Corruption in Ukraine : Rulers’ Mentality and the Destiny of the Nation, Geophilosophy of Ukraine [1 ed.] 9781443898140, 9781443896894

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Corruption in Ukraine

Corruption in Ukraine: Rulers’ Mentality and the Destiny of the Nation, Geophilosophy of Ukraine By

Oleg Bazaluk Translated by Tamara Blazhevych Proofread by Lloyd Barton

Corruption in Ukraine: Rulers’ Mentality and the Destiny of the Nation, Geophilosophy of Ukraine By Oleg Bazaluk This book first published 2016 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2016 by Oleg Bazaluk All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-9689-6 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-9689-4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ................................................................................... vii Introduction ................................................................................................ ix Chapter One ................................................................................................. 1 The Geophilosophy of Ukraine: Ukraine and the Ukrainians in 1990 Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 45 14 Years of Authoritarianism (between 1990 and 2004): How the Ukrainians Learnt to Give and Take Bribes Chapter Three .......................................................................................... 113 From the Orange Revolution to the Revolution of Dignity (2004–2013): The Confrontation between Two Cultures Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 189 The Years 2014–2015: Poroshenko -Yatsenyuk are Against Corruption— Corruption has Won a Victory Conclusion ............................................................................................... 223 Bibliography ............................................................................................ 227

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author is thankful to Professor Anna Brodsky, Boris Zlokazov, Sergei Krichevsky, and Vladimir Mandrahelya for their support, new ideas, and friendly advice on the content of the book. Special thanks go also to Professor Sergei Klepko and Denis Svyrydenko for their detailed analysis of the book. While initially the book was written in the scientific and journalistic style, after their advice, comments on the merits and friendly criticism, the author expanded the science components of the text. The life experience and broad knowledge of the scientists greatly enriched the book. Thanks to Tamara Blazhevych this project took place. She initiated it for English-speaking readers, inspired and translated in a three-month contract period. Sincere thanks to the whole Cambridge Scholars Publishing team for highly professional work; thanks to them this book has found its readers.

INTRODUCTION

On 16 July 1990, Ukraine made the first step towards its independence: the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR (Ukrainian parliament) adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine. Among the 15 former Soviet republics, Ukraine took the second place (after Russia) in terms of its national wealth, and was far ahead of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan and other republics, as well as the Warsaw Pact countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. The vast majority of the region's inhabitants did not hear the word “corruption” and were not involved in corruption schemes. People lived honestly and spent as much money as they earned. By 2014, a few people in the world knew about Ukraine as an independent state. Someone remembered that on April 26 1986 in Ukraine, Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant reactor exploded. Someone heard that Andriy Shevchenko was a native of Ukraine, a forward of Italian football club AC Milan (between 1999 and 2006), and the Klitschko brothers, the famous boxers, are not from Russia, but from Ukraine. In April 2013, a funny situation happened with me when I was in Brighton, England. I introduced myself to one respectable woman explaining that I was from Ukraine, and pointed out our country on the world map that hung on the wall in the dining room. She could not hide her surprise. Prior to our meeting, the well-educated 85-year-old woman believed that the state, which ranked second place in Europe in area (603.549 km2) and the seventh largest in terms of population (approximately 43 million people), was a Russian territory, and she knew absolutely nothing about 23 years of history of the independent Ukraine or any achievements of the Ukrainian people! Ukraine occupied the front pages of the world’s press in 2004 during the Orange Revolution, but not for long. However, subsequent events caused disappointment. The international community did not understand the Ukrainians; nor did they understand the significance of Ukraine on the scale of civilisation. Only in 2014, after the three bloody days of the Revolution of Dignity (19–21 February 2014), Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, an undeclared hybrid war against Russia in the Donbas, did the world community not only pay attention to Ukraine as an independent state, but also thought about its mission. Ukraine occupied

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the front pages of the world’s press for a long period. Hundreds of analytical materials were devoted to it. Ukraine was recognised as a component part of world politics. However, having focused the attention of the world community, Ukraine and the Ukrainians caused astonishment and incomprehension. The world community was very surprised about, for example: 1. The level of corruption in the state. How a nation with a rich thousand-year history (the first mention of Ukraine in writing dates back to the 10th – 12th century), in a relatively short period (between 1990 and 2014), managed to get used to corruption and make it a part of its mentality? Much of what the Ukrainians consider as a norm of civilised society is rejected and condemned in highly developed countries. In 2014, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index from a non-governmental international organisation struggling and researching corruption worldwide, Transparency International, Ukraine remains among the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking 142nd out of 175 countries, having only 26 points out of a possible 100. Ukraine shared this place with Uganda and Comoros. In comparison, Denmark, which was in first place with 92 points, and the worst results were for Somalia and North Korea – eight points each [Transparency, 2014]. 2. The lack of an elite (Ukrainian ruling elite), who were sincerely interested in the democratic development of Ukraine. Even after the Revolution of Dignity, the people who came to power had pasts that were tainted by prosecutorial decisions, which had been reported in the press but had not reached the stage of court decision-making (because of the corruption of Ukrainian courts). Literally, every representative of the Ukrainian government and parliament was accused of corrupt ties, and not one of them was able to explain the source of his income. 3. Backward economy. How could it be that over 25 years the financially independent and wealthy state was brought to the poverty? On 1 June 2015, the Ukrainian total debt was $68, 000, 000, 000 in GDP, having been $130, 908, 000, 000 in 2014! Fig. 1 below shows the ratio of gross domestic product (GDP) of Ukraine in the period from 1990 to 2010 as a percentage of GDP in 1990 [Gatsenko, 2011]. As can be seen from Fig. 1, over the years of independence, Ukraine has not been able to achieve the GDP estimates that were seen in 1990!

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Fig. 1. The ratio of gross domestic product (GDP) of Ukraine, in the period from 1990 to 2010 as a percentage of GDP in 1990 [Gatsenko, 2011].

4. Neglect for own health and the nation’s health. Ukraine has the highest mortality rate in Europe (15.7 deaths per 1, 000 people, according to the CIA in 2014). The country takes second place in the world in terms of death rate (after South Africa), and first place in the world in terms of natural loss of the population (-6.3 per cent or 6.3 people per 1, 000 inhabitants). The average life expectancy in Ukraine is about 70.4 years: for men it is 65.2 years, and for women it is 75.5 years. In Europe, the figures are 10 years higher [State, 2015]. 5. The population’s low education level. The processes of upbringing and education in Ukraine turned into fiction. Diplomas for secondary, technical secondary and higher education do not correspond to world standards. Most graduates from secondary and higher educational establishments do not have elementary (basic) knowledge, skills, and abilities. Because of the ineffective state educational policy, prosperous corruption in education, the daily life of Ukrainian people began to show inherent qualities in them that had not previously been there: aggression, rudeness, intolerance, boastfulness, reticence, and internal and external indifference towards society. 6. The backward scientific and technical base. In Soviet times, Ukraine had powerful scientific potential, which allowed the country to be competitive, sitting among the leading nations of the world, especially in such industries: the space industry, machinery, agriculture, light and food industries, and the mining and smelting complex.

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In 2015 in Ukraine, there were not any competitive industries, even comparison to the rest of Europe! In its economic development, Ukraine lagged behind not only from the former states of the Warsaw Pact, but was also inferior to many states of the former Soviet Union. The whole complex of negative processes that filled Ukraine, requires an honest, comprehensive, and impartial rethinking. In global scientific discourse, the problems of Ukraine are interpreted in a number of scientific studies. Of the latter, we should mention the collective monograph “Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe: The Transition Period”, edited by Daniel Smilov and Jurij Toplak [Political Finance, 2007]; the monograph “Rotten States? Corruption, PostCommunism, and Neoliberalism” by Leslie Holmes [Holmes, 2006]; and “Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism” by Taras Kuzio [Kuzio, 2015]. The common understanding of corruption is considered in the monographs “Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts”, edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston [Political Corruption, 2005]; “Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy” by Michael Johnston [Johnston, 2005]; “Political Corruption in America: An Encyclopedia of Scandals, Power, and Greed” by Mark Grossman [Grossman, 2008], as well as in a number of scientific articles. In Ukraine the problem of corruption was considered in two fundamental monographs: Mykola Melnyk [Melnyk, 2004] and Eugene Nevmerzhitsky [Nevmerzhitsky, 2008], as well as in the research of Oleg Bodnarchuk [Bodnarchuk, 2015], Alexander Kalman [Kalman, 2004], Yuri Kalnysha [Corruption in Ukraine, 2010], Vladimir Lanovoi [Lanovoi, 2015], Igor Réwak [Corruption, 2011], Simon Stetsenko [Stetsenko, 2008], Alexander Tkachenko [Stetsenko, 2008], and many others. Our book is a documentary description of events from the history of independent Ukraine; an attempt to find a scaled and unbiased understanding in comparison with the Eurasian territory and multidimensional communication space with high frontier energy. A methodology of geophilosophy allowed the author not only to consider the causes of political corruption in Ukraine, using such subjects as political philosophy, morphology of culture, ethnology, and geography, but also to offer solutions to the problem.

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The author, together with the Ukrainian people, endured a vague time of changes in post-Soviet Ukraine. Instead of the declared policy by Ukrainian politicians: from the totalitarian Soviet society to European democracy, from “decaying” socialism to market economy, before the author’s eyes, the highly developed self-sufficient industrial socialist republic turned into a poverty-ridden, technologically backward, authoritarian-oligarchic, corrupt state. In 2014 the famous Ukrainian poet, writer, and essayist, Oksana Zabuzhko, stated: everything was ready for dismantlement in Ukraine, but it (for 23 years) has not been able to show itself as a country, as the European project [Chruslinska, 2014]. Why wasn’t Ukraine able to find its destination? Why has the Ukrainian elite not formulated or conveyed to the people the consolidating national idea and the main markers of national and cultural identity? According to the author, not only in Ukraine but also in the international community, there is insufficient understanding of the role of Ukraine in modern geopolitics. An analysis of scientific literature on Ukraine (for example, the latest edition about Ukraine in English [Kuzio, 2015], and others) reveals the authors’ lack of understanding of the geophilosophy of the given region. For this reason, when writing the book the author pursued four main objectives: 1. Inform the world community about the little-known facts from the history of Ukraine’s independence; reveal the characteristics of the geophilosophy of Ukraine. 2. Mainly, on the basis of own life experience and socio-political analysis, show how corruption was formed, consolidated, and then flourished in Ukrainian society; how Ukrainians became massively accustomed to giving and taking bribes, and how it is connected with the geophilosophy of Ukraine. 3. At least partially, the Ukrainian people are absolved of responsibility for the disintegration of moral principles and the author entrusts that responsibility to the Ukrainian rulers. Piscis primum a capite foetet translated from the Latin: The fish rots from the head. The President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine have the exclusive right to determine the domestic and foreign policy of the state, an integral part of which is anti-corruption policy, and are key to ensuring its implementation. Ideally, these three highest state bodies of Ukraine (or rather the persons holding high-level positions in the state)

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should form the main group of people in opposition to corruption. However, in fact, the Soviet nomenclatura past of Ukrainian rulers, and the stereotypes that had developed in their outlook by 1990, contributed to the opposite process – the emergence and flourishing of corruption. The rulers set the tone in the formation of authoritarian-oligarchic governance in Ukraine, and among the people, there were no leaders who could insist on building a democratic society and the European choice of Ukraine. 4. In conclusion, based on their knowledge of the geophilosophy of Ukraine, the author will offer a solution to the problem of total corruption in Ukraine and formulate the role and importance of Ukraine in modern geopolitics. A methodology of geophilosophy allows him to examine the details and mark out, in the history of the formation of Ukrainian statehood, the destiny of the Ukrainian people in terms of the world culture, and to establish the main markers that identify the Ukrainian nation.

CHAPTER ONE THE GEOPHILOSOPHY OF UKRAINE: UKRAINE AND THE UKRAINIANS IN 1990

In the Soviet Union, a conviction predominated that said one man in a field is not a warrior. In the Russian language, there are a sufficient number of proverbs and sayings, the meaning of which boils down to the fact that it is more difficult to do things alone that you can do them with someone else. In Russian culture, the importance of the individual in history is denied. For any authoritarian and totalitarian regime, this is a very advantageous ideological stamp, which initially limits the role of a personality in history, and turns the community of personalities into a faceless, obedient mass. In the early 20th century, the Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset termed the representatives of an impersonal society by the concept of “a mass man” [Ortega y Gasset, 1991]. It is much easier for any power to rule a mass man than a community of educated people who have their own point of view and defend their rights and freedoms. However, the history of the Soviet Union and other nations of the world, the parallels between which can easily be drawn, prove the opposite: not a mass man and individuals determine the course of the development of nations and civilisations. What is most regrettable is that it is clearly visible on the example of the post-Soviet history of Ukraine: the mentality of the rulers influenced the destiny of the nation! Under this mentality we understand sustainable intellectual and emotional characteristics of a particular person (in our case – the ruler), which are formed in the process of upbringing and getting life experience. The mentality of the ruler is an individual perception of the world, which consists of a set of stereotypical views of varying degrees of stability. These stereotypes are closely connected with the sensory and emotional experience, etched in the subconscious, from early childhood through to youth and into adulthood.

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Given the fact that for a long period of independence in Ukraine the presidential-parliamentary form of government prevailed, when we speak about the Ukrainian rulers, we mean the presidents and their inner circle. The subject of this book is a study of the mentality of the presidents of Ukraine and certain influential politicians and businesspersons who, in our view, influenced the destiny of the Ukrainian nation. In these periods of historical change, some nations were more fortunate than others were: the high ideals and concern for future generations were dominated in their rulers’ mentality. Their upbringing, education, and culture helped them to put aside their personal ambitions and the authoritarian temptation in the name of public interest. Therefore, the states and nations under their leadership reached new levels of perfection. Such examples are enough in the history of civilisation. For example, the role of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and other presidents in history of the United States of America; or the role of Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore’s history; or the significance of Sir Winston Churchill and Margaret Thatcher in the history of Great Britain, and others. Other nations were less fortunate. For example, in the post-Soviet era the Ukrainians had absolutely no luck. All five presidents of Ukraine had (and have) a mentality that was dominated lust for power, greed, and servility to rank. Therefore, instead of reaching the standards of highly developed democracies, the Ukrainian society slipped to a level of authoritarian, oligarchic existence. The post-Soviet period in Ukraine, which is called the period of Ukraine’s independence, is illustrated by the manifestation of the five presidents’ mentalities. The rulers were Leonid Kravchuk (President from December 5 1991 to July 19 1994), Leonid Kuchma (President from July 19 1994 to January 23 2005), Victor Yushchenko (President from January 23 2005 to February 25 2010), Viktor Yanukovych (President from February 25 2010 to February 22 2014), and Petro Poroshenko (President from June 7 2014 to the present time). Owing to the five presidents and their inner circle, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine did not become a self-sufficient, highly developed European state; it became a region of prospering corruption, prostitution, and crime. Instead of the European vector of development: equality of rights, freedoms, and duties, in Ukraine, law, nihilism, and the extremes of the “Asian layers” have continued to become established so far: mass

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consciousness, worshiping rank, servility to rank and their awards, vulgarity, cynicism, and rudeness, amongst other things. At present, the Ukrainian nation exists in two realities. In one reality: the presidents (former and present) with their circles live in the world of wealth and luxury, splendor and magnificence, outside the law and bon ton, amazing the world by moral perversion, bad taste, and bad manners. For them, democracy came a long time ago, and, in such a format, they are quite satisfied with it. They call it – managed democracy, and believe that it is this form of democracy that is adapted to the national cultural traditions of Ukraine. In another reality, the vast majority of the population of Ukraine is struggling with poverty and hunger; they live in the world of lawlessness and self-destruction, surprising the world by indifference to the excesses of power and indifference to their present and future. The fact is that for the Ukrainians, this is the daily routine, whilst for Europeans it is bad manners and taboos. Unable to compare themselves to others (Ukrainian wages do not give the option of seeing the world), the Ukrainians are convinced that they live better than other nations. A large part of the society believes that European standards of everyday life do not correspond to Ukrainian history and culture. The Ukrainians manifest complete indifference to the authority’s corruption, do not comply with the law, and do not fight to abide by the others. The Ukrainians live in the authoritarian-oligarchic state, but they consider themselves free people with a very high level of democracy. But how could one instill a swineherd’s psychology – of rejection of the better, indifference to the present, and cowardice before authority – in the Cossack clan that was always freedom loving, proud, and enlightened? Why have the Ukrainians accepted the corrupt miserable reality and believed in the mirage that power is democracy? Let us try to answer these questions with facts from the history of Ukraine. However, before we consider the conceptual and methodological apparatus of our research.

1.1 Geophilosophy: conceptual and methodological apparatus of the research For the first time, the concept of “geophilosophy” is found in the work “What is Philosophy?” of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, published in

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France in 1991 [Deleuze & Guattari, 1994]. According to their view, geophilosophy is “thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth” [Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 85]. Further, the understanding of geophilosophy was greatly deepened and expanded by Nicola Masciandaro [Masciandaro, 2010], Ben Woodard [Woodard, 2013], Taylor Webb [Webb & Gulson, 2015], Kalervo N. Gulson [Webb & Gulson, 2015], and others. However, the author has a broader understanding of geophilosophy. If you look at geophilosophy not as the concept that was only introduced into scientific circulation in the late 20th century, but as philosophy of geography, the complexity and importance of the issues raised by geophilosophy will be comparable to ontology, gnosiology, and other key philosophical disciplines. The first pieces of research on philosophy of geography were found among the ancient Greeks and, in fact, the geophilosophy of Deleuze and Guattari – is only the visible part of the research, roots of which went back to the apophatic vision. Ukrainian philosopher Julian Tyutyunnik [Tyutyunnik, 2011] carried out large-scale analysis of the philosophy of geography. Tyutyunnik substantiates the apophatics-base of geophilosophy of the works of Alexei Losev, Martin Heidegger, and Gilles Deleuze. For example, according to Losev: “The existence starts with its apophatic moment. The existence is full of meaning and being, the inexhaustible source of life beats a key from its depths, and more and more new definitions” [Losev, 1990: 150]. According to Heidegger: “This incomprehensible nature only hits us then, when we are thinking over the position of the base, as if it would be facing backwards, not in the direction of the field and sphere of its usage, and in the direction of its own origin, i.e. from that, from where the position itself speaks” [Heidegger, 1999: 107]. According to Deleuze: “A singularity may be grasped in two ways: in its existence and distribution, but also in its nature, in conformity with which it extends and spreads itself out in a determined direction over a line of ordinary points. This second aspect already represents a certain stabilization, and a beginning of the actualization of the singularities a word already envelops an infinite system of singularities within this world, however, individuals are constituted that select and envelop a finite number of the singularities of the system. they spread them out over their own ordinary lines, and are even capable of forming them again on the membranes, which brings the inside and outside into contact with each other.” [Deleuze, 1990: 109-110]. Thus, geophilosophy reveals the meaning of the Earth’s surface, the meaning of its landscape, in which a person is an integral part.

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Geophilosophy studies the Earth, and the civilisations that populate it, as the “Earth surface area”, and at the same time as the “surface” which has depth – “rhizomes” in the understanding of Deleuze. Tyutyunnik defines the subject of geography as the locus, and geography as a science about endless localisation [Tyutyunnik, 2011: 55]. In our research, we use geophilosophy exclusively, as applied to human civilisation, and therefore the research subject of geophilosophy in our understanding is significantly narrowing. It resolves itself into the research of the loci of civilisations that have their depth, their history, and their rhizome. However, due to the fact that the rhizome is a complex interweaving of semantic lines that often have a single base in depth and branch out closer to the surface (or, on the contrary, in the depth diverse bases, which intertwine into a single and stable base to the surface), loci of civilisations are shown not as isolated of each other, but as a relatively integrated surface, in some places “redrawing”, conflicting, and in other places smooth and monolithic. Therefore, the research subject of philosophy, in our understanding, is the loci of civilisations (cultures), and the research object of geophilosophy is the Earth’s surface, woven from loci of disparate civilisations (cultures); the integrated surface of the Earth’s civilisation is inclined to endless localisation processes. The methodology of geophilosophy, as accurately noted by Julian Tyutyunik, conjugates science and philosophy together [Tyutyunnik, 2011: 159]. This allows us to consider the surface of continually changing loci of civilisations of the Earth as the whole area to determine the junctions (borders) of loci, as well as to delve into the meanings of the loci of civilisations, highlighting their depth. For these purposes, geophilosophy uses available methods of political philosophy, morphology of culture (culturology), ethnology, economics, and geography. Thanks to the versatility of the methods and its interdisciplinarity, geophilosophy is able to fulfil three main objectives: 1. Investigate the constantly changing surface of “woven” loci of disparate civilisations (world cultures), i.e. consider endless localisation of the Earth’s civilisation in the past, present and future. 2. Investigate the individual loci of civilisations, highlighting their depth, unraveling their rhizomes, discovering the foundation, and the origins of a given culture. This allows us to find out about the strength of the locus’ surface and its stability concerning neighboring loci of civilisation, as well

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as the continuous process of redrawing the boundaries of Earth’s civilisation. 3. Investigate the junctions (borders) of disparate loci of civilisations and determine the strength of junctions and risk of rupture. When speaking about the level of the frontier energy at the junctions of the world's cultures, we mean the strength of connection between disparate loci of civilisations. The lower frontier energy is, the stronger the connection is between disparate loci, and accordingly, the “smoother surface” in this place, the weaker borders are. The higher frontier energy – the stronger stresses on the junctions and the higher the probability of rupture and redrawing of the boundary loci.

1.2 Junctions of loci of civilisations The logic of our research is because the territory of Ukraine is situated on the junction of two large, stable loci of civilisations. In scientific literature, the word junctions of loci of disparate civilisations are defined by the concept of the limitrophe (from Late Latin limitrophus – a border or frontier). The doctrine about limitrophe, as the drawn borders (in our terminology – junctions between disparate loci of civilisations), was actively developed by the German school of geopolitics from the middle of the 19th century: Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, Friedrich Naumann, and others. At the end of the 19th century, Lord George Curzon created the term “buffer state” for scientific use, which referred to the buffer formation at the junction of the more powerful states [Curzon, 1909]. In the first half of the 20th century, German thinker Carl Schmitt proposed the concept of the “large space” (Großraum), which in his understanding should replace the concept of “territory” as the classical concept of the nation-state into the concept of “space”, with its moving and undefined boundaries [Schmitt, 2010]. In the second half of the 20th century, the fundamental work of Kenneth Boulding brought the research about limitrophes to a new level of understanding. Considering the concepts of the “sphere of vital interests” and the “sphere of influence”, Boulding introduced the concept of the “critical border” for scientific use [Boulding, 1962]. Thus, a limitrophe, in our understanding, is a territory, which geographically runs along the large disparate loci of civilisation. This area runs across the so-called Border States, which are included in the “sphere of influence” and the “sphere of vital interests” of opposing large loci. For

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example, if we look at fig. 2, we see limitrophe states that are located along the borderlines of two large stable loci: the Russian Federation and Europe are Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia.

Fig. 2. Eastern Europe Map, 2015.

1.3 1990 – A new milestone in the history of Ukraine? Now that we have considered the conceptual and methodological basics of our research in general (in fact they are much deeper and larger), come back to the theme of our research: how did the mentality of Ukrainian presidents influence on the destiny of the Ukrainian nation, and why did Ukraine get onto the list of the most corrupt countries (according to the

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rating of the international anti-corruption organisation Transparency International [Transparency, 2014])? For the first time at a state level, the Independence Day of Ukraine was celebrated on 16 July 1991, in memory of the fact that a year before (July 16, 1990), the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine. The same day, on 16 July 1990, the Supreme Soviet adopted a decree on “Independence Day of Ukraine”. Later, it was found that Ukrainian politicians too hurried to renounce the Soviet past, to become independent. After the celebration of the first Independence Day of Ukraine, the Ukrainian parliament, on 24 August 1991 complied with the necessary legal procedures and adopted the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine, which was confirmed by the people’s will on 1 December 1991 at the national referendum. Because of the legal conflict surrounding it, the date of the celebration of Independence Day of Ukraine had to be changed. On 20 February 1992, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a resolution on “Independence Day of Ukraine”, which was established on “24 August as Independence Day, and the annual observance of it as a public national holiday in Ukraine”. Thus, from the outset, the Ukrainian political elite demonstrated its professional incompetence: they had started to celebrate the beginning of independence before independence was legally declared. While Ukrainian politicians followed the politicians of the Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), Armenia, and Georgia by hastening to adopt the national laws as quickly as possible to separate Ukraine from the USSR, at the same time, the Ukrainians continued to live their lives and solve their own problems. Was the year 1990 a turning point for the Ukrainians? My memories, as well as analysis of the literature of that period, suggest only one answer – it was not. Maybe the ordinary Ukrainians supported the intentions of political leaders to change Ukraine from the Soviet Socialist Republic into an independent European state, but it did not go any further than. In the lifestyle and mentality of Ukrainians, the real changes were not observed. At that time (in 1990), for the whole world the number one event was the unification of Eastern and Western Germany. In 1991, the world community

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was anxiously watching the war in Iraq and the outbreak of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia. The Declaration of Independence of Ukraine did not interest the world community. Thus, Ukraine carried out the transition to independence quietly and completely unnoticed by the world community. Mostly, even in Ukraine, no one observed any of these steps; the Ukrainians continued to live in independent Ukraine as they had done in the Soviet period, not feeling any difference.

1.4. Features of the Ukrainian mentality in 1990

Fig. 3. The average salary of the Ukrainians from 1984 to 2015, as compared with the average salary of Americans over the same period [Mikhailovsky, 2015].

In Ukraine, 1990 turned out not to be the best year according to all development indicators over the course of its history: the lasting consequences of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika, the introduction of the

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laws of a market economy, the breaking economic ties between the republics within the USSR. However, the standard of living and prosperity of the Ukrainian population pleasantly stood out from the fraternal Union republics and Warsaw Pact countries. In Ukraine, up to 1990, the entire population worked and got a good salary. Fig. 3 above shows the average salary of Ukrainians from 1984 to 2015, compared with the average salary of Americans over the same period [Mikhailovsky, 2015]. As you can see, in 1990–1991 Ukrainians received four times less money than Americans did. In 2015, Ukrainians received an average salary that was 27 times lower than the US! Herewith, the prices for many types of goods in Ukraine (the author was personally convinced) are higher than in the United States. In 1990 and 1991, Ukrainians still went on planning their future with some anxiety. Stability diminished in the country, but people continued to believe strongly in the common sense of the party leaders and that was the course that the new party bosses chose. The overwhelming majority of the population remembered the difficult post-war years of 1949–1955, so they were ready to stay patient until the situation improved, hoping that soon the rulers would lead the country out of crisis. Patience to the excesses of power is a typical feature of all the peoples of the USSR, which passed through the dictatorship of the proletariat in the first decade of Soviet power, Stalin’s repressions, “Holodomor” (Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932–33), the Great Patriotic War, and the difficult post-war years. The Ukrainian people endured lots in that meat grinder of bloody events, about which Timothy Snyder wrote, reasonably and impressively, in his bestselling book “Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin” [Snyder, 2015]. Fear of the authorities is deeply stuck in the minds of older people. My grandmother, until her dying day, was afraid to talk about exile in Siberia. I have not heard the details about my grandfather’s communication with the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD USSR), after his liberation from Nazi captivity. Every Ukrainian family, in varying degrees, suffered from the Soviet power. Therefore, fear of the authorities had a great influence on Ukrainians’ behaviour and outlook for a long time in the post-Soviet period. We can formulate the first conclusion of our study: to understand the Ukrainian people and their patience for the excesses of power, one needs

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to remember the series of bloody events, through which the nation has passed for seventy years of Soviet Union history. In the course of these events the most eminent, active, and vibrant parts of Ukrainians were eliminated. During the years of Soviet power, fear of government officials, authorities, and law enforcement bodies was firmly stuck in the minds of Ukrainians. In relation to the people, they always carried out punitive functions. This fear spawned peculiar features of the Ukrainians’ mentality: timeserving to power, compromise with power, and indifference to events that do not affect personal interests. What features of mentality characterised Ukrainians in 1990? 1. Cordiality and hospitality. In Ukrainian families, stability and prosperity was ensured thanks to the fertile land and the most powerful economic potential. Traditional Ukrainian tables groaned under a massive amount of food: vegetables, fruits, meat, fish, and dairy foods. The Ukrainians have been characterised by their warmth and hospitality. I still remember the days, when I was a child, when I could freely come to see my distant relatives (not to mention the nearest relatives) or acquaintances, and was welcomed with the offer of a snack, and only then did they ask for the reason for my visit. The Ukrainians always loved feasts and holidays. They were easygoing and liked to have a rest by big companies. Ukrainian weddings lasted two or three days, hosting 200 guests or more. Anniversaries and feast days were spent not only with neighbours, relatives, and friends, but also with colleagues and friends, with music, songs, dances, and endless humour. 2. Highly educated population, living on the territory of Ukraine. In the southeastern and central parts of Ukraine, the manufacturing plants were concentrated and located, which set the tone for the industries of the former Soviet Union territory. Regional, national, and global-scale enterprises guaranteed high social status of their employees. The staff were highly qualified, generally erudite, and deeply minded. In Ukraine the most authoritative scientific schools were established, the world famous creative teams, well-stocked libraries, and art collections were created and worked successfully. The favourable scientific and creative environment influenced the Ukrainian people’s mentality and their daily lives. My parents and all my relatives belonged to the working class. All of them worked at the second

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largest tractor plant in the Kharkiv region (up to 15 thousand jobs). I distinctly remember how, after work, my parents came back home, had dinner, and read. Cheerful feasts and reading of books, newspapers, and magazines took up most people’s leisure time in Ukraine in the 80s. Our family, up to the collapse of the Soviet Union, subscribed to five newspapers and two magazines. I remember how difficult it was to buy a book, how people exchanged books; we visited each other to “look through” books. It is true that in 1990 the taste for reading declined in Ukrainian society. The market economy had created new temptations; new types of entertainment, so reading became secondary. However, the level of Ukrainians’ education remained high. 3. Family traditions. My parents are from large families. Every weekend we went to visit my grandmothers. Moreover, half of the day we spent with the father’s parents, the second half with the mother’s (or vice versa). The grandmothers usually gathered all their children with their wives and grandchildren. The adults helped somewhat with the housework; we children found our own entertainment. After work we all took seats around the table and had dinner. Having dealt with their hunger, the men played cards or dominoes, and the women sang songs. How beautifully Ukrainian women sang! At a contest of languages’ beauty in Paris in 1934, the Ukrainian language took third place after French and Persian on criteria such as phonetics, vocabulary, phraseology, and sentence structure. I remember how coming home along the street in evenings was, and from almost every yard, you could hear singing: often songs were sad and emotional, but others were funny and cheerful. 4. The people lived openly and trusted each other. I remember well the symbolic wooden fences with which the private areas were surrounded. The Ukrainians lived openly, without standing out. Neighbours were not simply acquaintances; they were friends, and we helped each other. People visited each other, borrowed money, food, and after a while gave it back. People trusted each other, trying not to lose and to justify the confidence. Now there is no such openness. New generations of Ukrainians replaced the wooden fences with concrete ones that were more than one and half metres high, and in many courtyards there are evil dogs. Ukrainians preferred an isolated life, watching world events on TV or on the Internet.

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5. The natural optimism of the nation. The Ukrainian nation is unique. People survived, despite the fact that they were on the verge of two worlds – Eastern (Asian) and Western (European). Many people in the history of the world had not experienced such an amount of occupations, persecutions, and ethnic cleansing. At the same time, the Ukrainians not only survived, but also gained steady optimism. It was as if life was not hard for the Ukrainians, and they always found a reason for laughter, humour, and fun. The Ukrainians greeted each new day with smiles and jokes, even if the previous day brought grief and misery. Life went on. Optimism helped our people to survive and preserve their culture and unique identity. Ukrainian women were often called the beauties that loved laughing a lot, and Ukrainian men never had to search for words, always finding witty phrases. Sincere laughter and singing was the healthy environment in which more than one generation of Ukrainians grew up. Eventually I taught myself to soothe a heavy heart and overcome a heap of trouble and misery, which repeatedly had to overcome my family and me, through laughter and jokes.

1.5 At the turn of two cultures. The basics of Ukrainian geophilosophy To understand the true causes of the events that have been occurring throughout the history of Ukraine, firstly, it is necessary to understand the peculiarities of the geophilosophy of the region. The author offered the main characteristics of the geophilosophy of the region, which formed the Ukrainian mentality for centuries. Geographically, modern Ukraine is located at the crossroads of two powerful cultures in the Eurasian continent: the Asian and the European. Such an important and complex fate befell Ukraine at the beginning of the 13th century. In 1237– 1240 the Mongol Empire’s troops, in the course of the Western invasion of the Mongols (Kipchak Khanate), led by Batu and the Mongol warlord Chingizid Subutai, seized the territories that had already disintegrated by that time as the result of feudal fragmentation of the Old Russian State with the capital in Kyiv. Thus, since the 13th century on the territory of Eastern Europe the communication space with epoch-making high energy, the unique junction of European and Asian cultures began forming. More than 250 years of Mongol occupation led to the fact that on the territory

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inhabited by Eastern Slavs, new generations were born, however, in their mentality, Asian values dominated, such as: – – – –

Having a respectful and deferential attitude to elders; A belief in strong power and a centralized state; A respectful attitude to traditions and culture; Dominance of community interests above personal needs and interests; – Helpfulness, submissiveness, and worship to the authority; – Minimalism and asceticism in everyday life and personal needs, and the needs of others. New generations of Eastern Slavs regularly started practicing raids upon the brothers: the southern and western Slavs, as well as the Golden Horde campaigns to Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary. With each generation of occupation by the Mongols, all Eastern Slavs became more different from the western and the southern Slavs, Germans, Celts, Balts, and FinnoUgric peoples, whose descendants had laid the foundation of European culture. From the 14th century, thanks to the support of the Horde, the previously suburban principality of the Old Russian state, The Grand Principality of Moscow started to gain momentum, and expanded its territory at the expense of the neighbouring Russian principalities manyfold. It began “gathering of the Russian lands” around new political centres. In NorthEastern Russia, the Grand Principality of Moscow headed this process up, which was in alliance with the Mongols and under their influence. In Southwestern Russia, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was engaged in gathering Russian lands, which was also alliance with Mongols. In the 14th century, because of internal contradictions of might, the Mongols’ forces weakened significantly. It let the Grand Duchy of Lithuania win back the land as it had been since the 14th century, which was formerly owned by the Old Russian state, thereby expanding the boundaries of Asian culture to the East. In North-Eastern Russia, the Mongol-Tatar Yoke stayed until 1480. The Old Russian state as a political organisation was not revived later. The city of Kyiv, the capital of the Old Russian state, according to various sources was founded in the 6th – 7th century; in 1240, the Mongols sacked and destroyed it almost to its very foundations. From 1362 to 1569, Kyiv

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was a part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and from 1569 to 1654, it was a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1654, an anti-Polish and Lithuanian uprising occurred, and Kyiv was passed “into the hands of the Tsar of Moscow”. However, up to the middle of the 18th century Kyiv (Pol. Kijów) remained under significant influence of Polish culture. From 1654 to 1991, Kyiv was under the influence of Moscow. In 2015 in Kyiv, the population was about 2.9 million. It is the seventh largest city in Europe. In the Grand Principality of Moscow (1263–1547), Russian Tsardom (1547–1721), Russian Empire (1721–1917), the Soviet Union (1917– 1991), and the Russian Federation (1991), the original culture of the Old Russian state was already present in a much smaller way. Almost two hundred and fifty years of the Mongol Yoke invasion played a role in the formation and development of the mentality of the ancient ethnic group. Now, it included the attributes of Asian culture and traditions, which in different periods of history, to a greater or lesser extent, were different from European culture. In the early 20th century, an authoritative Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev researched profoundly differences between the Asian and European soul of the Russians. Arguing with Maxim Gorky, who in his article “Two Souls” appealed to the Russian people: “We need to fight against the Asian layers of our mentality, we need to be treated” [Gorky, 1918: p.180], Berdyaev wrote: “Truly in the Russian soul is “Asian layering” and they always felt like a very radical Westernism of Gorky type” [Berdyaev, 1990: p.127]. Not all Russians felt ashamed about the Asian layers in their culture. For example, Prince Nikolai Trubetzkoy, the author of the concept of cultural and historic regions, believed that the main task of Russia is to create a completely new culture, their own culture, which would not resemble the European one. In the book “The Legacy of Genghis Khan”, published in 1925, Nikolai Trubetzkoy affirmed that Russia-Eurasia was the conscious heir to and bearer of the great legacy of Genghis Khan, and the Russian people were connected with the Eurasian people by a common historical destiny. Nikolai Trubetzkoy denied the relevance and viability of the Old Russian state in the implementation of the construction in Russia. In his understanding, the Russian Empire and Soviet Union were a geopolitical continuation of the Mongolian monarchy, founded by the great Genghis Khan [Trubetzkoy, 2012].

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Therefore, even after liberation from the Mongol Yoke, the territory of modern Ukraine continued to be the watershed between the Asian and European culture of The Grand Principality of Moscow, and the bearer of European culture continued to be the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Subsequently, this confrontation acquired forms that are more ambitious: more than 800 centuries on the territory of modern Ukraine has a “civilisational” split between the orthodox and the western civilisations, according to Samuel Huntington [Huntington, 1996]. I want to clarify the terminology, namely, the definition of the culture of the Grand Principality of Moscow, the legal successors of which were: the Russian Tsardom, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and finally the Russian Federation. In western scientific discourse the culture of the Grand Principality of Moscow, which reached the maximal borders during the time of the USSR, was designated differently at different times. For example, in the early 20th century Oswald Spengler named it “Russian Siberian” world culture [Spengler, 1998; Spengler, 1999]. A little later, Arnold Toynbee named it “Russian civilisation” [Toynbee, 1995]. At the end of the 20th century, Samuel Huntington named it “Orthodox civilisation”, significantly expanding its boundaries [Huntington, 1996]. None of these terms in Russian culture became acclimated, because they reflected neither the ambition nor the true state of affairs. In fact, the culture of the Grand Principality of Moscow, which was extant, consists of different cultural layers that really give the right to speak of it as self-sufficient Eurasian culture. In order of priority, we can highlight the following cultural layers: 1. Byzantine culture, since the reign of Ivan III (1440–1505), the Russian Tsardom was assigned by the legal successor. In connection with the decline of Kyivan Rus as the political centre (after the defeat of the Mongols in 1240), at the end of 1325 the location of the Kyiv Metropolitans was Moscow. It was there, with the growth of the power of the Grand Principality of Moscow that the legend was invented according to which the spiritual and political decline of the Byzantine Empire, the only stronghold of Orthodoxy, became Moscow, receiving the dignity of being the “third Rome”. Starting from the 15th century and continuing to the present day, the aim: Moscow ௅ the “third Rome” is a determinative for the understanding of Russian culture and imperial ambitions of Russian rulers.

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2. Asian culture. Under Asian culture, first, I understand multiculturalism in the Mongol Empire in Genghis Khan’s era. In the making of the Grand Principality of Moscow, the significance of Asian culture was as important as Byzantine culture. Thanks to the invasion of the Mongol Empire into the Russian lands, and then the friendship (and support!) with the khans of Horde, the ordinary Russian principality got a chance to win more powerful principalities of the Old Russian state and to expand its sphere of influence. For this reason, in the 16th century, after the collapse of the Golden Horde, Moscow historians have added the aggrandizing adjective “golden” to the word “Horde”. Until 1566 in Rus in all the manuscripts, the Tatars were simply called “Horde”. The friendship with the Tatars became truly the “golden” era for the Grand Principality of Moscow. Speaking about the Asian layers in Russian culture, Berdyaev warned: “...should not confuse dark, wild, chaotic Asian East culture with the ancient culture of East Asia, representing the original spiritual type, attracting the attention of the most cultured Europeans. The ancient Near East is considered the cradle of the great religions and cultures” [Berdyaev, 1990: p.127]. Therefore, in our study, when we talk about the Asian layers or Asian cultural manifestations in the post-Soviet space, we do not mean the richest culture of the Asian East, which has played a crucial role in the development of many of the world’s cultures, including the culture of Kievan Rus’ lands (Lev Gumilyov wrote convincingly about it [Gumilyov, 2001]), we mean its side-negative manifestations and extremes, such as pomposity, officialism, arrogance, cringing, worshiping and servility to rank, corruption, love for luxury, haughtiness, amongst many other traits. 3. European culture or, according to Samuel Huntington’s terminology, western civilisation. The impact of European culture on Eurasian culture of the Moscow principality and its successors was significantly weaker than Byzantine and Asian cultures. However, the Russians themselves have always recognised, with reservation, this influence, while completely denying the dependence of their culture (remember that Moscow ௅ the “third Rome”!) on the western one. Much of the history from the Grand Principality of Moscow to the Russian Federation is the internal unacceptance (even isolation) of European culture, or the competition against it for the right of dominance in the western part of the Eurasian continent.

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4. Culture of the Old Russian state. In self-sufficient Eurasian culture of the Russian empire, the culture of the Old Russian state was present. However, we must take into account the most important historical fact: in the Old Russian state with its capital in Kyiv, the Principality of Moscow was on the outskirts, which was located at a distance of more than 800 kilometres from the capital. In the 11th century, it was a great distance! For Kyiv, in regards to the era of the Old Russian state, Moscow had a reputation of being the most remote province. That is why the understanding of cultural heritage of the Old Russian state has always been strikingly different between Moscow and Kyiv. To put it in modern terms, while in the culture of ancient Rus Moscow esteemed conservatism, rituals, and attributes, Kyiv adopted the spirit of freedom, greatness of mind, and openness to innovation and change. That is why, as paradoxical as it sounds, the Ukrainians are more Rus than the Russians are, because the history of the Old Russian state for the Ukrainians is Kyivan Rus’ one, and for the Russians it is Moscow’s perception and assessment of events in Kyivan Rus. Western researchers do not understand the important difference between Kyiv and Moscow, the Ukrainians and the Russians, which were always different, are different, and will be different, despite being at first sight a single nation and culture. It does not matter what we call the culture of The Grand Principality of Moscow, the legal successor of which is the Russian Federation: or “Russian Siberian” world culture [Spengler, 1998; Spengler, 1999], or “Orthodox civilisation” [Huntington, 1996], or otherwise. It is important that Ukrainians do not see their place in this culture. Kyiv, as the ancient and richest cultural centre with a certain territory of influence, and the Ukrainians, as a guardian of their culture, claim (and not without reason) is not an appendage to the role of someone else's culture, especially the culture of the earlier vassal of the Principality of Moscow, and the revival of an independent locus. Since the 13th century, the Ukrainians have been trying to reunite the old boundaries and achieve independence. For eight centuries, the attempts to revive the Russian state (in the understanding of Kyiv) arose repeatedly. For example, a) the second third of the 12th century ௅ 40th years of the 14th century, the period of the existence of the Galicia-Volyn principality (or in Latin Regnum Russiæ), inherited the traditions of Kyivan Rus; b) 1340 ௅ the last quarter of the 15th century, the Ukrainian lands became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which is referred to in the latest historical research as the Lithuanian-Russian state. 9/10 of the Lithuanian-Russian population were the Ukrainians and Belarusians; c) from 1648 to 1764, the

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existence of Zaporizhska Sich (Hetman state or Hetmanate); d) from 1917 to 1921 ௅ the period of the Ukrainian national liberation movement; e) finally, from 1990 to the present time, the existence of independent Ukraine. All of these periods of the formation of Ukrainian statehood relied on the history of Kyivan, and not Moscow Rus. For Ukrainians, the history of Kyivan Rus is an unquestionable shrine for them, and an inexhaustible source of the struggle for independence. Unlike Ukraine and the Ukrainians, who are still trying to restore the historical statehood, the Principality of Moscow has already written its own history, not less, and perhaps even greater than the Old Russian state had. The question is only in the details, dates of the cultural origin, which are significant, but not to that extent. If the Principality of Moscow by any stretch could claim the role of the “third Rome” and be a culture bearer of Kyivan Rus, then the subsequent history of its greatness and significance is comparable with the history of the Old Russian state, the Roman Empire, and the Mongol Empire. The history of the Principality of Moscow is the history of a great nation, which was able to create its own unique, self-sufficient Eurasian culture, to conquer and hold the territory for a long time, comparable (or even superior!) from the Roman and Mongol Empires. Owing to the breakthrough of culture, at present for Moscow, Kyiv is on the outskirts, the remote province with high selfesteem: “... a poor relative, you always stand with the outstretched hand” – the words of ex-President of the Russian Federation, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, written on Facebook on March 2 2014. That is why, in my view, the culture of the Russian Federation would be reasonably named Byzantine-Asian culture, which emphasises its real importance, grandeur, and imperial ambitions. Although, I emphasise once more, it does not matter what the name of this or that culture (locus) is, including culture, as submitted by the Russian Federation. What matters is that in this culture, Ukraine, with its inexhaustible desire to restore the greatness of the culture of Kyivan Rus and to prove its historical significance, is a foreign body, pathology, with which Moscow either reconciles or tries to move away. If we add another equally important factor in that the territory of modern Ukraine consists partly of the territories that never belonged to it (for example, the Crimea, Galicia, Volhynia, Polesye), they became Ukrainian thanks to the behest of the Kremlin. Thus, the full rejection of Ukraine as an independent state by the rulers of the Russian Federation is clear.

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Over the last few centuries, because of constant wars and territorial disputes, European culture was significantly under the influence of the Byzantine-Asian one, having expanded it to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. The main representative of the Byzantine-Asian culture in Europe was Russia, as the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, in the second half of the 20th century, was able to extend Byzantine-Asian cultural influence far into Europe and to impose competition to European culture at its very heart: at the borders of France and Germany, the latter being bisected. The fact that in the 13th century it was not possible to do because of the Mongol invasion meant that the Soviet Union did it at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference of the Allied Powers, February 4–11 1945. So-called post-war world order was established, which meant the penetration of ByzantineAsian culture into Central Europe. The Yalta Conference with the leaders of the Allied powers in February 1945 and the formation of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 reduced the civilising pressure for a while on the territory of Ukraine. The high-energy frontier, associated with the confrontation of Byzantine-Asian and European cultures, shifted to the Baltic countries, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. Ukraine, which was reunited at last, plunged deep into Byzantine-Asian culture and got the opportunities for rest and recovery of its potential within a few decades. However, in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the border between two civilisations was put back to its original position, and on the territory of Ukraine. Every year Ukrainian Independence Day is a frontier confrontation between Eastern and Western cultures; it is a turn of Ukraine to the side of Moscow, or to the side of European choice.

1.6 The Russian Federation as a successor of the USSR and the example to be followed Former leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led the states that became independent after the collapse of the USSR. The politicians of the newly formed states had the same mentality and governing style. All of them passed one party school of public administration. That is why the development of the republics and peoples of the former Soviet Union in the post-Soviet period was typical. Nobody learned from the mistakes of the neighbours. On the contrary, all, as usual, looked up to Russia as an older brother and copied the governing model. Natural resources, the oil and gas abundance, as well as the competent policy of Putin’s power, helped to build up the authoritarian state in Russia on the principles of

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managed democracy. The ideology of managed democracy, supported by a strong source of financing and a large amount of well-organised information, represented the Russian governing model as an exemplary model that could compete on equal terms with the most highly developed countries in the world. Russian President Vladimir Putin became the most respected leader in the world. In a short time, he was able to get back the lost respect and fear of Russia. Therefore, the Russian governing model began to copy not only the former Soviet functionaries who headed the newly formed post-Soviet states, but also the political forces in different parts of the world. The ideology of managed democracy (in Russia it is called “adapted democracy”) is not “know-how” of Russian political technologists. The history of the term begins in the second half of the 20th century. Indonesian President Sukarno referred to guided democracy in his regime (1945 to 1966), which eventually led to the impoverishment of Indonesia and dethronement of the dictator. Managed democracies are authoritarianoligarchic regimes, using the democratic veil to cover their dictatorial powers. In the managed democracy the common features are hidden, namely, bombast, arrogance, haughtiness, showiness, and others. One of the characteristic manifestations of managed democracy is corruption of high-ranking officials and their entourage. The events in independent Ukraine are an exact copy of the events that have occurred and are occurring in Russia, the Caucasus, in Asia, in Africa, and in other parts of the world. Wherever the mentality of the rulers is determined by a thirst for power concentration of a single person, where officials believe that democracy can be managed, freedom can be dosed; events are developing around one scenario. The new format of authoritarianism and totalitarianism is the most favorable condition for the flourishing of corruption.

1.7 Geophilosophy of Ukraine: general characteristics Thus, Ukraine is not only a limitrophe state, but also the state, which claims the role of an independent locus of civilisation. At the junction of the Byzantine-Asian and European civilisation in 1991 (after the collapse of the Soviet Union), quite a unique situation, arose not only a “buffer state” arose in the terminology of Lord George Curzon [Curzon, 1909], which was located in the area of influence of two large loci, but also an independent locus was formed, which has a thousand years of history, a

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huge area and population size in terms of the scale of Europe. The peculiarity and complexity of this locus was the fact that about 55 per cent of the population was mentally inclined to the “sphere of influence” and the “sphere of vital interests” of the Byzantine-Asian locus of civilisation, but it took only 1/3 of the area of the locus, and 45 per cent of the population, which occupied 2/3 of the territory and was mentally inclined to the “sphere of influence” and the “sphere of vital interests” of the locus of European (western) civilisation (fig. 4).

Fig. 4. The map showing the ratio of the Russian-speaking (gray) and Ukrainianspeaking population of Ukraine in 2001.

What is even more interesting is the fact that this is not the first time this locus of civilisation arose in this part of the Earth’s surface, which indicates its stability in the deep layers of the surface, in the rhizome. The last time was in the period of the Ukrainian national movement between 1917 and 1921, and was interpreted in a number of the works. For example, Mykhailo Hrushevsky [Ukraine, 1997], Yaroslav Dashkevich [Dashkevich, 1991], Dmitro Dontsov [Dontsov, 2005], Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi [Lypyns’kyi, 1933], Ivan Lysyak-Rudnytsky [Lysyak-

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Rudnytsky, 2012], and others. The history of the Ukrainian locus of civilisation was studied in the basic works of Bohdan Hawrylyshyn [Hawrylyshyn, 2009], Mukola Riabchuk [Riabchuk, 2011], Natalia Yakovenko [Yakovenko, 2002; Yakovenko, 2012], Valery Smoliy [Ukraine, 1997], and many others. We describe a state of locus at the time of its emergence on the Earth’s surface in 1990, based on our own observations. To understand the Ukrainians, one should not only be born and grown up in Ukraine, but also live in its regions. Only in this way will one be able to understand the peculiar features of the Ukrainian mentality and realise that under the nationality “Ukrainian” is hidden at least three major regional and ethnonational groups: southeastern, central and Western Ukraine. Although, this division of Ukraine is relative and does not fully reflect the true historical and cultural traditions of the regions, after living there, one can be easily convinced of its reality. The Ukrainians of the southeastern, central and western regions differ from each other in history, mentality, traditions, way of life, and their vision of the future. The author was born and grew up in Southeastern Ukraine, living there for more than 16 years and teaching at one of the universities of Central Ukraine, and had creative working relationships with Western Ukraine for a long time. Let us briefly consider the features of these three regions of Ukraine that are not marked on any world map, but Ukrainians from which are not similar to each other and contradictory. It is this contradictoriness of locus of Ukrainian civilisation, despite the depth and strength of the rhizome, making it at the surface so unstable and conflicting.

1.7.1 Southeastern Ukraine Southeastern Ukraine is an industrial, Russian-speaking, populous region that includes the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Odessa regions, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (which was annexed by Russia in February-March 2014). Geographically, the Southeastern Ukraine is about 1/3 of the total territory of Ukraine. However, the population of this region is approximately 55 per cent of the overall population of other regions. The results of all election campaigns in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine or the presidential elections were directly dependent on the number of votes received by a candidate in the region. It was enough to persuade people from the Southeastern Ukraine to give their votes to the party, and the

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victory of any political force was guaranteed. For example, the map below (fig. 5) shows the results of the second presidential run-off in 2010. Despite the fact that Viktor Yanukovych won only at the polling stations of the southeastern part of Ukraine (blue), thanks to the high population density in the region, he won the elections against Yulia Tymoshenko, who gained a majority vote in the other regions of Ukraine (yellow).

Fig. 5. The results of the second presidential run-off, 2010.

