Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia: New Approaches to Radical Threats 9781350985902, 9781838608262

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Dedicated to: Alford Scardina Jr, my father. Our memories are reflective of both the past and present; they are reflections of the heart. Only an enduring love calms the uncertainty of the course and transforms the heart.

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Figures and Tables

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Figure 0.1

Violent Incidents by Region and Province

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Figure A1.1

Media Coverage of Terrorism, 1970–2010

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Table 4.1 CIIST: Strategy to Combat Ideological and Intellectual Support for Terrorism

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Table 4.2 CIIST Deconstruction Strategy Targeting the Non-Domestic Audience

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Table 4.3

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CIIST Media Strategy

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIF

Alharamain Islamic Foundation

AML

Anti-Money Laundering

AQAP

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

AQI

Al Qaeda in Iraq

AQIM

Al Qaeda in the Maghreb

AT Antiterrorism ATI

Antiterrorism Intelligence

CCST

Countering Cyber Support for Terrorism

CIIST Countering Ideological and Intellectual Support for Terrorism CITC

Communication and Internet Technology Commission

CMA

Capital Market Authority

COMINT

Communications Intelligence

CT Counterterrorism

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CTF

Counterterrorism Finance

CTI

Counterterrorism Intelligence

DPI

Deep Packet Inspection

FATF

Financial Action Task Force

FIU

Financial Intelligence Unit

FTF

Financial Action Task Force

GCC

Gulf Cooperation Council

GDI

General Directorate of Investigations

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xii  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia GIP

General Intelligence Presidency

HUMINT

Human Intelligence

ICT

Information, Communication and Technology

ISP

Internet Service Provider

ISU

Internet Service Unit

KACST

King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology

MENA FTF Middle East and North Africa Financial Task Force MWL

Muslim World League

NAUSS

Naif Arab University for Security Sciences

NGO

Non-Government Organisation

OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference) SAFIU

Saudi Arabian Financial Intelligence Unit

SAMA

Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority

SAR

Suspicious Account Report

SCT

Saudi Counterterrorism Model

SDI

Statute of Detention and Imprisonment

SIGINT

Signals Intelligence

SPAD Statute of Principles of Arrest, Temporary Confinement, and Preventative Detention

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UN

United Nations

US

United States

WAMY

World Assembly of Muslim Youth

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Publisher’s Foreword

Terrorism – the deployment of violence and intimidation by a political group to create terror among a general population in order to achieve the political ends of that group – has been a phenomenon on the stage of modern politics since the Anarchist Movement introduced the notion of indiscriminate violence into the public sphere in late nineteenth-century Europe. Many groups that have eventually come to be recognised as legitimate resistance or liberation struggles have dabbled to one extent or another in terrorism. Some achieved their aims and evolved into legitimacy. Others, bordering on mass thuggery, have been dominated by a kind of violence fetishism that has overtaken any political purpose they have sought to bolster by generating terror. The spectrum is huge. On any narrow definition, twentieth- and twenty-first-century examples of terrorism might include the Ku Klux Klan in the United States; the IRA and UVF in Northern Ireland; Irgun and the Stern Gang in British Mandate Palestine (today’s Israel); EOKA in Cyprus; FARC in Venezuela; Baader– Meinhof and the Red Army Faction in Germany; the Red Brigade in Italy; the Armenian ASALA; the Turkish Grey Wolves; the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso; the Montoneros in Argentina; the Tupamaros in Uruguay; the Basque ETA; and the PFLP General Command. What all of these groups have in common is their relatively narrow focus on quite specific outcomes with a nationalist or national identity tinge. Since the end of the twentieth century the trajectory of terrorism, with its origin in the Islamic world, has taken a new turn. What began as a liberation movement against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan evolved into a loose, but seemingly coherent, body of like-minded individuals determined to confront and smash what they saw as Western political,

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xiv  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia economic, military and cultural domination of the lands in the Muslim umma. After a series of spectacular operations on Western – principally American1 – interests in the Middle East and Africa, the world witnessed the extraordinary events of 11 September 2001 on the American mainland. What by now had come to be known as Al Qaeda was in full flow. Al Qaeda’s brief for itself was not only to attack and undermine America’s direct interests, but also to target America’s allies. Chief among these was Saudi Arabia. In response to a range of operations that Al Qaeda mounted within Saudi Arabia, the authorities in the Kingdom developed a series of measures against Al Qaeda terrorism that have come to be regarded as pioneering strategies. This book aims to set out the Saudi Antiterrorism (AT) and Counterterrorism (CT) strategies in detail. In brief, these strategies revolve around a recognition of the importance of intelligence and financial control as tools for confronting domestic terrorist threats, plus a proper understanding of the ideological issues that drive this brand of terrorism. The AT and CT strategies were developed as a response to the specific Al Qaeda brand and it is within that context that this analysis of Antiterrorism and Counterterrorism is set out in these pages. But of course, since the appearance of the Al Qaeda phenomenon other manifestations of terrorism have appeared both in the Middle East and in the West – the most notable examples being the Da’esh/ISIS-claimed activities in Syria, Iraq, Paris, Brussels, Boston, Nice, Berlin, Manchester and London. While the presentation of an AT and CT strategy as set out in this book is based on policies and experiences observed in Saudi Arabia in its confrontation with Al Qaeda between 2003 and 2006, the means deployed by the Saudis in that period – and the lessons learned – have an application that goes far beyond the specific Saudi encounter with Al Qaeda. This is why an account of the Saudi–Al Qaeda experience is important. A recognition of the key pillars that were identified as the basis for the Saudi strategy on terrorism – effective intelligence of terrorists’ intentions and capabilities; effective means by which to monitor, control and interdict terrorists’ means to finance their activities; effective mechanisms through which to understand the ideologies, indoctrination and psychology of terrorists – is fundamental to any attempt to undermine the objectives and efficacy of a terrorist movement, whatever its overall purpose and goals. The basis of what applied to the Saudi–Al Qaeda

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Publisher’s Foreword 

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experience will in large measure apply in any attempts to deal with Da’esh/ISIS or any other terrorist group, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere. Though it goes without saying that circumstances of terrorist threats and activities – whether they be national, geographic, political, cultural, social or economic – will vary in different parts of the world and at different times, it is the contention of this book that the fundamentals of the Saudi experience have general application.

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Acknowledgements

The word ‘adventure’ characterises the time spent on this project. King Saud University, the International Scientific and Twinning Program (ISTP), and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia opened their doors and provided me with a home for the period spent inside the country. They also helped to fulfil a childhood dream. There are no words to express my gratitude for the opportunity provided, their hospitality, and the lessons learned. The lessons learned and knowledge gained will last a lifetime. That knowledge has since been shared with many others who would not have otherwise read or purchased this book. There are many who should be thanked for various reasons, but sadly space does not permit acknowledgement of them all. Everyone met along the path over the last 12 years has in some way contributed to this book. It is from them, both strangers and friends, that I have learned many of life’s lessons. The lessons learned, the words herein contained, the perceptual misunderstandings presented, and the mistakes made, however, are my own. My writing moods can be, at times, like Florida’s stormy summer weather, but they have carried me to places in England, El Salvador, Egypt, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Israel, Jordan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Palestine, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. They have also introduced me to people from all walks of life – from government officials, insurgents and civil society actors to society’s most disenfranchised: those living in slums and prisons. They have also taken their toll on my family. My father was always the one who would make the round trip to the airport, or who I would call if I thought there might be some trouble on my return home. My mother was always a phone call away, whether it was in the taxi heading back to the hotel after Egypt’s Mubarak refused the convoy’s entry into Gaza, getting lost in Moscow’s

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xviii  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia transit system in 2010 on my second day there to work on Russian dialogue with Hamas, or wandering too far alone one night in 2012 on the streets of Riyadh. Frustratingly, she would ask, ‘What am I supposed to do? I am in the United States and you are across the world.’ I still smile in remembrance of her threats to move heaven and hell when I went incommunicado for three days in Jordan in 2006. In the end, it was the love expressed in her exasperation that was needed most. In addition to my mother, my daughter, sister and nephews were pivotal figures. Warming my heart are the memories my daughter, sister and I share from our time in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, and the fact that they still shake their heads in memory of my afternoon dance in Honduras. I will never forget the long walks my nephews and I took before I left for the Kingdom of Thailand in 2013. I am eternally grateful to all whom I have met since coming to the Land of Smiles. The Kingdom of Thailand has truly taught me how to smile once more. Outside of family, other individuals played a role in some way either during the writing process or in my struggle to come to terms with my father’s passing in 2012. Of those living in Saudi Arabia, I would like to mention Shadi, Anhar and the boys, Ibrahim and his family, Reyad S., Muhammed M., Mohammed S., Reyad A., Khalifa D., Saud A. and Abdulmalek. Those outside Saudi Arabia include Ahmed A., Widyan S., Mohanad A., Wael A., Amani S., Sammi I., Virginia Roberts, Amine N., A. Abertoun, Nasir U., Khalil A., Blue, Abdul M., Abdullah A., Maan S., Tariq Khan, Fouad G., Dave M. and Abdul Karim Bangura. I am especially grateful to Karim for the advice he gave to me over the years and the academic mentorship he has provided since 2002. Finally, a special thank you is in order for Dr Mubarak Alkhatnai, Virginia, my students and the editors. Dr Alkhatnai was critical to this entire project; its completion would not have been possible without him. Virginia read over every chapter of the first manuscript. My former students from West Virginia University and Emory & Henry answered questions and gave thoughts, while my present students at Webster University, Thailand Campus were patient and understanding during the rewriting of the first manuscript in 2014. There are a few students from Webster whom I would particularly like to mention, namely David Steele, Nishant Upadhay, Natasha Senieur Alnajjar and Nhan (‘Nathan’) Tran. They all read either parts of the manuscript or the entire thing, and Nathan helped with some of the final edits. The final manuscript would not have been possible without the editors. I am grateful to them, and all who have been a part of this project since it began in 2011.

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PREFACE

The definition of terrorism and who precisely constitutes a ‘terrorist’ are two questions that have plagued the world since the end of the nineteenth century. As is well known, one person’s proverbial terrorist is another’s heroic revolutionary or freedom fighter. The reality of the debate, at least for me, came through an experience in the mountains of El Salvador in 1993. El Salvador ended its civil war not too long before my family migrated there. We travelled with our restaurant workers to what was then, at least to us, an unknown land. I was only 14 years old. The bullet-pocked sign, ‘Incest Prohibido’, remains lodged in my memory, one of the first things I encountered as I entered the mountain community of Las Bermudas, which was situated between San Martin and Suchitoto. My time in El Salvador, especially at such a young age, taught me firsthand the importance and problem of competing narratives. We lived for a short time in what was considered to be the stronghold of the Frentre Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN – the country’s communist party). The FMLN, at least then, would be best characterised in today’s terminology as a network. They were a socialist collective comprising several groups who were fighting a rival party supported by the US government. For those not too familiar with or others too young to remember the history, El Salvador’s civil war occurred in the context of the Cold War rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the United States. In 2009, the FMLN, which became a political party following the end of the civil war, won the presidential election. Then, five years later, the former military commander and FMLN candidate won the presidential election.

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xx  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia To me, the experiences in El Salvador demonstrated that there are always two sides to a story and that there are always two or more narratives at play. Each one is derived from what is known, learned, filtered and perceived at a specific time. Sadly, too many people fail to query the narratives presented to them; and, if they do, it is often to rationalise their own thoughts rather than seeking to understand those of the ‘other’. The problem of perception intercedes, thereby limiting how the ‘self ’ and ‘other’ understand each other. Perception is a powerful thing, for it shapes the hearts and minds of the masses. It can bring people to the streets or lead them to take up arms. Actions taken, however, will always depend on the type of conflict. Conflict can be both violent and non-violent. It is a product of a perceived or real injustice that is fuelled by many things, which may be different from one place to another and from one individual to an entire society. Failure to understand hatred, ignorance, intolerance and many others can be cited as potential causes of conflict. Dialogue helps to reduce all of these causes. Dialogue is one of many alternative forms of conflict transformation and resolution. As case studies have demonstrated, groups and individuals moderate over time. The length of time will vary by case, circumstance and the individuals involved. Exclusion reduces the potential for moderation, breeds hatred and increases extremism. Exclusion will never reduce either actual or perceived forms of deviant behaviour, whether it be mild or extreme. Exclusion helps to create ‘the other’, and individuals need to free themselves and society from the imposed fear of the so-called ‘other’. Dialogue and other alternative, inclusive approaches have been critiqued by some as being ‘soft’. This supposedly soft approach is one that emphasises dialogue with, and rehabilitation of, those individuals who have transgressed by challenging through threat or action the security of a state or society. Yet, it is dialogue and other inclusionary approaches that are likely to have a greater long-term impact than the one that seeks to defeat and destroy terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic. It is not an actor that can be eradicated. Exclusion and killing merely breed greater hatred and perpetuate ignorance on both sides of the dividing line. Each one of us has an individually perceived dividing line. It is both the acceptance of difference and the encouragement of tolerance that binds us together and bridges the collective–individual philosophical divide. My greatest wish is for this book to promote acceptance of difference and encourage tolerance of ideas and policies that may diverge from the usual

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PREFACE 

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paths. The goals are to promote understanding of a controversial topic and to shed light on the complexities in dealing with the problem of terrorism. Confounding the underlying philosophical issues implied throughout the work was finding a way to frame the Saudi AT/CT model so that readers could open their minds to move beyond the models that have been framed in the past.

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Introduction

The twenty-first century has ushered in a complex world, where time and space no longer serve as barriers to divide people, ideas and cultures. People are now connected by networks of communication that span the globe. The digital and information revolutions have transformed lives and created an overwhelming reliance on technology. They have flooded the world with vast amounts of information. Not surprisingly, the global connectivity that these technological revolutions have engendered has also transformed the phenomenon of terrorism. Terrorism is an extreme tactic that can be deployed by extremists in any cause. Activists in whatever cause are diverse creatures, with some engaging in violence and most others pursuing their goals through non-violence. Both violence and non-violence are two separate paradigmatic approaches that coexist in the drive for collective action. The academic term ‘collective action’ is used to explain the mobilisation process that includes the creation of networks, movements, groups and/or coalitions in pursuit of specific action or a particular cause. While not all actors are terrorists, they are all activists. The designation of one as a terrorist denotes a tactic situated within the specific paradigm of violence which itself is situated inside the general paradigm of collective action. The existing scholarship does not examine the Saudi counterterrorism model systematically or in its entirety. Instead, it focuses on certain aspects of the Saudi programme: its origins, causes, objectives and outcomes. In fact, the Saudi counterterrorism model is wide-ranging, multipronged, multidimensional and not well understood. ‘I had no idea the Saudis even had a counterterrorism model,’1 said a former European military officer at

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2  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia an international conference I attended. This book seeks to shed more light on the Saudi model and attempts to rectify the unfamiliarity with it. The Saudi counterterrorism model consists of three pillars. The first pillar is primarily concerned with security and encompasses intelligence, military/security operations and diplomacy. The second pillar focuses on counterterrorist measures in the financial world, which deals with regulating financial transactions, cash couriers and charities. The third pillar focuses on combating ideological, intellectual and cyber support for terrorism. Each pillar of the Saudi model relates to the others and is dependent on them. The country’s counterterrorism policies are organically connected to and have evolved from past actions and policies. The normative principle guiding the policy making process, and underlying the policies, is pragmatism. To help better explain the evolution of the Saudi counterterrorism policy and the development of the Saudi model, the remainder of this introductory chapter will provide a brief background on Al Qaeda, since it was the Saudi Osama bin Laden who inspired this organisation that in turn went on to become one of the first international terrorist movements in recent times to deploy religion – in this case Islam – to further its aims. It predated Da’esh (or ISIS), which in many respects was an outgrowth of Al Qaeda. In the process, the chapter will also try to explain how terrorism has been viewed and applied in Al Qaeda, together with an overview of the debate within the counterterrorism field. Since its inception in the 1990s Al Qaeda has been a complex organisation and its complexity helps to explain how the Saudi counterterrorism policies evolved. Its complexity also helps to explain the larger paradigmatic shift in the field, which began in the period 2005–6. These paradigmatic shifts, and some of the methods adopted to deal with terrorism in Saudi Arabia, were not always consistent with the theory and practice of counterterrorism models existing elsewhere. The reason for this is that any policy or strategy is bound to vary temporally and spatially in accordance with circumstances, especially if the intent includes bringing and/or maintaining order, ensuring stability and promoting peace. Consistency in counterterrorism strategies, policies and models is further complicated by the problem of definition. This is because terrorism is a conceptually contested phenomenon. States and actors around the world differ in their definitions and understanding. This makes it all the more important to simply accept that terrorism is a complex issue and that the word can apply to a range of different forms and manifestations.

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Introduction 

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Al Qaeda and the Al Qaeda Network After 9/11 there was a tendency to view Al Qaeda as a singular phenomenon, i.e., as an organisation that operated within a single set of structures and assumptions, with only specific internal mechanisms functioning as possible operational variables.2 Policy makers and the media provided simplistic conceptualisations, in an attempt to capture its singular essence rather than to articulate its complexity. The public was thus perpetually confused about what the Al Qaeda enigma actually was. Al Qaeda could be described as a network of multiple actors operating at some distance from each other and consisting of a variety of organisational structures, a variety of different political ideologies and objectives, and a variety of modi operandi. The actors and organisations of this vast global network differed from country to country and region to region. What was once called Al Qaeda in Afghanistan has not remained the same as it evolved into a global entity. Similarly, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which has been active and fighting in Yemen, is not the same entity that engaged Saudi security services in 2003–6. Even Al Qaeda network members returning home from various conflicts today will be different from the smaller networks and organisations they once left. I.  The Enigma of Al Qaeda: From Afghanistan to the Global Level A vast amount of literature exists on Al Qaeda. Thus, an in-depth review of the Al Qaeda entity, its operational dynamics or historical developments is not necessary here. But we will undertake a short review of Al Qaeda, contexualised within the framework of Saudi counterterrorism and antiterrorism policies and tactics, which in turn will illuminate these policies and tactics. Obviously, changes in Al Qaeda and its policies have always mirrored shifts in Saudi counterterrorism policies and tactics. Al Qaeda evolved from a quasi-centralised movement located in Afghanistan to a decentralised global network made up of indigenous groups and individuals around the world. Al Qaeda’s gradual structural transformation over time resulted in changes in the Saudi state’s policies, strategies and tactics. It was simply not possible for the state to remain static while its adversary was evolving. The model adopted allowed for change to ensure that it would be sustainable. Finally, situating the emergence of Al Qaeda within context and highlighting its developments

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4  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia shed light on the larger argument that the policies and strategies for antiand counterterrorism would vary both temporally and spatially. Al Qaeda is not what it was when it first emerged in Afghanistan during the fight against the former Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989. It originally appeared on the scene when the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union was at its peak. Mujahideen (fighters) from Muslim communities throughout Asia, the Middle East and around the world were encouraged to fight against the oppressive Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. They were supported by the United States and its allies including Saudi Arabia, with funding, weapons, training and operational logistics. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), determined to undermine the Soviet penetration of Afghanistan, strongly encouraged Saudi Arabia to provide funding and irregular fighters to bolster the Afghan resistance. The CIA also worked with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to connect with the Mujahideen, and in the process, came to know and work with Osama bin Laden.3 The US alone provided $20 billion in weapons to defeat the former Soviet Union, with the American media – including Hollywood – building up the Mujahideen as heroes. Bin Laden and his colleagues facilitated and provided the logistical support and training needed for those fighting in the field; they would be the base – the Arabic word for base being Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda would be transformed following the defeat of the Soviet Union. With the war’s end, many former Mujahideen returned to their own countries as heroes. This included a large number who had gone to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia. While some were able to easily reintegrate into their earlier lives, others struggled silently with the horrors seen and/ or experienced on the battlefield. They were plagued with visible and invisible war wounds. Exacerbating the fighters’ plight were the domestic conditions back home. Life, now on home ground, was far different from what they had left behind in Afghanistan and radically different to what they had experienced on the battlefield. Conflict was also brewing in other zones of the region. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The Arab League, its member states, the Kuwaitis and the Saudis pressed for UN-led action, especially because of the concerns for the vulnerability of the Saudi oil fields in the Eastern Province. This led to the stationing of foreign, especially American, troops inside the Kingdom. Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were angered by this decision, especially since they had requested the authority to defend and protect the Kingdom.

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Introduction 

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From a military perspective, the Kuwaiti–Saudi–Arab League decision to invite non-Muslim foreign troops to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was understandable given the operational capabilities of Saddam Hussein. They calculated that the devastation and civilian casualties would probably have been far greater than turned out to be the case and the region would likely have been engulfed in prolonged conflict had the governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia decided on another course of action. But for bin Laden and his Al Qaeda warriors the stationing of foreign forces on Saudi soil was a desecration of Islamic purity and to be resisted. There was also conflict outside of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The Third Balkan War occurred between 1991 and 2003. Some of the former Mujahideen made their way to that conflict in support of Bosnian fighters facing their better equipped Serbian and Croatian adversaries. Going to fight was once again tacitly supported by the international community. While they were off to the Balkans, Osama bin Laden, whose Saudi citizenship had been revoked in 1994, left Saudi Arabia for Sudan. Meanwhile, in 1992, Al Qaeda begun a relentless attack on American interests from its African base with the bombing of a hotel in Aden thought to house US troops. This was followed by the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and attacks on US Navy ships including the USS Cole. In 1996, bin Laden had moved to Afghanistan, which would become Al Qaeda’s home until the US attack in 2001. After 9/11 forced him and others to leave the country, Al Qaeda operatives returned to Saudi Arabia, while others travelled to Iraq and Yemen. The Saudi–Al Qaeda battle would be waged from May 2003 to 2006. Yemen’s trouble with Al Qaeda would begin in 2000, triggered by the bombing of the USS Cole. In 2006, after the death of an Al Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab Alzarqawi, the global network would be consolidated. The development of Al Qaeda thus covered three phases, namely the period leading to 9/11 when the organisation was throwing down gauntlets; the 2003–6 period when Al Qaeda took their fight to Saudi Arabia; and the post-2006 period, when Zarqawi’s death resulted in consolidation. Each of these periods encompasses tactical, structural and ideological changes in the network. In the pre-9/11 period, the operational structure was more or less centralised and there was central planning for tactical operations. In the second period, the network became decentralised but maintained a hub of tactical operational linkages

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6  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia between the various entities that comprised the network. By the third period, the network was a fully decentralised entity with no control over the tactical operations of the various groups and individuals comprising the network. Elements within the network operated independently and locally. They were connected by the idea4 of a global struggle, but the battles waged were local. Al Qaeda thus became ‘glocal’ in the third temporal period. And in the process, it became much more of an enigma. II.  From the Arabian Peninsula and the Maghreb to the Beyond The previous section contextualised the development of Al Qaeda as a global movement comprising multiple actors around the world. This section will briefly examine some of the regional Al Qaeda networks, specifically covering Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and the Maghreb. A wealth of literature has covered each of these areas. But what has not always been properly understood is the extent of the geographical and foreign-policy importance to the Kingdom that this regional Al Qaeda presence has represented. It should be noted, however, that these regional Al Qaeda networks also comprised multiple actors, with some having actually pledged allegiance to the organisation while others were labelled as Al Qaeda networks by the international community simply by virtue of political expediency or as a convenient default position in the absence of more exact information. A.  Al Qaeda in Afghanistan Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was formed between 1988 and 1989. Its forerunner was the Maktab Alkhadamat (‘The Services Office’). The Maktab was created by Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri in 1984 to facilitate financing, recruiting and training for the Mujahideen who were setting up resistance to the Soviet presence there. Its recruits hailed from different states and were either individuals with no links or came from other organisations, sometimes local, regional or entirely unrelated to these states. Given the varied membership and the competing agendas of recruits, differences emerged among the leadership of what was gradually evolving as Al Qaeda. Sheikh Abdullah Azzam sought to emphasise rebuilding and regenerating the Afghan state while Ayman Zawahiri, an Egyptian Islamic Jihadist, wanted to channel efforts towards creating a transnational Muslim world. He specifically sought to

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Introduction 

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focus on states perceived to be not adhering to Islam and/or thought to have lost their way. Osama bin Laden would choose the path of Zawahiri rather than Azzam. Eventually, in 1989, Azzam was killed.5 The structure of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was quasi-centralised. There was a Consultative Committee that made policy and served in an executive capacity. Under the Consultative Committee were the various committees, namely the military, finance and business, fatwas (Islamic decrees) and Islamic studies, and media and publicity committees. This command and control structure comprised an inner and outer core, with the inner core consisting of a dozen or so former veterans of the Afghan conflict from various countries, and the outer core made up of a hundred or so highly motivated activists.6 This structure would collapse following 9/11, due to arrests, assassinations and members fleeing to safe havens in other locations. Those described as Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in the years following the defeat of the Taliban regime in the autumn of 2001 functioned more as an anti-US insurgency inside the country rather than as an Afghan outpost of an Al Qaeda global or regional network.7 Finally, the overwhelming majority of those in the so-called Al Qaeda in Afghanistan organisation would identify themselves as Afghans fighting for what they saw as an Afghan struggle. Only a minority of operatives were Arabs, Uzbeks or Chechens, or hailed from other parts of the world. B.  Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia Al Qaeda’s role in Saudi Arabia has been limited. Hostility toward the Kingdom emerged in the 1990s, focused both on the country’s domestic and foreign policies. Domestically, Al Qaeda cited economic mismanagement, licentious and immoral behaviour among some segments of Saudi society, and its perception of an inadequate adherence to and application of Islamic law on the part of the state and its elites. Al Qaeda’s domestic vision for the Kingdom was more conservative and religiously purist than that of the government and the majority of society. Hostility toward the Kingdom’s foreign policy centred on the Saudi position on the 1990–1 Iraq War, leading to the stationing of US troops within the Kingdom. It was this in particular that fed Al Qaeda’s hostility. As mentioned, they saw the stationing of non-Muslim soldiers in the heartland of the Islamic world as anathema. Then came the 1993 Oslo Accords. When the Palestinian leadership, following clandestine negotiations

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8  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia in the Norwegian capital signed an agreement with Israel recognising the legitimacy of the Jewish State in return for limited Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank. Al Qaeda considered this a betrayal of the Palestinian cause and blamed the Saudi government for not preventing the signing of the accords. Following attacks on various American interests in 1993, including the New York World Trade Center bombing, Al Qaeda blamed the Kingdom for bin Laden’s expulsion from Sudan. Many of bin Laden’s statements criticising the Kingdom featured the matter of Saudi–American relations and the US’s perceived influence over Saudi policy.8 Foreign policy played a more important role in his statements than domestic grievances. In making his pronouncements on behalf of Al Qaeda, bin Laden was not in reality directing his ire at an audience in Saudi Arabia per se but rather at the international sphere and especially at Muslim communities across the world. A systematic survey of the violent incidents that occurred in the Kingdom will help to better explain the Al Qaeda–Saudi relationship and the changes that occurred in Saudi counterterrorism policy from the 1990s to 2003. Violence in the country during the period can be broken into three phases: namely, violence in the 1990s, violence in 2000–2, and violence in 2003. These separate periods correspond, as previously discussed, to shifts in both Al Qaeda activities and Saudi antiterrorism and counterterrorism policies. The showdown in the Saudi–Al Qaeda conflict took place in 2003, which represented the climax in the clash between the two adversaries. It is worthwhile to set out the narrative of this more than decade long confrontation between the state and the radical extremists based on a range of government sources to provide a stronger contextual understanding and to create a framework to explain the antiterrorism and counterterrorism policies discussed in the subsequent chapters. Violence in the 1990s. The 1990s saw eight incidents of violence.9 On 4 February 1991, an unidentified gunman opened fire on a bus carrying American military personnel in Jeddah. It occurred in the context of the 1991 Gulf War after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and followed a call by Saddam Hussein on 31 January 1991 for Iraqis to infiltrate Saudi Arabia to carry out assassinations and acts of sabotage. The second incident occurred in March 1994. An Ethiopian, using a toy gun, hijacked a Saudi Arabian plane in route from Jeddah to Addis Abba. The reason for the hijacking was never explained. There were no connections between these incidents and bin Laden or Al Qaeda.

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Introduction 

9

The third incident occurred on 20 October 1995. A bomb exploded at a mosque in Qubah village in Asir province, which is 300 miles south of Riyadh in Bisha governorate. This attack was in response to a dispute over land claims when a frustrated and enraged landlord sought to take vengeance on local villagers. This incident had no religious significance (despite the attack taking place in a mosque crowded with village worshippers) nor did it have any links with Al Qaeda. The fourth and fifth incidents were the first known attacks on the American military in the Kingdom since the Iraqi scud missile hit American barracks during the 1991 Gulf War. The first of the two incidents occurred on 28 October 1995 when a Saudi national fired at a US army captain in Tabuk in the northwest of the Kingdom, close to the border with Jordan. The next occurred on 13 November the same year. A van packed with explosives detonated outside of the Office of the Program Manager/ Saudi Arabian National Guard in Riyadh, which as operated by the US military. The attack damaged the housing used by American advisors to the Saudi National Guard, who were charged with training the Saudi military.10 The bombing occurred at midday, which is when most Muslims would be praying and non-Muslims taking their lunch break. A wide range of groups – the Tigers of the Gulf, International Justice Group, the Partisans of God, Islamic Movement for Change and Saudi Islamic Jihad – claimed responsibility for the explosion, with each one citing the Kingdom’s domestic and foreign policies as justification. Although the Brigade of Faith, advocating violence, claimed no responsibility for the bombing in November, they were suspected of carrying out shootings, targeting public buildings and government cars in Jeddah. One of the groups that claimed responsibility, namely the Islamic Movement for Change, demanded that US forces leave the Kingdom. The group, Ansar Allah (Partisans of God) demanded not only the removal of US troops but also the release of a group of prominent activists, scholars and 200 other individuals in Saudi prisons. They also demanded the lifting of all restrictions imposed by the Kingdom on scholars and religious leaders, as well as full compliance and implementation of the Shari’a. The hostility toward the Saudi government derived not only from the stationing of US troops in the country but also from perceived socioeconomic problems following the Gulf War. The sixth incident of violence occurred on 25 June 1996. A fuel truck bomb exploded on the King Abdulaziz Air Base outside the Khobar

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10  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia housing complex for US Air Force personnel in Dhahran, principal city of the oil-rich Eastern Province. Responsibility was claimed by Hezbollah Alhejaz, the Legion of the Martyr Abdullah Alhuzaifi and the Islamic Movement for Change. Hezbollah Alhejaz threatened that if US troops did not leave, then it would be construed as a declaration of war in an internationally ‘accepted and clean sense’, i.e., because the US could be designated as an occupier once it had been asked to leave but refused. The Legion of the Martyr Abdullah Alhuzaifi was named after a Saudi citizen was beheaded in 1995 for throwing acid at a police officer. This group threatened additional attacks if US forces did not leave Saudi Arabia. They also called for the release of Sheikh Alhawali and Sheikh Alawadah. The Alhuzaidi incident was followed by a call from Osama bin Laden warning of political violence in the Kingdom. He urged the withdrawal of US troops and predicted an escalation of violence should his demands not be heeded. The final incidents of the 1990s occurred in January 1997 when a total of 14 letter bombs were mailed to the Riyadh offices of the Alhayat newspaper that was owned by Prince Khaled bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz. The letter bombs delivered to the Riyadh offices followed others delivered to Alhayat offices abroad. Although little of what happened in the violence of the 1990s can be linked to Al Qaeda terrorism, the period and its acts of terrorism are nevertheless relevant because they set the scene for the later terrorist waves, which would generate the Saudi counterterrorism model. Violence in 2000–2. There were six violent incidents in 2000. The first occurred in October when two Saudis hijacked a plane to Baghdad. The hijackers sought improvements in the education and health services and the removal of foreign troops. The second incident occurred on 17 November 2000. An explosive device was thrown through the window of a vehicle at an intersection in Riyadh, which killed a British man and injured his wife. The bombing occurred only a few hours before delegates from around the world were to meet in Riyadh for an international oil conference. It also followed a general warning issued by the US State Department to American personnel living in the Middle East. A third incident occurred five days later on 22 November. Four expatriates were injured when a bomb, placed in their car, exploded. Two of the victims worked for Alsalam Aircraft Company and the other two worked for the military hospital. The fourth and fifth incidents occurred

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Introduction 

11

on 15 December. A Briton was injured after an object located next to his car exploded, while another Briton was injured in a separate location in Khobar by an explosion from a small container located inside his car windshield. He was an employee at Coca Cola Company in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government claimed the so-called ‘Alcohol Turf War’ as the main explanation. All the incidents utilised low-grade bombmaking material. What the Saudi authorities would later term the Alcohol Turf War continued throughout 2001. There were five incidents of violence that year. The first occurred on 10 January. A small bomb placed inside a telephone booth exploded immediately prior to the call to prayer at the Euro Marche Shopping Mall in Riyadh. The mall was a favourite of Westerners living in the Kingdom and frequented regularly. The explosion was very small and resulted in no human casualties or injuries. This attack, however, was not designed to cause casualties or serious damage. It was instead designed as a warning to the government, pressuring them to release the Mujahideen youth being detained at that time. The second incident occurred four days later, on 14 January, when an Irishman found a bomb under his vehicle, which the authorities detonated without injury. The third incident occurred on 15 March when a Scotsman and an Egyptian were injured by a bomb inside a garbage can in front of a bookstore in Riyadh. The fourth incident occurred on 2 May when a letter bomb wounded an American doctor in a hospital in Khobar. When many of these events first occurred, the general assumption was that they were in fact political attacks on foreigners mounted by violent oppositionist radicals. Then the Saudi authorities described them as score settling and turf protection among Westerners engaged in illicit alcohol smuggling. This was met with widespread scepticism and viewed as a misguided attempt to discourage any talk of instability within the Kingdom. The final incident, also in Khobar, occurred on 6 October 2001. An American was killed and four foreigners injured. The attack on a popular shopping destination frequented by expatriates occurred immediately after the end of prayers. The event came at a time when there was a high level of anti-American sentiment in the region, not just due to the usual tensions in Palestine and opposition to preparations for the US-led war on Afghanistan. The assault after all took place a few weeks after 9/11, a period during which Saudi Arabia came in for a considerable amount of negative attention given the preponderance of Saudis among those responsible for 9/11.

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12  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Across 2002 seven violent incidents were witnessed. The first occurred on 5 June. An unidentified gunman attempted to assassinate an Australian employee of British Aerospace Systems (BAE) in the northwestern city of Tabuk. It followed the arrest and detention of a suspected Al Qaeda operative, who admitted to firing a missile at an American military plane leaving Prince Sultan Airbase in May. According to an official source at the Ministry of Interior, Saudi and Sudanese operatives linked to Al Qaeda had planned to use explosives smuggled into the country to attack the airbase.11 Some of the Sudanese operatives involved received assistance to thwart detection from Saudis and Iraqis connected to Al Qaeda. The Saudi and Sudanese government cooperated in this investigation under the auspices of the joint Arab Security Cooperation Agreement. And as a result of the operatives’ interrogation a cache of hidden weapons was found in the western city of Taif, near the airbase in Khamis Mushayt, as well as at two other locations. The weapons had not been fired and were seen as another warning to the authorities that Al Qaeda was actually capable of striking within the Kingdom. The second incident occurred on 20 June, when a Briton’s Land Rover exploded on a road close to a Western residential compound in Riyadh. The following week saw the third incident. An American couple discovered an object attached under their vehicle. Then, on the following day, another Briton also found a bomb located under his car. All these incidents occurred within the same residential compound. Two weeks later, on 9 July, Al Qaeda issued a statement suggesting more attacks and assassinations both inside and outside the United States were possible. Within two days, an armed man had attempted to storm the Qatari Consulate in Jeddah. There were no additional incidents until September. However, in August of 2002, street tensions were running high due to US preparations for war with Iraq. The Gulf States and Saudi Arabia in particular warned against the war, citing the destabilising effects on the region.12 Saudi opposition to the Iraq War coincided with a negative Western media campaign targeting the country. The American media, as the next chapter highlights, consistently presented negative images of the Kingdom during points of tension or when the Saudis opposed American policy. On 10 September 2002, bin Laden called for the Saudi government to release Sheikh Saeed bin Zuair, a former professor of Imam Mohammad bin Saud University who had ties to Saad al-Faqih of the Movement for Islamic Reform.13 Then, on 15 September, the government announced it would

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13

adhere to any United Nations resolution passed authorising the use of force against Iraq.14 On the same day, coincidently, unidentified assailants assassinated a judge in Skaka, the capital of Jawf Province. On 29 September, according to the Ministry of Interior, a 56-year-old German man travelling alone, who worked in the private sector, was killed after his vehicle exploded on Abdulhamida-Kaleb Street in the Suleimaniyya District in Riyadh.15 Anti-American and anti-Western sentiments were continuing to rise. As tensions were mounting Al Qaeda also announced its intent to engage in attacks on, and assassinations of, Westerners. Civilians, they argued, would continue to be targeted so long as the United States continued to target civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. On 8 October 2002, Ayman Al-Zawahiri released a tape calling for attacks on American economic and security interests. On 15 October, a Saudi passenger, wielding a gun, boarded a Saudi airliner in a highjack attempt. Security forces were able to overpower and arrest him. On the same day, another Saudi was arrested after driving his car into the gates of the US consulate in Jeddah. On 25 October, a bin Laden letter that had originally been released in December 2001 resurfaced. He accused fellow Muslim leaders of betraying him and ignoring the plight of Afghan Muslims. Bin Laden called for focusing inward rather than continuing to target the ‘Jews and Crusaders’. On 17 November 2002, the same day that Al Qaeda issued another warning to the United States of impending attacks outside its territories, Saudi security forces arrested another suspect in the Kingdom. A few days later, on 20 and 21 November, the Saudi authorities conducted an intense search for persons on their most wanted list.16 The hunt led to an apartment complex in Riyadh. During an exchange of fire between some occupants and security forces, two officers were wounded and both a Kuwaiti and a Saudi national were killed. Several others were arrested on terrorism charges. At the same time, with pressure mounting from the security forces, many families were persuaded to cooperate in locating those of their kin suspected of terrorist activities and extreme political activism. The Saudi authorities were keen to make the most of their successes, maintaining that they were demonstrating their society’s rejection of criminality, narrow-minded fanaticism and violence. Finally, the arrest of Al Qaeda’s Gulf operation chief Abdelrahim Alnashiri on 21 November 2002 led to more arrests and/or detentions. While investigations and arrests were ongoing, anti-American sentiment continued due to US policy toward Israel. Protests and boycott

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14  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia campaigns could be seen frequently throughout the region. When a call was made to expand the boycott campaign due to continued Israeli aggression, a number of McDonald’s restaurants in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere were set on fire. On 20 November 2002, an unidentified gunman walked into a McDonald’s in Kharj, 50 miles south of Riyadh and home to a US military base and pointed a gun at an employee. The gunman then proceeded to spray the restaurant with petrol and set it afire. On 30 November, a Dutch family escaped an attempted car bombing in the port city of Jeddah. Finally, on 19 December, a British citizen was shot and killed by a Saudi national,17 who was arrested following a car chase. The cycle of warnings and attacks had expanded significantly in 2002 and seemed set to continue. Violence in 2003 and the Saudi–Al Qaeda Showdown. This subsection provides the context for a better understanding of the policies discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. It describes the geographic context of both the incidents of violence and security operations.18 While there was much violence during this period, this subsection only covers events up to the end of 2003. Sporadic aggressive acts occurred between 2004 and 2006 during Saudi–Al Qaeda armed clashes when the state’s antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts were in operation.19 Saudi security thinking and tactics are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. The first incident of violence for 2003 occurred on 6 January. The police discovered a bomb placed in a telephone booth next to a petrol station on Sultana Street in a residential area in Riyadh. This followed a call to arms against America’s ‘occupation’ of (i.e., its increasing presence in) the Gulf in preparation for the Iraq War. Bin Laden warned his audience – the region – and those living in Saudi Arabia that America would attack Saudi Arabia following Iraq if not prevented from doing so. This spurred Saudi security into increasing its efforts to root out Al Qaeda operatives and sympathisers.20 As discussed in further detail in Chapter 2, the Kingdom’s antiterrorism and counterterrorism operations began in 2002 and continued to increase throughout 2003.21 On 15 January, at approximately 12:50 in the afternoon, an explosion at a house in the east of Riyadh killed its occupant.22 The authorities found a cache of weapons, explosives, chemicals, fake identification papers, mobile devices and a large sum of money. On 20 January, bin Laden called for all Muslims to stop fighting one another and to unite against the ‘crusader’

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15

coalition. This prompted the US to issue a warning to its citizens living in the country. Around the same time London Muslims took to the streets to protest the use of Saudi bases in the US-led war in Iraq. Anti-Western rhetoric increased around the region. On 5 February, a Briton working for BAE Systems in Riyadh escaped with minor injuries after being shot at while driving home from work. As we have seen, this was not the first incident targeting a BAE Systems’ employee, an Australian expat having been attacked in June 2002. On the following day, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced they would send a contingent of forces to defend Kuwait against an Iraqi attack. In fact, it was Iraq that was liable to be attacked on the declared assumption of the Western powers that Saddam Hussein had amassed weapons of mass destruction. In accordance with these plans, Kuwait agreed to host coalition forces at the end of 2002. These were to consist primarily of British and US troops. Saudi Arabia then set conditions for the use of its bases; namely that the United States could manage and direct an air campaign against Iraq from the command and control centre at Prince Sultan Airbase, but that the aircraft actually located at the base could not take off from these bases for direct flights on offensive missions. Their attack runs would have to originate from outside the Kingdom. On 17 February 2003, bin Laden responded by singling out Crown Prince Abdullah, later to become King. He claimed Abdullah had sold the blood of martyrs and Palestinian land to satisfy and support both the United States and the Israelis. Although bin Laden had domestic grievances with the Kingdom, his emphasis on the foreign element of Saudi activities was in line with his regional and international ambitions. He took great pleasure in repeating that Arab leaders had betrayed God and the Prophet Muhammad. As if in a carefully timed sequel, the deputy governor of Jawf was assassinated on the same day. This was the second targeted assassination in the same region, the first having occurred when a judge was killed in Skaka on 20 September 2002.23 On 20 February 2003, another British employee of BAE Systems was assassinated in his car while sitting at a traffic light in the district of Gharnala in Riyadh. The gunman was a Yemeni-born naturalised Saudi.24 Five days later, on 25 February, two unidentified attackers attempted to throw a bottle of flammable substance at a McDonald’s in Dammam.25 The fire-bomb was thrown without being lit, which suggests it could have been intended as a warning.

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16  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia On 9 March, Saudi authorities announced the foiling of a bombing attempt at a shopping mall in Jeddah. They found three devices made of dynamite located at the emergency exits, which were set to detonate at 9:00 in the morning, against the background of an increased American troop presence in the Kingdom. Around 2,000 to 5,000 troops had entered Tabuk the week before and taken control of the Arar Airport. The incident came one day after an announcement that Saudi Arabia was permitting the use of bases in Riyadh, Arar, Tabuk and Hafer Baten, which are all located along the Iraqi border. Two days later, on 11 March, bin Laden issued a statement seeking volunteers for martyrdom operations against the Saudi and Kuwaiti oil fields. Bin Laden’s statement was followed by a fatwa that was signed by 32 religious leaders. The decree stipulated: that it would be a grave sin to assist the United States; that all Muslims must ally against and mobilise to confront aggression; that Muslims must urge their governments to act against the American and Western war preparations; and that Muslims should not shed blood in their own country. Another petition signed by 200 scholars followed shortly thereafter. It opposed the Iraq War and called for reforms in Saudi Arabia. A week later, on 18 March, an explosion occurred in Jazira, in the eastern part of Riyadh. The explosion was a failure in that it was mistimed but its significance lay in timing of the overall operation itself. Although American and British forces began targeting Iraqi installations in the southern part of the country for missile strikes from the beginning of March, the official start of the Iraq War was two days after the Jazira incident, i.e., in the early morning on 20 March when US planes began bombing Baghdad. On 22 March, while peaceful protests erupted throughout the Middle East, the government in Riyadh issued a reminder to its citizens that protests are contrary to Saudi law. There were calls within the Saudi media for the government to lift the restriction on public action against the war; the requests were refused. Then, on 29 March three US missiles accidentally landed in the northwest region and a fourth west of Raas Mishaab. There were other missiles that landed in Turkey and Iran. This exacerbated antiAmerican and the anti-Western sentiment and bolstered the anti-war opposition, not just in Saudi Arabia but throughout the Arab world. On 7 April, bin Laden issued a statement that played on pre-existing domestic and regional fears. He warned there would soon be Western attacks on Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan, following on from

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17

the US and British operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However unsubstantiated the predictions, bin Laden’s statement fed into preexisting fears, and made his overall narrative seem more real. Bin Laden argued it was imperative for the Muslims of the world to raise their banners and collect their weapons before it was too late. The US, paying no heed to the gathering opposition, announced the transfer of American military equipment and 400 military personnel to Qatar on 29 April. Then, on 1 May an unidentified gunman wearing a Saudi naval uniform shot an American contractor with the Saudi Royal Navy at the King Abdulaziz Naval Base in Jubail.26 The then Interior Minister Prince Nayef 27 had publicly warned that an attack may occur. With both the war in Iraq and the regional protests against that war in full flow, the Saudi leadership concluded they would have to take full measures to preserve the security of the Saudi state. The first effect of this was that an investigation of suspected operatives on 3 May led to the identification of 82 warehouses and the seizure of travel documents, money, computers, large weapons, explosives and ammunition.28 This was deemed a great success which the authorities were determined to exploit. They therefore took an unprecedented step, displaying the names and pictures of 19 suspected operatives on Saudi television. Seventeen were Saudis, one Kuwaiti and one Yemeni. This episode will be discussed further in Chapter 2, but it should be noted here that the disclosure of the police and intelligence success not only signalled a policy shift in the use of the media – the Saudis having become notorious for their public discretion and unwillingness to publicise any signs of internal political difficulties – but also in the government’s recognition that combating violence required cooperation and coordination between the general public and the state’s security apparatus. On 11 May 2003, the Mujahideen in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaeda’s operational cell in Saudi Arabia, called for revenge attacks on US interests following the arms seizure. They asserted the arms were brought into the country for the purpose of killing those who attacked Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. They urged their followers to strike and destroy Western interests on land, sea and air wherever they may be; they called for unifying all Muslims against the so-called aggressors; and, they sought to attack Saudi officials who sided with these aggressors. Although this announcement marked a split among the jihadists – since 9/11 a debate had been taking place among the Islamic extremist organisations over whether to attack Saudi Arabia – from the perspective of the Saudi

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18  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia government this was yet another challenge which could not be ignored. But the pressure continued relentlessly. On the next day, in the late night of 12 May and early morning of 13 May, Al Qaeda operatives detonated three car bombs almost simultaneously at different locations.29 Nationals killed in the operation included Saudis, Swiss, Lebanese, Irish, Filipinos, Britons, Australians and Americans. Although the security forces exchanged fire with the operatives before the car bombs were detonated, casualties could not be prevented. This operation was the largest since the 1996 Khobar Bombing. It has been referred to as the Riyadh Compound Bombings. Al Qaeda issued yet another statement following this latter operation. It announced that arms and explosives were stored throughout the country and that martyrdom squads were being established to wage a guerrillastyle insurgency on both the government’s leaders and Western interests. Inevitably this led to a further intensification of antiterrorism security operations.30 Security forces sought to find the weapons caches, warehouses used for storage and bomb-making and to identify operatives within the Saudi Al Qaeda network. The Saudi Al Qaeda insurgency began with operations that intentionally created tension and confusion among the security services. They mounted major operations and lethal strikes, which meant that on almost every day from the time of the so-called Riyadh Compound bombing to the end of 2003, there were skirmishes and fire fights between operatives and security officials. Western governments, no less than the Saudis, were becoming apprehensive about all these events, especially the Americans. After a gunman was found roaming around the US consulate in Dhahran in the oil-rich Eastern Province on 19 May, the US closed its embassies and consulates for a whole week. Sensing blood on 21 May, Zawahiri called for more attacks on Westerners. The call went out to all Muslims, wherever they might be. Thus, three Moroccans were arrested later that day (21 May), while attempting to board a plane in Jeddah. They were planning to hijack the plane for a suicide attack. But these Moroccans, even if they were following Zawahiri’s directive, were the exception rather than the rule. Though the insurgents during the Al Qaeda conflict consisted of a combination of Saudi and non-Saudi operatives, the foreign elements of these groups were already present in the country when Zawahiri’s call went out. It was rare for foreign agents, like the three Moroccans, to be smuggled into the country for a specific operation.

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19

The vast size of Saudi Arabia’s land mass – almost equal to that of Western Europe, and with population centres (such as they are) widely dispersed – means it is not surprising that many of the operations throughout the Saudi–Al Qaeda contest occurred on the highways. On 1 June at 9:50 in the evening in the city of Hail, a security officer pulled over a car.31 The driver sped away after being asked for identification, which led to a chase. One of those in the car turned out already to be a terrorist suspect. The subsequent arrests led to other leads to further arrests on terrorism-related charges, of both Saudi and non-Saudi nationals, including some women. In one case, the female Saudi and non-Saudi suspects had weapons and a substantial sum of money in their possession.32 And given the sensitivities and the complications related to females in Saudi Arabia, some Al Qaeda operatives found it useful to disguise themselves as women to avoid detection by the highway security patrols.33 Through the summer of 2003, the cat and mouse game between the Saudi government and Al Qaeda continued relentlessly. Two days after the highway incident the Mujahideen of the Arabian Peninsula (one of the operation cells that formed what we have come to know as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) issued another statement threatening escalation. This followed the death of Yusuf Ayiri, their first leader, and the additional arrest of extremist religious figures.34 Then, at 9:30 on the evening of 14 June, security forces surrounded an apartment complex in Mecca.35 They requested the occupants to surrender and to handover their weapons. The occupants replied by opening fire. Five of them were killed and another five arrested. They were both Saudi and non-Saudis. Seventy-two bombs of various sizes, other weaponry, communication equipment and chemicals used to make explosives were seized from the apartment. On 19 June, a citizen opened fire on Saudi guards at the gate of the Investigations Bureau Building in Khobar. Seven days later, on 26 June, a wanted former security officer turned himself in to the Deputy Interior Minister.36 The Deputy Minister invited others who were suspected of, or actually involved in, terrorism to turn themselves in. It should be noted here that the Deputy Minister’s call and subsequently the Ministry of Interior’s adoption of a policy encouraging activists on the path of violence to surrender paved the way for others outside of the country to later choose the option of surrender and rehabilitation. The policy became official when in 2004 Crown Prince Abdullah, who at that time was the Kingdom’s Regent, introduced Amnesty policy, which

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20  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia invited individuals inside and outside the country to surrender to Saudi authorities. There are two notable incidents in 2004. An individual located in Iran, near its border with Iraq, and another one in Damascus contacted the respective Saudi embassies in those countries to surrender to the Ministry of Interior.37 These surrenders would not have been possible without the 2003 act of the former security officer and the subsequent offer set out by the Deputy Interior Minister. They contributed to confidencebuilding measures and laid the foundation for the later policies of surrender and rehabilitation. (Rehabilitation is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.) As the security forces expanded their efforts,38 this led to more arrests, detentions and seizures of ammunition and weaponry, communication devices, surveillance equipment, bullet-proof vests, forged personal and travel documents, passports, sums of cash and stolen vehicles.39 Examples of the weaponry seized throughout the Saudi Al Qaeda conflict included rocket launchers, bombs, grenades, machine guns and pistols.40 Many of the grenades were Russian made, while the typical guns found were Russian, Chinese and Iraqi Kalashnikovs.41 Most of the weaponry was smuggled into the Kingdom through the Jordanian border. The Yemeni border saw more human trafficking, while the Bahraini border experienced more cases of alcohol and drug trafficking. The chemicals for making explosives and other weaponry included ammonium nitrate, potassium nitrate, powder fertiliser, sulphur and a mixture of other items.42 Finally, Saudi security found labs in different locations across the country for the making, assembly and storage of explosives and other material needed for Al Qaeda operations. Saudi policies on border control and security operations are discussed in Chapter 2. On 19 July 2003, the motorcade of then Crown Prince Abdullah was attacked in Mecca but was foiled by security forces. Another operation was foiled on 21 July.43 On 28 July, authorities cordoned off a farm in Qasim. There were individuals located at the farm who were wanted. The wanted individuals opened fire and threw grenades. Security personnel responded accordingly.44 On 6 August, they caught a Saudi attempting to pack explosives into the walls of the air conditioning system in a cement factory located in Qasim province, north of Riyadh. In the previous week, on 28 July, in this the same province two other operatives and two security personnel had been killed during a shoot-out.45 Skirmishes between Al Qaeda and Saudi security continued on an ongoing basis.

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21

Although it would be too cumbersome to list all the confrontations, there is one incident on 10 August 2003 that deserves attention.46 A security officer attempted to stop a vehicle in the northern part of Riyadh but the suspect sped away. The officer gave chase and when he arrived at a rest area, two other vehicles approached and opened fire. He had stumbled onto weapons smuggling in progress and, when reinforcements arrived, a stash of rocket-propelled grenades and explosives was recovered.47 The month of September and the beginning of October 2003 witnessed continued attacks, arrests and detentions, as well as confiscations of ammunition, weaponry and other materials associated with terrorist attacks. As October progressed a gradual shift could be detected in the flow of events. While up to that point the Saudi response to the threat of terrorism seemed reactive, with Saudi security forces investigating attacks and targeting perpetrators, by early October the attitude became more proactive. It was no longer enough to make arrests based on interrogations or happenstance, derived from security officers on patrol observing suspicious activity. From this point going forward the efforts of the authorities would rely on better intelligence, better coordination between different arms of the security services and more effective surveillance. This intelligence-led approach signalled a shift from domestic counterterrorism operations to antiterrorism intelligence collection and analysis. Intelligence collection and analysis are discussed in further detail in Chapter 2. Meanwhile the Al Qaeda rhetoric kept up the psychological pressure on the Saudi regime. On 19 October 2003, a video of the May bombings in Riyadh surfaced on the internet. In the video, Mohammed Shahri, an Al Qaeda operative in the Arabian Peninsula, designated the bombings as a gesture in honour of Osama bin Laden and said the actions of the Mujahideen in the Arabian Peninsula were an answer to God’s call. Shahri released another statement two days later, which questioned the authenticity and validity of religious leaders and scholars who had previously lectured and written on jihad. It criticised their willingness to support the state in its anti-jihadist operations. In the following week, on 25 October, America and Britain issued yet more warnings to their citizens living in the Kingdom. On 6 November two men blew themselves up after being surrounded by security officials in Mecca.48 On the same day, police surrounded a house in Riyadh at four in the morning.49 The occupants threw grenades and opened fire on the officers. It later transpired that these grenades had

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22  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia been made locally.50 This was a departure since up to this point all grenades in the Saudi black arms market were of foreign (mostly Russian) origin. On 8 November, a deadly explosion rocked Riyadh in the Wadi Laban suburb.51 The attackers stormed past security guards in a vehicle marked as a police truck and wearing police uniforms. Two of the attackers fired at the guards and tossed grenades to distract them. Entering the Muhaya residential compound, the attackers detonated explosive-laden vehicles. The compound was located three miles from the entrance of the diplomatic quarter, which was home to several hundred other Arabs but very few Saudis. The attack was larger than the May bombing in terms of the numbers injured (122) and killed (11).52 After the Muhaya bombing, 4,600 Saudi National Guard troops were sent to Mecca in anticipation of another bombing. At the same time, the targeting of Arabs and Muslims prompted an intense debate within Saudi society. What many Saudi citizens found difficult to grasp was how members of an association that proclaimed itself as Islamic purists could so readily find it within themselves to kill and maim so many Muslims in the name of Islam. The strain within Saudi society was beginning to generate real hostility toward Al Qaeda. The reaction from Al Qaeda to this time of questioning was swift. It came as a statement from one of their senior figures, Mohammed Ablaj. He claimed that the Arab victims were collaborating with the Americans. His statement was followed by bin Laden’s announcement of the coming release of a tape titled ‘Those Killed in the Confrontations on the Soil of the Peninsula’ (i.e., in Arabia). Then, on 5 December, the Mujahidin in the Arabian Peninsula field commander released a statement calling for attacks on US military bases in the Gulf and for the youth of Arabia to begin attacks at home. He said it was time to punish those who betrayed the Islamic nation and that operations against the Americans and the Saudi state would serve as a lesson to others. The following day, 6 December, the Brigade of the Two Holy Mosques of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – also known as the Brigade of Death for Special Operations and the Alharamayn Brigades – threatened to cleanse Saudi Arabia of anyone helping the United States. The Saudi government announced it would reward anyone providing information on Al Qaeda operatives and sympathisers. In response, the Brigade of the Two Holy Mosques issued a warning on 12 December that the group would assassinate anyone passing information to the authorities. On 28 December, the US warned plans were in the making for an attack.

