Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963 0804747121, 9780804747127

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Confronting Vietnam

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IHTERHATIOHAI HISTORY PROJECT SERIES

Jam es G. H e rsh b e rg s e r ie s e d ito r

Brothers in Arma The Rise and Fall of the SinO'Sovlet Alliance, 1 9 4 5 -1 9 6 3 edited by Odd Am e Westad

Rotmomỉe Cold War Am erica's Embargo against China and the Sino-Sovlet Alliance, 1 9 4 9 -1 9 6 3 By Shu Quang Zhang

WOODROW W ILSON CENTER PRESS STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

CONFRONTING VIETNAM Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1 9 5 4 -1 9 6 3

Ilya V. Qakhik

W oodrow W ilson C enter Press W ashington, D.c. Stanford U niversity Press Stanford, C alifornia

EDITORIAL OFFICES: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N .w . Washington. D .c. 20004-3027 Telephone 202-691-4029 www.wiIsoncenter.org ORDER FROM: Stanford University Press Chicago Distribution Center 11030 South Langley Avenue Chicago, n i. 60628 Telephone 1-800-621-2736; 773-568-1550

02003 by Dya Gaiduk All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 2 4 6 8 9 7 5 3 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gaiduk. I. V. (Il’iaV .), 1961Confronting Vietnam: Soviet policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963 / Dya V. Gaiduk. p. cm.—(Cold War International History Project series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8047-4712-1 (alk. paper) 1. Indochina—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 2. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—Indochina. 3. Soviet Union—Foreign relations— 1953-1975.4. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975—Soviet Union. I. Title, n . Series. DS546.5.S65 G35 2003 959.704’3347—dc21 2002155618

For my mother

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The Center is the living memorial of the United States of America to the nation's twenty-eighth presi­ dent, Woodrow W ilson. Congress established the W oodrow W ilson Center in 1968 as an international institute for advanced study, "symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relationship between the world o f learning and the world of public affairs." The Center opened in 1970 under its own board of trustees. In all its activities the Woodrow W ilson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, supported financially by annual appropriations from the Congress, and by the contributions of foundations, cor­ porations, and individuals. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individual or organizations that provide financial support to the center.

T h « CoM W ar International History Project

The Cold W ar International History Project was established by the Woodrow Wilson In­ ternational Center for Scholars In 1991. The project supports the full and prompt release o f historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold W ar and seeks to dissem­ inate new information and perspectives on Cold W ar history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publi­ cations, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project publishes the Cold War international H istory Project Bulletin and a working paper series and main­ tains a website, cwihp.si.edu. In collaboration with the National Security Archive, a nongovernmental research in­ stitute and document repository located at George Washington University, the project has created a Russian and East-bloc Archival Documents Database at Gelman Library, George Washington University. The database makes available to scholars photocopies from Russian and other former Communist archives donated by the project, the National Security Archive, and various scholars. The database may be explored through a com­ puter-searchable English-language inventory. For further information, contact the Na­ tional Security Archive, Gelman Library, George Washington University, Washington, D .c. 20037. At the Woodrow Wilson Center, the project is part of the Division of International Studies, headed by Robert s . Litwak. The director o f the project is Christian F. Oster­ mann. The project is overseen by an advisory committee that is chaired by William Taubman, Amherst College, and includes Michael Beschloss; James H. Billington, li­ brarian of Congress; Warren I. Cohen, University of Maryland at Baltimore; John Lewis Gaddis, Yale University; James G. Hershberg, George Washington University; Samuel F. W ells, Jr., associate director of the Woodrow W ilson Center; and Sharon Wolchik, George Washington University. The Cold War International History Project was created with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

Contents

Abbreviations

X

Series Preface

xl

Preface

XV

Chapter 1. The Origins

1

Chapter 2. To Divide or Not to Divide

12

Chapter 3. M aking Peace at Geneva

28

Chapter 4 . From Support to Cooperation

54

Chapter 5 . Neither Peace nor W ar

69

Chapter 6. If the Fractured Friendship Collapses

98

Chapter 7. Crisis In Laos

122

Chapter 8 . Back to Genova

157

Chapter 9 . A Disposition to W ar

181

Conclusion

205

Bibliography

212

Notes

220

Index

265

AVPRF

cc CCP CDNI CIA CPSU DMZ DRV PO FRUS ICC KGB MAAG NATO NLHX NLFSV PathetLao PAV PRC PRO RLG RGANI RGASPI SEATO USSR Vietcong Vietminh WPV

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Central Committee Chinese Communist Party Committee for the Defense of National Interests, Laos Central Intelligence Agency Communist Party of the Soviet Union Demilitarized zone Democratic Republic of Vietnam Foreign Office (Great Britain) Fixeign Relations of the United States International Commission for Supervision and Control, sometimes called International Control Commission Committee on State Security (Russian acronym) Military Assistance Advisory Group North Atlantic Treaty Organization Neo Lao Hak Xat, Lao Patriotic Front National Liberation Front of South Vietnam Movement “Lao Nation” People's Army of Vietnam People’s Republic of China Public Record Office (Great Britain) Royal Lao Government Russian State Archive of Contemporary History Russian State Archive of Social-Political History Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Viet Nam Cong San (Vietnamese Communists), People’s Liberation Army in South Vietnam Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh, League for Independence of Vietnam Workers' Party of Vietnam, also called die Lao Dong Party

Series Preface James G. Herahberg

F ew, if any, C old W ar events convulsed Ư.S. politics and society, o r w reaked greater devastation and inflicted greater suffering on a region o f the w orld, m ore than the V ietnam W ar and related conflicts in Southeast A sia. There, in the decades after W orld W ar n , the tw in dram as o f decolonization and East-W est hostility intersected violently. In th eừ public pronouncem ents, successive A m erican presidents, from Trum an to Eisenhow er, K ennedy, Johnson, and N ixon, justified A m erican involvem ent (first in support o f the French and then in replacing them ), m ilitary engagem ent, and the ensuing sacrifice o f lives and treasure, on the grounds that the struggle represented a crucial battleground in the global confrontation w ith w orld com m unism led by the Soviet U nion. And yet, behind the scenes, experts puzzled at the true nature o f the K rem lin’s rela­ tionship w ith Ho Chi M inh’s V ietnam ese com m unist regim e and argued over M oscow 's m otives, objectives, and capabilities to influence the course o f events, especially in the context o f its evolving relationship w ith its com m unist ally-turned rival, the P eople's Republic o f China. In his first book, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (1996),1 R ussian scholar Ilya V. G aiduk drew upon previously unavailable M oscow archives to offer a fresh account o f the com m unist superpow er's involvem ent at the height o f w hat V ietnam ese call the “A m erican” o r “Second Indochinese” w ar, from 1964, w hen the Tonkin G ulf incident heralded the deepening o f direct u.s. m il­ itary engagem ent, through the years o f blood leading to W ashington's departure and defeat a decade later. Together w ith equally groundbreaking w orks on China’s policies and actions in relation to the V ietnam W ar,2 G aiduk’s book m arked a breakthrough in clarifying the m urky tale o f how intra-com m unist pol­ itics and relations affected, and w ere affected by, the evolution o f the w ar. G aiduk's current volum e, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963, both constitutes an essential prequel to his ear­ lier w ork—and therefore to an understanding o f the origins o f A m erica’s fullscale m ilitary entry into the V ietnam “quagm ire'' and the validity, or lack o f James G. Hershberg is associate professor of history and international affairs at George Washington University and editor of the Cold W ar International History Project Series. From 1991 to 1997 he was the first director of the Cold W ar International History Pro­ ject at the Woodrow W ilson International Center for Scholars.

Series Preface

sam e, o f W ashington’s perceptions o f the Soviet role there— and a com parably trail-blazing contribution to understanding the tangled history o f the C old W ar in Southeast A sia during earlier crises. These range from the latter stages o f the French colonial w ar to the w orld crisis over Laos (w hich, few rem em ber, aroused President K ennedy’s fears regarding the region far m ore than V ietnam when he first took office) and include the high-stakes G eneva conferences to deal w ith both (in 1954 and 1961-62, respectively). N ot only has G aiduk gone w here no analyst has gone before in tackling this story in a historically rigorous fashion, but he has, if anything, been even m ore successful than in his prior w ork in excavating crucial m aterials from the Soviet archives, despite considerable practical obstacles, and com bining these sources w ith the results o f prior histo­ riography and o f extensive w ork in Ư.S. and B ritish repositories, am ong other m aterials. The result is a trem endously exciting and original w ork that brings to light fresh inform ation and insights to area specialists and general Cold W ar histori­ ans alike, gathering a vast am ount o f hard-earned data in w ell-organized and en­ gaging narrative. Anyone interested in the conflicts in Southeast A sia or in So­ viet foreign policy, Sino-Soviet relations, or U .S.-Soviet relations during the Stalin and Khrushchev eras w ill find Confronting Vietnam m ust reading. M ore­ over, it also serves as a useful case study in several broader contexts: the history o f the international com m unist movement and o f nationalist-revolutionary move­ m ents; the difficulties and vicissitudes o f Soviet “alliance management” (which frequently seem s to be as much o f a m isnom er as “crisis management” some­ tim es was when that term was fashionable); international diplom acy, particularly in the revelations on the com m unist sides o f the G eneva gatherings and often dif­ ficult ties betw een M oscow and Hanoi; and as a test case for “pericentrism ,” the argum ent that, in the new Cold W ar international history, historians must pay in­ creased attention to the actions o f sm aller countries in explaining the outcom es and dynam ics o f vital international events rather than sim ply presum ing that they w ere determ ined by decisions m ade in superpow er capitals.3 A lso, in the lam entable absence o f access to crucial Vietnam ese foreign policy archives for this period, one may hope that this work as well as others exploiting com m unist archives w ill contribute to the efforts o f scholars, both Vietnam ese and foreign, to persuade Hanoi authorities to open further theừ historical repositories so that their country’s international relations are not reconstructed solely on the basis o f other nation’s sources.4 As editor o f the C old W ar International H istory Project Series, and as form er director o f the project, I consider it is a special pleasure to publish Ilya G aiduk’s w ork. W hen the project first organized a conference on Soviet foreign policy

Series Preface

during the C old W ar, which took place in a frigid M oscow in January 1993, one o f the highlights was G aiduk’s paper on the V ietnam W ar, based on m aterials from the archives o f the C entral C om m ittee o f the Com m unist Party o f the Soviet Union in the old c c headquarters in Staraya Ploschad (Old Square) and co-w ritten w ith an archivist w ho had helped gather the m aterials. Then a young scholar at the In stitute o f G eneral H istory o f the R ussian (form er Soviet) Academy o f Sciences specializing on the history o f Soviet-A m erican relations, G aiduk had taken on the task o f preparing the report despite lacking any prior experience w orking on the V ietnam W ar. (A ll other Russian historians lacked such experience, too, since the topic had previously been considered too sensi­ tive for serious research.) A ll o f the papers at the conference were unprece­ dented in theừ use o f Soviet archival m aterials— past conferences, even during G orbachev’s glasnost, had featured the absurd situation o f Russian historians using W estern sources and archives, com bined w ith public Soviet sources, on M oscow 's foreign policy— but G aiduk’s paper was especially eyebrow -raising for its revelations o f tensions betw een M oscow and H anoi even at the height o f cooperation during the w ar against W ashington.3 Follow ing the conference, G aiduk joined the first group o f C old W ar International H istory Project fellow s, young scholars from form er com m unist countries, to spend the first half o f 1993 in W ashington, D .C., w hich gave him an opportunity to expand his research on the topic to A m erican collections such as the Harrim an Papers at the Library o f Congress and the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Texas, and to establish frater­ nal ties w ith U .S.-based V ietnam specialists. In the succeeding years G aiduk’s career and w ork have put him at the fore­ front o f the “next generation” o f Cold W ar scholars to em erge from the com ­ m unist bloc, epitom izing the m ulti-archival, m ulti-national, m ulti-lingual re­ search and w riting that the end o f the superpow er rivalry has made possible. Striving tenaciously to overcom e the frustrations o f archival research in M oscow, presenting his w ork at international conferences, utilizing archives in the U nited States and B ritain and establishing ties w ith Vietnam ese colleagues, obtaining and taking advantage o f prestigious fellow ships in at the N orwegian Nobel Insti­ tute in O slo and the W ilson C enter and its Kennan Institute in W ashington, all the w hile dealing personally with the travails o f an ongoing econom ic and political crisis in Russia, he has, in effect, single-handedly created a Russian field o f schol­ arly studies on the Indochina conflict, and in so doing brought to an international audience long-hidden chapters o f that tragic history. Though, as he would be the first to acknowledge, im portant m aterials rem ain elusive, particularly in closed files in Hanoi and in the Presidential A rchives in M oscow, G aiduk’s work now offers a unique and com pelling window on the Soviet and com m unist dim ension

Series Preface

o f one o f the C old W ar's m ost fateful—and fatal— stories, and provides a new point o f departure fo r further investigations.

1. Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam W ar (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996). 2. See, for example, Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Zhai Qiang, “Beijing and (he Viet­ nam Peace Talks, 1965-1968: New Evidence from Chinese Sources,” CWIHP Working Paper no. 18 (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center, 1997); Chen Jian, M ao 's China and the Cold W ar (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), chaps. 5,8; Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., “77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977” CWIHP Working Paper no. 22 (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center, 1998); and Yang Kuisong, “Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude towards die Indochina War, 1949-1973,” CWIHP Working Paper no. 34 (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center, 2001). 3. Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” D iplom atic H istory, vol. 24, no. 4 (Fall 2000), pp. 567-591. 4. A limited number of scholars, such as David Marr, R obot Brigham, Nguyen Vu Tung, and Mark Bradley, have begun to tap Vietnamese archives and sources on the post-World War n period and the conflicts with France and the United States, and a num­ ber of oral history conferences on the war have taken place, but there has been a lack of extensive access to Foreign Ministry or Vietnamese Workers’ Party (Lao Dong) archives or secret materials related to international relations. See, e.g., Frederik Logevall, “Bring­ ing in the ‘Other Side’: New Scholarship on the Vietnam Wars,” Journal o f Cold War Studies, vol. 3, no. 3 (Fall 2001), pp. 77—93, and, on the oral history conferences, Robert s. McNamara, James G. Blight, and Robert K. Brigham, with Thomas J. Biersteker and Col. Herbert Y. Schlander (ret.), Argum ent w ithout End: In Search o f Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New York: Public Affairs, 1999). 5. For a revised version of this conference paper, see Dya V. Gaiduk, “The Vietnam War and Soviet-American Relations, 1964-1973,” in CW1HP B ulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996).

Preface W ann? W ie? und Wo? das ist die leidige Frage. J .w . Goethe Faust, n, 5

A r n o ld Toynbee pointed to curiosity as a driving force o f a historian’s activ­ ity.1C uriosity leads people who devote theừ lives to the study o f the past to pen­ etrate the tim e and understand origins o f events, consequences o f upheavals, and im plications o f the processes that took place m any years ago. H istorians very of­ ten purposefully m ove backw ards, deeper and deeper into the past, from the event to its precursor, trying to find an explanation for w hat happened later and why. A fter I com pleted my book on Soviet policy tow ard the V ietnam W ar,2 1 un­ derstandably decided to begin studying w hat preceded the w ar, the u.s. m ilitary involvem ent, the Soviet attitude tow ard the processes that led to the w ar’s out­ com e, and the reason that the Soviet Union— which alw ays expressed its appre­ hension about the danger o f w ar in Southeast A sia—and other countries were not able to avert it. M y interest in the period before 1964 was also stim ulated by some review s o f m y earlier book, review s that said the book lacked coverage o f the events that took place in the earlier period and questioned the conception o f the book on the grounds that it was im possible to understand the rationale for Soviet policy tow ard the w ar in V ietnam w ithout an analysis o f the earlier pe­ riod.3 A lthough I m aintain the view that the period after 1964 represents a to­ tally new phase o f the V ietnam ese conflict and should be studied in its own right, I felt that w ithout an exploration into the background o f the V ietnam W ar my study o f Soviet policy tow ard the conflict in Indochina that took place after the French had exited w ould be incom plete. Thus, curiosity together w ith a desire to answ er my critics becam e the tw o factors that led m e to feel the need to w rite a second book on the Soviet U nion and V ietnam . It is fortunate that, unlike fo r the p o st-1964 period, archival

Preface

sources on the earlier years w ere m uch better. M ost o f the Russian archival doc­ um ents that deal w ith the events o f the V ietnam ese crisis in die 1950s and early 1960s have been declassified and m ade available to scholars. A lthough docu­ m ents located in the archive o f the Russian foreign m inistry are being declassi­ fied in Russia m ore slow ly than scholars prefer, by the tim e I started work on this book, a large collection o f Soviet diplom atic docum ents on the conflict in Indochina had been opened in the A rchive o f Foreign Policy o f the Russian Fed­ eration. Among those docum ents are m em oranda o f conversations betw een So­ viet and foreign leaders and diplom ats in various countries, analytical inform a­ tion and reports from USSR diplom atic m issions abroad addressed to M oscow, letters and review s prepared by various foreign m inistry departm ents for the m inister and his deputies, as w ell as the m inistry's correspondence w ith the Cen­ tral Com m ittee o f the Com m unist Party o f the Soviet Union and other bodies o f the governm ent. An im portant supplem ent to Soviet foreign policy docum ents is located in the form er CPSU Central Com m ittee archive, which was recently renam ed in the Russian State A rchive o f Contem porary H istory. In addition to inform ation and m em oranda prepared by the Soviet em bassies in V ietnam and Laos, the archive provides access to annual em bassy reports. I also found in this archive som e o f the docum ents that w ere m issing from the Foreign M inistry’s archive. U nfortunately the doors o f the presidential archive rem ain tightly closed for the overw helm ing m ajority o f scholars, and therefore the Soviet Politburo’s de­ cisions and records o f conversations o f the Soviet leaders m ainly w ith their Com m unist colleagues are still inaccessible to historians. An exception has been m ade only for the part o f the so-called Stalin collection that was moved to an­ other form er Com m unist Party archive that is now known as the Russian State A rchive o f Social Political H istory. It is in this archive that I was able to find several im portant docum ents on Soviet-V ietm inh relations from the early 1950s and Stalin’s attitude tow ard revolutionary m ovem ents in A sia and, in particular, in Vietnam . The lack o f docum ents from the highest levels o f Soviet decision m aking has been m ore or less covered by the findings in other Russian archives w here the collections contain evidence on the K rem lin’s decisions, as well as in other countries’ archival collections and publications o f docum ents that are valuable mainly as sources on Soviet leaders’ m eetings and conversations w ith their W estern counterparts. For this book, I found such sources in the U nited States, G reat B ritain, and France (in France, m ainly in published collections). A fter the 19% publication o f my earlier book on the V ietnam W ar, a large num ber o f studies o f this w ar cam e to light, prim arily in the U nited States. Un­ like the works that were published before, w ith theữ em phasis on the u.s. role

Preface

in die conflict, the new er studies concentrated on the involvem ent o f other coun­ tries in that region. The recent studies have m arked die birth o f the truly inter­ national history o f the V ietnam W ar, the foundation o f which was laid down by the books o f B ritish scholar R. B. Sm ith.4 In 1998, a volum e on the V ietnam W ar w as published by M acm illan that com prised articles w ritten by U .S., B ritish, V ietnam ese, R ussian, and Chinese historians, analyzing the participa­ tion o f various countries, the Soviet U nion and China am ong them , in the In­ dochina conflict.5 Tw o years later a collection o f articles edited by Lloyd c. G ardner and Ted G ittinger added Korea, Japan, and U .S. European allies to this list.6 A book on China and both wars in V ietnam w ritten by Zhai Qiang pro­ vides, perhaps for the first tim e, a m ost com prehensive account o f B eijing’s role in the conflict on the basis o f docum ents from Chinese archives.7 N ot only have these and other w orks8 confirm ed and enlarged the conception form ulated by this author in The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, they also served as im portant sources for my research o f the earlier period. I have also benefited from the publication o f m em oirs o f Soviet leaders and diplom ats that have com e out in recent years in Russia as well as in other countries.9 As a re­ sult, this new book benefits from my ability to define a m ore am bitious task for m ysetf and base my assessm ents and conclusions on a m uch broader body o f sources than was the case w ith my earlier book. The task o f this book, as I form ulated it from the outset, is to analyze the foun­ dations o f Soviet policy tow ard the Indochina conflict and find an answ er to the question o f w hether Soviet policy had undergone any significant changes o f di­ rection in the period leading up to the V ietnam W ar, which began in 1965. It was necessary to discover the m otives that w ere behind the Soviet leaders’ actions, the factors that influenced theừ attitude tow ard the conflict, and the relation o f M oscow ’s policy tow ard V ietnam w ith other foreign policy objectives and pri­ orities. This book concentrates on the period after the 1954 G eneva conference on In­ dochina, w hich ended the French phase o f the war. The reasons for such a focus seem obvious. First, the first Indochina w ar represented quite a different phe­ nomenon, w ith its own origins and history. Second, it is hardly possible to de­ scribe a consistent Soviet policy tow ard Indochina before 1954. A t that tim e M oscow’s attention in A sia was m ostly consum ed by the processes in C hina and theứ im plications for Cold W ar confrontation. N evertheless, events relating to the 1954 G eneva conference, as w ell as the conference itself and its decisions, are put under close scrutiny in this book because w ithout them it is im possible to un­ derstand later developm ents in Indochina and die Soviet approach to them. The same considerations dictated the need to devote one o f the first chapters to the ori­

Preface

gins o f Soviet-Vietnam ese relations and Stalin’s views o f th a n . Because inter­ action betw een M oscow and Hanoi played an im portant role in M oscow’s policy tow ard the region in the 1950s and early 1960s, an analysis o f these relations oc­ cupies a substantial part o f tins bode. Some questions and problem s can be m ore easily approached if our know ledge includes w hat had transpired betw een tile So­ viet Union and the Vietm inh and betw een Stalin and Ho Chi M inh in tile earlier years. Furtherm ore, the issue o f the continuity o f Soviet policy beginning in the early 1950s, through die events o f tile conflict w ith the French, and then through tile w ar in Southeast A sia becom es clearer w ith tills knowledge. The study ends w ith the tw o fateful and tragic incidents that, in m y view , m arked a w atershed in the V ietnam conflict: the coup d ’état against President N go D inh D iem in South V ietnam and the assassination o f President John F. Kennedy in the U nited States. V ietnam is the alm ost exclusive focus o f this book because o f its central po­ sition in the region and its dom inant role in the Indochina conflict. The failure to find a lasting solution to the V ietnam ese problem and the division o f the coun­ try into tw o halves w ith hostile regim es in each part transform ed V ietnam into kindling fo r international tension and w ar. T he conflict there sm oldered throughout the period after the G eneva conference, threatening to develop into a serious crisis and spread to other countries o f the region. Events in Laos in the late 1950s and early 1960s proved the conflict could spread and, being closely linked to developm ents in Vietnam , drew attention o f the w orld com m unity. Therefore, the Laos crisis also becam e one o f the subjects o f the present study. The third country o f Indochina—Cam bodia—was for a tim e able to rem ain apart from the developing conflict. The situation in Cam bodia benefited from the flexible policy o f the Cam bodian leader, Prince N orodom Sihanouk, who w as balancing betw een the W est and the E a st H e achieved relative stability dur­ ing the period under consideration in this book. O nly years later did the flame o f the w ar in V ietnam engulf Cam bodia. For this reason, Cam bodia receives only m arginal attention in this book, and then only Cam bodia’s policy connected w ith the G eneva accords and Sihanouk’s peace initiatives. The order o f priorities o f this study w as determ ined m ainly by w hat im por­ tance M oscow attached to various events in Southeast A sia. E vents in In­ dochina, how ever, w ere not the only ones that drew the attention o f the Soviet leaders, especially at the highest levels. A t the tim e when the conflict in In­ dochina presented the K rem lin w ith difficult options, Soviet leaders w ere pre­ occupied w ith theữ relations w ith the W est, had to pay attention to the tension and contradictions w ithin the socialist cam p, and strove to strengthen thefr po­ sitions in the w orld com m unist m ovem ent. By the end o f the 1950s, the dispute

H n n fr i n n

rT0T8C6

w ith the P eople's Republic o f C hina dem anded m ore and m ore attention from the USSR. Therefore, Soviet policy tow ard Indochina cannot be analyzed in iso­ lation from other problem s and pressures M oscow had to deal w ith in the out­ side w orld. C old W ar polarization strongly influenced the K rem lin's approach tow ard developm ents in V ietnam and its neighboring countries. W hile w orking on this book, I had to explore a m ostly unknow n land. True, som e scholars in theữ books on the V ietnam ese conflict had touched upon the Soviet U nion’s role and involvem ent in i t 10 A deep and com prehensive study on the history o f Soviet-N orth V ietnam ese relations has been w ritten by Dou­ glas P ike,11 but his book concentrates on the years after the u.s. intervention in the V ietnam W ar, w ith only first chapters devoted to the preceding period. Re­ lations betw een the USSR and N orth V ietnam in the 1950s becam e the subject o f a brochure w ritten by a student from Norway, M ari O lsen, on the basis o f her findings in the R ussian Foreign M inistry archive.12 Some aspects o f Soviet pol­ icy in Indochina w ere touched upon in the book w ritten by Ang Cheng Guan on S ino-N orth V ietnam ese relations ỉn 1956-196213 and in the book by Zhai Qiang. E arlier, P. J. Honey provided a detailed account o f the D R V 's attitude and policy tow ard the Sino-Soviet dispute; the book was based partly on his own personal experience as a w itness.14 B ut no one had undertaken a com plex ap­ proach to Soviet policy tow ard the Indochina conflict in the 1950s and early 1960s, analyzing it from the broader perspective o f international relations in the C old W ar years and basing it on docum ents and m aterials from R ussian archives. W ith this book I try to fill the gap w hile clearly recognizing all the shortcom ings o f this first attem pt; how ever, I am fully conscious that this w ill not free m y w ork from subsequent critical evaluation by other historians and in­ terested readers. Arduum vũietur res gestas scribere. It seem s difficult to w rite a history. I m ore than once recalled these w ords o f Roman historian Sallustius w hile in the process o f w riting this book. Y et my difficulties m ight have been even m ore painful w ere it not for the help, support, and encouragem ent o f m any individu­ als and institutions. M uch o f the basic research fo r the book was done in the A rchive o f Foreign Policy o f the Russian Federation and the R ussian State A rchive o f C ontem porary H istory, both in M oscow. The collections o f these tw o archives contain valuable m aterials for students o f Soviet diplom acy. I am grateful to the people w ho w ork in those archives for theừ cooperation and as­ sistance in locating the docum ents I needed and m aking them available for me. I also w ish to thank the archivists o f the Russian State A rchive o f Social Politi­ cal H istory for providing m e w ith docum ents from the Stalin collection, which had ju st opened for scholars at that tim e.

Preface

My archival findings w ould not be com plete w ithout the archives o f other countries. M y research fellow ship from the Nobel Institute in 1995 enabled me to perform research in the Public Record Office, Kew G ardens, G reat B ritain. I am also indebted to Lloyd G ardner and Ted G ittinger, who included m e in the list o f participants in the series o f conferences on the V ietnam W ar at the Lyn­ don B. Johnson Library in A ustin, Texas, in 1993-2001 and thus gave m e the opportunity to not only take part in these sym posia but also look for appropriate docum ents in the library’s collection. Finally, my research for this book was supported by a grant from the Bureau o f Educational and C ultural A ffairs o f the Ư.S. D epartm ent o f State, adm inistered by the Kennan Institute for A dvanced Russian Studies o f the W oodrow W ilson International C enter for Scholars, w ith funds provided by the Bureau o f Educational and C ultural A ffairs o f the u.s. D epartm ent o f State through the R egional Scholar Exchange Program . This grant allow ed me, at the final stage o f the w ork, to supplem ent the book’s doc­ um entary basis w ith im portant m aterials from the u.s. N ational A rchives and the M anuscript D ivision o f the Library o f Congress. I owe thanks to m y colleagues and friends, both in Russia and in other coun­ tries, w hose interest in and enthusiasm about my book buttressed my sense o f responsibility and determ ination to com plete this study. A m ong this large group, I especially w ant to thank C hristian O sterm ann, director o f the Cold W ar International H istory Project at the W oodrow W ilson C enter, w hose friendship and encouragem ent helped m e com plete the m anuscript and prepare it for pub­ lication. I also w ant to express my deep gratitude to Jim H ershberg, the W oodrow W ilson C enter’s Cold W ar series editor, w ho not only was an atten­ tive and astute reader o f the m anuscript but has also been, since the early days, an enthusiastic supporter o f my project on the V ietnam W ar. The m anuscript was read in its entirety by G eorge H erring and Larry Berm an, and I am grateful to these leading u.s. experts o f V ietnam W ar history for theừ com m ents and suggestions. I w ish to acknow ledge m y gratitude to M ary M arik for her critical skill and her efforts in editing this m anuscript and im proving my English and to Yam ile Kahn, production editor, and Joseph Brinley, director o f the W oodrow W ilson C enter Press, who professionally guided the m anuscript through the publication process. I also w ish to express my thanks to R obert Litw ak, B laữ Ruble, and m any others at die W oodrow W ilson C enter w ith whom I shared six m onths as a Kennan Institute research fellow . I am im m ensely grateful to all these individuals, whose help and cooperation are im portant in w hatever virtues this book may have, although they have no part in its faults. I also w ish to thank the Kennan M oscow Project and the U .S.-Russian Joint Com m ission on Prison­ ers o f W ar/M issing in A ction for theừ assistance and cooperation.

Preface

My special thanks are reserved for the people who w ere around me during the long course o f this project: for my colleagues and friends at the Institute o f W orld H istory o f the R ussian Academy o f Sciences, V ladiim r and Tatiana Pozniakov am ong them ; and to my relatives, who are alw ays eager to provide theừ support, sym pathy, and encouragem ent. Finally, I am m ost indebted to my m other, Lidiya, w hose love and patience helped me survive all the disappoint­ m ents and setbacks o f this life. The book is dedicated to her.

1. The Origins D ear and B eloved Comrade. / am aw aiting your order so as to come, to k b s you, and to present a report on the question o f Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh to Stalin October 17,1952

T h o s e w ho are searching fo r the origins o f Soviet involvem ent in the In­ dochina conflict m ust pay attention to w hat happened in M oscow in late 1949 and early 1950. In D ecem ber 1949, M oscow w itnessed tw o im portant events: the seventieth birthday o f Iosif V issarionovich Stalin and the visit o f the leader o f the victori­ ous C hinese Com m unists, M ao Zedong. A lthough M ao sat next to Stalin at the official birthday reception at the B olshoi Theater, M ao was only one am ong m any other Com m unist leaders w ho cam e to M oscow to take part in Stalin’s birthday celebrations, and his visit w as not a form al tribute to the Vozhd’ (great leader) o f the w orld proletariat. R ather, M ao w anted to establish close relations w ith the Soviet U nion and lay a foundation o f the alliance betw een the tw o countries. This is not the place to discuss the Soviet-Chinese negotiations that led to the T reaty o f Friendship, A lliance, and M utual A ssistance betw een the Soviet U nion and the P eople's R epublic o f China (PRC) signed in February 1950. These negotiations and the resulting docum ents have been thoroughly analyzed by other scholars.1 Y et during the negotiations M ao raised the issue o f Vietnam . In one o f his conversations w ith Stalin, in January 1950, the Chinese leader in­ form ed his counterpart that Ho Chi M inh, then leading the struggle against the French colonialists in Indochina, was eager to com e to M oscow and negotiate the prospects o f Soviet-V ietnam ese cooperation.2 By early 1950, according to Chinese sources, the subject o f V ietnam had been discussed by the Soviet and C hinese leaders several tim es, first w hen Liu

The Origins

Shaoqi, M ao's closest subordinate in the Chinese Com m unist Party, cam e to M oscow in late June 1949 and then during the Stalin-M ao m eetings. The Soviet and Chinese leaders agreed that it was prim arily the Chinese responsibility to support Ho Chi M inh and the V ietm inh, a broad association o f the V ietnam ese political organizations dom inated by com m unists.3 A t first glance, Stalin should have been im pressed by the success o f the V ietnam ese com m unists in the w ar against the French. In 1949 and early 1950 the French expeditionary corps lost m ore than ten thousand dead, tw o hundred fortified points w ere destroyed, and the V ietm inh m aintained control over m ore than forty-tw o thousand square kilo­ m eters in the m ountainous areas o f the country.4 On the liberated territory the com m unists established “free zones” in w hich they set up local adm inistration, built factories, and organized agrarian com m unes. In 1950 there w ere thirty-six state enterprises w ith four thousand w orkers in those zones.5 A t the sam e tim e the Vietnam ese com m unists w aged guerrilla w arfare in areas occupied by the French and th en Vietnam ese allies. N evertheless, the Soviet leader's attitude tow ard developm ents in Indochina w as am bivalent at best. He apparently was influenced by his experience dealing w ith national liberation movem ents in A sia that w ent back to the 1920s. Stalin alw ays view ed these m ovem ents through the prism o f com m unist revolution in European countries. For exam ple, in M arch 1925, he concluded that, because o f the tem porary stabilization in the W est, revolutionary prospects seem ed m ore prom ising in the East. Therefore he deem ed it necessary for the W estern Com­ m unist parties to find w ays to coordinate the struggle o f the w orking class in ad­ vanced countries w ith the revolutionary m ovem ents in the colonies and depen­ dent countries.6 Stalin's enthusiasm about developm ents in A sia proved to be fatal for the Chinese Com m unists who follow ed instructions from M oscow in theừ relation­ ship w ith the Guom indang, or N ationalists. The Chinese Com m unists failed to secure leadership positions in the alliance w ith the N ationalists and w ere unable to accelerate the revolutionary process in C hina.7 The outcom e o f the events in China in 1926-1927 discouraged Stalin from m aintaining his overly optim istic approach to the idea o f revolution in A sia. M oreover, his failure to estim ate cor­ rectly the developm ents in China made him suspicious w henever it was neces­ sary for him to deal w ith local com m unists. It is therefore not surprising that in the follow ing years Stalin never paid m uch attention to tile East. His attitude was conditioned m ainly by the general orien­ tation o f Soviet foreign policy tow ard Europe, w here the danger o f the new w ar was becom ing m ore evident in the 1930s. It is understandable also that during W orld W ar n M oscow could not afford to be occupied w ith events in A sia if they w ere not directly related to the Soviet struggle against Germany and Japan.