I was born and grew up in Lozova, in the Kharkiv region. I took the first steps in the business with the so-called Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk clans. Therefore, this region of Ukraine is my homeland. The peculiarities of the region are the representatives that are often called “bandits”, “separatists” and “Kremlin’s secret agents”. In my family, we are all Ukrainians: on my mother’s side and father’s side. From 1975 to 1985, I studied at Specialized School No. 3 achieving a high level of English. I note that in our provincial town of 80, 000 citizens there were 12 schools, of which only one taught all subjects in Russian. In that period, “Ukrainization” of the country was occurring, not only in education, but also in all state institutions. Everybody was obliged to fill papers out and to talk in Ukrainian. However, one hardly can hear Ukrainian speech in the city. At most, it is a mixed Russian-Ukrainian dialect, Russian speech into which Ukrainian words and intonations are

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added. However, in the neighbouring district centre, Bliznetsy (18 kilometres from Lozova), a mayor, he is from Western Ukraine, and many people speak Ukrainian language. I only noticed it for the first time after the Revolution of Dignity, when American journalist Anna BrodskyKrotkin was interviewing him. By this example, I want to show that in Southeastern Ukraine there is absolutely no question of language. It is a farfetched problem of our politicians and it was always put on the agenda before the presidential or parliamentary elections. In Southeastern Ukraine, no one pays attention to what language a man is speaking: Russian or Ukrainian. Everyone understands each other well. Moreover, in Southeastern Ukraine, before the war with Russia, if Ukrainian speech was heard somewhere, one could really listen with delight, because Ukrainian songs and voices arouse a liking and something native, childish, and exciting. The history of Southeastern Ukraine is firmly linked with the history of Russia. On January 18 1654, in Pereyaslav, 80 kilometres from Kyiv, representatives of Zaporizhsky Cossacks, led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, which publicly decided to merge the territory of the Zaporizhsky Cossacks with the Russian Tsardom, and took an oath of allegiance to the Russian tsar. Since then, the history of Southeastern and Central Ukraine and the Russian Tsardom is considered as a unitary whole. As a person who was born and grew up in Southeastern Ukraine, I can say the following: several generations, including mine, were brought up in a culture in which individualism and any personal manifestations and initiatives were not encouraged. Our actions were always consistent with the opinions of others, which we valued very much. The southeastern region integrated into Russian culture more than other regions of Ukraine. It is connected with Moscovian migration policies, and with the history that was created together with the Russians, as well as having closer economic, social, and scientific relations. The Ukrainians of the southeastern region could not imagine life without Russians, and without the alliance with Russia. Only in the early 2000s did I begin to learn my lineage, before that Russians had mixed with Ukrainians and lived as one family. My grandmothers could not remember what nationality their ancestors were: Russian or Ukrainian. There was only one way we could find to solve our problem, by the fact they lived not far from each other, so we were able to establish the nationality from their biometrics. How much

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of our blood had mixed with the Russians and vice versa? Therefore, for many residents of the southeastern region, breaking with Russia is equivalent to pulling something important and determinative out of life. Even now, in 2015, after the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas, a majority of Ukrainians in Southeastern Ukraine find a justification for the aggression from the Russian Federation. In contrast to Western Ukraine, which was a part of other European countries (Poland, Romania, Austria-Hungary and Lithuania) for a long time, the people of Southeastern Ukraine could not compare their life with anyone. We only had the option of comparing it with the life of “katsaps” – this is what the Russians are called here – without malice and with a little neglect. We lived better than the Russians did: richer, happier, more open, so we all felt happy. Therefore, all attempts of Europe and the USA to destroy the Soviet Union and then to attack Russia were perceived by people in Southeastern Ukraine as an attack on their personal well-being. Most of us did not know how people lived “abroad”, we lived in our cultural and information space, enjoying what we had. In Russia, the people lived much worse than we did. This comparison made us calm and comfortable. The vast majority of religious people in Southeastern Ukraine are Orthodox, and are parishioners under the Moscow Patriarchate. The influence of religion on politics in the different regions of Ukraine was rather well described by Michal Wawrzonek in his new monograph: “Religion and Politics in Ukraine. The Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches as Elements of Ukraine’s Political System” [Wawrzonek, 2014]. Let us consider the main features. In southwestern Ukraine, the attitude to the church remains ambivalent and complicated. During the years of Soviet Power, Ukrainians were taught to believe in the communist future, because church was forbidden. Since the 1980s, churches have started to be revived. This revival was because communism collapsed, and it became more difficult to live. The Ukrainians were looking for support from faith, but faith in what? The revived belief in God seemed more suitable and effective. There were no other options, therefore, the atheists of Southeastern Ukraine immediately turned into believers. In the late 90s in Southeastern Ukraine, it became fashionable to visit churches and to leave alms. The churches were being built quickly as mushrooms grew. People had enough money, and many of them brought dutiful sacrifice for the

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glory of God. In return for it, they asked for help, forgiveness of sins, and health for their relatives. However, the church was not able to overcome the temptation of wealth, and the holy place turned into a real business. Business was prosperous and out of competition. The restored churches made an impression with their sumptuousness of interior. Superiors of the churches were driving luxury cars, and luxurious mansions were being built for them and their families. Against the background of their wellbeing, the population was becoming poorer and poorer, and priests became more impudent, not asking for alms but demanding it for the increasing need of the church. In the 90s, at the most honourable places in the churches there were always bandits, thieves, and government officials, because by donating a part of loot, they received not only forgiveness from God, but also “a pocket priest” who ran their errands, expecting to get the next “alms”. At the same time, the common people only watched how in front of them the powerful new alliance of the church and the criminals was firmly established. Often, at family celebrations, which were held in luxurious restaurants, one could notice a peaceful, close-knit group of people: a superior of the local church, a leader of the city gang, a mayor, a police chief, a prosecutor, and the president of the court. This group was not going to hide from visitors’ eyes, as a rule, they divided the spheres of influence of the city peacefully.

1.7.2 Geophilosophy of Ukraine: Western Ukraine Southeastern Ukraine was often opposed to Western Ukraine. Indeed, looking at a map of Ukraine, these two regions are like two opposite poles. Western Ukraine includes eight areas: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Volyn, Rivne, Khmelnytsky, Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia regions. At all the parliamentary and presidential elections, Western Ukraine always voted against the candidate from Southeastern Ukraine. However, because the population of the western region is significantly less than the southeastern region, the candidate from Western Ukraine was always behind. The only exception was the presidential election of 2004, when, because of the Orange Revolution, a native of Central Ukraine came to power, an ardent supporter of national ideas and European choice, Viktor Yushchenko.

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What is special in this region, whose representatives are called “Bandera”, “nationalists”, and “fascists” in Putin’s Russia? Western Ukraine is also an informal term, by which a certain amount of Ukrainian lands were designated, and the lands that were annexed to Ukraine at different times of Ukrainian history, which were a part of Austria-Hungary (1867–1918 years), Poland, Hungary, and Romania, as well as The Principality of Galicia-Volhynia and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic. For the most part, different parts of this region were joined to Ukraine by the Soviet Union in the middle of the 20th century, so it is much less integrated into the Russian-Ukrainian national-cultural relations, and is accustomed to that mixed Byzantine-Asian culture that continues to thrive on the Russian lands and in the mentality of those who inhabit it. The population of Western Ukraine, in spite of the efforts of repression and Soviet ideology, maintained a commitment to European values and to the European way of life. “When Vienna was the capital, we lived in poverty, but were free,” said representatives of the older generation who remembered those days. I had to go to Western Ukraine during the Soviet period, as well as Ukraine’s independence period, and while there, I noticed that they are very different from us, the representatives of the Southeastern Ukraine, mentally and in terms of the style of living. They differed in the language they used, which included not only Ukrainian words, but also Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian phrases. They were distinguished by their independence, genuine religiosity, and the cult of the family, individualism, and industriousness. In Southeastern Ukraine, we lived differently. After 2002 I started travelling more often and stayed longer in Europe, and I realised that their whole way of life is very similar to European life, and that Ukraine is oriented in Europe here, in the western region. In the mid-90s, I had the opportunity to be acquainted more closely with representatives of the region. It should be noted that the main differences between the southeastern and western regions that were examined in the early post-Soviet history of Ukraine: 1. Language. In Western Ukraine, people only speak the Ukrainian language; we do not understand many words, because they were borrowed from other languages, as a rule, from those countries with which this region of Ukraine has borders.

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2. Unlike most of us, a “zapadentsy” (from Ukrainian it is a native or inhabitant of Western Ukraine), speaks several languages fluently: Polish, English, Czech, Hungarian, and others. The western regions of Ukraine border European countries: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and therefore, knowledge of languages helped the residents of the region to carry out closer communication and trade relations with the people of Europe. Zapadentsy have been learning many foreign languages since childhood, which has made them more mobile and not tied to a single territory. 3. The population of Western Ukraine had a lot more work. In contrast with the population of Southeastern Ukraine, which was provided with well-paid jobs in the largest state-owned enterprises and protected by a variety of social benefits, the population of Western Ukraine was in the worst conditions. There was virtually no industry in the region, and the lands were worse in comparison with the fertile black soil of eastern and Central Ukraine, so zapadentsy had to survive. They roamed across Ukraine, Russia, and Europe in search of work. They performed the most difficult and thankless work, such as building, harvesting crops, and finishing work. They, in the literal sense of the word, “hacked” into our region, by doing heavy and thankless work that no one in Southeastern Ukraine, besides them, did. 4. In contrast to southeastern Ukrainian workers, zapadentsy had the opportunity to compare. Moving around the European Union in search of work, they could compare themselves to hired labour in Russia, at home, and in Europe. They were the first who felt the difference between the attitude to the labour force in Russia and Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. One can say otherwise, but if in Russia, a simple worker is viewed as “a second-class person”, in Europe he is a qualified person. That is why the skillful workers from Western Ukraine left home to search the work, and if they succeed, they did their best to get permanent residence in Europe. Those who did not know foreign languages or whose qualifications did not meet the European requirements, they went to Russia. 5. Taking into consideration that the people of Western Ukraine earned hardly any money, so they differed completely from eastern people with their approach to the problem of leisure. In Southeastern Ukraine, proximity of work and home, a stable salary and the possibility of “underworking” in the workplace, numerous grant awards from the state,

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early retirement, all that permitted them to “overspend” on: having meals at restaurants, having a holiday by the sea in Crimea or Turkish health resorts, building country houses and spending all weekend there. The west region, because of economic development, was deprived of these privileges. Therefore, people’s attitude toward money was thrifty in Western Ukraine. Most people spent their time in seasonal work away from home, and when they returned home, they spent money on their families. 6. Zapadentsy are people with much more developed “home feelings”. The house for them is like something sacred and sublime. Zapadentsy put much effort, time, and soul into their houses and comfort, so their houses differed from our grey, brick, and similarly tasteless buildings through their brightness, variegation, and high maintenance and quality factor. Each person tried to turn his home into a castle of the soul. Once, driving by that region, I visited the house of a “day labourer”, who had been working hard in eastern Ukraine for nine months; I was so struck by having seen how that “day labourer” lived; I could not believe it. He lived in a small fairy-tale castle, in comparison with which my big house seemed an ugly tasteless barn. His wife, a good fairy, cooked such delicious dishes, some of which I had never eaten before. In Southeastern Ukraine, our attitude towards the house was completely different. Our people spent more time in offices, at the workplace. Because people rarely changed jobs, they settled at their workplaces, and created their own comfort zone, as well as in the buildings in which they lived and spent time with their families. Those who did not have offices simply settled in their dachas and “rested” there, and those who did not have dachas, they settled in their box garages. Some people put their souls into cars and motorcycles. 7. The population of Western Ukraine differed in their attitude towards work. During the last years of the Soviet Union, the concepts of “a group of workers” and “labour” were strongly vulgarized. In Southeastern Ukraine, we have learned to create a semblance of activity – to show that we are in the process: always busy, industriously focused, always does something. At the same time, very few people were interested in the result, because people got money not for the result, and namely, for the effort, but for their participation in the process. Unlike us, zapadentsy always focused on results from labour. Such was life, and the fact was that they had not had the opportunity “to create a semblance of activity”. They always

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required results, and were paid for the result, not for the process. Therefore, western labour groups concentrated on results and did their work several times faster and better than groups of workers that were recruited from the residents of the southeastern region. 8. Western Ukraine was very different from the southeastern region in terms of religiosity. If in Southeastern Ukraine there was public ambivalence to religion, associated primarily with greediness and avarice of the priests themselves, then Western Ukraine was sincerely religious. In the western regions of Ukraine, Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Ukrainian Roman Catholic Churches have had greater influence. The priests of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church took an active part in the development of Ukraine’s independence. 9. A strong influence was exerted on Western Ukraine by the first and second waves of emigration to America. Maintaining the relationships with relatives, friends, and acquaintances in exile, it greatly reduced the effectiveness of Communist propaganda, fueled the belief in freedom and independence, and formed an alternative point of view on events in the Soviet Union and Ukraine.

1.7.3 Geophilosophy of Ukraine: Central Ukraine If the southeastern and western regions of Ukraine are two polar extremes of the Ukrainian nation, then Central Ukraine is a region that balances these extremes, and reduces them to unity. Central Ukraine combines the features of both southeastern and Western Ukraine, and at the same time softens them, achieving harmony and integrity. Central Ukraine is a geographical region that covers the Vinnitsa, Kirovograd, Poltava, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions. Central Ukraine is a real Ukraine. If Southeastern Ukraine is overly proRussian, “Russified”, and Western Ukraine is more concentrated on European values and that way of life, then Central Ukraine is more for self-identification, for its own path of development, for the continuation of the glorious thousand-year history of the Old Rus state. It is symbolic that the capital of Ukraine is Kyiv, located in Central Ukraine. With consideration for centralization of power and economy, in independent Ukraine, Kyiv and the Kyiv region has always had a privileged position. All money flows were pumped into Kyiv, all decisions were made in Kyiv,

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so the central region really personified the whole of Ukraine: with all its peculiarities and contradictions. The history of Central Ukraine is very similar to the history of Southeastern Ukraine. The only significant difference between these regions is that this region is less affected by the industrialization of the Soviet period. Except for the Kyiv region, this agricultural region contains the most fertile lands in Europe – due to the Ukrainian black soil. It is not surprising, but thanks to the agricultural direction and land values, Central Ukraine was much less affected by internal and external migration. Russian-speaking Kyiv contrasted greatly with the Ukrainian-speaking rural areas. Here, even at the time of the Soviet era, the people continued to speak the Ukrainian language that was “not fashionable” in the USSR, to preserve and develop their national and cultural traditions. A low population density and a relatively large percentage of the indigenous population contributed to the development of the special culture of this region. It kept the free spirit of its ancestors, the picturesque language of Taras Shevchenko and Nikolai Gogol, the love and considerate attitude towards Mother Earth. For the residents of Central Ukraine, the land was the mother “Nenka”. Whole dynasties of the population of this region faithfully served it: working the land, harvesting, and protecting it from invaders. I moved to Kyiv in early 2000. At the same time, I began teaching at Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky State Pedagogical University. The historic centre of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky became my second home for sixteen years. In spite of a closer attitude with the history of Southeastern Ukraine, the population of Central Ukraine’s mentality is very close to that of Western Ukraine. What features can be identified in the mentality of the population of this region? 1. In Central Ukraine, especially in the provinces, everybody only speaks Ukrainian. At university, I was the only one who spoke Russian. For a long time, up to the war with Russia, I had not paid attention to it, nor did anyone else. Although I know for sure that in some universities of Southeastern Ukraine, zealous officials made the university staff deliver lectures and conduct seminars only in Ukrainian. However, in our university there were no problems caused by language. The Ukrainian language of Central Ukraine, especially in Poltava, Kyiv and Chernihiv regions, is a pure Ukrainian. It contains neither Russims, nor Polish or

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Romanian phrases. How beautifully people sing in this region! What a rich and picturesque language of emotions, how many tinges and tones! 2. The main work in this region is agriculture. It is impossible to do nothing or to create a semblance of activity in agriculture. Therefore, the population of the region is mainly hard working and result-oriented. Lazy people in this region could not settle in. They moved to Southeastern Ukraine and found jobs at state-owned enterprises where they could blend into the group of workers, have a drink, and do nothing. Some devotees to rural areas stayed; those who loved the land and labouring on it. 3. The fertile black soil of Central Ukraine allowed people to grow good crops for the population from year to year. The Ukrainians of the central region were living slightly poorer than Southeastern Ukraine, but richer than the Ukrainians in the western region. Having gathered the harvest, residents of the central region could save money for trips around the country, e.g. to the seaside. They never had extra money, but thanks to the ground, they earned a living, providing a decent life, even during the economic downturn, through which Ukraine struggled. 4. The fertile lands gave not only a certain wealth to the houses; they also provided workers with spare time. In Central Ukraine, taking into account the seasonality of agricultural work, people had enough leisure time. However, they spent their leisure time differently than in Southeastern Ukraine. In Central Ukraine, people have a rest creatively, sometimes with the whole villages and communities. Epiphany (Theophany), Shrovetide, Easter, Trinity, Ivan Kupala Day (Feast of St. John the Baptist), Spas (one of several Russian church and folk festivals) and other public and religious holidays, which are celebrated within the framework of the culture and traditions: in bright Ukrainian robes, singing Ukrainian songs, with the involvement of all the neighbours, relatives, and friends. In celebration, all participants try to keep those features and details that were inherited from their ancestors. Therefore, festivities are not similar to each other; they convey all the nuances of the history and life of Ukraine. In Central Ukraine, many people treat historical and cultural traditions with great piety. 5. The population of Central Ukraine is more welcoming, hospitable, and frank. Though people were not too rich and lived off the land, the land gave sufficient harvest to receive guests warmly. The hospitality and restoration of historical and cultural traditions in modern times, in my

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opinion, are the main characteristics that are inherent to the population of this region. In Central Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP for short) takes the dominant religious position. It is a canonically unrecognised Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It was formed after independence and has been headed since 1995 by Patriarch Filaret (Denysenko), a former primate of the Russian Orthodox Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine, supported by the leadership of independent Ukraine. The Constituent (or otherwise dissenting) Council was held on 25–26 June 1992 in Kyiv. As of January 1 2010 in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate had 4,281 parishes, united in 32 dioceses. At the same time the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate had more than 11,000 parishes. Many people in Central Ukraine are believers. They truly believe in God and the Scripture, observing the traditions. Perhaps this is why the Ukrainians in this region are more open, sincere, spiritual, and lofty. Work on the land and unfeigned faith allowed them to endure various hardships, and their link with the past gave them strength. Perhaps that is why they believe in the future of Ukraine. They do not aspire to be a part of Russia, its culture and values; they do not see their future in the blind copying of European traditions. They have their own way: original and unique, which Ukraine as a European country is able to go through independently. Thus, in 1990, the locus of Ukrainian civilisation emerged, but despite the depth and stability of its rhizome, it was still conflicting and prone to further localisation into smaller loci. This was caused by a lack of a national idea, the markers of cultural identity to strengthen the surface and to establish itself as the single locus of civilisation.

1.8 Two main psychological types of Ukrainian The leading ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism of the first half of the 20th century, Dmytro Dontsov, in his studies paid close attention to the fundamentals of the Ukrainian mentality. Both Nikolay Berdyaev explored the peculiarities of the Russian soul, highlighting Asian and European styles in it and Dmytro Dontsov, using the richest arguments from the history of Ukraine, highlighted two main psychological types of Ukrainian, whose roots went back to the distant past. In his book “Where to Seek Our Historical Traditions”, Dontsov wrote: “There are gentry-peoples and

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“pleb” peoples (common people), the latter are called fellahs by Spengler. Taras Shevchenko also denoted them. Plebeians were “swineherds”, “buckwheat sowers”, and gentry-peoples – “the sons of Chivalry”, “Cossacks”, as if a special human kind were born not to dominate over someone, and on their own land; be the subject of life, and not the object, not clay in someone else’s hands, not “garbage” or “mud” [Dontsov, 2005: 89]. Then Dontsov mentioned that speaking about aristocrats (gentry people) and plebeians, he did not imply division “class and social, only psychological and typological” [Dontsov, 2005: 89]. Thus, based on convincing historiographical arguments of Dmytro Dontsov, and the words of Taras Shevchenko, we come to the understanding that limitrophe characteristics of Ukrainian statehood led to the formation of two main psychological types of Ukrainian: 1. Psychological type of a Cossack, a nobleman, a knight. It is the mentality of a warrior, a defender of his land, he is a sincere, open, freedom-loving, fair, incorruptible, and educated citizen of his motherland, aimed at the political, social, economic, and cultural development of his people; 2. Psychological type of a swineherd, a plebeian, a buckwheat sower. It is the mentality of a labourer, a plowman, who is willing to live under any authority so long as he is not touched; he is indifferent to everything, except his personal and isolated world; he is unsociable, secretive, cunning, insincere, narrow-minded, envious, willing to serve others, obsequious, and stingy. Unfortunately, the history of Ukraine is a gradual extinction (or more exactly, the destruction in the course of the wars, struggles, repressions, inefficiency of the system of education and upbringing) of the substitution of the Ukrainians of the first psychological type by the second type. In the late 20th century, Valery Chalidze even tried to create an abstract model of substitution of the “strong” psychological type by the “weak” [Chalidze, 1991].

1.9 Geophilosophy and corruption We also discuss the relation between geophilosophy and corruption; that gives us the right to use the methodology of geophilosophy for the

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investigation of corruption in Ukraine. Let us consider the advance information about a general characterisation of corruption. International experience (e.g. the researches of Michael Johnston [Johnston, 2005; Political Corruption, 2005], Mark Grossman [Grossman, 2008], Alexander Kirpichnikov [Kirpichnikov, 1997], Arnold J. Heidenheimer [Political Corruption, 2005], and others.), as well as the works of Ukrainian scientists: Mykola Melnyk [Melnyk, 2004], Eugene Nevmerzhitsky [Nevmerzhitsky, 2008], Oleg Bodnarchuk [Bodnarchuk, 2015], Alexander Kalman [Kalman, 2004], Yuri Kalnysha [Corruption in Ukraine, 2010], Vladimir Lanovoi [Lanovoi, 2015], and many others, which allow us to assert the following: 1. Corruption is a social phenomenon that is found in all the loci of modern civilisation. Currently, there is not a single state or culture in which there is no corruption. Even in Denmark, New Zealand, and Finland, which, according to Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International, took the first three places, receiving out of 100 scores of only 92, 91, and 89 respectively [Transparency, 2014]. Corruption is an essential attribute of the public authority. Separate loci of modern civilisation are distinguished not by the presence or absence of corruption per se, but its scale, nature of corrupt practices, and the influence of corruption on social, economic, and political processes. 2. The history of corruption is a few thousand years old and is closely linked to the history of human civilisation (this issue was deeply researched in the monograph of Eugene Nevmerzhitsky [Nevmerzhitsky, 2008]). It can be argued that corruption is a consequence of the development of a person’s mentality, which was accompanied, is accompanied, and perhaps, will be accompanied by his evolution in the future. Corruption refers to human vices and is studied by psychologists on a par with greediness, envy, laziness, interests, avarice, and others. Interesting arguments on this issue were put forward by Jon Elster, who points out that human vices have not always had a harmful effect on the community; they have also had a positive social effect due to their presence and practices [Elster, 1989]. 3. On an international level, the fight against corruption was organised and led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (http://www.oecd.org/). One of the recent publications of this organisation is “The OECD Convention on Bribery: A Commentary” [The

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OECD Convention, 2014]. This monograph defines bribery as an offer, promise, or passing of anything that can influence public officials in the performance of their official duties. In scientific literature, there is no single definition of corruption. This issue was considered in the monographs of Mykola Melnyk [Melnyk, 2004] and Eugene Nevmerzhitsky [Nevmerzhitsky, 2008]. For the most part, corruption is understood as bribery and any other remuneration, which was entrusted to a person for the performance of certain duties in the public or private sector, leading to a breach of the obligations imposed on him according to the status of a public official, a private employee, an independent agent, or any other type of relation with the purpose of obtaining any illegal benefits for themselves and others [Corruption, 2011]. There are a number of concepts concerning corruption: – “Protectionism” and “protection” – a system of informal political and administrative relations and services that lead to the rise of the family, compatriot and corporate clans as groups of political, economic, intellectual, and power support of their patrons; – “Nepotism” – the appointment of relatives, friends, or associates to profitable positions, providing them official patronage; – “Favouritism” – benefits and advantages of the high-ranking official patronage; – “Pull” – the use of personal connections and relationships for personal selfish interests; – “Clientelism”, “patronage”, “patron-client relations”, “solidarity networks”, “mutual support”, “influence peddling” [Germenchuk, 2010]. As we have said, corruption is a social phenomenon, which not only covers each locus of Earth’s civilisation, but also affects endless localisation of the Earth’s surface. Arnold J. Heidenheimer [Political Corruption, 2005], Michael Johnston [Johnston, 2005; Political Corruption, 2005], Eugene Nevmerzhitsky [Nevmerzhitsky, 2008], and other authors pay special attention to political corruption, which, more often than other types of corruption, leads to revolutions and the boundary changes of the loci of civilisation. Political corruption affects the formation and functioning of the governing bodies, the adoption and implementation of political decisions, and the destinies of whole nations.

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For this reason, corruption falls into the sphere of interests of geophilosophy, because, if not taking into account the degree of corruption of the society and the public authorities, it will be impossible to predict qualitatively the development of the locus of civilisation on the Earth’s surface and to research the process of endless localisation of the cultures.

1.10 Geophilisophy, corruption and Ukraine In 2003, according to a poll of Ukrainians, 8 per cent of respondents said that corruption in Ukraine was a normal phenomenon, which corresponded to national-cultural traditions [Nevmerzhitsky, 2008]. In 2014, the real situation was described to Master’s level students of the Faculty of Law at the Kyiv University of Tourism, Economics, and Law. On 18 June 2014 in broad daylight in the city centre, a seventeen-year-old daughter of a lecturer of the university was knocked down on a pedestrian crossing by a bus in front of dozens of witnesses. The seriously injured girl was taken to hospital, and that was confirmed by medical reports. However, the lawyer who took that case said that the investigator, Andrei Senchenko, had been given a bribe from the owner of the bus fleet to the amount of $3, 000, and that was why he refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the driver of the bus. Having told that situation to 52 students who were studying the law, future lawyers were asked: “How would they act in that situation: refuse to take a bribe and force the driver to carry a criminal sanction, or take $3, 000 and hush up the case?” All 52 students answered that they would choose money. The author realises that to explain the mass corruption mentality of Ukrainians by 2014 it was necessary to explore a whole range of factors: political, economic, legal, organisational, managerial, social, psychological, and others. The author also takes into account a certain influence of cultural and historical assumptions, which modern researchers of corruption in Ukraine discover in the history of the Russian Federation, in the sphere of interests of which Ukraine was developing (e.g. research by Mykola Melnyk [Melnyk, 2004] and Eugene Nevmerzhitsky [Nevmerzhitsky, 2008]). However, the author believes that in 1990, Ukraine received a unique opportunity: to establish itself as a separate and independent locus of civilisation. Moreover, why, during 24 years of independence, Ukraine did not do anything, is a direct fault of five presidents of Ukraine and a number of leading Ukrainian politicians. By the laws of Ukraine, very few people had the exclusive right to determine

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domestic and foreign policy, which was an integral part of the anticorruption policy and its implementation. The author realises that Ukrainian politicians are a mirror of the Ukrainian society that was being formed and supported by society. However, for the recovery of the society it is important to remember who has brought this disease, and what happened during its unconsciousness, to find the guilty after the final recovery. The society must get back what was stolen from it during its unconsciousness. The thief, no matter who he is – the president, a top-ranking official or an ordinary citizen, – should be punished, and a host should receive back a hundredfold return.

1.11 Corruption in the USSR Before we proceed to the consideration of corruption in Ukraine, let’s analyse the level of corruption in Ukrainian society on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union in general. In the last decade of the USSR, the people earned more than they could spend. Many factors influenced on the state of the economy, one of which was a change in the price of oil. In the 1970s, when oil prices increased, salaries of the Soviet Union population also increased, and when the price of oil in the early 1980s “fell”, the party leaders were not able to afford to “cut down wages” or decontrol the prices of a wide range of goods. It turned out that in the last decade before the collapse, the people of the Soviet Union lived beyond their means, “having spent” the budget, they moved rapidly to economic collapse. The shortage of consumer goods created a new kind of relationship in the USSR. People who had direct access to scarce goods: sellers, workers of the distribution centres, and other representatives of trade organisations, began to enjoy prestige and authority in the country. For a symbolic fee (small favours, a present, and a small overpayment for goods), they opened access to goods that were not on the shop racks yet, but this was only for their friends. A new incoming range of goods from the factory was being sold only “through good connections” from the warehouses, not even reaching the retail shelves. The representatives of the trade under the Soviet regime were not impudent; they were greatly afraid of the regulatory authorities that could imprison them for stealing state property, without pity and fully of Soviet laws. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, it was this stratum of the

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population who were better prepared and knew the laws of the market economy. Trade of consumer goods was developing on a full scale, not through state-owned shops, but “through connections”, from hands to hands, and further reselling. The goods were being sold to those who generously overpaid or offered instead “something better”. The goods that were bought by the last customer were sold at a much higher price. Speculation of the consumer goods was associated with the early years of Ukraine’s independence. Thus, a harbinger of corruption in Ukraine was “connections”, which became an integral part of Soviet society in the last years of the USSR.

1.11.1 Free medical services guaranteed by the state in the Soviet Union My mother has worked in medical services as a massage therapist for 40 years. With full responsibility, by the example of my family, I claim that medicine in the Soviet Union was free, and the attitude of health workers to the population was equal. However, if you look closely, and at the medical services since the Soviet period, there were certain preconditions that escalated into open corruption schemes during the years of independence. In my opinion, the fault lay primarily with the state, which made a bet on giving patients the same rights as doctors. However, doctors and patients were people with different worldviews, and different levels of professionalism and creativity. They naturally could not be equalized under certain average rates. I remember well that from the Soviet times people divided the doctors into “good” and “bad”. “Good” doctors and nurses were professionals that were responsible for their work. “Bad” were those healthcare workers who, for various reasons, lost their professional skills. Due to different gifts, such as food – boxes of sweets, poultry, and alcohol – the famous Armenian cognac, very often it was home-distilled vodka and thus very cheap, but people wanted to consult with “good” doctors. Another confidential privilege in the medical environment in the years of Soviet power was the ability to “place” their children into medical establishments. Within the medical community, the children of health care workers choosing the profession of their parents was openly welcomed. Officials in medicine kept calm at the entrance exams and were indulgent to physicians’ children. It looked as follows. A parent (doctor or nurse) with his/her offspring made an appointment to see the rector of the

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medical institute. The rector took them, asked a few questions to the offspring, and if he saw a young adequate man, he made a note. In 90 per cent of cases, such an “interview” worked, and a young man was matriculated. At examinations, the medical care workers’ children received scores higher than the other applicants. I note that the “interview” with the rector was often carried out without any “gifts”. The rector often provided services to the colleagues unselfishly. Although some of them came with “gifts”.

1.11.2 Benefits in the education system in the last years of the USSR Until 1990 in the education system, family dynasties were also welcomed. However, the level of knowledge of the applicant played a more important role. I want to note that education in the Soviet Union and even in the first years of independent Ukraine was separate from the corruption schemes. Students studied, passed exams, and the marks on the diplomas of an overwhelming number of graduates corresponded to their actual level of knowledge.

1.11.3 Benefits of the ruling political elite. Addiction to luxury and excesses of the party nomenclatura The Soviet nomenclatura is a concept that refers to the “elite” stratum of the population of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc. This stratum held various key managerial positions in all sectors in these countries: in government, industry, agriculture, education, and so on. Sergey Haytun, in the book «Nomenclature against Russia: an Evolutionary Dead End», argued the destructive role of the nomenclature for the USSR and any other society [Haytun, 2014]. Michael Voslensky, in the book «Nomenclature», estimates the number of officials as about 3 million people, with their family members in the Brezhnev era (1970 – 1980) [Voslensky, 2005]. However, I note that a bureaucratic caste lived in secret, hiding their wealth behind the guarded high fences of the government houses and residences. For the public, a frightening contrast between the luxurious life of the party leaders and ordinary Soviet people was revealed only in the last years of Gorbachev’s perestroika. Prior to that, the overwhelming majority of the population believed in unselfish work, with total absorption of party and industry officials for the benefit of the Soviet people and the communist future of the Soviet Union.

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Personally, it was my first serious encounter with impressive breadth of life of high-ranking Soviet officials in 1994, once I had a chance to visit the villa, the owner of which was Mikhail Gorbachev in the village of Myussera; it is 8 kilometres south of Pitsunda (currently a partially recognised state, the Republic of Abkhazia or Aphsny). Several of my friends were guarding the closed area. One day when the bosses were absent, they conducted a tour in the villa of the only president of the USSR who was ever awarded a Nobel Peace Prize. I note that that was one of the numerous villas of Mikhail Gorbachev, and not his main residence. Having seen the splendours and luxuries of the villa, it caused astonishment bordering on shock. At that time, besides the panel apartment buildings (in which my generation mainly grew) and modest one-storey private houses, in which my grandmothers lived, I did not know about the existence of other private property. Gorbachev’s villa was located on 50 hectares of the Pitsunda-Myussera Biosphere Reserve, it was a five-storey building, two stories of which were below ground, there was a beach with mooring for submarines, and the interior overshadowed the residences of French kings in Versailles and Fontainebleau, where I have been much later. All that wealth was “a gift” to Mikhail Gorbachev from the Georgian people. If one speaks the language of the corrupt officials, it was the bribe to the boss from the head of the republican scale immediately after his election to the head of the Soviet Union in 1985. Then, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, chose the place and personally oversaw the construction of the villa. The decorative work in the study rooms, guest rooms, and stained-glass windows was personally done by the venerable painter, sculptor, and designer, Zurab Tsereteli. I was sitting at Gorbachev’s marble writing desk and was astonished by the arrogance of decoration of Raisa Gorbachev’s bedroom and study room; she personally supervised the construction of the villa and several times forced the work, which had already been done, to be done again. For the first time I saw a home cinema for 20 people. I was amazed, having seen the steam room, in which the pipes, valves, bolts, and nails were all made of expensive types of wood. However, the pool that could be filled at the request of Gorbachev and his wife with fresh or seawater (intake pipes were specially deepened a few kilometres into the sea), did not astonish me.

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This “Gift” of such scale to the leader of the country from the head of one of the fifteen republics in 1985 was most probably accepted as due, if Raisa Gorbachev personally supervised the construction of the “dacha”. While Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife perceived Myussera Palace as “a dacha”, the Soviet people’s wildest dreams were to live in a two-room apartment (46 m2) in a panel building with a kitchen of seven m2! I learned more about the privileges of the ruling Soviet nomenclatura later. Since the mid 90s, in the media and in historic and scientific monographs, the authors described the bohemian life of the ruling elite and their families, their extra support in education, medicine, commerce, life. After 2000, I myself was convinced of insincerity and a double life of the Soviet nomenclatura. I was invited already as a scholar, a specialist in modern educational technologies, to a conference under the auspices of the regional leadership in Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. Regional highranking officials, who came mainly from the Soviet nomenclatura, demonstrating new vagaries of fashion, showed their democratic views, invited scientists to “their own” villas. In fact, the villas belonged to the state ownership, as the nomenclatura held high-ranking positions for many years (up to a ripe old age), so they considered the villas “their own”. Accordingly, the attitude of the officials to public property and to the staff (I note, to civil employees too) was akin to a private property. The conversations with the heads of the regions were held privately at the tables groaning under the weight of an abundance of rich foods and beverages in the luxurious atmosphere of the city banquet halls or suburban residences (without casual observers). We could not eat even a tenth of the prepared food. Love to the most beautiful places of nature, excess and wealth, and at the same time, wretchedness of the rulers’ mentality were passed to the modern leaders of post-Soviet states from the Soviet nomenclatura, and the Soviet nomenclatura got it from Asian and African dictatorships. It turned out that the Soviet nomenclatura was not only using the privileges of the ruling bourgeois class for decades, vilifying them mercilessly from rostrums of party congresses, but also that they gave birth and raised their children in wealth and luxuries! Children of the Soviet nomenclatura grew up in wealth and satiety, they enjoyed the benefits they took for granted, and did not even realise that generations of workers and peasants during the 50s–80s, their fellow citizens, were not even aware of the existence of such a life. The Soviet people were

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accustomed to asceticism, to living in spartan conditions, so minimalism and simplicity of life, were perceived by the Soviet people as the norms of living. Thus, we come to the second key conclusion of this book: that the Ukrainian people on the eve of independence had nothing to do with corruption. The people lived in poverty and did not even realise it. Corruption in Ukraine was not connected with the collapse of the USSR and the heritage, which the Ukrainians got from the Soviet mentality. Corruption in Ukraine is a consequence of state policy of the Ukrainian ruling elite, which, from the Soviet period, used to live as a privileged class.

CHAPTER TWO 14 YEARS OF AUTHORITARIANISM (BETWEEN 1990 AND 2004): HOW THE UKRAINIANS LEARNT TO GIVE AND TAKE BRIBES

In Chapter 1, exploring the geophilosophy of Ukraine, we have come to two conclusions: 1. The junction of two major cultures runs on the territory of Ukraine: Byzantine-Asian and European. This junction arouses a powerful energy of confrontation in communication, which manifests itself in different forms, the most brutal wars, armed conflicts, and political, social, and economic expansions. The Ukrainian territory was more than 800 years under the constant powerful press, oppression, and pressure from two loci of civilisation. In the course of centuries-old confrontation between the Russian Empire and European states, the nation is most active, creative, and brightest part disappeared. According to Taras Shevchenko’s terminology, the psychological type of the nation, which was described as chivalrous, elite Cossack was perishing. According to Oksana Mikolyuk, Ukraine lost nine million of its citizens during World War II. It consisted of irrecoverable losses of the Red Army soldiers (2.4 million), red partisans and citizen soldiers (0.2 million), soldiers – citizens of Ukraine as a part of military units of other states and armed groups in the UPA (0.3 million), losses as a result of migration of Ukrainians from the USSR abroad (1.7 million), losses among the civilian population – 4.4 million (people died of the mass terror of occupiers, and the catastrophic deterioration of living conditions) [Mikolyuk, 2003]. The Ukrainian scientists have estimated that if Ukraine managed to avoid all the catastrophes, wars, the Ukrainian Genocide Famine (Holodomor) and other social upheavals of the 20th century, the population of Ukraine

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would not be less than 43 million people, and it would be over 85 million [Mikolyuk, 2003]. 2. The Ukrainian nation, on the eve of its independence, had nothing to do with corruption. Corruption in Ukraine had nothing to do with the collapse of the USSR and the heritage, which was inherited by the Ukrainians from their Soviet past. Corruption in Ukraine is a consequence of the state policy of the ruling Ukrainian elite, which used to live as a privileged class in Soviet times, and in their mentality, in which prevailed the features of “Wild Asians” in the terminology of Nikolai Berdyaev [Berdyaev, 1990]. In the second chapter we consider how the nomenclatura past of the first two presidents of Ukraine: Leonid Kravchuk (1991–1994) and Leonid Kuchma (1994–2005) contributed to establishing the authoritarianoligarchic regime in Ukraine; creating a model of the corrupt triangle; and consolidating in the Ukrainians’ disrespect towards the law and power. We will try to prove that the political corruption of the first two presidents of Ukraine affected the fact that Ukraine had missed a unique chance that was given in 1990 – to become an independent locus of civilisation. In the mentality of Kravchuk and Kuchma the characteristics manifested that formed the basis of political corruption: 1. Indifference to people; 2. Venality; 3. Indifference to the interests of the state; 4. Incompetence; 5. Irresponsibility. We see how Kravchuk and Kuchma gave rise to a special, impartial type of Ukrainian politician, who corresponded to their inferior, nomenclature mentality.

2.1 The historic watershed: the honest citizens became the poor; the impudent ones became the rich For the first time in my life, I saw a foreign currency banknote (it was $10) in December 1991, at my two-month old daughter’s christening party. Jura Kovalenko, my school friend, with whom I had been sharing the same desk for the last five years at school, brought it. I invited him to be a godfather for my daughter. He had already been working as a sailor on a

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fishing trawler in Kerch for two years and earned in my understanding crazy money, it was about $500 a month! At that time, I was a senior lieutenant of a special police unit and earned 220 rubles (in December 1991 that was equivalent to less than $10). With such a salary, I could neither feed my family, nor help my parents. On the contrary, my parents helped me. Several times a month they sent food, sometimes money from Ukraine to Moscow. For comparison, a wage of the tram driver was 250 rubles in Moscow at year-end 1991. Thus, in the USSR, where everything was embraced by perestroika, a tram driver earned more than an officer, having combat experience, awards, and seven years experience in defending the country! And, if one takes into account that the commercial rate of the State Bank in April 1991 was equal to 1.75 rubles per dollar, and the black market rate was 30–33 rubles per dollar, then in contrast even with 1990 in the Soviet Union the people became poorer by almost 20 times! In 1992, after the collapse of the USSR, according to Maxim Mikhailovsky, my average wage was 116 times lower than the average wage of an American citizen [Mikhailovsky, 2015]! In 1992, I decided to resign from the army. I could not feed my family for the money that I got from the state. I returned to Ukraine, my hometown of Lozova, Kharkiv region. I began to do business. By the end of 2004, my business allowed me to earn no less than 10 thousand dollars a month. Having seen my success, my school friend Yuriy Kovalenko left the sea and tried to become a businessperson. I helped him, explaining how best to do it, but it turned out hard for him. He did not understand the nuances and details of the organisation and routine of business in Ukraine. What has changed in Ukraine in 12 years? Why could not all Ukrainians who wanted to become businesspersons do it? I know the answers to these questions: First, they did not know the peculiarities of doing business in Ukraine, and the organisation of business in Ukraine had its own specificity. Secondly, they did not have “connections”, and in Ukraine, “connections” solved everything! While my friend Yura plied the vastness of the ocean on board the fishing trawler, I, and my generation, learned to survive by the rules and laws that

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every year divided the Ukrainians into rich and poor more and more, those who could give and take bribes and those who tried to live honestly. “Honest” Ukrainians were getting fewer and fewer. Over the course of time, they understood the fallacy of the selected position in life and tried to change something to make up for lost time. They became more corrupt than those who went to conciliation with their conscience before. They betrayed and sold all that had remained sacred even for the first generations of corrupt officials. However, it was too late. All close connections with the “elite” had already been busy.

2.2 Ukraine 1991–1996: unity of business and crime Conditionally, union of business and crime in Ukraine in the period 1991– 1996 occurred in three periods: 1. The period of “speculators”; 2. Criminality as a way to protect the business; 3. Criminality as the head of business Let us consider these periods in detail and try to investigate the causes of such a shameful phenomenon in the history of Ukraine.

2.2.1 The first period of “speculators” I would remind you that the years 1985–1990 were a period of the socalled “Gorbachev’s perestroika”. On March 11 1985, after the death of Konstantin Chernenko, “young” political leader Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union. At the time of the elections, Gorbachev was 54 years old. When compared with his predecessors, who became the leader at 70 years old or even older, Mikhail Gorbachev was really young, energetic, and active. The Soviet elite laid their hopes on him. Did he justify them? Now, decades later, many researchers have different opinions about Gorbachev’s time in power. On the post of Head of State and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (it was the highest position in the USSR), Mikhail Gorbachev initiated perestroika in all spheres of life. As a result, this perestroika led not only to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of fifteen

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independent countries in the world, but also affected the course of the development of civilisation. Under Mikhail Gorbachev the following important events occurred: 1. Attempts at large-scale sustainable reforms of the Soviet system of statehood; 2. Introduction to the USSR policies of glasnost, freedom of speech and press, democratic elections, reforming a socialist-type economy towards a market-based economic model; 3. The end of the Cold War; 4. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (1989); 5. Renouncement of state status of the communist ideology and the persecution of dissidents; 6. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as a result of the transition of the USSR and the socialist Eastern European countries to a market economy and democracy. From the point of view of geophilosophy, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated two fundamental processes: 1. The change of the political system: dismantling of totalitarianism and building a democratic society; 2. The turn of the USSR’s previously cultural isolation to the values of European culture. It was not Vladimir Putin who broke the Yalta Agreement 1945 of the post-war world order, having annexed Crimea in 2014. Mikhail Gorbachev broke the Yalta agreement, after 40 years. From the point of view of geophilosophy, having destroyed the USSR and the Eastern Bloc (Socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, led by the USSR), Gorbachev changed the borders of locus of the Byzantine-Asian civilisation and returned them on the borderline that ran through the territory of Ukraine. Apparently, thanks to this, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990. Mikhail Gorbachev really brought peace and tranquility to Europe, having pushed back the aggressive and alien parts of Western civilisation from the borders and the culture of Russian civilisation, Mikhail Gorbachev really brought peace and tranquility to Europe (in contrast to the cruel days of Soviet life under Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, as well as the impartial and not widely known features of Soviet culture, the son of the famous Soviet writer and playwright Vladimir Bill-Belotserkovsky – Vadim Belotserkovsky wrote

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in his monograph “Travel Into the Future and Back Again: The Story of Life and Ideas” [Belotserkovsky, 2003]). However, if the changing of the territorial borderlines of two opposing cultures was carried out relatively quickly (for the period 1989–1991), then the need for the changing of people’s mentality took time. Behind a series of successive events, starting from the reunification of Germany in October 1990 and ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact (December 1991), there were the fates of hundreds of millions of people of different nationalities. They were all faced with one important problem, the need to revise their value orientations, the foundations of their worldview. For 70 years, whole generations had grown up and got education in the totalitarian state under the influence of communist ideology. Mikhail Gorbachev with his perestroika was not just stimulating the changes in people’s lives, he was trying to put hundreds of millions of people in front of a reality that required a completely new mentality: assessment of events, values, the ways of solving, and standards of behaviour. People had to rethink their past and future, their achievements and failures, their heroes and enemies, goals and objectives. Yesterday’s enemies were the United States and NATO countries, their “bourgeois” lifestyle, which was always presented by the Soviet ideology from a negative point of view, and at present their culture has become not merely allied, on the contrary, it became an ideal model for emulation. At the same time, the communist future that the Soviet people had been approaching for decades, in which tens of millions of people believed, and to the achievement of which they devoted their lives, turned out to be a beautiful dream that had nothing to do with the harsh Soviet reality. Rethinking on such a scale took time. Therefore, the older a generation was, the more time they took to realise and recognise the necessity of internal restructuring. That is why the first “businesspersons” in postSoviet territories were the people who had knowledge, skills, and abilities for the market economy: the representatives of commerce, supply, and sales departments, the children of the Communist Party nomenclatura, who travelled and got education abroad and were familiar with the European culture and market economy. The vast majority of the population of the USSR had never travelled abroad, so they could not imagine how hard it would be for them to change their mentality. During the years of the Soviet Union, people were taught to be obedient to authority, be devoted to work, and to fulfil the Communist Party and leaders’ tasks unquestioningly. The typical image of a Soviet man is

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apolitical, obedient to chiefs, and passive, his whole life he honestly worked at the same enterprise or plant, with the same staff, at the same time: from 8.00 a.m. til 5.00 p.m. (or in shifts: day, night, 48 hours of rest). A Soviet man had been accustomed to lead an ascetic way of life; he spent his free time watching TV, or worked on the land around the country house to provide his family with vegetables, fruit, and berries. A Soviet man’s ultimate dream was a separate apartment, a car, and once a year a family trip to the seaside. The market economy required very different qualities: to be ambitious, responsible, mobile, and competitive, to have internal freedom and desires to follow the norms of law, rather than the orders of the leaders... It is because of a striking discrepancy in mentality, that the basic mass of Soviet citizens did not take a new layer of society ௅ “businesspersons”. They were often called “speculators”, an insulting nickname, behind which was hidden the contempt for a new “profession” and its philosophy. The society rejected and condemned “speculators” with which were associated such negative traits as a swagger, arrogance, cunning, hypocrisy, commercialism, and thrift. The people believed that “speculators” parasitised the society, explaining it as vestiges of the bourgeoisie, and their wealth was made or acquired through dishonest means. The first Ukrainian “businesspersons” knew the weaknesses of a decaying economy of the USSR, using this information they enriched themselves during a few months. The more impudent and insolent a “businessperson” was, the faster he grew rich. For example, at the large public enterprises, the inventory accounting was depended on storekeepers. Storekeepers learned to write off the goods of the enterprises for recycling or for specific needs. However, in fact, the goods (belonging neither to a citizen nor to the state) were sold for nothing the next day to the dealers, who brought “written off” goods to the markets and sold them at a price below their production costs! The first post-Soviet “businesspersons” were robbing the state brazenly and cynically. The range of goods that were stolen from the enterprises were impressive enough! In the early 90s, in the secondhand goods market and “by pulling strings”, one could buy everything, up to a tank or combat aircraft. In the Soviet Union, there was no private property. All that was built and erected for decades belonged to the state. Following the logic of socialist

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management, the state was the people. All that belonged to the state belonged to the people. Because of this logic, in the Soviet Union, stereotypes were formed: if in the country, everything belonged to the people, and the people was I, then that means that the place where I work (or a tool or other means of production), belongs to either me, or no one. The people had such extreme attitudes towards public property, either seeing it as their own, i.e. responsible, or seeing it as belonging to no one, i.e. indifferent. Therefore, the first Ukrainian businesspersons ௅ “speculators” and “dealers” either easily established contacts with the indifferent and unconcerned men regarding public property, through these contacts, ruining the state-owned enterprises and enriching themselves, or met resistance from responsible officials, who were anxious about state property and thereby made problems for “businesspersons”. They could not steal and make good at the public expense. Businesspersons were looking for ways of pressure or elimination of the responsible officials, often using criminal methods.

2.2.2 The second period ௅ crime as a way to protect business The transition from planned economics to market economics was accompanied by not only a change of philosophical foundations of whole nations, but also a change of legislation. If someone went beyond the law in the USSR, then such actions were considered as immoral, criminal and condemned, but in the new reality, they are encouraged. The old laws were repealed; the new ones had not been clearly defined. The formation of legislative “holes” allowed for cleaning out the state with impunity. In some spheres of activity, between crime and lawful acts, uncertainty emerged. For example, how was the first million dollars earned by our current Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko? According to official data, which is published in his biography, Petro Poroshenko, with his older brother, created the private business that replaced functioning of some state structures in the years of Soviet power. During the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, there were close economic ties between enterprises, which allowed, for example, the equipment to be manufactured in Poland, raw material to be purchased in Hungary, the factory to be run in Kyiv, and the finished product to be sold anywhere in the Soviet Union. After the decay of the Soviet Union, the decade’s old established ties were ruined. The borders and customs were changed, new laws emerged, but the need for manufacturing and sales remained. It was that niche that was occupied by such young and energetic people like Poroshenko and his brother, who, thanks to the father’s and father-in-law’s coat-tails (the

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former nomenclatura of the Soviet workers), as well as thanks to new acquaintances, began to serve as the intermediaries between the enterprises that were located in the various states. On the one hand, they did a good thing: they were delivering the raw materials or components required by the enterprises of this or that sector of industry and then partially took it upon themselves to create the output. However, on the other hand, they did not pay taxes to the state, dumping the prices, and, owing to the connections and personal relationships, they monopolised the whole market direction. In fact, the market did not dictate the terms, “businesspersons” dictated the terms to the public enterprises, which subsequently went bankrupt and was later bought for nothing. Ukrainian legislation did not meet the requirements of market economies for a long time. In this legislative chaos, the authorities were interested, and those who felt euphoria from easy money became the first Ukrainian “businesspersons”. Although, legislative “holes” allowed for cleaning out the state property in impunity, they did not guarantee the protection of businesspersons’ interests. How could one protect capital, which was acquired for a few months and besides, for stealing state property? The first Ukrainian millionaires were completely vulnerable to competitors, debtors, and partners. They were the ordinary engineers and workers in the commerce sector, those who stole a million or more successfully and illegally from the state, who began to worry about their wealth, about the fate of the Soviet Union’s unprecedented luxury surrounding them. New millionaires began to recruit athletes, mainly boxers, wrestlers, karatekas, former officers of the Special Forces, or people with criminal records. They vested them with the following functions: 1) to “chase up” debts from debtors (take money by any means, up to acts of force); 2) to guard business (shops, offices, banks); 3) to guard them and their family members. Owing to the force of circumstances, may be because of misunderstanding, the new Ukrainian millionaires let the guards into their semi-criminal business, disclosing the information about their enrichment. Boasting and lawlessness, the rule of force and the power of the purse led to the fact that the guards began to unite and took over the business of their “masters”. It turned out to be much easier to steal from a thief than to rob the state. The thief cannot seek help from the authorities. The thief is helpless against a gang of thieves.

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2.2.3 The third period ௅ criminality is at the head of business Criminality quickly laid hands on the business. We can say that business was headed by criminality. When the functions of the state were not defined, when any intellectual could be an easy victim of physical violence, in Ukraine a symbiosis was formed: intelligent people united with physically strong ones. In the period of 1991–1996 in Ukraine, business and criminality were not separated. Any businessperson could not be without a “roof” (a protection racket – known as a krysha, the Russian word for “roof”) of this or that criminal gangs. He either paid the tribute for his safety (from 10 to 30 per cent of business profit), or went shares with the thugs (from 50 to 70 per cent of the profit to pay to the thugs), or he could earn 10 per cent of mediation in various shady schemes, which were related primarily with the ruin of the state enterprises.

2.3 The Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk clans The most powerful and influential criminal groups in Ukraine in the period 1991–1996 were the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk clans. They were the most wealthy, numerous, well armed, united, and aggressive. In brief, by my own example I tell how money was made in that period of Ukrainian history. I like Petro Poroshenko and his brother, as well as many other current Ukrainian oligarchs and millionaires, took advantage of the problems that arose in the Ukrainian economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of boundaries between previously common economic spaces. Self-isolation of the former “fraternal” republics of the USSR led to the fact that the long-established economic ties were ruptured. Local leaders, on the one hand, had the free and uncontrolled power, but on the other hand, they did not know what to do with this freedom in a market economy. After the disintegration of the USSR, in Ukraine the lustrations were not carried out, so the politicians and the officials from the era of “stagnation” and the collapse of the Soviet Union were engaged in the formation of a “new”, directed to European values, Ukrainian state. The nomenclatura, who had the privileged life in the Soviet Union and retained power in the newly independent state, realised the European direction of Ukraine in

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their own way: they stopped being afraid of people and hiding their income, they began a new life, showing off their luxury and extravagance. The old Soviet nomenclatura, which came from the Soviet Union to independent Ukraine, versed well in the problems and weaknesses of the economy of the state. However, they not only contributed to the development of the market economy and the elimination of legislative “holes”, but in every possible way they obstructed the process of transition (about corruption and the corrupting influence of the bureaucracy in the post-Soviet states, Eugene Nevmerzhitsky [Nevmerzhitsky, 2008], Leslie Holmes [Holmes, 2006], Sergei Haytun [Haytun, 2014], and others wrote in their works). The first president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk and the majority of his associates, as leaders, made their careers in the Communist Party during the Soviet era, so they were supporters of the planned economy, the old school of communist politics. The need to delegate their powers to third parties did not suit them at all. Mentally linked with the era of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s rulers embraced a market economy as an opportunity to usurp “legally” that which formerly belonged to the state. No, wonder that most of the privatised enterprises belonged not to the workforce, but to the heads of the enterprises. Using administrative resources and the support of government officials, the nomenclatura actually became the autocratic owners of various enterprises. The larger enterprises were the richer region, and the former party and industrial bosses grabbed the larger “tidbits”. In Ukraine, historically, all the major enterprises of the former USSR were concentrated in two regions: Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk, as well as in the two largest cities: Kyiv and Kharkiv. The defense industry was located in Kyiv and Kharkiv, which had not been privatised before the first wave occurred. Under President Leonid Kravchuk, this industry remained under state ownership. However, the enterprises of Mining and Metallurgical Complex of all-Union scale were passed into private ownership. The executives of the enterprises that had been supporting the industrial might of the Soviet Union for a long time became their autocratic masters. Billions of funds that were the prime source of revenue for the government of the USSR, and thanks to which 250 million people of the USSR who could live and feed themselves, began flowing into the pockets of the former directors. They were called “red directors”. Red is a symbol of the Communist Party and of the Soviet Union. Within months of the independence of Ukraine, the red directors turned into dollar millionaires,

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because 90 per cent of the enterprises were concentrated in the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk regions. Thus, the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk party and industrial “elite” became fabulously rich within the first years of the independence of Ukraine. In Ukraine, on this basis there was the formation of two major financial and industrial clans: Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk. Since about 1992, the clans began to fight for political leadership in the state. First, the struggle took place in the alliance against Kyiv politicians, led by President Leonid Kravchuk, and after coming to power Leonid Kuchma, who was one of the most influential red directors in the Dnepropetrovsk clan, the war for the “sphere of influence” broke out between them. Since 1991, after the (second) official Declaration of Independence of Ukraine, most of the money, which was earned by the industrial giants, ended up in their pockets and did not get to the State Treasury. The fabulous treasure, due to which the USSR was flourishing (Mining and Metallurgical Complex was the pride and symbol of the Soviet era), was concentrated in the hands of a few dozen “new Ukrainians” and a narrow circle of people, filling their pockets. Resignation, indifference, and avolition ingrained in the Ukrainians’ character by the communist totalitarian regime during decades, as well as in their fear of power, allowed the red directors not only to retain power in the independent Ukrainian state, but thanks to the “equitable” distribution of wealth, the physical elimination of rivals and malcontents, it also meant they could increase it. The totalitarian power of the Soviet Union, which was unable to compete with European democracy, disintegrated. However, instead of it, in the newly independent states the authoritarian-oligarchic power began to emerge. Instead of the dictatorship of the Soviet nomenclatura under the auspices of the Communist Party, a cult of personality emerged, such “indispensable” politicians, businesspersons, benefactors, and oligarchs. The largest totalitarian state of the 20th century was replaced by more than a dozen post-Soviet authoritarian regimes, which began to control people’s destiny at their own discretion.