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23

Later that day, the British Embassy issued a similar warning to Westerners of an imminent attack. On 29 December, a car bomb exploded in Salam district in Riyadh. While there were no casualties or damage other than to the car itself this was a stark reminder that, as 2003 was drawing to a close, the Saudi–Al Qaeda battle was still in full flow. The incident was claimed by the Brigade of the Two Holy Mosques.53 Clearly this was a conflict that, by the end of 2003, had not yet run its course. Equally clear, its dynamics were seriously influenced by the high operational capability of those fighters who had returned from Afghanistan.54 A majority of the Al Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia at this time were aged between 24 and 35.55 Most of them had left the country illegally to receive training and had now returned to take part in operations. While there were other nationalities recruited inside the country, the overwhelming majority of those comprising the Saudi Al Qaeda network were of Saudi nationality. This meant they knew the country – its geography, its social networks, its inherent religious commitment and its overall cultural make-up – very well. Knowledge of the country’s social networks was a particularly valuable asset for anyone seeking to influence Saudi internal politics. Saudi Arabia has five different regions and 13 administrative provinces, which are further demarcated by municipalities and districts. The administrative provinces are responsible for providing services and allocating resources to the people within them. Responsibility for overseeing the functioning of the provincial system is with the Ministry of Interior. It is also responsible for overseeing local civil defence and security offices across the country. It is therefore difficult for outsiders to navigate Saudi society given the geographical variance and different social networks across the country. An individual must be introduced to and accepted by a particular social network. Even then, without there being a deeper linkage, the interaction is limited. An outsider would need an existing network in the country to navigate the territory and existing social cleavages. This helps to explain why Al Qaeda took such pains to recruit operatives from within the Kingdom. They both knew the workings of the system and had a range of contacts and connections which would prove useful in carrying out their activities. Given the importance of geography and social networks for carrying out both terrorist and anti-terrorist security operations, Figure 0.1 provides a numerical breakdown of the incidents and operations from the 1990s to 2011.56

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Sudan

Egypt

Tabuk

8

Iraq

QASIM REGION

NAJRAN Incidents REGION Najran Jizan

RIYADH REGION

Baraidah

ASIR REGION 5

JIZAN REGION

BAHAR REGION

39 MAKKAH Jeddah Incidents REGION Mecca

Yanba

MADINAH REGION

HA’IL 155 REGIONIncidents

JAWF Incidents REGION NORTHERN BORDER REGION

TABUK REGION

Jordan

17 Incidents

Qatar

Yemen

EASTERN REGION

Dammam

Jubail

Kuwait

Oman

United Arab Emirates

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

100 200 100

0 0

300 Kilometres 200

XY Area and Number of Incidents by Regional and 300 Miles Provincial Breakdown

Regional Border

International Border

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

1990s

2003–2006

Total Number of Incidents by Regional and Provincial Breakdown Period 1990s–2011

N o rth ere nB Q o a rde s i m Ja r Pr w ov inc H f e/B Oa alt u ra sim Ri idah ya J dh Da uba mm il Kh am Ma T k a D ob k Ma ah P bouk hah ar rov kk Pr ran Ma ah P ince ovin k ka rovin /Ma ce h P ce kk rov /Je ah d in c e/Y dah an bu Jit an A s ir jra n

Israel

Iran

Na

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Jubail Dammam Khobar Dhahran Tabuk Province Mecca Province/Mecca Mecca Province/Jeddah Mecca Province/Yanbu Jizan Asir Najran

The Eastern Region: The Eastern Province

The Hijaz or Western Region: Tabuk, Medina, Mecca and Bahah

The Southern Region: Jizan, Asir and Najran

0 0 0

1 0 2 0

0 0 1 0

0 14 0 0

0 1

2000–2

Figure 0.1  Violent Incidents by Region and Province

0 1 0

1 0 2 0

0 0 0 1

0 2 0 0

Hail Qasim Qasim Province/Buraidah Riyadh

The Najd or Central Region: Hail, Qasim and Riyadh

1990s 0 0

Province/Area Within Province

The Northern Region: Northern Northern Border Borders and Jawf Jawf

Region

1 2 0

0 7 20 1

1 8 5 1

3 87 24 10

1 2

2003–6

0 0 1

1 0 1 3

0 0 0 0

2 7 3 3

2 2

2007–11

5

39

17

155

8

Regional Total

26  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia As the figure shows, a majority of incidents, investigations, arrests and/ or highway patrol incidents occurred in the Najd or the Central Region, which is comprised of the Hail, Qasim and Riyadh provinces. This region is the heart of the Al-Saud power base. Riyadh is, of course, the capital of the country. What is interesting to note is that there are more incidents in Qasim than in Riyadh. The former is far more conservative than the latter. There are also different social networks when comparing the two provinces, there being a clear rural–urban divide between Qasim (which contains no major city comparable to the capital) and Riyadh. Finally, there is a marked difference in the poverty levels between the two provinces, with urban, cosmopolitan Riyadh having emerged as a major commercial centre, while Qasim’s meagre agricultural base has not provided the same opportunities for real estate and trading riches. The Hijaz or Western Region has the second highest number of incidents, with Mecca Province being where most have occurred. Within the Mecca Province, the city of Jeddah had the highest number of events. Finally, there was an increase in the Jeddah incidents during the months of June to August, in line with the Riyadh government’s moves to Mecca Province for the summer months. The geographical distribution of operations and the tabulation provided here shed some additional light on the Saudi–Al Qaeda conflict. Hegghammer has argued that the coercive power of the state, the lack of popular support for the insurgents, their concentration on the Iraq War,57 and the heightened security in the Kingdom engendered by the war all help to explain why the Al Qaeda campaign in Saudi Arabia failed.58 While the role of the public will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, it should be noted here that Saudi security relied on information provided by the public in order to investigate and identify the Saudi Al Qaeda networks.59 The information they provided in the first years of the conflict contributed to the increase in the antiterrorism security operations deployed in the subsequent years. By 2004 the antiterrorist policies and activities of the Saudi state would undergo some change. As explained, the reactive characteristics of counterterrorism would transform into more proactive antiterrorism posture. But the changed approach within the Saudi Al Qaeda network was also significant. We have seen that at a global level they had undergone some fundamental changes between the pre-9/11 period and the 2003–6 period. Their network had transitioned from a quasi-centralised entity

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27

with a centralised operational command structure to a decentralised entity with quasi-decentralised tactical operational linkages between the command structure of the global network and the country-based operative networks. At the local level, the Saudi Al Qaeda operations reflect this structural change. Decision making for Saudi Arabia on a day-to-day basis shifted to the local Saudi command structure. This in part helps to explain their failure. The central command of the global network was not aware of conditions within the Saudi social environment. This caused tensions between the Saudi and global networks, with the latter arguing for the start of the campaign, whereas the responsibilities transferred to the local organisations meant that these directives from the centre actually undermined the decentralised organisation that had been put in place. Finally, and as Chapter 2 will highlight, better organised and more coherent Saudi antiterrorism and counterterrorism operations played an important part in undermining the Saudi Al Qaeda campaign. Assessment of the successes and failures of Al Qaeda’s campaign, however, are not within the purview of this book. The intent here is merely to provide data on Saudi policy. C.  Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),   Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Qaeda in Other Places This subsection examines Al Qaeda’s development in the areas beyond Saudi Arabia. The geographical spread of Al Qaeda adds to its complexity and to the difficulties of understanding how the organisation functions. Al Qaeda had pre-9/11 roots in the countries it targeted, as well as in the regions where they were located and/or were operating. This is important when assessing the patterns of their networks, the flow and movement of their operatives, and their operational signatures.60 Many of the Al Qaeda operatives leaving Afghanistan returned to their home countries. For example, the Iraqi Al Qaeda operatives returned to Iraq while the Saudi operatives returned home or went to Yemen. Inevitably more Saudi Al Qaeda operatives would cross the border into Yemen when Saudi security operations intensified. As already noted, Al Qaeda already had a foothold in Africa before 9/11. It even had connections to America and Europe. The linkages, connections and movement of operatives predate the 9/11 period. Yet even in this

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28  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia period when they did not yet occupy centre stage and were not yet on the radar screen of every intelligence organisation, even they felt the pressures of safety and security for their networks. Nevertheless, whether the policy of denying a safe haven for operatives is really conducive to countering the phenomenon and tactics of terrorism is a moot point. Arguably a greater sense of security derived from the absence of constant uncertainty would allow operatives to be identified and monitored more easily and for their operations to be infiltrated more effectively – all points to be discussed in later chapters. Al Qaeda in Yemen dates to the 1990s,61 but it had limited efficacy in the country for various reasons.62 The Yemeni government had other more pressing security issues at the time and it was also not among Al Qaeda’s first targets. It would not be until the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden harbour that the government would crack down on the network’s presence within the country. The government’s action triggered a response and galvanised some Yemenis into a reaction of anger fuelled by pride and humiliation. It would also lead to Al Qaeda Yemeni operatives focusing their efforts within rather than outside their country. Justification for the shift was the Yemeni government’s relationship with and policy toward the United States. The existing domestic grievances, however, provided a fertile context to justify Al Qaeda operations in the country. Al Qaeda in Yemen and Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia merged in 2009, thereby becoming Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).63 With the merger there was an expansion in the movement’s operational targets. These targets now included the Yemeni government, the United States and Saudi Arabia, the latter because of its close relationships with both the Yemeni and American governments. The physical contiguity of Yemen and Saudi Arabia also provided practical logistic benefits to collaboration. While AQAP deemed strongest in terms of organisational capacity, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was thought to be the most robust in the region in terms of tactical operations, knowledge and capabilities.64 This was, in part, because of the years spent engaging the United States in insurgency-style warfare. Any foreign component in AQI was there merely to provide the Iraqi members of the network with logistical knowledge and training.65 It should also be noted that AQI was a network comprised of Sunni Iraqis, many of whom were former Baath Party loyalists. They were resentful of having been sidelined and victimised in the Shi’a-dominated post-Saddam government of Nouri al-Maliki.

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29

Operations in Iraq from 2003 to 2006 were more akin to a civil war, with AQI members fighting alongside other anti-US insurgents against the US-backed Maliki government forces. In 2005, divisions emerged with the increased targeting of civilians by Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s leadership. This led some members of the larger anti-US insurgency coalition to break away and engage in conciliation with the Iraqi government, much aided by US inducements. The fragmenting of the coalition changed the dynamics of the operations. By 2006, there were still insurgency-style operations taking place in Iraq’s major population centres, especially in areas dominated by the Shi’a but the conditions were no longer conducive to the type of civil war that had raged before. The Al Qaeda that was once in Saudi Arabia and now in Yemen and Iraq were closest to the original Al Qaeda core which took shape in Afghanistan in the 1990s. As will be recalled, the original core of Al Qaeda was not per se indigenous to any particular area. The indigenous dimension emerged in the immediate pre-9/11 period, when operations and operatives shifted from the global to the local. In other words, indigenous operatives concentrated on operations within their countries of origin. Al Qaeda’s roots in Africa begin in the 1990s, namely when Osama bin Laden was based in the Sudan. In East Africa, the network was focused on regional targets rather than being concerned with the US. In North Africa, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), consisted of local indigenous groups, with a strong concentration in the Sahel. The network extended from Mauritania to Chad. Membership became overwhelmingly Algerian, but there were other recruits from Ghana, Mauritania, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal.66 While the group became multinational, AQIM took on a network structure, rather than an entity with a central authority presiding over a chain of command directing operations throughout the African continent. The groups comprising the network were indigenous, consisting of people primarily from the countries in which they operated. What bound them together was their regional struggle against what they deemed to be oppression, their opposition to US global and regional hegemony, and their fights against Western influence and domination – whether political, military, economic or cultural. From Africa to Southeast Asia, the Al Qaeda network thus evolved as clusters of indigenous groups. In Southeast Asia, the focus has been on confronting the US.67 As we have seen, what all the groups have in

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30  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia common is the idea that everyone is part of, and participating in, a global struggle against US global hegemony. Particularly fascinating with the Al Qaeda discourse are its attempts to link itself and relate to the larger nonviolent global movement. No actual connections between Al Qaeda and the non-violent movements have been identified, and the perceptions among Al Qaeda ideologues of common ground between the two movements will be explored in the next chapter. Suffice to say here that Al Qaeda’s views on the possibilities of interaction with the non-violent movements were themselves a significant part of their discourse. Perhaps it might have, and might still be, to signal a reduction in the violent tactics favoured within the Al Qaeda network. Finally, it should be noted that even in Europe and the Americas, the activists are indigenous and have no original direct connection to Al Qaeda’s original ideological foundation. In fact, in some Islamist and Al Qaeda circles in the Middle East and Asia there have been dismissals of the American and European interpretations and practice of Islam. This reinforces the notion that overall Al Qaeda, as a network, has moved beyond the ideologically defined boundaries of its pre-9/11 structure. Interaction and dialogue as a mediating factor and moderating force might well become part of the Al Qaeda model. As this entire section has demonstrated, Al Qaeda is complex. It is not an entity per se but, rather, an enigma. It is an enigma that is global and yet local. III.  A Global Movement with a ‘Glocal’ Emphasis The complexity of the Al Qaeda network makes it hard to define or to characterise it as a movement. An Al Qaeda leader described it as a flexible, amorphous entity lacking any permanent base.68 It is a work in progress that has many directions, strands and influences, with its positions, policies and strategies changing and varying according to circumstance. In this section, the enigma is further explored by examining its varied focus on ideology, an overall worldview, its goals, modus operandi and sources of influence and support. Al Qaeda’s worldview has changed over time. In the pre-9/11 period, its discourse held more of a religiously ideological overtone than it did after 2001.69 The post 9/11 Al Qaeda discourse transcended country and regional audiences whether of ordinary citizens or political actors. The messages sought to stretch beyond the Muslim world to reach people of all

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and no faith, and from the Asian to the American continents. It was the absence of a central command in the post-9/11 period that contributed to a subtly changed identity. Messages were given a strategic dimension, seeking merely to sanction, encourage, and provide guidance for those engaged in the global struggle against the perceived US/Israeli hegemony. Announcements relating to local issues were left to be distributed locally in each of the different areas. Overall, Al Qaeda has been pragmatic and strategic, with the messages shifting according to their relevance at any specific time or place. They focused on the global, and referred to local issues to the extent that they were part of the global. The changed emphasis in the Al Qaeda discourse and presentation, focusing post-9/11 on matters of ideology and strategy, also saw a shift in the locus of ideological influence within the movement. The existing literature describes this shift. Those who were ideologically close to the original movement were said to reflect the core. They were located in Asia and the Middle East. Outside the core there has developed a circle of groups around the world who are not ideologically close to the core. Africa sits among these, while Europe and North America are considered to be furthest from the ideological core.70 The spheres of ideological influence are not operationally connected. Rather, it is the idea of a global struggle that binds them together in a network. Most of the groups are self-sufficient, independent and indigenous to the areas where they are operating. Just as the Al Qaeda network has evolved ideologically so too have the goals. Previously, individuals sought to inspire and incite movements and the masses, to attack those who threatened Islam and Muslims, and to create an Islamic state in the countries in which they were fighting.71 These goals continued to form part of the discourse of any Al Qaeda grouping. But the ideological and geographical spread of the movement has also led to a significant growth in their numbers and their diversity. This complicates any attempt to identify and narrow down their aspirations to a single common set of goals. Two common goals that do continue to apply across the board are to end non-Muslim interference in the internal affairs of Muslim countries and to end what is perceived as US/Israeli global hegemony.72 With the exception of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, the tactical operations of various other Al Qaeda groups in different areas have never been properly studied and analysed, despite the fact that differences have

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32  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia been identified between insurgency-like tactics such as terrorism, versus traditional guerrilla warfare against the military and security forces of the state. Other activities noted include cyberattacks against intelligence and media targets, exploitation of the anger, frustration and resentment of Muslim communities against the US, and multigenerational campaigns that promote different policies and strategies. The last area to highlight is support. There are multiple sources of material and financial support given for entities within the global network of Al Qaeda.73 Finance is discussed in Chapter 3, but it should be noted here that funding is a complex issue. Al Qaeda’s funding structure is no longer centralised and the entities comprising the network are primarily responsible for developing their own operational and logistical funding base. Still, the majority of funds are derived from legitimate means, which to a degree are determined by the local, national, regional and global economy. The complexity of the Al Qaeda network makes it hard to define or to characterise. It is a flexible, amorphous entity without any permanent base74 that has many directions, positions, and policies with each changing and varying according to circumstance. This section has attempted to explain the enigma of Al Qaeda by identifying the varied ideologies, goals and modi operandi making up the movement, all of which help to define its complex character.

Understanding Terrorism and Counterterrorism The subject of terrorism is controversial and emotive. It is both a domestic and an international phenomenon that transcends international borders. Yet, it was not until 11 September 2001 that the international community would recognise and collectively rally against the threat of terrorism, despite the many previous calls for collective action to address the phenomenon.75 Effective cooperation in the area of counterterrorism in the domestic, regional and international sphere has been constrained by a number of factors: the definition problem – what actually constitutes terrorism?; politico–ideological issues – when is an act of violence terrorism and when does it become a gesture of resistance?; the matter of sovereignty – when does the international community acquire the right to override the sovereignty of a state to interdict terrorism? These questions were

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all further impacted by perceptions of the underlying motivations that drive terrorism. Where the goals behind the resistance to a terrorist threat are ‘disrupt, degrade, dismantle and defeat’, it would be right to assume that the norms and policies behind such efforts are driven by military security considerations and perspectives of the terrorists’ motives. But where the state’s goals are defined by a ‘pursue, prevent, prepare and protect’ attitude it would be fair to assume that the state’s norms and policies are driven by subtler political and social perspectives and considerations.76 These debates conform to the larger paradigmatic differences for countering terrorism. Two dominant paradigms have been recognised throughout modern history to counter terrorism. The first deals with terrorism as a criminal act, relying on countermeasures such as preventative and law enforcement policies. The second sees terrorism as an act of war or rebellion, where the countermeasures are military and security policies. A paradigm shift occurred in 2006, which synthesised the two previous approaches, namely terrorism-as-crime and terrorism-as-warfare. It is in this synthesis that the Saudi model of counterterrorism is situated. This shift contributed to greater levels of cooperation between the different arms of the Saudi state, resulting in clearer definition and planning of counterterrorism policy. Constraints on Counterterrorism Policies Throughout history, the definition of terrorism has varied according to interests, politics and relations between states.77 The French first used the term to refer to Robespierre’s Reign of Terror in 1793–4. It then described the chaotic violence unleashed by the new revolutionary French regime and essentially meant regime-sponsored violence. This shifted during the latter part of the French revolution, with a popular revolt against the ‘reign of terror’.78 The notion of ‘terror’ then took on a more negative connotation. Today the term is used in different ways, with different meanings and emphases. The word can have a neutral descriptive function or it can become a term of abuse between adversaries. The definition problem has been bedevilled throughout the contemporary era since the new common usage has created confusion and made it difficult to agree on the essence of terrorism and its elements. This problem has also had an impact on Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism policies.

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34  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia The Kingdom decided that death from terrorism should be considered as murder, that injuries from terrorism (or in fact any acts of terrorism) should be considered as attempted murder and that the uses of devices for carrying out actions that cause panic are terrorist acts, and as such are attempted murder.79 In the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism – also referred to as the Arab Agreement for Counterterrorism – terrorism is defined as: any violent act or threat, whatever its motive or purpose, which takes place to implement a criminal plan, whether individual or collective, aiming to cause panic among the people and frightening them, causing harm or exposing their life, freedom and security to danger.80

The Islamic Fiqh Academy in Jeddah of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) defined it as a form of aggression, intimidation or threat posed by the state, a group or the individual against the integrity of human life, religion, property and intellect.81 A group of students defined it more broadly as the destruction of human society.82 As these various definitions demonstrate, agreement remains a problem. Related to and impacting definitions are politico–ideological differences. For generations, both Arabs in particular, and Muslims in general, have been subjected to derogatory image-making in the West.83 The events of 9/11 certainly did nothing to change this situation. The continuing negative image of the Arab and Muslim worlds have impacted not only public opinion but also policy making in Western capitals. Take for example the ease with which the wording used to describe the UK and the US counterterrorism measures have conflated Islam and terrorism.84 Many Muslim scholars and leaders have continually sought to stress that Islam is a religion of peace that calls for equality, fairness, freedom and social solidarity, which (they argue) makes their faith the complete antithesis of terrorism. But their words and pleas for fairness have had little impact or reining in the incessant talk of ‘Islamic terrorism’.85 At the same time, this politico–ideological clash of world views hindered opportunities for effective cooperation and exacerbated US and European domestic, regional and international policy failures in the areas of both intelligence and terrorism. It has also influenced how the West has perceived Saudi Arabia’s policies.

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Politico–ideological debates also took place within Saudi Arabia. Some argued that the 9/11 acts were committed by individuals who were narrow-minded and conservative and with extreme thoughts, who misinterpreted the faith to carry out and justify their violence.86 The onus of their acts was placed on the personal characteristics of the individual involved. Others took a more generalist approach, arguing that intellectual, moral and religious issues contributed to the rise in violence and terrorism in the region.87 This view interpreted terrorist acts as a kind of response to a general malaise among perpetrators relating to the political and cultural shifts within the region. But here too there seemed to be general agreement that violent acts were derived from a misinterpretation of religious tenets even though there was little agreement on what might have been the core motives behind the terrorist acts. Because terrorism is an international and social phenomenon, an understanding of the motivating factors is essential.88 General contributing factors to terrorism can be segmented into three categories: the individual, the collective and the international.89 At the individual level, the contributing factors are economic, psychological and social; at the collective level, they are economic and social; and, finally, at the international level, the contributing factors are occupation of territory, denial of rights and an unresponsive international system.90 Looking specifically at the Arab world and taking a broad, all-encompassing view some Saudi scholars find that violence can be attributed to a lack of a religious education and the absence of religious education programmes; the lack of role models; and socio-economic factors such as demographic changes, education, economic gaps, family breakdown, generational conflict, illiteracy, instability and unemployment.91 The 2005 International Conference on Counter-Terrorism, which culminated in the Riyadh Declaration, led to a global consensus on 11 underlying factors or roots to terrorism.92 In order, they included extreme poverty; unfair social systems; corruption; political issues; foreign occupations; extreme exploitation; religious extremism; systematic abuse of human rights; discrimination and economic negligence; cultural imbalance; and regional disputes and crises. In a study on student perceptions in Bahrain, it was found that weakness of cultural awareness contributes to the rise of violence.93 In other words, a general level of ignorance about the history, social and cultural roots of a society contributed to its instability and proclivity for violence. This has also been

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36  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia suggested as a potential factor for both tension and violence that has occurred in the Eastern Province in Saudi Arabia. A study done on Saudi students, in general, found that there was a significant correlation between violence/aggressive behaviour and the lack of self-esteem and self-awareness and that males living in urban as opposed to rural areas were more prone to violence.94 Not all of these factors were present in every case, but certainly a combination of many of the motivational variables cited could be found among a significant portion of incidents of violence. As can be recognised, there are divergent views on the contributing factors to the growth of terrorist acts, with many scholars and policy makers not being able to come to agreement.95 Some scholars argue that it may be a mistake to attribute specific factors to the use of violence because the contexts in which the acts occur vary temporally and spatially, which means that no one single case will replicate itself.96 There are, multiple reasons that lead perpetrators to adopt a violent strategy.97 This, in part, complicates the policy making process at the domestic, regional and international levels. It also helps to explain why cooperation is, at times, limited. Terrorism, as highlighted by the referenced Saudi and Arab scholars, challenges the security of Arab countries and their stability, which obviously constitutes a threat to their fundamental interests. The threat posed is actually far deeper and not limited to one specific region or country; rather, it is existential across the board in the Arab world.

Summary: From Domestic Security to Global Mobilisation This chapter has been concerned with providing readers with a brief background on Al Qaeda, an understanding of terrorism, the debate within the counterterrorism field, and an overview of the chapters in the rest of the book. The complexity of Al Qaeda needs to be grasped in order to better contextualise Saudi and other counterterrorism policies, which will need to vary and remain flexible in order to maintain order, ensure stability, and promote peace in the different contexts in which these policies are situated. Security is thus at the heart of the Saudi counterterrorism model. The quest for security has clearly played a dominant role for humanity, governments and society since the beginning of time. But the Saudi model has created approaches that are important for finding the keys to peace and

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stability and which might even be applicable, in whole or in part, to regions beyond the Middle East. It has been one of the more successful models to date. Its multipronged, multidimensional and pragmatic characteristics deserve study for its broader relevance.

Outline of the Book Chapter 1 is concerned with the power of perception and policy construction. It examines Saudi–US relations; sets forth the theoretical underpinning of power and problem of perception; explains the theoretical approach to data collection and the formation of perceptions; describes the American perception of Saudi Arabia and its relationship to terrorism; and, finally, discusses America’s understanding of terrorism. The underlying argument is that public perception defines the boundaries of policy possibilities. If Americans are not aware of how they view the ‘other’, then the cognitive blocks used to build the bridges of understanding will remain superficial and unsteady. The preexisting public biases found in the US constrain not just policy action, but also have an impact on how Saudi counterterrorism policies and strategies are understood. As mentioned, the Saudi counterterrorism model consists of three pillars. Chapter 2 is concerned with Pillar I – the building blocks of stability, order and peace. Intelligence is the building block of stability; security is the building block of order; and politics is the building blocks for peace. Intelligence, security and politics are interrelated and permeate all the Saudi counterterrorism policies and strategies covered in the subsequent chapters. Each of the blocks that constitute this chapter are situated first in the normative context of Saudi Arabia’s sense of security. The in-depth examination explains the complexity of the policies pursued and demonstrates their evolutionary nature. Chapter 3 examines Pillar II; namely, counterterrorism financing. Specifically, it defines terrorist financing and specifically explains the elements of Al Qaeda’s funding. In the process, the chapter explores the role of economic factors in counterterrorism policy making and the ways in which the model attempts to navigate around the complexities surrounding Al Qaeda financing. It is from this chapter that the contextual variables on policy making will be better understood, as will the reasons for the variance in counterterrorism strategies from country to country and from region to region.

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38  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Chapter 4 addresses Pillar III, the policies and strategies deployed for combating ideological, intellectual and cyber support for terrorism. This pillar of the Saudi approach is vital to the country’s entire counterterrorism model. It is viewed as being more concerned with antiterrorism than counterterrorism. As explained in Chapter 2, counterterrorism and antiterrorism differ from each other. Antiterrorism is concerned with the policies, strategies and methodologies that prevent an act from occurring. It is preemptive rather than reactive. Counterterrorism is reactive. The emphasis on this distinction is crucial and makes this pillar the most important in the Saudi model because it recognises the role that ideas, identities and ideologies play in terrorism and the attempts to combat it. In the words of civil rights activist Medgar Evers, ‘you can kill a man, but you cannot kill an idea.’ Saudi Arabia has accepted this notion and, has attempted to embrace such ideas and ideology to promote moderation and tolerance over extremism and violence. The Conclusion brings the book to a close with a short review of the model and what was covered.

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1  THE POWER OF PERCEPTION,   POLICY CONSTRUCTION AND   SAUDI COUNTERTERRORISM

Al Qaeda’s complex structures and varied priorities were highlighted in the last chapter. A failure to recognise Al Qaeda’s complexity distorted understandings and perceptions of a movement that the global community and the United States in particular claimed as their opponent on the battlefield in the global ‘war on terror.’ The consequence of these misunderstandings and misperceptions was a failure in some, and limited success in other, antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts. It was only at the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century that the United States began to reflect on the policies pursued in the first decade of the century. The outcome of America’s reassessment of its policies seemed to suggest a shift in its perception of the terrorism issue. This chapter examines the making of US policy in the context of the American perceptions of Saudi Arabia and the phenomenon of terrorism. The first section of the chapter explores in theoretical terms the workings of power and the problems of perception. It is followed by a discussion on the perceptions of the American public and how these perceptions evolved. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion on the strategic uses of perception. An understanding of America’s perception of Saudi Arabia is important because Saudi Arabia came to be incorporated into the public image of terrorism following 9/11. The events of that terrible day had an impact on how the American public, policymakers and the media frame, interpret and

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40  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia understand Saudi antiterrorism measures and counterterrorism policies. Complicating the problem of American perception of Saudi Arabia was the fact that the country faced pre-existing biases in the United States. Whether based on actual or perceived biases, these perceptions came to play a role in the game of politics. They also led to the stifling and/or dismissal of any counter-narrative that questioned the American narrative. Attempting to reconcile conflicting narratives tends to highlight the power and problems associated with perception as well as to emphasise the opportunities for misunderstanding the complexities inherent in any situation. In particular, in the context of this study, conflicting narratives have complicated understandings of Saudi antiterrorism and counterterrorism policies.

The Power and Problem of Perception: Underpinnings   of the Grounded-Theory Approach to Perception Comparativist scholars writing on American political thought and philosophy argue that it is human nature to engage in comparison: e.g., between the ‘self ’ and ‘other’, or between one or more countries.1 Comparison sheds light on both a people and a country. A problem arises, though, when we attempt to impose value judgements based on those comparisons. As the first chapter highlighted in the discussion on the enigma of Al Qaeda, in any comparative situation the actors, their worlds, and the views held by them or their observers can never be treated on a simplistic level. An understanding of the complexity of all the factors involved and the way they impact policy helps to overcome the problems of perception and the negative influence of misperceptions. Theoretically, the study of and the focus on perception is situated within a cognitive approach. A cognitive approach assumes that all actors view their environments differently from each other and that they operate within their own psychological contexts.2 Their perceptions are based on actively picking up meaningful information from the environment.3 A closer look at classical perception theory reveals that perceptual actors perceive before sensing. Sensations occur when an actor is exposed to something, say the ‘other’. Before exposure of, introduction to, and interaction with the ‘other’, perceptions are formulated. These perceptions serve to interpret, infer, organise and attach meaning; to fuse them with existing memories; and to combine them with concepts, impose logic or construct models of understanding.4 These initial perceptions are either

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reified or modified based on the information gathered over time through interaction. Thus, it is the information processed or picked up in the environment that is used for making and refining perceptions. Perceptions are reflected in the discourse used by actors.5 Discourse signals the type of relations and the limits of possible action, and provides a basis for evaluating government policy.6 Perceptions are, therefore, important. They play a role in the process of how the public interprets and understands the imagined boundaries between different perceptions and strategies and possible behavioural outcomes. According to pictorial representation theory, humanity takes in different information depending on how something is represented. Information can be something learned from a teacher, something read in the media, or something observed from others. It, thus, matters how academia, government and the media learn and frame the other, which in this case is Saudi Arabia. Theories on perception recognise that no two like representations exist – there is how ‘I’ perceive something, ‘You’ perceive it, and the way it is perceived in society. This implies that the constructed representations of Saudi Arabia are not per se alike. The varying degrees of experience, exposure to other sources of information, and different learning processes lead to perceptual divergence from areas of image convergence.7 It is within the areas of convergence where collective action and policy can be formulated. The representations of Saudi Arabia were constructed using qualitative, content analysis of primary and secondary sources that selectively targeted academia, government and the media.8 The documents used included academic articles,9 government statements and/or quotations derived from the articles and wires, and media newswires. The period covered was 1 January 1973 to 31 December 2012.10 An inductive approach to data collection was adopted.11 That is, there was no preset theoretical frame imposed.12 The perceptual assumptions articulated, however, were used to frame the questions used for data collection.13 Further studies should be conducted to test, fine-tune, and address perception and its impact on relations between states.14

Modernity and Tradition: Two Heads of an Allegorical Image A polycephalic animal is one with multiple heads. While many may think of childhood books on Greek mythology there are real cases of both

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42  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia animals and humans who were born with the condition. They are, of course, a rarity. A rarity is that which is different or stands out from others; it can be something exceptional. Exceptionalism was how many Americans in the past and some in the present conceptually captured their values and experience with modernity and tradition. America’s notions of exceptionalism are not unusual. The notion or idea of exceptionalism has existed across and within cultures, communities, countries and peoples from throughout the ages. People in reality are not exceptional and accepting such a notion implies that one has a materially superior and another an inferior construction. It leads to divisions rather than fostering unity. Thus, ‘unbounding’ the conceptual boundaries of exceptionalism will lead to overcoming the perceptual confines of notions on what defines modernity and tradition. Dichotomies foster division, encourage intolerance and perpetuate hate. They do not lead to development but rather stunt human cognitive growth. America’s perceptual boundaries of modernity and tradition are rooted in the idea of American exceptionalism, which impacts and shapes how individuals, media and policy makers view the ‘other’ and the policies of a system different from its own.15 Americans have always had a tendency to believe, according to Pierre Hassner, that their country is empowered by the ‘purity of its intentions and the excellence of its regime,’ which gives it a right ‘to judge between good and evil,’ ‘not to recognise any superior legal authority’ and ‘to consider any external inclination to cast doubt on American intentions as an insult.’16 In the end, for Barry Buzan, American exceptionalism is the idea that ‘the US is special because its economic and political values are destined to shape the future of humankind.’17 As these two conceptualisations illustrate, some writers on the subject give preference to the ideas of egalitarianism while others cling to material conceptualisations. They all, however, elucidate the perceptual boundaries of exceptionalism that perpetuate perceived dichotomies in the self and other, as well as communities, countries, discourse, ideas and people. All of them are assessed and judged according to perceived human notions of what modernity and tradition are. Modernity and tradition are dichotomous conceptualisations that permeate the lens through which the American mind views Saudi Arabia. America tends to see and assess others based on its understanding of their location on the continuum of the transition from tradition to modernity. The transition to modernity, it is believed, requires a departure from

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tradition. Tradition is perceived to be plagued by the constraints of religion in the public sector or, rather, in relation to the state. A state, it is commonly posited, cannot be modern and expect to be progressive if it is steeped in religion. Secular discourse, in American thought, supplants and delegitimises religious-oriented discussions and concepts. Such conceptualisations give preference to the functioning of the economy over that of spiritual development, with the latter being perceived as leading to the path of backwardness and the other to material prowess. Emphasis on the economy and economic development18 is explained by the important role which capitalism plays in American political philosophy and thought.19 Most relations between states are, after all, built on and surround the economy. For example, Saudi–American relations first developed around economic relations which flowed from the exploration and exploitation of the country and its resources. These relations expanded over time and led to an American diplomatic presence in the Kingdom in 1945. Inevitably, any growth in economic relations between countries leads to an increase in ties between those countries, individual citizens, corporations and institutions. The net result is strengthening of political relations. As increased ties eventually facilitate interactions beyond economic and political relations, so actual or latent adversarial relationships can evolve into respect for one another. This transition in the relationship led to an expansion of relations to include educational and cultural exchanges. An expansion of educational and cultural exchanges facilitated relations based on friendship. This developmental process took time and for the US the development and maintenance of such relations was complicated by America’s own methods of understanding and processing its relations with others along the track of a modernity–tradition continuum or discourse. Perceptions are based on the hegemonic understanding of the framed ‘other’. A hegemonic understanding of the ‘other’ defines the perceptual boundaries of policy possibilities. The perceptual boundaries are reflected through discursive frames. Discourse, therefore, reflects the strategic use of communication in the construction of the public perceptions. These dominant frames or, rather, salient images are important not just because of Saudi–US relations. They are also significant because they have been used as a filter or lens through which the American mind has been taught to understand and interpret the Saudi counterterrorism model. Therefore, failing to understand how the American mind has framed the ‘other’ in the

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44  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia past and present prevents one from moving beyond and examining the model and policies presented in the subsequent chapters in a different light. Understanding how the ‘other’ is perceived leads to a question of existing conceptualisations and the search for new information. A search for new information expands the mind’s possibilities, promotes understanding and promulgates tolerance. Each of these requires an acceptance of the idea of complexity and recognition of the power and problem of perception. The perceptions of Saudi Arabia presented below are derived from the converging frames of the three target audiences, namely academia,20 government21 and the media.22 They are constructed from the points of image convergence. Permeating the image is the role of and inter-relationship between development, society, religion and political stability. I.  Development: The Root of Progress The economy and economic development have always been salient and have always formed the basis of America’s attempts to combine modernity with tradition in its world view. In the beginning, Saudi Arabia was economically defined as an oasis, a land of opportunity for Americans seeking new markets and economic openings. Salaries were described as higher than those in America and expatriates were depicted as flocking to the oil rich country. The tone was reminiscent of the historical narratives and documentaries of the California Gold Rush and the new American immigrants racing in their horse and cattle drawn buggies to find a plot of land to build homes and raise families. This idea was further enhanced by the geographical images of the country. Geographically, Saudi Arabia was depicted in the 1970s as a warm, desert area filled with air-conditioned tent cities located in the middle of nowhere. This image gradually evolved into one of a desert oasis, with pollution-filled streets similar to those found in any large Western city around the world.23 Acknowledging environmental change and the problems associated with economic development became associated with images of American urbanisation. Over the years the reports of businessmen and investors clamouring for Saudi attention caught the American public’s eye, while, the picture of the Saudi government spending billions and accelerating its pace of economic development was met with both pride and prejudice. There was pride

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because the Kingdom’s achievements were seen as a reflection of American influence and prejudice because Saudi Arabia’s culture, society and traditions seemed so distant and alien to American eyes. By the 1970s, Saudi economic development and the growing importance of its energy sector, economic relations with the rest of the world, and its role in the global oil market were becoming significant. By the 2000s, as the rapid growth of development in Saudi Arabia – ranging from geospatial technology to agriculture and food, desalination, civilian nuclear power, education and e-learning – demonstrated that the country was becoming a more complex and varied environment. Inevitably in this period, America’s understanding of Saudi Arabia’s development and its perception of the country became equally more complex and varied. II.  Society: Captivating and Contrasting Conceptions America’s role – and perceptions of America’s role in its relations with Saudi Arabia – affected the contrasting images of the Kingdom. ‘Saudi society,’ commented one observer, ‘is steeped in tradition that has seen relatively little change on its own, which is due to its oil wealth.’24 It is worth noting that points relating to political stability, succession and speculation about substantive changes in the Kingdom are often discussed during points of tension between Washington and Riyadh. And at these times it is usually specific political figures or ministries that are singled out. For example, in the period leading up to America’s 1979 energy crisis, it was former Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Zaki Yamani who was targeted in much of the American media. At other times, it has been specific ministries that were on the chopping block. The Ministry of Interior has frequently been the target of American politicians when they found themselves being criticised by their constituents, AIPAC and other lobbyists, or during an election cycle. This selected targeting took place in 1995, 1996, 2001 and also during the 2003–6 confrontations between Saudi Arabia and Al Qaeda. Specific issues such as oil prices, military purchases or security collaboration also became indicators of tensions. And when tensions abated, the American public has always been presented with a tranquil, stable and hospitable Saudi Arabia. The contrasting ways in which Saudi Arabia is presented and understood in the United States revolves around what is seen to be the contrasting dichotomy between ‘conservative’ public postures and ‘liberal’

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46  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia private behaviour. Not to be ignored in assessing America’s perceptions of the Kingdom is the US interpretation of the cultural shock that Saudis were assumed to have experienced with the inflow of wealth and the effects of development. The Kingdom’s internal conflicts are, as perceived, most evident in the gender debate. Gender has dominated the American view of Saudi Arabia since before the 1970s. Existing divisions, role divergences and power relations are explained as being part of the education system of a ‘traditionally Islamic’ country.25 At the same time, in any review of progress, development or the advance of modernity in Saudi Arabia, it is always the number of educated women emerging from behind the veil that is presented as evidence of societal change.26 Religious, socio-economic and technological changes within Saudi society are perceived to be due to its interaction with America.27 Posited further is that additional ‘strategic cooperation’ will promote change and reform in the Saudi system, which in turn will lead to societal progress over time.28 This is considered to be especially the case in regard to education. The reform needed is, as perceived, a new educational philosophy.29 But preventing all this from occurring is the view that the ‘religio–traditional elements’ within the country function as a huge brake on progress. III.  Religion: In Light there is Darkness, and in Darkness there is Light Religion complements other factors in its impact on the economy and governance. It has played a predominant role in Saudi policy.30 In the 1980s, the American public knew little of Islam and its role in policy making in Saudi Arabia. This lack of knowledge left the door open for ‘authoritative sources’, namely the government and the political elite in America, to shape the public image of the Kingdom and its religious traditions. It would later contribute to the rise of Islamophobia following 9/11. It was in the 1980s that Islam entered the American terrorism discourse. However, at this time the discussion of Islam focused on the Iranian dimension which also included the issues of Hezbollah and the stability of Lebanon. Distinctions were made between the so-called ‘moderate’ Sunni and the so-called ‘extremist’ Shiʿa. Saudi Arabia was known to be Sunni and, therefore, ‘moderate’. This meant religion in the Saudi context would not yet cast a dark shadow on America’s perceptions

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of the Kingdom, despite occasional references in some segments of the American elite media. These allusions would appear during times of American displeasure with the Saudis or during election cycles, or when the Israeli lobby was not happy with a coming military sales package. Religion and Islamic law were initially interpreted in America as having a powerful cleansing influence on Saudi society.31 This neutral, quasipositive characterisation shifted in the 1990s. The shift also corresponded to a change in the American perception of terrorism. As will be discussed below, coverage and the linking of terrorism to Islam doubled in the 1990s. It was in this period that religion and religiosity began to make a clear impact on America’s image of the Kingdom. Religion joined with such other issues as development,32 gender,33 ideology34 and politics35 in the multidimensional debates on the perceptions of Saudi Arabia. The bombings of American interests in the region and, particularly, in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s by apparent Islamist jihadists created a direct link between religion and politics. The connection between Islam and terrorism would become part of the American discourse defining its enemies. Al Qaeda entered the scene and its rhetoric and political perspectives were firmly cast in religious symbolism, language and imagery. Religion and politics were becoming inseparable and their coupling would become massively apparent on 9/11 after that fateful date all other issues between the US and Saudi Arabia would be seen as part of the problem of faith. The role of religion in American perceptions of Saudi Arabia is complicated by the associations with religion in America’s own history. In its drive to modernity, America has embraced secularism and materialism. Yet religion is one of those issues that has divided American society from within despite the fact that religion is also one of the foundational elements of America’s birth. Many Americans tend or want to dismiss this fact when contemplating images of non-Christian Americans and the Muslim ‘other’. So the appearance of Islam as a faith that has emerged as a political factor in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East not surprisingly complicates American attitudes toward religion in their day-to-day lives. Militant secularism further complicates matters for Americans.36 Militant secularism is the systematic denial of the relevance of religion to social life. In American liberal thought, the primacy of the individual and the notion of the separation of church and state has taken on a more militant, secular interpretation than its original intention, which

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48  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia was centred on the inalienable rights of the individual and promoted fundamental freedoms of speech, press, religion, the separation of church and state, the right to due process and equality under the law.37 A hyperindividualism38 that is devoid of any collective interpretation has driven American liberalism beyond its pragmatic and more humanitarianoriented foundations. This also sheds light on America’s religio–political identity clash. IV.  Political Stability: From a Barrel of Oil to the Barrel of a Gun Political stability has been a central concern to America and her image of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom, which American policy makers consider to be a vital actor in maintaining global oil market stability, is seen to be situated in a turbulent and volatile region. The region has been plagued by the Arab–Israeli and Palestinian–Israeli conflicts. The Palestinian issue is one that fans the flames of domestic, regional and increasingly in the twenty-first century, global instability. It is an issue that touches and resonates in streets to shopping malls as far apart from each other as Africa to South America. This issue, however, is not the only one that is contributing to America’s concern over regional instability. Violence in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen has dominated the first two decades of the twenty-first century.39 A consistent fear among some and a common topic of conversation throughout America has been the stability of Saudi Arabia. Vital to the American government has been and continues to be ‘securing the free flow of the region’s oil and natural gas to international markets and supporting allied regional governments in their efforts to balance external threats and maintain internal security.’40 Specifically, Anthony Cordesman summarised American interests as the need to secure the flow of energy exports to the global economy and to keep some restraining control over oil prices; to reinforce deterrence rather than threaten it; and to reduce the size of its force that must be deployed or ready to be projected in the region.41 The latter two are particularly interesting because of the changing nature of US military doctrine. Theoretical and some tactical changes in American military doctrine began in the first years of the twenty-first century, particularly after the emergence of the US Army’s Revolutionary Military Affairs Doctrine. Actual on-the-ground changes, however, did not begin taking effect until a few years later. This had the effect of changing the

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nature of the roles the US military and intelligence community were to play in their assignments at bases abroad and/or through strategic defence agreements with countries from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. The Americans deemed that they could no longer economically continue to maintain the global military policy and presence that they did in the twentieth and the earlier part of the twenty-first centuries.42 Thus, a stable Saudi Arabia and the implementation of policies and strategies to reduce direct involvement on the ground even in key regions became essential. Stability is necessary for increased reliance on regional strategic allies such as Saudi Arabia. This helps to explain the renewed emphasis on Saudi–US and GCC–US security coordination and the promotion of military interoperability. Saudi Arabia is considered a more significant ally by the US militarily than the other members of the GCC due to the size, and the level and capabilities of its military and security services. The long history of bilateral, military and security coordination between the US and Saudi Arabia make the Saudi role more strategically significant to US foreign policy in the region. The change in American foreign and defence policies signals that it will become more militarily dependent on the Kingdom for regional security. The Saudi–American military association is considered to be one of the bedrocks of the political relationship between the two countries. According to then Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Political–Military Affairs Andrew J. Shapiro in a joint press briefing on 29 December 2011, the security relationship is based on ensuring regional security and stability, the recognition of the Saudi Arabia’s ability to deter external threats, to enhancing US–Saudi military interoperability, and the protection of the US economy.43 The latter point, in particular, makes a reduction in arms sales difficult because of the economic impact on the US of a cancellation of US contracts. A recent study has shown there are also international linkages between the US Military Industrial Complex and the international economy, with old producers managing the integration of private and state outsourcing of sales, distribution and production.44 Thus, the line between government and private companies involved in the security apparatus has blurred with one becoming dependent on the other. It has not yet been so blurred that the economics trump the military in driving relations and perception, but it is not unforeseeable in the future. Political stability affects governance, growth, and physical and human development.45 According to the World Bank, political stability (or its

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50  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia absence) creates perceptions about the potential for politically motivated violence, including terrorism.46 The perception of Saudi political stability plays a vital role when it comes to military sales and oil. Oil in particular plays an important a role because, in the absence of cultural bonds between the two people and a deeper relationship that goes beyond mutual strategic interests in a specific period, the perception is that, but for the role it plays in the oil market, Saudi Arabia and its security are of little concern to the United States. This perception may well change in the future as the politics of the region, dogged by religious and jihadist extremism, targets American interests in the region that go way beyond oil. America and the Kingdom share the beliefs that regional political crises cause ‘profound threats to regional security’, that ‘common interests – and action – in keeping the Gulf open to the flow of oil’ are important, and that  they have a ‘mutual interest in countering external regional actors’47 efforts to expand military and diplomatic influence in the Gulf.48 With the re-emergence of regional and external tensions and the need for Saudi support, as provided in the past, the whispers in America of ‘democracy’ and ‘liberalisation’ have become muted, as has the political clout of the American religious establishment, which has always raised its eyebrows at Saudi Arabia. This perceptual shift is an indicator of the importance that Saudi Arabia now represents to America, both for its regional policy and to some extent, its domestic politics. Saudi Arabia is potentially coming to mean more than a barrel of oil and a stabiliser in the world oil market. However, Saudis are still faced with the image America has of them, which is linked to and further complicated by the American perception of terrorism.

Understanding America’s Perception of Terrorism Terrorism is an emotive issue that has been part of the American political and diplomatic discourse since the 1960s. It reached its apex on 9/11, thus preventing the development of what we might see as a counter-hegemonic narrative. A hegemonic narrative refers to the way an elite asserts its position by inculcating society through means of culture, civil society and the use of discourse to shape perception and experience.49 A counterhegemonic narrative began to gain ground in the latter part of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

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The past failure to question the 9/11 narrative or the public framing of terrorism permitted the treatment of Al Qaeda and terrorism as synonymous phenomena. This conflation contributed, in part, to some of the more unsuccessful American antiterrorism and counterterrorism policies and it narrowed the type of policy action possible. Furthermore, it served, to a degree, as both a cognitive obstacle and block for other perceptions to be considered. A bias in the American narrative also impacted American perceptions. American biases are, as discussed in the previous section, rooted in the modernity–tradition dichotomy, which is at the heart of American identity and that has permeated all aspects of how America views the world. Inevitably, this dichotomy has affected its perception of terrorism which in turn has impacted relations with Saudi Arabia. This section examines America’s general perception of terrorism, providing a context for and an explanation of its attitudes towards Saudi Arabia following 9/11 and the contradictions in its preexisting biases. Terrorism’s entrance into the American public mind had its impact on many events, actors and issues. Not least it provided an opportunity for Islam to enter the terrorism frame. In the process, the new terrorism– Islam axis permitted American policy makers and media personalities to strategically divide and parse the image of friend and foe at certain periods, particularly during election cycles or points of tension. I.  Terrorism’s Entrance The image or the framing of terrorism first evolved in the 1960s. The perceptual boundaries expanded and contracted, with terrorism at first being presented as an external threat. Terrorism was equated with Palestine and Palestinians, both of which were the distant ‘other’. As the image of terrorism moved beyond Palestine and encompassed the region more generally, the distant threat would gradually become a domestic reality. Terrorism would no longer be seen from a distance, it was arriving on the shores of America. As the spatial boundaries from the terrorism image expanded and contracted so too did the issue dynamics within the perceptual boundaries. For example, the image went from being devoid of any direct religious connotation to being defined by specific religious difference. This shift would further expand the perceptual boundaries. Driving the internal issues within those boundaries was politics.

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52  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia An  examination of terrorism’s entrance, therefore, helps to explain the complex perceptual dynamics any shift entails. The American public first became aware of terrorism in the 1960s after Palestinian groups hijacked commercial airlines to express their grievances against Israel.50 American awareness of terrorism was also heightened at about the same time by a number of hijacking of American planes to Cuba and Algeria. But these events eventually petered out and did not feed into the political discourse of later Middle East issues. American policy and politicians made no distinction between the legitimate right to resist illegal occupation, as permitted by international law, and terrorism in this case. Yet, American policy and politicians have recognised and supported that right in other contexts. They have even supported groups when it is politically expedient. For example, there has been American funding and support for Jundallah, which the Americans themselves designated publicly as a terrorist organisation. Jundallah claims to be fighting for Sunni rights in Shi’i Iran’s Baluchistan region, and supporting them has its practical value for a US which was willing to pursue every opportunity to undermine its perceptions of Iran’s strident regional ambitions. Some members within the Al Qaeda network were once praised while fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. They were considered as terrorists only once their Afghan relationship had outlived its usefulness both for the fighters and the Americans, after which they began to target US interests in the Middle East and Africa. The Mujahideen-e-Khalq, though intrinsically anti-American, was considered an asset by the US in its confrontation with Iran. Many terrorist attacks in Iran were attributed to the Mujahideen-e-Khalq. Their camps in Iraq were tolerated by both Saddam Hussain and the Americans until they were eventually disarmed and disbanded. In 2012, they were removed from the US terrorism list, with considerable backing from the Israelis who, like the Americans, saw the Mujahideen-e-Khalq as a potential asset in their antagonism towards a potentially nuclear Iran. All this demonstrates the role played by politics and its capacity to create its own perceptions of reality. The constant viewing of the Palestinian issue through a terrorism lens coupled with the rise in anti-Americanism abroad led a majority of Americans to believe that an attack inside the US was likely to happen in the second half of the 1980s.51 American policy has been consistently cited

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as contributing to anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East and in other parts of the world. Yet, its presentation in the media perpetuated the myth that it was not American policy that was problematic but rather the hatred of the ‘others’ towards America’s freedom and values. This belief or myth becomes possible because of the role American exceptionalism plays in the construction of American identity within American culture. In other words, the definition of American culture is itself a by-product of American exceptionalism. Constant identification of Palestine with terrorism and the equating of one with the other also ensured the embedding of the terrorist idea in the American public agenda. With the 1973 oil embargo, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the 444-day American hostage crisis in Tehran between November 1979 and January 1981, and the rise of antiAmericanism around the globe, the issues within the perceptual boundaries expanded. External events influenced which issues would become salient, while politics remained the internal driver within the perceptual boundaries. Simultaneously, the perceived threat of terrorism would geographically expand. In particular, Americans saw the crisis in Lebanon in the 1980s as increasing the risk of terrorism striking within America’s borders. Fears of terrorism striking America became a reality with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. This event, perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh is ironically important for understanding how Islam was drawn into a presentation and perception of having a relationship to terrorism. The first suspect in the Oklahoma bombing was not an American home-grown terrorist but, rather, a Muslim from the Middle East. American media and news agencies ran with the Middle Eastern terrorism angle, interviewing experts who claimed the bombing was similar to the World Trade Center explosion that had occurred two years earlier.52 On the same day as the incident, a Jordanian American was travelling from his home in Oklahoma City to Amman, Jordan. He was arrested, held and interrogated. The incident ended up causing severe trauma to not only him but also his family. While concern was raised outside America over the immediate reaction to the Oklahoma bombing’s coverage, there was little domestic criticism of the initial framing of the event. The nature of the initial presentation of the bombing was linked directly to an expanding US awareness of terrorism. This is problematic and suggests a deeper problem.

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54  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia II.  Islam, Sectarianism and Terrorism Since the 1960s there has been a linkage between terrorism, the Middle East and the Arab world. But Islam per se was not central to the terrorism issue until 9/11.53 Despite its lack of centrality, it was still present, albeit in  a sectarian context and lurking in the shadows, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Khomeini’s takeover of power in Iran in 1979 is important in this context because it gave rise to the idea of the ‘Muslim religious extremist’ who now entered into the public mind. This characterisation would not expand to encompass both the Sunni and Shiʿa until the 1990s. Terrorism and its relationship to Islam became central to America’s image of the Middle East in the 1990s. This corresponded to an increase in the coverage of the bombings on American interests and targets abroad.54 Specific events to be noted included the 1990–1 Gulf War, which created a degree of animosity in a region where some disagreed with reliance on the US for dealing with Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the 1995–6 bombings of US targets inside Saudi Arabia. By the end of the 1990s, and before 9/11, the coverage of terrorism had already reached a high. The limited but growing awareness of terrorism in the public image helps to explain what took place immediately after 9/11.55 The event demonstrated the political relationship between the government and the media and the impact of that relationship on shaping perception. American counterterrorism policies were constrained because of this linkage between government and media.56 But nevertheless the connectivity that had already been established between Islam and terrorism in the public discourse, coupled with the image of Saudi Arabia as a central point for Islam, made it easier for the American public to accept military action over diplomacy. The image of Saudi Arabia as an Islamic centre was enough to sweep away concerns about doubts that the Kingdom might have about the wisdom of the contemplated American– British attack on Iraq. Research extending back to the 1920s has demonstrated that most individuals rely on the media to contextualise events and identify the salient issues within a given time and place.57 This is even the case when individuals experience acts first hand. With respect to terrorism, the greater the proximity to having experienced an act of terrorism, the more there is a heightened perception of risk.58 There is also a greater potential for a behavioural or perceptual change. Most individuals do not alter their lives in the absence of an imminent threat or immediate crisis.

