Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy: Mapping Alternative Planetary Futures [1 ed.] 1032271299, 9781032271293

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Political economy was central to the revolutionary capitalist thinkers, Marx’s more revolutionary critique, and Gandhi’s revolutionary moral and spiritual critique. Ananta Kumar Giri has assembled a remarkable collection of diverse, wide-ranging, multidisciplinary essays that restore the centrality of critiques of political economy. These essays most significantly challenge us to rethink our understanding of our contemporary world and of our potential for creating a flourishing planetary future. Professor Douglas Allen, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, The University of Maine, USA

A critique is both an appreciation, a stretching, and a transcendence. Here is a critique of the critique. The volume is a treasure trove, which imbricates and complicates political economy through moral, humanist, ethical, indigenous, psychological, ecological, and spiritual aspects of life. The gift is that of rethinking and unthinking approaches to society and the opening of intellectual gestures towards planetary futures. Professor Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Professor/Chair in Epistemologies of the Global South, University of Bayreuth

Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy honours the Club of Rome’s tradition of thinking through the “human problématique” and fostering diverse perspectives to understand the complexity of today’s world and possible alternative futures. This book is a valuable multi-disciplinary, geographically diverse set of contributions unpacking rooted barriers to the re-design of the current political economy. The compound effects of the poly crisis and the calls for a deep transformation of our extractive economy to match the planetary emergency require a complete re-set of our vision of relevant political economies for 21st c challenges. This pioneering work helps us in this epochal task of re-envisioning and transformative action. Sandrine Dixson-Decleve, Co-President, The Club of Rome.

This collection of contemporary essays is an outstanding contribution to the critique of capitalism, bringing together—for the first time—the Marxian critique of political economy, moral economy, and ecological spirituality. Michael Löwy, ecosocialist philosopher



Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy

This book analyzes contemporary contributions to critiques of political economy and highlights the challenges to rethinking contemporary discourses and practices. It carries out a multipronged critical and transformative dialogue involving political economy, moral economy, moral sociology, moral anthropology, and spiritual ecology. The authors discuss diverse themes such as the relationship between consciousness and society, the dialogue between Karl Marx and Carl Gustav Jung, a critical sociology of morality and property relations, moral and political economy of the Indigenous peoples, and a critique of modern civilization, economic evaluation, and alternative traditions of thinking in Marx, Thoreau, Gandhi, J. C. Kumarappa, Rammanohar Lohia, B. R. Ambedkar, and Jayaprakash Narain. A unique transdisciplinary text, the book brings together authors and approaches from both the Global North and the Global South. It will be indispensable to students, research scholars, and teachers of humanities and social sciences in such fields as economics, sociology, philosophy, cultural studies, and development studies. Ananta Kumar Giri is a Professor at the Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India. He has taught and done research in many universities in India and abroad. He has an abiding interest in social movements and cultural change, criticism, creativity and contemporary dialectics of transformation, theories of self, culture and society, and creative streams in education, philosophy and literature. Dr. Giri has written and edited around two dozen books in Odia and English, including Global Transformations: Postmodernity and Beyond (1998); Knowledge and Human Liberation (2013), Practical Spirituality and Human Development: Creative Experiments for Alternative Futures (editor, 2019); Mahatma Gandhi and Sri Aurobindo (editor, 2022); The Calling of Global Responsibility: New Initiatives in Justice, Dialogues and Planetary Realizations (2023); and Social Healing (2023).

Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy Mapping Alternative Planetary Futures

Edited by Ananta Kumar Giri

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Ananta Kumar Giri; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Ananta Kumar Giri to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-27129-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-65095-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-65092-0 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920 Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

For C.T. Kurien, Thomas Piketty, Heikki Patomaki and Vandana Shiva

Contents

Foreword xi M. V. NADKARNI

Preface xviii List of contributors xx Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy: An Introduction and an Invitation

1

ANANTA KUMAR GIRI

PART I

Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy 1

7

Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy and Creative Planetary Futures: Political Economy, Moral Economy, Moral Sociology, Spiritual Ecology, and Beyond 9 ANANTA KUMAR GIRI

2

Moral Sociology and the Marxist-Humanist Critique of Property: Toward a Critical Social Psychology of Morality 28 ROBERT NONOMURA

3

Ensouling the Critique of Political Economy: From Marx and Jung to Degrowth 44 JULIEN-FRANÇOIS GERBER

4

From Gift to Debt: Rethinking Political Economy from a Radical Anthropological and Indigenous Perspective 60 FELIX PADEL



x Contents PART II

Further Engagement with Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy 5

71

Economic (E)valuation: Household and catallaxy 73 ANDREW SAYER

6

Lands of Plenty, Realms of Freedom: Imagining an Automatic Life 89 RONALD STADE

7

Self, Pathogen, and Climate: Rethinking Political Economy Today 100 KHIROD CHANDRA MOHARANA

8

India’s Crisis of Development 115 PULIN B NAYAK

9

A Relational Approach to Political Economy: Making New Sense of What We Know, Towards a Society of Living 127 CARLOS ALVAREZ PEREIRA

10 Creative Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy and Moral Economy: Cooperative Settlement and Utopian Community Projects as Modes of Conviviality for Thoreau, Ruskin, Tolstoy, and Gandhi 153 CHRISTIAN BARTOLF, DOMINIQUE MIETHING, AND VISHNU VARATHARAJAN

11 Broken But Not Useless: Revisiting Marx’s Workshop and a New Ecology of Hope 169 ABHIJEET PAUL

12 Rethinking and Transforming Critiques of Political Economy: Gandhi-Kumarappa Pathways

187

JOS CHATHUKULAM AND MANASI JOSEPH

13 International Political Economy at the Crossroads: Questions of World Order and Other Pressing Issues of International Politics

201

SUMAN BAGISHA

14 Deconstructing/Reconstructing Liberal World Order for the 21st Century 215 JOHANNES D SCHMIDT

Afterword: On the Very Form of Critique PIET STRYDOM

233

Index 255

Foreword M. V. Nadkarni

Professor Ananta Kumar Giri has brought together a collection of very thoughtprovoking, scholarly, and lucidly written essays in this unique volume. They have been contributed by eminent scholars from across the world. Their essays remind me of a poem on flowers by D. R. Bendre (1896–1981), a celebrated lyrical poet in Kannada, a verse from which I am roughly translating: Each unlike another, each one free of blemish, The beauty of each has its own flourish! Professor Giri, the editor of this volume, is no narrow social scientist. The sociologist, political scientist, economist, social psychologist, ethicist, philosopher, and poet—they are all combined and integrated into his intellectual identity. And that is what has enabled him to inspire these essays, making them into a book which is an enlightening guide to understand the deepening crisis through which our world is presently going. The book can be said to be in the tradition of critical theory, which deals with the totality of the society in its historical context, not with its individual parts in isolation from each other in terms of the economy, polity, and society separated from the former two. One can understand our crisis-ridden world only terms of such a holistic perspective. We cannot also find solutions to the crisis unless we first understand its causes. Moreover, we can understand better only if we theorize from the relevant empirical facts. Only a theoretical understanding can enable us to find solutions. Empirical facts make no sense in the absence of a theoretical perspective. When theories conflict with each other, we have to find out which theory explains the facts more satisfactorily and suggests convincing solutions. The essays in this volume meet this requirement well. Another important feature characterizes all these essays—they have a pronounced moral perspective. Karl Marx (1818–1883), who presented the first and most comprehensive critique of political economy, also had such a perspective. Without an ethical perspective in terms of human values, there cannot be any meaningful assessment of social phenomena and policies. I am using the word “social” here in an inclusive sense—inclusive of economic and the political aspects too. Marx’s critique covered not only the then prevailing economic system or the mode of production but also classical economics itself. He not only exposed how the economic system intrinsically involved rampant exploitation of labour in which 

xii Foreword the mass of humanity is involved but also the hollowness of a discipline which separated economics from ethics and isolated itself from any historical context as if the then prevailing mode of production was natural and eternal. Marx was not alone in doing this even at that time. His contemporary in England, John Ruskin (1819– 1900), famous for his work—Unto This Last (1877), criticized the then prevailing political economy, especially its concept of “Economic Man” divorced from ethics—a concept which has enjoyed a long reign. M. K. Gandhi (1869–1948) was influenced by Ruskin and denounced separating economics from ethics. Amartya Sen also did it later, in a theoretically more rigorous and convincing manner. The essays here present contemporary contributions to critiques of political economy, made mostly after the end of the Second World War. The first chapter in the book is actually the editor’s introduction to all other chapters together and discusses the major concepts in the new critiques of political economy. Some of these concepts are moral economy, political economy linked with psychology, anthropology, and art, respectively, limitation of pricing as an instrument of evaluation, moral sociology, social and spiritual ecology, and international political economy. I will not go into introducing these individual essays since it is done already by the editor admirably. I will confine myself to the challenges that have occasioned all the essays on contemporary contributions to critiques of political economy here and see how we can try to overcome them. We need to go ahead in the light of theoretical perspectives provided by the essays, keeping in mind Marx’s well-known adage that philosophers have interpreted the world but the task is to change it. What for is a critique of political economy of the world, unless it helps in changing it? The most conspicuous of the developments in economics is the rise in the ideology of neoliberalism, which has also influenced the functioning of the actual economies of the world, and facilitated the dominance of multinational corporations in the world economy. Among the ideals of the French Revolution, liberty was most emphasized, pushing aside the other two equally or even more important ideals of equality and fraternity. What is more, the ideal of liberty was applied much more in the economic sphere than in the political, almost excluding the other two no less relevant ideals, resulting in the advocacy of free markets and relative withdrawal of the state from the economy. The concept of liberty was twisted to mean the freedom of markets, more than freedom from hunger and ill health. It was freedom for the rich to acquire unlimited wealth. Inequality in the distribution of wealth and incomes reached unprecedented heights as a result in most of the countries, except perhaps in the countries with a strong tradition of democratic socialism where the state took care of providing free education, healthcare, and social security. Paradoxically, even countries which practised such a democratic socialism within their boundaries, practised the philosophy of free markets through their multinational corporations outside. State interventions under the influence of Keynesianism had helped several countries from crises, but neoliberalism looked upon state intervention as an undemocratic evil going against the principle of liberty. There is a tradition of anti-statism in political philosophy, and even Mahatma Gandhi himself did not like any dominance of a centralized state and had advocated

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both a decentralized state and decentralized economy through local governments tied together in a loose federation without a vertical hierarchy. Understandably, the essays in this volume deplore both extremes—neoliberalism and statism, and advocate a solution avoiding both. But there is need for a greater clarity about what the institutional alternative would have to be. In addition to decentralizing the state through more empowered local village and city governments or municipal bodies, the state itself at all levels has to be wedded to the concept of democratic socialism or social democracy. We cannot do away with the markets, as they perform essential allocative functions more efficiently than any state bureaucracy, but a social democracy can tame them so that they do not deviate from the social objectives. Even private enterprise can be allowed and make profits, but excess profits can be taxed to finance the provision of basic needs of all—free education up to 12th standard or grade, inexpensive or subsidized higher education, free healthcare, food security for the poor, and social security for all. Social democracy cannot wipe out inequality, since some functional inequality will be inevitable as long as talents are not equally distributed and incentive to achieve excellence will have to be maintained. But a social democracy should ensure that all children have equal opportunities irrespective of differences in the social and economic background of their parents. A social democratic state will also have to encourage and promote some alternatives in addition to allowing private enterprise. This could be in the form of cooperative institutions. Though they have already shown their rich potential in India, their role is often not recognized well enough. Housing cooperatives played a major role in a few Indian cities like Mumbai even before Independence in solving the problem of housing shortage for the lower middle class. The success story of Amul in the field of dairy economy is known worldwide. Cooperative credit has played an important role in providing cheaper credit to farmers in India. Quite a few cooperative sugar mills have succeeded in giving a better price to cane growers and more promptly too than private mills. Cooperative institutions still have an unrealized potential.1 In addition to them, NGOs have an important role in democracies which supplement the role of the state in many social activities, especially in cities. All these institutions have been playing a valuable role in democracies like India and the USA and have diluted the dominance of the central state as well as private enterprise. Trade unions are another important institution, which can constitute a “countervailing power” (Galbraith 1952) to private enterprise which may otherwise turn to be exploitative. Unfortunately, their power has declined both in India and the USA, partly due to policies of the state itself which are not favourable to trade unions becoming powerful. This is due to the fear of the unions becoming irresponsible and often disturbing industrial peace, which can discourage investment and enterprise. This fear is exaggerated, because labour also suffers gravely when strikes are declared, and they cannot afford to be whimsical. Trade unions have declined also because work is often outsourced to informal institutions where trade unions do not exist. Even colleges and universities in India are relying more on casual teachers than regular ones, which is a deplorable tendency. It is as if the whole economy

xiv Foreword is conspiring to deny what is due to labour. A democracy worth its name cannot ignore this issue because it is the bulk of humans who are denied the benefits of economic growth thereby. Anti-labour prejudices have to be removed from the laws and policies of the state, even if these prejudices are hidden. A strong, well-developed, and cultured civil society can be an effective deterrent to dominating state power and even to capital. In his Prison Note Books, Gramsci had observed that it makes the difference between an advanced capitalist country and other countries. “(W)hen the state trembled [in advanced countries], a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed” (Gramsci 1971: 238). When the state commits serious mistakes, a developed civil society can resist and even correct them. It can address poverty and inequality too, even if with mixed success. Apart from sharply increasing inequality in the distribution of income and wealth referred above, there are two more crises, which will adversely affect all people of the Globe—both the rich and the poor, pushing humankind to the brink. They are so serious as to make the survival of humans beyond the end of this millennium itself doubtful, unless we wake up and act. The first of these is the environmental crisis in the form of climate change, and accumulation of plastic and such other waste both in the oceans and on land on a massive scale which the natural environment cannot absorb. Cyclones and floods have become more frequent, and the sea level rise has become imminent leading to submergence of many islands and coastal areas. International migrations of the displaced are likely on an unprecedented scale, to which the world is not yet prepared, and no contingency plans are ready. This crisis can be directly attributed to our craze for free economic growth inspired by neoliberalism, which cares little for environmental consequences. The papers here attribute the environmental crisis to the human greed for having, instead of being; to preference for commodities instead of capabilities as Amartya Sen put it. Gandhi had a prescient awareness of the environmental crisis. He had warned against excessive consumerism and suggested producing durable goods in place of use-and-throw goods, using labour-intensive technologies wherever possible, producing more for the local markets than for the world markets, and using more local materials. His suggestions would reduce the need for transport which can be significantly energy-saving. Above all, he denounced the craze for constantly improving the standard of living on the part of the rich both in developing and developed countries. He wrote: “God forbid that India should ever take to industrialisation after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom [England] is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million [the population of India then] took to similar economic exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts.” —M. K. Gandhi (Young India, December 20, 1928). We have to realize that there cannot be a limitless growth for the world, and a few papers in the volume here discuss the need for degrowth. However, it is mainly economic growth which made it possible to significantly reduce poverty in the world

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from the high level of above 50 per cent in the middle of the 20th century to only about 10 per cent by 2011, the decline accounted largely by China. Unfortunately, poverty in India declined more slowly in comparison, since it was still at about 22 per cent in 2011. Economic growth is still needed in most of the developing countries to wipe out remaining poverty. It is in the developed countries that degrowth is urgently needed. Even in developing countries, growth is needed in the incomes of the poor, and not the rich. It has to be a pro-poor growth, not pro-rich growth. Gandhi suggested how to achieve this, on the lines indicated above.2 The second crises into which the world has plunged is nuclear brinkmanship. Several countries today have nuclear weapons. There is even a grave risk that they may fall into the hands of irresponsible terrorists. Let alone terrorists, even legitimate governments can threaten to use them in serious conflicts going beyond their control. The recent alleged threats by Russia to use them against an unyielding and defiant Ukraine have shocked many countries. Unintended nuclear accidents also have a great potential for damage to human life and environment. The extreme events may have less statistical probability, but when they do occur, their impact can be intolerably high, as argued by Taleb (2010). Taleb calls them as Black Swan events. They may be rare but are unpredictable, as he says. Wisdom lies in preventing them even if less likely, and being prepared for them with plans when they do take place. A basic problem between countries is that mutual trust is lacking, and there is too much emphasis on narrow national interests. There is a saying in Sanskrit—Ati sarvatra varjayet (always avoid anything which is too much), and this applies to nationalism too. Ultimately, the world is our home, which we have to protect by all means—against too much greed, too much selfishness, and too much nationalism. The feeling that we are citizens of the world too, and that we have to coexist and cooperate with others so that all of us can survive and even thrive as humanity, has to dominate over narrow loyalties and identities. As our Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared recently (November 2022) at Bali during the G-20 Meeting, the time is not for war; it is no longer to be considered as an option now to solve mutual problems. Marxists think that proclivity to war is a symptom of the imperialism of Capitalist countries. Imperialism is supposed to be an advanced stage of capitalism. The motive behind imperialism is supposed to be basically economic—finding markets abroad and getting cheap raw materials. Ironically, even supposedly communist countries also tend to behave in an imperialist fashion because they too adopt capitalism though under the auspices of the state. Besides, the ancient motive for war—one of extending one’s power and territory, is still very relevant. Imperialism, however, need not always take the form of undertaking aggressive military ventures and setting up military bases abroad by luring weak countries and their leaders into giving a consent for them. It can also take the form of extending credit and increasing the debt burden of weaker countries. To meet the excessive debt burden, the indebted countries are persuaded to cede control of strategic ports and the like to creditor countries. This is simply imperialism even if practised nonviolently under the garb of international economic aid. International cooperation is of course welcome in improving infrastructure and strengthening the economic

xvi Foreword base of poor countries. But when indebtedness increases too much, the indebted countries become subservient to the creditor countries and lose their political independence. We cannot attribute this all to neoliberalism alone. It is preferable if the large credit is extended only by international creditors like the World Bank under the auspices of UNO, instead of directly by individual countries. In turn, all the countries will have to contribute a certain percentage of their national income to the UNO, the percentage being higher in the case of rich countries. It is not only the national governments but also multinational corporations that will have to contribute in a similar way. Though the establishment of the UNO has been a significant landmark in the history of the world, it has not been effective enough in controlling the bullying by the big powers and their economic imperialism. This is because the UNO is itself dominated by big powers who often act in their own narrow interests rather than the interests of the world peace and welfare. There is need for a structural reform in the UNO, particularly for doing away with the notion of permanent membership of the big powers in its Security Council. To make it possible, it is necessary for other countries to join together and bring pressure for democratic reform of the UNO and its agencies like the World Bank. Total nuclear disarmament is one of the most urgent tasks that the UNO has to achieve. The second task is to take steps with international cooperation to end extreme disparities between countries in the fulfilment of basic needs. Humanity is one, and its care concerns all—people as well as governments. I conclude my Foreword by quoting a verse from my Mānava-Dharma-Shatakam:

Bhittikāḥ yaiḥ janāḥ deśāḥ parasparavibhājitāḥ, naradharmeṇa sarvāstāḥ nāśitavyāḥ jagad-hite. (113) (The walls by which people and nations stand separate, they should all be demolished by the religion of humanity for the world’s welfare.) (Nadkarni 2022: 262). I wish this volume great success which it richly deserves. Notes 1 See Naiknavare (2022) and Shylendra (2022) for a discussion of the role played by cooperatives in India and their future potential. 2 I have elsewhere presented in more detail the civilizational alternative proposed by Gandhi (Nadkarni 2015).

References in the Foreword Galbraith, J K (1952). American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power. Boston: Houghton Miffin. Gramsci, A (1971). Selections from Prison Note Books. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

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Nadkarni, M V (2015). ‘Gandhi’s Civilizational Alternative and Dealing with Climate Change’, Journal of Social and Economic Development 17(1): 90–103. Nadkarni, M V (2022). Sāmājika-neeti-kāvya-gucchah (A Bouquet of Verses on Social Ethics) (A collection of five Shatakams including Mānava-dharma-shatakam in Sanskrit with English translation). Manipal: Manipal Universal Press. Naiknavare, Prakash (2022). ‘Growth in Cooperative Sector in Post-Independence India and Future Ahead’, The Cooperator 60(5), November: 36–39. Shylendra, H S (2022). ‘Elevating Cooperatives: Contours of a New Cooperative Policy’, The Cooperator 60(5), November: 50–56. Taleb, Nissim Nicholas (2010, first edition 2007). The Black Swan—The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House.

Preface

Politics and economics have been interlinked in various ways in human history and in the modern world it has expressed itself through capitalism, state power, market dynamics, technological changes, and social, political, and spiritual movements for self and social liberation. Marx’s critique of capitalism, class consciousness, and state power in his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy has been very important in understanding and critiquing political economy in the modern world. We wanted to present our book, Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy: Mapping Alternative Futures, to the world on the 200th birthday of Marx in 2018. It has now taken five more years for the book to come out. We dedicate this volume to C. T. Kurien, Thomas Piketty, Heikki Patomaki, and Vandana Shiva noted economists, social thinkers, and activist scholars for their contributions to critiques of the dominant models of capitalist modernity and cultivating visions and pathways of creative planetary futures. C. T. Kurien has written insightfully and critically about economics and his works such as Rethinking Economics: Reflections Based on a Study of Indian Economics (1996) and Wealth and Illfare: An Expedition into Real Life Economics (2012) challenge us to rethink and transform existing discourses and organizations of economics, politics, and society. As the Director of the Madras Institute of Development Studies which just crossed 50 in 2022, Kurien nurtured students and scholars to think differently and critically and cultivate alternative visions and practices of development. Thomas Piketty is a creative thinker of our times whose critique of prevalent models of political economy in his pioneering works such as Capital in the 21st Century (2014) and A Brief History of Equality (2022) and has stimulated many to think about issues of economic equality. A reading of Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century (2014) while visiting Thapar Institute of Management, Derabasi near Chandigarh in May 2016 planted seeds for this project. Heikki Patomaki is a transformative thinker and activist of our times who has taken part in global tax justice movements such as Attac (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transaction and for Citizens’ Action) and the World Social Forum. His works such as The Great Eurozone Disaster: From Civil to Global New Deal (2013); Disintegrative Tendencies in Global Political Economy: Exits and Conflicts (2017); and World Statehood: The Future of World Politics (2023) help us rethink and transform current domination formations of neoliberal political economy and create new movements of social, ethical, and political learning. Vandana Shiva has been an inspiring thinker and 

Preface  xix activist of our times who continuously challenge us to relate economics to life and people, Nature, and Mother Earth. From her Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Survival in India (1988) to Terra Viva: My Life in a Biodiversity of Movements (2022), Shiva continues to challenge us to rethink and transform economics, politics, society, technology, and gender relations for creating beauty, dignity and dialogues, and creative planetary futures for all of us including non-human beings. In dedicating this work to these four dedicated seekers and scholars, we not only express our individual gratitude but what we collectively owe to them. This dedication hopefully can help us to walk and meditate with their lives and works; create new movements of thinking and transformative practice in our contemporary world; and cultivate creative planetary futures. I am grateful to all the contributors to our volume for their contribution, patience, support, and encouragement. I am grateful to Professor M. V. Nadkarni for his Foreword and Piet Strydom for his Afterword. I am grateful to Aakash Chakraborty, Anvitaa Bajaj, Brinda Sen, and Angeline Joy at Routledge for their kind support for this project. Finally, I hope that Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy helps us in rethinking and transforming our contemporary models and organizations of economy, politics, and society and brings political economy, moral economy, moral sociology, and spiritual ecology together for creating worlds of beauty, dignity, and dialogues. Rathayatra June 20, 2023

Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai

Contributors

Christian Bartolf is a doctor of philosophy, educational, and political scientist who graduated at Free University, Berlin, Germany. He has been decadeslong president of the Gandhi Information Center - Research and Education for Nonviolence, a society for peace history. He published several books and essays on Gandhi, Tolstoy and Nonviolence. For three decades, he has lectured at international conferences and universities in many continents, particularly during the Gandhi 150 Years celebrations and conferences. Email: mail​@bartolf​.in​fo; Website:  https://www​.bartolf​.info​/english​/publications​.html Jos Chathukulam is a former professor of Sri Ramakrishna Hegde Chair of Decentralization and Development, Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC) Bengaluru, India. Currently, Chathukulam is the Director of Centre for Rural Management (CRM), Kottayam, Kerala, India. He has done extensive research on decentralization and local governance across Indian states, Latin America, and Africa. He is an expert of Devolution Index, which is used to compare the rate of decentralization across the Indian states. His recent publications are “Challenges to Local Governance in the Pandemic Era: Perspectives from South Asia and Beyond” published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing, UK (co-edited) and “Deepening Democracy: Comparative Perspectives on Decentralisation, Co-operativism and Self-Managed Development” published by Routledge India (co-edited). Email: joschathukulam​@gmail​.c​om, Website: www​.crmindia​.org Julien-François Gerber is an associate professor at the International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague. Prior to that, he was based at universities in Bhutan, India, and the United States, including Jawaharlal Nehru University and Harvard University. He is broadly interested in the political economy of sustainability and in its anthropological and psychological dimensions. He has published on debt, ownership systems, agrarian change, social movements, the politics of knowledge, economic theory, and psychoanalysis. He is currently undergoing training in ecopsychology at the Pacifica Graduate Institute, USA. He has been active in the degrowth movement for the past 15 years. Email: gerber​@iss​.​nl; Webpage: https://www​.eur​.nl​/people​/julien​-francois​-gerber Manasi Joseph is a researcher at the Centre for Rural Management (CRM), Kottayam, Kerala, India. She holds a postgraduate certificate in New Media 

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– Journalism, Oakville, Ontario, Canada. She also has done a certificate course in Communications – Professional Writing. Her research interests include public and policy administration, health and nutrition, gender studies, development communications and paradigms, and counter culture. She worked as a stringer with Times of India. Her research articles have been published in Economic and Political Weekly, Indian Public Policy Review, UNU—WIDER, Gandhi Marg, and Mainstream Weekly. Email: manasijoesph​@gmail​.​com Dominique Miething is a lecturer in civic education and in the history of political ideas at the Freie Universität Berlin’s Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science. He is a long-serving board member of the Gandhi Information Center—Research and Education for Nonviolence, a society for peace history. Email: dominique​ .miething​@fu​-berlin​​.de Khirod Chandra Moharana teaches anthropology in University of Allahabad, Prayagraj. He received his PhD from Indian Institute of Technology Delhi for his thesis on “Mental Illness among the Hos of Odisha: An Ethnographic Study.” He was trained in anthropology from University of Hyderabad and is a university gold medallist. His research interest includes anthropology of health, climate change and society, and culture of consumption. He has presented his research papers in many national and international conferences. He has published his research in peer-reviewed journals and book chapters. He received the Exeter University Presidential Scholarship for attending its first international summer school on Leadership for Global Challenges in 2010 in Exeter, UK. In 2012, he attended the “Leadership for Mental Health” course by London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UK, and Sangath, Goa. He has experience of conducting anthropological fieldwork among many tribal groups across India. M. V. Nadkarni (Mangesh Venkatesh Nadkarni), born on February 23, 1939, an economist by training and profession, has deep interest in other social sciences as well, as also in religion and philosophy. His contribution to economics and other social sciences has been mainly in the areas of agricultural price policy, problems of drought-prone areas, farmers’ movements, political economy of forest use and management, economics of pollution control, and integrating ethics into economics, decentralised development, and the “broad-basing process.” He is currently an honorary professor at Institute of Social and Economic Changes (ISEC), Bangalore, where he has worked for many years. Author of numerous pioneering works such as Hinduism: Gandhian Perspective (2016), The Bhagavad Gita for the Modern Reader (2016), and Ethics for Our Times: Essays in Gandhian Perspective, Nadkarni is a transformative thinker of our times. Email: mvnadkarni1968​@gmail​.​com Robert Nonomura is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at University of Western Ontario, Canada. His research and teaching addresses questions of moral reasoning and social ethics, specifically in the realm of critical theory, violence, trauma-informed ethics, and intersectionality. As a public

xxii Contributors sociologist, he has worked closely with the Centre for Research & Education on Violence Against Women & Children (CREVAWC), developing knowledge mobilization resources on the social-structural dimensions of gender-based violence. These include cross-disciplinary knowledge exchange forums, research briefings on policy responses to domestic violence during the COVID-19 pandemic, and peer-led campus consent and sexual violence education programs. Email: rnonomur​@uwo​.​ca; Website: https://sociology​.uwo​.ca​/people​/profiles​/ Nonomura​.html Felix Padel is an anthropologist who has focused on understanding the situation of India’s tribal people or Adivasis. After first degrees studying Classics and switching to anthropology in Oxford, he did an M. Phil in sociology at the Delhi School of Economics, and remained affiliated there when doing his doctorate at Oxford. This was a study in ‘reverse anthropology’ about the power structure that British rule imposed over Adivasis, and became his 1st book, ‘Sacrificing people: Invasions of a tribal landscape’ (1995/2010). His next book was a study of the aluminium industry worldwide from the viewpoint of Adivasi movements opposing it: ‘Out of this Earth: East India Adivasis and the aluminium cartel’ (with Samarendra Das, 2010/2020), and his next extended this to look at India’s environmental conflicts, ‘Ecology, Economy: Quest for a socially informed connection’ (with Ajay Dandekar and Jeemol Unni). Felix was professor, rural management, at the Indian Institute of Health Management Research in Jaipur and has taught at several universities in India. He lives now in Wales is a Research Associate with Centre for World Environment History, University of Sussex, UK. Carlos Alvarez Pereira was previously a researcher in systems dynamics and entrepreneur in the digital sector and now promotes the emergence of a civilizational shift towards equitable well-being within a healthy biosphere. He is member of the Executive Committee of the Club of Rome, where he co-leads the initiatives on Emerging New Civilization(s) and Youth and Intergenerational Dialogues. He keeps doing research in complexity thinking and the transformation of knowledge and innovation to respond to the existential needs of the 21st century. He is also a member of the Advisory Boards of the International Bateson Institute and the UNESCO Chair on Global Understanding for Sustainability, and a fellow of the World Academy of Art and Science (WAAS). He has been a lecturer and researcher at the Polytechnic University of Madrid (UPM), founder and manager during more than 20 years of several consulting companies in Spain, Switzerland, France, and Germany, and founder of a non-profit research institution devoted to collaborative projects in the domains of complex systems and artificial intelligence. Email: calvarezinx​@gmail​.​com Andrew Sayer is Emeritus Professor of Social Theory and Political Economy at Lancaster University, UK. He is known for significant contributions to methodology and theory in the social sciences as well as moral economy and political economy. Sayer studied a BA (University of London, external) in

Contributors 

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geography at Cambridgeshire College of Arts and Technology (now Anglia Ruskin University) in the late 1960s and then did an MA and D.Phil. in urban and regional studies at Sussex University in the early 1970s. He was lecturer in the School of Social Sciences at Sussex until he moved to a lectureship at Lancaster University in 1993 where he continues to guide students even after his formal retirement. Although affiliated with sociology, he has affinities with other disciplines, particularly philosophy, human geography, urban and regional studies, and political economy and defines himself as “post-disciplinary.” He is known for his pioneering works such as Radical Political Economy: A Critique (1995), The Moral Significance of Class (2005), Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life (2011), Why we can't afford the rich  (2014). Email: a​.sayer​@lancaster​.a​c​.uk Ronald Stade was awarded a PhD in social anthropology at Stockholm University for a thesis based on his fieldwork in Guam. When he moved to newly established Malmö University, he created BA and MA programmes in peace and conflict studies and international relations. His research has included an investigation of the social life of the concept of “global governance,” conceptual studies of cosmopolitanism, engagements with research ethics, a multisectoral, country-wide study for UNICEF Lebanon, perspectives of Syrian refugees in the Middle East, and, most recently, the problem of morality in anthropology. He has been a fellow at the Swedish Consortium for Advanced Study, guest professor at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, affiliated with the Micronesian Area Research Center in Guam, guest lecturer at the University of Ghana, etc. Email: ronald​.stade​@mau​​.se; Website: https://en​.wikipedia​.org​/wiki​/Ronald​_Stade Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt is a senior expert at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, a senior researcher at Global Policy Institute, London, and an adjunct associate professor in Development and International Relations at Aalborg University, Denmark. He has held visiting Fellowships in Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Furthermore, he has extensive research experience from India, China, and Bhutan and done consultancies for UNESCO, the World Bank, ASEM, Nordic Consulting Group, and the Danish Development Agency. He published about 250 publications on issues ranging from social welfare, labour, urban development, economic policymaking, geopolitics, and geo-economics with a primary focus on Asia. Website: http://vbn​.aau​.dk​/en​/persons​/pp(6b5a9a55-a5d7-4d0d-ac2c896a774b708d)/publications​.ht​ml Piet Strydom, an ethical exile from the apartheid regime, retired from the Department of Sociology, University College Cork, Ireland in 2011. Publications include Contemporary Critical Theory and Methodology (Routledge, 2011), New Horizons of Critical Theory (Shipra, 2009), Risk, Environment and Society (Open UP, 2002), Discourse and Knowledge (Liverpool UP, 2000). He edited Philosophies of Social Science (Open UP, 2003, with Gerard Delanty) and contributed “Philosophies of the Social Sciences” to the UNESCO Encyclopedia of

xxiv Contributors Life Support Systems (Eolss Publishers, 2009). His latest publications include “Critical theory and cognitive sociology” in W. H. Brekhus and G. Ignatow (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Sociology (Oxford UP, 2019), “From transcendental pragmatics to cognitive sociology: An architectonic comparison in memory of Karl-Otto Apel,” Topologik, Special Issue No. 26: Karl-Otto Apel— Vita e Pensiero/Leben und Denken, vol. 2, 2020, pp. 163-82, and “The critical theory of society: From its Young-Hegelian core to its key concept of possibility,” European Journal of Social Theory, 2023, 10.1177/13684310221130914. Address: “Leaf Cottage,” Kinsale, County Cork, P17 HW95, Ireland. Email: strydom​@eircom​.n​et; Website: https://ucc​-ie​.academia​.edu​/PStrydom; https://www​.researchgate​.net​/profile​/Piet​_Strydom; https://cora​.ucc​.ie/ Bagisha Suman is an assistant professor, Department of Political Science, Department of Political Science at Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi. She holds a PhD and an MPhil in international politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University. She holds her masters in political science with gold medal from Banaras Hindu University. She has a number of peer-reviewed publications to her credit and has authored a book titled “Credit as Human Right? Microfinance, Development and Contemporary Global Order.” Her PhD work on “Political Economy of Fair Trade: Evaluating Evidence from India” has been recognized as the first PhD on Fair Trade organizations in India by the All India Body, Fair Trade Forum, India. Her research interests lie in international political economy, international development discourse, and international relations theory. Email: bagishasuman​@gmail​.c​om, bagishasuman​@bhu​.ac​​.in Vishnu Varatharajan is a PhD candidate at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. His thesis analyzes various parliamentary debates across cases, mapping the cognitive processes involved in the elites’ belief systems and the role of threat involved in their speeches. The thesis aims to expand the understanding of elites’ contextual use of threat, thus aiding in the assessment of intolerance amidst the rising majoritarian ethnocentric currents across the world. Vishnu also works as a research officer at Global Survivors Fund, an organization founded by Nadia Murad and Dr. Denis Mukwege following their Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 for their efforts to end sexual violence as a weapon of war in armed conflicts. He performs data analysis, data management, and is involved in editing and authoring studies on opportunities for reparation for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Email: vishnuvaratharajan​@gmail​.​com

Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy An Introduction and an Invitation Ananta Kumar Giri

Our contemporary global human condition calls for new modes of critique, creativity, and transformations. Our contemporary crises such as Covid-19, climate change, growing economic, and social inequality in our current dominant neoliberal capitalism heighten the need for a political economic critique of these. This book cultivates pathways of contemporary contributions to critiques of political economy. In the process, it tries to rethink, deepen, and transform dominant traditions of critiques of political economy by engaging with critiques of moral economy, moral sociology, and spiritual ecology. It also explores prospects of creative planetary futures for our interlinked and fragile planet. The book begins with Part 1, Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy. It begins with the introductory chapter of Ananta Kumar Giri, “Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy and Alternative Futures: Political Economy, Moral Economy, Moral Sociology, Spiritual Ecology and Beyond.” In his chapter, Giri explores how we can rethink and transform critiques of political economy today and link it to critiques, creativity, and transformations in moral economy, moral sociology, and spiritual ecology. Giri discusses the limits of dominant traditions of critiques of political economy such as Statism and opens it to multidimensional critiques of state, market, social movements, and self. Giri explores the need for transcivilizational dialogues in critiques of political economy for example exploring dialogues between Marx and Gandhi, Marx, and Sri Aurobindo. Giri’s chapter is followed by Robert Nonomura’s chapter, “Moral Sociology and the Marxist-Humanist Critique of Property,” in which Nonomura explores interrelationships between “prevailing moral conventions, the politicaleconomy, and human rationality.” Nonomura argues how conventional social psychology of morality “lacks dialogue with concerns of the Marxist-humanist tradition—this, despite a rich body of moral inquiry expounded by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School and by Marx himself.” For Nonomura, whereas this main stream of investigations into morality places its focus mainly upon the operation of moral conventions of society, the Marxisthumanist tradition has long been active in problematizing the underlying economic structures that shape those conventions in the first place. It also raises difficult questions about whether morality can be studied in a neutral, “value free” manner […] ; it highlights contradictions between a DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-1

2  Contemporary Critiques: Political Economy society’s moral codes and its actually existing social relations […] ; and it draws particular attention to the profound effects that social pathologies have on the moral development and the social bonds of human beings. Nonomura’s essay “defends the continued relevance of Marxist-humanist theory and political economic critique within the social psychology of morality.” Nonomura “explores how social psychologies of morality could be enriched by incorporating the radical analyses of this tradition” and how it can help us imagine “alternative futures” for our economic, political, and moral relations. Nonomura’s essay is followed by Julien-Francois Gerber’s essay, “Karl with Carl: Marxism, Degrowth and the Requirements of the Soul” in which Gerber helps us in deepening and enriching traditions of critiques of political economy by carrying out dialogues between Karl Marx and Carl-Gustav Jung. This helps us to engage with both structures of economy and society and structures of consciousness and unconscious which can enrich, deepen, and transform the traditions of critiques of political economy. For Gerber, “without Jung, Marxist praxis easily becomes rigid, bullish and dangerous as its intellectual system is overestimated. Without Marx, Jungian praxis easily becomes self-absorbed, toothless and politically regressive, as power relations and ideology are neglected.” In his essay, Gerber tells us that some kind of synthesis of Marx and Jung will bring us to unexpected territories – something that shouldn’t be too surprising given the core of their approach. In Marxian terms, we are looking for a dialectical synthesis; in Jungian terms, for an integration of opposites or, in more symbolic terms, for an alchemical reaction. In both cases, novelty is expected from the (re) combination. Gerber presents degrowth movement as the “natural outcome of this alchemy:” “Degrowth is a research field and a social movement that aims at shrinking unnecessary economic activity while reorganizing societies around human and nonhuman flourishing.” Gerber’s essay is followed by Felix Padel’s chapter, “From Gift to Debt: Rethinking Political Economy from a Radical Anthropological and Indigenous Perspective.” In his essay, Padel brings together insights from economic anthropology especially indigenous perspectives, heterodox economists, and radical critique of capitalism outlined in recent prison writings by Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan. For Padel, basic concepts of political economy and economics need a radical rethink, in the light of indigenous or ‘precapitalist’ economies, and analysis of the ultracapitalism characteristic of present times, understood as based on debt as a mechanism for accumulation and power by a viciously undemocratic elite, addicted to war.

Contemporary Critiques: Political Economy  3 Padel specifically discusses the prison writings of Öcalan. Öcalan’s models of economic, political, and gender democracy and equality were put into practice in Rojava. For Padel, The autonomous Rojava enclave in north Syria is based on Öcalan’s thinking to a considerable extent, especially his emphasis on democratic confederalism, as a system that questions the nation state, and women’s revolution. Marx’s emphasis on the degree of women’s emancipation in Iroquois society finds a new resonance in Öcalan and Rojava. For Padel, “The Rojava model of democracy offers an equally new economic model, whose ‘focal concern is on serving ‘the citizens and not the owners of capital.’ The Rojava administration is also pluri-cultural.” Öcalan builds upon indigenous perspectives on social, economic, and civilizational thinking and organization which gives emphasis to cooperation, reciprocity, and play rather than competition. For Padel, this is where Marxian analysis needs revitalising through Öcalan’s prison writings, as well as awareness of indigenous perspectives generally. The Kurds have a claim to be the one of the largest indigenous peoples of the Middle East, who have resisted assimilation into state society, from Sumerian times 5000 years ago to resistance against cruel marginalisation by the Turkish and Iranian states right now. With this, we come to Part 2 of our book, “Further Engagement with Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy,” which begins with Andrew Sayer’s essay, “Economic (e)valuation: Household and Catallaxy,” in which Sayer argues that dominant forms of economic evaluation under capitalism are narrowly focused on market and monetary considerations. While making economic evaluation, other non-market and non-monetary considerations are not taken into account such as evaluating economic values from the point of view of environment and human well-being. In his chapter, Sayer assesses different forms of economic evaluation, and the kinds of criteria, rationality, and judgement used. In particular, the author compares evaluation involving use-value measures and multiple criteria with “valuation” involving a single cardinal measure such as price. For Sayer, “while prices enable complex modern economies to be coordinated, they are seriously inadequate as indicators of economic value.” Andrew Sayer’s essay is followed by Ronald Stade’s essay, “Lands of Plenty, Realms of Freedom: Imagining an Automatic Life,” in which Stade discusses themes of labour, necessity, and freedom and how critical and utopian imagination in Marx and others have been engaged with attaining freedom from labour. In his essay, Stade discusses the insights of Marx, Ernst Bloch, Herbert Marcuse, and Jean-Paul Sartre. For Stade, “if the realm of labor and necessity is the inverse of

4  Contemporary Critiques: Political Economy the realm of freedom, abolishing human labor through automation seems to open a path to paradise on Earth.” Automation may provide this but this comes with dystopian dangers as Stade writes: The utopia of an automatic life is a human project that is easy to understand. It promises freedom from macroparasites and Sisyphean toil. It gives permission to fantasies of endless play and creativity. Nowadays, however, it is also perceived as a dystopia by doomsayers who warn of artificial intelligence enslaving humanity and runaway technology destroying the world. Stade’s essay is followed by Khirode Moharana’s Khirode Chandra Moharana’s essay, “Self, Pathogen and Climate: Rethinking Political Economy Today.” For Moharana, The Homo economicus which defines the political economy today is utterly helpless in realizing our connection with both the biotic and abiotic components of the earth. The neo-liberal self is self-centered, dominant, and an allconsuming entity which erroneously considers itself as the basic ingredient of human development. For Moharana, “The world political economy is a reflection of this misplaced assumption of human beings to rule over the world.” Furthermore, “the neo-liberal self needs to examine in a true sense its own role in creating an insensitive and selfish world.” This calls for a spiritual turning around of critiques of political economy. Moharana’s essay is followed by Pulin Nayak’s chapter, “Crisis of India’s Development,” in which Nayak presents us the contours of contemporary developmental crisis of India-rising economic inequality as well as rule of a regime of hatred and targeting of India’s minorities. Nayak presents us a historical narrative of it presenting us visions and works of Gandhi, Nehru, Ambedkar, Jai Prakash Narayan, and Ram Manohar Lohia, urging us to cultivate alternatives to the present neoliberal regime of economics and political regime of religious extremism. With this, we come to Part 3 of our book, “Critiques of Political Economy: Transformative Genealogies and Alternative Planetary Futures.” This begins with the chapter by Carlos Alvarez Pereira, “A Relational Approach to Political Economy: Making Sense of What We Know, Towards a Society of Living.” In his chapter, Pereira presents a relational approach to political economy and challenges us to rethink and reconstitute economics so that it can create a society of living. For Pereira, If our “economy” continues destroying more life than it creates, humanity will exit Earth in a miserable manner, no matter how long it will take for life to regenerate the planet without us. Pereira begins and concludes his essay with the weaving possibilities of music and our contemporary contributions

Contemporary Critiques: Political Economy  5 to critiques of political economy needs to help us weave threads of new relationships between self, society, economics, culture and the world. Pereira’s chapter is followed by “Creative Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy and Moral Economy: Cooperative Settlements and Utopian Communities Projects as Modes of Conviviality for Thoreau, Ruskin, Tolstoy, Gandhi and Kumarappa” by Christian Bartolf, Dominique Miething, and Vishnu Varatharajan. In their essay, Bartolf, Miething, and Varatharajan draw attention to great social reformers of the 19th century such as Ernest Howard Crosby, Henry George, and John Ruskin. George’s concept of land tax tremendously influenced Tolstoy and advocated the land ownership of farmers described in the Russian writer’s novel Resurrection. Ruskin exposed the principle of equality and equal payment and the concept of guaranteed income in his Unto This Last. Four Essays on the Principles of Political Economy, which inspired Gandhi to create the Phoenix Settlement near Durban in South Africa. Ruskin and Tolstoy designed elements of an alternative political economy, which include free will as well as mutual aid and sharing; character building and spiritual development; high standard of living and voluntary simplicity; integration of manual and intellectual labour; communal living and cooperative economy in home rule and self-reliance; rejection of coercion and violence; and life-long learning in conviviality and freedom of spirit. This chapter is followed by Abhijeet Paul’s essay, “Broken but Not Useless: Revisiting Marx’s Workshop and a New Ecology of Hope.” In his essay, Paul builds upon his ethnographic research on the jute mill workers of Kolkata as well as wider philosophical and theoretical works of Gilbert Simondon, Bernard Stiegler, Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay, and others. In his essay, Paul shows how “repair, rethinking, and reuse make community in local, supra-local, and even hyper-local terms in postecological realities.” Paul’s essay “weaves together Marx’s critique of technological breakdown, discourses of ies are produced and given value in a regime of extractive capitalism which works with a logic of ‘accumulation by dispossession,’” as termed by David Harvey. Paul’s essay is followed by Jos Chathukulam and Manasi Joseph’s chapter, “Rethinking and Transforming Critiques of Political Economy: Gandhi-Kumarappa Pathways.” In this essay, Chathukulam and Joseph explore This paper explores GandhiKumarappa framework on development and political economy. It also explores links between Gandhi–Kumarappa visions and practices social solidarity economy principles. This essay is followed by Suman Bagisha’s chapter, “International Political Economy at the Crossroads: Questions of World Order and Other Pressing Issues of International Politics,” in which Bagisha presents the framework of International Political Economy presented by Robert Cox. Bagisha presents Cox’s view on world order and possibly also world disorders and supplements this with some thoughts from the noted international relations scholar Richard Falk’s work on environmental crisis which is part of the current crisis of political economy. Bagisha’s essay is followed by Johannes D Schmidt’s essay, “Reconstructing Liberal World Order and Class Struggle for the 21st Century,” in which Schmidt discusses the contemporary crisis of liberalism, especially elitist liberalism which ignores the interests of the working class. Schmidt

6  Contemporary Critiques: Political Economy here discusses how during the “the last twenty years left-leaning governments, seizing the momentum of the democratic opening, won elections throughout Latin America.” These movements created rebellion against “dictatorship of finance” and for creating possibilities for democratic control of money and ending the privatization of credit creation. These movements can create new possibilities for class struggle in the 21st century but in the heartland of contemporary American capitalism, the prospects are less. For Schmidt, in countries like the USA, movements for identity recognition are not able to connect to class issues and struggle and often neglect these. In his thoughtful Afterword, Piet Strydom, a deep and critical thinker of our times known for his path breaking work on critical social theory and integral cognitive sociology, engages with each of the chapters and challenges us to further deepen our vision and practice of normativity and critique, thus helping us in our contemporary contributions to critiques of political economy, self and society and cultivate alternative planetary futures. Thus, our book explores different aspects of critiques of political economy today and in many different ways helps to rethink and transform it along related transformational trajectories such as moral economy, moral sociology, and spiritual ecology.

Part I

Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy



1

Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy and Creative Planetary Futures Political Economy, Moral Economy, Moral Sociology, Spiritual Ecology, and Beyond Ananta Kumar Giri

Here must all distrust be left; All cowardice must here be dead. Karl Marx (1859), Preface, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy Let us not be obsessed with catchwords and seductive slogans imported from the West. We have not our distinct Eastern traditions? Are we not capable of finding our own solution to the question of capital and labor? Let us study our Eastern institutions in that spirit of scientific inquiry and we shall evolve a truer socialism and a truer communism than the world has yet dreamed of. [...] Class war is foreign to the essential genius of India which is capable of evolving a form of communism broad-based on the fundamental rights of all and equal justice to all. Mohandas K. Gandhi quoted in de souse Santos 2022: 205. Introduction and Invitation We are facing rising inequality—economic, social and political—all over the world which points to the limits of dominant economic models such as the reigning neoliberal global capitalism. With the onset of Covid-19 pandemic, access to healthcare and the prospects of living or dying are also closely dependent on one’s economic and social position while dismantling of public healthcare systems in many countries has added to precariousness of lives on the part of the many (see Horton 2020). This heightens the need for bringing a political economy and moral economy critique to our contemporary condition (see Sayer 2014). But we also need to make fresh contributions to contemporary contributions to critiques of political Economy and link it to other linked concerns, themes, and domains such as moral economy, moral sociology, and spiritual ecology. This chapter tries to offer an integral critique and transformation of the contemporary condition by bringing critiques, creativity, and transformations in political economy, moral economy, moral sociology, and spiritual ecology together. It also explores pathways of transformations and alternative planetary futures emerging from such border-crossing critiques. DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-3

10  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy Critiques of political economy or political economy critiques of economy, society, and polity have played an important role in modern critical thinking as well as movements for social and political transformations in our multiplex modern worlds. Critiques of political economy as in the hands of Karl Marx (1859) had played an important role in critiques of capitalism and for realizing our potential individually, collectively as well as in our species-wide situation. Today, we need urgently the transformation of capitalism and other existing modes of economic organizations such as state-controlled economies and socialism. With rising inequality and devastation caused by rampant neoliberal global capitalism, we need to bring a political economy critique to our contemporary global human condition including critique of the rentier capitalism that is ruling the roost today.1 But here some of the frames and assumptions of political economy such as its uncritical statism and state-centredness need to be transformed, which does not mean supporting the neoliberal move of abandonment and destruction of state. Although Marx had challenged us to realize the limits of state and move towards building a stateless society, political economy as a critique of economy and society is still predominantly statist (see Dorahy 2020). This is evident in the work of Thomas Piketty (2014) who challenges us to realize the need for a perspective of political economy to understand and transform our contemporary condition of capitalism. But Piketty is still too statist in his analysis and prescription2 though in his latest book, A Brief History of Equality, Piketty himself writes: “Only powerful social mobilizations, supported by collective movements and organizations, will allow us to define common objectives and transform power relationships” (Piketty 2022, p. 244).3 Piketty advocates global taxation as an important solution to our contemporary crises but does it need a global state? How do we realize this? Piketty does not even mention about movements of global taxation such as Attac (Association for Taxation of Financial Transactions and Citizen Actions), which were active in his homeland of France and of which he is a member (Giri 2023). Participants in Attac and other global justice movements look at their involvement in Attac as an aspect of their own personal care and commitment to global justice and responsibility. Realizing global justice is thus neither just statist nor institutional urging us to transcend what Amartya Sen calls “transcendental institutionalism” (Sen 2009). It is a work of caring and concerned self as well as appropriate institutions. Realizing global justice calls for multidimensional movements of care, responsibility, and co-responsibility as well as building transformative institutions including transformative states and other interstate and trans-state organizations at local, regional, national, transnational, and planetary levels. It also calls for realizing transnational justice as “non-domination” where all concerned overcome existing political and economic domination and contribute to the constitution of a just, creative, and good society (see Forst 2017; Mohanty 1998). Creative human future today builds upon the critical spirit of political economy but there is a need here to transform the statist assumptions, frames, and binding of political economy, which also permeates the discourse of welfare state and makes it

Political Economy and Planetary Futures  11 part of multidimensional movements of border-crossing and transformations. But transcending Statism does not mean a relapse into free market, neoliberal, and conservative destruction and abandonment of state (see Appadurai & Alexander 2019; Brown 2015; Chandhoke 1994; Kalpagam 2019). It means calling for building a transformative state. It also means ethical, moral, and spiritual transformation of state as suggested by Kierkegaard, Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo, and Martin Luther King, Jr., among others. Critiques of political economy also call for new initiatives in restructuring our world economy and world politics animated by new modes of production, consumption, distribution, resource sharing, and ecological responsibility. In this context, Heikki Patomaki (2017) calls for the formation of political parties at the world level. Patomaki also calls for Global Keynesianism to implement a progressive policy of welfare and well-being at the world scale. But here again there is a need to transform Global Keynesianism as a Statist project with related multidimensional movements in state, market, civil society, and self. The challenge here is to cultivate new visions, movements, and practices of what Patomaki (2017) calls “ethical and political” learning and “heteroreflexivity” to which we can also add aesthetic and spiritual co-learning. It also calls for experimental creativity in building of creative self and institutions in social, economic, and political spheres to overcome existing structures and discourses of domination and disrespect (see Dorahy 2020; Unger 2004). Building upon the Brandt Commission Report, Patomaki links political economy critique of the present to developing a new world civilization and building a new “international economic system” (Patomaki 2013: 175–176). Traditions of critiques of political economy such as the Marxian have been primarily Euro-American in their civilizational moorings and assumptions and for developing a new world civilization, we need to acknowledge such initial locational bindings and the need for overcoming these with manifold visions and pathways of cross-civilizational and trans-civilizational dialogues. For example, around issues of production and consumption and their limits, it is fruitful to cultivate cross-civilizational and trans-civilizational dialogues with Marx and Gandhi. While Marxian critique of political economy is still predominantly within an industrial productive paradigm, Gandhi (1909) offers foundational critiques of it including critique of the foundations of modern civilization. The civilizational dimension of the present crises and movements for renewal are also highlighted in the work of Jeffrey Sachs (2011) who titles his reflections on the current crises as The Price of Civilization. Sachs asks us some fundamental questions which we can embrace as questioning our present civilizational foundations: “The Unexamined Life is not worth living,” said Socrates. We might equally say that the unexamined economy is not capable of securing our well-being. Our greatest national illusion is that a healthy society can be organized around the single-minded pursuit of wealth. The ferocity of the quest for wealth throughout society has left Americans exhausted and deprived of the benefits of social trust, honesty and compassion. We can escape our economic illusions by creating a mindful society, one that promotes the personal

12  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy virtues of self-awareness and moderation, with the civic virtues of compassion for others and the ability to co-operate across the borders of class, race, religion, and geography. (Sachs 2011)4 The present financial crisis is part of a crisis of civilization, of Western civilization of modernity in particular (Eisenstadt 2009 had coined the term civilization of modernity and Gandhi (1909) had challenged us to realize some of the foundational ills of this civilization of modernity). But to sustain civilization, Sachs says that we need appropriate taxation. The rise of the political right in the EuroAmerican world has cut down taxes on the rich and the super-rich, which led to production of bare life and barbarism in terms of social suffering and dismantling of services (Bourdieu et al. 2000; Sayer 2014). An appropriate taxation is not confined only at the national level, and it should be thought of at the global level too. In fact, 40 years ago, the Brandt Report had argued for global taxation, the revenue from which “would be used in efforts to eradicate poverty and to promote economic development of the global South” (Patomaki 2013, p. 176). Piketty (2014) also emphasizes upon appropriate taxation not only at the national level but also at the global level so that humanity does not descend into barbarism of unsustainable inequality and consequent violence and destruction of life.5 For this, Piketty calls for the rise of a new social state based upon impulse of political economy which is interested in redistribution of income and capital and strives for realization of widespread social well-being. But in a spirit of cross-civilizational dialogue, we need to realize that to sustain our existing civilizations as well as to create new ones; we need not only appropriate taxation but also appropriate virtues, character, modalities of mindfulness, ethics, aesthetics, politics, spirituality, and dharma (right conduct as it is suggested in Indic civilizations). Thus, it is helpful that in his book The Price of Civilization, Sachs (2011) reiterates the need for some of these, for example developing mindfulness in our economic and social relationships. The civilizational dimension of critique of political economy calls for new civilizational works as well as consciousness works. Piketty could term these civilizational and consciousness works as ideological works understanding ideology in a broad way. In his recent work, Capital and Ideology (2020a), Piketty tells us that economic inequality is not just dependent upon economic system but is produced by ideological structures that justify inequality, and if we are able to create new ideological movements for equality, then we can transform contemporary conditions of political, economic, and social inequality and create conditions and movements of equality. Piketty here mainly talks about creating social federalism, participatory socialism, and “a Universalist Sovereignism,” which goes beyond nationalist closure and the contemporary rising xenophobia.6 For Piketty, Social federalism is a view that if you want to keep globalization going and you want to avoid this retreat to nationalism and the frontier of the nation state that we see in a number of countries, you need to organize globalization in a more social way.

Political Economy and Planetary Futures  13 If you want to have international treaties between European countries and Canada and the U.S. and Latin America and Africa, these treaties cannot simply be about free trade and free capital flow. They need to set some target in terms of equitable growth and equitable development (Piketty 2020b). About participatory socialism, Piketty writes the following: Participatory socialism is the general objective of more “access” to education. Educational justice is very important in terms of access to higher education. Today there’s a lot of hyper criticism, not only in the U.S., but also in France and in Europe, that we don’t set quantifiable and verifiable targets in terms of how children [from] lower [income] groups [gain] access to higher education, what kind of funding [they] have for higher education. The other big dimension is circulation of property, so I talk about “inheritance for all.” The idea is to use a progressive tax on wealth in order to finance [a] capital transfer to every young adult at the age of 25. (Piketty 2020b) Creating participatory socialism along the lines of transformation of existing property relations and access to more equitable and dignified access to health and education calls for new ideological works which also can be realized as new consciousness works where we work on changing existing consciousness of self, society, and economy and create a new consciousness of our intertwined and interlinked existence. Consciousness works here do not have only a political and economic dimension but also a spiritual dimension where we also relate our work on equality to the integral equality of spirit and lives which again heightens the need for deeper cross-civilizational dialogues on consciousness, self, economy, and society. Such a consciousness work becomes part of a contemporary critique of political economy, but here the challenge is to go beyond a reductive understanding of consciousness. This calls for developing “heteroreflexivity” and “ethical and political learning” as discussed by Heikki Patomaki and as suggested in the works of Jurgen Habermas (1990). This challenges us to revisit and reconstitute the theme and work of consciousness with Marx and beyond. In his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx (1859) tells us: “The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.” But even while writing this, as evident in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx is not putting forward a totally determined view of history and much water has flown in varieties of Marxist and non-Marxist thinking on this subject. We now realize that consciousness is not totally determined by societies and histories though it is shaped by these and has the power to shape and transform societies and histories. For a contemporary critique of political economy, we need to understand and cultivate the autonomous and interlinked work of consciousness in the dynamics of self, culture, societies, and histories, and for this, we can build upon multiple traditions of critical and transformative thinking in politics, spirituality, and consciousness studies. For example, Gandhi and Sri

14  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy Aurobindo as well as the multiple traditions of Vedanta challenge us to realize the creative power of consciousness and bring this to work for critique of contemporary orders of bondage and domination. For transforming contemporary conditions of bondage, we need to engage ourselves in consciousness work for freedom and transformation. Here, we can build on works such as Paulo Friere’s (1970) Cultural Action for Freedom and cultivate new cross-civilizational dialogues between Marx and Gandhi, Marx and Sri Aurobindo, among others about manifold relationships between consciousness and economy, consciousness and history, and consciousness and society (see Chattopadhyaya 1988). Political Economy and Moral Economy Creative human futures today depend upon linking critiques of political economy with other visions, practices, and movements such as moral economy. Moral economy calls for development of moral consciousness on the part of self and society, which is not just an extension of existing logic of justification but the capacity to strive for beauty, dignity and dialogues with and beyond existing conventions and norms (Habermas 1990; Giri 2013). Moral consciousness includes ethics, aesthetics, and responsibility (Quarles van Ufford & Giri 2003). It challenges us to create economy as fields, circles, and spirals of flourishing of life. Moral economy helps us develop us as moral selves while being in economy and political transactions. Moral economy has a long genealogy in multiple traditions and religions of the world and builds upon classic works of Gandhi, Mauss, and Shalins, among others, and in recent years, sociologist Andrew Sayer (2000) has been cultivating this as a creative and critical approach to self, economy, and society (see Mauss 2000; Sahlins 1972). At the core of moral economy are the vision, practice, and policy of care and responsibility. For Sayer (2015), “moral economy is primarily a subject that analyses and assesses the fairness and justifications of actually existing economic relations and practices.” Furthermore, “‘Moral economy’ reinstates ethical approach to economy” (Sayer 2015, p. 291). It offers both a political and ethical critique and reconstruction of economy as Sayer writes: “Politics without ethics is directionless, while ethics without politics is ineffectual. Moral economy seeks to combine them” (ibid: 292). It is engaged in a normative critique of the economy where “normativity is not reducible to ‘normalizing’ or telling others what they should do” (ibid: 292) but involves critically looking at the nature of our self and institutions and their contributions to our well-being and ill-being.7 Linking his vision and critique of moral economy to the contemporary political and economic conditions of inequality and exploitation and movements such as degrowth for alternative economic visions and organizations, Sayer writes: We need not only draw attention to what’s problematic about the crisis we are in, but also to think normatively about what a good life after growth would be like, and the kind of economic organization that could support it (ibid: 295)

Political Economy and Planetary Futures  15 In his reflections on building sustainable social economies, which is not just addicted to conventional notions of economic growth, Sayer (2018) tells us that such economies should help us realize meaningful relations among people as well as with nature as part of a broad frame of provisioning of needs and flourishing of lives. Some aspects of our contemporary economic order such as the primacy of the financial sector where from a condition of being a servant it has become a master call for new coordination and regulation. For Sayer, financial products “need to be socially beneficial, in much the same way as new drugs have to be approved before being released onto the market” (2018, p. 113). For Sayer, “it will also be necessary to create publicly-accountable regional, national and sectoral investment banks that undertake real investment in projects that benefit the environment and society” (ibid). Works on moral economy become linked to creation of good life and good society. As Sayer’s collaborators Hartmut Rosa and Chris Henning write: The function of the economy and of democratic politics should be to allow for a good life for people, to better, not to worsen their situation. If economic growth is no longer functional in this respect, we have to conceive of forms of a good life that no longer rely on an enforced regime of economic growth, and which oppose the belief in ever higher rates of production, consumption, waste and destruction, just for the sake of further enriching the material cosmos of the wealthy. (Rosa and Henning 2018, p. 1) Hartmut Rosa here argues that for realization of good life, economy and society should help us realize our resonance with self, each other and Nature rather than just be in perpetual competition with each other and alienated from each other and Nature (Rosa 2018). Moral economy is not opposed to political economy. Both can supplement and challenge each other in the direction of mutual transformations. For example, critique and creativity in moral economy is not just anti-state and anti-market rather it challenges us to build market and state as moral institutions enabling individuals and societies to realize their multidimensional reality and potential rather than just being slaves of existing logics of profitmaximization of machineries of control and violence. But moral economy does not only have ethical and political dimensions but also have aesthetic and spiritual dimensions as the succeeding themes of moral sociology and spiritual ecology also have these. The aesthetic dimensions challenge us to relate to and realize economies as works of art and making our own lives as works of art (Foucault 1988, 2005). It invites us to realize new relationships between aesthetics and economics and aesthetics (see Giri 2012). The spiritual dimension of moral economy challenges us to understand the inescapable spiritual dimension of value and worth of our lives which cannot be exchanged for money and market but a dignified relationship can be created among them (see Tutu 2005; Pope Francis 2020). Here we can learn from all religious, philosophical, and spiritual streams of

16  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy the world such as Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism, and indigenous spirituality.8 Moral Sociology Moral economy is linked to multidimensional movements of moral sociology and moral anthropology (see Fassin 2012), which challenge us to create institutions of society as spaces of development of moral consciousness and ethically awakened communicative actions. Moral sociology has been at the heart of critical and creative sociology from the beginning—from Saint Simon to Marx and to Weber and Durkheim. In recent years, sociologists and political theorists such as Robert Bellah (Bellah et al. 1991), Roberto Unger (2004), Jurgen Habermas (1990), Andre Beteille (2008), Veena Das (2007, 2011, 2020), and Manoranjan Mohanty (1998) have in their own ways brought new depth and height to it. In their works, we find moral sociology related to institutional constraints as well as the vision and challenges of new imaginations in self and society. To understand this pluriverse of moral sociology, we can begin with the works of Robert Bellah and his collaborators The Good Society (Bellah et al. 1991). For Bellah et al., our contemporary problems of economy, self, and society are significantly institutional, in as much as they spring from the irrelevance of existing institutions and lack of availability of new institutions to guide our private lives and the public spheres. These institutional dilemmas in economy, for example, between competition and cooperation are primarily “moral dilemmas” (Bellah et al 1991, p. 38), which call for a new moral language to think about our institutions as they are now ridden with “unprecedented problems” (Bellah et al. 1991: p. 42). For instance, reflecting on contemporary American society Bellah et al. argue that in the face of the challenge of the present and the dislocations of the post–industrial transition, there is an urgency to think of “democracy as an ongoing moral quest,” not simply as a political process—“as an end state” (Bellah et al. 1991, p. 20). They are emphatic in their proposition that we currently need a new “moral ecology” to think creatively about institutions—their predicament and possibility since “the decisions that are made about our economy, our schools, our government, of our national position in the world cannot be separated from the way we live in practical terms, the moral life we lead as a people” (Bellah et al. 1191, p. 42; emphasis added). In TheGood Society, Bellah et al. tell us that contemporary American form of life minimizes seeking of any “larger moral meaning” and Americans have pushed the “logic of exploitation as far as it can go” (Bellah et al. 1991, p. 43). Furthermore, “the main line churches have done a lousy job in naming the suffering of middle class existence”—they do not say that it is the competition-driven existence which is a “form of human suffering” (Bellah et al. 1991, p. 210). In this context, they plead for a new paradigm for the actors and the institutions of the United States what they call the “pattern of cultivation.” This paradigm of cultivation refers to the habit of paying attention to the needs of one another and building of communities. “Attention is described here normatively which refers to pursuing goals, and relationships which give us

Political Economy and Planetary Futures  17 meaning, and is different from ‘distraction’ and ‘obsession’” (ibid). For Bellah et al. (1991, p. 273): Attending means to concern ourselves with the larger meanings of things in the longer run, rather than with short-term pay offs. The pursuit of immediate pleasure, or the immediate pleasure is the essence of dislocation. A good society is one in which attention takes precedence over distraction. Moral sociology here becomes a sociology of paying attention to each other and for building appropriate self and social institutions for this which also resonates with the works of Jeffrey Sachs (2011) on building economies as fields of attentiveness rather than distraction. Moral sociology and moral ecology are important parts of contemporary critiques of both political economy and moral economy. The multiverse of moral sociology also builds upon the seminal works of Jurgen Habermas. Habermas (1990) argues that the task of human emancipation today requires a moral approach along with the familiar models of political action. Consider, for instance, the persistent question of poverty and disadvantage in advanced industrial societies. For Habermas, while in the classical phase of capitalism capital and labour could threaten each other for pursuing their interests, today "this is no longer the case" (Habermas 1990, p. 19). Now the underprivileged can make their predicament known only through a "protest vote" but "without the electoral support of a majority of citizens … problems of this nature do not even have enough driving force to be adopted as a topic of broad and effective public debate" (Habermas 1990b: 20). In this situation, for Habermas, a moral consciousness diffusing the entire public sphere is crucial for tackling the problems of poverty, disadvantage, and income inequality. As Habermas argues: "a dynamic self-correction cannot be set in motion without introducing morals into the debate, without universalizing interests from a normative point of view" (ibid). The same imperative also confronts us in addressing contemporary global problems such as environmental disaster, world poverty, and the North–South divide. For Habermas, in addressing these problems, we also need a moral perspective, as he (1990b, p. 20) writes: these problems can only be brought to a head by rethinking topics morally, by universalizing interests in a more or less discursive form […] The moral or ethical point of view makes us quicker to perceive the more far–reaching, and simultaneously less insistent and more fragile, ties that bind the fate of an individual to that of every other, making even the most alien person a member of one's community. Moral sociology helps us in this as it also helps us asking whether the world views and institutions we have taken for granted are “instances of problematic justice” (Habermas 1990). Moral sociology helps us morally argue about the nature of our self and institutional conditions and not only reproduces conventions of injustice and wasted lives but also embodies postconventional development of self and society (see Giri 1998). Habermasian contribution to moral economy and moral

18  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy sociology builds upon his critique of political economy where “the categories of critiques of political economy breakdown” (Dorahy 2020, p. 9). For Habermas, “a critical theory of society can no longer be constituted in the form of a critique of political economy” (Habermas 1970,p. 101). The project of moral sociology also draws upon the many-sided works of Roberto M. Unger (2004), where morality finds an expression in cultivating creativity in self, polity, and institutions and in cultivating anti-necessitarian theory and consciousness. Manoranjan Mohanty brings the challenge of building a creative society to the pluriverse of moral sociology. For Mohanty (1988, p. 67), Creative society embodies a methodology of viewing society in terms of liberation from multiple dominations—class, caste, race, ethnicity, gender and many more yet to be discovered sources of domination—and it points at processes already active or yet to be articulated, seeking to reconstitute society. Such an understanding of creative society as overcoming domination can be linked to contemporary formulations of just society as a society of non-domination as suggested by thinkers such as Rainer Forst (2017) and Phillip Pettit (1999), which also resonates with contemporary contributions to critiques of political economy as critiques of domination and subordination (Dorahy 2020). To this pluriverse of moral sociology, Andre Beteille (2008) brings the challenge of constitutional morality where morality involves following constitutional principles and practice building upon the seminal work of B.R. Ambedkar. But Beteille’s constitutional morality seems to be more institutional and does not question constitutions and institutions themselves or realize them as documents of social and personal hope and not just as texts of application.9 The former seems to be arising in the works of Roberto Unger, Jurgen Habermas, Manorajan Mohanty, and others. But Beteille emphasizes the trust or fiduciary dimension of institutions and moral sociology which is significant (see Beteille 1980) for critique of political economy (see Fukuyama 1995). Here, we can also build upon the works of Veena Das (2011) where moral sociology includes moral and spiritual strivings where the concern is “how do we cultivate morality as a dimension of everyday life,” which also involves border-crossing coexistence between social groups such as Hindus and Muslims and themes such as moral/ethical and economic/political aspects of our lives. Moral sociology here is linked to a project of “ordinary ethics” where we live ethically in our everyday lives acknowledging our vulnerability and, at the same time, realizing our capacity to resist degradation and create new possibilities (Das 2020). The pluriverse of moral sociology with appropriate institutions, self, and movements of consciousness are helpful in critiques and transformations of political economy and relating it to the moral economy in creative ways. Social and Spiritual Ecology Critiques of political economy have from the beginning been confronted with the challenges of finding a creative balance between economics and ecology that has

Political Economy and Planetary Futures  19 inspired Marxist and Marx-sympathetic scholars such as David Harvey (1996) and Barbara Harriss-White (2020) to realize the concerns of ecology, restitution, and regeneration of our biological, and other realms in Marx. Here, what Barbara Harriss-White writes deserves our careful consideration: Marx envisaged an alternative dialectical process, one that was impossible under capitalist production and relations. He envisioned the systematic application of science to govern the “human metabolism with nature in a rational way—with the least expenditure of energy—and the re-use of waste—under collective (social control)—as associated producers.” These are the social and ecological conditions in which fully emancipated individual human development’ unfolds and in which science is to be used neither to dominate nature not to assume nature is inexhaustible. […] Understanding Marx’s concept of human development as implying the relation to nature which he called “restitution” [as different from “restoration” though this is how Marx’s original restitution in German has been translated into in English which for Barbara Hariss-White has a status quo and going back to Nature dimension] helps to appreciate why he thought this was something which only a socialist society could achieve. Societies are not owners of the earth, they are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding generations as bene patres familial. Our full, fee and rich development requires we improve the earth. (Harriss-White 2020, pp. 35, 36) Marx’s reference to associated producers in the above passage brings us to the social dimension of ecology which we find in some of the critical and creative ecological and sociopolitical movements of our times. Prafulla Samantara is an activist based in Odisha and has been involved with many political and ecological movements such as the movement of Kondhs in Niyamgiri not to allow the Vedanta mining project to work there. It may be noted that it is a historic achievement of the Kondhs that in their community meetings despite many pressures and violence, they decided not to allow Vedanta mining company to strip their hills. In his reflection on ecology and sustainable development, Samantara writes: “Sustainable development is dependent on and therefore should promote service-based commons like food production and consumption, common school education and health. Developing physical natural commons together with reform social organizations and structure of communities is a prerequisite” (in Foundations for Ecological Sustainability 2011: 124). Another example here is the work of Kerala Shastra Sahitya Parishad (KSSP). KSSP started its work in popularizing science and creating a people’s science movement in Kerala. It had struggled to save the Silent Valley in Kerala, a storehouse of biodiversity, which was to be destroyed by the building of a large dam in the area. KSSP had protested against this, and Dr. M.S Swaminathan, the noted agricultural scientist whose work we will discuss shortly, was the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture of the Government of India. From within the

20  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy Government, Dr. Swaminathan lent crucial support to the struggle of KSSP and as a result, the Government decided not to build the big dam, and the Silent Valley was saved. Recently, KSSP has been focussing on sustainable development and organic agriculture, and it has initiated processes such as sangha swapna or collective dreaming exercise to realize these (Parameswaran 2012,p. 93). The above pathways towards sustainable development emerged out of a project of collective dreaming in KSSP which reiterate the significance of new collective imagination which now find a resonance in such efforts as making Meenangadi Village Panchayat in Waynad district of Kerala carbon neutral. But this new imagination calls for transformation of existing systems of production, consumption, economy, and polity (see Clammer 2016). These proposals resonate with the thoughts of both Marx and Gandhi as well as Gandhian economists such as J.C. Kumarappa who had challenged us to create an economy of permanence (see Bandhu 2011). These proposals also resonate with contemporary articulations for transformations coming from many quarters. Nadia Johanisova and Stephan Wolf argue for instance “for the co-operative organization of economy and economic democracy as crucial to realizing sustainable development” (Johanisova & Wolf 2012,p. 564) as crucial to developing a sustainable way of dealing with economics and ecology. They also challenge us to realize the need to nurture diversity of scales and plurality of production modes (ibid). They also reiterate the significance of ecological tax reform: “Ecological tax reform (which entails higher taxation of material and energy capital consumption and lower taxation of work) could help internalize the environmental externalities of large corporations as well as consumer behavour” (2012). The proposal for ecological tax reforms here can be critically related to movements for tax justice in critiques of contemporary political economy offered by global justice movements such as Attac and interlocutors such as Thomas Picketty and Heikki Patomaki. Marx’s reference to our generational responsibility in our relationship with Nature resonates with ecological movements across the spectrum especially in the contemporary movement of young people inspired by Greta Thunberg who “concretises a politics of generational responsibility” (Harriss-White 2020, p. 43). But this generational responsibility is and can be accompanied by generosity. A contemporary critique of political economy, as it moves transformationally with both economics and ecology, needs to combine acts of generating or generativity, generations with generational responsibility, and generosity together. Generosity, generativity, and generational responsibility constitute a new trigonometry of critique, creativity, and transformations now. Ecology is a multidimensional vision, reality, and movement of being and becoming and has social, political, and spiritual dimensions. In our prevalent discourses and practices, while some attention has been given to social and political dimensions of ecology leading to social and political ecology, its interlinked spiritual dimension now needs creative restitution and unfoldment (see Reid & Taylor 2010; Escobar 2020). Generosity in our earlier trigonometry of generativity, generosity, and generational responsibility points to the integral spiritual dimension of ecology. M.S Swaminathan is a noted agricultural scientist of India and the

Political Economy and Planetary Futures  21 world. In the mid-60s of the last century, Swaminathan had helped in India’s green revolution, but from the beginning, Swaminathan had warned to realize the ecological dangers of overuse of chemical fertilizers and other dangers including the dangers of soil erosion. For the last quarter century, Swaminathan has been working for ever green revolution with simultaneous attention to ecology, economy, and agriculture and has been pleading for climate care movement (see Swaminathan 2011; also see Swaminathan 2012). In climate care movement, it is both ecology and spiritual ecology. Swaminathan challenges us to realize both the practical and spiritual dimensions of ecology. Spiritual ecology becomes practical spirituality in which we all take part in our daily lives taking care of ourselves, society, nature, and Mother Earth but also taking “courageous steps of abandonment and new creation in a spirit of evolutionary flourishing” (Giri 2018, p. 248; also see Berry 1990; Sharma 2012; Sivaraksha 2009; Vaughan-Lee 2013). Spiritual ecology as part of evolutionary flourishing challenges us to understand the challenge of evolution understood in a complex nonlinear way, and this is different from the current discourse of sustainable development which is mostly statusquo driven. It challenges us to design our mind, self, and society in a new way which Arturo Escobar (2018) calls designing a pluriverse. But this design is not just limited to the design of institutions but also is related to cultivating a new mind—both individual and collective. To come to terms with the challenges of evolutionary flourishing as part of contemporary contributions to critiques of political economy, moral economy, moral sociology, and spiritual ecology, we need to create conditions of more social and ecological minds. Classic works of G.H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (1934) and Gregory Bateson’s Steps to An Ecology of Mind (1972) help us here (also see Tramonti 2018). But in developing our mind as more ecological, we can also develop it as more spiritual animated by what the 14th Dalai Lama calls Bodichitta or Budha mind (see Dalai Lama 1999). Bodichitta helps us go beyond our ego and realize that we are part of Nature not as a dominator nor as a helpless straw but as a creative evolutionary co-participant. This helps us go beyond the prisms of modernistic individualism, anthropocentrism, and nationstate-centred rationality (see Dallmayr 2016). It is related to the creation of what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014) calls “ecology of knowledges” going beyond modern epistemicide and what Martha Nussbaum (2006) calls “cross-species dignity.” Spiritual ecology as part of an effort to create a new social, ecological, and spiritual mind going beyond the current neuropolitics of the division of the left and the right brain—rational and emotional—helps us in our contemporary contributions to critiques of political economy (see Connolly 2002; Strydom 2012). This is suggested in Patomaki’s (2017) cultivation of “heteroreflexivity” but seems to be missing from valorized proponents of political economy such as Thomas Picketty but finds a resonance in other important interlocutors of economic thinking today such as Jeffrey Sachs (2011) who talks about the need for developing an economy of attentiveness where we attend to each other’s needs including the higher dimension of ourselves rather than an economy of distraction. Sach’s economy of mindfulness resonates with Bellah’s (Bellah et al. 1991) approach of developing a society of attentiveness, thus bringing alternative considerations of economy,

22  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy society, and spirituality together. This draws inspiration from classic and perennial works such as J.C. Kumarappa’s Economy of Permanence and E.F. Schumachers’ Small Is Beautiful Creative Planetary Futures Our contemporary organization of economics and politics has brought us to the brink of collapse, which is also heightened by the devastation caused by the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. We need to critique our present regimes of politics, economy, self, and society and cultivate alternative presents and futures, which are not extensions or reproductions of the existing modes of thinking and collective organizations. Our alternative futures are part of planetary futures where we rethink and reorganize our modes of existence in our planet in new ways. We create new economies, polities, self, and societies and realize ourselves as children of Mother Earth realizing our kinship with all creation. Future is not only a fact—a cultural fact—but also a matter of values (Appadurai 2013). We are challenged to create pathways of beauty, dignity, and dialogues and alternative planetary futures that are not reproductions of existing dead and killing systems and ways of thinking. This calls for contemporary creative critiques of political economy as well as works on moral economy, moral sociology, and spiritual ecology. Notes 1 Here what Michale Hudson (2023) writes about history of economics, political economy, and the present condition is insightful: The classical economics of France’s Physiocrats, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx and their followers over the course of the 19th century developed a logic to free their countries from the legacies of feudalism: a landlord class receiving land rents as a hereditary privilege bequeathed by their warlord ancestors; a financial class receiving interest and other revenues for credit that played little productive role in financing industrial investment; and monopolists, many of whose rentyielding privileges were created to pay government bondholders for loans they had made to finance wars. These reformers defined economic rent paid to landlords, bankers and monopolists as the excess of market price over intrinsic cost-value. Explaining how land rent and banking based on war financing were introduced in Europe violently, they defined a free market as one that was free from economic rents and unproductive debt. Not playing a productive role, it was an economically unnecessary burden on the cost of living and doing business. If industrial economies were to expand and win markets throughout the world, their cost of living and doing business had to be minimised. That was to be achieved by collecting land and natural-resource rent as the basis for public revenue, either by taxing it or simply by taking land, banking and rentyielding monopolies directly into the public domain. […] The end of the 19th century saw landlords, bankers and monopolists fight back. [...] Landlords claimed to play a productive role by managing their property, earning the full rise in the market price for their land, housing or natural resources. Along similar lines, bankers claim that their interest and fees are a return for taking the risk on their loans (while insisting that governments guarantee them against default). And monopolists claim that their return is a profit from their intellectual prop-

Political Economy and Planetary Futures  23 erty right or for organising markets to save economies from disruptive competition. These arguments depicted rents as valid income earned for providing valuable services. Today’s mainstream economics follows this logic by treating all rental income, interest and penalty fees—and the wealth reflecting the valuation of these rent-yielding assets— as being earned by contributing useful services to production. Rejecting the distinction between socially necessary income and unearned rent, this value-free approach denies that any distinction exists between market price and intrinsic cost-value […] Industrial capitalism sponsored a revolution that freed European economies from the vestige of feudalism in the form of a hereditary landlord class. Today, bankers and the elite families with hereditary financial fortunes play the role that landlords did in the 19th century. The same contrast between earned and unearned income that was used to describe land rent, and the definition of rent as the excess of price over socially necessary cost value that described economic rent in general, may now be used to demonstrate the need to socialise the financial system’s money and credit in order to prevent the debt overhead from grinding industrial progress and prosperity to a halt. 2 Heikki Patomaki (2017) also writes: “Piketty’s account is too deterministic, often verging on the tautological.” 3 Changing power relationship also challenges us for a different vision, organization of and relationship with power where we do not become slaves of power and use it to dominate others rather to work in concert with others as Hannah Arendt suggests. This calls for spiritual mobilization of self and society which seems to be missing from Piketty’s approach to critique of political inequality and struggle for equality. 4 The critique of competititoin and the need for cooperation as suggested by Sachs can be taken in a deeper way such as transforming masculine domination and instilling more care such as feminine care. Here what Maira writes is helpful: The masciline view of the economy is a production machine driven by competition. A feminine view of the economy. A feminine view of the economy is is a society of human beings who care. Mainstream economics, so far dominated by men, has created a Tragedy of the Commons. Nobel Laureate Ostrom showed how local communities, often with women at their center, cooperatively govern their local resources equitably and sustainably. Ms. Ostrom proposed a different paradigm, based on cooperation, equity, and sustainability, for realizing the Promise of the Commons, which is the urgent need of this millennium. A paradigm change is required in economics. Paradigm changes always require power shift which is difficult because people with power will not let go. Money gives power; political authority gives power; and formal education and science (PhDs and Nobel Prizes) give power too. In fact, this is the basis of a caste system of power in all societies. Those with the power of money, authority and formal higher education are the upper castes in the hierarchy. They form coalitions among themselves, ostensibly to make life better for the common people who, they say, cannot govern themselves and must be developed. It is time for the powers above to humbly listen to the people and learn from them, rather than teaching them ways that have led humanity to grave problems of environmental degradation and economic inequities [..] 5 Piketty (2013: 471) writes: “But a truly global tax on capital is no doubt a utopian ideal. Short of that, a regional or continental tax might be tried, in particular in Europe, starting with countries willing to accept such a tax.” 6 In his latest, A Brief History of Equality, Piketty (2022: 244) writes: universalist sovereignism will not always be easy to distinguish from nationalist sovereignism, which is founded on the defense of a particular identity and inter-

24  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy ests that are supposed to be homogeneous within it. In order to clearly distinguish the two approaches, we have to adhere to several strict principles. Before committing to unilateral measures, it is critical to propose to other countries a model of cooperative development based on universal values and on objective, verifiable social and environmental indicators that make it possible to publicly state the extent to which different classes of income and wealth contribute to public and climate burdens. We must also describe precisely the transnational assemblies that would ideally be entrusted with global public goods and common policies of fiscal and environmental justice. 7 In his very important dialogue between normativity and naturalism, Sayer (2019b) develops a “qualified ethical naturalism,” which also invites us to relate normativity to our conditions of being part of Nature in connected open ways. 8 Islam and Christianity restrict interest on money lending and have their traditions of gift economies and economies of sharing. Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and indigenous spiritual traditions have also their visions and practices of economic sharing and social reciprocity. E.F. Shumacher (1973) has talked about Buddhist Economics (also see Brown 2016) and we can also explore similar meditations in Islamic Economics, Christian Economics, Jaina Economics, and indigenous economics. 9 We can find a mobilizing manifestation of constitutional morality in thinkers and activists such as Prabhat Patnaik’s where Indian constitution and its constitutionally morality is being read and used to today to create constitutionally guaranteed economic rights which would go a long way in transforming contemporary conditions of politically economy in India (Patnaik 2023).