T h e Origins

Yet die end o f the w ar did not change this situation significantly. Even China, at first, w as no exception; and in 1945 M oscow took no im m ediate notice o f V iet­ nam ’s A ugust R evolution and took no steps to recognize the D em ocratic Re­ public o f V ietnam (DRV) proclaim ed by Ho Chi M inh on Septem ber 2 ,1 9 4 5 , although M oscow ’s overall reaction m ight have been sym pathetic.8 A fter W orld W ar n, as before it, Stalin subordinated the Eastern direction o f Soviet foreign policy to the problem s o f the W est A ccordingly, his policy to­ w ard V ietnam w as determ ined by processes that were under way in France, where com m unists occupied m inisterial posts in the governm ent. Stalin did not w ant to underm ine prospects o f the French Com m unist Party in its bid for pow er by supporting the struggle for independence in Indochina, w hich w as a part o f France’s colonial em pire. As a re su lt all contacts w ith Ho Chi M inh at that tim e w ent through die French Com m unists who did not block the first Indochina w ar budget and em ergency m easures related to the prosecution o f the w ar. It is not surprising, then, that the conservative deputies in the France’s N ational Assem ­ bly applauded “th eừ own Com m unist colleagues and the Soviet U nion for leav­ ing France to fight its w ar in Indochina w ithout outside disturbance.” The French Socialist prem ier, Paul Ram adier, praised the “correct attitude o f the So­ viet G overnm ent” on the Indochina question.9 A lthough objective factors w ere influential in directing Soviet attention away from the East, in the case o f V ietnam Stalin’s personal prejudices still played an im portant role. The leader o f the French Com m unists, M aurice Thorez, once confided to his H ungarian com rades that “Stalin w as som ewhat distrustful o f Ho and his group.” Thorez said Stalin thought that H o Chi M inh had gone too far in his contacts w ith u.s. and B ritish intelligence. Furtherm ore, Stalin was annoyed by H o’s unw illingness to seek his advice and consent prior to taking action. As an exam ple, Thorez m entioned the dissolution o f the Indochinese Com m unist Party in 1945 and com plained that he had had a hard tim e convincing Stalin that it was ju st a tactical step in order to win support o f V ietnam ese nationalists. It is clear from Thorez’s testim ony that Stalin suspected Ho Chỉ M inh o f be­ ing too independent and nationalist oriented to be a loyal follow er o f M oscow ’s political line. S talin’s suspicion was not unfounded. The Soviet leader was ap­ parently inform ed that, in 1945, the U nited States assisted the V ietm inh in es­ tablishing an intelligence netw ork and guerrilla arm y against Japanese troops in Indochina. M oreover, Ho Chi M inh tried to win u.s. recognition. Secret direct contacts took place betw een representatives o f the V ietm inh and the U nited States in 1946 and 1947." This inform ation added substance to Stalin’s gener­ ally cautious attitude tow ard supporting A sian com m unists, an attitude based on the conviction that the prize o f Com m unist parties in France and Italy— disci­ plined, solidly aligned w ith M oscow’s political line, and w ell equipped to gain

Th e Origins

pow er in local governm ents—far outw eighed the advantages o f any successes in Indochina. Even the overall deterioration o f die situation in Europe in 1947 and the fail­ ure o f all attem pts to consolidate Com m unist pow er beyond die lim its reached by the Soviet arm y did not change significandy S ta lin 's policy tow ard In­ dochina. A lthough A ndrei Zhdanov, the principal Soviet ideologist, em phasized V ietnam along w ith Indonesia in his speech com m em orating the foundation o f the Com inform in 1947,12 his wends w ere follow ed by only propaganda, not practical steps. M oscow’s sporadic and som etim es spontaneous attem pts to es­ tablish contacts w ith the V ietm inh in 1947 and 1948 cam e to nothing, to the ob­ vious disappointm ent o f Soviet officials who w ere irritated by the V ietnam ese C om m unist lead ersh ip 's vacillations over its relations w ith the U SS R .13 M oscow continued its policy o f a successful “divorce” o f its interest in the colo­ nial question from its goals in the W est.14 The process o f Soviet reappraisal be­ gan after the Com m unist victory in China in 1949. Soviet policy tow ard China bore all the characteristic features o f M oscow ’s strategy in A sia. Stalin’s distrust o f the Chinese Com m unists and M ao Zedong personally was founded on the sam e ideology and rooted in the sam e personal prejudices that characterized his view s o f the V ietm inh and Ho C hi M inh. In ad­ dition, Stalin’s approach to the China issue w as undoubtedly influenced by his bitter experience o f 1926-1927.15 As early as autum n 1940, Stalin discussed his view s o f the Chinese Com m unist Party (CCP) w ith G eneral Chuikov, who w as on his w ay to China. The Soviet leader said that the CCP consisted largely o f peasants and tended to underestim ate the strength o f the w orking class.16 This alone m ade the CCP unreliable in Stalin’s eyes, an opinion he did not change af­ ter the end o f the w ar. N ikita K hrushchev confirm ed in his m em oirs that Stalin was critical w ith regard to the leader o f the Chinese Com m unists. He even called M ao a “cave-dw eller-like M arxist,” 17 w hich m eant that Stalin considered M ao’s view s prim itive and outdated. Such an attitude led to the underestim ation by M oscow o f the ability o f the Chinese Com m unists to achieve success in theừ contest for pow er w ith the Guom indang. As a result, after the w ar Stalin repeat­ edly requested the CCP to com prom ise w ith the Guom indang. Chinese Com m unist m ilitary gains during the civil w ar caused Stalin to re­ consider his approach to relations w ith the CCP, and the Com m unist victories in 1949 put an end to M oscow 's hesitation about w hich side—the Guom indang o r the Chinese Com m unist Party—it should deal w ith. D uring the Sino-Soviet ne­ gotiations in M oscow , Stalin praised the victory o f the C hinese revolution, called M ao “a M arxist leader,” and even apologized for interfering w ith the C CP’s policym aking in the post-W orld W ar n period.18 M oreover, after a pe­ riod o f uncertainty, Stalin agreed to rescind the treaty the Soviet U nion had con-

T h e Origins

eluded w ith Chiang K aishek’s governm ent and sign a new treaty w ith Commu­ nist China. M ao Zedong at this point suggested to Stalin that he invite H o Chỉ M inh to M oscow to discuss questions o f Soviet-V ietnam ese cooperation. Since B eijing had already decided to recognize the V ietm inh,19 the K rem lin decided to follow the C hinese lead and respond favorably to the V ietnam ese overtures. It was dif­ ficult for Stalin to reject M ao's proposal o f an invitation to Ho because a rejec­ tion w ould inevitably lead to Chinese bew ilderm ent and to uncom fortable ques­ tions, especially because (Ml January 16 die V ietnam ese le ad « ’ was already in C hina w aiting fo r new s from M oscow. Stalin, how ever, w as not at all enthusiastic about m eeting w ith H o Chi M inh and regarded a form al recognition o f the D em ocratic R epublic o f V ietnam granted by the Soviet U nion on January 30,1950, as sufficient under those cir­ cum stances.20 Stalin’s telegram to the Soviet am bassador in B eijing contained a m essage from Philippov (Stalin’s pseudonym ) to Ho, in w hich Stalin told the V ietnam ese leader about M ao’s suggestion and said he had no objections to H o’s visit to die Soviet U nion. Stalin then stated: “If you have not changed your plan concerning your com ing to M oscow after [the publication of] the Soviet note on the recognition o f V ietnam , I w ill be glad to see you in M oscow.”21Thus Stalin clearly hinted to H o C hi M inh that the diplom atic recognition o f the DRV by the Soviet U nion w ould be a good enough start and the Soviet leadership could offer the V ietnam ese Com m unists nothing else a t that stage. H o Chi M inh (intentionally o r not) overlooked Stalin’s h in t In his response from Chita, a tow n on the territory o f the Soviet U nion, he inform ed Stalin that be w ould like to keep his trip secret m ainly because if the French learned about his absence from V ietnam , “they could undertake political and m ilitary actions.” Ho Chi M inh deferred to Stalin about the secrecy o f his visit and em phasized drat the C entral Com m ittee o f the V ietnam ese Com m unist Party w ould agree if Stalin w anted his arrival to be official. “Upon arrival,” H o w rote to the Soviet leader, “I w ould like you to perm it m e to com e directly to you.”22 Ho C hi M inh's visit to M oscow23 did not change Stalin’s reluctance to pro­ vide all-out support to the com m unist struggle in Indochina and therefore was not a success fo r the V ietnam ese. The Soviet leader turned Ho over to the C hi­ nese, as w as agreed during the negotiations w ith Liu Shaoqi and later w ith M ao Zedong, and Liu and M ao prom ised that the CCP was ready “to offer every as­ sistance needed by V ietnam in its straggle against France.”24 The V ietnam ese leaders undoubtedly attem pted to persuade Stalin to agree on som ething com ­ parable to the Sino-Soviet treaty o f alliance. A t the reception honoring the SinoSoviet treaty, H o C hi M inh—feigning hum or—confronted the Soviet leader w ith the question o f w hy M oscow could not sign a sim ilar agreem ent w ith the

The Origins

DRV. In response, Stalin referred to the secret character o f H o’s visit and to the unavoidable disclosure o f his presence in the Soviet U nion if such an agreem ent w ere to be concluded. Ho then put forw ard the bizarre suggestion that Stalin provide a plane to H o for a brief flight ova* M oscow and then stage an official airport w elcom ing reception. This would resolve the problem . Stalin laughed, acting as if the whole exchange was not m ore than a joke.25 N ikita Khrushchev, who either had been a w itness to the Stalin-H o conversa­ tion or had had a first-hand account o f it, included this episode in his m em oirs. He strongly criticized Stalin for his behavior during the negotiations w ith the V ietnam ese leader. Khrushchev believed Stalin insulted and condescended to H o during their m eetings. W ith his colleagues in the Politburo, Stalin could not conceal his distrust o f Ho Chi M inh. Stalin later often spoke o f H o’s visit and com plained that the decision to recognize V ietnam had been prem ature. K hrushchev concluded that Stalin did not believe in the possibility o f the V ietm in tfs victory.26 l i e situation changed som ew hat w ith the outbreak o f the Korean W ar in June 1950. The open confrontation betw een the Soviet allies— N orth K orea and C hina—and the W est led by the U nited States opened Stalin’s eyes to the im­ portance o f the w ar in Indochina, which had now becom e a part o f the com m on struggle against u.s. im perialism and u.s. satellites. M oscow regarded the U.S. attack on N orth K orea as the realization o f the plan o f a three-pronged invasion o f m ainland C hina, w ith the other tw o prongs directed from Taiw an and V iet­ nam .27 In these circum stances M oscow m ore readily displayed enthusiasm over H o C hi M inh’s successes, which w ere in fact rather im pressive by the fall o f 1950. On Septem ber 16 the V ietm inh forces w ith the support o f theữ Chinese ad­ visers began the so-called B order Cam paign against French troops. This cam ­ paign was probably conceived during H o’s negotiations in M oscow and B eijing, although Chinese scholars attributed it w holly to the PRC leaders.28 It seem s possible that both Ho Chi M inh and M ao Zedong had prelim inary discussions about such a cam paign w ith Stalin, especially since a sim ilar strategy was used, on Stalin’s advice, by the Chinese Com m unists in 1945.29 Follow ing S talin's proposal to M ao that the CCP send som e o f its troops to the border betw een M ongolia and northeast C hina in order to receive Soviet w eapons and divert the Japanese forces, in Septem ber 1945 the Chinese Politburo decided to m ove its forces to the N orth and w ith Soviet support create in the N ortheast large revo­ lutionary bases.30 The B order Cam paign in V ietnam was thus sim ilar to the Chinese m aneuver five years earlier. The goal o f the cam paign was the capture by the V ietm inh o f territories in the N orth o f V ietnam on the border w ith China in order to create

The Origins

base areas directly backed by the PRC. The cam paign ended w ith a decisive V ietm inh victory. Ho Chỉ M inh him self was eager to report to “beloved com rade Stalin“ on the success o f the operation. He began his letter w ith inform ation on the results o f the V ietm inh’s offensive. A ccording to Ho, the V ietm inh forces, w hich included m ore than tw enty-five thousand regulars, about one thousand guerrillas, and eighteen thousand civilians, fought against six thousand French troops.3' D uring this cam paign the V ietnam ese Com m unists elim inated about tw enty-three hundred French officers and captured another tw enty-five hun­ dred.32 But a m ore im portant result o f the offensive was the occupation by the V ietm inh o f a num ber o f provinces in the N orth o f V ietnam on the border w ith China (Cao Bang, Dong Khe, T hat Khe). This provided the Vietnam ese Com­ m unists w ith direct com m unications w ith theữ Chinese ally, w hose vast terri­ tory becam e the strategic rear o f the Vietm inh. In his letter to Stalin, Ho Chi M inh em phasized the im portant role played in the cam paign by the C hinese advisers. “I m ust inform you,” he w rote to M oscow, “that the C[hinese] C[om m unists] from the C.C.P. have sent som e o f theừ best people to US as advisers, and they rendered valuable services to US.” 33 In contrast, Ho did not m ention any substantial aid from the Soviet U nion, which had obviously been lim ited to w hat Stalin had advised during the M oscow ne­ gotiations. T his lim itation w as the obvious im plication o f the V ietnam ese leader’s words at the beginning o f his letter, when he w rote about the “big help rendered by you [apparently by Stalin personally] and the Chừiese Communist Party.”*4 N evertheless, Din (as Ho Chi Mirth called him self in his correspon­ dence w ith Stalin) hurried to balance his praise o f the Chinese w ith the ac­ know ledgem ent o f the leading roles o f the Soviet U nion and Stalin, in particu­ lar. “D ear Com rade Stalin,” w rote Ho, “Am I right in regarding our success, though relatively m inor, as a part o f great victory o f revolutionary internation­ alism w hose the m ost heroic and beloved leader you are[?]"3S The success o f the Com m unist forces in V ietnam bolstered Soviet expecta­ tions o f developm ents favorable fo r M oscow in the situation o f sharp con­ frontation w ith the W est. H aving failed to outbid the U nited States in Europe, Stalin w as eager to com pensate for this failure w ith success in the Far East. A t the sam e tim e, he tried to avoid the danger o f global w ar and rely in m ost cases on local liberation movem ents to weaken the W est and to acquire new allies. U.S. analysts predicted that South A sia and Southeast A sia w ere the regions where the Soviets w ere m ost likely to apply their plans to achieve objectives “through m easures short o f arm ed aggression across frontier.”36 U.S. predictions were only partly correct, how ever. Indochina rem ained the only region w here Stalin w as prepared to encourage the m ilitant course. His at­ titude was influenced by the grow ing prospects o f the Com m unist victory in

T h e Origins

Vietnam . As years passed and the U .S. involvem ent in the V ietnam ese conflict deepened, another factor could play an im portant role—the fact that die V ietm inh struggle inflicted dam age to die prestige o f die U .S. adm inistration in the eyes o f die peoples o f the Third W orld w ho condem ned U .S. help to French colonialism , and in the eyes o f W ashington’s allies w ho w itnessed die Ư.S. in­ ability to suppress Com m unist insurgency in a relatively sm all country. Thus, V ietnam w as a special case. W ith respect to the other countries o f die region, M oscow w as m ore circum ­ spect and lim ited its action to advice and m oral su pport M oreover, when advis­ ing A sian Com m unist leaders, Stalin tried to discourage them from exclusive re­ liance on the arm ed struggle. F or exam ple, in h is le tte r to the Indonesian Com m unists, Stalin from the outset rejected the necessity o f the “m ilitary revo­ lution,” em phasizing instead the task o f agrarian reform . H e criticized the “spirit o f leftism ” am ong m em bers o f the C om m unist Party and praised practical, “m olecular,” “dirty” w ork in die sphere o f everyday needs o f w orkers, peasants, and intelligentsia.37 To convince A sian com m unists o f the correctness o f such a reform ist course, Stalin often referred to the experience o f C hina tested by developm ents in V iet­ nam. He pointed out that a successful guerrilla w ar needed not only a large coun­ try “w hich has a n u m b » o f forestry and m ountainous areas far from railw ays and cities,” but also a “solid rear” provided by a pow erful ally. This w ould guar­ antee liberated zones established by Com m unist insurgents from encirclem ent by rival forces.38 The exam ple o f the C hinese Com m unists w ho “m oved to M anchuria and found there a solid rear in the friendly Soviet state” confirm ed such a requirem ent. “It is notew orthy,” Stalin reasoned, “that only after the C hi­ nese com rades had obtained the solid rear and only after they leaned against the USSR as against their own rear, the enem y lost a possibility to encircle them , w hile the Chinese Com m unists got an opportunity to wage planned offensive against the Chiang K aishek arm y from N orth to South.”39 The im plication o f these instructions to the Indonesians is very clean M oscow did not w ant to en­ courage arm ed struggle o f those Com m unists w hose chances fo r success, be­ cause o f the absence o f the necessary conditions outlined by Stalin in his letter, w ere m inim al. On the other hand, the situation in a very few countries m ight be regarded as satisfying the requirem ents set forth by the Soviet leader. One m ay argue that the letter to the Indonesians only confirm s the dom ino theory put forw ard by the u.s. adm inistration in those years as a justification for its policy in Indochina. In fact, if one country becom es controlled by Commu­ nists, in a few years it could serve as a strategic rear for a com m unist insurgency in neighboring country, and the chain reaction m ight be lim itless. B ut the theory did not take into account m any other factors, not least o f them the unw illingness

Th e Origins

and, in som e cases, the inability o f the pow erful allies, prim arily the Soviet U nion and C hina, to support new Com m unist regim es and render them the nec­ essary m aterial aid upon w hich they as underdeveloped econom ies w ould un­ avoidably be dependent Even in V ietnam , w here the prospects o f Com m unist victory w ere prom ising, die local insurgents w aited in vain fo r substantial assis­ tance from the Soviets for their struggle. M oscow ’s reluctance to be involved in conflicts in A sia was heightened by die difficulties the Soviet allies encountered in K orea. It is possible to agree (w ith som e reservations) w ith Charles M cLane, who w rote in 1966 that “[h]ad die Korean effort succeeded, the strategy o f arm ed struggle, we m ay im agine, would have been vindicated in Soviet eyes and w ould have been m ore w idely urged throughout the East than heretofore. The ensuing chapter in M oscow’s Eastern policy w ould have been different. The Korean venture did not, how ever, succeed. In fact, the K orean W ar w orsened the international environm ent o f the Soviet U nion. O ut o f fear o f Com m unist attack elsew here in the w orld, the Trum an adm inistration tripled the u.s. defense budget. W ashington also decided to sta­ tion U .S. troops perm anently in Europe. A nd it also took the action “Stalin may have feared m ost o f all,” that is, to rearm the W est Germ ans.41 In A sia the So­ viet U nion perceived increased determ ination on the part o f the U nited States to counter the Com m unists in V ietnam , Burm a, M alaya, Thailand, and other coun­ tries when the U nited States provided direct aid to local regim es and rendered assistance to the European countries that had colonies in the region. In this situation Stalin had to abandon any m ilitant aspirations and seek a less turbulent course in A sia. The victim s o f Stalin’s reorientation o f Soviet policy w o e prim arily the V ietnam ese Com m unists w ho had to relinquish any hopes for substantial Soviet help. In addition, the failure o f the V ietm inh offensive in the Tonkin delta area in 1951 buried its plans o f a “general counteroffensive” aim ed at seizing the delta. The V ietm inh shifted its operation to upper Laos and north­ w estern V ietnam .42 It becam e apparent to H o Chi M inh and his brothers in arms that theừ final victory was still years away. In 1952, the Com m unist Party o f the Soviet U nion (CPSU) was preparing for its nineteenth congress, the first in m ore than ten years. The congress m ust have becom e a significant event not only in the fife o f Soviet Com m unists but also o f theữ com rades abroad. As usual, invitations w ere sent to representatives o f for­ eign Com m unist parties to com e to M oscow to attend die forum , but Ho Chi M inh him self, unlike other Com m unist leaders, had to w rite to Stalin to ask per­ m ission to com e. On Septem ber 30, 1952, a ciphered telegram was received in M oscow ad­ dressed to Com rade Philippov. In it Ho C hi M inh inform ed the Soviet leader

Th e Origins

that he had arrived in B eijing and w anted very m uch to com e to M oscow to par­ ticipate in the CPSU congress. A gain, H o expressed his desire to visit M oscow incognito o r under a false name because “if I w ould go to M oscow openly, first, this w ould provide enem ies w ith a pretext for political attacks against me and, second, [my] open trip would cause many inconveniences related to m y recep­ tion.”43 This excessive preoccupation w ith secrecy on the part o f Ho Chi M inh seem s strange, considering the recognition o f the DRV by the Soviet U nion and the presence in M oscow o f the DRV em bassy, w hich had opened in M arch Ỉ9S2. Y et as he w rote to Stalin in Septem ber 1952, H o C hi M inh m ay have kept in m ind the deteriorated situation in international relations as a result o f the K orean W ar and the Soviet leader’s resulting unw illingness to m ake public the contacts o f his country w ith representatives o f national liberation m ovem ents in A sia. In any case, H o’s principal goal w as not so m uch participation in the party congress as a m eeting w ith Stalin, for in the last paragraph o f his letter he stated that his purpose w as “to inform you and to discuss w ith you som e issues o f the struggle o f V ietnam and questions o f the activity o f tile labor [sic] party.”44 O n O ctober 2, he received a telegram from M oscow in w hich Stalin consented to the V ietnam ese leader’s arrival to M oscow ’’unofficially.”45 Stalin’s positive response did not m ean that Ho Chi M inh’s visit w as w el­ com e. The Soviet leader obviously intended to devote only as m uch tim e as nec­ essary not to alienate a representative o f a national liberation m ovem ent Thus w hen H o on O ctober 17 sent the K rem lin a request about the m eeting, during w hich he was planning to inform his pow erful ally about the situation in V iet­ nam ,46 Stalin in all probability decided to grant such an opportunity to the V iet­ nam ese leader. But this was the m ost that the Vozhd’ was prepared to do. One m onth lata*, on the eve o f Ho Chi M inh’s departure from the Soviet capital. Ho sent a request for an additional m eeting w ith Stalin. O n the basis o f available docum ents, it seem s Stalin ignored this request. On N ovem ber 15, V. G rigorian, head o f the CPSƯ C entral Com m ittee com ­ m ission responsible for relationships w ith foreign com m unist parties, sent Stalin a m essage in which he inform ed the Vozhd’ that Ho Chi M inh “orally” let him know that he was planning to leave for V ietnam shortly and w ould like to m eet w ith “Com rade Stalin for several m inutes.” If Stalin could not receive the V iet­ nam ese leader, Ho was going to w rite a m essage to him .47 This m essage, finally sent to Stalin on N ovem ber 19, said: V ery m uch beloved and respected Com rade. Today I am leaving for m y country. I thank you very m uch for w hat you have done for me. I prom ise you to w ork diligently in the realization o f the agrarian program and in w aging our patriotic war. I hope I w ill be able to

Th e Origins

com e back in tw o o r three years so as to subm it to you a report on the results o f our w ork. I w ish you very good health and very long life. I em brace you heartily. D in.48 Thus in 1952, as earlier, Soviet policy tow ard V ietnam rem ained uncertain. T hroughout the first post-W o rld W ar n decade, the discrepancy betw een M oscow 's words and deeds vis-à-vis V ietnam w as strikin& O n the one hand, Soviet leaders hailed the struggle fo r national liberation that hhd developed in a num ber o f A sian countries, expressed Soviet support for die aspirations o f op­ pressed peoples for independence and national sovereignty, and condem ned plans o f European im perialists to restore theữ colonial em pires. A t the sam e tim e, M oscow did alm ost nothing to help in any m aterial way the struggle o f those peoples, indicating that, in general, Stalin as w ell as his successors as­ signed a low priority to operations in the colonial w orld com pared w ith Euro­ pean policy. The K orean W ar further discouraged M oscow from risking a fur­ ther involvem ent in a w ar in the rem ote regions o f Indochina o r Southeast A sia. An early expert conclusion that “Soviet efforts in the colonies, despite repeated rem inders to the international m ovem ent that m ore vigorous activity was needed there, w ere on the w hole parsim onious,”49 was accurate. V ietnam was not an exception to typical Soviet strategies in A sia. A lthough the prospect o f success o f the national liberation struggle in V ietnam w as m ore prom ising than in other A sian countries, the m ost the K rem lin w as prepared to do w as give its blessing to C hina for rendering assistance to the Vietm inh. Such assistance m ight have included Soviet w eapons and equipm ent channeled to B eijing in the fram ew ork o f the tw o countries’ cooperation in the Korean W ar. In addition, Stalin could not overcom e his distrust o f Ho Chi M inh, whom he probably suspected o f being m ore a nationalist titan a com m unist. A fter it failed to achieve its goals in K orea, the Soviet U nion decided to turn to a m ore conciliatory policy w ith the W est, and after Stalin’s death in M arch 1953 it announced its desire for peaceful coexistence. The new collective lead­ ership in the Soviet U nion did not hesitate to sacrifice a total victory of the V ietm inh in favor o f better relations w ith W estern countries H o rn e t leaders té? garded the w ar in Indochina as an obstacle to this new poncyTand they were prepared to search for com prom ise in order to settle the conflict, which threat­ ened global war. They had decided to counter this risk w ith a m uch lesser risk— negotiations.

2. To Divide or Not to Divide The Russians, and perhaps the Chinese, are thinking in terms o f a partition o f Indo-China.

John Tahounttn Head of South East Asia Department, British Foreign Office, London March 19,19541

I t was a sunny day in July 19S4. In front o f the Palais des N ations in G eneva a stocky man w earing pince-nez stood looking at the im pressive M ont B lanc, w hich tow ered w ith its snowy top over the city. The m an addressed tile accom ­ panying people: “W hat an im pressive m ountain! But we are standing too close to it. The m ore we m ove aw ay, the better w e can see its grandeur. The sam e is true w ith the G eneva Accords. W e have ju st approved them and do not yet real­ ize theữ significance. It w ill reveal itself m ore and m ore w ith the passage o f tim e.”2 The stocky gentlem an w as V yacheslav M olotov, the Soviet foreign m inister and head o f the Soviet delegation at the G eneva conference, which for alm ost three m onths dealt w ith the problem s o f peace in A sia. Now the harsh declara­ tions, heated debates, and secret talks w ere left behind, and the Soviet m inister could express his satisfaction w ith the results o f the conference that settled a conflict in Southeast A sia and rem oved the danger o f w ar in that region. The road that led to this day and place was long and precarious, and it is not easy to find the beginning o f this journey. D id it begin w ith an exchange o f diplom atic notes in the sum m er and early fall o f 1953? O r did its origin lie in France’s fateful decision to restore its pow er over its colonies in Indochina ju st after the end o f W orld W ar n? In any case, only after alm ost seven years o f un­ successful struggle against the V ietnam ese resistance m ovem ent led by the Com m unist-dom inated V ietm inh, did French authorities begin thinking about a diplom atic resolution o f a w ar that had becom e an unbearable burden for the country.

To Divide or Not to Divide

Therefore die hint contained in the Soviet note o f Septem ber 28,1953, that a “num ber o f im portant questions concerning the situation in the countries o f Southeast A sia and o f the Pacific”3 could be a subject o f discussion at a pro­ jected international conference was received in Paris w ith hope. It indicated that die Soviet Union—w ith its great influence over A sian com m unists, including Ho Chi M inh—was prepared to assist Paris in finding an honorable way out o f the “dirty w ar.” This hope grew even stronger when the Chinese prim e m inis­ ter, Zhou Enlai, repeated in his declaration o f O ctober 8 his country’s readiness to contribute to the “consolidation o f peace in the Far East and in the w orld.”4 By putting forw ard the possibility o f settling die w ar in Indochina, M oscow o f course pursued its ow n goals. The Soviets regarded die w ar in Indochina w ith apprehension for they saw it as a conflict that could becom e an international cri­ sis. T heữ view strengthened as u.s. involvem ent in the w ar deepened. The So­ viet leaders w ere w ell inform ed about financial and m ilitary aid provided by the U nited States to France. The situation was even m ore delicate in Soviet eyes be­ cause o f the fact that on the other side o f the barricades in V ietnam w ere Com­ m unists w ho claim ed the D em ocratic Republic o f V ietnam had been recognized by die Soviet Union in 1950.3 The Soviet interest in developm ents in faraw ay Southeast A sia was slight, how ever, com pared w ith European problem s. European problem s w ere actually closely related to w hat was going on in Southeast A sia, w ith France being a focal point o f this relationship. The Soviets w ere preoccupied w ith W estern plans to establish the European D efense Com­ m unity (EDC) that envisaged the participation o f the Federal Republic o f G er­ m any. M oscow regarded the EDC as a revival o f G erm an m ilitarism and, be­ cause France w as vacillating about endorsing the new organization, tried to influence French public opinion by evoking the ghost o f the Germ an threat. In his speech before the Suprem e Soviet in A ugust 1953, Soviet leader G eorgii M alenkov used strong words: “A m ilitarist Germ any, regardless o f w hether it w ould appear in its form er clothes or under the cover o f the ‘European Defence Com m unity,’ is a m ortal enem y o f France and all other neighboring countries. Therefore, any attem pt to tie France to the ‘European D efence C om m unity’ w ould m ean the giving out France to G erm an revanchists.”6 Therefore, it seem s credible that the K rem lin hoped to induce Paris to reject the EDC by offering Soviet assistance in extricating France from the quagm ire o f the Indochinese w ar. An additional factor in the calculations o f Soviet decision m akers w as China. Ever since the proclam ation o f the People’s Republic o f China in 1949, M oscow undertook efforts to facilitate B eijing’s entry into the w orld com m unity and its recognition by other countries. The Korean W ar did not help this process. But Stalin’s death and the end o f the hostilities in Korea opened new opportunities

T o Divide or Not to Divide

fo r achieving this goal. In fact, recognition o f C hina seem ed even m ore attain­ able w ithin the fram ew ork o f the new Soviet policy o f relaxation o f international tensions and rapprochem ent w ith the W est. O ne elem ent o f this policy was a Soviet proposal to organize an international conference w ith the participation o f great pow ers, w hose task it would be to find a solution to the m ost urgent problem s o f international relations and thus con­ tribute to detente. The PRC was repeatedly included by the K rem lin in tile list o f tile m ain participants. In the Septem ber 28 note to the governm ents o f France, G reat B ritain, and tile U nited States, M oscow substantiated this claim . A fter it stated that there w ere im portant international problem s that dem anded “urgent consideration” by France, G reat B ritain, the U nited States, the People’s Repub­ lic o f C hina, and tile Soviet U nion, the note em phasized that “according to the UN C harter, it is first o f all w ith these countries that the responsibility for guar­ anteeing peace and international security lies.”7 The idea o f a peaceful resolution to the Indochina conflict at an international conference becam e even m ore attractive to the w ar-w eary B ench public after an exchange o f telegram s betw een the leader o f the V ietnam ese Com m unists, H o Chi M inh, and the m anaging editor o f a Swedish new spaper, the Stockholm Ex­ pressen, on N ovem ber 29, 1953. In the telegram s the V ietm inh leader, after stressing the determ ination o f the V ietnam ese people to carry the w ar to tile vic­ torious end, declared that if the French governm ent w ished “to bring about an arm istice and solve the V ietnam problem through negotiations, the people and governm ent o f the Dem ocratic Republic o f V ietnam w ill be prepared to discuss the French proposal.”8 Paris did not rem ain aloof from these peace feelers. The French prim e m inis­ ter, Joseph Laniel, in a num ber o f presentations in the N ational Assem bly as­ serted the readiness o f his governm ent to begin negotiations w ith the adversary.9 In spite o f these peaceful pronunciations, by 1954 neither side in the conflict was prepared to abandon its m ilitary course and sit down at the negotiating table. The French leaders hoped for the success o f the w ar plans put forw ard in July 1953 by G eneral Henri N avarre. The V ietm inh likew ise w as striving fo r victo­ ries in order to achieve new battlefield successes that w ould bring advantages in future negotiations.10 The first days o f 1954 saw progress on the way to realization o f the Soviet idea o f a great-pow er conference. In identical notes sent to M oscow by the U nited States, G reat B ritain, and France, the W estern pow ers inform ed the So­ viet leaders that they agreed to hold a conference o f foreign m inisters o f the four states in B erlin on January 2 5 .11 A lthough it was expected in tile W est that tills conference w ould deal predom inantly w ith German and A ustrian issues, the French w ere not ready to reject outright the evident Soviet intention to discuss

T o Divide or Not to Divide

in B erlin the prospects o f a future conference w ith the participation o f all five great pow ers, including tile PRC. Foreign M inister G eorges B idault o f France m ade this plain during die conference o f the three W estern pow ers in Berm uda in D ecem ber 1953. B idault’s advocacy o f the Soviet idea, w hich w as shared by his English colleagues, w as die result o f the expectation that cooperation w ith C hina w ould facilitate the search for a peaceful settlem ent in Southeast A sia.12 V yacheslav M olotov, the Soviet foreign m inister, was eager to use every op­ portunity during the B erlin conference to keep the hopes o f his French colleague alive, to the great displeasure o f the U .S. secretary o f state, John Foster D ulles. D ulles inform ed W ashington on January 2 7 ,1 9 5 4 , that during dinner w ith the French delegation M olotov “m ade an offer o f Soviet good offices in regard to Indo-C hina if the French G overnm ent w ould indicate exactly w hat w ere its view s in regard to a settlem ent This was preceded by an obvious hint that in re­ turn France should give at the conference here som e evidence o f a favorable at­ titude tow ards the ideas o f a Five-Pow er C onference.” 13 In another conversation w ith B idault, M olotov w as even m ore outspoken. W hen the French foreign m in­ ister expressed his governm ent’s preoccupation w ith finding an “appropriate so­ lution o f the Indochina question w hich w ould not assail national honor,” M olo­ tov im m ediately responded that “in resolution o f the Indochina question the best assistance could be rendered to France by C hina.” A s if to em phasize this the­ sis, M olotov stated, “W ithout C hina it w ill be difficult to resolve this prob­ lem .” 14 M olotov did not attem pt to keep secret his approaches to the French. D uring one o f his conversations w ith D ulles, he confided to his Ư.S. counterpart that he had suggested to B idault the m ediation o f the Soviet U nion and China tow ard a solution o f the Indochina problem . N ot very m uch surprised, D ulles responded w ith his readiness to assist w ith the problem o f a conference on A sia, adding that an agreem ent reached on this point o f the agenda “w ould be o f great signifi­ cance.” 13 The Soviet foreign m inister’s efforts w ere not fruitless. A lthough the W est­ ern pow ers refused to discuss the issue o f the five-pow er conference in the form suggested by M olotov at the beginning o f the conference in B erlin—a confer­ ence dealing w ith general problem s o f international relations such as disarm a­ m ent, prohibition o f the atom ic weapon, and other global issues— they had to accede to a m eeting o f the five foreign m inisters w ith the purpose o f consider­ ing a peaceful settlem ent o f the K orean and Indochinese questions.16 They also agreed on C hina’s participation in the conference. In light o f W ashington’s strong refusal to abandon its policy o f nonrecognition o f the Chinese Commu­ nist regim e, B ritish foreign m inister Anthony Eden sought to avoid the contro­ versial issue o f B eijing’s status. Eden suggested that the com m uniqué o f the

T o Divide or Not to Divide

B erlin conference sim ply list the countries in alphabetical order. It w as speci­ fied, therefore, in the part o f the docum ent that dealt w ith Indochina, that repre­ sentatives o f the U nited States, France, G reat B ritain, the Soviet U nion, C hina, and other concerned states w ould be invited to the conference in G eneva to dis­ cuss the problem o f restoring peace in the region.17 The Soviets expressed theừ satisfaction w ith the results o f the B erlin confer­ ence, but it appears they w ere m ore satisfied w ith the prospect o f B eijing play­ ing a greater role in the international arena than w ith the prospect o f the settle­ m ent o f the conflict in Indochina. In M olotov’s report to the plenary session o f the C entral Com m ittee o f the CPSU on M arch 2, M olotov analyzed the results o f the Berlin conference prim arily from the view point o f the adm ission o f C hina to the club o f great pow ers: “W e tried to use an obvious interest o f the French governm ent in extricating itself somehow from tile situation w hich arose in In­ dochina so that the People’s Republic o f China got the opportunity, at last, to oc­ cupy its place at a great-pow er m eeting on international questions. Now the first

step was made.”1* B ut was the Chinese reaction to the results o f the B erlin conference as opti­ m istic as M olotov’s? Even w ithout appropriate docum ents from C hinese archives, it is known that M olotov, before agreeing on the text o f the final com ­ m uniqué o f the conference, requested approval not only o f his colleagues in M oscow but also o f the com rades in Beijing. The Soviet am bassador to C hina, Pavel Yudin, on orders from M oscow, visited Zhou Enlai on February 16 and inform ed him o f the draft o f the decision proposed by Eden at the restricted ses­ sion the day before. The am bassador asked for the opinion o f the Chinese lead­ ership and insisted on an urgent reply because the next session was scheduled for February 17.19 Zhou prom ised to consult w ith Liu Shaoqi and then report on it to M ao Zedong. A t four o ’clock in the m orning o f February 17, Zhou called Yudin and asked him to inform M oscow that the C hinese leaders “entirely agree w ith the opinion o f the Soviet governm ent w ith respect to Eden’s project.”20 In light o f this exchange, the assertions o f som e scholars about B eijing’s dis­ satisfaction or even anim osity tow ard the Soviets, who allegedly had not de­ fended the status o f C hina sufficiently at the Berlin conference, seem question­ able.21 A lthough the C hinese m ight have felt som e disappointm ent over the w ording o f the Berlin conference com m uniqué, they w ere realists w ho could not but realize that M olotov had done all that was possible in prom oting C hina in the great-pow er club. He had set the door ajar, and it was now up to C hina to squeeze its way through—w ith Soviet help, o f course. Proof that the Chinese shared this view can be found in M olotov’s conversa­ tion w ith the Chinese am bassador in M oscow, Zhang W entien, soon after the Berlin conference. A fter expressing the PRC governm ent’s support o f the deci­

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sions o f the Berlin conference, the am bassador em phasized that “the PRC is go­ ing to take an active p aît in the G eneva conference and it holds the view that if tim e w ill not be great successes at the conference, any success would be im ­ portant, since for the PRC die w ay fo r active participation in international affairs ? ___ .__ „7 2 is opening. Even Secretary o f State D ulles, who could hardly be suspected o f being a M olotov sym pathizer, gave credit to the Soviet foreign m inister’s ability to get concessions. R eporting on the B erlin conference at a m eeting o f the u.s. Na­ tional Security C ouncil, D ulles described M olotov’s behavior at the conference as very sm art23 A t the sam e tim e, the secretary o f state evidently tried to justify his concessions to the Soviets. He put the blam e on B idault and Eden for theữ softness vis-à-vis M olotov’s intrigues and substantiated his ow n position through his concern over the fate o f the EDC. “Secretary D ulles said he believed it to be apparent that if B idault had not gone back to Paris w ith som ething to show on Indochina, the Laniel G overnm ent w ould have fallen at once and w ould have been replaced by a governm ent w hich w ould not only have a m andate to end the w ar in Indochina on any term s, but also to oppose French ratification o f ED C.” In other w ords, D ulles was sure that “if we had vetoed the resolution re­ garding Indochina, it w ould have probably cost US French m em bership in EDC as w ell as Indochina itself.”24 The other tw o u.s. allies, France and G reat B ritain, expressed a reserved op­ tim ism w ith regard to the prospects o f a settlem ent o f the Indochina war. In his speech at the N ational Assem bly on M arch 5 ,1 9 5 4 , Prim e M inister Laniel de­ clared: “U ntil 1953 there w ere tw o opposite tendencies in French public opin­ ion. Som e hoped to resolve the conflict by die way o f negotiations, w hile others believed it w as possible to win by m eans o f war. Today these debates should be term inated. W e are unanim ous, in fact, in the hope to settle the conflict by m eans o f negotiations.’’29 In M oscow, officials o f the M inistry o f Foreign A ffairs began to consider prospects o f success at the forthcom ing conference in G eneva. As soon as the B erlin conference w as over, the inhabitants o f the building at the Sm olenskaya Square began preparations to assure Soviet success. They w rote m em oranda and policy papers, w eighed various options for the settlem ent o f the Indochina con­ flict, and m et w ith C hinese and V ietnam ese colleagues to coordinate theừ work. As early as February 26, the DRV am bassador in M oscow, Nguyen Long Bang, m et w ith K irill N ovikov, the head o f the Foreign M inistry’s Southeast A sia D epartm ent and, on behalf o f the Central Com m ittee o f the W orkers’ Party ofV ietnam , requested instructions about “w hat should be the line o f behavior o f the DRV governm ent in connection w ith the forthcom ing Geneva conference o f 26 A pril 1954.”26 Later, on M arch 26, the Vietnam ese am bassador asked to pro­

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vide the DRV delegation w ith various analytical m aterials concerning tile situ­ ation in Indochina.27 The C hinese, seen from tile record o f M olotov’s conversa­ tion w ith B eijing’s am bassador, w ere m ore independent N evertheless, they also asked for theừ Soviet com rades to share their experience on preparing for an in­ ternational conference.28 B efore they advised their allies, die Soviets had to w ork out theừ own attitude on m any questions relating to tile G eneva conference: the com position o f the conference at the Indochina phase, procedural problem s like those o f the chair­ m anship, tactics during the course o f the conference, and, m ost im portant, a pos­ sible solution to the conflict in Indochina. M oscow seem s to have harbored certain view s about a possible solution as early as the conference in B erlin. On January 29, u.s. intelligence reported to the State D epartm ent that it had received inform ation that “the Soviet Union had ordered its A m bassador in France to test the French reaction to a possible set­ tlem ent in Indochina based on the follow ing provisions: there w ould be a provi­ sional arm istice line draw n at the 16th p a ra lle l. . . ; the French w ould evacuate H anoi and Tonkin D e lta .. . .’,29 The French w ere not alone in being approached by Soviet diplom ats on the issue o f the division o f V ietnam as a possible resolution o f the Indochina con­ flict. A t the beginning o f M arch, an official o f the U.S. em bassy in London in­ form ed the head o f the Southeast A sia D epartm ent o f the B ritish Foreign O ffice, John Tahourdin, that a diplom at from the Soviet em bassy, Rodionov, during a m eeting had suggested that “if it was not possible to reach a settlem ent on the basis o f Ho Chi M inh’s joining a V ietm inh/V ietnam coalition governm ent, the solution m ight be a partition o f the country on the sixteenth parallel.” “Such an arrangem ent,” Rodionov argued, “m ight help to guarantee C hina’s southern frontiers.”30 Tw o days before this conversation took place, a Soviet representa­ tive in London, N ikolai Belokhvostikov, approached H. A. F. H ohler o f the For­ eign O ffice w ith a sim ilar suggestion.31 Soviet diplom ats w ould not have probed the position o f the W estern pow ers w ith regard to a possible division o f V ietnam w ithout being sure that such a so­ lution w ould be m et w ith approval by M oscow ’s allies. The Chinese agreed w ith th eứ Soviet com rades on the subject o f partition. In a conversation w ith M olo­ tov on M arch 6, Chinese am bassador Zhang W entien him self raised the issue o f partition along the sixteenth parallel and stated that “this is a very advantageous proposal for H o Chi M inh and it should be accepted if it is put forw ard offi­ cially.”32 The V ietm inh’s attitude tow ard a possible settlem ent o f the conflict did not quite coincide w ith the opinion o f theữ pow erful allies. In a M arch 5 con­ versation betw een Pavel Y udin, the Soviet am bassador to C hina, and Hoan Van Hoang, the DRV am bassador to C hina, the Vietnam ese envoy boasted about the