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The environment or context therefore influences the perceptions of individuals and whether they are able to change their perceptions as well as affect what the media covers and how issues are presented. III.  Impacting Perception Context, government and the media influence American views on terrorism just as they shape perceptions of Saudi Arabia. They are as important in forming an image of the Kingdom in the United States as was the perceived linkage between Islam, terrorism and Saudi Arabia, or the modernity–tradition dichotomy, both already discussed. What we have demonstrated is that heightened public awareness created by the attitudes of government and media have an enormously important impact on the formation of any image or perception of a place – in this case Saudi Arabia. This reality is emphasised by the frequency and depth of media attention devoted to a subject. In the instance under discussion here, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda received more media attention than did President George W. Bush. Frequency, thus, becomes relevant in image formation almost on a par with the conceptual or narrative value of events. The value of a different narrative also depends to a degree on the nature of the difference and the extent to which it challenges existing, formed beliefs and images. Understanding the way the media covered Al Qaeda permitted it to use to its advantage the perceptions of the movement that were being formed in the media, just as negative images were used by its adversary politicians in various contexts including in election periods. Had Al Qaeda not had an effective media strategy of its own, then coverage in the American media may have been more limited. Here again it is good to recall the previous section and what happens to the ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ perceptual keys, especially the way they are used temporally and spatially. Media attention and the Al Qaeda message itself combined to fulfil the image that G.W. Bush had wanted to project. This increased the sense of fear among the wider population and helped to create a non-questioning consensus agreement over the policies formulated to handle terrorism. Suddenly, the conceptual juxtaposition of Al Qaeda and terrorism with the preexisting framework of its nexus with Islam and the Middle East was reinforced by 9/11. The hijackers being primarily Saudi-born and America’s preexisting biases combined to make the perceptual leap into accepting that nexus possible. It was this way that the conceptual

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56  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia linkage between Islam, Saudi Arabia and terrorism was reinforced in American minds. IV.  Changing Perceptions People are usually unaware of a particular image and its relationship to a specific issue or set of issues unless the connections have been made by the media.59 Concern for an event and support for action increase immediately after the event but then subside over time.60 The 9/11 event was unusual in comparison to other crises. It was a traumatic disaster in American history that powerfully shaped the perceptions and emotions of the US public.61 It firmly established a shift in public concern from domestic to international terrorism.62 Yet, the shift was actually rooted in the mid-1990s. Perception is like policy, as will be demonstrated in the next three chapters. Previous references to the targeting of American interests in Africa and the Middle East prior to 9/11 might help to recall the spatial and temporal connection with America’s perceptions. The change in America’s image of Saudi Arabia began to take shape in the 1990s. The 9/11 events and their immediate aftermath merely consolidated the negative turn, while the post-9/11 era further accelerated the negative perceptions.63 As a result, it took a long time for US public concern over terrorism to stabilise. It has thus been an ongoing struggle for Saudi Arabia to change how it is perceived in the American mind. A gradual shift in America’s perception of terrorism began in the latter part of 2005.64 Media coverage of Saudi Arabia dropped by 50 per cent.65 A slight peak did occur following the 2005 London attacks, but it was not appreciable and was not sustained. It is interesting to recall at this point a majority of the American public believed the US war on and invasion of Iraq in 2003 put the country and the people at greater risk of terrorism. Thus, the image created by the Bush White House that the war on Iraq would make the US safe from terrorism was rejected. This was a position roundly rejected by the American people. In 2012, terrorism once again competed with other issues such as the economy for political and public attention. Americans questioned US foreign policy toward Afghanistan in the turbulent years after the invasion of the country as they had done in Iraq. Al Qaeda-linked groups fighting in Syria and Libya, and American support for regime change in those

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places, further confused the American peoples’ perception of what their government was up to. No longer could the 9/11 period’s terrorism explanation and concerns remain unquestioned. This new American public scepticism had its impact on the country’s counterterrorism policies. It also affected the way in which academia, government and the media in the US began to interpret and perceive the policies of other states such as Saudi Arabia. V.  Evolving Perceptions and Making Assumptions Several assumptions can be derived from America’s general perception of terrorism. First, it has dominated the public attention and, thus, been on the public agenda since the hijacking of the 1960s. Yet, it would not be until the 1980s, after the Iranian Revolution, that Islam and terrorism would be linked. The topic of terrorism and its coverage as an issue increased over time, reaching its peak on 9/11. At this point the attention devoted to terrorism was so high that it prevented a counter-hegemonic narrative from developing, thereby permitting Al Qaeda and terrorism to be treated synonymously and to dominate the public agenda. This high level of attention also limited the type of policy options. A military track was the only course of action available given the public presentation of the topic by both the US government and media in the immediate post 9/11 period. Finally, it was a result of this terrible incident that the conceptual leap linking Islam and Saudi Arabia with terrorism could be made. This changed the framework within which the Kingdom was seen.

Conclusion: Saudi–American Relations, Strategic Use   of Perception and Counterterrorism Understanding the American perception of terrorism is important because of how it affects those who, in one way or another, become associated with the word. Saudi Arabia was perceptually linked with terrorism after 9/11 and, thus, its counterterrorism policies have become filtered through that same lens. This is in addition to the lens already created by the existing perceptions and persistent biases. The American public’s perception of terrorism and of Saudi Arabia in turn shape how Saudi policy is interpreted and understood in the US. Perceptions set the parameters within which actions can take place and relations can be formulated.

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58  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Saudi–American relations are pragmatic, strategic and securityoriented, which is reflected in how America’s image of Saudi Arabia evolved.66 Relations have been overwhelmingly stable, despite periods of tension.67 Any tension in relations between the two countries corresponded to perceptual shifts in America’s image of the Kingdom. These shifts occur in line with the rise or decline in coverage of the Kingdom in the US media.68 Perceptual shifts in America’s view of the Kingdom occurred around specific issues, namely the economy, energy, oil, military and armaments, and regional and international crises. The words ‘moderate’ and ‘tranquil’ or ‘conservative’ and ‘tradition’ became markers for those shits. The former signalled a positive attitude and the latter a negative one. The positive key words were used when the US was attempting to influence or encourage action on a policy matter that was beneficial to American interests. For example, when the US was attempting to encourage the Saudi government to increase oil production or not to agree to an OPEC69 price hike there were references to the Kingdom being ‘moderate’ or ‘tranquil’. ‘Moderate’ was also used when giving preference to the Kingdom over another actor such as Iraq, Iran or Libya. The negative key markers were used when the US was displeased and/or trying to discourage the Saudi government from taking a particular action. They also signalled when a change was coming. The negative discursive keys would appear right before a period of tension. Outside the tension points between the two countries, there would be specific events and issues that would serve as catalysts. The role of politics in the use of perceptual keys or discursive signals was highlighted by the way in which they would compete with one another. The conservative/ moderate behavioural signal would emerge at times over a conflict between the American executive and legislative branches. For example, in 1978 President Jimmy Carter kept using ‘moderate’ while Congress kept using ‘conservative’ in their battle over an arms package with Saudi Arabia. The former was supportive of the deal, while the latter was opposed. If it had not been for the rise in Yemeni tensions and a clear-cut Saudi policy strategy at the time, the passage of the deal could have been delayed for longer by the debate raging on Capitol Hill in Washington. What commonly triggered a change in American attitudes would be the Arab–Israeli and Palestinian–Israeli conflicts and or/any issue where Israel was involved.70

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These perceptual behavioural patterns highlight the fact that the perceptual shift intended to impact policy behaviour.71 The strategic use of perception became most evident during periods of tension, crises, conflicts or any critical events that affected America,72 when there were divergent Saudi and American interests involved, or when America needed Saudi Arabia to position itself in a particular policy direction. This pragmatic aspect of US–Saudi relations is brought into sharp focus through America’s perception of Saudi Arabia and by the US strategic use of its image of the Kingdom to its advantage. As previously discussed, images of Saudi Arabia should be understood in the context of a modernity–tradition dichotomy, where image making has oscillated from positive to negative, from conservative and traditional to moderate and modern, and from simplistic to complex. As the images of the Kingdom expanded from being more than just development or economically oriented to also encompass religious dissent and diversity, the perceptual boundaries became far more complex. Politics operated within those internal perceptual boundaries, resulting in particular images becoming prominent at given points of time and when specific issues were in play. The growing relations between the two countries also changed the level of interdependence and increased mutual awareness. With interdependence and increased mutual awareness, the strategic use of perception became more pronounced. Policy makers were able to use the various and competing perceptions to their advantage because of their hegemony over image construction. No counter-hegemonic narrative existed to challenge the images presented by the media and policy makers. Saudi Arabia was only known to the larger American public when there were points of tension, when it was election time, when a controversial arms package was being signed, or when some international crisis or conflict was in flow. Even then the images known and understood were those constructed and presented by the media and policy makers. Though the specialists were better informed and more nuanced in their perspective, they only rarely took part in public forums or on mass media platforms. Many of the images presented and publicly perceived were incorrect. But, in the absence of a counter-hegemonic narrative this never mattered. If there was nothing to challenge that which existed, then what did exist, regardless of whether it was real or not would, persist in the mind and

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60  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia define the image of the ‘other’. Arguably the perceived public image of Saudi Arabia in America did not matter prior to 9/11. Relations were, after all, primarily between the two states and a number of corporations. There was less global interconnectivity than there is today. Saudi Arabia’s image after 9/11 did matter very much. The 9/11 event crystallised many of the negative pre-existing public images of the Kingdom which, as was earlier discussed, were already coupled with America’s image of terrorism. Terrorism had been a factor in the American consciousness since the 1960s. The events of 9/11 complicated the earlier images of the Kingdom. The desert oasis that was Arabia was already known, whether via Hollywood or the popular press, but not in a positive way. America and Americans saw fire and in the process burned the Kingdom’s image without questioning whether what they understood to be true was in fact a reality or merely a mirage. They assessed and explained the Kingdom to themselves via an image and a political lens crafted in America, which did not benefit from any input derived from Saudi eyes.

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2  Pillar I: The Role of Intelligence, Security and Public Diplomacy as Building Blocks of Order, Stability and Peace

The first pillar of the Saudi counterterrorism (SCT) model encompasses intelligence, military/security, and political initiatives and strategies. These are viewed by the designers of the SCT as the building blocks of order, stability and peace. Regardless of whether they were sourced within the Kingdom, within the region, or beyond, all of the initiatives and strategies discussed here evolved over three temporal periods – pre-2001, 2001–3, and post-2003.1 These are referred to as the first, second and third temporal periods, respectively. The institutional bedrock of the SCT model and the policies employed in each pillar and the building blocks presented here is the Saudi Ministry of Interior. The Ministry incorporates and is supported by a vast organisational framework that incorporates not just traditional security elements but all social, economic and political institutions connected to the Saudi political and security structures. Thus, the organisational framework and the policies constructed and implemented transcend the public and private sectors and attempt to maintain a continuous flow of input in the policy making process of the country. Saudi antiterrorism and counterterrorism policies are designed to create a balance between the rights of the individual to live in an environment of peace and privacy and the obligations of the state to

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62  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia guarantee collective security. This creates dilemmas. The Saudi authorities have recognised the importance of maintaining a harmonious relationship between the society and the government.2 To achieve the right balance requires a trade-off between the rights of the individual and the security of the state. And it is at this point that the overall rights of society and public interest outweigh individual rights and private interests.3 This trade-off acts to promote order, security and stability. It is at the same time worth noting that nothing in this interaction between the interests of the individual and the interests of the state is peculiar to Saudi Arabia. The dilemma between protecting the rights of the individual and protecting the security of the state is common in one form or another to all nations and political systems. The social and political stability of any state is dependent on peace and public cohesion. And the foundation stone for pursuing these strategies is intelligence. Good intelligence forms the basis of all military and security policies and informs all political actions taken at the domestic, regional and international levels. These actions may range from identifying and capturing hostile operatives and collecting intelligence at the domestic, regional and international levels, to the launching of political initiatives which increase the potential for long-term policy success. The essence of security in Saudi Arabia lies in the fundamental will to pursue policies which enable the state to undertake actions which produce security for its citizens and protection of its national interest.

The Essence of Security in Saudi Arabia Muslims believe that Islam seeks to provide freedom and security to society.4 Society plays an important role in ensuring security.5 In Islamic societies, the role and importance of security are specifically recognised as being derived from the instincts that form human nature. If one follows this understanding of the roles of society and state, these instincts that are inherent in every individual and are directly related to the central role of iman (strength in faith).6 Emanating from iman but also central to understanding the importance of security within Muslim societies are the primacy of the family7 and an emphasis on the collective consciousness derived from a sense of community that produces a security cohesiveness, recognised within the world of modern social psychology.8 The perception of individual versus collective threats and the appropriate role of security

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institutions in protecting society lie at the heart of security policies and models around the world.9 To understand this, it is necessary to grasp, at least minimally, the essence of security and the impact it has on society. A sense of security has been vital to all of humanity since the beginning of time. This notion picks up on the perennial ideas throughout history about the vulnerability of human inter-relationships, as dramatically expressed in the Latin proverb ‘man is wolf to man’ and the imagery of ‘war of all against all’, both of which Hobbes noted in the seventeenth century in his De Cive and Leviathan. A breakdown of security increases the potential for disorder and, in the modern parlance, terrorism. Like terrorism and other contested terms, there is no agreed definition of what constitutes security. Building on the Hobbesian framework, Dr Khalid N. Alghamdi argues that ‘security is the foundational pillar of development in all human societies.’10 Every individual and society understands implicitly the term and what is meant by the concept of security. Yet, problems arise when attempting to agree on its definition. The definitional problem is, in part, due to the increasing needs of societies and politics to widen the traditional understanding of a security concept and to expand its scope.11 A widening of its conceptual boundary has led to contextual, temporal and spatial changes in the meaning of security.12 Security at its conceptual core refers to the physical and psychological conditions pertaining to the absence of fear, the freedom from threat, the feeling of safety and the removal of deprivation.13 So far, so good on a conceptual and theoretical plane. But societies and governing authorities will continue to diverge on what constitutes a shared definition. They will, however, continue to converge on their instinctive understanding of what constitutes the essence of security and its importance to the human condition and the development of societies in which humankind functions. Security’s centrality to humanity requires that governments, society and individuals understand the importance of order, stability and the effects that the absence of these can have. There is a perceived tendency on the part of both governments and societies to reinforce the preservation of what is defined as ‘normal’, thus excluding people and acts perceived as ‘abnormal’.14 Put another way, both governments and societies tend to be more comfortable with that with which they are familiar rather than with the unfamiliar. This means that rather than attempting to bridge differences they instead problematise issues of differentiation and define

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64  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia ‘others’ as threatening a society’s existence. Societies thus tend to tighten the existing social fabric around them by coalescing around those in their own ‘in-groups’, i.e., those with whom they are most familiar.15 The resulting drawing of boundaries gives rise to an apparent ‘other’ in society, which inevitably ends up creating security concerns.16 Problematising security – or identifying security as a point of concern in a society – is important because the expectation of security is a key aspect of the human experience and human development. Security and human development are connected by threats and vulnerabilities.17 The perception of security threats and the actual challenges to security change and evolve over time.18 According to JenkinsSmith and Ripberger, perceived security threats and the means for dealing with them are, in part, derived from the individual cultures and specific contexts of the state or society which understands itself to be threatened.19 Support for security demands among individuals and segments of society thus varies according to perception. This means support for security policies will likewise vary, especially according to the perceived threats. Changes in technology used for communication brought about through the internet and virtual social networking have transformed the conceptualisations of security threats. Globalisation has produced rapid social and technological transformations, not least facilitating the dissemination of information and technology worldwide. This has heralded a new age of collaboration, economic interdependence and increased cultural interaction. With these changes, it is important to recognise how perceptions of threats can emerge from societal differences, deprivation, degradation and exclusion at the individual and collective levels.20 Simultaneously, the changes in perceived threats can exacerbate existing cultural, economic, political and social divisions within societies. The relationship between the perception of threats and their impact on existing divisions is relational.21 Threats do not per se become the security issue, but rather the way the threats are framed, understood and reiterated by different actors. This whole process feeds into the attempt to legitimise or prioritise certain security threats at the expense of others. According to a study by D.M. Albadayneh, empirical evidence supports the notion that general strains such as the failure of human development and the absence of peace in society can produce violence and lead to perceived and actual security threats.22 If the state is successful in providing the conditions for human development the need to seek to

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revolutionise the situation through violent action is for the most part halted.23 This state involvement would also limit the likelihood of a security breakdown. Thus, the essence of security very much extends beyond the physical and includes the psychological. Throughout history, governing authorities have been extremely concerned with the problem of ensuring both their security and that of the polity which they rule. The policies, strategies and tactics employed to attain security have been culturally, contextually and historically interdependent.24 New security challenges and transformations have propelled the need for less static policies, strategies and tactics to prevent uncontrollable chaos and disorder. Arab states and societies recognise that changing societal exigencies require strategies and policies to deal with the new challenges.25 Just as mobilisation and the tactics employed for collective action have evolved, so too have security models. Particularly, the internal policy making mechanisms that permit the capacity to evolve become more significant. Models and strategies now tend to place simultaneous emphasis on the physical and the psychological aspects of security, recognising that the latter is, in reality, the bedrock for a longterm solution. In any Muslim society, particularly in Saudi Arabia, the security model and the policies that it encompasses will be rooted in Islam and derived from what the creators of these policies would deem to be an Islamic approach. An Islamic approach to security is often described as being a pre-emptive one.26 When looking at Islamic history and, in particular, at the period of the time of the Prophet Muhammad, the outlines of a security model can already be identified. An interpretation of the Prophet’s approach to and concept of security encompassed a number of factors in modern parlance: the development of an early warning system; the encouragement of strategic thinking; the actual development of strategies; the planning of logistical support; the mobilisation of the people; the maintenance of morale; and, finally, the access to intelligence from all sources.27 The main functions of security in any model are the protection of humanity generally and the principles and values that serve as society’s glue; the protection and promotion of economic, human and social development; and the maintenance of stability.28 Analyses of the factors propelling an understanding of security coalesce under a single set of propositions: that the Islamic method for security enforcement includes collective collaboration and the employment of measures to prevent acts of

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66  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia violence, especially in the areas of economics, politics and society.29 As will be demonstrated throughout the remaining chapters, this is the conceptual framework that many in Saudi Arabia policy circles use when constructing counterterrorism measures.

Intelligence: The Building Block of Stability Since 9/11 there has been an ongoing conflict in the shadows, where intelligence agencies seek to identify adversaries that have global networks.30 State agencies are not alone, as non-state actors also have their own intelligence apparatuses. Some within the Al Qaeda network are recognised by experts in the field as being well-versed in intelligence methods such as counter-surveillance and encryption.31 Many current and former Al Qaeda members are highly intelligent, well read and educated. They range from the self-educated to those with advanced college degrees in a spectrum from engineering to political science. These are men and women who cannot be described as ignorant.32 Movements are just like individual activists in that they too must be security conscious. The intelligence apparatus of non-state actors is not often under discussion within the media or the academic community. This is hardly surprising since intelligence is a world that functions through secrecy. But the non-state position of these actors does not imply simplicity or amateurishness. For example, Hezbollah is recognised by the United States as having a thoroughly professional and sophisticated intelligence infrastructure with a global reach among non-state actors.33 While many well-known and large non-state movements have created for themselves complex and large intelligence apparatus, small operative cells do not have the resources to match them. Nevertheless, they too are highly security conscious even if they lack a formal institutional structure with a command and control centre. Any type of violent or non-violent operation, irrespective of the size or structure of the cell, entity or group carrying out the operation, is dependent on intelligence gathering. Non-state actors, like state actors, vary in size and capability. They, like state actors, undertake intelligence gathering and analysis, carry out intelligence operations and experience intelligence failures. In brief, whether it is in their reliance on sophisticated and welleducated operatives, their security consciousness, their proclivity for secrecy and secretiveness or their emphasis on intelligence gathering,

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the dynamics of non-state actors and state actors carry very many similarities between them. A better understanding of the similarities between state intelligence agencies and non-state actors will help to explain the important role of intelligence in any counterterrorism effort – intelligence gathering, analysis, the actual operations and explanation of failures. All of this will be examined in the subsections that follow. But first let us review the Saudi intelligence community. Intelligence for Saudi Arabian policy makers is seen to be the building block of stability and peace. Intelligence plays a pivotal role in Saudi Arabia, not just in the Kingdom’s antiterrorism and counterterrorism policies but also as a means to understanding the general complexities of terrorism and the circumstances that have spawned such behaviour. Intelligence therefore goes beyond providing effective antiterrorism and counterterrorism policies. It also helps to explain where and how terrorist thoughts and aspirations have originated. I.  Intelligence and the Intelligence Community Intelligence agencies, whether of a state or of a non-state organisation constitute an intelligence community, which refers to all the agencies and actors involved in the field of intelligence. The Saudi intelligence community is like any other in that it evolved over time. Created in 1955, the initial General Intelligence, which is now the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), was separated from the General Directorate of Investigations (GDI) in 1957.34 The GDI is home to the Saudi domestic intelligence agency or the General Security Services (GSS), which is responsible for internal intelligence collection and analysis, counterintelligence operations, criminal investigations and counterterrorism.35 The GIP’s focus is external intelligence collection, particularly on the relations between external actors who pose a threat to the country or have connection with those inside the country who might pose such a threat.36 Its responsibilities include foreign security, antiterrorism and foreign liaison functions, as well as strategic analytical assessments, coordinating foreign covert networks and carrying out covert operations. In 2012, the agencies comprising the entire community consisted of the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), the General Security Services (GSS), the National Guard Intelligence Directorate, Military Intelligence (Army, Navy and Air Force), the Interior Minister’s Bureau of Analyses

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68  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia and Study and the National Guard’s Specialized Study Center.37 There are private firms as well, such as Ernst & Young, that provide support services for the Saudi security, intelligence and defence sectors.38 These support services might range from database support to expert advice on sector specific services like surveillance equipment and training in the latest communication and technological developments and cybersecurity. Within this framework, there is a growing trend towards privatisation, as indicated by the December 2013 decision by the Ministry of Education to allow private firms to provide security at schools across the county. Properly regulated privatisation can prove effective and efficient in areas where there are gaps in the support services needed by the intelligence community. A functioning intelligence community is important for both antiterrorism and counterterrorism operations. Intelligence is the first line of defence and the basis of informed policy making.39 The concept of intelligence has been defined as the collection and analysis of open, publicly attainable, as well as secret, information all for the purpose of reducing uncertainty regarding actual and/or perceived security threats and to inform policy making.40 It should be noted that the concept is similar to terrorism. The concept is contested, with definitions giving preference to the specialisation of the agency, agent, analyst or academic.41 For example, security and military intelligence officers are likely to define the concept differently from one working in a police department’s criminal intelligence investigation unit. Academics also tend to be more abstract rather than practical in their attempts to define intelligence. Yet, regardless of the definition adopted, what is captured by each version of a definition is the essence of intelligence, which is nothing more than the collection and analysis of information for the agency and/or organisation in which they are working. Intelligence related to terrorism is different from traditional intelligence. It is also broken into two distinct areas, namely counterterrorism and antiterrorism intelligence. Counterterrorism intelligence (CTI) is concerned with the collection of information that can lead to effective measures in response to actual or potential terrorist activity.42 For example, information might be collected to determine how to respond to Al Qaeda activity. As will be recalled from the previous chapter, Saudi security services solicited information from their employers and family members on individuals suspected of engaging in terrorism during the

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Saudi–Al Qaeda battle. They were seeking information for acts that had already occurred. Antiterrorism intelligence (ATI) is concerned with the collection of information for pre-emptive measures. That is, the contextual factors actually and potentially contributing to Al Qaeda activity. An example given from the Saudi context would be the collection and soliciting of information from individuals believed to be involved in the financing of terrorism. (The financing of terrorism is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.) During the first and until the end of the second temporal period, the Saudi government’s emphasis was primarily on counterterrorism. There was minimal emphasis on antiterrorism prior to the end of 2003.43 A shift occurred toward the end of that year. AT operations became salient in 2004 and continued to be the main focus following the Saudi–Al Qaeda battle. II.  Intelligence Collection and Analysis Intelligence collection is concerned with the acquisition of information rather than analysis. Analysis is separate yet related to the collection process. Analysts are dependent on the information collected through the various methods of intelligence collection. There are five common types of intelligence collection. They include human, signals, imagery, measurement and signatures, and open-source intelligence. Those most commonly used in counterterrorism are human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). They are both used by Saudi intelligence, with the former being used more than the latter.44 HUMINT is the use of agents to covertly or overtly acquire information. It is one of the least expensive yet most dangerous forms of intelligence collection methods. This is because false or inaccurate intelligence could lead to the loss of life. Inaccurate human intelligence could also lead to a national security crisis, ranging from something small, such as embarrassment or a diplomatic incident, to something large such as the outbreak of war. Cordesman critiques Saudi reliance on HUMINT.45 His critique requires an understanding of the role played by the interpretation of information and for interpretation to be situated within the specific context of US intelligence development. We will return to Cordesman’s critique but let us first discuss the functioning and role of interpretation.

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70  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Individuals absorb information through a cognitive lens,46 which filters information and thus endows it with meaning. One well known example using linguistic constructs not related to intelligence will help to better explain the importance of context and the role of interpretation. The example is intentionally simplistic in order to demonstrate the importance of imagery and interaction to interpretation. As discussed in the previous chapter, perceptions or imagery are important to both understanding and policy making. If Britons say ‘I had a flat in London’, they mean ‘I used to own an apartment in that city’. To an American, unfamiliar with British ways, it would mean ‘I had a flat tire’ when I was driving through London. This particular example illustrates that images can have multiple meanings and be interpreted differently among various audiences and that images, their meaning and the type of interaction they elicit also depends on geographical and cultural variance. The first interpretation of our example might elicit envy, while the second (American) interpretation would create sympathy. Or take the word ‘left’ when used in political context. In most parts of Europe, the word is accorded with various decrees of respect, even by individuals of non-leftist political persuasions. In the US on the other hand the word is almost always met with disdain and suspicion. Just as ordinary individuals are affected by their geographic and cultural origins when they ascribe meaning to the information they acquire by a filtering process that can interpret the same information in different ways, so the information collected for intelligence is likewise filtered through the lens of the agent collecting the information; filtered once more through the analyst assessing the information; and, again, filtered through the policy maker using the information. Researchers are the same. They filter information received through a lens, which is shaped and influenced by a whole host of contextual and political variables that vary temporally and spatially. Now returning to the critique of Cordesman regarding the Saudi reliance on human intelligence we must note that this very critique itself must be interpreted and understood in the context of America and American criteria. The reliance on US HUMINT declined in the 1970s47 and was replaced with an emphasis on technology, particularly signals intelligence (SIGINT).48 SIGINT was promoted and considered to be ‘objective’ and more reliable than human intelligence. In the 1980s, there was a move toward all-source intelligence, where every collection method was

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emphasised. In spite of this, SIGINT remained the dominant method of collecting intelligence by the US and the preferred one of intelligence analysts. There are many forms of SIGINT collections methods, with communication intelligence (COMINT) – the interception of communications – being the most common form used. Regardless of the different types of collection method, SIGINT is generally defined as the interception of foreign signals for the purpose of collecting data on foreign political, military, intelligence or economic actors or issues. SIGINT directs its attentions at the actions, intentions and plans of the actors it targets. The information sought, however, must be specifically targeted; that is, SIGINT attention is focused on individuals identified by the state as being of specific interest to it. SIGINT, to a degree, functions like the processes of filtering and monitoring discussed in Chapter 4. A state does not have the resources or time to collect information on every person. There is also more information available than can possibly be internalised and analysed. This raises the issue of information selection and biases. Biases raise the issue of perception in data collection as well as in data analysis. Analysis is defined as making sense of the various pieces of information collected.49 While the information collection process is dangerous, it is analysis that is more difficult to implement. There are many reasons for this but one of the most critical is the absence of strong research departments within state intelligence organisations.50 According to Cordesman, the Saudi intelligence community is one that particularly suffers from weak research and analytical departments.51 While this is a shared problem among global intelligence agencies, the Saudi government has sought to overcome the weakness by more effectively and strategically using a number of different resources. For instance, it has turned to private firms such as House of Development, Booz Hamilton and Ernst & Young to name a few. It has also provided research grants to boost knowledge in key areas such as cybersecurity and information technology and reached out to educational institutions such as King Fahd College for Security Sciences, King Saud University and Nayef Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS) to provide indirect support services. The support services not only help to fill a gap but also to provide insight into the areas where the government needs to implement new policies. For example, prior to the public unveiling of the Cyber Centre in April 2013, the Saudi government had conducted studies and held both

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72  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia conferences and meetings involving a range of university departments in order to learn about, and to provide officials and departments with, knowledge on the infrastructure needed for creation of the Centre. Similarly, the changes in the security plans and practices for Hajj in 2013 were also a product of previous studies done and conferences and meetings held with university departments on the subject.52 Two examples will suffice to illustrate this has been a common practice.53 In 2002, NAUSS signed an agreement with a Taiwanese research institute to share knowledge, cooperation and training in crime detection using DNA and toxicology analysis and forensic sciences. Similarly, officers were sent to universities in both the US and the UK for training prior to the establishment in 2005 of the six DNA facilities throughout the country – the Eastern Province, Tabouk, Jeddah, Mecca, Medina and Jizan. As will be mentioned in subsequent section on security operations, DNA analysis by Saudi research centres was useful for investigating Saudi Al Qaeda operations. The initial fingerprint system established in 2006 was a product of studies conducted by the National Information Center. Finally, graduate studies at universities by officers and officials in the Ministry of Interior have contributed to filling some gaps. The Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for overseeing security in Saudi Arabia, has to some extent remedied the research and analysis deficit in the Kingdom. But there is still a lack of deep analytical expertise that further confounds the problem. Deep analytical expertise differs from research and/or subject specialisation. In the global world of intelligence, too many analysts are country or subject specialists. They are not comparativists, which limits their ability to see larger patterns. Seeing larger patterns requires the analyst to better situate the information and behaviour of a multiple set of actors into a larger picture, taking into account the ideas, identities, cultures, policies and interests of all parties who are the subjects of analysis. Understanding the larger behavioural, communication and interaction patterns of their subjects helps analysts to refine the antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies needed to prevent against and to combat terrorism. Many states are good at and have effective counterterrorism intelligence (CTI) collection strategies, while most are weak in the area of antiterrorism intelligence (ATI) collection.54 Weakness in ATI inhibits the development of preventative measures for terrorism. The complexities of terrorism and the decentralised nature of terrorist networks makes it

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important to strengthen the research and intelligence analyses functions. The changes in the Ministry of Interior beginning in November 2012 such as the hiring of women to work in the security sector, and a greater emphasis on the higher education of security officials, indicate improvements are forthcoming in the research and analytical capabilities within the Ministry of Interior. Some specific areas in which improvement is needed include cultural intelligence specialisation, patterned analysis and psycho-discursive analysis. Psycho-discursive analysis falls within the purview of intelligence collection for psychological AT/CT policies and strategies. Saudi policies and strategies employed in the past are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Some of them include the rehabilitation centre, the Sakkinah programme and cyber-dialogue and engagement. Finally, coordination, cooperation and information sharing are the keys for maintaining stability, providing security and ensuring that peace prevails. III.  Intelligence Sharing Information sharing, or what some call fusion, is important for domestic, regional and international policies and strategies for combating terrorism. This is especially the case today. The information revolution has changed the nature of communication networks and increased the level of coordination, cooperation and information sharing among all agencies, whether domestic or international. It has reduced the relevance of divergence, whether spatial and temporal, among cultures, people and states. The breakdown of such barriers, however, exacerbates problems, particularly those which are associated with information sharing. The problem of internal and external information sharing has plagued all intelligence agencies, both from the state and the non-state sectors. For example, the fusion problem in the US intelligence community was cited by the Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.55 Cordesman and Obaid consider that internal Saudi intelligence sharing or fusion has been weak.56 They cite poor coordination between the different agencies and internal bureaucratic rivalries. All agencies have similar problems. A communication breakdown or, rather, a lack of sharing of information, is one common factor when looking at the many that contribute to intelligence failures around the world. The Saudi Ministry of Interior has sought to overcome this problem by increasing cooperation with its foreign counterparts. When looking at the period

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74  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 2002–11, there was a slow increase in incidents of bilateral information sharing that occurred in the broader context of the Ministry’s intent to increase security cooperation and coordination with non-Saudi agencies.57 In 2005, the Ministry of Interior sought assistance from Yemeni and Sudanese intelligence networks to obtain information on suspected operatives58 who were part of, and assisting, the Saudi Al Qaeda network. As will be recalled from the introductory chapter, most of the operatives in the Saudi Al Qaeda network were Saudi nationals and their operations were undertaken and planned within the Kingdom. The non-Saudi operatives also came from within the country. There were very few incidents where individuals travelled across the border for the purpose of engaging in an operation. Consequently, since the great majority of Al Qaeda operations within Saudi Arabia were sourced and planned domestically, there was less of a need for information sharing for either antiterrorism or counterterrorism operations than the United States or others have required in their own battle with the global Al Qaeda network. Saudi intelligence, however, did share information with others in the region and/or global community when asked and/or when the material obtained through HUMINT and SIGINT pertained to a planned operation in another country. The GCC region has always been the first geographical area of concern for Saudi intelligence and security cooperation and coordination. Consequently, at the regional level there have been many agreements with the Kingdom’s neighbours. These have sought, among other things, to promote cooperation and coordination for the collection and sharing of information; to settle border agreements; to increase border security; and within the GCC to unify laws and to develop a set of security and safety procedures.59 In 2012, at a meeting between the GCC Interior Ministers, there was an agreement to facilitate greater coordination and cooperation between the countries in the area of security and intelligence.60 The 2013 GCC decision to create a joint military and security force and to facilitate coordination with criminal investigations across the countries, was predicted to result in greater information sharing, joint security officer training, and collaborative research projects.61 At the broader, non-regional international level there is collaboration with foreign CT authorities to investigate cases, collect information on suspects during visits to Saudi Arabia, and share of information on selected cases. For example, in 2015, the Saudi Foreign Ministry emphasised intelligence cooperation, coordination and sharing between

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Britain and Saudi Arabia.62 The following year the presence of a number of CT and intelligence experts working inside the British Embassy in Riyadh was publicly cited as an example of the mutual cooperation between the two countries.63 The United States and Saudi Arabia have a long history in the sharing of information and collaboration in the area of intelligence and security coordination and cooperation. As noted earlier, many of the Saudi intelligence and security officers in the Ministry of Interior have received training in both the United States and the United Kingdom. In fact, former Crown Prince and Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef received training in both the United States and the United Kingdom. This helps to contextualise the hybrid nature of the Saudi counterterrorism model. Cooperation and coordination increases trust and facilitates intelligence sharing. Most of the information sharing between agencies, however, pertains to terrorist financing, which is discussed in Chapter 3. Intelligence sharing on terrorist finance occurs through the Financial Intelligence Units of the various countries with which Saudi Arabia collaborates. When information is sought by such a country, the Saudi government investigates the request together with any supporting evidence and reports its conclusions to the country initiating the request. If appropriate, it is the function of Saudi, as opposed to foreign, authorities to charge, adjudicate and punish any Saudis according to its laws when the evidence is sufficient and points to indicates culpability. Information sharing or fusion can be a double-edged sword.64 Increased access heightens the potential for information falling into the wrong hands. Mistrust is the key barrier for most intelligence-sharing arrangements.65 In general, trust can be violated by lying or fabricating intelligence, choosing not to share information and/or exaggerating the accuracy of the source or unintended leaks. Mistrust between a state and foreign agencies is endemic in such a relationship for all the obvious reasons including the fact that any interactions depend on secrecy, the protection of sources, and difficulties of verification will always be subject to abuse – something that all parties are constantly aware of. In spite of a high degree of professionalism and efficacy in intelligence collection66 and increased trust that facilitates information sharing, problems will always remain among internal and external intelligence agencies. This is because humans are imperfect and, thus, so are intelligence collection and analysis. All information is filtered through the cognitive lens of the agent and analyst and interpreted based on his

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76  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia or her perception of that which is received. Moreover, attacks may not be preventable even with full intelligence sharing.67 There will always be intelligence failures. The key is, therefore, to recognise the complexity of the issues at hand when dealing with intelligence collection and analysis for combating terrorism. IV.  Preventing Intelligence Failures and Combating Terrorism Intelligence is about getting people and particularly policy makers to think about (but not to try to predict) the future. Neither the information collected nor the analyses conducted are error proof. An intelligence failure is a breakdown in the process. Most failures among global intelligence agencies are due to systemic weaknesses in collection, analysis and information sharing processes.68 These are factors that have already been discussed on a theoretical level. The preventative measures adopted by the Saudi government to counter such difficulties should also be explored. The post-9/11 period witnessed changes in the monitoring of suspected individuals, the employment of tactical surveillance, changes in passport security and the introduction and adoption of digitised security.69 This section examines these corrective measures. A.  Persistent and Tactical Surveillance Investigation and surveillance relate to both the acquisition of information and the behaviour of subjects under investigation. Surveillance is different from persistent surveillance, which is why it is discussed in this section rather than the next one on security operations. Surveillance is the systematic but general observation of an area or a group of individuals by various means.70 For example, Saudi security patrols at night to detect and/ or look for suspicious behaviour are examples of surveillance.71 The surveillance undertaken is opportunistic in nature, rather like patrols intending to pick up intelligence or information that happens to become available. Persistent surveillance is specifically focused and directed at a prioritised target. A target in this case can be a suspect, warehouse and/or operational environment. An operational environment is the area where a planned subversive operation is expected to be executed. For example, the area surrounding the compound or apartment complex where security forces carry out a raid is considered an operational environment. In such

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instances, the purpose of the monitoring or surveillance is to procure information from the environment or the behaviour of individuals to facilitate a preventive raid. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, and is discussed in the section on security operations, many of the raids conducted by Saudi security forces occurred in the early hours of the morning. This timing is not just about the element of surprise but also because whatever actionable intelligence is gained from persistent surveillance – whether of the operational environment or any targeted individuals – is most valuable as soon as it materialises. The coordinated and simultaneous operations carried out by Saudi security forces in Riyadh and Jeddah are examples of those that required persistent surveillance before execution. The changing nature of Saudi security operations and the reliance on persistent surveillance contributed to overcoming the domestic intelligence failures prior to and during the first part of the Saudi–Al Qaeda battle. Saudi security forces’ operations were proactive by 2004. The change would not have been possible without the domestic intelligence operations being properly synchronised between the various collaborating agencies, including their collection and analyses activities. At the same time, the domestic intelligence operations were also highly reliant on human intelligence. By 2005, 95 per cent of all terrorist operations were caught in the planning stages.72 They were caught as a result of human intelligence. HUMINT is the heart, mind and soul of twenty-first-century intelligence.73 It has become the basis of all other forms of intelligence collection, from SIGINT and imagery intelligence (IMINT) to measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Without it, policy would be made in a vacuum and policy makers’ decisions would take place based on very narrow technical data. This does not imply that a greater emphasis on HUMINT would reduce all intelligence failures. But properly constituted HUMINT provides the depth and cultural hinterland against which all other intelligence gathering can be tested and assessed. Saudi domestic antiterrorism and counterterrorism intelligence strategies made it hard for individuals to operate and establish networks in the country. What it lacked, which Cordesman and Obaid point out, was oversight of the Saudis who went abroad and beyond the reach of Saudi persistent surveillance, which operated domestically.74 This was eventually corrected as the next subsection demonstrates. The earlier stages also

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78  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia witnessed limited knowledge of actors operating in Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, Europe and the Americas. B.  Passport and Digitised Security: From Fingerprinting   to Biometric Technologies Investigations and intelligence collected by Saudi security forces after 9/11 and during the Saudi–Al Qaeda battle revealed flaws in the system.75 In the early days of grappling with the terrorist challenge in the Kingdom there were many incidents of counterfeit, forgery and the trafficking of humans, chemicals, weaponry and other equipment and substances that could be used in the commission of a crime. What these incidents highlighted were breaches in passport security. Passport security is concerned with the identity of both Saudis and non-Saudis and the procedures used for, and policies concerned with the identification of individuals via conventional means such as digitised security and fingerprinting. Strong passport security policies and efficient up-to-date mechanisms are an obvious route to reducing intelligence failures. The Passport Department was restructured in 2001.76 An eight-month study commissioned by the Ministry of Interior and conducted in 2001 found that 5,610 Saudi passports were stolen and 4,900 of them were taken from inside the country. The others were found to have been stolen or lost in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Bahrain, Turkey, Indonesia, France, Great Britain and the United States. Many of the stolen passports were sold by Saudi thieves and used by others to travel abroad. A majority of them used the falsified documents to find better living conditions and/or employment opportunities, while a minority sought to use them to engage in criminal acts. It is now well known that seventeen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers used Saudi passports. During the Saudi–Al Qaeda battle, security forces found that many of the operatives had not only falsified documentation but possessed the equipment to enable them to engage in counterfeit and forgery. During their interrogation, it was learned that some of the Saudi Al Qaeda operatives had received training in Afghanistan in counterfeiting and forgery.77 Security forces also found corruption within some of the private security companies. A sting operation revealed that some of the security guards working in private security companies were financially well-rewarded for assisting in the falsification of documents.78 A deeper

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investigation found that some of the falsified documents were obtained in Yemen, which enabled individuals to enter and to bring weapons across the Yemeni–Saudi border. Border security is discussed in more detail in the next section, but in 2013, the Passport Department was restructured as part of the larger internal security sector reforms that began after November 2012. Passport security is vital for monitoring the movement of potentially subversive individuals and preventing identity theft, and the misuse of Saudi identity outside the country. As the introduction to this subsection highlighted, passport security is also concerned with fingerprinting and digitised security to help identify and keep track of personal identification and data records and identify suspects involved in the commission of a crime. The nationalised fingerprinting system was phased in over time and began with an experimental programme implemented by the Riyadh Passport Department in 2006. Implementation followed a study conducted by the National Information Center. The objectives were to increase passport security and to implement a national programme. Offices were then opened across the country. The final phase of the national fingerprinting system began in 2007, after which the Passport Department began integrating its data into the government’s systems. By 2009, all foreign workers in Saudi Arabia were required to be fingerprinted. To carry out this operation, the General Directorate of Passports placed mobile units close to employment premises throughout the country to supplement the local offices in each town or city. The idea was to increase accessibility and efficiency, and to ensure that the fingerprinting process was conducted accurately and quickly. By 2013, technology had evolved allowing security officers to use handheld fingerprinting devices to identify individuals from patrol cars and at checkpoints. The nationalised fingerprinting system resulted the creation of a central database, improved identity verification processes and reduced identity-related violations. In the second part of the twenty-first century, Saudis will witness the development and introduction by the National Information Center of a face verification system, a centralised archiving system, projects for integration of data, a fingerprinting back-up system and the implementation of the Electronic Resource Processing Management System. The fingerprinting system and the use of digitised security have increased the ability of authorities to keep track of, to identify individuals

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80  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia and to help in criminal investigations. The post-9/11 period witnessed the transition toward a greater reliance on digital security and the use of biometric technology. The Ministry of Interior, border control and other public sectors began using biometric and digital technologies prior to its introduction to the public in 2004. The Saudi public was initially concerned over the misuse of data and/or information but over time and with educational forums and technical improvements, the use of new technology was overwhelmingly accepted. Over the years technological developments and their applications to bolster state security have proceeded apace: the use of applications and network resources, the implementation of disaster recovery measures, the development of private ICT networks for data transfers and storage, the capturing of biometric data and the development of guidelines for data storages and usage – all these elements and processes are now part of the work tools available to the government and other parts of the public sector. In conclusion, the changes in the post-9/11 period to the present reflect the Saudi government’s attempt to prevent or at least reduce the intelligence failures that became apparent with 9/11 and the subsequent Saudi–Al Qaeda battle. There is now a growing awareness that the future of Saudi internal security will be shaped not by bureaucratic and administrative structures, but by how effectively and nimbly the government can respond to events and act collectively, whether by properly coordinating the activities of its internal agencies or through collaboration with external allies. And the necessity for a proper understanding of the connections between the actors in both the internal and external environment is now fully accepted. In short, the Saudis accept that intelligence is vital for maintaining security and stability. Intelligence underpins the making of policies whether in the domestic or international sphere. Intelligence forms the basis of the military and security actions taken at all levels. At the same time, all Saudi policies toward terrorism are designed to balance the individual-collective security dilemma and the rights–security trade-off, with the protection of societal rights and public interest trumping individual rights and private interests in the latter.79 This means there are delicate balances to be considered. And these are balances that can only be achieved through accurate and reliable intelligence sourcing, intelligence gathering, intelligence analysis, intelligence assessment and intelligence application.

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Security: The Building Block of Order Security is the foundation of order within society. While society entrusts the state with its well-being, each individual making up society is deemed to have a responsibility to help with maintaining order by protecting the security of the state. The security of the state is equivalent to the security of the individual. This is, in part, why the relationship between both the governed and the governor are important to societal well-being and results in a tolerable equilibrium within societies. The Saudi security apparatus is charged with ensuring societal well-being and granted the authority to do so by the Saudi state. The Saudi security apparatus is a complex mix of regular military forces, a separate national guard, and various internal security and intelligence services.80 While there is civilian control over all major policy decisions, security and military personnel are involved in and inform the policy making process. Saudi AT/CT policy making has evolved over time, which is reflected in the security-oriented policy initiatives adopted and implemented over the three temporal periods. The policies examined here are broken into three subsections, namely military/security operations; criminal justice and judicial actions and public diplomacy. It should at the same time be noted that the Saudi response to its encounter with terrorism was originally rooted in the traditional military-security counterterrorism model. A paradigm shift occurred when the Saudi government recognised that the conservative military/security model was not working well in Saudi Arabia or the region. This led to the implementation of some of the policies and strategies employed in the criminal justice AT/CT model. Thus a hybrid model was born that combined norms, policies and strategies common under both the military/security and the criminal justice models. The result has been a model that appears to produce pragmatic and effective outcomes which provide Saudi society with order and the necessary level of overall security. I.  Military/Security AT/CT Operations Military and security forces play a decisive role in AT/CT operations all over the world. They are usually the first line of defence after an attack, irrespective of whether it is to lead a military counter strike, engage in armed conflict, carry out insurgency operations or to investigate, arrest,

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82  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia detain and/or extradite a suspect. Their roles will vary temporally and spatially, as well as according to context and politics. Saudi security operations evolved over time. Saudi military and/or security operations began as primarily defensive and completely domestic in nature. They were used to engage operatives, to disrupt violent operations, and to target the organisational infrastructure.81 All security operations had to be clearly defined and could not be carried out in the absence of clear proof of actual or intended malfeasance on the part of the targets of any operation. Such operations were considered to be necessary but not the most important action for combating terrorism.82 With the start of the Saudi conflict with Al Qaeda, operations became both offensive and defensive. While they remained primarily domestically oriented, there were regional and international aspects to Saudi activities via information sharing and intelligence cooperation and coordination.83 This section is broken into several subsections. First, security for AT/CT operations is discussed generally and, then, specifically in the Saudi context. The use of security is dependent on and influenced by both context and politics. The second subsection examines the contextual, political and strategic impacts on AT/CT operations, while the third subsection examines the actual functioning of operations. Finally, the last subsection assesses the short versus the long-term value of strategic security operations. A.  Security AT/CT Operations: A General Discussion Most states conduct AT/CT operations through their security services for the purposes of deterrence, interdiction, surveillance, clandestine operations and intelligence gathering, hostage crises and hostage rescue, training local forces and pre-emptive intervention.84 The Saudis are no different in their use of security forces.85 They do, however, place greater emphasis on the role of the police in AT/CT operations. Security services and police forces are, therefore, used generally and interchangeably. From time to time problems may be referred to the Special Forces when relevant. But it is the Saudi police and not the Special Forces who take the lead in AT/CT operations in the Kingdom. The Special Forces are used selectively.86 As defined by the Interior Ministry, the main duties of the Special Forces include conducting special and emergency operations to preserve internal security; to provide support to other security sectors;

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to assist in security operations as needed; and, finally, to carry out operations as ordered on an ad hoc basis. Reliance on Special Forces to carry out regular AT/CT is regarded as inappropriate because of the additional time required for their mobilisation.87 This is not to imply that Special Forces lack efficiency. Police networks are obviously spread widely throughout the country whereas Special Forces camps are concentrated in specific regions of the country. Thus, in purely practical terms, the police are likely to reach a trouble spot much more quickly. AT/CT tactical efficiency exists among all of the security services. All sectors of the Saudi security services receive AT/CT training, which was incorporated into the security forces’ curriculum in 2003. They also continue to receive training one month out of the year, which keeps them up-to-date in the latest field developments. In conclusion, the police within the Saudi Security forces are the best line of AT/CT defence because they are ubiquitous. They are the first responders when an attack occurs and their ever-present status permits them to move in and out of, and to handle, society more efficiently. Moreover, the police have a close relationship to Saudi society due to their constant daily interaction with each other. Saudi security services are the backbone that both ensure and provide order and stability within Saudi society. B.  Influencing AT/CT Operations: Context, Politics and Strategic Pitfalls Many factors or variables impact AT/CT operations. Those cited in the general academic literature on the subject are context, politics and strategic pitfalls.88 They can either impede or expedite success. Success is defined here as effectively and efficiently carrying out an operation, while recognising that it is the recognition of operational goals, and the strategies and tactics employed for their attainment, which will determine more specifically whether a specific operation itself was successful. To a large extent the pitfalls in mounting an operation and the resulting societal reaction to an operation, with all its pitfalls, play a significant role in determining operational outcomes. This subsection, however, only provides a brief overview of the pitfalls. Context defines how states use the security forces to combat terrorism. That is, context determines whether an operation will be defensive or offensive or a combination of both. As the Saudi case demonstrates, there

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84  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia will be variance in the type of tactical operations employed. The early phases of the Saudi encounter with terrorism were primarily defensive, while the later phases saw a combination of and greater emphasis on security strategies akin to the criminal justice rather than the military/ security model. Shifts in the Saudi Al Qaeda’s tactical operations and socio-political contextual changes account for the shift. It has been recognised by experts and state actors that the Al Qaeda global network effectively adopted and implemented operations according to the context of the time and place in which they found themselves when planning their operations. As a mirror image, the planning and execution of operations has adapted itself to the same temporal and spatial factors.89 The Saudi Interior Ministry has actually confirmed that the Saudi Al Qaeda network’s military and tactical operational changes required alterations in Saudi security operations. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the shift in Saudi security operations occurred in 2004. Specifically, there was a shift in the priorities accorded to the type of operations employed. Antiterrorism operations rather than counterterrorism operations became the main focus of Saudi attention. Counterterrorism operations were employed to respond to actual incidents, while antiterrorism ones were employed to prevent and/or reduce Saudi Al Qaeda operations.90 It is this combination of approaches that has defined the Saudi response to terrorism, with each approach pursued as appropriate in accordance with the context, political factors and potential operation pitfalls relevant in each instance. C.  Saudi Security AT/CT Operations: From Clashes to Containment Saudi security services are the first line of defence after a terrorist attack. They are also responsible for investigating incidents, capturing those who have committed crimes, and implementing preventative measures to interdict and/or deter the commission of crimes. Terrorism is, all would agree, a crime. Any crime – including terrorism – will lead to social erosion if it is not understood and measures are not taken to address the underlying factors leading members of society to engage in criminal behaviour. The well-being of Saudi society is vital for ensuring stability and maintaining security. Actions taken by Saudi security are designed to maintain confidence and to create trust between individuals, society, the security sector and the government.

