Contested Homelands: Politics of Space and Identity 9789389812213, 9789389000894

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To

My family

Hilal, Sarmad, Maaz and Raheel

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List of Maps Map 1: Delhi and Around, 1893 Map 2: Division of Municipal Area into Intramural and Extramural Wards after 1884 Map 3: Demarcated Hindu-Dominated, Muslim-Dominated and Mixed Areas  Map 4: Muslim Camps, Muslim Zones and the Locations of Organised Communal Violence, 1948  Map 5: Zonal Division of the Walled City, 1962

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List of Figures Figure 1:

Figure 2: Figure 3: Figure 4: Figure 5: Figure 6: Figure 7:

Identification of Residential Space as Hindu, Muslim and Combined Areas for Police Arrangements during Bakra-Eid Celebration under CRS, 1946 108 Jama Masjid Camp, 1947–48 142 Purana Qila Muslim Refugee Camp, 1947–48 143 Humayun’s Tomb Refugee Camp, 1947–48, I 143 Humayun’s Tomb Refugee Camp, 1947–48, II 144 Demolition of Shops around Jama Masjid, 1975, I 225 Demolition of Shops around Jama Masjid, 1975, II 226

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List of Abbreviations ABPS

Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha

BGS

Bharat Gosevak Samaj

BJS

Bhartiya Jan Sangh

CAD (L)

Constituent Assembly Debates (Legislative)

CAD

Constituent Assembly Debates

DAA

Delhi Administration Act, 1956

DAG

Delhi-Ajmeri Gate Slum Clearance and Rehabilitation Scheme

DDA

Delhi Development Authority

DIT

Delhi Improvement Trust

DMC

Delhi Metropolitan Council

DMMA

Delhi Meat Merchant Association

DPSP

Directive Principles of State Policy

FFYP

First Five Year Plan

FRs

Fortnightly Reports

FRs

Fundamental Rights

GOI

Government of India

LSD

Lok Sabha Debates

MCD

Municipal Committee of Delhi before 1957 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi under the provision of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 xvii

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List of Abbreviations

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MCD

Municipal Corporation Debates

MCS

Municipal Corporation Secretariat

MHA

Ministry of Home Affairs

MPD

Master Plan of Delhi

NCR

National Capital Region

NDMC

New Delhi Municipal Committee before 1957 and New Delhi Municipal Corporation under the provisions of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957

PHC

Public Hearing Case

PMS

Prime Minister’s Secretariat. It was renamed as PMO— Prime Minister’s Office—after 1980

RSD

Rajya Sabha Debates

RSS

Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh

SCI

Shah Commission of Inquiry

SCI

Supreme Court of India (court cases)

SGMS

Sarvadaliya Goraksha Mahaabhiyan Samiti

TPO

Town Planning Organization

VHP

Vishva Hindu Parishad

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Acknowledgements This work on the communalisation of space is a reflection of my constant ideological and emotional tussle as a researcher as well as a Muslim myself. I would like to confess that I never wished to work on Muslim issues since I felt that I would be trapped into the established stereotyped notion of Muslim political identity. However, a wave of critical literature on Muslim areas after the publication of the Sachar Committee Report made me highly uncomfortable. Most of these works, in my opinion, typified the very term called ‘Muslim area’ by focusing on the ‘internal’ factors responsible for it being ‘Muslim’ and a ‘ghetto’. I found this kind of museumisation of a living community and, for that matter, its culture and its association with a living space problematic. Such rather sympathetic constructions of space–community relations re-establish a number of presumptions about Muslim area as being an ahistorical entity. It compelled me to question the very terminology that not only defines space with a communal character but also transforms it into an ever-contested category. This book is based on my PhD research. However, it has been revised extensively in the light of my continuous engagement with the theme of the book at large. I have looked at the debates over cow slaughter and its past in order to make a larger comment on communalisation of space. I believe that ideas are always collective in whatever form they are structured, and research is never completed without the support of a number of people. The first person I would like to thank is my PhD supervisor, Sekhar Bandyopadhyay. My discussions with him on the critical issues of this research have contributed to restructuring, articulating and presenting these ideas more profoundly. I am also grateful to Giacomo Lichtner, Malcolm McKinnon, Will Sweetman

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and Irfan Ahmed for their valuable comments and intellectual inputs on this research. In Wellington, I am grateful to Victoria University of Wellington for offering me the Royal Society of New Zealand Doctoral Scholarship 2013–2016 under the Marsden Grant; the faculty of humanities and social sciences; the staff of the university library, especially Justin Cargill for his help; and fellow researchers and friends including Sabbaq Ahmed, Benjamin Kingsbury, Sarah Pinto and Ambalika Guha for sharing their thoughts, world views and jokes. In Delhi, I would like to thank the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) and the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) for offering me the ICSSR Doctoral Fellowship and institutional support in the initial years of this study. I am also thankful to Shail Mayaram, Aditya Nigam, Sanjay Kumar, Priyadarshni Vijaisri, Ashis Nandy and Yogendra Yadav for their extended generosity and help. My special thanks to Awadhendra Sharan for his constant intellectual inputs. I am grateful to my teachers at the University of Delhi: Manoranjan Mohanty for teaching me the significance of what he calls framework, Ujjawal Kumar Singh, Pradeep Kumar Datta, Achin Vinayak, Neera Chandhoke, M.P. Singh, Sushila Kaushik, M.N. Thakur, M.P. Jain, Deepak Verma, Ashish Ghosh, Nivedita Menon, Anupama Roy and Manisha Priyam. Sharing ideas with Sudipta Kaviraj and Nilanjana Kaviraj have always been a rewarding and learning experience. Formal and informal discussions with Harsh Sethi (editor, Seminar), Shahid Siddiqui (ex-MP Rajya Sabha, editor, Urdu weekly Nai Duniya) John Dayal (human right activist), Mohammad Afzal (ex-MP Rajya Sabha and editor, Akhbar-e-Nau) and Rakesh Sinha (Rajya Sabha MP) were very enlightening. I thank them for sharing ideas and perspectives. I am equally thankful to the staff of National Archives of India, Central Secretariat Library, Nehru Memorial Museum Library, Delhi

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Acknowledgements

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Archives, Indian Institute of Public Administration Library, Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind Library, CSDS Library, Delhi Legislative Assembly Library and especially the Delhi Town Hall Library. I am really grateful to the librarian at the Delhi Town Hall, who went out of his way to help me find some important administrative reports and legal documents. Mr J.C. Khurana of Delhi Legislative Assembly Library facilitated access to the premises even during the winter sessions of the Assembly. I would have never been able to finish this work without the emotional and practical support and constant encouragement given to me by my late parents: Mr Mohammad Ahmed, an honest retired Superintendent of Customs, Indian Airline (now Air India), and Ms Khairunisa. They taught me the values of honesty and dedication. Sitting in Delhi, my brothers—Mazhar, Arif, Mushir and Arshad— and sisters-in-law—Zainab, Mehraj and Nida—helped in their own ways. Informal discussions about their experiences enriched my insights on the theme. Their jokes, puzzles and gossips made the pedantic exercise of writing a lot less taxing. I owe thanks to a number of friends and scholars in the field. Madhulika Banerjee, a friend who is like an elder sister, deserves a special mention as her encouragement gave me the strength to fight in difficult times. She has always been there for intellectual and emotional support with a smiling face. A number of friends—Bobby Luthra, Manish Jain, Ruma Dutt, Jinee Loknita, Sangay Mishra—also contributed in their own ways. My special thanks to Vikaram Nayak, a renounced painter, illustrator and cartoonist, for drawing important maps of Delhi for this study. Mohammad Ashiqeen helped in collecting material, photocopying and photographing at the Idgah slaughterhouse and Qasabpura. I would also like to thank the research participants who spent their valuable time sitting through long personal interviews. It was indeed difficult for them to recall and express their pain and trauma of Partition and Emergency. This research would never have acquired

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the shape it now has without their useful insights and constant support. The final revision of this book was completed in the city of Nantes, France. I am thankful to the Nantes Institute for Advanced Study Foundation, for the institutional support during my stay in France. A big thanks to Matthieu Forlodou, Anthony Clavier, Dimitri Bastard, Zaghira Danibert, Stéphanie Perrufel, François Vincent and Sandrine Pérou. Informal discussions with Mustafa Abdalla, Murat Akan, Marcelo Javier Borges, Wai Yip Ho, Roar Høstaker, Adrian Macey, Suleiman Mourad, Rochelle Pinto, Vijay Rao, Edna Politi, Rachel Riedl, Kanchana Ruwanpura, Isabelle Roy, Michelle Szkilnik, Afrah Shafiq, Ridham, Amrita Shah and Brij Tankha helped keeping the pace of my work during the difficult time of pandemic. I dedicate this book to my family: my life partner, Hilal Ahmed, and children, Sarmad, Maaz and Raheel. My children helped me in their special ways by recognising the importance of my working hours and being less demanding whenever it was possible, besides showering me with lots of cuddles and kisses. Sarmad helped me, especially, by not letting things go out of control in my absence. Hilal’s support cannot be expressed in a few words. He provided emotional support that I needed the most during this study. Despite all the disagreements we had, his intellectual support in terms of criticisms and queries, which he termed as ‘stupid questions’, helped me to think more critically.

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Map 1: Delhi and Around, 18931

1

Source: Hand drawn by Vikaram Nayak.

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Introduction All over the country wherever there is a masjid or a Muslim mohalla, the Muslims feel that it is their own independent territory … there are so many Muslim pockets, i.e., so many ‘miniature Pakistans’, where the general law of the land is to be enforced only with certain modifications … [it] implies a very dangerous theory fraught with possibilities of destruction of our national life altogether. Such ‘pockets’ have verily become centres of a widespread network of pro-Pakistani elements in this land.1 Muslims shouldn’t even be living in this country, they’re the ones who partitioned this country based on their population, so why do they need to live here? They were given separate territory, they should go to Pakistan or Bangladesh, what business do they have here.2 Provided that any person belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan, who entered into India on or before the 31st day of December, 2014 … shall not be treated as illegal migrant for the purposes of this Act.3

‘Can Muslim be an Indian?’ This question has been raised in a number of different ways in postcolonial India.4 However, anxieties of this kind have acquired a new political overtone in recent years. India is now being described as a ‘Hindu homeland’ where Muslims are asked to readjust themselves in order to be a part of a refined notion of the national mainstream.5 The debate on Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, the public discussions on the refugee status of Rohingya Muslims and Bangladeshi immigrants, and repeated statements that Muslims must go to Pakistan remind us that the discourse of homeland, which evolved in the 1940s and established competing notions of territorial nation as strong political perspectives in South Asia, still survives in the 21st-century

1

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Indian politics.6 Thus, the complexity associated with questions like ‘can Muslims be Indian?’ has its deep roots in the long historical process of the transformation of community–space relation and its political manifestations. Examining the process of identification, demarcation, organisation and/or reorganisation of space on religious lines, this book questions the dominant imagination of ‘Muslim areas’, an ambiguous yet politically vibrant category. The city of Shahjahanabad, which later became Old Delhi, is taken as a contested site to situate this politics of space. The book looks at the gradual transformation of caste/craft-based shared community space of the city known as mohallas into religion-based ‘segregated’ Hindu–Muslim pockets in colonial and postcolonial periods. As an interdisciplinary exercise, the book maps out two simultaneous trajectories of space: the changing sociological-demographic transformation of city–space at the ground level and the production of political vocabularies at the national level.7 The discourse of ‘homeland’ as a political metaphor was an outcome of an encounter between colonial techniques of management of Indian space as a ‘battleground of communities’ and the debates around representation on communal lines that concretised community–space relationship in strictly religious terms. Initially, it was the idea of Pakistan that evoked a communitarian notion of the nation with an imagination of ‘pure and ideal’ Muslim homeland. But, as the political negotiations for India’s independence materialised, the geopolitical entity called British India became a subject of multiple imaginations in the form of various ideas of homelands. These versions of homeland constituted parallel but contested visions of the nation(s). For Nehru and Indian National Congress, it was a composite and integrated cultural unit; for Jinnah and All-India Muslim League, it was Muslim India called Pakistan and for Savarkar and Hindu Mahasabha, it was non-divisible Hindu Rashtra. One may argue that Hindu political organisations like Maha Hindu Samiti (All-India Hindu Association) and Bharat Dharma

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Mahamandal initiated the discussion on ‘two nations’ in terms of defining Hindus and Muslims as ethnically, religiously and culturally distinct communities at the end of the 19th century in the Bengal Province. These exclusionary ideas were later strengthened and propagated by Hindu Mahasabha in the 1920s, much before the famous Pakistan Resolution of the Muslim League. An outline for a Hindu nation was certainly there in early Hindu nationalist imaginations, which envisaged India as a natural fatherland of Hindus and quite vehemently denied the claims of other religious communities on Indian space.8 However, it was the idea of Pakistan that legitimised the notion of homeland as an acceptable political idiom. In fact, the idea of Pakistan provided a new vocabulary to those political assertions by which the collective actions/reactions of different ethnic, religious and/or caste groups were articulated and played out from a rather totalist perspective in the 1940s.9 These various assertions of homelands were eventually reduced to the theory of ‘two nations’ or Hindu–Muslim communal antagonism. The protagonists of these conflicting notions of homelands made a clear distinction between ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’ to make a case for an ‘ideal’ and ‘pure’ nation(s). They envisaged a homeland as an unfinished project—something that had to be achieved. Although this distinction was very much linked to the transfer of power from the colonial state, the discourse of homeland offered templates for the communities to imagine their collective identities and relate them to their living spaces. The idea of Pakistan, for instance, evoked Muslim oneness as a community to clearly identify itself as belonging to the imagined, pure ‘land’. But, it had virtually no answer for the fate of Muslims of minority provinces. Similarly, the notion of Akhand Bharat, which asserted an ancient indivisible association of Hindus with the Indian space, did not correspond to the claims of non-Hindu religious minorities. As expected, the minorities, ‘minority provinces’ and/or ‘Muslim-dominated’ areas in Hindu-majority regions of British India turned out to be a matter

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of practical concern. Their existence had to be defined schematically and through further negotiations. These conflicting notions of homeland led to organised and violent claims and counterclaims on public as well as residential spaces in Delhi by political groups as Partition became a reality. The dominant meanings of Pakistan as a Muslim homeland prevailed over local meanings of space and eventually became a reference point for the debates on belongingness. In fact, the idea of Pakistan emerged as the Other, for making a case for an integrated (primarily Hindu!) Indian subcontinent described as Akhand Bharat. This anti-Pakistan rhetoric acquired an antiMuslim overtone by 1946 in Delhi. It generated new binaries like ‘nationalist Muslims’ versus ‘separatist Muslims’ and ‘Indian Muslims’ versus ‘Pakistani Muslims’, dividing Muslim identity into fragments, unlike other religious communities. These conflicting claims and realities of Partition eventually turned every Muslim household, gali, mohalla and ilaqa of Delhi into contested zones. The partition of South Asia between ‘Muslimdominated Pakistan’ and ‘Hindu-dominated India’ did not put these contradictory yet parallel ideas of homelands to rest. In fact, it reinforced religion as the prime marker of identity at every level of society, politics and administration evoking intense debates on citizenship, rights and belonging. The book tries to offer a historically embedded exploration of the discourse of homeland by investigating the manner in which such ideas evolved and concretised in the 1940s and translated in competitive politics in the 1952–1977 period. To that end, the book raises three interconnected questions: 1. How did the encounter between the colonial administration and Indian social realities produce the notion of communal space in Delhi? 2. How did the discourse of homeland evolve and consolidate in the 1940s?

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Introduction

3.

5

What were the manifestations of the discourse of homeland in postcolonial/post-Partition politics, especially in relation to Muslim localities of Delhi?

Delhi offers an interesting site to trace the long historical process of the production of communal space and its translation into national and local politics for two specific reasons. First, Delhi’s historical presence as the capital city makes it very relevant. The undisputed status of being the capital of various empires transforms it into a symbol of the ‘rise and fall’ of states and communities. This has been the reason why the urban decay of Shahjahanabad is always understood primarily as a symbol of Muslims’ inward-looking attitude and their political alienation, which in course of time was also interpreted as a refined form of Muslim separatism. Second, Delhi has also been the site where the claims and counterclaims of national politics are amalgamated and manifested through local politics.10 The book looks at four crucial urban developments in this regard. The transformation of the traditional caste- craft- and class-based mohallas of Shahjahanabad into spaces demarcated on religious lines, initially for religious processions and later for electoral representation, marks the first major urban process in colonial Delhi.11 The classification of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ as colonial administrative categories changed the spatial profile of galies, mohallas and ilaqe in the 1940s.12 In fact, every locality of the city turned out to be Hindu or Muslim around the time of Partition. The second major transformation began in 1947. The post-Partition migration of a large number of Hindu and Sikh refugees to Delhi and Muslims to Pakistan not only reduced the proportion of Muslim population but also led to the internal movement of those Muslims who decided to stay back in Delhi to Muslim-concentrated areas for the first time. The emergence of Muslim Refugee Camps, ‘Muslim Zone’ and the debates on Muslim evacuees’ properties intensified the communal demarcation of households, galies, mohallas and

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ilaqe again in the early 1950s.13 The planned urban development of Delhi underlines the third crucial transformation of the city in the 1960s. The evolution of urban educated middle-class upper-caste sensitivities around eating habits, cultural practices and hygiene aggravated the contest over Muslim localities. The cow protection movement and the legislative debates on meat control in the Delhi Metropolitan Council in the late 1960s became reference points to identify Muslim localities such as Qasabpura (inhabited mainly by Qureshi or Muslim butcher community) and areas around the Idgah slaughterhouse—Kishanganj, Bara Hindu Rao and Sadar Bazar—as unhygienic backward sites. And finally, the political configuration at local and national levels and the ‘spirit’ of National Regeneration Programme of the Congress government in the 1970s transformed the city space into clearance, redevelopment and resettlement zones. In this highly exhaustive urban, ‘secular’ and ‘neutral’ policy discourse, Muslim concentrated areas—Jama Masjid and Turkman Gate—of Old Delhi were redefined as pockets of ‘internal threat’.14 These ‘mini Pakistans’ had to be reorganised through clearance and population control during the time of national Emergency in 1976.15

I

Community–Space Relation:

A Conceptual Framework

There could be many ways to describe the relationship between ‘community’ and ‘space’. For instance, ‘community’ in the simplest sense of the term could be understood as a group of people defined in terms of imagined or physical boundaries.16 Thus, the collective existence of a community cannot be understood without referring to ‘space’ (either as a territory and/or belongingness). However, the discursive formation and the changing meanings of this relationship, in our case, should be located in the particular

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historical context of South Asia. This is precisely what Gyanendra Pandey highlights: Community in a pre-capitalist culture defines itself precisely by its territoriality and at the same time temporality. The onset of communalism, bringing with it profound changes in the material and spiritual resources available to the people, brought a redoubled emphasis on these defining characteristics. From the nation … to that of region … to the level of the tribal tract and the small town and village … the notion of rights over given territories was now obsessively brought forward.17

This formulation tells us, first, that communities always realise their community-hood in relation to a territory; and second, there is an important temporal dimension associated with it that makes it dynamic. Pandey argues that these defining characteristics acquire a kind of ‘fixed’ meaning when encountered with the ‘modern-rational’ frameworks brought by the colonial knowledge system. Sudipta Kaviraj argues that: [T]he principle of community construction in traditional India was different. These communities were ‘fuzzy’ in two senses: first, the complex sum of different identities, such as caste, village or region, was fuzzy. There wasn’t any overarching community identity available to them that could claim to represent all the layers of social bonds of an individual. Second, communities were not enumerated.18

According to Kaviraj, colonial modernity offered a new selfperception to Indian communities. The statistical counting and spatial mapping contributed significantly to this process. Consequently, it became possible to think of a homogeneous community, the exact numbers of its members, its common interests as well as geographical distribution, which led to the further concretisation of community and space relationships.

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This enumeration of communities and spatial mapping, Sekhar Bandyopadhyay informs us, produced a knowledge that was gradually established as rational ‘facts’ about, what he calls, ‘religiopolitical communities’.19 In this sense, the transmission of this knowledge through education further affected the self-perceptions of social groups, particularly at the local level. The English-educated elite started explaining the past, present and future of social groups in a political language of minority and majority. On the other hand, the social groups continued to practise their customs and rituals as per the historically evolved principles of community construction. Thus, the encounter between the actual social practices (and conflict) at the local level and the dominant majority-minority discourse at the national level affected the ways in which local communities imagined their belongingness. In other words, various ‘imagined communities’ based on regional, linguistic, caste and religious associations came into existence and local conflicts became universalised. Sandria Freitag’s work on the communalisation of local spaces in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is useful to understand the multiplicity of these political manifestations. She makes a crucial distinction between local conflicts that took place on religious processions and festivals in the 18th- and early 19th-century Banaras and the later more-organised ‘communal’ riots. She argues: Religion provided the vocabulary for expressing a variety of conflicts that arose around public arena activities. This vocabulary often indirectly suggested … the relationship of localized communities to each other and to the urban political economy as a whole. But in the late nineteenth century … the venue and symbolism remained unchanged, the meaning inferred by this symbolism came to be reinterpreted … a religious vocabulary became … a sustained way of imbuing collective expressions of localized, relational community with a more ideological and broad-based definition of the collectivity … and in the early twentieth century the use of religion to express community became linked to the overtly political activity by individuals whose concerted action had implications beyond the locality – or ‘communalism’.20

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This discussion elucidates how the colonial policies of categorisation, classification, enumeration and spatial mapping of the subject population transformed the fuzzy religious groups into enumerated communities, with specific claims on identity, history and territory. However, to understand these uniquely defined space and community configurations in terms of urban development, which is often considered as ‘neutral’ and ‘secular’, we need to pay close attention to the nature of the colonial state. Ranajit Guha defines the nature of the colonial state as ‘dominance without hegemony’. Guha explains that since the colonial state was based more on coercion than persuasion, ‘order’ was one of its idioms used by the British officials to establish this dominance over the colonial subjects. He says, ‘order was made [by colonial rulers] to preside over public health, sanitation and municipalisation in the large urban centres from the very beginning of the Raj.’21 This argument explains that urban development, which is considered to be a non-coercive function of the modern state, also became a contested terrain and defined the space and community relationship from above, demarcating the difference between colonial rulers and the colonial subjects. Partha Chatterjee defines this difference more explicitly and explains that the modern disciplinary institutions in India were guided by a ‘rule of colonial difference’. He suggests that in theory the colonial institutions were supposed to possess certain universally accepted characteristics. However, in practice, these laws were seen as external and superior to native cultures. Chatterjee argues that the impulse to modernise Indians was managed in such a manner that colonial difference could be maintained and reproduced.22 Following Chatterjee, it could be said that the colonial town planning was a latent manifestation of the ‘rule of colonial difference’ that took a new form in postcolonial Indian conditions. The notions of hygiene, congestion, sanitation and health got associated with cities like Old Delhi and produced various levels of spatial and social contestations

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especially when these notions were associated with the construction of social identities. These contestations are revealed in an interesting way in the developments of Muslim ilaqe in late colonial and postcolonial India. The present study employs the arguments of Guha and Chatterjee on urban policies in a slightly modified manner along with Freitag’s explanation of the production of communal space at local levels. Following Guha and Chatterjee, the study explores the ways in which urban space in colonial and postcolonial Delhi was sociologically and politically redefined. Employing Freitag’s formulation, we explore how the idea of communal space evolved and, as a result, a contested notion of Muslim space emerged in the post-Partition urban history of Delhi. It is important to emphasise that the community–space relationship, which was formed during the colonial period, could not be taken as a ‘yardstick’ to evaluate postcolonial experiences. The partition, subsequent communal violence and massive migration across the borders of the newly formed territorial nationstates changed the political context significantly. This led to a new kind of power relations and new forms of contestations. Sekhar Bandyopadhyay very rightly suggests: There was nothing ‘essential’ about community boundaries in colonial South Asia, as far as political action was concerned: these were constructed by the collective imagination influenced by specific historical contexts. So, as the context changed … the community boundaries also began to shift.23

This argument directs us to our second conceptual question, which is related to the historical continuities and discontinuities in terms of a transition from colonial to postcolonial Delhi.24 This question has two related, yet slightly different, aspects that need to be elaborated here. First, how do we look at the historical transition in a general sense, if we want to understand the specificities of postcolonial Indian

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politics? Second, how are we to understand events like the partition of 1947 that drastically reformulated the discourse of identities, citizenship and belongingness?25 The ‘aftermath of Partition’ thesis becomes relevant here, especially to explore the question of historical continuity and discontinuity.26 Bandyopadhyay points out that ‘historians … now look at how Partition impacted on post-colonial history and politics, how Partition memory defines community identities and affects inter community relations, thus emphasizing a historical continuity.’27 Further, as Tan and Kudaisya argue, ‘continuities must necessarily be kept as a backdrop against which the changes which Partition brought about need to be looked at.’28 This proposition provides a conceptual ground to examine how the idea of Pakistan continued to be re-invoked and reconfigured in postcolonial India. This brings us to one recurrent conceptual premise of the study: a focus on the idea of Pakistan rather than the actualities of the creation of Pakistan.29 Pakistan as an idea generated and somehow intensified a larger socio-political discourse that revolved around the space– community relationship in the late 1940s. This discourse had an intrinsic link with the colonial legal practices that defined communities in terms of their demography and political representation. The partition of British India turned the idea of Pakistan into a reality. It affected, though not directly, the Nehruvian project of nationbuilding and development in the 1950s. The changing dynamics of national politics and the overwhelming agenda of mainstreaming the minorities in postcolonial India gave new meanings to the language of rights, protest and development.30 It produced an intrinsically linked discourse of inclusion and exclusion. Although the Indian state, following an unwritten policy, tried to decolonise the process of the recognition of religious identity as an official category, the meaning of ‘minority’, which was constitutionalised, was to reinforce a division between Hindu/majority and non-Hindu/minority. This distinction between Hindu and non-Hindu or/and majority and

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minority not only re-established cleavages and differences internal to the categories but also imposed majority culture as a national framework or design.31 Urbanisation and development, in this sense, were projected as motivational forces to integrate the minority communities.32 It was expected that the communities would leave their religious, linguistic and caste associations behind and realise  themselves  as national subjects.33 In this context, along with other political and economic processes, the idea of Pakistan also emerged as an antagonistic, adverse and provocative force—the adversarial Other—opposed to a culturally integrated, territorially united and above all secular ‘nation’ of India. The ‘fear of disintegration’ and ‘communalism’ continued to be important political tropes invoked by the Nehruvian government in the 1950s and 1960s against supposed Muslim separatism. The two wars with Pakistan and the evident isolation and marginalisation of the Muslim minority in India further added to the anxieties about homogeneous nationhood in the later period. Partition, in this sense, is treated here as that formative and administrative process that continued to be a reference point for the invocation of the idea of Pakistan in postcolonial India. This study does not envisage the idea of Pakistan in isolation to this formative process and the subsequent violent experiences. Instead, an attempt is made to see the impacts of Partition on the construction of the images of Muslim localities. This book, it is important to clarify, does neither attempt to write a history of postcolonial Old Delhi nor does it narrate the story of Muslim localities of Shahjahanabad. Instead, it takes history as an important source to excavate the roots of a contemporary question i.e. why Muslim areas are imagined as a political and contested category? In this sense, it tries to trace the genealogy of the term ‘Muslim space’. Second, the book does not claim to make any comment on postcolonial Muslim politics or the formation of Muslim identity in terms of its caste, class, regional and linguistic variants. These aspects

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Introduction

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are discussed rather contextually. In fact, the book tries to develop an argument to scrutinise the given Muslim homogeneity and religiosity in relation to the multiple socio-cultural manifestations that take place in Muslim-dominated streets, mohallas or ilaqe of Delhi.

II

Structure of the Book

Chapter 1 of the book, which covers the 1857–1940 period, offers a brief narrative of the gradual transformation of caste- and craftbased shared community space into communally demarcated pockets. The chapter examines three important themes. First, it traces the nature of colonial administration, which evolved gradually and amalgamated with customary forms of space practices. Second, it investigates new forms of demonstrative and aggressive religious rituals evolved in this period that contributed to shaping the claims of Hindu and Muslim communities on public space. Finally, the chapter explores how the encounter between administrative mechanisms and socio-cultural processes translated into the debates on the right to communal representation. Identification of residential wards as Hindu–Muslim electoral constituencies after the introduction of local self-government in Delhi in the 1880s and separate electorates at all levels of representative bodies of the colonial government in 1935 are discussed to make sense of the nuances of communalisation and politicisation of religious identity in the colonial context. Chapter 2 discusses wider implications of administrative demarcation of space that eventually produced a discourse of homeland with multiple contested and competing imaginations of the geopolitical entity called India. The chapter discusses three parallel ideas of India: Nehru’s and Congress’ imagination of a united India, Jinnah’s and Muslim League’s definition of a Muslim India called Pakistan and Savarkar-led Hindu Mahasabha’s assertion for

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a Hindu Rashtra. These ideas of homeland, it is argued, responded to the colonial demarcation of Hindu, Muslim and mixed spaces in a significant way. The chapter explores the ideological premise of these imaginations of homeland and articulation of such ideas in the schematic imagination of the nation through idioms, symbols, dress codes and powerful political vocabulary. The manifestations of these ideas in Delhi is the second main concern of this chapter. It looks at the ways in which different political groups introduced the vocabulary of homeland to justify their acts and patterns of mobilisation in the galies and mohallas of Delhi. The unprecedented rise of a number of community defence groups like the Hindu Sena, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Rashtriya Sewa Samiti, Hindu Rashtra Dal, Lok Sena, Arya Veer Dal Muslim National Guard, Majlis-e-Ahrar-ul-Islam, Khaksars is discussed to show how ‘disciplining and militarising the youth’ actually became an important feature of local politics in Delhi in the mid-1940s. The chapter argues that the discourse of homeland reinforced the established demarcation of space into ‘Hindu-dominated’, ‘Muslimdominated’ and ‘mixed’ areas and converted every gali, mohalla, and ilaqa into contested zones of Hindus and Muslims. This chapter is based on archival sources such as the Fortnightly Reports published by the chief commissioner of Delhi, daily police reports, Intelligence Bureau reports, Annual Administration Report of Delhi (clubbed in the proceedings from the Home-Political Department of the Government of India available in the National Archives of India). Newspapers such as Hindustan Times (HT), The Times of India and Al-Jamiat, available in Nehru Memorial Museum Library and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema office library, are also consulted to understand different perspectives on the emergence of the discourse of homeland and local reception of political developments of the late 1930s and 1940s. Chapter 3 looks at the reformulation of the discourse of homeland in the aftermath of Partition. It maps out the ways in which Nehru’s

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idea of India was translated into a nation-building project in the 1950s with an overwhelming adherence to territorial unity. This proposal for a strong and united India also reshaped the imagination of Akhand Bharat. The Hindu Mahasabha, RSS and the newly established Bhartiya Jan Sangh came out with a revised version of Hindu Rashtra—the Indianisation. Interestingly, the idea of Pakistan continued to survive as the antagonistic Other in Indian politics, making the Indian Muslim identity as well as the spaces dominated by them in postcolonial India contested entities. The chapter looks at the multiple manifestations of these ideas in the administrative policy discourse that reproduced the vocabulary of homeland for managing and safeguarding minority religious communities. The evacuee property ordinances and acts, Nehru– Liaquat Agreement of 1950 regarding the rights and security of minorities, debates on the transfer of population and the management of Hindu/Sikh and Muslim refugee camps and Muslim zones in Delhi are discussed in detail to show how the realities of Partition and the discourse of homeland resulted in the making of exclusive Muslim and Hindu/Sikh localities for the first time in Delhi in the 1950s. This chapter also explores the controversies around the production, sale and consumption of bade ka gosht (meat of big animals, including cow) that re-established the notion of communal space in the 1960s. It discusses how an economic activity of slaughtering animals was turned into a ‘Muslim’ practice and placed in binary opposition to selective Brahmanical vegetarian sensitivities. The constitutional debates and legal developments on the issue of cow protection in India, campaigns for 1962 and 1967 Delhi Metropolitan Council elections, the Delhi Cow Protection Bill, 1967, and the Delhi Meat Control Bill, 1970, are discussed in the backdrop of the national politics of cow protection. Chapter 4 scrutinises the urbanisation ‘operation’ of the 1970s that focused on the reorganisation of city space and communities through redevelopment, resettlement and population control. This

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chapter examines various redevelopment schemes, local politics and administrative policies to see how statutory, metropolitan and municipal authorities zeroed in to end Muslim ‘segregation’ through forced clearance and sterilisation in Jama Masjid and Turkman Gate areas during the national Emergency (1975–1977). It shows how certain Muslim areas of Delhi were seen as locations of ‘internal threat’—as ‘mini Pakistans’ that need to be dismantled. This objectification of Muslim space in Delhi is seen in relation to the broader urban policy framework: Master Plan of Delhi 1962, Delhi Ajmeri Gate scheme, Jama Masjid clearance scheme, the Shahjahanabad redevelopment plan, the twenty-point programme of the Indira government and the five-point programme of Sanjay Gandhi. The politics of selective rehabilitation and clearance is also explored. The regularisation of colonies inhabited by the Hindu and Sikh victims of Partition and the rehabilitation of Muslim population evacuated from Shahjahanabad under a number of clearance schemes are discussed in detail to map out the relationship between urbanisation and electoral politics in Delhi. The chapter argues that the concerns for national security, especially during the Emergency, amalgamated with Jan Sangh’s Indianisation project to eventually lead to a highly authoritarian notion of nationalism. Apart from official documents and archival sources, this chapter relies heavily on oral history through interviews with those who were directly or indirectly affected by the clearance of shops and houses in Jama Masjid and Turkman Gate areas during the 1975–1977 national Emergency. Interviews with key figures of the Turkman Gate events— Jagmohan, DDA’s then vice-chairman; Chowdhary Shamsuddin, a local community leader and John Dayal, an activist-journalist—are treated as valuable sources for offering an informed narrative. The concluding chapter of the book summarises the main findings of this study and tries to offer a broad argument. It argues that the changing character of Muslim localities in Delhi is a product of historical processes. The discourse of homeland and the realities

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of Partition established the notion of ‘Muslim-dominated areas’ as ‘exclusionary’ and ‘contested’ zones. These localities turned out to be those pockets where the dominant ideas of the nation had to be engineered, materialised and practised.

Notes 1

2

3

4

5

M.S. Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts (Bangalore: Sahitya Sindhu Prakashan, 1969), 99. Available at: http://www.archivesofrss.org/ Encyc/2014/1/20/23_07_20_06_thoughts.pdf (accessed on 23 September 2015). Timesofindia.com, ‘Muslim Should Not Even Be Living in This Country, They Should Go to Pakistan or Bangladesh, Says BJP MP Vinay Katiyar’, The Times of India, 7 February 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes. com/india/muslims-should-not-even-be-living-in-this-countryshould-go-to-pakistan-bangladesh-says-bjp-mp-vinay-katiyar/ articleshow/62815998.cms (accessed on 23 September 2015). Ministry of Law and Justice, ‘The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1920’, The Gazette of India, New Delhi: The Controller of Publications, 12 December 2019, http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/214646. pdf (accessed on 23 September 2015). Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Can Muslim be an Indian?’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 4 (October 1999), 608–29; Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Partition and Independence in Delhi: 194–748’, Economic and Political Weekly 32, no. 36 (September 6–12 1997), 2261–72 and Ornit Shani, ‘Conceptions of Citizenship in India and the Muslim Question’, Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 1 (January 2010), 145–173. The concept of ‘homeland’ refers to a symbolic link between a group of people who claim to have a shared past and an intrinsic territorial association. Homeland, in this sense, is mythologized by political actors as the place where the ‘history of the nation’ was lived, the soil was cultivated to provide sustenance and where earlier generations were buried to rest. However, people do not live their lives with such grand ideas of homeland. They have their own meanings of such associations which are very much embedded in their everyday relations and practices. I have used the concept of homeland as a discourse to demonstrate how

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18

6

7

8

9

these territorial claims were articulated by different political actors in the 1940s. See: Kaiser, R., Homeland Making and the Territorialization of National Identity in Conversi D. ed. Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World (New York: Routledge, 2002), 229–47; Jones, R., Whose Homeland? Territoriality and Religious Nationalism in Pre-partition Bengal, South Asia Research, 26 (2006), 116–31. Williams, C. & A.D., Smith, The National Construction of Social Space. Progress in Human Geography, 7(4), (1983), 502–518. Christophe Jaffrelot and Sharik Laliwala, ‘The Segregated City’, The Indian Express, 26 May 2018, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/ columns/muslims-in-india-hindus-jains-gujarat-love-jihad-5191304/ (accessed on 23 September 2015). In his remarkable book The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre highlights the interrelationship between social space and mental space. He argues, ‘True space is a mental space whose dual function is to reduce “real” space to the abstract and to induce minimal differences. The dogmatism of this kind serves the most nefarious enterprises of economic and political power.’ I invoke Lefebvre’s argument here to examine the gradual transformation of social practices that led to the formation of different political discourses. Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 398. Shamsul Islam, Muslims Against Partition: Revisiting the Legacy of Allah Baksh and Other Patriotic Muslims (New Delhi: Pharos Media & Publishing, 2015). Shail Mayaram uses the term totalist to describe this phenomenon. For example, the vaguely enunciated demand for Dalitsthan in Central Provinces and Achchutsthan in Bakarganj district in east Bengal, Scheduled Castes Federation’s call for Rajasthan or a separate Rajbansi Kshatriya homeland for untouchables in northern Bengal, demand for an autonomous Pakhtunistan by the elected representatives (called Khudai Khidmatgars) of the North-West Frontier Province at the time of June 3 Plan and assertions of Khalistan, a Sikh nation on religious lines, found overt expressions in the late 1940s. Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Caste, Culture and Hegemony: Social Dominance in Colonial Bengal (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2004), 222; Mukulika Banerjee, ‘Partition

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10

11

12

13

19

and the North West Frontier: Memories of Some Khudai Khidmatgars’, in The Partition of Memories: The Afterlife of the Division of India, ed. Suvir Kaul (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001), 30–31 and Harnik Deol, Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of Punjab (New Delhi: Routledge, 2000), 1–10. There is a vast literature on historical characters and urbanisation in Delhi. See, Ajay K. Mehra, The Politics of Urban Development: A Study of Old Delhi (Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1990); Geert Lovink and Shuddhabrata Sengupta, Sarai Reader 2: City of Everyday Life (Delhi: Sarai: The New Media Initiative, 2002); Ravi Sundaram, Pirate Modernity: Delhi’s Media Urbanism (Oxford, New York: Routledge, 2010); Bharati Chaturvedi, Finding Delhi: Loss and Renewal in Megacity (New Delhi: Penguin, 2010) and Veronique Dupont, Emma Tarlo and Denis Vidal, Delhi: Urban Space and Human Destinies (Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2000). Narayani Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 1803–1930: Society, Government and Urban Growth (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981); Stephen P. Blake, Shahjahanabad: The Sovereign City in Mughal India, 1639–1739 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); R.E. Frykenberg, Delhi Through the Ages: Selected Essays in Urban History, Culture and Society (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986); Sandria B. Freitag, Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). Also see Report of the Delhi Municipal Organization Enquiry Committee, New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1948; Report of the Administration of Delhi Province 1928– 29’, Calcutta, GOI Central Publication Branch, 1930 and Fortnightly Reports of Delhi, 1940s onwards. Terms like gali, mohalla and ilaqa are used to define geographical stratification of space. Gali is a street, mohalla means neighbourhood and ilaqa refers to an area, locality, region or even country in Urdu. I use the word ilaqa (singular) and ilaqe (plural) to demonstrate widespread contestation of space in Old Delhi. There could be many Muslim/Hindu/Sikh mohallas in a Muslim ilaqa and vice-versa. Abdul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Hyderabad: Orient Longman Limited, 1988), 228–230. Lionel Carter, Partition Observed: British

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14

15

16 17 18

19 20 21

22 23 24

Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August–15 October 1947 (Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2011), 258–260; For debates on the sealing of Muslim properties in Muslim zones see Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Legislative) vol. II, no.1, 24 February 1949, 1023–1025. Nehru wrote to chief ministers highlighting the changing nature of majority communalism, which became a trend after Partition. See Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN vol. 26, 1954, 207–208. Public Proceeding Reports submitted to the Shah Commission of Inquiry (Government of India), Supreme Court-Shah Commission of Inquiry (SC-SCI) files; Era Sezhiyan, Shah Commission Report: Lost and Regained (Chennai: Azhi Publishers, 2010) and Delhi Metropolitan Council Debates (DMCD), Metropolitan Council Secretariat (MCS), Delhi. The national Emergency was imposed in India (chapter four) from 26 June 1975 to 21 March 1977. See John Dayal and Ajoy Bose, For Reasons of State: Delhi Under Emergency (Delhi: Ess Ess Publications, 1977) and Emma Tarlo, Narratives of the Emergency in Delhi: Unsettling Memories (California: University of California Press, 2003). Oxford English Dictionary, 167. Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), 110–111. Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, Hegemony’, in Politics in India, ed. Sudipta Kaviraj (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 147–148. Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India (Second edition) (New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2015), 263. Freitag, Collective Action and Community, 95–96. Ranajit Guha, Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 25–28. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 16–18. Bandyopadhyay, Caste, Culture and Hegemony, 191. The complexity of the administrative aspects of Partition itself and the multifarious formulations of identities are the main emphasis of recent writings on Partition. This historiography has explored the impact of

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Partition on the formation of religious, regional and caste identities in postcolonial India. The works of Gyanendra Pandey, Vazeera Fazila Zamindar, Haimanti Roy, Yasmin Khan and Neeti Nair are very relevant in this regard. Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Neeti Nair, Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). Vazeera Fazila Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (New Delhi: Penguin, 2008); Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (London: Yale University Press, 2007) and Haimanti Roy, Partitioned Lives: Migrants, Refugees, Citizens in India and Pakistan, 1947–1965 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2012). 25 On understanding the historical continuity in terms of postcolonial experiences, Leela Gandhi notes: ‘It is a disciplinary project devoted to the academic task of revisiting, remembering, and crucially, interrogating the colonial past.’ See Leela Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 14. The study, in this sense, uses historical continuity argument both in terms of colonial–postcolonial and Partition and its aftermath. 26 The aftermath thesis focuses on the immediate as well as long term impacts of Partition on the complex identity formations in South Asia. See Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2000). The aftermath thesis, it seems, is too overwhelmed with the immediate aftermath of Partition. It takes the events of the 1950s as ‘defining’ moments to underline the continuity of the ‘Partition’ process as well as to make a broad comment on subsequent political events and developments. Ted Svensson’s recent work criticises the continuity thesis and encourages looking at Partition as a rupture—a point of departure. He argues that both States actually moved into a political moment of decolonisation to construct new States and categories of citizens. Ted Svensson, The Production of Postcolonial India and Pakistan: Meanings of Partition (New York: Routledge, 2013). 27 Bandyopadhyay, From Plassey to Partition, 464.

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28 Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition, 28; Svensson, however, argues that ‘Independence and the Partition ought to be conceptualized in terms of “rupture” and not primarily as a case of continuity between the colonial and the postcolonial or as a ‘failed’ or insufficient reconstitution of sediment substructures of knowledge and power.’ He argues that at the juncture of Independence, India and Pakistan found themselves in an open, undecided terrain. Thus, what occurred in the period following the disintegration of British India and the integration of sovereign India and Pakistan was the incremental closure of a rare, colonial, moment of openness. The period between 1947 and 1952 was a truly political moment of decolonisation, i.e. the concomitant constitution of a novel social order and its legitimacy where, according to him, both the States got involved in the ‘proper’ making of majority and minority through constitutions. See Svensson, Production of Postcolonial India and Pakistan, 26. 29 Faisal Devji has made an attempt to unfold the meanings of Pakistan as a political idea in the context of Pakistan movement to analyse how it was interpreted by different groups. See Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). 30 Joya Chatterji’s critique of Vazeera Zamindar’s long-Partition thesis is very relevant here. Chatterji claims that Zamindar overemphasises ‘bureaucratic rationality’ or even governmentality to define minority communities as mere receivers of official categories. Chatterji argues that such categories were produced by ‘complex, often violent, interactions between governments and a range of non-state actors, who forced their ideas of nationality, justice and entitlement on to the statute book.’ Joya Chatterji, ‘South Asian Histories of Citizenship’, The Historical Journal 55, no. 4 (December 2012), 1070 of 1049–1071. 31 For a discussion on the constitutionalisation of minority-majority discourse see Svensson, Production of Postcolonial India and Pakistan, 114. 32 The literature on ‘Muslim ghettos’ is very relevant here. The works of Abdul Shaban, Janaki Nair, Ravi Kumar, Nida Kirmani, Christophe Jaffrelot and Laurent Gayer examine the socio-economic factors responsible for the emergence of Muslim areas as ghettoes. These

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works revisit the ‘Muslim search for security’ argument by examining the administrative processes that produce demarcated spaces on communal lines. This line of inquiry also provides a framework to study urban violence, especially the violence associated with clearance and resettlement of old neighbourhoods in Indian cities like Delhi. Abdul Shaban, Mumbai: Political Economy of Crime and Space (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 2010), 1–20; Abdul Shaban, ‘Muslims and Space in Mumbai’, in Lives of Muslims in India: Politics, Exclusion and Violence, ed. Abdul Shaban (New Delhi: Routledge, 2012), 215–240; Christopher Jaffrelot and Laurent Gayer, Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalization (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2012), 1–22; Janaki Nair, The Promise of Metropolis: Bangalore’s Twentieth Century (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 250–300 and Anasuya Chatterjee, Margins of Citizenship: Muslim Experience in Urban India (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis, 2017). 33 For an excellent discussion on the relationship between legal processes and political discourses see Ornit Shani, How India Became Democratic:  Citizenship and the Making of the Universal Franchise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

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1

Colonial Encounters, Identities,

Conflicts and Space: A Background

The encounter between colonial perceptions and Indian social realities produced complex social, legal and political structures. The colonial imagination of India as a battleground of different religions and castes not merely determined the actual management of space as a political territory but also redefined collective identities. This chapter focuses on the ways in which space in Delhi came to be defined in communal terms in the period 1803–1940. It offers a brief narrative of the gradual transformation of caste and craft-based shared community space into communally demarcated pockets. The chapter examines three important themes. First, the nature of colonial administration, which evolved gradually and amalgamated with customary forms of space practices, is traced to see how British policies perceived, defined and categorised space and communities in Delhi. A number of decrees, official declarations, municipal bye laws and police orders that established the legitimacy of certain acts as ‘legal’ and/or ‘illegal’ are examined. Second, it investigates new forms of demonstrative and aggressive religious rituals evolved in this period that contributed to shaping the claims of Hindu and Muslim communities on public space. It shows how new forms of religious assertion, particularly the religious reform movements of the 19th century, employed the colonial demarcation of public space for asserting their distinctive identities. The debates on cow slaughter and religious processions become relevant in this regard. Finally, the chapter explores how the encounter between administrative mechanisms and socio-cultural processes translated into the 25

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debates on the right to communal representation. Identification of residential wards as Hindu–Muslim electoral constituencies after the introduction of local self-government in Delhi in the 1880s and the introduction of separate electorates at all levels of representative bodies of the colonial government in 1935 are discussed to make sense of the nuances of the communalisation and politicisation of religious identity in the colonial context. The chapter argues that the administrative demarcation produced three categories of space: ‘Hindu-dominated’, ‘Muslim-dominated’ and ‘mixed’ areas. These spatial categories were gradually established as a yardstick for collective political expressions, claims and counterclaims on space in the 1940s. The chapter attempts to extend the scope of arguments on public-arena activities in the colonial context by bringing in an equally complex issue of mohalla associations.1 It intends to offer an interpretative exploration. In this specific sense, the history of Delhi is seen as a site of multiple contestations and varied interpretations to sketch out the continuously changing and evolving meanings of space and communities.2 This chapter is based primarily on published literature on the colonial history of Delhi and some archival sources.

I

Early Encounter: Management of Space,

Communities and Conflicts

In 1803, the British East India Company acquired Delhi through the Treaty of Surji–Arjungaon signed with the Maratha protectors of Mughal emperor Shah Alam II.3 The Delhi territory consisted of the walled capital city of Shahjahanabad surrounded by an area roughly seven miles in radius.4 In 1805, following the establishment of the British protectorate, the Company confined the Mughal jurisdiction to the Palace and established its authority over the lands in and out of the city, collection of revenue and the administration of justice

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in the Delhi territory.5 But the Company found it difficult to collect revenue and to deal with everyday social conflicts in a culturally diverse society without a ‘proper’ system of administration. In 1815, the British resident Thomas Metcalf introduced a ‘formal’ structure of administration that came to be known as the ‘Delhi System’. Metcalf devised two practical ways of administration.6 First, he identified a few possible collaborators and representatives of different communities in order to manage social conflicts; and second, he adopted the existing Mughal system of revenue collection with a few modifications.7 Under the Delhi System, the whole Delhi territory was treated as a province or suba. The British resident was the subedar, the head of the suba8 The new administration implemented zoning and grouping of different residential and agricultural units as a useful measure for the efficient management of revenues and taxes as well as populations.9 Contiguous villages in the territory were formed into groups called zails so that they could be treated as a block or cluster.10 In Shahjahanabad, the existing Mughal thana (police station) system was adopted, since it was interwoven with different residential mohallas.11 Twelve thanedars (heads of thana) policed the town, collected duties, regulated trade and industries and kept a record of the local population and immigrants.12 Each mohalla came under the jurisdiction of a thana situated near to its location. These mohallas were demarcated predominantly on the basis of caste, craft and class associations.13 British officials found this pattern useful because the mohallas were quite self-sufficient and could easily be managed as zones for generating taxes. In fact, they erected permanent barriers and gates at the ends of streets and alleys so that mohalla boundaries could be marked clearly within the jurisdiction of twelve thanas. It was done ‘in order to ensure peace and tranquility’.14 Most importantly, these caste- and craft-based mohallas intermeshed deeply with the emerging economic and commercial structures, especially with the

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disintegration of aristocracy and emergence of a powerful middle class in Delhi after the British arrival.15 It is worth noting that the British administration did not find any problem with the traditional demographic configuration of Shahjahanabad. This Mughal urban make-up had three important aspects. First, religion was not the defining feature of different mohallas; instead, different professions or crafts associated with numerous caste communities were the determining factors in the living pattern of the city. In some cases, a community with a particular religious affiliation lived in a specific geographical area. For instance, the areas near prominent mosques were dominated mainly by Muslim amirs (aristocrats). But these were not known as Muslim pockets; and, most importantly, they were not contested spaces. In fact, the presence of such concentrations very much reflected the caste or class character of the city. The Muslim amirs represented the upper-caste, upperclass groups. Second, class or prestige was an important factor in the traditional demographic make-up of mohallas since it had a crucial place in the overall administrative discourse of Mughal cities in India. Third, the unit of this distinction of space was mohalla, not ilaqa, which was a wider category in terms of spatial mapping. The category of ilaqa evolved at a later period of British administration especially after the 1930s with colonial policies of planning and improvement. This configuration of Delhi’s social life was clearly reflected in the celebration of certain local festivals.16 Religious processions and celebrations were common occasions participated by the people across caste, class and religious boundaries: their routes were not contested spaces.17 Similarly, religious celebrations and processions were observed equally by the Mughal court because of the religious associations of courtiers, nobles, amirs, other upper classes and most importantly the army chiefs and soldiers.18 It did not, however, mean that religious differentiations were insignificant for the residents of Shahjahanabad. Reflecting on such forms of syncretic practices and possibilities of religious clashes in north Indian cities, C.A. Bayly

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argues that there are many remarkable examples of syncretic practice in pre-colonial India ‘[b]ut this did not eliminate the possibility that clashes might occur over the status that different religious traditions held in relation to the control of festivals or holy places … [though it] in no way challenged the validity of syncretic practices.’19 Cow slaughter was one such issue that led to a number of clashes in these cities. Percival Spear also notes, ‘Communal life in the city was tranquil but not quite idyllic. There were no communal riots during the period, but there was always an undertone of tension … [over the] sacrifice of cows.’20 But these conflicts over cow slaughter or religious festivals often occurred when, according to Bayly, ‘local structures of police and urban government were in the process of change … religious conflict seems to have taken on an overtly communal form when local systems of compromise and bargaining were being rapidly modified by the social mobility of new groups’.21 However, even in such conflicts, it was hard to define them as clashes between ‘Hindu’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘Sikh’ religious groups. Apart from cow-centred religious conflicts, tussles were more sectarian (between Shia and Sunni and among varied Hindu sects including the Hindu– Jain conflicts) and more localised in nature in Delhi as well.22

Religious Encounters and Space The encounter between Christian values, evangelical proselytising techniques and Hindu and Muslim religious practices produced new forms of identity after the arrival of British in Delhi.23 Evangelical Christianity believed in the centrality of conversion or a ‘born again’ experience in receiving salvation, in the authority of the Bible as  God’s revelation to humanity and in spreading the Christian message. The Baptist Missionary Society was established in Delhi in 1818 and the Society for the Promotion of Gospel was formed in 1852. These missionary societies brought new institutionalised forms of conversions. They encouraged public preaching, religious lectures, distribution of written messages and public debates on

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religious philosophy. Because of its emphasis on monotheism, Baptists generated much interest, especially among Delhi’s socially and economically marginalised Hindu caste groups. At the same time, it created a competitive atmosphere and made religion, or more specifically religious distinctiveness, an important social marker of identity. The initial Muslim response to the emerging challenge of Christianity was equally forceful, which paved the way for a search for an authentic and codified form of Islam. But unlike the full-fledged reform movements of the late 19th century, religious leaders of this period only aimed at identifying the reasons behind the relative ‘marginalisation’ of Muslims.24 The Waha’bi (means ‘renaissance’ or ‘revitalisation’) reform movement of Shah Waliullah Dehlawi, the famous Muslim saint of Delhi, and his son, Abdul Aziz, is an example in this regard. The Waha’bi movement started with the aim of purifying Islam and took a concrete form after 1820. Reflecting on the declining political influence and power of Muslims made a distinction between an adulterated religion allegedly corrupted by customary practices and an ideal, scripture-based notion of Islam. Following this ideological premise, the Waha’bi leaders saw British rule and Christianity as a challenge and resorted to public debates, lectures and publication of provocative materials.25 Initially, these debates and discussions instigated tension only between Muslim religious scholars and Christian missionaries. But, the conversion of two prominent Hindus during the 1850s disturbed the relation between Hindu religious scholars and Christian missionaries as well.26 Hindu reformist leaders became sensitive about the conversion of caste communities to Christianity. Reconversion of these communities into Hinduism turned out to be an intrinsic feature of Hindu reform movements that acquired an organised form after the1870s. Hindu reformists emphasised public display of religious practices and rituals and, most importantly, reconversion (shuddhi) of those who had been converted to Christianity.27 Thus, the organised

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debates between Christian missionaries, Muslim maulvies and Hindu pundits became an important aspect of Delhi’s cultural life during the 1850s.28 In this sense, religion did not remain a ‘private’ affair; it began to define community boundaries quite sharply in the urban life of the city. These provocative debates generated fear of religious riots among the British officials.29 As a result, such dialogues were officially banned in 1857. The overtly modern forms of proselytisation had a deep impact on the formation of community identities. The reformist tendencies, propagated by the Hindu and Muslim upper castes and upper classes, played an important role in the gradual identification of culturally diversified communities into homogenous religious entities in Delhi. The ritualistic aspects of religion that used to be performed inside the confined domains of religious places of worship—mosques, temples or shrines—became the issue of communal conflicts. Public preaching of religions transformed the public space into a contested entity. The public space that was once shared equally by all communities now turned into a site of violent ideological struggles. It was for these reasons that religious processions and cow slaughter emerged as the most contentious political issues. Conflicts around the sacrificial slaughter of cow became one of the important markers to define or identify space according to religious identity in official terms.

Cow, Space and Conflicts As the Company rule unfolded, its policy of conflict management set the terms of discourse for colonial politics. The cow sacrifice had never been a major conflict between Hindus and Muslims of Delhi before the arrival of the British. It was always dealt with at the local level by employing a certain kind of context-specific restrictions.30 However, the cow became the most visible symbol of religious differences between the two communities in the 19th century. It is to be noted here that alongside Muslims and a few lower-caste Hindu

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communities, the Company officials also required beef.31 There was a high demand for beef among British officials and in the army cantonments, which led to the regularisation of cow slaughter. The Company policies contradicted previous royal proclamations on the prohibition of cow sacrifice, especially on occasions of Muslim religious festivities. Even after the onset of the Company rule, the last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, used to sacrifice the camel, not cow, on the day of Bakra-Eid, to avoid conflicts between the two communities and to show respect for Hindu sensibilities.32 Such proclamations were culturally rooted and practised by Mughal rulers. Since the time of Babur, cow slaughter was prohibited on Eid day.33 British officials discarded such arrangements and codified the practice of slaughter by issuing orders and decrees that had the effect of allowing cow slaughter under certain circumstances. They identified a group of people as community representatives in order to manage such social conflicts, which in turn led to a new politics of legal petitioning. The selected community representatives would approach the Company court in Delhi, especially on the question of cow sacrifice. The official response of the Company to these petitions expanded the scope of the debate on cow slaughter.34 The interaction between the selected community representatives and British officials produced new power equations in society. It had two implications. First, the dominant class within each religious community acquired a legitimate right to represent a group or community in official terms. The community elite articulated their arguments in an administrative language, thus defining categories of representation. Secondly, customary practices, which in the past were not entirely codified and prevalent as unwritten social norms, became fixed, codified and legalised. Most importantly, the definition of customs, interpreted and presented by uppercaste elites, established a set of religious rituals as legitimate Hindu and Muslim practices. Some of the older caste-centric rituals and

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practices prevalent among Hindus and Muslims gradually became irrelevant in the new administrative set-up. The Company recognised customary practices as fundamental sources of law in Delhi.35 However, different community representatives defined their customary practices from their own perspectives, providing conflicting narratives of religious norms. In fact, it became difficult for the officials to judge the veracity of these contradictory claims. For example, in a dispute over cow sacrifice in 1819, the British resident issued an order and allowed Muslims to sacrifice cows on Eid day within the boundaries of their own houses. This order was reissued in 1835. The order stated that ‘Mohemmadans are allowed to kill cows at the Eid in their own houses and at the accustomed places where it would not be offensive to the Hindoos [sic].’36 But the order soon became contentious as some petitioners claiming to represent Hindus insisted on a complete ban on cow slaughter. On the contrary, Muslim representatives claimed for the extension of this right.37 It was not the only instance when such contradictory petitions were filed against any order or decree issued by Company officials concerning cow slaughter for sacrifice. The Company also did not have a set of rules to administer such a sensitive issue. A new set of administrative measures were imposed in Punjab as the British began to take control of this region in 1845. The Company’s response to cow slaughter and meat regulations in the city of Delhi was also guided by these administrative measures it set up in the Punjab province. According to these measures, British officials were to follow the principle of religious neutrality and were ‘expected to extend equal rights to all native religions and to align with none.’38 This impartiality was not characterised by passive neutrality but by an active commitment to the protection of minority interests. In the context of animal slaughter, in Punjab, the principle of neutrality was translated for British officials to concede Muslims ‘their reasonable rights, provided that the exercise of these rights is so regulated as not

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to cause offence to others.’39 Following this, the ban on the slaughter of animal previously maintained in Punjab was removed. These norms were developed for Punjab in 1849 with a purpose to regulate the slaughter of cow and other animals under the authority of district officers ensuring that it was as inoffensive to the general public and Hindu sensibilities as possible. This conflict management had two important aspects: the legalisation of the practice of cow slaughter and the demarcation of the community space. Following these principles, several restrictions were imposed ordering that animal slaughter would not be permitted within 300 yards (about 274.3 meters) of cities, towns or villages where the Hindu and Muslim population was mixed or living in close proximity. Demarcated spots were to be provided for shambles and butchers’ shops in every large town away from religious places of worship or fakirs’ huts. These rules also mandated that beef, though slaughtered outside, would not be exposed for sale in shops within towns.40 These set of rules and instructions were employed in Delhi after a major dispute took place in 1852. A magistrate in Delhi ordered that ‘a list be prepared of the individuals who were in the habit of making sacrifice and that the rite may be observed at certain places where it used to be observed before.’41 This order was strictly followed, and every Muslim who sacrificed cow registered his name in the jurisdictional police station. However, this norm eventually became rather problematic due to the administrative inconveniences Muslims had to face in registering their names during festivals. Determining the nature and kind of animal sacrifice well in advance was also difficult. Cow being a big animal was bought by more than one person for slaughtering on Bakra-Eid day. In such cases, registering names of individuals having multiple shares in sacrificial cows was technically not possible. Considering these technicalities, Thomas Metcalf issued a decree in 1853 and introduced rules that were devised for the Punjab province. He allowed cow slaughter on festive occasions in Delhi and re-established the previous order of slaughtering cows

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within Muslim houses.42 Consistent with its historical stance, the Mughal court, particularly Bahadur Shah Zafar, was not in favour of this decision: when Muslim petitioners approached the emperor to revoke the magistrate’s order and get permission for unrestricted sacrifice, he categorically refused to accept this demand and argued that cow sacrifice should not be treated as the essential requirement of the Islamic faith as Muslims might sacrifice other halal animals.43 Hindu representatives also filed a petition against this official order of Metcalf explaining how such allowance to Muslims would only intensify their plight.44 This petition was declined by the British officials on the ground that the feelings of both sides must be considered and that there would be no change in the existing practice.45 However, this legal action did not solve the problem and massive riots took place in 1853 and 1855 when Eid and Ramlila festivals coincided. The situation became so severe that troops were called out by the resident in order to prevent clashes.46 Similarly, shortly before 1857, Metcalf permitted Muslim meat traders, especially Muslim Kasai/Qasab (Muslim butchers belonging to Qureshi community involved in meat trade), who also performed sacrificial sacrifices to slaughter cows in a locality that was largely Hindu. It was probably done to meet the increasing demand for beef among British officials and soldiers as Narayani Gupta argues. But this order led to violent clashes between the two communities.47 Cow sacrifice thus became an important factor in dividing the urban space by creating boundaries on religious lines. The British administrative intervention on this issue defined community space. The listing of people for ensuring peaceful and limited cow sacrifice redefined the act of animal slaughter in general and cow sacrifice as a specific community affair. At the same time, the identification of a clearly marked public place replaced the common space of the city governed conventionally by mohalla panchayats.48 In conjunction, these initiatives contributed to the consolidation of religious identities and their association with demarcated space for performing

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‘sacred’ religious practices. Terms used in these official orders—such as ‘not offensive to the Hindu community’, ‘habit of cow sacrifice’ and Muslim ‘houses and accustomed places’—officially classified and demarcated space where religious practices of particular communities would be legitimate and permissible. The events of 1857 further politicised and complicated this issue. The cow emerged as a strong political symbol, which was strategically manipulated by the political elites of all the groups. For instance, Emperor Bahadur Shah put a complete ban on cow slaughter on Bakra-Eid after the sepoys (soldiers) seized control of Delhi from Company officials. According to a royal proclamation issued on the occasion of Eid, ‘People belong to God, the country belongs to the King and the order of the Chief Commander of the army [prevails] … in the season of Baqarid [sic], before or after, [whoever] conceals the cow, oxen and buffalo in his house and slaughters or sacrifices them stealthily, will be treated as enemy of the king and he will be condemned to death.’49 The Mughal court employed strict measures to ensure that no cow slaughter took place in the city. He ordered for the listing of cow-owning Muslim households and took undertakings from Muslim residents and Muslim butchers to declare that no cow will be slaughtered on Bakra-Eid day. In fact, the court provided special police protection to all the big animals, including cows, buffaloes and bulls, to avoid any casual incident of cow killing in the city.50 These steps were taken to encourage Hindus and Muslims of the city to unite against British power. Farooqui indeed argues that the British rulers also waited for the occasion of Bakra-Eid to turn conflicts on sacrificial slaughter into a religious clash so as to weaken the opposition and regain control of the city. There were even rumours that a group of Muslim jihadists were planning to slaughter a cow in front of Jama Masjid to appropriate the mutiny and re-establish Muslim rule in Delhi.51 The Eid passed peacefully due to efforts taken by the Mughal court, leaving Company officials disappointed and confounded. A Company official Harvey Greathed

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wrote in a letter to his wife, ‘it is a good satire on the Mahommedan fighting for their faith, that at this Eid, under the Mahommedan King, no one was permitted to sacrifice a cow.’52 Such contested symbolism of the cow, religious identity of the ruling class and complex forms of negotiations had an important role in shaping British perception and in redefining space in Delhi in the post-1857 period.