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successes o f die People’s Arm y on the battlefield and m entioned “great diffi­ culties” that could arise during negotiations on a cease-fire w ith die French. “There is no definite front line in V ietnam ,” reasoned the am bassador, “and, as a result, it w ould be extrem ely difficult to determ ine a dem arcation line and a dem ilitarized zone___ ”33 The V ietnam ese am bassador’s argum ents obviously ran against die idea o f partition.34 B ut M oscow seem s to have been m ore sensitive to the needs o f its C hinese ally than to the interests o f the so far ephem eral D em ocratic Republic o f V ietnam . B y m id-M arch, Soviet diplom ats in foreign capitals w ere present­ ing partition as thè m ost expedient solution. F or exam ple, M . Zhivotovsky o f die Soviet em bassy in London in a conversation w ith Tahourdin “suggested that there w as a sim ilarity betw een the K orean and Indo-China problem s.” W hentijfi. B ritish diplom at asked him w hat this sim ilarity w as, Zhivotovsky replied tiiit“tf partition was to be the solution for K orea, such an arrangem ent m ight alstr6e~ suitable fo r Indo-Ô un& ”j Furtherm ore, Zhivotovsky hinted that the C hinese w o e also interested lh sflch a solution since “die C hinese w ere ’definitely sen­ sitive’ (he repeated this tw ice) to w hat w ent on on theữ southern frontier.”33 W hile the B ritish looked favorably upon Soviet suggestions for the solution to the V ietnam problem and the French w ere not hostile,36 M oscow also had to account fo r the U .S. position in die course o f preparation for the G eneva con­ ference. Ư.S. and Soviet positions w ere opposite on alm ost all issues. A lthough the u.s. secretary o f state agreed on die convocation o f a conference to deal w ith the K orean and Indochina questions, he did this, as w e have seen, out o f concern not to alienate his French allies. B ut, as com pensation for this concession, he in­ sisted on the insertion in die text o f the final com m uniqué in B erlin a provision aim ed against Com m unist China that specified that “neither the invitation to, nor the holding of” the conference w ith the participation o f the PRC w ould im ply diplom atic recognition “in any case w here it has not already been accorded.” In the period after the B erlin conference, D ulles— the m ainspring o f u .s . for­ eign policy— did his utm ost to elim inate the very reasons for such a forum . Lloyd c. G ardner w rote, “T he best thing from W ashington’s view point, o f course, w ould be if by the tim e o f the G eneva Conference there was nothing to negotiate. So he [Dulles] discouraged serious preparations fo r serious negotia­ tions.”37 H ow ever, D ulles had to consider the desperate situation on the battle­ fields in V ietnam w here the best units o f the French Expeditionary Corps w ere being assaulted by the V ietm inh at D ienbienphu, a fortress created by G eneral N avarre to defend the delta and regarded by French public opinion as a sym bol o f the w ar in Indochina. The French occupied this fortress in N ovem ber 1953, a m ove that m ost likely prevented a V ietm inh thrust into Laos and provided support fo r indigenous

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forces opposing the V ietm inh in this area. G en u al N avarre hoped that a show ­ dow n w ith the V ietnam ese Com m unist forces over the possession o f the fortress w ould cause the defeat o f the V ietm inh and turn the tide o f the w ar. By M arch 1954, how ever, V ietm inh troops had encircled D ienbienphu, which had been subjected to theừ constant assaults since M arch 13. D espite m assive B en ch aữ bom bardm ent, the French area o f defense w as constantly shrinking, and it be­ cam e obvious that the situation w as grave.38 U nable to prevent the convocation o f the G eneva conference w hile D ienbienphu was threatened, the U .S. secretary o f state hoped to neutralize any gains by Com m unist countries that m ight result from the conference. D ulles as w ell as President D w ight D. Eisenhow er and many other officials in W ashington re­ garded the prospect o f Ho Chi M inh’s victory as the beginning o f the process that w ould lead to Com m unist dom inance in the region and the loss o f South­ east A sia for the free w orld. This was the so-called dom ino theory form ulated by Eisenhow er at his press conference on A pril 7,1954: “Indochina was the first in a row o f dom inoes. If it fell its neighbors w ould shortly thereafter fall w ith i t ___”39 To prevent such an outcom e or, if that w ould not be possible, to lessen its scope, D ulles suggested “united actions” o f free nations. In his address be­ fore the O verseas Press C lub o f A m erica in New Y ork one w eek earlier, on M arch 29, D ulles declared that the threat o f com m unism in A sia should be m et by “united action.”40 Im m ediately after this declaration, D ulles began to build up a m ilitary alliance in Southeast A sia. M oscow w atched w ith apprehension the u.s. activities to create a new and aggressive bloc in A sia. B ut if the Soviets did not possess necessary instru­ ments— except propaganda—to prevent this process, they could counter it by supporting China in its claim for “m em bership in the great-pow er gam e.”41 Since the B erlin conference, Soviet officials in conversations w ith foreign colleagues insisted on the equal status o f China am ong other great pow ers at G eneva. On M arch 17, during a conversation betw een D eputy Foreign M inister V asilii K uznetzov and A m bassador C harles B ohlen o f the U nited S tates, K uznetzov handed Bohlen an aide-m ém oire about procedural questions relating to the G eneva conference. (The aide-m ém oire w ould have been a form al ex­ change o f diplom atic notes if the Soviets in th ev docum ent had not m entioned that they had consulted the Chinese on the issues touched upon in it and that the latter had given th en co n sen t) Bohlen im m ediately called attention to the fact o f the consultation w ith the Chinese and noted that it had been agreed at the B erlin conference that the inviting states w ere the Soviet U nion, the U nited States, G reat B ritain, and France; he im plied that it w as not at all necessary to request C hina’s prelim inary agreem ent on the questions relating to the convo­ cation o f the conference in Geneva.42 In response, K uznetzov stated that in the

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official com m uniqué the PRC was m entioned as an equal participant in the con­ ference in G eneva along w ith the other four pow ers. “In addition," K uznetzov reasonably noted, “we consider it expedient to discuss organizational questions prelim inarily so as not to divert the conference to technical problem s later, thus m aking its w ork m ore fruitful.”43 The Bohlen-K uznetzov conversation m arked the beginning o f the real w ar o f diplom atic notes that continued throughout the period that preceded the G eneva conference. Each side, basing its position on differing interpretations o f the w ording o f the B erlin com m uniqué (w hich w as, in fact, rather vague on this point), defended its position w ith respect to C hina’s status at the forthcom ing conference. This w rangle displeased the other participants in the conference, particularly the British. In his memorandum o f M arch 20, A ssistant U nder Sec­ retary o f State D enis A llen, quite an influential figure in the B ritish Foreign O f­ fice, w rote that the Ư.S. position on this issue, “although form ally correct, ap­ pears to be unrealistically rigid." He drew attention to the fact that only in consultation w ith the C hinese w ould it be possible to settle the participation o f other countries. Therefore, ipso facto, C hina’s status w as different from that o f “other interested states" not listed in tile com m uniqué. A nd, in A llen’s opinion, “to insist form ally and rigidly that this procedural question is a m atter for deci­ sion by the four pow ers m ight m erely com pel the Com m unists to press the the­ sis that it is a m atter for the five."44 This was exactly w hat happened. W hile clashing w ith the U nited States over the issue o f C hina’s role as a great pow er and criticizing u.s. attem pts to drive its allies into a m ilitary pact, Soviet Foreign M inistry bureaucrats w orked out various plans for Geneva.45 O n orders from M olotov, the Southeast A sia D epartm ent com piled a list o f questions per­ taining to the G eneva conferencITSoviet leaders w anted to know the W estern countries’ attitude tow ard the com position o f the Indochina phase o f the con­ ference, particularly theừ view on a possible invitation for representatives o f the DRV govem m ent/M oscow w orried that the W est intended to settle the In­ dochina question by depending on the agreem ent about K orea. The Soviets w ere also eager to find out how the French m ilitary view ed prospects o f the w ar in In­ dochina and w hat plans the United States had w ith respect to that region. O f course, the Soviet leaders would have liked inform ation about the W estern pow­ ers’ approach to the term s o f a peaceful settlem ent in Indochina, in particular, theừ view s on the fate o f the “puppet regim es” in Indochina, on elections, and on the future relationship betw een the A ssociated States (V ietnam , Laos, and Cam bodia) and France.46 M oscow needed this inform ation not only to w ork out its posture at the forth­ com ing conference in G eneva but also to form ulate positions for discussions w ith China and the V ietm inh so as to have an agreed position on all issues. The

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Soviets w anted to counterbalance D ulles’s “united action" in Southeast A sia w ith M olotov’s “united front" in Geneva. The Soviets therefore invited Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi M inh to M oscow in early A pril. The Chinese had in fact been talking since the beginning o f M arch about the necessity o f a prelim inary tripartite negotiation. In his conversation w ith M olotov on M arch 6 ,1 9 5 4 , the C hinese am bassador to the Soviet U nion, Zhang W entien, touched upon B eijing’s intention to invite Ho Chỉ M inh to C hina tow ard the end o f the m onth. He also asked the Soviet foreign m inister about the possibility o f a trip to M oscow for Ho Chi M inh “for discussing the positions at the G eneva conference.” M olotov understood the need for such a trip but added that this issue w ould be considered by the CPSU Central Com ­ m ittee.47 A pparently the C entral Com m ittee found it useful to have prelim inary discussions w ith the Soviet allies, and on M arch 31, M olotov inform ed the C hi­ nese am bassador that Zhou Enlai and H o Chi M inh w ere expected to com e to M oscow on A pril 2.48 The first m eeting betw een the Soviets and theừ A sian allies took place on A pril 3. A lthough the records o f the negotiations in M oscow in early A pril are still classified, recom m endations prepared by the Foreign M inistry for one o f M olotov’s conversations w ith Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi M inh are available. D ur­ ing this conversation M olotov was expected to discuss “not only the question o f conditions for ending hostilities in Indochina acceptable to the USSR, the PRC, and the DRV, but also the question o f w hat platform for m aintaining peace in Indochina and com plete settlem ent o f the Indochinese problem should be put forw ard” by the three delegations.49 M oscow decided to advocate the follow ing positions at the G eneva confer­ ence vis-à-vis Indochina’s participation: • Insist on the participation o f the D em ocratic Republic o f V ietnam in the conference; • “[N ]ot to raise objections to the participation o f representatives o f Laos, Cam bodia, and Baodaist V ietnam ” ; • Support the invitation o f “dem ocratic Laos and Cam bodia” to the confer­ ence but “not to m ake theừ participation as a necessary condition.’*30 M oscow conditioned acceptance o f a proposal for an end o f hostilities on the fulfillm ent o f such steps as France’s recognition o f the sovereignty and inde­ pendence o f the DRV and the w ithdraw al o f all French troops from the territory o f V ietnam , Laos, and Cam bodia. A t the sam e tim e M oscow suggested that the DRV recognize econom ic and cultural interests o f France in the region. The So­ viets w ere going to discuss w ith theừ C hinese and V ietnam ese allies the issues o f free all-V ietnam elections and the form ation o f a coalition governm ent.

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T he partition o f V ietnam was the m ost sensitive issue that M oscow raised during negotiations w ith Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi M inh. M oscow’s recom m en­ dations included the follow ing carefully form ulated point: To exchange opinions w ith Ho Chỉ M inh and Zhou Enlai about the position w hich is to be occupied in case a question o f the division o f V ietnam in tw o parts w ill arise at die conference in any form (forexam ple, on the sixteenth parallel). To ask them also w hether it is not expedient, on our part, to w ork out an acceptable version o f such a division o f V ietnam on the condition that all other term s acceptable to the DRV are m et (recognition o f the DRV sovereignty, w ith­ draw al o f French troops, etc.).31 These recom m endations show once again that the Soviet U nion was prepared fo r a com prom ise and regarded partition as the best solution to the Indochina problem . The C hinese shared this view w ith th en northern neighbor. W e do not know H o C hi M inh’s attitude tow ard this suggestion although it can be assum ed that such a solution w ould be unsatisfactory to the V ietnam ese leader whose arm ies w ere w inning on the battlefield. Perhaps he even argued against such a settlem ent. B ut he encountered the firm position o f China, which w as the V ietm inh’s principal supplier for its w ar against the French. M ikhail K apitsa, w ho attended the negotiations in M oscow, w rote later that Zhou Enlai expressed concern about the grow th o f u.s. involvem ent in the con­ flict in Indochina if the w ar w ould continue. “In case the A m ericans did not in­ terfere substantially in developm ents in V ietnam , the People’s Arm y o f the DRV w ill be able to liberate all the northern part o f the country, including H anoi and H aiphong, in the course o f tw o years,” reasoned Zhou Enlai. “However, it is difficult to count on w inning tw o m ore years, since the USA is accelerating its involvem ent” Zhou did not conceal his skepticism about the prospect o f C hina’s open support o f the V ietm inh struggle. “The question arises,” Zhou ar­ gued, “w hether China steps in, if the A m ericans w ill invade the territory o f V iet­ nam. This question troubles the A m ericans, rem ains a m ystery for them . The V ietnam ese com rades believe C hina w ill be able to take part openly in hostili­ ties on the V ietnam ese territory. The C entral Com m ittee o f the Chinese Com ­ m unist Party thinks, how ever, that it is im possible for the Chinese arm y to take part in operations on the territory o f V ietnam , because this counterpoises C hina to other peoples o f Southeast A sia. The U nited States w ould use this participa­ tion for establishing a bloc extended from India to Indonesia.”52 Zhou Enlai re­ peated his argum ents at the next m eeting, adding that on the issue o f C hina’s in­ volvem ent in the w ar in V ietnam there was disagreem ent betw een the Chinese and V ietnam ese com rades. Thus Zhou dem onstrated that the Chinese w ere in­

To Divide or Not to Divide

terested in a peaceful resolution o f the conflict in Southeast A sia, and he ex­ cluded the possibility o f underm ining the process o f negotiations.53 In this situ­ ation Ho Chi M inh obviously had no other choice but to acquiesce to his allies’ point o f view. It is safe to suggest that during the negotiations in early A pril all principal questions relating to the Com m unist position at the forthcom ing conference in G eneva were settled. Tactics w ere to be w orked out later that m onth during ne­ gotiations at the conference w ith the V ietm inh delegation headed by V ice Pre­ m ier Pham Van Dong. M oscow could now com plete w ork, w hich had started in M arch, on the directives to the Soviet delegation. The principal task o f the Soviet delegation at the conference w ould be the agreem ent on an arm istice in Indochina on conditions acceptable to Ho C hi M inh’s governm ent as w ell as the start o f negotiations betw een the DRV and France about further steps aim ed at restoring peace in the region. Y et, w hile “ [m jaintaining and defending at the conference legitim ate interests o f the D em ocratic Republic o f Vietnam , the Soviet delegation should at the sam e tim e pursue the objective o f strengthening Soviet relations w ith France.”54 D irectives envisaged three possible positions fo r the Soviets at the confer­ ence, the first o f w hich w as labeled, in the B olshevist tradition, the m axim um program . M oscow ’s m axim al dem ands included the w ithdraw al o f French troops from the territory o f V ietnam and recognition o f the sovereignty and in­ dependence o f the DRV. This position carried w ith it the im plication that the w hole o f V ietnam w ould be under the rule o f the V ietm inh. M oscow ’s second position w as based on the principle o f partition. The Soviets w ere prepared to agree on the w ithdraw al o f French troops from the “territory north o f the six­ teenth parallel” w ith a subsequent w ithdraw al from South V ietnam during the agreed period. A fter French w ithdraw al there should be a referendum in the South about unification o f the country. If this position w as found unacceptable to the W estern countries and their allies, the Soviets had a fallback third posi­ tion that envisaged a cessation o f hostilities on the condition o f French troops regrouping at specially determ ined points in V ietnam and subsequent direct negotiations betw een France and the V ietm inh about term s fo r the restoration o f peace in Indochina. A ll three positions included points about the establish­ m ent o f jo in t supervisory com m issions, recognition by the DRV o f the eco­ nom ic and cultural interests o f France, and the end o f u.s. involvem ent in In­ dochina.55 A lthough the second position seem s to have been m ost attractive to Soviet policym akers, M oscow possessed inform ation that the Eisenhow er adm inistra­ tion was against any settlem ent in Indochina based on recognition o f the Dem o­ cratic Republic o f V ietnam .56 The Krem lin, how ever, nourished hopes that it

T o Divide or Not to Divide

w ould be possible to use disagreem ents betw een die U nited States, on the one hand, and B ritain and France, (HI the other, to reach a favorable solution. For this, the B ritish position showed die m ost prom ise. Throughout the period after the B erlin conference, London firm ly and con­ sistently spoke in defense o f a peaceful solution to the Indochina problem . The B ritish foreign m inister, A nthony Eden, had played an im portant—perhaps even crucial—role in facilitating the agreem ent on a m eeting at G eneva. His position reflected the C hurchill governm ent’s general policy, w hich was based on the ne­ cessity o f negotiations w ith Com m unist countries. A fter B erlin, in M arch and A pril o f 1954, the B ritish resisted u.s. pressure for m ilitary action in Southeast A sia. They occupied a cautious position w ith respect to u.s. plans for a bloc in Southeast A sia because they feared that such plans would underm ine any posi­ tive results obtained at the G eneva conference. Eden and other B ritish diplom ats pondered possible ways to resolve the In­ dochina conflict peacefully. The B ritish em phasized geopolitical considera­ tions. They “w anted a settlem ent in Indochina that w ould provide a non-Com m unist buffer zone north o f M alaya, where B ritish w ere already involved in fighting a C om m unist-led insurrection. They also w anted guarantees fo r Laos, C am bodia, and Thailand, w hich, together w ith a buffer state in southern V iet­ nam , w ould form a Southeast A sian cordon sanitaire for the Com m onw ealth na­ tions o f Burm a, India, and M alaya.”57 Partition w as therefore the m ost accept­ able solution to the Indochina problem for London as well. Eden began to think about such a solution in early 1954.58 It is not surpris­ ing that Foreign O ffice bureaucrats soon included this option in th eừ recom ­ m endations fo r the G eneva conference. Soviet hints in favor o f partition only stim ulated this process. In early M arch John Tahourdin, head o f the Southeast A sia D epartm ent at the Foreign O ffice, inform ed the B ritish am bassador to Saigon, H ubert G raves, that his departm ent w as endeavoring to consider var­ ious settlem ent options that could be put forw ard before G eneva. Tahourdin referred to the inform ation received from the C hinese and the Soviets and con­ cluded that although the Foreign O ffice had thus far considered a cease-fire pending negotiations and a settlem ent based on the V ietm inh’s adm ission to a coalition governm ent, the tim e had com e to consider a third option, that is, partition. This option, how ever, involved m any questions that needed to be an­ sw ered before partition was accepted as the solution to the Indochina problem . A lthough it w as necessary to find a form o f partition that w as acceptable to both the French and the V ietnam ese, the Foreign O ffice w as m ore preoccupied w ith the problem o f “how a solution in Indo-C hina based on partition w ould affect Siam and B urm a and our ow n position and that o f A m ericans in SouthE ast A sia.”59

T o Divide or N ot to Divide

A fter w eighing all other choices, the Foreign O ffice Southeast A sia D epart­ m ent reported to Eden in A pril that there m ight be no favorable solution to die Indochina problem and the m ost the B ritish could strive fo r was the adoption o f the least disadvantageous course. In this tight the departm ent had concluded that “a solution based on the partition o f V ietnam and the safeguarding o f the inde­ pendence o f Laos and C am bodia m ight be best as ã pis otter.’*0 Therefore, M oscow could expect that at the conference the B ritish w ould not oppose Soviet efforts aim ed at reaching die settlem ent o f the Indochina problem based on partition. If so, the chances o f a favorable outcom e from the G eneva conference seem ed good. O f the nine probable participants o f the conference, at least three—the Soviet U nion, C hina, and G reat B ritain—regarded partition the least undesirable o f all options. France was not against such a solution on the sam e grounds. The V ietm inh had no choice other than to agree w ith its pow erfill allies w hile it hoped for unification o f V ietnam after elections. Laos and C am bodia were not counted as countries that could resist the division o f V iet­ nam if the conference guaranteed theử independence and sovereignty w hile it applied pressure on the V ietm inh to w ithdraw its arm ed units from those coun­ tries’ territory. A s a result, only the U nited States and the V ietnam ese govern­ m ent o f Bao Dai m ight oppose partition and, therefore, jeopardize the process o f peaceful settlem ent. The u.s. position had evolved during A pril. A t the beginning o f the m onth, in a conversation w ith the B ritish am bassador in W ashington, S ừ Roger M altins, U nder Secretary o f State w. Bedell Sm ith dism issed partition as an idea the U nited States had already exam ined and rejected,61 but on die eve o f the confer­ ence W ashington indicated that the division o f Vietnam m ight be acceptable.62 In the m eantim e, in M oscow the Foreign M inistry w as com piling lists o f m em bers o f the Soviet delegation, arranging lodging in G eneva, and establish­ ing com m unications betw een G eneva and the Soviet capital. The USSR delega­ tion o f about 200 persons included V yacheslav M olotov, head o f the delegation; his deputies V asilii K uznetzov and Andrei Grom yko; Sergei V inogradov, the Soviet am bassador in France; K irill N ovikov, the head o f the Southeast A sia De­ partm ent; and A lexander Lavrishchev, the future first Soviet am bassador to the Dem ocratic Republic o f Vietnam . In addition to diplom ats and Foreign M inistry officials, the delegation included people from the M inistry o f D efense and the KGB.63 T he delegation w as headquartered at the H otel M etropol although M olotov occupied the V illa Blanche w ith its vast, pretentious arm chairs and garish decoration.64 M oscow had also taken care to guarantee good press coverage o f Soviet ac­ tivities in G eneva. Eighteen correspondents o f the m ain Soviet new spapers and

T o Divide or Not to Divide

radio stations w o e sent to G eneva to follow every tw ist and turn during the course o f the conference and to uphold the Soviet people’s vigilance against “in­ trigues o f Am erican im perialists.“69 Among the journalists w as Yuri Zhukov, a correspondent o f Pravda who, then and later, som etim es assum ed responsibili­ ties o f an unofficial m essenger to W estern diplom ats. The K rem lin had to think about its allies as w ell. The prim ary Soviet concern w as the C hinese. M oscow arranged for an aircraft to bring the PRC delegation to G eneva and for a car—a Z is-110—for Zhou Enlai and a driver for that car. In response to a C hinese request, Soviet security personnel searched the villa G rand M ont-Fleuri w here Zhou Enlai was going to stay, in an attem pt to dis­ cover eavesdropping devices; Soviets w ere also involved in checking food pre­ pared for the Chinese prem ier.66 W ith th en V ietnam ese allies, tile Soviet Foreign M inistry officials finalized tile last details o f die coordinated tactics for the conference.67 The Soviets and the V ietnam ese discussed such issues as possible term s o f a settlem ent o f the conflict, the V ietm inh’s declarations at tile conference, the com position o f the DRV delegation, and prospects for participation in the conference by represen­ tatives o f insurgent m ovem ents in Laos and Cam bodia.68 Pham Van D ong, who headed the DRV delegation, asked his Soviet colleagues to think over questions such as an arm istice in V ietnam , DRV m em bership in the French U nion, France’s econom ic and cultural interests in V ietnam , and the w ithdraw al o f French troops from Indochina. He pointed out that tile V ietnam ese w ould like to consult w ith tile Soviets about these issues so as “to avoid m istakes and devia­ tions from the agreed course” in G eneva.69 For the V ietm inh, the best solution to the Indochina conflict was the com plete w ithdraw al o f the French troops and im m ediate elections in V ietnam , w hich w ould certainly have brought victory to the Com m unists and theứ allies among die nationalists. As a result, Ho Chỉ M inh w ould be able to m aintain his author­ ity over the whole o f Vietnam . But it was clear to the Soviets, who had retained w ithdraw al as part o f their m axim um program , as w ell as to the C hinese that the W est, especially the U nited States, w ould hardly agree to such a conference out­ com e. It w as therefore necessary to find a com prom ise acceptable to each party in the conflict and to th en allies or, as President Eisenhow er put it, to find a m id­ dle course betw een the unattainable and the unacceptable. M oscow saw the m id­ dle course as the partition o f Vietnam ; B eijing and London agreed. Paris acqui­ esced. W ashington grudgingly conceded to partition. A ll that rem ained was to w ork out form s o f a com prom ise and guarantee the result against possible vio­ lations. This becam e the task o f the conference that opened on A pril 26,1954, at the Palais des N ations in Geneva.

3. Making Peace at Geneva The prim ary task that is laid upon the parties to a peace conference ừ to make peace, and to make it quickly, even a t the price o f not making it well. A. J . Toynbee1

G e n e v a is w ell suited for a peace conference. As the site o f the League o f N a­ tions, this city represents the spirit o f com prom ise and peaceful intentions. “W ho could rem ain unaffected by this pervasive clim ate o f tolerance, by the calm that seem ed to soften the very air?" exclaim ed chroniclers o f the 1954 con­ ference.2 For som e paiticipants, how ever, G eneva w as a controversial sym bol. The U nited States was inclined to associate it w ith appeasem ent before the Second W orld W ar. The Soviets rem em bered theừ failure to create a collective security system in Europe and theừ expulsion from the League o f N ations. It would not be surprising if both the u.s. secretary o f state and the Soviet foreign m inister cam e to G eneva full o f determ ination to prevent a repetition o f his country’s ex­ perience. The first delegations arrived in G eneva on April 24,1954. Pravda correspon­ dents reported that it was particularly crow ded at the airport that day. “[R]epresentatives o f Sw iss authorities, journalists, cam eram en, photo correspondents were w aiting for the delegations o f the three great powers, the USSR, the USA, and the People’s Republic o f China.”3 The Chinese and Soviet delegations cam e in succession. Zhou Enlai’s plane landed first at 3:30 in the afternoon. Vyach­ eslav M olotov, the Soviet foreign m inister, arrived two hours later, but his arrival was quiet com pared with the arrival o f his Chinese counterpart Everybody at the airport was anxious to see the Chinese foreign m inister and M ao Zedong’s righthand man, the legendary Zhou.4 The U.S. secretary o f state, John Foster D ulles, arrived that evening and received less attention than his Com m unist rivals.

Making Peace at Geneva

H ie heads o f delegations made theữ statements at the airfield. M olotov, as al­ ways, read words prepared and approved in M oscow. He noted that for the first tim e since W orld W ar n all the great powers would take part in an international conference, and he mentioned all o f them by name, starting with France. The So­ viet foreign m inister pointed out that his delegation regarded as “the most impor­ tant task o f the Geneva conference” the restoration, as soon as possible, o f peace in Indochina. He expressed his conviction that conference participants should w ant to lessen international tension and strengthen peace in the world. If this hap­ pens, M olotov stressed, the conference “w ill achieve its positive results.”3 The conference opened on M onday, A pril 26, w ith a discussion o f how to end the Korean W ar. W hile undoubtedly im portant, this question w as not the main concern o f the Big Five, and at the conclusion o f the conference M olotov con­ fided to Eden: “on the Korean question from the very beginning he [M olotov] did not hope for m uch."6 M olotov’s counterparts seem ed to share this opinion, particularly the French, w hose m ain preoccupation w as not K orea but In­ dochina. As a result, w hile the participants in the Korean phase o f the confer­ ence exchanged diatribes, others made an effort to resolve issues concerning In­ dochina. M ost im portant was the issue o f the com position o f the conference. The Com­ m unist side long before had m ade it clear that the V ietm inh’s participation was indispensable to its success. The French objected, referring to Bao D ai’s oppo­ sition and to the fact that it was im possible to negotiate w ith an adversary w hile hostilities continue. Foreign M inister G eorges B idault o f France put forw ard these argum ents during his conversation w ith M olotov on A pril 27. B idault sug­ gested, instead, that participants should include the five great pow ers and the three A ssociated States— the French-supported regim es in Vietnam , Laos, and Cam bodia.7 M olotov was not against the participation o f the A ssociated States, but he rem ained adam ant about inviting the Vietm inh to the conference. M olo­ tov stated that “he could not im agine how it is possible to discuss the issue o f the restoration o f peace in Indochina if the participation o f the directly interested sides is not expected.”8 The Soviet foreign m inister repeated this argum ent to B idault at least tw ice. B idault reported on his exchange w ith M olotov to D ulles and Eden the same day. They concluded that “it opened distinct possibilities for negotiation.”9 The W estern m inisters were encouraged that M olotov, w hile insisting on the V ietm inh’s participation, did not m ention the Com m unist “governm ents” o f Laos and Cam bodia, and he had agreed to lim iting the conference to as sm all a num ­ ber o f pow ers as possible. The only difference was w hether the num ber would be eight (the Big Five plus the three A ssociated States) or nine (those eight countries plus the V ietm inh).

M aking Peace at Geneva

Eden reported that D ulles “strongly urged M. B idault to agree to die partici­ pation o f V ietm inh.” Eden advised his French colleague to dem and a price for w hat he considered a concession to the Soviets and, in exchange, settle the prob­ lem o f the evacuation o f the w ounded from D ienbienphu. “M . B idault,“ Eden reported, “seem ed m uch attracted by this idea.“ 10 B ut Eden’s advice turned out to be counterproductive. W hen B idault next spoke w ith the Soviet foreign m inister, he touched on this subject by saying that it w as very difficult for the French governm ent to agree on the participation o f the V ietm inh because the V ietm inh did not consent to the evacuation o f the w ounded. M olotov im m ediately interpreted B idault’s com m ent as prelim inary conditions, and he discarded B idault’s argum ents that the V ietm inh was not the state, w hich B idault had raised because the B erlin com m uniqué had stated that only states could take part in the conference. M olotov accused B idault o f creat­ ing artificial obstacles “aim ed at the postponem ent o f the opening o f the confer­ ence on the question o f the restoration o f peace in Indochina.” 11 For D ulles the issue o f the com position o f the conference appeared to be o f secondary im portance. Since he had agreed on the participation o f Com m unist China, the invitation to the Vietm inh m attered little to him . Furtherm ore, Dulles m ight have understood M olotov’s logic that it was im possible to negotiate about peace and the wounded w ithout the opposing party.12 D ulles was m ore interested in Soviet views on how to resolve the Indochina problem , and he used M olotov’s visit to him on A pril 27 to question the Soviet foreign m inister about this. D ulles opened the conversation on Indochina by expressing his fear that the Indochina conflict could be the beginning o f a chain o f events w ith far-reaching consequences. H e said that developm ents since the B erlin conference had not al­ layed his concern. D ulles concluded his introductory rem arks w ith the hint that although he him self did not see any solution to this problem , M olotov m ight have had som e in m ind.13 In response, M olotov assured his u.s. counterpart that “no country, including the faraw ay Soviet U nion, w ished enlargem ent o f In­ dochinese war” and added, apparently referring to u.s. efforts to aid France and to form a m ilitary alliance in Southeast A sia, that “a great deal depends on U nited States policy.’’14 D ulles deliberately ignored the hint. Instead, after dis­ cussing the issue o f the com position o f the conference on Indochina, he again pressed M olotov to reveal his view s on a possible solution to the conflict. H e even suggested continuing the discussion o f this subject at a later m eeting. But, to D ulles’s disappointm ent, the Soviet foreign m inister rem ained evasive. “A f­ ter some inconclusive discussion o f subject,” D ulles reported to W ashington, “M olotov took his leave having failed to rise any o f the flies I had cast.’’13 W hy w as M olotov silent about a settlem ent o f the Indochina question? D ulles suspected (and it was probably true) that the Soviet delegate had com e to find

M aking Peace at Geneva

o u t the suggestions the A m ericans w ere prepared to m ake concerning In­ dochina. A nother reason for M olotov’s reticence m ight have been his unw ill­ ingness to deprive the Com m unist side o f room for m aneuver by laying out thefr cards before the actual play had even started. M olotov's prim ary goal at this stage w as to obtain the W estern pow ers’ consent to the participation o f the VỈetm inh in the conference. O nly after both sides o f the conflict had occupied theữ places at the negotiating table w ould it be possible to discuss further steps to­ w ard the settlem ent. The firm position o f the Soviets on the issue o f the V ietm inh's participation bore quick results. As early as A pril 29, D ouglas D illon, the u .s. am bassador to France, reported to his superiors that Bao D ai, the form er V ietnam ese em peror w ho at that tim e occupied the position o f the chief o f state ofV ietnam , “received argum ents that V iet M inh be present at G eneva w ith less objection than had been feared.'*16 M arc Jacquet, the French m inister responsible for relations w ith die A ssociated States in the Laniel cabinet, w as sent to Bao D ai’s residence in Cannes and used strong language to convince him that no other solution w ould be in the interest o f his governm ent Three days later, the V ietnam ese foreign m inister, Nguyen Quoc D inh, inform ed D ulles o f Bao D ai’s final agreem ent to his representatives’ participation in the conference as w ell as to the V ietm inh’s invitation to G eneva.17 Jean C hauvel, a m em ber o f the French delegation and France’s am bassador in Sw itzerland, advised Andrei Grom yko o f Bao D ai’s de­ cision on the day it was m ade. It w as agreed that the Soviets w ould invite the V ietm inh and die French w ould invite die governm ents o f the three A ssociated States to attend the conference.18 On M ay 4, the delegation from N orth V ietnam headed by Pham Van Dong arrived in Geneva. As soon as the problem o f conference participation had been resolved, the great pow ers turned to the question o f the chairm anship. A t the m eeting o f the heads o f the W estern delegations that took place at B idault’s residence, villa Joli-Port in V ersoix, on M ay 1, it was agreed that B idault w ould suggest to M olotov that the rotation o f the three chairm en o f the Korean phase o f the con­ ference— M olotov, Eden, and Prince W an W aithayakon o f Thailand—should be continued. If the Soviets refused, the three W estern foreign m inisters decided to suggest a single chairm an. Prince W an.19 The Soviets w ere not satisfied w ith this W estern proposal, how ever. On M ay 5, in a conversation w ith C hauvel, Grom yko proposed instead a rotation am ong die five (or four, since France was a participant in the fighting).20 This sugges­ tion w as absolutely unacceptable to the U nited States because o f its opposition to the PRC, but the latter proposal was obviously designed by the Soviets as a bargaining chip only, since they had already decided who should preside at the sessions devoted to Indochina. The sam e day that G rom yko conversed w ith

M aking Peace at Geneva

C hauvel, M olotov dined w ith Eden. T heừ conversation o f course turned to the problem o f the chairm anship. UM. M olotov,” Eden reported to London, “at once suggested that he and I should alternate.” In response to Eden’s reference to the French and Ư.S. opposition to this arrangem ent, the Soviet foreign m inister said that the only alternative would be for the head o f each delegation to preside in turn, w hich was clearly im practicable. In his attem pt to persuade his counter­ part, M olotov throughout the evening “seem ed to be developing the them e that the success o f this conference largely depended upon him and m e, and it w as o ur ta sk to bring in h is case the C hinese, a n d in m ine the A m ericans, into lin e," Eden telegraphed the Foreign Office.^* M olotov’s im plicit referencelo C hina’s possible intransigence during the ne­ gotiations seem s strange since the Soviets had had preliminary discussions w ith Zhou Enlai in M oscow and had apparently w orked out a common position on this issue w ell before Geneva. During the conference M olotov often hinted at C hina’s m ore rigid attitude. These hints w ere interpreted by diplom ats and jour­ nalists and later by scholars as proof o f serious disagreem ents betw een the So­ viets and the Chinese.22 The Soviets successfully created an image o f the in­ transigent C hinese com pared to the flexible Soviets and convinced the W esterners that they had no option except to com e to an agreem ent w ith the Soviets. O therw ise they risked an encounter with the uncom prom ising stance o f the Chinese. C hina’s im plied intransigence did not prevent M olotov from prom oting his A sian ally’s interests; M olotov played the role o f a lady who introduces her young provincial protégé to high society. D ulles reported to W ashington that at the luncheon on A pril 30, to w hich M olotov had invited both Eden and Zhou Enlai, the “host raised no question o f substance but seem ed interested rather in en­ couraging cordiality betw een his guests.”23 Eden found Zhou “inaccessible and rough, hard, cold and bitterly anti-A m erican.”24 Zhou’s behavior notw ithstand­ ing, this encounter led to other m eetings during w hich many problem s o f SinoB ritish relations w ere settled. The A m ericans disapproved o f the overtures thefr allies m ade tow ard the C hi­ nese. Such a rapprochem ent w ith the Com m unist regim e in China contrasted to the m ultiple disagreem ents betw een D ulles and Eden at the conference. D ulles was so annoyed w ith the B ritish foreign secretary’s behavior (for exam ple, Eden’s silence in the face o f Russian and Chinese attacks on Ư.S. policy in Ko­ rea) that he alm ost lost control o f him self when he expressed his disappointm ent in a conversation with Eden. He even w arned his B ritish colleague that the “con­ sequences could be disastrous for the close Ư.S.-U.K. relations he wanted to m aintain.”25 But the Ư.S. secretary o f state was not able to stop the processes initiated at the conference. B itterly disappointed, D ulles left G eneva on M ay 3

Making Peace at Geneva

after he had assigned the duty o f negotiating the peace in Indochina to U nder Secretary o f State W alter Bedell Sm ith. The situation on the battlefields o f Indochina had m eanw hile becom e desper­ ate for the French. Starting on M arch 30 and throughout A pril, the V ietm inh’s fierce attacks against the French fortress at D ienbienphu continued day after day and night after n ig h t Soon the territory controlled by tile French was reduced to a circle w ith a diam eter o f a little m ore than one kilom eter. W ith the capture by the V ietm inh o f the northern part o f the airport, it becam e alm ost im possible for the French to support the defenders w ith parachuted supplies.26 On the evening (HI M ay 1, the Com m unist troops o f G eneral V o Nguyen G iap launched theữ final offensive. On M ay 6, a violent and m assive V ietm inh attack supported by heavy artillery fire resulted in the French capitulation the next day. O n M ay 8, the new s o f the French loss arrived in G eneva ju st as the Indochina convened for its first session. For the Communist dele­ gates it was ‘‘literally a m iracle,” N ikita Khrushchev rem em bered .21 It was a m iracle because the fall o f D ienbienphu suddenly changed the overall context o f the negotiations. The A m ericans tried to convince theứ French allies it was not a m ilitary disaster,28 yet the loss o f the fortress created a heavy psychologi­ cal effect in France and was perceived negatively by French public opinion. M ore than that, it dem onstrated the futility o f French efforts to achieve victory over the V ietm inh on the battlefield. N egotiations appeared to b e the only solu­ tion. The u.s. president w as correct, how ever, w hen he said that the French had in­ flicted “great losses on the enem y.” The Com m unist forces w ere alm ost ex­ hausted as a result o f thetf victory at Dienbienphu. Ho Chi M inh m ade it clear in early A pril during the negotiations w ith his Soviet and C hinese allies in M oscow that the V ietm inh had m obilized all theừ resources in order to win the battle at D ienbienphu, and they could not sustain the continuation o f another m ilitary operation o f a sim ilar scale. The V ietnam ese leader even pondered the possibility o f a retreat to the Chinese border in case o f failure at D ienbienphu.29 The fall o f D ienbienphu confirm ed to the V ietnam ese Com m unists that they needed a respite. A t a m eeting o f the Soviet, C hinese, and V ietnam ese m ilitary experts in G eneva, the V ietnam ese representative. Ha Van LauTponiUtd out tin t the DRV was interested in ending Ifflfitil«»"»« hgranse. first, ‘‘the Government policy fisl to m aintain peace and, second, a breathing-space is necessary for the arm y and the country and it is iy »/v»ccary in u sa n present favorable political and m ilitary situation for concluding an advantageous agreem ent on the settlem ent o f the Indochina question.”30 ~ M oscow was eager to jum p at the opportunity and prom ote negotiations when both sides w ere exhausted and 5trt ViniTlor peace. The Soviets could count o n th e

M aking Peace at Geneva

support o f the B ritish delegation and its head, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. M eetings betw een representatives o f the tw o delegations on the eve o f the In­ dochina phase o f the conference showed that, as before, both delegations were inclined to consider partition as the m ost acceptable so lu tio n /1 Scenarios w orked out in M oscow had prepared the Soviets for m uch bar­ gaining. These scenarios left die initiative for putting forw ard proposals to die V ietnam ese and the Chinese delegations, thus allow ing the Soviets to play the role o f arbiter.32 It is not surprising, therefore, that M olotov postponed his con­ ference address until after Pham Van Dong and Zhou Enlai had had an oppor­ tunity to speak. M olotov w aited to speak until M ay 14, at die fourth plenary session. I b e ma­ jo r part o f his speech contained standard Soviet accusations about France and the U nited States w aging a colonial w ar in Indochina, and he criticized the French proposals for not dealing w ith political problem s. A t die sam e tim e, M olotov accepted the French proposal about the conference guaranteeing the eventual settlem ent and suggested the establishm ent o f a supervisory com m ission com posed o f neutral countries?3 ------------- m e nrsfdâys ơf the Ihdõcĩunấconference thus set a pattern o f Soviet negoti­ ating behavior. In theừ public declarations at plenary and at restricted sessions beginning on M ay 17, M oH ^v and h it d fp n ti^ consistently supported their V ietnam ese allies who put fo rward maxim al dem ands concerning various as­ pects o f the settlem ent o f the conflict The Soviets com bined these expressions ofsupporT w ith denunciations Õ? the intransigence o f the W estern pow ers and theừ aggressive designs in Indochina. A t the same tim e, Soviet diplom ats form ulated their own proposals th a t though close to the position of thfi took into account the interests o f the W esterners and thus created a basis for a com prom ise. In private conversations w ith mem bers o f the French, B ritish, and u.s. delegations, the Soviets m ade further attem pts to persuade theừ counter­ parts o f the soundness o f th en proposals w hile they tried to find out w hat the W estern delegations w ere ready to suggest. M any tim es during the conference M olotov left this task to Zhou Enlai who, through his exchanges w ith the B ritish and the French, was eager to play a role o f m ediator betw een the w arring par­ ties. It w ould be an oversim plification to state that then* Wf"* among the Com m unists. But disagreem ents were being nvprram e during consultations am ong the three delegations at various Jevels. And soon after the opening o f the negotiations on Indochina, M olotov suggested arranging discus­ sions am ong the m ilitary experts o f China, the Soviet U nion, and the DRV in ad­ dition to the m eetings o f the diplom ats.34

M aking Peace a t Geneva

Soviet tactics soon brought positive results. A fter early prolonged and heated debates, the participants agreed on such issues as the evacuation o f the w ounded from D ienbienphu; tile separation o f the political and m ilitary questions, w ith priority given to the latter, and the beginning o f m ilitary staff talks to study con­ ditions fo r a cease-fire. A ll this was presented by the Soviet press as the “first success on tile way to the restoration o f peace in Indochina/*35 M olotov, partic­ ularly in private conversations during this period, played the role o f a detached â n < r Vế»- npgr^iafnr w h o w aseager to find a solutioiT tcTtKe mîmSTproblems so that negotiators CffllIH a p p ro a ch thế» principal ones as snnq as possible. W al­ ter Bedell Sm ith, who replaced Dulles as the head o f the u.s. delegation, after a m eeting w ith his Soviet colleague, observed that “it was as though he [M olo­ tov] w ere looking at the w hole situation through a m agnifying glass and ana­ lyzing its various aspects/*36 The situation changed in early June when the Soviet foreign m inister returned to Geneva from M oscow where he had spenTa few days. His position b ecame m ore rigid and uncom prom ising com pared w ith his previous attitude. A t the ple­ nary session on June 8, in his address to the conference, M olotov proposed that the conference participants exam ine political problem s and suggested that they consider m ilitary and political questions on alternate days.37 Zhou Enlai and Pham Van D ong supported this proposal, which altered the M ay agreem ent that priority be given to a m ilitary solution. The Soviet delegation also stalled on the issue o f the com position and com ­ petence o f an international com m ission w hose task was the supervision o f an arm istice in Indochina. A t a restricted session on M ay 31, M olotov’s deputy, A ndrei Grom yko, suggested that the com m ission be com posed o f officials from Poland, C zechoslovakia, India, and Pakistan.-** The W estern delegates ques­ tioned the ability o f such a com m ission, to perform its functions effectively on the grounds that socialist countries could not be regarded as truly neutral. A dis­ cussion about the m eaning o f neutrality ensued D elegates also disagreed about the relationship betw een the international com m ission and jo in t com m issions com posed o f representatives o f the belligerents. D eadlock was evident as w ell in the negotiations concerning Laos and Cam bodia.39 W hy had the Soviet position changed? W as M oscow dissatisfied w ith the concessions m ade by M olotov in M ay? D id M olotov have new instructions from the K rem lin to defend m ore vigorously the interests o f the V ietnam ese friends? O r was it only a tactical m aneuver to probe the positions o f the W est­ ern pow ers and to dem onstrate to the Soviet allies that M oscow supported theừ interests above all else? C ould M oscow have wanted to influence the outcom e o f debates in the French N ational Assem bly that started on June 1?