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This trust is essential in combating and preventing the adoption of terrorism as a tactic for the advancement of political or social aspirations. The challenge for terrorism comes from the fact that as a tactic it is designed to break the trust between society and the state; it is intended to drive society to question whether the state can actually maintain its wellbeing. Thus, how Saudi security forces conduct AT/CT operations matters. This subsection, therefore, provides a brief overview of Saudi security AT/CT operations. It is divided into two further subsections. The first examines the Kingdom’s domestic security operations and the second examines its border security operations. They are interdependent yet operationally distinct in the fight against terrorism. 1.  Security Operations: From Random to Strategic Coordination. The Saudi Interior Ministry serves as both a domestic intelligence and law enforcement agency. It employs both reactive and proactive approaches. A reactive approach entails the pursuit of suspects after the commission of a crime, whereas a proactive approach is concerned with predicting and preventing crime.91 The latter is important because it helps to identify the transition process from radicalism to violent extremism. Not all radicals are threats, however. An individual only becomes a threat when he or she is willing or about to engage in an act of violence; or, when he or she is willing to help another who is engaged, or planning to engage, in an act of violence. There is also recognition that the transition process, or the pathway from one to the other, will vary among individuals. This is why a proactive rather than a reactive approach is better for preventing terrorism. Saudi security operations take a pragmatic approach as the way to balance both long and short-term AT/CT planning. This subsection will provide a glimpse of Saudi security operations by concentrating on the three principal elements of the security spectrum: investigations and the methodologies deployed; the actual actions deployed such as skirmishes, raids, patrol and checkpoints; and specific preventative or containment methodologies. Investigations. The first step in any investigation of suspected Al Qaeda activity has always been to examine similar past violent incidents and the databases on existing criminal networks. In these investigations, Saudi security forces targeted suspected Saudi Al Qaeda operatives, their homes, and places of employment.92 Family, friends and acquaintances that either

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86  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia knew or might have known the suspects were also sought out and questioned. In this process, many of the illegal materials or items which could be used to engage in an act of terrorism were found stored in the homes and basements of suspects and/or their family members. In some cases, the locations for storage included places of employment. Weaponry found included bombs, grenades, machine guns, pistols and rocket launchers; and some of the chemicals found included ammonium nitrate, potassium nitrate, powder fertiliser, sulphur and a mixture of other varieties that could be used for making explosives and/or to be used in other weaponry.93 Investigations also identified the existence of labs for the making, assembling and storage of weaponry and other materials needed for carrying out operations. Labs were found in different locations across the country. Some of the investigations required coordination and cooperation with regional and international security partners. As both Saudi and non-Saudi operatives who were part of the Saudi Al Qaeda network, coordination and cooperation were, therefore, required with the country representatives and security personnel from each suspect’s country. For example, in one incident in 2005, Saudi security forces cooperated with their counterparts in Yemen.94 Their cooperation was undertaken in the context of the Ministries’ joint efforts to bilaterally strengthen security. Long-term investigations enabled Saudi security forces to identify operational and suspect behavioural patterns. For example, in mid-2004, security forces saw an increasing number of incidents of wanted suspects disguising themselves as women to avoid detection.95 Also in 2004, security forces were able to determine the location of bombmaking facilities through persistent surveillance.96 It should be noted that behavioural patterns would not have been detected without the use persistent surveillance. The identification process thereof helped to refine not only how Saudi security forces pursued terrorism investigations but also how they conducted AT/CT operations. Skirmishes, Raids, Patrols and Checkpoints. Skirmishes between Saudi security forces and operatives of the Saudi Al Qaeda network became frequent during the end of 2003 and in 2004.97 In 2004, many skirmishes involved encounters between highway patrols and activists.98 These might involve fire-fights initiated either by suspects as they were being approached by the patrols themselves to encourage suspects to lay

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down their arms. There were many such skirmishes during road patrols. Due to the frequency of skirmishes and exchanges of fire, the tactics of the patrols were changed.99 Security forces would wait to pull over a vehicle until the potential for harm or injury to civilians could be minimised. Concern for civilians and bystanders became paramount. Roadblocks and checkpoints were also used in part to protect civilians, since the area surrounding such control points had to be cordoned off.100 Skirmishes also occurred during investigative operations and raids.101 For example, in November 2004, Saudi security forces were investigating the inconsistency of names102 at an apartment building in Riyadh. Their checking of identities led to an exchange of gunfire between security forces and Saudi Al Qaeda operatives.103 Then, in August 2005, Saudi security forces conducted two simultaneous raids in the early hours of the morning to check identities in residential areas – one in Riyadh and one in Jeddah.104 Again, they met with gunfire before the suspects were apprehended. The routines following such encounters were entirely conventional: a verification of identities, search of the premises for evidence and the interrogation of suspects. Containment and Denying Sanctuary and a Safe Haven. Saudi security policy seeks to contain, isolate and understand security problems by keeping such problems within its borders. It does not adopt a policy that seeks merely to ‘deny a safe haven’. The overall literature on AC/CT posits that an enemy cannot be permitted to establish a safe haven or sanctuary in any country.105 The argument goes that the availability of sanctuary permits operatives to plan, lead or engage in an attack.106 If a person is constantly on the run, it is claimed, then he or she lacks the security needed to plan or carry out an attack. Thus, denying sanctuary entails eliminating or minimising safe havens which in turn reduces the likelihood of terrorist attacks. But while denial-of-sanctuary policy has short-term gains, it has longterm strategic problems. In the short term, operatives are indeed dispersed or flee to different countries. This does weaken their potential to operate within the country they left. Once settled and over time, however, it creates a global network of operatives that can coordinate and cooperate domestically, regionally and internationally. Each local operative will create his or her own base within the country in which he or she is living. This local contingent will focus on issues in the community to create the

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88  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia tacit support needed for an operation. Once an operation is planned, then there is regional and global coordination through coalition building around specific issues. This results in local issues becoming ‘glocal’. The ‘glocality’ of issues and campaigns increase the global reach of local activists and their power on the ground. A policy of denying sanctuary, can thus result in creating a formidable global movement with aspirations for greater political instability on an international scale. By the same token, a policy that denies sanctuary and so-called safe havens increase the potential for non-localised collective action to produce more dramatic acts of violence. Thus, a policy that contains or isolates potential operatives within borders, where their actions can be more effectively monitored, has greater long-term strategic value than one that seeks to forcefully remove such individuals from a territory thus dispersing activists often beyond the reach of security forces from any state. The Saudi policy of containment, therefore, can be characterised as more of an attempt to isolate rather than to exclude an individual. In pursuit of this tract, the community and family play a significant role. A person is unable to function within Saudi society if he or she is isolated. This further adds to the effect and benefit of containing within rather than exporting a security problem, which is what might result from a policy that denies a safe haven. A policy of containment requires security forces to adopt strategies and tactics that seek to contain rather than force an operative to flee. Selected targeting is an example of such a tactic. 2. Border Security Operations: Smuggling and Trafficking of Goods and People. This section examines the two principal crimes that concern border security – smuggling and trafficking – and their relationship to terrorism. This exploration inevitably highlights the importance of the temporal and topographical conditions for such crimes and surveys the Saudi border-security system and national strategy that drives this topic. Border security is concerned with preventing criminal activity, maintaining security and stability and ensuring the legal flow of goods and people in and out of the country. Arms/weapons, alcohol, counterfeit, electronic goods, petrol,107 unauthorised individuals,108 mobile devices and SIM cards are items commonly smuggled into the country.109 Smuggling and trafficking are two principal, yet conceptually and analytically different,110 types of border crimes committed and have their own set of

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network dynamics, forms, linkages and legal and illegal components.111 Given the importance of border security for AT/CT operations and policies, the various elements that feed into the topic bear some detailed examination.112 Smuggling is defined by the United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime (UNTOC) as ‘the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person without a State Party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident.’113 Penalties such as fines and imprisonment for smuggling in Saudi Arabia are determined by the Committee for Customs and Tariffs. The basis for smuggling is done for financial reward rather than exploitation, which is a word more appropriately used for trafficking. According to the Justice Ministry, there were 72 Saudi trafficking cases in 2012, with 72 per cent of them involving Saudis and 28 per cent involving non-Saudis. Trafficking is defined by the UNTOC as ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.’ The individuals typically trafficked into Saudi Arabia comprise Ethiopians, Somalis and Yemenis,114 assisted by African criminal gangs.115 The Human Trafficking Committee is tasked with determining the penalties. A typical sentence includes 15 years in prison and a fine of one million SAR. The fine and sentence can be higher if women or children are involved. Worthy of note is that the Saudi and Yemeni Border Guards have been assisted indirectly, and directly, in some cases by international and local activists working within Yemen to combat child trafficking between the two countries.116 The common routes for both smuggling and trafficking are the Saudi– Yemeni border, the Saudi–UAE border, the Saudi–Jordanian border and the Saudi–Bahraini border. The southern region of Saudi Arabia witnesses the most incidents of smuggling and trafficking. It encompasses the Jizan, Asir and Najran provinces, with Jizan and Najran being the main points of entry for cross-border flows. This region also saw the least amount of terrorism-related incidents in the years 2002–12. An interesting explanation for this relative quiescence would be that an increase in violent incidents there would have drawn greater attention from Saudi security

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90  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia forces, which would have inhibited cross-border movements, including the flow of and other materials needed by Saudi Al Qaeda to carry out operations against Saudi security forces. Most cross-border criminal operations occur when the environmental conditions make detection more difficult.117 Obviously night time, heavy rainfall/sandstorms and thick fog also assist these cross-border events. They are also more frequent during periods of domestic and/or regional chaos, conflict and war. For example, Saudi Customs and Border Authorities noted an increase in weapons smuggling prior to and during the Saudi Al Qaeda battle. They also detected an increase in Syrian manufactured drugs being smuggled into the country with the start of the Syrian Revolution. Alcohol is commonly smuggled into all border routes; arms and other weaponry-related material are usually brought in through the Saudi– Yemeni border, although there were specific periods between 2002 and 2013 when border and customs authorities saw an increase in weapons coming from Iraq. Drugs are most frequently brought in across the Saudi– Yemeni and Saudi–Jordanian borders. Many of the drug shipments coming in from Jordan have been found to be manufactured in Syria. Narcotic pills find their way into the country through the country’s commercial airports. The illicit export of gasoline takes place via Batha, Dammam and Jeddah. The Interior Ministry has noted linkages in the drugs and weapons’ shipment patterns.118 Knowledge of the criminal networks and the pattern of movements which goods and people follow across and within the country are, therefore, important intelligence tools for border security operations, as well as AT/CT operations. Saudi Arabia has been proactive in the measures taken to interdict and/or deter border violations. However, like the AT/CT policies and model, the border security system, the national strategy and border security operations have all evolved over time.119 A proper border security system is dependent on the infrastructure tools that will help to maintain that security.120 Prior to 2009 common measures taken to interdict and/or deter border violations included the creation of observation posts,121 the installation of cameras to monitor movement, the erection of fences to prevent infiltration and the implementation of routine field inspections and aerial surveillance. These measures were systematically consolidated in 2009. In 2009, Saudi Arabia signed a contract with the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), through its Saudi partner the

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Al-Rashid Trading and Contracting Company, to build a high-tech border security system. The system provides the technology which links and updates the existing facilities. It includes fences with night cameras and thermal heat sensors, border posts as well as surface-to-air monitoring systems, and domestic and regional situational awareness technology. Such technology is essential, not only for maintaining the system, but also for measuring the climatic and topographical conditions of the country at any particular time. As a result, the products which provide data that enhance the capacity for the most accurate information about a specific site or event to be available to security forces: view finders, night goggles, listening devices, sensors and so forth. Saudi Arabia adopted an aircraft border and patrol monitoring policy. Aircraft are now used regularly to monitor the borders and to support the work of border guards in the field.122 Saudi Arabia’s national strategy for border security was articulated and adopted in 2012, following the International Conference on Border Security held in Riyadh.123 The national strategy emphasised: sustainable development in the border region for long term border security; the role of advanced technology to combat piracy, intrusion and smuggling/ trafficking; the need to incorporate border security-related topics in the country’s university educational curricula; and the establishment of training programmes and research centres for those working in border security. This strategy was modified and further consolidated in February 2013 by the establishment of a high-level committee comprising of the various security organs.124 The committee was tasked with assessing the effectiveness and viability of security arrangements, determining the number of infiltrators and finding ways to repatriate them after any judicial process. The committee’s reviews also resulted in the creation of three rehabilitation and processing centres for humanitarian purposes to accommodate infiltrators while their cases were being investigated.125 A majority of the reported 27,603 infiltrators caught in the first ten months of 2013 were attempting to enter the country for work, while only a minority were engaged in criminal activity. Following interrogation, the benign majority was repatriated. A typical border security operation entails detecting and investigating movements along the border by deploying patrols, aircraft cameras, thermal sensors or receiving tip-offs from the public. To encourage the tip-offs, the Interior Ministry established a hotline for the public to report

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92  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia suspicious activity or knowledge of any planned or actual criminal acts. The resulting public response, and the information derived from it, has led to coordinated border security investigations and/or operations between Saudi forces such as the National Guard, the Defence Ministry and the Interior Ministry,126 as well as between Saudi forces and those of its neighbours such as Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE and Yemen.127 Aside from cases involving weapons or drug smuggling, the security officers generally turn back individuals from entering the country and to return them to their countries of origin. There are also a small number of incidents involving clashes, exchange of fire or a chase. Many such incidents involved individuals engaged in weapons smuggling. As a principle, Saudi security forces have instructions not to fire on suspects unless they are fired upon first, and then only if no other options exist to persuade the suspects to cease, desist and give themselves up. D.  Assessing Short- versus Long-Term Gains in Security AT/CT Operations Security operations and the use of security forces in antiterrorism and counterterrorism are controversial among academics and practitioners.128 This is because long-term impacts can outweigh the short-term strategic benefits. Most non-state actors have limited resources in comparison to state actors.129 It can happen therefore that a state’s overreaction through the use of force ends up empowering non-state actors. The environment in which AT/CT operations take place is also no longer confined to the domestic sphere. There are also regional and international environments that play a role in influencing operational and tactical outcomes. Non-state actors can achieve empowerment through delegitimising the state at the domestic and international levels. Either track, domestic or international, depend on the non-state actor’s target audience. For example, the non-state Shi’i actors in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia lack a larger domestic support base for their collective action policies since the Shi’i make up only about 15 per cent of the country’s population. Thus, they target the international level in an attempt to delegitimise the government while legitimising their cause in the full knowledge that in the international sphere their disaffection with the government will gain wide attention. Social media has transformed the role of public relations and, thus, perceptions. Narratives of military and security actions are no longer confined

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to government and media discourse. Actions are now simultaneously broadcast as they occur. Bahrain is an excellent case study showing how security and military efforts can produce collective action and yet undermine state legitimacy at the domestic, regional and international levels. The joint Saudi–Bahraini military intervention in Bahrain in 2011 proved a tactical success yet it undermined the legitimacy of the Bahraini state. In short, the various forms of collective action need to be examined separately to evaluate the success and failure of AT/CT operations. II.  The Criminal Justice Component: From Arrests to Detention A criminal justice system is generally comprised of laws, law enforcement, courts and correctional facilities such as prisons and rehabilitative centres. The Saudi system is governed by the country’s Basic Law of Governance. The Interior Ministry is tasked with law enforcement, while the Justice Ministry is responsible for the court system. Finally, the Interior and Justice Ministries, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the General Directorate of Prisons (DP), the Bureau of Investigation and Prisons (BIP) and the various judicial and security-related commissions and committees are involved in and affect the functioning of the correctional facilities. All these institutional components are, when taken together, designed to mitigate, interdict and deter crime. Terrorism is a crime. Under the 2013 Saudi Counterterrorism Law, it is considered to be any act by individuals and/or groups with a criminal motive, directly or indirectly, that undermines public order and the state’s security and stability.130 It includes actions: endangering national unity; disabling the country’s basic law or its articles; defaming the state and its reputation; causing damage to the state facilities or its natural resources; attempting to force one of its agencies to take unauthorised actions; threatening to carry out actions leading to the such goals; and/or inciting others to commit these crimes. As was already mentioned, the Saudi AT/CT approach is a hybrid amalgam of the assumptions and principles that describe the security-military and the criminal justice approaches. While the first part of this chapter considered security issues, this section will examine the Saudi AT/CT approach from the criminal justice or law enforcement perspective. The criminal justice or law enforcement systems treat terrorism as a process to be handled through the criminal justice mechanisms and

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94  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia not an actor to be defeated via straight military confrontation. There is a difference between fighting terrorism on a domestic rather than international front. A criminal justice approach is more effective in handling homegrown terrorism rather than international or cross-border terrorism.131 Terrorism outside the domestic environments requires coordination and cooperation with security authorities from other jurisdictions. They may also require a security presence on the ground from one country to another to assist local security authorities. A further complication is that the institutional framework of a particular country may not be per se conducive for the criminal justice approach. Context, politics and strategic capabilities play a significant role in determining which AT/CT policies to adopt and how they are to be implemented. This section examines the Saudi criminal justice approach, focusing specifically on arrests and detention, the prison system and the court system. A.  Arrests and Detention Arrest and detention procedures are governed by three laws, namely the Basic Law of Governance; the Statute of Detention and Imprisonment (SDI) of May 1978; and the Statute of Principles of Arrest, Temporary Confinement and Preventive Detention (SPAD) of November 1983.132 The Basic Law of Governance and the SDI prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention. Once in detention, detainees can be held for periods defined by the General Directorate of Investigations. Detention may be contested if the detainee is held beyond 21 days. However, a complaint can be made at any time to the appropriate authorities, including to the Interior Ministry and/ or the governor of the region in which the proceedings are taking place. Detained individuals are held for interrogation and to gather information pertinent for investigations. Detainees, however, are not considered political prisoners. An additional distinction is made according to the intentions and motives which led to an arrest. For example, those returning from Afghanistan direct or via Guantanamo Bay are distinguished according to whether they originally found themselves in Afghanistan for religious reasons (e.g., to teach in a madrassa), on account of religious appeals, or in order to engage in acts of terrorism. Chapter 4 discusses policy toward these individuals. To assist with arrests and detentions, the government coordinated and cooperated with other countries. This occurred in three ways. The first

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and most common approach is via the cooperation and coordination that takes place following bilateral security agreements between the countries such as in the case of Saudi – Yemeni security cooperation. Second, Saudi authorities provide assistance in the investigations which follows the arrest and detention of suspects by the security forces of another state. For example, in 2011, Saudi security forces assisted Turkish authorities after a Saudi national was detained in Turkey on terrorist charges. Third, extradition also serves is a form cooperation in the area of arrests and detentions.133 This route does however rely on the existence of extradition treaties. In the absence of a treaty, Saudi Arabia investigates and tries its citizens in absentia in accordance with the country’s laws. All states reserve the right to try their citizens under their own laws, especially in the absence of an extradition treaty or where there is concern over due process. B.  The Prison System The prison issue is one that has been cited by not only Saudi Al Qaeda operatives but other groups as well. The Saudi government generally recognises that a well-functioning prison system is vital to security and stability. It is also important for the success of AT/CT operations and policy implementation. Consequently, improvements in the prison system and of prisoner conditions have become a paramount concern. The Interior Ministry, Justice Ministry and the Public Prosecutor’s Office are responsible for overseeing the prison system in Saudi Arabia. This subsection provides a brief overview of the Saudi prison system. It highlights some of the problems cited by the government, the recommendations made, and the reform efforts undertaken. The overview is not meant to be exhaustive. In Saudi Arabia, there are a total of 40 permanent prisons and 60 transitional facilities,134 which are divided into three types – open, closed and semi-closed systems.135 A closed prison system restricts inmate interaction with members of society, whereas an open system permits and encourages societal interaction. Closed prisons are based on the idea of retributive rather than rehabilitative justice. Some European countries that follow the rehabilitation approach have lower crime and recidivism rates than, say, the United States which adopts retributive justice. The Saudi prison system is a hybrid. According to the Saudi Bureau of Investigations and Prisons (BIP), as of 2013 there were 47,000 prisoners in

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96  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Saudi jails; 24,000 of them were non-Saudis.136 Women account for six to seven per cent of the total prison population.137 A majority of the male and female prison population are imprisoned for petty crimes and misdemeanours.138 Forty-seven per cent are imprisoned on drug charges. There are only a minority of prisoners who have been charged with, or held for, terrorism-related crimes. According to the Interior Ministry, 2,772 Saudi citizens and 551 expatriates are, as of 2013, held on terrorism or terrorism-related charges.139 Each prisoner costs the government more than SAR 150,000 (approximately US $40,000) per year.140 This amount covers food, medical care, cleaning and other living necessities. In terrorism-related cases, the government is also providing financial support to the families. Common problems cited in the prisons include overcrowding, the conditions within the correction facilities141 and drugs.142 The drug problem led the Interior Ministry to establish a special committee to fight prison drug use and addiction in May of 2013.143 The issue of conditions is related to overcrowding. Overcrowding is when a prison contains more prisoners than which the correctional facility can accommodate. There are many direct and indirect factors contributing to the problem. The Justice and Health Ministries, prosecutors and immigration officers are cited as the responsible parties for a lack of progress in addressing this issue.144 The position of the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council has been that no prisoner shall be held without trial for more than six months.145 A sentence can only be extended by a court order.146 Holding a prisoner beyond his or her term is a gross violation of the country’s laws, particularly Articles 26 and 36 of the Law of Basic Governance.147 Given the importance of the prison system to security and stability, there have been several recommendations made by various government authorities over the years on how to reform the system. In 2004, there were recommendations for the creation of separate prisons for those awaiting trials and for others who had been convicted.148 There were also calls for deportation of the non-Saudis inside the prisons.149 In 2008, there were calls once more for the creation of more prisons. In 2009, the Director of Prisons made the case that education and rehabilitation would minimise violence inside the prisons and reduce criminality over time. In 2013, there were recommendations for the establishment of playgrounds for schools and institutions inside prisons; the establishment of shops outside of the

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prisons to market and sell the goods made by women prisoners; and the establishment of social and religious rehabilitation centres. The first set of recommendations in 2004 followed a major prison system overhaul in 2003.150 While the first plan for reform of the prison system was drafted in 2001,151 action was not taken until 2003. In 2003, the Council of Ministers removed the jurisdiction of the prisons system from the public security department and created an independent Department of Prisons within the Interior Ministry, which was then headed by the late Interior Minister and former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. The General Directorate of Prisons was headed by Major General Dr Ali bin Hussein Alharthy, who, it should be noted, has been a staunch supporter and advocate for rehabilitative justice.152 In 2009, he called for the establishment of guidance councils within the prisons in the Gulf region to facilitate coordination and cooperation among the states to reduce prison violence through rehabilitative justice. The General Department of Prisons is responsible for supervising the prisons and their management. Also authorised by the Council of Ministers’ was a prison council to look after prison affairs and follow-up on the condition of prisoners.153 The condition of prisoners is also monitored by the Human Rights Commission, which was established to supervise and monitor prisons to ensure human rights and fair criminal justice investigation and trial in the prison system.154 The year 2013 would see another overhaul or, rather, significant change. All this pointed to the rehabilitative or holistic approach to justice prevailing over the retributive track. The Saudi system was, and still remains, a hybrid. The marked difference that has occurred in this generation would be the transition from retributive to rehabilitative justice that began in 2003. The reforms undertaken in the ten-year transition from 2003 include administrative and structural reforms; specific reforms targeting the prisoners themselves; the adoption of alternative forms of punishment; the expansion of rehabilitative measures; and the creation of human rights’ councils inside the prisons.155 As an extension of the latter point, the National Society for Human Rights opened offices inside security prisons in Riyadh, Asir, Jeddah, the Eastern Province and Qasim.156 The administrative and structural reforms included approval for the construction of four new reform centres for Jeddah, Riyadh, Taif and Dammam; the implementation of an electronic system to connect prison

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98  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia departments with prosecution offices and judges in order to expedite bail or sentencing; the adoption of communications jamming technology in the prisons to prevent outsiders from helping or facilitating drug crimes in the prisons;157 and the commencement of a study to examine the implementation of a training centre or institute for prison employees.158 The implementation of the electronic system among these reforms follows the growing number of calls following the events of 2008 for greater accountability and transparency in the prison system. Specific reforms targeting prisoners included: the establishment of a communication portal between inmates and the outside world; greater efforts to protect women prisoners; the early release of non-violent, petty crime offenders to relieve prison overcrowding; and the adoption of alternative punitive measures. The communication portal allows prisoners to communicate and correspond with their families and to receive information on case details and procedural updates from their lawyers or the court. The portal also facilitates the issuance of visiting permits for families, lawyers and human rights activists and permits the online submission of requests for the release of prisoners. This electronic project is part of a larger project that seeks to develop a fully functioning electronic prison network system. Measures to provide better protection of women prisoners began in 2012. Hospitality houses for released women whose families would not take them back were established that year.159 In 2013, the Commission of Investigation and General Prosecution’s report recommended more protection and justice for women who served time. Women were also to be included in the 2012 prisoner amnesty.160 In 2012, a royal pardon ordered the release of prisoners who were serving jail sentences for petty crimes and who did not pose a threat to public security.161 This led the Interior Ministry to the form committees in every province, to identify and expedite the staged release of eligible prisoners. Prisoners must have served at least one month of their sentence. At the same time, prisoners with serious and infectious illness were exempted from punitive punishment and other punitive measures such as electronic ankle bracelets were adopted. Finally, rehabilitative, educational community service and employment programmes for prisoners were slated for expansion over a ten-year transition process. A holistic justice approach to prisons was adopted in 2013.162 It includes both a programme to rehabilitate prisoners and

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ex-offenders and a youth project established under the auspices of King Saud University’s National Center for Youth Studies. The rehabilitation programme for prisoners and ex-offenders were planned in collaboration with King Saud University. Its curriculum matched what was used in the CT rehabilitation programme (discussed in Chapter 4). The programme consisted of psychology, sociology, social services and religious courses and involved academics, psychologists, religious scholars and community leaders. The partnership with King Saud University was just one aspect of the education programmes established for prisoners. There was a call in 2008 for the creation of education and vocational programmes inside the prisons, especially for young offenders. The late Interior Minister, Prince Nayef, had submitted a proposal that year, which proposed a reduction in a prisoner’s sentence by 15 per cent if they partook in academic programmes while incarcerated. In 2011, the National Committee for the Care of Prisoners, Ex-Prisoners and Their Families established a scholarship programme at the Institute of Prince Ahmed bin Salman for Applied Information in Riyadh. In 2013, higher education and high school programmes for those who never formally completed their education were established. As of 2013, there were 38 adult education facilities, 42 intermediate schools, 43 high schools and four schools specifically devoted to women in the prison system. Education is critical for rehabilitative justice. It can help to break the cycle that led the individual down the criminal path in the first place. The community, work-release and employment programmes are other steps. While the community programmes reintroduce ex-criminals into society, the work release facilitates their communal involvement. The employment programme is intended to provide prisoners with sources of income to prevent any indication to reoffend. In fact, in 2012, the Labour Ministry itself stepped in to create employment for prisoners. The following year the Saudi Industrial Property Authority established 120 factories where inmates can work after completing their prison terms. These and other rehabilitative justice programmes are primarily available to Saudis rather than non-Saudis. Non-Saudis, who comprise the majority of the country’s prison population, are not per se excluded from participating, but they are usually deported immediately after their release. Nevertheless, a breakdown in the court system has led to many not being deported.

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100  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia C.  The Court System The prison system in Saudi Arabia continues to suffer many problems and shortfalls. Much of this is connected to and exacerbated by weaknesses within the judicial system. The judicial system is the responsibility of the Justice Ministry. While the Ministry is the principal actor in the dynamics of the country’s juridical network, other agencies too are involved namely, the Interior Ministry, the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution (BIP) and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. They also share responsibility for the judicial system’s stability and order in the Kingdom. This subsection, therefore, provides a brief overview of the problems within the judicial system, the reform efforts undertaken as of 2013, and the terrorism cases. Justice is the key to security and stability and, thus, Saudi Arabia’s AT/CT efforts. Given that justice is the key, it should come as no surprise then that the issues within the prison and judicial systems are intertwined. The problems within the prison system are exacerbated and, in part, a product of the weaknesses found in the judicial system. These include the disorganisation of the judiciary and an inadequate system that connects actors with the functional operational components of the judiciary. They also include an insufficient number of judges, inadequate training of personnel, mismanagement of trials, errors by prosecutors and an inadequate presence of women within the judicial system. These issues are interconnected. The Saudi government established the Judiciary Law and Court of Grievances Law in 2007 to bring about judicial reform. Between 2007 and 2011, the committees tasked with reform studied the best practices employed in other countries. In 2011, the Shura Council approved judicial reform after the Committee on Islamic Affairs and the Judiciary submitted its report. The next two years witnessed the gradual implementation of reforms. The judiciary was reorganised and an electronic system was developed which facilitated the flow of data and information within the various elements of the court networks. New courthouses were constructed adjacent or very close to correctional facilities across the country. The proximity of courthouses to prisons helped to reduce transportation costs for prisoners to and from the prison helped and, reduced the potential for bureaucratic and procedural delays. At about the same time a new electronic system was created to provide much more effective connectivity with the judicial networks. The e-gate

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system, which was established in 2012 as part of the late King Abdullah’s e-government project, intended eventually to see all government and public institutions electronically connected and accessible to public, private, governmental and non-governmental actors. In the initial stage of the e-gate project, about 400 courts were networked to enable the filing of cases from home and allow litigants to check on the status of their case. The system addressed one of the major criticisms over the years, namely the delay in submitting – or the inaccurate filing of – paperwork for legal proceedings. In addition to the e-gate system, a remote monitoring system was established in 2013 to provide judicial oversight, ensure accountability and facilitate transparency. It covers 80 per cent of the approximately 18,000 judges in the country. The remaining 20 per cent of judges are subject to on-site field inspection. Regardless of whether there is remote or on-site monitoring, their performance can be evaluated and their needs determined based on a systematic review of 30 cases per judge per year. Both the e-gate and remote monitoring system enables database linkage, facilitates transparency and ensures accountability. The introduction of an electronic system requires an extensive training programme so all court personnel undergo training in information technology and management. This includes 49 training programmes for judges, which occur annually. The 18–25 training sessions per year cover subjects such as rules of compensation, judicial specialisation, sentencing in absentia, writing reports and using modern technology. In addition to mandatory training for court personnel, the King Abdullah Judicial Reform project increased the number of personnel involved in the court system and encouraged the recruitment of more women.163 The decision to add more women or, rather, the implementation of a feminisation policy designed to secure a more extensive level of promotions for women was undertaken in 2012. The Justice Ministry decided to add women to the guidance centres to reduce the pressure on the court system, reflecting the fact that so many cases before the courts related to family issues. It should also be noted that the first woman was granted the right to serve as an attorney enabling how to practice in all areas of law.164 In 2014, the first female law office was opened in Jeddah thus further pushing forward the opportunities being opened up for women within the judicial system. Finally, the reforms led to the promotion and appointment of 223 new judges with an additional

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102  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 150–200 judges to be appointed each year. The additional judges will help to clear the back-log of cases.165 All cases fall under the legal procedures before the BIP and the Special Criminal Court.166 Special Criminal Courts for handling terrorism cases were established in 2008 in Riyadh, Dammam and Jeddah. Across the globe, terrorism cases have traditionally been tried in one of three arenas – national courts, special courts and military tribunals.167 The Saudi system adopts the national courts model. Within the national courts model, there are also three different types, namely regular courts, special courts and military courts.168 Most states adopt the special courts’ model, which is where the Saudi system for trying terrorism cases is situated.169 As of 2013, the court had ruled in 1,080 cases and was considering another 419 cases that involve 2,800 suspects. Terrorism suspects are tried and categorised according to the Saudi Al Qaeda networks or operational cells in which they are involved. For example, in 2012, ten operatives of the Alkhafji cell of the Saudi Al Qaeda network were sentenced by the Special Criminal Court. Other network/cells included the Almebriz cell and the Tarik Aldandani network.170 The Aldandani network was different than the Alkhafji and Almebriz cells in that it was divided into small cells demarcated by seven regions: Riyadh, Qasim, Kharj, South, Ahsa, Jawf and Darieyah. Evident in some of the cases was tension between suspected operatives and Saudi governing authorities. There was a case in 2012 of one operative who refused to participate in congregational prayer. His argument was that he refused to pray with those who recognise the legitimacy of the government. In another incident in 2012, a suspected operative refused to speak at his own trial. He refused to enter a plea and/or to defend himself against the charges.171 The BIP is responsible for charging suspects. There has been a range of charges across the cases. Sentences vary according to the nature of convictions.172 Over all, by the end of 2013, a total of 2,145 jail sentences for ‘supporting terrorism’ were handed out. Sentences or penalties are imposed in any society and for the public interest, with the intent to protect against deviant behaviour; to maintain the integrity of society; and to either punish or rehabilitate the criminal.173 Punishments in Saudi Arabia are determined by the level of involvement, as well as by the tenets of Islamic law.174 Beginning in 2013, the Interior Minister was granted the authority to provide immunity from

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prosecution for any persons who report crimes relating to terrorism and cooperate with authorities. He could free individuals from jail if they cooperated with the Interior Ministry. And any retributive dimension to sentencing in all instances is designed to avoid exacerbating the problem. Thus, there is no inclination towards collective punishment that might include a perpetrator’s family or, say, the confiscation of a family house. The idea is to bring closure to a process as quickly as possible in the belief that any type of violence against innocent people will, in turn, generate more violence. This approach must be seen in the context of Saudi Arabia’s transition from retributive to rehabilitative justice. III.  Public Diplomacy: Conciliation, Strategic Communication and Global Political Initiatives Public diplomacy is the last component of the criminal justice dimension of Saudi Arabia’s approach to confronting terrorism.175 It is often used conceptually as a catch-all phrase to refer to strategies and tactics used in conciliation, strategic communication and political initiatives.176 Conciliation is concerned with dialogue, while negotiations involve individuals or actors involved in adversarial situations. Public diplomacy is a process of promoting cooperation and creating harmony between such actors. Strategic communication is the synchronisation of action and discourse to communicate and engage with one or more target audiences.177 These might be adversaries or allies. Political initiatives refer to the domestic and international political actions taken by one or more actors engaged in a dispute, discourse or negotiation. Perception is essential to conciliation, communication and political initiatives.178 Perception is a key factor running through each of the further subsections below, which examine conciliation, strategic communication, and political initiatives. A.  Conciliation: The AT/CT Dialogue Strategy Following 9/11 some Western academics, media and government officials initially adopted a public diplomacy approach which challenged notions of both dialogue and coexistence. Chapter 1 discussed the prevalent ideas, discourse and perceptions following 9/11. Saudi academics, media personalities and government officials responded and publicly engaged in

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104  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia debates to highlight and critique the negative images that linked Islam, terrorism and Saudi Arabia. They challenged their Western counterparts on the claims they made regarding Islam as a religion and Muslim countries. They also critiqued Westerners for having either limited or no knowledge of Islam and for not having visited the countries for which they were making judgements. This, as will be discussed in the following subsection, led to the Saudi Deputy Ministry for Foreign Information to call for and to sponsor delegations to Saudi Arabia to facilitate dialogue. Dialogue is one of the most important aspects of AT/CT security operations.179 No AT/CT strategy can rely on the deployment of force alone; there must be engagement and dialogue. Dialogue helps to overcome misunderstandings, promotes moderation and fosters tolerance.180 With these obvious truths in mind, Saudi religious leaders called for the establishment of an organisation to tackle the phenomenon of terrorism at the regional and global levels, to engage in research on the root causes and proliferation of the phenomenon and to promote the principles of transparency, objectivity, justice and fairness in all actions.181 Then, in 2003, the late King Abdullah, who was at that time the Crown Prince, approved the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue as a venue for exchange and reconciliation of different views on the issues facing the country. Its objectives were to strengthen national unity through serious dialogue; to promote moderation; to discuss national issues through intellectual channels; and to make dialogue as the route to problem-solving. These objectives were to be secured through hosting conferences, holding lectures and sponsoring forums for national dialogue. The first two national dialogue forums were closed to the public but the subsequent sessions were opened to and broadcast throughout the country. Participants for these dialogues encompassed varied sectors and segments of Saudi society, including religious scholars, scientists, intellectuals and academics from a range of fields. Participation in the forums was determined by the Presidential Committee and the General Secretariat of the Center, together with preparatory committees. Some of the issues covered included the relationship between extremism and moderation; national unity; women’s rights; the role of youth in society, the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and the Saudi education system. These also all happened to be relevant to the country’s AT/CT media strategy, discussed in the next subsection.

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Prior to the centre’s establishment there was no venue for members of the public to come together to explore solutions to disputes. Government officials have always had an open-door policy, whereby members of the public could approach them to express their grievances. But this process was different than what the National Dialogue Center intended, which was to facilitate responsible public debate and constructive dialogue. Religious leaders reminded individuals and society that differences between scholars was once considered a blessing within the Muslim community; and that faith and the principles of tolerance, peace, justice and compassion were not restricted to only Muslims but all of mankind. The support of the religious leaders was reinforced by Saudi government officials, who constantly promoted the idea that dialogue was necessary to diffuse tensions. King Fahd’s call was reinforced by the late Interior Minister Prince Nayef who called on women, and particularly mothers, within Saudi society to educate the young, thereby recognising their important role in the family, society and the state.182 Religious scholars, educators, intellectuals as well as all parents were called upon to educate the young in the principles of moderation and in the dangers of following a path of intolerance and extremism. While academics from King Saud University participated in public lectures on the subject, academics from Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University conducted studies on how dialogue at the level of the international community could facilitate and serve the cause of peace and break the cycle of violence. The memory of past failures, defeats, insults and humiliation all lead to cognitive and behavioural entrapment of the self – whether an individual or the community – in a cycle of violence. Dialogue, it was posited, had the potential both to reduce any criminal behaviour and to break any such cycle. It was recognised as helping to overcome the suppression of healthy, robust discussion on issues of vital importance to the stability and security of a society. This period of self-reflection in the Kingdom through national dialogue would continue, becoming more complex over time and space. The AT/CT strategy of dialogue too would take root and be expanded. The Secretary-General of the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue argued that there should be no boundaries to dialogue,183 and so in cooperative dialogue efforts were realised through regional efforts with other Arab countries. The Arab AT/CT Strategy adopted in 2012 resulted in dialogue across Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and

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106  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Lebanon.184 The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) took the lead in organising venues for interfaith dialogue. It brought representatives together from different countries to exchange ideas on the perceived confrontation between the East and West that emerged in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. These representatives all stressed the need for educational reforms in the face of the transitions taking place toward knowledge-based societies. They also recognised that a concerted collaborative approach was essential. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation reinforced WAMY and promoted dialogue in the larger Muslim community. Dialogue was, according to the OIC, key for a holistic AT/CT approach.185 The OIC’s AT/CT dialogue initiatives encompassed both participating in and organising conferences, forums and interfaith meetings at the domestic and international levels which might include sponsorship or co-sponsorship from the OIC. Such events included the EU–OIC Forum, the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, the Dialogue Among Civilizations, the Alliance of Civilizations and building partnerships with other global organisations. The OIC also partnered with Saudi Arabia to establish the UNCTC and it endorsed the King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID). Finally, the OIC also engaged in outreach to reputable Muslim and non-Muslim think-tanks, academics and non-governmental organisations in the United States, the United Kingdom and other European countries. The GCC completed the circle of regional–global cooperative dialogue efforts through its participation in strategic dialogue meetings, initiatives and conferences.186 Peace, security and stability are the main objectives of the GCC strategic dialogue endeavours. The main issues in both the OIC and the GCC AT/CT dialogue strategy were social collaboration, peaceful coexistence, international cooperation, human rights and justice; and the goal was to promote dialogue so as to avoid misunderstanding and to facilitate stability.187 Stability, tolerance and dialogue are essential components for bridges of understanding, which in turn are built on moderation. The building of bridges was reinforced by a three-day interfaith World Conference of Dialogue in 2008.188 Bridges of understanding facilitate good neighbourly relations and promote stability at the domestic and international levels. The formation of the KAICIID in 2012 in Vienna propelled the AT/CT Dialogue Strategy to the global level.189 Recognising that religion had been the foundation

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of many past and present conflicts, the Center’s goals were very high minded: to promote peace; to serve humanity; to build bridges between communities; and to settle disputes without violence. To promote these goals the centre facilitates dialogue by convening of conferences, conducting research, and providing training in the fields of interreligious and intercultural education.190 In conclusion, the Saudi AT/CT Dialogue Strategy is imbued with the logic of communication and understanding, which is necessary to overcome the logic of conflict and confrontation. The dialogue strategy encompasses the domestic and international levels. It seeks to not just facilitate dialogue but to also to create actual interaction among the diverse segments of humanity. This strategy worked in tandem with the AT/CT Media Campaign and the AT/CT Global Political Approach, which are discussed in the remainder of this section. B.  Strategic Communication: The AT/CT Media Campaign   and Foreign Media Outreach The media has played a vital role in AT/CT policies and operations.191 They have a key part in any vital AT/CT press, information192 and educational efforts. Press AT/CT activities convey information for public consumption. Information AT/CT is concerned with communication channels for security purposes. Educational AT/CT is designed to educate the public at a more general level about issues, context and/or phenomena. All efforts help to facilitate dialogue among a variety of target audiences at the domestic and international levels. Responsibility for the AT/CT media campaign within Saudi Arabia lies with the Ministry of Culture and Information, while the office of the Deputy Minister for Foreign Information is responsible for the foreign media outreach initiatives. Both the AT/CT media campaign and the foreign media outreach initiatives are discussed in this subsection. Let us begin with the latter. The Foreign Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has undertaken outreach initiatives to: promote dialogue between foreign and domestic actors at all levels; facilitate visits of foreign, media and academic delegations; organise educational fieldtrips inside the country for visiting foreign, media and academic delegations; and to cooperate with Saudi embassies and consulates to distribute educational material to foreign governmental and non-governmental agencies, as well as the

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108  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia media and the domestic public in countries around the world.193 In its foreign dialogue outreach, the Ministry’s Foreign Information Office engaged with international media organisations and professionals, as well as foreign writers and intellectuals, regardless of whether they were intrinsically sympathetic or hostile toward the Saudi government and its policies. For many in the latter category, the Ministry actively encouraged visits to Saudi Arabia so that they could form their own views based on the reality on the ground.194 The Ministry arranged the flow of information to, and participated in, domestic and international exhibitions, cultural events and media festivals; it provided publications on issues pertaining to the country, human rights and terrorism in Saudi Arabia; and it distributed 30 books that dealt with the phenomenon of terrorism and related topics on the country such as the workings of Sharia law, the judiciary, education, religion and social life in general. All publications were in English and Arabic. Finally, the Ministry for Foreign Information cooperated with the Ministry of Culture and Information and its concerned departments in the AT/CT media campaign. The Ministry of Culture and Information and its respective bodies (the Radio and Television Commission, the Saudi Press Agency, and the Internal/External news agencies within the country) were instrumental in the launch of the AT/CT media campaign, which has operated continuously since 2001.195 Its goal was to present a unified approach to combat and prevent terrorism. In this unified approach, the campaign pursued four main objectives: to provide continuous and extensive coverage of any terrorist acts or plots; to share as much information with the public as was possible and appropriate; to generate a high degree of awareness among all elements of society; and to publicise the coordinated efforts being taken to both combat and prevent terrorism. The educational campaign consisted in examining six aspects of terrorism: 1. the phenomenon of terrorism itself and the underlying issues or causes that make its use as a tactic more prevalent; 2. the nature of terrorism – its types, its methodologies and specific terrorist events; 3. the competing viewpoints and various narratives relating to the perceptions of terrorism across Saudi society; 4. the methodologies of the Saudi security forces and the judicial proceedings of those caught or those who surrendered;

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5. the problems associated with the AT/CT operations; and 6. the need for domestic and international cooperation and coordination to bring an end to the terrorism phenomenon.

The terrorism educational campaign was complimented by the security narrative, which introduced the notion of security and its role in maintaining stability throughout the country’s history. It also introduced the public to the psychological and security dimensions in the AT/CT operations and helped to create some transparency in the conduct of the AT/CT operations. Straddling the terrorism and the security narratives was the political narrative. The political narrative promoted dialogue on terrorism, its causes and the solutions needed to combat the phenomenon. It linked the terrorism and security narratives to the societal and religious narratives. The societal narrative highlighted life, its importance to the individual and community, and the duty of all members of society to work toward human, community and social development. Finally, the religious narrative reminded society of the importance of faith, life and community and highlighted the trials and tribulations faced by both individuals and the community and the power of belief to overcome struggle. Furthermore, it promoted the need for efforts to prevent terrorism and to promote stability and educated the public on the antithetical relationship between terrorism and Islam.196 All of the narratives sought to strategically target specific segments of society and to use symbolism to link and fuse perceptions of terrorism in those different segments. They each were educational and informational in nature. The campaigns also sought to reach across the divide to embrace the perceived ‘other’, namely the terrorist. It was recognised that anticipating and preventing terrorism required an inclusive rather than an exclusive approach. This could only be conveyed through the media operations. The media operations were, therefore, important for creating the dialogue that would link the political and security initiatives. They also helped to create a climate in which rehabilitative justice would be accepted over retributive justice. While the Saudi domestic AT/CT media campaign was in operation, the GCC ran a regional AT/CT campaign. Its regional campaign produced three documentaries, 30 television and radio announcements and 15 drama episodes. The informational, educational and media initiatives focused on the rejection of both extremism and terrorism and called for tolerance and

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110  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia acceptance of others. The messages were conveyed by authoritative figures within society, namely academics, government officials and religious leaders. Each category of personalities emphasised the need for members of the community to condemn terrorism, to renounce violence as a means for resolving difference, and to promote of human interaction. While the GCC targeted the regional public, the WAMY targeted its media messages to the Muslim youth in the region and around the world, stressing that communities of all ages promote the pathways of peace, tolerance and justice. The Muslim World League (MWL) in its media campaign called for the establishment of media organisations to challenge stereotypes that link Muslims and terrorism and the holding of seminars and conferences in different parts of the world to confront that same stereotyping and suggested developing strong media to influence public opinion. Moreover, it emphasised the need for dialogue to bridge the East and the West and to promote understanding these different cultures and world views as well as the linking of Islamic learning centres around the world with the media campaigns and coordination and cooperation among all Muslim countries. Finally, in 2013, the Arab Information Ministers endorsed a regional AT/CT media strategy presented by the Saudi Cultural and Information Ministry. The endorsement signified the political will among the varied countries to collaborate with combat and prevent terrorism. C.  Political Initiatives: The ‘Glocal’ AT/CT Political Approach Political initiatives increase the potential for long-term success of policies against terrorism. Fighting terrorism in any society and especially Saudi society requires will.197 Political will is created and reinforced through the political initiatives taken at the domestic and international levels.198 The domestic initiatives provide the foundation for Saudi foreign AT/CT policy. International initiatives are actions taken in conjunction with regional GCC members and the wider international community. This subsection will look at each of the initiatives undertaken at the different levels. Domestic Initiatives. A general domestic political strategy toward terrorism was not formally articulated until the mid-1990s. It was driven by the government until around 1998, but then efforts collided with other societal-based informational and educational AT/CT initiatives.

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All initiatives undertaken provided the foundation for the regional and global AT/CT policies, thereby making the political approach ‘glocal’ in nature. The political initiatives initially emphasised self-preparation, learning about the underlying causes of terrorism and how they could be eliminated and directing educational campaigns at Saudi civilians.199 By the end of the 1990s, the emphasis shifted to the relationship between the external and internal factors, resulting eventually in a linkage of the domestic, regional and international political policy initiatives,200 which would in the process combat the psychological aspects of terrorism. The Saudi government also implemented social initiatives designed to promote a range of relationships. These were relationships with Saudi society, its own internal organs of the state, state and non-state actors in the region, and between the state and the international community.201 Regional Policy Initiatives. Saudi Arabia’s regional strategy was to provide aid to any coalition of states intent on combating terrorism that had a clear vision of their targets. The government constantly (even as it began its strategies against terrorism in the 1990s on the domestic level) called for political and security cooperation and coordination at the regional level. The Arab League, the GCC and the OIC condemned all forms of terrorism. They defined terrorism as criminal acts and made a distinction between terrorism and resistance.202 They all committed each of their member states to refrain from supporting, encouraging, giving asylum to, training or arming terrorist groups and prohibited the use of their territories as bases for such groups. The regional political strategy entailed adopting a unified position that regional actors would take part in any coalition to fight terrorism or extremism aimed at attacking any one of its member states; and to cooperate and coordinate in the areas of combating terrorist financing and psychological support for terrorism. Global Initiatives. Saudi Arabia has long recognised that only a global effort at an AT/CT strategy would be effective since domestic or regional policies on their own would not be sufficient. The Saudi government continuously argued that security cooperation, multilateral agreements to combat militancy and an exchange of information would be essential to success. It argued that, in the absence of a global effort, the world would be thrown into global anarchy, which would strengthen Al Qaeda and provide a more fertile ground for recruits and targets. Thus, more concrete efforts would be needed.203

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112  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Concrete global political initiatives included the holding of international conferences and the implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Conferences were held to develop a united political and strategic front, establish financing and information sharing and prevent acts of terrorism through cooperation in the areas of law enforcement, international security, the exchange of intelligence and the prevention of illicit weapons trafficking. The three general areas of bilateral and multilateral cooperation were drug trafficking, organised crime and combating terrorism.204 While the bilateral agreements were too numerous to mention, the Interior Ministry highlighted those cooperative security agreements signed with Asian, Arab and Muslim countries such as India, Iran, Turkey, Senegal, Pakistan, Tunisia, Oman, Morocco, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan and the Sudan. Additionally, the global political initiatives soon became very concrete, with several multilateral regional agreements (namely, six conventions for combating terrorism);205 several international treaties206 and 14 global counterterrorism conventions.207 As the number of agreements, conferences and conventions suggest, Saudi Arabia’s AT/CT engagement at the global level had been growing since the 1990s. The year of 2003, however, marked the beginning of the Foreign Ministry’s call for a global AT/CT model.208 It did not articulate a conceptual framework, but one was unintentionally being constructed through dialogue, engagement and interaction.209 Eventually, in 2006, the Ministry finally called for a global strategy.210 The call followed the International Conference held in Riyadh, the 2005 Riyadh Declaration, and the creation of the UN Counter Terrorism Center (UNCTC). These are discussed in the remainder of this section. They reflect the culmination of the Saudi AT/CT Global Political Approach and provide the foundation for Saudi Arabia’s vision for a Global AT/CT Strategy. The International Terrorism Conference in 2005 was attended by delegations and specialists in the field from 60 countries. The conference, according to the Saudi Foreign Minister, demonstrated a shared commitment to action that transcended boundaries, beliefs, cultures, religions and values.211 Not only was a global commitment demonstrated, according to then Interior Minister, the late Prince Nayef, but participants learned of the past lessons of AT/CT efforts.212 The conference culminated with the 2005 Riyadh Declaration. The 2005 Riyadh Declaration expressed the will of the participants to promote and foster AT/CT cooperation and coordination. The first

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plenary sessions adopted 16 recommendations that articulated a consensus on the underlying causes, the culture and the ideology of terrorism. Ten recommendations were produced in the second plenary sessions, resulting in consensus on the relationship between terrorism, money laundering and arms/drug trafficking.213 There were nine recommendations adopted in the third sessions, which covered the lessons learned in past and present Saudi AT/CT policies. Finally, the last of the plenary sessions produced ten recommendations on terrorist organisations and their formation. While the conference was ongoing, all educational, governmental and social organisations inside Saudi Arabia were participating either directly or indirectly. For example, the Saudi Ministry of Defence launched a National Antiterrorism Campaign to coincide with the conference.214 The campaign led to forums, information programmes and media campaigns to promote awareness and to share information pertaining to terrorism. There were also meetings in educational institutions at all levels.215 All of the global events promoted the values of tolerance, dialogue, coexistence and understanding.216 The Foreign Minister declared that the new age of cooperation, economic interdependence and increased cultural interaction required a new spectrum of remedies to deal with terrorism and to promote understanding and tolerance.217 Global strategies were needed to secure human development, promote sustainable growth, alleviate humanitarian suffering and influence the hearts and minds of people inhabiting the global village. The Foreign Minister went on to state that a successful AT/CT strategy would depend on a strict adherence to international law and respect of human and religious rights. The Saudi posture on the global threats to peace and stability have been expressed through the country’s Foreign Ministry and are simple and straightforward: unilateral efforts are no longer sufficient for addressing the problems of terrorism; the world is a global village; all humanity is impacted by terrorist threats to any specific community; a global will is needed to deal with such threats; and such a global will218 can only be derived from a set of national wills. The 2005 International Counter Terrorism Conference and the subsequent Riyadh Declaration is intended to signal the existence of a ‘global will for combating terrorism’ and the transition from the ‘Global War on Terror’ to the ‘Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism’.219 Since then, the Foreign Ministry continued to press for a Global AT/CT Strategy220 that encompasses coordinated efforts involving law enforcement, security, intelligence and information sharing;

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114  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia terrorist financing and money laundering; and ideological and intellectual security.221 Issues pertaining to a global strategy were further discussed at the 2012 International Conference on Border Security and the second advisory board meeting of the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) in Jeddah. Not only had Saudi Arabia been calling for the creation of the UNCCT but it also provided the foundational support needed for the opening of the centre.222 The UNCCT was established in 2011, under the auspices of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF).223 The CTITF seeks to mobilise member states around specific AT/CT areas to implement programmes that correspond to the UN Global CounterTerrorism Strategy. This strategy seeks to tackle the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, prevent and combat any usual terrorism, build and facilitate a country’s capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, strengthen UN AT/CT efforts and ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law while maintaining security and stability. The UNCCT supplements the work of the CTITF by engaging in projects not covered by it.224 It seeks to avoid duplication of effort in projects that overlap with other UNCT bodies. The UNCCT’s objectives are to strengthen the objectives of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, facilitate coordination and cooperation between state and non-state actors operating at the domestic, regional and global levels and to strengthen the capability of member states to engage in capacity-building to prevent and to combat terrorism. The nine strategic priorities of the centre include: the development of national and regional AT/CT strategies; support for integrated capacity-building; countering the financing of terrorism; promoting dialogue in order to understand and counter the appeal of terrorism; protecting human rights while countering terrorism; protecting vulnerable targets; border management; and the proper functioning of the internet. The global nature of the UN AT/CT efforts and the global strategy itself contribute to opening the gap created by the lag time in the response to any events or needs to react on the ground. This gap can be filled by the UNCCT. One of the actual and perceived strengths of the Center is its ability to engage with both state and non-state actors in the areas of capacity-building, dialogue and understanding.225 One board member noted the need to facilitate on-the-ground conferences and policy awareness as well as educational and training programmes for local

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communities or individuals who are engaged in AT/CT field work, and the Center’s potential in this area. Individuals and CSOs working in research, or who are responsible for capacity-building, often do not have the same level of access. The UNCCT can build these bridges, which will increase the efficiency of the individual and collective AT/CT programmes at all levels.

Conclusion: Finding Order, Maintaining Stability   and Promoting Peace Collective security acts promote stability. All Saudi AT/CT policies are designed to ensure balance in the individual–collective security dilemma and the rights–security trade-off. In all instances, the protection of societal rights and public interest trump individual rights and the private interests of individuals.226 Imbalance produces greater amounts of uncertainty and further segmentation among domestic, regional and glocal actors.227 The increasing needs of a globalised world have widened the scope of the traditional security concept and expanded its scope. A widening of the conceptual boundary led to contextual, temporal and spatial changes. Consequently, support for security varied according to the perceived threats. Threats did not, per se, become the security issue, but rather were influenced by the way they were framed and society’s response to them. Thus, perception played a significant role. Changes in the security apparatus evolved along with the internal and external threats to the country. As this chapter has demonstrated, Saudi AT/CT policies evolved around security, criminal justice and conciliation initiatives and strategies. Intelligence was vital for maintaining both security and stability. It is, for the country, the pillar of stability. The pillar of stability is the foundation of the strategies needed to maintain order and inform the policies required to maintain peace and stability. While the Kingdom’s security policies provide order, it is the quest for conciliation and dialogue and political initiatives to achieve these goals that increase the potential for long-term AT/CT policy success. The initiatives, policies and strategies discussed in this chapter are connected to, and provide a foundation for, those examined in the next two chapters. Intelligence provides the information needed to understand terrorist financing policies and the wherewithal to maintain ideological and intellectual security in the Kingdom. The military and security policies

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116  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia ensure that order is maintained and that malfeasants are captured before they unleash chaos. Moreover, it is through its military and security policies that the Kingdom can learn of the ideas and the motivating factors for underlying terrorists planning. In brief, successful Saudi AT/CT policies depend not so much on the system than on identifying the underlying factors and ideas that make the phenomenon of terrorism possible.