2.4 My first steps in business Watching TV and listening to the stories of Ukrainian oligarchs, politicians, or businesspersons concerning “how I earned my first million”, their stories made me laugh... bitterly. They all were telling untruth or more precisely – a half-truth. None of them earned the first million

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honestly. In Ukraine, it was impossible. In fact, someone made their “first million” thanks to their “connections” in politics (protection, nepotism, favoritism, etc.), someone, through schemes, obtained state property, and someone was able to make money through crime: racketeering, fraud, forgery, and deception. All enrichment was carried out mainly due to robbing the state. In Ukraine, it was not a shame to rob the state. Soviet mentality “if something is public, means that it belongs to no one” passed into the Ukrainians’ mentality. In each sector of the economy, there were some “vampires” who sucked funds that fed the state and its institutions. Every year the richest republic was bled white, and the vampires became millionaires and billionaires. If you read the biographies of the current Ukrainian oligarchs, you will see that they all came from the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk regions; they made money due to the natural resources and productive capacity of the region. Having seized the key industries: power industry, fuel industry, chemical and petrochemical industries, iron and steel industry, machine building, and metal working, they left the state with just the signboard: Independent Ukraine. In fact, Ukraine has become dependent on politicians, corrupt bureaucracy, and oligarchs in the authoritarian state. It was a very narrow circle of the Ukrainian nomenclatura who made the decision as to how many taxes to pay to the State Treasury for the maintenance of “all the other Ukrainians”; it was they who divided billions of foreign investments and taxes, raised from the people between them. How did I, a person having a military education, start business? In late 1992, I retired from the military forces and returned to Ukraine. I got a job through my father; I was a driver of the chief of supply department at a large plant in the East of Ukraine. I worked for six months as a driver and bodyguard of one high-ranking member of the nomenclatura in our city. I have learned a lot working with him: the breadth of views, the ability to work under the dissolved Soviet Union, I have also learnt the basics of business, and the features of nomenclatura mentality. I struck up an acquaintance with the same young guards who were the former officers, who worked with other high-ranking nomenclatura. My boss gave me a hint about the first option of how to make money on mediation services in agriculture. Personally, he was not interested in this direction; he made much more at the state enterprise,

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which was bought out later by the director and two deputies. He did not waste his time on “trivial matters”. I gratefully accepted his hint. Thanks to mediation services in agriculture, I earned “my first million”. Collective farms (in abbreviated form – kolkhozes) relived the hard times in the first years of the independence of Ukraine. At their disposal, they had fertile lands, machinery, and people who were bonded to the land. However, the collective farms did not know what to do with a number of farm products. During the years of Soviet power, the farms got used to fulfilling government orders, supplying the state with their products and receiving money for it. Since 1991, in this scheme the main thing changed, the collective farms supplied their products to the state, but the state did not give the money back. The money was spent on political struggle, hidden offshore and never given back to the collective farms. Therefore, in 1993, when I started doing this business, the collective farms were obliged to give their products to the state, and they did it with great reluctance. The collective farms tried to conceal the products and to sell them through intermediaries to large wholesale companies. They had no choice because the state had not paid them off, even for the harvests of previous years. The collective farm chairpersons were forced to search for potential buyers, to sell their products in order to make money. Having cash, they could buy petrol, oil, and lubricants for machines and spare parts and supplies for the repair of tractors and harvesters. They could also purchase seeds, fertilizer, and pay salaries to the collective farmers. The new Ukrainian government forced them to fill up the agricultural silos with the harvest, but at the same time, the officials found some compelling reasons to postpone the payment. However, agricultural work should be done quickly and in time. Agricultural soils could not wait: they needed to be fertilised and tilled, in time to be sown and harvested. Only in this case, the agriculture could get profit. However, finding a reliable buyer in the climate of lawlessness and chaos in the financial markets of Ukraine in the early 90s was not easy. On the one hand, the state was a monopolist and required the state silos to be filled up, using all elements of the state apparatus for this purpose. Law enforcement authorities forced the collective farms to openly hand over their products to the state. On the other hand, working with wholesalers (the new wave of Ukrainian businesspersons) the representatives of the collective

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farms were often deceived or not paid out fully, or were not paid for goods at all. Laws in Ukraine stayed idle, so no one could protect the producers. During this period, business in Ukraine was based not on the law, but on the relationships and connections. Those enterprises could develop whose leaders could keep their wicket up and keep their word. At that period of change, in the services market the first “intermediaries” were people whom the seller and buyer trusted. The intermediaries with their authority (and often their finances) guaranteed the payment to the collective farms, and the buyer was promised the quality of products. Unlike the state, the collective farm chairpersons could bargain with an intermediary. Each party left him their margins, and thus an intermediary could vary the price depending on the cost of the products. Such a scheme of the payment processes was convenient for the buyer and the seller. All was as fair as possible. Everybody was satisfied. The collective farm had money for the harvest, spare parts, and people’s salaries. The buyer received the qualitative agricultural products at greatly reduced prices (the price was lower than the state one), which were resold abroad immediately. I started my business as an intermediary between Donetsk millionaires, wholesalers, and a few collective farms. Honesty in relations and transactions with businesspersons was guaranteed by one of the most powerful criminal Donetsk groups in Kramatorsk, which kept the situation under control, including Slavyansk and some other neighbouring cities of the Donbas. I was introduced to this group, thanks to my boss’ connections and mutual help of the former officers of the USSR, who supported each other. Once, at an important meeting with a representative of the Donetsk clan, the former officer vouched for me, he was the same as I, a security guard driver of an important official, with whom I had previously crossed paths a few times. Through him, I was told the terms of the Donetsk clan – my earning was 10 per cent of a business deal. However, given the volume of transactions, it was a fantastic sum of money for me. At first, all transactions took place in presence of one or two representatives of the Donetsk clan (for keeping control of me and maintaining of my authority). Then in due course, I myself delivered up sums of money to a person who was responsible for money belonging to the Donetsk clan.

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Thus, without education, without deep knowledge of the market and features of its conduct, only thanks to my connections, since 1993 I became a businessperson. Thanks to my intermediary work, the Donetsk clan made a decent amount of cash, but I earned my 10 per cent through my organisation and honesty.

2.5 The first president of Ukraine and the peculiarities of his mentality Ukraine had no chance of becoming a highly democratic country under Kravchuk. The first President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk had the mentality of a typical member of the nomenclatura. He got used to leading, to living as a member of the privileged class, and to occupying underground intrigues. He passed a difficult way of life and made a career in the party structure, he did not intend to give up everything in old age, at the peak of achievement and create the conditions for freedom, fair competition, and equality before the law. If the party nomenclatura in the Soviet Union was above the law, could they deprive themselves of the privilege in independent Ukraine? What kind of revolutionary changes in the country and the foundations of democracy could we talk about if the authorities were the ones who got used to creating laws by themselves, pretending that they were doing it for others? Leonid Kravchuk always wanted to reign. He eventually became power addicted. He was unable to control an insatiable lust and addiction for power and so he did all he could to remain in power. After his former Prime Minister defeated him, Leonid Kuchma, at the extraordinary presidential elections of 1994, Kravchuk continued to struggle for political power, clinging to the slightest opportunity to stay in the circle of the ruling Ukrainian elite. Even in 2014, during the Revolution of Dignity, he tried to reconcile the parties in conflict. Did Leonid Kravchuk have the moral right to be a peacekeeper and to participate in the post-revolutionary politics of Ukraine? I do not think that he did. Geophilosophy evaluates the politicians not by their speeches, but by their deeds, which were directed at the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood in the most difficult conditions of intercultural confrontation. Leonid Kravchuk had the opportunity to enter into the history of Ukraine as one of the greatest political leader, who led Ukraine to independence; he laid the foundations of statehood and the development strategy. But what in fact did Kravchuk do for Ukraine, during his rule from 1990 to

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1994? What achievements did Leonid Kravchuk leave behind? Among the positive achievements of Leonid Kravchuk's ruling period, geophilisophy notes: 1. The secession of Ukraine from the Soviet Union, and obtaining the status of the independent state. Italian journalist and political analyst Giulietto Chiesa, in his book “Farewell, Russia!” expressed his opinion that the main initiator of the collapse of the Soviet Union was in fact Kravchuk [Chiesa, 1997]. 2. Support of Philaret’s proposal regarding the creation of the selfproclaimed Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate. Strategically, this was the right decision, which contributed to more profound and comprehensive processes of the identification of the Ukrainian nation. However, how much Leonid Kravchuk laid harm and negativity in the foundation of national development processes! Only a person with a plebeian mentality, a psychological type of a swineherd and a buckwheat sower (according to the terminology of the great son of the Ukrainian nation Taras Shevchenko), could have such an idea to renounce nuclear status unilaterally, and to release the nuclear weapons of the territory of Ukraine. As Mikhail Gorbachev predestined the collapse of the USSR through his actions, Leonid Kravchuk depriving Ukraine of its nuclear status condemned it to a strategic defeat: he predestined the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and the war in the Donbas, and other disorders that Ukraine suffered from. At the junction of two cultures, thanks to President Kravchuk, Ukraine remained relatively weak and unarmed. The mentality of President Kravchuk, influenced by the party officials of the USSR, transformed him from a great political leader and revolutionary in an odious politician who was condemned by his own people in his lifetime. Geophilosophy defines Kravchuk’s fatal errors for Ukraine, they are the following: 1. Unilateral refusal of Ukraine to have nuclear status and the weakening of national defence. 2. The absence of a clear development strategy for Ukraine, it was not defined by the national idea. The secession of Ukraine from the Soviet Union was only at the political level, in all other spheres of activity the

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Ukrainian people continued to live as if it were the Soviet Union, only much worse and more vulgar. 3. The origin of legal nihilism in the state under the rule of Leonid Kravchuk. Kravchuk did not keep the law and did not require the others to do the same. It was under Kravchuk that the former Soviet nomenclatura openly began to live as a privileged class, encouraging the people’s disrespect for the law and law-enforcement authorities. 4. Corruption in Ukraine on a higher level emerged under the rule of Kravchuk. It is enough to recall the collapse of Europe is most powerful and the world’s largest Black Sea Shipping Company (Odessa). Shipping Company history dates back to 1833. On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were about 300 ships of various classes, thanks to which 1991 brought a profit of 270 million rubles and foreign currency of 788 million dollars to the Company! It was Kravchuk whose decrees and greed brought Shipping Company to ruin. Today, the only part of the famous Black Sea Shipping Company left is one ship and hundreds of millions of dollars of debt. Owing to Leonid Kravchuk, the history of independent Ukraine began not with the establishment of equal rights, freedoms, and fair competition, but with the looting of the rich public resources by the party elite, which Ukraine received from the Soviet Union. The Kravchuk era (between 1990 and 1994) geophilisophy defines it as the Renaissance of the privileged class, which for a pittance not only privatised the richest sectors of the economy, but also received at their disposal 45,000,000 people.

2.6 The coming to power of a representative of the red directors My business was not influenced by the change in the presidency in 1994. I note that in 1994 the majority of the Ukrainian people showed indifference towards politics and politicians. Power was not condemned; out of habit, people were afraid of it, patiently accepting its “innovations”. The Ukrainians started to live worse than during the period of the Soviet Union. In Southeastern Ukraine the workers and the engineers of the major industrial enterprises, who constituted the bulk of the population, seemed to recall the Soviet era with nostalgia. The people did not love Leonid Kravchuk and Ukrainian nationalists, who separated Ukraine from Russia on political and economic levels. The construction of the separation wall

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with Russia negatively affected the salaries of the Ukrainians, and thus the financial position of Ukrainian families. However, people remained as obedient and hard working as ever. The everyday life of the Ukrainians in the Soviet period in comparison with European standards seemed modest, but during the Kravchuk era, people became even poorer. However, the Ukrainians were accustomed to tolerating that power and tried to survive in new living conditions, planting vegetable gardens and hoping for further improvement of their lives. If the ordinary Ukrainians did not feel an effect of coming to power Leonid Kuchma, a representative of the red directors from Dnepropetrovsk, then the change of political power in Ukraine had a strong effect on the business of the Donetsk clan. The competition between the two richest financial and industrial clans of Ukraine increased. Leonid Kravchuk, the first president of Ukraine, could not put himself on the level of the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk clan. As he admitted later, he did not realise the opportunities of the power in his hands. Throughout his life, Kravchuk filled various positions in the Central Office of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He made a career in the party, owing to his caution, diplomacy, and intrigue. That is how he behaved himself, separating Ukraine from Russia. The separation took place without fanfare and public political statements. Financially, Kravchuk and his associates seemed to have had enough money, which they embezzled after the division of state property of the Communist Party. However, as it turned out later, the financial potential of the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk clans significantly exceeded Kravchuk and his associates’ material wealth, which they had stolen without attracting attention. Kravchuk asked repeatedly for financial support from Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko. In return, the second and third presidents of Ukraine were helping Kravchuk to replenish his accounts for his political support. Confrontation between Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma began long before 1994. Already in 1990, Leonid Kuchma led a group of directors of the large enterprises in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the first convocation. At that time he had already been head of the A.M. Makarov Southern Machine-Building Plant, (PA Yuzhmash) for four years, it was a Ukrainian manufacturer of space rockets, satellites, and other high-tech products. “Pivdenmash” was geographically located in Dnepropetrovsk

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and employed more than 13, 000 workers. Thanks to the production of the plant, the USSR was provided with armament rockets, leadership in the space sector, as well as a rich assortment of manufactured goods. Leonid Kuchma came to power in Ukraine on July 19 1994, because of the early presidential elections. He ruled the country between 19 July 1994 and 25 January 2005. If we add the period of dictatorial powers, into which he was officially vested by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine while he was the Prime Minister of Ukraine between October 13 1992 and September 21 1993 (and when the Verkhovna Rada refused to extend these powers, Kuchma resigned his post), then the total period of Kuchma’s rule was almost 12 years. In our view, and we will try to prove this with the help of the facts, it was during the rule of Leonid Kuchma that Ukraine turned into an authoritarian, oligarchic, corrupt, backward state, which was economically dependent on the Russian state. No surprise that one need only look at the biography of Kuchma and understand that people like him would never agree to live according to democratic values. Democracy and its principles are not the conditions in which people with the mentality of Kuchma could feel comfortable and cozy.

2.7 Leonid Kuchma. Peculiarities of mentality, as the verdict of democracy in Ukraine The mentality of the second President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, was far from the principles of democracy compared to the mentality of Leonid Kravchuk. Kuchma grew up without a father (his father was killed during the Great Patriotic War) in a large family. We must pay tribute to Kuchma, he was only 29 when he was able to realise himself as a high quality engineer in mechanical engineering (majoring in aerospace engineering). After graduation from the Dnepropetrovsk State University, Kuchma worked in the field of aerospace engineering for the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Dnipropetrovsk, where he was able to demonstrate his engineering and organisational talent. However, in 1967 his life changed a lot. He married an adopted daughter of Gennady Tumanov – a high-ranking member of the Soviet nomenclatura. Gennady Tumanov occupied the post of Chief Engineer of the Main Technical Office of the Ministry of General Machine-Building Industry since 1966 (1966–1976). In the nomenclatura hierarchy of the

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USSR, he belonged to the powerful officials of national concern. For Leonid Kuchma the way to a privileged class was opened, and he successfully used it. Since 1967, Kuchma left a successful academic career and moved to party work. At 38 Kuchma became the Communist party chief at Yuzhny Machine-building Plant, and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. If Leonid Kravchuk spent decades and moved up the ranks due to patience, diligence, and effort, then Kuchma achieved success in a few years, due to a successful marriage. In 1976, a meteoric career in the party hierarchy was only possible with the direct support of high-ranking officials of the state. Kuchma’s father-in-law belonged to such a category. Thanks to the support of the father-in-law, Leonid Kuchma became a delegate of the Party Congresses and met with senior party officials in Moscow and Kyiv. In 1982, Kuchma was appointed the first deputy of general design engineer, and in 1986, he held the position of the company’s general director at Yuzhmash. At 48, Leonid Kuchma was the head not only one of the largest enterprises of the USSR, but also the most powerful Machine-building Plant, which provided the products for space and missile defense systems of the country! The Soviet military industry has always been a priority. Pre-1967 Kuchma (before his marriage to Lyudmila Talalayeva), and post1967 Kuchma, when Ukraine declared its independence are like two different people with completely different mentalities. The mentality of a scientist and the mentality of a director of the defense enterprise with 13, 000 workers (and if one adds the family members, then Kuchma directly ruled over more than 50, 000 people’s fates) is incommensurable. All, who knew Kuchma, noted that in the different periods of his life he was like a hard manager with voluntarist (dictatorial) manners. He got used to commanding and to achieving what he wanted at any cost. The companies of the Military Industrial Complex, among which Yuzhny Machinebuilding Plant held a leading position was based on a full-fledged military structure in which there was a clear hierarchy and military discipline. The Head of the company had a General Officer rank; accordingly, he behaved himself like the General. Thus, in 1994, a General officer – industrialist, a man with great ambition and manners of a dictator – came to take the place of the Communist Party official Leonid Kravchuk. Kuchma came to power for a long time, and unlike Kravchuk, he knew how to use that power. The strict hierarchy,

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servility to rank, and discipline in the military-industrial complex were much tougher than in the School of Party Diplomacy. Therefore, in contrast to the always cautious and diplomatic Kravchuk, Kuchma dealt with his first steps of being the head of state shortly: by sample of the Military Industrial Enterprise, he began to build a strong and obedient vertical power in Ukraine. The authoritarian mentality of Kuchma caused irreparable harm to the Ukrainian people. Instead of democratic changes, in the independent Ukrainian state one began to build a hybrid model of the bureaucraticauthoritarian regime: something between “stagnation” of the USSR period and authoritarian management of a major military-industrial enterprise. In Ukraine, a model of a corrupt triangle began emerging: the corrupt authorities, the monopolistic state-owned corporations, and the oligarchic private holdings.

2.8 Strengthening of Kuchma’s vertical power In Ukraine, the president is elected for a five-year term. Theoretically, Leonid Kravchuk should have governed the country by 1996. However, Kuchma and the directors of the large industrial enterprises in Ukraine (mainly from the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk regions), inciting their workers to strike, forced Leonid Kravchuk to agree to the early presidential elections in 1993. Thus, the elections were held in March 1994. Kuchma knew the power of the red directors, because he himself formed and used it to achieve power in Ukraine. The combined strength of the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk clans could crush any competitor in Ukraine, which was shown at the presidential election in 1994. Having reached the supreme power in Ukraine, Kuchma, as an experienced strategist, started to weaken his Donetsk allies. He knew that eventually, the Donetsk allies would become the competitors. For a long time, gang wars in the Donetsk region in the early 1990s were considered as the redistribution of power within the Donetsk clan. However, since 2011 in the press, more and more information was reported that the cause of discord emanated from the Dnepropetrovsk clan, which skillfully knocked together the leaders of the Donetsk clan. The names of Leonid Kuchma’s inner circle at that time were called Pavel Lazarenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. There was no direct evidence.

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However, the fact is the following: it was during the “dictatorial powers” of Prime Minister of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma (from October 13 1992 to September 21 1993) and in the first years of his presidency (March 1994 – the end of 1996). At that period in the Donbas the most resonant crimes occurred, which greatly weakened and actually made the Donetsk clan dependant on and obedient to the Dnepropetrovsk one. Let us compare the dates of the assassinations of leaders of the Donetsk clan during the rule of Leonid Kuchma: – – – –

– – – – – – –

November 6 1992 – the murder of Vladimir Goldin; November 10 1992 – the murder of Janos Kranz; 1993 – 1994 – the first murders of Nemsadze's group; March 19 1994 – the first attempt to kill Akhat Bragin (known in the criminal underworld as “Alik the Greek”, he was a mafia figure of the Donetsk Oblast and later the president of the football club Shakhtar Donetsk until his death); May 8 1994 – the second attempt to kill Akhat Bragin (known in the criminal underworld as “Alik the Greek”); September 2 1994 – the murder of Eduard Braginskiy (known as “Chirik”); November 30 1994 – the shooting on the Boulevard Shakhtostroitel in Donetsk; April 12 1995 – the murder of Jakov Bogdanov (Samson – senior); August 10 1995 – the murder of Arthur Bogdanov (Samson – junior); October 15 1995 – the murder of Akhat Bragin (known as “Alik the Greek”); November 3 1996 – the murder of Eugene Shcherban.

All of these victims were the top people in the Donetsk clan. In our view, it was no coincidence that they were all killed when the leader of their direct competitors – Leonid Kuchma – was in power. Let us pay particular attention to the last event: November 3 1996, in Donetsk airport Evgeny Scherban, one of the richest and most influential people, was murdered. He was returning from the anniversary of Iosif (Joseph) Davydovich Kobzon, from Moscow by his own Yak-40 plane. Evgeny Shcherban in the short period of 1995–1996 (i.e. after the murder of Akhat Bragin) was considered the richest and most powerful oligarch in the Donbas, and was the main shareholder of the Industrial Union of Donbas or ISD, which was one of the biggest corporations in Ukraine. A

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horizontally integrated holding company owned or directed stocks of 40 industrial enterprises in Eastern Ukraine, Hungary, and Poland. After the murder of Eugene Shcherban, who, according to various sources, had been hatching a plan concerning Kuchma’s removal from the presidential throne, Kuchma had no worthy competitor in Ukraine anymore.

2.9 Leonid Kuchma: the power instead of bandits There is a Ukrainian proverb: “Sirs fight – at lackeys forelocks crack”. The power struggle in Ukraine between the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk clans had nothing to do with the democratic aspiration and European values. On the contrary, Ukraine increasingly reverted to authoritarianism. The vertical of power, which was built by Leonid Kuchma and his inner circle, provided for the dominance of the power structure and public institutions. Only under the total state control in all areas can one make people be docile and manageable. Anyone, who did not obey or did not fit in the state model, which was being built by Kuchma and his associates, left Ukraine or was physically eliminated or morally destroyed. From 1994–1996 in Ukraine, crime competed with the government as an equal. Otherwise, it could not be, because the most powerful financialindustrial Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk clans supported it. Weakening the Donetsk clan due to internal conflicts and the most high-profile unsolved murder cases, Leonid Kuchma and his protégé, General Yuri Kravchenko (Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine from July 3 1995 to March 26 2001), undertook to eradicate crime. Authoritarianism is monocracy. Criminals did not fit in Kuchma’s and his inner circle’s state model in Ukraine. Therefore, someone was sent to prison, someone died during detention or under mysterious circumstances; someone was able to negotiate with the government and to play by their rules. It was the Donetsk clan, which had enough going on. The open and uncompromising struggle against crime in Ukraine, the active phase of which occurred from 1996–1998, did not mean the fight against well-established corruption schemes. Conversely, the power through law enforcement authorities took away the clan’s sources of income to keep it to themselves. It was the simple distribution of the cash flows. How was it? On October 5 1995, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, on the initiative of police officers and with the support of Leonid Kuchma, enacted a law “On

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Combating Corruption”. This law, which contained ambiguities in wording and selective justice in Ukraine, allowed General Kravchenko’s police officers to interfere in the activities of any business. The number of business inspections increased dramatically. The officers of the newly established department on the fight against organised crime, OCD Interior Ministry of Ukraine began to come to the businesspersons, and based on unreliable and often unchecked sources of information they interfered with the work of the enterprises. The lawyers’ work proved to be ineffective because the police did not follow the rules of law and were pursuing a completely different goal – to scare the owner of the business and make a deal with him on equity participation/the percentage of participation. The police openly stated to the entrepreneurs that now they would be a “roof” (protection) of their business with no bandits, and put forward the compelling arguments in evidence. I tell you about the “significance” of these arguments from my experience. In autumn 1996, the postal worker handed me a notice from the department on the fight against organised crime in Kharkiv region, OCD Interior Ministry of Ukraine. This was a new unit within the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, which had unlimited authority. The criminal environment was afraid of the officers of that department, because everyone, who got into their field of vision, would become either disabled (with broken kidneys, broken ribs, and other injuries), or disappeared, or very seldom were put behind bars. However, in most cases, it concerned such submen as racketeers, thieves, and robbers. I limited myself to a minimum participation in the organisation of the shadowy business of the Kramatorsk group (one of the structures of the Donetsk clan), and devoted more time to science. My younger daughter was born, so the time was distributed as follows: science, the family, and only then business. I was confused a little by the notice. My mediation was without any papers and signatures, it was based only on personal relationships, so the law enforcement officers had no evidence against me, in principle, it could not be right. I did not deceive any of my customers, my scale of activities in comparison to other schemes with coal, gas, and oil, was minimal, so I went to Kharkiv almost with a clear conscience. At 10.00 am, I entered the building on the notice of OCD to an investigator, Captain Kolesnikov. About 08.00pm, I was grabbed under my arms (I could barely move), and taken out of the building where I was

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left in the street. Through the pain, I hardly got to my car. The next morning I had an x-ray in hospital: a doctor found three broken ribs, internal bleeding, broken blood vessels in the eye, and other injuries. It took me a month to recover after “good” conversation in OCD. As it turned out later, four stages of torture existed at that time; I went through two of those stages. What happened to me? The investigators learned that I was not a gangster, but a simple businessperson, but for a long time they could not believe that in addition to agriculture I knew nothing more. Beating and torturing me, they wanted to know about other sources of Kramatorsk income, to hear the names of businesspersons, how much they earn, where they kept the money. However, I did not really go into the heart of another’s schemes. In the last year I reduced my acquaintance among the Donetsk clan to a minimum, because, on the one hand, science took up a lot of time, on the other hand, the money that I earned was enough to provide for my family and my research projects. On that day, having endured inhuman pain (It was the first but not the last time in my life since then I was beaten) I convinced the OCD officers of my sincerity. Just two hours before I was taken out of OCD by two strong sergeants, the chief of department Colonel Chikalo had personally come to talk to me. He explained to me very politely and sincerely that the time of the bandits had passed. If I wanted to go on living without problems, then I was to keep doing the same work, but only under their control. He assured me that working with him and his people, I would be able to derive the double benefit: 1) they would be able to tackle the problems more effectively; 2) they had far more opportunities than the bandits did, because they were the legitimate authority. I tried to argue that I was a little man, a mediator. If suddenly the chairmen of collective farms and the customers found out that I had changed “roof”, and on top of that, “police roof” (the police were not loved by the people since the first years of Ukraine’s independence), they would be reluctant to work with me, and could move to another intermediary. “Well, this is not your concern”, Colonel Chikalo reassured me. He took a list of the collective farms and the customers with which I had been working, selling the products. Then Colonel Chikalo introduced me to a man who would keep in touch with me and help in the development of my business. While I was regaining my health after the “heart-to-heart” talk

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and was covered with bruises yet, which did not allow me to go out; I was being waited for not only my “clients”, but also the whole list of “forciblywilling” collective farm chairmen, who wanted to work only with me. They offered me their products at prices that could not be lower in Ukraine. At the same time, a no less impressive line of customers aggressively sought to buy the products that I had been offered by the collective farms at grossly inflated prices. Colonel Chikalo turned out a magician: he really could do much more than the Donetsk clan could afford themselves. I worked with the police on the same terms as I had with the bandits – receiving 10 per cent of my mediation. However, due to the increased margin and the number of transactions, my earnings more than doubled. In my life, almost nothing changed, I spent most of my time researching peculiarities of the evolution of the human mind at the scale of the Earth and space, I was preparing to publish my first scientific monograph, though my income increased significantly. The OCD officers in Kharkiv region removed a number of intermediaries: two of them were sent to prison for the report, the others were asked, “convincingly”, to change the line of business. Thus, their entire business passed into my hands. That was Colonel Ivan Chikalo’s choice.

2.10 Policemen-protectors: struggle for businesspersons The police officials reoriented cash flows not only in the Donbas, but also all over Ukraine. In front of my eyes for a few years, those who earned millions under Leonid Kravchuk went bankrupt and became destitute. Their mistake was that they could not re-organise themselves under the new rules of doing business. They naively hoped that the stolen millions would protect them against arbitrariness of the new regime. However, the new government dealt shortly, and was not considered with achievements. The rules were dictated by the elite, so intractable millionaires of the first wave were changed by the more intelligent and tractable placemen of the new government. I consider I was lucky that Colonel Chikalo assigned a young and ambitious sergeant Dima Ladev to me. We were the same age, but we had different approaches to life. If I preferred to be alone with the scientific work and the books in the room, then Dima was the complete opposite. He was an energetic, active, and ambitious young man. He did not only keep an eye on me and handed over the money to the leadership from me; he

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turned my steps towards searching and developing new directions in business. “Study science, you will do later, first provide for your old age. The state will not take care about us, so we must take care of ourselves,” he said repeatedly. If it were not for Dima, I would be satisfied with very little, and would not have been able to organise and finance the international research projects starting from 2000. Dima made me search for new directions in business, to increase income, which we had already divided in half. The more we earned, the faster Dima was promoted in rank and position. I spent money on research projects; Dima invested his money into his career. Our working relationship became even friendlier in 1998, after I was kidnapped in broad daylight in the centre of the city. I still cannot believe that it happened. In the morning, I went to the market to shop. As soon as I came back to my car and was getting behind the wheel, four people suddenly burst into the cabin (into all four doors). At first, I was pushed by force out of the driver’s seat, and then a sack was put over my head and I was dragged over the back seat. Someone else started my car, and we rushed to an unknown destination. I did not resist. It was useless. While I was being taken in an unknown direction with a sack on my head, I tried to understand whom the kidnappers were, and what they were going to do with me. At first, I thought they were from the Donetsk clan, and I would be forced to work under their “roof”. Deep down, I remained calm: to kill was not right, and my connections allowed me to quickly understand the situation. I was taken out to the wood, somewhere to the country; most probably out of the city, (I never found out where I was taken, because the sack was taken off from my head much later and in a quite different place). They dragged me out of the car and began beating in silence: in the ribs, kidneys, liver, and legs. I was not beaten on the head to leave any traces of beatings. However, I was beaten neither by athletes nor by professionals, because I had already had an experience after visiting OCD, and of course, I could tell the difference between unprofessional blows and professional ones. It was painful, but bearable. Then the gun was put to my head and pulled the trigger. There was a click – the gun was not loaded. I was not scared, because as a military man I knew if they wanted to kill me, they would have done it immediately and not spent so much of their time and energy. I realised that the circus was for increasing fear.

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After the muffled click of the gun, I heard the first question: “What's your relationship with Colonel Chikalo?” I was asked. “Frankly, it looked funny. One can understand why Chikalo’s people beat me, they tried to find out about the Donetsk clan business – it meant that the power was interested in the sources of the clan’s income. However, why was I beaten now, might it be to elicit my connections with highranking police officials? Did the Security Service of Ukraine want to take me over their “roof”?” “The plight of a businessperson in Ukraine” – I thought to myself and inquired aloud: “And who is this?” I realised that someone was collecting compromising material on Colonel Chikalo, or was trying to increase fear to lure me under their “roof”. I did not like any of the options, so I remained silent and did not answer the questions. They beat me more than half an hour, so soon they were tired. One fired a shot just near the ear. I did not perceive any of this. I knew only one thing – I had to endure, and then everyone would come to his or her senses. I do not know why I felt sure that Colonel Chikalo and Dima would have to save me. My behaviour puzzled the kidnappers. They moved away, called someone, and returned. In their voices, I felt confusion and understood that the situation was not unfolding according to their plan. They put me again in the back seat of my car, not taking the sack off from the head and the handcuffs; I was taken to an unknown direction. However, the attitude towards me was changed. Affected aggression disappeared, and respect became manifest. After a while, the sack was taken off my head, and I saw the faces of my kidnappers – typical lamebrained police faces. I was brought from Lozova to Kharkiv. Night was falling. We already talked peacefully, someone even apologised. I was given some food from their reserves. Nevertheless, I spent that night in the prison.

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The next morning I was taken to the investigator, it was a young woman. Smiling, she started to speak to me kindly: “Well, you have made noise here. Colonel Chikalo himself called and was interested in your health. You must understand us, you have your connections and you are doing your job. I execute orders, so I do my job. You will have to spend another night with us. I promise it will be the last night here. The fact is that a car like yours was involved in the robbery. We need time to check your alibi and the car”. I knew clearly that all of this was fibs to justify what had happened. They could not force me to talk and slander Chikalo, now my patrons had all the trumps in their hands. As a result, my kidnappers feared for the consequences and tried to cover their criminal actions regarding me. I was calm and balanced exactly to the moment when the next day in a lineup, the witness of a robbery, hiding his eyes, pointed at me and said: “It is him!” At that, moment I thought my life was over. From an early age, I had dreamt of making my mark on the history of humankind, to do something important and useful for people. Nevertheless, so ignominiously and above all to be slandered, I could not imagine finishing my life in prison. I was returned to the cell. In my thoughts, I said goodbye to my daughters, my unfinished monograph and studies. Life lost its meaning, because of two words – “It is him!”, even though I knew that I did not do anything. However, someone was interested in it. My farewell with the future was interrupted by the metallic noise of the opening door. I looked up and saw the smiling Dima: “Have you rested? Come on! We have to work”. I did not understand what was happening. I just could not quite believe my ears. I could not help crying. We went out into the street. In the courtyard of the police station, my car was next to Dima’s one. There was also my investigator. Dima approached and thanked her. “Can you drive yourself?” he said to me.

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He saw my condition, and I am still grateful to him for his understanding. I felt so painful and happy at the same time that I was deeply ambivalent: I was here with him in the courtyard of the police station, which was surrounded by a high fence, and could not begin to comprehend what I was doing here. I got into his car, and we drove out of the yard. Behind the wheel of my car the investigator was driving. It took us 20 minutes to get to the centre of Kharkiv, to the building of the OCD. For the whole twenty minutes, Dima was telling me what had happened, about the causes and the consequences. It turned out that Captain Kolesnikov, who had taken part in my first arrest and beating, took up another police department. He did not forget about me, because he saw how fast Dima became richer and how successfully his career developed. He realised that I ran the whole business, and Dima provided a perfect cover for the taxes and bandits. He persuaded his higher-rank officials to arrest me. Captain Kolesnikov expected to get information regarding Colonel Chikalo, and if Chikalo left me, he would want to provide a “roof” (protection) for my business. Just to be safe, he invented a story about the robbery, in which my car was involved, put the witness, and put a former criminal up to “identify” me. Dima found out about my kidnapping over 10 minutes, as it had taken place in front of hundreds of people. While I was being driven from Lozova to Kharkiv, Colonel Chikalo fully understood the situation. He even reported my “heroic” silence. All the forces mobilised, and one police department at the highest level acted against the other. Later I learned that the higher-rank officials agreed among themselves, Captain Kolesnikov received a severe reprimand, and I and Dima (for they were not wrong regarding me) got promotion: I was offered to “supervise” a new business direction, and Dima soon was given the higher rank.

2.11 Authoritarianism in Ukraine – the flourishing Two stories that have happened to me were not exceptions but rather the norm of the first five years of the reign of Leonid Kuchma. Afterwards, I learnt from numerous straight talks with businesspersons of different levels that my cases were lucky. Many businesspersons from different regions of Ukraine ended with injuries, disabilities, someone went crazy, and someone was destroyed psychologically and became a drunkard.

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People in Ukraine got in the meat grinder of the formation of the authoritarian regime, therefore the strongest and most resilient people survived. Anyone who passed durability test called themselves wolves. Indeed, those who climbed up the career ladder in 1995 and 1999 lived as wolves according to the rules of the jungle: in a flock, it is every man for himself, and if somebody attacked a flock, the flock united and launched a counterattack. Dima often taught me, not conveying clearly his words, and the words of his elder colleagues: “Oleg, there is a narrow circle of like-minded people with their ideas, it is a clan. Within this circle, the relationships should always be clear. All money that you make, bring to the clan, learn to share, and always be honest. It is our general profit. All that is outside our circle, you can break and ruin. We will come to help. Just everything should be done right, carefully and consistently”. Therefore, we lived, helping each other in our careers. I invested in science and research projects, Dima and his environment – in his career and way of life. The presidential elections of 1999 were planned. In Ukraine, one could already sell or buy a lot: positions, awards, even ranks. If one of our police friends wanted to buy a higher position or rank, we, the businesspersons, would have a whip round as many times as we could. If it were not enough, we would lend him the money. We knew that a new position for our “roof” was new opportunities for us: a new dimension of business, new directions. Various clans often clashed over the spheres of influence. The period of the bloody shoot-outs ended, all matters were solved among the top officials and summed up with peaceful results. However, this “peace” meant the loss of millions for one side, and for others – the conquest of new heights of material and social rewards. Therefore, some clans went to the bottom and broke up, while others elevated to the heights of power, finding new allies and patrons. Nobody spoke about corruption as a mass phenomenon in Ukraine yet, but it was flourishing among officials. The favourable conditions for its heyday were created – authoritarianism, which corresponded to Leonid Kuchma’s mentality.

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2.12 Leonid Kuchma’s struggle against his associatescompetitors The second president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, came to power thanks to the collusion of the red directors, which were the basis of the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk clans. For the first three years (from March 1994 to November 1996), Kuchma worked on weakening and suppressing the political ambitions of the Donetsk clan. Leonid Kuchma made some efforts to ensure himself against the new leaders of the Donetsk clan, Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Yanukovych, who not only had presidential ambitions, but also unequivocally supported his power. The second of Kuchma’s steps in politics was to weaken competitors from his own environment. Let us list the most influential surnames of Ukrainian politics from the Dnepropetrovsk clan: 1. Pavlo Lazarenko – Prime Minister of Ukraine from May 1996 to July 1997; 2. Yulia Tymoshenko – Prime Minister of Ukraine from February to September 2005 and from December 2007 to March 2010; 3. Serhiy Tihipko – former Vice–Prime Minister and Minister of social policy of Ukraine (2010–2012), he ran unsuccessfully for President of Ukraine in the 2010 presidential election and participated in the 2014 presidential election; 4. Valery Pustovoitenko – Prime Minister from July 16 1997 to December 22 1999; 5. Oleksandr Turchynov – Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament from February 22 to November 27 2014, a former acting President of Ukraine from the removal from power of President Viktor Yanukovych from February 23 to June 7 2014). Ukrainian oligarchs from the Dnepropetrovsk clan: 1. Ihor Kolomoyskyi – a multibillionaire, he is rated as the second richest person in Ukraine, with a capital of 3.645 billion dollars (data from 2013); 2. Henadiy Boholyubov is rated as the third richest person in Ukraine with a capital of 1.3 billion dollars (data from 2015); 3. Victor Pinchuk – a son-in-law of former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. In 2013, he was rated as the sixth richest person in Ukraine with the capital of 2.150 billion dollars, and others.

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Since 1995, Leonid Kuchma had a particularly trusting relationship with Pavlo Lazarenko. Lazarenko was 15 years younger than Kuchma. He enjoyed a successful career in the Dnepropetrovsk region as an industrial manager, so when Leonid Kuchma was elected the president of Ukraine, he first assigned Lazarenko to the post of the Head of the Dnepropetrovsk region (in fact, he made him the head of the Dnepropetrovsk clan), and later he transferred him to another position in Kyiv. From the end of 1995 Pavlo Lazarenko – First Vice-Prime Minister of Ukraine, and from May 28 1996 to July 2 1997, he was Prime Minister of Ukraine. At 43, Pavlo Lazarenko was the second most influential man in the state after Leonid Kuchma. With the help of Lazarenko, Kuchma eliminated his external competitors from the Donetsk clan (all investigations led to Lazarenko and Tymoshenko), and put in place some close associates, thanks to which he won the 1994 presidential election. For example, Yevhen Marchuk was Prime Minister of Ukraine from June 1995 to May 1996, a presidential candidate, the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council from November 1991 to July 1994, and Defense Minister of Ukraine. Marchuk was too independent in his decisions, so Kuchma eliminated a competitor from power through Lazarenko. Experts positively evaluate the organisational and managerial skills of Pavlo Lazarenko. For example, Ivan Kyrylenko, the leader of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc in the Verkhovna Rada, ten years after Pavel Lazarenko’s premiership in the interview called him “a powerful organiser and a good economic manager” [Kyrylenko, 2008]. In 1996 and 1997, Lazarenko's status became so significant across the country that not only the Dnepropetrovsk clan, but also representatives of other regions of Ukraine, as an alternative to Kuchma in the forthcoming election of 1999, considered his candidacy. Kuchma, like any authoritarian leader, did not treat the competitors very well. Having learnt about the ambitions of his protégé, Lazarenko was not only removed from power, but also, as an example to others, he was punished severely. In Ukraine, there is a proverb: “Beat the dog before the lion”. Pavlo Lazarenko clearly overestimated his opportunities. The presidential ambitions of Pavlo Lazarenko were first awakened by Yulia Tymoshenko, with which Lazarenko not only had close partnerships in business, but also a close personal relationship. Tamara Lazarenko (Lazarenko’s first wife) confirmed that they had been having quite a stormy affair [Kolyada, 2013]. Law enforcement authorities regulated by Kuchma in 1997 after the appropriate command from the president, accused Lazarenko in major

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embezzlement of public funds, theft, and corruption. In July 1997, President Kuchma dismissed Lazarenko. On February 9 1999, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine asked the Verkhovna Rada to strip Lazarenko of his parliamentary immunity. On February 15 1999, Lazarenko was forced to leave Ukraine. On February 20 1999, he was detained in New York at JFK airport on suspicion of illegally entering the United States. In 2000, in the United States, Lazarenko was put on trial for money laundering, corruption, and fraud. The total amount of money that Lazarenko transferred from Ukraine to the USA, was estimated at 114, 000, 000 million dollars. According to an official count by the United Nations, Lazarenko looted approximately $200, 000, 000, or 0.4 per cent of Ukraine's gross domestic product (GDP). In 2006, 477 million dollars in Lazarenko’s accounts were frozen by the US court (but not confiscated). Thanks to American justice, who made information on the investigation of the crimes of Lazarenko in Ukraine available, we can confidently say that by 1996 the Ukrainian authorities had been entirely covered by corruption. It was from Kyiv, from high-ranking government officials, the corrupt schemes, which moved down to the regions and pulled in a vicious circle of business representatives and low-ranking officials. At the head of the corruption pyramid there was Leonid Kuchma, like an octopus with the help of the network of corruption schemes, he tried to entangle Ukrainian society. We can only guess the true dimension of corruption in the Ukrainian authorities of that time, if one man like Lazarenko could steal about half a billion dollars in cash (but much larger sums were invested by Lazarenko in real estate and other assets in Ukraine) in two years of profitable work with Kuchma. A question therefore arises as to how much President Kuchma and his associates had stolen from the Ukrainian people for his 12-year reign? According to Ukrainian unofficial sources, before escaping Ukraine, his estate was worth 5 billion dollars! He had a share of the energy sector, trade sector, and many others [Melnyk, 2004].

2.13 On the eve of the 1998 parliamentary elections On the management of the state with a population of 45 million, which is located at the turn of the world’s cultures, Leonid Kuchma perceived the mentality of the director of the military plant. Instead of taking into

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account the specific characteristics of each region of Ukraine, Kuchma established a new tradition to appoint to public positions not professionals, but people who were faithful and reliable. During the first term as President of Ukraine, Kuchma surrounded himself with people that he personally had more or less known during work in Dnepropetrovsk. After dismissing Lazarenko from the post of Prime Minister, Kuchma appointed to that post one of his good friends from Dnepropetrovsk – Valery Pustovojtenko. However, the confrontation with Lazarenko had just begun. Lazarenko was not going to put up with his defeat. The stolen billions, ambitions, and personal authority of Lazarenko allowed him to organise strong opposition to Kuchma’s power within the Dnepropetrovsk clan, as well as across Ukraine. For the first time, Kuchma encountered numerous obstacles such as opposition force that could shatter his plans regarding the second term. In that difficult period for Kuchma, he made two important decisions for his salvation: 1. Wait until the parliamentary elections and share power with the winners. 2. To “buy” the winners of the 1998 parliamentary elections at the expense of the richest state resources that remained in Ukraine since Soviet times. Kuchma understood that with his weakened team and low ratings of confidence from the people, he would not win the 1999 presidential election. Everything was against him. Ukraine was not a plant, so a confrontation between two cultures on the territory of Ukraine was gaining momentum. The Ukrainians from the southeast dreamt of returning to the Soviet Union and demanded tighter integration with Russia, the Ukrainians from the western part of Ukraine insisted on integration with Europe. A wave of discontent swept the country. In 1998, fortune smiled upon Kuchma. While the Lazarenko-Tymoshenko team invested the first protests and funded opposition in Ukraine, Viktor Pinchuk, as a relative, came to Kuchma's side. Viktor Pinchuk was a representative of the most influential and wealthy Jewish community in Dnepropetrovsk. In 1998, Leonid Kuchma’s daughter, Elena Franchuk, after her divorce from her first husband, Igor Franchuk, began to live with Victor Pinchuk in a civil marriage. In 2002, Elena Franchuk officially married Victor Pinchuk, but she only changed her surname to Pinchuk in

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2010. Pinchuk had a very complicated relationship with Lazarenko and personally hated Yulia Tymoshenko. According to Sergei Kolyada in 1994, Pinchuk, together with Tymoshenko, established a joint company “Commonwealth”. It was Pinchuk that made up a scheme of how to supply the enterprises with gas, thus having laid the foundation for work at Tymoshenko and Lazarenko’s Gas Company. After that, Tymoshenko took the scheme from Pinchuk, whereupon he left the company’s debt to him. It almost cost Pinchuk’s life: some days he was handcuffed to a radiator, and the kidnappers demanded that he return Tymoshenko’s debt [Kolyada, 2013]. Thus, for the 1998 parliamentary elections, Kuchma came with the following “achievements”: 1. The Donetsk clan, which was devoted to him, was headed by Viktor Yanukovych and Rinat Akhmetov. 2. The group that was split into two parts, the Dnepropetrovsk financial-industrial clan: Kuchma, Pinchuk, Pustovoitenko, and Lazarenko, Tymoshenko, Kolomoyskyi. 3. Well-established vertical of power. 4. The loyal police, in fact they were endowed with unlimited power. Impunity and corruption have turned the post of police officer in a prestigious profession, which, despite the small salary, allowed for providing them a good life. The main sources of police officers’ income – “protection” and “racketeering”; 5. Well-established and controlled business. 6. The state corporation through which Kuchma and his circle learned to launder the money, coming into the budget. 7. Gradually gathering momentum towards protest moods in society. 8. The state, which continued to become poorer, still had a powerful economic potential. Economic opportunities in Ukraine during the years of the Soviet Union turned out to be so powerful that for four years Kravchuk and his circle (1990 and 1994) plundered Ukraine, for four years Kuchma and his elite (1994 and 1998) did the same, but Ukraine's economy was still on a high European level. Short aside. While working on the book, one thought constantly haunted me: the first Presidents of Ukraine – Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma - as well as their men always positioned themselves among the most ardent nationalists, Ukrainian patriots. Their whole policy was based on the opposition: the era of the Soviet Union was the era of a dictatorship

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that destroyed the Ukrainian nation, and they as the rulers, created a new era in the history of Ukraine – the era of independence. I could not find the logic: over the years of the "dictatorship”, the territory of Ukraine not only increased manifold, due to the lands and peoples, which had never belonged to it previously. Moreover, in this territory, "dictators" created a scientific and economic potential, which the nationalists, who came to power in 1990, were plundering for eight years, and as a result, they were not able to plunder. Ukraine remained a highly developed European country! As we show below, very often petty-minded and selfish people hide themselves behind Ukrainian nationalism; they could not come to power through legal means. Since 1990, Ukraine was pursued by such a problem – absence of the social lifts, or irremovable Ukrainian “elite”. The history of Ukrainian independence is a sad story about how a small group of people with the mentality of a swineherd, who in the first years of Ukrainian independence were making their way to the power, and then one after another, often agreeing, sometimes delegating to their representatives, for 25 years they plundered the national resources of Ukraine and the workforce’s potential. Government officials, millionaireparliamentarians, and nationalists – they are the same people, infected by insatiable greed, an innate lack of culture and irresponsibility. Many of these negative characters we will mention in the book.

2.14 The 1998 parliamentary elections. New distress of Ukraine On 29 March 1998, the second parliamentary elections in Ukraine over the years of independence were held. In the election, 30 political parties participated, eight of which overcame the 4 per cent barrier. The Presidential Party, led by Valery Pustovoitenko, took the fifth position in the list, far behind the Communist Party of Ukraine (Leader – Petro Symonenko), the People’s Movement of Ukraine (Leader – Vyacheslav Chornovil), and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (Leader – Oleksandr Moroz). The Communist Party of Ukraine was victorious in 18 regions, including in the city of Kyiv, with a result of 6, 550, 353 votes (24.65 per cent), the People's Movement of Ukraine won with a result of 2, 498, 262 votes (9.40 per cent), the electoral block of Socialists and Peasants – 2, 273, 788 votes (8.55 per cent), and the People's Democratic Party (Leaders – Pustovoitenko-Kuchma) received 1, 331, 460 votes (5.01 per cent). It should be noted that the All-Ukrainian Association “Community” (simply

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known as “Hromada”), which was funded and led by Pavlo Lazarenko (Deputy – Yulia Tymoshenko), took sixth position (4.67 per cent), not losing to the presidential party by much [Central, 2016]. The 1998 parliamentary elections showed a complete failure of the domestic and foreign policies of Leonid Kuchma, and guaranteed defeat in the upcoming presidential elections of 1999. Despite the vertical power and authoritarian rule that had already been built, sometimes the Ukrainian people went out of the control of the government, but they only showed their rebelliousness through their votes in the elections. From the results of the 1998 parliamentary elections, it followed that at least three leaders of the parties on ratings overtook Kuchma: Communist – Petro Symonenko, Nationalist – Vyacheslav Chornovil, and Socialist – Olexander Moroz. As you know, there was still Pavlo Lazarenko, who received votes in Kuchma’s native Dnepropetrovsk region. None of the above leaders wanted to go into an alliance with Kuchma, hoping to win the presidential election themselves. The only one with whom Kuchma was able to negotiate after the parliamentary elections was the leader of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party – Victor Medvedchuk and Hryhoriy Surkis. The Medvedchuk-Surkis Party barely overcame the barrier of 4 per cent (the eighth position in the elections). It consisted mainly of young businesspersons, thus they willingly went to an agreement with the power. Considering that Medvedchuk, Surkis, and their associates (including Petro Poroshenko) greatly reminded him of Pavlo Lazarenko, Kuchma quickly found a common language with them. The result of the conspiracy for Kuchma and his associates with the part of the businessmen-parliamentarians was an agreement on the division of power in Ukraine by regions. Until 1998, Kuchma appointed the officials of the old party school to the regions, who were guarding public property and controlling the appetites of businesspersons. After agreements with Medvedchuk and Surkis, the loyal to power businessmen-parliamentarians got the regions to which Kuchma delegated authority to operate personnel policy. Largely, Kuchma divided Ukraine into the apanage principalities and appointed businesspersons who in 1998 became the people's deputies to control them. In return, the businessmen-parliamentarians guaranteed the people’s support to Kuchma in the upcoming presidential elections. Thus, in 1998, for the first time, Leonid Kuchma admitted some people he did not know to come to power; they represented a new social stratum of the Ukrainian society – the Ukrainian businesspersons. Every businessperson

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came to Parliament in different ways and for different purposes. Each of them had a life experience and his secrets as to how he made the first million. However, in the majority, as time has shown, all these people had one thing in common – irrepressible eagerness to become rich. Kuchma was subtly manipulating every situation to get exactly what he wanted. If until 1998, Kyiv was a hotbed of corruption, after the 1998 parliamentary elections and the decision to create a privileged class of businessmenpoliticians, a corrupt mentality began to establish itself heavily in the regions. The papers of 1998 and 1999 confirmed that during that period the first large-scale looting of the national wealth of Ukraine took place. If you compare the names of people’s deputies in Ukraine, which took place in Parliament in 1998, with the names of those who led the parliamentarian election campaign of Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine (or just working on him) in the presidential election in 1999, with the names of the Ukrainian millionaires, these names match. I want to name the surnames of the most famous people in Ukraine now, which got a chance to plunder some regions of Ukraine with impunity in 1998. They started their work activities in parliament as the workaholicbusinessmen, and a few years later, they turned into privileged people: having made a fortune plundering the state property and receiving as a fiefdom entire regions of Ukraine. To get such privilege they conducted the 1999 presidential campaign very competently and at a high level, helping Leonid Kuchma to be re-elected to his second term. Without the help of these people, Kuchma had no chance of winning the 1999 presidential elections. Here are just a handful of people who have been to blame for the misery of Ukraine and its people: 1. Viktor Medvedchuk headed one of Kuchma’s campaign offices in 1999. Between 1998 and 2007 he was the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) – the Ukrainian political party, which represented the interests of Leonid Kuchma in the Parliament. Now he is a millionaire (according to the Ukrainian magazine “Focus”, the capital of Medvedchuk in 2008 was estimated at 460 million dollars), politician. In 2004, in Kazan Cathedral, Saint Petersburg, Medvedchuk's younger daughter, Darya, was christened by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Svetlana Medvedeva, the wife of the Chairman of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev. 2. Leonid Kravchuk is the former President of independent Ukraine. In the period 1998–2006, he was the leader of the Social Democratic Party of

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Ukraine’s (united) parliamentary group in the Verkhovna Rada, defending the interests of Leonid Kuchma. 3. In 1998, Petro Poroshenko, a young and little-known Vinnytsya businessman first won a seat in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, thanks to the personal patronage of Viktor Medvedchuk. Between 1998 and 2000, he was a member of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united). In 2001, Petro Poroshenko, together with the representatives of the Donetsk clan Volodymyr Rybak (Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovych: from December 13 2012 to February 22 2014) and the Lugansk clan – Valentin Landik, were instrumental in creating the Party of Regions. In 1998 and 2003, Petro Poroshenko was loyal to Kuchma and his policies. 4. Volodymyr Lytvyn is a Ukrainian politician best known for being Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament. Between 1994 and 1999, Lytvyn was the aide to President Leonid Kuchma and, later, the head of his office. He was Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych. 5. Olexander Turchinov. In 1993, Turchynov was formally appointed an advisor on economic issues to Prime Minister Kuchma. In 1994, he created the political party Hromada, which later in 1997 was headed by Pavel Lazarenko. After the scandal around Lazarenko and his leaving the faction and party, “Hromada” supported Leonid Kuchma in the 1999 presidential elections. After the Revolution of Dignity, from February 23 2014 to June 7 2014, Turchinov was designated as acting President of Ukraine. The list could go on. As we can see, unfortunately, many of those who deceived the Ukrainian people and helped to retain Leonid Kuchma for the second term in 1999, came to power in Ukraine and took on the “salvation” of the state after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. Why did they not do it in 1999, when all of this started?