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Political Economy and Planetary Futures  25 Dallmayr, Fred. 2016. Mindfulness and Letting Be: On Engaged Thinking and Acting. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Das, Veena. 2020. “What Does Ordinary Ethics Look Like?” In Four Lectures on Ethics: Anthropological Perspectives. by Michel Lambek et al. Chicago: HAU Books. de Sousa Santos, Boaventura. 2014. Epistemoloiges of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Dorahy, J.F. 2020. “Habermas and the Critique of Political Economy.” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Online First. Escobar, Arturo. 2018. Designs for the Pluriverse. Durham, NC: Duke University of Press. ———. 2020. Pluriversal Politics: The Real and the Possible. Durham, NC: Duke University of Press. Eisenstadt, S.N. 2009. “Modernity and the Reconstitution of the Political.” In The Modern Prince and the Modern Sage: Transforming Power and Freedom (ed.) Ananta Kumar Giri, 3–24. Delhi: Sage Publications. Fassin, Didier. 2012. A Companion to Moral Anthropology. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. Foundation of Ecological Security. 2011. Vocabularies of Commons. Anand: Foundation for Ecological Security. Forst, Rainer. 2017. Normativity and Power: Analyzing Social Orders of Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Foucault, Michel. 1988. “An Aesthetics of Existence.” In M. Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984, 47–53 (Translated by A. Sheridan and edited by L. D. Kritzman). New York and London: Routledge. ———. 2005. The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France, 1981– 82. New York: Palgrave. Freire, Paulo. 1970. Cultural Action for Freedom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press. Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press. Gandhi, M.K. 1909. Hind Swaraj. Ahmedabad: Navajeevan Press. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 1998. “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action: From Discourse Ethics to Spiritual Transformations.” History of Human Sciences 11 (3): 87–113. ———. 2012. Sociology and Beyond: Windows and Horizons. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. ———. 2013. Knowledge and Human Liberation: Towards Planetary Realizations. London: Anthem Press. ———. 2018. “With and Beyond Sustainable Development: The Calling of Evolutionary Flourishing and a New Poetics, Politics and Spirituality of Thriving.” In Cultural Spaces for Sustainable Futures (ed.) Siddharta, 229–261. Bangalore: Fireflies. Habermas, Jurgen. 1990. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. ———. 1970. Towards a Rational Society. Boston: Beacon Press. Harriss-White, Barbara. 2020. “Making the World Better Place: Restitution and Restoration.” Socialist Register 56. Harvey, David. 1996. Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. Horton, Richard. 2020. The COVID-19 Catastrophe: What’s Gone Wrong and How To Stop it Happening Again. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hudson, Michael. 2023. “Today’ Mainstream Economics is Science Fiction, Not Science.” Economic and Political Weekly 58 (41).

26  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy Johanisova, Nadia & Stephen Wolf. 2012. “Economic Democracy: A Path for the Future?” Futures 44 (6). Kalpagam, U. 2019. Neoliberalism and Governance in India: Governmentality Perspectives. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Kumarappa, J.C. 2017. Economy of Permanence. Varanasi: Sarva Seva Sangha. Lama, Dalai. 1999. Ethics for the New Millennium. New York: Penguin. Marx, Karl. 1859. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Mauss, Marcel. 2000. The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. London: Routledge. Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (ed.) C. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mohanty, Manoranjan. 1998. “Social Movements in Creative Society.” In People’s Rights (eds.) M. Mohanty, Partha Muherjee, and Olle Tronquist. New Delhi: Sage. Nussbaum, Martha. 2006. Frontiers of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Parameswaran, M.P. 2012. “Musings of a People’s Science Activist.” Seminar 637: 88–93. Patnaik, Prabhat. 2023. For a Set of Constitutionally Guaranteed Economic Rights. Adisessiah Memorial Lecture. Chennai: Malcolm & Elizabeth Adisessiah Trust. Patomaki, Heikki. 2017. Disintegrative Tendencies in Global Political Economy: Exits and Conflicts. London: Routledge. ———. 2013. The Great Eurozone Disaster: From Crises to Global New Deal. London: Routledge. Pettit, Philip. 1999. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. New York: Oxford University Press. Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in 21st Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press. ———. 2020a. Capital and Ideology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 2020b. Interview with Thomas Piketty about his book, Capital and Ideology. Harvard Gazette. ———. 2022. A Brief History of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. Pope Francis. 2020. Encyclical Letter “Fratelli Tutti: On Fraternity and Social Friendship. Quarles van Ufford, Philip & Ananta Kumar Giri (eds.) 2003. A Moral Critique of Development: In Search of Global Responsibilities. London: Routledge. Reid, Herbert & Betsy Taylor. 2010. Recovering the Commons: Democracy, Place and Global Justice. Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Rosa, Hartmut. 2018. “Available, Accessible, Attainable: The Mindset of Growth and the Resonance Conception of the Good Life.” In The Good Life Beyond Growth: New Perspectives (eds.) Hartmut Rosa and Christoph Henning. London: Routledge. Rosa, Hartmut & Christoph Henning. 2018. “Introduction.” In The Good Life Beyond Growth: New Perspectives (eds.) Hartmut Rosa and Christoph Henning. London: Routledge. Sachs, Jeffrey. 2011. The Price of Civilization: Reawakening American Virtue and Prosperity. New York: Random House. Sahlins, Marshall. 1972. Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine Atherton, Inc. Sayer, Andrew. 2000. “Moral Economy and Political Economy.” Studies in Political Economy 61: 79–104. ———. 2014. Why We Can’t Afford the Rich? London: Policy Press. ———. 2015. “Time for Moral Economy.” Geoforum 65: 291–293. ———. 2017. “Welfare and Moral Economy.” Ethics and Social Welfare 12 (1): 20–33.

Political Economy and Planetary Futures  27 ———. 2019a. “Political Economic Conditions for a Good Life Beyond Growth.” In The Good Life Beyond Growth: New Perspectives (eds.) Hartmut Rosa and Christoph Henning. London: Routledge. ———. 2019b. “Normativity and Naturalism as if Nature Mattered.” Journal of Critical Realism 18 (3): 258–273. Schumacher, E.F. 1973. Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered. New York: Vintage. Sen, Amartya. 2009. The Idea of Justice. New York: Penguin. Sharma, Subhash. 2012. New Earth Sastra: Towards Holistic Development and Management (HDM). Bangalore: IBA Publications. Sivaraksha, Sulak. 2009. The Wisdom of Sustainability: Buddhist Economics for the 21st Century. Bangkok: Silkworm Books. Strydom, Piet. 2012. “Towards a Cognitive Sociology for our Time: Habermas and Honneth or Language and Recognition—And Beyond.” Irish Journal of Sociology 19 (1): 76–198. Swaminathan, M.S. 2011. In Search of Biohappiness: Biodiversity, Food, Health and Livelihood Security. Singapore: World Scientific. Swaminathan, M.S. 2012. “To the Hungry, God is Bread.” Tapasya Summer. Tramonti, Franscesco. 2018. “Steps to An Ecology of Pyschotherapy: The Legacy of Gregory Bateson.” System Research and Behavioral Science. Tutu, Deshmond. 2004. God Has a Dream: A Vision of Hope for Our Time. Penguin Random House. Unger, Roberto M. 2004. False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy. London: Verso. Vaughan-Lee, Llewellyn. 2013. Spiritual Ecology: The Cry of the Earth. Golden Sufi Center.

2

Moral Sociology and the MarxistHumanist Critique of Property Toward a Critical Social Psychology of Morality Robert Nonomura

Whither Critical Theory in the “New” Social Science of Morality? In recent years, academics from both the social and natural sciences have shown a renewed interest in morality as a topic of empirical investigation. Eschewing traditional disciplinary boundaries that had formerly restricted the study of morality to the domains of philosophy and religious studies, researchers from the social and biological sciences are exploring questions of human morality in new and creative ways that use a range of methodologies, techniques, and theories to directly confront normative-ethical problems. Social theorists like Gabriel Abend (2010, 2011, 2013), Steven Hitlin (2008), and Steven Vaisey (Hitlin and Vaisey 2010, 2013) have responded to this “explosion” in moral research by explicating a research programme for a “new” sociology of morality, capable of exploring the normative dimensions of an ever-broadening range of institutions, groups, and situations. Such a program, they argue, stands to take on the unique challenge of ascertaining knowledge about the social nature of morality—that is, the structures, processes, and forces which shape people’s moral conduct, as well as the prevailing “cultural codes that specify what is right or wrong, good or bad, acceptable, and unacceptable” within a given moral community (Stets 2010, p. 544; Abend 2010; Bargheer and Wilson 2018). This research would therefore expand upon the “old” sociologies of morality constructed by Durkheim and Weber by exploring the various overlapping and “cross-cutting” social factors that shape moral norms, behaviours, and identities (Hitlin and Vaisey 2013, p. 53). Likewise, Jonathan Haidt (2008) celebrates a “new synthesis” of evolutionary, neurological, and social-psychological research where a focus on moral emotions and intuitions replaces inquiry into the moral rationality of human thought. For Haidt, this “new synthesis” provides a functionalist alternative to a Kantian tradition of moral development research (e.g. Piaget 1965; Kohlberg 1981, 1984) that he believes had placed too much emphasis on Enlightenment themes of justice, freedom, and autonomous reason. Common among these “new” developments in moral research has been a curious shift away from critical sociologies that have shaped—and might continue to shape—our understanding of the interrelationship between society’s dominant moral conventions, the political economy, and human rationality. For instance, notably absent from these sociologies and psychologies of morality is the work DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-4

Moral Sociology and Critique of Property  29 and research concerns of the Marxist-humanist tradition—this, despite a rich body of moral inquiry expounded by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School and by Marx himself, as well as more recent work in moral economy (e.g. Sayer 2000, 2007). Whereas this main stream of investigations into morality places its focus mainly upon the operation of moral conventions of society, the Marxist-humanist and moral economy traditions actively problematize the underlying economic structures that shape those conventions in the first place. These frameworks raise difficult questions about whether morality can be studied in a neutral, “value-free” manner (Horkheimer 1947); they evince contradictions between a society’s moral codes and its actually existing economic relations (Marx and Engels 1964); and they draw particular attention to the profound effects that domination, exploitation, and misrecognition have on the moral development and the social bonds of human beings (Fromm 1955; Sayer 2007, 2009). Accordingly, this critical strain of moral inquiry suggests models for human sociality that are not confined to the ideological default of “capitalist realism” (Fisher 2009)—they dare to imagine more humane futures for moral and political-economic life. This chapter defends the continued relevance of Marxist-humanist theory and political-economic critique within the social science of morality. In the spirit of imagining “alternative futures” for our economic, political, and moral relations, it explores how theoretical and empirical research on morality could be enriched by incorporating the radical analyses of this tradition. A particular focus of this analysis will be on how critical theorists understand the relationship between bourgeois morality and private property. There are several ways that Marxist-humanist critical theory, particularly Marxian critiques of private property, might elicit important social-psychological insight into the moral domain. First, although the political-economic causes and consequences of private property have been a longstanding subject in social theory, these remain under-explored within the prevailing literature on the social psychology of morality. Marxist humanism and moral economy are well-positioned to address the ways that power and ideology coalesce in legitimating prevailing normative-ethical ideas about the privatization of resources. Second, by couching its understanding of morality in a historical context of political economy, Marxist-humanist theory has stood as a bulwark against an a priori acceptance of moral conventions such as unfettered property rights. Not only does it underscore the alienating effects of these conventions; it also clarifies how their contradictions may generate moments of potential transformation (either for better or worse). Third, Marxian critiques of private property regimes call on us to consider how our thinking about moral concepts like freedom and equality are conditioned by political-economic systems that may themselves be unfree and unequal. As a radical framework for the sociological and social psychological study of morality, it provides a standpoint from which “to look beyond the logic of capital” in assessing the social causes and consequences of moral phenomena (Skeggs 2014, p. 16). I first present a survey of the various lines of criticism that social theorists have expressed concerning the impact of modern private property regimes on the moral dimensions of social life. I then turn to a more detailed discussion of the radical

30  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy approach that the Marxist-humanist tradition has taken in conceptualizing this relationship, with a specific focus on Marx’s early critiques of private property and Erich Fromm’s (1976) conceptions of the “having” and “being” orientations. I give a reading of these works through the lens of sociology and social psychology, presenting the issues they raise as examples of the radical insight that may be generated by a Marxian approach to moral research. In conclusion, I discuss the implications that this may have for the development of a critical social psychology of morality, and how such a perspective might complement the concerns of moral economy and critical political economy explored in this volume. Private Property and the Critical Sociological Tradition European social theorists from Jean-Jacques Rousseau (2008) to Auguste Comte (1998) to Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1994) to Karl Marx (1990, 1992) and Friedrich Engels (1942, 1978) have made the institution of private property a recurring topic of critical social analysis, pointing to its psychologically oppressive tendency to pit the perceived interests of owners against non-owners specifically, and persons against persons more generally, and to legitimize self-interest over considerations of the greater human community. Max Weber’s climactic image of the “iron cage” in his foreboding conclusion to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is likewise posited in direct reference to the “increasing and finally inexorable power” that “the care for external goods” might wield under the rationalizing forces of modern capitalism (1930, pp. 123–124). During the twentieth century, theorists in the Frankfurt School tradition such as Max Horkheimer (1947, 1989, 1993), Theodor Adorno (1989), Herbert Marcuse (1964, 1972), and Erich Fromm (1976) specified this analysis to the proliferation of instrumental rationalization within bourgeois society, drawing links between mass consumer culture, ideological manipulation, and the truncation of individuals’ critical reasoning faculties. Non-Marxists, too, such as Hannah Arendt (1958), Bertrand Russell (1961), and C. B. Macpherson (1962) have postulated connections between the institution of private property ownership and a burgeoning sense of people’s individuation and disembeddedness from their material and social environment. Subsequent research in critical social science (e.g. Badiou 2014; Bauman 2008; Billig 1999; Thompson 2013) has similarly directed its attention to the processes and effects of consumer-capitalist proliferation and the concomitant atomization of the individual. Sayer (2000, 2015) likewise identifies property relations as one of several fundamental concerns for moral economy. Consistent across all these critiques has been an impetus to examine how private property relations come to shape human relations and on this basis to evaluate the effects of the capitalist system on human well-being, autonomy, and solidarity. This tradition of theoretical interest in the relationship between morality and property suggests a potential point of intervention for critical social-psychological and political-economic analyses of morality. Private property relations are, after all, so deeply entwined in the moral values of society that they inform not only our legal relations concerning access to resources but also the prevailing liberal

Moral Sociology and Critique of Property  31 concept of the “self-possessed” (i.e. free) subject (Macpherson 1962). Manners of moral cognition, social interaction, symbolic discourse, and group membership all take place within particular milieux of property relations and are more or less predisposed to reproduce those relations. And yet, despite how deeply property relations shape people’s lives, they generally remain a taken-for-granted norm, both culturally and cognitively. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (1953) remain correct today in their observation that “in the United States many master symbols of the social structure are derived from and primarily legitimate the economic order. ‘Free enterprise’ and ‘private property’ are practically unquestionable symbols, even when they are not very skillfully used” (p. 281). How is this possible? How is it that a social construct as ubiquitous as private property can be so rarely interrogated? And what impact does a system have on people’s moral consciousness when that system is predicated on the right of individuals to exclude (i.e. deprive) others from accessing an owned resource? It is here that Marxist humanism offers an illuminating theoretical perspective. If the total “social character” of an individual’s society—from “its language and its laws” (Marx 1992, p. 322), to its family structures (Engels 1942), to its mode of production (Marx 1992)—reinforces the legitimation of private ownership, we should then not be surprised to find complementary dispositions in individuals’ own normative-ethical and epistemological perspectives toward objects and others. Under such conditions, individuals are unlikely to reflect upon the implications of those norms and may mistake the rules, the relations, or the consequences of such exclusionary relations, as natural. A condition of this privilege to ignore the interests of “the other” is that, in engaging with moral situations regarding property a person is not likely to utilize cognitive operations to apprehend the claims and needs of the other. Especially under the rationalizing logic of privatization in modern capitalism, the needs of the propertyless “other” are effectively eliminated from practical and moral consciousness. It follows that private property institutionalizes not only a procedural framework for the control and disposal of resources (Waldron 1985) but also a moral doctrine that makes a virtue of individuals’ estrangement from one another. In short, the private, exclusionary quality of private property may be recognized as the legal expression of a more general moral atomization of human beings under capitalism. In the next section, I demonstrate how Marx’s and Fromm’s critiques of private property can provide social-psychological insight into this phenomenon. The Marxian Critique of Private Property An extensive tradition of Marxist scholarship has explored the normative-ethical thrust of Marx’s work (including debates on the extent to which Marx had a normative theory). The focus of this chapter is not to assess the merits of these positions but instead to discuss how Marx and Fromm take up morality as an object of analysis, specifically as an expression of private property relations. The following discussion examines the insights that their work provides into the ideological effects of private property on morality, and it explores the potential for extending

32  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy these critical perspectives into contemporary sociologies and social psychologies of morality. Alienation, Property, and Other Causes and Consequences of Bourgeois Morality

In his early writings, Marx raises the problem that prevailing property ownership norms are not merely alienating but that they are deleterious to the exercise of autonomous thought and action. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, he writes: private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours when we have it—when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc.—in short, when it is used by us. Although private property itself again conceives all these direct realizations of possession as means of life, and the life which they serve as means is the life of private property—labour and conversion into capital. In place of all these physical and mental senses there has therefore come the sheer estrangement of all these senses—the sense of having. The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order that he might yield his inner wealth to the outer world. (Marx 1978, p. 87; emphasis in the original) Here, it is apparent that Marx’s criticism of private property does not simply implicate problems of the unequal distribution and control of resources. Nor is Marx’s concern with private property simply about its impact on the ethical behaviours of individuals (avarice, selfishness, etc.). What is fundamentally at issue are the effects that private property regimes have on the humanity of their subjects. Human beings are made “stupid” by private property. Both our physical and mental faculties (which might otherwise be focused on creative forms of labour and thinking) become dominated by capital and estranged from our being as productive and social creatures. The “sense of having” replaces all other senses—physical, social, and mental—as the determinants of our practical conduct. In short, according to Marx, private property impoverishes the most basic human “senses” needed for an individual to relate productively to the natural and social world. This includes the capacity to think and act out our moral relations with one another. Marx’s critique of property receives further elaboration in his essay, “On the Jewish Question” (1978). Here, Marx demonstrates how bourgeois morality entrenches modern systems of private property ownership by reifying the “rights” of individuals as independent of (and morally prior to) one’s social relations with others. Marx interrogates the premises that distinguish the “rights” of citizens from those of humankind and demonstrates how the former reduces individuality and society to an egoistic abstraction. In bourgeois political economy, citizens’ rights to liberty, security, equality, and property are all formulated on the assumption that individuals’ interests are separable from those of the rest of social reality. Marx

Moral Sociology and Critique of Property  33 cites the guarantee of property rights in The Declaration of the Rights of Man to highlight how, at the bottom of all these moral precepts, lies a key institution: the right of private property (1978, p. 42).1 It is the “inviolable and sacred” right to private property which, Marx argues, grants the right to “enjoy one’s property and to dispose of it at one’s discretion (à son gré), without regard to other men, independently of society,” and thereby codifies “the right of self-interest” (1978, p. 42). Within this system, “none of the so-called rights of man … go beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a member of civil society—that is, an individual withdrawn into himself, into the confines of his private interests and private caprice, and separated from the community” (Marx 1978p. 43). Rather than conceive of the human being as simultaneously an individual and a member of society, modern rights relations conceive of the human being in abstraction, as an “isolated monad” whose bonds to society extend only to satisfying one’s private economic self-interests (Marx 1978, p. 42). For Marx, the implication that this condition has for social relations under capitalism should not be understated. He excoriates the “religious” power of money to privatize social relations and thereby rule over human beings: “Money is the alienated essence of man’s work and existence; this essence dominates him and he worships it” (1978, p. 50). Private property and other social-legal relations operate as a power over individuals and society and become “man’s supreme relation” to the world (1978, p. 51). Individuals’ social relations are compartmentalized into legal statuses of rights holders and rights-regarders, and the moral conduct enacted therefrom is based not on reason but on rules, not on rightness but rights. As a result, issues of need and desert are not resolved through the moral dialogue of autonomous individuals but by a heteronomous acceptance of abstract rules, which are revered as morally universal. The individual’s legal status and legal relations are obeyed “not because (they are) the laws of his own will and nature, but because they are dominant and any infraction of them will be avenged” (Marx 1978, p. 51. Emphasis in the original.). Moreover, because the right to privatize resources (and exploit labour) consists specifically in entrenching an exclusionary relationship between owners and non-owners, it “cleaves” the interests of the private individual from the interests of their community and thus from the potential for more cooperative, autonomous forms of moral discourse about how resources are allocated. By replacing one abstraction, God, with another, money, the modern political revolutions have only perpetuated humankind’s alienation in secular form. Thus, argues Marx, “man was not liberated from religion; he received religious liberty. He was not liberated from property; he received the liberty to own property. He was not liberated from the egoism of business; he received the liberty to engage in business” (Marx 1978, p. 45). In effect, the prevailing political-economic system abstracts the “individual” from the “material and cultural elements,” which constitute the individual’s social life circumstances, and modern man is left alienated from the psychological and social autonomy to shape these “elements.” Although much liberty humankind has been granted over their private affairs, the production and reproduction of “public” affairs are mediated by the “fantastical,” alien power of money—and thus the private interests of whoever controls it (Marx 1978, p. 52).

34  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy To recap the relevance of these insights to moral research, we can see that Marx’s early writings provide a radical framework for examining the prevailing legal relations and moral codes of bourgeois society. His work raises enduring problems about the ways that property regimes fortify the moral atomization of individuals from one’s fellow human beings and one’s own psychology. Under capitalism, Marx (1978) argues, commerce, competition, and private property become supreme values not only as abstract economic relations but as sacred moral dogma: money is the universal and self-sufficient value of all things. It has, therefore, deprived the whole world, both the human world and nature, of their own proper value. Money is the alienated essence of man’s work and existence; this essence dominates him and he worships it. (p. 50) Modern capitalism encroaches not only on the social relations of individuals but upon their psychological orientations—that is, their very capacity to perceive a moral world outside of capitalism—as well (Fisher 2009). This phenomenon became one of the major foci of the Western Marxists of the Frankfurt School who combined Marx’s insights with the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud. The problems posed by Erich Fromm take direct aim at the relationship between modern ownership regimes and moral autonomy and thus provide a compelling social-psychological elaboration on Marx’s early writings. It is to Fromm’s “radical humanist” critiques of capitalism, and his conception of the “having” and “being” orientations in particular, that the discussion now turns. The Moral Implications of “Having” versus “Being”

Drawing especially from his reading of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and his training as a psychoanalyst, Fromm contributes to Marx’s critique of property a direct examination of the connection between private property and alienation as a social-psychological phenomenon, as well as a prescriptive analysis that connects the development of human autonomy with the formation of productive (i.e. non-exploitive), loving modes of social relationship (Fromm 1956, 1965, 1976). In To Have or To Be, Fromm (1976) contrasts two “fundamental modes of existence” toward self and the world—“two different kinds of character structure … determining the totality of a person’s thinking, feeling, acting” (p. 12). Fromm terms these two social-psychological “modes” of orienting to the world the “having” mode and the “being” mode. Fromm (1976) explains that “the nature of the having mode of existence follows from the nature of private property. In this mode of existence, all that matters is my acquisition of property and my unlimited right to keep what I have acquired” (p. 64). Individuals in the “having” mode perceive the world in terms of things and possessions and thus regard social relations and social norms in static, instrumental ways. As Fromm describes, humans’ mastery over the material world, insofar as it has led to the ossification of subject and object, has a paradoxically oppressive

Moral Sociology and Critique of Property  35 effect on the “master.” Because the having orientation derives individuals’ “modes of existence” from their control over external objects, the individual is rendered dependent upon those objects. Fromm (1976) states that, In the having mode, there is no alive relationship between me and what I have. It and I have become things and I have it because I have the force to make it mine. But there is also a reverse relationship: it has me, because my sense of identity, i.e., of sanity, rests upon my having it (and as many things as possible). (p. 65, emphasis in original) Fromm’s statement echoes, from a critical psychoanalytic standpoint, Marx’s analyses of alienation and commodity fetishism: “to them,” writes Marx in Capital Vol. 1, “their own social action takes the form of the action of the objects, which rule the producers instead of being ruled by them” (Marx 1978, p. 323). Hence, both Marx and Fromm warn against the social and psychological pathology resulting from a mode of social life in which imperatives for profit generation supersede the ethical concern for human well-being. Fromm explores the implications of this pathology for social ethics through an unequivocally negative evaluation of the consumeristic, “materialistic” ethos of late capitalism. Drawing together his observation of hyper-individualism and authoritarianism in modern society, Fromm laments that “greed for money, fame, and power has become the dominant themes of life” in Western industrial society and has led to the intellectual deadening of humankind’s capacities for spontaneous, creative, productive existence (1976, p. 7). He grounds this critique further in the terrain of psychosocial development, drawing a correlation between the preponderance of psychological pathology and the pathology of the broader “social character”: what matters in Freud’s view is that the predominant orientation in possession occurs in the period before the achievement of full maturity and is pathological if it remains permanent. For Freud, in other words, the person exclusively concerned with having and possession is a neurotic, mentally sick person; hence it would follow that the society in which most of the members are anal characters is a sick society. (1976, pp. 83–84) Fromm’s concern is therefore not simply with possessiveness or consumerism per se, for these are cultural symptoms of a deeper system of root causes that demand radical change (Fromm 1955, p. 273). Amidst the factors Fromm identifies that persist today, the rationalizing system of capitalist exploitation appears pre-eminently and irredeemably implicated with the perversion of human beings’ most innate strivings for love, cooperation, solidarity, and reason—and therefore their capacities for moral maturity (Fromm 1956). The legitimation of private property, the romanticized pursuit of it, and the immense social power wielded by those

36  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy who possess it are therefore central to the having mode. However, Fromm also attributes the having mode preoccupations with asceticism as well as the “forced equality” of crude communism, since these too reflect an irrational, heteronomous preoccupation with the world of “thing.” In any of these cases, the having mode is manifested both as a consequence and a cause of alienation from our autonomous social faculties, particularly our capacities to exercise moral reason. Fromm’s social psychological theory is not altogether pessimistic, however. Like Marx’s vision for revolutionary action capable of abolishing private property, Fromm’s theory also prescribes a radical departure from bourgeois morality and bourgeois property. Whereas the having mode of existence is overdetermined by non-living entities (to the point of conceiving the individual’s own self in objectified, commoditized terms), Fromm (1976) conceptualizes the being mode as an orientation where one’s material and social environments are experienced as mutually constitutive of one’s life activity. This orientation is characterized by its “productive” rather than possessive disposition—for instance, by its affinity for creativity rather than commodification or the use-value rather than the exchange value of resources. In Fromm’s words, the mode of being has as its prerequisite independence, freedom, and the presence of critical reason. Its fundamental character is that of being active, not in the sense of outward activity, of busyness, but of inner creativity, the productive use of our human powers. (1976, p. 76. Emphasis added) The being mode of existence, therefore, is a “dynamic,” “spontaneous” orientation to one’s reason, one’s social relations, and one’s moment in the history of society (Fromm 1976, 1989, 1998). From an ethical standpoint, Fromm uses the being mode to highlight the concrete material conditions that must be realized for the flourishing of personal autonomy, critical reason, and mutual respect. A detailed examination of Fromm’s dedication to developing the “being” mode as a psychological construct (1989) and to realizing it as a political reality (1968) is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is worth noting how the dialectical tension between the alternatives of “having” and “being” elucidate critical insight into the ways that property regimes condition individuals’ moral sensibilities. Fromm (1976) states that, from these two contradictory strivings in every human being it follows that the social structure, its values and norms, decide which of the two becomes dominant. Cultures that foster the greed for possession, and thus the having mode of existence are rooted in one human potential; cultures that foster being and sharing are rooted in the other potential. We must decide which of these two potentials we want to cultivate, realizing, however, that our decision is largely determined by the socioeconomic structure of a given society that inclines us toward one or the other solution. (p. 93)

Moral Sociology and Critique of Property  37 Such alternatives, Fromm argues, have serious implications for how individuals relate to the rules of society. Individuals whose identities are rooted in their capacity to possess, consume, and privatize resources will not only be inclined to accept without question the “given” moral conventions of society; they will also be disinclined to orient their values around the interests of others for fear of “losing” power and possessions to them. For such individuals, morality is something prescribed heteronomously and is negotiable only for the sake of one’s utilitarian ends. Conversely, the being mode calls forth the active, productive powers of the human being which can only be fully realized through the emancipation of one’s social relations from the ideological and political-economic hegemony of exploitative property relations, and only also with the development of one’s critical reason necessary to autonomously exercise moral reason. It is reasonable to imagine that those who regard property as subject to cooperative productive use and subjective need (and not according to an ideological default of capitalistic “private property” or pseudo-communistic “social property”) will accordingly tend to orient their moral consciousness around principles of mutual respect, freedom, the substantive needs of persons, and so on. Like all other products of “free conscious activity,” moral judgements would thus be guided by the individual’s own active reasons and convictions rather than through uncritical obedience to power or instrumental self-interest (Fromm 1976). Moral Inquiry beyond Bourgeois Morality

What, then, is the significance of Marx’s and Fromm’s inquiries into property ownership for moral social science? It is their critical insight into the predominant cultural and political-economic relations of our epoch: that the regime of property engenders a distorted apperception of human relations and an impoverished orientation to moral agency. Their work also demonstrates how, by sacralizing private property as an inviolable right, bourgeois morality conceals from view the concrete realities of exploitation wrought upon working people and the natural world (Soto 2017). Rather than cultivating the productive powers of each person in their “real individual life” as members of a genuine community, the right of private property engenders egoistic self-interest, the commodity fetishism of material and cultural production, and the continued alienation of individuals from one another (Marx 1978, p. 105). In situations of ethical conflict, it curtails the individual’s capacity to assess the situation with regard to each party’s interests. Instead, “it leads every man to see in other men, not the realization but rather the limitation of his own liberty” (Marx 1978, p. 42). More recently, the political theorist Michael J. Thompson has explored the cognitive dimensions of these processes in a pair of papers conceptualizing alienation and false consciousness as forms of “atrophied moral cognition” and “defective social cognition,” respectively (2013, 2015). Indeed, the problem of moral autonomy today is not simply that moral matters are only perceived solely through the distorting lens of bourgeois ideology; it is also that, in cases of state violence, climate denial, systemic racism, heterosexism, and

38  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy colonial-capitalist expansion, the powerless/propertyless “other” often ceases to register as a moral relevant entity at all. And yet these critical theories also convey an emancipatory interest: the possibility for a radically different mode of being, one realized not in the personality factors found solely in the individual but through productive social relationships with other human beings. For instance, Engels (1978) writes, that “a really human morality, which stands above class antagonisms and above all recollection of them, becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class antagonisms but has even forgotten them in practical life” (p. 726–727). Similarly, Fromm’s humanistic ethics are informed by a vision of social, material, and moral relations where cooperation, material wealth, and freedom are made commensurate as productive human relations. He imagines that: a sane society is one in which qualities like greed, exploitativeness, possessiveness narcissism, have no chance to be used for greater material gain or for the enhancement of one’s personal prestige. Where acting according to one’s conscience is looked upon as a fundamental and necessary quality and where opportunism and lack of principles is deemed to be asocial; where the individual is concerned with social matters so that they become personal matters, where his relation to his fellow man is not separated from his relationship in the private sphere. (Fromm 1955, p. 276) From this reading of Marx’s and Fromm’s critiques of property, it is apparent that both theorists develop distinctly critical social-psychological understandings of how morality operates in modern society. Their analyses of capitalism’s deleterious effect on moral cognition offer a promising touchstone for contemporary research interested in critically evaluating, (re)imagining, and transforming the fraught moral conditions of our time. Conclusion: Coordinating Moral Social Psychology, Moral Economy, and Critical Theory—Intimations of a Critical Social Psychology of Morality The present analysis of morality and property shares the view expressed by Frerich and Münch (2010) that we not only “have to know what morality is as a social phenomenon and a scientific object; we also need to learn more about how morality is constructed, first of all” (p. 530). The preceding examination of Marx’s and Fromm’s theories underscores the influence of property relations in the formation of those assumptions and indicates some promising theoretical concepts for critically examining (and evaluating) this relationship from the standpoint of moral social psychology. Such an approach charts significantly different terrain than the mainstream approaches in the “new” synthesis of moral social science because it implicates the underlying political-economic structure of society in its critical analysis. Instead,

Moral Sociology and Critique of Property  39 it shares many of the critical concerns addressed in a moral economy analysis (e.g. Sayer 2000, 2007, 2018). From both a moral economy and a critical social psychological perspective, moral norms are “not merely conventions but embody assumptions about what well-being consists in, and these can be evaluated” (Sayer 2007, p. 261). By orienting research toward questions of validity as well as behaviour, a critical social science of morality has the potential to fight illusions and oppressions that could otherwise stupefy the moral agency of individuals and publics. In “Materialism and Morality,” Max Horkheimer (1993) observes that: the prevalent tendency in bourgeois morality to lay exclusive value upon conviction proves to be a position that inhibits progress, especially in the present. It is not consciousness of duty, enthusiasm, and sacrifice as such, but consciousness of duty, enthusiasm, and sacrifice for what which will decide the fate of humanity in the face of the prevailing peril. (p. 24; emphasis added) Horkheimer’s comments issue a resounding call for radical alternatives to the moral abstractions, rationalizations, and contradictions that pervade capitalist society. They also illuminate the stakes for moral research as a mode of critical praxis. If moral inquiry begins and ends with the analysis of “cultural codes” dictating right/wrong, good/bad, etc. in society, then the basis for analysing the social construction and philosophical legitimation of the codes themselves is severely diminished. For morality research to provide relevant sociological and psychological insight into the salient issues of our time, it must account for the way that politicaleconomic relations condition the apperception and deliberation of moral issues, not merely document the judgements or the norms themselves. It must also vigorously challenge processes by which epistemic violence (e.g. against economically, racially, sexually, geographically, or culturally marginalized communities) intersects with political-economic domination to distort emancipatory moral discourse and decision-making (Dotson 2010). The moral domain of social life encompasses not only established conventions and cultural codes but also situations of dynamic moral transformations (e.g. psycho-social maturation, consensus formation, spiritual awakenings, progressive or reactionary social change); hence, the importance of critically examining the social conditions under which a given moral rule or moral dilemma arises. Without an examination of the social and psychological conditions under which and through which circumstances become matters of “great [or] minor moral moments” (Churchland 2011, pp. 9–10, emphasis added), moral research is essentially reduced to a study of descriptive ethics, social behaviourism, and the record-keeping of changing cultural conventions. It constrains itself to the normative confines of the dominant culture, and in this respect is predisposed to normalizing its values rather than objectively evaluating their consequences for “actually-existing economic practices and situations” (Sayer 2015, p. 291). The Marxist-humanist tradition offers a penetrating theoretical framework for developing both a social-psychological complement to moral economy and a

40  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy critical dimension to the “new” sociology and psychology of morality within more mainstream academia. Sayer (2007) argues that a “critical” political-economic analysis can reveal how particular economic processes may be harmful to the wellbeing of persons, and/or reveal the inadequacy of prevailing understandings of those processes. This involves “relating morality to everyday life and the experience of well-being and ill-being without reducing it to a matter of individual subjectivity or social convention” (Sayer 2007, p. 261). As far as this chapter’s analysis is concerned, one societal process worth examining is the ways that everyday private property relationships condition a more total “privatization” of an individual’s social relations and moral perceptions. In this chapter, I have shown that Marx’s and Fromm’s humanistic analyses of private property extend beyond “just” the unequal distribution of material resources in capitalist societies. Their theories also examine the kinds of alienated social relations that prevail in these societies, and the corrosion of moral agency and social solidarity that ensues. Their work calls attention to the possibility that, concomitant with the social pathology of privatization, there is a psycho-social pathology of “atrophied moral cognition” that pervades capitalist society (Thompson 2013). They demonstrate how private property relations impose a devastating blow to human beings’ capacity to relate to one another as morally relevant beings—beings deserving of dignity, food, refuge, etc.—because it supersedes any personal duties an owner might have to support, or even consider, the needs of the other. In fact, it conditions our moral conception of freedom and individuality as precisely the absence of such duties (Macpherson 1962). However, their critical theories also make it possible to imagine the alternative human futures we might realize if we are willing to struggle for them together. Over the past two years, the suffering wrought globally by the COVID-19 pandemic—particularly among the most severely exploited members of the working class—has only further demonstrated that a humane planetary future must be one in which our political economy is transformed to facilitate the provision, not the privatization of life-saving and life-affirming resources. As humanity also confronts the ever-escalating peril of climate disaster and ecological collapse brought on by modern capitalism, the imperative to form new modes of being on this planet becomes a matter of existential significance. When social scientists reflexively clarify and aggressively interrogate the economic and socio-political relations that structure (and are structured by) the moral consciousness of persons in relation to one another, their moral research stands to challenge the prevailing normative conventions in contemporary society and leaves open the potential for planetary futures of more humane, autonomous modes of social being. Thus, Fromm’s (1947) exhortation for ethical responses to the crises of his own time holds an enduring relevance today: It is the task of the ethical thinker to sustain and strengthen the voice of what is good or what is bad for [humankind], regardless of whether it is good or bad for society at a special period of its evolution. He may be the one who

Moral Sociology and Critique of Property  41 ‘crieth in the wilderness,’ but only if this voice remains alive and uncompromising will the wilderness change into fertile land. (p. 245)

Note 1 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, Article XVII: “Property being an inviolable and sacred right, no one can be deprived of private usage, if it is not when the public necessity, legally noted, evidently requires it, and under the condition of a just and prior indemnity.”

References Abend, Gabriel. 2010. ‘What’s New and What’s Old about the New Sociology of Morality’, in S. Hitlin and S. Vaisey (eds.): Handbook of the Sociology of Morality. NY: Springer, pp. 561–584. Abend, Gabriel. 2011. ‘Thick Concepts and the Moral Brain’, European Journal of Sociology, 52(1): 143–172. Abend, Gabriel. 2013. ‘What the Science of Morality Doesn’t Say about Morality’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 43: 157–200. Adorno, Theodor. 1989. ‘The Culture Industry Reconsidered’, in S. Bronner and D. Kellner (eds.): Critical Theory and Society: A Reader. NY: Routledge, pp. 128–135. Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Badiou, Alain. 2014. ‘True Communism Is the Foreignness of Tomorrow: Alain Badiou Talks in Athens’ (http://www​.versobooks​.com​/blogs​/1547–true-​commu​nism-​is-th​e-for​ eignn​ess-o​f-tom​orrow​-alai​n-bad​iou-t​alks-​in-at​hens)​. Bargheer, Stefan and Nicholas Wilson. 2018. ‘On the Historical Sociology of Morality’, European Journal of Sociology, 59(1): 1–12. Bauman, Zygmunt. 2008. Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. Billig, Michael. 1999. ‘Commodity Fetishism and Repression’, Theory and Psychology, 9(3): 313–329. Churchland, Patricia. 2011. Braintrust. New Jersey: Princeton UP. Comte, Auguste. 1998. ‘The Second System’, in Gertrud Lenzer (ed.): The Essential Writings: Auguste Comte and Positivism. London: Transaction Publishers. Dotson, K. 2011. ‘Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing’, Hypatia, 26(2): 236–257. Engels, Frederick. 1942. The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. NY: International Publishers. Engels, Frederick. 1978. ‘On Morality’, in R. Tucker (ed.): The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd Ed. NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 725–727. Fisher, Mark. 2009. Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Ropely: O Books. Frerichs, Sabine and Richard Münch. 2010. ‘Morality, Modernity, and World Society’, in S. Hitlin and S. Vaisey (eds.): Handbook of Sociology of Morality. NY: Springer, pp. 529–548. Fromm, Erich. 1947. Man For Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics. NY: Fawcett Premier.

42  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy Fromm, Erich. 1955. The Sane Society. NY: Holt Paperbacks. Fromm, Erich. 1956. The Art of Loving. NY: Harper Collins. Fromm, Erich. 1965. Marx’s Concept of Man. NY: Fredrich Ungar Publishing Co. Fromm, Erich. 1968. The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology. NY: Harer & Row Publishing. Fromm, Erich. 1976. To Have or To Be. NY: Bantam Books. Fromm, Erich. 1989. The Art of Being. NY: Continuum. Fromm, Erich. 1998. Life Between Having and Being by Erich Fromm. R. Funk (ed.). NY: Continuum. Gerth, Hans and Charles W. Mills. 1953. Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions. NY: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc. Haidt, Jonathan. 2008. ‘Morality’, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(1): 65–72. Hitlin, Steven. 2008. Moral Selves, Evil Selves: The Social Psychology of Conscience. NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Hitlin, Steven and Steven Vaisey. 2010. ‘Back to the Future: Reviving the Sociology of Morality’, in S. Hitlin and S. Vaisey (eds.): Handbook of the Sociology of Morality. NY: Springer, pp. 3–14. Hitlin, Steven and Steven Vaisey. 2013. ‘The New Sociology of Morality’, Annual Review of Sociology, 39: 51–68. Horkheimer, Max. 1947. Eclipse of Reason. NY: Continuum Publishing. Horkheimer, Max. 1989. ‘The State of Contemporary Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research’, in S. Bronner and D. Kellner (eds.): Critical Theory and Society: A Reader. NY: Routledge, pp. 25–36. Horkheimer, Max. 1993. Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1981. The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice. NY: Harper & Row. Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1984. The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages. NY: Harper & Row. Macpherson, C. B. 1962. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. NY: Oxford UP. Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One-Dimensional Man. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Marcuse, Herbert. 1972. Counterrevolution and Revolt. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Marx, Karl. 1978. The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd Ed. R. Tucker (ed.). NY: W.W. Norton & Company. Marx, Karl. 1990. Capital Vol. 1. B. Fowkes (trans.). Toronto: Penguin Books Canada. Marx, Karl. 1992. Karl Marx: Early Writings. Toronto: Penguin Books Canada. Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1964. The Manifesto of the Communist Party. NY: Simon and Schuster. Piaget, Jean. 1965. The Moral Judgment of the Child. M. Gabain (trans.). NY: The Free Press. Proudhon, Pierre Joseph. 1994. What Is Property? D. Kelley and B. Smith (eds. and trans.). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 2002. The Social Contract and the First and Second Discourses. S. Dunn (ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Russell, Bertrand. 1961. The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell. R. Enger and L. Denonn (eds.). NY: Simon and Schuster. Sayer, Andrew. 2000. ‘Moral Economy and Political Economy’, Studies in Political Economy, 61: 79–104.

Moral Sociology and Critique of Property  43 Sayer, Andrew. 2007. ‘Moral Economy as Critique’, New Political Economy, 12(2): 261–270. Sayer, Andrew. 2009. ‘Who’s Afraid of Critical Social Science?’, Current Sociology, 57(6): 767–786. Sayer, Andrew. 2015. ‘Time for Moral Economy?’, Geoforum, 65: 291–293. Sayer, Andrew. 2018. ‘Welfare and Moral Economy’, Ethics and Social Welfare, 12(1): 20–33. Skeggs, Bev. 2014. ‘Values Beyond Value? Is Anything Beyond the Logic of Capital?’, British Journal of Sociology, 65(1): 1–20. Soto, Kohei. 2017. Karl Marx’s Ecosocialism: Capital, Nature, and the Unfinished Critique of Political Economy. NY: Monthly Review Press. Stets, Jan. 2010. ‘The Social Psychology of Moral Identity’, in S. Hitlin and S. Vaisey (eds.): Handbook of the Sociology of Morality. NY: Springer, pp. 385–409. Thompson, Michael. 2013. ‘Alienation as Atrophied Moral Cognition and Its Implications for Political Behavior’, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 43(3): 301–321. Thompson, Michael. 2015. ‘False Consciousness Reconsidered: A Theory of Defective Social Cognition’, Critical Sociology, 41(3): 449–461. Waldron, Jeremy. 1985. ‘What Is Private Property?’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 5(3): 313–349. Weber, Max. 1930. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Talcott Parsons (trans.). NY: Routledge.

3

Ensouling the Critique of Political Economy From Marx and Jung to Degrowth Julien-François Gerber

Introduction This chapter is an attempt to bring together a Marxist analysis of socioeconomic processes and Jungian depth psychology.1 Both Karl Marx and Carl Jung were groundbreaking thinkers, immensely influential, prolific, controversial, and profoundly integrative. Both sought to uncover invisible layers of reality, and both were ultimately concerned with human flourishing and forms of healing. Yet the two authors’ approaches couldn’t be more different. Jung was seven when Marx died; he remained all his life very sceptical of Marxism and never engaged with Marx as a thinker. My starting point, nevertheless, is to assume that these two “opposites” are both “right” in their own ways and that their legacy needs to be somehow critically integrated for genuine emancipation. Marx’s own dialectical method and Jung’s alchemical studies seem at least to be open to new, unexpected syntheses. Here, we would be talking about a synthesis of these two “halves” of reality that their works symbolize: the outer and inner worlds, the social and the individual, consciousness and the unconscious, objectivity and subjectivity, materialism and idealism, modernity and ancestrality, and science and spirituality. This essay will evidently not do justice to such a grand synthesis; it will only offer a few thoughts along the way and it will try to show why this is important for radical theory and practice. True, similar inner-outer integrations are not new to critical theory. They have already been proposed by Freudo-Marxists, socialist feminists, and more recently by Lacanian Marxists (Gerber 2022). But I would like to suggest here that a Jungian approach can bring unique elements to these important previous attempts, especially (i) the notion of the soul, (ii) a positive view of the unconscious and its potentials, and (iii) an opening to spirituality. Jung is arguably the first (professional) psychologist to have centred its work on the soul, defined as an embodied yet transpersonal Self going beyond the ego mind and characterized by wholeness and authenticity. He also perceived—unlike Freud or Lacan, but in agreement with Reich or Marcuse—that the unconscious entails a liberatory potential one can tune into.2 Finally, Jung prominently related the unconscious to the deepest layer of reality, that of “spirituality,” which encompasses our relationship with transcendence and the sacred.3 Spirituality cannot just be an optional extra, he argued; it is in our core, and it connects human emancipation to the more-than-human, not in DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-5

Ensouling the Critique of Capitalism  45 the form of obedience to a belief system but as something to be intimately lived and experienced. The current “spiritual turn” in the humanities and social sciences—after the excesses of modernist scientism and postmodern deconstructions—could be enriched by a recognition of its politico-economic implications, and this essay posits that a Jungian-Marxian dialogue could be helpful in that respect. Such a conversation would represent a useful, situated step along the longer path of human entelechy. But I would rather not promote the term “Jungian Marxism”4 for two main reasons. First, it wouldn’t be well-advised to personify another radical project with the names of two white men, as if their work already contained everything. In reality, several of their philosophical and normative ideas can be found in similar forms in non-Western traditions (e.g. Dussel 2013; Giri 2013; Wynter 2003). Second, “Jungian Marxism” would easily lead to extra misunderstandings since, as we will see, the combination of Marx and Jung is likely to give rise to ideas that were not explicitly present in their works. In particular, it might generate a new form of radical politics that is quite different from the common (mis)conception of Marxism as necessarily industrialist, statist, and anti-religious. In fact, I will suggest that the “new form” can only be ecological, autonomist, and spiritual—attributes that could resonate with the contemporary degrowth movement as we will see later in this text. After a brief exposition of some of the key divergences and convergences between Marx and Jung, I propose four fragments of a Jungian-Marxian anthropology, around (i) the multi-layered nature of social conflicts, (ii) the relationship between ideology and the unconscious, (iii) the psychological costs of capitalist development, and (iv) ecology and degrowth. I then conclude with some remarks on the requirements of the soul and its politico-economic implications. Bridging Marx and Jung I am not pretending to provide a complete assessment of the divergences and convergences between these two prolific and complex authors, far from it. I will only outline a few ideas, hoping to stimulate further discussions. Divergences

In a nutshell, Marx’s sociopolitical project can be characterized as mainly concerned with the social and the “outer” world; its philosophical standpoint is materialist; it relies on an early form of system theory and on critical science; it is “progressive” in the sense that it has great hope in societal improvement and “modernity”; it is critical of religion; its goal is to help humanity move beyond the capitalist mode of production, namely towards an economy where key resources are democratically held in common (“communism”); and its shadow sides are authoritarianism, dogmatism, and the disregard of subjectivities. In contrast, Jung’s psychological project is mostly concerned with the personal and “inner” worlds; it is philosophically inclined towards idealism;5 it relies on

46  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy phenomenology and hermeneutics, and rejects science as the only mode of reason; it is “conservative” in the sense that it sees a great deal of richness in cultural traditions and “ancestrality”; it embraces spirituality; its goal is to help humanity move beyond the egoic mode of consciousness, namely towards the soul life where wholeness and truthfulness prevail; and its shadow sides are elitism, obscurantism, and racism. The dark history of the use of Marx’s ideas in “actually-existing socialisms” has been discussed extensively (starting perhaps with Goldman 1923), and so have Jung’s problematic political statements. Jung has probably never been a Nazi sympathizer (Samuels 1993), but his writings clearly fell at times into the shadow aspects I mentioned above (e.g. Brewster 2017). Both traditions have had, as a result, the unfortunate habit of attracting unsolicited fellow travellers. Fortunately, however, many Marxist and Jungian analysts have explicitly sought to address the shadow sides of their “founding fathers.” There have been strong anti-authoritarian currents within Marxism, for instance with Freudo-Marxism in Germany, situationism in France, or autonomism in Italy. Similarly, a Left “political turn” has been observed within Jungian studies (Alschuler 2006; Kiehl et al. 2016). But let me briefly return to the basics of both Marx’s and Jung’s frameworks, in an attempt to sketch their complementary emancipatory potentials. Marx’s scientific and political project seeks to uncover the hidden principles of human history and capitalism in order to guide social movements towards a more just, equal, and sustainable society. For Marx, a society’s base or “infrastructure”— namely its ownership relations and productive apparatus—has a decisive influence in shaping the dominant ideology of that society and hence its political and cultural “superstructure.” In any society with private ownership of the means of production, he argued, different social classes necessarily appear and they have conflicting interests. In capitalism, this fundamentally takes the form of the clash between a minority of capitalists and a majority of wage labourers. But as change occurs on different levels, the inefficiency, injustice, and unsustainability of the system tend to intensify, which may eventually give birth to a new mode of production. Marx believed that the contradictions of capitalism have a good chance of being ultimately superseded by a classless society he called “communism.” For him, communism is a society “in which the free flourishing of each is the condition for the free flourishing of all” (Marx and Engels 1848, p. 66). This definition could well be one of the most radical propositions of the Communist Manifesto. Bhaskar (2017, p. 55) noted that it resonates with some spiritual traditions, like the idea of the bodhisattva in Mahayana Buddhism, whereby the realized soul cannot be free until each and every being in the cosmos is fully free as well, in the sense of realized. In a way, Jung’s scientific and spiritual project starts there, as he seeks to uncover the hidden principles of human flourishing. For Jung, a person’s “inner infrastructure,” or unconscious, has a decisive influence in shaping her thoughts, emotions, and behaviours. He perceived a great depth to the unconscious—historically in its pre-human origins as well as content-wise. He saw it as a vast and ambivalent reservoir of archetypes (i.e. innate patterns of “psychic energy” expressed in culturally specific ways) that move the subject in ways both creative and destructive. There are different depths to the Jungian unconscious, including the personal, family, cultural,

Ensouling the Critique of Capitalism  47 and collective unconscious—that deepest level which contains the archetypes and the instincts. Jung thus rejected the primacy of sexuality in the formation of the core personality, advocating instead a plurality of factors. He called “individuation” the subject’s lifelong process of balancing the expression of psychic energies, including archetypes. Key entities to consider in this balancing process are the shadow and the Self. The former contains non-processed or repressed qualities, while the latter represents the whole person: body, heart and mind, consciousness and the unconscious, autonomy as well as connections. Jung considered the fullest possible actualization of the Self—or soul—to be the main task of human life. As stated earlier, Jung remained all his life critical of Marxism and of any mass movements seen as dissolving individualities and prone to fanaticism. Examples of his anti-Marxism are multiple and often rooted in his defence of the psychological value of cultural traditions. But we should of course remember that the “Marxism” Jung had under his eyes was mostly Stalinism, a regime that had little to do with anything “socialist” in Marx’s sense (Castoriadis 1949). In this context, it may come as a surprise that both Marx and Jung also shared many ideas, and only a handful of authors have started to explore those links in more detail (Bengis 1977; Borba 2015; Friedman 2020; Glass 1972; Green 2006; Holt 1973; Rushing and Frentz 1991). Convergences

Jung’s conception of individuation could be seen as a psychological analogue of Marx’s theory of history (Rushing and Frentz 1991). Jung offers tools and a roadmap for healing and self-development, and in this sense, his “optimism is much closer in temperament to Marx’s revolutionary project than [was] Freud’s pessimism” (Friedman 2020, p. 7). As both Jung and Marx sought to understand the blocks to human flourishing, they developed a stark critique of capitalist modernity, expanding on the concept of alienation. Marx rooted alienation in capitalist exploitation separating producers from their creative potential, while Jung conceptualized alienation as modernity’s overconfidence in the conscious ego separating individuals from their Self and creating a profound sense of meaninglessness and disorientation. From this perspective, both Marx and Jung are in reality at the interface of the individual and the social, although both have their preferred focus. For Marx, communism is a society where people have both the time and resources to pursue their creative passions and genuine interests, and to contribute to social wealth in this way. His communism has therefore a strong individualistic component (Fromm 1961). In turn, Jung’s concept of the collective unconscious is by nature social. For him, all human psyches are interconnected at a deeper level, and “it follows that the process of individuation must lead to more intense and broader collective relationships” (Jung 2017, p. 412). Marx also perceived such an interconnection in the formation of the subject. He famously (and ambiguously) stated in the sixth thesis on Feuerbach that “the human essence […] is the ensemble of social relations” (Marx 1998, p. 570). As a result, to transform society for the better can potentially “improve” who we are. For Jung, in contrast, little improvement is to be expected from social change as human

48  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy beings will never fundamentally “deviate from the original pattern of [their] being” (Jung 1977, p. 436); most of the work for emancipation is therefore to be done at the personal level. Yet these two positions are not as clear-cut as it may seem and could even be overlapping. For Marx, a good society is one that allows our human nature (he called it our “species-being”) its full expression. For him, humans are social beings who fundamentally strive for freedom, creativity, and purposive production (Geras 1988). The Marxian psyche is thus not purely socially constructed and it resonates with Jung’s own conception of individuation (Glass 1972). On religion too, the divergence is not as simple as one could expect. That religion is the “opium of the people” has become the standard quote in Marxist understandings of religion, and it is assumed that opium refers here to a drug that kills pain, distorts reality, and creates addiction. But is it what Marx meant? McKinnon’s (2005) exegesis offers a more nuanced interpretation of this particular quote (putting aside for now a broader analysis of Marxism and religion). When Marx wrote it, “opium was a medicine (albeit one with significant, newly discovered ‘problems’); it was a source of enormous profit (which also provoked protest and rebellion); finally, it was a source of ‘utopian’ visions” showing consumers that another world was possible (ibid., 18). To use opium as a symbol for religion may thus contain several meanings, at once condemning the commodification of religion and its abuses, but also acknowledging its progressive, healing role by being “the soul of a soulless world,” as Marx wrote in the sentence preceding the famous quote. Marx, in fact, never objected to a spiritual life (see e.g. Marx 2007, p. 31) and Fromm (1982, p. 227) went as far as suggesting that Marx “was a profoundly religious person and an enemy of ‘religion’ for that very reason.” In contrast to Freud who saw religion as the symptom of a childish wish for a powerful father, Jung saw the absence of spirituality as the root of all adult psychological diseases. Based on his study of various religious traditions, he was convinced that the journey of entelechy is at the mystical core of all religions. This journey is an invitation to meet oneself at the same time as the divine. He wrote that “God has never spoken to Man except in and through the soul, and the soul understands, and we perceive it as somethings having to do with the soul” (Jung 1932, as quoted in Abt 1988, p. 339). Interestingly, Marx had also hinted at the existence of the unconscious. He wrote in 1844 that “the reform of consciousness consists entirely in making the world aware of its own [hidden] consciousness, in arousing it from its dream of itself, in explaining its own actions to it” (Marx 1844, p. 1). He then summarized his entire political mission with these words: Our programme must be: the reform of consciousness [or “the expansion of consciousness” one would perhaps say today] not through dogmas but by analyzing mystical consciousness obscure to itself, whether it appear in religious or political form. It will then become plain that the world has long since dreamed of something of which it needs only to become conscious for it to possess it in reality. It will then become plain that our task is not to draw a sharp mental line between past and future, but to complete the thought of

Ensouling the Critique of Capitalism  49 the past. Lastly, it will becomes plain that mankind will not begin any new work, but will consciously bring about the completion of its old work. (ibid.) Marx sounds here a lot like Jung. This passage claims, in short, that there is an old, hidden, and collective layer to our consciousness, and that this deeper layer can move us towards our own flourishing, provided it is correctly “analysed.” In turn, Jung’s take on capitalism is not always at odds with Marx’s. “The industrial worker,” Jung (1977, pp. 202–203) wrote, is a pathetic, rootless being, and his remuneration in money is not tangible but abstract. In earlier times, when the crafts flourished, he derived satisfaction from seeing the fruit of his labor. He found adequate self-expression in such work. But this is no longer the case. First of all, he is responsible for only a small part of the finished product. Secondly, the product is sold, it disappears, and he has no further stake in it. This passage captures the central elements of Marx’s theories of primitive accumulation and alienation. Finally, both men did not see a strong government as a desirable institution in itself. For Marx, a classless society would ultimately lead to the “withering away of the state.” Engels (2010, p. 212) noted that “free and equal association of the producers will put the whole state machinery where it will then belong—into the museum of antiquities.” Not dissimilarly, Jung had strong anti-state inclinations: “we are rapidly becoming the slaves of an anonymous state as the highest authority ruling our lives” (Jung 1988, p. 250). The state is treated by many as “a quasi-animate personality from whom everything is expected,” but this is “only camouflage for those individuals who know how to manipulate it” (Jung 2014, p. 11). Jung’s anti-statism seems closer to anarchism than to, say, neoliberalism in the sense that he emphasized the healthy potential of belonging to a municipality of a manageable size: “life in a small city is better than life in a large one, politically, socially, and in terms of community relations” (Jung 1977, p. 203). Fragments of a Jungian-Marxian Anthropology Given the frictions, complementarities, and scope found in the works of these two unusual writers, we can expect that their rapprochement will shed new light on problems of human flourishing. I outline below four areas of research in which a Jungian-Marxian anthropology could make an original contribution towards that goal. The Three Layers of Social Struggles

Social conflicts have at least three different layers of causes and hence also of targets. The first one is concerned with immediate impacts on the protesters’ wealth,

50  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy health, or, following Honneth (1996), recognition. These impacts may for example result in demands for higher wages, equal rights, or the halt of a given polluting industry. Taken together, such demands can be pretty radical, but taken individually, they do not really challenge the power structure in place, and in the long run, they might actually reinforce it. Hence the well-known need for broader answers. The second layer of causes/targets of social conflicts is thus concerned with the politico-institutional structure such as the distribution of ownership, the growth imperative, unequal exchange, coloniality, or patriarchy. The confrontation of capitalist-racist-sexist relations must go beyond a set of policies and requires a transformation of the structure of power. We are so far in a familiar Marxist terrain—but this is not quite enough yet. Social conflicts have also a third layer of causes and potential targets: the realm of the unconscious, namely the emotional, superegoic, shadowy, and archetypal dimensions of social struggles. This realm is about the inner worlds of protagonists: why, in terms of consciousness, did a given movement start/never started? What are the internalized norms that enable/deter mobilization? What relational conditions would ensure the healthy deployment of a radical project? What are the shadow, trauma, and personality types of leaders? What are the guiding images (archetypes) activated in political movements and programmes? To start addressing such questions, one must acknowledge that unconscious forces are essential drivers in the political sphere. There have been too many failed attempts at radical transformations because this third layer was neglected. This was the case in the ex-USSR, as Jung noted, where one élite was quick to replace another one and reproduce the same old relations. Marx might have lacked “satisfactory psychological insights” (Fromm 1955, p. 255), but his concepts of alienation, reification, and commodity fetishism open the door to psychoanalytic investigations. Yet without a proper psychological theory and praxis, classical Marxism could only coarsely understand the process by which a “class in itself” (“objective factors”) becomes a “class for itself” (“subjective factors”) as well as the inner conditions for the long-term viability of socialism (but see Reich 1972). Busy seeking to seize state power, classical Marxism did not emphasize prefigurative politics, that is, the concrete building of emancipated pockets seen as an essential learning ground for further and deeper transformations. My point is that radical politics requires some kind of “awakening” work in order to free oneself from as much biases as possible and to heal forms of alienation. The focus should not only be the deeper awareness/healing of the subject’s relationship to herself and others but also to the rest of nature and to the “underlying reality,” be it the unconscious or the divine. People like Otto Gross, Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm, Herbert Read, Lewis Mumford, and Simone Weil were pioneers in connecting radical politics, psychoanalytic inquiries, and spirituality. Among contemporary authors following this line, one could cite Roy Bhaskar, Eugen Drewermann, Gottfried Heuer, Joel Kovel, Ursula Le Guin, Hartmut Rosa, Theodore Roszak, or Katherine Tetlow. A Jungian-Marxian contribution to this third layer of social conflicts is still to be written. But building blocks can be found here and there, starting with the work of

Ensouling the Critique of Capitalism  51 anarchist psychoanalyst Otto Gross. The latter had a profound influence on Jung, who, until his encounter with him, had remained stuck in a largely bourgeois mindset. Jung praised Gross’s insights and enthusiastically embraced many of his ideas. He wrote to Freud in 1908: “In Gross I experienced all too many aspects of my own nature, so that he often seemed like my twin brother” (quoted in Heuer 2017, 50). With Gross, “psychoanalysis became politicized and, one might say, revolutionary politics became psychoanalysed” (ibid., 123). But more than that, Gross conceptualized “the personal, the political and the spiritual as ‘three coordinated and mutually inclusive aspects’ […], dialectically enhancing each other” (ibid., 62). For him, psychoanalysis was not a means to adjust people to the existing unjust order, but an essential tool in radical activism. He famously wrote that “the psychology of the unconscious is the philosophy of the revolution, i.e. it is called upon to enable inner freedom, called upon as groundwork for the revolution” (Gross 1913, p. 384, his emphasis). Whoever wants to change the structures of power and production, he thought, has also to work on understanding these structures interiorly. Without inner work, exterior targets alone will be of limited success, even if a Bastille is again taken. In the conclusion, I will come back to a core aspect of this inner work, namely the Jungian journey from ego- to soul-consciousness. Ideology and the Unconscious

How can consciousness be expanded to nurture emancipatory practices and politics? Marx would emphasize conscious discernment (“critique”) to free ourselves from an obstructive “normality” emanating from the interests of the ruling class. Jung, in addition, would emphasize the need to work with unconscious forces to tame their own limiting influence and to tune instead into their liberatory potential. Ideology and the unconscious influence each other in complex ways, not only through the ideological nature of the superego but also through the activation of archetypes, as we will see next. Linking Fredric Jameson’s Marxist analysis of ideology and Jungian psychoanalysis, Rushing and Frentz (1991) underlined the key role of the cultural unconscious in this interconnection. They define the cultural unconscious as “the site of a collision of psychic energies from two separate origins—the archetypes from the collective unconscious and the repressed contradictions from oppressive social formations” (ibid., 391). They see ideological production as the dynamic result of this clash. From “above,” ideological narratives seek to preserve the status quo by justifying existing social relations and masking contradictions. From “below,” popular culture may challenge them by revealing non-repressed material in a compensatory way. Folk songs, art, or tales can activate archetypal images and provide resources for societal renewal and transformation. In other words, it is out of the gap between Marx’s conception of ideology as “false consciousness” and Jung’s conception of the Self as “wholeness” that progressive initiatives and social conflicts may surge. More generally, Graeber (2017, p. 34) noted that the role of mythology is often to explore why “humans can no longer be genuinely creative” and he called for more critical research on myths because most of the great mythologists were politically

52  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy conservative, which has undoubtedly coloured their analyses. The Left has historically been suspicious of mythology, traditions, rituals, religions, and “ancestrality” in general—and often for good reasons—but to leave these areas to the Right was a profound mistake. Past and present symbolic narratives can offer rich teachings for emancipation and flourishing. Walter Benjamin might here show the way by providing a bridge between Marx and Jung, but due to his untimely death, this bridge was never fully elucidated. What is clear, though, is that Benjamin’s Marxist analysis mobilized concepts like archetypal images and the collective unconscious which were explicitly derived from Jung (Charles 2013). In fact, one could summarize the Arcades Project, his unfinished magnum opus, as a study of key archetypes of capitalist society (Benjamin 1999). The gambler personifies bourgeois modernity, the prostitute the embodied commodity form, the automaton the worker’s existence, and so on. Benjamin understood modernity’s ideological production as a “collective dream” that could be interpreted to open up possible futures. For him, such production is therefore not always “false consciousness.” He developed a Marxian version of Jung’s archetypal images that he called “dialectical images.” Dialectical images are historically situated rather than innate and timeless as in Jung, and they do not necessarily have a compensatory function between consciousness and the unconscious (Charles 2013). In a way, one could say that Benjamin’s project was to politicize the images of the cultural unconscious—not those of the collective unconscious in Jung’s sense. He thus focused on the sociopolitical meaning of their expressions and materiality, rather than on their links with deeper structures of psychic energy. The Psychic Costs of Capitalism

The dynamics of capitalist development are shaped by unconscious forces, but these dynamics, in reverse, also shape our psyches in various ways. Marx (1844) discussed how capitalism alienates wage labourers from the product and process of their labour, from themselves, and from others. Building on these insights, a Jungian-Marxian anthropology would expand on the notion of alienation and seek to understand the conditions for its minimization. The empirical starting point for such an objective is to investigate how capitalism has shaped our psyches and to compare this with pre- or non-capitalist settings. Abt (1988) provided what is perhaps the most thorough (non-Marxian) application of Jungian psychology to social change. Based on fieldwork in the Swiss Alps, his study begins with the frequent distress observable in the rural world as it transitions to capitalist modernity. He argues that the exterior-oriented reductionism of much of the social sciences is unable to grasp what is occurring and has typically painful consequences when “modernization” policies are derived from such research. What is at stake with capitalist development, he writes, is a profound mutation of people’s relationship with the environment and the community, a phenomenon that interferes in multiple ways with the psyche. With the introduction of markets, schools, mass media, and state laws, a new ego-oriented way of life appears, community bonds erode, and nature becomes disenchanted. The participation mystique slowly dissolves, with all kinds of nuanced consequences.

Ensouling the Critique of Capitalism  53 The ego may gain cognitive autonomy, but not necessarily, paradoxically, in inner freedom, as it may show a characteristic overconfidence in the conscious side of the psyche. Pre-capitalist communities, in contrast, have developed a variety of more or less conscious ways of dealing with the autonomous forces of archetypes and instincts. “In the legends, usages, rules, and customs—indeed, in the entire folk culture—the unconscious, common human background has always been able to collaborate in structuring and regulating life” (ibid., 363). Unlike Lacanian analyses emphasizing the irresistible enjoyment of drives, Abt posits that the freedom to flourish “rests to a very large extent on the inner freedom from feeling driven, and this, in turn, depends on the extent to which a person lives with the reality of the soul, that is, with living symbols” (ibid., 347). For Jung, to centre one’s life on living symbols found in sacred art, evocative rituals, and religious cosmologies can help in the path to the soul; it provides meaningful form and order to the drives by being able to hold together conflicting parts of the psyche. Jungian psychology may thus offer insights into what can be re-learned from pre-capitalist societies—something “anthropologists, so terrified of being accused of romanticizing the societies they study,” have largely stopped discussing (Graeber 2004, p. 75). While Abt obviously recognizes many positive elements in economic development, he warns that capitalist modernity conflates drive-regulating archetypes with the intellect, a confusion that is “the root of both the contemporary euphoric belief we can do anything and our feeling of powerlessness” (ibid., 357). For him, the only possible first step out of this dilemma is that of sacrificing the disastrous opinion that with our [conscious intellect] we are the light of the world […]. So long as we identify our intellect with the regulating spirit and believe that, thanks to our cleverness, we can get a grip on the growing [existential and ecological] imbalances, we will also remain unable to understand the moderating spirit of nature found in the collective unconscious and spiritual discernment. There is ample material to enrich a Marxist analysis of capitalist development. From Marx and Jung to Degrowth

A synthesis of Marx and Jung is likely to bring us to unexpected territories—something that shouldn’t be surprising given the core of their respective approaches: after all, both Marx’s dialectical and Jung’s alchemical endeavours are expected to generate novelty from the synthesis of opposites! I would like to suggest that degrowth is a possible outcome of this combination. Degrowth is a research field and a sociopolitical movement that aims at shrinking capital accumulation while reorganizing societies around human and non-human flourishing (D’Alisa et al. 2014; Gerber 2020). As people work and consume less, they have more time for community work, creative work, and other non-monetary pursuits. Starting in a materialist way, degrowth shows that our colossal and unequal global metabolism requires a radical resizing and reorganization. A diversity

54  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy of sustainable and egalitarian “human economies” becomes the guiding image for building alternatives. But beyond the ecological and distributional critique of growth and accumulation, degrowth includes a broader reflection on what constitutes an existentially meaningful mode of coexisting with the planet. Its answer has to do with notions like commoning, caring, horizontality, conviviality, autonomy, and simplicity. From this perspective, outer degrowth becomes an invitation for inner (re)growth. Some premises of degrowth can be found in Jung and even in Marx. Jung clearly saw that the more ego-oriented people become, the more their soul shrinks into the depths of purposelessness, people compensating for that by yet greater attachment to materialism: “At any rate, [a degree of simplicity] is healthier than affluence, which only a very few people can enjoy without ill effects, whether physical or psychic” (Jung 1976, p. 584). Elsewhere he noted that if material prosperity was the unique road to well-being, “the most […] comfortably off among us would be the healthiest. But in regard to neuroses that is not the case at all, quite the contrary” (Jung 1959, p. 181). In this sense, depth psychology may help solve the central degrowth hypothesis, namely that a selective decrease in material affluence can increase well-being.6 Parallel observations can be found in Marx’s early works: The less you are and the less you express your life; the more you have and the greater is your alienated life. […] Everything which the economist takes away from you in terms of life and humanity, he replaces for you in the form of money and wealth. (Marx 2007, p. 119, his emphases) What we have here in a compressed form is the starting point of the degrowth movement. But more broadly, Marx’s writings show a deep concern for environmental questions (Foster 2000). He for example initiated in Capital an ecological critique of “progress”: All progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time is a progress toward ruining the more long-lasting sources of that fertility […]. Capitalist production […] simultaneously undermin[es] the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the worker. (Marx 1982, p. 638) It is no coincidence, I suggest, that two of the first authors who sought to combine Marx and Jung are also considered forefathers of degrowth (Latouche 2016). The first one was Lewis Mumford, a critic of capitalist modernity and a philosopher of technology and the city. From Marx, he took the idea that techno-industrial civilization geared towards mindless accumulation will inevitably degrade the consciousness of the majority; from Jung, he prized the expressive nature of the unconscious, which he did not see as an epiphenomenon of the “infrastructure,”

Ensouling the Critique of Capitalism  55 but as a key formative force on material conditions (Green 2006). For him as for Jung, religion has the potential to empower individuals while also humbling their position in the cosmos. However, he criticized Jung’s failure to engage with the transformation of material conditions (Mumford 1973). As an urbanist, he developed an alternative vision he called “basic communism,” very much in line with degrowth, and grounded in networks of middle-sized towns able to balance industry and agriculture. This “eco-municipalist” model seeks to fulfil basic needs for all while being rooted in non-growing economies. The second forefather of degrowth who combined Marxism and Jung was Theodore Roszak, a radical historian who pioneered the field of ecopsychology. His project, in short, is the mutual healing of the self, society, and the planet—a project that could only, he argued, be anti-capitalist. He coined the term “ecological unconscious” for our sympathetic bond with the natural world that has been repressed by modernity. Accordingly, liberating the ecological unconscious requires a bold psychoanalysis of Western culture (Roszak 2009). He wrote that the psychotherapist’s role should primarily be that of raising questions about our standard of sanity. That is an extremely important role, as much for what it might serve to downplay (careerist pressures, money, and status) as for what it might emphasize (our abiding need for wilderness, tranquility, or animal companions). (Roszak 1992, p. 311) For him, both the therapist and the environmentalist have a common political agenda: “It is simply stated: Scale down. Slow down. Democratize. Decentralize” (ibid.). This is once again in a nutshell the programme of degrowth. Conclusion This essay proposed that a synthesis of Marxism and Jungian psychoanalysis can help nurture radical emancipation. For Marx, being “radical” is to realize that a fundamental reshaping of our societies’ ownership structure is necessary and to take part in that project. For Jung, being “radical” is to be (re-)rooted in our Selves (or souls) and in what has been lost or erased in our personal histories and/or in capitalist modernity. Without Jung, “extravert” Marxist praxis easily becomes rigid, bullish, and dangerous when its intellectual system and solutions are overestimated; and without Marx, “introvert” Jungian praxis easily becomes self-absorbed, toothless, and politically regressive, when broader social structures and power relations are neglected. While Jung neglected the possibility of a transformation of material conditions, Marx neglected the ego’s alienation from the Self and from the sacred. As a result, communism lost its soul on the way to fraternity, but today degrowth and other emancipatory movements are trying to reclaim it. Degrowth, as we have seen, invites us to imagine a new kind of radical eco-municipalism, simultaneously more materialist than many Marxisms—because taking ecological conditions

56  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy seriously—but also receptive to deeper existential and spiritual understandings. In this new synthesis, the ensouling of radical theory and praxis becomes an essential pathway to explore. As a way of concluding, I would like to add a few remarks on this ensouling of radical praxis. The soul is that universal dimension that we all individuate; it is that part of ourselves that listens to and holds together, the multiple contradictory voices we may hear inside (Bhaskar 2017). The soul is broader than the intellect and “develops only when the brain and the heart are united when feeling and thinking are integrated” (Fromm 1973, p. 358). In brief, the soul is one’s best energy, identified as that part of us which “knows and feels from an inner response to beauty as an ideal” (Tetlow 2020, p. 113). The journey to the soul should not be seen as abstract or idealistic. The soul is about seeking the guidance of the whole person; it is not about attaining “perfection” or “holiness.” It can be envisioned from a theistic or a non-theistic perspective, and while soul life often fosters quietness, it can also be festive and celebratory. At its core, the ensouling process is about lessening the influence of the ego— which is full of compulsions, drives, and goals—and about allowing an expansion of consciousness that permeates what was previously identified as purely “me” and “mine.” In the soul life, we are required to allow our personal will to step back, integrating both love and wisdom, in order to become receptive to a bigger frame of existence and in the service to others (Assagioli 1974). This by itself has subversive implications because we become more likely to question our attachments to conventional thoughts, ideologies, personal possessions, and ways of relating to others, recognizing our own particular lens with all its fallibilities. As Plotkin (2021, p. 51) suggested, to live from one’s soul is “naturally subversive to mainstream conformist-consumer culture” which is itself the product of an egocentric society. Whereas the ego strives to preserve the status quo of the personality, the soul often wants change. This might require us to withdraw from false securities in the hope of living something truer, more profound, but also potentially more risky from the perspective of the ego, yet healthier overall. Indeed, “it is no measure of health to be well adjusted to a profoundly sick society” (Jiddu Krishnamurti 1966, as quoted in Purser 2015, p. 42). The journey from ego- to soul-consciousness may thus quickly represent a threat to many, and this can increase the traveller’s marginalization—including within activist circles. On top of this, because the soul demands our authenticity, it easily makes us vulnerable. But the journey is made much easier when collectively recognized and supported. A key task—amply discussed by Jung—is to gradually assimilate unconscious material and make it conscious. Unprocessed emotions can be transformed into feelings, a progression that generates holistic responses instead of localized reactions such as projections. Love is here central, able to hold disparate categories, including an understanding of the enemy’s viewpoint. “Love is the great binding force,” writes Bhaskar (2017, p. 159), but this “does not mean hug everyone; it means that you treat each person according to what their higher self would want”—which may also include firm opposition when egos, superegos, trauma, alienation, fears, or ignorance are dictating speech and actions.