II

Reorganisation of City:

Official Demarcation of Space

The events of 1857 played a crucial role in the reconfiguration of space and identities in Delhi. A strong vocabulary of ‘loyal’ and ‘disloyal’ emerged out of the scenario of 1857 to differentiate between those who supported British rulers and those who helped the rebels either by conviction or for self-interest. These perceptions were based on the order of events that took place in Delhi. The direct involvement of the Mughal emperor in the uprising, his efforts to keep the communal relations intact through active measures and the participation of a large number of Muslim soldiers and some Muslim religious leaders in the violent events of May 1857 shaped the British perceptions about Hindus and Muslims. In these perceptions, Hindus emerged as loyal and Muslims emerged as disloyal citizens of the city. In this sense, the political configurations, negotiations and, most importantly, the British understanding of the mutiny—which was initially seen as jihad, a religious war, by the ‘Muslims’ against East India Company—set the terms of political discourse for the rest of the British rule in India and, most importantly, for the construction of religious identities and ‘community space’. The actual implication was reflected in the selective clearance and resettlement of particular areas after the British reoccupation of Delhi in September 1857.53 The British forces started killing the residents indiscriminately at the initial stage in order to avenge the deaths of British and

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Anglo-Indian officials and families. The whole population of the city was driven out as the British army captured the city after four days of continuous killings and looting. But, the actual implication of British perceptions—the later systematic and ‘rational’ ways of punishment—had completely gone against the ‘treacherous Muslims’ as a whole when the city was selectively destroyed and resettled. As Narayani Gupta argues, ‘the British then and later were to persist in holding at the later stage to the stereotypes of their own creation—the treacherous Muslim and the Loyal Hindu’.54 British forces employed three measures to selectively punish the rebels, especially Muslims, to prevent any possible future threats. First, they captured most of the Muslim religious places of worship, which were seen as symbols of Muslim presence and Mughal power in the city. It was argued that the mosques were the principal rallying points of Muslims and some, like Jama Masjid, had been used as strongholds in the street fighting.55 Following this policy, major mosques, including Jama Masjid, Fatehpuri Masjid, Idgah and Madrasa Gahziuddin, were occupied by British troops and used as barracks for years. The Jama Masjid was deliberately desecrated and turned into a stable. The Fatehpuri Masjid was sold to a trader named Lala Chunna Mal and the Zinat-ul-Masjid was used as a bakery for a long time. In fact, it became an unwritten British policy that principal mosques ‘…can never be allowed to remain in the hands of Muslim population’.56 Second, a selective clearance drive was also carried out to ensure security and better surveillance. The mohallas that were inhabited by the ‘loyalist’ Muslims and Hindus were left out from destruction either simply because they managed to ransom the guards for protection or because of their loyalties towards the British. After the initial excursion, British forces started targeting the mohallas that still inhabited ‘disloyal’ Muslims. Around sixty Muslims were captured from mohalla Ballimaran on account of their reported ‘disloyalty’. Kuncha Chelan, famous for being one of the most culturally

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advanced mohallas of the city and where some of the most talented poets and artists of Delhi resided, was devastated. It was reported that around 1,400 people were massacred by the British troops in this large mohalla.57 The whole population was driven out of the area after four days of continuous killings and looting by the British forces.58 After the revolt, the passage between the Red Fort and Kashmiri Gate was identified as an ideal location for British cantonment. Many properties, including a number of hawelies (mansions), palaces and even places of worship such as the famous Akbarabadi Mosque, were destroyed during this drive.59 On the contrary, many small temples and a large part of Dariba where a number of Hindu merchants had acquired shops were spared as a concession of loyalty after petitions were filed by the community panchayats.60 Third, a selective resettlement policy was employed. After the initial reconquest of Delhi, British forces started targeting the mohallas that were still inhabited by disloyal Muslims. For example, around sixty Muslims were captured from mohalla Ballimaran on account of their reported disloyalty.61 In terms of the readmission of the local population, quite categorically, only the selected ‘loyalist’ Hindu moneylenders, traders, bankers and clerks who extended financial support to the Company during revolts were allowed back into the city at the initial stage under proper restrictions in January 1858. The Muslim population was permitted back into the city only after a petition was filed before the government by Delhi Muslims in December 1859; eventually, they were readmitted by an order in 1860. Protection tickets or permits were issued to ensure restricted and registered entry of Muslim inhabitants. But their properties were still kept under official control. The British officials quite overtly asserted that ‘Muslims should not be employed around Delhi except those who remained faithful and these should be treated with special favour.’62 After long debates on the treatment of the guilty and the possible systems of punishment, the British decided to confiscate the properties of Muslims and some guilty Hindus. This group of guilty

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citizens were asked to provide proof of innocence to reclaim their properties. Many properties of those who could not demonstrate their loyalty were finally confiscated and later sold or auctioned out to the upper-caste, middle-class Hindu and Jain residents of the city as part of a compensatory scheme.63 Such selective treatment of population not only disturbed the caste- and craft-based demography but also turned areas with Muslim presence in Delhi into contested zones.64 Every living space, which was used by Muslims as a group for practising religious rituals and customs, was officially identified as a problematic site for the first time. In the post-1857 period, the population profile of the city changed drastically.65 The ratio of Hindus and Muslims in 1845–1846 was 54 per cent and 45 per cent respectively (in a total population of 160,000). But the city’s population dropped drastically during and after the 1857 siege. The census of 1864 records the presence of 142,000 people in Delhi after the uprising. The ratio of Hindu to Muslim had also shifted, though not so drastically, with Hindus now accounting for 60 per cent of the population and Muslims 39 per cent.66 Most of the affected Muslims and some Hindus migrated to Jaipur, Hyderabad or other places. Among those who remained in Delhi, there were many children and women of impoverished Mughal and other aristocratic families, who now settled mainly in areas near the city walls, such as the Motia Khan area of Paharganj, Qutub, Nizamuddin and Purana Qila.67 In the 1860s, the economic structure of the city also changed. The British started expansion towards the western suburbs with the construction of Sadar Bazar and the railway line. Rapid and widespread industrialisation took place in Delhi around this time with the emergence of a number of mechanised industries such as cotton mills, clothes manufacturing units, flour mills and printing presses in Sadar Bazar and its adjacent Sabzi Mandi areas.68 By the 1880s, Sadar Bazar became a hub of economic and commercial activities, largely controlled by Hindu and Jain traders. These traders were the

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main beneficiaries of selective post-mutiny British measures that somehow also reinforced their supremacy in the traditional castebased social composition. The economic success of this middle class was compatible with Delhi’s traditional occupational hierarchy. The Banias (a trading caste involved mainly in the business of groceries), Sahukars (moneylenders) and traders did not find any difficulty in operating under modern commercial institutions and activities such as financial transactions, commercial banking and insurance.69 As a result of these political, economic and demographic developments, the characters of Delhi’s different mohallas also began to change. The mohalla as an administrative mechanism, which was closely knitted with thanas, collapsed with the abolition of the Kotwali system due to renewed British intervention.70 The kuchabandi (the traditional administrative model of mohallas marked with clear boundaries and gates), which was strengthened by the British in the pre-1857 period, was now abandoned as it was found to be a serious threat to security. The actual class-communal configuration of the mohallas changed as the upper-caste, middle-class Hindus and Jains occupied many confiscated properties of Muslims in different mohallas. These mohallas had a considerable number of Muslim nobles before 1857, but they now suffered downward mobility. Many Mughal families settled in and around the city walls with lower-class and lower-caste communities and got involved in handicraft production for a living. This changed social and economic composition of the city had an impact on the power structure and communal make-up of the residential areas; however, the mohalla as a living pattern of the city based on caste and craft associations began to be transformed into communally marked spaces by the end of the 19th century with the politicisation of religious identity.

Communal Representation and Political Space The period from 1858 to 1863 was a period of political transition in terms of the establishment of ‘proper’ British colonial rule in India.

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Delhi was transferred under the provincial government of Punjab. The experiences of the mutiny and suggestions made by Sayyed Ahmed provided a cohesive approach to the British to rule in India. Indian participation in the administration for effective governance and strong policing and military arrangements were seen as two major aspects for the permanent settlement of British rule in India. The British identified two separate and incompatible groups of Indians— the western-educated Muslim elite and the landed gentry based in parts of north India—as possible allies in the rule and rewarded them with wealth, land, khilats (a Mughal tradition of offering a dress or shawl to honour a person with an award, designation or status) and titles. These groups of Indians were considered as possible ‘collaborators’ who could work as a link between the British and the native ‘subjects’ while remaining ‘loyal’ to and appreciative of British administration and practices. This was also the time when English education was realised as a possible political means to create a class of such ‘collaborators’. The second important consideration was the requirement of strong administrative and military mechanisms that would be sustained by Indian revenues. In order to implement these mechanisms with the help of Indian collaborators and revenues, the systems of nomination, representation and election were introduced in the later period in different provinces of British India.71 The Councils Act that was passed in 1861 introduced a ‘consultative mechanism’ in matters of governance.72 This system was compatible with the ‘consultative mechanism’ evolved in India since 1757, yet it was for the first time that an official structure was constituted and implemented for certain kind of formal representation at a higher level. According to Farzana Sheikh, there were three principal considerations that impinged upon colonial policy on Indian representation between the period from the end of mutiny to the consolidation of a Liberal government in Britain—1860–1900: (1) India’s indigenous institutions and their significance, which were more suitable for political consultation than political control (2) India’s social diversity, which was thought to prevent the

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emergence of a coherent ‘public opinion’ that could effectively sustain Western representative institutions (3) The need for good, effective governance rather than self-governance.73 So, the British’s quest for a responsive government that doesn’t have to deal with the dangers of control intrinsic to representative governance and strong security was manifested in the formation of municipalities at local levels under the Police Act, 1861. It gave power to the governor-general to nominate six to twelve members in his council only to make laws and regulations. Fifty municipalities were set up in Punjab before 1864. The Delhi Municipal Committee was established in 1863. In the same vein, the Jama Masjid Committee and the Delhi Society—sedate clubs of officials and local inhabitants who included Ghalib and Sayyid Ahmed—were established in 1962 and 1965 respectively to bring the city back to life. The Delhi Society was formed to promote interest in literature, history, social reform and education in the city. The municipal commissioner of Delhi worked out a comprehensive set of bye-laws concerning the other functions of the municipality. These functions were generalised for the whole province under the Punjab Municipal Act, 1867. It defined the area under municipal jurisdiction to be ‘the city and the suburbs’ including the cantonment. With increasing plans for the ‘improvement’ of the city, the municipal structure was more rationalised and the city and its suburbs were divided into fifteen wards. Twelve intramural wards were roughly based on the Mughal thana divisions (See Map 2: Division of Municipal Area into Intramural and Extramural Wards after 1884). It replaced the traditional Kotwali system. Each of these wards was controlled by a Non-Official member of the government. In this sense, the old thana system that corresponded with the mohallas was abolished and replaced by a new vocabulary of ward headed by a Non-Official member of the government. The city suburbs, including the British cantonment and the Civil Lines areas, also came under the municipal jurisdiction.74 This was the beginning of the official demarcation of space in Delhi, which later acquired a more political–communal overtone.

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The organisational structure of the municipality and its powers could not be called responsive in the formal sense of the term. The municipality was actually a site where different interests— British, local, sectarian, religious and commercial—intersected with each other. On the one hand, loyalty towards the British was an established principle for being nominated to this body. The members had a very limited role to play in the actual decision-making process.75 The municipalities were not fully supported by the government and were ‘encouraged to generate their own funds’.76 This mechanism of city governance eventually empowered the elite groups who were actually its main source of funding. This class acquired the power to initiate and implement policies to secure their own economic interests, consolidate social hierarchies and ensure wider political gains. The formation of the municipality and other institutional bodies can also be seen as a reflection of a balancing act of the government. In order to avoid 1857-like conflict, Muslim loyalists were incorporated in British-supported institutions like Jama Masjid Committee, Delhi Society and the Fatehpuri Masjid Committee (formed later in 1877) apart from the municipal committee.77 This particular composition of administrative structure was designed to restrict the possibility of disloyal Muslim groups taking over any kind of influential position in the local government of the city. Such perceptions continued to be the guiding force behind all British policies until the 1880s. However, the attitude of the British towards the Muslims began to change after the 1880s. The principal descriptor of ‘disloyalty’ was replaced by a new technique of favouritism.78 The Ripon reforms introduced the concept of local self-government in 1881. These reforms, with an approach to encourage Indian participation, highlighted the need for a representative and responsive government at the municipality level. It sought to restructure the municipal and local boards by incorporating a majority of elected Indian NonOfficial members. These administrative changes began with a new vocabulary and started defining communities, specifically religious

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communities, as ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ groups. This vocabulary, with a policy of favouritism, created serious political differences between Hindu, Jain and Muslim members of the municipalities. The Hindu and Jain members favoured elected representation but Muslim members rejected it completely fearing marginal representation. Evoking India’s unique social diversity, the Muslim leaders made a strong case for a consultative system. It was argued that a Western electoral system based on majoritarianism would give more power to the Hindu majority; therefore, there should be a system of separate electorate for the representation of Muslims.79

Map 2: Division of Municipal Area into Intramural and Extramural

Wards after 1884 80

Representative self-government was introduced only partially in Delhi because of the general tension between Hindus and Muslim especially after a riot in 1883.81 The fear of communalising the electoral process and the fear of losing authority at local levels continuously forced the officials to delay or to draw special rules for the Delhi municipality.

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Most importantly, the restricted franchise was implemented in the first elections, which was held in 1884,82 and separate identification of communities on religious grounds became a feature of representative government.83 Narayani Gupta reports that although the first election results did not show any sign of religious polarisation, it created communal tension among religious communities. The Hindus were the majority voters but six Muslims were elected against five Hindu members. According to Gupta, the official reports of the time also suggested that ‘the leading people of the town … have expressed the fear that the elections may have helped to accentuate the differences already brewing between Hindus and Muslims.’84 It was further noted that voting in twelve intramural wards was on communal lines, unlike the other three extramural wards.85 The introduction of a representative system at the municipal level also had some direct political–communal implications. It encouraged politicisation of religious organisations that raised to speak on behalf of the social group they claimed to represent. For example, Muslim reform organisation like Anjuman-e-Islamia, which was founded in 1875, actively campaigned for the inclusion of all eligible Muslim voters into the electoral registry. This development eventually intensified the communal situation. The increased incidence of religious riots in Delhi in the late 1880s is a good example to underline the fact that the collective and concentrated presence of a social group turned out to be a tool to make a wider political claim.86 The formation of the Muslim League in 1906 in Dhaka further intensified this debate in Delhi. The Hindu and Jain members of the municipality supported a joint electorate while Muslim members demanded weightage system or a separate electorate. In fact, they expressed ‘fears’ of ‘Muslim marginalisation’ by a Hindu majority in the municipal committee. It was argued that Muslims would not be able to win a majority in a particular ward if it had a large presence of educated Hindu residents who could press their claims more effectively. The 1909 reforms, which made it mandatory to establish communal representation at

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different levels of governance, galvanised the debates on Muslim representation in Delhi.87 The introduction of local government transformed every ward into a politico-spatial category. The replacement of thanedars and Kotwali system by nominated Non-Official middle-class upper-caste Hindu and Jain loyalists superseded multifarious local interests and initiated the process of politicisation of space practices. The electoral representation on communal lines after 1881 transformed each ward into an electoral unit that acquired a new character of being a Hindu or Muslim majority area. These were gradually established as fixed spatial categories of electoral politics with the emerging vocabulary of minority and majority communities.

Re-formed Identities and Public Space The search for an authentic religious past and assertion of a collective religious-self led towards more institutionalised forms of Hinduism and Islam in the post-1857 period. The Christian missionaries extended their activities immediately after the recapture of Delhi, offering shelter to economically and socially marginalised sections of society, especially during the famine of the 1860s. A number of Christian basties (colonies) emerged in Paharganj, Sadar Bazar, Mori Gate, Turkman Gate and Delhi Gate areas due to an increase in converted Christian population.88 Although there were only 997 ‘native Christians’ in the Delhi district as per the census of 1881, this was the largest Indian Christian population in any district of the Punjab province.89 The historian Kenneth W. Jones argues that this growing trend of conversion was seen as a serious threat to the collective existence of Hindu community in Delhi. Moreover, caste Hindus were converting not just to Christianity but to Islam as well. As a result, the decade of 1870s saw a rise in Hindu and Muslim reformist organisations asserting for sectional as well as religious identities. 90 The number of these organisations increased after the ceremonies of Delhi Durbar in

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1877 that returned the reputation of Delhi as a centre of administrative power in North India. Delhi became a centre of religious activities of all kinds in North India especially after the arrival of several Hindu organisations. The figure of community newspapers and publication houses also increased after the Durbar of 1877.91 Some of these newspapers and publication houses indulged in the publication of polemical religious literature from Christian, Hindu and Muslim groups, as each organisation and movement sought to attack all the others. These developments created sectional as well as religious controversies between reformist and orthodox within religious communities and Hindu versus Muslim at a wider level. The anxiety about conversion was reflected in religious dialogues and public debates, which took more organised and violent forms in the 1880s. It was because the Arya Samaj and various other Hindu organisations like Varnashram Dharm Sabha also started participating in these public debates on religion.92 Jama Masjid and Fatehpuri Masjid became the focal point of discussions after it was transferred to Muslims in 1877. These debates encouraged a trend that involved an aggressive display of religious rituals and practices. Collective singing of religious songs like bhajan (a form of devotional music), chanting religious slogans during processions, public hawans (a collective Hindu religious practice to please the God of fire for a wish) and distribution of religious–polemical literature such as pamphlets emerged as some of the legitimate religious practices. This massive display of religion transformed the public spaces such as Chandni Chowk and Ramlila Maidan into contested zones. The cow protection movement and the Arya Samaj-led reconversion or shuddhi (purification) movements were two important developments that sharpened the intra-community conflicts during this period. Various cow protection organisations, which were initially established in the United Provinces, identified Delhi as a centre of activities in North India.93 These organised Hindu religious groups published polemical literature depicting

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Muslims either as kasai (butcher), who killed and ate cows, or as converted Hindus, whose shuddhi was inevitable.94 Although this kind of literature was distributed mostly in the United Provinces, it had serious impacts in Delhi. The upper-caste, middle-class Hindu and Jain communities overwhelmingly supported these two movements.95 This aggressive Hindu assertion became so intense that Muslim religious leaders made common cause with Christian missionaries to stop the spread of Hindu reconversion efforts.96 The increasing sense of religious-self resulted in a series of communal riots during the mid-1880s. One of the reasons behind these riots was the fact that between 1884 and 1887 Dussehra and Muharram fell within days of one another. These developments had a few direct impacts on social relations and spatial practices. First of all, religion and religious belongingness were discussed, debated, displayed, asserted and claimed aggressively in public. The ritual practices, the spaces occupied by Hindus and Muslims and, most importantly, the claims of communities on public spaces became highly contentious. This was the reason why the collective presence of the perceived ‘other’ was likely to generate conflict. Second, these religious conflicts also affected commercial relations. Third, the introduction of local self-government intensified a sense of distinctive religious-self and converted religious communities into political identities as debates on the form of representation intensified gradually with time. The electoral politics not only paved the way for the politicisation of religious and customary practices but also provided a vocabulary to articulate collective claims as well as grievances politically.

Cow Slaughter, Meat and Muslim Space The legalisation of the slaughter of animals was a matter of serious concern in the post-1857 period. The killing of animals, whether for food or religious sacrifice on Eid, had been restricted to slaughterhouses outside the city walls. Beef, however, was permitted

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for sale within the city, unlike other towns where the 1849 rules were enforced. The municipal authorities gave a more structured definition of ‘public space’ by imposing fines for ‘encroachment of roads’, ‘unauthorised structures’ and carrying on ‘offensive trades’. These categories were defined specifically for commercial purposes; however, such measures also identified zones and spheres claimed by different communities. It brought together animal slaughter, meat sale and associated trades under the definition of ‘offensive trades’, which might cause a nuisance to the public due to religious sensibilities as well as public hygiene. The municipalities restricted these commercial activities by imposing, as Gupta describes, a fee on slaughterhouses. Furthermore, cow slaughter was strictly prohibited within the walled city.97 But this act of regularisation of animal slaughter with strict legal limitations and paying respect to religious feelings and sensibilities required delicate balancing acts. The rules of 1849 lacked the clause for a penalty in the instance of a violation of law in relation to animal slaughter and meat sale. However, the later legal developments, especially the Punjab Laws Act, 1872, called Act IV of 1872, mandated that the sale of beef could take place only when it was subject to rules to be prescribed by the government from time to time. Furthermore, it was felt desirable that the slaughtering be conducted as privately as possible so that those who were opposed to the practice were not offended. Simultaneously, provisions were to be made to facilitate without undue restrictions the sacrificial slaughter of animals by Muslims. The key to employing such measures was to gather information with ‘great tact’ and avoid ‘innovation’ ‘to restrict alter or restrict local usages as little as possible’.98 The anxieties about the sites of slaughter, both for animals for sale and/or ritual sacrifice, were often mixed with sensitivities around the transportation of meat within the city. It was stipulated time and again that the number of shops would be restricted and situated only in Muslim localities with stricter licencing provisions

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for both shops and slaughterhouses. In the context of such anxieties, cow slaughter continuously acquired a political meaning that could easily be manipulated by the elite. These claims around the body of the cow were more organised after the beginning of cow protection movement, which turned it into a question of Hindu identity. By the 1870s, meat shops situated in ‘Hindu-dominated’ areas of Delhi—Kashmiri Gate, Mori Gate and the Phatak Habsh Khan— were closed down and transferred to the meat market near Mor Sarai. The only meat shops that remained were in the ‘Muslim quarters’ of the city.99 Although the presence of these meat shops did not create any major conflict, slaughtering, exposing and selling meat became controversial and tended to limit the claims of Muslims on public space. There were numerous incidents when municipalities criticised meat traders for carrying meat or beef through the streets of mohallas. It also raised concerns among British officials. They employed stricter measures of licencing for animal slaughter and meat sale.100 As a result, meat practice became an issue of everyday conflict between the two major communities of the city seeking to mark out their exclusive spaces. In the backdrop of these conflicts, Bakra-Eid turned out to be a critical period of festivity in terms of administration in the city since it was the most comprehensive of all Muslim festivals. It involved several activities: sale and purchase of a number of big and small animals, sacrificial slaughtering and transportation of meat of sacrificed animals back to individual homes for celebrations that lasted over three consecutive days. It required movement of people throughout the city on all three days. The British government, therefore, took special measures to ensure its smooth celebration by employing stricter provision for sacrifice during Bakra-Eid. In order to manage this situation, the municipality created ‘delimited zones’, drafted a design for clear mapping of routes for animals taken for sacrifice and formatted a comprehensive and intensive scheme of surveillance. Two official proclamations are relevant in this

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regard. First, following the provisions of Act IV of 1872, the deputy commissioner explicitly banned slaughtering of horned animals within the municipal areas of Delhi after 1880. Such slaughtering was allowed only in the abattoirs, which would remain open on the day of the festival and two succeeding days until 2 p m . Following these measures, the parading or slaughtering of any horned animal was completely banned in the municipality of Delhi, except in the three ‘delimited zones’. Even within these zones, the use of certain bazaars was prohibited. Each zone had one gate through the city wall through which cattle could be brought in accompanied by no more than seven people. Furthermore, it was made mandatory to display the number and name of the owner on the body of the animals. Once the cattle had been killed, the flesh was carried back through the same gates, covered in cloth and without displaying or exposing in such manners as to ‘hurt the feelings of others’.101 These routes were defined based on the religious configuration of areas characterised by the official— ‘Hindu dominated’, ‘Muslim dominated’ and ‘combined’—to avoid the possibility of conflict between communities around the city. But this marking, contrary to what the authorities expected, increased the possibilities of a clash on this festive occasion. These measures had legalised ‘denial’ before redefining the notion of communal space. The second proclamation was related to special measures that had to be deployed to deal with situations arising out of any unpleasant incidents during Bakra-Eid. These measures encouraged intensive policing of the city during the festive occasion, which required close monitoring of the situation by the magistrate and the police. It also involved issuing of Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) to prevent breaches of the peace and maintain order in the city.102 These measures remained in force for twenty years and were renewed in 1904 with some modifications. These modifications were made because the excessive display of religious rituals became a feature of almost all festive occasions that were performed collectively by different groups. The authorities decided that there should be fixed

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programmes for policing the city, especially along the main routes of religious processions on all important annual festivals such as BakraEid, Muharram and Dussehra (Ramlila). It was made mandatory for every community to notify the local authority in advance the date, time and area of any religious procession or public ritual.103 In this sense, every gali, mohalla or ilaqa came under the purview of the administrative mechanism to define and categorise it according to its perceived communal character. Thus, the urban space of Delhi, which was previously mutually shared by the two communities, increasingly became divided into communal domains. To prevent any general conflict over transportation of meat through the streets, the government in 1881ordered that beef should not at all be exposed for sale in towns. This order provoked reactions from the local Muslim population in Delhi. Muslim organisations such as Anjuman-e-Islamia started taking a strict stand on the regulation of meat shops in the city. They strongly asserted the Muslims’ right to expose meat for sale on the streets. This conflict took a serious turn after the introduction of communal representation and debates on the weightage system. A confrontation between Hindus and Muslims took place on the regulation of meat shops in 1906 after the municipality passed bye-laws to impose control over the sale of meat. Although the municipality did not have the power to prohibit meat shops in any particular locality (even if it had a large Hindu population), there was a consensus that meat shops should be managed in an organised way for the maintenance of hygiene in the city, especially after the outbreak of the plague epidemic in Delhi. However, as the municipality tried to exercise power on the regulation of meat shops, the issue took a communal turn. It was proposed that meat shops be relocated from crowded areas to a new slaughterhouse near Idgah, which was to be constructed by 1915. The meat traders of the city protested against this proposal and argued that grain shops (mainly owned by Hindus) were more responsible for spreading the plague because they are the most probable breeding

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grounds for mice. Most importantly, they claimed that these bye-laws were interfering with their religious customs and were unjust towards them since the majority of Delhi’s inhabitants were meat-eaters.104 The Qureshi community approached the British authorities and successfully secured the revocation of these bye-laws. The educated Muslim professionals in the Punjab province, who were already demanding separate electorates and trying to develop an argument for a separate Muslim identity, started polarising the community on such issues. The Amritsar newspaper Vakil criticised the municipalities and argued that these bye-laws were guided by the Hindu prejudice against Muslims rather than sanitary requirements. Moreover, the Punjab Observer extended these reactions and tried to connect it to the experiences and grievances of a pan-Indian Muslim community. The paper wrote, ‘We warn the Muslims of all India to be on their guard. The Hindus in other Municipalities might do things against Muslims if they (Muslims) are not careful.’105 This debate strengthened the arguments of the Muslim League for separate electorates in the municipalities at a later stage. Cow slaughter and meat trade as practices associated mainly with Muslims were constantly questioned by officials on the grounds that these could lead to riots as they hurt the feelings of local Hindus. In this sense, meat shops fell into the category of offensive trade, and a commercial activity gradually acquired communal character. Furthermore, the city was divided into ilaqe at a later stage. These ilaqe were organised to carry out water supply, drainage and public health, and, like the electoral wards, produced new and complicated communal configurations. The debates on separate electorates and weightage system concretised these categories. The 1857–1911 period is as a period of political interaction between new forms of urban organisation and the changing cultural life of communities. This encounter had some very important outcomes. First, with the increasing realisation of permanent religious identities, any violation of collective customary practices was understood and

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projected by community elites as a threat to cultural and religious rights. In fact, the political-administrative language of cultural and religious rights and the arguments based on majority-minority classifications constituted the vocabulary of community life in Delhi. Second, communal representation allowed the emerging political elites to manipulate administrative policies for their own legitimacy. That was the reason why even commercial interests were defined in communitarian terms. Caste, sectional and occupational identities were relegated to the margins and religion as an administrative, political category was established at the local level. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Muslim and Hindu ilaqe were formed on the basis of specified collective cultural practices, but the casteand craft-based mohalla as a unit continued to survive in Delhi. That was the reason why Hindu caste groups living in Muslim ilaqe and Muslim caste groups living in Hindu ilaqe remained an important feature of the demographic pattern of the city.

III

New and Old Delhi:

Hindu–Muslim Constituencies and

Contested Space

The declaration of the transfer of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi in 1911 brought some significant changes to the city space. The debates around the planned extension of the city were centred on the growing administrative concerns related to ‘congestion’ ‘improvement’ and ‘hygiene’. In fact, the distinction between residential and commercial areas became an important principle of space management. The administrative framework governing the proposed new capital is very relevant for understanding the relationship between the ongoing political debates in the city (which eventually became ‘old’ Delhi) and the formation of the colonial capital. It must be noted that the colonial state did not propose any significant legal changes in terms of the

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status of Delhi as its capital. Delhi remained within the jurisdiction of the provincial government of Punjab. Thus, the Cantonment Act was not extended to Delhi and the degree of effective self-government was reduced given the increasing political and religious activities. The municipality’s territory and authority were also condensed. However, it was empowered to make bye-laws in 1913.106

Slaughtering, Selling and Hawking The most significant development that the municipality brought about was in relation to the categorisation of certain commercial acts as a nuisance to the public in terms of hygiene; this led to the introduction of stricter laws to control them. These laws complicated the already brewing tussle over meat business and eventually strengthened the communal demarcation of space in legal terms. In 1913, the Delhi municipality established a comprehensive legal framework by introducing a set of municipal bye-laws, rules and directions to put some control on the sale of meat in the city’s market for reasons of hygiene. The municipal bye-laws defined ‘any act, omission, place, animal, or thing which causes or is likely to cause injury, danger or offence to the sense of sight, smell or hearing, or which is, or may be, dangerous to life or injurious to health or property’ as a nuisance to the general public.107 More specifically, ‘animal carcasses … putrid or putrefying substances other than sewage’ were classified under the category of ‘offensive matters’.108 The municipality made provisions that such trades should not be allowed to operate in the city because of the health risk that they may pose to the population. Following these provisions, all meat shops were shut down and forcefully shifted to municipal markets situated outside the city walls. Meat traders protested against the municipal provisions and their forced relocation outside claiming that it would have serious implications on their livelihood. They went on a strike. Muslim leather merchants also condemned these laws because they were the next commercial group in the meat value chain, after the

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meat traders, who would be most affected. Muslim representatives in the municipality were also against the shifting of meat shops to municipal markets outside the city citing reasons of inconvenience for the non-vegetarian population. They extended their support to the meat traders by criticising the municipality and police for the coercion and pressure that sought to push them out of the Delhi city. Consequently, the municipality made some concession to traders and agreed to enforce a ‘limited control’ over meat trade. Meat was allowed to be sold by hawkers only ‘in mohallas in the occupation of Muslims’—a demographic spatial concept that now seemed to have been well entrenched. The second-most significant development that concretised the official demarcation of space on communal lines was the construction of a slaughterhouse away from the crowded quarters of the city. It was a crucial decision. There were two large slaughter yards under the municipal control—one for cattle and the other for sheep and goats—situated at a little distance outside Turkman Gate. The condition of these abattoirs was insanitary because they lacked proper sanitary arrangements or required timely inspections.109 The proposal to construct a new abattoir, in this sense, was contingent upon the broader principle of improvement and, to some extent, conflict management. The construction of a new slaughterhouse near Idgah, however, produced a new set of complications. The Hindu and Jain communities living in areas around the new location of the slaughterhouse protested against it. One of the important reasons behind their resentment was the presence of the old Jhandewalan temple that was situated within close proximity of the proposed site of the abattoir.110 To respond to these grievances, the government marked out routes along which cows could be taken to the abattoir; this was done by keeping in mind the religious configuration of different localities. But this demarcation of routes once again made it highly probable that a conflict could occur when sacrificial cows are being led to the slaughterhouse. Intensive policing and army

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deployment were used during festive occasions in order to avoid rioting in the city. For instance, serious riots broke out in 1924 and 1925 on the occasion of Bakra-Eid when cow processions clashed with the Hindu festivities of Dussehra. The government prohibited Pahari Dheeraj Road and other routes that passed through Hindudominated areas in order to avoid tension during Bakra-Eid. But this arrangement raised protests from the Muslim community and meat traders since Pahari Dheeraj Road was the shortest route to the Idgah slaughterhouse for Muslims living in the Sadar Bazar area.111 The scuffle resulted in a violent clash leading to attacks at a mosque. This issue erupted again in 1925 and the following year, resulting in several deaths and injuries. But the situation continuously went out of control and even the municipality could not control it. The Muslim members of the municipality proposed two solutions to deal with this situation. For a permanent solution, they suggested that the Muslim community should avoid the route during Bakra-Eid and requested the government to establish a new slaughterhouse at Bara Hindu Rao, a Muslim-dominated area. But these suggestions were ignored both by local meat traders and the government.112 The spatial mapping of the public routes automatically problematised the cultural practices of a particular community in the wider framework of national politics. By the early 20th century, the cow turned out to be the most significant symbol of differentiation between Hindus and Muslims of Delhi. The official demarcation of boundaries, which aimed at controlling communal conflicts, actually exaggerated religious differences. As a result, taking cows in the prohibited Hindu-dominated areas or keeping Muslims away from the prohibited areas at ‘special’ occasions became a way to make claims on space. Consequently, clashes occurred whenever there was an encounter between these conflicting claims that redefined, reconfirmed and re-established the division of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ areas at the local level. The administrative report of Delhi 1924– 1925, for instance, noted a violent communal clash between a

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‘Mohammedan boy and some Kahars (potters) at a well in which the boy was beaten badly.’113 It resulted in a small fight between two groups of people that the police effectively controlled. This incident, however, was recorded in a different way in the explanation of the nature of communal occurrences in the same report. According to the report: [I]n order to provoke the Hindus of that Mohalla, the Muslim group tried to take cows through that locality. It says, ‘the riot was caused by Mohemmadans [sic] attempting to take a cow for sacrifice through a Hindu Mohalla, in spite of a prohibition order by district magistrate… Mahemmadan [sic] gangs [attacked] on several Hindu houses and temples in side streets.114

The legalisation of the claims of different communities over public routes converted space into a permanent social category. Deliberate playing loud music during religious processions while passing through the areas where mosques were situated in an attempt to disturb the prayer turned out to be a similar kind of practice to assert claims and denial of claims on public space. Four out of ten major communal conflicts that occurred in the 1930s were centred on this particular issue. In this sense, the encounter between the consolidated religio-political identities and their claims converted everything into ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’.115 Consequently, the areas that were in close proximity to Hinduor Muslim-dominated localities became the most sensitive communal areas. This symbolic use of cow to arouse communal feelings was not confined to urban areas.116 Confrontations of this kind took place in villages situated on the city’s outskirts, such as in Jangpura in 1927. The village was dominated by the Hindu community; therefore, cow slaughter was prohibited. According to the Delhi administration report: On a representation from the Hindus the slaughter of cows in the village was forbidden and it was permitted only in the neighboring

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slaughter-house at Nizam-ud Din [sic]. When animals were being taken there, the Hindus attacked the Mohemmadans [sic] and the police had tried to rescue the cows.117

It is important to mention here that Jangpura was a stronghold of Arya Samaj activities and was getting exposed to the cow-protection movement in the wake of Hindu reform movements. This increasing communalisation of space resulted in more administrative control attempting to have clearer demarcation of space. After massive riots took place for three consecutive years from 1924 to 1926, the authorities intensified police arrangements for regulating all the festivals in the city—Muharram, Ramlila and Bakra-Eid. Revised and more intensive special police measures were implemented, specifically for the celebration of Bakra-Eid, due to the fanfare it involved throughout the city and for being an occasion prone to communal tension. In 1933, a much-organised programme was employed for patrolling the city during the Bakra-Eid celebration; it involved intensive surveillance and street-by-street information gathering in and around the Sadar Bazar area. These programmes were further revised to deal specifically with rioting situations. In 1934, a ‘scheme for police and other dispositions in the event of a communal riot in Delhi’—called the Communal Riot Scheme (CRS)— was issued for policing the city on Bakra-Eid days. The scheme was comprehensive and precautionary in nature. It had detailed instructions for controlling the spread of violence before and after the occurrence of a rioting situation. It had two important aspects: Its purpose was: ‘…to localize the rioting, to guard places of worship, picket “danger spots” and prevent gang attacks in mohallas, where one community is weak…’118 At this stage, the focus of policing was the areas where violence could be prevented by stopping the crowd passing through the streets and controlling them from spreading rumours. These were mainly the areas that were likely to spark off communal violence. In the second stage, the focus was to be shifted from these areas to those that should be protected in order to prevent

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them from attackers and avoid the possibility of violence turning into a full-scale riot. Consequently, every ward falling in the category of ‘sensitive’ pockets was policed and every street was patrolled and monitored for ‘disturbances’.119 The identification of streets and routes on communal lines classified the urban topography in terms of community identities. The domain of religious conflicts, thus, extended from cow processions to the deliberate use of music in religious processions and massive wedding celebrations passing through the areas where mosques were situated. Four out of ten major riots that occurred in the 1930s—which the administrative reports recorded as ‘genuine’ communal conflicts in terms of their nature—were centred around these issues. The communal situation had become so sensitive that it was difficult for authorities to differentiate between an ordinary conflict that involved a Hindu and a Muslim and a real communal disturbance. The fortnightly report of January 1939 suggests, ‘It is difficult to say what constitutes a “disturbance of a communal character”. Delhi is full of hooligans and it is hardly correct to describe every fight in which one side is Hindu and the other Muslim as a communal disturbance.’120 It perhaps implies that ordinary encounters often became entangled with religio-political identities and their claims converted everything into Hindu and Muslim.121 Consequently, areas that were in close proximity to Hindu- or Muslim-dominated localities became the most sensitive communal areas.

Politicised Religious Identities and the Self Defense The reformist Hindu and Muslim religious organisations further intensified the differences between communities. In fact, these groups transformed into political units and started evoking a new language of community interests.122 For example, Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, an umbrella organisation of Hindu reformist and orthodox movements established in 1915 in Banaras, shifted its headquarters to Delhi in 1925. It claimed to represent the ‘official’

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voice of the Hindu community.123 Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind was also founded during the Khilafat movement in 1919. The Muslim ulama (Islamic scholars) utilised this platform and represented themselves as the authoritative religious and political voice of India’s Muslims.124 The participation of Muslim religious elite in the Khilafat movement intensified the discourse of communal politics in India; however, it did not have a significant impact on Delhi.125 In 1926, the assassination of Swamy Shraddhanand, an Arya Samaj associate, by a Muslim and the outburst of riots in Bareilly in the same year deeply affected the communal atmosphere in Delhi. The Hindu–Muslim tension intensified and ‘community-based self-defence’ mechanism emerged as a new form of communal mobilisation. Organisations such as Arya Vir Dal and Arya Raksha Samiti along with Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (which also started sending its recruiters and cadres to different parts of the country) emerged in Delhi to provide an organised defence to Hindus.126 These political–religious movements were also intrinsically linked to the caste–class configuration of the city. The caste-based tussle among Hindu and Muslim groups and the conflicting commercial interests of community elites became entangled with the political ideologies of religious reform movements. For instance, the Arya Samaj began an aggressive shuddhi campaign in the name of Hindu inclusion in the areas in and outside the city walls inhabited by lower-caste, lower-class groups. The Arya Samaj movement received significant support from the Jat community, a prominent group in the largely Hindu-dominated pastoral industry. The Jat community, which was settled outside the city walls, gradually settled in the city after its westward expansion. This aggressive Jat support increased the prospects of violent Hindu movements as the community had played a very active role during riots and the periods of political instability in the past. Similarly, Muslim meat traders, especially the butchers, were a disgruntled group due to regularisation of meat by the municipality and the controversies over cow slaughter.

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The support given by Muslim organisations and Muslim leather merchants of the city to meat traders was also very significant in this regard. The issues of cow slaughter, cow processions and meat trade, in general, were appropriated by Muslim elites as an exclusive community issue. Like the Jat community, Muslim meat traders were the ‘front soldiers’ during communal clashes, not merely because of religious reasons but also because of their direct association with the production of meat. It is to be noted that butchers, Chamars (the tanner community from Hindu, Muslim and Christian religious groups), Muslim leather merchants and Muslim shoe merchants were parts of an economic chain that was sustained and somehow controlled by money floated by the upper-caste moneylenders in Delhi. The political appropriation of butchers, Chamars, Jats and other caste groups by religious organisations tended to change these other forms of social relationships in the city.127

Representation, Space and Constituencies Such conflicts had a direct impact on the issue of communal representation. The debates on municipal reforms under the ‘reforms scheme’ and the recommendations of the decentralisation commission from 1918 onwards re-established the relationship between space and communities as political categories. The issue of separate electorate became important again in the municipality. Questions such as who represents whom? gradually evolved and finally transformed into the famous debate on mixed/joint versus separate electorates. After a long discussion, the system of separate electorate was finally extended to the local administrative body in Delhi. It was decided that one Hindu and one Muslim candidate should be elected from each double-member constituency. The chief commissioner, elaborating the law explained that: The point of introducing two members in each ward was to avoid friction caused by Hindu–Muslim contests. It follows that in each

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ward Hindus must vote for a Hindu candidate, and Muslims for a Muslim. Otherwise, in some of the wards where Hindus predominate, they would control the election not only of the Hindus but of the Muslims also.128

The reason given by the commissioner behind the implementation of separate electorate and rejection of joint electorate was that municipality members were, ‘Free to give unreserved expressions to communal demands resulting in considerable communal tension in the committee’s deliberations…’129 The notion of separate electorate became more complicated in the 1920s. The reforms of 1919 had already provided for separate electorates for smaller minorities like Sikhs, AngloIndians, Christians and Europeans. In the 1920s, representations of religious sub-groups such as Shias and, most importantly, commercial and professional groups like merchants and bankers emerged as points of discussions. The municipality passed a resolution in 1924 in favour of joint electorates. It was proposed that a voter should cast two votes: one for a Hindu candidate and the other for a Muslim candidate. But in view of the changed political scenario, the officials rejected this proposal.130 The 1924 riots during the Bakra-Eid festival over cows taken to the Idgah– Jhandewalan slaughterhouse were crucial in this discussion. The Muslim members overwhelmingly opposed the municipal resolution for joint electorates and made a plea for separate electorates in order to safeguard the community’s interests. By the 1930s, separate electorates were established as an official norm at all levels of government. The Delimitation Commission of India (1936) provided the provision for separate electorates at the level of the assembly. Thus, the whole Delhi territory was treated as one chief commissioner’s province along with British Baluchistan, Ajmer Merwada and Coorg. It was divided into Federal Assembly and Council of State constituencies. The Assembly constituency was further divided into two seats: General

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constituency and Mohammedan constituency. For the Council of State, there was provision for only one General constituency.131 The communal electorate for Federal Assembly defined the Muslims of Delhi into one singular electoral unit and at the same time demarcated the spaces permanently as minority or majority spaces, or more precisely as Hindu or Muslim constituencies. Communal demography thus began to define political space in Delhi. It is, however, important to emphasise that the franchise was limited to particular landed and educated classes of Hindus and Muslims who were more inclined towards their commercial and professional interests. The relationship between community and space that was defined during the 1803–1940 period produced a complex matrix of identities and politics in Delhi. The British administrative mechanism created multilayered divisions through categorisation, classification, enumeration and mapping of communities and spaces for the efficient management of social and economic life in the city. It transformed the shared, common space of Delhi into a structured public space defined through mapping of routes, scheduling of processions and police patrolling. It created a strong division between public space and community space by confining the performance of certain practices within the boundaries of demarcated space ‘inhabited’ by a particular community. As a result, notions such as Hindu-dominated, Muslim-dominated and mixed localities emerged (Appendix). This transformation of social groups into homogeneous religious communities produced complex configurations. First, the practices associated with meat, which were historically shared amongst numerous caste groups not only in relation to its consumption but also as an economic activity, became contested. This contestation escalated from meat being stigmatised in the first stage to being politicised in the second and communalised in the final stage during the 19th and 20th centuries. In this sense, meat practice became a marker of communal space.

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Second, the official vocabulary of minority–majority communities, evolving norms of community-based electoral representation and notions of legalities and illegalities in relation to the performance of religious and cultural practices infused a sense of ownership among communities.

Notes 1

2

3

4

Sandria B. Freitag, Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 1–20. Sudipta Kaviraj, The Imaginary Institutions of India: Politics and Ideas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 39–40. Sudipta Kaviraj’s argument that colonialism should not only be studied as a historical object but also as a discourse is very relevant here. He suggests that we need to raise a few ‘second order questions’ to make sense of the historical foundations of those questions that we encounter in our ‘present’. Narayani Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 1803–1931: Society, Government and Urban Growth (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), 2. Also see Stephen P. Blake, Shahjahanabad; The Sovereign City in Mughal India, 1639–1739 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 57, 15–17 and 161–173; Percival Spear, Delhi: A Historical Sketch (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1945), 33–42; Percival Spear, Twilight of the Mughuls: Studies in Late Mughul Delhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 1–12; Stephen P. Blake, ‘Cityscape of an Imperial Capital: Shahjahanabad in 1739’, in Delhi Through the Ages: Selected Essays in Urban History, Culture and Society, ed. R.E. Frykenberg (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), 153–163. See Francois Bernier, Travels in the Mogal Empire: A.D. 1656–1668, 2nd. edn. (New Delhi: S. Chand & Company, 1968), 241. Also see Gordon Risley Hearn, Cities of Delhi: A Description and History (Delhi: Thacker, Spinck & Company, 1928); Patwant Singh, ‘The Nine Delhis: Historical Perspective’, in Delhi: The Deepening Urban Crisis, ed. Patwant Singh and Ram Dhamija (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1989),

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5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12

13

14 15

16 17 18

19

67

13–18; Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires; Blake, Shahjahanabad; Spear, Delhi: A Historical Sketch; Spear, Twilight of the Mughals. Spear, Twilight of the Mughals, 10 and 92; Blake, Shahjahanabad, 169– 171. Ibid., 170–171. Spear, Twilight of the Mughals, 85–88. For a theoretical understanding on the idioms of dominance and power employed by the British rule in India and its implications in the emergence of a specific kind of political system in South Asia see Ranajit Guha, Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 25–28. Spear, Twilight of the Mughals, 88. Ibid., 170–171. Ibid., 88–89. Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 3–11. Ibid., 11. Also see R.E. Frykenberg, Delhi Through the Ages: Selected Essays in Urban History, Culture and Society (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 140–142. For caste- and craft-based demographic pattern of mohallas of Shahjahanabad see Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 52–55 and Blake, Shahjahanabad, 82–85. Blake, Shahjahanabad, 178. Margret Pernau, Ashraf into Middle Classes: Muslims in Nineteenth Century Delhi (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 266. Also see Narayani Gupta, ‘Delhi and Its Hinterland: The Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries’, in Delhi Through the Ages, ed. R.E. Frykenberg, 140–142. Spear, Twilight of the Mughals, 195.

Blake, Shahjahanabad, 150–153.

Rana Safvi, ‘Dussehra Festivities in Shahjahanabad’, Economic and

Political Weekly XLVIII, no. 41 (12 October 2013). Available at: http:// hazrat-e-dilli.com/dussehra-festivities-in-shahjahanbad-2/ (Accessed on 23 May 2014). C.A. Bayly, ‘The Pre-History of “Communalism”? Religious Conflict in India, 1700–1860’, Modern Asian Studies 19, no. 2 (1985), 202 (177– 203).

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68 20 21 22 23

24 25

26 27

Spear, Twilight of the Mughals, 195. Bayly, ‘The Pre-History of ‘Communalism’, 203. Freitag, Collective Action and Community, 1–20. Kenneth W. Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India: The New Cambridge History of India, III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) See Aziz Ahmad, ‘An Eighteenth-Century Theory of the Caliphate’, Studia Islamica, no. 28 (1968), 135–144. M. Hermansen, ‘Fakirs, Wahhabis and Others: Reciprocal Classifications and the Transformation of Intellectual Categories’, In Perspectives of Mutual Encounters in South Asian History 1760–1860, ed. J. Malik (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Marc Gaborieu, ‘A Nineteenth-Century Indian ‘Wahhabi’ Tract Against the Cult of Muslim Saints: Al Balag al Mubin’, in Muslim Shrines in India, ed. Christian Troll (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 198–239; Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims: the Politics of the United Provinces Muslims 1860–1923 (Delhi: Oxford University Press 1993); Francis Robinson, The ‘Ulama of Farangi Mahal and Islamic Culture in South Asia (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001); Muhammad Qasim Zaman, ‘Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrasa in British India and Pakistan’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 2 (1999), 294–323; P. Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Christian W. Troll, Sayyid Ahmad Khan: a Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1978); Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmed Riza Khan and His Movement, 1870–1920 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996). Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 9. Kenneth W. Jones, ‘Organized Hinduism in Delhi and New Delhi’, in Delhi Through the Ages, ed. R.E. Frykenberg. 208. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986. Also see: Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India; Amiya P. Sen, Social and Religious Reform: The Hindus of British India. Debates in Indian History and Society (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003); Swaminath Natarajan, A Century of Social Reform in India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House,

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28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43

69

1959); Charles Herman Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964); Dermot Killingley, ‘Modernity, Reform and Revival’, in The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism, ed. Gavin Flood (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 509–525; John Nicole Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements in India (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1964). Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 12. Ibid., 15. Ian Copland, ‘What to Do About Cows? Princely State Versus British Approaches to a South Asian Dilemma’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 68, no. 1 (2005), 60–62. Ian Copland argues that there was no uniform principle on the slaughter of cows in pre-colonial India. Every princely state has a different principle based on the size and requirement of Hindu and Muslim population divided regionally. Ibid., 65. Spear, Twilight of the Mughal, 196–197 and 170–171. Mehmood Farooqui, Besieged: Voices from Delhi 1857 (Delhi: Penguin, 2010), 155. Copland, ‘What to Do About Cows?’ 60–62. Gregory C. Kozlowski, Muslim Endowments and Society in British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1–17. Spear, Twilight of the Mughal, 195. Ibid. Cf. Awadhendra Sharan, In the City, Out of Place: Nuisance, Pollution and Dwelling in Delhi. C. 1850–2000 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 75. Cf. Ibid., 75. Ibid., 75–76. These norms were applied in Delhi in 1853 by Thomas Metcalf since the Delhi territory was a part of the Punjab province. Spear, Twilight of the Mughals, 196. Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 53–54. Spear, Twilight of the Mughals, 197. The word ‘halal’ means ‘permissible’ in Arabic. It is associated with any object or action that is permissible to use or engage in according to Islamic law. Halal animals mean animals whose meat is permissible by Islamic law for human consumption.

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44 Ibid., 194–204. Spear provides an interesting contextual background to this petition. 45 Ibid., 196. 46 Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 53–54. 47 Ibid. 48 For an analysis on the gradual transformation of community space into public space administered by the colonial authorities see Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘Filth and the Public Sphere: Concepts and Practices about Space in Calcutta’, Public Culture 10, no. 1 (1997), 83–113. 49 Cf. Farooqui, Besieged, 155. 50 Cf. Ibid. 51 Ibid., 157–158. 52 Cf. William Dalrymple, The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi, 1857 (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), 297. 53 Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 21. 54 Ibid. 55 Spear, Twilight of the Mughals, 220–221. 56 Ibid., 220. 57 Dalrymple, The Last Mughal, 386. 58 Ibid. 59 The remains of the Akbarabadi Mosque were found recently during the construction of an underground metro station near Jama Masjid: http:// www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/high-drama-at-akbarabadimosque-site/article3667112.ece (Accessed on 23 July 2014). 60 Spear, Twilight of the Mughals, 221. 61 Dalrymple, The Last Mughal, 386. 62 Spear, Twilight of the Mughal, 220. 63 Dalrymple, The Last Mughal, 386. 64 Ibid., 443–447. The official report by W.W. Hunter, ‘Indian Musalman’, insisted upon the factor of ‘Jihad’ (a religious war) on the other hand, the Sayyed Ahmed Khan’s report submitted to the British government titled Asbab-e-Baghawat-e-Hind (Causes of Indian Revolt) broadly argued that the lack of Indian participation in governance was the main reason behind the mutiny. See Shan Mohammad, Writing and Speeches of Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications, 1971). 65 Dalrymple, The Last Mughal, 461–462.

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66 Blake, Shahjahanabad, 173–175 and Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 3–4. 67 Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 23. 68 Blake, Shahjahanabad, 84 and Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 39 and 54. 69 Pernau, Ashraf into Middle Classes, 10–15. 70 Kotwali means police headquarters. Here it is referred to the Mughal system of policing. 71 Farzana Shaikh, Community and Consensus: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860–1947 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 52. 72 Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 117. 73 Sheikh, Community and Consensus, 50–52. 74 Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 85. 75 Shaikh, Community and Consensus, 95. 76 Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 70. 77 Ibid., 73–79. 78 Hardy, The Muslims of British India, 117. 79 For a discussion on separate communal electorates in the Bengal legislative council see Shaikh, Community and Consensus. Shaikh, Community and Consensus, 111. 80 Source: Hand drawn by Vikaram Nayak based on information collected from Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 161. 81 Delhi was the only district in Punjab that was denied full self-governance due to the fear of communal clash and its strategic location. For details see Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 111–115 and 143. 82 Following this an open ballot system was followed. Contrary to the fear of British, more Muslims were elected than Hindus from different wards. There was a majority of Hindu voters but six Muslims were elected as against five Hindus. 83 An open ballot system was followed. Twelve municipal members had to be elected out of the total number of twenty-four members of the municipality. Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 119. 84 Ibid., 120. 85 Ibid., 119–121.

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72 86 87 88 89 90

91

92

93 94

95

96 97 98 99 100 101

Ibid., 121.

Ibid., 118.

Ibid., 55 and 81.

Jones, ‘Organized Hinduism’, 212.

For example, Muslim reform organisation like Anjuman-i-Imani,

Anjuman Islamia and Anjuman-e-Rifaiat-e-Hind were established in 1871 and 1875. The establishment of a branch of Arya Samaj, a revolutionary Hindu reform movement in 1976 by Swami Vivekanand Saraswati, was the first move towards an organised form of Hinduism in Delhi. Jain temple and Gurudwara Sisganj Sahib were also built in the 1870s. Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 102. Anjuman Islamia used to publish three newspapers: Nusrat-ul-Akbar, Nusrat-ul-Islam and Mihir-e-Darakshan. See Jones, ‘Organized Hinduism’, 212. Arya Samaj  was founded by the sannyasi (ascetic) Dayanand Saraswati on 10 April 1875. It is a revolutionary movement whose main objective is to rid society of superstitions. Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), 163–166. Christopher Penny, Photos of God: The Printed Image and Political Struggle in India (London: Reaktion Books, 2004), 107; Anand A. Yang, ‘A Conversation of Rumors: The Language of Popular “Mentalities” in Late Nineteenth-Century Colonial India’, Journal of Social History 20, no. 3 (1987), 485–505. Jones, ‘Organized Hinduism’, 207–209. Although these organisations were divided on ideological lines, there emerged a consensus on the supremacy of Hindu rituals and adherence to the protection and upliftment of Hindu culture. Jones, ‘Organized Hinduism’, 210. Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 127–129.

Cf. Sharan, In the City, Out of Place, 78.

Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 129.

Ibid., 132. Sharan, In the City, Out of Place, 80. Also see Stephen Legg, Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi’s Urban Governmentalities (Malden: Blackwell Publishing 2007), 122–123.

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110 111

112 113 114 115 116

73

Legg, Spaces of Colonialism, 123–124. Legg, Spaces of Colonialism, 124. Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 146. Ibid., 148. Ibid., 188–189. Cf. Sharan, In the City, Out of Place, 3. Cf. Ibid., 5. Sharan, In the City, Out of Place, 84–85. It was only after the municipal bye-laws in 1912 that the improvement of slaughterhouses came into focus. Following that, the time of bringing cattle for slaughter to a slaughterhouse was fixed (3 am and 11 am ) and the inspection of animals before slaughter became compulsory. Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 200.

For details see Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 39, 51, 61, 65 and

67. Sadar Bazar was developed by the British in the 1860s. Initially, only the shopkeepers and the Muslim dwellers who were displaced from the city after 1857 clearance drive settled in the nearby localities of Sadar Bazar. But it extended extensively and got connected with the Idgah, Kishanganj and Pahari Dheeraj with the development of railways and industries after the 1970s. Most of these industries were owned by Muslim and Hindu upper-caste/upper-class merchants who also patronised the Fatehpuri Masjid and Jhandewalan Temple, respectively. The construction of a new slaughterhouse in 1915 led to the extension of the administrative demarcation of routes to these areas as well. Given the commercial interests as well as religion and caste associations of population, Sadar Bazar area became communally sensitive. Ibid., 218. ‘Report on the Administration of Delhi Province for 1924–25’ (Calcutta: GOI Central Publication Branch, 1926), 3. ‘Report on the Administration of Delhi Province for 1924–25’ (Calcutta: GOI Central Publication Branch, 1926), 11. ‘Press Note’, Office of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi (Home/ Political–1939, File no. 22/15/39). Cow processions by Hindus and Muslims in the later stage was a practice that emerged in the nineteenth century. The procession by

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117 118 119

120 121 122

123 124

Hindus involved the parading of a decorated cow through different routes to the temple for worshipping. This practice emerged with the cow protection movement after the 1880s and became a prominent Hindu tradition in north India. On the other hand, Muslims adopted this new form of parading a decorated cow before sacrifice on Eid day. This practice became highly contentious in Delhi with the construction of slaughterhouses outside the city wall and the mapping of routes going through different Hindu/Muslim-dominated areas. ‘Report on the Administration of Delhi Province for 1928–29’ (Calcutta: GOI Central Publication Branch, 1926), 13. Cf. Legg, Spaces of Colonialism, 128 and 146. Ibid., 129. Legg further explains that the intention behind these strict police arrangements was to stop the rioters from entering New Delhi and Civil Lines, which is home to the Delhi administration and local elite population. ‘Press Note’, Office of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, GOI, Home/ Poll.–(I), 1939, File no. 22/1/39. National Archives of India (NAI). ‘Press Note’, Office of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, GOI, Home/ Poll.–(I), 1939, File no. 22/15/39 (NAI). A number of Hindu and Muslim political organisations emerged in Delhi during and after the 1930s. Walter Andersen, ‘The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh–II: Who Represents the Hindus?’, Economic and Political Weekly 7, no. 12 (18 March 1972), 633–640; Jones, ‘Organized Hinduism’; Also see significant archival files: ‘Information Bureau Report (IBR)’, 1939, Government of India (GOI), Home-Political (Poll.)–(I), 1939, File no. 71/39, NAI. Further references could also be found in ‘Fortnightly Report (FR)’, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), 1939, File no. 18/4/39. NAI; ‘IBR’, April 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 15/4/46. NAI; ‘FR’, Delhi, September 1946, GOI, Home-Poll–(I), File no. 18/9/46. NAI; ‘FR’, Delhi, May 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 30/5/46. NAI. Jones, ‘Organized Hinduism’, 213. See Freitag, Collective Action and Community, 1–25. The  Khilafat movement  (1919–1922) is considered to be an important aspect of the history of communalism in India. Freitag argues that the conflicts that took place after 1920 in India were communal in nature with a

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125

126 127 128 129 130 131

75

pan-Indian overtone, unlike the more localised and religious occurrences of the 19th century. See Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Calcutta: Asia Publishing House, 1963), Ch. IV. Also see ‘FR’, March 1942, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), 1942, File no. 18/3/1942. NAI. Jones, ‘Organized Hinduism’, 214. Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 219. Cf. Ibid., 214. Cf. Ibid., 216. Ibid., 216. ‘Indian Delimitation Commission: Proposals for the Delimitation of Constituencies in the Provincial and Central Legislature’, Volume II (Shimla: Government of India Press, 1936), 227.