2.15 The 1999 presidential elections. Professionalism of political consultants I have already written that by 1999 the political activity of the Ukrainian people had increased significantly. The people did not remain indifferent

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and passive observers concerning their impoverishment. They struggled with the existing corrupt power as they could, within the law. Some opposed power, showing their passivity during the elections, others supported alternative candidates. At one of my lectures for the political science course at the University, I tell students, the future political scientists, about the 1999 presidential elections in Ukraine, as a classic example of the opportunities of voting technologies. This example from the history of Ukraine is instructive, how one of the political consultants (unfortunately, I could not find out his family name) properly took into account protest moods in society and used his tactic to strengthen the underdog – Leonid Kuchma – at the presidential elections. Consider how cleverly the businessmenparliamentarians built Kuchma’s election campaign. The 1998 parliamentary elections showed the main competitors to Leonid Kuchma in the 1999 presidential elections might become a Communist, Petro Symonenko, a Nationalist, Vyacheslav Chornovil, a Socialist, Oleksandr Moroz, and a former associate, Pavel Lazarenko. By mid-1999, Leonid Kuchma and his new circle consisting of the businessmen-politicians managed to get rid of two rivals: the Verkhovna Rada voted on February 17 to strip former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko of his legal immunity and to arrest him. Lazarenko fled from Ukraine and was arrested in the United States on 20 February. On March 25 1999, the second rival Vyacheslav Chornovil died in a suspicious automobile crash. Thus, Leonid Kuchma, on the eve of the presidential elections, had two real rivals: a Communist, Petro Symonenko, and a Socialist, Oleksandr Moroz. On October 31 1999, the first round of the presidential elections took place in Ukraine. Pay your attention to the results of the voting: First place: Leonid Kuchma (independent candidate) – 9, 598, 672 (36.49 per cent) votes. Second place: Petro Symonenko (Communist Party of Ukraine) – 5, 849, 077 (22.24 per cent) votes. Third place: Oleksandr Moroz (Socialist Party of Ukraine) – 2, 969, 896 (11.29 per cent) votes. Fourth place: Natalia Vitrenko (Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine) – 2, 886, 972 (10.97 per cent) votes.

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Fifth place: Yevhen Marchuk (independent candidate) – 2, 138, 356 (8.13 per cent) votes [Central, 2016]. At first glance, a Communist, Petro Symonenko, was regarded as a chief rival to Leonid Kuchma. However, in fact, the whole circle of Kuchma understood that it was Olexander Moroz, because Natalia Vitrenko and Yevhen Marchuk’s votes were potential votes for Olexander Moroz, who lost them, thanks to the skilful Kuchma team. In the 1999 presidential election, the Kuchma team was mainly aimed at preventing Olexander Moroz from the second round, because in the second round he would be a winner of the elections. That is why he could not even take second place in the first round. All energies of the Kuchma team were focused on taking away not only Moroz’ potential votes, but also adding the votes belonging to Petro Symonenko. Namely, Symonenko should be a rival to the underdog – Kuchma – in the second round. The well-conceived strategic plan succeeded. Oleksandr Moroz took third place in the electoral list and did not get into the second round of elections. If it had not been for those technical candidates, Natalia Vitrenko (her election campaign was financed from Russia) and Yevhen Marchuk (who, according to the different sources, was given several hundred million dollars for the voters’ voices in favor of Kuchma), Olexander Moroz would have had more than 7 million votes, and won a hundred per cent over Leonid Kuchma in the second round, because Moroz’s voters were mostly from the agrarian oriented Poltava and Vinnytsia regions, and plus the electorate of Symonenko (mostly from the centre and south regions), Vitrenko (took the peak of the candidate list in the Sumy region), and Marchuk (mostly from the central and southern regions). Thus, in November 1999, the first and only time in the history of independent Ukraine, the presidential candidate from the Southeastern Ukraine won the presidential election (in the second round) by an overwhelming number of votes in the western regions. Western Ukraine voted against the Communist Symonenko and, despite little support in Kuchma’s native southeastern regions, the President of Ukraine was the representative of the Dnepropetrovsk clan for the second term. The Kuchma team to the last details counted the behaviour of voters: the voters of the central and Western Ukraine would submit ballots for Socialist Oleksandr Moroz, but would never, under any circumstances, vote for the

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Communist Petro Symonenko. They believed it would be better to live under the corrupt Kuchma than to have a reminder of the Soviet Union in the person of Symonenko. The presidential election campaign of Leonid Kuchma in late 1999 was considered as well conceived and organised plan: Leonid Kuchma authorised the looting of Ukrainian resources for the businessmenparliamentarians, which in reward for that, organised Kuchma’s victory in the third presidential election. We can state the obvious fact: the people of Ukraine have already begun to struggle with the government since 1998. This struggle was still within the law. Unfortunately, signs of an authoritarian state have already begun to be viewed in Ukraine: selective justice worked, the rights and freedoms of citizens were restricted, and corruption has become entrenched among politicians and bureaucrats.

2.16 The second presidential term of Leonid Kuchma: Corruption covers all sphere of activity By the end of the second presidential term of Leonid Kuchma (in early 2005), Ukraine has already had 30 billion dollars of the external debt. At the same time, in 2008, the magazine “Focus” estimated the capital of Kuchma’s son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk at 10.5 billion dollars. In 2008, Leonid Kuchma’s daughter Elena Pinchuk (at that time her surname was Franchuk) became owner of the most expensive real estate in England – the five-storey Victorian villa in London (the area of the estate was about 2, 000 square metres) for 128 million dollars [Comparison, 2014]. Leonid Kuchma and his family plundered the state and allowed his circle doing the same. Therefore, we name his mode not authoritarian, but the authoritarian-oligarchic, because in addition to Kuchma, the people who he trusted also possessed authority. In different periods of his reign, they were Pavel Lazarenko, Yuri Kravchenko, Volodymyr Lytvyn, Viktor Medvedchuk, Viktor Yanukovych, and others. In 2010, restoring the vertical power in Ukraine and corruption schemes, Viktor Yanukovych copied the Kuchma actions in many ways: that could afford the second president of Ukraine, why the fourth could not? Leonid Kuchma stole in favour of his son-in-law Victor Pinchuk, and in a few years, the latter became a billionaire. Viktor Yanukovych began to steal in favour of his eldest son Olexander, and transform him from a mediocre dentist (basic education Olexander Yanukovych) into a Ukrainian

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oligarch. If one compares the Kuchma scale of theft for his son-in-law, with the scale of theft of Yanukovych and his family, it was a huge difference in sums, but as a result Viktor Yanukovych was exiled from his native land and declared as a dictator, looked rather modest than his rivals. According to the authoritative Ukrainian Internet portal Cenzor.Net (http://censor.net.ua/) the Kuchma family cleaned out Ukraine in a few tens of billions more than the Yanukovych family. In 1999–2004, fast money was made in Ukraine in the following: 1. The market of oil and gas. 2. Accepting, resale (or recycling) of scrap metal and nonferrous metals. 3. Development of quarries (sand, granite, crushed stone, etc.). 4. Agriculture. In these years, some Ukrainians could become millionaires as quickly as they could ruin themselves and go to jail. Everything depended on the level of political relations or close kinship with the top public officials. In this matter, Kuchma copied the model of the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union. In the USSR, all law enforcement agencies were categorically forbidden from working against high-ranking members of the Communist Party. The Soviet Nomenclatura was above the law and was aware of their impunity. The same impunity and immunity under the law was permitted in the circle of Kuchma. The ruling Ukrainian elite and businesspersons working under their “protection” were not only freed from the numerous inspections, but also from the mandatory tax payments. In 1999, Kuchma forcedly changed the personnel policy – he expanded the category of the privileged class by businessmen-parliamentarians, which ensured the loyalty of his power in “their” regions. Kuchma divided Ukraine into regions and gave them to certain political groups. It was this period when the merger of business and politics finally took place. The businesspersons loyal to Kuchma were appointed to the public office, and the devoted politicians were awarded with rights to acquire existing assets: factories, profitable business, forests, and fertile lands. Since 1999, Ukrainian politicians and businesspersons were divided into “our” and “their”. “Our” businessmen-politicians received immunity from power: taxes, and inspections, “their” were purposefully ruined, were accused of violating the law, and were sent to prison.

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According to Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine “On Status of a People’s Deputy of Ukraine”, People’s Deputies were prohibited from being engaged in any other area than the deputy, paid work, as well as from being a member of the management, the board, or the works council of the enterprise, the institution, or the organisation, with the aim of making a profit. However, according to the State Tax Inspectorate of Ukraine, in April 2000, 364 (out of 450) People’s Deputies of Ukraine had official sources of income from commercial structures. People’s Deputies headed 202 companies and were the founders of 473 companies. In 1999, People’s Deputies’ companies carried out 25.3 per cent of imports and 10.1 per cent of exports of the total import and export of Ukraine. In 1999, according to the results of companies’ economical activity, People’s Deputies were in arrears to the state budget of Ukraine for 4, 100, 000, 000 UAH (about $1, 000, 000, 000) when GDP was 130, 442, 000, 000 UAH ($31, 581, 000, 000). [Nevmerzhitskiy, 2008]. Thus, by 2000, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as the highest legislative body of the state was completely discredited. Representatives of the legislature not only stopped respecting the laws of Ukraine, but also contributed to adapting the legal framework of the state under the corrupt scheme of the authorities. By 2000, the third independent branch of government – the judiciary – was also under the control of Kuchma. Viktor Medvedchuk engaged this direction. About the scale of corruption of the judiciary in Ukraine, one can judge according to several high-profile scandals. In December 2008, when taking a bribe of $100, 000 for making an illegal decision, the Chairman of the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal, Igor Zvarych, was detained. During the search of the place of residence and his office, a total of over $1, 500, 000 in cash was seized [Segodny, 2008]. On March 10 2014, the Ukrainian National Anti-Corruption Portal “ANTIKOR” published photos of Ukrainian judges and the watches that they were wearing on their hands. For example, a judge of the Supreme Economic Court of Ukraine, Alexander Udovichenko, wore a Vacheron Constantin watch worth $41, 500 (the same price was for one-room apartments in the centre of Kyiv); Chairman Pechersk District Court in Kyiv Vladimir Kolesnichenko wore a Breguet Classique watch worth $ 23, 700, etc. [Segodny, 2008]. Thus, by 2000, Kuchma had created ideal conditions for the flourishing of corruption. All three branches of government: legislative, executive, and

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judicial were in his sphere of influence. Kuchma very finely read mentalities: government officials, politicians, judges, and even leading journalists were vulnerable and dependent on the ruler, when their own business interests burdened them. Kuchma “helped” public officials of all branches of government to become entrepreneurs (either directly or through family and friends), and then, through the pressure on their business, Kuchma began to manipulate them. For these purposes, Leonid Kuchma established an extensive network of controlling bodies, which had the authority to close even the most prosperous business. To control the legality of conducting and development of business in Ukraine had the right not only to tax inspection and to the police, but also to the prosecutor’s office, to the Security Service of Ukraine, to the sanitaryepidemiological and fire inspections, to the state employment service, etc. Generally, for the years of Kuchma’s presidency in Ukraine more than 25 controlling bodies were established, which had the right not only to control, but also to affect, the development of the business. In 1998, Dima Ladev, who was assigned to me at one time by colonel Chikalo, introduced me to the prosperous businesspersons from Kharkiv, Gennady Kernes and Mikhail Dobkin. Dima and I were partners on a number of directions in business. He always aimed for me to expand our business to get more income. Dima always tried to materialise his new acquaintance to make profit for him and us. At that time, Mikhail Dobkin had just organised his first political campaign. He was running for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. I was asked to join his team and go into politics. At the time, I was finishing my dissertation and was making plans for a scientific career, so for the first time in our relationship with Dima I refused. Dima did not understand my refusal, because, in his opinion, very few people would be offered such a chance. Afterwards I have never regretted my decision. Gennady Kernes and Mikhail Dobkin soon became well-known businessmen-politicians in Ukraine. Under President Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych, they supervised the Kharkiv region. Kernes and Dobkin helped Dima to enjoy a meteoric career in the police. Dima, in terms of degree of influence, not only quickly overtook his former chief Colonel Chikalo, but also greatly surpassed him. Perhaps the success of my scientific career seemed very small and ridiculous in comparison with the fortune that they made in politics thanks to power that they had in the different periods of history of Ukraine. However, it was my choice.

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In 1999, thanks to my new acquaintance of Dima Ladev, we were able to enter into the market of scrap metal, and occupied a significant place in the Kharkiv region. To tell the truth about this business will take another book with about four years work in it, in which I will describe how during a few months the equipments of the enterprises were implemented on scrapping, though, as we know, those enterprises were being built during decades of the Soviet period. The mayors gave permission for bribery, and playgrounds, rides, whole amusement parks from all over Ukraine went to the melting furnaces of the Donbas metallurgical enterprise. Everything that had weight and was valuable in public hospitals, schools, and institutions was written off. Chairpersons of the collective farms, taking “bribes” of some thousand dollars signed the papers, and carvers of metal did their work, they cut agricultural machinery, irrigation systems, metal boxes, and farms. In all that semi-legal destruction of public property, which was accumulated on the territory of Ukraine for 70 years of Soviet power, our business with Dima took perhaps one-thousandth part. However, if we earned more than we could spend, the question arose as to how much was earned by those who authorised that process of destruction of the state property? After all, that process was started from the top-level positions, and we played a secondary role in the mechanism of the scale looting of state property. After my refusal to be engaged in a political career, we started to meet with Dima Ladev less and less. I began to teach at the university, defended my dissertation, and moved to Kyiv. I almost ceased to pay attention to the business, and Dima began to transfer his new partners in a new direction. At some point, our paths diverged, because Dima, with his new team, Mikhail Dobkin and Gennadiy Kernes, rushed to the heights of power and millions that the power guaranteed them. In the world of science, which I chose myself, everything was easier and more prosaic: there it only valued the knowledge and significance of my discoveries. Money and power meant absolutely nothing. Dima Ladev loved to invite me to his new offices. When he took a higher position in the police structure, his offices became more spacious and decorative. The new Ukrainian government was not different from the old Soviet nomenclatura: the higher the position, the more spacious the office and the more rich the furniture. Dima seemed to want to show me how wrong I was to have refused my wellbeing. However, it was ridiculous to compare, because my life was exactly the opposite: I left my big and spacious house and chose a smaller and more modest apartment. That was

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a better place to work, and nothing could distract me from thoughts continuously generated by the brain.

2.17 The school of life: how to learn to give a bribe? In Ukraine, the word “bribe” was entering hard in daily life. After all, it was not included, because it consisted of too much negativity and bad associations. The word “bribe” was replaced by another word – “gratitude”. The phrases “to show gratitude” and “to return the favour” for every Ukrainian were synonymous with the phrase “to give a bribe”. Eventually, it sounded nice. Since 1999, Ukraine had passed through several stages of adapting to corruption: 1. When one feared “to give a bribe”. 2. When one “gave a bribe” but feared that “gratitude” would offend a person. 3. When one “gave a bribe”, and his/her “gratitude” was assessed and could even be bargained with. 4. When without “a bribe” it was impossible to achieve any positive solutions. 5. When the officials became so spoiled by “bribes” that they took them and did not do anything. By 2004, “bribes” had become the norm in the daily lives of Ukrainians. In every state structure, there were its own prices. The official’s signature cost a certain “bribe”. For comparison, in 2004, I bought the land with the dilapidated carpentry workshop in the urban village to build there a small hotel with a restaurant; I paid about 5 thousand dollars. The sales transaction at the notary took two hours. However, in order to change ownership of the land, I spent more than six months and paid about 10 thousand dollars of bribes! In each authority, I was forced to pay for the chief’s signature, which included any approvals, permits, and certificates. If I refused to pay, my documents were not even touched by the officials. The government officials took bribes with smiles on their faces. Putting the envelopes with “bribes” in a pocket or on a table, an official said: “I must earn a living, I have a family!” Every day the top state officials reported on the fight against corruption on television, the reduction in the number of state officials and inspection

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bodies, the reduction in the officials’ wages. The Ukrainian officials really received meagre wages, often lower than workers in enterprise did. These salaries did not allow them to support a family. So none of the officials lived off their wages. All of them had additional income: from the family business or in conjunction with the third party, the flows of “bribes” or wages “in the envelopes”. Despite the insignificance of their wages, the Ukrainian officials could not be called poor. Their expensive houses, cars, phones, and clothes surprised even businesspersons. The state officials lived due to their positions, businesspersons – due to their daily work and the need to pay taxes and wages to their hired workers in time. The top-level officials lived a hundred times richer than businesspersons did, because in their pockets there were the flows of “bribes” brought not only from businesspersons, but also from their subordinates. The state officials were earning their millions just off the fact that they occupied the right position, a “plum job”. Their heads were not filled with thoughts about the state, only how much longer to hold that position. Between people giving and taking “bribes”, communication established quickly. Ones quickly got used to paying bribes and achieving their goals; others quickly got used to taking bribes and satisfying their living needs. People who gave and took “bribes” committed a crime, but when everyone everywhere in the state, starting with the President and the top officials, committed a crime, it became routine and began to be perceived as a prerequisite for communication. In Ukraine, the forms of giving and taking bribes were constantly improved. For comparison, in 1861, a rich Russian aristocrat, philosopher, and playwright, Alexander Sukhovo-Kobylin, based on his life experiences in the drama “The Case” (Russian: “Delo”) (1861) wrote: “There are different types of bribes. For example, there is a rural bribe, so to speak, pastoral, arcadian. It is taken mainly in the form of agricultural products and from each according to his mug. It is not really a bribe. Then there is an industrial bribe, which is taken out of profit, a contract, or an inheritance, in short out of some acquisition. It is based on the axiom “love your neighbour as you do yourself”; he acquired something – let us divide it up. Nevertheless, this is not still a bribe. There is the criminal or snare bribe. It is taken until there is nothing left to take, until a person is stripped bare!”[Sukhovo-Kobylin, 1861]. In 2014 (after 153 years), a form of bribe changed. In Ukraine, a range of bribes depended on the level of an official

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and complexity of the problem in need of solving. Here is the range of bribes: – Expensive strong beverages; – “Packages” with a standard set: a box of chocolates + a coffee can + a jar of red caviar + a sausage or a bottle of cognac (or a bottle of champagne for female); – Phones, home appliances; – Office equipment; – Building materials; – “Envelope” – a usual envelope with national or foreign currency put in it; – “Card” – a bankcard that included a certain amount of money. It could be either a one-time sum, or a certain sum of money that was put on the card on a monthly basis; – “Box” – a cardboard box for home appliances. I know that 10 thousand dollars could easily be put into a DVD box. One day I saw how a “box” for a plasma TV was presented. Someone said there were 500 thousand dollars inside. – Gold – gold bars of different weights. I do not know why, but the Ukrainian officials did not like to take bankcards as a form of “gratitude”. They preferred to take bribes in US currency, in the old reliable way. Bribes in euros began to occur just before the Revolution of Dignity. I do not know why, but before the revolution, the officials did not prefer to deal in euros. Those who took bribes also tried as hard as they could. For example, in medicine, when one came to see a doctor, one could often see a calendar on the table, printed as an image of a 200 UAH banknote. This meant that a doctor’s service cost 200 UAH. If on the table there was a calendar with an image of a 100 UAH banknote, it meant a service cost 100 UAH. If a patient did not understand a hint, he asked: “How much should I pay?” and the doctor pointed to the calendar on the table, and everything became clear. Concerning education, when my youngest daughter studied in college in Kyiv, their supervising professor ordered different gifts for her birthday: from blankets on a double bed to a laptop. The latter particularly outraged the parents. On the eve of the birthday, 30 students each gathered 50 UAH and bought her, instead of the requested laptop, a touch pad. The

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supervising professor did not like her gift (as the previous group of students had already presented it to her); she was offended and returned the gift. The parents were outraged, but anyway they added money and bought her a laptop that she wanted. I note the college was under the university where I was Head of Department. I have never given money to such events, but as far as I know, my daughter did not want to stand out in the group and gave her pocket money. .

2.18 A typical image of the Ukrainian official between 1999 and 2004 The high-ranking Ukrainian officials (politicians, judges, journalists) were supported by businesspersons or already worked with them in factions since 2000. In addition to a small government salary, they received impressive monthly amounts in envelopes. Common business interests linked the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, as well as major Ukrainian news agencies and TV channels. The main features of the Kuchma mentality, such as erosion, were destroying the surface of a still neutral, free, and independent drifting locus of Ukrainian civilisation. Indifference to the people, to the interests of the state, corruption, incompetence, and irresponsibility were the main characteristics of the “leaders” of different levels during the Kuchma era. Over 12 years of presidency, Kuchma brought up a number of his own kind of politicians, bureaucrats, businesspersons, judges, journalists, and representatives of science and culture. About this time in Ukraine, a new trend of profitable business started – the sale of government jobs. Each position in any state institution had its cost. If a vacancy freed, initially the candidates were chosen depending on who could pay the designated amount of money. Less importance was attached to education and work experience. It was often that the competition won who outbid the designated sum, although his education and abilities did not correspond to that position. If a chief found the right person for a certain position but he did not have enough money to pay for a new job, then the position was sold on credit. The newly appointed official had to pay in full for six months or a year. If an official did not pay, he was desired to. As a rule, it never happened, because such officials were given the opportunity to work off a debt. They signed the documents, which had already been paid for, thereby repaying their debts.

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Most officials were forced to sign documents, understanding that they would be punished for such illegal acts and be subject to criminal penalties. However, they were not afraid of the law and did it consciously. As the statistics revealed, in Ukraine, no one went to prison for corruption. The officials tried to steal “more than enough”: so much to have enough to buy off justice and to provide for their daily lives. A little remote, but proximity to the authorities guaranteed immunity from the law. The officials, who had direct support from power during 24 years of Ukrainian independence, had never gone to prison. It is a little difficult to imagine that, during Leonid Kuchma's presidency, a right-hand man of President Viktor Medvedchuk might be sent to prison, or during Viktor Yushchenko’s governance Yulia Tymoshenko or Petro Poroshenko went there. In Ukraine, top-level officials went to prison only in two cases: if the power changed and the new rulers took revenge on their predecessors, or if a politician for this or that reason opposed the people in power. Many publicised criminal cases, court sentences, and the actual terms of imprisonment were ascribed to the high-level officials by the new government in the person of former competitors. It happened very rarely, and even then, only in cases when the former political opponents could not agree among themselves. For example: 1. Yuriy Lutsenko is a Ukrainian politician and former Minister of Internal Affairs (December 18 2007 to January 29 2010), an associate of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. After Viktor Yanukovych came to power on December 26 2010, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine arrested Lutsenko for abuse of office and embezzlement of state property in particularly large amounts. After the investigation, on 27 February 2012, Lutsenko was convicted and sentenced to four years in jail, with confiscation of all his property. In April 2013, he was released from prison because Ukrainian President Yanukovych pardoned him. In fact, all misfortunes and problems of Yuriy Lutsenko began only after his public speech against President Yanukovych, openly denouncing his policies in the press. The associates of Lutsenko tried to sober him up, but he did not agree to a compromise, so he was put in jail. Both Lutsenko and his political allies regarded his trial as an act of political persecution by the regime of Yanukovych. 2. Yulia Tymoshenko is a Ukrainian politician, a millionaire, the first woman to be appointed Prime Minister of Ukraine, and for a long time she was an implacable opponent of Kuchma and Yanukovych. February 13

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2001 was the first time that Tymoshenko was arrested and convicted of criminal cases. The main were transporting “contraband Russian gas to Ukraine” during her ruling of the corporation “United Energy Systems of Ukraine” (UESU) in 1995 and 1997, and for tax evasion. However, on March 27 2001 the Pechersk District Court in Kyiv cancelled the approval of her arrest, recognising the charges against her as groundless. For the official version of the court was the unofficial reason – Tymoshenko was opposed to Leonid Kuchma and his circle. After reaching certain agreements, she was released. She got off scot-free. The second time Tymoshenko was imprisoned was after losing the 2010 presidential election. After Viktor Yanukovych came to power, Tymoshenko did not want to negotiate with the new power, criticising it and being openly opposed to him. By the end of 2010, a number of criminal cases against Tymoshenko were instituted. On October 11 2011, the Pechersk District Court in Kyiv convicted her of embezzlement and abuse of power in the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine. According to the court, Tymoshenko exceeded her authority as Prime Minister, after the negotiations on January 19 2009 with Russian Prime Minister Putin; they came to the Ukrainian-Russian agreements on gas supply and transit, which, to the opinion of the court, resulted in the loss by Naftogaz Ukraine of $189, 500, 000. The court sentenced Tymoshenko to seven years in prison, deprived of the right to hold certain positions in state government for 3 years after serving the main sentence, and ordered to pay the state $189 million. On February 22 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine because of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution “on the implementation of international obligations of Ukraine on release of Yulia Tymoshenko”. Based on this decision, Tymoshenko left the prison hospital in Kharkiv on the same day. Thus, by the end of the second presidential term of Leonid Kuchma, he had at his disposal obedient and executive corrupt bureaucracy in all spheres of activity. All state institutions subordinated to the Presidential Administration and executed orders that came from it. Each high-level official dutifully fulfilled the will of Kuchma, because each official had sufficient tools to constitute incriminating evidence regarding their activities. Those who were opposed to Kuchma and his circle were dealt with quickly and mercilessly. All state-owned enterprises, which were monopolists in many sectors of the economy, served Kuchma and his regime. Under the lead by relatives or members of Kuchma’s team, the

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enterprises did not work for the state and the people, only on the regime. Through the super lucrative enterprises, using the simple plans, were withdrawn not only profit, but also specially directed budgetary funds. A model of the corrupt triangle: corrupt bureaucracy ĺ monopolistic stateowned enterprises ĺ oligarchic private companies developed in the mid90s, but it started to work in full force and with maximal feedback around the year 2000.

2.19 People’s resistance to the Kuchma regime in the early 2000s In early 2000, a small part of the population of Ukraine was opposed to the authoritarian-oligarchic state power of Kuchma. The reasons for the low protest activity of Ukrainians in that period were: – – – – –

Fear of power, which was genetically predetermined from history; Lack of inner freedom, civic engagement; Disunity of the politically active part of the Ukrainian population; The absence of charismatic leaders of the opposition; Detachment towards the political life of the country, the political illiteracy of the population; – The lack of an effective system of education and training that could form inner freedom, self-respect, and self-sufficiency (psychological type of Cossack, lord of their own fate) in the younger generation. However, the mood of protest in society emerged. Nationwide protest activities took place in all parts of the country, but they were separated and insignificant. The authorities brutally suppressed them. However, thanks to these attempts and on their basis, for several years in Ukraine a powerful opposition force against the Kuchma regime had been formed, which in 2004 turned into mass protests, called the Orange Revolution. Here are some examples of the history of dissent in Ukraine during that period: 1. The first victim of the President Kuchma regime and the hero of the protest movement in Ukraine became Georgy Gongadze – he was a Georgian-born Ukrainian journalist. Gongadze was a co-founder of a news website, Ukrayinska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth), which was opposed to the Kuchma regime. This was the first Ukrainian website, which, since April 2000, began publishing critical articles about Leonid Kuchma and his circle.

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On July 14 2000, Georgy Gongadze officially sent a letter to Prosecutor General Michael Potebenko, in which he wrote about the fact that he was under surveillance by police officers and unknown people. On September 16 2000, about 10:30 p.m., Georgy Gongadze left a co-founder of the “Ukrainian Truth” Olena Prytula, but he did not return home. On November 2, a body was found in a forest in the Taraschanskyi district of the Kyiv region. The corpse had been decapitated and doused in dioxine, apparently to make identification more difficult. His wife and friends officially identified it as being Gongadze. Several independent international examinations confirmed the identity of the headless corpse with the personality of the journalist. The three former officers from the Ukrainian Interior Ministry External Surveillance and Criminal Intelligence Department: Mykola Protasov, Valeriy Kostenko, and Oleksandr Popovych were sentenced to prison for the murder of Gongadze. Guilt and involvement in the murder of their immediate chief, General Alexei Pukach, the former Chief of the Criminal Investigation Department, was proved in July 2009. The circumstances of the death of Georgy Gongadze caused an international scandal, which led to protests against President Kuchma. During the Cassette Scandal, also known as Tapegate or Kuchmagate, recordings of the President’s secret conversations with the Chairman of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine, Volodymyr Lytvyn, and other high-level officials were played, allegedly showing them discussing how to stop Gongadze talking, because in his online articles he wrote about the corruption of top officials. Under pressure from the international community, the perpetrators of the murder went to prison, but the persons who ordered the murder remained unpunished. 2. On February 9 2000, in the evening on the stairs of the hotel “Moscow” in the city centre, the oppositionist, People’s Deputy of Ukraine Alexander Elyashkevich, was beaten and hospitalised with a diagnosis of “concussion of the brain”. In February 2002, Alexander Elyashkevich, referring to the tape recordings of the Ex-Major of the State Guard Department of Ukraine Nikolai Melnichenko, accused President Kuchma of organising the murder. The same year, he left Ukraine, explaining his departure as a threat to the life and safety of his family. On September 12 the same year, the former deputy got political asylum in the USA. 3. On June 9 2000, on Lviv square in Kyiv, Police Major Nikolai Naumets, Senior Lieutenant Oleg Marinyak (both were sentenced to a

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three-year jail term by the Kyiv Court of Appeal in May 2007) and Police General Alexei Pukach kidnapped a journalist Aleksei Podolsky. The Podolsky case proved a rehearsal for the Gongadze case. The difference was that Alexei Podolsky, who was also brought into the forest and choked by a belt, survived. The conversations concerning the Podolsky case were also recorded on the Melnichenko tapes. According to the recordings, the blame of Alexei Podolsky was that when working in the fund “Ukrainian prospect”, he published a number of articles on corruption among the high-level officials connected with President Kuchma. 4. In 2000, in Donetsk, journalist Alexander Akimenko, who had broadcast anti-Kuchma flyers, was killed. He was burned in a car. The case has not yet been solved. By the end of 2000, the scattered confrontation of the oppositional deputies and journalists began to get a more organised form. After the revealing of the Kuchma role concerning the murder of Gongadze, as well as other critics of the regime, the protests escalated in a completely new direction, which was called “Ukraine without Kuchma”. The first protest was held on December 15 2000. On February 13 2001, President Leonid Kuchma, Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, and Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Ivan Plyushch, signed the “the letter of three”, in which, appealing to the nationals, they claimed that against the state “unprecedented political protests with the signs of psychological warfare” were deployed. They called what was happening a form of Ukrainian National Socialism. On March 9 2001 near the presidential administration of Ukraine, the participants of “Ukraine without Kuchma” came into collision with the police. Police detained several hundred protesters. Consequently, 19 of them were convicted for “organising mass disorder” for a 2 to 4.5 years jail term. Protests by “Ukraine without Kuchma” lasted until April 2001. Under the pressure of protests, the Interior Minister Kravchenko, Chairman of the General Security Service of Ukraine, and General Derkach were sacked. The coordinators of the protests “Ukraine without Kuchma” were a member of the student movement 80–90, nonpartisan Vladimir Chemeris, and a member of the Socialist Party, Yuriy Lutsenko.

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Thus, the person who orderd the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze was Leonid Kuchma (not yet proved fact), and the members of his inner circle were the force that united the opposition movement in Ukraine, significantly increasing the number of its active members and directing them against the authoritarian-oligarchic power.

2.20 The Beginning of the 21st century: Geophilosophy of Ukraine Personally, for President Kuchma and his inner circle, the third millennium began with failure: – In November 2000, Leonid Kuchma was accused of the murder of a journalist that was out of favour with power, Georgy Gongadze (the so-called “cassette scandal”). The leader of the Socialist Party of Ukraine Oleksandr Moroz made the recordings of the President’s secret conversations with Chairman of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine Volodymyr Lytvyn and Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko, regarding the disappearance of Gongadze public. This was the beginning of the movement “Ukraine without Kuchma” organised by the opposition; – In 2001 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine tried several times to demand Kuchma's impeachment. He was accused of illegal arms trade, and the organisation of assault and battery of Deputy Alexander Yelyashkevych. Leonid Kuchma was losing popularity. His confidence rating was at 20 per cent; – On October 4, 2001 Siberia Airlines Flight 1812 was shot down by the Ukrainian military over the Black Sea, en route from Tel Aviv, Israel to Novosibirsk, Russia. 78 people were killed. Leonid Kuchma responded strangely to the tragedy, saying: “A tragic coincidence, but even today it can be said that bigger tragedies took place”, the international community was shocked. During this period in Ukraine, the influence of the two neighbouring loci was intensified significantly: the Russian Federation and European Union countries. For more than ten years (between 1990 and 2000) the territory of Ukraine did not represent the interests of neighbouring loci: under Yeltsin the Russian Federation hardly coped with its internal problems, letting Ukraine be out of its sphere of influence for a while, and the Central European States were establishing relations with the countries of Eastern Europe that after the collapse of the Soviet Union tried to find

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markers of their own identity. Ukraine was a useless major locus, whose presence no one was interested in and annoyed by. On the eve of the 1998 parliamentary elections, as a result of lobbying by Catherine Chumachenko-Yushchenko (a citizen of the United States, the second wife of Viktor Yushchenko) and some other US organisations and journalists, Ukraine got into the US sphere of interest. However, their interest was cooled for a while by the corruption and irresponsibility of businesspersons in which the Americans were going to make a bet in the highest legislative body of Ukraine. Politicians of Western civilisation did not understand the people who were for the sake of short-term gain to lose their reputation. As we wrote, Kuchma purchased almost all businesspersons who came to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 1998. They put their own interests above the national interests. Why did it happen? I believe that the main reason is the level of education and breeding. We have already noted that ever since the USSR, Soviet citizens had a certain stereotype: a disregard for public property. If it is state property, then it means it belongs to nobody. Businesspersons who came to Parliament in 1998 were cheeky, impudent, indifferent to the interests of the people and the state, the corrupt “youth” (mostly at the age of 30 to 45), who made their “first million” by plundering the state budget and property. They read books long ago, completely divorced from the spiritual culture, and believed that everything had its price. This is a type of Pavlo Lazarenko: a mixture of narrow-mindedness, cruelty, and efficiency. That is why Kuchma quickly found a common language with them. Here are some of them: 1. Igor Bakai (born in 1963), between April 1998 and April 2000 was Chairman of the National Joint Stock Company Naftogaz of Ukraine. Over a few years he became a multi-millionaire by inventing uncomplicated theft such as unsanctioned siphoning off the transit of Russian gas; for the state he purchased energy resources at inflated prices through a chain of intermediaries; he put under his personal control the operation of the majority of Ukrainian oil and gas companies. When the scale of the theft was discovered, Kuchma gave Bakai a post in his presidential administration. From October 2003 to December 2004, Bakai headed the State Administrative Office (the structure that supports the operations of the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada, Cabinet of Ministers, and other authorities). There, Bakai managed to steal more than $300 million. In 2004, he fled to the Russian Federation, where he immediately became a citizen.

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2. Michael Brodsky (born in 1959) has the nickname “Pups” (a baby doll) in criminal circles. He had amassed a considerable fortune from the deception of depositors of the bank “Dandy” (more than $2 million), the sale of land near Kyiv, laundering of criminal money. 3. Andrei Derkach (born in 1967) is the Ukrainian oligarch, the owner of the media holding and the TV channel “Era”. At the time of his election, his father – Leonid Derkach – was the Chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine and entered Kuchma’s inner circle. According to various estimates, the Derkach family robbed Ukraine of more than $3 billion. Despite the corruption scandals and the fact that Leonid Derkach was involved in the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze, Andrei Derkach buys a place in the Ukrainian Parliament until today. This list can be continued for at least 236 families, whose actions have caused substantial harm to the Ukrainian statehood. In 1998, much to the consternation of American politicians of the 450 deputies, more than half not only remained (they became) businessmen (that was prohibited by law), and for a few months, against the background of increasingly strained situations and the upcoming 1999 presidential elections, they became criminals in the understanding of Western civilisation. Having been frightened off by representatives of Western civilisation, Ukrainian politicians, bureaucrats, and servants of Themis were almost stewing in their own juices until 2002. Naturally, they did not read Francis Bacon, who in the 16th century from his rich experience of the Lord Chancellor wrote: “The vices of authority are chiefly four: delays, corruption, roughness, and facility. For delays, give easy access; keep times appointed; go through with that which is in hand, and interlace not of business but of necessity. For corruption, do not only bind thine own hands or thy servants’ hands from taking, but bind the hands of suitors also from offering; for integrity used doth the one, but integrity professed, and with a manifest detestation of bribery, doth the other; and avoid not only the fault, but also the suspicion. Whosoever is found variable, and changeth manifestly without manifest cause, giveth suspicious of corruption; therefore, always, when thou changest thine opinion or course, profess it plainly, and declare it, together with the reasons that move thee to change, and do not think to steal it. A servant or a favourite, if he were inward, and no other apparent cause of esteem, is commonly thought but a by-way to close corruption. For roughness, it is a needless cause of discontent: severity breedeth fear, but roughness breedeth hate.

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Even reproofs from authority ought to be grave, and not taunting. As for facility, it is worse than bribery, for bribes come but now and then; but if importunity or idle respects lead a man, he shall never be without; as Solomon saith, “To respect persons it is not good, for such a man will transgress for a piece of bread” [Whately, 1858: 107–108]. Low level of education and basic features of the mentality of Kuchma (indifference to people, corruption, and indifference to the interests of the state, incompetence and irresponsibility), took root in the mentality of the Ukrainian officials that were around him. By 2000, this so-called “Ukrainian elite” created in Ukraine such a political, economic, and social environment, which frightened off the representatives of Western culture. However, for the ruling “elite” of the Russian Federation, the mentality of Ukrainian rulers was more than understandable. Coming to power, Vladimir Putin drew attention to the “fraternal peoples”, which actually turned out to be in isolation from Western civilisation. Common mentality of Russian and Ukrainian politicians led to the fact that Kuchma, who was ignored by Western politicians, began to orient on the Russian Federation and its interests. By 2002, the locus of Ukrainian civilisation began to lose its independence and autonomy, and to enter into the sphere of interests of the Russian Federation that was enriched by oil and gas.

2.21 The 2002 parliamentary elections The Parliamentary elections in Ukraine are held on the eve of the presidential elections. They adequately disclose the prospects of the party leaders in the struggle to win the presidential race. By 2002, Kuchma was not only in international isolation, but also with the burgeoning problems in internal policy. Firstly, the young businesspersons who came to the Parliament in 1998 failed to live up to Kuchma's expectations. They helped Kuchma in the 1999 presidential election, but in state administration, they showed complete failure. The changes in the government, which were initiated by Viktor Yushchenko, Kuchma was not impressed, and the businessmen-parliamentarians got used to President Kuchma’s credibility, having directed cash flows from the regions to themselves, sometimes even infringing upon Kuchma’s inner circle’s interests. Naturally, Kuchma could not stand it. Secondly, on Ukrainian territory, the confrontation between the two world cultures activated. With the growth of Russian activity on Ukrainian

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territory, Western culture also increased activity. However, if the Russians formed their relationship on the bribery of Ukrainian politicians and officials, the European politicians invested in community organisations, increasing civil society activity. Around since 2000 in Ukraine, frontier energy was on the rise, affecting the mood and preferences of Ukrainians: the Russian Federation put pressure on the history between “fraternal peoples” and invested in Southeastern Ukraine; the European Union began to finance more Ukrainian public organisations in Western and Central Ukraine. Thirdly, Kuchma could not see his future, he thought: in contravention of the Constitution of Ukraine to go for a third term or look for a successor. The successful experience of the transfer of power from the old to the new regimes in the Russian Federation, from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin, Kuchma felt an urge to choose the second option. However, who would be a successor? Leonid Kuchma got the answer to this question in the parliamentary elections of 2002. Parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine on March 31 2002. The political bloc “For United Ukraine!” which was supported by Leonid Kuchma, and the head of which was Vladimir Lytvyn, won 11.77 per cent of the votes. This put them in third place, which was far from the results of the opposition parties: the Bloc of Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine (23.57 per cent) and the Communist Party of Ukraine (19.98 per cent). The parties of Yulia Tymoshenko (8.52 per cent) and Oleksandr Moroz (6.87 per cent) were close to the leading parties [Central, 2016]. The results of the parliamentary elections frightened Kuchma. He saw that the Ukrainian people wanted changes, and these changes were things the people saw in European values that were completely alien to Kuchma’s mentality. Kuchma understood that in 1998 his decision to share power with the businessmen-politicians led to the birth of a new class – millionaire-politicians. The new generation of financially independent politicians understood the people much better and was able to speak clearly and pleasantly. Millionaire-politicians began to unite around Yushchenko, and made insidious plans for the 2004 presidential election. Kuchma knew that if in 1999 with the lowest ranking of confidence they could retain his victory over the stronger opponents, they would have no difficulty in organising Yushchenko’s victory, which was popular with the people, in the 2004 presidential election. Kuchma lost all the levers of influence on this daring team of millionaire-politicians.

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The 2002 parliamentary elections showed Kuchma that there could be no question of a third term. As a minimum, it was necessary to decide: – To retain power until the end of his second term, 2004; – To decide on a successor; – To guarantee his safety and son-in-law’s business under a new president. Vladimir Putin had a strong influence on the choice of Kuchma’s successor. Against the background of increasing pro-European sentiment in Ukraine, the impact of the Russian Federation on the state-forming processes in Ukraine increased. Putin and Kuchma liked two main features in Yanukovych: – Rigidity and the ability to achieve the desired result. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, Yanukovych once again demonstrated his ability to command: the Donetsk region was the only one in which the pro-government party “For United Ukraine!” won 36.9 per cent of the votes; – The same mentality, based on closeness with fraternal Russian people and indifference to his own people. In addition, as in the Donetsk clan as in Kuchma’s son-in-law, the whole business was focused on Russia, so Yanukovych and Akhmetov, with the same concern as Kuchma and Pinchuk, were watching the attempts of the young oligarchs who were around Yushchenko, to orientate Ukraine toward Western civilisation.

2.22 The coming into power of the Donetsk clan Once again, I want to draw attention to how the mentality of the ruler can change the destiny of the whole nation. In early 2002, one was still able to speak about Ukraine as an independent locus of civilisation. Yes, it was riddled with corrosion of corruption, weakened politically and economically, demoralised of the moral principles, but it remained independent. The 2002 parliamentary elections exacerbated the struggle within the homegrown“Ukrainian elite” during the Kuchma era, but even Yushchenko himself, around whom was a club of English-speaking businessmenpoliticians, orienting him to the values of Western civilisation, remained loyal to Kuchma and did not think about the revolution. High-ranking officials, parliamentarians, and judges wanted everything to remain as

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before: equal access to the state budget and resources. The “elite” should remain untouchable. However, at the end of 2002, Kuchma made a single-handed decision that undermined the independence of the locus of Ukrainian civilisation. Worrying about his own future, the fate of the stolen billions, after consultations with Moscow, on 21 November 2002, Kuchma appointed to the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych. By taking this step, Kuchma made a clear sign to the leaders of Western civilisation, as well as his circle, of the return of Ukrainian policy to the Russian Federation’s sphere of influence. In fact, under Kuchma, nationalist sentiment was limited to general statements and declarations. At the state level, attempts to establish and consolidate the markers of cultural identity of the Ukrainian nation were stopped. Therefore, the appointment of openly pro-Russian Yanukovych to the second most important post in Ukraine formally stated that Ukraine as an independent state, and the Ukrainians as independent people, no longer existed. Why did Kuchma choose Viktor Yanukovych as his successor? There were other candidates no less (and perhaps more) worthy. For example, a young and promising politician, Serhiy Tihipko from Dnepropetrovsk or a devoted and competent industrial manager, the Minister of Transport and Communications Georgy Kirpa. Why did Kuchma choose the governor of the Donetsk region, with his two criminal records, criminal past, and proRussian mentality? To understand Kuchma’s choice we need to understand the logic of a man who was betrayed by associates many times, who was hated and despised not only in Ukraine, but also around the world. After the scandals with wiretaps in his office, after massive opposition protests, and especially after the 2002 parliamentary elections, which passed quite miserably, Kuchma was not interested in the fate of Ukraine and the Ukrainians. The main question for him was his own security. Yanukovych and the Donetsk clan guaranteed him not only calm and secure old age, but also to retain the year and a half of the presidential cadence. A real choice in favour of the Donetsk clan and Putin, he vouched for them, and the agreements should always be complied. In November 2002, Viktor Yanukovych did not just head the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers; he also brought with him a cohesive and reliable team. In Ukraine, on the political Olympus, the new names were sounded,

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which would later be included in the history of Ukraine as the personification of dictatorial power: 1. Mykola Azarov is a Ukrainian politician who was the Prime Minister of Ukraine from March 11 2010 to January 27 2014. Azarov also served ex officio as an acting Prime Minister in the First Yanukovych Government when Yanukovych ran for president at first, and then upon resignation of his government; 2. Sergey and Andriy Klyuev (Klyuev brothers) were “gray cardinals” during Yanukovych’s government. In different periods of the Yanukovych rise to power, they held key government positions and were in charge of domestic and foreign policy of the state. In 2013, the magazine “Focus” estimated the Klyuyev brothers’ capital at $618, 000, 000; 3. Viktor Pshonka was Prosecutor General of Ukraine from November 4 2010 to February 22 2014; 4. Boris Kolesnikov is the former Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine and the Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine (December 2010 to February 2014). In 2013, the magazine “Focus” estimated his capital at $810, 000, 000; 5. Yuri Ivanyushchenko is Donetsk criminal boss; his nickname is “Yura Yenakiyevskyi”. According to the Ukrainian magazine “Focus” in 2012, he took 26th place in the list of 200 most influential people of Ukraine, and his capital was estimated at $756, 000, 000. For a long time he was Viktor Yanukovych’s confidante. The main personality, more important than Yanukovych, was the “informal” leader of the Donetsk clan, Rinat Akhmetov. For a long time Rinat Akhmetov did not emerge from the shadows of Viktor Yanukovych. Only in the 2006 parliamentary elections did he openly support the Party of Regions (which was formed by Petro Poroshenko under Kuchma) and started to be engaged in politics. Until that time, the people heard about Akhmetov as the richest Ukrainian person. According to the annual rating of the magazine “Forbes”, the capital of Rinat Akhmetov was estimated at $16, 000, 000, 000 in March 2012, and he was in 39th place in the ranking of the richest people in the world.

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2.23 Ukraine on the eve of the Orange Revolution Leonid Kuchma’s two terms as president turned the prosperous and wealthy Ukrainian Socialist Republic into the authoritarian-oligarchic state, in which three major oligarchic clans ruled: 1. The presidential clan – represented by Kuchma and his son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk; 2. The Donetsk clan – headed by Viktor Yanukovych and Rinat Akhmetov; 3. The Kyiv clan – represented by Viktor Medvedchuk, Hryhoriy Surkis, and Nestor Shufrych. All three clans put emphasis on the values of the Byzantine-Asian culture, had a similar way of thinking, and the same vision of the future of Ukraine. The main task of the clans was to retain their power in the upcoming presidential elections. Two main forces resisted the authoritarian-oligarchic power of Leonid Kuchma: 1. Businessmen-parliamentarians, most of whom, due to Kuchma, became millionaires between 1998 and 2002. By the end of 2004, their business became much worse. Coming to power, the Donetsk clan significantly limited their influence in the regions, and on a governmental level. The greatest fear that millionaire-politicians had, which pushed them into open confrontation with the government, was the fear of takeover by the Donetsk clan. As early as 2004 in Ukraine, rumours circulated that the Donetsk clan was grabbing all the promising and profitable directions in business. Therefore, millionaire-politicians considered the Yanukovych victory in the 2004 presidential elections as a threat to their own prosperity and prospects. Rumours were supported by the concrete facts: through the illegal seizure of Petro Poroshenko and Yevhen Chervonenko’s business, they openly financed the opposition movement. 2. Economic poverty led to protests by the majority of the population. Salaries, pensions, and scholarships in Ukraine in 2004 were several times lower than in Russia and Belarus. Prior to the 2004 presidential campaign (i.e. June 2004), scholarship students in higher education institutions were worth 34 UAH ($6 per month), the average pension in 2004 was 182 UAH ($35), and the average salary was 590 UAH ($105). The Ukrainians

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associated their impoverishment with Kuchma’s presidency, and particularly with Prime Minister Yanukovych. Two opposing forces were preparing for the presidential election campaign carefully. Each of the parties was willing to fight until the end.

2.24 Presidents Leonid Kuchma – in the history of Ukraine Let us sum up Kuchma’s presidency in Ukraine for nearly 12 years. From the point of view of geophilosophy in the history of Ukraine, Kuchma was a disaster that put down the richest republic to the level of the poor African dictatorships. His son-in-law Victor Pinchuk and his only daughter Elena Pinchuk, through the Pinchuk Foundation and their own six Ukrainian TV channels (STB, ICTV, Novy Kanal, M1, M2, and QTV), tried to “clean” Kuchma’s reputation for the stolen national money, but the facts speak for themselves: 1. It was under Kuchma and under his leadership that an authoritarianoligarchic system of government was established in Ukraine; 2. It was under Kuchma that the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities merged around a common interest – the theft of material and labour resources of the state; 3. It was Kuchma who undermined the independent existence of the locus of Ukrainian civilisation and returned Ukraine to the sphere of Russian interests. Through this step, he again turned Ukraine into a limitrophe state; 4. It was Kuchma who, with his perverted mentality, could allow that the head of the Presidential Administration Viktor Medvedchuk invited the leaders of the neighbouring state to be godparents. Judging by the reaction, Kuchma did not pay any attention to that shameful phenomenon, at that time he had already made his choice in favour of Russia; 5. With the direct involvement of Kuchma, a corrupt triangle was formed in Ukraine: Corrupt bureaucracy ĺ monopolistic state-owned enterprises ĺ oligarchic private companies

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This model allowed Kuchma to ruin Ukraine and to plunge it into a multibillion-dollar debt; 6. It was Kuchma who thought up combining politics and business and created regional businessmen-politicians, which in return for their loyalty and obedience got entire regions of Ukraine to manage; 7. It was Kuchma and his circle that had taught officials to live in idleness and plenty, to worship ranks and their awards. He debased state ranks, titles, and awards so much that any official could afford to save up the required amount to buy another bureaucratic rank, title, or state medal. His mistress, Tatiana Zasukha, was awarded three Orders “For Merit”; in 2003 (her 39th birthday) she was awarded the highest state award of Ukraine – the title of Hero of Ukraine “for outstanding personal merits before the Ukrainian state”; 8. It was under Kuchma that legal nihilism was allowed to exist in Ukraine, when each man knew that he should steal “more than enough”: so much to have enough to pay off justice and to provide for his daily life. Piscis primuin a capite foetat. It was Kuchma who became the rotten head for Ukraine and the Ukrainians, with which the moral decay of society began.

CHAPTER THREE FROM THE ORANGE REVOLUTION TO THE REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY (2004 AND 2013): THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN TWO CULTURES

In September 2015 when I worked on this book, collected material on the second Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and his role in the history of Ukraine, I was invited to oppose the doctoral thesis at Dnepropetrovsk National University. The defence of a thesis was on 18 September, at the Palace of Students of the Dnepropetrovsk National University. Moreover, that, as it happened, meant that the defence of a thesis took place on the first floor of the building, and on the ground floor, the graduates of 1960 in the faculty of Physics and Technology Department of the Dnepropetrovsk National University, celebrated their meeting. They were waiting for the arrival of Leonid Kuchma. Preparing for my opponency, I was walking near the entrance to the Palace of Students. By chance, I witnessed the arrival of Leonid Kuchma and his greetings with the graduates. Leonid Kuchma was just five metres away from me. If I wished, I could ask him a few questions. I did not break the idyll of the meeting between the nearly octogenarian people. It was their holiday. When watching the frail and bald figure of the second president of Ukraine, I noticed his behaviour was unusually ordinary and approachable, I would like to ask just one question: “Why Russia?” The choice depended only on Kuchma: democracy or authoritarianism, independence or again dependant “fraternity”. He chose the latter. If he did not make that choice, perhaps everything would be in a different way. In 2003 in Moscow, Kuchma published a book “Ukraine is Not Russia” [Kuchma, 2003], while in November 2002, Yanukovych was appointed to the post of the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Kuchma had made a choice for himself. It seems to be disingenuous...

