. During the summer of 1961, Barzani returned north and began to settle old scores with rival clans that had taken over his land during his exile with the help of his fierce tribal warriors. Seeing that Barzani had thoroughly defeated any opposition to his position in Kurdistan, Qasim began to plan military operations against the north.19 Toward the end of the summer of 1961, just as Qasim was preparing to move against the Kurds in the north, Barzani and the aghas (tribal chiefs) loyal to him began to take over control and forcefully expel Iraqi officials from Kurdistan, which were predominantly Arabs from the south that owed allegiance to Qasim. Then, on September 11, and unbeknown to Barzani, a group of Kurds attacked an Iraqi army column near Kirkuk, killing 23 soldiers. Qasim was furious and ordered the Iraqi Air Force, one of the few segments of the military that were completely loyal to him, to bomb Barzan, the hometown of Barzani,

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even though he had nothing to do with the attack. But Qasim did not stop at the bombing of Barzan; he followed up the attack by strafing and bombing Kurdish villages, which only consolidated support among Kurds for Barzani. Essentially, Qasim’s efforts backfired on him, and, by September 24, he publicly acknowledged that a full-scale insurrection was underway in Kurdistan. Thus, from September 1961 onward, the Kurds openly revolted against the Iraqi central government.20 By early 1963, Qasim’s haphazard balance-of-power political game, combined with a series of embarrassing defeats at the hands of the Kurds that resulted in considerable discontent among the military, led to his demise. On February 9 an unlikely alliance of the military and members of the secretive Ba’ath Party launched a daring coup, and after a two-day-long pitched battle in Baghdad, the group overthrew Qasim, bringing to power a Ba’athist government. As the leader of the coup, Abd as-Salam Arif became president and designated Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr prime minister.21 Although the new regime was determined to implement socialist policies, it was extremely dysfunctional, partly due to divergences among the civilian and military wings of the Ba’ath Party. After the infighting became overt, President Arif, who was not a Ba’athist but had used the party as a marriage of convenience rather than an actual alliance, on November 18 forced the Ba’ath from power in “a bloodless coup.”22 The short-lived Ba’athist government was quickly replaced by a more stable regime consisting of Nasserites and moderate Ba’athists. According to Phebe Marr, Iraq moved from internal chaos to a progressive calm under the Arif regime: There was a relaxation of the tensions and clashes that had been engendered by the two previous regimes. . . . The National Guard with its excesses was dissolved; foreign relations were normalized; greater freedom of speech and action was allowed; and a sensible and relatively successful attempt was made to balance Iraq’s internal needs with its foreign policy. Unfortunately, the progressive measures and the return to normalcy in Iraq met an unfortunate fate when Arif and a number of his key ministers were killed unexpectedly in a helicopter crash in April 1966. Subsequent investigations turned up no evidence of foul play, but the regime that followed thereafter, headed by Arif ’s brother, Abd ar-Rahman Arif, who, after a disastrous military campaign against the Kurds, allowed his prime minister, Abd ar-Rahman al-Bazzaz, to negotiate a military settlement with the Kurds, known as the twelve-point-plan. Bazzaz’s skillful diplomatic overtures with

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the Kurds managed to buy the new Iraqi president two years of peace, whereupon he turned his attention to rebuilding the shattered Iraqi military. While Rahman’s decision to negotiate with the Kurds proved to be a success in the short term, capitulation to the Kurds resonated among the Arab dominated military. Unable to bear the embarrassment of capitulation, on July 17, 1968, members of the Ba’ath party and their allies in the military offered Rahman an ultimatum: leave Iraq immediately or die. Thus, the second Arif regime was overthrown in a bloodless coup by a coalition of his disaffected colleagues and a rejuvenated Ba’ath Party.23 With the second coming of the Ba’ath in 1968, the new regime, now led by the duumvirate of Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, vowed to not repeat the mistakes of 1963. As the leader of the military wing of the Ba’ath, al-Bakr had close connections to the military and “brought the party a certain legitimacy” among the Iraqi people. Meanwhile, Saddam’s youthful dynamism appealed to the civilian wing of the party and “those more imbued with ideology and more interested in progress and development.”24 Between the two, they achieved a high level of party unity, which had proven so elusive in 1963, allowing them to quickly consolidate their control over the new regime. Al-Bakr became president, prime minister, chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which was the de facto ruling body of Iraq, and secretary general of the Ba’ath Party. Then, with Hussein’s help, they quickly purged the military and bureaucracy of any rivals that could threaten their position.25 Throughout this process, Saddam’s pronounced organizing capabilities and his utter ruthlessness became very evident, and by 1969 he “was clearly a moving force behind the scenes. . . . However, he could not do entirely without al-Bakr’s support and patronage, which he used astutely until . . . he had gradually come to overshadow the older man.”26 After coming to power in 1968, the Ba’ath immediately recognized that it needed to solve the Kurdish problem. Essentially there were two options: attack the Kurds and destroy them militarily or negotiate. The military wing of the Ba’ath Party clearly favored the former option, while the civilian wing favored the latter. By the fall of 1968, it was clear that the military wing triumphed in this policy debate. It ordered the army to mobilize forces, and on January 3, 1969, Iraq launched an offensive against Barzani’s positions in the north, which immediately faltered. At this point, the Iranians, who were supplying the Kurds with just enough defensive weaponry to allow them to maintain a near-constant state of war as part of a long-term strategy to weaken Iraq’s military, massed troops along the under-protected Shatt al-Arab river, forcefully repatriated Iraqi civilians, and then offered to renegotiate the

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17

sovereignty of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which runs for 192 kilometers (120 miles) along the Iran-Iraq border by the thalweg principle. This meant that the river boundary was set down the middle of the deepest channel.27 The Iraqis took the matter to the UN, where Iran simply reiterated its offer to renegotiate the issue of the sovereignty of the Shatt al-Arab, which Iraq rejected, leaving the matter unresolved.28 By December 1969, it was evident to al-Bakr that the military mission against the Kurds was a complete failure. At this point, he sent Faud Aref, a well-known Kurd, north to contact Barzani about negotiating a peace agreement. Barzani responded positively, but insisted that any agreement with the government must be registered with the UN. Agreeing to these terms, al-Bakr sent Saddam Hussein north with carte blanche orders to negotiate an agreement with the Kurds. Despite the Shah’s best efforts to scuttle the agreement, on March 11, 1970, the RCC announced that Saddam Hussein and Mullah Mustafa Barzani had reached a “total and final” settlement of the Kurdish Question in Iraq.29 In the agreement, known as the March Manifesto, the central government: agreed to recognize the binational character of Iraq—in effect establishing the Kurds as free and equal partners with the Arabs; reaffirmed Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights; provided economic rehabilitation and development of the devastated regions of Kurdistan; and, most importantly, provided for the establishment of a self-governing region of Kurdistan.30 While the March Manifesto was hailed as a major step toward the national reconciliation between the Arab and Kurdish populations of Iraq, the agreement ran aground almost as soon as the ink dried on the paper. Not long after signing the agreement, disagreement erupted over the status of Kirkuk (whether the oil-rich city would be included in the autonomous zone), the definition of autonomy, the disarmament of Barzani’s private army, known as the Peshmerga (literally, those who face death), and the appointment of a Kurdish vice president. But it was the brazen attempt on Barzani’s life on September 29, 1971, that convinced the Kurdish leader that he needed outside support against such a ruthless regime. Because of the Kurd’s inherent distrust of Iran, which “insisted on maintaining such heavy-handed control over Kurdish activities,” Barzani wanted to diversify his sources of support and turned to the Americans who rejected the Kurds with a polite but firm reiteration of its policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of Iraq, a policy that had been in place since the revolt broke out in 1961.31 In March 1972, the Nixon administration’s policy toward the revolt began to shift after an unexpected de´marche by a senior official from Iran’s National Intelligence and Security Organization (better known as Savak) who formally requested CIA assistance for the Kurds. “The SAVAK official cited Soviet

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pressures on al-Barzani and the imminence of a Soviet-Iraqi treaty” as reasonable justification for a Savak-CIA operation to overthrow the Ba’thist regime. To this effect, the SAVAK official . . . wished to know if the United States would be prepared to provide financial and military support for the attempt and assist in drawing together Iraqi exiles who would comprise the nucleus of a separatist government initially harbored by al-Barzani.32 Amid the backdrop of the internal debate generated by Iran’s request, a number of significant developments occurred that tipped the debate in favor of American intervention. On February 10, an Iraqi delegation led by Saddam Hussein arrived in Moscow in order to study measures that could be taken to put Iraqi-USSR relations on a “new, higher level by formulating them into a treaty arrangement,” along the lines of the recent Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship signed in May 1971. According to a joint communique´ released on February 18, both sides agreed to increased military, economic, and political cooperation. In addition, the Soviets also offered to help Iraq “establish a national oil industry and to exploit its oil wealth independently,” which posed a direct threat to American investments in the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC).33 Undoubtedly, the news of Saddam Hussein’s mission to Moscow “opened a new phase of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Ba’th Party Government in Baghdad,” which, understandably, did not sit well with the American government.34 The Nixon administration’s concerns were further compounded when Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin traveled to Baghdad in early April 1972, where he signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Iraqi President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. The treaty did not come as a surprise to Washington, as it was simply viewed as the “culmination of existing relationships.” Although it was based on the Egyptian-Soviet treaty, Iraq’s treaty held greater significance because the Iraqis initiated it, whereas the Soviets initiated the Egyptian treaty.35 At face value, the treaty did not significantly depart from confirming the preexisting relationship between the signing parties. However, according to a CIA analysis of the treaty, “the published provisions,” as it was assumed that there were a number of secret provisions, . . . provide for the coordination of their stands in the event of a threat to the peace of either party and continuing cooperation in consolidating their mutual defense capabilities. These provisions gave the Iraqi regime the prospect of Soviet support in the event of external attacks, and possibly even in the event of an internal insurrection.36

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19

Article 9 was particularly significant: “In the interests of the security of both countries, the high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the strengthening of their defense capabilities.”37 According to the CIA, this article promised “the Soviet Union increased naval facilities in Iraqi Gulf ports and further access to Iraqi airfields,” which would significantly improve its strategic position vis-a`-vis the Persian Gulf. In fact, the CIA had “reason to believe the Soviets refused a request by [Saddam Hussein] that the Soviets guarantee to intervene in the event Iraq is attacked by Iran.”38 The signing of the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation significantly impacted the policy debate in Washington about providing aid to the Kurds. First, it was clear that Moscow was making significant strides toward its historical goal of expanding toward the Indian Ocean. This was problematic, as the crux of America’s Cold War policy was containing the Soviet Union’s expansionist tendencies. Second, Iraq held some of the largest oil reserves in the world. Allowing the Soviet Union to consolidate its position in Iraq was simply anathema to American policy objectives. Meanwhile, the United States was bogged down and desperately trying to extricate itself from Vietnam, a nation of scarce resources and of insignificant strategic value to the United States. Which begs the question: why was the United States concentrating so much of its resources to “saving” a strategically insignificant nation, while letting the petroleum rich, strategically important nation of Iraq go by the wayside? It was around this exact time that President Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, began to ask the very same question. The seemingly inconclusive debate surrounding whether the United States should provide aid to the Kurds finally came to a conclusion at the end of May 1972. It was at this point, on May 30, that Nixon and Kissinger visited Tehran on their return trip from the Moscow Summit for discussions on regional issues with the Shah. The day after arriving in Tehran, the Shah discussed the problems facing Iran with Nixon and Kissinger, focusing on in particular the recent arms deal signed by Saddam Hussein and Kosygin. According to Kissinger, the Shah believed that the Iraqi-Soviet treaty would embolden Iraq to challenge Iranian efforts at establishing hegemony in the Persian Gulf after the completion of the British withdrawal from the region. Iraqi intransigence led to military skirmishes outside Basra in the spring of 1972. In response to the Shah’s concerns, Nixon “approved the sale of highperformance aircraft which had been ordered by the Shah but held up by bureaucratic disputes within the Pentagon over whether to deliver the Air Force F-15 or the Navy F-14.” With respect to the Kurds, the Shah pleaded with Nixon to reconsider the American position and informed him that he had “concluded that, without American support, the existing Kurdish

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uprising against the Baghdad government would collapse.” The objectives of such an operation, according to Kissinger, were an odd mixture of strategic morality: Our purpose was to raise the cost to the Iraqis of imposing their regime, to increase the Kurds’ bargaining power, and thereby to induce Baghdad to conduct a policy more respectful of the security concerns of Iraq’s neighbors and the autonomy of the Kurdish minority. American participation was believed to be the key: it would bring about coherence among the occasionally conflicting purposes of the other financial contributors, each of which attached great importance to its relations with the United States, and to inhibit them from abandoning the Kurds—a judgment which, as we shall see, proved too optimistic.39 After Nixon agreed to help the Kurds, he ordered the CIA to work with Savak to establish a conduit to provide Barzani with arms, which further emboldened Kurdish intransigence against Baghdad. The deteriorating relationship between the Kurds and the Ba’ath came to a head on March 11, 1974, when the government unilaterally announced the creation of an autonomous zone in northern Iraq, but it completely ignored the promises that it had agreed to implement as part of the March Manifesto. The objective of the Ba’athist move was to goad the Kurds into revolt, which was precisely what happened. Having built up its military forces with the help of the Soviet Union over the preceding three years since the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, including the withdrawal of 18,000 soldiers from the Jordanian front, the Iraqis unleashed the entire weight of its military against the Kurds at the beginning of April 1974. The ferocity of the Iraqi assault on the Kurds prompted Iran to intervene more overtly, which threatened to escalate an internal conflict into a far more dangerous regionalized war. While Iran was not prepared to force a full-scale war, Iraq also did not want a war with Iran as it “recognized that its military was no match for the Shah’s armed forces. Iran’s army was not only more than twice the size of Iraq’s military, it possessed the latest American weaponry.”40 But by the end of the year, the Kurds, with the notable help of Savak, Mossad (Israeli intelligence), and the CIA, fought the Iraqi army to a standstill.41 It was also becoming increasingly evident in Baghdad that the “fighting in the north was financially costly, sapped resources, occupied Iraq’s military forces, contributed to Iraq’s instability, and absorbed the attention of Iraq’s leaders.”42 The military situation was so tenuous, according to former Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, that Iraq was forced to capitulate and negotiate with Iran, because “it was either that or lose the north of the country.”43

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21

Iraq chose the latter option as Saddam Hussein felt that if he could “persuade the Iranians to disengage from the conflict he was confident that his forces would be able to suppress the Kurdish resistance.” But Iran, recognizing Iraq’s weak position, was determined to drive a hard bargain. It was at this point that the Iraqis quietly contacted King Hussein of Jordan and requested that he act as an intermediary to the Iranians. King Hussein agreed and wrote directly to the Shah to convey the Iraqi wish to settle the dispute with Iran over the Shatt al-Arab river in return for the Shah ending his support for the Iraqi Kurds.44 Although the Shah did not immediately agree to these terms, he informed the Americans on February 18, 1975, that he was considering negotiating with the Iraqis, to which Kissinger expressed his reservations.45 Two weeks later, at an Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) conference in Algiers, Algeria, Saddam Hussein met with the Shah of Iran and negotiated the Algiers Agreement. In the agreement, announced on March 6, both parties agreed to three articles: first, to “carry out a final delineation of their land boundaries in accordance with the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the Proceedings of the Border Delimitation Commission of 1914.” Second, to demarcate the Iran-Iraq border along the Shatt al-Arab waterway by the thalweg principle. Third, “the two parties shall restore security and mutual confidence along their joint borders. They shall also commit themselves to carry out a strict and effective observation of their joint borders so as to put an end to all infiltrations of a subversive nature wherever they may come from.” Essentially, the deal had been a quid pro quo: Iraq conceded to Iran partial control over the Shatt al-Arab, and in return, the Iranians agreed to withdraw their support from the Kurds.46 The impact of the Algiers Accord on the Kurds was immediate. According to David Korn, a senior diplomat in the State Department, on March 18 Barzani met with his senior military commanders and announced that he could not go on. “Iran, he pointed out, would be closing its border to the Kurds on April 30; Turkey had already closed its border; and the Iraqi army would seal off Kurdistan to the south and west. It was a hopeless situation.”47 Barzani would live the rest of his life in exile in either Iran or in the United States, where he received treatment for lung cancer, which he succumbed to in 1979. The collapse of the Kurdish revolt in March 1975 marked a new beginning for the Ba’athist regime. For the first time since coming to power, the Ba’ath could focus its efforts on rebuilding the Iraqi economy and implementing its socialist policies. The defeat of the Kurds was also a victory that could be claimed by Saddam Hussein alone. Indeed it was the final victory of the civilian wing of the Ba’ath Party over the military wing. From this point onward the concentration of power in Iraq quietly shifted from al-Bakr

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to Saddam Hussein. Although al-Bakr officially retained the title of president, according to Phebe Marr, he began “to gradually retire from an active political role,” as Hussein took over his duties and the power of the Iraqi state. “By 1977, the party bureaux, the intelligence mechanism, and even ministers who, according to the constitution, should have reported to al-Bakr, reported to Husayn.” As Saddam consolidated his power, he set his eyes on the presidency but privately feared that al-Bakr would select someone else as his successor. As a result, on July 16, 1979, Saddam forced al-Bakr from office.48 But Saddam Hussein’s ambitions did not end at becoming president of Iraq; he was equally interested in taking up the mantle of Arab nationalism left absent by the death of Nasser in September 1970. Undoubtedly, Saddam viewed the signing of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt as a great opportunity for him to achieve this goal. Once Egypt made peace with Israel, Saddam denounced the Egyptians as traitors and pushed for its ejection from the Arab League, which forfeited Egypt’s position of influence. Egypt’s fall from grace provided Saddam with an ideal opportunity to assume the leadership of the Arab nationalist cause. Indicative of his designs, Saddam unsuccessfully lobbied to move the Arab League’s headquarters to Baghdad, but his bid failed, and the headquarters was moved to Tunis, Tunisia. 49 Another good example was Saddam’s announcement of an Arab National Charter in February 1980, a document that committed Iraq “waging an all-out war against Israel and to call upon all other Arab States to join in that war.”50 Further evidence of Iraq’s nationalist ambitions, Saddam also desired to be the head the NAM. His interest in the movement dated back to 1979 when he had attended the quadrennial conference in Havana, Cuba. At Havana, Saddam arranged for the 1982 conference to be held in Baghdad in the hope that he would replace Fidel Castro as NAM head in 1982.51 But Saddam Hussein’s ambitious plan never materialized thanks to his decision to invade Iran in September 1980.

2

The War of Subversion

When Great Britain announced in January 1968 that it would unilaterally withdraw its military forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971, the United States was forced to reevaluate its strategy toward the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Although America and the Soviet Union had entered an era of de´tente, Washington believed that Moscow’s ultimate goal for the region was to acquire a warm water port in the Indian Ocean that it believed would shift the balance of power in its favor. In response, the United States set up a regional containment strategy designed to check Soviet power with its allies.Problematically, “The war [in Vietnam] prevented the Nixon administration from giving any serious consideration to the idea of replacing the British with U.S. forces.” 1 To counter this obstacle, the Nixon administration turned to the pro-Western Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, to fill the power vacuum. In May 1972 the Nixon administration agreed to massively increase its political, economic, and military relationship with the Shah’s regime (and to secretly work together on an operation designed to destabilize the increasingly pro-Soviet government of Iraq).2 By the time President Jimmy Carter came to office in January 1977, America’s Persian Gulf policy “was seen as resting on two secure pillars, Iran and Saudi Arabia.”3 Although Saudi Arabia was considered an integral part of the equation, particularly due to its vast wealth, Iran retained the “U.S. designation as the ‘strategic prize’ of the Near East.”4 Iran’s value centered on its size, population, and economic resources (oil and natural gas), but most importantly, its strategic location at the Strait of Hormuz that allowed it to dominate access to and from the Persian Gulf. In addition, Iran served as an important

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pro-Western buffer state, standing between the Soviet Union and the Indian Ocean. Thus, during the 1970s, America’s Persian Gulf strategy rested on the twin pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia, with Iran bearing the greater weight of the two and enjoying a close military alliance with the United States. But America’s policy toward the Gulf was near-sighted and failed to ask a fundamental question: what would happen if one of the twin pillars collapsed? Jimmy Carter’s election as president in 1976 marked an abrupt change in the conduct of American foreign policy. Part of Carter’s appeal during the election was his moral integrity and strong support for human rights. Consequently, Carter’s plans for the presidency did not bode well for the American relationship with Iran because the Shah possessed an abhorrent human rights record. Nevertheless, the American-Iranian strategic relationship took precedence over the misdeeds of the Savak, the Shah’s secret police. Certainly, American priorities were evident during Carter’s state visit to Tehran at the end of 1977 during which he declared, “Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas in the world.”5 Yet even as Carter spoke these fateful words, strong undercurrents of popular unrest opposed the Shah because his ambitious reform and modernization programs had profoundly alienated many segments of Iranian society who, thanks to political liberalization, could vocally express their discontent—but not always in safety. When faced with popular discontent, the Shah often resorted to torture and employing the military to disrupt political protests, which only further angered Iranians. No event since the detonation of a Soviet nuclear weapon in 1949 affected American strategic perceptions more than the Iranian Revolution in 1978– 1979. After all, prior to the revolution, Iran was a pro-Western, monarchical, secular government and was the most populous and powerful state in the Persian Gulf region, shared a long border with the Soviet Union, possessed the fourth largest oil and second largest natural gas reserves in the world, and had been a crucial American ally in the Cold War. The dramatic transformation of the regional security situation of the Persian Gulf in 1978 caught the Carter administration completely off guard. Consequently, it was unable to formulate an effective strategy to respond to the threat posed by Iran’s radical brand of Islamic fundamentalism and the subsequent war that ensued between Iran and Iraq. Because the Carter administration had not anticipated the Iranian Revolution, it was forced to completely reevaluate its entire geopolitical strategy for the region at a time when the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly aggressive. Prior to the Iranian Revolution, the most prominent opponent to the Shah’s regime was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who demanded the Shah’s

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ouster and the institution of a theocratic form of government based upon Islam. A theological scholar, Khomeini had been a long-time vocal critic of the regime, vehemently attacking “the Shah and his secular, dictatorial, pro-Western policies,” a position that led to his first arrest in June 1963.6 Undeterred by his brief incarceration, Khomeini maintained his ferocious verbal attacks against the Shah until he was expelled to Turkey in 1964.7 From there, Khomeini relocated to the holy city of Najaf, Iraq in October 1965. During his extended exile in Iraq, Khomeini organized political and military attacks against the Shah’s regime and cultivated widespread support for his actions within Iran. In 1975, after the signing of the Algiers Accord, approximately 130,000 Iranian pilgrims traveled to Iraq in order to visit Shia holy sites. The influx of Iranian pilgrims into Iraq made it easier for “Khomeini to maintain regular contact with acolytes, and guide them in their anti-Shah struggle through smuggled tape recordings.” In October 1978, the Shah, fed up with Khomeini’s subversive acts, requested that Iraq expel him under the pretext of the Algiers Agreement, an act the Ayatollah never forgave.8 The Iranian Revolution was initially greeted by Iraq in a positive way. After all, deposing the Shah took care of Saddam Hussein’s most fierce regional rival. Nevertheless, having undergone its own revolution in 1958, Iraq endorsed the revolution as a positive step toward the removal of foreign powers from the Persian Gulf. We are keen on cooperation with Iran in a way that will ensure the interests and security of the people in the area as well as preserve the historic ties of non-interference and respect for national sovereignty. . . . Any system which does not side with our enemy, respects our independence and whose oil policy is consistent with the interests of our two peoples will certainly command our respect and appreciation.9 Saddam Hussein’s February 1979 speech paid lip service to Khomeini in the hope that he would respect the terms of the 1975 agreement. Although Saddam viewed that pact as personally humiliating, he believed it was in Iraq’s best interests to court the revolutionaries in order to prevent radical fervor from spilling into Iraq and inflaming its large Shia population. Although the Iranian Revolution tipped the regional balance of power in Iraq’s favor, Iraqi authorities showed no indication that they truly comprehended the profound developments in Iranian politics. According to Sharam Chubin and Charles Tripp, as far as the Iraqis were concerned, the only difference in Iran was that an autocratic Ayatollah had replaced a dictatorial Shah; the basic rules of the game remained the same. As such, Iraq chose to treat Khomeini as a “turbaned Shah” rather than alter its tactics toward Iran. But

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Khomeini was by no means a “turbaned Shah”; he did not play by the same rules at all and was determined to destabilize the entire Persian Gulf region.10 Under the Shah, the military had been the source of state power and had been closely associated with “the Great Satan,” America. According to Gary Sick, upon assuming power, the new regime was determined to use a cycle of chaos to undermine “the structure and morale of its armed forces.”11 Capitalizing on pervasive fears of a military coup, between February and September 1979 the revolutionary regime executed “some 85 officers” and “hundreds more (including all major-generals and most brigadier-generals) were imprisoned or forced to retire. According to Efraim Karsh, by September 1980 some 12,000 officers had been purged.”12 Unsurprisingly, the expulsion or execution of such a vast number of officers considerably weakened Iran’s ability to defend itself. Two other factors led to the steady decline of both offensive and defensive military capabilities. In the revolution’s immediate aftermath, the United States, through General Robert E. Huyser, coordinated with Iran’s military to prevent “sensitive U.S. military equipment” from falling into revolutionary hands.13 As a result, advanced components from Phoenix missiles, computerized logistics systems, and key components of F-14 fighter jets “were disassembled and removed by American technicians before their departure from Iran.”14 Meanwhile, throughout the summer of 1979, “Iran proceeded to dismantle the armed forces bequeathed it by the Shah by canceling military orders, cutting the already reduced military budget by one third, halving conscription to one year and seeking to return to the United States the 80 F-14 aircraft together with their Phoenix missiles.”15 The loss of these mechanisms greatly diminished Iran’s ability to fight an air war. Credence was given to this analysis in March 1980 when Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, also the Commander-inChief, “asked a group of experts to prepare a report on the state of the armed forces, which proved to be alarming since the army had a combat capability of zero, the navy 10 percent, and the air force 20 percent.”16 Infighting between the various Iranian factions also weakened the military. The so-called moderate camp, led by Bani-Sadr, wanted a democratic system of governance. The objectives of the moderate camp, which were surprisingly consistent with American values, were summed up in the slogan “The people in the political arena: free, active, critical, involved, responsible.” In retrospect, Washington could have made a more active effort to appeal to this camp. Unfortunately, the second faction, consisting of the radical mullahs that wanted to impose a totalitarian theocracy upon Iran, possessed more power and quickly crushed their opponents. To achieve their objectives, the radicals utilized a fanatical private army, known as the Pasdaran (or Revolutionary Guards), to instigate conflict between the two groups—just as Hitler’s Sturmabteilung (SA)

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27

corps did in the early 1930s. The resulting chaos destabilized Iran’s political system, which, in turn, prevented the organization of adequate defenses, leaving Iran vulnerable to attack. Complimenting Iran’s demilitarization, many senior Iranian civilian and military officials were offered safe-haven by Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The most prominent were former Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar and General Ghoam Ali Oveissi,17 who had served as the martial-law administrator for Tehran under the Shah.18 Scholars agree that these Iranians manipulated Hussein into believing “the Iranian army would collapse in the face of a determined assault, that the revolutionary government in Tehran could not survive such a defeat, and that the population in Khuzestan would rise up in support of an Iraqi advance.”19 Even though Iraq did not immediately recognize that the balance of power had shifted in its favor, the change immediately caught the attention of the CIA. In May 1979, it drew up a National Intelligence Estimate entitled “Iraq’s Role in the Middle East.” This document clearly identified that “the collapse of the Iranian military establishment means that Iraq has a substantial advantage in the size and capability of the forces it could deploy against Iran.”20 As Iran’s military was in total disarray, “It will take time, measured in years, before the armed forces of the new Iranian regime will, realistically, be able to entertain the idea of large-scale combat with Iraqi forces.”21 Paradoxically, while Iran’s new regime was savagely purging its own armed forces, it was simultaneously determined to destabilize Iraq’s internal security. In the spring of 1979, tensions began building between Iran and Iraq and soon escalated beyond a simple “war of words.”22 In May 1979, military clashes broke out along the border.23 Then, in June 1979, antigovernment riots swept through the Shia-dominated southern Iraq in response to the arrest of a prominent Shi’ite cleric, Ayatollah Muhammad Bakir al-Sadr. A former colleague of Khomeini, al-Sadr led a delegation of Shi’ite dignitaries to congratulate Khomeini personally for the success of the Islamic revolution.24 Al-Sadr’s arrest was not unreasonable for he was an outspoken critic of the Iraqi regime and an active member of an Iranian-backed Shi’ite terrorist organization known as al-Da’wa (the Call). Throughout 1979, al-Da’wa killed “a score of government officials” in Iraq and had conducted numerous terrorist attacks against the Iraqi government.25 Although al-Sadr was subsequently released in response to the riots, the confrontation convinced Iraq’s Sunni-dominated government that it could not trust its Shia population.26 By the start of 1980 it was evident that the Iranian regime had embraced a new policy of subversion, aimed primarily at Iraq and the Gulf States (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). Indicative

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of this was the widespread rioting in November 1979 and then February 1980 “in the Shi’ite towns of the oil-rich Saudi province of Hasa, exacting dozens of casualties.” Similar events occurred in Bahrain and Kuwait as the latter nation “became the target of a sustained terrorist and subversive campaign” aimed at overthrowing Kuwait’s monarchy. In all cases, Shia were identified as the source of the disturbances. This caused a great disturbance among the Gulf States, and they became increasingly convinced that Iran was unwilling to act responsibly.27 Beyond Iran’s efforts to export its revolution to Iraq and the Gulf States, the radical regime in Tehran was also making enemies throughout the Western world, particularly the United States. Relations with the United States had been shaky since the start of the revolution, but they deteriorated rapidly after a group of students stormed the American embassy in downtown Tehran and took 52 Americans hostage on November 4, 1979. The so-called hostage crisis would last for 444 days.28 At face value, the hostage crisis appeared to benefit Iran’s revolutionary regime. It undermined international confidence in the United States, prevented American military action against Iran, and stifled any plans for a CIA coup akin to that of 1953. But the subsequent American diplomatic backlash isolated Iran from the international community. This would prove to be problematic for the new regime, as the United States was its primary source of military hardware, further contributing to Iran’s military decay. Iran’s increasing political and economic isolation gave the impression that Iran was increasingly “incapable of defending its interests and was isolated diplomatically, particularly in the Gulf region” and in the West.29 The emasculating effect of the Iranian Revolution on the United States became evident when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 25, 1979. The Soviet invasion effectively eliminated a neutral buffer state between American interests (Pakistan and Iran) and the Soviet Union. The Carter administration believed that a major motivation behind the Soviet action was an historical Russian desire for a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean; thus, invading Afghanistan was a step closer to this goal. Although Afghanistan was a landlocked nation, the strategic Pakistani region of Baluchistan was situated to its immediate south. Importantly, as Baluchistan shared half the Afghan border and over half of the Pakistani shoreline, Brzezinski believed the Soviets intended to encourage Baluchistan to separate from Pakistan, allowing Soviet forces to surge to the Indian Ocean.30 This fear prompted a thorough review of American policy for the region: Steps were initiated to open a new dialogue with Pakistan, India, Iraq and other nations whose relations with the United States were seriously

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29

strained but who were now confronted with the new reality of a potentially expansive and militant Soviet presence on, or much closer to, their own borders. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan altered the tactical framework in which the Carter administration had to operate. Ominously, the “Soviet intervention was the first Soviet use of its own military forces outside its own satellite empire since World War II.”31 The invasion had removed Afghanistan from its historical position as a neutral buffer state between the Soviet Union and Pakistan, which was aligned with the United States under the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). By occupying Afghanistan, the Soviets were in an ideal position to exploit the instability of Iran for: A successful take-over in Afghanistan would give the Soviets a deep penetration between Iran and Pakistan, and pose a threat to the rich oil fields of the Persian Gulf area and to the crucial waterways through which so much of the world’s energy supplies had to pass [the Strait of Hormuz].32 Given the Strait’s recognition as the “jugular vein of the West,”33 American national security demanded that the Strait had to remain beyond the Soviet Union’s reach. But the invasion had placed powerful Soviet forces within striking distance of this important waterway, thus altering the regional balance of power again. Meanwhile, according to Gary Sick, a senior advisor to the National Security Advisor on Iranian affairs, just as analysts were concentrating on the Soviet buildup near Afghanistan: . . . in early December [1979], there were reports from Western observers in Iraq that the Iraqis were planning an invasion of Iran’s oil fields, and the reports were given credence by increasingly frequent guerrilla attacks on oil installations and by the accelerated tempo of military clashes between Iraqi and Iranian forces along their common frontier.34 On January 9, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Stansfield Turner, posited three potential ways to positively affect the outcome of the crisis. First, he noted the possibility that “the United States might invade Iran” given the significant pressure from American hardliners upon President Carter to act more forcefully against Iran. Second, the DCI wrote, “ethnic dissidence had risen to the point that solving that issue [the dissidents] was so important as to make it desirable to dispense with the hostage problem.” Lastly but importantly, as “Iraq was likely to invade Khuzestan to take

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advantage of the internal chaos in Iran,” only the timing seemed in doubt. “The perception of all of these possibilities,” Turner pointed out, “could be encouraged by U.S. actions and propaganda.”35 By January 1980, with the collapse of the American two-pillar policy complete, President Carter addressed the shift in the regional balance of power, declaring: Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.36 This so-called “Carter Doctrine” was designed to tackle all of the security issues that had developed in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although Carter did not specifically publicly aim the doctrine at the Soviet Union, his language left little room for ambiguity. Further, the doctrine was a fundamental shift in American global policy for: The President’s words represented a formal recognition of a centrally important reality: that America’s security had become interdependent with the security of three central and inter-related strategic zones consisting of Western Europe, the Far East, and the Middle-East-Persian Gulf area.37 An important consideration behind the Carter Doctrine was the creation of the Rapid Deployment Task Force (RDTF or RDF), publicly announced on March 1. Based at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, the RDTF was designed to increase American capacity to respond to the events unfolding in Afghanistan and Iran. The administration also expanded efforts “to obtain bases in the area and expand U.S. lift capabilities.”38 Consequently, the RDTF “became the operational catalyst for facilitating substantially increased U.S. military presence in the Gulf during the height of the Iran-Iraq conflict.”39 In March 1980, not long after Khomeini’s expansionist declaration, Iraq responded swiftly and brutally to the accumulating acts of internal subversion. Saddam Hussein ordered the execution of 97 civilian and military men, half of them members of al-Da’wa, and declared that membership in al-Da’wa was punishable by death.40 However, these repressive actions only further provoked both the Shi’ite dissidents and Iran. To underscore the level of hostilities, on March 8 “Iran announced that it was withdrawing its ambassador from Iraq, and by April 7 its remaining diplomatic staff had been ordered home.”41 The escalating hostility between Iran and Iraq culminated with a brazen assassination attempt by al-Da’wa on Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s deputy prime minister,

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on April 1. The attack lightly wounded Aziz, but killed and wounded many others. Not to outdo themselves, al-Da’wa terrorists then assaulted the funeral procession of those killed in the Aziz attack, causing more deaths. Absolutely infuriated by these actions, Hussein vowed that these acts would not go unpunished.42 He declared that membership in al-Da’wa “was made retroactively punishable by death,” 43 resulting in the arrests of between 35,000 and 100,000 Iraqi Shia.44 Iraq also began providing support for “separatist Kurdish and Arab elements within Iran. These countermeasures, however, failed to impress the ayatollahs.”45 But that was not enough for Saddam Hussein, who wanted to satisfy his vengeance for the attack on Aziz. He dispatched his special forces to Najaf, where they arrested [Ayatollah Muhammad al-Sadr] and his sister. Obeying their orders to shoot to kill, they overwhelmed Sadr’s guards and brought the prisoners back to Baghdad. There is little doubt that the cleric and his sister were tortured by Saddam’s half brother, Barzan al-Tikriti, the head of General Intelligence, before being hanged in secret after a summary trial. When word of al-Sadr’s execution reached Khomeini, he furiously declared, “The war that the Iraqi Baath wants to ignite is a war against Islam. . . . The people and army of Iraq must turn their backs on the Baath regime and overthrow it . . . because the regime is attacking Iran, attacking Islam and the Koran.”46 By calling upon Iraqis to revolt against their government, Khomeini effectively had declared a full-scale war of subversion against Iraq.47 Throughout the spring of 1980, the American Persian Gulf policy focused on the hostage crisis and preparation for a rescue attempt. During the intensive planning period following Carter’s formal approval for the doomed rescue mission, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) source reported on April 9 “that there is a fifty percent chance that [Iraq] will attack [Iran].” The source averred that Iraq had “moved large numbers of military personnel and equipment to the [Iraq-Iran] border in anticipation of such an invasion and is using the dispute over the Shatt and Little Tomb and Abu Massa Islands as an excuse to provoke Iran.” 48 Although the document noted that the sub-source of this intelligence was unknown to the DIA, if one takes into consideration the chaotic events of the previous week, notably the attempt on Aziz’s life and al-Sadr’s subsequent execution, the report appears accurate. Carter provided further credibility to the claim when he stated that around April 10 he had learned that “Iraq was [again] threatening to invade Iran.”49 In the aftermath of the failed rescue attempt on the night of April 24–25, 1980, Iran heightened its war of subversion against Iraq. On May 4, Richard

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Cottam met with Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh to discuss the hostage crisis and the rescue attempt. A memorandum of the conversation, prepared by the head of the Iranian Desk, Henry Precht, reported, “Ghotbzadeh implied he had been building support for Iran against Iraq. He told Cottam that Saddam Hussein would be overthrown quite soon.” Most interestingly, Cottam noted, “that Ghotbzadeh did not introduce any conspiracy theory suggesting that the U.S. was manipulating Iraq.”50 In the summer of 1980, Iran began building up what was left of its army along the border with Iraq and, on several occasions, fired upon Iraqi oil installations.51 During this time, the Iranians began to sense that Iraq and the United States had begun colluding to destroy Khomeini’s regime. The collusion-theory first became public in 1991 when Abolhassan Bani-Sadr published his memoir, My Turn to Speak. He argued that Ghotzbadeh purchased incriminating documents from a South American intelligence agent in 1980 “that described a royalist plan to regain power with Iraq’s help.” Bani-Sadr explained that: It was later confirmed that this plan . . . had been formulated in a hotel on the Boulevard Raspail by a group of Israeli generals, Americans, and exiled Iranians. It called for destroying the regime by means of an external war. To get to the bottom of this, I asked our air force to see if there were any troop concentrations in the areas mentioned in the plan. As it turned out, there were—but they were not royalist, they were Iraqis. This confirmed the information obtained by the intelligence section of the Iranian Army that the Iraqis, with U.S. approval, were planning to attack.52 According to Bani-Sadr, after the revolution a document created by the second bureau of the Shah’s army, which was run by the Americans, was brought to Bani-Sadr’s attention. Apparently, the plan . . . called for preserving the existing structures—especially the administrative, banking, and budgetary structures—and maintaining oil sales at a level of six million barrels a day, the purpose being not only to sustain the national economy but also to keep Iran dependant on foreign powers until the revolutionary fervor subsided. Much of the plan concerned the army, which was to be preserved through the creation of internal and external threats. The internal threat—civil disturbances in the provinces—was clearly identified. The external threat was not specified, but the only logical choice was a hostile neighbor. We had only one.53 The plan’s logic was apparent. So long as Iran kept a high level of oil production, its economy would be dependent on foreign sales. This explains why in

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October 1978 Brzezinski had pushed the Shah to implement the “iron fist” policy when Iran was experiencing oil strikes.54 More importantly, the plan called for the maintenance of the army by combating a series of internal and external threats. As Bani-Sadr indicated, the internal disturbances were prevalent in Iran throughout 1979 and 1980. For instance, the Kurds and Azerbaijanis had revolted in northwest Iran, while the minority Arabs in Khuzestan and the Baluchs in the south had rebelled too.55 A third component of Bani-Sadr’s theory centered on an alleged meeting that took place between Brzezinski and Saddam Hussein in Jordan in July 1980. Although no evidence exists to verify whether this meeting actually took place, Bani-Sadr pointed out that “Brzezinski never denied this trip to Amman.”56 However, just because Brzezinski made a trip to Amman does not necessarily mean that he met with Saddam Hussein. According to Gary Sick, who accompanied Brzezinski on this trip: I was with him at least 14 hours a day, including a brief visit to Jordan, and I can attest absolutely that (1) Iraq was not on the agenda, and (2) he could not physically have made such a visit—even if he stayed up all night and got a secret flight to Baghdad. . . . If he had wanted to deliver a secret message to Iraq at any point, he would probably have asked me to arrange it (that was my job) or at the very least I would have learned about it. However, details of Brzezinski’s trip to Amman remain classified.57 Nevertheless, it was unlikely that a strong-willed dictator like Saddam Hussein would ever surrender his own decision-making to meet the approval of the United States. Why would he even bother asking the United States for permission? What did he care of American interests? After all, it had been exposed in 1976 that the CIA had actively colluded with the Kurds to bring about the Ba’ath regime’s downfall. Bani-Sadr’s plan was entirely possible. Theoretically, Iraq could have invaded, toppled the regime, freed the American hostages and the indentured Iranian Arabs (to great fanfare), and gained a large portion of Iran’s oil reserves. But realistically, the plan was far too idealistic to be true. In spite of the unlikelihood of Saddam Hussein looking to the United States for a “green light” to attack Iran, it is, however, likely that he consulted the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia. Saddam did so in August 1980, when he traveled to Saudi Arabia to consult with King Khalid about his invasion plans. According to Nita M. Renfrew, King Khalid “reportedly gave his personal blessing to the invasion and promised Saudi backing.”58 This was a very significant gesture, especially in light of the closeness of American-Saudi relations, but the theocratic nature of the Iranian regime openly threatened

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the stability of Saudi Arabia, which would override any consideration to American interests. Although Saddam did not immediately act upon the Saudi gesture, it began to implement preparations for war. Hussein needed a casus belli. In late August, Iraq began to shell Iranian forces stationed along the southern border, near the port of Khorammshahr. According to the Washington Post, Iranian troops used ground-to-ground missiles for the first time in a clash with Iraqi forces on the western border. The commander of the Kermanshah garrison said the missiles were fired after the Iraqis began a heavy artillery barrage across the border, killing two Iranian soldiers.59 In response to Iran’s provocative assault, the Iraqi regime launched a limited military campaign to take the territory promised to it by Iran in the Algiers Agreement, starting in the north and working its way south. Iran responded to Iraq’s probes by shelling, on September 4, the Iraqi towns of Khanaquin, Mandali, Naft Khaneh, and Zarbatiya. By September 16, Iraq had recaptured all of its legitimate territorial claims and was eying the Shatt al-Arab. There was no particular concern in Washington about Iraq capturing territory that was promised to it by the Algiers Accord. Supporting this view, analysts from the White House Situation Room reported to Brzezinski that for “the past two days” fighting along the border was “at a routine level.” But when the Iraqis ran out of territory to take, the only option left was to reclaim the entirety of the Shatt al-Arab waterway.60 Later that day, Iraq petitioned Iran to “review the terms of the Algiers accord” and gave it “a last chance to avoid war and still save face.” Iran responded by firing on Iraqi ships in the Shatt al-Arab, destroying oil installations, launching air strikes against Mandali, and shelling Basra.61 In response to these provocative actions, Saddam Hussein publicly tore apart the Algiers Agreement, which he regarded as a personal humiliation. Months earlier Saddam lamented that the Algiers Accord was his greatest personal failure. . . . the signing of the 1975 accord is the only step I have ever regretted in all my political life. . . . This accord was forced upon me . . . but I had no other choice. . . . Due to the battle at the northern front our army was in disarray . . . I had to sign it. But at the very moment I was signing it, I was thinking of a day when I could tear it to pieces and retrieve Arab rights from the marauding Iranians.62 By unilaterally abrogating the Algiers Accord, the Iraqis officially renewed its claim to the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Unfortunately, the only way for Iraq to

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enforce that claim was to invade Iran. At this point, war appeared all but inevitable. Six days later, Iraqi forces crossed into Iran to enforce its claim to the Shatt al-Arab, and so began the Iran-Iraq War. Following the Iranian Revolution, it was all but inevitable that a war would break out with Iraq. By 1980, these two nations fundamentally clashed on so many different levels: culturally, Iraqis are predominantly Arab and Iranians are Persian; religiously, Iraq is ruled by Sunnis and Iran by Shi’ites; ideologically, Iraq is secular; Iran is a theocracy; geopolitically, Iraq has been the victim at the expense of Iran; and on a personal level Khomeini and Saddam Hussein absolutely loathed each other. These underpinning differences have led to centuries of conflict between the two nations. When Iran began its war of subversion against Iraq, it ran up against a very determined and utterly ruthless leader who would do anything to maintain his grip on power. Saddam Hussein’s response to the Iranian provocations was remarkably measured. But who was at fault for starting the Iran-Iraq war? In December 1991, Secretary-General Javier Pe´rez de Cue´llar officially blamed Iraq for starting the war,63 but the circumstances behind the outbreak of war were far more complex. Certainly Iraq was the first to cross the border, but Iran did everything it possibly could to provoke the Iraqi assault. From assassinations and terrorism to inciting riots to shelling Iraqi villages, there was no moral low to which the Iranians did not go. Even over the issue of the sovereignty of the Shatt al-Arab, the Iranians “acknowledged that Iran had not completely fulfilled the terms of the Algiers agreement and blamed it on the shah.” According to Bani-Sadr, “Who signed that agreement? Even the Shah’s regime did not apply it, and furthermore, from the start Iraq has adopted a hostile attitude toward the Islamic revolution.”64 But just because the Shah did not abide by the agreement did not mean that it was not binding. Bani-Sadr’s statement clearly indicated that Iraq had legitimate territorial grievances with Iran that were systematically being ignored. In light of this, and Iran’s war of subversion, what were the Iraqis to do? The evidence supporting whether the United States gave the Iraqis a so-called “green light” for invading Iran is purely circumstantial. At this point, no irrefutable evidence is available to suggest that Brzezinski gave his approval for Iraq to invade Iran or that Carter had ordered him to do so. The evidence offered by Bani-Sadr just does not hold ground: Where did this so-called “South American Intelligence Agent” obtain this document? How is this document bona fide? But most important, why would Saddam Hussein ever have felt the need to get American approval to invade Iran? Particularly when Iraq made this decision without bothering to consult its Soviet allies, which it was

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required to do under the 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Furthermore, as a staunch Arab nationalist, Saddam’s desire to lead the Non-Aligned Movement flies in the face of him needing—let alone wanting—American approval. Certainly, Iraq’s invasion benefited the interests of the United States. After all, Iraq was considered a secular bulwark against the spread of radical Islam to the rest of the Middle East, and the war increased pressure upon Iran to resolve the seemingly endless hostage crisis. But this did not mean that the Carter administration actively encouraged Iraq to invade Iran. Consider the following: by 1980, the United States did not have a diplomatic relationship with Iraq, beyond a small Interests Section (non-official embassy) in each other’s capitals. Four years earlier, it was exposed that the CIA was working with the Kurds in the early 1970s to overthrow the Ba’athist regime. Beyond all of that, Iraq was considered staunchly pro-Soviet. In light of this, it certainly would have been an impressive feat for the Carter administration to successfully convince a Soviet ally to do its bidding, but this simply was not the case. Furthermore, the timing of Iraq’s invasion also suggests no American role. For instance, in early September, a major breakthrough in the hostage negotiations occurred in West Germany,65 but because Iraq’s air force attacked Tehran airport on September 22, Iran’s negotiator, Mohammad Sadeq Tabatabai, could not return to Tehran with the American proposal, thus further delaying the release of the hostages.66 In light of this development, why would the United States approve of Iraq’s invasion at a time when it was about to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough in the hostage crisis? If Washington had any foreknowledge of the invasion, logic would suggest that the timing would be postponed until after the hostages were successfully released. Besides, why did National Security Council (NSC) staff members express uncertainty on September 22 about whether Iraq formally declared war against Iran?67 Thus, in light of all of these factors, it was highly doubtful that the Carter administration helped instigate the war.

Part II

Strict Neutrality

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3

Setting the Stage

It would be difficult to fault the Carter administration for not anticipating the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq. Since the signing of the Algiers Accord, periodic skirmishes occurred along the border, whether under the Shah or Khomeini. Certainly evidence suggests that the United States was aware of Iraq’s plans to attack Iran, because in mid-October 1979, the Department of State “sent a CIA operative to Tehran to warn the provisional government” of the impending invasion, “but the Iranian government took no action.”1 After Iranians stormed the American embassy and initiated the hostage crisis, there was no love in Washington for the radical mullah’s in Tehran. Iraq’s invasion of Iran was out of its own volition. Iraq was trying to enforce its claim to the Shatt al-Arab waterway at a time when it believed Iran was weak. There was not, however, any credible evidence that suggests that the Carter administration gave Iraq a so-called “green light” to invade Iran. At the time, the focus of the American government was split between the protracted hostage crisis, the Soviet war in Afghanistan, an economic crisis at home, all while Carter was running for reelection against a formidable candidate, Ronald Reagan. It was not until Iraq unilaterally abrogated the 1975 Algiers Agreement that real concern about the escalating border conflict emerged in Washington. But by that time, the administration was hoping its negotiations in West Germany would attain the release of the hostages. Unfortunately, as Iran’s chief negotiator was returning to Tehran, Iraq launched a massive air assault against Iran, and its army surged across its southern border, starting what would end up being the longest conventional war in the twentieth century.

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In the early morning hours of September 22, 1980, the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) launched a massive preemptive strike against key military targets throughout Iran. According to a variety of sources, Iraq’s tactics were modeled on the Israeli preemptive strike in the 1967 war, which had deeply impressed Saddam Hussein.2 According to Kenneth M. Pollack, the first wave of attacks struck “every major airbase in western Iran, including Mehrabad Air Force Base outside Tehran,” followed by a second wave that “struck the five airfields in and around Khuzestan and several key Iranian radars.”3 In total, the Iraqis hit 10 airfields in order to destroy the key runways; the intention, of course, was to inhibit the retaliatory capacity of the Iranian air force. But the objective was not achieved.4 “The airstrikes on 22 September were pitiful” because, as Pollack points out: The Iraqis had neglected to study Iranian air force doctrine altogether and simply assumed it was similar to their own, despite the fact that the Shah’s air force had been trained by the United States, whereas the Iraqis had an awkward me´lange of British and Russian, and even some French doctrine. The Iraqis also were unaware that Iran had built hardened aircraft bunkers (HABS) to protect their combat aircraft from enemy air attack.5 This oversight by the Iraqi military worked against its favor as the Iranian air force, largely intact, retained the ability to counterattack. The first attacks of the Iran-Iraq War did not go as well as the Iraqis had expected, which would be a common theme throughout the course of the eight-year war. The morning after Iraq’s air strikes, between six and nine Iraqi divisions surged across the border into Iran in four places.6 The bulk of Iraq’s initial thrust consisted of four divisions that struck the strategic Khuzestan province in southwestern Iran. Two divisions laid siege to the cities of Khorramshahr and Abadan, while the remaining two divisions made an enveloping movement intended to secure the Khorramshahr-Ahvaz-Susangerd-Musian line, effectively cutting Iran off from the Shatt al-Arab river. According to Efraim Karsh’s detailed analysis of the war, two additional divisions invaded Iran, one from the north near Qasr-e Shirin, just south of the Kurdish city of Sulaimaniya, and a second toward Mehran, in order to block the northern invasion routes toward Baghdad.7 At dawn on September 23, the largely intact Iranian air force struck an Iraqi petrochemical installation at Basra, destroying fuel storage tanks and residential housing, killing five people, two of which were British nationals, as well as civilian targets in Baghdad, Mosul, Al Tagaddum, and Nasiriya. As Iran launched these attacks, Iraqi aircraft bombed “Shahroki, Ahvaz, Dezful, Bushehr, Tabriz, and Hamadan

Iraq’s invasion of Iran, September–December 1980. (Adapted from United Nations High Commission for Refugees: Iraq. http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/ english/htmain.htm.)

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areas, as well as the Vahdati airfield.”8 The following day, the Iranian Navy attacked Basra and, according to Karsh, attacked “two oil terminals near the port of Faw, thereby severely reducing Iraq’s oil-exporting capacity.”9 It was immediately clear that fighting along the Iran-Iraq border was no longer “at a routine level” but had escalated into a full-scale war. By September 23, it was evident that war had broken out between Iran and Iraq. Amid the backdrop of the fighting, from September 23 to 29, the Carter administration held a series of Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) and mini-SCC meetings to formulate its policy toward the new conflict in the Persian Gulf.10 Although the intimate details of these meetings remain secret, declassified documents provide valuable insight into the formulation of American policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. On the morning of September 23, after the intelligence community confirmed that Iraq had indeed invaded Iran, an emergency SCC meeting was called even though President Carter was away on an election-campaign stop in Los Angeles. The participants agreed that the best course of action was to declare a policy of strict neutrality,11 which President Carter formally declared later that day at a meeting with reporters in Los Angeles.12 The decision to adopt a policy of strict neutrality allowed the United States the most room to maneuver. The preceding year had been a very difficult one for the Carter administration: Iran had abducted its citizens; the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan; the attempt to rescue the hostages had failed miserably; and now Iran and Iraq were at war. Taking sides in the conflict was unavailable as an option. Moreover, even if the United States had wanted to take sides, neither belligerent seemed interested in such support. After all, Iran was still holding 52 American hostages. At the same time, American relations with Iraq were tenuous at best considering diplomatic ties were severed in 1967 and because the Pike Committee had exposed the CIA role in supporting the Kurds against Baghdad four years earlier.13 Importantly, Iraq was closely aligned with the Soviet Union. Despite the pervasive desire among American officials to hurt Iran, there was little the Carter administration could do beyond pursuing a policy of strict neutrality. Over the course of its deliberations, the SCC identified four major policy considerations: obtaining the release of the hostages; preventing the exploitation of the war by the Soviet Union; protecting the Gulf States; and maintaining free navigation of the strategic Strait of Hormuz to ensure access to Persian Gulf oil.14 Certainly, the war placed tremendous risk to the hostages still held in Iran, which meant that Washington needed to demonstrate to Iran that it was genuinely neutral in the conflict. This would prove difficult considering the state of American-Iranian relations. However, the war

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changed Tehran’s political priorities. Although negotiating the release of the hostages became less urgent, America’s former military-supply relationship with Iran suddenly provided it with considerable leverage as Iran’s leaders became “increasingly concerned about the war with Iraq and the lack of military resupply or availability of parts.” Iran’s need for spare parts provided the United States with a unique opportunity to manipulate its military-supply relationship with Iran to attain the release of the hostages.15 The Carter administration was also very concerned about the Soviet Union taking advantage of the conflict to pursue its expansionist policies in the region. Throughout 1980, animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union increased considerably in light of the Afghanistan invasion. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the Soviets accused the United States of instigating the conflict, mainly because Iraq failed to consult with the Soviets as agreed to in the 1972 Treaty of Friendship prior to the invasion of Iran. Moscow alleged that the United States urged Iraq to invade “in order to increase tension in the [region] and as a prelude to a possible seizure of the oil resources,” arguing that Carter was “using the Iran/Iraq war to divert attention from the discredited Camp David Peace Process and the general U.S. military buildup in the Middle Eastern/Persian Gulf area.”16 The Soviet allegations were quite revealing of its limited ability to influence its primary regional ally. Realistically, the Soviets were as unhappy about the war’s outbreak as the United States. On September 22, immediately after the conflict commenced, the CIA’s National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) produced its initial assessment of the Soviet reactions to the hostilities. The NFAC thought it unlikely that the Soviets had actively encouraged the conflict, pointing out that Moscow had “long been concerned that a military clash between Iran and Iraq would damage their relations with both countries” and worrying “that such a clash might lead Tehran to reduce its hostility to the U.S.”17 Indeed, a State Department analysis drew similar conclusions, pointing out that Iraq’s invasion came “at a particularly inopportune time for Moscow, because the USSR has been trying to improve its relationship with both countries.” As such, there was little doubt that Moscow was unhappy that Iraq instigated hostilities with Iran. Indicative of its attitude was the “very chilly Soviet reception” of an Iraqi delegation dispatched to Moscow on September 22 and 23 for belated consultations under the 1972 Friendship Treaty.18 According to the CIA, throughout 1979 and 1980 the Soviets repeatedly warned the Iraqis “against abrogation of the 1975 Iraq-Iran accord and against a military confrontation with Iran.” Therefore, the Soviets were justifiably angry when Iraq failed to consult them beforehand. After all, since the collapse of the Shah’s pro-Western regime, the Soviets were actively trying to cultivate a relationship

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with Iran, which they viewed “as a greater geopolitical prize than Iraq,” an ideal “candidate for eventual pro-Soviet transformation.” The [Soviet] opportunities for further strategic gain [in Iran] would be broad: a potential base for exerting pressure on Pakistan and Turkey as well as Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf oil-producing states; possible oil acquisition at bargain prices; and naval and air facilities that would enhance the Soviets’ capability to threaten an oil cutoff from the Gulf, and lend credibility to the USSR’s demands to participate as a guarantor of security of access to Gulf oil. But Iraq’s war posed significant challenges to the advancement of these interests. After all, the war only improved the possibility of an American-Iranian rapprochement due to Iran’s need for American arms. At the same time, the war undermined Soviet efforts to build influence in Tehran because of its own military-supply relationship with Iraq. This factor alone significantly undermined Soviet efforts to build influence among Tehran’s theocratic elite.19 Unique to the Cold War, Moscow’s policy objectives were almost identical to Washington’s. For instance, neither was interested in seeing Iraq emerge as the dominant regional power, especially if the Iraqis seized and held Iran’s oilproducing regions, nor did they want the other superpower to resume good relations with Iran. Thus, the most ideal outcome for both superpowers was for the region to return to the status quo ante, while avoiding any actions that could escalate the conflict into a wider regional war. Indeed, a fundamental aspect of Carter’s policy was to “not act in a manner that might be seen as provocative to either the Soviets or the Iranians.”20 American analysts also concluded that the war threatened to disrupt the stability of the conservative monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The primary concern of the Gulf States was that the conflict would spill over into the gulf, threaten the flow of oil, and potentially lead to great power intervention and confrontation. While this concern was valid, there was no immediate threat to the flow of oil from the region, as both belligerents were also required to export oil in order to finance the war. Due to Iran’s continued subversion of the Gulf States, there was considerable support for the Iraqi invasion. But while the Saudis agreed to help finance the war, they privately feared that an Iraqi victory could enhance Iraq’s regional ambitions, which in all likelihood would bring it into conflict with Saudi Arabia—as it did in 1990. Thus, the Gulf States preferred to see “a military stalemate that preserves the present precarious balance of power in the Gulf.”21 Perhaps the Carter administration’s greatest fear pertained to safe navigation of the Strait of Hormuz, the so-called “jugular vein of the West.”22 With Iraq

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45

invading its territory, the easiest Iranian tactic to counter the attack was to close the Strait as a means of economically starving Iraq and its supporters in the Gulf. Without the means to finance its war, Baghdad would be forced to either adapt or fall back. American fears were given credence on the first day of the conflict when three Iranian frigates challenged ships passing through the Strait. Because of the potentially catastrophic consequences of such a closure, the United States made it explicitly clear to both Iran and Iraq that it would not tolerate any impediment to traffic through the Strait because not only would the closing of the Strait of Hormuz directly violate international law, it also threatened the national security interests of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia.23 In the event that access through the Strait was blocked, the consequences would be catastrophic globally as this strategic waterway serves as the sole entrance to the Persian Gulf through which the majority of the region’s oil transits. Considering that the revenue generated by the oil that passes through the Strait serves as the primary source of gross domestic product (GDP) for the region, it was vital to the economies of the Gulf States and Iran that unfettered navigation of the Strait of Hormuz was ensured. On an international level, access to the Strait was extremely important to the French and Japanese economies. For instance, at the start of the war, 21 percent of France’s oil imports came from Iraq (an additional 3% came from Iran). Twenty percent of Japan’s imported oil also passed through the Strait of Hormuz, 7 percent from Iraq and 13 percent from Iran. 24 Simply put, because of the economic linkage between the Persian Gulf and America’s allies—not to mention the threat posed to the profits of American oil companies—it was not in the interest of the United States to allow the Strait of Hormuz to be closed. On September 24, a second SCC meeting aimed at formalizing the decisions taken the previous day was held in the Situation Room. Although the president remained absent, the vice president, the secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, as well as the director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were present. After a short briefing by Director Stansfield Turner on the current situation, discussion shifted to the efforts being made by Secretary of State Edmund Muskie at the United Nations. After the outbreak of hostilities, Muskie went to the UN and engaged in a dialogue with European allies in order to obtain a ceasefire resolution. Unfortunately, these efforts quickly stalled. A secondary objective of his mission was to coordinate an effective multilateral strategy to resolve the conflict. Along this avenue the SCC recommended that the United States undertake “specific contingency planning” with the British,

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French, and Italians in the event of “possible interference with normal traffic through the Strait.”25 After the meeting wrapped up, the principals met with President Carter to brief him on the situation. Secretary Muskie, Under-Secretary Warren Christopher, and Jody Powell were present for the first half of the meeting and departed just after noon, leaving behind Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director Turner, and White House Chief of Staff Jack Watson. After assessing the situation, Carter retired to the second floor of the White House to recuperate from his campaign stop in Los Angeles. Shortly thereafter, he had a quick meeting with Brzezinski, made his way to the press briefing room, and publicly declared American policy toward the war.26 Carter opened his statement by boldly declaring that “the United States is in no way involved in this dispute—and charges to the contrary are obviously and patently false.” He went on to recognize that the war represented an inherent “danger to the peace and stability of the region” and that the “fighting should be promptly terminated.” Addressing concerns about access to oil, Carter pointed out that as the current oil supplies were plentiful the war would not cause a major disruption to the global economy. However, he did point out that “a total suspension of oil exports from the other nations who ship through [the Strait of Hormuz] would create a serious threat to the world’s oil supplies and consequently a threat to the economic health of all nations.” In light of the tough economic times facing the United States, this was a significant warning to Iran and Iraq to maintain unfettered shipping through the Strait. After warning Iran to ensure the safety and well-being of the hostages, Carter concluded with a firm commitment to the policy of strict neutrality: “Let me repeat that we have not been and we will not become involved in the conflict between Iran and Iraq.”27 The next day, as proof of the American commitment to neutrality, the administration announced that it “was holding up the planned shipment of several [General Electric manufactured] turbine engines that were to be used in Iraqi frigates being built [sic] by Italy.”28 Originally approved by the Commerce Department in January 1980, the controversial deal received a negative response from Congress. Opponents of the deal questioned why the administration would “participate in strengthening Iraq’s navy,” particularly in light of the fact that Iraq was “labeled a supporter of international terrorism” and had a history of hostility toward American interests in the region.29 It certainly was in the best interests of the administration to delay the deal, but at a cost: on the one hand, the decision resolved the domestic political tensions over the sale; on the other, it had a disruptive effect on American-Italian relations.

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While the conflict continued to rage in the Persian Gulf, Secretary Muskie was fully engaged in a diplomatic offensive at the United Nations. On September 23, the Security Council issued a statement calling on both sides to cease hostilities and settle their dispute peacefully, though neither side heeded its call.30 A few days later, on September 26, “an extraordinary session” of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in New York to find a way to mediate between the two warring nations. Although the initiative was taken outside UN auspices, the president of the Security Council, Tunisia’s Taieb Slim, openly welcomed the goodwill mission. Meanwhile, Mexico and Norway requested a formal Security Council meeting in order to draft a resolution intended “to reiterate the Charter’s requirement to settle disputes peacefully, call for a ceasefire and endorse conciliation moves.”31 Later that day, Tariq Aziz announced that Iraq had achieved its war aims, listing four conditions for the end of hostilities, including “the end of all aggressive Iranian activities against Iraq, agreement on good neighborly relations between the two nations, noninterference in the affairs of other countries, and Iranian recognition of Iraq’s sovereignty over all the territories and waters it lays claim to.”32 This statement clearly indicated that Iraq’s war aims were limited, while putting the onus on Iran to end the war. Unsurprisingly, the Iranians chose to bypass the first of many opportunities to end the war. Later that day, Iran declared a war zone in the Persian Gulf extending 19 kilometers (12 miles) out from the Iranian coast and the same distance from the two Tunbs islands and Abu Musa, which the Shah annexed in 1971 from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In response, the Carter administration further discussed a multilateral naval “peace patrol” to ensure, by force if necessary, the free navigation of the Strait in order to deter Iran from taking further provocative actions that could threaten the flow of oil from the region.33 On September 28, after considerable delay—thanks to stalling tactics by the Soviet Union and because a Pakistani mission had been sent to Iran in a failed effort to mediate an end to the conflict34 —the Security Council unanimously adopted UNSC 479 that weakly condemned the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq. The resolution called on both nations to cease hostilities, to allow third-party mediation efforts, and warned other states to refrain from becoming involved in the conflict.35 The resolution’s language, however, was surprisingly feeble. It failed to identify the instigator of hostilities and did not call for the belligerents to return to their internationally recognized borders. As Anthony Clark Arrend points out, there was “a clear reluctance on the part of the [United Nations] to serve as a collective security body.”

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Under the theory of limited collective security that undergirds Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, when there is a threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression, the Security Council is to investigate the matter, determine the guilty party, and order appropriate enforcement measures.36 But by failing to identify the instigator of the conflict, the Security Council undermined its own authority, and sent a message to Iran that it was not impartial. Further underscoring the argument that Iraq’s war aims were limited, on September 29, Saddam Hussein advised Secretary General Kurt Waldheim that Iraq could accept the terms of the resolution if Iran did so as well. Iran, on the other hand, gave no indication that it was willing to accept the resolution until it had regained lost ground.37 Thus, by offering to accept the resolution, Iraq skillfully manipulated international opinion to its favor and placed the onus to end the war on Iran, which refused to negotiate. A fundamental aspect of Iranian foreign policy was to limit a foreign presence in the Persian Gulf. As the Carter administration worked to build an international coalition to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, Tehran announced on October 1 that it had “no intention of blockading the vital Straits of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf as part of its war effort against Iraq.”38 Iran’s move was brilliant. By declaring that it posed no threat to the Strait, Iran effectively deprived the Carter administration of the entire basis for its coalition. This showed that Iranians possessed a remarkably astute understanding of international politics. Despite the Security Council’s call for peace, fighting between Iraq and Iran showed no sign of ending. Essentially, Iraq had three main political objectives in the war. First, the Iraqi army wanted to establish a security zone along the southern frontier, separating the river from the rest of Iran, which would allow it sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab.39 Secondly, Iraq wanted to “impress the Iranian leaders with the quality and resolve of Iraq’s military strength in order to face them with the choice of escalation or concession.”40 Unlike its previous encounters with Iranian forces during the Kurdish war in the 1970s, Baghdad wanted to prove to Tehran that it would not tolerate subversion. To prove this point, Saddam Hussein believed that he needed to force the Iranian regime to acknowledge that the regional balance of power had shifted in its favor through a dramatic display of force. Finally, the Iraqi leadership wanted to “liberate” the minority Arab population of Khuzestan in order to score a major public relations victory among the Arab states akin to Nasser’s rise to prominence after the Suez Crisis in 1956.41

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In order to defeat Iran, Iraq had to achieve one major military goal: to seize the Iranian province of Khuzestan. By September 1980, the impact of the economic sanctions imposed on the Iranian regime following the hostage crisis had a crippling effect on the Iranian economy. Because Iranian “oil sales provide over 95 percent of hard currency earnings and over 50 percent of total government revenue,” the clerical regime in Tehran was vulnerable to external economic strangulation. To its further disadvantage the Iranian province of Khuzestan that bordered Iraq along the Shatt al-Arab river and was within striking distance of Iraq, produced “more than 80 percent of Iranian oil.” Baghdad believed that capturing Khuzestan would cut off a massive source of income for the Iranian regime, cripple the Iranian economy, and force Iran to the negotiating table at an incredible disadvantage.42 Unfortunately, Baghdad’s political aims did not match with military realities. As Kenneth Pollack points out, because the Ba’athist leadership’s insistence on a limited war and its unwillingness to accept casualties, Iraq relied upon a policy of intimidation, relying exclusively “on overwhelming firepower” to annihilate resistance before engaging Iranian ground forces. Unfortunately, instead of a lightning war to capture Khuzestan, “Iraqi forces moved at a snail’s pace against meager Iranian resistance,” showed no creativity on the battlefield, and made no attempt “to use fast-moving armored columns to penetrate and disrupt Iranian rear areas and to capture key objectives before the Iranians could react.” Furthermore, “the Iraqis never tried to seize key terrain to cut off Iranian lines of communication and retreat.” The Iraqi military also put too much emphasis on taking cities and miscalculated the importance of capturing all of Khuzestan province. Instead of attacking densely populated cities, the Iraqis should have captured high-value targets like oil fields, refineries, and transportation hubs. After all, encirclement would have deprived the trapped Iranian forces of supplies and forced them to capitulate. The strategic blunders of the Iraqi military in the early stages of the war undoubtedly prolonged the length of the war and permitted Iran the time to regroup.43 The inability of the Iraqis to capture Khuzestan and force peace upon Iran in the first few weeks of the war seriously undermined the stability of the Ba’athist regime. After all, it was Iraq’s unwillingness to sustain casualties that allowed the Iranians to mount a more organized defense and to make effective use of the advanced American weaponry bestowed upon them by the Shah. According to a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysis produced on October 11, the longer the war continues, the “military prospects for Iraq and stability of [the] Saddam Hussein [government] grow increasingly uncertain.”