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2

Contested Homelands: Territorial

Nations and the Idea of Pakistan

The politicisation of space and community that started in Delhi in the late 19th century came to its fruition at a pan-India level in the 1940s through the idea of Pakistan and the politics around it. Partition studies, it seems, often struggle to understand whether the idea of Pakistan was imagined ‘sufficiently’ or ‘insufficiently’.1 This kind of argument is based on a strong assumption that the idea of Pakistan was a manufactured doctrine, intended to dismantle the territorial integrity of India. The post-Cabinet Mission political debates on the future of British India and the actual (violent!) process of Partition are taken as evidence to justify such claims. Consequently, the guilt of the partition of South Asia is somehow transferred to Muslims permanently.2 It is, therefore, important to situate the idea of Pakistan in the wider discussion of ‘homeland’, which tried to define India in varied forms and gave numerous interpretations of community–space relations in the 1940s. This chapter focuses upon this discourse of homeland to show how it reinforced the demarcation of space into ‘Hindu-dominated’, ‘Muslim-dominated’ and ‘mixed’ areas. It also looks at the ways in which the ownership of space was claimed by various communities to perform cultural and religious practices in the 1940s. Following this logic of ownership, the chapter tries to explore the imposed sense of ‘insecurity’ that led to the political elite making spatial claims in an organised way. The chapter discusses a few important questions. How did the dominant political ideologies define the geopolitical space of British 76

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India and its relationship with different communities, specifically the Muslims? What were the local manifestations of this discourse in Delhi? How were the conflicting notions of homeland, especially of Pakistan, and the associated political negotiations received at the local level? How were the narratives of ‘difference’ understood at the local level and did they lead to new claims and/or denial of claims by communities on space? And finally, how did it define the community–space relation in terms of Muslims in Delhi?

I

Discourse of Homeland: Ideas of India and

Contested Demography

To understand the nature of the discourse of homeland, two important aspects of colonial politics need to be underlined. First, the colonial legal–administrative categories provided a space for varied interpretations of India as a political entity. The legal arrangements for proportional representation on a communal basis under the Indian Councils Act of 1909 and the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 did identify Muslims as a minority entitled to separate political representation. This recognition of Muslim exclusiveness provided a framework to envisage a distinct territorial space for Muslims politically.3 This kind of imagination was contingent upon the ways in which colonial legality was instituted. It gave a powerful language to the political elite who constructed historical narratives, manipulated the present differences and proposed different designs for envisaging ideal forms of the nation.4 Second, British India as a territorial entity had a complicated form. Apart from various British administrative provinces, there were a number of princely states with a very distinct relationship with the colonial state. In such a scenario, imagining or proposing a concrete set of schemes for a separate or united independent nationstate would be difficult. Moreover, since all the political actors were

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principally concerned with British India, the fate of the ‘space’ governed by the princely states was not entirely clear.5 Let us look at two different ideas of homeland that emerged in the 1940s. On the one side, there was the imagination of a culturally diverse yet territorially united India. This position was shared by Jawaharlal Nehru, the main leader of Congress, and Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani, the leader of the Jamiat-Ulama i-Hind. On the other end was the idea of a culturally homogenous political space or nation-state—either an exclusive Muslim state of Pakistan or an undivided Hindu nation-state called Akhand Bharat in which there would be no place for non-Hindus. Both Mohammad Ali Jinnah (and the Muslim League) and Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (and Hindu Mahasabha) seemed to subscribe to this position but for very different reasons (Appendix).6 These two dominant imaginings of nation-state not merely demarcated the community–space relation in different ways but also affected the complex configuration of local politics. Thus, it will be worthwhile to discuss these ideas for making sense of the local political discourse in Delhi of the 1940s.7 Nehru’s imagination of a culturally integrated and territorially united India presents an idea of a composite and secular India. For Nehru, ‘nationalism is essentially a group memory of the past achievements, traditions and experiences.’8 Although he was less interested in the territorial make-up of India, the unity of different regions including British India and the autonomous princely states was so essential for him that he tended to reject all possibilities of divisions. For instance, he suggested that ‘to accept the principle of the division of India or rather the principle that there should be no enforced unity may lead to a calm and dispassionate consideration of its consequences and thus to a realization that unity is in the interests of all.’9 In this sense, the idea of secular Indian homeland constructed by Nehru had limited space for such assertions or ‘nations’ aspiring for self-determination. According to him:

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Whether India is properly to be described as one nation or two or more really does not matter. For [the] modern idea of nationality has been almost divorced from statehood. The national state is too small a unit today and small states have no independent existence…. The national state is thus giving space to multi-nation[al] states or large federations.10

The Nehruvian construction of the idea of the Indian nation lies in its ever-evolving nature. He constructed a secular narrative of Indian past. He emphasised the ethnic and regional transnational character of political encounters and cultural traditions that contributed to the making of this nation–space. For him, India was a space for a federation of diverse nations.11 Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani formulated the idea of a composite and united India from a theological perspective. He argued that all faiths deviated initially from Islam as different sects but later organised themselves into different religions due to the messages delivered by various prophets (avatars). Referring to the Quran he said, ‘mankind was but one nation’. In this sense, he argued that India was also a land of prophets who came to spread the message of Islam before Prophet Mohammad.12 Thus, they shared a common religious heritage. In terms of the Muslim political claim over space, he elaborated, ‘Like the Aryans, Greeks, Egyptians, Turks, Mongols et al. who have come … and settled … Muslims too have made India their permanent homeland.’13 He, in this sense, argues for a collective possession of this space shared by all religious communities. While differentiating between a nation called qaum and religious community called umma, he suggests that Muslims are a part of Islamic umma in terms of belief but they are an inseparable part of India as a nation.14 In fact, according to him, Muslims have a greater claim over this space than Hindus because they submerge completely in the soil of this land after death. He argues for a united India based on composite heritage. However, Madani, like Nehru, does not try to dilute the collective religious self. Instead, he argues

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for assuming religious identity with rights of religious freedom and a policy of non-interference in each other’s beliefs and practices.15 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, on the other hand, was not interested in the historical construction of India’s past like Nehru or theological construction of composite claims since his ‘exclusionist’ argument cannot incorporate the cultural encounters and, more specifically, the evolved Indian Islamic traditions. Deconstructing the given definition of the unity of India, he claims that Hindus and Muslims are two distinct nations who must have an equal right over this space. According to him, ‘Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory, and their state.’16 Therefore, the category of culture and civilisation for Jinnah, like Nehru, is important for his description of the idea of India. But, he attempts to highlight ‘differences’ to claim a Muslim homeland. Jinnah, in this sense, seems to work out two possible principles to define the idea of space. He suggests that ‘geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments … that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority … should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.’17 Second, he explains: In the parts of India where Musalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided … for them and other minorities, for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.18

Jinnah, emphasising differences, aspires for a political right to selfdetermination to establish a legal claim on the space ‘occupied’ by the Indian Muslim community.19 For him, ‘nation does not live in the air. It lives on land, it must govern land and it must have a territorial state.’20

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Vinayak Damodar Savarkar proposed an idea of politically, ethnically and religiously demarcated territorial Hindu–Indian space. Defining a strong Other, Savarkar proposed a territorial nation, which categorically denies all claims of self-determination by other communities. For Savarkar, Hindusthan (as Sanskritised from the Persian term Hindustan) meant the land of Hindus. He explained that the ‘first essential of Hindutva must necessarily be … [the] geographical one. A Hindu is primarily a citizen … of “Hindusthan” and claimed the land as his motherland.’21 According to his conceptualisation, only they have a claim on this space who love the land that stretches from Sindhu to Sindhu, from the Indus to the Seas, as their fatherland consequently claim to inherit the blood of the race that has evolved, by incorporation and adaptation, from the ancient Sapta Sindhus can be said to possess two of the most essential requisites of Hindutva … of one nation and one race—of a common fatherland and … common blood.22

Savarkar constructed an essentially Hindu idea of India, which is even greater than Hinduism. He established an exclusive Hindu claim on the lands and territories of India. The idea of having a homeland, in his conception, meant emancipation of the sacred Hindu space called Bharata (India) from the influence of alien cultures—Islam and Christianity—which have not only destroyed Hindu Vedic cultural heritage and traditions but also traumatised and desecrated the Hindu race. It could only be achieved through the transfer of power to Hindus.23 The comparative analysis of these contextually formulated dominant political ideologies of homeland reveals that space as a geographic phenomenon and its association with the community was articulated in very different ways in the 1940s. Nehru’s, Madani’s and, to some extent, Jinnah’s claims were not space centric. Nehru’s imagination of space was shared and evolutionary; Madani’s notion of space was sacred and Jinnah’s definition of space was

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community-based. In contrast, Savarkar’s idea of space was also community-based, but it was defined quite categorically in terms of religion and race. These ideological positions defined the claims of communities over space in terms of their legal and political rights to perform cultural and religious practices. These ideas of ‘homeland’, thus, established certain new definitions of ‘secularism’, ‘nationalism’, ‘communalism’ and, most importantly, communal (religious) identities.24 Interestingly, the identity of Muslims in post-partition North India emerged as the victim of this discourse, primarily because its place in the evolving ideas of India, Pakistan and Hindu Rashtra (state) had always been contested.

‘Imagined’ and ‘Real’ Space: Designs of a ‘Muslim India’ Called Pakistan The idea of Pakistan became the most important reference point for understanding the notion of ‘Muslim homeland’, which was pursued, countered, analysed and negotiated in high politics after it was proposed as a political demand in 1940.25 Therefore, it became a political compulsion for the Muslim League to provide concrete plans for realising a territorial nation. Various schemes were drafted by Muslim League associates to visualise geographic representations of Hindu and Muslim nations on Indian space.26 These schemes articulated the so-called Muslim demand by arguing for a division of space into ‘majority provinces’ and ‘minority provinces’ based on the concentration of Muslims and Hindus, with a guarantee of effective safeguards for minorities. The Aligarh scheme was designed by Professor Syed Zafarul Hasan and Dr M.A.H. Qadri. Criticising the famous Sikandar Hayat’s Scheme of Indian Federations and Punjabi’s Confederacy of India Scheme, these Aligarh scholars insisted that the Muslims of India, ‘a nation by themselves’, must not be ‘enslaved into a single all-India federation with an overwhelming Hindu majority in the Centre’. They argued that India should be divided into several

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wholly independent states—Pakistan, Hindustan, Hyderabad and Bengal—with a possibility of Delhi and Malabar as two new autonomous provinces with a strong Muslim minority.27 Focusing on a three states formula, the Aligarh scheme explained that Pakistan and Bengal should be recognised as the homeland for the Muslims and Hindustan the homeland of the Hindus, with no restriction on inter-state migration of the inhabitants/citizens. It was suggested that ‘Muslims in rural areas of Hindustan must be persuaded not to remain scattered as negligible minorities, but to aggregate in villages with a predominantly Muslim population.’28 He further proposed that ‘In Hindustan Muslims are to be recognized as a nation in a minority and a part of a larger nation inhabiting Pakistan and Bengal.’29 Thus, according to these Aligarh scholars, Muslims should not be deprived of their separate religious, cultural and political identity and should be given full and effective support by Muslim majority provinces. It was argued that ‘an accredited Muslim political organization will be the sole official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan.’30 The scheme advocated effective constitutional safeguards and a separate electorate to protect the religious, cultural, political and economic rights of Muslim sub-groups in Hindustan and non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan, including Sikh, non-caste Hindus etc. It proposed that the three states of Pakistan, Bengal and Hindustan would enter into defensive and offensive alliances to accommodate and safeguard the ‘sub-groups’ living in each state.31 This imagination of homeland, especially by the Aligarh school, indicates the ambiguities inherent in the idea of a territorially defined national space based on the construction of homogenous identities. First of all, the schemes or the idea of Pakistan placed the space and community relations in a paradox: it defined space as a fixed entity demarcated by legally codified boundaries while pursuing claims on that space from the perspective of subjective associations, such as belief systems, cultural practices, belongingness and the communities’

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right to self-determination. Thus, it created a permanent tussle between the ‘imagined’ and ‘real’ spaces for Muslim communities. For instance, the demarcation of Muslim ‘majority provinces’ and ‘minority provinces’ put the identity of North Indian Muslims in a complicated matrix: on the one hand they had their ideological association with that ‘ideal’ or ‘imagined’ space (‘majority provinces’), but they had to relate to the ‘existing’ or ‘real’ space (in ‘minority provinces’) on the other. Furthermore, they were classified as ‘sub national’ groups, as according to Jinnah, ‘Muslims in the United Provinces are not a national group; they are scattered. Therefore, in constitutional language, they are characterized as a sub-national group who cannot expect anything more than what is due from any civilized government to a minority.’32 Interestingly, this ‘sub-national group’ could be a part of the ‘religious collective’ Jinnah was arguing about but not the territorial space that he was claiming for. Second, these divisions were proposed on the basis of established official categories of Muslim-dominated, Hindu-dominated and mixed areas. This imagination of homogenous cultural zones led to the conceptualisation of space populated by the majority community as ideal and uncontested. On the other hand, it quite obviously characterised ‘mixed’ spaces like cities, localities, mohallas and galies as units that were inherently contested. Such classifications re enforced the need for a minority community like the Muslims to stick together and form their exclusive cultural zones as a guarantee of ‘security’ in regions dominated by Hindus. In this sense, it objectified the collective presence of Muslims in certain demarcated spaces and made such Muslim majority zones unacceptable to other ideas of homeland, such as Akhand Bharat and inclusive/secular India. These imaginations nevertheless had an impact on the ongoing process of codification and legalisation of collective claims on communally demarcated space at the local level. These debates consolidated the process of the contestation of cultural practices and community identities. But a question should be raised here: were people aware

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of such an imagination of ‘Pakistan’ in Delhi, as they did not even belong to a ‘minority province’? Were they able to relate to their real spaces while referring to their imagined homelands?

Popular Meanings of Pakistan It is important to note that the idea of Pakistan was compatible with the political realities of the 1930s and 1940s. It was not a break or rupture that destabilised the already communalised discourse of late colonialism. In fact, Pakistan became a point of reference even for those who favoured communal harmony and the unity of India. Therefore, it is worth looking at the popular imagination of the idea of Pakistan in Delhi in the mid-1940s. This aspect could be explored at two levels: what Pakistan meant for Muslims in Delhi and how it was contested? A few in-depth interviews with Muslim residents of old Delhi who witnessed the processes leading towards Partition may introduce us to the popular meanings of Pakistan at the local level in the mid-1940s. A respondent named Mirza Zameer (name changed), referred to here as Mirza Sahib, who was in his 80s at the time of the interview, recalls his school days in the early months of 1947.33 On the question how he recalls the association of Muslims with the idea of Pakistan at that time, he says, ‘we were given Muslim League badges and Jinnah caps that we wore proudly. As students, we were not interested in the political debates on Pakistan, but these things made us Muslim in that particular context.’34 Pakistan had to be a territorial space owned by Muslims. However, the territoriality of this space was not at all important for common Muslims because it produced an imagined Muslim space. Muslims who supported the League in Delhi, according to Mirza Sahib, were aware of the fact that ‘Pakistan would be established; but where it would be established and whether or not their own houses, mohallas or even the city would become a part of it did not even come in people’s minds’.35 It shows that when their ideas were translated into the

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realities of Partition, only then they came to know that their ‘Muslim’ identity needed to be configured with the new territorial ‘nation(s)’. The Congress leader Maulana Abul Kalam Azad also subscribed to this aspect in his book titled India Wins Freedom. He noted, with reference to Jinnah’s message to North Indian Muslims to stay in India as a loyal minority: As I talked to them [League supporters] I realised that these men had formed a picture of Partition, which had no relevance to the real situation … these Muslim Leaguers had been foolishly persuaded that once Pakistan was formed, Muslims whether they came from majority or minority province would be regarded as a separate nation and would enjoy the right to determine their own future.36

Azad explained that the Muslims of North India had created an illusory idea of Pakistan in their mind, which was beyond the realities of Partition. Pakistan, in this sense, meant a ‘legal’ claim on the space—galies, mohallas, localities—where they lived to perform cultural and religious practices. This is exactly what Mirza Sahib asserts: ‘Pakistan meant a right to be able to live in their own ways wherever they [were].’37 On the question why his family did not move to Pakistan, Mirza Sahib replied that nobody would like to leave her/his belongings, house or surroundings where her/his ancestors have grown. It’s not only that, going to Pakistan even in that period of violence was considered as ghaddari (betrayal) with the neighbours and qaum. He explained: There was mili-juli abadi (mixed population) in our mohalla and there had never been any conflict. People from here actually went to Pakistan secretly, mostly during the night, because of the shame that they were not only breaking mohalladari (the collective feelings of living together) but also leaving their fellow Muslim brothers behind. There were only a few, mainly Leaguers, who went willingly; otherwise, it was a majboori (compulsion) due to fear of violence and hopelessness.38

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Mirza Sahib’s narrative could be refuted as merely a ‘survival strategy’ of Muslims—who once associated themselves with the Muslim League’s propaganda—living in India in the current political scenario. But, this is a reality Muslims can associate with: as the idea of Pakistan evolved and established, as a metaphor for the imagination of Muslim collective identity and as a nation at that time to make ‘legitimate’ claims on their physical space. It does not, however, mean that the making of Pakistan was never debated in Delhi. There were Muslim League campaigns in Delhi and people participated in them, though there was not much enthusiasm. A local respondent Mohammad Sayeed (name changed), who proudly described his family as a ‘traditionally Congress supporter family’ and whose father was a freedom fighter, explained: Demand for Pakistan created divisions within Muslim families. There was a time, especially after 1945, when there were Muslim Leaguers and Congressmen within families, creating severe ideological disputes among brothers and between fathers and children…. [Muslim] Leaguers were criticised in families as firqaparast (sectarians) and enemies of qaum (nation) and qaumi ittehad (communal harmony), responsible for destroying the peace for the benefit of a bunch of selfish leaders.39

According to him, Congress Muslims used to highlight the falsity and inherent obscurities related to the idea of Pakistan to underline the weaknesses of Muslim League’s political mobilisation. The Government of India’s fortnightly reports of September 1946 on the political situation in Delhi quite rightly confirm this aspect, even after the failure of Cripps Mission. It notes that Muslim League leaders ‘appear to have been unsuccessful in endeavoring to persuade local Nationalist Muslims, who have always been fairly strong in Delhi, to join the Muslim League.’40 There is an interesting caste and class dimension here as well. Mirza Sahib and Mohammad Sayeed belong to relatively educated

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upper-caste influential families. They studied in Anglo Arabic School—a school established by Muslim elites in the 19th century— that was exposed to political–ideological debates and campaigns of all kinds. In fact, this school was in direct confrontation with other community-based educational institutions of the city such the Anglo Sanskrit School, Hindu College and St. Stephen’s College established around the same time in Delhi.41 This educational background somehow empowered these upper-caste Muslims to get exposed to the debates and negotiations taking place in high politics. However, lower-caste, lower-class Muslims had a very different viewpoint on how the notion of Pakistan was perceived or received in Delhi. Haji Babuddin (changed name), who belongs to the Manihar biradari (a Muslim caste-group now recognised as Other Backward Class or OBC traditionally involved in bangle manufacturing and selling) of Delhi, did not entirely subscribe to the upper-caste elite Muslim version of Pakistan movement. He is a chowdhary (head) of his biradari for more than thirty years. His family shifted from Pahari Dheeraj, a traditional Manihar mohalla, to the Ballimaran area during the Partition riots in 1947. On the question on Pakistan, he said it very bluntly: Please excuse my rudeness, but educated people like you are responsible for the partition of this country. Common jahil (uneducated) people like us had nothing to do with siyasat (politics) or Pakistan because it meant nothing to us. It was only the occupation of the educated who discussed and debated it. They did not have to struggle for rozi roti (livelihood) like us every day. Our fathers were karigars (artisans) who needed aman (peace) in the city so that they can earn to survive. People like us had no time and money. The educated were the ones who would benefit from the making of Pakistan. Hence, they were debating it for their own mafad (benefit).42

Haji Sahib’s accounts open an untold narrative, a version which explains an important aspect of the discourse of homeland, specifically of Pakistan. Not all Muslims could easily reconcile

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the realities of their existential space with the ideological contours of the imagined space of their nation. But despite there being so many variations in ‘Muslim opinion’, Pakistan became a strong marker of Muslim distinctiveness and ‘separatism’ in popular parlance leading to an anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim environment in the city. But, a question should be raised here: was this ‘separatist’ or ‘exclusionist’ perspective solely associated with Pakistan demand?

II

Contested Gali, Mohalla, Ilaqa,

City and the Nation: Discourse of

‘Homeland’ and its Local Manifestations

The developments that took place in high politics during the 1940s produced a vocabulary of ‘homeland’ that could be discussed, debated, negotiated and achieved. It gave a rather fuzzy shape to conflicting ideas of struggle for autonomy from colonial rule and the domination of the immediate ‘impure’ Other to establish a legally constituted ‘land of the pure’.43 The discourse that was generated around cultural and/or religious ‘differences’, collective claims and the denial of claims on the so-called secular public space at the beginning of the 20th century was further strengthened after the 1940s. Most importantly, it acquired an official language. While it was negotiated at the level of high politics by different actors, every locality ‘dominated’ by a particular community inevitably turned out to be its ‘homeland’ where the communities claimed ‘legal’ and ‘political’ rights to perform their cultural or customary practices without hindrance from others. The political elite, who put forward these collective claims on space and their denials of the rights of rival groups to the same spaces, started organising for violent confrontation in the early 1940s. It took a highly aggressive form, as the call for ‘direct action’ justified the communal anxieties in Delhi

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after 1945. This overwhelming propaganda for self-defence, however, had a direct link to the developments taking place in high politics. The beginning of the Second World War in 1939 and the changes in England’s political regime unfolded a phase for political negotiations in the subcontinent. It provided an opportunity for parties to present their cases in the language of legal/constitutional rights. The colonial rulers proposed various plans for India’s independence in return for support from all parties and communities for its war efforts. For its part, Congress, at the Wardha meeting of its working committee in 1939 and the Lahore session of the party in 1940, played an important role in intensifying the Indian push for ‘freedom’. Congress demanded Purna Sawaraj (complete independence) while the Muslim League aspired for independence with a guarantee of autonomy for Muslim majority provinces in return for cooperation during the war. The Hindu organisations, being out of official negotiations, presented their claims for Akhand Bharat strongly as a pressure group in two ways: by criticising Congress’ policies and the Muslim League’s demands and appropriating or translating favourable Congress policies in order to give their exclusionist agenda of cultural nationalism a political voice. The British proposals were declined by both Congress and the Muslim League on political grounds, including the Cripps Mission in 1942 that proposed for full dominion status and limited self-rule for India after the war. In fact, Cripps Mission was criticised equally by the Muslim League and Congress for different reasons. In this volatile political context, when virtually all negotiations with the British failed, Congress launched the Quit India (Bharat Chodo Andolan) or noncooperation movement on 8 August 1942 in response to Gandhi’s call for immediate independence for India. The Quit India movement, however, was boycotted by the Muslim League and leading Hindu organisations. They decided to stay away from the movement to show solidarity with the Raj in an anti-Congress gesture.44 In the wake of such politically charged atmosphere, different political groups resorted to two methods of mobilisation: the militarisation of youth

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for self-defence through training and ceremonial representation of their political ideologies—a gesture to mark their aggressive physical presence on the streets of Delhi through marches and public address. A number of volunteer–organisations called armies, guards or senas (armies) were formed during this period for the militarisation of youth in different ways that re-enforced the display of collective strength as a weapon of defence. These efforts for ‘strengthening’ the community were especially visible in the residential blocks in Karol Bagh and other areas adjacent to New Delhi, which were newly built to accommodate government officials. The formula of self-defence was so heightened during this period that it manifested in the collection and storage of domestic weapons such as lathies (sticks), chippers and knives. Commenting on this obsession for self-defence amongst youth, the fortnightly report of June 1940, for example, notes that ‘there has been a boom in lathies the price of which is said to have risen from As. /3/ to As. /7/ [three annas to seven annas]’45 Such organised efforts led to various action programmes for the gradual and effective militarisation of the youth. For instance, V.D. Savarkar, the president of All-India Hindu Mahasabha, issued a circular memorandum dated 27 August 1941 regarding the formation of an All-India Hindu Militarisation Board. It was the time when the British government established a number of army recruitment camps in different provinces for its war efforts. Members of the Hindu Mahasabha saw it as an opportunity to militarise Hindu youth, at the expense of the British government, for a larger battle on the ground against Muslims whom they identified as their main enemy.46 The circular overtly argued that recruitment in the British Armed Forces should be facilitated by the Mahasabha in order to militarise the Hindu youth through integrated efforts at the all-India level. The circular emphasised that recruitment of Hindu youth must always be seen in relation to the proportion of Muslims in all the three wings of the British Armed Forces—the Army, Navy and Air Force.47 In fact, this was one of the reasons why the Mahasabha supported British

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war efforts and campaigned enthusiastically for the involvement of Hindu youth in the British army. Interestingly, various other outfits, both Hindu and Muslim, also established their youth wings for training and discipline. For instance, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Rashtriya Sewa Samiti, Hindu Rashtra Dal, Lok Sena and Arya Vir Dal aimed at training Hindu youth in lathi, squad drill and physical training.48 The Muslim League also formed the Muslim National Guard in 1940 on similar lines.49 Similarly, Majlis-e-Ahrar-ul-Islam, Khaksar Volunteer Corps of Khaksar Tehreek and others such groups also reorganised themselves.50 Interestingly, Congress Working Committees established in different districts were also urged to increase volunteer recruitment programmes for maintaining ‘order’ and to safeguard ‘internal security’. The intelligence reports of the deliberations of Provincial Congress Volunteer Boards confirms that the board resolved to organise a ‘national defence force’ in every town and village for the protection of the public in the event of internal disorder. The board aimed at recruiting around 100,000 volunteers. These volunteers were to be the uniformed members of the para-Congress bodies like Seva Dal and were to be distinct from satyagrahees. Influenced by the growing impact of RSS and Arya Samaj kind of organised volunteer activities, some prominent leaders of Congress like Pandit Krishnakant Malviya and Purushottam Das Tandon made public speeches calling for the need of organisations of volunteers on paramilitary lines as well. The Congress committees run organisations like Kesari Dal, Mahabir Dal and Sardar Ji’s Training Camp, as the camp was popularly known, in different districts in United Provinces and Central Provinces with the specific objective of organising Hindu communities and depressed classes.51 The Congress volunteer groups like Seva Dal also received training in drill, methods of crowd control, first-aid and even fire-fighting in Delhi. Youth associated with these organisations often carried weapons for self-defence, dressed in a specific costume that represented party ideology and started marching

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on different streets and mohallas of Delhi to mark their presence and instil a sense of ‘security’ amongst their ‘respective’ communities.52 It seemed that each homeland had to be achieved locally in order to be heard nationally. Raising an alarm at the sudden growth of these weaponised groups, an Intelligence Bureau report of that time noted, ‘A truculent spirit is growing among volunteers of all classes due to an aggressive propaganda … and of training agenda along military line which is being vigorously imparted everywhere.’53 The agenda of militarisation became so heightened that in August 1940 the government had to order a ban on volunteer organisations or parties either engaged in a military drill or wearing a distinctive uniform.54 The second mode of mobilisation was the ceremonial display of political ideologies. These political groups also started organising public events like conferences and symbolic ‘independence day’, ‘Pakistan day’ and even ‘anti-Pakistan day’. The Muslim League, which had passed the Pakistan Resolution on 23 March 1940 in its Lahore session, introduced Pakistan demand as its political agenda in Delhi in April the same year. The league celebrated ‘All-India Pakistan Day’ in Delhi with full fanfare to mobilise Muslim opinion. This event was followed by nine-flag salutation ceremonies. In response to Congress-led ‘Independence Day’ event, which used to take place every year on 26 January, the league decided to mark 23 March as ‘Pakistan Day’ every year. The first such Pakistan Day celebration took place in 1941 in Delhi. It eventually became a part of political mobilisation techniques of the Muslim League. A number of all-India Muslim conferences and meetings were also organised in continuation of these events in later years. According to the fortnightly reports of Delhi, these conferences and ceremonies were more focused on the demands for ‘separate electorates for the Constituent Assembly, and on “safeguards” for minorities to be prescribed by Muslim representatives themselves.’55

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In reaction to this aggressive Muslim League campaigns, the radical Hindu organisations like Hindu Mahasabha, Arya Yuvak Sangh and RSS began to organise the same day (23 March) as ‘AntiPakistan Day’ every year to mark their political presence in the city. Similarly, apart from organising Akhand Bharat Conferences, several meetings were held in Delhi by Hindu organisations, including Hindu Mahasabha, Arya Yuvak Sangh and RSS. Various meetings and a number of Akhand Bharat Conferences were also held in Delhi by Hindu organisations to agitate and stand against the Muslim League’s Pakistan resolution and Congress’ policy of negotiation with the league. These conferences rejected Congress’s policy towards Muslims and described it as ‘Muslim appeasement’. On the other hand, the pro-Congress Muslim organisations such as Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind, Ahrar Party, Anjuman-e-Saif-ul Islam and other anti-League Muslim groups joined the Congress’ anti-Pakistan platform.56 These organisations held large meetings to emphasise the need for Hindu–Muslim unity and condemn the demand for a ‘separate Muslim nation’. The Muslim League also established its official newspaper, Dawn, in October 1941 in Delhi. The paper claimed to advocate and publish news and views of the Muslims of India for the cause of Pakistan demand. In fact, it started referring to the north-west Muslim-majority provinces of British India (Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan) as Pakistan after 1943. There was a specific column in the newspaper titled ‘Pakistan News’.57 The party also began a symbolic campaign in the same year to encourage Muslim men to use Jinnah cap to show their dedication towards Jinnah as Qaid-e-Azam (the great leader). The Muslims were also urged to put the proposed flag of Pakistan in their localities.58 This aggressive politics of the Muslim League resulted in an antiMuslim polarisation in Delhi and throughout North India. Hindu organisations, including the Mahasabha and Arya Samaj, initiated a mobilisation drive to stress upon a joint Hindu–Sikh action against

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the demands of Pakistan, especially in the United Provinces and different parts of Central Provinces. For instance, in April 1940 the fortnightly report of the United Provinces noted that the Sikhs were coming closer to Hindus in opposition to Muslims, particularly on Pakistan scheme. In meetings, separately organised by Sikh leaders and Hindu Mahasabha, it was stressed that there was a need to join hands with each other. The report said, ‘At an Arya Samaj Meeting in Pratapgadh one speaker threatened the Muslims that the Sikh would drive them out of India as the Jews were driven out of Germany.’59 In fact, it was a manifestation of the growing feeling of Sikh political isolation. The future of Sikh as a politically conscious community was unclear because the proposed division of Punjab was to be worked out only on the basis of Hindu and Muslim majorities. As the realisation of a distinct religious-political identity acquired an organised form, Sikh leaders began to articulate their claim on the region they possessed as their right to self-determination and identified Hindu organisations as their natural and strategic allies. The demand for Khalistan—a ‘pure’ land for the Sikh community of India—was the obvious outcome that started taking shape after 1942. This emerging Hindu–Sikh polarisation had a significant impact on Delhi’s politics. The fortnightly report of Delhi observed that ‘Master Tara Singh and other Sikh leaders have expressed their desire for an independent state in joint conferences with Hindu organizations.’60 Although the notion of a Sikh nation called Khalistan did not evoke much enthusiasm since the Sikh population was small in Delhi, the anti-Muslim/anti-Pakistan Hindu–Sikh coalition became politically powerful. The changing nature of Sikh religious celebrations is a good example to illustrate this point. The Sikh processions went through a significant transformation in the 1930s from being an occasion of festivity to an aggressive anti-Muslim demonstration.61 The Sikhs of Delhi used to take out a procession on Guruparva to commemorate the martyrdom of Guru Teg Bahadur, the Sikh Guru who, in 1675, was killed by Emperor Aurangzeb. Guru Teg Bahadur was beheaded

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at Gurudwara Sis Ganj in Chandni Chowk for his religious dissidence. The ceremony involved the transfer of Guru Granth Sahib (holy text) from Gurudwara Sis Ganj Sahib Ji in Chandni Chowk to a different Gurudwara either in Rakabganj or Bangla Sahib in New Delhi. This annual procession used to move through different ‘sensitive’ routes from old Delhi (Jama Masjid, Ajmeri Gate to the Paharganj Bazar area) to the newly developed/extended areas of Delhi/New Delhi. This religious procession, however, turned out to be one of the main reasons behind communal clashes between Muslims and Sikhs of Delhi. Deliberate gatherings outside mosques and intentional disturbances during the prescribed and daily prayer times became the main features of this aggressive Sikh assertion. The government had to make special police arrangements for defining the time, route and form of processions for the Sikh community to ensure that they did not reach the mosques situated in ‘sensitive’ areas at the time of evening prayers (Asar, Maghreb and Isha).62 However, Sikh processionists continued defying police restrictions by deliberately delaying or increasing the pace of processions to reach mosques at restricted prayer times. The Sikh community, who never shared the symbolism constructed over cow sacrifice or meat consumption, joined the Mahasabha-led anti-meat/anti-beef campaigns in an apparent anti-Muslim mobilisation in the city. Sikh political leaders came in support of cow protection movements and started evoking the sacredness of the cow as a symbol of unity between Hindus and Sikhs. But it wasn’t only Sikh processions that led to such clashes. Wedding processions and other festival processions that involved loud music and fanfare conflicted with prayer times resulting in violent fights that had to be administered through route mapping and restricted timing. This demarcation of certain time and space also contributed to the process of establishing ‘sacred’ symbols for conflicting cultural claims and the remapping of the public space

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in Delhi for religious celebrations as discussed in the previous chapter. These developments show how anti-Pakistan agitation turned into a general anti-Muslim platform as the politicisation of religious/ cultural differences found a political overtone. It contributed both to the discourse of homeland and the collective marginalisation of Muslims under the imagined as well as imposed notion of an idealised homogeneous nation. Thus, conflicts between struggles for ‘freedom’ from British rule and the rule of the majority resulted in antiMuslim polarisation in areas where Muslims were in minority. Such imagination of the Other consolidated and resulted in aggravated communal tension as negotiations in high politics failed to arrive at a mutually agreed space for all the nationalities. Although the years up to 1940–1941 saw communal polarisation, the anti-British war campaign was successful in calming down the communal atmosphere to some extent. There was a significant decline in the number of reported communal incidents during the period 1942–1944 in Delhi. While the Muslim League and Hindu organisations supported the British war efforts, Congress, Ahrar Party, Jamiat and various socialist and communist groups raised concerns about the government’s lethargic attitude towards the masses during the war crisis. They criticised the British government’s Air Raid Precautions (ARP) policy in India, merits of rationing for the poor to handle wartime food crisis and lack of basic amenities in Delhi. They argued that the government neglected the needs of native citizens for its war interests. This campaign helped in successfully mobilising the masses against the British government. Congress achieved enormous support not only in urban Delhi but also in its surrounding rural areas.63 According to official reports, Nehru, Azad and other leaders of Congress were received with much enthusiasm in Delhi.64 But political activities such as the symbolic celebration of ‘independence’ continue to dominate the political life of the city.

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In this backdrop, the Cripps Mission of 1942 initiated political negotiations for freedom in India. However, the British government did not deviate from its established position that India’s independence was inextricably linked to the ‘Muslim question’ and hence ‘Congress [alone] could not speak for the whole country’.65 This official recognition to the ‘Muslim question’ brought the Muslims League to the forefront of the negotiations along with Congress and the British government. After the unsuccessful talks between Gandhi and Jinnah in 1944, political configurations in high politics changed dramatically. The Shimla Conference in 1945 was yet another effort to negotiate a settlement that failed due to the Muslim League’s claim that it should be recognised as the sole representative of Indian Muslims.66 Congress wanted to invite other Muslim organisations to represent Indian Muslims but British officials refused to acknowledge or call on such representative bodies. These developments established that only a power-sharing arrangement between the two major parties could prevent communal disputes between Hindus and Muslims and determine whether British India would be better off unified or divided. Maulana Azad’s observation captures the nature of these negotiations. He sums up thus: ‘The Conference marks a breakwater in Indian political history. This was the first time when negotiations failed, not on the basis of political issue between India and Britain, but on the communal issue dividing different Indian groups.’67 The Cabinet Mission in 1946 officially rejected Jinnah’s claim for an independent sovereign Muslim state with six provinces— Muslim majority provinces of Bengal and Assam in the north east and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west—as a non-viable concept.68 On 16 May, the Cabinet Mission offered a three-tier structure of a loose federal government for the Union of India, including both the

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provinces and the princely states. It proposed that there would be a Union government at the top, which would look after defence, foreign affairs and communications. The Union would also have limited financial powers to perform these functions. All residual powers would be vested in the provincial governments with a will to form groups; each group could also have their own executives and legislatures and could decide what provincial subjects to take on. The Cabinet Mission Plan suggested that a Constituent Assembly should be formed, which was to be elected by the constituted provincial assemblies, to draft a constitution for the whole of India. The Constituent Assembly was to split into three sections: Section A was to combine Hindu-majority provinces, Section B Muslim-majority provinces and Section C Bengal and Assam. The princely states would be given adequate representation at the Constituent Assembly. It was suggested that once a constitution was finally settled for all three levels (Union, group and province), the provinces would have a right to opt out of any particular group but not from the Union; they could also reconsider the constitution after an interval of ten years. An interim government was to be formed to manage everyday matters until the constitution was ready. The Muslim League accepted the plan because, as Ayesha Jalal argues, it was ‘something which Jinnah wanted to achieve in actual sense by evoking the demand for Pakistan as a political tactic.’69 In fact, the plan was a reflection of the Pakistan schemes that had been discussed and debated after the introduction of the two-nation theory. Congress, however, had some serious reservations. It was not only that complete freedom, the prime objective of Congress, still seemed a distant goal; Congress also objected to the proposed association of Assam and NWFP, in both of which it had achieved a majority in the then-recent elections, with other Muslim-majority provinces. The creation of a Sikh-majority province in Punjab

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was another important factor. Apart from all, Congress wanted to have more powers with the central government to intervene in time of crisis or extreme breakdown of law and order situation. Consequently, Congress rejected the mission plan, yet it decided to participate in the Constituent Assembly. The short-term plan to constitute an interim government could also not work out since Congress wanted to include a Muslim candidate amongst its own nominees. For Jinnah, it was a complete betrayal by Congress. On 29 July, in response, the Muslim League Working Committee withdrew its approval of the Cabinet Mission’s long-term plan and gave a call for ‘Direct Action’.70 The ‘Direct Action Day’ was to be organised on 16 August 1946 to demand Pakistan. The day was supposed to be a peaceful protest by the league against the policies of Congress and the British government as Jinnah claimed in various pamphlets and posters issued through Dawn. The newspaper published Direct Action Day pamphlets and the full texts of The Resolution for the ‘achievement’ of Pakistan quite boldly and called for ‘the nation to carry it out’.71 The pamphlets claimed that ‘might alone can secure their right’ while stressing the need for discipline. The Provincial Muslim Students Federation called for a strike on that day and the Delhi Provincial Muslim League carried out flag salutation ceremonies in different wards of the city.72 The Muslim League sent out appeals to government officials to cooperate with its agenda and follow the non-cooperation policy. It used congregational prayers, particularly the Jummah prayer, as a political tool for disseminating their message.73 Dawn also urged Muslims to observe the day through a nationwide strike, protest meetings and demonstrations to explain the meaning of Pakistan and the reasons for rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan. But in the communally charged atmosphere throughout India, and especially in the Muslim League-ruled Calcutta, it took a violent

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form. Calcutta was the scene of horrific riots with 3000 dead and more than 20,000 injured. Some chroniclers have put the number of injured at over 100,000. The riots continued for five days in the absence of any effective measure from the Muslim League-headed government. The ‘Great Calcutta Killings’, as it is known in history, destroyed all hopes for a negotiated settlement between the Muslim League and Congress. How were these negotiations that took place in high politics received at the ground in Delhi? It had a direct impact on Delhi’s politics. The fortnightly reports of August 1946 observe that the religious polarisation on political lines increased in Delhi after the formation of the interim government. The reports also note that after Nehru was invited to form an interim government by the British, ‘Congress right-wing [became] more and more apparently fascist’ with a feeling of success, and ‘it [was] possible that many of the more moderately minded Muslims of Delhi who so far have not joined the League, will now do so in the same way as many, if not most, of the members of the Hindu Mahasabha have now become members of the Congress or Congress supporters’.74 The reports also observe that the Muslim League’s propaganda that the British Raj was simply going to be turned into a ‘Hindu Raj’ was creating an atmosphere of distrust and fear amongst Muslims. The activities in Delhi intensified with the continuous failure of negotiations between Congress, Muslim League and colonial rulers. A Criminal Investigation Department daily report anticipated just before the Cabinet Mission in April 1946: Following the exciting speeches made by the Muslim League leaders at the Muslim League Legislators Convention held in Delhi … communal bitterness has been greatly aggravated by both Hindus and Muslims who are believed to be collecting lathies, swords, hatchets etc. for offence and defence should the Cabinet Mission fail to solve the Indian political situation.75

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It should not, however, be assumed that people embraced the homogeneous ‘Hindu’ Indian or ‘Muslim’ Pakistani identities or transformed themselves according to this given framework of difference. Neither was it the case that local conflicts always had a ‘communal’ overtone nor that people were always migrating from ‘mixed’ localities to segregated pockets. But the constant use of the vocabulary of communal identity by the educated upper-caste and upper-class community elites produced and organised the communal ‘differences’ into clearly identifiable Other(s)—either ‘non-Muslim’ or ‘non-Hindu’.76 Local disputes between Hindus and Muslims in Delhi transformed into fragments of inevitable national conflict.77 The idea of Pakistan was the new metaphor of this communally charged politics. For the Muslim League, it was a promised homeland that was to be achieved, while for Hindu and Sikh organisations it was a negation of the Pakistan demand and an assertion of their distinctiveness. The Provincial Mahasabha—which used to focus in its city election campaigns on the elimination of meat shops (particularly of beef), rejection of separate electorate and weightage system—now incorporated the anti-Pakistan campaign in its municipal election agenda.78 Other Hindu religious groups, such as Arya Samaj and Arya Vir Dal, and Sikh religious groups joined the election campaigns and strengthened the evolving discourses on ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ nation(s). Anti-Muslim/anti-Pakistan and anti-Hindu/anti-majority speeches became regular features of the campaigns for municipal elections in Delhi in the 1940s.79 Additionally, the national level debates, schemes and counter schemes for Pakistan, proposals made by B.R. Ambedkar on the ‘validity’ of a cultural nation and its demand for self-reliance or autonomy were constantly re-enacted at the local level, consolidating both pro-Muslim and anti-Muslim platforms.80 However, it was the ‘nationalist’ politics—which defined dissident voices as reactionary,

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separatist and, above all, against the spirit of nationalism—that seemed to acquire wider acceptance. Although there were serious differences between the exclusionary idea of Hindu Rashtra promulgated by the Mahasabha or other ‘Hindu’ organisations and Congress’ inclusive idea of India, the opposition to Pakistan and Partition constituted a common ground. This debate produced and established new categories—‘nationalist Muslims’ and ‘proPakistani Muslims’—compartmentalising Muslim political identity into fragments.81 A question however still remains: How was it manifested at the local level in terms of the demarcation of space on religious grounds? Did it change the traditional mohalla associations?

Contested Public Space and ‘Secular’ Residential Quarters The process of demarcation of public and residential spaces intensified in the galies and mohallas of Delhi in which Muslims formed a minority after the Cabinet Mission’s proposal to divide India into Hindu- and Muslim-majority zones. Although the Cabinet Mission failed to arrive at a consensus between the two parties, it seemed that the senas and guards that were trained for collective defence committed themselves to achieve their cherished goals. The presence of a Muslim minority in Delhi turned it into a contested terrain. It led to a series of communal riots. Most importantly, it reinforced the official demarcation of communal geography in multiple ways (Map 3 demonstrates the areas in Old Delhi that were officially categorised as Hindudominated, Muslim-dominated and mixed). This demarcation was reinforced every time there was a need to make arrangements for cow processions, regulation of meat and meat shops, police arrangements for Bakra-Eid, Diwali or Dussehra festivals, municipal elections and communal clashes.

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Map 3: Demarcated Hindu-Dominated, Muslim-Dominated and

Mixed Areas82

Many reported incidents show that Muslim residents were denied access to public space by Hindu religious organisations. A series of such complaints were registered by various Muslim residential bodies with Delhi police. For instance, residents of Circular Road made a complaint to the senior superintendent of police on 21 May

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1946 about an organised communal clash that took place at Ramlila Maidan. It stated: Some people from the city gather in Ramlila Ground … parade in the military lines and train themselves in the use of knives etc., shout slogans, salute the yellow flag … [they] deliberately interfere in the harmless and non-serious squabbles and turn them into communal quarrel and disturbances … a mild argument started between a Hindu and Muslim which as usual was settled. These … trained young men … started [it] … afresh and made it a Hindu-Muslim tension…. There happen to be a structure … to which they … [call] “temple”. Lathies and other fighting equipment are concealed in the “temple”. [They] … took out … lathies … and attacked … Musalmans who happened to be very few in numbers…. These disturbances … are not uncommon … in spite of the police order. [They] remain near the “temple” parading, shouting slogans … it is apparent that since the recent political negotiations, they have taken a very aggressive and threatening attitude [emphasis added].83

Interestingly, copies of such complaints were not merely registered formally with the local administrative authorities but also submitted to the Dawn newspaper, the Delhi branch of All-India Muslim League and Provincial Muslim League. This informal network shows how local incidents could at once be linked to the wider politics of homeland. The westward expansion of Delhi after the 1930s also contributed to the communalisation of public space. The Paharganj riots that took place during the festive occasion of Bakra-Eid in November 1946 is a good example in this regard. The Paharganj area was developed more recently, along with Karol Bagh, at the time of the construction of the new capital and the New Delhi railway station. A number of residential quarters were developed in these areas for housing government servants. These areas had not come under police patrol and surveillance that was necessitated by the processions of sacrificial cows or the ‘sensitivity’ of the routes to the slaughterhouse, according

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to Communal Riots Scheme (CRS). The Bakra-Eid festival, thus, had the potential to create problems in these newly developed areas of the city where there hadn’t yet been any defined or prescribed route for such acts. It was natural for the non-Muslim population of these areas to extend their territorial claims on public space and exclude Muslim festivities in these neighbourhoods. This was precisely what happened in 1946. When the Muslim religious procession was taking the traditional route on Bakra-Eid day, a group of Hindu and Sikh residents forced it to divert towards the newly built Chitragupta Road. The residents of this locality, however, objected to the movement of the procession from the Paharganj mosque to the Idgah in Sadar Bazar.84 This intervention resulted in a serious riot.85 The chief commissioner’s account of the incident brings out the complexities surrounding the legalities of cultural rights and the ineffective role played by the authorities: Today only two cows had to be taken in procession. Yesterday when an attempt was made to take one cow by an authorized route, Hindus objected … a settlement was more or less reached. This morning, however, the Muslims wanted to take out the procession by another route to which Hindus objected. The Deputy Magistrate tried to settle the dispute again and his proposals were accepted … an attempt was made to take out the first cow through one of the routes which was the subject of discussion…. This was objected to by a crowd of some 200 Hindus who became rowdy and turbulent … it seems to have been assumed that the route alleged by the Muslims was the one followed in previous years but it appears that detention was hotly denied by the Hindus … the denial should have … the necessity of the District Magistrate prescribing some route. Having regard to the sentiments of the Hindus on the spot and insistence of the Muslims of what they conceived was their right, precautions should have been taken … the cow was not brought there to be an eye-sore and a cause of provocation to both the parties.86 (Emphasis added.)

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The riot continued for nearly a week and spread across Sadar Bazar, Ajmeri Gate, Darya Ganj, Faiz Bazar and Kashmiri Gate. Meanwhile, residents of Chitragupta Road and Square Road (the ‘new’ authorised route that the procession was forced to take) also submitted a number of complaints to the Home member of the Government of India against shifting the trouble ‘from Pahadganj [sic] on to the Government quarters … [that] had at [sic] no other occasion been the scene of any trouble.’87 This riot not only reinforced the officially defined communal geography of Delhi but also demarcated secular and communal public spaces through administrative mechanisms. The government took a very critical view of these riots since the Paharganj area came under the New Delhi municipality. It was to employ intensive surveillance and policing measures to control such incidents in the future. In terms of intelligence, house searches, listing of ‘bad characters’ of both communities in the city, close observation of the activities of militant communal organisations, enforcement of strictly patrolled curfews, deployment of Criminal Procedure Code, strict patrolling of highly ‘communal mohallas’, ‘mosques and temples’ were declared as specific measures in order to detect ‘doubtful strangers’.88 Although CRS—a ‘Scheme for Police in the Situation of Communal Riots in Delhi’—was implemented in 1876 to control rioting in the city, it was revised for policing the city for a continuous three days on Bakra-Eid in 1934 and again in 1946. This was done to control communal riots from spreading towards New Delhi. The scheme aimed at thorough investigation of activities. Its purpose was to guard places of worship, picket ‘danger spots’ and prevent gang attacks in mohallas where one community was weak. Consequently, every ward falling in ‘sensitive’ category was policed and every street was patrolled and monitored for ‘disturbances’ (See Figure 1). The scheme brought every gali, mohalla and ilaqa under the purview of the administrative mechanism that described and categorised each with its communal character. At the same time, the revised CRS exemplify the re-conceptualisation of Delhi’s urban

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space into communally demarcated zones of Old Delhi and nonaccessible ‘secular’ quarters situated in extended New Delhi.89 Old Delhi, in this sense, was considered to be a political/communal space in contrast to the new administrative/secular space of New Delhi.

Figure 1: Identification of Residential Space as Hindu, Muslim and Combined Areas for Police Arrangements during Bakra-Eid Celebration under CRS, 1946 90

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This contestation did not remain confined to public routes of religious processions alone. It extended to residential spaces as well. A complaint registered in 1946 by the president of Anjuman-e-Islamia, Islam Nagar, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, after the Bakra-Eid celebration can be taken as evidence in this regard. The letter said: On the … day of Baqr-Id the Hindu and Sikh residents of the locality tried to raise a quarrel with the Muslims … [on] “Cow killing” … one Mr. Ansari sacrificed a cow on Id Day at the slaughter house and brought meat under cover. In the evening some bones … were given by Mr. Ansari to sweeperess [sic]. Those the sweeperess [sic] threw in the dustbin … the dogs spread these over on the road. Hindus and Sikhs on seeing the bones … raised a hue and cry…. They collected on the spot in hundreds armed with lathies and other weapons and began to pass offensive … remarks…. They were heard to say ‘pour kerosene and set fire to Ansari’s House.’ They are … likely to harass the Muslim residents who are in a hopeless minority in the locality.91 (Emphasis added.)

This complaint demonstrates how the notions of homeland were being localised and exercised aggressively even in residential quarters of Delhi. The demarcation of public space on religious lines was being claimed for political gains to problematise the presence of a minority community. In fact, the meat practice was established as the most important issue over which such organised aggression appeared in residential quarters of Delhi. It also shows how the performance of a cultural practice particularly associated with Muslims was being objected to and defined as a troublesome affair that was not acceptable in the newly built public space of the city. This was a reflection of a gradually emerging urban mindset that combined the Hindu uppercaste version of secularity with the notion of demarcated communal space. The colonial measures of mapping, scheduling and categorising, as discussed in the previous chapter, continually intensified the contestation of public space in the mid-1940s. The ‘permitted’ use

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of community spaces for designated cultural practices was also redefined, marked and legalised for what is called ‘law and order’. It is true that the local government also made some efforts for communal harmony, which included the formation of mohalla peace committees, radio broadcasts on communal harmony and the need for a mutual celebration of each other’s festivals. 92 However, the contests over homelands continued to perpetuate the mental divisions of space.

Unsecured Majority/Minority Spaces and the Call for ‘Safeguards’ The need for self-defence against an imagined enemy intensified a desire for being surrounded by fellow community members. This sense of insecurity produced a strong threat perception. A section of government servants and the educated middle-class Hindus and Muslims of the city were the carriers of this threat perception. They evoked the notion of self-defence and argued for a protected/ demarcated neighbourhood for ensuring collective security of the community they claimed to represent. This was reflected in the support, sometimes even active participation, of these officials in the activities of armed voluntary groups organised on communal lines. For instance, Muslim residents of the Karol Bagh area wrote to the senior superintendent of police and the chief commissioner on 24 April 1946: We … beg to state that for the last four or five days several groups … roam around the quarters during night time with big lathies and naked kirpans[,] shouting out threats of various kinds…. [T]he manner in which they shout and the attitude they usually adopt is thumping their lathies on the ground and the way in which they use their torches[,] throwing light on the sleeping residents of quarters … constitute[s] a menace to the peace-loving residents of the quarters.… [W]e feel that the activities … are giving a cause for alarm…. [W]e are anxious that these activities be stopped as early as possible so that the fear they are creating in our minds may be alleviated.93

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The letter does not give any clue to identify the ‘groups’ of people who were harassing the residents. But in the given scenario, it could be assumed that the groups belonged to some Hindu organisations active in Old Delhi. Another complaint was filed by Anjuman-eIslamia of the government quarters in Karol Bagh on 22 April 1946 to the senior superintendent of police, Delhi. This complaint is a reflection of how, in an atmosphere of communal distrust, casteand regional identity-based habitational patterns were interpreted in communal terms. The complaint said: These (communal) feelings have … crept [into] the minds of Government servants living in the locality and our Hindu brothers are spreading various rumors [sic]…. [W]e are being threatened and terrorized … therefore … our duty is to [present] the following facts … for necessary precautionary steps - (1) There are approximately 550 quarters … in this locality…. Muslims occupy nearly 150 quarters only scattered all over the area…. [The] remaining 400 quarters are occupied by Hindus and in most of them two or three families are living. Moreover, the whole locality is surrounded by Hindu population of Devnagar and Regharpura etc…. [A]ll laborers, shop keepers, milk sellers are Hindus. Taking all these facts in consideration the Muslims are here in a negligible minority and feel insecure.94 (Emphasis added.)

The letter further mentioned training in guerrilla warfare or military drill by Hindu youth under the auspices of various Hindu organisations on a regular basis at different spots in Old Delhi. It was against this backdrop of fear from being a minority that political mobilisation took place in the localities. However, as we will see below, the majority community also shared this threat perception, albeit in different ways. The official recognition of the Muslim League as the ‘sole’ representative of Indian Muslims and Pakistan as a legitimate desire of scattered and diverse Muslims of India resulted in a different kind of polarisation in Delhi. Direct Action Day did not produce any communal clash in Delhi. The fortnightly report of Delhi expressed

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its surprise: ‘with the present temper and bitter communal feelings that now exist; there have not been serious communal clash in other parts of the country … including Delhi’.95 The news of violence coming from Calcutta, however, intensified the atmosphere of distrust and threat. The Hindu residents of government quarters also started calling for defence and precautionary safeguards. This threat perception put particular localities in the category of ‘unsecured’ spaces.96 A letter from the president of Hindu Bharat Sabha of the government quarters at Anand Nagar, Karol Bagh, Delhi, dated 22 August 1946 is a good example. This letter was written to the secretary of Home Department, Government of India, on behalf of the residents under the subject ‘Maintenance of Law and Order and Safeguarding the Life and Property of Citizens.’97 It said: What has followed the Muslim League ‘Direct Action Day’ on 16/8/46 in Calcutta has caused nervousness all rounds…. We the Hindu residents … are under the grip of a similar but intense danger and request … for taking necessary measures to protect our lives and property against any possible onrush[.] Intense and brisk activities on the part of the members of the so-called minority community in this area … their steps to organize and equip themselves have confirmed our fears especially regarding the outcome of their Juma-Ul-Vida celebrations … the report is current that they are determined to launch an organized mass offensive on a scale bigger than even that of Calcutta…. [W]e request … for some extra precautions for Friday the 23rd August 1946 in order to safeguard our lives and property.98

This reference to Jumat-ul-Vida reveals an interesting politics of the symbolic politicisation of congregational prayers. The Muslim League, in the backdrop of ‘Direct Action Day’, tried capitalising these prayers as an expression of Muslim reaction. For instance, the Jumat-ul-Vida prayers that mark the last Friday of Ramadan had always had great relevance for Muslims. Dawn published ‘Many Thousands Muslims Offer Jumat-ul-Vida Prayers at Delhi’ to create an impression that

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the gathering was to express Muslim solidarity with the Pakistan demand.99 Interestingly, Hindu political organisations also posed this collective presence to create the same expression amongst the masses. The above complaint exemplifies this symbolisation. Such examples reveal that as the claims and counterclaims on space became violent, the notion of security was perceived and articulated in a mutually exclusive way in the Hindu and Muslim quarters to highlight their religious and cultural differences. The educated middle class replaced the hierarchy of traditional classes in the municipality. They placed themselves as community representatives or mediators who established a link between the grand ideas and local realities by translating, defining and normalising the political discourse of their choice. The fortnightly report for the first half of September 1946, for instance, explained the communal situation and the role of government clerks in Delhi in the following words: The inauguration of the negotiation between the Viceroy and Mr. Jinnah have [sic] slightly eased the communal tension, but … it is still very high, particularly among Government clerks, who … form a high proportion … in Delhi. Often educated in communal institutions and unaccustomed to the rough and tumble of less sheltered walks of life, in which members of all communities must inevitably mix freely. Their alarm at the prospect of communal strife is pathetic and they seem to have little recreation other than the study of communal politics. Their feelings are accentuated by the inevitable jealousies in matters of promotion etc. and since they mostly live in specifically built quarters, they are scarcely able to get away from this artificial atmosphere. A potentially dangerous feature is the growth of communal volunteer organizations, viz. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Dal [sic], Azad Hind Dal, Congress Sewa Dal and Muslim League National Guards … there has been an increase in enthusiasm in attendance at these functions, particularly amongst the government clerks … political speeches emphasizing the need for self-defense are too frequent and … encourage these movements.100 (Emphasis added.)