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3  Pillar II: Countering Terrorist Financing (CTF)

Terrorist financing has plagued states, their security services and the victims of terrorism for as long as terrorism has been in existence. As Chapter 1 highlighted, emotive reactions and the drive to assign blame do impact public debate and distort any meaningful discourse. It should come then, as no surprise that following 2001, with global attention centred on Saudi Arabia, a defensive posture was adopted by many individuals, organisations, charities and institutions in the Kingdom. The emotive reaction of many outside commentators sometimes bordered on the offensive.1 Consequently, there was only limited, immediate reflection on the nature and realities of terrorist financing. No serious dialogue on terrorist financing among states and their security organisation occurred until 2003. Similarly, before then most states had not begun in earnest to tackle the issue of money laundering and its links to terrorism. One year later, Saudi Arabia was sharing with its allies the information it had on terrorist financing, as well as the successes and failures in the implementation of the Anti-Money Laundering/ Combating Terrorist Financing system (AML/CTF).2 Two years later an Interior Ministry official was openly discussing in a public forum, including participants from various countries around the world, how Saudi Al Qaeda operatives were able to exploit the country’s intelligence short comings, and the measures now being implemented by the country to overcome the flaws within the system. In a nutshell, the proposition was that, to overcome this terrorist challenge required an emphasis on

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118  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia understanding the reasons behind and the methods being deployed by the terrorist to further their cause. But while the importance of understanding why and how terrorists operate is crucial to any attempts at countering the phenomenon, the specific issue of financing is particularly complex. Terrorist financing has generally been defined in seemingly straightforward terms: the financial support, in any form, of terrorism or of those who encourage, plan or engage in terrorism.3 In Saudi Arabia, financing acts of terrorism and terrorist organisations are considered money laundering crimes pursuant to the country’s Anti-Money Laundering Law (hereafter ‘AML Law’), even if done through legal means. Money laundering is defined by the Saudi AML Law as ‘any actual or attempted act aimed at concealing or camouflaging the nature or illegally or illegitimately earned property to make it look as proceeds from legal sources.’4 Saudi Arabia’s definition of terrorist financing is specifically derived from Article 1.7 of the AML, Bylaw 2.1 of the AML Law and the 1999 UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.5 By thus weaving its antiterrorism financing measures into an existing law dealing with money laundering, the Saudis have attempted to take a pragmatic approach to bypass the need for fresh legislation or decrees that would require debate and time spent on drafting. According to the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism: Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully or wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: a. An act that constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed.6 b. Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.7

Article 1.7 of Saudi Arabia’s AML Law and By-law 2.1 of the AML Law add to the general definition. The former thus included ‘any activity sanctioned

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by Shariah or law including the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations’, while the latter added ‘property that comes from legitimate sources’. The addition of property from legitimate sources is particularly important given that a majority of terrorist financing comes from legitimate rather than illegitimate means. As will be discussed later in the chapter, the nature of the economy is one of many factors that impacts where resources are derived from and how they are used. It has also been generally accepted that funding terrorist activity has originated from a network of websites, religious institutions, NGOs, intermediaries, facilitators, charities, banks and other financial institutions.8 The issue of terrorism financing is complex, and the international politics of states will, at times, be relevant to their approach to the subject. The difficulties of finding a consensus on the definition of terrorism and who should be designated a terrorist highlights the complexity of reconciling national interests with international obligations.9 This chapter, therefore, examines Saudi Arabia’s AML/CTF strategy, which is consistent with what has been adopted and implemented by other countries.10 Saudi Arabia’s posture conforms to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)11 requirements that all member states must adhere to and implement.12 The government’s Anti-Money Laundering and the Combating of Terrorist Financing Laws and Regulations (AML/CTF) likewise criminalise all money laundering and financing of terrorism.13

The Complexity of Terrorist Financing: Definition,   Context and Structure The complexity of the domestic, regional and global Al Qaeda networks and the changes in the network structure were highlighted in the introductory chapter. The networks have also impacted the nature of Al Qaeda financing.14 Specifically, Al Qaeda financing has become more decentralised, with the onus of raising operational and structural funds placed on each entity within the global Al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda’s funding structures are not the subject of this study. Suffice it to say that their funding mechanisms highlight the importance of understanding the complexity of terrorist financing, which is this section’s focus. The issue will be examined here from three perspectives: definition; contextual factors; and structural variables. The definition problem highlights how the larger question of who is a terrorist impacts the

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120  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia meaning of terrorist financing, as does the question of terrorist’s support and sympathy base. Contextual factors and structural variables clarify the larger difficulties associated with understanding the nature of and for developing policies to combat terrorist financing. Economies in different countries vary and so too will funding, and the mechanisms of how funding is delivered and received. The amount and type of funding depends on the structural variables, namely infrastructural needs and operational costs. Although interdependent, they are two different phenomena. An understanding of the complexity, therefore, places the AML/CTF strategy in context. I.  The Definitional Problem The debate over terrorist financing is complicated by the controversy over who is considered to be a terrorist. Many states make a distinction between terrorism, the right to resist an illegal occupation and the struggle for selfdetermination. Saudi Arabia’s Undersecretary for Multilateral Relations made the same distinction on behalf of his country at a Human Rights Conference in Geneva in 2003.15 The international community has recognised the Palestinian right to self-determination and resistance to Israel’s occupation, while Israel (and some other countries) designate Palestinian groups as terrorist organisations. History demonstrates that political perceptions change over time. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was once, but is no longer, considered a terrorist organisation and in 2012, the United States removed the Mujahideene-Khalq from its terrorist list. Iran continues to designate it as a terrorist organisation. In the case of Al Qaeda, some of its members who were once promoted and sponsored by the United States and others during the Cold War were later designated as terrorists. Highlighted in these examples are the interconnections between politics, the definition of who is a terrorist and the issue of complexity. These issues complicate any understanding of terrorist financing. For example, scholars have argued that a government can be said to be passively sponsoring or supporting terrorism if it knowingly allows a terrorist group to raise money, enjoy sanctuary, recruit or operate without interference.16 What is considered as interference is also a contested concept. So we see that at the heart of the issue is terrorism’s definitional problem. In short, shades of grey tend to colour considerations of who is and who is not a terrorist. The same problem of course relates to the matter of

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direct and indirect support and financing for terrorism, with politics and state interests often intervening. A lack of agreement, boundaries and clarity led Saudi scholars, who are cited in the previous chapters, to raise the idea of accepting the essence of terrorism. As will be recalled, its essence is defined by conceptual convergence. Conceptual convergence within a given context provides a foundation upon which to build for domestic, regional and international AML/CTF strategies. II.  Contextual Matters Implementing any type of strategy is always heavily dependent on context and this is no different when considering the matter of terrorist funding.17 Context impacts the nature of funding, the sources of available funds, and how they are transferred. Each of these is briefly discussed in this subsection from which we can gauge the complexity of terrorist financing. The nature of funding relates to the country’s economy and its regulatory system. Regulatory systems constitute a structural variable, and are thus discussed in the next subsection. Here, however, we shall deal with the nature of an economy and a country’s economic sectors. Both determine how funds are raised and invested or laundered to finance terrorism. Raising funds can vary according to the type of economy a country runs and the dominant sectors in that country. For example, an agriculture-based economy is going to be different in terms of how funds are raised than in an industrial or services-based economy. Thus, in states like Colombia, where parts of their economic sector are dependent on both legitimate and illegitimate funding sources, we can assume that some of FARC’s resources would be derived in part from the illicit drug trade. This also holds true for Afghanistan, Mexico and other countries where the drug trade plays either a direct or indirect role in their national economies. The Saudi Arabian model of an economy, which does not include the creation or distribution of illicit goods, is reliant for its sources of revenue principally on oil, the export of agricultural products and hajj pilgrimages. This means the Saudi economy is much more easily capable of being controlled from the centre, including those aspects of the political economy that pertain to the monitoring and interdicting of terrorist financing. According to the reports issued by the Financial Intelligence Unit (2006–13), there are many types of actual and potential routes for the

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122  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia financing of terrorism. The forms of financing fall into three categories: financial support through charitable and NGO activities; criminal activity such as money laundering; and legitimate sources through investment and business activities. The mechanisms of funding include: alternative remittance devices (hawala), cash couriers and currency smuggling; structuring and currency exchanges; the use of credit cards, cheques, wire transfers and trade-based money laundering; the purchase of valuable assets, investment, mingling and the use of shell companies; the purchasing or use of overseas businesses; the use of foreign bank accounts; identity fraud/false identification and the use of nominees, trusts or third parties; the use of professional services like insurance companies; and finally, the abuse of non-profit organisations such as charities and NGOs. The type of funding and how that funding is used will depend on the nature of business and investment opportunities available within a given country. The nature of a country’s economy and the types of economic sectors available in a country will also influence the types of business and investment opportunities that attract terrorist funding, as well as the ways by which financial flows can be concluded. Businesses prone to money laundering include shell corporations, non-banking financial institutions, travel agencies, import/export businesses, precious commodities traders, cash driven businesses, offshore financial services, charitable or non-profit organisations. The concealment of financial flows both for financing of terrorism and for money laundering are very similar to each other. The principal difference between the two is that money laundering involves smaller amounts, thereby making it far more difficult to track. Both terrorist financing and money laundering take considerable time to complete before any funds can be used.18 In Saudi Arabia, the Financial Intelligence Unit reports that there are three stages in the process. The first stage is the entry of money into the system (deposit). The second is transferring and exchanging the money once in the system (coverage). The final stage is the merging or mingling of money with funds being transferred legally to ensure the illegal source is hidden (amalgamation). A key element within this process is the selection of a country with a weak system of financial regulation to function as an operational base. Finally, the transfer of money to another country will vary depending on characteristics of that country’s economy, the nature of its economic sectors and its geographic factors. The loss of a base for Al Qaeda in

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Afghanistan resulted in a greater decentralisation of the funding process, making detection more difficult. It also changed how transactions occur. Local context influences the elements of any transaction. For example, Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Maghreb use financial institutions for receiving funds less than Al Qaeda groups in other locations. In areas like Afghanistan and Pakistan, groups are primarily located in rural and/or mountainous areas. This is bound to have an impact on how funds reach them. By the same token, funding structures and methods will certainly be different in countries where financial institutions are concentrated in cities rather than rural areas. The urban–rural geographical distinction revolves around issues of anonymity and identification. It goes without saying that an individual is often faceless in the crowded streets of New York during morning rush hour or in Riyadh’s malls on the weekend. And even if he or she is dressed differently from the rest of the crowd, an individual or traveller who stands out is a less common occurrence in an urban rather than a rural environment. The need to overcome the problem of anonymity led Saudi Arabia to require its banking and financial institutions and exchangers to adopt a customer-friendly approach to all customers, which helps when questionable transactions arise and Suspicious Activities Reports are required to be filed. The level of anonymity and the potential to exploit that anonymity for criminal purposes depend also, in part, on the regulations that countries have in place. An example from Saudi Arabia will help. It is generally impossible in the Kingdom to transfer money overseas without a residency permit. This simple straightforward regulation does help the government to keep track of the financial flows and who is sending money, at least as far as the foreign community is concerned.19 Bearing in mind that such non-Saudis might well have extremist tendencies, intending to use the Kingdom as an operational base, the regulation has its value. The identification of funding sources is not always going to prevent violent acts. To think that it will is to oversimplify the issues involved. Identifying potential sources of violence will remain troublesome because of the global nature of financial transactions and the fact that the majority of funding appears to come from seemingly legitimate sources. At the same time, it is easier to identify cross-border financial transfers than domestic ones. This is in large part because of the globalised nature of the international economy.

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124  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Across the world, there are virtual businesses, charities and transactions. Locally, leaders, members, cells and groups that are part of or affiliated to Al Qaeda rely on local networks for income generation. Each local area varies, making source identification more difficult, especially given that a majority of funds come from legitimate sources. It is almost impossible to regulate and identify domestic transfer patterns; it is far easier to track and monitor transactions across boundaries.20 Another way to avoid the triggering of monitoring agencies is to ensure that donations and financial transactions are also carried out on a smaller scale. Just as context matters so too do structural variables. III.  Structural Matters Policies for combating Al Qaeda financing must take into consideration the context of the core structure of Al Qaeda and its relationship to such structural variables as the operational, organisational and functional changes taking place within the larger network of the core structure and the way regional and local entities like the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Anasr Al-Islam in the Gulf or Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) have evolved. The networked nature of Al Qaeda is important for understanding the complexity of its funding methods and the corresponding Saudi AML/CTF strategy.21 Funding of a network need not be consistent and transaction flows are, more often than not, decentralised. In brief when assessing the AML/CTF strategy vis-à-vis terrorist funding, it is important to understand the structural relationships between the Al Qaeda core and the different variables represented by its regional affiliates. The factors examined in this section are broken down according to operational costs and structural capabilities. Structural capabilities are concerned with how the type of organisational or network structure impacts funding. Operational costs help to explain why financing is less important than some of the other types of AT/CT policies. Both the operational costs and structural capabilities impact the resources needed. The funding of the former is different from the financing of a group’s structural apparatus and/or a network. It has been widely recognised that small amounts of financial resources are required to carry out operations.22 The financial costs of mounting a terrorist operation are low in comparison to state counter-actions, let alone open warfare. The 9/11

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operational costs for Al Qaeda have been assessed at only $500,000,23 while the Madrid bombings have been estimated to cost a mere $10,000, though the Spanish government placed the figure at $60,000.24 The 7 July 2005 UK attacks were estimated to have cost less than $8,000.25 Certainly, the state response to these non-state operations would in each case have to run into many millions of dollars. So the examples given here illustrate the cost differential of terrorist acts in relation to state and non-state actors. Those waging guerrilla and insurgency warfare are aware of this differential. The resort to terrorism after all, is not about militarily defeating a state opponent but more about a war of psychological attrition. Terrorist operations are designed in the full knowledge that the adversary has far greater military capabilities and economic resources. This is why, as was discussed in the previous chapter, military/security responses to terrorism are only minimally effective. Likewise, regulations limiting or interdicting financial transactions are only likely to slow rather than halt the planning of terrorist acts. Structural factors will also impact operational costs. It matters whether an entity or non-state actor has the capabilities of a large network, organisation or just a small group. This is because the level of funding will differ, as will the method by which funds are collected. The funding structure is more decentralised for small groups than it is for networks and organisations. This is, in part, because the latter require stable and predictable sources of income. Small groups and cells on the other hand require lower resources because their funding is directed at specific operations.26 For networks and organisations, financial resources are believed to be project-specific and are derived from sympathetic supporters such as diaspora communities, political and religious sympathisers and organised crime.27 Global networks such as Al Qaeda require more fluid forms of funding due to the transnational nature of their operations and its structural composition. This means they do not need a fixed and stable source of income to sustain the larger network. Positing this is not meant to imply that there were no financial flows from Al Qaeda’s central command to those who have pledged allegiance to and/or were affiliated with it in another way. Rather, it merely is demonstrative of how the structure changes funding flows. Financial flows from the Al Qaeda central command were not and cannot be considered stable. At the same time and similar to other nonterrorist entities belonging to and/or participating in a network does open additional funding channels. Groups and individuals within the network

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126  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia are also responsible for their own funding base. Funding of small groups is difficult to trace. This has led to concern over the post-Arab Spring Al Qaeda network strategy, with greater emphasis being placed on the promotion of small cells rather than organisational, networked infrastructures. Al Qaeda is an excellent example for understanding the complexity of terrorist financing because of its funding structure having gone from needing stable to fluid sources. Its change can be demarcated temporally before and after the US–Afghan war. This change corresponded to the structural changes from an organisational framework to a global network. The structural changes were a result of the contextual variables, which were of course affected by political and state interests. Financing, therefore, is not and can never be understood in black and white terms and the policies employed from state-to-state and region-to-region will vary. Al Qaeda has proved to be a model to many groups for various reasons.28 Its functional and structural capacity and evolution from creation to the present are, in part, reasons. This also helps to understand why there is a rise in groups that are affiliated and align themselves with the network but lack ideological affinity, or others who are not in any way affiliated but model it structurally. It will be particularly interesting to see how these changes impact the larger ideological structure. In conclusion, the specific problem with combating terrorist financing is that the situation is far more complex. Complexity requires employment of various AML/CTF strategies. The strategies are likely to differ and vary. The strategies employed will depend on the organisational structure, the network composition, and the environmental or contextual variables within the given area of operation and location of a group, an individual or a network. Divergence in the strategies employed does not imply one or the other has failed. Rather, their variance must be examined with the complexities in mind. Finally, knowledge of laws and regulations, investigation and analysis, and of the banking, finance, accounting and other related economic activities are needed.29

The AML/CTF System: The Legal and Regulatory Framework The governing authorities of the Saudi AML/CTF System include the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), the Bureau of Investigations and Prosecution and the Ministries

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of Commerce and Industry, Finance, and Interior. The Saudi AML/CTF system is similar to other countries, including the United States. System similarities are explained by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),30 which requires all member states to implement minimal system requirements for effective AML/CTF strategies.31 Those minimal requirements include a legal framework, a financial regulatory system, a Financial Intelligence Unit, law enforcement capabilities and judicial and prosecutorial processes for combating terrorism financing and money laundering. The Saudi AML/CTF Laws,32 which were discussed in the introduction of this chapter, provide the legal framework for the AML/CTF system.33 The law enforcement, the judiciary and the prosecutorial processes were discussed in the previous chapter. This section, therefore, examines the financial regulatory system and the Financial Intelligence Unit. Strong financial institutions are important for combating money laundering and terrorism financing. Central to the Saudi banking, finance and monetary system are the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA)34 and the Capital Market Authority (CMA).35 Established in 2003, the CMA operates in accordance with the Kingdom’s Capital Market Law, which provides a legal, regulatory framework for all capital market activities such as trading, bonds, corporate papers and mutual funds.36 The SAMA is a semi-independent regulatory agency. Since 1952, it has been responsible for issuing directives to banks and money changers.37 In 1995, it was responsible for establishing and ensuring compliance with the guidelines to prevent, detect, control and report actual or suspected illicit financial activities. The date corresponds to the date when international agreements were drawn up to establish regulations on money laundering on a global basis. In 2003, the SAMA incorporated the AML/CTF regulations stipulated by the FATF in its guidelines, which all banking and financial institutions had to follow. The guidelines were updated again in 2012. The SAMA requires all Saudi banking and financial institutions to adopt minimal requirements to safeguard and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. In addition to adhering to the AML/CTF laws, all banking and financial institutions and currency exchange offices in the country, as well as those that were Saudi-owned and operated abroad, must implement requirements for minimum compliance. Minimum compliance entails developing and implementing policies, plans and procedures and internal controls, developing an internal accounting and auditing system to supervise the basic requirements to combat money laundering and

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128  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia terrorist financing, and developing training programmes to keep the relevant employees informed of the changes within their fields of activity. All internal policies and regulations of the banking and financial institutions and the currency exchange offices had to include selfassessment procedures and the means for assuring compliance. Ensuring compliance, according to the SAMA, entailed conducting onsite inspections and receipt of compliance reports and certification by external auditors. Banks, financial institutions and currency exchange offices were required to submit regular reports to the SAMA and to notify it of any suspicious activity.38 The furnishing of financial and statistical statements to the SAMA actually extended back to the Saudi Bank Control Law of 1966.39 They were also required to implement internal precautionary and supervisory measures to monitor and to detect irregularities through the establishment of an investigative unit, or to at least assign an individual to handle such efforts. Measures were also sought to develop a specialised, automatic or computerised program and database to facilitate the internal AML/CTF system and to develop a set of indicators for detecting money laundering and terrorist financing that were institution specific.40 Finally, all banking, financial and money changing institutions were required to cooperate with the SAMA locally through their representatives in the established AML/CTF committees. These committees were designed to exchange information with each other about cases, transactions and to engage in dialogue. The SAMA coordinates with the Saudi Financial Intelligence Unit (SAFIU) under the Interior Ministry. The channel of communication between the two facilitates cooperation and coordination for both money laundering and terrorist financing.41 Organisational coordination is assisted by advice and consultation in policy planning, implementation and evaluation. The SAFIU is the authority for the AML/CTF system. While its institutional framework was put in place in 2002, the SAFIU would not be formally established as an autonomous authority for the purpose of receiving and analysing actual or suspected financial transactions until 7 July 2003.42 It should be noted that the late Interior Minister Prince Nayef had banned all overseas funding for charitable organisations and projects until the regulatory system was in place.43 The regulatory system did not formally commence until 11 September 2005.44 The SAFIU consists of seven divisions: namely, the computer division;45 the training division;46 the financial and administrative affairs division;47 the

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information and studies division;48 the information, exchange and follow-up division;49 the data gathering and analysis division;50 and the reports division.51 Of these, the last four are main divisions, while the other three serve as support divisions. The SAFIU was charged with the responsibility to:52 receive incoming reports of suspected AML/CTF crimes; establish, maintain and update a database containing all the reports; request and exchange information with competent authorities and take the necessary action; request, exchange information and to sign Memorandums of Understanding with other Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs); prepare the necessary documentation and data with which to notify other FIU’s about suspected violations; conduct financial field research and investigations and to refer cases to the appropriate competent authorities; request the Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution to seize money and/or property belonging to parties involved in AML/CTF crimes; coordinate with surveillance authorities to ensure that institutions are in accordance with the AML/CTF laws; and submit recommendations and provide advice to the permanent committee on changes to better facilitate AML/CTF laws. Within the SAFIU organisational structure, there are three inter-agency cooperative bodies and two private committees. The three inter-agency bodies are the Permanent Committee on Combating Money Laundering, the Permanent Committee on Combating Terrorism, and the Permanent Committee on Mutual Legal Assistance. The two private committees are the Self-Supervisory Committee and the Financial Crime and Money Laundering Committee. Also involved in the relevant AML/CTF committees are the security officials that have the authority to investigate and arrest.53 Each actor provides input and brings diverse perspectives to the committees, which help the system function. In conclusion, the Saudi AML/CTF system outlined here is not foolproof. Its quasi-centralised structure, however, reduces the potential for abuse of the financial systems at the domestic level. The domestic level is far easier to monitor than the transaction flows across borders, where the system in a cross-border country would have to be AML/CTF compliant for any effort to interdict money laundering and terrorist financing to be effective. The problem though is that AML/CTF mechanisms are expensive to set up and implement thereby making the process difficult for many developing countries. It is worth noting, as a final caveat, that systems and controls can always be violated where determination and adequate skills exist to undermine

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130  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia them. Irrespective of the system, it must also be kept in mind that misuse will occur when there is a will to exploit, which is why the underlying factors must be addressed and greater attention placed on the psychological aspects of violence.

The Saudi AML/CTF Strategy: An Institutional   Regulatory Approach The Saudi AML/CTF strategy is comprehensive and encompasses initiatives undertaken at the domestic, regional and global levels. At the domestic level, Saudi Arabia enacted laws to better safeguard its banking and financial system. It has criminalised money laundering and terrorist financing and has implemented institutional mechanisms in the banking, financial and security sector to combat and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. Additionally, it has established committees and a taskforce to study, review and advise on the workings of money laundering and terrorist financing, conducted awareness and education campaigns to inform the public, and has hosted and sponsored lectures, public talks and conferences.54 This process was aided by the Saudi religious community, who also played a pivotal role in the Kingdom’s AML/CTF strategy.55 At the regional level, Saudi Arabia has signed and ratified a number of treaties and conventions;56 assumed membership and participated in the MENA–FATF, the Arab League, the GCC, and the OIC; spearheaded multilateral AML/CTF initiatives among the Arab Ministers of Interior and Justice; participated in and helped to coordinate regional meetings, conferences and special taskforce on topics such as border security, terrorist financing, money laundering and trafficking; and finally, participated in and sponsored conferences, lectures, training programmes and workshops.57 The purpose behind these regional AML/CTF coordination efforts was to achieve compliance with international standards and to provide technical assistance to countries not yet capable of achieving these standards with their own resources.58 Finally, at the global level, Saudi Arabia has signed and ratified additional treaties and conventions with various UN agencies;59 assumed membership and participation in global entities such as FATF and Egmont; and participated in international conferences and training sessions on issues both directly and indirectly related to terrorist financing and money laundering.60

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This section examines the AML/CTF strategy. It divides the initiatives into two categories, namely the banking and financial regulatory initiatives and the regulation and monitoring of charities and NGOS. The banking and financial regulatory initiatives examined include monitoring, the freezing of accounts and assets and the investigatory processes, whereas the subsection on charities and NGOs examines the issue of ‘Saudi funding’ of terrorism, the Saudi/Charitable Regulatory Framework and the Charitable/NGO AML/CTF Strategy. This reflects the comprehensive and pragmatic nature of the AML/CTF Strategy employed to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. While the initiatives were overwhelmingly legislative and procedural, they also encompassed educational and awareness campaigns and targeted all of Saudi society to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. I.  Banking and Financial Regulations It is well enough known that banking and financial institutions can be targeted and exploited, directly and indirectly, as support for terrorism.61 This can be done with the knowledge, or more frequently without the knowledge of these institutions. Regulations help to reduce the banking and financial system becoming a vehicle for terrorist financing by making funding structural capabilities and operations more difficult. They can also reduce the exploitation of charities and NGOs whether by individuals or organisations. The objectives of banking and financial regulations include: ensuring that banks and currency exchange offices comply with the AML/CTF laws and regulations; helping institutions to achieve the necessary compliance implementing policies, standards, procedures and system to prevent, standards; detect, control and report money laundering and terrorist financing; protecting institutions operating in Saudi Arabia from being exploited as channels for illicit transactions; maintaining, enhancing and protecting the banking and financial system; and providing security and protection for customers. The legal regulatory framework has already been discussed and the regulation of charities and NGOs are discussed in the following subsection. This subsection examines the monitoring, the freezing of accounts and assets, and the investigative processes for combating and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing.

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132  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia A. Monitoring The process for transferring funds for terrorism through banking and financial institutions are similar to money laundering. According to the SAMA, financial transactions for money laundering are carried out through different channels62 in order to ‘decompound’ or break up large sums into smaller amounts, which can be deposited without suspicion.63 Any known patterns of transfers or deposits that have been previously identified as having a terrorist link become tagged as suspicious and lead to monitoring and the issuance of a Suspicious Account Report (SAR). This monitoring initially was limited to bank accounts, financial transactions and assets associated with Osama bin Laden and other known Saudi Al Qaeda operatives, which had been frozen. It was later expanded to encompass all suspected operatives, individuals and organisations engaged in or connected to terrorism, including other instances where any suspicious activity was detected.64 The indicators signalling suspicious activity are broken down by typology. As will be recalled from the beginning of this chapter, the detection of any patterned behaviour indicating terrorist financing is often difficult. Existing, identifiable indicators can be associated with the most mundane aspects of the banking world: the opening of accounts, deposits and withdrawals, wire transfers, customer behaviour and geographical locations. Each indicator has a specific list of patterned behaviour or set of signals attached to it that triggers the attention of a monitor analyst or agency. For the opening of an account, the signals that trigger attention vary widely and will include: the type of information provided on the account holder; the type of account; the role of all signatories on the account; the presence of multiple accounts; and irregularities in deposits and transfers that do not correspond to the behaviour of the account holder or normal account activity. It is the nature of deposit and transaction flows that are used for the construction of patterns that lead to questions. What will always be of interest in transfers is the amount sent, the type or lack of information from the sender, the involvement of other names, the use of multiple accounts, and the level of foreign exchange transactions. The involvement of multiple individuals or organisations, shared addresses of senders and recipients, lack of correlation between employment income and sums being transferred or deposited, unexplained inconsistencies and the presence of a safe deposit box held by a customer whose modest

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possessions or resources are not consistent with deposit box ownership are all signals that can trigger alarm. Finally, the geographical location of individuals and their account or account activities can also trigger questions about the bona fides of a deposit or transaction.65 The triggers result in the relevant Saudi institution submitting an SAR. The majority of SARs coming into the SAFIU for analysis are from financial institutions, though the SAFIU also reports from non-financial institutions, government entities and individuals. A majority of those reported are closed following in-depth analysis, while others are either referred to an investigation authority or to other competent authorities. Financial analysts and officers within the banking and financial institutions have received exclusive training in this area.66 Training is conducted by the AML/CTF experts within the SAMA, which also furnishes them with the guidelines and regulations. All the guidelines and regulations are in accordance with the principles of Basel’s Committee on Banking Supervision and International Practices in the banking sector.67 Training programmes have been implemented for banks, customs, governmental bodies and departments and public prosecutors. They are often held in cooperation with NAUSS, the King Fahd Security College, and the Public Security Training City.68 Many regulations and bans on financial transfers are limited only to international transfers. As will be recalled from the discussion in the section on complexity, the global nature of the financial systems requires regional and global cooperation and consensus for the implementation of the AML/CTF system. If such multilateral cooperation and consensus could be implemented then some of the complexity would be reduced over time and greater amounts of information could be shared by virtue of more member states qualifying for participation in the Egmont Group. The Egmont Group is an international organisation comprised of qualifying states, which send their AT/CT or FIU representatives to multilateral meetings for information exchange on AML/CTF policies. It is designed promote dialogue, to ensure transparency and also to protect individuals from the politically driven motives that can at times drive investigations. The AML/CTF system and bodies like the Egmont Group and others make it easier to track and to share information on cross-border financial flows. But to monitor domestic transactions still remains far more difficult. For example, sending money from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan through official banking and financial channels can be easily regulated due to the

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134  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia highly controlled Saudi system. But the multiplicity and decentralised nature of domestic transactions makes them far more difficult to monitor and are thus a weak link in the AML/CTF system. B.  Freezing of Accounts and Assets The freezing of accounts and assets has both a domestic and an international application. It goes without saying that states, in controlling their internal affairs, have a relatively simple task of imposing account and asset freezing on individuals or organisations when it suits their purposes to do so, as in the case of interdicting terrorist activity. They introduce legislation or implement executive orders, and the freezing action is complete. But implementing similar action on the international scale requires a multilateral set of understandings and agreements that are often difficult to achieve. For example, as of January 2012, Russia designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation in spite of its non-violent nature, while it was not recognised as such internationally. In fact, not even the United States labelled it as a terrorist organisation. American domestic law has, however, named Hamas as a terrorist organisation, while Saudi Arabia and Russia do not recognise it as such. These inconsistencies in approach and definition clearly hinder the implementation of any policies, relating to the freezing of accounts and assets on an international level. UN resolution 1373 in 2001 did attempt to bring some order to the situation, when each country was given the authority to freeze accounts and assets. However, for this to have teeth, it requires cooperation from the international community. A state initiating a freezing operation must be able to rely on the other states where the accounts or assets are located.69 The initiator states are required to furnish information and evidence to the state and to the banking and financial authorities where the individual or accounts and assets are located. It is up to those other states to comply with or deny any requests after reviewing all the information and evidence submitted to them. Politics often intervene and limit cooperation and coordination between states. C.  Investigating Violations Saudi Arabia does not act unless it has specific proof or evidence of actual or potential terrorist activity. Assets and accounts will not be frozen unless

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there is sufficient evidence based on thorough investigation by the General Investigation Unit in the Interior Ministry.70 Some security and intelligence specialists consider the most effective tactic is to immediately arrest individuals suspected of terrorism and related acts,71 while others respond that this is not very effective.72 Those in the latter camp argue that the better AML/CTF tactic is to invest resources in financial investigations units who are capable of working within a multiagency and multilateral framework and who can follow financial and transfer threads in a way that will permit higher value intelligence on a terrorist operation or organisation.73 There is also a socio-cultural aspect to understanding Saudi Arabia’s preference for a longer, more detailed investigative process. Given that Saudi society and its public play an important part in ensuring security and stability, it is important that the balance between providing security and protecting individual rights is fully maintained. This is only possible with the assistance, coordination and cooperation between the government and its people and between security forces and the public. Understanding this relationship is necessary to understand the normative underpinnings of the investigative process. Accusations of wrong-doing carry a social stigma that has the potential to harm the individual, family and society. Thus, the investigative process is crucial and the accuracy of its outcome must be beyond reproach. Criminal and terrorist activities are frowned upon by individuals, family and society. An accusation has significant repercussions that could result in an individual being ostracised from his or her family, alienated from the larger community in which he or she is living, and shunned for employment. For these reasons, the security personnel have to be very exact in their investigations.74 They are also very meticulous in this matter due to the role of charity (zakat) in Islam and the importance of the family to both faith and society.75 Accounts are scrutinised by financial investigators trained to identify irregularities when there is suspected criminal activity. Investigation and analysis of large sums or higher risk transactions are passed on to an independent reviewer. Review or auditing entails investigation of a specific transaction; making inquiries to see whether there is a rational explanation; comparing it to other transactions; and submission of an SAR where there is no rational explanation for the unusual activity. The transaction monitoring threshold is 60,000 Saudi Arabian Riyals for all types of accounts and relationships.76 Each case is

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136  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia examined on an individual basis. There is no reliance on an electronic internet bot or software program when assessing risks.77 In the Saudi system, as in most other systems, one is presumed innocent of terrorist financing until proven guilty. When there is prima facie evidence found of an attempt to exploit an opportunity, the individuals charged are announced in the media. This permits the public to be diligent in their charitable giving and helps to protect society from criminals.78 Violations of Saudi laws regarding donations or misuse of funds for criminal purposes result in accounts and transactions being frozen. Actions, however, are only taken once there is clear evidence of wrongdoing. II.  Regulating and Monitoring Charities and NGOs Many Saudi charities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were initially condemned and publicly demonised following 9/11.79 Even in academic writing in the aftermath of 9/11 there were analyses that directly placed the blame of terrorist financing on Saudi Arabia.80 The evidence cited included Saudi aid to the Palestinians and the Alharamain Charity case. A brief review of these two cases following the prominence accorded to them both on a popular level and in the academic literature, will place them in the context of the actual aid process. Finally, this subsection concludes with an overview of the Saudi Charitable/NGO regulatory framework and the mechanisms implemented to prevent charities and NGOs from being used for money laundering and terrorist financing. A.  The Palestinians and Alharamain Charity Case A variety of Palestinians groups are considered legitimate political organisations within many countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe and Asia. The classification of some as terrorists and, thus, branding as funding terrorism the aid provided to them to benefit Palestine’s people without clarifying the differing political positions of the groups being aided again raises the thorny issue of the definition problem. And with any definition issue comes the perception of culpability in the mind of the ‘other’. The Alharamain Islamic Foundation (AIF) was a private, international charitable and educational NGO that had offices in 70 countries around

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the world. Its funding was derived from individual benefactors and the running of special campaigns that targeted selected businesses around the world. In 2004, a case against the AIF in Bosnia and Herzegovina linked one of its members to an Al Qaeda financier. This led to investigations into the other branches. The AIF Branches in Somalia, Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, the Netherlands, the Union of the Comoros and the United States were accused of providing Al Qaeda with financial support in some way. It is important to note that it was an individual within AIF and not the organisation itself that was accused of being connected to the suspected Al Qaeda financier within the global Al Qaeda network. Additional investigations and studies conducted thereafter found neither intentional funding of terrorist activities nor Saudi government involvement in the financing of Al Qaeda.81 Moreover, an American appellate court upheld a lower court’s decision in 2011 that the US Department of Treasury’s procedures employed to close the AIF US office violated the US Constitution. The absence of Saudi government funding does not imply that there was no ‘Saudi funding’ to Al Qaeda. A qualification must be made, however. There is a tendency within popular parlance and among both the policy corridors and in academic studies to utilise the concept of ‘Saudi funding’ to refer to individual cases. There are indeed individual cases of Saudi citizens having donated to organisations, charities and individuals, either directly or indirectly, connected to the global, regional and/or domestic Al Qaeda networks. This chapter has highlighted the charges of terrorist financing, while the introductory chapter referenced the confiscations of large sums of money during arrests and raids of suspected and actual operatives in years between 2001 and 2012. A more specific example is the 2011 ‘Lady Al Qaeda’ case. A Saudi woman was accused of, and charged by the Saudi authorities with, collecting funds for terrorist activity in Afghanistan and Yemen. She claimed the money was collected and to be used for the poor in those countries; it was not meant for terrorist activity. In addition to terrorist financing, she was charged with providing other material support and the harbouring of two individuals suspected of being Al Qaeda operatives. There are general lessons to be learned from the Palestinian case, the Alharamain case, and the individual funding cases. The first lesson is that terrorist financing is complex and made more complicated by the

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138  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia problems of definition and politics, thereby blurring the line of what is considered terrorist financing. The second lesson is that regardless of realities, perceptions emerge and these can have severe long-term consequences for individual donors and legitimate charity organisations. As of 2014, individuals and charitable NGOs operating in Saudi Arabia have had difficulties collecting money because of the stigma associated with ‘Saudi funding’. Perceptions can destroy lives and hinder charitable projects to needy communities around the world. The third lesson to be learned is the need for coordination, cooperation and information sharing on the regulatory frameworks and the implementation of mechanisms to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. B.  The Saudi Charitable/NGO Regulatory Framework Many states, including Saudi Arabia, implemented a more centralised aid process to provide for better regulation and monitoring of charities and NGOs. The government’s Decree No. 107 of 1990 provided the legal foundation for the functioning of charities and NGOs and the enactment of subsequent laws.82 This legal framework specifically prohibited charities and NGOs from assisting or cooperating with agencies outside the country. It required them to provide clarity of their mission, scope of services provided, to prevent overlap and to report questionable financial issues and irregularities; and it further required the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to conduct annual visits to review all charity and NGO financial accounts.83 Charities and NGOs were also required to adhere to the AML/CTF laws and regulations. Saudi regulation and the supervision of domestic charities fall under the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.84 Other ministries play a role too in the process, especially in regard to the funds transferred outside the country. Contributions directed outside the Kingdom must go through the Saudi National Commission for Relief and Charity, which, in 2008 and under the law regulating charities and NGOs, became the National Commission for Charitable Societies and Associations. The commission was established to ‘take over all aspects of private overseas aid operations and assume responsibility for the distribution of private charitable donations from Saudi Arabia.’85 It is staffed by individuals known for their expertise in the area of a charity’s activities; and, it is supervised by a highlevel committee that includes representatives from the Foreign Ministry,

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the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Finance Ministry, the Justice Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and the SAMA. In March 2016, Saudi Arabia updated and tightened regulation of civil society organisations with the passing of the Law on Association and Foundations (‘CSO Law’).86 Protecting against the abuse of donations is not easy. Saudi Arabia is one of the largest providers of foreign humanitarian aid.87 According to the Foreign Ministry, four per cent of the country’s GDP is allocated to foreign economic and humanitarian aid.88 Saudi government aid is delivered to more than 80 countries through governmental, quasi-governmental and private organisations. The aid process is handled and administered through the Saudi Bank for Development.89 It all begins with an idea or request that is followed by a feasibility study. If a project appears plausible a delegation is sent by the bank to visit the country, after which decision is made on the project. The areas under which projects fall include communication, education, health, humanitarian assistance, social needs and natural disasters. Finally, there is a three-tier vetting process for the funding of projects.90 While the Saudi government does provide some aid to charities and NGOs, a majority of their funding revenue comes from businessmen, contributions from individual members of business or cultural associations, charitable projects, zakat and returns on investments.91 Whether from the government or non-governmental sources, all of the financial transactions for overseas operations have to pass through approved banking and/or financial institutions. This increases accountability and facilitates transparency. Finally, supervision of financial transactions, operations and projects is undertaken by auditors and the appropriate governmental regulatory bodies.92 The organisational structure of charity regulation is governed by systematic rules and overseen by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.93 Charities and NGOs are required to provide an annual report of their activities, the minutes of their board meetings, general assemblies, accounts and expected budget projections. C.  The Charitable/NGO AML/CTF Strategy The strategy employed evolved over the three temporal periods94 and transcended the domestic, regional and global levels, thereby making the approach glocal in nature. The first phase was primarily domestic-oriented,

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140  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia employing targeted operations against known Al Qaeda operatives and the specific organisation with which they were associated. The second phase was also primarily domestic. But while there was a continuation of selected targeting of known and/or suspected Al Qaeda operatives, this second phase saw a new strategy of prohibiting the disposable funds to organisations that had not received government approval being adopted. This helped to prevent the possible use of third parties by suspected or known Al Qaeda operatives. The third phase entailed the institutionalisation of the Charity/NGO-AML/CTF Regulatory Framework. Although these actions were primarily directed at the domestic sphere, awareness and educational campaigns that materialised had their impact on the international front too. These linkages facilitated a glocal approach. A glocal approach became institutionalised in the third phase through global coordination and cooperation on charitable/NGO regulation. Global coordination and cooperation were in turn facilitated by international NGOs such as the International Program of the Charity Commission to help entities with regulatory changes.95 At the domestic level, the strategy initially employed targeted Al Qaeda operatives such as Osama bin Laden and banned charities connected to them. The government would eventually expand the regulations and its policy initiative by prohibiting any and all individuals and organisations to donate to outside charities and NGOs without government approval. The government also simultaneously conducted public awareness and educational campaigns to notify and inform the Saudi public of the changes to the laws governing charities and NGOS and banking and financial institutions. By the third phase, policy initiatives encompassed the implementation of controls over all charities. They were required to provide accounting and accurate budget data prepared by professional accountants; they were to cease collecting donations at mosques and obliged to remove donation boxes; they were prohibited from making cash transfers and required to make all transactions through check or electronic transfers; and, they were to ensure their donations be given only to approved charities.96 While recognising that action at the domestic level alone was not sufficient because of the global nature of finance, the economy and the banking sectors, the Saudi government called for greater levels of coordination and cooperation. Its primary efforts and initiatives were undertaken through regional and international venues. At the regional

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level, organisational participation occurred through the MENA–FATF, the GCC, the Arab League and the Council of Arab Interior Ministers. There were also conferences and training programmes held in the Kingdom and the region. Finally, at the global level there was organisational participation through FATF, Egmont, and the United Nations, as well as attendance and participation at global conferences, trainings and workshops. Absent at the regional and global levels, as the Saudi government has pointed out, are any enforcement mechanisms to facilitate the AML/CTF system being adopted by other countries. This would help to reduce the potential for charities and NGOs being exploited for money laundering and terrorist financing. If common regulations and procedures for coordination could be adopted across the board internationally, this would certainly help to limit terrorist financing and make operations more transparent.

Conclusion: Evaluating AML/CTF Policy Combating money laundering and terrorist financing is considered an important pillar for any AT/CT model. Some analysts and academics take the view that it is the most important element of a fight against terrorism while others argue that other elements of the AT/CT process should be given more prominence. As in any debate, experts will tend to promote positions with which they are more closely aligned or comfortable. There will be valid points and arguments from both sides. The merits of either side are for the reader to decide. Given the fluid and global nature of the finance system and porous international borders, financial transactions across frontiers will always be a reality and interdicting such money movements, while helpful, will not solve the problem of terrorism. For this reason, a greater emphasis needs to be placed on the underlying factors of terrorism that are more likely to have a long-term impact on reducing terrorist violence. This does not imply finance is unimportant.97 But strained AT/CT budgets in hard economic times should lead policy makers and the public to allocate resources in directions that will have a greater and a more immediate impact. Short-term policy solutions are not always the best, especially given that the phenomenon of terrorism has plagued history since the beginning of time. In a sense, this is what makes the Saudi strategy interesting.

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142  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia It attempts to strike a balance between short- and long-term policy concerns and needs. Academic scholarship has in the past strongly criticised Saudi AT/CTF efforts,98 following the widely expressed view that the country is one of the major sources of funding for and the supporting of terrorism. Despite the US General Accounting Office conclusion in 2009 that the US government had found no direct evidence of Saudi government funding of terrorism,99 the nagging belief of Saudi terrorist funding persists within some US political and public circles as well. This demonstrates a major point made in Chapter 1. Namely, that no matter what may be the hard information at hand, perception plays a significant role in defining images and the parameters of policy making. Absent from the critiques of Saudi Arabia are contextual and structural variables and the complexities of the AT/CTF problem. The Saudi government’s AT/CTF policy is similar to what other countries have implemented. It introduced policies in the 1990s to regulate charities and NGOs and to monitor the banking and financial system. The domestic policies were limited in the early 1990s but expanded by the time of 9/11 into a fully developed AML/CTF system. The implementation of the system was relatively straightforward because the AML/CTF policy came within the purview of the Interior Ministry. Other ministries do participate and have representatives that sit on the committees that make and evaluate policy. Overlapping members among several committees helps too. Furthermore, the Saudi CT policy process is not beset with as many of the bureaucratic difficulties that are associated with the inter-agency competition and competing political agendas in other systems. At the regional and international level, Saudi Arabia called for multilateral cooperation and coordination in attempts to counter terrorism, eventually participating in international forums and collective bodies like the Egmont Group. The Financial Action Task Force commended Saudi CTF efforts, as going beyond what many other states have done in this area. The Kingdom was viewed to have struck the right balance between centralisation and decentralisation of its financial systems. Banking and financial regulations for private and public banks matter. There is greater amount of oversight in countries where there is a preponderance of public financial institutions. Confounding both the Saudis and other countries is domestic regulation. The quasi-centralised system for banking/financial institutions and charities/NGOs does seem to permit for greater domestic oversight. Future studies should be done to comparatively assess the impact of

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organisational structure of the AML/CTF system on countries that have the two distinct internal financial structures. However, no system is foolproof. Ultimately the role of the individual is still key and if an individual is determined and equipped to abuse the system, then no amount of regulation will prevent his or her action. The Saudi system is unique in that it has specifically attempted to use cultural norms to check this behaviour and to reduce potential abuse. Many have labelled such actions as being ‘soft’ but, as was discussed in the first chapter, the Saudis have a lower recidivism rate than do the United States and the United Kingdom. The low recidivism is the result of these apparently ‘soft’ measures. All policies are geared toward targeting and treating the individual, seeing the individual as much a victim as a perpetrator.100 This approach allows the Saudis to get at the underlying factors, and contextual variables that lead to – or at least contribute to – terrorism. Context matters and structural variables helped clarify the larger difficulties associated with understanding the nature of and for developing policies to combat terrorist financing. They also impact the state policies implemented, shed light on policy divergence and highlight the complexity of terrorist financing. Complexities were broken into the definition problem, the contextual matters and the structural variables. The definition problem sought to highlight how the larger problem of who is a terrorist impacts the definition of terrorist financing. Impacted by this has been who is considered to be supporting such behaviour. All of this impact both terrorist financing and the policies employed by Saudi Arabia. Policies for combating Al Qaeda financing must take into consideration context and its relationship to the structural variables such as the operational, organisational and functional changes of the larger network and the way in which regional/local entities like the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Anasr Al-Islam in the Gulf or Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) have changed. Al Qaeda is an excellent example for understanding the complexity of terrorist financing because of the change in its funding structure. Change in the funding structure corresponds to the structural changes, particularly from an organisational framework to a network. The structural changes were a result of the contextual variables, which were of course affected by political and state interests. The changing nature in the financing of individuals, operations and organisations, as demonstrated by the Al Qaeda case, reinforces the notion

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144  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia that irregular patterned financial behaviour does not signal an operation is about to take place. Rather, identification of suspected operatives and the monitoring of their activities, in combination with the signals intelligence derived from environmental variables, trigger warnings that an operation may be in the process. The monitoring of financial flows, however, permits identification of other operatives and the extent of the network. Finance, in a sense, serves as a good measure for determining the degree and centrality of individuals and organisation in the larger terrorist network. Future policies will need to continuously evolve with the change and flow of the global financial system.

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4  Pillar III: Providing Psychological Security. Countering Ideological, Intellectual and Cyber Support for Terrorism (CIIST & CCST)

The concept of psychological security is at the heart of any state’s attempt to run an ordered society that values mutual understanding between government and the governed, facilitates tolerance and promotes moderation. Psychological security is the mental state of an individual or group that derives from a general sense of contentment and lack of anxiety regarding the physical, social and cultural environment in which such individuals or groups exist. Psychological insecurity, on the other hand, can be a function of fear or anxiety about physical security or violence, or it can evolve from a gnawing dissatisfaction with the social and cultural environment in which individuals or groups find themselves. The psychological instability and intellectual crises that can result from psychological insecurity are often the by-products of closed minds rigidly adhering to ideas and ideologies that limit creativity, foster intolerance and, in extremis, can trigger an embrace of terrorism. The encouragement of psychological security that reduces misunderstandings, facilitates tolerance and promotes moderation sits at the heart of Saudi Arabia’s AT/CT thinking and the Kingdom’s attempts to pursue a structured law and order policy.

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146  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia This section examines the Saudi AC/CT strategy, which encompasses initiatives and tactics intended to counter ideological, intellectual and cyber support for terrorism. All these initiatives, strategies and tactics are rooted in the lessons learned from the Afghan-Soviet war.

The Psychological Impact of Memories   of the Afghan–Soviet War It was a brutal war that raged from December 1979 to February 1989. Men from Arab, Asian and European countries flocked to Sovietoccupied Afghanistan to join the Afghan resistance in fighting the militarily superior occupying power. It was a first for many, including the Saudis, who went to fight. Whatever their inspiration, they were not welltrained. Combat experience was limited in comparison to their Soviet counterparts. Their advantage, however, was that they were led by local Afghans who had knowledge of the rugged Afghan terrain and a total commitment to their cause. Many of these foreign fighters headed home after the war ended. While some felt isolated on returning, a majority received a hero’s welcome. They had won respect from the elders within their communities and admiration of the young whom they had not previously known. It had been ten long years for some men, and only a few years for others. Regardless of their ages and time spent fighting, the battlefield horrors experienced by most were kept well hidden in their memory banks. ‘To share or not’ is a common mental struggle for all armed operatives, regardless of the perceived lines of legitimacy drawn in the sand by their superiors at any given time and in any particular context. Memories can haunt dreams and take hold of the mind at random moments. Sharing stories of death, destruction and the other perils of war may be understood by other seasoned soldiers but, for those uninvolved and not experienced in combat, hearing tales of warfare can diminish respect for fighters telling their stories. Mental images of the loss of a friend to a bullet, the cleaning of wounds, tending to torture victims or burying the enemy dead – these are all experiences devoid of emotional meaning to those who have not been involved on the battlefield. Thus, it is only through help from others, preferably those who are professionally competent, that such memories recede into manageable, mental compartments.

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Further confounding the plight of those who returned were the socio-economic conditions that they had to face. Many could not find employment and others found societal reintegration difficult. Reintegration into Saudi society following the war was made difficult by both ideological and political factors. Ideologically, there was tension between the pan-Islamist campaign to promote warfare against the nonbelievers, in this instance the Soviets and the conditions that governed relations at home with the other non-believers.1 Politically, there was tension over the nature of, and who would take part in, an Arab force to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, i.e., the extent to which the West – principally the US – was managing this effort, meaning the stationing of Western military forces on Saudi territory. The absence of a rehabilitation programme to deal with the ideological, emotional and cognitive conflicts faced by returnees and the lack of any reintegration and employment programmes contributed to some taking the decision to return to the battlefield. Those who returned were joined by some of the younger Saudis who had often grown up influenced by their families’ and society’s glorification of the Afghan war.2 War and conflict are not pretty from either side of the battle lines. Today, there are programmes to help resolve, and create greater public awareness of, the post-traumatic stress and depression that all soldiers/operatives experience. There were no such programmes, little awareness, and even less acceptance of psychological impacts of war and conflict, when the fighters returned from Afghanistan in 1989.3 It is not known whether things would have turned out differently had there been programmes then, but the studies done on states who later implemented such programmes suggest that some lives would have been saved and different paths would have been chosen. The debates on rehabilitation continue to rage just as wars continue to be fought by both state and non-state actors.

Recognising the Importance of Ideology in Debates   about Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation The importance of ideology to AT/CT strategies is clearly established.4 However, such strategies intended to combat ideological and intellectual support for terrorism do vary. As will be recalled from the previous chapters, contextual variance and political interests play a role in

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148  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia determining the most appropriate strategies within a given area and at a specific point in time. Two controversial types of strategies employed are rehabilitation and deradicalisation. Yet, as discussed in the previous section, both are critical for the long-term security and stability of individuals and society. Deradicalisation was a popular idea in the mid-1960s. Programmes were designed to transform and motivate potential activists and operatives to reject violence as a form of collective action. Some scholars believe that cognitive openings, whether generated by some form of religious or spiritual quest, or whether in response to a personal or psychological crisis, can lead individuals to seek fulfilment through ideology.5 Such ideological fulfilment will vary by context and the proclivity of individuals depending on their experiences. Others have described the process as akin to facing an identity crisis.6 Whatever the process – a religio-spiritual, psychological or identity quest – a deconstruction of the factors that lead individuals to engage in terrorism is a crucial element of the AT/CT strategy. This can happen by engaging in dialogue with potential activists and operatives, with the added benefit that in the process these individuals get to know themselves better and can identify and isolate the ideas that were driving them in the direction of violence. It has been suggested that only the ‘foot soldiers’ can be engaged in this way because leaders, or those with extensive backgrounds in the service of so-called jihadism, are incapable of changing or being rehabilitated. Yet, there is also evidence that, over time, engagement actually does have a moderating impact on both the foot soldiers and the longer serving activists, whereby their views moderate and they can therefore be rehabilitated. There will of course be exceptions and some will choose to return to activism and violence. But even among such recidivists, the knowledge that there is at least understanding of what was experienced has its value.

The AT/CT Psychological Security Strategy: Combating Ideological, Intellectual (CIIST) and Cyber Support   for Terrorism (CCST) Policies and strategies to provide psychological security follow the same temporal patterns described in previous chapters: namely, the

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first temporal (pre-2001), the second temporal period (2001–3), and the third temporal period (post-2003). The psychological security strategy consists of both the CIIST and the CCST strategies. They each include a set of initiatives, strategies and tactics that are employed to realise certain overarching goals and objectives. Linking the CIIST and CCST is the Sakkinah programme. This section, therefore, examines separately the CIIST and CCST strategies and their corresponding psychological security initiatives, strategies and tactics. They are all rooted in and build on those discussed in previous chapters. I.  Combating Ideological and Intellectual Support   for Terrorism (CIIST) Strategy Countering ideology and the justifications used for terrorism has been one of the hallmarks of the Saudi AT/CT model.7 The CIIST operational strategy is comprised of three main components, namely the ideological and intellectual initiatives; the rehabilitation programmes; and the Sakkinah programme.8 Each one is discussed in a separate subsection of this section. They also have their own corresponding phased initiatives, strategies and tactics. The phased CIIST initiatives, strategies and tactics fall into phased deconstruction and/or reconstruction strategies and tactics, which target the domestic and/or non-domestic audiences at different levels. The goals of the CIIST operational strategy include countering the ideological and intellectual support for terrorism; countering the discourse, ideas and narratives of operatives who employ violent means; and countering the discourse, ideas and narratives of operatives for the purpose of preserving security and stability.9 Its objectives include targeting the discourse, ideas and ideologies supporting terrorism and illegitimate violent collective action; targeting expressed, perceived grievances; reducing social polarisation, division and fragmentation; challenging the discourse, ideas, ideologies, images and narratives of the ‘other’; and facilitating change in the contextual conditions in order to reduce the type or form of collective action employed. The overarching operational strategy has employed phased deconstruction and reconstruction strategies and tactics. They have targeted both the domestic and non-domestic audiences at different levels. The variance in the targeted operations reflects a strategy rooted in pragmatism. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the Saudi CIIST Strategy.

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150  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Table 4.1  CIIST: Strategy to Combat Ideological and Intellectual Support for Terrorism Goals

Counter the ideological and intellectual support for terrorism Counter the discourse, ideas and narrative of operatives who employ violent means Counter the discourse, ideas and narrative of operatives to preserve security and stability

Objectives

Target the discourse, ideas and ideologies supporting terrorism and illegitimate violent collective action Target expressed, perceived grievances Reduce social polarisation, division and fragmentation Challenge the discourse, ideas, ideologies, image and narrative of the ‘other’ Change the contextual conditions to reduce the type or form of collective action

Target Audience

Domestic: masses, support base and operatives Non-domestic: Arab, Muslim and non-Muslim at the domestic, regional and global levels

Tactics/Types of Initiatives

Dialogue Media Ministerial sponsored/endorsed programmes (religious community rehabilitation, rehabilitation of operatives, cyber dialogue and Sakkinah) Sponsorship of relevant/topical initiatives Conferences, workshops and forums Development of shared strategies Bi-lateral and multilateral agreements

Nature of Initiatives

Strategic: targeted and general Informational and educational

Strategy

Phased deconstruction of the ideological and intellectual support network Reconstruction of the discourse, ideas and ideologies of Al Qaeda operatives and/or sympathisers

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Underpinning this model is the concept of strategic pragmatism. The strategic goals include: countering the ideological and intellectual support for terrorism; countering the discourse, ideas and narrative of operatives who employ violent means; and, countering the discourse, ideas and narratives of operatives to preserve security and stability. The strategic objectives include: targeting the discourse, ideas and ideologies supporting terrorism and illegitimate violent collective action; targeting expressed, perceived grievances; reducing social polarisation, division and fragmentation; challenging the discourse, ideas, ideologies, images and narratives of the ‘other’; and facilitating change in the contextual conditions in order to reduce the type or form of collective action employed. The remainder of this section provides an overview of the components of the CIIST strategy. A.  Ideological and Intellectual Initiatives The overall CIIST strategy entailed the gradual deconstruction of the ideological and intellectual underpinnings and support network driving the motivations of Al Qaeda operatives and sympathisers. This deconstruction of their motivations helped to explain the cognitive processes, which enabled the development of specific strategies and tactics leading to the reconstruction of their ideologies and ideas. This subsection provides an overview of the ideological and intellectual initiatives directed at individuals in the CIIST programme. Ideological and intellectual initiatives focus on the discourse, ideas, ideologies and narratives that justify operatives to engage in violence. As will be recalled from past chapters, violence is merely one of many forms of collective action. Discourse, ideas, ideologies and narratives do not necessarily lead to a particular form of collective action, such as violence. Rather, they provide context, and possible explanations for grievances and a sense of alienation, exclusion and neglect by the society in which they are living. Dialogue is the only viable option for bringing about understanding.10 Understanding can change the form of collective action adopted to express dissatisfaction and societal grievances. The Saudi government’s attempt to delegitimise the Saudi and global Al Qaeda networks through deconstruction and reconstruction revolves specifically around attempts to differentiate Islam and terrorism; to separate the relationship between

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152  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Islam and extremism; and to deconstruct the response to grievances deployed by Al Qaeda operatives. These initiatives were coupled with media campaigns to promote an image of Islam and to distract from the image resulting from Al Qaeda’s extremist actions. These efforts targeted both domestic and non-domestic audiences. Strategic Targeting of the Domestic Audience.  There were two temporal demarcations to the phased strategy that was deployed to target the domestic audience. The two temporal periods were pre- and-post 2001. In the pre-2001 period, the Saudi strategy made no attempt to directly tackle the Al Qaeda discourse, ideas and ideologies or to deconstruct the Al Qaeda narrative. Rather, the Saudi response was to try to delegitimise Al Qaeda actions by pointing out that all they achieved was to benefit the interests of Israel. So not surprisingly, and in the absence of any Saudi move to confront their discourse, the Al Qaeda narrative also critiqued the Saudi government for policies they perceived to be both Western-oriented and benefitting the United States over the interests of the Saudi, Arab and Muslim worlds. In the post-2001 period, the Saudi strategy sought to deconstruct the domestic support base of the Al Qaeda network and its domestic operatives by challenging the Al Qaeda critique of the Saudi state’s Islamic identity. The dominant Al Qaeda discourse was Islamic in nature. Given that Islam is a fundamental component of the Kingdom’s identity, Al Qaeda’s drive to undermine that identity presented an existential challenge. This required the mobilisation of religious leaders, society as a whole, families and indeed the entire population to engage in dialogue and debate to combat the Al Qaeda discourse, ideas and narratives. The mobilisation programme involved authoritative figures both from the government and non-government sectors. Specifically, the government first opened dialogue with security officials and members of the religious establishment for the purpose of mobilisation. Mobilisation was necessary to implement security measures. It was recognised across the board that the successful implementation of any psychological security initiatives required the participation of all sectors of Saudi society. The process began at the top. The late King Abdullah encouraged the religious community to shun extremism and promote Islam as a faith of moderation. As discussed in Chapter 4, the late Interior Minister Prince Nayef also targeted the issue of women and emphasised their importance in CIIST. He stressed they had a pivotal role to play in mobilising and

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educating the young to counter the ideas, ideologies and narratives espoused by the Al Qaeda network. On the religious front, imams were urged to tone down their sermons to avoid vilifying people and countries. The call went out that mosques were not to be politicised and that Islam should be practiced with moderation. These initiatives paved the way for other concrete actions such as the development of ministerial or government-sponsored programmes to disseminate information; the convening and attendance of conferences, training programmes and workshops; the development of a regional consensus on combating psychological security; and, finally, the signing of bilateral and multilateral agreements with regional and other states pertaining to the exchange of information and intelligence on security issues. Ministerial efforts included rehabilitation programmes and the Sakkinah programme. The rehabilitation programmes had a dual purpose, one directed at imams and mosque employees and the other at Al Qaeda terrorists and other operatives. The programme for imams and mosque personnel was led by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. It was a kind of reeducation programme in which the state and the religious authorities could measure their own assets more effectively. Therefore, imams were assessed, sermons were monitored and mosque maintenance was reviewed for quality of management and administration within the religious sector. Once this assessment phase was completed, mosques were activated to influence society on social, moral and ideological issues, all with a view to combating both extremism and terrorism. The purpose of the programme was to ensure that members of the religious community were promoting moderation and not advocating extremism. The Rehabilitation and Care programme targeted Al Qaeda operatives and other non-Al Qaeda operatives who were detained in prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo. The Sakkinah programme was a government endorsed non-governmental programme led by former operatives and other volunteers. These Rehabilitation and Care and Sakkinah programmes are discussed in separate subsections below. Strategic Targeting of the Non-Domestic Audience.  Similar to the strategic targeting of the domestic audience, the phased strategies deployed to target the non-domestic audience were also subject to the pre- and post2001 temporal demarcations. The non-domestic audience was categorised into Muslim and non-Muslim populations. In the first temporal period,

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154  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia the strategy targeted the non-Muslim community at a global level. As will be recalled from Chapter 1, there had been a general conceptual conflation in the Western world of Islam and terrorism in the pre-2001 period and a conflation of Islam, Saudi Arabia and terrorism in the post-2001 period. Such conceptual conflations and a general ignorance of Islam hindered the ability to immediately tackle the Islamic discourse of Al Qaeda. Thus, it became necessary to first mobilise the Muslim community so that it could debate and engage in dialogue to clarify the definitional problems of the non-Muslim world. A consensus developed among Muslims that terrorism was an act of aggression unjustly committed by individuals, groups or states against human beings for the purpose of terrorising the societies in which they lived. This consensus helped to mobilise efforts to promote moderation and to combat extremism. It was in the second temporal period, i.e., after 2001, that the Muslim communities throughout the world woke up to recognising the need for unity as a way to promoting moderation. What was required was to tackle both the image of Islam among the non-Muslim world and the image of Islam held by segments of the Muslim world itself, who supported the Al Qaeda ideology and its networks. A broad drive for dialogue helped to create the links that facilitated coordination and cooperation among Muslims in efforts to confront the false image of Islam that was beginning to take root. The outcome of these coordination and cooperation efforts produced some action: global condemnation and calls for action; the signing of agreements to combat terrorism; the development of strategic plans to implement these agreements; and, media, informational and educational initiatives. Specific actions included ratification of the OIC agreement on terrorism prevention,11 which highlighted that Islam and terrorism were antithetical to each other;12 adoption of the GCC strategic plan to defend Islam and fight extremism; and the articulation of the Mecca Charter for Islamic Action by the MWL. Symposia were held, such as the one coorganised by the UAE’s Sharjah police and NAUSS in Riyadh, to discuss the protection of youth against being led astray. A legal society for the defence of Islam and Islamic causes was also created. Finally, there was a drive to encourage and participate in dialogue for tolerance and understanding across cultures. The culmination of these initiatives was the promotion of national, regional and international dialogue and the establishment of centres and institutional bodies at different levels to secure the CIIST goals and objectives.