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Some Iraqi observers privately fear that Iranian public sentiment is bound to be increasingly disturbed at [the] prospect of losing oil rich Khuzestan and that this will boost [the] stability of the Khomeini [government], and stimulate [the] Iranian war effort.44 These fears were perfectly rational, as the absence of a decisive military victory over Iran in the first month of the war undermined any chances of a ceasefire. On October 24, the Iranian city of Khorramshahr finally fell to Iraq after a four-week siege. Typical of early Iraqi tactics, at the opening stage of the battle the city was subjected to seven days of artillery shelling. The objective was to demoralize the defenders of the city and to send a message to Tehran that Iraq would not hesitate to unleash its military forces against civilian areas. 45 But unbeknown to the Iraqis, and largely due to its failure to surround the entire city, during the course of the shelling the Iranians evacuated the city and replaced the inhabitants with Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) companies and regular units: The fighting . . . was conducted on a street by street, house by house basis, starting in the northwest quadrant of the city and gradually moving toward the bridge that connects the bazaar area to Abadan island and the town of Abadan; it was through this link that the Iranian forces were reinforced and resupplied.46 Military journalist Edgar O’Ballance revealed that during the Battle of Khorramshahr, “each side suffered about 7,000 killed or seriously wounded, while Iraqis lost over 100 tanks and other armored vehicles, like self-propelled guns.”47 The immense cost of the Battle of Khorramshahr, in terms of lives, equipment, and treasure, was embarrassing for Iraq, particularly because the defending Iranian soldiers were equipped only “with small arms, light anti-tank weapons, and Molotov cocktails.”48 Despite these embarrassing details, Iraq had finally securely occupied a major Iranian city, but was rapidly losing initiative. Starting the third week of November, the region’s rainy season set in, turning the southern front into a swampy quagmire and making it virtually impossible to fight. This was a major problem for Iraq because, according to O’Ballance, “In most places vehicular movement was largely impossible and Iraqi armored columns and detachments had to stay more or less where they were, making individual defensive arrangements as best they could and being supplied by helicopter.” Seeking another avenue of attack, on December 24, the Iraqis launched an additional offensive in Iraqi Kurdistan toward the Iranian town

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of Penjwin to secure its northern flank against Iranian penetration.49 The attack in the mountainous northern region was essentially defensive in nature, as the Iraqis could not take the risk of leaving the sector defenseless, especially when they were bogged down in the strategically significant south. Meanwhile the start of the rainy season greatly benefited Iran, allowing it time to recuperate and build defenses. As the war between Iran and Iraq slowly slipped into a stalemate, the political environment in Washington took a dramatic turn. On November 4, the American people, frustrated with the struggling economy, record-high inflation, and the never-ending hostage crisis, voted Jimmy Carter out of office. The landslide election of Ronald Reagan as the fortieth president of the United States marked an abrupt shift in the conduct of American foreign policy. To many Americans, the emasculation of the preeminent world superpower by a developing nation was unacceptable. As the Carter administration’s failure to resolve the hostage crisis had left morale at an all-time low, the public demanded change. Despite losing the election, the Carter administration continued its efforts to resolve the hostage crisis. On January 19, 1981, the day before Reagan’s inauguration, the American and Iranian governments, through the mediation efforts of Algeria, reached an agreement to release the remaining hostages. The deal set out four provisions: an American promise of noninterference in Iranian affairs; Washington would release Iranian assets that had been frozen in response to the taking of the hostages; both countries agreed to respectively end litigation and sanctions; and, the United States pledged that American courts would recognize Iranian court decisions pertaining to the Shah’s assets.50 The next day, only minutes before Reagan’s inauguration, Iran made good on its promise and released the 52 remaining hostages.51 An Algerian plane flew the hostages to West Germany where the former president met them; their 444-day hell ended with Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Although Iraq’s invasion of Iran caught the Carter administration off guard, it took a remarkably practical approach to the war. The administration quickly identified the major policy considerations—checking the Soviets, ensuring the safety of the hostages, maintaining access to oil (Strait of Hormuz), protecting regional allies—and responded with a rational policy of strict neutrality. While the administration immediately feared for the safety of the hostages, its primary concern was preventing the Soviet Union from taking advantage of the crisis. Through its actions at the United Nations, the State Department was able to use UNSC 479 to lambast the Soviets for arms transfers to Iraq, which they slowed in retaliation to Iraq’s failure to consult them prior to the invasion. Nevertheless, the Carter

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administration worked this angle to its advantage. At the same time, Carter also recognized that the conflict threatened the security of close American allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman. These states feared that if the conflict were to escalate beyond Iraq and Iran, the security situation would be so unstable that they would be forced to look to either superpower for security. Quickly recognizing their concern, Carter made it clear that containing the war was a fundamental tenet of American policy and offered the Gulf States security assurances, while declaring that the United States would remain neutral in the conflict. By selecting such a policy, the Carter administration effectively accomplished a number of significant goals. Notably, it blocked Soviet efforts to expand its influence, prevented the expansion of the conflict into a regional war, and effectively reassured American allies in the Persian Gulf of its support. In spite of its track record with the Iranian revolution and the ensuing hostage crisis, the Carter administration’s response to the Iran-Iraq War clearly indicates that it was very capable of handling major international crises. Unfortunately by the time Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, the enduring hostage crisis had already ruined Carter’s presidency. While the Carter administration did a good job managing the first few months of the Iran-Iraq War, the election of Ronald Reagan signaled that there would be a radically new approach to the region.

Part III

Strict Neutrality?

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The people elected Ronald Reagan to restore American power around the world. Upon taking office, Reagan vowed to revitalize American foreign policy, arguing that the policies of the Carter and Ford administrations lacked the aggressiveness needed to check the equally difficult problems of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War. However, an actor by trade, Reagan’s knowledge of foreign affairs was quite limited when he came to office. He believed, and had been encouraged of this view by [Richard Allen, Reagan’s new national security advisor], that Henry Kissinger under Nixon and Zbigniew Brzezinski under Carter had exercised authority as national security advisers that was properly vested in the secretary of state. With the national security advisor openly accepting his diminished role in the decision-making process, Reagan needed a secretary of state that could take on a role akin to that of a Kissinger or a Brzezinski. To fill this important role, he looked to General Alexander Haig, Jr. who had a long resume including chief of staff under Nixon and Ford, deputy assistant for national security affairs under Nixon, and supreme allied commander in Europe from 1974–1979. From the start, Reagan assured Haig that shaping America’s foreign policy was his primary role. As for the secretary of defense, Reagan chose Caspar Weinberger, an able administrator who worked in the office of budget and management during the Nixon administration. Despite his lack of experience in defense matters, Weinberger proved himself to Reagan in the late 1960s as

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the California state director of finance. Rounding off Reagan’s foreign policy team was William Casey, who was a former officer of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s predecessor, who was named Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Reagan hoped that Casey’s OSS experience would revitalize the CIA in the aftermath of Admiral Stansfield Turner’s demoralizing reign and the vicious investigations by the Pike and Church Committees during the mid-1970s. Through the cumulative experience of his national security team, Reagan hoped to accommodate his weakness on matters of American foreign policy.1 By the time Ronald Reagan took his oath of office on January 20, 1980, the Iran- Iraq war was firmly stalemated. It was apparent that the Iraqis were fighting a limited war, relying on its static, defensive doctrine, while never pressing its advantage. Barring its initial thrust, the Iraqis moved slowly into Iran, establishing a firm hold on the east bank of the Shatt al-Arab. Throughout, the Iraqis relied heavily on artillery barrages, while inching forward and building its rear defenses. Iraq’s tactics were undoubtedly designed to limit armor and personal losses. Meanwhile, the Iranians, drawing on large caches of artillery rounds and antitank missiles, capitalized on the lull in fighting and regrouped the shattered remnants of its armed forces. When it became clear in Washington during the spring of 1981 that Iran’s military had recovered and was preparing to go on the offensive, the Reagan administration accelerated efforts to improve its relations with Iraq. Since Iraq was unable—or unwilling—to capture enough territory to bargain for peace, the administration was desperately seeking to find international support to end the war. Since the hostages were released on Reagan’s assumption of office, there was great consensus that the American government had to extract its revenge on Iran. In light of these circumstances, it was unsurprising that within the first few months of Reagan’s presidency American and Iraqi interests conveniently converged. At this point, the war was broken up into two sectors along the 1,173kilometer (733-mile) front. The southern sector consisted of territory north and south of Basra. Iraq’s deployment in Khuzestan included 52,000 men and 1,300 tanks in 21 divisions whereas Iran had 11 divisions, 27,000 troops, and 240 tanks defending the area. The northern sector ran north into Iraqi Kurdistan where the Iraqi, Turkish, and Iranian borders meet. Due to limited movement along the northern front because of its mountainous terrain, Iraq deployed 52,000 men and 440 tanks, which faced 30,000 Iranians and 110 tanks. Later in the war, a central sector to the east of Baghdad would open up, which ran from Marivan in the south to Qasr-e Shirin in the north. The larger number of tanks in the south for both sides indicated that both sides believed the southern sector was the most critical front.2

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Since late December it was apparent that Iran was preparing a large-scale spring offensive aimed at retaking its territory. Although Iranian President and Commander-in-Chief Bani-Sadr was hesitant about launching an offensive before enough military forces could be brought to the front, the fanatical mullahs in Tehran insisted that the army counterattack against the Susangerd area on January 5. The initial thrust was quite successful, penetrating deep into the Iraqi lines, but Iran’s early success was short-lived. Its forces crashed head-on into an Iraqi armored division that enveloped the advancing Iranian division and almost completely destroyed it, leading to the largest tank battle fought since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.3 According to O’Ballance, over the course of the next four days the Iranian forces were “severely mauled” by the Iraqis, losing perhaps as many as 214 tanks.4 Iran’s defeat was so devastating that the State Department believed that its ability to conduct successful large-scale offensive operations “for at least the rest of the year” was seriously weakened. Contributing to Iran’s weakened position was its inability to get adequate weaponry. “Iran has not been able to acquire quantities of weapons, ammunition, and spare parts sufficient to offset expenditures and losses.”5 This created exactly the type of opportunity the administration had been hoping for in order to reestablish its arms-supply relationship with Iran, but the Iranians still refused to deal with the United States on any level. On February 3, the State Department convened the Iran-Iraq Work Group (IIWG) to discuss the policy options available to the new administration. Chaired by Acting Assistant Secretary of State Peter Constable, the discussion focused on the military, diplomatic, political, and economic aspects of the Persian Gulf conflict. The group came to five conclusions: First, as long as Iran and Iraq continued their efforts to export oil, the global oil supply would remain stable. Second, although there were advantages to a continuation of the fighting, including letting the two regional powers bleed each other dry, a cessation of the conflict was in the best interests of the United States. Third, the likelihood of Iran turning to the Soviet Union for military equipment was remote. Fourth, the United States should subtly encourage Turkey or Pakistan to supply equipment to Iran in order to use the renewed military-supply relationship as leverage to encourage it to negotiate a ceasefire. Finally, the administration should offer support for diplomatic efforts of the United Nations, the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) and the NonAligned Movement (NAM).6 Although the IIWG identified many significant points, the National Security Council (NSC) staff were not satisfied and requested a “more forward-looking and conceptual” analysis of its options.7 For the next few weeks, the IIWG worked hard to revise the administration’s policy options toward the war.

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By February 13 the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) had concluded that the main factor behind Iraq’s dismal military performance was the regime’s “conscious decision to minimize casualties, seemingly without regard to its impact on tactical operations.” Based on this assessment, the INR concluded: Iraq can conduct successful offensive operations on a significant scale in Khuzestan once the ground dries out, but is believed to have only limited further objectives. Iran cannot prosecute a major offensive in Khuzestan, although small-scale attacks could achieve some local success.8 The Reagan administration viewed the next round of fighting with unease. What were Iraq’s intentions? Was its plan to capture Khuzestan, or did it just want to hold the Shatt al-Arab waterway? Was there any threat to the Iranian regime? What might occur if the Iranian regime fell? How would the Soviet Union respond to this? A month later, the Reagan administration concluded its internal review of its policy toward the war. On March 15, Secretary Haig sent a cable to all American embassies and consular posts outlining the parameters of updated guidelines. The cable pointed out that after six months of fighting, the war looked as if it were about to escalate significantly after rains subsided at April’s end. Throughout the first phase of the war, the United States avoided taking sides in order to avoid regional escalation. The fear was that if the United States openly came out in support of Iraq, it would draw the Soviet Union into the war on the side of Iran. As the driving force of American foreign policy during the Cold War was to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence, a regional escalation of the conflict could have adverse consequences on the long-term American interests in the region. To allay this scenario, the administration declared its support for the territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq and vowed to remain neutral, which was the best option for the United States, at least while Iraq had the upper hand militarily. The administration also believed that the most effective means to end the conflict was to deny access to weapons to both belligerents. To highlight the importance of this point, the cable affirmed America’s policy of not selling military articles to either belligerent. It also highlighted that its primary objective was to bring the conflict to an honorable and just conclusion. The overall objective of the policy was to generate a solution to the war that would allow both belligerents to save face, allowing neither to claim victory.9 By the spring of 1981, the Iranian regime decided that it would strike at Iraq’s weak points and extend the theatre of war to the north.10 On April 15, Iranian forces launched an attack in the northern sector near Qasr-e Shirin.

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This attack was significant because for the first time Iran employed large numbers of Revolutionary Guards and the voluntary paramilitary force known as the Basij (Mobilization Resistance Force) in its attacks. The Basij are quite controversial, because the bulk of these forces are composed of children below the age of 18, adult males older than 45, and women. The use of children in war was not an Iranian invention; Germany employed the Hitler Youth in the Second World War. What was novel was that these children were often the first line of attack. Early in the war Ayatollah Khomeini announced “as a special favour,” that he would allow schoolchildren between the ages of 12 and 18 to join the Basij and fight in the war. According to an Iraqi officer: They chant “Allahu Akbar” and they keep coming, and we keep shooting, sweeping our 50 millimeter machine guns around like sickles. My men are eighteen, nineteen, just a few years older than these kids. I’ve seen them crying, and at times the officers have had to kick them back to their guns. Once we had Iranian kids on bikes cycling towards us, and my men all started laughing, and then these kids started lobbing their hand grenades and we stopped laughing and started shooting.11 Making extensive use of the religious fervor of these youthful warriors, the Iranian offensive at Qasr-e Shirin caught the Iraqi forces by surprise. Although the Iranian assault was limited in scale, its success “convinced the mullahs in Tehran that large-scale infantry assaults relying on the Islamic fervor of the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij were their ace in the hole”12 because they were both willing to suffer extremely high casualty rates.13 Beyond this brief skirmish, “both sides remain dug in along essentially static lines,” but the “Iraqis still have some time in which to initiate a spring offensive.”14 Not long after the Iranian victory at Qasr-e Shirin, Iraq took a tentative step toward rapprochement with the United States when it agreed to the first high-level contact between the two governments since 1977. Undoubtedly the State Department’s approval of the sale of five Boeing aircraft to Iraq paved the way for the meeting. Leading the mission to Iraq was Morris Draper, the deputy assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs, and later Reagan’s special envoy during the Lebanon crisis (1981–83). On April 4, William Eagleton, the head of the American interests section in Baghdad, cabled Draper indicating that he believed that an American-Iraqi rapprochement could be in the works. The atmosphere here is excellent following our decision not to sell arms to Iran, the increased Iraqi commerce and contacts with the U.S.,

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mutual upgrading of diplomatic staffs. . . . Although there remain a number of areas of serious disagreement on regional matters, we now have a greater convergence of interest with Iraq than at any time since the Revolution [sic] of 1958. With regards to the American position toward Iran, Eagleton said, “our views largely converge and [the Iraqis] will be interested in Draper’s assessment of the situation.” On the topic of bilateral relations, Eagleton advised Draper to be subtle in his approach, warning, “The Iraqis will not appreciate any pressure to restore diplomatic relations before the new U.S. administration has taken steps or made statements which they can represent as a change in U.S. policy more favorable to the Arabs.” To this end, “Our best tactic now would be not to raise the question of diplomatic relations with the Iraqis, except indirectly in discussing what further steps we might take to improve contacts in the absence of diplomatic ties.” These steps included assisting the chief of Iraq’s interest section in Washington to cultivate contacts with government officials and suggesting that a visit by a senior Iraqi official would be well received. The purpose of the Draper mission was to open channels for future exchanges to “keep the Iraqi leadership informed of our thinking” on regional issues, like its war with Iran. In the end, Eagleton hoped that “Draper’s visit can be presented as the inauguration on such a high level two-way exchange.”15 Morris Draper arrived in Baghdad to a warm and cordial reception on April 12. After consulting with William Eagleton on the five-hour drive to Baghdad, Draper first met a senior Iraqi foreign ministry team headed by Muhammad Al-Sahwaf, Chief of the First International Department for over an hour and a half. Opening the discussion, Draper stressed the twin U.S. objectives of improving the security environment in the region against outside threats and challenges and moving forward on the peace process [with Israel] were inter-linked, co-equal in priority, and mutually reinforcing; progress toward one objective would help progress in the other and vice versa. Responding to this bold declaration, the ministry team, “having sensed that the U.S. was looking at the Middle East in East-West terms exclusively,” expressed its relief, particularly about the “co-equal priority to the peace process.” Nevertheless, Sahwaf made it pointedly clear that “a formal resumption of diplomatic relations would not be possible” until the United States altered its Middle East policy—a veiled reference to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Putting this point aside, Sahwaf still welcomed a more sensible level of

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relations, expanded substantive dialogue, and improved economic and commercial relations with the United States.16 Prior to Draper’s arrival in Baghdad, Secretary Haig cabled a letter to the U.S. interests section in Baghdad for Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoon Hammadi. At the commencement of his meeting with Hammadi, Draper presented Haig’s letter. In it, Haig explained that the American objective for the meeting was to “share with the Iraqi government . . . the basic attitudes of the United States toward issues and the threats endemic to the region.” He described Iraq as “an important country which has been carrying out an ambitious economic development program and which has the capacity to influence major trends in the region.” Haig emphasized the need for both “countries [to] be able to exchange views, freely and on a systematic basis,” while recognizing that there “are issues on which I believe we could find agreement. And there are issues which divide us. Nevertheless, it would be best to talk them over so that we can come to understand more fully the views of one another.”17 After reading Haig’s message, Hammadi indicated that he looked forward to meeting with Haig at the general assembly meeting in the fall, if not earlier. At this point, Draper reiterated America’s policy of not selling “lethal equipment to either [sic] side.” He said that Secretary Haig had “made this position clear to other governments, but nonetheless believed that it is in the world’s overall interest that the war be concluded as soon as possible.” After Hammadi pointed out the one-sided nature of the American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, Draper redirected the conversation to reflect America’s determination to assist “our historical friend, Saudi Arabia, with the F-15 enhancement despite significant Israeli and domestic opposition.” With regards to U.S.-Iraqi relations, Hammadi indicated that Iraq will “wait and see” how the United States approaches its relations with Iraq “and then examine [the] question of renewal of diplomatic relations.” Then, Hammadi informed Draper, “in a manner that [was] distinctly warm and forthcoming,” that “Iraq was ready to raise the level and intensify all contacts with the US and improve communications” and “reiterated Iraq’s wish to expand economic cooperation and said US companies were welcome to compete” for Iraq contracts. At this point, Hammadi informed Draper that Iraq would allow the United States to expand its interests section in Baghdad on “a reciprocal basis,” because “severed relations between two countries are not normal and should not remain forever.” The conversation closed with a short discussion of the Security Council’s efforts to negotiate a peace and Draper agreeing to keep in touch about any significant progress.18 Not long after Draper’s mission to Baghdad, Washington recalled Eagleton for consultations. Upon his return to Baghdad, he sent a formal request to

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the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to meet with Tariq Aziz, a senior Ba’ath ideologue and party spokesman on foreign policy, which was subsequently approved. In Eagleton’s report to the Department of State, he points out: This is [the] highest level in the Iraqi government our Baghdad mission has met with since the 1967 break in relations. Tariq Aziz has considerably more clout within Iraq’s leadership than Foreign Minister Hammadi and is the highest level spokesman on foreign policy after Saddam Hussein. Eagleton and Aziz met for an hour and a half on May 28. After the usual diplomatic niceties, Eagleton expressed satisfaction about the positive trend in the American-Iraqi relationship and offered suggestions about ways to enhance progress. Replying at length, Aziz indicated “Iraq would continue to promote better relations with the US.” But he gave no illusions that it would happen immediately: in 1975 Saddam Hussein [sic] had told David Rockefeller that the relationship [between the US and Iraq] was like a door with two keys, the first involving Iraq-US relations and the second, Arab-US relations. The first key would turn when the US stopped interfering in Iraqi internal affairs. . . . He could officially tell me that the first key was now turning. The second one, however, was awaiting the outcome of US policy [sic] deliberations. . . . His treatment of the subject seemed to indicate an Iraqi desire to renew relations as soon as suitable movement is found in the US-Arab context. Shifting the conversation to the war, Eagleton explained the policy of neutrality “which caused us to refrain from selling or licensing arms for either side.” In light of this rule, Eagleton raised Iraq’s “concern over [American-made] helicopter deliveries [to Iran] from Italy, noting that these licenses had been obtained and payment made prior to the taking of American hostages and the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war.” Responding to this, Aziz emphasized the “supreme importance” of the American attitude to the war, adding that he “did not believe that the U.S. was providing arms to Iran, but somehow the Iranians were getting some U.S. arms and spare parts.” Surprised by the allegation, Eagleton suggested that Aziz provide “any information he had in this regard” since such sales contravened American policy. Concluding the meeting, both sides exchanged their mutual interests in building upon the burgeoning relationship between both countries.19 In his own analysis of the meeting, Eagleton commented that because Aziz was part of the inner circle of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)

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leadership, the United States was now “in a position to communicate directly with the leadership should we have any sensitive or particularly important message to convey.” Like the Draper-Hammadi exchanges, the EagletonAziz meeting was also a success. Within the first four months of the new administration, an identifiable trend toward conciliation was evident.20 The rapprochement between the United States and Iraq was mutually beneficial. For the United States, establishing contacts with Iraq could help it achieve its strategic objectives in the war. Clearly the Americans were probing to see if Iraq was capable of taking on Iran’s former role in a revived twopillar policy. While Iran was an enemy, Washington’s objective was to limit Soviet influence in the region; bringing Iraq into the Western orbit was a means to that end. Iraq had different motives for contact with the United States. As noted, since the conflict began, Iraq had been getting cold responses from Moscow, particularly with respect to its arms-supply relationship. The Soviet Union had terminated military shipments to Iraq in response to the invasion and had been actively attempting to cultivate contacts in Tehran. From an Iraqi perspective, rapprochement with Washington sent an unveiled signal to Moscow to follow through with its obligations or else Iraq would look elsewhere for support, particularly in terms of arms. Iraq was undoubtedly more successful at attaining a consistent supply of weapons than Iran. In early 1981, France made its first delivery of four Mirage F-1 fighter jets from an order of 36 contracted by Iraq in 1977. While the shipment of the advanced fighter jets did not have an immediate impact on the fighting, as it would take quite some time to train Iraqi pilots, it did boost Iraqi morale. Iraq also signed a contract with Italy to acquire four frigates, six corvettes, and a support ship. Although the agreement was significant on paper, an order of this size took time to fulfill. Of immediate use, however, were “Franco-German anti-tank missiles” and a large shipment of T-55 tanks received from the Soviet bloc.21 In early March, the Israeli press reported that Iraq was also receiving war material from Egypt, including “spare parts of Soviet-made weapons in its possession.” The Israeli article suggested that Egypt shipped the weaponry to Iraq via Jordan after pointing out high-level political contacts between Cairo and Amman and separately Amman and Baghdad. 22 A few weeks later, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat publicly confirmed that Egypt sold Soviet weaponry to Iraq.23 At first, the shipments were small, a token of Arab solidarity, but by 1982 the value of military hardware had grown to $1 billion.24 It was evident that either the United States was ignoring the weapon sales to Iraq or American efforts to persuade its allies to refrain from providing arms to the belligerents were not working.

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Iraq was also receiving help from the Soviet bloc. By May 1981, the Soviet Union relaxed the arms embargo imposed on Iraq for its failure to consult Moscow before invading Iran. According to a State Department analysis, the decision to relax the embargo was “probably due to Moscow’s concern for the erosion in its relations with Baghdad without any significant gains in its efforts to improve its position with Iran.”25 The Soviets were also aware of the growing relationship between Iraq and the United States, which likely influenced its decision to resupply Iraq. Further influencing Moscow’s efforts to rebuild its relationship with Baghdad related to reports that surfaced in June 1981 that Iraq signed a military agreement with China to obtain Soviet-origin military hardware and parts. Like Nixon in 1972, the Iraqis were exploiting the Sino-Soviet split to the utmost of its ability.26 By mid-1981, Iran was in desperate need of arms to halt Iraq’s offensive and allow it to counterattack. Certainly, Iran had greater difficulty acquiring the weapons and spare parts needed to replace its battlefield losses. Its primary problem was that the majority of its equipment was of American origin. Iran’s need for American weaponry led to the resumption of the traditional—though not comfortable—alliance between Israel and Iran. Just as the Shah did before the mullahs, the Iranians and Israelis found a rare ground to stand on. Both nations despised Iraq and saw great benefit in the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. As a result, from the outset of the war, Israeli policy tilted heavily in favor of Iran. “Although both Iran and Iraq were . . . sworn enemies of Israel, the Israelis recognized that Iraq was a far more dangerous threat—not only to Israel, but to the entire Middle East. Iran, by contrast, was less harmful than its rhetoric implied.” From an Israeli perspective, so long as the war continued, the Iraqi threat was neutralized, allowing Israel a free hand to pursue its regional objectives without fear of a unified Arab retaliation. According to Colonel Oliver L. North, a former NSC staff member and the key figure in the Iran-Contra scandal, the driving factor behind Israel’s early tilt toward Iran was concern about the safety of approximately 30,000 Iranian Jews. “Although the Jews of Iran were not locked up and under guard . . . they were all under the strict control of the Ministry of Internal Security, and their passports included a seal that prohibited them from traveling to ‘occupied Palestine.’ ” As it turned out, since the Shah’s fall in 1979, Israel had been quietly bartering with Iran to attain the release of the Iranian Jews. The deals were a simple quid pro quo: in return for releasing the Jews, Israel would provide Iran with much-needed military hardware. When the war started with Iraq, Israel seized upon the Iranian disadvantage and began negotiating better conditions for the exchanges.27 Giving credence to this view, on July 26 the New York Times reported that

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Israel recently supplied Iran with “American-made tank parts and ammunition . . . [and] had agreed to provide . . . Tehran with 360 tons of military equipment worth $15 million.”28 Beyond the release of the captive Jews, Israeli policy also “sought to maintain a balance of power [in the war] as a means of prolonging the conflict by denying victory to either party.” If Iran won the war, it would resume its old place as regional powerhouse, threatening the moderate Arab States, but because it stood on Israel’s periphery it was not considered a major threat. However, if Iraq proved victorious, it would pose a direct military threat to Israel and the region. Thus, the most ideal outcome for the Israelis was for Iran and Iraq to bleed each other dry, thus limiting the prospects for either turning their militaries against Israel. But, as Bernard Reich pointed out, because the Iranians were at a considerable disadvantage to the Iraqis in terms of arms procurement, “Providing arms to Iran was a means of continuing the war to the advantage of Israel.”29 Thus, throughout the war, the Israelis actively worked to sabotage Iraq’s offensive capabilities. In the late 1970s, France sold Iraq an OSIRUS-type research reactor, which was later renamed OSIRAK, pursuant to the French-Iraqi Agreement of Cooperation signed on November 18, 1975.30 From Israel’s perspective, the prospect of a nuclear Iraq was unacceptable. “The United States made repeated secret attempts to persuade the French not to ship enriched weaponsgrade uranium to Iraq. Even Saudi Arabia and Syria pleaded secretly with the French.”31 Despite the diplomatic opposition to the sale, France fulfilled its contract, but not without a few setbacks. By coincidence or not, on the evening of April 6, 1979, the French factory that was making components for the OSIRAK reactor suddenly exploded. According to the American Embassy in Paris, “The highly professional manner in which the plant was blown up has led to speculation and rumors that the Israelis may have been involved in this sabotage.” Whether the Israelis were behind this or not remains unknown. Nevertheless, France went ahead and installed the OSIRAK reactor at the Iraqi Nuclear Research Facility in Tuwaitha, just outside of Baghdad.32 Then, in December 1980, “an Israeli F-4 Phantom, operating under the cover of the confusion of the Iran-Iraq war, struck the [OSIRAK] installation with a bomb,” but it did not damage the main building. There was great speculation about who had perpetrated the attack, as Iran could just as easily have carried out the attack. After all, it was also equipped with Phantom F-4s and was at war with Iraq. Indeed, Iraq was under the assumption that the attack on the reactor had come from Iran. Not long after the attack Saddam Hussein declared, “the Iranians had attacked the target in vain since

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it was being constructed against Israel alone.” This declaration only further compelled Israeli efforts to prevent the nuclear reactor from becoming operational.33 Indicative of Israel’s perception that Iraq was the greater threat to its security, on June 7, 1981, the Israeli air force launched a surprise attack on the OSIRAK nuclear facility located just outside Baghdad, destroying it. According to a statement based on “reliable sources,” the Israeli government believed that the Iraqi reactor would be complete either at the beginning of July or September 1981. To them, the window of opportunity to destroy the reactor was slowly closing. After all, once the reactor became operational and hot: . . . no government of Israel could contemplate bombing the reactor. Such an attack would have brought about a massive radioactive lethal fallout over the city of Baghdad, and tens of thousands of its innocent residents would have been hurt. We would thus have been compelled to passively observe the process of atomic bombs in Iraq, whose ruling tyrant would not hesitate to launch them against Israeli cities. . . . Therefore, the Government of Israel decided to act without further delay to ensure our people’s existence.34 When viewed in these terms, the rationale for Israel’s attack upon the OSIRAK reactor was entirely justifiable, but its failure to inform Washington of its plan seriously strained American-Israeli relations. As an American ally and recipient of massive amounts of military aid, Israel’s failure to inform Washington of its plans had been unacceptable. To add insult to injury, “Israeli Air Force units were equipped with defense articles furnished to Israel by the United States under the Foreign Military Sales Program” of 1952. As part of the agreement, Israel promised that it would only use these articles for defensive purposes and not undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Israel clearly violated the agreement with its attack on Iraq; however, they argued that because Iraq never signed a peace agreement the two nations were officially in a state of war. Despite this justification, Washington was furious that Israel failed to notify it of the attack in advance. In order to save face in light of the recent moves toward an American-Iraqi rapprochement, on June 10 President Reagan announced his decision to suspend a shipment of four F-16s to Israel. Despite the fact that Israel violated one of the fundamental principles of a defense relationship with the United States, there was little the president could do.35 Within the administration there were mixed reactions to the Israeli attack. While Director Casey saw the diplomatic necessity of withholding the F-16s, he privately felt that the gesture was “bullshit.” Like others, he believed that

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Israel was justifiably concerned with Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, and the strike was a simple solution to what had increasingly become a complex problem. However, Casey’s deputy Bobby Ray Inman, a highly respected intelligence officer, was furious that Israel misappropriated American intelligence and equipment. According to Bob Woodward, Inman felt that “Under the intelligence-sharing arrangement set up with Casey’s approval, Israel had almost unlimited access to U.S. satellite photography and had used it in planning their raid.” Inman questioned “how the United States could maintain any balanced policy if Israel was permitted to drop bombs all over the Middle East using American intelligence?” Frustrated with the unrestricted access to American intelligence assets, Inman changed the “rules by which Israel could get photos and other sensitive intelligence only for defense.”36 By the end of the summer of 1981, it was clear that Iraq’s spring offensive would never materialize. Following a successful offensive against Qasr-e Shirin, Iran launched an offensive aimed at dislodging the Iraqi forces from the Allah Akbar heights overlooking the Iranian city of Susangerd. Unlike its disastrous January offensive, Iran’s forces quickly routed the Iraqis and secured strategic heights, allowing it to control the approaches to the city and set itself up in an ideal position to launch an offensive to retake the city of Abadan.37 Having clearly gained the initiative, Iran launched a major counteroffensive in the middle of the night against the port city of Abadan on September 26. According to Kenneth Pollack, “The Iraqis were surprised and overwhelmed, and their lines began crumbling almost immediately.” Despite Baghdad’s best efforts to support its units, the Iranians effectively lifted Iraq’s siege on Abadan “while trapping several Iraqi battalions before they could flee.”38 The Battle of Abadan was a tremendous victory for Iran and signaled a turning point in the conflict. From Abadan, the Iranians struck the Iraqi-held town of Bostan on November 29. For the next 36 hours, amid pounding winter rains and the accompanying mud, Iraqi and Iranian forces fought a desperate battle over the town. “By the evening of the 30th, the Iranians were in possession of Bostan and the Iraqis had fallen back about 5 miles to the large village of Sableh . . . , still blocking the obvious Iranian route westward.” At the Battle of Bostan, Iran employed “human-wave” tactics for the first time, whereby wave upon wave of soldiers attacked Iraqi positions, not unlike the frontal assault tactics used in the First World War.39 Iran’s victories at the Battles of Abadan and Bostan gave its army a considerable boost in morale as the winter rains set in once again. In the aftermath of Iran’s thorough routing of Iraq’s forces at Bostan, the administration immediately reconsidered its position toward Iraq. For instance, on February 26, when the administration submitted its annual

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Iran’s counteroffensives, 1981–82. (Adapted from United Nations High Commission for Refugees: Iraq. http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm.)

report to Congress on the countries repeatedly supporting international terrorism40, Iraq was notably absent from the list. According to a report prepared for Vice President George H. W. Bush on Iraq’s removal from the list, Iraq had made considerable strides in “reducing its assistance to terrorist groups and coming closer to moderate Arab nations,” such as the Gulf States. Encouraged by this positive trend, the administration wanted to offer incentives “to encourage Iraq to go further in this direction,” while at the same

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time making it clear to the Iraqis that “backsliding on their part could reverse this decision.”41 By removing Iraq from the list of nations that sponsor terrorism, it effectively removed any legal obstacles preventing the CIA from providing Iraq with intelligence. According to Staff Major General Wafiq al-Sammara’i, chief of the Iran section at Iraq’s military intelligence directorate, in March 1982 the United States began passing intelligence to Iraq by way of Arab countries. I was called to one of the luxurious houses on the bank of the Tigris in Baghdad to meet with three American CIA agents. . . . They said they had come to provide us with intelligence about Iran. . . . They brought with them precise maps and plans of Iranian sectors and regions, as well as satellite photographs. At that time we were in desperate need of this information.42 Although difficulty surrounds verifying this allegation, this example remains indicative of the prevailing need to shore up the Iraqi regime. During the spring of 1982, the Iranian army continued to build its strength in preparation for a spring offensive to drive the Iraqis from Iran. “Iran’s victory at Bostan left the Iraqi forces around Dezful father north in a salient that both sides recognized as vulnerable to an offensive.” On March 22, 1982, after four months of building up forces in the Dezful area, four Iranian divisions attacked to the north of the Iraqi salient, hoping to draw Iraqi forces northward. Two days later, Iran launched a second prong further south that enveloped Iraq’s forces after six days of fighting. Its crushing defeat at Dezful had catastrophic implications on Iraq’s war effort. In a six-month time frame, Iraq had lost three significant battles, giving up considerable territory in each case. The Iraqi military’s inability to defend against the innovative Iranian tactics did not bode well for future entanglements. Recognizing the implications of the Dezful defeat, Saddam reluctantly ordered the Iraqi military to pull out of Khuzestan except for a small salient in the south containing Khorramshahr. The Iraqi reluctance to completely withdraw from Khuzestan signaled the inevitability of a major battle for Khorramshahr. Following up quickly on the victory at Dezful, Iran launched a two-prong offensive from the north and northwest of Khorramshahr on May 22. After less than 28 hours of fighting, the Iranians managed to surround the city, sever Iraqi forces from its supply lines, and killing or capturing 15,000 Iraqi soldiers in the process. The dramatic recapture of Khorramshahr was a major turning point in the war. After all, Iran had successfully retaken all of its territory and was forcing Iraq back to the border. At this point, it was only a question of whether Iran would make the fateful decision to invade Iraq.43

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In either case, the Reagan administration was not taking any chances and had already offered to initiate an intelligence relationship with Iraq. By the end of 1981, it was clear that Israeli policy differed significantly from its American counterpart. As the Reagan administration actively tried to improve its relations with Baghdad, the Israelis went behind the back of the United States and provided Iran with desperately needed weaponry and then bombed Iraq’s OSIRAK nuclear reactor. In May 1982, just days after Iran’s victory at Khorramshahr, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon publicly acknowledged to reporters in Washington that the Israelis provided Iran with $27 million in spare parts and that the American government was informed of each of these shipments. According to Sharon, these shipments included tires and spare parts for U.S.-made F-4 Phantom jets and “maybe some munitions.” American officials, greatly frustrated with Israel’s divergent policy toward the war, acknowledged that the transaction took place, but the State Department “refused requests to permit shipment to Iran of any military items over which the United States retained some measure of control.” Israel, in return, simply sold material that was outside U.S. arms controls.44 Undoubtedly this greatly frustrated America’s efforts to stabilize the Persian Gulf and undermined its efforts to build a constructive relationship with Iraq and its Arab allies. However, in spite of Israel’s divergent policies toward Iraq, it was certainly in the Reagan administration interests to continue to pursue its own agenda toward the war. The first year of Ronald Reagan’s presidency was quite eventful. In the twelve months since coming to office, the Iranians managed to regroup, launched a series of successful counteroffensives, and recaptured the bulk of its territory; in the spring of 1982, they were poised to invade Iraq. Throughout this period, the Reagan administration practiced its policy of strict neutrality, whereby it refused to sell weapons to either side and openly urged both sides to resolve their differences through negotiation. In spite of this, the administration also sought opportunities to improve its relations with the Iraqi regime. This was evident in the highly successful meeting between Draper and Hammadi and the subsequent Eagleton-Aziz demarche. In both of these instances, the Iraqis strongly indicated that they were pleased with the improving relationship with the United States. For the Reagan administration, improving relations with Baghdad was a logical step because America’s allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, all viewed Iraq as a bulwark against Iranian expansionism. Iraq’s defeat at Khorramshahr underscored the fact that America’s passive policy toward the war was no longer working, leading to voices in the Reagan administration calling for a tilt toward Iraq.

5

The Tilt

Iran’s four successive military victories between September 1981 and May 1982 had a terrifying effect on the entire Persian Gulf region. The regional balance of power appeared to have tipped back in Iran’s favor. Unsurprisingly, this did not bode well for American policy, as Ayatollah Khomeini “made no secret of his ambition to establish a Shia Islamic government in his life-time for the whole of the Middle East.”1 Adding urgency to the situation, Iran was poised to invade Iraq and was openly threatening the security of the Gulf States who looked to the Iraqis to be the bulwark against the spread of Iran’s radical form of Islam. A key component of the American policy towards the war was the protection of its regional allies, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and most importantly Saudi Arabia. As a direct result of the war, the Gulf States formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on May 25, 1981 in order to coordinate its respective policies towards the war.2 In light of this, it was unsurprising that the United States worked closely with the GCC to coordinate its policies towards the Persian Gulf as part of an effort to balance Iran’s influence in vital waterway. Like the United States, from the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia declared policies of strict neutrality. However, also like the Americans, they—with the notable exception of the United Arab Emirates—tilted heavily toward Iraq. According to Gerd Nonneman’s analysis of Iraq’s relations with the Gulf States during the war, the reason why the Gulf States tilted heavily toward Iraq was because they strongly believed that Iran posed such a significant threat to the region that tilting towards Iraq was the lesser of two evils.3 As a result, the Gulf States

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The Persian Gulf (Source: NASA)

provided Iraq with financial aid, and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, transit rights for the shipment of weapons. For instance, by the end of 1982, Nonneman’s analysis suggests that Iraq had received a total of $14 billion from Saudi Arabia, $6 billion from Kuwait, between $2 to 4 billion from the UAE, and $1 billion from Qatar, totaling $23 to 25 billion from 1980–1982.4 In addition: Saudi Red Sea ports became important transit points for Iraqi imports. From November 1980 there were reports of arms and ammunition supplies, mainly East European and Soviet, going [toward Iraq], and steadily rising during 1981 such that by . . . [September 1981] . . . more arms were reported to be reaching Iraq via Saudi Arabia than by any other route.5 Meanwhile, all of the Gulf States vehemently denied any such support for Iraq in public, while maintaining their guise of neutrality, which was clearly not the case. Underlining American concerns about the safety of the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia in particular, on October 29 the Reagan administration pushed

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through the $8 billion sale of five Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircrafts to Saudi Arabia. The deal for the sophisticated aircraft was originally conceived by the Carter administration in February 1980 because of the threat posed by revolutionary Iran. But because the Saudis refused to allow American military facilities on its soil, the sale of the AWACS offered a viable alternative, not to mention an infusion of much-needed capital into the sagging American economy. Unfortunately, the deal immediately ran aground in Congress, leading the Saudis to withdraw their bid, deciding instead to await the results of the presidential election that fall. “The administration was relieved at the Saudis’ willingness to await the elections. It anticipated problems in Congress and did not expect President Carter to court electoral problems by raising the issue.”6 When Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, however, the Carter administration immediately reconsidered its position and sent four AWACS to Saudi Arabia on October 1.7 When Reagan came to office in 1981, he decided that the administration would proceed with the sale. Israel was adamantly opposed to Reagan’s decision and unleashed its lobbyists in Washington, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), to scuttle the deal. During the debate over the AWACS, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin visited Washington to try to convince Reagan to drop the sale. During his visit, Begin promised Reagan that he would not mount a major public debate against the sale. But immediately after this meeting and in open contradiction of his assurances, “Begin denounced the AWACS sale in a speech to Congress and in several television interviews.” Reagan took Begin’s duplicitous actions personally, bluntly responding, “It is not the business of other nations to make American foreign policy.” A week later, “Reagan met privately with forty-three Republican senators and put the issue in terms of loyalty to their president vs. loyalty to Israel.” The effort exerted by Reagan over the AWACS sale proved to be successful. On October 28, the Senate approved the deal “by a four-vote margin.” Understandably, Israel was furious.8 Meanwhile, Iranian provocations against the Gulf States during 1981 pushed them further toward Iraq. In the first instance, Iranian pilgrims, chanting pro-Khomeini slogans, incited a riot in Mecca that led to clashes with Saudi security forces in October 1981. Not long after, pro-Iranian forces launched a failed coup attempt in Bahrain that led to the arrest of 65 plotters9 and the ousting of the Iranian Ambassador Hassan Shushtri, “because of his links with the subversion group.”10 These events simply stiffened the resolve of the Gulf States against the Iranians, which led to further support for Iraq. Throughout the spring of 1982, the international community went on a diplomatic offensive to bring about a ceasefire in the war. Iraq’s embarrassing

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defeat at Khorramshahr led to an emergency meeting of foreign ministers of the Gulf States in Riyadh from May 30 to 31, 1982. The result of these meetings was a public declaration of policies of strict neutrality, despite Iraqi pleas for assistance and a commitment to peace initiatives by the UN, NAM, and ICO.11 Unfortunately, several obstacles prevented efforts to mediate a negotiated ceasefire. First, Iraq demanded full sovereignty of the Shatt al-Arab, the return of territories ceded by Iran in the Algiers Agreement of 1975, and for Iran to commit to an agreement of noninterference. Second, Iran’s position, largely influenced by Khomeini’s religious ideology and his personal hatred toward Saddam Hussein, refused to negotiate a ceasefire as long as Hussein remained in power and while Iraqi troops occupied its territory. Finally, Iran boycotted the UN and refused to accept its resolutions because it suspected the international body to be “pro-Iraqi and pro-U.S. in outlook.”12 Iraq, on the other hand, was willing to accommodate the efforts of third parties to seek a negotiated ceasefire, as indicated by its acceptance of UNSC 479. Consequently, the irreconcilable differences between Iran and Iraq’s negotiating positions made a ceasefire virtually impossible. In Washington, the Reagan administration was faced with the grim prospect of an Iranian invasion of southern Iraq, which, if successful, could bring its forces within 50 kilometers (31 miles) of the Kuwaiti border and under 200 kilometers (125 miles) from Saudi Arabia. Certainly, this posed a strategic dilemma for American policy makers. Would Iran invade Iraq? If so, could Iraq resist a full-scale Iranian invasion? With Iran having regained its territory, was a negotiated settlement possible at this juncture? What would happen if Iraq fell to Iran? Would—or rather could—Iran impose an Islamic regime in Iraq? If Iran defeated Iraq, would it then attack the Gulf States or Saudi Arabia? If this were the case, how would the United States respond? Could this lead to a regional conflict, or worse, a full-scale Cold War confrontation if the Soviet Union became involved? These concerns prompted the NSC in May 1982 to request the CIA to analyze the everchanging situation on the battleground and its potential consequences for Iraq and Iran, the region, and the United States. Even before Iran launched its Khorramshahr offensive, CIA analysts already concluded that Iraq was losing the war. In an analysis entitled “Possible Outcomes and Implications of the Iran-Iraq War,” the CIA discussed four possible outcomes in the war after Iran’s impending victory over Iraq at Khorramshahr and the implications for American policy. The outcomes included a border war with no peace but no invasion; a ceasefire, withdrawal, and negotiations; an Iranian military invasion of Iraq; and finally Arab involvement in the war. Each of these outcomes deserves further analysis.

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The CIA believed that the “most likely immediate outcome” was that Iran would either push Iraq out of its territory or the Iraqis would withdraw voluntarily and then continue a border war while refusing to negotiate. The Iranians could then continue military pressure on Iraq through sporadic clashes and subversion, while preventing the reopening of the Shatt al-Arab, which would continue to have a detrimental economic effect on Iraq. Consequently, this outcome would mean Iraq’s continued dependence on Arab oil producers for aid because its ports would remain closed, which would greatly hinder its ability to export oil and rebuild its economy. Another option was for Iran to capitalize on Kurdish desires for autonomy and finance an “Army of Liberation” aimed at overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime. Under this option, the United States would be forced to support Iraq against Iran, which would likely lead to the “abandonment of any public stance of neutrality or understanding for Iran’s revolution.”13 The second outcome—although less likely—was a total Iraqi withdrawal followed by a ceasefire and protracted negotiations through the ICO. Indeed, from early 1981, Iraq had been desperate—and remains so at this point—for negotiations. However, the regime in Baghdad wanted to control who facilitated the negotiations and would not allow what it considered to be a biased third party to mediate. The Iranians, on the other hand, showed no interest in negotiating and would only do so if “assured of complete public vindication of its position, and a corresponding humiliation of the current Iraqi regime—leading to its downfall.” In addition, the Iranians also would demand substantial reparations (in the range of $100 to 150 billion), which Iraq, even in conjunction with the Gulf States, could not afford. This option best suited American interests in the region for a number of reasons. First, it would allow Saddam Hussein’s secular regime to stay in power longer, thereby reducing the prospects of an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Baghdad. Second, it would allow Iraq to quickly resume oil exports, which would renew downward pressure on the price of oil. Finally, with the renewed income, it would allow Iraq to rebuild its shattered economy, “which would reinforce its drift away from the Soviet orbit.”14 The third option was an Iranian invasion of Iraq with the objective of overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime. Under this outcome, the CIA believed Iran had three choices. The first was the introduction of a “liberation army” consisting of “Iraqi exiles, ex-POWs, and possibly Iranian volunteers.” The Iranians are [already] providing military training to some of the estimated 50,000 Iraqis expelled from Iraq during the past three years. They could be introduced into Iraqi Kurdistan where, combined with

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local Kurdish rebels, they could capture a major city and proclaim a provisional government. Since the start of the war, the Kurds were actively cultivating a new strategic relationship with the new Iranian regime as they had with the Shah from 1961 to 1975. The CIA believed that the same tactic could be used in Basra, in the Shia dominated south. After all, “Iranian troops at the border already are within 20 kilometers of Basrah, Iraq’s second largest city and the most likely target of a full-scale Iranian attack.” The second option was for limited military incursions into Iraq in order to support local uprisings, which Iran was actively trying to cultivate. The third was an all-out attack against Basra with the hope of sparking a general insurrection among the co-religionist Shia population in the city. Generally, these options would adversely affect growing American interests in Iraq and the region. After all, the United States would be subject to criticism from the moderate Arab states for not being able to contain Iran’s aggressiveness. Furthermore, refusing to help Iraq in its dire military situation would confirm the “widely-held suspicion that US policy is tied to Iran and that Israeli military deliveries to Tehran have US approval.” However, on the plus side, the Gulf States “might be more willing to accept US support in the intelligence and security fields, but they also might ask for security guarantees.”15 The fourth potential alternative—although doubtful—built largely upon the third option. In this case, however, the creation of a provisional government in Iraq would invite Arab intervention, triggering “a more general Arab-Persian war.” For instance, the establishment of a Kurdish state could invite the direct intervention of Turkey, or a Shia state in the south could pull Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and possibly Syria16 into the conflict. It was less likely that Egypt, the only state with the military capacity to make a significant contribution to the fighting, would become involved. That was because, according to the CIA, “Cairo probably would not risk heavy involvement in a cause that at best would have only modest support from its people.” Meanwhile, the total combined military capacity of the Gulf States would amount to less than onethird of Iraq’s ground forces. Therefore, any provision of military support would have little impact on the war. Certainly, a war of this nature would have catastrophic implications for American policy. It could close the Strait of Hormuz, disrupt the global oil supply, spread the conflict throughout the Middle East, and lead the Gulf States to seek American help. In turn, this could push Iran into the arms of the Soviets, leading to a major superpower conflict.17 On June 8, the CIA distributed Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 34/36.2-82, “Implications of Iran’s Victory Over Iraq,” which came

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to the blunt conclusion that “Iraq has essentially lost the war with Iran.” In light of this judgment, the estimate focused primarily on the challenges facing both Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Gulf States, respectively, and the implications on America. With regards to the status of the war, the CIA made four primary conclusions. First, “Iran has recovered most of its territory formerly held by Iraq.” Second, “The Iranian leadership believes its principles and policies have been justified and its rule strengthened.” Third, Iran’s relative strength has been magnified by its victories.” And finally, “The regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has been severely hurt.” In light of these conclusions, Baghdad’s main concern was to prevent an Iranian invasion and maintain its grip on power. In terms of military support from its Gulf State allies, the CIA felt, “There is little the Iraqis can do, alone or in combination with other Arabs, to reverse the military situation.” The war’s lack of progress significantly increased pressure on Baghdad to either defeat Iran or negotiate an end to the war, which was unlikely in light of Iran’s excessive demands and refusal to negotiate.18 Iran’s routing of Iraq posed both domestic and external challenges to Saddam Hussein’s rule. Externally, the threat was obvious: Iran was bent on Saddam’s removal from power. Internally, however, the situation was much more complicated. Saddam Hussein’s total identification with the costly and unpopular war points towards increased challenges to his rule even without Iranian moves against him. Saddam’s decision to go to war with Iran has been a disastrous mistake. His static battlefield strategy has placed Iraqi forces in a difficult situation, and damage to Iraq’s economic and foreign policy goals grow [sic] daily. After all, Saddam’s micromanagement of the war put him in direct conflict with Iraqi civilian and military leaders who were in a position to plot against him. However, his “command of extensive levers of repression—most run by trusted family or tribal brothers—and his record of striking first” limits the extent of these threats. Perhaps the greatest danger to the regime was an isolated assassination. On a number of occasions since the war’s start, Saddam narrowly avoided a number of assassination attempts. But even if he were killed, the CIA believed Ba’athist rule in Iraq would likely remain entrenched. Another possibility was a coup from within the Ba’ath Party or the military, but Saddam’s firm control of Iraq’s internal security and intelligence apparatus meant that this option was less likely. Another possible threat was a popular uprising against the regime, but this too seemed impossible because opposition “seem incapable of fomenting open revolt.” Thus,

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Iran’s options for removing Saddam with subversion were limited, indicating that Iran’s best option was military force.19 The CIA’s primary focus was the dual questions of whether Iran invades Iraq, and, if so, how would such an attack affect the region? The Khomeini regime sees itself as a leader of people “oppressed by imperialism,” particularly in the Gulf States where the United States held considerable influence. Many feared that “An Iranian invasion of Iraq would strain the fragile cohesion of the Saudi-dominated Gulf Cooperation Council and possibly further weaken the moderate Arabs’ confidence in the United States.” At this point, the Gulf leaders “are increasingly worried about Iranian military intentions as a result of Iran’s latest gains against Iraq.” Nevertheless, the CIA concluded, “A major Iranian military attack on one or more of the Gulf States appears remote,” because it would likely invite American intervention. Undoubtedly, American “interests generally would be adversely affected by Iran’s carrying the fight in Iraqi territory.” Not only would an Iranian invasion threaten the Gulf ’s stability, leading to further criticism at America’s inability to restrain Iran, but the “war could easily escalate, particularly if the Arabs intervened on the side of Iraq.” At this point, a ceasefire would serve American interests best, but a protracted war of attrition did provide some opportunities, notably alleviating Arab pressure upon Israel. Nevertheless, the United States should still “search for ways to mitigate Iran’s efforts to export its revolution and to prevent Tehran from drifting towards the Soviets.” In sum, “The West—and the United States in particular—has little leverage to affect the course of events in Iran or to advance Western regional interests with Tehran. . . . Even though Iran is willing to deal with some Western nations, it will continue to oppose the West and particularly the United States.” Beyond a symbolic display of support for the Gulf States, there was little else the Americans could do.20 In light of such bleak conclusions, the NSC staff drew up a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) for President Reagan to sign that reflected the dire need to prevent an Iraqi defeat. According to Howard Teicher, a senior NSC analyst for the near east: In June 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran. President Reagan decided that the United States would do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran. President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive. . . . I have personal knowledge of this NSDD because I co-authored the NSDD with another NSC Staff Member, Geoff Kemp.

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Going further, Teicher explained that the NSDD called for the United States to supply “the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry required.”21 By signing the NSDD, President Reagan officially ordered the American government to defy its official policy of neutrality. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Air Force, reeling from Iraq’s defeat at Khorramshahr, decided to step up its air attacks on Iran. For instance, not long after the battle, Iraqi warplanes raided Kharg Island, Iran’s principal oil terminal in the Persian Gulf, in an effort to hinder its ability to export oil.22 Following this, an Iraqi warplane daringly flew deep into Iranian territory, breaking the sound barrier over Tehran on June 2 and buzzing the holy city of Qum, where Ayatollah Khomeini resides. The objective of the flyby was to serve a warning to Iranian leaders that Iraq still had the military capacity to cause serious harm to Iran.23 Indicative of Iraq’s ability to cause Iran harm, on June 5 Iraqi warplanes attacked the city of Ilam, the capital and namesake of a province in western Iran, and, according to news reports, killed 40 people and wounded more than 200. Unsurprisingly, the Iranians reacted furiously to the attack, increased shelling of Iraqi positions along the Shatt al-Arab, hardened its resolve to see Saddam Hussein punished for these “crimes,” and significantly increased the likelihood of an Iranian attack against the Iraqi city of Basra.24 In the face of the obvious escalation in the conflict and Israel’s sudden invasion of Lebanon on June 6, the next day the ICO sent delegations to Baghdad and Tehran in an attempt to pacify both parties, but returned empty-handed.25 Meanwhile, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, heightened the sense of urgency to resolve the conflict between Iran and Iraq, which were the two strongest Islamic military powers next to Egypt, which had forfeited its involvement following the signing of its peace agreement with Israel in 1978.26 With the backdrop of Arab furor over Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, on June 10, Iraq announced that it would observe a unilateral ceasefire, pull out from Iran, and use its military forces to fight against the Israelis. The decision to withdraw was made after an emergency session of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) that was attended by the major Ba’ath Party and military leaders, amid an abrupt visit to Baghdad by King Hussein of Jordan. In its announcement, the RCC indicated, in an effort to appease Islamic mediators, that it was ready “to end all forms of military action as soon as Iran agrees to a cease-fire,” including the prompt withdrawal of “all its forces from all land and cities in Iran” and return “to the international border within a maximum period of two weeks.” 27

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Unsurprisingly, considering Iran’s military advantage on the battlefield, the Iranians scoffed at Iraq’s attempt at a truce and shelled Iraqi forces, which responded in kind, killing 37 Iranians.28 In the days that followed, despite Iran’s rejection of Iraq’s unilateral ceasefire, Iraq refused to initiate hostilities. Then, on June 20, Saddam Hussein indicated that Iraqi forces were pulling out of Iranian territory, which was to be completes within 10 days.29 Indeed, by June 30, Baghdad announced that the last of its forces had withdrawn from Iran and they were now prepared to negotiate (although Iraqi forces remained on Iranian territory along the central front).30 Meanwhile, a heated debate raged within Iran about whether to invade Iraq or not. Certainly, Iraq’s earlier attacks on Iranian civilians had galvanized support to invade among the hardliners in the regime. Unbeknown to Western intelligence officials,31 on June 21, after weeks of debate, Khomeini decided that invading Iraq was the best course. “The following day, General Shirazi, army chief of staff and commander of the ground forces, stated, ‘We shall continue the war until Saddam Hussein is overthrown so that we can pray at Karbala and Jerusalem.’ ” 32 Today, many scholars of Iranian history view the decision to invade Iraq as a tragic mistake. According to interviews conducted by Joost Hiltermann, . . . some Iranian commanders wanted to enter Iraq to prevent Iraqi artillery attacks on Iranian cities, but soon they started talking about taking territory as a bargain chip, then about going to punish the aggressor. If Iran had not invaded Iraq, Saddam Hussein might have fallen. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia offered to pay Iran damages, but now they turned to support Iraq, and so did the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain. Indeed, Hiltermann also points out from an interview with Iranian analyst Gary Sick that the decision to invade Iraq was derived from “a foolish judgment that [the Iranians] could overthrow Saddam Hussein. They thereby prolonged the war for six more years.” Indeed, within Iran, since the death of Khomeini in 1989, debate has raged over the wisdom of pursuing “six senseless years of war whose revolutionary fervor soon petered out in the absence of realistic objectives and as casualties mounted–a war, moreover, that rather than bringing Saddam Hussein’s regime to an end, served to strengthen it.”33 In the event of an Iranian invasion, its most likely point of attack was the city of Basra. Located only 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) from the Iranian border, Basra has a large Shia population and is the second largest city in the country. After taking Khorramshahr, the Iranian army was well within

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artillery range of Basra. Meanwhile, the Iranians were actively engaged in a propaganda campaign to spark a general uprising among the Shia living in the city. The CIA believed that the key to Iraq’s defense of its territory was the morale of its troops, even though most of Iraq’s “regular forces have fought hard despite recent defeats and probably would resist any Iranian thrust into Iraq.” Blame for the defeats was not placed on the troops, but rather “the incompetence of senior Iraqi commanders” that squandered their obvious “advantages in weapons and defensive positions.” In light of this, “If the Iraqi Army were severely crippled, or Al Basrah occupied, the Ba’thist regime itself would be badly shaken and Saddam’s chances for survival would be minimal.” The fundamental question of the time was whether Iraqi troops could stiffen their resolve enough to defend their own territory.34 On July 12, White House, Pentagon, and State Department officials indicated that Iran was massing up to 80,000 Iranian troops in the vicinity of Basra, and an invasion could be expected “within a matter of days.” According to the Washington Post, Intelligence information indicates the Iraqis have close to 100,000 troops arrayed against the Iranians, giving the defenders some numerical advantage. Because the Iraqis would be fighting for their own homeland, they might fight more effectively now. But American officials said the intelligence information also indicates that Iraqi readiness has been poor in comparison to the Iranian efforts. They said there are holes in the trench line dug along portions of the 700-mile border, and that morale continues to be low among Iraqi soldiers.35 Meanwhile, the Security Council unanimously adopted UNSC 514 that called for an immediate end to all military operations, for the return to internationally recognized boundaries, the dispatch of UN observers to verify disengagement, and urged mediation efforts to settle the conflict.36 As usual, Iraq immediately accepted the resolution, while the Iranians, emboldened by their military advantage, “flatly rejected any UN actions to end the dispute, since the UN made no effort to intervene when Iraq had the upper hand.”37 Just after dark on July 13, Iranian forces surged across the border, launching “human-wave” offensives against the Iraqi defenses outside of Basra, which was “strongly defended by earth-works in successive arcs in which were set bunker and weapons positions, covered with miles of barbed wire fencing and entanglements, and protected by extensive minefields.”38 The main Iranian thrust toward Basra came east of the city, along a 16-kilometer (10-mile) front. Unlike the previous battles in the war, the Iranians encountered fierce resistance

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from Iraqi forces when they invaded. “The Iranians apparently hoped to cut off routes of retreat for the Iraqi forces across the Shatt al Arab to Basra.” American officials believed that if this strategy was successful, it could “neutralize a major part of the Iraqi army.” But within 48 hours of Iran’s offensive, it was clear that the Iraqis stopped the main Iranian thrust 10 kilometers (6 miles) inside Iraq39 and launched a counteroffensive that pushed them back to within 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) of the border. According to Department of Defense officials, the initial fighting was intense, “involving tank battles and artillery exchanges as well as infantry clashes.” One American official indicated that “the Iraqis haven’t cracked under fire and the original Iranian thrust has been unsuccessful,” but there was “likely to be protracted

The Battle Lines around Basra (Source: NASA)

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fighting along the front until the outcome becomes clear.”40 Interestingly, according to CIA and DIA sources, during the course of fighting, the Iraqis extensively employed the use of military-grade tear gas (CS). While tear gas was not lethal, it caused Iranian soldiers to become seriously ill, and the resulting panic proved to be an effective means of breaking up the “human-wave” offensives against Basra.41 The sheer determination and aggressiveness of the Iranian offensive against Basra alarmed the Reagan administration. On the day of the offensive, President Reagan and NSC officials met with Republican congressional leaders to discuss the fighting. Administration officials indicated that Iran’s attack posed serious implications for American policy toward the Middle East. The pervasive fear was that the collapse of the regime in Baghdad could lead to the installment of an Islamic fundamentalist government, which could assist Iran in overthrowing the moderate Arab governments in the Gulf.42 It was around this time that voices in Washington began to speak out and argue that something had to be done to shore up the faltering Iraqi regime. One such voice was Henry S. Rowen, the chairman of the national intelligence council, who, on July 20, wrote a brief addressing the dangers that America faced in the Persian Gulf amid the most intense fighting of the war. Rowen’s position was clear: In the absence of outside military support for Kuwait and other Gulf states, an Iranian defeat of Iraq would set in motion forces for accommodation with anti-Western goals—whether by overthrow of existing regimes or accommodations by them. It is imaginable that it could help bring into power fundamentalist regimes of such anti-Western animosity, hostility against neighbors, or internal incoherence that oil supplies could be seriously disrupted. . . . [We] cannot be at all sanguine that events will develop in a favorable way to [American] interests. We may soon be faced with a situation in which a significant proportion of the oil supplies to the West are heavily influenced by Iran or by political forces hostile to the West or by forces unable or uninterested in maintaining the flow of oil.43 That being the case, the United States needed to be prepared to work to avoid this and if that meant tilting heavily toward Iraq, so be it. As a result, the administration convened a meeting of the Senior Interagency Group (SIG)44 in order to discuss the “possible reasons for tilting U.S. policy towards Iraq in the current Iran-Iraq war.” The group identified a number of important reasons for considering a tilt toward Iraq. First, the administration received a number of requests by Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf States for “a clear

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tilt in U.S. policy towards Iraq.” Indeed each of these states had reason to be apprehensive about an Iranian victory over Iraq. Second, if Iran achieves its objective of overthrowing the Iraqi government and establishing an Islamic fundamentalist state, it will seriously harm America’s regional security, and its political and economic interests. A further reason related to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Iranian victories over Iraq gave the fundamentalist cause the cachet of success at a time when traditional Arab societies and governments have been humiliated by their impotence in the face of Israel’s attack on Lebanon. . . . This situation would pose a significant threat if a marriage of convenience were to form between the Palestinian radicals and Shiite fundamentalists.45 Unfortunately for the Americans, the overall performance of the Iraqi army was very poor. It was not until the Battle of Basra that Iraq showed some sense of competency. In light of this, the Reagan administration had to ask to what extent it wanted to align itself with Iraq. After all, what would happen if the United States openly sided with Iraq and it was defeated? The consequences could be irreparable. As a result, any operations conducted to support Iraq had to be plausibly deniable. The SIG identified five options available to the United States that fit this standard. The first was to provide overt political support for Iraq. Despite the beneficial psychological effect this option posed, the SIG doubted that political support, “if taken in the absence of military measures,” would have a positive impact on the war and was “likely to highlight U.S. impotency.” The next option was to mount clandestine operations aimed at overthrowing Khomeini. But this would be exceptionally difficult, as the Khomeini regime, “bolstered by military victories and increased oil exports,” appeared firmly entrenched. Consequently, the SIG believed that “the efficacy of a clandestine operation does not appear to justify the political costs.” A third option was to provide military equipment to Iraq directly or indirectly through third parties, such as South Korea, Jordan, and Egypt. Indeed, this option was worth pursuing as “Iraq recently . . . queried U.S. manufacturers about purchases of military trucks and helicopter gunships,” which, when brought to the attention of the administration, were subsequently denied. Nevertheless, even if the administration wanted to sell American military equipment, all transfers above $7 million were subject to congressional approval, which in Iraq’s case seemed unlikely. Thus, Washington’s only feasible alternative was to quietly encourage the Egyptians or French to “step up their supply of non-U.S. equipment.” The fourth option was to provide military support to Iraq in indirect ways, such as

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“airlifting Egyptian or Jordanian troops” to the Iraqi front. However, the SIG felt that it was unlikely that enough Egyptian or Jordanian forces could be “deployed to make a significant difference on the battlefield.” Furthermore, the administration would encounter congressional opposition to such efforts because they would violate the policy of strict neutrality. The final option, providing intelligence support to Iraq, was indeed the most intriguing: Baghdad’s most basic need is for accurate and timely intelligence on Iranian unit and equipment dispositions and Iranian intentions. [Excised] Providing real-time or near real time intelligence on order of battle, (the information which would have the greatest impact on tactical situation) is virtually impossible without overriding risks. [Excised] Nevertheless, even strategic intelligence can play a significant role. [Excised] Our role might be identifiable and might have a negative impact in the Iranian military. [Nevertheless,] Of all the options reviewed by the [Interagency Group], this option has the greatest attraction. It could have an immediate impact on the war and it maintains at least some degree of deniability.46 Most of the options suggested by the SIG had their limitations; however, the third and fifth options were quite viable. Over the course of the next six weeks, Iran launched Operation Ramadan, which consisted of three separate attacks against the Iraqi defenses around Basra. Like previous battles, the Iranians made extensive use of its “human wave” tactics, often led by the youthful Basij, some as young as twelve years of age. Essentially, as Edgar O’Ballance put it, the Basij were battle fodder, charged with “moving through minefields ahead of ‘human-waves’ of Pasdaran” in order to explode mines and cut wire obstacles.47 In the initial phase of the invasion, the Basij proved quite effective, managing to pierce through Iraqi defenses and make it as far as 16 kilometers (10 miles) into Iraq before being halted. The Iraqis subsequently counterattacked and pushed the Iranians back to the border, where fighting continued for three more days until slowing. A second round of fighting broke out on July 21, when Iran again pushed 10 kilometers (6 miles) into Iraq. According to O’Ballance, on two occasions the Iranians reached the Kutayban River, a tiny tributary of the Tigris River, but they failed to cross it. After three nights of fighting, the Iranians claimed to be in possession of 288 square kilometers (180 square miles) of Iraqi soil. The next day, however, the Iraqis counterattacked and drove the Iranians back to their starting point, where fighting again slowed to a stalemate. The final Iranian thrust came on August 1, when, in a last ditch effort, it attacked the Iraqi lines, taking a sliver of land before fighting died down.48

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Casualty estimates vary wildly. On August 1, Iraq claimed that it had killed more than 27,000 Iranians in the first two phases of battle.49 American officials were certainly skeptical of Iraq’s claims, but it was not altogether surprising that the Iranians suffered significantly higher losses than the Iraqis. After all, “Iran’s use of massed infantry assaults against dug-in defenders . . . exposed Iranian troops to devastating fire from artillery, tanks and machine guns.”50 O’Ballance, however, gives a more plausible estimate: Human casualties [during the first two phases of fighting] had again been very heavy, one source . . . estimated [that overall casualties] . . . averaged over 1,000 on day. . . . The Iranians later admitted losing 10,000 men, but claimed they had killed 7,000 Iraqis, and taken 1,400 prisoners. Most estimates put the ratio of Iranians to Iraqis dead as still being in the region of three to one.51 Despite the horrific loss of life, the battle was unquestionably a victory for the Iraqis. After all, the Iraqis held their ground against the Iranians. At the same time, Khomeini expected that Basra’s co-religionist, Shia population would rise up against the Ba’athist regime, but this did not happen. Instead, the Shia rallied to their nation’s call, no longer viewing the war in religious terms (Sunni vs. Shia), but rather in the context of Arab-Persian rivalry. As a result, the absence of the Shia defection to Iran greatly stiffened the resolve of the Iraqi forces to defend their homeland, as had happened in Iran two years earlier when Iraq invaded.52 Understandably, the Reagan administration was under intense pressure by the Gulf States to shore up the embattled Iraqi regime. With the slowing of fighting around Basra, it looked as though Iraq was safe for the time being. This provided an ideal opportunity for the United States to reassure the Gulf States of their safety. To this effect, the United States announced on August 25 that it was planning an “elaborate air, land and sea military exercise in and around the strategic Persian Gulf country of Oman” for the fall. Unsurprisingly, the objective of the exercise was to “reassure oil producing gulf countries that American forces could hurry to their assistance in an emergency.” At the same time, the exercise also intended to send a message to Iran that the Reagan administration would not tolerate any threats toward these nations.53 It was in this context that the Reagan administration began providing Iraq with classified, tactical intelligence on Iranian troop movements. According to Bob Woodward, just after the Battle of Basra the CIA: . . . established a direct top-secret Washington-Baghdad link to provide the Iraqis with better and faster intelligence from U.S. satellites. Casey

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[also] met with senior Iraqis to make sure the new channel was functioning and to encourage more attacks on Iran, especially against economic targets.54 The provision of tactical intelligence was a logical step for the Reagan administration. In order to adequately defend themselves from an Iranian attack, all the Iraqis needed to know were the positions of Iran’s forces. This could be easily passed to the Iraqis by way of a military attache´ or political officer in the American interests section in Baghdad. As the war entered its third year, Iran launched an offensive against Iraqi forces still occupying the Iranian village of Sumar on September 30. Located in the rugged foothills above the Iraqi town of Mandali, Sumar was 115 kilometers (72 miles) northeast of Baghdad. According to a report in the New York Times, “American intelligence sources reported that the forces on each side numbered about 15,000 men, although the Iranians were believed to have 35,000 more men available for use if their attacks succeeded.” Again, the Iranians adopted the same “human-wave” tactics used at Basra. However, a shortage of air support limited the effectiveness of their assault.55 Nevertheless, Iran successfully recaptured approximately 145 square kilometers (90 square miles) of its territory, including the strategic heights overlooking the central Iraqi plain. Even though Iraq held “a clear advantage in terms of air superiority, tanks and logistical lines . . . the Iranians have demonstrated a persistence and occasional battlefield ingenuity that has succeeded in pushing the Iraqis out of almost all” of its territory. Indeed, the Iranians appeared to be slowly inching toward Baghdad.56 Not long after the fighting at Mandali, the recently appointed Secretary of State George Shultz, after Alexander Haig stepped down in June 1982, met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi for over an hour at the United Nations in New York on October 5. Over the course of discussions, Hammadi was quite frank with Shultz; they talked about a variety of issues, including the status of the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East peace process, and Iraqi links to terrorism. Essentially, the Iraqis viewed the most recent Iranian offensives to be the last “before a state of no-war, no-peace sets in.” In other words, the Iraqis were hoping for a stalemate. As he had with Draper in 1981, Hammadi again requested that Washington work to “stop Israel’s alleged continuing supply of military equipment to Iran,” but after questioning on this subject he admitted he was unable to provide evidence of the Israeli-Iranian link. This did not, however, mean that the link did not exist, which Shultz knew was in fact the case. Turning to the issue of Iraq’s support of terrorism, Hammadi “categorically denied” any Iraqi involvement with terrorists, arguing that

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“Iraq is itself a victim of terrorism and condemns it.” To this, Shultz pointed out to Hammadi that although the United States removed Iraq from its list of nations that supported terrorism, it still viewed terrorism as a major obstacle to the resumption of formal diplomatic relations. In the end, the meeting proved to be an ideal opportunity for the new secretary of state to familiarize himself with Iraq’s perceptions toward its war with Iran. It also was significant in that it was the first official meeting between an American secretary of state and an Iraqi foreign minister since the process of rapprochement had begun in April 1981.57 Indeed, a meeting of this level further bolsters the argument that aggressiveness in Iran’s invasion at Basra and Mandali made a strong impact on the desire of the United States to quickly improve its relationship with Iraq. As the winter rains set in for the third time, the Reagan administration focused its energy on building confidence among the Gulf States. At the beginning of December 1982, the United States conducted its previously announced military maneuvers, known as Operation Jade Tiger, off the coast of Oman and Somalia. The operation involved 2,500 Marines and was aimed at testing regional defenses “in the event of a Soviet or other foreign [read Iran] attack on the Persian Gulf region.”58 The impact of the Reagan administration’s decision to take Iraq off the list of countries that support terrorism became clear in late December 1982. It appeared that as soon as Iraq was removed from the list a number of major American businesses scored lucrative contracts with the Iraqis. For instance, on December 15 the Wall Street Journal broke the story that Hughes Helicopters Incorporated recently sold 60 helicopters, plus spare parts, and ground-support equipment and training, to Iraq for $25 million.59 After the story broke, Hughes formally announced the sale, indicating “the singleengine copters were being sold strictly for flight training, transportation and agricultural purposes.” In an effort to deflect accusations that the helicopters would be used in military operations, which would defy the policy of strict neutrality toward the war, a company spokesman stated that in order to use the helicopters for military use, it “would involve substantial aerospace manufacturing and engineering capability” that Iraq simply did not have.60 The senate committee on foreign relations admonished the president on December 23 for approving the transaction as the sale violated the American policy of neutrality in the war and failing to subject the sale to congressional review. When the committee demanded to know why it had not been permitted to review the sale, commerce department officials explained that, “the Iraqi sale went through without a review because the helicopters weigh less than 10,000 pounds each and, therefore, are classified as “civilian,” not

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requiring an export license.” Unhappy with this explanation, the committee “strongly urged” the president to halt the shipment of the remaining helicopters, arguing, “It is only reasonable to assume that the Iraqi Government will employ this large number of helicopters in its war with Iran, whether for artillery spotting or otherwise.” The administration knew that it could not obtain congressional approval for the helicopter gunships that Iraq wanted, so instead it had authorized the sale of helicopters that were not subject to review.61 By the end of 1982, it was clear that the United States, out of necessity, was tilting decidedly toward Iraq in the war. Prior to Iran’s aggressive offensive at Basra, the Reagan administration’s efforts to improve relations with Iraq consisted of diplomatic demarches that were significant in their own right, but nothing substantive in terms of diplomatic, security, or intelligence sharing evolved immediately. Iran’s offensive against Iraq in the summer of 1982 was a watershed in the administration’s approach to the war. Immediately afterwards, senior administration officials reassessed the necessity of shoring up the Iraqi regime against collapse. Although privately many American officials detested the repressive nature of the Iraqi regime, the importance of preventing an Iranian victory trumped any personal reservations. Undoubtedly, America’s allies in the Persian Gulf greatly influenced the decision to begin supporting Iraq. After all, any threat posed to Iraq was equal to the threat posed to the Gulf States, the only difference being that Iraq’s military appeared to be able to hold itself against Iran, whereas Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates were not. The only exception to this rule was Saudi Arabia, but that was due to its close association with the United States, evidenced by Reagan’s decision to sell the AWACS. In the end, it was the intelligence gleaned from the AWACS that proved to be the most useful to Iraq. Using its advanced technology, the Americans were able to pass directly to the Iraqis advanced warning of Iranian troop movements prior to an offensive. In doing so, providing tactical intelligence proved to be a small but extremely effective means of supporting the Iraqi regime. The sale of helicopters to Iraq also indicated another small but effective effort to bolster the Iraqi regime. From a realist perspective, despite the official policy of strict neutrality, providing support for Iraq in the face of Iran’s decision to invade was unquestionably in America’s best interests.