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The statement in the report is a reflection of how the educated middle class living in well-defined residential areas used modern democratic structures to reformulate communitarian social ethos and thus reproduced the broader national political discourse on Partition at the local level. In this sense, the desire for a communally segregated and demarcated space was displayed mutually to make a wider claim by denying the existence of the imagined Other in residential quarters. This class strictly adhered to their regional as well as religious identities while forming complex commercial relations. In fact, they were the main ‘subjects’ of the local- as well as national-level political negotiations due to their educational background, political affiliations and economic relations. But the question remains: was it only the occupation of government officials, living in government quarters, to incite violence? Did this communal discourse never manifest in the violence in traditional mohallas of Old Delhi? My respondent Mirza Sahib, who used to live in a mixed locality near Darya Ganj and was quite aware of the discourse of high politics of that time, told me proudly that: Fifty per cent of the houses in our gali (lane) belonged to Hindus and there was an intersection that still connected our gali to Jatwara (a mohalla of Hindu Jat community), but we never had any riot. Few Leaguee and Mahasabhai (members of the Muslim League and the Mahasabha) who never [in the past] dared to disclose their siasi (political) associations, [now] started arguing openly. There were rumours of killings and kidnapping every other day that were shown as Hindu–Muslim issue to give them a siasi rang (political colour). For Dilliwale (Delhiites), mohalladari and ankh ki sharam (neighbourly feeling and general etiquettes) were important factors that was mutually respected. That was the reason why it did not become violent. But there is no doubt in saying that shehar ki hawa kharab thi (the atmosphere was bad in the city). There were fears that the debates on Pakistan could take a violent colour at any time. Everybody was worried what will happen—azadi kab milegi, Pakistan banega ya nahin, bantwara hoga ya kya hoga? Asisa lagta tha jaise azadi mulk

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ki qurbani liye bina nahin ayegi (When will we get freedom, whether or not Pakistan will be created, will Partition happen or not, it was as if freedom would not arrive without exacting sacrifices from the nation).’101

Mirza Sahib further explained that ‘the areas outside Purani Dilli (Old Delhi) like Sadar Bazar, Karol Bagh, Paharganj, Sabzi Mandi were communally sensitive areas.’ When inquired why it was so, he gave an interesting explanation: ‘They were people who came from different regions outside Delhi. They had no neighbourly associations with each other. They were not like Dilliwale who had been living together even after having different religious associations and cultural practices.’ K.R. Jain (name changed), a retired professor of political science and a one-time resident of a relatively mixed area of old Delhi (Tiraha Behram Khan, Darya Ganj), also reflected on this aspect in the same way. He explained that: It was the fringe element that created problems or tried diverting minor conflicts into a communal issue. Local people used to live side by side. They certainly had differences. Like my family was strictly vegetarian, but we did not have any problem with our Muslim neighbours who were non-vegetarian. The only principle was that we were not used to eating or drinking at their homes, but in terms of being neighbours, we had good relations.102

It does not, however, mean that there was no polarisation in traditional mohallas. The construction of the ‘Other’ was imagined in these localities rather than given: the Hindus and Muslims of a mohalla would not blame each other for any unpleasant event, yet they continued to be terrorised by the imagined fear of collective existence of the other community. This feeling was gradually creeping into traditional mohallas in the 1940s, dividing traditional neighbours, the mohalladars, into warring communities though it didn’t take a violent form. The complaints registered by residents of government quarters also reflect that communal antagonism was more palpable

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in the newly developed areas of Delhi. This is exactly what Haji Sahib, the head of Manihar biradari, said during the interview: Pakistan was ‘the occupation of [the] educated’ no matter where you belong.103

Changing Political Identity of Space: Idea of Secular India and Local Constituencies The debates on political representation became more vibrant after the formation of the interim government in September 1946 under the prime ministership of Nehru and the formation of the Constituent Assembly in the same year in December. The purpose of the Constituent Assembly was to draft a constitution for the country. The British Cabinet issued a statement in December 1946 that if a constitution is framed by an assembly in which a large section of the population is not represented, then the British government could not contemplate forcing such a constitution on any unwilling part of this country. A tussle continued between Congress and the Muslim League on the issue of representation in both the interim government and the Constituent Assembly. The Muslim League continued boycotting the Constituent Assembly. The non-cooperative attitude of the Muslim League members forced the interim government to approach the British parliament to formally remove the Muslim League representatives from it and make a final solution for self-rule. In response to this, British Prime Minister Clement Richard Attlee led Cabinet made final announcements on 20 February 1947 for the transfer of power to British India by 3 June 1948 on the condition of adequate representation of all communities in the Constituent Assembly. The Muslim League saw it as an advantage to capture ‘Pakistan provinces’, especially Punjab, Assam and NWFP, through propaganda, civil disobedience and violence. Given the worsening communal situation in the country, which could have led to civil war, Lord Mountbatten, then newly appointed viceroy and the first governor-general of free India, announced the June 3 Plan a year before in 1947.104 Against Attlee’s pronouncement of transfer

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of power to undivided India with a federal constitution, the June 3 Plan of Mountbatten accepted the principle of the partition of the subcontinent into two independent dominions—India and Pakistan. The partition plan was finalised after a number of failed negotiations between Congress and the Muslim League as Jinnah completely rejected a proposal for a federal government dominated by Congress.  Violence broke out, especially in Punjab and Bengal, as the plan was announced. Following this, Mountbatten advanced the date of the partition and independence from June 1948 to 15 August 1947. He argued that any delay in transferring power to India would only intensify communal hatred. This sudden announcement resulted in a chaotic situation. The uncertainty of the borders caused Muslims and Hindus to move into the direction where they felt they would be in the majority. Muslim movement from the East was balanced by the similar movement of Hindus from the West.  A boundary committee chaired by Cyril Radcliffe  was charged with drawing boundaries for the new nations on communal lines. The committee was mandated to draw borders in a way that could leave the maximum number of Hindus and Sikhs in India and the maximum number of Muslims in Pakistan. Radcliffe came up with a map that split the two countries along the borders of Punjab and Bengal, ensuring the mandate. However, this bordering of imagined nation-states on the physical map left around fourteen million people on the ‘wrong’ side of the border, creating chaos that was to settle the course of identity politics in the subcontinent in years to come. It was the time when the ‘safety’ of officially defined minority communities was to become a new agenda for political bargains on adequate safeguards between the newly formed territorial nations. This official demarcation of territories also changed the nature of deliberations in the Constituent Assembly. In fact, the provisions regarding reservation for religious minorities contained in the first draft of the constitution were rejected after a long debate. It was decided that electoral representation could only be guaranteed for the Scheduled

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Castes and Scheduled Tribes in order to avoid any kind of ‘separatist’ politics as well as to establish the secular idea of India substantially. These developments in high politics also had a powerful impact on the debates on political representation of religious communities in municipal bodies. The municipal constituencies needed to be rearranged as the transfer of power was being negotiated. The Delhi Municipal Organisation Enquiry Committee (DMOEC) circulated a structured questionnaire amongst various organisations, including public bodies and ‘respected’ individuals, in Delhi in May 1947 to reflect upon some critical issues.105 It included subjects such as the reorganisation of constituencies, separate electorate and minority safeguards in the light of political developments taking place at the national level. The findings of the report demonstrate a significant change in Muslim opinion in terms of political representation in local administrative bodies before and after the announcement of the June 3 Plan. On the basis of its findings, the report, published in 1948, noted: Most of the Muslim witnesses were … in favor of existing arrangement in the Delhi Municipal area under which the Hindus and Muslims are represented through separate electorates. Most of the public bodies have … held the view that separate electorate would be harmful and that it should be replaced by joint electorates with the reservation of seats for minorities on population basis. The June third statement … however, quickly brought about a change in representative Muslim opinion placed before the committee in the course of oral evidence … it became clear that agreement was likely on the basis of joint electorate with reservation of seats for minorities.106

The report of the DMOEC underlines that the national-level political debates, as well as the ongoing discussions on the future constitution of independent India, were to be established as guiding principles of political representation. By 1949, Muslim representation through reservation emerged as a ‘compromise’ formula or as an important

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‘safeguard’ for securing minority interests in the future municipal administration of the city. These changes had multiple implications for Muslims in Delhi. The religious identity as electoral and administrative categories started fading away from official discourse with the establishment of a secular republic. But the politically charged and historically constituted Hindu–Muslim identities kept the contestation of space alive in the city. This contestation took an even more violent form immediately after Partition. The Hindu organisations, especially RSS and Mahasabha, targeted Muslims living in Hindu-dominated areas and forced them to either move to Pakistan or adopt to get converted. This forced homogenisation of residential localities became a pattern of Partition violence throughout the subcontinent. Delhi, along with ‘minority provinces’, remained live zones of this religious contestation. This brings us to the three main findings of this chapter. First, categorisation of space on communal lines produced three categories of localities: Hindu areas, Muslim areas and mixed localities. This categorisation was established as an official measure to deal with claims and counterclaims of communities by the colonial state. Interestingly, this simple division of space found a very political overtone in the 1940s and evolved into a larger discourse of homeland. This contestation of space eventually led to the partition of the subcontinent on religious lines. The Muslim majority provinces of British India formed Pakistan and Hindu Majority provinces came to be defined as India. The fate of mixed cities or ‘minority provinces’ remained contested space forever. Second, the configuration of Muslim space/Pakistan strongly differentiated between ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’, making the creation of ‘ideal’ and ‘pure’ nation(s) an unfinished project— something that had to be achieved.107 Although this division was very much linked to the transfer of power from the colonial state, the discourse of homeland offered blueprints on how the communities

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should imagine themselves and relate to their spaces. The idea of Pakistan—while pursuing this imagination of ideal space and homogenous Indian Muslim community for political negotiations— clearly identified who actually belonged to the ‘holy land’. The Muslims of ‘majority provinces’ were the ones who would live, ‘own’ and have the right to govern Pakistan, while for the Muslims of ‘minority provinces’ it was an imagined ideal space that they could look up to for emotional, spiritual and political support if needed. The Aligarh scheme exemplified this distinction as well as the realisation of the weaknesses of Muslims who did not possess the natural right to be in Pakistan. In this sense, it problematised the presence of Delhi Muslims, since they did not belong to the space that was imagined as an ideal territorial location for diverse and scattered ‘Indian Muslim community’. In fact, Delhi did not even form a minority province since it was always a ‘mixed’ city with large Muslim concentrations. Yet, Delhi became an important operational site to witness how conflicting ideas of homelands transformed the caste- and craft-based traditional mohallas on religious lines.108 The making of India and Pakistan made these Muslim-dominated localities look like residues yet to be competed for by the parallel notions of homelands. Finally, the idea of homeland also established a political discourse that provided the language of power politics. Although the Constitution of India envisaged a clear division between the secular character of political institutions and religious–cultural background of its future citizens, the electoral politics that evolved in postcolonial period relied heavily on different notions of homeland. The officially sanctioned and politically legitimated space– community relationships produced a powerful political discourse in the 1940s based on new idioms of homeland. This discourse helped the Muslim League to carve out a plan for Pakistan on behalf of Indian Muslims, at the same time, it was translated in multiple ways to define Muslim space in Delhi. For the Muslim educated class, particularly those associated with the Muslim League, Pakistan was a ‘secured’

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space to ensure its political, cultural and economic rights while for the educated Congress Muslims it was a political disaster. Despite this clear division of opinion amongst the educated, the common Muslims of Delhi, divided by caste and class, did not find anything extraordinary or shocking in this political proposal. In the context of local discontents, fears and anxieties, the idea of an imagined homeland with self-regulated everyday practices and customs was understood as a ‘secured community space’. Yet, Pakistan was initially neither a territorially defined space nor an antagonistic idea; rather, it was an articulation of Muslim difference. Thus, the relationship between the Muslim communities of Delhi and the idea of Pakistan was highly complicated, as their imagined land did not coincide with their actual lived spaces. But in the complex political scenario of the 1940s, it turned out to be a reference point, not merely for Muslim identity but also different notions of homeland. Thus, it would be interesting to examine, in Chapter 3, how these notions of homeland were continued and ‘asserted’ at the local level in Delhi after August 1947.

Notes 1

2

Venkat Dhulipala, ‘A Nation State Insufficiently Imagined? Debating Pakistan in late Colonial India’, The Indian Economic and Social History Review 48 (July/September, 2011), 377–405. Also see Venkat Dhulipala, Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Robinson Francis, ‘Nation Formation: The Brass Thesis and Muslim Separatism’ in Political Identity in South Asia, eds. David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (London: SOAS, 1979), 70–110; Francis Robinson, Islam and Muslim History in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000); Farzana Shaikh, ‘Muslim Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan’ in India’s

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3 4

5

6

7

Contested Homelands Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization, ed. Mushirul Hasan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 81–100; Farzana Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860– 1947 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Ayesha Jalal refutes these arguments by critically investigating nationalist histories of South Asia; see Ayesha Jalal, ‘Exploding Communalism: The Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia’ in Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India, eds. Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2–4; Ayesha Jalal, ‘Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of “Communalism”: Partition Historiography Revisited’, Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 3 (July 1996), 681–689. A recent study on Partition by Shamsul Islam unfolds a field for a critical investigation of the ideas of homeland. See Shamsul Islam, Muslims against Partition: Revisiting the Legacy of Allah Baksh and Other Patriotic Muslims, (New Delhi: Pharos Media & Publishing, 2015). Hardy, The Muslims of British India; Robinson, ‘Nation Formation’. Choudhary Rahmat Ali’s famous pamphlet ‘Now or Never’ in which the word ‘PAKISTAN’ was used for the first time is a good example. The pamphlet employs the available legal vocabulary to demand a separately governed nation-state. G. Allana, Pakistan Movement Historical Documents (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1969), 407–411. Ian Copland, ‘The Princely States, the Muslim League, and the Partition of India in1947’, The International History Review 13, no.1 (February 1991), 38–69. Aysha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: South Asian Studies, 1994), 1994. Jalal has argued that Jinnah did not initially want partition but preferred a federal India with autonomy for the Muslim majority provinces. But it can be argued that the idea of exclusive space for Muslims or Muslim majority provinces being the homeland of Indian Muslims was present in his thinking. J.L. Nehru, The Discovery of India (Calcutta: The Signet Press, 1946); Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani, Hamara Hindustan Aur Uske Fazail (India: Our Land & Its Virtues) trans. Mohammad Anwar Hussain (New Delhi: Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind, n.d.); Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani, Composite Nationalism and Islam, trans. Mohammad Anwar Hussain

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8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15

16

17 18 19

123

and Hasan Imam (Delhi: Manohar Publication, 2007); Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Calcutta: Asia Publishing House, 1963); Sayed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents: 1906–1947 (New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Company, 1982); and G. Allana, Political Documents of Pakistan II (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 2007), 1924–1947; Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Hindutva ke Panch Prarn (New Delhi: Bharti Sahitya Sadan, 1971). Nehru, The Discovery of India, 516.

Ibid., 527.

Ibid., 528. For a critical study of Nehruvian secularism and the idea of united India see Aditya Nigam, The Insurrection of Little Selves: The Crisis of Secular Nationalism in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 70. Also see Sunil Khilnani, Idea of India (New York: Hamish Hamilton, 1997); Partha Chatterjee, Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Aditya Nigam points out, ‘[T]o Nehru it was “national unity” and the cause of “Indian Freedom” that was paramount. It mattered little to him … that the entire ethos of that “unity” and “urge for freedom” was under-girded by a Hindu nationalism.’ Madani, Hamara Hindustan Aur Uske Fazail, 3. Ibid., 8. Ibid., 9–10. For a critical study of Madani see Barbara Metcalf, Husain Ahmed Madani. (The Makers of Muslim World): The Jihad for Islam and India’s Freedom (Oxford: One World Publications, 2008). ‘Address by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah at Lahore Session of Muslim League, March, 1940’ (Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publishing, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1983), 5–23. Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, 310; and Allana, Political Documents of Pakistan, 312. Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, 312. For a critical study on Jinnah and Muslim League see Jalal, The Sole Spokesman; Asim Roy, ‘The High Politics of India’s Partition: The

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20 21 22

23

24 25

26

Contested Homelands Revisionist Perspective’ in India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization, 1947–1965, ed. Mushirul Hassan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 102–137; R.J. Moor, ‘Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand’ in India’s Partition, ed. Mushirul Hasan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 59–195. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah 2 (Lahore: Ripon Printing Press, 1942), 247. Savarkar, Hindutva ke Panch Prarn, 54–55. Ibid., 17. The Indus River, mentioned in the abstract from Savarkar’s book, flows from Tibet into Jammu and Kashmir (India) and the rest of the north-western region called Pakistan now. The river is the greatest river on the western side of the subcontinent and is one of the seven sacred rivers of Hindus. It was the birthplace of the early Indus Valley civilisation. For a critical study of Hindutva ideology see Shamsul Islam, Hindutva: Savarkar Unmasked (Delhi: Media House, 2015); Christophe Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism: A Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Kenneth W. Jones, ‘Organized Hinduism in Delhi and New Delhi’, in Delhi Through the Ages, ed. Robert Eric Frykenberg (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993); T. Basu, Khaki Shorts and Saffron Flags: A Critic of the Hindu Right (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 1993); Walter Andersen, ‘The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh–II: Who Represents the Hindus?’, Economic and Political Weekly 7, no. 12 (18 March 1972), 633–640. Jalal, ‘Exploding Communalism’, 2–10. Karim Rezaul, Pakistan Examined with the Partition Schemes of Doctor Latif, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan and Others (Calcutta: The Book Company, 1941); Yusuf Meherally, Pakistan by Babu Rajendra Prasad (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1940); and B.R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or the Partition of India (Bombay: Thaker and Company Ltd., 1946). A few tentative schemes were proposed by members of the Muslim League in the late 1930s. The Pakistan scheme proposed by Syed Abdul Latif (1938) broadly talks about creating a federation of Muslim and Hindu cultural zones by clubbing the Hindu-dominated and Muslim-dominated regions into different blocks. He suggested for the transfer of population and a Public Law of Indian Nations as a safeguard for those who are

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33 34 35 36 37 38 39

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bound to remain in ‘Majority Cultural Zones’. He suggests that the Hindu and Muslim zones ‘should fulfill the cultural and political aspirations of every unit and secure to each a free homeland in proportional extent … of the total population of India’. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan Scheme (1939) proposed that British India and the princely states should be divided into seven zones on regional basis under a federal executive. The federation should consist of a viceroy and a council of seven ministries. The seven regional legislatures would have representatives of British India and princely states with at least one-third of Muslim ministers. India should remain a dominion and achieve self-governance in stages. The confederacy scheme by ‘Punjabi’, as the scheme is called, advocates a confederacy of India based on different cultures/religions and regional lines. It argues that the sub-continent of India should be divided into different (five) countries on cultural lines and reassembled in a confederacy of India. He rejects the exchange of population and suggests that the presence of minorities in each cultural zone will work as a guarantee of safeguards for all. See Rezaul, Pakistan Examined. Rezaul, Pakistan Examined, 150. Ibid., 151. Ibid. Ibid., 152. Ibid., 150–152. Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah I, 492. The speech was delivered at the annual session of AIML in Karachi on 15 November 1942. Interview with Mirza Zameer (name changed) dated 28 March 2014, Delhi. Ibid. Ibid. Abdul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1988), 117. Interview with Mirza Zameer (name changed) dated 28 March 2014, Delhi. Group discussion dated 17 April 2014, Delhi. Interview with Mohammad Sayeed (name changed) dated 23 May 2014, Delhi. A Pakistani serial called ‘Dastan’ situated in the context

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of pre-and post-partition Punjab beautifully visualises these ideological divisions within families, while the film Garam Hawa (Directed by M.S. Sathyu, 1974), written jointly by Shama Zaidi and Kaifi Azmi, based on an unpublished short story by Ismat Chughtai, deals with the same issue in the context of pre-partition Agra, United Provinces (UP). It was not a case only amongst Muslim families. The ‘Hindu’ families were also divided on the exclusionary idea of Akhand Bharat. An example is the Hindi film titled Dharmputra (directed by Yash Chopra, produced by B.R. Chora, 1961) based on Acharya Chatursen Shastri’s novel Dharamputra. Considered to be the first Hindi film on Partition, the film underlined the ideological conflicts between the exclusionary ideas of Akhand Bharat and Nehru’s imagination of a composite India quite beautifully in an upper-caste Hindu family. 40 ‘Fortnightly Report (FR)’, September 1946, Government of India (GOI), Home-Poll.–(I), 1946, File no. 18/9/46. NAI. A similar expression was made by Special Intelligence Bureau Report (IBR) in 1944 regarding the activities of Muslim National Guard in Delhi. For details see GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), February 1944, File no. 17/2/43. NAI. 41 Narayani Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 1803–1931: Society, Government and Urban Growth (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), 157–159. 42 Interview with Haji Babuddin (name changed) dated 17 October 2014, Delhi. A short story titled ‘Naya Qanoon’ written by Saadat Hassan Manto offers an interesting subaltern perspective. Although the story does not deal with partition, it highlights how the life of common people does not get affected by the changes taking place in high politics. See Saadat Hassan Manto, ‘Naya Qanoon’, in Saadat Hassan Manto Dastavez II (New Delhi: Rajkamal Prakashan, 1993), 27–35. 43 The words Pakistan and Khalistan refer to the ‘land of the pure’. The imagination of Akahnd Bharat was also based on the notion of pure Hindu blood for the creation of Hindu Rashtra. 44 Islam, Hindutva, 42; Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan 2, 365–68. For a special reference to Delhi see ‘IBR’ on the circular issued by V.D. Savarkar to provincial offices regarding the formation of Hindu Militarization Board, 1941, GOI, Home-Poll.-(I), File no. 200/194. NAI. 45 FR, Delhi, June 1940, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/6/1940. NAI.

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46 Walter Andersen, ‘The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh–II: Who Represents the Hindus?’, Economic and Political Weekly 7, no. 12 (18 March 1972), 633–640. 47 Ibid. 48 Andersen, ‘The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh–II’. 49 ‘IBR’ on the activities of the Muslim League and Muslim National Guard: ‘IBR’, 1943, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 17/2/43. NAI. On State Muslim League, ‘IBR’, 1943, GOI, Home-Poll–(I), File no. 519/3/43. NAI. 50 For an official note on Khaksar Movement see ‘IBR’, 1939, GOI, HomePoll.–(I), File no. 71/39. NAI. Further references could also be found in FR, April, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/4/39. 51 Gyanesh Kudaisya, ‘Foreshadowing Quit India: The Congress in Uttar Pradesh 1939–1941’ in Mapping Histories: Essays Presented to Ravinder Kumar, ed. Neera Chandhok (London: Anthem Press, 2000), 226–227. Also see William Gould, Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 52 Interview with Haji Babuddin (name changed) dated 17 October 2014, Delhi. 53 ‘FR’, Delhi, April 1939, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/4/39; Further references in this regard could also be found in ‘FR’, Delhi, March 1943, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 28/3/43.NAI; ‘IBR’, April 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 15/4/46. NAI; ‘FR’, Delhi, September 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/9/46. NAI; ‘FR’, Delhi, May 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 30/5/46. NAI. 54 ‘FR’, Delhi, September, 1940, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/9/40. Further references in relation to the ban on such activities could be found in ‘FR’, Delhi, March 1943, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 28/3/43. NAI. 55 ‘FR’, Delhi, April, 1940, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/4/40. NAI. 56 Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind was founded during the Khilafat movement in 1919. Initially, the Muslim ulamas (Islamic scholars) of all schools utilised this platform to be the religious and political voice of Muslims but after the collapse of Khilafat and non-cooperation movement, only Deoband ulamas remained in the organisation. The Jamiat worked closely with Congress and opposed the Muslim League. In 1940, Azad Muslim

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57 58

59

60 61 62 63

64

65 66 67 68 69

Contested Homelands Conference was organised on behalf of Jamiat Ulama in Delhi to voice its opposition to the demand for Pakistan while reiterating religious and cultural safeguards for minorities in the future constitutional set-up of India. See Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan Chapter IV (Calcutta: Asia Publishing House, 1963). For Congress-led anti-Pakistan platform see ‘FR’, Delhi, March 1942, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/3/42. NAI. Dawn, 1942 onwards. Dawn, September 1945 and onwards. Also see Mirza Abol Hassan Ispahani, Qaid-E-Azam Jinnah: As I Know Him (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1976), 37–41 and 67–83. See ‘FR’ of UP, April 1940, Home. Poll.–(I), File no. 18/4/40. NAI. Furthermore, the other report noted that ‘Hindu Mahasabha is becoming popular. A meeting was organised in Lucknow and claims were made that the Hindus were in majority and therefore they had the right to rule the country. These organisations joined hands with Sikhs on Guruparva and chanted slogans like ‘Hindustan Hinduon ka na kisi ke baap ka’ (Hindustan belongs to no other than Hindus). See FR, UP, January, 1940, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 23/1/40. NAI. FR, Delhi, February 1942, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/2/42. NAI; Also See FR, Delhi, January, 1944, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/1/44. NAI. For details see Stephen Legg, Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi’s Urban Governmentalities, (Malden Mass.: Blackwell, 2007), 138–144. Ibid. FR, Delhi, January 1944, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/1/44. NAI; FR, January 1945, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no.18/2/45; also see FRs for the period of 1942–1945. FR, Delhi, September 1942, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/9/42. NAI. The FRs for the entire war period after 1942 could be referred to in this relation. Azad, India Wins Freedom, 49. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 60–95. Azad, India Wins Freedom, 117. Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, 513. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 201–202. For a critical discussion and debates on the Muslim League, Jinnah and Cabinet Plan see Sekhar

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71 72 73

74

75 76

77

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Bandyopadhyay, Plassey to Partition and After: A History of Modern India (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2015), 449–451. Other references could also be found in Azad, India Wins Freedom, 145–160; Asim Roy, ‘The High Politics of India’s Partition’, 102–137; R.J. Moor, ‘Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand’, 159–195. For details see Bandyopadhyay, Plassey to Partition and After, 451–452. Also see Dawn and Hindustan Times, 14–31 August 1946; Debjani Sengupta, ‘A City Feeding on Itself: Testimonies and Histories of “Direct Action” Day’ in Strange Days: The History and Geography of Turbulence, ed. Monica Narula, Shuddhabrata Sengupta and Ravi Subhramaniam (New Delhi: The Sarai Programme, 2006), 288–295; Suranjan Das, Communal Riots Bengal, 1905–1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991), 161–188; Suranjan Das, ‘Communal Violence in Twentieth Century Colonial Bengal: An Analytical Framework’, in Communalism in India, ed. K.N. Panikkar (New Delhi: Manohar, 1991), 36–50; Joya Chatterji, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932–1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). The Hindi version of a Tamil Commercial film titled ‘Hey Ram’ (produced and directed by Kamal Hasan, 2000) also tells a chilling story of Calcutta Killings. Dawn, ‘The Resolution’, 17 August 1946. Dawn, ‘Muslim India Observes Direct Action Day’, 18 August 1946. ‘FR’, Delhi, August 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no.18/8/46. NAI. See Dawn, ‘Many Thousands Muslims Offer Jumatul-Vida Prayers at Delhi’, 25 August 1946. ‘FR’, Delhi, August 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/8/46. NAI. Also see FR, Delhi, September 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/9/46. NAI; Dawn, ‘Jinnah Ex-Rays Congress Cabinet Resolution’, 14 August 1946. ‘IBR (Abstract from CID Daily Report)’, 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 4124/46. NAI. Tamas (Directed and written by Bhishm Sahani, 1971) based on a Sahitya Akademi Award winning Hindi novel Tamas (1967). The television series highlighted the complex caste, class and religious identity configurations and politics in the backdrop of partition violence. There was disputed site in Queens Garden, Old Delhi. The Hindu organisations claimed that it was a temple of Lord Shiva while Muslims

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78 79 80 81

82 83

Contested Homelands alleged that it was a shrine, which had been destroyed to develop Queens Garden. This dispute took a violent turn after the 1930s because many Delhi-based and other Hindu organisations from UP, MP and Berar region, along with Hindu Mahasabha and RSS, got involved in this issue. The other important conflict was related to Muslim organisations involvement in Hyderabad Agitation. There was a political conflict between Indian National Congress and the Nizam of Hyderabad on the issue of constitutional reforms. Congress initiated protests against the Nizam. Arya Samaj-Hindu Mahasabha combine also launched their campaigns. Consequently, a number of protests were organised in Delhi in support or against the Nizam of Hyderabad followed by flag salutation ceremonies, Hyderabad Day and anti-Hyderabad agitations, Nizam Day and anti-Nizam Day observations. Mahasabha continued the agitations till it was replaced by anti-Pakistan processions. The issue, in this sense, was actually not ‘local’, but it played an important role in communal polarisation and intensifying the ideological differences between political groups. FR, Delhi, June 1939, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/06/39. NAI; FR, Delhi, April 1939, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 18/04/39. NAI; ‘Press Note’ issued by the Office of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, 23 January, 1939, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 22/15/39. Also see ‘Statement Showing the Number of Disturbances of Communal Character which Took Place in The Delhi City from 1930 Up-to-Date’, 27 February 1939, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 22/15/39. NAI. Further references on both issues can be found in FRs of this period. ‘IBR’, February 1940, GOI, Home. Poll.–(I), File no. 20/2/40. NAI. FR, Delhi, March 1940, GOI, Home. Poll.–(I), File no. 18/3/40. NAI. See Meherally, Pakistan by Babu Rajendra Prasad; Ambedkar, Pakistan or the Partition of India. Jalal, ‘Exploding Communalism’; Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Can Muslim be an Indian?’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, 4 (October 1999), 608–629. Source: Authors. ‘Letter to the Superintendent of Police’, 21 May 1946, GOI, HomePoll.–(I), File no. 21/5/46. NAI. For Police Report, 1946, GOI, HomePoll.–(I), File no. 22/5/46.NAI.

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84 Cow procession signifies new forms of public festivals, which emerged with the increasing zeal to revive old religious observances and to infuse religious meanings into previously secular festivals. For details see: Freitag, Collective Action and Community, 41. 85 ‘Chief Commissioner’s Report to the Home Secretary’, November, 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 7/11/46. NAI. 86 ‘Chief Commissioner’s Report to the Home Secretary’, November 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 7/11/46. NAI. Also see: ‘Police Report’, December 1946, GOI, Home. Poll.–(I), File no. 2/12/46. NAI. 87 ‘Letter to the Home Member from the residence of the Government Quarters of Chitra Gupta Square Road, Dikhusha Square and Aram Bagh’, New Delhi, 21 November 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 21/11/46. NAI. 88 Legg, Spaces of Colonialism, 47 and 146. 89 For details see ‘Police Orders for Id-Ul-Zuha’, 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.– (I), 1946, File no. 7/11/46. NAI. 90 ‘Police Orders for Id-Ul-Zuha’, 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), 1946, File no. 7/11/46. NAI. 91 ‘Letter to the Senior Superintendent of Police from the Anjuman-eIslamiya, Islam Nagar, Karol Bagh’, 21 November 1946, GOI, HomePoll.–(I), File no. 21/11/46. NAI. 92 Civil Defence Committee, Mohalla Turkman Gate, ward no. 8, Delhi, is an example in this regard. The committee organised various meetings involving Hindu–Muslim members of the respective ilaqa (Turkman Gate and mohalla Qabristan) during and after April 1946 due to the increasing communal hatred in the city. See ‘Letter signed by the Mir Mohalla, on behalf of the Civil Defence Committee, Mohalla Turkman Gate’, May 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 1/5/46. NAI. 93 ‘Letter to the Senior Superintendent of Police from the Muslim residence of Double Storey, Government Quarters of Karol Bagh’, 24 April 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 25/4/46. NAI. 94 ‘Letter to the Senior Superintendent of Police from the President Anjuman-e-Islamiya’, 22 April 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), 1946, File no. 25/4/1946. NAI. 95 ‘FR’, Delhi, August 1946. GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no.18/8/46. NAI.

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132 96

97

98

99 100 101 102 103 104

Contested Homelands See A report sent by the secretariat of the governor-general to home ministry to declare the Muslim League an unlawful association under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908. It contains newspaper reports describing the violent campaign of Muslim league activists and National Guards against non-Muslims during the month of August 1946 in West Bengal. See ‘Report on Muslim League and Muslim National Guard’, May 1947, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 17/5/47. NAI. I found only one complaint in the National Archives filed by Hindu residents living in these government quarters in comparison to a number of complaints by Muslim residents. Although there are FRs that record the presence of Ahrar Party, Muslim League National Guards and, especially, the presence of Khaksar Tehreek in Delhi, there is no record of organised training camps and violent attacks conducted by these organisations. Mirza Zameer (28 March 2014) and some FRs of that period suggest that there used to be marches and training campaigns by Ahrars but these were not at an alarming scale and were mainly anti-British for which these organisations were banned for some time. See ‘IBR’, October 1946, GOI, HomePoll.–(I), File no. 08/10/46. NAI. ‘Letter to the Secretary, Home Department, Government of India, from the President of Hindu Bharati Sabha’, 22 August 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I) File no. 23/8/46. NAI. Dawn, 25 August 1946. Also see ‘FR’, Delhi, August 1946, GOI, HomePoll.–(I), File no.18/8/46. NAI. ‘FR’, September 1946, GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), File no. 21/9/46, NAI. Interview with Mirza Zameer, dated 28 March 2014, Delhi. Interview with K.R. Jain, a retired prof. of political science and an old communist party activist, dated 18 December 2014, Delhi. Interview with Haji Babuddin, dated 17 October 2014, Delhi. The plan was also known as the Mountbatten Plan. It was announced by the British government. The Indian Independence Act 1947 was the implementation of the June 3 Plan. Severe riots started in Punjab, West Bengal and UP after this declaration. Two nations came into existence in 1947 with the transfer of power on 14 August to Pakistan and 15 August to India. See Bandyopadhyay, From Plassey to Partition and After, 405–438.

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106

107 108

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The questionnaire enquires: ‘Will it be necessary or desirable to reserve any number of seats for any community and if so on what basis?’ Furthermore, question no. 7 (c) asks, ‘Should the electorate be joint or separate (community wise), and if the latter, on what basis?’ ‘Report of the Delhi Municipal Organization Enquiry Committee’, 1948, New Delhi: Government of India Press, 84–85. ‘Report of the Delhi Municipal Organization Enquiry Committee’, 1948, New Delhi: Government of India Press, 20. Also see for debates on representation: Abdul Gafoor Abdul Majeed Noorani (A.G.), The Muslims of India: A Documentary Record (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2003), 193–195. Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). K.A. Abbas’s famous Urdu story Sardarji is a revealing example of this tussle. The story is set against the backdrop of a newly developed residential quarter in New Delhi. See K.A. Abbas, Sardarji and Other Stories, ed. Suresh Kohli (Delhi: Om Books International, 2014).

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3

Demarcated Homelands: ‘Mini

Pakistans’ in Delhi

The discourse of homeland in the 1940s re-established the fact that the contest over space no longer remained localised. The Boundary Commission, set up by the government in June 1947, divided British India into Hindu-dominated and Muslim-dominated regions— leaving the future of mixed cities for further political negotiations between the new dominions of Pakistan and India, which became independent on 14 and 15 August 1947, respectively.1 The creation of Pakistan, however, did not bring the discourse of homeland to an end; instead, it intensified the ambiguities and obscurities inherent in the schematic imagination of two nations as territorial nation-states. Partition brought these ambiguities to the surface. The Muslims in India were defined as a religious minority and the idea of a secular mainstream was also carved out.2 However, these structural changes had to confront the colonial demarcation of space on religious lines. In such a context, the collective presence of Muslims in specific geographical areas emerged as a politically contentious issue. This chapter examines this complex process of identification of space in postcolonial/post-Partition Delhi in the period 1947–1974, which made the Muslim areas appear as problematic zones or ‘mini Pakistans’ in the popular imagination. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines how Partition violence politicised Indian Muslim identity in terms of belongingness and citizenship. The second section revisits the space–community relationship and investigates the reconfiguration of Muslim identity in relation to Muslim refugee camps in Delhi. The third section looks at the 134

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resettlement of Muslim population in clearly demarcated Muslim zones. This section discusses the ways in which these protected zones were popularly tagged as ‘mini Pakistans’ in the immediate aftermath of Partition. Finally, the fourth section revisits the political trajectories of cow protection and meat in post-Partition Delhi. The chapter argues that the idea of Pakistan continued to survive in postPartition Delhi and influenced the remaking of Muslim identity in terms of the space occupied by them.

I

Divided Homelands: Reconfigured Idea of

Pakistan in Independent India

A Dilliwala to a Magistrate: ‘Are Dilliwalas not permitted (to board the train to Pakistan)?’ Magistrate: ‘Yes, they (Pakistan authorities) say that the agreement for the transfer of population was only for western and eastern Punjab. So many people have gathered here from each district that there is no room for others. Pakistan is too small, how would this number of people be accommodated there?’ Dilliwala (with anger): ‘Why that idiot (kambhakht) made such a small Pakistan that we [Dilliwalas] cannot be accommodated.3 (Emphasis added.)

This conversation unfolds the complex trajectory of Delhi Muslims and the Muslims of north Indian provinces in general. This was, however, neither the sudden outcome of Mountbatten’s plan nor did it begin at ‘the stroke of midnight hour’ of 15 August 1947. It was the result of a discourse of homeland, which had now taken a concrete form. Everything had to be ‘corrected’ and divided completely and unambiguously—the land, the people, the culture, the language and history—for the making of these imagined, and now ‘achieved’, homelands. Most importantly, religious identity intermingled inextricably with national identity—Muslim Pakistani and Hindu

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Hindustani—in popular parlance, and for some time in official languages, too. A long bureaucratic process of the making of two nations, as Vazeera Fazila Zamindar in her seminal work explains, started to deal with the immediate aftermath of Partition. A Partition Committee was formed in which Lord Mountbatten was its chairman and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Dr Rajendra Prasad, Liaqat Ali Khan and Abdur Rab Nishtar were its members. The committee had its first meeting on 12 June 1947. Later, this committee was replaced by Partition Council. In this council, Congress was represented by Sardar Patel and Dr Rajendra Prasad, with C. Rajgopalachari as an alternate member. The Muslim League was represented by Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, with Abdur Rab Nishtar as an alternate member. Partition Council remained in existence even after 15 August 1947. With the help of a number of expert committees, the council’s responsibility was to deal with the transfer of staff, organisations, assets and liabilities, finance, defence, trade and economic relations between the two countries.4 A number of ordinances, agreements and Acts were passed by India and Pakistan for the safe transfer of population, temporary settlement of unsettled communities, division and management of evacuee properties and, most importantly, for the management of minorities on both sides.5 Punjab, with a large number of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim population, had to go through this imposed and violent process of ‘homogenisation’ through an organised transfer of population.6 Delhi, being the capital of British India, was not only a witness to this violent process of ‘divisions’ but was also a site where the official identity of north Indian Muslims and their relationship with the territorial space of India was taking concrete shape. The incidents of communal clashes in Delhi in August and September 1947 were not something unexpected. A number of clashes, including looting and stabbing as discussed earlier, actually begun well before August as rumours of Partition started circulating. These incidents increased with the news of riots and killings in other

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parts of India, including Calcutta, Noakhali, Bihar, and in East and West Punjab, leading to an organised transfer of population. But like Karachi, Delhi faced orchestrated Partition violence only at the beginning of September with the arrival of refugees.7 The influx of Hindu and Sikh refugees coming from Sindh and West Punjab created a pool of displaced population that was quite unprecedented.8 Delhi had a population of about 950,000 in 1947 (918,000 at the time of the census in 1941). Nearly 500,000 Hindu and Sikh refugees arrived in Delhi in the immediate aftermath of Partition. This flow of refugees continued as the long process of the partitioning of families and assets posed new challenges for both India and Pakistan. Even in 1951, Partition refugees (excluding local Muslim refugees displaced due to riots) still accounted for 28.4 per cent of the total population of the city. The number increased initially with the inclusion of ‘local Muslim refugees’ who did not go to Pakistan and remained displaced within the city.9 In fact, Delhi, according to Gyanendra Pandey, ‘became a “refugee-istan” with a staggering number of people displaced from elsewhere seeking … new homes in the city, and an equally staggering number of other – local – refugees imprisoned in their own homes or refugee camps nearby.’10 The situation resulted in a reconfiguration of communal demography of Delhi with the establishment of Muslim refugee camps and Muslim zones. Hindu and Sikh refugees came with a feeling of being displaced, looted, killed and raped.11 The sense of marginalisation, hopelessness and anger resulted in violent clashes and, in some cases, attacks on Muslims in Delhi, who were seen as immediate enemies responsible for their displacement.12 The aggressive Mahasabha–RSS politics and the communalisation of the bureaucratic system and state machinery successfully mobilised refugee discontent against the Muslim population of Delhi.13 The Hindu nationalist organisations started a process of cultural homogenisation through different ways of killings, forced evacuation of the Muslim population and forced conversion to Hinduism (reconversion according to Hindu political

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groups) of Muslim artisans and other occupational classes from Old Delhi and its suburban areas.14 Maulana Azad recollects in India Wins Freedom: ‘When the reports of massacres in West Punjab reached Delhi, Muslims in the city were attacked by mobs … Sikh took the leading part in organizing these murderous attacks in Delhi.’ He further explains that in areas like Karol Bagh, Lodhi Colony, Sabzi Mandi and Sadar Bazar, or areas that are identified in the previous chapter as new areas with a mixed population, ‘life and property [of Muslims] were no longer safe … the situation became so bad that no Muslim could go to sleep at night with the confidence that he would wake up alive the next morning.’15 Azad points out that the police and army played a very dubious role in this rioting situation. He stated that the deputy commissioner, M.S. Randhawa, played a key role in maintaining law and order in Delhi because the chief commissioner of Delhi, Khurshid Ahmed, was afraid of taking any strong action against the rioters as he thought that his actions might be seen as an act of favour to Muslims. And Randhawa, who was seen by the local Muslim population as a fair-minded and strong officer before Partition, he explained, was also affected by the communal environment/tension in Punjab and Delhi.16 While safeguarding Muslim localities, the police officers under his supervision allowed mobs of Hindu and Sikh refugees to engage in some kind of organised attacks.17 When every relationship was defined in terms of religion, army and police officials could not remain isolated. Azad explains that ‘the majority of troops in Delhi were Hindus and Sikhs … in a few days it became clear that they could not be relied upon … [for] restoring law and order in the city.’18 Describing a similar situation, a British resident wrote that ‘September 1947 will be remembered by Delhi residents as a period of horror. Moslems were being systematically hunted down and butchered … thousands of them [Muslims] were herded into camps … the dead lay rotting in the streets … hospitals were choked … and in imminent danger of attack because of the presence of Moslem

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staff and Moslem patients.’19 The violence intensified the atmosphere of fear and insecurities and re-enforced the identification of each mohalla on communal grounds. But, unlike previously when mixed localities were seen as problem areas, this time it was Muslim mohallas that emerged strongly as the most contested communal spaces. Mirza Sahib, a witness of Partition violence, also reconfirms that the feeling of insecurity and distrust, even of the police and army, were so high that guarding streets at nights by local residents became a practice and continued for a very long period.20 Yet, on 7 and 8 September 1947, some of the best-guarded areas of New Delhi also experienced violence. The violence resulted in a breakdown of trust that forced people to leave their immediate surroundings and become refugees. It is estimated that between 20,000 and 25,000 Muslims were killed and, towards the end of October, only about 150,000 of Delhi’s 500,000 Muslims remained in the city and did not go to Pakistan.21 The internal displacement of Muslim population led to a significant reconfiguration of urban residential space along communal lines. Hindu and Sikh refugees in search of shelter occupied ‘evacuee’ and ‘abandoned’ properties. Initially, these were the properties of those who had left for Pakistan or moved to some ‘secured’ places. This occupation, however, encouraged a section of rioters to forcefully ‘push’ Muslim neighbours out of their homes and occupy their residential and commercial properties. M.S. Randhawa, the deputy commissioner of Delhi, noted that ‘forcible possession of some vacant houses was an outcome of “refugees” discontent [sic] who are without shelter [and] wander about from street to street in search of accommodation.’22 Thus, forceful evacuation of Muslim houses and commercial units and their ‘illegal’ occupation was a specific feature of communal violence in the city during the initial post-Partition period that continued with further migration from both sides. Nehru mentioned it as a dangerous phenomenon in his various speeches.23 The ‘forced evacuation’ was not only creating another set of displaced persons

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but also raising fear and insecurity amongst the Muslims of Delhi. It was an urgent task for Nehru, Gandhi and Maulana Azad to stop such occupations, displacement of the Muslim population and their migration to Pakistan by ensuring safety and security of life and property. At the same time, they had to find ways to carry out the important and immediate task of rehabilitating Hindu and Sikh refugees. An emergency board of the Cabinet called Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (ECC) was set up by Mountbatten on 6 September with parallel committees for Delhi and East Punjab to control unprecedented Partition-related violence. It consisted of members of the Cabinet and some high civil and military officers. With the intervention of the government, it was decided by the ECC that Muslims from Hindu-dominated and mixed areas should be moved to some ‘protected’ places.24 The Muslim refugee camps and ‘Muslim zones’ were seen as a temporary arrangement for the safety of the Muslims of Delhi. A special regiment from South India was called in to establish law and order and provide protection to these localities.25 This virtually meant the emergence of a new definition of a Muslim area as communally ‘sensitive’ area.

Unsettled but ‘Secured’: Muslim Refugee Camps A number of refugee camps emerged to accommodate refugees belonging to different communities, such as Hindu and Sikh refugee camps and Muslim refugee camps. Hindu and Sikh camps had population displaced mainly from West Punjab and Sindh. The Muslim camps had the Muslim population of Old Delhi, New Delhi and others coming from parts of North India, including U.P., M.P. and the Mewat region. Following this, the galies and mohallas of Delhi were reorganised on religious lines either spontaneously or forcibly. The mohallas that had been traditionally unaffected by religious contestations and had successfully managed to remain ‘mixed’ were also unsettled for the first time. For instance, Sadar Bazar, Karol Bagh, Paharganj and Pahari Dheeraj (with a small

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Muslim population) were mixed areas (even according to the official classification), which became a site of communal violence in 1947. Muslim residents were either killed or pushed out of these areas.26 A popular perception established that Muslims could not be Indian citizens as they had their homeland—Pakistan.27 Two types of Muslim camps emerged in Delhi. The first was an unorganised gathering of the Muslim population in Muslimdominated areas or religious places of worship, with either no support or minimum assistance from the government. These were unorganised camps since the State did not intervene directly to provide food and security to the inhabitants. Most of these sites came into existence quite spontaneously. Muslims, especially from the Hindu-dominated areas where they were fewer in number, initially started gathering at places that were considered to be ‘safe’. Mosques, graveyards, dilapidated buildings and historic monuments like Jama Masjid, Idgah, dargahs (shrines), Delhi College (now known as Zakir Hussain College) and Nizamuddin Basti turned into asylums. Many Muslims moved into the houses of friends and relatives situated in Muslim-dominated areas. Muslim ministers such as Maulana Azad and Rafi Ahmed Qidwai, and other influential community leaders, also provided refuge to the riot victims.28 The Jama Masjid and Idgah camps were ‘managed’ by Muslim voluntary organisations with some support such as food and medical supplies from the government (see Figure 2 for a rare picture of Jama Masjid Camp).29 Initially, these places were popularly called Muslim camps. The Purana Qila (Old Fort) and Humayun’s Tomb camps (see Figure 3 for the Purana Qila refugee camp and Figures 4 and 5 for the Humayun’s Tomb camp) were the second type of Muslim camps, the ones that were organised and administered by the government. The Purana Qila camp had a different status because it became the biggest departure point to Pakistan. Initially, it was set up to transfer, through the intervention of the Pakistan High

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Commission, some 12,000 Muslim government employees and their families who decided to work for the Pakistani government.30 Special trains were made operational for them from Purana Qila to Lahore, and this service became more regular by early October 1947. Soon, due to increasing violence in Delhi, this camp was also considered a ‘secured’ place by the emergency committee (ECC), especially for Muslims living in mixed and Hindu-dominated areas.31 Azad explains this in India Wins Freedom: ‘it soon became clear that it was not possible to protect isolated [Muslim] houses in different parts of the city … we therefore decided that Muslims should be brought together and placed in protected camps.’32 Over 50,000 Muslims moved to the camp within a few days with or without the intention to go to Pakistan. They continued to dwell here until early 1948. Muslim residents from other places like the Jama Masjid and Idgah camps also started gathering in Purana Qila since there was not enough space in those sites to accommodate the increasing number of local Muslims and Muslims coming to Delhi from other regions.33

Figure 2: Jama Masjid Camp, 1947–4837

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Figure 3: Purana Qila Muslim Refugee Camp, 1947–4834

Figure 4: Humayun’s Tomb Refugee Camp, 1947–48, I35

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Figure 5: Humayun’s Tomb Refugee Camp, 1947–48, II36

There were around 121,000 Muslim refugees in the Purana Qila and Humayun’s Tomb camps in September 1947. This number increased to 164,000 within a short while. In early October, figures of 62,000 and 63,000 Muslim refugees were quoted for the Purana Qila and Humayun’s Tomb refugee camps, respectively; though some reports put the figure for the Purana Qila camp at 80,000 or even higher. It was estimated that by mid-September around 60 per cent of the

Muslims of Old Delhi and 90 per cent of them in New Delhi had

fled to these camps for refuge as the communal violence increased. Between 20,000 and 25,000 Muslims were said to have been killed. Thus, towards the end of October, only about 150,000 of Delhi’s 500,000 Muslims remained.38 But this gathering of Muslim population created other problems in the chaotic situation of the time. The official status of these camps remained quite ambiguous for some time for two reasons. First, the transfer of administrative staff, as discussed

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earlier, was an official process that took place alongside the migration of common Muslims in the wake of increasing communal violence in the city. Second, the bureaucratic machinery, especially the Delhi administration that was under the direct control of Home Minister Sardar Patel, quite strongly asserted that the management of Muslim camps was the responsibility of the Pakistan government since all Muslims in the refugee camps were willing to go to Pakistan.39There was no organisation, administration or resources available in the Purana Qila camp. In this situation, the Pakistan High Commission requested the Indian government to take over its management. It was only after Gandhi visited these camps on 13 September 1947 that the Indian government took over the responsibility to administer the site with the appointment of a Muslim guard on the request of the Pakistan High Commission.40 But the conditions in terms of the availability of resources and facilities continued to be debatable issues.41 According to Mirza Sahib, the conditions in the Purana Qila camp were so unhealthy that many people died after they moved there. He said, ‘Purana Qila camp was a living graveyard of people. It was full of dilapidated structures. There was nothing apart from bushes and big pits.’42 Dr Zakir Hussain, the vice-chancellor of Jamia Millia Islamia and a member of the emergency committee, also argued that ‘these poor men and women had been rescued from sudden death to be buried in a living grave.’43 It was only in late September 1947 that the Government of India started recognising the proper maintenance of Muslim camps as its administrative responsibility. Gandhi’s fast in Delhi and Maulana Azad’s famous speech at the Jama Masjid in October 1947 encouraged the Indian government to send a clear message that Muslim camps were also ‘our’ camps and that these Muslim refugees were ‘our’ citizens. It was only after this loud announcement that Indian officials took over full responsibility of supplying food and maintenance of security at these camps.44 This step was taken to stop mass migration of Indian Muslims to Pakistan,

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which created critical conditions for the displaced population in Karachi. But the crisis did not end here. The Indian-ness of Muslims living in refugee camps came under intense scrutiny.45 The unclear policy of the two governments made the supposed ‘intention’ of Muslim refugees a defining marker of their belongingness and national identity. Arguments were proffered that all Muslims who had moved to the camps intended to go to Pakistan.46 Although this ‘intention’ factor was much discussed in relation to the management of evacuees’ properties, such assertion was also made during the emergency committee proceedings and Constituent Assembly (CA) debates. The emergency committee reports suggest that it was hard to enumerate the exact number of refugees who left for Pakistan in that chaotic condition. The committee, thus, recommended that refugees in the Purana Qila camp should be divided into two groups—those who want to go to Pakistan and those who wish to stay in India.47 The minister of relief and rehabilitation, K.C. Neogy, who was given the task of counting the refugees in the camps, claimed that about 90 per cent of Muslims in the camps ‘seem[ed] to want to leave for Pakistan’.48 In reality, however, it was hard to estimate the actual figure of those who really intended to leave and those who moved there only temporarily in search of security due to increasing violent incidents. In fact, an emergency committee report noted that most of them ‘have not yet finally made-up their mind’.49 This aspect of the ‘intention’ of Muslim became more complicated to assess when a number of them decided to go back to their houses in Delhi once the scale of violence came down in 1948. Gandhi, Azad and Nehru also appealed to Muslim refugees to return to their homes consistently and ensured them for their safety. Moreover, Muslim refugees who fled to Pakistan also started returning as soon as the permit system was introduced in the same year.50 This reverse migration of Muslim refugees from the camps and from Pakistan led to a very chaotic and

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sensitive situation in the city since a number of ‘empty’ properties that they left were now occupied by the displaced Hindu and Sikh population. In this situation, the ‘intention’ of Muslim refugees—a highly subjective expression which was very difficult to establish and use to estimate the actual number of those who really wish to leave for Pakistan—was taken as a yardstick to scrutinise Muslim claim on evacuee properties and Muslim zones. Thus, the rehabilitation of Hindu and Sikh refugees, or ‘hamare log’ (our people) as it was popularly as well as officially understood in the complex scenario of the time, turned out to be contingent upon the departure of Muslim refugees to Pakistan. This difference was made clear at a number of occasions as evacuee property pool was created. For instance, G.D. Khosla, the person appointed to undertake an enquiry into the working of the custodian of evacuee property in Delhi, argued in a meeting with Gandhi that, ‘the Muslims in the Old Fort [Purana Qila] camp have no wish to stay in this country…they would like to go to Pakistan. Our own people are without shelter. It breaks my heart when I see them suffering like this.’ 51 However, Gandhi, who insisted the Indian government to take responsibility for the management and security of Muslim camps and appealed Muslim refugees to return to their homes, was very critical of such divisions. He strongly refuted these arguments at a number of occasions. Replying to Khosla, he pointed out that, ‘they do not say [to me] that they want to go to Pakistan. They say … if we cannot keep them in their own homes, we should send them to … anywhere except Pakistan … they are also our people… bring them back and protect.’52 This conversation reveals that the ‘intention’ of Muslim refugees became a highly contested issue since it was directly placed in associated with the rehabilitation of Hindu and Sikh Partition victims. Sardar Patel highlighted the complexity as well as the priorities that should be taken to deal with ‘refugee resettlement’ in an emergency committee meeting quite bluntly.

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He commented that ‘there was bound to be trouble if as a result of these Muslims not moving out, it proved impossible to accommodate non-Muslim refugees.’53 Patel argued that the ‘[g]overnment could not take responsibility for telling people to stay and guaranteeing them protection if they did’ in this chaotic situation.54 However, for Nehru, the mass migration of Muslims was an equally worrying concern because most of these Muslims were karigars involved in traditional occupations and had historically been an intrinsic part of the socio-economic life and cultural fabric of the city. He pointed out that ‘if mass migration of Muslims continued [the] whole organization would collapse’, and that would have a devastating impact on society as well as the economy.55 Nehru’s concern was not unfounded because educated and affluent Muslims, including government employees and karkhana owners, had already moved to Pakistan. The mass exodus of middle-class Muslims would have definitely led to a crisis situation. In this highly volatile context, Gandhi began a fast in January 1948. He made a powerful plea that there should be no violence in the city and Muslim refugees should be rehabilitated in their own houses. Gandhi’s fast, according to Azad, had an ‘electric effect’ not only in Delhi but throughout North India.56 On the other hand, the situation of Muslim refugees in Pakistan was quite complicated. The migrating Muslims of North India faced a very delicate situation. Their plight was termed as ‘refugee problem’ in the official discourse. Unlike India, no arrangements were made to accommodate Muslims coming from the so-called ‘minority provinces’ of British India. Eventually, they started looting and targeting Hindu and Sikh houses in Pakistan. According to the official records, 27,000 refugees reached Sind by mid-September 1947. This Muslim refugees’ number multiplied within a week.57 It is worth noting that government officials and influential propertied classes had already declared their intention to serve in Pakistan after the release of the June 3 Plan. They were well accommodated and served in Pakistan. However, there was no plan of action for the common

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Muslim population as there was no discussion on the possibilities of transfer of population. This situation subscribes to Haji Babuddin’s account of ‘Pakistan being the occupation of educated’ quite well. On the question of who benefitted from the making of Pakistan, he explained quite categorically that: The educated and ashraf left India well before the qatl-e-aam [massacre] started in Delhi, because they knew how and when the partition would happen and how they could migrate safely. It was the poor who suffered the most. They had nothing to take or leave behind except hope.58

Begum Anees Qidwai also makes this observation quite categorically in her memoirs titled Azadi Ki Chhaon Mein. Describing the vulnerable situation of the people living in Muslim refugee camps, she observes: ‘[T]he so called nawabs, begums and the affluent people of the city … had not taken shelter anywhere nor did they help the needy … it was only the small shopkeepers, karkhana [small-scale industry] owners, artisans and lower class people in these camps. Delhi’s aristocrats—the ashrafs—who were proud of their high culture and language, had … already fled to Pakistan in early September.’59 (Translation.)

These Muslims of Delhi had no idea how they were going to survive in this critical situation. Apart from government officials and propertied classes, these residents of ‘minority provinces’ were not even invited in Pakistan. In fact, the Pakistan government made continuous appeals to the Indian government and made radio announcements for Muslims in Delhi to control and discourage their movement from provinces that were not under the ‘agreed areas’.60 The Pakistan emergency committee suggested to Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan that he should ‘advise them [refugees in Delhi] to … understand that they were now nationals of India and should look to the Indian

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government for protection.’61 On the other hand, the status of Muslim camps was not entirely clear for the Indian government. For instance, the Muslims in Purana Qila and Humayun’s Tomb refugee camps were considered as the responsibility of the Pakistan government for a very long time. Haji Sahib explained this situation with a sense of betrayal: First Jinnah and his followers betrayed Muslims by demanding Pakistan for their mafad [benefit] and then came the Indian government. Our biradari [occupational association] and hunar [skill] were our only saviour. We were provided protection in Delhi only after the Hindus and the government realised that the economy cannot survive if karigars [artisans] were not saved or stopped from leaving out of fear.62

Haji Sahib’s accounts open an untold narrative—a version that explains an important aspect of the making of Muslim space and identity in postcolonial Delhi. Muslims who had taken shelter in various camps in Delhi were highly undecided and unsure of their status as to which homeland they belong to. This sudden break up in the relationship between Delhi’s Muslims and their ‘space’—galies and mohallas that they inherited historically—led to a breach of trust, which was to be rebuilt to allow them to see themselves as citizens of the Indian State.63 This extremely volatile communal situation forced them to leave their houses and enter a contingent and contested space called ‘refugee camp’. The camp was based on the assumption that ‘protection’ of Muslims could only be ensured if they were together at one place. Muslims also found a sense of protection in these camps since the State failed to provide security in their surroundings. These camps became spaces that absorbed all kinds of fears, insecurities and anxieties, providing momentary settlement to the unsettled. In this sense, the camp as space was linked to a moment in time that was going to redefine the complex yet intrinsic relationship of Muslims as a religious community with the newly emerging State(s)/nation(s)

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and their homelands. In other words, it was a moment when Muslims of North India, specifically Delhi, were forced to make a ‘choice’ between their religious identity, which claimed to be transforming into a nation called Pakistan, and their association with a nation called India, which was in a state of crisis and yet to be firmly established as a democratic and secular entity. Therefore, the Muslim camp in Delhi was not a space they had arrived at to acquire a ‘permanent’ national identity, as was the case with Hindu and Sikh refugees; instead, it was a point of departure from where started the long crisis of their ‘north Indian Muslim’ identity which was to take multifarious shapes.

The Muslim Zones When two brothers divide their residential and commercial properties and separate with their share … they do not claim on each other’s property. Same should be applied to Hindus and Muslims. When they have taken their … share than what right do they have on Hindustan?... When we lived together … everything was shared and everybody had claims. They have no right to claim now that the bantwara has taken place.64 It was the general understanding amongst people in Delhi, which opened a field of new forms of contestations and brought the discourse of bantwara from localities and mohallas to individual properties. The Muslims’ right to claim on space was also denied silently as well as violently. The Hindu nationalist forces established this understanding specially to articulate the plight of Hindu and Sikh Partition victims. This dialogue reflects how and why the protection of properties evacuated by Muslims turned out to be the most critical issue after Partition and eventually led to the evolution of communal demography in Delhi. The Muslim population was forced to leave, as mentioned earlier, areas like Paharganj, Karol Bagh, Sabzi Mandi and the surrounding localities where they were in a minority.65 Muslims living in mixed areas of Old Delhi, including areas that were not directly affected by communal violence, also decided to take

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shelter either in refugee camps or at their relatives’ living in Muslimdominated pockets.66 These spontaneous (sometimes forced) but always less organised forms of internal movement of Muslim populations to areas perceived to be ‘safe’ paved the way for the creation of an administratively unclear and politically provocative category called the ‘Muslim zones’. There was also a grave risk that Muslim residents could be ‘pushed out’ of their areas as the ‘evacuated’ Muslim properties were to be allocated to Hindu and Sikh refugees. There were a number of incidents in which RSS workers and other right-wing Hindu political elements started threatening Muslim neighbours once an evacuee house was occupied by Hindu or Sikh refugees even in Muslimdominated areas. Nehru termed this a deliberate ‘pushing out’ of the Muslim population. The peace committees, voluntary bodies formed to promote communal harmony in times of violence, requested the government to stop rehabilitation of Hindu and Sikh refugees in Muslim-dominated areas.67 The emergency committee also raised this concern.68 It was decided that Muslims would be rehabilitated in predominantly Muslim areas with government intervention.69 The city space in Delhi was thus finally reconfigured on the basis of communal identity. Nehru strongly supported this as a temporary arrangement to ensure the safety and protection of Muslims. It was also done to secure the rights of Muslims who were now called ‘evacuees’ after moving from their houses to refugee camps. The term ‘evacuee’ came into being as an important official category, primarily for the properties of those Muslims who moved to Pakistan. For efficient management and administration of evacuee properties, the Government of India promulgated the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. The objects and reasons of the Act were to provide for the administration of evacuee properties and for compensating refugees who lost their properties in Pakistan. The evacuee property law, which was initially formulated for the East and West Punjab provinces, was extended to Delhi for this purpose.

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These properties became a part of an ‘evacuee pool’, which was to be managed by an appointed body called the custodian. The custodian was responsible for the verification of any property as ‘evacuee’ and its allotment to Hindu and Sikh refugees until a suitable alternative accommodation was arranged for them. Muslims who settled in Pakistan were compensated by the Pakistan government following the passing of an ordinance on similar lines. But this category of ‘Muslim evacuee’ became a problem for those Muslims who did not go to Pakistan but had left their properties and moved to Muslim refugee camps and/or Muslim-dominated areas. This problem deepened as Muslim refugees started returning home from the camps when violence and chaos created by Partition abated. In order to save the rights of these Muslims, properties situated in Muslim zones were excluded from the jurisdiction of the custodian and the custodian’s pool.70 The ‘empty’, ‘evacuee’ or ‘abandoned’ properties in Muslim mohallas, or Muslim basties (as Nehru called them), like Phatak Habash Khan, Pahari Imli, Pul Bangash and Sadar Bazar were kept secured by police to accommodate Muslims coming only from mixed areas or to rehabilitate returning Muslim ‘refugees’ at the later stage.71 In the given violent circumstances, it was decided that only Muslims or the old local Hindu population (not refugees) should remain in these zones. Muslim evacuee waqf properties were also kept secured on grounds of community rights at the request of Jamiat Ulama-iHind.72 The government made special arrangements at the later stage for the transfer of Muslims from mixed and Hindu-dominated areas to these ‘Muslim zones’. Few Muslim households situated in mixed areas were also forcibly evacuated by the authorities. They were told to vacate their houses and move to designated areas for their safety.73 After hectic deliberations of the emergency committee, chief commissioners and military officers were directed to devise schemes for additional protection and more intensive patrolling of these selected Muslim areas in order to restore confidence amongst

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Muslims in the city.74 The notion of ‘Muslim zones’ came into being in this way as ‘risk management’ tactics. In that sense, the areas for the first time came to be clearly arranged, quite involuntarily, on the lines of established categorisation: ‘Hindu-dominated’, ‘Muslimdominated’ and ‘mixed’. In fact, the numerical strength of the community in crisis became an important administrative principle in the official discourse. The Muslim zones had no ‘legal’ sanction. In fact, they came into being by an order issued directly by the national government during the state of emergency.75 Nehru requested some kind of intervention from the home ministry to protect such properties from organised attacks and forced occupation. One of his letters to Sardar Patel, the then home minister, says, ‘I understand that no formal orders to this effect have been issued by the Home Ministry and the local authorities, therefore, have been functioning rather in the air. May I suggest that such orders might be sent to them to regulate their actions?’76 The home ministry rejected the request arguing that the relief and rehabilitation ministry was responsible for the execution of the Cabinet orders for the maintenance of vacant houses for Muslims.77 Therefore, the relief and rehabilitation ministry issued an office memorandum on 20 November 1947 to the custodian of evacuee properties explaining that a number of houses that had fallen vacant in ‘predominantly Muslim mohallas in Delhi city (not Karol Bagh, Sabzi Mandi and Paharganj) should … [be] given only to Muslims so that certain mohallas would form compact Muslim blocks in the city [emphasis added].’78 It was the responsibility of the local administration, police and the custodian to ensure proper implementation of this order and secure these properties. However, two days later another order was issued by the Ministry directing the custodian to ‘hold the instructions contained in the order in abeyance [emphasis added]’.79 Consequently, no instructions were issued to the local administration or police for the enforcement of this policy till

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late in 1948. The concerned authorities and officials, therefore, doubted the ‘legality’ of such orders and refused to maintain Muslim zones for a long time.80 The local government bodies, which had a number of clerks and babus (government servants) sympathetic to the RSS, implemented the official orders selectively.81 In the wake of Partition and related violence, local officials clearly distinguished between hamare log (our people) and Pakistani Musalmans (Pakistani Muslims) when it came to prioritising between Hindu and Sikh refugee rehabilitation and Muslim resettlement.82 Azad made a powerful observation about the functioning of local bodies in Delhi. He noted that the administrative officers ‘were divided into two groups. The larger group looked up to Sardar Patel and acted in a way which they thought would please him. A smaller group looked up to Jawaharlal and me and tried to carry out Jawaharlal’s orders.’83 This group of people drew inspiration from Sardar Patel as, according to him, Sardar Patel stood completely against Gandhi and Nehru on the issues of protection and resettlement of the Muslim population in Delhi. According to Azad, Sardar Patel declared his position by clearly differentiating between hamare log and Muslims during his discussions with Gandhi on many occasions.84 In this situation, the security of these zones largely remained the responsibility of the peace committees, which continued to guard evacuee properties during riots with the help of local residents and some refugees working as volunteers.85 It was only after prolonged deliberation that the local administration and police provided protection to these localities. ‘Muslim zone’ was an administratively unclear and politically provocative spatial category. Socialist leader Mir Mushtaq Ahmed took a very critical view of this zoning of Muslim areas in official terms and the consequent controversies that led to organised and violent attacks on these localities by Hindu communal forces. Challenging the official status of Muslim zones, he argued that:

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The concentration of Muslim population in certain traditionally Muslim-dominated areas was actually an outcome of the violent creation of Hindu and Sikh zones in Paharganj, Sabzi Mandi and Karol Bagh. Hindu and Sikh communal groups cleared those areas of Muslims and occupied their residential and commercial properties. The only thing that the government did was to ensure that no Hindu and Sikh refugees were to be resettled in Muslim-dominated areas, as a way of ensuring that violence against Muslims did not spread to these pockets. Ahmed explained that now that such localities were categorized as Muslim zones, Hindu and Sikh communal groups had made the rehabilitation of refugees an excuse to attack these areas with the help of police … there is a large old Hindu and Christian population living traditionally in these so-called Muslim zones.’86

Scrutinising this so-called official demarcation of space on communal lines, Ahmed further argued that the stigmatisation of localities was, in fact, a reflection of the growing communal antagonism in the city that had been justified in the name of Muslim protection. This observation underlines an important aspect of the emerging communal demography in Delhi in the form of organised confinement of Muslim populations, which was to establish an important marker of Muslim political identity in later years.