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Table 4.2  CIIST Deconstruction Strategy Targeting the Non-Domestic Audience Phase 1

Mobilising and situating the Muslim community so that it could debate and engage in dialogue on terrorism and the definitional problem with the non-Muslim community.

Phase 2

Tackling of both the image of Islam held by the non-Muslim community and the image of Islam held by the segments of the Muslim community who supported the Al Qaeda operatives and the network.

Phase 3

Dialogue and engagement to link actors to facilitate coordination and cooperation.

Phase 4

Regional and global concrete actions such as joint condemnation and calls for action; the signing of agreements; the development of strategic plans; and media, informational and educational initiatives targeting the non-domestic audience to combat CIIST.

The CIIST Deconstruction Strategy targeting the non-domestic audience evolved over time. The first steps were to examine the causes that drove individuals towards terrorism including the propaganda factors that persuaded them; and, then to develop long-term mechanisms to combat CIIST. There was also a determination to avoid an ‘us versus them’ mentality. Such constructs are divisive and contrary to the essence of Islam’s understanding of humanity. Islam teaches protection of the innocent and describes the killing of an innocent as the equivalent to the murder of all of humanity, irrespective of faith. This quest for common understandings across time and space would clear the path to moderation and mutual tolerance. The CIIST Deconstruction Strategy targeting the non-domestic audience was driven not by senior figures in positions of authority but by existing regional and global governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations and actors. It was important for the Saudi voice to be heard, but it could not be the sole driver of the actions. This is due, in part, because of the fixed image in the non-Muslim community, which conflated Islam, Saudi Arabia and terrorism. While Saudi Arabia strongly argued against the accuracy of this image and attempted to present evidence proving its fallacy, the momentum behind this image in popular discourse, meant that the Saudi message was not believed or understood. It was eventually only through dogged drives to engage in international moves

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156  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia against terrorist intentions and actions, which required extensive coordination and collaboration on the international level, that a change in perception began to emerge and the misunderstandings at the domestic, regional and global levels gradually reduced. What helped to make this happen was the CIIST media strategy. The CIIST Media Strategy.  The temporal demarcations for the CIIST strategy were the pre- and-post 2001 periods. Like the other strategies, its development evolved over the years. The CIIST media strategy sought to counter via the media the discourse, ideas, ideology and narratives of those promoting violence; challenge the actions and behaviour of those employing violence; promote the image of Islam as a path to peace, justice and wisdom, and distinguish it from those who adopted Al Qaeda discourse, ideas, ideologies and narratives; collectively counter the foreign media and its attempts to depict a relationship between Islam and terrorism; challenge the actions and behaviour of those employing and promoting violence; challenge the narrative that questioned the Kingdom’s Islamic identity; demonstrate and promote the image of domestic stability; address any specific issues and perceived grievances that might lead some towards a road to violence; and sponsor media initiatives that were in line with, and would help to attain, these objectives.13 To achieve these goals, the CIIST strategies required an indirect approach. That is, they needed to deconstruct the narratives from which Al Qaeda drew its support. Thus, the media strategy targeted, its efforts at all levels – domestic and international – with the international efforts encompassing both regional and global initiatives. These initiatives occurred in a non-linear yet phased pattern. On the international level, they targeted the foreign media to counter the prevalent image of Islam connected to violence, and were coupled with political initiatives, which attempted to address the perception of popular grievances that formed a basic plank of the Al Qaeda discourse. Thus in the post-2001 period the media approach was to confront those underlying grievances publicly, accompanied by concrete political actions taken by the government by way of demonstrating to the international community that the Saudi government had the Al Qaeda situation in hand and would not allow Al Qaeda’s claims to go unanswered, especially while the government was implementing a prison reform system, including a review of prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners, which were factors that the international community had taken a specific interest in.

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On the domestic front, also, the media challenged the grievance-driven narrative of Al Qaeda. But here they were also concerned to project other messages: they strove to counter the Al Qaeda’s challenge to the Kingdom’s Islamic identity and legitimacy; and they were determined to demonstrate an image of stability and order at all levels. At the same time, the media also openly discussed prison conditions – here too it was also important on the domestic front for the Saudi public to recognise their government’s determination to demonstrate a control and understanding of the situation. Finally, both on the domestic and international levels, there was a series of other efforts in which the media played a prime role: endorsements and sponsorship of non-governmental media initiatives to address the negative image of Islam; regional initiatives to promote and facilitate the adoption of information and media regulations to protect security and stability; regional initiatives to combat anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment in the West; and bilateral and multilateral efforts for CIIST; and concerted efforts at all levels to directly counter the Al Qaeda discourse, ideas, ideologies and narratives. Table 4.3 summarises the phased development of the CIIST Media Strategy. The strategy linked together the various ways to deconstruct and dismantle the Al Qaeda discourse, while at the same time aiming at reconstructive methods such as the rehabilitation and Sakkinah programmes. Table 4.3  CIIST Media Strategy Goal Objectives

Counter the behaviour, discourse, ideas, ideology and narratives of violent actors in the media. Promote the image of Islam and to distinguish it from those who adopted Al Qaeda discourse, ideas, ideologies and narratives. Collectively counter the foreign media and its depiction of a relationship between Islam and terrorism. Challenge the actions and behaviour of those employing illegitimate violence. Challenge the narrative that questioned its Islamic identity. Demonstrate and promote the image of domestic stability. Address the specific issues and perceived grievances. To sponsor media initiatives in-line with the goal and lead to the attainment of the objectives. (Continued)

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158  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Table 4.3  (Continued) Target

Regional, domestic and global

Audience

Foreign media Arab, Muslim and non-Muslim The Al Qaeda network

Phased Development

Regional media initiatives targeting foreign media to counter the salient image of Islam and its relationship to violence. Domestic and global media initiatives to deconstruct the narrative and highlight the underlying grievances. Domestic media initiatives to counter the discursive challenge to the state’s identity. Accompanied by political initiatives to address perceived grievances. Domestic media initiatives to facilitate the image of stability. Endorsement and sponsorship of non-governmental media initiatives to address the negative image of Islam. Awareness campaign around issues central to those that the Al Qaeda network capitalised on in the discourse, ideas, ideologies and narratives. Domestic media initiatives to directly counter the Al Qaeda discourse, ideas, ideologies and narratives. Regional initiatives to promote and facilitate the adoption of information and media regulations to protect security and stability. Regional initiatives to combat anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment in the West. Bilateral and multilateral efforts for CIIST.

B.  From Egypt to Saudi Arabia: The Development   of the Rehabilitation and Care Programme Rehabilitation programmes are based on several factors: understanding the underlying logic of the individuals undergoing rehabilitation; deconstructing and understanding the motivating ideological and psychological elements in someone that lead him or her to adopt violence; and aiding the individual in the psychological process that shifts this motivation and produces an acceptance of behaviour change. Deradicalisation programmes focus on the ideas that transform subjects

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and motivate them to reject the methods of violence and terrorism.14 Such programmes operate under the assumption that some individuals will moderate their behaviour and ideology in time. The Saudi Rehabilitation and Care programme commenced in 2003. It was modelled after an Egyptian programme established in the 1960s.15 The 1960s saw rehabilitative justice movement rise in popularity. It led to the development of alternative programmes being developed across Europe and the United States. Around the same time Egypt too was faced with the need to combat the continued rise of groups within the country that it designated as terrorist organisations, especially since previous measures had failed. Egypt then adopted a deradicalisation strategy to deal with the ideas and ideological discourse of dissidents both inside and out of detention.16 The programme was mandatory and centred on social interaction, selective inducements, the promotion of education, and a focus on the leadership of the groups whether those in or out of detention. Leaders were encouraged or induced to counsel their younger followers to question the ideas that had led, or would lead, to adopting violence as a political tool. After their release, individuals were permitted by the Egyptian state to operate through civil society organisations. Permitting the formation of civil society organisations brought discontented youth into the system, rather than forcing them underground. The government recognised that channelling grievances and providing potential outlets for activists was essential to reducing and to managing youth radicalisation. It also enabled better oversight on their social activities. Using civil society organisations for political activities was prohibited, however. While the Egyptian programme would be the basis from which the Saudis would build their own efforts, the catalyst was an incident that occurred prior to the release of the first set of nine Guantanamo detainees in May 2003. A man by the name of Abdul Rahman Alghamdi, who had been designated as a terrorist by the Saudi government, agreed to turn himself in to the then Interior Minister, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. Rather than putting him in prison, the Interior Minister decided to have a religious leader live with him for one year. Alghamdi’s thought process gradually changed and he was reintegrated into society. The first set of Guantanamo detainees participated in a similar programme. Their combined experience, as well as the study of past programmes around the world, led the Interior Ministry to formally launch the Saudi

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160  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Rehabilitation and Care programme in 2003. The programme, which was designed to prevent and combat the intellectual and ideological support for terrorism of Al Qaeda operatives and other individuals advocating violence, officially opened in 2006.17 The programme passed through several phases, which will be discussed in this section, namely detainee repatriation, the rehabilitative programme curricula and the release and aftercare programme. Detainee Repatriation.  Prior to 2014, there was no advanced warning from the US government of impending detainee repatriations given to states by Guantanamo. The process was surrounded by secrecy. However, once notified of a repatriation of its citizens, the Saudi Interior Ministry would send a team and advisory committee to Guantanamo. Medical and psychological evaluations of the detainees commenced prior to take off and continued during the return flight. On landing detainees were transferred to the Alhaair prison outside of Riyadh. Their families were notified by the Interior Minister or the governor of the provinces from which they originated. Media was only informed following family reunification. Both the families and detainees undergo counselling with the members of the Advisory Committee. The involvement of families was considered essential to the programme’s success and the individual’s cooperation with the programme.18 The General Administration of Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Advice and Care.  The Center is a human, education and rehabilitation institution. The Supreme Council of the Center is comprised of 12 individuals – the Interior Minister, the Director General of the General Investigation, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Higher Education, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Civil Service, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Health, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Culture and Information, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Labor, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance, and a number of assistant directors of related departments.19 Its programmes are supervised by professionals, who are specialised in various disciplines.20 Every member, from the Supreme Council to the staff, are responsible for and play a significant role in the Center’s development and the rehabilitation of individuals.21

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Rehabilitation entails confronting and deconstructing attitudes, ideas and ideologies that through misinterpretations and misreading of texts, or through sheer perverse mindsets produce destructive outcomes. The purpose is to reconstruct the mind or a mental process that functions along lines of reason and rationality.22 Thus a deconstructive– reconstructive cognitive and philosophical approach is designed to rehabilitate political operatives away from violence. The approach seeks to promote moderation and enhance loyalty to the state, reject extremism, and achieve intellectual, psychological and social balance for groups targeted for rehabilitation. It utilises ideology prevalent within Saudi society, which is rooted in Islam and taught in the Saudi educational curricula.23 The educational curricula incorporate the values, customs and traditions of the country and the tenets of Islam.24 Imbued in all the programmes, therefore, are the principles of tolerance, moderation, justice and fairness, forgiveness, dialogue and abstaining from discord. The Programmes and the Curricula.  The rehabilitation programmes include the prevention programme, the rehabilitative programme and the care programme.25 The prevention programme is advisory in nature and aims to correct any deviant ideology advocating violence or other forms of extremism embraced by Al Qaeda operatives or groups targeted either inside and outside prison. It encompasses preventative and curative counselling programmes, with the former being done outside the prisons and the latter inside prisons. The preventative counselling programmes include awareness counselling, directed counselling and electronic counselling. Awareness is achieved through lectures, seminars and meetings in regions and governorates. Directed counselling occurs through dialogue sessions with individuals and often their families at their homes. The electronic counselling is provided through internet sites. The curative counselling programmes, intended for persons in detention, include individual counselling, scientific courses, and programmes designed specifically for women. Individual counselling for male prisoners is conducted by specialists who are male while women’s counselling is provided by female specialists. Finally, scientific courses are delivered through systematic lectures by members of the Counselling Committees inside the prisons. The rehabilitation programme also includes general education, job training, culture and sports programmes. Finally, the care programme encompasses pre-care efforts and aftercare attention.

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162  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Religious scholars, sociologists, psychologists and other expert staff and oversee the implementation of the five main rehabilitative programmes. These include the Shariah programme, the Social programme, the Psychological programme, the Art Therapy programme and the Sports programme. A detainee can only be released after successful completion of all five programmes. The underlying themes of these programmes are rooted in the Saudi educational curricula, which steers students away from hostile acts in all forms, including the various acts of terrorism and criminal behaviour.26 It encourages self-control, forgiveness and communication, based on Islamic, moral and humane foundations that reform and do not corrupt the individual and society, build and do not destroy the individual and society, and prepare the individual to participate in the construction of a sound and balanced community. Those supervising and staffing the programmes recognise that each beneficiary or detainee will undergo an internal and psychological journey.27 Thus, participation in each of the programmes is voluntary. The Shariah Programme. This examines religious interpretations and concepts and exposes participants to Islamic literature. Many of them have never received religious training and their interpretations of Islam have been learned informally. This religious programme is tailored to age. It is interesting to note that university students – those qualified to engage in higher education and beyond – believe that an important factor on the path to terrorism is a gross misinterpretation of the tenets of Islam – i.e., that based on a primitive understanding of the religion, individuals tempted towards extremism, find ways to rationalise their thoughts and actions by a misreading of the faith’s basic principles.28 Participants thus also receive individual counselling where corrective interpretations become necessary. The Social Programme. Societal reintegration is critical to the rehabilitation programme because of the wider belief throughout Saudi Arabia that terrorism consists of wrongful acts committed by those who were narrow-minded, conservative, possess extreme thoughts, and guided by an erroneous interpretation of faith.29 Thus, this programme targets individuals and their families. Success in the programme and reintegration into society heavily depend on family acceptance of an individual’s culpability and their support for the programme.30 The family’s help is most critical after an individual’s release, especially given the nature of social relationships and social interaction in Saudi society.

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The Psychological Programme. Individuals undergoing the rehabilitation programme are introduced and taught about the elements of basic psychology such as the concepts of ‘self ’ and ‘other’. This leads to discussions on the relationships between these two cognitive states and how they relate. This psychological programme goes on to provide the foundation for the cultural and sports programmes. The Cultural Programme. Individuals who may once have been involved in acts of violence and terrorism often experience invisible wounds.31 They are subject to high levels of stress and have many difficulties relating to their families, society and even the group in which they were a member.32 Arguably in many cases the psychological strain is far worse than that of soldiers in battle due to the secret and isolated nature of terrorism. A military parallel may be the experience of US Special Forces, which are often sent into remote areas alone to carry out clandestine intelligence or military operations. In some operations, their identity becomes free of any connection with the US and the US in turn denies any knowledge of their existence if anything goes wrong. Many of their stories in the field parallel some of those told by armed radical Islamist operatives, who are designated as terrorists on the international stage. Given the clandestine nature of their operations, their stories can never be shared, something they have in common with the clandestine special forces of a state. They can both face the same psychological pressures. Thus, armed radical Islamist operatives who operate not for a state but a movement, can also suffer such invisible wounds. Cultural programmes have been found to be beneficial for individuals who have emotional, cognitive and/or physical ailments or who are the victims of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or depression.33 PTSD and depression are two of the most common ailments found among individuals returning from conflict.34 They can also occur after an extremely traumatic or life-threatening event. PTSD symptoms include persistent recollections of the trauma, heightened alertness, nightmares, insomnia and irritability. The symptoms of depression include persistent sadness or irritability, changes in sleep patterns and appetite, difficulty concentrating, lack of interest in the world around the sufferers and feelings of guilt or hopelessness. Both types of psychological distress – PTSD and depression – and their associated symptoms impact the daily life and the interaction of individuals with society.

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164  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Therapy through the cultural programmes can help sufferers move through the psychological healing process. It also helps professionals assess how well the person is progressing in the programme. Many find it hard to see how art can help, so it may be easier to equate the process through writing. How many kept diaries or daily logs as a child or teenager? How many still do? While some are diligent in recording their daily activities, many find themselves writing only in times of crises. On analysing what individuals have written, it becomes clear that the writing eased the mind and helped the wounds to heal. Art and other types of cultural therapy programmes have been found to have a similar effect. The Sports Programme.  Sports therapy helps with social interaction. By observing how individuals behave while engaged in sporting activities counsellors are able to assess whether they are ready or able to interact with society on their release. Again, this has parallels with soldiers when they return home from warfare. Many are withdrawn, much is left unsaid (especially about battle experiences), and conversations are strained, stilted and limited. In both instances engagement with sports, which invariably involves interaction with others and a level of competitiveness that helps to create levels of cognitive awareness, has been found to be an important feature of any rehabilitation or reconstruction programme. Release and Aftercare. Release from the rehabilitation and care programme is determined by the Saudi Interior Ministry.35 Successful completion does not guarantee release, especially if the prison sentence is not completed.36 There are standardised guidelines for determining release. After release, the Saudi government facilitates jobs; sometimes provides wives; obtains security assurances from families; prohibits individuals from travelling abroad; and, finally, monitors their activities over time. Monitoring is done through an aftercare programme, which is designed to lead to complete reintegration in society. C.  The Sakkinah Program for Dialogue: From the Dark Corridor   to a Lighted Path The Sakkinah Program for Dialogue seeks to lead the youth away from extremism, aggression and violence through an intellectual engagement – a kind of exploration of the mind – intended to lead37 individuals to ask deep, probing questions about their circumstances, their aspirations and the career path they seek to follow. This process of reflection results in

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individuals looking within themselves rather than to others for answers and solutions to their problems. In the process, the resulting dialogue between individuals and counsellors allows individuals to open up, for some trust to be established with counsellors and for alternative paths to be explored for the organisation of their lives. At the same time, it is through dialogue that tolerance can be promoted. The key to tolerance is moderation, which requires an individual to find balance. For it is imbalance that leads into the dark passages of the mind. As in so many instances dialogue and engagement can often be the most effective route to problem-solving and conflict resolution. The Saudi rehabilitation and reconstruction programme is no exception. The Sakkinah Program for Dialogue is an online counter-radicalisation programme that bridges the CIIST and CCST strategies. It also employs a hybrid deconstructive–reconstructive approach that is designed to be proactive and preventative. The approach seeks to correct concepts, dispel misconceptions and deconstruct extremism, aggression and violence narratives by focusing on both public and private discussion through twoway communication programmes.38 These include websites, forums, online messengers, Skype, Viber and WhatsApp, and social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. The programme has been in operation since 2003, so the communicative platforms have evolved and varied according to what is available and the trends used by the masses. The general programme goals include: the combating of anti-social ideologies and methodologies that lead to extremism and violence; the spread of a moderate methodology and the laying of the foundation for its parameters and concepts; the building of a balanced, productive, positive and aware individual; and the promoting of a deeper understanding of the concepts of loyalty and allegiance. Specific goals include: spreading moderate Islamic concepts, discourse, ideas, ideologies, narratives and rulings; correcting erroneous notions of Islam propagated by violent and/ or anti-social operatives; exploration of problematic issues using proper scholarly Islamic methodology and good manners; refuting incorrect and anti-social discourse, ideas, ideologies and narratives; resolution of the underlying problems and factors leading to extremism, aggression and violence; and observing and analysing ideological movements as they spring up even before their activities become very damaging. The purpose of the Sakkinah programme is thus to target individuals who, for whatever reasons, are reaching out to circles and organisations

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166  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia that could potentially lead them down the wrong path.39 It is a preemptive programme that seeks to identify individuals who might eventually espouse extremism, aggression and violence. These might be individuals who have expressed solidarity with but who have not engaged in violence. In these instances, their discourse, ideas, ideologies and narratives – gradually being formed – are not directly challenged, attacked or addressed. Rather, trained specialists engage them in discourse and dialogue first through psychological and sociological arguments for the purpose of assessing each individual. Assessment is necessary for narrative deconstruction and ideological reconstruction. Each case is well documented for the benefit of researchers and specialists and to function as a record of the interaction.40 This approach is all the more important because of the role cognitive dissonance plays in the dialogue process, especially when engaging someone who holds a different narrative or understanding of an event. Dialogue and engagement can last hours, weeks or months.41 Effective dialogue and engagement require trust.42 The path to trust is eased through the nature of the programme itself, the nature and skills of the specialists staffing the programme, and the quality, length and depth of the dialogue process. The non-governmental status of the programme and the support it enjoys from both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs lead it to function as a bridge between the extremist operatives (or those on the borderline of becoming one) and the government. Serving as a bridge between the actor and government is comparable to someone extending his or her hand to another who has fallen. Dialogue conducted online provides an added degree of anonymity to the sessions. The anonymity can remove a layer of the protective mask all individuals wear in public and even in private around others. The composition of the volunteers too helps to encourage trust. Volunteers – all trained religious scholars, academics and other professionals – supervise and maintain the programme. Many of the volunteers are themselves former activists, giving them insights and perspectives that come only from direct experience. They engage in dialogue with their charges, most of who are between the ages of 16 and 30, to confront any misunderstandings and ideological manipulations of faith, and to expose any hint of personal gain as a motivational factor. As of 2013, there was a total of 3,250 individuals who had undergone a process of debate and dialogue.43 Almost 50 per cent of those engaged had

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fully recanted, with half of them hailing from the Gulf, 30 per cent from other neighbouring and regional countries and 20 per cent from Europe and America. The 50 per cent whose recanting was not total nevertheless denounced the most aggressive and dangerous aspects of their positions. Recantations have been documented, recorded and stored at the Center for Studies and Research.44 The Sakkinah staff and volunteers monitor critical and offending websites in order to study their content, their discourse and their ideas, as well as to observe their recruitment and mobilisation patterns. They collect, catalogue and analyse every item of material that might be deemed useful.45 The programme also sponsors scholarship and research dissertations on subjects pertaining to or utilising the material collected.46 All these studies contribute to producing a better methodology towards achieving the goals of the Sakkinah programme, which are to encourage moderation, correct misconceptions and deviant attitudes towards Islam, institutionalise the dialogue process, and ascertain the best mechanisms to produce useful debate. Its success led to the development of other non-governmental internet programmes, with similar goals to the Sakkinah programme. For example, dummy websites were created to open up channels of communications with young radicals, while others were developed to distribute materials that refuted any deviant narrative. There was even infiltration of radical groups, their online fora, and communication networks to sow dissent and disrupt whatever discourse was taking place among the radicals.47 On a more informal level academics, government officials and ordinary citizens were encouraged to use blogs and twitter as vehicles to fight radicalisation.48 Other non-cyber-related but connected activities were also deployed. These included open popular campaigns to counter even nonviolent discourse and collective action; the participation in events, conferences and symposia at a domestic, regional and global level; and the sponsorship of events in universities.

Combating Cyber Support for Terrorism (CCST) Cyberterrorism and cyber support for terrorism are two different concepts. Cyberterrorism is typically defined as the use of the internet to launch an attack.49 An example would be to initiate a cyber-attack against a state’s critical national infrastructure. It can also be used for cyber espionage or

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168  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia data-hacks. Cyber support for terrorism is the use of the internet to provide support rather than to engage in an actual act of terrorism. The internet can also be used by non-violent activists to preempt or to check violence by organising protests, demonstrations or strikes as a stand against whatever acts or policies by regional governments or the United States that might otherwise spawn a violent act of terrorism.50 Whether to counter acts of violence or to encourage non-violent collective action to supplant a move towards terrorist violence, the internet enhances the command, control and communication opportunities to manage dangerous and potentially violent situations. In short, it serves as a resource bank and a communication network. And by the same token, the internet is a tool for both state and non-state actors to collect information, make connections, and engage in dialogue.51 The fact that the Saudi state is an extensive user of the internet is self-evident. But the internet is also a fundamental component of non-state activism. According to the Ideological Security Unit of the Interior Ministry, monitoring the Al Qaeda network’s presence online revealed that 36 per cent of its recruits came from the internet.52 The internet has also led to what some in the literature refer to as ‘self-radicalised’ operatives or lone wolves.53 They are individuals who empathise with some perceived injustice or who are angered by the lack of attention and/or action to resolve the underlying causes of whatever it is that they oppose or object to.54 They do not per se have an ideological affinity toward a particular action group or network; rather, it is usually some other motivating factor that brings them to either join or take part in violent action. But the process of venting their anger over the internet or engaging in dialogue with activist recruiters also creates an internet footprint that provides state actors with the opportunity to engage with them in dialogue and discourse that can often steer them away from choosing the option of violence in favour of non-violent alternatives so just as cyber interaction can lead to self-radicalisation, it too can facilitate greater levels of understanding that can in turn lead to moderation. A CCST strategy is, therefore, critical for any AT/CT model. This section provides a cursory overview of the development of Saudi Arabia’s CCST strategy and the initiatives taken within that strategy. It begins with a discussion on the internet and its usage in Saudi Arabia and the regulatory legal frameworks covering misuse. This will also provide a context for discussing the cyber initiatives that have been developed so far.

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These initiatives will point to a rudimentary strategy, which can only be sketched out in rough terms because, as of this writing, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia, Pakistan and the United States, to name a few, are all in the process of developing their own cyber strategies for defensive, offensive, and AT/CT purposes. I.  The Internet and its Regulatory Frameworks Internet development in Saudi Arabia has been a phased process.55 In 1994, the Saudi government went online; then, in 1997, the academic, medical and research institutions joined the internet; and finally, in 1999, the public joined the online community.56 Usage was supervised by the Internet Service Unit (ISU) of the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST).57 The ISU was responsible for overseeing internet services, implementing government rules and regulations for internet usage, and promoting public awareness. In 2006, the Communications and Internet Technology Commission (CITC) took over the supervision of the internet from the KACST and the ISU, who continue to service universities and government research centres.58 The CITC is responsible for making any necessary regulatory changes in the ICT sector.59 Legal frameworks were established for such things as e-transactions, e-crime and the Information Technology Law for Terrorism. The E-transactions Act protects against fraud and other online abuses, while the E-crime Act provides regulations to counter hacking, electronic defacement and defamation and information theft. Article 2 of the Anti-Cybercrime Law empowers the government to pursue Information Security; to protect public and private rights pertaining to the usage of the internet; to protect public interest, morals and common values; and to protect the national economy.60 The law was enacted in 2007, following a rise in cybercrime. In 2008, an Information Technology Law for Terrorism was passed. It provided a ten-year prison sentence and a fine of $1.3 million for individuals charged with running websites in support of terrorism. In 2013, the National Center for Electronic Security (NCES) was created.61 The Council of Ministers placed it under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry, which instructed the NCES to: develop a legal regulatory system for cybersecurity and cybercrimes; encourage recruitment and training specialists in the field of information security;

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170  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia coordinate and collaborate with other electronic and cyber-security bodies around the world with information and know-how sharing; simulate cyberattacks as a means to protect the CNI; and develop skills and methodologies to predict cyberthreats. It was to work in coordination with both the CITC and the National Center for Information Security, a non-profit organisation established to raise awareness about the threats and dangers in cyberspace. The NCES was expected to both lead and to play a vital role in the country’s development and implementation of cyber strategies. II.  Sketching the CCST Strategy through Phased Development The Interior Minister authorised the NCES to develop and present a CCST strategy in 2013, following an order by the Council of Ministers that placed the NCES within the purview of the Interior Ministry. The development of CCST can be seen as having two phases: 2001–11 and 2012–13. The first period covered the setting of policies for monitoring and filtering information. These policies were vital for any CIIST strategy as well as for any security and intelligence AT/CT operations undertaken. They also paved the way to understanding how operatives utilised the internet to both engage in and provide support for terrorism. Thus, they were the bridge for the initiatives in the second temporal period. But it was in the second temporal period that more concrete initiatives were undertaken. In 2012, the establishment of a cyber centre was explored. The following year the centre was actually created. This section, therefore, examines the policies of monitoring and filtering information, followed by the development of the Cyber Center itself. A.  The First Temporal Period (2001–11): From Debates on Cybercrime   and Terrorism to the Policies of  Internet Filtering and Monitoring In the aftermath of 9/11 in 2001, the world witnessed an increase in cyber-related crimes.62 With political hacking, code-breaking for both software and computer penetration, and the development of viruses to shut down mainframes, the dawn of the twenty-first century revealed new dimensions and methods describing how conflicts could be waged and grievances expressed. These developments would change the discourse on cybercrime, security and terrorism – how cybercrimes were committed;

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how cyber-criminals could overcome security measures; the role and importance of cyber-security; the importance of awareness of, and training for, cyber-security63 debate would turn to setting of the right penalties to deter cybercrimes.64 By 2010, studies were completed on the costs of cyberattacks to critical infrastructure such as electrical grids, telecommunications and transportation networks.65 By the end of this temporal period, between 2001 and 2011, the Saudi authorities recognised the need for coordination and cooperation among the universities to prepare the younger generation for ICT field developments. Cyber monitoring and filtering of internet-origin information were two concrete policies that took hold in this first temporal period. They would pave the way for the development of other cyber and CIIST initiatives. The legal framework for these monitoring and filtering efforts came from Interior Ministerial Decision No. 163, dated 3 March 1997. The CITC assumed responsibility for policy development with Ministerial Decision No. 229, dated 27 September 2004. Actions to block or unblock websites and to draft the policies for content filtering were supervised by an interagency Permanent Committee headed by the Interior Ministry, which included representatives from various other ministries and governmental agencies.66 Filtering is a security tool that provides centralised, server-side protection from undesirable specifically identified content. Internet monitoring is a process used to access information about internet resources and usage and has a roaming dimension. It is, therefore, a proactive search, while filtering is reactive and predefined to already identified targets. A private company provides the software used for both filtering and monitoring.67 The software program records a variety of information like the time spent browsing, the size of materials downloaded, and the content accessed. It has predefined typologies that contain sets of URLs that are to be filtered. The content is then classified, categorised and updated regularly. Content that is not predefined by the software program is determined locally by either the CITC or recommended by the public. If a website is recommended for blocking, then a request is filed and it is reviewed by the Interior Ministry’s Permanent Committee to determine whether the content is in fact prohibited or could pose a threat to national security. The decision on whether a site should be blacklisted or not is taken by the committee.

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172  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Many Al Qaeda network-related websites, and those supportive of Al Qaeda or its ideas and ideology, have been blocked.68 They are still monitored, even if blocked. Monitoring enables the Ideological Security Unit to learn more about the ideas and ideology of those under surveillance and to keep abreast of the debates occurring within and between those circles. What is learned from website monitoring helps officials to hone and improve their CIIST strategies or tactics. From a security perspective, the monitoring also allows for antiterrorism activities, permitting the possibility of early intervention and identification of a new or existing network. Monitoring, in fact, according to the Interior Ministry, has in the past led to the arrest of suspects and the identification of cells throughout Saudi Arabia, as has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. An overview of how the incoming and outgoing data are transmitted through the internet by those under surveillance sheds some light on the Saudi government’s filtering and monitoring processes. All incoming and outgoing material originally went through the ISU at the KASCT prior to the 2006 ICT infrastructure change.69 After the change,70 all internet service was routed through the main proxy run by the CITC. Only the internet service providers (ISPs) were permitted to make the initial connection. The filtering and monitoring processes occur when traffic reaches the CITC, and is not undertaken by the ISPs. The ISPs, however, are obliged to keep for one month the logs of user activity. Monthly logs have been likened to little ‘black boxes.’71 All logs must include user IP addresses, user names, dates and times of activities, HTTP commands and full URL addresses accessed. This is the type of information that is sought in most monitoring programs around the world. Every country monitors internet traffic and mines data searching for illegal activity, so it is not surprising that their methodologies are similar.72 Data Packet capture programs permit the capturing of data before it reaches its destination. When messages are sent their contents are disassembled and broken into parts. A Packet Capture program permits not only data targeting but also reassembly. The problem is that this is as far as that program goes; in order to read content other programs must be accessed. Content is not usually readable for someone without an IT engineering background. There are computer programs that enable content reading but, again, the data seeking to be read must have been

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specifically targeted. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technologies are responsible for examining, categorising and extracting data.73 Packets that contain key words or are destined for a specific location will be filtered out and flagged for further analysis. It is not just certain words or destinations that can trigger a flag. Communication with specific individuals can trigger interest in an IP address. Sometimes this is why communications between subversive operatives is entirely unidirectional, i.e., not directed at a particular recipient in the knowledge, which that individual will have ways to pick up a message with no address.74 Saudi Arabia monitors the websites and sniffs only the IP addresses of the visitors to these sites. This requires specific targeting of an individual or IP address. Such specific targeting requires time and resources and most individuals are just not that important to warrant being monitored. So although this makes it unrealistic to assume specific targeting is undertaken extensively, it does not stop many people from remaining paranoid about being the victim or target of a government sniffing program. Beyond the targeted sniffing that occurs as a result of website monitoring, most states have automated internet surveillance computers that sift through data packets and select those that contain content of concern. These packets become subject to further analysis based on content-textual analysis programs that are specific to a particular surveillance or intelligence agency. Filtering and monitoring are distinct but interrelated processes. As previously discussed, most software programs for filtering rely on a predefined set of URLs. Prior to the development of URL-based filtering, many programs used text-based content filtering. The Interior Ministry’s Permanent Committee has not defined those specific criteria; it merely defines the basic normative criteria. Based on these normative criteria, the software programs provided by the companies have used a filter for preset categories such as ‘gambling.’ An excellent example for lay readers is to think of the computer application Windows Live. When installing Windows Live, the program offers basic or selected installation and allows users to include or exclude specific software content. Another example would be installing parental controls on a child’s computer. In the process, one defines the content to exclude and/or include. Filtering software programs perform similarly. This is why filtering is action specific and reactive while monitoring is more of a proactive process to sweep in non-specific

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174  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia data. It is also of limited value because like examining the contents of a vacuum cleaner bag, it is time and resource consuming in comparison to filtering. Filtering is not foolproof. This is because millions of web pages are created daily and there are also existing changes on previously blocked pages. New pages or changes in previously blocked URLs can result in potentially undesirable content escaping the filter. The software company is responsible for updating the list, which means that when the software is updated, a new or changed URL may end up being blocked. Before then it remains open and accessible. There are ways to bypass web filters, namely by getting around or through them. In a decentralised system, it is easier to bypass filters through the use of encryption or proxy software programs. In a centralised or quasicentralised system, it is harder to get around them. This means that one must get through the filters, which is not an easy task. Yet, for the technologically savvy it is possible. The same holds true for monitoring. Full encryption programs can be used to protect or limit monitoring programs. There are also options such as the creation of shells, data switching and masking, and creating false negatives so that packets are not picked up by the program. The point of raising these issues here is to highlight the fact that no security measure is foolproof. States are primarily concerned with security and not violating or eavesdropping on all of its citizens. This does not mean abuses cannot occur, as Egypt prior to the fall of Hosni Mubarak and after the removal of Mohammed Morsi demonstrate. But even then, many individuals managed to escape being targeted. Saudi Arabia’s engagement in and use of the cyber world and ICT technology for combating the ideological support of terrorism are a product of its extensive monitoring program of websites and information found online, as well as observing traditional informational outlets that began under the Sakkinah program. In the AT/CT area, the websites blocked are those that encourage extremism; spread hatred and promote violence; advocate political intolerance; contain information on how to join and help extremists; and contain information on how to make explosives or create havoc.75 Internet cafes in Saudi Arabia also contain cameras and record the names and identities of customers. This reflects a growing trend across the globe.

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B.  The Second Temporal Period (2012–13): From Aramco to the National Center for Electronic Security (NCES) In 2012, Operation Aramco was unleashed. This was a sophisticated, targeted cyber-operation planned by a network of global hackers, directed at Saudi Arabia and its oil supplies, and operating from many different countries. It was described by the Saudi government as a failure because it failed to disrupt the supply of oil.76 Security experts in the country concluded it failed because of the structured counter-systems built into the oil supply chain, which allowed core operations to continue running smoothly.77 The attack resulted in the hacking of the double-layered, ICT network infrastructure and the infecting of 30,000 computers. The lesson drawn was that if Aramco could be penetrated, then so too could any systems network in the Kingdom. The government recognised that cyberspace would in the future become one of the many battlefields for war and conflict.78 It was thus in this second temporal period, and in response to this hacking event, that the National Center for Electronic Security was established. There were already increased calls for the creation of a Saudi security-related cyber centre in 2012. There were also discussions about the creation of an emergency contingency plan should the country’s critical national infrastructure come under cyberattack. Conferences, forums and private consultations were set up to address the key issues: managing malware, firewall protection; understanding the anatomy of a cyberattack; the role and importance of social media and, e-governance; the importance of defining the Kingdom’s cyber ambitions; the various ways in which governments could effectively use the internet to increase cyber coordination and information exchange; and specific security-related issues such as access, control and biometric technologies, building management systems, video surveillance, critical infrastructure and integrated security systems for the areas of cyber, commercial, industrial and nuclear security. Finally, in the latter part of 2012, the Interior Minister authorised the upgrading of the country’s security facilities and the formation of a centre to counter attacks that could effectively mount counter-attacks against cyber-security threats.79 In October 2013, a regional forum was held in Algiers to discuss the development of standardisation, secure information systems and

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176  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia communication networks.80 There were also debates in government circles and the media on a number of related issues: how to address cyberattacks and the role of society in preventing cyber-intrusions in both the public and private spheres; pirated software, its role in cyberattacks, and the risks posed to both the public and private sectors; and the use of telecommunications for cybercrimes and espionage. Continuous cyberattacks on the various ministries, conferences and the public debates in Saudi Arabia led to the recognition of the need for several steps by the authorities: to understand the built-in architecture of systems networks used by the public and private sectors; to create a cyber centre and a national emergency plan to prevent incursions into the country’s critical cyber infrastructure; to encourage public awareness, information and educational campaigns on cyber protection; and to foster GCC coordination and cooperation in CCST. Both the Saudi government and the majority of the country’s population accepted that digitisation would encompass all aspects of present and future life and that this would present problems and opportunities. While a digitised world would always be open to abuse and subversion, digitisation would also facilitate the identification and interdiction of malefactors. Thus, by the end of 2013 a number of steps were taken to turn digitisation to advantage. The National Center for Electronic Security (NCES) was established; a royal decree was issued categorising the IT crimes study centre as a specialised research body to coordinate studies between the IT/computer departments of different universities; collaboration with international bodies such as Interpol was initiated to issue arrest warrants for cyber criminals; the government made recommendations for all agencies to use digital certificates issued by the National Center for Digital Certification; the dissemination of information on the internet that could benefit terrorists was outlawed; a study was conducted on establishing a national commission for information security; and finally the development of unified, regional legislation against cybercrime was planned. In 2014, the Interior Minister instructed the NCES to develop a national regulatory framework and cyber strategy.81 With the United States, Russia, Pakistan and China already developing similar strategies, it seemed reasonable to assume that a global cyber AT/CT strategy was in the offing.

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This section highlighted the growing cyber-security developments that correspond to the broader, global transition from traditional to intelligent warfare. In Saudi Arabia’s case, this transition will make the cyber developments in the country and the work of the NCES critically important to its defence, intelligence and security sectors, as well as central to all future AT/CT initiatives in the Kingdom. Warfare of the future will not revolve around the numbers of foot soldiers deployed to launch an invasion or the equipment with which to make bombing campaigns. It will rather be characterised by electronic jamming equipment and radar systems, and by the abilities and technological skills to hack into an adversary’s communication systems to cause malfunctions, disable equipment like drones, sever command and counter mechanisms and prevent hostile military initiatives. As the twenty-first century progresses we are likely to see a gradually increased application of one of Master Sun Tzu’s wise lessons: that the true master of war is the one who can defeat an opponent without drawing a drop of blood.

Conclusion: Evaluating Efforts to Combat the Ideological   and Intellectual Support for Terrorism We have seen that psychological security is the third pillar of the Saudi AT/CT model. Its foundations are provided by the CIIST and CCST initiatives tactics and strategies. All the initiatives, tactics and strategies seek to deconstruct and reconstruct the discourse, ideas, ideologies and narratives of operatives who employ violent and other means to create chaos and disorder within Saudi society. Vital for this process is an understanding of the ideological and intellectual factors that drive individuals to subversion and terrorism. Thus, the battleground requires understanding of the ‘other’ and the architecture that provides the communicative network upon which activists and operatives interact.82 The literature examining the ideology underlying the Saudi AT/CT programme has focused on the role of religion,83 the education system,84 and a rehabilitation programme rather than attempting to analyse the details of CIIST and CCST developments. Since the topic of rehabilitation and the normative aspects were discussed in this chapter, further elaboration in this concluding section seems unnecessary and redundant.

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178  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Thus, we shall concentrate briefly here on the role of religion and education in the formation of Saudi AC/CT efforts, especially since religion and education are interconnected, as they are in most Muslim countries. Ideology based on religion and education plays a part but it is not the only causal variable explaining the use of violence. Those who posit the view that religion and education are umbilically linked to violence failed to acknowledge that, in order to counter subversive violence and prevent its spread, it is essential to adopt and select messages, narratives and themes that resonate not just with those who already oppose such violence but also with those elements in society that are inclined to listen favourably to the messages of malefactors. Ideology on its own is never itself sufficient to mobilise them. Activists who pursue violence and seek to mobilise others into collective action rely on attaining some form of legitimacy in the community in which they operate. Ideology therefore functions as the fundamental underpinning of subversive action, but the vehicle for actually unleashing violence relies on the discourse used within a community. Scholars have argued that in addition to Saudi CT efforts to actively combat subversion and terrorism, the government was simultaneously quickly strengthening and reinvigorating the religious establishment behind the scenes and reaching out to religious officials and community members who adopted hardline attitudes or propagated hardline views.85 The government’s deployment of such efforts to address the problem of extremism, which required reaching to all segments of Saudi society, has been largely overlooked by observers of the Kingdom. Through the leadership of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, and religious scholars, the government has led a concerted drive to promote tolerance and moderation as a counterweight to extremism. The education system in Saudi Arabia has been a target of some criticism. This is in some measure due to the perceived role of religion in the school curriculum86 and the country’s funding of various Islamic projects, schools, charities and NGOs around the world.87 Criticisms of the education system in the Kingdom are not unlike some educational debates inside the United States. The questions to ponder are straightforward: whose ideology is right or wrong? And, do others have the right to criticise or denounce the ideological foundations of the other?

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Philosophically, those who are ideologically opposed to the role of religion in the public sector, especially in any educational curriculum, are always going to find fault in the Saudi education system. Those who hold that their ideology and system are superior will likewise find fault in the other and look to the other’s ideology and culture as being the cause of any failure or an explanation for violence. This is particularly so when they do not understand the other’s culture and ideology and where the person who committed a crime or atrocity happened to have hailed from that other’s system. As was discussed in Chapter 1, human nature is emotive and in times of crisis we tend to blame and target what is different from our own experience. Over the critics, and their positions moderate, especially when they come to know and learn about the other. Differences in understanding and over ideology can only be overcome through dialogue, which is actually at the heart of every CIIST policy initiative discussed here. As the home of two of Islam’s holiest places, Saudi Arabia will always consider religion as playing a central and public role in the country’s life. Moreover, it is part and parcel of the identity of the Saudi people and the Saudi state. To challenge and criticise the role of religion in the Kingdom is to raise an existential question about the spirit and essence of the country and its people. This is not to imply that the Saudi education system is perfect and that reforms are not needed. But it does suggest that it is Saudi society that should define and determine what, if any, are the problems that the Saudi state may face and the means by which such problems may be solved. Advice is always welcome but to advise is different from fundamentally denouncing the Saudi experience and identity. The Ministry of Education and the government of Saudi Arabia regularly evaluate their systems and methods and constantly make changes in how they operate. They consistently seek the advice of others on various educational models. There are private institutions that have American and British curricula. Some are experimenting with models found in parts of Asia that have demonstrated outstanding excellence in maths and science. Even public institutions do evolve to some degree, depending on the area in which they are located. Other changes are underway that began with the late King Abdullah’s Knowledge-based Society Initiative. To demonstrate the dynamics of the Saudi process, change to government regulations is contemplated, committees are formed to study the issues and produce recommendations. These may be either adopted or rejected. Those that are adopted are implemented. Policy making or laws

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180  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia regulating curricula or social norms may be slow to materialise but, once they do, there tend to be fewer failures than the experience in systems where action immediately follows legislation. In brief, the Saudi policy making model is decentralised but normatively centralised. Thus, all policies must take into account the inherent diversity of Saudi society. Saudi Arabia’s AT/CT psychological security initiatives, strategies and tactics have therefore attempted to account for the diversities in the country across time and space, the varied target audiences that the programme is attempting to reach and the glocal nature and characteristics of the twenty-first century, a period in which Saudi Arabia, like the rest of the world, is witnessing changes to which it is adapting.

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Conclusion

The memories of 9/11 and the events that followed have lingered in the consciousness of people around the globe and will continue to do so. From America to Afghanistan, lives have been changed by these events. The assault on US soil was a shock and an affront for Americans, who had not experienced anything like this since Pearl Harbor. The human tragedy of 3,000 deaths was compounded by the fact that these were ordinary civilians rather than military personnel. And the fact that the attackers were 19 misguided individuals, rather than a sophisticated fighting force, made the tragedy all the more galling. America’s response – the invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq – was robust and decisive. And on a human level it was understandable. But with hindsight, it is now clear that the policy reactions that followed 9/11 have set in motion a dark and divisive period around the world that will have long-term consequences. The emotions of fear, anger, mistrust and even hatred that the tragedy and its aftermath engendered will take generations to overcome. The Saudi AT/CT model has been designed to recognise the importance of addressing the wounds created by the political and cultural confrontation and antagonism that both led to and followed from 9/11. As the chapters in this book have attempted to demonstrate, radicalised individuals fighting on battlefields have common experiences. Their families share the struggle of helping a loved one to find his or her path to directions that lie outside confrontation and conflict. And when it comes to the adversarial relations that divide the formal status quo preserving

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182  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia state actors (i.e., the security forces) and the informal radical non-state actors (i.e., the terrorists), the Saudi AT/CT model recognises that the divergences between them are not so clear cut as they may at first appear. Both groups display passion for and commitment to the paths on which they find themselves. Both are rooted in a kind of intellectual integrity that permits the followers on each path to claim the righteousness and rightfulness of their divergent paths. These common denominators of approach to opposing causes create a kind of commonality. And it is this commonality – this set of shared approaches and experiences in the midst of mutual conflict – that can form the basis for bridge-building between antagonists, in this instance the Saudi state and its actors on the one hand, and actual or potential terrorists on the other hand. The potential for communication and dialogue created by the recognition of commonality is intended to create a framework for at least some healing between antagonists. And in the absence of healing, the wounds will fester, because both the fear and hatred of the perceived ‘other’ will act as perceptual barriers to overcoming the misunderstandings created over the years. Letting go of, but learning from, the past is the key to change. And it is through change that the elements for communication and dialogue can begin to form, all with a view to creating a greater appreciation for compassion, tolerance, peace and moderation, the prerequisites to creating any behaviour modification. The Saudi AT/CT model seeks to identify new ways of looking at problem-solving for both the state and non-state actors in the perpetual search for stability, because it is stability that is the essential ingredient for security. Security, as the previous chapters have highlighted, depends on community, and human and social development. It also requires the participation of both the individual and society to plan for and build any tolerable future. With the future in mind, this concluding chapter will provide readers with an overview of the topics discussed in this book in order to reinforce lessons that can be learned. What has been learned – and the model derived by the Saudis over the years from these lessons is – applicable universally, not just by academics and specialists in the field or policy makers seeking AT/CT policy reform. It is important for the lay reader and the curious alike because, written between-the-lines, is a story about a human approach in a world that seems ever more dominated by procedures, bureaucracy, digital skills and cultural/ psychological ineptitude.

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The Saudi AT/CT Model: Building Blocks for Security and Stability The Saudi AT/CT model is multi-pronged, multidimensional and pragmatic. Its institutional bedrock is the Ministry of Interior, which incorporates and is supported by a vast organisational framework. This framework incorporates not just traditional security elements but also all the social, economic and political institutions connected to the structures and institutions of Saudi governance. Both the framework and the policies constructed and implemented, therefore, transcend the public and private sectors. This transcendence helps to maintain the continuous dynamics of the AT/CT policy making process. As will be recalled from the introductory chapter, this process evolved over time, evolving from being primarily concerned with counterterrorism to an antiterrorism focus. With that change, there was also a transition from a retributive to hybrid system that encompassed both retributive and rehabilitative policies, strategies and tactics. By the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, there was greater emphasis on the latter. This transformation in the Saudi model has resulted in and reflects factors that describe the exceedingly complex phenomenon of global terrorism based on clear evidence and the pursuit of proactive steps to achieve the outcomes desired. We set out these factors here in what we have called the pillars of the AT/CT model, i.e., the conceptual structures on which the Saudi AT/CT programme is built. The first pillar covers the role of intelligence gathering in fighting terrorism based on clear evidence and the pursuit of proactive steps to achieve the outcomes desired. The second pillar underscores the need to counter and thwart any attempts by terrorist organisations and their sympathisers to secure and receive funding for themselves from any sources. It is a basic tenet of the Saudi AT/CT model to confront terrorist financing and to interdict it, having taken the necessary measures to monitor and cut any financial transaction that might end up in the hands of terrorists. The third pillar of the Saudi AT/CT model is to anticipate and counter any ideological, intellectual or emotional support for terrorist organisations. We shall now review these in more detail. Pillar I Pillar I encompasses intelligence collection, analysis and operations; military/security operations; strategies and tactics; and public diplomacy.

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184  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Intelligence in all its manifestations – collection, analysis and operations – is vital for maintaining order, providing security and encouraging peace. It also makes possible military/security operations and public diplomacy. Saudi AT/CT intelligence collection, analysis and security operations are carried out by the Saudi security apparatus, which is under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry. As described in Chapter 2, the Interior Ministry is a law enforcement agency that plays a vital function in the maintenance of security. Security is the foundation of order within any society. While society entrusts the state with its well-being, individuals also have a responsibility to help maintain order by protecting the security of the state. Protecting the security of the state entails taking part in collective efforts to prevent terrorism and to reduce crime. Crime leads to social erosion if the process of criminality is not understood and if there are no measures in place to address the underlying factors leading individuals to engage in criminal behaviour. All these factors applying to the general world of crime and criminality are equally applicable to terrorism. Following 9/11 Saudi Arabia consistently highlighted the need for policies to address the underlying factors of driving terrorism.1 Terrorism, wherever it occurs, is clearly a crime. It is one of the greatest challenges to security because it is, as a tactic, designed to break the trust between society and the state and lead society to question whether the state can actually maintain the well-being of its people. Terrorism and other acts of violence are employed by actors with the knowledge that the state is dependent on good civilian–state relations. The absence of good relations leads to a breakdown in law and order, which produces instability and feeds into the goals of terrorism. As the Al Qaeda–Saudi battle outlined in the introductory chapter highlighted, brief periods of instability are to be expected. No society is immune to fluctuations in its stability levels. The degree of instability, however, will determine whether terrorist violence is sustained and also who is being targeted by the violence. An initial act or set of incidents will generate awareness of the terrorists and their goals and will create confusion within a society. This initial sense of shock will play in the favour of the perpetrators. States may react with excessive violence, or appear incapable of interdicting terrorism. But over time, and depending on the targets and tactics of perpetrators and the security forces, the tide will begin to turn in favour of the security sector and government

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authorities. Targeting civilians and their work or living environments will inevitably create a degree of fear within society. When fear is at a certain pitch, then the terrorists will have forfeited whatever claims to legitimacy they may have had in launching their operations. That pitch is reached when a community that has been the subject of terrorist incidents no longer remains neutral or passive. Whether a society or community adopts a passive, neutral or acquiescent attitude to acts of terrorism will be indicated by the extent to which they participate and collaborate with the state’s security services. As will be recalled from Chapter 2, security services are responsible for investigating incidents, capturing those who have committed crimes, and implementing preventative measures to interdict or deter the commission of terrorist acts. This then means that how Saudi security forces conduct AT/CT operations and how they implement security policies becomes a matter of great importance. The way they respond to terrorism, and the commitment they demonstrate, will impact the attitude of the communities in which they operate and a positive attitude from these communities will prove an invaluable help to the security forces and their attempts to combat a terrorist threat. Security operations alone are not sufficient for preventing terrorism. Public diplomacy is also necessary. As discussed in Chapter 2, public diplomacy is a catch-all phrase that refers to strategies and tactics used in conciliation, strategic communication and political initiatives. Conciliation is concerned with dialogue and negotiations with the varied actors involved in a conflict. It is a process of promoting cooperation and creating harmony between opposing sides in a conflict. In the case of Saudi Arabia this requires the Saudi authorities to not only participate in but to also encourage dialogue within society, including between themselves and those who in one form or another advocate acts of violence against the State. Dialogue among aggrieved segments of society is important and access to officials within a community is necessary to maintain social and political stability. Grievances shared across a community can, and often do, lead to social and political instability. Such grievances can be exploited by subversives within society to mobilise for collective, political action, whether violent or non-violent. Chapter 2 attempted to demonstrate that it is dialogue and not coercive measures that finally brings an end to conflict. The forms and acts of dialogue must be strategically thought through, however.