6

The Internationalization of the War

Not long after Operation Jade Tiger, the Pentagon announced that it was transforming and expanding the Carter administration’s Rapid Deployment Task Force into the Central Command (CENTCOM). As it turned out, Operation Jade Tiger underlined significant logistical problems that the U.S. military faced in operating in the near east region. Notably, the Persian Gulf, which clearly appeared to be the center of the crisis, “is more than 6,000 miles from bases in the United States,” which meant that American forces could not deploy effectively to counter Soviet advances in the region, as evidenced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.1 The new command officially came into existence on January 1, 1983, and was tasked with the planning and coordination of “U.S. military operations throughout Southwest Asia and to demonstrate America’s commitment to stability in the region.” The creation of CENTCOM set the stage for an expanded American presence and role in the region, which would prove useful later in the IranIraq conflict.2 Just before midnight on February 6, Iran launched a new phase of its war called Operation Wal Fajr (Dawn). According to a map seized from an Iranian prisoner, the operation’s objective was to seize the Baghdad-Basra road that runs through the city of Amarah.3 Launched from Dezful, at the foot of the Zagros Mountains, two Iranian divisions, 24 kilometers (15 miles) apart and in “human-wave” formation, moved east toward the frontier town of Fakkeh. The attack was a diversion, but the Iraqis did not take the bait. At dawn, the real offensive was launched on February 7 with two additional divisions charging in the same pattern toward Fakkeh. When the Iranian

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divisions came up against the Iraqi lines, its largely infantry forces were mowed down by Iraq’s superior firepower. The next morning, Iran launched a third “human-wave” assault on the Iraqi lines, only to be checked by the Iraqis again. In the late afternoon of February 9, the Iranians launched an armored attack that fought through the night and broke the Iraqi lines. When morning came the next day, the Iranian armored division was isolated deep within Iraqi territory and vulnerable to counterattack. The Iraqis then surrounded the division, which immediately surrendered.4 Throughout the course of the battle, American intelligence agencies were largely in the dark about what was occurring. This was because the Iranians launched the offensive amid an intense rainstorm, which continued for the better part of the fighting. Due to the cloud cover, American satellites could not observe the course of the battle nor pass word on to the Iraqis about Iranian troop movements.5 Meanwhile in Tehran, the failed offensive against Amarah led to intense deliberations among Iran’s ruling elite about how to proceed with the war. According to Edgar O’Ballance: The sharp rebuff to Operation Wal Fajr caused the Iranian [Supreme Defense Council or SDC], and senior commanders, to rethink future strategy and tactics. The vaunted dramatic “human-wave” massed attacks were not proving to be successful, they were extremely wasteful of human life, and it was beginning to become apparent that the former well of Iranian manpower was no longer overflowing. Regular Army senior officers were all against further ‘human-wave’ attacks. The outcome of SDC deliberations was that Iran should fight a war of attrition, in which its large numbers and resources would eventually wear down the lesser ones of Iraq. The policy was to be to exert steady pressure against the whole (now) 650 mile (1040 kilometer) Front, from north of Penjwin, down to the Shatt al-Arab, to stretch Iraqi resources until they snapped under strain, by keeping huge formations deployed close to, and along the whole length of the Front.6 Accordingly, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) believed the Iranian attack was “a complete failure,” because it failed to reach its intended objective despite the staggering loss of life.7 Indeed, while a strategy of attrition was a logical step to defeat Iraq, it was clear that Iran’s tactics were putting significant strains between the mullahs in Tehran and its military. In late December 1982, William Eagleton met with Tariq Aziz in Baghdad and discussed the possibility of Hammadi visiting the United States. After brief deliberations, the Reagan administration agreed to receive the Iraqi

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delegation and arranged meetings with Secretary Shultz and members of Congress for early February. Significantly, Eagleton raised with Aziz the issue of Iraq’s support for terrorism.8 Aziz indicated that Iraq had largely ceased its financial backing for pro-Palestinian terrorist organizations, but he did not see any problems with offering them safe haven in Iraq. To this, Eagleton remarked that Iraq openly harbored notorious terrorist Abu Nidal,9 to which Aziz categorically denied any affiliation or support for his activities, although he promised to examine the matter more closely. Iraq’s support for terrorist groups was becoming a political problem for the Reagan administration, which was getting pressed by Congress to adhere to its policy of strict neutrality. At a follow-up meeting on January 15 between Eagleton and Issam Mahboub, the acting head of the first international department of the Iraqi ministry of foreign affairs, these issues were raised again, but the Iraqis were not yet prepared to respond to American requests.10 On February 14, Secretary Shultz met with Hammadi, Iraq’s minister of foreign affairs, at the Department of State. At the outset, Hammadi urged the United States not to base its policy toward Iraq on “the misperception that the Iraqi regime is unstable,” to which Shultz indicated that no such perception existed. Hammadi suggested that Iraq was poised to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf region, particularly in terms of regional stability. He pointed out that Iraq was strong militarily, whereas “Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States were financially strong but militarily weak.” Commenting on Iraq’s desire to promote regional stability, Shultz observed that Iraq’s “support for terrorism was inconsistent with the promotion of regional stability,” while noting that recent progress had been made. Hammadi then asked Shultz what progress had been made with American efforts to bring Iraq’s war with Iran to an end, suggesting that the United States should “urge our friends to limit their arms supply to and trade to Iran, and that [the US] police the black market in arms more effectively.” Considering the absence of any influence over Iran, the Secretary noted that the Reagan administration continued “to prohibit export of US licensed military components or equipment to Iran, sometimes at great diplomatic cost to our European allies,” like Britain, France, and West Germany. Finally, “Hammadi asked the US to expand the otherwise satisfactory US-Iraqi trade relationship by providing and encouraging financing from official and private sources, following the example of friends of the US who have important economic ties with Iraq.” This clearly referred to the French, who had dramatically increased their military-supply relationship with Iraq since the start of the war. With regards to this, Shultz indicated that the State Department would study this and get back to Iraq on this.11

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Immediately after Shultz’s meeting with Hammadi, the Washington Post reported that the administration agreed to extend Iraq “subsidized, lowinterest sales” for purchases of “up to $450 million in American agricultural commodities.” The decision to offer Iraq credits stemmed “partly from the administration’s tendency to regard Iraq as a potentially good market for U.S. exports and partly from a political and strategic desire to help Iraqi President Saddam Hussein ward off Iran’s drive to overthrow his regime.” The credits provided by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) would be used to buy $210 million in export guarantees and $160 million to buy wheat, rice, and barley. This clearly indicated that the Reagan administration went beyond studying bilateral economic opportunities and immediately went forward with this option.12 The root of Iraq’s economic problems can be traced to Syria’s decision in April 1982 to close Iraq’s major oil pipeline to the Mediterranean that traversed its territory. Hafez al-Assad’s decision to close the pipeline reflected Syria’s growing alliance with Iran, which requested that it close the pipeline as part of a strategy to economically starve the Iraqi regime. According to the CIA, in return for keeping the pipeline closed throughout 1983, the Iranians provided the Syrians with $1.4 billion worth of oil.13 The closing of the pipeline effectively cut Iraq’s ability to export oil by half and the subsequent loss of revenue forced Baghdad to dip deeply into its foreign-exchange reserves.14 By early 1983, it was clear that Iran’s strategy was working. For instance, in 1979, Iraq’s oil exports brought in a total of $23 billion in revenue, whereas in 1982 it only brought in $9.2 billion.15 As the war dragged on, Iraq continued to dig deep into its foreign-exchange reserves to purchase vast quantities of weaponry, while relying on its oil revenues and foreign loans to artificially inflate the Iraqi economy. As a result, Iraq’s foreign-exchange reserves fell from approximately $33 billion in 1980 to $5 billion by 1982.16 This led Iraq to seek further loans from the Gulf States, which were entirely hesitant about doing so, and the “rescheduling of debts from its trading partners, suppliers and backers.”17 As a result, in 1983, it was unlikely that total aid from the Gulf States would “exceed the previous level of $5.5 billion in 1982.”18 On April 10, the Iranians launched an offensive against the Baghdad-Basra road from an area just north of Fakkeh. Using approximately 15,000 troops, the objective was to “regain another small sliver of Iraqi-held ‘Iranian’ territory.”19 According to a report in the New York Times, “Iran said it had retaken 60 square miles of its territory in the [Mussan] area Monday, including five strategic hills and several other vantage points that brought Iraqi positions across the border within range of Iranian artillery.” 20 After the

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fighting died down on April 16, both sides claimed extravagant casualties, although most experts agreed that 5,000 Iraqis and 3,000 Iranians were killed in the battle.21 On April 18, terrorism took on a new meaning for the American public and policy makers in Washington when a truck filled with explosives detonated on the grounds of the American embassy in Beirut. Immediately after the attack, a secretive, pro-Iranian terrorist organization known as Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. In the aftermath of the bombing, 63 people died and 80 were wounded, and the majority of the victims were Lebanese. Among the dead were 17 Americans, including CIA Deputy Station Chief Robert Clayton Ames, who was described by the agency as “the top Middle East analyst in the entire intelligence community” and 8 other CIA officials.22 Although this cataclysmic event was not directly related to the Iran-Iraq war, the American position toward Iran hardened immensely. The desire for vengeance against Iran undoubtedly resulted in a desire to tilt further toward Iraq, but because the embassy bombing wounded the American psyche so deeply, if the Iraqis wanted any help from the United States it had to sever its ties to terrorist organizations. Addressing the new diplomatic imperative of Iraq’s support for terrorism, Eagleton met with Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti, Saddam’s half-brother and the head of the Iraqi General Intelligence Services (Mukhabarat) on May 4. Eagleton got straight to the point and raised the administration’s concern about Abu Nidal’s presence within Iraq. Barzan explained, “[It] was a mistake to consider [Abu Nidal] a tool of the Iraqi government.” The only way to “exert some influence on him” was to allow his presence in Iraq. “After the [Israeli] massacre of Palestinians in Lebanon,” Barzan recalled, Abu Nidal “was planning revenge against Jews in Europe and we convinced him there was no benefit in this. However, sometimes he has plans which we do not know about.” Barzan questioned the relevance of American concerns about Iraqi contacts with terrorists. “There is a thread between [Iraq] and Abu Nidal. Does the U.S. believe that this is beneficial or is it better to cut the thread?” Through this thread we can have some effect. Cutting it might cause him to act against us and against the U.S. If we send him out he might come under the influence [sic] of Syria which would help him choose his targets and assist him in acts against the U.S or Iraq. While he remains in Iraq we can prevent certain things. He is prepared to go to Syria or Libya. They might push him to act against Arafat or King Hussein. If one of these were killed, the U.S. Middle East Peace Plan would fail, so is it beneficial to cut this thread?

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Despite the logic of Barzan’s analysis, Eagleton curtly explained that if Iraq did not sever its contacts with Abu Nidal and other terrorist organizations there was little room for improvement in relations.23 Toward the end of May, a diplomatic breakthrough in the conflict appeared to be on the horizon. On May 20, Iran agreed to mediation efforts by the GCC that called for a return to the borders as outlined in the Algiers Agreement of 1975 and provisions for the exchange of thousands of prisoners of war. 24 Around the same time, Iran surprised regional analysts when it requested that the secretary-general send a mission to the war zone in order to inspect the civilian areas damaged by the war, a suggestion that Iraq subsequently supported. The Iranian request was remarkable because throughout the course of the conflict Tehran had dismissed the UN as biased. Over the course of its two-week long inspection, the mission visited 12 Iranian and 7 Iraqi civilian areas. The mandate of the mission had three components. First, “to determine whether civilian areas had been subject to damage or destruction by military means;” second, “to assess the extent of such damage and destruction as far as possible;” and third, “to indicate, where possible, the types of munitions used.” The inspector’s report found that Iran had sustained greater physical damage than Iraq. For instance, the Iraqis had completely destroyed Abadan and Khorramshahr, displacing the large civilian populations from both cities. Furthermore, “During the evacuation of the population several thousand civilians had been killed, and thousands more wounded.” By contrast, the damage inflicted upon Iraq was mostly superficial.25 In mid-May 1983, Iraq’s economic crisis became quite apparent when it began bartering military supplies from France with oil. The arrangement was that Iraq would pay 90 percent of its debt to France with shipments of crude oil. At this point, the Iraqis owed France an outstanding debt of $1.76 billion, while at the same time, the French were investing large amounts of capital in Iraq. According to Mike Dobbs of the Washington Post: About 6,000 French nationals are employed on projects under construction in Iraq. The [French] government has guaranteed investments of about $4.75 billion in Iraq and is politically committed to the Baghdad government, which France sees as a key to stability in the region.26 While in Paris, Aziz reached an agreement with the French government to lease five Super E´tendard fighter jets equipped with Exocet antiship missiles. It was clear that the sale of the Super E´tendards would greatly improve Iraq’s ability to attack Iranian shipping in the Gulf. Iraq’s previous attacks, according to American officials, “used Super-Frelon heavy helicopters and Mirage F-1 interceptors, but neither is as effective as the Super E´tendard, which is

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the French Navy’s chief carrier fighter-bomber.”27 The CIA supported this assessment, pointing out that the delivery of “the Super E´tendard aircraft . . . would make it feasible for Iraqi attacks against shipping nearly as far south as Bandar-e Abbas,” located in the Strait of Hormuz.28 On July 20, Tariq Aziz announced that Iraq would begin attacks on Iranian economic targets, including those in the Strait of Hormuz, in retaliation for Iran’s “war of economic attrition.” The new tactic had two interrelated aspects. First, Iraq would attack Iranian economic targets in the Gulf to convince Tehran that the war of attrition should be discontinued. But Iran was not willing to end the war until it removed Saddam Hussein from power. Not unlike Iraq during 1980–1981, Iran would not readily agree to end a war that it seemed to be winning. Aziz clearly recognized the tactical advantage of acquiring the Super E´tendards, which tipped the balance of the war in its favor. No longer did Iraq have to suffer alone with its economic stagnation. You will see, you will hear, in every month from now Iraq will be able to cause some damage to the Iranian economic institutions in the depth of Iran and the gulf. . . . This means that the economic conditions in Iran . . . will suffer more deterioration . . . contrary to what those ignorant people expect.29 The second aspect of the Iraqi policy was to internationalize the war. Unable on its own to force a quick end to the conflict, Iraq thought that attacks in the Gulf would prompt a sharp international response, quite possibly in the form of Western intervention. In that event, Iran would face two options: agree to a ceasefire or face a military confrontation with the West. The acquisition of the Super E´tendards, coupled with Iraq’s military and economic crises, prompted the CIA to circulate SNIE 36.2-83 on July 19. The CIA believed that since Iraq’s retreat from Iran in May 1982, it had forfeited “the ability to control the scope and duration of the conflict.” It cannot regain the initiative without escalating the fighting and, in the process, decreasing the already slim chances of a political settlement. Consequently, it most likely will continue to wage a defensive war punctuated by occasional air raids or missile attacks against Iranian oil facilities and population centers but also with the possibility of escalating attacks on Iranian shipping. The CIA saw that Iraq’s military performance had improved significantly since its embarrassing defeats in 1981–1982. This was primarily because “Iraq has more mobile forces, a better organized logistic system, and elaborate defensive fortifications along the border.” Certainly this was accurate,

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but the big improvement came from “improved intelligence, especially signal intercept capability.” As a result, “Iraqi commanders almost always have foreknowledge of Iranian moves” and preparations for offensives. Other factors behind Iraq’s improved military capabilities relate to “Purges of incompetent senior Iraqi commanders following the Khorramshahr defeat, improved tactical planning, and a greater willingness of Iraqi troops to fight in defense of their own territory.” But despite these significant improvements, Iraq had no ability to force Iran to negotiate a settlement, particularly in light of the fact that the regime in Tehran “espouses Saddam’s overthrow as a religious duty.” As a result, the CIA did not believe that the war would end anytime in the near future.30 In assessing Iraq’s response to Iran’s attrition strategy, the CIA believed that Iraq had two main objectives. First, Baghdad needed to “convince Tehran that it cannot win the war militarily and that continuation of the war, even at reduced levels, is not in Iran’s interest.” Second, the Iraqis believe in the need to persuade “the major powers that the war must be stopped and that outside parties must work for a cease-fire.” In other words, Iraq wanted to internationalize the war. In order to achieve Iraq’s objective, it could either attack “Iranian oil installations, cities, and civilian targets with surface-tosurface missiles,” or initiate “air attacks on Iranian oil facilities and tankers in the Persian Gulf.” The prospects of an escalation of the war into the Gulf had terrible implications for American policy. Indeed, attacks on Gulf shipping would escalate the war extensively and appreciably increase the likelihood of greater superpower involvement in the region. The CIA believed that if Iraq were to choose this option, Iran would likely retaliate by closing the Strait of Hormuz or, worse, attacking the Gulf States. In either case, it significantly raised the possibility of a direct American or multinational intervention.31 Perhaps the most significant element of SNIE 36.2-83 was its reference to Iraq’s chemical weapons capability. The estimate identified that Baghdad’s imperative goal was to “prevent Iran from achieving tangible military success while inflicting the heaviest possible losses on Iranian forces.” Baghdad for many months has boasted that it possesses a secret weapon that can inflict massive casualties and ensure victory. . . . Iraq reportedly has at least 1,000 artillery shells filled with mustard agent but has not used them so far in the fighting. The Iraqis have used tear gas in the fighting, but no lethal or incapacitating agents, against the Iranians. While the use of mustard would inflict heavy casualties on Iran’s infantry forces, it would not force Iran to end the war.

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Unsurprisingly, the introduction of chemical weapons into the war was viewed as a major escalation in the war. But the CIA believed that Iraq’s chemical weapons capability was limited and “still in the experimental stage.”32 This final point proved to be incorrect, as Iraq used chemical weapons for the first time only days after the release of SNIE 36.2-83. In late July, the Iranians launched Operation Wal Fajr-2, a joint operation between Iranian and Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) forces. The operation’s objective was to capture territory held by the Iraqi-backed forces of Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, known as the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I). The operation was launched near the strategic town of Haji Omran, which straddled the Iran-Iraq border in the northeastern-most extremes of Iraq, near Rawanduz. Historically, this town was Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s base of operations during his 1961–1975 revolt against the Iraqi government. Since the start of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi government dramatically increased its aid to Ghassemlou’s KDP-I to disrupt Iranian operations in the Kurdish sector. The Iranians, however, played the exact same game. Early in the war, Tehran began working with the remnants of Mullah Mustafa’s KDP, now jointly run by his two sons Massoud and Idris, who wanted to achieve the autonomy in northern Iraq that was promised to their father. Nevertheless, when Iran launched its offensive against Haji Omran on July 22, it managed to penetrate deep into Iraqi territory, capturing the Iraqi barracks, which was used as a supply base for the KDP-I, and Mount Marmand, the strategic heights overlooking the town, and as many as 20,000 women and children that were transported to detention camps in southern Iran.33 The Iraqis were largely caught off-guard by the sudden invasion of Kurdistan. Having lost a significant portion of its territory in the north, the Iraqi regime viewed the Kurdish role in the operation as treason. As a result, it lashed out viciously, airlifting reinforcements into the Rawanduz valley by helicopter and unleashing the IAF against Kurdish strongholds.34 After the fighting died down, the Iranians and Kurds consolidated their new positions. During this time, Tehran invited reporters to visit the battleground, which clearly indicated the accuracy of its claims.35 Undoubtedly, the offensive was a massive success for the Iranians, as they finally managed to capture and hold a significant piece of Iraqi territory. But to the KDP it was an even greater victory, as it finally managed to recapture the historic stronghold that it had been expelled from after the Algiers Agreement in March 1975. Coming immediately on the heels of the successful Iranian offensive against Haji Omran, on July 30 the Iranians opened a second front, launching Operation Wal Fajr-3 against the central sector of the front near Mehran.

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Unlike the offensive in Kurdistan, the Iraqis preempted the Iranian offensive by attacking first. The Iranians, however, proved to be resolute. They immediately reversed the Iraqi attack with three successive “human-wave” attacks in as many days. By the time fighting died down on August 10, the Iranians could accurately claim to have captured the Iraqi border town of Doraji and Badra Dam, recaptured the Iranian village of Forakhabad, and secured three strategic heights in the area. 36 Thus, between July 22 and August 10, the Iranians managed to launch two thoroughly successful offensives against the Iraqis, in addition to securing significant portions of territory. Understandably, the Iraqis were furious about the further treachery of the Kurds. Consequently, “Starting on July 30, between five and eight thousand Barzani men . . . were rounded up and taken away, never to be seen again.” Two months later, when confronted with this horrific tragedy, Saddam Hussein argued that the Kurds “betrayed the country and the covenant . . . so we punished them severely and they went to hell.”37 In the immediate aftermath of the Iranian victories at Haji Omran and Mehran, Saddam Hussein announced his intention to extend the war into the Gulf. On August 12, he declared the creation of a “Naval Exclusion Zone” that covered the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab and extended south into the Persian Gulf to include Kharg Island, Iran’s major oil export terminal. This prompted the Iranians to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz. Dismissing the critics’ arguments that closing the Strait would be economically and logistically unfeasible, the Iranian regime cited three potential options: The first was to create a ‘Wall of Fire’ from 120 mm guns on Qesham and Larak Islands, through which . . . ships could not pass unnoticed. . . . The second was to fire on ships passing through the Straits with missiles from aircraft . . . and the third method was to sink a large super-tanker in the Straits. But the Iranians did not stop at rhetoric, by September it deployed approximately 600 troops to Sirri Island, within the Strait of Hormuz.38 In September 1983, when it was clear that France was proceeding with its lease of the Super E´tendards to Iraq, the Reagan administration examined a number of diplomatic steps in order to prevent a dangerous escalation of the war. On September 3, Shultz proposed a three-track approach “to try to head off a situation that could escalate into a threat to international navigation in the Gulf.” The first track consisted of urging France to suspend or delay the sale of the aircraft to Iraq. If that failed, France could “at least consider imposing on Iraq the condition that [the aircraft] not be used against oil

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shipping or export facilities.” In addition, the State Department asked the “British to support this demarche to the French with a high-level approach of their own.” The second track was to consult with the Iraqis about the issue, while the third track involved discussions with the Gulf States “about ways in which they could try to dissuade Iraq from [a] potentially dangerous escalation of military activity in the Gulf, including further measures to ease the economic burden of the [Syrian] pipeline closure on Iraq.” While the GCC agreed at the end of August to approach Syria about the Iraqi pipeline, there was no indication that Syrian President Hafez al-Assad would compromise on this issue. In addition, the Gulf States could try to persuade France to put off its sale of the jets to Iraq. Through these efforts, the administration believed that it could exert enough pressure on France to reconsider the sale. However, the administration needed a military contingency plan should these efforts fail.39 Quite significantly, on September 7, Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger met with Iraqi ambassador Ismat Kittani to discuss the state of American-Iraqi relations. During the course of their discussions Eagleburger informed Kittani that the Reagan administration considered Iraq’s defeat as “a strategic defeat for the U.S.” and that ending the Iran-Iraq War was a “priority interest.”40 This strong statement clearly implied that the United States was seriously reconsidering its traditional policy of neutrality in favor of a tilt toward Iraq. In late September, due to intense diplomatic and internal pressure, Francois Mitterrand’s government appeared to agree to postpone the Super E´tendard delivery. But according to an INR report from October 6, the French decision to delay the delivery of the jets was a highly calculated feint. In the wake of Iran’s recent threats of retaliation, there probably was a recognition in Paris that France would be regarded as partly responsible for any deterioration of the situation in the Persian Gulf. . . . The French probably held up delivery hoping that the domestic and international clamor would subside. Mitterrand’s plan was to wait for the publicity surrounding the sale of the jets to subside, while using the opportunity to train Iraqis in the use of the jets, and then proceed with the transaction. Problematically, during this time, “the French . . . convinced the Iraqis that the US was primarily responsible for Paris’ decision to postpone the delivery of five Super E´tendard aircraft to Iraq.” Unsurprisingly, a furious Iraq expressed its displeasure with Washington through its Interest Section in Washington and at the United Nations. But why did the French purposely injure American efforts to prevent an escalation

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in the Gulf? Despite France’s attempts to scuttle the growing American-Iraqi relationship, the INR noted that: . . . the impact on US-Iraqi relations probably will be short-lived: the French are likely to deliver the E´tendards to Iraq at some point and the whole affair may serve as a useful reminder to the Iraqi regime that US concerns cannot be totally disregarded in Baghdad’s strategic calculations.41 Although the situation had an immediate chilling effect on the relationship between Baghdad and Washington, in the long term Iraq needed American and Saudi support, which were both working to deescalate the war, not the opposite. The next day, October 7, Nicholas Veliotes, the assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs, and Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, the state department director of the bureau of politico-military affairs, produced an important analysis for Lawrence Eagleburger on the validity of the American policy of strict neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. The analysis opened with a discussion on the benefits derived from the strict neutrality policy. After four years of conflict, the policy helped to avoid a direct great power conflict, prevented the spread of the war, contributed to the current stalemate, and preserved the possibility of a future U.S.-Iran rapprochement while undermining Soviet influence in the region. Overall, this policy was a remarkable success. Since the start of the war, two major changes occurred that raised the issue of whether neutrality was best serving American regional objectives. First, American-Iraqi relations had improved significantly since the start of the war; and second, Iran’s tactical use of military attrition and economic strangulation were nearly crippling the Iraqi economy. In response, Iraq was pursuing options that could escalate the war by attacking Iranian economic targets in the Persian Gulf, which ran contrary to American interests in the region. With these factors in mind, Veliotes and Howe analyzed the economic, diplomatic, and military options available to the United States.42 Financially, the United States faced two options. First, it could provide capital directly to Iraq, but this option was not feasible in light of the considerable legal and policy constraints. Without doubt, congressional supporters of Israel would block this measure with greater vigor than they tried to block the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia. The second option, providing support to Iraq to allow it to export more oil, seemed more promising but the United States could not do much directly. Iraq’s pipeline through Turkey was already being expanded by 25 percent, but this project would not be finished until late spring 1984. There was also the prospect of installing an American-built

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pipeline through Saudi Arabia that would connect to the Red Sea, but again this job would not be completed until the end of 1984. The best solution to Iraq’s financial problems was to reopen the Iraqi-Syrian pipeline. Unfortunately, beyond encouraging the GCC to talk to Syria, Washington could do little in terms of direct economic support.43 Diplomatically, considering the dismal state of American-Iraqi relations following the exposure of Washington’s covert support for the Kurds in 1976, the United States had significantly improved its relationship with Iraq by 1983. While the Super E´tendard issue set back American-Iraqi relations, the State Department believed it would only be temporary. Meanwhile, the United States was seeking a resolution at the United Nations that would discourage “attacks on oil-related facilities in the Gulf.” The hope was that this resolution would allow Iraq to reopen its oil exporting facilities at Umm Qasr, its only viable port, which would enable “Iraq to meet its financial needs by increasing oil exports” through the Gulf. The administration hoped that this resolution would vitiate “Iran’s strategy of economic strangulation” and reduce “the motivation of Iraq to escalate the war.” It appeared that American efforts at the United Nations were the best avenue for helping Iraq during its financial crisis.44 In terms of military options, preventing Iran from acquiring American arms was the most promising. Eventually this proposal would develop into Operation Staunch, which would eventually be vaunted as evidence of America’s neutrality in the war. Another potential option was to permit Iraq to buy American weaponry directly or through third parties, an avenue that faced considerable obstacles. First, Congress would never permit this to occur; second, that policy would undermine the American efforts at the United Nations; and finally, Iraq did not use American weaponry. The worst-case scenario was to commit American troops to protect Iraqi oil exports, but this option could lead to war with Iran and would undoubtedly face intense congressional opposition. In sum, Veliotes and Howe concluded, “the military or quasi-military options” available to the United States “have far more disadvantages than advantages.”45 After reviewing the various financial, diplomatic, and military options available to the United States, Veliotes and Howe made several important conclusions. As the United States could do little to help Iraq militarily, the most productive measure was to prevent Iranian acquisition of American-made weaponry. Financially and diplomatically, the best option in the near-term for the United States was to continue to pursue its initiative at the United Nations. In the long-term, the construction of the Saudi pipeline and a reopening of the Syrian pipeline held the most promise for Iraq’s prospects.

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Nevertheless, Veliotes and Howe did not mince words when they pointed out that: [The American] policy of strict neutrality has already been modified, except for arms sales, since Iran’s forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982. The steps we have taken toward the conflict since then have progressively favored Iraq. (We assume that other actions not discussed here, such as providing tactical intelligence, would continue as necessary.) They also offered words of caution: We need to continue to be cautious about tilting so far towards Iraq that either Iraq is able to force a level of U.S. support we may not wish to provide . . . or that we become identified with a regime whose longer-term prospects remain uncertain. . . . In addition, the qualified tilt which we have in fact practiced for over a year is again being ratcheted [sic] one notch higher through the UN approach we are pursuing to assist Iraq to resume oil exports through the Gulf. It balances our interest in seeing that Iraq is not defeated with our interest in avoiding an escalation which could draw us directly into the conflict—while doing nothing to worsen our position with respect to Iran. In the final analysis, they concluded, “we see significant advantages in maintaining an overall posture of neutrality.” Produced by two high-level American officials, an analysis of this nature had considerable impact on the policy toward the war.46 On November 2, Iraq announced France’s delivery of the five Super E´tendard aircraft. According to the Washington Post, the aircraft left France in early October,47 but Iraq had since complained bitterly that they had not arrived.48 Since then, mystery surrounded whether the French would actually go through with the delivery, as it was under intense pressure from the United States, among others, to delay or cancel the deal. “Delivery was originally scheduled for mid-September but was delayed after concern was expressed in Western capitals. French diplomats used the delay to attempt to show that the major obstacle to peace came from Iran rather than Iraq.”49 Although American and Iraqi interests collided over the question of expanding the war into the Persian Gulf, toward the end of 1983 it was clear that the Reagan administration was tilting in favor of Iraq. With Iraq’s military on the ropes and its economy in crisis, America’s tilt was out of necessity. Meanwhile, the Iranian hand in the October 23 bombing of American and French barracks in Beirut that killed 241 marines and 58 French paratroopers hardened the French and American attitudes toward Iran.50

7

Turning a Blind Eye

In the aftermath of the First World War, the leading powers of the world joined together and banned the “use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices” with the Geneva Protocol of 1925.1 Both Iran and Iraq were signatories to the protocol, with Iran ratifying it in 1929 and Iraq two years later, but Iraq attached a condition to its accession, “having the effect of a ‘no first use’ clause.” This meant that Iraq would not use chemical weapons unless they were used against it first. An important aspect of the convention that most observers fail to point out was that prior to the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, no international treaty forbade the development, production, or deployment of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons.2 Undoubtedly Iraq’s extensive use of chemical weapons during its war with Iran, contributed significantly to the banning of not just the use of chemical weapons, but also its possession and production. According to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction), Iraq’s interest in a chemical weapons capacity dates back the early 1960s. In 1964, under President Abdul Salam Arif, Iraq established the Iraqi Chemical Corps (ICC), which consisted of a core group of officers that were sent abroad to study nuclear, biological, and chemical defenses. In 1971, ICC requested and received Ba’athist approval to synthesize small quantities of mustard, Tabun, and tear gas (CS) agents “for familiarization and experience.” This led to the construction of laboratories near Baghdad. But following the signing of the Algiers Accord, the Iraqi government no longer felt the need for a chemical weapon

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defense. As a result, Iraq suspended its efforts to produce chemical weapons in 1978. But the Iranian Revolution quickly changed its priorities: By the end of 1979, a reorganized Chemical Corps used the expanded al-Rashid site to produce CW agents, ostensibly for the testing of CW defensive gear and detection equipment. . . . The outbreak of war with Iran in 1980 and Iraq’s failure to attain a speedy victory appear to have been the impetus for the Ministry of Defense’s launch of its industrialscale, comprehensive, strategic CW program . . . on June 8, 1981. Within months of the reformation of the ICC, construction began on Iraq’s main CW production facility “under the cover of pesticide production.” According to the CIA, West German businesses, using East German designs, supervised the creation of what was at the time the world’s most modern and bestplanned CW facility. Construction actively between 1982 and 1983 was intense. Iraq’s foreign contractors, including Karl Kolb with Masser for reinforcement, built five large research laboratories, an administrative building, eight large underground bunkers for storage of chemical munitions, and the first production buildings. Iraq also purchased “40,000 artillery shells, and 7,500 bomb casings from various countries,” including Spain, between 1981 and 1984.3 All of this combined, clearly indicates that Iraq had a premeditated desire to arm itself with a chemical weapon capability, but by the standards of the time this was not illegal. Iraq’s first use of chemical munitions occurred in July 1982, when its military used military-grade tear gas (CS) to break up Iran’s “human-wave” offensives against Basra. Even though tear gas was not lethal, nor illegal, it was highly effective both militarily and psychologically, which underscored the value of Iraq’s already blossoming chemical weapons production capability to the Iraqi leadership. Indicative of this, on April 12, Iraq warned Iran that it would use a new weapon that “will destroy any moving creature,” one so devastating that it had not been “used in previous attacks because of humanitarian and ethical reasons.”4 It was not until July and August 1983, when Iraq faced the loss of a significant section of its territory in Iraqi Kurdistan, that the regime opted to “cross the chemical threshold.” At the time, the Iraqi regime was particularly upset about Kurdish treachery during the fighting around Haji Omran. On August 8, after fighting died down at Mehran, in the central sector, Iraq finally unleashed its “secret weapon,” dropping mustard gas, a blistering agent that

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was extensively used by Germany during the First World War, on the KurdishIranian positions on the mountains above Haji Omran.5 According to the unofficial Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), “more than 50 Iranian combatants suffered severe injuries as a result of chemical bombs dropped by Iraqi planes six kilometers west of the Piranshahr-Rawanduz [sic] road, in the northwestern border region.”6 Indeed, since the fighting in July, the Kurds had fortified its positions around Haji Omran. According to Iranian physiologist Dr. Abbas Foroutan, the Iraqis carried out a total of seven chemical attacks in the Haji Omran area during the offensive.7 According to Wayne White, the principle INR analyst on the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq slathered the area with mustard gas and then landed its elite special forces on the peaks shortly after by helicopter, but the operation was “a mess because of Iraq’s inexperience.” Unlike the relatively flat terrain around Basra, the mountainous terrain around Penjwin was not particularly suited for chemical warfare. . . . mustard gas settles on vegetation as a still-dangerous liquid film, there was plenty of bush [and] plant cover on these low mountains [and] a fairly large number of the Iraqi troops involved became gas casualties as a result of coming into contact with such residue (which is quite capable of even burning through uniform cloth).8 Understandably, Iraq’s inexperience with chemical weapons certainly led to casualties on both sides, but its overall use was largely ineffective. Just after midnight on October 20, the Iranians followed up its earlier Wal Fajr offensives with a heavy push toward the Iraqi city of Penjwin, located on the Iranian border near Marivan. Although the front was 150 kilometers (94 miles) wide, the bulk of the Iranian thrust occurred in the Penjwin valley, which consists of a small salient of Iraqi territory that juts about 45 kilometers (28 miles) into Iran in between the Iranian towns of Marivan and Baneh. The Iranian offensive “followed a familiar pattern of mass infantry attacks supported by a few tanks,” with the apparent goals of putting Baneh and Marivan “out of range of Iraqi guns” and striking at pro-Iraqi Kurds in the area. Within 24 hours of launching its attack, Iran claimed it had pushed 16 kilometers (10 miles) into Iraq, capturing the strategic heights above Penjwin and a small garrison town named Garmak, located 6 kilometers (4 miles) to the northeast. 9 In response to Iranian aggression against the sparsely defended area, Iraq launched missiles for the first time against Iranian civilian targets, killing 128, and mined the approaches to the key Iranian port of Bandar Khomeini.10 The CIA confirmed these reports.11 Once again, Iran’s breakthrough at Penjwin resulted in desperate moves by the Iraqis to halt the advance. Over the course of five days of fighting, Iraq

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unsuccessfully counterattacked on five occasions, using approximately a hundred tanks and armored personnel carriers.12 As Iran’s momentum grew, Iraq once again resorted to using chemical weapons. The IRNA reported that “Iraqi forces fired at least 28 chemical artillery shells on the positions of the Islamic forces [on October 21] in the Sarbish and Hani Baraneh regions north of the Iraqi town of Penjwin [sic].”13 By October 25, Iran claimed it captured more than 600 square kilometers (375 square miles) inside Iraq and drove “Kurdish rebels” from 100 square kilometers (62.5 square miles) of Iranian territory.14 Then, after a brief lull in fighting, the Iranians launched the second phase of its offensive on October 26, which nearly encircled Penjwin and occupied all of the “key high ground” in the area.15 By November 1, the Iranians claimed to have occupied the Kalu Heights, which loom above Penjwin and offer an exceptional view of the surrounding area.16 Not long after the offensive, the CIA confirmed Iraq’s use of chemical weapons at Penjwin. Interestingly, the CIA believed that Iraq’s use of chemical weapons was not necessarily authorized by Baghdad. In light of this, the Ba’athist leadership ordered its forces on November 1 to not use chemical weapons unless authorized. In light of Iraq’s increasing use of chemical weapons—whether authorized or not—the CIA legitimately feared that the Iranians would begin “to search for their own sources of chemical weapons” and “expect Iran to adjust its tactics to account for Iraq’s more effective use of mustard agent.”17 That same day, Admiral Howe sent an urgent memorandum to Secretary Shultz regarding Iraq’s “almost daily” use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Howe’s message deserves to be quoted in full. We have recently received additional information confirming Iraqi use of chemical weapons. We also know that Iraq has acquired a [chemical weapon or CW] production capability, primarily from Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary. In keeping with our policy of seeking to halt CWuse wherever it occurs, we are considering the most effective means to halt Iraqi CW use including, as a first step, a direct approach to Iraq. This would be consistent with the way we handled the initial CW use information from Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, i.e., private de´marches to the Lao, Vietnamese and Soviets. As you are aware, presently Iraq is at a disadvantage in its war of attrition with Iran. After a recent [Senior Interagency Group] meeting on the war, a discussion paper was sent to the White House for an [National Security Council] meeting . . . , a section of which outlines a number of measures we might take to assist Iraq. At our suggestion, the issue of Iraqi CW use will be added to the agenda for this meeting.

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If the NSC decides measures are to be undertaken to assist Iraq, our best present chance of influencing cessation of CW use may be in the context of informing Iraq of these measures. It is important, however, that we approach Iraq very soon in order to maintain the credibility of U.S. policy on CW, as well as to reduce or halt what now appears to be Iraq’s almost daily use of CW.18 This report clearly indicates that the Reagan administration was deeply concerned not only about Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, but also its own potential complicity in Iraq’s acquisition of a chemical weapons capability. After accusing Iraq of using chemical weapons in the war, the Iranians took the matter to the United Nations, an institution that it deeply distrusted. On October 31, the Security Council passed UNSC 540, which condemned both nations in the conflict and called “for the immediate cessation of all military operations against civilian targets, including city and residential areas” as well as a return to internationally recognized borders. Referring to Iraq’s threat to escalate into the Gulf, UNSC 540 called for both sides “to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict.”19 UNSC 540 was important because for the first time the Security Council set out an identifiable framework for the conflict’s cessation. Unfortunately, like all previous resolutions, Iraq immediately accepted its terms, while Iran rejected it outright. On November 8, Iran took the matter of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons to the Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar and asked for a UN Commission of Experts to investigate the matter. Unfortunately, there was not much the secretary-general could do because there was no mechanism available to investigate these claims, let alone the political will. According to Giandomenico Picco, the assistant secretary-general for political affairs: The idea of investigating chemical warfare accusations was very new, even though to the Western mind it’s logical to investigate when you have an allegation. There had been no such investigations since the signing of the Geneva Protocol on gas warfare in 1925, and so when the secretarygeneral raised this with the Security Council in 1983, he encountered an anarctically cold atmosphere; the Security Council wanted nothing of it.20 The chilly response from the Security Council was not altogether surprising considering Iran’s steadfast refusal to adhere to resolutions calling for an end to the war. Iraq’s considerable escalation of the war, in terms of both the introduction of the Super E´tendards and chemical weapons, and Iran’s abrupt turn to the

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United Nations prompted the State Department to react. On November 10, the bureau of politico-military affairs drew up instructions for the American interests section in Baghdad on how to respond to the growing crisis. While noting the “sensitivity of reporting on this subject has precluded discussing it with foreign governments,” Iran’s approach to the UN provided “both an opening and the necessity to raise this issue in Baghdad.” In the cable, the department instructed Eagleton to raise a number of points with Tariq Aziz. First, “the [United States Government or USG] is very concerned with the present overall situation in southwest Asia. We strongly support a negotiated settlement.” Second, “It is thus in a constructive spirit that we raise with you an issue of great sensitivity and importance to the USG, namely, prohibited use of lethal chemical weapons.” Third, “We raise the issue now neither to enter into a confrontational exchange with you, nor to lend support to the views of others; but, rather, because it is a long-standing policy of the U.S. to oppose use of lethal CW.” Fourth, “We also raise the matter now because we believe continued Iraqi use of CW will play into the hands of those who would wish to escalate tensions in the region, as well as constrain the ability of the USG to play a helpful role in the region.” Fifth, “We note that Iraq long ago acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of CW. We believe Iraq’s scrupulous adherence to that protocol is important to avoid dangerous escalation of the war, to maintain the hope of bringing Iran to the negotiating table, and to avoid providing Iran with a potent propaganda weapon against Iraq.” And finally, that the United States hopes that Iraq “will receive our representation in the spirit it was intended.”21 Eagleton’s instructions clearly reflect the pervasive view in Washington that Iraq’s introduction of chemical weapons significantly escalated the war, while undercutting international efforts to mediate a negotiated settlement. Furthermore, in the background information provided to Eagleton, the State Department felt there was legitimate reason to believe that given Iraq’s “desperation to end the war, [it] may again use lethal or incapacitating CW, particularly if Iran threatens to break through Iraqi lines in a large-scale attack.” Although the instructions and background material were drawn up on November 10, State did not approve and send them until November 21, indicating that the department was split over how to approach Iraq with the matter.22 Nevertheless, upon receiving instructions from State, Eagleton met with Iraqi officials the next day and outlined the Reagan administrations concerns about Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Unfortunately details of Iraq’s reaction are not yet available.23 In the fall of 1983, the Reagan administration convened the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), an interagency body, to devise the

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diplomatic and military guidelines (known as Terms of Reference) in the event that the war escalated in the Persian Gulf. According to the terms, the United States intended to increase its naval presence in the region, expand intelligence sharing with the Gulf States, commence planning and preparations for a multinational force to protect shipping in the Gulf, and increase in Gulf States’ air defense readiness. Should this not deter the belligerents, the American navy would intervene directly “to counter minelaying or conduct mine-clearing operations in international and non-belligerent territorial waters.” Should this not work, the navy would then organize a convoy system to protect shipping in the Gulf. The navy would also work to “defend against an attack on [a] non-belligerent’s territory or oil facilities.” Finally, “Provided the US obtained a reliable warning, the US would . . . initiate direct military action against Iran, either before or in response to overt Iranian military actions,” although this would require Reagan’s authorization. Ideally, a multilateral military response to escalation in the Gulf would best serve American interests, but the United States “would be prepared to act alone if our Allies declined to participate.”24 To coordinate the American military response, the NSPG created the IranIraq Conflict Escalation Containment Military Planning Group under the direction of the Department of Defense. The group’s principle objective was to engage in a series of bilateral military discussions with nations “that have an interest in or benefit from continued access to Persian Gulf oil,” with the purpose of formulating “combined military plans or coordinated actions to contain an escalation of the Iran-Iraq conflict.” Overall, the depth of the military response to the escalating situation in the Persian Gulf underlined the vital importance of the region to American interests.25 The escalation of the war into the Persian Gulf led President Reagan to sign National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114 on November 26, which became the basis for the official American policy toward the Iran-Iraq War. Essentially, NSDD 114 recognized the imperative need for political and military consultations with America’s key regional allies and the Gulf States in order to prepare for contingencies in the event of a disruption of oil from the Persian Gulf. Underscoring the Persian Gulf ’s importance, NSDD 114 declared: It is present United States policy to undertake whatever measures may be necessary to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to international shipping. Accordingly, U.S. military forces will attempt to deter and, if that fails, to defeat any hostile efforts to close the Strait to international shipping. Because of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment

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in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic. Later in the war, when Iran and Iraq increased attacks against merchant shipping in the Gulf, NSDD 114 served as the basis for the dramatic expansion of America’s military forces in the region and ultimately leading to direct confrontation with Iran.26 Not long after Eagleton’s de´marche about Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, the Iraqis approached the interests section and “prominently alleged the failure of the U.S. and its allies to keep promises to press Iran for a ceasefire in the Gulf.” In the same meeting, “Iraq implied that this inactivity leaves it no choice but to press Iran militarily.”27 A few days later on December 7, William Eagleton approached Iraq’s Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf and proposed a high-level visit by President Reagan’s ambassador-at-large Donald Rumsfeld on December 12 and 13. To this request, Sahhaf “replied without hesitation such a visit would not be convenient” on these dates, as the foreign minister and president were both busy, suggesting instead that Rumsfeld visit after December 17.28 Three days later, Eagleton met again with Sahhaf to finalize the details for the visit. At this meeting, Eagleton emphasized the importance that Reagan’s envoy meet directly with Saddam Hussein. At Sahhaf ’s request, Eagleton identified the topics that the ambassador wished to discuss, including “the Gulf War, the Middle East peace, Lebanon, Syria, and any other question that the Iraqis wished to raise.” In the end, it was agreed that Rumsfeld would visit Iraq from December 19 to 20.29 In preparation for Rumsfeld’s visit, Eagleton’s staff drew up a number of “talking points” for his meetings with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein. The cable emphasized that Rumsfeld’s upcoming meeting with Saddam was the first time an official of the executive wing of the American government had ever met with the secretive leader. Nevertheless, the meeting’s objective was “to initiate a dialogue and establish a personal rapport” with Saddam. With regards to Iraq’s war with Iran, Rumsfeld was to convey that the president and the American government “are committed to a sustained effort to help end the war” and that it “would regard any major reversal of Iraq’s fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West.” Rumsfeld was also to emphasize America’s support for UNSC 540, while indicating that the American government would “continue efforts to bring Iran to accept or acquiesce in its terms.” Recognizing Iraq’s inability to export its oil, the Reagan administration supported the expansion of Iraqi pipelines through Saudi Arabia and Jordan in

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order to “redress the Iran-Iraq oil export imbalance.” On the issue of terrorism, Rumsfeld was to express satisfaction about “Iraq’s expulsion of the Abu Nidal terrorist group,” which Secretary Shultz had previously identified as an impediment to the growth of American-Iraqi relations.30 The biggest obstacle facing the Rumsfeld mission was conveying to Iraq the administration’s desire to prevent an Iraqi collapse. The Iraqis were frustrated by Iran’s continued access to American weaponry through Israel. Although there was little the State Department could do to stop Israel from pursuing its own agenda, this issue provided an ideal opportunity for the State Department to push for closer relations. Since the start of the war, the State Department led a number of efforts to block American weaponry from reaching the Iranians, but without the support of its allies, these efforts were largely fruitless. For instance, high-level de´marches had already been made to Israel, South Korea, and Spain about providing weapons to Iran. Similar efforts were made to France about its arms relationship with Iraq, but as the sale of the Super E´tendards reflects, these efforts saw little success.31 Operation Staunch, however, served to greatly expand America’s efforts at halting illegal diversions of American-made military equipment. The Reagan administration believed that by targeting Iran’s access to weapons was the best option to force it to negotiate. After all, throughout the war Iraq consistently accepted UN resolutions calling for a ceasefire, while Iran remained intransigent, furthering the argument that Khomeini’s regime was the only obstacle to peace.32 Early in the morning on December 12, a truck loaded with explosives smashed into the American embassy in Kuwait. According to the New York Times, bombs went off: at the airport, killing an Egyptian technician; at the French Embassy, slightly injuring two workers and causing extensive damage; at a residential area where many Americans live, and at an industrial complex and an electric power station. Another car bomb was found at the Kuwaiti passport and immigration office and was rendered harmless before it could be detonated. In total, 7 people were killed and 62 injured in the attacks. 33 Reagan administration officials linked the attack to Iranian-backed terrorists. But the attack cast further evidence of a new phenomenon: state-sponsored terrorism. As one intelligence official lamented, “It’s very different from having terrorist groups operating on their own. . . . When you link terrorism to the resources of a government, the possibilities are frightening.”34 Operation Staunch was formally launched on December 14 when Secretary Shultz sent a cable to all of its major embassies outlining the scope of

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the new policy initiative. The cable instructed American diplomats to approach their host nations and request that they “consider stopping any traffic in military equipment of whatever origin that may exist between your country and Iran at least until a ceasefire is in place” and “extend the reach of your law to your private citizens who may be engaged in such traffic from third countries.” Furthermore, it asked that America’s allies “retard or reduce the flow of any military equipment that may transit your country for the belligerents.” In order to justify such a request, the State Department pointed out that the recent escalation of the war into the Gulf was “so threatening to all our interests” that it was essential to “diminish Iran’s ability to prolong the war and use violence to spread its influence abroad.” Furthermore, the Reagan administration indicated that it was prepared to redouble its own efforts to block further shipments of weaponry to Iran, but these efforts could only “be fully effective . . . if supported by our allies and friends.”35 It was no coincidence that Operation Staunch was launched immediately before Rumsfeld’s arrival in Baghdad, as the initiative was a boon to Iraq. After all, the vast majority of Iraq’s weaponry came from non-Western sources in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This meant that the United States and its allies had virtually no ability to influence the shipment of weapons to Iraq. The only exception was France, but as the Super E´tendard fiasco underscored, the Americans had virtually no ability to influence French policy. By launching Operation Staunch when it did, the State Department provided Rumsfeld with clear evidence of America’s efforts to help force Iran to accept UNSC 540, while increasing the potential for the resumption of diplomatic relations. In other words, Operations Staunch was a boon to Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld and his entourage arrived in Baghdad on December 19 and during his two-day visit he participated in three important meetings that deserve to be discussed at length. The first meeting, which took place at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, was an unexpected, private meeting between Rumsfeld and Tariq Aziz. The meeting was quite informal with both participants frankly exchanging their views on a wide variety of issues. At the outset, Rumsfeld stated that the purpose of his mission was not to restore diplomatic relations, but rather to discuss a number of areas where American and Iraqi interests intersected, including “the security and stability in the gulf ” and the need to increase Iraq’s ability to export oil, potentially using two proposed pipelines, one through Saudi Arabia and another through Jordan to the Red Sea at Aqaba. With regards to the latter pipeline, Aziz expressed his concern about the pipeline’s proximity to Israel and the inherent vulnerability that brings. Nevertheless, while Iraq was certainly interested in expanding its exports, it needed “to find the right formula.” With regards to the Iran-Iraq war,

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Rumsfeld asked a number of pointed questions about the details of the fighting. Aziz indicated that the front was broken down into “four of five sectors” and that Iraq’s defenses “run the entire spectrum.” Aziz explained that machine guns and artillery have been particularly effective against Iran’s human wave assaults. Nevertheless, Aziz felt that “the war was over in the strategic sense in that Iraq will not lose. What he didn’t know was the tactical issue of when the war would end—One. Two. Three. Four years from now.” Perhaps Iraq’s greatest concern was Iran’s ability to have “enough oil to continue the war indefinitely,” while recognizing that its limiting factor was access to weaponry. This provided Rumsfeld with an excellent transition to bring up American efforts through Operation Staunch, which Aziz appreciated and offered to provide a list of countries known to be providing arms to Iran. Rumsfeld offered his appreciation for the list and indicated that the United States “would work with the countries involved on a sustained basis to try to reduce the flow to Iran.” It was evident from Aziz’s conversation with Rumsfeld that he had developed a newfound appreciation for American efforts to curb Iran’s access to weaponry. He also expressed his appreciation for American support for UNSC 540, to which Rumsfeld explained that it was the administration’s desire to seek a mediated end to the war without further escalation of the conflict. But Rumsfeld made clear that America’s “efforts to assist [Iraq] were inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for [the United States] citing the use of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the gulf, and human rights,” to which Aziz made no identifiable response.36 After the private meeting, Rumsfeld and Aziz joined the rest of the American mission for a meeting with Sahhaf and former Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Ismat Kittani. Throughout the course of the second meeting, Rumsfeld continued to emphasize the themes of America’s desire to redress “the present regional imbalance,” the importance of reducing Iran’s access to weaponry, and its desire to resume relations on Iraq’s schedule. Overall, the group discussions, though less candid, generally reflected the private discussions between Rumsfeld and Aziz. However, Rumsfeld seemed to have struck a chord with the Iraqis when he stated, “It was regrettable that a whole generation of Americans and Iraqis were growing up without contacts,” because the next day Saddam Hussein paraphrased this exact statement.37 The next morning Rumsfeld met with Saddam Hussein for an hour-and-ahalf to discuss the state of American-Iraqi relations, means to improve economic stability, and regional security issues such as Lebanon’s deteriorating situation and its war with Iran. Understandably, the meeting was viewed as a “positive milestone in [the] development of U.S.-Iraqi relations,” as it marked the first time a high-level American official had met with Hussein. At the

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outset, Saddam “showed obvious pleasure” with a letter presented from President Reagan, which effectively “removed whatever obstacles remained in the way of resuming diplomatic relations.” While relations would not resume for some time, there were several indications that Iraq was seriously reconsidering its position. For instance, Saddam indicated to Rumsfeld that “before the war, [the] Iraqi leadership had examined [the] circumstances of severance of relations and possible resumption,” but the conflict with Iran had prevented this from occurring. Saddam felt that the absence of diplomatic relations with the United States was “unnatural,” as an “independent and non-aligned country . . . it was incorrect and unbalanced to have relations with the Soviet Union and not with [the United States].”38 Turning to the war, Rumsfeld pointed out that it was neither in the interest of the region nor the West for the conflict to create greater instability or to produce an outcome that “weakened Iraq’s role or enhanced [the] interests and ambitions of Iran.” Further, he stressed that an escalation of the war into the Persian Gulf would be detrimental to the interests of the region as a whole, while noting that a negotiated peace was the preferred outcome of the United States. Rumsfeld reiterated the State Department’s efforts through Operation Staunch to prevent weaponry from reaching Iran. At this point, Saddam interjected “that Libya and Syria had been intermediaries in such deals, like the recent Spanish sale.” Although the United States could use its influence with Spain, and indeed had recently done so, these other nations “were sovereign states who would end up doing what they pleased.” Regarding the war, Iraq’s patience “should not be misunderstood,” Saddam explained: While concerned with [the] security of the Gulf, Iraq could not dispense with its national interest. With Iran exporting oil and Iraq not able to do so through the Gulf or the Syrian pipeline, it was not for Iraq to look after the world’s interests before its own. What was needed was to stop the war, or put the Gulf in a balanced situation for the belligerents. This was a significant point, for Iraq was at an economic disadvantage in the war. Rumsfeld pointed out that he discussed this subject in detail with Tariq Aziz and reiterated that American companies were involved in the construction of a pipeline through Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Accepting this, Saddam still pointed out his hesitancy due to Israel’s proximity. But because of the involvement of American companies, he indicated that he would reconsider the value of the project. The discussion concluded with Rumsfeld pointing out that Iraq did not want to be dependent on only one route for the export of oil and that these alternatives were perfectly viable.39

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Overall, Rumsfeld’s mission to Iraq had been a success. It set the stage for further improvements in American-Iraqi relations and presented viable ways to improve Iraq’s economic problems. Beyond this, the mission’s objectives were clearly to convey to the Iraqi leadership America’s efforts to force Iran to accept UNSC 540 by curbing its access to weaponry and to overcome the “chill” in relations following the Super E´tendard debacle. Interestingly, Rumsfeld’s only reference to the “almost daily” use of chemical weapons appeared to be mentioned as a seemingly minor obstacle to American-Iraqi relations and did not even elicit an Iraqi response. This leads one to conclude that the moral implications of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons did not stand in the way of the political goal of rapprochement, a stance that underlined the realist elements of American policy. Upon returning from the Middle East, Rumsfeld informed Shultz that America’s commitment to the Gulf States posed a serious problem for American policy toward the region. Rumsfeld reported that “The Gulf Arabs think the Carter Doctrine means we save their regimes and keep the oil flowing.” As a consequence, he warned: The president is out on a limb with this [Carter’s] holdover commitment, but our defense orientation can’t match it. The Gulf could cave in to Iran—a collapse. It would be Lebanon all over again, but on a huge scale. Lebanon is a sideshow. . . The Gulf is crucial, and we are neither organized nor ready to face a crisis there . . . [and] if things got out of control there] . . . it could make Lebanon look like a taffy pull. Shultz agreed with Rumsfeld’s warning, noting that “If Iraq collapsed, that could not only intimidate but inundate our friends in the Gulf and be a strategic disaster for the United States.” Thus, the deteriorating situation in the Persian Gulf forecast an increased American military presence in the region.40 Immediately after Rumsfeld’s return from Iraq, the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) recommended that Iraq receive approval for financing from the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM), which would allow it to purchase American goods. In the past, EXIM opposed loans to Iraq because there was no “reasonable expectation of payment” thanks to its rescheduling of commercial contract payments, large transfers of funds from the Gulf States, decreases in oil production, considerable war damage, and a drop in Iraqi foreign-exchange reserves. But despite these reasonable objections, extending EXIM credits could produce considerable benefits. For instance, “The U.S.-Iraqi political relationship could be advanced by EXIM financing, which had previously not been possible for

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political reasons,” such as its support for terrorism. It also could help to “secure a U.S. foothold in a potentially large export market,” which would bolster the American economy. More importantly, providing EXIM credits would signal “support for Iraq in a practical, neutral context.” The administration could then use its enhanced influence to persuade Iraq not to extend the war into the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, the State Department noted that Iraq had managed to alleviate the “crisis situation” that had faced its economy in 1983. With these factors in mind, the administration urged EXIM to reconsider providing credits to Iraq. 41 Subsequently, on February 1984, EXIM agreed to “consider requests for small amounts of essential imports on a case-by-case basis,” despite its recognition that Iraq was a bad credit risk.42 Not long after Rumsfeld departed Iraq, William Eagleton called on Sahhaf to follow up and “compare notes on Ambassador Rumsfeld’s visit.” It was immediately apparent that the mission was a complete success. The Iraqis were clearly pleased about America’s commitment to blocking weapons from reaching Iran and efforts to help increase its ability to export oil. Sahhaf also reflected upon the lack of progress toward ending the war, but accepted that there was little the United States could do beyond what it was already doing. Eagleton pointed out that the American government had recently concluded a “high level policy review,” referring to the terms of reference and NSDD 114 (see previous chapter), which “established the environment and policy positions that had been conveyed to the Iraqi leadership by Ambassador Rumsfeld.” In Eagleton’s analysis of the conversation, he underscored the success of the Rumsfeld mission: Ambassador Rumsfeld’s visit has elevated US-Iraqi relations to a new level. This is both symbolically important and practically helpful. On the strategic level this new relationship has been usefully registered by our friends, and probably by Iran and Syria as well. Within Iraq, the visit has been observed by the bureaucracy and it will improve our access here. We must now maintain some momentum in the dialogue and relationship. But while the relationship improved significantly, the Iraqis would not commit to cease attacks on Iranian shipping in the Gulf: During and following the Rumsfeld visit we have received no commitment from the Iraqis that they will refrain from military moves towards escalation in the gulf. Nevertheless, the relationship being established with the US may have a restraining influence on the Iraqi leadership,

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perhaps causing them to pause and give diplomacy [a chance] and the hope for a fortuitous [sic] development in Tehran more time. The Iraqis, however, do not consider attacking ships in the exclusion zone near Bandar Khomeini to be an escalation. Eagleton’s follow-up meeting with Sahhaf clearly indicated that the American-Iraqi relationship was positively affected by Rumsfeld’s visit, but it also highlighted that while there was significant improvement, the Iraqis were still very much inclined to address its own interests before accommodating those of the United States.43 American allies throughout the region viewed the Rumsfeld mission positively. In one instance, Saudi officials praised the de´marche as a “very good development” and indicated their pleasure with Operation Staunch. The Saudis pointed out the great benefit of such a program, but noted that Iran was still managing to find weapons largely through the “uncontrolled black market” and from some Western nations. Nevertheless, it was clear that the Saudis viewed the Rumsfeld mission and the launch of Operation Staunch as a great step forward.44 Not long after Eagleton’s meeting with Sahhaf, he was called to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry for consultations with Tariq Aziz about Iraq’s inability to export its oil. At the start of the meeting, Aziz pulled out a piece of paper and read verbatim a message from Saddam Hussein that indicated his pleasure from meeting Rumsfeld and Reagan’s letter. Afterwards, Aziz turned the discussion toward the “American idea” of testing Iran’s reaction to Iraq rebuilding its oil export facilities at Umm Qasr. Aziz explained that while this idea was worth exploring, it was “not yet possible because export facilities were badly damaged and waterways were blocked by mines and other objects.” In light of these circumstances, the Iraqis resolved to rebuild the facilities first and then consider exporting through the Gulf. Another idea suggested a quid pro quo, whereby Iraq allows the Iranians to rebuild its export terminal at Bandar Khomeini in exchange for the Iranians allowing Iraq to do the same to Umm Qasr, although the prospect of Iran agreeing to such terms appeared remote. Aziz also queried American assurances for security from Israel and about the Iraqi pipeline through Jordan. Not having an answer to this question, Eagleton promised to raise the issue with the State Department and report back.45 In January 1984, Geoffrey Kemp, the NSC director for Near East and South Asian affairs, sent Reagan’s national security advisor, Robert “Bud” McFarlane, a memo “describing the Khomeini government as a menace and calling for resumption of covert activity against it.”46 In light of Iran’s continued support

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for terrorist acts aimed at American interests, particularly in Lebanon, prompted the administration to designate Iran as a sponsor of terrorism on January 20.47 By mid-January 1984, the State Department had received considerable feedback with regards to the launching of Operation Staunch. Accepting that the original instructions were somewhat vague about what was expected of each nation, a second cable was sent to all diplomatic posts on January 20 to help clarify the operation. It identified a number of key points. First, because of “Iran’s intransigent rejection of efforts to end the war, its efforts to export its Iran-centered revolutionary ideology, and its willingness to employ terrorism to expand its influence,” the United States and its allies needed to reduce its access to weapons. Acknowledging that the American policy remained neutral, the focus of its efforts was to “seek a negotiated settlement that would respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both sides. We do not wish to see either party dominate the other, nor to fall under outside (i.e., Soviet) influence.” However, because of the economic imbalance between Iran and Iraq and the success of Iran’s attrition strategy, there was: . . . a growing possibility that Iraq may undertake desperate measures to interdict oil and other shipping to Iran. This could result in drastic Iranian action, such as an attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz or retaliation against Iraq’s Arab supporters, thus enflaming the gulf and precipitating wider military involvement—a consequence we very much wish to avoid. As a result, the State Department wished its diplomats to convey the seriousness of the economic chaos that could result from these actions and again asked “in the strongest of terms,” that its allies “stop arms sales to Iran.”48 Meanwhile, building upon the foundation of friendship that the Rumsfeld mission generated, on January 30 the State Department recommended the sale of 2,000 “dual use” heavy transport trucks to Iraq, which would likely be used to rapidly redeploy tanks along the front. When the Iraqis originally proposed the purchase of these trucks in 1982, the State Department blocked the sale because it considered the heavy trucks as subject to the regional stability controls of the Export Administration Act. The trucks were clearly of military value to Iraq, but after the successful Hughes helicopter deal, how could the United States sell helicopters of clear military value but not heavy transport trucks? Thus, the NEA argued: In blocking the truck exports to Iraq, apart from dissatisfying Iraq and the exporters, we have sacrificed U.S. employment opportunities and

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foreign exchange earnings amounting to several hundred million dollars over the past three years in order to maintain a strict and inactive neutrality. By underlining the political value of the sale to the administration, particularly in an election year, the NEA hit the nail on the head, resulting in the administration’s approval of the heavy truck sale on February 13.49 While Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in late 1983 threatened to escalate the war, the Reagan administration’s desire to improve its relations with Iraq appears to have trumped any concerns. Evidence suggests that the subject was raised first by Eagleton’s de´marche on November 22, and Donald Rumsfeld brought it up again in his private meeting with Tariq Aziz on December 19. Unfortunately the details of Eagleton’s approach to the Iraqis remains classified. Rumsfeld’s meetings, however, are available. These records strongly suggest that improving American-Iraqi relations were clearly the priority: helping Iraq redress its oil exports and convincing the Iraqis that the United States was working to block Iranian access to arms. It appeared that Iraq’s use of chemical weapons ranked in the same category as Iraq’s dismal human rights record and was mentioned almost in passing. In the aftermath of the Rumsfeld mission, an identifiable trend was evident: as American relations with Iraq steadily improved, the exact opposite was occurring with Iran. By early 1984, it has been established that the Reagan administration was providing Iraq tactical intelligence, financial assistance in terms of EXIM credits, and approval of the sale of a large number of “dual use” helicopters and heavy trucks. Meanwhile, the State Department was actively pursuing Operation Staunch that blocked Iran’s access to Western arms. The policy was clearly lopsided, as it plainly called for blocking Iranian arms while “urging” Iraqi restraint. But the American policy made perfect sense. After all, Iran refused to negotiate a ceasefire in its war with Iraq and was increasingly using terrorist acts as means of policy. Understandably, this posed a greater challenge to the Reagan administration, particularly as Iranian support for terrorist acts escalated into 1984, including the abduction of a number of American citizens, which presented President Reagan with the exact same dilemma that faced Carter.