Ensouling the Critique of Capitalism  57 Commoning, caring, horizontality, conviviality and simplicity are central to the soul life—just like these notions are central to the degrowth project. As Tetlow (2020, p. 255) puts it, wanting “to have” should be the first casualty; excessive “doing” is the second. It is instead the capacity for “being” that grows the soul. The best political systems endorse individual growth in the context of communal ownership that gives everyone their share, living the “I,” whilst experiencing the “we.” Then nobody needs to cling to their privatized ego, allowing also a greater freedom in relationships, needing neither to be merged, nor cut. Notes 1 A previous version of this chapter was published in the International Journal of Jungian Studies (Gerber 2021) under the licence CC BY 4.0. 2 Steuernagel (1978) showed that Marcuse’s conception of the psyche was much more Jungian than Freudian. Like Jung, Marcuse saw the resources of the unconscious as a potential support for positive social change. 3 Erich Fromm gets close to these three Jungian contributions—and he was undeniably deeply influenced by Jung despite criticizing him. 4 In English, French, German, or Spanish, the term “Jungian Marxism” (or its translation) was apparently mentioned in only one publication (Walker 2017) where its possible meaning is only very briefly discussed. 5 However, as a medical doctor, Jung was well aware of the psyche’s biophysical basis. More broadly, his notion of unus mundus refers to the ultimate unity of matter and psyche, a non-dual position that transcends idealism (as well as materialism). 6 In a degrowth kind of way, Jung built his own house in Bollingen (Switzerland), living as simply as possible, without electricity and running water.

References Abt, T. 1988. Progress Without Loss of Soul. Wilmette: Chiron Publications. Alschuler, L.R. 2006. The Psychopolitics of Liberation: Political Consciousness from a Jungian Perspective. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Assagioli, R. 1974. ‘Jung and psychosynthesis’, Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 14(1): 35–55. Bengis, S.M. 1977. Towards individuated socialism: Contradictions, parallels and confluence between Marxism and Jungian depth psychology. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Benjamin, W. 1999. The Arcades Project (edited by R. Tiedemann). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bhaskar, R. 2017. The Order of Natural Necessity. London: CreateSpace. Borba, J.T. 2015. Indivíduo e Capital: Uma Abordagem a Partir de Marx e Jung. Jundiaí: Paco e Littera. Brewster, F. 2017. African Americans and Jungian Psychology: Leaving the Shadows. New York: Routledge. Castoriadis, C. 1949. ‘Les rapports de production en Russie’, Socialisme ou Barbarie, 2: 1–66.

58  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy Charles, M. 2013. ‘On the conservatism of post-Jungian criticism: Competing concepts of the symbol in Freud, Jung and Walter Benjamin’, International Journal of Jungian Studies, 5(2): 120–139. D’Alisa, G., F. Demaria, and G. Kallis (eds.). 2014. Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. London: Routledge. Dussel, E. 2013. Ethics of Liberation: In the Age of Globalization and Exclusion. Durham: Duke University Press. Engels, F. 2010 [1884]. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. London: Penguin Classics. Foster, J.B. 2000. Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature. New York: Monthly Review Press. Friedman, T. 2020. ‘For a Jungian turn in cultural studies’, https://www​.academia​.edu​ /36665743​/For​_a​_Jungian​_Turn​_in​_Cultural​_Studies (accessed on 25 July 2020). Fromm, E. 1955. The Sane Society. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Fromm, E. 1961. Marx’s Concept of Man. New York: Frederick Ungar. Fromm, E. 1973. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Fromm, E. 1982. ‘Religion and society’, in R. Funk (ed.): Erich Fromm: The Courage to be Human. New York: Continuum, p. 227. Geras, N. 1988. Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend. London: Verso Books. Gerber, J.-F. 2020. ‘Degrowth and critical agrarian studies’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 47(2): 235–264. Gerber, J.-F. 2021. ‘Karl with Carl: Marxism and the Jungian path to the soul’, International Journal of Jungian Studies, 14(2): 182–203. Gerber, J.-F. 2022. ‘The psychoanalytic critique of capitalism: Elements for an overview’, Psychotherapy and Politics International, 20(1–2): 1–23. Giri, A. 2013. Knowledge and Human Liberation: Towards Planetary Realizations. London: Anthem Press. Glass, J.M. 1972. ‘Marx, Kafka and Jung: The appearance of species-being’, Politics & Society, 2(3): 255–271. Goldman, E. 1923. My Disillusionment in Russia. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. Graeber, D. 2004. Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press. Graeber, D. 2017. Foreword to The Fire of the Jaguar (by Terence S. Turner). London: HAU Books. Green, A. 2006. ‘Matter and psyche: Lewis Mumford’s appropriation of Marx and Jung in his appraisal of the condition of man in technological civilization’, History of the Human Sciences, 19(3): 33–64. Gross, O. 1913. ‘Zur Überwindung der kulturellen Krise’, Die Aktion, 14: 384–387. Heuer, G. 2017. Freud’s ‘Outstanding’ Colleague/Jung’s ‘Twin Brother’: The Suppressed Psychoanalytic and Political Significance of Otto Gross. New York: Routledge. Holt, D. 1973. ‘Jung and Marx: Alchemy, Christianity, and the work against nature’, lecture given at the Royal Society of Medicine, November 1974, London. Honneth, A. 1996. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge: MIT Press. Jung, C.G. 1959. Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self. New York: Pantheon Books. Jung, C.G. 1977 [1950]. ‘Man and his environment’, in C.G. Jung Speaking: Interviews and Encounters. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 201–204.

Ensouling the Critique of Capitalism  59 Jung, C.G. 1976 [1941]. ‘The return to the simple life’, in Collected Works, Vol. 18. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 582–588. Jung, C.G. 1988 [1954]. ‘On resurrection’, in Psychology and Western Religion. New York: Routledge, pp. 247–251. Jung, C.G. 2014 [1957]. The Undiscovered Self. New York: Routledge. Jung, C.G. 2017 [1921]. Psychological Types. New York: Routledge. Kiehl, E., M. Saban, and A. Samuels (eds.). 2016. Analysis and Activism: Social and Political Contributions of Jungian Psychology. London: Routledge. Latouche, S. 2016. Les Précurseurs de la Décroissance: Une Anthologie. Neuvy-enChampagne: Le Passager Clandestin. Marx, K. 1844. ‘Letter from Marx to Arnold Ruge’, https://www​.marxists​.org​/archive​/marx​ /works​/1843​/letters​/43​_09​-alt​.htm (accessed on 25 July 2020). Marx, K. 1982 [1867]. Capital, Vol. I. New York: Penguin Books. Marx, K. 1998 [1846]. The German Ideology. Amherst: Prometheus Publications. Marx, K. 2007 [1844]. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Mineola: Dover Publications. Marx, K. and F. Engels. 2008 [1848]. The Communist Manifesto. London: Pluto Press. McKinnon, A.M. 2005. ‘Reading “opium of the people”: Expression, protest and the dialectics of religion’, Critical Sociology, 31(1–2): 15–38. Mumford, L. 1973. The Condition of Man. London: Thomson Learning. Plotkin, B. 2021. The Journey of Soul Initiation: A Field Guide for Visionaries, Revolutionaries, and Evolutionaries. Novato: New World Library. Purser, R. 2015. ‘Clearing the muddled path of traditional and contemporary mindfulness’, Mindfulness, 6: 23–45. Reich, W. 1972 [1934]. ‘What is class consciousness?’, in L. Baxandall (ed.): Sex-Pol Essays, 1929–1934. New York: Vintage Books, pp. 277–358. Roszak, T. 1992. The Voice of the Earth. New York: Simon & Schuster. Roszak, T. 2009. ‘A psyche as big as the Earth’, in L. Buzzell and C. Chalquist (eds.): Ecotherapy. Berkeley: Counterpoint, pp. 30–36. Rushing, J.H. and T.S. Frentz. 1991. ‘Integrating ideology and archetype in rhetorical criticism’, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 77(4): 385–406. Samuels, A. 1993. ‘New material concerning Jung, anti-Semitism, and the Nazis’, Journal of Analytical Psychology, 38(4): 463–470. Steuernagel, G.A. 1978. ‘The revitalization of political philosophy: Towards a MarcuseJung synthesis’, Polity, 10(3): 365–378. Tetlow, K. 2020. Spiritual Life. Vol. 4. Unpublished book manuscript, 332 p. Walker, G. (ed.). 2017. Jung and Sociological Theory: Readings and Appraisal. London: Routledge. Wynter, S. 2003. ‘Unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom’, CR: The New Centennial Review, 3(3): 257–337.

4

From Gift to Debt Rethinking Political Economy from a Radical Anthropological and Indigenous Perspective Felix Padel

This chapter argues that today’s capitalist economy is predicated on debt and war; and that political economy needs a drastic reconceptualization to come to terms with the implications of this. Debt controls the lives of countless individuals and the policies of every nation state—a fundamental technique of modern power structures. The arms industry is arguably the defining feature of nation states that are termed “developed”; arms deals have a key, but too-little-acknowledged influence on every “developing” or “underdeveloped” country’s economy; and the war in Ukraine is giving arms manufacturers a huge boost (Gravitas 2022, Klarenberg 2022, Bloom 2022, Guyer 2022). The argument of my co-authored book Ecology, Economy (2013) is that economics needs a radical rethink if humanity is to survive, since we have divorced economics not only from morality but also from its root linkage with ecology. As a result, the whole discipline of economics or political economy is a pseudo-scientific edifice built on quicksand, in the sense that basic concepts such as “growth,” “the market,” “free trade,” and “sustainable development” are divorced from the real world of what is happening in nature: “growth” is measured without taking into account damage to ecosystems; “the market” is an abstraction claiming an impersonal validity without taking into account gross manipulation by governments, traders and financial institutions; “free trade” is far from free due to this manipulation; and “sustainable development” is used to justify unsustainable industrial or economic growth by giving primacy to the economic sphere, over ecology and society. The measurements that give economics its claim to scientific exactitude are nullified when one takes into consideration the black economies, unmeasurable by definition, that play a key role for example in motivating arms and mining deals, and that tax havens are designed to draw from (Shaxson 2011). The UK for example “appears to be the money-laundering capital of the world” (Monbiot 2020), as a country surrounded by tax havens, with money from black transactions and corrupt arms deals playing a key role in the economy, quite as much as in more obviously corrupt countries. When such corruption has become “normalized” and “respectable,” is transformation towards a moral or truly healthy economics possible? In this chapter, I would like to offer (political) economists the gift of some anthropological and indigenous perspectives, in the hope this may provoke DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-6

From Gift to Debt  61 the kind of radical insights that are so urgently needed. The main title “From Gift to Debt” offers an overview of human history, starting from societies whose economies were based on reciprocity of equal exchanges, conceptualized as gifts—rather than on “barter,” as economic historians tend to imagine (Eistenstein 2021: 22). This is the essence of the influential essay The Gift by Marcel Mauss (1925), a foundational text in social anthropology. Today we take for granted a situation where money is created through unrepayable debt in a manner that puts almost every country and a large proportion of human beings into financial bondage (Rowbotham 1998). Taking a fresh view of the phenomenon of debt—as the late David Graeber did in his book Debt: The First 5000 Years (2011)—also involves highlighting the centrality of the arms industry and trade to the world economy, as well as wars; the boom-bust cycle that economists accept as “normal,” and the role of inflation bubbles in perpetuating this instability; and the remorseless economic exploitation that traps “poor” countries and people into cycles of unequal exchange that simultaneously involves the devastation of the ecosystems that human life depends on. Heterodox Conceptualizations Anthropology and sociology have given many frameworks for rethinking economics, from Malinowski’s Argonouts of the Western Pacific (1922) and Mauss’ Gift (1925), through Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation (1944), Marshall Sahlins’ Stoneage Economics (1973) to Graeber’s Debt (2011), to mention just a few key texts. Another, unjustly neglected work, that rethinks the mainstream anthropological tradition, is my teacher J. P .S. Uberoi’s book The Politics of the Kula Ring (1962), which examines Malinowski’s data from the viewpoint of political relations among the Trobriand Islanders who made “Kula” gift exchanges that emphasized status value and beauty alongside economic or practical value. Together, these works build a picture of economic systems characteristic of tribal or indigenous societies that contradicts the homo economicus myth of mainstream economics—the myth that humans are always driven by narrowly defined selfinterest. Economic Anthropology generally emphasizes reciprocity and exchange. In my own work, I use the term “Adivasi Economics” to emphasize the importance of exchange labour and the sense of sacredness, reciprocity, and restraint in relation to natural species among India’s tribal or Adivasi (“first dwelling”) peoples (Padel, Dandekar and Unni 2013). I would suggest that anthropological insight into exchange systems that emphasize utility and reciprocity alongside status and beauty are characteristic of the economic systems of “pre-historic” peoples everywhere—by which I mean “neolithic,” “stone age,” “bronze age,” and “iron age” societies as well as indigenous or tribal societies that did not use writing until recently, whose history before the 16th–19th century was not recorded in writing (Wolf 1982/2010).  Sahlins’ Stoneage Economics emphasized a complementary point: “primitive” or huntergatherer societies are not characterized by less leisure time, as classical political

62  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy economists suggested (such as Hobbes), but by far more and varied leisure pursuits compared to “‘modern,” industrial society. Yet contributions from anthropology have had little or no impact on economic policy. Partly this is due to anthropologists’ marginal role in economic decisionmaking and power structures. For example, David Mosse (2006) refers to the World Bank’s increasing employment of anthropologists as “Christmas tree decoration” in as much as their work is used basically as PR to embellish the crucial studies and decisions that are invariably made by economists. Mosse shows how systematically anthropologists in the World Bank have been excluded from key decision-making bodies. Somewhat similar is Adam Curtis’ outline of the influence of Edward Bernays, “father of PR,” in creating a false synthesis between the incompatible ideologies of democracy and capitalism (Century of the Self, 2002). Because we take for granted the idea that capitalist countries are “democratic,” we fail to see their blatantly undemocratic features, such as the lobbying and hidden deals in politics, and the imposing of debt and war on other countries. Before coming to the work of Marx and Engels, I would like to draw attention to a number of “heterodox” economists, whose vital contributions seem to have been airbrushed out of economics history. Michael Rowbotham (The Grip of Death: Modern Money, Debt Slavery and Destructive Economics, 1998) and Frances Hutchinson (Understanding the Financial System: Social Credit Rediscovered, 2010) have emphasized the extreme marginalization of Henry George and Clifford Hugh Douglas, erasing all memory of the momentous impact of George’s Progress and Poverty (1879) and Douglas’ Economic Democracy (1920) and Social Credit (1924). Douglas proposed an economic system that was implemented in Alberta from 1935, drastically reducing this Province’s debt burden by taxing financial transactions. His marginalization has partly been done by depicting him erroneously as anti-Semitic. From a radical political perspective, I would like to join these streams with that of Abdullah Öcalan, whose recent prison writings give us the concept of democratic civilization, as a goal we have yet to reach. As a key influence on Öcalan, Murray Bookchin guides us Towards an Ecology of Freedom (1982), from which Öcalan (2020) has pointed the way to a Sociology of Freedom (2020). Indigenous or tribal cultures show us ways to return to a more balanced relationship with nature. Politicians steeped in ancient history seem to repeat the same formulae laid out by the Roman wars of conquest and emperors, by Machiavelli and the sordid history of 19th- to 21st-century wars, including the cold war, that masked many vicious proxy wars in “third world” countries. This is why the arms industry plays such a crucial yet little-analyzed role at the heart of the world economy. As Andrew Feinstein has shown (The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade, 2011), corruption is endemic in the arms trade, and the pre-eminent place that arms transactions occupy in national economies should be at the forefront of what economics students are presented with, as a central problematic; and at the centre of attempts to reform economics, if we are to evolve to a stage that can be described as democratic civilization.

From Gift to Debt  63 An Historical Overview of Money and Economics These patterns are apparent if we look at the history of money. Coins—the first incarnation of “money” proper—were first made and used in Lydia (in the southwest of what is now Turkey) slightly before 600BC. The first coins were made of an amalgam of silver and gold called electrum. It is thought that the primary purpose of these first coins was to pay Greek mercenaries; and the first king credited with issuing separate gold and silver coins was Croesus of Lydia, around 555BC, minting them at his capital, Sardis (BBC 2014). This establishes a relationship between money, mining, and war that has continued ever since; all too evident for example in Blackrock’s controlling investments in the world’s mining companies, in arms technologies such as drones, and in wars such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Kasana 2018). Among the first systems of coinage following the Lydian lead were those of Athens and other Greek city states, including the little-known Bactrian Greeks, from whom coins spread to Mauryan India. The silver for Athens’ beautiful drachmas was mined nearby in Attica, worked by slaves. The Romans continued this usage of currencies based on gold, silver, and copper as carriers of a hierarchy of values. The slave labour in the Romans’ silver mines (starting with those taken over from Carthaginians in Spain during the 2nd century BC) continued centuries later in the infamous Potosi silver mines in Spanish-ruled Bolivia. The system of gold-silver-copper continued until the 20th century, when US debt incurred during the Vietnam war made Nixon end the gold standard, as paper currencies gradually took over, increasingly ceding to electronic money during the late 20th century. The “physiocrats” in France are generally credited with initiating the discipline of political economy, though they called themselves “Les Économistes.” Following them, Adam Smith is considered “the father of economics” through his influential work The Wealth of Nations (1776). It is interesting to note how much modern usage of Adam Smith depoliticizes his work and distorts his message. For example, he was a strong critic of corporations, especially the world’s first multinational corporation, the East India Company (Robins 2004), and he warned of the terrible form of tyranny that would arise if government regulation of corporations were ever removed—precisely the situation today! These aspects of his work are ignored in the website of the Adam Smith Foundation, for example (a rightwing, UK-based “think tank”). David Korten’s When Corporations Rule the World (1995) shows how precisely what Adam Smith warned us of is with us now. Adam Smith wrote in the wake of the South Sea Bubble in the 1720s, which developed out of a company created for the slave trade that took on England’s national debt, swollen by war; and of the forgotten “Bengal bubble” in the 1760s, arising from the looting of Bengal as it came under East India Company rule (Robins 2004). When the EIC took over Bengal, following the battles of Plassey and Buxar (1757, 1764), what followed was loot—a Hindi word that entered the English language at this time—especially of gold. This inflated the share price of the EIC in a short-lived bubble that ruined many investors when it burst some years

64  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy later, when India was suffering impoverishment and famines under EIC rule, and profits fell. During the late nineteenth century, Henry George’s book Progress and Poverty (1879) had a huge impact and was apparently considered more dangerous for the financial establishment than the works of Marx and Engels. His economic philosophy—which was also a moral economics—emphasized the idea that people should own the value of what they produce themselves, while land and natural resources should belong equally to all members of society. He advocated a tax on land as the basic panacea for inequality. The paradox at the centre of his work is that what is generally seen as “progress” (or “development” in today’s parlance) has vastly increased poverty, despite repeated promises that it will diminish or put an end to it. This paradox is as stark today as it was 150 years ago, showing up the hypocrisy of World Bank schemes as well as the development discourse in a “developing country” such as India. Economics became defined as a new discipline from the 1890s, through the influence of Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1890) among others. In his earlier thinking, Marshall was influenced by Henry George. During the 20th century however, as Frances Hutchinson (2010) documents, George’s ideas, as also those of Clifford Hugh Douglas (1920, 1924) were airbrushed out of the history of economics. Both advocated a “debt-free currency,” and a tax on land and natural resource extraction (George) or financial transactions (Douglas). Their critique of debt is explored in Rowbotham’s book The Grip of Death (1998), a literal translation of the French-origin word “mortgage.” This book shows in detail, using quotations, how money itself is created through debt, by banks; and how unrepayable debt is a principal element in exploiting people in every country. In Out of This Earth (Padel and Das 2010/2020) we showed how the World Bank exercised an apex role of “moneylender colonialism” in the modern power structure that defines relations between countries. John Perkins’ Confessions of an Economic Hitman (2004) shows how violent and deceitful the system of enticing countries into unrepayable debt for “development projects” has been. Most countries, and states within countries, are embroiled in debt, to the World Bank and other entities, that continues to rise. So long as they meet stipulated “conditionalities,” annual interest payments are offset against new loans, as the debt burden rises inexorably. India, for example, was already the country most indebted to the World Bank in the 1960s, when the Damodar dams were built to fuel the coal and steel industry in Bihar/West Bengal. Out of This Earth emphasizes the situation in the state of Odisha, whose mineral wealth caused it to become the most highly indebted Indian state to the World Bank by the 1990s. As part of this, Odisha was the first state to privatize its electricity, in a system where large corporations frequently avoid paying their electricity and water bills, as well as tax; with major bank loans often written off (Research Collective 2014). The infrastructure of dams and coal, roads, and railways, has led to a proliferation of mining projects, which are devastating ecosystems and communities, while profits have never been shared with local populations, despite promises and schemes aimed at doing this.

From Gift to Debt  65 Radical Questioning and Relearning Indigenous Values Why didn’t Marx and Engels analyse the mining industry? Engels’ classic text The Condition of the Working Class (1845/2009) showed how industrialization was lowering, not raising workers’ living standards, and Marx’s Das Kapital gave us our best analysis of capitalist exploitation in factories. But why did they take the cloth factory as a norm, instead of mines and metal factories, when coal and steel were at the heart of the industrial revolution, and the processes of industrialization that capitalism is based on? The Marxian tradition has frequently neglected to analyse or critique the mining industry, from the often-appalling condition of workers in mines and factories to the extreme complexity of mining finance and interlinkages with the arms industry; including the key role of black money in the form of bribes. In relation to indigenous societies, however, Marx and Engels highlighted their strong emphasis on communal as opposed to private property. This is apparent in Engels’ book The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State, in the Light of the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan (1884/2001). Their concept of “primitive communism” derived in part from Lewis Henry Morgan’s book Ancient Society (1877), and his research on the Iroquois people in particular. Marx’s Ethnological Notebooks (1882/1974) contains much that Engels left out (Rosemont 2010), especially in terms of Marx’s open admiration for the Iroquois system of democracy. This is where Marxian analysis needs revitalizing through Öcalan’s prison writings, as well as awareness of indigenous perspectives generally. The Kurds have a claim to be one of the largest indigenous peoples of the Middle East, who have resisted assimilation into state society, from Sumerian times 5000 years ago to resistance against cruel marginalization by the Turkish and Iranian states right now (Padel, Sadik, and Gupta 2018). The autonomous Rojava enclave in north Syria is based on Öcalan’s thinking to a considerable extent, especially his emphasis on democratic confederalism, as a system that questions the nation state, and women’s revolution. Marx’s emphasis on the degree of women’s emancipation in Iroquois society finds a new resonance in Öcalan and Rojava. Öcalan has oriented his writings towards investigating The Roots of Civilization (2007) in the hierarchical accumulation started by the Sumerians and symbolized in the ziggurats, and towards a Sociology of Freedom (2020) and quest for a democratic civilization. In many ways, especially in this insistence on women’s equal participation in the power structure and in questioning the nation state, Rojava offers the world a new model of democracy, forged like the Athenian model over 2,400 years ago, in a situation of all-out war. The Rojava model of democracy offers an equally new economic model, whose “focal concern is on serving ‘the citizens and not the owners of capital’” (Trainer 2020). The Rojava administration is pluricultural, and its status as a new model needs to be taken seriously. Our present democratic system is mired in the corruption of undemocratic deals and lobbying behind closed doors and the increasingly visible faults in the system of vicious competition (which in India includes norms

66  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy of extreme corruption) around elections. Does competition in a political system work against consensus? Competition is a prime value in capitalist societies, in economics especially, in politics, in education, and in Law, where the Roman model is built on win-or-lose, and it is the essence of most modern sports. By contrast, it does not have this primacy in indigenous societies. To imagine a new economic system, perhaps the first thing we must do is jettison the idea that competition characterizes a healthy economy. In indigenous ideas, exchanges are generally based on fairness—a moral economics again—which is why tribal people have been so easily duped and robbed of their land in exchanges with outsiders: they simply could not imagine such immorality. Europeans everywhere saw “savages” as naïve for this simplicity, rather than questioning their own duplicity. As for democracy, Jaipal Singh Munda’s famous exchange with Nehru during the Constituent Assembly debates in 1946 sums up the difference. When Nehru spoke of introducing democracy to the tribal areas, Jaipal said “You cannot teach democracy to the tribal people; you have to learn democratic ways from them. They are the most democratic people on earth” (Barla 2015: xxii–iii). Anyone who has witnessed a tribal or Adivasi council at work in India is likely to have witnessed real democracy at work. Everyone has their say, and though men may predominate as decision-makers on the surface, women speak out as equals and often play an equal role in reaching decisions, as Marx understood about the Iroquois. In Law, unlike the Roman system that is based on combat between lawyers, with outcomes too often depending on how much these are paid, the aim of the Adivasi legal process is not to declare one party right and the other wrong, but to bring about a reconciliation between parties, with fines usually going towards a feast of reconciliation. Regarding sports, dancing in many indigenous societies is a passionate sport demanding great skill but without winners or losers. An American traveller in Brazil once described to me how he joined in with a game of football that missionaries had taught a remote indigenous village. When his passionate involvement led to a fight between two boys, a man came onto the field and speared the football. The American traveller felt like all his democratic values had just been speared, and as the men assembled in a semicircle facing the forest to talk through what had happened, he asked the boys why the man had speared the football. As one boy explained to him, “Our parents don’t like this game; they think it makes us competitive and increases conflict among our community.” Cricket as played in the Trobriand Islands illustrates the same point: “its objective is not to win—all matches end in a draw” (Kildea 1976). The point of cricket as adapted by the Trobriand Islanders, whose system of exchange Malinowski made famous in anthropology, is not to win—it’s the dancing and expression! The “Permanent Settlement” effected by the British East India Company in late 18th-century India started a transition towards private property that has reached a new level of land grab in the 21st century, with the appropriation of Adivasi lands in ever-larger quantities. Gladson Dungdung, as an Adivasi writer who investigates these land grabs, focuses particularly on dispossession for mining and the

From Gift to Debt  67 abrogation of forest rights (Dungdung 2015, 2019). In Odisha, the Dongria Konds, alongside Dalit villagers, in the famous Gram Sabhas held in 12 villages, called for by the Supreme Court in 2013, voted not only against the mining of bauxite in their mountains; they also refused plots of forest land under the Forest Rights Act (FRA), claiming joint ownership of all the forest land in the Niyamgiri range instead (Padel 2014). This validates Marx’s understanding of the importance of communal property, whose significance has largely been missed in India, with communal property rights hard to apply for under the FRA. The discipline of economics urgently needs rethinking (Korten 2010). Aristotle’s concept of oikonomia (economics) derives from the ancient Greek word oikos for “house,” as does oikologia (ecology), linked with nomos, law, and logos, logic. Oikonomia is often translated as “laws for correct household management” in a (city) state. Isn’t it time that these two concepts, Economy and Ecology, are properly interlinked, returning to their conceptual roots? Aristotle contrasts oikonomia with chrematistike, profit-making (Drekmeier 2009; Padel, Dandekar and Unni 2013). A healthy economy is one that conserves or even enhances the natural environment, not one that devastates it for profit. The discipline of Ecological Economics aims to interlink them properly (Martinez-Alier 2002). Since value is created not just by labour but from natural resources, shouldn’t economists train also in ecology to understand the ecosystems that we depend on, that too often are devastated by “economic growth”? Can we materialize a Sacred Economics? (Eisenstein 2021) In this, our best teachers are indigenous peoples who preserve their values of respect for nature, as in the concept of “taboo”—an English word deriving from Maori tapu, meaning “sacred.” If the Niyamgiri forest still exists, and the Dongria still holds out against mining, this is due to their taboo on cutting trees on their mountain summits. Is it too late for humans to relearn this kind of restraint and taboo? References Barla, Alma Grace. 2015. Indigenous Heroines: A Saga of Tribal Women of India. Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). BBC ‘History Extra’. 2014. ‘When were the first coins made?’ Bloom, Peter. 2022. ‘How the world’s arms giants are making billions from Ukraine’s war’, RTÉ, Ireland, 11 March. Available at https://www​.rte​.ie​/brainstorm​/2022​/0311​/1285738​ -arms​-industry​-ukraine​-war​-business​-analysis/ Bookchin, Murray. 1982. Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy. Cheshire Books. Curtis, Adam. 2002. Century of the Self. BBC [documentary series]. Dierksmeier, Claus. 2009. ‘Oikonomia versus Chrematistike: Learning from Aristotle about the future orientation of business management’, Journal of Business Ethics. Available at https://www​.academia​.edu​/10561991​/Oikonomia​_Versus​_Chrematistike​_Learning​ _from​_Aristotle​_About​_the​_Future​_Orientation​_of​_Business​_Management Douglas, Clifford Hugh. 1920. Economic Democracy. London: Cecil Palmer. ———. 1924. Social Credit. London: Cecil Palmer. Dungdung, Gladson. 2015. Mission Saranda: A War for Natural Resources in India. Ranchi: Deshaj Prakashan.

68  Contemporary Critiques of Political Economy ———. 2019. Adivasis and Their Forest. Ranchi: Adivasi Publications, with IWGIA (Copenhagen). Eisenstein, Charles. 2021. Sacred Economics: Money, Gift & Society in an Age of Transition. California: North Atlantic Books. Engels, Friedrisch. 1845/2009. The Condition of the Working Class in England. London: Penguin. ———. 1884/2001. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. [first English translation 1902]. University Press of the Pacific. Feinstein, Andrew. 2011. The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade. London: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. George, Henry. 1879. Progress and Poverty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Graeber, David. 2011. Debt: The First 5000 Years. New York: Melville House. Gravitas. 2022. ‘Western companies profiting from Russia’s war’, 1st March. Available at https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=Ea5cidWmBAE Guyer, Jonathan. 2022. ‘This DC invite shows all the money to be made off the Ukraine war’, Vox, 16 December. Available at https://www​.vox​.com​/world​/2022​/12​/16​/23507640​/dc​ -party​-invite​-military​-contractors​-money​-ukraine​-russia​-war​-us#:~​:text​=Among​%20the​ %20biggest​%20winners​%20are​,has​%20been​%20sending​%20to​%20Ukraine Hutchinson, Frances. 2010. Understanding the Financial System: Social Credit Rediscovered. Jon Carpenter. Kasana, Mehreen. 2018. ‘Finance giant Blackrock faces activist heat for investing in the war machine’, Common Dreams, 25 May. Available at https://www​.commondreams​.org​ /views​/2018​/05​/25​/finance​-giant​-blackrock​-faces​-activist​-heat​-investing​-war​-machine Kildea, Gary. 1976. ‘Trobriand cricket: An ingenious response to Colonialism’. Available at http://nafa​.uib​.no/​?q​=node​/299 Klarenberg, Kit. 2022. ‘Arms flood into Ukraine as US, NATO pursue proxy war over peace’, The Dissenter, 8 March. Available at https://thedissenter​.org​/arms​-flood​-ukraine​ -us​-europe​-proxy​-war/ Korten, David. 1995 (3rd edition 2015). When Corporations Rule the World. Oakland: Berrett-Koehler. ———. 2010. Agenda for a New Economy: From Phantom Wealth to Real Wealth. Oakland: Berrett-Koehler. Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1922. Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. New York: Routledge. Martinez-Alier, Joan. 2002. The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation. Edward Elgar. Marx, Karl. 1882/1974. The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx, ed. L. Krader. Netherlands: Gorcum. Available at https://www​.marxists​.org​/archive​/marx​/works​/1881​/ ethnographical​-notebooks​/notebooks​.pdf Mauss, Marcel. 1925/2016. The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (translated from the French, Essai sur le don). Chicago: HAU books. Monbiot, George. 2020. ‘If you think the UK isn’t corrupt, you haven’t looked hard enough’, The Guardian, 10 September. Morgan, L.H. 1877. Ancient Society. London: MacMillan. Mosse, David. 2006. ‘Localized cosmopolitans: Anthropologists at the World Bank’, paper presented at ASA (Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK). Available at https:// bara​.arizona​.edu​/sites​/bara​.arizona​.edu​/files​/files​-page​/DavidMosseKeele​.pdf

From Gift to Debt  69 Öcalan, Abdullah. 2007. The Roots of Civilization. Translated by Klaus Happel. London: Pluto. ———. 2020 [in Turkish 2009]. The Sociology of Freedom: Manifesto for the Democratic Civilization, Vol. 3. Oakland: PM Books and Cologne: International Initiative. Translated by Havin Guneser. Padel, Felix. July 2014. ‘The Niyamgiri movement as a landmark of democratic process,’ Vikalpsangam. Available at http://vikalpsangam​.org​/article​/the​-niyamgiri​-movement​-as​ -a​-landmark​-of​-democratic​-process/#​.U9HMfLEruO5 ———, Ajay Dandekar, and Jeemol Unni. 2013. Ecology, Economy: Quest for a Socially Informed Connection. Delhi: Orient BlackSwan. ——— and Samarendra Das. 2010/2020. Out of This Earth: East India Adivasis and the Aluminium Cartel. Delhi: Orient BlackSwan. ———, Omar Sadik, and Malvika Gupta. 2018. ‘Review article: The Kurdish quest for a democratic civilization, through democratic confederalism and a sociology of freedom’, Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, vol. X, no. 2, pp. 204–212. Available at https://www​.anthro​.ox​.ac​.uk​/sites​/default​/files​/anthro​/documents​/media​/jaso10​_2​ _2018​_204​_212​.pdf Perkins, John. 2004. Confessions of an Economic Hitman. New York: Penguin. Polyani, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. New York: Farrar and Rinehart. The Research Collective. 2014. Down the Rabbit Hole: What the Bankers Aren’t Telling You! An Analysis of Lending Practices Adopted by Banks to Finance ‘Development’ Projects in India. Delhi: Programme for Social Action. Available at https://updatecollective​.files​ .wordpress​.com​/2015​/05​/down​-the​-rabbit​-hole​.pdf Robins, Nick. 2004. The Corporation that Changed the World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational. London: Pluto. Rosemont, Franklin. 2010. ‘Karl Marx and the Iroquois’, The Anarchist Library. Available at https://theanarchistlibrary​.org​/library​/franklin​-rosemont​-karl​-marx​-and​-the​-iroquois Rowbotham, Michael. 1998. The Grip of Death: Modern Money, Debt Slavery and Destructive Economics. Jon Carpenter. Sahlins, Marshall. 1973. Stoneage Economics. New York: Routledge. Shaxson, Nicholas. 2011. Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World. London: St Martin’s Press. Trainer, Ted. 2020. ‘Kurdist Rojava: A social model for our future’, Resilience, 3 January. Available at https://www​.resilience​.org​/stories​/2020​-01​-03​/kurdist​-rojava​-a​-social​ -model​-for​-our​-future/ Uberoi, J.P.S. 1962. Politics of the Kula Ring: An Analysis of the Findings of Bronislaw Malinowski. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Wolf, Eric. 1982/2010. Europe and the People Without History. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Part II

Further Engagement with Contemporary Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy



5

Economic (E)valuation Household and catallaxy Andrew Sayer

Introduction What is or should be involved in rational economic evaluation, that is, in deciding how societies can best provision themselves? The article assesses different forms of economic evaluation, and the various kinds of criteria, rationality, and judgement involved. In particular, it compares evaluation involving use-value measures and multiple criteria with “valuation” involving a single cardinal measure such as price. It is argued that while prices enable complex modern economies to be coordinated, they are seriously inadequate as indicators of economic value. The argument is developed via a comparison of a self-sufficient household economy or commune with a “catallaxy” or economy with an advanced division of labour coordinated by markets, such as capitalism. In the household, its unity and internal transparency is such that economic evaluation can be based on assessment using several different criteria regarding needs, products, work, social relations and environmental impacts. In a catallaxy, as Hayek and others argued, this transparency is absent: the deep division of labour implies a division of knowledge that cannot be grasped by a single agent as was hoped in attempts at comprehensive central state planning under state socialism. However, while coordination via market price has significant advantages it allows important information relevant to economic evaluation to be ignored. I argue that the household case holds important lessons regarding the kinds of economic evaluation and regulation that are necessary for an environmentally sustainable economy that is socially just and supports well-being. I shall use a “moral economic” approach to tackle this subject. While the term “moral economy” has been used in many different ways, here I use it to refer to an approach that examines and assesses the justifications of specific forms of economic organization and practice, such as particular property relations (Sayer, 2007). It regards the transhistorical point of economic activity as provisioning— providing the wherewithal for societies to survive and perhaps flourish. While this involves a “substantivist” view of economics, rather than a “formalist” one in which economizing is seen as central, it can acknowledge economizing wherever it occurs. We can also acknowledge that under capitalism the goal for capitalists is profit rather than provisioning. However, the viability of capital accumulation depends on capitalism’s workforces being reproduced, so their provisioning has to be secured somehow. DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-8

74  Further Critiques of Political Economy It is customary in the economic literature to focus on “value” and “value theory,” which immediately suggests that it is about something unitary and quantifiable; similarly, “valuation” suggests assigning something a single value. Here I shall question the very idea of such a thing. Evaluation by contrast implies something more qualitative and plural, involving assessing different qualities against different criteria. Some of these issues were raised in the classic debates about economic planning and markets and the so-called “socialist calculation” problem, between OttoNeurath and Ludwig von Mises and Frederik Hayek, particularly the latter’s claims about the problems of centralized economic planning and the superiority of price as a coordinator of economies (Hayek, 1944, 1948, 1978; von Mises, 1920). K. W. Kapp’s work on the “social costs” of capitalism is also relevant to the critique of market value (Kapp, 1978). My argument draws upon some of this and subsequent literature relating the issues to the evaluation of the environment (Martinez-Allier et al., 2001; O’Neill, 2004, 2012; Uebel, 2018). However, like Kapp, I prefer to discuss economic evaluation and the forms of rationality it involves rather than planning and markets as the former are inescapable regardless of whether economies are coordinated by planning or markets. I also want to avoid reducing economic rationality to a problem of “calculation.” I shall begin with some preliminary remarks about the differences between valuation and evaluation, their relation to human flourishing, and the strange idea that economic value can be represented by prices. I then briefly outline the evaluation of the ends of economic provisioning, the economic rationality involved in achieving them, and how these relate to market economies. Next, I compare economic evaluation in a hypothetical democratic, largely self-sufficient household economy with that in a catallaxy or market society in order to highlight the restricted and distorted nature of (e)valuation in the latter. As we shall see, many considerations relevant to the democratic household are already present within actually existing societies, and so can be used as a basis for an immanent critique. Preliminary Points: Evaluation and Valuation “We must expect no more precision than the subject matter admits of.” (Aristotle, NE, 1094a19)

Although “valuation” and “evaluation” are sometimes used interchangeably they are not synonyms. Valuation suggests commensuration, quantification, and measurement, yielding a single figure. Evaluation is more likely to be qualitative and plural—an assessment of the various qualities of an object: for example, how comfortable, durable, appropriately sized, and attractive a chair is. The difference parallels the fundamental exchange-value/use-value distinction, where the former takes the form of a ratio between quantities in exchange, or a price. Assessing the use-value of different things requires different standards or criteria, which may be incommensurable, as in the case of those for assessing furniture, bread orhotels (Martinez-Allier et al., 2001). Nevertheless, the absence of a single criterion or measure that fits all of them does not prevent individuals from making reasonable

Economic (E)valuation  75 decisions about what mix of use-values they should pursue. Given that we are complex beings with multiple needs1, capacities, and forms of dependence and vulnerability, there are always many different things to evaluate, requiring different criteria. While it is customary in economic matters to talk of value and valuation rather than evaluation, this immediately narrows down what is involved in making economic decisions to the use of a single cardinal measure such as a price or index or score. I shall argue that this tendency to assume that economic (e)valuation should yield a single precise figure is actually problematic. As Robert Ayres put it: It is the great defect of price theory of economic value … that price makes economic value seem very much more definite and quantitative than it is. (quoted in O’Hara, 2001, p. 98). Where there are multiple, and indeed incommensurable, criteria, commensurating them to produce a single measure can restrict rational judgement, even though it may be convenient for some purposes. Teachers know this from the experience of marking essays and attempting to convert judgements of the different qualities expected of an essay into a single mark. To be sure, they may find it useful to provide such a mark in order to give an indication of the overall quality of each essay relative to others, but it is always dependent on a reasoned assessment of several differing qualities; the quantitative valuation can only be justified by referring back to the prior qualitative evaluation. More generally, the adoption of metrics resulting from commensuration, such as league tables in education, can radically transform institutions and social practices, for better or worse (Espeland and Stevens, 1998). Because we live in an economy dominated by market exchange, we have become accustomed to the idea that the value of what is exchanged can be measured exactly by the price. However, in the case of gift exchange, it is unclear what the equivalent should be. In pre-capitalist economies, gift relations were much more important than they are in modern society, and they functioned without a measure of value (Graeber, 2011). Today, if we are invited for a meal by someone, it is far from clear what we should do or provide in return, not least because what would have to be evaluated would be not only the meal but what the provider has done, her circumstances, and our relationship to her. From this standpoint, the belief that economic value might be summarised by a precise number is extraordinary. Things are very different in our contemporary economy, where what is most visible is not fellow producers but an “immense collection of commodities”, as Marx put it, behind which the social relations—not only those of capitalist and worker but also producer and consumer—are mostly hidden (Marx, 1976, p. 125). Although price is widely treated as a measure of “value,” it should not be seen as a measure of how important, deserving, beautiful, useful (etc.,) things are. If someone asks what a possession of ours is worth, we may wonder whether to suggest a price or to describe its uses and importance to us. If the former, we may feel that what it would fetch on the market would fail to reflect its value to us; our valuations of things and market prices need not coincide. I shall argue that this intuition is correct: price formation is only weakly related to (e)valuation, though in capitalism

76  Further Critiques of Political Economy we are often obliged to treat price as if it were a measure of what things are worth. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the precision and lack of ambiguity enabled by money and prices are convenient. In modernist thought, there is a tendency to regard formal rationality using a single cardinal measure as a means of valuation as the exemplar of rationality, while other kinds, involving multiple criteria and qualitative judgements, are scarcely regarded as a kind of rationality at all. There is a wider problem here: modernist conceptions of rationality tend to reduce it to a matter of the “horizontal” relations among premises and conclusions or numbers, ignoring the “aboutness” of reasoning—the “vertical” relations to the things it’s about. In the latter case, rationality is characterized in the first place by attentiveness to the object or situation and its specific qualities (Collier, 2003; Sayer, 2011; Sen, 2009). An additional misconception—one that was propagated by Weber among others—is that evaluation and value, are simply a “subjective matter” in the sense of not being susceptible to verification. But we can only survive and flourish if we attend carefully to the objective properties of the resources we use, and to our own needs, which, while they are subjectively assessed, are not merely a matter of wishful thinking. Our judgements of them have at least to be practically adequate for sustaining life and participation in the contingent social and cultural practices of our particular society. Hence, (e)valuation always involves both objective and subjective aspects. However, certain kinds of economic organization can restrict or distort this evaluation—as is clearly the case with our life-threatening treatment of the environment. Bearing these points in mind, we can now distinguish the key kinds of evaluation and rationality relevant to economic activity. Evaluating Ends

Given that the point of economic activity is to provide people with the wherewithal to live, economic evaluation concerns how this provisioning is done, but as such it depends on a prior kind of evaluation of how we and the various things we need and care about are faring. As capability theorists argue, our well-being or flourishing cannot be reduced to a single dimension, like physical health or material wealth, as it is multidimensional: for example, it involves being safe and free from violence, being able to associate with others, having access to education, and so on (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2011). In addition to these basic matters, our well-being is also related to the commitments we form to particular practices, each with its own internal goods, and to causes and people; thus, if we become committed to a religion or to an art form or sport, our well-being depends on participating in them and achieving the internal goods associated with them (MacIntyre, 1981; Sayer, 2011). Economic provisioning may therefore need to take account of these. We have many ends and have to balance them somehow without being able to reduce them to a single metric. Further, the various components of flourishing are not substitutable and so cannot be simply traded off against one another; we can’t substitute education for nutrition, for example (O’Neill, 2004). There are also thresholds

Economic (E)valuation  77 for each element below which our well-being is damaged. The lack of a single index of well-being or flourishing need not prevent us from making good-enough judgements about such matters. Rather, making such judgements involves “giving each good its due”, as Elizabeth Anderson puts it (1993, p. 104). Economic Evaluation and Rationality

Economic evaluation makes judgements about provisioning by considering what is needed to support our ends in accordance with our evaluation of them, and in relation to constraints of human and other resources. From a normative point of view, while it is primarily instrumental, the particular means have to be evaluated not only in terms of how well they enable the achievement of ends as a consequence but whether they themselves are consistent with those ends and the values associated with them. Economic evaluation therefore involves a mix of kinds of rationality (Uebel, 2018, Weber, 1978, pp. 83–84). Weber’s definition of “substantive rationality” reflects this: the degree to which the provisioning of a given group of persons (no matter how delimited) with goods is shaped by economically orientated social action under some criterion (past, present, or future) of ultimate values, regardless of the nature of those ends. (Weber, 1978, p. 85).2 For example, in order to support people’s well-being, provisioning, to be substantively rational, must not involve methods that are harmful to producers, even though where there is a division of labour those not subject to those methods may benefit. Here, four qualifications are in order. First, as we shall see, economic rationality need not be formal, that is, involving quantitative measures and calculation, though usually there is a need to quantify at least some things, for example, amounts of resources, and time available. Formal rationality is dominant in market systems, and especially capitalism, given their dependence on money as a measure of value—a “real abstraction” whose relation to well-being is contingent. Second, while some fortunate workers may not regard their work in purely instrumental terms, seeing it rather as a source of meaning and fulfilment, the point of economic work is nevertheless the product, not the enjoyment of the worker. Third, even though provisioning may be achieved through activities that are primarily cultural—for example, cooking a birthday meal for someone—the means for achieving such ends have to be adequate, so economic evaluation is still needed. Hence, although, as anthropologists are likely to point out, some societies do not distinguish economic from cultural practices and may not consciously economize on their use of certain things, they have to provision for themselves somehow, and given that resources may not be plentiful, there will inevitably be better and worse ways of doing this. The conventional methods that have evolved are likely to be practically adequate.3Fourth, although there are two levels of evaluation—the first concerning

78  Further Critiques of Political Economy ends in terms of well-being, needs and concerns, and the second relating to provisioning to meet those ends—in practice there may be feedback from the latter to the former, where people adjust their ends to fit their means. What is commonly called “value” in economic matters in modern societies is only weakly related to these matters. In an everyday discourse in capitalism, if not in political economic theory, “value” tends to mean price, or else what is considered should be the price of something (Elder-Vass, 2019). But market prices are affected not only by what market actors think things are worth but by scarcity, including that deriving from minority control of assets needed by others (a consequence of the definition of property rights), and by technical matters such as the efficiency of technologies. Price formation is a matter of the “hydraulics” of markets and the distribution of economic power—an outcome of the operation of diverse forces, some of them having nothing to do with value or evaluation (Kapp, 1978).4 My first claim, then, is that economic value, though generally discussed as if it were a single, measurable thing, is or should be considered as plural—as requiring the evaluation of several different things, according to different criteria. A Household Economy and Catallaxy Compared I now want to enlarge on the above points via a comparison of a hypothetical household (or commune) and a “catallaxy” or system of numerous producers and consumers linked by markets.5 The former resembles the household œconomy discussed by Aristotle, only here it is an egalitarian, democratic household. It is largely self-sufficient and only marginally involved in producing commodities.6 Aristotle famously contrasted the household’s focus on the production of use-values with economic activity aimed at the accumulation of money, with the latter characterized as irrational—an aberration. Economic Evaluation in a Hypothetical Household Economy

In this case, it is clear that the economic problem is one of provisioning to support the household and enable it to flourish. Economic evaluation here does not centre on money but is in kind. As producers, users, and bystanders within the household, its members have a great deal of information about what goes on and what is needed. As a democratically run organization, members would be expected to give reasons for doing or having A rather than B (see O’Hara, 2001), though they would still use standard procedures and rules of thumb for much of their work as it is impractical to attempt to deliberate on everything all the time. There can still be conflict in such a setting of course, and they may sometimes encounter genuine dilemmas, particularly where resource scarcities are severe. If this moneyfree economy sounds far-fetched, remember that within contemporary families or workplace teams, members do not buy and sell services from one another but still have to make judgements about what should be provided and how it should be done.

Economic (E)valuation  79 There are several things to evaluate in provisioning such a household. I list 6 below, though there are other possible ways of individuating them: 1. The products or services that are needed or wanted by the household, both in the short run and the long run; not only the quantities but the desired quality of each good or service have to be considered. 2. The time and effort required to produce them7, taking into account the capacities of the workers. Even in the absence of competition, productivity is still a consideration for time and resources are likely to be scarce. 3. The skills involved and the (non-monetary) costs and benefits of acquiring them. 4. The difficulty, danger, pleasantness, or unpleasantness of the work. 5. Issues of fairness and cultural values: is the allocation of work fair and is the work done in a way that shows due respect and consideration for others? (In a family and indeed in any self-governing small group, the maintenance of relationships as ends in themselves, and not merely as a means to the end of provisioning, is a key goal.) More generally, work and the distribution of its products are also assessed in terms of how they meet the shared standards of behaviour of the community. 6. Environmental constraints and effects: what resources are needed and how scarce and difficult to get are they?; what waste is involved?; and how is the environment likely to be affected? Thus, economic evaluation in this context is substantively rational and multidimensional, covering the work, the worker, the resulting products or services, and their wider effects on the members and others, and on the environment, indeed the full spectrum of “social costs” as Kapp called them (Kapp, 1978). This follows from the household’s dependence on its own members for meeting its needs, and it is facilitated by its small scale and transparency. Most clearly, environmental considerations are likely to be inescapable, though the household may not have the knowledge and expertise to be able to take many of these into account. There is no commensurability across the different aspects, and hence no single measure of performance or adequacy. From the standpoint of what are regarded as “economic” matters in contemporary societies 5 and 6 might seem somewhat peripheral: the well-being of workers and the quality of social relations and environmental implications have widely come to be regarded as “social” or “environmental” matters, separate from “economic” ones. But then, the very concept of the economy as something distinct from society or environment is a product of the disembedding of economic activity produced by capitalism.8 In a household economy, however, the centrality of 1–6 would be obvious and such distinctions would have little meaning. Supporting the wellbeing and goals of the members as both workers and users would be the overarching objective of its economic provisioning rather than a side issue. The dependence of the household on the social relations among its members and on its immediate environment would be obvious. Such is evident in subsistence economies.

80  Further Critiques of Political Economy Again, if this thought experiment seems far-fetched, it is worth noting that equivalents of many of the same issues that are raised in 1–6 are to be found in contemporary households in relation to domestic labour, and within public and private organizations, especially in work teams. Even in capitalist societies much economic work or provisioning involves ongoing evaluation and planning in kind rather than prices. Thus, arguments about housework include not only about what needs doing and who does it, but how it is done including whether it is in a way that takes due account of other household members. Even the 6th environmental criterion has its equivalent: e.g. do we clean up after we’ve done the cooking or leave the kitchen in a mess? In work teams in organizations, workers informally assess their own and others’ contributions in terms of whether they pull their weight and do their share of necessary but unattractive tasks—matters of “contributive justice” (Gomberg, 2007)—and whether they are considerate to others and respectful. Later I shall argue that even when dealing with market-oriented enterprises, whether capitalist businesses, cooperatives, or self-employed workers, we need to consider equivalents of the 6 criteria identified above, though some may be neglected or be difficult to address, particularly in the case of capitalism, where they are at odds with its overarching goal. (E)valuation in a Catallaxy

The term catallaxy was popularised by Hayek who defined it as "the order brought about by the mutual adjustment of many individual economies in a market” (Hayek, 1982, pp. 108–109). Here, Hayek was alluding to Aristotle’s use of “economy” to refer to the management of a single household. Whereas the household has a unitary objective, a catallaxy does not, for the economic actors operate within an advanced division of labour and thus have particular, specialized capacities and needs. As Hayek pointed out, such a division of labour implies a division of knowledge. This knowledge is partly tacit and embedded in local specialized practices and contexts. Nevertheless, the diverse and ever-changing decisions and plans of the myriad producers and consumers are “miraculously” coordinated by the market, through price signals, without any central information gathering and control. As Hayek put it: The marvel is that in a case like that of a scarcity of one raw material, without an order being issued, without more than perhaps a handful of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity could not be ascertained by months of investigation, are made to use the material or its products more sparingly; that is, they move in the right direction. (Hayek, 1948, p. 87) Thus, in a catallaxy, price signals are claimed to solve the “epistemic problem” posed by the division of knowledge (Hayek, 1949)—a problem which comprehensive central planning cannot solve, as the history of state socialism showed (Nove, 1983; see also Mises, 1920). Attempts at democratically authorised planning

Economic (E)valuation  81 would face the same problem. However, while the household/catallaxy difference is hugely significant, we need to make several modifications to Hayek’s account if we are to assess its implications for economic evaluation adequately. 1. In some ways, Hayek underplays its significance because he relies mainly on a vague concept of “market” to cover the features of an advanced, spatially extended division of labour comprising millions of producers, consumers, and millions of qualitatively different commodities. The geographical separation of production and consumption conceals relevant social and environmental constraints and consequences from us; whereas in our household economy, these are mostly local and visible, in a catallaxy causes and effects are horizontally displaced. Thus, while we might regard the powers of market coordination as all the more remarkable, they also foster ignorance and irresponsibility. (Even if participating in the market means that producers degrade their own local environments, it at least provides them with a source of income.) The effects of this spatial separation and the mobility of labour and capital in facilitating environmental degradation and our estrangement from nature have been widely overlooked. 2. In other ways, Hayek exaggerates the role and powers of market coordination via price signals. Within enterprises producing commodities, decisions on the proportions of inputs that are needed for a particular level of output are governed not merely by their prices but by technical, physical constraints: the baker cannot trade-off yeast against flour as their prices change. In this respect, like members of a household, the firms have to take the use-value, physical characteristics of their resources seriously. Hence, Hayek was wrong to say that price was the only thing market actors needed to know in these circumstances.9 In addition, market actors trying to plan their actions need to know what future, rather than current, market conditions and prices will be, although the future depends on what they, their competitors and others, do. This situation invites cycles of overproduction, as Marxists have argued (O’Neill, 1998, pp. 134ff). Further, while enterprises might be thought of as islands of planning within the market ocean, in our actually existing catallaxy there are also bridges between some of the islands in the form of supply chains that are hierarchically dominated by major firms and in which output and prices are planned and controlled. These govern relationships involving materially related products and services, so the chains function as a compromise between the “despotism” of the technical division of labour one finds in the production of a particular product within an enterprise and the “anarchy” of the market-coordinated social division of labour across firms producing different products under separate control. However, these bridges are only possible where there are use-value complementarities between products and techniques. The difficulty of planning the allocation of resources among largely unrelated activities, such as pharmaceuticals and tourism, means that this is more easily regulated by market prices (Sayer, 1995).

82  Further Critiques of Political Economy 3. Hayek’s account of economics and knowledge fails to acknowledge the special nature of scientific knowledge, some of which may be economically relevant. Unlike the kind of knowledge required by enterprises that Hayek had in mind, science’s knowledge claims are universal, rather than specific to particular actors and their subjective preferences (O’Neill, 2012). Particular producers in a catallaxy may neither know nor wish to know what the sciences know about their environmental and social impact, but that is precisely why they need to be constrained by extra-market organizations such as states and associations.10 In a catallaxy, the state may not be capable of determining how many widgets of a particular kind will be needed, but it is in a position to take action on issues such as CO2 emissions and labour rights. 4. Hayek’s idealized model of a catallaxy ignores private monopolies11 and socially constructed scarcity, so all market actors appear as price-takers. In practice, of course, varying degrees of monopoly (Kalecki, 1971) are common. One reason is that space itself has inherent monopoly properties and competition can result in local spatial monopolies, as central place theory showed. Especially in contemporary rentier capitalism much economic activity is dominated by the pursuit of economic rents from the control of assets—from land, buildings, finance, natural resources, intellectual property, and radio spectrum rents to platforms and contract rents (Sayer, 2014; Christophers, 2020). 5. Unlike Hayek and many others, we must not ignore the huge differences between individual market actors and giant capitalist firms within the catallaxy or market. Equally, we must not reduce markets to capitalism, for they are also compatible with other social relations of production—the self-employed, petty commodity producers, cooperatives and other notfor-profit organizations, and nationalized enterprises like public utilities. We have thus to consider whether particular effects in a catallaxy are a consequence of the catallaxy and its advanced divisions of labour and knowledge per se, or of the particular social organization of enterprises within it. Clearly, this has major implications for possible forms of market socialism (Burczak, 2006). Bearing these qualifications in mind, what are the key implications of this comparison of household economy and catallaxy for economic evaluation? Most obviously, the development of a social division of labour and knowledge means that market actors as producers are no longer making decisions about their own needs, or, as users, about the work involved in providing them.12 By contrast, our household can provision on the basis of such information, and without the need for a single unit measure to assess its situation.13 It remains true that in a spatially extended catallaxy involving thousands of producers and millions of different commodities—most of them intermediate goods rather than final goods like bread or cars—it is not possible to scale up the economic logic of the household economy and use it for coordinating the division of labour through comprehensive socialist planning (Mises, 1920).

Economic (E)valuation  83 Instead of the substantive rationality of the household economy, involving practical judgements about its various needs and constraints without the need for a single, common metric, the market enterprise lives or dies according to formal rationality based on a single, abstract cardinal measure—price, which it has to treat as if it were the prime measure of economic value. Anything that compromises the enterprise’s ability to earn cash is likely to be treated as wasteful; hence the demotion of other criteria such as workers’ welfare and environmental consequences. While this is clearest in the case of capitalist enterprises, in competitive markets self-employed workers, worker cooperatives and not-for-profit organizations may struggle to resist this pressure too. For buyers, the focus is on the product and its price; only exceptionally do concerns about workers’ remuneration, work conditions, and environmental impact figure in their (e)valuation. As Hayek saw, this restriction of economic rationality has the advantage of limiting the amount of information that actors need in order to make economic choices. The “miracle of the market” is not to be dismissed: it is indeed remarkable that divisions of labour involving millions of products, enterprises, and individuals can, to a substantial extent, be coordinated through the price mechanism. While certain sectors may more successfully be centrally planned (e.g. health services, railways), attempts to replace markets comprehensively will be defeated by the intractability of the spatially extended, advanced division of labour and knowledge (Nove, 1983). Marx had an insufficiently materialist understanding of such a division of labour: its coordination is anarchic not simply because it is controlled by a host of competing capitalists, but because whoever controls it, it is too complex and its needs and capacities too changeable and unknowable to be susceptible to successful comprehensive central planning, let alone democratic planning (Sayer, 1995). A further feature of a market economy is that, in contrast to the household, market actors do not have to justify their decisions to others. Since markets operate without regard for persons or their reasons, sellers do not ask “why do you want this?”; as long as the buyer can pay, their money does the talking. This gives individuals more freedom and avoids the risk common in multi-person households and communes of illiberal tendencies in which members zealously police each other’s behaviour. On the other hand, the opacity of a global market system conceals information that is relevant to rational economic evaluation in relation to the well-being of humans and the planet. Market actors become more self-interested than household actors not only because they are free to do so, but because they lack both the information and the kinds of relation to others and to the environment that encourage more socially and environmentally responsible attitudes. Mainstream economics treats this restricted form of economic rationality uncritically: there are just “preferences,” reflected in the price we are willing to pay, and for which no reasons need be sought, since they are just “subjective.” Reason only enters in the limited form of formal instrumental action geared to maximizing financial returns and a tautological, meaningless “utility.” Substantive economic evaluation is ignored. While market actors are pressured into treating prices as valuations of commodities, as we noted earlier, prices are only partly influenced by actors’ (e)valuations; they also reflect economic power in terms of the ability to pay and control of resources.

84  Further Critiques of Political Economy For example, house prices are determined not merely by construction costs and scarcity in relation to demand but by land rent and housing finance. Cheap, loosely regulated credit has allowed house prices to rise much faster than real incomes and most other goods over many decades, but this has nothing to do either with changes in the way people value housing or the costs of construction. Further, to the extent that individuals have views on what the price or “proper” value of something should be, those views tend to be adaptive; thus, we become accustomed to house price inflation and continually reset our ideas about what price would reflect a house’s value. Finally, individuals’ judgements of the value of commodities are only influential to the extent that their “preferences” are backed by the ability to pay. For all these reasons, price is a poor indicator of economic value. For Hayek, all this is beside the point, for he argued that the justification of prices and markets lies not in the economic valuation of commodities, but in their ability to coordinate the plans and actions of agents across the division of knowledge(Hayek, 1948). We don’t have to agree with Hayek’s extravagant claims about the alleged wider benefits of catallaxy to accept this. As a mode of coordination, money and market prices are above all convenient as they economize on information needs, though as we have seen from the point of view of economic evaluation this is also a major drawback. Further, markets provide a “discovery procedure”—a bottom-up process in which new products can be tried out as and when market actors are able and willing to do so, without needing authorization from some central planning body.14But the important point for the present argument is that since price is not a measure of value, price-based decision-making should not be regarded as an adequate substitute for substantively rational economic evaluation, though from a pragmatic point of view doing so may be innocuous for many product lines. Such market coordination can operate within legal constraints set by governments and other authorities on the basis of a more rational economic evaluation involving all 6 elements noted in our household model. We can therefore disregard assumptions common in mainstream economics that intervening in markets to fix certain prices or set quotas (for example to protect natural resources) or set standards results in misvaluation and misallocation of resources. We can still have the benefits of markets and prices as means of coordination where such constraints are imposed, just as they do where there are natural constraints. Thus, markets may, where appropriate, be manipulated to achieve goals that follow from non-market economic evaluation, and still perform their coordination function. This is not an argument merely for state intervention only where things cannot be priced (i.e. to correct market failure) or where there are collective action problems. Rather, the point is to achieve goals arrived at by substantive economic rationality—for example, to protect the environment or incomes and work conditions or alter the distribution of property—without losing the benefits of catallaxy as regards economic coordination of the division of labour/knowledge. A catallaxy constrained in this way would still reward producers unequally according to how much their products were in demand and how far they could keep their costs down, albeit within social and environmental limits. Further, regulation of a catallaxy can extend beyond external constraints on what market actors can do to the internal organization of enterprises, including property

Economic (E)valuation  85 rights. It can therefore go beyond what is associated with “a mixed economy” or regulated capitalism. For example, capital–labour relations could be abolished by giving workers the rights to control their own enterprises. They could still produce commodities and hence be subject to market discipline, but their social relations of production would make a difference to how they responded: for example, they would take more note of worker and local interests and be more likely to consider the long term. Conclusion Rational economic evaluation is necessarily multidimensional, involving assessments of the products or services desired, the amount and nature of the work involved, and the wider effects on workers and others, and on the environment, on which life depends. In a democratic, largely sufficient household or commune, the very idea that the well-being of its members and the environment on which it depends were somehow extra-economic matters would seem absurd. It is clear that rational economic evaluation has not only to be oriented to the ends of provisioning but the ways in which those ends are met in terms of their impact on the well-being of its members and the environment. In market systems, the replacement of pluralistic evaluation by valuation according to price merely means that matters of central relevance to economic evaluation are ignored. Hence, as Kapp put it, capitalism is an “economy of unpaid costs” (1978, p. 268). Those unpaid costs are not non-economic: they are merely non-market. Substantive rationality oriented to the well-being of the household is replaced by narrow formal rationality oriented to an abstract goal, money. Particularly in capitalism, the combination of property relations that deny workers ownership rights over what they produce (Ellerman, 1992), competition between enterprises, and spatial divisions of labour that separate production and consumption from their consequences, leads to both the suppression of labour’s interests and unprecedented environmental damage. The price system deals with one epistemic problem but hides and increases others. Prices are not a measure of economic value, but rather a convenient means of coordinating the extraordinarily complex social division of labour. Although, as Hayek and Mises argued, such an economy cannot be controlled in the same way as a simple household economy, this does not mean markets cannot be regulated in ways that approximate the moral economic principles of a democratic household. The biggest obstacle to such regulation is the power of capital, but markets can exist without capital–labour relations and can be supplemented by state and other non-market producers. Such an alternative economy is likely to be necessary to save the planet and humanity from capitalism. Acknowledgement My thanks, with the usual disclaimers, to Steve Fleetwood for comments on a draft of this paper.

86  Further Critiques of Political Economy Notes 1 For the rest of the article, I will use “needs” to refer to needs and wants. 2 I am indebted to Uebel’s (2018) clarifications of Weber’s analysis of economic rationality. 3 Hence, the substantivist-formalist debate in economic anthropology has tended to overdraw the distinction between provisioning and economising. 4 Even if prices were influenced solely by buyers’ and sellers’ valuations, this would not mean that particular exchanges implied commonly agreed values. The parties to an exchange do not have to agree on their evaluations or reasons, indeed exchange implies different valuations. As Ludwig von Mises put it: “The basis of modern economics is the cognition that it is precisely the disparity in the value attached to the objects exchanged that results in their being exchanged. People buy and sell only because they appraise the things given up less than those received. Thus the notion of a measurement of value is vain.” (Von Mises Human Action, 1963 [1949], ch. ΧΙ, pp. 203–204, cited in Theocarakis, p. 39) 5 I am not the first to make such a comparison (see Mises’ passing comparison of a market economy with a “a farmer in economic isolation” in his critique of socialist planning [Mises, 1920, p. 9], though there it is used for a different purpose.) 6 It may also engage in gift relations and occasional cooperation with other households. 7 While labour time is a consideration, labour is only valued if it produces what the household requires. Work on, say, hobbies, is not likely to be regarded as a substitute unless it happens to meet this criterion. 8 See also Kapp, 1978. 9 However, in his later work, he acknowledged that economic behaviour and social order also depend on “social rules”—an extraordinarily capacious category covering everything from laws of property to norms, conventions, expectations and habits (e.g. Hayek, 1982). 10 Hayek did acknowledge that some environmental “negative externalities” can’t be responded to on the basis of prices: “Nor can certain harmful effects of deforestation, of some methods of farming, or of the smoke and noise of factories, be confined to the owner of the property in question, or to those willing to submit to the damage for an agreed compensation” (Hayek, 1944, p. 44). 11 However, Hayek did have reservations about some forms of monopoly, particularly industrial patents (1948, pp. 113–114). 12 “Since the producers do not come into social contact until they exchange the products of their labour, the specific social characteristicsof their private labour appear only within this exchange” (Marx, Capital, I, p. 165). 13 Mises acknowledged this but commented “The experiences of a remote andbygone period of simple production do not provide anysort of argument for establishing the possibility of an economic system without monetary calculation.” Weber agreed (Weber, 1978, p. 101ff). 14 One can acknowledge Hayek’s point and still also argue that some important kinds of innovation require central authorisation, planning and funding (Mazzucato, 2013).