M aking Peace at Geneva

In any case, when M olotov m et w ith B idault on the eve o f his uncom prom is­ ing June 8 speech, he was reasonable and polite. M ost o f theừ conversation was devoted to the com position o f an international supervisory com m ission. M olo­ tov listened w hile B idault explained why France could not agree on the compo­ sition proposed by Gromyko: the character o f Soviet relations w ith Poland and C zechoslovakia was different from relations France had w ith Pakistan and, es­ pecially, India, w hich Paris did not regard as a truly neutral country because o f existing problem s in bilateral relations. N evertheless, B idault was not opposed to India’s m em bership in the international com m ission. In response, M olotov d id n o t exclude other candidates from the com m ission: he added that, wHîIë'considering the com position o f ti& pppunission, it was. necessary to tg k fijn ta ac­ count the existence o f its m em bers^political relations w ith both warring Pflftiftg. TcTSubsUiiitiHte lil^UCSfre to resolve this problem , M olotov stressed that the So­ viet delegation was eager to facilitate the settlem ent o f the conflict and it was “not going to give up in searching for appropriate ways to this end.”40 He as­ sured B idault that there was a basis for a solution o f the issue although such a solution m ight not be ideal. M olotov was likew ise in good hum or when he m et the sam e day w ith W alter B edell Sm ith. Again touching on the issue o f the m em bership o f the supervisory com m ission, he adm itted that he was ready to reexam ine Czechoslovakia and Poland as candidates. Yet he stated openly that “he could not agree to any mem­ bership not on 50-50 basis, that is 50% Com m unist and 50% non-C om m unist” He also underlined that at least two o f the mem bers o f the com m ission w ere re­ quired to have diplom atic relations w ith the DRV. “He was absolutely adam ant on this Question.”41 ■ M olotov, contrary to expectation, did not becom e angry over Sm ith’s w arn­ ing about a possible u.s. intervention in case the V ietm inh had “too great ap­ petites” and “over-reached them selves.” He also did not react to the u.s. diplo­ m at’s hint that bordered on the threat that if the question o f the com position o f the com m ission could not be resolved, “there were great risks inherent in the sit­ uation in Southeast A sia.” M olotov rem ained unim pressed even by Sm ith’s fi­ nal rem ark to the effect that it was futile to try to reach agreem ent w ith the Com­ m unists on anything else when even such a m atter as the com position o f the supervisory com m ission could not be settled.42 The Soviet foreign m inister’s flexible behavior during conversations w ith B idault and Sm ith m ade his uncom prom ising address on June 8 inexplicable. But tw o days later, on June 10, four m ilitary experts— tw o from the French del­ egation, Colonel de Brébisson and General D elteil, and tw o from the V ietm inh delegation, Ha Van Lau and Ta Quang Buu— m et secretly betw een 10:00 p.m . and m idnight on the outskirts o f G eneva in an isolated villa that had been hastily

Making Peace at Geneva

rented for the purpose.43 The V ietnam ese openly dem anded a northern part o f V ietnam w here the V ietm inh w ould establish theừ own state. W hen the seem­ ingly astounded French delegates asked w hether the V ietm inh delegates agreed to splitting the country, Buu adm itted that it w ould be only a tem porary partition that w ould come to an end as a result o f all-V ietnam elections.44 The proposals made at this late-night m eeting represented a significant step forw ard from Pham V an D ong’s position on M ay 25, w hen he agreed to re­ grouping regular m ilitary forces into zones established by the conference, thus tacitly accepting a tem porary de facto partition.45 The Soviets and the Chinese not only knew about the secret m eeting betw een the French and the V ietm inh delegates, they had been closely involved in its preparation, w hich had been concentrated in the hands o f m ilitary advisers and experts o f the three delega­ tions w ho, at M olotov’s initiative, got together for regular m eetings soon after the opening o f the Indochina phase o f the G eneva conference. The aim o f these m eetings w as to w ork out recom m endations fo r the Com m unist delegations concerning form s o f the settlem ent. For exam ple, during the m eeting on M ay 19, the m ilitary experts discussed the situation in V ietnam and the zones for re­ grouping troops. H a Van Lau, w ho represented the DRV delegation, inform ed his colleagues that the V ietm inh occupied the m ost secure positions in the N orth o f V ietnam . In the South the situation was quite opposite, w ith C entral Vietnam being betw een these tw o extrem es. The V ietnam ese delegate w ent on to present three alternatives for troop regroupm ent. He alm ost repeated the previous opin­ ion o f the DRV governm ent, w hich had rejected the idea o f a division o f V iet­ nam along any parallel as “politically disadvantageous” and instead supported regroupm ent on the basis o f the situation in the country after the fall o f D ienbienphu.46 The Chinese experts o f course regarded this plan w ithout enthusiasm . A t the m eeting o f M ay 27, a C hinese representative put forw ard argum ents in support o f partition. He suggested a division o f V ietnam along the fourteenth, fifteenth, o r sixteenth parallel and argued, paradoxically, that partition w ould m ake it pos­ sible to create a “political and econom ic unity o f the country.“47 The Soviets played the role o f arbiters in this dispute and, at a m eeting that took place on M ay 28, they observed that there were, in fact, tw o plans for re­ groupm ent, the V ietnam ese plan and the Chinese plan. Because the V ietm inh experts w ere ready to consider the Chinese proposal, the Soviets suggested that the tw o delegations m eet and discuss theữ points o f view because they w ere very fam iliar w ith the situation, “f t you need our help,” assured the Soviet com­ rades, “w e w ill render it w ith pleasure.”48 The C hinese readily agreed and prom ised they w ould be able to bring the positions o f the tw o delegations closer together.

M aking Peace at Geneva

W e do not yet know w hat m ethods die Chinese used to persuade theừ V iet­ nam ese friends that the partition o f V ietnam was the best solution to the In­ dochina problem . B ut at a m ilitary e x p a ts m eeting on June 9, on die eve o f die secret gathering at the villa, Pham V an D ong discussed a scenario based on die idea o f partition. Tw o Soviet m ilitary advisers, F. A. Fedenko and N. p. Tzygichko, recom m ended that the V ietm inh representatives talk w ith the French and open theứ situation m ap and put forw ard proposals about zones o f regroup­ m en t “W ith all lucidity it is necessary to raise the issue o f the liberation o f the Red R iver D elta,” dictated die Soviet experts, “by m otivating this that die D elta is connected w ith the rem aining part o f N orth V ietnam econom ically and polit­ ically and that it could not be isolated from this territory.”49 Thus, not only did the Soviets know about secret discussions betw een the m ilitary representatives o f France and die V ietm inh, they, in cooperation w ith theừ Chinese allies, had prepared “the m ost productive stage o f the G eneva conference.”50 To m ake the W estern delegations recognize fully the significance o f die con­ cession m ade by the V ietm inh on the issue o f partition and, at die sam e tim e, to create a sm okescreen around the relationship o f the Com m unist delegations so that suspicions w ere not raised about pressure exerted on the DRV delegation, Com m unist delegations m ight w ell have decided to accom pany this im portant leap forw ard w ith diatribes by M olotov and Zhou Enlai on June 8 and 9. A t the sam e tim e, the revival o f the proposal to discuss political as w ell as m ilitary is­ sues w as probably designed to placate the V ietnam ese Com m unists who had agreed on partition w ith the hope that eventual all-V ietnam elections w ould put an end to the division o f theữ country. If this was an intention o f the Soviet and Chinese delegates, it was success­ ful. A depressed and dow ncast m ood had reigned at the conference since the ple­ nary sessions o f June 8 and 9, when even Eden, w ho was alw ays striving for a com prom ise, experienced a failure o f nerve and concluded that an agreem ent at G eneva was m ost unlikely.51 However, a light at the end o f this tunnel suddenly glim m ered once again. That the new proposals had been m ade by the V ietm inh delegation becam e public very soon thanks to Edouard Frédéric-D upont, the French m inister re­ sponsible for the A ssociated States w ho tried to prevent the fall o f the Laniel governm ent by presenting to the N ational Assem bly in France the new s about favorable developm ents in Geneva.52 A lthough he failed and tile Laniel gov­ ernm ent fell on June 12, his inform ation indicated that the Com m unists did not w ant the conference to break dow n and w ere ready to take steps to prevent its collapse. Soviet jo u rn alist Y uri Zhukov, w ho dined w ith a u.s. jo u rnalist, Kingsbury Sm ith, on June 9, confirm ed this. Zhukov assured his counterpart that “M olotov was confident that agreem ent could be reached at the Conference” but

Making Peace at Geneva

w arned that “it w ould take tim e.”33 To reinforce W . B edell Sm ith’s opinion o f 'Zhukov as “som etim es rather reliable,”34 at the thirteenth restricted session on June 14, M olotov m ade concessions on the m ode o f voting in tile international supervisory com m ission and proposed that India be m ade its perm anent chair­ m an.35 M olotov continued his search for a com prom ise at the m eeting w ith Eden the next day.36 On June 16, it was Zhou E nlai’s turn to suggest concessions. D uring his con­ versation w ith Eden, the C hinese foreign m inister recognized the necessity for separate discussions o f the situation in Laos and Cam bodia, w hich the Chinese and V ietm inh delegations had refused to acknow ledge since the beginning o f the conference, and Zhou prom ised that “there would be no difficulty in getting an agreem ent from the V iet M inh to the w ithdraw al o f theữ troops from Laos and C am bodia as part o f the w ithdraw al o f all foreign bases.” Eden rem ained con­ vinced that Zhou w anted a settlem ent o f the conflict and therefore feared that the conference m ight fail.37 The sam e day, at the restricted session, M olotov pro­ posed that Indonesia join the international supervisory com m ission along w ith India, Pakistan, C zechoslovakia, and Poland. He also put forth tile possibility o f a three-m em ber com m ission com posed o f representatives from India, Indone­ sia, and Poland, and he returned to his previous view about the priority o f a m il­ itary solution over political questions.38 A lthough som e observers and scholars interpreted these Com m unist conces­ sions as being influenced by their concern over forthcom ing A nglo-A m erican negotiations in W ashington and u.s. intentions to depart from the G eneva con­ ference,59 these concessions w ere instead a continuation o f the line approved in M oscow in A pril that was aim ed at the settlem ent o f the Indochina conflict on the basis o f the division o f Vietnam . N evertheless, the Soviets seem ed to be con­ cerned about the departure o f the leading delegates o f the U nited States and G reat B ritain and the announced negotiations in the U nited States. M olotov re­ vealed this concern in the course o f the m eetings w ith his W estern counterparts. B idault assured M olotov that the negotiations in W ashington w ere not o f pri­ m ary im portance because France w ould not participate in them . He also said that Paris intended to prevent the breakdown o f the conference and expressed his personal desire that the negotiations at G eneva continue at the highest possible level.60 The sam e assurances w ere m ade to the Soviet foreign m inister by w. B edell Sm ith, w ho said that the conference “should be kept going w hile there w as hope o f reaching reasonable settlem ent.”61 Eden shared his colleagues’ opinion and, in response to M olotov’s question o f w hether he thought that the m inisters had already com pleted all theữ w ork and further negotiations should be held betw een the w arring parties, he stressed that the “m inisters had done ev­ erything they could at the present stage o f the conference. Y et, in his opinion.

M aking Peace at Geneva

they w ill have to m eet w ith each other once again" to settle such problem s as su­ pervision and guarantees.62 [D uring these conversations M olotov tried to persuade his counterparts that agreem ent at the conference was still possible and the Com m unist delegations w ere ready to occupy realistic positions. In the Soviet view , how ever, this could not be said o f the Ư.S. position. M olotov frankly told the head o f the U .S. dele­ gation that the A m ericans could veto the actions o f theừ allies, all theừ public assurances to the contrary notw ithstanding.63 In a conversation w ith Eden M olotov was even m ore outspoken on this issue. “The A m ericans,” he said, “seem to be w orried, lest the French would agree on too big concessions, though this [concern] w as based on nothing, and the Ư.S. G overnm ent’s position, ap­ parently, is aim ed at keeping the French from finding an exit from the existing situation."64 M olotov repeated this tw ice. The Soviet m inister w as not far from the truth. A lthough W ashington em ­ phasized at every opportunity that the U nited States was only an interested na­ tion “w hich, how ever, is neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotia­ tion,"65 the actions o f the u.s. adm inistration before and during the conference dem onstrated that W ashington tried to influence the positions o f its allies and the A ssociated States o f V ietnam , Cam bodia, and Laos regarding the condi­ tions o f peace in Indochina.66 The seven points w orked out by the u.s. and B ritish leaders at the negotiations in W ashington at the end o f June w ere specif­ ically designed, in D ulles’s w ords, to “stiffen French position so that they would not accept terms which we would be unwilling to respect.”61 These points determ ined the lim its o f the French bargaining position and the condi­ tions o f the u.s. support o f any future settlem ent. The essence o f the seven points cam e dow n to tw o dem ands: independence o f Laos and Cam bodia; and the division o f V ietnam along the eighteenth parallel, w ith the southern part re­ m aining non-Com m unist. D ulles, the initiator o f the seven points, w as skeptical about prospects for their realization. In a m em orandum to be sent to President D w ight D. Eisen­ how er, the u.s. secretary o f state expressed his doubts that the French would succeed in getting peace on the Ư.S. term s. The only factor that could induce M oscow and B eijing to accept these term s, D ulles believed, was the threat o f Ư.S. intervention.68 Soviet leaders harbored no illusions about W ashington’s possible intentions in Southeast Asia. In his report about the Geneva conference to the plenum o f the CPSU Central Com m ittee, M olotov referred to the Ư.S. attem pts to create a m ilitary pact in Southeast A sia and concluded that the “U.s. governm ent’s agreem ent to participate in the G eneva conference was ju st a forced concession to the position o f England and France on this question. Its calculations w ith re­

M aking Peace at Geneva

spect to Indochina have not been based at all on the desirability o f reaching an agreem ent on the Indochina question at die G eneva conference.”69 The Soviet foreign m inister inform ed his Com m unist Party com rades that the conference had entered its m ost im portant phase. He em phasized that during this phase it w as necessary to approach political issues that w ere even more significant because o f plans to divide the territory o f V ietnam into tw o p a rtsf M olotov justified the partition because it “w ould elim inate num erous pretexts for m utual encounters. . . o f m ilitary units.” A t the sam e tim e M olotov w arned o f negative consequences o f partition if the G eneva conference avoided decisions about po­ litical issues that included, first, the prom pt organization o f all-V ietnam electiq g sju id the establishm ent o f a united and dem ocratic V ietnam ese govern­ m e n t^ “M olotov touched on the political situation in France as w ell. D uring his con­ versation w ith Eden on the eve o f his departure from G eneva, the Soviet foreign m inister w ondered if new opportunities w ould occur as a result o f the fall o f the Laniel governm ent and the accession o f Pierre M endès France as the new pre­ m ier in France. Eden w arned M olotov that the new French cabinet w ould not agree to France’s surrender, and Eden doubted that M endès France’s conditions differed from those o f his predecessor. Eden did not expect the new prem ier to be m ore pliable.71 In M oscow M olotov w as accordingly cautious in his estim ate o f the new French governm ent. “It w ould be risky now to m ake any conclusions on the issue w hether changes in the governm ent o f France w ill influence the course o f the G eneva agreem ent,” he declared at the plenum . “Y et it is known that the new governm ent o f France regards the acceleration o f the resolution o f the problem o f the restoration o f peace in Indochina as one o f its principal tasks.”72 T he new French prem ier had prom ised to reach agreem ent on Indochina w ithin four w eeks from the m om ent o f his accession to pow er.73 This deadline caused m uch controversy am ong observers at the tim e o f the conference and am ong scholars later. Som e regarded the public deadline as a courageous step aim ed at a prom pt settlem ent o f the conflict. Pravda journalists hailed M endès France’s prom ise because it, in their w ords, indicated “not an ordinary change o f the C abinets w ho have the sam e policy, as it often happened thus far in France, but a certain political shift w hich is conditioned by the failure o f the for­ eign policy course.” The journalists drew attention to the fact that for the first tim e since W orld W ar n the governm ent had to resign because o f a foreign pol­ icy issue, and they advised readers to see to “w hat degree the new French gov­ ernm ent w ill take into account the m ood o f the m ajority o f the people.”74 O th­ ers, especially the representatives o f the non-Com m unist V ietnam ese, accused M endès France o f easing the w ay for a settlem ent favorable to the V ietininh.79

M aking Peace a t Geneva

In other w ords, according to D evillers and Lacouture, “the diplom ats considered 'a m onth to m ake peace* som ew hat too little, although the soldiers thought it rather too long.”76 D espite the deadline im posed by the new French prem ier, the last w eeks o f June and first days o f July did not show substantial m ovem ent tow ard the set­ tlem ent. H ow ever, Zhou Enlai, w ho left G eneva later than other heads o f die great-pow er delegations, arranged a June 21 reception at his villa for die Lao­ tian and Cam bodian delegations, and tw o days later he m et w ith M endès France. B oth events reflected the Chinese desire to keep the negotiations going. A t a re­ ception organized by the Chinese in honor o f the V ietm inh delegation, Zhou provided the Laotians and Cam bodians an opportunity to m eet and discuss w ith Pham V an Dong issues o f m utual in te re st This created conditions for further m eetings, the venue o f w hich often becam e the headquarters o f the C hinese del­ egation.77 The m eeting betw een Zhou and MendỀs France took place at the French em ­ bassy in Bern. The Chinese prem ier was rather reserved and official in his con­ versation w ith his French counterpart Zhou had undoubtedly been inform ed that during the N ational Assem bly vote for M endès France to becom e prem ier, M endès France had rejected Com m unist votes o f support, a situation that did not help soften Zhou’s w atchful attitude tow ard the French. B ut he used this m eet­ ing w ith M endès France to expound on the Chinese position w ith respect to In­ dochina. From the outset Zhou declared that his country w as opposed to the extension and internationalization o f the Indochina conflict H e agreed th a t although the m ilitary and political aspects o f the negotiations w ere closely linked, for the mo­ m ent m ilitary issues had a priority. H is greatest concern w as that u.s. bases could appear in the A ssociated States. Zhou probably felt relief w hen M endès France assured him that the “French G overnm ent had not the slightest intention o f allow ing them to be established.”78 Turning to the issue o f Vietnam , Zhou Enlai assured his counterpart that the “Chinese delegation w ere doing theừ best to urge the V ietm inh Governm ent to bring together not only the V ietm inh G overnm ent and the French Governm ent, but also the V ietm inh Governm ent and the V ietnam Governm ent o f B ao D ai.” In conclusion Zhou urged the French prem ier to m eet w ith the representatives o f the V ietm inh.79 W hen M endès France asked Zhou’s opinion about the way in which troops should be regrouped, Zhou supported the idea o f large regrouping areas for the tw o parties o f the conflict. A lthough nothing decisive resulted from this m eeting o f the tw o prem iers, the conversation helped clarify view s o f the French and Chinese governm ents and facilitated future direct negotiations betw een M endès France and Pham Van

M aking Peace a t Geneva

D ong. The basis o f such negotiations had already been prepared by tile m eetings o f the tw o delegations* m ilitary representatives, w ho continued to discuss pos­ sible w ays to settle the conflict. On June 28, Ta Q uang Buu proposed that the provisional frontier betw een the tw o parts o f V ietnam be draw n slightly to the north o f the thirteenth parallel.80 This proposal w as, o f course, unacceptable to Paris; MendỀs France adhered to the eighteenth parallel as his ultim ate dem and. D espite die differing approaches, the talks continued. Soon they w ere supple­ m ented by m ilitary talks in the Tonkin delta, w hich began on July 4, and by the establishm ent o f the m ilitary com m issions on Laos and Cam bodia. These developm ents in G eneva and in Indochina apparently m ade M oscow anxious to resum e high-level negotiations in G eneva. O n July 4, M olotov asked the B ritish am bassador w hen Eden was going to com e back to G eneva. W illiam H ayter assured the Soviet foreign m inister that Eden had declared his intention to return to G eneva but had not specified tile date.81 M oscow asked B eijing the same question on the follow ing day. On the order o f the C enter (in other words, the K rem lin), M oscow ’s chargé d ’affaires in C hina, V. V as’kov, m et w ith M ao Zedong and inform ed him that the CPSU C entral Com m ittee considered it nec­ essary to use the favorable situation in France for resolving the Indochina ques­ tion. A ccording to V as’kov, M olotov w as planning to go to G eneva on July 7 and m eet w ith MendỀs France before official sessions o f the conference re­ sum ed. The Soviet diplom at hinted that “it w ould be good if com rade Zhou Enlai could arrive in G eneva before 10 July.” M ao replied that Zhou was at that tim e in Kwangsi Province where he m et w ith Ho Chi M inh and Vo Nguyen G iap. He could return to B eijing not earlier than on July 6 o r 7, then go to M oscow on July 9 o r 10, and arrive in G eneva at the earliest on July 12 or 13.82 This w as apparently acceptable to M oscow since, as it turned out, Eden cam e to G eneva on July 12 as w ell, and M olotov had tim e to m eet w ith Pierre M endès France and probe the new French governm ent on issues o f the negotiations. M olotov arrived in G eneva on July 8 as planned, and the next day he received Jean C hauvel, w ho headed the French delegation in the absence o f M endès France. Chauvel began the conversation w ith the inform ation that the French prem ier w as com ing to G eneva on July 10 and he w ould like to m eet w ith M olo­ tov.83 Chauvel also used this opportunity to com plain to the head o f the Soviet delegation about the intransigence o f the V ietm inh representatives, and he asked for a m eeting betw een French and Russian m ilitary experts to explain the diffi­ culties that had arisen in the talks w ith the DRV. M olotov adm itted that there were obstacles that should be overcom e on the way to peace. In spite o f the ob­ stacles, M olotov assured C hauvel, the general tendency o f the conference was favorable to its successful outcom e and the Soviet delegation was ready to help in finding “concrete” solutions.84

Making Peace at G eneva

Follow ing the M olotov-Chauvel conversation, C olonel B iébisson m et w ith die Soviet m ilitary experts Fedenko and Tzygichko on July 10. The French del­ egate inform ed his Soviet colleagues about three problem s discussed a t the ne­ gotiations w ith the Vietm inh: the dem arcation line, regroupm ent zones in Laos, and the evacuation o f French troops from the Tonkin delta. T he first issue caused the greatest controversy because the V ietm inh insisted on the thirteenth or fourteenth parallel as the location o f tile dem arcation line, contrary to the eighteenth parallel proposed by the French. Brébisson explained to the Soviets that Paris was interested only in providing Laos w ith access to the sea. There­ fore it w as essential to retain French control o f colonial route no. 9 that ran from Laos to the seacoast. The coast itself, B rébisson assured his counterparts, in­ cluding the port o f Tourane (D anang), w as not im portant. The French w ere not interested in the airfield at Tourane either. K eeping this in m ind, Brébisson sug­ gested, “it w ould be possible to find other narrow places in V ietnam for draw ­ ing the dem arcation line,” not only the eighteenth parallel.85 Em phasizing the im partiality o f the French dem and, the French colonel brought up the interest o f the Bao D ai governm ent o f V ietnam in the port and airfield at Tourane as w ell as its interest in H ue, the ancient capital o f the coun­ try. C learly nodding at the U nited States, he even hinted that som e third coun­ tries w ere interested in this part o f central Vietnam . The French, Brébisson reit­ erated, w ere interested only in route no. 9 to provide Laos w ith access to the seacoast.86 The content o f this m eeting w as reported to M olotov and could have been used by the Soviet foreign m inister during his conversation w ith M endès France, which took place the sam e day. However, the Soviet m inister rem ained a supporter o f the dem ands o f his V ietnam ese friends, at least on the surface. W hen the conversation turned to the problem o f the dem arcation line, M olotov and M endès France each repeated theữ positions, w hich had been evoked m any tim es by each side during the negotiations. N either seem ed prepared to m ake concessions.87 M oreover, M olotov used the issue o f the dem arcation line to speak again o f the need to discuss political problem s at the conference. He pointed out that political questions had not been touched on by the conference although they w ere o f im portance. The French prem ier agreed w ith M olotov, perhaps to the surprise o f the Soviets w ho recalled the constant refusal by M endès France’s predecessors to discuss political issues. M endès France in­ form ed M olotov that the French delegation was trying to prepare an appropriate declaration that should be acceptable to all participants in the conference.88 A lthough M olotov and MendỀs France did not budge in theừ view s on the lo­ cation o f the dem arcation line and on other issues, theừ first conversation was not inconclusive. They decided that from then on the m ain activity at the con-

M aking Peace at Geneva

feience should take place during private m eetings o f the participants. M endès France adm itted that “unofficial conversations and personal contacts betw een representatives could be m ore useful at the present stage o f the negotiations than plenary sessions.” M olotov concurred by saying that the G eneva conference had “already passed over the period o f m aking speeches.” M olotov stated that the tim e had com e to m ove from a general discussion to concrete decisions.89 As a result, die M olotov-M endès France conversation initiated a num ber o f private talks, m eetings, and discussions that m arked the final ten days o f the conference in Geneva. O n July 11, die French prem ier m et w ith the head o f the V ietm inh delegation, Pham Van Dong, for the first tim e. This m eeting sym bolized the abandonm ent o f die previous French policy o f denying the utility o f direct contacts w ith die adversary, and the DRV representative tried to underline die turnabout. A l­ though his villa w as next door to the villa w here MendỀs France was living, Pham V an Dong used his black Zis lim ousine provided by the Soviets to com e to the m eeting w ith the head o f the French delegation.90 A fter Anthony Eden and Zhou Enlai arrived in G eneva on July 12, unofficial talks reached theừ full tem po. O nly the U.S. representative, w. Bedell Sm ith, w as absent in itially . B ut after repeated urging from Eden and, especially, M endès R anee and negotiations in Paris on July 13 and 14, D ulles agreed to Sm ith’s return to G eneva on July Ỉ7 .91 Private talks and secret contacts w o e not very fruitful in the beginning. As before, there w ere three principal issues over which debate developed: the de­ m arcation line, all-V ietnam elections, and the organization o f international con­ trol. The situation in Laos and Cam bodia was closely related. The m ost recent concession m ade by Pham Van Dong about the dem arcation line w as in a conversation w ith M endès France on July 13; they had talked about die sixteenth parallel.92 This was the line considered by M oscow as acceptable long before the G eneva conference. N ot surprisingly, M olotov tried to capital­ ize on such a concession on the part o f the V ietm inh. Talking to MendỀs France on July 13, M olotov com m ented that Pham Van Dong had m ade a substantial step forw ard by abandoning the territory betw een the thirteenth and the six­ teenth parallels. It w as necessary to take into account, the Soviet m inister hinted, that a “strong force o f persuasion w as required” to m ake the DRV abandon the captured territory. Now it was up to the French to com pensate this V ietm inh concession in finding an appropriate dem arcation line.93 M olotov also insisted on fixing a deadline for all-V ietnam elections and sub­ stantiated his dem and by rem inding MendỀs France o f the partition o f V ietnam . Because die country w ould be divided, M olotov reasoned, the V ietnam ese ex­ pected that the G eneva conference w ould set the date for V ietnam ’s reunifica­

M aking Peace at Geneva

tion.94 H e rem ained unm oved by M endès France’s argum ents about insufficient conditions in V ietnam for holding early elections. Failing to convince M olotov o f the validity o f the French positions on the ma­ jo r questions that separated France and the DRV, M endès France suggested they be resolved at tripartite m eetings w ith participation by M olotov, Eden, and him­ self. Such m eetings, tile French m inister said, could help com e to com prom ise on controversial issues, “to m ake concessions on som e questions w hile com­ pensating them on others.” M olotov w ould have to inform the Chinese and tile V ietm inh about the contents o f such m eetings, and Eden w ould inform the u.s. delegation.93 M olotov agreed, and the first tripartite m eeting took place on July 16. M olo­ tov, how ever, continued to insist that, first, the date o f all-V ietnam elections should be fixed by the conference and, second, the sixteenth parallel should be the dem arcation line betw een N orth V ietnam and South V ietnam .96 M oreover, at the m eeting o f July 17, he unexpectedly called on his W estern counterparts to jo in in holding a restricted session o f the conference the next day. Eden, who was annoyed, told w. Bedell Sm ith that “M olotov had now becom e the m ost difficult and intransigent m em ber o f Com m unist delegation.”97 W hile appearing intransigent to the W estern delegations, at his m eetings with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, the Soviet foreign m inister was preparing a ba­ sis for future compromise. On July 16, M olotov infram ed his allies about his con­ versations w ith the B ritish and the French and shared his im pression that the French m ight agree to a dem arcation line only somewhere to the north o f the six­ teenth parallel. He also asked his allies w hether it was worthwhile to insist that the elections in Vietnam be held in 1955 o r to recommend a m ore flexible form ula that w ould allow both sides to decide, not later than June 1955, on the date o f the elections. Zhou proposed three options: the elections should be held not later than June 1955, the elections should be held during 1955, or not later than June 1955 both sides would decide on the date o f the elections. He said that he had discussed this issue w ith Ho Chi M inh, and the Vietm inh leader had agreed on third option as a compromise.98 However, at the conclusion o f their m eeting, they agreed that in Pham Van D ong’s forthcom ing conversation w ith the French prem ier, he would insist on the sixteenth parallel and a specific date for the elections.99 A t theừ m eeting the next day, the Com m unist delegates again discussed the issues o f the dem arcation line and the elections. Pham Van Dong acceded to a dem arcation line draw n slightly to the north o f route no. 9, but he dem anded in exchange concessions from the French on the tim ing o f the all-V ietnam elec­ tions. Zhou Enlai supported D ong’s position. B ut M olotov again suggested they determ ine only the period o f tim e during w hich the elections should be held. The exact date o f the elections, the Soviet foreign m inister said, could be determ ined

M aking Peace at Geneva

by representatives o f both sides in V ietnam later o n .100 The Com m unists w ere also prepared to assent to the B ench proposal concerning the com position o f the International C ontrol Com m ission (ICC ), which w ould include India, as chair, along w ith Canada and Poland.101 M olotov im m ediately inform ed M endès France o f the results o f his discus­ sions w ith his allies, a significant step forw ard com pared w ith the V ietm inh’s earlier dem ands. B ut the French prem ier, according to his agreem ent w ith D ulles in Paris, continued insisting on the dem ands as they appeared in the seven points o f the Anglo-A m erican com m uniqué and refused to concede on any o f the principal issues. The Soviets began to suspect that the W estern pow ­ ers’ objective w as to prolong the negotiations until July 20 and then confront the Soviets w ith an alternative to either agree on the French proposals o r accept re­ sponsibility for the failure o f the negotiations. It w as M olotov’s suspicion that caused him to insist on holding the restricted session on July 18.102 He shared his concern w ith his allies and received their full support. A t the restricted session, M olotov drew participants’ attention to die possi­ bility that a basis for peace in Indochina had been established. He appealed to the delegations to recognize the accom plishm ent and praised the private con­ versations that had made it possible. The Ư.S. delegation reported to the State D epartm ent that “M olotov said that all this shows recent private talks have had success and he expressed belief that such success w ould continue.’’103 For w. B edell Sm ith and his W estern allies, this restricted session was the “strangest perform ance to date.” 104 They tried in vain to receive clarification o f M olotov’s intentions from Zhou Enlai, w ho pretended to know nothing about the purpose o f the Soviet action. It is apparent, how ever, that the Soviets w anted to dem on­ strate that they regarded the negotiations optim istically and it w ould not be their fault if the conference failed. Y et the possibility o f failure w as quite real on July 18, when only three days rem ained until the deadline im posed by M endès France. On that day Eden re­ ported to London that, in his view , the conference had “no m ore than fifty-fifty chance o f reaching agreem ent.” 105 The delegations continued to discuss various options, trying to reach a com prom ise. A t this stage the C hinese, apparently w ith Soviet consent, had m oved to the front line in pushing for settlem ent A fter the restricted session o f July 18 was over, Zhou Enlai approached Eden and inform ed the B ritish foreign secretary that he agreed that the ICC could con­ sist o f India, Poland, and C anada.106 The W estern delegations received this new s w ith satisfaction.107 On the next day, W ang Bingnan, secretary general o f the C hinese delegation, m et w ith a French delegate. Colonel G uillerm az, and confided to him that Zhou Enlai agreed that the elections in V ietnam could be postponed for tw o years, until 19S6, w ith the provision that during this period