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A Sophisticated Strategy

Having received the Super E´tendard jets from France in late 1983, throughout the lull in fighting during the winter rainy season Iraq focused its efforts on attacking shipping in the Gulf. In response, Ayatollah Khomeini repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, which greatly concerned policy makers in Washington. But Iran’s threats were not aimed at Iraq, which had no ability to export oil through the Gulf; rather they were aimed at the Gulf States, whose economies were inextricably linked to the oil trade that passed through the waterway. Thus, in early 1984, the United States, along with France and Britain, increased their naval presence in the Persian Gulf. By mid-February 1984, the United States had deployed its 28-ship Indian Ocean fleet, including the aircraft carrier flagship USS Midway, to the northern Arabian Sea, near Oman. This placed the fleet within easy striking distance of the strait to uphold the so-called Carter doctrine in the event of a closure.1 Ever since its crushing defeat at Basra in 1982, the Iranian leadership adopted a strategy of military attrition along the 1,173-kilometer (733-mile) front, relying on its superiority in numbers and its stronger economy to wear down the Iraqis. What Iran did not count on was the efforts of the West, particularly France, to bolster Iraq’s economy and forestall its collapse. With its economic tactics thwarted, the Iranians returned their focus on continually pressing the Iraqis along the massive border. As we have seen, fighting occurred in three main sectors: in the north near Penjwin, Mehran in the center, and outside of Basra in the south. By varying the location of their attacks, the Iranians hoped to spread Iraq’s forces thin. When the offensives

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came, the Iraqis were already prepared and able to contain the Iranian advances, thanks to American tactical intelligence. However, in some instances the Iraqis were caught off guard and lost significant portions of its territory. In each of these cases, the Iraqis, in desperation, resorted to the use of chemical weapons that led to horrific losses of life. The massive number of Iranian casualties soon became a political problem in Tehran and debate emerged about whether it was worthwhile to continue the war. Many Iranian politicians were horrified by the mullahs’ seemingly mindless decision to send thousands of young Iranians to their deaths. In the spring of 1984, Iran’s leadership ignored the growing chorus of voices calling for an end to the war and pushed forward for a “final offensive” against Iraq. But unlike previous offensives, which relied almost exclusively on the religious fanaticism of the Pasdaran and Basij to overcome their military inferiority, Iranian politicians, disgusted with the incredible loss of life and in the midst of parliamentary elections, forced the mullahs to lift the restrictions against the involvement of the Iranian armed forces in the planning and implementation of military operations.2 As a result, the spring offensives of 1984 were remarkably well planned and coordinated and had tangible objectives. Immediately after the lifting of restrictions, the Iranian military identified that it was hopeless to attack Basra head-on, as Iraq’s defenses were far too strong. Instead, the military identified that the Hawizeh Marshes, the swampy delta at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, provided a viable invasion route. Significantly, the eastern shore of the marsh was close to the strategically important BaghdadBasra road, which was long considered the main logistical artery of the Iraqi army and was often used to rush troops to threatened areas on the front. Iran’s military believed that if it could occupy the marshes, cut the road, and block the river, it could trap Iraq’s Third Army tasked with defending Basra. Surprisingly, from the start of the war, the Iraqis viewed the marshes as an “impassable” physical barrier along the front and had not devoted significant resources for its defense. Nevertheless, the Iranian military recognized that it needed to draw the Iraqi forces defending the marsh north with two wellplaced diversionary attacks just to the north of the marsh. The first diversionary attack, Operation Wal Fajr-5, was launched from the Iranian border town of Mehran on the night of February 16. The offensive had two objectives. The first was to drive Iraqi forces “out of the Mehran area and the hills to the southeast.” The second objective was to push southwest from Mehran toward the Iraqi city of Kut, which is located on the BaghdadBasra highway and was an important communications hub for the Iraqi army. By the end of the second day of fighting, the Iranians had pushed forward

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from Mehran, captured a number of strategic hills overlooking the Tigris plain and were within 30 kilometers (19 miles) of Kut. At this point, the Iranians began to shell the strategic Baghdad-Basra highway for the first time.3 In response to the offensive, the Iraqis launched six counterattacks, pushing the Iranians back from Kut, while taking on significant casualties— approximately 3,600 in four days of fighting.4 Amid the combat in the central sector, Iran launched a second diversionary attack from Dehloran against some heights held by the Iraqis, near the town of Ali al-Gharbi, which was also on the Basra-Baghdad road. According to Edgar O’Ballance, the fighting at Dehloran was confused and only lasted a couple of days before the Iraqis contained the offensive.5 It was quite evident to the Iraqis that Operation Wal Fajr-5 and Wal Fajr-6 were diversionary attacks aimed at diverting Iraqi forces defending Basra further to the north. But the Iraqis did not fall for the trap. At the time, it was a well-known secret that Iran had built up close to half a million troops in the southern sector outside Basra6 That being the case, and in light of Iraqi access to American intelligence, the Iraqis did not fall for Iran’s trap and continued to focus its defenses around Basra. On the eve of what would become Operation Kheiber, William Eagleton, the head of the American interests section in Baghdad, cabled Washington and reported that an Iranian offensive against the Basra sector was imminent. According to Eagleton, Saddam Hussein warned Iran on February 21 that if it attacked, Iraq would no longer confine itself “to a static defense but would be compelled to strike deep inside Iranian territory.” Of greater concern, in his speech Saddam openly threatened the Iranian “invaders” that Iraq would use chemical weapons in the event of an offensive. Addressing the Iranian leadership, Saddam cautioned that “for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever their number and [that] Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide.”7 This unveiled threat of the use of chemical weapons in the war was certainly a new development. The next evening, Iran launched Operation Kheiber, a three-prong attack across the Iraqi border by way of the Hawizeh Marshes that lie just north of Basra. Just before midnight, Iranian forces, making use of a flotilla of small boats, slowly made their way through the marshes. By morning, Iraq’s unsuspecting defenders on the western edge of the marsh were taken by surprise. The first prong of the attack struck the undefended town of Beidha, located on the western edge of the marsh, just east of Azair. After the Iranian army established a bridgehead, it moved to the villages of Sabkha and Al Harrah, which were connected by artificial causeways. The Iranians pushed deep into Iraqi territory, getting within 500 meters (1/3 mile) of the Baghdad-Basra highway, where they set up a howitzer that shelled the road for a few hours

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Operation Kheiber, 1984. (Adapted from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. http://ochaonline.un.org/iraq/MapCentre/ReferenceMaps/ tabid/2375/language/en-US/Default.aspx.)

before it was destroyed by Iraqi aircraft. The Iraqis quickly responded in full force, displayed the full extent of its military capabilities, including helicopter gunships and chemical weapons. After three major counteroffensives, Iraq managed to push Iran out of Sabkha.8 According to O’Ballance, on the third and final day of the battle, “the Iraqis drove their T-62 tanks along the 5-yard wide [causeways] to crush the Pasdaran in their fox holes.” The fleeing Iranian forces “jumped into the water to escape the Iraqi fire-power, many of these, it seems, could not swim and . . . drowned.” For those who could swim, the Iraqis “fitted electrodes in some of the water channels,” which “accounted for many unmarked bodies later found.” After three days of vicious fighting and considerable casualties, the Iraqis managed to expel Iran’s forces from Beidha on February 25.9 The second prong was launched further south against the town of Ghuzail, which was about 40 kilometers north of Basra. Unlike the offensive near Beidha, where Iranian forces launched amphibious assaults against meager Iraqi defenses, the terrain surrounding Ghuzail was quite firm, allowing Iran to once again use its “human-wave” tactics. For five days Iran launched a series of “human-wave” offensives against the strong fortifications north of Basra. Throughout the course of the fighting, the Iraqis gave little ground

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and managed to prevent a major breakthrough, largely through the use of chemical weapons. Frustrated with its lack of tangible results, particularly in light of the regimes grandiose public claims, on February 29 Iran threw three divisions of Pasdaran (about 30,000 men) against the Iraqi defenses. On March 1, the Iranians reinforced the Pasdaran divisions with an additional 20,000 men, but it was of no use. The next day, the Iraqis launched a massive counterattack and forced the Iranians into the marshes, where many drowned. The desperate, last-ditch offensive at Ghuzail was simply a waste of human life; the Iraqi lines held and inflicted heavy casualties (intelligence estimates indicate that 14,500 Iranians died during the battle).10 Iran directed the third prong of its offensive against the Majnoon Island complex, located just inside the Iraqi border amid the marsh. Unlike the battles at Beidha and Ghuzail, Iran met virtually no resistance and captured the remarkably important island from Iraq; the island held untapped oil reserves “estimated to exceed 7 billion barrels, almost one-quarter of Iraq’s known oil reserves.” But because the islands were never developed, the Iraqi regime did not believe they were of immediate value. Upon taking the island, the Iranians ferried some 20,000 troops across pontoon bridges and built up their defenses without being harassed by the Iraqis, who were locked in battle elsewhere. While the initial capture of the island complex could be perceived as a major victory, it would ultimately cost many Iranians their lives holding onto this soggy piece of Iraqi territory.11 On February 22, President Reagan held a press conference to address concerns about Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz. In light of Tehran’s present aggressiveness, the administration believed that the Iraqis might panic and attack Iran’s oil export facilities, which in turn would lead Iran to close the strait. In light of this, Reagan declared: . . . there was no way that we—and I’m sure this is true of our allies— could stand by and see that sealane denied to shipping, and particularly, the tankers that are so essential to Japan, to our Western allies in Europe, and, to a lesser extent, ourselves. We’re not importing as much as they require. But there’s no way that we could allow that channel to be closed. Reagan pointed out that he was committed to the Carter doctrine, while indicating that the American navy was “virtually permanently stationed in the Arabian Sea, and so have some of our allies.” Reagan did not appear to be frightened by Iran’s threats, pointing out that it regularly threatened to close the strait, but had yet to do so.12 Other administration officials did not view the matter in such optimistic terms. According to the Miami

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Herald, some officials indicated that Reagan, “if necessary,” was prepared to send American ground troops to the Persian Gulf. “The situation there could become far more serious than anything we have encountered in Lebanon,” commented a senior administration official. “It could make Lebanon look like a Sunday school picnic.”13 Interestingly enough, Israeli intelligence officers did not share the same fears about Iran as the Reagan administration. While noting that the recent Iranian offensives were extremely well-planned, the Israelis believed “that the Iraqis were not as weak as Iranian communique´s suggested.” With regards to the strait, the Israelis did not believe the Iranians would actually follow through with their threat because closing the strait would cut its own traffic from the gulf.14 After all, if Iran were to block the Strait of Hormuz, it would in effect be sabotaging its own economic lifeline, as it exported up to 2.43 million bpd (barrels per day) through the waterway.15 Interestingly, Tehran responded to Reagan’s challenge by threatening suicide attacks against American vessels if they interfered with Iran’s efforts to block the strait.16 In light of this, the U.S. Navy declared that “ships and planes [are] not to come closer than five miles [eight kilometers] to American ships without identifying themselves.” The statement also indicated that planes flying lower than 2,000 feet “whose intentions are unclear to U.S. naval forces may be held at risk.” This last statement will become important toward the end of the war, when the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian passenger airplane, killing the 290 people on board. On February 26, the USS Lawrence fired warning shots ahead of a low-flying Iranian patrol plane and broadcast a warning to an Iranian frigate that approached within 4 kilometers (2.5 miles). Two days later, the USS Lawrence fired shots across the bow of a ship that came within a kilometer-and-a-half (1 mile) of the American fleet stationed near the strait. In each case, the Iranian vessels veered away from the fleet, but these incidents clearly suggest that the inexperienced Iranian Navy was testing the resolve of the American commitment to keep the strait open.17 Iraq’s aggressive response to Operation Kheiber, particularly its seemingly excessive use of chemical weapons, proved to be problematic for the Reagan administration. Part of the problem was that unlike previous battles, where Iraq’s use of chemicals went largely unnoticed by the rest of the world, throughout Operation Kheiber, Western journalists began reporting Iran’s increasingly assertive claims that Iraq was using chemical weapons. In one instance, a reporter for the New York Times questioned an Iraqi general about the chemical weapons allegations. The general avoided answering directly, “We never welcome an enemy with flowers. . . . Therefore, we will use all possible means to defend our country.” Around the same time, the speaker of the Iranian

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Parliament announced that 400 Iranian soldiers had been killed and 1,100 more were seriously injured last week near Basra due to Iraqi chemical attacks. The speaker called on the United Nations to investigate. To attain unequivocal proof of its assertions, Iran flew five soldiers exposed to chemical weapons to Sweden and another ten to Austria for advanced medical treatment.18 As Iranian troops began arriving in European hospitals for treatment for chemical weapons, the Reagan administration could no longer ignore Iraq’s breach of the laws of war. As a result, the State Department held a press conference on March 5 where it strongly condemned Iraq for using chemical weapons against Iranian forces in violation of the Geneva Protocol. The United States has concluded that the available evidence indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons. The United States strongly condemns the prohibited use of chemical weapons wherever it occurs. There can be no justification for their use by any country. The United States has been working for many years with other nations to establish a treaty banning production and stockpiling of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons, in order to strengthen the present international prohibitions against their use. The use of chemical weapons in recent conflicts including the Iran-Iraq War only adds to the urgency of this undertaking. While condemning Iraq’s resort to chemical weapons, the United States also calls on the government of Iran to accept the good offices offered by a number of countries and international organizations to put an end to the bloodshed. The United States finds the present Iranian regime’s intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims. The United States deplores the tragic and needless loss of both Iranian and Iraqi lives, especially through attacks on civilian populations. We urge both states to respect their obligations under international conventions designed to mitigate the human suffering of warfare, particularly those banning the use of chemical weapons, and requiring the humane treatment of prisoners of war and protection of civilians.19 According to the New York Time’s coverage of the announcement, the Reagan administration was aware of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons since the summer of 1983: The United States has had information for at least a year that the Iraqis were considering the use of chemical weapons, and it urged Iraq several

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times through diplomatic channels not to do so. The official said it was decided today to issue a public statement because the evidence had become “increasingly convincing” that the Iraqis had rejected the American appeals.20 In order to balance the American condemnation of Iraq, the State Department included in its statement criticism of “the present Iranian regime’s intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq [as] inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations.”21 The suddenness of American condemnation caught Iraq’s senior leadership completely off guard, especially in light of the improving state of its relations with the United States. The next day, Iraqi officials lashed out at the administration’s “hypocritical” comments, recalling America’s “use of atomic weapons against Japanese cities” in the Second World War “to shorten the war and reduce casualties.” They argued of all the countries to condemn it for using chemical weapons, the United States was the “last country with the right to speak about the ethics of war.”22 Iraq’s stunned reaction raises important questions about its relations with the United States. Certainly, the Iraqis did not expect Washington’s public condemnation, particularly since its “almost daily” use in November 1983 produced only a small, private rebuke, followed by a high-level envoy to Iraq, the approval of EXIM credits, and the sale of 2,000 heavy trucks. This leads one to conclude that Iraq’s use of chemical weapons was not a problem as long as it remained out of the public domain, but the arrival of blistered and dying troops in Europe could not be ignored. The Reagan administration was split over the State Department’s condemnation of Iraq. According to Secretary Shultz, some senior intelligence officials were highly critical of the announcement. On March 7, two days after the statement was issued, Shultz read an intelligence analysis that angrily asserted, “we have demolished a budding relationship [with Iraq] by taking a tough position in opposition to chemical weapons.” Shultz was dismayed by this point of view because he believed that “the United States had to speak the truth and speak out forcefully” about clear violations of international law, despite setbacks to the American-Iraqi relationship.23 Despite Shultz’s well thought out and retrospective claim, it was generally accepted by American military and intelligence officials that Iraq was faced with a situation where it was being attacked by a fiercely aggressive foe that would stop at nothing, including the outright sacrifice of thousands of children, in order to defeat Iraq. It legitimately feared that “any major crack in [its] defenses could bring down the army and the government.” In light of this, American officials

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privately asserted that “it was not surprising that Iraq would use any weapon in its arsenal” to prevent an Iranian breakthrough.24 Iran’s allegations of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons prompted SecretaryGeneral Javier Perez de Cuellar on March 6 to send a four-person investigation team to Iran under his own authority to investigate the charges.25 Two days later, Iraq launched a major counteroffensive to retake the Majnoon Island complex. Because of Iraq’s inherent reluctance to take casualties, the Iraqi military once again made extensive use of chemical weapons. The offensive opened on March 8 with a massive bombardment of the island by the IAF, including 338 raids using jets and helicopters.26 The bombardment of the island continued for days, making use of chemical weapons,27 napalm of French origin, and dropping 1,200-pound bombs on Iranian positions.28 The Iraqis then boxed the island from the north, east, and south, but were unable to cut Iran’s supply lines across the marsh. At this point, the Iraqis launched a tank assault against the island, but its reluctance to use its infantry rendered the attack ineffective.29 It was not until March 15 that the Iraqis finally sent in its infantry and managed to establish a bridgehead on the southwest corner of the island. In the end, the Iranians managed to hold onto threequarters of the island complex, with the Iraqis holding the southwest corner.30 In the meantime, doctors in Vienna presented definitive evidence of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons on March 10. After examining ten Iranian soldiers, of which three succumbed to their injuries, the Austrian physicians concluded: Blood and urine samples of two of the Iranians were sent to the Institute of Toxicology at the University of Ghent (Belgium). Analyses of the samples showed that they contained residual amounts of toxic substances allegedly used by Iraq in the Gulf War. The experts specifically found evidence of poisoning by Mustard Gas and Mycotoxin (Yellow Rain).31 With the available evidence, the Iranians proposed a Human Rights Council (HRC) resolution condemning Iraq. With an Iranian resolution on the table at the HRC, the State Department was faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, it did not want to jeopardize its relationship with Iraq and, on the other, did not want to condemn the Iraqis without also condemning Iran its continuation of the war. In light of this, Shultz advised the American delegation at the UN to “develop [a] general Western position in support of a motion to take ‘No Decision’ on the Iranian draft resolution on use of chemical weapons by Iraq. If such a motion gets reasonable and broad support and sponsorship, USDEL [the U.S. delegation] should vote in favor. Failing Western support for ‘No Decision,’ USDEL should abstain.” In the face of such overwhelming evidence of Iraq’s actions, why did the Reagan administration take

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this stance? On the one hand, the State Department did not believe that the HRC was an appropriate forum for matters dealing with chemical weapons.32 On the other: . . . there existed a general feeling among Council members . . . that, despite the importance of the issue, a condemnation of chemical weapons should occur in the context of a more general resolution urging an end to the fighting, since Iranian intransigence was largely responsible for the war’s continuation.33 After all, since the start of the war, Iraq accepted every resolution relating to the war, while Iran refused. In light of this, why would the United States support a resolution condemning Iraq when the only reason why the war continued was because Iran refused to cease hostilities? By late March 1984, Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, its use of terrorism as a means of policy, the potential for an Iraqi defeat, and Iraq’s increasing use of chemical weapons and nerve agents, prompted the administration to review its policies toward the war. On March 20, an interagency memo was circulated that discussed the diplomatic responses available to the administration in the event of a major escalation of the war into the Gulf. There was little doubt that the situation was grim. “Whether we like it or not, we have been identified by our regional friends as an important actor in the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war, and we will bear some responsibility in their eyes for an Iraqi defeat, regardless of our ability to affect the outcome.” In light of this, the group identified a number of policy choices that would best protect American interests in the region. These options included preserving the Gulf States in order “to protect continued access to their oil;” preventing the spread of hostile Iranian influence . . . at the expense of moderate governments friendly to the U.S.;” and safeguarding of American credibility among its regional allies through further collaboration against Iranian expansionism. There was little doubt that America’s regional allies were looking to the United States to help prevent an Iraqi defeat, but if adequate support could not be provided, these allies “might question our commitments and our reliability as a friend and security partner.” This put the Reagan administration in a difficult position where it had to “decide whether any combination of U.S. policy measures will have a reasonable chance of preventing an Iranian victory.” Nevertheless, there appeared to be little the United States could do—short of abandoning its neutral policy—to prevent itself from being blamed for an Iraqi defeat.34 In the event of an imminent Iraqi defeat, the group identified five policy options available to the Reagan administration to help prevent it. The first

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option was the direct introduction of American forces into the conflict. Although this option was viable due to the proximity of the American fleet stationed near the Strait of Hormuz, it was highly unlikely that Congress would sanction the use of military force to support a despot like Saddam Hussein. The second option was to provide direct military assistance to Iraq, including the sale/transfer of U.S. military equipment. While this would not include a commitment of American forces to Iraq’s defense, it would likely include provision of military advisors, which would also require congressional notification. Another problem was that Iraqis were not familiar with American weapons systems, which would limit the effectiveness of this proposal. In addition, direct provision of weapons to Iraq would diminish the prospect of future reconciliation with Iran. The third option was to provide assistance through friendly third parties. This would include encouraging allies to aid Iraq and allow them to use American weaponry, but the catch was that the United States would take on the funding of these operations. While allowing third parties to use American arms would not require notifying Congress, resupplying these nations would require notification and would inevitably lead to opposition. The fourth option was to encourage financial support for the Iraqis from third parties, including the GCC states and France. However, the analysis notes, “unless we were willing to provide direct US assistance to Iraq such urgings would have little practical effect.” The final option was to increase American support for the defense of the Gulf States, including arms transfers and troop deployments. The purpose of this option was simply to shore up the GCC countries to the point that even in the event of Iraq’s collapse, Iran would be unable to dominate them. Overall, the analysis concluded that the Reagan administration’s options were remarkably limited, which was primarily due to congressional constraints under the War Powers Act of 1973 that required notification of any deployment of American forces unless involved in “imminent hostilities.”35 On March 23, the CIA produced a “speculative, ‘worst-case’ assessment” of the possible consequences of an Iranian breakthrough at Basra. The paper recognized that Iran’s primary goal was to “inflict a major defeat on Iraqi forces, causing heavy Iraqi losses, and to threaten Al Basrah.” In doing so, Iran wanted to weaken the regime of Saddam Hussein to the point that it would collapse. However, the CIA believed “Iraq should be able to contain the Iranians as long as senior Iraqi commanders avoid major mistakes and Iraqi troop morale remains high,” which was precisely what had occurred during Operation Kheiber. Fortunately for the Iraqis, its commanders on the ground had access to “good intelligence on Iranian deployments,” thanks to the CIA. In the event of an Iranian breakthrough, the CIA identified a

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number of possible scenarios that could occur. First, “the Iraqi army might fall back in an orderly fashion and continue fighting.” Second, “Saddam would retaliate by lifting all restraints on military activity,” including attacks on all “international oil tankers calling at Khark Island,” Iran’s primary oil export terminal, and the use of “long-range surface-to-surface missiles and chemical weapons against military and civilian targets in Iran.”36 In time, this assessment proved to be remarkably accurate. The same day, a separate CIA report concluded that Iraq had “begun using nerve agents on the Al Basrah front and likely will be able to employ it in militarily significant quantities by late this fall.” This was a significant development and would have a major military impact on the war, as it would effectively check Iran’s “human-wave” tactics. This was because nerve agents: . . . are much more effective than mustard chemicals on the battlefield. Exposure through breathing vapors, eye contact, or as little as one drop on the skin can cause reactions within minutes. The victim loses control of all organ functions and usually suffers an agonizing death. The nerve agent used by Iraq has a very short effective life span and depending on weather conditions is dangerous only for about five minutes to one hour. It is therefore a very good offensive as well as defensive weapon. The implications of this development were quite significant. Unlike mustard gas, which incapacitates though not necessarily kills its victim; the Iraqis could wipe out entire human-wave formations within minutes of employing nerve agents. As a result, the introduction of nerve agents meant that Iran would have to rethink its war strategy, particularly the use of “humanwave” formations. In light of this, the CIA expected Iran’s commanders to push Tehran to give up large offensives and return to a war of attrition, with only periodic small attacks along the border, which appears to have been the case, as throughout the rest of 1984 Iran resumed its strategy of attrition.37 From March 12 to 19, a team of UN investigators visited Iran “to determine, to the extent possible, whether chemical weapons had been used in Iran and, if so, the type and extent of their use.” During the course of its investigation, Iraq launched its counteroffensive against the Majnoon Islands. This allowed the inspectors to examine troops that were exposed to Iraq’s chemical and nerve agents at Majnoon on March 9. After taking samples of the toxins, the UN team sent them to labs in Europe to identify the compounds. The lab results unequivocally showed that Iraq used mustard gas and the nerve agent Tabun in the war.38 After presenting the council with the report, Iqbal Riza, the UN political officer that led the team,

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met privately with American diplomats to discuss some issues that could not be raised in the report. Riza explained that the team visited two sites in Iran about 5 kilometers (3 miles) from the border, just east of the Majnoon Islands, where the Iranians showed him gas masks captured from Iraqi troops that bore Arabic script. He also indicated that the Iranians “gave no signs of war-weariness nor of a willingness to end the war.” But Riza warned the United States that the Iranians “may well decide to manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves if [the] international community does not condemn Iraq.”39 Meanwhile the UN report prompted a flurry of activity at the Security Council, where the British and Dutch sponsored a resolution condemning Iraq for its use of illegal weapons. Unlike American efforts at the HRC, the United States was in favor of the resolution condemning Iraq. At this point, the evidence was simply too convincing for the American delegation to react otherwise. Understandably, the Iraqis denounced the report, denied using chemical weapons, and criticized the UN secretariat for concentrating “on the secondary aspects of the conflict,” while “ignoring the necessity to end the war on the basis of relevant Security Council resolutions,” referring to UNSC 540.40 At this point, debate narrowed down to whether the Security Council would adopt a formal resolution condemning Iraq or if it would issue a strongly worded statement from the president of the council. On March 29, Nizar Hamdoon, Iraq’s deputy chief of mission for its interests section in Washington, called on the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke to discuss the pending Security Council resolution condemning Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. At the outset: Hamdoon expressed strong Iraqi preference for a statement by the President of the Security Council rather than [a] UNSC resolution. [The] Iraqis believed that a resolution would be subject to too many compromises and cause “baloo” about CW issue, while [a] presidential statement could be clearly drafted and could include CW as one of three or four elements. Iraq believed presidential statement should include: 1) mention of former UNSC resolutions on the war, including [UNSC] 540; 2) strong call for progress toward ending war through ceasefire or negotiations’ 3) reference to CW without mentioning any specific country. With regards to the latter point, Hamdoon believed the UN report did not specifically identify Iraq as the culprit and could therefore “not be held responsible for continuing the war.” Responding to this, Placke reiterated the administration’s firm opposition to the use of chemical weapons, while

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pointing out that it “agreed on [the] desirability of continuing to call world attention to [the] tragedy of the war and would support [the] Dutch draft, including [the] three points made by Iraq.” Essentially, the United States wanted to see something constructive come from the UN efforts, but if consensus emerged about the issuing of a presidential statement, the administration would not stand in the way. Placke also advised Hamdoon about the recent implementation of export licensing controls on chemicals for both Iran and Iraq and asked for cooperation from the Iraqi government in avoiding actions that would “lead to difficult and possibly embarrassing situation[s],” because the Reagan administration did not want the chemical weapons “issue to dominate our bilateral relationship nor to detract from our common interest to see [the] war brought to [an] early end.”41 The next day, the president of the Security Council issued a statement that strongly condemned “the use of chemical weapons reported by the mission of specialists.” The Iraqis had performed a diplomatic coup.42 Placke’s discussion with Hamdoon and the subsequent statement issued by the Security Council were quite telling of the Reagan administration’s views toward Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. First, it clearly indicated that the Reagan administration showed no particular interest in condemning Iraq at the United Nations. In fact, it appears that it was inclined to let the British and Dutch work out the details of their resolution, while adopting a “waitand-see” approach before taking a position. In doing so, the administration was able to cushion any potential fallout with the Iraqis, particularly after its public condemnation. The conversation also suggested that the administration was only concerned about Iraq’s use of chemical weapons insofar as it did not dominate American-Iraqi bilateral relations. This helps explain why the administration only denounced Iraq once irrefutable evidence emerged and served as a warning to the Iraqis to tone down its use of chemicals in the war. At the same time, the presidential statement reflected that council members were similarly disinterested in the face of Iranian intransigence. Understandably, the presidential statement was a diplomatic victory for Iraq and a severe defeat for Iran. After all, this was the first significant diplomatic action of the Iranians since the start of the war. Problematically, the Security Council’s failure to identify Iraq as the culprit underscored the already prevalent view in Tehran that the UN was biased. On March 30, Reagan convened a NSPG meeting to “address Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and the need to move forward with a U.S. draft treaty on the prohibition of these weapons.”43 At the meeting, the NSPG agreed to “institute foreign policy controls for the export to Iran and Iraq of certain compounds which could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons.”

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In addition, the administration launched a diplomatic initiative that included consultations with its allies that urged similar actions. At a press conference announcing the new measures, Secretary Shultz indicated that he already discussed reports that “facilities capable of producing nerve gas may have been shipped to Iraq by a German company” with West German authorities, which assured the American government that they had “been investigating the matter on an urgent basis.” Shultz spelled out America’s concern about Iraq’s use of chemical weapons: We have supported U.N. efforts to investigate and favor a Security Council statement on the report. We are instituting . . . special licensing requirements for export to Iran and Iraq certain compounds which could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons. We have urged other countries to do likewise. We continue to support efforts to try to induce Iran to accept a cease-fire, because stopping hostilities is the most effective and practical way to prevent further use of chemical weapons, and in humanitarian terms, we cannot and should not limit attention to the victims of chemical weapons. Instead, we must also work to stop the tragedy of the tens of thousands of lives—many of them belonging to children—which are needlessly being lost because of the Iranian regime’s continued attempts to spread its revolution through the region.44 Although this statement glowingly accounts American efforts to address the issue of chemical weapons, the reality was that the chemical weapons issue was never a political priority of the Reagan administration. The pervasiveness of this view was reflected in NSDD 139, signed by President Reagan on April 5 after weeks of interagency review. Despite the public assertions that Iraq’s use of chemical weapons was a political priority, the new directive focused almost exclusively on countering Iranian threats. The only exception was the last paragraph that ordered the Secretary of State to: . . .ensure that the policy of the United States government condemning the use of chemical warfare (CW) munitions in the Iran-Iraq war is unambiguous and consistent with the 1925 Geneva protocol. Our condemnation of the use of CW munitions by the belligerents should place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives. The rest of the directive focused on the importance of supporting American allies in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, and efforts to counter Iranian influence. For instance, Reagan directed the government to “undertake the

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consultations and advance planning necessary to permit contingent access for U.S. forces which may be deployed to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.” Reagan also ordered the dispatch of a political-military mission to the Gulf to undertake consultations to “obtain agreement for contingent access to Gulf facilities” in the event of a major escalation in the war. He also directed the CIA to improve its collection of intelligence in the region and ordered the secretary of defense to enhance “our near-term readiness to respond to sudden attacks on U.S. interests in the region in a timely, effective, and forceful manner.” With regards to “the growing threat of Iranian-sponsored terrorism,” Reagan instructed the secretary of defense to enhance “the anti-terrorist posture of the U.S. military activities . . . in the Persian Gulf ” and ordered the director of Central Intelligence to “examine additional counter-terrorist measures . . . with regional states.” Clearly underscoring the strategic importance of Iraq, Reagan charged the secretaries of state and defense and the director of Central Intelligence to “prepare a plan of action designed to avert an Iraqi collapse.” This included “An evaluation of Iraqi military needs and measures which could be taken to facilitate indirect security assistance (e.g., from Egypt) and to provide enhanced intelligence analysis and advice, which will bolster Iraqi defenses” and “Approaches to friendly states (e.g., France and Jordan) capable of providing overt and covert military support to Iraq.”45 The directive’s focus was clearly not Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, but the growing threat posed by Iran. The directive also underscored the hardening of American policy toward Iran. In light of this, NSDD 139 was significant because it significantly enhanced the ability of the American government to rapidly respond to the increasing escalation of the war. By mid-April it was clear that Iran’s preparations for an offensive had stalled. The delay of the offensive came amid parliamentary elections in Iran that occurred on April 15.46 The election clearly placed a great deal of pressure on Iranian leaders to limit casualties in the war, which would play into the hands of opponents of the war. By May, the CIA reported squabbling among senior Iranian leaders “over who is to blame for the 20,000 to 30,000 casualties suffered since late February.” As hardliners in the regime pushed for further offensives, opponents questioned the practicality of wasting so much human life, particularly in light of the minimal gains achieved from the fighting. Meanwhile, other factors helped attribute to the delay of the Iranian offensive. In particular, the Iraqis intentionally breached a levee that flooded Iranian positions on Majnoon, and heavy spring rains created logistical problems for resupplying its troops. As a result, the Iranian offensive stalled indefinitely.47 As the Iranian offensive stalled, Iraq launched a provocative air campaign against Iranian economic targets in the Gulf, including the strategically

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significant Kharg Island. By mid-May, Iran’s stalled offensive and Iraq’s increasingly brazen attacks against Iranian economic targets, prompted the regime to reevaluate its tactics in the Gulf to include attacks on shipping. In spite of the fact that the Iranian air force was nearly crippled, on May 13 it managed to attack a Kuwaiti tanker near Bahrain, which was the first major Iranian attack on commercial shipping in the war. Soon thereafter, Iran attacked a Saudi vessel, which led to heightened concern among the GCC states that the war was escalating out of control.48 Over the next five weeks, both sides dramatically increased attacks on shipping in the Gulf, resulting in strikes on 11 ships, 10 of which were oil tankers.49 In the wake of the Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi shipping in the Gulf, the Reagan administration once again was forced to reevaluate its policy toward the war. Iran’s attack against a Saudi Arabian vessel prompted the Saudis to turn to the Reagan administration to help improve its air defenses. After consultations, Reagan signed NSDD 141 on May 24 that outlined American plans to dramatically increase its protection of Saudi Arabia. “In view of the threat of Iranian preemption,” Reagan ordered the immediate transfer of 400 Stinger surface-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia. The directive also included an increase of aerial reconnaissance over eastern Saudi Arabia and the immediate review of held-up arms requests. Of greater importance, NSDD 141 outlined American contingency planning in view of the escalation. These provisions included increased warnings to vessels entering the Persian Gulf, responding militarily to acts of aggression against American allies, further studies of escalation scenarios, including “ambiguous threats such as unconventional or terrorist attacks against facilities used to support U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf,” and the continuation of consultations with the Gulf states.50 As with NSDD 139, NSDD 141 continued to underscore the value the administration gave to the threat Iran posed to the region, even though it was Iraq that escalated the war into the Gulf. Not long after the publicly announced delivery of the Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia, the Iranians brazenly attempted to test Saudi resolve. On June 5, American AWACS identified two Iranian jets entering Saudi airspace, which led to an intense dogfight where the Royal Saudi Air Force shot down an Iranian F-4 fighter over Saudi Arabia’s territorial waters. The incident constituted the first direct involvement of Saudi Arabia in the Iran-Iraq war and threatened to dramatically escalate the conflict into a regional war.51 Fortunately, following the confrontation, Iran quietly conciliated Saudi Arabia, thus preventing further escalation. In addition to attacks in the Gulf, throughout the summer of 1984 Iran and Iraq attacked each other’s cities in what became known as “War of the

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Cities,” which resulted in 900 civilian casualties between June 5 and 12. Appalled by the scale of the casualties, the United Nations managed to convince both sides to halt attacks on civilian areas. This was the first time both sides in the war agreed to a UN call to reduce fighting in the war.52 Most interestingly, on June 15, not long after agreeing to the moratorium, Iran called for a wider UN agreement that would include attacks in the Persian Gulf, to which Iraq agreed.53 After these two significant agreements, the level of fighting in the war quieted down to levels unseen since the start of the war. With the war in the Gulf clearly stalemated, on September 25 the DIA produced a Defense Estimative Brief on the “Prospects for Iraq.” The estimate came to a number of significant conclusions. Like earlier estimates, the DIA believed that Saddam “will likely remain in power for the next two years.” Noting the worsening so-called Tanker War, the name given to the attacks in the Gulf, “Iraq will most likely continue to escalate its attacks against targets in the Gulf.” Explaining that “Husayn believes that increased international condemnation of Iranian retaliatory strikes against third parties, restriction of arms sales to Iran, and the reduction of Iranian oil sales serve his goal of ending the war on terms favorable to Iraq.” With regards to Iraq’s economy, the DIA noted that the economic crisis of 1983 had passed and that the “regime has obtained a fragile economic equilibrium,” but the continuing construction of oil pipelines significantly improved “international confidence in Iraq’s future.” Militarily, “Iraq perceives that a drastic reduction of Iran’s income is a key to ending the conflict.” This explains the stepped-up attacks on Iranian economic interests in the Gulf. On the battleground, the Iraqi regime recognized “that it has little chance of a decisive military victory over Iran” and, as a result, Iraq’s tactics will continue to: . . . rely upon strong defensive positions, especially physical barriers, and the threat to use all weapons in its arsenal, to include chemicals, to dissuade any Iranian attack. In the event [that] Tehran does launch an offensive, Baghdad will carry through with its threats to extract maximum Iranian casualties while attempting to keep its own losses to a minimum. In the end, the DIA concluded that the continued stalemate in the Iran-Iraq war had positive implications for the United States, because continued American “assistance [to Iraq] could allow for additional inroads and possibly a resumption of full diplomatic relations.”54 The lull in ground fighting since the end of Operation Kheiber ended in mid-October when Iran launched an offensive just north of Dehloran against the Seif Saad area, where Iraq occupied a number of strategic heights. “The

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Iranians attacked in three waves along mountain passes just before midnight” on October 18. The objective of the offensive was “to halt Iraqi shelling of Iranian villages near the border.”55 According to reports in the Washington Post, the Iraqis actually anticipated the offensive and preemptively attacked Iranian positions in the south, near Basra. 56 In fact, Iran admitted on October 19 “that Iraqi troops penetrated about half a mile [800 meters] through its lines east of Basra,” but Iranian forces surrounded the pocket and “killed or captured all the attackers.”57 By October 22, the Iranians claimed a “spectacular victory” over Iraqi forces. According to a report in the Guardian, Iranian forces, advancing through “barbed wire and minefields under artillery cover . . . pushed the Iraqis back after hours of bloody, often hand-to-hand fighting.”58 When the fighting died down, the Iraqis retained a hold of some Iranian territory, with Iran occupying about 77 square kilometers (48 square miles) of Iraqi territory.59 Beyond the brief resumption of military activity in mid-October, for the rest of 1984 little occurred along the front. Since coming to office in January 1981, the Reagan administration consistently indicated to the government of Iraq that it was interested in resuming relations, but only when Iraq was ready. Because American-Iraqi relations were quite tumultuous throughout 1984, the Reagan administration was caught quite off-guard when Tariq Aziz approached Secretary Shultz at the UN and informed him that Iraq was ready to reestablish relations with the United States. “Aziz expressed a willingness to come to Washington at an early date to cement the resumed relationship and make a public announcement.” In response to the sudden change in Iraqi policy, Shultz asked Aziz to “put the visit off until after the U.S. election because of the “tight schedule” of President Reagan.”60 Having secured American interest in renewing relations, on October 12 Saddam Hussein publicly announced that he “was ready to consider re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States after the American elections.”61 While the administration was always interested in resuming relations, the decision was ultimately made by Iraq. On November 6, 1984, Ronald Reagan won his second term as president, beating Democratic candidate Walter Mondale in the largest electoral victory in American history. Reagan, with 59 percent of the popular vote, took 49 states and won 525 electoral votes. Having secured itself a second term, the Reagan administration moved forward with resuming its diplomatic relations with Iraq. On November 26, three weeks after winning the election, Tariq Aziz traveled to Washington to formally reestablish relations with the United States. Meeting at the Department of State, Aziz and Shultz discussed a number of important topics, including the status of the war and Iraq’s use

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of chemical weapons. With regards to the war, Aziz expressed satisfaction with American “efforts to stop the flow of Western arms to Iran,” while noting that Iraq’s access to weaponry assures its defense. The secretary assured Aziz that the United States would “continue to talk with its allies on dealing with Iran, in particular on curbing the flow of Western arms to Iran.” With regards to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, Shultz “remarked that Iraq can expect the U.S. to maintain its opposition to both the use and production of chemical weapons,” while noting that the American “position is not directed specifically at Iraq, but is taken out of concern over this form of warfare.”62 Just before noon, Tariq Aziz visited the White House, met President Reagan for a photo shoot, and formally restored full diplomatic relations after a 17-year break.63 The resumption of diplomatic relations was the culmination of years of proactive diplomacy by the Reagan administration. Despite significant bumps along the road, including the debacles over the Super E´tendards and Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, the Reagan administration continuously aligned its interests next to those of Iraq. There were certainly reasons for this. First, Iraq was viewed by all of America’s regional allies as the bulwark against Iranian expansionism. Second, because Iraq consistently accepted Security Council resolutions to end the war while Iran absolutely refused, the administration was not particularly interested in condemning Iraq in the absence of Iran agreeing to end the war. In fact, when Iranian claims about Iraq’s use of chemical weapons gained traction in March 1984, they managed to convince the United Nations to investigate. The result was a diplomatic defeat. Not only did Iran not get a resolution condemning Iraq through the council, Iraq was not even mentioned in the presidential statement, despite unequivocal evidence of its use of mustard gas and the nerve agent Tabun. When the United States did condemn Iraq for using chemicals, the Iraqis reacted angrily in public but privately “agreed to overlook the condemnation.”64 It appears the Iraqis understood that reestablishing relations with America could not occur during an election year and adjusted its private posture to reflect its real intentions. This indicates that Saddam Hussein’s regime was entirely pragmatic and executed a sophisticated strategy that led to formalizing relations with the United States. With relations reestablished with Iraq, the Reagan administration was finally in a position to turn its attention to the deteriorating political situation in Iran and attempt to establish covert ties with so-called “moderate” elements in the Iranian regime. Unfortunately, this nearsighted initiative of the White House would end in disaster and ultimately bring the United States directly into the war.

Part IV

The Policy Collapses

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9

The War of the Cities

There is little doubt that the theocratic regime in Tehran used terrorism as a means of policy. Starting in 1983, Iranian-backed terrorist organizations began targeting American interests throughout the Middle East. For instance, in 1983 alone, terrorists linked to Iran bombed the American Embassy in Beirut in April, killing 63, including 17 Americans; the Marine barracks in Beirut in October, which killed 241 Marines; and the American Embassy in Kuwait in December. Iran’s secret hand in these operations prompted the United States to retaliate with a systematic effort to dry up Iran’s access to arms through Operation Staunch. Following this, the State Department designated Iran as a sponsor of international terrorism on January 20, 1984. But beginning in March of that year, terrorists began kidnapping American citizens in Lebanon, starting first with Jeremy Levin, the Beirut bureau chief for Cable New Network (CNN) on March 7. More surprisingly, a week later, on March 14, terrorists managed to brazenly kidnap William F. Buckley, the CIA’s Lebanon station chief. Understandably, the kidnapping of such a senior CIA official enraged Director Casey, who legitimately feared that Buckley was being tortured into revealing the identity of CIA agents throughout the Middle East. As a result, Director Casey took extraordinary measures to rescue Buckley, such as authorizing money to pay informants, ordering the stepping up of communication interceptions, and establishing a “special hostage-rescue task force.”1 But his efforts were in vain, and terrorists continued to target Americans, kidnapping Reverend Benjamin Weir on May 8, 1984. This pattern continued into 1985, with four more Americans being kidnapped:

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Father Lawrence Martin, director of Catholic Relief Services in Beirut on January 8; Terry Anderson, chief Middle East correspondent for the Associated Press on March 16; David Jacobsen, director of the American University Hospital on May 28; and Thomas P. Sutherland, dean of the American University’s School of Agriculture on June 9.2 Like Jimmy Carter before him, President Reagan became fixated on attaining the release of the hostages. In early January 1985, officials at the CIA began worrying about the increasing frequency of Iraq’s attacks in the Gulf. After the arrival of the Super E´tendards in late 1983, Iraq gradually increased its attacks on Iranian shipping in the Gulf. Before long, a pattern was established whereby Iraq would unleash a flurry of attacks in the Gulf followed by a six-week lull, then a renewed period of attacks. According to the CIA, this was a strategy of “phased escalation.” For instance, in late 1984, after a typical six-week lull, Iraq resumed shipping attacks in the Gulf “at record levels.” In early 1985, Iraq purchased 20 additional Exocet-armed Mirage F-1 fighters from France, which would allow Baghdad to use “the F-1s on a sustained basis.” As a result, the CIA believed Iraq would significantly increase its attacks that spring, when the weather became more favorable to air operations.3 However, when the weather cleared, Iraq did not increase its attacks in the Gulf, but rather against civilian centers throughout Iran, including Tehran. Having recently reestablished relations with Iraq, the Departments of State and Commerce immediately arranged for a delegation of American officials to visit Iraq to inquire about commercial opportunities on January 15, 1985.4 A memorandum to Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Policy, Beryl Sprinkel, regarding Iraq’s application for credits from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) raised concerns about Iraq’s finances. It indicated that Iraq received $650 million of credit in fiscal year 1984 and had “been deferring short-term payments to its creditors,” although “it has been paying the United States.” In light of this, Treasury advised against increasing American exposure to Iraq, even for short, “one-year terms.”5 An additional problem was that Iraq was due to pay the first installment on its $500 million loan from 1983, which would deprive Iraq of much-needed foreign currency. Indeed, American bankers were very concerned about Iraq’s ability to repay its debts, as many were owed considerable dividends. They even approached the American Embassy on January 21 to gauge the embassy’s perceptions of the Iraqi economy.6 Yet, despite Iraq as a credit risk, four days later the CCC agreed to provide $247 million in credit guarantees on a three-year term, despite Treasury’s opposition.7

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Besides the desire to further improve American-Iraqi relations, part of the reason for the CCC’s approval of credits was due to Iraq’s renewed ability to export oil. Recall that the Syrian pipeline and Iraq’s Gulf export facilities were closed, leaving a pipeline through Turkey, which carried 500,000 barrels per day (bpd), as Iraq’s sole means of exporting oil. In 1984, the Iraqis completed an expansion of the pipeline, which brought its oil exports up to a million bpd. In addition, the Iraqis were building a tie-in to a Saudi pipeline that was to be complete by September 1985. The tie-in would carry an additional 500,000 bpd to the Red Sea. This would bring Iraq’s total oil exports from an all-time low of 500,000 bpd in 1983 up to 1,500,000 bpd by the end of 1985.8 Meanwhile, American companies were privately seeking deals with Iraq. On January 17, the Iraqi government appraised the embassy in Baghdad that it concluded an agreement to purchase 45 Bell 214ST (capable of carrying 16 passengers) and 26 Hughes 530D helicopters that would be “strictly for civilian use.” According to Hughes, the helicopters it was providing were intended to replace the ones it had sold to Iraq in December 1982.9 Interestingly, the Hughes helicopters, although lightweight and thereby skirting congressional export controls, were clearly for military purposes. After all, the “D” in the name “530D” stands for “Defender.” The deal remained quiet until February 14 when a Foreign Report article exposed the story. The article goes on to suggest that the helicopters would not be used for civilian purposes, but rather to quickly transport Iraqi troops “to key points in war zones.” As press coverage over the helicopter deals increased, the State Department contacted Bell, who reiterated that the aircraft were to be used for civilian purposes. Unconvinced, State warned Bell that if evidence to the contrary were to become public, the American government would “place a new export control to prevent subsequent deliveries.”10 But the helicopters were hardly for civilian purposes, argued Robert Frisk in July 1985. . . . new American-built helicopters in camouflage paint have been observed outside Baghdad in what Arab diplomats interpret as indirect US assistance to Iraq’s war effort. The machines, believed to be the first part of a consignment of 48 Bell 214ST troop-carrying helicopters to come from America, have already been fitted with rocket launchers. . . . Capable of carrying 14 soldiers and flying up to 450 miles, the helicopters would be ideal for defensive use in the Kurdestan region. In spite of evidence to the contrary, nothing ever came of the State Department’s threat to change export controls for helicopters to Iraq.11 Iraq initiated a new phase of the war on March 4 when it bombed an unfinished nuclear plant at Bushehr and a steel plan in Ahwaz, which

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prompted Iran to shell Basra. Following Iran’s retaliation, Iraq unleashed a brutal air campaign that severely bombed “more than a dozen Iranian cities.”12 Unsurprisingly, Iran responded in kind, and the two belligerents proceeded to launch missiles and conduct air raids against each other’s cities and shell villages along the border, killing hundreds of civilians. The devastation was unprecedented; in one raid against Iran’s second largest city, Isfahan, Iraq killed 277 civilians. 13 In retaliation, the Iranian air force attacked Baghdad on March 11, its first air raid on Iraq’s capital since early 1983. The escalation of fighting was so intense that between March 9 and 10 over 500 civilians were killed.14 Unsurprisingly, the UN condemned both sides for breaking the moratorium and urged both sides to cease attacks on civilian populations.15 As the so-called War of the Cities escalated, Under Secretary of State Richard Murphy met with Tariq Aziz in Washington at the start of March to discuss the status of American-Iraqi relations. During the course of discussions, Murphy briefed Aziz on recent American-Soviet talks, where the United States stressed to the Soviets the need to curb East bloc arms from reaching Iran. Aziz completely agreed and appreciated this gesture of support for Iraq, emphasizing that Iraq was putting similar pressure on Moscow and its allies on this issue.16 As attacks on civilian populations escalated and the winter rains eased, Iran launched Operation Badr (New Moon) north of Basra on the evening of March 11. Operation Badr was modeled on Operation Kheiber, as it focused its efforts on breaking through the Hawizeh Marshes with the objective of capturing the Baghdad-Basra road. The attack consisted of three separate thrusts along a 10-kilometer front (6 miles) through the marshes. The weight of the initial thrust managed to break through Iraq’s newly developed defenses on the west side of the marshes, which were in full-flood due to the swelling of the Tigris River from winter rains. According to O’Ballance, the Iraqis were “surprised by the strength of the attack” and gave ground, allowing Iran to establish a bridgehead at Beidha, which was quickly reinforced.17 In the face of a breakthrough in the war, Iraq rushed its top generals to the scene; they again ordered the use of chemical weapons to break the offensive.18 In spite of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, by March 14, a group of about 25,000 Pasdaran managed to cross the Tigris River19 and captured up to 10 kilometers (6 miles) of the Baghdad-Basra road. On March 15, the Iraqis managed to halt the Iranian advance and began its counterattack, maneuvering the Iranians into a three-sided “killing box.” The following day, Iraq unleashed the full weight of its military, including extensive use of helicopter gunships, and forced the Iranians to retreat into the marsh.

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By March 17, Baghdad could accurately claim that it had stemmed the offensive. Having failed to achieve its objectives with Operation Badr, the Iranians followed up the offensive with another attack against Iraq’s recently occupied positions on Majnoon Island on March 19, which was immediately broken up by Iraqi firepower. The Iranians, however, were not deterred, launching a follow-up offensive on the night of March 21 that reoccupied the entire island complex. Reports on the number of casualties are conflicting.20 However, a CIA report estimates that Iran “suffered at least 30,000 casualties, including a minimum of 15,000 killed.” In sum, at a cost of 30,000 wounded and 15,000 killed, Iran achieved no major territorial or strategic gain from Operation Badr.21 Just as the fighting subsided in the marshes, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and King Hussein of Jordan made a surprise visit to Baghdad on March 18 to meet with Saddam Hussein. Although the purpose of the trip remains unknown, it was quite significant as it was the first time an Egyptian leader visited Iraq since the Ba’ath broke relations in 1979. Upon returning from Baghdad, Mubarak was quoted as calling on Iran to negotiate a peace with Iraq, while indicating his confidence that the Iraqis were in a “good position” militarily and did not need military assistance from Jordan or Egypt.22 Having stopped Iran’s offensive, Iraq resumed its attacks on Iran’s cities with virtual impunity, due to the immensely deteriorated condition of Iran’s air force. On March 16, Iraq declared that Iranian air space would be a “prohibited war zone,” which led to the suspension of flights to Iran and Iraq from Western air carriers.23 In retaliation Iran began firing surface-to-surface missiles against Baghdad, which were rumored to be Soviet-made SCUD missiles supplied by Libya or Syria.24 The Iraqis responded with a near continuous bombardment of Iranian cities, including on Tehran, Isfahan, Khermanshah, Bushehr, Tabriz, Hamadan, and Dezful. This eventually prompted an American appeal to Iran, urging it to accept a ceasefire and seek a negotiated end to the war, which was promptly rejected.25 Meanwhile, Iran again sent troops exposed to Iraqi chemical weapons during Operation Badr to European hospitals, while calling for another investigation. When news of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons became public in late March, the State Department issued a statement condemning Iraq for once again using chemical weapons in its war against Iran. According to the statement, “the administration reached its conclusion on the basis of reports issued by doctors who examined Iranians sent recently to West German hospitals.” Based on the evidence, the American government was convinced that “Iraq used CW, chemical weapons, against the recent Iranian invasion attempt.” As such, “We condemn the use of chemical weapons in

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violation of international law and convention whenever and wherever it occurs, including this latest instance.” Secretary Shultz also raised the issue with Tariq Aziz on March 25, who left the meeting well aware of the American position. Unsurprisingly, the Iraqis flatly denied the allegation, charging that Iran made the claim in an attempt “to cover up its huge defeat” during the latest offensive.26 With the dramatic escalation of violence toward civilians in the war, including daily raids against Tehran, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar took steps to intervene. Starting March 31, he undertook a personal mission to the Persian Gulf to meet with regional states, including Iran and Iraq, in order to attain an agreement that would end the attacks on civilians. On April 10, after ten days of consultations, he announced that his mission failed, explaining that the gap between the views of Iran and Iraq was “as wide as ever.”27 Immediately after the Secretary General’s attempt at shuttle diplomacy, Iraq launched a series of effective airstrikes against the buildup of Iranian forces along the southern front. Interestingly, around this time, American intelligence sources were very concerned about a follow-up offensive to Operation Badr. According to research conducted by Nigel Ashton, King Hussein’s files indicate that on April 11 he passed a “critical” American intelligence report to the Iraqis that warned of another “massive attack” from the marshes “involving 700 armoured vehicles, three-quarters of the total possessed by Iran, an estimated 150,000 troops and several thousand boats intended to ferry the troops across the water.” According to the report, the whole area between the Iranian town of Ahwaz and [the marshes] was full of infantry units, and Iran was apparently building underground command posts to direct the operation. . . . Iran, the report claimed, had for the first time sent high-ranking commanders to the area including General Shirazi, the renowned commander of all Iranian ground troops. The attack, it was warned, might come at any point, but “the main operation” was expected to take place later in April. The report also included a critical analysis of Iraqi dispositions in the face of this threat. Iraq lacked an overall strategy, it was argued, and it had thus far failed to increase its troops and defences in the area. It was critically important to prevent the Iranians from carrying out a successful river crossing, as they had done in their previous operation in March, otherwise Iraq would risk a “great defeat.” With the warning duly delivered, King Hussein added his own concluding note to the report, wishing Iraq a great victory under Saddam’s leadership.28

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Although Iran’s offensive never came, this was likely due to an air campaign launched by the Iraqis the day before, when its jets flew 164 sorties and its helicopter gunships conducted 35 combat missions in the southern sector, all the while using chemical weapons. Although the attack occurred the day before King Hussein passed this “critical intelligence” to Baghdad,29 a likely explanation for Iraq’s preemptive attack against the Iranian troop buildup along the southern sector was that the CIA already provided this intelligence to Iraq, who acted as King Hussein deliberated passing it on to Baghdad. Nevertheless, on April 13, with the King’s specific intelligence on hand, the Iraqis launched further air attacks against Iranian positions in the south, again using chemical weapons.30 Indeed, according to an Iraqi officer interviewed by Hiltermann: “The weak point in Iranian strategy . . . was that they could not keep on advancing because our air force attacked their supply lines and reserve troops with gas. We had to saturate their staging areas with gas in order to disrupt their operations.”31 Thus, by passing intelligence to Iraq about Iran’s troop deployments, the United States assisted Iraq in eliminating the possibility of a major Iranian offensive in 1985. Frustrated by its lack of progress at the UN concerning Iraq’s continued use of chemical weapons, Iran began threatening “retaliation in kind.”32 Iran’s veiled threats to use chemical weapons prompted considerable concern within the American government. As a result, the State Department expressed concern on April 25 that “Iran may have developed an arsenal of chemical weapons to use in retaliation against Iraq.” According to State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb, “We are aware that Iran has been seeking to develop a chemical weapons capability, and it may now be in a position to use such weapons.” Apparently, American intelligence agencies obtained evidence that suggested both Iran and Iraq were “setting up dummy companies in third countries to buy the chemicals” needed to produce chemical weapons, in order to skirt Western efforts to block access to precursor chemicals.33 It was interesting that the United States would express its fear that Iran would use chemical weapons, when Iran had not ever used such weapons. After all, seeking weapons of this nature was, in fact, not illegal. The next day, the Security Council issued a statement condemning “all violations of international humanitarian law,” while urging “both parties to observe the generally recognized principles and rules of international humanitarian law.” The statement then urged the “cessation of hostilities” so that a “prompt, comprehensive, just and honourable settlement” of the war could occur. Like the council statement issued in 1984, this statement failed to identify the culprit, even in the face of evidence that was convincible enough to prompt an American condemnation of Iraq.34 In light of this,

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it was no surprise that Iran, in its second attempt to utilize the United Nations in good faith, was disenfranchised by the feeble reaction. As such, Iran immediately denounced the worldly body, indicating that it had “no confidence in the Council, accusing it of bias and inaction in the face of Iraq’s alleged use of chemical weapons.”35 On April 20, the recently appointed Ambassador to Syria, William Eagleton—who was head of the American interests section in Baghdad until David Newton replaced him June 1984—met with Tariq Aziz in Damascus. During the course of discussions, Aziz raised alarm about reports he was receiving from Washington that “there were moves afoot to again place Iraq on the list of countries supporting terrorism.” Surprised by this news, particularly since he played a pivotal role in getting Iraq to cut its ties with terrorists, Eagleton “assured him of administration opposition to [the] inclusion of such language in the [Export Administration Act] and reminded him of the complicated process necessary to pass such a bill into law.” Eagleton then indicated that the administration would put forth its “strongest efforts” to remove Iraq from the bill “when it went to conference committee.”36 As it turned out, an amendment to the Export Administration Act was put forward in the House on April 16. Essentially, the amendment proposed “to restore Iraq to the list of countries supporting international terrorism . . . unless the President makes the certification required to remove a country from the list to Congress.” In light of Aziz’s discussions with Eagleton, and presumably with the Iraqi ambassador in Washington, Secretary Shultz wrote Representative Howard Berman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, and the author of the amendment, asking him to scuttle the revision. The letter effectively outlines the efforts made by the State Department to convince Iraq to cease its support for terrorists. After all, it was Iraq’s compliance with this request that led the administration to remove it from the list, which helped contribute to the restoration of diplomatic relations. Restoring Iraq to the list, argued Shultz, was counterproductive to the efforts presently being put forth by State to improve relations. Ultimately, Shultz’s lobbying proved fruitful, and Congress “acceded to the State Department’s request that [the] language be deleted” from the amendment on June 27.37 In the meantime, a bureaucratic feud erupted in April between the Department of State (with the backing of the CIA) and the Department of Defense over whether to allow Iraq access to advanced American technology. Essentially, the problem was that State wanted to expand commercial ties in Iraq, including access to modern technology, but Defense feared that Iraq was a national security risk because of its seemingly close ties with the USSR. State argued that under the pretext of NSDD 99, which directed the

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expansion of American-Iraqi relations as a means to counter Soviet influence, it was justifiable to provide Iraq with access to modern technology. But Defense, specifically the International Security Policy Directorate (ISP) under Assistant Secretary Richard Perle, “has used year-long delays and imposition of unworkable conditions . . . to ‘kill’ exports” to Iraq. This has led senior Iraqi officials to “view the delays and conditions as a political signal” that the United States was not actually interested in building a mutually beneficial relationship. On April 30, Secretary Shultz sent a letter to Secretary Weinberger that outlined State’s concern about the matter.38 Supporting his argument that Iraq did not pose a threat to the proliferation of American technology, Shultz enclosed a CIA report that bluntly concluded, “we have no evidence that Iraq has passed controlled Western dual-use equipment to the Soviets or has misdirected equipment to non-authorized domestic users.” The report pointed out that the equipment in question was not so advanced that Iraq or the Soviets could not get it elsewhere. “For their part, if the Iraqis do not get this equipment from the US, they almost certainly will be able to buy similar equipment from a number of Western suppliers.”39 In other words, it was diplomatically prudent for the technology to come from the United States. Unfortunately, Defense did not see it this way. In a memo to Weinberger from Richard Perle, he argued: . . . we have a number of legitimate national security concerns in regard to high technology exports to Iraq that must continue to be addressed. To wit . . ., in part from the CIA report on Iraq enclosed with Secretary Shultz’s letter, that there is a body of evidence indicating that Iraq continues to actively pursue an interest in nuclear weapons, that the large number of Warsaw Pact nationals in Iraq makes diversion-in-place a real possibility and that, in the past, Iraq has been somewhat less than honest in regard to the intended end-use of high technology equipment.40 Perle’s argument was clearly flawed, as the CIA study did not suggest that there were any legitimate reasons for denying Iraqi access to American technology. Ultimately, Weinberger rejected Perle’s advice and expedited the transfer of the technology to Iraq.41 This ordeal clearly indicated that by April 1985 internal divisions within the Reagan administration about how to deal with Iraq were beginning to bubble to the surface. Meanwhile, Ayatollah Khomeini’s declining health situation— it was widely believed that he had prostate cancer—and speculation about his successor was disrupting Iranian politics. As a result, many American officials were anxious to find ways to influence a post-Khomeini Iran. According to the Senate and House Committee report on the Iran-Contra Affair, “Since

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the fall of 1984, the National Security Council (NSC) staff had been pressing other Government agencies to develop a plan for opening a relationship with Iran and moderating that government’s anti-American stance.”42 Unfortunately, as CIA’s National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, Graham Fuller, so aptly pointed out in May 1985: “Nobody [had] any brilliant ideas about how to get [the United States] back into Tehran.”43 As a result, the Reagan administration unwittingly embarked on the path toward one of the greatest foreign policy debacles in American history: The Iran-Contra affair. In the immediate aftermath of the costly Operation Badr, the CIA concluded that in the near-term there would be political instability in Iran, as senior Iranian leaders, who were already “split over the question of continuing the fight,” became more “aware of the dimensions of Iran’s defeat.” Beyond the schism over the war, there were signs that Khomeini’s physical and mental health was faltering, which raised the question of succession. Meanwhile, Iran’s economy was in a downturn, due to its sharply reduced oil income. The soft oil market and Iraqi attacks against oil tankers have reduced Iranian oil receipts by about 30 percent since August 1984. As a result, the government can no longer rely on oil-financed imports to maintain consumption levels and provide materials for domestic industry. The insecurity around Khomeini’s future and the economic downturn led to considerable infighting among factions within the regime.44 A separate CIA analysis, circulated in early May, identified the three factions vying for power in Iran, including Islamic radicals, conservatives, and so-called pragmatists. Essentially, the Islamic radicals were opposed to relations with other governments, advocated the export of revolution, and the use of subversion and terrorism as a means of policy. However, the conservative elements of the regime balance the tendencies of the former group favoring normal foreign relations, particularly in economic matters, and opposing measures to export revolution. The third group, the pragmatists, were the real power brokers; they were willing to do whatever deemed necessary to further Iran’s interests. As such, it operates as “a swing element,” providing the “winning margin in policy formation.” When the pragmatists have sided with the conservatives, they have sometimes been able to curb radical excesses. They, however, have not hesitated to advocate use of terrorism and subversion themselves when they believe them useful in advancing Iranian interests. As a result, terrorism continues to be part of Iran’s policy options despite disapproval from the conservatives.45

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Reports like this strongly influenced the thinking of American policy makers, which led to pondering about whether the pragmatists in the government would set aside their differences toward the United States in return for the arms desperately needed to fight its war with Iraq. Indeed, officials in Western Europe entertained similar thoughts and approached Michael Ledeen, consultant with the NSC, in March 1985, suggesting that the United States use its close relationship with Israel to gain access to Iran. After all, it was well known among diplomatic circles that the Israelis were supplying weapons to Iran. Upon Ledeen’s return from Europe in April, he set about convincing Robert McFarlane, Reagan’s third national security advisor, to approve an approach to the Israelis. After consultations with the NSC staff, who were not necessarily thrilled with the idea of Ledeen being an intelligence conduit with the Israelis, McFarlane approved the de´marche. On May 3, Ledeen met with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to express American interest in sharing intelligence on Iran. The Israelis were very interested in the proposal and indicated that they recently received offers “by various Iranians” to help free the hostages. The meeting ended with Peres asking for approval “to sell artillery shells or pieces to Iran but would do so only if it received U.S. approval.”46 When Ledeen returned from Israel, he informed members of the NSC staff about what had transpired. At the time, Donald Fortier, an NSC staff member, was working with Graham Fuller on a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) that assessed American prospects for influencing the power struggle that would ensue before and/or after Khomeini’s death.47 The estimate argued that there was little the United States could do to influence Iran’s growing political turmoil, while pointing out that the Soviets were far better situated to shape events.48 When the SNIE was circulated on May 20, a memorandum submitted by Fuller three days earlier to Director Casey was attached. Entitled “Toward a Policy on Iran,” Fuller’s memo essentially argued for an American tilt toward Iran. Our tilt to Iraq was timely when Iraq was on the ropes and the Islamic revolution was on a roll. The time may now have come to tilt back—at least via our allies—to ensure the Soviets lose both attraction and potential access to the clergy. After outlining the basic tenets of American policy, namely Operation Staunch and responding with force against Iranian-supported terrorist acts on American interests, Fuller argued that these two pillars “can no longer serve as the primary vehicle for US policy towards Iran. Both are entirely negative in nature and may now serve to facilitate Soviet interests more than

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our own.” He then suggested seven policy options for consideration. The first was to work closer with Iraq to defeat Iran militarily, which could bring about regime change. This could include helping to organize “crippling attacks on Kharg Island and key Iranian economic facilities.” On the downside, the outcome of this option was entirely unpredictable in light of the power struggles already underway in Tehran. The second option was to open Iran up to “friendly state influence.” This would include urging America’s allies to dramatically improve Western influence in Iran, even if it meant lifting “all restrictions in sales—including military—to Iran.” Third, the United States could attack Iran’s radical allies, like Libya and Syria in order to send a message to Tehran and weaken its support from those quarters. A fourth consideration was to dramatically increase support for Turkey and Pakistan in order to prevent further deterrence from Soviet encroachment in the region. A fifth option was rapprochement with Iran. This could include the issuing of public statements that reiterated that the United States was “not dedicated to the overthrow of the Islamic Republic or the collapse of Iran.” As a sixth option, Fuller recognized that “mere words may not be enough” and suggested that the United States provide examples of goodwill toward Iran, such as the “withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet from the vicinity of the Persian Gulf.” On the downside, this may persuade radicals that they defeated the United States. It would also precipitate a hostile response from the GCC states. Finally, Fuller suggests that the United States bargain with the Soviets. While recognizing that the United States had little leverage, he aptly points out that the Soviets were constantly complaining about the American plan to place Pershing missiles in Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan. Fuller argued that “these are bargaining chips which could be ‘given away’ at no cost in exchange for some ‘understanding’ over Iran.” In the end, Fuller advocated “inserting Western allies and friends into Tehran quickly through the arms door.” Having been given such a high recommendation from Director Casey, it was hardly surprising that this document proved to be instrumental in bringing about the American tilt toward Iran throughout 1985–1986.49 In early June, after the circulation of the SNIE and Fuller’s memo among senior American policy makers, Secretary Shultz learned of Ledeen’s secret trip to Israel and immediately put a halt to any further “secret missions.” Recognizing that Shultz could prove to be a considerable roadblock to any Iranian initiative, McFarlane initiated an interagency policy review to devise a new policy toward Iran, instructing Donald Fortier and Howard Teicher to prepare a draft NSDD on Iran.50 The draft NSDD was submitted to McFarlane on June 11 attached with a cover letter describing the draft

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NSDD as “provocative.” In the letter, Fortier and Teicher recognized that the draft NSDD “would require a sharp departure from ongoing overt and covert measures, most notably the supply of Western military hardware, U.S. initiative to dialogue with Iranian leaders, and activist covert actions.” In light of the sensitivity of these matters, they recommended that a copy be provided only to Shultz and Weinberger for comments.51 The draft NSDD outlined the prevalent concerns in Washington about the political instability in Tehran, while underscoring fears that the Soviets were better positioned to take advantage of a post-Khomeini Iran. “The dynamic political situation in Iran and the consequences for U.S. interests of growing Soviet and radical influence, compel the U.S. [to] undertake a range of short-term and long-term initiatives that will enhance our leverage in Tehran, and, if possible, minimize that of the Soviets.” The draft then called for a number of initiatives to better position the United States in the event of Khomeini’s death. This included many of Fuller’s proposals, including encouraging Western allies to “help Iran meet its import requirements so as to reduce the attractiveness of Soviet assistance,” which would include the “provision of selected military equipment as determined on a case-by-case basis.” Among other initiatives, the draft called for responding to Iraniansupported terrorism “with military action against terrorist infrastructure,” taking advantage of the growing political fragmentation in Tehran by “discretely communicating our desire for correct relations to potentially receptive Iranian leaders” and providing support to elements opposed to Khomeini and the radicals. With regards to the Iran-Iraq war, the draft did not depart significantly from established policy goals of encouraging third party mediation, increasing cooperation with the GCC, and curbing Iran’s collaboration with Syria and Libya. Nevertheless, the draft NSDD was certainly a provocative policy document, but before it could become official policy, it needed to pass a formal interagency review.52 Reactions to the draft NSDD were mixed when it was circulated to Secretary Shultz and Weinberger on June 17. Shultz was the first to respond to the draft NSDD. On June 29, he sent a memo to McFarlane indicating that he was vehemently opposed to providing Iran with arms. Shultz argued that the draft’s proposal to “permit or encourage a flow of Western arms to Iran is contrary to our interest both in containing Khomeinism and in ending the excesses of [the Iranian] regime. We should not alter this aspect of our policy,” he continued, “when groups with ties to Iran are holding US hostages in Lebanon.” Shultz also disagreed with the suggestion that American “efforts to reduce arms flows to Iran should be ended,” adding that “The steady decline of Iran’s military capability is in [American] interest[s], and we should

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not facilitate the supply of weapons from Western Europe that would revive that military capacity.” He also felt that the draft exaggerated the “current anti-regime sentiment and [the] Soviet advantages over [the United States] in gaining influence,” pointing out that “Iranians have a deep historical mistrust of the USSR” and that relations consisted mainly of “feelers to the Soviets . . . for arms and for limitations on Soviet arms supplies to Iraq; the Iranians do not seek a close relationship.”53 Apparently Weinberger agreed with much of Shultz’s assessment of the draft, writing on the transmittal note: “This is almost too absurd to comment. . . . It’s like asking Qaddafi to Washington for a cozy chat.”54 In his response to McFarlane on July 16, he indicated that he agreed with many points of the draft, but “several of the proposed actions seem questionable. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to consider an explicit revision of our policy toward Iran as long as we continue to receive evidence of Iranian complicity in terrorist actions and planning against us.” With regards to lifting arms restrictions against Iran, Weinberger emphatically argued along the same lines as Shultz. “Under no circumstances . . . should we now ease our restrictions on arms sales to Iran. Attempting to cut off arms while remaining neutral on sales to either belligerent is one of the few ways we have to protect our longer-range interests in both Iran and Iraq.” Not to mention providing arms to Iran “would adversely affect our newly emerging relationship with Iraq.” But Weinberger was not opposed to the draft altogether and made a number of suggestions, like improving intelligence gathering, providing political and/or financial support for elements opposed to Khomeini, and discretely communicating through allies America’s interest in reestablishing “correct” relations.55 In marked contrast to the objections of Shultz and Weinberger, Director Casey responded on July 18 indicating that he “strongly endorse[s] the thrust of the draft NSDD on U.S. Policy Toward Iran, particularly its emphasis on the need to take concrete and timely steps to enhance U.S. leverage in order to ensure that the USSR is not the primary beneficiary of change and turmoil in this critical country.” While Casey agreed that the Soviets were making progress in Iran, he pointed out that it ignored a number of developments, like the Soviets withdrawing between 1,000 and 1,500 economic advisors from Iran, the significant decline in trade over the past year, and the resumption of hard-line Soviet propaganda on Iran. In light of these factors, Casey was inclined to agree with Shultz that the draft overstated the severity of the situation. Nevertheless, he was certainly in favor of increased public statements showing that the United States had “no apathy towards Islam” and to “make clear our lack of hostility towards the Islamic Republic of Iran as long as international norms of terrorism and subversion are not violated.”