II

Muslim Localities as a ‘Threat’ to National

Security

The Hindu political organisations communalised sections of the bureaucracy and local police described Muslim-dominated areas as a threat to ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security. These zones became the target of organised communal violence as they were systematically circled and attacked with the help of local police.87 The unavailability of houses as well as a feeling of betrayal by Muslims forced the Hindu and Sikh refugees to use violence and other measures to enter these

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zones (see Map 4 for locations of violence and Muslim refugee camps).88 Maulana Habibur Rehman of the Central Muslim Relief Committee wrote to the deputy inspector general of police: In Sadar Bazar[,] Muslims have been constantly made to make room for the refugees by all sorts of tactics … endeavours [sic] were being made to evict them from Qasabpura and clear the locality of Muslims…. [L]ast night it is alleged that an offensive was organized and led by some special police officers … he [sic] was out to hunt out Muslims from their dwellings, cause women and children to be out in the open, harass and terrorize them … and make them to leave the place at the earliest. The display of police force and his [sic] highhandedness had certainly the effect of demoralizing Muslims and make them to leave the place at the earliest.89

This situation continued even after much of the violence had stopped. Randhawa, the deputy commissioner of police, tried to justify the role of police in such violent incidences. He described Muslim zones as the main hurdle in the rehabilitation of Hindu and Sikh refugees. In his various reports, Randhawa claimed that the main cause of trouble in Delhi was ‘a scramble of [sic] Muslim houses … the “miserable plight” and “great hardship” of these [Hindu and Sikh] refugees, had forced them to … invade empty Muslim houses’. According to him, since the refugees lost everything already, they had ‘no fears in [sic] going to jail’, which made the task of policing Muslim zones very difficult.90 Randhawa further argued that ‘these empty houses’ in Muslim zones became ‘a bone of contention’ that must be resolved first to ensure peace in the city. He insisted that empty houses in Muslim zones be allocated to refugees. Only then, ‘people’s attention will be diverted towards the construction of new houses’.91

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Map 4: Muslim Camps, Muslim Zones and the Locations of Organised

Communal Violence, 1948 92

In the backdrop of this contest over refugee rehabilitation in Muslim concentrated areas, a new, powerful political metaphor— mini Pakistan—emerged, which became a stereotypical reference point in the years to come. The Muslim zones were said to pose a ‘serious threat’ to internal security, especially when Delhi’s displaced Muslims started returning from refugee camps in 1948. The reversed

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migration of Muslims from Pakistan also contributed to the growing controversies around Muslim zones. Randhawa’s comment is worth mentioning here: The refugees were living in the hope that they will be able to get these houses, but with the return of Muslims, these hopes are vanishing. Consequently they want to create panic among Muslims by spreading rumours that some trouble will take place. Creation of the so-called Muslim zones, which are nothing but miniature Pakistans, is also resented [by Hindu and Sikh refugees]. Common criticism is that if we are building a secular state then why this compartmentalization and zoning of citizens.93 (Emphasis added.)

His reports also established an important connection between Delhi’s Muslims and Pakistan by describing these localities as a ‘serious menace to law and order’.94 In one of the reports, he claimed that ‘the influx of a large number of Muslims to this place is due to a deep conspiracy aimed at the establishment of a Muslim rule at this place.’95 This official attitude shows how the discourse of homeland deeply permeated the administrative structures. Any collective Muslim spatial presence was to be understood as ‘mini Pakistans’ in India. The areas occupied by Muslims were characterised as ‘communally sensitive areas’ that were in need of strict surveillance. If for Nehru these localities were sensitive because they needed protection from organised attacks and violence, for others they posed potential threats to the security of Indian nation.96 In this sense, the Muslimdominated areas called Muslim zones became a contested category of Delhi’s urban geography.97 The Muslim zones also came under attack in the Constituent Assembly.98 It was argued that the rehabilitation of Hindu and Sikh refugees should be the priority of the Indian government because they ‘are natives of this country, born of the soil … they have a right to live in these portions of the country’ and ‘they must be made proper citizens of India’.99 Sardar Patel stridently claimed that ‘whatever the

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definition [of Indian citizenship] may [be] … Hindus and Sikhs of Pakistan cannot be considered as alien in India’.100 By this definition, Hindus and Sikhs were to become natural Indian citizens while Muslim’s citizenship status had always to be negotiated. This popular notion of national identity was established as the criterion to evaluate Muslim’s claims on their own residential and commercial properties. It is worth noting here that authorities directly related to the ministry of rehabilitation (formed in 1950) also claimed that Muslim zones were to be opened up for settling down refugees.101 The Hindu Mahasabha leader Ram Singh argued in public meetings and press conferences that Muslim evacuee properties should be made available to refugees. In a series of articles, he proposed that 40,000 refugees could be settled in these properties and that there would be no need to develop new colonies for them.102 Nehru reacted strongly to such arguments saying ‘Muslims who are living in these houses are sent there by the Government after full consideration. They are Muslims of Delhi who were driven out of their own houses or, sometimes, Muslims of parts of UP near Delhi who were also driven out of their houses during the troubled period of 1947–48.’103 Commenting on the objections to these houses being offered to Muslims as a favour, he argued that ‘their houses were included in the evacuee pool. They are thus given these houses in exchange of their own.’104 The displacement and horrific conditions of the Hindu and Sikh population and the pathetic attitude of Pakistani authorities towards its minorities aggravated these criticisms of Nehru.105 The Mahasabha tried to demonstrate that the creation and protection of ‘Muslim zones’ by the Indian government were meant only to ‘appease’ Muslims. Thus, the clash between the urgent need to rehabilitate Hindu and Sikh refugees and the forced displacement of Muslims resulted in an inevitable conflict between the evacuee property law and protected Muslim zones.106 There was a direct relationship between the debates on evacuee properties and the creation of Muslim zones. The evacuee property

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law categorised Muslim refugees into two groups: ‘evacuees’ and ‘intending evacuees’. The status of these groups was determined based on their location, ‘intention’ and conduct. According to subsection ‘e’ of section 2, an ‘intending evacuee’ ‘includes any person against whom an intention to settle in Pakistan is established from his conduct or from documentary evidence’. This sub-section empowered the custodian to declare any property as ‘evacuee’ and Muslim residents as ‘evacuees’ or ‘intending evacuees’. This allencompassing ‘intending evacuee’ clause was essentially invoked by the custodian to discriminate against Muslim citizens and to occupy their residential and commercial properties, thereby expanding the number of houses and shops potentially available to Hindus and Sikhs. This discriminatory management of evacuee properties led to the communalisation of the entire rehabilitation process.107 A long debate took place in Lok Sabha on 11 August 1952. Sardar Hukam Singh, an active Sikh politician from Punjab, raised the issue of Muslim zones of Delhi in the discussion. Although Muslim zones were outside the jurisdiction of the custodian of evacuee property, Singh highlighted the need to rehabilitate Hindu and Sikh refugees in the evacuee houses situated in Muslim zones. Singh argued that the ‘liberal attitude’ of the Indian government towards Muslims encouraged by ‘lofty ideals’ of the nation would lead to delay in the process of rehabilitation of Hindu and Sikh refugees. He said: The custodian is not allowed to go there…. Possession has not been taken. The Jamiat is keeping possession of them and distributing as it likes. It is not permitted that any Hindu or Sikh might go inside that. There are Muslim zones for past five years and this is being continued up to date. What right have they? Is this loyalty to India that they can keep those doors closed? Those zones are closed to [sic] everybody. Even the custodian cannot go and take possession … people are lying on the streets, but these houses should be kept intact…!108

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He further argued that there were two sets of Muslims: ‘honest Muslims’ and ‘others’. An honest Muslim, according to him, ‘would [not] be threatened [by the custodian of evacuee property] and be obliged to leave this country’. But there are others, according to him, ‘who have no intention of living here’ but have stayed on only with the intention of strengthening Pakistan financially by keeping their properties and businesses intact on both sides.’ Hukum Singh insisted that this category of Muslims should be brought under the evacuee property law.109 These Muslim zones were also seen as a serious challenge to the implementation of improvement schemes in Delhi in later years. For instance, there were forty-three Muslim families to be shifted to the Andha Mughal area in Karol Bagh as part of Delhi-Ajmeri Gate Slum Clearance Scheme (DAG) in 1951. These families refused to move unless alternative accommodation was given to them in a Muslim locality. In a letter dated 4 April 1952 regarding difficulties faced by authorities in implementing the ambitious slum clearance scheme (DAG), S.M. Sapru wrote to the Commissioner of Delhi: A difficulty which confronts us is that of the 179 families 43 are Muslims who have … refused to move out of the city … for security reasons. We have used the method of persuasion but it has failed. The only alternative is to use force, but I do not think it would be advisable. A possible solution will be to move the Muslim families to the houses of evacuees which had been sealed.110

In response to this, Sushila Nayar, a concerned officer in the Ministry of Rehabilitation, replied that ‘I have already passed order on the same file … that the 43 Muslim families should be housed in the vacant houses in the so-called Muslim zones [emphasis added].’111 This example not only demonstrates that the controversies around Muslim zones continued long after Partition, but it also shows how the religious demography of Delhi, especially the insecurities of the Muslim community and their demand for safe residential space in a

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communally charged environment, conflicted with the development agenda of independent India. Nehru’s later correspondence also underline this dilemma. He, it appears, realised that the arrangements that were instituted as a temporary measure for protecting Muslim properties and lives were intensifying the communal tensions even in the realm of urban planning and administration. That could have been the reason why he strongly argued for the abolition of the evacuee property law. In his various communications with the ministry of rehabilitation regarding organised attacks on Muslim zones and the political controversies around them, Nehru pointed out that in the past communal violence was primarily directed against the lives of Muslims, but in the post-Partition period, their residential and commercial properties were also being systematically targeted.112 On 27 November 1953, Nehru wrote to A.P. Jain, the minister for rehabilitation, that the evacuee property law ‘come[s] in the way of our economic life … especially of the economic life of Muslims in India…. Psychologically it is bad … [and] we must … put an end to the further application of these … laws.113 It was announced that after 7 May 1954 no person would be called an evacuee in India. Finally, on 25 September 1954 Lok Sabha passed Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Bill, which abrogated the evacuee property law in respect of future cases. It stipulated that the ‘object of the law is that nobody should be declared an evacuee for anything … [and] he [the Muslim] becomes a normal citizen like any other citizen.’114 The Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1954, was a landmark development. The so-called Muslim zones were officially ‘opened’ for the resettlement of Hindu and Sikh refugees and around 3,000 houses were allotted to them.115 Consequently, all the controversies surrounding the properties in these areas came to an end. As for Muslim residents, it was an end of harassment by the custodian and the bureaucratic machinery. The evacuee property law had been the main hurdle in the official recognition of their

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citizenship status. Now there was no risk of having more properties declared ‘evacuee’. Their ‘intention’, which was the only thin line between their claim on residential and commercial properties and their ‘doubtful’ loyalty towards Indian state, had vanished. These hitherto Muslim areas became ‘mixed’ localities, except for few traditionally Muslim-concentrated pockets. However, the tendency to gather together in crises was established as a survival strategy for Muslims. These deliberate residential practices not merely defined the contours of what is later called the Muslim ilaqe but also emerged as an intrinsic feature of Delhi’s communal demography. These Muslim ilaqe were the sites where Indian secularism was to be tested and exhibited, primarily because they had already become symbols of Muslim ‘segregation’, ‘betrayal’ and religious ‘difference’ in the popular imagination.

III

Site, Smell and View: Cow Protection,

Meat and Muslim Localities

While Muslim zones and refugee camps were defining Muslim areas as contested space in post-Partition Delhi, meat practices—its production, sale and consumption—become visible cultural markers of such pockets. The revival of the cow as an important political symbol in legal-constitutional debates and electoral politics in the post-1947 period established a new set of stereotypical binaries, which juxtaposed the Hindu culture of ahimsa (non-violence), cow protection and ‘selective’ vegetarianism with the Islamic culture of ‘brutality’, cow killing and meat-eating.116 In the backdrop of these debates, bade ka gosht (meat of big animals like buffalo and cow called beef in popular parlance) and kasai (butcher) were established as intrinsic symbols of Muslim cultural-religious identity and space in the public discourse.117 Although these symbols evolved out of cow politics during the colonial period, the meat of water buffalo, called

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carabeef, was the most important category of food that became a crucial aspect of communal politics. Thus, the slaughterhouses, meat shops and, above all, Muslim localities became important sites where the politics of meat was played out.

Cow, Meat and Political Imagination of the Nation The post-1947 legislative debates—both in the Constituent Assembly and the first Lok Sabha—that are considered to have established the foundational principles of preservation laws in India produced a complex framework that transformed the issue of cow protection into an everlasting political battle. The crucial aspect of these debates was the ways in which Hindu nationalist alliance and Congress turned a particular class of bovine animals into a contested category and at the same strengthened their ideological positions in the name of cow protection. Congress’ cow protectionist lobby and Hindu nationalist alliance projected the cow as a symbol of ‘Hindu unity’, while the ‘modern-progressive’ faction led by Nehru used the body of the animal to articulate grand ideas of the secular nation-building project. Consequently, the body of the cow and the category of other bovine animals turned out to be a reference point for defining different notions of nation, national identity and belongingness. The constitutional arrangements that rejected a uniform law for the protection of cow and other animals gave liberty to states to adopt context-specific legislations and provided a fertile ground for meat politics that demarcated Muslim space and identity in north India. This politics became visible immediately after the constitution was adopted. For instance, the Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha (ABPS) or All-India Representative Committee of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) passed a resolution titled ‘Ban on Cow Slaughter’ in 1952. It stated, ‘[T]he issue of cow protection is not merely an economic question for our country; it is a point of cultural sanctity and a symbol of our national oneness.’ The resolution called for a

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nation-wide public protest in order to ‘remind [the government] of their sacred duty to protect the bovine species’.118 On 26 October 1952, the RSS launched an anti-cow slaughter campaign in several provincial capitals to demand a common law. The RSS activists took out cows for processions, launched a signature campaign to send a petition to the president and organised public meetings calling upon the Central government to pass a central law for a blanket ban on cow slaughter. The Nehru-led section of the Congress managed the issue within the framework of its stated liberal-secular modernism. While the Congress adopted as an election symbol two oxen as representing its notion of nation, Nehru quite openly opposed the Hindu political organisation’s agenda on the grounds that they were trying to communalise the issue of cow protection. He became very critical of such protests. Addressing a public meeting in Bhisla, Madhya Pradesh, on 29 November 1952, he made a comment that ignited this debate and brought the issue back in the arena of electoral politics. He said: I will never allow a Central legislation to ban cow slaughter in the country…. The states are at liberty to ban the slaughter of cows in their respective areas … the communal organisations … are attempting to divert … people from the fundamental economic problems by inciting communal hatred.’119 (Emphasis added.)

However, Nehru took a very different stand in Parliament. For instance, in 1955, Seth Govind Das, a Congress cow-protectionist leader who supported the demand for making the cause of cow preservation a fundamental right of Hindus in the CA debates, presented Indian Cattle Prevention Bill in Lok Sabha, which in effect sought to prohibit the slaughter of cows and its progeny by a Central legislation. As expected, the Bill was severely criticised by Nehru and his supporters, insisting that the matter should be discussed purely on economic grounds and the approach should be constructive. He even went on saying, ‘my advice to the state

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governments is not to bring forward any Bill for cow protection…. I am even prepared to resign the office of Prime Minister rather than yield in this matter’.120 Interestingly, the cow protectionist lobby, Purushottam Das Tandan and Thakur Das Bhargava, of the Congress voted in support of the Bill by openly expressing their will against the so-called party line. However, the Bill was rejected simply because its subject matter was in the exclusive sphere of state legislatures.121 Later, the Cabinet constituted an expert committee to look into the matter in a comprehensive manner. The committee, however, did not deviate from Nehru’s position. It recommended that (1) a total ban on cow slaughter would be injurious to the economy and (2) it would be prejudicial to the health of the limited stock of healthy cattle because their maintenance would be sacrificed for preserving the unproductive and unprofitable cows. The committee’s report established an administrative consensus.122 In fact, the First Five Year Plan categorically rejected a universal ban.123 These overwhelming planning-centric administrative claims of Nehru-led Congress, however, did not become any kind of ‘guiding principle’ for regional manifestations of cow politics.124 Quite contrary to what the Nehru regime claimed at the national level, a number of Congress-ruled states—especially in North India, the centre of aggressive cow politics—adopted stricter animal preservation measures came up with discriminatory legislations within the span of six years.125 These Acts made no exception to the slaughter of cattle even for bona fide religious purposes. Similarly, municipalities in states like West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and other north Indian states that were dominated by Congress’s cow protectionist lobbyists issued by-laws banning the slaughter of cows and buffaloes arguing either to increase the supply of milk and cattle wealth or to close down a trade ‘objectionable’ to other local communities. The municipalities cancelled the license of meat traders, shut down municipal slaughterhouses and stopped issuing further permits for slaughter and sale of beef. It also revived

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contestation over the religious festivities of Bakra-Eid because these bye-laws either completely ignored the sacrificial slaughter or made it an exception subject to complex administrative procedures that involved an approval from a number of authorities. Similarly, these states imposed stricter legislation on meat trade in the name of cow preservation laws. Most importantly, these laws criminalised cow slaughter, making it cognizable (arrest without warrant) and nonbailable offence.126 Such an extensive ban on the slaughtering of ‘big’ animals (cows and buffaloes) affected the livelihood of a number of Muslim and non-Muslim communities traditionally associated with meat trade and auxiliary industries, such as Kasab (a section of Muslim butchers involved specifically in slaughtering big animals), Khatik (Hindu butcher), Balmiki, Charmakar and Badhir (Hindu butcher caste of Bihar) who constituted a thick socio-cultural network and a rather informal web of economic interdependency.127 The constitutional validity of these legislations became a contested issue. A number of petitions against the ban on the slaughter of big animals were filed in different high courts. Most of the petitioners were from the Muslim butcher community since they were the first to be affected in the meat value chain by such moves.128

Muslim Localities as Meat-Eating Sites! It is important to remember that the Delhi municipality officially banned cow slaughter in 1951.129 The Metropolitan Council byelaws under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, prohibited cow slaughter further and made it a punishable offence. However, the regulation of meat by the municipal authority in Delhi not only re-established the demarcation of space on religious lines but also defined the sight and smell of select categories of non-vegetarian products as ‘acceptable’ and ‘legal’ for hawking across these zones. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) bye-laws of 1957, which was an adaptation of the Municipal Committee of Delhi bye-laws

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of 1913, employed such categories for regulating meat and its byproducts. According to sections 405–507 of the Act, the corporation was responsible for regulating various stages of the production, processing and sale of meat. The corporation ensured that no person without the general or special permission of the commissioner was entitled to sell or expose for sale any animal or meat in any municipal market. The MCD bye-laws Part III explains: No person can slaughter or cause or permit to be slaughtered at any place other than a public slaughter house an animal the flesh of which may be used as human food … provided that this rule shall not apply to an animal intended for sacrificial slaughter on the occasion of any festival or ceremony … the slaughter of such animal shall not be carried on within the sight of the public except in case of Zabiha in localities exclusively inhabited by Muslims.130

The corporation made specific rules for regulating the sale and hawking of meat as well. Clause 15 of Part VII of the bye-laws directs: No person other than the owner or licensed occupier of a shop shall sell or expose for sale … meat by hawking in any street or other public place before 2 p.m. provided that the municipal Committee may forbid or permit at its discretion in specified streets or areas except under a special license issued for the purpose … such hawking shall be confined to localities mainly inhabited by Muslims.131(Emphasis added.)

The sale and consumption of meat thus came to be associated with Muslim localities. However, the corporation categorically stated that these bye-laws ‘shall not apply to the sale of fish [emphasis added]’.132 The exception created for the sale and hawking of fish thus established certain non-vegetarian food items as legal and acceptable for public view. It, in this sense, established a noncontroversial domain around the consumption of select categories of non-vegetarian food. Interestingly, chicken, goat and sheep also acquired this status in ‘public’ sensibilities with time. The important reason behind the acceptance was that a large number of Hindu

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and Sikh refugees were non-vegetarians too, and they were more inclined towards consuming mutton, chicken and fish. In fact, many non-vegetarian outlets emerged in the 1970s in Delhi to cater to the increasing demand for chicken and fish.133 Thus, these categories of non-vegetarian diet acquired an acceptable urban-elite character. On the other hand, bade ka gosht remained a matter of contestation due to its consumption being associated with the Muslims and other lower-caste, lower-class communities. Meat shops, thus, became specific targets of communal politics. There were incidents when meat shops were vandalised by Jan Sangh and RSS cadres with the help of local police. In many such cases, claims were made that the ‘sight, smell and view’ of these shops were unacceptable to the public and Hindu religious sensibilities. Various meat shops situated in Muslim-dominated pockets of mixed areas were targeted by Jan Sangh and RSS to claim that they were illegally placed in those areas. For instance, a complaint was registered with the police in December 1954 by members of the local wing of Jan Sangh regarding a particular meat shop situated in the Rod Garan area of Old Delhi for selling carabeef. It was argued that bones and carcases of animals were left on the roads, which not only attracted vultures and eagles in the area but also hurt the religious sensibilities of non-Muslims. It was also contended that the meat shop was visible to passers-by, thus its location, smell and view were objectionable to public and needed to be shut down at the earliest.134 The additional magistrate inspected the location of this particular shop in December 1954. Contrary to claims made in the complaint, he submitted a satisfactory report stating that the shop was situated under the balcony of a Masjid that was pretty much away from public view. He also found that the area had around 60 per cent Muslim population and there were no non-Muslim residents or shopkeepers around the shop; even carcases or bones were never noticed by passers-by. The local Hindu and Muslim residents had no problem with the presence of the shop since no vultures or eagles were

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reported to be attracted by its presence.135 Even though the additional magistrate submitted satisfactory inspection reports in a number of similar complaints, meat shops situated in Muslim pockets of largely Hindu areas were continuously targeted and vandalised on many occasions. They were forced to close during festive occasions like Navaratras and auspicious days like Tuesdays, which are considered as non-meat eating days amongst Hindus. Tools used by butchers also emerged as symbols of Muslim aggression in these riots. Sharp knives of different kinds used by butchers for slicing, chopping and grinding meat were constantly projected as weapons kept by Muslims for organised communal violence. On many occasions, these tools were confiscated during police raids. One of the participants of my study, Kareemuddin Qureshi (name changed), owner of a private slaughterhouse, skin processing units and meat supplier, pointed out that ‘these tools contributed to the Sangh’s agenda of defaming the Muslim community in the eyes of fellow Hindu neighbours and workers’. He further explained, ‘There were many incidents when our tools were confiscated by the police on charges of keeping weapons. They were only returned after constant appeals, which sometimes took months.’136

Idgah Slaughterhouse and Qasabpura as ‘Mini Pakistan’ The Idgah slaughterhouse remained closed for a month in 1947 after Partition. The All-India Jamiatul Quresh (AIJQ), a philanthropic organisation that played an important role in representing the economic interests of the Qureshi community, made a written request to Nehru for reopening of the slaughterhouse. It was reopened in October 1947.137 The location of the slaughterhouse, after it was moved outside the city walls in 1915, became a part of Old Delhi, with its expansion both in terms of increasing residential quarters and commercial activity. As we have noted earlier, the area around the slaughterhouse eventually became a mixed locality. However, the

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Idgah slaughterhouse and the Muslim hamlets around it remained a focus of conflict until the slaughterhouse was finally moved to Ghazipur in 2008. The Nehru government was willing to bring meat production within the framework of planning so that animal husbandry and agricultural economy could efficiently be managed. Catering to the high demand for halal meat in West Asian countries in the 1950s was another reason to pay attention to the production of meat. The government constituted a committee for examining the efficiency and conditions of different slaughterhouses situated in Delhi and other states. The committee submitted its report in December 1957 and recommended for improvement of the conditions in the abattoirs in Delhi and other states.138 A number of committees like the Committee for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Expert Ad Hoc Committee on Slaughterhouse and Meat Inspection Practices, and Pharmaceutical Enquiry Committee were set up in 1957 and 1958 so that the production of meat and its associated businesses could be brought within the framework of planning. The committees made recommendations for state governments to consider the feasibility of modernising their slaughterhouses in Bombay (now Mumbai), Calcutta (now Kolkata), Madras (now Chennai) and Delhi. The purpose of these endeavours was to improve existing meat inspection practices and export of meat and meat products to foreign countries. These recommendations were also made in relation to Indian tanneries so that rawhides can be exported to foreign countries to cater to the increasing demand for good quality Indian leather.139 In this context, the Town Planning Organization (TPO) of Delhi, a predecessor of Delhi Development Authority (DDA) set up in 1957, recommended that the Idgah slaughterhouse, along with the Shahdara abattoir and a piggery situated on Mehrauli Road, should be relocated outside the city to Rohtak Road, eight miles from Delhi. It was suggested that the slaughterhouse should be built along modern lines with a scalable slaughtering capacity of small and big animals.140

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TPO also proposed for the development of associated industries like tanneries, wool and manure manufacturing units around the area.141 This matter was discussed in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi since the recommended village named Sayadan, located adjacent to Rohtak Road and Najafgarh Road, was a part of the refugee rehabilitation area.142 The rehabilitation department refused to allot this land for the construction of the slaughterhouse.143 Therefore, the relocation project was rejected by the Municipal Corporation in 1960 since the recommended plan was also opposed by Sayadan villagers.144 Subsequently, the Delhi Master Plan 1962 incorporated the issue of relocation and proposed the construction of a new abattoir on scientific lines.145 However, what was important was the politicisation of the issue. Jan Sangh opposed the proposal on the ground that it was appeasement of Muslims, notwithstanding the fact that the meat industry or the meat value chain involved a number of caste communities across religious groups.146 The pamphlets used by Jan Sangh during municipal elections in Delhi in 1962 established a connection between the proposal for the construction of a new slaughterhouse with the slaughtering of cows and the appeasement of Muslims by the Congress government.147 One such pamphlet titled Bharat Maan Ki Durdasha Kyon? (Why is Mother India suffering?) quite powerfully personifies the Hindu nationalist imagination of India as Bharat Maan (Mother India)—a Hindu Goddess.148 It was written by Lala Hardev Sahai, a known cow protectionist from Punjab, who was closely associated with the Cow Slaughter Prevention Committee and Congress’ cow protectionist lobby. The pamphlet demonstrates the plight of Mother India with interesting illustrations.149 The figure of Bharat Maan is symbolised by the map of undivided India—the Akhand Bharat. She is shown holding the tricolour, which symbolises the Congress party that Mother India considered as a protector and liberator. But she is, as the picture depicts, enchained and crying as Congress has

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wounded her body by slashing her arms and dividing her identity. It illustrated the partition of 1947 in the form of a severed hand of mother India with a caption dasta ki zanjeer na kati to bhuja kaat di (when the chain of slavery couldn’t be broken, the arm was slashed (implicitly by the Congress). This caption was meant to suggest that Congress divided the nation in order to achieve freedom but did not end the plight of Mother India. Congress, suggested the pamphlet, aggravated her pain with more problems like cow killing, corruption, casteism and linguistic regionalism.150 The Hindu nationalists also criticised Congress for industrialising India, because they saw it as an attack on the agricultural economy that depended on godhan. This is depicted through a projection of Congressmen slitting the other hand of Mother India with which she is holding a bunch of crops that symbolises cow feed. Interestingly, in another illustration, Nehru is depicted holding a sword, above which is listed some rhetorical questions like ‘Who is the biggest enemy of the cow? And how? Blaming Congress for promoting meat industry by opening four new slaughterhouses and reducing land for cow fodder, it claimed that the party is protecting the interests of gohathiyare (cow killers), a term used for Muslims. The picture portrayed Nehru holding in one hand a sword dripping with blood and in another a cow’s head while a beheaded cow lay on the floor. The leaflet called upon Arya Veer and Hindu Veer (the courageous Hindu fighters) to ‘arise to protect mother cow; to stop fellow Hindus and Congress from indulging in a sinful act of killing mother cow’. It evoked group solidarity by arousing the feeling of a common experience of hurt and humiliation.151 This interesting illustration does not merely represent the mode of election propaganda against Nehru and Congress. Instead, it places the symbol of the cow in the larger philosophical premise of the Hindu nationalist ideology of RSS to assert its supremacy over Congress in defining nation and national identity. The use of the word Arya represents Aryavrat—the land of Aryans (a pious Hindu land). It

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provoked Hindu sentiments associated with the sacred land of cows. This is exactly what Christopher Penny points out in his study of printed images with religious icons like the cow. He argues that ‘cow protection involved a struggle not only over a ‘sacred symbol’ but also, locally, over ‘sacred spaces’.152 Nehru, who is prominently labelled as Congress from top to knee in this metaphorical representation, is shown and ‘viewed’ as an enemy of mother cow as well as the pious Hindu nation-space.153 The pamphlet reiterates Congress–Muslim connection saying: ‘opening of new kasai-khane (slaughterhouses) in different states and planning to increase the export of meat, leather and associated products to foreign countries is only a way to appease Muslims.’154 It further says: The Muslims earn profits worth billions of rupees annually by slaughtering cows, selling cow meat, cow skin, and cow blood. Thus, Congress would never take a step which could go against the Muslims no matter how harmful it would be for the nation and its Hindu population.155 (Translation.)

This aggressive cow politics could not produce any immediate political benefit for Bhartiya Jan Sangh though it consolidated the party’s vote share amongst traditional Hindu voters.156 For instance, in the 1962 Delhi Municipal Corporation election, the party won only nine seats out of eighty; but in Kucha Pati Ram, a traditional Hindu, Punjabi Hindu and Sikh refugee area, it managed to get 78 per cent votes. But its successful electoral campaigns in other parts of North India encouraged Jan Sangh to give a political voice to cow protection movement in the capital city, especially after Nehru’s death in 1964. While the Jan Sangh MPs pressurised Parliament through a number of delegations and referendums to enforce appropriate laws, the working committee of Jan Sangh facilitated cow protection conferences organised by Bharat Gosevak Samaj (BGS), RSS and Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) to pursue the cause.157 Jan Sangh helped in the formation of a committee called Sarvadaliya Goraksha

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Mahaabhiyan Samiti (Committee for All-Party Grand Campaign for Protection of the Cow or SGMS) in September 1966 and made it a nation-wide campaign.158 The committee had representatives of VHP, RSS, Bharat Sadhu Samaj (a body representing different Hindu sects), Arya Samaj, Hindu Mahasabha, Ram Rajya Parishad (a party formed by Hindu ex-princes) and three Shaivite Shankaracharyas including the Jagatguru (world-teacher) Shankaracharya of Puri, and different heads of monasteries called Mahants.159 The working committee of Jan Sangh extended its support to the movement and facilitated a large agitation led by Sadhus in front of Parliament on 7 November 1966.160 The Jan Sangh MPs provoked agitating sadhus to attack Parliament and eventually the protest turned violent. The clash between the agitating sadhus and police resulted in the death of eight people including one policeman. The Indira Gandhi-led Central government arrested the Shankaracharya of Puri who had started fasting with others to register his protest. This act of the government aroused public anger following which the Shankaracharya was released, though he continued his fast.161 This episode was a turning point in the communal polarisation of Delhi. BJS won thirty-three out of fifty-six seats of the Delhi Metropolitan Council election in 1967 and formed the government. It also won six out of seven parliamentary seats in the Lok Sabha election that took place in the same year.162 The success of Jan Sangh was not just because of an anti-Muslim campaign. As Geeta Puri argues, it should also be seen as a reflection of anti-Congress sentiment. The weaknesses of Congress, especially after Nehru’s death, the internal conflicts within the Delhi state Congress and, most importantly, the issue of the cow that preceded the elections in 1967 helped Jan Sangh to intrude into the traditional stronghold of Congress, such as Chandni Chowk and Sadar Bazar areas, in the walled city of Delhi.163 The election results showed that the party also drew support from all sections of society besides its traditional voters, the upper-caste Hindus and refugees. The

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Scheduled Castes and a section of Muslims also voted for it. But Jan Sangh did not do well in Muslim-dominated constituencies; it was able to secure Muslim votes only in mixed areas. For example, in the Chandni Chowk metropolitan council seat, which was a mixed locality, the party got around 59 per cent votes, while in Ballimaran, which was a Muslim-dominated area, it got only 33 per cent.164 Jan Sangh’s victory in the 1967 election should also be seen in relation to the changing urban politics of Delhi. The party now received the overwhelming support of the educated middle class, mainly Central government employees who lived in several government colonies in New Delhi.165 This support base of Jan Sangh underlined the changing attitude of the middle class, which was crucial to understanding the dominant discourse of cleanliness, beautification, population control and, most of all, selective yet modern, urban vegetarian sensibilities. The political discussions that took place in the late 1960s around the failures of planning and modernisation paved the way for the production of an urban sentiment around selective meat practices, slum clearance and family planning in later years. Interestingly, this middle-class sentiment also focused on spatial confinement of the meat industry rather than its improvement. Thus, relocation of slaughterhouse due to insanitary conditions turned out to be an important concern of local politics in Delhi. This victory gave a new motivation to the cow movement in Delhi. In 1967, Delhi Cow Protection Bill was passed by Delhi Metropolitan Council and was forwarded to Parliament for approval. It proposed to prohibit in the Union Territory of Delhi the slaughter of cows, including bulls and bullocks of any age, even after they ceased to be capable of yielding milk or breeding or working as draught animals. Interestingly, there was practically no need to pursue such a ban as the municipal bye-laws of the corporation had already banned the slaughter of cows, calves and bullocks under the provision of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. Delhi Cow Protection Bill, 1967,

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proposed to put a complete ban on the import, sale and serving of cow meat within Delhi by making it a punishable offence with ten years imprisonment and a fine of up to ten thousand rupees. Prem Chand Gupta, a Jan Sangh member of the metropolitan council, argued that the purpose of the bill was not only to protect the cow but to increase the production of milk in the capital city and to establish cow shelters. He said, ‘Although … cow slaughter is prohibited … cow beef is imported, cooked and served in big hotels in Delhi.’166 He further argued, ‘[T]oday India is surrounded by a serious threat from Pakistan and China. If our soldiers did not get enough milk and ghee … our nation will be in great danger … it is our responsibility to provide nutritious food to our soldiers fighting at the borders … but there is a lack of milk … [because] no breed of good cows is left … they are slaughtered … I insist that it is not a question of cow protection but of the protection of the nation.’167 The bill was passed by the council on 14 November 1967 and sent to Parliament for further consideration.168 This transformation of cow protectionism into a Hindu–Muslim issue was not the only aspect of BJS’s aggressive meat politics.169 The prime concern was to communalise the meat of big animals—its production, sale and consumption—other than the cow. That was the reason why the relocation of slaughterhouses became a highly contentious issue after 1967. The Jan Sangh not merely argued for the relocation of the Idgah abattoir but also demanded that other municipal slaughterhouses like the one situated at Shahdara should also be moved. Interestingly, its location was also problematised on grounds of religious sentiments. During a discussion in Rajya Sabha in 1968, a Jan Sangh member of parliament, P.D. Thengari, asserted that the government should relocate the Shahdara slaughterhouse as it was situated near two temples and thereby caused inconvenience to the devotees performing puja (prayer). He also claimed that the presence of this kasaikhana (slaughterhouse) is also a source of insanitary conditions in the area. The then minister of health,

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planning and urban development, however, refuted this claim and informed the House that no such complaints of inconvenience had ever been received from the devotees or other residents of the locality. Thengari, however, strongly insisted that the objection he was raising ‘should be taken as the religious sentiments and feelings of the devotees. And the government should consider shifting the slaughter house so that people’s feelings are not injured and they do not go and start an agitation.’170 To further capitalise on this imagined idea of ‘wounded’ Hindu sensibilities, the Jan Sangh government introduced Delhi Meat Control Bill, 1970, in the metropolitan council. The bill aimed at prohibiting the slaughtering of goats, sheep, buffaloes or any other bovine animals on the occasion of major Hindu festivals and other auspicious days like Varsha-Pratishtha, Vayas Puja, Raksha Bandhan, Vijayadashmi, Diwali, Holi, Makar Sankranti and Shivratri. The bill also sought to ban slaughtering on Tuesdays and Fridays. It also proposed to make animal slaughter, import, sale and supply of meat or food containing meat for human consumption on prohibited days punishable offence. These restrictions were imposed entirely on the production of carabeef. The bill, quite deliberately, excluded mutton, poultry and fisheries from the category of animal and meat slaughtered or supplied on prohibited days. It is important to note here that clause nos. 407 and 424 of Delhi Corporation Act, 1957, had already authorised the commissioner to declare any day as prohibited day and to stop any ‘unauthorised’ act within the municipal boundary. The MCD also had a list of days on which there ware complete ban on slaughterhouses. The list of declared prohibited days, which included every Friday and other public holidays, was followed strictly by the butchers. Roshan Lal, a Congress member of DMC, reacted quite sharply on the intent and content of the bill. He said, ‘The Bill is drafted to harass the people of a particular community involved in meat trade … it is discriminatory in nature and biased … and … does not benefit

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any vegetarian or non-vegetarian interests.’171 In defence of the bill, a Jan Sangh member, Tilak Raj Varma, insisted that ‘…there are strong feelings in India against non-vegetarianism. It is considered a sick mentality here … the bill will put a restriction on meat and nonvegetarian practices.’172 He further argued that ‘jeev hatya’ (animal killing) was a problem that needed to be addressed.173 Although Congress members walked out of the council in protest against the bill, it was passed with some amendments on 30 September 1970.174 The Idgah slaughterhouse was also part of the slum clearance and improvement scheme of the Delhi administration (I discuss the scheme in detail in Chapter 4). However, since the scheme of relocation could not be finalised quickly because of political hurdles, the metropolitan council became hyperactive in limiting slaughtering. Since the passage of Delhi Meat Control Bill, 1970, the corporation imposed seventy closing days in a year on the slaughterhouse. Additionally, the fee for slaughtering per animal was increased from one rupee per animal to eight rupees for buffaloes and from twenty-five paise to one rupee per small animal, including goats, sheep and pigs. The local government’s anti-meat attitude made it easy for police to harass meat traders. The number of meat inspections increased mainly to ensure that slaughtered meat was not cow beef. Several incidents took place when police personnel spoiled buffalo meat illegally by pouring anti-bacterial chemicals, especially when the meat was being transported to shops or during inspections at meat shops even after stamp verification by municipal officials.175 The Qureshi biradari started an organised protest against such restrictions and harassments. In 1971, an organisation of goat butchers, Delhi Meat Merchant Association (DMMA), was formed. Buffalo Association was also established in the same year to speak on behalf of the kasai community dealing specifically in bade ka gosht.176 DMMA filed a writ petition against the imposition of closing days on slaughterhouses and meat shops. The Delhi high court, showing sympathy for the kasai community, directed the state

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administration to keep meat shops out of this provision but insisted that slaughterhouses should remain closed on recommended days.177 This aggressive meat politics of Jan Sangh intensified the communal atmosphere of the city in the early 1970s, especially in the Idgah and Sadar Bazar areas. Sadar Bazar, as we have seen in the previous section, was essentially a Muslim-dominated locality that witnessed the displacement of a number of Muslim families and resettlement of Hindu Punjabi and Sikh refugees in the wake of the Partition riots. The Punjabi Hindu refugees occupied a large number of Muslim houses whose owners/residents either moved to refugee camps or Muslim zones or Pakistan. Due to the discriminatory evacuee property laws and the partisan role played by the custodian department, Muslims returning from refugee camps and, in some cases, Muslim zones could not occupy their properties and were forced to become tenants under the emerging class of Hindu Punjabi landlords. This new relation was reported to be generally tense due to a number of factors.178 One important factor was meat. Normally, a Hindu landlord would object to his/her Muslim tenant cooking meat, particularly if it was beef. He/she would also not allow his/her Muslim tenant to perform Qurbani (religious sacrifice) within the premises since it was against his/her religious feelings. Similarly, a Muslim landlord would not allow puja (prayer) to be performed in his/her premises. Such conflicting cultural claims communalised the situation in the Sadar Bazar area in the early 1970s. Jan Sangh—which had been evoking anti-Muslim/anti-meat rhetoric to mobilise trading and professional middle-class, upper-caste Hindus in the area for electoral gains— emerged as the main political player in these riots.179 Massive riots broke out in the Bada Hindu Rao and Kishanganj areas in 1973 and 1974, respectively.180 In fact, the Kishanganj riot was the biggest recorded riot that Delhi had faced since Partition. The immediate reason behind these violent events was not meat or cow slaughter but a small quarrel between some boys from different

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communities following an incident of eve-teasing. Consequently, the local Qureshi community became its main victims. A number of meat shops and Muslim-run enterprises were looted and destroyed.181 Tools used by the butchers were confiscated, their shops burnt and meat and meat products worth millions of rupees were spoiled.182 This particular conflict was an outcome of the increasing communal polarisation and trust deficit between Hindus and Muslims of this locality. The Tandon Commission, a fact-finding team that was constituted to inquire into the causes of the Sadar Bazar riots, found that ‘fear’ was generated in the Sadar Bazar area amongst Hindus, which resulted in psychological discontent and enmity between the two communities. This ‘imagined’ fear exacerbated an already volatile communal situation after Jan Sangh’s defeat in the metropolitan council election in 1971. There were two other important reasons behind this imagined fear. In the late 1960s, flourishing leather-goods trade and increase in meat export affected the economic status of a section of the local Qureshi community—hide merchants and Kasab. A section of the community even started a direct meat export, which had been dominated by Hindu merchants and traders.183 The emergence of the Qureshi community as an upwardly mobile economic class was seen as a challenge by local Hindu merchants and shopkeepers of Sadar Bazar. There was another, perhaps direct, implication of this economic empowerment of the Qureshi community. The elite section of the community started purchasing residential and commercial properties owned by local Hindus.184 These developments were manipulated by local RSS and Jan Sangh to consolidate their positions in the area by creating fear psychosis amongst Hindus. The conflicting statements made before Tandon Commission reveal this fear psychosis quite well. Leaders of local Jan Sangh claimed that there was a Muslim plot to strategically suppress Hindu residents of the locality. It was also asserted that ‘the local Muslims were planning to create Bara [Bara Hindu Rao locality] as a pure

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Muslim zone’.185 The Sangh representatives also claimed that the Muslim mind was communalised ever since the Muslim League won the Ballimaran Council seat in the 1971 elections.186 The Muslim League leader Mohammad Ahmed, however, contested these claims. He told the commission that because Jan Sangh had lost the elections, it was trying to reclaim its position in the area by inciting communal passion and creating fear in the Muslim mind. He argued that this strategy helped Jan Sangh reassure Muslims that only Jan Sangh’s regime could ensure security for all in the locality. The theory of the plot, Tandon Commission argued, did not have many supporters. The Commission observed: ‘It may perhaps be nearer the truth to say that on account of a certain atmosphere of tension and uneasiness in the area, every little thing assumes far greater importance than one would expect in a normal situation. The seeds of discontent and disaffection are rather to be discerned in the psychological make-up of the two communities.’187 The Vijay Pal Singh inquiry committee, which was constituted to enquire into the reasons behind the Kishanganj riot of May 1974, also made similar observations.188 It concluded that the riot was preplanned and specifically targeted against the Muslim community with the involvement of RSS, Jan Sangh and a section of the police force.189 Highlighting the general bias against the community during riots, the inquiry committee report noted that only those shops that were owned by non-Muslims and adjacent to Muslims’ shops were burnt. The police did not allow fire brigade to control until Muslim shops were burnt completely. It allowed curfew passes only to Hindu residents and RSS and Jan Sangh members. Surveys conducted after the riot and the testimonies revealed that a number of references were made to highlight Muslims’ association with Pakistan. The Muslimdominated Kishanganj area was seen by local Hindus as ‘little Pakistan’ and claims were made that these people should go to Pakistan.190 This ‘mini Pakistan’ rhetoric acquired a new political overtone in later years, especially during the period of the Emergency (1975–1977).

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The partition of India transformed the fuzzy religious identity of space into concrete social and political categories. The Muslim zone and/or Muslim ilaqe, placed bizarrely in a wider secular Indian space, emerged as a powerful urban category in this period. The meltingpot thesis of Nehru saw these homogenised units as a temporary measure to protect the community and eventually integrate them into an India-specific secular-modern framework. But the sense of insecurity and fear of the community intensified. The description of Muslim zones as ‘mini Pakistans’ further established Muslimdominated localities as strong markers of Indian Muslim identity. Subsequent communal violence transformed these areas into ‘communally sensitive areas’ and, more generally, ‘Muslim ghettos’. The parallel discourse of ‘Hindu Rashtra’, which at least till the 1950s was expressed as the demand for Akhand Bharat, continued to refer to Pakistan in relation to Indian Muslim identity, marking Muslim residential areas as usurped territories within the sacred Hindu space. In later years, this allegation gradually started characterising Muslimdominated spaces as symbols of ghettoisation, associating them with the alleged Muslim tendency of separatism. The proponents of both ideas—secular India and Hindu Rashtra—expected the Muslim community to leave aside their religious identity and join the national mainstream. The question of Indian-ness of Muslim identity, in this sense, was never dissociated from the idea of Pakistan. For the Hindu nationalists, it was a tool to keep the discourse of Akhand Hindu Rashtra alive. On the other hand, protection of the Muslim minority, even after the making of Pakistan, became a political imperative for Indian secularism.

Notes 1

India Independence Act 1947, 10 and 11 Geo. 6. Ch. 30, 4. See Neeti Nair, Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India. (MA.: Harvard University Press, 2011).

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4 5

6

7 8

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For Constituent Assembly debates on separate electorate see Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) V, 27–28 August 1947, 211–272. Also see A.G. Noorani, The Muslims of India: A Documentary Record (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003). See Begam Anees Qidwai, Azadi Ki Chhaon Mein (Under Freedom’s Shade) (Delhi: National Book Trust of India, 2000), 163. Begum Qidwai recorded this conversation at the time of Muslims boarding a train going to Pakistan. Special permits were issued by the Pakistan government for Muslim refugees from Punjab to board special trains while Delhi Muslims or Muslim ‘sub-groups’ coming from ‘minority provinces’ were not allowed in Pakistan. Translation mine. On permit system see Vazeera Fazila Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (New Delhi: Penguin, 2008), 126–127. For details on the functioning of Partition Council see Constituent Assembly Debates CAD (Legislative) I, no. 1, 26 November 1947, 747–761. CAD (Legislative) from 1947 onwards; Jawaharlal Nehru and Liyaquat Ali Khan, ‘Agreement Between India and Pakistan on Minority’, Middle East Journal 4, no. 3 (July 1950), 344–346. For violence in Punjab see Nair, Changing Homelands; Ravinder Kaur, Since 1947: Partition Narratives Amongst Punjabi Refugees of Delhi (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007). For work on West Bengal see Joya Chatterji, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932–1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Haimanti Roy, Partitioned Lives: Migrants, Refugees, Citizens in India and Pakistan, 1947–1965 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012). For Partition violence in Karachi see Zamindar, The Long Partition, Ch. II. The word ‘refugees’, or more specifically, ‘Hindu and Sikh refugees’, ‘Muslim refugees’ or ‘non-Muslim refugees’ were contextually constructed categories. There were constant debates in the Constituent Assembly to denounce the word refugee, specifically for the displaced Hindu and Sikh population of Sindh, Punjab and other regions that became part of Pakistan. It was argued that they should be called ‘sharnarthies’ (people in need of refuge). Later on, the Indian government took a conscious decision to rename refugees as ‘displaced persons’ and refugee camps as ‘relief camps’ in all official communication.

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9

10

11 12

Contested Homelands Displaced persons included those who were displaced from their homes in Pakistan. Similar debates took place on describing the ‘Hindu and Sikh refugees’ as ‘non-Muslim refugees’. The category of ‘Muslim refugees’ was also replaced by ‘Muslim Evacuees’ to identify those who were displaced from their homes in India. See CAD (Legislative) II (29 November 1947), 891–892. For a detailed discussion on refugee identity see Liisa Malkki, ‘Refugees and Exile: From Refugee Studies to the National Order of Things’, Annual Review of Anthropology, no. 24 (1995), 498; Liisa Malkki, ‘National Geographic: Rooting of People and the Territorialisation of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees’, Cultural Anthropology 7, no.1 (1992), 24–44; Valentine E. Daniel and John Chr. Knudsen, Mistrusting Refugees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Also see Zamindar, The Long Partition, 9–10. Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 122. Also see Lionel Carter, Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August–15 October 1947 (Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2011), 361. Pandey, Remembering Partition, 124. Also see Pandey, ‘Partition and Independence in Delhi: 1947–1948’, Economic and Political Weekly 32, no. 36 (Sept. 6–12, 1997), 2261–2272. For critical condition of Sikh refugees see Carter, Partition Observed, 66–67; Kaur, Since 1947, Ch.1. Official reports suggest that the discontent against Muslims was not local. In fact, there were situations, recorded by the victims, when local Hindus saved the lives of their Muslim neighbours. Similar kinds of narratives were recorded by Sikh refugees who were supported by their fellow Muslim neighbours in Pakistan side of Punjab. See Carter Partition Observed, 285 and 326; Pandey, ‘Partition and Independence in Delhi’; Zamindar, The Long Partition; and Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘The Hindu Nationalist Movement in Delhi: From ‘Locals’ to Refugees—and Towards Peripheral Groups?’ in Delhi: Urban Space and Human Destinies, ed. Veronique Dupont, Emma Tarlo and Denis Vidal (Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2000), 181–204.

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13 Jaffrelot, ‘The Hindu Nationalist Movement in Delhi’, 181–183; Also see Carter, Partition Observed, 253, 474–475. 14 Qidwai, Azadi Ki Chhaon Mein, 104–108. 15 Abdul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1988), 229; also see Carte, Partition Observed, 165, 178–179, 183, 188, 193, 239, 267, 285, 327 and 361. 16 Azad, India Wins Freedom, 231. 17 For a study on the changing attitude of refugees, as their anger, born out of sudden displacement, killings and bloodshed, settled down with the gradual settlement policies of the government see R.N. Saksena, Refugees: A Study in Changing Attitudes (Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1961). 18 Azad, India Wins Freedom, 229. 19 Quoted in Pandey, Remembering Partition, 128. Also see ‘Statement on the Disturbance in Delhi’, CAD (Legislative) I, no. 1 (19 November 1947), 190–191. 20 Interview with Mirza Zameer (name changed) dated 28 March 2014, Delhi. 21 It is difficult to extract the accurate number of displaced population due to the chaotic situation of violence and constant displacement of the population. See Dipankar Gupta, ‘The Indian Diaspora of 1947: The Political and Ethnic Consequences of Partition with Special Reference to Delhi’, in Communalism in India: History, Politics and Culture, ed. K.N. Panikkar (New Delhi: Manohar, 1991); V.N. Datta, ‘Punjabi Refugees and the Urban Development of Greater Delhi’ in Delhi Through the Ages, ed. R.E. Frykenberg (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993). 287– 296; Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation: India’s Muslims Since Independence (London: Hurst & Co., 1997), 17; Pandey, Remembering Partition, 123–124. 22 ‘Letter from Randhawa to Khurshid’, 14 June 1947, Home-Police, CCO, Delhi, File no. 68/47-C. Delhi State Archives (DSA). 23 Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 26 (1954), 98. 24 See Azad, India Wins Freedom, 230. 25 Ibid., 230. 26 For a reaction to the mixed areas being turned into ‘Hindu and Sikh zones’ in Paharganj, Sabzi Mandi and Karol Bagh see Al Jamiat,

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27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42

43

Contested Homelands 26 July 1952. Also, interview with Haji Babuddin (name changed), dated 17 October 2014, Delhi. Haji Sahib’s paternal family was a victim of Partition violence. They moved from Pahari Dheeraj to the Muslimdominated area of Ballimaran in 1947. Further references can also be found in Azad, India Wins Freedom, 229. Pandey, ‘Can Muslim be an Indian’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 4 (October 1999), 608–629. Qidwai, Azadi ki Chhaon Mein, 52–53. Also see Pandey, ‘Partition and Independence in Delhi’, 2263. Qidwai, 37. Ibid., 52.

Azad, India Wins Freedom, 230.

Ibid.

Qidwai, Azadi Ki Chhaon Mein, 54 and Zamindar, The Long Partition,

35. Muslims of Delhi left their homes to take shelter in Purana Qila. Source: Maulana Athar Hussain Dehalwi’s collection, Old Delhi. Source: Maulana Athar Hussain Dehalwi’s collection, Old Delhi. Ibid. Source: Maulana Athar Hussain Dehalwi’s collection, Old Delhi. U. Bhaskar Rao, The Story of Rehabilitation (New Delhi: Department of Rehabilitation, Government of India, 1967), 26–29. Also see Pandey, ‘Partition and Independence in Delhi’, 2263. Azad, India Wins Freedom, 232–234. Carter, Partition Observed, 223 and 239; Also see Zamindar, The Long Partition, 34; Qidwai, Azadi ki Chhaon Mein, 31–40. Pandey, ‘Partition and Independence in Delhi’, 2265. Interview with Mirza Zameer, dated 28 March 2014, Delhi. Reports of the outbreak of cholera in Purana Qila and Humayun’s Tomb refugee camps, which caused some deaths, were recorded. It led to the issuance of special permits to control the in-and-out movement of refugees from the camps. See Carter, Partition Observed, 351–352. For general conditions of Muslim camps. See 238–240. Interview with Mirza Zameer, dated 28 March 2014, Delhi. Also see Azad, India Wins Freedom, 233; and Qidwai, Azadi ki Chhaon Mein, 31– 33. Also see Brijkrishan Chandiwala, Gandhi Ji Ki Dilli Dairy Tatha Dilli

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46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

189

Ka Swatantrata Sangram III (Delhi: Gandhi Memorial and Gyandeep, 1970), 300–303. Carter, Partition Observed, 327. Also see Pandey, ‘Partition and Independence in Delhi’, 2266. See ‘Report on the Working of Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1949–1950’ (Delhi: Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India), 19–20; ‘Report on the Working of Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1950–1951’, 13–15; ‘Report on the Working of Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1952– 1953’, 17; ‘Report on the Working of Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1953– 1954’, 22–25; ‘Report on the Working of Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1954–1955’, 22–27. CAD (Legislative) VII, no. 1 (2 September 1948), 777–783. Cf. Zamindar, The Long Partition, 36. Cf. Ibid., 37. Cf. Ibid., 37. Zamindar, Long Partition, pp. 161–165. G.D. Khosla, Memory’s Gay Chariot: An Autobiographical Narrative (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1985), 175. Ibid. Carter, Partition Observed, 238–239. Ibid., 238–239. Ibid. By ‘organization’ Nehru meant the migration of the artisan class that was the backbone of household industries in India and remains so even today. Azad, India Wins Freedom, 233. Rao, The Story of Rehabilitation, 16–25. Interview with Haji Sahib (name changed) dated 17 October 2014, Delhi. Qidwai, 50. Al Jamiat, 16 October 1947. Cf. Carter, Partition Observed, 258. Interview with Haji Sahib (name changed) dated 17 October 2014, Delhi. John Knudsen, ‘When Trust is on Trial: Negotiating Refugee Narratives’, in Mistrusting Refugees, eds. E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr. Knudsen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 22.

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64 This question was raised by two youths associated with RSS to Begum Qidwai since she was in contact with the peace committee involved in securing properties in Muslim zones. See Qidwai, 249. 65 Azad, India Wins Freedom, 228–230. For debates on the sealing of Muslim properties see CAD (Legislative) II, no.1 (24 February 1949), 1023–1025. See Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 26 (1954), 207–208; Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 26 (1954), 98–99. 66 Al Jamiat, 26 July 1954. 67 Nehru’s statement in Parliament, CAD, 11 February 1948, question no. 239. Also see Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 26 (1954), 98–99. 68 Azad, India Wins Freedom, 230. 69 There are many references in letters written by Nehru to the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Chief Ministers regarding the worsening communal situation and the possible solutions to secure the lives and properties of Delhi’s Muslims. This is the reason why there was any ambiguity about the notion of ‘Muslim Zones’ in official circles. Nehru’s statement in Parliament, CAD, 11 February 1948, question no. 239. For further reference see Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 26 (1954), 98 and 207–208. 70 Refugee & Rehabilitation (R&R) Section, chief commissioner’s office (CCO), Delhi, 1948, File no. 2 (13) 1948. DSA. For a detailed discussion on evacuee properties see CAD (Legislative) from 1947 onwards under the title ‘Refugee Rehabilitation’. 71 Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 26, 98. Also see Durga Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence (hereafter SPC) (Ahmedabad: Navjeevan Publishing House, 1974), 1945–1950; Vol. V, 261–262. 72 Qidwai, Azadi Ki Chhaon Mein, 190. For details see Zamindar, The Long Partition, 132 and 140–141. 73 Zamindar, The Long Partition, 29–30. 74 Carter, Partition Observed, 285–286 and 327. 75 Nehru’s statement in Parliament, CAD, 11 February 1948, question no. 239. 76 Das, SPC, 1945–1950; Vol. V, 260–262. 77 Ibid. 78 ‘Resettlement of Muslim Evacuees in Delhi Province’, R&R, CCO, Delhi, File no. 2 (1) 1948. DSA. 79 Ibid.

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80 Qidwai, Azadi ki Chhaon Mein, 191. 81 Das, SPC V, 266. Qidwai also made this observation in Qidwai, Azadi ki Chhaon Mein, 181. 82 For details on how bantwara (partition) was popularly seen see Khosla, Memory’s Gay Chariot, 170–175; and Qidwai, Azadi ki Chaon Main, 249. 83 Azad, India Wins Freedom, 231. 84 Azad, India Wins Freedom, 230–244. Also see Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy Through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012). 85 In fact, local socialist activists and their nominees were housed in these properties, which were still vacant for protection. See Das, SPC, 1945–1950; Vol. V, 267; and Qidwai, Azadi ki Chhaon Mein, 191–193. 86 See Al Jamiat, 26 July 1952 for a statement by a socialist leader Mir Mushtaq Ahmed on the ‘pushing out’ of Muslim population. 87 Al Jamiat, 26 July 1952. Also Al Jamiat newspaper continued to publish lists of Muslim evacuee properties, advertisements for the sale and purchase of properties and, most importantly, about the atrocities on Muslims by the custodian. See ‘Custodian Ki Sitam Zarafiyan’, Al Jamiat, 1 December 1951; ‘Custodian General Sharnarthiyon Ke Mafad Par Musalman Nakasiyon Ke Mafad Ko Qurban Nahin Kar Sakta’, Al Jamiat, 5 October 1951. For a long list of evacuee properties see Al Jamiat, 24 October 1950 and 2 January 1951. 88 Das, SPC, 1945–1950; Vol. V, 266–267. 89 ‘Letter to Deputy IG Police from Maulana Habibur Rehman’, 14 January 1948, Home-Police, CCO, Delhi, File no. PXI (50)/general(genl.), DSA. 90 ‘Letter from Randhawa to Khurshid’, 14 June 1948, Home-Police, CCO, Delhi, File no. 68/47-C. DSA. 91 Ibid. 92 Source: Author. Based on information collected through oral interviews and archives. 93 ‘Letter from Randhawa to Khurshid’, 1 June 1948, Home-Police, CCO, Delhi, File no. 60/47-C, DSA. 94 ‘Letter from Randhawa to Khurshid’, 29 March, 1948, Home-Police, CCO, Delhi, File No.: 60/47-C.DSA, 86.