M aking Peace a t Geneva

representatives o f the N orth and the South w ould m eet to agree on the precise date.108 A nd, finally, on July 19, W ang Bingnan inform ed G uillerm az that his delegation and the V ietm inh delegation agreed that the dem arcation line should be draw n ten kilom eters to the north o f route no. 9, that is, som ew here near die seventeenth parallel.109 This agreem ent w as confirm ed during a m eeting o f Eden, M endès France, M olotov, Zhou, and Pham V an Dong at tile headquarters o f die French delegation on July 20. Zhou Enlai and his subordinates put to use the decisions that had been m ade at the m eetings o f the three Com m unist dele­ gations several days earlier. Thus the last obstacles on the w ay to peace in Indochina seem ed to have been rem oved and tile delegations w ere ready to gather at the plenary sessions to sign and publicize the final docum ents o f the conference. B ut the dém arche o f tile Cam bodian delegation, w hich refused to sign any docum ent that allegedly in­ fringed on the sovereignty o f Cam bodia, delayed the outcom e. The Cam bodians objected to the conferees’ decision to deny Cam bodia’s right to join an alliance and request m ilitary assistance from the U nited States o r any other country. Sam Sary, the head o f the Cam bodian delegation, expressed concern about the dan­ ger o f C om m unist expansionism and w anted to reserve the right to ask the U nited States to establish bases on Cam bodian territory.110 Cam bodia’s protest perturbed the C hinese, w ho continued to insist on guar­ antees against tile establishm ent o f m ilitary bases in Laos and Cam bodia. Dur­ ing his conversation w ith Eden on July 17, Zhou Enlai repeated tile Chinese point o f view on die issue o f m ilitary alliances and bases on its southern borders. “C hina’s policy in regard to South East A sia is quite sim ple,’’ stated the C hinese prem ier. “They approved o f a Locarno-type arrangem ent which as m any States as possible w ould join, so that a large area o f peaceful co-existence in A sia should be created. B ut the proposed South-East A sia A lliance w ould split tile area ju st as N.A.T.O. had split Europe, and would m ake peaceful co-existence very difficult. . . . As regards the three A ssociated States in particular they should be independent, sovereign and neutral.” 111 A t his m eetings w ith M olotov and Pham Van Dong, Zhou Enlai again voiced Chinese concern over m ilitary alliances and bases. On July 16, he noted that the U nited States, England, and France had probably agreed on die establishm ent o f a m ilitary bloc in Southeast A sia. “If the Am ericans w ill be able to draw Bao D ai’s Vietnam , Laos, and Cam bodia into a m ilitary bloc,” w arned Zhou, “die agreem ent proposed by US that prohibits the establishm ent o f foreign m ilitary bases on the territory o f the m entioned states w ould lose the significance we at­ tach to i t ” 112 Therefore, the refusal o f the Cam bodians to sign an agreem ent that w ould deny them the right to jo in alliances and invite foreign m ilitary personnel on

M aking Peace a t Geneva

th eữ territory threatened to underm ine die results o f the conference. M olotov suspected that the Cam bodian dem ands w o e a consequence o f Ư.S. intrigues. H e was partly rig h t The Ư.S. conference delegation was dealing w ith the Cam­ bodian and Laotian delegations according to D ulles’s instructions, w hich stated: “C ontinue encourage Laotians and Cam bodians to proclaim theừ peaceful in­ tentions but w arn them against m aking any com m itm ents to Com m unist bloc w hich m ight com prom ise theữ present defenses or hinder theừ participation in defense arrangem ents w hich m ay be made hereafter.” 113 In any case, the Soviet m inister understood that it w ould be necessary to find an acceptable form ula that w ould reconcile the C am bodian dem ands w ith the interests o f the Soviet U nion’s Chinese allies and, at the sam e tim e, prevent the failure o f the confer­ ence. The entire w orld was w aiting for die final act at G eneva. The hall o f the Palais des N ations was illum inated. Journalists, experts, and curiosity seekers gathered to w itness this historic e v e n t B ut the debates w ith the Cam bodians lasted longer than the lim it set by M endès France in June. A very plausible legend describes how , in order to prevent the fall o f the M endès France governm ent, som eone thought o f stopping the clock at the Palais des N ations. It stood at m idnight all n ig h t114 The solution w as found at 2:00 a.m . on July 21. M olotov conceded that the Cam bodians m ight appeal for foreign m ilitary aid if it was under external threat. U nder pressure from MendỀs France, delegates extended the sam e right to Laos as w ell.115 L ater that day, the conference participants gathered for the final ple­ nary session. They discussed ten docum ents prepared fo r theừ consideration: the three agreem ents on the cessation o f hostilities, each o f w hich was accom­ panied by tw o unilateral declarations, and the final declaration o f the Geneva conference. To these docum ents w ere added a unilateral declaration by the head o f the u.s. delegation, an am endm ent to the final declaration from the state o f V ietnam , and an oral statem ent o f C am bodian claim s on part o f the territory o f V ietnam . The last tw o w ere not accepted by the conference.116 M olotov in his speech at the plenary session summed up the results o f the conference and theừ significance, noted the V ietm inh’s contribution to the suc­ cess o f die delegation, drew attention to the im portance o f the PRC’s participa­ tion in the conference, and stressed that the G eneva agreem ents that divided V ietnam into tw o halves created the new task o f reunification o f the country “in accordance w ith national interests o f all the V ietnam ese people.” 117 M any scholars have analyzed the significance o f the G eneva conference and its agreem ents.118 W estern estim ates o f course differed from the approaches o f representatives o f Com m unist countries. But m ost analysts have regarded these agreem ents as a com prom ise, how ever im perfect, am ong the clashing interests

M aking Peace at Geneva

o f the countries involved. A lthough the conference dealt w ith die Indochina problem , Indochina itself was not the preoccupation o f the conference; the rep­ resentatives o f the five great pow ers w ere m ore concerned w ith the general sit­ uation in international relations, European and national security, and the nor­ m alization o f bilateral relations. They w ere ready to sacrifice die interests o f the countries o f Indochina if that w ould help them achieve theứ desired aim s. As of­ ten happens in diplom acy, the sm all countries— in this case the Southeast A sian countries— w ere but pawns in the gam e o f the great pow ers. ^ The controversy over the European D efense Com m unity is an exam ple o f this great-pow er negligence. A lthough allegations o f a deal betw een M endès France and M olotov on the EDC are alm ost certainly false,119 the fact rem ains that both the U nited States and the Soviet Union tried to use the conference to influence the French decision on the EDC. U nlike W ashington, M oscow had to approach this problem m ore carefully and indirectly so as to avoid accusations o f inter­ ference in France’s internal affairs. Therefore M olotov had to drop the subject o f European security from a June 10 conversation w ith M endès France, when the French m inister refused until after the G eneva conference to discuss any is­ sues other than the settlem ent in Indochina. N evertheless, the Soviet foreign m inister hinted to the French prem ier that the Soviet Union was ready to assist France in achieving “honorable and ju st conditions" o f peace, im plying that in response Paris should take into account the Soviet interests in Europe. M olotov tried to m ake this im plication clearer w hen he stated th at “the position o f M endès France as Prim e M inister o f France, inspires the Soviet delegation’s re­ spect. This positio n aim ed a t the establishm ent o f p ea ce in Indochina w ill p ro m ote the srren g tn ertffig q fp ea ce a ll o ver the w orld. 110 Funner proof that there was no global bargaining (m archandage planétaire, in G eorges B idault’s w ords) betw een the Soviets and the French was M olotov’s conversation w ith MendỀs France on July 21, im m ediately after the end o f the G eneva conference. D uring tiieừ conversation, which lasted about tw o hours, the Soviet m inister tried to convince the French prem ier that the European D e­ fense Com m unity could not guarantee security on the continent and should be rejected in favor o f other form s o f cooperation betw een countries in Europe, in­ cluding those proposed by M oscow. In his argum ent, M olotov em phasized the interests o f both France and the Soviet U nion and prospects for Soviet-French relations that did not alw ays conform to the objectives o f the U nited States. “A m erica," M olotov argued, “was far from G erm any and perhaps she was more prepared to pursue a m ore risky policy. France and the Soviet Union are inter­ ested in m ore cautious policy in the question o f the rearm am ent o f G erm any."121 These anti-EDC argum ents addressed to the French prem ier w ould have been unnecessary if a secret deal had been struck betw een M oscow and Paris.

M aking Peace at Geneva

M endès France drew M olotov’s attention to tile difficulties his governm ent encountered on the issue o f the EDC. H e referred to external pressures on France in favor o f die ratification by Paris o f die EDC treaty and suggested that the Soviet U nion w ork out a proposal that w ould be acceptable for the W est A t the sam e tim e he w arned M olotov that he could not guarantee that die various French opinions on die issue w ould be reconciled in a way acceptable to the S o ­ v iets.122 The conversation ended w ith m utual assurances o f peaceful intentions in both countries. Although the Soviet leaders w ere preoccupied w ith issues o f general peace a n rf European

security

it w n n ld hft an eTapperarirtn tn H aim that

indjffigent about the G eneva conference's fW iy o n s rhnr ffftWTM-ped the situation in Indochina. First, die Soviets w ere apprehensive that the crisis in Southeast A sia could grow into a w orld conflict w ith unpredictable consequences. The G eneva A ccords rem oved this danger, at least for the tim e being. M oscow had supported its V ietnam ese allies and secured for H o Chi M inh a territory that could becom e a nucleus o f a new Com m unist state in A sia closely allied w ith the socialist com m unity. The U SSR had also brought in from isolation another ally, C om m unist C hina, and introduced B eijing to the great-pow er club, thus en­ larging the PR C ’s possibilities in international politics. ^ Soviet leaders appeared to be less concerned that, as a result o f the decisions m ade in G eneva, V ietnam becam e divided. M oscow did not regard the division as a fatal outcom e. O ther divided countries in tile w orld (Germ any and K orea before the K orean W ar) had dem onstrated that such an international solution could guarantee peace and stability fo r a prolonged period o f tim e. Therefore M oscow from the outset considered partition an acceptable com prom ise and view ed it optim istically. The Soviet leaders o f course did not exclude eventual reunification but regarded it as possible in another international situation, in th eừ parlance, a “correlation o f forces.” In other w ords, if M oscow had not been able to reach its maximum program objectives, it certainly exceeded the m ini­ mum in good Soviet tradition. k. The G eneva conference occurred ju st as M olotov’s role w as about to undergo a change. Jam es Cable w rote in his book that tile conference w as B ritain’s swan song as a great pow er.123 For M olotov also tile G eneva conference w as his swan song as a pow erful Soviet foreign m inister. One year later, at another G eneva conference, M olotov did not possess the sam e pow er and authority in the Krem­ lin that he had enjoyed during these Indochina negotiations. K hrushchev, who w as playing an increasingly dom inant role in Soviet foreign policy, was begin­ ning to undercut M olotov. He was still influential ỉn 1954, and M olotov’s be­ havior contrasted starkly w ith the tim e when he was only a m outhpiece for die ruthless Soviet dictator, Stalin, in the international arena. A ll participants in tile

M aking Peace a t Geneva

conference w ho had know n M olotov from those days, especially Sm ith and Eden, noted the change. w. Bedell Sm ith, w ho had m et M olotov w hen he w as the U .S. am bassador in M oscow soon after the end o f W orld W ar n , w as im pressed by M olotov’s trans­ form ation. In his report from G eneva on one o f his m eetings w ith the head o f the Soviet delegation, Sm ith noted that at the conference M olotov “w ent further, w as m uch m ore frank, m ade no charges, by im plication or otherw ise, no re­ crim inations. . . . There is apparent m uch greater setf-confidence and author­ ity.” 124 Eden’s reports praised M olotov’s reasonableness and desire to find a com­ prom ise. In a telegram to the Foreign O ffice on his dinner w ith the Soviet dele­ gation, the B ritish m inister w rote: M . M olotov w as in unusually relaxed m ood, and talked freely on a num ber o f subjects unconnected w ith the present conference— On m atters concerning the conference itself he w as also m ost am enable. I do not think that throughout the evening he disagreed w ith any­ thing that I said in the course o f frank discussion o f our problem s here, nor did he even seek to m ake a m erely debating p o in t His w hole attitude was in contrast to our experience o f him in B erlin [at the January-February 1954 four-pow er conference]. H e seem ed genuinely anxious that the conference should succeed, and also con­ siderably w orried over the situation in Indochina.125 M olotov’s attitude did not change during the course o f the negotiations and, on July 12, Eden wrote: “M olotov gave the sam e im pression as in the earlier part o f the Conference that he w ished to do w hat he could as a jo in t chairm an on pro­ cedural m atters.” 126 The foreigners’ im age o f M olotov does not correspond w ith the estim ates o f his Soviet superiors and subordinates. K hrushchev w rote o f his colleague’s rigidity, outdated view s on developm ents in the w orld, the lack o f “elastic­ ity.” 127 O leg Troyanovsky, aide to M olotov and his interpreter at the Geneva conference, found many sim ilarities in the characters o f his chief and Secretary o f State D ulles: [B]oth w ere dogm atists to theừ very m arrow , both considered the [social] system s they represented incom patible w ith one another, both regarded the possibility o f any prolonged agreem ents betw een the U nited States and the USSR w ith skepticism , both feared that their leaders, Eisenhow er and K hrushchev, could agree on unjustifi­ able concessions and com prom ises.128

Making Peace at Geneva

In spite o f the sim ilarities in the characters o f the tw o foreign m inisters, M olo­ tov, unlike D ulles, rem ained in G eneva and tried to obtain a com prom ise that w ould elim inate the danger o f w ar in Indochina. He was often rigid in his de­ m ands concerning, for exam ple, the com position o f the ICC or the question o f elections in Vietnam , but he was ready to make concessions on these and other issues. The softening o f M olotov grew from the change in Soviet priorities after Stalin’s death. The new party leaders w anted a relaxation o f their relations w ith thẻ outside w orld, and M olotov, as one o f them , also recognized that such a change was necessary. He had alw ays been a disciplined Com m unist who had obediently follow ed instructions approved in M oscow, how ever m uch he dis­ agreed with them . But in the case o f Indochina, it seem s that he supported the decisions made by the Kremlin; hence the flexibilityTreadiness tnr rnrnprnrnkp relaxeeTmoog, and good hunge r Ihät w ere nntnH hy M nlntrm ls W estem jx)!leagues at the G eneva conference. He was apparently satisfied with the outcome o f the conference, ana ne was convinced that its significance w ould be m ore ap­ preciated w ith the passage o f tim e.

4. From Support to Cooperation The negotiations have revealed the complete unity o f views o f the governments o f the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic o f Vietnam on the issues o f the ùưem atỉonal situation, as well as in the sphere o f the fu rther development ofpolitical, economic, and cultural cooperation between the USSR and the Democratic Republic o f Vietnam.

Excerpt from Joint Communiqué Soviet-North Vietnam negotiations July 18,19551

T h e G eneva conference was over, and the clock at the Palais des N ations— stopped to m eet the deadline im posed by MendỀs France—started counting out the hours o f the new period in Indochina. The Soviets displayed cautious en­ thusiasm about prospects for developm ents in the region; their declaration on the conference results em phasized that “the cease-fire in Indochina opens to the peoples o f Vietnam , Laos, and Cam bodia opportunities for econom ic and cul­ tural progress under peaceful conditions w hich, at the sam e tim e, w ill create a basis for the developm ent o f friendly cooperation betw een those peoples and France.” M oscow drew attention to tile im portance o f the G eneva provisions that prohibited the establishm ent o f foreign m ilitary bases on the territory o f the Indochinese states, as w ell as thefr m em bership in m ilitary alliances. The decla­ ration referred to the free general elections envisaged by the G eneva A ccords for July 1956 that would create conditions for the unification o f Vietnam , 'in ac­ cordance w ith national interests and aspirations o f all the V ietnam ese people.” This provision, according to the Soviet declaration, “means the defeat o f those aggressive forces w ho strove for dism em berm ent o f V ietnam w ith the purpose to convert South V ietnam in one o f the springboards o f a projected new aggres­ sive bloc in Southeast A sia.”2

From Support to Cooperation

M oscow evidently w as satisfied w ith the outcom e o f the G eneva conference, its satisfaction related not only to the end o f the w ar in Indochina but also to the elim ination o f tile danger that the Indochina w ar could develop into a global co n flict Because the Soviets expected new opportunities to be created in the sphere o f international relations, the K rem lin inserted into the text o f its decla­ ration tile follow ing paragraph: The Soviet G overnm ent believes that the agreem ents on the cease­ fire and the restoration o f peace in Indochina, w hile contributing to the relaxation o f international tension, create favorable conditions for tile settlem ent o f other unresolved im portant international issues con­ cerning not only A sia, but also Europe, and first o f all, such issues as the stoppage o f arm s race and prohibition o f tile nuclear weapon, the safeguarding o f collective security in Europe and the settlem ent o f the G erm an question on peaceful and dem ocratic basis.3 Thus tile Soviet declaration dem onstrated once m ore that at G eneva M oscow w as concerned not only w ith the w ar in Indochina. It w as, how ever, ironic that M oscow expressed hope at finding a solution o f the G erm an question: after set­ tling the issue o f V ietnam by splitting this country in tw o, M oscow called for tile opposite outcom e for divided Germ any. D espite their optim ism , the Soviets could not but realize the shortcom ings o f the G eneva settlem ent The vague w ording o f the conference docum ents, espe­ cially the final declaration, could result in grave consequences during im ple­ m entation. Furtherm ore, the final declaration containing the m ost im portant pro­ visions for determ ining the future political structure o f V ietnam was not signed by conference participants; because o f this, it rem ained only a com pendium o f good intentions, not the obligations assum ed by the pow ers for fulfillm ent. M oscow w as particularly concerned about the attitude o f the u.s. delegation for it publicly acknow ledged the term s o f the G eneva A ccords but did not sign or verbally endorse them . The Soviet governm ent expressed its concern in its dec­ laration, w hich noted that u.s. representatives had tried to prevent a successful outcom e o f the conference: “The u.s. did not w ant to participate in the jo in t w ork along w ith France, England, the USSR, the PRC, and other states in order to guarantee the restoration o f peace in Indochina.”4 W ith these w ords, M oscow seem s to be pointing out the country responsible for any future violations o f the G eneva settlem ent These m isgivings notw ithstanding, for M oscow “the G eneva A ccords sig­ n ifie d ] an im portant victory o f forces o f peace and a serious defeat o f forces o f w ar” and m eant “an international recognition o f the national liberation struggle and great heroism o f the peoples o f Indochina displayed in this struggle."3

From Support to Cooperation

The V ietm inh’s reaction to the G eneva agreem ents was less sanguine than M oscow ’s. Ho Chi M inh’s statem ent that a “diplom atic victory" had been achieved at G eneva did not conceal the fact that the V ietnam ese Com m unists re­ ceived less than they had expected. It was to those disillusioned w ith the deci­ sions m ade at G eneva that Ho Chi M inh attem pted to justify the results o f the conference. He assured them that the dem arcation line that split the country into tw o halves w as a “tem porary and transitional m easure” necessary fo r the restoration o f peace as a condition for national unification through general elec­ tions. He rejected the notion that this line m eant a “political or territorial bor­ der." A special paragraph in his statem ent was devoted to the Com m unist com ­ patriots in the South tow ard whom the V ietm inh leadership m ust have felt the greatest rem orse. Ho Chi M inh expressed his conviction that the V ietm inh had “put the interests o f the whole country above local interests, perm anent interests above present interests" and w ould struggle fo r “unity, independence and dem ocracy" in V ietnam hand in hand w ith other people.6 W hatever disappointm ent the V ietnam ese Com m unist leaders felt about the outcom e o f the G eneva conference was apparently alleviated by the hope that theữ pow erful allies in M oscow and B eijing w ould assist them in the im ple­ m entation o f the agreem ents, w hich the V ietm inh believed depended on strengthening the D em ocratic R epublic o f V ietnam . In his response to M oscow ’s congratulatory telegram , Ho C hi M inh, after prom ising to struggle for the m aintenance o f peace in Indochina and unification o f the country, openly stated that he and his com rades-in-arm s expected that “in the struggle for the re­ alization o f these objectives we w ill enjoy your help.”7 Pham Van Dong was the first to approach M oscow for help. On his way back from Geneva, he and Zhou Enlai stopped in M oscow, and during his first con­ versation w ith a Soviet foreign m inistry official, K irill Novikov, head o f the Southeast A sia D epartm ent, Dong asked the Soviet governm ent to “render the DRV assistance in w orking out a plan o f friendly countries’ help to the DRV. He stated that w ith the end o f hostilities the DRV w ill have to actively deal w ith econom ic buildup. The DRV governm ent would be grateful if we [Soviets] as­ sist them in determ ining where and w hat it is possible to buy at the cheapest prices.’’8 N ot expecting a resolute response from a bureaucrat o f the Soviet Foreign M inistry and w anting to discuss m ore strategic issues o f cooperation betw een the Soviet Union and the Dem ocratic Republic o f Vietnam , the DRV vice pre­ m ier requested through Zhou Enlai a m eeting w ith the highest Soviet leaders.9 His subsequent m eeting w ith Soviet prem ier G eorgii M alenkov was discourag­ ing, however. M ikhail K apitsa, w ho was closely involved in everything that concerned the G eneva conference and its afterm ath, w rote that M alenkov, al­

From Support to Cooperation

though taking a positive attitude tow ard D ong’s requests for Soviet help, ex­ plained a t length that it w as beyond the capacity o f the Soviet Union to support all die people’s dem ocracies that existed in die w orld. Therefore, the Soviet leader reasoned, it w ould be expedient to divide functions betw een M oscow and B eijing. The Soviet U nion w ould concern itself w ith socialism and dem ocracy in Europe, and China w ould be concerned w ith Southeast Asia. K apitsa noted that “Pham Van Dong reacted coldly to this idea.’’10 Such a reaction w as quite understandable. W hat could China, itself in desperate need o f assistance from developed countries, give the DRV? B eijing w ould pass to Vietnam only w hat rem ained o f the help it received from other socialist allies. M alenkov’s words to Dong should not be taken literally. The Soviets did not refuse to render assistance to the DRV. A division o f responsibilities rather than a division o f labor was the Soviet conception, at least in the early period after the G eneva conference. The new Soviet leaders, rhetoric notw ithstanding, w ere retaining the policy o f theữ predecessor, Stalin, and w ere adhering to the view that because o f geographic proxim ity and a common past and traditions, China w ould better understand the problem s o f the V ietnam ese Com m unists. M oscow planned for C hina to becom e a Soviet agent in Southeast A sia rather than an in­ dependent player. That this was the case is proved by the first steps that M oscow and H anoi took on the path to bilateral relations. As soon as the G eneva conference was over and the ephem eral state o f the D em ocratic Republic o f V ietnam had acquired its territory, full-fledged diplo­ m atic relations becam e prom inent on the agendas o f the tw o countries. A lthough the Soviet U nion had recognized the DRV in 1950, the K rem lin had not ap­ pointed a diplom atic representative to Vietnam . The V ietm inh, how ever, had sent to M oscow an am bassador, Nguyen Long Bang, who served as a liaison of­ ficer betw een the Soviet leaders and Ho Chi M inh. Now the tim e had com e to repair this im balance. On A ugust 4, 1954, D eputy Foreign M inister V alerian Zorin m et w ith the N orth V ietnam ese am bassador and inform ed him that the So­ viet governm ent officially asked for the DRV governm ent’s consent to the nom­ ination o f A lexander Lavrishchev as Soviet am bassador to Vietnam . Zorin let his counterpart know that his superiors w ere prepared to send the am bassador even before the liberation o f H anoi, “if the DRV governm ent finds it expedient.’’ If the am bassador arrived in those uncertain circum stances, M oscow w ished only to know w here in N orth V ietnam the am bassador should arrive and w hat the conditions w ere in that location.11 In the sam e conversation the Soviet offi­ cial inform ed Nguyen Long Bang that M oscow was assem bling the staff for the Soviet m ilitary attaché in Vietnam . He asked the N orth V ietnam ese official’s opinion about when it was desirable for the m ilitary attaché to leave for V iet­ nam , in other w ords, before or after the arrival o f the am bassador.12

From Support to Cooperation

A fter several days the V ietm inh envoy forw arded his governm ent’s response to K irill Novikov. He said that the DRV accepted Lavrishchev’s designation “w ith great delight" and w ould like the Soviet em bassy to “arrive to V ietnam the earlier the better." A s to die m ilitary attaché, Bang stated that it w ould be good if he left for V ietnam at the sam e tim e as the em bassy, o r even earlier.13 N orth V ietnam was eager to receive the Soviet diplom atic m ission, and the Soviet U nion was eager to dem onstrate its support o f its new allies in Southeast A sia, b u t the K rem lin’s choice o f am bassador to the DRV seem s strange. A lexander A ndreevich Lavrishchev had served in die USSR Foreign M inistry since 1939 and could be considered a career diplom at because he had occupied som e im portant positions in the Soviet diplom atic hierarchy. B ut he was not an A sia expert, least o f all an expert on Indochina. Lavrishchev’s prior posts in­ cluded m inister in the Soviet em bassy in B ulgaria and am bassador to Turkey. H e served as the head o f the Fourth European D epartm ent and then becam e the head o f the departm ent responsible for the B alkan countries. Just before his as­ signm ent to V ietnam he was the head o f the First European D epartm ent, w hich supervised relations w ith the W est European countries, including France.14 In this capacity Lavrishchev was included in the Soviet delegation to the Geneva conference as an adviser.15 Thus the Soviet choice for am bassador to Vietnam could have been due to the Soviet interest in developing relations w ith France and M oscow ’s aw areness that it w as France that w ould rem ain the principal So­ viet counterpart in Indochina. The Vietm inh kept insisting on the arrival o f the Soviet em bassy’s staff in V ietnam at the earliest possible date. Nguyen Long Bang repeated this request during his m eeting w ith Lavrishchev on A ugust 10. Since the V ietm inh had not yet occupied Hanoi, they suggested that the Soviet em bassy staff should go to Thai Nguyen, about eighty kilom eters north o f H anoi, where the tem porary V iet­ nam ese Com m unist governm ent had been established. Because conditions in Thai Nguyen were poor (in B ang’s words: “in the area o f the tem porary residence o f the [Vietminh] governm ent there are enorm ous difficulties w ith lodging and even difficulties w ith provisions are possible”), the DRV am bassador recom ­ m ended that Soviet diplom ats not bring fam ilies and bulky luggage w ith them .16 W hile insisting on the expeditious arrival o f the Soviet diplom ats, the DRV leaders w ere even m ore interested in the presence in N orth V ietnam o f the So­ viet m ilitary m ission. The V ietnam ese am bassador said they “urgently needed advice o f the Soviet m ilitary representatives” fo r the im plem entation o f the cease-fire agreem ents.17 B ut the designation o f the Soviet m ilitary attaché re­ quired m ore tim e than the selection o f the Soviet am bassador. Finally on O cto­ ber 1 4 ,19S4, Novikov sought N orth V ietnam ese consent for the assignm ent o f G eneral Pavel Bunyashin as m ilitary attaché to the D R V .18

From Support to Cooperation

The delay in appointing a m ilitary attaché actually had not retarded Soviet m ilitary assistance to die DRV. D uring his m eeting in M oscow w ith K irill N ovikov, Pham Van D ong asked the Soviets to provide ships to die V ietnam ese fo r transporting V ietm inh troops from the South to the N orth o f V ietnam .19 In his m em orandum to V yacheslav M olotov, the head o f the Southeast A sia De­ partm ent recom m ended against such assistance, advising instead that ships from India, R an ee, England, and Poland be borrow ed.20 H ow ever, the C entral Com­ m ittee o f the Soviet Com m unist Party evidently decided that assistance to die DRV in regrouping its troops w ould facilitate the fulfillm ent o f the G eneva Ac­ cords. Soviet ships along w ith vessels from Poland w ere provided to the DRV.21 Soviet aid to the Ho Chi M inh regim e to help im plem ent the cease-fire agree­ m ents w as n o t the only S o viet-N orth V ietnam ese cooperation in the first m onths after the G eneva conference. The situation in V ietnam m ade Soviet eco­ nomic help no less vital for the fledgling Com m unist state. Splitting Vietnam into tw o parts w as not beneficial for the country, w hich had been ravaged by w ar fo r m ore than eight years. The tw o parts o f V ietnam —the N orth and the South— com plem ented each other econom ically. The northern zone possessed rich re­ serves o f m ineral resources (coal, anthracite, iron ore, vast apatite deposits, w ol­ fram , tin , uranium phosphate deposits, tungsten, and chrom ium ),22 and the southern part produced agricultural products (rice, rubber, spices, and textiles). Thus die division o f V ietnam created an econom ic im balance that m ade both sections dependent on external aid. The DRV possessed territory that was m ore developed industrially than the South. The textile plants o f Nam D inh, the cem ent plants o f H aiphong, the coal m ines o f Hon Gay and Dong Trieu, dozens o f pow er plants and pow er stations, locom otive and streetcar workshops, and flood control and irrigation system s re­ quired only proper m anagem ent to serve the new Com m unist regim e. B ut m an­ agem ent w as die very thing the DRV lacked. It had no educated cadres o f V iet­ nam ese engineers and technicians, and the new leaders did not trust the French engineers rem aining in V ietnam and w ere reluctant to exploit theữ know ledge and abilities. The situation for the V ietnam ese was com plicated by the fact that the departing French had dism anded all the equipm ent that w as possible to re­ move: dock cranes, railroad repair equipm ent, and even radium for the X -ray m achines in the hospitals in H anoi.23 The situation led the DRV authorities to ask for help from theừ pow erful al­ lies. This issue becam e urgent in the fall o f 19S4. On O ctober 28, Nguyen Long Bang visited the Soviet Foreign M inistry and inform ed officials there about the desperate situation in the DRV, which was on the brink o f fam ine because o f the loss o f the M ay and O ctober rice harvests. The Chinese had agreed to send the DRV rice. A m bassador Bang said, but the PRC did not have ships. The V iet­

From Support to Cooperation

nam ese asked fo r M oscow ’s consent to transport rice from C hina in som e o f the ships that had been provided by the Soviet U nion for the transport o f V ietm inh troops.24 The threat o f fam ine in the northern zone had m ade it clear to M oscow that the DRV could not survive w ithout sufficient econom ic assistance. In January 19SS, the Foreign M inistry’s Southeast A sia D epartm ent sent M olotov a mem­ orandum that drew his attention to A m bassador Lavrishchev’s conversations w ith DRV representatives in w hich they consistently brought up the subject o f econom ic and technical assistance to N orth V ietnam from friendly countries and, in particular, the Soviet U nion. The V ietnam ese had prepared and handed to the am bassador a “draft o f directives on general postw ar reconstruction o f the DRV econom y,” w hich assum ed friendly econom ic help from allies as a pre­ condition for the plan’s success. The m em orandum em phasized that the restora­ tion o f the N orth V ietnam ese econom y w as crucial as a factor in the struggle for the unification o f the country and that unification could not be achieved w ithout help from friendly countries. A m bassador Lavrishchev suggested that the Soviet U nion prom ise Ho C hi M inh econom ic aid but only after the final reconstruc­ tion plan w as w orked out.25 The m inistry in M oscow thought that Lavrishchev’s suggested response was unsatisfactory on the grounds that the issue o f form s and am ount o f help w as as yet unclear. But the Foreign M inistry officials w ere also eager to find out the C hinese attitude tow ard the problem o f aid to the DRV and, in particular, tow ard dispatching to the DRV advisers from countries other than C hina. The memo­ randum eventually prepared by the Southeast A sia D epartm ent recom m ended coordination w ith the Chinese com rades to reach a com m on position on this is­ sue.26 The C hinese apparently did not object to Soviet involvem ent in assisting N orth V ietnam econom ically, and on January 19,1955, the USSR Council o f M inisters decreed that, in order to evaluate the scope o f Soviet aid, M oscow would send to H anoi a group o f experts who w ould be assigned to prepare for the Soviet governm ent “m aterials and docum ents necessary for w orking out re­ spective agreem ents on the procedure and form s o f the use o f the gratuitous help in the am ount o f three hundred m illion rubles provided by the Soviet U nion to the D em ocratic R epublic o f V ietnam fo r the restoration o f its econom y in Ỉ955-1956.”27 D uring theừ trip the experts w ere to pay special attention to the situation in the m ining industry and to sea and river transportation, including conditions in the ports. They w ere requested to analyze the financial and trade policy o f the new regim e. The directives to the Soviet specialists did not rec­ ommend that they dem onstrate an “excessive interest” in the questions that w ere the subject o f the DRV-China aid agreem ent, but they w ere advised to m aintain

From Support to Cooperation

“necessary and friendly contact w ith PRC advisers on the issues relating to the study o f econom y o f the DRV.”28 The Soviet delegation’s visit to the N orth o f V ietnam produced a draft agree­ m ent on Soviet aid for the restoration o f N orth V ietnam ese econom y.29 The draft envisaged Soviet assistance to the DRV for the repaừ and building up o f industrial and com m unal enterprises, for the organization o f a m eteorological service, geological exploration w orks, and m edical services. The Soviet Union prom ised to deliver goods necessary to the econom y and the population o f the DRV. The am ount rem ained at three hundred m illion rubles. The draft prepared by the Soviet experts becam e the basis o f the agreem ent signed during the July 19SS visit to the Soviet U nion o f the DRV governm ent delegation headed by Ho C hi M inh. The first official visit o f Ho Chi M inh as head o f a sovereign state w as a tri­ um ph for the leader o f the V ietnam ese Com m unists after the hum iliations he had suffered during his 19S0 and 1952 visits to M oscow and his m eetings w ith Stalin. Regardless o f his changed circum stances, Ho Chi M inh had no illusions about the obstacles that existed on the way to cooperation betw een the tw o coun­ tries. The principal obstacle was the Soviet fear lest the Soviet-DRV alliance un­ derm ine the process o f détente inaugurated by the Soviet collective leadership in its relations w ith the W est. A s a result, M oscow was extrem ely sensitive to any steps that could shatter the fragile peace in Indochina established by the G eneva conference. Therefore the fulfillm ent o f the provisions o f the cease-fire agreem ents by M ay 1955 m ade a good basis for the talks betw een the tw o allies. The C entral Com m ittee o f the W orkers’ Party o f Vietnam (W PV) had confirm ed to M oscow in advance by telegram from H anoi that the last units o f French troops had been evacuated from H aiphong; at the sam e tim e the V ietm inh troops had been successfully transferred from South Vietnam to the N orth.30 In its re­ sponse, the K rem lin heartily congratulated its Vietnam ese com rades and ex­ pressed its aw areness that they w ould be able to com plete the “tense struggle” for a unified dem ocratic V ietnam .31 A nother factor that m ight have helped overcom e Soviet reluctance to align closely w ith H anoi was the grow ing u.s. presence in Indochina. Soon after the G eneva conference the Eisenhow er adm inistration m ade its “m ost crucial V iet­ nam decisions.”32 On A ugust 12,1954, the Ư.S. N ational Security Council ap­ proved a new policy statem ent for Southeast A sia (NSC 5429). The docum ent recounted the dam age inflicted to u.s. prestige by the recent French reverses in Indochina and declared that it was im perative that the U nited States “protect its position and restore its prestige in the Far East by a new initiative in Southeast A sia, w here the situation m ust be stabilized as soon as possible to prevent fur­ ther losses to Communism through (1) creeping expansion and subversion, or

From Support to Cooperation

(2) overt aggression.”33 W ashington was going to achieve this goal by m eans o f a new m ilitary alliance, a Southeast A sia Treaty O rganization (SEATO). The u.s. adm inistration also decided to exclude the French as the interm ediary in its contacts w ith South V ietnam and assum ed an obligation to train South V iet­ nam ese m ilitary forces. O n A ugust 18, the State D epartm ent notified the French governm ent that W ashington w ould authorize its m ilitary m ission in V ietnam to train the V ietnam ese.34 In early Septem ber, eight pow ers— the U nited States, U nited K ingdom , France, A ustralia, New Z ealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines— adopted in M anila the Pacific C harter “that affirm ed the right o f self-determ ina­ tion and expressed the intent o f the signatories to resist all C om m unist attem pts in the treaty area to subvert freedom .”35 H ie so-called M anila Pact led to the es­ tablishm ent o f SEATO on February 19, Ỉ9SS. By M ay 19SS, it had already be­ com e clear that U .S. influence in Indochina “was rapidly superseding that o f France.” D uring the talks in M ay betw een France and the U nited States in W ashington, D ulles indicated that the u.s. adm inistration w ould no longer ad­ here to a jo in t Franco-A m erican policy tow ard V ietnam .36 Thus the prospects for any future collaboration betw een the form er colonial pow er and the new pa­ trons o f “free A sia” appeared bleak. These developm ents had not escaped the attention o f Soviet policym akers w ho, during m eetings w ith foreign representatives as w ell as in analytical doc­ um ents, expressed theừ concern over u.s. penetration into Indochina. Because India was one o f the countries responsible for supervising the im plem entation o f the G eneva A ccords, Indian leaders were m ost receptive to these Soviet com ­ m ents. In an A pril 1955 conversation w ith the Indian am bassador to M oscow, Kum ar M enon, Soviet prem ier N ikolai B ulganin revealed the K rem lin’s irrita­ tion over W ashington’s policy in Southeast Asia: It is annoying that the large tasks com pleted by the countries that w ant détente in international relations w o e practically underm ined by other countries. Last year India, die Soviet U nion, and C hina m ade great efforts to achieve the G eneva agreem ents, and this was done not only to stop the w ar in Indochina, but also to reach détente in international relations as a w hole— Now w hen an agreem ent on the Indochina question concluded, intrigues continue along the southeast borders o f C hina, in w hich the in itiato r is the U nited States. The sam e can be said about the situation in the region o f In­ dochina. The A m ericans have kicked o r are kicking th e F rench O ta there a t th e expense o f b lo o d a n d su fferin g s o f th e p eo p les o f In ­ dochina.37

From Support to Cooperation

A t a m eeting betw een B ulganin and Indian prem ier Jaw aharlal N ehru, they also discussed die issue o f U .S. policy and strongarm tactics. The Soviet leader spoke again about M oscow ’s desire to am eliorate the w orld situation and its contribution to the settlem ent o f die A ustrian question, to the end o f the conflict w ith Y ugoslavia, and to the Soviet invitation issued to Konrad A denauer to visit M oscow . “H owever,” Bulganin com plained, “the Soviet governm ent could do nothing w ith those m en from the U nited States w ho w ant to prove, by any m eans, that they could achieve som ething by theừ policy o f strength— [S]uch a policy could bring nothing good to the U nited States itself.” N ehru agreed w ith his counterpart’s point and added that he did “not understand w hy a m an w ith strong m uscles should publicly dem onstrate his m uscles all the tim e.”38 A l­ though they did not raise the issue o f Indochina and V ietnam openly this tim e, die Soviet and Indian prem iers m ost likely had it in mind. Soviet anxiety over developm ents in Indochina w as also evident in the open­ ing passage o f a m em orandum that Foreign M inister M olotov sent the CPSU C entral C om m ittee on M ay 19: A t the present tim e the activity o f the Am ericans has increased in South Vietnam ; it is aim ed at ousting the French from Vietnam . The Am ericans are trying to underm ine the econom ic position o f France. They are w orking actively to oust the French from the arm y, trying to assign theữ advisers to the m ost im portant posts. They strengthen th eừ political influence by bribing not only political leaders but w hole organizations.39 M oscow ’s concern w as understandable because one o f the prem ises o f peace in the region, the French presence, began disappearing. The grow ing u.s. influ­ ence w ould dem and a Soviet response and its deeper involvem ent in a conflict in a rem ote region. But N orth V ietnam welcom ed this situation that the Krem­ lin w anted to avoid. Ho Chi M inh undoubtedly factored in the grow ing U .S. in­ fluence w hen he w as planning his visit to the Soviet Union. C ounting on Soviet apprehension about the increasingly active U .S. role in the region, the N orth V ietnam ese leader decided to probe M oscow’s attitude to­ w ard m ilitary cooperation w ith the DRV. In a conversation w ith the Soviet am­ bassador in H anoi, Ho raised the question o f V o N guyen G iap’s inclusion in the delegation to M oscow. Ho Chi M inh characteristically expressed his opinion that the DRV m inister o f defense should not visit B eijing and M oscow. He also told the am bassador he was going to bring up before the Central Com m ittees o f Soviet and Chinese Com m unist parties the question o f agreeing to a plan for the D RV ’s defense. He continued that it w ould therefore be expedient to convene in B eijing a m eeting o f responsible m ilitary officials from the USSR, the PRC, and