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In addition, Casey strongly favored the suggestion that the United States seek to “open lines of communications to the existing Iranian leadership.”56 The vehement objections from the secretaries of state and defense effectively killed the draft NSDD. However, as Bob Woodward points out, “Casey knew that [their] rejection . . . was not necessarily fatal to the idea.”57 Indeed, the Tower Commission, set up by President Reagan in 1986 to investigate the details of the Iran-Contra Affair, pointed out, “The abandonment of the draft NSDD marked the end of efforts by Mr. McFarlane and the NSC staff to use the formal interagency policy process to obtain an explicit change in U.S. policy toward Iran. From this point on, the matter moved along a different track.”58 In effect, the decision to circumvent the interagency process and proceed with the rejected proposal marked the collapse of the Reagan administration’s policy toward the war.

10

The Policy Collapses

Throughout the second half of 1985 and all of 1986, members of the National Security Council (NSC) actively engaged in an illegal covert operation that provided Iran with much-needed military hardware in exchange for American hostages held in Lebanon. While it is easy to get lost in the details of the operation, this chapter’s discussion will be limited to the operation as it relates to American policy toward the war.1 Throughout this period, the fissures between the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and the NSC over the policy toward Iraq and the arms-for-hostage program only deepened. Meanwhile, there was no end in sight for the five-year-old war that had been a stalemate since 1982, save for a few major battles that had limited results. Iraq dominated the air, bombarding Tehran at will, but the entire dynamic of the war would abruptly change in February 1986 when Iran broke through Iraq’s defenses and captured a large portion of the Faw peninsula. But at the moment when Iraq needed America the most, President Reagan was focused on giving its enemy vital weapons and tactical intelligence. On the ground, the tempo of the war died down significantly after Operation Badr’s failure. However, periodically throughout the summer of 1985, fighting erupted. For instance, on June 14, Iran launched a limited offensive against Iraqi positions in the northern part of the Hawizeh Marshes, but withdrew almost immediately. This was followed by a second limited attack in the central sector near Qasr e-Shirin that lasted only ten hours. Then, on June 28, both Iran and Iraq made commando raids on each other’s positions on the Majnoon Islands, which left their positions virtually unchanged.2 Throughout most of July, fighting occurred along the northern front, as Iran

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launched limited offensives against Kurdish positions near Haji Omran (July 14–19),3 Sumar (July 25) and Mandali (July 30).4 Meanwhile, Israeli officials traveled to Washington in early July and proposed an interesting solution to two major problems facing the Reagan administration: the hostages in Lebanon and the absence of influence in Iran. Israel suggested an arms-for-hostage deal, whereby the United States would supply small amounts of weaponry to Iranian “moderates” in exchange for the release of the hostages in Lebanon, similar to the transactions where Israel obtained the release of hundreds of Iranian Jews after the revolution. When McFarlane pitched the idea to Reagan at a National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting, it received the same response as the draft NSDD; Shultz and Weinberger opposed the proposal, while Casey was supportive. Nevertheless, the president felt that it was worthwhile to “explore” the proposition.5 On August 2, David Kimche, the director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, traveled to Washington to meet with McFarlane to discuss the Iranian initiative. During the course of the meeting, Kimche requested the specific position of the Reagan administration on a pending sale of 100 Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) antitank missiles of American origin. The missiles are lightweight, highly mobile, and highly effective antitank weapons that the Iranians desperately needed to even its military balance with Iraq. Although McFarlane was not prepared to provide approval for the sale, he promised Kimche that he would present the proposal to Reagan and get back to him.6 McFarlane met with President Reagan, secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, and Donald Regan, the White House chief of staff, at the White House on August 6 to discuss the proposed sale. As with the earlier proposals, Shultz and Weinberger were opposed to providing Iran with any sort of weaponry. Interestingly, Regan was also opposed to the sale, cautioning the president to “go slow” and to “make sure we know who we are dealing with before we get too far into this.” In spite of the prevailing view among the participants that this “was a very bad idea,” Reagan telephoned McFarlane a few days later and “authorized the Israelis to proceed with the sale in modest quantities of ‘TOW missiles or other military spares’ that would be replenished by the United States” in exchange for the release of hostages, while stipulating that “the sales not affect the balance of the Iran-Iraq war.” With Reagan’s approval of the sale in hand, the Israelis proceeded to deliver 504 TOW missiles to Iran in two separate shipments, with the first 96 delivered on August 30 and a separate shipment of 408 on September 14. In return, the Iranians arranged Reverend Benjamin Weir’s release the following day, after the arrival of the second shipment.7

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As the White House worked to arrange the sale of the missiles, on August 15, Iraq attacked Iran’s primary oil export terminal on Kharg Island for the first time, which was situated 176 kilometers (110 miles) southeast of Iraq and contributed 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports. American intelligence officials later confirmed the attack, but the extent of the damage remained uncertain.8 According to shipping experts in the region, the attack reduced Kharg’s loading capacity (i.e., the number of terminals available) by 25 to 40 percent. Ten days later, Iraq launched a second assault on the island that further reduced Iran’s ability to export oil through the island.9 The success of these attacks, and Iran’s limited ability to defend its most important oil terminal, emboldened Iraq to try to destroy the island. Thus, between August 30 and September 19, Iraq raided the island eight more times.10 The final raid, on September 19, effectively put Kharg Island out of commission; the Iraqis destroyed the island’s largest loading dock and sunk a supertanker at its berth. By the end of the month-long assault, only three of the island’s fourteen loading berths were intact, leading Iran to close the terminal and shift its exports further south to Sirri Island. The ultimate impact of the assault on Kharg Island was that Iran’s oil exports, which throughout the course of the war were at about 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd), dropped below that of Iraq for the first time.11 Meanwhile, the tension between the NSC and the Departments of State and Defense over the Iranian arms deal led McFarlane to order the CIA to cut both departments entirely out of the loop. According to the Iran-Contra Report, “At McFarlane’s instruction, [Oliver] North told [CIA’s Charles] Allen to distribute the intelligence [on the sales] only to McFarlane, Vice Admiral A. S. Moreau of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Casey, and North. Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger were not to receive the intelligence.” Because State and Defense were both cut off from intelligence on the arms sales to Iran, they both continued to proceed with what they believed was the official American policy. According to the report, Weinberger eventually found out that he was being denied this intelligence and demanded access, while Shultz and State were continuously kept in the dark.12 As the assault on Kharg Island reached its climax, the new American ambassador to Iraq, David Newton, met with Saddam Hussein on September 17 in order to present his credentials. Newton’s appointment as ambassador to Iraq was not a typical appointment. While he had been a political officer in Iraq since 1981, he had only been serving as the head of the American interests section in Baghdad for a few months when Iraq abruptly resumed relations with the United States. When Newton presented his credentials to Saddam, the typically short, ceremonial event ended up lasting a half hour. During

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the course of the meeting, Saddam engaged Newton in an informal discussion on various issues, including his views on Khomeini, bilateral relations, and the war with Iran. Ironically, the Iraqi dictator expressed gratitude for American efforts to block weaponry from reaching Iran, but pointed out that Israel was still providing Iran with American-origin weapons. This underscored the depth of Iraqi intelligence’s knowledge of arms traffic to Iran, but little did Saddam know that the 504 TOW missiles Israel recently delivered to Iran had America’s blessing.13 In late September and early October, Iran launched a series of additional offensives against Iraq. The first came shortly after midnight on September 25 in the central sector, in the highlands near Sumar, with fighting subsiding by morning. 14 Fighting also broke out around the same time on Majnoon Island, but again, little territory changed hands.15 On October 1, Iran launched an additional offensive on the northern front that also resulted in limited gains. Unfortunately, wire reports at the time were not particularly descriptive of the battle or its results.16 On October 9, Under Secretary of State William Schneider and Deputy Under Secretary James Placke met with Tariq Aziz in New York to discuss Operation Staunch. Ignorant of the top-secret negotiations to provide arms to Iran, Schneider and Placke reviewed some of the successes and problems the administration was facing on a country-by-country basis. Placke pointed out that while Italy was working with the American government, “private Italian firms were interested in making sales.” According to Placke, the Portuguese government was not following through with its promises and was “shipping light arms and ammunition to Iran.” Interestingly, the British were also problematic, as they felt contractually obligated “to fulfill pre-existing contracts for nonlethal goods.” Beyond that, they were working closely with the Americans to stop sales of lethal equipment to Iran. Latin American countries were also very problematic. For instance, there was “a great deal of cooperation between Argentina and Iran in both military and civilian spheres.” Brazil was also challenging, as it sold substantial quantities of arms to Libya that could have been easily diverted to Iran, its close ally. Schneider felt getting Brazilian cooperation would be difficult because Brazil’s arms industry was “highly export-oriented.” During the conversation Aziz asked for America’s assessment of rumors about “large arms transfers from the [People’s Republic of China] to Iran,” potentially including advanced missile systems. In response, Schneider indicated, “there may well be some foundation to the rumors, considering China’s eagerness to acquire foreign exchange,” while noting that “any transfer would be conducted in great secrecy . . . and through a third party.” To which Aziz simply said, “Pakistan.”17

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Meanwhile, throughout October and November 1985, Oliver North, a NSC staff member who was put in charge of the operation by McFarlane, arranged a third delivery of American weapons to Iran. However, unlike the earlier TOW antitank missile sales, this sale was for the much more advanced HAWK antiaircraft missiles. Also quite mobile, HAWK missiles would greatly reduce Iraq’s dominance of the skies—at least while they lasted. On November 24, Israel, with the illegal help of a CIA proprietary aircraft, flew 18 HAWK missiles to Iran. When the missiles arrived in Iran, one of the missiles had Israeli markings, which was viewed as a provocation by the Iranians. Another problem was that the missiles were outdated. The Iranians wanted missiles to shoot down Soviet high-flying reconnaissance planes and Iraqi bombers, but the missiles provided were HAWK missiles, not the Improved-HAWK (I-HAWK) used by the American army after 1972. Iran demanded their removal, and no hostages were released. As the Iran-Contra Report aptly concluded, “The shipment of HAWKs to Iran was bad policy, badly planned and badly executed. In contradiction of its frequently emphasized public policy concerning the Iran-Iraq war and nations that support terrorism, the United States had approved the sale of arms to Iran.”18 Not long after Israel provided HAWK missiles to Iran and almost immediately after the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva, Richard Murphy traveled to Baghdad on December 1 to meet with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein. In his conversation with Aziz, Murphy briefed him on the discussions in Geneva, indicating that both sides agreed “the war should not become part of the East-West rivalry” and that Iran “was the intransigent party.” In addition, Reagan urged the Soviets to curtail its arms supplies to Iran. Aziz lamented that he wished the war would have factored more in the conversations and was concerned about Soviet disinformation about a shift in American policy toward pursuing an arms embargo against Iraq, which Murphy vehemently denied and put the matter at ease.19 After Murphy’s three-hour-long meeting with Aziz, the two called on Saddam Hussein for a two-and-a-half-hour-long discussion that focused almost entirely on the Geneva summit, events in the Middle East, and the war. After Aziz reviewed the details of their previous conversation, the subject turned to Iraq’s war with Iran. Murphy commented that despite Iraq’s attacks on Kharg, “Iran was maintaining and even increasing production [of oil].” Saddam explained that Iraq “wanted peace immediately on the basis of sovereignty, good neighborliness, and non-interference in internal affairs.” With regards to Iran’s recent offensives, Saddam said, “Although small areas of territory do not determine the results of a long war. . . . Iraq must be careful not to yield yet another inch because even those small gains would consolidate a declining

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regime.” Turning to arms control, the Iraqi president was pleased to hear that the Soviets and Americans would work together to block arms to Iran, pointing out that the communist nations appeared “more serious in finding ways to stop the arms flow.” Murphy agreed with Saddam’s assessment, commenting “that the Soviet Union had been furious and embarrassed over Libyan shipment of [SCUD] missiles to Iran,” though he had not seen any tangible evidence of a firm commitment to blocking arms to Iran. Nevertheless, Saddam said he received intelligence that suggested that the Warsaw Pact countries had agreed to not let arms reach Iran.20 Certainly, if the Eastern bloc followed through with this apparent decision, it would severely restrict Iran’s already limited ability to find arms and place greater pressure on Iran to end its intransigence. Not long after the Murphy mission, on December 4, Robert McFarlane resigned and was replaced by Vice Admiral John Poindexter, Reagan’s fourth national security advisor. From this point onward, the NSC took a more active role in the “arms-for-hostages” initiative. As his first act in his new role, Poindexter provided Reagan with a retroactive NSDD that legalized the CIA’s illegal involvement in the November shipment of HAWKs from Israel to Iran, which Reagan signed. A few days later, on December 7, Reagan met with his advisors to review the status of the arms-for-hostage deals. Once again Shultz, Weinberger, and Regan voiced their opposition to any further deals with Iran. The vehement opposition to providing Iran with weapons during the meeting left Weinberger with the impression that “the initiative was put to rest once and for all,” but this was in fact not the case.21 Over the course of the next few weeks, Oliver North and John Poindexter continued to secretly pursue other avenues to attain the release of the hostages, and by early January 1986 a new proposal was put forward. The new initiative, however, was different from the previous operations in that instead of using Israel as an intermediary, which CIA lawyers determined was illegal, the United States would directly provide arms to Iran. On January 17, Poindexter sent Reagan a memorandum that outlined the new initiative allowing for the CIA, “using an authorized agent as necessary,” to purchase arms from the Department of Defense under the Economy Act and then transfer them to Iran directly. In an effort to further convince Reagan of the imperative need to act, Poindexter pointed out that the Israelis were “very concerned [about] Iran’s deteriorating position in the war with Iraq, the potential for further radicalization in Iran, and the possibility of enhanced Soviet influence in the Gulf—all pose significant threats to the security of Israel.”22 Reagan did not hesitate to sign the finding. Since meeting with the families of the hostages in June 1985, the president became determined to attain the release of the hostages, even if it meant cutting deals

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with Iran. Sneakily, the finding ordered that the operation be concealed from Congress: “I determine it is essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.” The goals of the finding were threefold: . . . (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to determine the current Iranian Government’s intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of the American hostages held in Beirut and preventing additional terrorist acts by these groups. But, most surprisingly, the finding called for the provision of “funds, intelligence, counter-intelligence, training, guidance and communications and other necessary assistance to these elements, groups, individuals, [foreign intelligence services] and third countries in support of these activities.” In other words, the United States would provide people affiliated with Iran with intelligence. Finally, it ordered the American government to: . . . act to facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to establish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements with arms, equipment and related material in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their efforts to achieve a more pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union.23 That evening, Reagan wrote in his diary: “Only thing waiting was N.S.C. wanting decision on our effort to get 5 hostages out of Lebanon. Involves selling TOW antitank missiles to Iran. I gave a go-ahead.”24 Not long after Reagan signed the finding, Deputy DCI John McMahon wrote to Director Casey describing the unease at CIA headquarters about providing Iran with “a map depicting the order of battle on the Iran/Iraq border showing units, troops, tanks, electronic installations, and what have you.” The request for intelligence came after a recent meeting North had with Manucher Ghorbanifar, who was the middleman between the United States and Iran. At the meeting, Ghorbanifar indicated that the Iranians wanted American intelligence to establish its bona fides. Everyone here at [CIA] headquarters advises against this operation not only because we feel the principal involved [Ghorbanifar] is a liar and

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has a record of deceit. But, secondly, we would be aiding and abetting the wrong people. I met with Poindexter this afternoon to appeal his direction that we provide this intelligence, point out not only the fragility in the ability of the principal to deliver, but also the fact that we were tilting in a direction which could cause the Iranians to have a successful offense against the Iraqis with cataclysmic results. I noted that providing defensive missiles was one thing but when we provide intelligence on the order of battle, we are giving the Iranians the wherewithal for offensive action. Despite McMahon’s opposition to the deal, Poindexter “insisted that it was an opportunity that should be explored.” McMahon then indicated that “in spite of our counsel to the contrary, we are proceeding to follow out orders” and prepared the battle of order map.25 McMahon’s warnings against providing tactical intelligence to Iran went unheeded, and it was provided to the Iranians in late January, only days before the Iranians launched a spectacularly successful offensive against Iraq.26 Beyond providing intelligence, amid the greatest Iranian breakthrough in the war, the Reagan administration also facilitated the direct sale and delivery of two separate shipments of 500 TOWs missiles (a total of 1,000) from the United States to Iran. As outlined in the finding, the CIA purchased the missiles from Defense and sold them to Iran by way of an approved intermediary. The first shipment of TOWs occurred on February 17, but no hostages were released. Despite this, the second shipment was delivered to the Iranians on February 27, with the same result; no hostages were released.27 Thus, in the face of the intense opposition from the CIA and the secretaries of State and Defense, the Reagan administration not only circumvented its official policy of strict neutrality, but also violated its active policy of tilting decidedly toward Iraq. To make matters worse, this all occurred at a time when Iranian troops were pouring into southern Iraq. Iran’s Faw offensive in February 1986 was a perfect example of its military ingenuity. Late in the evening on February 9, Iran launched Operation Wal Fajr-8, a three-prong offensive in the southern sector. Planned by the Iranian army staff,28 the first prong was a diversionary attack directed from approximately 40 kilometers (25 miles) north of Basra. Launched on the firm, open desert terrain at the southern edge of the Hawizeh Marshes, the objective was to utilize the speed of an armored division to cross the border and hook south toward Basra. By finally launching the long anticipated offensive to the northeast of Basra, the Iranians drew Iraq’s Third Army further north, where a major tank battle took place on February 11; Iraq

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emerged victorious. Around the same time, Iran launched a second prong against the small island of Umm Rasas, which lay to the southeast of Basra, about 72 kilometers (45 miles) up the estuary of the Shatt al-Arab, near where the river ceases to be the border.29 After capturing the island, the Iranians established a large bridgehead on the west bank of the river. The purpose of this attack was to draw Iraq’s Seventh Army north toward Basra from the far south, where the third prong was attacking. The next day, as predicted, the Seventh Army launched a successful counteroffensive against the bridgehead and recaptured the island, while unwittingly leaving the Faw

Iran’s invasion of Faw, February 1986. (Adapted from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. http://ochaonline.un.org/iraq/MapCentre/ ReferenceMaps/tabid/2375/language/en-US/Default.aspx.)

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peninsula virtually defenseless.30 Although the Iraqis recaptured the island, the remaining troops from Iran’s bridgehead were not altogether defeated, and the surviving forces moved further south to join up with a second bridgehead further south.31 Meanwhile, the third prong, also under the cover of darkness and a severe spring storm, bridged the turbulent Shatt al-Arab further south and established a large beachhead just north of the sparsely defended city of Faw. Once the beachhead was established, Iran quickly reinforced its position and attacked south toward Faw, which put up a stiff resistance until its collapse on February 14.32 After capturing the city, the Iranian column moved westward toward Iraq’s primary naval port, Umm Qasr, only 16 kilometers (10 miles) away, while the newly reinforced Umm Rasas column moved north along the Basra-Faw road.33 The successful invasion of Faw caught the Americans and Iraqis by surprise. Iran had carefully calculated all of its moves leading up to the offensive, taking considerable precautions to prevent either country from anticipating its next moves. According to Dilip Hiro, after the failure of Operation Badr, the Iranian army began carefully planning every stage of the new offensive. This included perfecting their amphibious tactics by conducting drills and “practice runs in the mountain lakes and rivers in northern Iran,” where large troop concentrations would have gone unnoticed. Hiro explained that a major factor behind Iran’s surprise was its recognition that Iraq was relying on the United States for intelligence: [The] Iranians employed certain means to deceive and circumvent the American intelligence-gathering equipment. For instance, they used open trucks to transport troops: the intelligence analysts concluded that these vehicles were carrying goods rather than men. Also Iranian field headquarters sent messages to field commanders by couriers using motorcycles, and not by coded messages over radio telephone, thus depriving the American and Iraqi monitoring devices the opportunity to pick up these messages. Because of the weather conditions and Iranian tactics, American satellites and AWACS were unable to predict the Faw offensive and once it was under way could not immediately confirm its strength or dimensions.34 At the time, most analysts believed the Faw breakthrough was an Iranian feint, intended to draw Iraq’s Third Army from around Basra, where the real offensive was expected. On February 13, American officials told the New York Times that “only relatively small numbers of Iranian troops had been used” in the attack on Faw and they “doubted that the fighting around Faw

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posed much threat to Basra.” According to the official, the attack against Faw was likely an Iranian “feint to be followed by an attempt to cross the Tigris north of the city near Majnoon Island in the Hawizeh Marshes,” where “Iran had again massed its forces.” 35 Indeed, this view was far more pervasive among American analysts than the article suggests, and it seemed to be confirmed by the fighting north of Basra at the start of the operation. Not long after the offensive was launched on February 9, King Hussein again passed American intelligence to Iraq. According to Ashton, the intelligence suggested “that the attack at Faw was a limited diversionary assault, and that the main Iranian offensive would come later in the central sector of the front” through the marshes. “As a result the Iraqis did not react promptly to the Faw offensive, believing that it was a feint for the real attack elsewhere.”36 When the weather finally cleared on February 13, American satellite pictures stood in stark contrast to earlier analyses; Faw was a major attack. By then, Iran had spent three full days reinforcing its bridgehead, ferrying 30,000 troops, artillery, vehicles, and supplies across the Shatt al-Arab, while digging in deep. With the clear weather, Iraq realized that Faw was a major invasion, and they launched a major three-prong offensive against the peninsula on February 14 using the Seventh Army and the Republican Guard. The eastern column, consisting of the forces that defeated the Iranian bridgehead at Umm Rasas, moved south along the Basra-Faw road that runs adjacent to the Shatt al-Arab. The central column also moved south, but along a road that Iraqi General Maher Abd al-Rashid, one of Saddam’s kinsmen and the best performing Iraqi general at the time, had built the previous year that ran about 12 to 16 kilometers (8 to 10 miles) west of the Basra-Faw road, just outside of the reach of Iranian artillery. The western column “moved southwards from Umm Qasr-Basra road junction along the road by the northern shore of the Khor Abdullah that ran west of the Mamlaha salt beds.”37 For the next seven days, the two armies fought a titanic battle on the Faw peninsula, with Iran holding its ground. Throughout the course of the entire counteroffensive, Iraq once again extensively employed the use of chemical weapons. Joost Hiltermann once again provides an excellent firsthand account of the fighting. According to Taghi Aghaei, a Basij volunteer who participated in the fighting, “they fired chemical shells at us, and we fled back toward the river. . . . As we pulled back, many of our men had blisters on their faces and were choking. The doctors at the mobile hospital were completely overwhelmed. It was a total disaster.” Hiltermann provides testimonials of doctors that diagnosed Iraq’s use of mustard gas and nerve agents. They describe Iraq’s devastating air attacks, where its air force would first drop conventional munitions and then

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chemical bombs. “Iran later claimed to have suffered 12,000 casualties at Faw from chemicals alone.” 38 As fighting died down on the front, Saddam ordered several detachments of the elite Republican Guard to the front on February 23, rather than divert units from the Third Army defending Basra. With the arrival of the Republican Guard, Iraq launched another counteroffensive and slowly inched forward until fighting died down on March 11. In the course of the three-week-long battle, Iraq only managed to recapture 6 kilometers (4 miles), 39 while Iran held onto 512 square kilometers (320 square miles).40 A few days after Iran’s successful invasion of Faw on February 15, the Barzani-KDP backed by Pasdaran forces, launched Operation Wal Fajr-9 in the northern sector along the Sulaimaniya valley. After occupying a number of villages in the valley, Barzani moved north toward Chwarta and “captured a ridge of peaks” about 22 kilometers (14 miles) north of the Kurdish city of Sulaimaniya. Due to winter conditions in the mountains (heavy snow and thick cloud cover), the Iraqi Air Force was unable to provide air support for a counterattack. On March 1, the Iraqis were forced to withdraw an entire mountain brigade from the region in order to send them south to reinforce its forces fighting at Faw. The KDP, taking advantage of the vacuum left by the departing Iraqis, attacked a small garrison at Sitak and on March 3 the Iranians began shelling Sulaimaniya for the first time in the war. Due to the dramatic breakthrough in the southern sector, there was little the Iraqis could do to prevent a similar penetration in the north.41 At the behest of members of the Arab League, the Security Council met in mid-February to discuss the recent escalation in the war between Iran and Iraq. A few days later, on February 26, it unanimously passed UNSC 582, which deplored the escalation of the conflict, “especially territorial incursions, the bombing of purely civilian population centers, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under 1925 Geneva Protocol.” The resolution called upon Iran and Iraq to observe an immediate ceasefire, urged the exchange of prisoners of war and for both to submit all aspects of the conflict to mediation. Although UNSC 582 condemned the use of chemical weapons, once again the United Nations failed to identify Iraq as the perpetrator.42 In light of Iran’s continued allegations about Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, the secretary-general ordered a mission to Iran to further investigate allegations against both Iran and Iraq of chemical weapons use. The mission visited Iran from February 26 to March 3 to investigate Iran’s allegations. While visiting an Iranian field hospital across the river from Faw, the

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investigators managed to interview nine Iraqi soldiers who confirmed that Iraq was using chemical weapons. The Iraqi personnel gave a consistent account of the attacks that caused their injuries, either after they had been captured by, or had surrendered to, Iranian forces or were in no man’s land between opposing forces. Almost all of the Iraqi personnel claimed that they had been injured by bombs dropped by Iraqi aircraft. When asked how they knew the identity of the aircraft they stated that the aircraft were bombing Iranian positions and were subject to Iranian anti-aircraft fire. In addition, the mission interviewed a captured Iraqi pilot, who freely admitted that he had been involved in “special missions” against Iranian forces using chemical bombs. In the end, the mission concluded, “without any doubt,” that the injuries sustained by the victims they examined were caused by mustard gas. Interestingly, thanks to the evidence provided by captured Iraqis, the mission unanimously concluded that Iraq, on many occasions, “used chemical weapons against Iranian forces” and that the “agent used has mainly been mustard gas although on some occasions nerve gas was also employed.”43 These conclusions were presented to the secretary-general on March 12 and a week later the president of the Security Council issued a statement expressing its profound concern “by the unanimous conclusion . . . that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces, most recently in the course of the present Iranian offensive into Iraqi territory.”44 For the first time in the war, Iraq was officially identified by the United Nations as using chemical weapons in its war with Iran. Iraq’s thorough routing at Faw prompted the NSC to order a review of Iraq’s prospects in the war. Circulated in early April, the title of SNIE 34/36.2-86 asked a question that was on the minds of many military analysts at the time: is Iraq losing the war? The analysis concluded that Iraq’s continued failure “to exploit its many military advantages over Iran will mean that Iraq will suffer additional military setbacks and probably lose the war over the long term.” The CIA identified that Iraq’s military strategy was “to end, and not win the war,” whereas Iran wanted to win the war and had specific goals (Saddam’s ouster and the establishment of a fundamentalist regime) that it considered tantamount to victory. It concluded that Iran was likely to launch a number of medium- or small- sized offensives to weaken Iraq’s defenses, predicting that “Iran’s leaders are unlikely to scale back the war effort in the next 12 months.” Inadvertently or not, the estimate laid out a viable strategy for Iraq to win the war. Pointing out that “Iran’s vital economic and military facilities remain highly vulnerable to Iraqi air attack,” the estimate argued for

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“a sustained and effective Iraqi campaign against these targets,” which “could severely limit Iran’s ability to fight the war and ultimately force the regime to reconsider its policies—short of making peace.45 In late-April 1986, military analysts began to predict an impending Iraqi offensive. “There’s no doubt about it (an offensive) is coming,” remarked one observer. The only question was where? Analysts were split on this question. Many felt that Iraq had to eject the Iranians from the Faw peninsula because it was a matter of national pride. But, at the same time, “Analysts disagree on the strategic necessity of having to remove the Iranians holding Faw.” After all, the 30,000 Iranian troops occupying the peninsula were virtually trapped, with only meager supplies that can make it across the Shatt al-Arab to keep them going.46 The Iraqis appeared to have come to similar conclusions. On May 14, it launched an offensive in the central sector against the Iranian border town of Mehran. After three days of fighting, Iraq captured the town, two strategic heights overlooking it, and 160 square kilometers (100 square miles).47 In the meantime, the administration’s efforts to attain the release of the hostages led Robert McFarlane (as a private citizen), Oliver North, and George Cave to Tehran from May 25 to 28. The purpose of the mission was to meet with high-level Iranian officials in order to arrange for the release of American hostages in Beirut, but it ended up being a spectacular failure. According to Cave, a former CIA official who served as the mission’s translator, not long after arriving in Tehran the mission started to go awry. As it turned out, the Iranians were unprepared for the meeting because they did not believe that the delegation would actually come to Iran. “As a result, they had only sent someone to Lebanon on the evening of May 25th, after our arrival in Tehran, to negotiate with the actual hostage holders.” As a result, the meeting that day consisted of the Iranians enumerating all of America’s sins. On May 27, frustrated by the continuous delays, McFarlane issued an ultimatum. “If the hostages were released before early morning, he would order the rest of the Hawk spares flown in. If not, the American party would break off negotiations and depart Tehran.” The next morning, the Iranians failed to produce the hostages, and the mission departed. The failure of both sides to find a compromise doomed any chance for a successful resolution to the crisis in the future.48 On June 30, Iran launched a major counteroffensive against Mehran, retaking the town and expelling the Iraqis across the border after two days of heavy fighting. After the battle, Iranian radio played a commentary that asked rhetorically: “Where are the spy satellites of the superpowers now, to see their gifts of advanced equipment to the Iraq regime, which is in flames?”49 With

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two consecutive major defeats at Faw and Mehran, the Iraqi leadership desperately needed to reevaluate its static defense strategy that was clearly not working. Beyond its troubling military situation, by July 1986, Iraq had fallen into arrears on its payments to EXIM by approximately $3.5 million. Due to Iraq’s inability to pay its debt, EXIM refused to extend further credit to Iraq for purchases of American goods, which injured Iraq’s ability to keep fighting the war. Up to this point, the Iraqis had always put repayment of debt to the United States as a priority. The fact that Iraq was now falling into arrears meant that its financial situation was deteriorating.50 Facing such dire military and economic conditions, the Ba’ath Party convened an “Extraordinary Congress” in Baghdad on July 10. During the conference, the party concluded that the only solution to its economic and military crises was to force the war to a rapid conclusion. “There appears to have been general recognition among the Ba’athist leaders that their existing strategy of static defense was not working and required drastic overhaul, if not complete abandonment.” Indeed, the failed Mehran offensive underlined that Iraq’s defensive strategy conditioned its commanders and troops to avoid taking risks on the battlefield. In order to solve both problems, the “Extraordinary Congress” opted to draft college students, who had previously been exempt from the draft, and to specially train them in offensive tactics for a future assault.51 Not long after the congress, a similar meeting took place in Washington. On July 23, the Crisis Preplanning Group (CPPG) met to discuss Iraq’s deteriorating financial and military situation. A briefing memorandum, prepared for Michael Armacost, the under secretary of state for political affairs, identified general concern in Washington “over Iraq’s ability to sustain its defenses has substantially risen over the past three weeks, focusing particularly on the Iraqi battlefront defeat at Mehran in early July.” The essential point is incontrovertible: The trends in the war, developing at an ever fast pace since the Iranian success at Faw in February, underscore our long-held view that the longer the war continues, the greater the risk of an Iraqi defeat, whatever its form may take.52 Three days later, Armacost cabled the American embassy in Baghdad, outlining the details of the meeting. The CPPG decided that Vice President George H.W. Bush, who was touring the region at the time, would pass a message from President Reagan to Saddam Hussein via King Hussein or Egyptian President Mubarak that conveyed the administration’s belief that Iraq needed to step up its air war and focus on bombing Iran’s economic targets.53 Starting in early August, the IAF commenced a campaign aimed at crippling Iran’s economic infrastructure. For instance, on August 7 Iraqi warplanes

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raided Kharg Island on three occasions: they hit an oil refinery, a power station, and two generators in Isfahan.54 On August 11, Iraq launched a second attack against the oil refinery in Isfahan and the following day attacked Iran’s new oil export terminal on Sirri Island, located 720 kilometers (450 miles) south of Iraq, setting three supertankers ablaze. This attack strongly suggested that Iraq now had the capability to attack throughout the Persian Gulf.55 This pattern of striking Iranian economic targets continued into September, when Iraq announced on September 3 that “all Iranian ports and oil-terminals were now considered to be within its Naval Exclusion Zone,” which was announced by Saddam at the start of the war.56 In early October, Poindexter met with Casey to discuss providing intelligence to both Iran and Iraq. According to an email sent by North on October 2, the Iranians were again looking for “intelligence assistance” in their war against Iraq, including: 1:50,000 scale maps, Location of Iraqi Army Corps and Division [Head Quarters] 30–45 km behind the front, Location of Logistical Centres Main Supply Routes to the front, Info on Iraqi troop movements, Reserve units and tank concentrations, Where the Iraqis believe that the main Iranian attack will occur and where diversionary attacks will occur. Essentially, Iran sought any further information that it could use to launch another successful offensive against Iraq. But in the same communique´, North pointed out that “we DO NOT have to tell the truth about all of this.”57 At the same time, Iraq was also putting in further requests for intelligence about Iran, “specifically, on electrical power plants and kerosene manufacturing [sic] plants,” as part of Iraq’s efforts to destroy Iran’s economic infrastructure.58 After the meeting, Poindexter indicated to North that he needed “a thoughtful piece that lays out a rational scheme for [sic] providing [intelligence] to both sides. The Iraqis are asking for the same sort of thing—location of economic targets behind the lines.”59 By late fall, Iraq’s attacks on Iran’s economic targets were beginning to have an effect. On October 9, the NSC produced a study on the war that argued that, “Iran now concludes that it can not win a war with Iraq,” because its “economic infrastructure [sic] can no longer support the effective waging of the war against Iraq.” The Iranian government wants to conclude peace with Iraq, but has a problem in that it must be able to present the end of the war as a “victory” for Iran. . . . In order to present the Iranian people with a “victory,” the

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Iranians have planned one last offensive. The purpose of this offensive is to gain enough territory to give [sic] the Iranians a strong bargaining [sic] position. It was quite evident that as the war entered its sixth year, Iran, increasingly war weary, for the first time was interested in finding an “honorable peace.”60 Interestingly, in late October, Iranian authorities quietly contacted the administration, “indicating that they want secret—but officially structured— discussions on improving relations.” Most importantly, and unlike any previous meetings, the Iranians did not pose “any preconditions (e.g., arms sales) for such talks.” At this point, the Iranians faced a number of significant obstacles, including “the war, a devastated economy, the Soviets in Afghanistan, [and] domestic unrest.” As a result, the State Department concluded that the absence of preconditions on these talks meant “Iran needs us.” The hope was that Iran’s economic, military, and diplomatic isolation would force the regime in Tehran to turn to the United States. It appeared that the stage was set for an improved relationship with Iran, but the American media and public were becoming increasingly aware that the administration had secretly traded arms for hostages with Iran.61 In early November, it became clear that the facts about the arms-forhostage deals were going to become public. Recognizing this, Shultz had the State Department analyze the potential fallout should the initiative become public. Fortunately for State, throughout the entire fiasco Shultz vehemently argued that providing weapons to Iran contradicted the official policy of neutrality and negated the entire purpose of Operation Staunch. The facts of what has happened are coming out fast. There is a real danger of spinning a web of misleading if not incorrect statements that won’t stand up to press and Congressional investigation. If there is not full and swift disclosure—to the public and intelligence committees, as appropriate—this affair is going to go on and on in an agonizing and terribly corrosive way. All of the administration’s “policies and official statements—on the Gulf war, on Israeli deliveries, on AWACS, on terrorism—have just been turned upside down.” In other words, the short-sighted objectives of a select group of officials eclipsed all of the positive elements of the policy toward the Iran-Iraq war, while destroying all American credibility throughout the region.62 On November 3, a pro-Syrian Lebanese publication, Al Shiraa, reported that Reagan’s administration secretly sold arms to Iran in exchange for the release of hostages held in Lebanon.63 The Syrian story immediately caught

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the attention of the Western media, resulting in a political firestorm in Washington. By November 13, it was apparent that nothing could be done to contain the scandal. That day, President Reagan addressed the American public in an effort to explain the administration’s rationale behind the Iran initiative. Reagan explained that since the Iranian Revolution, the United States had engaged in continuous efforts to “renew a relationship with Iran,” in the hopes of achieving an “honorable” end to the Iran-Iraq war, eliminating Iran’s ties to terrorism, and attaining the release of the hostages in Lebanon. Reagan decried the media’s allegations, particularly about the trading of hostages for arms, stating that they were “utterly false.” But Reagan admitted he had “authorized the transfer of small amounts of defensive weapons and spare parts for defensive systems to Iran” in order to “convince Tehran that our negotiators were acting with [his] authority, [and] to send a signal that the United States was prepared to replace the animosity between us with a new relationship.” Ultimately, it was “because of Iran’s strategic importance and its influence in the Islamic world that [the administration] chose to probe for a better relationship between our countries.”64 On November 25, after coming under intensive criticism, John Poindexter resigned as national security advisor and was replaced by Frank Carlucci, the fifth person to fill this role during Reagan’s presidency. A week later, Reagan, who wanted “all the facts [to] come out,” signed Executive Order 12575 that formally established the president’s Special Review Board led by John Tower.65 The Tower Commission’s mandate was to investigate the scandal and report to the president. But from the outset, the Tower Commission faced considerable obstacles. First, in late October and early November, when it had become apparent that the scandal would break, North and Poindexter shredded hundreds of pertinent documents.66 Second, Director Casey suffered a sudden seizure on December 15, completely incapacitating him until his death on May 6, 1987.67 “Because of his illness and subsequent death,” Reagan once lamented, “I never had a chance to learn from Bill Casey what he knew about Iran-Contra. Probably only John Poindexter and Oliver North know all the answers.”68 The controversy that surrounded the “Iran-Gate” scandal focused largely on the administration’s use of the NSC as a base for covert operations. When planning the operation, Casey and Poindexter purposely cut Congress and the departments of State and Defense out of the loop in order to shield its illegal activity from public oversight. The entire ordeal underscored the absence of a uniform policy toward the war. Up until the start of 1985, the American policy toward the war was explicitly spelled out. Throughout this entire period, the administration’s efforts adhered to two policy objectives: first, to

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cut off Iran’s arms supply to force it to end the war, and, second, to tilt toward Iraq in order to maintain a balance of power in the region. As such, it initiated Operation Staunch to dry up arms sales to Iran and began providing Iraq with tactical intelligence to help undermine Iran’s military strength. But throughout 1985–1986, segments of the Reagan administration actively worked against this policy, providing much needed antitank and antiaircraft missiles and spare parts to Iran in a futile effort to attain the release of American hostages held in Lebanon and rebuild American influence in Iran. In addition, the same elements in the administration provided tactical intelligence to Iran, which, according to former State Department officials who viewed the intelligence provided to both sides, was far more detailed and actionable than the intelligence provided to Iraq.69 To make matters worse, the intelligence provided to Iran occurred just before it made a spectacular breakthrough in the war at Faw, followed by another victory in Iraqi Kurdistan. After the Iranian breakthrough, the Reagan administration then took steps to correct its massive error by helping the Iraqis destroy Iran’s economic infrastructure. The Iraqis no doubt appreciated the gesture, but at the time they were unaware that the administration had been playing both sides. Thus, when news broke in November that the United States provided weapons to Iran that were used to kill Iraqis, Saddam Hussein lashed out at President Reagan on November 18 that underlined his “intense anger and sense of betrayal.”70 In light of the collapse of American policy, the Reagan administration was forced to immediately reevaluate its policy not just toward the war, but also toward the Gulf States, who were outraged by America’s cold-hearted betrayal.

Part V

The Collapse of Neutrality

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11

The Aftermath of Deception

President Reagan’s admission that America was complicit in providing Iran with weapons prompted the administration to overhaul its entire policy in early 1987. While the basic tenets of the pre-imbroglio policy remained the same, the administration’s pursuit of these goals was notably invigorated. Unlike the passive efforts at the United Nations over the previous six years, the administration actively pursued resolutions “with teeth” to call for an end to the war, while urging an arms embargo against Iran for failing to accept the council’s many resolutions. At the same time, the administration renewed its efforts through Operation Staunch to block weaponry to Iran. Finally, the revelation that the United States provided arms to Iran in order to kill Iraqis nearly destroyed America’s relationship with Iraq. Although Baghdad did not break relations with Washington, American officials—particularly the duplicitous CIA—were persona non grata in the Iraqi capital. At first glance, the exposure of the Iranian arms deal boded terribly for Iraq; after all, a perceived ally was providing arms to an indisputable enemy. But in the aftermath of the debacle, the political reality was that the United States now had no other option but to tilt even further toward Iraq, if only to rebuild confidence with its actual allies in the Persian Gulf. In effect, the exposure of the Iran-Contra Affair allowed the State Department to regain control of the American policy toward the war. Because of the destruction of American credibility throughout the region, the Reagan administration was left with only one option: abandoning all pretext of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. Since Iran’s tremendous defeat at Basra in June 1982, the Iraqis dramatically improved the city’s defenses, including the creation of an artificial lake on the

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east bank of the Shatt al-Arab only 10 kilometers (6 miles) to the northeast of the city. Known as Fish Lake, the lake was approximately one kilometer (half mile) wide and 30 kilometers (18 miles) long, running on a northwest axis from a point about 2 kilometers (1 mile) on the Iraqi side of the border at Shalamcheh, Iran. Following its withdrawal from Iran in 1982, Iraq built five massive defensive arches to the east of Basra, consisting of five massive earth causeways that were flush with concrete bunkers and heavy gun, tank, and artillery emplacements. Each causeway was about one kilometer (half mile) apart and was separated by the soggy, muddy ground of the Shatt al-Arab delta during the winter rainy season and was littered with trenches, barbed wire, metal obstacles, and landmines.1 Throughout the fall of 1986, as the world focused on the political firestorm in Washington, Iran mobilized approximately 650,000 troops on the southern front in preparation for another major offensive.2 As with similar buildups, the Reagan administration warned Iraq in December 1986 of an impending offensive against Umm Rasas.3 Known as Karbala-4, Iran’s offensive came late in the evening on Christmas Eve, when a small number of Iranian special forces overwhelmed the Umm Rasas’ defenses, crossed the Shatt al-Arab, and established a bridgehead on the east bank of the river, just as it had during the Faw offensive. Prepared for the offensive, Iraq’s Third after fourteen hours of fighting.4 The next day, Iran launched an additional offensive from its southern position at Faw against Iraq’s Seventh Army, which was also quickly crushed.5 At first glance, the objective of the offensive could have been to draw units from Iraq’s Seventh Army north from Faw. But the Iranians anticipated that Baghdad would not be willing to weaken its defensive positions in the south and would have to use the Third Army to counterattack eastward toward Umm Rasas, which ultimately weakened its defenses at the point where the Third and Seventh Armies’ lines meet at the Iranian border, near Shalamcheh.6 Having weakened Iraq’s defenses east of Basra with Karbala-4, Iran launched Operation Karbala-5 just after midnight on January 9, 1987. The offensive was the longest battle of the entire war, lasting sixteen days. The first phase of the offensive consisted of two thrusts from the northeast and southeast of Basra with the objective of encircling the city. The first prong was launched from the Iranian border post of Shalamcheh, 35 kilometers (22 miles) to the southeast of Basra. In the middle of the night, the well-equipped Pasdaran caught the Iraqis off-guard and managed to push past two of Iraq’s defensive lines by dawn.7 The Iraqis fitfully tried to hold off the “human wave” offensive, but were completely overwhelmed by the ferocity of Iran’s forces, launching unsuccessful counterattacks on January 10. That day, Iran launched a second offensive from the northeast of Basra, near the Iranian border town of Kushk.

The Battle of Basra, January–February 1987. (Adapted from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. http://ochaonline.un.org/iraq/MapCentre/ReferenceMaps/tabid/2375/language/en-US/Default.aspx.)

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Having expected a thrust in this region for years, Iraq’s Third Army was already prepared to meet the Iranians, and the Iranians did not gain any ground.8 As the northern prong faltered, Iran reinforced its position on a small 5 square kilometer (3 square mile) strip of Iraqi territory and launched an additional thrust, hooking south under Fish Lake where it managed to firmly establish a beachhead on January 12.9 Significantly, by attacking where the jurisdiction of Iraq’s Third and Seventh armies meet, Iran was able to temporarily sever communications between the two armies.10 On January 15, the Third Army ruthlessly counterattacked against Iran’s salient southwest of Fish Lake, but the Pasdaran refused to budge.11 The suddenness of the Iranian offensive near Shalamcheh caught the Iraqis completely off-guard. This was evident not so much in the fact that Iran captured two impressively defended battlement lines, but in the fact that the Iranians captured 2,500 Iraqi soldiers, including ten colonels and a brigadier-general, who were later paraded to foreign journalists visiting the front.12 Throughout the first phase of the battle, the Iranians showed a marked improvement in their ability to launch full frontal offensives. Understandably, the influx of American TOW antitank and HAWK antiaircraft missiles, coupled with black-market purchases of spare parts for Iran’s air force significantly impacted Iran’s ability to fight.13 This helps explain why the Iraqis were taken aback when Iran launched its initial offensive. Never before had the Iranians been able to utterly destroy tanks, or shoot down Iraq’s helicopter gunships or aircraft. The sudden and dramatic improvement of Iran’s offensive capability quickly negated the Reagan administration’s best efforts to argue that its military sales to Iran were insignificant and would have no impact on the war.14 As the Iraqis continued to launch counterattacks against Iran’s foothold near Basra, the Iranians opened up a second front in the war, attacking Iraqi positions on a number of strategic hills near Sumar that were occupied and held by Iraq since early in the war. The offensive appeared to be a success, with the recapturing of 14 hills and a number of strategic border posts. The Iraqis immediately counterattacked, but after six main thrusts against Iran’s new positions, the counteroffensive faltered, leaving Iran in control after five days of fighting.15 On January 14, Iran launched a two-prong assault against Iraqi islands to the south of Shalamcheh and its salient near Fish Lake. The objective of this push was to capture a series of islands along the northern shore of the Shatt al-Arab. Occupying these islands was important because it allowed Iran to block potential Iraqi counterattacks across the river and put its artillery within close range of the outskirts of Basra. After 36 hours of fierce fighting, Iran

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managed to capture Bovarin Island, just south of Shalamcheh. 16 From Bovarin, the Iranians captured the islands of Toveyla and Fayyaz. From Iran’s new positions on the Shatt al-Arab, it was able to position its artillery within range of Basra’s southernmost suburbs, including a petrochemical facility that was shelled on January 18, releasing toxic gas into the air.17 The next day, Iran renewed its efforts at Fish Lake, pushing past Iraq’s third line of defense, crossing the Jasim River that flows southward into the Shatt al-Arab18 and capturing the abandoned Iraqi hamlet of Duayji by January 21.19 On the day Duayji fell to Iran, Saddam Hussein issued a plea for a ceasefire in the conflict, offering “Tehran a complete mutual withdrawal of troops, an exchange of prisoners, a treaty of non-aggression, a deal of non-interference in each others internal affairs and security in the Gulf region.” The Iranians, recognizing the plea as a sign of weakness, scoffed at the Iraqi regime’s diplomatic efforts to end fighting and did not even bother to issue a formal response.20 By January 24, the fighting outside Basra slowed, allowing Iran to bring journalists into captured Iraqi territory south of Fish Lake and to Bovarin Island. For the first time since the start of the offensive, eyewitnesses were able to attest that Iran had indeed captured three out of five of Iraq’s defensive lines.21 Over the course of the tour, journalists were able to interview Iranian soldiers and Iraqi POWs, who clearly evidenced that the Iranian offensive caught the Iraqis by surprise. One journalist, Robert Suro, provided a detailed description of the battlefield: The causeway [that the journalists rode to the front on] was elevated and without any cover so the Iraqi artillerymen had a clear view of all traffic. The journalists could look across Fish Lake, and on the far side they could see where the heaviest fighting was taking place. . . . Then the causeway broadened and became part of the first Iraqi defensive line. The fortifications consisted of strong points made of brick and larger forts made of concrete that were connected by a series of slit trenches. Emplacements had been created for tanks and artillery. Stretching in front of the fortifications was a marsh flooded by the Iraqis to the depth of two or three feet [less than one meter], deep enough to make it very slow going for infantrymen, but not deep enough for most boats. Multiple lines of barbed wire and metal obstacles were laid in the marshes.22 Another journalist, Robert Fisk of The Times of London, provided an equally fitting description of what he saw at the front. The images of the First World War and its terrible casualties are no journalistic cliche´ here. The battlefields are on an epic scale; even when the

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shells burst in the canal on both sides of us, it is impossible not to be awed by the lakes of mud and water, craters and dugouts, the sheer infernal sound of a conflict that has already consumed a million dead, perhaps 20,000 of them in the past two weeks in this very filth around us. There are Iraqi bodies still rotting unburied beside their burned-out tanks on the way to [Duayji], the arms of dead soldiers wrapped around each other, blasted into a final embrace by the shells that killed them. The mud fields are littered with unexploded, big grey-finned, sharklike beasts that half buried themselves in the soggy mass when the Iraqi Air Force vainly tried to half Iran’s Karbala 5 offensive.23 By the time the first major round of fighting died down on January 24, both sides had sustained considerable casualties. According to figures compiled by the Defense Intelligence Agency and released on January 21, since fighting commenced at Umm Rasas on December 24, the Iranians “suffered an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 casualties, of whom nearly half were killed in combat. The Iraqis, in turn, suffered between 10,000 and 20,000 casualties during the period, but fewer than 10,000 of their troops have been killed.” In spite of Iran’s victory on the battlefront, the loss of up to 50,000 of its most zealous Pasdaran was a considerable price to pay.24 On January 20, as the second Battle of Basra was reaching its climax, Dennis Ross, director of Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, wrote to Reagan’s fifth national security advisor, Frank Carlucci, about the status of the fighting. “The latest intelligence shows that the Iranians [are] around two miles from the Iraqi perimeter,” Ross explained. “While the Iranians may be unlikely to take Basra at this time, they have already achieved a significant gain in a strategically important area.” One consequence of the Iranian breakthrough was that the GCC states, in spite of their anger about the Iran scandal, were more likely to turn to the United States for support.25 Later that day, Carlucci responded to Ross, indicating Secretary Shultz agreed to convene a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) to “do some contingency planning should Basra fall.” According to the message, Director Weinberger was greatly in favor of an “overt tilt toward Iraq,” while Shultz—as usual— was much more cautious.26 Ross followed up to Carlucci’s reply, underscoring the importance of energizing “the bureaucracy so that we are in a position to begin communicating to Gulf regimes about the steps we are prepared to take.” At this point, fears will dominate the behavior of many of our friends— and they will be looking for signs that we are not paralyzed by the Iranian affair. While we have much to overcome, the Saudis and others still have no one else to turn to in the crunch and this could be a time to

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begin to re-establish some of our credibility. Given all that’s at stake— and the pattern of the intelligence community underestimating the Iranian potential for gains—I think an early Deputies group meeting is called for.27 Clearly the fighting at Basra heightened concerns among administration officials about America’s fragile position in the Persian Gulf. The next morning, Reagan met with the NSC to discuss the direction of American policy toward the Iran-Iraq War. Discussions opened with Carlucci reviewing the “shopping list of possible US actions which [Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] Dick Murphy had brought over last evening.”28 These included a presidential statement on the war that called for an end to the war, condemned the current invasion of Iraq, and reaffirmed America’s position that any expansion of the war was a threat to its interests in the region; consultations with the permanent members of the Security Council, including the Soviets, and urging them to issue similar statements; and inviting Shaikh Zaid of the UAE and currently the head of the GCC to Washington for consultations.29 After reviewing these options, Weinberger voiced his opinion that the time had come “to drop any pretense of even-handedness” toward the war. Going further, he argued that there was no point in talking about ending the war “with no winners or losers,” insisting that because Iran was clearly the aggressor in the war, the United States “should not only be supportive of Iraq, but should be seen to be supportive.” After all, if America comes out swinging against the intransigent Iran, the administration could potentially “recoup some of our standing in the region and regain credibility with the Arab states.” As the discussion drifted back to Richard Murphy’s “shopping list” of diplomatic items, Weinberger again reiterated his point that the United States “should not only take action to assist Iraq but ensure that the assistance is visible.” At this point the question of directly supplying Iraq with American arms was raised,30 including selling artilleryfinding radar equipment to Iraq. Essentially, this weapons system had the ability to “track an artillery shell in flight and, using a computer to describe its path, determine the position of the enemy gun battery.”31 Such a sale could result in huge political payoffs, particularly with the moderate Arabs and King Hussein, who proposed the sale.32 Weinberger believed this was a good idea. “Even if [the Iraqis] don’t need U.S. arms, we should make the offer,” if only to “impress on the Iraqis our bona fides and show the other Arabs as well that we want to be supportive.” Other participants were not so certain that “an arms sale would be appropriate, or that it would play well politically” in the United States. The fear was that an arms deal with Iraq could be perceived as “a ploy by

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the President to deflect criticisms of the Iran arms deal.” One person at the meeting pointed out that Iraq’s problem was not a lack of weapons, but rather poor leadership and morale. At this point, Carlucci observed that it might be a good idea to send a team of military advisors to Iraq to “discuss their needs,” while, in the meantime, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the possibility of providing arms to Iraq.33 In light of the prevailing view that Iraq needed American assistance, potentially including direct or indirect military aid, the State Department drew up an analysis on the pros and cons of such an assistance program. Certainly, providing weapons would boost Iraqi morale, but more importantly, it would signal the Gulf States that the administration was committed to preventing an Iranian victory. Unfortunately, American weaponry would be of little use, as Iraq’s forces were not trained in their use. In addition, providing military aid could raise the expectations of a broader commitment of American forces to the region, could undercut Operation Stanch, and could further set back the prospects for normalized relations with Iran. Perhaps the most important factor was that Congress would never approve the sale, especially after the administration had purposely deceived it during the arms-for-hostages imbroglio.34 However, there was a way that the president could circumvent Congress. According to a memorandum, section 506 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act gives the president “special authority to provide military equipment to Iraq” in the event of an “unforeseen emergency,” such as an Iranian breakthrough at Basra. At this point, the president would notify Congress “before transferring any equipment, and then keep Congress informed on what is actually being sent.” According to the act, should the president decide to invoke this prerogative, the Reagan administration could effectively ship military aid to Iraq up to $75 million in any fiscal year.35 On January 23, Reagan issued a statement on the Iran-Iraq war, addressing his concerns about the current fighting at Basra and the region’s security, as well as his desire to seek a negotiated end to the conflict. He declared that the war threatened “not only American strategic interests but also the stability and security of our friends in the region.” As I have emphasized many times, we are determined to help bring the war to the promptest possible negotiated end, without victor or vanquished, leaving intact the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. We cannot but condemn Iranian seizure and occupation of Iraqi territory, and we again call upon the Government of Iran to join the Government of Iraq in seeking a rapid, negotiated solution to the conflict.

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We share the concern of our friends in the Gulf region that the war could spill over and threaten their security. We would regard any such expansion of the war as a major threat to our interests as well as to those of our friends in the region. We remain determined to ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. We also remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the Gulf, with whom we have deep and longstanding ties.36 Remarkably, Reagan’s speech did not feature significantly in the American press, which was focused almost exclusively on the Iran-Contra scandal. Not long after the SIG meeting, Secretary Shultz asked Richard Murphy and Allen Holmes to draw up a study on the possibility of the United States transferring American weapons to Iraq through third parties. The study unequivocally concluded that providing Iraq with American weaponry “would be inadvisable and counterproductive.” However, Murphy and Holmes noted that the only exception was an emergency situation where Iraq was running dangerously short of munitions and only the immediate provision of American supplies could forestall its collapse. But even so, it was highly unlikely that the Iraqis would ever make this request, as it could meet its equipment requirements through other countries, and American weaponry was not compatible with its military doctrine. After all, “Iraq’s lackluster military performance has not been due to a lack of adequate arms or munitions,” but rather its “unwillingness to take casualties and tactics dominated by a static defense [have] been the most important factors in recent Iraqi setbacks.” Transferring weapons through third parties would not make things easier for the administration, particularly in the aftermath of the Iran-arms debacle. “Indeed, it could complicate efforts to win Congressional approval of arms sales to other Arab states if Congress concludes we are using third-country transfers to avoid their oversight.” Thus, the only circumstances where the United States would provide arms to Iraq was if it were an emergency and, in that event, arms would be transferred directly under the president’s authority to Iraq after notification of Congress.37 Meanwhile, the fighting continued to rage near Fish Lake, with Iraq launching a series of counterattacks against the Iranian bridgehead at the start of February. In light of the Third Army’s failure to recapture territory from Iran, Saddam replaced its commander with General Maher Abdul Rashid in late January. Recognizing the importance of his new position, Rashid launched a major counteroffensive against the Iranian salient at Fish Lake on February 1. Unlike the previous Iraqi efforts to dislodge the Iranians, Rashid made effective use of tanks, artillery, infantry, and air support to

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dislodge the Iranians. According to the New York Times, the offensive opened with a successful tank attack that smashed through Iran’s positions on the western side of Fish Lake. After routing the Iranians, the armored brigade turned south and fired on the right flank of Iran’s salient near Jasim River. All the while, Iraqi artillery, based on the south bank of the Shatt al-Arab, “fired on the left flank of the Iranian salient, while aircraft and attack helicopters attacked both the salient and Iranian artillery positions to the rear of the Iranian defenses.” With Iran’s forces being attacked from both sides, the Iraqi infantry attacked the dug-in Iranian forces near the river, recapturing a small segment of its territory. For the following two weeks, both sides periodically skirmished along the front, but neither side made significant territorial gains.38 From February 13 to 18, Representative Robert Torricelli (D-N.J.) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee visited Baghdad and met with senior Iraqi officials. Over the course of his tour, Iraqi officials complained that Iran had shot down 45 to 50 warplanes, or “roughly 10 percent of its air force,” since the start of fighting around Basra. The fact that Iraqi officials would provide accurate figures to a representative of the American government underscored its bitterness about the sale of spare parts for Iran’s HAWK missiles. The Iraqis also complained bitterly of “extremely heavy tank losses” thanks to American and Israeli shipments of TOW missiles. According to Torricelli, what really made the Iraqis mad “was that President Reagan sent a letter to Saddam Hussein right after the disclosures telling him that the United States had only sent limited defensive weapons to Iran that would have no impact on the war,” which was clearly not the case.39 On February 12, Reagan convened the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) to discuss further options for the war. At the meeting, the president agreed to three primary objectives for the American policy toward the war. The first was to increase efforts to bring the war to an early, negotiated end. This included a proposed meeting between Vice President Bush and the Iraqi ambassador, reinvigorating Operation Staunch, and continuing efforts at the UN to bring about a binding resolution on the war.40 The second goal was to improve the GCC’s defenses. The third aim of the administration was to ensure the continued flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Finally, the NSPG affirmed the longstanding American objective of limiting Soviet influence in the region.41 The group also recommended that President Reagan reiterate his concern about the danger to American interests posed by the escalating war by issuing another statement emphasizing the need for a negotiated end to the war. Toward the end of January, when it looked like Iran would break through at Basra, the United States pushed the Security Council to adopt a “resolution

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with teeth” that ordered a ceasefire in the war. Unfortunately, the urgency of the resolution faded with Iraq’s miraculous recovery, but this did not stop the administration’s efforts.42 Throughout February, American diplomats continued to press for a resolution that demanded a ceasefire and a withdrawal of forces to the borders of August 1980. Most importantly, the administration was pushing to include “mandatory action by the UNSC under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to place a formal arms embargo against either party that refuses to abide by a UNSC resolution.”43 Unfortunately, the Chinese refused to support such measures, as it just concluded a significant arms deal with Iran. Nevertheless, America’s forceful lobbying at the Security Council for such measures sent a clear message to Baghdad that Washington again had its back. On February 25, Reagan made another public plea for a negotiated settlement to end the Gulf war. Once again, he admonished the leadership of Tehran, pointing out its continued unresponsiveness to “all efforts to encourage reason and restraint in its war policy.” He announced that he ordered Secretary Shultz to reinvigorate Operation Staunch and pledged his support for Congress’s approval of Under Secretary-designate Ed Derwinski, who would be charged with overseeing the operation. Turning back to the war, Reagan laid out America’s interests in the region. [W]e are determined to help bring the war to the earliest possible negotiated end. With that goal in mind, the United States calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities, negotiations, and withdrawal to borders. I urge the international community, in the appropriate forum and through the appropriate mechanisms, to cooperate in the endeavor. The time to act on this dangerous and destructive war is now.44 The next day, whether in response to Reagan’s plea or not, Tehran announced the successful completion of Operation Karbala-5.45 Not long after fighting died down along the southern front, the Iranian regular army, which had largely been brushed aside by the fundamentalist Pasdaran, launched an offensive against Iraqi positions near Haji Omran, in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran’s offensive against Haji Omran was launched in the early morning hours of March 4 against a number of strategic peaks that run north of the Rawanduz Valley, near where the Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish borders meet. After an 18-hour firefight, the Iranians had advanced 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) into Iraq, while inflicting heavy casualties on the defending Iraqi forces. That evening, the Iraqis launched three counteroffensives, but failed to dislodge the Iranians from the peaks. A final attempt to rout the Iranians was made on March 8, but with little effect. Once again, the Iranians captured a small chunk of Iraqi territory.46

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Throughout April, Iran launched a series of probing assaults all along the 1,173-kilometer (733-mile) front. On April 7, Iran launched Operation Karbala-8 against Basra, when “Iranian sappers moved forward under cover of darkness and cut through coils of barbed wire strung along the canal[s]” located at the southwestern tip of Fish Lake. According to Robert J. McCartney, a Washington Post reporter who visited the front, the sappers were then “followed by the main wave of experienced Pasdaran, armed with Kalashnikov automatic rifles, and later by less-trained volunteers.” The fighting would last for more than a week, with the Iranians once again capturing and holding the third line of Iraq’s defenses. According to press communique´s, the offensive was in retaliation for Iraq’s escalating campaign of bombing Iranian economic targets in the Gulf, which Iraq reinitiated in response to the fighting around Basra.47 As Operation Karbala-8 was raging near Basra, the Iranians launched Operation Karbala-9 near Qasr e-Shirin. Typical of Iranian offensives, the assault began before dawn on April 9 and after two days of intense, hand-to-hand fighting, they managed to recapture three strategic heights within Iranian territory.48 A few days later, a group of PUK Peshmergas attacked a number of mountains surrounding the Jafati valley, almost reaching the road connecting Sulaimaniya to the town of Dukan, which was located near a major hydroelectric damn on Lake Dukan. The next day, the Iraqis unsuccessfully counterattacked against the Kurds. During the course of the counteroffensive, Iraq extensively used chemical weapons against PUK forces, but also against its own population. On April 16, Iraq brutally attacked a series of Kurdish villages in the Balisan valley, which was where the PUK’s regional command for Erbil province was located. Unlike earlier attacks that focused almost exclusively against combatants in the war (either Iranian or Kurdish Peshmerga), this was the first instance of the indiscriminant use of chemical weapons against a civilian population. The Iranians made no secret of the attacks and pressed the United Nations to investigate Iraq’s atrocious use of chemical weapons.49 Interestingly enough, Iraq, for the first time in the war, agreed to allow UN investigators to enter Iraqi territory. It was Saddam Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid (better known among Western audiences as Chemical Ali), who directed the Iraqi counterattack against the PUK. Saddam appointed al-Majid as chief of the northern bureau a few weeks earlier, on March 18, granting him virtual impunity to deal with the Kurdish problem once and for all. According to Joost Hiltermann: Al-Majid’s use of gas was an integral part of a two-pronged strategy to defeat the insurgency. One component was to depopulate the countryside. To this end, al-Majid undertook a three-stage village destruction

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campaign in the spring and summer of 1987. Army engineers equipped with bulldozers and dynamite and backed by military forces first moved into villages and subdistrict towns (nahyas) located on paved roads that were easy to reach. Then they moved against villages nestled against the mountainsides, where guerrillas used the tall vegetation to spring ambushes on poorly motivated Iraqi troops. The third stage, aimed at villages in the higher mountain valleys, could not be accomplished in 1987 and was postponed for a year.50 The American embassy reported Chemical Ali’s campaign against the Kurds to the Department of State on April 22. According to the report, local journalists that recently ventured into Iraqi Kurdistan returned very disturbed by the sights they saw. In the aftermath of the joint KDP, PUK, and Pasdaran attack northeast of Sulaimaniya, the Iraqis began implementing their program of “systematically evacuating villages on the border area, resettling villages in tents, and then bulldozing the villages to make a ‘cordon sanitaire’ along the border.” The cable predicted that fighting in the mountains was likely to increase toward the end of April, leading up to Saddam’s birthday, April 28.51 From April 22 to May 3, a team of UN inspectors toured the southern and northern sectors of the front. As with earlier investigations, the inspectors unanimously concluded that chemical munitions were used in the war. In Iran, the focus of the investigation was along the northern front, near the Iranian town of Baneh. Of great concern, the team concluded that for the first time in the war, civilians had been targeted with chemical weapons. The conclusion came after examining two women and two young girls, aged two and four, who were exposed to chemicals during the recent round of fighting in the area. “As a result of the examination of these patients, it was unquestionably concluded that these patients had been exposed to mustard gas.” Interestingly, UN inspectors were invited to Iraq for the first time to investigate claims that Iran used chemical weapons in early April during the fighting at Basra. Their investigation in Iraq, however, was not conclusive. Examinations of soldiers exposed to chemical weapons on the front, notwithstanding, the Iraqis failed to provide conclusive evidence that an Iranian chemical attack occurred. Although the report does not indicate this outright, the exposure of Iraqi troops to chemicals was likely the result of winds blowing its own gas back toward its forces. In the end, the team made three significant conclusions. First, “There has been repeated use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, employing aerial bombs and very probably rockets. The chemical agents used are mustard gas . . . and probably . . . nerve agents”; second, “A new dimension is that civilians in Iran also have been injured by

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chemical weapons”; and finally, that Iraqi forces had also sustained injuries from chemical warfare.52 Significantly, the investigating team did not include in the report one of its most startling findings, namely, that the UN team was shown a number of Iraqi civilians that were recently exposed to chemical weapons. Because the mandate of the team was to investigate actions related directly to the war, it could not report on the internal problems of Iraq, even though the Iraqis were using chemical weapons on its own population. According to Iqbal Riza, who again led the investigating team, the investigators opted to send “a separate letter to the secretary-general to inform him what we had seen,” but this information “was never made public, and it was not made available to the Security Council.”53 As the team toured Iraq and Iran, the Kurds continued to push into Iraq, threaten to take Kirkuk, and attack Iraq’s crucial oil pipeline through Turkey. Although the likelihood of the Kurds actually posing a threat to Iraq’s pipeline was slight, the threat was enough to convince Chemical Ali that an utterly ruthless response was necessary. The Kurdish offensive began on the morning of April 2454 in the exceptionally rugged terrain that lies approximately 48 kilometers (30 miles) north of Sulaimaniya. Although details of the fighting are limited, when reporters visited the occupied Iraqi town of Mawat on May 10, Iran could accurately claim to have captured another small chunk of Iraqi territory.55 Three days after the UN team submitted its report to the secretary-general, Loren Jenkins, a journalist reporting for the Washington Post, reported from the Iranian city of Baneh that he saw firsthand the victims of Iraq’s chemical attacks against its own citizens. While in Baneh, an Iranian town approximately 45 kilometers (28 miles) to the west of Iraqi Kurdistan, Jenkins interviewed a number of Iraqi civilians that were exposed to chemical weapons. He described children with their eyes swollen shut, “being led like blind people, holding on to the belts of those in front of them.” According to his report, since April 14, “Iraqi planes have dropped mustard gas on at least two dozen Kurdish villages that straddle the border between Iran and Iraq, killing 33 Kurds and injuring more than 450 civilians.” Jenkins’ observations clearly reflect those ascertained by the UN investigators that were not publicly reported.56 Thus, by mid-1987, conclusive evidence was emerging that Iraq had begun to target civilian populations with chemical weapons. Sadly, not long after Iraq’s initial chemical attacks on civilian populations in April 1987, Chemical Ali issued two standing orders to Iraqi forces in northern Iraq that stood as the basis for its genocidal efforts toward the end of the war. The first order, issued June 3, outlined a so-called “cordon

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sanitaire” along the Iranian border. Within this corridor, al-Majid ordered that Iraq’s “armed forces must kill any human being or animal present within these areas.” The second order, dated June 20, instructed Iraqi commanders to “carry out special strikes by artillery, helicopters and aircraft at all times of the day or night in order to kill the largest number of persons present in those prohibited zones” and that “All persons captured in those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them.”57 Two months later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent out a widely disseminated cable confirming American knowledge that Iraq’s regime had “embarked on a resettlement campaign, flattening some 300 villages and destroying residential areas in frequent air raids.” The cable pointed out, “Despite the ruthless repression, which also includes the use of chemical agents, and the reinforcement of the armed forces by several brigades of the Presidential Guard, Iraqi Security operations, coordinated by Ali Hassan al-Majid, have failed to stifle the Kurd insurgence so far.”58 Thus, by late 1987, it was well known by the American military and government that Iraq was turning against its own Kurdish population. As it turned out, Iran’s offensive against Basra in January and February 1987 was truly its “final offensive,” because soon thereafter public support for the war plummeted, leaving the regime with limited options. As a result, throughout the latter half of 1987, the land war effectively ground to a halt, with both belligerents focusing on the sea and air wars in the Persian Gulf. In the Gulf, Iraq continued to attack economic targets and merchant shipping. But Iran did not have the same luxury, as Iraq’s only ports were inoperable. As a result, Iran focused its attacks on Iraq’s two key allies in the Gulf, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, with the objective of putting pressure on them to cease their support for Iraq. Unfortunately for Iran, this tactic backfired when Kuwait requested the United States and the Soviet Union to reflag and escort half of its oil tanker fleet. Faced with the prospect of an increased Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf, the Reagan administration had no other option but to accept Kuwait’s offer. This led to a massive buildup of the American military presence in the Persian Gulf as part of a grander strategy to take up the role of regional policeman. Unfortunately, the mullah’s in Tehran—like the Shah before them—saw themselves as the rightful guardian of the Persian Gulf. Faced with such diametrically opposite national interests, direct conflict with Iran was all but inevitable.