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In previous chapters, we came to three main conclusions: 1. Ukraine is a limitrophe state, located between two major loci of civilisation. In 1990, with regard to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had a unique chance to take its place as an independent and selfsufficient locus of civilisation. However, it did not take advantage of its chance, and in 2002 was again in the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation; 2. The Ukrainians, on the eve of its independence, had nothing to do with corruption. Corruption in Ukraine has nothing to do with the collapse of the USSR, and the heritage that the Ukrainians got after the Soviet mentality. Corruption in Ukraine is a consequence of the state policy of having a narrow circle of Ukrainian rulers: Kravchuk and Kuchma, prime ministers, deputies, judges. Most of them in the past were the Soviet nomenclatura. In 1990, they threw away party tickets, got dressed in embroidered shirts, and only used the Ukrainian language in their speeches, but in these beautiful patriotic speeches were hidden the features that were most clearly shown in the mentality of Kuchma: indifference to the interests of his own people and the state, venality, incompetence, and irresponsibility. These features united the so-called “Ukrainian elite” and led to the fact that since 2002 Ukraine actually began to lose its independence. 1990 to 2004 is the period of the omission of the processes related to national development. Instead of the formation and development of the Ukrainian state, three ruling oligarchic clans in Ukraine: KuchmaPinchuk, Yanukovych-Akhmetov and Medvedchuk-Surkis returned Ukraine to the sphere of interests of the Russian Federation; 3. Western civilisation was preparing for revenge. Various international organisations and charitable foundations, state and public organisations of the European Union, the United States, and Canada, private foreign investors, etc., invested heavily in the development of Ukrainian statehood and supporting the values of Western civilisation. Reviews of various aspects of influence of Western civilisation on Ukraine on the eve of the Orange Revolution can be found in the works of Taras Kuzio [Kuzio, 2015], NadČžda Šišková [Šišková, 2014], Daniel Smilov [Political Finance, 2007], Jurij Toplak [Political Finance, 2007], Andrew Wilson [Wilson, 2005], in the collective monograph “Democratic Revolution in Ukraine: from Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution” [Democratic Revolution, 2009] and many other works.

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In the third chapter, we consider the following questions: 1. The Orange Revolution of 2004, how technology awakened the masses, which was forced to protect the millionaire-politicians’ business; 2. Why the Orange Revolution of 2004, instead of actualisation of values of Western civilisation, on the contrary, encouraged the further spread of corrupt mentality in all sectors of Ukrainian society; 3. What are the reasons why Ukrainians consciously chose not an ardent revolutionary like Yulia Tymoshenko (who is known as the “mother of corruption” among Ukrainian politicians and journalists) in the 2010 presidential election, but Viktor Yanukovych, a politician with a criminal past and reactionary view; 4. We will show how the political ignorance and corruption of the fourth Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych exacerbated the conflict between the two cultures of the world, and provoked the war on the territory of Ukraine.

3.1 November 22 2004 to January 2005 – the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. A new point of view On the Internet, on official sources, and in reference books, the following definition of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine is given – it is a series of peaceful protests, rallies, pickets, and strikes that took place in Ukraine from late November 2004 to January 2005. It began on 21 November 2004, after the Central Election Commission of Ukraine had announced the preliminary results of the second round of the presidential elections, according to which Prime Minister of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych had a margin of 3 per cent over his rival. Supporters of Yushchenko, he was the main rival to Yanukovych, and most foreign observers believed that preponderance of the votes was achieved due to irregularities in vote counting. The protest started as a reaction to mass falsification that affected the outcome of the election. In the official description, which was important at the scale of Ukraine’s historical events, the other reasons were hidden; let us concentrate our attention on them.

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3.1.1 Quick enrichment of the authoritarian-oligarchic clans on the eve of the 2004 presidential elections So far, many Ukrainians believe that economic growth in Ukraine has been reached only under Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. However, the author was surprised to learn first-hand that during the premiership of Viktor Yanukovych (2002–2004), Ukraine’s economy was characterised by high growth rates, low budget deficit, low inflation, and improving balance of payments position. Coming to power, the Donetsk clan actually turned out to be professionals. Between 2001and 2004, Growth Rates of the Ukrainian economy averaged more than 7 per cent per year. The real annual growth rate of investment exceeded 7 per cent. Single digits measured inflation and the currency exchange rate of UAH remained stable. In the first quarter of 2004, economic growth rate of Ukraine amounted to 10.8 per cent. For the first 4 months of 2004, GDP growth was at 11.5 per cent, in comparison with the same period of 2003, including the growth of industrial production – 17.7 per cent. According to these indicators, Ukraine was in the lead in the post-Soviet area [State Statistics, 2015]. Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who served as Head of the National Bank of Ukraine between July 4 2004 and February 2005, wrote about high rates of economic development in Ukraine in his monograph [Yatsenyuk, 2008]. In his memoirs, he writes: “In 2003 and 2004, Ukraine was referred to as the “Eastern-European tiger”, it was similar to the “Asian tigers” – South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore. The rates of development of our country were high even in comparison with other transition economies. In 2003, gross domestic product grew at a rate of 9.6 per cent, and in 2004 at 12.1 per cent. Results of observations indicated that the shadow economy was growing at the same rates and was about 60 per cent legal. At that time, only China and India could demonstrate such success. The whole world envied the macroeconomic indicators of Ukraine. Production in the country expanded at a great rate, providing a record amount of foreign exchange flows, income growth of the population, and the rapid development of the banking sector” [Yatsenyuk, 2008: 21]. After the revelations of the future Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk, personally I was not only astonished, but also perplexed. About what growth of incomes of the population Yatsenyuk wrote, if, for example, the minimum pension in 2004 was 50 UAH (about $10)? This amount did not exceed 14 per cent of the subsistence minimum. Most

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Ukrainians could only buy clothes in second-hand shops. Between 1992 and 2004, the population of Ukraine decreased by 4 million people. The Ukrainian authorities admitted that the problem was the spread of tuberculosis (disease of poor and undernourished people) that was not under control for a long time. The only conclusion that one could come to by analysing Yatsenyuk’s book and studies of that period is that before the 2004 presidential elections a quick enrichment of the oligarchic clans, as close as possible to Leonid Kuchma and dozens of businessmen-parliamentarians that Kuchma appointed to the role of the regional elite, took place. For the majority of the Ukrainian population, the coming to power of Viktor Yanukovych and the Donetsk clan brought only further impoverishment, the frightening difference in incomes between rich and poor, as well as the political course of Ukraine’s development, aimed at Russia and values of the Byzantine-Asian culture.

3.1.2 The members of the opposition on the eve of the 2004 presidential election. “The regional elite” Who were the leaders of the Ukrainian opposition on the eve of the 2004 presidential election? Among the leaders of the opposition, there were only a mere handful of people that were ideological, honest, and with an unblemished reputation. Ukrainian opposition leaders at the end of 2004 were those who raised the people, those who led the Orange Revolution, and then came to power – they felt themselves offended, disadvantaged, hungry for more power and money, they were politicians-millionaires. Viktor Yushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Petro Poroshenko, David Zhvania, Eugene Chervonenko, Yuriy Lutsenko, Mykola Martynenko, Olexander Tretiakov… Whom among these names can be called honest, ideological oppositionists? The Orange Revolution is a struggle against corruption, for democratic values and for European culture. We heard it in late 2004, and people believed it. However, time has shown that the Orange Revolution was in fact a confrontation of businessmen-parliamentarians, who were denied access to the national budgets by the three ruling oligarchic clans. By the end of 2004, Yanukovych and the Donetsk clan significantly limited the influence of the regional elites. Many regional businessmen-parliamentarians were deprived of the opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of the national budget, government orders, foreign investments, and state-

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owned enterprises. Unlike the population of Ukraine, the regional politicians-millionaires were aware of the economic growth in Ukraine, and naturally about the rates of enrichment of the Kuchma-Pinchuk, Akhmetov-Yanukovych and Medvedchuk-Surkis clans. Cupidity and envy did its thing. When a person gets used to “easy” money, which is earned only through relations with the government, the daily work of a businessperson becomes a burden. Unfortunately, there were few Ukrainian businessmen-politicians who were talented or educated (I do not take into account that many diplomas and degrees were bought) in honest business management. The discontent of the regional elite was caused, especially in the central and western regions of Ukraine, by the support of the political course towards Russia, which was openly pursued by Yanukovych’s government. Imitating Russian oligarchs, Ukrainian “elites” (especially from Donetsk), who engaged in their personal enrichment, aroused envy and jealousy in the regions. To buy and keep football clubs, yachts, model agencies, TV channels, and print media – it was all too tempting, but was not available for the regional politician-millionaire. These blessings of civilisation in the Ukrainian reality were available only for those who were in or close to Power.

3.1.3 Biographies of opposition leaders of 2004: Viktor Yushchenko Consider the biographies of three Ukrainian opposition leaders that led the Orange Revolution a little later. Excerpts from biographies of Viktor Yushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, and Petro Poroshenko, taken from open sources of information, will allow us to create a psychological portrait of the leaders of the Orange Revolution and to understand the reasons why after the Orange Revolution Ukraine and the Ukrainians were not able to get, in principle, what they were struggling for on the Maidan í equality of rights, freedoms, and duties. Consider the psychological portrait of Viktor Yushchenko, the opposition leader, the third president of Ukraine. What is common between Kravchuk, Kuchma, and Yushchenko? All three of them were brought up in a certain system of professional and life values. They are not just from the Soviet Union by birth; they have been brought up in highly specialised professional systems, which left their mark on the mentality of each of them. Leonid Kravchuk was trained in the system of the party officials,

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Leonid Kuchma among the industrialists-manufacturers, Viktor Yushchenko, in the banking system. All three Presidents of Ukraine were people of a team; two of those (Kravchuk and Yushchenko) made a career in their systems through their own talents and skills, thanks to established links to the systems. Teamwork and the trust to team members is clearly seen in the personnel policies of all three Presidents. The resemblance of Yushchenko and the previous two Presidents of Ukraine has finished. Differences begin: Firstly, an important feature of the presidents was their age. If Kravchuk and Kuchma were almost the same age (1934 and 1938 years of birth), then Yushchenko (born in 1954) represented the generation that did not remember the war, only vaguely recollecting the difficult postwar years. Secondly, only Kravchuk can be called a professional politician. Kuchma and Yushchenko perceived politics through the mentality of the systems in which their career development and personal formation took place. Kuchma planned the domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine through the mentality of a Director-General of a large military-industrial factory; Yushchenko through the mentality of the Head of a major bank. Viktor Yushchenko is a professional banker who did not aspire to politics. He felt comfortable with the position of Head of the National Bank of Ukraine (between January 26 1993 and December 22 1999). Yushchenko was held in well-deserved respect and authority among colleagues around the world. In 1996, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development called Yushchenko the best banker of the year. In 1997, according to the magazine “Global Finance”, Yushchenko took sixth position in the ranking of the best bankers in the world. The third feature of Yushchenko is his management style. To manage a bank is quite different to ruling a party organisation (as Kravchuk was taught), or a large military factory (as Kuchma was taught). In managing the bank, one should be more liberal, in his own style, impressive. That is how Yushchenko subsequently ruled Ukraine: as an aristocrat, a liberal, an educator, and a freelance artist. Fourthly, Yushchenko was distinguished from his precursors by Ukrainian nationalism and pro-Western mentality. These qualities made Yushchenko a leader of the opposition in the early 2000s.

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Fifthly, Yushchenko was affected by his inner circle. Women had a particularly strong influence on his world-view and career. Yushchenko’s first wife, Svetlana Kolesnik, a teacher of Ukrainian language and literature, awakened Yushchenko’s love of Ukrainian traditions. Her friend Tamara Kiseleva, a journalist with wide connections in the Komsomol and business circles, played an important role in the appointment of Yushchenko as the head of the National Bank of Ukraine in 1992. His second wife, Catherine Claire Chumachenko, worked at one time as the director of the Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS), the Washington DC public affairs bureau of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA). Together with her American friends with Ukrainian roots: Martha Kolomiets, Mary Miso (a journalist for the “Los Angeles Times”) and Christ Freeland (a journalist for the “Financial Times”), she formed Yushchenko’s stable orientation toward Western values. These women made Yushchenko a strong lobby in America and Ukraine [Secrets of Wives, 2009]. Biographical facts speak for themselves: in January 1998 Yushchenko married an American, Catherine Claire Chumachenko, and in early 1999, contrary to his former principles, he made his debut in politics. Like all businessmen-parliamentarians, Yushchenko’s first steps in politics were made in Leonid Kuchma’s team. During the 1999 presidential election, he took an active part in the Kuchma campaign. After Kuchma’s trip to the United States in December 1999, Viktor Yushchenko headed the Ukrainian Government. In February 2001 in one of the interviews with Viktor Yushchenko, he was asked the question: “How do you feel about President Kuchma?” He answered that Kuchma was like “a father”. However, being a man of the system, Yushchenko was already an official with a new mentality, pontificating Ukrainian national traditions and pro-Western development of Ukraine. Against the background of the pro-Russian President, the Donetsk and the Kyiv clans, Yushchenko seemed like an alien among senior officials of the Kuchma era. Perhaps that is why he was involved in major politics against his will and desire. In the National Bank, as in the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yushchenko was distinguished by his professional attitude. Unlike all previous Prime Ministers, Yushchenko behaved himself quite independently regarding President Kuchma and his entourage. Experts appreciated the work of Prime Minister Yushchenko. For example, Viktor Lisitzky noted the following achievements of Yushchenko and his government [Lisitzky, 2004]:

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1. in the field of production: – For the first time over the years of independence, Ukraine enjoyed GDP growth (6.6 per cent in 2000); the decline of GDP stopped, which had started in 1991; – It was managed to radically change the mechanism of calculations and payments to the central and local budgets; – Bartering and borrowing were discarded; – Substantially increased revenues to the state budget. 2. in the social sphere: – For the first time (since 1992) arrears on debt repayments on pensions and scholarships were liquidated, but “wage arrears,” continued; – In towns and villages “rolling blackouts of electricity” stopped. However, Kuchma and the businessmen-parliamentarians who formed the majority of the Verkhovna Rada’s third convocation did not support the activities of Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. It ran counter to their interests and already established corrupt mentality. Therefore, on April 26 2001 after a report on the work of the government at the meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, and the whole of the government machinery, were forced to resign in connection with a parliamentary vote of no confidence [Ukraine Parliament, 2001]. However, instead of forgetting, as had been envisaged by the ill wishers of Kuchma’s inner circle, the removal from power made Yushchenko a symbol of the opposition movement. The turning point in the political career of Yushchenko was the 2002 parliamentary elections, in which he made his debut as the “leader of the political force”. For these elections, the Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraina) bloc was formed and, to the surprise of many, took first place with 23.6 per cent of the vote. Thus, Our Ukraine took 112 seats in the Parliament of Ukraine out of a possible 450. The analysis of the program and actions of Yushchenko and his political force in the period 2002–2004 shows that Yushchenko and his party members, with great difficulty, can be called the oppositionists. Firstly, almost all of Yushchenko’s inner circle were millionaire-politicians from the regional elites, Yushchenko’s welfare continued to depend on the wellbeing of the authoritarian regime of Kuchma. Secondly, none of them thought to speak out against the Kuchma regime. Yushchenko’s entourage showed their opposition in competition for cash flows and spheres of

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influence with the three closest oligarchic clans to the president: KuchmaPinchuk, Akhmetov-Yanukovych and Medvedchuk-Surkis. Using their influence in parliament, Yushchenko’s party, consisting of the millionairepoliticians (or their relatives), traded voices.

3.1.4 Biographies of opposition leaders of 2004: Yulia Tymoshenko Yulia Tymoshenko is the second opposition leader, a businessperson and politician. It is not easy to speak about her objectively, without emotion. Her unhealthy aspiration for power, proneness to conflict, hypocrisy, and ambiguous actions aroused either total rejection or blind deference. The life of Tymoshenko is remarkable for mutability of the fate, the highs and lows, fame and oblivion, betrayals, and conflicts. All she was doing she was doing for herself and for the sake of her goals. However, some of her actions played a positive role in the formation of the Ukrainian state. For example, the significance of Tymoshenko in the awakening of civil society activities. Yulia’s father, Volodymyr Hrihyan, who according to his Soviet passport was Latvian, abandoned the family when his daughter was only three. Her mother brought up Yulia Tymoshenko. The first half of her life was spent in Dnepropetrovsk. In high school, Yulia Hrihyan decided to change her surname. She took her mother's surname and became Telehina. At age 19, she married (in 1979), and changed her surname for the third time, becoming Yulia Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko’s marriage can be called successful. The husband’s family was a family of the regional Soviet nomenclatura. Her father-in-law was a party official, after the collapse of the Soviet Union; he helped his son’s family to make their first steps in business. Given the possibilities of the Dnepropetrovsk clan, the family of Tymoshenko rapidly enriched. In the early 1990s, the Tymoshenko family (father and son) combined their capital and established the company “The Ukrainian Petrol Corporation”, which eventually became a monopoly in supplying the agricultural industry of Dnepropetrovsk with fuel. In November 1995, based on “The Ukrainian Petrol Corporation”, this company was reorganised into “United Energy Systems of Ukraine” (UESU) – the main importer of Russian natural gas from Central Asian states to Ukraine.

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By studying and comparing the biography of Yulia Tymoshenko and Pavlo Lazarenko, you conclude that the establishment and prosperity of the corporation “United Energy Systems of Ukraine” occurred not thanks to the genius of Tymoshenko or someone from her family, but because of intimacy between Tymoshenko and Lazarenko. In 1995 and 1996, Pavlo Lazarenko served as the First Vice-Prime Minister (in Energy Affairs), and in 1996 and 1997 as the Prime Minister of Ukraine. 35 year-old Tymoshenko and 42 year-old, Lazarenko established a powerful tandem, which was based on love and corruption. A few years later, the connection with Lazarenko led to the destruction of the Tymoshenko family business. It was in 1997, after President Kuchma had dismissed Prime Minister Lazarenko, that State Tax Inspection of Ukraine brought an action against Tymoshenko’s company – “United Energy Systems of Ukraine” to the amount of 1.4 billion UAH (at the beginning of 1998 it was a little over $740, 000, 000). UESU was accused of a series of financial irregularities and in 1998, UESU was excluded from the natural gas market of Ukraine, later; the other business was closed down. However, by this time, Tymoshenko had found a new sphere for the realisation of her ambitions. Thanks to Lazarenko, Tymoshenko turned from a regional businessperson into a politician on a state level. Tymoshenko’s political career began on January 16 1997, when Pavlo Lazarenko was at the peak of his career and his influence in Ukraine. Tymoshenko entered politics when she was elected to the Verkhovna Rada. This was thanks to the political party All-Ukrainian Association Hromada (Community), which was registered in the Constituent assembly on December 12 1993. The party leader was elected as Olexander Turchinov. It was Turchinov, who, after the Revolution of Dignity from February 23 2014 to June 7 2014 (before the election of Poroshenko), was designated as acting President of Ukraine. Turchynov and many other modern Ukrainian politicians made their careers under Kuchma. He was a long-time associate of Tymoshenko, but their paths diverged in 2014. Pavlo Lazarenko funded the “Hromada” political party. In April 1997, under the influence of ambitious Tymoshenko, the political and economic council of “Hromada” made a decision about the transition to active political activities. Tymoshenko and Lazarenko began to prepare for the 1999 presidential elections. The political activity of Lazarenko’s rubber-stamping party convinced Kuchma of the presidential ambitions of Lazarenko, which is why he was dismissed in July 1997. On September 27 1997 Lazarenko headed the party “Hromada” (Tymoshenko and Turchinov

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his deputies), and in the 1998 parliamentary elections the party took the sixth place, receiving 4.67 per cent of the vote of the eight parties that entered the parliament. This was an excellent result, considering that the pro-presidential People’s Democratic Party (“Ukraine”) Pustovojtenko – Kuchma took fifth place (5.01 per cent) and was slightly ahead of the party Lazarenko- Tymoshenko-Turchinov. The deputy’s mandate did not save Lazarenko from persecution by Kuchma. Six months later, he was forced to leave Ukraine, and was arrested in the United States. I want to draw attention to the behaviour of Tymoshenko in those difficult times for her patron and lover. Tymoshenko’s actions reveal the features of her psychology: – The end of January 1999. The first deputy chairman of the political party “Hromada” (remember, it was the party of Lazarenko) Yulia Tymoshenko and Vice-Chairman Olexander Turchynov resigned due to a disagreement with their party’s leader Pavel Lazarenko; – February 9 1999. Prosecutor General of Ukraine demanded the Verkhovna Rada to strip Lazarenko’s parliamentary immunity; – February 15 1999. Lazarenko fled the country on the eve of the parliamentary vote; – February 17 1999. 310 deputies out of 450 voted to waive Lazarenko’s parliamentary immunity and consented to his arrest; – February 20 1999. Lazarenko was detained in New York at JFK airport, for violation of visa regime; – April-May 1999. Tymoshenko and Turchynov founded the deputies’ group in Parliament (called “Fatherland”); – July 9 1999. At the Founding Congress for money for Tymoshenko, a political party, the All-Ukrainian Union Fatherland, was set up; – December 18 1999. At the II Congress of the Party, Tymoshenko was elected the Chairman of the party “Fatherland” (her deputy, Olexander Turchinov); – December 22 1999 Tymoshenko became the second person in the newly appointed government of Viktor Yushchenko. In the renewed details of Tymoshenko’s biography, we see that for a year Tymoshenko betrayed not only the person who had brought her to the level of state policy, but also she quickly found a new patron, through which she became the most powerful woman in Ukraine.

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Thus, Tymoshenko’s biography indicates not only her ambitions, but also at least two betrayals: – In 1995, Tymoshenko betrayed her spouse and started an affair with Lazarenko. As a result of intimacy with Lazarenko, from the level of small-scale family business, Tymoshenko reached the level of the Dnepropetrovsk elite and declared herself an independent politician, with her faction in parliament and her own party; – In 1999, Tymoshenko betrayed her lover and business partner and went to the team of Viktor Yushchenko, which allowed her to become the most powerful woman in Ukraine for many years. Unfortunately, it was not Tymoshenko’s last betrayal. It is fair to present a number of facts from the biography of Tymoshenko that greatly influenced the formation of her contradictory character, and to some extent justified her aggression, sometimes even the fanaticism in her actions: – On August 18 2000 the Prosecutor General of Ukraine first detained and then arrested Tymoshenko’s husband, Alexander. He was charged with the embezzlement of 800, 000 UAH of public funds. In fact, behind the arrest of Alexander Tymoshenko, the conflict of Tymoshenko with the person of the “presidential” clan, Kuchma’s son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk, was hidden. A criminal case was against Tymoshenko’s father-in-law Gennady Tymoshenko; – On January 19 2001 Tymoshenko was dismissed from her position in the government, and on February 13, she was arrested. She was accused of smuggling Russian gas to Ukraine and tax evasion during the period of her being the head of United Energy Systems of Ukraine from 1995 to 1997; – On March 27 2001 the Pechersk District Court in Kyiv cancelled an arrest warrant for Tymoshenko, recognising the charges against her as groundless. She was in pre-trial detention centre for 42 days and then released; – Olexander Tymoshenko was only released from custody on August 9 2001, after almost a year in prison. According to him, he was repeatedly tortured in the detention centre; – In October 2002, in the same case as Tymoshenko, her father-inlaw Gennady Tymoshenko was arrested. While in custody,

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Gennady Tymoshenko had a stroke. He was only released in late 2003. All these events, in my opinion, aroused hatred in Tymoshenko towards Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Pinchuk. We cannot rule out that Pinchuk took revenge on Tymoshenko for her earlier committed frauds. The Orange Revolution is mostly the energy of Tymoshenko that was awakened by hatred. Without the fanatical hatred of Tymoshenko, and her Herculean efforts, arrangements, and organisations, the Orange Revolution would never have taken place. Since 2001, with the arrest of her husband, Yulia Tymoshenko began to doom the regime of Kuchma. Not all actions, movements, currents against Kuchma occurred without Tymoshenko. She fired the still passive and indifferent, and those who fear the power of Ukrainians, instilled in their minds a sense of dignity and worth, provoked a civil activity of the population, conducted still rare masses on shares of disobedience, but it did not, for the sake of high ideals and a bright future Ukraine, satisfy their hatred for Kuchma and Pinchuk.

3.1.5 Biographies of opposition leaders of 2004: Petro Poroshenko Peter Poroshenko is a typical regional parliamentarian-businessman, dreaming of becoming an oligarch. Poroshenko did much for the establishment of Kuchma’s authoritarian regime, but with the advent of the Donetsk clan to power, he considered himself offended and joined the “moderate opposition”, which had been forming around Yushchenko since 2002. We chose Poroshenko from Yushchenko’s milieu for several reasons: 1. Poroshenko was considered as the richest man of the dozens of regional politicians-businessmen who were around Yushchenko since 2002. 2. Poroshenko was one of the main sponsors of a political force, Our Ukraine, and the Orange Revolution. 3. As a result of the conflict between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, in September 2005 the split in Yushchenko’s presidential team took place. For the subsequent four years, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko’s inner circles were sorting out their relationship to the detriment of Ukraine and its people. Because of constant bickering, accusations, and populist solutions between the conflicting “revolutionists”, the oligarchic clans not only retained their power in Ukraine but also

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consolidated it in the 2010 presidential election by the victory of Viktor Yanukovych and the Donetsk clan. 4. Poroshenko’s career suddenly resumed after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. Perhaps unexpectedly, even to himself, Petro Poroshenko became the fifth President of Ukraine, elected on May 25 2014 and inaugurated on June 7 2014. What character traits and peculiarities of mentality does analysis of Poroshenko’s biography reveal? First, Petro Poroshenko was from the family of the Soviet nomenclatura of the regional level, he studied at the elite Soviet school (such schools were only for the children of the Soviet nomenclatura). He has been learning a few foreign languages since childhood (the merit of his mother!) and drove him to school by a company car “Volga” (who understands, it was very cool at the Soviet era). Secondly, Poroshenko has experienced the vicissitudes of life since childhood: the constant moving from town to town, first because of the arrest of his elder brother (in 1974), who fought at the time of the schoolleaving examinations (this case did not come to trial, the parents managed to hush it up); then because of his father’s arrest (on July 20 1986 Aleksey Poroshenko, according to the verdict of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of the Moldavian SSR, was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment to be served in a corrective labour colony of general regime, confiscation of property and deprivation of the right to occupy leadership positions within 5 years. On September 10 1987, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic rejected theft charges against Aleksey Poroshenko, reducing the term of imprisonment to up to 2 years). In 1992, Poroshenko’s parents moved to Kyiv because of the war in Transdniestria, where Petro Poroshenko had already been studying. Thirdly, Poroshenko was sociable, active, and energetic since childhood. He could always negotiate with any person. All these qualities helped him later to multiply his capital under any power and become a billionaire and the President of Ukraine. Fourthly, Poroshenko is a family man. The example of his parents’ family, who together overcame all their difficulties, lay the important principle in Poroshenko – value for his friendship. Perhaps that is why over the years

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the same people have been around Poroshenko, those who became like a family to him. He fully trusts them and can forgive their mistakes. The closest people are his parents, wife, children, which secure not only his rear, but are also probably the meaning of his life. With respect to the cult of the family and his family, Poroshenko is very similar to Yushchenko. Family values, well-educated wives and children of almost the same age, Yushchenko’s and Poroshenko’s fates were firmly tied for several years. In early 1990, Poroshenko took the first steps in business under the guidance of his father and his brother Michael (who died in a car accident in 1997). By that time, the brother had been living in the Netherlands and already understood the basics of market economy. Petro Poroshenko’s brother was 7 years older and this meant a lot for his development. In honour of the brother, Poroshenko named his first cargo ship, built in the shipyard “Lenin’s smithy” that was under his control in Kyiv – “Mikhail Poroshenko”. Having analysed the biography of Poroshenko we have concluded that he loves power and money. He is a typical representative of Byzantine-Asian culture, which dominated in the Soviet Union. This is evidenced by his morbid craving for honours and awards, which was most clearly manifested at the age of 30. For instance, at 32 years old (under Leonid Kuchma) Poroshenko became Honoured Economist of Ukraine (August 21 1997). At 33 he was awarded the “Order of Merit” of the third degree (December 9 1998) by Kuchma “for long-term conscientious work and personal contribution to the development of the Ukrainian state”! At 34 (just over a half a year later) he was awarded “Order of Merit” of the second degree (September 24 1999) “for significant personal contribution to Ukraine’s economic reform and active participation in the legislative process of the state”. In addition, over three months later he became the laureate of the State Prize of Ukraine in Science and Technology (December 1 1999) “for the Creation of a scientifically-industrial complex on manufacturing of lead-acid storage batteries”! It was a show, like the starfall of the awards, which was impossible according to the law of Ukraine, as the awarding was permitted only at five-year intervals! Poroshenko’s vanity was not satisfied by the state awards, so in 2002, “a specialist on manufacturing of lead-acid storage batteries”, “a reformer of Ukrainian industry”, and a businessman, Poroshenko defended his thesis in juridical science on: “Legal regulation of management of the state corporate rights in Ukraine” at the National University “Odesa Academy

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of Law”. I note that Petro Poroshenko had had nothing to do with juridical science (if you do not take into account his close relationship with the talented lawyer-oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk. Poroshenko was the protégé of Medvedchuk). Between 1989 and 1992, Poroshenko was taking a postgraduate course, but in the field of international economic relations. All this unhealthy fascination with collecting of honours or awards shows not only typical Asian layers in the mentality of this far from stupid, purposeful young man, but also the well-established corrupt constituents in his mentality. In fact, no honours and awards, given to Poroshenko between 1997 and 2002, are an objective assessment of the Ukrainian people to the comprehensively gifted native of Moldova, and Poroshenko’s ability to bargain for his privileges and preferences. From 1998 to 2002, Petro Poroshenko was not just a businessperson, but also the Deputy of Ukraine of III convocation! Between 2000 and 2002, Poroshenko led the faction “Solidarity” in the Verkhovna Rada, which merged with the Party of Regions led by Viktor Yanukovych and Rinat Akhmetov. Since 2001, Petro Poroshenko co-chaired the presidential party! All the awards received by Poroshenko were a personal evaluation of Kuchma concerning the dedication and effort of the unfamiliar to him Vinnitsa businessperson who was protected by a person whom Kuchma fully trusted – Viktor Medvedchuk. Poroshenko tried his best, fawned on power, and the authority, in turn, estimated his efforts, intelligence, and energy. Through the efforts of Medvedchuk (Leader of the Kyiv oligarchic clan), the authority accepted Poroshenko into the circle of “untouchable”. Poroshenko, being satisfied with the amount of medals and ranks, began to satisfy his other passion (which, in principle, never left him alone) – to earn a billion, and to become an oligarch like Medvedchuk. Going forward, I want to draw attention to three character traits of Poroshenko, which are an integral part of his mentality, and which directly influenced (and will influence) the destiny of the Ukrainian people, and Ukraine as a whole. The first characteristic of the mentality is adventurousness. Petro Poroshenko is a risky, adventurous man, and has gone for broke more than once in his life. For a businessperson it may be a reasonable and even necessary trait, but in politics, and at this level, it is always fraught with serious consequences. Poroshenko’s adventurous nature was embedded in his subconscious, and it meant forever. I will substantiate with facts from his biography:

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1. 1982 (17 years old). In 1982, Poroshenko entered Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Behind the fact the whole story is hidden, which Petro Poroshenko told in one of his interviews. The fact was that Poroshenko strongly risked submitting application documents for admission into one of the most prestigious universities in the USSR. If he did not enter the University, he could not get out of serving in the army. To be safe, Poroshenko and his father thought up the scheme: Poroshenko’s father came to the school principal with a statement that his son lost the school certificate, for the reason they were given a duplicate. Poroshenko to the Odessa National Maritime Academy (formerly Odessa State Maritime Academy) submitted the duplicate of the school certificate; he had dreamt of studying there since the sixth grade, and the original certificate he brought to Kyiv. As a result, Poroshenko simultaneously joined two higher educational institutions of the USSR, and between the sea and business, the choice was for business. In the USSR, such frauds were forbidden, and if it had been exposed, Poroshenko would have not only been expelled from the University, but also put on trial. 2. 2004 (39 years old). To become the leader of the Orange Revolution, Poroshenko was pushed by the circumstances, but not the desire for profound changes in the state. Despite the close relationship with Nikolai Azarov, Poroshenko had not been able to establish relationships with the Donetsk clan. The Donetsk clan believed that Poroshenko was Medvedchuk’s man (the Kyiv oligarchic clan), however Poroshenko also had not so good relationships with the Kyiv clan. Poroshenko showed his closeness to power, but he relied on Yushchenko. In 2004, power did not welcome such ambiguous behavior. Poroshenko was demanded to determine whether in the 2004 presidential election he would be for Yanukovych or Yushchenko. Poroshenko played for time practically until the summer of 2004, struggling to cope between power and Yushchenko. Then he chose Yushchenko, because in the case of Yushchenko's victory, Poroshenko could hit a jackpot, but with the victory of Viktor Yanukovych, he would have stayed in a supporting role. Those in power regarded Poroshenko’s choice as betrayal and began to suppress his business activity. Just like Tymoshenko, those in power backed Poroshenko into a corner, until, when he had no less energy than Tymoshenko; he plunged into the revolutionary movement, saving himself and his business. 3. 2005 (40 years old). The post of Prime Minister of Ukraine, which Poroshenko expected, Yushchenko gave to Tymoshenko. Poroshenko was

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offended and became the oppositionist to Tymoshenko. To use all the levers of influence on Yushchenko, he convinced the ailing President of Ukraine of the need to strengthen the powers of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), resulting in a de facto alternative government. As the NSDC Secretary, Petro Poroshenko had the opportunity to participate in the meetings of the Cabinet in an advisory capacity, to give orders to the bodies of executive power, to influence the personnel policy in the law enforcement agencies and the appointments of judges. It was through the efforts of Poroshenko that Yuriy Lutsenko was appointed as the Minister of the Interior. After lots of intrigue, accusations of corruption, and scandals associated with the struggle for power between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, Yushchenko dismissed both. After this humiliating defeat, Poroshenko was out of politics for almost four years, concentrating exclusively on building his business empire. 4. 2012 (47 years old). Poroshenko changed his “opposition” to the side of the Donetsk clan, and for the sake of new preferences, he was included in the government of Mykola Azarov. On March 23 2012, Viktor Yanukovych signed a decree on the appointment of Poroshenko as the Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine. After the appointment of Poroshenko as Minister, no one could accuse Yanukovych of harassment of the opposition. Although at that time, Yulia Tymoshenko, Yuriy Lutsenko, and many more of Poroshenko’s associates of the Orange Revolution were in prison. The second characteristic of the mentality is self-interest. This may be a little rough, but without any desire to offend, I note that Poroshenko’s complete biography and deeds suggest that his mentality is inherently profiteering, mercenary, and full of self-interest. As proof, I offer the following examples: 1. The years 1997 and 2002 – gathering of awards, ranks, and scientific degrees; 2. The years 2004 and 2005 – a bargain with President Yushchenko concerning the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine. After Yushchenko had appointed Poroshenko to a less important post of Secretary of the National Security Council, Poroshenko made every effort to expand his authority;

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3. The year 2009. Yushchenko, despite the low ratings, decided to participate in the 2010 presidential elections. Many of his associates had already changed sides to Tymoshenko; her ratings were much higher than the ratings of Yushchenko. Viktor Yushchenko requested the assistance of the unclaimed Poroshenko. As a “friend”, Poroshenko did not refuse, but in return he demanded to obtain for himself by bargaining the post of Foreign Minister of Ukraine and the highest state award – the title of Hero of Ukraine to his father Alexei Poroshenko; 4. The year 2014. Being already the fifth President of Ukraine, in the midst of the war in the Donbas, even taking advantage of people’s trust, Poroshenko insisted on the inclusion of his eldest son in the party list in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Through the efforts of Poroshenko Aleksey Poroshenko (named after his grandfather) became Deputy of Ukraine of the eighth convocation on November 27 2014; 5. The year 2015. To date, Poroshenko cannot part with the Lipetsk confectionery factory “Roshen” (Russian Federation). He continues to pay taxes in a country that is at war with Ukraine. The cost of the factory was estimated to be $200, 000, 000 by Poroshenko himself. However, for Poroshenko’s business (in June 2014 “Forbes” estimated it at $1, 300, 000, 000), it is not a small amount. Self-interest saw Poroshenko differ from Tymoshenko and made them antagonists. Poroshenko’s greed caused the conflict between them in 2005 and undermined the revolutionary initiative in the community. Tymoshenko considered political power as a defense against Kuchma’s victimisation and his entourage and, at the same time, as a weapon of vengeance. That is why for Tymoshenko the power became the fetish, the meaning of her life. Poroshenko was not interested in power for a long time. He was only interested in money that he had learned to make, skillfully maneuvering between the first persons of the state. For Yushchenko, he financed the project of the party “Our Ukraine”, not because of his opposition to Kuchma’s power or personal ambition. He soberly assessed the situation and his chances. For him, politics and Our Ukraine was a business project, which allowed him to claim budget money in the authoritarian-oligarchic state. If you compare the amount of money that Poroshenko spent on the 2002 election campaign of Our Ukraine with the amount he earned, being a “gray cardinal” of the political force up to 2004, it is pittance. In return, for his party funding, Poroshenko obtained skillfully by bargaining a profitable position in the Verkhovna Rada:

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between May 2002 and September 2005 Poroshenko was the chairperson of the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on issues of budget. This is one of the key committees of Parliament, through which sums of money collected from all over the state passed! “Bit by bit”, Poroshenko was deliberately making his fortune, including in the new directions his business: media, agriculture, automobile production, insurance, services, and others. Therefore, for Tymoshenko, the Orange Revolution was an opportunity to satisfy her ambitions and to take revenge for the humiliation, and for Poroshenko it was the opportunity to earn from Yushchenko and the revolutionary situation in the country! One important indicative fact: immediately after the victory of the Orange Revolution in January 2005, Poroshenko bought a new Mercedes-Benz Premium-Class. The third characteristic of the mentality is timeserving. Poroshenko is a conformist by nature. He adapts to people, to the authorities, social systems, circumstances, and in all cases, he gets benefits for himself. Perhaps this is a good quality for a politician, if not two, “but”: 1) in leadership positions that require revolutionary changes, Poroshenko as a specialist is useless. Instead of radical changes, he has just reformed the system, not destroyed it, only reshaping it; 2) A conformist collaborates with conformists easily, and the nature of revolutionists scares and irritates them. Therefore, Poroshenko’s entourage is not revolutionists, who are able to destroy the foundations of the authoritarian-oligarchic government, which was formed by Kuchma in Ukraine. These people are only capable of reforming; cosmetic changes of the existing power structure. Poroshenko’s timeserving to the circumstances was manifested and caused damage to Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, and after the Revolution of Dignity.

3.1.6 The fourth presidential elections in Ukraine í by a margin of 3 per cent I found out about the fact that Viktor Yanukovych beat Viktor Yushchenko by a margin of 3 per cent two weeks before November 21 2004, when the Central Election Commission of Ukraine announced the preliminary results of the second round of the presidential elections. Many people had already known about the 3 per cent difference in the elections in favour of Yanukovych. One of my good friends worked in the campaign headquarters of Yanukovych, and as it was explained to me, this was the maximum that the equipment of the Central Election Commission allowed in favour of this or that presidential candidate. I note that the 3 per cent of

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the computer system of the Central Election Commission was used even by Yulia Tymoshenko to her advantage in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections. However, at that time, Yanukovych won by a margin of 4.5 per cent, so 3 per cent could not help Tymoshenko. Yanukovych celebrated his victory with a margin of 1.5 per cent. In 2004, three ruling oligarchic clans in Ukraine mobilised all the financial and media potential for the transfer of power from Leonid Kuchma to Viktor Yanukovych. The Donetsk clan of Yanukovych-Akhmetov, the President’s family Kuchma-Pinchuk, and the Kyiv clan of MedvedchukSurkis, with the personal support of Vladimir Putin, presented their opposition as a united front. They opposed the weakened Dnepropetrovsk oligarch clan of Kolomoyskyi-Tymoshenko, and millionaire-parliamentarians who rallied around Yushchenko: Petro Poroshenko, Yevhen Chervonenko, David Zhvania (the latter was supported by the financial resources of Badri Patarkatsishvili and Boris Berezovsky), Olexander Tretiakov, and others. A few people believed in the victory of the opposition in the 2004 presidential elections. If the population of Ukraine saw the 2004 presidential elections as an ordinary event, then for the opposition, Yanukovych’s victory meant much more than a political defeat. In Ukraine, the opposition was physically being destroyed, discredited, imprisoned, or ruined financially. Each member of the opposition felt the cynicism and cruelty of the Presidential, Donetsk, and Kyiv clans, so each of them was aware of what he was fighting. In the struggle for power, the opposition chose the most effective strategy in their opinion – European choice. In the 2004 presidential election, the confrontation between the two world cultures emerged from the shadows and became a part of state policy. The Ukrainian millionaire-parliamentarians did not understand the depth and importance of the issues involved, playing with an explosive topic like a soccer ball. They split Ukraine into east and west (under Western Ukraine they meant central and Western Ukraine), and began to stir up both sides against each other. The struggle for power and money had eclipsed reason of Ukrainian politicians, and they began to artificially worsen the frontier energy, opposing not only two world cultures, but also the Ukrainians, many of whom were still undecided on their cultural identity. Analysing the 2004 presidential election, we can say that the millionairepoliticians chose the strategy of struggle within the ruling oligarchic clans

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correctly. The Ukrainians identifying themselves with European culture were much more numerous than Kuchma and Yanukovych expected, and possibly the oppositionists themselves. It is possible that by a narrow margin Viktor Yushchenko won, even in the first round. Anyway, for the first time in the entire electoral process in Ukraine, Central Election Commission was engaged in counting the votes for three weeks. According to Article 84 of the Ukrainian law “On the election of the President of Ukraine”, the Central Election Commission had to announce the voting results within 10 days. Thus, starting from the first round of the elections, the Central Election Commission, headed by Sergei Kivalov, came to blatantly violate the laws of Ukraine. The 3 per cent difference in votes cost Yanukovych too much. According to various sources, each member of the Central Election Commission, for counting votes with a margin for Yanukovych, was offered half a million dollars. Moreover, the money was transferred immediately after the first round of elections.

3.2 Was the Orange Revolution by the Revolution? Much was written, is being written, and will be written about the Orange Revolution. For example, the books of Yuri Kotlyarevsky [Kotlyarevskiy, 2005], Taras Kuzio [Democratic Revolution, 2009; Kuzio, 2015], Askold Krushnelnycky [Krushnelnycky, 2006], Andre Wilson [Wilson, 2005], a collection of articles “Orange Revolution”, edited by Mikhail Pogrebinsky [Orange Revolution, 2005], and many others. However, we are not interested in the details, although it took place almost below the windows of my apartment. Our research is a scale of geophilosophy, so we look at all the events in the history of Ukrainian statehood through the prism of its methodology. In science, there are the classic definitions of revolution and influential theories of revolution: Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin (Ulyanov), Pitirim Sorokin, Lyford Edwards, Samuel Huntington, Anthony Giddens, Gilles Deleuze, Jack Goldstone, Randall Collins, Ted Skocpol, and others. These entire theories boil down to one: a revolution is a radical, basic, profound, qualitative change, a leap in the development of society, nature, and knowledge that is the result of an open break with the previous state. Does the Orange Revolution in Ukraine correspond to this definition? No, it does not.

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3.2.1 The theory of revolution according to Anthony Giddens – the first criterion For a more weighty argument, not a revolutionary character of the Orange Revolution, we use the criteria of the theory of revolution of the most authoritative sociologist Anthony Giddens, who claims that a revolution should be only be called that when the events apply to three basic criteria [Giddens, 1982]: 1. The sequence of events is not a revolution, if there is no mass social movement. 2. A revolution leads to large-scale reforms and changes; the people who come to power must actually be more capable of managing this society, than those whom they deposed; leaders of a revolution should be able to achieve at least some of their goals. A society in which the movement of this kind is possessed only by external, formal attributes of power, but then proved incapable of real management, cannot be considered revolutionary. A society is rather in a state of chaos, or is in danger of falling apart. 3. A revolution involves the threat of violence or the use of it by the participants of a mass movement. A revolution is political changes, occurring in countering the ruling circles that cannot be compelled to give up their power, except under the threat of violence or by its actual use. Putting together three criteria, Anthony Giddens defines a revolution as the seizure of power by violence perpetrated by the leaders of a mass movement. The power, which has been seized, is used in future in order to initiate radical social reforms [Giddens, 1982]. Let us consider the Orange Revolution in accordance with the terms of the theory of revolution of Anthony Giddens. The first necessary criterion of a revolution is a very social movement. Did a very social movement take place in the Orange Revolution? Objectively speaking yes and no. There was a broad campaign of peaceful protests, rallies, pickets, and strikes, which took place in Kyiv and other cities of Ukraine between November 22 2004 and January 2005. An orange ribbon became a symbol of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. Many people participated in that campaign; many of them were people of principle, who were seeking change to improve the standard of living in

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the Ukraine, while others came to the Maidan to make money. The payment for a day on the Maidan ranged from 30 to 100 dollars. One can calculate the percentage of those who fought for the idea and for money, but it is impossible and does not make sense, because what Anthony Giddens meant by a mass social movement was something different from what happened in Kyiv. Previously, (under the Soviet Union), I had to see a mass social movement in Sumgait (Sumgait Pogrom February 27–29 1988), mass protests in Yerevan in 1988, the opposition rally in Tbilisi in April 1989, so what happened in Kyiv, personally, I took as a show, a mass spectacle that was arranged by Yushchenko and his entourage in order to achieve their goals. At this show-festival, Ukrainian and foreign musical groups, politicians, poets, and public figures appeared on stage all day and night. At that show, any participant could have a meal free, his travel expenses and accommodation were covered, and he was even given pocket money. In every region of Ukraine at the request of the people, buses, train carriages, whole trains were organised to transport them free of charge to Kyiv. In Kyiv such groups met, wrote down the names, fed, settled, and they were instead required only to be present on the Maidan. For example, from Lozova (my birthplace), my relatives and friends (including my sister, brothers, neighbours, and acquaintances) went in such a way to Kyiv. They were all satisfied with the entertaining spectacle and returned in a good mood! However, Anthony Giddens meant something quite different, speaking about a very social movement: not the pursuit of pleasure and positive emotions from the entertainment and mass communication, and anger, indignation, rage, and resentment of public masses with high negative emotions from such policy of authority.

3.2.2 The theory of revolution according to Anthony Giddens – the second criterion Anthony Giddens argues that a revolution, if it really is a revolution, should lead to large-scale reforms or changes; leaders of a revolution should be able to achieve at least some of their goals. A society in which the movement of this kind is possessed only by external, formal attributes of power, but then proved incapable of the real management, cannot be considered revolutionary. It is rather in a state of chaos, or is in danger of falling apart [Giddens, 1982].