From Support to Cooperation

the DRV w ith G iap’s participation.40 Thus, w hile he m ade a concession on G iap’s trip to M oscow, he also put forw ard a dem and for som e form o f m ilitary cooperation. M oscow ’s response w as evasive. A pparently, the question o f close coopera­ tion in the m ilitary sphere had been discussed w ith the Vietnam ese several tim es before. Therefore the Soviet Foreign M inistry found it w ise to ask the m ilitary’s advice. The m ilitary’s response was unequivocal. In a letter, the general staff drew the attention o f the Foreign M inistry to the fact that Chinese m ilitary ad­ visers to the People’s Army o f V ietnam (PAV) “know specifics o f that country and its arm y quite w ell. They have m any years o f experience in assisting the V ietnam ese com rades on the questions o f the buildup o f arm ed forces, the train­ ing and education o f soldiers.” As to help from the Soviet U nion, the letter re­ ceived from the general staff continues, “the Vietnam ese com rades could at any tim e receive necessary consultation from US through the com m and o f the Peo­ ple’s Liberation Army o f China as it is practicing in the present tim e.”41 The So­ viet Foreign M inistry then cabled the Soviet am bassador in Hanoi; the m in­ istry’s response avoided any clear-cut prom ises or obligations on M oscow ’s part. A fter agreeing w ith Ho Chi M inh that it w ould be inexpedient for V o Nguyen G iap to com e to the Soviet capital, the Foreign M inistry w ent on: “A s to the question o f convoking in B eijing a m eeting o f Soviet and Chinese m ili­ tary officials together w ith Vo Nguyen G iap, inform Com. Ho Chi M inh that this question, in your opinion, could be considered during his visit to M oscow after having taken into account the Chinese com rades’ view s on this issue.”42 W hile the N orth V ietnam ese governm ent delegation was visiting C hina, the Soviets w orked out theừ positions for the negotiations w ith Ho Chi M inh. The Foreign M inistry together w ith the M inistry o f Foreign Trade and the M inistry o f D efense prepared directives for the Soviet-N orth Vietnam talks that were sent to the CPSU C entral Com m ittee for approval. The principal objective o f the negotiations, as form ulated in the directives, was; [F]urther developm ent o f friendly political, econom ic, and cultural cooperation betw een the USSR and the D em ocratic R epublic o f V ietnam w ith the purpose o f all possible strengthening o f the Demo­ cratic Republic o f V ietnam and its international status, the unifica­ tion o f V ietnam on the basis o f dem ocracy, the com plete im plem en­ tation o f the G eneva A ccords on Indochina, and the earliest possible restoration o f the people’s econom y o f the Republic.43 The Soviet U nion w as planning to render necessary assistance to support the DRV’s struggle for the unification o f the country. M oscow approved o f H anoi’s intentions to cooperate w ith the French on this m atter and advised the V iet­

From Support to Cooperation

nam ese to agree on die existence in South V ietnam for the tim e being o f a “po­ litical regim e different from the regim e in the DRV (a republican regim e w ith the participation o f the French capital in the sphere o f econom y and a slow er tem po o f dem ocratic reform s).”44 N orth V ietnam ese cooperation w ith the French w as necessary as a counterw eight to die U .S. influence in South V iet­ nam .45 On the question o f the DRV’s cooperation w ith China and the Soviet U nion, the directives contain the follow ing passage, which reflects the essence o f the K rem lin’s policy in Indochina: “G ive Ho Chi M inh to understand that on prac­ tical questions relating to rendering aid to the Dem ocratic Republic o f V ietnam , it is expedient for the V ietnam ese com rades to consult and ask for the advice o f the Chinese friends m ore often, taking into account that the latter are fam iliar w ith the situation in V ietnam and that the DRV governm ent has to solve at this tim e the problem s that have been recendy resolved o r are being solved in C hina.”46 The Soviet leadership decided to reject the idea o f jo in t Sino-Soviet econom ic and m ilitary m issions to N orth V ietnam on the grounds that “practice o f cooperation betw een the Chinese and V ietnam ese friends has already been established and has proved its value, w hich does not exclude, o f course, render­ ing technical assistance to the DRV on the part o f the Soviet U nion.”47 Thus M oscow did not w ant to abandon the division-of-responsibilities prin­ ciple in its relations w ith the DRV. This was also evident in the instructions con­ cerning concrete issues o f bilateral relations. A lthough the Soviet Union was ready to allocate three hundred m illion rubles for the restoration o f the N orth V ietnam ese econom y (in the final com m uniqué this am ount w as increased to four hundred m illion rubles48), help the DRV in the construction o f industry and the training o f V ietnam ese youth in Soviet colleges and universities, and send its advisers to N orth Vietnam , nothing like the Soviet-Chinese Treaty o f Friend­ ship, A lliance, and M utual A ssistance was on the agenda o f the Soviet leaders. On all questions relating to political and m ilitary cooperation w ith the DRV, M oscow was prepared to act only through the Chinese allies. To com pensate for theừ reluctant relations w ith the “V ietnam ese friends,” the Soviet leadership planned to organize an im pressive reception cerem ony for the DRV delegation from the m om ent it landed in the USSR. A t Ho Chi M inh’s stopovers in Irkutsk, N ovosibirsk, and Sverdlovsk, he was to be greeted by the highest local officiais and hundreds o f Soviet citizens. A ll the members o f the CPSU C entral C om m ittee Presidium had to m eet the delegation at the capital’s cenư al airport, w ith N ikita K hrushchev, N ikolai B ulganin, and K lim ent V oroshilov, the chairm an o f the Presidium o f the Suprem e Soviet o f the USSR (analogous to the position o f president in a W estern country) am ong them . In the group greeting Ho Chi M inh w ere the heads o f alm ost all leading m inistries and

From Support to Cooperation

all deputies o f the foreign m inister. Three to four thousand M uscovites w ere gathered at die airport to hail tile leading representatives o f the “heroic people o f Vietnam .”49 The program fo r the visit w as likew ise im pressive. O n the second day after his arrival. Ho Chi M inh w as to talk to V oroshilov and B ulganin as w ell as ne­ gotiate w ith the Soviet leadership and m inisters. A nother m eeting w ith the So­ viet leaders was planned for the fifth day o f the visit. A reception for five hun­ dred to six hundred guests w as to be organized in the K rem lin in honor o f the delegation. The V ietnam ese w ere invited to see the A ll-U nion A gricultural Ex­ hibition and an atom ic pow er station.50 The splendid reception for the N orth V ietnam ese delegation was designed not only to conceal Soviet reluctance to develop full-scale cooperation w ith the DRV but also to use the H anoi regim e to put obstacles in the way o f u.s. pene­ tration in the region. A lthough determ ined to avoid m ilitary obligations to H anoi, M olotov in M ay suggested that the W orkers’ Party o f V ietnam “pay m ore attention to the w ork in South V ietnam w ith the purpose o f the intensifi­ cation and rallying o f patriotic and anti-im perialist forces in that part o f V iet­ nam .”31 The Soviet foreign m inister prepared a draft o f a telegram to H o advis­ ing him “to use the situation in South V ietnam for the strengthening o f public forces there who are for the unification o f the country on the dem ocratic basis and who are for national independence o f the country.”52 In other w ords, the So­ viets found it useful to w ork w ith the South V ietnam ese population and even act through religious sects in the South in order to instigate anti-A m erican feelings in the country. W hen he arrived in M oscow, Ho Chi M inh subm itted to his hosts a list o f questions on a broad range o f problem s relating to DRV internal and external policy. To H o’s question o f w ho was the “principal enem y o f the V ietnam ese people,”53 the Foreign M inistry responded: ‘T e ll Com. Ho Chi M inh that, in our opinion, at the present tim e the principal and m ost dangerous enem y o f the V iet­ nam ese people is A m erican im perialism , w hich undertakes active actions aim ed at the w recking o f the G eneva agreem ents and the transform ation o f V ietnam into an Am erican colony.” The m inistry em phasized that, “in the Soviet gov­ ernm ent’s opinion, it would be necessary to direct the efforts o f the V ietnam ese com rades tow ard the intensification o f w ork am ong all strata o f the population o f South V ietnam in order to counter the A m erican influence.”54 A lthough these Soviet instructions, had they been known to the W est, w ould certainly have been treated as instigators o f the subversive activities in South V ietnam that led to the V ietnam W ar, they fell far short o f H anoi’s strategy in the South in later years and w ithin the custom s o f international politics, which include m anipulation o f public opinion in other states.55 M oscow w anted to

From Support to Cooperation

lim it N orth V ietnam ese activity tow ard South V ietnam to a secret propaganda w ar against tile Saigon regim e, w hile not excluding som e sort o f cooperation be­ tw een the N orth and the South. Consequently the Soviets could not approve public dem onstrations o f hostility by the N orth V ietnam ese regim e vis-à-vis its southern counterpart A s early as D ecem ber 1954, the head o f the Southeast A sia D epartm ent K ir­ ill N ovikov, addressed a m em orandum to M olotov, in w hich he expressed his concern that inform ation agencies in the DRV alw ays characterized the Ngo D inh D iem regim e as a “puppet clique,” “lackey o f A m erican im perialism ," o r a sim ilar epithet. N ovikov suggested that because, according to the G eneva agreem ents, the tw o V ietnam ese governm ents w ould consult in July 1955 and hold general elections in 1956, the Soviet U nion should “recom m end carefully to the governm ent o f the D em ocratic Republic o f V ietnam not to resort to epi­ thets o f various kinds in relation to both N go D inh Diem and his governm ent”56 In sum, the Soviet-N orth V ietnam ese negotiations in M oscow dem onstrated that the m ost that the Soviet leaders w ere prepared to do fo r the DRV was pro­ vide political and m oral support in the struggle for im plem entation o f the provi­ sions o f the final declaration o f the G eneva conference, especially the general elections and the assistance tow ard the restoration and developm ent o f the DRV econom y. The jo in t com m uniqué signed upon the com pletion o f Ho Chi M inh’s visit to the USSR in the sum m er o f 1955 contained the usual form al words about the unity o f view s o f the leaders o f both countries, the international situation and prospects o f bilateral cooperation, theữ unanim ity o f opinion on the execution o f the G eneva A ccords, and th en hopes for further strengthening o f peace in the w orld and a relaxation o f international tensions. The com m uniqué also stressed tile im portance o f consultations betw een N orth and South V ietnam and con­ dem ned “attem pts to include South Vietnam , Laos, and Cam bodia in the zone covered by the aggressive m ilitary bloc in Southeast A sia (SEATO) w hich was in contradiction to the G eneva A ccords.”57 The U nited States w as not m entioned by nam e in the com m uniqué; how ever, the Soviet and N orth V ietnam ese governm ents “drew attention” to the “at­ tem pts” on the part o f “som e foreign countries” to interfere in the affairs o f South V ietnam , Laos, and Cam bodia and to “thrust on those countries” m ilitary agreem ents incom patible w ith the G eneva A ccords.58 The Soviets prom ised to raise the issue o f political settlem ent in V ietnam at the upcom ing sum m it o f the four great pow ers that w as scheduled for late July in G eneva.59 The M oscow negotiations in 1955 apparently did not satisfy H anoi’s expec­ tation for a full-fledged alliance w ith the Soviet Union. M oscow was unw illing to jeopardize its process o f détente w ith the W est and underm ine the G eneva set­ tlem ent by any display o f an open alignm ent w ith the Com m unist regim e in the

From Support to Cooperation

N orth o f Vietnam . Y et it could not disregard the needs o f a friendly regim e in Southeast A sia either. The K rem lin tried to solve this dilem m a by developing its cooperation w ith the DRV in the econom ic sphere and encouraging the struggle for the im plem entation o f the G eneva A ccords. But by declaring the Soviet U nion’s adherence to the agreem ents reached in Geneva, Soviet leaders w ere actually signaling theữ satisfaction w ith the preservation o f the status quo in In­ dochina as established in July 1954.

5. Neither Peace nor War . . . Since the Government in South Viet-Nam adhered unflinchingly to the position that it was not a party to the Geneva Agreem ent or Final Declaration and therefore under no obligation to discuss elections and to the view that in any case it was unrealistic to think that any elections held in Communist North Viet-Nam could be free, there was nothing that could be done.

Documents relating to British Involvement in the Indo-Chlna Conflict, 1945-1956'

H o Chi M inh was still in M oscow w hen, on July 1 6 ,19SS, South Vietnam ese prem ier N go D inh Diem broadcast his rejection o f elections in Vietnam . D iem ’s rebuff was a response to Pham Van D ong’s June statem ent about the DRV’s w illingness to hold a consultative conference on elections. R eferring to the fact that his governm ent did not sign the G eneva agreem ents that w ere concluded “against the w ill o f the V ietnam ese people,” D iem declared that he was not bound in any way by them . Although he did not reject the principle o f free elec­ tions as a m eans o f achieving the unification o f Vietnam , he considered free elections im possible as long as there was a Com m unist regim e in the N orth.2 D iem ’s broadcast occurred four days before the deadline im posed by the fi­ nal declaration o f the G eneva conference, w hich prescribed in paragraph seven that consultations on future elections in V ietnam w ere to be held “betw een the com petent representative authorities o f the tw o zones from 20 July, Ỉ9SS, on­ w ards.”3 South V ietnam ’s rejection w as hardly a surprise to the Hanoi leadership and its Soviet and C hinese allies. A lthough hope alw ays existed that the South V iet­ nam ese regim e— to preserve the appearance o f com pliance w ith the G eneva A ccords— w ould at least agree to consultations about general elections in V iet-

Neither Peece nor W ar

Dam, nobody believed that the elections them selves w ould ever take place. V ic­ to r B ator, an author w ho analyzed the G eneva A ccords and th eừ im plem enta­ tion, asks: W ould Ho Chi M inh let his country slide into the area controlled by A m erica? W ould D iem be w illing to disappear behind the bam boo curtain? W ould C om m unist C hina allow H o Chi M inh— even if H anoi w anted—to align him setf w ith the Free W orld? O r, for that m atter, w ould the U nited States look w ith indifference on Diem m aking a deal w ith Ho Chi M inh, [M ao Zedong], or [Zhou Enlai]?4 B ator concludes: “The answ ers to all these questions could only be no." Several reasons account for such an outcom e. First, the G eneva docum ents w ere “extrem ely vague in their references to a political settlem ent and to nation­ w ide elections.”3 The final declaration that contained provisions about the even­ tual political settlem ent in V ietnam w as not signed by any o f the conference par­ ticipants. M oreover, South V ietnam ese officials protested from the outset that they had not been consulted about the cease-fire agreem ent and the declaration insofar as they covered V ietnam . The U nited States only took note o f the G eneva docum ents, prom ising not to upset the settlem ent by threats or use o f force. In addition, the G eneva conference had not w orked out effective m achin­ ery for im plem entation o f the accords. The cease-fire agreem ent envisaged the establishm ent o f international com m issions on supervision and control (the In­ ternational C ontrol Com m issions, or IC Cs) com posed o f representatives o f In­ dia, Canada, and Poland, w ith India occupying the chair. The m ain task o f the ICC for V ietnam w ould be to supervise the fulfillm ent o f the cease-fire, the re­ grouping o f troops, the nonviolation o f the dem arcation line as w ell as prevent the introduction o f arm s and w ar m atériel into both zones o f V ietnam .6 In addi­ tion to these principal obligations, the com m ission mem bers w ere to be respon­ sible for arranging for the supervision o f the all-V ietnam elections. To ensure the effectiveness o f the com m ission’s activities, the G eneva con­ ference had specified in paragraph thirteen o f the final declaration that partici­ pants “agree to consult one another on any question which m ay be referred to them by the International Supervisory C om m ission.. . "7 But it was unclear w hat form such consultations w ould take. In fact, the historical introduction to the docum ents relating to B ritish involvem ent in the Indochina conflict stated, “the Conference devised no standing m achinery through w hich m em ber States m ight discharge theữ responsibility.”8 Eventually such m achinery was devised, and the foreign m inisters o f G reat B ritain and the Soviet Union— both countries w ere responsible fo r financing the com m issions in Indochina—becam e the channel for the transm ission o f reports from the ICCs to the other conference

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participants and to the referees, to whom com plaints o f violations o f the G eneva agreem ents w ere addressed. T he role o f the cochairs w as as am biguous as the w ording o f the conference docum ents, how ever. M[T ]heừ authority rested on no clear foundation. Indeed, the A greem ents and the Final D eclaration are oblivious o f th eừ very exis­ tence; and though they becam e virtually the executive arm o f the conference, there w as no sanction for th eừ authorities except the practical needs o f the sit­ uation.’*9 This am biguity o f th eừ position notw ithstanding, neither the Soviets nor B ritish opposed th e ừ continuing leading role in the im plem entation o f the G eneva agreem ents. Both V yacheslav M olotov and Anthony Eden w ere deter­ m ined not to allow the settlem ent in Indochina be underm ined, w hich w ould push die w orld back to the situation fraught w ith the danger o f w ar. For Eden, “mené than other statesm en present, G eneva cam e close to being the m odel C old W ar solution. He had a big stake in its su c c e ss.. . .” 10 A s for M olotov, the G eneva conference w as die last gleam in the com ing tw ilight o f his pow er in die K rem lin, and he m ight have been anxious to rem ove any shadow from i t The risk o f failure for M oscow and London w as negligible, for no one could re­ proach the cochairs for poor fulfillm ent o f theừ obligations because no such obligations had been fixed by the G eneva docum ents. As a result, when diese “fathers” o f the settlem ent in Indochina left office— Eden to becom e prim e m in­ ister and M olotov to sink into obscurity—the cochairs lost the personal aspect and becam e only routine duties o f the serving foreign m inisters. Y et neither the ICC, w hich w as responsible for supervision o f the general elections, nor the cochairs, w ho served m ainly as go-betw eens for the confer­ ence participants, possessed the instrum ents necessary to enforce the political provisions o f the G eneva agreem ents. W ho w ould pressure N go D inh Diem ? The Soviet U nion did not have diplom atic relations w ith South Vietnam . The B ritish, although they had recognized the Saigon regim e, did not enjoy any in­ fluence over its leaders. The only country that could im pose its w ill on the South V ietnam ese leaders was the U nited States, but its leaders w ere least enthusias­ tic about the outcom e o f the G eneva conference, and the Eisenhow er adm inis­ tration refused to be directly associated w ith its agreem ents. It regarded the al­ location o f even part o f the territory o f V ietnam to the Com m unists as a betrayal o f the principles o f the policy o f containm ent, and it w as determ ined to prevent Ho C hi M inh from extending his pow er farther south than the seventeenth par­ allel. The U nited States intended to use any m eans necessary to create in the South a bastion against Com m unist penetration o f the region. A nd for W ash­ ington the political provisions o f the G eneva agreem ents had becom e an obsta­ cle to its plans.

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A lthough the U nited States alw ays tried to present itself as a cham pion o f free elections— com pared w ith Soviet tyranny— no one doubted that, if such elec­ tions were to take place in V ietnam , a V ietm inh victory w ould have been the outcom e.11 A lthough the B ritish advocated holding the elections and risking a V ietm inh v icto ry ,12 the Eisenhow er adm inistration, especially Secretary o f State John Foster D ulles, found this unacceptable. The best solution for the U nited States w as to neither oppose the elections nor risk them . M ost U.S. offi­ cials w anted to m anipulate the election issue: “Saigon could seize the propa­ ganda advantage by announcing its w illingness to begin talks on July 20, in preparation for a 1956 vote. If D iem insisted on num erous safeguards to guar­ antee a free election, the DRV w ould probably balk and thus appear to be the obstacle to the election process.“ 13 Diem in fact chose a m ore straightforw ard way. On July 16, because he considered fair elections in V ietnam im possible, he sim ply spoke out against negotiations w ith the Com m unist regim e o f Ho Chi M inh on the elections issue. To prove it was serious about its stand against elections, the South V iet­ nam ese governm ent w ent even further. O n July 20, the anniversary o f the G eneva agreem ents, it proclaim ed a day o f national sham e. T hat m orning a crow d o f several hundred young m en arm ed w ith sticks, knives, and other weapons that could easily be found in theừ backyards attacked the hotels where the mem bers o f the ICC w ere staying. The crow d broke open room s, cut tele­ phone connections, and destroyed and stole personal belongings o f the ICC staff. An Indian m em ber o f the ICC for Laos who was visiting Saigon was at­ tacked and injured. The dem onstrators also burned the com m ission’s cars, which w ere parked outside the hotels. Sim ilar dem onstrations occurred at sev­ eral places in South Vietnam . In no case did the South V ietnam ese authorities take m easures to bring die rioters under control.14 The tim ing o f D iem ’s statem ent on the elections and o f the dem onstrations against the G eneva agreem ents could not have been w orse. On July 18, the heads o f the governm ents o f the four great pow ers—France, G reat B ritain, the Soviet U nion, and the U nited States— gathered in G eneva for their first sum m it m eeting since the end o f the Second W orld W ar. An outright violation, such as D iem ’s, o f international agreem ents was regarded by those who w anted a m ore favorable atm osphere in international relations as a threat to th en plans. Summ it participants issued strong m essages condem ning the South V ietnam ese govern­ m ent and dem anding that it take all necessary action for the proper functioning o f the ICC. But theữ declarations in favor o f all-V ietnam elections seem ed to be ju st a form ality. None was prepared at that tim e to m ove farther. Even the Sovi­ ets were reluctant to spoil “the spirit o f G eneva,’’ the only result o f the 1955 summit.

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T he d raft o f the directives to the Soviet delegation show ed that the issue o f V ietnam ese elections w as not on the list o f Soviet priorities at the 19SS sum ­ m it B efore the directives w ere drafted, the Soviets started receiving indica­ tions from the W est that the elections in V ietnam w ere hardly possible in V ietnam 's existing situation. F or exam ple, a Polish representative to the ICC, R . M elkhior, visited the Soviet em bassy in H anoi in January 1955 and con­ fided that a prom inent m em ber o f the B ritish L abour party doubted that the elections w ere possible since a proper political clim ate fo r them did not exist in V ietnam . N go D inh D iem could not com e to H anoi, w hile H o C hi M inh had no opportunity to go to Saigon. If H o C hi M inh w on the election. D iem w ould not be able to form an opposition, and in the opposite circum stances H o C hi M inh could be repressed. The L abourite believed that D iem w as ready to start negotiations w ith the DRV in July and that he had the support o f the Ư.S. am ­ bassador in Saigon, J. Law ton C ollins, because D iem intended to accuse the H anoi regim e o f suppressing freedom and sabotaging further talks. R egarding B ritish policy, the L abour Party m em ber confirm ed that, although England w as supporting anti-C om m unist regim es in A sia, it w ould not oppose regim e change as a result o f internal processes and w ould not resort to m ilitary inter­ vention.19 T his B ritish p o litician 's opinions, relayed to the Soviets, w ere close to reality, and it w as not the only confirm ation o f W estern plans regarding V ietnam to reach M oscow . W ith this know ledge and unw illing to overem phasize the issue o f V ietnam at the G eneva sum m it o f 1955, w hich w as to be devoted to m ore global and urgent problem s o f East-W est relations, M oscow took a passive attitude tow ard the question o f the V ietnam elections. D irectives from M oscow confined the Soviet delegation at G eneva to registering the fact that the fulfillm ent o f the m ilitary clauses o f the G eneva agreem ents o f 1954 had created a favorable situation for political settlem ent in Indochina. The Soviet delegation had to “draw attention o f die conference participants to the political and econom ic chaos that existed in South V ietnam as a result o f foreign interference and that N go D inh D iem ’s governm ent pursues a policy aim ed at the disruption o f the general elections in V ietnam in 1956.” The Soviets planned to state theừ support for holding a con­ sultative conference betw een representatives o f both parts o f V ietnam w ith the help o f the ICC, in case such necessity w ould arise.16 It is notew orthy that, in die course o f the w ork on the draft, all accusations against the U nited States w ere elim inated from the text o f the directives, additional confirm ation that M oscow did not w ant to allow the issue o f V ietnam to destroy w hatever prospects there w ere fo r norm alization o f relations w ith the W est. The only problem that was resolved at the conference o f four great pow ers in G eneva in 1955 w as the transfer o f the duties o f the chairm an o f the 1954 G eneva confer­

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ence from Anthony Eden to H arold M acm illan, w ho had succeeded Eden a t the Foreign O ffice.17 A lthough the Soviets displayed passivity at die sum m it and did not press die V ietnam question, they w ere determ ined not to abandon it entirely. A t G eneva in 1955 Eden assured M olotov that B ritain, France, and the U nited States w ould recom m end to D iem that he com m unicate his position on elections directly to the D R V .18 M olotov, reassured, recom m ended th at H anoi request th at the cochairs urge die Saigon governm ent to agree to a consultative conference w ith the DRV even after D iem ’s refusal on A ugust 9 to engage the Hanoi regim e in direct correspondence.19 The result w as a letter from Pham V an D ong to the cochairs requesting th eữ intervention in securing the im plem entation o f die po­ litical term s o f the G eneva agreem ents. B ut D iem rem ained adam ant He had W ashington’s tacit approval, and he did not react to public pronouncem ents by his m asters in die U nited States. A B ritish official assessed D iem : “So long as M r. D iem believes he can rely on A m erican support w hether o r not he takes A m erican advice, I doubt w hether he w ill be de­ flected from his obstinate purpose.”20 W hat W ashington did not expect w as the D RV ’s behavior in these circum stances. “From the north cam e reasonablesounding statem ents and an underlying m oderate position that m ade it increas­ ingly difficult to show ‘that the failure to secure free elections is the fault o f the C om m unists.’”21 This reasonable attitude rem ained the characteristic feature o f H anoi’s stance until after all hopes for a peaceful solution o f the problem o f unification had dis­ appeared. In the fall o f 1955, the V ietnam ese Com m unists had not yet aban­ doned plans to achieve unity o f the country under theữ rule through elections. In a conversation w ith a Soviet diplom at, a m em ber o f the Politburo o f the W PV, Truong C hinh, shared his ow n and his colleagues’ view s on the prospects o f unification. To achieve this goal, he said, there w o e “tw o form s and tw o m ethods o f the struggle”: those o f peaceful struggle, and those o f force and vi­ olence. “In the present political situation,” said Truong Chinh, “the m ost prof­ itable fo r the V ietnam ese people are the m ethod and the form o f peaceful strug­ gle.” H anoi’s use o f peaceful struggle w as conditioned, said the W PV leader, “by our adherence to the spirit and letter o f the G eneva agreem ents.” Truong C hinh w arned, how ever, that this did not m ean they w ere incapable o f using vi­ olence. But the use o f peaceful m eans, he repeated, in the existing political sit­ uation w as m ore profitable. Then Truong Chinh touched upon how to achieve the unity o f the country peacefully. “V ietnam was tem porarily divided in tw o zones,” he argued. “Each zone has its own political system ____Each zone has its own governm ent and arm ed forces. Under such conditions neither zone can force the other and gam

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the upper hand. Any such attem pt w ould lead to w a r.. . . B ut w e have to choose w hat kind o f unification it w ill be: an im m ediate and com plete unification o r an incom plete, partial unification. We are not demanding an unmediate and com­

plete unification. We even agree to a pro form a unification, and this ừ still bet­ ter them the division o f the country."22 Tm ong C hinh further elaborated on die m ethods o f such a unification. There m ust be general elections, a fin w hich a national assem bly o f the w hole o f V iet­ nam w ould be created. This assem bly w ould elect the central governm ent and w ould adopt a constitution accepted in both zones. Both die N ational A ssem bly and the governm ent w ould include representatives o f both zones. Arm ed forces o f each zone w ould have th eữ own rules and internal regulations but they w ould represent tw o parts o f the one arm y. Internal policy w ould be organized in each zone. They w ould together, Chinh said, guarantee political freedom s and agrar­ ian reform , but reform in the South w ould be different from in the N orth. Such a unification, Truong C hinh concluded, w ould not lead to com plete unity, and the governing circles in South V ietnam w ould see that they still retained theữ positions and advantages.23 Even after the failure o f their attem pts to begin consultations w ith the Diem regim e, the N orth V ietnam ese leaders clearly did not abandon theừ intentions to unify the country peacefully. M oreover, they w ere prepared to be flexible dur­ ing the process. T heừ behavior did not support the im age o f intransigent and m ilitant C om m unists that w as created by u.s. and South V ietnam ese propa­ ganda. Q uite to tire contrary, it w as D iem w ho proved his intransigence and rigidity throughout the period leading up to the failure o f general elections in Vietnam . O n O ctober 2 3 ,19SS, the D iem governm ent held a referendum in South V iet­ nam that approved o f the rem oval o f Bao Dai as chief o f state and his replace­ m ent by N go D inh Diem. Three days later, South V ietnam was proclaim ed a re­ public w ith D iem as its president. D iem announced his plans to hold a unilateral election o f a national assem bly on M arch 4 ,1 9 5 6 . This assem bly was to draw up a constitution for the new republic. These unilateral steps by D iem under­ m ined w hat rem ained o f the political provisions o f the G eneva A ccords. States that had approved these accords did not act decisively to take issue w ith Diem . W estern countries led by the U nited States recognized the new republic by the end o f 1955. G reat B ritain was am ong the countries that did not risk its alliance w ith W ashington by openly protesting violations o f the G eneva agree­ m ents. A rthur Combs w rote, “As the year drew to a close, Anthony Eden and his governm ent, finally resigned to the failure o f the accords, abandoned their last trench line— The B ritish w ere now m erely casting about for som e way to forestall public adm ission o f G eneva’s death.”24 In N ovem ber 1955, D enis

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A llen, a senior Foreign O ffice official, advised the B ritish governm ent to dis­ tance itsetf from its dudes as a sponsor o f the G eneva accords.23 As a result, when he was asked on D ecem ber 21 about D iem 's statem ent on unilateral elec­ tions, the B ritish foreign secretary stated that this was the internal affak o f V iet­ nam. B ritain was also inclined to regard its role and responsibility as cochair as “neither m ore nor less than those o f the other Pow ers adhering to the Final Dec­ laration o f the G eneva Conference.”26 France, also, ignored the South V iet­ nam ese defiance. M oscow could do little to prevent die peace built up at G eneva from falling apart. A lthough the Soviets possessed enough weapons in theữ diplom atic arse­ nal to insist on m ore decisive actions against violations o f the international agreem ent, the question w as w hether they w anted to draw down th ev stores to achieve goals not on their list o f priorities. Because the possibility o f peaceful unification had not disappeared com pletely, it was necessary for the K rem lin to act in support o f tile aspirations o f its V ietnam ese friends. The Soviet Union therefore successfully played the role o f a faithful ally at the m eetings o f cochairs and at other international forum s. A fter the July 19SS sum m it, tile tw o cochairs o f the 1954 G eneva conference m et in N ovem ber 1955. By that tim e the Soviet and B ritish foreign m inisters had received a num ber o f appeals and declarations supporting the idea o f elections and condem ning the policy o f South Vietnam . Among this m aterial was Pham Van D ong’s A ugust 17 letter to the cochairs and a letter from Zhou Enlai in sup­ port o f the DRV position. In addition, M olotov and M acm illan possessed the fourth interim report prepared by the Vietnam ese ICC, in w hich the Polish and Indian delegations w arned o f theừ inability to carry on the ICC activities “in the face o f the declared opposition o f the governm ent o f the State o f V ietnam to the G eneva A greem ents.”27 The cochairs decided to issue a letter on the Vietnam question; in it they w ould express th eữ concern over the fulfillm ent o f the G eneva agreem ents. A draft o f a letter proposed by M acm illan drew attention to the unsatisfactory im plem entation o f som e provisions o f the agreem ents. It referred to the ICC’s fourth interim report and pointed out the lack o f cooperation betw een civil and m ilitary authorities o f the northern and southern zones in their observation o f ar­ ticles 14(c) and 14(d) o f the V ietnam cease-fire agreem ent.28 A rticles 14(c) and 14(d) had been a battleground and a basis for accusations and counteraccusations for the N orth and the South since the first days after the G eneva conference. A rticle 14(c) required each party “to refrain from any reprisals or discrim ination against persons o r organizations on account o f theữ activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their dem ocratic liberties.” A r­ ticle 14(d) contained the provision that if “any civilians residing in a district con­

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trolled by one party” w anted to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party, they should have an opportunity to do so w ithout any obstacle being cre­ ated by die authority in that district.29 H anoi accused D iem o f violating the cease-fire agreem ents because, in order to consolidate his pow er, he clearly tried to rid South V ietnam o f real o r assum ed supporters o f the V ietm inh and he or­ ganized repressions against them . Diem, in turn, condem ned Hanoi for violating the freedom o f m ovem ent o f its own people because o f the N orth Vietnam ese regim e’s earlier attem pts to {»event the em igration to the South o f 860,000 Red R iver delta inhabitants w ho decided to flee from the Com m unists after the vic­ tory o f the V ietm inh.30 M oscow objected to M acm illan's em phasis on articles 14(c) and 14(d). M olotov, in a letter to the CPSU C entral Com m ittee, said that the B ritish foreign m inister avoided “the m ain question o f the unsatisfactory im plem entation o f the provisions o f the G eneva agreem ents concerning the preparation to the all-V iet­ nam ese elections” w hile putting forw ard questions o f the fulfillm ent o f articles 14(c) and 14(d). Furtherm ore, M acm illan claim ed that both the N orth and South V ietnam ese w ere responsible for the violation o f these articles. Because o f this, in M olotov’s opinion, M acm illan’s draft could not be considered satisfactory. The follow ing passage in the Soviet foreign m inister’s letter to his superiors is notew orthy: “H ow ever, taking into account the English desire to drag out the solution o f this question [the question o f the election], as w ell as taking into con­ sideration an indisputable advantage for US that a join t m essage o f the tw o chair­ m en w ill be sent to the participants o f the G eneva conference and to the mem­ bers o f the International Com m ission on supervision in V ietnam , w hich draw s attention to the unsatisfactory situation o f the im plem entation o f the Geneva agreem ents, the U SSR Foreign M inistry finds it expedient to agree w ith M acm illan’s draft o f the m essage.”31 Instead o f the paragraph in the B ritish draft that stressed the failure o f both sides to com ply w ith articles 14(c) and 14(d), M olotov proposed a suggestion to the other conference participants and the ICC m em bers that they send the cochairs theừ proposals for the im provem ent o f the im plem entation o f the G eneva agreem ents. M olotov’s letter shows that for M oscow the postponem ent o f the solution to the elections problem w as clearly preferable to the B ritish decision to drop it en­ tirely. If the B ritish position on elections prevailed, M oscow could rem ain the only country, except perhaps for India, that continued to support the issue o f elections. The battle w ould then be lost even before hope was abandoned that the elections w ould be held at tile tim e specified at Geneva. The m essage o f the cochairs was not m ade public until D ecem ber 21. It is un­ clear why such a delay took place. Possibly the Soviets decided to consult the Indians before the publication o f the m essage; N ikita K hrushchev and N ikolai

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Bulganin w ere on an official visit to India in N ovem ber-D ecem ber Ỉ9SS. N ehru did discuss the political im passe in the im plem entation o f the G eneva agree­ m ents w ith the Soviet leaders. And the jo in t Soviet-Indian com m uniqué o f De­ cem ber 13, 1935, regretted the obstacles raised to the im plem entation o f tile G eneva agreem ents and urged all signatories to tile G eneva settlem ent to elim i­ nate these obstacles.32 In reply to the cochair’s m essage o f D ecem ber 21, 1933, C hina, the DRV, Cam bodia, Poland, and the Soviet U nion proposed to reconvene the G eneva conference in order to settle all the problem s relating to the settlem ent in In­ dochina. This idea had already been suggested by Pham Van Dong in Septem ­ ber, but now it was supported by N orth V ietnam ese allies as w ell as by Cam bo­ dia. C hina, on January 23, 1956, and N orth V ietnam on February 14, 1956, reiterated th eir appeals about reconvening the conference. B oth countries w anted to invite the ICC pow ers to take part in it as w ell, on the grounds that “they understand the conditions in V ietnam and can m ake a useful contribu­ tion.”33 On February 18, the Soviet U nion issued a note that supported this and declared that since “the m easures previously taken by the tw o Chairm en to im­ prove” the situation in Indochina had not “yielded positive results,” M oscow shared “the opinion o f the Governm ents o f the C hinese People’s Republic and the D em ocratic Republic o f V iet-N am about the expediency o f sum m oning a new conference on V iet-N am .”34 H anoi’s dem and for a new G eneva conference w as designed m ainly as propaganda, how ever. T ruong C hỉnh, w ho w as in M oscow on the occasion o f the tw entieth CPSU congress at the tim e the diplo­ m atic note w as issued, inform ed his counterpart. D eputy Foreign M inister V asilii K uznetzov, that the central com m ittee o f his party had discussed the question o f 1956 general elections in V ietnam several tim es and cam e to the conclusion that sufficient conditions for holding these elections did not e x ist Y et the V ietnam ese people hoped they w ould take place in July 1956. B ut be­ cause the consultative conference had not yet begun there w ould obviously be no elections during July. “If w e w ere to inform the people about this,” reasoned C hinh, “the result w ould be a sharp change for the w orse in the m ood o f the peo­ ple.” How w ould it be possible to avoid such an outcom e? H anoi believed that “the best form w ould be the convening o f the conference o f nine states, partici­ pants o f the G eneva conference on Indochina, plus three m em ber states o f the International C ontrol Com m ission w ho w ill make a decision on this question.”33 Thus the DRV believed that the elections w ould be unsuccessful in any case and w as searching only for a plausible way to explain this fact to its own people. Kuznetzov referred to the Indian proposal to arrange a m eeting o f the tw o cochairs instead o f a w hole conference and warned Truong Chỉnh that the new con­ ference might not be convened. The Soviets asked the opinion o f theừ Vietnamese