12

The Collapse of Neutrality

The impact of the Iran-Contra scandal was widespread. Certainly, it prompted efforts to reinvigorate America’s tilt toward Iraq, but the Iraqis were still angry with the Central Intelligence Agency for providing Iran with intelligence and weapons. The debacle also shifted control of the administration’s policy from the National Security Council—which still functioned in its organizational role—to the departments of State and Defense. Meanwhile, the Gulf States were horrified that the Reagan administration double-crossed them. Unfortunately for them, the fiasco occurred just when the Gulf States needed the United States the most. Starting in late 1986, Iran dramatically increased its attacks against traditional American allies, like Kuwait, who, in turn, approached the Soviet Union for protection. It was clear that America’s role as guardian of the Persian Gulf was floundering. Under these circumstances, the administration went on a diplomatic offensive aimed at improving its credibility, including efforts at the United Nations to coax Iran into ending the war and a reinvigorated Operation Staunch. At the same time, the CIA’s role in providing tactical intelligence to Iran, despite its institutional abhorrence to the order, meant that it was no longer welcome in Baghdad, even though its tactical intelligence was. Because the CIA no longer held any clout in Baghdad, the administration was forced to take a new approach and ordered members of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to devise a way to get Washington back into Baghdad, which resulted in a brilliant plan to utilize Iraq’s superior air force to conduct an air campaign aimed at crippling Iran’s ability to fight the war. It was the Reagan administration’s hope that providing such an attractive gift to the Iraqis would make amends. They were right. Thus, through the combined efforts of

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diplomatic efforts of the State Department, the show of force in the Persian Gulf by the U.S. Navy, and the DIA’s covert operation to destroy Iran’s infrastructure, the United States played a significant role in forcing Iran to end the war in August 1988. Since the start of the Tanker War in March 1984, attacks against merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf gradually increased in frequency with each passing year. According to document prepared by the DIA, by the end of 1986 there were a total of 220 attacks against merchant shipping in the Gulf, with almost half of the total occurring that year. The upward trend continued into 1987, when both sides pulverized each other’s economic infrastructure following the Battle of Basra.1 Of the attacks, Iraq was certainly responsible for the majority. Cumulatively, by May 1987, Iraq had attacked between 140 to 150 ships, while Iran was responsible for 90 to 95 incidents. As Iran and Iraq increased the volume of attacks in early 1987, the Gulf States, despite their revulsion with the United States over the arms fiasco, were forced to look to America for protection.2 By December 1986, Iraq’s air campaign against Iran’s economic infrastructure had taken a serious toll on the Iranian economy. According to a CIA analysis, “In view of the damage to Iran’s oil export system,” particularly through Iraq’s sustained attacks against Kharg Island, Tehran believed it needed “to back up its repeated threats to make Iraq’s allies suffer if Iran cannot export oil.” Iran singled out two main allies, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, for the vast majority of its attacks. Iran had a number of reasons for targeting Kuwait: First, the Iranians were “annoyed by Kuwaiti intransigence over oil production quotas at recent OPEC meetings.” Second, Kuwait was an attractive target “because it cannot effectively defend shipping beyond its coastal waters.” As a result, the majority of Iran’s attacks “in the past few months were conducted against Kuwaiti vessels or those trading with Kuwait.” This approach stood in stark contrast to Iran’s carrot-and-stick line with Saudi Arabia. Although Iran attacked a number of Saudi vessels in April and May of 1986, when Tehran and Riyadh’s positions moved closer at the OPEC negotiations, the Iranians ceased its attacks. Thus, by late 1986, the CIA concluded that Kuwait was Iran’s primary target in the Gulf.3 In the spring of 1986, Iran purchased 12 HY-2 (Silkworm) antishipping batteries from China, with each battery having four launchers and about 24 missiles.4 Undoubtedly, the arrival and deployment of the first Silkworm missile battery to Qeshm Island, located in the Strait of Hormuz, in December 1986, posed a major threat to not only Kuwaiti shipping, but also all shipping from the Persian Gulf.5 Unlike Iran’s other antishipping weapons, the Silkworm missile’s warhead was 500 kilograms and had a range of up to 95 kilometers

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(57 miles), nearly three times as large as Iraq’s French-made Exocet missiles and seven times as large as its Italian-made Sea Killer missiles. Because of the size of its warhead alone, the Iranians could now cause extensive damage or perhaps sink an oil tanker.6 Iran test fired its first Silkworm missile in early March 1987.7 On December 23, 1986, Kuwait approached the United States, the Soviet Union, and a number of European nations, with a scheme to reflag its oil tankers or lease American vessels.8 Certainly the arrival of the Silkworms in Iran was the primary catalyst for the request, but asking both Washington and Moscow to work together was doubly clever. First, in the aftermath of the Iran-Gate scandal, the administration, desperate to improve its credibility in the region, recognized that helping Kuwait would greatly improve its standing. Second, the Kuwaitis understood that the Reagan administration would have no choice but to oppose any opportunity that could increase Soviet influence in the region and would readily agree to help. The administration was effectively caught between a rock and a hard place. It would either have to refuse the request on the ideological grounds of not working with the Soviet Union or sacrifice those ideals for the sake of improving its credibility to its allies in the Gulf. The administration eventually chose the latter option and offered to provide military escorts for Kuwait’s vessels.9 The prospect of an increased Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf, whether to protect its flagged vessels or not, was viewed with great apprehension in Washington. Because Kuwait essentially served as an Iraqi port for Soviet weaponry, American officials begrudgingly accepted the relationship, so long as the Soviet’s stayed out of the Persian Gulf. But not long after Kuwait made its request for Soviet and American help, intelligence sources indicated that a Soviet warship entered the Gulf in early January for the first time in order to escort a convoy of its merchant ships. Around the same time, Iran significantly altered its tactics in the Gulf. Late in the evening on January 19, an Iranian jet launched an unanticipated night attack against ships anchored in the Gulf. What was remarkable about the strike was that all of Iran’s previous attacks on shipping took place during the day, which allowed tankers to seek safe haven in friendly ports during that time. When night fell on the Gulf, tankers would then move out of port and continue toward its destination. The sudden appearance of night attacks by Iran in early January signaled that this tactic would no longer suffice and it heightened calls from the GCC for external support.10 In light of these developments in the Persian Gulf, Deputy National Security Advisor Colin Powell received a memorandum from Dennis Ross on January 21 outlining the military actions agreed on by the NSC. The memo identified a number of important steps that would dramatically

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increase America’s role in the war. First, it suggested the redeployment of the Middle East Force to the northern areas of the Gulf, which would send a positive signal to Kuwait and Iraq. Second, the United States could offer to hold a joint Saudi-American naval exercise in the Gulf. Third, the Reagan administration could offer the “rapid deployment of an F-15 TacAir Squadron to Dhahran,” located on the littoral coast near Bahrain. Fourth, they needed to consult the British and French about a joint naval exercise in the Gulf. Fifth, they could review the possibility of moving an aircraft carrier into the Persian Gulf.11 The final option was to offer “technical and tactical military advice” to Iraq “through Jordan.” According to a notation written by Colin Powell on a briefing paper that outlined all of the diplomatic and military options discussed at the SIG meeting, these options were “read and acknowledged” by President Reagan at a meeting with Vice President Bush, Frank Calucci, and Donald Rumsfeld on January 22.12 Throughout February, the Department of Defense was busy implementing Reagan’s order to bolster the Middle East Force (MEF) stationed in the Gulf. During this period, the Reagan administration continued negotiations with Kuwait, rejecting its initial request to transfer the registration of its tankers to the American flag and counter offering direct military protection for Kuwaiti vessels.13 Amid negotiations, Reagan delivered his February 25 speech on the war, hoping to send a message to Kuwait that it was prepared to protect it. [T]his conflict threatens America’s strategic interests, as well as the stability and security of all our friends in the region. We remain strongly committed to supporting the self-defense of our friends in the region and recently moved naval forces in the Persian Gulf to underpin that commitment. We also remain strongly committed to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz.14 The message was received, but the Kuwaitis insisted on the reflagging option, which left the negotiations deadlocked. Meanwhile, Kuwait’s government reached an agreement with the Soviet Union in late March to lease three Soviet tankers to transport oil through the Gulf. Although the Kuwaitis only agreed to lease three tankers, the Soviets immediately raised the possibility of providing naval escorts, which prompted loud protests from Washington. The presence of Soviet warships in the Persian Gulf constituted a threat to American interests, as it meant the Soviet Union would have not only a political presence in the region, but also the ability to intervene militarily.15 Kuwait’s agreement with the Soviets effectively served notice to the Reagan administration to seriously reconsider the reflagging options. To this end, Kuwait rejected Washington’s proposal to simply escort

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its tankers, prompting the Reagan administration to agree “in principle” to reflag 11 Kuwaiti vessels with the American flag in late March, which would allow Kuwait’s tankers the same protection as American ships.16 In early April, Caspar Weinberger formally announced the expansion of the MEF to six warships in an effort to fulfill President Reagan’s pledge of support to its regional allies and to ensure the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. The announcement was certainly designed to calm Arab fears after Iran’s acquisition of Silkworm missiles. As part of the American commitment to the region, Weinberger indicated that from this point onward the navy would maintain an aircraft carrier—presently the USS Kitty Hawk—in the Gulf to act as a deterrent to attacks against America’s allies. Concerning the safety of American vessels in the vicinity of Iran’s Silkworms, Weinberger assured that the missiles were no threat to American vessels. After all, the navy intended to sail out of range of these missiles, but within easy striking distance of America’s Tomahawk cruise missiles. Around the same time as the announcement, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., toured the Persian Gulf as part of the administration’s efforts to reassure Saudi Arabia and Kuwait of its commitment to regional security.17 On May 8, a delegation from the Arab League arrived in Washington, as well as the capitals of the other four permanent members of the Security Council, to urge strong action at the United Nations to help bring the war to a close. Considering the American-led efforts already occurring at the UN since early January, the delegation did not have to press the administration hard to support its cause. The Arab States, even with the reluctant support of Syria, were pushing for a resolution that would call for an immediate end to the war and an arms embargo against “whichever government does not comply.”18 At the photo opportunity with the Arab leaders, President Reagan offered his full support for the Arab League’s initiative, which greatly complimented American efforts already underway. Reagan reiterated his earlier pledge to support the self-defense of the Gulf States and ensure the continued flow of oil from the Gulf.19 Around the same time that the Arab League delegation was visiting Washington, Richard Murphy was touring the Middle East, meeting with the heads of state for Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates between May 7 and 15. The trip served as an opportunity for a senior American policy maker to review and reinforce the diplomatic and military steps taken by the Reagan administration to put its policy back on the right track. A secondary purpose of the trip was to undercut the value of the recent visit by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky, who sought to spread disinformation about American policies

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toward the Gulf.20 A letter provided by Murphy to Saddam Hussein during his visit outlined America’s efforts in support of Iraq. As you have by now observed, that statement of February 25 accurately defines both the policies and the actions of my Administration. We have been very active over the past three months in pressing for concrete international action, focused at present upon the United Nations, to bring Iran to join in a ceasefire, withdrawal, and negotiations leading to a just settlement of the war. We have pursued energetically a rejuvenated initiative to persuade third countries not to sell arms to Iran. It is also our judgment, which we have made clear to others, that there should be penalties for refusal to enter negotiations or to accept mediation, notably an embargo upon the supply of arms. Reagan urged Saddam to increase its political pressure on the Soviet Union and China to end their recalcitrant efforts to block a resolution at the UN.21 Unfortunately, just as Murphy was returning to Washington, tragedy struck. Reagan’s decision to bolster America’s forces in the Persian Gulf came back to haunt him on May 17 when an American warship was attacked by an Iraqi Mirage F-1 jet 136 kilometers (85 miles) northeast of Bahrain. The incident occurred at 10:10 p.m.22 when two Exocet missiles struck the vessel’s sleeping quarters,23 killing 37 Americans.24 Soon thereafter information attained from AWACS and signal intelligence confirmed the attackers as Iraqi, not Iranian.25 The administration’s response to the attack was swift. It immediately contacted Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon and demanded a full explanation. Hamdoon expressed his regret for the tragic incident and indicated that his government accepted full responsibility.26 The next day, much to the surprise of the administration and outside observers, Saddam Hussein wrote a letter to President Reagan personally accepting responsibility for the attack and expressing his “deepest regret” for the incident. Explaining that Iraqi planes “had no intention whatsoever of striking against a target belonging to [the United States] or any country other than Iran,” Hussein asked if the president “would kindly convey to the families of the victims [his] personal condolences and sympathy” for their loss.27 On May 20, Reagan held a NSPG meeting where it was decided to change the rules of engagement for American forces in the Persian Gulf, which allowed “the fleet to fire if necessary on any aircraft or ship that exhibits hostile intentions against U.S. vessels.”28 This order would ultimately serve as the basis for American military actions against Iran later in the war. It was also decided that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would send a team to Iraq to investigate the incident. Among the members of the team was Colonel W. Patrick Lang, the DIA’s defense intelligence officer for the Middle East

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and South Asia. Although the Iraqis insisted that the incident was an accident, Lang found this hard to believe. He was not the only one: “the Pentagon burned with speculation that the Iraqis had been engaged in payback for the betrayal that the Iran-Contra investigation had revealed.” But beyond payback, Lang observed that the Iraqis were treating the visit of the investigating team as a major political event and a possible reopening of American-Iraqi relations, which had stalled after the Iran-arms scandal. It occurred to Lang that the Iraqis attacked the ship as part of an effort to “break the logjam” the arms scandal imposed on both nations. In effect, this was exactly what happened, as soon thereafter the United States and Iraq set up a procedure for both sides to communicate with each other to prevent another attack. The trip to Baghdad also proved to be an excellent opportunity for the DIA to reestablish an AmericanIraqi intelligence relationship, although cutting the CIA out of the loop.29 The USS Stark incident brought the issue of reflagging Kuwait’s oil tankers into the open. As a result, in mid-June, the leaders of the recently formed Democratic Majority in the Senate called on senior Reagan officials to explain why the Senate should support the administration’s decision to reflag Kuwait’s ships and increase American forces in the Gulf at a time when the war between Iran and Iraq was clearly escalating. After all, the United States just lost 37 sailors in a war it was supposed to be neutral in. As a result, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd wanted the president to delay the reflagging of Kuwait’s ships, but Reagan refused to budge. 30 Testimony from both Secretary Weinberger and Assistant Secretary of State Michael Armacost argued that the operation to escort reflagged Kuwaiti vessels was designed to send a message to Iran that America supported its allies not only in the Persian Gulf, but in Western Europe and Japan and would not tolerate Iran’s threats to hold the world hostage.31 The State Department’s diplomatic offensive at the United Nations came to fruition on July 20, when the Security Council unanimously adopted UNSC 598. By comparison to the rather toothless previous resolutions, UNSC 598 was an impressive document. The resolution deplored both sides for attacks on civilian population centers, neutral shipping, and for violating “international humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict, and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva convention.” Most importantly, for the first time a Security Council resolution identified under Articles 39 and 40 of the UN Charter that there was a “breach of peace” between Iran and Iraq. As such, UNSC 598 demanded that Iraq and Iran “observe an immediate cease-fire, discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in the air and withdraw all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay.” The resolution

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requested that the secretary-general dispatch an observation team to the warzone to verify compliance. It urged that prisoners of war be “released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” It called on other nations to “refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict.” Also for the first time, UNSC 598 requested that the secretary-general explore “the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict.”32 The strong language of UNSC 598 leaves little room for doubt that the Reagan administration’s diplomacy at the United Nations was unsuccessful. Despite this, the Iraqis accepted UNSC 598 in early August, while Iran remained intransigent. Tehran’s refusal to accept the resolution led to aggressive diplomacy on the part of Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cue´llar to convince Iran to accept the terms in late 1987, but his efforts proved fruitless because Iran was concentrating on another “final offensive.”33 After the Iraqi assault on the USS Stark, attacks against shipping in the Gulf underwent a notable lull. According to a document circulated by the CIA on June 17, “The last attack by Iran took place on 24 May and Iraq’s most recent strike was on 18 May.” During the lull, Iran worked feverishly to negotiate a permanent ceasefire in Gulf waters before the reflagging of Kuwait’s ships, but Iraq viewed Iran’s efforts as a sign of weakness and refused to agree.34 The next day, the CIA circulated SNIE 34/11/39-87, which analyzed Iran’s intentions toward the United States and the Soviet Union in the Gulf. The estimate concluded, “The risks of a US-Iranian military incident in the Gulf have risen and will increase further when the U.S. protection of Kuwaiti ships begins” next month. Iran is acutely aware of concerns in the United States and the Gulf about expanding superpower involvement. Tehran is prepared for confrontation if, in its perception, other measures prove inadequate to force the United States to back down. The estimate explains that once the escort operation begins in late July, Iran will likely resort to terrorism and indiscriminant attacks against American interests in the Gulf in order to increase domestic pressure on the Reagan administration to withdraw, much as it did in Lebanon in 1983. “Tehran does not believe the United States will maintain its commitment to Kuwait in the face of sustained terrorist, diplomatic, and military pressure to force Washington to back down.” To achieve this end: Iran is likely to increase its attacks on nonescorted Kuwaiti shipping, including US-flag vessels, and also to lay more mines near Kuwait.

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Iran will also probe for opportunities to attack escorted US-flag ships. . . . Tehran’s perceptions of serious divisions in the United States over policy in the Gulf may well lead the Iranians to risk some dramatic act that could crystallize US opinion against an expanded role in the Gulf.35 The fact that Iran was so vehemently opposed to an increased American presence in the Gulf underscored the need for the operation. Despite Senator Byrd’s best efforts to block the administration’s plan to reflag and escort Kuwaiti vessels, the American navy initiated Operation Earnest Will at 2:00 a.m. (EST) on July 23.36 Unfortunately, the next day, during the first American escort of the operation, the newly reflagged MV Bridgeton struck an underwater mine near Farsi Island. Fortunately, no one was hurt. American reporters aboard another ship in the convoy immediately wrote sensational reports about the attack, which ultimately played into Iran’s plan.37 That day Iranian leaders described the incident as “an irreparable blow on America’s political and military prestige.” Certainly, to have hit a newly minted American vessel on the first day of the widely publicized operation, the Iranians appeared to have achieved its objective of sowing discontent in the United States. But instead of derailing the administration’s efforts, the media supported the operation and called for better minesweeping operations in the Gulf.38 In the wake of the Bridgeton incident, the Pentagon ordered a dramatic increase in America’s naval presence in the Gulf. Two days after the explosion, Secretary Weinberger warned that the United States would retaliate using force against “any country” that places mines in the way of merchant ships bound for Kuwait, referring obliquely to Iran. Although there was no hard evidence available to implicate Iran, there was not a person at the Pentagon that was convinced otherwise. American officials all believed that the Pasdaran forces, operating lightweight, high-speed vessels from Farsi Island, laid the mine the previous night. Nevertheless, Weinberger indicated that he ordered the Pentagon to give more priority to sweeping for mines than for retaliating for the Bridgeton explosion.39 Despite the explosion, the first convoy of Operation Earnest Will continued to Kuwait where the Bridgeton was patched and loaded with oil. A few days later, on July 28, the Pentagon ordered the rapid transfer of eight minesweeping Sea Stallion helicopters,40 five oceangoing minesweepers, and six small coastal minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to assist with the operation.41 The deployment significantly increased the American presence throughout the region, but also increased the risks of confrontation with Iran.

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Tragically, two days later, a navy helicopter serving as part of the operation crashed into the Persian Gulf, killing four passengers, while five others were rescued. Although an accident, critics of the operation immediately seized upon the incident as proof of the peril faced by American sailors in the Gulf. To some extent, the critics had a point: in the first convoy of the operation the United States lost four soldiers and one of its vessels was struck by a mine. But the administration stood its ground. “I want to make the point that this is not a simple task and anyone who says it is a simple task hasn’t really been listening to us for the last three months.”42 To make matters worse, on August 10, an American-operated supertanker loaded with oil struck a mine in the Gulf of Oman. This immediately raised fears that the Tanker War could spill into the Indian Ocean.43 In spite of the “invisible hand” laying mines throughout the region, following the passing of UNSC 598 a de facto ceasefire fell over the Gulf. In light of the escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf during the summer of 1987, the NSC requested that the CIA draw up a SNIE on the implications of an American-Iranian confrontation. The estimate identified four potential scenarios for the escalating tensions in the Gulf. The first scenario would be the withdrawal of American forces from the region in the face of sustained pressure from Iran. This scenario represents a strategic American defeat in the region and beyond, resulting in unpredictable outcomes. The second scenario—though unlikely—was for tensions between the United States and Iran to simply defuse, leaving American credibility intact while leaving the potential for a future rapprochement. The third—and most likely—possibility was for simmering tensions between the two sides to continue. This would have mixed effects: On the positive side, it draws the line for Iran, reinforces Gulf Arab willingness to resist Iranian pressure, and strengthens Arab perceptions of US commitment to the region. On the negative side, this scenario represents a costly and open-ended commitment that would probably include occasional military clashes and terrorism, and it holds significant risks of miscalculation and escalation. The fourth scenario—so less likely—was for tensions to escalate in the face of Iran’s refusal to be intimidated by American military power. Although most of the implications of this scenario would be positive, it would undermine any attempt at an American-Iranian rapprochement and potentially push Iran closer to Moscow. The final potential outcome was a large-scale and protracted military conflict between the United States and Iran. This would result in heavy economic costs, could result in considerable casualties, disrupt

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world oil and financial markets, and enhance Soviet influence in the region. In light of the various potential outcomes, the Reagan administration’s policy was certainly geared toward achieving the third scenario.44 In spite of Iraq’s attacks on economic targets in the Gulf during early August, since the attack on the Stark the Iraqis refrained from attacking merchant vessels. The 45-day truce against such acts of aggression was shattered on August 29, when Iraq attacked two Iranian ships.45 Later that day, Iraqi Ambassador Hamdoon announced that Iraq’s “strategy is to continue to hit [Iran’s] ships until they accept the Security Council resolution.”46 For the next six days Iraq and Iran attacked 20 ships in the Gulf, which forced the Reagan administration to postpone its call for sanctions against Iran to allow the secretary-general to rush to the region to negotiate another ceasefire.47 Amid the bloodletting against merchant vessels in the Gulf, Iranian forces stationed on the Faw peninsula fired three Silkworm missiles at Kuwait for the first time. Fortunately, the missiles failed to cause any significant damage or casualties. Kuwait responded the next day by ousting five Iranian diplomats. Meanwhile, the United States had amassed an armada of 40 vessels in and around the Persian Gulf, which only increased the likelihood of a confrontation with Iran.48 Throughout most of September, guns fell silent on the front as the secretary-general visited Iran and Iraq in a fruitless effort to end the war. But just when Iran appeared to be willing to make major concessions toward peace, including abandoning its longstanding condition of Saddam Hussein’s removal,49 American helicopters observed an Iranian vessel, the Iran Ajr, laying marine mines in the northern Gulf on the evening of September 21. The helicopter strafed the ship, but it continued its mining activities. The next morning, the navy, exercising “its inherent right of self-defense,” boarded the ship and found ten additional mines below its deck, thus proving that Iran was engaging in mining operations.50 The vessel’s crew was repatriated to Iran and the ship was scuttled, much to Tehran’s chagrin. Describing the incident, Weinberger said that the captured ship represented “not just a smoking gun, but a blazing gun” that clearly refuted Iran’s denial of laying mines.51 While this incident heightened tensions between the United States and Iran, it served to reinforce earlier American warnings to Iran to end its aggressive operations in the Gulf or face the consequences. The incident was also significant because for the first time the United States directly engaged Iranian forces in combat, leaving Iran with a bloody nose. Of greater importance, the United States irrefutably identified Iran as the source of the widespread use of marine mines in the Persian Gulf. From this point onward, any incident involving marine mines would result in retaliatory actions against Iran.

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Not long after the Iran Ajr incident, an American surveillance helicopter spotted four Iranian vessels near a major American command vessel in the northern Gulf on October 8. When the pilot moved to get a closer look, the Iranians opened fire at the helicopter “without provocation.” In defense, the pilot unleashed its arsenal on the vessels, sinking three, while one escaped. Not long after the incident, American ships in the area approached the crippled Iranian crafts, pulling six Iranians out of the water, though two later succumbed to injuries.52 A few days later, Iran retaliated against the American actions by launching a Silkworm missile against the U.S.-flagged tanker, the Sea Isle City, in Kuwaiti waters on October 16.53 Such an overt attack against an American vessel prompted the Reagan administration to seriously consider retaliation. This time, however, Congress firmly had Reagan’s back. “I think we have every right to take out the Silkworm missiles,” commented Democrat Senator Sam Nunn. “If the President decides to take a response and it is proportionate, I will support it.”54 Reagan decided his response at an NSPG meeting the next day. The plan called for an attack on two adjoined oil platforms located 195 kilometers (120 miles) east of Bahrain in the southern Gulf. The operation commenced at 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon on October 19, when four guided-missile destroyers approached the platforms and offered the occupants 20 minutes to evacuate before it would be bombarded. The Iranians readily complied and the navy fired 1,000 rounds of heavy shells into the platform, completely destroying it. A few hours later, a naval commando unit boarded a third platform located 8 kilometers (5 miles) away and destroyed its radar and communications equipment. The Reagan administration openly acknowledged that its actions were unlikely to halt the cycle of violence that persisted with Iran. But the retaliatory attacks on the oil platforms were necessary, argued Vice President Bush. “I think [Ayatollah Khomeini] would have gotten the wrong response if nothing had been done.”55 With tensions between the United States and Iran escalating, there was a desperate need for a diplomatic breakthrough in the war. Even though Iran’s fiercely intransigent stance was beginning to falter, as long as its war machine remained intact, it would never willingly end the war. Unfortunately, the Iraqi regime remained reluctant to go on the offensive. In light of these factors, the Reagan administration ordered DIA to implement its previously shelved operation to assist Iraq in destroying Iran’s military infrastructure. Code-named Operation Druid Leader, the operation was approved by the Department of Defense in the spring of 1988, and from that point onwards DIA operatives would work closely with the Iraqi government to devise and implement a crippling air campaign that would destroy Iran’s ability to fight the war, which in turn forced the clerical regime in Tehran to end the war.56

13

Forcing the War to an End

By the end of 1987, the Iran-Iraq war was beginning to show the first signs that it was heading towards a conclusion. Iran’s failure to take Basra in January 1987 was a major turning point in the war. Since then, fighting along the front had slowly ground to a halt. Meanwhile, Iran’s population became increasingly disillusioned with the war, particularly in light of the staggering costs both in treasure and manpower. Iran’s war at sea was not going particularly well either. Kuwait’s request to reflag 11 of its oil tankers with the American flag had an unintended consequence; it effectively made the United States effectively the regional policeman, a role that the Iranians greatly coveted. In light of its new role, the Reagan administration dramatically increased America’s military presence in the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly, the Iranians saw the American naval buildup as a direct threat to its quest for regional hegemony. Consequently, this fundamental clash of interests led to physical confrontation. From the outset of Operation Earnest Will, it was evident that Iran’s objective in the Gulf was to increase the risk to American forces by laying water mines along major shipping lanes in the hope that it would turn public opinion against the operation, but the opposite occurred. Instead of turning public opinion against the mission, Iran’s attacks simply reminded the America public of the hostage crisis of 1979–1980 and of the eight Americans still held by terrorists in Lebanon. Meanwhile, having exhausted its diplomatic efforts to break Iran’s continued intransigence and refusal to accept the unanimously passed UNSC 598, the Reagan administration resolved that something needed to be done to force Iran to end the war. After all, despite threats of an arms embargo, Iran still refused to accept UNSC 598. Thus, in the spring of 1988,

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the Reagan administration stepped up its overt (Operation Staunch, Operation Earnest Will, and diplomacy at the UN) and covert (the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Operation Druid Leader) efforts to force Iran to end the war. By late 1987 the Reagan administration was concerned about its relationship with Iraq. The CIA’s influence in Baghdad was almost nonexistent after the public exposure that it had provided Iran with tactical intelligence only days before the Faw offensive. To the Iraqis, this treacherous act was unforgivable. Six months later, Iraq inadvertently bombed an American naval vessel, killing 36 sailors. At the time, senior officials at the Pentagon believed that this barbaric act was a “getting even” moment. In the aftermath of the attack, Washington made considerable strides to once again improve its relationship with Baghdad, including a DIA operation to destroy Iran’s infrastructure, as the CIA was persona non grata in Iraq.1 According to Patrick Tyler, not long after the attack on the Stark, Lieutenant General Leonard Peroots, director of the DIA, approached Colonel W. Patrick Lang and ordered him to draw up a detailed contingency plan devised to utilize Iraq’s air superiority to destroy Iran’s ability to fight the war. Iraq’s problem was that it focused its air power on either the frontlines, economic targets deep within Iran, or in the Persian Gulf. Lang proposed that Iraq focus its air power on systematically knocking out logistical targets that were vital to Iran’s war effort, such as divisional and corps level operational headquarters, supply and repair units, troop concentrations, boats for river crossings, and railroad and highway bridges. By attacking these targets, Lang believed Iraq could force Iran to capitulate in the war. However, when the plan was proposed to the NSC in mid-1987, most in the room were intrigued but felt that the timing was not right. By late 1987, however, the situation in the Gulf had changed. On a number of occasions, Iran openly attacked American interests in the Gulf, which resulted in retaliatory measures by the U.S. Navy. As AmericanIranian tensions peaked, the NSC reconsidered its position on the DIA operation to destroy Iran’s military infrastructure and on February 112 the newly appointed Defense Secretary, Frank Carlucci, ordered the operation, now named Druid Leader, to proceed.3 A major contributing factor behind the decision to implement Operation Druid Leader was American intelligence reports that circulated in late December 1987, showing “a heavy deployment of equipment and arms to Iran’s southern positions, suggesting another thrust was being prepared. Hundreds of tents were being set up in apparent anticipation of new forces.”4 According to Lt. Col. Rick Francona, Col. Lang’s assistant, around this time, the “DIA assessed that if the Iranians could mount an offensive in early 1988, they would take al-Basrah and likely be able to push on toward Baghdad,

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possibly ending the war in their favor.”5 However, by late January, not long after the NSC approved Operation Druid Leader, diplomats and military experts began to see signs that Iran was having difficulty mobilizing its forces along the southern front. Compared to the massive numbers mobilized the previous year, Iran had only built up a force of “between 70,000 and 250,000 men.” 6 On February 11, State Department officials indicated that many of the tents set up remained unoccupied. “The enthusiasm just [is not] there,” commented one official. “[The] heavy losses suffered by Iranian forces in last year’s thrust against Basra have made it difficult to recruit new soldiers and that improved Iraqi defenses around Basra may have contributed to the [postponed] decision.”7 Throughout January and February, the DIA worked to seek formal approval of its covert operation to help Iraq. It was a difficult process, particularly in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal, as the DIA needed to seek “approvals and/or coordination from CIA, Defense Department, State Department and the US Central Command.” At the same time, Lang and Francona also had to brief and seek the approval of both the House and Senate intelligence committees on the plan; they reluctantly agreed. Thus, by late February, the DIA had received official approval to commence Operation Druid Leader.8 Another factor contributing to Iran’s decision to postpone its southern offensive was an American-sponsored resolution being negotiated at the Security Council that sought to impose an arms embargo against Iran for failing to accept UNSC 598. In light of this, the Iranians were hesitant to provide the Soviets or the Chinese with any reason to support the embargo, which they had stalled since August 1987. On February 20, Secretary Shultz met with the counterparts of the five permanent members of the Security Council to discuss the imposition of the arms embargo against Iran. The American draft proposal called for “a halt in the sale of arms, spare parts, arms manufacturing facilities and military training services to Iran.” However, according to the Washington Post, the administration appeared prepared to shelve the measure in the absence of a unanimous agreement. “Shultz placed major importance in his remarks on continued unanimity in the Security Council, suggesting that the United States might not push the proposed embargo to a vote if he finds that, despite his impending pleas and Arab pressures, the Soviet Union still balks at adopting strong measures against Iran.” 9 In spite of Shultz’s efforts to win over the Soviets, the administration agreed to delay the imposition of an embargo four days later, allowing the secretary-general to continue his diplomatic efforts to bring the war to a close.10 On February 28, the IAF launched a massive air campaign that pounded all of Iran’s major oil refineries and undisclosed targets in Tehran. 11 Iran

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retaliated immediately by launching cruise missiles at Baghdad, thus marking a sharp escalation in the so-called War of Cities. According to the CIA, the next day, February 29 (as 1988 was a leap year), Iraq launched nine intermediate-range SCUD-B missiles against Tehran for the first time in the war, with three hitting Tehran.12 Over the course of the next three weeks, Iran and Iraq massively bombarded each other’s capitals with missiles, killing hundreds. According to the Washington Post, between February 29 and April 18, Iraq fired 160 missiles at the Iranian capitol.13 Iraq’s missile barrage against Tehran proved remarkably effective at demoralizing its population. The Iranian capital had previously been spared from the war, barring the occasional Iraqi bombing raid that was typically ineffective. Nevertheless, the CIA believed that “The intensity of [Iraq’s] unprecedented long-range missile attacks” against Iran was “designed to demoralize the Iranians and weaken their support for the clerical regime.”14 Indicative of its effectiveness, amid the bombardment, Iranian diplomats at the UN sent an unsigned letter to the Security Council indicating that Tehran was willing to end the war. Although American officials suspected that the sudden about-face was a tactical ploy to forestall an arms embargo, the Iranian move clearly indicated deep fractures among Iran’s political elite over whether to continue the war.15 Throughout late February and early March, Lang, Francona, and a 60-member team of military and intelligence analysts spent weeks reformatting the DIA’s original plan into what would become Operation Druid Leader. Satisfied with the operational details, on March 13, Lang and Francona traveled to Baghdad to brief Iraqi military intelligence on the operation. While in Baghdad, they met with Brigadier General Wafiq al-Samarra’i, deputy director general of military intelligence, and went through a list of 20 major logistical targets that the IAF needed to destroy in order to cripple its ability to fight. At the meeting, Lang provided the Iraqis with “beautiful drawings” of Iran’s “air defense emplacements, structured details of buildings and fortifications,” that had been prepared by Lang’s team. After going over the target packages, the Iraqis expressed their immense pleasure with the proposal and indicated that they planned to proceed with the plan the next day.16 Meanwhile, the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan was beginning to boil. Throughout the fall of 1987, the Kurds—referring to Masoud Barzani’s KDP and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—with the help of the Pasdaran, continued to escalate their military campaign in northern Iraq. But in the spring of 1988, the Iraqi regime resolved to employ a strategy so utterly reprehensible that Hitler or Stalin would have been proud: genocide. The new Iraqi commander in the north, Chemical Ali, was determined to destroy the treacherous Kurds. Having demonstrated the effectiveness of

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chemical weapons on Kurdish villages in April 1987, throughout the fall of 1987 Chemical Ali planned a major offensive against the Kurds. At the same time, Iran’s inability to launch an offensive in the south prompted it to use the Kurds as a proxy force in order to tie up a large portion of the Iraqi army. The entire operation was a mirror image of the mullah Mustafa Barzani revolts of 1961–1975, which resulted in the Shah selling the Kurds out to Saddam Hussein. Similarly, the Kurdish insurgency utilized similar tactics, with Peshmerga and Pasdaran forces launching limited attacks against Iraqi garrisons, then retreating into the mountains, where Iraq’s conventional forces were useless. At the same time, the Peshmerga also initiated a campaign of assassinations and kidnappings directed against local Iraqi officials.17 But the Kurds underestimated the ruthlessness of Chemical Ali, whose battle-hardened and extremely well-equipped army paled in comparison to Iraq’s forces during the 1960s. Complicating matters for the Kurds, Iraq was supported by all of the major world powers, including the Soviet Union and the United States. Tragically, because of this Cold War anomaly, and the fact that the Kurds were Iraqi citizens, there was little the outside world could do to stop Iraq from dealing with its “internal matters” as it saw fit. With the southern front no longer a threat, in late February the Iraqi regime moved to put down its Kurdish problem once and for all. Starting on February 23, the regime initiated the first phase of the notorious Anfal (retribution) operation. That day, Iraqi forces launched a full-scale air and artillery assault on the PUK’s headquarters in the Jafati valley that lasted for four weeks. Over the course of the bombardment, the Iraqi regime extensively used chemical weapons against not only the PUK headquarters, but also against the surrounding villages. As more and more unsuspecting Kurdish villagers became exposed to chemical weapons for the first time, word of the chemical attacks began to spread. In the face of Iraq’s assault, Peshmerga and Pasdaran forces launched two offensives against the territory surrounding the small Iraqi city of Halabja, near the strategically significant Darbandikhan and Dukan dams, starting on March 13. Two days after the initial thrust, Iran launched Operation Wal Fajr-10 that captured the town of Halabja, situated 24 kilometers (15 miles) inside Iraqi territory. The Iraqi forces defending the region collapsed in the face of the Kurdish-Iranian assault. Later that day, the Iraqi military, fearful of potential causalities if it were to launch a major counteroffensive, decided to attack Iranian positions with chemical weapons, including mustard, cyanide, and nerve gases, killing between 3,000 to 5,000 Kurdish civilians.18 There is an extensive debate over whether or not Iran used chemical weapons during the fighting around Halabja. On one side of the debate is Steven Pelletiere, who argues in a 1990 study that the CIA and DIA both

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believed that Iran used chemical weapons near Halabja. According to Pelletiere, “Iraq was blamed for the Halabjah attack, even though it was subsequently brought out that Iran too had used chemicals in this operation, and it seemed likely that it was the Iranian bombardment that had actually killed the Kurds.”19 Joost Hiltermann, however, takes exception to Pelletiere’s claim, arguing that, “There is . . . no convincing evidence that Iran ever used chemical weapons” during its war with Iraq. This view is supported . . . by a range of Iraqis interviewed for this book—military officers and soldiers, a chief of military intelligence, a defense attache´ in Washington, a senior diplomat at the UN, and a senior advisor to Saddam Hussein, all of whom either fought for or otherwise served their country during the war.20 In light of these diverging viewpoints, Hiltermann’s meticulous study, which included hundreds of interviews with actors from both sides of the conflict, proves to be far more convincing than Pelletiere’s. The propaganda value of the Iraqi attack on Halabja was not lost on the Iranians. Still occupying the town in the aftermath of the chemical bombardment, the Iranians seized upon this opportunity to denounce Iraq for its use of chemical weapons against its own civilian population and invited foreign reporters to visit the city. Paul Koring, a foreign correspondent for Canada’s national newspaper, the Globe and Mail, and the Washington Post’s Patrick Tyler were among two of the many reporters that visited Halabja in the aftermath of the attack. According to Koring’s report: Most of the victims were infants, children, women and elderly men. Iranian soldiers say a house-to-house search produced a count of 4,000 civilians killed in this once-bustling market town of 70,000. But scores of collapsed buildings make any accurate toll impossible.21 Patrick Tyler had similar observations: Some victims hugged children in silent embraces, others sprawled in doorways. One family lay near a table set for lunch. In another house, the cellar became the death chamber for residents trying to flee the heavier-than-air cloud—said by Iranian scientists to be a mixture of mustard and cyanide gases—that seeped down into their refuge to kill them. Outside, the streets were littered with bloated carcasses of cattle and sheep, cats and dogs, all trapped by the chemical burst near the city center. . . . But the starkest and most gruesome scenes of this lush valley flanked by snow-crested peaks are the faces of the noncombatant dead:

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four small girls in traditional dress lying like discarded dolls by a trickling stream below Anap; two women cuddling in death by a flower garden; an old man in a turban clutching a baby on a doorstep.22 In light of the extensive reporting on the event from foreign journalists, the Iranians capitalized on the massacre to build domestic support for the war among the already war-weary public and to turn Western audiences against Saddam’s ruthless regime. As it turned out, neither were interested in what Iran had to say. While the Reagan administration publicly condemned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against its own civilian population at Halabja on March 23, it also perpetuated the belief that Iran also used chemical weapons during the fighting. According to a State Department spokesmen, “There are indications that Iran may also have used chemical artillery shells in this fighting,” but would not elaborate what this meant. The problem with this allegation, as Hiltermann pointed out, was that there was no actual basis in fact for this charge. What was clear was the Reagan administration decided that accusing Iran of using chemical weapons would further increase pressure on it to end the war, and it could undermine Soviet and Chinese efforts at the UN to block an arms embargo against Iran. Indicative of this, at the time, American officials privately acknowledged that the evidence of Iran’s use of chemical weapons “was far less convincing than the startling evidence of Iraqi chemical attacks provided by television cameras that filmed scores of dead Iraqi Kurds.”23 And yet, the repetition of Iran’s alleged—though not confirmed—use of chemical weapons continued. Iran’s efforts to publicize Iraq’s brutal use of chemical weapons against its own population proved to be Pyrrhic. By emphasizing to its citizens the depressing scale of death caused by Iraq’s chemical weapons at Halabja, the regime hoped its citizens would rally to its call to fight the obviously evil Saddam Hussein, but the opposite happened. Having endured a horrific month-long bombardment, Tehran’s citizens asked themselves: if Saddam were willing to use chemical weapons against his own citizens, what would stop him from doing the same—or worse—to them? In an effort to perpetuate such fears, Iraq threatened to attack Iranian cities with chemical weapons on March 29. According to the Globe and Mail, an Iraqi government spokesman told Nuri Nayef, head of the Iraqi News Agency office in Cairo, that Iraq’s military “might choose a number of large Iranian cities to be the targets of chemical weapons as a deterrent and punitive measure.”24 This threat, when coupled with Iraq’s daily bombardment of the capital, put immense pressure on the Iranian regime to end the war.

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On April 8, Iranians went to the polls to elect a new parliament. Iran’s citizens faced a number of troubling questions, but the most difficult question was whether to end the war. The election was essentially a showdown between the so-called pragmatists that wanted to end the war and radicals that did not. “The psychological terror caused by Iraqi bombings of Tehran and the lack of international condemnation after Iraq’s renewed use of chemical weapons in Kurdistan” impacted the views of most Iranians. Intelligence officials believed that the elections “were bringing in new radical deputies who were eager for a head-on collision with the United States, an opinion that is not shared by the State Department or most Iran analysts.”25 In the aftermath of the elections, the State Department produced an analysis on the status of the Iran-Iraq war. Militarily the conflict remained a stalemate, but “Iraq’s continued use of chemical weapons risks Iranian retaliation on a growing scale. Iraq now certainly possesses weapons stocks and delivery means (aircraft, artillery, rockets) for much more widespread use.” This was problematic because the “pattern of regular direct chemical exchanges with Iranian troops on the battlefield, however, would rather quickly spur existing Iranian programs to produce chemical weapons and could lead to a jump in use this year producing significant casualties.” Although Iranian use of chemical weapons would increase casualties, the analysts felt “this would eventually lead to a mutual backing off from the employment of chemicals, as in World War I.” In the end, the State Department concluded that “Iraq can’t win, but need not lose; Iran can win, but probably won’t.”26 Incidents in the Persian Gulf had subsided significantly in the aftermath of the American attacks on the Iranian oil platforms in October 1987. Since then, Iran appeared to make a point of avoiding direct engagement with the United States. But in early April, the Pasdaran quietly resumed mining in the Gulf. On April 14, the USS Samuel B. Roberts was returning to port in Bahrain after a successful convoy mission when it struck an Iranian mine to the northeast of Qatar. The amphibious mine ripped a 25-foot hole in the vessel, injuring 10 crewmembers, with one sustaining serious burns over 85 percent of his/her body, although listed in stable condition.27 The Reagan administration was convinced that Iran had laid the mines within the previous 48 hours, as a convoy had just passed uneventfully through the area. The next day, Reagan met with his advisors who immediately began planning their revenge.28 On April 15, Lieutenant General George B. Crist, commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), indicated to reporters that Iraq’s air attacks on Iranian infrastructure as part of Operation Druid Leader were beginning to bare fruit. Although Crist never discussed America’s covert role, nor were reporters aware of the covert operation at the time, his statements about Iraq’s

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air campaign were quite telling. The air campaign, according to Crist, crippled Iran’s infrastructure, sharply reduced its daily oil output, and left it short of foreign capital needed to purchase arms for a new offensive. Interestingly, Crist told reporters that in addition to missile attacks, the Iraqis had launched an air campaign against more than 37 cities inside Iran, adding that Iraq’s strategy “does not get the headlines, but it is just as effective.” 29 However, Rick Francona, who was intimately aware of the targets struck in the campaign, agrees with the number of targets, but insists that the program was never targeting cities. According to Francona: The targets were railroad bridges, air defense sites, logistics/ maintenance/ supply depots, transportation hubs, command and control facilities—in a specific order. Each built on the other in a thought-out air campaign, all what we would call interdiction targets. We’re professionals—we don’t target “cities.” Nevertheless, Crist’s comment was quite remarkable, particularly his use of the exact number of airstrikes conducted at the time; it was quite telling of the covert American role at the time. When informed of Crist’s comments to reporters, Francona was astonished, “I am really surprised that was made public—we were operating on a strict need to know basis.” However, Francona pointed out, “Crist’s comments would not have meant anything without the context of the program.”30 On April 17, Reagan met with his military advisors to discuss plans to retaliate against Iran. According to Reagan, the plan called for an attack on two or three oil platforms and possibly an Iranian naval vessel. In his diary, Reagan emphasized, “We seek no killing—just the destruction of the targets.” The administration then called congressional leaders to the White House where they were briefed on the plan; they readily agreed to it. He then issued the order for the retaliatory operation to commence that evening at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time).31 Unfortunately, the timing of the order could not have been worse. Earlier that day—American intelligence was almost certainly aware of this plan—Iraq launched the first phase of Operation Tawakalna Ala Allah (In God We Trust), a decisive multistage offensive aimed at recapturing all Iranian occupied territory. For months prior to the offensive, the highly trained Republican Guard rehearsed each phase of the operation to scale on similar terrain in the Iraqi central plain. Instructed by Soviet military advisors, the Iraqis were trained in what was known as “all arms” warfare, meaning it deployed a systematic use of air strikes, artillery, chemical weapons, armor, and finally infantry against the adversary.32

Iraq’s Operation Tawakalna Ala Allah, 1988. (Adapted from United Nations High Commission for Refugees: Iraq. http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/ htmain.htm.)

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Starting just before dawn, Iraq launched a two-prong attack against the heavily defended Iranian positions on the Faw peninsula. In the early morning hours, as Iraq moved its forces into place, it commenced a massive artillery and chemical weapon bombardment of Iran’s positions. Having saturated Iran’s defensive positions, the Seventh Army pushed south along the BasraFaw road, through the palm groves that line the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Meanwhile a second prong was launched to the east along the Khor Abdullah Channel that separated the peninsula from the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. In addition to the two thrusts, Iraq managed to make an amphibious landing behind Iranian lines. Prior to the attack, it was anticipated that Iraq would retake the peninsula in approximately five days, but the offensive proved to be remarkably successful, and Iraq recaptured it in only 36 hours. In total, Iraq used a massive force of some 200,000 troops to retake the peninsula, and only lost about 200 soldiers.33 Confirming the massive scale of chemical weapons use in the offensive, a few days after the offensive, Rick Francona, who was in Iraq at the time helping with Operation Druid Leader, flew down to Faw with an Iraqi escort to survey the scene of the battle. While there, he observed “spent atropine injector,” that were used as an antidote for nerve gas, “all over the battlefield.” A few days later, Patrick Tyler visited the battlefield, where he also took note of the considerable evidence of the use of chemical weapons.34 Meanwhile, in the early morning hours of April 18, the U.S. Navy attacked two Iranian oil platforms, the Sassan and Nasr, in the southern gulf. Typical of American attacks, the navy gave the Iranians time to vacate the platforms before the attack commenced. When this was done at the Sassan platform, the Iranians ignored the warning and opened fire on the American vessels. The navy responded by shelling it; once it was deemed safe, a marine unit went aboard to set and detonate explosives. Ten minutes later, a second squadron of American naval vessels approached the Nasr platform, 160 kilometers (100 miles) away, near Sirri Island, and shelled it after giving the Iranians time to vacate. At this point, Tehran ordered its navy to respond to the American attacks. Just after noon (Persian Gulf time), three Iranian speedboats fired at an American helicopter near the destroyed Nasr platform. Shortly after the altercation, an American commercial vessel reported that it was under attack to the southeast. At this point, an Iranian vessel, the PTG Joshan, began to approach the USS Wainwright. Despite repeated warnings, the Joshan fired a missile at the Wainwright that missed—thanks to evasive measures taken by the American ship. In response, the Wainwright fired a Harpoon missile at the Iranian vessel and struck it, while the nearby USS Sampson also launched two missiles at the ship that also hit. Then a fourth missile was launched

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against the Joshan that succeeded in sinking it. The altercation ultimately left many Iranians dead. In spite of this, “Within the hour, two Iranian F4 fighter planes streaked toward the Wainwright. The planes dove and reportedly fired a missile that missed its target.” The Wainwright responded by firing two antiaircraft missiles with one hitting and destroying the aircraft. “Meanwhile, the U.S. military intercepted communications in which Tehran ordered two of its frigates, the Sahand and the Sabalan, to retaliate against U.S. naval forces.” Anticipating the attack, the United States dropped plans to attack a third oil platform and moved to intercept the Iranian vessels. In the process, the navy fired upon three fast-moving Iranian speedboats that were firing upon smaller vessels in the area, sinking one and disabling another. At around 4:00 p.m., the Sahand approached the American ships, which warned the Iranian vessel against any aggressive actions. Twenty minutes later, the Sahand opened fire on the American ships, which led to a major naval battle. “American A6 planes hit the Iranian ship with a Harpoon missile, then blasted it seven minutes later with laser-guided bombs. The frigate USS Strauss then scored a direct hit with another Harpoon.” The battle left an unknown number of Iranians dead. Two hours later, the navy located the Sabalan that then fired a surface-tosurface missile at the USS Jack Williams and a second missile at American fighter jets flying overhead. Both missed. The navy retaliated by attacking and sinking the ship. Tragically, over the course of the operation, an American helicopter was reported missing, and the two aboard were feared dead.35 At this point, Admiral Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, turned to Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci in the Pentagon command center and said, “I think we’ve shed enough blood.” To which Carlucci replied, “I think you’re right.”36 Immediately following the largest naval battle fought by the American navy since the Second World War, the Reagan administration gave consideration to the prospect of expanding its fleet in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s aggressive actions against American forces greatly concerned many administration officials, although it was also recognized that the navy effectively destroyed the bulk of Iran’s fleet. On April 22, the Department of Defense informed Congress that it decided to revise the rules of engagement for American warships operating in the Persian Gulf. These revisions included coming to the aid of neutral merchant ships that were coming under attack. “Under the policy, if an American warship is near the site of an Iranian attack on a neutral merchant vessel, it could intervene in response to that attack.” In addition, “the rules would also permit United States warships to protect American-owned vessels sailing in the gulf under foreign flags.”37 Meanwhile, on April 19, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a widely disseminated cable outlining Iraq’s continued repression against its Kurdish population.

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It pointed out that Iraq was continuing its “resettlement policy,” which in reality was akin to Hitler’s extermination programs. By April 19, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) estimated that Iraq resettled 1.5 million Kurds into “resettlement” camps, destroyed between 700 to 1,000 villages and small residential areas, and placed large numbers of Kurds into “concentration camps located near the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian borders.” This confirmed, once again, that the JCS and the American government were well aware of the atrocious acts being committed by the Iraqi regime, even at a time when America’s involvement in the war was becoming overt.38 In early May, Iraq indicated that it was abandoning its diplomatic efforts to bring the war to a close in favor of a military solution. Iraq’s dramatic, rapid victory at Faw proved the Iraqi regime was capable of achieving an offensive military victory. As part of its tactical shift, on May 10, Tariq Aziz publicly disclosed for the first time that Iraq would resort to chemical weapons if need be. “Iraq has to repel . . . aggression, calling on all means including the use of chemical weapons against those who seek to occupy its territory.”39 Remarkably, Aziz made this statement the day after the Security Council passed UNSC 612, which vigorously condemned the use of chemical weapons in the war, although not identifying Iraq as the culprit.40 Immediately following Iraq’s victory at Faw, its military set about preparing to retake the Iranian salient to the east of Basra, at Fish Lake. As Pelletiere points out: “The fact that the Iraqi army moved methodically, at one month intervals, as ground dried and became suitable for armored operations, and only after intensive, if quick, training, seems to confirm that the army was following a well thought out plan.”41 For instance, throughout the winter the Iraqis drained Fish Lake so that it could launch a spring offensive on solid ground where its heavy armor advantage would prove more effective. Indeed, this tactic alone proved to have impressive results. When Iraq’s Third Army launched the second phase of its offensive on May 25, it pulverized the defending Iranian forces. Once again, the offensive opened with a devastating artillery and chemical weapon barrage that terrorized Iran’s defending forces. With Iran’s troops on the run, Iraq sent in its infantry to mop up. After nine hours of fighting, the Third Army succeeded in reclaiming all of the territory lost in 1987 and expelling Iran’s forces across the border. On May 30, the Iraqi government took journalists on a tour of the war zone to prove the success of its smashing victory. They were shocked at what they found. There were few signs of resistance: Iranian gun emplacements and bunkers were littered with unused ammunition, grenades, small rockets, and bullets. Artillery positions were in a similar state, with small piles of spent shell casings next to

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stacks of wooden crates filled with unused shells. Iranian fighters left behind their gas masks, clothing, portable equipment and personal effects. The stunning swiftness of Iraq’s victory over Iran astonished journalists, military analysts, and diplomats alike, which raised fears to the extent of the disarray—politically and militarily—in Iran.42 Fighting between Iran and Iraq continued throughout June. On June 13, Iran gave a last ditch effort to recapture the salient it had been evicted from three weeks earlier, but this was met with disaster. In the face of Iran’s counteroffensive, the Iraqis retaliated by saturating the Pasdaran forces with chemical bombs dropped by its warplanes. After a 19-hour battle, the Iraqis managed to once again push the Iranians back to the border.43 Not long after repulsing the Iranian offensive, the Iraqis, and an Iranian rebel movement, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (National Liberation Army or MEK), launched the third phase of the offensive against Mehran, 160 kilometers (100 miles) east of Baghdad. Once again, Iran’s defenses buckled in the face of a chemical barrage, allowing the Iraqis to recapture its territory, push 20 kilometers (12 miles) into Iran, and capture the border town.44 Wasting no time, Iraq launched the fourth phase of its offensive against the Majnoon Island complex starting at 3:45 a.m. on June 25. Following the same pattern as its previous offensives, the Iraqis bombarded the defending Iranians with chemical weapons. After the gas settled, a combination of the Third Army and the Revolutionary Guard, both trained in marsh warfare and equipped with amphibious assault vehicles, stormed the islands. Meanwhile, the Third Army’s mechanized units thrust eastward into Iran, hooked north, and cut off Iran’s supply lines to the islands. After eight hours of fighting, Iran’s resistance collapsed, with Iraq capturing 2,115 prisoners-of-war.45 Five days later it recaptured the Kurdish garrison town of Mawat in another blitz offensive.46 By the end of June, it was abundantly clear that Iran’s military was collapsing, its government was in political disarray following the April elections, and its people had lost the will to fight. In a futile effort to boost morale, on July 3, three Iranian gunboats fired on and narrowly missed an American reconnaissance helicopter in the southern Gulf. As per its rules of engagement, the USS Vincennes and the USS Elmer Montgomery engaged in combat with five Iranian vessels, sinking two and damaging a third.47 Forty-five minutes after the initial provocation, Iran Air Flight 655, on a 224-kilometer (140-mile) flight from Bandar Abbas to Dubai, strayed too close to the vicinity of the battle. Fearing that Flight 655 was an F-14 coming to aid the Iranian vessels, the USS Vincennes, which was

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equipped with state-of-the-art radar and communications systems, hailed the European-made A300 Airbus and warned it to avoid the battle. According to the investigation report, “A review of the Vincennes tapes found that the plane was well inside the commercial corridor, that it was emitting only a civilian electronic transponder code and that it was climbing. In addition, one of the crew members warned at one point that the aircraft might be commercial.” Tragically, when Flight 655 failed to respond to numerous hails, Captain William Rogers made the fateful decision to fire. The naval vessel fired two standard surface-to-air missiles at the passenger jet, killing all 290 passengers aboard. Ultimately, the investigation report concluded that a combination of human errors and the fog of war led to the tragedy.48 Remarkably, the American public, though recognizing the tragic nature of the event, was supportive of the decision to shoot the plane down.49 After all, it was the commander’s duty to defend both their sailors and vessels, and the USS Stark incident was still a deeply ingrained memory. The shooting down of Iran Air 655 was the war’s final turning point. According to the Washington Post, the Reagan administration initially denied having downed the Iranian jet but later came clean, explaining that the reason for the delay was due to the immense task of “sifting through . . . detailed reports and electronic intelligence . . . to confirm [that it was] a tragic case of mistaken identity.”50 That day, President Reagan addressed the American public, expressing his deepest sorrow for the incident, while affirming that it was an act of self-defense. I am saddened to report that it appears that in a proper defensive action by the U.S.S. Vincennes this morning in the Persian Gulf an Iranian airliner was shot down over the Strait of Hormuz. This is a terrible human tragedy. Our sympathy and condolences go out to the passengers, crew, and their families. The Defense Department will conduct a full investigation. We deeply regret any loss of life. The course of the Iranian civilian airliner was such that it was headed directly for the U.S.S. Vincennes, which was at the time engaged with five Iranian Boghammar boats that had attacked our forces. When the aircraft failed to heed repeated warnings, the Vincennes followed standing orders and widely publicized procedures, firing to protect itself against possible attack.51 Despite Reagan’s best efforts to assure the Iranians that it was unintentional, the damage was already done. The Iranians were convinced that the United States purposely shot down its civilian airliner as a warning that it would stop at nothing to destroy Iran.52

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The day after the disaster, an ailing Ayatollah Khomeini lashed out at the “Great Satan” and its allies in the Persian Gulf as Iran observed a day of mourning for the 290 martyrs. “We must all be prepared for a real war and go to the war fronts and fight against America and its lackeys.”53 But the moderate elements in Iran, led by newly appointed Iranian Commander in Chief, Hashemi Rafsanjani, appealed to Iranians to show restraint. “If we respond (with violence), world opinion will be against us, and the world will not listen to us. . . . The world knows we can respond with violence to this crime,” said Rafsanjani. “We very wisely did not do anything wrong.” It was shocking that an Iranian leader would urge restrain in the face of such a horrific tragedy.54 The two greatly divergent pleas from Iran’s most powerful leaders underscored that the so-called moderates appeared to be taking control of Iran’s foreign policy. As the Iranian regime continued to debate whether to end the war, Iraq launched a massive offensive against Iran’s Penjwin salient in the early morning hours of July 12. The offensive proved to be remarkably successful. In less than four hours, the First Army completely decimated Iran’s forces, recaptured all of its territory, including twelve peaks, and thrust 45 kilometers (28 miles) into Iran.55 After decisively defeating Iranian forces, Iraqi forces promptly withdrew to the “border with the equipment and prisoners they had captured.”56 The same day, two American helicopters exchanged fire with Iranian gunboats near Farsi Island, in the northern Gulf. The altercation occurred that evening when the U.S. Navy picked up a distress call from a Panamanianflagged vessel. Under its new rules of engagement, the regional commander dispatched two helicopters to the site for assist. When the helicopters approached the imperiled ship, two Iranian gunboats opened fire. Taking evasive measures, the helicopters returned fire with rockets, damaging one of the boats.57 Once again, America’s actions in the Persian Gulf appeared to be timed with Iraq’s major offensives. Unsurprisingly, the incident simply confirmed the prevailing belief in Tehran that the United States would stop at nothing to force it to end the war. Two days after the naval skirmish, Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi and Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati traveled to New York and called on the Security Council to denounce the United States for “its inhuman massacre of innocent civilian passengers [on] Iran Air Flight 655.” Arguing on behalf of the United States was Vice President George H.W. Bush, who was running for president against Democrat candidate Michael Dukakis. Bush was an old Security Council veteran, having served as President Nixon’s ambassador to the UN from 1971 to 1973. While acknowledging the tragedy, Bush dismissed Iran’s “offensive” and “absurd” allegation that the United States purposely shot down the passenger jet outright. He turned the argument

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around on Velayati, arguing that Iran must “bear a substantial measure of responsibility” for the incident because it refused to accept UNSC 598 and end the war. After all, if Iran had not rejected the resolution, the U.S. Navy would not need to be stationed in the Persian Gulf, and tragedy would never have happened.58 According to Thomas L. McNaugher, when Mousavi and Velayati met with diplomats behind the scenes, instead of finding support, he “found diplomats telling him to end the war.”59 The lack of support at the UN brought to focus the cold reality that it was completely isolated in the world. The only course at this point was to end the war. Defeated, Mousavi and Velayati returned to Tehran with the bad news. On July 17, Saddam Hussein startled diplomats when he urged Iran’s leaders to “learn from their recent defeats and negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement restoring security to the Persian Gulf.” In his speech, Saddam reiterated Iraq’s commitment to UNSC 598, declaring his willingness to negotiate with Tehran based on five principles: “complete withdrawal to recognized borders, prisoner exchanges, a nonaggression pact, respect for each country’s political system and a contribution to security in the gulf region.”60 Interestingly, the five-point proposal closely mirrored the Algiers Accord of 1975, but there was one notable difference: the question of sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. In spite of this, Saddam’s sudden overture had a profound impact in Tehran. The next day, Iranian president, Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei, sent a letter to Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, formally notifying him that Iran unconditionally accepted UNSC 598. In light of the political turmoil in Tehran and the collapse of its military, Iran’s about-face did not come as a complete surprise.61 For the Iranian leadership, the downing of Iran Air 655 was the turning point in the debate about continuing the war. According to Rafsanjani, the leadership did not begin serious discussions on the truce until after the disaster.62 On July 20, Khomeini made a radio address to the Iranian public announcing his acceptance of the resolution: Because of the events and factors which I will not discuss for the time being, and considering the advice of all ranking political and military experts of the country . . . I agree to accept the ceasefire resolution . . . I consider it to be in the interest of the revolution and the system at this juncture. God knows that, were it not that all our honour and prestige should be sacrificed for Islam, I would never have consented [to the ceasefire.]63 Khomeini emphasized how difficult the decision to sue for peace was, reminding Iranians that he “had promised to fight to the last drop of [his]

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blood and to [his] last breath.” In spite of this promise, he explained that “Taking this decision was more deadly than swallowing poison. I submit myself to Allah’s will and drink this drink for his satisfaction.” Confronting Iraqi skepticism about Iran’s about-face, Khomeini declared that his decision was “not a new tactic to continue the war” and gave Iran’s acceptance of UNSC 598 his personal blessing.64 In light of Iran’s acceptance of UNSC 598, the Reagan administration voted in favor of UNSC 616 that expressed its “deep distress” about the downing of Iran Air 655. The resolution expressed sincere condolences to the bereaved families, called for an independent investigation into the incident, and stressed the need for the “full and rapid implementation” of UNSC 598, which the council viewed “as the only basis for a comprehensive, just, honourable and durable settlement of the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq.”65 Iran’s sudden overture proved to be an opportunity for the regime in Baghdad. As the secretary-general worked feverously to bring Iran and Iraq to the negotiating table, the Iraqis stalled. Recognizing that negotiations were imminent, starting on July 22, the Iraqis launched a series of limited offensives into Iran in an effort to even the disparity of prisoners of war and weaken Iran’s bargaining position. The offensive, which was the final installment in Iraq’s Tawakalna Ala Allah campaign, was launched against Qasr e-Shirin. In light of the dramatic political developments in the previous days, Iran’s forces were caught completely off-guard. Iraq’s assault, using tanks, warplanes, and chemical weapons, pushed nearly 64 kilometers (40 miles) into Iranian territory, capturing the three large Iranian towns, Qasr e-Shirin, Pol-e Zohab, and Khusrawi, in the first day, and then hooking south, where they captured the small city of Gilan-e Gharb.66 The next morning, Iraq launched a threeprong tank offensive further south from the northeast of Basra toward the large Iranian city of Ahvaz. According to the New York Times, “The heaviest battles were around the towns of Hamid, Jofair and Khushk west of Ahwaz, as well as Shalamcheh a little farther [south], and the northern suburbs of the Iranian port city of Khorramshahr.” As with the previous offensives, Iraq continued to rely on its use of chemical weapons to break through Iran’s already crumbling defenses. Nevertheless, Iraq achieved its stated objective, capturing thousands of Iranians and improving its negotiating position in the upcoming peace talks.67 On August 7, after exerting considerable diplomatic finesse, SecretaryGeneral Perez de Cuellar Javier managed to convince Iran and Iraq to agree to a ceasefire that was set to start on August 20; it would be followed immediately by direct talks. Since Iran’s acceptance of UNSC 598, the Iraqis had

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blocked the secretary-general’s efforts to bring about a ceasefire by demanding direct talks with Iran before implementing a ceasefire.68 Iraq’s obstinacy was clearly a delay tactic designed to allow it to continue its prisoner-grab offensives against Iran in order to increase its leverage at the bargaining table. On August 4, the Reagan administration indicated that it was pressing Iraq to end its attacks against Iran and accept the ceasefire proposal.69 Two days later, Saddam Hussein announced that he was ready to accept the implementation of a ceasefire to be followed by direct talks. The next day, Iran accepted Iraq’s proposal.70 At midnight on August 20 the Iran-Iraq war officially ended when guns all along the entirety of a 1,173-kilometer (733-mile) front fell silent for the first time in eight years, thus marking the end of the longest conventional war of the twentieth century. Five days later, Iranian and Iraqi leaders met for the first time in Geneva, Switzerland to begin the arduous process of peace negotiations. There was little doubt that the United States played a significant role in bringing the Iran-Iraq war to a close. Since the exposure of the Iran-Contra affair, the Reagan administration put intense political, military, and diplomatic pressure on Iran to end the war. Certainly, the public exposure of Israel’s role in the arms-for-hostage dealings with Iran helped dry up Iran’s most lucrative source of weaponry. Closing the Israeli sieve allowed Operation Staunch to work more effectively. In addition, a sudden change of heart occurred among world leaders, even those in the Eastern bloc, who finally agreed to stem the flow of weapons to Iran. Operation Earnest Will, on the other hand, physically projected American power into the Persian Gulf, while sending a clear message to Iran that the United States was not to be reckoned with. Tragically, the message came in the form of numerous military altercations ending with the shooting down of a civilian airplane. By the end of the war, there was little doubt that Iran had received the message loud and clear. But the problem was ultimately Iran’s ability to find endless scores of mindlessly fanatical warriors. Thus, in order to counter this obstacle to peace, the United States implemented a joint American-Iraqi operation that effectively destroyed Iran’s military infrastructure, which allowed Iraq’s forces to win the war.