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We have considered three main features of the leaders’ mentality of the Orange Revolution: Viktor Yushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko. To prove that the Orange Revolution, its course, and consequences, does not correspond to the classic definitions and theories of revolution, let us briefly look at the achievements of these leaders of the revolution between 2005 and 2009, when each of them was at the pinnacle of power and had the opportunity to influence the history of Ukraine. In my opinion, a report on their “achievements” provides an opportunity to understand the reason for Viktor Yanukovych’s victory in the 2010 presidential election, rather than any of the other members of the team of “revolutionaries”. a) Viktor Yushchenko took part in the 2004 presidential campaign with a simple and particular programme: “Ten Steps towards the People”. During the Orange Revolution from the Maidan rostrum, Viktor Yushchenko repeatedly read 10 items of his programme as an oath to the people: 1. Protect the value of the family, respect for parents and children’s rights. 2. Promote the spiritual, ethical values. 3. Conduct foreign policy in the interests of the Ukrainian people. 4. Provide priority funding for social programs. 5. Increase the combat capability of the troops, respect people in uniform. 6. Promote the development of the Ukrainian village. 7. Increase the budget – cut taxes. 8. Create five million jobs. 9. Make power work for the people, fight against corruption. 10. Create a safe environment for people. Five years later (in late 2009), on the eve of the 2010 presidential election, Yushchenko published an official report on the promised implementation of the promised items [Program, 2009]. However, the “Report” of Yushchenko is so false that we will not dwell on it. The Ukrainians had the opposite opinion on the effectiveness of President Yushchenko, which was expressed in the 2010 presidential elections. Yushchenko took fifth place (5.45 per cent of the votes), significantly inferior to Viktor Yanukovych (35.32 per cent), Yulia Tymoshenko (25.05 per cent), Serhiy Tihipko (13.06per cent), and Arseniy Yatsenyuk (6.96 per cent) [Central, 2016]. It is noteworthy that Yushchenko’s result was historically low

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among the incumbent heads of state in the history of all democratic elections! From the programme “Ten Steps towards the People”, we will consider only the ninth promise of Yushchenko, which directly concerns the theme of our research: “Make the power work for the people, fight against corruption”. What was at the end of Yushchenko’s five-year fight against corruption in Ukraine? Firstly, as we have already mentioned, during Kuchma’s reign in Ukraine he built the authoritarian-oligarchic government, which was enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine. However, during the Orange Revolution, one of the trade-off problems between the authority and Yushchenko’s supporters was the amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, which considerably reduced the powers of the President of Ukraine. On December 8 2004, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted decisions on amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, and turned Ukraine from a presidential-parliamentary republic into a parliamentary-presidential one. Viktor Yushchenko, as the third president of Ukraine, had not possessed the same powers as Kuchma, so he could not turn Ukraine into an authoritarian-oligarchic state. Yushchenko could only destroy the corrupt triangle model, establish an independent work of three branches of government (legislative, executive and judicial), and allow the public to control the power. However, Viktor Yushchenko failed that task. Under Yushchenko, Ukraine turned into an oligarchic state. By the end of the presidential cadence of Yushchenko (2010) in Ukraine, seven oligarchic clans were flourishing Yanukovych-Akhmetov, Firtash-Lyovochkin, KolomoyskyiTymoshenko, Zhevago-Tymoshenko, Kuchma-Pinchuk, Yaroslavskiy, Tihipko, and many other clans competing for the status of “oligarchic”: Litvin-Efremov, Hryhoryshyn-Poroshenko, and many others. Under Yushchenko, the main part of the regional millionaire-parliamentarians, who helped him to come to power, had access to the budget money. What was plundered under Kuchma by only three ruling oligarchic clans in the parliamentary-presidential republic was divided into seven parts, sometimes more. Given the fact that the de facto power was concentrated in the hands of a triumvirate: the president, the prime minister, and the head of parliament, then all the oligarchic clans were divided into three groups. Victor Yushchenko was financially supported, therefore, his financial sponsors received preferential treatment in reward for this, such clans as

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Yanukovych-Akhmetov, Firtash-Lyovochkin, Kuchma-Pinchuk and some others, Yulia Tymoshenko – Kolomoyskyi-Bogolyubov, Zhevago and Vladimir Litvin – Yefremov, and others clans. Secondly, under Yushchenko, corruption reached its peak; it came into the mentality of the Ukrainian people and became a part of everyday life. Bureaucracy, feeling impunity and anarchy, got cocky and began to steal more and more impudently. According to the Corruption Perception Index of the International Anti-corruption Organisation Transparency International, Ukraine in 2009 ranked 146 out of 180 (with Russia, Cameroon, Kenya, Zimbabwe, etc.). For comparison: in 2008 Ukraine ranked 134 (out of 180 countries), in 2007 – 118 (out of 179 countries), in 2006 – 99 (out of 163 countries), in 2005 – 107 (out of 158 countries) [Transparency, 2009]. Thirdly, the regional millionaire-parliamentarians who helped Yushchenko to come to power in 2004, during five years of his reign they formed their clans, seated their people in the parliament, expanded spheres of influence. The state-owned enterprises were the subject of bargaining between politicians-millionaires, and often were passed from one sphere of influence into another. At the same time, each influential group, understanding the time of their control over the enterprises, tried to steal from them as quickly as possible. For example, the investigation of Victor Sukhorukov with respect to speculation of Mykola Martynenko and David Zhvania on the market of nuclear fuel and nuclear waste showed that these millionaire-politicians, the sponsors of the Orange Revolution, earned about $850, 000, 000 for a few years under Yushchenko [Sukhorukov, 2015]. Since 2012, the Swiss Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal case against Mykola Martynenko, but it was strongly hindered by the Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office, because Martynenko was and is included in the inner circle of Viktor Yushchenko, Catherine Chumachenko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, and others. Another example reveals the true intention of Yushchenko is another assistant and the sponsor of the Orange Revolution, Olexander Tretiakov. “The first assistant of the president, Tretiakov recreates the system of governance with an accuracy of less than a μm as his predecessor in Kuchma’s administration – Lyovochkin. Tretiakov entered the Sberbank Supervisory Board, Ukrtelecom, publishing and began to control the processes in the oil and gas sectors. Thanks to Tretiakov’s efforts Mr. Voronov was returned to the post of Deputy Chairman of the NAC “Naftorgaz of Ukraine”, which had organised the gas schemes during

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Kuchma’s regime”, said Olexander Zinchenko on September 5 2005 [Scandalous Press Conference, 2005]. In addition to Tretiakov, at the scandalous press conference Yushchenko’s Secretary of State Alexander Zinchenko accused Mykola Martynenko and Peter Poroshenko of corruption and lobbying the officials of their inner circle, appointing them to leadership positions in public corporations. Fourthly, according to official data, during Yushchenko’s reign (by 2008), the level of the shadow economy rose to 31.1 per cent of GDP, which exceeded even the sad “achievements” of Kuchma’s era (30.7 per cent of GDP in 2001) [Corruption, 2010]. Thus, under Yushchenko, theft and bribery became normal. Yushchenko appointed the godfathers of his children, relatives, and those that brought their relatives, friends, and acquaintances with them to power in state leading positions. Nepotism, cronyism, kinship, favoritism, and protectionism became not only the visiting card of the Yushchenko era, but also reached abnormal proportions. To steal everyone, who ever wanted something? To steal from competitors, from acquaintances and, of course, first, every man tried to steal from the state. Triumvirate in the country led to complete chaos, anarchy, where no one was responsible for anything, and nothing was in control. Irresponsibility and impunity was in all spheres of activity. b) Let us consider the objectives of Yulia Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko in her entire political career has promised much, but her promises, like Yushchenko, have never been systematised and concretised. If we consider her “achievements” within 2005 and 2009 through the theme of corruption, the numerous journalistic investigations give us the right to say that Tymoshenko was not only fighting against corruption, but also many corrupt schemes were led by Tymoshenko [The Accounting Chamber, 2009]. After her rather sudden resignation from the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine on 8 September 2005 (only six months after the end of the Orange Revolution), Yulia Tymoshenko apparently felt that their partnership with Yushchenko was over. Tymoshenko devoted herself to her personal career. We have no reason to directly accuse Tymoshenko of enrichment and greed, because according to her official declarations that later became public, Tymoshenko lived on the brink of poverty. However, the cost of the dresses in which Tymoshenko appeared in public (the press constantly

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reported about scandals, even by European standards, of Tymoshenko’s luxurious and bright dresses [Amchuk, 2005]) as well as the budget of Tymoshenko’s party, but most importantly, the financial state of the oligarchs who were her “purses” (Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Konstantin Zhevago), we may tell that Tymoshenko made money any way she could. Her transient and situational alliances in the parliament tell us that Tymoshenko decided in 2005 to achieve the maximum in her political career – the presidential post. Therefore, since 2005 she prepared the financial and political basis for the 2010 presidential elections. Leonid Amchuk, a journalist of the popular Ukrainian Internet newspaper “Ukrainian Truth”, analysed that in a few months of 2005, the cost of Tymoshenko’s clothing, shoes, and handbags from the fashion house Louis Vuitton, which she was wearing at the public events, were estimated at $31, 620. Although according to the declaration filed in 2004, Tymoshenko together with her husband earned just 65, 727 UAH and 54 kopecks (according to the currency rate in 2004 this was equal to around $12, 400) [Amchuk, 2005]. The cost of a few blouses, bags, and coats from the Tymoshenko’s wardrobe was almost three times higher than her official annual salary! In the period 2005 to 2009, Tymoshenko took one of the seats in the ruling triumvirate. During that time, her political rating and financial status and that of her party “Fatherland” were continuously increasing. In March 2006, in the parliamentary elections, Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc took second place (22.29 per cent) after the Party of Regions (32.14 per cent), and held in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 129 Deputies, that was 109 deputies more than in the previous parliamentary elections of 2002. The business of people who personally financed Tymoshenko and the business of her inner circle, unlike the condition of the country, were prospering. For example, Ukrainian “Forbes” in 2007 estimated the estate of the main financier of Tymoshenko, Konstantin Zhevago, to be worth $1, 000, 000,000, and in 2010, his capital was estimated at $2, 400, 000, 000 (according to the magazine “Correspondent”). Therefore, if we consider Tymoshenko’s objective was enrichment, she reached it. In the period from 2004 to 2009, Tymoshenko brought nothing but harm to the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian people. During the period of the second premiership of Tymoshenko (between December 18 2007 to March 3 2010), Ukraine was rocked the following negative processes:

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– An increase of the external debt from 12.31 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 35.38 per cent in 2009; – In 2008 the national currency (UAH) devalued by 60 per cent; – In 2009, Ukraine’s GDP reduced by 14.8 per cent; – In 2008 and 2009, inflation in Ukraine was 25.2 per cent and 15.9 per cent respectively. c) Let us consider the “achievements” of the third leader of the Orange Revolution Petro Poroshenko (between 2005 and 2009). Poroshenko, who was accused of corruption by his associates, decided to quit politics the same day as Tymoshenko, and up to 2009 (the appointment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine), he avoided journalists. From Poroshenko’s circle, one said that allegations of corruption by Olexander Zinchenko and the humiliation by Tymoshenko replica in the whole country strongly influenced on him. It should be remembered that Yulia Tymoshenko in all media described Poroshenko’s resignation from the post of Prime Minister. She was in the office of Yushchenko: “... In the office of Yushchenko, Poroshenko broke into… in tears and snot...” [Tymoshenko, 2005]. This was a capacious characteristic, which Tymoshenko gave Poroshenko. The Ukrainians remembered it for a long time and used it in humorous programs. Poroshenko’s image is still associated with the phrase “in tears and snot”. However, failing to realise his ambitions in politics, Poroshenko concentrated his efforts on enrichment and multiplication of his capital. If talking about the growth of Tymoshenko’s capital, we can speak only through the analysis of the income of Tymoshenko’s circle, and then the growth of Poroshenko's capital annually was evaluated by specialised rating agencies. The magazine “Korrespondent” gave the following assessment of the growth of Poroshenko’s capital: the summer of 2006 – $505, 000, 000; 2007 – $756, 000, 000; 2008 – $1, 120, 000, 000. While the politicians and the people laughed at him, he was turning into the Ukrainian oligarch. I note that the enrichment of Poroshenko occurred at a time when he was the Chairman of the Board of the National Bank of Ukraine (between February 22 2007 and April 26 2012). Thus, if we talk about the development of the Ukrainian state (as opposed to personal enrichment), then three leaders of the Orange Revolution did not achieve any goals they had announced from the tribune on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in December 2004. The leaders of the Orange Revolution, which came to power, had considerable gaps

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between promises and the actual actions during their rule, which plunged the country into chaos. The Ukrainian people became disillusioned by politicians, whom they appointed to the leading positions, under the impression of the ideas of the Orange Revolution. As proof, cite the rating of Viktor Yanukovych, who, after falling sharply during the first six months of Yushchenko’s rule, by the end of autumn 2005 restored the trust of citizens almost to the level of 2004 (30 per cent of support across Ukraine). In March 2006, in the parliamentary elections, the Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovych, won by a wide margin of Yushchenko’s political force (13.95 per cent – the third result) and Tymoshenko (22.29 per cent – the second result). In 2002, the Party of Regions could take only 60 seats in the Parliament of Ukraine, then in 2006 – 186 Deputies! The leaders of the Orange Revolution not only completely discredited themselves in the eyes of the Ukrainian people, but they also contributed to the conveying of a negative attitude towards themselves on the idea of European integration that the Ukrainians attributed to them.

3.2.3 The theory of revolution according to Anthony Giddens – the third criterion Finally, according to the third criterion of Anthony Giddens, a revolution must assume the threat or its use by the participants of a mass movement. A revolution is political changes, occurring in countering the ruling circles that cannot be compelled to give up power, except under the threat of violence or by its actual use [Giddens, 1982]. The Orange Revolution does not meet even the third criterion according to Anthony Giddens. In the first period, threats of violence by the authorities existed. Then everything turned out at the level of behind-the-scenes political agreements and bargaining, as evidenced by the gradual change in legislation, the statements made by the authorities and the opposition, and others. The threat of violence or its use by the participants of a mass movement was not considered at all (except that in response to the violence of the authorities). The opposition used the people and the Maidan as pressures on the authorities, forcing Kuchma and Yanukovych to agree to Yushchenko’s victory by blackmail. To attract people to the Maidan and to keep them as a potential threat to the authorities, the leaders of the opposition arranged a two-month New Year’s show. People from all

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corners of Ukraine arrived to Kyiv to look at a festive spectacle, but not to the barricades.

3.2.4 Viktor Yanukovych and the Donetsk clan after the Orange Revolution In my opinion, the main evidence of inconsistency of the Orange Revolution to the classic definitions and theories of revolution was the fate of Viktor Yanukovych after the so-called “revolution”. The criminal past of this politician, as well as his connection with the Donetsk financialindustrial group, were used by the leaders of the opposition as the main cause of the fight against “criminal and corrupt authorities”. Indeed, after the victory of the Orange Revolution and the coming to power of the leaders of the Orange Revolution, the law-enforcement authorities initiated criminal cases against Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Pinchuk, Viktor Yanukovych, Rinat Akhmetov, Viktor Medvedchuk, as well as against officials and businesspersons from their close entourage. During the first few months, the new power of Yushchenko dismissed more than 70 per cent of the government officials who had been working under President Kuchma. “Their” people were appointed to those positions. Characteristically, when changing the bureaucracy, and as in the days of Kuchma’s rule, professional suitability of officials was not taken into account, and only their participation in the revolution or their connection to the leaders of the revolution was. As time has shown, the replacing of one official by another did not bring benefit to the state and did not change the attitude of civil servants to their responsibilities. Other, less well-off ones, who began to steal more and more impudently, replaced a few corruptionists. In September 2005 (six months later after the revolution!) current president of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko and “failed President” Viktor Yanukovych formally signed the “Memorandum”. According to the signed agreements, the Party of Regions voted in favor of the appointment of Yuriy Yekhanurov to the Cabinet of Ministers (after the dismissal of Tymoshenko, Yushchenko and his faction felt a lack of votes in Parliament), and in return Yushchenko undertook the obligations to stop the persecution of the Party of Regions’ supporters and not impede the introduction of Constitutional Reform, limiting the power of the president. The signed Memorandum guaranteed the safety of the corruptionists of the Kuchma-Yanukovych era, and the legalisation of criminal privatisation of

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state facilities, which the ruling oligarchic clans made on the eve of the 2004 presidential election. The leaders of the Orange Revolution and the people whom they brought to power were even less professional than the officials of the Kuchma era. By their unprofessionalism, irresponsibility, and corruption, they managed in a short time not only to cause frustration among the people, but also resentment. On 26 March 2006 in the parliamentary elections, the Party of Regions won the most votes. Viktor Yanukovych became a People’s Deputy from the Party of Regions and headed it in the Verkhovna Rada. On July 18 2006, an “Anti-crisis coalition” of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, consisting of: the Party of Regions (leader Viktor Yanukovych), the Socialist Party of Ukraine (leader Olexander Moroz), and the Communist Party of Ukraine (leader Petro Symonenko) nominated Viktor Yanukovych as a candidate for the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine. On August 4 2006, Viktor Yushchenko endorsed the candidature of Yanukovych to that post. What kind of revolutionary views can be discussed in a public mass, if in January 2005 the leaders of the Orange Revolution announced their victory and asked people to go back to their places, and a year later (in March 2006), Viktor Yushchenko claimed Viktor Yanukovych as the “enemy of the Ukrainian people”, against whom the revolution was directed, as the Prime Minister of Ukraine? However, according to the new Constitution of Ukraine, the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine was an equivalent degree of influence to such positions as the President and Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Thus, the Orange Revolution does not conform to any of the criteria of the theory of revolution according to authoritative sociologist Anthony Giddens. The Orange Revolution is not a revolution; it is a struggle for power between oligarchic clans at the expense of the people. It is rather a reform of the state system, the substitution of authoritarian-oligarchic government by other oligarchs.

3.3 The Yushchenko-Tymoshenko-Yanukovych era (January 23 2005 to February 25 2010) Scientifically, it is incorrect to call the Orange Revolution a revolution, but also for the reason that for the five years after the Leonid Kuchma era the same politicians were in power as that under Kuchma:

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– Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister of Ukraine in the Kuchma era (between December 22 1999 and May 29 2001); – Yulia Tymoshenko, Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine in the Kuchma era (between December 30 1999 and January 19 2001), which twice led the Cabinet under Yushchenko (between January 24 2005 and September 8 2005 and between December 18 2007 and March 3 2010); – Viktor Yanukovych, he served as Prime Minister of Ukraine under Kuchma and Yushchenko (between November 21 2002 and January 5 2005 and between August 4 2006 and November 23 2007); – Volodymyr Lytvyn, he headed the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine under three Presidents of Ukraine: Kuchma, Yushchenko, and Yanukovych (between May 28 2002 and April 26 2006 and between December 9 2008 and December 12 2012); – Olexander Moroz, he headed the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine under Kuchma and Yushchenko (between May 18 1994 and May 12 1998 and between July 6 2006 and November 23 2007). As well as the politicians of a little lower level: Petro Symonenko, Serhiy Lyovochkin, Olexander Turchynov, Petro Poroshenko, Mykola Azarov, Nestor Shufrich, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Alexander Volkov, David Zhvania, Mykola Tomenko, Yevhen Chervonenko, and others. All these politicians, as well as many others, are the people trained by the party during the Kuchma era, which due to the medium of communication imbibed the typical manifestations of the mentality of the Kuchma era: indifference to the interests of their own people and state, venality, incompetence, and irresponsibility. None of them was going to radically change the world around them, because at the level of ideas and ideals, they were in harmony and complement each other. The discrepancy was only in one thing – prices. Every politician named his sum for which he would be ready to sell his help. Moreover, here there was a problem – the requested sums did not correspond to the real “importance” of the politicians. Every Ukrainian politician had exaggerated self-assessment, considering himself above and more significant than others, and for his mediocrity, he compensated for the close connection to Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, or their circles. Protectionism, nepotism (cronyism and kinship), and favoritism were the visiting card of the Yushchenko era. As one of numerous examples to show who, and how you made a career

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during the Yushchenko era, let’s consider the career of Arsen Avakov, who, to the surprise of the whole country, after the Revolution of Dignity (February 27 2014), became the Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Avakov was an ordinary businessperson from Kharkiv; in 2000, Colonel Chikalo gave him a short but capacious characteristic – “a petty crook”. Perhaps Avakov would be “a petty crook” in the history of the Kharkiv region, if in 2001 he did not establish a close relationship with Victor Yushchenko’s brother (at that time Victor Yushchenko was the Prime Minister of Ukraine and Leonid Kuchma’s favorite) – Petro Yushchenko. The elder brother of President Yushchenko spent most of his life in Kharkiv. Avakov was able to mend fences with him, or rather his son, Yaroslav Yushchenko (year of birth – 1980). Thanks to Yushchenko’s nephew, Avakov was able, from “a petty crook” (a characteristic of a highranking police official) in February 2005, to become a governor of the Kharkiv region, and his 24-year patron, Yaroslav Yushchenko was appointed as a vice-governor of the region. Due to the closeness to the Yushchenko family, Avakov not only headed one of the most important regions of Ukraine, but also in the short-term, he greatly enriched himself. According to the magazine “Focus”, at the beginning of 2008 Avakov’s capital was estimated at $385, 000, 000. Avakov’s insincerity to the Yushchenko family is shown by the fact that in 2009, when the ratings of Tymoshenko significantly exceeded the ratings of Yushchenko, and Tymoshenko was almost considered the next president of Ukraine, Avakov quickly took the side of her supporters. The journalistic investigation of Ivan Verstyuk describes how Avakov was able to enrich himself as a governor of the Kharkiv region, how Avakov's almost entire business was confiscated under President Yanukovych, and how after the Revolution of Dignity, taking the post of Minister of Internal Affairs, Avakov not only got back what had been taken away before, but he also multiplied his capital for the year [Verstyuk, 2016]. Thus, we formulate the fourth conclusion of the book: the main problem of Ukraine is the lack of social elevators in the ruling elite and fair competition. Politicians who discredited themselves with corruption and lack of professionalism disappear into the “shadows” for a while, but then again come to power. Thus, replacing each other, the members of the exclusive club of “the Ukrainian elite”, covering up the crime of each other, have been ruling the state for three decades. An honest man has no chance of making a career in public service in Ukraine. Places in the ruling “elite” are completely occupied, and the only chance to get closer to power is to lower ourselves to the level of “avakov”.

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In the era of the authoritarian-oligarchic power of Leonid Kuchma, talent activities provided by influential politicians, the vengeful and principled Kuchma, supported by his vertical of authority, controlled government officials, oligarchs, and judges. Kuchma possessed dictatorial powers, and, if he wanted, he could have any official or a millionaire-politician who behaved brazenly put in their place. Viktor Yushchenko as a political leader is also a man of principle; this was repeatedly manifested in his traits, particularly in relation to Yulia Tymoshenko. However, in contrast to Kuchma he did not have any power and advantage. Therefore, highranking representatives of all three branches of government (millionairepoliticians, government officials, and judges), cleverly varied between the ruling triumvirate and their interests, at the same time getting more powers than they had enjoyed under Kuchma. The President, the Prime Minister, and the Head of the Verkhovna Rada had strength in unity, and that was a feature of the Public Management Model. However, in Ukraine there was no culture of mutual compromises and agreements. The politicians did not have the ability and did not want to negotiate with each other, forming only situational alliances, in which they always deceived each other. Therefore, in Ukraine the triumvirate ruled in total contradiction and disagreement with each other. Geophilisophy defines a five-year cadence of President Viktor Yushchenko, which, in brief, can be described as chaos. Freed from the authoritarian-oligarchic power of Kuchma, Ukraine plunged into chaos for five years: political, economic, legal, social, and moral.

3.4 The geophilosophy of Ukraine as of 2006 The 2006 parliamentary elections and a convincing victory for the Party of Regions (the leader – Viktor Yanukovych) disclosed a very important aspect of the geophilosophy of Ukraine. In the 2004 presidential election, the pro-European orientation of Viktor Yushchenko and the revolutionary rhetoric of his inner circle divided Ukraine in the ratio: 51.99 per cent (of votes for Viktor Yushchenko in the third round) and 44.20 per cent (for Viktor Yanukovych) [Central, 2016]. It seemed that these results allowed us to affirm that in the confrontation between two world cultures, the Ukrainian people preferred the European choice. However, the parliamentary elections on 26 March 2006 (only a year after the Orange Revolution) showed a different dynamic: the Party of Regions (the leader – Viktor Yanukovych) – 32.14 per cent; Yulia Tymoshenko bloc (the leader –Yulia Tymoshenko) – 22.29 per cent; Our Ukraine bloc (the leaders – Yuriy Yekhanurov and Viktor Yushchenko) – 13.95 per cent; The Socialist Party

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of Ukraine (the leader – Olexander Moroz) – 5.96 per cent; The Communist Party of Ukraine (the leader – Petro Symonenko) – 3.66 per cent [Central, 2016]. Of the five parties and blocs that were elected to the Verkhovna Rada, only Our Ukraine Bloc, led by Yekhanurov and Yushchenko, openly held to rhetorics of European integration. All four other parties and blocs concentrated on the Russian Federation (to a greater or lesser extent), which had chosen an aggressive policy by that time in relation to Ukraine. It was not only Yanukovych and Symonenko who, as the leaders of the elected parties in the Verkhovna Rada, openly preached drawing attention to the values of “fraternal” relations with Russia, but also Tymoshenko and Moroz softened their statements to the Russian Federation, assuming a strategic alliance with the eastern neighbour. Such variability and uncertainty in the views of the population is inherent in unstable limitrophe states. Attracting the methodology of geophilosophy, the author claims that in 2006 de jure, while remaining independent, Ukraine de facto turned into a limitrophe state, depending on the influence of two major loci of civilisation. There could already be no question about any autonomy and independence of locus of Ukrainian civilisation. At that time, Ukraine had already missed the chance to take its place as an independent state, and became a zone of active confrontation between the Russian Federation and the states of Western civilisation. The end of 2004 and the beginning of 2006 show strong peaks of the frontier energy, associated with increased activity of two cultures in the frontier. Each of the cultures celebrated the temporary victory, but by 2007, the final victory was won by the Russian Federation. The chronology of this period of intercultural conflict in Ukraine can be summarised as follows: – Summer – early autumn of 2004 – a triumph of the Russian Federation, which hastened to recognise Yanukovych as the third president of Ukraine; – November 22 2004 (the beginning of the Orange Revolution) – the businessmen from Yushchenko’s entourage, supported by the politicians of the Western states, questioned the legitimacy of the election of President Viktor Yanukovych; – November 28 2004 at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Deputies of all levels (mainly there were businessmen, politicians, government officials, and leaders of civil organisations of Southeastern

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Ukraine) in the city of Severodonetsk, the Luhansk region, the Russian Federation made the first attempt to change the territorial boundaries of Ukraine. The attempt to annex Southeastern Ukraine in 2004 failed; December 2004 and January 2005 – the celebration of European diplomacy: President Viktor Yushchenko and Ukraine was in the sphere of influence of Western civilisation; August and September 2005 – clearly any inconsistency is found in the mentality of Ukrainian politicians to the values of Western civilisation. Businesspersons from Yushchenko’s entourage quarreled among themselves, and the Western politicians saw their new “partners” in a new light. Yushchenko allied himself with Yanukovych, thus destroying all plans for European integration; September 2005 and March 2006 – Ukraine, shaken by corruption scandals, returned to the sphere of interests of the Russian Federation; August 2006 and November 2007 – after the appointment of Yanukovych as Prime Minister, Ukraine finally fell into the sphere of interests of the Russian Federation.

If someone once questions the possibility of a ruler to change the destiny of a nation, it is enough to recall the destiny of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. The history of independent Ukraine is a sad story of the nation whose future was determined by the corrupt mentality of their rulers: Kravchuk, Kuchma, Yushchenko, and others. If due to Kravchuk and Kuchma, by 2002 Ukraine ceased to exist as an independent locus of civilisation, then from mid-2005 due to Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, Poroshenko, and millionaire-politicians brought up by the Kuchma regime, Ukraine dropped out of the sphere of interests of Western civilisation for almost a decade. Politicians of Western civilisation found that in the speeches about European integration and the values of Western culture, the Ukrainian politicians hid their mentality, very closely resembling the mentality of Russian rulers: indifference to the people, venality, and irresponsibility. However, unlike the Russians, in the Ukrainian “ruling elite”, patriotism and professionalism was completely absent, so in 2006 Ukraine rapidly returned to the role of the “younger brother” of the Russian Federation.

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3.5 Geophilosophy: two main models of governance To more deeply understand the reason for the return of Ukraine into the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation in the period of 2006 and 2007, it is necessary to know the main difference between the two major loci of civilisation, the boundaries of which run through Ukraine. This difference lies in a model of governance: Western civilisation adhered to collegial or democratic governance, supported by a highly developed legal culture of society, and the Russian Federation tends to the sphere of its influence – Ukraine adhered to the legislative or authoritarian style of government, using widespread legal nihilism. It is necessary to carefully read the basic principles of a democratic style of government to understand that both Yushchenko and businessmen-politicians, who came to power with him, could not build a democratic model of state power in Ukraine on principle. How Poroshenko, Chervonenko, Zhvania, Kyrylenko, Martynenko and others from Yushchenko’s inner circle who had an unquenchable greed for money, prestige, and consumption, could translate into reality at least eight principles of democracy: 1. Acknowledge the people or a certain part of them as the source of authority. 2. Enter a transparent election of representative bodies. 3. Provide a permanent impact of society on the government. 4. Ensure the equality of citizens to participate in political life. 5. Allow the rule of law and equality of all before the law. 6. Accept the law of “Taking after the Collective” through decisionmaking and recognition of interests; protection of minority rights. 7. Organise political pluralism, i.e. the existence of a multiparty system, political ideas, and candidates. 8. Ensure the right of citizens to independent information. The mentality, education, and culture of the Ukrainian millionairepoliticians, brought up mainly in the Kuchma era, did not meet the basic values of Western civilisation. As in the 1990s, the mentality of the Soviet nomenclatura, which maintained their position in independent Ukraine, contributed to the building of an authoritarian-oligarchic regime in Ukraine, as in 2005 and 2007 the mentality of millionaire-politicians, brought up in the Leonid Kuchma era, led to the building in Ukraine of a hybrid oligarchic-anarchic power. The Ukrainian ruling “elite” of the Yushchenko era only verbally advocated for the European choice, but due to their actions and deeds, they returned Ukraine to the sphere of interests

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of the Russian Federation. And if Putin treated Kuchma and his entourage with respect that allowed for talks about the “equality of fraternal peoples” on a political level, then Yushchenko and his entourage, because of their hypocrisy and even more corruption and indifference to the interests of the state, Putin despised. In the person of “revolutionaries”-“young-oligarchs”, Putin humiliated Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. Putin, and after him Medvedev, avoided meetings with high-ranking godfathers of Yushchenko, had an aversion to shaking hands, communicated through their assistants and received the country as their “younger negligent brother”. By that time in the Russian Federation its own geophilosophy had already been formed. On the basis of the ideas of Vadim Tsymbursky, Russian politicians began to consider the lands of the Russian Federation as a separate island, which in certain periods (cycles) tried to annex European territory. Tsymbursky offered the basic markers of the Russian cultural identity. According to Tsymbursky, Russia is an island in the heart of the land. The huge Russian island within the continent with other ethnic communities has the blurred but impregnable boundaries [Tsymbursky, 1999]. Paradoxically, a native of Western Ukraine (born in Lviv), Vadim Tsymbursky suggested the Russian national idea and the basic markers of Russian cultural identity in which Ukraine (as well as other countries bordering with the Russian Federation) was presented as a secondary limitrophe state, as a kind of buffer between the great Russian civilisation and European countries.

3.6 Viktor Yushchenko in the History of Ukraine Let us summarise a five-year presidential cadence of Viktor Yushchenko. The Yushchenko era was the next era of missed opportunities: – Formulate a national idea, find markers of cultural identity and imprint them in the Ukrainians through the system of education and upbringing. – Build a democratic model of governance and raise the level of legal culture in the society. – Destroy the corrupt triangle model. – Use social elevators and replace the corrupt ruling “elite” with conscious and responsible citizens of Ukraine. – Reduce frontier energy by a competent foreign policy, and other similar policies. Under Yushchenko, Ukraine returned to the sphere of Russian interests. We cannot say that Western civilisation lost in the confrontation with the

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Byzantine-Asian culture of the Russian Federation – it retreated voluntarily. Obviously, Western politicians saw the separating gulf between the mentality of Ukrainian and European politicians. The return of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence was humiliating and disgraceful. The Russian leadership did not want to contact in person Yushchenko nor millionaire-politicians of his entourage. Officials of secondary rank conducted all negotiations. Putin and Medvedev even ignored communication with Yanukovych, opting instead for Tymoshenko. Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and their environment caused serious damage to Ukraine’s integration with regard to the western civilisation, because the citizens of Ukraine associated the values of Western culture with the moral character of the leaders of the Orange Revolution. How could the population of 45, 000, 000 people know that the mentality of Yushchenko and his relatives, godfathers, and friends, who fell greedily on power in late 2004, were not related to the values of Western civilisation. Their actions conformed more to the mentality of Russian politicians, but even the Russian leaders were surprised by venality, incompetence, irresponsibility, and indifference to the interests of their own state and people. However, despite the above-stated criticism of the Yushchenko era, geophilosophy determines that, unlike the first two Presidents, Viktor Yushchenko made some positive marks on the history of independent Ukraine. Here are Yushchenko’s services to the nation: 1. Viktor Yushchenko is the first president in the history of independent Ukraine who tried to turn the population of Ukraine as a territorial unity and mental diversity towards the direction of European culture. Unfortunately, few people in the West and in Ukraine itself realised the historical mission of Yushchenko. However, if Mikhail Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize by the European Community for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the return of the borders with the European culture up to the territory of Ukraine, then Viktor Yushchenko deserved a certain degree of respect from the Ukrainian and European nations for what he tried to do by redrawing the boundaries from Belgorod and Rostov, up to the Russian Federation. Yushchenko broke off Ukrainian and Russian relations for a while, which Kuchma began to establish in the last years of his rule. During all five years of his presidential cadence, Yushchenko tried to awaken in the

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Ukrainians historical memories, to return their respect for their historical and cultural heritage, to teach the nation to identify itself not through the Russian mentality but through the roots of their ancestors – the Kyivan Rus. On 8 January 1654 in Pereyaslav, after the speech of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, leaving the Ukrainians with a choice to surrender to any of the four sovereigns: the Sultan of Turkey, the khan of the Crimea, the King of Poland, or the Russian Tsar, Ukrainian Rada chose the “Russian orthodox Tsar”, and after 350 years Yushchenko tried to return Ukraine and the Ukrainians to the fold of the European culture. Yet he did not succeed, but the attempt is worthy of respect. 2. The Ukrainians called Viktor Yushchenko a “weak president”. To keep up with Russia and Putin, the Ukrainian people dreamed of a “strong hand”, a “master”, who would bring order in the country. No surprise, because the Ukrainians were accustomed to living and developing in the authoritarian model of the state authority, when the leader of the nation determined the destiny of the nation and led to certain value orientations. Yushchenko was the first to propose to Ukraine such a similarity of a democratic model of governance. He ruled Ukraine, based on his managerial experience in the banking system. I note; it was not the worst choice of democratic governance. The main problem was not so much in Yushchenko, but that there was no legal culture in Ukraine, and Yushchenko, according to of the Constitution of Ukraine adopted in 2004, could not establish the prerogative of the law. In the period between 2004 and 2009, Yushchenko was only one of three rulers of Ukraine, two of whom (Yulia Tymoshenko and Volodymyr Lytvyn) were supporters of authoritarian rule. On top of everything else, Yushchenko’s inner circle, the members of his team, thanks to the Orange Revolution and flirting with the people, starting from Tymoshenko and Poroshenko and ending with their drivers, all began to enrich themselves at the expense of the state and at the expense of the citizens of Ukraine. 3. The merits of the Yushchenko era could even include the chaos, which was in all spheres of public life. As we have established, that chaos was not the result of “weakness” of President Yushchenko, but because of uncoordinated actions of the ruling triumvirate: YushchenkoTymoshenko-Lytvyn, in which Tymoshenko performed the main destructive role. In that, chaos the authoritarian model of governance that had been built by Kuchma was destroyed. Chaos freed a civil activity; the Ukrainians lost their fear of the authorities, concealed their emotions with respect to power, felt themselves at ease, reviewed their past, and felt

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themselves a free people. Living in the chaos under Yushchenko, it was the first experience of gaining inner freedom by the Ukrainians, who, during the centuries, lived under the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Ukraine of the Kravchuk and Kuchma eras. Thanks to that chaos, which destroyed not only the authoritarian foundations of the state but also changed the foundations of the Ukrainian mentality (e.g. “I have nothing to do with it”), gave a birth to a new generation that could no longer live without freedom, who respected themselves and were ready to make any power respect them, including the dictatorial regime of Yanukovych. It was this generation, and not any of the politicians, that organised the Orange Revolution and on 21 November 2013 came to the Maidan under batons and bullets of the police units. It was they who accomplished the first revolution in the history of independent Ukraine – the Revolution of Dignity! Therefore, the chaos of the Yushchenko era was the forgotten sense of inner freedom, which Yushchenko and Tymoshenko returned to the Ukrainians. This feeling was so forgotten, unknown, and many people even felt the unpleasant taste, that is why they hurried to get rid of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, as one would hurry to get rid of the devil. However, the aftertaste was left! 4. Under Yushchenko’s presidency, the Ukrainians found inner freedom. Inner freedom is not a lack of restraint and permissiveness; it is one's responsibility and discipline. In the early 20th century, the Great Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin wrote: “real discipline is, above all, a manifestation of inner freedom, that is, the spiritual self-control and self-management. One accepts and supports by voluntarily and consciously” [Ilyin, 1993: 213]. Between 2005 and 2009, the Ukrainian people could still not realise the importance of inner freedom and more so could not voluntarily adopt its control methods. To consolidate inner freedom needed contrast and time spent thinking about it. Ukraine and Ukrainians under Viktor Yanukovych received all this. The Ukrainians had to go through a series of hard transitions in the history of Ukraine to understand the importance of inner freedom: Authoritarianism under Kuchma ĺ Chaos – Freedom under Yushchenko ĺ Dictatorship under Yanukovych ĺ Revolution of Dignity

This sequence of governance changes led to the formation of civil society in Ukraine.

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3.7 The 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine. The victory of Viktor Yanukovych If we compare the presidential elections of October and December of 2004 and January and February of 2010, then we see that geophilosophy has discovered two important positive changes that occurred in the mentality of the Ukrainian people: 1. The Ukrainians lost their fear of change. 2. The Ukrainians became increasingly guided by inner freedom. During the 2010 presidential campaign, I worked at two universities: in Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky State Pedagogical University that is not far from Kyiv, and as the Head of the Department of Philosophy in Kyiv University of Tourism, Economics, and Law. I gave lectures in political science at both universities and could compare the attitude of young people towards politics and politicians, not only in the capital of Ukraine, but also in the provinces. What interesting trends with respect to the theme of the book can be mentioned? 1. The theme of corruption was interesting for very few people in society. Corruption took root in the Ukrainian mentality so deeply that it seems to have become an integral part of our society. When I expressed the idea that politicians should be changed more often to increase their responsibility for their promises to the community, the students objected, explaining “that the old politicians are better than the young ones because the old ones had already grabbed a lot, and the young ones will steal more than the old ones”. 2. If, following the logic of the students, I offered to support the billionaire Serhiy Tihipko in the 2010 presidential elections, most of the students doubted his victory: “Tymoshenko has already paid for the election, all the candidates agreed”, though they took a liking to Tihipko. 3. Yulia Tymoshenko conducted an aggressive election campaign, directly using administrative resources (at the time of elections, Tymoshenko was Prime Minister of Ukraine), bribing voters, luring them with various show programs. Students (by their words and their parents) did not refuse Tymoshenko’s money, they took part in the free concerts, took financial help, but knew that “this was bribery, and that they would not vote for her in any case, and only for their candidate”.

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4. To the question whether they would vote for Yushchenko, the vast majority of students responded negatively, saying, “That the president should be replaced, because time has come to put the country right. 5. To my question about the cultural identity of Ukrainians in the Byzantine-Asian or European cultures, the students’ opinion differed. The answers depended on the cultural environment in which the student was brought up. If the training took place in Southeastern Ukraine, the student chose the cultural markers of the Byzantine-Asian culture. If the training of students was carried out in the west, and often in the central part of Ukraine, the student preferred European culture. However, few could argue their preference. Students used general remarks and sensoryemotional closeness of the culture. Students were interested in politics, the particularities of the formation of the Ukrainian state, worried about the political and economic instability in the country. In considering the first round of the 2010 presidential election in Ukraine, the following points should be noted: 1. Never before did the politicians of the age of Arseniy Yatsenyuk (1974 year of birth) not get so many votes in the presidential election in Ukraine. 1, 711, 749 (6.96 per cent) voted for Arseniy Yatsenyuk –fourth place in the election. 2. Serhiy Tihipko, a Ukrainian politician and businessperson, was able to compete with the two major oligarchic clans: Donetsk (Viktor Yanukovych) and Dnipropetrovsk (Yulia Tymoshenko). 3, 211, 257 (13.06 per cent) voted for him, which was the main part of the emerging civil society in Ukraine, which aspired to a qualitative change in the processes related to national development. 3. There was a surprising unanimity of Western and Russian politicians concerning the “desired” president. Almost the whole world gave their preference to Yulia Tymoshenko. For the first time in the history of Ukraine, the presidential candidate was holding all the cards: a) an unlimited budget for the election campaign; b) the support of the United States, Europe, and Russia; c) the availability of her own party, voters, and administrative resources. As early as October 2009, three months before the elections, throughout Ukraine the billboards with a picture of

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Tymoshenko and the inscription “I – Ukraine” appeared. It looked like Tymoshenko herself believed in her victory. 4. For the first time, the people of Ukraine surprised politicians and political scientists. The results of the first round of the presidential elections shocked the aspirants: – Viktor Yanukovych lost his voters in Southeastern Ukraine for the first time. – Yulia Tymoshenko invested more than 1, 000, 000, 000 UAH in the election campaign and used administrative resources. Second place disappointed her. – Tihipko was proud of his support among the population of Ukraine, and subsequently he made a number of serious mistakes that cost him his political career. – Arseniy Yatsenyuk proved his political independence, although the election showed that the image of the brave defender that was offered by his image-makers did not impressed the Ukrainians. Yatsenyuk had hoped for more, but many mistakes were made by his campaign headquarters. – Viktor Yushchenko experienced the biggest disappointment. The Ukrainian people showed their contempt for the incumbent President. In the second round of the presidential campaign, there were two aspirants – Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko. Emotions were beyond the margin. Tymoshenko surprised everybody by the scale of her lies, manipulation, and provocation. For example: – In January 2010, Tymoshenko, with her associates, tried to organise the capture of Ukraine Publishing House, which printed the ballot papers. – February 6, a few hours before the day of the second round of elections, provocatively, in the automatic mode on the 6702 telephone numbers in Kharkiv (67.14 per cent of the voters who voted for Yanukovych), as well as a large number of calls in Lugansk (more than 70 per cent voted for Yanukovych) and other cities. Voters got calls from people claiming to be from the polling stations. Voters were recommended on the phone “how to correctly vote for Viktor Yanukovych”: opposite his name on the ballot paper they had to put the “cross” and Yulia Tymoshenko should be

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“crossed out”, because the Central Election Commission of Ukraine adopted its final decision concerning a form of voting”. In fact, the election commissions would recognise the ballots, which were filled in this way, as invalid. Tymoshenko went all-in on the eve of the second round of the elections, reflecting both her character traits, and the understanding of the inevitability of loss. In the second round, Tymoshenko could count only on the voters of Viktor Yushchenko, because the voters of Serhiy Tihipko for the most part were the followers of Yanukovych. However, Yushchenko took vengeance on Tymoshenko. Despite all of her requests and appeals, Yushchenko called on his supporters to vote for Yanukovych. Perhaps it was not even vengeance, but a wise prevision, because Yushchenko knew that better than anyone, Tymoshenko got into the character of a destroyer so well that it seemed impossible to stop her. Tymoshenko was prevented by the Ukrainian people from taking the last step to the top of power. The Ukrainians were just tired of her. Throughout 2009 from morning, ‘til evening all television channels broadcast Tymoshenko’s hyperactivity; she accused the enemies, criticised both Yushchenko and Yanukovych, and promised people “mountains of gold”. However, afterwards, the opposition published the evidence of her involvement in corruption schemes, exposing her unrealistic promises. People stopped believing her, because every day life was getting worse and worse. Tymoshenko herself was deprived of the presidency. On February 7 2010, the Ukrainians’ choice between two odious politicians was that one, who behaved calmly and with dignity, did not bother them much. Because of the counting of votes, Viktor Yanukovych won first place – 48.95 per cent (12,481,268 of votes), Yulia Tymoshenko – 45.47 per cent (11,593,340 of votes) and against all – 4.36 per cent voted (1,113,051 of votes) [Central, 2016]. By the will of the Ukrainian people on 10 February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych was chosen as the fourth president of Ukraine. Yulia Tymoshenko tried through the courts to challenge the victory of Yanukovych, but in the oligarchic state in which Tymoshenko was directly involved, money talked. The Donetsk clan had enough money. After the announcement of the election, results Tymoshenko’s supporters began to take the side of the Donetsk clan in large numbers and those who too zealously opposed Yanukovych during the Orange Revolution and the 2010 presidential campaign left the country. Ukraine entered a new era – the presidential cadence of Yanukovych and the Donetsk clan.

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3.8 The psychological portrait of Viktor Yanukovych As we said, the environment of communication and education of future presidents directly influences the formation of their mentality and behaviour. Knowing the past of any Ukrainian President, one can predict their actions in the present and in the future. The authoritarian-oligarchic model of power, which was established by Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma in the post-Soviet history of Ukraine, distanced Ukraine from European culture and made it dependent on the mentality of the president and his entourage. In the Yushchenko era, the model of authoritarian power was destroyed, but an alternative model of democratic governance was not built. The people demanded that Yanukovych “restore order” in the country, which, in the Ukrainian understanding, corresponded to the revival of the authoritarian model of governance. Anyway, Yanukovych and his team regarded a credit of trust from the people in this way. Therefore, having won the presidential election with the slogan “I hear each person”, smiling Yanukovych began to build a model of governance, corresponding to his education, life experience, and an established belief system. What are the peculiarities of the mentality of the fourth president of Ukraine? At once, I note that the environment of formation of the mentality of Yanukovych was radically different from the social environments in which the mentality of the previous three presidents of Ukraine was formed. There was a huge difference as well in the culture of communication, and in experience managing! Only Leonid Kuchma, due to the perversion of his thinking, could wish such a ruler for Ukraine. With the help of his “light hand”, a man whose upbringing, education, and “work” experience better suited the position of Head of the International Crime Syndicate, first, he headed the Donetsk crime clan, in 2002, he became Prime Minister of Ukraine, and in 2004, he was the official “successor” of Kuchma’s authoritarian-oligarchic power. Kuchma found himself an equivalent replacement. However, if in 2004 Kuchma’s plan failed, and then in 2010, to the surprise of the whole world, a person was leading the state in the heart of Europe with a criminal mentality. What gives us the right to so sharply and categorically speak of the fourth president of Ukraine? The answer we find in the analysis of the official version of his biography, which was cleansed by the image-makers. I note that Yanukovych is the only president of Ukraine whose biography contains so much uncertainty, and so many gaps and inconsistencies.

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Apparently, Yanukovych does have something to hide and be afraid of, otherwise why has he so carefully concealed facts, destroyed evidence, and intimidated witnesses? Only criminals are afraid of their past, and Viktor Yanukovych has never talked in detail about his childhood and youth. Here is what we found out from the analysis of numerous investigations and stories of eyewitnesses about the main stages of Yanukovych’s life, which influenced the formation of his mentality. 1. Viktor Yanukovych was born, grew up, and made a career in a district that is very close in spirit to the Black quarters of Harlem. The outskirts of the mining town Yenakiyevo, 50 kilometers from Donetsk, differs little from the New York slums. 2. At the age of two, Viktor Yanukovych lost his mother. Olga LeonovaYanukovych died at age 27. His father, Fedor Yanukovych, who worked as a train driver, got married for the second time. However, the relationship between Viktor and his stepmother did not work out, and he, together with his grandmother (father’s mother), had to move into the wing. In the mining area, the wing was a shabby, tiny, wooden extension to the house. Together with his grandmother (who, I note, had been an orphan), Viktor Yanukovych lived most of his childhood. Viktor Yanukovych is a man without a childhood. Analysing his biography, I was confronted with the fact that not only did Yanukovych himself always talk monosyllabically and reservedly about his childhood, but also numerous biographers could also not highlight the formative years of his subconscious. No one knows the fates of his two aunts on his mother’s side, three uncles and the families on the paternal side. It turns out that Viktor Yanukovych had two stepsisters by his father (from his second marriage), who still live in Yenakiyevo, not significantly different from other residents. One of them works as a senior street cleaner, the other as a homemaker. The sisters and their families refuse to talk to reporters, but judging by their standard of living, their elder brother broke off his relationship with them long ago. Even the grandmother’s name, with whom Viktor Yanukovych as a child shared the same bed, and who raised him up, Yanukovych mentioned only once – Kastusya Ivanovna. Why she lived with her son Fedor, but not with other sons, no one knows. 3. Viktor Yanukovych was brought up in the street. The factor “street upbringing” is very important in understanding the psychology of Yanukovych. Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma also grew up without

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fathers in large families. However, the “street upbringing” of Kravchuk and Kuchma was very different from Yanukovych’s. Kravchuk and Kuchma belonged to the pre-war generation, whose fathers died for the idea, and the children were proud of them. Fatherlessness was widespread at the time of Kravchuk and Kuchma’s generation, but in every possible way, the society tried to compensate. Yanukovych was in a completely different situation. His orphanage was connected with problems in the family. Being evicted with the grandmother into the wing isolated him from his father, stepmother, and stepsisters. Since childhood, bitterness and asociality was awakened in him, which aroused rejection of culture and a sensory-emotional basis that every family brings up in the soul of every child. In the family, Yanukovych felt like an outcast, maybe that is why he found the understanding and support of his actions in elder “friends”, neighbours, and acquaintances who were the same age as the generation of Kravchuk and Kuchma, but were not able to fulfill themselves in society. As a young Yanukovych, they lived without a sense of home, and a family for them (for similar outcasts of society “mates”) was their meetings and communication. These “friends” of Yanukovych who felt rejected and could not fulfill their potentials in society, they gathered in the company (currently they are called organised crime groups) to gamble, to discuss the news of the town, to be on the loose, to steal, and to enjoy life. 4. Viktor Yanukovych is the only President of Ukraine who served his sentence in a colony, twice. It is noteworthy that due to Yanukovych’s vulgar behavior, in his teenage years he repeatedly drew the attention of law enforcement authorities. His first prison sentence was at the age of 17. For robbery, the court deprived him of liberty for a term of 3 years, but Yanukovych was released under an amnesty and came out after a year and six months. Shortly after release (1969), Viktor Yanukovych again got into a fight, but was imprisoned 9 months later, in June 1970. In the period of the Soviet Union, it was a rather strange situation. One of the reasons was the unreasonable prolonged investigation, the biographers of Yanukovych called his acquaintance Lyudmila Nastenko in December 1969. According to one version, the influential relatives of the girl were trying to send Yanukovych in prison to avoid unequal marriage, or they tried to help a future son-in-law to avoid a term, delaying the investigation. I believe that the family of Lyudmila was trying to delay the case, because the relationship of Viktor Yanukovych and Lyudmila Nastenko developed

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rapidly, and everything was going towards their wedding. To avoid a term was not possible. The court sentenced him to two years imprisonment in the penal colony. 5. His cellmates recounted some interesting characteristics of Viktor Yanukovych’s behaviour in prison while serving his second term. I note that Yanukovych was put in prison as a worker of the Yenakiyevo Metallurgical Plant. After the first term, Yanukovych was renewed on the second year of Yenakiyevo Mining College, lived in the barracks with the same juvenile offenders, and had no money. However, this is what a former prisoner, Mikhail Danilevych, said, who at that time was with Yanukovych in the prison: “He treated us to smoked foods chickens, Dutch cheese. Such packages he received twice a month. I was hired to carry them from dates. Yanukovych did not work in the prison. Instead of him the others worked. He paid them a few rubles per month. In Strizhavskaya, penal colony Yanukovych was called “cad”. He was hottempered.... Every time he received two wads of cash, denominations of 50 rubles” [Yanukovych, 2011]. The question arises, where did an ordinary worker receive so much money from and get so many benefits? Assuming manners of the Donetsk people, one can consider two versions. First, after the first term, Yanukovych became the authoritative prisoner and the people on the outside helped him. Second, Yanukovych could have had help from his fiancée and her family. We cannot exclude any help from either channel. 6. In 1972, after serving his sentence, Viktor Yanukovych got married to Lyudmila Nastenko. The researcher of Viktor Yanukovych's criminal records, Dmitry Zerkalov, drew attention to the “magical” transformation from the juvenile offender Yanukovych into a successful leader. After his release from prison in 1972, Yanukovych worked as an electrician at the Motor-Transport Enterprise, in 1973, the charges were dropped and he was allowed to finish technical school. Immediately after graduating from technical school, he was transferred from electronics into mechanics (the post of an engineer!) and was taken to Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Young Communist League). In 1974, he was elected as a secretary of the Komsomol organisation, and was sent to study in Donetsk Polytechnic Institute. Yanukovych had hardly graduated from the Institute when in 1976 he was recommended for the post of the director of the newly established enterprise “Ordzhonikidzeugol” [Zerkalov]. Dmitry Zerkalov links Yanukovych’s rapid career progression to the patronising of Lyudmila Nastenko’s family members. It should be noted that Viktor

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Yanukovych not only got married with Lyudmila Nastenko, but he also left his shabby housing and moved into the three-room apartment of his wife’s parents. By Soviet standards, the Nastenko family lived rich and well fed. To justify the surprising transformation of Yanukovych from the offender into the perspective nomenclatura, his image-makers have come up with a legend about the acquaintance of Yanukovych (or his father) with cosmonaut Georgy Beregovoy. According to numerous investigations of journalists, for example, Dmitry Zerkalov [Zerkalov], the legend was invented to hide prosaic reality: just like Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko, and Petro Poroshenko, Viktor Yanukovych used his wife’s parents’ connections to further his career. 7. The first leading post of Viktor Yanukovych was at the age of 26, in 1976. Up to August 1996, when Yanukovych was appointed Deputy Chairman of Donetsk Regional State Administration, he enjoyed a fantastic career in the motor transport enterprises of the Donetsk region. As the nomenclatura manager, Viktor Yanukovych was developing in a very specific environment of the drivers. In the Soviet era, a driver, especially in the mining region, was a special social stratum, which requires a separate description. It so happened that I was born and brought up in the drivers’ dynasty. My great-grandfather, my grandfather, my mother’s three brothers, their children, my dad, and I myself (in a certain period) had to deal with trucks and cargo transportation on a professional level. Half of us were at leading posts in motor companies. Drivers in Soviet times differed by being independent, quick-tempered, unruly, and open-minded, but were also ready to partake in mutual assistance. They were constant wanderers, spending most of their lives alone in the cab of their cars. Many of the drivers were individualists, willful, tough, people of principle. To prove they were right, drivers often got into fights, sometimes in a knife fight to death. My sister’s husband was also a driver; in one such fight “colleagues of the transport shop” beat him to death. The drivers’ environment appreciated professionalism, physical strength, character, openness, straightforwardness, efficiency, a man’s word. Gaining the respect in the drivers’ environment was difficult, but Yanukovych managed to do it. Yanukovych’s mentality was perfect for that rigid hierarchical structure, built on personal authority and physical strength. Yanukovych’s management culture was based on good blows with his fist, revoltingly gross expletives, shouts, fearlessness, and rancor.

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Yanukovych learned to build such a perfect hierarchy of any organisation, that Kyiv authoritarian-oligarchic power drew attention to him. All undesirables were physically attacked or destroyed by Yanukovych (people simply went missing), and the rest followed him unconditionally and uncomplainingly. 8. The political career of Viktor Yanukovych began in summer 1996. In August 1996, in accordance with regulation from Kyiv, Yanukovych was appointed Deputy Chairman, and in September, the first Deputy Chairman of the Donetsk Regional State Administration. Between May 14 1997 and November 2002, he served as Chairman of the Donetsk Regional State Administration. I am concerned by one more fact in the biography of Viktor Yanukovych: The political career of the director of the Donetsk auto transport company began just a few months before the murder of Shcherban. In the second chapter, we wrote that Yevgeny Shcherban – the leader of the Donetsk financial-industrial group (1995–1996), had planned to direct the power of the Donetsk clan against Kuchma and the Dnipropetrovsk clan. Shcherban was preparing for the 1999 presidential elections and could count on his victory. Leonid Kuchma led the fight against the powerful and richest man in Ukraine competently. Four months before the murder of Yevgeny Shcherban, Kuchma dismissed the Chairman of the Donetsk Regional State Administration, a namesake, friend, and business partner of Yevgeny Shcherban – Vladimir Shcherban. In his place, Kuchma appointed “his” man, Sergei Polyakov, who was supported by “local authority” – Viktor Yanukovych. It turns out that Yanukovych’s transformation from a manager of a motor enterprise into a politician ran parallel to the death of the leader of the largest Donetsk financial-industrial group was not an accident. Kuchma needed a reliable person on the territory of the Donetsk clan. As an experienced politician and psychologist, he chose 46-year-old Viktor Yanukovych and 30-year-old Rinat Akhmetov from many candidates. To counter Yevgeny Shcherban and his entourage, he needed to find people who were foolhardy, impudent, fearless, cruel, and above all, faithful. Kuchma understood that killing Shcherban was not sufficient. In 1995, instead of murdering Akhat Bragin, Shcherban came to power, which strengthened the influence of the Donetsk clan in Ukraine.