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192 95

96 97

98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105

106

Contested Homelands Source Report, 12 May 1948, Home-Police, CCO, Delhi, File no. 55/48-Confidencial (Conf) C, 8, DSA. Also see Azad, India Wins Freedom, 232. Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN, 198. For example, a memorandum submitted to State Reorganisation Commission in 1952 on behalf of the Delhi government, while describing the demographic composition of the city of Delhi, identified Muslims as a separate category along with urban, rural and total displaced population. See Brahm Praksh, Case for Greater Delhi: Memorandum, Submitted to the State Reorganization Commission on Behalf of the Delhi State Government (Delhi: DSG Publications 1954), 7. CAD (Legislative), 11 February, 1948, Question no. 239. CAD (Legislative) II, 29 November 1947, 867, 872 and 920. ‘Letter from Sardar Patel to Parmanad Trehan Regarding the Hindu Exodus from Sindh’, 16 July 1947, in Das, SPC V, 289. CAD (Legislative) II, no. 1, 21 (February 1949), 884. Also see debates on 26 March 1949, 1925–1935. For Nehru’s response to Professor Ram Singh’s comments see Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 26 (1954), 98. Kumar and Prasad. SWJLN 26 (1954), 98. Ibid. CAD (Legislative), 21 February 1949, 884–887; CAD (Legislative), 24 February 1949, 1003–1005; CAD (Legislative), 4 March 1949, 1243– 1245; and CAD (Legislative), 19 March 1949, 1953. For details on evacuee property debates and laws see Joseph B. Schechtman, ‘Evacuee Property in India and Pakistan’, Pacific Affairs 24, no. 4 (December 1951), 406–413; ‘Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950’, The Minority Agreement Between India and Pakistan 1950’, ‘The Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1954’, ‘The Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954’; Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 24 (1954), 45–56 and 463–465. On the communal angle of Muslim evacuee properties in Delhi see Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 26 (1954), 98–99; Zamindar, The Long Partition; Nair, Changing Homelands; and Kaur, Since 1947. Also see CAD (Legislative), 18 November 1947, 64–65; CAD (Legislative), 24 February 1949, 1012–1013; ‘Report on the Working of Ministry of

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108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116

193

Rehabilitation, 1949–1950’, 19–20; ‘Report on the Working of Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1950–1951’, 13–15; ‘Report on the Working of Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1952–1953’, 17; ‘Report on the Working of Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1953–1954’, 22–25; ‘Report on the Working of Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1954–1955’, 22–27. For details see ‘The Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1954’, 2–5; For a comparative perspective on the communalisation of ‘evacuee’ property clause in Delhi and Karachi see Zamindar, The Long Partition, 120–160. CAD (Legislative), 11 August 1952, 132; Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 24 (1954), 459 and SWJLN 26 (1954), 98–100. Parliamentary Debates, House of the People Official Reports 1, no.1–21, 11 August 1952, Parliamentary Secretariat, New Delhi, 5354. Ibid. R&R, CCO, Delhi, 1952, File no. 2 (24) 1952. DSA. Ibid. For a detailed letter to K.N. Katju regarding an incident of communal violence see Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 26 (1954), 207–208. Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 24 (1954), 459. Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 26 (1954), 98–100. Qidwai, Azadi Ki Chhaon Mein, 252 and 192. By the term ‘selective’ vegetarianism, I mean the diverse food habits and preferences that are largely claimed to be vegetarian and placed in binary opposition to non-vegetarianism. There has been no structured study to analyse the food preferences of people in general and their religious, regional, ethnic or caste specificities in particular. Pure vegetarianism is followed by a small group of North Indian Hindu upper-caste group and a few other Hindu caste groups. A small but influential Jain community also adheres to pure vegetarianism, sometimes even more strictly than do Hindu upper-caste groups. In this sense, the Hindutva claims of vegetarianism are a selective view. See Paul Robins, ‘Meat Matters: Politics Along the Commodity Chain in India’, Cultural Geographies 6, no. 4, (October 1999), 399–423; A. Appadurai, ‘Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value’, in Social Life of Things, ed. A. Appadurai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 3–63; Sanat K. Majumdar, ‘Vegetarianism:

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194

117 118

119

120 121

122 123 124 125

Contested Homelands Fad, Faith, or fact? The Ecological and Nutritional Aspects of Vegetarianism are Appraised Against the Backdrop of the Current World Scene’, American Scientist 60, no. 2 (March–April 1972), 175–179; Mukandi Lal, ‘Cow Cult in India’, in Cow-Slaughter: Horns of a Dilemma, ed. A.B. Shah (New Delhi: Lalvani Publishing House, 1967), 15–35; Imtiaz Ahmed, ‘Of Eggs and Beef ’, Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 48 (26 November–2 December, 2005). For a recent survey conducted by the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) see http://www.livemint.com/Politics/RhPVLUFmclIDWRIiSoTC7N/ Who-are-the-beef-eaters-in-India.html (Accessed on 15 May 2015). Meat acquired from water buffaloes is called bade ka gosht in popular parlance. ‘Ban on Cow Slaughter’, the resolution passed by Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha (ABPS) or All India Representative Committee of Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), 1952. See http://www. archivesofrss.org/Resolutions.aspx (Accessed on 15 October 2014); Also see Resolution for ‘Cow Protection’, 1958; ‘Constitutional Amendment for Cow Protection’, 1960; ‘Government Policy vis-avis Cow Protection Movement’, 1966, http://www.archivesofrss.org/ Resolutions.aspx (Accessed on 14 May 2015); Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN Second Series 20 (1952), 211–212. Also see GOI, LSD, Vol. 3 Part II, 1955, 4148. Hindustan Times (HT), 1 November 1952, and for extracts of Nehru’s speech at a public meeting in Nagpur on 31 October 1952 in this regard published in HT see Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN Second Series 20 (1952), 211. LSD, GOI, Vol. 3 Part II, 1955, 4153. S. Sathe, ‘Cow Slaughter: The Legal Aspects’, in Cow-Slaughter: Horns of a Dilemma, ed. A.B. Shah (Delhi: Lalvani Publishing House, 1967), 81–82. Ibid., 77–78. Planning Commission, FFYP, GOI, 1951, 279. Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970), 18. For instance, The C.P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949, placed a total ban on the slaughter of cows and buffaloes (male or

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126

127

128

129

130 131 132 133 134 135

195

female, adults or calves). Under this act, however, the slaughter of buffaloes was permitted only on obtaining a certificate granted by proper authorities. The Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act, 1955, put a total ban on the slaughter of all categories of bovine cattle—meaning, no slaughter was permitted under any circumstances. The UP Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955, prohibited the slaughter of cows completely though it remained silent on the slaughter of other bovines. Rohit De, A People’s Constitution: The Everyday Life of Law in the Indian Republic (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), 137–147. ‘Overview of The Indian Buffalo Meat Value Chain’ (New Delhi: Agriculture Division Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), 2013), Annexure 2: 56–75 and Annexure 3: 76–78; Also see: Bellwinkel-Schempp Maren, ‘The Khatiks of Kanpur and the Bristle Trade: Towards an Anthropology of Man and Beast’, Sociological Bulletin 47, no. 2 (1998); Subhash C. Kumar, Indian Leather Industry: Growth, Productivity, and Export Performance (New Delhi: APH, 1997). These petitions were eventually responded by Supreme Court in the famous Hanif Qureshi & Others vs. the state of Bihar & Other case in 1958 (AIR 731, 1959, SCR 629). Bye-Laws of Delhi Municipal Committee. In fact, the ban was welcomed and appreciated by the Urdu weekly Al Jamiat as well. The Jamiat editorial published on 1 September 1951, ‘Zibah Gaye Band’, (ban Cow Slaughter) said: ‘If the government of India decides and billions of Hindus feel that cow slaughter should be banned, a relevant law should be enforced.’ See Al Jamiat, 1 September 1951. Bye-Laws of Delhi Municipal Committee, 1951, 43–45. Ibid. Ibid., 51. Interview with John Dayal (activist) dated 8 December 2015, Delhi. Pratap (Hindi Daily), 10–30 November and December 1954; and Al Jamiat, 27 November 1954 and 3 January 1955. Pratap, 10–30 November and December 1954; and Al Jamiat, 27 November 1954 and 3 January 1955.

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196 136 137

138 139

140 141 142 143 144 145 146

147

Contested Homelands Interview with Kareemuddin (name changed) dated 17 December 2014, Delhi. Interview with Anees (name changed) dated 19 December 2014, Delhi. For more details visit: www.http://aijamiatulquresh.org/ For AIJQ’s actions in this regard see ‘Jamat Quraish Huqumat Hind se Dilli Ke Haliya Waqyat Par Mutalaba’, Al Jamiat, 30 May 1952. GOI, RSD, 19 February 1958, 904–905.

GOI, RSD, 19 February 1958, 905; 4 March 1958, 2047–2050 and for

the recommendations of Ad-hoc Committee on slaughterhouses see 7 May 1959, 2183–2184 and 2195–2196. GOI, RSD, 4 March 1958, 2047–2050. GOI, RSD, 7 May 1959, 2195–2196; GOI, RSD, 15 December 1959, 2495–2499. Delhi Metropolitan Council Debates (DMCD), Metropolitan Council Secretariat (MCS)/Delhi, 29 September 1970. 223–225. GOI, RSD, 4 March 1958, 2047–2050. DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 29 September 1970, 223–225. GOI, RSD, 28 February, 1966, 1594–1596. The Sangh representatives used aggressive terminology like kasai khana for slaughterhouses and slaughtering. The word ‘beef’ was also used interchangeably in the debates for cow and buffalo meat quite deliberately. This vocabulary was also used in popular parlance to establish the image of Muslim as kasai and beef eaters. See GOI, RSD, 19 February 1958, 905; GOI, RSD, 29 November 1966, 2011. Also see a recent article clarifying what beef means for Old Delhi people and how it has been a continuous practice for them to clarify what it means: http://www. thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/in-old-delhi-beef-means-buffalo-meat/ article7820864. (accessed on 18 June 2015). Reference to Pakistan was also frequently made in relation to the export of beef and transportation of cows across borders. See GOI, RSD, 15 December 1959, 2499–2500. This propaganda material was published by Go Hatya Nirodh Samiti, a Delhi based organisation. They were also distributed widely in UP, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Bihar during the assembly elections. For an Intelligence Bureau Report (IBR) and a copy of pamphlet see ‘Action Against Pamphlets … which are to the effect that Prime Minister Nehru is Responsible for Cow-Slaughter’, GOI, MHA, Poll.–(I), 1961, File no. 37 (14)/61. NAI.

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150

151 152 153

154 155 156 157 158 159

160

197

Ibid. The image of pamphlet could not be used in the absence of copyright permission from the concerned authority. The personification of India as ‘Mother India’, a Hindu goddess, emerged as an important political symbol during the freedom struggle. Later on, different political ideologies appropriated this symbol. It became an important symbol for Hindutva politics for asserting the idea of India as Hindu Rashtra due to its obvious reference to India as a Hindu goddess. For details see Purushottam Agrawal, Who is Bharat Mata? History, Culture and the Idea of India: Writings by and On Jawaharlal Nehru (New Delhi: Speaking Tiger Books, 2019). GOI, Home-Poll.–(I), 1961, File no. 37/14/61. NAI. Also see ‘Hindu Mahasabha Ki Hindu Huqumat’, Al Jamiat, 27 April 1965; ‘Election ke Mutadat Pehlu’, Al Jamiat, 1 March 1967; ‘Sirf Khawaish Aur Jazbaat’, Al Jamiat, 10 Jan 1967; ‘Election Ka Faisla Kya Hoga’, Al Jamiat. 10 January 1967; ‘Dilli Corporation Mein Jan Sangh ki Aksariyat’, Al Jamiat, 26 February 1967. Christopher Penny, Photos of God: The Printed Image and Political Struggle in India (London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 2004), 107. Ibid. ‘Action against Pamphlets … [regarding] Cow-Slaughter’, GOI, MHA, Poll.–(I), 1961, File no. 37 (14)/61. NAI. The image of pamphlet could not be used in the absence of copyright permission from the concerned authority. Ibid. Ibid. Geeta Puri, Bharatiya Jana Sangh Organization and Ideology Delhi: A Case Study (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1980), 162. Organizer, 31 August 1964, 8. Jeffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 206. See the debate on Delhi Cow Protection Bill, 1967, DMCD, MCS/ Delhi, 2 May 1967, 54. The Bill was also supported by Muslim members of the corporation, including Anwar Ali Dehlvi and Imdad Sabri, evoking the Islamic view on the protection of cow and a number of fatwas (religious sanctions) that were issued by Mughal courts in this regard. See DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 20 October 1967, 54–58. B.D. GOI, RSD, 7 November 1966, 133–146; Al Jamiat, 10 January1967 and 2 February 1967. Also see Al Jamiat, 7 November and 30 November 1966; DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 2 May 1967, 52–59.

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198 161 162

163 164 165 166

167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176

177

Contested Homelands Jeffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 207. Puri, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 180. Also see Raj Chandidas, ‘Elections to Delhi Metropolitan Council: An Analysis of Electoral and Ecological Variables’, Economic and Political Weekly 10, no. 25/26 (21–28 June 1975), 964–973; Parkash Chander, ‘Socio–Economic Background of the Metropolitan Councilors of Delhi: An Empirical Study’, The Indian Journal of Political Science 33, no. 3 (July–September 1972), 323–340; Mahender Kumar Saini and Walter Andersen, ‘The Congress Split in Delhi: The Effect of Factionalism on Organizational Performance and System Level Interactions’, Asian Survey 11, no. 11 (November 1971), 1084–1100; Mahender Kumar Saini and Walter Andersen, ‘The Basti Julahan Bye-Election’, The Indian Journal of Political Science 30, no. 3 (July–September 1969), 260–276. Theodore P. Wright, ‘Muslims and the 1977 Indian Elections: A Watershed?’, Asian Survey 17, no. 12 (December 1977), 1207–1220. Puri, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 161 and The Statesman, 6 January 1967. Ibid., Puri, 165. Ibid., 162. DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 2 June 1967, 43–47. Also see DMCD, MCS/ Delhi, 5 May 1967, 55–57; 20 October 1967, 40–43; and 6 November 1967, 49–55 for debate on Delhi Cow Protection Bill 1967. DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 2 June 1967, 44. DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 14 November 1967, 36–43; GOI, RSD, December, 1967. Puri, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 162. GOI, RSD, 12 May 1968, 4221–4222. DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 29 September 1970, 222–223. Ibid., 228. Ibid., 228. DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 30 September 1970, 105–111. ‘Gosht Bechne Walon Par Police Ki Zayadati’, Al Jamiat, 29 March 1972. Mohammad Sadruddin Dehalvi Quraeshi, Hindustan Ki Qureshi Biradari (Qureshi Biradari of India) (Delhi: All-India Jamiat-ulQuresh, 1999), 131. Al Jamiat, 29 March 1972. Civil Writ Petition no. 1139 of 1971, High Court, Delhi.

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Demarcated Homelands: ‘Mini Pakistans’ in Delhi 178 179 180

181

182 183 184 185 186

187 188 189

190

199

Shalina Mehta, The Eternal Web: Hindu-Muslim Relations (New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 1992), 65–132. Puri, Bhartiya Jan Sangh, 210. Al Jamiat, ‘Barha Hindu Rao Mein Achanak Fasad Phoot Para’, 14 June 1973. Also see Al Jamiat, 14–18 June 1973; For Kishanganj and Sadar Bazar riot see Al Jamiat, ‘Dilli Ke Aman Ko Kharab Karne Ki Napak Sazish’, 11 March 1974. Also see Al Jamiat, 8 May–8 July 1974. Mehta, The Eternal Web Ch. 3 & 4, 65–132; Gopal Krishna, ‘Communal Violence in India: A Study of Communal Disturbance in Delhi’, Economic and Political Weekly 20, no. 3 (19 January 1985), 117–131. Al Jamiat, ‘Masjid Dur Ka Nahate, Qureshi Biradari Wa Takiya Rajan Ke Nuksanat’, 31 May1974. Interview with Kareemuddin (name changed), 17 December 2014, Delhi. Mehta, The Eternal Web, 43–44. Krishna, ‘A Study of Communal Disturbance in Delhi’, 119. The Muslim League had no political relevance in Delhi. Most of its members joined Congress after the partition or moved to the southern part of India. The office did remain in Old Delhi but with a completely different political stance and focus on the internal reform of the community. Cf. Krishna, ‘A Study of Communal Disturbance in Delhi’, 119–120. Al Jamiat, ‘Sadar Bazar Ka Fasad Sochi-Samjhi Sazish Ka Nateeja Tha’, 11 May 1974. Al Jamiat, ‘Haliya Firqawarana Hungamain Intezamiya Ki Saazish Ka Nateeja Tha’, 18 May 1974. Al Jamiat published a list of properties owned by Muslims, specifically the Qureshi community, that were destroyed during the riots. Al Jamiat, ‘Masjid Dur Ka Nahate, Qureshi Biradari wa Rakita Rajan Ke Nuksanat’ and ‘Qureshi Biradari Ke Nuksanat’, 18 May 1974. Krishna, ‘A Study of Communal Disturbance in Delhi’, 127.

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4

Reorganisation of Space and Communities: Clearance, Resettlement and Redevelopment The Muslim-dominated areas of Delhi re-emerged as a deeply contested category in the political and social life of the state in the wake of the country’s two wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, respectively. A growing official concern for ensuring internal security began to define Muslim localities as spaces that had to be controlled and organised through clearance, resettlement and regeneration of populations.1 The developments that took place in the 1970s, especially the forced clearance of Jama Masjid areas and demolition of an old Muslim locality near Turkman Gate during Emergency, brought these spatial zones into the wider discourse of nation, national identity and national integration. This chapter examines how the community–space relationship was transformed in the 1970s and paved the way for a new kind of administrative politics. Muslim localities that were previously seen as polluted, stagnant and unhygienic spaces, which needed to be administered and modernised through democratic institutions, were now envisaged as directly controllable spaces through strict bureaucratic action. This process of objectification of Muslim space in Delhi is thus analysed at three levels. First, the chapter looks into the overwhelming concerns of the Indian State for urban development and its zeal to offer modern living conditions by transforming the city into a developed, inclusive and cohesive space. Second, it examines the discourse around the ‘Indianisation’ of religious minorities, city space and cultural symbols by reclaiming the ‘lost’ heritage being pursued by Hindu political organisations like RSS and

200

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Jan Sangh from the late 1960s through the 1970s. Third, the chapter explores the political context at both the national and local levels in the immediate aftermath of the two wars with Pakistan, which led to the reinforcement of concerns for internal security, national identity and nationalism.

I

Reorganisation of Space: Dark and Damp

Localities of Shahjahanabad and Its Inhabitants

To understand the process of reorganisation of Old Delhi in the late 1960s, we have to begin with the famous Delhi-Ajmeri Gate Slum Clearance Scheme, popularly known as Delhi-Ajmeri Gate Clearance and Improvement Scheme or DAG, started in 1926 and finalised in 1938. It was the first planned initiative that focused on the improvement of civic conditions of Old Delhi. The area was referred to as ‘evil slum area’ by the New Delhi authorities since it was the nearest part of the old city exposed to the newly built capital city.2 A number of katras (small premises inhabited by a number of families in closely built temporary or permanent structures with shared toilets and bathrooms) in Old Delhi were declared ‘unfit for human habitation’.3 Redevelopment of the Turkman Gate area (municipal ward no. 8) was a part of this scheme since it was situated between the Delhi Gate and Ajmeri Gate areas. The scheme was ambitious. It involved massive clearance and resettlement of around 3,422 families, including a process of acquisition of properties and payment of compensation. The plan provoked multiple reactions from residents. The area covered by the scheme was populated mainly by the biradaries of artisans— both Hindus and Muslims (as discussed earlier). The family ties, the cultural association of these communities with each other and, most importantly, proximity to their workplaces and businesses were

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some of their major concerns.4 Many meetings were organised by local residents to register their resentment against the scheme. Asaf Ali, a member of the legislative assembly, raised these points in the Central Legislative Assembly.5 He tried to bring the attention of Delhi Improvement Trust (DIT was constituted in 1937 to implement the task of improvement and redevelopment) towards these issues so that a Delhi specific policy framework could be evolved. In his presentation, Ali divided the local population into three segments: (1) old residents, (2) landlord class and (3) shifting population. Categorising biradaris and landlords as the oldest residents and bearers of the rich heritage and culture of Old Delhi, he tried negotiating a good deal for their relocation to nearby places with a ‘proper and tempting re-housing scheme’.6 The argument that residents of any locality should either be resettled at the same place after redevelopment or within the proximity of redevelopment area became the most contentious aspect of the resettlement policies in Delhi in general and Muslim-dominated areas in particular. It was repeatedly recommended in every official survey, plan and scheme carried out in postcolonial Delhi. The colonial government carried out the partial implementation of the scheme by clearing a portion of the slum, developing or extending the acquired and nazul land (government land that had not already been appropriated by it for any purpose) on the Darya Ganj side and linking DAG with the Western Extension scheme to avoid confrontations.7 A part of the city wall was demolished and the ditch along the wall between Delhi and Ajmeri Gates was filled up. In addition, a commercial complex was also built. But the redevelopment of the area between Angurighatta and Turkman Gate—parts I and II of the scheme—was left for future consideration and improvement.8 This scheme, like other colonial-era initiatives, was refined in the 1950s from the perspective of planning and development since urbanisation emerged as one of the important objectives of the post-Partition Indian State. Nehru strongly asserted that

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modern living conditions would encourage communities to give up religious and caste considerations and become a part of the ‘national mainstream’.9 Nehru looked at Old Delhi as a symbol of India’s glorified past and the aristocratic culture of Dilliwalas. He found Old Delhi as a ‘city not merely of buildings, but of ideas, of historicity with an inner spirit’ and a reflection of the Indian mainstream that needed to be preserved and returned to its old glory and aristocratic values through ‘conservation’.10 This statement reflected Nehru’s assertion that old Indian cities and buildings should also echo the spirit of modern, planned and developed India. At the same time, it also shows the assumption that reorganisation of space in a certain way would have an inevitable impact on people’s behaviour. Thus, careful planning was required for the redevelopment of the old city. In fact, it had to be reorganised in a way that it could be integrated into the contours of New Delhi and would reflect the secular and modern spirit of the capital region. This aspect remained the focus of planning for Old Delhi in the postcolonial period, especially in the immediate aftermath of the partition when Hindu and Sikh refugee influx transformed the spatial demography of Delhi. The population of Old Delhi increased from 5,22,000 in 1941 to 9,15,000 in 1951 and 9, 51,000 in 1956 with the resettlement of Hindu and Punjabi refugees.11 This phenomenal increase in population led to the ‘unplanned’ growth of structures used for accommodation, business and small workshops in the old city and its extensions, which consisted of areas of Sabzi Mandi, Motia Khan, Sadar Bazar and Paharganj. Living conditions and civic amenities deteriorated in all these localities.12 The deteriorating old katras and basties (slums or similar kind of localities inhabited by people belonging to lowerclass, lower-caste communities) of Shahjahanabad and the sprawling refugee residential colonies without ‘proper’ layouts were identified as two main challenges of planning of the city. To address these

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concerns, a process of planned acquisition and control of ‘public’ land in and around the city began soon after independence. The Planning Commission established a direct link between economic development and planned urbanisation. It replaced the Delhi Improvement Trust of 1937 with a new statuary body called Delhi Development Authority (DDA). The commission aimed at transforming Delhi into a ‘proper’ capital city through an Act of Parliament. The Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957, empowered DDA ‘to acquire, hold, manage and dispose of land and other property, to carry out building, engineering, mining and other operations’.13 It made provisions for the compulsory acquisition of land.14 Furthermore, DDA was given the power to declare any non development area, which did not come under other local authorities, as a development area (Section 22A).15 By implication, every land or property, except the ones with private ownership rights or the ones that came under the hold of other local representative bodies like Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC), legally became the property of the Central government.16 Any construction without permission on such lands was to be declared ‘illegal’ and ‘unauthorised’ and the inhabitants were to be called ‘encroachers’. In April 1957, the prime minister’s office convened a Cabinet meeting to develop a legal framework for the task of clearing slums and unauthorised constructions in Delhi. The meeting made three provisions. First, the home ministry should set up a mobile agency headed by a police officer of the rank of deputy superintendent of police. The function of this agency would be to discover unauthorised structures and take necessary steps for their removal. The city was divided into three zones for the purpose of ‘mobile surveillance’ (a term used in the Cabinet meeting) of government land.17 Second, a Central Demolition Squad was set up on 23 May 1957 and placed under the local self-government department of the Delhi administration. Local police and the demolition squad formed a

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team to patrol different zones of Delhi and carry out the task of slum clearance.18 Third, the Cabinet meeting commissioned a number of surveys and organised various mobilisation drives at the local level conducted through Bharat Sewak Samaj (BSS), a Congress-affiliated voluntary organisation.19 These moves by the prime minister’s office demonstrated that the priority of ‘planning’ was to clear squatters. The resettlement of population, which should have been the very first step of any planned redevelopment scheme, was relegated to the margin.20 For Nehru, these were the problems associated with people’s lack of modern aspirations, which was responsible for making slum conditions a ‘vicious cycle’ of their lifestyle.21 Thus, planning and training in every sector of government and society turned out to be the prime concern of the Nehru regime, which required command and control over physical resources, especially land and population.22 This is how a legal and administrative framework was constituted in the first decade after independence. An efficient vocabulary of development—‘legal/ illegal’, ‘encroachment’, ‘authorised/unauthorised’ constructions— was established during this period. The actual implementation of those policies with disastrous human consequences could be seen in subsequent years.

Master Plan and the Delhi–Ajmeri Gate Scheme The purpose of the formation of DDA was to prepare a comprehensive plan with the help of Town Planning Organization (TPO), which was constituted in 1955 by the health ministry to deal with increased congestion in Delhi. A Ford Foundation team was also consulted to develop the plan. On 24 December 1958, the health ministry submitted a note declaring the following wards as slum areas under the Slum Area Clearance and Redevelopment Act, 1956: 1. Ward Nos. I to VI 2. Ward Nos. VII to X excluding G.B. Road

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3. 4. 5.

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The Delhi-Ajmeri gate scheme between Asaf Ali Road and Zere Fasil Road Ward No. XI excluding the area Darya Ganj South Ward No. XII

Ward Nos. VII to X included Ajmeri Gate, Turkman Gate, Matia Mahal, Faiz Bazar and Ward No. XI included the Jama Masjid area.23 These areas were populated mainly by lower-caste, lower-class Muslims, as has been explained in the previous chapters. The Master Plan of Delhi (MPD–1, 1962–1981) that was created for the clearance of these slum areas incorporated some parts of the previous DAG scheme. In 1961, the rest of the slum clearance work, which could not be incorporated in MPD–1, was transferred to Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) by the Central government for implementation. The MCD prepared general plans and sent them to the Ad hoc (Slum Clearance and Improvement) Committee in 1963 for further planning and regulations. It was decided that 500 quarters would be constructed as transit camps at Minto Road, within the proximity of the Turkman Gate clearance area, for temporary relocation of people so that they could be easily resettled in the newly built or improved quarters at a later stage. It was to ensure a phase-wise implementation of the scheme as it was planned originally in the DAG scheme.24 But nothing much happened. In June 1973, the lieutenant governor, Baleshwar Prasad, submitted a report to the Central government highlighting the unsatisfactory handling of the slum clearance work by MCD and the long delay in implementing the old improvement schemes including DAG. Consequently, the Central government in February 1974 transferred the slum clearance work from MCD to DDA.25 To deal with congestion and improvement, the master plan (MPD) divided Delhi into nine planning divisions, which were further subdivided into a number of planning zones. Each zone was identified as a redevelopment, rehabilitation and/or conservation

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area. The plan highlighted the fact that Shahjahanabad was the most problematic area within Old Delhi, and its improvement ‘through a large scale clearance and redevelopment was not possible’.26 Hence, the process required an interconnected redevelopment approach for making balanced and appropriate provisions for proper rehabilitation, commerce, industries and other activities in the areas marked for demolition. Shahjahanabad was sub-divided into twentyeight development zones, of which A-13 to A-26 and C-1 formed part of the Walled City. The Turkman Gate area was a part of zone number A-13. It was identified as a rehabilitation area along with some other areas such as Mori Gate, Phatak Habsh Khan, Kashmiri Gate, Chandni Chowk, Naya Bans and Farashkhana (See Map 5).27 These areas were described as slums that had to be cleared for the purpose of redevelopment.

Map 5: Zonal Division of the Walled City, 196228

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It is worth noting that a number of these areas were inhabited by a mixed population of Hindus and Muslims.29 MPD strongly argued that the zoning should not in any way be used for any kind of human segregation such as the exclusion of certain communities or income groups from particular areas. It also recommended that a status quo should be maintained until sub-zonal plans were prepared. But in practice, plans for some of the zones were not even prepared, and in cases where plans for some of the zones were drafted, they could not be implemented for a very long time in the absence of subsequent approval by DDA. There were many reasons behind this delay, such as official apathy, severe inconsistencies in the policy framework and, most importantly, political interests involved in the administrative structures.30

DDA, MCD and DMC: Politics of Clearance and Rehabilitation The process of reorganisation of space in Delhi should be seen in the light of two interconnected programmes: clearance and resettlement. DDA was the main executive body for carrying out clearance tasks at the request of other municipal and executive bodies because, apart from having extraordinary legal powers, it had an approved demolition squad. Thus, broadly, clearance of unauthorised structures turned out to be its main function. It is important to understand here that public land in Delhi belonged to different bodies (see Table 4.1).31 This complicated land ownership had obvious political implications. There had always been a provision within this DDA-centric legal framework that could turn the DDA into an authoritarian body for implementing the changing concerns of the Central and local governments in relation to the reorganisation of urban space. On the other hand, MCD and DMC were elected representative bodies that defined the reorganisation of land or city space more in political terms.32 The purpose of MCD, apart from clearing jhuggies (slum dwellings typically made of mud and corrugated iron) with

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the help of DDA, was to carry out comprehensive infrastructural development programmes along with other agencies to provide water, electricity, sanitation, health and education to people in authorised and unauthorised areas, including jhuggi clusters. Being an elected body, MCD represented various local political interests. The local councillors were usually not willing to pursue clearance operations since they often resulted in disaffection and political protests, which could affect their future electoral prospects. Thus, redevelopment and resettlement, rather than clearance, remained the main concern of MCD and DMC. Moreover, for DDA and MCD, the management of land and population, or the reorganisation of city space and communities, was not a mere ‘neutral’ development process but a response to the relations of power between the Central and local governments.33 Clearance, resettlement, determination of the status of unauthorised colonies and infrastructural development were broadly carried out or determined as ‘punishment’ or ‘reward’ depending on the political association of the residents of these areas. There were no clear guidelines at the beginning regarding clearance areas and the mode of clearance operations. However, in 1968, in a meeting called by the Union Home Minister and presided over by the Minister of Works and Housing, a high-powered committee recommended some guidelines: (i) The Lt. Governor, in his capacity of Administrator, and not as Chairman of DDA, will decide on the priorities for clearance; (ii) the land owning authority, which wants any land to be cleared, would furnish a certificate to the effect that the land in question is required for the development scheme … as soon as the clearance operations are completed the land will be fenced immediately and suitable arrangements will be made to prevent fresh squatting; (iii) clearance could also be undertaken if the Lt. Governor is satisfied that encroachments constituted a traffic hazard or are prejudicial to public safety … (iv) non-official opinion (local MPs, leaders of political parties, groups in MCD and NDMC) will be taken into

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Statuary body constituted by an Act of Parliament (Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957).

DDA

Responsible to the Central government.

Status

Administrative Body Lt governor, chairmen—the administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi. Three bureaucrats—vicechairman, finance and account officer, engineer—to be appointed and three persons nominated by the Central government. Two elected representatives of MCD and three of DMC as un-official members, commissioner of the MCD as ex-officio.

Make-Up

Table 4.1: DDA, MCD and DMC: Clearance and Rehabilitation Contradictions

Clearance and rehabilitation to suit local political interests.

Land acquisition for the Improvement work purpose of development carried out or denied in Delhi and National for political interests: Capital Region (NCR). Regularisation of Carry out clearance unauthorised colonies operations at the by DMC. request of land-owning authority with the help Provision of basic of demolition squad and amenities—water, Delhi police electricity, health, Building and sanitation, education, engineering work. parks etc.—by MCD and DMC.

Area of Operation

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DMC

MCD Elected representatives.

Responsible to the people.

DMC was formed under Elected representatives the provisions of Delhi Administration Act, 1966.

Responsible to people.

Representative body constituted under DDA Act, 1957, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi Act, 1957.

Provision of electricity, water, sanitary arrangements and other facilities to every locality—‘authorised’ or ‘unauthorised’.

Rehabilitation and resettlement of population.

212

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account in selecting the sites for clearance operations through meetings in a general manner on the list of places where operations are to be carried out at the request of various land owning agencies. The actual programme of demolition or clearance is to be generally kept secret in order to avoid legal complications.34

Dynamics of Local Politics: Bharatiyakaran and MuslimDominated Areas The absence of a clear urban policy framework and principles, combined with unlimited administrative power, provided a framework for authoritarianism in city planning and development, especially after the political success of the Jan Sangh. The party secured a majority in all constituencies dominated by Hindu and Sikh Partition victims, areas traditionally inhabited by the Hindu population, Hindu lower-class, lower-caste localities and, most importantly, the colonies of Central and local governments employees. It lost in almost all Muslim-dominated areas.35 This phenomenal success empowered Jan Sangh to reinterpret city planning from its ideological premises. Bharatiyakaran (Indianisation) of minority communities was an important cultural campaign pursued by Jan Sangh after coming to power in Delhi.36 The Indianisation campaign rested on two planks: ‘dewesternization’ of city space in terms of the marking of street names and ‘de-Islamisation’ and ‘de-Anglicisation’ of minority religious communities. It proposed that Bharatiyakaran could be done by establishing Indian cultural values that referred back to the rich ancient traditions and by preventing and destabilising the impacts of foreign religions and traditions. Ban on cow slaughter, promotion of vegetarianism, the establishment of a uniform civil code, promotion of moral education based on Bharatiya sanskriti (Indian tradition) and maryada (honour), and the promotion of Hindi for official communication were some of the issues that Jan Sangh continued to assert.37 Similarly, Jan Sangh leader Balraj Madhok proclaimed in a

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speech at Lawrence Club on 9 March 1970 that ‘I do not talk about the Bharatiyakaran of Muslims only, but, if Muslims stand against this idea and prioritize their religion over nation, then there is definitely a need to Indianize even their religion—Islam.’38 The party also offered a rather selective meaning of redevelopment and beautification. It initiated the regularisation of ‘unauthorised’ colonies, which were mainly inhabited by the Hindu and Sikh partition victims.39 A new ‘Harijan Housing’ scheme was also launched in 1968–1969 to improve the living conditions of Schedule Caste communities of Delhi. On the other hand, the Muslim-dominated katras and jhuggi-jhopri clusters were identified for selective and forced clearance drive.40 The institutional tussle between DDA and DMC was also redefined as the Jan Sangh government started appropriating the clearance agenda of DDA. DMC constituted a Yamuna Bank Development Board, which developed a comprehensive scheme for the improvement of the banks of the river Yamuna. Interestingly, this move was also given an overtly religious orientation.41 For revitalising the religious significance of Yamuna River, the area between Old Delhi and Ring Road was cleared and trees were planted.42 Around 30,000 slum dwellers who used to live in this catchment area were resettled in Seelampur and Seemapuri colonies across the river Yamuna (popularly known as Jamuna Par). Jagmohan, the deputy commissioner of the department of land management, who was approached directly by the Delhi administration for clearance of the site of Yamuna River and other places, glamorised this phase of Delhi’s development under the Bhartiya Jan Sangh (BJS). He writes: A vigorous clearance-cum-resettlement-cum-redevelopment drive was launched by the DDA in 1967–68. The first major operation was taken in the Yamuna Bazaar (locally known as Jamunabazaar) area near Nigam Bodh Ghat, between the Yamuna and the city wall. The Ghat is a sacred and historical site … [it] was allowed to become a vast stinking slum with about 6,000 squatters … and

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700 non-confronting industries … [a] foulest nauseating slum, incapable of being developed or serviced at reasonable cost.43 (Emphasis added.)

But who were the slum dwellers that got evicted? The metropolitan council debates between the BJS and Congress members offer us an interesting insight into the nature of such moves. The Congress members alleged that selective clearance of unauthorised structures was being conducted as a ‘punishment’ against the Muslim population of Delhi for not supporting Jan Sangh during elections. A Congress councillor argued that ‘Jhuggi-Jhonpdi dwellers were removed from Jamuna Bazar, Mirdard Road and other places without being provided [with] developed alternative sites … 48 hours eviction notices were served the day before demolition on 86 Muslim families of Pahari Bhojla, whereas 30 days-notice [sic] is required under the Delhi Slums Improvement and Clearance Act.’44 He further reiterated that similar kind of clearance drives was also conducted in other Muslim-dominated areas near Idgah, Gurudwara Moti Bagh, Kotla Firoz Shah, Tilak Bridge, Ghata Masjid, at Phool Walon Ki Ser and the site around Dargah Nizamuddin. Apart from the Muslim factor, a number of jhuggi dwellers evicted from these localities were immigrant daily-wage labourers who had voted for Congress in local and national elections.45 By removing these sites from several municipal constituencies, it was alleged that BJS was trying to convert them into safe electoral pockets. But it was not a completely new phenomenon. Urban development was a politically motivated task that was played selectively by Congress as well. The council debates reveal that the Congress-run Central government and local bodies never carried out a planned clearance and rehabilitation drive simply because the parties wanted to consolidate electoral gains at the cost of improving these slum areas where instant attention was in order. In this sense, Congress adopted this ‘status-quo’ approach to protect the interests of its supporters—mainly Muslim and Dalit communities. On the

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contrary, BJS justified its selective clearance drive by presenting Congress’ apathy as evidence of ‘Muslim appeasement’. For instance, in a council debate, a member of Jan Sangh argued, ‘[T]he Congress had kept the residents of Pahari Bhojla and Pahari Imli, Matia Mahal, Balli Mara, Lal Kuan etc. as captives within four walls just to gain electoral benefits. Now that they have been brought out in the open air, Congress members are criticizing Jan Sangh and trying to act as the saviour of Muslims.’46 But BJS did something more. As soon as it came to power, it started systematically clearing colonies of Congress supporters from municipal constituencies. Interestingly, while Congress criticised the demolition drives in Old Delhi and surrounding areas, BJS received appreciation from its educated middle-class support base for the improvements it made to the National Capital Region by immediately fencing cleared areas, widening the roads and developing parks and green areas on demolition sites.47 Jagmohan, the then DDA vice-chairman, remained a central figure in these ‘clearance-cum-improvement cum-development drives’ in Delhi.48

Bangladesh War and Muslim Areas After the Bangladesh war in 1971, Congress made a remarkable comeback under the leadership of Indira Gandhi. The ‘Garibi Hatao’ (eradicate poverty) slogan became the buzzword in Indian politics.49 This pro-Congress national sentiment also affected the local politics in Delhi. The party won the metropolitan council elections in Delhi in 1972 with forty-four out of the total of fiftysix seats. Jan Sangh’s victory was reduced to winning the MCD election.50 These electoral results had obvious political implications. Broader concerns like national security, development and defence were overwhelmingly popularised during this period to expand the legal framework in favour of centralisation of power. The declaration of national emergency on 25 June 1975 was the

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culmination of this growing centralisation. In a very dramatic way, the Indira Gandhi government invoked Article 352 (Proclamation of Emergency) under Part XVIII of the Constitution to deal with ‘internal disturbance’.51 The crisis of leadership in Congress, which had started disintegrating the party immediately after Nehru’s death, was generalised and converted into a crisis of the Indian State by the Indira Gandhi government with the imposition of the national emergency.52 The growing left radical politics especially after the Naxalbari uprising, the well-known railway strike of 1974 and, finally, Jay Prakash Narayan’s movement for ‘total revolution’ were some of the immediate developments identified as serious threats to national security.53 However, it was the war with Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh that provided the government with its most important justification for introducing a coercive yet ‘legal’ framework of the rule to tinker with the Constitution. A number of acts were passed and amended to give more power to the Central government.54 State governments and bureaucrats were given extraordinary power while the individual rights of the citizens were curtailed.55 Indira Gandhi changed Congress into a highly centralised party organisation and developed a close circle of ‘yes men’ around her who were made to perform development tasks according to the priorities of the regime.56 These officers were commanded and given targets for the implementation of the ‘Twenty-Point Programme’ of Indira Gandhi and ‘Five-Point Programme’ of her influential son Sanjay Gandhi by completely surpassing local representative bodies and institutions.57 Sanjay Gandhi was the president of Youth Congress.58 Ideologically, he was close to RSS. He had no authority to execute such programmes or take decisions on behalf of national or local government. The beautification of the city and family planning were two important aspects of his Five-Point Programme, which became a prominent part of the

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agenda of Indira Gandhi’s government during Emergency. The sterilisation campaign (as it is popularly known) for population control was linked to urban resettlement in an unprecedented way. In this way, local representative bodies were either paralysed or used favourably by this enthusiastic team of committed workers of her regime. Delhi being the capital city was directly exposed to this centralised power structure. The clearance of Delhi’s Muslim localities in the postBangladesh-war era was inextricably linked to strong threat perception about the Indian Muslim community and Muslimdominated areas, especially after the first war with Pakistan in 1965.59 These localities were called the hub of Pakistani agents and fifth columnists that had the potential to create ‘internal disturbance’ to support Pakistan in the war. There was also a view that Muslims should be removed from the border areas and, most importantly, from all influential posts.60 These areas remained under strict surveillance even after the war. Imdad Sabri, a member of the metropolitan council, observed in 1967 that ‘the Muslim area of Jama Masjid has been under strict police surveillance for last 10–12 years. There used to be police postings in every gali of the mohalla and search operations carried out on the roofs of the houses at night time during the initial years. A new practice is in place now for the last few days. On every Friday and Sunday, the police take control of the ilaqa and heavy police pickets are posted at the corner of every street and road by dawn.’61 Sabri criticised the Congress government for harassing the Muslims of the area.62 This kind of treatment of Muslim areas continued and, in fact, came under intense police observation again in 1971 during the Bangladesh war.63 By criticising the Congress policies as appeasement of the Muslim community, Jan Sangh continued to evoke a majoritarian argument. And this, at a later period, helped define Muslim areas as breeding grounds of seditious activities.

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II

Reorganisation of Space and Communities: The

Placing of Muslim-Dominated Areas in National

and Local Perspective

In the 1970s, the debates around development, mainstreaming of minorities and national security complemented each other. Redevelopment of Shahjahanabad and conservation of its historical heritage by removing its ‘filthiest’ and ‘stinking’ parts became the centre of official discussions. These parts of the city, populated traditionally by Muslim communities, had to be cleared and reorganised in such a way that the historic beauty of this place could be reclaimed. Various redevelopment schemes were designed in this period, highlighting the relevance and applicability of the master plan (MPD) for a coordinated and intensive plan of action.64 For instance, a high profile seminar on ‘Redevelopment of Shahjahanabad’ was organised by the ministry of works, housing and urban planning on 31 January 1975 in Delhi. Speaking on this occasion, the chief executive councillor of Delhi, Radha Raman, said, ‘[C]onstructions within the city should be stopped whether it was for commercial and residential purpose.’65 The vice-chairmen of DDA, Jagmohan, also wrote a series of articles in Hindustan Times (Sunday World) expressing his concerns about the deteriorating civic and moral atmosphere of Shahjahanabad. These articles were later compiled in a book titled Rebuilding Shahjahanabad: The Old City of Delhi.66 The book, published in 1975, speaks of an interesting relationship between nation-building and the development of the city. It also elaborates Jagmohan’s concerns about the demarcated areas of Shahjahanabad. He says: A sick, shattered and dismembered city like Shahjehanabad [sic] can neither inspire nor be inspiring. It can only be a symbol of national shame and diffidence, a readymade material for our denigrators. If

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… we are able … to eliminate what is cruel and clumsy in existing Shahjehanabad [sic], preserve what is healthy and beautiful … it could become a symbol of national pride and resurgence…. Rebuilding of cities is plainly not an act of isolated civic reform, it involves the vaster task of restructuring the fundamental forces which govern the life of people.67

Jagmohan established an important link between living space and people by claiming that reorganisation of space could not merely be reduced to civic reform. It was, in fact, the moral conditions and fundamental forces that governed the life of the people. Thus, restructuring space and reforming people were the only ways to establish Shahjahanabad as a symbol of national pride. According to him, ‘[R]ebuilding of Shahjehanabad [sic] involves rebuilding the society, rebuilding Indian state and the political structure’.68 For Jagmohan, the existing Shahjahanabad was not a symbol of Islamic high culture of the past but, as he termed it in later years, a threat to national security. He notes: Certain parts of Shahjehanabad [sic] have become dead – intellectually and culturally. In Hauz Qazi, Lal Kuan and Turkman Gate, bums and bad characters are all that can be seen at nightfall…. It is necessary to brighten up these areas; otherwise these will remain the breeding grounds for criminals and rioters, engendering the cult of the dagger and the spear … material redevelopment of the city is not possible without its cultural rejuvenation.69

It is important to remember that Jagmohan was appointed the vice-chairman of DDA during the crucial years of Emergency. He became an executive force for the implementation of the National Regeneration Programme (which incorporated twenty milestones for ‘comprehensive economic development’ and ‘five points for the social and moral development of Indian society’).70 Urbanisation drive and family planning were the two most-visible campaigns of national regeneration in Delhi that were initiated and supervised by

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Jagmohan. A massive displacement and resettlement programme was carried out across Delhi during the eighteen months of Emergency. People were displaced from Indira Vikas Puri, Shahdara, Jama Masjid, Turkman Gate and were to be resettled in twentyseven new colonies, including Mangolpuri, Trilokpuri, Khichripur, Jahangeerpuri, Welcome and other colonies.71 These colonies had no basic amenities or even structures/shelters.72 In this context, two major ‘clearance-cum-improvement’ drives that were carried out in 1975 and 1976—Jama Masjid Clearance Scheme and Turkman Gate Redevelopment Scheme—emerged as the most contested events of urban politics in postcolonial Delhi.73

Jama Masjid Clearance Scheme The Jama Masjid Improvement Committee was formed in 1954. It made necessary recommendations and suggested ways and means to remove congestion and insanitation from the area around Jama Masjid to protect the historical relevance of the monument and its surrounding area.74 The scheme was transferred to the metropolitan council in 1961 along with the Delhi-Ajmeri Gate Clearance and Improvement Scheme (DAG) mentioned earlier. In fact, a separate plan was formulated in a meeting in September 1961 for a phase-wise clearance of shops and makeshift structures built on and around the plinth of Jama Masjid and their resettlement at a different site. The plan was finally approved.75 The chief commissioner sanctioned the project for shifting the shops and construction of (1) ninety small two-room multistorey tenements for slum dwellers, (2) sixty-two residential flats for middle-income families and (3) 375 shops to provide alternative accommodation to occupants of existing structures. Besides, the scheme also approved the construction of community buildings, schools, dispensaries and fire station in the Jama Masjid area.76 However, the project could not be taken up due to the lack of financial assistance in local bodies. Also, the architecture and

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planners disapproved of the construction of shops around Jama Masjid. Thus, an alternative scheme was prepared, and it was decided that a shopping centre would be constructed for shopkeepers at Paiwallan. The architect-planner of DDA also prepared a scheme for rehabilitating shopkeepers, mainly kabadies (junk traders) at a new market in a distant place called Mayapuri. This scheme was also approved by DDA and Delhi Wakf Board, a statutory state body that administers, controls and manages wakf properties.77 But no further action was taken, mainly because of non-availability of funds.78 However, the situation changed after 1975. A task force, set up in March 1975 by the ministry of works and housing and headed by the state chief executive councillor, took charge to implement immediate short-term measures for the upliftment of the deteriorating living conditions in the inner city areas of Shahjahanabad.79 In February 1976, a high-level ministerial panel (with the secretary of works and housing as chairman) was also set up to examine the redevelopment of the walled city.80 The ministry also insisted on controlling the economic activity in the area, which they felt was causing a nuisance. Local shopkeepers, mainly the junktraders, were subjected to harassment because of their trade, which was considered as the most polluting job. To understand the actual and violent reception of the Jama Masjid Clearance (JMC) scheme, one has to closely look at the local politics of Old Delhi in early 1975.81 A series of violent incidents took place on 2 and 14 February 1975. The Imam of Jama Masjid, Abdulla Bukhari, who emerged as a national Muslim leader after these events, tried to manipulate the anger of local shopkeepers and junk traders. He tried mobilising these traders as a force, especially against the Delhi Wakf Board and DDA, to establish his control over the administration of Jama Masjid.82 According to newspaper reports, at least fourteen people died, around 200 people including policemen were injured and over 450 people were arrested at these events. Abdulla Bukhari was arrested under Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA).83

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Quite incidentally, a devastating fire broke out in the area and a large number of shops were gutted, including shops of cloth merchants and junk traders.84 This accident created a chaotic situation that led to a serious trust deficit between the government and the local community. On the other hand, these incidents intensified the internal security threat perception of the government. In fact, Jama Masjid emerged as a powerful symbol of Muslim collective identity.85 The Jama Masjid scheme, which had been neglected so far, now received serious attention and became a part of an aggressive urbanisation operation. Interestingly, the government refused to hold any official inquiry into these incidents but made the clearance drive coercive: curfews were imposed in the Jama Masjid area; electricity and water supplies were stopped, and telephone lines were cut off for several days.86 The clearance of shops, in this context, took a distinctly antiMuslim tone. A number of junk-traders were evicted to Mayapuri, but more trouble was awaited as the clearance drive was yet to be completed. The shopkeepers, mainly cloth merchants, who lost their shops in the fire, started constructing pucca (concrete) structures around Jama Masjid. In the absence of any kind of support from authorities, they took upon themselves to rebuild their lives and livelihood.87 According to newspaper reports, they lost properties worth 1.1 million rupees in the fire.88 The situation, thus, became more threatening. Delhi Urban Art Commission, which was made responsible for the art and architectural part of Jama Masjid Redevelopment Plan, raised beautification concerns about the pucca constructions. In the name of conserving the ecology and historical structures of the area, the commission completely ruled out having any plan for the rehabilitation of cloth merchants to the Paiwallan area.89 In other words, the clearance and beautification of the city space were in every sense given priority over the rehabilitation of Muslim shopkeepers. The declaration of the national emergency on 26 June 1975, for the maintenance of ‘internal security’, gave unprecedented power to

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authorities to interpret, reinterpret, misinterpret or completely reject established laws, bye-laws or even administrative policies. This was also the case with the JMC scheme. The demolition drives, we must note, were neither a part of the master plan of 1962 nor was it outlined in subsequent zonal plans for Old Delhi. However, the imposition of emergency gave new momentum to the clearance drive around the Jama Masjid area: junk shops on the eastern side of Jama Masjid were removed; junk traders and especially the old motor-part dealers were shifted to a newly developed market in Mayapuri and Muslim ‘squatters’ were removed from the Hare Bhare Mazar area in August 1975.90 These administrative moves had a mixed reception at the local level. The local shopkeepers, as soon as they realised that their grievances were used by Abdulla Bukhari in his personal conflict with Delhi Wakf Board, sought to pursue their case themselves by expressing support to the government. In September 1975, Anjuman-e-Tajran, an association of shopkeepers of the Jama Masjid area formed in 1972, wrote a letter to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The association tried to bring the attention of the authorities to the ‘explosiveness of the situation which has developed around this area due to the official callousness and deliberate attempts [at] harass[ment]’. The letter explained that ‘since most of us are Muslims the situation is unnecessarily taking a communal turn and it is not unlikely that it may explode into violence at any time [emphasis added]’.91 The association tried to express their support with the authorities. The letter stated: (i) The decision to remove us into Paiwallan … [was] accepted [by us]. (ii) It had been provided in the Master Plan … again in October 1973, … decision was taken at a meeting presided over by Sh. Om Mehta, the then Minister of Works and Housing that … [it] should be constructed to enable us to move there. (iii) Whatever the reason for this delay in constructing the … market, we should not be penalized … because we have … been prepared to shift there. (iv) There is a baseless apprehension in certain quarters that if this market is not cleared during present emergency, it may be difficult to do so later.

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(v) We may state that the Emergency and the 20-point programme are meant to improve the socio-economic condition of the people like ourselves and not to be used as a pretext to harass us. In case if we are uprooted without an alternative market at Paiwallan, our livelihood will suffer. (vi) An example has already been set in the case of Cycle market at Esplanade Road which has been shifted to another well-built market. The same principle should apply to us. (vii) We guarantee … to shift to the Paiwallan market as soon as it is ready. Till then we should be allowed to stay where we are … much against our wishes, our enthusiasm to actively participate in the implementation of 20-point programme becomes damp with this democle’s [sic] sword hanging over our heads. (viii) We will be perfectly happy if you were to appoint a person or persons who are impartial and interested enough to report to you personally in this matter and who can also strike a balance between our socio-economic requirements and aesthetic beauty of the place where we have lived and worked for generations.92

Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind also sent a telegram to Indira Gandhi in this regard stating: ‘Shopkeepers of Jama Masjid Delhi who are tenants of Delhi Wakf Board be not removed from their places without giving him (sic) permanent places at the Paiwallan (stop) they should not be transferred to any transit camp (stop)….Syed Ahmed Hashmi M. P. and General Secretary Jamiat Ulama I Hind.’.93 But these requests from local shopkeepers were completely ignored by the authorities. On 22 and 23 November 1975, about 300 shops around Jama Masjid were cleared in a very dramatic way by DMC with the help of DDA demolition squad. Along with the newly constructed pucca structures, the demolition squad cleared the shops that had been around for thirty-forty years. These shops belonged to Cotton Market Association and Commercial Market Association. The rest were shacks made of wood and other improvised structures. All these shopkeepers were conducting business in motor parts, cotton cloth, spare parts and radio and watch repairing etc. Quite astonishingly, no efforts were made by authorities to take local community leaders into confidence or issue a prior notice to the shopkeepers. They were given only about forty-five minutes to one hour to clear their stuff and vacate the shops.94 The

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junk-traders had previously agreed to move to Mayapuri after some initial tussle, but the cloth merchants and others were in chaos since no arrangements were made for their rehabilitation. While demolishing the shops, the DDA bulldozers also damaged a part of the foundation of the historic mosque and a watercourse. This invited some protest from the Imam. The police arranged a heavy contingent of force who were asked to close all major exit routes to prevent ‘problems being created by elements outside’.97 A.K. Paitandey, the sub-divisional magistrate of the area, wrote in his statement to the Shah Commission of inquiry: The police and magistracy was not given any time [by the DDA] to make any assessment of the situation … [and] to talk to the local leaders…. As a result of this sudden demolition drive, there were reactions from the local shopkeepers. While the DDA demolition squad was in action, some people started pelting stones. We intervened and resorted to the use of tear-gas to disperse the miscreants…. [if it was not] for the heavy deployment of police force and the suddenness of the operation, it would have not been an easy task to clear the area. The Imam of Jama Masjid was hostile to this operation and some of the miscreants had thrown stones on [sic] the officials from the Jama Masjid. This incident also get [sic] sorted primarily because of the heavy deployment of police [see Figures 6 and 7].98

Figure 6: Demolition of Shops around Jama Masjid, 1975, I 95

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Figure 7: Demolition of Shops around Jama Masjid, 1975, II 96

Many people were arrested for protesting against the demolition drive, primarily under Defence of India Regulation Act (DIR), which was later withdrawn to keep the ‘legality’ of the arrests.99 The decision for demolition in the area was taken at a high-level meeting in which Sanjay Gandhi reportedly said, ‘[The] removal of the shopkeepers during the Emergency had eradicated a potential nest of Pakistani supporters and restored the historical beauty of the mosque.’ [emphasis added]100 Finally, after constant efforts made by some influential local Muslim leaders, especially by Mir Mushtaq Ahmed, a new market called Meena Bazaar was constructed between Jama Masjid and Red Fort in Urdu Bazar and Paiwallan. DDA also built, following legal guidelines, a thick wall around Jama Masjid to protect the historical building from further encroachment by local residents.101 Interestingly, the clearance operation in the Jama Masjid area in August and November was undertaken without any reference to the task force or the high-level ministerial panel.102

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Turkman Gate Clearance and the Family Planning Campaign Turkman Gate is linked to Asaf Ali Road, one of the outer roads of the city connecting Delhi Gate and Ajmeri Gate. The area consisted of two localities in the 1970s: the old Turkman Gate locality that stretched from Phatak Telian to the city wall and the transit camp locality. The transit camp was created to accommodate over 120 families of the Dujana House jhuggi cluster under Dujana House Rehabilitation Project.103 Dujana House, located less than a mile away from Turkman Gate, has a significant place in the history of what happened on 19 April 1976. As discussed earlier, Turkman Gate was a part of Delhi-Ajmeri Gate Clearance and Improvement Scheme known as DAG.104 The full implementation of the scheme was slowed down because the acquisition of many private properties could not be finalised. After surveys conducted by the municipal corporation in 1963 and 1968, the scheme was changed to ensure that private properties were left out of clearance. The rehabilitation of people displaced by the clearance also posed a serious challenge. People wanted to be rehabilitated in nearby areas due to their traditional and commercial associations with the area as explained earlier. The master plan (MPD–1) also mentioned the importance of this factor: ‘[I]t becomes essential to earmark some of the areas … for the relocation of persons…. [O]ne such area is the Mata Sundari area, which is between the congested old City [sic] and the important commercial area of Connaught Place and its proposed future extension.’105 Thus, the Mata Sundari–Minto Road area was identified as the nearest suitable place for the rehabilitation of evictees of the walled city in general. Jagmohan also envisaged the development of this area as ‘Second Shahjahanabad’, the blueprint of which finds a place in his book.106 MCD, which was responsible for slum-clearance work before it was transferred to DDA in February 1974, prepared a scheme for

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shifting people in seven phases to the nearby Mata Sundari–Minto Road complex where 384 tenements had been constructed. In fact, in December 1972 DDA shifted the residents of a Dalit locality, Basti Narnaul, in the first phase of the DAG scheme, voluntarily and peacefully, without employing any policeman or the intervention of official machinery. Local people and political leaders were taken into confidence and convinced about the lasting benefits of this historic scheme.107 Subhadra Joshi, a Congress member of parliament, also confirmed this aspect saying, ‘[T]he residents of Basti Narnaul and Shish Mahal … were shifted with their consent to transit accommodation in the Minto Road complex.’108 It shows that people were usually in support of such improvement tasks. A number of nine-storey buildings and quarters were constructed at the Mata Sundari area on five acres of land as per the decision of the ministry of works and housing for the rehabilitation of people from Old Delhi. But these places were allotted to government officials just before the emergency.109 The demolitions in Turkman Gate started on 13 April 1976, nearly four months after the forced clearance and demolition of shops in the Jama Masjid area.110 DDA undertook the demolition of the Dujana House transit camp, which was in a dilapidated condition due for demolition. It appears that, according to a report, notices were issued to the residents in advance to inform about it. Thus, it did not raise any objection or create any resentment. The transit camp was evacuated in the initial two days and the residents were moved to Ranjit Nagar without much difficulty.111 However, on 14 April the residents of the area became apprehensive when they came to know about the intention of DDA to clear some more areas. The second stage of the demolition of houses in Turkman Gate started on 15 April. Not only were the residents not informed about this extended demolition plan, but even the authorities concerned and local political representatives had no clue about it.112 The residents resisted it and tried to approach influential people, including

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politicians, who could negotiate with the authorities on their behalf.113 According to Rajesh Sharma, a member of the metropolitan council, ‘[R]esidents of this area were under fear of bulldozers … everyone was opposed [to demolition] because it was even against the declared policy of the government…. For the next four days there was great panic in the area and … meetings of the groups of people voicing their resentment.’114 However, the inquiry reports suggest that orders were issued from the top and that the matter was not in the hands of local representatives of the government.115 DDA vice-chairman Jagmohan, in a letter dated 7 April 1976 to the deputy inspector general (DIG), P.S. Bhinder, claimed that he intimated the authorities concerned in advance. In this letter, Jagmohan referred vaguely to ‘[c]learance operation to be taken up by the DDA inside the walled city and adjoining areas’. He also wrote, ‘Intimation about the sites, etc. will be supplied by the Delhi Development Authority staff to the officers concerned.’116 However, the only information that was given in this regard to the superintendent of police was that only the Dujana House transit camp and Asaf Ali Road would be demolished. It vaguely added that the operation would cover further pockets. The Shah Commission found various suspicious aspects and irregularities in this and subsequent official correspondence, apart from lack of proper verbal communication about the drive.117 It appears that DDA either did not want to disclose its complete plans or deliberately gave misleading information. As a result, wild rumours spread throughout Old Delhi, resulting in an atmosphere of panic and fear. In this chaos, the state authorities tried to manipulate the fears and anxieties of the residents through bargaining and negotiation. This is when Dujana House came into the picture. A sterilisation camp was inaugurated on 15 April 1976 by Lt Governor Krishna Chand at Dujana House near Jama Masjid.118 The camp was organised to perform vasectomy and tubectomy operations on men and women. This was also done at various government

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hospitals and dispensaries throughout Delhi to control fertility. It was an intrinsic part of the family planning campaign of National Regeneration Programme for population control. Dujana House was the only camp organised in a residential area. Rukhsana Sultana, a close friend of Sanjay Gandhi and a glamorous socialite-turned‘social worker’, was in charge of this campaign in Delhi. Because of Sultana’s political influence, she was approached by the residents of Turkman Gate. She immediately agreed to pursue DDA officials to stop the demolitions on the condition that local residents helped her in setting up a family planning camp at Turkman Gate. Besides, they were required to clock 300 sterilisation cases that week.119 One of the victims of Turkman Gate demolition drives, who now lives in the multistorey apartment that replaced the old Turkman Gate locality, said, ‘It seemed, at that point, as if the whole government (poorisarkar) was against the Muslims of this area … we categorically rejected the offer (bilkul mana kardiya).’ Posing a rhetorical question to me, he continued, ‘You tell me, would any person whose house is being demolished in front of his eyes and without being given any information or hope of resettlement, go for nasbandi [a popular term for vasectomy operation, which was at the centre of the family planning campaign]. It was not feasible and tolerable, especially at a time of crisis.’120 Thus, Sultana’s political connection could not save the area from forced demolition. On 16 April, while the demolition was on, DDA officials started issuing allotment slips for plots in Nand Nagri and Trilokpuri resettlement colonies to people whose houses were still standing. At this point, a residents’ delegation headed by Chowdhary Shamsuddin (name changed), 121 a traditional head of the Teli biradari, along with other local leaders, appealed to the DDA officials for suitable alternative accommodations, preferably in nearby transit camps situated at Mata Sundari Road or Minto Road, as recommended and approved under various schemes. But the residents were denied any favour at that point.122

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On 17 April, the DDA officials offered another deal. Residents were told that if they signed a statement declaring that their houses were demolished according to their wishes, they would be relocated to a better place of their choice other than Trilokpuri or Nand Nagri. The residents refused to sign any statement as they suspected evil intentions. Shamsuddin explained in his broken voice, ‘We would have been nowhere after signing such statement. It could have ceased all our claims for compensations.’123 The residents decided not to believe in a single word of what the officials told them. Finally, the DDA vice-chairman, Jagmohan, was approached. A small delegation of the residents of Turkman Gate met him on 18 April and requested that residents be allotted plots in Welcome, New Seelampur or other suitable transit camps, if not in Mata Sundari Complex. The delegation said: If you have to remove us, remove us all to some large area where we can carry on our respective jobs and trades. Don’t scatter us all over the outskirts of Delhi.124

The delegation pleaded that they would like to live together as a community since they all belonged to a biradari and had close family ties (the residents belonged to the Teli biradari who were traditionally engaged in the manufacturing and refinement of different kinds of oils, but many of them also became involved in other commercial activities with new opportunities). Jagmohan categorically rejected their demand, bursting in sudden anger he reportedly said: ‘Do you think we are mad to destroy one Pakistan to create another Pakistan? [emphasis added]’125 He further boasted before the delegation members that ‘this is one time you people will not get any special privileges [emphasis added].’126 He also warned the residents saying, ‘If you make the foolish mistake of resisting the demolition operations, the consequences will be serious.’127 Meeting Jagmohan was their last effort to have a peaceful resolution, after which ‘direct action’ was the only alternative they