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com rade on what to do in such a case. Truong Chình repeated the North Viet­ nam ese leadership’s desire to convene a new conference; however, he thought it would be possible to agree on die m eeting o f die two cochairs, during which it would be necessary “to insist on the convening o f a new conference on Vietnam.”36 A rm ed w ith the consent o f the V ietnam ese allies, M oscow in M arch 19S6 agreed to a m eeting o f the cochairs. In their note to the B ritish governm ent on M arch 30, the Soviets confirm ed theữ support o f the C hinese and N orth V iet­ nam ese proposal for a new conference: “The sum m oning o f such a conference w ould in the opinion o f the Soviet G overnm ent, be the m ost expedient and ef­ fective m eans o f settling the position in Vietnam .” H ow ever, M oscow nodded tow ard B ritain’s opinion as w ell as tow ard the Indian proposal and said it “ [did] not object to the prelim inary discussion by the Chairm en o f the G eneva C onfer­ ence on Indo-C hina o f the question o f possible m easures to guarantee the im ­ plem entation o f the G eneva A greem ents in Viet-N am , including the question o f summoning a new conference, bearing in m ind that this w ill help to m ore quickly reach agreem ent concerning the sum m oning o f the above-m entioned conference.”37 By one stroke the K rem lin reconciled the opposing opinions o f its allies and the W est w hile it kept upperm ost its ow n interests, w hich were based on its unw illingness to change die status quo in Vietnam . M oscow even seem ed to be ready to close its eyes to die recent developm ents in Indochina al­ though these developm ents threatened the w hole edifice o f the peace settlem ent created at Geneva. On January 19,1956, the South V ietnam ese governm ent requested the w ith­ draw al o f French troops by A pril 2 9 ,1956, saying that the troops’ presence in the South “w as incom patible w ith V iet-N am ’s concept o f full independence.”38 Such a right w as provided to the states o f Indochina by the G eneva agreem ents. A t G eneva, the V ietm inh as w ell as its Com m unist allies considered the French the other party o f the agreem ent, and th en plans w ith respect to the future o f the peace in the region w ere based on this assum ption. It was expected that the French troops w ould rem ain in South V ietnam at least until the July 1956 elec­ tions. The w ithdraw al o f French troops, although logical in the process o f elim ­ inating the French presence in the region, had started soon after the G eneva con­ ference. This m eant, how ever, that the French arm y ceased to be a guarantor o f the cease-fire provisions and its responsibility w ould have to be assum ed by the South V ietnam ese governm ent, the very governm ent that refused m ore than once to be bound by the G eneva agreem ents. D iem continued to take unilateral steps aim ed at m aking South V ietnam an independent entity and the dem arcation line its international boundary. O n M arch 4 ,1 9 5 6 , the election o f the South V ietnam ese constituent assem bly took place. L ater that year this assem bly “debated” and approved a constitution for

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the Republic o f Vietnam . N ot only did the referendum o f 19SS and the elections o f 1956 create a form al basis for a new state in South V ietnam , they also solid­ ified the Saigon regim e and prom oted Diem in the eyes o f his U.S. partners. W ith these developm ents in the South, the peace in V ietnam stalled to resem ble a house o f cards ready to collapse. The first casualty was to be die International Control Com m ission. The Indians first sounded the alarm . In a February 19,1956, letter to the tw o cochairs, Nehru suggested that a review o f the situation was necessary and could take place at a m eeting o f the cochairs. On M arch 26, the ICC chairm an in V iet­ nam , G. Parthasarathi, w arned the South V ietnam ese about the serious situation in case a decision was not taken on the succession to the French high com ­ m and.39 In spite o f this warning, on M arch 30, Saigon concluded an agreem ent w ith France for the com plete evacuation o f French troops and the dissolution o f the French high com m and by A pril 28,1956. On A pril 3, France inform ed the cochairs o f the agreem ent. O ne w eek later, alm ost one hundred years after the first French soldiers had arrived in South V ietnam ’s capital, the last parade o f French troops took place in Saigon.40 M uch now depended on the outcom e o f negotiations that opened in London on A pril 11 betw een Lord Reading and A ndrei G rom yko, representatives o f the cochairs o f the G eneva conference. Before these conversations took place, the new Soviet am bassador to the DRV, M ikhail Zim yanin, m et w ith V ietnam ese officials, discussed the subject o f the forthcom ing talks, and tried to explore H anoi’s view s on the prospects o f the situation in Vietnam . In one conversation, Pham H ung, a prom inent m em ber o f the Central C om m ittee o f the Lao Dong Party (also known as the W orkers’ Party o f V ietnam [W PV]), inform ed the So­ viet diplom at about a prelim inary C entral Com m ittee discussion o f the situation created in Indochina as a result o f the French w ithdraw al. The N orth V ietnam ese leadership believed the situation w as very precarious, for ’’the French have left and can no m ore bear responsibility for the im plem entation o f the [Geneva] A greem ents, w hile Diem does not recognize these A greem ents and refuses to becom e a French successor in the fulfillm ent o f theứ obligations assum ed at G eneva.” Therefore, the N orth V ietnam ese believed that the struggle for the im ­ plem entation o f the G eneva agreem ents w ould be “prolonged and difficult,” m aking it necessary to strengthen N orth V ietnam and em phasize the necessity o f observance o f the G eneva agreem ents. Hanoi did not reject the possibility o f negotiations w ith the South; in fact, it stressed that it w ould be useful to arrange a “direct m eeting w ith Diem as France’s successor.”41 The N orth V ietnam ese also advocated the continuation o f the activity o f the ICC. A fter considering this and other conversations w ith the N orth V ietnam ese leaders, the Soviet em bassy prepared its own evaluation o f the situation in In­

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dochina. In die docum ent entitled “Some Issues o f die Im plem entation o f die G eneva A greem ents on Indochina,” die em bassy at the outset stated its firm con­ clusion that there was som e understanding am ong the U nited States, England, and France on securing the division o f V ietnam into tw o parts. The em bassy also noted the existence o f contradictions am ong die W estern pow ers as w ell as be­ tw een the W estern pow ers and India. W hile the U nited States w as sending eco­ nom ic and m ilitary assistance to Indochina w ith the aim o f building up a strate­ gic base against C hina and India, France did not w ant to w ithdraw from the region com pletely and w as trying to preserve its political and econom ic posi­ tion. And the B ritish w ere trying to assum e in South V ietnam “the functions o f m ediators betw een D iem (i.e., die A m ericans) and the French, pretending to play a role o f ‘peacem akers’ . . . in order to strengthen theứ influence in that re­ gion. In reality, the B ritish are follow ing the lead o f the A m ericans.”42 The So­ viet em bassy suggested that the grow th o f Ư.S. influence in Indochina could be countered by strengthening the influence o f the socialist cam p and prom oting peace in the region; the em bassy did not suggest that M oscow ’s first priority should be the struggle for elections o r the declaration that D iem ’s actions in the South w ere illegal and therefore null and void. The V ietnam question w as being solved by a characteristic C old W ar m ethod: counter the strength o f the enem y w ith our strength. L ater in the docum ent, how ever, the Soviet diplom ats in H anoi did pay atten­ tion to the problem o f elections. They noted theữ V ietnam ese com rades’ incli­ nation to postpone elections as a “com prom ise solution o f the question” in ex­ change fo r D iem ’s prom ise to participate in elections and pursue a foreign policy that excluded the interference o f other pow ers in South V ietnam ’s do­ m estic affairs (an obvious allusion to the U nited States). The em bassy docum ent also em phasized D iem ’s interest in the ICC. O n the basis o f these tw o observa­ tions, the em bassy put forw ard its recom m endations. It advised that M oscow use D iem ’s acceptance o f the “articles o f the G eneva A greem ents profitable for him ” as w ell as his interest in the ICC in order to “m ake him agree on political consultations w ith the DRV” and create a favorable situation for the IC C ’s ac­ tivities in the South. In the em bassy’s view , it w as also possible to agree w ith the B ritish proposal about the postponem ent o f the elections “since political consultations betw een N orth and South V ietnam have not begun as yet.” H ie cochairs w ould have to envision the sum m oning o f a new G eneva conference in case D iem rejected consultations w ith the DRV.43 Step by step, M oscow w as reconciling itself to the eventuality that the m ost im portant political provision o f the G eneva agreem ents about the 1956 elections w ould not be fulfilled. It w as therefore im portant for the Soviets to keep in force other conditions o f the agreem ents that preserved peace in the region, and dur-

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ing the London talks betw een G rom yko and Lord R eading, M oscow displayed its readiness for com prom ise as long as the foundations o f die Indochina settle­ m ent w ere not underm ined. In general, alm ost all the countries involved in the situation in Indochina dem onstrated their com pliance w ith the latest regional developm ents. A pait from the U nited States and South V ietnam —w hose hostility tow ard die G eneva agreem ents w as w ell known— die B ritish clung to the view that “since the G ov­ ernm ent in South V iet-N am adhered unflinchingly to the position that it w as not a party to die G eneva A greem ent or Final D eclaration and therefore under no obligation to discuss elections . . . there was nothing that could be done.’*44 France had to bow to D iem ’s dem ands to w ithdraw m ilitarily w hile it cherished hopes o f retaining its presence in econom ic and cultural life o f the region.43 In­ dia also abstained from decisive actions. “In retrospect this seem s a m ajor con­ cession on the part o f N ehru, w ho should have insisted on a legal com m itm ent by South V ietnam to elections at som e date beyond m id-1956. If there w as ever an opportunity to vehem endy insist upon the im plem entation o f the G eneva A greem ents on Vietnam , it w as at this tim e, before the deadline set in the agree­ m ents fo r elections and before the w ithdraw al o f French troops from South V iet­ nam .”46 India possessed leverage on the elections issue—it could threaten its w ithdraw al from the ICC—but N ehru did not w ant to use it out fear o f jeopar­ dizing his ow n vision o f peace on the A sian subcontinent The Com m unist pow ers—die Soviet U nion, C hina, and Poland (as a m em ber o f die ICC)—eagerly com plied w ith H anoi’s acceptance o f postponed elections. In theữ recom m endations before the Lord R eading-G rom yko talks in London and K hrushchev and B ulganin’s A pril 1956 visit to G reat B ritain, the C hinese reiterated to M oscow theừ proposal fo r a new conference on Indochina and stated that “the Chinese governm ent also shares the V ietnam ese governm ent’s opinion th a t in the case o f necessity, it is possible to consider the question about the postponem ent o f die general elections in V ietnam .”47 The London talks reflected this general attitude. The tw o cochairs reached a tacit understanding that there w as no point in holding a new conference and that reunification w ould have to be postponed indefinitely. They also absolved France o f any further obligation w ith respect to die G eneva agreem ents. A t die end o f the talks, the cochairs issued letters addressed both to the DRV and the Republic o f Vietnam (the official nam e o f the Saigon governm ent) as w ell as to France and the ICC.4®The decisions contained in these letters “represented for the m ost part a patchw ork, a vague reiteration o f the provisions o f the G eneva A greem ents w ithout specific deadlines o r guarantees, hardly altering the situa­ tion in V ietnam , where a political im passe continued in m ore o r less the sam e m anner as before.”49 It did not help that a t the sam e tim e the cochairs w ere ne-

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gotiating prospects fo r peace in Indochina, tw o Soviet leaders—K hrushchev and Bulganin—cam e to London for the first high-level visit in the history o f Soviet-B ritish relations. The subject o f Indochina did not occupy a prom inent place during the London v is it50 Thus the Lord R eading-G rom yko talks sealed the fate o f die V ietnam parti­ tion, w hich had com e to resem ble Germ any and Korea. Such an outcom e w as o f course m ost disappointing to H anoi. It becam e d e a r that there would be no g â t­ erai election in July 1956 o r in the near future. Furtherm ore, the V ietnam ese Com m unists had to bow to the fact that no new conference w ould resolve the im passe in Indochina. Hanoi m ight very w ell have felt betrayed by its Commu­ nist allies on tills issue. Even the C hinese, as soon as the London decisions w o e announced, dropped their dem and for a conference.31 N evertheless, soon after the London talks, on M ay 11, Pham Van Dong addressed one m ore letter to Ngo D inh Diem . “In a conciliatory tim e as never thereafter,”92 tile N orth V ietnam ese prem ier called fo r general elections, the result o f w hich w ould be a coalition governm ent He suggested restoration and developm ent o f norm al relations be­ tw een tile tw o zones as a prelim inary step tow ard creating favorable conditions for elections. D iem rejected this approach as w ell.53 The Com m unist leaders in Hanoi found them selves in an uneasy situation. They had to explain to theừ people the latest developm ents on the question o f the reunification o f Vietnam . They had to justify theữ adherence to using peace­ ful m eans for achieving this goal even when it becam e clear that reunification was im possible given the intransigence o f the Saigon regim e. Leaders in the N orth had to resist th en com rades’ desire to resort to violence, especially after the South V ietnam ese governm ent repression o f form er V ietm inh m em bers and those suspected o f supporting them . A ccording to som e estim ates, tw elve thou­ sand w ere killed during 1955-1957 in South V ietnam .54 A January 1956 presi­ dential ordinance prohibited all political opposition. By the spring o f that year, fifteen thousand to tw enty thousand peasants labeled as V ietm inh sym pathizers had been detained in reeducation cam ps.55 Newspapers w ere closed routinely. These actions as w ell as the general consolidation o f the Saigon regim e w ere made possible by Ư.S. support. In the first year after the G eneva conference, Diem received $322 m illion in aid from W ashington.56 This aid increased w ith­ out interruption in the follow ing years. Because they encountered repression in the South when prospects o f peace­ ful reunification w ere bleak, the C om m unist cadres rem aining in the South after the V ietm inh’s w ithdraw al57 questioned the N orth’s policy and began to con­ sider various m ilitary solutions to reunification. Som etim e in M arch 1956, Le D uan, w ho headed the South V ietnam ese C om m unists at the tim e, presented the 14-point plan o f action that had been adopted by the Nam Bo regional com m it­

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tee. The plan recom m ended m ilitary action in com bination w ith other activities in the South, the creation o f support bases and m ore battalions, and the consol­ idation o f the m ilitary organizations in districts (interzones) in South Vietnam . Hanoi turned down this plan as prem ature.58 But die N orth V ietnam ese leader­ ship understood that it w ould not be able to contain these dem ands indefinitely. Ho Chi M inh im plied this during his conversation w ith the Soviet am bassador. He confirm ed that there w ere alm ost no prospects for political consultations w ith the South V ietnam ese governm ent o r all-V ietnam elections, and, as a re­ sult, DRV cadres as w ell as ordinary people w ere now asking w hat should be done in order to achieve unification o f the country. Especially concerned, in H o’s w ords, w ere the “m any thousands o f V ietnam ese who had com e from the South.” They w ere asking when they w ould be able to return hom e, hence the basis for theữ discontent.59 Ho Chi M inh inform ed die Soviet am bassador that the V ietnam ese Politburo had discussed the new situation in V ietnam , and Ho revealed w hat the Politburo believed w ere shortcom ings o f policy. The lack o f foresight that “the French w ould kneel to the A m ericans so early” was m entioned as one shortcom ing.60 Ho also said that the C entral C om m ittee o f the Lao D ong Party was preparing instructions about tasks and m ethods for the cadres w orking in the South. In conclusion, Ho Chi M inh repeated his assessm ent o f the situation: The situation has becom e m ore com plicated. The W orkers’ Party in­ tends to concentrate its attention on the task o f the strengthening o f the DRV and the intensification o f the struggle fo r the unification o f the country. It is necessary to increase support o f the dem ocratic forces struggling in the South. The underground o f the W orkers’ Party in the South had been preserved, in spite o f fierce repression on the part o f Diem , and the great losses that the party underground suffered, particularly in Interzone V. In the southern districts o f the country the underground has been preserved better, there are clan­ destine arm ed forces [there].61 M oscow w as not frightened by Ho C hi M inh’s alm ost open adm ission o f the possibility o f arm ed struggle in the South. Soviet leaders w ere com ing around to the view that as long as the status quo was preserved and developm ents in In­ dochina did not threaten to jeopardize international stability, there w as nothing to worry about in South Vietnam . The K rem lin w as even prepared to go so far as to agree on the form alization o f the existence o f tw o separate states in V iet­ nam , w hich w as the im plication o f the discussion over the adm ission o f South V ietnam to the U nited N ations.

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O n January 2 3 ,1 9 5 7 , thirteen countries o f the W estern bloc introduced tw o draft resolutions in the special political com m ittee o f the UN G eneral Assem bly calling on the Security Council to consider the applications o f South Korea and South V ietnam for m em bership in the U nited N ations. The next day the Soviet delegation objected to the resolution because it “suggested that South Korea and South V ietnam represented the w hole o f Korea and the whole o f V iet Nam re­ spectively.” M oscow proposed instead that the Security Council consider si­ m ultaneous adm ission o f the “D em ocratic Republic o f K orea, South Korea, the D em ocratic Republic o f V ietnam and South V ietnam ."62 The Soviet proposal m entioned “the states” o f V ietnam , thus im plying sovereign and independent status o f the N orth and South.63 W ang Bingnan, a Chinese diplom at, has w rit­ ten that K hrushchev had toyed w ith this idea since 1956 and it was w ell known in diplom atic circles in both die U nited States and C hina.64 The Soviet proposal apparently w as m ade w ithout prior consultations w ith the N orth V ietnam ese. On January 25,1957, DRV prem ier Pham Van Dong sent a protest to the Security Council and the G eneral Assem bly, draw ing attention to the fact that the proposal by the thirteen countries was “at variance w ith the spirit o f the G eneva A greem ents o f 1954”65 and that an “attem pt o f the adm in­ istration o f South V ietnam —an adm inistration that has only tem porary pow er over the territory o f one o f the zones o f V ietnam (according to article 14a o f the G eneva A greem ents on the cessation o f hostilities in Vietnam )— to obtain South V ietnam ’s adm ission to the U nited N ations O rganization represents an act aim ed at the perpetuation o f the division o f V ietnam .”66 Pham Van Dong re­ ferred to the final com m uniqué o f the conference o f nonaligned nations at Ban­ dung that stated that V ietnam could becom e a m em ber o f the UN only as an uni­ fied country. This com m uniqué, unlike the final declaration o f the G eneva conference, had been approved by Saigon. D id the Soviets not perceive the im plication o f theừ proposal to adm it both zones o f V ietnam as independent states? Their proposal revealed that they as­ sum ed there w ere no prospects for the unification o f V ietnam in the nearest fu­ ture. If not, why not therefore counter the W estern resolution about the adm is­ sion o f South V ietnam w ith the m ore im partial suggestion to accept both parts o f the country in the w orld body? But M oscow clearly failed to see the sym bol­ ism o f this step as a de facto recognition o f the Saigon regim e. D uring their m eeting on January 30,1957, Ho Chi M inh drew the Soviet am­ bassador’s attention to the Soviets’ sym bolic act. He brought up D iem ’s decla­ ration that the Soviet proposal for sim ultaneous adm ission to the UN o f N orth and South V ietnam “m eans the recognition by the Soviet Union o f the com pe­ tence o f the D iem governm ent and, therefore, the liquidation o f the G eneva agreem ents."67 Thus, H o im plicitly accused M oscow o f lining up w ith the

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Saigon regim e in underm ining the G eneva agreem ents, the very agreem ents that the Soviets had helped to w ork out but to w hich they did not rem ain faithful. The Soviet am bassador m ade excuses fo r the actions o f his superiors, rem inded Ho that the Soviet Union w as defending “vital interests" o f the DRV, and tried to prove that the Soviet position in the U nited N ations did not “contradict the G eneva agreem ents and die struggle o f the V ietnam ese people fo r die peaceful unification o f the country." If the Soviet U nion vetoed the proposal about the ad­ m ission o f South V ietnam in the UN, he argued, the U nited States w ould do the sam e w ith respect to N orth V ietnam .68 Y et the Soviet excuses w ere w eak and the Soviet foreign m inistry adm itted this internally. In a m em orandum to D eputy Foreign M inister N ikolai Patolk h ev , head o f the m inistry’s Southeast A sia D epartm ent, B. V olkov stated th at the Soviet d raft o f the resolution a t the UN did contradict “the w ellgrounded position o f the V ietnam ese friends." He expressed his concern that this proposal could “give cause fo r objectionable interpretations” o f the Soviet position w ith regard to the G eneva agreem ents and suggested w ithdraw ing this resolution w hile supporting Pham Van D ong’s letter instead.69 The Soviet del­ egation at the UN forestalled any new instructions, how ever, and even before new instructions cam e from M oscow, it declared that on the question o f V iet­ nam ese adm ission to the U nited N ations it w ould stand w ith the position o f the DRV.70 A t the Security Council m eeting on Septem ber 9 ,1 9 5 7 , the Soviet rep­ resentative vetoed the thirteen-pow er draft resolution and insisted that the ques­ tion o f adm ission be postponed until after the unification o f V ietnam .71 M oscow, how ever, continued to base its policy on the recognition o f the ex­ istence o f tw o states on the territory o f V ietnam . The Soviet am bassador in H anoi, M ikhail Zim yanin, stated this plainly during a conversation w ith the C hi­ nese chargé d ’affaires, Li Zhim in, in the afterm ath o f the discussion at the UN. A lthough he denied that there w ere any disagreem ents betw een M oscow and H anoi on the question o f adm ission to the UN, Zim yanin spoke fo r the need to m ore closely coordinate the tactics o f the struggle for the unification o f V ietnam in the future. Zim yanin referred to the fact that V ietnam w as divided into tw o states and this division w ould rem ain over a “m ore o r less long period o f tim e,” but the Vietnam ese Com m unists som etim es did not take this into account As an exam ple, the Soviet am bassador criticized “som e V ietnam ese com rades” who w orked in South V ietnam and w ho proposed to organize arm ed uprisings against the Diem regim e. Zim yanin called such an approach to the situation “oversim plified" and “non-M arxist" and justified Soviet policy as necessary in order to prevent South V ietnam from falling into the hands o f the A m ericans.72 It seem s that M oscow w as even prepared to grant recognition to the D iem regim e if the N orth V ietnam ese w ould not vehem ently oppose the idea.

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The Soviet leadership’s Vietnam policy fell in line w ith the K rem lin's general policy in die n u rd W orld, inaugurated soon after S talin's death and confirmed at the tw entieth CPSU congress in February 1956. It looked back to “Lenin’s vision o f forging a united front betw een the nationalist aspirations o f the developing w orld and die revolutionary, anti-W estern objectives o f the Soviet regim e.”73 In part, it was a response to U.S. efforts to create an alliance system in A sia within the fram ework o f the policy o f containm ent M oscow w anted to ensure the neu­ trality o f as m any countries as possible in the international struggle between cap­ italism and communism. O f course, the Soviet Union’s principal targets were countries that professed a nonaligned approach to foreign policy, for exam ple, Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, and Egypt;74 but die Kremlin did not w ant to aban­ don hope that other countries, even such an anti-Com m unist countries such as South Vietnam , w ould leave the W estern bloc and choose nonalignm ent The Soviet leaders already had in C am bodia a good exam ple o f a country in Indochina th a t w hile rem aining opposed to Com m unist ideology and develop­ ing relations w ith W ashington, was not eager to align itself blindly w ith U .S. policy in the region. A lthough Laos still suffered from internal disorder and po­ litical instability, it w as possible that it w ould follow Cam bodia’s policy as soon as it could establish a stable governm ent. W hy then did South V ietnam becom e an exception? W hy, the Soviets w ondered, should it refuse to enter a “peace zone” proclaim ed by Khrushchev at the tw entieth party congress, a “vast” zone that included “socialist as w ell as non-socialist peaceloving countries in Europe and A sia.”73 South V ietnam m ight be able to find its ow n place in it, the Sovi­ ets thought. Such hopes w ith respect to South V ietnam m ight have existed in the m inds o f the Soviet leaders, considering theữ “great optim ism concerning developm ents in the Third W orld” and “a lack o f detailed inform ation o r ideological form ula­ tions concerning dom estic developm ents in the T hird W orld.”76 Such optim ism w as not totally baseless. The Soviet U nion had never been a colonial country w ith overseas territories like B ritain and France. M oreover, the USSR’s “con­ nections w ith colonialism ” w ere m uch less visible than those o f its rival, the U nited States. M oscow had one other advantage as w ell, w hich was that industri­ alization in the USSR had proceeded m uch m ore rapidly than in the capitalist w est. For people suspicious o f capitalism anyw ay because o f its links to im perialism , this record o f accelerated developm ent— this lure o f a short cut to econom ic prosperity and social justice— provided yet another incentive to look to M arxism -Leninism as a m odel.77

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If the head o f the South V ietnam ese governm ent had not been as staunch an anti-Com m unist and as fanatical a Catholic as D iem , who knows w hether So­ viet T hud W orld policy w ould have succeeded in the South o f V ietnam ? But it is also necessary to rem em ber that Soviet hands w ere tied by the regim e in H anoi, w hich follow ed closely M oscow ’s every step and vigorously protested every sign o f rapprochem ent w ith the Saigon governm ent, as the episode o f ad­ m ission to the UN had dem onstrated. It was therefore hardly possible for Soviet leaders to realize a policy in the South o f V ietnam sim ilar to Soviet policies to­ w ard other T hird W orld countries. It w ould have risked losing its friends in the N orth. It becam e clear by 1957 that m ost o f the countries involved in the 1954 G eneva conference had concluded that the division o f V ietnam w as, if not per­ m anent, at least long lasting. C hina was no exception. A lthough the C hinese leaders form ally assured H anoi o f their support for the policy o f unification, they did nothing to translate such declarations into reality. For exam ple, B eijing did not support the Soviet proposal to adm it N orth and South V ietnam into the U nited N ations. But there w ere no reports o f any Chinese protests on behalf o f the N orth V ietnam ese either.78 W hat did still rem ain o f the G eneva agreem ents on V ietnam was the ICC, al­ though its w ork by 1957 “w as truncated, confined m ainly to supervision o f the cease-fire, checking the im ports o f w ar m aterials, and investigating com plaints regarding violation o f freedom s under articles 14(c) and (d).”79 N evertheless, the Com m unists were interested in the IC C ’s activities, how ever lim ited, for the com m ission represented the last obstacle before total disintegration o f peace in Vietnam . In the spring o f 1957, how ever, the functioning o f the ICC was further jeop­ ardized. In its sixth interim report subm itted in 1956, the com m ission drew at­ tention to its inability to investigate com plaints m ade by H anoi about the Diem governm ent’s violation o f article 14(c)— the requirem ent that both sides avoid repressions and discrim ination against form er V ietm inh m em bers o r those who had cooperated w ith the V ietm inh during the w ar against French. The com m is­ sion put the blam e on South V ietnam .80 On A pril 11, 1957, the com m ission sent the cochairs a letter that inform ed them o f the decision o f the South Vietnam ese governm ent not to respond to com plaints about the violation o f this article and not to allow ICC m obile team s to investigate such com plaints. The com m ission asked the cochairs to consider this situation, which had led to the lim itation o f the IC C ’s functions in South Vietnam , and to instruct it as to further actions. The com m ission also stated that thereafter it could not undertake effective m easures against violations o f article 14(c) until the difficulties w ere rem oved. In addition to its letter to the cochairs,

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the com m ission adopted a decision not to pass on to the South V ietnam ese gov­ ernm ent the com plaints o f the governm ent o f N orth V ietnam concerning the South’s violations o f article 14(c).81 The Polish representative to the com m is­ sion approved the letter to the cochairs and voted against the refusal to pass on the DRV’s com plaints to Saigon. He explained his actions to Soviet am bassador Zim yanin: “ [H ]aving agreed to sign the letter to the tw o chairm en, we took into account the situation o f im potence in w hich the com m ission had found itsetf on the question about article 14(c), as w ell as a possibility o f the alignm ent betw een the Indian and the Canadian [delegates] and the adoption o f the decision by the m ajority.”82 H ow ever, tile Poles w ere not successful at excluding from the letter a refer­ ence to the IC C ’s inability to undertake effective m easures against the violations o f the article as long as the difficulties w ere not resolved. The N orth V ietnam ese did not like this passage and at the last m om ent dem anded that the letter not be signed. Pham V an D ong in a conversation w ith the Soviet am bassador presented H anoi’s interpretation o f the D iem governm ent’s recent actions and the ICC’s behavior. He accused the Indians o f pursuing a policy that led to the “liquida­ tion o f the control over the fulfillm ent o f article 14(c).” The N orth V ietnam ese prem ier believed that the Indians and Canadians on the com m ission provided “great help to the A m erican-D iem ist clique," w hile the head o f the Polish dele­ gation did not understand this yet.83 Concerned w ith the possible outcom e o f these developm ents, H anoi appealed to M oscow to propose a m eeting o f the tw o cochairs to discuss the im plem entation o f the G eneva agreem ents and the future activities o f the ICC.84 Soviet foreign m inistry officials seem ed to share the concern o f theữ V iet­ nam ese friends, and they suggested that the USSR support the proposal for the m eeting o f the cochairs. They even tried to persuade the B ritish to agree that the Soviet am bassador in H anoi and the B ritish am bassador in Saigon could play the roles o f m ediators in arranging consultations betw een the N orth and the South on the issue. The Soviets prepared a draft o f instructions for cochaừ talks in London.85 But, perhaps to their surprise, the Soviets discovered that the Chinese w ere not enthusiastic about this plan. The Soviet am bassador in B eijing reported to M oscow that “the Chinese friends believe that the conditions for the m eeting o f the tw o Chairm en have not ripened yet." U nder these circum stances, the cochairs could only respond to the ICC letter w ith the dem and to continue strict control over the G eneva agreem ents. The Chinese also proposed a letter from the cochairs to South V ietnam w ith the requirem ent that it continue its cooper­ ation w ith the ICC and a letter from China and the Soviet Union to the Indian governm ent w ith a request not to abandon its defense o f the G eneva agree­ m ents.86 The Soviet Foreign M inistry recom m ended that the K rem lin agree w ith

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the Chinese proposal. In accordance w ith this recom m endation, M oscow sug­ gested to the B ritish that a jo in t m essage be sent to the South V ietnam ese au­ thorities and to the ICC w ith the request that the provisions o f the G eneva agree­ m ents be observed. London, how ever, rejected the need for such a m essage and inform ed M oscow that it w ould do no m ore than acknow ledge receipt o f die com m ission’s m essage.87 This w hole episode dem onstrated tile Soviet anxiety about preserving at least the appearance that the G eneva agreem ents w ere functioning in V ietnam , even if they w ere reduced m erely to die activities o f die ICC. This guaranteed to die Soviets that the status quo in the region w ould not be changed. A m em orandum prepared by the Foreign M inistry’s Southeast A sia D epartm ent stated, ‘in spite o f all attem pts o f the South V ietnam ese authorities to deprive the Com m ission o f the opportunity to carry out its activities efficiently, the very existence o f the Com m ission in V ietnam is a param ount factor o f m aintaining peace betw een the tw o zones and a certain obstacle for the policy o f violation o f the G eneva A gree­ m ents pursued by the South V ietnam ese regim e.”88 The Soviet em bassy in the DRV concurred w ith its superiors’ opinion and recom m ended that the U SSR support the com m ission’s attem pts to fulfill its functions “even in its present form ” and declare all attem pts to stop its activities “as a direct threat to the cause o f peace in Southeast A sia.”89 A lso helping to preserve peace in Indochina w as die developm ent o f good re­ lations and the grow th o f Soviet influence in N orth Vietnam . O n the basis o f this influence, M oscow could keep the V ietnam ese Com m unists from underm ining the G eneva agreem ents and resorting to arm s. Soviet influence was especially effective because Hanoi respected Soviet authority as the vanguard o f the w orld com m unist m ovem ent and was interested in Soviet econom ic and m ilitary aid. Y et, initially, it w as China that M oscow relied on in its policy tow ard Vietnam . A t this tim e, there w ere no signs o f disagreem ents and contradictions betw een the tw o Com m unist giants and the principle o f sharing responsibilities w as still on the agenda o f the Soviet policym akers. The K rem lin did not refuse to develop relations w ith N orth V ietnam , but it w as w illing to share w ith B eijing the bur­ den o f aid to the DRV. C hina w as the greatest supplier o f econom ic assistance to N orth V ietnam in the years after the G eneva conference. From 1955 to 1960, C hinese econom ic aid to the DRV am ounted to tw ice as m uch as that from the Soviet U nion (1,428 m illion dong from the PRC com pared w ith 711.2 m illion dong from the U SSR). M ote than 2,000 C hinese specialists w orked in N orth V ietnam in 1956 com pared w ith 658 Soviets.90 B eijing’s highest officials regularly vis­ ited the DRV; and H o C hi M inh, Pham Van D ong, and other V ietnam ese lead­ ers som etim es visited B eijing several tim es a year. T heir histories, cultures.

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and in terests show ed m uch in com m on. T he leaders o f the tw o countries shared m any o f the sam e view s on dom estic policies as w ell as on the inter­ national situation. N otw ithstanding its excellent relations w ith B eijing, H anoi did not abandon its intent to develop close ties w ith the Soviet U nion and counterbalance its alignm ent w ith C hina by cooperating w ith M oscow. The Soviet U nion rem ained attractive in the eyes o f the N orth V ietnam ese leaders as it w as a m ore pow erful and developed country. In addition, traditional suspicion and even hatred tow ard the C hinese lingered am ong V ietnam ese; som etim es these negative tendencies cam e out into the open. The C hinese am bassador to the DRV, Luo G uibo, com ­ plained to his Soviet counterpart that chauvinistic inclinations existed am ong the highest officials and even m ore often am ong the intelligentsia. In V ietnam , these chauvinistic inclinations w ere particularly strong against C hina. Luo G uibo w as referring to local festivities dedicated to V ietnam ese heroes w ho had fought against C hinese feudal lords and about the V ietnam ese intent to prohibit theatrical plays w ritten w hen V ietnam was a part o f the C hinese em pire.91 W hen die Soviet am bassador touched on this subject w ith H o C hi M inh, the V iet­ nam ese leader agreed that there w as a tradition o f celebrating historical events related to the struggle against the Chinese. He also com m ented that chauvinis­ tic propaganda could not be popular, how ever, am ong people w ho had w it­ nessed the assistance that China had rendered to V ietnam .92 In this conversation w ith the Soviet am bassador, Ho Chỉ M inh adm itted that there w ere anti-Soviet feelings in his country as w ell, but he did not explain w hy they existed. Because this conversation occurred in January 1957, it is possible that events o f 1956 in the Soviet U nion and other socialist countries had caused resentm ent in the DRV tow ard the Soviet Union. The m ost im portant event o f 1956 had been the tw entieth congress o f the So­ v iet C om m unist P arty. T he rep o rt delivered to the congress by N ikita K hrushchev and revelations m ade in his secret speech about S talin 's cult o f per­ sonality seem ed to shake the whole edifice o f w orld com m unism .93 For the V iet­ nam ese Com m unists tw o things about K hrushchev's pronouncem ents m ight have been especially objectionable: the principle o f peaceful coexistence and the repudiation o f the inevitability o f w ar betw een capitalism and com m u­ nism ,94 and criticism o f the cult o f personality as incom patible w ith the party principle o f the collective leadership. Peaceful coexistence m eant that M oscow w ould avoid any risk o f confrontation w ith the W est and, consequently, w ould be overcautious w ith respect to V ietnam , trying to contain the m ilitancy o f the Com m unists in theữ struggle against the D iem regim e. Elim inating the cult o f personality did not please Ho Chi M inh personally because it threatened his po­ sition in the V ietnam ese leadership.