References Anderson, E. 1993. Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Aristotle. 1980. The Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Economic (E)valuation  87 Burczak, T.A. 2006. Socialism after Hayek. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Christophers, B. 2020. Rentier Capitalism: Who Owns the Economy, and Who Pays for It? London: Verso. Collier, A. 2003. In Defence of Objectivity. London: Routledge. Elder-Vass, D. 2019. No price without value: Towards a theory of value and price. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 43, 1485–1498. Ellerman, D. 1992. Property & Contract in Economics: The Case for Economic Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Espeland, W.N. and Stevens, M.L. 1998. Commensuration as a social process. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 313–343. Gomberg, P. 2007. How to Make Opportunity Equal: Race and Contributive Justice. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Graeber, D. 2011. Debt: The First 5000 Years. NY: Melville House. Hayek, F.A. 1944. The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Hayek, F.A. 1948. Individualism and the Economic Order. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Hayek, F.A. 1949. Individualism and Economic Order. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Hayek, F.A. 1978. Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hayek, F.A. 1982. Law, Legislation, and Liberty. London: Routledge. Kalecki, M. 1971. Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy 1933–1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kapp, K.W. 1978. The Social Costs of Business Enterprise. Nottingham: Spokesman. MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. London: Duckworth. Martinez-Allier, J., Munda, G. and O’Neill, J. 2001. Theories and methods in ecological economics: A tentative classification. In The Economics of Nature and the Nature of Economics, eds. C.J. Cleveland, D.I. Stern, and R. Costanza, 34–56. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Marx, K. 1976. Capital Vol 1. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Mazzucato, M. 2013. The Entrepreneurial State. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Mises, L. von. 1920. Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth. Mises Institute. https://cdn​.mises​.org​/Economic​%20Calculation​%20in​%20the​%20Socialist​ %20Commonwealth​_Vol​_2​_3​.pdf Accessed 27th October 2020 Nove, A. 1983. The Economics of Feasible Socialism. London: Allen and Unwin. Nussbaum, M.C. 2011. Creating Capabilities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. O’Hara, S.U. 2001. The challenges of valuation: Ecological economics between matter and meaning. In The Economics of Nature and the Nature of Economics, eds. C.J. Cleveland, D.I. Stern, and R. Costanza, 89–108. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. O’Neill, J. 1998. The Market: Ethics, Knowledge and Politics. London: Routledge. O’Neill, J. 2004. Ecological economics and the politics of knowledge. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 28, 431–447. O’Neill, J. 2012. Austrian economics and the limits of markets. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 36, 1073–1090. Sayer, Andrew. 1995. Radical Political Economy: A Critique. Oxford: Blackwell. Sayer, Andrew. 2007. Moral economy as critique. New Political Economy, 12 (2), 261–270. Sayer, Andrew. 2011. Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

88  Further Critiques of Political Economy Sen, A. 2009. The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane. Theocarakis, N.J. 2006. Nicomachean Ethics in political economy: From the Scholastics to the neoclassicals. History of Economic Ideas, 14 (1), 9–53. Uebel, T. 2018. Calculation in kind and substantive rationality: Neurath, Weber, Kapp. History of Political Economy, 50 (2), 289–320. Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

6

Lands of Plenty, Realms of Freedom Imagining an Automatic Life Ronald Stade

The Dialectic of Actuality and (Im)possibility Karl Marx criticized Adam Smith and David Ricardo for assuming that, on one hand, human beings have an unchanging nature and, on the other, human individuals can be considered in isolation from their historical and social context. Human beings are social animals by nature, Marx believed.1 Marx, who in his younger years considered himself a humanist—for example when he contrasted his own “real humanism” with the “spiritualism” and “speculative idealism” of the Young Hegelians (Marx and Engels 2001a: 127)—argued that the individual human being is an ensemble of existing social conditions and that this is her essence (Marx and Engels 2001b: 609). Viewing human beings as nothing but social products is, of course, the opposite of humanism. A few mid-twentieth-century Marxist philosophers, who had witnessed what the de-individuation of human beings in the name of the greater good could result in, tried to revise Marx’s anti-humanism. Jean-Paul Sartre did this by stating that existence precedes essence and that therefore the human condition precedes any social condition (more about Sartre later). Ernst Bloch did it by introducing the existential capacity of hope. Bloch wrote that hope is a universal human capacity, regardless of historical, cultural, social, economic, and political context, and that this capacity directs human beings beyond the actual and towards the possible. To quote Bloch (1995, p. 7): “Expectation, hope, intention towards possibility that has still not become: this is not only a basic feature of human consciousness, but, concretely corrected and grasped, a basic determination within objective reality as a whole.” In everything from daydreams and fairy tales to art and utopias, humans imagine what is or might be possible: “How richly people have always dreamed of this, dreamed of the better life that might be possible” (Bloch 1995, p. 3). It took Ernst Bloch years to write The Principle of Hope (1995 [1954]), a tome of more than 1,600 pages in three volumes. Bloch’s magnum opus is a prolix account of the universal human principle of hope, in which he takes the reader on a journey through various types of human practice that in one way or another are connected to the topic of hope and possibility, “the not-yet.” Bloch argued that hope and possibility are dialectically linked to the actual. Hope and possibility are, on one hand, conceived in actuality and, on the other, a surplus of actuality. The extent to which hopes, daydreams, fairy tales, utopias, and so on, are limited by their origin in a DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-9

90  Further Critiques of Political Economy particular historical situation varies, as does the range and force of their negation of this situation. Bloch uses Aristotle’s distinction between kata to dynaton (“that which is possible now”) and dynamei on (“that which might become possible”) to address the difference between a type of possibility that issues from what is actual and another type of possibility that cannot be realized now, but that, using one’s imagination, is conceivable as a potentiality. Although Bloch mentions popular fantasies of Schlaraffenland, the German name for a land of plenty, in which work is prohibited, food and drink are endlessly available, and an eternal and healthy life is guaranteed, he dismisses them as Staatsmärchen, political fairy tales that delude people into dreaming about that which is impossible. In rhetoric, figures of speech that refer to impossible things—for example, “if pigs could fly,” “when hell freezes over,” “it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God,” etc.—are called adynata (see Curtius 2013, pp. 95–98). In antiquity, as well as in medieval European literature, adynata were sometimes used to describe a world that was upside down: “the dog flees from the hare, the fish hunts the beaver, the lamb the wolf” (ibid, p. 97). Some such upside-down worlds were narrated as cautionary tales of moral and social decay. Others were created as glorious utopias, in which the unjust social order and existential conditions of ancient, medieval, and modern life were turned upside down. Such utopias were usually portrayed as lands of plenty: The Land of Milk and Honey in ancient Greek comedies; the European Land of Cockaigne, glutton’s paradise, Schlaraffenland; and so on. In places like Cockaigne and Schlaraffenland, humans are exempt from labour and toil, and food and drink are always available in unlimited abundance. In their total inversion of the actual, lands of plenty illustrate a much more radical and existentially anchored vision of freedom than any political utopia. As Wilhelm Grimm (1850: 66) observed, some fairy tales maintain the pretence of possibility, but the fairy tale of Schlaraffenland deliberately brings together everything that is impossible: “Human imagination satisfies here the desire to, for once, operate in total freedom the big knife that cuts through all barriers.” While dreams of that-which-is-possible-now and of that-​which​-migh​t-bec​ome-p​ossib​le-in​-the-​futur​e nurture the hope that what is not yet might still become, the adynata of lands of plenty per definition do not maintain the pretence of possibility. Yet, they are much closer related to actuality than might appear at first sight. The Labour of Others Like other living organisms, human beings survive by ingesting, processing, and excreting matter. Be it air, plants and animals, or liquids, human beings absorb parts of their environment to exist. Marx (2001c: 7879) thought that this kind of absorption requires labour, which therefore, in his view, is nothing but human beings taking part in the metabolism of nature. From a historical perspective, the kind of labour that humans used for the purpose of survival did not change for hundreds of thousands of years. Anatomically modern human beings evolved in Africa some three hundred thousand years ago. They were a subspecies of the genus Homo that had included, and

Lands of Plenty, Realms of Freedom  91 for thousands of years continued to include, ancestral and related subspecies like Homo erectus and Homo neanderthalensis. The mode of subsistence for the subspecies of the genus Homo was gathering, hunting, and fishing. Anatomically modern human beings (Homo sapiens sapiens) developed alternative modes of subsistence for no more than some 3.5% of their historical existence. In other words, modern human beings have been hunter-gatherers for most of their history. For a long time, European and American travellers, historians, anthropologists, and philosophers—and the reading public that was informed by them—were convinced that hunter-gatherers led a life more similar to that of animals than to that of “civilized” human beings: “A man who spends his whole life following animals just to kill them to eat, or moving from one berry patch to another, is really living just like an animal himself” (Braidwood 1957: 122; quoted in Sahlins 2004: 56). Inexplicably, the same Europeans and Americans described this kind of handto-mouth life as plagued by extreme scarcity. Hunter-gatherers were said to have to spend all their waking hours scavenging for food and to always exist on the verge of starvation. It was the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (2004 [1972]) who turned this image upside down by defining hunting and gathering economies as the original affluent societies. Scarcity, he wrote, is a relation between means and ends (ibid, p. 54). If the end is survival and the means to achieve this end are wholly sufficient, there is no scarcity. Or, as Georg Simmel (2011 [1900]) observed many decades before Sahlins, scarcity is an economic value: Wild grain, which can be harvested without effort and immediately consumed without any exchange, is an economic good only if its consumption saves some other expenditure. But if all the necessities of life could be obtained in this way without any sacrifice there would be no economic system, any more than in the case of birds or fish or the inhabitants of the land of milk and honey. [Schlaraffenland in the German original] (ibid, p. 93) What authors who depicted the existence of hunter-gatherers as a life of misery failed to understand was that the members of the original affluent society did not want what they did not know and need. Want not, lack not. Only from the point of view of bourgeois travellers, missionaries, traders, fieldworkers, and so on, did the life of hunter-gatherers appear inadequate. “Having equipped the hunter with bourgeois impulses and palaeolithic tools, we judge his situation hopeless in advance” (Sahlins 2004, p. 54). But if mobility is a precondition for survival, as it was for foraging hunter-gatherers, the accumulation of property presents an encumbrance. In the life of hunter-gatherers, portability, not property, is a core value. Furthermore: A good case can be made that hunters and gatherers work less than we do; and, rather than a continuous travail, the food quest is intermittent, leisure abundant, and there is a greater amount of sleep in the daytime per capita per year than in any other condition of society. (ibid, p. 79)

92  Further Critiques of Political Economy Less necessity, less labour, more freedom. But labour nevertheless. In ecologically suitable areas, hunter-gatherers could abandon foraging in favour of collecting, which, in the Fertile Crescent, over millennia turned into the deliberate planting and harvesting of founder crops like wheat, rye, lentils, and bitter vetch. A next development was the domestication of animals like sheep, goats, pigs, and cows. Over the centuries, the domestication of plants and animals led to discrete patterns of living. On one hand, there were those who settled and cultivated a piece of land and engaged in animal husbandry. Their settlements grew in size and density, which facilitated the spread of infectious diseases and increased the dependency on climatic and ecological conditions. On the other hand, there were those who led a migratory life, which continued to be a way of life that settled populations, if necessary, could resort to as well. The cultivators who occupied the most fertile areas along the rivers of the Fertile Crescent, however, were less likely to be forced to abandon their fields because of changing climate and environment. Instead, they were at risk of being raided by nomads like the desert dwellers; that is, the Bedouin of the Levant and Arab peninsula. In the Levant, tales are still told about desert tribes raiding (ghazu) the peasant settlements of the Jordan Valley or peasants having to pay “tribute” (khawa)—in effect protection money—to Bedouin tribes. Bedouin tribes did not just extract khawa from peasants but also from other weaker Bedouin tribes (see Shryock 1997). To this day, the Arabic word for spoils, booty, loot, trophy, etc., is alghanima, which is derived from Arabic for sheep (ghanam). The Moroccan philosopher Mohammad Abed al-Jabri argued that the mentality of al-ghanima has persisted in Arabic political culture and that this explains why the idea of the common good never took hold as a universal value in Arab countries (al-Jabri 1990). But Bedouins were far from the only ones who fed on the labour of others. William McNeill (1976) observed that settled peasant populations fell victim to two types of parasites: microparasites like bacteria, viruses, fungi, insects, mice, and rats; and macroparasites like the Bedouin, traders, warlords, thieves, etc. Subsequently, a social order developed that was said to be naturally given or divinely ordained, in which there were three categories of people: priests, warriors, and peasants (and other commoners). The former two were the macroparasites feeding off the rest. In ancient and medieval Europe, they did so by attaching cultivators to the soil as serfs (eparouros; adscriptus glebae). Serfs had to perform corvée and other services and surrender a considerable share of their yield—we are reminded that the words “task” and “tax” at first were synonymous. When the microparasite Yersinia pestis spread to and among human organisms, death was all around. The macroparasites, in an attempt to uphold their lifestyle, pushed their serfs hard to provide more labour and tribute. The villeins rose in rebellion, but the Jaqueries of the fourteenth century ended in defeat. What remained were dreams and tales of life beyond serfdom, of a world in which nobody would feed on the labour of others. Labour and Freedom “The realm of freedom really begins only where labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends,” wrote Marx (2001c: 7894) in the third volume of

Lands of Plenty, Realms of Freedom  93 Capital. This, according to the same quote, holds true “in all forms of society and under all possible modes of production” (ibid). It is an important statement because it invalidates, on one hand, Marx’s and Engels’s utopia of a communist society in which labour would be cherished and, on the other, the value system of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century labour movements that exalted the figure of the upright, sturdy, steadfast, selfless worker swinging a hammer, epitomized in the novy sovetsky chelovek (“new Soviet man”). If we agree with Marx’s quote, this figure represented an unfree human who was condemned to live in the realm of necessity (unfreedom) for at least a third of every day of his or her life (except on Sundays). The labour movement was successful in reducing the realm of necessity and increasing the realm of freedom by shortening the daily working hours, extending the weekend to two days, being granted time off for vacation and sick leave, and not having to work prior to and past a certain age. In recent years we have witnessed how these achievements are being eroded in the name of “flexibility” and “making it easier to access the labour market.” Also, in many countries of the world, the expansion of the realm of freedom either never took place or does not apply to large groups of inhabitants like migrant workers. Nowadays, a contingent of local service workers—cleaning ladies, nannies, security guards, taxi drivers, restaurant employees, etc.—is available for those who can afford their services (Reich 1991). They provide their employers with freedom: the freedom not to clean, not to watch the children, not to be vigilant against intruders, not to walk or take public transport, not to prepare food, etc. The labour of others extends the realm of freedom for those who can pay for it. In a country like Sweden, where a successful labour movement had created a functioning welfare society, but also social norms of equitable individualism, employing cleaners was frowned upon because it was seen as a step backward in societal evolution. It was reminiscent of an earlier period, in which the bourgeoisie had maids taking care of the household. And so, employing someone to cook, clean, or take care of children in one’s home was considered a return to the era of the maid (piga in Swedish). In today’s Sweden—which is a country where all adults in households with children tend to participate in the labour market—there continues to be a political divide between those who openly employ domestic help and those who refuse to do so. In other countries, having a maid and nanny—and possibly a cook, driver, and gardener—is routine among people with a certain available income. In the Middle East, the nizam al-kafala (“sponsorship system”) functions like a slave system. Agencies provide Arab “sponsors” (employers) with maids, nannies, cooks, construction workers, etc., who arrive mostly from the Philippines, Bangladesh, African countries, etc. The workers are wholly dependent on their “sponsor” for their livelihood and residency permit. In the restaurants of Arab countries, it is common to see brown and black maids and nannies who eat with the children or at a separate table when the family is out for lunch or dinner. It is also common to see them work late at night dressed in their maid uniforms. Construction workers— often refugees from Syria in places like Lebanon and Jordan—labour under unsafe conditions without protective clothes and gear. Their “sponsors” are not required to pay them or their families if they are injured or die as a result of industrial

94  Further Critiques of Political Economy accidents. In the food processing, garment, and chemical factories of the region, Arab owners prefer to employ Asian and refugee labourers because they “work harder and don’t complain about the working conditions.”2 The macroparasites, in the meantime, enjoy their leisure in private clubs, exclusive lounges, and behind the walls of their properties. Keeping the realm of necessity as small as possible, however, is hardly a moral defect in them. Judging from human behaviour throughout history, to grow the realm of freedom and shrink the realm of necessity seems to be a universal aspiration with human beings. The issue is rather if one’s freedom depends on the unfreedom of others. Babylands As mentioned above, Marshall Sahlins (2004 [1972]) tried to prove that the realm of freedom was greater for hunter-gatherers than for their peasant and worker descendants. It is questionable if the freedom that leisure provided for huntergatherers was more substantial than that of later periods’ macroparasites. In either case, neither hunter-gatherers nor macroparasites can escape the realm of necessity entirely. We might ask what a life completely void of necessity, without any form of labour, would even look like. The historical record shows that human beings have indeed thought about this. In antiquity circulated tales of a Golden Age: First, there was peace over all, like water over hands. The earth produced no terror and no disease; on the other hand, things needful came of their own accord. Every torrent flowed with wine, barley-cakes strove with wheatloaves for men's lips, beseeching that they be swallowed if men loved the whitest. Fishes would come to the house and bake themselves, then serve themselves on the tables. Men were fat in those days and every bit mighty giants.3 Kronos, of whom it was said that he devoured his children, was the ruler of the Golden Age. One of Kronos’s children, Zeus, escaped being eaten by his father. Later, having been tricked by Prometheus, Zeus decided to take revenge on the golden race of human beings by burying their means of life deep in the earth.4 The new iron race of humans had to secure their food through toil, and it was only by the sweat of their brow that they could eat it. The Golden Age gave way to a life of exertion and want and to its analogue, a perpetual yearning for a life of ease and abundance. In medieval Europe, dreams of a life free of toil and scarcity gave rise to the fiction of lands of plenty. The Land of Cockaigne or Lubberland was a popular fantasy, depicted in poems like Hans Sachs’s Das schlauraffenland (1530) and paintings like Pieter Bruegel’s Het Luilekkerland (1567). Whereas the manor was the scene of endless toil and giving, the Land of Cockaigne was a place of doing nothing and of pure receiving. The two major features of Cockaigne are, on one hand, that everything is available in abundance and, on the other, that no effort is required to obtain whatever one wants. These two features can be gleaned from the

Lands of Plenty, Realms of Freedom  95 various names given to this land of leisure and plenty. Cockaigne derives either from a Germanic word for cake or from the Latin word for cooking (coquere); in either case, the name points to abundance in food. One of the Spanish names for this land is la cucaña, another name is Jauja, which refers to the ancient capital of Peru, known for its ostentatious wealth in pre-Spanish times. Lubberland, on the other hand, signifies a land for lubbers, as do the designations Schlaraffenland in German (meaning, “the land of clever apes”) and zemlja dembelija (“lazy land”) in Serbo-Croatian. The Dutch word Luilekkerland, which can be translated as lazyluscious land, finally combines both meanings. As a socially shared fantasy, the Land of Cockaigne belongs to medieval Europe, but its antecedents can be found in several sources: in the Pentateuch’s story of an ancient well-watered garden; in the above-mentioned Greek depiction of a Golden Age; in Petrus Alfonsi’s (2006, pp. 149–150) description of the Muslim paradise; etc. A similar, yet different, motif can be found, for example, in the stories of the Tibetan Shambhala and the Chinese “Peach Spring beyond this world” (shìwaì taóyuán). Chinese mythology has it that peaches—just like nectar and ambrosia in Greek and amrit in Indian mythology—provide immortality. A poor peasant happened to find a village of immortality, abundance, and tranquillity. He left after a week, promising not to reveal the village’s location—a promise he broke. Despite many efforts, however, nobody has been able to find the legendary peach spring beyond this world. Nowadays, “peach spring beyond this world” is a popular Chinese expression, meaning an unexpectedly pleasing place off the beaten path, usually an unspoiled wilderness of great beauty. In Cockaigne, anyone, not just a few, can lie about and have all their needs satisfied without exertion. Cockaigne erases the distinctions between the labouring and the privileged classes. Nobody has to work. The horn of plenty provides for everyone equally and to the fullest. But this also means that Cockaigne is a negation of the fall of man and his expulsion from paradise. Set against the background of medieval Europe, such a negation could serve as an illustration of the Church’s catalogue of deadly sins, which included lechery, gluttony, greed, and sloth. Therefore, the story of Cockaigne was often used as an indictment of the serfs, whom the lords accused of trying to wriggle out of their tasks whenever they could. In the genre of genus humile, the peasant class was taunted for being dumb, crude, and ugly (see Raupp 1986). The motif of Cockaigne was used in this genre to chide the poor for wanting to get something—or everything—for nothing. It fell upon the clergy to admonish the vulgar to lead a virtuous life and beware of temptation. Then again, in medieval Europe the same clergy had the reputation of indulging in every sort of wickedness, which, in the thirteenth century, led vagrant clerical students from universities all over Europe, called goliards, to protest the moral decay within the Church by staging outrageous performances and writing satirical verses and songs. An example is Carmina Burana number 222, which begins with the lines, “Ego sum abbas Cucaniensis; et consilium meum est cum bibulis” (“I am the abbot of Cockaigne; and my council consists of those who drink with me”). The men of the Church were depicted as lazy fools, who ate like pigs, drank like fish, and copulated and gambled. As

96  Further Critiques of Political Economy macroparasites, the clergy seemed to have at least one foot in Cockaigne and their admonitions therefore sounded hollow. When Bruegel painted the Land of Cockaigne in the 1560s, he could rely on everyone being familiar with the motif, which allowed him to use it as an allegory of the political situation in the Low Countries after the Duke of Alba and his soldiers had arrived to deal with the Calvinist heretics.5 Even if Bruegel used the story of Cockaigne as mere scaffolding for a political indictment, we can appreciate that his depiction of a peasant, a soldier, and a burgher lying on the ground like bloated babies turns Cockaigne into a land of regression: grown men turn out to be infants passively waiting to be fed. It is not that the men, against some demand, refuse to be active; they simply find themselves in the position of pure passivity. But, as opposed to macroparasites like aristocrats and clergy, the inhabitants of Cockaigne do not have to rely on the labour of others to enjoy a carefree existence. It is the land of plenty itself that satisfies all their needs. Just like infants, those who dwell in the realm of perfect freedom that is Cockaigne only need to lie still and open their mouths to be fed. The fantasies of such lands of plenty are in other words fantasies of regression to the earliest state of existence. For medieval Europeans, to not exploit the labour of others and yet be able to exist wholly in the realm of freedom, it seemed necessary to turn into infants. The Automatic Life Herbert Marcuse, in his book Eros and Civilization, read Freud with Marx and wrote: “Under the “ideal” conditions of mature industrial civilization, alienation would be completed by general automatization of labour, reduction of labour time to a minimum, and exchangeability of functions” (Marcuse 1955: 152). If the realm of labour and necessity is the inverse of the realm of freedom, abolishing human labour through automation seems to open a path to paradise on Earth. Just as in Cockaigne, labour is automatized and human beings need not do anything out of necessity. They are free to enjoy a life of plenty. The concept of automation is not modern; it is in fact ancient. The Greek word automatos was used to describe the self-moving gates of Olympus and the tripods of Hephaestus in the Iliad (v. 749; xviii. 376). In the Golden Age, everything happened by itself (i.e. automatically). Humans lived o automatos bios, “the self-going life.” There was no need for human agency. But, in reference to Sartre’s (2007: 29) comment that, by being born, human beings are condemned to be free, one could conclude that the automatic life is completely unfree because it eliminates agency and thus free will. Sartre’s point is that human beings are free because, once cast into the world, they are responsible for everything they do (ibid). This idea corresponds to a generally shared common sense because throughout history and across cultural horizons, individual human beings have been held responsible for their actions. Socially speaking, freedom and responsibility are two sides of the same coin. The infant, however—be it a tiny human being or an adult resident of Schlaraffenland—cannot be held responsible for

Lands of Plenty, Realms of Freedom  97 anything because she or he lives an automatic life. They are not free in an existentialist sense because they lack agency. Does this insight provide sufficient ground to question Marcuse’s utopia, as well as the fantasy of a land of plenty? No, because most human beings, even infants, do more than eat and drink (and sleep and relieve themselves). As it is now, children and adults are likely to perform labour: in school, in a workplace, in a field, etc. They do so out of necessity, which is the true antithesis of freedom. Ronald Inglehart (2018) links the concept of necessity to the issue of survival, that is, of economic and physical security. Inglehart’s initiative, the World Values Survey, which has just completed its seventh wave of measuring cultural values in seventy-seven countries,6 provides data for his basic thesis: that economic and physical insecurity generates and maintains cultural survival values; and that economic and physical security generates and maintains cultural self-expression values. Survival values are functional. Their purpose is to protect against existential insecurity, and they persist in cohorts that have experienced economic and/or physical insecurity. That is, even if a cohort has moved from economic and physical insecurity to security their values are unlikely to change. It takes another generation to embrace self-expression values. Survival values centre on tradition, religion, authority, community, etc. Consequently, those who share such values tend to be intolerant of non-traditional ideas and lifestyles, of outsiders and individual freedom. Self-expression values, on the other hand, “emphasize gender equality, tolerance of gays, lesbians, foreigners and other outgroups, freedom of expression and participation in decisionmaking in economic and political life” (Inglehart 2018, pp. 1–2). The current rise of populist authoritarianism in many countries, Inglehart interprets as a response to growing economic insecurities due to decades of anti-welfare policies. The evolution of cultural values is not predetermined. Just as biological evolution can end in extinction—the Neanderthals now only exist as genetic traces in modern humans—cultural evolution can dissolve and leave nothing but the memory of a time when there existed existential security in some parts of the world. To speak of cultural evolution is uncommon (to say the least) among anthropologists. To sort cultural values—and “cultures”—into just two categories, however, is not as unusual for them.7 In the case of survival and self-expression values, what seems like a binary opposition is actually a spectrum. In other words, values can be more or less determined by economic and physical insecurity and be more or less shaped by economic and physical security. Values that originate entirely in insecurity are the least conducive to individual freedom. It seems harsh to quote Sartre to an individual who is surrounded by people who share strong survival values and tell her that she is condemned to freedom.8 The Hegelian formula that one always has a choice between living as a slave or dying might become obvious or urgent in some circumstances, but it ought not to be made the foundation of existentialist humanism. If existentialism is a humanism it needs to remind humans that their existence indeed precedes their essence and that they therefore are born free. But it must also resist the temptation to judge others for their inability to realize their freedom. After all, Sartre (2007: 43) wrote these lines:

98  Further Critiques of Political Economy There is a universality in every project, inasmuch as any man is capable of understanding any human project […] Given sufficient information, one can always find a way to understand an idiot, a child, a person from a so-called primitive culture, or a foreigner. The utopia of an automatic life is a human project that is easy to understand. It promises freedom from macroparasites and Sisyphean toil. It gives permission to fantasies of endless play and creativity. Nowadays, however, it is also perceived as a dystopia by those who warn of artificial intelligence enslaving humanity and runaway technology destroying the world. With a majority of human beings still being guided by survival values, and the rollback of welfare systems leading to new cohorts adhering to survival values in countries in which self-expression values once were widely shared, the utopia or dystopia of an automatic life remains an adynaton. For the time being, cultural evolution depends on the struggle to enhance the realm of freedom by reducing the realm of labour and necessity, as well as ensuring economic and physical security. It is the essence of self-expression values that extends existential security to the life of human individuals. Cultural evolution, then, is a product of the welfare society that provides economic and physical security, reduces the realm of labour and necessity, and allows the individual to realize her freedom. Notes 1 Marx 1962: 346. The phrase “by nature” was omitted in most English translations (see Nitsch 1992), which is why the reference is to a German publication. 2 Interviews with Arab employers conducted in Jordan in early 2020. 3 Athenaeus (citing Telecleides) in The Deipnosophists, VI, 268B. English translation by Charles Burton Gulick (London: William Heinemann, 1927). 4 Hesiod, Works and days, line 42. 5 See Frank 1991 for a compelling interpretation of Bruegel’s painting. 6 In each country, between 1,000 and 6,935 respondents have answered an extensive questionnaire on issues like attitudes and stereotypes, well-being, trust, security, corruption, migration, religion, ethics, etc. 7 Ruth Benedict employed Friedrich Nietzsche’s dichotomy of the Dionysian and the Apollonian to classify “cultures”; Claude Lévi-Strauss distinguished between sociétés froides and sociétés chaudes; Felix Keesing contrasted soft-shelled with hard-shelled “cultures”; etc. 8 On Sartre’s revision of the concept of individual freedom, see the debate between him and Lévi-Strauss (discussed, e.g., in Jameson 2004; Rosen 1971; and Doran 2013).

References Alfonsi, Petrus. 2006 [1106]. Dialogue against the Jews. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press. al-Jabri, Mohammad Abed. 1990. Al-aql al-siyassi al-arabi: muhadadatuh watajliatuh [The Arab political mind: its determinants and manifestations]. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies.

Lands of Plenty, Realms of Freedom  99 Athenæus. 1927. The Deipnosophists, translated by Charles Burton Gulick. London: William Heinemann. Bloch, Ernst. 1995 [1954]. The Principle of Hope, 3 vols. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Braidwood, Robert J. 1957. Prehistoric Men. 3rd ed. Chicago Natural History Museum Popular Series, Anthropology, Number 37. Chicago: Chicago Natural History Museum Press. Curtius, Ernst Robert. 2013 [1948]. European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Doran, Robert. 2013. Sartre’s “Critique of dialectical reason” and the debate with LéviStrauss. Yale French Studies 123: 41–62. Frank, Ross. 1991. An interpretation of Land of Cockaigne (1567) by Pieter Breugel the Elder. The Sixteenth Century Journal 22 (2): 299–329. Grimm, Wilhelm. 1850. Vorrede. In Kinder- und Hausmärchen, ed. Brothers Grimm. Sixth expanded and improved edition. Göttingen: Verlag der Dieterichschen Buchhandlung. Inglehart, Ronald. 2018. Cultural Evolution: Peoples’ Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jameson, Frederic. 2004. Foreword. In Critique of Dialectical Reason: Theory of Practical Ensembles, vol. 1, ed. Jean-Paul Sartre, pp. xiii–xxxiii. London: Verso. Marcuse, Herbert. 1955. Eros and Civilization: Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. Boston: Beacon Press. Marx, Karl. 1962 [1890]. Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. MEW 23. Berlin: Dietz Verlag. Marx, Karl. 2001 [1894]. Capital: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole, volume 3, ed. Friedrich Engels. London: ElecBook. Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 2001a [1845]. The Holy Family. London: ElecBook. Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 2001b [1845]. Theses on Feuerbach. London: ElecBook. McNeill, William. 1976. Plagues and Peoples. New York: Anchor Books. Nitsch, Thomas. 1992. Marx on man’s sociality by nature: An inexplicable omission? International Journal of Social Economics 19 (7/8/9): 108–120. Raupp, Hans-Joachim. 1986. Bauernsatiren: Entstehung und Entwicklung des bäuerlichen Genres in der deutschen und niederländischen Kunst ca. 1470–1570. Niederzier: Lukassen. Reich, Robert B. 1991. Secession of the successful. New York Times Magazine, January 20, 1991, Section 6, p. 16. Rosen, Lawrence. 1971. Language, history, and the logic of inquiry in Lévi-Strauss and Sartre. History and Theory 10 (3): 269–294. Sahlins, Marshall. 2004 [1972]. Stone Age Economics. London and New York: Routledge. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 2007 [1946]. Existentialism is a Humanism. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Shryock, Andrew. 1997. Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan. Berkeley: University of California Press. Simmel, Georg. 2011 [1900]. The Philosophy of Money. London and New York: Routledge.

7

Self, Pathogen, and Climate Rethinking Political Economy Today Khirod Chandra Moharana

Introduction The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has opened up many fundamental questions linked to human existence and its future. The pandemic has engulfed almost all parts of the world though the remote and inaccessible regions were lately affected. The entire world was completely shot down for several months and slowly the livelihood concerns are forcing everywhere to unlock. The worldwide suffering and death are unprecedented and comparable only to the pandemic due to Spanish Flu which devastated the world almost a century ago. Amidst this massive suffering and deaths, the question most fundamental that should bother all of us is the cause of this pandemic and the measures we should take to protect humanity from such pandemics in the future. The paper attempts to examine some of the possible factors behind the COVID-19 pandemic and reflect on the role of the contemporary political economy in it. The ongoing pandemic, the emerging infectious diseases, and the global threat of climate change are examined to question the modern self. We argue here, and it is unfolded in this paper, that the self created by the contemporary political economy is broadly responsible for the above-mentioned crises. We need a self which rethinks its position in the natural world to go down the hierarchy and positions itself as a responsible species on this planet and not the master of all species. What we need is a reworking of the self to interact with other species on this planet at the same level and not behave as the owner of this planet. We also need to work on the self to reposition itself in today’s social world. This is essential because without a proper social repositioning, the project of repositioning in the natural world is impossible. Both of these are achievable if our self is truly transformed for a sustainable world. The notion of ecological citizenship (van Steenbergen 1994) can work only when an ecological self (Clammer 2018) is in place. Further, it is argued in the paper that the rational, secular, and scientific interventions are insufficient in facing the contemporary global climate crises. The Covid 19 Pandemic In December 2019 the central Hubei province of China witnessed an outbreak of pneumonia-like infections which later was diagnosed to be a novel coronavirus disease (COVID). The virus quickly spread over many countries and in March 2020 the World Health Organization (WHO) declared it as a pandemic. Investigations were carried out DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-10

Self, Pathogen, and Climate  101 and it was established that the COVID-19 pandemic was caused by the SARS-COV-2 virus whose ecological reservoirs are the bats. The most agreed-upon path of transmission was that the virus jumped from its natural host to an intermediary host through which it got transmitted to humans. The seafood market of Wuhan in China where the virus is believed to cross the species barrier is the place where exotic animals are commercially cultured and sold1. Frequent interaction between these artificially cultured animals and humans led to the jump of the virus to the human species. A similar path has also been discovered for other pathogens which attacked humans in the last several decades. The emerging infectious diseases have posed as a challenge to public health in today’s world. Since the 1980s, many new infectious diseases have been emerging and reemerging such as Ebola, SARS, MERS, Nipah, influenza, yellow fever, Zika, and dengue. In a short span of three decades, about 150 new infectious diseases have emerged and re-emerged (Smith et al. 2014). The common trend of infection is that the pathogens cross over the species barrier to infect new host, i.e. human beings. This is due to the increasing proximity of pathogens and human beings as a result of a variety of recent factors related to men’s economic and commercial activities. Earlier studies have also shown this trajectory and often linked the emerging infectious diseases to men’s commercial interest and their invasion into wild animals’ territory (Barret et al. 1998). Other studies linked the rise in infectious diseases to population growth, rapid urbanization, deforestation, globalization, and climate change. The extant political economy based on neoliberal transactions and globalizations represents the expansionist behaviour of the modern man. This is crucially linked to the exploitation and destruction of pathogens’ as well as the vectors’ ecology. Recently there is also a marked shift in the ecology of the known vectors (Bedford et al. 2019) including the aedes aegipty mosquito and other primates. Human has begun to control almost all parts of our planet today. Man has expanded its operation in almost all parts of the world often trespassing territory or ecosystem of pathogens and vectors. There is an overlapping of human territory with the ecosystems of disease vectors and pathogens due to rapid urbanization and it leads to a large number of human population interacting with animals in a very thickly populated area. (Neiderud 2015). Earlier studies have already shown the linkages of infectious diseases with animal culture in China. Commercial farming of swine and turkey in the United States as well as swine-duck combined agriculture in southern China is argued to contribute to the genetic adaptability of the flu virus (Shu et al. 1994). Thus, the empirical findings suggest a strong correlation between our increasing interactions with wild animals with the emerging infectious diseases in the last several decades. COVID-19 can be argued to be a result of such possibility of unrestricted man–animal interaction leading to breaking of species barrier for the pathogens to enter the human system. Climate Change and the Anthropocene The other crucial and broad factor that is often argued to be fundamentally linked to increasing infectious diseases is climate change. Climate change is an important

102  Further Critiques of Political Economy factor contributing to disruption of ecosystems in contemporary time. The ecosystem of disease vectors and pathogens are also disrupted due to the climate change which has led to their migration and proliferation (Patz et al. 1996) and eventual crossing over the species barriers to infect human beings. Scientific evidences show that the changing habitats and the migratory habit of vectors are fundamentally linked to climate change (Paijmanns et al. 2009). Climate change is not only driving the ecosystem disruptions of pathogens and disease vectors but also leading to other catastrophic changes on planet Earth. Geologists have established since long that climate change is not new and the planet Earth has been witnessing it since its inception. In various geological periods the earth has experienced major changes in climate due to glaciations and other factors. Thus, major changes in the earth’s climate have been happening irrespective of man’s arrival on this planet. But what is unique in the ongoing climate change is its pace. We all know that there is a rise in the earth’s global average temperature since the pre-industrial period. There is a corresponding rise in the carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration in earth’s atmosphere too. We also know that the greenhouse gas emissions have been increasing since the last one and half century. This time period is a miniscule compared to the geological time scale required for the earlier corresponding changes in earth’s climate. Thus, scientists have argued with the help of compelling evidences that the present climate change is anthropogenic. The emergence of culture in human society and especially the activities of industrial man has impacted earth’s climate in a very significant way. The question now, can be asked, what man has done to this planet in the last two centuries? What new things man has introduced in this earth which is acting against the health of the very planet which sustains it? Most evidences suggest that it is not the entire period since human beings have appeared on this earth but the last two hundred years and especially the last fifty years which contributed to these colossal changes in earth’s climate. What happened in this period? Most crucial changes that men introduced on this earth since the last two centuries and especially after 1950s are the introduction of atomic weapons and the resulting radioactive isotopes on earth’s surface, massive spread of plastics on earth surface and in the ocean, and alarming level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The above events are so profound that geologists have proposed a term anthropocene2 to recognize man’s impact on the earth system. It signals the beginning of an epoch which is markedly distinct from the epoch Holocene which continued since the last 12,000 years. In May 2019 the Anthropocene Working Group (AWG) voted in favour of formally designating this epoch as sufficiently distinct from the earlier to be called as “anthropocene” with geologic marker produced by human activities. Thus, there is profound effect of human activities since about the last two centuries which was able to alter the earth system. Some of the activities that need urgent attention here are the industrial mass production and consumption of goods which is responsible for massive emission of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases. We have put enormous plastics on the earth surface, water bodies, and ocean and now microplastic particles are available in the poles too. We have used atomic bombs and other radioactive materials in

Self, Pathogen, and Climate  103 our warfare and some industrial activities to such extent that traces of radioactive materials are found everywhere. We have increased our economic activities to such an extent that there is nothing left on this planet which is out of our consumption gaze. We are adding infinitely to the list of our consumption items and for that we exploit not only metals and plants but also the rich varieties of world fauna. Why are we doing this? We argue that human beings behave in this way because in the course of time, we have forgotten our rightful place in the natural world. We have forgotten that we are one among the millions of species that the planet Earth has been sustaining. We have ignored the rightful places of our fellow species to act as the master of all. Our political economy has a crucial role in forgetting our position in the natural as well as the social world. Role of the Neoliberal Self Political economy studies the relationship between individual and society by investigating their interactions with the state and the market. The varying influence of the state and market on the individual has been a matter of analysis by scholars since the beginning of modern disciplines. The emergence of the modern economy is marked by the recognition and encouragement of a self which is motivated by self-interest (Smith 1776 [1994]). In his book Wealth of Nations Smith argues that it is by appealing to each other’s self-interest that everyone’s want can be fulfilled. This interplay of self-interests, Smith argues, creates a balanced social, economic and political environment for general welfare, and hence, any kind of restrictions or regulations is detrimental to the development of individual and society. Much of the economic decisions taken by business houses as well as states are still largely influenced by classical ideas like that of Smith. The economic self became more rational, competitive, and utility-maximizing with the publication of a much influential textbook in economics by Paul Samuelson (1948), a pioneer neoclassical economist. He promoted the idea of a “value-free” economic man in his book “Economics: An Introductory Analysis” which influenced generations of economists and shaped economic decisions even today. The practice of neoclassical economics heralded by Samuelson contributed in a major way to the formation of value-free human subjectivity. Human actions towards maximizing utility became “rational” behaviour and it was expected that man should behave in this way. Thus, the modern economic man became self-centred and thought it right to look for profit and utility from everything around him. Most European countries and the USA acted as torchbearers of this capitalistic transformation of human self worldwide. The global liberal order imposed by the US gradually penetrated not only the political and economic space but also captured human mental space driving it towards a consumerist lifestyle. The event in modern history that essentially shaped the contour of human consumption is Fordism. It helped us to produce goods in assembly lines eventually enabling us to produce manufactured items in plenty. This was an economic wonder at that time but it eventually led to a situation where the supply of manufactured goods was more than the demand. Therefore, a need was felt to induce

104  Further Critiques of Political Economy more consumption so that the produced goods can be sold. This was possible through increasing buying powers of the people and by creating new notions of needs and lifestyles among the people. This is termed as consumerism where more consumption is desired and designed by various sectors of economy. Creation of new necessities became one of the goals of modern economy so that demand for more products was ensured. This cycle of consumerism coupled with a profitmaximizing tendency resulted in mindless competition among business houses which eventually led to the unabated exploitation of natural resources. The single motive for profit, considered as right and rational, hardly allowed any ethical and environmental concerns to surface. Thus, the liberal consuming self is amoral and considers all other species of plants and animals as resources to be exploited. The liberal self lacks a genuine connection with other species on this earth. The motive to produce and consume has engulfed all ethical considerations of respecting and preserving various flora and fauna of our ecology. The goal of mass production and mass consumption knows no bounds because in the present political economy, the coexistence with other species takes a back seat for the sake of profit. The homo economicus is valued and its “rational” actions are thus considered required for a modern life. The consumer behaviour has been considered to be determined by rational choice since the time of classical economics. The neoliberal self believes in economic calculation as the basis to satisfy its wants. Rational choice theory is considered as a key methodology for mainstream economics and is widely used (Reiss 2013). It is based on the construction of an ideally rational agent who always ranks his preferences on the basis of calculations based on reason. Rene Descartes’ influence on early economic theorizing also contributed to the making of the self which is rational, bounded and averse to subjective parameters. Descartes’ conception of a unitary machine-like body shaped early economic thinking in a fundamental way. The physicality of body swept economic thinking largely by not allowing any non-biological factors in making of the economic self. So, there is no scope of values which is thought to influence economic behaviour. Today our behaviour is largely determined by this wrongly constructed rational and profit-maximizing self. Our relations with the biotic and abiotic component of this planet are based on rational calculations. All goods are subject to calculations within a market in today’s neoliberal economy. Consumer is a part and parcel of the amoral market and is considered safe in an environment marked by rational decisions. Consumer is an actor who intends to maximize profit in every transaction. Today we assume that all goods in an individual’s life can be reduced to economic calculations and commoditization. Today, the neoliberal self is mesmerized by needs that are constructed by media and advertisements. Most of these needs are neither essential to life nor beneficial to the environment. The race for a better lifestyle is motivated by the forces of capitalism as an unending process. New trend in apparel, newer versions of mobiles, newer brands of cars, etc., give us a sense of updated lifestyle encouraged by various forces of market. In this race of consumerism various objects are being transformed into the status of commodity. Various objects are commoditized and for this man keeps on exploiting hitherto untouched flora and fauna. Transition of

Self, Pathogen, and Climate  105 things from object to commodity is realized through a transition of human subjectivity mediated by a transition from a need to desire. The dominant self today is averse to nature, separated from other species on earth, and can exploit any living or non-living part of this planet for its own consumption and desire. The “technology of consciousness” (Kidner 2017) is at work with the help of a battery of well-coordinated mechanisms such as media, advertisement, films, and celebrity endorsements in creating new notions of needs, desires, lifestyles and life. Rethinking the Self in Political Economy Political economy aims for human development or flourishing and therefore the enquiry about the true nature of human self is a crucial component in its deliberations. Early thinkers of political economy mostly influenced by critical works of Rene Descarte and David Hume, conceptualized man as physical, bounded and rational. This physical and bounded human self combined with Adam Smith’s notion of “self-interest” consequently considered everything around him as resources to be used for its own flourishing. This way of thinking was and still continues to be considered as rational and any other mode of behaving with the components of nature was/is considered as irrational (Smith 1776 [1994]; Samuelson 1948). Today much water has flown on the scientific knowledge about the human body and existence since the time of Rene Descarte. Still, we are stuck with a self who is rational, bounded, and focused on self-interest because the economy has become an ideology in today’s world. It is high time the political economy recognized this serious lacuna and incorporated in its functioning an ethical, spiritual, and compassionate self. Transformation at the level of both the self and the state is what is required at this crucial juncture of human history. In this section, I have attempted to discuss how this transformation can happen at both the above two levels and have emphasized the role of value in realizing this goal. The Cartesian human body is utterly inadequate to capture the complexities that are associated with human life and existence. The anatomical, technological and philosophical conceptual details provided by Descartes had a profound effect in making the body dehumanized and mechanized (Judovitz 2001). Recently there have been interesting researches about the composition and meaning of human body. We are dependent not only on outside but also on the inside of our body. We are dependent on the microbiome that thrives inside our body. The physical body of human beings is a storehouse of trillions of bacteria. Human cells and bacteria have evolved together since the appearance of man on this earth. Life is possible due to mutual interaction between human cells and these microbes. So, our existence is justifiably a product of multiple entities and therefore conceiving ourselves as a singular being is contestable. Both inside and outside our body we are colonized by microbes. They make life possible. Traditionally our knowledge about microbes is limited to their pathogenic character but recently there have been substantial amount of research on their contribution to the making up of our selves. Martin J. Blaser (2014) writes in his bestseller “Missing Microbes: How

106  Further Critiques of Political Economy the Overuse of Antibiotics Is Fueling Our Modern Plagues” that our life and health have been possible due to a rich microbiome inside our body. He writes: Each of us hosts a similarly diverse ecology of microbes that has coevolved with our species over millennia. They thrive in the mouth, gut, nasal passages, ear canal, and on the skin. In women, they coat the vagina. The microbes that constitute your microbiome are generally acquired early in life; surprisingly, by the age of three, the populations within children resemble those of adults. Together, they play a critical role in your immunity as well as your ability to combat disease. These microbes have been found responsible for contributing to gene expression which has been considered as unique to each individual and constituting the biological identity or self of a person. Microbial communities too are found to be uniquely suited to the host species almost as unique as fingerprints (Dethlefsen et al. 2007). Microbial genes contribute to host phenotypes, metabolism, disease susceptibility, and efficacy of therapeutic drugs (Rees et al. 2018). Thus, the traditional understanding focused towards our genome as the sole determinant of human self is challenged here. Microbes do not merely influence our physiology, nosology and phenotypic expression but it constitutes our being or self. In other words, the view that we are alone and bounded is questioned. The Cartesian notion of the mechanical body has been recently challenged by research in epigenetics as well (Lock 2017). Gene as the ultimate decider of human phenotypes faces crucial challenges when it was revealed that the immediate environment influences significantly on gene expression. In other words, gene reacts with its external and internal environment to express itself. As Margaret Lock aptly puts it “Given the bourgeoning effects of human activities on the environment sufficient to herald a new geological epoch, combined with the relegation of genes to a reactive function in response to environmental stimuli, the time is ripe, it seems, for cultural and social anthropologists to reassemble mind and body”. Thus, today there is an urgent need to reassemble human self and recognize its porous state. We are not bounded and separated from other organisms including microorganisms. More importantly microbes are increasingly found to be a part of our being. Today the need of the hour is to reposition ourselves in the natural world based on these findings. In Berry’s words, we need to “reinvent the human within the community of life systems”. There is an urgent need to shift the human-centric understanding of community to “earth as a single community” (Berry 1999). We have been deviated from the path of coexistence by the political economy and now we need to restore it. A cursory look at the story of biological evolution indicates that human beings are a very recent addition to the already thriving biotic world. The microbes represent the most successful, widespread, and numerically preponderant part. They are found in water, soil, air, and in plants and animals including human beings. Human beings believe that they are the most intelligent and successful species on this earth and therefore tend to dominate over other species. The world political economy is a reflection of this misplaced assumption of human

Self, Pathogen, and Climate  107 beings to rule over the world. Most of us see other species as living at the mercy of human beings but the truth is that we live at their mercy and very much dependent on them for our survival. They are the factors, which make life possible on this earth. They keep us and our planet healthy. Not only microbes but the entire biotic environment helps us in direct and indirect ways for our survival on this earth. But we have forgotten this inter-dependence and have been massively swayed by capitalist intentions. As a result, we have started behaving as if we are the master of all species and have the right to kill, commercially produce, and again kill them for our economic interest. The above scientific research and evidences are very much required but are not sufficient to instil sustainable behaviour in us. There are scientific understandings that emerged in the last century which talks about our intricate relationship with our environment. It is now a common sense that we owe our existence to our continuous interactions with the biotic and abiotic components in our surrounding. Both humans and other species play their respective roles in the overall functioning of the ecosystem. We are essentially dependent upon various flora and fauna of nature directly or indirectly for food, clothes, shelter, and other basic necessities or merely because they are a part of the food chains of our ecosystem. The knowledge about food chain and ecosystem balance has already become a common sense and we all possess this knowledge but acting responsibly towards the environment is still a distant dream for many of us. Why don’t we put our knowledge about environmental conservation into practice? For acting environmentally sustainable way we need something more beyond possessing the knowledge about it. We need to work on our consciousness for transforming ourself to act in environmentally responsible way in a true sense (Freire 1970). Scholars like Giri (2013) and Habermas (1990) too connected our being environmentally conscious with a larger project of human development or human flourishing through the path of moral economy. Mere possession of scientific knowledge seems to be inadequate and we need a new self beyond the limits of homo economicus to live in a sustainable way. Clammer (2018) emphasizes the notion of “ecological self” and argues that “without the self-transformation of its members, no institution, however well intentioned, will achieve more than surface changes, leaving the deeper problems unresolved”. The ongoing economic activities led to the expansion of human territory to remote and inaccessible parts of the environment thereby bringing more wild animals to the fold of human exposure and consequently leading to emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases. The recent epidemiological transition to emerging infectious diseases is unique in the sense that the reason we are invading wild animals’ territory is not to fulfil our essential needs like the earlier we did. This time we are invading wild terrain for profit. Modern sporting activities and other entertainment activities motivated by commercial interest led us to invade wild territory. This has led to construction of houses in wild areas leading to contacts with ticks and their wild animal reservoirs. From the analysis of the transmission pattern of diseases such as Ebola and HIV it is clear that the pathogens are often provided the opportunity to jump the species barrier (Lappe 1994) due to increased contact

108  Further Critiques of Political Economy of humans with wild animals and disruption of the ecosystems of the pathogens. Thus, we are forgetting the basic value of mutual coexistence for the sake of profit and other commercial interests. There is a shift of focus from mutual coexistence to self-interest and the dominant discourse fails to reposition our aim towards the former. The inadequacy of the existing conventions and norms for a creative and critical discourse is recognized by Giri (2018) who emphasizes on moral economy as a possible methodology to meet the challenges of political economy. Contemporary biotechnological innovations too indicate the patronization of a self by modern political economy which is bounded and self-centred. Recent developments in biotechnology are a great boon to human society but irresponsible use of this knowledge for selfish commercial interest causes irreversible damage to our planet. Antibiotics have been helpful for saving lives from deadly pathogens though in long run almost all antibiotics have failed due to increasing microbial resistance. Microbial resistance can throw ample light on the futility of men’s battle against pathogens. The very concept of antibiotics in natural environment is a contested idea. Data shows that most antibiotics invented to kill certain pathogens have eventually failed. Pathogens have built resistance against antibiotic in due course and have become more adaptive and powerful. In this context the question may be asked: do antibiotics really help humanity? Three years after the famous introduction of penicillin to combat gram-positive staph infections new strains of Staphylococcus aureus began to emerge which could resist the effect of penicillin (Neu 1992). About 95% of Staphylococcus aureus have been resistant against penicillin today (Jacoby 1996). The overuse and lack of compliance while taking antibiotics is a major factor in evolution of drug-resistant variants of pathogens (Kunin 1993) and it is mostly motivated by commercial interests coupled with fundamental wrong notions about our place vis a vis other species on this planet. Moreover, men’s greed and expansionist behaviour are evident in the unabated commercial use and overuse of antibiotics. We are now using antibiotics for better productivity in agriculture, poultry, and other artificial culture of animals. The neoliberal self prefers treatment to prevention of diseases and chooses to use antibiotics against pathogens rather than depending on promotion of healthy habits. Most of the second and third world is known for unnecessary prescriptions of antibiotics by physicians for trivial health issues (Llor and Bjerrum 2014; Kollef 1994)). This is due to selfish commercial interest of pharmaceutical companies and physicians. This is also due to a very busy and workaholic modern self that the present political economy has created who has neither time nor patience for allowing the body to heal naturally. The unnecessary use, overuse, and commercial use of antibiotics give rise to the emergence of resistant versions of pathogens in our environment (Orzech et al. 2008). This is responsible for making humanity more vulnerable to emerging and reemerging diseases and epidemics. In spite of recent developments in scientific research on the possible catastrophic impacts of such technologies, human’s greed for profit and utility makes the entire species helpless. Thus, it can be argued that mere knowledge about the need to reposition ourselves in the natural world is not enough. What we more crucially need is a transformation in our self so that we can reposition ourselves in our natural as well as social world. Being

Self, Pathogen, and Climate  109 rightly positioned in the social world is important. A self cannot be responsible towards the environment if it is not responsible towards the society. So, a socially responsible self is the need of the hour. Being socially responsible is a reflection of a truly transformed self. The neoliberal self needs to examine in a true sense its own role in creating an insensitive and selfish world. What kind of thought we are harbouring in our mind and what kind of actions we are performing in our daily life? As Sachs (2011) emphasizes we should practice mindfulness “to promote personal virtues of self-awareness and moderation” along with the “civic virtues of compassion for others and the ability to co-operate across the borders of class, race, religion, and geography”. Thus, a transforming self is the cornerstone of a transformed economy and society. The recovery process therefore must invariably consist of the repositioning of ourselves with respect to the social world we live in. Individualism has kept the world hypnotized claiming it to be the torch bearer of individual freedom, choice, and rights but the end result is apparent before us. Individualism has bred selfcenteredness and selfishness eventually leading to implicit and explicit violence against others. Today we have forgotten our real relations and positions with respect to other members of human society. We tend to live in this world as if only we are the ones who have the right to live here. We still subscribe to the apparent “survival of the fittest” thesis and believe in some inner corner of our hearts that the weak, the disadvantaged, and the marginalized are destined to be doomed and this is the natural law. But anthropologists have argued that man became successful on this planet when it created society. In other words, being social is natural and fundamental to human survival on this planet (Levi Strauss 1949). Moreover, society is antithetical to the argument that only the fittest part of the species will survive. Human society has been trying and ensuring to protect and contribute to survival and flourishing of the marginalized and the disadvantaged, the so-called unfit part of the species. But thanks to the contemporary emphasis on individualism, we have forgotten the art of co-living with our own brethren. We have created a false image of ourselves as separate from others having more capability and intelligence and therefore worthy to be the owner of more power and resources. It is the making of society which has made it possible for Homo Sapiens to flourish on this planet. But man has forgotten the role of society and has started focusing on individualism at the cost of breaking solidarity. Along with the transformation of our neoliberal self what we need is a deep transformation in the logic and architecture of the state to address this urgent predicament. Modern state should be based on this fundamental idea about the essential relationship between the self and the society. The power of the state is justified in recognizing this essential need to equalize the status of all human beings. Striving for individual concentration of power and privileges needs to be discouraged by the state. For this, there has to be a dialectical relationship between the self and the state in making both of them ethical, democratic, and averse to power. This is possible when there is a true understanding of one’s self in the social world and a genuine eagerness on the part of state to ensure equality. The decentralization of state power can be actualized through a distribution of power and dominance at the levels of self, community, state, and other stakeholders. The

110  Further Critiques of Political Economy very logic of power needs to be transformed to create new realities and possibilities rather than using it for maintaining structures of hierarchy and domination. Moreover, a proper value system needs to be ensured by the state. The present society values individualism, individual achievement, and success whereas it should actually value inner work of the self. There is an urgent need to recognize a self which can understand its relations with other human beings. A deeper understanding can originate from repositioning ourselves in the natural world that we all are fundamentally related with each other and the other is not there to be subdued. What we give value as a society needs a fundamental transformation. There is a need to stop or minimize valuing material achievement, individual success, and social status based on positions and power. Society should start valuing spiritual achievement and how one is helping others, the marginalized, and the poor. For the neoliberal self, it pays for being selfish but now is the time to reverse the trend. The society should value not achievement per se but examine what the achievement is for. If what is achieved is for common good then only it should be recognized and valued. Today we see individual success and achievement come with a little bit of selfishness. Certain actions are prioritized for our individual success which may go against the ethos of helping others or giving time for others. But in the name of achievement and success we sacrifice that scope of doing well for others. In other words, today success favours those who have a little self-centred attitude. Thus, the neoliberal self stands on a pedestal of self-interest and selfishness to which the present society is subscribed both consciously and unconsciously. Reason for achievement needs to be examined and valued than mere achievement per se. There is a need to examine any selfish interest or common good behind any achievement. Achieving for common good needs to be recognized and valued. This is evident from anthropological research findings on sustainable behaviour seen in many cultures around the world. Tribal societies often follow sustainable behaviour because there are many cultural mechanisms to promote these behaviours. Prudent use of resources is encouraged and valued through many cultural prescriptions, taboos, and norms in tribal societies (Moharana 2019). The modern state needs to incorporate the tribal ethos of creating and ensuring values that are compassionate, ethical, and egalitarian. The value-free neoliberal self needs to be transformed into a self who can strive for being spiritual and cooperative rather than being bounded and competitive. Conclusion The post-industrial revolution world has witnessed a gradual replacement of natural force with cultural force which brought about irreversible changes on this planet. There has been a major transformation in human self due to a domineering political economy the world has espoused in the last two centuries. The chemical footprint of industrial man is so massive that the epoch Anthropocene has been declared to have been started. The impact of the greedy and insensitive human beings is so vast that the earth is going to become unlivable soon and the indicators such as global climate change and emerging infectious diseases

Self, Pathogen, and Climate  111 are very much apparent before us. Margaret Lock (2017) has rightly pointed out the kind of earth the neoliberal self has presented itself since the last two centuries and especially in the last fifty years: Humans have manufactured numerous mineral compounds, including more than 500 million metric tons of pure aluminum since World War II, much of which has sedimented into earth’s layers. Even more striking are “mineraloids”—glass and plastics—300 million tons of which are made annually and are present on the earth’s crust and in all the oceans. Concrete, a rock of our own making, encases much of the globe today. Our chemical footprints are everywhere, principally in the form of CO2, nitrogen fertilizer, pesticides, and diesel fuel, which have accumulated as toxic waste distributed globally. (Lock 2017) Now much has been discussed and planned by countries and international organizations to realize the gravity of the situations. Countries agree on certain points to work together to curtail greenhouse gas emissions but nothing substantial has been achieved till now. Many scientific innovations and interventions have been designed and being implemented but we find hardly any interventions which is successful. The paper dwells on this predicament and argues that what we need today is an urgent transformation of our self from a rational, bounded, and value-free being to a moral, compassionate, and spiritual being. The genealogy of unsustainable behaviour has been examined to reveal the fundamental flaw in the political economy which created the contemporary allconsuming, insensitive and self-centred self. The historical and philosophical origin of the neoliberal self is explored and it is argued that the transformation of the self is possible with the active participation of both the self as well as the state. The ecological self (Clammer 2018) can sustain itself only under a transforming state with a new set of value systems to encourage. Foucault’s technologies of self (1998) is useful here to think of a battery of mechanisms at the level of individual thought, conduct, and lifestyle supported by a corresponding group of mechanisms initiated by the state. Going back to the Stone Age is neither advisable nor possible but a truly transformed self can herald a slow down or degrowth movement which is urgently required at this juncture of time. Scientific and rational interventions are required but not sufficient for initiating a truly sustainable way of life. What we urgently require is a transformation at individual level with the help of positive disciplinary inputs from the state to achieve our ecological self. The time has come for an urgent rethinking of the Cartesian body. The biological self as conceptualized by Rene Descartes was constructed on the basis of the research at that time. But much water has flown since Descartes’ time and the conception of a bounded biological entity which is called man is deeply challenged now. In this context the rational economic actor based on a bounded human self is misplaced and wrongly conceived. Today in this globalized world we are hardly

112  Further Critiques of Political Economy separate from any parts of the world however remote or inaccessible the area is. The so-called third world slums and unhygienic areas are not a problem for the third world only but it is a serious problem to the entire world today. No first world or second world can stay safe without thinking about the dump yard of the third world. There is an urgent need to shape a new self which include the fate of individuals directly linked to the fate of people of the third world. No one can now think safe in terms of disease susceptibility and in this regard what we need today is the transformation of the neoliberal self into a self based on coexistence and compassion. A self who is in constant communion with not only people of other parts of the world but also with our flora, fauna, microbes, and abiotic components in this planet. Notes 1 Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Accessed on September 7, 2020. https://www​.who​.int​/docs​/default​-source​/coronaviruse​ /who​-china​-joint​-mission​-on​-covid​-19​-final​-report​.pdf 2 The term “Anthropocene” was coined by Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer in 2000 to denote the present geological time interval which is argued to be resulted from human activities on earth.

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India’s Crisis of Development Pulin B Nayak

Introduction India is now in her 76th year of Independence from colonial rule. A natural question arises as to how the country has fared in terms of its overall social and economic development over the past three quarters of a century. At the time of her Independence in 1947, India was a poor country with a population that had among the lowest levels of educational and health indicators, with a life expectancy that was barely 32 years. There is little doubt that the country has come a long way. The educational scene has been vastly transformed and life expectancy now is around 70 years now around 70 years, a remarkable improvement, though the quality of health for the vast masses of the population is far from satisfactory or acceptable. The poor performance on the health front has been particularly brought home in the context of the corona virus pandemic that engulfed the world, including India, starting in early 2020. According to official figures, some 5,32,021 lives have been lost due to the pandemic, a staggering number by any yardstick. At the time of writing this, India, with 1.431 billion, is the world’s most populous country. China, a close second, is the only other billion-plus country. But whereas China is a totalitarian state, India has essentially been a liberal parliamentary democracy with a free press. There have however been growing concerns in recent years that India is no longer home to a liberal democratic environment and that there are noticeable authoritarian tendencies in the political sphere. But no matter what the political dispensation, India’s sheer size makes it a sui generis case of a gigantic project committed to social and economic development of a stupendous mass of people, comprising a sixth of the world’s population. The results of this exercise would obviously be of great consequence not only to India but to the world at large. Two decades after India’s Independence, Gunnar Myrdal published his ambitious work, “Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations” (1968), in which he argued that population growth in Asia would stunt economic growth. This was a highly pessimistic account of Asia’s development prospects. A half century on, the prospects of growth and development of Asia in the third decade of the twenty-first century appear to be dramatically different. It would be no exaggeration to say that China today occupies a pivotal position in the world economy, with a staggering base and size that presents a serious challenge to the hegemony DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-11

116  Further Critiques of Political Economy of the US economy. The Indian economy, although much smaller than China’s, has been recording robust growth rate of its GDP, in the range of about 7% plus. This is one of the highest among the major economies of the world. Several other Asian countries too have also been experiencing booming growth. At a minimum, this suggests that some of the most respected among the Western scholars of the subject may have been grossly errant in some of their well-known projections. It is worth recalling however that despite the rapid trajectory of growth that India experienced during 2005–08, with the annual growth rate of its GDP tipping the 9% mark, the international financial crisis of 2008 put a damper on the country’s subsequent growth trajectory. Fortunately, due to certain robust institutional strengths, India was able to overcome the crisis in a short span of time, and by 2013–14 India was back to being one of the faster growing economies of the world. The episode of demonetization in 2016, followed by the somewhat hastily implemented goods and services tax (GST), subsequently played havoc on the functioning of an economy that seemed to have moved on to a higher growth path. The overall growth rate plummeted, and the investment climate was seen to be particularly tepid. The unemployment rate reached its highest level in 45 years. It is in this setting that the corona pandemic struck the Indian economy in early 2020. A nationwide lockdown was announced on 24th March 2020. Its impact was devastating. As per official statistics, the Indian economy shrank by 7.3% during 2020–21. For some of the most iconic names in the firmament of the social sciences— including, for example, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Joseph Schumpeter— development is a holistic process. It is a mistake to think of it as a purely economic phenomenon. Societal, political, historical, and cultural factors have critical implications for the process of development and growth. Marx was clear about the importance of historical and social productive forces in addition to material factors that contribute to the process of economic development. As a keen scholar of Marx, Schumpeter too was always careful to emphasize the importance of sociological factors in the process of economic development. We shall attempt to examine the Indian development experience within a broad holistic context. Indian Thinking After nearly two centuries of colonial rule, the Indian economy, at Independence, was poverty stricken, with a very poor social and economic infrastructure. The colonial dispensation was not really interested in building a strong Indian economy. The ultimate aim was always to serve the best interests of Britain, the colonial power. Towards achieving this, if it helped that, for instance, the railways and the post and telegraph were to be developed in the subject country, the task was undertaken. The railways helped transport raw materials to the Indian ports for shipment to Britain, and the finished goods produced in Manchester were shipped back to India, with the railways providing the last stage connectivity to the Indian consumer markets.

India’s Crisis of Development  117 Well before India’s Independence, during the long and protracted political struggle for freedom, some of the key national leaders had articulated their respective visions of India’s development process. Mahatma Gandhi had fairly early on penned down his thoughts in Hind Swaraj, or Indian Home Rule (1909). He was still based in South Africa, and this brief pamphlet was written on board a ship from London to South Africa. The book was thought to be seditious and banned by the colonial government. Hind Swaraj was a severe indictment of Western civilization. Gandhiji believed that since India lived in her villages, the right way to think of development of the country at large would be to think of developing the villages as self-sufficient republics. Gandhi believed that a village should be independent of its neighbours for its own wants and yet interdependent for many others in which dependence is necessary. He was always interested in drawing a better balance between man and nature, and he believed that this would be possible in the context of a pastoral, village setting. The ideal village must of course have, among others, provision for education of children, development of handicrafts, and a place for cultural intercourse among the residents. For Gandhi the topmost priority was to ensure that all able-bodied adults be gainfully employed. He believed that the large population mass of the country was an asset, a view opposite to the one held by Malthus. But the key caveat was that each person must make his or her own contribution to the social and economic process of development. There was no place for idleness. It is in this context that he advocated the use of the charkha, which could be used by any able-bodied person. There were a number of other notable features of Gandhiji’s socioeconomic formulation. He was firmly opposed to the Western capitalistic mode of production which promoted concentration of income and wealth. It also typically economized on the use of labour, and promoted the use of capital, and was therefore antithetical to Indian requirements. But most importantly, Gandhi emphasized minimization of wants. This was the exact obverse of the entire project of Western economic thought which was based on the principle of expansion of human wants and the economy’s production possibility frontier. It is obvious to see how this Gandhian idea of minimization of wants is consistent with long-term ecological sustainability. By no means was it the case that the Gandhian notions of social and economic development went uncontested. In particular, Gandhi’s chosen heir, Jawaharlal Nehru, had sharply different views on the way the development process was to be carried out once India gained independence. Nehru was a modernizer and believed firmly in the central role of industrialization to uplift an essentially stagnant rural economy. He also believed that it was necessary to foster a scientific temper in the vast masses that had been deeply tradition-bound and superstitious. From his early youth Nehru fashioned himself as a Fabian socialist. Though he had stated clearly that he was far from being a Communist, he had been much influenced by the Marxian mode of analysis. This is acknowledged both in his “Autobiography” (1936) and in “The Discovery of India” (1946). He had been much impressed with the results of economic planning in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. This had

118  Further Critiques of Political Economy convinced him that planning was critically required to bring about a rapid social and economic transformation of a poor country. During the 1930s when the freedom struggle led by Gandhiji had ignited the entire nation, there was a faction led by Jayaprakash Narayan, Acharya Narendra Dev, Ram Manohar Lohia, and Minoo Masani, among others, who formed the Congress Socialist Group to address the social and economic issues facing the country. This group had distinctly different ideas from the ones held by Gandhiji in several spheres. Nehru was sympathetic to the Congress Socialist Group, though he was never formally a member. In 1938, with Subhash Chandra Bose as the Congress President, a National Planning Committee was set up to deliberate on the economic policies to be adopted once the country was to gain independence, and the person to head this body was Nehru. The Committee was a diverse body with eminent politicians, industrialists, economists, engineers, and scientists. In Nehru’s (1946) own words, “it was a strange assortment of different types and it was not clear how such an odd mixture would work.” The Committee met a number of times, but the proceedings were disrupted owing to World War II. Yet a number of key issues were discussed in detail. The protracted War as well as the disturbed political circumstances leading up to partition and India’s Independence in 1947 kept developmental issues in a limbo. Gandhiji’s assassination within months after India’s Independence made Nehru the virtually unchallenged arbiter of the country’s development path. Both Gandhi and Nehru were votaries of a socialist order, but their approaches to reach this goal were markedly different. They had detailed exchanges and correspondence on this matter, but each more or less stuck to his original point of view. They were however both in total agreement in regard to the eschewal of violence. Gandhiji believed in private ownership of the means of production, and never supported the idea and mechanism of planning. He held on to the notion that capitalists, or more generally, owners of the means of production ought to be called upon act as “trustees” of the production process that was to be dedicated to serve the social good. This was intrinsic to Gandhiji’s moral view of the world, even when it was very well known that the ground reality usually is starkly different. Nehru, Jayaprakash Narayan, and Gunnar Myrdal, among many others, were sharply critical of this idealistic, and rather unrealistic, whim of Gandhiji. Since, at the time of Independence, capitalism was at a nascent stage, Nehru was convinced that India needed centralized planning to channelize resources into socially desirable ends. The Planning Commission was formed on 15 March 1950 under Nehru’s chairmanship. The main focus of course was to mobilize resources to channelize funds into infrastructure and core industries such as steel and cement. It is worth asking whether agriculture and rural development were neglected. On a balance of considerations, one would have to say that that was not the case. One might say that the stress on agriculture and industry seemed to be evenly matched in the first plan. It was the second plan, with the Mahalanobis-Feldman growth formulation, which had a distinct tilt towards the heavy industry. However, by the third plan, again, the salience of agriculture had been restored.

India’s Crisis of Development  119 In recent times it has been fashionable to place all ills of the Indian economy at the doorstep of Nehru. It is often implied that his aristocratic upbringing and class background prevented him from understanding and appreciating the problems of the poorest of the poor. The truth is however otherwise. It must not ever be overlooked that Nehru cut his political teeth in his prolonged involvement with the kisan movement in eastern Uttar Pradesh in the early 1920s. This brought him face to face with the agrarian crisis, and it is from this that he drew his political spurs. Nehru was a keen student of the Marxian mode of analysis and expressed his repugnance at the pursuit of the capitalists’ profit motive. He harboured the belief that most of the basic human wants could be adequately and effectively met by a production process based on the social ownership of the means of production. One of his greatest obsessions was to provide a strong push for education and health. He was intuitively aware of the special nature of these two merit goods and was keen to provide these as part of the public provisioning from budgetary resources. If India today has a fair supply of scientists, engineers, doctors and other technicians, a good measure of the credit must go to the massive push that was given by Nehru in the 1950s to establish institutions like the IITs, CSIR, AIIMS, and other scientific research bodies. In addition to Gandhiji and Nehru there have been very many other epochal figures who have thought seriously about India’s social and economic development. We consider three of them briefly. The first is Babasaheb B R Ambedkar (1891–1956), the inspiring and singular star of the Dalit movement who was a jurist, economist, politician, and social reformer. He is regarded as the chief architect of the Constitution of India and was the Chairman of the Drafting Committee. Of all the pre-Independence public personalities Ambedkar had possibly the most formidable educational qualifications, with doctorates in economics from both Columbia University and the London School of Economics. Being from the dalit Mahar caste, he has been possibly the sharpest critic of the Hindu caste system. His forthright critique of the caste system brought him into open conflict with Gandhiji. In terms of his economic thinking Ambedkar was an advocate of both industrialization and agricultural growth for the Indian economy. He was critical of Gandhiji’s idea of developing Indian villages as self-sufficient republics. He believed that villages have been the den of ignorance and have been the cause of the ruination of India. The greatest aspect of his social and economic thinking was to give primacy to distributional considerations and to insist on raising the social and economic status of the dalit communities. His advocacy of the dalits provided the basis for the social and economic policy of affirmative action. He believed that the origin of untouchability resides in the exclusive mind-set of upper caste Hindus. He had famously declared: “I was born a Hindu but will not die a Hindu.” In the last days of his life he embraced Buddhism, which he believed was the most rational among religions. The second person we consider is Jayaprakash Narayan (1902–79), who had a unique understanding of India’s developmental process. In his early youth he was drawn to the Gandhian movement. At the age of 20 he went to the USA for further studies and after several odd jobs in fields, factories and hotels to meet his

120  Further Critiques of Political Economy expenses, he attended various universities and finally took his Master’s degree in sociology from Ohio. He returned to India, a Marxist, in 1929 to join the Indian National Congress at the invitation of Nehru. He later became one of the founders of the Congress Socialist Party in 1934. In 1952, JP was the key leader of the Praja Socialist Party, and through the early decades after Independence remained a committed socialist. Around 1974 when the country was riven with economic and political crises, JP provided an alternative political and intellectual leadership in his call for “total revolution.” In his early career, JP had been a strong votary of the Marxian mode of analysis. In his essay entitled “The Foundation of Socialism,” JP (1964) categorically states that “there is only one type, one theory of Socialism–Marxism.” Sometime around the mid-1940s JP had openly advocated the use of arms in the struggle for freedom, openly confronting Gandhiji. But he was to change this view later and became totally persuaded about the Gandhian path of non-violence. The third thinker we wish to consider briefly is the redoubtable Ram Manohar Lohia (1910–67), known for his originality and self-reflective acumen. He first met Gandhiji when he was only ten years of age and continued to be strongly influenced by him. He went to London and then Berlin when he was barely 19 and finished his doctorate in 1932 under the guidance of Werner Sombart of Humboldt University. His dissertation topic was “The Economics of Salt Satyagraha.” Sombart was an economist and sociologist of the first rank and was one of the youngest members of the German Historical School. The notion of “creative destruction” associated with capitalism is his coinage, which was later made prominent by Joseph Schumpeter. Lohia returned to India in 1933 and dived headlong into the national movement. He too was one of the founders of the Congress Socialist Party and left behind trails of thought that attracted significant numbers of followers. He believed that neither capitalism nor communism is relevant for India because both are doctrines of centralization and mass production. He called this the principle of “Equal Irrelevance.” Lohia (1963) regarded himself as a socialist who advocated the “small-unit” machine for industrialization. He was keen student of both Marx and Gandhi and believed that genuine socialism would have to destroy both the capitalist relations of production as well as the capitalist forces of production. He attached great importance to the organization of the peasant movement in developing the latent powers of the peasants. Socialist Orientation It should be clear from above that the nature of social productive forces was regarded as being crucial for the development process of a poor economy with large tracts of poverty and unemployment. All of the thinkers considered above subscribed to some form of socialism. It is true that Ambedkar had turned down the proposal of economist K T Shah to include the term socialist in the Constitution’s preamble. But this should not lead us to believe that he had any doubts regarding the fundamental appeal of a socialist ideal. His idea of socialism was premised on

India’s Crisis of Development  121 the need to eliminating the hierarchical caste structure so that there is perfect equality among human beings. He had said: I do not believe that we can build up a free society in India as long as there is a trace of this ill-treatment and suppression of one class by another. Believing as I do in a socialist ideal, inevitably I believe in perfect equality in the treatment of various classes and groups. I think that Socialism offers the only true remedy for this as well as other problems. (Ambedkar 2014) There need be no doubt regarding the commitment to the socialist ideal in the thinking process of Gandhi, Nehru, Jayaprakash, or Lohia. They were all epochal figures. They were cerebral and selfless beings. They had each endured long years of incarceration in British jails. They were public spirited to a fault, and have each left behind enough ideas for subsequent generations and their acolytes to mull over. All of them were engaging with social phenomena and processes. Gandhi and Nehru had trained as lawyers, and while Gandhi’s theoretical formulations emerged from his praxis, Nehru had been a keen student of history. While JP studied sociology, Lohia was a student of economics. All four of them engaged with Marx in varying degrees, and all of them critiqued capitalism (see Nayak (2021)). Both Marx and Gandhi were strong votaries of an equitable world, though the processes they favoured were different. Marx allowed for armed rebellion, while for Gandhi non-violence was a sacred creed. The Gandhian emphasis on non-violence was favoured by Nehru, Jayaprakash Narayan, and Lohia. However, during the course of the freedom struggle and subsequently, there were several points of difference between them that emerged. At the early stage in his political career Lohia had been a keen follower of Nehru, but as time passed, they developed sharp political differences, and by the early 1960s Lohia was possibly one of the sharpest critics of Nehru. Jayaprakash was more in tune with the Nehruvian worldview soon after Independence, but he later became active in the Sarvodaya movement and distanced himself from active politics. In the early 1940s JP and Lohia had been in prison together and were close political collaborators, but after Independence JP chose the path of non-statist voluntary action as part of his project of societal transformation, whereas Lohia firmly believed in statist political action. Inevitably JP and Lohia gradually drifted apart. We now turn to a different aspect. This relates to the approaches of the above figures to the question of secularism. Regarding Gandhiji and Nehru there can never be any question about their total commitment to the creed of secularism. Gandhiji’s fundamental commitment to secularism cost him his life. Nehru’s view of the ideal society had no truck with communal thoughts. Being a dalit himself, Ambedkar was fundamentally opposed to caste-ridden Hindu religion. He instinctively knew that an equal society has to be based on secularism, and should make no concessions to communal forces. However, when we consider the careers of JP and Lohia, we find that they each had, during the last stages of their political careers, clearly collaborated with

122  Further Critiques of Political Economy communal elements. Lohia’s intense anti-Congress stance in the 1960s led him to join forces with the Jana Sangh, which gave a new lease of life to RSS and its communal politics. Likewise, when JP gave a call for total revolution in the 1970s against the authoritarian tendencies in Indira Gandhi, he actively joined hands with the RSS to push his political agenda. A comprehensive study of the political careers of Lohia and JP is perhaps still to be undertaken. However it is possible to suggest that coming from two of the tallest stalwarts of the socialist movement, their collaboration with the RSS was to later set the stage for the legitimation and steady rise of the BJP subsequently. The legitimation, once obtained, was to stand the BJP in good stead. The party capitalized on it to gradually expand its hold in parliamentary politics. It emerged victorious in the general elections held in 1999, 2014, and 2019. After more than 9 years at the helm of national politics since 2014 Narendra Modi appears to be in complete command of the governmental machinery. It would be no exaggeration to assert that the condition of the minorities, especially the Muslims, has taken a turn for the worse under the BJP, while Hindutva seems to be the defining stance of government policy. All critical voices which would ordinarily speak up for the rights of the minorities seem to be on the defensive. The electronic and print media appears to be totally co-opted, and meekly goes along with the ruling powers. During the Prime Ministership of Dr. Manmohan Singh, the Sachar Committee was set up in March 2005 to study the social, economic, and educational conditions of Muslims in India. The Committee came up with some rather startling findings. It pointed out that whereas Muslims constituted 14 per cent of the Indian population, they comprised only 2.5 per cent of the Indian bureaucracy. The Committee held that the conditions facing the Indian Muslims were below that of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Committee made a number of recommendations. The key one was to set up an Equal Opportunity Commission to look into the grievances of deprived groups like minorities. One of the curious political fallouts of the post-Modi dispensation is that there has been a virtual erosion of effective opposition. The Congress Party has clearly lost its hegemonistic position. Yet it is the only party with an all-India presence which might potentially pose a challenge to the BJP. But as things stand, it has been seriously ineffective in playing the role of the principal opposition party. The left parties appear to be in a supine state. It is only at the state levels that there is evidence of regional parties, such as TMC in West Bengal and AAP in Delhi, which have been able to provide a counter weight to the BJP. India’s Growth Experience The growth rate of the Indian economy in the half century prior to Independence was under one percentage point per annum. After the planning process was begun in 1950, the emphases on agriculture and industry varied from one five-year plan to another, but considering the three-decade period till the late 1970s, the average growth rate was somewhere in the range of about 3.5 to 4 percentage points, which earned the sobriquet of the Hindu rate of growth by the late economist Raj

India’s Crisis of Development  123 Krishna. In order to address the problem of poverty alleviation and employment, the country needed a much higher pace of growth. There was widespread feeling among the observers of the Indian political economy that planning was responsible for a repressed economy, and there were many who argued for an opening up of the economy to allow private entrepreneurs a higher role in the development process. However it was not easy to do away with the political reality which continued to favour a strong role of the state in the developmental process. The opportunity for radical economic reform presented itself in 1991 in the wake of a serious fiscal and foreign exchange crisis the country found itself, under the early days of the new government headed by P. V. Narasimha Rao, with Dr. Manmohan Singh as the Finance Minister. The country went in for an extensive reform in the fiscal, trade, and industry sectors. The results were almost immediate. The average growth rate in the 1990s moved up to the range of around 6 percentage points. However, it was in the first decade of the new millennium that the Indian economy moved onto a markedly higher growth path. During 2005–08, the growth rate of GDP tipped the 9 per cent mark, the rate at which the Chinese economy had been growing consistently since 1980. However, the international financial crisis of 2008 was to put an abrupt halt to this growth process. Luckily, some careful handling of the fiscal and monetary sectors helped in reorganizing the economy, and by 2014, the Indian economy was again back to a decent growth rate of around 7.5 per cent. By this time the Chinese growth rate had dipped somewhat and the Indian economy was one of the fastest growing major economies. There is little doubt that the growth rate of the Indian economy under Narendra Modi’s dispensation has taken a decisive hit, first owing to the demonetization in 2016, and then the implementation of the GST. Of course, the fury of the corona pandemic from early 2020 has dealt the biggest ever blow, with the growth rate going into the negative zone. At the time of writing this in September 2023, the unemployment problem is at its most acute. There are severe job losses. The investment climate in the corporate sector is extremely weak, even though, paradoxically, the stock market has been scaling unprecedented heights. We now proceed to make three observations. First, it may be asserted that the greatest problem characterizing the Indian economy is the picture of a very high, and possibly rising, degree of inequality. The richest 1 per cent of the population accounts for around 22 per cent of national income. The distribution of wealth is sharper still. The top 1 per cent owns as much as 58.4 per cent of the wealth. The share of agriculture in GDP is currently about 18 per cent, down from about 55 per cent at the beginning of the planning process in 1950. However, it should be noted that the share of the labour force dependent on agriculture is around 50 per cent, down from about two thirds of the population in 1950. It is this which is very much at the heart of the sharp accentuation of inequality in the economy at large. In order to reverse this process, there has to be a massive step up of income generation from the agriculture sector. This would, inter alia, call for a quantum jump in investment in rural infrastructure, including small and medium irrigation projects. Second, when we look at the issue of public expenditure on education and health, we see that there has been a gradual withdrawal of the state in both these sectors,

124  Further Critiques of Political Economy with a much higher role now having been earmarked for the private sector. In the health sector, public expenditure continues to be a dismal 1.3 per cent of GDP, one of the lowest figures amongst major countries of the world. The figure for China is around 3 per cent, whereas countries in Western Europe spend around 8 to 10 per cent. It should be clearly underlined that insurance-based health initiatives are no substitutes for the state to have well-provided public hospitals everywhere and especially in the interior rural sectors and tribal belts. Third, nearly 90 per cent of the country’s workforce is in the informal sector with no minimum wages or any kind of social security. They are among the most vulnerable and marginalized sections of the economy. In a situation such as the coronavirus pandemic there have been widespread job losses and unprecedented hardship. The total number of internal migrants in India, as per the 2011 census, is 45.36 crore, or 37 per cent of the country’s population. In the wake of the corona crisis vast numbers of these migrant labourers were forced to return from their work spaces back to their native homes when a nation-wide strict lockdown was imposed on March 24, 2020. The hardships they endured were unprecedented. Without trains or buses running, some of the migrants walked more than a thousand kilometres to reach their homes. Any government body to come to the help of the poor and needy was conspicuous by its absence. There appeared to be a complete breakdown of the social contract between the rulers and the ruled. Concluding Remarks An important question pertains to the ideal nature of the social, political, and economic fabric that would be appropriate for our contemporary setting. In our view there is a clear imperative to adopt the twin ideals of secularism and socialism. A country which has been home to multiple religions for centuries can ill afford to promote the ideology of Hindutva, based on the notion of the preeminence of Hindus vis-à-vis other religious groups. The ideology of Hindutva is essentially political and is to be distinguished from the religion of Hinduism. Hindutva triggers insecurities and fears among the minority religious groups, especially the Muslims and Christians, which ultimately weakens the social and economic fabric. Likewise it seems reasonably clear that the present dispensation has opted for a social and economic policy that favours the upper strata of corporate interests. The consequences of this have been catastrophic for income distribution. Thomas Piketty has marshalled a vast amount of data to conclude that the cult of hypercapitalism has led to such a sharpening of income disparities in the advanced capitalist countries that the world is on fire. He makes the reasoned observation that this is now a “Time for Socialism” (2021). His observation holds with greater force for India where almost a fifth of the population continues to be below the poverty line and where the vast bulk of the population lives under precarious material circumstances. In his magisterial work entitled “Capital and Ideology,” Piketty (2020) examines the trajectory of income inequality in the world, and the Indian experience is an important component of his analysis. He opens his book with the rather arresting

India’s Crisis of Development  125 proclamation: “every human society must justify its inequalities, or the entire social or political construct could collapse.” In his panoramic sweep of history, Piketty shows how Western capitalism attains its maturity in the second half of the nineteenth century, about a hundred years after the spinning jenny. However, its apogee came about during 1880–1914, the “Gilded Age,” when the rich and the well to do in the advanced capitalist countries enjoyed unprecedented levels of affluence, even as the inequalities of income and wealth were getting sharper and reached their peak just before the start of the First World War in 1914. Inequality is as much a social and cultural phenomenon as it is economic. In the Indian context the fundamental social inequality that the caste system has always represented and continues to represent is at the heart of the deep oppression and exploitation that the lower rungs have suffered through the centuries. Piketty believes that during the first three decades of India’s planning regime starting in the 1950s the index of income inequality was kept within bounds. In his view the elaborate social policy of affirmative action had a dampening effect on inequalities getting blown up out of hand. The liberalization and reform process began thirty years back in 1991. Despite the expansion of reservations to other backward classes, or OBCs, the sheer power of market forces has been such that the degree of inequality has continued to grow and has now reached unacceptable heights. The case for an appropriately calibrated wealth tax and estate duty would appear to be compelling, among other measures, to moderate inequality. There are good theoretical reasons to expect that high-income inequality is usually the basis for low-effective demand. This arises simply from the behavioural pattern that the poor tend to spend all their income on necessities while the higher income earners have a higher propensity to save. It was well understood by the classical masters that the capitalist system is inherently prone to accentuation of inequality. A more equitable distribution of income is ultimately desirable to maintain a high level of effective demand. This would also offer a higher potential for growth and development. Almost 80 per cent of India’s farmers have small holdings under 2 hectares. And almost all of them are financially hard up. To this one must add the nearly 14 crore landless labourers who live in constant penury. Workers in industry and services constitute about 27 crores, who are overwhelmingly in precarious, informal jobs. Workers in the organized sector constitute barely about 2.7 crores, of whom around 1.7 crores are in the government sector. The overall picture is thus one of a massive degree of inequality and precarity at the workplace. It is this which is possibly the biggest challenge to India’s process of development. The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution were clear in their mind that the political system that is most appropriate to deliver well-being and progress for all is parliamentary democracy. The country had its first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, a person of impeccable commitment to democratic values and norms. Indian parliamentary democracy from the early 1950s was known for its allegiance to a set of liberal values, where dissent was freely permitted. Sadly, we cannot say that of the present times. Political and social commentators are today

126  Further Critiques of Political Economy cautious to speak out their minds in criticizing the government lest they be charged with the provisions of the penal UAPA. So prevalent have been the use of the provisions pertaining to national security and terror that one might well wonder whether we are living in an open democratic society anymore. Electoral compulsions possibly forced Prime Minister Modi to withdraw the three farm laws, but the farmers continue to be far from satisfied. More generally, for all the claims of economic success proclaimed by the government media, there appears to be a deep trust deficit that minorities and large sections of the labouring classes seem to be suffering from. It is this which needs to be sincerely addressed as we embark on the final quarter that would bring a closure to the first century of Independent India. References Cited Ambedkar, B R (2014), Annihilation of Caste, in Vasant Moon (ed.) Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai. Lohia, Ram Manohar (1963), Marx, Gandhi and Socialism, Ram Manohar Lohia Samata Vidyalaya Nyasa, Hyderabad. Myrdal, Gunnar (1968), Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth. Narayan, Jayaprakash (1964), Socialism, Sarvodaya and Democracy, Bimla Prasad (ed.) Asia Publishing House, Bombay. Nayak, Pulin B (2021), India’s Development Challenge: A Synoptic View, A N Sinha Foundation Day Lecture, A N Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna. Nehru, Jawaharlal (1936), An Autobiography, John Lane, The Bodley Head Ltd, London. Nehru, Jawaharlal (1946), The Discovery of India, The Signet Press, Calcutta. Piketty, Thomas (2020), Capital and Ideology, The Bellknap Press/Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Piketty, Thomas (2021), Time for Socialism: Dispatches from a World on Fire 2016–2021, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.