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186  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Strategic communication involves synchronising action and discourse to communicate and engage with an intended target audience. In the case of the Saudi programme, there are multiple target audiences. The more successful awareness and educational campaigns waged were those that strategically and simultaneously targeted the domestic, regional and global environments. Environments often overlap because of the nature of relations in the increasingly globalised environment of the twenty-first century. The globally networked relations of the twenty-first century have changed the nature of interaction, have led to the reconfiguring of conventional notions of time and space and have increased the number of actors involved in any conflict situation. As the number of actors rises so too do the issues and the nature of the shared grievances. Both the issues and grievances and the attempts at solutions take on a glocal nature. The glocal nature of conflict and, thus, collective action to deal with conflict require political initiatives to simultaneously accompany strategic communication. In the Saudi case, failing to strategically engage and to employ AT/CT initiatives will limit the nature of success in reducing or preventing terrorism. As Chapter 2 attempted to point out, terrorism or any sort of violent action can be curtailed and prevented only with concerted action taken by the security apparatus and society working hand-in-hand. Pillar II Pillar II combats terrorist financing. This is undertaken in the context of the global Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting Terrorist Financing (AML/CTF) system. From Chapter 3, we see that the Saudi AML/CTF system is quasi-centralised. It was argued that this structure for the Saudi system actually reduces the potential for abuse at the domestic level, as opposed to one that is completely decentralised on the one hand or overly centralised on the other. This quasi-centralisation results in the domestic financial scene being far easier to monitor. On the other hand, the monitoring of transaction flow across borders remains difficult. The difficulty is a product of both the global nature of the banking, economic and monetary systems and the absence of uniform systems and structures in corresponding countries. Other countries must be AML/CTF compliant for the AML/CTF feedback loop to operate more efficiently.

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AML/CTF systems and procedures on their own are not sufficient. There must also be an effective AML/CTF strategy. As was learned from Chapter 3, the Saudi AML/CTF strategy is comprehensive and encompasses initiatives undertaken at the domestic, regional and global levels. At the domestic level, Saudi Arabia enacted laws to better safeguard the banking and financial system from abuse. They criminalised money laundering and terrorist financing activities; implemented institutional mechanisms in the banking, financial and security sector to both help combat and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing; established committees and a taskforce to study, review and advise on money laundering and terrorist financing conducted awareness and education campaigns to inform the public; and, hosted and sponsored lectures, public talks and conferences. At the regional level, Saudi Arabia signed and ratified a number of treaties and conventions; assumed membership and participated in the MENA–FATF, the Arab League, the GCC and the OIC; spearheaded multilateral AML/CTF initiatives among the Arab Ministers of Interior and Justice; participated in and helped to coordinate regional meetings, conferences and special taskforce on topics such as border security, terrorist financing, money laundering and trafficking; and finally, participated in and sponsored conferences, lectures, trainings and workshops. Finally, at the global level, Saudi Arabia signed and ratified a number of treaties and conventions; assumed membership and participation in global entities such as FATF and Egmont; and, participated in international conferences and trainings on issues both directly and indirectly related to terrorist financing and money laundering. While the system and the strategy employed are important, a final lesson highlighted in Chapter 3 is that combating terrorist financing is far more complex than might appear to non-specialists. To deal with this complexity requires the deployment of a variety of different AML/CTF strategies, which need to vary temporally and spatially. How they vary specifically will depend on the organisational structure, the network composition and the environmental or contextual variables of any given situation. Knowledge of a whole range of factors relating to banking, finance and accounting is essential. These factors comprise: laws and regulations; investigative procedures; and methods of analysis. In addition to these specific points, a series of more general issues also play their role in combating terrorist financing. For example, the definition of what is considered terrorism can often be laden with political considerations and

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188  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia interests, best expressed in the oft-cited axiom ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’ This definition problem, influenced by political perspectives, can certainly blur the lines when considering terrorist financing. Also, initial perceptions of what constitutes a terrorist act – or who bears responsibility – can change over time, yet these initial perceptions can have long-term consequences for the individuals or organisations who are caught up in these perceptions, regardless of what other explanations might emerge later. And finally, the role of coordination, cooperation and information sharing on the regulatory framework to combat money laundering and terrorist financing should never be underestimated. Pillar III Pillar III combats ideological, intellectual and psychological support for terrorism (CIIST) and combating cyber support for terrorism (CCST). Countering ideology and its justifications for terrorism has been one of the hallmarks of the Saudi AT/CT model. As set out in Chapter 4, the CIIST operational strategy consists of three main components, namely ideological and intellectual initiatives, rehabilitation programmes, and the Sakkinah programme. The goals of the CIIST operational strategy described in Chapter 4 included countering any ideological and intellectual support for terrorism and countering the discourse, ideas and narratives of any individual operatives who pursue violent means, or who seek to undermine the security and stability of the state. All of the initiatives, strategies and tactics deployed sought to achieve a variety of goals: target the discourse, ideas and ideologies supporting terrorism and illegitimate violent collective action; engage with any expressed or perceived grievances that might be gnawing away at individual communities or society as a whole; reduce social polarisation, division and fragmentation; challenge the discourse, ideas, ideologies, images and narratives of the ‘other’; and be aware of any contextual conditions that might breed discontent and to facilitate change where appropriate. The overarching operational strategy here deployed both phased deconstruction and reconstruction tactics, targeting the domestic and non-domestic audiences at different levels. The variety in the targeted operations reinforced the norm of strategic pragmatism. The Saudi CCST strategy is still in the process of being formulated. As the Interior Ministry recognised in 2013, when it developed the National Center for Electronic Security (NCES), a CCST strategy is critical for any

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AT/CT model. The NCES, in coordination with the CITC and the National Center for Information Security, is charged with developing the legal regulatory system applying to cybersecurity and cybercrimes; developing careers in the field of information security; coordinating and cooperating globally with other bodies to share information and experience; simulating cyberattacks to protect the Kingdom’s intelligence and information networks and systems; and, defining a comprehensive strategy to predict cyberthreats. This is one of the most significant developments in the security sector reforms that began in 2012, because it reflects the broader, global transition from traditional to cyber warfare.

The Second Decade of the Twenty-First Century: A Time for Finding Peace and Healing Wounds While the problems inherited from the twentieth century and 9/11 will take generations to overcome, the signs in the second decade of the twenty-first century suggest change has begun to define something new. There are two reasons for some optimism. First, the relative success of the Saudi/Al Qaeda battle and the country’s determination to counter terrorism on all levels have demonstrated a commitment to attack the roots of terrorism that in turn has resulted in a dramatic reduction in terrorist activity. Evidence for the success of the AT/CT model is presented throughout this book. What is more, the Saudi experience has become a subject of much interest in other countries where it has been studied as a possible source or ideas and emulation. Second, during the years in which Saudi Arabia has had to confront its array of terrorist threats, there has evolved a gradual recognition that education, as a country’s asset, is a subtle tool with which to resist extremism. Education has been accepted as the key to any better tomorrow. But the quality of that education determines its value, which is the acquisition of knowledge and the pursuit of curiosity. Thus reading, research and writing, which breed a quest for knowledge and liberate the mind from imitation, derivation and dependence. They facilitate thinking, reflection, induction, deduction and extrapolation; they open up the capacity to reason; and they pave the pathway to truth. It is for all of these reasons that the Saudi AT/CT programme and the rehabilitative justice policies teach individuals how rather than what to think. The intention behind such a pedagogy is nothing less than to transform human conduct.

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190  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia We should of course recognise that although this book has focused mainly on a specific time – namely the period of the terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia in the immediate post 9/11 world – the Saudi AT/CT model would apply to any other time frame or environment. Indeed, as the second decade of the twenty-first century evolves, and as newer and more serious threats emerge, the urgent need for counterterrorism measures is at its highest. The appearance of newer terrorist organisations such as the so-called Islamic State (ISIS or Da’esh) certainly requires worldwide cooperation to preserve security and stability. In the process, states that have suffered the impact of the more recent wave of attacks would do well to consider and deploy the well-developed and well-tested models in countering terrorism that the Saudi AT/CT offers. And finally, a general thought. Human conduct based on tolerance, moderation, peace and justice leads to dialogue rather than the drawing of the sword. Saudi Arabia recognises there are some within society who do not accept the spirit of dialogue and cannot coexist with those that do.2 Their failure to accept the spirit of dialogue should not lead society, its component individuals or its leaders to turn their backs on a brother, sister or even a stranger. Dialogue is fundamental to any kind of conflict resolution and in the Saudi context it lies at the heart of the Kingdom’s antiterrorist and counterterrorism programme.

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APPENDIX

In the 1970s, there were a total of 845 media documents; 6,501 in the 1980s; 16,245 in the 1990s; 18,655 in the 2000s; and 4,926 in the years covering 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2011. The total number of media documents in the data period was 47,172. In mainstream media coverage in the United States, there was a jump from 43 to 172 documents covering the Kingdom in 1977. Looking at the statistics for the 1970s, there was a 15 per cent jump in coverage. Figure A1.1 contains the data distribution. From this point forward, there too continues to be steady increase in coverage. Data on mainstream media coverage was taken from the Lexis-Nexus Database and the search term used was extremely general. Only the term ‘Saudi Arabia’ was used. However, once the number of documents hit 1,000, the search was limited to those that contained it at least five times. This limitation was necessary and provided a good sample to analyse for the conceptual construction of the image and specific patterns. A shift to documents that contained the search term at least five times did not alter the upward trend in coverage that began in the peak year of 1977. The peak in the 1990s corresponded to the attacks on US targets in the Kingdom, while 9/11 was the triggering event for the increase from the previous period. The peak for the 2000s was simultaneously 2003 and 2004, with an 8 per cent decline in 2005. This trend is particularly interesting because it raised the question as to whether Iraq was the driving factor. In particular, it was the peak in combination of the decline that led to a questioning of the role played by Iraq in the coverage.

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192  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 40 30 20 10 0 −10

Percentage

−20 Year

−30 1970

1975

1980

1985

1995

1990

60 Percentage of coverage Perceptual shifts

50 40 30 20 10 0 −10

1995

2000

2005

2010

Figure A1.1  Media Coverage of Terrorism, 1970–2010

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NOTES

Publisher’s Foreword 1 Throughout, the terms ‘America’ and ‘American’ are used interchangeably with ‘United States’ and ‘US’, to refer to the United States of America rather than the larger continent.

Introduction 1 Public lecture given in Cha’Am/Hua Hin and Bangkok at Webster University’s Thailand campuses on 30 October 2013. The Bangkok audience was streamed in live to the Hua Hin/Cha’Am campus. 2 S. Khatab, ‘Towards a General Counter Terrorism Strategy’, GTReC International Conference, Monash University (2008), pp. 33–59. Available at: http://artsonline. monash.edu.au/gtrec/files/2012/08/gtrec-proceedings-2008-02-sayed-khatab.pdf. 3 A. Rabasa, P. Chalk, K. Cragin, S.A. Daly, H.S. Gregg, T.W. Karasik, K.A. O’Brien, and W. Rosenau, Beyond Al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006). 4 Ibid. 5 The exact circumstances of Azzam’s death are unknown. He was killed by three assassins. The assassination occurred at a time when there were internal disputes within Al Qaeda. Some security sources report that intelligence was provided from within because of the internal dispute between him and Al-Zawahiri. See http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804, 1902809_1902810_1905173,00.html. 6 Rabasa, et. al., Beyond Al-Qaeda. 7 J. Rollins, ‘Alqaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspectives, Global Presence, and Implications for US Policy’, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Center, 2010), pp. 1–33. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf. 8 This is a shared perception regionally and internationally. While writing this chapter in Riyadh, I had conversations with officials from two different countries – one

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194  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia from the Middle East region and another in Asia – who both held the same view of US influence over Saudi policy. And in Morocco a few weeks later I heard the same view was expressed in a private luncheon with some of the political elite of the country, including government officials. 9 Rachael Rudolph, Saudi Arabia’s War on Terrorism: From 1929 to 2003 (Germany: VDM, 2009). 10 The US and Saudi Arabia signed an accord in 1973 to provide training to Saudi forces. The late King Abdullah oversaw the National Guard prior to the death of his brother, King Fahd. 11 Statement by an official source at the Ministry of Interior, 18 June 2002. 12 They argued that the United States needed to focus more on the Palestinian issue rather than war with Iraq, especially after fighting a war in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan war was considered to be officially over, but it was still raging outside of Kabul between insurgent and the US-led coalition. Stability had not been achieved. 13 Zuair was arrested in 1995 during a crackdown on dissidents who were calling for political change. In particular, he was calling for democratic reforms. 14 This change in policy resulted in the government being severely criticised in the Arab media. 15 Clarification statement by an official source at the Ministry of Interior, 29 September 2002. 16 Official statement by an Interior Ministry official (21 November 2002) and clarification statement on the 20–21 November incident published on 7 February 2003, Ministry of Interior. 17 Official statement by an Interior Ministry official on 19 December 2002, which was clarified in another statement on 20 February 2003. 18 Data counts from the 1990s to 2001 were derived from LexisNexis News Wires. Data counts for the years between 2002 and 2011 were derived from the Ministry of Interior statements. The counts for 2002–11 were not just limited to violent incidents; they also included incidents during security operations such as exchange of fire, drive-by shootings during investigations, and highway patrol incidents. As the introduction to this section indicated, the incidents after 2003 were numerous and involved a different form of combat/warfare than what occurred in the previous period and in 2003. The temporal periods were the 1990s, the period 2000–2, the period 2003–6 and the period 2007–11. 19 Statements by the Ministry of Interior, 2002–11. 20 On 12 January, following the discovery of the bomb, a Saudi opened fired on worshippers in a mosque in Kharj, which injured one of his own relatives and seven other individuals. The authorities said this incident was not related to any campaign of violence but was rather a family dispute. In fact the assailant had just recently become unemployed after being fired from the National Guard. 21 Analysis based on official statements by the Ministry of Interior between 2002 and 2003. 22 Official statement on 15 January 2003 by the Ministry of Interior, which was approved on 18 March 2003.

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23 These incidents occurred during intense debate within Saudi society over the nature of reforms. There was anger among some in the province when the deputy governor showed the then Crown Prince Abdullah in a meeting with women. 24 The assassin came from the Alharthi tribe, to which the Al Qaeda suspect Sunian Alharthi belonged. The tribe comes from Yemen’s Hardramout Province. Alharthi was assassinated in a targeted US missile attack in Yemen. 25 This was the second time McDonald’s was targeted. 26 Official source at the Ministry of Defence and Aviation and Inspector-General, 1 May 2003. 27 Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz was Interior Minister from 1975 to 2012. He died on 16 June 2012. 28 Official source at the Interior Ministry, Ministry of Interior (7 May 2003). 29 Official statement by an Interior Ministry official on 12 December 2003, which was clarified in another statement on 13 May 2003 and updated in another statement on 14 May 2003. 30 Analysis of statements from the Ministry of Interior, 2002–11. 31 Official source of the Interior Ministry, Ministry of Interior (1 June 2003). 32 Official source of the Interior Ministry, Ministry of Interior (1 June 2003). 33 Statements from the Ministry of Interior, 2002–11. 34 Prior to becoming its leader, he played a significant role in Al Qaeda operations in other areas, both in terms of media operations and violent operations. 35 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 14 June 2003 and official statement of official source at the Interior Ministry, 17 June 2003. 36 Statement by an official Interior Ministry source, Ministry of Interior (26 June 2003). 37 Official sources at the Interior Ministry, 13 July 2004 and 16 July 2004. 38 Official sources at the Interior Ministry, 2–5 July 2003 and 28 July 2003. 39 Statement by an official source at the Interior Ministry 5 July 2003 and Appended statement of official source at the Interior Ministry, 5 August 2003. 40 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–11. 41 Interview on 23 November 2013 with an Iraqi source on the smuggling of weapons into Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi border. 42 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–11. 43 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 21 July 2003. 44 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 28 July 2003. 45 Despite there being days or weeks between the incidents, Al Qaeda and security forces were engaging in skirmishes daily in certain provinces. It would be too voluminous for a detailed accounting of the daily raids, seizures, arrests, and gun battles. 46 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 10 August 2003. 47 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 26 August 2003 (corresponding to 10 August 2003). 48 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 6 November 2003. 49 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 6 November 2003.

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196  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 50 Explanatory Reports for Incidents in the Previous Period, Ministry of Interior, 14 January 2004. 51 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 8–9 November 2003. 52 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 8–9 November 2003. 53 This incident was to serve as a warning of the group’s plans to assassinate the ‘Imams of Unbelief ’ and the ‘Soldiers of Evil’, warning that they had compiled specific information on the whereabouts of these ulema and security officials, their family members, their houses, and their vehicles. 54 T. Hegghammer, The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2010). 55 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–11. 56 I would like to especially thank my research assistant, Nhan (‘Nathan’) Tran, for his assistance in depicting the data. 57 It should be noted that Al Qaeda in Iraq was participating in the insurgency against the US. 58 T. Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 59 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–11. 60 Just as crimes have signatures or common characteristics so too do Al Qaeda operations. For example, the 2013 bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Lebanon has similar operational signatures to the Riyadh Compound bombing in 2003. There were common characteristics in not just the way the operation was carried out but also in terms of geographical, group and membership linkages. Abdullah Azzam Brigades claimed responsibility for the bombing in Lebanon and it claimed affiliation with the global Al Qaeda network. Some of its members have hailed from Saudi Arabia and have linkages to the Al Qaeda network operating in Saudi Arabia in 2003–6. 61 G. Nonneman, ‘Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests, and Regional Diplomacy’, Chatham House Briefing Paper (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011), pp. 1–20. Available at: https://www. chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/19237_0511yemen_gulfbp.pdf. 62 Christopher Boucek, ‘Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral’, Carnegie Papers Middle East Program Number 102 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), pp. 1–30. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/yemen_downward_spiral.pdf. 63 Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia; Rollins, ‘Alqaeda and Affiliates’. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 A. Aldis and G.P. Hurd, The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2007). 69 Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘Al Qaeda Statements and Evolving Ideology’, CRS Report for the US Congress (Washington, DC: 2005), pp. 1–10. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32759.pdf.

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7 0 Aldis and Hurd, The Ideological War on Terror. 71 Ibid. 72 Rollins, ‘Alqaeda and Affiliates’. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 See G. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989); A. Abdulmahmood, CounterTerrorism (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Science, 2005); R. Young, ‘Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept within International Law and Its influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation’, BC International and Comparative Law Review 23/3 (2005), pp. 23–103; D. Fouquet, ‘Defining Terrorism and its Implications’ (Strategic Alliance for Asian Studies, 2002). Available at: http://www.eias.org/conferences/euasia911/euasia911fouquet.pdf/. 76 UK Government, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy (London: The Stationary Office, 2006). 77 A.F. Aljahani, Terrorism: Concept and Reality (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2005). 78 Wardlaw, Political Terrorism; Abdulmahmood Counter-Terrorism. 79 Aljahani, Terrorism. 80 Ibid. 81 N. Albagami, ‘Salient Misconceptions on Terrorism: A Critique’, Arab Journal for Security Studies and Training (2008). 82 F. Alghuraibah, and F.M. Alghuraibah ‘Standpoint of the Arab Youth Toward Terrorism’, Arab Journal for Security Studies and Training (2008). 83 Ibid. 84 See UK Government, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy (London: The Stationary Office, 2006); US Government, The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism (Washington, DC: The White House, 2005). 85 M. Alomairi, Islamic Science on Terrorism (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2005). 86 Ibid. 87 K.Y. Barqawi, ‘Terrorism as Viewed by the University Youth’, Arab Journal for Security Studies and Training 25 (2008), pp. 40–48. 88 M. Eid, Terrorism in the Arab World (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2005). 89 Abdulmahmood, Counter Terrorism; Eid, Terrorism in the Arab World. 90 Abdulmahmood, Counter Terrorism. 91 Ibid. 92 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Counter-Terrorism International Conference’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 May 2005. 93 Alghuraibah and Alghuraibah, ‘Standpoint of the Arab Youth Toward Terrorism’. 94 Z.Y. Lay Lal, ‘Predicting Student Violent Behavior’, Arab Journal for Security Studies and Training 14 (2006), pp. 123–35. 95 Eid, Terrorism in the Arab World.

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198  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 96 Aljahani, Terrorism. 9 7 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Speech of HRH Prince Saud Alfaisal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Royal United Service Institute’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 January 2006.

Chapter 1: The Power of Perception, Policy Construction and Saudi Counterterrorism 1 Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996). 2 J. Rosati, ‘The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics’, International Studies Review (2000), pp. 45–75. 3 E.S. Reed and R.K. Jones, ‘Gibson’s Theory of Perception: A Case of Hasty Epistemologizing?’ Philosophy of Science 45/4 (1978), pp. 519–30. 4 K. Lynggard, ‘Causality in Europeanization Research: A Discursive Institutional Analytical Strategy.’ Workshop on Methodological Challenges in EU Studies. Boston, Massachusetts: 12th Biennale Conference of the European Union Study Association, 2011. 5 Lynggard, ‘Causality in Europeanization Research’. 6 Also recognised is that voicing something does not translate into what is actually done. There are numerous examples that can be given to demonstrate the inconsistency between action and discourse. In spite of this outward contradiction and, in part, because of it, perception provides the discursive context in the framing of issues and represents, to a degree, the articulation of the possible. Discursive context does reflect existing and accepted perceptions within a given context that defines or sets the parameters in which action and relations can occur. 7 E. Gombrich, ‘Review Lecture Mirror and Map: Theories of Pictorial Representation.’ Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London (1975), pp. 119–49. 8 It is recognised that specific examples could be raised to refute a particular characterisation. This is because differences are a product of interpretation and perception. In reality, multiple interpretations coexist with one another, with one not being less valid than the other. Conflicts emerge when the images converge or are intentionally used strategically without recognition by the public. 9 Academic articles were taken from the J-STOR and EBSCO database. 10 The start date was based on beginning of the e-wires contained in the Lexis-Nexus database. 11 It is recognised that an atheoretical approach is frowned upon in the larger American political science literature, but it is one that is accepted in the psychology and social psychology literature. See Eric J. Mash, ‘Has Behaviour Modification Lost its Identity’, Canadian Psychology 15/3 (1974), pp. 271–80. 12 The intent behind adopting such an approach was to inductively construct or develop America’s image of Saudi Arabia. 13 The questions used were as follows: What was the peak year in each period? Were there other significant shifts that occurred within the ten-year intervals? What was

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occurring at the time in which these shifts occurred, both in the Middle East and in the United States? What were the dominant issues in the coverage? Was coverage in the peak periods positive, negative or neutral? What factors influenced tone of coverage? What were the perceptual boundaries that emerged in the academic, government and media frames? What are the areas of perceptual convergence and divergence among the frames? What contextual variables help to explain convergence and divergence? Those asked produced another subset of questions. At what point does a negative perception of the Kingdom become dominant; what leads to its dominance; and, how long does it last? Does perception return to a more neutral tone at some point? Are the shifts driven by particular issues? Does coverage correspond to economic, social or political crises? Are there specific domestic, regional and/or international patterns that emerge in relation to the crises and coverage? If so, what does this imply for the boundaries of perception? Are there particular individuals from the Kingdom who are targeted in the coverage; and, if so, what are the particular issues that make them salient? What are the contextual variables surrounding the coverage? And, finally, at what point is there convergence of the Saudi and terrorism frame among the coverage in the three target areas? 14 American policy has suffered over the years because Americans tend not to look at how they frame and see others. Rather, scholarship tends to look at and explain how others see America. If Americans understood how they perceived the other, then perhaps misunderstanding could be bridged and biases overcome. 15 Lipset, American Exceptionalism. 16 P. Hassner, ‘The United States: the empire of force or the force of empire?’, Chaillot Papers 54 (2002), pp. 26–7. 17 Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), p. 155. 18 D. Davis, and N. de Duren, Cities and Sovereignty (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). 19 N. Lichtenstein, American Capitalism: Social Thought and Political Economy in the Twentieth Century (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 20 In the 1970s, there were a total of 28 academic articles in the Academic Search Complete database. There were 63 the 1980s; 949 in the 1990s; 1351 in the 2000s; and 719 from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2011. The total number of academic documents in the data period (1970s to the present) was 3,110. The large number for the 2010–11 period permits the safe estimation that the upward trend in scholarship on the Kingdom is likely to continue. In the analysis of the academic literature, book reviews were not selected and books were also excluded. It was assumed that their inclusion was unnecessary and redundant because the bibliographies for the academic articles covered the American literature leading up to and through the specific periods. 21 Presidential and Congressional online document archives only cover from 1995 to the present. Consequently, it was difficult to devise a more precise means of data collection for analysis of government perception prior to the mid-1990s.

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200  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia President Carter’s online library database was used in order to derive a conceptual understanding of the executive’s perception of Saudi Arabia during the time in which he was president. Congressional statements or remarks were also used for the period of 1973–95. Finally, references within the academic literature to government documents and/or statements were also used. From 1995 to the present, presidential and congressional document archives were used. 22 See Appendix 1. 23 M.M. Nasralla, ‘An Investigation of Some Motor Vehicle Exhaust Pollutants in Jeddah Streets’, International Journal of Environmental Studies 26/3 (1986), pp. 217–23. 24 K. Gallant was interviewed electronically in December 2011. 25 Y. Erturk, ‘Convergence and Divergence in the Status of Moslem Women: The Cases of Turkey and Saudi Arabia’, International Sociology 6/3 (1991), pp. 307–20; N. Elsanabary, ‘Female Education in Saudi Arabia and Reproduction’, Gender and Education 6/2 (1994), pp. 141–51; S. AlKhateeb and A. Hameed, ‘Women, family and the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia’, Marriage & Family Review, 27/1–2 (1998), pp. 167–90; E.A. Doumato, ‘Women and Work in Saudi Arabia: How Flexible are Islamic Margins?’, Middle East Journal 53/4 (1999), pp. 568–84. 26 See the articles listed in the previous footnote. 27 This was a pervading theme throughout the wires covering 1973 to the present. 28 David E. Long, ‘Stability in Saudi Arabia’, Current History 90/522 (1991), pp. 9–39; J.D. Green, ‘Political Reform and Regime Stability in the Post-War Gulf ’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 16/10 (1993), pp. 9–23; M.G. Nehme, ‘Political Development in Saudi Arabia: Empty Reforms from Above’, International Sociology 10/2 (1995), pp. 155–71; M. Alrasheed, ‘The Politics of Encapsulation: Saudi Policy Towards Tribal and Religious Opposition’, Middle Eastern Studies 32/1 (1996), pp. 96–120; M. Viorst, ‘The Storm and the Citadel’, Foreign Affairs 75/1 (1996), pp. 93–107; M. Ahari, ‘The Future of Political Stability in Saudi Arabia’, Mediterranean Quarterly 8/30 (1997), pp. 100–15; M. Ahari, ‘Political Succession in Saudi Arabia: Systemic Stability and Security Implications’, Comparative Strategy 18/1 (1999), pp.  13–30; S.R. David, ‘Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars’, Foreign Affairs 78/1 (1999), pp. 103–16; Gwenn Okruhlik, ‘Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia’, Current History 101/651 (2002), pp. 2–29; E. Rouleau, ‘Trouble in the Kingdom’, Foreign Affairs 81/4 (2002), pp. 75–89; J.F. Seznec, ‘Stirrings in Saudi Arabia’, Journal of Democracy 13/4 (2002), pp. 33–41.. 29 See the articles listed in the previous footnote for the 1990s. 30 Fourteen per cent of media articles that incorporated religion and Islam with its emphasis on Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. In the 1990s, it was 23 per cent; in the 2000s, it was 19 per cent; from 2010–11 it was 45 per cent; and 36 per cent of the coverage incorporated both subjects in the same period. 31 S. Sourayal, ‘The Religionization of a Society: The Continuing Application of Shariah Law in Saudi Arabia’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 26/4 (1987), pp. 429–49. 32 Erturk, ‘Convergence and Divergence in the Status of Moslem Women’.

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33 M.G. Nehme, ‘Saudi Development Plans between Capitalism and Islamic Values’, Middle East Studies 30/3 (1994), pp. 632–46. 34 J. Nevo, ‘Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia’, Middle East Studies 34/3 (1998), pp. 34–54. 35 Nawaf E. Obaid, ‘The Power of Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Leaders’, Middle East Studies Quarterly 6/3 (1999), pp. 51–9. 36 L.E. Schmidt and S.M. Promey, American Religious Liberalism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012). 37 G. Robinson, and Paul Kelly ‘American liberalism and capitalism from William Jennings Bryan to Barack Obama’, Alfred Deakin Research Institute Working Paper Series (Melbourne: ADRI, 2012), pp. 1–46. 38 Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 2012). 39 According to the World Governance Indicators for Saudi Arabia, 34 per cent was the average for political stability in the Kingdom from 1996 to 2010, with the lowest point being the year 2004. The lowest point in 2004 corresponds to the peak period in the battle between Saudi Arabia and Al Qaeda. The highest percentage of political stability was in 2000, which ranked at 48.1 per cent. The percentage between 2000 and 2002 was only down by 5 per cent, which is more than likely explained by 9/11. Regardless, the shift was not that significant when considering it in light of the already low ranking. 40 Christopher M. Blanchard, and R.F. Grimmett ‘The Gulf Security Dialogue and Related Arms Sale Proposals’, Congressional Research Services Report for Congress, RL34322 (Washington, DC: 2008), pp. 1–17. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/weapons/RL34322.pdf. 41 Anthony Cordesman, The New Saudi Arms Deal (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010). 42 Ibid. 43 Andrew J. Shapiro, ‘Joint Press Briefing on US Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia’, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 29 December 2011. 44 J.P. Dunne, and E. Skons, ‘The Changing Military Industrial Complex’, Carecon. org.uk (2011). Available at: http://carecon.org.uk/DPs/1104.pdf. 45 A. Aisen and F.J. Veiga, ‘How Does Political Stability Affect Economic Growth’, IMF Working Paper (International Monetary Fund: Middle East and Central Asia Department, 2011), pp. 1–27. 46 World Bank, ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’, Available at: http://info. worldbank.org/governance/wgi/faq.htm#14. 47 The actual quote referenced Soviet but it was replaced with external regional actors because US framing is maintained for the Cold War period to the present. In the 2010s, there are utterances of Russia, China and Iran as the external regional actors. 48 US Department of State, US Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia (Washington, DC: GIST Bureau of Public Affairs, 1987). 49 Ingo W. Schröder, ‘Hegemonic Narratives and Religious Identity: Politics in Contemporary Lithuania’, Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis 19 (2009),

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202  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia pp. 49–57. Available at: http://briai.ku.lt/downloads/AHUK_19/19_049–057_ Schroeder.pdf. 50 B.L. Nacos, Y. Bloch-Elkon, and R.Y. Shapiro, ‘Post-9/11 Terrorism Threats, News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United States, International Journal of Conflict and Violence 1/2 (2007), pp. 105–26. 51 It should be noted that economically, the beginning of the 1980s was devastating to the American population, with slight and slow improvements beginning around 1983. The US economy would not recover until 1992. Studies have demonstrated that contextual variable heightened the perception of fear and risk among the people. Simultaneously, in such hard time and it makes conditions riper for the potential of either unrest or violence. The form of collective action, as is discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3, depends on the existing conditions and the presence and absence of particular variables at a given moment for there to be certain types of violent or nonviolent protest. 52 P.B. Fuchs, ‘Jumping to Conclusions in Oklahoma City?’, American Journalism Review (1995). Available at: http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=1980. 53 In the 1980s, 11 per cent of the coverage referenced religion and terrorism; 26 per cent in the 1990s; 60 per cent in the 2000s; and 29 per cent from 2010 to the end of 2011. 54 Nacos et al., ‘Past-9/11 Terrorism Threats’. 55 P.R. Pillar, ‘American Perceptions of Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Decade’ (The Counter Terrorism Center, 2011). Available at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ american-perceptions=of-terrorism-in-the-post-911-decade. 56 See F. Gregory Gause, ‘Be Careful What You Wish For’, World Policy Journal 19/1 (2002), pp. 37–50; H. Horan, ‘Those Young Arab Muslims and Us’, Middle East Quarterly 9/4 (2002), pp. 51–7; A.M. Lesch, ‘Osama Bin Laden: Embedded in the Middle East Crises’, Middle East Policy 9/2 (2002), pp. 82–91; Nawaf E. Obaid, ‘In Al-Saud We Trust’ Foreign Policy 128 (2002), pp. 72–4; Okruhlik, ‘Networks of Dissent’; J.E. Peterson, ‘Saudi–American Relations After September 11’, Asian Affairs 33/1 (2002), pp. 102–15; Rouleau, ‘Trouble in the Kingdom’. 57 Nacos et al., ‘Past-9/11 Terrorism Threats’. 58 J. Woods, T.A. Eyck, S.A. Kaplowitz, and V. Shlapentokh, ‘Terrorism Risk Perceptions and Proximity to Primary Terrorist Targets: How Close is Too Close’, Human Ecology Review 15/1 (2008), pp. 63–70. 59 Woods, et al., ‘Terrorism Risk Perceptions’. 60 Pillar, ‘American Perceptions of Terrorism’. 61 Ibid. 62 Nacos et al., ‘Past-9/11 Terrorism Threats’. 63 Woods, et al., ‘Terrorism Risk Perceptions’. 64 Nacos et al., ‘Past-9/11 Terrorism Threats’. 65 Ibid. 66 Saudi Arabia’s relations consisted primarily of Europe and the Ottoman Empire prior to World War II. In Europe, the countries that mattered for the Kingdom included Britain, France, the former Soviet Union and Germany. Its relationship

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with Britain can be seen in the context of its conflictual relations with the Ottoman Empire, who supported the rival Alrasheed family over the Alsaud. Relations with other countries were seen as the Kingdom’s attempt to balance and prevent a complete financial and security dependence on Britain. Following WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Britain continued to be the Kingdom’s dominant partner. It was not until the latter part of the 1930s and early 1940s that America began openly competing with Britain for Saudi attention. Saudi–American relations developed around economic relations. Expanding economic relations would lead to an American diplomatic presence in the Kingdom in 1943. Two year later, in 1945, King Abdulaziz and the American President Roosevelt met on a boat at Great Bitter Lake, which was a mid-way point between the Kingdom and Egypt. Discussed in the middle of the lake was the future relationship between America and Saudi Arabia. Relations have evolved extensively since that time in 1945. 67 Bzostek and Robinson identify specific dates where the relationship with the US was stressful. See R. Bzostek and S. Robison, ‘U.S. Policy toward Israel, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia: An Integrated Analysis, 1981–2004’, International Studies Perspectives 9/4 (2008), pp. 359–76. 68 Perceptual shifts were measured by the per cent changes from the year before. In 1977, there was a 15 per cent change in the coverage from the previous year, which dropped to 5 per cent the following year. In 1981, there was a 13 per cent increase and 13 per cent decrease in the year after. In 1990, there was a 32 per cent increase and 15 per cent decrease the following year. In 1996, there was a 5 per cent increase and a 4 per cent decrease the following year. In 2002, there was a 4 per cent increase and a 3 per cent decrease the following year. The 2002 downward trend continued hitting a peak dip in 2005, and after which it tapered off. Finally, there was 30 per cent peak in 2010. As per the data, therefore, perceptual shifts were identified as occurring in the years 1977, 1981, 1990, 1996, 2002 and 2010. 69 OPEC, www.opec.org. By 1975, there were 13 members and today there are 12. OPEC’s objective is to coordinate policies among member states to ensure there is stability in the global oil market. In the 1970s, the member countries gained a majority interest in the distribution and production of oil and policy making process in their respective countries. Each country gained a majority or full control at different periods, which fuelled, in part, the internal and external OPEC battles of the period. Two of the most volatile periods in the market were 1973 and 1979. The OPEC international development fund was also created in 1976. 70 The common factor in the Arab–Israeli conflict, Egypt, and military sales was the role played by AIPAC and Israel. When Israel disagreed with an arms package or Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in the region, it applied pressure on Congress and the US mainstream media ran stories that differed from its usual coverage. 71 A change in policy behaviour may be opposition to the sale of an arms package that leads to a delivery delay. It may also lead to Saudi Arabia behaving in a certain way such as to fund a certain programme in Africa or an arms package for another country or actor such as Egypt or Pakistan, which were two past examples. It may also accept, adopt or not oppose a particular US policy position.

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204  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 72 Perceptual shifts mainly occurred in internal US political events of particular importance were the US elections, executive and legislative tension, and AIPAC/ Israeli opposition. The importance of events supports findings in the existing policy literature and among media studies that a window of opportunity opens signalling a potential opportunity for perceptual change.

Chapter 2: Pillar I: The Role of Intelligence, Security and Public Diplomacy as Building Blocks of Order, Stability and Peace 1 These temporal periods are commonly accepted within the existing academic literature on Saudi counterterrorism. 2 Interview on 9 June 2012 with General Mansour Alturki, spokesman for the Ministry of Interior. 3 M. Alomairi, Islamic Science on Terrorism (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2005). 4 M.A. Mohammaden, Alternative Measures to Detention (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2005). 5 K. Albishr, ‘Security is the Responsibility of All: A Suggestive Model for KSA’, Society and Security Symposium (King Fahad Academy for Security Sciences, 2005). Available at: http://www.assakina.com/wastiah/6605.html. 6 A.F. Aljahani, Terrorism: Concept and Reality (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2005); Alomairi, Islamic Science on Terrorism; Mohammaden, Alternative Measures to Detention; K. Alghamdi, Sound Belief and its Role in Ensuring Security (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2010). 7 Alomairi, Islamic Science on Terrorism. 8 According to Dr Alghamdi, the Qur’anic roots of security’s importance are found in Al-Baqra, pp. 125; Al-Ankabut, pp. 67; and Al ‘Imran, p. 97. 9 J.T. Ripberger, H.C. Jenkins-Smith, and K.G. Herron, ‘How Cultural Orientations Create Shifting National Security Coalitions in Nuclear Weapons and Terrorist Threats in the American Public’, PS: Political Science and Politics 44 (2011), pp. 715–19. 10 Alghamdi, Sound Belief and its Role in Ensuring Security. 11 Aljahani, Terrorism. 12 B. Ajdari and S.E. Asgharpour, ‘Human Security and Development’, Proadia Social and Behavioral Sciences 19 (2011), pp. 41–6. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 D.N. Baker and B.E. Price, ‘Counter-Terrorism Post 9/11: The Hidden Agenda of Exclusion’, International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory 3/2 (2010), pp. 531–42. 16 Ibid. 17 J. Busumtwi-Sam, ‘Contextualizing human security: A ‘deprivation-vulnerability’ approach’, Policy and Society 27/1 (2008), pp. 15–28.

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18 L.S. Germani and D.R. Kaarthikeyan, Pathways Out of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Dynamics of Terrorist Violence and Peace Processes (New Dawn Press, 2004). 19 Ripberger et al., ‘Cultural Orientations’. 20 Ibid. 21 E.S. Reed, and R.K. Jones, ‘Gibson’s Theory of Perception: A Case of Hasty Epistemologizing?’, Philosophy of Science 45/4 (1978), pp. 519–30. 22 Dr Albadayneh is Vice President at Alhussein Bin Talal University in Jordan. See D.M. Albadayneh, ‘Human Development, Peace, Corruption and Terrorism in the Arab World’, 1st International Symposium on Terrorism and Transnational Crime (11–13 November 2009), Antalya, Turkey. Available at: http://ikcrsjo.org/docs/ Human_Development_Terrorism-1-2010.pdf. 23 Albadayneh, ‘Human Development’. 24 Ajdari and Asgharpour, ‘Human Security and Development’. 25 A.A. Yaqub, Social and Educational Characteristics of Juvenile Delinquents in Jordan: Toward an Idealized Standard Arab Trainee (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2009). 26 M. Alqahtani, Juristic Approach of Islam and Contemporary Arab Legislation Toward Organized Crime (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2009); A.S. Alshuwair, Prison and the Treatment of Prisoners in Islam (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2009). 27 B.A.A. Alkharashi, ‘Prophetic Approach on Countering Security Problems’, Arab Journal for Security Studies and Training (2009). 28 Aljahani, Terrorism. 29 Ibid. 30 A. Aldis, and G.P. Hurd, ‘The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter Terrorism’ (London: Routledge, 2007). 31 Ibid. 32 It is unfortunate that many of the biases present in Chapter 1 colour the lens of how the ‘other’ is seen. Setting biases and perception aside for the moment, readers should understand that any violent or nonviolent activist must be security conscious. They are, after all, fighting against some perceived injustice by an authority or state. 33 Emad Mughniyeh was a tactician and strategist on the field and behind the desk. He was both respected and hated by intelligence agencies around the world. Mughniyeh was believed to be a high-ranking official within Hezbollah’s intelligence and security apparatus prior to his assassination in February of 2008. 34 In 1979 and after the takeover of the Al-Haramain Masjid, the Grand Mosque, the General Intelligence opened external offices for intelligence collection and liaison. In 2001, it became the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP). 35 Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009). 36 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, Saudi Internal Security, A Risk Assessment: Terrorism and the Security Services Challenges and Developments (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004). 37 Ibid.

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206  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 38 Author interview on several occasions between February and November of 2012 with a manager of Ernst & Young in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 39 J.M. Rote, ‘More than Combating Terrorism: The Force Security Concept and the Role of Intelligence’, USAWC Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1998), pp. 1–43. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a346262.pdf. 40 J.I. Walsh, ‘Intelligence Sharing in the EU: Institutions Are Not Enough’, JCMS 44/33 (2006), pp. 625–43. 41 M.T. Bimfort, ‘A Definition of Intelligence’, CIA Studies Archive Indexes 2/4 (1958), pp. 75–8. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/kent-csi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a08p_0001.htm. 42 R. Kopal, The Role of Criminal Intelligence Analysis in Anti-Terrorism (Ministry of Interior for the Republic of Croatia, Crimes Analysis Department, 2010). 43 Statements by the Ministry of Interior, 2002–11. 44 Cordesman and Obaid, ‘Saudi Internal Security’. 45 Cordesman and Obaid, ‘Saudi Internal Security’; Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009). 46 R. Horowitz, ‘A Framework for Understand Intelligence’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence 8/4 (1995), pp. 389–409. 47 R.D. Steele, Human Intelligence: All Humans, All Minds, All the Time (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2010). 48 J.T. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (New York: Ballinger, 1989). 49 R.D. Williams, ‘(Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection, and Covert Action’, The George Washington Law Review 79/4 (2011), pp. 1162–200. 50 F.R. Schreier, ‘Counter Terrorism and its Implications for Intelligence’ (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), pp. 129–66. 51 Cordesman, Saudi Arabia. 52 Council of Ministers Meeting in Jeddah, July 2013. 53 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–11. 54 Schreier, ‘Counter Terrorism and its Implications for Intelligence’. 55 Barbara A. Grewe, ‘Legal Barriers to Information Sharing: The Erection of a Wall Between Intelligence and Law Enforcement Investigations’, Staff Monograph, Commission on Terrorist Attack Upon the US (Washington, DC: 2004), pp. 1–35. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/wall.pdf. 56 Cordesman and Obaid, ‘Saudi Internal Security’. 57 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–11. 58 Statements of official sources at the Interior Ministry, 2005. 59 Rachael Rudolph, Saudi Arabia’s War on Terrorism: From 1929 to 2003 (Germany: VDM, 2009). 60 Statements by the Ministry of Interior, 2012. 61 Statements by the Interior Ministry of Interior, 2013. 62 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Inaugural of the periodical Press Briefing by HRH Prince Saud Al-Faisal-Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered in Riyadh on 2 Rajab 1426 H corresponding to 7 August 2005’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005.

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63 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Press Briefing’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2006. 64 R. Nelson, Information Sharing in Security and Counterterrorism: The Challenge of Balancing Sharing with Security (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011). Available at: http://csis.org/publication/informationsharing-security-and-counterterrorism. 65 Walsh, ‘Intelligence Sharing in the EU’. 66 S. Tsang, Combating Transnational Terrorism: Searching for a New Paradigm (Praeger Security International, 2009). 67 E. Laipson, ‘Foreign Intelligence Challenges Post-September 11’, Paper delivered at the Lexington Institute’s conference Progress Towards Homeland Security: An Interim Report Card, 3 February 2003. Available at: http://www.lexingtoninstitute. org/library/resources/documents/HomelandSecurityConference/foreignintelligence-challengest.pdf. 68 D.L. Brockington, Preventing Intelligence Failures in an Unpredictable 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2012). 69 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–11. 70 US Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for Persistent Surveillance (Norfolk, VA: USJWC Joint Doctrine Support Division, 2011). 71 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–11. 72 Interview on 9 June 2012 with General Mansour Alturki, spokesman for the Ministry of Interior. 73 Steele, Human Intelligence. 74 Cordesman and Obaid, ‘Saudi Internal Security’. 75 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–11. 76 Statement by an official source at the Interior Ministry, 2001. 77 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 29 December 2004. 78 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2007. 79 Alomairi, Islamic Science on Terrorism. 80 Cordesman and Obaid, ‘Saudi Internal Security’. 81 Targeting the organisational infrastructure as it did made possible a policy of conciliation, which is discussed in subsection four of this section. 82 Rudolph, Saudi Arabia’s War on Terrorism. 83 Interview with an official at the Ministry of Interior on 9 June 2012. 84 G. Hughes, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Implications for Liberal Democracies (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2011). 85 The American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is responsible for carrying out and leading major domestic AT/CT operations, with local police forces being involved to varying degrees. 86 Interview with an official at the Ministry of Interior on 9 June 2012. 87 Interview with an official at the Ministry of Interior on 9 June 2012. 88 Hughes, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism. 89 Christopher Boucek, A. Rabasa, Stacie Pettyjohn, and Jeremy J. Ghez, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2010). 90 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–11.

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208  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 91 J.P. Bjelopera, ‘The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations’, Congressional Research Service, pp. 1–27. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ terror/R41780.pdf. 92 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–13. 93 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 20 July 2005. 94 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 9 July 2005. 95 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2004–6. 96 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 3 June 2004. 97 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–11. 98 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 20 May 2004. 99 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 17 November 2004. 100 Clarification by the Ministry of Interior, 30 May 2004. 101 A raid refers to either an attack or the forcible entry into a particular area by surprise. 102 This incident is reminiscent of the ‘Al Capone’ approach used by the US Federal Bureau of Investigations. The approach refers to the investigation of lesser crimes for the purpose of acquiring the time needed for further inquiry into suspected acts of terrorism. 103 Official source at the Interior Ministry, 20–21 November 2004. 104 Spokesman of the Interior Ministry, 18 August 2005. 105 Christopher Boucek, ‘Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [online], 12 September 2011. Available at: http:// carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf; S. Khatab, ‘Towards a General Counter Terrorism Strategy’, GTReC International Conference, Monash University (2008), pp. 33–59. Available at: http://artsonline. monash.edu.au/gtrec/files/2012/08/gtrec-proceedings-2008-02-sayed-khatab.pdf; R.M. Monarch, Denying Sanctuary: Rejecting Safe Havens in Counterinsurgency Operations (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2009). 106 Ibid. 107 Petrol, it should be noted, is smuggled out of rather into the country, while human smuggling and trafficking are done both within and outside of the country. 108 Human smuggling/trafficking cases within the country deal with the illegal movement of migrants to Mecca and Medina for pilgrimage and the cases outside the country are concerned with migrants entering the country legally or illegally for work or other purposes. 109 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012–13. 110 The two main distinguishing features are that while trafficking can entail or include smuggling, exploitation is always present and there is no aspect of choice. There is choice in smuggling. 111 C. Burke, ‘Smuggling versus Trafficking: Do the UN protocols have it right?’ in Arianna Nowakowski (ed.), Human Rights and Human Welfare (Denver, CO: Josef Korbel School of International Studies, 2012), pp. 104–19. Available at: http:// www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/trafficking/UNProtocols.pdf. 112 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012–13.

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113 United Nations Office on Drug Control, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime and the Protocols Thereto (Vienna: UNODC, 2004). Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20 Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf. 114 Some have been exploited by the gangs in kidnapping-for-ransom schemes. 115 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012. 116 Activists are working with UNICEF and the International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor. They launched several programmes to rehabilitate child workers who were repatriated from Saudi Arabia. Their main concerns are to help the repatriated migrants find employment, to minimise infiltration and trafficking of children, and to facilitate their return to school. Many of the children deported from Saudi Arabia were between the ages of 12 and 16. 117 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2009. 118 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012. 119 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2003–13. 120 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2013. 121 The creation of border posts along the Saudi–Yemeni border in 2004 helped each side to simultaneously monitor border security. 122 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2013. 123 It should be noted that in this year, with the support of the Interior Ministry, several Border Guard security officials obtained their doctoral degrees for research in the area of border security and counterterrorism. 124 Former Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef ordered the creation of the committee in February 2013. 125 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2013. 126 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012. 127 Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed an agreement to regulate borders in 2003 and a major agreement with Iraq to combat terrorism and organised crime in 2006, which included cooperation on illegal border infiltration. Yemen and Saudi Arabia also agreed in 2004 to the establishment of joint patrols on the mountainous border that divides the two countries. Their agreement came one year after agreeing at the fourth meeting for the Joint Committee assigned to organise border guard authorities. It was also step toward solidification of the historic pact signed between the two countries on 12 June 2000, which led to the demarcation of boundaries. 128 Hughes, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism. 129 Khatab, ‘Towards a General Counter Terrorism Strategy’. 130 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2013. 131 W.K. Lietzau, ‘Combatting Terrorism: Law Enforcement or War?’ Terrorism & International Law: Challenges and Responses (2002), pp. 19–30. Available at: http:// www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/Terrorism%20and%20IHL.pdf. 132 Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia: A Justice System Without Justice (2000). Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3b83b7000.pdf.

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210  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 133 Saudi Arabia not only expected other states who signed the Anti-Terrorism Accord in 1998 to extradite suspects, but also agreed to hand over prisoners to states who signed the accord. 134 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2013. 135 Each prison has a different set of criminals. For example, the Buraidah prison holds mostly drug traffickers, murderers, rapists and burglars. 136 Bureau of Investigations and Prisons statements published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2013. 137 It is interesting to note that in 2002 female recruits underwent training inside the prisons. They must fulfil conditions like their male counterparts, except for field training. Female wardens are appointed as non-commissioned officers and soldiers. They also have the right to be promoted to the rank of head sergeant. 138 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2004. 139 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2013. 140 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2004. 141 Some specific complaints registered with the Interior Ministry by National Society for Human Rights included overcrowding of cells, flawed arrangements for weekly family visits, improper distribution of dresses, poor air-conditioning, and poor standards of food. 142 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2001–13. 143 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2013. 144 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2013. 145 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2006. 146 The issue resulted in the Compensation Courts ordering the government to reimburse inmates for time spent beyond the actual terms of sentence imposed. The court system is discussed in the next subsection. 147 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2013. 148 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2004. 149 Some of the calls asked for deportation after their sentence had been served. Others suggested the prisoners should be sent home to serve their sentence. The problem the government had was that some of countries did not want them to return, irrespective of whether their sentence had been served. 150 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2003. 151 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2001. 152 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2003–13. 153 The council was comprised of experts from the public and private sector. 154 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2012. 155 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2003–13. 156 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2013. 157 The electronic jamming technology was adopted in 2011. 158 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2013. 159 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2012. 160 Males over the age of 60 and females over the age of 50 were to be treated the same as young adults between the ages of 15 and 18.

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1 61 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012. 162 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2013. 163 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2012. 164 Her licence enables her to practice all areas of law. She will serve for several years under the apprenticeship of another attorney before having the right to litigate cases on her own. This is not because she is female, but simply a common practice within the Saudi judicial system. 165 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2014. 166 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012. 167 D.A. Mundis, ‘Prosecuting International Terrorists’, Terrorism & International Law: Challenges and Responses (2002), pp. 85–95. Available at: http://www.iihl. org/iihl/Documents/Terrorism%20and%20IHL.pdf. 168 For more information on the types of courts employed by countries see Ibid. In general, regular courts, the main issue is that much of the information used for the cases are from intelligence collection and agents. Thus, there are heightened security risks and the evidence publicly released could lead to a national security threat. Finally, the existing laws and procedures for a regular court do not cover the scope of terrorism cases. In special courts, the right to confront witnesses or evidence is often curtailed, especially when the identity of those participating is withheld and there is a lack of expertise among the legal community who can handle sensitive information. Finally, military courts, which also encompass military tribunals and commissions, are conducted expeditiously; can be held virtually anywhere; and are established after the commission of a crime. There are greater levels of human rights abuses for civilians and a lack of public access to such courts. The US used military courts to try detainees in Guantanamo. 169 Government statements on prisons published by the Saudi Press Agency, 2008. 170 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2011. 171 His attorney and several other suspects who were being tried with him attempted to get him to break his silence. They were not successful. 172 For example, November 2013, a terror suspect went on trial for planning to set up a weapons factor to supply militants in Iraq and for opening an office in China to carry out logistical operations. He was one of 18 who were tried. One defendant received 25 years, while the others received 22, 13 and 10 years. In December, there were another 25 operatives sentenced for terrorism-related crimes. They received sentences varying from 18 months to 19 years. 173 Alomairi, Islamic Science on Terrorism. 174 Execution or the death penalty could be given for those engaged in acts of terrorism, but whose acts led to the death of another. Although the prosecution has recommended the death penalty in some of the terrorism cases, there have been no such sentences. Assets could be frozen and citizenship stripped. In addition to determent policies, the government began enforcing existing criminal laws with respect to firearms. 175 As will be recalled, the criminal justice model focuses on apprehension, diplomacy, extradition, trial and conviction.