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were left with.128 According to Rajesh Sinha, the executive councillor, ‘[T]here was great resentment against the administration in the entire area between Ajmeri Gate and Delhi Gate; nobody felt safe and there was a great panic as the demolitions continued till the incident of 19 April.’129 Early in the morning on that day, nearly 500 women and 250 children squatted at the demolition site to stop the bulldozers from moving further. The police post was surrounded by two groups coming from two sides at around 1:30 p m : one from Phatak Telian side and the other from Delight Cinema side.130 Realising the intensity of the situation, DDA officials called for help. The first contingent of police arrived almost immediately; seven trucks full of armed Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) entered Turkman Gate with riot shields, tear gas guns and rifles. Delhi Armed Force, Border Security Force and local police also arrived; they gathered around the Faiz-eElahi mosque, adjacent to Ramleela Maidan. This show of power and stand-off continued until the time of Zohar (afternoon prayer). But what triggered the violence? According to Dayal and Bose, the chief of Nehru Brigade131 threw a stone at the protestors, shouting, ‘[T]hey are going to throw stones, stop them!’132 The stone injured a woman in the crowd leading to chaos and anger. In response, the crowd retaliated by throwing stone debris of their bulldozed houses. A fight broke out that led to lathi charging (police beating), teargas shooting and, finally, firing; by 2 p m the chaos had spread to Turkman Gate and to the Faiz-e-Elahi mosque areas thereafter. Meanwhile, trouble was also brewing in the nearby Jama Masjid area. Forced sterilisation of the poor Muslim population, including rag pickers, rickshaw pullers and the homeless, provoked the women of this area to come out on the streets to rescue men from getting forcibly sterilised. In the morning of 19 April, they stopped a familyplanning van, loaded with fresh victims, in front of the Jama Masjid police station. The police dragged the women and arrested those who resented their action. News of the arrest and police brutality against women spread in the area. A call for hartal (strike) was given by the

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shopkeepers following which shops began to close from Darya Ganj, Suiwallan to Turkman Gate by 11:30 am. A group of angry women gathered around a sterilisation camp and raised anti-family planning and anti-establishment slogans. They rescued male victims from the camp and pressured Rukhsana Sultana to close the camp. Sultana replied, ‘[T]he camp will go on till we get enough sterilization cases … instead of creating a scene here why don’t you go and motivate some men in your homes to … sterilize themselves?’133 Hearing this, the women tried attacking Sultana but she managed to escape. At the intervention of the district authorities the activities in the camp were suspended for the day and, according to the public hearing report, ‘an ugly situation which had the potential of developing into a serious law and order problem involving the Imam of Jama Masjid was averted’.134 One of my interviewees who lives in Pahari Bhojla said that the entire area was under the shadow of fear of police atrocities. Male members of the families, young and middleaged, hid in basements and attics, as news about forced sterilisation spread.135 The Shah Commission, which inquired into the excesses of Emergency, found that there were a number of allegations of forcible sterilisation and such cases were reported to have occurred even after the Turkman Gate incident. It said, ‘The sterilization of poor Muslim population in the area between Jama Masjid and Turkman Gate, was likely to be treated as a planned strategy of the government to break the strength of a minority community.’136 Alarmed by the critical situation created by women, the size of the police contingent at Jama Masjid was increased.137 It was around this time that a message from Turkman Gate about police atrocities reached the Jama Masjid area. People who were gathered at the family planning camp abandoned it and ran towards Turkman Gate to save their relatives and friends. The two parallel dramas—forced sterilisation and clearance drive—finally converged. Consequently, the number of armed forces increased at Turkman Gate also. Indiscriminate firing, after a round of lathi charging (police beating) and tear-gassing,

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continued till 4:00 p m after which the situation got ‘under control’ with the arrest of many residents including women and children. Masjid Faiz-e- Elahi was desecrated by police; a number of killings and beatings took place inside.138 At 5:30 in the evening, a curfew was imposed. A number of people died in this incident while many were injured, including some constables and officials. This ‘controlled’ situation allowed armed forces to harass people. According to reports, police constables looted houses and sexually assaulted and molested women.139 The number of bulldozers increased and continued to demolish houses at Turkman Gate till 22 April 1976. The demolition operation was carried out during the night under floodlights, especially fitted by DDA, with the help of six more bulldozers and one motor grader. The area was under curfew, therefore, a large number of people whose houses were demolished were taken into police custody. In total, 764 residential structures and 199 commercial and industrial establishments were demolished.140 Eight residents died and over 146 injured, including some police officials.141 The entire area under the Jama Masjid police station (including the Turkman Gate area) was under curfew from 19 April to 13 May 1976. The authorities did not even relax curfew on two Fridays, 23 and 30 April, for allowing normal prayers for Muslim residents. They insisted that people wishing to offer Friday prayers in the mosque should obtain curfew passes; only a few people took the pass. Regarding this, the Shah Commission’s inquiry said: The situation had come under control on 19 April and the police were in favor of relaxing curfew after a few days. However, the curfew continued to facilitate the demolition operation and also to “penalize the residents” for their protests on 19 April. It seems that the decision to continue the curfew was taken at the higher level. This continuous demolition of houses and denial of opportunity to local residents to freely offer their prayers in Jama Masjid led to considerable resentment and misgivings among the people about the attitude of authorities towards their actual problems.142

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After the clearance operation at Turkman Gate in April, DDA prepared a commercial project for the construction of a multistorey building at the same site. This proposal was placed before DDA on 30 July 1976. DDA approved this proposal, but the chief town planner in Town and Country Planning Organization (TCPO) seriously objected to it on the ground that it would require a change in the prescribed land-use plan mentioned in MPD–I. It was also felt that this proposal would have serious repercussions on the planning of Delhi, particularly of Shahjahanabad. However, the proposal was sent to the ministry of works and housing for further action. The lieutenant governor, Kishan Chand, explained, ‘[T]his proposal had approval of Sanjay Gandhi and Prime Minister’s House; therefore I had no option but to forward it. I do not know if any assurances had been given to the evictees of Turkman Gate … but the proposal to construct a … Commercial Complex at that time did violate the provisions of Master Plan.’143 Despite the expert objection, the proposal was approved by the ministry. The government, to follow the ‘legal’ procedure, published the plan for a change of land use and invited public submission. In all, 788 objections and suggestions were received from all those officials, planners and political representatives who had shown their resentment against the demolition drive. Interestingly, while these submissions were still not looked at and a decision in this regard was yet to be taken, DDA engaged a private architectural firm C.P. Kukreja and Associates to prepare designs for the project.144 This convinced local people like Chowdhary Shamsuddin that Sanjay Gandhi wanted to build a Sanjay Minar (building) on the cleared area.145

The fact that it was the Muslim community that was primarily at the receiving end of the clearance drive and sterilisation programme was admitted by a number of official observers. According to Om Mehta, the then union home secretary, ‘[T]he situation at Jama Masjid had grown extremely sensitive after the February 1975 incident … local population, particularly the Muslims, had been feeling alienated and sullen….’146 The inspector general of police, Bhawani Mal, also confirmed this point: ‘[I]n both these areas the population was predominantly Muslim [emphasis added].’147

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No magisterial or judicial inquiry was commissioned after the Turkman Gate incident—which was a requirement in cases of firing resulting in deaths. The only committee appointed by the government was a fact-finding team of two officers of Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and Indian Police Service (IPS) on 25 May 1977.148 Later, a general Emergency excesses commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of a retired Supreme Court judge, Justice K.C. Shah, looked into the Turkman Gate incidents. Controversies surrounded its appointment. Most importantly, it was argued that official or judicial inquiries of the incidents in the Turkman Gate and Jama Masjid areas would hurt the morale of local police and military.149 The commission opened its inquiry on 30 September 1977. It received as many as 48,000 allegations of abuse from across India, which was whittled down to 2,000 cases for investigations. The public hearing report of the Shah Commission of Inquiry found that residents of the Turkman Gate area were subjected to various ‘illegalities’ conducted by the State and, most particularly, by DDA. Apart from the whole drive being illegal in the first place, the criteria adopted for allotment of alternative accommodation to the affected persons and the places to which they were shifted generated great resentment amongst the displaced people. Only those residents who were regular tenants of the acquired properties were given tenements in Ranjit Nagar and Shahdara. The rest of them were allotted plots of 25 square yards in size in jhuggi jhopri resettlement colonies in Trilokpuri and Nand Nagri. This was completely in contravention to the resolution of the Ad hoc (Slum Clearance and Improvement) Committee of DMC adopted in July 1973. The committee recommended that all unauthorised tenants of acquired properties were to be regularised on payment of prescribed damage.150 In fact, residents of Basti Narnaul, all unauthorised tenants according to the official definition, were made eligible for allotment of alternative tenements on payment of damages. But the way Turkman Gate residents were treated was

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completely different and illegal. Apart from this, in nearly all cases no allotment was made before or at the time of demolition; it was done much later. DDA demolished twenty-nine private properties that had not been acquired at all. In fact, the DAG scheme was changed from time to time to ensure that private properties were left out of clearance and redevelopment plans. Residents of these properties were house-tax payers. They presented their receipts and purchase deeds, but these were completely ignored by the DDA officials.151 The Metropolitan Council (DMC) proceedings reveal that in many cases allotments were made contingent on the production of sterilisation certificates. DDA officially said, ‘You have been allotted a slum tenement shop plot on provisional basis. It has been decided to confirm the allotment only on getting sterilized within four days.’152 Another notice, which was issued even to widows, reads: It has been decided to confirm the allotment only on getting sterilized within four days failing which the allotment will be cancelled. You are therefore advised to contact the Family Planning Wing of Irwin Hospital for sterilization. After necessary sterilization, you may contact Shri. B. Singh, Asstt. (sic) Estate Officer, Slums, DDA for confirmation of the allotment.153

As for commercial properties, evidence suggests that while in some cases alternative plots of smaller size were allotted, in other cases larger commercial plots in better-situated areas were given on an ad hoc basis.154 Jagmohan presented his side of the story, in his book Island of Truth, refuting these charges. He argues, ‘Not in a single case, compulsory sterilization was made a pre-condition for allotment of land or plot to those who were affected by the clearance-cumresettlement operations.’155 But the Shah Commission inquiry report clearly shows that favourable residential and commercial allotments, even multiple post-demolition allotments, were used as an incentive

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for sterilisation at the family planning camps.156 On the other hand, it was also reported that some people who had been shifted from Turkman Gate to Trilokpuri were not allotted tenements but were forced to live on open lands.157

III

Muslim Collective Identity:

‘Backward’ and/or ‘Ghettoised’?

The Shah Commission’s public hearing report suggests that a number of people expressed suspicion that the demolitions in the Jama Masjid area were undertaken with ulterior motives. According to Inder Mohan, a social worker of that area: The ruling circles of the Congress Party began to think that such a concentration of Muslims in one particular pocket of Delhi should not be allowed to continue. Indications of this trend were available from certain reactions expressed from time to time. Under the garb of congestion, beautification and economic upliftment, Muslims were being manipulated so that they could be dispersed across the city.158 (Emphasis added.)

Interestingly, the violent incidents that took place at the Jama Masjid area in February 1975 had a direct link to the way demolitions were carried out in the Turkman Gate locality subsequently. The Muslim collective identity was seen as a serious internal threat against State power. Thus, coercive measures were adopted to break the imagined Muslim solidarity as well as their numerical strength. For instance, Inder Mohan further told the commission: Mohammad Yunus, who was officially designated as Special Envoy of the Prime Minister and also In-charge of the functioning of the Wakf Board all over the country, came out with utterances to me: ‘All these Muslims who are supporting the Imam, should be dragged and thrown out of the city.’ Jagmohan, Vice-Chairman, DDA told me

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personally more than once that this community must be dispersed in different parts of the city.’159

Siraj Piracha, another social worker of that area, added, ‘Shri Sanjay Gandhi and Shrimati Indira Gandhi were confirmed in their views that so long as the majority of a particular community in the Jama Masjid area was not finished, the area would continue to cause headache to them’ [emphasis added].160 Shashi Bhushan, a Congress member of parliament, while also confirming this visible hostility towards Muslims, said, ‘The entire program [demolition] was being implemented in the most callous and ruthless manner … on the advice of … Shri Sanjay Gandhi who nursed the feeling of hostility towards Muslims.’161 The local Muslim community also perceived the forced demolitions in the same way. They were apprehensive about these schemes and programmes. The master plan, which intended to ‘plan’ the city in a better way, was seen as a draconian policy of the government to ‘displace’ and break the strength of the Muslim population.162 These fears were not completely false or baseless. The entire area between Jama Masjid and Turkman Gate, which was known as the ‘Muslim belt’ of Shahjahanabad, had already been declared a ‘slum area’ under different schemes. Jagmohan, however, presented a different picture of these events when I interviewed him. He referred to Shamsuddin, the leader of the residents’ delegation, as a liar and selfish community leader who tried to manipulate people’s emotions against DDA. He claimed that Shamsuddin had his interests. His shops had been destroyed during the drive and he wanted to get multiple compensations against one of his several shops.163 This charge by Jagmohan seems to be unjustified as Chowdhary Shamsuddin was living in penury in a dilapidated condition at the time of my interview with him. He and his wife— along with his son, daughter-in-law and three grandchildren—were living in a small two-room accommodation with a tiny courtyard. This was an old building that was let out to him on pagri (an old

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system in which a nominal amount is paid as security against a residential or commercial property with a minimum monthly rent). He was denied any compensation even after several inquiries were conducted since 1977 following Emergency.164 The resistance of the local Muslim population was also represented as a serious threat hindering the development process of the country. Apart from declaring local residents as encroachers and miscreants in press notes, official statements of leaders like Indira Gandhi and officials like Jagmohan tried to underplay the ruthlessness of the clearance operation by highlighting the family planning campaign as the most important reason behind the use of force at Turkman Gate.165 It was, it seems, done to cover the illegalities and coercion that were used during demolitions. But there was a deep communal angle behind it. By overplaying the sterilisation aspect, it was easy to blame the Muslims of the area who were projected as backwards and ghettoised. Jagmohan tried to justify the firing incident by bringing in the religious aspect of family planning. According to him, there was a general sense of resentment among the local Muslim population who thought that the campaign was against Islamic principles. He mentioned a few reports to demonstrate that various ‘Muslim’ institutions like Indian Union Muslim League, Muslim Personal Law Board, Jamat -e-Islami Hind—which was banned during Emergency—and the Imam of Jama Masjid had already prepared a situation for agitation by calling sterilisation ‘un-Islamic’. Referring to an additional district magistrate’s report prepared in the evening of 19 April 1976, he claimed in his book Island of Truth: There was a lot of resentment amongst the Muslims of the area against the alleged high-handedness in the family planning campaign. The Imam made a speech at 9.30 A.M. against family planning in Jama Masjid area from the P.A. system installed in the mosque. The atmosphere became tense … a number of women assembled … the

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Imam himself came to the family planning camp at 10.45 and tried to incite the crowd.166

Quite contrary to this statement, the residents were very disappointed at the indifferent attitude of the Imam. They informed that the Imam did not make any effort to stop forced sterilisation. In fact, he told the women of the Jama Masjid area to act according to their conscience and refused to help when he was approached on the day of the protest.167 He stated in favour of the family planning drive much before the controversies arose. His statement was disseminated by the Indira government as a fatwa (a statement based on Islamic principles issued by a religious head) well before the sterilisation campaign.168 The Imam was also reluctant to take any anti-establishment position mainly because of the incidents that took place at the Jama Masjid area in February 1975, resulting in his arrest, as discussed earlier. The prime minister’s statement in Parliament about the firing incident at Turkman Gate also deliberately avoided any reference to clearance but mentioned the incident purely in terms of ‘chaos’ created by the family planning campaign. She stated: We do believe that programme of sterilization … for the control of population are important and most urgent…. [W]hen a situation of confrontation is deliberately created, there are tragic consequences. Some deaths have taken place due to firing … [and] organized groups have also killed policemen and other citizens, even those who were not on family planning mission. Where there is harassment, it should certainly be dealt with. But it will be easier if people are not incited and encouraged to take the law in their hands….’169

Jagmohan, portraying himself as the only honest man surrounded by hypocrites and buffeted by concocted accusations, also argued that the riots were caused by fear of family planning at Dujana House. He argued that people who died during the incident did not belong to Turkman Gate and had nothing to do with the demolition drive.

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However, the findings of the Shah Commission inquiry contradicted these statements: Though the family planning programme may have contributed to the build-up of tension … in the area, the firing was a direct and immediate sequel to the decision of the authorities to proceed with demolitions regardless of the resistance of the people and consequences…. [T] he subsequent conduct of authorities, silence of significant several relevant and important records on material particular [sic], indicate that this was a part of a design to justify the firing by the police.170

As for the sterilisation camp, Dujana House was the only camp that was placed in a residential colony in Delhi. Sterilisation in other areas was conducted either in local dispensaries or hospitals. According to John Dayal, the camp was deliberately placed in the Jama Masjid area with a sinister design: on the one hand, to clear the Muslim population by bulldozing through their shelters and, on the other, to control their growth by extensive sterilisation. RSS and Jan Sangh always portrayed the Muslim population as a threat that would grow and overpower or marginalise the Hindus of India, if not controlled.171 But it was Congress that always let such discourse evolve and flourish, despite its secular image. These perceived fear and communal design of the Indian government colluded with the national objectives of urbanisation and family planning, which Dayal argues, was specifically directed against the Muslim population of Delhi and Uttar Pradesh (UP). It was indeed a collaborative action, since the entire government machinery, at the state and local levels, and Jan Sangh, the biggest opposition party, were in agreement on these acts. The Muslims of Delhi, in this sense, turned out to be the biggest victims of State-sponsored atrocities during Emergency.172 Reflecting on the economics of the clearance drive and being an active observer of events, Dayal also informed that big contractors and an active section of upper-class, upper-caste Delhi elite were involved in supplying bulldozers, trucks, incentives distributed for

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sterilisations and, most importantly, new constructions on cleared lands. The situation reflects a convergence of powerful interests in the service of the demolition drives. It was not surprising that local residents who happened to be Muslims were perceived as a strong internal threat. The community was portrayed as anti-development and their resistance anti-establishment. The collective grievances of a local community could thus be turned into a communal conspiracy against the State and its development agenda. Officially, the period of Emergency ended on the 23 March 1977, though Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called for fresh Lok Sabha elections much before that on the 18 January. In a major turn of events, the Congress party was badly defeated in the Indian general election that took place on 16–20 March 1977. A Janata alliance of non-Congress parties, later called Janata Party, won 298 out of 545 Lok Sabha seats. Indira Gandhi and her son Sanjay Gandhi both lost their Lok Sabha seats. The Janata Party also came to power in the Delhi Metropolitan Council in 1977, winning 46 out of 56 seats and remaining in office until 1983. These developments had a significant impact on the Turkman Gate locality. The Turkman Gate event was used by the Janata alliance as a symbol of state atrocities and coercion conducted against the poor and the religious minorities during the Congress rule. The Janata Alliance candidate Sikandar Bakht won the Chandni Chowk Lok Sabha seat with overwhelming support and eventually became a Mister for Urban Housing and Development. Morarji Desai, the leader of the alliance, who became India’s first non-Congress Prime Minister on 24 March, laid down the foundation stone of a new housing complex at the demolition site of Turkman Gate area. A number of families acquired allotment slips with or without the mandatory sterilisation against the backdrop of new political developments; the rest were resettled in New Seelampur and Welcome colonies.173 Indira Gandhi was arrested on the 3 October and released the next day. She claimed that the Shah Commission was politically motivated and agreed to come to the court only after

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much pressure, but refused to stand in the witness box and be sworn in for testimony. This resulted in Justice Shah ordering a case to be filed against her, thereby delaying the proceedings of the commission. It is interesting to note here that even before the commission opened its inquiry in September 1977, the anti-Emergency narrative already started declining against a backdrop of rising prices and political chaos. John Dayal and Ajoy Bose commented, in their second book on Emergency, that with the increase in prices of all essential goods ‘there had begun to circulate only among some a dangerous logic that perhaps Mrs Gandhi was right in saying that the Emergency was a bitter pill needed by the country’.174 Meanwhile, Indira Gandhi continued to wield power within Congress and was beginning to reassert her importance by promising to devote herself to the service of the nation. With her eyes on the next general elections, she reached out to the victims of Emergency, including those from the Turkman Gate episode. She invited Chowdhary Shamsuddin, the leader of the Turkman Gate area delegation, to her residence and met him in the presence of Sanjay Gandhi sometime in December 1979. She told Shamsuddin, ‘I am like your mother and if you consider so than Sanjay is like your younger brother.’ She asked Shamsuddin to forgive Sanjay Gandhi for what he did; she also told him to forget everything and move on as things had been settled. According to Shamsuddin, ‘[He] looked into Indira’s eyes and said you are a jadoogarni [magician] and embraced Sanjay.’175 Shamsuddin supported the breakaway Indira-led Congress—Congress (I)—in the next Lok Sabha elections that took place in January 1980. Indira Gandhi came back to power with 353 seats; she won all three parliamentary constituencies in the walled city—Matia Mahal, Chandni Chowk and Ballimaran. Emma Tarlo explains that the feeling that Emergency was a bitter pill was the beginning of the end of the anti-Emergency narrative. The atrocities of Emergency were gradually wiped out from public memory. Indira Gandhi and Sanjay emerged as heroes who had good intentions but made wrong choices, a perception of Emergency that

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was reinforced after the sudden death of Sanjay Gandhi in June 1980 in a plane crash. Quite interestingly, a portrait of Sanjay Gandhi, with wooden garland, hanged until recently, on the second-floor balcony of a house situated right in the middle of Chitli Qabar, within a few meters’ proximities of Turkman Gate area and Dujana House Camp, to commemorate his death. The Jama Masjid and Turkman Gate events contributed significantly in marking out Muslim areas in the dominant narrative of secular and progressive India. Muslims as a homogenous entity was considered a segregated, backward and ghettoised social group who did not wish to move out of their physical as well as traditional cultural environment.176 Thus, an unwritten in situ principles (keeping it the way it is) was applied, in general, to justify the administrative apathy towards Muslim-dominated localities, officially called ‘slums’. On the other hand, the manner in which clearance and development drives were conducted in these areas re-established a sense of insecurity amongst the Muslim inhabitants. These streets and alleys, previously seen as dark and damp spaces by the community itself, now came to be looked at as protected zones in order to counter the forced agenda of development. In this sense, caste, class, regional and cultural differences amongst different Muslim biradaries were not only evaporated but also overtaken by new rhetoric of Muslim ilaqa in the late 1970s. This reinforcement of Muslim identity, in response to the policy discourse and local perceptions that emerged during this period, played an important role in normalising the image of Muslim localities as culturally segregated and politically separatist spaces. Justifying the forced clearance of the Turkman Gate locality, Jagmohan claimed during the interview that people who moved out of their localities during Emergency became millionaires and lived a healthy life, whereas Muslims who stayed back remained where they were due to their inward-looking attitude. According to him, ‘Clearance and family planning was [sic] a way to take them out of their backward thinking.’

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The idea of ‘inclusive city’ in terms of the reorganisation of space was defined in relation to different threat perceptions of the Indian State under different regimes. For Nehru, an inclusive city meant a gradual process of cultural integration. He envisaged a homogenous Indian national identity by acknowledging internal diversity marked by regional, religious, caste and linguistic differences. Thus, for Nehru, collective identity was a component of the Indian nation that would eschew all forms of cultural essentialism and be fused with modern living patterns. So, ‘unplanned’, ‘undisciplined’ and ‘unauthorised’ constructions were a threat, which could reduce the possibilities of integration. Thus, it had to be cleared and redeveloped. But for Indira Gandhi, who had no such vision of her own, inclusive city meant the dissolution of all collective identities, except the ultimate national identity, through the reorganisation of its physical space to achieve national unity. In this sense, while invoking the Nehruvian idea of a territorially united India, Indira Gandhi undermined the principle of ‘unity in diversity’ and/or the notion of ‘culturally evolved’ Indian space. Unity was defined in a crude sense of territoriality while completely ignoring the idea of cultural diversity embedded in the Nehruvian idea of India. Thus, for Indira Gandhi, diversity was perceived as a threat to national unity and integrity. Muslim-dominated spaces were considered an internal threat to this notion of territorial unity of India. Consequently, redevelopment did not remain mere surveillance of ‘unauthorised’ constructions and clearance for redevelopment. Instead, it turned out to be a measure to diffuse Muslim spatial concentration to rehabilitate the community as dispersed fragments.

Notes 1 2

The Twenty Points Programme of Indira Gandhi was called National Regeneration Programme. Awadhendra Sharan, In the City, Out of Place: Nuisance, Pollution and Dwelling in Delhi, 1850–2000 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 137.

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3 Jagmohan, Island of Truth (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978), 123. 4 Sharan, In the City, Out of Place, 138–139; also see Narayani Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 1803–1931: Society, Government and Urban Growth (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), 14. 5 Asaf Ali was a freedom fighter  and noted Indian lawyer. He was elected in 1935 as a member of the Central Legislative Assembly from Delhi,  representing Congress  against the Muslim League. The road from Delhi Gate to Ajmeri Gate was subsequently named after him. 6 Sharan, In the City, Out of Place, 138–139. 7 Ibid. 8 Ajay K. Mehra, The Politics of Urban Development: A Study of Old Delhi (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1991), 62. 9 For instance, praising Chandigarh, the city that was designed completely on modern principles in the mid-1950s, Nehru said, ‘A city or building is a symbol of society and the life of a community … you can tell from the city the habits of the people who live there and their social and economic organizations…. People must be able to gauge the type of society we are trying to build … [in] all provinces of India.’ See Ravinder Kumar and H.Y. Sharada Prasad, Selected Works of Jawahar Lal Nehru (SWJLN) (Second Series) 28 (1955) (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 26. 10 Kumar and Prasad, SWJLN 23 (1953), 132. 11 Bharat Sevak Samaj, Slums of Old Delhi: Report of the Socio-Economic Survey of the Slum Dwellers of Old Delhi City, (Delhi: Atma Ram & Sons, 1958), 35. 12 Mehra, The Politics of Urban Development, 62–63.

13 Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957, 3.

14 Ibid., 10.

15 Ibid., 15.

16 For a critical discussion on the acquisition of land by the Central government see: Sushmita Pati, ‘Jagmohan: The Master Planner and the “Rebuilding” of Delhi’, Economics and Political Weekly XLIX, no. 36 (6 September 2014), 48–56. 17 ‘Slum Clearance–Cabinet Meeting’, Government of India (GOI), Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), File No.: 27/4/57-Delhi. NAI.

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18 The enthusiasm of this squad was quite evident as it demolished 2290 ‘illegal’ structures that very year. ‘Slum Clearance–Cabinet Meeting’, GOI, MHA, File No.: 27/4/57-Delhi. NAI. 19 ‘Slum Clearance-Cabinet Meeting’, GOI, MHA, File No.: 27/4/57-Delhi. NAI. 20 ‘Report of the Advisory Committee (Asoke Sen Committee)’, GOI, MHA, File No.: 14/16/58-Delhi. NAI. 21 Bharat Sevak Samaj, Slums of Old Delhi, 7. 22 Pati, ‘Jagmohan’, 48–56. 23 ‘Slum Clearance Work in Delhi’, GOI, MHA, File No.: 33/1/59- Delhi. NAI. 24 ‘Annual Administration Report’, 1963–1964 and 1964–1965; Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi, 26–27. Also see Mehra, The Politics of Urban Development, 59–63. 25 Jagmohan, Island of Truth, 124.

26 Mehra, The Politics of Urban Development, 63. Also see ‘Master Plan—

Role of Delhi Municipal Corporation and DDA’, GOI, MHA, File No.: 16/20/58-Delhi. NAI. Old Delhi included western extension areas covering Karol Bagh, Sadar Bazar, Sabzi Mandi, Paharganj and others while Shahjahanabad meant the Old Mughal city/walled city as discussed in previous chapters. 27 Mehra, The Politics of Urban Development, 68. 28 Source: Hand drawn by Vikaram Nayak based on MPD, 1962. 29 Ibid., 64. 30 Mehra. The Politics of Urban Development, 69. 31 ‘Delhi Development Authority’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 7/419/74-PMS. NAI; also see ‘Declaration of Certain Areas as Development Areas in Delhi Under … DDA’, GOI, MHA, File No.:16/26/58-Delhi. NAI. 32 Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) was formed in 1957–1958 following the provisions of Delhi Development Authority (DDA) Act, 1957, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi Act, 1957. MCD and DDA were formed to look into issues of urbanisation and governance in the national capital region. It was followed by Delhi Administration Act, 1966, under which Delhi Metropolitan Council (DMC) was formed. The first elections of DMC were held in 1967 for 56 elected and 5 nominated members called councillors. DMC became the main representative body of Delhi to deal with developmental work.

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33 For discussion on the multiplicity of authorities, which have been a problem in local administration, see Metropolitan Council Debates (MCD), Metropolitan Council Secretariat (MCS)/Delhi, DMCD, MCS/ Delhi, 2 May 1973, 192–193. 34 ‘DDA–Miscellaneous Correspondence’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 7/419/70 PMS. NAI. 35 Geeta Puri, Bharatiya Jan Sangh: Organization and Ideology: Delhi: A Case Study (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1980), 214. Also see Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘The Hindu Nationalist Movement in Delhi: From Locals to Refugees and Towards Peripheral Groups?’ in Delhi: Urban Space and Human Destinies, eds. Veronique Dupont, Emma Tarlo, Denis Vidal (Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2000); Mahender Kumar Saini and Walter K. Andersen, ‘The Basti Julahan By-election’, The Indian Journal of Political Science 30, no. 3 (July–September 1969), 260–276; Parkash Chander, ‘Socio-Economic Background of the Metropolitan Councilors of Delhi’, The Indian Journal of Political Science 33, no. 3 (July–September, 1972), 323–340; Mahender Kumar Saini and Walter Andersen, ‘The Congress Split in Delhi: The Effect of Factionalism on Organizational Performance and System Level Interactions’, Asian Survey 11, no. 11 (November 1971), 1084–1100. Also see Raj Chandidas, ‘Elections to Delhi Metropolitan Council: An Analysis of Electoral and Ecological Variables’, Economic and Political Weekly 10, no. 25/26 (21–28 June 1975), 964–973. 36 Puri, Bharatiya Jan Sangh, 66. Also see Al Jamiat, ‘Jan Sangh Ka Yeh Khawab…’, 4 January 1970, for a statement of Jeevan Singh, chief minister of Punjab and general secretary of Akali Dal, against Jan Sangh’s resolution on Bhartiakaran (understood as conversion to Hinduism) of religious minorities in India. 37 These aspects had always been pursued by BJS in Delhi. For instance, in 1955 a deputation of the party met Delhi chief commissioner and demanded ‘change of names of streets and removal of the statues of the foreign rulers that disfigure the city to give Delhi a “Bharatiya” look’. Cf. Puri, Bharatiya Jan Sangh, 67. 38 Al Jamiat, ‘Jan Sangh Ki Taraf Se … Bharatiyakaran Ka Naara’, 10 March 1970. Also see Al Jamiat, ‘Musalmanon Ke Bharatiyakaran Ka Naara…’, 6 May 1970.

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39 For a resolution on regularisation of ‘unauthorised’ colonies in Delhi see DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 2 April 1971. For Jan Sangh’s and RSS’ involvement in promoting the construction of ‘unauthorised’ structures in Delhi in and around the refugee colonies see DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 6 May 1975. 40 Special funds were issued by the Delhi administration for the improvement of Harijan colonies and katras of Old Delhi and as many as 1,000 quarters were constructed for sweepers in 1969–1970. See Puri, Bharatiya Jan Sangh, 221. 41 Puri, Bharatiya Jan Sangh, 223. 42 DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 29 March 1968, 59. 43 Jagmohan. Island of Truth. 31. 44 DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 29 March, 1968, 46–47. 45 Puri, Bharatiya Jan Sangh, 224. 46 DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 29 March 1968, 65–68. 47 There was a competition between Jan Sangh and Congress to take credit for clearance drives in Delhi since DDA was a statutory body working under the Central government. However, because poor Muslims were the prime victims of these drives and the local Congress wings actively criticised these clearance drives, Congress had to give it away for wider electoral benefits. See: ‘DDA-Miscellaneous Correspondence’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 7/419/70-PMS. NAI. 48 Jagmohan, Island of Truth, 31. Jagmohan represents the epitome of upper-caste, middle-class urban sensitivities/sensibilities that really came into its own in the 1960s and tried redefining the image of the capital region on the lines of modern upper-caste Hindu Indian values. See Mrinalini Rajagopalan, ‘Post Secular Urbanisms: Situating Delhi Within the Rhetorical Landscape of Hindutva’ in The Fundamentalist City? Religiosity and the Re-making of Urban Space, eds. N. Al Sayyad and M. Massoumied (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011), 257–282; Patrick Clibbens, ‘The Destiny of the City Is to be the Spiritual Workshop of the Nation: Clearing Cities and Making Citizens During the Indian Emergency, 1975–1977’, Contemporary South Asia 22 (I) (6 Jan 2014), 51–56; Pati. ‘Jagmohan’; B. M. Sinha, Operation Emergency (Delhi: Hind Pocket Books, 1977); Amita Bavsikar, ‘Cows, Cars and Cycle Rikshaws: Bourgeois Environmentalists and Battle for Delhi’s

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49

50 51 52

53 54

251

Streets’ in Elite and Everyone: The Cultural Politics of the Indian Middle Classes, eds. Amita Baviskar and Raka Ray (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011); Nishat Bari, ‘Lost world’, India Today, 10 November 2013. Available at http://indiatoday.in/site/story/Lost+worlds/1/81449.html (accessed on 17 May 2016); The Tribune, ‘Stress Must be On Medieval History’, 9 June 2002. Available at http://www.tribuneindia.com/ 2002200220609/ncr1.htm (accessed on 12 May 2014); Vinod Khanna, ‘Jagmohan: Clean-up, Get Rs. 1 Crore’, The Times of India, 26 January 2003. Available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-01 26/india/27269179_1_vinod-khanna-jagmohan-culture-and-tourism (accessed on 13 May 2014). The slogan was turned around and called a policy of ‘Ghareebon Ko Hatao’ (eliminate the poor) in the post- Emergency period due to the way these programmes were implemented. For a detailed analysis see Puri, Bharatiya Jan Sangh, 185 and 193. Gyan Prakash, Emergency Chronicles: Indira Gandhi and Democracy’s Turning Point (Delhi: Princeton University Press, 2019). Partha Chatterjee, ‘Introduction: A Political History of Independent India’ in State and Politics in India, ed. Partha Chatterjee (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1–40; Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Plassey to Partition and After (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan Pvt. Ltd., 2015), 510–513; Atul Kohli, ‘Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-Determination Movement in India’, Journal of Asian Studies 56, no. 2 (1997), 325–344; Myron Weiner, ‘The 1971 Election and the Indian Party System’, Asian Survey 11, no. 12 (1971), 1153–1166; Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘A Critique of the Passive Revolution’, Economic and Political Weekly 23, no. 45/47 Special Number (November 1988), 2429–2444; Rajni Kothari, ‘The Congress System Revisited: A Decennial Review’, Asian Survey 14, no. 12 (1974), 1035–1054. P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi: The Emergency and Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 154. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, Prevention of Insult to National Honor Act, 1971, and Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), 1971. MISA continued to be in operation even after the Bangladesh liberation, to deal with unspecified ‘internal disturbances

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55

56

57

58

59

Contested Homelands and threats’. After the declaration of emergency, MISA was amended multiple times (for example, the Maintenance of Internal Security (Amendment) Act, 1976). It was finally repealed in 1977 when fresh elections were declared and Janata Party  came to power. See ‘Public Hearing Cum Summary of Parliamentary Debate on Maintenance of Internal Security Bill, 1971’, GOI, Court–Shah Commission of Inquiry (SCI), File No.: 31024/33/78-Court-SCI. NAI. ‘PHC of Demolition in the Walled City of Delhi during Emergency in Jama Masjid (hereafter JM) and Turkman Gate (hereafter TG) Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI. See ‘20 Point Programme—Enlargement of Employment and Training Through Apprentices Scheme’ GOI, PMS, File No.: 37(633)/20/75-PMS, NAI; ‘20 Point Programme Review of Implementation’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 37(633)/75-PMS, NAI; ‘20 Point Programme Padyatra Undertaken by Leaders, PMs etc.’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 37(632)/misc./76-PMS, NAI; ‘20 Point Programme Parliamentary Questions’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 37(633)/Parliament (Parl.) Qn./76-PMS. NAI and ‘Correspondence Regarding Statements …. by the PM in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha’, GOI, Parl., File No.: 56/29/76-parl.,PMS. NAI. Also see DMCD, MCS/ Delhi, 18 March 1975; DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 20 March 1975; DMCD, MCS /Delhi, 2 May 1975; DMCD, MCS /Delhi, 6 May, 1975; DMCD, MCS /Delhi, 27 January, 1976; DMCD, MCS /Delhi, 27 January 1976; DMCD, MCS /Delhi, 4 May 1976; DMCD, MCS /Delhi, 5 May 1976; DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 7 May 1976; DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 12 May 1976. For Sanjay Gandhi’s political associations and ambitions see Vinod Mehta, The Sanjay Story: From Anand Bhawan to Amethi (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1978); Emma Tarlo, Narratives of the Emergency in Delhi: Unsettling Memories (California: University of California Press, 2003); Also see Puri. Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 217–223 for Jan Sangh’s policy framework. For the discourse on the 1965 war with Pakistan in relation to the identification of Muslims and Muslim areas as a potential threat to internal security see Al Jamiat, ‘Hindustan Ke … Musalmanon Ko Pakistan Ki Hifazat Nahin Chahiye’, 25 January 1965; Al Jamiat, Editorial, 7 February 1965; Al Jamiat, ‘Hindu Mahasabha Ki Hindu

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60 61 62

63

64

65

66 67 68 69

253

Huqumat’, 27 April 1965; Al Jamiat, ‘Hum Sab Barabar Ke Shehri Hain’, 25 October 1965; Al Jamiat, ‘Fasadi Jama-aton Ka Kirdar’, 24 December 1965; Al Jamiat, ‘Apnon ko Ghair Na Samjho’, 5 May 1965. See Al Jamiat, ‘Pakistan Agent Kaun?’, 6 Jan 1965; Al Jamiat, ‘Musalmanon Ko Sarhadon Se Hatao’, 11 July 1965. DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 11 April 1967. Thanksgiving motion following lieutenant governor’s address to the council. For an interesting analysis of anti-Congressism of Jan Sangh in relation to Muslim-dominated constituencies see Zahoor Masood Quraishi, ‘Emergence and Eclipse of Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawrat’, Economic and Political Weekly 6, no. 25 (June 1971), 1229–1234. Imdad Sabri raised questions in relation to the requirement of a citizenship certificate to be presented by Muslims for selling properties in Delhi. This aspect became critical once again in the post-1970 period. For discussions on the Bangladesh war see DMCD, MCS/ Delhi, 6 October, 1971, 80–101. For communal aspect—Muslim agent and Akhand Bharat see 90–94; DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 23 April, 1973, 19–23; and DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 2 May 1973, 159–165. It is important to mention here that ‘public order’ and police in Delhi NCT are under the ministry of home affairs (MHAs), Government of India, in accordance with the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1948. https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=delhi%20police%20act (accessed on 16 June 015). For a Non-Governmental Resolution No. 2 passed in DMC for the improvement of the katras of Old Delhi see DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 2 May 1975, 96–106. Also see Biswajit Banerjee, ‘Shahjahanabad and the Master Plan for Delhi: A Critical Appraisal’, Economic and Political Weekly 10, no. 46 (15 November 1975), 1779, 1781–1784. Proceedings of the seminar on ‘Redevelopment of Shahjahanabad’ (Delhi: Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Planning: 31 January 1975), 2. Jagmohan, Rebuilding Shahjahanabad: The Walled City of Delhi (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1975). Ibid., x. Ibid., xi. Ibid., 71–72.

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70 The Statesman, ‘Mrs. Gandhi Announces New Plans: National Fitness to Get Priority’, 16 May 1976. 71 For a list of demolished and resettlement colonies see DMCD, MCS/ Delhi, 27 January 1976. Quite interestingly, Turkman Gate locality was not included in the list of cleared areas. For a discussion on the devastating conditions in rehabilitation colonies see DMCD, MCS/ Delhi, 12 May 1976, 16–21. 72 See DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 12 May 1976, 16–21. 73 The Al Jamiat newspaper is full of reports on communal violence and similar disturbances throughout North-West India, including Gonda, UP (16 February 1973); Nagaur, Rajasthan (26 March 1973); Hazari Bagh, Bihar (19 April 1973); Pune, Maharashtra (20 April 1973); Bara Hindu Rao, Delhi (14 June 1973); Jama Masjid, Delhi (19 July); Allahabad, UP (13 December 1973); Meerut, UP (13 December 1973) and various other places in Gujarat (14 January 1974) and Kishanganj, Delhi (11 March 1974). The year 1975 and 1976 is full of police atrocities during the Jama Masjid clearance drive, which I will discuss in the next section. See Al Jamiat, ‘Jama Masjid Ke Ilaqe Main Do Groupon Ke Darmiyan Danga’, 8 May 1973; Al Jamiat, ‘Barha Hindu Rao Mein Achanak Fasad Phoot Para’, 14 June 1973; Al Jamiat, ‘Jama Masjid Ke Ilaqe Mein Phir Do Groupon Mein Ladai: 6 Giraftar’, 29 July 1973. 74 It is difficult to provide religion-based demographic data of different localities of Old Delhi for two reasons. It is an unwritten policy of the Indian government to not use religious identity as an official category. Second, the Union Territory of Delhi was treated as one district till the 2001 census. It was only in 2001 that Delhi was divided into nine zones for the purpose of census data collection. For reference see Hemanshu Kumar and Rohini Somanathan, ‘Mapping Indian Districts Across Census Years, 1971–2001’, Centre for Development Economics. Department of Economics. Delhi School of Economics. Working Paper No. 176. Available at http://www.cdedse.org/pdf/work176.pdf also see http://delhi.gov.in/DoIT/DoIT_Planning/ES2012-13/EN/ES_ Chapter%202.pdf (accessed on 13 December 2015). 75 ‘Jama Masjid Clearance Operation’, GOI, PMS, File No: 7(383)/74 PMS. NAI.

76 Ibid.

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77 Delhi Wakf Board is responsible for the management of mosques and its finances. Collection of rent from shopkeepers around Jama Masjid was also the responsibility of the board since these shops were a part of wakf property along with the mosque. The Wakf Board was consulted as a stakeholder in this case. 78 ‘Jama Masjid Clearance Operation’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 7(383)/74 PMS. NAI. 79 See DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 18 March 1975. 80 ‘High Level Ministerial Panel to Examine the Redevelopment in Walled City’, GOI, MHA, Delhi, File No.: U-12011/2/75-D. NAI. 81 See Hilal Ahmed, Muslim Political Discourse in Postcolonial India: Monuments, Memory, Contestations (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014), 98–140. 82 ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-court-SCI. NAI. Also see Ahmed, Muslim Postcolonial Discourse, Ch. 4. For other views see A.K. Chakraborty, ‘Imam versus Masjid’, Secular Democracy (February 1975), 12–14. For a more critical view of the government’s role, Special Correspondent, ‘Jama Masjid Riot: Politics of Wakf Boards’, Economic and Political Weekly XVX, no. 8 (22 February 1975), 75. For the Imam’s own self-defence see Khushwant Singh, ‘The Man Who Swayed the Muslim Vote’, Illustrated Weekly of India XCVIII, no. 24 (12 June 1977), 26–27. Also see Al Jamiat, ‘Ilaqa Jama Masjid Mein Fasad’, 23 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Ilaqa Jama Masjid Mein Aman: Giraftari Ki Tadat 350 Ho Gayi’, 5 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Ilaqa Jama Masjid Mein Marne Walon Ki Tadat 8 Ho Gayi…’, 6 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Jama Masjid Mein Doosre Din Aman Lekin Curfew Jari’, 6 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Jama Masjid Mein Police Ki Andha-Dhundh Firing Ki Muzammat’, 6 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Delhi Mein Curfew Ke Dauran C.R.P.F. Ka Zalimana Raveya’, 6 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Delhi Ka Khooni Drama Khatm Hua’, 7 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Sayed Abdulla Bukhari Ne Imamat Ke Mansab Par Najayaz Qabza Kiya’, 7 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Delhi Mein Giraftariyon Ki Tadat 435 Tak Pahunch Gayi’, 7 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Shahi Imam Maulana Sayed Hamid Saheb Jama Masjid Mein Namaz Padhaya Karengey’, 10 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Ilaqa Jama Masjid Se Din Ka Curfew Khatm Aur Jama Masjid Ki Dukanon Ki Tameer Ki Ijazat’, 12 February 1975.

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83 Al Jamiat, ‘Sayed Abdulla Bukhari Giraftar’, 7 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Maulana Sayed Abadullah Bukhari Ki Rihari Ki Koshish’, 15 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Tiharh Jail Se Sayyed Abdullah Bukhari Saheb Ki Apeal’, 15 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Maulana Abdulla Bukhari Ki Rihai: Delhi Administration Ka Faisla’, 19 February 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Naib Addulla Bukhari Riha Ho Gaye’, 20 February 1975. 84 Al Jamiat, ‘Jama Masjid Ke Dukandaron Ka 11 Lakh Ka Nuksan’, 14 February 1975. 85 Al Jamiat, ‘Jan Sangh Jama Masjid Ko Apni Siyasat Ka Akharha Na Banaye: Delhi Ke 10 Musalmanon Ka Khoon Jan Sangh Ki Gardan Par’, 12 February 1975. 86 ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI/ NAI. 87 ‘Jama Masjid Clearance Operation’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 7(383)/75 PMS. NAI. 88 Al Jamiat, ‘Jama Masjid Ke Dukandaron Ka 11 Lakh Ka Nuksan’, 14 February 1975. 89 ‘Jama Masjid Clearance Operation’. GOI, PMS, File No.: 7(383)/74 PMS. NAI. Also see DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 18 March 1975, 28. Also see Delhi Urban Art Commission, Second Report (Delhi, Vigyan Bhavan Annexe, 1975–77), 14–15. 90 ‘Jama Masjid Clearance Operation’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 7(383)/74 PMS. NAI. Also see DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 5 May, 1976, 39. Also see The Indian Express, ‘Jama Masjid Area Cleared’, 21 August 1975; The Indian Express, ‘Joblessness Among Those Resettled in Seelampur’, 7 September 1975; Hindustan Times, ‘Chandni Chowk Sans Sunday Bazaar’, 21 July 1975; Hindustan Times ‘Masjid Area Cleared of 500 Junk Shops’, 24 August 1975. 91 ‘Jama Masjid Clearance Operation’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 7(383)/75 PMS. NAI. 92 ‘Jama Masjid Clearance Operation’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 7(383)/75 PMS. NAI. It is important to mention here that leading Urdu newspapers also published editorials in favour of Emergency. Al Jamiat, ‘Emergency Kisi Farad Ya Party Ke Khilaf Nahi Balki Mulk Ke Mafad Main Hai’, 24 July 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Emergency Ke Sau Din’, 10 October 1975.

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95 96 97 98 99

100

101

102

257

‘Jama Masjid Clearance Operation’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 7(383)/75 PMS. NAI. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-court-SCI. NAI and ‘PHC of TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-court-SCI. NAI. Also see Hindustan Times, ‘Market Cleared From Jama Masjid Steps, 23 November 1975; Hindustan Times, ‘Jama Masjid Regains Old Grandeur’, 14 December 1975. Al Jamiat, ‘Jama Masjid KeIlaqe Main DDA Ka Achanak Aur Sabse Bada Operation’, 24 November 1975; Al Jamiat, ‘Corporation Chawri Bazar Scheme Ko Age Badhane Main Sargarm’, 19 June 1976. Demolition of shops adjacent to the wall of Jama Masjid. Source: Ahmed, Muslim Political Discourse, 109.

Ibid.

‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI.

Ibid.

Defence of India  Regulations  Act was an emergency criminal law enacted in 1915 for curtailing nationalistic and revolutionary activities. It was amended as the  Defence of India Act and Defence of India Rules (DIADIR) in 1962. Any person held under this act will have his/her fundamental rights effectively suspended; Rule 30 of the act specifically gives power to the government to hold any person in detention without explanation. For Sanjay Gandhi’s response on the construction of Meena Bazar see http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/ deep-focus/Can-Congress-get-rid-of-Sanjay-Gandhis-baggage/ articleshow/7202986.cms (accessed on 13 December 2015); Times of India, 26 December 1975, Delhi, 3. ‘Jama Masjid Clearance Operation’, GOI, PMS, File No.: 7(383)/75 PMS, NAI and ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI. Also see AlJamiat, ‘Vazeer-e-Azam Ko Mir Mushtaq Ahemd Ka Khat’, 28 June 1976. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI.

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258 103

104 105

106 107

108

109 110

111 112

Contested Homelands Remodelling of Dujana House, the area situated between Jama Masjid and Turkman Gate, was among the first rehabilitation projects undertaken after independence. It was declared a slum and cleared in the early 1960s. The residents were put in transit camps located at Turkman Gate, adjacent to the old Turkman Gate locality. Over eighty families were resettled in newly built four multistorey housing blocks in Dujana House after clearing the jhuggies. The remaining forty families were to be shifted to Ranjit Nagar since they could not be offered a place in Dujana House. For details of the scheme see ‘Slum Clearance Work in Delhi’, GOI, MHA, File No.: 33/1/59-Delhi-MHA. NAI. For a reference to DAG and Turkman Gate see DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 5 May 1976, 38–39. ‘Master Plan for Delhi’, prepared by DDA and approved by the Central government under Delhi Development Act, 1957 (Delhi: DDA, 1962), 23. Jagmohan. Rebuilding Shahjahanabad. 82. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI, NAI and ‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-Court-SCI. NAI. Ibid. and ‘Public Hearing Cum Summary of the Case of Shri Sanjay Gandhi’s Role in Connection with TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/44/78-Court-SCI. NAI. Even the land allotted for the construction of these quarters was ten acres. See DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 5 May 1975. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI; ‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, CourtSCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-Court–SCI. NAI. For a discussion on atrocities during clearance drive and sterilisation camps see DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 4 May 1976, 44–56. Interestingly, the page numbers (57–64) dealing with the Turkman Gate incident are missing from the debates. Also see DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 5 May 1976, 38–41. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI; ‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, CourtSCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-Court –SCI, NAI.

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Reorganisation of Space and Communities 113

114

115 116 117 118

119 120 121

122 123 124 125

126

259

Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin (name changed) dated 17 April 2014, Delhi. Also see ‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-Court-SCI. NAI; John Dayal and Ajoy Bose, For Reasons of State: Delhi Under Emergency (Delhi: Ess Ess Publications, 1977), 35. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI, NAI; and ‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.:31024/45/78-Court-SCI. NAI. ‘PHC of TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.:31024/45/78-CourtSCI. NAI. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court–SCI. NAI. Ibid. ‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-Court –SCI. NAI; DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 4 May 1976, 21–24 for forced the sterilisation campaign in Old Delhi. ‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-Court– SCI. NAI. Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin (name changed), 17 April 2014, Delhi. Also see Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 35. Chowdhary Shamsuddin died recently. I had a chance to interview him when he was suffering from a long-term illness. He spoke about the incidents of the Turkman Gate area in his broken voice in a way as if everything was still distinctly inscribed in his memory. I have also referred to Dayal and Bose in order to fill out possible gaps in the description. Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin, 17 April 2014, Delhi. Also see Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 35. Ibid., Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin. Ibid., Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin; Also see Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 45. Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin, 17 April 2014, Delhi and Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 45. Also see Javid Laiq, ‘Turkman Gate: The Tale of Woe’, Radiance XII, no. 51 (8 May 1977), 6. Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin, 17 April 2014, Delhi; and Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 45.

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260 127 128 129

130

131

132 133 134

135 136

137

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Contested Homelands Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin, 17 April 2014, Delhi; and Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 45. Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 45. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI; and ‘Public Hearing … Case of the TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-Court-SCI. NAI. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.:31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI; and ‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-Court-SCI. NAI. The  Nehru Brigade  (1944) or  4th Guerrilla Regiment  was a unit of the Indian National Army (INA). Subhash Brigade was the 1st Regiment, Gandhi Brigade the 2nd and Azad Brigade the 3rd; they constituted part of the First Indian National Army,  and later, part of the 1st Division after the revival of INA under Subhash Chandra Bose. Nehru Brigade played an important role in the Second World War. This divisional classification of Indian Army continued after independence. Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 55. Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 52. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI; and ‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-Court-SCI. NAI. Interview with Rukhsana (name changed), a female resident of Pahari Bhojla, 22 April 2014, Delhi. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI; and ‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-Court-SCI. NAI. It is called ‘second front’ by Dayal and Bose to highlight the targeted action of the State against the Muslim community of Old Delhi. They argue that clearance and sterilisation, which were shown as two different incidents, were actually part of the same design. Thus, parallel agitations of the people converged in Old Delhi, resulting in a collective protest. Dayal and Bose. Delhi Under Emergency, 48–50. Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 48–50. For details on rounds of firing, looting and demolitions see ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No. 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI;

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140

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‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No. 31024/45/78-CourtSCI. NAI. ‘Public Hearing Case Summary of the Case of Allegations Regarding Deaths, Injuries, Beating, Molestation of Women etc. in TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/43/78-Court-SCI. NAI. The commission did not pursue the inquiry in such cases because of lack of circumstantial evidence in the absence of any official inquiry. See DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 4 May 1976, 54. Also see Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 62–63; Sehziyan, Shah Commission Report, 252. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No. 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI. For an enthusiastic statement of the Delhi administration on the achievements of clearance drives in Old Delhi see Annual Administration Report 1975–1976, Delhi Administration, 76–77. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI. Dayal and Bose recorded twelve deaths. See Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 57–58. For details of casualties see ‘Public Hearing Case … of Allegations Regarding … Molestation of Women etc. in TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/43/78-Court-SCI. NAI. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI; and ‘PHC of the TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/45/78-Court-SCI. NAI. Similar kind of incidents of firing, clearance and sterilisation took place in Muslimdominated districts of Sultanpur and Muzaffarnagar, which is highly unexplored. Even the Shah Commission report did not inquire into these incidents. For reference see ‘Appointment of a Fact Finding Committee for … Slum Clearance … Firing incident in TG in April, 1976’, GOI, MHA, File No.: U-11011/5/77-Delhi-MHA. NAI. The National Commission for Minorities (NCM) recently asked the Uttar Pradesh government to submit a report on the killings of twenty-five people in a police shootout in Muzaffarnagar during Emergency. See http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/ emergency-era-police-firing-national-commission-for-minorities seeks-report-from-uttar-pradesh-government/ (accessed on 10 March 2015).

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262 143

144 145 146 147 148

149

150 151 152 153 154 155 156

157 158

Contested Homelands ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI; For Sanjay Gandhi’s involvement in the manipulation of documents see ‘PHC of Sanjay Gandhi’s Role in … TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/44/78-Court-SCI. NAI. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI.NAI. Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin, 17 April 2014, Delhi. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI.NAI. Ibid. ‘Appointment of the Fact Finding Committee … for Slum Clearance … Firing in the TG Area in April, 1976’, GOI, MHA/Delhi, File No.: U-110111/5/77. NAI. This committee was not welcomed by the residents of Old Delhi and Muslim leaders in general. See Al Jamiat, ‘Turkman Gate Par Mamuli Tehkiqati Committee Mukarrar Kar Ke Zakhmon Par Namak Chirka Hai’, 29 May 1977. ‘Appointment of the Fact Finding Committee … Slum Clearance … Firing in the Turkman Gate Area’, GOI, MHA/Delhi, File No.: U-110111/5/77. NAI. Al Jamiat, ‘Emergency Ki Zyadtiyon Ki Tahkiqat Ke Liye Comission: Justice Sah Sarbara’, 30 May 1977. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31204/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI. Ibid.; Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin, 17 April 2014, Delhi and Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 50–55. DMCD, MCS/Delhi, 4 May 1976, 53. Ibid. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78, Court-SCI. NAI. Jagmohan, Island of Truth, 82. PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78, Court-SCI.; Also see Tarlo, Narratives of the Emergency in Delhi, Ch. 4. GOI, Delhi Department (DD), File No.: U-11011/5/77-DD. NAI. ‘PHC of Demolition … in JM and TG Area’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/42/78-Court-SCI. NAI.

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162

163 164 165 166 167

168 169 170 171

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Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. R.K. Ohri, SP (central) district stated that Sanjay Gandhi visited the Turkman Gate site on 20 April after the firing incident before he went to Irwin Hospital to see injured police personnel. He praised the policemen for their good work and expressed his desire for them to be rewarded. For statement see ‘Public Hearing … Case of Shri Sanjay Gandhi’s Role in … TG Firing’, GOI, Court-SCI, File No.: 31024/44/78-Court-SCI. NAI. The master plan was understood and referred to as Musalmano ko Beghar Karne ki Saziash (conspiracy to displace local Muslims): Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin, 17 April 2014, Delhi. Interview with Jagmohan, 19 March 2014, Delhi. Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin, 17 April 2014, Delhi. Times of India ‘Turkman Gate: Situation Under Control’, 22 April 1976, New Delhi. Jagmohan, Island of Truth, 148. Interview with Rukhsana (name changed), 22 April 2014, Delhi; Dayal and Bose, Delhi Under Emergency, 51. The Shah Commission of Inquiry found serious irregularities in the statements, official correspondence and the documents presented in this regard. It also found a number of reports and statements that were actually made-up to authenticate and justify the ‘official’ claims made by participants of the demolition drives. See Ahmed, Muslim Political Discourse, 98–140. ‘Correspondence Regarding Statements … by the PM in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha’, GOI, Parl., File No.: 56/29/76–Parl., PMS. NAI. Sehziyan, Shah Commission Report, 253. Interview with John Dayal, 8 December 2015, Delhi. For debates and diverse views on family planning in India see Marica Vicziany, ‘Coercion in a Soft State: The Family Planning Program of India: Part 2: The Sources of Coercion’. Pacific Affairs 55, no. 4 (Winter, 1982–1983), 557–592. Davidson R. Gowatkin, ‘Political Will and Family Planning: The Implication of India’s Emergency Experience’. Population and Development Review 5, no. 1 (March, 1979), 29–55; Malika Mistry, ‘Role of Religion in Fertility and Family Planning

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172

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174 175 176

Contested Homelands Among Muslims in India’, Indian Journal of Secularism 3, no. 2 (July– September 1999), 1–33; Zohurul Hoque, ‘The Ethnic Numbers Game in India: Hindu-Muslim Conflicts over Conversion, Family Planning, Migration and the Census’ Delivered at the American Political Science Association Meeting, 5 September 1976 and at the Indian Institute of Islamic Studies, New Delhi, 20 January 1977; Ajoy Kumar, ‘A Bitter Pill for Muslims’, Far Eastern Economic Review XCII, no. 19 (7 May 1976), 12–13. Zohurul Hoque, ‘Religion of Islam and Family Planning’ The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs LVIII, no. 1 (January 1970), 6–10; M.E. Khan, ‘Is Islam against Family Planning?’, in Islam and the Modern Age VI, no. 2 (May 1975), 61–72 and A.V. Pai Panandikar and P.K. Umashankar, ‘Fertility Control and Politics in India’, Population and Development Review 20 (1994), 89–104. Interview with John Dayal, 8 December 2015, Delhi. Also see Veena Das, Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995). For an enthusiastic statement of the Delhi administration on the achievement of family planning targets in Delhi see Annual Administration Report 1975– 1976, Delhi Administration, 46–47 and 64–65. For details on the resettlement of the Turkman Gate residents in Welcome and New Seelampur see Tarlo, Narratives of the Emergency in Delhi, 62–110. Dayal and Bose, The Shah Commission Begins (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1978), 3. Interview with Chowdhary Shamsuddin, 17 April 2014, Delhi. Interview with Jagmohan, 19 March 2014, Delhi.

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Conclusion The emerging literature on Muslim areas (or what is often called Muslim ‘ghettos’) tries to examine the ‘internal’ make-up of these pockets to understand the factors of ‘segregation’, ‘exclusion’ and, above all, Muslim marginalisation. But the demarcation of space on religious lines or the meanings of Muslim isolation and exclusion—which are very much embedded in the way the politics of Partition and its engagement with Muslim identity are understood in postcolonial/post-Partition India—are either completely ignored or taken as a pointer to conclude the Muslims’ search for security argument. In this sense, not only the concept of ‘Muslim locality’ but also explanatory terms like segregation and exclusion are taken as a given phenomenon in these narratives. This book has made a modest attempt to revisit these complexities by investigating community–space relations in colonial and postcolonial Delhi. It has raised two fundamental questions: how did the relationship between community and space come to be defined on religious lines? and in what ways were ‘Muslim-dominated’ areas perceived as contested zones? Invoking the ideas of homeland as a useful vantage point to enter into the wider discourse around the conceptualisation of space, the book suggests that the relationship between Muslim communities and their living spaces called Muslim ilaqe has evolved out of a long process of politicisation and communalisation of space in Delhi. Thus, questioning the conceptualisation of ‘Muslim ilaqe’ as a ‘given’, ‘objective’, ‘homogenous’ and ‘permanent’ category, the book has endeavoured to unfold the layers of this discursively constituted community–space relation by focusing on certain specific periods and themes.