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A Relational Approach to Political Economy Making New Sense of What We Know, Towards a Society of Living Carlos Alvarez Pereira

Impromptu Franz Schubert had a short life, he died in Vienna in 1828 at 31 years of age, after composing more than 1500 works. His music might not be the most heard today, but it usually leaves a deep impression on listeners. Here is the testimony by Theodor W. Adorno: We cry without knowing why; because we are not yet as this music promises us to be, but already in the unnamed happiness of feeling that this music being what it is, it is sufficient to ensure that one day we will be like it. [Adorno 1928–1967] Dear reader, you might wonder why a text on political economy starts with the evocation of a musical genius. More than two millennia ago Terence, a playwright born in Africa and brought as a slave to Rome, said that Nothing human is alien to me. Is Schubert alien to political economy? Taking into account that he never achieved any commercial success during his life, he was a non-event, as far as the “economy” is concerned. I have taken the example of Schubert from my cultural background but I am sure all readers can find in their own culture’s other examples of the same: lasting achievements of musical creativity which are completely irrelevant in monetary terms and hence fall out of the scope of political economy. Given the prominence of this discipline in the way we conduct ourselves in society, and the way we conceive the future of humanity, this is, as we will discuss, hugely problematic. There is a second reason to evoke here the works of Schubert and other creative geniuses. Of all languages created by humans, music is certainly the one that touches us the deepest. Not surprisingly music therapy is one of the tools used to combat Alzheimer´s and other severe cognitive diseases. Music is deeply in us, largely because it connects us with the natural patterns of life, starting before birth with our mother´s heartbeat. In many cultures, from shamanism to Hinduism, Sufism, and many more, music is the conduit to supreme knowledge and a medium to connect with the divine essence [Khan 1923]. And music is a generative language without the pretension to codify nature, to capture it in a rationally intelligible framework. We do not expect birds to play Mozart, even if they seem to love DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-12

128  Further Critiques of Political Economy his music. On the contrary, in the culture of Modernity initiated in Europe around the 18th century, our words have that pretension. We expect nature and human beings to conform to our explicit plans of exploitation and mechanization. There is evidence that this expectation is self-deceiving. Could we come back to a better attunement to life, the kind that music has? Are We on a Good Course? For whoever is listening the world emits confusing signals. Life expectancy has been steadily increasing. Literacy is slowly but surely reaching the entire humanity. Not without obstacles and setbacks, women are emancipating themselves everywhere. Aspirations for material well-being seem a dream at hand for many millions of people living in Most of the World (i.e. 6 out of 7 humans living in countries outside “the West”). Science and technology overcome limits in our knowledge and capacity to act. To many, caring for one another is the name of the game. At the same time, inequality is dramatically growing everywhere. Science and technology are also paving the way to dystopian futures with deeper divisions between winners and losers. Relentless competition is still the name of the game. Human-induced climate change and other effects of industrialization are destroying the vitality of processes on which human life depends. Exhaustion of fossil fuels is closing an era of cheap energy. Many millions have to move to keep alive, and families are torn apart. Signs of collapse are accumulating. Humanity is thriving and committing suicide, at the same time. Our conscious mind does not access “reality” (whatever this might be) in a direct way. We receive signals from our senses, and we build perceptions and give meaning to them through the lenses of our frameworks of interpretation, which are often not explicit, nor even conscious. The same “reality” leads to different perceptions and even opposite interpretations, also because we are receiving at the same time signals from our closest neighbourhood and the most remote places. We live in the best of times, but also for many in the worst of times. What might be most relevant is that for many millions it looks like the future will be worse than the past. The feeling that your children will have a tougher life than yours is the tipping point of Modernity, that cultural era built on the dream of eternal progress. That tipping point becomes visible in unexpected ways. Here are two declarations by Antonio Guterres, Secretary General of the United Nations. On 6 November 2017, at the inauguration of the Web Summit in Lisbon, he said: In the last decades, we have witnessed an enormous impact of innovation, science and technology combined with globalization (…) Globally it is clear that our world has been moving for the good but there was some collateral damage: climate change and growing inequality. Three years later, on 2 December 2020 at Columbia University in New York, he gives a very different interpretation of the state of affairs of the planet:

Relational Approach to Political Economy  129 To put it simply, the state of the planet is broken. Humanity is waging war on nature. This is suicidal (…) Making peace with nature is the defining task of the 21st century. It must be the top, top priority for everyone, everywhere. The shift in worldview is abysmal. The issues that humanity faces are no longer deemed “collateral” but crucial enough to consider the state of the planet as “broken.” Three years is too short a period to produce a significant change in the overall state of the biosphere. What has changed dramatically is the interpretation. Covid19 happened between the two statements, and it showed at the very least the fragility of human systems, induced into collapse by the tiniest of primeval life, as if our view of evolution had lost all meaning. Also, the lack of progress in tackling the “collateral” challenges of climate change and the rise of inequality, must have contributed to the shift in Guterres´ interpretation. His declarations show that our interpretation of reality is not a technical issue: it is a political act. None of the statements above is “fake news,” they give testimony to two different ways of thinking about the relationships among humans, with life at large and implicitly with time. Such an important shift in perception by the same person at two moments in time gives an idea of the breadth of variation possible if we were to take worldviews coming from different cultures and social circumstances. Together with many others, we state that the complexity, depth, and size of the challenges humanity faces today, are indeed of an existential, suicidal nature. They create widespread and growing anxiety about a deeply unknown future. Global health emergency and its economic and social consequences; growing inequalities leading to fragmentation and polarization; consumption of the future by an ever-increasing debt; climate emergency and loss of biodiversity; exhaustion of non-renewable resources; geopolitical tensions; technology-induced disruptions: the list of challenges is long and shows no sign of shrinking. Descriptions are provided in myriads of documents by UN organizations and advisory boards, governments, unions, think tanks, NGOs, and business associations. Most importantly, the convergence of many different crises disrupts the everyday life of billions of people who often feel helpless and incapable of shaping their own future. And the distribution of hardship is extremely unequal: while a few indulge themselves in the fantasies of space trips and digital immortality, half of the world population is literally struggling to meet the most basic needs [Wackernagel 2021; World Bank 2018]. We see this everywhere. The Trilemma of Modern Civilization Signals of the serious issues created by the course of the Modern industrial civilization have been with us for a while. They fed the intuitions of many authors ever since Modernity started, around the 18th century. In 1972 the Club of Rome published the best-selling report The Limits to Growth[Meadows et al. 1972], where a rigorous attempt at simulating multiple scenarios for the future of population, resources, production, and pollution led to the conclusion that in most of the trajectories considered (but not all), human civilizations would face collapse by

130  Further Critiques of Political Economy the middle of the 21st century. Later exercises in revisiting the hypotheses and checking what happened in the last 50 years are not comforting, to say the least [Herrington 2020; Turner 2014]. In response to this and other worrying signals, the UN crafted the concept of “Sustainable Development” [UN WCED 1987]. This was done without revisiting the intellectual foundations of “development” and Modernity, adding instead new dimensions to a conception otherwise focused on eternal growth and progress. Representations like Figure 9.1 became common in the literature of multilateral institutions and governments. This figure proposes a balance between the three fundamental dimensions of development, while previous frameworks were focused on economic development only. But the Economy, Society and the Environment appear as three different entities, quite distant from one another and represented in a way that ensures that the economy prevails. The subtext is that we should first care about the Economy, then if it grows enough, we can devote resources to social issues, and lastly address Ecological issues if possible. This is exactly what governments have been practicing for decades, not doing much for Society and the ecology unless the Economy grows fast as if Guterres´ qualification of these issues as “collateral” was correct. This is what we call the “separatist” manner of addressing Sustainable Development, for reasons explained later. More recently, a reformulation has emerged to take into account the concept of “planetary boundaries” [Rockström 2009]. The “People, Planet and Prosperity” (PPP) approach (Figure 9.2) aspires to build pathways serving all three elements at the same time and recognizes this requires substantial changes in regulations, technologies and, most importantly, social processes [Raworth 2017]. Both representations suggest that trade-offs have to be made in order to balance imperatives of a

Figure 9.1  The “separatist” view of Sustainable Development [Serageldin 1996]

Relational Approach to Political Economy  131

Figure 9.2  The rebalancing of Sustainable Development

different nature that human societies have to fulfil at the same time. Let us make this even more explicit, as in Figure 9.3. The ecological imperative is the most important in the long term, therefore we put it on top. We cannot escape the principles of life. We are not separated from nature that is giving us breath and food, and we cannot destroy the natural conditions that give and sustain life without dying in the process. On the other hand, the democratic imperative comes from our aspiration to be heard and belong, be treated with dignity and share a good life with our beloved ones. Contrary to the Western pretension to a universal concept of democracy, that aspiration can take many forms in different geographies and cultures. In

Figure 9.3  The trilemma of modern civilization

132  Further Critiques of Political Economy many indigenous cultures the ecological and democratic imperatives are indeed woven together since nature elements are considered as “nations.” History also shows that a society can be democratic inside its borders and behave brutally in the game of power between countries. The third imperative, the aspiration to affluence, derives from the way we relate to time, and how we make use of the heritage of the past to deal with future uncertainties. Heritage has multiple forms, including ancient wisdom, cultural and scientific knowledge, the institutions we created, and the infrastructures shaping where and how we live. As we will discuss, this third imperative is the most populated by blind spots. Dealing with the future seems to be linked—particularly in Modern secularized cultures—to the anticipation of suffering and death, and hence it creates the perfect locus for our fears. The evolution of human societies, at least during the period of Modernity, could be described by following the history of collective decisions giving predominance to one or the other of the three imperatives. During the whole period, the ecological imperative has been mostly ignored by industrializing societies. And the aspirations to affluence of the ruling elites have been combined (not without many struggles) with a growing respect for the democratic imperative within Western societies, at the same time that other nations were colonized and exploited, at a huge cost to the oppressed and for nature. The promotion of “democracy” under Western hegemony effectively served the colonial exploitation of resources in the rest of the world. Since the tipping point of the 1980s, the aspirations for private affluence morphed significantly. Within a culture where the status for social belonging is gained by material accumulation, the strong momentum of financialization spreading across all domains and borders transformed the longing for affluence into the individual aspiration for monetized “wealth.” And the role of diverse and pluriform heritage to provide for our well-being in the future has been overshadowed since money seems able to provide for everything. Moreover, the anxiety about the future so characteristic of Modernity fed the belief, deemed as “rational” but with no grounding on biophysical or social realities, that financial capital by itself entitles individuals to receive returns in the future. This built what we could call the rentier imperative, as the option of choice to deal with our concerns and fears. Individuals left alone in the pursuit of their own interests: this sounds as an exciting perspective of freedom for many, but destroying the social fabric has a high cost. We are going against the essence of life, which is only possible through extremely complex and dense webs of relationships. The mechanism of separation leading to extreme isolation is at the core of Modernity, as we will discuss later. And since the current formulation of “Sustainable Development” is based on our separation from nature and from other humans, we actually conceive it as a negotiation between the imperatives represented in Figure 9.3. The effects of not respecting the ecological imperative cannot be ignored anymore and huge amounts of debt are being fabricated to prevent the collapse of economies, hence the negotiation looks much harder. Austerity measures imposed after 2008 and the consequences of Covid have harmed the perspectives of millions of people everywhere, so much so that large segments of populations in industrialized countries perceive that their lives and those of their children will be worse in the future. For all the efforts by

Relational Approach to Political Economy  133 the elites to ensure that a trade-off between the three imperatives can be found and nobody will be left behind, people know better. Historical evidence attests to the reality that many have been often left behind. Fears of the future make political systems more fragile. Also, approaches like the tragedy of the commons [Hardin 1968] have fed since long the idea that taking care of ecosystems requires limiting human rights, and even to the racist view that the future of humanity is threatened by overpopulation in the “developing” world. The possibility of “eco-fascism” is unfortunately not to be discarded if we remain in the separatist framing of Modernity. More generally, since people perceive that sacrifices have to be made, it becomes usual to hear that authoritarian governments are better equipped than democratic ones to deal with current circumstances. A crucial question is what kind of cultural change we need to transcend these misleading and potentially dangerous manifestations of the trilemma of Modern civilization. Before responding to this, let us analyse the role of political economy, as it is predominantly practiced today, in creating the dead ends which Modernity is facing. What Is in a Name? A conventional definition of political economy would state that it addresses the conditions of production and trade of economic goods and services (including monetary policies and inflation), their relations with law and government and the distribution of national income and wealth. Historically, economic processes have been an object of attention for rulers since the beginning of human civilizations. The Code of Hammurabi (1750 BC) is full of economic injunctions. But the political economy of Modernity sets its own origins in the 18th century with the French “physiocrats” (Quesnay, Turgot), and the British thinkers, Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo. To date, the discipline pays little attention to non-Western worldviews from ancient and modern civilizations (Egypt, India, China,), not to talk about the traditional knowledge of indigenous cultures all over the world. The ambition of the discipline is very high. It considers itself the cornerstone of appropriate governance of society, providing “evidence-based” arguments to public policies. Different schools of thought propose different recipes, with special reference to the degree and ways of public intervention in the economy. But they share the idea that an optimal functioning of the economy is an essential part of good governance and societal evolution. In this sense, political economy is an integral part of the utopia of Modernity. It promises to provide an optimal administration of natural and human resources, in order to ensure welfare for all of humanity. The realization of that utopia is dependent on education, science, and technology, all “exogenous” factors for conventional economic thinking. Science and technology experienced an impressive process of expansion and self-reinforcing development since the dawn of the Modern era. Their outcomes have been used for large-scale exploitation and industrialization and created a new world, much more disconnected from “nature” and providing the material means for a more comfortable and longer life for many. In addition, some long-standing dreams were achieved, such as flying or looking at Earth from outer space. This narrative of knowledge, industrialization,

134  Further Critiques of Political Economy Table 9.1 The foundations of modern political economy Elements

Description

Individualism Assume that human societies are made of isolated individuals pursuing their own interests in competition with one another Comparison Apply comparative frames to many domains where it was not used before, and develop obsession with performance and optimization in all aspects of life, human-made or natural, regardless of context Productivity Give priority to the production of goods and services and its maximization, leading to the concept of productivity (with a narrow meaning) as the central tenet of most of economic thinking, and to the fantasy of unlimited growth Colonization Legitimize and institutionalize the colonizing mindset, through which a selfattributed sovereignty over others (humans and nature) is grounded on the possibility of superior productivity as the hallmark of progress Quantification Generalize measurement, quantification, and monetization, thus spreading the practice of assigning comparable valuations to (almost) everything Engine Assume "the economy" is a separate machine, acting as the engine at the core of human societies Capital Give a central role to the concept of capital, as the recipient of past achievements and expectations about future returns, and to its accumulation as the main instrument to ensure human welfare Abstraction Construct additional ways of labelling nature or human-made elements as "capital", regardless of their grounding in biophysical realities

accumulation, and welfare, is still strong today and feeds the dreams of billions, who do not yet have access to the amenities common in industrialized countries. But one needs to ask today if the negative consequences of Modernity could be defined as “collateral.” Are they not structural and direct consequences of the shortcomings of the intellectual and political framing of Modernity? Most importantly, how much of the good things can we keep in an ecologically unbalanced planet? Can we reconcile industrialization with a healthy biosphere? To start with, let us have a look at the foundations of mainstream schools of political economy in the context of Modernity. We present brief descriptions of what appears to us to be key elements of those foundations, in Table 9.1. Comparability, performance, productivity, capital, colonization, are all pursued in the name of progress. These concepts constitute the core of political economy today, so much so that they are taken for granted. Not even global crises are able to shaken their status: in response to the financial crisis in 2008–2011 and again during the Covid pandemic, pragmatism took the lead for a while by creating massive amounts of public money to keep the economy going. But the fundamentals have not been questioned. Responses to the self-inflicted challenges of humanity described in Sections 1 and 2 are framed within the same foundations. The dominant interpretation of Modernity tells a story of success created by the combination of this particular kind of economics, the politics of Western democracy, and the Scientific Revolution initiated in the 17th century, as if what we call “Enlightenment” broke with previous centuries of darkness. That story-telling is built on blind spots. For instance, it ignores how much Western science and technology are in debt with older developments: to

Relational Approach to Political Economy  135 name just two of them, China as the first industrial civilization on Earth, centuries before the West, or the Islamic Enlightenment initiated in the 14th century. To be fair, there is no doubt that the impressive technoscientific achievements of Modernity have been key to the intensification and expansion of economic processes through industrial means. But the cornerstone role of political economy is not built on science. Political economy inherited most of its epistemology from classical mechanics and still uses it today, while the discipline of physics learnt long ago about the limitations of classical mechanics and developed different paradigms of knowledge whenever they were needed. Political economy did not learn that lesson and, in our view, cannot address present challenges without a shift in sense-making. This is why we devote most of this text to shed light on the blind spots of Modernity, and not so much on contributing to existing schools of thought of political economy. Our focus is on making the point that political economy as it is framed today is blind to some fundamental issues and substantially different ways of thinking are required. At the core of that blindness is the unusual success of the concept of separation. Separation and Its Consequences There is enough reason to believe that we are witnessing the first civilizational collapse on a global scale, resulting from systemic failure in addressing our selfinflicted existential threats. Gregory Bateson famously said that: the major problems in the world are the result of the difference between how nature works, and the way people think. And Richard Feynman warned us that you cannot cheat nature. We take it for granted that the issues we face are linked to the limitations of our ways of thinking and of understanding our place in the world. We urgently need to start asking better questions if we want to facilitate the emergence of better responses, to ensure that human well-being be attuned to the health of the biosphere. Many fundamentals of the Scientific Revolution and the political economy born at the same time are based on separating what are inseparable realities. The separation of mind and matter (“dualism”), of the observer from the object observed (“objectivity”), and of reason from emotions (“rationalism”), are considered prerequisites of the scientific method. All of them are being questioned by science itself, but they nevertheless continue to frame our ways of thinking. The splitting of complex systems into pieces (“reductionism”) and the conception of society as a collection of separated individuals (there is no such thing as society, Thatcher dixit), remain common traits. Altogether they form a specific epistemology, a certain way of thinking about us and our place in the world. It is relevant to outline that the act of comparison which we mentioned among the foundations of political economy, requires an underlying separation. Not only are the objects separated and compared to each other, but also the objects themselves are separated from their own contexts. If we retain the whole contextual richness of any pair of human or natural events, it will be much harder to practice comparative valuations. We often need to compare for valid reasons, but life

136  Further Critiques of Political Economy is made of incommensurable manifestations. Assigning them comparable values, through monetization, is an act of radical decontextualization and reductionism to one dimension of infinitely complex phenomena. Decontextualization in turn paves the way for the claim of “universality,” a characteristic of post-“Enlightenment” Western thought in general, and of political economy. In essence, nothing can be universal if it does not ignore contextual circumstances. The argument for universality comes from science. It sounds like a powerful dream to figure out the “universal laws” in economics as we do in physics. The biophysical world shows indeed some regularities which look universal (e.g. the laws of gravity and thermodynamics), but thus far we have found an extremely limited set of them, always conditioned by their domain of applicability (different for classical mechanics than for quantum physics), and their tentative status (valid to the best of our knowledge until proven otherwise). At the same time, life thrives on radical diversity. Its actual forms are always local, derived from specific circumstances. Identifying certain regularities as universal does not imply that everything must fit in the frame of universality. We could be able to identify knowledge of universal value in the domain of matter and energy, but not in what pertains to forms, patterns, and communication [Bateson 1972]. Pluriversality of circumstances, perspectives, and behaviours might be the most universal trait of life, after all. The dominant framework of thinking craves universality. But there are good reasons to say that the universal is always the universal of somebody, as Barbara Cassin puts it. At the level of conscious thinking, our natural capacity for distinction (“I am different from you and other living beings and inanimate things”) tends to lead to separation ("I am an independent individual") and ultimately to the fantasy of exclusion (“I don´t need to care about what happens to you and others”). And if you don´t care about what happens to the rest of the world, you can easily label as “universal” what only happens to yourself! Such separatist framing has many consequences. At some point, it may have been useful to produce new knowledge, although the limitations of the mechanistic paradigm in physics became evident and led to the development of new perspectives, based on interdependency rather than separation. Separation creates an obsession with defining clear boundaries (between humans, aspects of life, countries, and so on). It is as if Western thinking developed an obsessive-compulsive disorder built on separation. The perception that society is made of isolated individuals necessarily creates a deep anxiety about our fundamental loneliness, a feeling that literally destroys life. Given that fear is the most overwhelming of our emotions, especially when combined with imagination, it is easy to follow the trail going from separation to the feeling of isolation, then to the acceptance that man is a wolf to man, a belief widespread in Western culture but not in others. The logical outcome is the idea that we compete for scarce resources, hence we (wrongly) identify competition as the main driver of natural evolution and social life. The perception of scarcity created by competition drives our fearful obsession with individual performance and accumulation. Scarcity combined with the promise of material abundance for high-performing individuals, is indeed a

Relational Approach to Political Economy  137 schizophrenic combination that captures our social attention, and, how we define success in life. The whole process is performative and self-reinforcing. As in the case of the prisoner´s dilemma, the best collective option is to be generous and collaborate. But if we believe that the rest of the people are selfish, most of the time we choose the selfish option, which pays off for the selfish prisoner if the other is generous, but overall, it is always worse for the collective. This is how the misleading idea of the tragedy of the commons is validated ex ante. Our obsession with scarcity is deeply rooted in the woundedness of lonely souls, constantly reinforced by the dominant traits of Modern culture. Everything Crucial Is Outside Robert Kennedy famously said that GDP measures everything except what makes life worthwhile and Simon Kuznets himself, who initiated the computation of GDP in the USA in the 1930s, stated that The welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income as defined by GDP. There should be nothing surprising in that their statements are vividly demonstrated today, yet consistently ignored. The Economy conceives of itself as separate from Society and the Environment, as we saw in Section 2. Mainstream economics only cares about a limited set of topics: prices, market conditions, capital investments, macroeconomic imbalances, monetary policies, and trade agreements. It does so by leaving outside of its scope of analysis the most crucial manifestations of humanity, such as love, friendship, art, spirituality, and all kinds of cultural expressions. And by pretending to be scientific and hence free from ideological biases, it also throws politics and power structures out of its reflections. Economics literally says it can identify an optimal way to conduct the economy and this should be protected from the influence of politicians and democratic debate (as implemented f.i. in the status of independence of central banks in many industrialized countries). But how could any “optimal” way be found to conduct the economy when most of what makes us human is left outside? The response from mainstream economics is very clear in Figure 9.1 above: first we must ensure that the economic machine works well and produces “Sustainable Growth, Capital and Efficiency” before we can take care of anything else. Unless making big money as some superstars do, art is just decoration, economy-wise. Exit Schubert. The same with love, unless it is the object of monetary transactions, whether through prostitution (now included in GDP) or in paid digital services in the new universe of the end of love[Illouz 2019]. But can we have a healthy economy without considering human motivations? This is exactly what economics pretends is possible by leaving out any serious reflection on human aspirations and how they are conceived in different cultures and contexts. So, the mainstream political economy fails what should be its very purpose. It proposes the fantasy of “homo economicus,” the nowhere to be seen purely rational actor taking decisions based on computations of risks and opportunities, and in doing that it skips saying anything about what is most important. In its framing not only art and love

138  Further Critiques of Political Economy are decoration, but human well-being is also irrelevant if it does not fit with the maximization of production (and hence of consumption) and with capital accumulation. If this does not match your ideas about well-being, you must not be a Modern human! Even more, the political economy admits it needs “exogenous shocks” to keep the economy going in the direction of growth and accumulation of capital. Unless something new, coming from outside the economy, creates additional sources of “value,” the economic machine based on separation and competition exhausts itself. Historically the main sources of economic growth have been the colonization of “new” territories (only new to the colonizers, not to their inhabitants), the development of technological innovation to facilitate the exploitation of resources and territories, and a combination of both, i.e., the creation of tech-based territories like the cyberspace. So, economics pretends to have superior knowledge for purposes of unlimited growth and welfare, but it needs politicians, soldiers, lawyers, scientists, and technicians, all of them using non-economic capacities, to actually manufacture the growth it promised. Also, when things really get bad, orthodoxy is abandoned, pragmatism is called to the stage, and politicians decide to create huge amounts of money to keep the economy going. Does the central role of political economy in government make any real sense? In the Blind Our frameworks of interpretation, through which we give meaning to our perceptions of reality, are riddled with blind spots. A frequent one is to believe that we don´t have blind spots, or that science is already taking care of them. It is possible to combat this one by asking better questions. Many blind spots correspond to unknown unknowns, what we even don´t know that we don´t know, and there is little we can do in this respect. We cannot plan for systematic discovery of unknown unknowns. But more blindness comes from what we already know and yet have not yet learned. As the Spanish saying goes: there is no blindness worse than not willing to see. For instance, if we take capital as the origin of all wealth, it will be difficult to see that life (in the wide sense of the term) is the origin of all wealth. Many blind spots and inconsistencies of mainstream political economy have been abundantly documented in the literature, mostly by non-dominant schools of thought [Sapir 2000]. Just to mention two of them:

• the irrationality of assuming that we make our decisions as rational “homo eco-

nomicus,” i.e., by weighting quantitative measures of risks and opportunities to compute the best option; • the enduring life of the General Equilibrium paradigm, built on hypotheses which are false and not even approximations of reality, the crucial flaw being that we humans, our organizations, and life at large, are always dynamic and far from equilibrium. An obvious blind spot of political economy, of the voluntary kind mentioned above, is the degradation of the biosphere produced by the economic processes

Relational Approach to Political Economy  139 of Modernity. As Nicholas Stern put it, Climate change is the greatest market failure the world has seen. And yet climate is only one manifestation of that degradation. In line with the Modern way of thinking, we put climate change in a box separated from the boxes of biodiversity, social inequalities, or geopolitical imbalances, as if they were not intimately intertwined. Some schools of thought (such as feminist and indigenous economics) started looking at the epistemic foundations of political economy to identify the sources of blind spots. This promising endeavour is given little space though: if we do not hear much from them because we pay too much attention to the mainstream, how can we learn something new? Fortunately, perceptions change and interpretations are more fragile than we think: when facing truly critical situations we are able to learn fast, as Covid-19 showed eloquently. The pandemic by itself did not change our epistemology, though. It probably opened many minds to uncomfortable questions, a first step to go deeper into the inconsistencies of our ways to relate to other humans, to life, and to time. We mention here a few more blind spots of political economy as it is still practiced. “Value creation” comes from acts of power. As shown in Figure 9.4, financial “wealth” is no more a consequence of the production of monetized goods and services: its growth is three times faster than that of GDP. And that pattern was established before the crises of 2008 and Covid-19. The only explanation is to assume that most of the assets created are fictitious, a consequence of the exercise of economic power without any relation to the “real” economy and much less to biophysical realities. But fictitious capital claims for real benefits over time become a heavy burden on the aspects of the economy critical to human and natural

Figure 9.4  The evolution of world financial assets compared to GDP

140  Further Critiques of Political Economy metabolism. Our economic systems have become addicted to the creation of debt (considered as assets by the creditors), and hence are burning not only fossil fuels but also the least renewable of all resources: time of humans in the future. Craving instability. Governments and economic actors call for macroeconomic stability in order to fuel economic development, while most of the “value creation” depends today on higher and higher levels of instability [Klein 2008]. The dominance of derivatives over the financial sphere and hence over the economy ensures that disasters and tragedies produce huge amounts of “wealth,” mostly captured by a few. Climate change is now considered as a big business opportunity. Questioning how disasters could create inequitable “wealth” is not only a matter of justice: it also sheds light on the growing disconnection between a strongly financialized economy and the conditions nurturing human life on Earth. What “value” can come from that? Perception of scarcity: mainstream political economy rejects the existence of the limits to growth [Meadows 1972] but builds its apparatus on the notion of scarcity of resources: what a paradox! It makes people dream of abundance in a horizon ever to come, while keeping them in competition every day. Scarcity and abundance are a matter of perception: scarcity is a cornerstone of Modern thought, whatever the level of “development” of a society and is not less acutely felt in GDP-wise “rich” countries than in “poor” countries. On the contrary, traditional African cultures are built on a perception of abundance [Biko 2019]. The belief in eternal growth, coupled with the denial of sufficiency, is indeed a sign of addiction: we know the lie, but we cannot live without it. Capital is possibly the biggest blind spot of all, especially because it is constantly invoked and given multiple labels (financial, technical, human, natural, etc.). The concept is originally grounded in living processes: land can constantly produce resources useful to humans and hence feeds the idea that future returns can be expected. But this does not happen magically, it requires the contributions of the sun, water, wind, and soil materials, i.e., exactly the Four Elements of ancient traditions. Modern legal practices attach some strong privileges to capital and make the concept more and more abstract and disconnected from its biophysical context. Productivity is invoked to legitimize processes of “enclosure,” of land first and then of corporations, debt, and multiple forms of intellectual property [Pistor 2019]. Ultimately the creation of capital becomes an act of faith and power, as sacred and mysterious as possible in political economy, by which almost anything can be legally labelled as “capital” and still carry with it the aura of expecting returns, without anything justifying it from the biophysical point of view. In the political economy of Modernity capital plays the role of a totem, without recognising it is so. In a way, it is a legally encoded violation of the second principle of thermodynamics, or if you prefer, a legal exhortation to the impossible existence of the Perpetuum Mobile. Our Modern societies obscure at their core what science has already illuminated. Technomimesis: getting rid of humans. Technology is the standard response of Modernity to any issue. It is expected to deliver solutions to all our problems. But can it work against the limitations of its own framing? Based on a culture of

Relational Approach to Political Economy  141 separation, innovation is contributing to the destruction of social fabric and creating more inequality, dehumanization, and a greater distance between the artificial creation of financial wealth, on one side, and social and biophysical realities on the other. This reinforces rising trends of anxiety and competition. Even beyond these consequences, it is interesting to note that technology acts as a mirror through which we think we can see ourselves as similar to the machines we build. We first applied the metaphor of mechanical artifacts to everything, including the organization of society. Nowadays, the same is happening with computational artifacts: we must be like computers, although imperfect because we are driven by irrational emotions. The subtext in “Artificial Intelligence” is that people are problematic, and our technical creations can be “better” than ourselves. A terrible blind spot comes with it: our most “advanced” technology tells us we can, and we should get rid of humans. In the self-defeating process of human civilizations, it could be that ecological catastrophes combine with radical robotization in the ultimate achievement: the effective destruction of ecosystems and humanity, at the same time. Map and territory. Blind spots reveal the distance between a representation of the world and real life. Political economy, as an area of study, can of course produce valuable knowledge. An old modelling adage says that all models are wrong, some are useful, so the issue is not the distance per se between the territory and the map, this being necessarily reductionistic. But the divorce between what really happens and the intentions of dominant economic thinking might have reached a critical point. Earthquakes (in literal or figurative sense) create “wealth” through magical sleights of hands. The future is consumed to keep the present going. This reminds of Alice in Wonderland running faster and faster to stay exactly at the same point. Most importantly, the assumptions listed in Table 9.1 are human constructs, historically and politically determined, of limited applicability to understand how life works. They make us blind to life as a complex process of ecosystemic evolution, and hence impede our search for ways of human well-being within a healthy biosphere. This is true for all schools of economic thinking sharing a mechanistic perspective of the economy as the “engine” of society and the notion that societies are made of isolated individuals. Since time has come for a paradigm shift [Kuhn 1962], should we try to put inside political economy what we know about living systems? Trying to infuse life again in the concepts of Table 9.1 might lead to a gigantic botch. But in any case, Modern political economy is not even trying. Governments, central and private banks, corporations, and multilateral institutions continue to use the same lenses to define what is “human development” and prescribe how it should be achieved, imposing policies within and beyond borders. We know our lenses are no longer useful to map the territory: they only map the map itself! But we have replaced the uncomfortable exploration of the territory with the cozy exercise of making collateral amendments to the known imperfections of the map. With all due respect to blind people, who develop extraordinary capacities to sense reality despite impaired vision, one cannot help remembering the outstanding painting by Pieter Brueghel the Younger (Figure 9.5). Will we be able to get out of our row of blindness before it is too late?

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Figure 9.5  Peter Brueghel the Elder “The Parable of the Blind”

Why Still Reigning? If Modern political economy is so weak in dealing with the negative consequences of the worldview it helped to create, why is it still reigning over public debates and collective decisions? Why is it so successful in framing any alternative as conducive to the loss of both freedom and welfare? How could Modernity be so effective in creating such a huge and accelerating disruption of everything, landscapes, ecosystems, and human societies altogether? All existing systems tend to be persistent but there seems to be something specific to Modernity making it more resilient than other human configurations. Ultimately, is there a way to escape from the scenario of civilizational collapse other than trading off between the three imperatives described in Section 2? Many of the critiques of Modernity and its consequences point to the extremely unequal distribution of power it created as an explanation for its capacity for action, self-justification, and resistance to change. And the accumulation of power is self-reinforcing: the more you have, the easier it gets to have more. People in power have access to legal, financial, intellectual, and psychological instruments, and ultimately to physical coercion, to convince the majority of humanity that trying anything different from status quo is nonsense. And they most often succeed in that task. For anyone willing to engage into real transformations of any kind, the imperialism of the present is heavy: the asymmetry between momentum for change and the capacities accessible to elites to prevent it creates an effective sense of helplessness (TINA: there is no alternative, as Margaret Thatcher put it). But if power is the disease, what is the remedy? The history of political revolutions

Relational Approach to Political Economy  143 in the era of Modernity does not provide a clear and comforting response. The often-tragic imbalance between expectations and outcomes contributes to scepticism even among those who would gain the most from power shift. The idea of replacing those in power has been tested several times but, as far as the dominance of Modernity is concerned, it does not guarantee a deep transformation. Karl Deutsch said that Power is the ability not to have to learn anything. And today´s Nigerian writer, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, explains that Power is the ability not just to tell the story of another person but to make it the definitive one. The exceptional strength of Modernity might come from its capacity to learn whatever needs to be learned without questioning the foundations of its own storytelling. As discussed, one of them is the principle of separation and exclusion. When we label somebody (the elites in power or “capitalists”) as responsible for the tensions and tragedies created by Modernity, we might be factually accurate but we still practice that separatist principle. A framing such as “us vs them” leads to binary dilemmas: incumbent thinking responds that anything which is not capitalism is communism, implying everybody would be less free and less prosperous and effectively blocking explorations beyond Modernity´s limitations. Blaming “capitalism” might make sense and comfort our feelings, but Modernity has repeatedly shown its ability to replace elites in power without really shaking its own fundamentals. On the other hand, while considered by many as the response par excellence, technological revolutions are not fundamentally changing the patterns of our self-destructive path. They have rather accelerated them [Alvarez Pereira 2019]. Negative consequences of Modernity are identified but labelled as “collateral” effects to be corrected, and “solutions” are investigated within the same framework. Since the social roles of science and technology are framed in a way consistent with dominant thinking, they also contribute to the persistence of the status quo. At the same time, “innovation” has made change the most permanent trait of Modern societies. “New” is the magic word all around to substitute for a fundamental change of the self-destructive patterns we seem captured by. Many and quick changes happen, yet are we not in a trap in which, to use the words of Tomasi di Lampedusa, everything has to be changed in order not to change anything? Is the maelstrom of change in which we live anything else than a gridlock at high speed? Upton Sinclair evoked our mental processes when he said long ago that it is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon not understanding it. Many alternative thinkers and movements have rightly pointed to the essential role of cultural change in shifting societal arrangements. The cause and achievements of women´s liberation all over the world is probably the best example of deep and positive change, bringing with it hope for the future. But what kind of cultural change is needed to free us from the addiction to Modernity and create the equity in human well-being that a healthy biosphere requires? It seems we need to understand better the mechanisms through which Modernity is able to learn and not to learn, at the same time. In our hypothesis, these mechanisms have evolved in such a way that it has led to the constitution of a self-reinforcing loop, as represented in Figure 9.6.

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Figure 9.6  The self-reinforcing loop of modernity

Figure 9.6 is a simplistic representation: it isolates the different elements represented and sets them in a linear sequence which overall feeds into itself as a feedback loop. Things happen in a more confusing manner, but two traits are relevant. The first is that there is indeed an overall self-reinforcing loop explaining the enduring and exponential nature of Modernity, and the presence of all elements indicated in the graph is critical. A second caveat is that the constitution of this loop of Modernity is not the result of a conspiracy by a small group of powerful men against the rest of humanity, it is rather the outcome of myriads of concurrent processes, from which a sophisticated mechanism of self-preservation of the status quo has emerged over time. The beneficiaries of this mechanism are of course a small group of privileged people, so in practical terms the whole thing might look like the result of a conspiracy, but this explanation misses the systemic nature of this self-reinforcing loop, which is crucial. The key point is how Modernity reacts to disruptions coming from the tensions and tragedies caused by incumbent political and economic processes. These could be opportunities for learning, in the sense of modifying structural patterns. Though, as any incumbent system does, a first reaction is to simply ignore the challenge: many tragedies are not recognized until much after they happened. At this point, they can be formulated as something of the past and co-opted into the language of today. All Western societies are nowadays officially against racism and colonization and make solemn statements about their own histories. Many acknowledge the guilt for the colonial and racist past in a way that does not compromise the current situation. The subtext is that the colonial past did not significantly contribute to shaping the present.

Relational Approach to Political Economy  145 This is a first level of disconnection—the integration of past tragedies is done in a way which does not invalidate the present and the future and hence does not disrupt the foundations of Modernity. A relevant example is that of the financial debt of Africa and the Global South at large. History of colonization is recognized but this recognition does not move multilateral institutions to realize that the debt written in books would have an opposite sign without that colonial past and the neo-colonial present [Mostert 2021]. The same mechanism of disconnection of past from present and future is used in the COP Paris Agreement on climate change. The elephant in the room is the huge imbalance in the responsibility for past industrialization based on fossil fuels and how that process created a wrong model of “development” for the whole world. Without talking to this elephant, all COP meetings will fall below expectations. The tragedy of Covid 19 could not be ignored. However, it has been addressed through a mix of disconnection (isolating people from each other) and technical fixes at individual level (through the development of vaccines). From the point of view of public health this was probably the most sensible path to follow, but a deeper reflection on, and learning about the conditions making possible the emergence of Covid 19 and the global collapse it created, is mostly missing. Aspirations to “build back better” are framed in a way that avoids questioning the destruction of ecosystems as a central and structural feature of “development.” Additional layers of technology and bureaucracy are imposed to better control Covid-like disruptions in the future. Being human is made more difficult by the responses to Covid, instead of inquiring if reconnecting humans to themselves and nature could help in avoiding future Covid scenarios. Modernity is particularly effective in reframing the consequences of the tensions and tragedies it causes in a way that science and technology seem capable to respond to them [Boltanski & Chiapello 1999]. This effectiveness (of which the development of Covid-19 vaccines in almost no time is the latest example), is the argument per excellence to defend the pertinence of Modernity, also because it combines techno-scientific responses with a business orientation. This is where the central role of instability is revealed: every tragedy is reframed as a business opportunity for now and the future (“green growth” is an excellent example). But this requires further and further commitments to deliberate blindness. We see the opportunity of capitalizing new legal and technological responses while we pretend not to see that existing “wealth” should be massively written off. Ignoring the consequences of the past can only be done at the expense of burning the future through massive rounds of money creation to keep the system running. At this stage, how is it still possible to give an economic value to assets dependent on fossil fuels? But we ignore this question to create “value” linked to renewable energies without disrupting the fundamentals of “capital” and Modernity. We are proud for good reasons of all the knowledge we have developed in the last centuries. How much of that truly legitimizes the foundations of Modern political economy listed in Table 9.1? Not much, if we consider that modern science has either invalidated or questioned those foundations, which are mostly of a political nature. But they still shape our responses to crises. The prestige of

146  Further Critiques of Political Economy science is hacked to justify the social processes through which science and technology are framed and made to deliver responses compatible with the foundations of Modernity. Science itself is not to blame here, it is rather the history of how scientific inquiry and technological innovation have been designed to work, in a manner largely driven by military, command, and control purposes, i.e., as part of the apparatus of expansive Modernity in action. Still today, science and technology are largely developed and used for military and security purposes, always justified by the emergence of new risks and fears. These new risks are consequences of the additional layers of abstraction, disconnection, and fragmentation produced by the responses to crises. In 1971, the Nixon Administration decided to address the crisis of the Bretton Woods system by terminating the convertibility of the US dollar to gold. That was the starting point of a new era in which the combination of political decisions with the expansion of digital technologies made possible the creation of the huge, financialized space, assumed as free from any direct connection to biophysical realities, in which our economies live today. This is just an example of how crises are interpreted in a way leading to further levels of abstraction and disconnection from life, and then to a formulation of “problems” for which science and technology are called upon to design “solutions” avoiding a deeper learning. And we kick the can down the road again. Modernity is excellent at creating levels of abstraction and virtual realities: this avoids the need to respond to crises at the original biophysical and societal levels where they were produced. It is for these reasons that our responses to crises do not contribute to our reconnection with ourselves and the ecosystems of which we are part, i.e., to life at large. This is not the way to get out of the war we are waging on nature (and hence on ourselves) that Antonio Guterres speaks about. Relational Learning If societal systems built on the foundations of Modernity are only able to learn whatever reinforces their own foundations, we face a daunting challenge. How do we create conditions for the kind of learning that addresses the blind spots of Modernity? What would such a process look like? The case for energy transition offers a good example to understand what we are missing. There is a large consensus that shifting from fossil fuels to renewable energies (wind, solar, etc) is required if we pretend to abate greenhouse gas emissions. But this challenge can be formulated in different ways, leading to different levels of learning. For now, it is mostly assumed that the transition should be a technical shift, substituting some sources of energy by others, without questioning how much consumption is required for human well-being, or rather assuming that wellbeing requires a growing amount of energy consumption per capita. Within that logic, it would be a matter of investments and economic incentives to achieve the energy transition. But what if that logic has a huge blind spot? Whatever the artificial sources of energy we consider, if we take for granted that well-being is dependent on ever-growing levels of consumption per capita, humanity is

Relational Approach to Political Economy  147 doomed anyway, since “renewable” is not a fully accurate label for sources of energy that also depend on non-renewable resources such as rare earth minerals [Valero& Valero 2015]. A different way of questioning our energy needs points to the decoupling of consumption from human well-being. This would imply that once a certain level of infrastructure is reached, the progress of societies would no longer need growing material throughput per capita and human “development” (whatever that could mean) would continue without increasing energy consumption. This promising perspective faces several obstacles. The first, is that most of the world is still far from that level where decoupling is expected to start. The second is that decoupling is anyway not happening in a systemic manner, even in countries with well-developed infrastructures [Fletcher & Rammelt 2017]. Decoupling is probably unachievable if we do not reformulate the question in a different manner: what drives human health and well-being? Is it energy consumption? The obsession of Modernity with the maximization of production has made us lose sight of the fact that well-being is not driven by material prosperity, especially if GDP and inequality grow at the same time [Wilkinson & Pickett 2019]. Moreover, modern science has rediscovered an eternal truth—our health and sense of a meaningful life and hence of well-being is driven by the quality of our relationships with others—humans and non-humans[Mineo 2017]. This crucial point is among others outside the realm of mainstream political economy—the discipline cannot see it. But it opens the door to start imagining another way of learning, in which relationships and interdependencies would play the dominant role. Regarding the basic metabolism of Modern societies, we continue to be stuck in the fixed response (“fossil fuels”) that we learned around a century ago, while we struggle to learn a different response of the same type (“renewables”) and promote a reframing of the question itself (“decoupling”). But we need to learn at an ecosystemic level, which is where we can reconnect with our fundamentally relational nature. Note that “ecosystemic” does not mean “global” at all, rather the contrary: that level is fractal, ecosystems are present at all scales, and manifestations of life are always local, hence creativity should be allowed to follow suit. Instead of abiding by the separatist framing of Modernity, we should cross borders, start repairing artificially broken interdependencies, learn the (re-)emergence of relationships, and regenerate ecosystems, and in that way give renewed meaning to what we already know. Along these lines, Table 9.2 intends to confront the elements of mainstream political economy (as described in Table 9.1), by proposing first sketches of what could be the fundamentals of a “relational political economy,” yet to be developed. This proposal is just a starting point. Our economic processes need to make sense again within the logic of life. We do not know and most probably cannot know the logic of life in its entirety, but we know enough to be sure we are not going in the right direction, and that we are even running faster and faster towards nowhere. Reconnection, heritage, diversity, weaving, and vitality seem to provide good sparks to ask better questions and learn responses more attuned to life.

148  Further Critiques of Political Economy Table 9.2 The foundations of a "relational political economy" Mainstream political economy (see Table 1)

Relational political Description economy

Individualism

Interdependencies

Comparison

Contextualization

Productivity

Health of relationships

Colonization

Vitality and creativity Diversity beyond measure

Quantification Engine

Weaving for life

Capital

Heritage

Abstraction

Reconnection

Consider human societies at all scales as evolutionary ecosystems: evolution and creativity are made possible by the interdependencies Consider and respect the local nature and contextual richness of all manifestations of life. Promote trans contextual pollination rather than "scaling up" Give priority to the health of relationships as the best guarantee of well-being, also leading to the material sufficiency compatible with the health of ecosystems Decolonize mindsets. Respect and get attuned to the vitality of ecosystemic processes Develop assessment techniques supporting relationships, vitality, and diversity, rather than separation, extraction, and uniformity Consider that economic processes are part of the web of life and depend on our worldviews and values, framed by history and culture Consider life as the origin of all wealth. Replace "capital" by "heritage" to make clear it has multiple expressions, it is pluriversal and fragile, and it requires care Reverse mechanisms allowing for the disconnection of economy from biophysical realities, and organize the shift from financialized abstractions to life-driven valuations

Towards Relational Well-Being: The Society of Living Modernity is resilient because it always proposes the easy “solution”: avoid facing the origin of our fears. It builds layers and layers of cheating into social constructs to avoid recognizing the consequences of past tragedies. Therefore, it requires unlimited growth, the hubris of a runaway society, to hide the sleight of hands in dreams of prosperous futures. We see this happening again after Covid-19. Vaccines make it possible to skip the deeper question: if we know so little about the most primitive fragments of life, it is because we know very little about life itself, and how to take care of it. Besides the satisfaction from the development of vaccines, we should have the humility to recognize that ancient cultures had more respect and a better understanding of ecosystems than ours. They were better prepared to face the origin of our fears. Not facing these does not provide true relief. Modern societies, for all their sophistication, continue to be a permanent hotbed of anxiety. There is much more than an epistemological mistake here. We are not becoming a learning society, with a real capacity to modify our suicidal course. Doing

Relational Approach to Political Economy  149 so requires addressing our blind spots and dramatically changing our learning processes [Alvarez Pereira 2021], their stages, roles, and ways of exchange and evaluation. To start with, we need to recognize that learning implies changing (not just understanding something at a rational level), and that it is always mutual and contextual [Bateson 2016]. Also, we need to accept that the path forward is one of radical exploration rather than implementation of known recipes. And for that, we need to trust the fundamental humanity of everybody, including those whose behaviour we do not appreciate or understand, rather than deepen our practices of separation and fragmentation. In a relational political economy, reconnecting means creating safe spaces for conversations among people as people (not as stakeholders), building and enriching relationships, and co-creating new responses to challenges. Doing otherwise is to continue feeding our suicidal runaway course. Everyday economic processes go on pursuing more material and monetary throughputs and more profits. Many sources of inertia are on the side of this clear goal, including the belief that the clarity of conscious purpose and path forward is a good thing. But life has no purpose that we could describe with words: its purpose and meaning is life itself, now and in the future. If our “economy” continues destroying more life than it creates, humanity will exit Earth in a miserable manner, no matter how long it will take for life to regenerate the planet without us. The “Society of Living” is just a provocative evocation of something different, in which we take care again of our relationships with humans, with life at large, and with time [Alvarez Pereira 2016]. While this resonates with the trinity of Figure 9.3, it is a manner of saying the same thrice. All our relationships happen in time, and we cannot be true to other humans while destroying nature. Provided we understand that well-being comes from taking care of all others, because this means taking care of ourselves, we will be able to face our fears and dissolve the trilemma of Modern civilization. All this may sound too feeble and abstract, especially when confronting the weight of dominant thinking. But there is nothing more practical than changing the way we think. As Nelson Mandela said, it always seems impossible until it is done. This is not the place to develop a program of action for the transition to a relational political economy (and society). Concrete ideas exist for transforming “capital” into something closer to what we call “heritage” [Lietaer 2011; Pistor 2019]. But they will not be heard until conditions change for people to liberate their potential to ask better questions and to learn by themselves. The Music of Weaving

But where the danger is, also grows the saving power. Let us bet that Hölderlin was right. If so, we must be getting closer to salvation. Where will it come from? Maybe from where everything began, the Mother Continent. Despite colonization, Ubuntu and its cultural peers are still alive in Africa. They provide a solid foundation for a relational worldview. What needs to emerge from all our emergencies might be the weaving of many ancient wisdoms together with life-inspired modern science beyond disciplines [Goodchild 2021]. And what if this process only could happen beyond conscious reasoning? Donella Meadows titled her last paper Dancing with

150  Further Critiques of Political Economy Systems[Meadows 2002]. Aurelio Peccei called for a Human Revolution, a massive shift in mindsets [Peccei & Ikeda 1984]. Our words are powerful, but not as much as our deeper connection to the natural patterns of life. A musical interpretation is never just a superposition of voices following scripted scores. Even with centuries-old compositions already interpreted thousands of times, music is always a magic of the instant. It happens in between the scores, the instruments, the interpreters, and the public. It is individual and collective at the same time, the most natural form of resonance and weaving. The footprints of lively futures might be found in the ignored tragedies of the past, through acts of weaving together destroyed interdependencies. That weaving requires its own pace, rhythm, and melodies. Maybe it needs to be inaudible for a long time before emerging [Bateson 2021]. Maybe the Human Revolution is already here, invisible in plain sight, inaudible for many and yet alive. It might have the form of what Karima Kadaoui calls a silent melody. Do you hear it?

Acknowledgment This work would not have seen the light without a great number of inspiring conversations with Aude Chesnais, Karima Kadaoui, Nadia Sandi, and Samantha Suppiah, and the invaluable and relentless support by Mamphela Ramphele. My deep gratitude to all of them for their insights and generosity. References Adorno T.A. (1928–1962) “Musikalische Schriften”. French edition “Moments musicaux”, Éditions Contrechamps, June 2017. Personal translation of the quote. Alvarez Pereira C. (2016) “Towards a Society of Living”. Eruditio, vol. 2, no. 2, 72–101.

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152  Further Critiques of Political Economy Sapir J. (2000) Les trous noirs de la science économique: Essai sur l´impossibilité de penser le temps et l´argent. Ed. Albin Michel. Serageldin I. (1996) Sustainability and the Wealth of Nations: First Steps in an Ongoing Journey. World Bank. Turner G. (2014) “Is Global Collapse Imminent? An Updated Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Historical Data”. Research Paper No. 4, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, University of Melbourne. UN World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future. Oxford University Press. Valero A., Valero A. (2015) Thanatia. The Destiny of the Earth´s Mineral Resources. World Scientific. Wackernagel, M. et al. (2021) “The Importance of Resource Security for Poverty Eradication”. Nature Sustainability, vol. 4, 731–738. https://doi​.org​/10​.1038​/s41893​ -021​-00708​-4. Wilkinson R., Pickett K. (2019) The Inner Level: How More Equal Societies Reduce Stress, Restore Sanity and Improve Everyone's Well-Being. Penguin Press. World Bank (2018) Piecing Together the Poverty Puzzle. Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report 2018. World Bank Group.

10 Creative Contributions to Critiques of Political Economy and Moral Economy Cooperative Settlement and Utopian Community Projects as Modes of Conviviality for Thoreau, Ruskin, Tolstoy, and Gandhi Christian Bartolf, Dominique Miething, and Vishnu Varatharajan Attempts at establishing cooperative settlement and utopian community projects in the nineteenth century help us to understand concepts of Transcendentalist thinkers and utopian socialists. These concepts, in turn, crystallized in communal land ownership based on the principles of equality, simple living, and trusteeship. We aim to demonstrate how certain farming community examples from English and North American (Curl 2009) history became relevant for the social and political thought of their contemporaries such as Thoreau, Tolstoy, Ruskin, Gandhi, and Kumarappa. Whereas the Welsh textile manufacturer and founder of Utopian socialism and cooperative movements, Robert Owen, gained reputation not only because of introducing the eight-hour day at his textile mill at New Lanark, Scotland, but also because of his experimental community (1825–1827) at New Harmony, Indiana, we find real precursors embodying the principles of Tolstoy and Gandhi, who lived close to the US Transcendentalist community in Concord, Massachusetts. A key group involved in the formation of an English vegetarian society in 1847 were supporters of the Alcott House in Ham Common, near Richmond, Surrey, England, the home of a Utopian community (1838–1848) founded by James Pierrepont Greaves (1777–1842), whose major influences were the US transcendentalist Amos Bronson Alcott (1799–1888) and the Swiss pedagogue Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827). One of the followers was Charles Lane (1800– 1870), who aimed at producing the most lovely, intelligent, and efficient conditions for divine progress in humanity on the basic principles of vegetarianism, celibacy, and simple living. The Alcott House became the home of The Concordium, a cooperative vegetarian community and progressive school for children. Greaves joined Pestalozzi in 1818 at Yverdon, a municipality in the Swiss Jura region, where he taught English and met fellow socialist Robert Owen. Greaves founded a philosophical society in 1836, the Aesthetic Society, meeting at a house in Camden. Greaves not only followed the ideas of Jacob Böhme (1575–1624) and German Romanticism but was also a teetotaller and a vegetarian experimenting with natural cures by bathing in spring water. Furthermore, he recommended a fruitarian diet consisting of fruits, nuts, and vegetables.

DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-13

154  Further Critiques of Political Economy Charles Lane was a voluntaryist, advocating self-ownership and non-aggression. Lane was the main founder of Fruitlands (Francis 2010), a transcendentalist experiment in community living in the 1840s, and himself a vegan. He collaborated with Amos Bronson Alcott, a leading transcendentalist in the circle of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) and Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862), a teacher and member of the New England Non-Resistance Society along with William Lloyd Garrison (1805–1879). Fruitlands (1843–1844) was a utopian agrarian commune in Harvard, Massachusetts, an account of which is found in the book “Transcendental Wild Oats” by Amos Bronson’s daughter Louisa May Alcott (1832–1888). Amos Bronson Alcott and Lane conceived of private property in similar terms as the self-sufficient Shakers, who traded handmade goods for coffee, tea, and milk. But Alcott and Lane rid their diet of animal products and stimulants. A precursor of Fruitlands was another transcendentalist community founded by Unitarian minister George Ripley and his wife Sophia Ripley (1802–1880 and 1803–1861) at the Ellis Farm in West Roxbury, Massachusetts, near Boston: Brook Farm (1841–1847). The Ripleys were involved in “Associationism,” a utopian socialist economic theory. Simple association, according to Charles Fourier (1772– 1837), was based on the cooperative enterprise of artisans or farmers (Fourier 1971). Wage labour would be abolished. Brook Farm, formally referred to as Brook Farm Institute of Agriculture and Education, was one of more than 30 Fourierist associations in the United States between 1843 and 1845. The Fourierists succeeded the Owenists between 1825 and 1827, while antedating Icarianists between 1848 and 1898 and Bellamyists between 1889 and 1896. The Ripley’s farm was founded as a joint stock company, where workers shared the profits equally. The Brook Farmers adopted a model based on the Fourierist concept called phalanstery (phalanstère, Fourier’s own combination of the French words phalange [phalanx] and monastère [monastery]). Another founding member of Brook Farm was the famous writer and one of the most prominent US transcendentalists Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804–1864) of Concord, Massachusetts. Worth mentioning is the Hopedale Community (1843–1867), in Milford, Massachusetts, founded by the philosopher of Christian non-resistance and a member of the New England Non-Resistance Society Adin Ballou (1803– 1890), whose community stood for abolitionism, women’s rights, and temperance. The latter opposes the consumption of alcoholic beverages. Hopedale Community was founded on Ballou’s universalist beliefs in truth, righteousness, justice, love, patience, non-resistance, and a universal brotherhood of men. While Henry David Thoreau advocated all-out simplicity in his ecological understanding of economy, pioneering the ecology movement against the exploitation of natural resources, he and his friend Emerson were inspired by but remained sceptical of the communal experiments at Brook Farm and the Hopedale Community (see Lane 1844a and Lane 1844b). ---

Critiques of Political and Moral Economy  155 In 1842, the transcendentalist and Fruitlands co-founder Charles Lane revised a table of the “The Circumstantial Law,” originally created by James Pierrepont Greaves. Lane published it in the journal The Healthian of the Alcott House group (Francis 1973, p. 217; Francis 2018, pp. 168f.). This table appears to have been a spiritual guideline for the communal settlement Fruitlands: The True Practical Socialist, being aware that Man is not a simple, but a compound, or, rather, a complex Being, whose threefold Character is formed by the threefold Law in the sympathetic, intellectual, and physical Circumstances, or Conditions, by which he is constantly surrounded, is desirous of presenting to such Law, in its several spheres, the circumstances most conducive to Man’s harmonious development. Though it be true that the CREATIVE POWER cannot properly be attributed to the CIRCUMSTANCES, because the latter term is used to designate the things which STAND ROUND something already created, yet, for as much as RESULTS can never be attained without circumstances, or conditions, or secondary causes, and it is only over these that Men individually, or socially, have any interfering power, the furnishing of suitable conditions, is a subject demanding the deepest consideration. While neither etymology, nor logic, nor truth, permits the assertion, that Circumstances form the Character; we may safely affirm that the END, or the CAUSE in CIRCUMSTANCES produces RESULTS. (Greaves/Lane 1840–1844; reproduced in Francis 2018, p. 169) Greaves and Lane rejected “Prevailing Erroneous Conditions,” which were “Bad, for all Nature,” e.g. “coal-dust, smoke, tobacco,” “Animal Lust,” “Slave-Labour,” “Flesh of Animals,” “Fermented Liquors,” “Luxurious Mansions and dilapidated Cottages,” “Routine of discipline,” “Treatment of the Being as a passive blank,” “Exchange of Commodities, useful & useless.” The virtues mentioned are “Active Benevolence. Love for the unlovely,” “Thoughtful benevolence. Thought for the thoughtlessness,” “Practical benevolence. Bread for the hungry” (Greaves/Lane 1840–1844). This table is a rare charter text of utopian socialist cooperative settlements of the nineteenth century in England and the United States. --Utopian communities and cooperative settlement projects were linked to great social reformers of the nineteenth century such as Ernest Howard Crosby (1856– 1907), Henry George (1839–1897), and John Ruskin (1819–1900). Comprised of 932 acres (3.77 km²), the Christian Commonwealth Colony in Columbus, Georgia, was founded in 1896 mainly by Christian socialists. While the Colony’s residents were influenced by the economic thought of Henry George and Edward Bellamy (1850–1898), the Colony itself was promoted by Crosby: “After meeting Congregationalist pastor and activist Ralph Albertson [1866–1951] during the 1894 Pullman strike in Chicago, Crosby served on the executive committee

156  Further Critiques of Political Economy of Albertson’s utopian Christian Commonwealth Colony in Columbus, Georgia, which was organized on values compatible with Tolstoyan principles.” (Stauber 2018, p. 196; Stauber 1995) George’s concept of land tax, as put forth in his 1879 book Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth: The Remedy, tremendously influenced Tolstoy and advocated the land ownership of farmers described in the Russian writer’s novel Resurrection (1898). Ruskin exposed the principle of equality and equal payment and the concept of guaranteed income in his Unto This Last. Four Essays on the Principles of Political Economy (written 1860, published 1862), which inspired Gandhi to create the Phoenix Settlement near Durban in South Africa: Ruskin’s Unto This Last. Of these books, the one that brought about an instantaneous and practical transformation in my life was Unto This Last. I translated it later into Gujarati, entitling it Sarvodaya (the welfare of all). I believe that I discovered some of my deepest convictions reflected in this great book of Ruskin, and that is why it so captured me and made me transform my life. A poet is one who can call forth the good latent in the human breast. Poets do not influence all alike, for everyone is not evolved in a equal measure. The teaching of Unto This Last I understood to be: 1. That the good of the individual is contained in the good of all. 2. That a lawyer’s work has the same value as the barber’s inasmuch as all have the same right of earning their livelihood from their work. 3. That a life of labour, i.e., the life of the tiller of the soil and the handicraftsman is the life worth living. The first of these I knew. The second I had dimly realized. The third had never occurred to me. Unto This Last made it as clear as daylight for me that the second and the third were contained in the first. I arose with the dawn, ready to reduce these principles to practice. (Gandhi 1970a, p. 239) Ruskin criticized the orthodox notions of capital and value as basic terms in political economy, while George created a single tax movement concerned with the problematic distribution of economic rent derived from the ownership of land. In England, Tolstoy’s secretary Chertkov and his biographer and translator Aylmer Maude were trustees of the Purleigh Brotherhood Colony (1896–1903), founded by John Coleman Kenworthy, who emerged from the Christian Brotherhood Church, of the Whiteway Colony (1898–1909) near Stroud, Gloucestershire, United Kingdom, founded by Quakers, and the Tolstoy Colony (1900–1908) in Tuckton, Dorset, with the Free Age Press (later continued by Charles William Daniel in Christchurch, Hants), which published Tolstoy’s pamphlets (translated by Maude, Chertkov, and Isabella Fyvie Mayo).

Critiques of Political and Moral Economy  157 The Tolstoy Farm (1910–1913), near Lawley station close to Johannesburg, founded by Gandhi and Hermann Kallenbach (1871–1945), was a practical experiment with communal cooperative settlements for the Indian community in South Africa. Tolstoy Farm, and Phoenix Settlement, established in 1904 near Durban, were inspired by ideas of John Ruskin, which he laid out in his works Munera Pulveris (written 1862–1863, published 1872; Ruskin 1894), Fors Clavigera (written and published as pamphlets between 1871 and 1884) and Unto This Last. We give a brief insight into some key motifs, which differ from his contemporaries’ notions, particularly from those of economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo. As for “wealth,” Ruskin contrasts two ways: In fact, it may be discovered that the true veins of wealth are purple—and not in Rock, but in Flesh—perhaps even that the final outcome and consummation of all wealth is in the producing as many as possible full-breathed, bright-eyed, and happy-hearted human creatures. Our modern wealth, I think, has rather a tendency the other way;—most political economists appearing to consider multitudes of human creatures not conducive to wealth, or at best conducive to it only by remaining in a dim-eyed and narrow-chested state of being. (Ruskin 1866, p. 61) As for “property,” Ruskin emphasizes that the accumulation of property depends on the commercialized power over labour, be it paid labour, bonded or indentured labour or slavery: […] an accumulation of real property is of little use to its owner, unless, together with it, he has commercial power over labour. Thus, suppose any person to be put in possession of a large estate of fruitful land, with rich beds of gold in its gravel, countless herds of cattle in its pastures; houses, and gardens, and storehouses full of useful stores; but suppose, after all, that he could get no servants? In order that he may be able to have servants, some one in his neighbourhood must be poor, and in want of his gold—or his corn. Assume that no one is in want of either, and that no servants are to be had. He must, therefore, bake his own bread, make his own clothes, plough his own ground, and shepherd his own flocks. His gold will be as useful to him as any other yellow pebbles on his estate. His stores must rot, for he cannot consume them. He can eat no more than another man could eat, and wear no more than another man could wear. He must lead a life of severe and common labour to procure even ordinary comforts; he will be ultimately unable to keep either houses in repair, or fields in cultivation; and forced to content himself with a poor man’s portion of cottage and garden, in the midst of a desert of waste land, trampled by wild cattle, and encumbered by ruins of palaces, which he will hardly mock at himself by calling “his own.” (Ruskin 1985, pp. 181f [Essay II: The Veins of Wealth])

158  Further Critiques of Political Economy As for “capital,” Ruskin criticizes the accumulation of capital which merely produces capital as such, instead of products of real use value, which may then be consumed. While the multiplication of capital reproducing only itself leads to an “aggregation of bulbs,” Ruskin pleads for the production of goods which are of real value for people’s use, for example seeds for bread and tulips, anticipating the early twentieth century call for “Bread and Roses”: Capital signifies “head, or source, or root material”—it is material by which some derivative or secondary good is produced. It is only capital proper (caput vivum, not caput mortuum) when it is thus producing something different from itself. It is a root, which does not enter into vital function till it produces something else than a root: namely, fruit. That fruit will in time again produce roots; and so all living capital issues in reproduction of capital; but capital which produces nothing but capital is only root producing root; bulb issuing in bulb, never in tulip; seed issuing in seed, never in bread. The Political Economy of Europe has hitherto devoted itself wholly to the multiplication, or (less even) the aggregation, of bulbs. It never saw, nor conceived, such a thing as a tulip. (Ruskin 1985, p. 218 [Essay IV: Ad Valorem]) As for the distinction between “rich” and “poor,” Ruskin went beyond a mere critique of economy, and instead refers to cultural depravation, too: The rich not only refuse food to the poor; they refuse wisdom; they refuse virtue; they refuse salvation. (Ruskin 1985, pp. 223f. and 225f. [Essay IV: Ad Valorem]) As for “ecology,” Ruskin proves to be a pioneer of the notions “sustainability,” “equilibrium” and the quality of “good work”: No scene is continually and untiringly loved, but one rich by joyful human labour; smooth in field; fair in garden; full in orchard; trim, sweet, and frequent in homestead; ringing with voices of vivid existence. No air is sweet that is silent; it is only sweet when full of low currents of under sound—triplets of birds, and murmur and chirp of insects, and deep-toned words of men, and wayward trebles of childhood. As the art of life is learned, it will be found at last that all lovely things are also necessary;—the wild flower by the wayside, as well as the tended corn; and the wild birds and creatures of the by every wondrous word and unknowable work of God. (Ruskin 1985, p. 226 [Essay IV: Ad Valorem]) You are to do good work, whether you live or die. It may be you will have to die;—well, men have died for their country often, yet doing her no good; be ready to die for her in doing her assured good: her, and all other countries with her. Mind your own business with your absolute heart and soul; but

Critiques of Political and Moral Economy  159 see that it is a good business first. That it is corn and sweet pease you are producing,—not gunpowder and arsenic. And be sure of this, literally:—you must simply rather die than make any destroying mechanism or compound. You are to be literally employed in cultivating the ground, or making useful things, and carrying them where they are wanted. Stand in the streets, and say to all who pass by: Have you any vineyard we can work in,—not Naboth’s? In your powder and petroleum manufactory, we work no more. (Ruskin 1985, p. 303 [Fors Clavigera. Letters to the Workmen and Labourers of Great Britain [1871–1884] (Letter Seven: Charitas, Denmark Hill, 1st July 1871)]) As for “luxury,” Ruskin stresses the importance of giving, serving and sharing as an antidote to the poison of the orgy of destruction and waste of the Earth’s natural resources (cf. the Federal Republic of Germany’s “Basic Law,” i.e. Grundgesetz, Article 14 (2): “Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.”): Luxury is indeed possible in the future—innocent and exquisite; luxury for all, and by the help of all; but luxury at present can only be enjoyed by the ignorant; the cruelest man living could not sit at his feast, unless he sat blindfold. Raise the veil boldly; face the light; and if, as yet, the light of the eye can only be through tears, and the light of the body through sackcloth, go thou forth weeping, bearing precious seed, until the time come, and the kingdom, when Christ’s gift of bread, and bequest of peace, shall be “Unto this last as unto thee”; and when, for earth’s severed multitudes of the wicked and the weary, there shall be holier reconciliation than that of the narrow home, and calm economy, where the Wicked cease—not from trouble, but from troubling—and the Weary are at rest. (Ruskin 1985, p. 228 [Essay IV: Ad Valorem]) As for the frenzy of “war,” Ruskin describes its relationship to the follies of greed, robbery, and theft, and the vice of capitalist economy: The first reason for all wars, and for the necessity of national defences, is that the majority of persons, high and low, in all European nations, are Thieves, and, in their hearts, greedy of their neighbours’ goods, land, and fame. But besides being Thieves, they are also fools, and have never yet been able to understand […] that the prosperity of their neighbours is, in the end, their own also; and the poverty of their neighbours, by the communism of God, becomes also in the end their own. “Invidia,” jealousy of your neighbour’s good, has been, since dust was first made flesh, the curse of man; and “Charitas,” the desire to do your neighbor grace, the one source of all human glory, power, and material Blessing. […] But Occult Theft,—Theft which hides itself even from itself, and is legal, respectable, and cowardly,—corrupts the body and soul of man, to the last fibre of them. And the guilty Thieves of Europe, the real sources of all deadly

160  Further Critiques of Political Economy war in it, are the Capitalists—that is to say, people who live by percentages on the labour of others; instead of by fair wages for their own. (Ruskin 1985, p. 301 [Fors Clavigera. Letters to the Workmen and Labourers of Great Britain [1871–1884] (Letter Seven: Charitas, Denmark Hill, July 1, 1871)]) On this Ruskin further tells us: […] capitalists, when they do not know what to do with their money, persuade the peasants, in various countries, that the said peasants want guns to shoot each other with. The peasants accordingly borrow guns, out of the manufacture of which the capitalists get a per-centage, and men of science much amusement and credit. Then the peasants shoot a certain number of each other, until they get tired; and burn each other’s homes down in various places. Then they put the guns back into towers, arsenals, etc., in ornamental patterns; (and the victorious party put also some ragged flags in churches). And then the capitalists tax both, annually, ever afterwards, to pay interest on the loan of the guns and the gunpowder. This is what capitalists call “knowing what to do with their money”; and what commercial men in general call “practical” as opposed to “sentimental” Political Economy. (Ruskin 1894, pp. xxvi, xxvii [Preface]) As against “violence,” Ruskin anticipates Leo Tolstoy’s critique of retaliation and revenge: Seek to revenge no injury. You see now—do not you—a little more clearly why I wrote that? what strain there is on the untaught masses of you to revenge themselves, even with insane fire? (Ruskin 1985, p. 304 [Fors Clavigera. Letters to the Workmen and Labourers of Great Britain [1871–1884] (Letter Seven: Charitas, Denmark Hill, July 1, 1871)]) One of Ruskin’s practical advice for policy makers is a plea for an appropriate income tax: All rich people object to income-tax, of course;—they like to pay as much as a poor man pays on their tea, sugar, and tobacco,—nothing on their incomes. Whereas, in true justice, the only honest and wholly right tax is one not merely on income, but property; increasing in percentage as the property is greater. And the main virtue of such a tax is that it makes publicly known what every man has, and how he gets it. (Ruskin 1985, p. 303 [Fors Clavigera. Letters to the Workmen and Labourers of Great Britain [1871–1884] (Letter Seven: Charitas, Denmark Hill, July 1, 1871)]) Ruskin himself, being the first Slade Professor of Fine Art at Oxford from 1869 on, practiced Bread Labour with his undergraduate students William Gershom

Critiques of Political and Moral Economy  161 Collingwood, Oscar Wilde, Arnold Toynbee, and others, by reconstructing roads to improve the lot of the villagers near Oxford—a path between Oxford and North Hinksey is known today as “Ruskin’s Ride.” Furthermore, The Guild of St George (since 1871) became Ruskin’s education trust, the nucleus of the Ruskin Collection and the Sheffield Museum: Ruskin announced the formation of St George’s Company, as it was first called, in 1871, but it was not till 1878 that it was properly constituted and given its present name. In its origins, it was a frankly utopian body. It represented Ruskin’s practical response to a society in which profit and mass-production seemed to be everything, beauty, goodness and ordinary happiness nothing. Ruskin made it clear in a monthly series of “Letters to the Workmen and Labourers of Great Britain” called Fors Clavigera […] that the ambitious aim of the Guild was to make Britain a happier place to live in. “I have listened to many ingenious persons,” he wrote, “who say we are better off now than ever we were before” but (he went on) “we cannot be called, as a nation, well off, while so many of us are living … in … beggary.” In other words, for Ruskin, no nation should be called rich if its cities were ugly, its countryside polluted and its people poor, hungry and ignorant, and he asked those who agreed with him to join in “establishing a National Store instead of a National Debt.” In practice the Guild’s efforts were focused on quite modest ideals. He targeted three main areas of English life in need of support and improvement: art education; craft work; and the rural economy. He hoped to promote the understanding and appreciation of good art, to encourage craftsmanship rather than mass production, and to revive what we should now call sustainable agriculture and horticulture. He was trying to create, in effect, an alternative to industrial capitalism. In some ways, as the word “Guild” suggests, he looked back to certain values of the past, particularly of the Middle Ages, but he combined those values with a belief in social improvement. St George’s communities were to be based on the land and on agricultural labour, but they were also to include schools, libraries and art galleries, so that Companions, as members of the Guild are still called, worked with their hands and cultivated their inner lives. (The Guild of St George n.d.) In the United States, Julius Augustus Wayland founded the Ruskin Colony in Tennessee City, Dickson County, Tennessee (1894–1896): The Ruskin Colony was a utopian socialist colony and existed on the Tennessee City property from 1894 to 1896, when it moved to the Ruskin property. It stayed there until 1899, when it moved to Waycross, Georgia, and then dissolved in 1901. The Colony was named Ruskin after the English socialist writer, John Ruskin. Five Hundred Dollars was charged to become a member of the colony. A huge three-story central building called the Commonwealth house was put up to house The Coming Nation Print Shop. The first floor housed the print shop, press room, stock room, and offices. On the second floor were the mailing rooms,

162  Further Critiques of Political Economy editorial rooms, barber shop, living quarters, great room, and a library. The third room housed the auditorium and dining hall for 700 members. A steam plant was constructed next to the central building to provide heat. A water reservoir was built on the hillside above the cave and gravity fed water to each home on the colony. Among the enterprises were a chewing gum factory, a photo gallery, a steam laundry, a machine shop, a café, a bakery, a school, a sawmill, a cotton gin, a grist mill, a blacksmith shop, a wagon shop, a suspender and clothing factory, a plant for a patent cure-all medicine called “Ruskin Ready Remedy,” a print shop, a coffee plant, and a canning industry which operated inside the cave. The coffee plant was known as Ruskin Cereal Coffee, which was a substitute coffee made with toasted grain. Their goods were sold in neighbouring towns as well as distributed worldwide due to advertisements in “The Coming Nation” (newspaper owned and edited by [the] founder of the colony, Julius Augustus Wayland), which had over 60,000 subscribers. Mr. Wayland used the newspaper to raise both support and money for his proposed colony, The Ruskin Cooperative Association. Altogether, seventy-five structures were erected on Ruskin’s near 1,000 acres. Ruskin had a Drama Troupe and the Ruskin Band. An eight-hour school was established and a college was planned for the property. Isaac Broome, a well-known sculptor, was given free membership to the colony and was to head the college. The cornerstone to the college was laid on June 19, 1897. (The Ruskin n.d.) From this discussion of the co-operative settlement and movement initiated by Ruskin now let us turn to Tolstoy. The Doukhobors’ example of rural village life had its centre in Peter Kalmykov’s Gorelovka, Georgia, and was a role model for Tolstoy, who was inspired by Bondareff’s concept of Bread Labour. In the 1920s, when Gandhi created the movement of the spinning wheel (charka) for homespun cotton yarn (khadi), before the concept Sarvodaya had been woven into an all-embracing constructive program with the support of Joseph Chelladurai Cornelius Kumarappa (1892–1960), his younger brother Bharatan Kumarappa (1896–1957) and Vinoba Bhave, Gandhi recollected Bondareff and Tolstoy’s concept of Bread Labour in detail and compared Bread Labour with the ancient Indian notion of sacrifice (yajna): Jesus was a carpenter. He never used his intellect to earn his livelihood. We do not know how much manual work Buddha did before he attained wisdom. Yes, we know this much, that he did not propagate religion for securing his livelihood. He lived on charity. That could not militate against the duty of labour. A roving ascetic has to do a lot of manual work. Now, to come to Tolstoy, what his wife has said is true but it is not the whole truth. After the change in his outlook Tolstoy never took for himself the income from his books. Although he had property worth millions, he lived like a guest in his own house. After the attainment of wisdom, he worked eight hours a day and earned his wages. Sometimes he worked in the field and sometimes he made shoes at home. Although he

Critiques of Political and Moral Economy  163 did not earn much by doing such work, still he earned enough to feed himself. Tolstoy strove hard to practise what he preached. This was characteristic of him. The sum and substance of all this discussion is that the duty which the ancients observed themselves and which the majority in the world discharges even today has been presented to the world in an explicit manner by him. In fact this doctrine was not Tolstoy’s original idea; it was thought of by a great Russian writer by name Bondaref. Tolstoy endorsed it and proclaimed it to the world. (Gandhi 1970b, pp. 489f). Gandhi further tells us: The Ashram holds that every man and woman must work in order to live. This principle came home to me upon reading one of Tolstoy’s essays. Referring to the Russian writer Bondaref, Tolstoy observes that his discovery of the vital importance of bread labour is one of the most remarkable discoveries of modern times. The idea is that every healthy individual must labour enough for his food, and his intellectual faculties must be exercised not in order to obtain a living or amass a fortune but only in the service of mankind. If this principle is observed everywhere, all men would be equal, none would starve and the world would be saved from many a sin. It is possible that this golden rule will never be observed by the whole world. Millions observe it in spite of themselves without understanding it. But their mind is working in a contrary direction, so that they are unhappy themselves and their labour is not as fruitful as it should be. This state of things serves as an incentive to those who understand and seek to practise the rule. By rendering a willing obedience to it they enjoy good health as well as perfect peace and develop their capacity for service. Tolstoy made a deep impression on my mind, and even in South Africa I began to observe the rule to the best of my ability. And ever since the Ashram was founded, bread labour has been perhaps its most characteristic feature. In my opinion the same principle has been set forth in the third chapter of the Gita. I do not go so far as to say that the word yajna (sacrifice) there means body labour. But when the Gita says that “rain comes from sacrifice” (verse 14), I think it indicates the necessity of bodily labour. The “residue of sacrifice” (verse 13) is the bread that we have won in the sweat of our brow. Labouring enough for one’s food has been classed in the Gita as a yajna. Whoever eats more than is enough for sustaining the body is a thief, for most of us hardly perform labour enough to maintain themselves. I believe that a man has no right to receive anything more than his keep, and that everyone who labours is entitled to a living wage. This does not rule out the division of labour. The manufacture of everything needed to satisfy essential human wants involves bodily labour, so that labour in all essential occupations counts as bread labour. […] Gandhi continues: In an institution where body labour plays a prominent part there are few servants. Drawing water, splitting firewood, cleaning and filling lamps with oil, sanitary

164  Further Critiques of Political Economy service, sweeping the roads and houses, washing one’s clothes, cooking,—all these tasks must always be performed. Besides this there are various activities carried on in the Ashram as a result of and in order to help fulfilment of the observances, such as agriculture, dairying, weaving, carpentry, tanning and the like which must be attended to by many members of the Ashram. All these activities may be deemed sufficient for keeping the observance of bread labour, but another essential feature of yajna (sacrifice) is the idea of serving others, and the Ashram will perhaps be found wanting from this latter standpoint. The Ashram ideal is to live to serve. In such an institution there is no room for idleness or shirking duty, and everything should be done with right goodwill. If this were actually the case, the Ashram ministry would be more fruitful than it is. But we are still very far from such a happy condition. Therefore although in a sense every activity in the Ashram is of the nature of yajna, it is compulsory for all to spin for at least one hour in the name of God incarnated as the Poor. (Daridranarayana) (Gandhi 1970c, pp. 214–216) All these early examples of utopian and cooperative settlement projects influenced Gandhi’s and Joseph Chelladurai Cornelius Kumarappa’s concept of village industries as integral part of the Constructive Program, and at the same time reflect the background of Martin Buber’s book Paths in Utopia (Buber 1949). Joseph Chelladurai Cornelius Kumarappa was a professor of Economics at the Gujarat Vidyapith in Ahmedabad. Between May 1930 and February 1931, he also edited “Young India,” which coincided with the Salt Satyagraha (“Salt March”). Kumarappa organized the All India Village Industries Association in 1935 and participated in the National Planning Committee of 1938 (Nehru 1938). During his imprisonment (Quit India movement, 1945), he wrote his Economy of Permanence (Kumarappa 1946). Gandhi, while riding the train to Bombay on 20 August 1945, penned a foreword to this book: This doctor of our village industries shows that only through them we shall arrive at the economy of permanence in the place of that of the fleeting nature we see around us at present. He tackles the question—shall the body triumph over and stifle the soul or shall the latter triumph over and express itself through a perishable body which, with its few wants healthily satisfied, will be free to subserve the end of the imperishable soul? This is “Plain living and High thinking.” (Gandhi, in Kumarappa 1957, p. iii) Kumarappa published a substantially extended second edition in 1948 and an identical third reprint of his Economy of Permanence in 1957. In the latter edition—for the first does not contain the following—Kumarappa fleshes out his idea of a cooperative society: Co-operation implies the elimination of competition and working in a kind of partnership resulting in advantages to all. Its basic requirement is an identity

Critiques of Political and Moral Economy  165 of interest of parties to the enterprise. There can be no exploitation in cooperation. Therefore, there can be no co-operation with an exploiter at one end and his victim at the other end. Foreigners come to sell their goods to us. That is their only interest in us. It is for that, they hold others in political bondage. If co-operative societies help hand-loom weavers to obtain American yarn they are linking up incompatibles and therefore are not functioning in the true spirit of co-operation. Their legitimate sphere would be to bring local village spinners and weavers into a living touch with one another. They have to bring about co-operation all along the line-raw material produced with artisan and then with the consumer. The co-operative societies should be the link binding all parties together—like a silver wire that holds the pearls together. (Kumarappa 1957, pp. 144f.) Kumarappa envisaged village panchayats for village administration based on selfgovernment and multi-purpose cooperative society—gram seva sangh as nonprofit charitable trust: The panchayat will have direct responsibility in regard to all village services, such as, village roads, village water supply, village education, village dispensaries, village sanitation, administration of justice within certain limits, village, lighting etc. These services will have to be compulsorily provided for in every village. If the revenue raised and allotted is not sufficient to provide for those services the deficit should be borne by Government. (Kumarappa 1957, p. 196) This economic model bears out upon Gandhi’s educational philosophy of Nai Talim (basic education), originating from Gandhi’s Tolstoy Farm experiences and the National Education Conference held at Wardha, October 22–23, 1937 (Sykes 1988; Lang-Wojtasik 1999; Holzwarth 2015; MacDonald 2018). In the aftermath of this conference, two model basic education schools opened at Wardha and nearby Segaon. Following Gandhi’s death, the Gandhigram Rural Institute continued this new approach. Kumarappa wrote about the meaning of education: If education is to fit us for life—to make us better citizens, better husbands and fathers—it has to be a continuous process from the cradle to the grave. Through all the changing scenes of life we ought to be able to pass with the least shock. If, on the other hand, education taught us only certain tricks which we could perform we should be completely at sea when a different set of circumstances confronted us. Education need not cramp our minds with facts and figures but it should give us an attitude towards life. An educational system has to have a philosophy behind it and its purpose should be to elicit the best in an individual. (Kumarappa 1957, pp. 177f.)