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212  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 176 B. Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the US Experience’, Counterterrorism Seminar: Assessing and Countering Jihadist Propaganda (Geneva, Switzerland: Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~smpa/faculty/documents/GenevaTalk_ PD_April2008.pdf. 177 V. Mihaila, NATO’s Strategic Communication in Combating Terrorism (NATO Science and Technology Organisation, 2009). 178 Joseph R. Biden, and Nancy Pelosi, ‘National Framework for Strategic Communication’, (Washington, DC: The White House, 2009) Available at: http:// www.fas.org/man/eprint/pubdip.pdf. 179 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012. 180 Government public statements, 2001–13. 181 Government public statements, 2001–13. 182 Interview with an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 June 2012. 183 Government public statements, 2007. 184 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012. 185 Informal discussion on AT/CT initiatives, Saudi Arabia, Myanmar and other related issues with an OIC representative in Malaysia at the OIC–Business Centre sponsored conference, 2013. 186 Government public statements, 2012. 187 Government public statements, 2008. 188 Government public statements, 2008. 189 Government public statements, 2012. 190 Government public statements, 2013. 191 Hughes, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism. 192 Information operations are concerned with conveying and engaging in communication for military and security purposes. 193 Written briefing by the Deputy Ministry for Foreign Information on its efforts in combating terrorism over the years covered throughout this study, 2013. 194 There were 49 specific delegation visits from various global, regional and foreign domestic media outlets between 2010 and 2013. 195 Written briefing by the Ministry of Culture and Information on its efforts in combating terrorism over the years covered throughout this study, 2013. 196 For example, the mass communications department at Imam Muhammed ibn Saud Islamic University conducted research in 2004 into how dialogue within the international community can be made effective to serve the cause of peace. It also examined the coverage of Saudi media with regard to terrorism and the role it can play in addressing the problem. 197 Interview on 9 June 2012 with General Mansour Alturki, spokesman for the Ministry of Interior. 198 The Saudi political initiatives are operationalised according to whether they are directed toward the domestic, regional or international levels. 199 The government, in conjunction with leading societal figures, condemned and rejected all acts of violence and attempted to isolate those engaging in such

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behaviour. A debate over the underlying social, economic, and political conditions that influence terrorism did not occur until 1997. In 1999, a debate over the causes was limited to international and regional phenomena that influence terrorism. In 2001, it was specifically defined by the Palestinian issue. In 2003, it was further expanded to include the US injustice toward Arabs and the absence of political, social, and economic justice in the Kingdom. Specific concrete political actions, or the perceived threat to take action against those involved in acts of terrorism, included the stripping of citizenship and expulsion from the country; hosting and meeting with tribal delegations; and, prohibiting pilgrims from indulging in any form of political propaganda. 200 Rudolph, Saudi Arabia’s War on Terrorism. 201 In 2002, the government commissioned and issued an electronic encyclopedia in five different languages in an attempt to promote its image and the image of Islam within both the domestic, regional, and international arenas. In 2003, the government began offensively soliciting support, cooperation and coordination from all segments of Saudi society through not only talks with tribal delegations but also through the national dialogue centre. Moreover, the government continued to implement social, economic and political reforms. 202 Resistance to occupation is considered legitimate under international law, thus a clear distinction was made between the Palestinian struggle and the campaigned waged by Al Qaeda. Armed struggle is violence utilised against foreign occupation for liberation and self-determination. Any harmful act to the territorial integrity of a signatory country is not considered legitimate struggle for liberation. Terrorism also cannot be considered a political crime, even if the violence was committed for political reasons. 203 Rudolph, Saudi Arabia’s War on Terrorism. 204 Interview on 5 June 2012 with a representative of the Ministry of Interior’s permanent committee on terrorism. 205 According to the Ministry of Interior, the regional conventions include: the Code of Conduct for Combating International Terrorism (adopted by the Organization of the Islamic Conference in the Seventh Islamic Summit Conference in 1995); the Arab Strategy to Combat Terrorism (adopted in 1996 by the General Secretariat of the Council of Arab Interior Ministers); the Arab Convention Against Terrorism (1998); the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism (1999); the Security Strategy for Combating the Phenomenon of Extremism Accompanied by the TerrorismRelated Extremism for the Gulf Cooperation Council; and the Convention for the Cooperation Council for the Gulf Arab States on Combating Terrorism (2004). 206 Interview on 9 June 2012 with a representative of the Ministry of Interior’s permanent committee on terrorism. 207 According to the Interior Ministry, the Kingdom joined and ratified the following: Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Actors Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo, 1963); Convention for the Suppression of unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Lahey, 1970); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against

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214  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1971); Convention on the Prevention of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents and Punishment (New York, 1973); International Convention Against Taking Hostages (New York, 1979); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation attached to the Convention for the Suppression of unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1988); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime prosecution (Rome, 1988); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of the Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Rome, 1988); Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for Detection (Montreal, 1991); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 1999); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (New York, 1997); International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism (New York, 2005); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna, 1980); and, Amendments to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. 208 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Press Briefing’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 May 2003. 209 There was a total of 140 Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents in English pertaining to the subject matter of terrorism. They ranged in length, with some being only one page and others eighteen pages. The period covered was 2001 to the present, although longer speeches made references to the pre-2001 period. From the documents, interviews, press releases and speeches, patterns could be extracted and identified. 210 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘HRH Prince Saud Al – Faisal Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia statement to the 61st Session of the U.N. General Assembly’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 September 2006. 211 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Final Report of the Counter-Terrorism International Conference, Riyadh, 5–8 February 2005’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005. A copy of the reports and speeches were provided in a bounded volume by Prince Turki bin Mohamed bin Saud Alkabeer. 212 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2005. 213 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Final Report of the Counter-Terrorism International Conference, 2005. 214 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘HRH Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, Second Deputy Premier, Minister of Defense and Aviation and Inspector General has instructed the Ministry of Defense to participate in the National anti-terrorism campaign’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 July 2005. 215 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Speech of HRH Prince Saud Alfaisal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Royal United Service Institute’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 16, 2006. 216 HRH Prince Saud Alfaisal, 7 August January 2005 and 16 January 2006. 217 HRH Prince Saud Alfaisal, 16 January 2006. 218 HRH Prince Saud Alfaisal, 16 January 2006.

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219 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Prince Saud Al-Faisal/Speech/THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS New York 20/-09–2005’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 September 2005. 220 In 2007, the Foreign Minister’s reference to the ‘pillars of security and stability’ being the essence of effective counterterrorism strategies signals the need for a global counterterrorism model that would encompass multiple different strategies. 221 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Prince Saud Expresses Concern about Situation in Iraq’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 May 2007. 222 Interview in New York in July 2013 with two representatives from Saudi Arabia’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations. The first representative serves as the CTC Coordinator and the other serves as adviser to the 6th Committee and Counterterrorism. 223 Interview with an UN CTITF representative at the United Nations in New York in July 2013. 224 Interview with Ambassador Abdullah Y. Almuallimi at the Saudi Arabian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York in July 2013. 225 Interviews with board members of the UNCCT at the United Nations in July 2013. 226 Alomairi, Islamic Science on Terrorism. 227 Philip G. Cerny, ‘The New Security Dilemma: divisibility, defection and disorder in the global era’, British International Studies Association 26/4 (2001), pp. 623–46.

Chapter 3: Pillar II: Countering Terrorist Financing (CTF) 1 Government public statements, 2001–13. 2 Government public statements, 2004. 3 But the definition problem of terrorism itself complicates the designation of someone as a terrorist and, thus, what is considered supporting terrorism. The sources and types of financing also add to the complexities. Structural and contextual variables matter, so all of these issues impact state policy being implemented, shed light on policy divergences, and emphasise the complexity of terrorist financing. 4 Kingdom of Saudi Arabi, Anti-Money Laundering Law, Royal Decree No. M/39, 23 August 2003. 5 The SFT Convention had been ratified by just a few states before 11 September, 2001. Afterward, states were pressed to ratify the convention and the FATF Special Recommendations. The convention is the most comprehensive international instrument for combating terrorist financing. It requires states to establish the detection, reporting and criminal legislation; cooperate with each other and to provide legal assistance; and to take appropriate measures for identifying, detecting and freezing funds used for and the proceeds derived from terrorist financing. Please see the following source for more detailed information on the regulatory and institutional requirements for AML/CTF: World Bank, Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism: A Comprehensive Training

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216  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Guide: Workbook 3a. Regulatory and Institutional Requirements for AML/CTF (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009). Available at: https://openknowledge. worldbank.org/handle/10986/2661. 6 There has been a total of 14 international legal instruments to combat terrorism since 1963. A list of and access to the legal instruments can be found on the United Nation’s website for counterterrorism. Available at: http://www.un.org/terrorism/ instruments.shtml. 7 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Rules Governing Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing (Riyadh: Banking Inspection Department, SAMA, 2003). 8 US Government, ‘Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology and the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Financial Services’, US House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 2nd Session (30 September 2004). 9 For example, the United States was funding Jundallah as part of its covert operations inside Iran, which was authorised under the Bush administration. Jundallah is a group that is considered a terrorist organisation with links to Al Qaeda. See Seymour M. Hersh, ‘Preparing the Battlefield: The Bush Administration steps up its secret move toward Iran’, The New Yorker (7 July 2008). 10 A majority of the material used for this chapter was derived from Financial Investigation Unit of the Interior Ministry. 11 The FATF is a non-governmental policy making body headquartered in France that was created in 1989 to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial-related issues that impact the international financial system and member states of the International community. Although it focuses primarily on state initiatives non-state actors are increasingly impacted by the regulations and thus play an indirect role, especially given that one of the normative tasks of the body is to create global and national will on the issue areas of concern. For more information on the FATF please see its website at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/. 12 Funding is generally more difficult in financial systems such as Saudi Arabia that are quasi-centralised in their organisational structure and regulatory framework. A system itself is not alone sufficient, however. 13 Reports from the Financial Investigation Unit, Interior Ministry. 14 American and NATO military operation led to the dispersal of many of the global Al Qaeda network’s leaders and members. Their dispersal to other countries and regions of the continent led to further decentralisation of the Al Qaeda network structure. This changed both the nature of how operations were to be conducted but also for fundraising and the finance needed. 15 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘59th Session of Commission on Human Rights/H. H. Prince Turki bin Mohammed bin Saud Al-Kabeer/Geneva/19-03-2003’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 May 2005. 16 Daniel Byman, ‘Passive Sponsors of Terrorism’, Survival 47/4 (2005), pp. 117–44. 17 Interview on 8 July 2012 with Prince Turki bin Mohammed bin Saud Al Kabeer Al Saud, then Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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1 8 Financial Intelligence Unit Reports, 2006–13. 19 There is also an official way to overcome the issue, but it depends on the individual case. For example, I could have asked or requested my sponsor to seek special permission from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) to allow me to send money without a residency permit. 20 Angel Rabasa, P. Chalk, K. Cragin, S.A. Daly, H.S. Gregg, T.W. Karasik, K.A. O’Brien, and W. Rosenau, Beyond Al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006). 21 Operational and policy making procedures will differ from other non-network structured entities. The groups comprising the Al Qaeda network are also linked in varying degrees, with nodes ranging from weak to strong according to ideological affiliation, leadership and membership exchanges and influence, and financial interdependency. 22 Maurice R. Greenberg, William F. Wechsler, and Lee S. Wolosky, Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council of Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002); Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing; Financial Action Task Force, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Paris: FATF, 2010). 23 J. Roth, D. Greenburg, and S. Wille, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the US: Monograph on Terrorist Financing. (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 24 Şener Dalyan, ‘Combating the Financing of Terrorism: Rethinking Strategies for Success’, Defense Against Terrorism Review 1/1 (2008), pp. 137–53. 25 UK Government, ‘Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005’ (London: The Stationary Office, 2006). 26 Antonio Maria Costa, ‘Drugs, Crime and Terrorist Financing: Breaking the Links’, Speech at Conference on Combating Terrorist Financing, Vienna, 9 November 2005 (Vienna: UN Office on Drug and Crime, 2005). 27 Ibid. 28 Rabasa, et al. Beyond Al-Qaeda. 29 Egmont Group. ‘Information Paper on Financial Intelligence Units and the Egmont’ (2004). Available at: http://www.felaban.com/lvdo/cap2/concepto_fiu.pdf. 30 FATF was created in 1983. It is an independent IGO that develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial system. Recommendations provided by FATF are considered to the global standard and guide for all UN member states. 31 Reports by the Financial Intelligence Unit, Interior Ministry. 32 While the AML laws were first introduced in the 1990s, they were updated in 2003 to incorporate counterterrorist financing. The FATF AML/CTF guidelines were once more updated in 2012. The SAMA requires strict compliance to all UN and FATF AML/CTF directives. 33 Financial Intelligence Unit Report, 2012. 34 M. Aljasser, ‘Working Paper: Financial Sector Development for Better Growth’, Symposium on ‘A Future Vision for the Saudi Economy until 2020’ (organised by the Ministry of Planning, Riyadh, 19–23 October 2002), pp. 1–27.

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218  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 35 Yousef Alhozaimy, The Islamisation of SAMA and the Financial System of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Experience from Selected Muslim Countries (Bangor, UK: Bangor Business School, 2009). 36 Ibid. 37 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing. 38 Alhozaimy, The Islamisation of SAMA. 39 Aljasser, ‘Financial Sector Development for Better Growth’. 40 Absent here and what is likely to occur in the near future is similar to what is taking place in the Justice and Interior Ministries, the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution, and the prison system, which is the linking of computer systems and databases. In fact, in 2013, at a meeting of GCC officials, the linking of banking and financial institutions across the member states was discussed. One of the arguments for linking the systems was that it would help the relevant authorities in the member states to combat and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. 41 Interview on 9 June 2012 with a representative of the Ministry of Interior’s permanent committee on terrorism. 42 Interview on 9 June 2012 with a representative of the Ministry of Interior’s permanent committee on terrorism. 43 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002. 44 Reports by the Financial Intelligence Unit, Interior Ministry. 45 This division was created to provide support for the unit. It covers the areas of information security, system analysis and technical support. 46 This division is responsible for facilitating expert lecturers to speak to the unit staff; to coordinate with government bodies to provide training to their staff on AML/ CTF-related issues, changes and laws; and to coordinate with foreign entities for unit staff to attend and/or to collaborate with trainings. 47 This support division handles the administrative and financial affairs, prepares the budget, takes care of financial issues for employees, and provides office supplies to the SAFIU. 48 This division is responsible for keeping and documenting information and preparing information. Specifically, it creates the database. The database consists of reports of suspected transactions; reports that have been referred to security authorities; and, the AML/CTF indicators. In addition to creating and maintain the database, the division participates in awareness and educational programmes, prepares the annual reports for the SAFIU activity. And follow-up on the latest developments in the field. 49 This division is responsible for exchanging information with local authorities and international FIUs; for signing Memorandums of Understanding; and, for following up the necessary procedures required by Egmont. 50 This division is responsible for studying and analysing the information and data attached to the SAR and/or the data collected from investigations. It then provides an analytical report, which is submitted to the appropriate authorities. Finally, this

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division is responsible for making the request to the BIPP for monetary and/or property seizure. 51 This division is responsible for receiving all reports of suspected violations of the AML/CTF laws. 52 Annual Reports of the Financial Intelligence Unit, 2006–12. 53 Financial Action Task Force, Mutual Evaluation Report. Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Paris: FATF, 2010). 54 Financial Intelligence Unit Reports, 2006–13. 55 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2010. 56 Signed and ratified the Arab Anti-Terrorism Agreement under the auspices of the Arab League; the OIC Agreement for the Suppression of Terrorism; the GCC Anti-Terrorism Security Agreement; and a founding member of the MENA–FATF, which was created in 2004. 57 The 2002 Asian Regional Conference on Money Laundering was in Riyadh. It called for the implementation of additional mechanisms for the monitoring of charities and NGOs; and, the establishment of a data network to link Arab and Asia authorities. The data linkage would help to facilitate information sharing and the publication of names of those involved in money laundering and terrorist financing. In 2012, Nayef Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS) and the secretariat general of the Arab Council of Social Ministers jointly organised a scientific conference on the impact of development, wherein the impact of terrorist financing on development was discussed. Also in the same year, the General Secretariat of the GCC and SAMA jointly organised a workshop on the FATF recommendations. The emphases were on money laundering and terrorist financing typologies and cooperation with international organisations. 58 Statement by the Interior Ministry, 2004. 59 Signed and ratified the UN Convention on illicit Traffic of Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substance (1998); the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999); the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000); UNSC Resolutions 1267, 1333 and 1373, which deal with AT/CT and AML/CTF; became a full member of the FATF through membership of the GCC; and a sponsor of the UNCCT. 60 Financial Intelligence Unit Reports, 2006–13. 61 R.B. Johnston and D.M. Nedelescu, ‘The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets’, IMF Working Paper WP/05/60 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2005), pp. 1–21. 62 Electronic or telex transfers are the most common methods for transfer, but there are other methods such as money transfers, the acquisition of tangible and/or intangible assets, the purchase of cash instruments, and bank account deposits or the placement of funds through fictitious companies. 63 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing.

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220  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 64 The implementation of said policies and the regulatory framework previously discussed are believed to be the reasons why Al Qaeda shifted its emphasis to financial facilitators and back channels in the latter part. 65 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing. 66 Interview on 9 June 2012 with a representative of the Ministry of Interior’s permanent committee on terrorism. 67 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide. Saudi Arabia is one of the committee members. 68 Interview on 9 June 2012 with a representative of the Ministry of Interior’s permanent committee on terrorism. 69 United Nations Security Council, ‘Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution’, Press Release SC7158, 28 September 2001. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158. doc.htm. 70 Interview on 9 June 2012 with a representative of the Ministry of Interior’s permanent committee on terrorism. 71 The problem with this from an intelligence operational perspective is that it limits an understanding of the development of interactive patterns and the extent of an actual finance network. When we look at the development of signal intelligence as a method of data collection, one can ponder the possibility of developing similar methods for this issue area. The argument that the immediate arrest of someone will result in stopping an operation is limited. As most cases demonstrate, authorities are not aware of the funding for a particular operation until after it occurs. A person must be under investigation for suspected activity for there to an increased chance that an operation will be halted through his or her arrest. Even his or her arrest does not guarantee that the operation will be thwarted. This is because within a terrorist group most individuals have a particular role and there are multiple individuals who play similar roles, all of whom are disconnected from one another. This is a security measure taken internally with those who plan operations. 72 E.F. Kohlman, ‘The Role of Islamic Charities in International Terrorist Recruitment and Financing’, DIIS Working Paper No. 2006/7 (Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006), pp. 1–19. 73 Ibid. 74 Interview on 9 June 2012 with a representative of the Ministry of Interior’s permanent committee on terrorism. 75 M. Alomairi, Islamic Science on Terrorism (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2005). 76 Financial Intelligence Unit Reports, 2006–12. 77 Interview on 9 June 2012 with a representative of the Ministry of Interior’s permanent committee on terrorism.

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78 Interview on 9 June 2012 with a representative of the Ministry of Interior’s permanent committee on terrorism. 79 Government public statements, 2002–13. 80 Mark Basile, ‘Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27/3 (2004), pp. 169–85; Byman, ‘Passive Sponsors of Terrorism’. 81 Christopher M. Blanchard, and Alfred B. Prados, ‘Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues’, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005). 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Interview with an official source at the Interior Ministry, June 2012. 85 Roth et al, Monograph on Terrorist Financing. 86  International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, ‘Civic Freedom Monitor: Saudi Arabia’, ICNL [online]. Available at: www.icnl.org/research/monitor/saudiarabia. html. 87 K. Alyahya and N. Fustier, Saudi Arabia as a Humanitarian Donor: High Potential, Little Institutionalization (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 2011). 88 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Statement of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Delivered by H.E. Dr Nizar Obaid Madani, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Before the United Nations General Assembly 59th Session’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 November 2004. 89 Interview on 19 June 2012 with the undersecretary for Multilateral Relations. 90 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002. 91 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2001. 92 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2001. 93 ‘Saudi Arabia: A commission will supervise charity donations’, Arabic News, 3 March 2004. Available at: http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/040301/2004030101. html. 94  As will be recalled from the previous chapters, all policy developments were temporally categorised. Temporal categorisation occurred according to the demarcations found in the pre-exiting literature, which corresponded to policy shifts. The periods were the pre-2001 period, the 2001–3 period and the post-2003 period, which are respectively referred to as the first, second and third temporal periods. Simultaneous temporal and spatial examination of policy developments permitted the capturing of policy evolution. 95 Since 2002 the International Program has been working with civil society and government bodies. They have worked with over 40 countries and currently have projects in the Gulf, Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia. More information can be found at http://www.ngoregnet.org/. 96 Interview with an official source at the Interior Ministry, 9 June 2012. 97 Interview at the Ministry of Interior in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 9 June 2012. 98 Basile, ‘Going to the Source’.

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222  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 99 US Government, Combating Terrorism: US Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed (Washington, DC: USGAO, 2009), pp. 1–56. 100 Briefing on 9 June 2012 by Dr Abdulrahman Alhadlag, head of the Ideological Security Unit at the Ministry of Interior.

Chapter 4: Pillar III: Providing Psychological Security. Countering Ideological, Intellectual and Cyber Support for Terrorism (CIIST & CCST) 1 T. Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 2 A paradox needs to be highlighted. Some states and non-state actors gave political legitimacy to non-state, transnational actors to fight in the Afghan–Soviet and the Balkan’s wars. They provided funding, support and operational, logistical assistance to operatives. Today, some of those actors are waging, funding and providing operational, logistical support to kill, capture and defeat some those same actors. Just as context and politics define who is a terrorist, they also have an impact on how war heroes are defined. How individuals are defined can change over time – thus goes the fading light of war heroes, as new ones are created and others are castigated. The period immediately before, during and right after the Vietnam War in US history help to contextualise the sentiment changes for older readers, while the climate inside the US and in many European countries in 2012 may help the younger readers. Soldiers were glorified at the start of the war, but their status declined as the number of dead returned and the public grew tired. 3 The psychological impact of the conflict at that time was not commonly accepted, understood and treated, including in the United States. Many American readers may recall that it took the 1990–1 Gulf War for US medical treatment facilities and health professionals to realise the American military had a problem on its hands. Attention and public awareness emerged only after media reports on the increased number of cases of suicide, domestic violence, increased substance abuse, and other ailments by former US soldiers. While the psychological issues and trauma resulting from conflict was recognised, acceptance of psychological ailments as a by-product of war and of long-term conflict even though it is publicly recognised was not. It would take far longer for treatment programmes to be established in the United States. The reason that is, in part, because society perceives soldiers to be different from the ordinary individuals. They tend to set them apart, thinking they are psychologically stronger than the normal person. Soldiers are human and suffer from the same ailments that any emotionally traumatised victim may experience. The same holds true for those who are now defined as terrorists. 4 A. Aldis, and G.P. Hurd, The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2007).

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5 S. Khatab, ‘Towards a General Counter Terrorism Strategy’, GTReC International Conference, Monash University (2008), pp. 33–59. Available at: http://artsonline. monash.edu.au/gtrec/files/2012/08/gtrec-proceedings-2008-02-sayed-khatab.pdf. 6 Jørgen Staun, Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy (The Hague: COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management, 2008). 7 Christopher Boucek, ‘Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [online], 12 September 2011. Available at: http:// carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf. 8 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–13. 9 Statements by the Ideological Security Unit of Interior Ministry, 2002–13. 10 A. Alqasim, A. Allihadin, A. Almutlaq, A. Alturaiqi, A.W. Alsheikh, A. Alrasi, A.R. Alzunaidi, A.W. Alturayri, J. Alomar, I. Albilaihi, K. Alojaimi, M. Alturki, M. Albihr, M. Alhamed, N. Alaql, N. Alsaad, S. Alotaibi, S. Aloudah, and Z. Alhussain, Letter to the West: A Saudi View (Saudi Arabia: Ghalnaa Publications, 2008). 11 The Convention is available at http://www.oic-oci.org/. 12 The OIC agreement provides a definition of terrorism, distinguishing it from liberation struggles, as well as the foundations of Islamic cooperation for combating terrorism and measures to prevent and combat terrorist crimes. Measures for combating terrorist crimes include: the exchange of information; investigation; exchange of expertise; development of education and information fields, which are designed to promote the true image of Islam; and cooperation in the judicial field regarding extradition, the seizing of assets and proceeds of crime, and exchange of evidence. 13 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–13. 14 Khatab, ‘Towards a General Counter Terrorism Strategy’. 15 Briefing by the Ideological Security Unit of the Ministry of Interior, 2012. 16 Khatab, ‘Towards a General Counter Terrorism Strategy’. 17 Briefing prepared by the Ideological Security Unit, 2013. 18 Briefing by the Ideological Security Unit of the Interior Ministry, 2012. 19 Briefing prepared by the Ideological Security Unit, 2013. 20 Briefing prepared by the Ideological Security Unit, 2013. 21 In the first phase, the Center was called the Advice Committee in the first phase of development; it was called the Prince Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Advice and Care in the second phase; and, in the last phase it was named the General Administration of Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Advice and Care. 22 Briefing prepared by the Ideological Security Unit, 2013. 23 There are those within America and other places who argue that the ideology prevalent within the Kingdom is extremist and not based on moderation. This is, in part, to do with ignorance of the ideological diversity of Islamic thought throughout the country and the selective highlighting of texts by Western commentators. 24 Alqasim et al., Letter to the West. 25 Briefing prepared by the Ideological Security Unit, 2013.

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224  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 26 Alqasim et al., Letter to the West. 2 7 Individuals cannot be forced to change; they must want to make the transition. They must want to open their hearts and minds to something different. Each involved individual has a story of trials, tribulations and triumphs. The trials, tribulations and triumphs are laden with good and bad memories, which resurface at certain points. The rehabilitative programmes recognise this and the reality that only time will help an individual come to terms with both the past and present. It is only by coming to terms that one can reflect to learn those past lessons.   Some American and Western readers can relate to the subject and the underlying philosophical vision used within the programme by thinking of some of the public political debates and discourse used by the far left as some refer to it, also referred to as socialists by others. The far left in the US tends to use the traditional Marxist discourse when framing any political situation. While this resonates with the younger generation born after the Cold War, those who were old enough and lived during that period recall the ideological framework of these times and the demonisation that resulted from anyone accepting such ideas. Thus, when a segment of the older generation listens to the present Marxian and socialist discourse used on the streets of America, they close their mind to the underlying and shared grievances which generate such discourses. Their ideological frame of the past, which was contextualised through experience, serves as a cognitive inhibiter from the ideas and discourse used on the streets in the present. No matter what is said there are those segments within society that will reject the ideas and arguments because they are contrary to their set of beliefs and the discourse is radical in comparison to their own. 28 K.Y. Barqawi, ‘Terrorism as Viewed by the University Youth’, Arab Journal for Security Studies and Training 25 (2008), pp. 40–8. 29 M. Alomairi, Islamic Science on Terrorism (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2005). 30 Briefing by the Ideological Security by the Interior Ministry, 2012. 31 It might help readers to understand the emotional difficulties if they make a comparison with soldiers. In the case of soldiers, it is accepted, recognised and understood that all conflicts and wars produce invisible wounds. See Vanessa Williamson and Erin Mulhall, ‘Invisible Wounds: Psychological and Neurological Injuries Confront a New Generation of Veterans’, Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America Issue Report (New York: IAVA, 2009), pp. 1–23. Available at: http://www. issuelab.org/resource/invisible_wounds_psychological_and_neurological_injuries_ confront_a_new_generation_of_veterans. 32 A. Abdulmahmood, Counter-Terrorism (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Science, 2005). 33 In the US, soldiers experience some form of the two, which vary in length. Studies have also found that many do not seek help because of the professional repercussions and social stigma associated with mental and psychological issues, especially those emanating from conflict or war. While not in every case, former soldiers have found themselves feeling isolated from family and society. Family

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is usually the one whom individuals turn to when they are most in need. Their troubles can prevent them from holding a job or lead to a substance abuse problem. Correlations have also been found between the trauma suffered and domestic violence. There have even been cases of suicide. 34 Williamson and Mulhall, ‘Invisible Wounds’. For more resources on the subject of PTSD see ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Military: A Selected Bibliography’ (US War College Library, 2011). Available at: http://www.carlisle. army.mil/library/bibs/PTSD11.pdf. 35 Briefing by the Ideological Security of the Interior Ministry, 2012. 36 Christopher Boucek, ‘Saudi Arabia’s “Soft Counter Terrorism” Approach’, Carnegie Papers Middle East Program Number 97 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), pp. 1–25. Available at: http://www. carnegieendowment.org/files/cp97_boucek_saudi_final.pdf. 37 Statement of the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia provided by the Sakkinah Program for Dialogue, 2013. 38 Briefing prepared by the Sakkinah Program for Dialogue, 2013. 39 Briefing prepared by the Sakkinah Program for Dialogue, 2013. 40 Briefing prepared by the Sakkinah Program for Dialogue, 2013. 41 Abdullah F. Ansary, ‘Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s Approach’, Middle East Policy 15/2 (2008). Available at: http://www. mepc.org/combating-extremism-brief-overview-saudi-arabias-approach. 42 Elizabeth I. Bryant, ‘The Iron Fist vs. the Microchip’, Journal of Strategic Security 5/2 (2012): pp. 1–26. 43 Data provided by the Sakkinah Program for Dialogue, 2013. 44 The research centre was created to serve as an archival and retrieval site for researchers. 45 Christopher Boucek, ‘Understanding Cyberspace as a Medium for Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization’ Written Testimony US House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities December 16, 2009 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009). Available at: http://carnegieendowment. org/files/1216_testimony_boucek.pdf. 46 Briefing prepared by the Sakkinah Program for Dialogue, 2013. 47 Boucek, ‘Saudi Arabia’s “Soft Counter Terrorism” Approach’. 48 Briefing on 9 June 2012 by Dr Abdulrahman Alhadlag, head of the Ideological Security Unit at the Ministry of Interior. 49 Eben Kaplan, ‘Terrorists and the Internet’, Council on Foreign Relations [online], 8 January 2009. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-technology/terroristsinternet/p10005. 50 Nonviolent activists have, in some areas, been able to reduce the use of violence by others, particularly in the Maghreb. While not wanting to expose some of the underground work being done by activists because of the danger it poses to them, the 2012 case in Libya is an excellent example. Following the violent actions over the anti-Muslim film and the CIA operations in the country, nonviolent activists

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226  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia were able to rally large numbers to call for the ousting of some of the armed groups and the halting of the use of violence by others. The shutting down of supply lines in the Northwest Province of Pakistan following the US drone strike of the former TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud after he had agreed to TTP-Pakistani government dialogue is another example that demonstrates the power of non-violence to counter violence. Following the assassination, the TTP threatened retaliation. Activists quickly intervened and put the US on notice of their intent to shut down supply lines on a particular date. When the US failed to publicly state it would halt the drone strikes the supply lines were shut down. They remained down for quite some time; there was no retaliatory strike by the TTP on US targets inside Pakistan; the US did not immediately resume drone strikes; and, finally, dialogue between the Pakistani government and the TTP resumed in January of 2013. Drone strikes resumed later in 2013 but they were halved. According to the New America Foundation, drone strikes in Pakistan dropped from 48 in 2012 to 26 in 2012. They continued to drop each year after. Please see ‘U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan’, New America [online], https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/americascounterterrorism-wars/pakistan/. Both incidents lend support to the argument that a managed chaos model may reduce the proclivity toward violence, if employed strategically and with a well-defined strategy. There is a balance, however. Thus, strategic pragmatism should be the guide in any situation wherein non-violence is used to attempt to counter violent collective action. 51 A.F. Alghamoos, The Future of Terrorism in the Present Country (Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2006). 52 Briefing by the Ideological Security Unit, 2012. 53 Raffaello Pantucci, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2011). Available at: http://icsr.info.publications/papers/ 1302002992ICSPRPaper_ATypologyofLone Wolves_Pantucci.pdf. 54 Recruits coming from America and Europe to fight in the Syrian civil war are examples. 55 According to a CITC study conducted in 2009, internet usage increased from 43 per cent in 2007 to 53 per cent in 2009. In terms of usage, computer penetration among government is 97 per cent; 82 per cent among businesses; 79 per cent among educational institutions; 63 per cent among health institutions; and, 40 per cent among individuals. The primary reasons for not using the internet among individuals are a lack of knowledge and affordability. Those who use it do so for its availability, accessing information, and communicating. See ‘ Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ’Computer and Internet Usage in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2007–2009)’ (Riyadh: Communications and Information Technology Commission, 2009). 56 There are 25 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that connect users to the national network. The ISPs are licensed by KACST; they purchase bandwidth from three Data Service Providers (DSPs), namely Bayanat, ITC and STC. Only the DSPs can purchase bandwidth from KACST.

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57 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘General information on Filtering Service,’ (Riyadh: Communications and Information Technology Commission). Available at: http:// www.internet.sa/en/general-information-on-filtering-service/. 58 Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski and Jonathan Zittrain (eds), Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). 59 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ’Computer and Internet Usage’. 60 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Anti-Cyber Crime Law: Royal Decree No. M/17, 8 Rabi 1 1428/26 March 2007 (Riyadh: Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers, 2009). 61 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2013. 62 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2001. 63 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2001. 64 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2003. 65 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2010. 66 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘General information on Filtering Service’. 67 The CITC contracts with a commercial company, who provides Secure Computing’s SmartFilter software. 68 Briefing provided by the Ideological Security Unit, 2012. 69 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘General information on Filtering Service’. 70 ICT liberalisation in Saudi Arabia was designed to promote competition among the ISPs, which would make service more affordable and increase the number of users. The Kingdom is keen on promoting information society initiatives, which correspond to the knowledge-base initiatives. 71 The problem with the centrality of this is that all users’ information within a network are stored in one place. This means that if I had nefarious intentions, I need only identify and breach the one location. Moreover, if I was truly intent on causing hard to a state’s ICT infrastructure, it would be the area wherein in which I attempted to insert a virus, Trojan or backdoor; or it would be the focal point of my electronic bombing attack (the overloading of a system with data packets that either slows it significantly or disrupts services). 72 Martin Rehak, Michal Pechoucek, Martin Grill, Jan Stiborek, Karel Bartos, and Pavel Celeda, ‘Adaptive Multiagent System for Network Traffic Monitoring’, IEEE Intelligent Systems 24/3 (2009), pp. 16–25. 73 Christopher Parsons, ‘Britain’s Digital Surveillance: Hiding from her Majesty’s “Black Boxes”’, openDemocracy [online], 11 November 2008. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/blog/ourkingdom-theme/christopherparsons/2008/11/11/britains-digital-surveillance-hiding-from-her-majestys-blackboxes. 74 Ibid. 75 Rafid Fatani, ‘Saudi Arabia: Social Networking and the Women Who Aren’t Allowed to Drive Cars’, in Alan Finlay and Lori Nordstrom (eds), Global Information Society Watch 2011: Internet rights and democratisation (Global Information Society Watch, 2011) pp. 228–30. Available at: https://www.giswatch. org/sites/default/files/gisw_-_saudi_arabia.pdf.

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228  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia 76 It is disputable that this was the operation’s ultimate objective. The context of the situation at the time of the operation itself suggests the objectives were something entirely different than which the authorities and Aramco believe. 77 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012. 78 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012. 79 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2012. 80 Statement by the Interior Ministry, 2013. 81 Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2014. 82 Aldis and Hurd, The Ideological War on Terror. 83 R. Bronson, ‘Rethinking Religion: The Legacy of the US-Saudi Relationship’, Washington Quarterly 28/4 (2005), pp. 121–37. 84 M. Prokop, ‘Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Education’, International Affairs 79/1 (2003), pp. 77–89. 85 J.R. Bradley, Saudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crisis (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). 86 See M. Al-Atawneh, ‘Is Saudi Arabia a Theocracy? Religion and Governance in Saudi Arabia’, Middle Eastern Studies 45/4 (2009), pp. 721–37; M.M. Kraidy, ‘Reality, Television, Gender, and Authenticity in Saudi Arabia’, Journal of Communication 59/2 (2009), pp. 345–66. 87 Daniel Byman, ‘Passive Sponsors of Terrorism’, Survival 47/4 (2005), pp. 117–44.

Conclusion 1 A. Alqasim, A. Allihadin, A. Almutlaq, A. Alturaiqi, A.W. Alsheikh, A. Alrasi, A.R. Alzunaidi, A.W. Alturayri, J. Alomar, I. Albilaihi, K. Alojaimi, M. Alturki, M. Albihr, M. Alhamed, N. Alaql, N. Alsaad, S. Alotaibi, S. Aloudah, and Z. Alhussain, Letter to the West: A Saudi View (Saudi Arabia: Ghalnaa Publications, 2008). 2 Alqasim et al., Letter to the West.

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238  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Schmidt, L.E. and S.M. Promey, American Religious Liberalism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012). Schreier, F.R. ‘Counter Terrorism and its Implications for Intelligence’ (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), pp. 129–66. Schröder, Ingo W. ‘Hegemonic Narratives and Religious Identity: Politics in Contemporary Lithuania’, Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis 19 (2009), pp. 49–57. Available at: http://briai.ku.lt/downloads/AHUK_19/19_049–057_ Schroeder.pdf. Seznec, J.F., ‘Stirrings in Saudi Arabia’, Journal of Democracy 13/4 (2002), pp. 33–41. Shapiro, Andrew J., ‘Joint Press Briefing on US Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia’ (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 29 December 2011). Sourayal, S., ‘The Religionization of a Society: The Continuing Application of Shariah Law in Saudi Arabia’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 26/4 (1987), pp. 429–49. Staun, Jørgen, ‘Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy’ (The Hague: COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management, 2008). Steele, R.D., Human Intelligence: All Humans, All Minds, All the Time (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2010). Tsang, S., Combating Transnational Terrorism: Searching for a New Paradigm (Praeger Security International, 2009). UK Government, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (London: The Stationary Office, 2006). ————, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy (London: The Stationary Office, 2006). United Nations Office on Drug Control, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime and the Protocols Thereto (Vienna: UNODC, 2004). Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20 Convention/ TOCebook-e.pdf. United Nations Security Council, ‘Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution’, Press Release SC7158, 28 September 2001. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm. US Department of State, US Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia (Washington, DC: GIST Bureau of Public Affairs, 1987). US Government, ‘Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology and the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Financial Services’, US House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 2nd Session (30 September 2004). ————, The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism (Washington, DC: The White House, 2005). US Government Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: US Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed (Washington, DC: USGAO, 2009), pp. 1–56.

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240  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Interview on 23 November 2013 with an Iraqi source on the smuggling of weapons into Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi border. Interview on 9 June 2012 with Dr Abdul Rahman Alhadlag, head of the Ideological Security Unit. Interview on 9 June 2012 with General Mansour Alturki, spokesman for the Ministry of Interior. Interview on 9 June 2012 with a representative of the Ministry of Interior’s permanent committee on terrorism. Interview with an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 19, 2012. Interview on 8 July 2012 with Prince Turki bin Mohammed bin Saud Al Kabeer Al Saud, then Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview on several occasions between February and November of 2012 with a manager of Ernst & Young in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview with Ambassador Abdullah Y. Almuallimi at the Saudi Arabian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York in July 2013. Interview with an UN CTITF representative at the United Nations in New York in July 2013. Interviews with board members of the UNCCT at the United Nations in July 2013. Official source at the Ministry of Defence and Aviation and Inspector-General, 1 May 2003. Reports by the Saudi Arabian Financial Intelligence Unit, 2006–13. Statements by the Ideological Security Unit of Interior Ministry, 2002–13. Statements by the Interior Ministry, 2002–2013. Statement of the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia provided by the Sakkinah Program for Dialogue, 2013. Written briefing by the Deputy Ministry for Foreign Information on its efforts in combating terrorism over the years covered throughout this study, 2013. Written briefing by the Ministry of Culture and Information on its efforts in combating terrorism over the years covered throughout this study, 2013.

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INDEX

t = table/diagram. ‘7/7’ attacks (London, 2005) 125 ‘9/11’ attacks (alleged) Saudi funding 136 attackers’ national origins 55–6, 78–9 impact on Al Qaeda discourse 30–1 impact on Western perceptions of Saudi Arabia 59–60 international responses 32, 35, 39–40, 47, 50–1, 54, 181–2 media coverage 55–6 online impact 170–1 operational costs 124–5 public diplomacy responses 103–4 Abdullah, King 15, 19–20, 101, 104, 152 Ablaj, Mohammed 22 Afghanistan Al Qaeda in 6–7 changing Western attitudes to 52 Soviet invasion (1979–89) 52, 146–7 Africa, Al Qaeda in 27–8, 29 Al Qaeda 2–32 in Afghanistan 6–7 in Africa 27–8, 29 in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 3, 19, 28, 124 command structures 7

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complexity 2, 7, 30, 32, 36, 39, 119, 124, 126 conflict with Saudi authorities 80, 82, 84, 184–5, 189 coverage in Western media 55 demography 23 evolution 3–6, 26–7, 30–1 financial monitoring 132, 139–40 funding 32, 37, 119, 122–3, 124, 125–6, 137 governmental investigations 85–6 international networks 27–8, 30–2 in Iraq 28–9 in the Maghreb (AQIM) 124 members’ backgrounds 66 online operations/monitoring 168, 172 operational costs 124–5 post-9/11 discourse 30–1 recruitment policies 23, 168 regional differences 3, 29–30 in Saudi Arabia 7–27, 45, 47, 84, 117 targeting by CIIST/CCST strategies 151–3, 156–7, 168 Al-Rashid Trading and Contracting Company 90–1 Alawadah, Sheikh 10 Albadayneh, D.M. 64–5 alcohol, smuggling of 90

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242  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Alghamdi, Abdul Rahman 159 Alghamdi, Khalid N. 63 Alharamain Islamic Foundation (AIF) 136–8 Alharthy, Ali bin Hussein, Maj.-Gen., Dr 97 Alhawali, Sheikh 10 Alhuzaifi, Abdullah 10 Alnashiri, Abdelrahim 13 AML/CTF (Anti-Money Laundering/ Combating Terrorist Financing) system 117, 119, 126–44, 186–7 authorities 126–7 effectiveness 141–4, 187 international cooperation 130, 140–1, 186 legal/regulatory framework 126–30 quasi-centralisation 142–3, 186 short vs long-term policies 141–2 strategy towards NGOs/charities 139–41 see also banking regulation ammunition, seizures of 20 Ansar Allah (Partisans of God) 9 Anti-Cyber Crime Act see E-crime Act 2007 Anti-Money Laundering Law 2003 118–19 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1998 34 Arab League 4–5, 111, 130, 141, 187 Arab Security Cooperation Agreement 12 Aramco, Operation 175 arms, smuggling of 90 arrests 94–5 art therapy 162, 164 Azzam, Abdullah, Sheikh 6–7 BAE (British Aerospace), attacks on premises/employees 12 Bahrain 35 cooperation with Saudi Arabia 93 trafficking across border 89–90 Bank Control Law 1966 128

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banking regulation 131–6 account monitoring 132–3 asset freezing 134 cross-border 133–4 investigation procedures 134–6 transaction monitoring threshold 135–6 Basic Law of Governance 1992 93, 94 bin Laden, Osama 2, 4–5, 55, 132, 140 in Afghanistan 5, 6–7 public statements on Saudi Arabia 10, 12–13, 14–15, 16–17 in Sudan 5, 29; expulsion 8 bin Zuair, Saeed, Sheikh 12–13 border security 88–92 coordination 92 infrastructure 90–1 operational procedure 91–2 rehabilitation/processing centres 91 see also smuggling; trafficking Brigade of Faith 9 Brigade of the Two Holy Mosques 22–3 Bush, George W. 55, 56 Buzan, Barry 42 Capital Market Authority (CMA) 126–7 Capital Market Law 2003 127 Carter, Jimmy 58 CCST (Combating Cyber Support for Terrorism) 149, 167–77, 188–9 global developments 175–7 importance to overall strategy 168–9 phased development 170–7 charities see NGOs CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 4 CIIST (Combating Ideological and Intellectual Support for Terrorism) 149–67, 188 Deconstruction Strategy 155–6, 155t media strategy 156–7, 157–8t objectives 149, 150t operational goals 149, 150t

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INDEX 

Rehabilitation and Care programme 153, 158–64 role of dialogue 151–2 strategies 150t, 151 target audience 149, 150t, 152–6; domestic 152–3; non-domestic 153–6, 155t types/nature of initiatives 150t value of online monitoring 172 CITC (Communications and Internet Technology Commission) 169, 171, 172 Cole, USS 28 communications technology 64, 100–1 conciliation 103–7, 185 role of dialogue 104, 185 conflict, mental states in aftermath of 146–7, 163–4 containment strategies 87–8 context (of security operations) 83–4 Cordesman, Anthony 48, 69, 70, 71, 73, 77–8 Council of Arab Interior Ministers 141 counterterrorism differing priorities 33 global strategy, calls for/development of 113–15, 176–7 ideological strategies 147–8 intelligence 68–9, 72–3 see also Saudi counterterrorist model Counterterrorism Law 2013 93 courts 100–3 criminal justice, Saudi 93–103 arrests/detention 94–5 authorities 93 courts 100–3 e-gate system 100–1 handling of terrorist offences 93–4 international cooperation 94–5 prison system 95–9 Culture and Information, Ministry of 107–8

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243

cybersecurity future impact 177 global developments 175–7 cyberterrorism defined/distinguished from cyber support for terrorism 167–8 post-9/11 increase 170–1 Da’esh (ISIS) 2, 190 Data Packet capture programs 172–3 Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) 173 depression, post-conflict 163 deradicalisation programmes 147–8, 158–9 detention 94–5 periods 94 dialogue importance to AT/CT strategies 104, 151–2, 185 inter-faith 105–7 drugs, smuggling of 90 E-crime Act 2007 169 E-transactions Act 2007 169 Eastern Province 35–6, 92 economy Saudi model 121, 122 US influence in Saudi Arabia 44–5 education centrality to AT/CT programme 105, 152–3, 177–8, 191 of (ex-)prisoners 99 external criticisms of Saudi system 178–9 gender imbalance 46 governmental/media campaigns 105, 108–9, 152–3 religious basis 178–9 see also universities Egmont Group 133, 187 Egypt, Rehabilitation and Care programme 158–60

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244  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia English (language), US/British usage 70 European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) 90–1 Evers, Medgar 38 Fahd, King 105 filtering, internet 171–4 distinguished from monitoring 171, 173–4 limitations 174 software 171 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 119, 142 see also MENA-FATF Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) 129 fingerprinting 78–80 compulsory 79 Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 107–8, 113–14 freezing of assets 134 French Revolution (1789–95) 33 gender, role divisions/stereotyping 46 globalisation 1, 64, 186 security implications 88 Guantanamo Bay, release of detainees 94, 153, 159–60 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 15, 74, 106, 111, 141, 187 regional media campaign 109–10 Gulf War (1990–1) 54 Hamas 134 Hassner, Pierre 42 Hegghammer, Thomas 26 Hezbollah 66 Hezbollah Alhejaz 10 Hobbes, Thomas 63 human intelligence (HUMINT) 69–71, 74, 77

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centrality to intelligence operations 77 over-reliance on 69, 70 Hussein, Saddam 8, 15, 28, 54 Ideological Security Unit 172 ideology, importance to AT/CT strategies 147–8 Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University 105 Information Technology Law for Terrorism 2008 169 intelligence 66–80, 183–4 antiterrorist vs counterterrorist 68–9, 72–3 collection/analysis 69–73 interpretation 70 non-state organisations 66–7 objectives 76 prevention of failures 76–80 sharing 73–6 state agencies 66, 67–8 see also human intelligence; Saudi intelligence; signals intelligence Interior, Ministry of AML/CTF role 128 cooperative security arrangements 112 intelligence role 72–4, 80, 184 online supervisory role 168, 169–70, 171 public statements 84 reforms 73 role in counterterrorist model 61 security role 84, 85, 90, 91–2 US criticisms 45 International Conference on CounterTerrorism (2005) 35 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 118–19 International Program of the Charity Commission 140

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INDEX 

internet Data Packet capture programs 172–3 Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) 173 hacking 175 post-9/11 developments 170–1 rehabilitation programmes 164–7 studies 171 supervision/regulation 169–70, 171–4 (see also filtering) support for terrorism on 167–9 investigations 85–6 Iran designation of terrorist organisations 120 internal conflicts 52 Islamic Revolution (1979) 54 Iraq Al Qaeda in 28–9 cooperation with Saudi authorities 92 invasion of Kuwait (1990) see Kuwait US-led invasion (2003) see Iraq War Iraq War (2003–) 14–15 justification 181 public misgivings 56 UN authorisation 12–13 Islam dialogue with other faiths 105–7 governmental calls for non-extreme message 152–3 role in Saudi society 46–7, 62–6 separation from terrorism 151–2 see also Western images of Islam Islamic Affairs, Ministry of 153 Israel conflicts with neighbours 58 US policy/relations with 13–14, 58 Jeddah security operations 77, 87 Jenkins-Smith, H.C. 64 Jordan trafficking across border 89–90

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245

Judiciary Law and Court of Grievances Law 2007 100 Jundallah 52 Justice Ministry 100 Khaled bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz, Prince 10 Khomeini, Ruhollah, Ayatollah 54 King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue 104–6 King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue 106–7 King Saud University 105 cooperation with justice system 98–9 Kuwait cooperation with Saudi authorities 92 Iraqi invasion (1990) 4–5, 7, 8, 54, 147 Legion of the Martyr Abdullah Alhuzaifi 10 Libya 56–7 Madrid bombings (2004) 125 Maktab Alkhadamat (Services Office) 6 al-Maliki, Nouri 28–9 McDonald’s (burger chain), attacks on 14, 15 McVeigh, Timothy 53 media, role in AT/CT operations 107, 108–9 CIIST strategy 156–7, 157–8t regional campaigns 109–10 MENA–FATF (Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force) 130, 141, 187 militant secularism 47–8 military forces international cooperations 93 security role 81–2, 115–16

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246  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Nayef, Crown Prince 75, 97, 159 Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Advice and Care 160–1 money laundering defined 118 (see also AML/CTF) exploitation of charities/NGOs 141 Muhammad, the Prophet 65 Mujahideen-e-Khalq 52 Muslim Brotherhood 134 Muslim World League (MWL) 110 National Center for Digital Certification 176 National Center for Electronic Security (NCES) 169–70, 175, 176, 188–9 National Commission for Charitable Societies and Associations 138–9 National Society for Human Rights 97 Nayef, Crown Prince 105, 112, 128, 152–3 NGOs (non-governmental organisations) (alleged) involvement in 9/11 136 financial monitoring 131, 136–41; AML/CTF strategy 139–41; regulatory framework 138–9 non-state actors intelligence gathering 66–7 Obaid, Nawaf E. 73, 77–8 oil role in Saudi economy 49–50 Saudi Ministry 45 Oklahoma City bombing (1995) 53 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 34, 106, 111, 154, 187 Oslo Accords (1993) 7–8 Palestine funding of groups 136–8 political situation/developments 7–8, 48, 120 Western perceptions 51–3 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 120

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passports 78–80 security breaches 78–9 pictorial representation theory 41 police 82–3 political initiatives 110–15, 186 domestic 110–11 global 111–15 regional 111 polycephalism 41–2 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 163 prison(s) 95–9 2012 amnesty 98 conditions 96 hybridity of Saudi system 95–6, 97 oversight 95, 97 population 95–6 problems 96 projected reforms 96–9 rehabilitation programmes 98–9 terrorist inmates 96 types 95 women prisoners 98 private companies, use in security/ intelligence 68, 71 online 171 psychological security 145, 177, 180 strategies designed to provide see CCST; CIIST public diplomacy 103–15 strategies 103, 185–6 see also conciliation; political initiatives; strategic communication raids 76–7 Rehabilitation and Care Programme 158–64 art therapy 162, 164 cultural programme 162, 163 general administration 160–1 origins 158–60 programme content 161–2 psychological programme 162, 163

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INDEX 

release from 164 Shariah programme 162 social programme 162 sports therapy 162, 164 rehabilitation programmes 20, 147–8, 153, 158–67 online 164–7 for prisoners 98–9 see also Rehabilitation and Care Programme; Sakkinah Program for Dialogue religion role in counterterrorist model 105, 152–3, 162, 177–8 role in educational system 178–9 role in Saudi society 46–8, 178–80 Ripberger, J.T. 64 Riyadh International Conferences on Border Security (2005/12) 91, 112, 114 security operations 77, 87 violent incidents 10–11, 13, 14–15, 21–2 Riyadh Declaration 2005 35, 112–13 Robespierre, Maximilien 33 Russia, designation of terrorist organisations 134 Sakkinah Program for Dialogue 73, 149, 153, 164–7, 174, 188 fora 165 influence 167 intermediary function 166 objectives 165–6 volunteer operatives 166–7 sanctuary, denial of 87 strategic problems 87–8 Saudi Arabia administrative divisions 23 Al Qaeda in 7–27 (alleged) terrorist funding 136, 137–8, 142 cyberattacks on 175, 176 economic development 44–5

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247

ideological debates 35 intelligence agencies see intelligence internal conflicts 45–6 international perceptions 39–40 land area/geography 19 political (in)stability 48–50 regulatory reform proposals 179–80 religion 46–8 studies 35–6 violent incidents 8–27, 35–6; regional breakdown 24–5t, 26 see also Islam; Saudi counterterrorist model; Saudi intelligence; Saudi security operations Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) 126–8, 132 Saudi counterterrorist model balancing of individual and collective concerns 61–2 common ground of opposing sides 181–2 context 83–4 development 26–7, 81, 84, 115 effectiveness 189 impact of 9/11 78, 80 misconceptions 1–2 pillars 2, 37–8, 61, 115–16, 145–6, 177, 183–9 security concerns 36–7 see also CCST; CIIST; Saudi intelligence; Saudi security operations Saudi Financial Intelligence Unit (SAFIU) 121–2, 128–9, 133 committees 129 divisions 128–9 Saudi intelligence 67–9, 71–6, 183–5 antiterrorist/counterterrorist 68–9, 72–3, 115–16 Cyber Centre 71–2, 175 failings 69, 70, 72–3, 77–8, 117–18 improvements 71–2, 79–80 sharing 73–5

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248  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia state agencies 67–8 surveillance/raids 76–7 use of educational establishments 71–2 use of private firms 71 Saudi security operations 78–116, 184–5 border 88–92 (see also border security) containment strategies 87–8 context 83–4 digitisation 79–80 domestic 85–8 evolution 82, 115 flaws 78–9 investigations 85–6 military role 82 online see CCST; cybersecurity place in counterterrorist model 36–7, 81, 84–5 raids 76–7, 86–7 role of police/Special Forces 82–3 short/long-term impact 92–3 skirmishes 86–7 schools, security in 68 security 61–116 centrality to maintenance of order 36–7, 81 digitised 78–80, 176 focus of counterterrorist policy on 33, 36–7, 81 international cooperation 112 (perceived) threats to 64–5 pre-emptive approach 65–6 private firms 68, 71 relationship with Islam 62–6 requirements 182 role in human history/philosophy 63 role of military 81–2 see also cybersecurity; Saudi security operations security services see military forces; police; Special Forces Shapiro, Andrew J. 49 Shariah, in Rehabilitation and Care Programme 162

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signals intelligence (SIGINT) 69–71, 74, 77 advantages over HUMINT 70–1 types of 71 skirmishes 86–7 smuggling distinguished from trafficking 88–9 goods 90 penalties 89 routes 89–90 social media 92–3 Southeast Asia, Al Qaeda in 29–30 Southern Region, as smuggling/ trafficking centre 89–90 Special Forces 82–3 sports therapy 162, 164 Statute of Detention and Imprisonment 1978 (SDI) 94 Statute of Principles of Arrest, Temporary Confinement and Preventive Detention 1983 (SPAD) 94 strategic communication 107–10, 186 ministerial responsibilities 107–8 role of media 107, 108–9 strategic pragmatism 151 Sudan bin Laden based in 5, 29 collaboration with Saudi government 12, 74 expulsion of bin Laden 8 Sun Tzu 177 surveillance, persistent/tactical 76–7 Suspicious Account Reports (SARs) 132, 133 Syria 56–7 terrorism changing perceptions 51–3, 56–7 cyber support for 167–8 definitions 33, 93, 120–1 designated perpetrators see terrorist organisations media coverage 54–5, 56–7, 191, 192t

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INDEX 

motivational factors 35 treatment by criminal justice system 93–4 Western perceptions 50–7, 153–4 terrorist financing 117–44 (alleged) Saudi involvement 136, 137–8, 142 anonymity, issues of 123 context 121–4, 143 international cooperation against 117–18 local variables 122–3 measures to combat see AML/CTF system operational costs 124–5 (problems of) definition 118–19, 120–1, 136 routes 121–2 structural issues 124–6, 143 see also Al Qaeda, funding terrorist organisations, groups classified as 52, 120, 134, 136 Third Balkan War (1991–2003) 5 trafficking 88–92 penalties 89 routes 89–90 scale of operations 89 Turkey, cooperation with Saudi authorities 95 UAE (United Arab Emirates) cooperation with Saudi authorities 92 trafficking across border 89–90 United Kingdom, intelligence sharing 74–5 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) 112, 114–15 financial regulatory legislation 134 United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime 2000 (UNTOC) 89 United States AML/CTF system 127

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249

designation of terrorist organisations 52, 120, 134 exceptionalist outlook 41–2 (fears of) terrorist attacks within 53, 73 (see also ‘9/11’; World Trade Center) intelligence gathering 69–71 intelligence sharing 74–5 modernity vs tradition 41–4 perceptions of terrorism 50–7 policy on Israel 13–14 repatriation of detainees 160 world view 39–60 see also US perceptions of Saudi Arabia; US–Saudi relationship universities intelligence role 71–2 peace studies 105 see also King Saud University US perceptions of Saudi Arabia 37, 39–40, 41, 44–50, 193–4 association with terrorism 55–6, 142 contrasting (liberal/moderate vs conservative/traditional) 45–6, 58 evolving nature 55–6, 57–60 political 48–50 religious 46–8, 54 stereotypical 44 US–Saudi relationship 37, 43 economic 44–5 political/military 48–50 stability 58 tensions 45–6, 58 Western images of Islam association with terrorism 34, 46–7, 51, 54, 55–6, 153–4 derogatory/stereotypical 34 Saudi efforts to change 154–6 (semi)-positive 47 Windows Live (computer program) 173–4

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250  Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia women education role 105, 152–3 educational levels 46 lawyers/court officials 101–2 prisoners 98 World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) 106, 110 World Bank 49–50 World Trade Center, New York 1993 bombing 5, 8, 53 2001 attacks on see ‘9/11’

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Yamani, Zaki, Sheikh 45 Yemen Al Qaeda in 27–8 cooperation with Saudi authorities 86, 92, 95 internal tensions 58 trafficking across border 20, 89–90 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab 5, 29 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 6–7, 13, 18

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