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The encounter between colonial administrative policies and Indian realities produced a complex configuration of identity and politics that redefined space–community relations in Delhi in the 19th century. The caste craft and class-oriented mohallas of Shahjahanabad went through a decisive transformation during the period of British colonialism and came to be defined exclusively on a religious basis. The British policy of compartmentalising diverse social groups into homogeneous religious categories through enumeration and mapping of galies, mohallas, ilaqe and regions on these lines worked as a formula for authorities to manage communities and space efficiently. Although this process started with the reorganisation of the city after the events of 1857 when British officials selectively evacuated and resettled the Muslim population as a punishment, it took a concrete form in the later years. The formation of religiopolitical identities—codification of cow slaughter and the marking of space for producing, selling and even consuming meat, identification of routes for religious processions, and arrangement of residential wards as communal electoral constituencies etc.—led to the gradual demarcation of space into ‘Hindu-dominated’, ‘Muslimdominated’ and ‘mixed’ areas. This demarcation gradually changed the way communities imagined their association with shared space. Furthermore, the continuous use of official vocabulary by the educated middle-class elite to define community boundaries as well as to make collective political claims produced the concept of communal space in Delhi, especially in the early decades of the 20th century. But these claims and counterclaims did not remain localised after the 1940s. Instead, a much more nuanced configuration of identities and space was articulated and expressed through various imaginations of the homeland. Initially, it was the idea of Pakistan, introduced in Delhi in 1940, that evoked a communitarian notion of the nation with an imagination of ‘pure and ideal’ Muslim homeland. But as political negotiations for India’s independence materialised, the geopolitical entity called

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British India became a subject of multiple imaginations in the form of various ideas of the homeland. These versions of ‘homeland’ constituted parallel but contested visions of nations. However, the rhetoric of homeland was very different from the popular meanings of Pakistan, especially in Delhi. For Delhi Muslims, homeland was nothing but an evocation of the right to live and perform their religious and cultural practices in the galies, mohallas and ilaqe where they were the majority. This book, thus, suggests that conflicting claims and realities of the partition turned every Muslim household, gali, mohalla and ilaqa of Delhi into contested zones. I argue that these various assertions of homelands were eventually reduced to the theory of ‘two-nation’ or communal antagonism. The partition of South Asia between ‘Muslim-dominated Pakistan’ and ‘Hindu-dominated India’ did not put these contradictory yet parallel ideas of the homeland to rest. Instead, it reinforced religion as the prime marker of identity at every level of society, politics and administration, evoking intense debate around citizenship, rights and belongingness.1 The book argues that these notions were reconfigured specifically to achieve the projects of imagined ‘ideal’ nations—either a composite Nehruvian secular India or a majoritarian Hindu Rashtra—at least in the immediate aftermath of the partition of India. In this context, the idea of Pakistan—along with other political and economic processes—also emerged as an antagonistic and provocative force, the adversarial Other, to define India in terms of cultural assimilation, territorial unity and, above all, as a secular ‘nation’. The ‘fear of disintegration’ and ‘communalism’ continued to be important political tropes for condemning supposed Muslim separatism by the Nehruvian government and propagated aggressively by the Hindu political voices.2 The Nehruvian State envisaged the de-politicisation and de-communalisation of religious identities as an important means of achieving a secular, united and integrated India. The State, following an unwritten policy, tried to decolonise the polity through non-recognition of religious identity as

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an official category. The terminology of ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ was considered to be a more democratic and secular way of recognising communities in postcolonial/post-partition context. But while the meaning of ‘minority’ was overwhelmingly constitutionalised, it merely reinforced the division between Hindu/majority and nonHindu/minority.3 This distinction not only re-established cleavages and differences internal to the categories but also imposed, quite inevitably, the majority culture as national mainstream. The term ‘mainstream’ seems to underline the larger objective of the Nehru government, which offered a comprehensive nationalist framework for the unity and integrity of India. Nehru offered a blueprint for the making of Indian subjects into ideal citizens by focusing on non-controversial, neutral and somehow ‘emancipatory’ mission of urbanisation and development. But this definition of Indian mainstream, which was intrinsically exclusionist for a diverse society, had multiple implications and manifestations. The book has tried defining these manifestations through the issues of citizenship and belongingness in 1950, Bharatiyakaran (Indianisation) in the 1960s and reorganisation of living patterns of Muslim social groups in the 1970s.4 This process of decolonisation contradicted with local level developments since the realities of Partition re-established religion as the prime marker of identity in the popular imagination. This religion-based contest of identity and space led to forced internal movement of the Muslim population from ‘mixed’ areas of Old Delhi to Muslim-dominated areas for the first time, which came to be defined as protected ‘Muslim zones’ and ‘Muslim refugee camps’ in official vocabulary in the aftermath of the partition. The Muslim zones were not created by the Indian government; instead, they were created by the Muslims of Delhi as a defence mechanism. The Indian government intervened at a later stage to protect evacuee properties in Muslim-dominated areas for the rehabilitation of Muslim ‘refugees’. For the Muslims staying in these ilaqe, it was not a matter of choice;

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nor was these enclaves celebrated zones of culture. Instead, living in these areas became a compulsion for Muslims—for safety. In a few years, these pockets were marked as ‘communally sensitive areas’—a stigma that transformed these areas in later decades from protected sites to zones of trouble. The study shows how colonial categories and the vocabulary of homelands converged to establish the right to collective presence: in the pre-partition period, it meant a ‘right to be able to assert and observe religious and cultural practices’, while in post-partition Delhi, it came to be recognised as a means to ensure security for the minority Muslim community. Given the fact that the partition violence of September 1947 resulted in the migration of a significant section of the Muslim population of Delhi, whether out of choice, fear or persuasion, the idea of Pakistan turned into a source of collective guilt for the Delhi Muslims who stayed back. Their association with the Muslim League and Pakistan and/or with Congress and the nationalist idea of India became important idioms to draw multiple meanings of nationalism, loyalties, belongingness and, even, right to citizenship. Quite interestingly, these meanings depended on ways in which their association was perceived by the administrative machinery and Hindu political groups. As for the Delhi Muslims, both who stayed and who returned, the partition and the creation of Pakistan meant: a betrayal both by the Pakistan and Indian governments, violent and organised exclusion of the community and, above all, a tale of lost dignity. This sense of marginalisation somehow forced Muslim political organisations to adopt a defensive mode—a stated apolitical agenda for internal reforms. Jamiat-Ulema-i-Hind, for instance, passed a resolution in the mid-1950s that committed itself to give up active politics and work for the socio-economic empowerment of the Muslim community. Urbanisation and development were also seen, in the 1950s, as modes of modernisation or secularisation—to turn social groups into national subjects. It was anticipated, as Sunil Khilnani argued,

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that the communities, in the long run, would leave their religious, regional and linguistic associations behind and imagine themselves as Indian citizens.5 This agenda of mainstreaming was appropriated by the Hindu political organisations like RSS and Jan Sangh. They offered a majoritarian meaning of the mainstream by evoking certain undefined, unclear and unwritten expectations. In their imagination, religious minorities, particularly Muslims, would have to appear, behave, live, organise, vote or even eat in some particularly nationalistic ways to prove their loyalties. It created a fertile ground for competitive electoral politics. For instance, although the communal demarcation of electoral constituencies disappeared from administrative frameworks in post-independence India, the association of Muslims with specific electoral constituencies continued to dominate political discussions even in the 1950s. The local electoral politics is a revealing example in this regard. A vote for Congress was not only a guarantee of security for the Muslims of Delhi but also a reflection of an obvious expression of their patriotism. At least, this is what Congress tried to underline. On the other hand, Hindu political organisations saw it as an appeasement of Muslims by the Congress-run government and, consequently, the marginalisation of Hindus. In both situations, however, Muslim-dominated constituencies of Delhi were either ‘protected’ to retain secured electoral support or forcibly cleared to make favourable equations of voters. I argue that competitive electoral politics not only shaped the Muslim identity and space but also turned these pockets into sites that had to be kept contentious for them to remain significant enough. Meat practice—in terms of its production (space where animals are slaughtered), sale (the shops and streets where meat is displayed or hawked to be sold) and consumption (households where it is eaten)—was another important aspect that re-established Muslim ilaqe as culturally contested sites. The competitive politics of space around the Idgah slaughterhouse, meat shops and the locality of Qasabpura (which comes under the Sadar Bazar police station)

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reveals that the contest over meat practice emphatically linked an occupation and eating habit to national Indian culture and identity, resulting in the communalisation of meat. The body of the cow, claimed to be a symbol of national pride by Hindu organisations, and the location of slaughterhouses became important political idioms by which majoritarian Hindu notions of the mainstream were evoked. Since cow slaughter was already banned in Delhi, the Hindu religious and political organisations used cow killing as a plea to restrict the slaughtering of all big animals, especially buffalos. The book shows that the legal-constitutional and administrative processes—meant especially to legalise the sensibilities around the cow and to regularise meat practice through bye-laws, acts and bills in the late 1960s—not only constrained a potentially flourishing business but also sharpened the class, caste and religious distinctions. Selective non-vegetarian practices like the sale and consumption of chicken, mutton, fish and eggs acquired an acceptable and non-controversial place in the educated middle-class, upper-caste urban culture of Delhi. Bade ka gosht (meat of big animals)—consumed mainly by lower-caste, lowerclass communities and religious minorities, especially Muslims—was seen as non-acceptable food. The book suggests that the practice of meat in the 1960s and 1970s consolidated the communal demarcation of space and re-established Muslim-dominated areas as unhygienic cultural zones. The book has also examined the process of urbanisation and debates on internal security that redefined the Muslim areas in a different way, especially in the 1970s. The overwhelming concerns of the State for cleanliness, population control and beautification gradually evolved into a set of policies. Although the stated objective was to reclaim urban land from ‘illegal’ encroachments and protect cultural heritage from filthy occupants, the old city of Delhi became one of the prime targets of urban development. In this schema, the Muslim-concentrated pockets were seen not only as failures of the expected secularisation programme but also perceived as closed and

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segregated pockets of underdevelopment. At the same time, these areas also became the source of concern for ‘internal security’. Two wars with Pakistan (in 1965 and 1971) and the complex configuration of local politics of the early 1970s transformed these areas into sites of ‘internal threat’. In the backdrop of Indira Gandhi’s famous National Regeneration Programme, which combined urban aspirations, internal security concerns and social regeneration plans, the Muslim localities were called ‘mini Pakistans’ in India. This book shows how statutory, metropolitan and municipal authorities formed a collaborative team and zeroed in on ending Muslim ‘segregation’ through forced clearance and sterilisation in the Jama Masjid and Turkman Gate areas during Emergency (1975–1977). There were protests from residents of the Turkman Gate and Jama Masjid areas against forced demolition and sterilisations, which resulted in lathi charging, tear gassing, firing, curfew, looting and sexual abuse by police. The Muslim areas, as a result, were defined as troublesome and backward, held back by self-imposed religious sanctions against family planning. The book highlights how administrative policies, in terms of clearance, resettlement, redevelopment and regularisation of ‘illegal’ encroachments, were implemented selectively in Delhi during the 1960s and the 1970s. The Muslim-dominated pockets became victims of these policies rather than beneficiaries. This status of victimhood changed with the construction of a housing complex at the demolition site and allotment of houses at suitable alternative places, but the cost that was paid in the form of compulsory sterilisation tells a complex narrative of the making of Muslim areas as contested zones. The events of Jama Masjid and Turkman Gate were forgotten in political circles and disappeared from public memory with the end of the anti-Emergency narrative, but the perceptions that those events reinforced about Muslim areas remained important determining factors in the policy framework. In the discourse of urban development, Muslim living spaces were regarded as contentious

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sites that were best left alone because the community was inwardlooking and against the inclusive living and progressive ideas like population control, health and hygiene. These pockets were thus deprived of necessary improvement in redevelopment, sanitation and hygiene, a fact underlined by the Sachar Commission report. This neglect and constant deprivation resulted in a kind of segregation as Hindu and Punjabi refugees started moving out of the Walled City to newly developed colonies after this area was declared a slum in the 1970s. (They, however, continued to hold their commercial units like shops, karkhanas and other businesses.) On the other hand, Muslim concentration in the Walled City of Delhi increased after Emergency, as security became an important concern for the Muslims of Delhi and those who migrated from other areas of UP. Interestingly, new colonies that emerged after the1980s were predominantly either Hindu or Muslim in their demographic composition. For instance, a number of private housing societies owned by the educated middle class emerged specifically on communal lines in the extended areas of Delhi. Some of them were Taj Enclave, Azad Apartment and a few more inhabited only by Muslims, while there were others with distinctively Hindu concentration. More importantly, these societies deliberately found ways to deny access to members of other communities, thereby becoming highly segregated living quarters owned by educated middle-class/upper-middle-class Hindus or Muslims. These events and the entire period of Emergency had an enduring political significance. The course of politics in north India completely changed with the emergence of new political actors like Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which came into its own in the wake of the disintegration of the anti-Congress platform in 1980. Jan Sangh, which was a part of Janata Party, along with other political parties like Janata Dal and a faction of Congress, formed BJP in 1980. Religious polarisation became an important feature of national and local level politics with the emergence of BJP. These

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developments in competitive electoral politics had a direct impact on the re-establishment of the dominant conceptions of Muslim space that had evolved in the postcolonial/post-partition context. It led to the politicisation and communalisation of religious identity and space—whether it was related to food habits, backwardness, threat perception or the communally sensitive character of these localities—which were prone to conflict and disturbances. The politics of space, in this sense, found concrete expression in the language of Hindu Rashtra; a new slogan of the ‘rise of Hindus’ emerged as BJP grew stronger at both local and national levels, especially in the second half of the1980s. The book thus argues that the changing character of Muslim ilaqe in Delhi is the product of historical processes. The discourse of homeland and the realities of partition established the notion of ‘Muslim-dominated areas’ as ‘exclusionary’ and ‘contested’ zones. These localities turned out to be those pockets where the dominant ideas of the nation were to be engineered, materialised and practised. Consequently, these localities were looked at differently over four decades: in the 1940s, as ‘Muslim-dominated’ areas that were to be administered for the sake of communal peace; in the 1950s, as ‘Muslim zones’ that needed to be ‘protected’; in the 1960s, as ‘isolated’, unhygienic cultural pockets that were to be cleaned and Indianised; and in the 1970s, as locations of ‘internal threat’—‘mini Pakistans’—that were to be dismantled and integrated. The book thus suggests that ‘Muslim localities’ are discursively constituted political entities, which may or may not correspond to the actual demographic configuration of any administrative urban unit. They continue to determine the various, actual manifestations of the ideas of homeland. Hence, the term ‘mini Pakistan’ should always be seen in relation to the equally persuasive claims of Hindu Rashtra and the demands posed by the State-centric discourse of secularism. These dominant notions have resulted in the objectification or, more appropriately, ‘museumization’ of the everyday spatial practices and

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culture of a living community. This is one of the reasons why these pockets came to be seen as ‘terrorist hide-outs’ in the altered political scenario of the late 1990s and why the issues that underpin such objectification persist in the 21st century.

Notes 1

2 3 4

5

Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Partition and Independence in Delhi: 1947–48’, Economic and Political Weekly 32, no. 36 (6–12 September 1997), 2261– 2272; Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Can Muslim be an Indian’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 4 (October 1999), 608–629. See Sunil Khilnani, Idea of India (New York: Hamish Hamilton, 1997), 15–60. Ted Svensson, The Production of Postcolonial India and Pakistan: Meanings of Partition (New York: Routledge, 2013), 114 Kumar and Prasad, Selected Works of Jawahar Lal Nehru (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), Second Series 28, no. 1 (February–31 May 1955). For critical analyses on ‘mainstream’, the book has used the following sources: Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Can Muslim be an Indian’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 4 (October 1999), 608–629; Joya Chatterji, ‘South Asian Histories of Citizenship’, The Historical Journal 55, no. 04 (December 2012), 1070 of 1049–1071; Aditya Nigam, The Insurrection of Little Selves: The Crisis of Secular Nationalism in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006.); Aditya Nigam, The Insurrection of Little Selves: The Crisis of Secular Nationalism in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006.); Khilnani, The Idea of India; Svensson, Production of Postcolonial India and Pakistan; Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Decolonisation and the Politics of Transition in South Asia (New Delhi: Orient Black Swan, 2016). Khilnani, Idea of India, 1–15.

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Appendix Table 1: Understanding the Discourse of Homeland, 1940s Composite Idea of India

Exclusionary Idea of India

Themes/ Exponents

Nehru/Congress

Jinnah/Muslim League

Savarkar/ Mahasabha

What is India in terms of space?

(a) Evolving space: A politically and geographically evolved spatial entity called Hindustan. (b) Shared spatiality: The shared experiences of colonialism have given a spatial and political commonness to diversified communities.

Defined Space inhabited by two nationalities: A political, territorial and geographic entity defined as a unit called Hindustan or India by British colonialism inhabited by two distinct nationalities having completely different zones of culture.

Demarcated sacred Hindu space: A politically, ethnically and religiously demarcated territorial space. The words Hindu, Hidusthan and Hind represent the soul of a Rashtra evolved with a belief system, culture and tradition that is non-divisible, nonsharable.

Who has the right over this space?

(a) Nationalism as a stakeholder: Since anti-colonial nationalism offers a collective expression of Indian political identity, nationalist selfdetermination should be taken as a principle for ensuring right over this space.

Nationalities’ claim to statehood: Nationalities have a right over the space where they live and practice specific belief system, culture and tradition. The Muslim India belongs to Muslims and Hindu India belongs to Hindus.

Hindu by birth, belief and culture: Those for whom Hindusthan is a pious and holy land by birth, belief and culture own this space. Hindus and the communities who belong to the belief systems sprouted out of Hinduism on Indian soil are the true and only claimants of Hindusthan.

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Composite Idea of India

Exclusionary Idea of India

Nehru/Congress

Jinnah/Muslim League

Savarkar/ Mahasabha

How to Collectivism deal with based on modern differences? democratic ideas: Integration of different communities at all levels in India’s historically evolved soul for the making of modern India.

Constitutional safeguards: Adequate rights and representation to sub-national groups or minorities living in that demarcated space.

Complete assimilation of various offspring of Hinduism who have common Hindu blood, belief, culture and customs such as Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs and Arya s Samajies.

A secular republic: A modern democratic republic based on the principle of unity in diversity.

Territorially defined nationstates: Hindustan for Hindu India and Pakistan for Muslim India.

Hindu nation state: An Akhand Hindusthan Hindu Rashtra following Hindu culture, belief system and ideology.

Themes/ Exponents

(b) Collective contribution as right to space: All communities and groups who have contributed to the making of India belong to this space in every sense.

What is the Idea of future India?

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Glossary Ashraf: elite Azan: call for prayer Bada Janwar: big animal Bade ka gosht: meat of big animals Badhir: Hindu butcher community of Bihar Bhartiakaran: Indianisation Bhartiya: Indian Biradari: brotherhood, occupational community Chamar/Charmkar: community who traditionally deal in skinning and shoe making Chamdra: animal skin Char Deewari Shaher: a city surrounded by four walls Darwaza: gate Dilliwala: an inhabitant of Delhi Fasil/Deewar: wall Fatwa: religious sanction Firqaparasti: communalism Gali: street Ghaddari: betrayal Halal: Islamic way of slaughtering Hawan: a collective Hindu religious practice to please the God of fire for a wish Hunar: skill Ilaqa: locality Jahil: uneducated Jhatka: Sikh way of slaughtering, also prevalent amongst Hindus Kamela: livestock market Karigars: artisans Kasab: a section of Muslim butcher community who slaughter big animals Kasai: a term used for Muslim butcher which the community considers derogatory Khatik: Hindu butcher community of Delhi and UP.

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Glossary

279

Kuchabandi: a practice of fencing a mohalla with gates at the main entrance Mohalla: neighbourhood Mafad: interest Majboori: compulsion Manihar: Muslim community who manufacture and trade bangles Maryada: honour Mili-juli abadi: mixed population Mohalladars: neighbours Mohalladari: neighbourly feeling Namaz: Muslim prayer Nasbandi: sterilisation Nazul land: government land Purnasawaraj: complete independence Qatl-e-aam: massacre Qaum: community Qaumi ittehad: communal harmony Qurbani: religious sacrifice Qureshi: Muslim community involved in meat and associated trades Samaj: society Sanskriti: tradition Shuddhi: purification Suba: province Subedar: a head of Suba Thana: police station Ulaema/Ulema: religious scholars Umma: community Wakf: property donated for the welfare of the Muslim community Zabiha: Islamic way of slaughtering Zila: district

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Roy, Asim ‘The High Politics of India’s Partition’, in Mushirul Hasan (ed.). India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993). _______The Islamic Syncretic Tradition in Bengal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Roy, Haimanti. Partitioned Lives: Migrants, Refugees, Citizens in India and Pakistan, 1947–1965 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012). Saini, Mahander Kumar, Walter K. Andersen and Mahender K. Saini. ‘The Basti Julahan Bye-Election’, The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July–September 1969). Saksena, R.N. Refugees: A Study in Changing Attitudes (Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1961). Sanyal, Usha. Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmed Riza Khan and His Movement, 1870–1920 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996). Sarai Reader 2: City of Everyday Life (Delhi: Sarai, CSDS, The Society for Old & New Media, 2002). Sathe, S.P. ‘Cow Slaughter: The Legal Aspects’, in A.B. Shah (ed.). Cow Slaughter: Horns of a Dilemma (Delhi: Lalvani Publishing House, 1967). Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar. Hindutvake Panch Prarn (Five essentials of Hindutva) (Hindi) (New Delhi: Bharti Sahitya Sadan, 1971). Sen, Amiya P. (ed.). Social and Religious Reform: The Hindus of British India (Debates in Indian History and Society) (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003). Sezhiyan, Era (ed.). Shah Commission Report, Lost and Regained (Chennai: Azhi Publishers, 2010). Shaban, Abdul. ‘Muslims and Space in Mumbai’, in Abdul Shaban (ed.). Lives of Muslims in India: Politics, Exclusion and Violence (New Delhi: Routledge, 2012). _______Mumbai: Political Economy of Crime and Space (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 2010). Shaikh, Farzana, ‘Muslim Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan’, in Farzana Shaikh (ed.). Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860–1947 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

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Sharan, Awdhendra. In the City, Out of Place: Nuisance, Pollution and Dwelling in Delhi, 1850–2000 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014). Siddiqi, Shahid. The Golden Pigeon (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2014). Sikand, Yoginder. The Origins and Development of the Tablighi-Jama’at (1920–2000) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2002). Singh, Patwant. ‘The Nine Delhis: Historical Perspective’, in Patwant Singh and Ram Dhamija (eds). Delhi: The Deepening Urban Crisis (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1989). Spear, Percival. Delhi: A Historical Sketch (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1945). _______Twilight of the Mughals: Studies in Late Mughal Delhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951). Sundaram, Ravi. Pirate Modernity: Delhi’s Media Urbanism (Oxford, New York: Routledge, 2010). Svensson, Ted. The Production of Postcolonial India and Pakistan: Meanings of Partition (New York: Routledge, 2013). Talbot, Ian and Gurharpal Singh (eds). Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Talbot, Ian. ‘The Growth of the Muslim League in Punjab, 1937–46’, in Mushirul Hasan (ed.). India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993). Tan, Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudasiya. The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2000). Tarlo, Emma. Unsettling Memories: Narratives of the Emergency in Delhi (London: Hurst & Co., 2003). Taylor, David and Malcolm Yapp (eds). Political Identity in South Asia (London: SOAS University of London, 1979). Troll, Christian W. Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978). Veer, P. Van Der. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Williams, C., A.D. Smith. ‘The National Construction of Social Space’, Progress in Human Geography, 7(4) (1983), 502–518. Yang, Anand A. ‘A Conversation of Rumours: The Language of Popular “Mentalitès” in Late Nineteenth-Century Colonial India’, Journal of Social History, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Spring, 1987), 485–505.

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Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. ‘Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrasa in British India and Pakistan’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1999), 294–323. Zamindar, Vazeera Fazila-Yacoobali. The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia (Refugees, Boundaries, Histories) (New Delhi: Penguin, 2008).

Primary Sources Bharat Sewak Samaj, Slums of Old Delhi: Report of the Socio-Economic Survey of the Slum Dwellers of Old Delhi City (Delhi: Atma Ram & Sons, 1958). Indian Delimitation Commission: Proposals for the Delimitation of Constituencies in the Provincial and Central Legislature, Vol. II (Shimla: Government of India Press, 1936). Overview of The Indian Buffalo: Meat Value Chain (New Delhi: Agriculture Division Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry [FICCI], 2013). Report of the Delhi Municipal Organization Enquiry Committee (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1948).

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Annual Reports of the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation (1949–1967).

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Urban Art Commission Annual Reports (1972–1975).

Newspapers and Magazines Al-Jamiat Hindustan Times Organiser Pratap Hindi Daily Dawn The Times of India

Acts and Judgments: Buffalo Traders Welfare Association &… vs Maneka Gandhi & Ors., 30 November 1996, SCI. Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957. Hanif Qureshi & Others vs The State of Bihar, 1958 (AIR 1958 SRC 731, 1959 SCR 629). Maneka Gandhi vs. Union Territory of Delhi and Ors., 18 March 1984 (ILR 1995 Delhi 49) Delhi High Court (DHC). Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Mohammad Yasin Etc., 28 April 1983 (1983 SCR (2) 999, 1983 SCC (3) 229). India Independence Act, 1947.

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Web Sources http://www.livemint.com/Politics/RhPVLUFmclIDWRIiSoTC7N/Who are-the-beef-eaters-in-India.html (accessed on 15 May 2015). http://www.archivesofrss.org/Resolutions.aspx (accessed on 15 October 2014). http://dahd.nic.in/documents/reports/report-national-commission-cattle (accessed on 23 June 2016). http://www.ummid.com/news/2015/March/11.03.2015/animal-slaughterin-india-key-facts.html#sthash.C5aC6hIk.dpuf (accessed on 18 June 2015).

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Index A Achchutsthan, 18n9 Ad hoc (Slum Clearance and Improvement) Committee, 206, 236 Administration of Evacuee Property Act (1950), 152 Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act (1954), 163 aggressive religious rituals, 13, 25 agricultural economy, 172, 174 Ahmed, Khurshid, 138 Ahmed, Mir Mushtaq, 155, 226 Ahmed, Mohammad, 183 Ahmed, Sayyid, 43 Ahrar Party, 94, 97, 132n97 Air Raid Precautions (ARP) policy, 97 Akhand Bharat, 3–4, 15, 78, 84, 90, 94, 173 demand for, 184 Akhand Bharat Conferences, 94 Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, 61 Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha (ABPS), 165 Al Jamiat, 191n87, 254 Ali, Asaf, 202, 206, 227, 229, 247n5 Aligarh scheme, 82, 83, 120 Al-Jamiat, 14 All-India Hindu Mahasabha, 91 All-India Hindu Militarisation Board, 91 All-India Jamiatul Quresh (AIJQ), 171 All-India Muslim League, 2, 105 ‘All-India Pakistan Day’, 93 Ambedkar, B.R., 102 Anglo Arabic School, 88 Anjuman Islamia, 72n90 Anjuman-e-Islamia, 46, 53, 109, 111 Anjuman-e-Rifaiat-e-Hind, 72n90

Anjuman-e-Saif-ul Islam, 94 Anjuman-e-Tajran, 223 Anjuman-i-Imani, 72n90 Annual Administration Report of Delhi, 14 anti-British war campaign, 97 anti-League Muslim, 94 anti-Muslim platform, 97, 102 anti-Pakistan agitation, 97, 102 anti-Pakistan day, 93–94 anxieties, 1, 12, 48, 50–51, 121, 150, 229 artisan, migration of the, 189n55 Arya Raksha Samiti, 62 Arya Samaj, 48, 62, 92, 94–95, 102, 176 shuddhi campaign, 48, 62 stronghold of activities, 60 Arya Samaj-Hindu Mahasabha, 130n37 Arya Veer, 174 Arya Vir Dal, 62, 92, 102 Arya Yuvak Sangh, 94 Attlee, Clement Richard, 116 Azad Apartment, 273 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, 86, 97– 98, 113, 138, 140–142, 145–146, 148, 155 Azadi Ki Chhaon Mein, 149 Aziz, Abdul, 30

B Babuddin, Haji, 88, 149 Bada Hindu Rao, riots (1973 and 1974), 181 Bade ka gosht (meat of big animals), 15, 164, 170, 180, 271 Bakht, Sikandar, 243 Bakra-Eid, 32, 34, 36, 51–53, 58, 60, 103, 105–109, 168

297

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 297

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298

Index

patrolling the city during the, 60 riots during (1924), 64 traditional route on, 106 Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar, 8, 10–11 Bangladesh war, 215–217 control of the ilaqa by police, 217 hub of Pakistani agents, 217 Muslim areas and, 215–217 strict police surveillance of Jama Masjid area, 217 Baptist Missionary Society, 29 Bayly, C.A., 28 beautification of the city, 216, 222 beautification, selective meaning of, 213 Bharat Dharma Mahamandal, 2–3 Bharat Gosevak Samaj (BGS), 175 Bharat Sewak Samaj (BSS), 205 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 273–274 rise of Hindus, 274 Bharatiyakaran (Indianisation), 212, 268 Muslim-dominated areas and, 212–215 Bhargava, Thakur Das, 167 Bhartiya Jan Sangh, 15, 175–176, 213, 213–214 aggressive meat politics, 178 Bhawani Mal, 235 Bhinder, P.S., 229 Bhushan, Shashi, 239 Bose, Ajoy, 244 Brahmanical vegetarian sensitivities, 15 British Cabinet, 116 British East India Company, 26 British understanding of the mutiny, 37 Bukhari, Abdulla, 221, 223

C Cabinet Mission, 76, 98–101, 103 reasons for rejecting the, 100 failed to arrive at a consensus, 103 call for ‘direct action’, 89, 100 camel sacrifice, 32 Cantonment Act, 56 caste- and craft based community, gradual transformation of, 13

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 298

caste- and craft-based demography, 40 caste craft and class-oriented mohallas, 55, 120, 266 caste, sectional and occupational identities, 55 caste-based tussle, 62 caste-class configuration, 62 categorisation, colonial policies of, 9 central demolition squad, 204–205 Central Muslim Relief Committee, 157 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), 232 changing political identity of space, 116–121 Chatterjee, Partha, 9–10 Christian missionaries, conversion, 30 Chunna Mal, Lala, 38 Citizenship (Amendment) Act (2019), 1 citizenship and belongingness, 268 Civil Defence Committee, 131n92 class-based mohallas, 5 classification, enumeration and spatial mapping, 9 collective identity of Muslims, 238–246 coercive measures, 238 illegalities and coercion during demolitions, 240 resistance of the local Muslim population, 240 colonial administration, nature of, 13, 25 colonial imagination, 25 colonial modernity, 7 commercial market association, 224 Committee for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 172 communal demography, 65 communal identity, vocabulary of, 102 ‘communal mohallas’, strict patrolling of, 107 communal polarisation, 97, 176, 182 communal representation, 13, 26, 41–47, 53, 55, 63

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Index colonial policy on Indian representation, 42–43 intramural wards, 43 mechanism of city governance, 44 organisational structure of the municipality, 44 political space and, 41–47 political–communal overtone, 43 representative self-government, 45 communal riots, 8, 29, 49, 103, 107 Communal Riot Scheme (CRS), 60, 106 communal space, idea of, 10 communal violence, 10, 60, 139, 141, 144–145, 151, 156, 163, 171, 184 communalism, 7–8, 12, 82, 267 communally sensitive areas, 115, 159, 184, 269 community-based electoral representation, 66 community-based self-defence, 62 community–space relations, 2, 76–78, 265, 200 transformation of, 2 comprehensive economic development, 219 conceptualisation of Muslim ilaqe, 265 congregational prayers, symbolic politicisation of, 112 Congress, 6, 13, 78, 86–87, 90, 92–94, 97–101, 103, 113, 116–117, 121, 136, 165–167, 173–176, 179–180, 205, 214–217, 228, 238–239, 242–244, 269–270, 273 competition with Jan Sangh, 250n47 cow protectionist lobby, 165, 167, 173 crisis of leadership in, 216 criticised the demolition drives in Old Delhi, 215 evidence of Muslim appeasement, 215 five-point programme, 216 remarkable comeback, 215 sterilisation campaign, 217

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 299

299

twenty-point programme, 216 consultative mechanism, 42 contested demography, 77–79 contested public space, 103–110 contested space, 55–66 conversion, 29–30, 47, 137 anxiety, 48 Cotton Market Association, 224 Councils Act, 42 cow politics, 164, 167, 175 cow protection, meat and Muslim localities, 164–184 anti-cow slaughter campaign of RSS, 166 Congress’ cow protectionist lobby, 165 cow protectionist lobby, 167 extensive ban on the slaughtering of ‘big’ animals, 168 Idgah Slaughterhouse Indian Cattle Prevention Bill, 166 Muslim cultural-religious identity, 164 muslim localities as meat-eating sites, 168–171 political imagination of the nation, 165–168 Qasabpura, 171–184 ‘selective’ vegetarianism, 164 transformation into Hindu– Muslim issue, 178 cow protection movement, 6, 48, 51, 60, 96, 175 cow protection organisations, 48 cow protectionist lobby, 167 cow slaughter, 25, 29, 31–34, 36, 50–51, 54, 59, 62, 63, 166–168, 178, 181, 266, 271 Bakra-Eid (critical period of festivity), 51 ban on, 165, 194n118, 212 ‘delimited zones’ by municipality, 51–52 general conflict over transportation of meat, 53 intensive policing of the city, 52

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300

Index

legalisation of the slaughter of animals, 49–50 meat and Muslim space, 49–55 meat shops in ‘Hindu-dominated’ areas of, 51 Cow Slaughter Prevention Committee, 173 Cow, space and conflicts, 31–37 administrative measures in Punjab, 33 British administrative intervention, 35 Company’s response to cow slaughter, 33 conflict management, 34 cow emerged as a strong political symbol, 36 demarcation of the community space, 34 dispute over cow sacrifice (1819), 33 legalisation of the practice, 34 regularisation of cow slaughter, 32 riots (1853 and 1855), 35 royal proclamation on occasion of Eid, 36 scope of the debate on cow slaughter, 32 Criminal Law Amendment Act (1908), 132n96 Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 52, 107 Cripps Mission (1942), 87, 90, 98 failure of, 87 curfew, 183, 222, 234, 272 custodian department, partisan’s role, 181 custodian of evacuee property, 147, 161–162

D Dalitsthan, 18n9 danger spots, 60, 107 dark and damp localities, 201–217 ‘proper and tempting re-housing scheme’, 202

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 300

‘unplanned’ growth of structures, 203 Bangladesh war and Muslim areas, 215–217 Bharatiyakaran and Muslimdominated areas, 212–215 deteriorating old katras and basties, 203 katras, 201 landlord class, 202 master plan and the Delhi–Ajmeri gate scheme, 205–208 nazul land, 202 old residents, 202 politics of clearance and rehabilitation, 208–212 shifting population, 202 Dawn, 94, 100, 105, 112 Dayal, John, 16, 242, 244 decolonization process, 268 de-communalisation of religious identities, 267 Defence of India Act and Defence of India Rules (DIADIR) (1962), 257n99 Defence of India Regulation Act (DIR), 226, 257n99 de-Islamisation and de-Anglicisation of minority religious communities, 212 Delhi College (Zakir Hussain College), 141 Delhi Corporation Act (1957), 179 Delhi Cow Protection Bill (1967), 15, 177 Delhi Development Authority (DDA), 16, 172, 204–206, 208–213, 215, 218–219, 221, 224–239 allotment slips for plots in Nand Nagri and Trilokpuri resettlement colonies, 230 clearance agenda of, 213 clearance and rehabilitation, 210–211 (Table) clearance-cum-improvementcum-development drives, 215

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Index institutional tussle with DMC, 213 legal framework, 208 management of land and population, 209 purpose of the formation of, 205 purpose of, 208 Turkman Gate clearance, 228 Delhi Development Authority Act (1957), 204 Delhi Improvement Trust (DIT), 202, 204 Delhi Master Plan (1962), 173 Delhi Meat Control Bill (1970), 15, 179–180 Delhi Meat Merchant Association (DMMA), 180 Delhi Metropolitan Council, 6, 15, 176–177, 179, 208–213, 224, 236–237 constituted a Yamuna Bank Development Board, 213 clearance and rehabilitation, 210–211 (Table) institutional tussle with DDA, 213 Delhi Metropolitan Council election, 15, 176 Delhi Municipal Committee, 43 Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (1957), 168, 177 Delhi Municipal Corporation election (1962), 175 Delhi Municipal Organisation Enquiry Committee (DMOEC), 118 Delhi Slums Improvement and Clearance Act, 214 Delhi social life, configuration of was, 28 Delhi Society, 43–44 Delhi Urban Art Commission, 222 Delhi Wakf Board, 221, 223–224, 255n77 Delhi–Ajmeri Gate scheme, 162, 201, 205–208 master plan and, 205–208 phase-wise implementation of, 206

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 301

301

Delimitation Commission of India (1936), 64 demarcation of space, 13–14, 37–55, 60, 76, 103, 134, 156, 168, 265–266, 271 demonstrative religious rituals, 13, 25 de-politicisation of religious identities, 267 Desai, Morarji, 243 ‘de-westernization’ of city space, 212 Dharmputra (film), 126n39 Dilliwalas, aristocratic culture of, 203 Direct Action Day, 100, 111–112 dominance without hegemony, 9 dominant imagination of ‘Muslim areas’, 2 Dujana House rehabilitation project, 227–258n103

E East India Company, 37 economic structure of the city, 40 electoral constituencies, 270 electoral politics, 16, 47, 49, 120, 164, 166, 270, 274 electoral process, fear of communalising, 45 Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (ECC), 140, 142 Emergency (1975–1977), 6, 16, 20n15, 140, 183, 200, 215–217, 219–220, 224, 226, 233, 236, 240, 243–245, 272–273 atrocities of, 244 population control, 6 anti-Emergency narrative, 244, 272 declaration of the, 215–216, 222-223 ended on the 23 March 1977, 243 Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (ECC), 140, 142 English-educated elite, 8 evacuees, 146, 152, 161–162 evacuee pool, 153, 160 evacuee property law, abolition of, 163 evacuee property ordinances, 15

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302

Index

Evangelical Christianity, 29 Expert Ad Hoc Committee on Slaughterhouse, 172

F Family Planning Campaign, 227–238 agitation by angry women, 233 Dujana House incidence, 229–230, 241–242 fatwa, 241 Forced sterilisation of the poor Muslim population, 232 intrinsic part of, 230 justification of firing incident, 240 police brutality against women, 232 sterilisation camp, 229 sterilization of poor Muslim population, 233 at Turkman Gate, 230 Fatehpuri Masjid, 38, 44, 48, 73n111 fatwa (statement based on Islamic principles by religious head), 241 favouritism, new technique of, 44 first five year plan, 167 five-point programme, 16, 216 Ford Foundation, 205 Freitag, Sandria, 8, 10

G Gahziuddin, Madrasa, 38 gali, 4, 14, 19n12, 53, 107, 114, 217, 267 Gandhi, Indira, 176, 215–217, 223– 224, 239–240, 243–244, 246, 272 arrest of, 243 came back to power, 244 emerged as heroes, 244 undermined the principle of ‘unity in diversity’, 246 See also Emergencey (1955–1977) Gandhi, Sanjay, 216, 226, 230, 235, 239, 243–245 emerged as heroes, 244 sudden death of, 245 Garam Hawa (film), 126n39

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 302

‘Garibi Hatao’ slogan, 215. See also Gandhi, Indira Ghalib, 43 ‘Ghareebon Ko Hatao’, 251n49 Ghazipur, 172 ghettoisation, symbols of, 184 Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, 77 Govind Das, Seth, 166 ‘Great Calcutta Killings’, 101 Greathed, Harvey, 36 Guha, Ranajit, 9–10 Gupta, Narayani, 35, 38, 46 Gupta, Prem Chand, 178 Gurudwara Sisganj Sahib, 72n90

H Hanif Qureshi vs. State of Biharr, 195n128 Harijan Housing scheme, 213 Hasan, Syed Zafarul, 82 Hashmi, Syed Ahmed, 224 Hindu and Punjabi refugees, resettlement of, 181, 203 Hindu and Sikh Partition victims, 16, 147, 151, 212 Hindu and Sikh refugee, 203 Hindu culture of ahimsa (nonviolence), 164 Hindu-dominated demarcations, 104 (Map) Hindu-dominated India, 4, 267 Hindu–Indian space, 81 Hindu Mahasabha, 2–3, 15, 78, 91, 94–95, 101, 160, 176 Hindu–Muslim communal antagonism, 3 Hindu–Muslim constituencies, 13, 26, 55–66 Hindu–Muslim identities, 119 Hindu–Muslim unity, 94 Hindu nationalist alliance, 165 Hindu Rashtra Dal, 14, 92 ‘Hindu Rashtra’, parallel discourse of, 184 Hindu Sena, 14

19/10/20 11:53 AM

Index Hindu–Sikh action against demand of Pakistan, 94–95 Hindu–Sikh coalition, 95 Hindu–Sikh polarisation, 95 Hindu Vedic cultural heritage, 81 Hindu Veer, 174 Hindustan Times (HT), 14 Hindutva ideology, 124n23 homeland conflicting notions of, 3–4, 77 discourse of, 1–5, 13–16, 76–77, 88, 97, 119, 134–135, 159, 274 imagination of, 83 concept of, 17n5 homogenous cultural zones, imagination of, 84 Hussain, Zakir, 145 Hyderabad Agitation, 130n77

I ideas of India, 77–79 identity-based habitational patterns, 111 Idgah slaughterhouse, 171–184 aggressive meat politics, 178 ban on slaughterhouses, 179 Delhi Meat Control Bill (1970), 180 efficiency and conditions of, 172 expert ad hoc Committee on Slaughterhouse, 172 fee increased for slaughtering per animal, 180 location of, 171 meat inspection practices, 172 part of slum clearance and improvement scheme, 180 relocation due to insanitary conditions, 177 ilaqa, 4, 14, 19n12, 28, 53, 107, 217, 245, 267 illegal encroachments, 271–272 imagined communities, 8 ‘inclusive city’, idea of, 246 India Wins Freedom, 86, 138, 142 Indian Cattle Prevention Bill, 166

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 303

303

Indian Councils Act (1909), 77 ‘Indian Muslims’ versus ‘Pakistani Muslims’, 4 Indian National Congress. See Congress Indianisation campaign, 212 Indus river, 124n22 intending evacuees, 161 inter-state migration, 83 Island of Truth, 237, 240–241

J Jagmohan, 16, 213, 215, 218–220, 227, 229, 231, 237–241, 245 Jain, A.P., 163 Jama Masjid clearance scheme, 16, 220–221 actual and violent reception of, 221 alternative scheme, 221 clearance drive, 223 clearance of shops, 222 demolition drives, 223 demolition of shops around Jama Masjid, 226 (Figure) disappeared from public memory, 272 Jama Masjid emerged as a powerful symbol of Muslim collective identity, 222 lack of financial assistance, 220 project for shifting the shops, 220 short-term measures for the upliftment, 221 violent incidents (1975), 221 Jama Masjid Committee, 43–44 Jamat-e-Islami Hind, 240 Jamia Millia Islamia, 145 Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, 62, 78, 94, 127n56, 153, 224, 269 Jamiat-ul-Ulema office library, 14 Jamuna Par, 213 Jan Sangh, 16, 170, 173, 175–183, 201, 212–215, 217, 242, 270, 273 aggressive meat politics of, 181

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304

Index

competition with Congress, 250n47 defeat in the metropolitan council election (1971), 182 introduced Delhi Meat Control Bill, 179 success of, 176 support base, 177 victory in the 1967 election, 177 Janata Dal, 273 Janata Party, 243, 273 Jay Prakash Narayan’s movement for ‘total revolution’, 216 Jhandewalan Temple, 73n111 Jhuggi-Jhonpdi dwellers, removed from Jamuna Bazar, 214 Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 2, 13, 78, 80–81, 84–86, 94, 98–100, 113, 117, 136, 150 Jones, Kenneth W., 47 Joshi, Subhadra, 228 Jumat-ul-Vida prayers, 112

K Karol Bagh, 91, 105, 109–112, 115, 138, 140, 151, 154, 156, 162 katras, 201, 203 Kaviraj, Sudipta, 7 Kesari Dal, 92 Khaksar Volunteer Corps, 92 Khaksars, 14 Khalistan, 18n9, 95 demand for, 95 Khan, Liaqat Ali, 136, 149 Khan, Phatak Habash, 153 Khilafat movement (1919), 62, 74n124, 127n56 participation of Muslim religious elite, 62 khilats, 42 Khilnani, Sunil, 269 Khosla, G.D., 147 Kishan Chand, 235 Kishanganj areas, riots (1973 and 1974), 181, 183 kotwali system, abolition of the, 41

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 304

Krishna Chand, 229 Kucha Pati Ram, 175 Kukreja, C.P., 235

L liberal-secular modernism, 166 linguistic regionalism, 174 local constituencies, idea of, 116–121 local disputes, 102 local politics, dynamics of, 212–215 Lodhi Colony, 138 ‘lofty ideals’ of the nation, 161 Lok Sena, 14, 92

M Madani, Maulana Hussain Ahmad, 78–79 Madhok, Balraj, 212 Maha Hindu Samiti (All-India Hindu Association), 2 Mahabir Dal, 92 Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) (1971), 221, 241n54, 251 Majlis-e-Ahrar-ul-Islam, 14, 92 majoritarianism, 45 ‘majority cultural zones’, 125n26 majority-minority discourse, 8 ‘majority provinces’ and ‘minority provinces’, demarcation of, 84 Malviya, Pandit Krishnakant, 92 mapping, colonial measures of, 109 marginalisation of Muslims, 30, 97 Masjid Faiz-e- Elahi, 234 Master Plan of Delhi (1962), 16, 206 Mata Sundari–Minto Road, 227–228, 230 Mayapuri, 221–223, 225 meat industry campaigns on the elimination of shops, 102 communalisation of, 271 meat inspection practices, 172 meat practice, 270 spatial confinement of, 177 Meena Bazaar, 226

19/10/20 11:53 AM

Index Mehta, Om, 223, 235 Metcalf, Thomas, 27, 34–35 middle class, economic success of, 41 ‘mini Pakistans’ in Delhi, 6, 16, 134–135, 159, 184, 272, 274 cow protection and, 164–184 meat and, 164–184 muslim localities and, 164–184 Muslim localities as a ‘threat’ to national security, 156–164 partition violence, 134 political trajectories of cow protection, 135 reconfigured idea of Pakistan, 135–156 resettlement of Muslim population, 135 space–community relationship, 134 minority provinces, 3, 82, 84, 119–120, 148–149 Minto Road, transit camps at, 206 mixed-areas demarcations, 104 (Map) ‘mobile surveillance’, 204 ‘modern-rational’ frameworks, 7 mohalla, 1, 4, 14, 19n12, 26–28, 35, 38–39, 41, 53, 55, 86, 88, 103, 107, 114–115, 139, 217, 267 as an administrative mechanism, 41 caste- and craft-based mohallas, 27 class-communal configuration of the mohallas, 41 defining feature of, 28 distinction of space, 28 jurisdiction of a thana, 27 kuchabandi (traditional administrative model of mohallas), 41 polarisation in, 115 traditional demographic makeup, 28 mohalla panchayats, 35 mohalla peace committees, formation of, 110 Mohan, Inder, 238 moral education, promotion of, 212

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 305

305

Motia Khan, 40, 203 Mountbatten Plan, 117, 132n104 Mughal system of revenue collection, 27 Mughal thana divisions, 27, 43 Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), 168–169, 173, 179, 206, 208–212, 215, 227, 248n32 ban on slaughterhouses, 179 Clearance and Rehabilitation, 210–211 (Table) local political interests, 209 management of land and population, 209 purpose of, 208 Turkman Gate clearance, 227 Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) bye-laws (1957), 168–169 municipal reforms, 63 Muslim ‘ghettos’, 265 Muslim ‘segregation’ through forced clearance and sterilisation, 272 Muslim amirs, 28 Muslim appeasement, 94, 215 Muslim distinctiveness and ‘separatism’, 89 Muslim-dominated areas, 3, 141, 152–153, 156, 159, 200, 202, 212, 214, 217, 265, 268, 271, 274 placing of, 218–238 constituencies, 177, 270 demarcations, 104 (Map) regions, 134 Kishanganj area, 183 Muslim evacuee, 5, 153, 160 Muslim ghettos, 32n22, 184, 265 Muslim homeland, pure and ideal, 2, 266 Muslim homogeneity and religiosity, 13 Muslim identity, 4, 12, 15, 54, 86, 121, 134–135, 151, 184, 245, 265, 270 Indian-ness of, 184 Muslim ilaqe, developments of, 10 ‘Muslim India’, designs of, 82–85 Muslim League, 13, 78, 82, 85–87, 90, 92–94, 97–102, 112–114, 116–117, 120, 136, 183, 269

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306

Index

advantage to capture ‘Pakistan provinces’, 116 aggressive politics of, 94 arguments for separate electorates in the municipalities, 54 definition of a Muslim India, 13 demands and appropriating, 90 formation of, 46 non-cooperative attitude, 116 official recognition of, 111 Pakistan resolution of, 3, 93–94 political mobilisation, 87, 93 propaganda, 87, 101 tentative schemes proposed by, 124n26 won the Ballimaran Council seat in the 1971 elections, 183 Muslim localities as a ‘threat’ to national security, 156–164 ‘communally sensitive areas’, 159 ‘evacuees’, 161 implementation of improvement schemes, 162 ‘intending evacuees’, 161 Muslim’s citizenship status, 160 official attitude, 159 refugee rehabilitation in Muslim concentrated areas, 158 reverse migration of Muslims from Pakistan, 159 Muslim localities as meat-eating sites, 168–171 bade ka gosht, 170 forced to close during festive occasions, 171 inspection reports by magistrate, 170–171 ‘sight, smell and view’ of meat shops, 170 Muslim localities of Shahjahanabad, 12 Muslim minority, isolation and marginalisation of the, 12 Muslim National Guard, 92 Muslim Personal Law Board, 240 Muslim polarisation, 94, 97 Muslim politics, 12

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 306

Muslim refugee camps, 5, 140–151 bureaucratic machinery, 145 Humayun’s Tomb camps, 141, 143 (Photo), 144, 150 Idgah camps, 141 in Muslim-dominated areas or religious places of worship, 141 Indian-ness of Muslims, 146 ‘intention’ of Muslim refugees, 146–147 Jama Masjid camp, 141, 142 (photo) management of Muslim camps, 145 management of, 15 Purana Qila (Old Fort) camp, 141, 143 (Photo), 145–146, 150 reverse migration of Muslim refugees, 146 ‘refugee resettlement’, 147 role of Pakistan High Commission, 145 types of, 141 Muslim refugees, situation in Pakistan, 148 Muslim segregation, 16, 164, 272 forced clearance and sterilisation, 16, 272 Muslim separatism, 5, 12, 267 Muslim space, 10, 12, 85, 119–120, 150, 165, 274 objectification of, 16, 200 Muslim zones, 151–156 administratively unclear, 155 official demarcation of space, 156 politically provocative spatial category, 155 protection and resettlement of the Muslim population, 155 ‘legal’ sanction, 154 notion of, 154 ‘risk management’ tactics, 154

N National Capital Region, 215 National Regeneration Programme, 6, 219, 230, 246n1, 272

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Index ‘nationalist Muslims’ versus ‘separatist Muslims’, 4 Naxalbari uprising, 216 Nayar, Sushila, 162 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 2, 13–15, 78–81, 97, 101, 116, 139–140, 146, 148, 152–155, 159–160, 163, 165–167, 171–172, 174–176, 184, 202–203, 205–216, 232, 246, 268 idea of the Indian nation, 79 imagination of space, 81 Nehru–Liaquat agreement (1950), 15 Nehruvian government, 12, 267 Nehruvian project of nationbuilding, 11 Nehruvian secularism, 123n11 Nehru Memorial Museum Library, 14 Neogy, K.C., 146 New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC), 204, 209 Nishtar, Abdur Rab, 136 Nizamuddin Basti, 141 non-coercive function, 9

O ‘offensive trades’, definition of, 50 The Old City of Delhi, 218 open ballot system, 71n82 organized Hinduism, 72n90

P pagri system, 239–240 Paharganj, 40, 47, 96, 105–107, 115, 140, 151, 154, 156, 203 Pahari Imli, 153, 215 Paitandey, A.K., 225 Pakhtunistan, 18n9 ‘Pakistan day’, 93 Pakistan emergency committee, 149 Pakistan High Commission, 141, 145 Pakistan, idea of, 2–4, 11–12, 15, 76, 82, 83, 85–87, 102, 120–121, 135, 184, 266–267, 269 Pakistan, popular meanings of, 85–89

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 307

307

Pandey, Gyanendra, 7, 137 partition, 4–5, 10–12, 14–15, 76, 85–86, 88, 103, 115, 119, 134–140, 151, 153, 155, 162–164, 171, 181, 202, 265, 268 Hindu and Sikh Partition victims, 16, 147, 151, 212 Partition Committee, 136 Partition Council, 136, 185n4 Partition thesis, aftermath of, 11 partition violence, 119, 134, 137, 139 partition violence, 134 political discourse on, 114 post-Partition migration, 5 refugees, 137 Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai, 136, 145, 147, 154–155, 159 Penny, Christopher, 175 permanent religious identities, realisation of, 54 personification of India as ‘Mother India’, 197n149 Pharmaceutical Enquiry Committee, 172 Piracha, Siraj, 239 Planning Commission, 204 ‘planning’, priority of, 205 planning-centric administrative, 167 Police Act (1861), 43 political transition, period of, 41 political–communal implications, 46 political–ideological debates, 88 political–religious movements, 62 politico-spatial category, 47 politics of clearance and rehabilitation, 208–212 clearance and resettlement, 208 DDA–main executive body, 208 MCD and DMC were elected representative bodies, 208 population profile of city, 40 Prasad, Baleshwar, 206 Prasad, Rajendra, 136 Prevention of Insult to National Honor Act (1971), 251n54 propaganda material, 196n147

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308

Index

Prophet Mohammad, 79 proselytisation, modern forms of, 31 Provincial Congress Volunteer Boards, 92 Provincial Mahasabha, 102 Provincial Muslim League, 100, 105 public routes, spatial mapping of the, 58 public space communalisation of, 105 definition of, 50 Pul Bangash, 153 Punjab Laws Act (1872), 50 Punjab Municipal Act (1867), 43 Punjab Observer, 54 Punjabi’s Confederacy of India Scheme, 82 Puri, Geeta, 176 Purna Sawaraj (complete independence), 90

Q Qadri, M.A.H., 82 Qaid-e-Azam. See Jinnah, Mohammad Ali Qidwai, Anees, 149 Qidwai, Rafi Ahmed, 141 Quit India (Bharat Chodo Andolan), 90 Quran, 79 Qureshi community, 35, 54, 171, 180, 182 emergence of the, 182

R Radcliffe, Cyril, 117 railway strike (1974), 216 Rajbansi Kshatriya homeland, 18n9 Rajgopalachari, C., 136 Rakabganj or Bangla Sahib, 96 Ram Rajya Parishad, 176 Raman, Radha, 218 Randhawa, M.S., 138–139, 157, 159 Rashtriya Sewa Samiti, 14, 92 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 14–15, 62, 74n122, 92, 119, 137,

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152, 155, 165–66, 170, 174–176, 182–183, 200, 216, 242, 270 All-India Representative Committee of, 165 anti-cow slaughter campaign, 166 organise ‘Anti-Pakistan Day’, 94 ‘rational’ ways of punishment capturing of Muslim religious places of worship, 38 selective clearance drive, 38–39 selective resettlement policy, 39–40 Rebuilding Shahjahanabad: The Old City of Delhi, 218 reconfigured idea of Pakistan, 135–156 communal clashes in Delhi, 136 communalisation of the bureaucratic system, 137 forced conversion to Hinduism, 137 ‘forced evacuation’, 139 identification of mohalla on communal grounds, 139 inclusion of ‘local Muslim refugees’, 137 internal displacement of Muslim population, 139 Muslim refugee camps, 140–151 Muslim zones, 151–156 ordinances, agreements and Acts, 136 violent process of ‘homogenisation’, 136 reconversion, 30 redevelopment, selective meaning of, 213 ‘reforms scheme’, 63 refugee-istan, 137 regularisation of colonies, 16 rehabilitation department, 173 rehabilitation of Muslim population, 16 Rehman, Maulana Habibur, 157 ‘relief camps’, 185n8 religion-based demographic data, 254n74

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Index ‘religio-political communities’, 8 religio-political identities, 59, 61 formation of, 266 religious conflict, 29, 49, 61 religious differentiations, 28 religious encounters and space, 29–31 religious identity, 11, 31, 37, 41, 80, 119, 135, 151, 164, 184 communalisation of, 13, 26 non-recognition of, 267 politicisation of, 13, 26, 61–63, 274 religious minorities, Indianisation of, 200 religious polarisation, 46, 101, 273 religious processions, 28 religious riots, 31, 46 reorganisation of space and communities, 200, 218 applicability of the master plan (MPD), 218 ‘clearance-cum-improvement’ drives, 220 displacement and resettlement programme, 220 family planning campaign, 227–238 Jagmohan’s concerns about demarcated areas, 218–219 Jama Masjid clearance scheme, 220–227 rebuilding the society, 219 redevelopment of Shahjahanabad, 218 Turkman Gate clearance, 220, 227–238 representative system, introduction of, 46 ritualistic aspects of religion, 31 Rohingya Muslim, refugee status of, 1 Roshan Lal, 179

S Sabri, Imdad, 217, 253n63 Sabzi Mandi, 40, 115, 138, 151, 154, 156, 203 Sachar Commission, 273

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309

sacrificial slaughter of cow, 31 Sadar Bazar, 6, 40, 47, 58, 60, 106–107, 115, 138, 140, 153, 157, 176, 181–182, 203, 270 hub of economic and commercial activities, 40 riots, 182 Sahai, Lala Hardev, 173 Sapru, S.M., 162 Sarvadaliya Goraksha Mahaabhiyan Samiti, 175–176 Savarkar, V.D., 2, 13, 78, 81–82, 91 ‘second front’, 260n137 second mode of mobilisation, 93 ‘second Shahjahanabad’, 227 Second World War, beginning of, 90 secular India, idea of, 116–121 ‘secular’ residential quarters, 103–110 Seelampur, 213, 231, 243 Seemapuri, 213 ‘selective’ vegetarianism, 164, 193n116 self defense, 61–63 need for, 110 sensitive pockets, 61 separate electorates, 13, 26, 54, 63–64, 118 separatism, Muslim tendency of, 184 ‘separatist’ or ‘exclusionist’ perspective, 89 Seva Dal, 92 Shah Alam II, 26 Shah Commission, 225, 229, 233–234, 236–239, 242–243 Shah Zafar, Bahadur, 32, 35–36 Shah, K.C., 236 Shahjahanabad, 2, 16, 26–28, 203, 207, 218–219, 221, 235, 239, 266 urban decay of, 5 problematic area within Old Delhi, 207 redevelopment plan, 16 sub-divided into twentyeight development zones, 207 Shamsuddin, Chowdhary, 16, 230–231, 235, 239, 244, 259n121

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310

Index

Sharma, Rajesh, 229 sharnarthies (people in need of refuge), 185n8 Sheikh, Farzana, 42 Shraddhanand, Swamy, 62 Sikandar Bakht, 243 Sikandar Hayat’s Scheme of Indian Federations, 82 Sikh political isolation, 95 Sikh religious, changing nature of, 95 Singh, Hukum, 162 Singh, Master Tara, 95 Singh, Ram, 160 Singh, Sardar Hukam, 161 Sinha, Rajesh, 232 Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan Scheme, 125n26 slaughterhouse efficiency and conditions of, 172 expert ad hoc Committee on Slaughterhouse, 172 fee increased for slaughtering per animal, 180 intensive policing and army deployment, 57–58 ‘limited control’ over meat trade, 57 meat traders protested against the municipal provisions, 56 official demarcation of space on communal lines, 57 relocation due to insanitary conditions, 177 selling and hawking, 56–61 shifting of meat shops, 57 slum clearance. See also central demolition squad Slum Area Clearance and Redevelopment Act, 205–206 Society for the Promotion of Gospel, 29 socio-cultural manifestations, 13 socio-economic empowerment, 269 space categories of, 26 changing political identity of, 116–121 cohesive, 200

Contested Homelands- Nazima Parveen.indd 310

communal demarcation of, 56, 271 communal representation, 41–47 contestation of, 119 contested public space, 103–110 contested space, 55–66 cow slaughter, 49–55 cow, and conflicts, 31–37 damp, 245 definition of, 81 demarcation of public and residential spaces, 103 demarcation of, 13–14, 37–55, 60, 76, 103, 134, 156, 168, 265–266, 271 ‘de-westernization’ of city space, 212 distinction of, 28 division of, 82, 119 geopolitical, 76 ‘Hindu-dominated’, 26 idea of communal space, 10 ilaqa, 28 Madani’s notion, 81 meat and muslim space, 49–55 ‘mixed’ areas, 26 ‘Muslim-dominated, 26 Muslim space, 10, 12, 85, 119–120, 150, 165, 274 Nehru’s imagination of, 81 politics of, 2, 274 re-formed identities and public space, 47–49 religious encounters and, 29–31 safe residential, 162 secured community space, 121 separatist, 245 space–community relations, 11, 266 unhygienic, 200 spatial mapping, 7, 8, 28, 58 state-sponsored atrocities during Emergency, 242 strong administrative and military mechanisms, 42 Sultana, Rukhsana, 230, 233. See also Gandhi, Sanjay Surji–Arjungaon Treaty, 26 ‘survival strategy’ of Muslims, 87

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Index Swamy Shraddhanand, assassination of, 62 symbolic ‘independence day’, 93

T Taj Enclave, 273 Tandon Commission, 182–183 Tandon, Purushottam Das, 92, 167 Tarlo, Emma, 244 Teli biradari, 230–231 ‘terrorist hide-outs’, 275 thanedars and Kotwali system, replacement of, 47 Thengari, P.D., 178 theory of ‘two nations’, 3, 267 The Times of India, 14 Town and Country Planning Organization (TCPO), 235 Town Planning Organization (TPO), 172–173, 205 traditional Kotwali system, 43 trust deficit between Hindus and Muslims, 182 Turkman Gate clearance, 206, 227–238 challenges, 227 curfew imposition of, 234–235 demolition of houses, 228–229 demolition of the Dujana House transit camp, 228 demolitions in Turkman Gate, 228 fact-finding team, 236 full implementation of the scheme, 227 rehabilitation of people displaced, 227 responsibility of MCD, 227 Shah Commission of inquiry, 236–237 disappeared from public memory, 272 redevelopment of area, 201 20 Point Programme, 16, 252n57 two nations, discussion on, 3

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311

U uniform civil code, 212 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (1967), 251n54 urban development, 214 urban educated middle-class, evolution of, 6 urbanisation and development, 12, 269 urbanisation drive, 219 urvival strategy of Muslims, 87

V Vakil, 54 Varma, Tilak Raj, 180 Varnashram Dharm Sabha, 48 vegetarianism, promotion of, 212 Vijay Pal Singh inquiry committee, 183 Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), 175–76

W Waha’bi movement, 30 waqf properties, 153 Wardha meeting, 90 western-educated Muslim, 42 westward expansion of Delhi, 105

Y Yamuna Bank Development Board, 213 Yamuna river, religious significance, 213

Z Zamindar, Vazeera Fazila, 136 Zinat-ul-Masjid, 38 Zonal Division of the Walled City, 207 (Map)

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About the Author Nazima Parveen is an independent research scholar. The focus of her work is the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, communalisation of space and the politics of urban transformation in colonial and postcolonial South Asia. Parveen completed her PhD from Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. She has worked as an assistant professor at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. Parveen has also worked in the UK, India and Nepal. She has worked on different UK government and EU-funded research programmes during 2002–2007. She was the  recipient of ICSSR Post-Doctoral Fellowship 2018, Royal Society of New Zealand Doctoral Scholarship 2013–2016, ICSSR-CSDS Doctoral Fellowship programme 2010–2012 and ASIA Fellows Awards 2008–2009. She also writes opinion pieces on current affairs for digital news portals.

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