166  Further Critiques of Political Economy Kumarappa provided a general outline: The Wardha or Basic scheme, as this new plan has come to be known, recommends a course for seven years’ compulsory basic education for boys and girls from the age seven to fourteen. The medium of instruction is to be a craft like spinning, around which all subjects are taught. The everyday life of the child and the correlation of the craft, the physical and social environment of the child afford points of co-ordination for all departments of knowledge. The standard aimed at is the present matriculation without English. There will be no effort to teach writing until the child has learnt drawing. Reading will be taught at first. After the age of twelve, the pupil may be allowed to choose a craft as a vocation. It does not aim at turning out expert workmen at the age of fourteen but the pupil will have acquired sufficient training to enter a vocation in which he will do his talent justice. The central idea of this scheme is that intellectual development must be attained through vocational training. (Kumarappa 1957, pp. 185f.) A visit to the United States inspired Kumarappa to combine concepts of vocational training, education through art and convivial living: I had the opportunity of visiting a school in New York State run by the Federation of Labour Unions. In that school the whole community lived together and the children took part in the supply of food products and all other domestic matters. (Kumarappa 1957, p. 187) No vocational training or education can be complete unless it has some relation to art. Thus part of our education has been attended to by Poet Tagore. The emphasis placed on folk songs, music and art must form part of every village school. If such schools can be found to function with a vocation of craft as the base and art as an aid, however simple the courses may be, the result will be an outturn of men and women with a backbone of character and self-respect who will not purr round the feet of foreign masters for a silken couch to lie on but who will hold their head erect, independent, and be prepared to share the lowly life of the general run of the people. (Kumarappa 1957, p. 189) We have presented visions and practices of alternative political and moral economy in the works of John Ruskin, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi and J. C. Kumarappa. Their works show how elements of an alternative political economy shall be free will as well as mutual aid and sharing; character building and spiritual development; high standard of living and voluntary simplicity; integration of manual and intellectual labour; communal living and cooperative economy in home rule and

Critiques of Political and Moral Economy  167 self-reliance; rejection of coercion and violence; and life-long learning in conviviality and freedom of spirit. All these have a great salience in our contemporary critique and reconstitution of political economy and moral economy. References Cited Buber, Martin. 1949. Paths in Utopia. London: Routledge & Paul. Curl, John. 2009. For All the People. Uncovering the Hidden History of Cooperation, Cooperative Movements, and Communalism in America. Oakland: PM Press. Fourier, Charles. 1971. Design for Utopia: Selected Writings. Studies in the Libertarian and Utopian Tradition. New York: Schocken Books. Francis, Richard. 1973. ‘Circumstances and Salvation: The Ideology of the Fruitlands Utopia’, American Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (May), pp. 202–234. Francis, Richard. 2010. Fruitlands: The Alcott Family and their Search for Utopia. New Haven: Yale University Press. Francis, Richard. 2018. Transcendental Utopias. Individual and Community at Brook Farm, Fruitlands, and Walden. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gandhi, M. K. 1970a. ‘An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth’ - Chapter XVIII: The Magic Spell of a Book - Ahmedabad, 1925 – 1928, in Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 39, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, pp. 238–239. Gandhi, M. K. 1970b. ‘Varnadharma and Duty of Labour – III’, Hindi Navajivan (20-21930), in Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 42, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, pp. 488–490. Gandhi, M. K. 1970c. ‘History of the Satyagraha Ashram’ [11 July 1932] – VI: Bread Labour, in Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 50, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, pp. 188–236. Greaves, James Pierrepont and Charles Lane. 1840–1844. ‘The Circumstantial Law’, Harvard University, Houghton Library, Autobiographical collections. Vol. V. 1840– 1844. Concord. England. Concord. Harvard. 328f. Special contents: ephemera of J. P. Greaves and Charles Lane; Fruitlands materials. (MS Am 1130.9-1130.12), (https:// hollisarchives​.lib​.harvard​.edu​/repositories​/24​/digital​_objects​/6125) (accessed on 29 June 2022). Holzwarth, Simone. 2015. Gandhi and Nai Talim: Rural Craft Education for a New VillageMinded Social Order. Doctoral dissertation. DOI: http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.18452​/17651. Berlin, Humboldt Universität. Kumarappa, J. C. 1946. Economy of Permanence (A quest for social order based on nonviolence). With a foreword from M.K. Gandhi. Maganvadi, Wardha, C.P.: The All India Village Industries Association. Kumarappa, J. C. 1957. Economy of Permanence (A quest for social order based on nonviolence). With a foreword from M. K. Gandhi. Third Edition. Rajghat, Varanasi: Sarva-Seva-Sangh-Prakashan. Lane, Charles. 1844a. ‘Brook Farm’, The Dial, Vol. 4, No. iii (January), pp. 351–357. Lane, Charles. 1844b. ‘Life in the Woods’, The Dial, Vol. 4, No. v (April), pp. 415–425. Lang-Wojtasik, Gregor. 1999. ‘Life-long Learning for All. Gandhis Nai Talim’, Zeitschrift für internationale Bildungsforschung und Entwicklungspädagogik, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 7–11. MacDonald, Sharon M. H. 2018. ‘“The Other West”: Gandhian Quaker, Marjorie Sykes (1905–1995)’, Deportate, esuli, profughe, Vol. 37, pp. 117–134.

168  Further Critiques of Political Economy Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1938. Report of the National Planning Committee 1938. New Delhi: India Institute of Applied Political Research. Ruskin, John. 1866. Unto This Last. Four Essays on the Principles of Political Economy. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Ruskin, John. 1894. Munera Pulveris. Six Essays on the Elements of Political Economy. London: George Allen. Ruskin, John. 1985. Unto this Last and other writings by John Ruskin, ed. Clive Wilmer. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books. Stauber, Rory. 1995. Lifting the Banner of Tolstoyan Non-Resistance in America: Ernest Howard Crosby’s Lonely Quest, 1894–1907. PhD diss., Drew University. Stauber, Rory. 2018. ‘Crosby, Ernest Howard (1856–1907)’, in Mitchell K. Hall (ed.), Opposition to War. An Encyclopedia of U.S. Peace and Antiwar Movements. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, pp. 196–197. Sykes, Marjorie. 1988. The Story of Nai Talim: Fifty Years of Education at Sevagram, 1937– 1987: A Record of Reflections. Sevagram, Wardha: Nai Talim Samiti. The Guild of St George (eds.). n.d. ‘The History of the Guild’, (https://www​.guildofstgeorge​ .org​.uk​/about​/the​-history​-of​-the​-guild) (accessed on 28 June 2022). The Ruskin. (eds.). n.d. ‘The History of The Ruskin’, (https://ruskinvenues​.com​/our​-history​ .html) (accessed on 28 June 2022).

11 Broken But Not Useless Revisiting Marx’s Workshop and a New Ecology of Hope Abhijeet Paul

“gangar dudhare onek mil/cotton mill, jute mill, paper mil, miler obhab ki! Many mills on both banks of the Ganga/Cotton mill, jute mill, paper mill, no lack of ‘mil’ [rhyme]!”

Repair as an Act of Hope In this chapter, I discuss a less travelled path in Marxist thought (Western and nonWestern): Marx’s relationship with technology a.k.a. the machine, an “instrument of labour,” in his critique of capital. For orthodox Marxists as well as post-Marxists of various kinds, technology as instrumentation is seldom the object of subjective reflection. Yet Marx was keenly aware that machines inevitably break down, and when they do, the progress of capital is interrupted, if momentarily. Marx makes a characteristically astute observation in Capital Vol. I: “A machine under repair is no longer an instrument of labour, but its material. Work is no longer done with it but upon it, in order to patch up its use value” (Marx 1977, p. 312). I want to dwell on this moment of interruption, which can be overcome by performing patchwork to restore vitality to the machine. In other words, the machine is broken but not useless. There is hope. This hope goes beyond the factory floor and spills over into communities engaged in repair work or reuse of materials in industrial and neoliberal capitalism, especially in the postecological 21st century. Repaired, reused, and even discarded technologies have been neglected in academic studies due to the assumption that capital is progressive and that therefore the entanglement of post-obsolescence industrial and household technologies with material and moral relations in communities is accidental. Studies of technology in India have operated from relatively fixed ideas of modernity and nationhood. For example, David Arnold frames his work on “everyday” and “small-scale” technologies in 19th–20th century India against Gandhi’s “rejection” of technology and as a way to re-think “class, race, and gender…and Indian nationhood” (Arnold 2015); without going into a detailed discussion of Gandhi’s thoughts on technology, which is beyond the scope of this paper, I will point out that Arnold again misses the element of handicraft and repair in the life of technologies of all scales in India, as well as the roles of caste and community. Drawing on ethnographic research I conducted in India in 2011 as well as the works of Gilbert Simondon, Bernard Stiegler, Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay, and others, this essay shows how repair, the body, and community sustain each other and the hope of livelihood. DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-14

170  Further Critiques of Political Economy Human and Machine: Corporeal and Affective Relationships Nature builds no machines …. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it (emphases, author’s). Karl Marx, “Notebook VII: The Chapter on Capital (continued),” The Grundrisse, 1858, p. 706. Marx’s evocation of machines as “organs of the human brain” resonates with the human-machine relationships implicit in the local languages of jute communities. The three words commonly used for machines in Bangla and Hindi-Urdu include jantra, kal, and masin (Eng. “machine”). Jantra has a range of meanings: an organ of the body, a tantrik diagram, an instrument (musical or otherwise), machine, or contraption; to state this is not a philological exercise but points to the need to think beyond received categories. Bangla writer Subodh Ghosh’s short story “Ajantrik (Non-Mechanical),” and Ritwik Ghatak’s film adaptation with the same title vividly portray the intimacy of human and machine through the story of a taxi driver’s love for his old car, foregrounding repair as an act of hope (Ghosh 1994—date of writing unknown, probably late 1930s; Ghatak 1958). The car in the story shares its affectionate nickname, Jagaddal (“that which presses down the world,” used in the sense of “mighty”), with one of the early jute mills and with Samaresh Basu’s epic novel about the local history of the jute industry (Basu 1966). A scene in the novel gives an in-depth tour of the mill machinery through the workers’ local names for machine parts, a combination of localized English words and Bangla words for parts and functions of the human body. This kind of evocative, even affectionate naming is still a part of jute work today, such as the softening machine nicknamed hati kal or “elephant machine.” The names capture something about the machine’s feel to the human senses, hardly surprising as workers inhabit the factory space for long hours of the day and night in the presence of constant motion, among the moving parts of massive machines bolted to the ground—true “Jagaddals.” Not to mention the sound of the machines, sometimes literally deafening, and the phensua (fluff) and garda (dust) that are the worker’s constant companions, as portrayed in the short stories of Mohammad Israil (Israil 1938). Kal in both Hindi-Urdu and Bangla means device, machine, mill, or factory; a Bangla proverb warns that dharmer kal batashe nore (the device of justice moves in the wind), i.e. wrongdoers won’t get away with anything in the end. Of course, the human-machine relationship has a dark side too, as evident in worker’s stories and legends about incidents of mutilation; when I was growing up in the chatkal ilaka or jute mill area, I used to walk by a mill sign every day that read: MIND YOUR LIMBS, SPARES NOT AVAILABLE.1 This grim reminder that the human body is not so easily repaired nevertheless references the culture of repair, reuse, and patchwork that sustains not only the worker’s body but the whole community.

Broken But Not Useless  171 The following fragment of a conversation with Abbas, a mechanic in the maintenance department of Kamarhatty Jute Mill, a medium-sized mill north of Kolkata, in 2011 posits repair as a relation between human and mechanical bodies: masin ghanchakkaria cheez hai--bap-pardada ne yihan kaam kiye hain na. mein bhi karta hoon. roti kapra ka sawaal hai. dekhke rakhna padhta hai. Machines are loopy things—my father and his father worked here, and so do I. It’s a question of roti-kapra (“bread and cloth,” idiom for “livelihood”), you have to look after them [the machines].” 2 Abbas, about sixty-five years old, has spent more than three decades in the maintenance department as a mechanic or mistri.3 By calling machines “loopy” Abbas may mean that to talk about machines is to invite long-winded conversations about technical matters, or perhaps that they can be truly baffling to deal with on a daily basis. In any case, he goes on to highlight three things: the knowledge of repair work passed down through generations, machine work as livelihood, and the idea that like humans, machines need to be “looked after” on a day-to-day basis, especially when most of them are getting on in years and one or the other breaks down every day. Inter-generational relationships factor in here in several ways. The jute mill depends heavily on the kamarshala or repair workshop because much of the mill machinery is quite old, some dating back to the 1900s; however, the charge of “anachronism” levelled against the jute industry by several critics (such as Chakrabarty 1989; de Haan 1997; Fernandes 1997; and Sen 1999) misses the integral role of repair throughout the jute community, in which old clunkers coexist with the latest gadgets. The average age and work experience of jute mill mechanics is more than that of workers in other departments,4 but younger mechanics are informally trained as shagird (apprentices) of an ustad (expert teacher). Not only do the workers have long years of experience; their interactions have a peculiar character borne through generations of foundry and repair work. Just as the long history of the jute fibre links the handloom to the factory floor, repair work too has a long family and community history. One can begin to understand why work with and on pieces of metal becomes humanized through naming, rituals, and other forms of signification; names like those discussed above have been attached to practically every piece of metal in the kamarshala as well as on the factory floor over the generations. Technics and the Worlds of Labor and Work The above discussion of human-machine relationships leads us to the idea of technics (Simondon 1980; Stiegler 1998). In its simplest formulation, technics indicates a cognitive understanding of a process that cannot be summed up by the system alone but involves the senses, the organs, and the body in particular ways. Acknowledging technics enables different ways of looking at labour, its essential

172  Further Critiques of Political Economy human relations, and the conditions it creates. Objective and non-subjective categories such as class, gender, and politics become available for further scrutiny without their strictly oppositional biases. For example, one can recognize class as essential to explaining the discourses and practices of modern labour without losing the individual person toiling under precarious conditions. Technics qua process is as much linked to labour and work as it is to the proper functioning of instruments, machines, and broadly speaking, technology. In the jute industry and other industries in the global south, gadgets, machines, and technology exist in both old and new-school, analogue and digital forms. Drilling and boring machines from the 1850s and new liquid crystal display computers work side by side in jute mills, performing two seemingly discretely different sets of functions. Both types of machines are viewed as technological means to an end— modes of production in the political economy of jute, yet it is easy to forget in this high-strung world of machines, productivity, work, and markets that people— experts, technologists, workers, observers, commentators, laypersons, and consumers—are shaped by technology and technics in some way or the other. This is especially relevant in the context of capital, consumption, and power, which shape forms, communication, and representation—essential to making sense of the world of work. Factory “workflows” recast traditions through technical temporalities and propel us towards other inventions—ethical, corporeal, temporal. The vitality of the vernacular is essential in rethinking work around the globe, especially in the “global south.” My exploration of technics in the context of machines and mechanical work in Kolkata jute mills is part of a larger trend of writing the vernacular (see for example Mukhopadhyay 2005). From this perspective, the economy of labour and commodities appears as a performance, in which conditions, constructions, and techniques play vital roles. Without overemphasizing continuity, relationships between past and present have great importance, as they disrupt the binary notion of “tradition” and “modernity.” Machine workers in the Kolkata area are mainly from Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh, and their ancestors (both male and female) have been thoroughly familiar with urban labour dynamics in Kolkata since the late 19th century. My experience hanging out in jute communities tells me that the tangled threads linking past and present can give us important clues to questions of subjectivity and beliefs that are basic to investigating lifeworlds of labour. In this context, I present selective readings of conversations with mechanics on a jute mill shop floor to highlight their vision of repair work and its relation to community. The Jute Mill Repair Workshop and Repair in Jute Communities Since the 1890s, about 24 jute mills have operated on the banks of the Hooghly or Ganga (Ganges) river north of Kolkata in what is now North 24 Parganas, West Bengal. Many of the mills have now closed, with about 10 still in operation. The jute mill, known in Bangla and Hindi-Urdu as chatkal, depends heavily on the kamarshala or repair workshop, because much of the mill machinery is quite

Broken But Not Useless  173 old, some dating back to the 1900s. These old analogue machines made in Scotland coexist on the factory floor with their newer coworkers, semi-automated machines made in China; some of the older machines have been hybridized in terms of form factors, electrical wiring, operation, parts, etc. as Indian manufacturers have taken over. Kamarshala literally means a blacksmith’s workshop or forge, relating factory repair to traditional handicrafts. The kamarshala may be inside the mill compound or outside it, or both; regardless of the workshop’s physical location, repair networks extend beyond the mill into the mohalla (community or neighbourhood) and the local bazaar. Mill mechanics and people who repair household appliances and other devices in the community share approaches, ideas, and social relationships; sometimes the same person does both kinds of repair. Machine Stories and Community Following my earlier discussion of technics, technology, and human labour, we seem to have two choices: we can view the machine as a purely technical object that makes a default modernity and the systems around it work, or we can assume a critical point of intervention, interaction, and relation, where subjectivity, knowledge, and epistemes work on the machine. Taking the latter position, at what point does the technical become personal, relational, and part of retail consumption in everyday conversation? The question is not imposed here as a theoretical exercise but as a point of entry for conversations and storytelling, without which this work would not be possible. In 2011, when I told labour activist Gour Goswami that I wanted to interview him for my research on jute, he said, “Gappo likhben (So you want to write a story)?” Of course! The experience of the machine is vital to the jute worker, and various facets of this experience form the core of what I call machine stories. These stories are as much about the people who run machines or keep them going as they are about the machines. Machine stories are tied to sensible and sensory responses to clunky pieces of metal, cogs, wires, levers, wheels, belts, switches, gear, grease, emulsions, contraptions of various proportions, measurements, functions, capacities, dynamics, movements, and technical complexities and capacities. In a jute mill of medium size, rollers, threshers, feeders, carders, spinners, winders, beamers, cutters, pulleys, belts, weavers, looms, and many other mechanical switches, knobs, levers, parts, and moving bodies create a dynamic environment in which emotion, sensation, psychology, corporeality, and the instincts of fear, survival, security, and resistance play a large part in the function, operation, and productivity of the machine. Precision, accuracy, information, and experience are the basic elements necessary to survive the imposing and alienating worlds of mechanical objects. And yet, when the people who work tirelessly in various mill and maintenance departments effortlessly and emphatically explain the numerous distinctions in size, shape, dimension, and weight of different machines, they represent technological affects. Contrary to conventional wisdom in labour research, affect does not diminish the weight or validity of questions about the ethics and politics of

174  Further Critiques of Political Economy mechanical work in abusive corporate systems of exchange and profit; if anything, affect complicates the exchanges and relationships in labour markets. Given that the machine is vital to the culture of jute, are machine stories translatable in shared cultures of mechanical work and toil elsewhere in India and the world? Logs, flow charts, workflows, information, cycles, production statistics, and knowledge belonging to technical literatures, production cycles, and breakdowns are generally overlooked in academic research on labour because they appear as means (technique) to ends (commodities). The means, I claim, can be subjectively appreciated, simply because those who retool the means are individual workers who constantly engage, communicate, and present both straightforward and complex scenarios, directing attention to decision-making and everyday chains of operations. Likewise, the many levels and loops of communication on the floor are as complexly produced as the finished products. These forms of communication spill over into the larger culture around the chatkal or the jute mill, known as chatkalia or “jute mill culture.” In this sense, gossip, rumours, jokes, casual conversations, and everyday forms of language become the critical markers of subjectivity. Jute mills are rumour-prone, as both ethnographic work and literary and cultural texts written by jute biographers, novelists, observers, and even industry analysts from the 1940s have indicated; this continues to be true today. For example, during my fieldwork in 2011, a brief interaction with one teli chacha or “oil uncle” in Kamarhatty Jute Mill revealed that he and my father had been friends; he was pleased to learn that I had returned to the place where my father worked for more than twenty-five years. Rumour spread fast among the workers that the father’s son had returned to do “his work.” My family history thus created a sense of a shared past and personal touch that generated discussions and debates in the mill and outside in the evening at local chai and sweet shops. In less than a week’s time, I was no longer the outsider. viewed with suspicion as “company ka aadmi” (company’s designated personnel) but someone with whom one could chat in a friendly way.5 This made it easy to get to know the mechanics on the factory floor and in the kamarshala. This indicates the circulation of hearsay, gossip, and, ultimately, the vigorous presence of a community. We Are Engineer-Like: Visvakarma and the Ritual of Work The Hindu engineer-god Visvakarma, at once a mechanic and the architect of the universe, has a special place in the jute works and other workshops in the wider community. I argue that absorbing a non-secular ritual body into the metallic bodies of the mill produces a complex rite of attention that is neither premodern (waiting to be modern) nor postcolonial—to critique Dipesh Chakrabarty’s idea of the “waiting room of history” as well as his portrayal of the jute industry as “anachronistic” in (Chakrabarty 2000 and 1989). Instead, it is a ritual like many other rituals, verbal and nonverbal, integral to everyday life. For example, the everyday act of riding beat up Raleigh bicycles to work and the act of worshipping Visvakarma share a common trait: habit.6 [Critique Arnold’s Everyday Tech here? Arnold 2015.] Looking at the Hooghly works today, any other essentialist meaning we

Broken But Not Useless  175 could assign to this ritual, particularly based on the notion of difference, is pushing the limits too much; instead, commonsensically, rituals are a part of participation in and the coherence of everyday work. This is particularly important because in neoliberal capitalism, difference (cultural, ethnic, societal) is usually treated as a matter of preference and marketing practices. This becomes more evident in the inimitable localized spaces of the jute mohalla (neighbourhood) bazaar which accommodates cheap digital and virtual commodities. In the Hooghly works, I became friendly with a mechanic I will call Ratan-da (“da” is a mark of elderly respect in Bengali; the name has been changed for confidentiality). Ratan-da has been mending analogue jute machines for over forty years. Ratan-da acknowledged that he and his mechanic colleagues are not engineers with formal degrees or even a formal apprenticeship system. However, Ratan-da and his colleagues as well as his jugaad (helpers) are responsible not only for “ordinary routine maintenance” but also for redesign, re-envisioning, and enactment of repair work of the total machine works necessary for global production. The repair mechanic’s mantra is trial and error. This, Ratan-da contends, is part of the tradition of Visvakarma. The body mechanic thus posits his own work as belonging to Visvakarma’s larger work of creation; the critical part of the ritual is to worship the god along with the tools he holds in his hands, the haturi (hammer) and cheni (chisel). Visvakarma’s presence is found in the Puranas7 as well as the mangal kavyas (“poetry of well-being,” medieval narrative poems about local deities) of Bengal like the Manasa Mangal. In the Manasa mangal, which involves the wooing of Chand sadagar (Chand the merchant), a Siva worshipper, by the snake goddess Manasa, Visvakarma appears as the architect of an iron palace that Chand sadagar wants to build to save his youngest son Lakhindar, from Manasa’s wrath, as she has ordained that he will be fatally bitten by a snake on his wedding day. Visvakarma builds an invincible fortress but cannot seal the entire structure off—he must leave one tiny hole for the system to “breathe.” Manasa sends in her snake through this hole to kill Lakhindar, but Behula, the chaste wife, brings her husband back from the realm of the dead with her piety. The point of this story in the present context is that even Visvakarma, the architect of the universe, is not infallible. Therefore, nothing is beyond repair. Both imperial observers and postcolonial critics have tended to look at the “event” of a puja to establish the actual “ritual” dependence of individuals on work and other social and community forms of being. For example, postcolonial and gender scholars have drawn on Visvakarma puja to explain the internal cliques of jute industrial labour (Chakrabarty 1989; Fernandes 1997); anthropologist Laura Bear argues in her work on a Bengali shipyard that Visvakarma puja and its domestic form, Ranna puja (cooking puja) manipulates the worker’s sense of self and identity both at work and at home (Bear 2013). Yet forms of belief and other cultural frames of reference are not confined to the puja event; rather, they are diffused in daily practices and habits of thought and expression throughout the seasons. In the jute mill as well as in other kinds of repair work, metalwork, etc. in India, traces of Visvakarma are discernible in everyday work forms, in manifold acts and

176  Further Critiques of Political Economy moments of intuiting and performing work. This is particularly evident in the mechanics’ admission that they are not “engineers” but are “engineer-like” in the sense that they are engaged in repairing the “total works,” which involves practice and specific modes of attention such as calculation, discernment, and intuition.

Masin ka Darsan: Envisioning the Machine in “Ordinary Routine Maintenance” This is the philosophy of the machine, that human work should be less, that in one’s spare time one be human, adept at some other task.8 Gopal Prasad, Chatkalia dohe, 1978, p. unmarked. Gopal Prasad, a weaver in Kankinara Jute Mill and a poet in Hindi and Bhojpuri, invokes masin ka darsan, the philosophy of the machine, in the lines quoted above from his Chatkalia dohe (Jute mill couplets): the hope of mechanization freeing up time and energy for “some other kind of work” is realized in the form of deep inequality and injustice, in which the worker gets rest and free time only at the cost of hunger during factory lockouts, strikes, or chatai (retrenchment). Yet Prasad’s poetry was and is part of a diverse and dynamic “jute mill culture,” known locally as chatkalia, teeming with old and new forms of artistry and performance: the doha (couplet) form going back to Kabir, the trans-linguistic ghazal form (travelling from Persian through Urdu into Bhojpuri), and contemporary poetics drawing on the Hindi modernists; the nautanki (operatic) and contemporary Bhojpuri musical forms that connect “traditional folk” with popular cinema, electronic or “techno” music, and digital media. In a similar way, the traditional handicrafts—patshilpa (working with the raw jute fiber in various forms, including tantshilpa or handloom weaving) as well as the work of the kamar (blacksmith) and other artisans—were not completely replaced by modern industry or chotshilpa (mass production of processed jute textiles) as is usually assumed, but have lived on in some way, incorporated in and transformed by the industry. Note that in Bangla, shilpa means both art/craft and industry. The relationship between the handloom and the powerloom, and that of both looms to a long and complex history of poetry and politics, is beyond the scope of this paper. What I want to highlight here is that repair work has a strong element of handicraft which is often overlooked, and that it involves a certain kind of vision of the machine (not so incidentally, darsan or “philosophy” more literally means “vision”). In the kamarshala, the “body mechanics” (naturalized as bodi mekanik) are responsible for “ordinary routine maintenance” of analog mill machinery. As commentators from both the colonial and postcolonial periods have remarked, (Wallace 1928; Chakrabarty 1989; Sen 1999), the expression, “ordinary routine maintenance” is a euphemism for making do with old technology and machines for a variety of purposes such as cost-cutting and cheap labor utilization (Das 2004).

Broken But Not Useless  177 Nevertheless, local and migrant populations have eked out a living for several generations performing maintenance work. The repair community within the mill includes degree-holding engineers, informally trained mistri (mechanics), and jugaad (helpers). Transmission of the skills and knowledge of repair happens largely through informal apprenticeship, often expressed in terms of relationships between ustad (teachers or experts) and shagird (students, apprentices). Tiwariji (the suffix “ji” is used for elders or respected persons), the head engineer of the mechanical department, and Iqbal, the lead mechanic, told me a good deal about the system of apprenticeship in the department and the process of learning and performing repair work. Tiwariji is known among his colleagues and apprentices as a “sochnewala” (thinker) of machines, work, technics, and ethics.9 It is hard to determine whether this is because he has a technical degree from Benaras Hindu University, or because he feels responsible for the everyday performance of his own and others’ work, or if he is simply obsessive, or all of the above. In any case, I want to highlight the act of seeing (dekhna), both literal and metaphorical, which emerges as critical to the technics, mechanics, and dynamics of malfunction as much as any other kind of productive work.10 The key question is, what is there to see? Or perhaps more appropriately, what must one look for? Three aspects of repair work emerge as we approach this question: hisab, or “calculation,” dekhke samajhna, “to look and understand,” or loosely, “discernment,” and samajhke dekhna, “to understand and then look,” or loosely, “intuition.” The word hisab literally means accounting, a method that requires calculations and measured responses to a problem; the phrase hisab-kitab refers to taking notes. The technical capacity to take notes, read, and interpret them according to the demands of engineering is an important practice that Tiwariji has taught Iqbal and all his apprentices for years. In fact, according to Tiwariji: hisab-kitab karna asan nahin hai. kaam sikhne ke liye yeh zaroori hai. bachhon ka kaam nahin. (Taking notes isn’t easy. It’s essential to learning the work. It’s not something a child can do.) And yet, Tiwariji confesses, hisab karna hi sab kuch nahin hai. dekh ke samajhna chahiye. (Accounting is not all. You must be discerning.) Both Tiwariji and his disciple Iqbal readily agree that the process of maintenance is at once mechanical, thoughtful, and intuitive. There are mechanical and technical aspects of any given maintenance problem that one must learn on the job in an ongoing process; yet the intuitive aspects of the problem demand equal attention.

178  Further Critiques of Political Economy I want to tell a story about the hati kal or “elephant machine” to better illustrate this. The hati kal, of which there are usually eight or nine running in one mediumsized jute factory, softens or loosens the jute fibre before it is sent to the carding machine for breaking and “finishing” into rolls, which are then sent to the drawing machine, where the first yarn is made. The hati kal, as its name suggests, is a large machine, several meters high, and electric powered; it is rectangular in shape, with a sprayer in the middle that sprays emulsions from a certain height to soften the jute fibre as it travels through the belly of the machine on conveyer belts by a series of cogs, wheels, and larger and smaller pulleys. As the machine releases the loosened fibres at the other end, the fibres are piled up—a process known as piling. On a regular working shift, a single machine is capable of piling about forty rollers or so. These machines date back to the 1920s and so break down easily and often. During each maintenance job, at least two to three individuals must put their heads together. Since the parts are also old (because they belong to the old machines), spares must sometimes be “made” on-site in the mechanical departments. When this happens—and it happens a lot—the team expands to include expert borers, threaders, fitters, drillers, chisellers, and lathe operators. Mapping a job then includes mechanics of various orders and skills shuttling back and forth between the mill side and the maintenance department or workshop. In the present story, the hati kal broke down twice in the months of March and April 2011. Mechanic Iqbal and his assistants Aftab and Ram worked for two days in a row to get the “pina” (pin) right. On the first day, Iqbal dismantled the machine, taking out the cogs, levers, wheels, belts, and pulleys, and Ram and Aftab observed and participated while sitting on the large frame of the machine. Each part was then tested for quality, requiring cutting, reshaping, recalibrating, and all the necessary mechanical operations. Meanwhile, Iqbal and his assistants discussed the process every step of the way, forming a coherent narrative. About a quarter of the way through the job, the pressure cylinder became the centre of the conversation. The pressure cylinder releases emulsions with two control valves on its side. Jute mill machinery of the older make have manual pressure controls with an analogue ghari kanta (clock dial), which needs to be read at regular intervals. When these controls fail, it is time to take the machine apart and set it back on its feet again. Iqbal explained, yeh ghari kanta ko dekh kar hisab lagana padta hai. (You have to make your calculations based on this pressure clock meter.) Of course, mechanics must pay attention to meters, pressure cylinders, and indicators if they want to do the repair work successfully. But in Iqbal’s assessment, this accounting must be done based on not only what one physically sees, but also what one can see conceptually and intuitively: yeh soch ke batana padta hai (you must think before making statements)

Broken But Not Useless  179 The cause of a malfunction is not always easily detected, and sometimes all it takes is a push— yeh sab purana masin hai. kabhi do char laat marne par chal padhta hai. (These are all old machines, sometimes, you need to kick and shove them to make them start working again.) With old-style machines, the “kicking and shoving” is to be taken literally; Choubey, the supervisor, usually keeps a list of drawing machines that need frequent shoving. If the machine can’t run even after a push or normal troubleshooting, such as: power hai? Lever up ya down hai? Upar ka batti jal rahi hai? Niche ka switch adha daba hua hai? Lever me pina ghusa nahin hai na? pina hatha do to zara? (is there power? Is the lever up or down? Is the light on top on? Is the switch underneath half-pressed? There is no pin that is jacking the lever, right? If so, can you remove the pin please?) then the next step is something harder to explain: agar hatha na sakte ho to utha ke dekho. Thik se dekho. Dikh nahin raha hai? Tab samajh ke dekho. (If you can’t remove it, please lift it and look. Look carefully. You can’t see it? Then, try to understand it [and then see, a construction difficult to translate].) Sensing one’s way into the processes of work is everything, whether in “ordinary routine maintenance” (working machine maintenance) or in detecting and correcting malfunction. As Iqbal narrated each step in the troubleshooting with possible solutions, the cogs and wheels of the hati kal refused to rotate and the pressure cylinder did not show the normal mark of seventy on the pressure clock dial. Iqbal knew it was time to start making elaborate notes about what was precisely wrong. Although these large, old machines are not conventionally associated with precision engineering, working with them requires a great deal of precision; the livelihoods of repair workers depend on the combination of precise calculation, discernment, and intuition. The Mechanic in Local and Global Discourses The story of the hati kal related above gives us some idea of the “body mechanic” and the manual and thought processes of learning and doing repair work on the

180  Further Critiques of Political Economy factory floor and in the kamarshala. Little work exists on the figure of the body mechanic in labour histories and ethnographies, with a few exceptions in Indian scholarship such as the work of ethnologist K. P. Chattopadhyay (Chattopadhyay 1952) and that of the “cultural biographers of jute,” Mohanlal Gangopadhyay (Gangopadhyay 1963) and Gorakhnath Mishra (Mmishra 2009). Lately, in the context of the ethnography of “globalization,” the work of repair has begun to gain more attention in English-language academia. The idea of the mechanic as automatically fragmented has recently become the centrepiece of sociological attention, especially in Michael Burawoy and Joseph Blum’s Global Ethnography (2000). In the sociological imagination, the mechanic in the “global” context—“global” here refers mostly to the Eastern Bloc countries newly recruited to the European Union as well as industrialized and “individualized” economies in the West—is a fragmented and redundant figure, living in between jobs, despite decades of experience in his trade. This emergent scenario acknowledges the shift within economies and societies in “globalization,” a broadly construed phenomenon that has been criticized for its Euro-American bias. Thus, mechanics in the West in the Euro-American “global ethnography” are construed as “utility workers,” declassified, reclassified, and ultimately, disposable. Concomitantly, the individual and collective sites of their work— industrial machinery—are junked into archives of “industrial memory,” to be reinvented in spaces like Maker Faire and Do-It-Yourself hobbyist communities. What then do we make of the figure of the jute mill mechanic in the context of “globalization”? Should we treat this figure as part of a global or a local discourse? In jute mill culture, the “body mechanic” is contrasted and yet connected to the idea of the toota-foota mekanik (“fragmented mechanic”) of semi-automatic and semi-analog technologies; the objects of repair in jute communities thus include purana masin (old machines) and their parts, such as the hati kal and its pina, in the factories as well as a variety of household appliances and utilities such as TVs and electrical connections out in the community. In order to understand the toota-foota or “fragmented” mechanic, we first have learn more about the “body mechanic” and his vision of the total works. As evident from the story of the hati kal, entering a field of semi-specialized process layout machinery without prior advanced knowledge might seem bewildering, but over time it becomes possible to gauge the degree of personalization and collaboration in the mechanic’s lifeworld despite the “asamapta” (incomplete) nature of the work, to echo Mohanlal Gangopadhyay’s asamapta chatabda (1963). In fact, one may rhetorically argue that what organized capitalism (along with petty trading and business practices) has rendered incomplete, the “body mechanic” has attempted to render complete. The Bodi-Mekanik and the Toota-Foota Mekanik: Seeing the Whole in Fragments, or the Hope of Community in a Changing World Intuition and community work contribute to this vision of totality, which marks the difference between Ratan-da as bodi-mekanik and the fabled and rumoured

Broken But Not Useless  181 toota-foota mekanik (fragmented mechanic), who has yet to arrive or may already have arrived on the scene with the introduction of the cheap China-looms in the late 1990s-early 2000s in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Repairing semiautomatic consoles in SEZs requires a new set of skills, which practically no one in the old factory works currently has. For mechanics like Ratan-da, the long process of familiarization has transformed cogs and wheels made of heavy gauge steel, making them a part of specific relations with the self, family, and community. Repair of the old analogue contraptions automatically implies handiwork of some sort, even though the individual may not have caste-occupational connections with the lohar (kamar) or smithy caste today. But before we can arrive at the defragmented mechanic—a deskilled worker— and a lost world of what Western DIY hobbyists would dub “old world charm,” we need to hear how Ratan-da is trying to problematize the category of the bodimekanik, asserting that it is not entirely limited to the specialized space of the industrial works, but is pervasive in local forms of life—it is the very stuff of the community and community work. In a rush of optimism, Ratan-da wonders how long the toota-foota mekanik will be able to endure as a singular category the abstraction of piecemeal and fragmented repair work, in which the mistri will not be able to “see” the work and the works in totality. Ratan-da has a Bengali proverb to support his claim: “juto shelai theke chandi path korte hoy (we do everything from mending our shoes to reciting the mantra of Chandi).” Chandi refers to the goddess celebrated in the Chandimangal, another poem in the medieval genre of mangalkavya. The proverb indicates that a mistri needs to know everything about his work—from the ritual act of reciting the mantra to the actual work and all of its associated tasks, including menial jobs like mending a broken shoe. This capacity to switch from one mode to the other demands an understanding of all kinds of work—the menial, the abstract, and the spiritual. For the postcolonial critic, this appears as an example of incommensurability with “Western” life, in which the dyad of private and public cannot be reconciled. In Ratan-da’s case, the ritualistic interactions between the three categories appear to be the source of his optimism. The question is, does this optimism have any basis in reality? Ratan-da carefully founds his logic of how the toota-foota mekanik will be coopted by the philosophy of the bodi-mekanik at work through the extended family of repair mechanics working in the semi-formal and informal economy on the “outside,” who characterize the life of the household, para/mohalla (neighbourhood; para is the Bangla word roughly corresponding to the Hindi-Urdu mohalla), and locality. As examples, Ratan-da cites the repair mechanics of manual, semiautomatic, and automatic household appliances, from broken mixer grinders to colour television sets, who have been setting up micro-repair shops in his para (neighbourhood) called Nawadapara in the south-eastern side of the mill since the 1980s. I was aware of this already, having lived in the same locality in the 1980s and 1990s; these micro-shops exist all over the Kolkata area, concentrated in socioeconomically disadvantaged pockets. This is not the place to survey household

182  Further Critiques of Political Economy appliances and their repair genealogies, but I would like to give one example to situate the bodi-mekanik argument above. Hearing Ratan-da speak about the bodi-mekanik and its extended family so convincingly, I decided to follow up on this idea before returning to the jute works. Among other things, I visited Shahid, the mistri our family always called on to fix our television set when I was living there in the 1980s and 1990s. The son of a jute worker in the batching department, Shahid had made a strong reputation for himself at the time among the scores of TV repair mechanics in the locality. He used to make a living out of TV repair but has now upgraded to repairing computer hardware—a result of the flooding of the television and electronic media market since the 1980s. Back then, Shahid’s clients extended well beyond the mohalla and the galli (narrow lanes) of the jute bazaar locality to the central repair bazaar in Chandni Chowk, a heavily congested neighbourhood along Lenin Sarani near Dharamtala in the heart of Kolkata. Chandni Chowk is now also the place to find used and new electronics audio, video, and computer-related consumer items, contraband stuff, and wholesale electronics assembly parts. Shahid’s background and achievements easily qualify him as a reliable interlocutor in this field. Shahid, I learned, never has and still does not replace and “repair” assemblies and circuits by using a sensor arm or replacing entire printed circuit boards (PCBs), but works on individual sites (of the PCB) with a soldering iron—a common method of DIY electronics repair. This kind of work requires a deliberate dismantling of ICs, capacitors, and transistors. A thorough visualization and re-visualization of a copper-clad PCB is necessary to perform this cuttingedge work. The advantage is that this kind of micro-repair work can be done for a fraction of the cost of replacing an entire PCB, which often costs nearly as much as the unit itself. In the micro-repair of PCBs, each part is hand-tested, crafted, and fixed as per circuitry needs and requirements. Technologically, this method is different from “wire” technology in electronics, based on the “single-capacitor” method. Shahid says, “andaz zaroori hai. Dekhne ka kayda hona chaihiye (Intuition/gauging/discerning is essential. You need to know the techniques of seeing).” The “ways of seeing” and discerning a TV or computer motherboard circuitry is admittedly different from seeing pinions on clunkers like the hati kal or other analogue machines in jute factories. Most importantly, a TV/computer repair mechanic needs some form of technical certification, which can be expensive. But what seems common to both kinds of repair work—regardless of apprenticeship and training methods—is the mode of attention and the envisioning of the individual and micro-site(s). In both cases—pinion repair and PCB—the repair technician must have a large enough field of vision, a “total” view, regardless of the manifold ruptures in the work itself. In the case of PCB repair, it is a qualitatively different experience from merely disassembling and replacing the circuit board. According to Shahid, that kind of replacement is what third-party repair units do; while “maalamaal (loaded)” customers might prefer that, it is too expensive for the ordinary customer. But most importantly for Shahid, it is “lazy”

Broken But Not Useless  183 work, dissatisfying as it does not showcase one’s wizardry with an obstinately inoperable, nearly-impossible-to-repair circuit board—such challenges make up the stuff of one’s “zindagi ka kaam” (life’s work). Shahid’s opinion of his own work echoes that of Ratan-da and many mechanics in the kamarshala, for whom hammering, cutting, chiselling, and other forms of “mechanical” and repetitive work also count as expressions of one’s life’s work. In this way, the proverb juto shelai theke Chandi path perhaps represents the baromasya (twelve-month cycle of stories) of a mistri’s everyday life. Conclusion Having explored the jute mill, the kamarshala, and the wider repair community through the machine stories of engineers, body mechanics, and toota-foota mechanics, what does it mean to say that repair is part of an ecology of hope? We can think of repair as an integral feature of the jute ecology in the sense that it is what keeps life going under harsh conditions, with available tools and materials; and in the light of the current global crisis, it seems clear that members of the community must continue and are continuing to innovate ways of making the household economy work despite the wheels of commerce coming to a grinding halt at the national and global levels. If nothing else, we can hope to learn from this example. In Spaces of Hope, David Harvey exhorts us to imagine ourselves as “insurgent architects” who strive to change the world and ourselves by envisioning utopian spaces and by “making and breaking” the rules of the community, which he fears “almost invariably degenerates into regressive exclusions and fragmentations” without the intervention of the utopian visionary. Throughout the book, Harvey presents the increased diversity and mobility of the global workforce and reclaiming of marginality, cultural identity, and the body as obstacles to global change, attempting to resurrect a largely Euro-American “dialectical utopianism” as a “space of hope” (Harvey 2000). The problem is that this utopian vision is founded on a projected homogeneity and will therefore never really include people like the jute mill repair workers in Kolkata. Repair workers, I argue, are not marginal at all but integral to the jute industry, community, and culture, and ultimately to contemporary capitalism and globalization in the “global south.” The misplaced fear of community devolving into communalism seems based on a top-down political theology of the state and the political process in which the community is subservient to other processes. I began this essay by exploring the relations between human and mechanical bodies; what interests me there is no domination in the social process alone, but the play of intricate relations in habitual and ritual processes of the body, the multifariousness of work, knowledge forms, and sharing practices. This extends to chatkalia, the culture of jute, a space shared by Hindu, Muslim, Bengali, Bihari, Telugu, and Oriya men and women and by diverse cultural forms such as Visvakarma puja and the Bhojpuri nautanki; the cultural identity of jute workers is constructed both

184  Further Critiques of Political Economy along and across the lines of caste, gender, and regional origin, and yet this unity in diversity cannot be reduced to “class,” a category which has been seriously challenged by the Dalit movement. As Prasad remarks in several of his Chatkalia dohe: Every jute mill is itself a little Hindustan in which the penniless work hard, Hindu or Musalman Oriyas, Telugus, Vilaspuris, Biharis, and U​.P​.it​es, the jute mill region is everyone’s pilgrimage site Both weavers are fat and cheerful, both work the loom fast, but still the two are not the same, they are of different castes Where does this leave us regarding hope? Repair workers may not see themselves as “insurgent architects” designing a utopian society, but they do see themselves as participating in an architecture that connects human/machine, body/community, and universe; their space of hope is not imagined and future but real and every day: the factory floor, the workshop, the bazaar, the mohalla, the household. Obviously, this does not mean that the struggle is over. Prasad wonders: New tools of exploitation are ever being made, but the exploited, how will they be saved? I want to conclude that it may be necessary to return to work and its intricate relations with something of a clean slate, and with a bit more trust in community and community-formation. Notes 1 Samita Sen notes that the hati kal was a source of frequent accidents in the 1920s and 1930s. Women’s bangles would get caught in the moving parts of the large machine. 2 Abbas, chat in tea shop, Kamarhati, August 2011 or interview in Kamarhatty Jute Mill, April 2011. 3 In a culture where mainly Bhojpuri speaking people from several districts of Bihar (Ara, Siwan, Muzaffarpur, Patna, Gaya) and eastern Uttar Pradesh in India are viewed as the proper subjects of labour, it is necessary to historicize. In jute communities, individuals are known both by their first names and by their caste, community, and religious affiliations, as well as by their statuses as workers, supervisors, contractors, or managers. 4 The average age of rehired mechanics (80% of jute mill mechanics are rehired) is about 60 years, and their average work experience is about 32 years—seven or eight years more than that of workers in other departments. 5 This experience can be contrasted with what Leela Fernandes reports about her experience with jute workers in the 1990s: it took her a lot of time to adjust and the distance between the ethnographer and the subject remains quite visible throughout her fieldwork on the floor, although her experience with the labor colonies and lines did help bring her close to people in the community. 6 This is quite clearly a question of identity. See Sen 1999. 7 Literally “ancients,” a vast and diverse body of literature in Sanskrit and regional languages including mythological stories that were passed down orally and then in manuscript. 8 Translation by Rebecca Whittington (unpublished). 9 Interviews with Shyamal Roy, mechanic, Kamarhatty Jute Mill, April 2011.

Broken But Not Useless  185 10 Outside the floor, mechanics, fitters, union workers, jobbers, contractors, and managers from Kamarhati to Metiabruz (the northern and southern extremes of the Hooghly jute industry) commented on the critical phenomenon of seeing and feeling about machines.

References and selected bibliography Arnold, David. Everyday Technology: Machines and the Making of Modern India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. Basu, Samaresh. Jagaddal (1966). In Samaresh Basu Rachanabali Vol. IV. Kolkata: Ananda, 2012. Bear, Laura. “‘This Body is Our Body:’ Viswakarma Puja, the Social Debts of Kinship and Theologies of Materiality in a Neo-Liberal Shipyard.” In Vital Relations: Kinship as a Critique of Modernity, edited by Fenella Cannell and Susan McKinnon, 155–178. Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2013 (Spring). Burawoy, Michael, Joseph Blum, Sheba George, Zsuzsa Gille, and Millie Thayer, eds. Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000. Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Rethinking Working Class History: Bengal 1890–1940. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. ———. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001, orig, 2000. Chattopadhyay, Kshiti Prasad. A Socio-Economic Survey of Jute Labour. Calcutta: Department of Social Work, Calcutta University, 1952. Das, Nilanjan. Of Dust and Distress. Delhi: Indian Publishers and Distributors, 2004. Fernandes, Leela. Producing Workers: The Politics of Gender, Class, and Culture in the Calcutta Jute Mills. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997. Gangopadhyay, Mohanlal. asamāpta chatābda (The Incomplete Century of Jute). Kolkata: Grantha Prakash, 1369 (1963). Ghatak, Ritwik, dir. Ajantrik (Non-mechanical). Kolkata: L.B. Films International, 1958. Ghosh, Subodh. “Ajantrik (Non-mechanical).” Date unknown, possibly late 1930s. In Subodh Ghosh, Galpasamagra (Collected Stories) Vol. 1. Kolkata: Ananda, 1994. Gourhan, Andre Leroi. De Haan, Arjan. Unsettled Settlers: Migrant Workers and Industrial Capitalism in Calutta. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Harvey, David. Spaces of Hope. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000. Israel, Mohammad. Fark (short stories). Calcutta: (publisher unknown), 1938. Kazi, Nazrul Islam. Gangar du dhare onek mil (could not find the date). Marx, Karl. Capital Vol. I. Trans. Ben Fowkes. New York: Vintage, 1977. ———. Grundrisse. Trans. Martin Nicolaus. New York: Vintage, 1857 (1973). Mishra, Gorakhnath. Jute: udhyog evam shramik. Kolkata: Arindam Prakashan, 2009. Mukhopadhyay, Bhaskar. The Rumor of Globalization: Globalism, Counterworks and the Location of Commodity. Dialectical Anthropology 29 (2005): 35–60. Prasad, Gopal. Chatkalia dohe. Kakinada: Rekhodoy Prakashan, 1978. Sen, Samita. Women and Labour in Colonial India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Simondon, Gilbert. On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. University of Western Ontario, 1980 [1958].

186  Further Critiques of Political Economy Stiegler, Bernard. Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998 and 2010. ———. For a New Critique of Political Economy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010. Wallace, D.R. The Romance of Jute: A Short History of the Calcutta Jute Mill Industry. Calcutta: W. Thacker & Co., 1928 (2nd edition).

12 Rethinking and Transforming Critiques of Political Economy: Gandhi-Kumarappa Pathways Jos Chathukulam and Manasi Joseph

Introduction Mahatma Gandhi and his close associate J. C. Kumarappa, a renowned Gandhian economist, envisioned a non-violent social and economic order that promoted equity and justice for all. Gandhi and Kumarappa shared a common belief that “the only path to true democracy in political life, and to peace among nations was a decentralized economic and political system where, necessarily, the rewards were moderate” (Kumarappa, 1936, p. 27). They firmly believed that economic progress was not to be measured in monetary terms alone and proposed that an ideal social order should afford every individual the fullest measure of political, economic, social, and spiritual autonomy to fulfil their creative potentials (Govindu and Malghan, 2016). For Gandhi and Kumarappa, a decentralized Indian economy was an alternative strategy to fight the evils of capitalism and socialism. Kumarappa, who was a devoted disciple of Gandhi, was heavily invested in the development of an economics rooted in Gandhian values of satya (truth) and ahimsa (non-violence). Kumarappa, who has been widely accepted as the true Gandhian economist, always wanted to establish an Economy of Permanence within the Gandhian framework of satya, ahimsa, nature, spirituality, ecology, sustainability, and intergenerational justice. Kumarappa emphasized on decentralization of production and distribution to establish a natural order (Nadkarni et al., 2018). Kumarappa strongly argued that Economy of Permanence has the potential to bring harmony at the level of state, society, nature, institutions, groups, and individuals and these are crucial factors when it comes to establishing a sustainable development order in the post-pandemic India. Gandhi and Kumarappa were of the opinion that villages should serve as the foundation of economic planning. Kumarappa’s vision was that of a decentralized economic planning aimed at making villages self-sufficient and self-reliant in such a way that the villagers can make optimum use of local resources (Kumarappa, 1945). Kumarappa’s economic doctrine—the Economy of Permanence gives emphasis on a sustainable natural order in which “human beings collaborate with nature to meet their needs without disrupting the natural patterns of growth and renewal”, (Kumarapppa, 1945). Eminent historian Ramchandra Guha calls Kumarappa as the Green Gandhi considering the fact that his writings reflect the need to conserve and preserve the earth and its resources. The motive behind the Economy of Permanence was to establish a sustainable model of DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-15

188  Further Critiques of Political Economy development to ward off the harmful effects of industrialization. In short, Gandhi and Kumarappa introduced a distinct and perspective understanding of the “economic question” and its relationship to individual and social well-being (Govindu and Malghan, 2016). Gandhi and Kumarappa presented an alternative economic development model to modern days green economy, ecological economics, happiness economics, and degrowth (Taneja, 2021; Gerber and Raina, 2018). Gandhi and Kumarappa stood for local economic development based on values such as solidarity, self-help, mutual aid and cooperative efforts. Gandhi-Kumarappa economic model proposed that community-based, community-owned, community-managed enterprises and artisan-based economies for fostering local economic development (Lindley, 2007; Gireesan and Chathukulam, 2020). While Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s call for Aatmanirbhar Bharat may have political undertones, one cannot deny the fact that the concept of Aatmanirbhar Bharat or Self-Reliant India is very much a Gandhian concept. Modi’s Aatmanirbhar Bharat envisages a self-reliant economy in which the needs of the country will be met domestically, the same was preached by Gandhi through his Swadeshi, Swaraj. The Union Government’s Make in India and Vocal for Local are also rooted in Gandhian ideals. Meanwhile, how far Aatmanirbhar Bharat and similar initiatives will operate through the Gandhian “means and ends” need to be seen. Though the medium and small-scale industries (MSMEs) which contributes to around 30 per cent to country’s GDP, were on the verge of a financial distress, in the post-pandemic scenario, the Union and state governments have been rolling out some schemes to revive and uplift MSMEs. However, whether it will give the desired results needs to be critically evaluated. Apart from decentralizing the industrial structure for rural development, Gandhi strongly advocated for decentralization of political power. Gandhi believed that decentralization of politico-economic system was necessary to prevent exploitation, inequality and conflicts. Decentralization forms the organizational method of the Gandhian-Kumarappa model. Gandhi wanted a decentralized pattern of development because such a pattern was required to achieve accomplish a holistic development. Gandhi was of the opinion that decentralized industries can play a crucial role in the development of a country like India with the least disturbance and dislocation. The philosophy of decentralization confirms to the principle of minimum dislocation and small and village industries could serve the purpose of decentralization (Ghosh, 2012). Gandhi and Kumarappa believed that centralized industries, especially large-scale industries are anti-democratic while village industries are conducive to the growth of amicable relations between labour and capital. Gandhi and Kumarappa also believed that decentralization can prevent violence. The decentralization of economic power through the development of village and cottage industries as a means to eradicate the concentration of economic power in a few hands. In Gandhian political economy, the decentralization is advocated for at least four basic reasons: for better administration, control, and supervision, for eradicating the possibility of violence as centralized institutions are more prone to violence and conflicts, to prevent the misuse of power and authority in the name of settling socioeconomic problems and for maximization of individual freedom

Transforming Critiques of Political Economy  189 (Ghosh, 2012). Gandhi was also in favour of giving more power to people’s organizations including Panchayats. Kumarappa argued that “only decentralized production will improve the situation of people permanently” (Chathukulam et al., 2018). The key difference between Gandhi-Kumarappa economic model and the Marxist and Capitalist economy is that the Gandhi-Kumarappa model gives emphasis to a need-based economy with minimalist production while the other two dominant ideologies focus on maximizing production and thrives for a greed-based economy. Critique of Political Economy of Capitalism and Marxism through the Lens of Gandhi-Kumarappa Political Economy Though Gandhi’s ideas were rich in political economy elements, he never attempted to present his ideas on political economy through a theoretical framework and here is where the significance of Kumarappa arises. To Gandhi, the term “political” is broad and pervasive and it encompasses economic, social, political, and religious factors. B. N Ghosh in his book titled Gandhian Political Economy: Principles, Practices and Policy, argues that Gandhi-Kumarappa Political economy is based on four pillars and they are: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Satya (Truth) Ahimsa (Non-Violence) Anasakthi (Non-Attachment to Worldly Wealth) Sarvodaya (Welfare of all)

The sociopolitical principles of Gandhian-Kumarappa political economy such as path tendency, holism, ceremonial encapsulation, and circular and cumulative causation are very much dependent upon the interdependent principles of truth, nonviolence, non-possession/attachment, and welfare of all (Ghosh, 2012). In the case of Kumarappa, one of the trusted disciples of Gandhi, his entire ideas and concepts are solely based on the two fundamental principles of Truth and Non-Violence. Like Gandhi, Kumarappa also had a holistic view of development and formulated an ethical economics or in other words he formulated an economics rooted in spirituality and nature called the Economy of Permanence and today it remains one of the best available literatures on Gandhian political economy framework. In Gandhi’s own words, “only through truth and non-violence” in every walk of life people can experience deliverance. The Kumarappa-Gandhian framework suggests that economic development must emphasize on the production of the basic necessities of life and surplus resources should be allocated for the improvement of the quality of life at the community and family levels (Ghosh, 2012). Gandhi and Kumarappa were in favour of labour-surplus economy in which labour-intensive methods of production can be increased for increasing employment and income and in reducing poverty. Gandhi was right in his observation that in a labour-surplus economy like India, labour-displacing technological innovation was not appropriate and this has often led to a false assumption that Gandhian

190  Further Critiques of Political Economy political economy is incompatible with the technological progress in the contemporary world. It is also to be noted that it was visionaries like Gandhi and Kumarappa who advocated the fact that economic performance should be measured and evaluated on the basis of human development and not on the basis of GDP. It is also interesting to note that much before Human Development Index (HDI), it was Gandhi who popularized the idea of measuring economic performance through holistic welfare through his Sarvodaya. For Gandhi and Kumarappa, “the basic desideratum of all social action and policy is the maximization of social welfare that invariably includes individual welfare” (Ghosh, 2012). Gandhi-Kumarappa concept of welfare is based on the growth of the totality of an individual. The Gandhi-Kumarappa framework is against the neoclassical notion of homo-economicus (Ghosh, 2012). Their economic framework is based on the economics of basic human needs including food, clothing, and shelter and suggested that all economic activities should be based on moral and ethical considerations. Economics that hurts the moral well-being of an individual or nation is immoral and, therefore, sinful… True economics never militates against the highest ethical standard; just all true ethics to be worth its name must at the same time be also good economics. (Gandhi, 1968) The basic worldview of Gandhian political economy is that of a society where there would be an “internalization of spiritual values, abstention from greed and capacity, absence of abuse of power, of exploitation and rent-seeking, and a fuller scope for liberty and capability extension” (Ghosh, 2012). The present-day materialistic and profit-centric world order can look up to mutual cooperation based on ethics and morality and the motto of equal respect and opportunities to address the various imbalances and disorders that ail them. The problems and challenges faced by many countries including socialist, capitalist and communist, and democratic countries in the world right from rising inequality to poverty to food insecurity to environmental issues can be addressed to a large extent if they can operate within a Gandhian-Kumarappa political economy framework. For Gandhi and Kumarappa, the development of village economy was meant to be an appropriate answer to the dominant economic ideologies of capitalism and communism. Kumarappa argues that both capitalism and communism are based on the consideration of material values that forget the aspect that the myth of the Economic Man does not exist and in such a framework the “human factor” and “effects of culture” are ignored (Kumarappa, 1936). On the other hand, the GandhiKumarappa proposed a natural order rooted in cultural values and human needs. The Gandhi-Kumarappa framework argues that human beings cannot nurture their full stature under a system that carries a division of labour to the extreme and opined that a person’s religion, politics, social and economic activities, philosophy and his family relations play a significant role in the creation and evolution of a cultural person.

Transforming Critiques of Political Economy  191 According to Kumarappa, imperialism, communism, socialism, Nazism, and fascism are Economies of Transience as they are all based on the fleeting interests that govern the short span of an individual’s life or even that of a group or nation. The major distinction between Gandhian economics and classical economics of both the capitalist and Marxian variety “lies in the underlying assumptions about human being and human conduct and therefore its moral underpinnings. Gandhian Economics is situated within a culture and its mores. (Nair, 2020) Gandhi and Kumarappa emphasize on an economy of permanence that is rooted in spirituality. According to Kumarappa, Man is a piece of the Divine seeking his ultimate union with the Infinite through the love of life all around him. His end is not self-indulgence and enjoyment during his short span of three score years and ten. He should look at himself in the perspective of eternity and exclaim: “What is man that Thou art mindful of him?” We have no continuing city here. We are all campdwellers and sojourners. (Kumarappa, 1936) Kumarappa argues that such a belief in the Divine ordering of the universe as proposed by Mahatma Gandhi can eventually lead to the “progress and prosperity of the human race to a life of peace and goodwill based on culture and refinement” (Kumarappa, 1936; Bandhu, 2018). Both Gandhi and Kumarappa stressed the need of principles of economics to be permanent in nature in which one “recognizes the transience of life and formulate laws in perspective of eternity.” Gandhi had cautioned the world about the hidden dangers posed by large-scale industrialization and rapid urbanization and how it will eventually lead to the destruction of environment (Hind Swaraj, 1909). Gandhi gave emphasis to “production by the masses” as it can result in the development of an economic system that minimizes destruction to the environment and leads to a more sustainable model of development and he suggested Swaraj as a means to accomplish it. Khadi, which has been widely accepted as the symbol of unity, freedom, and equality is also an important aspect of Gandhi-Kumarappa political economy as Khadi also implies the decentralization of production and distribution of necessary products. Gandhi and Kumarappa, in their schema of building village republics, gave great importance to the development of Khadi industries. In Gandhi’s own words, “When once we have revived the one industry (khadi) all other industries will follow. I will make the spinning wheel the centre round which all other activities will revolve” (Gandhi, 1968, vol.6:393). It is a widely accepted fact that Gandhi led a zero-carbon footprint lifestyle and Khadi would be the perfect example here. Though Gandhi encouraged the use of Khadi to make India self-reliant and to generate self-employment at the grassroots level, it is also one of the most eco-friendly fabric, a fact many failed to notice

192  Further Critiques of Political Economy even during the time of Gandhi. Not many know that Khadi is a “minimum carbonfootprint fabric” since spinning and weaving of khadi are largely done by hand (with minimal use of water, electricity, or fuel). There is minimum transportation and packaging involved. At a time when we are attempting to mend our ways to save the earth, Gandhian way of life can be helpful not only in reducing carbon emissions but also in generating self-employment opportunities The Relevance of Gandhi-Kumarappa Pathways of Sustainable Development in the Age of Extractivism, Neoextractivism Extractivism refers to those activities that remove large quantities of natural resources that are not processed (or processed only to a limited degree), especially for export (Acosta, 2013). Eduardo Gudynas defines extractivism as a means of describing developments in the mining and oil sectors. The term extractivism was promoted by “large transnational corporations in what we would today describe as the “extractive sector” of capitalist development (mining, fossil fuels), as well as by multilateral banks and governments (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014 and 2020). However, groups and organizations and civil society, as well as environmentalists and political activists opposed to extractivism or different “modes of extraction”, for their negative social and environmental impacts (Veltymeyer, 2020). Acosta argues that extractivism has been a mechanism of colonial and neo colonial plunder and appropriation. This extractivism, which has appeared in different guises over time, was forged in the exploitation of the raw materials essential for the industrial development and prosperity of the global North. And this took place regardless of the sustainability of the extractivist projects or even the exhaustion of the resources. This is compounded by the fact that most of what is produced by the extractive industries is not for consumption in the domestic market but basically destined for export. Despite the scale of this economic activity, it generates very few benefits for the country concerned. Likewise, most of the goods, inputs and specialist services required for the extractive industries to operate rarely come from national companies. And in the countries whose economies are based on extractivism it seems that there has not been much interest in the way the income obtained is used. Extractivism has been a constant in the economic, social and political life of many countries in the global South. (Acosta, 2013) Neoextractivism can be defined as a contemporary and updated version of the extractivism that existed in 1980s and 1990s. Though neoextractivism was commonly used to refer to denote South America’s own contemporary version of developmentalism under a new cultural and political hybridity, now the term is generally used to denote the extractivism done on an extensive scale with the help of advanced technologies and mechanisms. The problems associated with

Transforming Critiques of Political Economy  193 extractivism and neoextractivism does not exist in Gandhi- Kumarappa economic model. Even if some issue arise in this regard, it can be addressed through the Gandhi-Kumarappa economic framework and “natural order.” While Kumarappa doesn’t openly use the word extractivism and neoextractivism it is evident from the words and connotations he has used to describe the exploitation of natural resources for greed. An excerpt from J C Kumarappa’s Why the Village Movement (1936): We have to be sparing in exploiting natural resources and must base it/ on the consumption of labour and of materials that can be created by man which can be available always, rather than live by predation by drawing on natural reservoirs. This lays the emphasis on distribution. Such an organisation will give expression to a mode of life very different from what is considered ‘modern’ in the West. Iron will be used sparingly as mines are reservoirs which will be exhausted in time. As far as possible, all our requirements must come from things that can be produced by man. The supply of wood can be increased by carefully planning the growth and administration of forests. The “Modern” world is of Iron and Steel. We cannot afford to draw on our inheritance too freely and extravagantly. Brick and mortar, cement and wood belong to the regime of the Economy of Permanence while reinforced concrete buildings, steel doors and cabinets are of the transient order. Strange as it may seem the mud huts of India belong to the Economy of Permanence while the steel and concrete sky scrapers of New York are symbols of the Economy of Transience. Similarly, in all other departments of life man has to rely more on his own efforts than the apparent abundance of nature to supply his needs. This will give a fresh orientation to our standards of life. (Kumarappa, 1936, p. 22) Throughout his writings, Kumarappa writes extensively about the exploitation of resources that too without naming it as “extractivism” and “neoextractivism”. According to Kumarappa, Mines and quarries are the treasure trove of the people. Unlike the forests, these are likely to be exhausted by exploitation. Hence great care must be taken to make the best use of thorn. They represent potential employment for the people. When ores are sent out of the country, the heritage of the people of the land is being sold out. It is the birth right of the people to work on the ores and produce finished articles. Today, in India most of the ores are being exported. We are, therefore, not only losing the opportunities of employment for the people but impoverishing the land. Minerals, like other raw materials, have to be worked into consumable articles and only after that can the commerce part of the transaction commence. Any Government that countenances a foreign trade in the raw materials of a country is doing a disservice to the land. A Swaraj Government will not only organise the exploitation of the raw materials for the people but will help them to use

194  Further Critiques of Political Economy these in their industries. Here is the rightful place for large scale industries under the control of the Government. (Kumarappa, 1936, p. 111) The concerns echoed by Kumarappa can be found in the writings of Albert Acosta, an Ecuadorian Economist. In his 2013 paper titled Extractivism and Neoextractivism: Two Sides of the Same Curse, Acosta argues that extractivism is not limited to minerals or oil industry but also in farming, forestry, and fishing. The problem with extractivism and neoextractivism is that the societies rich in natural resources are at the same time impoverished. Acosta cites the major reason behind such an unhealthy trend on the basis of various annual reports and technical studies carried out by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The studies by IDB argue that “development is determined by geography: the countries that are richest in natural resources and closest to the equator are condemned to be more backwardand poor. (…) This suggests a tropical fatalism, whereby nations near the equator seem destined to be poor. (…)” (Acosta, 2013). In the IDB’s judgement, the richer a country is in natural resources, the slower it will develop and the greater its internal inequalities will be” (Gudynas, 2009). While extractivism in the name of development and growth paved the way for a vibrant local economy for a given period of time, in the end it leaves the community impoverished. It has also been observed that in regions that have been subjected to extractivism, a peculiar political economy has been created in that region. The public opinion is in a way manipulated in favour of the vested political interests operating in the region which in a way promotes unchecked extractivism on a large scale. When it comes to politics of extractivism and natural resource development one highly contested argument at the level of politics and policymaking in many developed and developing countries with both a capitalist state, i.e. “a state that is designed or serves above all to advance and protect the interests of the capitalist class, and indigenous communities with a territorial claim on the resources slated for extraction and development.” (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014) For example, Canada is highly dependent on its wealth of natural resources to maintain its advanced level of national development, but when it comes to decision-making, “the disposition of these resources is highly contested and subjected to powerful forces of resistance mobilised by indigenous organizations and communities” (Veltmeyer and Bowles, 2014). It is interesting to note that Kumarappa spoke and wrote about the ill effects of extractivism and neoextractivism way back in 1936, but it took more than 70 years for Western and Latin American scholars to place it within the paradigm of extractivism. Though Kumarappa did not use the word “extractivism” and “neoextractivism”, he foretold the dangers that the future generations will have to face at some point of time. Studies and researches have suggested that “structural transformation and persistence of primary commodity dependence create highly

Transforming Critiques of Political Economy  195 porous extraverted economies, organized around extractive cores as in the case of African economies” (Castel-Branco, 2014). Kumarappa stood for rural India. He believed in what Gandhi said, “India lives in her villages.” His aim was to establish the “Economy of Permanence” based on the principles of nature. Gandhi and Kumarappa stood for self-sufficiency and self-reliance of villages with the help of small-scale and cottage industries. Gandhi too has addressed the issue of extractivism and neoextractivism and it is evident from his own remarks that “If all the needs for raw materials were to be met by the village, why the villagers should not be taught to work on it themselves instead of being exploited by the more resourceful city-dwellers.” Gandhi himself has shed light on the exploitation of resources at the village level by the affluent and powerful sections of the society. Gandhi once said, “But for the last 150 years the trend has been for cities to exist only to squeeze wealth out of the villages. They took raw material from the villages, carried on trade with foreign countries and made crores of rupees. This money did not go to the villagers, or only a very small fraction of it did. The bulk of it went to millionaires and the mill-owners. Towns exist to exploit the villages. The city culture does not therefore fit into the framework of villages.” (Prarthana Pravachan II, pp.185–188)

Why India Needs Gandhi-Kumarappa Solidarity Framework to Achieve Its Sustainable Development Goals? Gandhi-Kumarappa model of economy and sustainable development is closely aligned with the solidarity economy framework rooted in Gandhian ideals of localism, village(ism) and satisfaction of basic needs. India has signed the declaration of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of United Nations. Solidarity economy framework rooted in Gandhian values of localism, village(ism), and satisfaction of basic needs (opposed to capitalism and industrialism) is also particularly relevant in the context of realizing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For instance, in matters related to inclusive growth, the SDG goals including SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), SDG 10 (Reduced inequalities), SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), SDG 12 (Responsible Production and Consumption), SDG 13 (Climate Action) are crucial and all these goals can be accomplished by India if it can embrace Gandhi-Kumarappa sustainable development model. The SDG goals are based on the hypothesis that the existing pattern of development could be reoriented towards achieving the goal of sustainability, whereas Gandhi-Kumarappa model of development goes much beyond the socalled Sustainable Development Goals conceived by the UN (Siby, 2018). GandhiKumarappa’s economy of permanence and peace is highly required not only for accomplishing SDGs but also for the survival of India in the post-pandemic world.