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It could not be excluded that someone else would be even more dangerous for Kuchma instead of Shcherban. It would therefore be more correct to hand over power in Donetsk to controlled leaders who would know their place under Kuchma – the “master”. The duet of Yanukovych-Akhmetov was perfect for Kuchma’s plan. They were not only both on the same mental level of the leaders of International Crime Syndicates, but Kuchma also had enough incriminating material to cool their political ambitions, if necessary. The criminal duet of Yanukovych-Akhmetov is another great invention of Kuchma’s (and perhaps even Pavlo Lazarenko’s), as thanks to them also a little later forming the privileged caste of regional businessmenparliamentarians, President Kuchma built the authoritarian-oligarchic power in Ukraine. Kuchma did not make a mistake in choosing a criminal duet; they coped with the given tasks. As we have already mentioned, after the murder of Shcherban at the foot of the stairs of his own airplane (November 3 1996), just a year later there was nothing left from his business empire. Shcherban’s people were ousted from Ukraine. Those who tried to return and restore something came under fire. For example, on September 22 1997, Yevgeny Shcherban’s Empire’s heirs: the eldest son Yevgeny (the namesake of his father) and Yuri Dedukh (the main business partner of the murdered Shcherban), having returned from the United States to their homeland, were attacked by fire on the highway between Mariupol and Donetsk. Both were saved due to the guards’ car, which took over the gunfire. One guard was killed. After that incident, none of Shcherban’s heirs tried to restore the father’s business. I would add that while Yanukovych-Akhmetov were fulfilling Leonid Kuchma’s orders, the others were destroying Shcherban's Empire, and the mayor of Donetsk Volodymyr Rybak helped in it rather a lot. Rybak led the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine under President Yanukovych (between December 13 2012 and February 22 2014). Up to the escape of Yanukovych of Ukraine Volodymyr Rybak served his longtime associate faithfully. Thus, Yanukovych received a ticket to the big policy of Ukraine, for the “protection” of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions from Eugene Shcherban’s influence. Through blood and cruelty, he proved his loyalty to President Kuchma. Kuchma always kept in mind his faithfulness. The Donetsk clan, under the leadership of Yanukovych and Akhmetov served Kuchma faithfully until 2004. It is for their faith and diligence that

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Kuchma wanted them to be his successors. The criminal duet was connected by the victims’ blood. 9. A new test for Viktor Yanukovych and the Donetsk clan was their moving to Kyiv and the transition to a new level in Ukraine. On November 21 2002, Leonid Kuchma appointed Viktor Yanukovych to the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine. In the summer of 2002, during the parliamentary elections, in the interviews with the various publishers, Yanukovych himself ruled out his moving to Kyiv, but Kuchma’s authoritarianoligarchic power needed strengthening. The opposition movement, headed by Yulia Tymoshenko, was gaining strength. After the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze, the new Parliament was collecting votes to begin impeachment proceedings, as international condemnation was growing. Kuchma needed support in a hard manager that would be able to clean Kyiv Augean stables. “Kyiv period” of Yanukovych is a separate chapter in the book of his life. If in the Donbas Yanukovych felt like a master, and many people surrounding him with a similar mentality understood him, then in Kyiv a new environment met him. Kyiv politicians were not Donetsk people who changed their tracksuits on designer suits. In Kyiv, people thought or did things differently: they carried on intrigues, played dirty tricks, gossiped, and betrayed. The capital saw forthright and unsophisticated Yanukovych as a victim. Even Kuchma, whom Yanukovych idolised and served like Kadyrov served Putin’s regime, betrayed him in late 2004. That is why in Kyiv, Yanukovych was constantly in the environment of the people from the Donbas. Being around all of them, he felt himself more comfortable; together they spoke the same language, which he had known since childhood. In the period between 2002 and 2004, Viktor Yanukovych coped with Kuchma’s task. Sometimes by force, and sometimes by bribery, he held back the opposition for two years and served as a watchdog during Kuchma’s regime. In 2004, Kuchma officially announced his successor as Viktor Yanukovych. Kuchma knew that Yanukovych being the President would not only change the state system built by him in Ukraine, but would also descend deeper into authoritarianism. In Ukraine under Yanukovych’s presidency, Kuchma would feel himself safer and freer than with anyone else. He knew that during Yanukovych’s presidency people would think of him as God, because Yanukovych’s dictatorial ways instilled fear even into his relatives. It was not by chance that Victor Medvedchuk, contrary

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to logic and common sense, leading the Presidential Administration of Ukraine, through the christening of his daughter Daria, became related demonstratively with top officials of the Russian Federation. By that time, Medvedchuk and Yanukovych hated each other. Through nepotism, Medvedchuk protected the Kyiv oligarchic clan, headed by him against the rancorous and vengeful Donetsk clan. In turn, the leaders of the Russian Federation, through the influence of Medvedchuk, had full access to the domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine. They were dreaming about redrawing the borders of the Russian Federation up to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, wondered about the destiny of the Baltic countries, and perhaps made plans for Moldova and the Caucasus states. Yanukovych was organically included in their plans, because both Medvedchuk and Yanukovych were thought of as satraps. 10. However, the revolution, which was organised by the young-oligarchs of Yushchenko’s entourage in 2004, changed a lot. On the one hand, the Ukrainian people changed, they found inner freedom and self-esteem, on the other hand, Yanukovych himself changed. In 2005 and 2009, the two important events greatly influenced his mentality. In 2007 and 2008 he was betrayed by his old partner, Rinat Akhmetov, who mistakenly thought that Yanukovych as a politician had exhausted himself. Akhmetov took Yulia Tymoshenko’s side. In the period between 2008 and 2009, Vladimir Putin came to the same conclusion, who also bet on Timoshenko’s victory. At that difficult time of doubt and rethinking (2007 and 2009), the people faithful to Yanukovych were only sons, the Klyuyev brothers, older friends Mykola Azarov and Viktor Pshonka, and oligarchic group Lyovochkin-Firtash, could not get along with Tymoshenko and her entourage from the beginning of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency. Even Kuchma-Pinchuk’s oligarchic clans reconciled with Tymoshenko and bet on her. Seemingly, in the losing situation, and contrary to the logic and wishes of the outside world, thanks to the will of the Ukrainian people, in 2010 Viktor Yanukovych came to power. The fourth president of Ukraine became a man with a mafia mentality, ignored by Western and Eastern politicians, holding a grudge against the “Ukrainian political elite” generated by Kuchma, and not nourishing piety concerning the Ukrainian people and their traditions since childhood.

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3.9 The year 2010 – the origin of the dictatorship Having come to power, Viktor Yanukovych at once began to restore the destroyed vertical power since the days of Yushchenko’s presidency. At the initiative of Yanukovych, at the end of February 2010 the ruling coalition in the Verkhovna Rada broke up. On March 3 2010, the Verkhovna Rada sacked Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. Then in Ukraine, the power by means of People’s Deputies and Judges swiftly usurped and monopolised: 1. On 11 March 2010 in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Yanukovych’s party formed a parliamentary coalition called “Stability and Reform”. Deputies’ votes were purchased for between $200, 000 and $800, 000. 2. On the same day the new Cabinet of Ministers, headed by loyal Mykola Azarov was appointed. 3. Between 17 and 26 March 2010, Yanukovych replaced all the governors and heads of law enforcement agencies. 4. During the first two months of Yanukovych’s presidency, pressure on the media was increased; for example, journalists of two leading TV channels such as “1+1” and “STB” announced the introduction of state censorship. 5. On the initiative of Yanukovych on 1 October 2010, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine overturned the constitutional reform of 2004 and returned the authoritarian powers of President Leonid Kuchma. One is surprised by the following fact: in 2004, to limit Kuchma’s authoritarian power the Orange Revolution took place and the decision of the Verkhovna Rada (402 votes out of 450 People’s Deputies). In 2010, by the decision of the 18 judges of the Constitutional Court, Ukraine turned from a parliamentarypresidential republic into a presidential-parliamentary one. 6. On 31 October 2010, the local elections were held in Ukraine. The majority of the votes (36.2 per cent) were received by the ruling Party of Regions. Thus, on February 25 2010, after becoming the President of a parliamentary-presidential republic, Viktor Yanukovych, by the beginning of November 2010, had turned Ukraine into a presidential-parliamentary authoritarian state, in which even the oligarchs began to pay tribute to the President’s family. The legislative, executive, and judicial powers were again concentrated in the hands of one person. It took Kuchma 12 years to

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establish a presidential-parliamentary authoritarian state, and Yanukovych little more than six months. It seems that the Ukrainian ruling “elite” was just waiting for their leader to return a favorable environment to them. In the 1970s of the 20th century, famous Ukrainian economist and social activist Bohdan Hawrylyshyn put forward conditions that made authoritarianism impossible: – The highest authority has to be deprived immunity. – The existence of predominantly internal interdependence, and not dependence of the poor from the rich. – Education of the masses. – Political awareness and the awakening of the masses. – The aspiration of the majority to assert themselves. – Heterogeneity and adherence to pluralism in the country. – The lack of close external threat to society [Hawrylyshyn, 2009: 58-59]. Analyzing the history of independent, Ukraine and the behavior of the ruling Ukrainian “elite”, the firm conviction is formed that the Ukrainian people had being prepared for the coming of the dictator for decades already.

3.10 Political harassment of the opposition We have already talked about the revengeful and rancorous manager of motor fleet of the Donetsk region, Viktor Yanukovych. Having received authority in Ukraine, these traits of Yanukovych manifested in full. Almost all of Yulia Tymoshenko’s inner circle, including herself, were harassed and arrested. Yanukovych’s old friend, Viktor Pshonka, which was appointed at the post of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine by the Verkhovna Rada controlled by Yanukovych, headed the persecutions. Here are some extracts from the chronicle of the Tymoshenko’s persecution and her allies [Yanukovych, 2011]: – May 12 2010, the “criminal case of 2004” against former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko was resumed (it was closed in 2004 under President Kuchma), according to which Tymoshenko was charged with “attempting to bribe in order to free her father-inlaw”;

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– August 12 2010, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine opened a criminal case against the Minister of Economy under Tymoshenko’s governance – Bohdan Danylyshyn. Later Bohdan Danylyshyn moved to the Czech Republic, where he officially requested and received “political asylum”. – October 15 2010, the registered audit of economic activity of Tymoshenko’s governance was completed. Based on a foreign auditors’ report, Tymoshenko was accused of using budget funds for her campaign, misuse of budgetary funds to cover the shortfall in the pension fund, and misuse of equalisation fund. – December 2 2010, Tymoshenko was summoned to the Central Investigation Department of the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine as a suspect in the embezzlement of budget funds received from the sale of greenhouse gases under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. – December 13 2010, a criminal case against former Interior Minister of Ukraine Yuriy Lutsenko on suspicion of embezzlement of state property and abuse of the misuse of official authority was opened. Note that while against Tymoshenko’s allies were opening criminal cases; Viktor Yushchenko’s close associates were getting high positions and state awards. For example, Viktor Baloga, who was the Head of the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine between September 15 2006 and May 19 2009, under Yanukovych he took up the post of the Minister of Emergencies of Ukraine; Roman Bezsmertnyi, Yushchenko’s trustee, Yanukovych appointed him at the post of Ambassador of Ukraine to Belarus. Under Yanukovych, the “moderate opposition” felt good and earned in the person of ex-Speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Serhiy Tihipko, Oleh Tyahnybok, and Vitali Klitschko.

3.11 The Family According to the authoritative Ukrainian Internet edition “Glavred”, Yanukovych’s family legalised and misappropriated more than $9, 000, 000, 000 [Media, 2014]. Yanukovych placed “his” people in all the key positions in the state: – The security service and law enforcement agency were headed by Viktor Pshonka, Alexander Yakimenko, and Viktor Zakharchenko; – The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was led by Mykola Azarov;

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– The most important Ministries: Revenues and Duties, Healthcare, Agrarian Policy and Food, ɋustoms and Tax administration were headed by people in Yanukovych’s inner circle. While the older generation of the Donetsk clan provided in force covering, the younger generation was engaged in finance. In a few years Alexander Yanukovych, Sergei Kurchenko, Artem Pshonka, and Alexander Bogatyrev were among the richest people in Ukraine and Europe. As if their fathers at the time divided the Donbas, they, and “young people” divided Ukraine into the spheres of influence. Yanukovych, while he was still the Prime Minister under Kuchma, knew how to build and efficiently organise the work of the corrupt triangle. However, if under Kuchma the finances were distributed amongst the corrupt bureaucracy and three oligarchic clans (and something was left for the regional “elite”), then under Yanukovych all means were redirected into one pocket. The name of that pocket was Alexander Yanukovych, the eldest son of the President. Everyone had to share with the young-oligarch, from Rinat Akhmetov to Kuchma’s son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk. Yanukovych remembered all the oligarchs, politicians, and officials for their betrayal, intrigues, and plots against him. Even former patron Leonid Kuchma lost his quiet life. A number of criminal cases were opened against him, and he was summoned to the prosecutor’s office for questioning. Note that “revolutionary” Yushchenko did not allow such an attitude to Kuchma! Yanukovych avenged old Kuchma fully for his betrayal and humiliation in 2004. Yanukovych’s family made money, using any way they could: from the most profitable market of oil and gas up to the criminal “squeeze” of business and property. I personally know successful Kharkiv businesspersons, whose business was squeezed by the Donetsk clan in 2011. The scheme was simple, in the style of Yanukovych’s mentality. After a call from the public prosecutor's or police officer, a polite unremarkable man came to the owner of a successful business. He introduced himself, then left his business card and made a stunning proposal: to buy the business that was estimated, for example, at $100, 000, 000 for $ 80, 000, 000, or just give it as a present to him. He gave him a week to think it over. While a businessperson was taken aback by his proposal and collected his thoughts, the stranger left. At first, of course, no one considered this proposal seriously; businesspersons thought it was a hoax or simple “shakedown” in the style of the early 90s.

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However, when businesspersons were asking for help from their “protection” and they began to make inquiries about the visitor (by the business card left specially), it was revealed that the visitor was not joking and was not bluffing. He was a member of the inner circle of someone of the family, and no one wanted to deal with the family. Around the businesspersons, who were brought under the interests of the members of Yanukovych’s family, in a few days a vacuum was formed. Officials, who used to readily and gratefully accept bribes, stopped answering the phone and avoided any contact. As a result, 80 per cent of the businesses were sold with an unprofitable discount for their perspective well-established businesses, and they were “allowed” to leave the territory of Ukraine with cash. Some of them were in business with them in equity participation. The other 20 per cent, who were trying to defend their rights, were sent to jail on false denunciations and on trumped-up criminal cases or with serious injuries they were brought to hospital, or some lives even ended tragically. During Yanukovych’s presidency, raiding turned into one of the most profitable businesses. Yanukovych and his family methodically, systematically, were turning Ukraine into a kind of the Donbas. As an anecdote that was told in Donetsk, people were afraid to go out from their houses, because they would be rounded up and taken to Kyiv, where they would be placed in top positions. Throughout Ukraine: from Lviv to Kharkiv, from the Crimea to Chernigov, in the regions, natives of Donetsk were appointed to key management positions. The deputies of the mayors of the large cities, whose residence permits were from Donetsk, were controlling financial flows of the city. Yanukovych managed to sit in Kyiv, create his favorable atmosphere, and talk to people, as he used to talk in his Donetsk: with punches, obscenities, and shouts.

3.12 Corruption under President Yanukovych Already in the first year of Yanukovych’s presidency, in Ukraine the value orientations of the political and ideological activity were changed. Quickly the theme of the Ukrainian famine and Ukrainian identity was forgotten, which Yushchenko had conducted for five years. Scandals that were made by Tymoshenko on the air every week began to be diminished, and the people no longer laughed at the authorities. Moreover, around Yuriy Lutsenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Serhiy Vlasenko, and other politicians and officials, who openly opposed Yanukovych’s government, the false exposures were created against them, after which they were imprisoned,

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deprived of parliamentary immunity, or forced to leave the territory of Ukraine. Harassment of the opposition forced the Ukrainians to think about whether to scold those in power. Those who, during the Yushchenko era, participated in various political talk shows and were raising their political rating, criticising those in power, suddenly began to sing in unison with the authority. The Verkhovna Rada, as in the old days of the USSR, began to vote almost unanimously for the laws that facilitated the usurping of power by Yanukovych’s “family”. The Ukrainians in their daily lives became closed, cautious in their words, especially those who held senior positions. Under Yanukovych, to live became much harder, but people did not grumble as much under Yushchenko. In Kyiv, under Yanukovych the difference between the rich and the poor became more visible every year. The middle class practically disappeared: business stopped working; those who could went abroad, while others had to refuse entertainment and pleasure. On the central streets of the capital, in front of “blind” police, children of fortune became impudent in “premium” class cars with Donetsk numbers. At that time in the province, pensioners could not buy meat and lived on pasta and bread. If under Yushchenko the corrupt mentality penetrated into all sectors of society, then under Yanukovych it legalised. Now, even to come to friends with “empty” hands and ask about something became uncomfortable. A mediator without a “gift” was perceived as mauvais ton, and to solve any problem you had to bring a “gift”. To “give thanks” not only longer stopped afraid, but it also became a part of the reputation. For example, in the Ministry of Education, in the central building I was watching from the sidelines, how through the security desk, the mediators openly carried paper bags during the day, from which was heard the sound of clanking bottles of expensive alcohol and in which you could see boxes of chocolates. In the evening, at the end of the day, Ministry officials also publicly came out from their offices with paper bags in hands (sometimes five or six paper bags in each hand), and were hurrying to their cars. A man with a paper bag became reality, and people stopped being surprised in the subway, on the streets, and furthermore near the administrative buildings. Senior officials did not carry paper bags. Their drivers were taking them out from their offices, or the gifts were delivered directly to their homes.

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The corrupt mentality of the Ukrainians manifested especially clearly at officials’ birthdays. For example, it was the Rector’s birthday in the University. Beforehand, all university lecturers of the departments gathered a certain amount of money, as a rule, the head of the department (and one or two lecturers with him) went to the rector’s office and gave an envelope with the money and a bunch of flowers. In the dean's office, the money was taken from the dean’s staff, and sometimes from students. At the Rector’s birthday, starting from the morning in the reception room one could see queues of delegations consisting of the departments’ staff and the deans’ offices' staff. In big universities, in order not to create queues, the rector’s assistant (or one of the vice-chancellors) told the time when the department or the dean's office was obliged to come and congratulate their leader. Standing at the table, which was strewn with flowers, envelopes with money, and festively wrapped boxes, the rector took the gifts, listened to a greeting speech and thanked people for coming. For each group no more than 3-5 minutes was given. Neither the rector, nor the “congratulators” felt any embarrassment. On the contrary, everything happened naturally, often sincerely. Greeting poems were read, women entered the roles and were moved to tears, hugged and kissed the rector, thanking them for the support of the department or the dean’s office. For the rector, the stream of congratulations was taken for granted, and the rector’s proxies watched closely that no one forgot to congratulate him on his birthday. In the afternoon, the Rector of the University arranged a banquet in the dining room, but he invited only authorised persons: heads of departments, deans, and vice-rectors. Lecturers were not honoured with such an invitation. The Rectors’ big universities “celebrated” their birthdays for a few days, giving everyone the possibility to congratulate them. At the Rectors’ birthdays, many cars of the grateful students’ parents often drove to the University courtyard to congratulate him. Of course, not all, but those who were listed in the University, passing from one educational year to another (often studied even “excellent”), but in the university they did not come at all. This is the so-called category of “children of fortune”. With lush bunches of flowers and huge bags of gifts, the children’s parents followed each other through the main entrance to the university, emphasising their importance, to the reception of the rector. Depending on the post of the parents, the Rector received them in the office, in the reception room, or in

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the hall. The higher the post of the parent, the more preferably the Rector behaved (the more expensive the gift was!). Approximately, according to such a scenario vice-rectors, deans, and heads of departments celebrated their birthdays. The lower position and importance of the person was the more modest celebration and fewer congratulators, of course, the more modest the gifts were. However, all the festivities were held at the universities in front of the students and instructional staff. In any other Ministry or Institution (public or private) scenario, birthday greetings differed insignificantly. Starting from Yanukovych’s birthday celebrations to the birthday of an ordinary police officer, a teacher or a nurse, a celebrating scenario was prescribed as in lock step. Colleagues and superiors, congratulated ordinary officials, congratulated by subordinates and sometimes by superiors, and their dependent persons and organisations, chiefs sometimes. Given the fact that in Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovych there were 24 state control inspections, officials and chiefs of various levels, that was impressive. Reasons to take and give a bribe were respected strictly and thought up with surprising creativity. Firstly, both a chief and his subordinates clearly remembered birthdays, public holidays, professional holidays, and sometimes-religious holidays. Ukraine celebrates 10 public holidays, 179 professional events and numerous religious holidays that under Yanukovych honoured him with piety. In these days, to forget to congratulate the leadership was equivalent to dooming oneself to dismissal. For such “forgetfulness”, chiefs resented and often found an occasion to dismiss a “forgetful” subordinate. Chiefs regarded such cases as disrespect for their authority. Secondly, in the last years of Yanukovych’s presidency, a rule to celebrate the name days was imposed. For example, my name is Oleg, my father’s name – Alexander. I am Oleg Alexanderovych. Oleg’s “Angel’Day” is on 3 October; Alexander’s “Angel’Day” is 40 times in a year (!) (January 17, February 7, March 8, March 22, March 26, March 28, etc.). Thus, in view of my birthday I can celebrate the name day 42 times in a year! The higher my state position, the more carefully the staff remember my name day and the name of my father.

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I assume that Victor Yanukovych or someone in his entourage thought up the celebration of “Angel’Day” for a reason. Viktor Yanukovych’s birthday is on 9 July, and Viktor’s name-day is celebrated 12 times in a year (February 13, March 3, March 23, April 2, April 28, May 1, July 19, September 2, September 29, October 10, November 19, and November 24) and Fedorovych celebrates 63 times in a year (January 9, January 24, February 5, February 8, February 12, February 21, etc.). In total, there are 76 occasions for subordinates and the citizens of Ukraine to personally congratulate the President of Ukraine and give him a personal gift! Thirdly, the higher rank an official was the more attention the subordinates paid to the birthdays of his wife, children, wedding day, and other family celebrations. Fourthly, often when the leader fell ill or someone from his relatives, subordinates gave money for “treatment”. Care of the chief’s health was in a forced, not voluntary form. Thus, Ukraine created favourable conditions for corruption. Plenty of reasons were thought up to give a bribe and take it. “Gifts” allowed the Ukrainians to solve any problem, and officials were not allowed to live poor under scanty earnings.

3.13 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine under Yanukovych – the level of the supreme legislative body of the state Vitaly Chervonenko, a correspondent of the Ukrainian Internet publication “Glavkom”, on the eve of the 2012 parliamentary elections analysed the first hundred names on the list of the Party of Regions – the ruling party of Yanukovych-Azarov-Akhmetov [Chervonenko, 2012]. By that time, Yanukovych and his associates restored the model of authoritarian power in Ukraine, so domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine was fully dependent on the mentality of the ruling elite. What did the political “elite” of Ukraine look like in the understanding of Yanukovych? Judging by the list of the Party of Regions, Yanukovych and his inner circle selected people of their level to the posts in the supreme legislative body: oligarchs’ drivers, bodyguards, secretaries, turncoats from the various parties, and the former oligarchs from Tymoshenko’s circle. From the first hundred there were just 14 people who had never been Deputies. The old hands of Akhmetov took the lion’s share of the passing part of the list of the Party of Regions: Akhmetov’s lawyer – Yuri Nikolaev (26th place), the president

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of FC “Zorya” – Eugene Heller (29th place), assistant to the President of FC “Shakhtar” – Yuri Kyi (33th place), Akhmetov’s driver – Vladimir Maltsev (30th place) [Chervonenko, 2012]. In addition to them in the list: – The youngest son of Yanukovych – Viktor Yanukovych, who was in a list of the members of parliament the third time in 22nd place. – Yuri Ivanyushchenko (24th place), a crime boss, his nickname was “Yura Yenakievskiy”, the old friend and partner of Yanukovych. – Millionaire Tariel Vasadze (36th place), Honorary President of “UkrAVTO”. – Millionaire Andrew Verevskiy (44th place), the owner of Kernel Holding SA. – The millionaire Eugene Segal (48th place), the owner of “Gavrilɿvsky Kurchat”. – Millionaire crime boss Vladimir Prodius (56th place), the head of the supervisory board of “Mostobud”. It is noteworthy that Rinat Akhmetov’s driver, Vladimir Maltsev, was valued in the hierarchy of the Party of Regions higher than many millionaire-politicians with their experience, and scientist-academicians like Valery Smoliy (86th place) – the famous Ukrainian historian who took the post of Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine between 1997 and 1999. However, we were even more impressed by the results of the 2012 parliamentary elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, on the list of the Party of Regions only 72 people entered, so the driver of Akhmetov and a crime boss, Yura Yenakievskiy, became People’s Deputies, and progovernmental historians and academicians, did not. What could we expect from the supreme legislative body of Ukraine with such a selection of “experts”? Nevertheless, largely the vast majority of People’s Deputies of all convocations – they were completely random and far from politics and legislation: drivers, mistresses (and lovers), singers, guards, family members, top managers, as well as millionaires and billionaires themselves... These people were mentally similar to each other, and made corruption in Ukraine an administrative (rather than criminal) offence, which entailed only the administrative responsibility: a fine from 25 to 50 non-taxable minimum incomes of citizens (i.e. from 425 to 850 UAH). If an official was caught taking a bribe of one million dollars, he paid a fine of $40 and was free. The so-called opposition, with its list of members, never ceased to surprise. For example, People’s Deputy Igor Skosar told reporters from the

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TV programme “People’s Control” on the TV channel ZIK that in 2012 he paid $6, 000, 000 for a place on the list of the opposition party “Fatherland”. He states that he gave the money personally to Mykola Martynenko, and the number was agreed with Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Alexander Turchinov [Skosar, 2014].

3.14 Pre-revolutionary Ukraine (2013) By 2013, dissatisfaction was growing in the country. On February 7 2014, Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Zakharchenko said in an interview with the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda in Ukraine: “Only during the last two years, in the country, 328, 000 public events were recorded, which were attended by more than 100 million people” [Minister, 2014]. If at first the Ukrainians believed that Viktor Yanukovych’s team raked ruins of the economy, which remained after Yushchenko’s and Tymoshenko’s presidency, then by 2013 the people started to openly talk about Yanukovych’s family, about greed of the eldest son of President Sashadentist (Alexander Yanukovych), impudence of young Ministers, and the formation of a dictatorship in Ukraine. During that time, I communicated with the Ukrainians from Southeastern, Central, and Western Ukraine, and they all expressed rare unanimity in their opinions – to go on living in such a way was impossible. People were becoming angrier, more susceptibile and irritated. Misunderstanding of the geophilosophy of Ukraine and the resulting failures in foreign and domestic policy exacerbated the rather difficult and ambiguous situation in Ukraine on the world stage. Politicians of Western civilisation ignored Yanukovych, as the Head of State, and he did not build relationships with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Putin’s entourage. For example, on September 21 2011 during the UN General Assembly in New York, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, as well as other leading politicians, refused to meet with Yanukovych. In May 2012, the US Congress prepared a resolution calling for sanctions against President Yanukovych and his inner circle. On the other hand, between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in 2011, trade wars started, with insulting remarks made to Yanukovych and his entourage personally. The Russian Federation entered the peak of its power, and any hints of independence or ambition on the part of Ukraine and Ukrainian politicians was perceived with hostility. Most Ukrainian politicians had received bribes from their Russian colleagues and sold the interests of Ukraine openly for several years.

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Not finding mutual understanding with the neighbours, Yanukovych and his entourage felt like outcasts in the world geopolitics. They began the process of the self-isolation of Ukraine, trying to isolate it equally from Europe and Russia. However, the strategy of Yanukovych and political scientists who were working with him was originally based on false postulates. By virtue of its location, the equidistance of two major loci of civilisation from Ukraine is impossible in principle. Ukraine is a very important actor on the Eurasian continent, and any attempt at self-isolation was a utopian doom. The confrontation of two major loci of civilisation, which ran through the territory of Ukraine, forced it to be just in three states: under the protectorate of the Russian Federation, or the European Union, or in the state of a strong, independent locus of civilisation. In the 17th century, Bohdan Khmelnytsky already understood it, that he would not save Ukraine as an independent locus of civilisation and voluntarily surrendered under the authority of the Russian tsar. Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ukrainian Cossack officers chose the Tsardom of Russia, because it seemed more favourable in every respect: similar mentality, religion, and culture, but the main opened a prospect of preservation and increase of national identity markers. After all, it was about the preservation of the Ukrainian nation, culture, and identity. The Zaporizhsky army primarily as an enemy who wanted to uproot the Ukrainian identity perceived Rzeczpospolita. Therefore, the geophilosophy of a Ukrainian politician should be formed, first, by the public interests, the preservation and consolidation of the Ukrainian identity. To this should be directed domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine, or the Ukrainian nation will be doomed to assimilate with the stronger culture, as happened with the Ukrainians in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. And since Ukraine de facto lost its independence even under Kuchma, Yanukovych was required to make a choice in favour of one of the cultures, but he had to choose the stronger and significant culture, which guaranteed the preservation and further development of the main markers of identification of the Ukrainian nation. Trying to isolate Ukraine, Yanukovych was initially put in the role of the victim. Yanukovych considered his encirclement’s opinion; who did not understand geopolitics and geophilosophy. Dmitry Firtash (a gas magnate, the only oligarch who retained his power under Yanukovych), Sergei Lyovochkin (Head of the Presidential Administration under Yanukovych), Mykola Azarov (Prime Minister), Viktor Pshonka (Prosecutor General of Ukraine), and most of all the son of President Alexander Yanukovych

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hoped that Ukraine’s equidistance from the Russian Federation and the European Union would allow them to maintain their influence in Ukraine for at least two presidential terms, but they experienced quite the opposite effect. They again aggravated the struggle between two loci of civilisation. How and why did this happen? We have already mentioned that by 2007 politicians of Western civilisation had lost interest in Ukraine, because they found a discrepancy between values of the ruling Ukrainian “elite” and the basic values of European civilisation. From 2007, Ukraine returned to the sphere of interests of the Russian Federation and became its limitrophe state. One of the many confirmations of that were onerous for Ukraine, but the Gas Agreement under Favourable Conditions for Russia was signed January 19 2009 by the leaders of “Naftogaz” (Ukraine) and “Gazprom” (Russian Federation) on the results of the negotiations between Yulia Tymoshenko and Vladimir Putin. According to experts’ opinions, every year Ukraine overpaid the Russian Federation on the contract, by an average of $6, 000, 000, 000! However, with Yanukovych coming to power in 2010, and especially in 2012, after Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency, the relationships between Ukraine and Russia deteriorated rapidly. Yanukovych was fully oriented to the Russian Federation, revering Putin and all Russians; he expected not to be an equal, but at least to have a respectful attitude to him and his entourage. However, what kind of respectful attitude could be discussed, if the Ukraine in 2012 in almost all spheres of activity was entirely dependent on its eastern neighbour? The leading Russian politicians expressed particular scorn at the pettiness and greed of Yanukovych and members of his family, which were manifested in stealing parts of the already devastated and impoverished Ukraine. Therefore, the politicians of the Russian Federation did not negotiate with Ukrainian politicians, they put forward their own terms and required their strict observance. By 2012, the language of blackmail, sanctions, and accusations carried out the political dialogue between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. By virtue of incommensurability of the degree of influence, the last word was always for the Russian Federation. With tensions between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the politicians of Eastern European States decided to take advantage: Bronislaw Komorowski (President of Poland), Andris Berzins (President of Latvia),

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Dalia Grybauskaitơ (President of the Republic of Lithuania), and some others. In contrast with Yanukovych and his associates, they saw each year as Ukraine lost its autonomy and independence and was being transformed into a terrirory similar to Belarus. None of them could exclude that the ambitions of the rulers of the Russian Federation would be satisfied. In foreign policy, the Russian Federation took the aggressive position in dialogues with the Baltic States, Poland, and Moldova. The establishment of a single economic space, initiated personally by Putin, was more like a restoration of frontiers of the Soviet Union, and emphasised the imperial ambitions of the Russian leadership. When Putin returned to power, he was in a hurry to create something grandiose and great to get into the history of Russia. Active and coordinated political position of the politicians of Eastern European States forced the European Union once again to join the struggle for Ukraine. Although Yanukovych and his entourage corresponded even less to the democratic values of Western civilisation than Yushchenko and his circle of millionaire-politicians, Western civilisation, taking into account its strategic interests, started the process of rapprochement with Ukraine. Yanukovych had a chance not only to retain his power, but also to go down in the history of Ukraine as a national hero. Unfortunately, by education, culture, and mind Yanukovych was far not Bohdan Khmelnytsky, so he was wrong in his choice. Once again, the destiny of the Ukrainian people was dependent on the mentality of their own ruler.

3.15 Euromaidan – turn to European values An objective analysis of the two major loci of civilisation, in the sphere of interests of which Ukraine is geographically located, leads to the conclusion that at present for Ukraine and the Ukrainians, European culture (Western civilisation) is profitable and promising with the democratic model of governance. At present, the best side of the model is: a) high social standards; b) multiculturalism; c) guaranteed personal rights and freedoms. The main problem of the independent Ukraine is the absence of a national idea and basic markers of cultural identity, which would have established: who is Ukrainian, and what is the role of Ukraine in the history of civilisation? Starting from the Kuchma era, the Ukrainians have been judged primarily on the nomenclatura, who themselves (or their godfathers, relatives, friends, mistresses, etc.) travelled around the world

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and introduced “the Ukrainians”. However, through Ukrainian national clothes and Ukrainian speech their essence is easily seen: they are corrupt, indifferent to the interests of the Ukrainian nation and the state, irresponsible, incompetent, and uneducated. If the Ukrainians from the first and second waves of immigration (or immigrated during recent decades) had not made a significant contribution to the history of human civilisation, then the image of Ukraine and its population would be greatly undermined. Integration with Western civilisation, as the minimum will allow: 1. Understand that no matter where a person was born and what nationality he is, it is important how deeply he took into his heart the culture of Ukraine, its traditions and the spirit, and that he made for its development, enrichment, and prosperity. European integration will allow the Ukrainians to preserve and consolidate the necessary minimum of their own cultural identity markers that can help people get rid of their own confusion, self-humiliation, and belittling of the achievements and merits. 2. Get help from highly developed democratic countries vices, which are a consequence of post-colonialism, and the authoritarian regimes of Kravchuk and Kuchma. Ukraine and the Ukrainians are ill with corruption, the “Asian layers”, laziness, irresponsibility, self-abasement, etc. In particular, the so-called “Ukrainian elite” requires thorough cleaning. 3. Show the European civilisation the dignities of the Ukrainian nation. Ukraine and its people have much to be proud of, and European integration will help to reveal the best qualities of the people who managed not only to preserve but also to increase the culture of the family of ancient Rus. The Russian Federation will not give such ideal conditions and such help to Ukraine! That is why, in view of the national (and not personal) benefits, President Yanukovych should have accepted the terms of the European Union. However, his corrupt mentality and inner predisposition to authoritarianism meant that Yanukovych first humiliated himself with the purpose of rapprochement with the Russian Federation, but being refused, started to flirt with Europe, and later when Putin changed his mind and started luring him in, he deceived Western partners and jumped into the “fraternal”

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embrace of his eastern neighbour. We assume that Putin by threats and money ($15, 000, 000, 000 of loan, three of which the Russian Federation immediately transferred) influenced on the decision of Yanukovych. However, the result of all that geopolitical fuss, arranged in the centre of Europe, was that Yanukovych played off two mighty civilisations. On the one hand, he satisfied Putin’s ambitions, who had already begun to lose touch with reality, on the other hand, he insulted and humiliated the politicians of Western civilisation, and thirdly, with this act he showed the Ukrainians and the international community that his money was more important than the interests of the state and nation were. Perhaps for the wretched mentality of Yanukovych and his entourage, in that step there was nothing reprehensible: money and material assets always meant more to the Ukrainian “elite”, starting from the time of President Kravchuk, than spiritual assets, traditions, culture, and perspectives. However, in Ukrainian society it also formed a generation that thought differently. This generation was not afraid of threats by the authorities, and came to the square to show their disagreement with Yanukovych’s choice. These were mainly students who demanded ordinary things: the rule of law, human rights, freedoms, and equal opportunities. Observing the rapid enrichment of Yanukovych’s son Alexander and Kharkiv’s young oligarch Sergei Kurchenko, the Ukrainian youth knew that to turn from a dentist or small wholesaler on the gas market into a billionaire over the course of a year was possible only in an oligarchic and corrupt country. Most young people, who came to the Maidan against Yanukovych and his decisions, were much more talented than those two petty criminals who climbed to the crest of the related and criminal connections. Among the students on Evromaidan, there were students and lecturers of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky Pedagogical University: Professor Yaroslav Potapenko, associate professor Vitaly Kotzur, student Bogdan Marchenko, and others. They showed their talent and even genius in choosing insight into the situation, in its competent assessment. For them, the wrong choice of Yanukovych seemed so obvious that to keep silent about it seemed tantamount to a crime towards their own people and the future of Ukraine. That is why Euromaidan did not start the parliamentary opposition, who largely consisted of corrupt millionaire-politicians (who bought their seats in the Verkhovna Rada for $6, 000, 000, 000! [Skosar, 2014]), but students who, up to the dispersal of the rally on 30 November, did not want to unite with any party – neither Vitali Klitschko (“Beat”), nor with the parties Arseniy Yatsenyuk (“Fatherland”) and Oleh Tyahnybok (“Freedom”). The so-called Ukrainian “opposition” in 2013 differed little from the pro-

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governmental parties, which were mired in corruption and secret agreements. On November 21 2013 in Kyiv, the new generation came on the Independence Square, whose mentality was formed in the chaos of the Yushchenko era, the generation, in which a sense of inner freedom and the psychology of the Great Cossack family was dominated.

3.16 Dispersal of Euromaidan. The beginning of the Revolution of Dignity Neither Yanukovych nor his entourage understood the significance and scale of the processes taking place in Ukraine and abroad. For them, Euromaidan was a group of young people who were out of control. However, in fact, disobedience of students was the crest of a wave, in the base of which two world civilisations clashed. The opposition politicians did not realise the scale of the looming catastrophe in Ukraine too. Ukrainian opposition leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Vitali Klitschko, and Oleh Tyahnybok, up to the last days (February 21 2014) negotiated with Yanukovych and his proxies on some compromises about the amount of compensation. They hoped that they would lead, and then, as during the Orange Revolution, they would send protests to their own scenario. Judging by the events that unfolded, they were able to convince Yanukovych and members of the “family” that young people in the Maidan were the people of the same mentality as them: corrupt, selfish, cowardly. Yanukovych, who had already made a choice in favour of Russia and spurred by it to take decisive action, made the final step, which plunged Ukraine into a state of war. At 4 o’clock in the morning of November 30 2013 a special operation on the dispersal of Euromaidan started. If before the dispersal of students on November 30 the basic demands of the protesters were the signing of an Association Agreement with the European Union, suggesting the abolition of the visa regime (although the association agreement did not mean that), after the severe beating of students, in Ukraine people started to talk about changing the ruling “elite”. On the scale of geophilosophy, it meant the open confrontation between Russia, which supported Yanukovych and the grouped around him Ukrainian “elite”, and the European Union, which made a bet on the opposition.

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3.17 Viktor Yanukovych in the history of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych entered the history of Ukraine as a failed dictator, the owner of the “golden loaf”, symbolising scant thoughts and desires of Ukrainian rulers. As the era of Leonid Kuchma, during which Ukraine ceased to exist as an independent locus of civilisation, the era of Viktor Yanukovych was an absolute evil for Ukraine and the Ukrainians. In less than three years of government, Yanukovych and the Donetsk clan, with their criminal mentality and scant thoughts, a homemaker war on the territory of Ukraine. In the tragedy that was taking place in front of us, a positive for Ukraine and the Ukrainians, it was that for the first time since the 13th century, Ukraine, in such territorial integrity, took the side of the stronger opposition. The dispersal of Euromaidan triggered a sequence of events that provoked the annexation of the Crimea and the invasion of Russian troops in the Donbas. Because of the strategic miscalculations of Putin, 55 per cent of the pro-Russian Ukrainians, for the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, expressed a preference for European values. The Russian Federation not only lost its influence in Ukraine, but also was also involved in the confrontation with Western civilisation. Yanukovych in the history of Ukraine became the anti-hero, a villain, with whom future Ukrainian presidents and politicians will be compared for a long time. Any resemblance will provoke people to disobedience, because to forget Ukrainian bloodshed on Ukrainian land is impossible.

CHAPTER FOUR THE YEARS 2014 AND 2015: POROSHENKO-YATSENYUK ARE AGAINST CORRUPTION— CORRUPTION HAS WON A VICTORY

In chapter four, we show the difference between the mentalities of revolutionaries-corruptionists of 2004 and 2014. We answer the question why the Revolution of Dignity has not led to radical changes in society; highlight the course of the two wars that Ukraine was waging: a war with the Russian Federation for its territorial integrity and the war against corruption. At the end of the chapter, we formulate the author’s idea of the Ukrainian national idea, which follows from the geophilosophy of Ukraine. The author believes that the methodology of geophilosophy allows for abstracting away from the details and highlighting in the history of the formation of Ukrainian statehood only important and determining the mission of the Ukrainian nation in the history of civilisation, which identifies it against the background of the other nations of the world, rallies, and gives it a specific role.

4.1 The Revolution of Dignity In the previous chapter, we have not just questioned the revolutionary spirit of the Orange Revolution, but brought evidence that characterises the Orange Revolution, not as a revolution, but as a power struggle between the oligarchic financial-industrial groups with the involvement of the public masses. Something like those opposition millionaire-politicians tried to arrange during the Revolution of Dignity. They partially succeeded, but those processes that were out of control give us full right to claim that the Revolution of Dignity was the first revolution in the history of independent Ukraine. As proof, we use the same criteria of Anthony Giddens’ Theory of Revolution [Giddens, 1982].

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1. The first necessary criterion for revolution, according to Giddens, is a mass social movement. In contrast to the Orange Revolution, during the Revolution of Dignity the Maidan no longer reminded us of a festive show. During the Revolution of Dignity the Maidan was a big part of the central street of Kyiv – Khreshchatyk (not longer than 1 kilometre), which was turned by the rebels into a fortification – Sech, remotely resembling fortifications, which at the beginning of the 16th century the Zaporizhsky Cossacks formed a battle line against enemies. Only instead of earth ramparts, the Maidan was fenced off from the surrounding streets with snow blocks, sandbags, and put the stack of automobile tires. Along the Maidan, there were many tents located where one could always get warm and eat. In the centre, on Independence Square, the leaders gave guidance to the camp tent and the fighting against government police units from a platform. Those wishing to participate in the revolution were combined in their hundreds. By the way, not all were taken, mainly retired officers, veterans of Afghanistan, volunteers who were physically fit. As on February 26 2014 in “Maidan Self-Defence”, there were officially 42 squadrons (sotnia). Maidan Self-Defence’s activities were controlled and led by the Commandant of the Maidan, Andriy Parubiy. For each squadron secured the barricades. When someone from the squadrons had free time and was not on the barricades, they were being trained in the uncomplicated art of war: to resist police attacks, to use shields and batons correctly, and to throw Molotov cocktails and stones. Every day volunteer squadrons of the Maidan Self-Defence turned into fighting units, on an equal head-to-head opposing the police units, which were pulled to Kyiv from all over Ukraine. In addition to the squadrons of Maidan Self-Defence, thousands of people took part in the Revolution of Dignity; they brought food, helped with finance, their presence. Journalists played a major role in the Revolution of Dignity, which provided an objective assessment of the events, not the distorted version that promoted pro-government Ukrainian and Russian channels. The Revolution of Dignity was really a mass social movement in which the Ukrainians from all regions took part, different social classes, professions and religions. 2. The second necessary criterion for revolution, according to Anthony Giddens: the revolution must lead to large-scale reforms or changes;

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Revolution leaders should be able to achieve at least some of their goals [Giddens, 1982]. On November 24 2013, in the largest (at that time) opposition rally (during Yanukovych’s presidency), the requirements of Euromaidan were unanimously adopted: 1. The resignation of Mykola Azarov’s government for the betrayal of national interests. 2 The holding of exceptional sessions of the Verkhovna Rada was on 27 November 2013 (i.e. before the Eastern Partnership Summit on 28–29 November 2013 in Vilnius), where all the necessary European integration laws should be adopted, including the law on the release of Yulia Tymoshenko. In case of failure of these laws, Euromaidan required the dissolution of parliament and the holding of early elections. 3. The Maidan required Viktor Yanukovych to cancel his decision about suspension of preparation to conclude Association Agreement with the EU, to release Tymoshenko, and to sign the “Agreement on Association of Ukraine and the European Union” at the summit in Vilnius. In case of not signing the “Association Agreement”, the Maidan would require the impeachment of Yanukovych for the betrayal of national interests. Starting from December 14 2013, the main requirement of Euromaidan was the return to the legitimate Constitution of Ukraine in the version from December 8 2004. All requirements of Euromaidan were met by February 22 2014 (before Yanukovych and his entourage fled the country). As for the goals and their implementation by the leaders of the revolution, then Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity did not have pronounced leaders. This was really a public revolution, which flowed at the behest of the people and their demands. Formal opposition leaders in the persons of Vitali Klitschko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and Oleh Tyahnybok did not control revolutionary processes. The proof of that was the fact that many agreements between the formal opposition leaders and the representatives of Yanukovych were continually frustrated, not finding support in the revolutionary mood of the masses. Especially significant was Vladimir Parasyuk’s speech on 21 February 2014. After the report of the so-called

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opposition leaders about personal agreements with President Yanukovych in front of the participants of Euromaidan, without saying a word to the organisers, unknown at the time, a 26-year-old resident of Lviv, Volodymyr Parasyuk, went up on the rostrum. On behalf of his squadron, he expressed distrust for the overly cautious, in his opinion, policy of the opposition leaders, and publicly vowed to carry out an armed assault on the Presidential Administration, if Yanukovych did not resign before 10:00 a.m. the next day. Parasyuk’s speech found enthusiastic support from the protesters. There is an opinion that Parasyuk’s emotional speech accelerated Yanukovych’s decision to secretly leave Kyiv [Kovalenko, 2014]. 3. The third necessary criterion for revolution, according to Anthony Giddens: the revolution must assume the threat or its use by the participants of a mass movement [Giddens, 1982]. During the Revolution of Dignity, there were 102 opposition protesters that were killed, hundreds of people were wounded. The power was so afraid of the Maidan participants that they put snipers and machine gunners against the aluminum shields and batons, with which the rebels were initially armed. Thus, the Revolution of Dignity corresponds to the three basic criterion of the theory of revolution of Anthony Giddens. This was therefore the first revolution in the history of independent Ukraine.

4.2 Changes in Ukraine after the Revolution of Dignity If we step back from the details and consider the changes in Ukraine through geophilosophy, over the period 2014–2015 one can highlight the following series of key events: 1. On 22 February 2014, after the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych and the resignation of Mykola Azarov’s government, during 2014 power in Ukraine was concentrated in the hands of three people: – Oleksander Turchynov, who, after the Revolution of Dignity, headed the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (between February 22 2014 and November 27 2014) and served as the President of Ukraine (between February 23 2014 to June 7 2014).

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– Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who, on February 27 2014, headed the Ukrainian government (up to the present). – Petro Poroshenko, who, by the will of the Ukrainian people became the fifth president of Ukraine on 7 June 2014. 2. On February 22 2014 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine cancelled the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated September 30 2010, thanks to which President Yanukovych was endowed with authoritarian powers. Ukraine again became a parliamentary-presidential republic. 3. On February 23 and 24 2014 the Russian Federation began a preplanned operation to annex part of the territory of Ukraine – the Crimea. The Russian intervention began. 4. On May 25 2014, the extraordinary presidential elections in Ukraine took place. Of the 23 candidates by a large margin, Petro Poroshenko won the victory; he got 9, 857, 308 votes (54.70 per cent votes). In comparison, Yulia Tymoshenko got 2, 310, 050 votes (12.81 per cent) [Center, 2016]. 5. On October 26 2014, in a time of acute political crisis, early parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine. In the Verkhovna Rada of eighth convocation, six parties and blocs passed 1. People’s Front (leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk – 22.14 per cent); 2. Petro Poroshenko Bloc (leader Petro Poroshenko, Yuri Lutsenko – 21.82 per cent); 3. SelfReliance (Samopomich) (leader – Andriy Sadovyi, Lviv City Mayor – 10.97 per cent); 4. Opposition bloc (members are the former allies of Viktor Yanukovych, the leader – a representative of the oligarchic clan of Lyovochkin-Firtash, a millionaire Boyko – 9.43 per cent); 5. Radical Party (leader Oleg Lyashko – 7.44 per cent); and 6. Fatherland (leader Yulia Tymoshenko – 5.68 per cent) [Center, 2016]. On the territory of modern Ukraine a series of events provoked by the board of Yanukovych has been continuing. We are talking about the two wars that took place in Ukraine up to the present time: a) war against the Russian Federation for territorial integrity, and b) the war against corruption. Let us consider the causes, course, and consequences of two wars in more detail.

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4.3 The war against the Russian Federation for territorial integrity. External causes The author has written a book on the theme war in Ukraine “Theory of War and Peace, Geophilosophy of Europe”, which is soon to be published. In this book, we emphasise only the key points of this problem. As we have already noted, the Revolution of Dignity did not provoke the Russian invasion in the Crimea, and then in the Donbas. It all started a few years earlier, when President Yanukovych by his decisions violated the delicate balance between the two major loci of civilisation and provoked their conflict. All subsequent events that began to unfold in Ukraine already depended largely on the military strategies of the Russian Federation and Western civilisation. Geophilosophy highlights internal and external factors that have influenced and continue to influence the unfolding conflict on the territory of Ukraine between the Russian Federation and Western civilisation. Consider external factors: 1. The main external cause of the outbreak of armed conflict in Ukraine is a strategic miscalculation of Vladimir Putin concerning Ukraine, which he had to compensate with for the impulsive tactical decisions. For example: – Starting from 2003, Vladimir Putin made a bet on Viktor Yanukovych, however in the 2004 presidential elections Viktor Yushchenko came to power. Putin chose confrontation with Yushchenko. – Starting from 2008 Putin supported power-hungry Yulia Tymoshenko. However, Viktor Yanukovych won the victory in the 2010 presidential elections. Putin-Medvedev chose the confrontation with Yanukovych and a trade war with Ukraine. – Between 2011 and 2012, Putin began a trade war with Ukraine, working on breaking the reputation of his potential ally, Yanukovych. In this, he succeeded. – When in 2013 Yanukovych of hopelessness appealed to the European Union, Putin, contrary to the logic of his previous actions, changed the course of Russian policy towards Ukraine and began to generously subsidise the Ukrainian economy.

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– The bulk of financial flows that went through Ukraine during the period between 2010 and 2013 accounted for the Russian money, but this money did not work on the public image of Russia and did not promote alternative political leaders to Yanukovych. Putin did not have a wish to work with Yanukovych, at the same time the Russian funds did not work on the public image of the alternative pro-Russian politicians. A lack of a competent strategy towards Ukraine led to the fact that Putin could not influence the course of events in Ukraine, and he was forced to respond to them. From the standpoint of tactics, his decisions were correct, but winning situationally, Putin lost future perspectives. For example, the annexation of the Crimea, though it was preparing on the sidelines of Putin is administration, was an impulsive decision, without a thorough analysis of the consequences. Tactically, Putin won: he defended the Russian military base in Sevastopol, strengthened his political rating in Russia, and expanded the territory of the Russian Federation. However, if we look at the decision in terms of strategy, Putin crossed the Rubicon, violated many international agreements, challenged the countries – the guarantors of the world order and created a precedent of possible impunity for any aggression. Having annexed the Crimea, Putin actually declared war on Western civilisation. 2. The strategic miscalculation was Putin’s decision to put Russian troops into the territory of Ukraine in August 2014. From a tactical point of view, the solution was not in doubt: the Ukrainian army successfully pressed demoralised units of separatists (mostly consisting of Russian mercenaries) and planned to release the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in a month. Russian project “Novorossiya” was on the verge of failure, so on 24 August 2014 the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, Valery Gerasimov, ordered three Russian battalion-level tactical groups to attack the flanks of the Ukrainian army. More than 3, 500 Russian soldiers, supported by 60 tanks, 320 infantry combat vehicles (BMD), and 60 artillery guns struck unexpectedly, broke through the defence, and closed the part of the Ukrainian army in the so-called “Ilovaisk pocket” (encirclement) [LIGABusinessInform, 2015]. It seemed to be a brilliant victory, the triumph of the Russian army... However, in the strategic plan, the war that was started by the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine has led to the strengthening of the Ukrainian army; providing it with the latest weapons of NATO countries;

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a new wave of Ukrainian patriotism; to mass anti-Russian sentiment not only in Ukraine, but throughout the world; to the oil price collapse; new sanctions against Russia, almost to its complete isolation; and as a consequence, to the internal economic and social crisis. 3. In contrast to the authoritarian impulsive decisions of the Russian president, endowed with unlimited power in his state, the leaders of the European Union reacted to events much slower. The lack of efficiency in decision-making is, perhaps, the weakness of democratic states. The leaders of the political forces in Western civilisation, before taking responsibility for themselves, consider the decision twenty times, weigh it, and consult with experts, because a mistake costs them a political career. However, the slowness of operational decisions is in full compensated by a strategic win. What is perceived as a weakness is in fact the strength of Western civilisation. Not one person and his emotions take part in making the decision; it is made by different groups of politicians, based on the professional findings and conclusions of specialised analytical centres. In all wars strategy has always won, not tactics. At present the Russian Federation, which is completely dependent on impulsive and emotional Putin’s decisions, is forced to make mistakes, to dissipate its energies, and to enjoy Pyrrhic victories. Actually: – Hostilities were “suspended” in the Donbas. – The attention of the Russian Federation was diverted competently from the territory of Ukraine to other areas. – The Russian Federation pulled into the war in Syria. – Even greater dispersion of forces and means caused a clash between the Russian Federation and Turkey. – The differences in relationships with potential allies are deepened: Belarus and Kazakhstan. – Information warfare on an unprecedented scale started personally against Putin, highlighting the “dark” sides of his biography (e.g., poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and the reasoned decision of a judge of the High Court of Justice Sir Robert Owen on 22 January 2016). In general, the Russian aggression is skillfully squeezed out of the territory of Europe to deep into the Byzantine-Asian culture, creating tensions away from European borders. Along with the drop in oil prices and the tightening of sanctions, the Russian Federation is forced to wage war on

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several fronts: the Crimea, Donbas, Syria, and Turkey. This also causes a heavy financial cost. The Russian Federation is forced to save on social programs and science, to tax business. The state, which still in 2014 was the fifth largest GDP in the world, in front of us turned into “suck” [International, 2015]. Despite Putin’s efforts, the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation narrowed every month. Russia lost Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Cuba. Russia’s sphere of influence was left with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Syria, and the Middle East. 4. In response to the unprecedented powerful and cynical Russian propaganda, Western civilisation started a powerful information war against the Russian leadership and the ideology of the “Russian World”. The concept of the “Russian World” is filled with negativity, which begins to cause emotional rejection. Gradually the word “Russian” and “terrorism” became synonyms, and the “Russian World” was associated with the culture of violence, hypocrisy (double standard), and so-called “little green men” (or “polite green men”). 5. Politicians of Western civilisation still do not trust Ukrainian politicians and officials; they entirely cooperate only after the fulfillment of certain obligations. This is clearly seen in the financing of the Ukrainian army. Perhaps such a pragmatic approach of Western politicians in a time of war in Ukraine with the strongest army of the world is cruel and inhuman in nature. Perhaps high-tech weapons from NATO countries would be inclined to overweight in favour of the Ukrainian armed forces. However, according to the analytics of an authoritative Ukrainian military expert, Yury Butusov, such relations, which contribute to the rapid and qualitative reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, are an effective opposition to corruption and bureaucracy among the “parquet” Ukrainian generals [Butusov, 2016].