Part VI

Conclusion

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Conclusion

While the official American policy toward the Iran-Iraq war had been that of strict neutrality, throughout the conflict the United States openly contradicted its stated policy by providing military, economic, political, and diplomatic support to Iraq. Starting in the spring of 1981, the Reagan administration began quietly increasing contacts with Iraq at the behest of the Gulf States who viewed Iraq as a bulwark against the spread of Iran’s form of radical Islam. The objective of the rapprochement was to encourage Iraq to continue its trend toward moderation and to see if Iraq was capable of replacing Iran in a modified “two-pillar” policy. But just as American-Iraqi relations were beginning to improve, Iran routed Iraqi forces, recaptured its territory, and was poised to invade Iraq by June 1982. Iraq’s reversal alarmed policy makers in Washington, who based their trepidation on an adaptation of the Truman administration’s domino theory, believing that if Iraq fell to Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States would collapse soon thereafter. The escalation of the war in 1982 also increased the potential for an expansion of the war to include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Bahrain, Oman, or Kuwait. In that case, the United States would be forced to intervene to protect its allies or once again look impotent in the face of Iranian aggression. In order to allay these fears, the Reagan administration opted to tilt toward Iraq, just as the Wilson and Roosevelt administrations tilted toward Great Britain during the First and Second World Wars. However, in doing so, the United States violated its policy of neutrality. The American policy toward the Iran-Iraq war went through four distinct phases. The first phase lasted from the start of the war until the end of the Carter administration. When the war broke out between Iran and Iraq, the

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Carter administration was already deeply embroiled in the hostage crisis. Although it had foreknowledge that Iraq was considering invading Iran, the actual event caught the White House completely by surprise. At this point, no documentary evidence is available that convincingly shows that the Carter administration gave Iraq a so-called green light to invade Iran. Nevertheless, President Carter adopted and adhered to a policy of strict neutrality, whereby it did not provide any kind of support for either belligerent. This policy was based on a number of considerations. First, neither belligerent was particularly interested in attaining or accepting American support. Secondly, if the United States were to support Iraq, it would run the risk of pushing Iran further into the Soviet’s arms. Third, a neutral stance in the war helped to ensure the safety of the hostages still held in Tehran. Finally, maintaining neutrality left open the possibility of a future rapprochement with Iran, the geostrategic prize of the region. Realistically, the Carter administration had few other options than to declare that the United States was neutral. When the Reagan administration came to office, it announced that it would continue to adhere to the policy of strict neutrality, although its commitment was only skin deep, as it immediately began to cultivate a covert relationship with Iraq. The second phase of the American policy occurred between 1981 and 1984 when the Reagan administration progressively improved its overt and covert relationship with Iraq. Throughout this period, revolutionary Iran was on the offensive and threatened to topple the secular Iraqi regime while refusing to negotiate an end to the hostilities. At the same time, the incredible expansion of Iran’s military power posed a significant threat to the security of the Gulf States who turned to the United States for support. In sum, the regional balance of power had effectively shifted back in Iran’s favor, which led the Reagan administration to tilt heavily toward Iraq in order to create balance. When the Reagan administration first began helping Iraq, the scope of the operation was limited to preventing its collapse, but as the war progressed, Iraq’s needs increased, which led to an expanded American role. The decision to tilt toward Iraq was driven by a number of factors. First and foremost, the United States and its regional allies viewed Iraq as the bulwark against the spread of Iran’s revolutionary ideology that openly espoused the overthrow of the Gulf monarchies. Second, it was widely believed that if Iraq were to collapse, nothing short of superpower intervention could prevent Iran’s forces from rolling over the entire Persian Gulf, if not the Middle East. Contributing to these fears, Iran openly declared its intention of setting up a theocratic regime in Baghdad, modeled on its own form of government. All of these fears came to a head in the summer of 1982, when Iran was poised to invade

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southern Iraq. At this point, the Gulf States frantically turned to Washington to help prevent Iraq’s collapse, and the Reagan administration was more than willing to comply. The United States supported Iraq in many ways. Launched in December 1983, the backbone of the State Department’s efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war came in the form of Operation Staunch. The objective of Operation Staunch was to convince Iran’s arms suppliers to cease shipments as part of a global effort to force the Iranians to end the war. In addition to Operation Staunch, the State Department also provided diplomatic support for the Iraqis at the United Nations by downplaying Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and by pushing for resolutions that condemned Iran for refusing to end the war. Even when faced with indisputable evidence of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, the State Department pushed for a nonbinding statement from the Security Council’s president, as opposed to a formal resolution condemning Iraq. When resolutions were passed, the United States worked to water them down and deflect the focus away from Iraq and onto Iran, due to its refusal to end the war. In more practical terms, the State Department helped stave off an Iraqi economic crisis in 1983 by approving millions of dollars in export credits and working with American companies to increase Iraq’s ability to export oil through alternative routes; they also approved the sale of dual-use items, such as heavy trucks that were used to transport tanks rapidly along the front, and Bell helicopters that were used to rapidly ferry troops to the front and were eventually retrofitted by a third party to include rocket launchers. Beyond the efforts of the State Department, between 1982 and 1986 the CIA regularly provided the Iraqis with tactical intelligence (the DIA provided Iraq with intelligence following the USS Stark incident), describing Iranian troop movements, enemy buildups, supply lines, and the locations of impending offensives. Intelligence was also passed to Iraq from close American allies, like the Saudis and Jordanians. The intelligence relationship, however, collapsed in 1986 with the revelation that the CIA supplied Iran with tactical intelligence on Iraqi positions just prior to Iran’s breakthrough at Faw. The Reagan administration also worked closely with America’s regional allies to prevent Iraq’s defeat, including working with the Saudis to increase Iraq’s ability to export oil, protecting Kuwaiti vessels from Iranian attacks in the Gulf, and quietly urging third parties, such as Jordan and Egypt, to continue supplying Iraq with weaponry. America’s tilt toward Iraq, however, came to an abrupt halt in 1985, when the Reagan administration, in an about-face from its actual policy, decided to provide Iran with much-needed military intelligence, TOW and HAWK missiles, and spare parts. There was little doubt that this operation was driven by

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the desires of a small group of individuals from the NSC, which purposely cut the departments of State and Defense out of the loop. There was such institutional resistance to helping Iran that when the NSC ordered the CIA to provide Iran with tactical intelligence and desperately needed military hardware, particularly at a time when the Iranians clearly held the upper hand in the war, senior CIA officials questioned the order. Indeed, the departments of State and Defense were even more vehement in their opposition to any deal with Iran than the CIA. They argued that it was against the interests of the United States to provide anything to Iran. After all, Iran was responsible for the hostage crisis of 1979–1980, numerous terrorist attacks against American interests, and the kidnapping and murder of American citizens. Beyond that, the active policy of the United States was to covertly support Iraq militarily and economically, as part of a realpolitik strategy aimed at balancing Iran’s military strength. And yet, in spite of vehement opposition from Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger (as well as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McMahon), the hawkish members of the NSC, led by Robert McFarlane, John Poindexter, and Oliver North, prevailed in the debate. The apparent reason for overlooking the opposition of these two seemingly influential statesmen was that analysts at the NSC believed that the Soviet Union was better positioned to influence a post-Khomeini Iran, even though this view was not widely accepted in the wider intelligence community. A secondary—though equally important— factor influencing Reagan’s decision to approve the operation was his steadfast desire to obtain the release of American hostages held by Iranian-backed terrorist groups in Lebanon. Apparently, these factors outweighed potential setbacks in American policy, and, as a result, the Reagan administration foolishly embarked on an arms-for-hostages operation that resulted in the near-destruction of its influence in the Persian Gulf. Although the overall extent of American support to Iran was rather limited, its impact on the battlefield was quite profound. After all, the Reagan administration provided Iran with thousands of TOW antitank missiles and a number of HAWK antiaircraft missiles, which had a profound impact on the fighting a year later at Basra, when the Iranians destroyed a great number of U.S. tanks and shot down many aircraft. Indeed, had it not been for Iraq’s extensive use of chemical weapons against Iran’s “human waves” at Basra, the Iranians could very likely have breached the city’s defenses and altered the entire course of the war. It was Iraq’s reliance on chemical weapons that checked Iran’s infantry-based tactics. Furthermore, according to Wayne White, an INR analyst who saw the intelligence provided to both Iran and Iraq during the war, the quality of the intelligence provided to Iran was of a

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higher quality than that provided to Iraq. Typically, the intelligence provided to Iraq was very general, indicating numerous potential areas where an offensive could occur, whereas the intelligence given to Iran was quite “actionable,” identifying specific targets and locations of Iraqi defenses.1 One possible explanation for the difference in the quality of intelligence provided to Iran was that the Iranians would have a better understanding of America’s intelligence capabilities than the Iraqis—thanks to its access to intelligence documents from the Shah era. As a result, it would have been much more difficult for the CIA to dupe the Iranians than the Iraqis. The fourth phase of the American policy toward the Iran-Iraq war began in November 1986, when a Syrian newspaper reported details of the Reagan administration’s secret dealings with Iran. America’s reputation in the Persian Gulf plummeted. The Gulf States were absolutely horrified by Reagan’s betrayal of their national interests. Understandably, they questioned America’s sincerity, particularly when it came to regional security. Since coming to office, the Reagan administration had been trying to project itself as the new regional policeman—in place of the Shah. In the face of such an unprecedented international backlash, the Reagan administration promptly resumed its policy of tilting toward Iraq, albeit this time more overtly. This phase would last until the end of the war. During this period, the State Department revamped Operation Staunch and worked feverishly at the UN to bring about an arms embargo aimed at forcing Iran to end its intransigent refusal to abide by Security Council resolutions. Meanwhile, after the reflagging of 11 Kuwaiti oil tankers, the Department of Defense dramatically increased the size of American operations in the Persian Gulf, which led to a number of military engagements with Iranian forces. At the same time, the Department of Defense ordered the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to work closely with the Iraqis on a tactical operation designed to destroy Iran’s military infrastructure. Ultimately, the cumulative effect of these efforts contributed significantly to Iran’s acceptance of UNSC 598. In the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair and its resulting embarrassment, the direction of America’s policy toward the Iran-Iraq war shifted back to the State Department. After all, throughout 1986 and 1987, the State Department continued to pursue Operation Staunch, even as members of the administration actively worked against it by providing arms to Iran. The exposure of the scandal resulted in the administration’s full support for Operation Staunch. Fortunately for the State Department, the disclosure that Israel was Iran’s primary source for weaponry greatly embarrassed the Iranians, as they lost any anti-Israeli credibility among Arabs. This meant that Iran would no longer be interested in making arms purchases from Israel. With

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Iran’s major source of weaponry dried up, the effect of Operation Staunch truly began to weigh on the Iranian regime. Following the second Battle of Basra, where Iran depleted its limited resources in a last-ditch effort to capture Basra, the Soviets and the Eastern bloc countries agreed to end arms sales to Iran. By 1988, virtually all of Iran’s major arms suppliers had agreed to halt arms sales to it, leaving its army to cope with incredibly limited supplies. At the same time, American diplomacy at the United Nations in 1987 and 1988 proved to be remarkably effective in bringing the permanent members of the Security Council to unanimously adopt UNSC 598 that demanded an end to the war. When Iran refused to accept the resolution, American diplomats began negotiating the implementation of a total arms embargo against Iran, which put greater pressure on the Soviet Union and China to urge Iran to end the war. When faced with a total arms embargo and feeling the impact of Operation Staunch, Tehran suddenly dropped its more contentious demands—like the removal of the Ba’athist regime—and appeared to be willing to negotiate a ceasefire. In the immediate aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal, the United States dramatically increased its military presence in the Persian Gulf as part of an effort to rebuild confidence with its regional allies. Capitalizing on the dramatic decline of America’s influence in the Gulf, the Kuwaitis manipulated the Reagan administration into agreeing to reflag its oil tankers by also asking the Soviet Union to reflag three of its vessels as well, knowing full well that the United States was opposed to the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. The catalyst for Kuwait’s request, however, was Iran’s acquisition of Silkworm missiles from China, which dramatically increased its ability to sink vessels in the Gulf. Kuwait’s request also provided the administration with an ideal opportunity to physically project America’s status as regional policeman, as Iran posed a threat to American interests in the region and the U.S. military was no longer saddled with the war in Vietnam. The problem, however, was that Iran viewed America’s military buildup in the region as a direct challenge to its national interests. Thus, when President Reagan ordered the implementation of Operation Earnest Will in the spring of 1987, which led to the introduction of over 30 American naval vessels into the Persian Gulf, direct conflict with Iran was all but inevitable. From the first day of the operation, Iranian forces challenged the American presence in the region, leading to a number of skirmishes, including a massive naval battle in April 1988 that happened to coincide with Iraq’s military victory over Iran at Faw. Meanwhile, the DIA covertly conducted Operation Druid Leader that utilized Iraq’s air force to destroy Iran’s military infrastructure in the spring of 1988. By the time the DIA operation got underway, the effects of

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Operation Staunch and the State Department’s diplomatic efforts at the UN were already beginning to set in. When Iraq unleashed its air force against Iran’s military infrastructure in the spring of 1988, it effectively left Iran with only one option: diplomacy. But just as Iran was beginning to come to terms with its need to seek a diplomatic solution, the United States pushed it one step further. The catalyst was the accidental downing of an Iranian passenger jet, killing all 290 on board. When Iranian diplomats arrived at the UN to urge the Security Council to condemn the American action, the full reality of Iran’s isolation became clear. Instead of finding scores of angry diplomats yearning to condemn the United States for this abominable act, the Iranians were forcefully urged to end the war. Upon returning to Tehran, Khomeini reluctantly agreed to drop all of his demands and negotiate peace with his nemesis, Saddam Hussein. The cost of the war was immense. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, by the end of 1987 Iran had spent up to $14.6 billion on arms, primarily from Israel ($4 billion), China ($3 billion), and North Korea ($2.4 billion), compared to Iraq’s $49.5 billion on arms, mainly from the Soviet Union ($17.5 billion), France ($8.3 billion), China ($5.1 billion), Italy ($3.6 billion), and Brazil ($1.7 billion), among others. 2 Clearly, throughout the course of the war, Iraq had a significant advantage over Iran in terms of access to weaponry. But Iraq’s willingness to finance its war effort largely on credit left it virtually bankrupt at the end of the war, as it begged its creditors for loan deferrals. Ultimately, this led to Iraq’s quarrel with Kuwait and the 1990–1991 Gulf War. But the cost in treasure cannot be measured when compared to the number of victims the war claimed. Iraq fared better numerically than Iran. But demographically, as it had a much smaller population to draw from, it was hit very hard. Just over 120,000 Iraqis were killed or missing in action and 300,000 were wounded. The Iranian figures are much more bleak. More than 320,000 Iranians were either killed or missing in action, with another 500,000 soldiers wounded.3 However, these figures are considered quite conservative. For instance, the New York Times puts the figures at more than one million dead, with Iranian deaths composing twothirds of the figure, 1.7 million wounded and close to 1.5 million refugees.4 The reason for the disparity between Iran’s high figures and Iraq’s relatively low figures can be explained by differences in military tactics. Iraqi and Iranian strategies differed significantly during the war. From the outset, Iraq adopted a very conservative, static defensive doctrine. At no point during the opening stage of the war did the Iraqis press their advantage against the disorganized Iranian forces, indicating that the regime in Baghdad wanted to fight a short, limited war, with the hope of taking few casualties.

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The initial objective of Iraq’s strategy was to force Iran to renegotiate the Algiers Accord, but after its military setbacks during 1981, its goal shifted to simply ending the war, while ensuring the regime’s survival. This meant that Iraq forfeited any control over the scope or duration of the war. In order to survive, the Ba’ath Party employed all of its resources to prevent an Iranian victory, relying heavily on its massive advantage in terms of weaponry, armor, air power, and the extensive use of chemical weapons. But, even though its access to weaponry was far superior to Iran, the Iraqi regime was consistently unwilling to use its equipment advantage in the face of potentially high casualties. It was not until the final stage of the war that the Iraqis replaced its static defense doctrine with an offensive doctrine that allowed Iraq to crush Iran’s military in a sweeping series of offensives. But by this point, Operations Staunch and Druid Leader had virtually crippled Iran’s military. Unlike Iraq, Iran’s strategy had clearly defined goals—the overthrow of the Ba’athist regime and its replacement with a theocratic Islamic government. As such, Iran refused to abandon these goals until its military forces were thoroughly defeated by Iraq’s final campaign. Early in the war, Iran’s mechanized forces deteriorated rapidly, and Iran was forced to rely on its larger population to fight an infantry-based war. As such, a key component of Iran’s military tactics was the use of “human wave” offensives, whereby thousands of fanatical Pasdaran and Basij would simultaneously attack Iraqi lines, hoping to overwhelm its defenses. Tragically, many of these offensives were spearheaded by children as young as twelve, who believed their martyrdom would guarantee them a place in heaven. The consequence of Iran’s head-on infantry assaults was that its forces suffered massive casualties, almost three times as many as Iraq. In the face of such staggering casualties, Iran adopted a strategy of attrition in 1983, capitalizing on its numeric superiority to overwhelm Iraq’s defenses. Significantly, the primary reason for the prolongation of the war was Iran’s intransigent refusal to accept nothing less than its stated objective. It was not until Iran faced the threat of an arms embargo, had virtually no supply of weaponry, and its military infrastructure was nearly destroyed that it agreed to alter its objectives and negotiate peace. Although the Iran-Iraq war occurred during the Cold War era, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the conflict was that it did not take on any of the characteristics of the other Cold War conflicts, such as Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, and Afghanistan. Indeed, the Kurdish revolt from 1961 to 1975 closely mirrored these conflicts, with Iran, Israel, and the United States supporting the Kurds and the Soviet Union supporting Iraq. But the Iranian Revolution fundamentally altered the regional dynamic and ultimately provided a third column representing vehement anti-American and anti-Soviet views that

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differed significantly from the nonaligned movement, largely due to its use of terrorism as a means of policy. Because Iran was such a staunch American ally earlier in the Cold War, its revolution left Washington scrambling to devise immediate tactics and long-term strategies that largely rested on an optimistic belief that Iran would eventually reconsider its radical policies and realign itself with the United States. At the same time, the Soviets were never able to capitalize on the Iranian Revolution because Iran deeply distrusted Moscow’s intentions. As a result, the superpowers had identical policy objectives toward the war, as they both wanted a return to the status quo, with neither belligerent emerging victorious, while also undermining their opponent’s opportunities to expand influence in the region. Because of this rare confluence of interests and the mutual absence of influence in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war stood in stark contrast to all of the major conflicts that occurred during the Cold War. From the outset of the war, France decided that its interests were best served by fully supporting Iraq against Iran. Paris’s decision to wholeheartedly back Iraq was driven by financial concerns. By early 1983, the French government had committed $4.75 billion in investment in Iraq, while at the same time the Iraqi government owed France $1.76 billion for large purchases of military equipment. Thus, the French government had no other choice but to support Iraq, if only to protect its investment. By and large, American and French interests in Iraq were similar, but on a number of occasions Paris’s zeal for supporting Iraq, particularly the sale of the Super E´tendards, conflicted with Washington’s desire to deescalate the war. But beyond this brief clash of interests, the French and American governments worked together to help bring Iran to the negotiating table. Although the Reagan administration was a staunch supporter of Israel, the Iran-Iraq war represented a fundamental clash of interests between the two allies. On the one side, the United States backed Iraq and helped it defend itself against Iran. On the other, Israel actively supported Iran as part of its periphery doctrine, which “held that the improbability of achieving peace with the surrounding Arab states forced Israel to build alliances with non-Arab states of the periphery—primarily Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia—as well as with non-Arab minorities, such as the Kurds and the Lebanese Christians.”5 The periphery doctrine, however, did not collapse with the fall of the Shah, but continued throughout the Iran-Iraq war as Israel sought to weaken Iraq, the most dangerous of the Arab states. In spite of Israel’s alliance with America, the Israelis always put their national interests ahead of those of the United States. But in spite of this fundamental clash of interests, Israel eventually managed to manipulate the United States into supporting Iran as well, leading to the Iran-Contra affair. After Israel’s role in supporting Iran became public

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with the exposure of the scandal, Israel’s ties to Iran began to deteriorate, and by the early 1990s the periphery doctrine appeared to have collapsed.6 The Iran-Iraq war underscored the growing influence of the Gulf States on American policy. From the outset of the war, a fundamental tenant of the American policy was the protection of the moderate Gulf States from Iranian encroachment. In order to achieve this objective, the United States continuously worked to bolster the defenses of the Gulf States, including the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia, the sale of major weapons systems, major military exercises, like Operation Jade Tiger, and close cooperation as part of Operation Staunch. Beyond that, America’s tilt toward Iraq was solely at the behest of the Gulf States, which viewed Iraq as a bulwark against the spread of Iran’s form of Islamic fundamentalism. In spite of America’s close cooperation on security matters, throughout the first three phases of the war (1980–1986), America’s physical presence in the Persian Gulf was limited. The Iran-Contra scandal undoubtedly changed everything. The dramatic decline in American credibility in the region prompted a massive buildup of its military forces in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Earnest Will. Even though there was hesitation within Congress over the buildup of America’s military forces in the Persian Gulf, Operation Earnest Will finally allowed the United States to project the full weight of its power in the region. A long-standing myth about American policy toward the war was that the United States provided Iraq with American-origin weaponry. Certainly, on a number of occasions, the Reagan administration considered this as an option, but ultimately rejected the idea for a number of reasons. First, Iraq had an abundant supply of modern military hardware from the Soviet Union, France, Egypt, Jordan, and the Eastern Bloc nations. The Reagan administration did, however, encourage its regional allies to provide Iraq with non-Americanorigin weaponry, while consistently refusing requests for American weapons (particularly from Jordan). Beyond that, the Iraqis were neither trained in American military doctrine nor on how to use its weapons, rendering them useless in combat. Furthermore, there was no way—in light of America’s stated neutrality—that Congress would ever approve of such a transaction. The notable exceptions to this rule were a number of dual-use civilian/ military items sold to Iraq that had practical military applications. For instance, the sale of 2,000 heavy trucks in early 1983 that could easily be used to rapidly transport heavy loads, including tanks, artillery, and ammunition, along the front. In addition to the sale of heavy trucks, the Reagan administration approved the sale of 60 Hughes helicopters in December 1982 and an additional 26 530-Defenders in January 1985. Around the same time as the second sale of the Hughes aircraft, the Reagan administration approved the sale of

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45 Bell 214ST helicopters that were each capable of rapidly transporting up to 16 troops to remote areas of the front. At face value, the sale of these quasimilitary vehicles would appear to violate America’s stated policy of neutrality, but the administration found a loophole in the Export Administration Act that limited the sale of aircraft on the basis of weight, not functionality. As a result, the sales of these aircraft to Iraq were perfectly legal. The American stance on Iraq’s use of chemical weapons was not particularly rosy. Indeed, the Reagan administration appeared to be quite reluctant about admonishing the Iraqis for using chemical weapons. In fact, a pervasive view was that it was okay for Iraq to use chemical weapons in self-defense. After all, Iraq had accepted all UNSC resolutions and Iran had not. Because of Iran’s intransigent refusal to end the war, its continued aggressive offensives against Iraq, and its continued support of terrorist attacks against American interests, the administration felt no love for Iran. Even so, as soon as Iraq’s use of chemical weapons became public, the Reagan administration quickly moved to ban the export of precursor chemicals while publicly condemning Iraq. Although the administration claimed to condemn the use of chemical weapons whenever they were used, on numerous occasions they did not. In fact, the only instances when the administration condemned Iraq occurred when indisputable evidence became public. For instance, in March 1984 when Iranian soldiers maimed by chemical weapons began arriving in European hospitals. There is, however, some truth behind the allegation that the United States indirectly helped Iraq acquire a chemical weapons capability. But it is important to note that this was done with neither the knowledge nor the complicity of the American government. Amid Iraq’s almost daily use of chemical weapons in the fall of 1983, American officials confirmed that Iraq acquired its chemical weapons capability from a West German firm that was an American subsidiary. But the acquisition occurred long before the start of the war and was reasonably explained at the time to be for agricultural purposes. Beyond that there were no international agreements in place that banned the production of chemical weapons—only the Geneva Protocol of 1925 that banned their use. Sadly, the Kurds did not factor significantly into America’s strategy to end the war between Iran and Iraq. This was painfully evident by the events that followed before and after the ceasefire. The problem was that the Kurds aligned their interests with their traditional regional ally, Iran. But, in doing so, the Kurds aligned themselves against Washington. Tragically, when Iran capitulated to Iraq to end the war, it cut its support for the Kurds and closed its border in the north, trapping its former allies just as the Shah had in March 1975. In turn, the ceasefire freed many units of the Iraqi army,

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allowing them to turn north and finish the Kurds once and for all. Once again, the Kurds were the victims of regional politics. Sadly, there was little the international community could do to stop the massacre. Because the Kurds were Iraqi citizens, the atrocious acts of the Iraqi government were considered an internal matter and fell outside the confines of international law. On September 8, 1988, the Reagan administration condemned Iraq once again for using chemical weapons against its own citizens, and Congress moved to impose sanctions against Iraq.7 But these actions came too late for the Kurds who were gassed into submission in the mountains of Iraq. In the end, the Kurds were the ultimate losers in the Iran-Iraq war. So it goes. American policy toward the Iran-Iraq war underscores the ambiguity of the concept of neutrality. Although at first glance, America’s policy toward the war appears to be starkly contradictory (i.e., claiming to be neutral, while doing the opposite), but neutrality was by far the best option for the United States, allowing it to maximize its maneuverability to better position itself to serve as a counterbalance to Iran and Iraq’s expansionist tendencies, while effectively checking Soviet interests in the region. Furthermore, by claiming neutrality, the White House effectively undercut Congress’s ability to limit executive prerogative over America’s foreign policy, while allowing it to pursue realpolitik policies toward Iran and Iraq. Thus, America’s policy of neutrality toward the Iran-Iraq war, in spite of being a sham, provided a successful outcome from an American foreign policy perspective. But in the end, it was Kuwait’s request to reflag its oil tankers in 1987 that allowed the United States to assume the role of regional policeman, finally filling the void left by the British withdrawal of its military forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971. There was certainly some reluctance among the Americans to take on and maintain this role, primarily out of fears of open-ended commitments, but it was Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, that cemented its presence in the region for good.

Notes

INTRODUCTION 1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). CHAPTER 1 1. Phebe Marr, A Modern History of Iraq (London: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), pp. 82–86. 2. Urial Dann, Iraq Under Qasim: A Political History, 1958–1963 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), p. 8. 3. Phebe Marr, p. 218. 4. Con Coughlin, Saddam: His Rise and Fall (Toronto: Harper Perennial, 2002), pp. 3–4. 5. Ibid., p. 1. 6. Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (London: Brassey’s, 1991), p. 2. 7. Urial Dann, pp. 11–12. 8. For more information on American perceptions toward the Iraqi Revolution, see Foreign Relations of the United States (herein FRUS), 1958–1960, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, pp. 289–334. 9. Urial Dann, p. 21. 10. Ibid., p. 19. 11. Con Coughlin, p. 26. 12. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Interview Session [with Saddam Hussein] Number 6,” February 16, 2004, National Security Archive (herein NSA), Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI: Twenty Interviews and Five Conversations with “High Value

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Detainee # 1” in 2004 (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 2009), document 7, p. 1. 13. FRUS, 1958–1960, volume XII, p. 494. 14. Con Coughlin, p. 82. 15. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Kurdish Problem in Perspective,” PA79-10330D, August 1979, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (herein JCPL), NLC-8-3-2-3-5, p. 1. 16. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Kurdish Problem in Perspective,” PA79-10330D, August 1979, JCPL, NLC-8-3-2-3-5, pp. 6–7. 17. Amir Hassanpour, “The Kurdish Experience,” in Middle East Report, No. 189 (Jul.–Aug., 1994), pp. 3–4. 18. Ibid., p. 3. 19. Sa’ad Jawad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question (London: Ithica University Press, 1981), pp. 40 and 80. 20. See Department of State, National Archives, Record Group 59, State Department Central Files, Record Group 59, “Iraq 1960—January 1963,” Microfilm, Rolls 2–3. 21. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 152. 22. Phebe Marr, p. 190. 23. Ibid., pp. 191–193 and 205. 24. Ibid., p. 217. 25. Charles Tripp, pp. 194–196. 26. Phebe Marr, p. 220. 27. Stephen R. Grummon, The Iran-Iraq War, Islam Embattled (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Praeger Publishers, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982), p. 7. 28. Con Coughlin, p. 119. 29. Dana Adams Schmidt, “Iraq Recognizes Kurdish Autonomy,” The New York Times, March 12, 1970, p. A8. 30. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Kurdish Problem in Perspective,” June 30, 1979, JCPL, NLC-8-3-2-3-5, p. 8. 31. American Embassy Beirut to Department of State, “Request from Mustafa Barzani for Clandestine Contact with USG,” Beirut A-222, July 16, 1971, National Archives, Record Group 59, State Department Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Box 2382, POL 13–3 Ethnic and National Minorities (1971), pp. 1–3. 32. Central Intelligence Agency, “Intention of Kurdish Leader Al-Barzani to Approach the United States Government for Assistance; Iranian Intelligence Request for Expression of United States Government Willingness to Overthrow the Ba’thi Regime of Iraq,” March 9, 1972, FRUS, Nixon-Ford Administration (herein FRUSNFA), Volume E-4, Document 299; and National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 13–3 IRAQ, pp. 1–2. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/ho/frus/nixon/e4/index.htm.

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33. Jacob Beam (American Embassy Moscow) to Department of State, “IraqSoviet Communique´ Raises Prospect of Treaty in Near Future,” February 18, 1972, FRUS-NFA, Volume e-4, Document 298; and National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 7 IRAQ, pp. 1–3. 34. Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, et al, “1. Kurdish Views on Increasing Soviet-Iraqi Cooperation, Soviet and Iraqi Pressure for the Formation of a Ba’thCommunist-Kurdish Coalition in Baghdad, and Kurdish Reservations on Negotiations with the Ba’th; 2. Kurdish Speculation on Possible Brezhnev or Kosygin Visit to Baghdad in April 1972,” March 31, 1972, FRUS-NFA, Volume e-4, Document 302; and National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC, Country Files, Iraq, Box 603, Volume I—June ’72–Oct ’73, p. 1. 35. The White House, “Iraq Politics in Perspective,” May 18, 1972, FRUSNFA, Volume e-4, Document 308; and National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 479, Presidential Trip Files, Briefing Background, “Visit of Nixon to Iran, May ’72,” p. 5. 36. FRUS-NFA, Volume e-4, Document 321, pp. 2–3. 37. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “Moscow and the Persian Gulf,” Intelligence Memorandum, May 12, 1972, FRUS-NFA, Volume e-4, Document 307, p. 2. 38. FRUS-NFA, Volume e-4, Document 308, pp. 6–7. 39. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), p. 583. 40. Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Council on Foreign Relations, University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 180. 41. See Jonathan C. Randal, After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 183–202. 42. Shaul Bakhash, “Iran and Iraq, 1930–80,” in Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War, Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, eds. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 20. 43. Nita M. Renfrew, “Who Started the War?” Foreign Policy, No. 66 (Spring, 1987), p. 100. 44. Helms (American Embassy Tehran) to Department of State, “King Hussein’s Intermediary Role,” December 10, 1974, National Archives, Access to Archive Database (AAD), Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973–12/31/1975, documenting the period 7/1/1973–12/31/1975, Record Group 59, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974–12/31/1974, pp. 1–2. 45. Henry Kissinger, p. 592. 46. For a full copy of the Algiers Accord, see http://www.mideastweb.org/ algiersaccord.htm. 47. David Korn, “The Last Years of Mullah Mustafa,” in Middle East Quarterly (June 1994). See http://www.meforum.org/220/the-last-years-of-mustafa-barzani. 48. Phebe Marr, pp. 228–229.

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49. Christopher S. Wren, “Arab League Bars Meetings in Cairo; Aide Says an Egyptian-Israeli Pact Will Prompt Group to Weigh Moving its Headquarters,” New York Times, November 6, 1978, p. A17. 50. United Nations, Security Council, Minutes of the 2203rd Meeting of the United Nations Security Council, March 1, 1980, S/PV.2203. 51. Con Coughlin, p. 195. CHAPTER 2 1. Amitav Acharya, U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 21, 23. 2. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), p. 583. For more information, see Foreign Relations of the United States (herein referred to as FRUS), Nixon-Ford Administration (NFA), Volume E-4 “Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972.” Located on the World Wide Web: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ ho/frus/nixon/e4/index.htm. 3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1983), p. 454. 4. Amitav Acharya, p. 3. 5. President Jimmy Carter, “Toasts of the President and the Shah at a State Dinner,” Tehran, Iran, December 31, 1977, The American Presidency Project. Located on the World Wide Web: www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7080. 6. Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1991), p. 33. 7. William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (New York: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 413–414. 8. Dilip Hiro, pp. 33, 26. 9. Edmund Ghareeb, “The Roots of Crisis, Iraq and Iran,” in Christopher C. Joyner, ed., The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, Contributions in Military Studies, Number 99, 1990), p. 30. 10. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988), pp. 24, 26. 11. Gary Sick, “Moral Choice and the Iran-Iraq Conflict,” Ethics and International Affairs (Vol. 3, 1989), p. 120. 12. Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988 (London: Osprey Publishing, 2002), p. 19; Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, p. 33. 13. National Security Council, “The Huyser Mission in Iran: January 4 to February 4, 1979,” JCPL, Box 34: Donated Historical Material—Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, “Meetings—Vance/Brown/Brzezinski: 3/80-9/80,” Document 5A, p. 1. 14. Shahram Chubin, Security in the Persian Gulf 4: The Role of Outside Powers (Totowa, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Co. Publishers, Inc., 1982), p. 22. 15. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, p. 33.

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16. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, My Turn To Speak (Washington: Brassey’s, 1991), p. 69. 17. Nita M. Renfrew, p. 98. See also Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Council on Foreign Relations, University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 183. 18. Gary Sick, All Fall Down (New York: Random House, 1985), p. 99. 19. Gary Sick, “Moral Choice and the Iran-Iraq Conflict,” Ethics and International Affairs (Vol. 3, 1989), p. 121. See also Kenneth Pollack, p. 183, Nita M. Renfrew, p. 98, and Dilip Hiro, p. 37. 20. Director of Central Intelligence, “Iraq’s Role in the Middle East, Annex D: Military Forces,” National Intelligence Estimate 36.2-1-79, June 21, 1979, MORI DocID: 1115785, NSA, Electronic Briefing Book No. 167 (EEB-167), Saddam’s Iron Grip: Intelligence Reports on Saddam Hussein’s Reign (Washington DC: National Security Archive, 2005), Document 2, pp. D3-D4. Located on the World Wide Web: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NASEBB/NSAEBB167/02.pdf. 21. Ibid., p. D4. 22. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, p. 26. 23. Ibid., p. 34. 24. Dilip Hiro, p. 28. See also Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, p. 25. 25. Con Coughlin, Saddam: His Rise and Fall (Toronto: Harper Perennial, 2002), p. 186. 26. Dilip Hiro, p. 28. 27. Efraim Karsh, Essential Histories: The Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988 (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2002), pp. 12–13. 28. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Little Rock: University of Arkansas Press, 1995), p. 457. See also Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 373. 29. Stephen R. Grummon, The Iran-Iraq War, Islam Embattled (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Praeger Publishers, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982), p. 9. 30. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1983), p. 427. 31. Gary Sick, p. 247. 32. Jimmy Carter, pp. 471–472. 33. Cyrus Vance, p. 391. For a more in-depth investigation see Congressional Research Service, Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982). 34. Gary Sick, p. 246. 35. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Hostage Situation,” January 9, 1980, JCPL, NLC-6-30-6-3-3, p. 2. 36. Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980. As cited in Amitav Acharya, U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 55. 37. Zbigniew Brzezinski, p. 443.

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38. Robert H. Johnson, “The Persian Gulf in U.S. Strategy: A Skeptical View,” International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Summer, 1989), p. 124. 39. Maxwell Orme Johnson, “The Role of U.S. Military Force in the Gulf War,” Ed. Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War, Lesson for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, Contributions in Military Studies, Number 99, 1990), p. 130. 40. Dilip Hiro, p. 35. 41. Efraim Karsh pp. 13–14. See also Edward Willett, War and Conflict in the Middle East: The Iran-Iraq War (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc., 2004), p.17. 42. Edmund Ghareeb, p. 33. See also Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, p. 26–27. 43. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, p. 27. 44. There is dispute over the number of Shi’ites who were expelled from Iraq. Efraim Karsh, p. 13 and Edward Willett, p. 17 put the figure at 100,000 Shi’ites having been expelled from Iraq. However, Nita M. Renfrew, “Who Started the War?” Foreign Policy, (Spring, 1987, No. 66), pg. 101 and Con Coughlin, Saddam: His Rise and Fall, (Toronto, Harper Perennial, 2002), pg. 186 place the figure at 35,000. See also Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, p. 27. 45. Efraim Karsh, p. 13. 46. Con Coughlin, pp. 186–187. 47. Nita M. Renfrew, p. 99. 48. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Iraq Goads Iran,” April 9, 1980, Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), George Washington University, Iraq-Gate Collection, IG00021, pp. 1–2. Herein all references to DNSA files will simply cite the DNSA reference code (i.e. IG00021). See also Phebe Marr, “The Iran-Iraq War: The View from Iraq,” Ed. Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War, Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 61. 49. Jimmy Carter, p. 506. 50. Henry Precht, Iran Working Group, “Cottam/Ghotzbadeh Conversation, 8:00 a.m., May 4, 1980,” May 4, 1980, JCPL, NLC-6-33-2-2-5, p. 1. 51. Nita Renfrew, p. 103. 52. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, p. 13. 53. Ibid., pp. 69–70. 54. Zbigniew Brzezinski, p. 362. 55. Eric Hooglund, “Strategic and Political Objectives in the Gulf War: Iran’s View,” Ed. Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War, Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 40. 56. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, p. 70. 57. Email correspondence with Gary Sick, December 26, 2006. 58. Nita M. Renfrew, g. 98. 59. The Washington Post, “Iranian, Iraqi Forces Clash,” August 28, 1980, p. A41.

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60. The Situation Room to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Evening Notes,” JCPL, NLC1-16-9-15-8, September 16, 1980, p. 1. William Eagleton, Towards an International History of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988. A Critical Oral History Workshop, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Middle East Program, and the National Security Archive, Conference Transcript, July 19, 2004, pp. 10–11. 61. Nita M. Renfrew, p. 103. 62. Richard Schofield, “Position, Function, and Symbol: The Shatt al-Arab Dispute in Perspective,” Ed. Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 54. 63. United Nations, Security Council, “Further Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 (1987),” December 9, 1991, S/23273. 64. David B. Ottaway, “Iraq Cancel’s Border Agreement, Vows to Wrest Land From Iran,” The Washington Post, September 18, 1980, g. A1. 65. Stephen R. Grummon, p. 58. 66. Gary Sick, p. 313. 67. The White House, Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from William Odom, “Alleged Iraqi Declaration of War,” September 22, 1980, JCPL, The Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box 16, Geographic File, “Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf,” Document 15, p. 1. CHAPTER 3 1. Cold War History Project, The 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War: A CWIHP Critical Oral History Conference, July 19, 2004. Located on the World Wide Web: http:// www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=90411&topic _id=1409. 2. For comparisons to Israel’s 1967 attack, see Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Council on Foreign Relations, University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 184; Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988 (London: Osprey Publishing, 2002), p. 22; Edgar O’Ballance, The Gulf War (New York: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988), p. 32; and Dilip Hiro, The Longest War, The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1991), p. 40. 3. Kenneth M. Pollack, p. 185. 4. On the total number of air strikes, see Efraim Karsh, p. 22. For discussions on the quality of the Iraqi attack, see Kenneth M. Pollack, p. 185; and Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, p. 54. 5. Kenneth M. Pollack, p. 185. 6. There is dispute about how many divisions invaded Iraq. Efraim Karsh, p. 22, puts the total number at six, whereas Kenneth M. Pollack, p. 187, contends that the number was nine.

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7. Efraim Karsh, p. 22. See also Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 32–33. 8. Department of State, “SPOT Commentary: Iraq-Iran,” September 23, 1980, JCPL, NLC-6-34-2-7-9, p. 1. 9. Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis (London: Adelphi Papers 220, Spring 1987), p. 21. To distinguish between this book and Karsh’s other work, herein this work will be referred to as Efraim Karsh (Adelphi). 10. The full SCC met on September 23, 24, 28, and 29. In addition, a miniSCC was held on September 27. 11. National Security Council, “Agenda for SCC Meeting on Iran/Iraq” September 23, 1980, JCPL, Collection: Staff Offices Counsel Lloyd Cutler, Box 89, “IranIraq War, 9/80,” p. 1. 12. Jimmy Carter, Remarks in an Interview With Reporters From Newscenter 4, KNBC-TV, September 23, 1980. Located on the World Wide Web: http://www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45118. 13. The Village Voice, CIA: The Pike Report (London: Spokesman Books, 1977), pp. 195–198, 211–217. 14. National Security Council, “Agenda for SCC Meeting on Iran/Iraq” September 23, 1980, JCPL, Collection: Staff Offices Counsel Lloyd Cutler, Box 89, “Iran-Iraq War, 9/80,” p. 1. 15. Stephen R. Grummon, p. 58. 16. Department of State, “Soviet Perspective on the Iran/Iraq War,” September 24, 1980, IG00028, p. 1. 17. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, “Soviet Reactions to Iraq-Iran Hostilities,” September 22, 1980, JCPL, NLC-6-34-2-4-2, pp. 1–2. 18. IG00028, p. 1. 19. Central Intelligence Agency, Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-34/ 36.2-80, “Soviet Interests, Policies, and Prospects With Respect to the Iran-Iraq War,” December 24, 1980, SE00539, p. 6. 20. Zbigniew Brzezinski, p. 453. 21. Central Intelligence Agency, “Impact of Escalation on Area States,” September 22, 1980, JCPL, NLC-6-34-2-5-1, pp. 2–3. 22. Cyrus Vance, p. 391. 23. Department of State, “SPOT Commentary: Iraq-Iran,” September 23, 1980, JCPL, NLC-6-34-2-7-9, p. 2. 24. Central Intelligence Agency, “Impact of Escalation on Area States,” September 22, 1980, JCPL, NLC-6-34-2-5-1, pp. 6, 8. 25. National Security Council, “Agenda for SCC Meeting on Iran/Iraq: September 24, 1980, 9:30 a.m.,” September 23, 1980, JCPL, Collection: Staff Offices Counsel Lloyd Cutler, Box 89, “Iran-Iraq War, 9/80,” p. 1. 26. The Daily Diary of President Jimmy Carter, September 24, 1980, JCPL. Located on the World Wide Web: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/ diary/1980/d092480t.pdf.

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27. Jimmy Carter, “Situation in Iraq and Iraq Remarks Concerning the Conflict,” September 24, 1980. Located on the World Wide Web: http://www.presidency .ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45129. 28. Stephen R. Grummon, pp. 61–62. 29. Stu Eizenstat to the President, “Naval Engine Sales to Iraq,” March 28, 1980, IG00020, p. 1. 30. Don Oberdorfer, “Security Council Appeals for End to Gulf Fighting,” The Washington Post, September 24, 1980, p. A21. 31. Peter Tarnoff to Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Iran-Iraq Conflict” September 26, 1980, JCPL, NLC-6-34-2-30-4, pp. 3–5. 32. David B. Ottaway, “Iranians Stiffen Ground Defenses; Air War Goes On; Iraq Claims Gains in War, Capture of Key Iranian Port; Baghdad Sets Down 4 Peace Conditions,” The Washington Post, September 26, 1980, p. A1. 33. Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Iran-Iraq Conflict” September 26, 1980, JCPL, NLC-6-34-2-30-4, pp. 3–5. 34. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 57. 35. United Nations, Security Council Resolution 479, September 28, 1980. 36. Anthony Clark Arend, “The Role of the United Nations in the Iran-Iraq War,” Christopher C. Joyner, ed. The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 192. 37. Bernard D. Nossiter, “Iraq to Accept U.N. Call if Iran Does,” The New York Times, September 30, 1980, p. A14. 38. Ram Suresh, Reuters News Release, October 1, 1980, JCPL, Box 31, NSA Affairs—Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief, “9/28/80-10/3/80,” p. 1. 39. Efraim Karsh, p. 22. 40. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, p. 54. 41. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 232. 42. Department of State, “SPOT Commentary: Iraq-Iran,” September 23, 1980, JCPL, NLC-6-34-2-7-9, pp. 4–5. 43. Kenneth M. Pollack, pp. 187–189. 44. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Iran/Iraq Conflict: Sitrep Nineteen,” October 11, 1980, IG00031, pg. 2–3. 45. Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 37–38. 46. Stephen R. Grummon, p. 24. 47. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 38. 48. Kenneth M. Pollack, p. 190. 49. Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 41–42. 50. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, “Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (General Declaration),” January 19,1981. Located on the World Wide Web: http://www.iusct.org/general-declaration.pdf. 51. See Gary Sick, October Surprise: America’s Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan (New York: Random House, 1991). Sick argued that William Casey

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and George H. W. Bush—from the Reagan camp—met with Iranian officials and came to an agreement whereby the Iranians would delay the release of the hostages until after the election to ensure Reagan’s victory. CHAPTER 4 1. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: PublicAffairs, 1991, 2000), pp. 61–62, 155. 2. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Current Analysis Series: Politico-Military Analyses, “The Iran-Iraq Conflict: Status and Prospects,” February 13, 1981, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492 “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, pp. 1–4. 3. Efraim Karsh (Adelphi Papers), p. 22. 4. Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 59–63. O’Ballance states that the Iraqis claimed that they had captured or destroyed 214 tanks, while the Iranians only admitted to losing 88. 5. Secretary of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, “Iraq-Iran Conflict: Update and U.S. Views,” State 066174, March 15, 1981, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492 “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, p. 2. 6. Chris Shoemaker to General Robert Schweitzer, “Iran-Iraq Meeting,” February 4, 1981, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492 “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, pp. 1–2. 7. General Robert Schweitzer to Richard V. Allen, “Iran-Iraq Conflict,” February 4, 1981, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492 “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, p. 1. 8. Department of State, Current Analysis Series: Politico-Military Analyses, “The Iran-Iraq Conflict: Status and Prospects,” February 13, 1981, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492 “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, pp. 1–4. 9. Secretary of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, “Iraq-Iran Conflict: Update and U.S. Views,” State 066174, March 15, 1981, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492 “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, pp. 1–6. 10. Efraim Karsh (Adelphi), p. 21. 11. Efraim Karsh, p. 62. 12. Kenneth M. Pollack, p. 195. 13. Secretary of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, “Iraq-Iran Conflict Update,” State 221025, August 20, 1981, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492 “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, p. 3. 14. Secretary of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, “Iraq-Iran Conflict Update,” State 141331, May 30, 1981, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492 “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, pp. 1–4. 15. William Eagleton to Secretary of State, “Prospects for [Deputy Assistant Secretary] Draper’s Visit to Baghdad,” Baghdad, April 4, 1981, IG00045, pp. 1–3. 16. United States Interests Section to Secretary of State, “Meetings in Baghdad with Foreign Minister Hammadi,” BAGHDA 00972, April 12, 1981, IG00047, pp. 1–3.

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17. United States Delegation Secretary Aircraft to United States Interests Section Baghdad, “Secretary’s Message to Iraqi Foreign Minister,” SECTO 02976, April 9, 1981, IG00046, pp. 1–2. 18. United States Interests Section to Secretary of State, “Meetings in Baghdad with Foreign Minister Hammadi,” BAGHDA 00972, April 12, 1981, IG00047, pp. 3, 5–7. 19. William L. Eagleton to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, “Meeting with Tariq Aziz,” Baghdad 1446, May 28, 1981, NSA, EBB-82, Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 2003), Document 10, pp. 1–6. 20. NSA, EBB-82, Document 10, p. 6. 21. Secretary of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, “Iraq-Iran Conflict: Update and U.S. Views,” State 066174, March 15, 1981, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492, “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, pp. 2–3. 22. American Embassy Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, “Israeli Media Says Egypt Sending Arms to Iraq,” TEL AV 03933, March 11, 1981, IG00039, pp. 1–2. 23. American Embassy Cairo to Secretary of State, “Sadat Confirms Egyptian Arms Supply to Iraq,” CAIRO 07515, March 31, 1981, IG00043, pp. 1–2. 24. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, p. 145. 25. Secretary of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, “Iraq-Iran Conflict Update,” State Ref: State 141331, May 30, 1981, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492, “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, p. 3. 26. Department of State, “China—Iran/Iraq Conflict” June 1980, CH00550, p. 1. 27. Oliver L. North with William Novak, Under Fire: An American Story (New York: Harper-Collins Publishers, 1991), p. 25. 28. New York Times, “Israel Is Said to Supply U.S. Arms to Iranians,” July 26, 1981, p. 14. 29. Bernard Reich, “Israel and the Iran-Iraq War,” The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy, Christopher C. Joyner, ed. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 79. 30. Arthur A. Hartman to Secretary of State, “French Research Reactor (OSIRAK) Sale to Iraq,” Paris 11683, April 11, 1979, IG00016, pp. 1–3. 31. Undated note, RRPL, Executive Secretariat NSC: Country File, Box 37, “Iraq (Israel Strike on Iraq Nuclear Facility 6/8/81),” Folder 3, p. 1. 32. Arthur A. Hartman to Secretary of State, “French Research Reactor (OSIRAK) Sale to Iraq,” Paris 11683, April 11, 1979, IG00016, p. 1. 33. Press Reports, Reuter, June 9, 1981, RRPL, Executive Secretariat NSC: Country File, Box 37, “Iraq (Israel Strike on Iraq Nuclear Facility 6/8/81),” Folder 6, p. 1. 34. Embassy of Israel, “A Special Statement by the Government of Israel,” June 8, 1981, RRPL, Executive Secretariat NSC: Country File, Box 37 “Iraq (Israel Strike on Iraq Nuclear Facility 6/8/81),” Folder 6, pp. 1–2. 35. Walter J. Stoessel, “Statement by Walter J. Stoessel before the House of Representatives, Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and International

250

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and Scientific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,” June 17, 1981, RRPL, Executive Secretariat NSC: Country File, Box 37, “Iraq (Israel Strike on Iraq Nuclear Facility 6/8/81),” Folder 3, pp. 1–2. 36. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1987), p. 139. Telephone interview with Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, November 4, 2009. 37. Efraim Karsh (Adelphi Papers), p. 22. 38. Kenneth M. Pollack, p. 195. 39. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 68. 40. Secretary of State to American Interests Section Baghdad, “De-Designation of Iraq as Supporter of International Terrorism,” State 053009, February 27, 1982, NSA, EBB-82, Document 13, p 2. 41. Nancy Bearg Dyke to the Vice President, “Countries Supporting International Terrorism,” March 25, 1982, TE00689, p. 1. 42. Cited in Joost Hiltermann, p. 43. Wafiq al-Sammara’I, Hotam al-Bawaba al-Sharqirya (The Destroyer of the Eastern Gate) (London: publisher and year not listed), pp. 82–83. 43. Kenneth M. Pollack, pp. 196–198. 44. Dan Oberdorfer, “Israel Told U.S. of Arms Sale to Iran, Defense Minister Says,” Washington Post, May 28, 1982, p. A1. For a better understanding of Israeli Policy towards the Iran-Iraq War see Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007). CHAPTER 5 1. Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 95–96. 2. Because of the direct linkage between the Gulf States and the GCC, both terms will be used interchangeably throughout this book. 3. Gerd Nonneman, Iraq, The Gulf States & The War: A Changing Relationship 1980–1986 and Beyond (London: Ithaca Press, 1986), p. 31. 4. Ibid., pp. 95–97. 5. Ibid., p. 39. 6. Shahram Chubin, Security in the Persian Gulf 4: The Role of Outside Powers (Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun & Co. Publishers, Inc., 1982), p.52. 7. Michael Getler, “U.S. Sends Four Radar Planes to Aid Saudis in Air Defense,” Washington Post, October 1, 1980, p. A14. 8. Lou Cannon, p. 342. 9. Gerd Nonneman, pp. 48–49. 10. New York Times, “Around the World; Bahrain, Charging Plot, Calls Iran Envoy Home,” December 19, 1981, p. A5. 11. David B. Ottaway, “Arab Gulf States Take Neutral Stance on Iran-Iraq War,” The Washington Post, May 31, 1982, pg. A18. See also Gerd Nonneman, pg. 48. 12. Stephen R. Grummon, pp. 74–75.

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13. Central Intelligence Agency, “Possible Outcomes and Implications of the Iran-Iraq War,” May 12, 1982, CIA-FOIA, pp. 1–2. 14. Central Intelligence Agency, “Possible Outcomes and Implications of the Iran-Iraq War,” May 12, 1982, CIA-FOIA, pp. 2–3. 15. Central Intelligence Agency, “Possible Outcomes and Implications of the Iran-Iraq War,” May 17, 1982, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492, “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, p. 3. 16. At this point, it was hard to say how Syria would react to an Iranian invasion. According to a cable from the American Embassy in Damascus citing close contacts with high-level Syrian officials, “Should Iran’s intention be to install an Islamic regime, however, the Syrian reaction would be sharp. Assad would be willing to commit Syrian troops to fight Iran in Iraq to prevent this from taking place.” American Embassy Damascus to Secretary of State, “Syrian Perceptions of Iranian Invasion of Iraq,” Damascus 05049, July 15, 1982, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492, “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, p. 2. 17. Central Intelligence Agency, “Possible Outcomes and Implications of the Iran-Iraq War,” May 17, 1982, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492, “Iran/Iraq, Jan–Jun 1982,” Folder 2, p. 4. 18. Central Intelligence Agency, Special National Intelligence Estimate 34/36.2-82, “Implications of Iran’s Victory Over Iraq,” June 8, 1982, NSA, EEB-167, Document 3, pp. vii and 1–5. For a more detailed analysis on the problems facing Saddam Hussein’s regime, see Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq: Succession Politics,” June 1, 1982, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492, Folder “Iraq 1982,” pp. iii–iv and 1–10; State Department, “Saddam Hussein and the Question of Succession,” December 17, 1982, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492, Folder “Iraq 1982,” pp. 1–6. 19. NSA, EEB-167, Document 3, pp. 1–5. 20. NSA, EBB-167, Document 3, pp. 8–15. 21. Affidavit, Howard Teicher, located in National Security Archive, The Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988, (Washington DC: Cold War International History Project, 2004), pp. 1014–1015. Located on the World Wide Web: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/The Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran-Iraq war, 1980–1988.pdf. Teicher does not indicate the number of the NSDD, only that it and its identifying number are classified. Interestingly, the Federation of American Scientists website (fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html) offers a complete list of the NSDDs from Reagan’s presidency. It does not, however, identify a NSDD in June that relates to Iraq, which calls for efforts to declassify this directive. 22. Henry Tanner, “Iraqi Air Raid Kills 40 in Provincial Capital, Iran says,” New York Times, June 6, 1982, p. A3. 23. Globe and Mail, “Iraqi plane sends ‘warning’ over Tehran and holy city,” June 3, 1982, Globe and Mail. See also Washington Post, “Iraqis Fly Over Tehran,” June 3, 1982, p. A27. 24. Henry Tanner, “Iraqi Air Raid Kills 40 in Provincial Capital, Iran says,” New York Times, June 6, 1982, p. A3.

252

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25. Washington Post, “Mediators Fly to Iraq, Iran,” June 7, 1982, p. A23. 26. Globe and Mail, “Arab States Call for Unity Against Israel,” June 9, 1982. 27. New York Times, “Iraq Vows to Quit Iran, Fight Israel,” June 10, 1982, p. A1. 28. Globe and Mail, “Iran Ignoring Ceasefire Proclaimed by Iraqis,” June 12, 1982. See also New York Times, “Iraqis Say Iranians Are Still Attacking,” June 12, 1982, p. A2. 29. Globe and Mail, “Iraqi forces start pullout from Iran in wake of losses,” June 21, 1982. See also The New York Times, “Iraq Withdrawing in War with Iran,” June 21, 1982, p. A12 and Washington Post, “Iraq Pulling All Troops Out of Iran to Make Stand on Border,” June 21, 1982, p. A17. 30. New York Times, “Iraq Reports Last of Its Troops Have Left Iran,” June 30, 1982, p. A15. 31. New York Times, “Iranian Army Poised for Invasion of Iraq, U.S. Officials Assert,” July 12, 1982, p. A1. 32. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 93. 33. Joost R. Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 24–25. 34. NSA, EEB-167, Document 3, p. 5. 35. Michael Getler, “Iran Troops Gathering Near Iraq; Invasion Feared; U.S., Gulf Nations in ‘Great Alarm,’ ” Washington Post, July 13, 1982, p. A1. 36. United Nations, Security Council Resolution 514, July 12, 1984. 37. Michael Getler, p. A1. 38. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 94. 39. Philip Taubman, “Iranian Invaders Said to Penetrate 10 Miles into Iraq,” New York Times, July 14, 1982, p. A1. 40. Philip Taubman, “Iranian Invasion of Southern Iraq Appears to Stall,” New York Times, July 16, 1982, p. A1. 41. Department of Defense, “The Iran-Iraq War: A Reference Aid,” DDB-26005954-88, 1988, RRPL, William J. Burns, Box 91852 “Gulf War,” Folder 2. See also Central Intelligence Agency, Special National Intelligence Estimate 36.2-83, “Prospects for Iraq,” MORI DocID: 1115990, July 19, 1983, NSA, EBB-167, Document 4, Footnote, p. 9. 42. Philip Taubman, “Iranian Invaders Said to Penetrate 10 Miles into Iraq,” New York Times, July 14, 1982, p. A1. 43. Chairman Henry S. Rowen to Geoffrey Kemp, “The Iranian Threat to American Interests in the Persian Gulf,” July 20, 1982, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492, “Iran/Iraq, July 1982,” pp. 3–4. 44. The SIG, the Reagan administration’s equivalent to President Carter’s Special Coordinating Committees (SCC) consisted of the senior foreign policy advisors to the president from State, Defense, and the CIA. 45. National Security Council, “Discussion Paper for SIG on Policy Options for Dealing with Iran-Iraq War,” no date, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492, “Iran/Iraq, July 1982,” pp. 1–2. There is no date on the document. However, we

NOTES

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can extrapolate an approximate date from the following statement: “Iraq having stopped the Iranian invasion thus far.” By July 15, Iraq had stopped initial Iranian advance and, presumably, this was around when the Senior Interagency Group met. 46. National Security Council, “Discussion Paper for SIG on Policy Options for Dealing with Iran-Iraq War,” no date, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492, “Iran/Iraq, July 1982,” pp. 3–7. 47. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 107. 48. Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 94–98. 49. New York Times, “Around the World; Iraq Says It Has Slain 27,000 Iranians in Battles,” August 1, 1982, p. 5. 50. Robert J. McCartney, “Iraq Showing New Resolve in Latest Battles With Iran,” Washington Post, August 8, 1982, p. A1. 51. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 97. 52. Kenneth M. Pollack, pp. 203–205; Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 93–97 and 107. 53. George C. Wilson, “U.S. Plans Maneuvers With Oman; Iran Threat Cited in Persian Gulf Troop Exercises,” Washington Post, August 25, 1982, p. A1. 54. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1987), p. 487. 55. New York Times, “Iranians Mount Major Offensive on Iraqi Border,” October 2, 1982, p. 1. 56. Richard M. Weinraub, “Iran Claims Strategic Victory Along Road to Iraqi Capital,” Washington Post, October 2, 1982, p. A1. 57. United States Delegation in New York to Secretary of State, “Secretary’s Meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi, October 5, 1982-Memcon,” Secto 13070, October 7, 1982, RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, Box 90492, Folder “Iraq1982,” pp. 1–9. 58. New York Times, “2,500 US Soldiers Reported Holding Maneuvers in Oman,” December 6, 1982, p. A8. 59. Steve Mufson, “untitled,” Wall Street Journal, December 15, 1982, p. A5. 60. United Press International, “Firm announces $25 million copter sale to Iraq,” December 15, 1982. 61. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Charles H. Percy, Alan J. Dixon, Rudy Boschwitz, Larry Pressler to the President, December 23, 1982, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Office of the NSC: Records Country File, Box 37 “Iraq 1/20/81-12/31/83,” Folder 4, pp. 1–2. CHAPTER 6 1. Drew Middleton, “Iran After Khomeini: Some See a Crisis; Military Analysis,” New York Times, December 20, 1982, p. A11. 2. Maxwell Orme Johnson, p. 130. 3. A.D. Horne, “US Officials Say Casualties Are High; Iran Presses Attack on Iraq; Neither Seen Winning Battle,” Washington Post, February 10, 1983, p. A30.

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4. Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 114–116. 5. A.D. Horne, p. A30. 6. Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 116–118. 7. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Appraisal, “Iran-Iraq: Spring Offensive,” May 3, 1983, RRPL, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC, Box 90583, “Iraq 1983,” Folder 2, p. 1. 8. American Interests Section Baghdad to Secretary of State, “Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister,” Baghdad 00120, January 16, 1983, IG00095, pp. 1–2. 9. Herbert H. Denton, “Iraq Says It Will Escalate Attacks On Petroleum Centers Inside Iran,” Washington Post, July 21, 1983, p. A25. Abu Nidal was the leader of an extremist, breakaway faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization dedicated to the eradication of Israel. Abu Nidal has claimed the shooting of the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom in London in 1982 and the assassination of PLO peace activist, Issam Sartawi. 10. American Interests Section Baghdad to Secretary of State, “Continued Iraqi Support for Terrorism,” Baghdad 00629, March 8, 1983, RRPL, Executive Secretariat, Office of the NSC, Box 90583, “Iraq 1983,” Folder 2, p. 1. 11. Secretary of State to American Embassy Amman, “Briefing most Governments on Secretary’s meeting with Iraqi Minister of State Hammadi,” State 043368, February 16, 1982, IG00109, p. 1. 12. John M. Goshko and Ward Sinclair, “U.S. Offering Iraq Credits On Food Commodity Sales,” Washington Post, February 16, 1982, p. A14. 13. NSA, EEB-167, Document 4, p. 11. 14. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, p. 110. 15. David B. Ottaway, “Iraqis Seek Help to Meet Rising Costs of War,” Washington Post, March 16, 1982, p. A19. 16. NSA, EBB 167, Document 4, p. 11. 17. David B. Ottaway, p. A19. 18. NSA, EBB 167, Document 4, p. 11. 19. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 118. 20. New York Times, “Iran and Iraq Report More Battles,” p. A4. 21. Edgar O’Ballance, pg. 118. See also Ibid., April 12, 1983, p. A4. 22. Paul Hodge, “Three Area Men Among Dead in Embassy Bombing in Beirut,” Washington Post, April 20, 1983, p. A22. See Bob Woodward, pp. 230–231 for CIA perceptions of the bombing. See also Lou Cannon, p. 358 on the number of CIA dead. 23. American Interest Section Baghdad to Secretary of State, “Meeting with [excised],” State Ref: Baghdad 01204, May 4, 1983, RRPL, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC, Box 90583, “Iraq 1983,” Folder 2, p. 1–4. Interestingly, in the subject section of the first page of the cable, the name Barzan Ibrahim il-Tikriti was excised, but later in the document his name appears unexcised. 24. David B. Ottaway, “Iran Accepts Gulf State Mediation in War with Iraq,” Washington Post, May 21, 1982, p. A1.

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25. United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary General, “Mission to Inspect Civilian Areas in Iran and Iraq Which have been Subject to Military Attack,” June 20, 1983, S/15834, pp. 1–27. 26. Michael Dobbs, “Iraq Asks France to Trade Arms for Oil,” Washington Post, May 13, 1982, p. A15. 27. Bernard Gwertzman, “French Agree to Lend Iraq Planes to Use in Firing its Exocet Missiles,” New York Times, June 28, 1983, p. A1. 28. NSA, EBB 167, Document 4, p. 10. 29. Herbert H. Denton, “Iraq Says It Will Escalate Attacks On Petroleum Centers Inside Iran,” The Washington Post, July 21, 1983, pg. A25. 30. NSA, EBB 167, Document 4, p. 7. 31. Ibid., pp. 9–10. 32. NSA, EBB 167, Document 4, p. 9. 33. Herbert H. Denton, “Iran Opens New Drive into Iraq,” Washington Post, July 24, 1983, p. A1. For more details on the conflict between Barzani’s KDP and Ghassemlou’s KDP-I, see Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 132–138. 34. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 138. 35. New York Times, “Iranian Troops Take Reporters Into Iraq,” July 27, 1983, p. A3. 36. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 119. 37. Joost Hiltermann, p. 31. 38. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 127. 39. Secretary of State to American Embassy Abu Dhabi, et al, “Iran-Iraq War: Next Steps with Gulf States on Deterring Escalation in the Gulf,” State 252861, September 3, 1983, RRPL, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC, Box 90583, “Iran-Iraq 1983,” Folder 1, pp. 1–6. 40. Secretary of State to Donald Rumsfeld, “Clarifying US and Iraqi Interests in the Gulf,” State 353821, December 14, 1983, Intelwire, p. 4. Located on the World Wide Web: intelfiles.egoplex.com/1983-12-14-secret-clarifying-us-interests.pdf. 41. Department of State, “Iraq-US: Bilateral Chill Over Super E´tendard Delay,” October 6, 1983, RRPL, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC, Box 90583, “Iraq 1983,” Folder 1, pp. 1–2. 42. Department of State, Nicolas A. Veliotes, Jonathan Howe, “Iran-Iraq War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality,” October 7, 1983, IG00139, pp. 1–2. 43. Ibid., pp. 2–3. 44. IG00139, pp. 4–5. 45. Ibid., pp. 5–7. 46. IG00139, pp. 7–8. 47. Washington Post, “French Jets Reported en Route,” October 8, 1983, p. A14. 48. Michael Dobbs, “New French Planes Still Undelivered, Iraqi President Complains,” Washington Post, October 14, 1983, p. A21.

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49. Michael Dobbs, “Super Etendards Received, Iraqi Minister Reports,” Washington Post, November 3, 1983, p. A24. 50. United States Congress, Daniel K. Inouye, Lee H. Hamilton, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair With Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views, H.R. No. 433, S.R. 216, 100th Congress, 1st Session, November 13, 1987 (herein referred to as Iran-Contra Report), p. 160. CHAPTER 7 1. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925. Located on the World Wide Web: www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/keytext/genprot.htm. 2. Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, “Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons,” November 21, 1983, IG00147, p. 7. 3. Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DIC on Iraq’s WMD, Volume III, September 30, 2004, pp. 5–8. 4. Jonathan T. Howe, IG00147, p. 6. 5. Joost Hilterman, p. 30. 6. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “IRNA reports Iraqi regime using Chemical Weapons to Stop Val-Fajr IV,” October 22, 1983, IG00144, p. 1. 7. Joost Hiltermann, pp. 30–31. 8. Wayne White, email correspondence, November 28, 2009. 9. Drew Middleton, “Iranian Attack of Iraq: Strategy of Attrition,” New York Times, October 23, 1983, p. A4. 10. Washington Post, “Iraq Acknowledges Attacks with Missiles,” October 24, 1983, p. A8. 11. Central Intelligence Agency, “National Intelligence Daily,” October 24, 1983, CIA-FOIA, p. 2. 12. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 140. 13. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “IRNA reports Iraqi regime using Chemical Weapons to Stop Val-Fajr IV,” October 22, 1983, IG00144, p. 1. 14. Globe and Mail, “Iraq Vows Quick Defeat of Iran,” October 25, 1983. 15. Central Intelligence Agency, “National Intelligence Daily,” October 26, 1983, CIA-FOIA, p. 2. 16. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 140. 17. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iran’s Likely Reaction to Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons,” November 7, 1983, CIA-FOIA, pg. 2. 18. Jonathan T. Howe to the Secretary of State, “Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons,” November 1, 1983, IG00145, p. 1. Emphasis mine. 19. United Nations, Security Council Resolution 540, October 31, 1983. 20. Joost Hiltermann, p. 58. 21. Jonathan T. Howe, IG00147, pp. 1–2. 22. Ibid., pp. 1–2.

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23. Joost Hiltermann, p. 48. 24. Department of State, “Terms of Reference, Political Consultations with US Allies and Friends on Escalation of the Iran-Iraq War,” no date, RRPL, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC, Box 90583, “Iran-Iraq 1983,” Folder 1, pp. 1–9. Although the document is undated, the Veliotes-Howe analysis clearly refers to this group when it states on page 9, “This paper only reviews the issue of tilting toward Iraq. An inter-agency group is currently reviewing U.S. response options should Iran threaten an attempt to close the Gulf and near-term measures which might be taken to deter such events.” That being the case, one can extrapolate that this document was generated sometime shortly after October 7, 1983. 25. Department of Defense, “Terms of Reference for the US Representative to Combined Military Discussions on Containment of an Escalation of the Iran-Iraq Conflict,” no date, RRPL, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC, Box 90583, “Iran-Iraq 1983,” Folder 1, pp. 1–12. 26. The White House, National Security Decision Directive 114, “U.S. Policy Towards the Iran-Iraq War,” November 26, 1983, RRPL, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC, Box 90583, “Iran-Iraq 1983,” Folder 1, p. 1. 27. Secretary of State to American Interests Section Baghdad, “Clarifying US and Iraqi Interests in the Gulf,” State 343831, December 14, 1983, Intelwire, p. 2. Located on the World Wide Web: intelfiles.egoplex.com/1983-12-14-secret -clarifying-us-interests.pdf. 28. American Interests Section Baghdad to American Embassy London, “Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq,” Baghdad 03065, December 7, 1983, IG00149, p. 1. 29. American Interests Section Baghdad to American Embassy London, “Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq,” Baghdad 03079, December 8, 1983, IG00151, pp. 1–2. 30. American Interests Section Baghdad to American Embassy Amman, “Talking Points for Amb. Rumsfeld’s Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein,” Baghdad 03101, December 14, 1983, IG00153, pp. 1–8. 31. Secretary of State to American Interests Section Baghdad, “Clarifying US and Iraqi Interests in the Gulf,” State 343831, December 14, 1983, Intelwire, p. 4. Located on the World Wide Web: intelfiles.egoplex.com/1983-12-14-secret-clarifying-us -interests.pdf. 32. Secretary of State to American Embassy Seoul, et al, “Staunching Iran’s Imports of Western Arms and Urging Restraint on Iraq,” State 353843, December 14, 1983, IG00152, p. 5. 33. New York Times, “7 Dead in Kuwait As 6 Blasts Rock Sites Across City,” December 13, 1983, p. A1. 34. Philip Taubman, “U.S. Seems to be Target of New Strain of Terror,” New York Times, December 13, 1983, p. A18. 35. IG00152, pp. 1–5. 36. American Embassy London to Secretary of State, “Rumsfeld one-on-one meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz,” London 27592, December 21, 1983, IG00157, pp. 1–14.

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37. American Embassy Rome to Secretary of State, “Rumsfeld’s Larger Meeting With Iraqi Deputy PM and FM Tariq Aziz, December 19,” Rome 30305, IG00154, pp. 1–8. 38. American Embassy London to Secretary of State, “Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein,” London 27572, December 21, 1983, IG00156, pp. 1–5. 39. United States Embassy London to Secretary of State, “Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein,” London 27572, December 21, 1983, IG00156, pp. 11–18. 40. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 235. 41. Richard W. Murphy to Lawrence Eagleburger, “EXIM Bank Financing for Iraq,” December 22, 1983, IG00159, p. 1. 42. Export-Import Bank of the United States, Memorandum to the Board of Directors, Africa and Middle East Division, “Country review and recommendations for Eximbank’s programs,” February 21, 1984, IG00174, p. 4. 43. William Eagleton to Secretary of State, “Follow-up on Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad,” Baghdad 03163, December 26, 1983, IG00160, pp. 1–6. 44. American Embassy Jidda to Secretary of State, “Saudi Official Commends U.S./Iraqi Contacts,” Jidda 10963, December 27, 1983, IG00161, pp. 1–2. 45. William Eagleton to Secretary of State, “Meeting With Tariq Aziz: Expanding Iraq’s Oil Export Facilities,” Baghdad 00009, January 3, 1984, IG00162, pp. 1–3. 46. Lou Cannon, p. 531. 47. Secretary of State to American Consulate Jerusalem, “Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran,” State 012251, January 14, 1984, IG00160, pp. 2–3. 48. Secretary of State to American Embassy Brasilia, “Staunching the Flow of Arms to Iran Military Addee Handle as Specat Exclusive,” State 018764, IG00165, pp. 1–3. 49. David T. Schneider and Jonathan T. Howe to the Secretary of State, “Easing Restrictions on Exports to Iraq,” January 30, 1984, IG00168, pp. 1–6. CHAPTER 8 1. Martin Merzer, “Renewed Iran-Iraq War Spawns New Alliances in Uneasy Mideast,” Miami Herald, February 24, 1984, p. A1. 2. Central Intelligence Agency, “National Intelligence Daily,” March 6, 1984, CIA-FOIA, p. 5. 3. Drew Middleton, “Iran-Iraq Conflict is Seen at New Critical Juncture,” The New York Times, February 18, 1984, p. A4. 4. New York Times, “Around the World; Heavy Fighting Erupts in Persian Gulf War,” February 20, 1984, p. A5. 5. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 143. 6. Globe and Mail, “Heavy Gulf Fighting Reported; Air Raid Kills 16 Iraqi Civilians,” February 18, 1984.

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7. American Interest Section Baghdad to Secretary of State, “Iraqi Warning Re: Iranian Offensive,” Baghdad 0382, February 22, 1984, IG00175, p. 1. 8. Miami Herald, “At the Front: Death Marks Iraqi Hamlet,” March 1, 1984, p. A18. 9. Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 144–145. 10. Ibid., pp. 145–146. 11. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 146. 12. Ronald Reagan, “The President’s News Conference,” February 22, 1984. Located on the World Wide Web: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/ 1984/22284c.htm 13. James McCartney, “U.S. Troops May Fight for Strait; Gulf War Threatens Link to Oil,” Miami Herald, February 24, 1984, p. A1. 14. Drew Middleton, “Israelis Worry About an Iran Victory,” New York Times, February 24, 1984, p. A8. 15. Jim Hampton, “Strait Talk is Getting Scarier,” Miami Herald, February 26, 1984, p. E2. 16. Central Intelligence Agency, “National Intelligence Daily,” March 2, 1984, CIA–FOIA, pp. 4–5. 17. New York Times, “U.S. Confirms Naval Incidents in Strait of Hormuz,” February 29, 1984, p. A7. 18. Henry Kamm, “New Gulf War Issue: Chemical Arms,” New York Times, March 5, 1984, p. A3. 19. Secretary of State to United States Mission Geneva, “UN Human Rights Commission: Item 12: Iranian Resolution on Use of Chemical Weapons by Iraq,” March 14, 1984, IG00181, pp. 2–3. 20. Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Says Iraqis Used Poison Gas Against Iranians in Latest Battles,” New York Times, March 6, 1984, p. A1. 21. Michael Getler, “U.S. Accuses Iraq of Employing Chemical Weapons Against Iran; Mustard Gas Use Condemned,” Washington Post, March 6, 1984, p. A1. 22. American Interest Section to Secretary of State, “Iraq Reacts Angrily to US Condemnation of CW Use,” Baghdad 0521, March 7, 1984, IG00179, p. 1. 23. George P. Shultz, p. 239. 24. Michael Getler, “U.S. Accuses Iraq of Employing Chemical Weapons Against Iran; Mustard Gas Use Condemned,” Washington Post, March 6, 1984, p. A1. 25. New York Times, “Iran Accuses Iraq of Chemical War,” March 10, 1984, p. A4. See also R. P. H. King, The United Nations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1986 (New York: Ford Foundation, August 1987), p. 19. 26. Miami Herald, “Iraq Launches Drive on Captured Island,” March 7, 1984, p. A10. 27. New York Times, “Iran Accuses Iraq of Chemical War,” March 10, 1984, p. A4. 28. William Drozdiak, “Iraq Says Its Army Repulsed New Attacks by Iran,” Washington Post, March 13, 1984, p. A9.