196  Further Critiques of Political Economy Gandhi-Kumarappa Framework for Local Economy and Local Economic Development Like Gandhi, Kumarappa also believed that India lives in its villages. Gandhi and Kumarappa strongly advocated that the villages in India should serve as the foundation of economic planning. The Gandhi-Kumarappa political economy stressed the development of the local economy or village economy. Kumarappa strongly advocated that the villages in India should serve as the foundation of economic planning. Kumarappa’s vision was that of a “decentralized economic planning aimed at making villages self-sufficient so they make optimum use of local resources,” (Kumarappa, 1945). Gandhi and Kumarappa saw the revival of cottage industries as a vital instrument to accelerate local economic development. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts (CAAs) empowers and mandates rural and urban local governments for preparation of plans for economic development and social justice by Panchayats and through this process and an element of GandhiKumarappa framework can be seen here. The 1996 People’s Plan Campaign from Kerala, the Gram Panchayat Development Plan (GPDP) at the national level and Mission Antyodaya framework are also deeply rooted in Gandhi-Kumarappa framework. However, there is no acknowledgment regarding their contribution in shaping these ideas. Being a genuine peace economist, Kumarappa has not made any compromise towards war-oriented industries including nuclear industries which thrive on non-renewable resources (Victus, 2018). Solomon Victus in his paper Decentralization and Inter-generational Justice in J. C. Kumarappa’s writings argues that the concept of economy of permanence is about futuristic economics and his perception is about intergenerational justice (Victus, 2018). Kumarappa’s Vision and Practice of Local Finance Kumarappa envisioned a local economy and finance rooted in the spirit of cooperation and service and sought to link the economy with the Gandhian ideals of harmony and peace along with sustainability. Kumarappa was of the opinion that only decentralized productive activities have the potential to improve the situation of people on a permanent basis (Chathukulam et al., 2018). Kumarappa’s vision and practice of local finance is deeply rooted in the decentralization. For Gandhi and Kumarappa, decentralization and decentralized planning are associated with nonviolence. Kumarappa believed in land reforms through decentralization. Though Kumarappa was not against industrialization, as a true Gandhian he insisted that its pursuit should not lead to an “economy of violence”. Gandhi always asserted “production by masses and not mass production” and Kumarappa argued that if decentralized production and distribution have to be successful, then the administration itself has to be decentralized in the first place. For such a decentralization to happen, Gandhi’s concept of Village Swaraj needs to be established. According to Gandhi, each village is a “little republic” and wanted the political power to be distributed among the villages in India (Guruswamy, 2018). According to Gandhi, the Panchayats has to look after the planning of village or in other words democratic decentralization is the way to strengthen local finances, local economy,

Transforming Critiques of Political Economy  197 and above all grassroot governments. Gandhi and Kumarappa also stressed on the importance of local products including cottage industries and Khadi and strengthening local finance sources through these avenues. Their calls to revive and protect agriculture are also closely connected with local finances. For a village to become self-reliant and self-sufficient, it should be capable of managing not only local resources but also in strengthening its finances through Gandhian way. For Gandhi and Kumarappa, village-based industries were one of the cornerstones of Indian economy and polity and they both started the Gram Udyog Sangh to revitalize these village industries. The local finance pioneered by Kumarappa is an embodiment of the Gandhian economics of decentralization, self-sufficiency, and lasting peace (Bandhu, 2011). Gandhian Tenets on Nutrition and Its Relevance in the Post-Pandemic India According to the Global Nutrition Report (GNR) 2020, India has been identified as a country with the highest rates of domestic inequalities in malnutrition. “Inequality is a cause of malnutrition—both under-nutrition and overweight and other diet-related chronic diseases. Inequities in food and health systems exacerbate inequalities in nutrition outcomes that in turn can lead to more inequity, perpetuating a vicious cycle”, (GNR, 2020). As per the GNR 2021 report, India’s child wasting rate among children under 5 years of age stands at 17. 3 per cent. The GNR 2021 reports state that an estimated 6.2 per cent adult women (aged 18 and above) and 3.2 per cent adult men in India are living with the obesity and the report further suggests that the “Indian diet is significantly low in fruits, legumes, nuts, fish and diary that are crucial for optimum growth, development and prevention of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs). Food insecurity is one of the major reasons that has led to abysmal nutrition levels in the country. In 2019, which is in the pre-pandemic India, more than 6.2 crore people were living with food insecurity, in 2020, in the midst of the pandemic, there were around 200 million undernourished people (Ray and Suri, 2021). The Covid 19 pandemic and subsequent lockdowns have worsened the food security crisis in the country as children and adults especially in rural and underdeveloped areas of the country were deprived of nutritious food. While India has rolled out schemes like Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS), Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Prime Minister’s Overreaching Scheme for Holistic Nourishment (POSHAN Abhiyaan) and Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana (PMMVY), the worsening social and economic condition exacerbated by the pandemic has not only pushed the nutrition to the backseat but has also reversed the progress achieved so far. The crucial question here is that how can India combat the burden of food insecurity, nutrition inequality and malnutrition? The answer is simple and all we have to do is to incorporate the good health practices preached by Mahatma Gandhi. It was Gandhi, who advocated the importance of locally grown, less oily, less salty, less sugary, farm fresh and low fat much before World Health Organization (WHO) and the modern-day nutritionists. The importance of consuming locally

198  Further Critiques of Political Economy grown vegetables, fruits, less sugary, less oily, less salty food items, maintaining environmental cleanliness, and personal hygiene were preached by Gandhi centuries ago are relevant even today. The dietary pattern suggested by Gandhi can act as a panacea for addressing nutritional crisis and NCDs. Gandhi followed a minimalistic approach to diet and for him excessive eating, frequent meals and immoderation of concentrated starch and sugar were unhealthy (Chathukulam et al., 2020). In his work, The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism, Gandhi wrote “Food should be taken as a matter of duty even as a medicine to sustain the body, never for the satisfaction of palate.” Meanwhile to adopt Gandhi’s dietary lifestyle into our lives, we have to attain self-sufficiency in food production at local level and if everyone can embrace small-scale farming in their home steads it would be a crucial step towards self-reliance, self-sufficiency, and food sovereignty. The Gandhian dietary practices form a major crux of the Gandhian political economy, and it can be used as a viable and alternative strategy to address food insecurity and malnutrition in general and child malnutrition in particular. Conclusion In recent times, there has been an onslaught of materialistic culture along with an alarming rise in violence and conflicts between nations as well as within the communities. In such cases, Gandhian political economy has a huge scope especially due to the anti-materialistic and anti-capitalistic stance deeply rooted in values such as non-violence, grassroots democracy, decentralization, community-based economics, self-realization, cooperative enterprises, and environmental protection. Green political economy introduced by the Green Party in the 1950s also shares similar characteristic features of the Gandhian political economy. While Gandhi’s moral and philosophical ideas have received considerable attention, the same cannot be said about his ideas on political economy and his economic ideas. Similarly, Kumarappa, who extensively wrote about Gandhian economy and Gandhian political economy have been pushed to the oblivion. It was Kumarappa who introduced the economic ideas of Gandhi or the various facets of Gandhian political economy to the masses through his Economy of Permanence. However, Kumarappa has not been given his due in popularizing Gandhian perspectives on political economy and Gandhian economics in general. In the contemporary world, especially in the post-pandemic world, the relevance of Gandhi-Kumarappa framework on sustainable development and their political economy views have increased ever than before. Though there are criticisms that the ideas of Gandhi-Kumarappa political economy are Euclidean in nature and that it will probably remain unrealized, the real truth is that the contemporary world is not prepared to accommodate and absorb the ideals and visions of Gandhi and not because his ideas are quixotic (Ghosh, 2012).The concept of “degrowth” also needs to be appreciated as it calls for a radical assessment of what one needs to be produced and envisages a democratic planning around human needs (Gerber, 2020). Political ecology, ecological economics, feminist political ecology, environmental justice, and bio economics

Transforming Critiques of Political Economy  199 which are part and parcel of Gandhi-Kumarappa model also fall under the purview of degrowth paradigm. It is the need of the hour to adopt a solidarity economy framework rooted in a sustainable yet simplistic model of development as suggested by Gandhi and Kumarappa in which human beings collaborate with each other to meet their demands. References Acosta, Alberto. (2013). Extractivism and Neoextractivism: Two Sides of the Same Curse. In Miriam Lang and Dunia Mokrani (eds.), Beyond Development: Alternative Visions from Latin America, 61–86. Quito: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and Amsterdam: Transnational Institute. Bandhu, Pranjali. (2018). Exploring Gandhian Ideas on Political and Economic Decentralization as Peace-Keeping Forces. Gandhi Marg 39 (4): 301–310. Bandhu, Pranjali. (2011). Back to Basics: A J.C. Kumarappa Reader. India: Odyssey. Castel-Branco, C. N. (2014). Growth, Capital Accumulation and Economic Porosity in Mozambique: Social Losses, Private Gains. Review of African Political Economy 41 (1): 26–48. Chathukulam, Jos, Manasi Joseph, and Rekha V. (2020). Navigating the Report of the Comprehensive National Nutrition Survey (CNNS) from a Gandhian Perspective. Gandhi Marg 42 (1&2): 25–82. Chathukulam, Jos, D. Kumar, and K. Gireesan. (2018). Exploring the Ideas of JC Kumarappa on Decentralisation, Green Economy and Alternative Development in India. Gandhi Marg 39 (4): 263–270. Gandhi, M. K. (1908). Hind Swaraj: Indian Home Rule. SarvaSeva Sangh Prakashan. Gandhi, M. K. (1968). Selected Works, S. Narayan (ed.). Ahmedabad. Gerber, J.-F. (2020). Degrowth and Critical Agrarian Studies. Journal of Peasant Studies 47(2): 235–264. Gerber, J. F., and R. S. Raina. (2018). Post-growth in the Global South? Some Reflections from India and Bhutan. Ecological Economics 150: 353–358. Ghosh, N. B. (2012). Gandhian Political Economy: Principles, Practices and Policy. Aldershost: Ashgate Publishing Company. Gireesan, K. (2018). Contemporary Discourse on Sustainable Development: Revisiting the Perspectives of Kumarappa. Gandhi Marg 39 (4): 345–346. Gireesan, K. and J. Chathukulam. (2020). From Self-reliant Villages to a Self-reliant India. Mainstream Weekly LVIII (27): 10–12. Global Nutrition Report (2020). Action on Equity to End Malnutrition. Bristol: Development Initiatives. Govindu, M. Venu and Deepak Malghan. (2016). The Web of Freedom: J.C. Kumarappa and Gandhi’s Struggle for Economic Justice. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Gudynas, E. (2009). Ten Urgent Theses on the New Extractivism: Contexts and Demands Under Contemporary South American Progressivism. In Jürgen Schuldt (ed.), Extractivism, Politics and Society (pp. 187–225). Quito: Andean Center for Popular Action and Latin American Center for Social Ecology. Gudynas, E. (2010). The New Extractivism of the 21st Century: Ten Urgent Theses about Extractivism in Relation to Current South American Progressivism. Americas Program Report. Guruswamy, P. M. (2018). Relevance of J.C. Kumarappa’s Concept of Decentralization in Modern India. Gandhi Marg 39 (4): 373–380.

200  Further Critiques of Political Economy Joseph, K. Siby. (2018). United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and Kumarappa’s Economy of Permanence. Gandhi Marg 39 (4): 353–362. Kumarappa, J. C. (1945). Economy of Permanence. Varanasi: SarvaSeva Sangh Prakashan. Kumarappa, J. C. (1936). Why the Village Movement. Wardha: All India Village Industries Association. Lindley, Mark. (2007). Kumarappa: A Giant or a Midget? Economic and Political Weekly 42 (21): 1975–1981. Nadkarni, V. M., N. Sivanna, and Lavanya Suresh. (2018). Decentralised Democracy in India: Gandhi’s Vision and Reality. New Delhi: Routledge. Nair, N. V. (2020). Solidarity Economics and Gandhian Economics: Can they Supplement Each Other? Gandhi Marg 42 (1&2): 83–106. Nair, N. V. and M. S. John. (2018). Revisiting the Discourse on Protection of Western Ghats from a Gandhi-Kumarappa Perspective. Gandhi Marg 39 (4): 311–330. Nair, Nisha and John Moolakkattu. (2022). Solidarity Economy and Social Change: Contesting Liberal Universalism. In R. Baikady et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Global Social Change. Switzerland: Springer Nature. Ray, Subashree and Sobha Suri. (2021). Global Nutrition Report 2021 – India’s nutrition profile and how to meet global nutrition target, Observer Researcher Foundation (ORF). Taneja, K. Pawan. (2021). Aatma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyan — Theory, Actions and Way Forward, Theme Paper for the Sixty-Fifth Members’ Annual Conference 2021, Indian Institute of Public Administration. Tittor, Anne, Bernhard Leubolt, Daniel Hawkins, Olaf Kaltmeier, and Eleonora Rohland. (2020). The Routledge Handbook on the Political Economy and Governance of the Americas. London and New York: Routledge. Veltmeyer, H. (2020). Latin America in the Vortex of Social Change: Development and Social Movement Dynamics. World Development 140, 45–65. Veltmeyer, H. (2019). Resistance, Class Struggle and Social Movements in Latin America: Contemporary Dynamics. Journal of Peasant Studies 46 (6): 1264–1285. Veltmeyer, H. (2018). The Social Economy in Latin America as Alternative Development. Canadian Journal of Development Studies 39 (1): 38–54. Veltmeyer, H. and J. Petras. (2014). The New Extractivism. London: Zed Books. Veltmeyer, Henry and James Petras. (2020). The New Extractivism: A Post-Neoliberal Development Model Or Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century? Bloomsbury Publishing. Veltmeyer, H. and P. Bowles. (2014). Extractivist Resistance: The case of the Enbridge oil pipeline project in Northern British Columbia. The Extractive Industries and Society 1(1): 59–68. Victus, Solomon. (2018). Decentralization and Inter-generational Justice in J.C. Kumarappa’s Writings. Gandhi Marg 39 (4): 331–344.

13 International Political Economy at the Crossroads Questions of World Order and Other Pressing Issues of International Politics Suman Bagisha Introduction Political Economy as a conscious intellectual exercise has an inextricable link to the ideas of progress and rationalism making their presence felt in human lives with the onset of the project of modernity1. The International Political Economy (IPE) as an intellectual endeavour made a mark from the decade of 1970s;2 however, the writings on political economy can be dated back to the writings of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and a rich legacy afterwards. It was only when the disciplinary segregations were created in the late 19th century that the tendency to look at economics, politics, sociology, etc. as separate quests began. The realization coming sooner that such compartmentalization was not of much help. The discipline of International Relations (IR) which flourished in the aftermath of the horrors of the First World War, from the very beginning had its focus on the questions of redressing the inter-state conflicts and wars. The theoretical debates within the discipline and the focus on issues of high politics (military conflict and security) have had an overarching presence in the lexicon of IR. However, what is today called as the IPE has gained ground within the disciplinary confines of IR largely (however, as some scholars say that IR should rather be seen within the larger discipline of IPE3) owing to many factors, most importantly being the realization that the foci of study being the state cannot be studied without considerations of the market, that if conflict needed attention, so was the development and these two have to be seen parallelly. Thus, the status that IPE has gained as an area of fertile engagement is based on the realization that the so-called high politics and issues of war, security are not enough to explain the realities and the exigencies of human life. While the Cold War period and its brinkmanship were responsible for this focus of IR, the turn of events and scholarly enterprise in this direction made a mark since the decade of 1970s. What Benjamin J Cohen has very aptly called a consequence of “agency and contingency” behind the rise of IPE as an intellectual arena (Cohen 2008, p. 6). A remarkable set of scholars have been credited in the shaping of IPE as a disciplinary enterprise, most notables among the names being Susan Strange, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Robert Gilpin, Charles Kindelberger, Steven Krasner, Robert Cox, and Peter Katzenstein to just name a few4 (Cohen 2008). The task that this paper takes for itself is two-fold. First, to delineate the rich intellectual legacy of International Political Economy within the larger context and DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-16

202  Further Critiques of Political Economy discipline of IR and highlight its significance and second, to pose some critiques for the intellectual journey of IPE from two perspectives, the talks of a new world order5 in the last one decade, the challenges that envisioning a new world order brings and a critique from the perspective of the Global South. The paper takes the task of revisiting the seminal work of Robert Cox (1981, 1987, 1996) in the present times and argues that, of the multiplicity of theoretical positionings that the intellectual enterprise of IPE has developed, all of which have significantly enhanced our understanding of states and their functioning, the Coxian lens still provides an unsurpassable way to look at the affairs of the world.6 The onset of pandemic Covid-19 has put new kinds of issues into the limelight. The latest report by Oxfam International (Oxfam 2022) that the ongoing pandemic of Covid-19 has profited billionaires heftily and they have seen as much increase in their fortunes in the last two years as they could probably see in the last 23 years. And, very contrastingly, the combined effects of the pandemic and ensuing inequality and rising food prices could have concomitantly push as many as 263 million people into extreme poverty in 2022, reversing the gains made in decades. These figures are just one glaring example of how the prevalent ways of understanding our realities and trying to solve emergent issues have not been sufficient. And with all the current theoretical takes within IPE, there is an urgent need to revisit the theoretical edifice of this field to find how far this has honed our understanding and how has it also prevented from thinking rather unconventionally. So, as Ernesto Vivares (2020, p. 12) has remarked in his influential work, the orientation of IPE so far has been so that across its myriad strands it has tried to bring new ideas to the understanding of these concomitant goals and paths of development and conflict. So, as has been time and again remarked by many eminent scholars of the field that IPE is the quest to incorporate the pursuit of wealth with power in the context of state and market, politics and economics, and international and domestic (Vivares 2020). So, even with diversity of approaches and theoretical positionings, some common perspectives can be deciphered across and that is to comprehend how the struggle for power and wealth bring about development and conflict in the intersections of international and domestic, state and market, regional and global, formal and informal realities of development. As Harari remarks in his seminal work that areas of concern like technological change, inequality, and ecological disruption by humans are the signs of the decline of liberal order today and there is an urgent need to address these issues with novel research (Harari 2018). This chapter would look at some of the issues plaguing the concerns of humanity that need attention across disciplinary boundaries and more particularly within the domains of International Politics and IPE. The issues of environment, inequality, poverty, and development, four key areas that have dominated the global debates, and more urgently how the understandings of IPE have honed the discourses on these issues and what are the critical takeaways from the important contributions of the works on IPE on such issues. These issues have to be situated within the larger contexts of the pandemic and the anxieties regarding the unfolding of a new world order.

Political Economy at the Crossroads  203 Theoretical Underpinnings of IPE The field of IPE has had a very interesting trajectory of seeing multiple contestations shaping the discipline. The quest to understand the dynamics of state and markets, power and wealth as many have defined the field of IPE has had the theoretical contestations among the Liberal, Realist and Marxist schools at the forefront though other perspectives like Constructivist, Post-modernist, Ecological, Feminist cannot be overlooked. Another vantage point has been to see the intellectual lineage of IPE divided across the Atlantic between what is called as the British and North American styles of IPE7. The third development has been what has lately been called the developments along the Global Political Economy (GPE). The latest addition of the term GPE has been claimed, justified and differentiated from the IPE by scholars on the ground that even though IPE and GPE are complementary and overlapping in their emphases, but not the same. GPE as an intellectual exercise is said to be a product more of the local surroundings, which means contributions from spaces and voices across the world, more importantly from areas not considered mainstream like Africa, Latin America, and Asia to offer their say to questions of development and conflict. IPE, in contrast, is disposed to start the other way round by offering through general themes and definitions on issues of conflict, development and more that are then applied to the local levels. So, IPE carries the risk of imposing explanations from one milieu to other milieus whose reality could be emerging in different patterns. However, what is important is that GPE and IPE both, however, need to deal with the big questions of our time. The tracing of the Intellectual trajectory of IPE is being done in order to have an idea of how has the discipline proceeded in its stance of offering to the table on key issue areas. Liberals believe in the idea of liberty in both economic and political sphere. They also vow for the various ways in which this liberty can reap dividends for individuals, states as well as the larger international system. So, for them, the individual human good, issues of state, and market all are interconnected in domestic and international spheres where harmony of interests is possible among nation states by increasing cooperation through institutional mechanisms i.e., through appropriate international organizations, free trade and promotion of liberal democracy to name a few important ways. These being the main ideas, the liberals believe that the benefits of growth and development accrued through free flow of goods, services would benefit all in the long run, be it disadvantaged individuals or disadvantaged nation states. Thus, free and invisible hands of the market can supplement for the state which should limit its area of action to essential public services, issues of defence, security and currency. The raging debates within the larger sphere of liberals revolve around the question of how much is due for the state and how much for the market or to the question of how much economics can be made to influence politics and vice versa. So, economics and politics or so to say states and markets are two autonomous spheres that need to work in tandem to achieve the best for individuals, societies, states and international system as a whole. However,

204  Further Critiques of Political Economy nowhere does the question of economics and politics being concomitant and having equal weight is questioned in the liberal discourse of IPE. The realist paradigm which has the status of being the most dominant paradigm in IR unlike Liberals gives supremacy to nation states as the most important actors which are driven by the sole considerations of power and their national interest in their behaviour. While markets and their importance cannot be ruled out by Realists, but when it comes to states, their analysis puts markets and issues of economics at the backseat. This is because of the realist assumption that states live in an anarchic international system where any overarching authority over states is missing and under such conditions, institutions, rules, organizations, and practices set to bring harmony or peace always run the risk of being overpowered by the powerful ambitions of the states who cannot be compelled to behave in a certain manner because they are sovereign units short of any supreme power above their authority. Realist political economy looks for how changes in the distribution of power at the international level affect international economic arrangement. Moreover, a variant of Realist lens called Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) puts emphasis on the role of hegemonic powers in bringing stability to the international system. The HST holds that in order for an open international economic system—that is, the one characterized by the free exchange of goods, capital and services—to exist successfully, it is needed that a single dominant or hegemonic power is present in order to provide stability to the that system and construct a strong regime. So, seeing through the Realist lens, then, it is the pursuit of power by nation states that shapes the international economy. And, issues of pure economy, trade, development, and prosperity are not the “high politics” issues as they are controlled by the “high politics” of power play. Thus, international politics occupies primacy and the power distribution in it occupies supreme importance when it comes to explaining the IPE. The Marxist understanding of the IPE sees the economy as an important determinant of politics, especially the important issues at the international level being determined by the economic interplay. For them the class-based division of society is also manifested at the international level and issue areas among states and questions of power play, rivalry, and supremacy have an inherent economic base through which to explain these. Marxists critique the liberals and their claim of advocating the harmony of interests among the nations. According to them, the capitalist system has the inherent tendency to suppress the cause of the proletariat class of people or even the underdeveloped states which suffer with the liberalcapitalist international system in place across the world. The various schools and developments within the Marxist scholarship which discuss as to how much is the relative autonomy of the state or as to how much is for the international capitalist system or the states to be blamed for this state of affairs and many other debates of structure and agency within Marxism remains there and it is beyond the scope of this paper to cover those nuances. However, what is important across these perspectives is that each of these three large mainstream theoretical positions within IPE has their own set of negotiating positions between International Economy and International Politics. Each of these perspectives comes with different set of assumptions. For Liberals,

Political Economy at the Crossroads  205 individuals form the basic unit of analysis, while for Marxists and Realists, it is the classes and nation states respectively which form the basic unit of analysis. The three perspectives differ on the question of unavoidability of conflict within the IPE. While, Liberals believe that economics and politics are largely independent domains and can and should work together, Marxists maintain that economics governs politics, and Realists argue that politics controls economics. (Freidan and Lake 2003, pp. 12–13) Another way of looking at the major divide among the IPE theories is what Cohen (2008) has called the British and North American IPEs. While this divide is important as a heuristic tool to understand the augmentation of IPE across the length and breadth of understanding its cross-sectional journey, what is important to point out here is that the earlier tripartite taxonomy of the theoretical positionings of IPE or this taxonomic exercise of IPE’s intellectual expanse by Benjamin J Cohen here is being mentioned in order to not just juxtapose the various ways in which the IPE scholarship has developed across the English speaking academia but also to have an idea of what they have offered in terms of understanding the prevailing dilemmas of our times.8 The British and North American styles of IPE here refer to not the geographical boundaries of scholarship but more of two ways in which the English-speaking academia of IPE has been divided between a more analytic, less empirical, and grand-theorizing manner of doing IPE (British) and more scientific, positivist and empiricist way of doing IPE research with midlevel theorizing being its avant-garde focus (American) respectively (Phillips and Weaver 2011). According to Cohen (2008, p. 14), U.S. style IPE is mostly concerned with the causes and consequences of public policy while being state-centric, the British style is more inclusive and is inclined to encompass a rather broader range of social issues and concerns. What is worth noting here is that these two styles or schools of IPE have complemented each other in their quest to understand international aspects of political economy. Bringing the Coxian IPE Back What concerns the author here is not just the larger social concerns of the British IPE but a scholar like Robert Cox who has been said to belong to the British School of IPE and is known for his perceptive work and reference to the question of world orders and the forces which shape world orders. The point that the author wants to bring forth is that the theoretical underpinnings of the IPE have developed in myriad directions, be it issues of inter-state conflict or issues of human development but very few of the theories have tried to address these questions from the systemic level, from the level of system as a whole (read world orders) trying to harbour the possibilities of finding alternatives to the present-day world order and alternatives which are possible. While as charted out earlier, the various developments within the IPE reflect the trajectories of theoretical discourse between liberal, realist, and Marxist lenses (and many others), the British and the American styles, the third one being the difference mapped between IPE and GPE where GPE talks of bringing forth local experiences and visions of

206  Further Critiques of Political Economy scholars and groups not considered mainstream by the IPE, these visions cannot be seen as viable alternatives until they do not question the prevailing order’s driving logic. The prevailing world order, or what is also called global liberal order, has to be seen within the context of the rise of populism and nationalistic force challenging the liberal norms and taking protectionist stance, something liberals had not predicted would happen any time soon. It is not just these forces but also factors like the rise of China, the pandemic, the ongoing Ukraine war, the deglobalizing trends, the declining role of the US-backed ideas, institutions and material capabilities (to borrow it from Cox’s analysis) that are putting the issue of world order into limelight for over a decade now. Though America’s decline has been a clarion call for many, what are the alternatives which one can think of is more important. Though scholars agree that a critical shift is taking place in terms of world order but what is the direction and the shift signifying is not coming up very clearly. The rise of China and the institutional stalemate that the US, Russia, and China have seen on multiple occasions be it trade wars and WTO or influencing small powers or providing a vision or alternative form of world order, things are quite in a flux. In such a scenario, it feels urgent to visit the work of Robert Cox (1981) who almost forty years back had talked of the importance of world orders and various forces which shape and shift world orders. What is important in Coxian writing is the importance he gives to the three elements of ideas, institutions, and materialist forces, all shaping historic structures9 at a given point of time and how these historical structures determine our reality, the physical, social as well as the intellectual reality. Thus, Cox starts by questioning the prevailing modes of thinking and theorizing existing (be it realist or liberal theory) by questioning their stance as being isolated from their historical reality and their negligence of the question of the long durée of historical transitions in which the world orders have to be seen instead of just assuming that the prevailing world order is a given constant. It is in this context that Cox is being revisited in times when the question of world order is again at the centre of heated debates. The important question that remains to be seen is not on the doubt on the prevailing signs of the portentous change in world order that is being heralded for more than a decade now owing to many tell-a-tale signs rather whether this change in world order signifies any major overhaul. A change which comes with a change in the historic structures that Cox had been alluding towards while trying to make sense of our social-political-economic reality at the international level and advancing his historicist and critical theory which he differentiates from the problem-solving theory, status-quoist theory. The Question of World Order and Other Issues While dealing with the larger questions and theoretical positionings within IPE and placing the importance of Coxian lens to the question of world orders, it is important to ask the question as to what is a world order? What constitutes the signs of its change/ decline of a global liberal order as it is being projected? Why is it important to discuss the issue of world orders in the context of the larger international political-economic debates of the contemporary era? And last, but not the

Political Economy at the Crossroads  207 least, why and how envisioning an alternative world order is not just important, it is equally challenging to not just envision it with a more humane face but to construct an alternative for a better future, better possibility of a world less rife with poverty, inequality etc. which is possible through thinking/theorizing in that direction. As Cox’s intervention through his critical theoretical stance shows that theorizing doesn’t happen in abstraction and as his proverbial statement says that “theory is always for someone and some purpose”10. And it is in this context that Cox makes this very important distinction between problem-solving and critical theory. By invoking Cox’s work on critical theory, world orders and historical structures, one very important purpose is being served at this critical juncture of history of international politics, that of the multiplicity of the ways in which IPE has been theorized and even the alternative voices that are coming up from the GPE, it doesn’t serve much purpose till these ideas, one or more than one of these ideas are able to form an alternative historical structure or gain a common sensical position. To quote Vivares (2020, p. 9) we assume that GPE is not a counter-hegemonic approach in contrast to Western thinking or a means to throw away all done in IPE. Instead, GPE emerges as an ongoing set of conversations and inquiries to the world order from diverse perspectives focused to a significant extent upon the wide conceptual umbrellas of development and conflict. In that sense, GPE may include all strands of thinking, under the common factor of addressing development and conflict, within the coordinates between politics and economics, domestic and international, in the formal and informal pursuit of wealth and power in the world order. So, of the multiplicity of ways in which poverty, inequality, development or ecological/environmental disruption (the four issues which the author identifies as the most urgent ones) are being thought of or debated, do we see any substantial contestations which can change the status quo in favour of real change or change the prevalent set of ideas, institutions and material capabilities interacting to form historical structure of the kind humanity needs right now. Then only the talks of a changing world order come forth as a fruitful exercise. There is no dearth of work on world order and its evolving nature but what makes Cox’s work special is his take on the importance of the dialectical11 process of meeting contradictions leading to a new kind of reality. The international political economy of our times, a moment when thirty years since the bipolar moment was called off and since then so many contestations have happened at the level of ideas, be it neoliberal orthodoxy or its alternative discourse through the global economic recession of 2007–2008, the liberal democracy making a triumphant moment and simultaneous rise of authoritarian populist governments across many countries, liberal internationalism and yet gross violations of liberal institutions at the international level. All these are but just a few examples of the way the contradictions are revealing themselves in the world of ideas. There are alternative set of institutions coming up

208  Further Critiques of Political Economy from an emerging global giant like China through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), its state-controlled capitalism. But are these contestations substantial enough for a new world order to germinate? And if at all this germinates in the long durée, what kind of ideas, what kind of alternative visions should be placed within that world order? While this study cannot be deterministic and it sounds very ambitious, the whole purpose of it is to add a normative and historicist angle to this question of world orders within the IPE discourse. As Cox remarks that before looking at a theoretical explanation, one must confront the question about the purpose for which the theory has been constructed in specific historical situations. And, according to Cox for any theory, there are two possible purposes to serve. One is for guiding the solving of problems posed within the particular context, the existing structure. This leads to a problem-solving form of theory, which takes the existing context as given and seeks to make it work better. The other which I call critical theory is more reflective on the processes of change of historical structures, upon the transformation or challenges arising within the complex of forces constituting the existing historical structure, the existing “common sense” of reality. Critical thinking then contemplates the possibility of an alternative. (Cox in Schouten 2009) Now coming to the question of world orders, while there has been so much discussion and theorizing on the question of world orders, there have been relatively few attempts to define the term “world orders.” The commonly understood meaning of world orders is defined as the body of rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations among the key players in the international environment. (Mazarr et al. 2016 as quoted in Mortensen 2020, p. 229) The Coxian definition and dealing with the word “world orders” is interesting. To quote Cox (1981, pp. 151–152) I use the term “world order” in preference to “inter-state system” as it is relevant to all historical periods (and not only those in which states have been the component entities) and in preference to “world system” as it is more indicative of a structure having only a certain duration in time and avoiding the equilibrium connotations of “system.” “World” designates the relevant totality, geographically limited by the range of probable interactions (some past “worlds” being limited to the Mediterranean, to Europe, to China, etc.). “Order” is used in the sense of the way things usually happens (not the absence of turbulence); thus, disorder is included in the concept of order. An inter-state system is one historical form of world order. The term is used in the plural to indicate that particular patterns of power relationships which

Political Economy at the Crossroads  209 have endured in time can be contrasted in terms of their principal characteristics as distinctive world orders. Now, coming to the question of the Chinese assertion and its impact on the ensuing world order, it is important to reflect upon this issue at this point. So, while China is setting up its own institutions, promoting its own version of values, norms but these are still largely underpinned by the norms of the liberal international order (Ikenberry 2017). While G John Ikenberry, a liberal internationalist acknowledges a probable strain between a rising China and the hegemonic United States, but he also highlights the point that how China may be satisfied with the liberal order now while the United States appeared to be renouncing its support for the system. (Ikenberry as quoted in Murphy 2022) The larger background that has to be seen in this context is that even though China represents a contrasting civilization, the institutions and ideas it is promoting and the kind of material capabilities it is basing its ambition on represents itself in sharp contrast to the US led world order on the one hand, but the larger historic structure upon which these triumvirate interact remains driven by the neoliberal market capitalism with which China has itself benefitted profusely. There are talks of competing visions and unfolding of the Asian Century, the focal point of world order shifting to Asia sooner but the larger question remains if these really mean a shift in the driving logic of our times which has shaped predominantly how to think of development issues like poverty, inequality and environment among myriad other issue areas. Ikenberry (2014, p. 9) argues that for an international order to be durable, it needs to be built around three features. It must be supported by a configuration of power, wielded by one or several leading states. There must be some measure of legitimacy to the rule and institutions that mark the order. And the order must provide functional returns to participating states. That is, it must solve collective action problems or provide services and benefits to states within the order. Ikenberry argues that if these claims are correct, the American-led international order may have more life in it than is generally thought. China and other states may grow more powerful but an alternative order that harnesses the power of leading states may not exist for decades to come. This perspective of Ikenberry is in sharp contrast to the realists. As Mortesen (2020, p. 229) says, Mainstream International Political Economy (IPE), understood as liberal and realist theorizing about the state-market relationship, frames this as a transformed world order. Liberals see an erosion of the US-led post-war liberal order, epitomized by Donald Trump’s trade policy and the surge of economic populism from left and right. Realists see multipolarity as the key structural change underpinning a turn towards a harsher era of globalization. Critical IPE questions whether the world order has transformed at all.

210  Further Critiques of Political Economy So, it can be seen that while there are prevalent ways to anticipating the change in world order by the various theoretical lenses (Liberal, Realist, Critical), each of these contributing to the discourse on the changing world order. While the Liberals emphasize largely on the role of institutions and in the faith for the liberal order, the realists posit the importance of power and revisionist tendencies. The prevalent IPE take on the issue of world orders remains unsung without the intervention of Coxian take on the role of critical theory, its stance on alternative historic structures as confronting the prevailing historic structure of the present-day world order. If such a possibility doesn’t exist, then perhaps all the talks of changes in the world order are just too much and too little as they don’t bring any major change in how the prevailing, urgent problems of the world are being addressed. Be it poverty, development, environment, inequality. Cox writing in the aftermath of the Cold War was remarkably attentive to the questions of the environment disaster. As Falk (2016, p. 502) presents this crisis: the fallout from ongoing encounters between the rapacious tendencies of globalizing capitalism emphasizing growth at any cost and the well-being of people and the sustainability of the quality of life throughout the planet. And it should be noted that Cox has been so prescient in this understanding through the critical theoretic lens that while analysing the neoliberal upsurge in the world historical problematique, he was writing and speaking for biosphere in a period before the facts of the Anthropocene had come out so evidently in the mainstream discourse (Falk 2016, p. 502). His Braudelian take on history and emphasis on long durée has had an inclination to view the plight of the humans juxtaposed with the kind of socio-economic-political practices of the prevailing world order, one which has been dominated by the capitalist, neoliberal historic structure. It is in this context that we need to ask this question, if the world order that is being so eagerly heralded is going to bring forth any alternative ideas or institutions or involve such material capabilities that bring change in the commonsensical understanding of how poverty, development, inequality and environment are thought about. These issues are the most far-fetched and deeply entrenched in the very system of how the present-day world order has unfolded after the Second World War. As Falk (2016, p. 502) points out in the context of the most important step in the series of declarations and commitments on the question of environment, especially climate change, The 2014 Paris Agreement on Climate Change was negotiated with great fanfare by more than 190 governments under UN auspices. In keeping with the Cox approach, the outcome reflected the problem-solving approach of neorealism that pushed governments and the global private sector to their limits due to the manifested urgency of the situation, but what was agreed upon still fell dangerously short of what an overwhelming scientific consensus prescribed as prudent. In this respect, the severity of the climate change problem posed for world order can be minimized and deferred for now, but since it cannot be solved given the parameters of feasibility set

Political Economy at the Crossroads  211 by Westphalian geopolitics and neoliberal capitalism, it is almost certain to reemerge more disruptively in the decades ahead. It is in this sense that Coxian IPE makes us understand and see the larger implications of the present-day world order. And not just make us understand these but helps us in situating our analysis around larger socio-political-economic frameworks. Conclusion Does the rise of China, or the rise of populistic, nationalistic assertions, or the deglobalizing trends mark any change in the underneath ideas, institutions, and material capabilities which have shaped the contemporary world order? Taking the Braudelian lens from Cox, in a matter of about one century since the discipline of International Relations was founded in the year 1919 just in the aftermath of the first world war, leading to the America-led world order unfolding slowly and manifesting itself from the end of the second world war, the question remains that whether the rise of China or the rise of Asia or the rise of multipolarity really make any departure in the kinds of policies that are being advocated for the surging inequality, poverty and development challenges looming so large in the post-pandemic era? Coxian epistemology in the tradition of critical theory denies this, but when we are talking of alternatives, voices from the Global South, how come these become central, how come one or more than one of these alternative voices from any of the spatiotemporal zones of the world form a historic structure and offer such ideas, institutions and material capabilities which can counter-hegemonize the prevalent ways of how we deal with such massive issues, that is where Cox is and will always be relevant. Cox brings our attention to this fact that ideas that get institutionalized may remain there for long even after the material forces that backed them have altered. And even the hegemonic power (here the context is the USA and China) that institutionalized and made them commonsensical and acceptable them, have declined. In such conditions the rival social forces emanating out of the changing or changed material conditions may struggle for triumphing and that can take long and theory is itself a part of that exercise. The critical theory has to break free itself from that enmeshed historic structure and let the alternate historic structure germinate. Cox is someone who is not deterministic of history and sees history as open-ended. He wants us to grasp this that it is not just human endeavours but also theorizing which is important and is itself part of a historical structure. It constitutes part of the problematique being researched. At this critical moment in history, when we are opening up to revisit the foundations and trajectories of the research in political economy, it is important that we delve into such questions. Notes 1 Political Economy and modernity are mostly related directly in the prevalent literature. Even though some of the latest works by Hobson (2021) and Helleiner (2021) try to contest this idea by advancing the important role played by non-Western circuits of trade

212  Further Critiques of Political Economy and industry like India and China even before the powerhouse of capitalism and industrial revolution in Britain and Europe took roots, the mainstream literature on political economy generally sees a direct relationship between the major works on political economy flourishing contemporaneously/in the aftermath of industrial revolution/spread of capitalism and modernity. The English administrative reformer Sir William Petty is said to have spoken of “Political Oeconomies” for the first time in 1671. The term gained popularity with not just the classical economists of the 18th and 19th centuries but also with scholars like Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. All these scholars saw this subject called political economy as an integrated social science which could be as well linked to the domain of moral philosophy. So, the earliest university departments dealing with this area were all named as departments of political economy. 2 Here, the distinction needs to be made between Political Economy and International Political Economy in particular. While Political Economy has a lineage much older than IPE, this is just one of the many fundamental differences between Political Economy and IPE. IPE in its most basic definition is about the complex interrelationship between economic and political activity at the international level while Political Economy is not just an older quest whose lineage is to be traced to enlightenment and modernity, it did not encompass methodologies and issues of as vast a nature as IPE has sought to do since its inception around the 1970s. Hence, many scholars also talk of ontological and epistemological differences existing between the two. In terms of tracing its intellectual lineage, IPE goes back to the liberal Enlightenment era in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. So, even before the disciplinary existence of economics and political science as separate fields, there was political economy-the label which was given to the study of the economic facets of public policy. 3 Scholars of the likes of Susan Strange, one of the leading lights of IPE very forcefully argue that instead of IPE being made a subdiscipline of IR, the vastness and comprehensive nature of IPE necessitates the other way round. 4 These are just a few notable names, fondly called as “intellectual entrepreneurs” by Benjamin J Cohen (2008) in his outstanding work on the Intellectual History of International Political Economy. There are many others who have contributed to the field and it is an exhaustive list. 5 The word “world order” is being deliberately used in preference to the world “global order” which is more popularly used these days. The reason for the same being that although “global order” covers the reality of today’s interlinked multiple actors’ dominated world, “world order” has been used by Robert Cox since the 1980s when the talks of this so-called global liberal order and its decline were not dominating the academia and common parlance. And Robert Cox has been very pioneering and instrumental in bringing the focus to the question of how the configuration of ideas, material capabilities and social forces shape world orders which have a deep impact on how states act amidst the larger gamut of international forces. 6 States and their functioning within the larger contexts of market forces, the issues of inter-state conflict, the issues of development, power and wealth and ultimately how the interaction of economics and politics cannot be shunned within the larger rubric of international politics. 7 This intellectual pattern of dividing IPE’s intellectual quest has been charted out by Benjamin J Cohen (2008), himself a renowned name within the IPE scholarship and has found a wide acceptance across academia. And he mentions that this division of IPE’s schools carries significance in trying to make our genealogical exercise clearer and easier. 8 It needs to be mentioned here that the prevalent ways of inspection by the IPE which talks of undertaking both the state and markets, wealth and power, development, and conflict at the domestic and international levels for study has at its centre many core burning issues like poverty, inequality, development, and environment. All these issue

Political Economy at the Crossroads  213 areas and many more such which were traditionally considered to be not within the disciplinary confines of the intellectual enterprise which started around the discipline of IR made way for themselves emphatically as the interdisciplinary thrust gained grounds with the reassertion of political economy with dedicated scholastic focus on IPE since 1970s. However, what this paper has taken to do is to see as to what these binaries have failed to offer in a world which is not just in flux, but caught in a moment where talks of a change in world order have been resonating with much vibrance and is simultaneously being fast-forwarded by the dilemmas brought forth with the ongoing pandemic, global recession, a full-blown war going on and the inefficiency of our current arrangements, be its international organizations, free trade ideas or democracy to say the least. 9 Cox uses the concept of “historical structure” to explain how the prevailing world order has come about. He defines a historical structure as “a particular configuration between ideas, institutions and material forces.” This concept is a framework of action which consists of pressures and constraints within which the individual and societal actions take place. However, historical Structure does not determine actions in any direct, mechanical way. So, to quote Cox (1981) “Individuals may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them. To the extent that they do successfully resist a prevailing historical structure, they buttress their actions with an alternative, emerging configuration of forces: a rival structure.” 10 This classic statement by Robert Cox (1981) speaks against the neutrality of theories and theorization in the sense that it brings home the point that thinking, advancing ideas and concepts never happens out of the context and is never free of ideology. Thus, theories have a very intrinsic relation to the social reality in which those are situated. It brings home a very important point that our ideas, intellectual exercise, and thought processes are influenced by and have implications for our reality. It is in this context that Cox’s critical theory is being invoked, which calls for the role of theory (read critical theory) to advance alternative ideas/from possible alternative historical structures. 11 Dialectical method has been the centrepiece of many scholarly works, Marx and Hegel being the two main exponents of this method. However, what makes the work of Cox really useful in IPE is his emphasis on the contestation of historic structures to make way for a new and alternative kind of historic structures and theories (critical theories) being a carrier for the same.

References Cited Cohen, Benjamin J. 2008. An Intellectual History of International Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cox, Robert W. 1981. ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10(2): 126–155. Cox, Robert W. 1987. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press. Cox, Robert W. 1996. Approaches to World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Falk, Richard. 2016. ‘On the Legacy of Robert W. Cox’. Globalizations, 13(5): 501–505. Frieden, Jeffry and David A. Lake (eds.). 2003. International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. London: Routledge. Harari, Y. 2018. 21  Lessons for the 21st Century. New York: Spiegel and Grau. Helleiner, Eric. 2021. The Neomercantilists: A Global Intellectual History. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Hobson, John. 2021. Multicultural Origins of the Global Economy: Beyond the Westerncentric Frontier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

214  Further Critiques of Political Economy Ikenberry, G. John. 2014. Power, Order, and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ikenberry, G. John. 2017. ‘The Plot against American Foreign Policy: Can the Liberal Order Survive?’. Foreign Affairs, 96(3): 2–9. Mazarr, M., M. Priebe, A. Radin, and A. Stuth. 2016. Understanding the Current International Order. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Available at: www​.rand​.org​/ pubs​/research​_reports​/RR1598​.html Mortensen, J. 2020. ‘World Order: Perspectives on lines of Transformation’. In Ernesto Vivares (ed.): The Routledge Handbook to Global Political Economy: Conversations and Enquiries. New York: Routledge, pp. 229–246. Murphy, Dawn C. 2022. China’s Rise in the Global South. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Oxfam International. 2022. Profiting from Pain. https://www​.oxfam​.org​/en​/research​/ profiting​-pain (accessed on 30th May 2022) Phillips, Nicola and Catherine E. Weaver. 2011. International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present and Future. New York: Routledge. Schouten, P. 2009. ‘Theory Talk #37: Robert Cox on World Orders, Historical Change, and the Purpose of Theory in International Relations’. Theory Talks. http://www​.theorytalks​ .org​/2010​/03​/theory​-talk​-37​.html (12-03-2010) (accessed on 17th May 2022) Vivares, Ernesto. 2020. The Routledge Handbook to Global Political Economy: Conversations and Enquiries. New York: Routledge.

14 Deconstructing/Reconstructing Liberal World Order for the 21st Century Johannes D Schmidt

Introduction The argument proposed here is that Western strategic reliance on the liberal world order and the so-called “rules-based international order” is in crisis and in the danger of erosion from the inside by the same Eurocentric power centres whose interest it has served. The United States imposed a much-proclaimed rules-based or new liberal international order in the post-World War era. Nearly eighty years later this hegemonic Anglo-Saxon domination of the world order reached a near-collapse with the implosion of the global financial system in 2008. This evolution saw the rise of protectionism, nationalism, and right-wing movements across the globe including the United States under Donald Trump’s presidency. The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate; the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, World Health Organization and undermining the WTO and the International Court of Justice and genuine threats against traditional NATO allies. This crisis was further exacerbated with the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021. These policy U-turns initiated by the Trump administration after entering the White House in January 2017 challenged the pillars of the liberal world order. This was an outright attack on the institutions of global governance to neoliberalism and rentier capitalism itself, economic openness and multilateral trade and security cooperation. Few scholars and commentators would deny that the “rules-based liberal world order” faced the greatest and deepest challenge since its establishment and the question is whether it changed in January 2021 with the new Biden administration. The worldwide Covid-19 pandemic, at the time of writing, has reached more than 250 million confirmed cases and more than five million death at the global level (800,000 in the United States alone) (John Hopkins 2021). It makes Covid-19 the deadliest epidemic ever in the United States “surpassing the death toll of the 1918 flu, and indeed the combined US military deaths in World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf Wars and the Afghanistan War” (Sachs 2021). The globalization of the Coronavirus happened in the context of the alarming impact of global warming, rising temperatures, and extreme weather conditions. The pandemic and climate crisis further exacerbate the coming of a major social crisis challenging the contest for international legitimacy and compliance DOI: 10.4324/9781032650920-17

216  Further Critiques of Political Economy with so-called international norms, between unipolarity and multipolarity. The latter relying on the UN system and international law while the first refer to American dominance. What appears most chocking to liberals is that the threat to the so-called rulesbased or liberal world order is homemade. Britain voted exit from the EU and Trump defeated his opponent whom he called “liberal order” Hillary Clinton. Illiberal and racialized authoritarian-populism has become the game of the day and anti-immigration, anti-refugees, populism, and above all extreme levels of inequality (Piketty 2014) fuel it. The social contracts, which created cohesion and rising wages, were broken many years ago. At the same time, the attacks on organized labour, during the neoliberal phase of capitalism, were not only driven by liberal policies at home but became externalized in tandem with export of capital and production to illiberal societies with no labour protection to maximize profit. Succinctly said, over the past forty years global labour’s income share of profits has been in a steep decline. Income accruing to labour has decreased and capital’s profit share has correspondingly increased. The liberal international order and its concomitant policy device—of neoliberal globalization has shifted the balance between capital and labour in favour of capital. The outsourcing of jobs, offshoring of manufacturing, privatization and deregulation has weakened worker’s bargaining power and compressing wages. This evolution led to a downward spiral against the interests of global as well as national working-class consciousness and the erosion of labour power. The transition from four years with Republican Donald Trump in the White House to the Democratic-led administration under Joe Biden in January 2021 has only accelerated the crisis of the liberal world order, domestically as well as internationally. The United States entered its Weimar era (Bello 2021) precisely as an outcome of its dysfunctional democratic system where the loosing part rejected the result of the election. The violent storm of the Capitol in Washington DC was a turning point in American history. President of the Council on Foreign Relations Richard Hass reflected on the wider repercussions of the violent attempt to overthrow US democracy: We are seeing images that I never imagined we would see in this countryin some other capital yes, but not here. No one in the world is likely to see, respect, fear, or depend on us in the same way again. If the post-American era has a start date, it is almost certainly today. (Haass 2021a) In another tweet, he summarized: So much for the peaceful transfer of power, for American exceptionalism, for our being a shining city on a hill. We already knew what we needed to know about this president; the question is how did we get to where so many Americans are so willing to throw democracy overboard? (Haass 2021b)

Liberal World Order for the 21st Century  217 One of the answers to these questions is easy to depict since the average eligible voters not represented in the American electoral process is about forty per cent in the last 12 elections. In some elections, more than half of the electoral participants did not vote at all. This relates to the two-party regime type of American democracy and not least, the almost surgical and devastating effect of money politics in election campaigns. Some observers may question whether the United States is a full-blown democracy to worth emulating. This is a difficult problem as we shall see! The chapter's main assumption is that “international orders relate to how rules, institutions, law, and norms produce and maintain patterns of relating and acting” (Barnett 2021, p. 4). Following the introduction, the first part “Proponents’ version of the liberal world order” introducing the positivist arguments, which characterize the liberal world order as benefitting humankind. The second “The critique of the Eurocentric origin of the Liberal World Order” scrutinises the Eurocentric understanding of world order. These issues are also explored in the third section “The erosion of labour power and democracy in the United States” while the final part “Implications for the Left and international solidarity” focuses on the current status of the Left emphasis on identity and political culture. It suggests a materialist approach, which challenges the “culturalization of politics” that may be seen as distorting the realities of class exploitation and obfuscates the fundamental antagonisms and contradictions involved in class struggle. These apparent dilemmas are discussed together with a search for new avenues encapsulated in class conflict and international solidarity—to deconstruct and reconstruct a multipolar international order based on justice, democracy, and respect. A brief “Postscript” suggests some ways to overcome the current stalemate. Proponents’ Version of the Liberal World Order Future historians will declare spring 2020 as the tipping point in global politics and changing world orders. Starting in March the moment when the United States and its allies, facing the gravest public health threat from Covid-19 and economic catastrophe of the postwar era, could not even agree on a simple communiqué of common cause. The economic and social chaos of the pandemic engulfing the world was only exposing and accelerating what has been in the pipes for years. The decline of American hegemony is a result of this long-term crisis. This has led to the present situation of weakening globalization, economics and political uncertainty. The result is a new alienation of the sub-altern and working classes from politics. As Ikenberry puts it: “On public health, trade, human rights, and the environment, governments seem to have lost faith in the value of working together. Not since the 1930s has the world been this bereft of even the most rudimentary forms of cooperation” (2020). The liberal world order imposed by the United States after 1945 was literally seen as liberal because the United States was liberal and meant the pursuit of security both through the spread of liberty, in the form of free markets and democratic constitutions, and the rule of law, in the form of rule-based international

218  Further Critiques of Political Economy institutions (Porter 2018). Proponents of US hegemony claim there are four interconnected features: A continuing growth of regimes and rules with the purpose to collectively manage, regulate, and govern world affairs. Furthermore, the acceleration of capitalist modes of production and economic globalization was organized around neoliberal logics based on the withdrawal and reduction of the state. Ideally, this strategy supports diffusion of liberal values and institutions, including democratic regimes and universal human rights norms, while simultaneously delegitimizing and stigmatizing illiberal worldviews and identities. Finally, not only the idea itself encapsulates the Eurocentric bias, but it also reflects the core interests of powerful Western actors. According to this view, institutions were built to promote peace (UN), economic development (WB) and trade and investment (IMF), and what later became the WTO to promote “free” trade. All this, and more, was backed by the economic and military might of the United States, a network of alliances across Europe and Asia, and nuclear weapons, which served to deter aggression. The liberal world order was thus based not just on ideals embraced by democracies, but also on hard power (Haass 2018) For almost eighty years, the liberal international order has been tied to American power, its economy, the Dollar, alliance systems, leadership in service of largely Western preferences and interest groups and “as the most powerful state in the system, the United States has disproportionately shaped its rules while reserving the right to periodically flout them” (Lissner and Hooper 2018). The main ingredients of the US-dominated liberal world order maintain that individualism, democracy, and human rights will lead to peace and prosperity. The main question is how these “principles of liberalism” have been crafted and utilized “into a new language of power designed to promote American foreign policy” and when used they all have “significant precursors in Washington’s national security concerns” (Peck 2010, pp. 1 and 4). Regardless of their implementation, it is important to challenge the wisdom of these highly idealistic propositions. With India and China re-entering their engagement with the world system and world economy (Schmidt 2021, pp. 146–148), having more diverse sets of ideologies and agendas, the old bargains and institutions that provided the sources of stability and governance are being put in question. This evolution triggered “crisis of authority.” The “globalization” of the liberal order furthermore led to a loss of capacity to function as a security alliance. This is also a “crisis of social purpose.” During the Cold War the claim was, the liberal order served as “full-service security community,” reinforcing the capacity of Western liberal democracies to pursue policies suiting their own interests. With liberal internationalism becoming “the platform for the wider global order, this sense of shared social purpose and security community eroded” (Ikenberry 2018). Seen in this light, the question, which remains to be asked, is of course whether the liberal order more order than liberal. Was Huntington right in his proposition that

Liberal World Order for the 21st Century  219 The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do. (Huntington 1998, p. 51) In this context, it is legitimate to ask determine whether the re-emergence of a de facto multipolar world system is a reflection of American hegemonic decline or pressure and spill-over effect of the challenges from the new regional hegemons, especially in Asia? The Critique of the Eurocentric Origin of the Liberal World Order The following propositions relate to history and more specifically the implicit and explicit norms inherited from the self-perceived superiority of Anglo-Saxon and European values and worldviews. The dominant position of European colonialism and imperialism came together with the constitutive and universal aspect of the European state and later its liberal form. This universalization of Eurocentrism relies on an interpretation of world history that was hijacked and monopolized by the traditional European narrative: “The theft of history” … refers to the take-over of history by the West. That is, the past is conceptualized and presented according to what happened on the provincial scale of Europe, often Western Europe, and then imposed upon the rest of the world. That continent makes many claims to having invented a range of value-laden institutions such as “democracy,” mercantile “capitalism,” freedom, individualism. However, these institutions are found over a much widespread range of human societies. (Goody 2006, p. l) The imperial forms of rule also exposed the racialized hierarchies of European empires: Through the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, motives of occupation and exploitation began to coexist with beliefs about the betterment of the “natives.” Ideas about the superiority of Christian European people continued to inform law and diplomacy in the first half of the twentieth century as the mandates system modified imperial ordering by legitimating rule over ‘backward peoples’ through the principle of trusteeship. (Duncombe and Dunne 2018) Eurocentrism was imperialist friendly in the sense that it was foundational for the imposition of what later became the liberal world order. It also partly explained how “the axiomatic and intrinsically contradiction between underconsumption and

220  Further Critiques of Political Economy income distribution played a key role in their conceptualization of surplus absorption through the export of capital” (Schmidt and Hersh 2019, p. 8). Reluctantly there is an increasing confrontation within the realm of social sciences concerning the appropriate historical paradigm for understanding the origin and formation of the process of capitalist expansion encompassing the entire world (Schmidt and Hersh 2019, p. 2). Marxist analysis provides a framework for understanding how and why capitalism and imperialism continue to operate by the same mechanisms’ century after century. It may have changed face by giving finance a dominant position over productive capital today but it “remains governed by the system of social production and private gain, by capital’s immense power over the system of production and accumulation” (Prashad 2020). Dumenil and Levy (2004) refer to Marx who described a range of capitalist “counteracting influences” to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall such as increased exploitation or depression of wages. Foreign (free) trade, which through the exploitation of overseas labour increases the rate of surplus value and cheapens materials tied up in constant capital. The result is an increase in the rate of profit realized through the expansion to foreign markets. Marx described how this played into the exploitation of labour within colonies. Capital invested in colonies, on the other hand, may yield higher rates of profit because the rate of profit is higher there due to the backward development, and likewise the exploitation of labour, because of the use of slaves, coolies, etc. (ibid). Imperialism maintained the structure of capitalist accumulation, ensuring access to cheap labour within colonies to counteract falling rates of profit in the metropoles. The modern phase of imperialism originated in the 1970s and 1980s with the advent of the new phase of neoliberal accumulation (Dumenil and Levy 2004, p. 659). Indeed, neoliberal ideology in line with axioms embedded in the liberal world order proclaim free markets, free trade, and free economies. However, there are contradictions since neoliberalism is the result of a new deliberate course targeted for the restoration of income and wealth of capitalist classes, imperial due to the continued (or increased) pressure on the rest of the world, and under US hegemony because of the dominating position of the United States among imperialist countries. (Dumenil and Levy 2004, p. 661) According to Joan Roelofs (2020), these arguments backed by the role of a militarized society, the Military-Industrial-Complex (MIC) including the role of Pentagon, which in fact rely on more than 850 military bases across the globe and remain the biggest transnational company in the world in money terms. The MIC has penetrated every aspect of American life. Most departments and levels of government, businesses, and many charities, social services, environmental, and cultural organizations, deeply embedded with the military. The amnesia and silence of American society and the two-party is glaring and even the main pension funds of organized labour are heavily engaged in the weapons industry. The paradox is that the MIC is the highest guarantor of the

Liberal World Order for the 21st Century  221 rules-based and liberal international order and its quasi-domestic ideology and political economy. This problem does not exist in isolation. Rather a shortcoming exists in relationship to other material processes, historical conditions, and state or corporate actors. The imposition of the so-called liberal world order made it possible to maintain the system in favour of MIC and the Western powers. In fact, the regular violation of the norms related to sovereignty, non-interference, and use of force only for self-defence cannot be utilized with reference to liberalism but brute force. The former colonial powers did not voluntarily support de-colonization. On the contrary, core liberal (imperial) states were in many, if not most cases, violently defending occupation, exploitation, and the instalment of repressive regimes. The government of the United States controlled the Bretton Woods institutions. The Third World became a majority but was unable to exercise any meaningful influence on the international system. The US and the former colonial powers did not support democracy and human rights in the newly independent countries. Mainstream liberal analysts presumed that “the global order must have some legitimacy because there were no great (or at least successful) revolts by the Third World, but they mistook coercion and the lack of alternative for consent” (Barnett 2018). In addition, it gave the United States enormous positional advantages by granting it the capacity to shape the international preferences of other states, externalize domestic economic crises, and construct the kind of international economy it wanted (Stokes 2018). The authoritarian and anti-foreigner actions of the Trump administration, Brexit, and the escalation of global anti-labour governments and policies clearly illuminate that the domestic context derailed liberal states that were supposed to defend the liberal international order (Barnett 2018). Protectionist trade policies, gross mismanagement of Covid-19 response, together with wrenching social turmoil not seen since the late 1960s, were all painfully visible manifestations of America’s sharply diminished global leadership or outright abdication for global leadership in its push for de-globalization, de-coupling, and trade protectionism. In fact, the seeds of Trump’s victory were sown in the erosion of the postwar social contract that ultimately led to neoliberalization, small government, low taxes, and erosion of workers' solidarity. Wages fell over a sustained period in the United States. Starting under the Washingtonian duopoly in the 1980s, export of capital and production led to the weakening of the economy. Combined with automatization, living standards declined as corporate wealth and political power increased and became more concentrated and creating monopolies. Essentially the capitalist system has lurched from crisis to crisis, unable to face its antagonistic contradictions and unable to offer solutions to endemic social problems. However, it would be entirely wrong to say that Trump was the cause of the downturn of the US economy. Rather, he was the symptom. “The greatest threat to the order is the order itself: more specifically, the people who, over the past few decades, it has dislocated and antagonized” (Lind 2017, p. 2). The Biden administration, which entered the White House after the storm on Capitol in January 2021 claims rhetorically that the United States is back and bound

222  Further Critiques of Political Economy to lead. It has reinserted the country in several multilateral institutional pillars, which the Trump administration had left. The Biden administration is attempting to create alliances such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, with India, Australia, Japan, and the United States and AUKUS with Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United States has broken its own set rules at will. The latest example is the decision to supply Australia with nuclear-driven submarines using bomb-grade uranium. This is a clear and dangerous violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocols and thereby blowing one bigger hole in the so-called rules-based international order “unless we all agree that the so-called rules-based international order is in essence the US and its allies making all the rules” (Purkayastha 2021). Australia will become the first non-nuclear-weapon state to be able to exploit a loophole that allows it to remove nuclear material from the inspection system of the IAEA. Seen in this light, it might be more correct to say the so-called rules-based international order “looks like a strange anachronism” (Scott 2021b). The starkest example is the so-called war on terror. After twenty years, trillions of dollars on military activities and almost nothing on education, health, and infrastructure. Afghanistan is bleeding even more than before the United States and its allies occupied the country. The coalition of the willing invaded the country to eliminate terror. Today, after the Biden administration decided to leave over the summer 2021 Afghanistan is number one on the Global Terrorism Index. The United States left a country in trauma and violence, economic starvation, and millions of Afghan children at risk of starvation and according to the international NGO Save the Children, “almost 33,000 children have been killed and maimed in Afghanistan during the past 20 years, an average of one child every five hours” (Sabic-El-Rayess 2021). In 2001, the year before the invasion, “Afghanistan was number 16 on the Global Terrorism Index. After 20 years of occupation, Afghanistan no longer holds that position. It is number one. And we helped them get there” (Sabic-El-Rayess 2021). The list continues and is endless. The body count in Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and number of casualties is enormous. Pentagon and the White House have committed bombings, invasions, and interventions in more than fifty countries since WW II. Thus, in the period 1950–2005 there have been 82 million avoidable deaths from deprivation (avoidable mortality, excess deaths, excess mortality, deaths that did not have to happen) associated with countries occupied by the United States. In fact, the United States had 90% of its existence involved in wars and conflicts in different countries of the world. These numbers are important to keep in mind when we are trying to delineate the real content of “rules-based world order.” As Malcolm Chalmers is pointing out: In recent years, however, a rightful acknowledgement of the importance of rules has too easily been inflated into the shorthand assumptions that there is a single, universally acknowledged rules-based international system, that the world is now divided between those who obey the rules (ourselves) and

Liberal World Order for the 21st Century  223 those who do not (the others), and all that is now required for international peace and stability is for everyone (now including President Trump) to return to compliance with the system. Furthermore, he argues that: This obscures the reality of how today’s rules-based systems have developed and are sustained. International rules evolve, and sometimes dissolve, in response to the decisions of their participating states, and particularly those of their most powerful states. The best rules-based systems add predictability to relations between states, reducing transaction costs and serving the mutual interests of their members. Nevertheless, rules, per se, do not have a positive quality. Rather, their worth depends on the extent to which they serve the interests and values of the states which sustain them. (Chalmers cf Tuygan 2021) The point being made here is that all orders are rule-based and the question is not whether the order has rules but what the rules are, and most discussions emphasize various tenets that arguably liberal and illiberal states can support: sovereignty, international law, diplomacy, various forms of multilateralism and principles of nondiscrimination, peaceful settlement of disputes. (Barnett 2021, p. 20). Furthermore, it may be true that the state remains the backbone of the international system, “but the system no longer conforms to one ordering principle…” (Sørensen and Holm 1995, p. 202). Worse is the fact that the United States is a declining superpower armed to its teeth at home and abroad with more 750 military bases worldwide (Schmidt 2010, p. 23). The United States has more than 5.500 nuclear weapons and as Gerson convincingly notes it was the United States that eviscerated Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic weapons. During the 1955 and 1958 Taiwan crises, the U.S. prepared and threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons. In fact, we have since learned that in 1958 then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was willing to sacrifice Taiwan to Soviet retaliatory nuclear attacks in an expanded version of what later became the Vietnam War paradigm of destroying a village in order to save it. (Gerson 2021) American leaders have repeatedly prepared and/or threatened to initiate nuclear war. Nearly a dozen times to reinforce U.S. Middle East hegemony. At least six times against North

224  Further Critiques of Political Economy Korea. Four times during the Vietnam War. And, of course, during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1954 CIA backed coup in Guatemala. The list includes the initial Bush-Cheney response to the 9-11 attacks, the two Bush wars against Iraq, President Obama's ‘by any means necessary’ threats against Iran, and Trump’s “fire and fury” threats against North Korea. (Gerson 2021). Daniel Ellsberg, who was senior nuclear war fighting planner in the three administrations under Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, wrote that successive U.S. presidents “used nuclear weapons” in the way that you use a gun when you point it at someone’s head in a confrontation…whether or not you pull the trigger. You’re also using it when you have it on your hip ostentatiously. (Gerson 2021) The Biden administration seems to have realized that the key to international defence of the democratic model is the improvement of the domestic polity, which implies an improvement of the polarized version of American democracy. Related to such a strategy improve “U.S. compliance with international norms would greatly enhance U.S. defence of the rules-based international order” (Scott 2021a). Interestingly, its partners and allies of the United States are pressurized to put their money, resources, and support on the agenda The Erosion of Labour Power and Democracy in the United States At this point, I would like to argue that the undermining of worker’s rights and labour power, in the United States was the result of unrelenting anti-labour national politics, marginalization and a sense of crisis. The capitalist world economy entered a phase that may be called the cacophony of crises. From the Wall Street crash in 2008 to climate crisis and now the Covid-19 pandemic create a sense of loss of authority. The latter with a tremendous impact on labour and the marginalized in the United States. The bottom-line is that the promises of neoliberal globalization have failed to materialize. Even adherents of the ideology of utopian “free markets” fear that, with this temporary phase of crisis, globalization has reached its endpoint. The strategy of neoliberalism on the world scale has become synonymous with a dysfunctional calamity of hyper-exploitation, growing inequalities, exclusive imposition of property rights, and greed that benefits a tiny elite of super nova rich. (Schmidt 2010, p. 19) The immense productivity of capitalism relies on private property. Capital is restless and must always seek to maximize profit. It is by controlling the production

Liberal World Order for the 21st Century  225 process that capital exploits labour and draws out surplus value. “Private capital controls the system of social production, and appropriates the social wealth produced, with little share to the actual producers” (Prashad 2020). It is the dual crisis of weakness in Western strategic agency and in the domestic social contract that poses the biggest threat to the liberal world order (Stokes 2018). This weakness has led to changing class and subaltern group relations. The corrosion of a common civic identity is inextricably tied to the erosion of the last traces of a weak “class compromise” or social contract. It entailed a compensation by the notorious “trickle-down effect” of economic growth. The failure of neoliberalism to deliver alienated the working classes, especially in the United States, from those same elites who supported open and free markets. The instabilities, uncertainties and unpredictability produced “experiences of injustice and disregard” which “in turn generate[d] indignation and feelings of rage” among subaltern classes. Therefore, large numbers of blue-collar working-class voters (and other marginalized groups) are increasingly rejecting core tenets of the common civic identity, such as an embrace of economic openness or international cooperation through institutions. (Babic 2020) In the liberal world order, the uneasy stalemate between capital and labour that was so often mediated by strong welfare and the threat of communism went astray, and “everywhere there is directional, class-based action from the capitalists, where an injury to one is an injury to all, every day and on a global scale” (Marcus and Menzies 2007, p. 26). In the United States, much of what is left of organized industrial labour is in weapons manufacture. Its Political Action Committees fund the few “progressive” candidates in the political system, “who tend to be silent about war and the threat of nuclear annihilation. Unlike other factories, the armaments makers do not suddenly move overseas, although they do use subcontractors worldwide” (Roelofs 2020, p. 2). Labour unions have not just disappeared but decreasing labour power in the United States is one of several reasons for as much as one-third of the rise in inequality among men and one-fifth among women. Labour unions are the most important redistributive institutions, so it is no wonder that the capitalowning class has gone out of its way to make them disappear. The share of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement dropped from 27 per cent to 11.6 per cent between 1979 and 2019, meaning the union coverage rate is now less than half where it was 40 years ago. Collective bargaining is the key driver towards higher wages, social benefit, and terms of employment but the fact is that the weakening of collective bargaining is an outcome of more than 40 years conscious policy decisions by the duopoly and militant corporate hostility towards unions and the growing precariatization of the workforce (Standing 2016). The liberal order in the United States is under attack. No election can change that and the US reputation and ability to govern, domestically the disaster related to the handling of the Corona pandemic, a society with grave disparities and inequalities,

226  Further Critiques of Political Economy and internationally United States as role model as the land of plenty appears to get to the end of the road.

Implications for the Left and International Solidarity The aim of this last section is modest since it rests on the assumption that social change, international solidarity, and a new world order from below are possible. This does not mean that the UN system and international law are superfluous. Rather on the contrary. We need to understand the history and the present to change the future. Finding a way of transgressing the capital-labour nexus, fundamental to the accumulation process, can be said to be the precondition for the most radical break in the history of capitalism (Schmidt 2010, p. 25). The current alternatives are indeed examples of a break with the very holy grail of capitalism, namely private property. In this way, it may be relevant to remind of the intrinsic and determining exploitation by the North of the post-colonial governments trying to establish a social contract in the spirit of Jean-Jacques Rousseau inside their societies. Connected to that many tend to forget the attempts in many newly independent states to gain control over collective property like the nationalization of oil in Iran; the Suez Canal in Egypt; Copper in Ghana, Zaire, and Chile, and presently oil in Iraq, Libya, and Venezuela; these attempts were formulated as alternatives to what was seen as inherent antagonisms between North and South. In this way, the quest for political decolonization turned into a continuing struggle against imperialism and Eurocentric dominance. During the last twenty years left-leaning governments, seizing the momentum of the democratic opening, won elections throughout Latin America. The re-nationalization of oil and other natural resources in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia was a victory for the Left, and a rebellion against the dictatorship of finance, and can be interpreted to bring money back under the democratic control of public authorities, while ending the privatization of credit creation (Bienefeld 2007, p. 28). These initiatives have been under immense pressure during the Obama interpretation of international order and even more so with sanctions and other harsh remedies during the Trump administration. However, note that most policies referring to sanctions, against China, Russia and other nations daring to endorse another policy and give labour a slice of the cake, are hit by the whip in the form of sanctions by the duopoly of US politics. Property ownership and the labour capital nexus remain at the core of the discussion and are linked to welfare versus workfare (Schmidt and Hersh 2006). A way to surmount the dichotomy of welfare and workfare is related to the conflict between the expropriation of people’s means of subsistence and the continuous identification of labor power as a market commodity. The commodification of work has been a determinant component of primitive accumulation that made, and makes, industrial capitalism possible. As noted by Karl Polanyi, following Karl Marx, this relationship puts workers at the

Liberal World Order for the 21st Century  227 mercy of the demands of capital. The human commodity has little control as to where, why, and how it will be used, or not used, a condition exacerbated under neoliberal globalization. It is exactly here that the position of labor in the future comes to the fore. (Schmidt 2010, p. 29) It is the irony of history that the “Right to Work” has been celebrated as a great victory by labour and socialist forces. This way, the working class has landed in a “prisoner’s dilemma,” whereby the essence of the capitalist exploitation of labour is cemented politically and ideologically. The defensive struggle for the protection and betterment of the conditions of the working class could not be anything but a ‘guerrilla war’, without possible victory, as long as the struggle did not raise the battle cry of the abolition of the wage system altogether. Voices like Karl Marx and Paul Lafargue within the socialist movement were aware of this impasse. (Schmidt 2010, p. 29) What about the impact of identity movements in the United States? There are plenty of oppositional movements, peaceful demonstrations take place almost daily and the defence of rights of African-Americans is fought for. Life and death of black Americans and police killings are linked to slavery and colonialism. Me-too is another movement highlighting women’s rights against abuse. One major problem with these movements is the delinking of identity politics from the questions about money and power. The problem is the “culturalization of politics” or the institutionalization of post-political multicultural ideology as “the cultural logic of multinational capitalism” (Žižek 1997, p. 28). This ideology makes possible the proliferation of social movements that inscribe their presumably oppositional subjects primarily within the sphere of cultural production (Khader 2017, p. 477). As Malcolm X notes in Passim he learned the brutal facts of the white man’s never-ceasing “piratical opportunism” to victimize and degrade every other race and culture, under the sheer perception of “Christian teachings.” India, China, and Africa alike have all fallen victim to the “manipulative trickery of the American and Western European man; the human rights of the oppressed minorities of the world are often swept under the rug” (Malcolm X 1992). Later Malcolm X reformulated his thesis: I believe that there will ultimately be a clash between the oppressed and those that do the oppressing. I believe that there will be a clash between those who want freedom, justice and equality for everyone and those who want to continue the systems of exploitation…It is incorrect to classify the revolt of the Negro as simply a racial conflict of Black against white, or as a purely American problem. Rather we are today seeing a global rebellion of the oppressed against the oppressor, the exploited against the exploiter. (Malcolm X 1994, pp. 232–233)

228  Further Critiques of Political Economy Multicultural post-politics, referring to victimization and the primacy of identity, reduces the struggle for emancipation and economic justice to a struggle over identity politics and the politics of recognition, be it gender, racial, sexual, national, ecological, and so on (Žižek 1999, p. 396). The problem is these movements’ complicity with capitalism and that multiculturalism enumerates these ontic properties or secondary contradictions within the constellation of identity politics, bearing “witness to the unprecedented homogenization of the contemporary world” by the “(dead universal)” global capitalist machine, which colonizes the “heart of each (particular living) ghost” (Žižek 1997, pp. 45–46; Khader 2017, p. 477). What we are seeing is the emergence of “catastrophe capitalism” or primitive accumulation probably endorsing warfare over welfare. The supposed premier model of liberal capitalism has turned into a mirage. For a majority of workingclass Americans, their once-stable manufacturing jobs have been sent overseas, immigrants compete with them for low-paying jobs at home, and incomes have stagnated. Shockingly, blue-collar white men are the only group in America whose life expectancy has declined since 1999, due mainly to suicide and substance abuse (Foster and Suwandi 2020). Hillary Clinton’s degrading remarks of “the deplorables” show the arrogance of the upper classes in the United States. Ultimately, such humiliating language indirectly creates an explosion of racial hatred and divide in American society. Liberal, and academic arrogance fertilizes the soil for the decisive split among Blacks, Latino, and White working classes in the United States and further erodes worker’s solidarity along racialized and class hierarchies. This notwithstanding, the overall architecture of international labour solidarity depends on how national strategies fit together. The decline of labour’s political power at the national level, along with its ability to deliver economic benefits to its members, is one of the most salient features of the neoliberal era and even more so during Trump. Union density is down, and anti-union legislation flourished while inequality in income and wealth skyrocketed. These predicaments raise several questions. Referring to Samir Amin’s work, (Martins 2019), notes that the contradictions inherent in present-day disaster capitalism include the growing division of labour, which drives the heterogeneity of workers within and between national states, acting to reinforce fragmentation of workers. The success of capital in the fight against workers is specifically articulated in the forms of geospatial specialization and dispersion of labour, but this advantage is not linear, progressive, or definitive. It presents itself, cyclically, subject to the political and social actions of the workers who, through the national and international articulations of their class struggles guided by their material, subjective, and civilizing interests, can partially restrain or destroy it by means of combined rebellions, reforms, and revolutions. Is it enough to introduce redistributive policies, including social protection expenditures? Yes, it would be a step in the right direction. Is it enough to introduce universal health care? Yes, it would mean tremendous change which not least the impact of Covid-19 has shown not only with devastating deadly consequences but also in terms of high unemployment rates of nine per cent and 54 million people

Liberal World Order for the 21st Century  229 who are food insecure or to put it more bluntly hunger is a basic challenge in the land of plenty (Waldmeir 2020). Workers are struggling with mass eviction and joblessness crisis on top of the health crisis posed by COVID-19. Yet the US population represents only 4 per cent of the world’s total. Over 80 per cent of people at risk of eviction from the economic crisis reside in Black or Latino neighbourhoods. Would it be enough to introduce a New Green Deal? Yes, it would create jobs but also inflation. Right now, the social fabric of the United States is being torn apart and a new depression such as that of the 1930s may be repeating itself. This implies that social reforms of the kind mentioned above will not change the antagonisms and contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production, but it would give relief and so would heavy taxation of the rich. Stronger trade unions aiming to create greater consciousness and striving to establish links across the globe—a Fifth International—could be the harbinger we are all waiting for. One of the preconditions though is a strong national labour movement in the United States and elsewhere and constituted social movements. The ideas for the Fifth International grew out of the World Social Forum, which established a Group of Nineteen. The Porto Alegre Manifesto outlined 12 proposals on economic measures, peace and justice, and democracy, “to give sense and direction to the construction of another, different world.” It was an attempt to further explore ideas Samir Amin had earlier referred in an article about international solidarity (Amin 2017). Martins (2019) mentions that Samir Amin emphasizes that the Fifth International must rescue from the First International its critical spirit and diversity of visions. Democratic participation should entail the right to move toward socialization through innovation, subversion, and rupture with the sacred private property. Socialism contains various transitions and theory, and practice should articulate with each other to produce gradual convergences. In this spirit mobilization of a diverse set of social forces critical towards capitalism, imperialism, and inequality should work for the emancipation of human beings from oppression. Amin urges progressive forces to gather revolutionaries and reformists who not only struggle against neoliberalism, but for democratic and social advances, for a multipolar world and for the ecological management of the planet. Postscript The so-called rules-based order and the Post-Westphalian liberal world order ensure that state sovereignty is subordinated to the interests of private investors and capital accumulation and it “has endured despite its extremely uninspiring name and the return of ‘great power competition’. Observers might expect that this competition would come at the expense of rules” (Scott 2021b). It is an imperial US-imposed order requiring one powerful state exercising control over the political sovereignty of political entities abroad whether by direct or indirect intervention. It has been exercised either by force, political collaboration, or dependency relations at various levels, and the arguments for a rules-based order overlook

230  Further Critiques of Political Economy the United States’ own willingness to ignore, evade, or rewrite the rules whenever they seem inconvenient. If we are honest with ourselves, we have to acknowledge that Washington sometimes thinks it is perfectly okay for might to make right and for winners to take all. (Walt 2021) Solutions to the world’s most urgent threats including nuclear weapons, global pandemics, and climate chaos are well known. Political courage and popular will are the missing points. “The prospects of great power war, nuclear war, and devastating climate chaos are no longer unimaginable. But what humans have created, we can change” (Gerson 2021). References Amin, Samir (2017) Revolution from North to South, Monthly Review, July 1, https:// monthlyreview​.org​/2017​/07​/01​/revolution​-from​-north​-to​-south/ Babic, Milan (2020) Let’s Talk about the Interregnum: Gramsci and the Crisis of the Liberal World Order, International Affairs, Volume 96, Issue 3, May 2020, 767–786. Barnett, Michael N. (2018) The End of a Liberal International Order That Never Existed, April, https://theglobal​.blog​/2019​/04​/16​/the​-end​-of​-a​-liberal​-international​-order​-that​ -never​-existed/ Barnett, Michael N. (2021) International Progress, International Order, and the Liberal International Order, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 14, Issue 1, Spring, 1–22, https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/cjip​/poaa019 Bello, Walden (2021) America has Entered the Weimar Era, Foreign Policy in Focus, 7 January, https://fpif​.org​/america​-has​-entered​-the​-weimar​-era/ Bienefeld, Manfred (2007) Suppressing the Double-Movement to Secure the Dictatorship of Finance, in Ayse Bugra and Kaan Agartan (eds.), Reading Karl Polanyi for the TwentyFirst Century- Market Economy as a Political Project, Palgrave Macmillan, London. Duménil, Gérard and Dominique Lévy (2004) The Economics of US Imperialism at the Turn of the 21st Century, Review of International Political Economy, Volume 11, Issue 4, 657–676. Duncombe, Constance and Tim Dunne (2018) After Liberal World Order, International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 1, January 2018, 25–42. Foster, John Bellamy and Intan Suwandi (2020) COVID-19 and Catastrophe Capitalism, Commodity Chains and Ecological-Epidemiological-Economic Crises, Monthly Review, Volume 72, Issue 2, https://monthlyreview​.org​/2020​/06​/01​/covid​-19​-and​-catastrophe​ -capitalism/ Gerson, Joseph (2021) Alternatives to the Pentagon’s China Nightmares, Common Dreams, 6 November, https://www​.commondreams​.org​/views​/2021​/11​/06​/alternatives​-pentagons​ -china​-nightmares Goody, J. (2006) The Theft of History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA. Haass, Richard N. (2018) Liberal World Order, R.I.P., Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March, https://www​.cfr​.org​/article​/liberal​-world​-order​-rip Haass, Richard N. (2021a) 6 January, https://twitter​ .com​ /richardhaass​ /status​ /1346920408386129922 Haass, Richard N. (2021b) 7 January, https://twitter​.com​/richardhaass​/status​/1346980746 229993478

Liberal World Order for the 21st Century  231 Huntington, S. P. (1998) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone Books, London. Ikenberry, John (2018) The End of Liberal International Order? International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 1, January. Ikenberry, John (2020) The Next Liberal Order, Foreign Affairs, July/August, Volume 90, Issue 4, pp. 133–142. Washington DC. John Hopkins (2021) 17 November, https://coronavirus​.jhu​.edu​/map​.html Khader, Jamil (2017) Class Struggle for the 21st Century: Racial Inequality, International Solidarity, and the New Apartheid Politics, Journal of World-Systems Journal, Volume 23, Issue 2, August. Lind, Jennifer (2017) Saving the Liberal Order From Itself, Politique étrangére, 4, https:// www​.ifri​.org​/sites​/default​/files​/atoms​/files​/lind​_en​_ok​_002​.pdf Lissner, Rebecca Friedman and Mira Rapp-Hooper (2018) The Liberal Order Is More Than a Myth. But It Must Adapt to the New Balance of Power, Foreign Affairs, 31 July, https://www​.foreignaffairs​.com​/articles​/world​/2018​-07​-31​/liberal​-order​-more​-myth Marcus, A. Allen and Charles R. Menzies (2007) Towards a Class-Struggle Anthropology, New Proposals, Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry, Volume 1, Issue 1, May, 14–39. Malcolm X. (1992) The Autobiography of Malcolm X, Ballantine, New York. Malcolm X (1994) Malcolm X Speaks: Selected Speeches and Statements, George Breitman (ed.), Grove Press, New York. Martins, Carlos Eduardo (2019) Samir Amin and the Challenges of Socialist Transformation in Senile Capitalism, Globalizations, Volume 16, Issue 7, 980–984. Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels (1998) [1846] Die deutsche Ideologie, Marx EngelsWerke, Band 3: 9–429, From Karl Marx, The German Ideology, Literary Theory: An Anthology. 2nd ed., Blackwell, Oxford. Peck, James (2010) Ideal Illusions. How the U.S. Government Co-opted Human Rights, Metropolitan Books, New York. Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty-first Century, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Porter, Patrick (2018) A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal Order, Policy Analysis No. 843, CATO Institute, 5 June, https://www​.cato​.org​/publications​/policy​-analysis​/world​ -imagined​-nostalgia​-liberal​-order Prashad, Vijay (2020) Not Just an Orchard, Not Merely a Field, https://consortiumnews​.com​ /2020​/09​/18​/not​-just​-an​-orchard​-not​-merely​-a​-field/ Purkayastha, Prabir (2021) What does India Get Out of Being Part of the Quad? Asia Times, 8 October, https://asiatimes​.com​/2021​/10​/what​-does​-india​-get​-out​-of​-being​-part​-of​-the​-quad/ Roelofs, Joan (2020) The Political Economy of the Weapons Industry. Guess Who’s Sleeping With Our Insecurity Blanket? https://joanroelofs​.files​.wordpress​.com​/2018​/07​ /insecurity​-blanket​.pdf Sabic-El-Rayess, Amra (2021) The US did More to Radicalise Afghanistan than Osama bin Laden, Aljazeera, 2 November, https://www​.aljazeera​.com​/opinions​/2021​/11​/2​/the​ -us​-did​-more​-to​-radicalise​-afghanistan​-than​-bin​-laden Sachs, Jeffrey (2021) The Real Reason this Pandemic is the Deadliest to Ever Hit the US, cnn​.c​om 22 September, CNN. Schmidt, Johannes Dragsbaek (2010) A Cacophony of Crises: Systemic Failure and Reasserting People’s Rights, Human Geography, Volume 3, Issue 1, 18–33. Schmidt, Johannes Dragsbaek (2021) The Elephant and the Panda – India and China: Global Allies and Regional Competitors, in J. D. Schmidt and S. Chakrabarti (eds.), The

232  Further Critiques of Political Economy Interface of Domestic and International Factors in India’s Foreign Policy (pp. 145– 166), Routledge, Abingdon, https://doi​.org​/10​.4324​/9781003122302-1 Schmidt, Johannes Dragsbaek and Jacques Hersh (2006) Neoliberal Globalization: Workfare Without Welfare, Globalizations, Volume 3, Issue 1, 69–89. Schmidt, Johannes Dragsbaek and Jacques Hersh (2019) Eurocentrism and Imperialism, Zak Cope and Immanuel Ness (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, London and New York. Scott, Benn (2021a) The Trouble with Washington’s ‘Rules-Based Order’ Gambit, The Diplomat, August, https://thediplomat​.com​/2021​/08​/the​-trouble​-with​-washingtons​-rules​ -based​-order​-gambit/ Scott, Benn (2021b) Rules-based Order: What’s in a Name? Lowy Institute, https://www​ .lowyinstitute​.org​/the​-interpreter​/rules​-based​-order​-whats​-in​-a​-name Standing, Guy (2016) The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class, Bloomsbury Academic, London. Stokes, Doug (2018) Trump, American Hegemony and the Future of the Liberal International Order, International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 1, January 2018, 133–150. Sørensen, Georg and Hans-Henrik Holm (eds.). (1995) Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado. Tuygan, Ali (2021) The Rules-based International Order, Diplomatic Opinion, 21 May, https://diplomaticopinion​.com​/2021​/05​/10​/the​-rules​-based​-international​-order/ Waldmeir, Patti (2020) Pandemic Ushers in New Era of Hunger in the US, Financial Times, 22 September. Walt, Stephen M. (2021) China Wants a ‘Rules-Based International Order,’ Too, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government, March 31, https://www​.belfercenter​.org​/publication​/china​-wants​-rules​-based​ -international​-order​-too Wilson, Edmund (1972) To the Finland Station: A Study in the Writing and Acting of History, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York. Žižek, Slavoj (1997) Multiculturalism; or, The Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism, New Left Review, 225, September–October, 28–51. Žižek, Slavoj (1999) The Ticklish Subject, Verso, London and NY.