4.3.1 The War against the Russian Federation for territorial integrity. Internal causes of the ongoing war Let us consider the internal causes that have influenced and continue to influence the war in Ukraine against the Russian Federation for the restoration of territorial integrity. 1. At present, the main problem of Ukraine is a legacy that was left after the presidency of Kravchuk, Kuchma, Yushchenko, and Yanukovych. Not only during their presidency, the state was stolen to the condition of the

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poor African and Latin American dictatorships, but they also left a legacy of politicians whose mentality was formed in a corrupt environment. After the Revolution of Dignity, the “leaders” of the Orange Revolution that were just released from prisons or returned from exile came to power again, people that were from social stratum formed by Kuchma, regional businessmen-parliamentarians and their entourage. On TV, screens, as in the Yushchenko era, sounded the fiery speeches and promises of Yuriy Lutsenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Petro Poroshenko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Arsen Avakov, and many others. Many of those who brought Ukraine to chaos in the era of President Yushchenko, by any means began to remind Ukrainians about themselves, climbed to power and stole, as they used to steal under Yushchenko. Olexander Turchinov, Oleh Makhnitsky, Petro Poroshenko, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, Mykola Martynenko, and dozens of other politicians-corruptionists of the Yushchenko era, not just compromised the ideals of the Revolution of Dignity with their presence, but also continued to consider Ukraine and the Ukrainian people as a source of enrichment. For example, numerous journalistic investigations discovered the theft of hundreds of millions of dollars by one of the Members of the Freedom Party, Oleh Makhnitsky, who in the period between February 25 2014 and June 18 2014 was Acting Prosecutor General of Ukraine. Though the journalists proved Oleh Makhnitsky’s theft, it slid right off his back, because Oleh Makhnitsky was supported by the party leader – Oleh Tyahnybok (since 2004 Oleh Makhnitsky was the lawyer of Oleh Tyahnybok). On June 19 2014, the popularly elected president of Ukraine, Poroshenko, appointed to the post of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine his old friend Vitaly Yarema. At the time of appointment, Yarema not only had the reputation of “a Corrupt General”, but also, during the bloody fighting in the Donbas, he helped the high-ranking officials of the Yanukovych era to take flight, and helped them to return to them millions of dollars of frozen assets [Yarema, 2015]. Through numerous journalistic investigations and revelations of corruption, Poroshenko had to dismiss Yarema six months later and appoint Shokin, but offences committed by Yarema against the Ukrainian people went unpunished. The unpunished theft of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine Oleh Makhnitskyi and Yarema, as well as hundreds of other examples of corruption exposed by journalists and disclosed by law enforcement agencies showed in the Ukrainian ruling “elite” in the background of bloody fighting in the Donbas, greatly undermined the patriotism of the

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masses. Students with aluminum shields in February 2014 were fearless under fire on Independence Square, were in August 2014 asking me a question: And for what should we fight: for corrupt authorities or Akhmetov’s businesses? What has changed since independence, when those who robbed Ukraine under Yushchenko are returned to power? 2. The odious politicians who came to power after the Revolution of Dignity and that redistribution of property that they made (as in 2005, after the coming to power of Viktor Yushchenko), caused resistance of the Ukrainian oligarchs, especially those whose business was focused on Russia. For example, the richest man in Ukraine, Rinat Akhmetov, after Yanukovych fled Ukraine, organised, and financed a separatist movement in the Donbas, Alexander Efremov – in Lugansk and Gennady Kernes and Mikhail Dobkin in Kharkiv, Oleg Tsarev in Dnipropetrovsk. It was these (as well as hundreds of others) corrupt businessmen-politicians and their impact Putin oriented in promoting the project “Novarossiya”. The project “Novarossiya” did not come out of nowhere. Its creators from Putin’s presidential administration thought it was the logical conclusion of the First and Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Deputies of all levels in the city of Severodonetsk, Luhansk region (congresses held on 28 November 2004 and 1 March 2008 respectively). Unfortunately, at that time, the Ukrainian authorities did not appreciate the danger of the incipient separatism in Southeast Ukraine. 3. The representatives of the emerging civil society played a significant role in the events that started in Ukraine. Suddenly, for all sides of the conflict: the Russian Federation, the European Union, the Ukrainian oligarchs and businessmen-politicians who came to power, the representatives of Ukrainian civil society were so active, determined, and organised, which became an important and decisive actor in the unfolding conflict between the two world cultures. The percentage of Ukrainians with an active civil position was constantly increasing. For the first time the civil society leaders were journalists Serhiy Leshchenko, Mustafa Nayyem, Savik Shuster, Tatiana Chornovil, Yury Butusov, Dmitry Tymchuk and others; civil society activists Dmitry Yarosh, Vladimir Parasyuk, Igor Lutsenko Alexey Gritsenko, etc.; volunteers: Yury Biryukov, Yuri Kasyanov, Tatiana Rychkova, George Tuka and others, then every month of 2014 and 2015, the number of Ukrainians showing their inner freedom and civic activity increased exponentially. Thanks to the volunteers, soldiers, officers, journalists, civil society activists, the inhabitants of Odessa who on 2 May stopped separatist sentiment in the

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city, the inhabitants of Kharkiv who did not succumb to the traitors’ propaganda, the inhabitants of Dnipropetrovsk and of Zaporizhia, who not only defended their regions, but also helped to hold the large areas in the Donbas, they managed to achieve almost the impossible: – – – –

Stop the advance of Russian troops deep into Ukraine. Suppress separatist sentiment in Southeastern Ukraine. Cancel the Russian project “Novarossiya”. Cause the worldwide respect for its heroism in the battles against the superior in number and armament of the Russian army (it is enough to recall the 242-day defence of Donetsk airport, fighting for Saur Mogila and many others). – Start the construction of a democratic model of state power. – Prevent the repetition of the consequences of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

4.4 The war against corruption If the war of Ukraine against the Russian Federation consolidated Ukrainian society on a wave of patriotism, Ukraine lost the war against corruption. To fight with internal defects, to correct the mentality, became much more difficult than defending the territory from Russian aggression. I got convinced when at the request of the American journalist Anna Brodsky I took part in the preparation of material for American publications on the subject of corruption in Ukraine. In the spring of 2015, I set up meetings for Anna Brodsky with students, teachers, civil society activists, government officials, members of the government. I was surprised that the people I knew as heroes of the Revolution of Dignity and the war in the Donbas, the people who came under fire without fear on Independence Square (the Maidan) and at Donetsk airport were afraid to put their names under the revelations of corruption schemes in education, science, medicine, and in the government. They were speaking on tape sincerely and indignantly about corruption in Ukraine, but then, at the end of the interview, they asked us not to mention their names. Anna Brodsky and I spent two weeks and collected extensive information on corruption in Ukraine, but we could not use it, because the journalistic ethics did not allow us to name the sources of these revelations. Anonymity of revelations reduces their value and effectiveness. Perhaps just out of despair I have written this book. If you knew a lot, and saw a lot, if you organised and were involved in corrupt schemes, if you

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admit the corruption is evil, but when one offers you a bribe, you ask yourself: “But, how will I live on a small salary?”, you realise that this theme should not be hushed up. On the one hand, we cannot indiscriminately accuse the Ukrainians of instilling this mentality, but on the other hand, one should start to admit your own corruptions, and you need to start with yourself. If not you, then who?

4.4.1 Corruption in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine One of the main problems in Ukraine is the lack of legal culture. The Ukrainians should be taught to respect the law, from that, democracy begins. Logically, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the highest legislative body of the country, one of the three branches of power in Ukraine, should do this. People’s Deputies, ideally, are society’s faces, as they are the best of its representatives. However, in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 8th convocation, I will note, re-elected after the Revolution of Dignity (in October 2014) the members differed little from the Verkhovna Rada under Kuchma, Yanukovych, and Yushchenko. What example of lawfulness the Ukrainians can inherit? – People’s Deputy of Ukraine Semen Semenchenko. According to the journalistic investigation, Vladimir Boyko and Semen Semenchenko are the ordinary conmen, a swindler Konstantin Grishin was previously convicted, whose heroic image under the nickname of Semenchenko was created by Anton Gerashchenko in the middle of 2014, at that time the advisor to the Minister of Internal Affairs, who is also currently People’s Deputy [Boyko, 2015]. Despite the irrefutable evidence of fraud, Semenchenko-Grishin and Gerashchenko are still “People’s” Deputies. – People’s Deputy Serhiy Melnychuk, a former commander of Aidar battalion who was not much at war, but according to investigative reporting and a number of completed cases, was engaged in raiding, robbery, and extortion. Despite the irrefutable evidence, People’s Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine boycotted demanding the removal of his parliamentary immunity [Law Enforcers, 2015]. – People’s Deputy Yuriy Boyko, a former Minister of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine during Tymoshenko and Azarov’s government, was a member of Yanukovych’s oligarchic group of Lyovochkin-Firtash. Yuriy Boyko was accused on the fact of losses of billions of dollars in Ukraine, but the Poroshenko’s power and the pro-government coalition boycotted

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demanding the removal of Boyko’s parliamentary immunity. The reason for such “loyalty” to power is banal – Boyko is the Chairman of the parliamentary faction “Opposition Bloc” in the Verkhovna Rada, and in exchange for the votes of his faction, he extends his parliamentary immunity. – People’s Deputies brother and sister, Sergei Lyovochkin and Julia Lyovochkina, the creators of the oligarchic clan Lyovochkin-Firtash, who grabbed Ukraine under Yushchenko and Yanukovych. The amounts of losses incurred to the state are estimated at billions of dollars, but the Lyovochkins remain unpunished. – People’s Deputy Andriy Derkach: his father was involved in the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze, the heads of the deputy group “Will of the People” in the Verkhovna Rada. It was Derkach and Shufrych – two odious politicians of the Kuchma era - they were the authors of the scandalous amendments to the 2016 budget that postponed the introduction of electronic declarations to 2017, though it was provided by the law on the prevention of corruption [LIGABusinessInform, 2016]; – People’s Deputy Aleksey Poroshenko, a son of the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko. If we exclude his family ties with the President, then for what services and professional quality does a young man of 29-years-old (born in 1985) with a specialty in “International Business”, work in the Supreme Council of Ukraine? Comparisons were not encouraging: in 2002 under President Kuchma, a millionaire-Deputy Petro Poroshenko defended a PhD in juridical science; in 2014 under President Poroshenko, a businessperson, the heir to a billionaire, Alexei Poroshenko is a member of the Supreme Council of Ukraine that specialises in lawmaking, rather than business. Now the heir oligarch, People's Deputy Poroshenko-junior has to defend a PhD in juridical science and family continuity is obvious. Of the 450 deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 8th convocation that were elected after the Revolution of Dignity and during the war against the Russian Federation, more than 350 deputies have corrupt past and the mentality far from the interests of the state and the Ukrainian people. As one of the many proofs of anti-Ukrainian activities of People’s Deputies of the current convocation, let me give you some results of the investigation of Fedor Orischuk and “Glavcom” Internet publication in Ukraine. “Glavcom” has analysed the judicial sentences for the “illegal enrichment” of officials that were given over the past five years in

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Ukraine. It turns out for five years, in a period of rife corruption in Ukraine, only 20 corruption cases came to the trial stage. Of the two dozen officials caught on bribes, only two are serving a sentence. However, the most interesting, under the new Ukrainian authorities in the persons of Poroshenko, Yatsenyuk and Groysman, the corrupt officials have not been sentenced since 2015. This was due to “errors” of the legislators (intentional or accidental?) – that one of the most important articles on corruption of the Criminal Code did not work for a few months, between October 2014 and the end of winter 2015 [Orischuk, 2016]. The 2014 parliamentary elections found the lack of social lifts in the country’s political elite, the immutability, and the rigidity of the power. Even after the Revolution of Dignity in politics, take places: crooks, populists, lovers, relatives, and top managers of companies of the Ukrainian oligarchs. To this day, despite all the promises of the ruling triumvirate in Ukraine Poroshenko-Yatsenyuk-Groysman, there was no separation of business and politics. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, with a few exceptions, consists of the groups of interests that are funded by Ukrainian and Russian oligarchs. Places in the Verkhovna Rada can be purchased, the sale remains valid. The cost of a place ranges from $500, 000 to $6, 000, 000! A striking example of the attitude of Poroshenko to the quality of the Supreme Council of Ukraine are the elections in the Verkhovna Rada in district 205 of Chernihiv (one of the oldest cities in Ukraine), which were held on 26 July 2015. Especially cynical facts are the following: – The main contenders for the deputy mandate in Chernigov: Sergey Berezenko and Gennady Korban did not have anything to do with Chernigov. One represented the Vinnitsa clan of Poroshenko; the other represented the Dnepropetrovsk clan of Kolomoyskyi. – Sergey Berezenko (born in 1984) – the son of a well-known Vinnitsa businessperson and a nephew of not less well-known politician, Anatoly Matvienko. Anatoly Matvienko, between 1989 and 1991, was the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Youth of Ukraine, a member of Kravchuk’s inner circle. The level of kinship helped Berezenko in 2005 (at the age of 21) to come to politics and to immediately get into corruption scandals. With Poroshenko coming to power, Berezenko’s career resumed. He was appointed to the post of Head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine. Despite the car that was full of money, it was intended to

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bribe voters, thanks to a strong administrative support; Berezenko won the elections [Chernigov Winner, 2015]. – Berezenko’s main rival in the elections in Chernihiv was Gennady Corban, famous raider in Ukraine, one of the few friends of oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi. – During the election, independent observers recorded numerous violations, but Poroshenko and his entourage met the election results, and Berezenko, contrary to logic and common sense, became a People’s Deputy. This example of Berezenko’s election into the highest legislative body of the state is one of many examples that characterise Ukrainian power. Such “Berezenkos” in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, instead of legislative activity, are engaged in populism and lobbying oligarchs’ interests, who paid for their election. The expert of public organisation “People’s control”, and “Word and Deed” Sergei Mikhal’kov analysed the promises of People’s Deputies in 2015. According to him: “During a year the Deputies promised 6,595 things. Fulfilled promises – 975, or 14.8 per cent” of these [Mikhal’kov, 2015]: – Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (leader – Petro Poroshenko) – 19 per cent; – The party of SelfReliance (leader – Andriy Sadovyi) and “Radical Party” (leader – Oleg Lyashko) – 16 per cent; – The party of “Fatherland” (leader – Yulia Tymoshenko) and “People’s Front” (leader – Arseniy Yatsenyuk) – 13 per cent; – “Opposition bloc” (leader – Yuri Boyko) – only 5 per cent of the promises were fulfilled. Ukrainian politicians continue to destroy the image of the state, and political corruption continutes to frighten away potential investors.

4.4.2 Corrupt mentality of the rulers In the book, I specifically drew attention to the corrupt mentality of Ukrainian rulers. The fish rots from the head. President of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine have the exclusive right to determine domestic and foreign policy, a part of which is anti-corruption policy, and to ensure its implementation. About what kind of victory against corruption in Ukraine can be discussed if the current rulers of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk

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actually lead corruption? This categorical statement is proved by the results of numerous journalistic investigations that are blocked at the level of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, Viktor Shokin. Poroshenko and Shokin have known each other since 2003. Back in 2006, Ihor Kolomoyskyi testified in the London court that: “Shokin worked in the security service of Poroshenko for half a year” [Poroshenko, 2015]. Therefore, it is not surprising that after coming to power, Poroshenko appointed Victor Shokin – first Deputy Prosecutor General of Ukraine (June 2014), and later the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (February 10 2015). It is at the level of the Prosecutor General Shokin that the investigation against Igor Kononenko is blocked, a key business partner of the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko. Igor Kononenko (an old Army friend and business partner of Poroshenko for a long time) under President Poroshenko performs the same role that Alexander Yanukovych under President Yanukovych, which is the president of Ukraine, directs all financial flows through him. Kononenko actually led the Petro Poroshenko Bloc in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (formerly it was led by Yuriy Lutsenko), in a short time, through his corrupt mentality and open lobbying of Poroshenko’s business interests, he turned a part of the fraction against himself, for example, the People’s Deputies of Viktor Chumak, Serhiy Leshchenko, Svetlana Zaleschuk, and others. In chapter three, we considered Poroshenko’s biography and created his psychological portrait. The findings were disappointing because Poroshenko is a typical billionaire-politician, brought up during the Kuchma era, who became rich under the godfather of his child, President Yushchenko. Poroshenko always put his own business first. As proof, we present the following arguments: between March 23 2012 and December 3 2012, Poroshenko held the position of Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine in the government of Mykola Azarov. In the opinion of Mykola Azarov and another billionaire Sergei Taratuta, Poroshenko was the most ineffective Minister of Economy in the history of Ukraine, because the bulk of the time was devoted to the development of his business [Taratuta, 2015]. Another proof: during the year of holding the position of President of Ukraine, Poroshenko has increased his income sevenfold. Thus, according to a declaration in 2013, Poroshenko has declared 51, 830, 000 UAH gross of total income and in 2014, against the background of general decline of the Ukrainian economy, and in an environment where his business faced serious problems in Russia and the

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Crimea; his earnings amounted to almost 369 million UAH [Dorosh, 2015]. The same rapid revenue growth is observed in people from Poroshenko’s inner circle: Igor Kononenko, Valerija Gontareva, Victor Shokin, and others. In autumn 2009, a few dozen political scientists and I were invited to the round table with the participation of Petro Poroshenko (who by that time, Victor Yushchenko had appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine) and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, Mikhail Zurabov. It was about the upcoming presidential elections in Ukraine and many other things. It was the first and last time I met Poroshenko. In contrast to a tactful, intelligent, and humorous Zurabov, Poroshenko lost so much; he looked angular, vulgar, like a peasant, and not only I, but also the rest of the audience in the hall of political scientists, felt uncomfortable for the official representative of Ukrainian policy. Mikhail Zurabov was able to take control of the audience so quickly and easily (his speech was the first) that the audience completely fell to his charm. Poroshenko’s speech was so straightforward and scathing that its aversion bordered on enmity to the speaker. All subsequent discussion turned into a contrast: laugh, smiles, and ease of dialogue with Zurabov, stirred with dryness and harshness of Poroshenko’s responses, in which more vulgarity of the oligarchbusinessman was shown than erudition, tact, and diplomatic manner. Judging by the speeches of Peter Poroshenko between 2014 and 2015, how he talks to people has not changed. He is the oligarch, ruler, so used to broadcasting, instructing, and conducting. A culture of dialogue, negotiation, and compromise, he never mastered. Even more significant for the negative image of Ukrainian politics has become Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Prime Minister of Ukraine (between February 27 2014 and to the present). I do not want to speak a lot about him, because one of the former protégés of Yatsenyuk – David Zhvania – described him briefly and clearly as a “political villain” [Musaeva-Borovik & Kryukova, 2015]. As proof, Zhvania gave quite a convincing argument. It turns out that Yatsenyuk came to politics thanks to the wife of Viktor Yushchenko – Ekaterina Yushchenko. It is thanks to her protégé that Yatsenyuk came to the party Our Ukraine, later he headed the party Bloc Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defence (OU-PSD), which promoted him to the post of Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (December 4 2007 – November 12 2008). David Zhvania concluded, in whatever

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political projects Arseniy Yatsenyuk took part (Our Ukraine, Our Ukraine – People’s Self Defence, “Fatherland”), he always ruined it and then left it, but with his interest. I note that during the Revolution of Dignity, Yatsenyuk was the only opposition politician who was met by the Maidan with whistles, shouts of discontent, and “huff”. The Maidan disliked Yatsenyuk for his cunning, hypocrisy, and populism. As Head of the Government of Ukraine, Arseniy Yatsenyuk has changed little. His inner circle always gets into scandals and revelations. For example, it turned out that even in 2013; the Swiss Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal case of corruption against the millionaire and financier of Yatsenyuk’s party – Mykola Martynenko. Yatsenyuk knew about the criminal case against a party fellow and friend, but until the last moment, he did not tell. During this time, judging from the accusations of exPresident of Georgia, and now the governor of the Odessa region Mikhail Saakashvili, personally Yatsenyuk and Mykola Martynenko took part in the embezzlement in the billions in the Odessa Portside Plant (between 2014 and 2015) [Samofalov & Musaeva-Borovik, 2015]. The war against corruption is difficult to win, when the one who headed it and the one who announces a campaign against it, are the same persons. Having declared war to the oligarchs in Ukraine by oligarch-President Petro Poroshenko, it caused confusion among the public. Show yourself deoligarchisation and possibly the rest of the oligarchs voluntarily, without loud statements, will return the previously stolen state assets. When Yatsenyuk speaks about corruption, but this time a financier of his faction in the parliament, a man who is hiding from justice in Switzerland and the Czech Republic – Mykola Martynenko – is it not mocking the people participating in the war.

4.4.3 Model of corruption triangle in Ukraine A year after the Revolution of Dignity in the ranking of international anticorruption organisation Transparency International, Ukraine was ranked 142nd out of 175 places, close to Uganda and the Comoros [Transparency, 2014]. Even during the Yushchenko era of chaos, Ukraine’s place was a little better: 146th out of 180 countries [Transparency, 2009].

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We have already talked about dating back to Kuchma’s model of the corruption triangle in Ukraine, which allows the president to enrich himself, corrupt bureaucracy, millionaires and billionaires, those who are close to power. According to estimates of the ex-Minister of Economy Volodymyr Lanovoi, every year under Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk in the Ukrainian corruption triangle, about 500 to 690 billion UAH disappear, or rather, illegally taken out of the national economy! This amount is equivalent to the entire budget of Ukraine together with the Pension Fund [Lanovoi, 2015]. The logic of the existence of corruption triangle is quite simple and uncomplicated. At the highest levels of the economic hierarchy of corrupt state bureaucracy allocates budget funds to loss-making state monopolies as the investments, grants, allowances, price indexing, and loans. Mikheil Saakashvili assesses the amount of the annual budget useless expenses to cover losses of state monopolies at 120 billion UAH. Under Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk, this figure has increased by at least 40 per cent. In turn, the state-monopoly associations through fraudulent schemes – overstatement of payment services and goods of private companies, however they buy products at artificially low prices – are creating artificial income to the holding companies of the oligarchs. Nikolai Gordienko, who was dismissed from his post as Head of the State Financial Inspection, called the sums of detected thefts by these schemes from 0.5 to 4 billion UAH per year [Gordienko, 2015]. It is only in the audited monopolistic corporations. Such monopolistic monster companies only in the sphere of fuel and energy are more than a dozen. The total number of state enterprises in Ukraine is about 200, of them monopoly ones are not less than 50. The amount of burglaries in this sphere is difficult to assess, however, based on the average performance, it is 40–60 million UAH per year. Vladimir Lanovoi believes that private oligarchic companies are making cash thanks to their financial support by the corrupt power. The most important mechanisms of the corrupt money are [Lanovoi, 2015]: 1. Tax benefits, including VAT refunds unduly large, mostly illegal. They can be estimated at 40–50 million UAH. 2. Budget guarantees and loans for individual government programs and government contracts – from 50 to 80 million UAH in different years. 3. The loans to refinance the banks of the oligarchs, given by the National Bank of Ukraine. Every year is 40–50 million UAH, but in 2014, a record was set: banks were given 180 million UAH. In

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previous years, about half of the refinancing loans were not returned. In return for this generosity, bureaucratic leadership of the government received bribes. According to insiders up to 50 per cent of the funds were received. There is another side of the looting of Ukraine: the export of cash money abroad. According to Lanovoi under President Yanukovych from Ukraine annually 200–275 billion UAH exported (about $ 25–35 billion). Under President Poroshenko, the flow of exported money increased to 300–480 billion UAH (according to the current exchange rate it is $15–22 billion) annually. This is more than Ukraine gets for the year from all creditors [Lanovoi, 2015]. Thus, the corrupt mentality of politicians, civil servants, and judges (who by their decisions cover many corruption schemes, or are directly involved in them), who came to power after the Revolution of Dignity, thanks to them Ukraine returned to the model of oligarchic rule. This model of government is close to the mentality of the ruling triumvirate in the person of oligarch-President Petro Poroshenko, a multimillionaire-politician Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko’s protégé – Volodymyr Groysman. Ukraine returned to the model of government that existed under President Viktor Yushchenko, who had brought Ukraine to the state of chaos: in politics, economy, and society.

4.4.4 Corruption and journalists In the states of Western civilisation in addition to the three major independent branches of government: legislative, judicial, and executive, there is the fourth power – the independent media. We considered how Ukrainian rulers were able to combine the three branches of government on one basis, that of corruption. Having headed corruption branch, Ukrainian presidents and their inner circle concentrated in their administration strands of the legislative, executive, and judicial power. Partly they were able to do it and with the media. For example, Ukraine’s largest media holding StarLightMedia belonged to Kuchma’s son-in-law – Viktor Pinchuk. The holding includes six TV channels: STB, ICTV, Novy Kanal, M1, M2, and OTV, the newspaper “Fakty”, “InvestGazeta”, the MMR and the group “Tawr Media”, which manages six national radio stations: “Russian radio. Ukraine”, “Hit FM”, Kiss FM, Radio Rocks, “Melody” and “Relax”. It is for this reason that the tragic role of Kuchma in the history of independent Ukraine not only suppressed, but in every

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way “is being cleaned”, allowing Kuchma to live out his old age not in prison (at least for the organisation, or participation in the organisation, of the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze), and live in wellbeing and with family warmth. The second place in the information space of Ukraine took the media holding of Boris Lozhkyn UMH Group, who in 2013 sold to young oligarch Sergei Kurchenko, from Yanukovych’s inner circle. Lozhkyn organised it, together with Poroshenko. Currently Lozhkyn, despite the accusations of tax evasion in the sale of the media holding, headed the Presidential Administration under Poroshenko. UMH Group owns the newspaper “Argumenty i Fakty in Ukraine”, “Komsomolskaya Pravda in Ukraine”, the weekly “Korrespondent”, “Focus”, “Telenedelya”, as well as the magazines “Forbes” and “Vogue”, to their publications the company has a license. In addition, the media holding includes “Autoradio”, “Nashe Radio”, and “Retro FM”, information Internet resources Korrespondent.net, Football.ua, Vgorode.ua, Internet portals I.ua, and Bigmir.net. The third place took Dmitry Firtash’s media holding Inter Media Group, combining TV channels “Inter”, “HTH”, “Enter-Film”, “Piksel”, “K1”, “K2”, “Mega”, and “MTV Ukraine”. The fourth place, the company 1+1 media, the owner of which is Igor Kolomoisky. Holding controls the channels “1+1”, “2+2”, “TET”, “Plusplus” and “UNIAN-TV”, as well as the news agency “UNIAN”, Internetprojects “Glavred” and “Telekritika”. Fifth place was taken by the media holding, Media Group Ukraine, owned by Ukrainian businessperson Rinat Akhmetov. The holding company includes the TV channels “Ukraine”, “Football”, a regional TV channel “Donbas”, the newspaper “Today”, as well as Internet resources, in particular video service “Oll.tv”. Thus, approximately 95 per cent of Ukraine’s information space is concentrated in the hands of the odious Ukrainian oligarchs who manipulate public opinion at their sole discretion. It turns out that there is nobody to fight against corruption in Ukraine: legislative, executive, judiciary, and the media, concentrated in the hands of corrupt officials.

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4.5 What to do? In the book, we have tried to show how corruption arose in Ukraine, how it hit the ruling class (Ukrainian nomenclatura), and how it spread to the masses, and what Ukraine lost because of political corruption. By 2014, due to political corruption, Ukraine had not only ceased to exist as an independent locus of civilisation, but on its territory, the interests of the Russian Federation and Western civilisation passed into an acute phase of the armed conflict. However, even the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of the Crimea and the war in the Donbas did not change the mentality of corrupt politicians, bureaucrats, judges, and individual journalists. Corruption in Ukraine wove four independent branches of the government into a single force that continues to ravage the rich potential of the state and nation. The question arises: “What to do?” In 2013, the author initiated the project “Heroes of Ukraine speak about education”. In his understanding, Heroes of Ukraine, as Cavalier of the Legion of Honour or Cavalier of the Garter – the elite of the nation, its title, face. The project was widely covered in the press; a book was published [Bazaluk, 2014]. However, after five interviews the author left the project. I really went to pieces. To choose the first five Heroes of Ukraine (interviews planned with 120 Heroes of Ukraine), one of the Heroes of Ukraine received the highest award for being the mistress of the president, and the other – as the title of a political project of Medvedchuk the third considered award as a source of stable income. It turned out for the title of Hero of Ukraine they get the equivalent of $2,000 of extra payment each month, and the title provides more than 25 different benefits. In Ukraine, where the minimum wage is $50, the Star of the Hero of Ukraine guaranteed a comfortable life. In February of 2014 in the midst of the Maidan, the author, together with students of political science, created the Internet project “Ukrainian Politician” (http://www.ukrpolitic.com/). As the basis, the most authoritative Ukrainian Internet Project was taken, and Georgy Gongadze founded “Ukrainian Truth” in 2000. The project was based on analyst reports and not news ones – every day, we posted five articles (mostly about politics, or political and economic corruption). During two years, about 9,000 analytical articles were published. The author and his students of political science wrote some of them, but the main part was taken from

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other publications. During the two years of daily work, our opinion of the level of Ukrainian analytical journalism was formed completely. According to the subjective assessment of the author, in Ukraine there are four major independent publications that offer qualitative daily policy analysis and analyst concerning the state of corruption in Ukraine: “Ukrainian Truth”, “Ukrinform”, “Cenzor.Net” and “Glavcom”. Sometimes a qualitative analysis on the above themes can be found in such publications as “Gordon”, “Glavred”, “New Time”, and “Hvilya”. Qualitative texts of policy analysis and corruption in Ukraine wrote: Serhiy Leshchenko, Mustafa Nayyem, Sevgil Musayeva-Borovik, Yury Butusov, Eugene Kuzmenko, Paul Vuets, Fedor Orischuk, Katerina Peszko, Alexander Michelson, Yuri Sandul, Dmitry Tymchuk, Andrew Samofalov, and some other journalists. Is it a lot or a little for the 45, 000, 000 state? It is a little. Nevertheless, these publications and those journalists, holding perhaps no more than 1–2 per cent of information space of Ukraine, were able to fight, first, against political corruption in Ukraine, put on display the mentality of the ruling “elite” in all its ugliness, corruption, indifference to the interests of the nation and the state. Georgy Gongadze paid with his life for it. Therefore, the question “What to do, to defeat corruption in Ukraine?” it seems to me that you need to: 1. Start with yourself. One in the Field Is a Warrior. The above-mentioned journalists and some other social activists and organisations that at the time of mutual responsibility of corruption in Ukraine alone came to defend the future of Ukraine proved this. In addition, I am talking not only about taking bribes. I think this is not enough. Civic stand – prevent bribery in the environment. Visiting the universities of Western Europe and the United States, I was struck by the actions of students who themselves fight against plagiarism without any help from lecturers. Corruption in Ukraine can be defeated if the Ukrainians not only cease taking bribes themselves, but bribery will consider as mauvais ton and will be condemned by society. 2. Do not keep quiet. Corruption, like money, loves peace and silence. When a problem is brought up for discussion, when the facts are revealed and new corruption offences – unified whole field is formed integrally, which outlines solutions. The more facts and evidence, the harder life is for corruptionists. The Western civilisation values not money, but reputation. The task of civil society is to achieve that the Ukrainian government consists of officials with the maximum clean reputation.

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Reputation is being won over the years, so it is important to fix corrupt practices and the names of the officials to judge their reputation over the years of their career. 3. Unite. In the book, we showed how much Ukraine and the Ukrainian people paid for freedom, independence, and European standards of living due to the corrupt mentality of the Ukrainian rulers. Corruption continues to thrive in Ukraine, despite the bloodshed on Independence Square and the war in the Donbas. The strength of a nation in unity. We need to unite our strengths in various community organisations, and together, in an organised way to control the nomenclatura that is entrenched in the Administration of the President, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Supreme Court of Ukraine. The Ukrainians have the experience to be united, but this should not be in bursts, periods of extremes and desperation. Control and pressure on the authorities of public organisations is the only force that is able to force officials to build a life not for themselves, as a privileged caste (“elite”), and for society, for the nation. A non-governmental association, foundations, social organisations is the foundation of civil society, its backbone. 4. Learn. During the period of independence of Ukraine, the quality of secondary, secondary technical, and higher education significantly decreased. The Ukrainians are proud that according to the number of issued diplomas of higher education, Ukraine takes a place in Europe. However, is the matter in the numbers? During Kuchma’s presidency, Ukraine destroyed the Soviet model of education, and even then, it did not find time to build its own more efficient and self-sufficient form. Under Yushchenko, the attempt to impose on the Ukrainian mentality, European standards of training ended ingloriously. Someone earned millions of budget funds and European grants, but what level of education and training is low in recent generations of the Ukrainians, nobody worries. One feels awkward when students – heroes of the Maidan, perhaps the bright future of our society - in the course of communication with peers from Europe show their gaps in the basic knowledge of their profession and are not ready to work in a rhythm habitual for Western students. It often grates on my ear when I hear such wild, simplified arguments of thinking, which correspond to the primary school level, but not to graduate students. Learn – it means having an opportunity to compare, and only in comparison, we can clearly understand where we will be better: in the western civilisation, or in “brotherhood” with the Russian Federation, with or without corruption.

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5. Do not believe the authorities. Under Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk, through the government-controlled media holdings, a false stereotype began to be imposed on the Ukrainians: “The worse to Russia, the better to Ukraine”. Thus, with this post-colonial syndrome, the current Ukrainian rulers are trying to divert the Ukrainians’ attention from their corruption, incompetence, and irresponsibility, and thanks to that, they have turned Ukraine into an even poorer state than under dictator Yanukovych. About the post-colonial syndrome, Mykola Riabchuk wrote well [Riabchuk, 2011]. About the harmful consequences for Ukraine of extreme “Westernism” or “Easternism”, especially in terms of its geographical location, in the early 20th century, a reputable Ukrainian politician and historian Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi warned. Based on the experience of the lost Ukrainian national liberation movement (1917 and 1921) and his education, he argued that at times of harmony in relations between the West and the East, the flourishing of an independent Ukrainian nation occurred [Lypyns’kyi, 1933: 64]. Over the past two decades, Ukraine got a third chance, albeit under the tutelage of Western civilisation, to build civil society and a democratic model of the government. How to look our children straight in the eyes, if and at this time because of the mentality of our rulers and our own indifference we will remain a faceless workforce serving the interests of politicians, bureaucrats, judges, and oligarchs?

4.6 The image of an ideal Ukrainian politician The coming to power of Poroshenko and his inner circle did not change the membership of the Ukrainian ruling “elite”. After the Revolution of Dignity, those who were robbing Ukraine under Yushchenko seized the power systematically. Perhaps if it were not a strategic error by Putin, Ukraine would have once again returned to the sphere of Russian interests, because the mentality of Poroshenko is very close to the mentality of the Russian leadership. In any case, none of the high-ranking politicians of Western civilisation appointed their relatives, godparents, childhood friends, and business partners to the leading positions in the state; none of them placed a son with an economic education in the highest legislative body of the country; none of them allowed others to enrich themselves in time of war and allowed the Vinnytsia region (in which the main business interests of Poroshenko concentrate) receive subsidies from the state budget more than in Kharkiv, Sumy, and other borders with the stateaggressor areas. This is only possible in a state that on management style

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remotely resembled the facade democracy in Cambodia. It is a pity, but the fact is enough to make comparisons [Karbaum, 2011]. Why can one not win against corruption in Ukraine? 1. Ukraine is ruled not by politicians, but by businesspersons, whose business interests are above the interests of their own Ukrainians and Ukraine. If Poroshenko has not yet closed his business in Russia, how can he abandon preferences for his business in Ukraine itself? The self-interest and ambition of Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk are so obvious that the interest of Ukraine and the Ukrainians in their perception of the world is simply nowhere to be seen. The Ukrainian ruling “elite” lives in their reality, far from the reality in which the Ukrainian nation survives. 2. Ukraine has not built a democratic model of state power. A return of Constitution of Ukraine sample of December 2004 supposes an independent power triumvirate President, Prime Minister, and Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. However, in this triumvirate PoroshenkoGroysman it is one person (Volodymyr Groysman is a native of Vinnitsa, from the Poroshenko Clan), and the mentality of Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk is similar. It is beneficial for both uncertainty and irresponsibility of the government, which is reminiscent of the chaos of the government under Yushchenko. Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk consider it important to preserve corrupt courts and the prosecutor’s office, to pursue their own enrichment and presence in the government. 3. Because there are no social elevators and fair competition in the higher state bodies of the state. As long as in the Administration of the President, the Verkhovna Rada, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which have the exclusive right to determine domestic and foreign policy of the state, are incompetent, irresponsible, and indifferent to the interests of the state people and people are under the patronage, corruption in Ukraine will never be defeated. 4. Due to the weakness and disorganisation of non-governmental organisations. Changes are taking place, in Ukraine the civil society is formed, but, unfortunately, the degree of influence of non-governmental organisations on the politicians and on Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy remains low.

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5. Because of the imperfections of the legal framework, this still allows corrupt officials to escape punishment. 6. Due to the lack of transparency in government activity, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Administration of the President, and the courts. All the activities of officials should be carried out in an open manner, under the careful supervision of public organisations. Based on the foregoing, we can outline the image of the “ideal” Ukrainian politician, who will be able to consolidate the results of the Revolution of Dignity, and promote the further development of the Ukrainian state on the foundations of Western civilisation. An ideal Ukrainian politician is: – A politician without his own business: a journalist, social activist, lawyer, etc. The difference between a politician and a businessperson is huge: a politician cares about the people and the state, a businessperson cares about the state of his business. Separation of politics and business, this is one of the main conditions for the ideal politician and internal Ukrainian policy in general. – A man with a highly developed legal culture. Unfortunately, such people in Ukraine are few, because during 25 years of independence in Ukraine, the Ukrainians were brought up under legal nihilism. Ukrainian politicians should by their example show obedience to the law and legal culture. Any violation of the laws of Ukraine (or even attempt of violations) should cost a politician his career. The basic principle of a politician is start with yourself. If Ukrainian politicians will learn to respect the laws themselves, the Ukrainian people will follow an example. – Openness in front of the people. A politician is a servant of society. Openness of a politician in front of the society is a guarantee of his honesty and integrity. All of the modern Ukrainian politicians seek to “clean” their biography: something to conceal, hide, and be insincere, because each of them grew up in the period of lawlessness. However, the fact of concealment of the offense emphasises insincerity of the politician. The politician prone to deception is the return to the Kuchma and Yanukovych era. Therefore, society needs to identify deception and insincerity in the words and actions of Ukrainian politicians and get rid of them for the last time.

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– Higher education and professionalism. In Ukrainian politics there are enough people with the fake (purchased) diplomas of higher education, or academic degrees. Those politicians should be identified, because the purchased education indicates a low culture and philistinism of a politician. A politician is a profession, so a basic knowledge of the profession, current research in political science, geopolitics, and geophilosophy is a necessary requirement for Ukrainian politician. The attitude to his profession reveals the seriousness of the intentions of a person to realise himself in this sphere of activity; – Matching words and deeds. Ukrainian politicians promise a lot, but do little. Politicians who build their careers on a beautiful speech and the ability to present information must be replaced by politicians, maybe not as skilled in speech (although the ability to convince is very important for a politician!), but by those who perform their promises and items of their election programs. The Ukrainians have to learn to ask about the promises; politicians should constantly be rotated, replacing a politician-deceiver and populist by politicians who keep their word. – Sociability. A politician is a person who is constantly aimed at interpersonal relationships. Through him, the connection between people and the authorities is carried out. It is therefore very important that a politician could listen to people and convey his sentiments to the government, as well as carry out the reverse communication: to explain the logic of the behaviour of the people to those in power. The authority as a regulator of the internal and external development of the society should take into account the mood of society and react to them. A politician in this chain is a communicator between the government and the people. High standards of the ideal Ukrainian politician opens the way to representatives of the Ukrainian Diaspora, which thanks to their “fresh blood” and behaviour have to compete with homegrown millionaires, politicians of the Kuchma era, gradually displacing the last representatives of power. If in Great Britain Board of Treasury II was headed by a Canadian, why in Ukraine, are representatives of Western civilisation not able to realise their ambitions? Talks about “Varangians” who do not understand Ukrainian reality are empty excuses of corruptionists from the private club of the Ukrainian “elite”.

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4.7 Ukrainian national idea Methodology of geophilosophy allows us to ignore the details and to highlight in the history of Ukrainian statehood the basis for determining the destiny of the Ukrainian people, which should ideally strengthen the surface of the Ukrainian locus of civilisation. Ever since the 13th century, the course of development of the Eurasian civilisation occurred so that the territory of Ukraine was divided by the borderline between the two world cultures: Asian, which later took the form of the Byzantine-Asian, and European culture (enlarged to the scale of Western civilisation). Ukraine has become a suburb of both major loci of civilisation. As historian Natalia Yakovenko suggested, perhaps it was from here that its name originated [Yakovenko, 2012]. The history of Ukrainian statehood is a history of the influence of three cultures: Southeastern Ukraine was formed under the dominant influence of the Byzantine-Asian culture (which is represented by its eastern neighbour – the Russian Federation); Western Ukraine was formed under the influence of European values of culture (mainly through the influences of Poland, Romania, and Hungary); but Central Ukraine, with its capital in Kyiv, preserved an original culture of the Old Rus state and cultural markers that identify Ukraine as a self-sufficient locus of civilisation. Perhaps for this reason, strangers both perceive Ukraine and Ukrainians in Russian and European history. However, it cannot be otherwise, because Ukraine and the Ukrainians are a borderland between two cultures with its original core! During eight centuries (with some interruptions) on the territory of Ukraine the watershed of two world cultures took place, and the Ukrainians as a nation absorbed the elements of the Byzantine-Asian and European cultures in its ancient Rus essence. Therefore, the Ukrainians cannot be identified either as Russians or as Europeans. The Ukrainians have absorbed elements of both cultures, but the roots have remained of Rusyns – ethnos, that coming out of the Rus state with its capital in Kyiv. The main marker of identification of the Ukrainian nation is a thousand-year culture of an ancient nation with elements of assimilation of the Byzantine-Asian and European cultures. It is from here that the Ukrainian national idea originates: Ukraine – Keeper, and the Ukrainians – the guardians of peace and a thousand-year old culture in the western part of the Eurasian continent. The tranquility between two world cultures depends on the situation in Ukraine.

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It is worth noting that not only can Ukraine and the Ukrainians call themselves the guardians of peace in the western part of the Eurasian continent. If we look at figure 2, as well as it is in geophilosophy of Vadim Tsymbursky [Tsymbursky, 1999], that is popular in Putin’s entourage, there are limitrophe states: Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Lithuania. In different periods of history, it is through the territories of these countries that ran and runs the boundary between the two major loci of civilisation. Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the Ukrainians inhabiting the area are worthy of respect in the history of the Byzantine-Asian and European culture, at least for the fact that the whole history of Ukrainian statehood and culture of the Ukrainian nation was formed on the boundary of confrontation: in wars, violence, slavery, genocide, and humiliations. Each of the two opposing cultures (civilisations) tried to reverse the Ukrainians under it, to burn the roots of our ancestors in the memory. However, because of all these external violent refractions, a nation is formed – guardians, psychological type of Cossack, who in war – the best warrior, in the world – an educated, creative, and hard-working person. National idea: Ukraine – Keeper, the Ukrainians – the guardians of peace and a thousand years culture in the western part of the Eurasian continent, it not only identifies the Ukrainian nation, rallies, gives the role, allowing taking its rightful place among the great nations and cultures of the world, but also imposes a high responsibility. It is due to the national idea – the destination of the Ukrainian nation, follows its main cultural markers: 1. Ukrainian – a warrior-guardian. Ukraine, because of its geophilosophy, must have an efficient, well-equipped army. The stronger the Ukrainian army is, the higher it is fighting spirit and training, the safer it will be on the border between two cultures. Ukraine is a fortress within which the outposts of both cultures are placed. A Ukrainian is, primarily, a warrior: intelligent, strong, agile, and skillful. Defending the independence of the state, he guards the borders of the Byzantine-Asian and European cultures. 2. A Ukrainian is a highly educated person; Ukraine is innovation and high technology. Highly educated Ukrainians make difficulties for manipulation of consciousness, reduce the effectiveness of information warfare (propaganda), expand the scope of creative self-realisation, and provide the innovation and introduction of new technologies. Borderland of the Ukrainian nation opens up the opportunity to take the best from

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each culture and the best use when it benefits to a thousand-year-old culture and rise in living standards. There is no shame in learning; we should learn from each other’s experiences. In today’s world high technologies are ruling, so the nation that is developing on the border of two world cultures should differ by innovation, creativity, and technological effectiveness of its resources. A striking example of the development is Finland, the same limitrophe state, like Ukraine. High education will reduce the influence of propaganda, expand the boundaries of perception of the world, and allow it to make independent verified decisions, particularly concerning the destiny of the nation and the state. 3. Ukraine is a democratic state, and the Ukrainians are people with a highly developed legal culture. Ukraine is obliged to build a democratic model of state power – the most efficient governance model in the worldwide civilisation. Power, money, and permissiveness turn a Democrat-Ukrainian into a hetman, an ataman, or a master easily. Therefore, the Ukrainians need a democratic model of governance and legal culture to ensure fair competition in the government and popular control of power. All are equal before the law of Ukraine: from a citizen to the President. Only in this way can we avoid a repetition of the Kravchuk, Kuchma, Yushchenko, and Yanukovych era.... 4. A Ukrainian is a free and responsible citizen with an active lifestyle. The psychological type of a Cossack and mentality of a warrior – this is inner freedom, which is controlled and regulated, not temporary subjective value orientations of the next leader or dictator, and the laws of Ukraine are the same for all. Inner freedom is a high civic activity, awareness of the importance of strengthening social institutions, and development of spheres of activity. It is the responsibility in front of generations of ancestors and the future of the nation. Borderland peculiarity is constant vigilance, the introduction of better and advanced technologies, a willingness to defend its independence and parity of cultures. Enervation at the border, the uncertainty of domestic and foreign policy, and corruption are an occasion for aggression, loss of independence and bonded labour on the “elite”: the oligarchs, rulers, nomenclatura, etc. 5. A Ukrainian is a hospitable host, and Ukraine is an open country. When we speak about Ukraine as a fortress, we do not mean in any way the isolation of Ukraine or equidistance from one (or both) cultures. For Ukraine, due to the peculiarities of its geographical location and history, this is equivalent to a loss of independence or part of the territories.

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Ukraine will not be able to resist itself to one or even two world cultures. When we speak about Ukraine as a fortress, on the contrary, we assume its openness to the penetration of both cultures, its accessibility, and nonresistance. Let the Russians or Europeans come to the fortress, create a sphere of their influence. Let Byzantine-Asian and European cultures penetrate not only to Ukraine, but also interpenetrate each other; it is their choice, that is why they are the world cultures. However, it is important that these penetrations and influences remained for Ukraine on the surface, supplementing, being for the benefit of developing Ukrainian statehood. It is important that the cultural heritage of Kievan Rus, identifying the depth of the roots of Ukrainian culture, remained paramount for the Ukrainians, dominant and preponderant in importance over any other culture. The Old Rus culture of Ukraine is a fundamental and defining culture and one for which values for Ukrainians should be stable, sacred, and cult. It is thanks to them that guests will know Ukraine and the Ukrainians and identify them. For its own safety, Ukraine should gain the respect of its cultural heritage and set out clear markers of cultural identity. Ukraine is a fortress, and the Ukrainians are the guardians-warriors of peace, and a thousand years old culture – this is the core of the Ukrainian nation, the ice on the surface of which the waves of two world civilisations are taking place, but only strengthen it, and without penetrating into the deep structures. Independent Ukraine is a borderland between the Russian Federation and the European Union at the same time. It is for this reason that Ukraine cannot be pro-Russian or pro-European. Ukraine is obliged to be itself – Keeper, the guardian of peace and of its own culture in the western part of the Eurasian continent. An illustrative example for Ukraine should be the experience of Finland, whose people have been able to find their own identity and to build a harmonious relationship with the ambitious Russian Federation.

CONCLUSION

In the monograph “Corruption in Ukraine: Rulers’ Mentality and the Destiny of the Nation, Geophilosophy of Ukraine”, the author used a methodology of geophilosophy to show how over 25 years of Ukrainian independence, the former Soviet nomenclatura, which became the rulers of the Ukrainian people and raised a new generation of Ukrainian nomenclatura in their image, not only turned a rich socialist republic into an impoverished, corrupt, authoritarian-oligarchic state, but also deprived Ukraine of its independence. Based on open source information, the author created five psychological portraits of the Ukrainian presidents and a few politicians, who since 1990 and up to the present (January 2016) merged the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, as well as some media, into a single force. United by common corruption interests, this force took the main potential of the state and the people into the pockets of wellestablished groups of ruling “elite”, and prevented Ukraine from establishing an independent, highly developed, democratic, and legal state. Irremovability of the Ukrainian “elite”, its venality, indifference to the interests of their own state and people, incompetence, and irresponsibility provoked a clash of two major loci of civilisation on the territory of Ukraine, which led to the annexation of the Crimea, to separatism in Southeast Ukraine, and to war in the Donbas. Based on the analysis the author has come to the following conclusions: 1. The geophilosophy of Ukraine represents Ukraine as a limitrophe state, the boundary line of the confrontation between two major loci of civilisation runs through its territory: the Byzantine-Asian culture of the Russian federation and the European culture, enlarged to the scale of Western civilisation. 2. Thanks to depth and strength of its roots (its history), Ukraine has the potential to be a separate locus of civilisation, such as Poland, Romania, and other independent limitrophe states of Eastern Europe. This is evidenced by the repeated manifestations of an independent locus of civilisation on this territory over the last millennium. For example, the emergence and continued existence of the Galicia-Volyn principality (the

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second third of the 12th century ௅ the 40s of the 14th century), the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1340 ௅ the last quarter of the 15th century) and others. 3. The last manifestation of an independent locus of the Ukrainian civilisation occurred in 1990 and ended in 2002, at that period Yanukovych was appointed to the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine, he set the stage for Ukraine's drift back into the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation. 4. The methodology of geophilosophy and the problem of corruption in the majority of cases are not compatible because the scale of the study in geophilosophy far exceeds the importance of the problem of corruption. However, in the case of Ukraine this is another matter. Corruption in Ukraine has entered the state level and united, as a rule, independent branches of government: legislative, executive, judiciary, and the media. Corruption has swept not only through the ruling class, but also through the whole society. It exerted influence not only on the geophilosophy of Ukraine, but also on the relationship between the two major loci of civilisation. It is this reason and disparate corruption scale that allowed us to use the methodology of geophilosophy not only to explain the logic of the events taking place in Ukraine, but also in part to give the recommendations concerning stabilisation of the situation in the region. 5. Using the methodology of Ukraine, the author discovered the following: a) After the collapse of the USSR, for the second time during the 20th century Ukraine became an independent locus of civilisation. b) Instead of strengthening independence and self-sufficiency of the newly formed locus of the Ukrainian civilisation and consolidating the Ukrainians around the Ukrainian national idea, the main markers of cultural identity, the ruling Ukrainian “elite” headed by President of Ukraine Kravchuk, began to build an authoritarian-oligarchic, corrupt state. An analysis of Kravchuk’s mentality told us the root cause of what happened – almost all Ukrainian new ruling “elite” were the old Soviet nomenclatura who after the collapse of the USSR retained control over the levers of power in independent Ukraine. c) Under Kravchuk, because of outright stealing of the state by Ukrainian new ruling “elite”, the two largest financial and industrial criminal clans – Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk – formed.

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d) In 1994, in the early presidential elections, thanks to the joint efforts of the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk clans, a representative of the Dnepropetrovsk clan, Leonid Kuchma, came to power. e) During the period 1994–1996 Kuchma, with the help of Pavel Lazarenko and high profile unsolved murders, placed the Donetsk clan under his control. Upon agreement with Kuchma, Viktor Yanukovych and Rinat Akhmetov headed the Donetsk clan. f) During the period 1994–2004 Kuchma was building an authoritarianoligarchic vertical power in Ukraine. Moreover, as a tool he used corruption, through which the legislative, executive, and judicial power were fused in Ukraine. i) In 2002, fearing Yushchenko’s influence and millionaire-politicians who gathered around him, and were supported by Western civilisation, Kuchma returned Ukraine to the sphere of Russian interests, guided by purely personal interests. Ukraine ceased to exist as an independent locus of civilisation. j) From 2002 to 2004 (the last years of his presidential cadence) Kuchma authorised the massive looting of the largest state-owned assets. The three oligarchic clans: Kuchma-Pinchuk, Yanukovych-Akhmetov and Medvedchuk-Surkis got the most profitable state-owned assets for nothing. k) In 2004–2005, millionaire-politicians supported by Western civilisation, removed from the state budget, with the help of the deceived people, committed a coup d'etat in Ukraine. l) In 2005–2009 Ukraine undergoes redistribution of state financial flows, the emergence of new oligarchic clans: Firtash-Lyovochkin, TymoshenkoKolomoyskyi, Tymoshenko-Zhevago, Poroshenko-Hryhoryshyn, etc. The clans of Kuchma-Pinchuk and Yanukovych-Akhmetov retain their influence; the clan of Medvedchuk-Surkis lost their influence. m) About 2007 the politicians of Western civilisation ruled out Ukraine from their sphere of interests because of deep differences in the mentality of Ukrainian and foreign politicians. Ukrainian politicians were characterised by venality, indifference to the interests of the people and the state, incompetence, and irresponsibility. Ukraine, under the leadership of

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Tymoshenko, once again, of necessity, on the shameful and degrading conditions, was back in the sphere of interests of the Russian Federation. n) In the 2010 presidential elections, the emerging Ukrainian civil society showed their character and instead of brazenly imposing by politicians of East and West a candidacy of scandalous, odious Tymoshenko, chose their President – odious, but phlegmatic Yanukovych. o) The years 2010 and 2013. The choice turned out to be unsuccessful. Ukraine restored the authoritarian governance; Yanukovych’s incompetent policy actions led to the confrontation between the Western civilisation that resumed its interest to Ukraine (under the influence of limitrophe countries of Western Europe) and the Russian Federation. p) The year 2014. Putin’s strategic mistakes, as well as the patriotic mood caused by these mistakes, consolidated Ukrainian civil society, by expanding its percentage of Ukrainian people with all types of background. Under pressure from civil society activity, Ukraine began to enter into the sphere of interests of Western civilisation. The Revolution of Dignity and especially the annexation of the Crimea and the war in the Donbas became a taboo theme of “fraternity” between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. g) The years 2014 and 2015. Corruption in Ukraine became a new obstacle to Ukraine’s emerging civil society and democratic reforms in the country. The Ukrainian ruling “elite” of the Yushchenko era, having returned to power after the Revolution of Dignity, started routinely appointing their friends, relatives, and business partners to the top government posts and to steal, just as they used to do under Yushchenko. The probability of building a state according to international standards with such rulers equals zero.

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