260

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29. William Drozdiak, “Heavy Losses Feared; Iraqis Failing to Retake Majnun Island Oil Fields,” Washington Post, March 10, 1984, p. A1. 30. William Drozdiak, “Iraq Claims Its Troops Return to Oil Island,” Washington Post, March 16, 1984, p. A17. 31. United States Embassy Vienna to Secretary of State, “Iranian War Wounded in Vienna,” Vienna 03407, March 14, 1984, IG00180, p 1. 32. Secretary of State to United Nations Delegation New York, “U.N. Human Rights Commission: Item 12: Iranian Resolution on Use of Chemical Weapons by Iraq,” State 074411, March 14, 1984, IG00181, p. 2. 33. R. P. H. King, pp. 20–21. 34. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iran-Iraq War: US Responses to Escalation Scenarios and Threats to Persian Gulf States,” March 20, 1984, IG00184, pp. 1–10. 35. Ibid., pp. 10–14. 36. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iran-Iraq: Consequences of an Iranian Breakthrough at Al Basrah,” March 23, 1984, CIA-FOIA, pp. 1–3. 37. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq: use of Nerve Agent,” March 23, 1984, CIA-FOIA, pp. 1–3. 38. United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Specialists Appointed by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the use of Chemical Weapons,” March 26, 1984, S/16433, pp. 1–12. 39. United States Mission to the United Nations to Secretary of State, “UN Report on Chemical Weapons Use in Iran/Iraq War: Consideration in Security Council,” USUN 00626, March 28, 1984, IG00190, pp. 1–4. 40. Ibid., pp. 1–4. 41. Secretary of State to American Embassy Amman, “Chemical Weapons: Meeting with Iraqi Charge,” State 094420, April 6, 1984, IG00197, pp. 1–5. 42. United Nations, Security Council, “Note By the President of the Security Council,” March 30, 1984, S/16454, pp. 1–2. 43. George P. Shultz, p. 239. 44. Secretary of State to American Embassy Beirut, et al., “Department Press Briefing March 30, 1984,” State Ref: State 093714, March 31, 1984, IG00192, pp. 1–3. 45. Ronald Reagan, National Security Decision Directive 139, “Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War,” April 5, 1984, PR01528, pg. 1–3. A less redacted version of this document is located on the World Wide Web: fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-139.pdf. 46. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iran-Iraq Military Situation Report 32,” April 16, 1984, CIA-FOIA, p. 4. 47. Central Intelligence Agency, “Tehran’s Stalled Offensive,” May 2, 1984, CIA-FOIA, pp. 13–14. 48. Jonathan C. Randal, “Saudi Supertanker Is Attacked in Gulf; Iranians Are Accused,” Washington Post, May 17, 1984, p. A1. 49. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984– 1987 (London: The Royal United Services Institute, 1987), p. 66.

NOTES

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50. Ronald Reagan, National Security Decision Directive 141, “Responding to Escalation in the Iran-Iraq War,” May 25, 1984, pp. 1–2. Located on the World Wide Web: fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-141.pdf. 51. Judith Miller, “Clash is Seen as Widening the Gulf War,” New York Times, June 6, 1984, p. A3. 52. David B. Ottaway, “Iran, Iraq Halt Attacks on Cities But Say War Goes On,” Washington Post, p. A27. 53. David B. Ottaway, “Iran Proposes Wider U.N. Pact to Cover Ships,” Washington Post, p. A1. 54. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Defensive Estimate Brief: Prospects for Iraq,” September 25, 1984, IG00221, pp 1–5. 55. Guardian, “Iraqis retain foothold in Iran/Iranian offensive in Meimak Heights,” October 24, 1984. 56. Herbert H. Denton, “Experts See Assault as Limited, Not Kickoff of Final Offensive,” Washington Post, October 19, 1984, p. A27. 57. Washington Post, “Iran, Iraq Claim Gains in Fighting,” October 20, 1984, p. A14. 58. Guardian, “Iraqis retain foothold in Iran/Iranian offensive in Meimak Heights,” October 24, 1984. 59. Washington Post, “Iran, Iraq Claim Gains in Fighting,” October 20, 1984, p. A14. 60. Don Oberdorfer, “Iraq Reported Set to Renew Diplomatic Ties With U.S.; Restoration Put Off Until After Election,” Washington Post, October 26, 1984, p. A1. 61. Bernard Gwertzman, “Iraqi Leader Says He is Ready to Renew U.S. Ties,” New York Times, October 13, 1984, p. A5. 62. Secretary of State to American Embassy Baghdad, “Memcon: Secretary’s Meeting with Iraqi [Deputy Prime Minister] Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984, 10:10 a.m.,” November 29, 1984, IG00228, pp. 1–5. 63. White House, “White House Diary, November 26, 1984,” located at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 64. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq: Relations with the United States,” June 22, 1984, CIA-FOIA, p. 2. CHAPTER 9 1. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1987), p. 395. 2. United States Congress, Daniel K. Inouye, Lee H. Hamilton, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair With Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views, H.R. No. 433, S.R. 216, 100th Congress, 1st Session, November 13, 1987, p. 160. (Herein referred to as Iran-Contra Report.) 3. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq-Iran: Stepping Up the Pressure in the Gulf,” January 10, 1985, CIA-FOIA, pp. 1–6.

262

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4. American Embassy Baghdad to Secretary of State, “Iraq Requests Additional Commodities and Credits under PAC Program,” Baghdad 00183, January 22, 1985, IG00239, p. 1. 5. [Redacted] to Under Secretary Beryl Sprinkel, “[Credit Commodity Corporation (CCC)] for Egypt and Iraq,” January 15, 1985, IG00235, p. 2. 6. American Embassy Baghdad to Secretary of State, “US Bankers Call on the Embassy: Concerned About Debt Repayments,” Baghdad 00182, January 21, 1985, IG00238, pp. 1–2. 7. [Redacted] to Under Secretary Beryl Sprinkel, “CCC Guarantees for Iraq,” February 7, 1985, IG00242, p. 1. 8. Elaine Sciolino, “The Big Brother: Iraq Under Saddam Hussein,” New York Times Magazine, February 3, 1985. 9. American Embassy Baghdad to Secretary of State, “US Civilian Helicopter Sale to Iraq Concluded,” Baghdad 00157, January 17, 1985, IG00237, pp. 1–2. 10. Secretary of State to American Embassy Baghdad, “UK Inquiry on US Helicopter Sales to Iraq,” State 061831, March 1, 1985, IG00244, pp. 3–4. 11. Robert Frisk, “Saddam seeks more arms from Russia as Iran launches new offensive/ Continuing Gulf War,” The Times (London), July 25, 1985. Emphasis mine. 12. Herbert H. Denton, “Iraq’s Apparent Goading of Iran Nearly Backfired; Baghdad uses Air Superiority,” Washington Post, March 25, 1985, p. A1. 13. Courier-Mail, “Iraqis Kill 277 in City Bombing Raids,” March 12, 1985. 14. New York Times, “Iran Reports it Bomb Baghdad,” March 11, 1985, p. A3. 15. Courier-Mail, “Iraqis Kill 277 in City Bombing Raids,” March 12, 1985. 16. Secretary of State to American Embassy Baghdad, “Murphy-Aziz Discussions: US-USSR Talks; Arms Sales to Iran; Iraqi-Korean relations,” State 072621, March 9, 1985, IG00247, p. 1. 17. Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 162–163. 18. New York Times, “Iran Says Iraq Used Poison Gas Again,” March 14, 1985, p. A3. See also Herbert H. Denton, “Iranian Offensive Pushes into Iraq; Tehran, Baghdad Hit,” Washington Post, March 14, 1985, p. A21. 19. Jonathan C. Randal, “Hussein, Mubarak Make Surprise Trip to Baghdad; Iraq Appears to Be Halting Iran’s Offensive,” Washington Post, March 19, 1985, p. A1. 20. Globe and Mail, “Iraqis Defend vital Highway; Airlines Warned to Avoid Iran,” March 18, 1985, claims that 15,000 were killed; Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 163–166 indicates that 12,000 were killed; and the Miami Herald, “The Pyrrhic War,” Editorial, March 22, 1985, p. A22 puts the number at up to 30,000. 21. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “Iran: Prospects for Near-Term Instability,” March 28, 1985, CIA-FOIA, p. 2. 22. Jonathan C. Randal, “Hussein, Mubarak Make Surprise Trip to Baghdad; Iraq Appears to Be Halting Iran’s Offensive,” Washington Post, March 19, 1985, p. A1. 23. New York Times, “Iraq-Iran Battle Called Heaviest in the Gulf War,” March 18, 1985, p. A1.

NOTES

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24. Herbert H. Denton, “4th Blast Rocks Baghdad; Iranian Missiles Suspected; Fighting in Marshlands Said to Subside,” Washington Post, March 20, 1985, p. A1. 25. Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Appeals to Iran to Forsake a Military Solution,” New York Times, March 21, 1984, p. A13. 26. David B. Ottaway, “U.S. Says Iraq Used Gas Again in War with Iran,” Washington Post, March 27, 1985, p. A25. 27. New York Times, “Gulf Foes Called Still Wide Apart,” April 10, 1985, p. A11. 28. Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 220–221. 29. Globe and Mail, “Iraqis launch new attacks as UN chief winds up trip,” April 10, 1985. 30. New York Times, “Around the World; Iran Accuses Iraq of Using Chemical Weapons,” April 14, 1985, p. A5. 31. Joost Hiltermann, p. 66. 32. Ibid., p. 68. 33. New York Times, “U.S. Fears Iran May Use Chemical Arms,” April 25, 1985, p. A3. 34. United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council,” April 25, 1984, S/17130, pp. 1–2. 35. Globe and Mail, “UN Censures Use of Chemical Weapons,” April 26, 1985. 36. American Embassy Damascus to Secretary of State, “Iraqi Concerns About Congressional Passage of the Export Administration Act,” Damasc 02601, April 23, 1985, IG00249, p. 1. 37. United States House of Representatives, “Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference,” House Conference Report No. 99-180, June 27, 1985, IG00260, pp. 108–110. 38. Richard W. Murphy to Secretary of State, “Letter to Secretary Weinberger on U.S.-Iraqi Relations and Advanced Technology Exports to Iraq,” April 29, 1985, IG00250, pp. 1–3. 39. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “Iraq: The Technology Transfer Issue,” April 8, 1985, CIA-FOIA, p. 1. 40. Richard Perle to Secretary of Defense, “High Technology Dual-Use Export to Iraq,” July 1, 1985, IG00262, p. 1. 41. Department of Commerce, “Your Luncheon on Monday, August 12 at 12:00 noon with Iraqi Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon, at the International Club,” August 5, 1985, IG00272, pp. 1–2. 42. Iran-Contra Report, p. 163. 43. Graham E. Fuller to the Director of Central Intelligence, “Toward a Policy on Iran,” May 17, 1985, CIA-FOIA, p. 3. 44. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “Iran: Prospects for Near-Term Instability,” March 28, 1985, CIA-FOIA, pg. 2. 45. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “Iran: The Struggle To Define and Control Foreign Policy,” May 1, 1985, CIA-FOIA, pp. iii–iv.

264

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46. Iran-Contra Report, p. 165. 47. Ibid., p. 165. 48. John Tower et al, Report of the President’s Special Review Board, (New York: Bantam Books, February 26, 1987), p. III-3–4. (Herein referred to as The Tower Report.) 49. Graham E. Fuller to the Director of Central Intelligence, “Toward a Policy on Iran,” May 17, 1985, CIA-FOIA, pp. 1–5. 50. Iran-Contra Report, p. 165. 51. Don Fortier and Howard R. Teicher to Robert C. McFarlane, “U.S. Policy Towards Iran,” June 11, 1985, IG00254, p. 1. 52. Donald R. Fortier and Howard J. Teicher to Robert C. McFarlane, National Security Decision Directive (Draft), “U.S. Policy Towards Iran,” June 11, 1985, IG00254, pp. 1–6. 53. Department of State, George Shultz to Robert McFarlane, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Comment on Draft NSDD,” June 29, 1985, IG00261, p 2. 54. Iran-Contra Report, pg. 165. 55. Caspar Weinberger to Robert McFarlane, “US Policy Toward Iran,” July 16, 1985, IG00266, pp. 1–3. 56. William Casey to Robert McFarlane, “Draft NSDD re: US Policy Toward Iran,” July 18, 1985, IC01346, pp. 1–6. 57. Bob Woodward, p. 409. 58. Tower Report, p. III-4. CHAPTER 10 1. For details of the Iran-Contra Affair, see John Tower et al, Report of the President’s Special Review Board (New York: Bantam Books, February 26, 1987), referred to as The Tower Report; United States Congress, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), referred to as the Iran-Contra Report; Oliver North, with William Novak, Under Fire: An American Story (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991). For a better understanding of Israel’s role in the affair see, Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007). 2. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 166. 3. Washington Post, “Fighting in Gulf War,” July 19, 1985, p. A22. 4. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 166. 5. The Tower Report, p. III–6. 6. Iran-Contra Report, p. 167. 7. Iran-Contra Report, pp. 167–169. 8. Charles Mohr, “Iraq, in an Unconfirmed Report, Says it Ruined Iranian Oil Depot,” New York Times, August 16, 1985, p. A4. 9. New York Times, “Iraq Reportedly Strikes Iran Oil Depot Again,” August 26, 1985, p. A4.

NOTES

265

10. Besides August 30, Iraq launched assaults on September 2 and 5, two on September 7, and further attacks on September 10, 12, 19, 24, and 25. But from September 19 onward Iran ceased exporting from the island. 11. Lee A. Daniels, “Attack by Iraqis on Iran Raises World Oil Prices,” New York Times, September 21, 1985, p. A35. 12. Iran-Contra Report, p. 169. 13. American Embassy Baghdad to Secretary of State, “Ambassador’s Meeting with President Saddam Hussein,” Baghdad 2907, September 18, 1985, RRPL, Howard Teicher Files, Box 91681, Folder “Iran-Iraq 1985,” pp. 1–2. 14. Globe and Mail, “Iraqis, Iranians exchange claims on gains, losses,” September 26, 1985. 15. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 167. 16. Washington Post, “Iran, Iraq Report Fighting On Northern Gulf War Front,” October 1, 1985, p. A14. 17. Secretary of State to American Embassy Baghdad, “U/S Schneider’s Meeting with Tariq Aziz,” State 310798, October 9, 1985, RRPL, Howard Teicher Files, Box 91681, Folder “Iran-Iraq 1985,” pp.1–3. 18. Iran-Contra Report, pp. 184–188. 19. American Embassy Riyadh to Secretary of State, “Murphy Mission: Tariq Aziz: Summit,” December 3, 1985, RRPL, Howard Teicher Files, Box 91681, Folder “Iran-Iraq 1985,” pp.1–3. 20. American Consul Jerusalem to Secretary of State, “Murphy Mission: Meeting with Saddam Hussein—Gulf Issues,” December 3, 1985, RRPL, Howard Teicher Files, Box 91681, Folder “Iran-Iraq 1985,” pp. 1–4. 21. Iran-Contra Report, pp. 195–198. 22. Memorandum, John M. Poindexter to President Ronald Reagan, “Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran,” January 17, 1986, IG00301, pp. 1–3. 23. Ronald Reagan, “Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 As Amended, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection,” January 17, 1986, IG00301, p. 1. 24. Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, ed. Douglas Brinkley (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Foundation, 2007), p. 384. 25. John N. McMahon to Director of Central Intelligence, “Present Status in Saga Regarding the Movement of TOW Missiles,” January 25, 1986, IG00302, pp. 1–2. Emphasis added. 26. Iran-Contra Report, p. 222. 27. Ibid., pp. 217–221. 28. Efraim Karsh, p. 48. 29. David Hirst, “Iran claims victory in Gulf/ Iraqi town of Alfaw reported captured,” The Guardian, February 12, 1986. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 172. 30. New York Times, “Iraq Says it Retook Isle from Iranians,” February 12, 1986, p. A7.

266

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31. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 176. 32. Charles Mohr, “New Iranian Drive Seen As Diversion,” New York Times, February 16, 1986, p. A18. 33. Edgar O’Ballance, pp.173–177. 34. Dilip Hiro, pp. 167–170. 35. Charles Mohr, p. A18. 36. Nigel Ashton, p. 221. 37. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 175. 38. Joost Hiltermann, pp. 70–72. 39. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 178. 40. Dilip Hiro, p. 166. 41. Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 180–181. 42. United Nations, Security Council Resolution 582, February 24, 1986. 43. United Nations, Security Council, “Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq,” March 12, 1986, S/17911, pp. 1–26. 44. United Nations, Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council,” March 21, 1986, S/17932, pp. 1–2. 45. Central Intelligence Agency, Special National Intelligence Estimate 34/36.2-86, “Is Iraq Losing the War?,” NSA, The Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988, (Washington DC: Cold War International History Project, 2004), p. 649. Located on the World Wide Web: http://www .wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.documents &group_id=187963. 46. Patrick Martin, “Iraq ready for offensive, analysts say,” Globe and Mail, April 26, 1986, p. A12. 47. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 179. 48. George Cave, “Why Secret 1986 U.S.-Iran “Arms for Hostages” Negotiations Failed,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (September/October 1994), pp. 8, 89. Located on the World Wide Web: http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/ 0994/9409008.htm. 49. John Kifner, “Iranians Recapture Border Town, Turning Back 6-Week Iraqi Drive,” New York Times, July 3, 1986, p. A2. 50. Richard W. Murphy to Michael Armacost, Bureau of Near-Eastern Affairs, “Iraq: CPPG Meeting of Wednesday, July 23,” July 23, 1986, IG00346, p. 5. 51. Stephen C. Pelletiere et al, Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990), pg. 14–18. 52. Richard W. Murphy to Michael H. Armacost, “Iraq: CPPG Meeting of Wednesday, July 23,” July 23, 1986, IG00346, pp. 1–2. 53. Secretary of State to American Embassy Baghdad, “USG Support for Iraq During the War,” State 234618, July 26, 1986, IG00347, pp. 1–2. See also Affidavit,

NOTES

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Howard Teicher, located in The National Security Archive, The Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988, (Washington DC: Cold War International History Project, 2004), p. 1015. 54. New York Times, “Around the World; Iraqi Planes Attack Targets in Iran,” August 8, 1986, p. A5. 55. New York Times, “Iran and Iraq Trade Strikes on Refineries,” August 12, 1986, p. A3. 56. Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 182–184. 57. Oliver North to John Poindexter, “Iran,” October 2, 1986, IG00361, p. 1. 58. Robert W. Pearson to John Poindexter and Atlon G. Keel, “Expanding Intelligence Provided to Iraq,” October 3, 1986, IG00363, p. 1. 59. John Poindexter to Oliver North, “Iran,” October 2, 1986, IG00362, p. 1. 60. George Cave, “Notes on [Dissemination] Concerning Iran’s Possible Loss of War with Iraq. Their Need for an “Honorable Peace,” and Their Fear that the Upcoming Offensive May Not Be Successful,” October 9, 1986, IC03564, p. 1025. 61. Department of State, ”State Department Summation of the Problems Generated by Exposure of the Iran Initiative,” Exhibit GPS-40, November 1, 1986, IG00367, p. 1. 62. Ibid., pp. 2–5. 63. Shireen T. Hunter, “After the Ayatollah,” Foreign Policy, No. 66 (Spring 1987), p. 77. 64. Ronald Reagan, “Iran-United States Relations: Address to the Nation,” November 13, 1986, DNSA, IC03766, pg. 1559–1561. 65. The Tower Report, p. I-1. 66. Oliver North with William Novak, pp. 298 and 323. 67. Bob Woodward, p. 514. 68. Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 543. 69. Email correspondence with Wayne White, November 28, 2009. 70. Richard Murphy to Michael Armacost, “U.S.-Iraqi Relations: Picking up the Pieces,” December 5, 1986, IG00380, pp. 1–2. CHAPTER 11 1. Robert Suro, “At the Front in the Gulf War: The Iranians Seem Confident,” New York Times, January 28, 1987, p. A1. 2. New York Times, “Iraq Says it Blunted Leading Edge of Iran Thrust,” December 25, 1986, p. A8. 3. Edgar O’Ballance, p. 191. 4. Miami Herald, “1,500 Iraqi Attackers Killed, Iran Says,” December 26, 1986, p. A28. 5. Patrick E. Tyler, “Iran, Iraq Each Claim Victory After Tehran’s New Assault,” Washington Post, December 26, 1986, p. A1.

268

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6. One must note that there was a great deal of confusion surrounded the reporting of events during the course of the battle. See Efraim Karsh, p. 58; Kenneth M. Pollack, pp. 221–223; Edgar O’Ballance, pp. 194–198; and Stephen Pellitiere, et al, pp. 20–21. Both Iran and Iraq greatly exaggerated claims about the extent of fighting. Because Iran and Iraq blocked reporters or third-party observers from visiting the front, most reporting came from war communique´s, radio broadcasts, or television reports issued by either government. As a result, it was difficult to ascertain how the battle actually unfolded. However, through an extensive survey of newspaper articles, secondary sources, and with the help of publicly available satellite imagery, a better understanding of the battle can be ascertained. The newspapers consulted were: The Globe and Mail (Toronto), The Guardian (London), The Miami Herald, The New York Times, The Times (London), and The Washington Post. 7. Globe and Mail, “Iran left ‘mountains of bodies’ after attack repulsed, Iraq says,” January 10, 1987. 8. Miami Herald, “Iraqis Fight off Advance Iranians Attack in Basra Region,” January 11, 1987, p. A1. 9. Thomas Masland, “Iran Sends More Troops Into Fray at Bridgehead Near Big Iraqi City,” Miami Herald, January 12, 1987, p. A8. 10. Patrick Tyler, “Missiles Hit Cities in Gulf War; Iran Said to Rush Troops to Bridgehead,” The Washington Post, January 12, 1987, p. A15. 11. John H. Cushman, Jr., “Iran is Said to be Solidifying Foothold Gained Inside Iraq,” New York Times, January 20, 1987, p. A8. 12. See Robert Fisk, “Iranians laugh amid debris of fighting,” Times (London), January 28, 1987, no page indicated; Robert Suro, “At the Front in the Gulf War: The Iranians Seem Confident,” New York Times, January 28, 1987, p. A1; and Don Murray, “Iran-Iraq: Two Sides of a Bloody Conflict; Fear Permeates the Air on a Tour of Iranian Front,” Globe and Mail, February 6, 1987. 13. John Kifner, “Iraq Claims Gains Against Iran Push,” New York Times, January 13, 1987, p. A12. 14. Michael Dobbs, “Iran Opens 2nd Front in Gulf War; Troops Take Positions Near Baghdad, Hold Footholds in South,” Washington Post, January 15, 1987, p. A1. 15. John Kifner, “Tehran Reports Opening 2nd Front,” New York Times, January 15, 1987, p. A13. See also Edgar O’Ballance, p. 198. 16. John Kifner, “Iraqis Assert They Bombed Khomeini’s Home,” New York Times, January 18, 1987, p. A13. 17. John Kifner, “Iran Reports Advance; Iraq Says the Attack Failed,” New York Times, January 19, 1987, p. A8. With regards to the release of toxic gas, see Patrick E. Tyler, “Drive Seen Straining Iran’s Forces; Battle for Iraqi City is One of Longest in War,” Washington Post, January 21, 1987, p. A1. 18. John H. Cushman, Jr., “Iran is Said to be Solidifying Foothold Gained Inside Iraq,” New York Times, January 20, 1987, p. A8.

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19. Globe and Mail, “Iran Reports Capture of Town East of Basra after Heavy Fighting,” January 22, 1987. See the Miami Herald, “Iraq Town Taken, Iran News Claims,” January 22, 1987, p. A17. 20. Miami Herald, “Iraq Town Taken, Iran News Claims,” January 22, 1987, p. A17. 21. Robert Fisk, “Iranians laugh amid debris of fighting,” Times (London), January 28, 1987. 22. Robert Suro, “At the Front in the Gulf War: The Iranians Seem Confident,” New York Times, January 28, 1987, p. A1. 23. Robert Fisk, “Iranians laugh amid debris of fighting,” The Times (London), January 28, 1987. 24. Miami Herald, “Iran Presses its Basra Thrust; Iraqis Resist,” January 21, 1987, p. A6. 25. Professional Office System (herein PROFS), Dennis Ross to Frank C. Carlucci, “Response on Waite and Status of Iran-Iraq War,” January 20, 1987, IG00395, p. 1. 26. PROFS, Frank C. Carlucci to Dennis Ross, “Response on Waite and Status of Iran-Iraq War,” January 20, 1987, IG00396, p. 1. 27. PROFS, Dennis Ross to Frank C. Carlucci, “Response on Waite and Status of Iran-Iraq War,” January 20, 1987, IG00397, p. 1. 28. PROFS, William A. Cockell to Colin Powell, “Iran-Iraq,” January 21, 1987, IG00399, p. 1. 29. Memorandum, Dennis Ross to Colin Powell, “January 21 PRG Meeting on Iran-Iraq War,” January 21, 1987, RRPL, William J. Burns Files, Box 91852, Folder “Gulf War [1],” p. 1. 30. William A. Cockell to Colin Powell, “Iran-Iraq,” January 21, 1987, IG00399, p. 1. 31. David K. Shipler, “U.S. Rejects Request by Iraq for C-130s but Still Sends Data,” New York Times, April 2, 1987, p. A1. 32. Memorandum, Dennis Ross to Colin Powell, “January 21 PRG Meeting on Iran-Iraq War,” January 21, 1987, RRPL, William J. Burns Files, Box 91852, Folder “Gulf War [1],” p. 3. 33. William A. Cockell to Colin Powell, “Iran-Iraq,” January 21, 1987, IG00399, p. 1. 34. Department of State, “Direct/Indirect U.S. Military Assistance to Iraq,” January 21, 1987, IG00400, p. 1. 35. Memorandum to H. Allen Holmes, “Emergency Assistance for the Middle East,” January 21, 1987, IG00401, p. 1. 36. Ronald Reagan, “Statement on the Iran-Iraq War,” January 23, 1987. Located on the World Wide Web: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/ 1987/012387f.htm. 37. Richard Murphy and Allen Holmes, “U.S. Policy on Third-Country Transfers of U.S. Arms to Iraq,” February 4, 1987, IG00404, pp. 1–2. 38. Bernard E. Trainor, “Iraq Said to Gain Upper Hand at Basra,” New York Times, February 7, 1987, p. A3.

270

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39. David B. Ottaway, “Iraq Lost 10% of Air Force, Lawmaker Reports,” Washington Post, February 22, 1987, p. A26. 40. Robert B. Oakley to Frank C. Carlucci, “Arab League Delegation on Gulf War,” April 27, 1987, RRPL, William J. Burns Files, Box 91852, Folder “Gulf War [2],” p. 1. 41. Robert B. Oakley to Frank C. Carlucci, “NSPG on Gulf Policy: Monday, March 23, 1987, 2:00–3:00 p.m., Situation Room,” RRPL, William J. Burns Files, Box 91852, Folder “Gulf War [1],” p. 2. 42. Ibid., pp. 2–3. 43. Secretary of State to American Embassy Baghdad, “Presidential Decision: Pressing For U.N. Action in the Gulf War,” State 054487, February 25, 1987, RRPL, William J. Burns Files, Box 91852, Folder “Gulf War [1],” p. 1. 44. Ronald Reagan, “Statement on the Iran-Iraq War,” February 25, 1987.Located on the World Wide Web: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/ speeches/1987/022587i.htm. 45. Bernard E. Trainor, “New Iranian Offensive Expected on Iraqi Port City,” New York Times, February 7, 987, p. A5. 46. Patrick E. Tyler, “Iran Seizes Terrain Inside Northern Iraq; Mountain Battle Stretches Iraqi Defenses,” Washington Post, March 15, 1987, p. A1. 47. Robert J. McCartney, “Iranians Display Strength On Southern War Front; New Offensive Is Expected Within a Month,” Washington Post, April 22, 1987, p. A21. 48. Globe and Mail, “Iran Claims New Offensive in Area North of Baghdad,” April 10, 1987. 49. Joost Hiltermann, pp. 97–98. 50. Ibid., pp. 93–94. 51. American Embassy Baghdad to Secretary of State, “Increased Violence in Kurdistan Leading up to Saddam’s Birthday,” Baghdad 01879, April 22, 1987, IG00420, pp. 1–2. 52. United Nations, Security Council, “Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq,” May 8, 1987, S/18852, pp. 1–19. 53. Joost Hiltermann, p. 98. 54. American Embassy Baghdad to Secretary of State, “Iraqis Repulse ‘Karabala X,’ ” Baghdad 01945, April 27, 1987, IG00423, pp. 1–2. 55. Loren Jenkins, “Iranians Push Into Northern Iraq; Offensive Grinds Through Barren Mountains in Kurdistan,” Washington Post, May 10, 1987, p. A19. 56. Loren Jenkins, “Iranians Detail Charges of Gas Warfare,” Washington Post, May 11, 1987, p. A1. 57. Joost Hiltermann, p. 99. 58. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Defense Intelligence Agency, “IIR [Excised] the Internal Situation in Iraq,” August 4, 1987, IG00453, pp. 1–2.

NOTES

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CHAPTER 12 1. Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Research Reference Series, “The IranIraq War: A Reference Aid,” DDB-2600-5954-88, 1988, RRPL, William J. Burns, Box 91852, “Gulf War,” Folder 2. 2. Morton I. Abramowitz to the Secretary, “Persian Gulf Tanker War— Background,” May 18, 1987, IG00436, pp. 1–2. 3. Central Intelligence Agency, “Near East and South Asia Review: The Growing Iranian Threat to Persian Gulf Shipping,” December 5, 1986, CIA-FOIA, p. 5. 4. Central Intelligence Agency, “Possible Use of New Antiship Missiles,” March 24, 1987, CIA-FOIA, p. 1. 5. Central Intelligence Agency, “Near East and South Asia Review: The Growing Iranian Threat to Persian Gulf Shipping,” December 5, 1986, CIA-FOIA, p. 5. 6. Central Intelligence Agency, “Increased Threat to Shipping,” February 27, 1987, CIA-FOIA, p. 1. 7. Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Warns Tehran on Missile Menace; Weapons Threaten Oil Flow; Naval Escort for Tankers Considered,” Washington Post, March 20, 1987, p. A27. 8. David B. Crist, “Joint Special Operations in Support of Earnest Will,” in Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 2001–02), p. 15. Located on the World Wide Web: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0629.pdf. See also David B. Ottaway, “Kuwait Rejects U.S. Offer of Gulf Tanker Escorts,” Washington Post, March 28, 1987, p. A15. 9. Neil A. Lewis, “Kuwaiti Proposal on Gulf Shipping,” New York Times, April 7, 1987, p. A10. 10. Bernard E. Trainor, “Iranian Warships Now Using Missiles for Night Attacks,” New York Times, January 19, 1987, p. A1. 11. Memorandum, Dennis Ross to Colin Powell, “January 21 PRG Meeting on Iran-Iraq War,” January 21, 1987, RRPL, William J. Burns Files, Box 91852, Folder “Gulf War [1],” p. 2. 12. Briefing Note, National Security Council, “Iran-Iraq Situation,” January 22, 1987, RRPL, William J. Burns Files, Box 91852, Folder “Gulf War [1],” p. 1. 13. Neil A. Lewis, “Kuwaiti Proposal on Gulf Shipping,” New York Times, April 7, 1987, p. A10. 14. Ronald Reagan, “Statement on the Iran-Iraq War,” February 25, 1987. Located on the World Wide Web: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/ 1987/022587i.htm. 15. Bill Keller, “Kuwait to Lease Soviet Tankers; Moscow Weighing Naval Escorts,” New York Times, April 15, 1987, p. A1. 16. Caspar Weinberger, “A Report to Congress on Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf,” June 15, 1987, p. 3. Located on the World Wide Web: www.dod.mil/ pubs/foi/reading_room/72.pdf. 17. Richard Halloran, “U.S. Tells Navy to Bolster Force at Persian Gulf,” New York Times, April 5, 1987, p. A1.

272

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18. Robert B. Oakley to Frank C. Carlucci, “Arab League Delegation on Gulf War,” April 27, 1987, RRPL, William J. Burns Files, Box 91852, Folder “Gulf War [2],” p. 1. 19. Frank C. Carlucci to President Reagan, “Photo Opportunity with Arab League Delegation on Gulf War,” May 6, 1987, RRPL, William J. Burns Files, Box 91852, Folder “Gulf War [2],” pp. 1–3. 20. Action Memorandum, Robert B. Oakley to Frank C. Carlucci, “Murphy Mission and Presidential Letters to Gulf Leaders,” May 1, 1987, RRPL, William J. Burns Files, Box 91852, Folder “Gulf War [2],” p. 1. 21. Letter, Ronald Reagan to Saddam Hussein, May 5, 1987, RRPL, William J. Burns Files, Box 91852, Folder “Gulf War [2],” p. 1. 22. John Cushman, Jr., “Attack on Stark: Answers to Key Questions are Beginning to Emerge,” New York Times, May 21, 1987, p. A18. 23. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “SPOT Intelligence Report: For Urgent Reading, Attack on USS Stark,” May 17, 1987, IG00434, p. 2. 24. Patrick E. Tyler, “Admiral Tells of Surprise Aboard Stark; Toll is 37; Navy Chief in Gulf Says Attack Was Unexpected,” Washington Post, May 20, 1987, p. A1. 25. IG00434, p. 2. 26. Secretary of State to American Embassy Baghdad, “Iraqi Aircraft Attack on US Naval Vessel,” State Ref: State 150888, May 17, 1987, IG00433, p. 1. 27. Letter, Saddam Hussein to Ronald Reagan, May 18, 1987, IG00435, p. 1. 28. Patrick E. Tyler, “Admiral Tells of Surprise Aboard Stark; Toll is 37; Navy Chief in Gulf Says Attack Was Unexpected,” Washington Post, May 20, 1987, p. A1. 29. Patrick E. Tyler, A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East— from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), pp. 334–335. Email correspondence with Colonel W. Patrick Lang, January 16, 2010. 30. Ronald Reagan, p. 516. 31. Caspar Weinberger, “A Report to Congress on Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf,” June 15, 1987, pp. 1–37; and Richard Murphy, “U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging,” June 16, 1987, The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Journal (Fall 1987, Volume 10, Number 1), pp. 11–16. 32. United Nations, Security Council Resolution 598, July 20, 1987. 33. Anthony Clark Arend, “The Role of the United Nations,” as cited in Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War, Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 194–195. 34. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iran-Iraq: Lull in the Gulf Anti-Shipping War,” June 17, 1987, CIA-FOIA, pp. 1–3. 35. Central Intelligence Agency, Special National Intelligence Estimate 34/11/3987, “Iran and the Superpowers in the Gulf,” June 19, 1987, CIA-FOIA, pp. 1–18. 36. Ronald Reagan, pp. 516–518. 37. “After the Blast, Journey Continues,” July 24, 1987, p. A5. 38. Allen Cowell, “A Mine Sends Shock Waves Through U.S. Policy in Gulf,” New York Times, July 26, 1987, p. D1.

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39. John H. Cushman, “U.S. Can Retaliate For Mining in Gulf, Weinberger Warns,” New York Times, July 27, 1987, p. A1. 40. Ibid. 41. Molly Moore, “U.S. Helicopters Hit Iranian Naval Ship in Persian Gulf; Strike on Alleged Minelayer Follows Gunboat Attack on Tanker,” Washington Post, September 22, 1987, p. A1. 42. Neil A. Lewis, “U.S. Copter Crashes in Gulf; 1 Is Dead and 3 Are Missing,” New York Times, July 30, 1987, p. A3. 43. Globe and Mail, “Iraqi Jets Bomb Iranian Oil Fields; Tanker Struck by Mine Outside Gulf,” August 11, 1987. 44. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Persian Gulf: Implications of a US-Iranian Confrontation,” August 18, 1987, pp. 1–6 45. Neil A. Lewis, “Attacks By Iraqis Stirs U.S. Concern,” New York Times, August 30, 1987, p. A14. 46. James Rupert, “Iraq Renews Attacks on Iranian Shipping; Warplanes Strike Gulf Oil Sites, Tanker,” Washington Post, August 30, 1987, p. A1. 47. John Kifner, “20 Ships Hit in Gulf in Six Attacks, Raising Fears of Maritime Nations,” New York Times, September 4, 1987, p. A1. 48. Patrick E. Tyler, “Kuwait Ousts 5 Iranian Diplomats; Expulsions Follow 3 Rocket Attacks,” Washington Post, September 6, 1987, p. A1. 49. Richard M. Weintraub, “Iran Open to U.N. Peace Effort; Tehran Said to Drop Demand for Removal of Iraqi President,” Washington Post, September 19, 1987, p. A17. 50. Secretary of State to United States Delegation to the United Nations, “Security Council: U.S. Letter on Incident with Iranian Vessel,” September 22, 1987, RRPL, William J. Burns Collection, Box 92155, Folder 3, “Exchanges with Iran,” p. 1. 51. John Kifner, “United States Blows Up Captured Iranian Vessel,” New York Times, September 26, 1987, p. A5. 52. John Kushman, Jr., “U.S. Says Copters, Answering Shots, Sank 3 Iran Boats,” New York Times, October 9, 1987, p. A1. 53. Juan O. Tamayo, “Iranian Hints at Conditions for Accepting a Cease-fire,” Miami Herald, October 19, 1987, p. A1. 54. John H. Cushman, Jr., “Reagan Chooses The U.S. Response to Iranian Attack,” New York Times, October 19, 1987, p. A1. 55. Steven V. Roberts, “U.S. Ships Shell Iran Installation In Gulf Reprisal,” New York Times, October 20, 1987, p. A1. 56. Patrick E. Tyler, p. 336. CHAPTER 13 1. Email correspondence with Col. W. Patrick Lang, January 16, 2010. 2. Email correspondence with Lt. Col. Rick Francona, February 7, 2010.

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3. Patrick Tyler, pp. 335–336. Email correspondence with Col. W. Patrick Lang, January 16, 2010. 4. Globe and Mail, “Iran May Call off Attack Due to Lack of Troops,” February 11, 1988. 5. Email correspondence with Lt. Col. Rick Francona, February 7, 2010. 6. Alan Cowell, “Gulf Lull: An Iran Offensive on Hold,” New York Times, January 26, 1987, p. A10. 7. Globe and Mail, “Iran May Call off Attack Due to Lack of Troops,” February 11, 1988. 8. Email correspondence with Lt. Col. Rick Francona, February 7, 2010. 9. Don Oberdorfer, “Shultz Discloses Superpowers Weigh Gulf War Formula,” Washington Post, February 21, 1988, p. A1. 10. Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Courting Soviets, Agrees to Delay Iran Arms Embargo,” Washington Post, February 25, 1988, p. A34. 11. New York Times, “Iraqi Planes Attack Tehran; Raids on Refineries Reported,” February 28, 1988, p. A22. 12. Central Intelligence Agency, “National Intelligence Daily,” March 1, 1988, CIA-FOIA, p. 5. 13. Patrick E. Tyler, “Well-Armed Iraq Takes Aggressive Stance; Baghdad Seen Newly Committed to Military Solution in Gulf War,” Washington Post, May 11, 1988, p. A1. 14. Central Intelligence Agency, “National Intelligence Daily,” March 12, 1988, CIA-FOIA, p. 14. 15. Elaine Sciolino, “Move by Iranian Sows Confusion On a Cease-Fire,” New York Times, March 6, 1988, p. A1. 16. Patrick Tyler, p. 336; Email correspondence with Col. W. Patrick Lang, January 16, 2010; and Email correspondence with Lt. Col. Rich Francona, February 7, 2010. 17. Patrick E. Tyler, “Kurdish Guerrillas Pose Growing Threat to Iraq; Rival Factions Unify, Gain Iran’s Backing,” Washington Post, February 19, 1988, p. A15. 18. For an excellent discussion of the chemical attacks on Halabja, see Joost Hilterman, pp. 104–124. For estimates on the number of people killed in the attacks, see Nicholas Beeston, “Hundreds Die in Iraqi Chemical Attack on Kurds,” The Times (London), March 22, 1988, and Paul Koring, “Poison-gas attack Leaves City of Dead; At least 4,000 Killed in Halabja,” Globe and Mail, March 24, 1988. 19. Steven C. Pelletiere, et al, Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990), pg. 52. 20. Joost Hiltermann, pp. 157–159. 21. Paul Koring, “Poison-gas attack Leaves City of Dead; At least 4,000 Killed in Halabja,” Globe and Mail, March 24, 1988. 22. Patrick Tyler, “Poison Gas Attack Kills Hundreds; Iran Accuses Iraq of Atrocity in Kurdish Region Near Border,” Washington Post, March 24, 1988, p. A1.

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23. David B. Ottaway, “U.S. Decries Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons; ‘Grave Violation’ of International Law Cited,” Washington Post, March 24, 1988, p. A37. 24. Globe and Mail, “Iraq accuses Iran of using poison gas,” March 30, 1988. 25. Elaine Sciolino, “Turmoil Is Reported in Iran; Iraqi Air Raids Add to Mood,” New York Times, April 21, 1988, p. A8. 26. Department of State, “Iran/Iraq War,” April 12, 1988, IG00547, pp. 1–3. 27. United States Central Command to National Military Command Center, “Incident Identification and Details/Underwater Explosion USS SB Roberts,” April 14, 1988, IG00549, p. 2. 28. Ronald Reagan, p. 597. 29. George C. Wilson, “Air Attacks, Recruiting Woes Said to Have Weakened Iran; U.S. General Calls Major Offensive Unlikely,” Washington Post, April 15, 1988, p. A26. 30. Email correspondence with Lt. Col. Rick Francona, February 7, 2010. 31. Ronald Reagan, p. 597. 32. Alan Cowell, “Iraq’s Dark Victory,” New York Times Magazine, September 25, 1988, p. 34. For further analysis, see Stephen Pelletiere, et al, pp. 31–32. 33. Stephen Pelletiere, et al, pp. 27–29. 34. Patrick Tyler, pp. 336–337. 35. George C. Wilson, Molly Moore, “U.S. Sinks or Cripples 6 Iranian Ships in Gulf Battles; No American Losses Reported, but Helicopter missing,” New York Times, April 19, 1988, p. A1. See also Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “SPOT Intelligence Report: Gulf Situation Report,” April 18, 1988, IG00553, p. 1; Pieter H. F. Bekker, “Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States),” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. 3 (July, 2004), pp. 553–554; Department of Defense, “The Iran-Iraq War: A Reference Aid,” DDB-2600-5954-88, 1988, RRPL, William J. Burns, Box 91852, “Gulf War,” Folder 2; and Patrick Tyler, pp. 338–341. 36. Patrick Tyler, p. 341. 37. Robert Pear, “U.S. Will Increase its Gulf Defense of Merchant Ships,” New York Times, April 23, 1988, p. A1. 38. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to Defense Intelligence Agency, “[excised] Baghdad’s Repressive Measures Against the Kurds,” April 19, 1988, IG00555, pp. 1–2. 39. Patrick E. Tyler, “Well-Armed Iraq Takes Aggressive Stance; Baghdad Seen Newly Committed to Military Solution in Gulf War,” Washington Post, May 11, 1988, p. A1. 40. United Nations, Security Council Resolution 612, May 9, 1988. 41. Pelletiere, p. 29. 42. Patrick E. Tyler, “Iraq Shifts Strategy, Ousts Iranian Forces; Apparent Hasty Retreat by Tehran Raises Questions About iIts Resolve to Continue Fighting,” Washington Post, May 30, 1988, p. A23. 43. New York Times, “Iran Attacks near Basra; Iraq Claims Victory,” June 14, 1988, p. A5.

276

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44. New York Times, “Iranian Rebels Occupy Town near Iraq,” June 20, 1988, p. A3. 45. Patrick E. Tyler, “Iraq Recaptures Strategic Marshes; Southern Zone Sits Atop Major Oil Field,” Washington Post, June 26, 1988, p. A22. For information on Iraq’s tactical maneuvers, see Pelletiere, et al, p. 30. 46. Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Iraq Says U.S. Supplied Iran With Data on Planned Raid,” New York Times, July 1, 1988, p. A2. 47. Paul Koring, “290 Die As U.S. Downs Jet in Gulf; Reagan Calls Incident ‘Defensive Action,’ ” Globe and Mail, July 4, 1988. 48. Molly Moore, “Vincennes Report Admits Errors But Urges No Disciplinary Action,” Washington Post, August 20, 1988, p. A1. 49. Ronald Reagan, p. 626. 50. George C. Wilson, “Navy Missile Downs Iranian Jet Liner,” Washington Post, July 4, 1988, p. A1. 51. Ronald Reagan, “Statement on the Destruction of an Iranian Jetliner by the United States Navy Over the Persian Gulf,” July 3, 1988. 52. Kenneth M. Pollack, p. 229. 53. Youssef M. Ibrahim, “THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT 655; As Iran Mourns, Khomeini Calls for ‘War’ on U.S.” New York Times, July 5, 1988, p. A9. 54. Marc Duvoisin, “Iranian Calls For Restraint Toward U.S.,” Miami Herald, July 9, 1988, p. A1. 55. Globe and Mail, “Strategic Peaks Recaptured, Iraqi Army Says,” July 11, 1988. 56. Kenneth M. Pollack, p. 229. 57. Miami Herald, “U.S. Exchanges Fire with Iranian Gunboats Attacking Freighter,” July 13, 1988, p. B10. 58. David Hoffman, Michael J. Berlin, “Bush Terms Strike At Plane Self-Defense; Iranian Charges U.S. Acted Deliberately,” Washington Post, July 15, 1988, p. A1. 59. Thomas L. McNaugher, pg. 121. See also Eric Hooglund, p. 53. 60. Edward Cody, “Iraqi Leader Renews Call for Peace Talks; Troops Leave Newly Won Iranian Territory,” The Washington Post, July 18, 1988, p. A9. 61. Fox Butterfield, “Iran, In Reversal, Accepts U.N. Plan for a Cease-Fire; A Surprise to Most Diplomats,” New York Times, July 19, 1988, p. A1. 62. Robert Pear, “U.S. Says Teheran Will Honor Truce,” New York Times, July 20, 1988, p. A6. 63. Dilip Hiro, pp. 243, 248. 64. Juan O. Tomayo, “Khomeini Reluctantly OKs Truce ‘Like Swallowing Poison,’ He Says,” Miami Herald, July 21, 1988, p. A1. 65. United Nations, Security Council Resolution 616, July 20, 1988. 66. Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Iraq Mounts New Drive on Border to Gain Edge in Talks With Iran,” New York Times, July 23, 1988, p. A1. 67. New York Times, “Iraq’s Forces Push into Iranian Territory,” July 24, 1988, p. A3.

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68. Paul Lewis, “Cease-Fire Plan of U.N. Leader Rejected by Iraq,” New York Times, August 3, 1988, p. A1. 69. Robert Pear, “U.S. Presses Iraqis to Accept Cease-Fire,” New York Times, August 5, 1988, p. A8. 70. Paul Lewis, “Iran Accepts Plan by Iraq For Truce and Direct Talks,” New York Times, August 8, 1988, p. A1. CONCLUSION 1. Email correspondence with Wayne White, November 28, 2009. 2. Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Research Reference Series, “The IranIraq War: A Reference Aid,” DDB-2600-5954-88, 1988, RRPL, William J. Burns, Box 91852, “Gulf War,” Folder 2. 3. Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Research Reference Series, “The IranIraq War: A Reference Aid,” DDB-2600-5954-88, 1988, RRPL, William J. Burns, Box 91852, “Gulf War,” Folder 2. 4. Paul Lewis, “Gulf Foes Open Direct Talks in Geneva,” New York Times, August 26, 1988, p. A8. 5. Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007), p. 21. 6. Ibid. pp. 172–174. 7. Hazhir Teimourian, “UN Inquiry Urged on Iraq Use of Gas,” Times (London), September 9, 1988.

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Selected Bibliography

SECONDARY SOURCES Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, My Turn to Speak (Washington: Brassey’s, 1991). Adam Tarock, The Superpowers’ Involvement in the Iran-Iraq War (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998). Amir Hassanpour, “The Kurdish Experience,” in Middle East Report, No. 189 (July– August 1994). Amitav Acharya, U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf (London and New York: Routledge, 1989). Anthony Clark Arend, “The Role of the United Nations in the Iran-Iraq War,” Ed. Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War, Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991). Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984–1987 (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1987), pg. 66. Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1968– 1977, Ed. Alinaghi Alikhani (London: I.B. Tauris & Company, Ltd., 2008). Bernard Reich, “Israel and the Iran-Iraq War,” Ed. Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War, Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991). Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1987). Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge University Press, 2000). Con Coughlin, Saddam: His Rise and Fall (Toronto: Harper Perennial, 2002). Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).

280

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

David B. Crist, “Joint Special Operations in Support of Earnest Will,” in Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 2001–2002), pg. 15. Located on the World Wide Web: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0629.pdf. David Korn, “The Last Years of Mullah Mustafa,” in Middle East Quarterly (June 1994). Available on the World Wide Web: http://www.meforum.org/220/ the-last-years-of-mustafa-barzani. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004). Dilip Hiro, The Longest War, The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1991). Edgar O’Ballance, The Gulf War (New York: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988). Edmund Ghareeb, “The Roots of Crisis, Iraq and Iran,” Ed. Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War, Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York, Greenwood Press, Contributions in Military Studies, Number 99, 1990). Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis (London: Adelphi Papers 220, Spring 1987). , Essential Histories: The Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988 (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2002). and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (London: Brassey’s, 1991). Eric Hooglund, “Strategic and Political Objectives in the Gulf War: Iran’s View,” Ed. Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War, Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991). Gary Sick, “Moral Choice and the Iran-Iraq Conflict,” Ethics and International Affairs (Vol. 3, 1989). , October Surprise: America’s Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan (New York: Random House, 1991). George Cave, “Why Secret 1986 U.S.-Iran “Arms for Hostages” Negotiations Failed,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (September/October 1994), pg. 8, 89. Located on the World Wide Web: http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/0994/ 9409008.htm. George P. Shultz, Turmoil P. Triumph: My Years As Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993). Gerd Nonneman, Iraq, the Gulf States & the War: a changing relationship 1980–1986 and beyond (London: Ithaca Press, 1986). Haim Shemesh, Soviet-Iraq Relations, 1968–1988: In the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992). Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993). Hussein Sirriyeh, US Policy in the Gulf, 1968–1977: Aftermath of British Withdrawal (London: Ithaca Press, 1984). Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Little Rock: University of Arkansas Press, 1995).

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Jonathan C. Randal, After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999). Joost R. Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Council on Foreign Relations, University of Nebraska Press, 2002). Lou Cannon, President Reagan, The Role of a Lifetime (New York: PublicAffairs, 1991, 2000). Maxwell Orme Johnson, “The Role of U.S. Military Force in the Gulf War,” Ed. Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War, Lesson for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, Contributions in Military Studies, Number 99, 1990). National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 2003). , Electronic Briefing Book No. 167, Saddam’s Iron Grip: Intelligence Reports on Saddam Hussein’s Reign (Washington DC: National Security Archive, 2005). Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 220–221. Nita M. Renfrew, “Who Started the War?” Foreign Policy, No. 66 (Spring, 1987), pg. 100. Oliver L. North with William Novak, Under Fire: An American Story (New York: Harper-Collins Publishers, 1991). Patrick E. Tyler, A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East—from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009). Phebe Marr, A Modern History of Iraq (London: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), pp. 82–86. Quil Lawrence, Invisible Nation: How the Kurds’ Quest for Statehood is Shaping Iraq and the Middle East (New York: Walker & Company, 2008). R. P. H. King, The United Nations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1986 (New York: The Ford Foundation, August 1987). Richard Murphy, “U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging,” June 16, 1987, The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Journal (Fall 1987, Volume 10, Number 1). Rick Francona, Ally To Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq’s Fall From Grace (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1999). Robert H. Johnson, “The Persian Gulf in U.S. Strategy: A Skeptical View,” International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Summer, 1989). Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990). , The Reagan Diaries, ed. Douglas Brinkley (The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Foundation, 2007). Sa’ad Jawad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question (London: Ithica University Press, 1981).

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Shahram Chubin, Security in the Persian Gulf: The Role of Outside Powers (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982). Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988). Shaul Bakhash, “Iran and Iraq, 1930–80,” Ed. Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), pg. 20. Shireen T. Hunter, “After the Ayatollah,” Foreign Policy, No. 66 (Spring 1987), pg. 77. Stephen R. Grummon, The Iran-Iraq War, Islam Embattled (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Praeger Publishers, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982). Steven C. Pelletiere, The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984). Stephen C. Pelletiere, et al, Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990). Steve A. Yetiv, The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2006 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008). Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007). Urial Dann, Iraq Under Qasim: A Political History, 1958–1963 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969). The Village Voice, CIA: The Pike Report (London: Spokesman Books, 1977). William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (New York: Westview Press, 2000). Wilson Centre, Cold War History Project, The 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War: A CWIHP Critical Oral History Conference, July 19, 2004. The Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988, (Washington DC: Cold War International History Project, 2004). Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1983). Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). CORRESPONDENCE Email Correspondence with Gary Sick, December 26, 2006. Email Correspondence with Wayne White, November 28, 2009. Email Correspondence with Colonel W. Patrick Lang, January 16, 2010.

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Index

Abadan, 40, 50, 67, 95 Abu Nidal (terrorist organization), 92, 94–95, 112 Afghanistan, 4, 28–30, 39, 42, 43, 55, 90, 107, 174, 234 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 5, 73, 89, 101, 137, 167, 174, 199, 236 Algiers Accord (1975), 21, 25, 34–35, 39, 43, 74, 95, 98, 104, 222, 234 American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), 73 Arafat, Yasir, 94 Arif, Abd ar-Rahman, 15–16, 104 Arif, Abd as-Salam, 12, 15 Armacost, Michael, 172, 200 Aziz, Tariq, 30–31, 47, 62–63, 70, 91–92, 95–96, 109, 111, 113–15, 118, 120, 139–40, 146, 148, 150, 161–62, 218 Ba’ath Party, 12–16, 20, 22, 33, 36, 49, 62, 77, 79, 86, 104, 107, 147, 172, 232, 234

Bahrain, 27–28, 52, 71, 73, 89, 137, 197–99, 205, 213, 227 Bakhtiar, Shahpur, 27 al-Bakr, Ahmad Hassan, 11, 15–18, 21–22 Bandar Khomeini, 106, 118, 219 Bani-Sadr, Abolhassan, 26, 32–33, 35, 57 Barzani, Masoud, 169, 209 Barzani, Mullah Mustafa, 14–21, 98, 210 Basij, 59, 85, 122, 168, 234 Battle of Basra (Operation Karbala 5, 8, 9), 180–90 Battle of Basra (Operation Ramadan), 80–88 al-Bazzaz, Abd ar-Rahman, 15 Beidha, 123–25, 146 Bostan, 67, 69 Brazil, 161, 233 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 4, 28, 33–35, 46, 55 Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 58, 100–101, 106, 230

286

INDEX

Bush, George H. W., 68, 172, 188, 197, 205 Carlucci, Frank, 175, 184–86, 207, 217 Carter Administration, 5, 6, 24, 28–29, 36, 39, 42–44, 47–48, 51–52, 73, 90, 227–28 Carter Doctrine, 30, 116, 121, 125 Carter, Jimmy, 23, 24, 29–31, 35, 39, 42–44, 46, 51–52, 55, 73, 116, 120, 144, 228 Casey, William, 56, 66–67, 86, 143, 153–54, 156–57, 159–60, 164, 173, 175 Central Command (CENTCOM), 5, 90, 213 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 6, 13, 17–20, 27–28, 33, 36, 39, 42–43, 56, 69, 74–78, 81, 83, 86, 93–98, 105–7, 131–32, 136, 143– 44, 147, 149–52, 158, 160, 162–65, 170–71, 179, 194–95, 200–201, 203, 207–10, 229–31 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 29 Chemical Ali. See al-Majid, Ali Hassan Chemical Weapons, 97–98, 104–109, 111, 114, 116, 120, 122–36, 138, 140, 146–47, 149–50, 168–70, 183, 190–93, 200, 209–14, 216, 218–19, 223, 229, 230, 234, 237, 238 China, 65, 161, 195, 199, 232–33 Cottam, Richard, 32 Crisis Preplanning Group (CPPG), 172 Crist, George B., 213–14 Crowe, William J., 198, 217 Dawa (the Call), 27, 30–31 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 31, 49, 83, 91, 138, 184, 194–95, 199–200, 205–10, 229, 231, 233

Department of Defense, 45, 55, 82, 110, 136, 138, 150–51, 157–58, 160, 163, 165, 175, 186, 194, 197, 205, 207–8, 218, 220, 230–31 Department of State, 21, 39, 43, 51, 57–59, 62, 64, 70, 81, 92, 100–102, 109, 112–20, 127–30, 139, 143, 145, 147, 149–50, 174, 176, 179, 186, 191, 195, 200, 208, 212–13, 229, 231, 233 Dezful, 40, 69, 90, 147 Draper, Morris, 59–61, 63, 70, 87 Eagleton, William, 59–63, 70, 91–95, 109, 111, 117–18, 120, 123, 150 Ethiopia, 235 Export Administration Act, 119, 150, 237 Faw, 158, 165–72, 176, 180, 207, 216, 218, 229, 232 France, 3, 10, 11, 40, 45–46, 63, 65, 80, 84, 92, 95–96, 99–103, 112–13, 121, 129, 131, 136, 144, 196–97, 233, 235, 236 Francona, Rick, 6, 207–9, 214, 216 Fuller, Graham, 152–55 Geneva Protocol, 104, 108, 109, 127, 135, 169, 237 George Cave, 171 Germany (pre-1945), 3, 12, 59, 106 Ghotbzadeh, Sadegh, 32 Ghuzail, 124–25 Great Britain, 3, 10, 11, 23, 80, 92, 121, 227 Gulf Cooperation Council (Gulf States), 5, 7, 27–28, 33, 42, 44–45, 52, 68, 70–78, 83, 86, 88–89, 92– 93, 97, 100, 110, 116, 121, 130–31, 136–37, 176, 186, 194–95, 198, 227–29, 231, 236

INDEX

Haig, Jr., Alexander, 55, 58, 61, 87 Haji Omran, 98–99, 105–6, 159, 189 Halabja, 210–12 Hammadi, Sadoon, 20, 61–63, 70, 87–88, 91–93 Hawizeh Marshes, 122–23, 125, 146–48, 158, 165, 168, 183 HAWK Missiles, 162–63, 171, 182, 188, 198, 229–30 Hostage Crisis (1979–1980), 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, 40, 42, 43, 46, 49, 51, 52, 56, 62, 228, 230 Hostage Crisis (1983–1986), 143, 144, 153, 155, 158, 159, 162, 163, 164, 165, 171, 174, 175, 176, 186, 200, 206, 224, 230 Howe, Jonathan, 101–3, 107 Hussein, Saddam (al-Tikriti), 7, 11, 16–19, 21–22, 25, 27, 30, 32–36, 40, 48–49, 62, 64–65, 69, 74–75, 77–81, 93–94, 96–97, 99, 111, 114–15, 118, 123, 131–32, 138–39, 140, 147–48, 160–63, 168–70, 172–73, 176, 183, 187–88, 190–91, 199, 204, 210–12, 222, 224, 233, 238 Huyser, Robert E., 26 India, 28 Iran, 4–9, 13–14, 17–22, 23–36, 39–52, 55–67, 69–70, 71–89, 90–103, 104–20, 121–40, 143–44, 146–57, 158–76, 179–93, 194–205, 206–24, 227–38 Iran (pre-1979), 13–14, 17–22 Iran-Contra Affair, 151–176, 179, 187, 194, 200, 208, 224, 231–232, 235–236 Iranian Revolution, 25–30 Iran-Iraq Conflict Escalation Containment Military Planning Group, 110 Iran-Iraq Work Group (IIWG), 57

287

Iraq, 4–9, 10–22, 23–25, 27–36, 39–52, 55–70, 71–89, 90–103, 104–20, 121–40, 144–56, 158–76, 179–93, 194–205, 206–19, 221–24, 227–38 Iraq (pre-1958), 10–12 Iraqi Air Force (IAF), 14, 40, 79, 169, 184 Iraqi Revolution (1958), 12–13 Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), 47, 57, 74–75, 79 Israel, 10–11, 20, 22, 32, 40, 57, 60–61, 63–67, 70, 73, 76, 78–79, 85, 87, 94, 101, 112–13, 115, 118, 127, 153–54, 159, 161–63, 174, 188, 224, 231, 233–36 Jalal Talabani, 209 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 45, 160, 186, 193, 198–99, 217 Jordan, 12, 20, 21, 33, 63, 76, 79, 83, 84, 85, 111, 113, 115, 118, 136, 147, 197, 218, 229, 236 Karsh, Efraim, 11, 26, 40, 42 Khamenei, Hojatolislam Ali, 222 Kharg Island, 79, 99, 137, 154, 160, 162, 173, 195 Khomeini, Rulhollah, 24–27, 30–32, 35, 39, 50, 59, 71, 73–74, 78–80, 84, 86, 106, 112, 118, 121, 151–53, 155–56, 161, 205, 221–23, 230, 233 Khorramshahr, 40, 50, 69, 70, 74, 79, 80, 95, 97 Khuzestan Province, 27, 29, 33, 40, 48, 49, 50, 56, 58, 69 Kimche, David, 159 King Hussein, 21, 79, 94, 147–49, 168, 172, 185 Kissinger, Henry, 19–21, 55 Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), 14, 98, 169, 191, 209 Kurdish Revolt, 13–21

288

INDEX

Kurds, 12–21, 31, 33, 36, 42, 48, 50, 56, 75–76, 98–99, 102, 105–7, 159, 169, 176, 189–93, 209–13, 217–19, 234–35, 237–38 Kuwait, 5, 7, 27–28, 52, 71–72, 74, 80, 83, 89, 112, 137, 143, 193–98, 200–6, 227, 229, 231–33, 238 Lang, W. Patrick, 6, 199–200, 207–9 Lebanon, 59, 79, 84, 94, 111, 114, 116, 119, 126, 143, 155, 158–59, 164, 171, 174–76, 201, 206, 230 Ledeen, Michael, 153, 154 Libya, 94, 115, 147, 154–55, 161, 163 Mahboub, Issam, 92 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, 190–93, 210, 210 Majnoon Islands, 125, 129, 132–33, 136, 147, 158, 161, 168, 219 Mandali, 34, 87, 88, 159 Marivan, 56, 106 McFarlane, Robert, 118, 153–57, 159–60, 162–63, 171, 230 Mehran, 40, 98–99, 105, 121–23, 171–72, 219 Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), 219 Mossad, 20 Mubarak, Hosni, 147, 172 Murphy, Richard, 146, 162–63, 185, 187, 198–99 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 11–12, 22, 48 National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC), 43 National Security Council (NSC), 36, 57, 64, 74, 78, 83, 107–8, 118, 152–53, 157–58, 160, 162–63, 170, 173, 175, 184–85, 194, 196, 203, 207–8, 230 National Security Planning Group, 109, 159, 188 Neutrality Acts, 3–4

Nixon, Richard M. (administration), 17–20, 23, 64, 221 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 11, 22, 35, 57, 115 North Korea, 233 North, Oliver L., 64, 160, 162–63, 164, 171, 173, 175, 230 NSDD (Draft—June 1985), 154–57, 159 NSDD (National Security Decision Directive—June 1982), 78–79 NSDD-114, 110–11, 117 NSDD-139, 135–37 NSDD-141, 137 Oil, 18–19, 23–25, 29, 32–34, 42–47, 49–51, 57, 75–76, 79, 83–84, 86, 93, 95–97, 99, 101–3, 110–21, 125, 130, 132, 137–38, 145, 152, 160, 162, 173, 187–88, 192–93, 195–98, 200, 202–6, 208, 213–14, 216–17, 229, 231–32, 238 Oman, 27, 52, 71, 86, 88, 89, 121, 198, 203 Operation Badr (New Moon), 146–48, 152, 158, 167 Operation Druid Leader (Elephant Grass), 205–9, 213, 216, 232, 234 Operation Earnest Will, 202, 206, 207, 224, 232, 236 Operation Jade Tiger, 88, 91 Operation Karbala-4, 180 Operation Karbala-5, 180, 184, 189 Operation Karbala-8, 190 Operation Karbala-9, 190 Operation Kheiber, 123–26, 138 Operation Ramadan, 85–88 Operation Staunch, 4, 102, 112–15, 118–20, 143, 153, 161, 174, 176, 179, 188–89, 194, 207, 224, 229, 231–34, 236 Operation Tawakalna Ala Allah (In God We Trust), 214–23

INDEX

Operation Wal Fajr (Dawn), 90–91 Operation Wal Fajr-10, 210 Operation Wal Fajr-2, 98 Operation Wal Fajr-5, 123 Operation Wal Fajr-6, 123 Operation Wal Fajr-8, 165 Operation Wal Fajr-9, 169 OSIRAK Nuclear Reactor, 65–66, 70 Oveissi, Ghoam Ali, 27 Pahlavi, Mohamad Reza (the Shah), 14, 17, 19–21, 23–27, 32–35, 39, 50–51, 64, 76, 193, 210, 231, 235, 237 Pakistan, 28–29, 44, 47, 57, 154, 161 Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard), 26, 50, 59, 85, 122, 124–25, 146, 169, 180, 182, 184, 189, 190, 191, 202, 209, 210, 213, 219, 234 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 190–91, 209–10 Penjwin, 51, 91, 106, 107, 221 Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 35, 95, 108, 129, 148, 169–70, 192, 201, 204, 208, 222–24 Perle, Richard, 151 Persian Gulf, 4–8, 19, 23–26, 29–31, 42–45, 47–48, 52, 57, 70–72, 76, 79, 83, 86, 88–90, 92, 97, 99–101, 103, 110–11, 115–17, 121, 126, 136–18, 148, 154, 173, 179, 185, 193–200, 202–4, 206–7, 213, 216 Peshmerga, 17, 190, 210 Poindexter, John, 163, 165, 173–74, 230 Powell, Colin, 196–97 Precht, Henry, 32 PTG Joshan (Iranian Naval Vessel), 216–17 Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 12–15 Qasr-e Shirin, 40, 56, 58, 59, 67, 158, 190, 223

289

Rapid Deployment Task Force (RDTF or RDF), 30, 90 al-Rashid, Maher Abd, 168, 187 Reagan Administration, 4–5, 7, 55–56, 58, 66, 70–74, 83–84, 86–89, 91–93, 99–100, 103, 108–13, 120, 125–31, 134–35, 137, 139–40, 151–52, 157, 159, 165, 172, 174–76, 179–80, 182, 185–89, 193–94, 196–201, 204–7, 212–14, 217, 220, 223–24, 232, 235–38 Reagan, Ronald, 9, 39, 51–52, 54, 56, 66, 70, 139 Reflagging of Tankers, 5, 193, 196–202, 206, 231, 232, 238 Regan, Donald, 159, 163 Restoration of American-Iraq Diplomatic Relations, 139–40 Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), 16, 17, 62, 79 Revolutionary Guard. See Pasdaran Ross, Dennis, 184, 196 Rumsfeld, Donald, 8, 111–20, 197 Sabalan (Iranian Naval Vessel), 217 al-Sadr, Muhammad Bahir, 27, 30–31 al-Sahhaf, Mohammed Saeed, 111, 114, 117–18 al-Said, Nuri, 10, 12, 14 al-Sammara’i, Wafiq, 69 Saudi Arabia, 5, 23, 24, 28, 33, 44, 52, 61, 65, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, 80, 89, 101, 102, 111, 113, 115, 118, 135, 136, 137, 145, 184, 193, 195, 197, 198, 218, 227, 229, 236 Savak (National Intelligence and Security Organization), 17–18, 20, 24 Senior Interagency Group (SIG), 83–85 Shah. See Pahlavi, Mohamad Reza Shalamcheh, 180, 182–83, 223 Shatt al-Arab, 16, 17, 21, 34–35, 39, 40, 48–49, 56, 58, 74–75, 79, 91,

290

INDEX

99, 166–68, 171, 180, 182–83, 188, 216, 222 Shultz, George, 87–88, 92–93, 99, 107, 112, 116, 128–29, 135, 139, 140, 148, 150–51, 154–56, 159–60, 163, 174, 184, 187, 189, 208, 230 Sick, Gary, 6, 26, 29, 33, 80 Silkworm Missiles, 5, 195, 196, 198, 204, 205, 232 Sirri Island, 99, 160, 173, 216 South Korea, 84, 112 Soviet Union, 4–5, 13–14, 17–20, 23–24, 28–30, 35–36, 39, 42–44, 47, 51–52, 55, 57–58, 63–64, 72, 74–76, 78, 80, 88, 90, 101, 107, 113, 115, 119, 146–47, 151, 153–56, 162–64, 174, 185, 188, 193–94, 196, 197–201, 204, 208, 210, 212, 214, 228, 230, 232–36, 238 Special Coordinating Committee (SCC), 42, 45 Strait of Hormuz, 5, 23, 29, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 51, 76, 96, 97, 99, 110, 119, 120, 125, 126, 130, 131, 187, 188, 195, 197, 198, 220 Sumar, 87, 159, 161, 182 Super E´endard, 95–96, 100, 102–3, 113, 116, 121 Susangerd, 40, 57, 67 Syria, 10, 12–13, 65, 93–94, 100, 102, 111, 115, 117, 147, 150, 154–55, 198 Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadeq, 36 al-Tikriti, Barzan Ibrahim, 31, 94–95 Torricelli, Robert, 188 TOW Missiles, 159, 162, 164, 182, 188, 229–30 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1972), 18–20, 36, 43 Treaty of Lausanne, 13 Treaty of Sevres, 13

Turkey, 13, 25, 44, 57, 76, 101, 145, 154, 192, 227, 235 Turner, Stansfield, 29–30, 45–46, 56 United Arab Emirates, 27, 47, 71, 89, 198 United Arab Republic, 12, United Nations, 4–5, 45, 47, 51, 57, 87, 100, 102, 108–9, 127, 134, 138, 140, 150, 169–70, 179, 190, 194, 198–201, 229, 232 United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), 129–30, 133 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 5, 47, 48, 61, 81, 108, 111, 113, 114, 116, 133–35, 140, 149, 169–70, 185, 188–189, 192, 198, 200–201, 203–4, 206, 208–9, 218, 221–23, 229, 231–33 UNSC 479, 47, 51, 74 UNSC 514, 81 UNSC 540, 108, 111, 113–14, 116, 133 UNSC 582, 169 UNSC 598, 200–201, 203, 206, 208, 222–23, 231–32 UNSC 612, 218, 223 United States, 3–9, 14, 18–24, 26, 28–30, 32–47, 49, 51–52, 55–71, 72–92, 94, 100–103, 109–10, 113–21, 127–28, 130–31, 133–35, 138–40, 143–44, 146, 149–67, 172, 174–76, 180, 184–85, 187–89, 193–206, 208, 210, 213, 217, 220–21, 224, 228–38 United States Congress, 3–4, 8, 46, 68, 73, 83–85, 88–89, 92, 101–12, 131, 145, 150, 164, 172, 174–75, 186–87, 189, 205, 214, 217, 236, 238 United States Navy, 7, 110, 125–26, 195, 198, 202–05, 207, 216–17, 221–22 USS Bridgeton, 202 USS Elmer Montgomery, 219

INDEX

USS Jack Williams, 217 USS Kitty Hawk, 198 USS Lawrence, 126 USS Sampson, 216 USS Samuel B. Roberts, 213 USS Stark, 199–201, 204, 207, 220, 229 USS Strauss, 217 USS Vincennes, 126, 219–20 USS Wainwright, 216–17

291

Veliotes, Nicholas, 101–3 Vietnam, 4, 8, 19, 23, 107, 232, 234 Waldheim, Kurt, 48 Weinberger, Caspar, 55, 151, 155–56, 159–60, 163, 184–85, 198, 200, 202, 204, 230 West Germany, 36, 39, 51, 92 White, Wayne, 6, 106, 230 William Buckley, 143

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About the Author

BRYAN R. GIBSON is a PhD candidate in International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science under Professor Nigel Ashton. His current research focuses on the American policy toward the Kurdish Revolt, which lasted from 1961 to 1975. His research focuses on the complex relationships between the United States, Iran, and Iraq during the Cold War period. He did his masters and undergraduate degrees at the University of Ottawa, in Ottawa, Canada. Covert Relationship is his first book and is an expansion of his master’s dissertation.