Afterword On the Very Form of Critique Piet Strydom

Introduction A careful survey of the content confirms that this collection attains its goal of making a contribution to the critique of political economy in the context of the contemporary crisis-ridden global situation. In fourteen chapters, experts in their respective fields from countries as far-flung as Canada, Denmark, Germany, India, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom in some detail carry out this timely project conceived and orchestrated by the editor. Not only do the authors take critical perspectives on the existing political-economic dispensation while focusing on a diverse range of pressing internal and external issues, but they also probe possibilities that could transcend the present by pointing towards an alternative future for humanity and the planet. In line with the double-barrel concept, both the constitution and governance of political economy are targeted, but it is in particular the associated consequences of this long-standing modern institutional arrangement that allow the analysis and critique to branch out in a variety of future-oriented directions. Unsurprisingly, the critique of political economy draws on and seeks to continue in some sense or another the critical tradition founded by Marx and subsequently pursued in a broadened format by critical theory and related developments which raised further complementary perspectives. This lineage is simultaneously updated, however, by the incorporation of insights gained from psychology and sociology touching on ethics and morality as well as from aesthetics, anthropology, development, international relations and post-colonial studies. As demanded by the task at hand, this afterword first offers a brief overview of the chapters and then takes a step back to make some broad comments on the content with reference to the theoretical and normative dimensions of the argumentation presented in the volume. Of central interest here is critique per se, the very form of critique assumed in this volume. Overview of the chapters In the editor’s opening chapter, Ananta Kumar Giri sets the agenda and tone of the collection by avoiding from the outset a narrow focus following the conventional conception in favour of a broad grasp of political economy situated in its 

234 Afterword sociocultural context. This perspective accommodates the full range of dimensions necessary to get to grips with this complex phenomenon. Besides both the governance and productive components of political economy, he not only extends the perspective to the moral economy, but still more incisively shifts it so as to include also the underpinning and encompassing moral and ethical dimensions. Significantly, therefore, the analysis is not confined just to the externally observable features of political economy alone, but rather embodies a stance that simultaneously penetrates to the internal visions and practices which guide, motivate and drive political-economic as well as environing social and individual forces. As regards the analysis of the contemporary political economy, Giri singles out neo-liberal capitalism and its statist governance as sources of a series of problems that explain the need for the renewal of the critique of political economy originally suggested by Hegel and then famously carried out by Marx. Among the disadvantaging and, indeed, destructive consequences of this contemporary dispensation count, most immediately, excessive inequality accompanied by exploitation, precarity and alienation and, on a global planetary scale, both the lack of cosmopolitan relations and the already advanced ecological crisis which confront humankind with the spectre of self-destruction and catastrophe. For Giri, these problems are not just objective states of affairs calling for description and analysis by a disinterested external observer, but rather real phenomena that should be considered from the inside out as harbouring crucial cultural and social resources. Once this is done, it becomes apparent that they signal meaningful concepts and normative principles that could stimulate the imagination, provide motivation and direct action and practices. A variety of agents have already begun to respond to the challenges entailed by the demand for an alternative present and future. Included among them are social movements spearheading social and ecological change, those advancing inter-cultural and trans-civilizational dialogues and discourses, and individuals engaged in working on self-transformation whose importance should not be underestimated. In this latter respect, Giri invokes the Buddhist notion of bodicitta referring to the mind (citta) awakening or becoming enlightened (bodhi) with knowledge, wisdom and compassion in relation to all sentient beings, human and non-human. It is in this agential field that the internal visions and practices which imaginatively guide, motivate and drive critique, creativity and transformation are to be found. The task of the contemporary critique of political economy is to take up this experience-based internal critique and to help give it a form that could be more effectively communicated and disseminated to all those, from top to bottom, who are responsible for identifying possibilities and bringing into being alternatives to the different dimensions of the contemporary political economy. While aware of the recent increase of cross-disciplinary interest in the moral dimension of human social life, Robert Nonomura draws inspiration in chapter two more particularly from sociology and social psychology within this broad field to bring into view a blind spot of political economy. These social scientific concerns with morality by themselves are of course not sufficient for an adequate critique of contemporary political economy. Rather than merely juxtaposing morality to political economy, therefore, the latter has to be critically opened up by finding

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an internal source that could account for its detrimental social and psychological effects. For this reason, Nonomura links directly with the well-established critical lineage represented by its founder, Karl Marx, and some of those who followed in his footsteps, among whom are Erich Fromm and critical theory more generally. Alongside critique as the signature of this lineage, however, Nonomura places the young Marx’s humanist theory which was continued by Fromm and is still alive today in critical theory. In this way, he simultaneously wants to confirm the abiding relevance of Marxism to the social sciences. Thus a twofold basis for a critique of contemporary political economy becomes available. First, Nonomuran probes Marx and Fromm’s critique of private property and their exploration of its shaping impact on bourgeois morality. Second, he specifies this general deforming propensity of private property by shifting to the social sciences and their deep concern with morality. Not only does sociology expose how political-economic forces shape and deform the coding of moral concepts and principles as well as the resulting discrepancies and contradictions between culturally secured societal values and concrete social relations and practices. But psychology and sociology in tandem also reveal how the concomitant social pathologies divert, deform and block individuals’ development of moral consciousness, thus impairing their moral cognition and ultimately their autonomy. On the one hand, then, Nonomura’s critique attacks the capitalist political economy centrally characterized by private property relations that figure as a virtually inescapable force shaping and deforming cultural and social constants and thereby generates social pathologies which, in turn, fracture the integrity and wellbeing of individuals.1 On the other hand, by contrast, human morality is afforded priority, followed by individual autonomy, which together allow and invite the imaginative projection of alternative futures at the different dimensions involved. These would include the equitable distribution of property, intact yet situationally attuned moral codes, convergence between sociocultural structures and practical social relations in concrete situations, the facilitation of conditions for the undisturbed formation of moral consciousness and, hence, the securing of competent individual moral cognition and judgement. Thus, the intimated prospect of Nonomura’s critique is a political economy thoroughly transformed by being permeated and leavened by morality and individual moral consciousness. In chapter three, Julien-François Gerber starts with an acknowledgement of the relevance of complementing Marx by the addition of psychology, as had been done before, but since still more depth is desirable to enrich and strengthen the critique of political economy, his proposal is to introduce Jungian psychoanalysis. Rather than simply intellectual, his aim with this departure is practical in that it relates to the actual carrying out of this critique. Gerber’s ultimate interest is in the agency required to spearhead the transition from the present to a post-capitalist mode of political economy. On investigation, he finds that the lines of thought stemming from Marx and Jung respectively converge on a common interest in human flourishing and wellbeing, but that they nevertheless diverge in their selection and prioritization of dimensions of reality. Whereas the Marxian line tends to stress the social, the conscious, the objective, modernity and science, the Jungian is by

236 Afterword contrast concerned with the individual, the unconscious, subjectivity, ancestrality and spirituality. Considering this classification, Gerber appreciates that if human flourishing and wellbeing were to be advanced, then the separated sides needed to be mediated and combined under actual conditions. The best suited case under which the depth of such mediation, combination and eventual synthesis could be determined are emancipatory social struggles. Gerber gives the mode of investigation he follows in this respect the title of a ‘Jungian-Marxian anthropology’ that has the necessary qualities to untangle and clarify the intricate way in which ideology and the unconscious relate to one another in social struggles motivated by the imposed costs of the existing capitalist political economy and pushing towards a political project of transformation. The agency Gerber advocates is radical activism, an ‘ensouled’ agent commanding a meaningful yet thoroughly critical grasp of reality and a direction of action, all infused with an imaginative vision and matching passion. Under current conditions, the most appropriate corresponding political project would be that of ‘de-growth’ oriented towards a post-capitalist political economy characterized by a decelerated time-culture and politics, a less complex and abstract life, and a drastic increase in compassion for both humans and non-humans. On the one hand, critique is levelled against the prevailing political-economic conditions that infringe on and limit the contemporary form of life and, concomitantly, cause serious psychological damage which has its own further detrimental consequences. As a correction to these unjustifiable conditions, on the other hand, an ensouled agent, a transformative political project, emancipation, a new form of life, psychological wellbeing and human and non-human flourishing are invoked. For the purpose of a drastic rethink of political-economic concepts, indeed, for a radical critique of capitalism, Felix Padel in chapter four adopts a penetrating anthropological perspective that both reaches back to the past of the current dispensation and digs down to its submerged human foundation. A carefully selected range of literature, from anthropology via heterodox economics to radical politics, informs this perspective and lends it the sharp edge required for an effective critique. There is indeed evidence that reconsideration of the conventional politicaleconomic concepts and arguments has already begun, but since the marginality of the different efforts still limits their impact on policy, the need for contributions on all relevant aspects remains. Here the rationale for probing the less explored anthropological underpinnings of the phenomenon is to be found. The central prong of Padel’s critique is directed at the contemporary ultra-capitalist political economy as a form of vicious domination that is maintained by the employment of an obfuscating financial mechanism. Not only is debt, which is inextricably tied to war, mobilized as a means for accumulation and subordination, but the framework within which all of this is achieved is orchestrated by an iniquitous undemocratic elite whose self-interest exclusively prioritizes the amassing of wealth, capital and power.2 Padel’s critique of this prevailing form of political economy is framed in anthropological terms enriched by the indigenous perspective. It shows that the contemporary debt-based ultra-capitalist political economy developed out of the earlier system of reciprocity or fair exchange signified by the master symbol of the

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gift. From this follows, therefore, that the prevailing political economy genealogically owes a significant human moral-ethical element to the earlier system which today, unfortunately, appears only in a severely curtailed and thwarted guise. Accordingly, Padel’s conclusion is that the characteristic core element of the reciprocity system of the past is clearly in need of being rediscovered and unearthed, and that for this to succeed a return to the past in some sense is necessary. Where objects of critique such as elite power, mechanisms of accumulation, wealth and inequality are targeted on the one hand in this analysis, then, they are balanced on the other by a critique that reveals the anthropologically or humanly significant deep-seated and culturally codified concept of reciprocity. It is in its terms that social relations have to be reset beyond the current situation. The perspective Andrew Sayer adopts in chapter five for the purpose of his critique of political economy is at its core doubtlessly inspired by his notable extant contribution to moral sociology. The aim of the chapter is to assess different forms of economic evaluation in terms of possible types of regulation or governance to which they are subject. Two broad categories within which to deal with evaluation in a critically comparative way are selected – to wit, the self-sufficient household or commune and the ‘catallaxy’, as Sayer calls it, or complex market coordinated economic system with an advanced division of labour, such as the contemporary capitalist political economy. A particularly interesting part of Sayer’s approach, however, is his further specification of a finely grained theoretical framework for the analysis of evaluation in these two different contexts. Evaluation is possible only by appeal to a broad yet definite criterion or criterial structure that regulates or governs such activity and thereby secures its coherence. Besides the relevant criterion, however, the actual exercise of evaluation involves a corresponding but contextually appropriate rationality and a related mode of judgement. Economic evaluation in the household or commune is obviously oriented towards a different criterial structure than in the capitalist market economy. Also the exercise of judgement in it follows a rationality that contrasts sharply with that reigning under the conditions of the current political economy. Evaluation in a complex market economic system such as the latter is oriented towards and regulated or governed by the criterion of price, which indeed fulfils an essential coordination function, while judgement follows a strictly means-ends economic rationality. Compared to the household or commune setting, such economic evaluation is decidedly one-dimensional in that economically by no means irrelevant considerations and information are, or at least, tend to be treated as inadmissible. Crucial to the household or commune, in contrast, is a set of interrelated criteria relative to the multiple dimensions of such an arrangement, including utility but in particular also social relations, individual integrity and the natural environmental and resources. Considering that criteria such as use-value, social justice, individual wellbeing and environmental sustainability therefore play a regulative or governing role, economic evaluative judgement should observe not a single means-ends rationality, but rather a corresponding set of related multiple rationalities – meansends, utilitarian, moral, ethical and objective environmental.3 It should be apparent that the significance of Sayer’s chapter dealing with the criteria and rationality

238 Afterword of evaluative judgements is that he virtually approaches a full-scale normative analysis and critique. On the one hand, the setting of price as the single cardinal criterion together with the concomitant monetization of everything under the conditions of the current political economy is critically taken apart. This is done by exposing its inherent blocking of vital information important to economic evaluation and the unjustifiable as well as devastating consequences thereof, including injustice, individual harm and environmental destruction. On the other hand, not only are the multiplicity of criteria and rationalities as well as their crucial role in the regulation or governance of the economy highlighted, but in particular social justice, individual wellbeing and environmental sustainability are in a critical and future-oriented move played off against the prevailing political economy as being realizable beyond its corrosive impact. Such an achievement would obviously require the impact of an active civil society and the strengthening of the political component of political economy. Adopting an anthropological perspective and drawing not uncritically on the critical tradition represented by Marx, Bloch and Marcuse, Ronald Stade in chapter six not only presents an indirect yet historically grounded critique of political economy. Simultaneously, he also offers a potent yet subtly underplayed ideology-critique of utopias persistently produced over time and purporting to transport humans beyond the world of necessity and labour. The two-sided core argument of the chapter is framed by the modal conceptual pair actuality/(im)possibility which he correlates with the distinction between labour and freedom. This conceptual framework is put to effective analytical use. On the one hand, the critique of contemporary political economy is suggestively presented through a reconstruction of social, political and economic relations covering a wide variety of geographically dispersed historical situations over many centuries. Central to this analysis is inequality which is sharply profiled by the highlighting of the exploitative role played by privileged elite ‘macroparasites’, as Stade calls them, in the organization of labour-freedom relations. In a critical warning, on the other hand, the history of utopia construction is traced from antiquity to modernity, with special attention paid to such medieval European images of unrestrained lands of plenty and realms of freedom as Cockaigne, Luilekkerland and Sclaraffenland. While ostensibly attempts to reverse the relation between necessary toil and freedom, these constructions are actually no more than adynata (Greek: άδύνατος, impossible), rhetorical flourishes of impossible utopias or in principle unreachable ideals, although not altogether devoid of potential for the formulation of concrete goals. A most interesting feature of Stade’s argument is his subtle combination of a naturalistic anthropology with cultural evolution. Humans indeed have the irresistible inherent desire to reach beyond actuality towards possibility, which typically finds expression in accompanying adynata. But as certain historical situations demonstrate, within reach there is actually a realizable goal – the welfare state, with its constitutive principles, concepts and practices, is the closest approximation thus far to a life of freedom and a land of plenty that humans have produced. This forward-looking reform-oriented conclusion is perhaps Stade’s most pointed critique of the core regressive feature of the contemporary political economy.

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The context in which Khirod Chandra Moharana locates his critique of the current state of the political economy in chapter seven is the present global crisis defined by climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic and the spectre of the proliferation of debilitating noozotic pathogens and diseases. Due to threatening the very existence of the planetary system, this is a multidimensional crisis that inescapably compels concerted attention to be given urgently to what is still largely unthinkingly and unquestioningly taken for granted regarding our human relation to nature. The supposed, indeed deluding, normality of the political economy which determines the contemporary lifestyle as well the fate of the biosphere and therefore all living species, is in dire need of being questioned, rethought and confronted with possible alternative ways of life. Moharana’s core concern is the mutually reinforcing relation between the political economy and the self. While taking a neo-liberal and technocratic form, the capitalist political economy operates in an all-determining manner through an one-sidedly rational market, on the one hand, and a form of a hands-off spectator state which, nevertheless, is often in cahoots with economic actors, on the other. It is by means of this twofold institutional structure that capitalist forces create, shape and encourage the form of the self that seamlessly complements it – to wit, Homo economicus in its present still more distorted version of the neo-liberal self. Characteristically, this self is decidedly individualist, self-centred, never-satisfied, all-consuming, power hungry, competitive, invariably in pursuit of fulfilling limitless needs and wants, and arrogantly deludes itself as being the basic building block of human development. In Moharana’s view, this form of self is not only defining of the contemporary political economy, but simultaneously also the major source of the current multilevel crisis.4 Overall, the thrust of Moharana’s argument points in two distinct yet complementary directions. On the one hand, the critique of political economy is aimed at the all-determining and destructive impact of capitalist forces in their contemporary guise with the intent of highlighting and thus advancing their urgently needed transformation and the neutralization of their undesirable consequences. A central aim of this moment of critique is the undoing of the neo-liberal self. On the other hand, the projection of the auto-reflective transformation and emancipation of the self invokes something of cardinal importance. Not only does it promise the reconnection of humans with the biotic and abiotic components of planet Earth and the recognition that the self is existentially dependent on the biosphere and its organic substructure. But by a complementary moment of critical disclosure, it identifies some major features of an alternative political economy and, thereby, obliquely hints at the latter’s corresponding governing principles. In chapter eight, Pulin Nayak subjects India’s development from independence to the early 2020s to an assessment to which is central a multilevel critique of its current political economy. While both the political and economic prongs are targeted, he is acutely aware that development is a holistic process, simultaneously involving as it does also historical, social and cultural dimensions. Britain’s selfinterested colonial ransacking left India undeveloped and poor and thus bequeathed an enormous task to the founding fathers, Gandhi, Nehru, Ambedkar, Narayan and Lohia, who assumed political leadership for the first number of decades starting

240 Afterword around 1950. Despite differences and even tensions between them, these men on the whole pursued the ideals of socialism, secularism and parliamentary democracy, entailing liberal values such as equality, an equitable world and freely permitted dissent. Economically, the growth rate during the period of their leadership was between 3-4 percent which, however, proved inadequate to mitigate persistent underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty. The dominant role of the state, which contributed to this unfortunate outcome, was reversed only in the early 1990s when a programme of liberalization and fiscal, trade and industrial reform started to transform the economy and led to a significant increase in the growth rate. India having weathered the 2008 financial crisis well, a quite remarkable growth rate was achieved by the mid-2010s. Parallel to this development, however, the lingering traditional class inequality and skewed distribution of wealth increased due the prioritization of hyper-capitalism and, concomitantly, social and economic policies favouring the upper strata and corporate interests while intensifying the exploitation of the workforce. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, especially in the wake of his demonetarization and general sales tax policies introduced in 2016 as well as his authoritarian predisposition fuelled by the political Hindutva ideology, this trend intensified. Not only did the growth rate decline, but the oppression of minorities, in particular Muslims representing fourteen percent of the population, exploitation of the workforce and neglect of marginal sections of the population also intensified. The decisive blow delivered by the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 exacerbated all these negative trends. In his critique of the components of the political economy, Nayak focuses on three problems. First, finding support in Piketty’s recent ground-breaking analysis, he sees the already very high yet still increasing inequality and the related asymmetrical distribution of wealth as the most serious problem of the economy. Second, he points to policy decisions leading to the withdrawal of public expenditure on education and health which, furthermore, is worsened by allowing private interests to enter those fields. Third, he stresses that without social security and a minimum wage, the ninety percent of the workforce active in the informal sector are left marginalized, vulnerable and precarious – a condition that has been exacerbated in the extreme in the context of the pandemic due to the government’s neglect of those affected and, indeed, its effective reneging on the social contract. If these three points represent one side of Nayak’s critical analysis of the Indian political economy, on its other side he imagines an ideal social, political and economic institutional framework that could help make an alternative to the current catastrophic situation visible. This he finds in a return to the pursuit of the ideals of socialism and secularism – the former through implementation of a wealth tax and estate duty to moderate the unacceptable degree of extreme inequality,5 and the latter to disempower the Hindutva ideology so as to equally include the diversity of multiple communities and religions in India. Carlos Alvarez Pereira gives political economy a general treatment in chapter nine that rises to a full frontal critique of ‘Modernity’ (written with a capital letter) which was constructed on the foundations laid by the Enlightenment in the 18th century. The justification for this approach is that political economy is but an internal – if the key – part of the utopia of modernity. As regards the contemporary

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world, there is but one word that could adequately describe it: contradiction – including progress yet increasing inequality, science and technology preparing a dystopian future; competition with winners and losers and ecological destruction; human thriving and societal suicide. Given this accumulation of contradictions, the contemporary world has now reached a tipping point. Climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic revealed not only the fragility of human systems and the inadequacy of our interpretative frameworks, but also the self-destructive, indeed, collective suicidal course on which humanity is rushing headlong into the future. Alvarez Pereira explains this unenviable state of the world in terms of what he terms ‘the trilemma of modern civilization’. While facing a basic need for tradeoffs among its three principal components, the economy, society and ecology, modernity compromises this achievement due to its fear of the future – a fear that it strangely understands as resolvable only by financial capital as the guarantor of a future return and, hence, by continuous GDP growth and progress. Instead of integrating the three components, they are fatefully separated with dire consequences pointing towards the first civilizational collapse on a global scale. The basic concepts and key elements of political economy underpinning the modern approach encode what Alvarez Pereira terms its‘separatist’ epistemology and mode of understanding: mind/matter, subject/object, reason/emotions, object/object and object/ context. Prioritized are above all the rationally calculating individual, society as a collection of isolated wolf-like individuals, and nature as an objectifiable and infinitely exploitable resource. Alvarez Pereira’s penetrating critique goes in two directions. First, the single-minded attachment of economics to GDP entails its externalization of everything of consequence, from society and the environment, generally, to human motivations and aspiration, love and wellbeing, more particularly. Simultaneously, the maximization of production and capital accumulation depends on external sources of value, for example, the acquisition of new territories such as novel fields of knowledge, resource-rich colonies and expansive cyberspaces ripe for exploitation. And whenever it is interrupted by crisis, economics pragmatically takes recourse to the creation of fiat money or compels the taxpayer to pay up. Second, the epistemology or intellectual and political frameworks of interpretation are riddled with blind spots, not just unknown unknowns and known unknowns, but in particular what is already known yet still remains to be appropriated and taken to heart. A crucial blind spot is capital which refers not merely to accumulated economic resources, but actually rather broadly to the human inheritance per se. An acutely relevant further blind spot is ‘technomimesis’ in the sense of the advancing process whereby the coincidence of the human-created ecological crisis and radical robotization as the ultimate cultural achievement promises to bring humans and their civilization to an inhuman fiery end. The most important blind spot, however, which economics also excludes, is life itself to which humans and their human world are inherently related and the natural rhythm and pattern of which they willy-nilly follow. Alvarez Pereira nevertheless contends that, since a systemic logic is at work in the trajectory modernity is following, it is not plausible to lay the blame for its glaring shortcomings and negative consequences simply at the door of a particular cohort, such as for example a powerful moneyed elite.The

242 Afterword direction of this logic could be meaningfully altered, however, but only if modernity’s persistent tendency not to reflect on, acknowledge and appropriate the causes and reasons for past tragedies, like colonialism, financial crises or pandemics, is reversed.6 Alvarez Pereira’s principal positive emphasis is on learning. We have to learn, society can and has to learn and make what we already know its own. This amounts to‘relational learning’ – learning to incorporate our rich human heritage and accumulated wisdom stretching back to ancient times and reflected in modern transdisciplinary science, learning to maintain our relations to others, to nature, to ourselves and, above all else, to life. Christian Bartoff, Dominique Miething and Vishnu Varatharajan devote chapter ten to the identification of a series of 19th-century creative and radical departures, such as cooperative settlements and utopian communities in the United States and Britain, which anticipated or served as precursors of contemporary contributions to critiques of political economy and concerns with moral economy. The aim of their argument is not the presentation of a critique of political economy, therefore, but rather the provision of some historical background that enhances the understanding of the different strands of the current turn against the prevailing political-economic dispensation. This foil allows the emergence of the profiles of notable historical figures like Thoreau, Ruskin, Tolstoy and Gandhi whose social and political thought as well as actions had been impacted by the transcendentalist cooperative settlements and utopian socialist communities. More vaguely identifiable further back are influential figures and developments such as Jacob Böhme, German Romanticism, Johannes Heinrich Pestalozzi, Charles Fourier and Martin Buber. The authors make reference to more than a dozen cooperative settlements and utopian communities in the United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa. The first is the US transcendental community at Concord, Massachusetts, followed by the experimental utopian socialist communities founded in 1825 by Robert Owen in Scotland and at New Harmony, Indiana. A series of communities established by James Pierrepont Greaves and George and Sophia Ripley between the early and late 1830s are briefly covered as well as a number founded by Charles Lane and Adin Ballon in the United States in 1843. Of the later communities established around the mid-1890s, including also the Christian Commonwealth Colony in the United States and John Coleman Kenworthy’s Purleigh Brotherhood Colony in the United Kingdom, our authors Bartoff, Miething and Varatharajan go in great detail into the Ruskin Colony in Tennessee. The latest departures to receive attention, both founded by Gandhi under the influence of Ruskin and Tolstoy in South Africa in 1904 and 1910 respectively, are the Phoenix Settlement at Durban and Tolstoy Farm in Johannesburg. Generally speaking, these communities were based on communal land ownership and followed principles such as equality, cooperation, conviviality, non-violence and trusteeship. The universalistic beliefs behind these principles and their concrete interpretation are readily apparent in the charter, called ‘The Circumstantial Law’, which was drawn up by Greaves and revised by Lane and followed by the 19th-century utopian socialist cooperative settlements. Besides references to Tolstoy, Bartoff, Miething and Varatharajan give the last part of their chapter over to extensive discussions of Ruskin and his impact on

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Gandhi, as for example seen in the case of the Tolstoy Farm community he founded in Johannesburg. Gandhi himself and his associate Kumarappa are also covered in some detail. Of particular importance to Gandhi was Ruskin’s key politicaleconomic concepts which differ markedly from their standard interpretation as inherited from Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Among them are wealth, property, capital, rich/poor, ecology, luxury, war and violence. These concepts played an important part in Gandhi and Kumarappa’s alternative conception of political economy, their so-called ‘Constructive Programme’, which is guided by the idea of ‘Ashram’ or the ideal of living to serve.The core component of this programme is their multi-layered idea of cooperative village industries which includes also Tolstoy’s Boudareffian concept of ‘Bread Labour’ – that is, that everyone should work for their livelihood. While assuming the contemporary global crisis as the overarching and relevant context, Abhijeet Paul in chapter eleven does not dwell on the typically articulated critical perspectives on political economy, but instead searches for a space of hope emerging under the difficult conditions of our time. To this end, he reports on the findings of ethnographic research he conducted in the jute industry in India, led by a novel theoretical perspective inspired by an ignored strand of Marx’s critique of capitalism. It has a bearing on the relation between humans and machines. This perspective is concerned with the illumination of the concentrically expanding entangled relations that are missing from political economy and get misrepresented by its contemporary critics. Marx provided a fecund starting point with his observation that the momentary interruption of capitalist progress by the breakdown of a machine as an instrument of labour gets bridged by patchwork done on it to restore its use value. Paul is interested in the moment of interruption, but his attention is captured in particularly by the performance of the required repair work and what it entails in relational terms. The centrality afforded the repair community substantially shifts the focus. Paul bypasses the angle adopted not only by modern critics concerned with domination, exploitation and the fragmentation or deskilling of workers under the conditions of the current political economy, but also by post-colonial critics who decry the Indian jute industry for maintaining outdated 19th-century machines side-by-side with contemporary digitalized technology. Investigating the maintenance and repair of broken yet not redundant machines, he shows that it demands close cooperation of different categories and levels of workers, from qualified engineers via informally trained mechanics to unskilled helpers. Such cooperative relations depend on the informal transmission of knowledge which itself covers multiple levels, from the technical via work to ethics implicating both the personal and the social. The process furthermore demands the uncanny embodied envisioning ability of combining intuition, discernment or understanding and looking/looking and understanding, and precise calculation. And then there is still handicraft as well, since apparently obsolete practices remain an indispensable part of the repair process even in the advanced neo-liberal political economy. Here the ‘body mechanic’, absent from the literature, makes its appearance and simultaneously renders visible the lifeworlds of the repair workers as well as the larger community on which they depend and which they in turn help sustain. The

244 Afterword work flow is both integrative, mediating as it does the past and present, personalities, ethnicities and regional differences, and redirecting in that it gives rise to temporal, corporeal and ethical inventions. Paul’s principal concern, however, is the most significant emergent property of the repair process, what he calls the ‘ecology of hope’. Repair, the body and community mutually sustain each other and generate the hope of a livelihood, a meaningful life and a sustainable community. Rather than the arbitrarily imagined utopia of the non-fragmented worker enjoying so much attention in the literature, this is the real everyday hope arising from the factory floor and workshop and sustaining the household, bazaar and community. On the basis of a reconstructed early twentieth-century political-economic conception advocated by Mahatma Gandhi and his close associate J C Kumarappa, Jos Chathukulam and Manasi Joseph devote chapter twelve to an argument in favour of its relevance for resolving the problems of our time. The result of the reconstructive exercise is the Gandhi-Kumarappa model of a decentralized political-economic system erected on the Gandhian values of truth, non-violence, non-attachment to worldly wealth, equity, social justice, welfare for all and a harmonious humannature relation. It is not only critically played off against the Marxist and capitalist political economies, but is also portrayed as significantly different from the currently flagged alternatives. It is in this sense that Chathukulam and Joseph in their title speak of ‘rethinking and transforming critiques of political economy’. Their critique, in other words, is meant to cut deeper than any of the available ones, whether old or new. Notwithstanding their basic difference, both the Marxist and capitalist political economies are branded as materialist and greed-based and, accordingly, seen as oriented towards the acquisition of power and maximal production. This is particularly evident in the currently prevailing political-economic arrangement where the emphasis on Homo economicus, one-sided progress and obsession with GDP leads to profit- and rent-seeking, abuse of power, exploitation and neo-colonial extractivism and plunder. The inevitable adverse consequences, from inequality and poverty through violence and conflict to food insecurity and environmental destruction, are an irrefutable affirmation of the basic imbalance of this kind of institutional framework and form of society which has to be avoided. As regards the currently flagged alternatives, such as the green, ecological, degrowth and happiness political-economic designs, Chathukulam and Joseph see some instances of overlap with the Gandhi-Kumarappa model, but none of them is nearly sufficiently radical. The defining characteristic of the latter politicaleconomy is that it is village-based, owned by the community and both centred on and managed by it. Individual community members embody internalized values in contrast to the self-interested and rational economic calculators populating a greed-based society. Involving cooperative local relations, it is oriented towards social and individual wellbeing. Stressing artisanship, making optimal use of local resources and keeping to local production and distribution, it is self-sufficient and self-reliant. Simultaneously, a collaborative relation with nature focused on conservation and preservation is maintained, so that it constitutes a natural order. The Gandhian-Kumarappa political economy thus represents an ‘economy of permanence’ that contrasts rather sharply with the critiqued arrangements which are

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effectively ‘economies of transience’. It is with this radical possibility of a new permanent order envisioned by the Gandhi-Kumarappa model that Chathukulam and Joseph positively complement their negative critique of the extant politicaleconomic models and critiques thereof. In their view, it is a political economy able to generate such a permanent order that India is urgently in need of in the current post-pandemic opening. A question that is not explicitly raised is whether such an institutional complex might be necessary more generally if the survival of the human species were to be secured. In chapter thirteen, Suman Bagisha conducts a comparative investigation into the major theoretical directions in the discipline of international political economy with the aim of clarifying the concept of ‘world order’ and, then, of evaluating the widely accepted assumption that the current neo-liberal order is being displaced due to developments such as the rise of China, Asia and a multipolar world, the proliferation of populist-nationalist authoritarianism, and de-globalization. Her ultimate motivation for focusing on the world order concept under contemporary conditions is to sensitize to the need for possibilities and alternatives, such as a more humane order and less strife and conflict, inequality, poverty and environmental damage. Against the entrenched liberal, realist and Marxist directions, Bagisha plays off Robert Cox’s revitalized ‘critical theory’ that had been formulated originally in dependence on the Annales School’s and Fernand Braudel’s seminal conception of the longue durée. Whereas the liberals stress the state and economy as independent, the realists the self-interested powerful nation-state and the Marxists the all-determining class-based economy, the critical theorists by contrast adopt an overarching temporal perspective according to which they treat all these elements as dialectically interrelated in a single world caught in a long and slow process of transformation that preceded that current world and will continue beyond it. In their view, it is simply self-defeating to try to fix the relations between the state and economy theoretically beforehand, as the standard approaches propose, since their changing interrelations are embedded in a process where historically specific requirements apply. According to the critical theorists’ approach, the social construction of time is manifest in a plurality of social times in the form of historically specific structures, each representing a distinctive world order exhibiting a particular time-limited pattern of ideas, institutions, power relations and material capabilities. The world order therefore cannot be reduced to a body of rules, norms and institutions guiding relations among state actors in the international sphere, as it is typically conceived under the influence of the liberal status-quo theory and the realist problem-solving approach. Rather, it is a set of historically specific relations enduring over a stretch of time with a characteristic materially driven logic in which a variety of contradictions are worked through in a dialectical process from which a new kind of reality could potentially emerge. In the case of the present-day world order, for example, the neo-liberal capitalist orthodoxy is contradicted by oppositional discourses, liberal democracy is attacked by populist movements and authoritarian governments, the norms and institutions of the liberal international order are routinely broken by gross violations, and so forth.The key question is what substance emerges from this mediation of contradictions. From her critical

246 Afterword standpoint, Bagisha is convinced that both the liberal and realist diagnoses of the current world order are mistaken. So far from something new, both the diagnosis of the erosion of the liberal status quo by the rise of China on the basis of faith in the liberal world order and the diagnosis of structural change leading to a variety of challenges on the basis of the realist commitment to problem-solving are, in fact, still taking place within the confines of the current world order. Neither the liberal nor the realist approach disposes over the necessary critical capability to sense possibilities beyond that order, such as those articulated by the many voices from the Global South. None of them is producing any alternatives to the series of grave problems facing the liberal world order, including its inhumanity, persistent strife and conflict, escalating inequality, world poverty and environmental catastrophe. This is precisely the mission of the critical theory of the international political economy, doing so in both historically specific and normative terms. Johannes D Schmidt’s primary concern in chapter fourteen is the decline of the liberal world order in the current ‘post-American era’, as he refers to it following Richard Haass, and the horizon of possibilities and alternatives concomitantly coming into view now. At the core of his analysis is the historical fate as well as the future prospects of the relation between capital and labour and the implications for the Left. Schmidt locates his account in a quite detailed context which he reconstructs at a number of different levels. A characterization of the liberal world order as its architects and defenders see it is followed by a more penetrating critical perspective on both the material and sociocultural underpinnings of that order. According to the standard view, the liberal world order consists of three components: the rules-based governance of world affairs, the capitalist mode of production and economic globalization, and liberal values embodied in the individual, institutions, democracy and human rights. As Schmidt points out, however, operative ideas and ideals require backing by hard power. The United States was in fact able to maintain its power and institutions and to dominate this order on behalf of Western preferences and interests for some 70 years only thanks to its military might, which includes a pronounced nuclear capability and extends right up to NATO. Besides this considerable military backup, though, there is still the fateful Eurocentric history behind the liberal world order which is instantiated in imperialism and capitalism and ideologically directs and guides it. Schmidt shares the widely observed decline of the liberal world order in recent times, but instead of simply ascribing it to the rise of China, the process of globalization and so forth, he critically traces the decay to the internal Eurocentric-inspired policy decisions and self-interested actions of American economic and political elites. On the one hand, the state does not shrink back from violating its own rules and, on the other, under the mantle of a neo-liberal consensus the corporations and the state were complicit in tearing the social fabric apart through the off-shoring of key economic components and functions. Being interested in the consequences of these decisions and actions, Schmidt focuses on the socially devastating dismantling of organized labour power and the deeply concerning erosion of democracy7 as well as their ramifications at both national and international levels. Nevertheless, his modicum of cautious optimism regarding the possibility of change under contemporary crisis

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conditions leads to his probing of the state of the Left and the prospect of revitalizing international solidarity. Rejecting the ‘culturalization of politics’ by the identity-oriented movements, he positively evaluates the potential of reform moves in the direction of redistributive policies and a green new deal, yet qualifies that none of this would be enough to mitigate the contradictions and antagonisms inherent in the unfettered capitalist mode of production. The attainment of social and democratic advances, a multipolar world order and an ecologically sound relation to nature would furthermore require the mobilization of a diverse set of social forces, from political parties to civil society organizations, NGOs and social movements.8 In this respect, Schmidt pins his hope to the idea of the ‘Fifth International’ formulated at the World Social Forum and articulated in its 2005 Porto Alegre Manifesto. Significantly for Schmidt, this Manifesto stresses, above all, the always latently available deep-seated human capacity to construct a different human world. Comment on the chapters For all their differences, considering the focus of this volume, the chapters quite expectedly without exception exhibit a similar form, albeit for the most part in an implicit way. On the one hand, erosive, deforming, destructive and thus unjustifiable features of political economy are selectively identified and singled out for critique, whether the modern political economy in its present manifestation or more broadly in its historical guise, or both in combination. On the other hand, this negative critical orientation aimed at eliminating any objectionable features is complemented by the introduction and, at times, defence of a positive orientation. Here quite different attempts are made to critically unearth and disclose possibilities that would make plausible a proposal either for the correction of political-economic failures or for the adoption of steps that could potentially lead to the realization of an alternative of some sort beyond the present arrangement. Recognizing and maintaining these two complementary orientations sidesby-side are of course characteristic of the critical enterprise per se, as is convincingly demonstrated by the Frankfurt iteration of the critical theory lineage where a negative destructive critique is balanced by a positive disclosing critique (Strydom 2011). Whatever the differences among the particular designs of negative and positive critiques, more generally, each of the chapters adopts a stance in the present, from there takes recourse to the past for the purposes of grasping better the intricacies of the present and then, on that basis, imaginatively projects or more precisely sketches a potentially productive orientation towards the future and a corresponding course of action. The latter stretches from reform, such as wealth taxation, redistribution and welfare state enhancement, via strengthening democracy through inclusive practical discourse or Ubuntu, to more radical proposals such as those involving NGO, civil society and social movement action aimed at an alternative institutionalization of the political economy. The interpretative framing the chapters gained through their modal temporal stance is then, secondly, located within the context of the multilevel global crisis. In all cases, this context is delineated with reference

248 Afterword to the multiple ‘mega threats’ (Roubini 2022) and challenges facing not just the human species and its sociocultural form of life, but indeed all life on Earth. Although a theoretical framework covering the parameters and internal structures of society (e.g. Strydom 2022) would be the most appropriate means for identifying and systematizing the instances of the mega threats and challenges discussed in the chapters, a rudimentary theoretical classification of societal dimensions into the objective, social or moral and subjective or ethical could nevertheless be useful for present purposes. Those falling in the objective category include climate change, ecological catastrophe and zoonotic diseases and pandemics; the economy, whether capitalist or neo-liberal capitalist, corporate bloating, debt and inflation; technology, including the spectre of nuclear disaster and artificial intelligence; and state structures at the national and interstate level, great power competition, war and entry into a period comparable to the four destructive and tenebrous decades between 1914 and 1945. The second social or moral category includes challenges like power structures, the politics of will, culturalization of politics, identity politics,9 democratic decline, populism, neo-fascism and authoritarianism; and domination, inequality, injustice, lack of solidarity, exploitation and poverty. In the third subjective category, finally, fall deficient development of moral consciousness and judgement, Homo economicus and negative freedom, individualism, inauthenticity, and the aberrant type of cultural personality of our time exhibiting obsessive materialism, possessiveness, egomania and narcissism. While the chapters either explicitly refer to all three dimensions or simply assume their relevance, they differ in their selective emphasis of some rather than other of these dimensions. But it is more precisely in their selective treatment of the particular instances of the three dimensions that the chapters display the distinctive interests of their authors. In respect of both negative and positive critiques advanced in the volume, the chapters typically yet selectively identify agents who are either centrally involved in or affected by the operation of the political economy. Both those responsible for the objectionable political-economic tendencies and those subject to and suffering from them are located as well as those who, by contrast, embody the promise and potential of carrying through the correction of the adverse and unacceptable conditions it continues to give rise to, or even the displacement of the present arrangement by some alternative. The identified agents thus include the asymmetrically related privileged powerful wealthy economic-political elites, on the one hand, and both workers and inhabitants of former colonies, developing countries and neocolonies, but also oppositional civil society actors, NGOs and social movements intent on bringing about change. Complementing the action dimension, the chapters of course also selectively make reference to, or invoke, different types of consequential structures, some of which are essential to the maintenance of the contemporary version of political economy and others harbouring the potential for changing or transcending it. Among them are constraining and enabling structures, for example: physical, biological and chemical structures of nature providing the organic and inorganic foundations of life on Earth; power structures of a state, military, economic, corporate and political party nature; social structures such as the superordinate and

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subordinate, but also organizational structures of civil society, labour and NGOs; cultural structures including knowledge, cultural models such as capital, accumulation, progress, circular economy, growth, de-growth, democracy, authoritarianism, rule of law, an equitable society and Homo economicus; personality structures such as moral consciousness, maturity, possessive individualism and egotistic individualism; above all, however, meta-cultural structures such as validity concepts and normative principles, like truth relative to the objective dimension, freedom, justice, equality and solidarity relative to the social or moral dimension, and finally autonomy and sincerity relative to the subjective or ethical dimension. The topic of this volume is not merely the contemporary political economy, however, but emphatically a critique thereof. Now, critique by definition requires an appeal to some or other normative magnitude without which it would simply be impossible. Here enter the cultural structures and meta-cultural structures that serve as the vehicles of normativity. In so far as they engage in critique, therefore, all the authors unavoidably appeal to normative structures – that is, most immediately to norms in the form of established and highly valued cultural models and, ultimately, to the meta-cultural structures housing abstract validity concepts and normative principles. The significance of these concepts and principles is that they give cognitive form and structure not merely to the valued norm-bearing cultural models, but ultimately to society as a specifically human form of life. For example, cognitively structured and available cultural models like democracy, rule of law, a just society, an equal society, international solidarity, ‘Ubuntu’, peaceful interstate relations, the authentic individual, wellbeing and so forth, all function as norms. By contrast, meta-cultural cognitive structures like the concepts truth, freedom, justice, equality, sincerity and various others operate as principles securing the validity of any critique proffered through an appeal to norms applicable to specific contexts or situations. While the authors necessarily appeal to normative conceptions in the course of their critiques, it is of particular interest and importance to note that they do so mostly in a less than reflective manner. Their writings show that the norms appealed to and the principles invoked are largely assumed or taken-for-granted. Indeed, normativity as the core component of a critical approach receives little or no recognition and attention in its own right. Nor does the fact that, from a social scientific viewpoint, the vehicles of normativity such as norms, validity concepts and principles are clearly identifiable structures of a cultural and meta-cultural kind. If not articulated or even not being directly articulable, especially the metacultural concepts and principles should ideally be facilitated to show themselves. Were that done, it would lend a given critique of an economic, political or social state of affairs a sharper edge and profile, add to the plausibility of a projected vision of a better or alternative arrangement or future, and strengthen the validity of the claim thereby advanced. No more could be asked of a critique, whether of a dismantling or a disclosing kind. An example could shed light on the intricacies, both explicit and implicit, of critique as exercised and presented in this volume. To start with, it could with justification be submitted that the cultural model that plays the most central role in the

250 Afterword construction, reproduction and operation of the prevailing type of political economy is capital – to be sure, a decidedly one-sided interpretation of capital. As such, capital is the core of the object of critique in this volume. Rather than appreciating that all the material, cultural (including meta-cultural concepts and principles), social and cognitive resources together accumulated since ancient times actually constitute humanity’s capital, the standard interpretation reduces this composite heritage of humanity strictly to a quantity of financial resources for investment in the expectation of future profit. It is this narrow economistic interpretation of capital that serves as the cultural model of the neo-liberal capitalist political economy. This one-sided cultural model provides the ideal that inspires, gives direction to, guides and regulates capitalist economic activities in the course of their pursuit of profit. Whatever normativity this cultural model exerts through regulation, however, is of an extremely narrow sort in that it draws on a biased selection of neighbouring cultural models, such as negative freedom, possessive individualism, Homo economicus, rational choice conduct, natural resources as limitless cornucopia, progress,10 growth, profit and so forth. As such, it not merely excludes the broad range of individual, social and ecological concerns by starkly externalizing them, but also cuts normativity down to the bare minimum of means-ends rationality. It is quite comprehensible, therefore, that this anaemic economistic cultural model of capital invites the justifiable critique of the capitalist political economy in the majority of chapters in this volume. After all, it amounts to hardly anything more than an ideological construct that blocks the realization of adequate human relations within a cared-for planetary biosocial ecosphere. In turn, this construct again finds support in other political and cultural ideological constructs, for example, the multi-layered Eurocentric ideology with its morally and ethically objectionable colonialist, supremacist, racist and other connotations. To be fair, besides the central political-economic object of attack, the authors on occasion also direct their critiques at oppositional constructs in cases where civil society actors, NGOs or social movements and even academic critics in their enthusiasm overblow the imaginaries they project. The critique exercised in the chapters, nota bene, is itself guided by a cognitively structured and available cultural model – that is, the theoretical-methodological cultural model of critique which was handed down from generation to generation, from the Enlightenment thinkers Bayle and Kant, via Hegel and Marx as well as Lukács, Horkheimer and Adorno, to Apel and Habermas and contemporary critical theory. Now, the Enlightenment origin of the modern cultural model of critique followed also in this volume should be elevated to the level of consciousness. This should caution against the tendency in some chapters, presumably under the influence of postmodernism and post-colonialism, to simply reject the Enlightenment and modernity out of hand, as though they are not just completely obsolete, but actually the sources of all contemporary limitations, problems and evils. Without in any way denying the necessity of pointed critique of certain Enlightenment and modern strands, indeed needed urgently, relentlessly and persistently, there is obviously a more nuanced understanding required here of the unredeemable entanglement of the present critique

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of political economy with the modern Enlightenment cultural model of critique, and by implication therefore with the Enlightenment and modernity more generally. By no means exhausted by its dominant strain, modernity has since its emergence harboured an alternative but suppressed modernity (e.g., Schäfer 1985; Eder 1988) that has all along been struggling from the inside for rights and appropriate relations to nature, others and the self as well as recognition of the governing meta-cultural structures – such as truth, justice, sincerity – which humans cognitively have in common. The degree of reflexivity and self-critique that modernity more generally did achieve in the course of time, indeed feeding on the past and strengthened by mounting external critiques, originally derives from this internal source that cannot be identified with dominant modernity. The associated cultural model of critique, so profusely employed in this volume, is a treasure we have inherited from this inestimable but suppressed sub-lineage of modernity which itself forms part of the continuous human heritage. But let us take a closer look at the form of the critique presented in the present volume. In the following analytic model, critique is reconstructed in terms of six progressively deeper levels. 1 In taking on the contemporary neo-liberal political economy, first, critique most obviously targets the spectrum of capitalist economic activities and institutions together with their adverse and destructive consequences as well as undesirable side-effects.11 2 Less obviously, second, critique simultaneously attacks the economistic cultural model of capital that inspires, directs, guides and regulates the economic activities shaping and carrying the neo-liberal political economy. While being targeted, awareness of this crucial cultural dimension of political economy is lacking throughout the chapters. 3 Critique thirdly penetrates deeper to the set of cultural conditions making the economistic model and, thus, the political economy possible in conjunction with action and practices – that is, the set of supporting cultural models including, for example, negative freedom, possessive individualism, Homo economicus, rational choice conduct, natural resources as limitless cornucopia, accumulation, profit, growth and so forth. In the chapters, critical attacks are selectively launched against these cultural models, although not always explicitly, certainly not as cultural models essential to the operation of the current political economy. 4 To enable a critique, however, an author of necessity has to appeal in the fourth place to different normatively rich, cognitively available, well-institutionalized and socially widely accepted cultural models that delimit or counter the limited, biased, distorted or ideological nature of the economistic model of capital and the economic activities deployed under its influence. Among these cultural models are, for example, such strongly normative constructs as democracy, the rule of law, a just society, an equitable society, international solidarity, ‘Ubuntu’, peaceful interstate relations, the autonomous individual, wellbeing and so forth. It is only by virtue of an appeal to one or more of these normatively potent cultural models that the necessary contrast can be

252 Afterword established that exposes an unjustifiable feature of the current political economy and thus delivers a negative destructive critique of it. These normative structures in particular cry out for treatment in the cultural terms appropriate to them and social scientific conceptualization. 5 Where authors were not content with a negative critique alone, but moved on to deliver a full-fledged critique including also a positive moment of disclosing critique, they took a fifth step. In this case, cues were intuitively taken from the relevant normatively potent cultural model as a source of surplus or excess possibilities and alternatives in order to make a meaningful proposal for a potentially practical realization of a selected possibility or alternative. Examples from the chapters, although not presented as critical disclosures, include a morally leavened political economy, a fully funded and developed welfare state, de-growth, post-capitalism, a post-productivist gift economy, a new world order of international solidarity, and so forth.12 6 At the deepest sixth level, however, there still remains the most crucial question of the normative correctness and validity of the critique advanced. To secure these qualities, critique has to have recourse to or invoke the relevant meta-cultural structures – the relevant validity concepts and normative principles – which cognitively govern the construction within society of cultural models, meaning, institutions, practices, orientations and personalities as well as situations in conjunction with relevant cultural models. The significance of such recourse is that it finally completes or systematically unifies an instance of critique. Given the nature of the human sociocultural world, every critique without exception relates to three distinct dimensions. Since it unavoidably refers to some aspect of objective reality and brings into play both the social or moral and the subjective or ethical dimensions, it must respectively satisfy the requirement of the corresponding validity concepts of truth, justice and sincerity in a way appropriate to the practical situation in point. Generally speaking, this threefold requirement of maintaining an abiding relation to the meta-cultural structures of society can be taken to be discharged unconsciously in the chapters, with only sporadic indications that an intact relation is in fact operative. Still, in most if not all cases, awareness of this most important, indeed, essential aspect of critique would make a significant difference in the presentation of the results. It can be said, therefore, that the critiques presented would benefit from a full completion through invocation of the meta-cultural dimension by more or less self-aware claims-making to satisfy the threefold validity requirement. However, this observation in no way detracts from the laudable contributions made in the chapters, each in its own way, to a contemporary critique of political economy. Notes 1 To specify Nonomura’s general reference to ‘critical theory’, it can be pointed out that his central concern with the political economy’s pathological impairment of moral consciousness and, hence, individual autonomy has its roots in Habermas’s extrapolation

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of the Piaget-Kohlberg conception of the ‘development of moral consciousness’ (1979) and his thesis of the ‘colonization of the lifeworld’ (1987: 355) according to which the deforming imposition of the dual bureaucratic state-capitalist economic system on communicatively mediated social life generates a series of social and individual pathologies as well as legitimation problems. 2 For a historically informed account of the long-term debt cycle gripping contemporary capitalism and its predictable devastating end, see Dalio (2018). The optimistic view that bitcoin holds the solution to the financial system’s woes, however, is an entirely different matter. 3 For an important step towards the improvement of current economic evaluation and judgement, see Euronews Green (2022) on the innovative proposal of Paulo Quattrone and Ariela Caglio to alter the accounting and auditing system inherited from Adam Smith by adding a mandatory line for nature to the standard value-added income statement, thereby making nature a visible key stakeholder with value and a voice and, simultaneously, compelling stakeholders to pay serious attention to how corporate activity relates to nature. 4 Here it could be noted that the neo-liberal self is mirrored exactly on the corporate side in what The Economist (2022) refers to as its ‘conglomeritis’ which includes ‘bloating and egomania’. The importance of attending critically to the significance and role of corporations in contemporary political economy cannot be over-emphasized. 5 An important implied yet unaddressed question in many of the chapters is what an acceptable or legitimate level of inequality would be. In his research, Millward-Hopkins (2022) shows that a decarbonized democratic world would require a drastic reduction of the purchasing power and consumption of the rich. As part of such a reduction, what should the purchasing power/consumption ratio between the rich and poor be? 6 On the problem of ‘working through the past’ originally raised by Adorno and here hinted at by Alvarez Pereira, see Schultz (2022). 7 The most detailed analysis of the devastating consequences of US tax policies as well as of tax fraud and avoidance is presented by Bartlett and Steele (2000) and most recently Steele (2022) in his collaboration with The Center for Public Integrity on an investigation of inequality. 8 For the most recent comprehensive account of global social movements and social change, see Chase-Dunn and Almeida (2020). 9 A graphic depiction of what the culturalization of politics and identity politics entails is offered by Zizek (2022). 10 The critical focus of the relevant literature is typically trained on capital, lately in exemplary manner in Piketty (2017), but it could also be on progress, in which case see, for example, the recent collection in The Sociological Review Monographs (2022). 11 For a finely grained analysis of neo-liberal capitalism through its various phases, from the 1970s to the present, see e.g. Volscho (2017). 12 Based on the work of authors like Jens Beckert, Paul Mason, Robert Reich, Wolfgang Streeck and Immanuel Wallerstein, Delanty (2019) sketches five scenarios of the future or end of capitalism.

References Bartlett, L. and Steele, James B. (2000) The Great American Tax Dodge: How Spiraling Fraud and Avoidance are Killing Fairness, Destroying Income Tax, and Costing You. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company. Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Almeida, Paul (2020) Global Struggles and Social Change: From Prehistory to World Revolution in the Twenty-First Century. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

254 Afterword Dalio, Ray (2018) Principles for Navigating Big Debt Crises. New York: Simon & Schuster. Delanty, Gerard (2019) ‘The future of capitalism: Trends, scenarios and prospects for the future’, Journal of Classical Sociology 19(1): 10–26, https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /1468795X18810569. The Economist (2022) ‘Special edition on America’s digital darlings’, 12 November, https:// www​.economist​.com, accessed 12 November 2022. Eder, Klaus (1988) Die Vergesellschaftung der Natur. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp [The Socialization of Nature]. Euronews Green (2022) ‘“Accountants can save the world”: How financial reports could give nature a voice’, https://www​.euronews​.com​/green​/2022​/12​/23​/accountants​-can​ -save​-the​-world​-how​-financial​-reports​-could​-give​-nature​-a​-voice​?utm, accessed 23 December 2022. Habermas, Jürgen (1979) ‘Moral development and ego identity’, chapter 2, in Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society. London: Heinemann. Habermas, Jürgen (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2. Cambridge: Polity Press. Millward-Hopkins, Joel (2022) ‘Inequality can double the energy required to secure universal decent living’, Nature Communications 13, 5028, https://doi​.org​/10​.1038​/ s41467​-022​-32729​-8, accessed 15 December 2022. Piketty, Thomas (2017) Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Roubini, Nouriel (2022) Megathreats: Twenty Dangerous Threats that Imperil Our Future, and How to Survive Them. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company. Schäfer, Wolf (1985) Die unvertraute Moderne: Historische Umrisse einer anderen Naturund Sozialgeschichte. Frankfurt: Fischer [The Unfamiliar Modernity: Historical Outline of a Different Natural and Social History]. Schultz, Johannes (2022) ‘“Vergangenheitsbewältigung” revisited: Distinguishing two paradigms of working through the past’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, https://doi​.org​ /10​.1177​/01914537221117562, accessed 30 December 2022. Sociological Review Monographs (2022) ‘Progress’, 70(2), https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1177​ /00380261221084417, accessed 11 December 2022. Steele, James B. (2022) ‘How four decades of tax cuts fueled inequality’, www​.publicintegrity​ .org​/author​/jim​-steele/, accessed 7 December 2022. Strydom, Piet (2011) Contemporary Critical Theory and Methodology. London: Routledge. Strydom, Piet (2022) ‘The critical theory of society: From it Young-Hegelian core to its key concept of possibility’, European Journal of Social Theory, https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /3684310221130914, accessed 22 October 2022. Volscho, Thomas (2017) ‘The revenge of the capitalist class: Crisis, the legitimacy of capitalism and the restoration of finance from the 1970s to present’, Critical Sociology 43(2): 249–66, https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/0896920515589003. Zizek, Slavoj (2022) ‘Ethics on the rocks’, Project Syndicate, Newsletter, 11 November 2022, www​.project​-syndicate​.org​/ethical​-decency​-right​-wing​-violence​-hate​-left​-wing​ -woke​-cancel​-culture​-by​-slavoj​-zizek​-2022, accessed 11 November 2022.

Index

Abbas 171 Abend, Gabriel 28 Abt, Theodor 52, 53 Alberto, Acosta 192, 194 Adivasi 61, 66–67 Adorno, T. A. 127 adynata 90 African economies 195 agents 248; civil society organizations 238, 247–250; labour 246, 249; NGOs 247–250; social movements 247, 248, 250, 253; wealthy economic-political elites 248 ahimsa 187, 189; Pereira, Carlos Alvarez 143, 149 Ambedkar, Bhimrao Ramji 119, 121, 126, 239 Amin, Samir 229 Anasakthi 189 anxiety 129, 132, 136, 140, 148 Apel, Karl-Otto 250 Arendt, Hannah 23 artisan-based economies 188 Aristotle 67, 74, 78 Arnold, David 169 “Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations” by Gunnar Myrdal 115 Atmanirbhar Bharat 188 Attac (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citiznes) 9–10 attunement 128, 135, 147, 148 autonomy 187 AUKUS 222 Babic, Milan 225 Bagisha, Suman 245 Ballou, Adin 154 Bandhu, Pranjali 191, 197, 199 Barnet, Miachael N. 217, 221 Barret, R. 101 Bartoff, Christian 242

Basu, Samarendra 170 Bateson, Gregory 21, 134 Bateson, N. 149, 150 Bayle, Pierre 250 Bedford, J. 101 Bellah, Robert N. 16–17 Bellamy, Edward 155 Bello, Walden 216 Bendre, D. R. xi Benjamin, Walter 52 Bernays, Edward 62 Berry, Thomas 106 Beteille, Andre 18 Bhaskar, Roy 46, 50, 56 Biden, Joe 215 Bienefeld, Manfred 226 Biko, H. 139 biosphere 129, 134, 135, 138, 141, 143 Bjerrum, L. 108 Blaser, Martin J. 105 blindness/blind spots 132, 134, 137, 138, 140–142, 145, 146, 149 Bloch, Ernst 89 Bloch, Marc 238 Bodichitta 21 Böhme, Jacob 153, 242 Boltanski, L. 145 Bookchin, Murray 62, 67 Bose, Subhas Chandra 118 Bowles, P. 194, 200 Braudel, Fernand 245 bread labour 160 Brook Farm 153–154 Brueghel, P. 141, 142 Buber, Martin 164, 242 Buddhism 234 Buraway, Michael 180 capabilities approach 76 capital 132, 134, 136–138, 140, 141, 143, 145, 148, 149, 236, 241, 243, 246, 249–251, 253; accumulated economic



256 Index resources 241; economistic interpretation of 250, 251; heritage of humanity 241, 250; and labour 246 capitalism 45–47, 49, 52–55, 62 cartesian 105, 106, 112 Carthaginians 63 Cassin, B. 192 catallaxy 73, 80–85 Chakraborty, Dipesh 174 Chathukulam, Jos 187–189, 196, 198, 199, 244, 245 Chattopadhyaya, K. P. 180 chemical footprints 110–111 Chertkov, Vladimir 156 Chiapello, E. 145 Chris, Henning 15 civilization 129, 131, 133, 134, 140, 142, 149 Clammer, John 100, 107, 111 climate change 100–101, 128, 129, 138, 139, 145 Cockaigne, Land of 90, 94–96 Cohen, Benjamin J. 201, 205 collapse 128, 129, 132, 134, 142, 145 colonialism 219 colonization/colonial 132, 134, 137, 141, 144, 145, 148, 149 commensurability 75, 79 comparison 134, 135, 139, 141, 148 competition 128, 136, 137, 139–141 complex/complexity 129, 132, 135, 141 context/contextual 134, 135, 137, 140, 141, 148, 149 cooperative 188, 198 cooperative enterprises 198 cottage industries 188, 195–197 Cox, Robert 245 creativity 127, 147, 148 critical 138, 140, 144 critical theory of international political economy 245–246 critique/s 187, 247–251; form of 251–252; Frankfurt tradition of 247, 250; negative destructive 247, 249, 252; positive disclosing 247, 249, 252 Crosby, Ernest Howard 155 culture/cultural 127–129, 131–133, 136–140, 143, 145, 148, 149, 236; cultural conditions 251; cultural models 249–251; cultural structures 249; metacultural structures 249, 252 dalits 67 Daniel, Charles William 156 Das, Veena 18

debt 60–64 decentralization 187, 188, 191, 196–200 degrowth 45, 53–55, 57, 188, 198, 199 degrowth movement 111 democracy 62, 65–66, 246, 249 Descartes, Rene 105 Dethlefsen, Les 106 Deutsch, K. 143 developmentalism 192 diet 197, 198 dietary practices 198 disconnection 139, 145, 146, 148 division of knowledge 80–82 division of labour 73, 81, 82 Dominique, Lévy 220 Dongria Konds 67 Douglas, Clifford Hugh 62, 64, 67 Drewermann, Eugen 50 drones 63 Duménil, Gérard 220 Duncombe, Constance 219 Dungdung, Gladson 66–68 Duopoly 221, 225 dynamei on 90 dysfunctional democracy 216 Earth 239, 248 East India Company 63–64, 66 ecological destruction 241 ecological economics 67 ecological self 100, 107, 111 ecology 60–62, 67, 130–132, 134, 140, 187, 198, 200 economies of transience 191 economy of permanence 187, 189, 191, 193, 195, 196, 198, 200 Elsberg, Daniel 224 emergence 130, 135, 144–147, 149, 150 emergency 129 emerging infectious diseases 100, 101 encapsulation 189 Engels, Friedrich 38, 62, 64–65, 68 enlightenment 240, 250, 251 environment 74, 79–80, 83 epidemiological transition 107 epigenetics 106 Escobar, Arturo 21 eternity 191 Eurocentrism 246, 250 evolution 129, 132, 133, 136, 139, 141, 148 existential 129, 134, 139, 140 exploitation 128, 132, 133, 137, 188, 190, 192, 193, 195 extractivism 192–195, 199, 200

Index  fascism 191 Feynman, R. 135 financial 132, 134, 138–140, 142, 145, 146, 148 financial crisis 240 Fletcher, R. 147 Fordism 103 forest 66–67 Foster, John Bellamy 220 Foucault, M. 111 Fourier, Charles 154, 242 fragility 129, 133, 138, 148 framework 127, 128, 130, 135, 137, 143 Frankfurt critical theory 247, 250 Frankfurt School 30, 34, 39 Freire, Paulo 107 Freud, Sigmund 44, 47, 48, 51 Fromm, Erich 30–31, 34–38, 48, 50, 57, 235; “Having” and “being” 34–37 Galbraith, John K. xiii Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand xiii, 9, 117, 121, 157, 162–164, 166, 188–193, 195–199, 239, 242–244 Gandhian economics 191, 197, 198, 200 Gandhian economy 198 Gandhian political economy 188–190, 198, 199 Gandhi-Kumarappa 187–193, 195–200 Gandhi-Kumarappa model 189, 195, 198, 244, 245 Gangopadhyay, Mohanlal 180 GDP 136–139, 147, 241, 244 gender equality 195 gene expression 106 genome 106 geographical space 81, 82 George, Henry 62, 64, 68, 155 Gerber, Julien-François 235–236 Gerson, Joseph 223, 230 Ghosh, B. N. 188–190, 198, 199 Ghosh, Subodh 170 Gireesan, K. 188, 199 Giri, Ananta Kumar 107–108, 233, 234 Global South 246 Goodchild, M. 149 Goody, J. 219 Graeber, David 51, 61, 68, 188, 198, 199 Gram Panchayat Development Plan 196 Gramsci, Antonio xiv Gram Udyog Sangh 197 Greaves, James Pierrepont 153, 155 Green Gandhi 187 Gross, Otto 50, 51

257

growth 60 Gudynas, E. 192, 194, 199 Guha, Ramachandra 187 Guruswamy 196, 200 Guterres, A. 128–130, 146 Haass, Richard 216, 218, 246 Habermas, Jurgen 17, 107, 250 Haidt, Jonathan 28 Hammurabi 133 happiness economics 188 Hardin, G. 133 harmony 187, 196 Harriss-White, Barbara 19 Harvey, David 183 Hawthorne, Nathaniel 154 Hayek, F. A. 73, 74, 80–84 health 129, 134, 135, 137, 141, 143, 145, 147, 148 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 234, 250 Herrington, G. 130 Heuer, Gottfried 50 “Hind Swaraj” by M. K. Gandhi 117, 191, 199 Hindutva 240 Hitlin, Steven 28 Hobbes, Thomas 62 Hölderlin, F. 149 holistic development 188 homo economicus 190, 239, 244, 248–251 Hooper, Mira-Happ 218 Horkheimer, Max 39 household economy 73, 78–80, 83 Hudson, Michal 22 humanity 127–129, 133, 134, 136, 140, 142, 144, 146, 149 Hume, David 105 Huntington, Sameul 218–219 ideological constructs 240, 250 ideology 46, 51, 52 Ikenberry, John 209, 217, 218 Illouz, E. 137 imperialism 219 indigenous 194 indigenous cultures 60–62, 65–66 industrialization 128, 129, 132–134, 137, 145 inequality 128, 129, 138, 140, 147, 188, 190, 197, 240–246, 248, 253 Inglehart, Ronald 97 innovation 128, 137, 140, 143, 146 instability 139, 145 Intan, Suwandi 228

258 Index Inter-American Development Bank 194 interdependency 136, 147, 148, 150 Inter-Generational Justice 196, 200 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 222 International Court of Justice 215 interpretation 128, 129, 134, 137, 138, 150 Jacoby, George A. 108 Jacques Hersh 219–220, 226 Jameson, Fredric 51 Johanisova, Nadia 20 Johns Hopkins 215 Johnson, Chalmers 222–223 Joseph Blum 180 Joseph, Manasi 187, 199, 244, 245 Judovitz, Dalia 105 Jung, Carl 44–47, 235 Kadaoui, K. 150 Kallenbach, Hermann 157 Kamarashala 172–173, 183 Kant, Immanuel 250 Kapp, K. W. 74, 79, 85 kata to dynaton 90 Kennedy, R. 136 Kenworthy, John Coleman 156 Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad 19–20 Khan H. I. 127 Kidner, David W 105 Klein, N. 139 knowledge 127, 128, 132–137, 140, 145 Kollef, M. H. 108 Kovel, Joel 50 Kuhn, T. 141 Kumarappa, J. C. 20, 22, 162, 164–165, 187–200, 243, 244 Kunin, C. M. 108 Kurds 65 Kuznets, S. 136 labour 216, 221, 224–229 labour-displacing 189 labour-intensive 189 labour-surplus 189 lacan, jacques 44, 53 Lafarge, Paul 227 Land Tax 156 Lane, Charles 153–155 Lappe, M. 107 learning 134, 138, 143–149 Left, the 246, 247 Le Guin, Ursula 50 Levi strauss, Claude 109

liberalism 245 liberal world order 246 liberty 190 Lietaer, B. 149 life/living 127–129, 131–133, 135, 136, 138–141, 143, 146–150 limits/limitations 128, 129, 133–137, 139–141, 143, 148 Lind, Jennifer 221 Lindley, M. 188, 200 Lissner, Rebecca Friedman 218 little republics 196 Llor, C. 108 local economy 194, 196 local finance 196, 197 localism 195 Lock, Margaret 106, 111 Lohia, Dr Ram Manohar 118, 120–122, 126, 239 loop 143, 144 Lukács, Georg 250 Machiavelli 62 Maira, Arun 23, 169 make in India 188 Malcolm X 227 Malinowski, Bronislav 61, 68 Malthus, T. 133 Marcus, A. Allen 245 Marcuse, Herbert 44, 238 Martins, Carlos Eduardo 229 Marx, Karl xi, xii, 9–10, 13, 44–57, 62–63, 65–68, 89, 116, 121, 169–170, 220–221, 233–235, 238, 243, 250 Marxism 189, 235, 244–245 Masani, Minoo 118 Maude, Aylmer 156 Mauss, Marcel 61, 68 Mayo, Isabella Fyvie 156 McNeill, William 92 Mead, George Herbert 21 Meadows, D. 130, 139, 149 mechanical body 106 Menzies, Charlesa R. 225 microbial resistance 108 microbiome 105 Miething, Dominique 242 Military Industrial Complex (MIC) 220–221 Mills, C. Wright 31 Mineo, L. 147 mining 63–65, 67 Mishra, Gorakhnath 180 mission antyodaya 196

Index  modern epistemology 241 modernity/modern 128–134, 136–149 modernity 235, 238, 240, 241, 250–251; dominant 251; suppressed 251 Modi, Narendra 180, 240 Mohanty, Manoranjan 18 Moharana, Khirod Chandra 110, 239 money politics 216 moral economy 14–16, 73, 108, 234, 242 morality 37, 40–41; Bourgeois morality 32–34, 37–38; social psychology of 28, 37–41 Morgan, Lewis Henry 65, 68 Mostert, M. 145 Mozart, W. A. 127 multilevel global crisis 247–248 Multipolar world 245 multipolar world system 219 Mumford, Lewis 50, 54, 55 Munda, Jaipal Singh 66 music 127, 128, 149, 150 Muslims 240 Myrdal, Gunnar 115, 126 Nair 191, 200 Narasimha Rao, P. V. 123 Narendra Dev, Acharya 118 NATO 246 natural order 187, 190, 193 nature/natural 127–129, 131–133, 135, 136, 138, 140, 141, 144–150 Nayak, Pulin 115–116, 239, 240 Nayaran, Jai Prakash 118, 119, 121, 126, 239 Nazism 191 Nehru, Jawaharlal 66, 239 Neiderud, Carl Johan 101 neoclassical 190 neo-colonial 192 neoextractivism 192–195, 199 neo-liberal self 103, 104, 108, 109 Neu, Herold C. 108, 117–119, 121, 125, 126 Neurath, O. 74 New Harmony (Indiana) 153 Nixon, Richard 63, 146 Niyamgiri 67, 69 Nonomura, Robert 234–235 non-violence 187, 189, 198 normative principles 234, 235, 238, 239, 242, 249, 250, 252 normativity 249, 250 Nussbaum, Martha 21 nutrition 197–200

259

O’Neill, J. 76, 82 Obama, Barack 224 Öcalan, Abdullah 62, 65, 69 Orzech, Kathryn M 108 Owen, Robert 153, 242 Paaijmanns, Krijn P 102 Padel, Felix 236–237 paradigm 134, 136, 138, 141 Paris Agreement on Climate 215 Patomaki, Heikki 11, 12, 21, 23 Patz, Jonathan A 102 Paul, Abhijeet 243–244 peace 187, 191, 195–197, 199 Peccei, A. 150 Peck, James 218 perception 128, 129, 136–139 Pereira, Carlos Alvarez 240–242 Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich 153, 242 Petras, J. 192, 194, 200 Pickett, K. 147 Piketty, Thomas 10, 12–13, 21, 23, 216, 240 Pistor, K. 140, 149 Plotkin, Bill 56 Polayni, Karl 61, 69, 226 political economy: alternative 239, 243; capitalist 235, 236, 239, 244, 250; contemporary 234, 237, 238; decentralized 244; Gandhi-Kumarappa 243, 244; Indian 240; international 245, 246; Marxist 244, 245; neo-liberal 243, 245, 250, 251; post-capitalist 235, 236; reform of modern 247; ultra-capitalist 236; village-based community 244 Porter, Patrick 218 Porto Alegre Manifesto 247 Post-American era 246 Prarthana Pravachan 195 Prashad, Vijay 220, 225 precarization 225 Principle of Minimum Dislocation 188 private property 29–34, 40 production by the masses 191, 196 productivity 134, 140, 141, 148 provisioning 73; criteria for 79–80 Purkayastha, Prabir 222 Purleigh Brotherhood Colony 156 Quesnay, F. 133 radical robotization 241 radioactive isotopes 102, 103 Raina, R.S. 188, 199 Rammelt, C. 147

260 Index rational choice theory 104 Raworth, K. 30 Read, Herbert 50 realism 245 reality 128, 129, 133, 137, 138, 141 reciprocity 61 Rees, Tobiash 106 Reich, Wilhelm 44, 50 Reiss, Julian 104 relational/relationships 127, 129, 132, 133, 138, 146–149 revolution 134, 135, 142, 143, 150 Ricardo, David 89, 133, 157, 243 Ripley, George 154 Rockström, J. 130 Roelofs, Joan 219, 225 Rojava 65 Rosa, Hartmut 15, 50 Roszak, Theodore 50, 55 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 226 rural development 188 Ruskin, John 155–162, 166, 242 Ruskin Colony xii, 161 Sachs, Jeffrey 10–12, 21, 215 Sahlins, Marshall 61, 69, 91 Salt March 164 Samantara, Prafulla 19 Santos, Baoventura de Sousa 21 Sapir, J. 138 Sartre, Jean-Paul 89, 96–98 Sarvodaya 189, 190 Sayer, Andrew 14–15, 40, 73–87, 237 scarcity 136, 139 Schlaraffenland 90, 94–96 Schmidt, Johannes D. 218, 224, 246 Schmidt, Johannes Dragsbaek 219 Schubert, F. 127, 137 science 128, 133–135, 138, 140, 143, 145–147, 149 science and technology 241 Scott, Benn 222, 224, 229 self-expression values 97–98 self-reinforcing 133, 137, 142–144 Sen, Amartya 10 separation 130–138, 140, 141, 143, 147–149 Serageldin, I. 130 shift 129, 134, 141, 143, 146, 148, 150 Siby 195, 200 Simmel, Georg 91 Sinclair, U. 143 Smith, Adam 63, 89, 133, 157, 243

social conflict 49–51 social contract 216 socialism 187, 191, 229 social movements 247, 248, 250, 253 social sciences 235, 249 societal dimensions: objective 248; social/moral 248; subjective/ ethical 248 society/social/societal 127, 129–133, 135, 136, 138–144, 146–149 solidarity 188, 195, 247–249, 251, 252 solidarity economy 195, 199, 200 Sophia 154 Sørensen, Georg and Holm, Hans Henrik 223 soul 44–48, 51, 53–57 spirituality 187, 189, 191 Stade, Ronald 238 Standing, Guy 225 Stephen Wolf 20 Stern, N. 138 Stokes, Doug 221, 225 structures 248–249 suicidal 128, 129, 148, 149 Sumerians 65 Suri 197, 200 survival values 97–98 sustainability 187, 192, 195, 196 sustainable development goals 195, 200 Swadeshi 188 Swaminathan, M. S. 19–21 Swaraj 188, 191, 193, 196 systemic logic 242 Taneja 188, 200 tax havens 60, 69 technoloy 128, 129, 133, 134, 140, 143, 145, 146 Tetlow, Katherine 50, 57 Thatcher, M. 143 thermodynamics 135, 140 Thoreau, Henry David 154, 242 Tim, Dunne 219 time 147, 149, 150 tipping point 128, 132 Tolstoy, Leo 154, 156, 162, 166, 242, 243 Tolstoy Colony 156 Tolstoy Farm 157 Tomasi di Lampedusa, G. 143 transcendentalism 153 Trobriand islands 61, 66 tropical fatalism 194 Trump, Donald 215, 218, 221, 223

Index  Turgot, A. R. J. 133 Turner, G. 130 Tuygan, Ali 223

vitality 128, 147, 148 vocal for local 188 Von Mises, L. 74, 86

Uberoi, JPS 61, 69 Unger, Roberto M. 18 UN WCED 130 Utopia 241, 244 Utopian communities 242

Wackernagel, M. 129 Waldmeir, Patti 229 Walt, Stephen M. 230 war 60, 62, 63, 65 wealthy economic-political elites 248 weaving 147–150 Weber, Max 30, 76, 77, 86 Weil, Simone 50 Weimar 216 West: Western 128, 131–136, 144 Whiteway Colony 156 Wilkinson, R. 147 winners and losers 241 working class 217, 225, 227–228 World Health Organization (WHO) 197, 215 world order 245, 246 World Social Forum 247 World Values Survey 97 worldview 129, 133, 142, 148, 149

Valero, A. 147 Valero, A. 147 validity 249, 252 value 73, 78, 85, 135, 137–139, 145, 148; exchange value and use value 74, 75, 78; theoriesof 74; valuation and evaluation 73–85 Varatharajan, Vishnu 242 Veltmeyer, H. 192, 194, 200 Victus, S. 196, 200 village 188, 190, 191, 193, 195–197, 199, 200 village economy 190, 196 village republics 191 violence 187–189, 196, 198 Visvakarma 174–175, 183

Žižek, Slavoj 227–228

261