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The K rem lin understood that not all o f its Com m unist allies w ould applaud die results o f the CPSU congress. It decided« therefore, to send special envoys to the capitals o f friendly regim es; these envoys w ould explain the congress’s decisions and defend th eir correctness. S oviet P olitburo m em ber A nastas M ikoyan visited H anoi in A pril Ỉ9S6. A lthough docum entary inform ation about this visit is still not available, w itnesses to his visit said that M ikoyan spoke in favor o f building a strong and w ealthy socialist state in the N orth, w hich w ould eventually be follow ed by the South. N o jo in t com m uniqué follow ed the visit, w hich not only “suggests that the N orth V ietnam ese and the R ussians could not reach a unity o f view s”93 but also indicates that no such com m uniqué had been planned by the Soviets and the V ietnam ese ow ing to the w orking character o f the visit. Soon after M ikoyan’s departure from Hanoi, the N orth V ietnam ese leader­ ship held the ninth plenary session o f the Lao D ong C entral Com m ittee, w hich discussed the resolutions o f the tw entieth CPSU congress. The plenum ’s deci­ sions w ere reported to the Soviet am bassador by Nguyen Duy T rinh, a m em ber o f the secretariat o f the Lao Dong Party. Trinh inform ed A m bassador Zim yanin that the C entral C om m ittee had de­ cided to discuss the results o f the CPSU congress w ithout em phasizing the issue o f the cult o f personality. The first part o f the plenum had been devoted to a dis­ cussion o f the international situation in light o f the decisions o f the CPSU congress and related problem s o f foreign and dom estic policies o f the DRV. H ie second part focused on internal w orkings o f the Lao Dong Party and the m ean­ ing o f K hrushchev’s report about the cult o f personality.96 Zim yanin’s m em orandum o f conversation about his talk w ith Trinh shows that T rinh’s principal goal was to assure his Soviet com rades that there was no cult o f personality in Vietnam . Trinh had assured Zim yanin that the principle o f collective leadership dom inated the activities o f the Com m unists in the DRV. A ll im portant problem s w ere discussed in the Lao Dong Politburo and plenary sessions. The question that stirred the m ost anxiety at the ninth plenum was w hether the popularity o f Ho Chi M inh should be interpreted as respect to the Vozhd’ or as the cult o f personality. The V ietnam ese Com m unists finally con­ cluded that there w ere “som e elem ents” o f a cult although these elem ents w ere not “o f a system atic and serious character.”97 The discussion am ong the V ietnam ese Com m unists at the plenary session and theữ criticism o f the cult o f personality was apparently m ore a dem onstration o f loyalty to the Soviet ally than a sincere stance. A part from theừ attitude to Stalin (w hose sizable picture in H anoi’s International Bookshop rem ained in place un­ til M arch 196298), the DRV leaders had serious m isgivings about the applica­ bility to their country o f K hrushchev’s m ethods in the USSR. They feared that

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if they follow ed K hrushchev's direction it m ight jeopardize the leading role o f the party in the struggle against Saigon and in the consolidation o f the Commu­ n ist regim e in the N orth. In his conversation w ith the Soviet am bassador, Nguyen Duy Trinh adm itted that there had been repressions during the agrarian reform against even the heads o f local party organizations. There had also been ideological errors and a b u se s." W hen the V ietnam ese leaders decided to follow the Soviet exam ple—and the Chinese exam ple to som e degree100—and adm it their errors openly and liberalize ideological restrictions, they had encountered theừ m ost severe crisis since 1954. For exam ple, in N ovem ber 1956, the N orth V ietnam ese governm ent had to quell an uprising in Nghe An province that had arisen as a result o f repression against the peasantry during the agrarian reform in 1954-1955. The peasant un­ rest coincided w ith the intensification o f dissent am ong intellectuals inspired by the decisions o f the tw entieth CPSU congress and the Chinese hundred-flowers policy. Peasants dem anded not only m aterial im provem ents but also freedom o f expression. Bernard Fall w rote, “[n]one o f the ‘sacred cow s’ o f the regim e” es­ caped criticism o f the V ietnam ese intelligentsia: “The Viet-Nam People’s Army w as accused o f being anti-intellectual; the Russian experts o f being overbearing and o f driving around in big cars; the Party o f antagonizing the peasantry and al­ low ing corruption to flourish am ong its m em bers.” 101 There appeared several publications that started to discuss them es o f individual freedom and the pursuit o f dem ocracy.102 Furtherm ore, the Com m unist leadership in the N orth faced pressure from com rades w ho felt it necessary to pay m ore attention to the strug­ gle in the South. Le D uan, who was assigned by the V ietnam ese Politburo to re­ m ain in South Vietnam , in A ugust 1956 w rote his thesis, “The Path o f the Rev­ olution in the South o f O ur C ountry,” in w hich he “clearly pointed out” that the path o f the liberation o f the South could only be a violent revolution.103 V ietnam ese leaders had every reason to blam e these difficulties on theữ So­ viet and C hinese com rades. From this tim e on, perhaps, they chose not to follow the lead o f th eừ pow erful allies in dom estic policy, alw ays referring instead to the specific situation o f theừ country. It w as, how ever, m ore difficult to differ from theữ allies in the sphere o f foreign affairs. Hanoi clearly could not openly discount the principle o f peaceful coexistence, but the N orth V ietnam ese sup­ ported it only if it did not contradict th en plans w ith respect to the South. They continued to regard South V ietnam not as an independent state recognized by foreign pow ers but only as the other part o f one country, tem porarily divided. In theữ view , then, the principle o f peaceful coexistence did not apply. The V ietnam ese Com m unists also did not accept K hrushchev’s declaration about how various countries could achieve socialism . W hile inform ing the So­ viet am bassador about the ninth plenary session o f the Lao Dong Party, Nguyen

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D uy T rinh did not say a w ord about H o C hi M inh's speech at die plenum . T ru th 's silence about H o 's speech is understandable because Ho had not ex­ cluded the possibility o f resorting to arm s to achieve unity: A lthough it is possible that certain countries may achieve socialism by peaceful m eans, w e m ust understand that in those countries w here the adm inistrative m achinery, the m ilitary pow ers and the se­ cret police o f the bourgeois class are still pow erful, the proletariat m ust prepare for an arm ed struggle. W hile noting the possibility o f achieving the territorial unification o f V ietnam through peaceful m eans, we m ust not forget [that] the A m erican im perialists and theừ lackeys still occupy one-half o f our national territory and are prepar­ ing fo r w ar. This is w hy, w hile holding high the flag o f peace, we m ust be prudent and v ig ila n t104 B ut H o 's w ords did not in fact contradict K hrushchev's judgm ent o f the w ays to achieve socialism . F irst the Soviet leader had noted that the Soviet Commu­ nists did not regard violence and civil w ar as the only way to overthrow capital­ ism , but he did not discard those tactics com pletely. A lso, in his pronouncem ent he was m ostly referring to developed capitalist countries, in w hich the w orking class had an “opportunity to inflict a defeat to the reactionary, anti-popular forces, to w in over a solid m ajority in the parliam ent and to convert it from an organ o f bourgeois dem ocracy into a tool o f really popular w ill."103 Thus K hrushchev’s thesis about peaceful achievem ent o f socialism had nothing to do w ith Vietnam . Strictly speaking, the V ietnam ese C om m unists, when adm itting the possibility o f arm ed struggle for unification, did not violate any o f the guide­ lines proclaim ed by M oscow ; nevertheless they w ere eager to conceal theừ view s because they could not but understand that such view s ran counter to the interests o f the Soviet leaders, w ho w anted to try rapprochem ent w ith the W est, and counter to the sim ilar trend in C hina, w here M ao Zedong had stated in his speech at the eighth congress o f the CCP in Septem ber 1956 that “the current in­ ternational situation is turning better. W e figured that w ar is unlikely to break out.” 106 Because the trend am ong theừ allies did not seem to benefit them , the V ietnam ese Com m unist leadership found it expedient to w ait until the m ood changed in the capitals o f theữ allies; in the m eantim e, they concentrated on the developm ent o f cooperation w ith M oscow and B eijing in various spheres, in­ cluding the m ilitary. The N orth V ietnam ese leaders' decision to bide th eừ tim e com plem ented theứ strategy aim ed at the developm ent o f the econom y o f the N orth and the buildup o f socialism so as to m ake the N orth a base for the unification o f the country.107 In this, Hanoi could expect enthusiastic support o f its Com m unist al­

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lies. W hile the W est strove to m ake South V ietnam a “ ‘show case’ that w ould outshine the N orth,” 108 the Soviets and Chinese w ere also eager to dem onstrate the advantages o f the system that w as being created in die DRV w ith th ev help. D uring Ho Chi M inh’s visit to M oscow in the sum m er o f 19SS, the Soviet U nion had prom ised to render the DRV assistance am ounting to four hundred m illion rubles. In early 1956, a half year later, Pham Van D ong inform ed the So­ viet am bassador that this sum had been depleted.109 M oscow w as helping w ith a num ber o f projects to build up N orth V ietnam .29 To create industrial sites, M oscow sent industrial equipm ent and assisted in draw ing plans for econom ic developm ent. A pproxim ately 275 experts w ere sent to the D RV, including m em bers o f geological expeditions and m edical units. The Soviets provided the N orth V ietnam ese w ith various goods as w ell as food. A shortage o f rice had oc­ curred because V ietnam ’s rice-producing regions w ere located in the southern zone.110 It becam e necessary to discuss prospects fo r further Soviet-N orth V iet­ nam ese econom ic cooperation. T his w as one objective, am ong others, o f M ikoyan’s visit to H anoi in A pril 1956.111 By m id-1957, the results o f Soviet aid to N orth V ietnam had becom e notice­ able. A m em orandum prepared for M ikoyan som etim e in the sum m er o f 1957— tw o years after the first agreem ents fo r econom ic cooperation w ere signed be­ tw een the tw o countries— stated that the Soviet specialists had “fully fulfilled” their obligations. They had put into operation five industrial enterprises, am ong them a tin m ining and processing factory at Tinh Tue that could produce 650 tons o f tin yearly, a tea factory, a hydroelectric pow er station, and tw o lines o f electricity transm ission. The Soviets organized geological exploration fo r ap­ atite, w olfram , zinc, lead, uranium , and other deposits. They m odernized the port o f Haiphong and helped organize production o f cem ent and coal m ining in Hon Gay. In addition, M oscow invited 249 V ietnam ese specialists to the Soviet U nion for further training.112 Econom ic aid w as not the only area o f Soviet-N orth V ietnam ese cooperation. A t its sixth plenum , the Lao Dong C entral C om m ittee had recognized the task o f developing the arm y into a m odem and regular one as a necessary condition o f dealing effectively w ith the new revolutionary situation in the country. H anoi therefore sought Soviet support in the m ilitary sphere as w ell. The issue o f m od­ ernizing the arm y w as again under consideration o f the tw elfth plenary session o f the Lao Dong C entral C om m ittee in M arch 1957 when G eneral Vo N guyen Giap, the DRV m inister o f defense, again pointed out that the People’s Arm y o f V ietnam m ust be developed into a m odem and regular arm y in order to be able to effectively carry out its m ission o f protecting the N orth and unifying the co u n try .113 T his w as also the m ain subject o f G iap’s conversation w ith Zim yanin on the eve o f Ho Chi M inh’s unofficial visit to M oscow in the sum­

Neither Peace nor W ar

m er o f 1957. G iap discussed at great length the shortcom ings o f the N orth V iet­ nam ese arm y. He com plained that the arm y w as not w ell adapted to the condi­ tions o f Vietnam , that the creation o f new branches o f the services occurred too slow ly, and that many errors had been m ade during the introduction o f con­ scription. G iap then disclosed a part o f the PAV general s ta ffs report that w as devoted to the assistance o f fraternal countries, and he drew attention to the need for co­ operation. The thrust o f his conversation was that the present level and form s o f assistance to the arm y w ere not enough. The C hinese, who had played the lead­ ing role in providing expertise and training for the V ietnam ese, them selves ad­ m itted that the buildup o f the m odem arm y was a new problem for them . They did not possess the necessary know ledge and w ere not fam iliar w ith the new m ilitary equipm ent that was delivered from the Soviet Union. Therefore, G iap stated, it w ould be useful if Soviet e x p a ts w ere dispatched to N orth Vietnam “for a certain period o f tim e.” 114 The general also spoke about sending a PAV representative to M oscow to discuss plans for the m odernization o f the N orth V ietnam ese army. Ho Chi M inh apparently also touched on this issue during his unofficial visit to M oscow in July 1957.115 A lthough details o f his discussions in M oscow re­ m ain unknow n, one result w as a trip by G iap and a group from the V ietnam ese m ilitary to M oscow in N ovem ber o f that year. A m bassador Zim yanin indicated to Foreign M inister A ndrei G rom yko that the purpose o f this secret m ilitary visit, w hich took place from N ovem ber 14 to D ecem ber 2, was “getting to know the fife o f the Soviet U nion and the activities o f the Soviet arm y.“ 116 A t about this tim e “a publicity blackout" on G iap’s activities caused som e W estern observers (and, later, scholars) to suspect that there was som e kind o f struggle w ithin the V ietnam ese Politburo— either betw een the pro-Chinese fac­ tion and the pro-Soviet faction, to which G iap allegedly belonged; o r betw een G iap and Le D uan, w ho had returned by that tim e to Hanoi from the South and who did not have good relations w ith the defense m inister.117 Instead, the si­ lence about G iap could be explained by his trip first to China and, then, to the Soviet U nion, during which he discussed issues o f m ilitary cooperation w ith the N orth V ietnam ese allies. If G iap’s position in the N orth V ietnam ese leadership was precarious, the Soviet am bassador knew nothing about it because, in that sam e letter to G rom yko, he referred to G iap as “one o f the m ost prom ising po­ litical leaders in the DRV.“ 118 Ho Chi M inh was also absent from the public arena at this tim e. D uring his July visit to M oscow he was invited to return in N ovem ber on the occasion o f the fortieth anniversary o f the O ctober R evolution.119 B ut later he asked the Krem lin if it w ould be possible for him to com e earlier, on O ctober 19, so he

Neither Peace nor W ar

could rest on the outskirts o f M oscow before the festivities. The Soviet leader­ ship had been inform ed about H o’s request by a letter prepared in the Foreign M inistry and in the international departm ent o f the CPSU C entral Com m ittee: Taking into account that the flight o f Com. Ho Chỉ M inh after illness from B eijing to M oscow requires a special concern over his health, the em bassy finds it expedient to send from M oscow to B eijing a doctor to accom pany Com. H o Chi M inh as w ell as to deliver for him in B eijing a set o f w arm clothes.120 Ho Chi M inh, who w as in his late 60s, obviously w anted to be in good shape fo r participating not only in the O ctober festivities but also in the m eeting o f rep­ resentatives o f Com m unist parties that w as tim ed to coincide w ith the anniver­ sary. D esigned as a dem onstration o f the unity o f the Com m unist m ovem ent af­ te r the tw entieth congress o f the Soviet Com m unist Party in February 1956 and the dissolution o f the Com inform one m onth later, this m eeting instead m arked the beginning o f a serious crisis in w orld com m unism that m anifested itsetf in the grow ing rift betw een M oscow and B eijing. This rift had profound conse­ quences fo r Vietnam .

6. If the Fractured Friendship Collapses Sifractus illabatur orbis, Impavidum ferient ruinae. Horatius1 You never trust the Chinese! You only trust the Russúmsỉ [To youJ the Russians are the first-class [people] whereas the Chinese are among the ừựerior who are dumb and careless. Excerptfrom a conversation between Mao Zedong and Yudin, Soviet ambassador to China July 2 2 ,19582

F rictíons in Soviet-Chinese relations existed w ell before the conflict betw een M oscow and B eijing becam e evident to Com m unist allies and, to a lesser extent, the W est. The Chinese leaders had m uch to com plain about concerning Soviet policy tow ard China, from the days o f the Com intern to the very m om ent when the Chinese Com m unist Party dealt the final blow to the G uom indang and es­ tablished a Com m unist regim e in all o f C hina except for Taiw an and a num ber o f sm all offshore islands.3 The Chinese Com m unists’ com ing to pow er only heightened theữ inferiority com plex w ith respect to the Soviets, whom they sus­ pected o f chauvinism and o f w anting to subdue theừ country. A lthough M oscow and B eijing signed the Treaty o f Friendship, A lliance, and M utual A ssistance in 1950 and developed bilateral relations in many areas, the Chinese leaders re­ m ained suspicious about the Soviets’ real objectives w ith respect to C hina. M ao Zedong, for exam ple, could not forgive and forget Stalin’s behavior during the Sino-Soviet negotiations in late 1949 and early 1950. The Soviet dictator treated “the revolutionary leader from the ‘Central K ingdom ,’ as the inferior ‘younger brother.” *4 M ao’s attem pt to prove him self a theoretician by discussing w ith Stalin issues o f com m unist theory encountered Stalin’s contem pt

If tha Fractured Friendship C ollapses

Y et M ao and his colleagues concealed theừ chagrin because Stalin—-his ar­ rogance and patronizing notw ithstanding—rem ained for them Lenin’s beừ, a “pow erful, though im perfect, incarnation o f the revolutionary G ospel.“3 In ad­ dition to this reverence tow ard tile Soviet dictator, the C hinese leaders under­ stood that “acquiring Soviet aid w as highly desirable, if not necessary, so as to resolve the nation’s inmiftrfiate econom ic problem s.”6 Com m unist China also needed M oscow ’s support and encouragem ent in its situation o f alm ost com ­ plete international isolation. A t tile sam e tim e M ao resented any notion that C hina ought to be a Soviet satellite. He w anted M oscow to treat his regim e as an equal partner. M ao’s dream m ight have been realized after Stalin’s death. The new Soviet leaders’ visit to C hina in the fall o f 1954 resulted in the elim ination o f the m ost irritating features o f bilateral relations under Stalin. N ikita K hrushchev pro­ posed abandoning the practice o f jo in t Soviet-C hinese ventures, w hich he re­ garded as sim ilar to those o f the im perialist countries.7 K hrushchev agreed to w ithdraw Soviet arm ed forces from th eữ naval bases in Lushun. A ll in all, K hrushchev seem ed to understand the C hinese feelings o f inferiority and theừ desire fo r equality w ith th eứ Soviet partners. For his part, M ao Zedong felt him setf equal if not superior to the new Soviet leader ow ing to his longer ex­ perience a t the top o f the C om m unist Party hierarchy. B ut the great expecta­ tions o f the C hinese leaders bom during the first years after Stalin’s death w ere not realized. K hrushchev, w hile m alting concessions on som e issues o f Sino-Soviet coop­ eration, w as not at all eager to com prom ise (H I the idea that the Soviet U nion w as “the vanguard o f the w orld Com m unist m ovem ent” and “the first country o f the victorious socialism ” w hose destiny w as to serve an exam ple for all other peo­ ples w ho w ould follow the sam e path. Besides, the new Soviet leader w as sus­ picious o f M ao’s aspirations and designs. He rem em bered S talin’s m ocking re­ m arks when he likened M ao Zedong to a radish—red from above but w hite inside.8 It was therefore unthinkable for K hrushchev to accede to M ao’s preten­ sion o f inheriting S talin’s role o f theoretician and spiritual leader o f the com ­ m unists. A s a result, after his first visit to China in 1954, K hrushchev firm ly COTcluded that a conflict betw een M oscow and B eijing w as unavoidable.9 B ut there was another reason w hy, even in tile heyday o f the Sino-Soviet al­ liance, distrust and bitter feelings continued to poison the atm osphere o f bilat­ eral relations. A lthough he had denounced Stalin’s abuses o f pow er and his cult o f personality, K hrushchev could not overcom e Stalin’s old m ethod o f dealing w ith other Com m unist parties. K hrushchev, like Stalin, believed that w hatever had been done in M oscow should serve as a directive for the w hole com m unist m ovem ent. In other w ords, despite all the revelations about the exigencies o f

If the Fractured Friendship Collapses

Stalin regim e, M oscow pretended to rem ain the ruling center for all com m unist allies. François Fejtö noted in his book on the Sino-Soviet conflict that there w as a contradiction betw een tile liberal and reform ist contents o f the decisions o f the tw entieth CPSU congress and the Stalinist m ethods o f theữ im plem entation.10 C onsidering tile sensitivity o f the B eijing leadership to C hina's independence and its desire to play a role in tile socialist cam p equal to the Soviet U nion, this Soviet contradiction only added to B eijing's determ ination to revolt. In addition, M ao disagreed w ith alm ost all o f the principal ideas put forth at the congress o f tile CPSU. M ao distrusted the policy o f peaceful coexistence and criticized the Soviet belief that the dictatorship o f the proletariat could be estab­ lished by peaceful m eans.11 B ut M ao Zedong was m ost hostile tow ard die de­ nunciation o f Stalin. A lthough M ao criticized the Soviet dictator’s m istakes, es­ pecially when they w ere com m itted w ith respect to C hina, M ao regarded him as a “great M arxist-Leninist revolutionary leader.” He adopted a “seventy-thirty ratio '' m ethodology, claim ing that S talin 's achievem ents should account for 70 percent and his m istakes for 30 percent.12 In addition, M ao, who had endured Stalin’s arrogance and m altreatm ent, de­ fended the Soviet dictator and tried to em phasize his historical role because o f his own desire to occupy S talin 's place in the w orld com m unist m ovem ent and his reluctance to dism antle his ow n cult o f personality in China. In previous years M ao associated him self too closely w ith the Soviet dictator to be able to reject this relationship outright. Thus, for M ao, follow ing K hrushchev’s exam ­ ple and denouncing Stalin m eant condem ning him self and underm ining the foundations o f his authority in C hina. M ao insisted that Stalin’s errors w ere sec­ ondary com pared w ith his achievem ents13 and, later, M ao distinguished be­ tw een correct and incorrect personality cults.14 In general, the Chinese leader believed that K hrushchev’s speech “m ade a m ess” 15 and shattered Soviet positions am ong other Com m unist parties. This situation seem ed to favor M ao and his aspirations for com peting w ith M oscow fo r the leadership o f the com m unist w orld; and the crises in Poland and H ungary during w hich the Chinese leader played an im portant role in containing Soviet intervention, in the first case, and blessing it, in the second, had consolidated M ao's positions.16 “A lthough in public M ao continued to m aintain that M oscow rem ained the center o f the socialist cam p, he really believed that it w as be who w as m ore qualified to dictate the principles underlying relations betw een and am ong socialist countries.” 17 M ao’s belief in his rightful position m ight have ac­ quired new im petus as a result o f the struggle w ithin the Soviet leadership. The anti-party plot o f Ỉ9S7, although it consolidated K hrushchev's position in the country and in the party, seriously weakened his position in Chinese leaders’ eyes.

If the Fractured Friendship Collapses

N evertheless, when the leaders o f the Com m unist parties from m any coun­ tries gathered in M oscow in N ovem ber Ỉ9S7, M ao displayed his loyalty tow ard M oscow. M ore than that, he called other Com m unist leaders to recognize the USSR’s leadership role. Perhaps he was expressing his gratitude fo r the Soviet decision, m ade at the sam e tim e, to provide China a training m odel o f an atom ic bom b and related equipm ent.18 If so, M ao did everything at the Com m unist par­ ties m eeting to discourage the Soviets from this step. First o f all, nobody in the Soviet leadership, including K hrushchev him seư, believed in the sincerity o f M ao’s acknow ledgem ent o f the USSR’s leading role. K hrushchev suspected a double gam e on the part o f the Chinese. “If all other parties acknow ledge the role o f the leader as belonged to the one party,” he w rote in his m em oirs, “then the leader could be changed. Today [there is] one leader, tom orrow — another. W e believed that the Chinese w ere preparing a ba­ sis fo r theử future claim s to such a role.” 19 M ao also literally shocked the Soviets by his pronouncem ents concerning w ar and revolution. He em phasized that “the Com m unists should not be frightened by the prospect o f a nuclear w ar started by the im perialists but should realize that such a w ar, although carrying a high price, w ould bring the im perialist sys­ tem to its final conclusion.”20 He repeated his fam ous slogans about the “east w ind w hich is prevailing over the w est w ind” and im perialists as paper tigers.21 In the sam e vein, the Chinese protested against a peaceful transition to so­ cialism . A t the conference they dissem inated a m em orandum that both con­ ceded that it w as useful to include the passage about a peaceful socialist revolu­ tion in the text o f the conference’s docum ents and argued that the com m unists should not insist too m uch on peaceful revolution, for this could lead to weak­ ened m ilitancy on the part o f the proletariat and to the confusion o f the Com­ m unist parties w ith the socialists in the eyes o f revolutionary m asses.22 O nly af­ ter long debates w ere the C om m unist leaders able to com prom ise. H aving obtained Chinese support fo r the policy o f peaceful coexistence, the Soviets conceded on the issue o f the transition to socialism and accepted that, under cer­ tain circum stances, there could be a nonpeaceful transition to socialism . The N ovem ber 1957 M oscow conference o f the leaders o f the Com m unist and W orkers’ Parties thus revealed several points o f disagreem ent betw een the Soviets and the C hinese that w ere based on the rivalry betw een M oscow and B eijing over the leadership o f the w orld com m unist m ovem ent. In 1957 a com ­ prom ise betw een the CPSU and the C hinese Com m unist Party was still possi­ ble, but it w as based on a w eak foundation and quickly crum bled into acute con­ flict. A fter the conference, M ao Zedong continued to assert his dom inant role as the new Com m unist ideologue, at least, for A sian Com m unist parties. On D e-

If the Fractured Friendship Collapses

cem ber7,1957, he told the C zechoslovak m ilitary delegation that it w as C hina's responsibility to develop a new theory and practice o f com m unism in A sia.23 M ao regarded any step by the Soviet U nion to acquire geopolitical positions in A sia as an attem pt to underm ine C hina’s role as a first-class pow er. W hen M oscow approached B eijing in 1958 w ith die suggestion that they jointly build a pow erful long-w ave radio station linking the C hinese navy w ith the Soviet navy in E ast A sia and establish a jo in t flotilla o f nuclear-pow ered subm arines for a common defense o f the Far East, M ao not surprisingly w as outraged. He sum m oned the Soviet am bassador, Pavel Y udin, and railed against the inferior treatm ent o f his country by die Soviets. “Y ou never trust the C hinese,” M ao ex­ claim ed. “Y ou only trust the Russians! [To you] die R ussians are the first-class [people] w hereas die Chinese are am ong the inferior w ho are dum b and care­ less----- W ith a few atom ic bom bs, you think you are in a position to control US through asking the right o f rent and lease.”24 A fter m alting K hrushchev rush to B eijing and offer his apologies fo r the m is­ understanding,25 M ao asserted his independence o f M oscow in die area o f for­ eign policy and in A ugust and Septem ber o f 1958 ordered a large-scale shelling o f a G uom indang-controlled island—Jinm en (Quemoy)— o ff the coast o f Fujian province. He had not inform ed M oscow about the details o f this operation o r about its ultim ate goal.26 As a result, M oscow expressed support and solidarity w ith C hina w hile it could only guess w hat the Chinese w ere striving fo r by con­ fronting the U nited States in a crisis that could lead to nuclear w ar. O nly during Soviet foreign m inister A ndrei G rom yko’s unscheduled v isit to B eijing in Septem ber 1958 did M oscow learn that M ao did not plan to invade Taiw an o r to involve C hina in a direct m ilitary confrontation w ith die U nited States. A l­ though M ao had dom estic as w ell as foreign policy reasons fo r the shelling, die C hinese leader clearly w anted to teach the Soviets that the era o f M oscow’s abil­ ity to dictate to China was over, and henceforth China did not intend to coordi­ nate all its international actions w ith the Soviet U nion.27 The events o f the sum m er o f 1958 w ere a turning point in the developm ent o f the Soviet-Chinese conflict For the first tim e after his accession to pow er, M ao Zedong openly defied Soviet prestige and disregarded the interests o f his pow­ erful ally. A lthough on the surface relations betw een the tw o countries rem ained friendly and cooperation in various areas continued, undercurrents o f disagree­ m ent, suspicion, and m istrust w ere destroying the foundation o f the Sino-Soviet alliance.28 The tw o sides diverged on issues o f foreign policy as w ell as on dom estic re­ form . B eijing did not w ant to accept the Soviet concept o f peaceful coexistence, w hich the C hinese leaders regarded as capitulation to the W est. The Chinese be­ lieved that this Soviet policy stem m ed from the Soviets’ erroneous approach to­

If the Fractured Friendship Collapses

w ard international relations in general. Zhou E nlai subm itted his evaluation o f M oscow ’s policy to M ao Zedong and die Chinese Com m unist Party leadership in early 1957 and w rote that the Soviet leaders: spend m ore tim e and effort on coping w ith specific and isolated events than on evaluating and anticipating situations thoroughly from different angles. They explicitly dem onstrate w eakness in con­ sidering and discussing strategic and long-term issues. As far as tac­ tics are concerned, on the other hand, lacking clearly defined princi­ ples, they tend to be on such a loose ground in handling specific affairs that they w ill fail to reach satisfactorily the strategic goals through resolving each specific co n flict29 In return, M oscow disapproved o f w hat it regarded as the PRC’s adventurist international policy. The Soviets criticized B eijing fo r its lack o f understanding o f the new correlation o f forces in the w orld and for its opposition to the idea o f full and com plete disarm am ent They derided the Chinese idea o f im perialists as paper tigers and o f the possibility o f nuclear w ar. This criticism w as translated into practical steps by the Soviet leadership. W hile K hrushchev was ready to support C hina during the 1958 Taiw an Strait crisis, he strongly opposed the C hi­ nese in th eữ conflict w ith India in A ugust 1959 although officially the Soviet governm ent occupied a neutral position.30 M oscow regarded C hina’s initiation o f the conflict w ith India on the eve o f K hrushchev’s visit to the U nited States as an attem pt by the C hinese to frustrate an expected am elioration o f U .S.-So­ viet relations.31 B ut especially strong criticism w as voiced by M oscow w ith respect to the do­ m estic reform s begun in China after the eighth plenary session o f the C hinese Com m unist Party in M ay 1958. M oscow regarded C hina’s G reat Leap Forw ard as a result o f C hinese self-conceit and arrogance in theừ assessm ent o f the suc­ cess o f their econom ic developm ent in 1958.32 The Soviet leaders also w ere not optim istic about people’s com m unes. They assessed M ao’s agrarian reform as an “attem pt to jum p over a large historic stage o f socialist developm ent, to de­ clare Com m unism on the prim itive basis in the backw ard C hinese village.”33 The Soviets tried to convey to B eijing theữ doubts about Chinese reform s in in­ dustry and agriculture but, as expected, these w arnings only stim ulated Chinese resentm ent The Chinese am bassador to M oscow, Liu X iao, reported to his su­ periors in O ctober 1958 that the Soviet leaders “lacked a profound understand­ ing o f the application o f our Party’s strategy and tactics in [econom ic affairs] and the new thoughts and new practices that have em erged in our [econom ic] developm ent” Such issues as people’s com m unes and C hina’s rapid transfor­ m ation tow ard Com m unism w ere “incom prehensible” to them .34 B ut w hat the

If the Fractured Friendship Collapses

Soviet leaders especially w orried about w as that the Chinese exam ple m ight be attractive to other countries and even to the people o f the Soviet U nion. In his m em oirs K hrushchev w rote that som e Soviet new spapers in the territories on the border w ith C hina raised the issue o f the USSR copying the experience o f the people’s com m unes. “W e should adm it this frightened US,” K hrushchev con­ fided and told how the B ulgarian Com m unists follow ed the Chinese exam ple until the Soviets taught them that this exam ple could not be applied in the con­ ditions o f the European socialist countries.35 The Chinese had begun to com pete w ith theừ Soviet allies for ideological influence w ithin the socialist cam p. Soon this com petition spread to the Third W orld. By I960 M oscow recognized the im portance o f strengthening its influence in developing countries o f A sia, A frica, and Latin A m erica. The principle o f the division o f responsibilities w ith Com m unist C hina adopted by M oscow in its foreign policy tow ard Third W orld in the m id-1950s proved to be obsolete now , even before disagreem ents betw een the tw o Com m unist giants led to co n flict M oscow realized it could not allow Chinese prestige to grow at the expense o f Soviet influence in the new ly independent countries as w ell as in the national liberation m ovem ents. If the Soviet Union and Com m unist C hina acted in uni­ son tow ard the Third W orld initially, thetf differing view s o f theữ leaderships on the principal international issues gradually eroded th eừ cooperation and pulled the tw o countries apart in their policies tow ard the Third W orld. In 1958, the Soviet em bassy in B eijing had already reported on the “ten­ dency” o f the Chinese friends “to solve the issues concerning A sia indepen­ dently.”36 In 1959-1960, the em bassy reported to M oscow about C hina’s “ten­ dency tow ard retreat from the internationalist policy, com m on to the w hole socialist cam p.” M m e than that, according to the Soviet diplom ats, B eijing had undertaken steps “that could inflict dam age to the common cause o f the work­ ing class.” The Chinese leaders em phasized the special position o f theứ country in the socialist cam p, draw ing attention to its closeness to the countries o f A sia, A frica, and Latin A m erica due to the specific historical experience. The C hinese belittled the support o f other socialist countries, first o f all, that o f the Soviet U nion, w hile they tried to present C hina as the only faithful ally o f the people w ho w ere struggling for theừ independence and the country best able to prom ote national liberation m ovem ents. They popularized M ao Zedong’s ideas about the predom inant role o f national liberation m ovem ents in the struggle against im ­ perialism , neglected Soviet proposals in the UN on the com plete abolition o f colonialism , and spoke against Soviet proposals on disarm am ent Furtherm ore, B eijing spared no effort to convince Third W orld leaders that only the Chinese C om m unist Party w as a truly revolutionary party as opposed to the CPSU, w hich was ’Tailing aw ay from class positions.”37

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T he “huge num ber” o f various delegations from A sia, A frica, and L atin A m erica that cam e to B eijing sa v e d to dem onstrate Chinese activity in this area o f foreign policy. For exam ple, in 1960, m ore than 90 A frican delegations vis­ ited C hina, and all the C hinese leaders w ere involved in w elcom ing them . M ao Zedong received representatives from A frica, A sia, and Latin A m erica 34 tim es, and Liu Shaoqi received delegations 37 tim es. B ut Zhou Enlai, w ith 111 such m eetings, outdid both leaders. “A t the sam e tim e,” Soviet diplom ats noted sourly, “the Chinese leaders extrem ely rarely m et w ith representatives o f the So­ viet U nion and other socialist countries.”38 Thus, by 1960, Com m unist C hina, instead o f being an ally, had becom e a ri­ val to the Soviet U nion. H ow ever, an open split had not yet occurred. N either M oscow nor B eijing was prepared to com pletely abandon its policy o f cooper­ ation and expose contradictions to the outside w orld. The Soviets particularly dem onstrated theữ eagerness to preserve the status quo in bilateral relations; and K hrushchev, w ho had ju st returned from an official visit to the U nited States on Septem ber 15-27,1959, w ent to B eijing, allegedly to celebrate the P R C s tenth anniversary but, in reality, to discuss w ith his Chinese counterparts the pressing problem s o f bilateral relations and to try to bridge the w idening gap betw een the tw o countries. D uring his m eeting w ith the Chinese leadership on O ctober 2, K hrushchev spoke o f the necessity for the socialist countries to “avoid everything that m ight be used by reactionaries in order to push the w orld into the ‘Cold W ar’ again.” He criticized the C hinese actions against Taiw an and India and com plained about an abnorm al situation in w hich “w e, the Chinese allies, do not know w hat the C hinese com rades w ill undertake tom orrow in the sphere o f foreign policy.” He accused the Chinese o f not understanding the policy o f peaceful coexistence and said that they com plicated “the positions o f the socialist cam p by theừ in­ correct actions.”39 The Chinese responded w ith theữ ow n accusations. They criticized K hrushchev for his denunciation o f Stalin’s cult o f personality w ith­ out prior consultation w ith B eijing and for seriously com plicating the situation in the w orld Com m unist m ovem ent w ith the decisions o f the tw entieth CPSU congress. Through the Chinese foreign m inister, Chen Y i, they criticized the So­ viet position tow ard the Sino-Indian conflict, calling M oscow’s policy “tim e­ serving” as opposed to the consistent policy o f C hina.40 It turned out that, in­ stead o f leading to im proved o f relations betw een the tw o countries, the Soviet-Chinese negotiations led to even m ore serious discord, w hich w as about to com e to light. In fact, fragm entary inform ation about the disagreem ents betw een the Soviet U nion and China had reached the W est before the split in the Com m unist w orld becam e an established fact. K hrushchev hỉm seư, in spite o f his position as an

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avow ed defender o f Chinese interests in his encounters w ith the W est, had to ad­ m it in a conversation w ith A verell H arrim an, the form er am bassador to the So­ viet U nion, that differences existed in the view s o f the tw o countries on a num ­ ber o f issues.41 However, since such revelations w ere accom panied by Soviet declarations in support o f C hina, U .S. officials w ere circum spect in theừ evalu­ ation o f the scope o f Sino-Soviet differences and w arned against an overly op­ tim istic approach. For exam ple, in a m em orandum prepared at the tim e o f K hrushchev’s Septem ber 1959 visit to the U nited States, the State D epartm ent’s Bureau o f Intelligence and Research repented to Secretary o f State C hristian H erter that: “W hile available evidence does suggest that the Sino-Soviet rela­ tionship at the present tim e m ay be subjected to unusual strains, it w ould be pre­ m ature to conclude that the problem s cannot be resolved at least to the extent o f preventing a serious w eakening o f the alliance itsetf.”42 It took a full year before the director o f the CIA , A llen D ulles, could provide the u.s. adm inistration w ith m ore o r less reliable inform ation on the Sino-Soviet conflict. He reported at a m eeting o f the N ational Security Council on Septem ber 7, I960, that “Commu­ nist C hina and tile USSR have been quarreling for about tw o years,” and he out­ lined five issues o f disagreem ent betw een the tw o countries.43 Thus, despite theừ public pronouncem ents about a consolidated international com m unism , U .S. officials w ere w ell aw are o f the lack o f a com m unist m onolith in the sense o f a concentrated and optim ized threat.44 By the tim e the new s o f Sino-Soviet discord reached W ashington, the discord had long ceased to be a secret to the m em bers o f the socialist cam p. Among the Com m unist leaders who follow ed m ost attentively the developm ents in SinoSoviet relations w ere tile N orth V ietnam ese. For N orth V ietnam , m ore than any other Com m unist country, the quarrel be­ tw een the Russians and the C hinese posed great problem s. The DRV could not openly align itsetf w ith M oscow, as m ost East European countries did, o r w ith Beijing, as A lbania did. The problem for N orth V ietnam was m uch m ore com ­ plicated than the geographic proxim ity o f C hina because it involved m any fac­ tors, such as historical background o f the relationship betw een the tw o coun­ tries, the m ore recent experience o f V ietnam ’s cooperation w ith both the Soviet U nion and C hina, the division o f V ietnam in tw o parts and the task o f the unifi­ cation o f the country, and, o f course, the ideological preferences o f the Hanoi leadership. The V ietnam ese, at first glance, had m uch in com m on w ith the ideology o f theữ Chinese neighbor. Ho Chi M inh, like M ao Zedong, had suffered greatly from Stalin’s arrogance and distrust o f the A sian com m unists. A t the sam e tim e, Ho did not com pletely support K hrushchev’s denunciation o f Stalin and was in­ clined to agree w ith M ao’s 70-30 ratio in his assessm ent o f the Soviet dictator’s

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achievem ents.43 Like M ao, H o’s greatest concern was his special position on the question o f the personality cult— the role o f the leader w ho concentrates pow er in order to achieve die tasks o f die regim e. H o believed that he, as die V iet­ nam ese leader, m ust direct developm ents in his country until the goal o f unifi­ cation was achieved, m uch as Stalin had held all the strings o f governm ent dur­ ing the w ar against N azi G erm any. The same goal dictated die N orth Vietnam ese attitude tow ard peaceful coexis­ tence and die peaceful transition to socialism. Both o f diese Soviet concepts con­ tradicted the plans for the South that Hanoi was working out after die 1954Geneva conference on Indochina. Those plans never excluded the possibility o f resorting to w ar if all other methods proved to be fruitless.46 But everybody understood that a w ar in Vietnam w ould unavoidably be waged not only against the Saigon regim e but also against its U .S. supportas because the United States would be involved in one form or another. Hence any revolution in the South would likely not be peaceful but would lead to a local w ar that could endanger the policy o f peaceful coexistence pursued by die Soviet Union. Therefore, the Vietnam ese m ight w ell have felt relief when, at the 1957 M oscow conference o f the Com m unist parties, the Soviets had to concede under Chinese pressure that under certain circum­ stances there could be a nonpeaceful transition to socialism .47 This affinity o f view s did not presuppose unconditional support fo r C hinese policies on the part o f H anoi, how ever. Experience had taught the V ietnam ese Com m unists to be careful in follow ing the lead o f B eijing. Exam ples o f ques­ tionable Chinese policies include the disastrous agrarian reform in N orth V iet­ nam that had been advised and supervised by Chinese instructors and the liber­ alization o f ideology and propaganda along the lines o f M ao’s hundred-flowers cam paign.48 The N orth V ietnam ese leadership justified its decision to abandon the slavish im itation o f China by referring to specific conditions that existed only in Vietnam . H anoi’s attitude tow ard the Soviet U nion w as m ore utilitarian. N o one w ould deny H anoi’s ideological closeness to M oscow, but ideology was by no m eans the only factor that pushed the N orth V ietnam ese leaders to seek Soviet advice and su pport The Soviet U nion w as a pow erful industrial country that could as­ sist Hanoi not only m orally but also m aterially. C hina w as not capable o f com ­ peting w ith the advanced technology and skill that M oscow could provide to the DRV. H anoi also regarded the Soviet U nion as a counterbalance to Chinese in­ fluence and com m and. As a re su lt despite th e n disagreem ent w ith som e aspects o f Soviet foreign policy and theory, Ho Chi M inh and m ost o f his subordinates never risked open dissent from M oscow ’s pronouncem ents. Thus the DRV’s situation w as precarious. D ependent on B eijing as w ell as M oscow, the N orth V ietnam ese had to pursue a m iddle course and avoid, fo r as

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long as possible, taking sides in theữ disputes. The result was a tactic “o f re­ sponding to pressure from the Soviet U nion and C hina by offering verbal sup­ port but taking no action.“49 The grow ing Sino-Soviet estrangem ent threatened to jeopardize N orth V iet­ nam ’s ability to achieve a balance. The N orth V ietnam ese leadership under­ stood that in the case o f an open rift both allies w ould dem and a clear-cut align­ m ent. Furtherm ore, Hanoi regarded any sharpening o f contradictions w ithin the Com m unist bloc as dam aging the cause o f the unification o f V ietnam because Com m unists would be diverted from a unified front vis-à-vis the im perialist pow ers. It is therefore not surprising that the N orth V ietnam ese w ere m ost un­ happy about disputes betw een tile Soviets and the C hinese and w ere m ost eager to m ediate the disagreem ents. The role o f the V ietnam ese Com m unists as m ediators w ould reveal itse ư lat«:, in 1960, when at a M oscow conference a last attem pt was m ade to preserve the unity o f the socialist cam p. M eanw hile both allies developed theừ relations w ith the DRV, but China gained the lead. Sino-V ietnam ese econom ic coopera­ tion continued to broaden and intensify. On M arch 3 1 ,19S8, a new protocol on Chinese aid to the DRV and an agreem ent on assistance to N inth V ietnam for the construction o f 18 industrial projects during 1958-1961 w ere signed by the tw o countries. These industrial projects w ere to be built w ith part o f the 800 m il­ lion yuan that the Chinese com m itted to the V ietnam ese as a gift in 1955.50 Is­ sues o f Sino-V ietnam ese econom ic cooperation w ere actively discussed by Pham Van Dong during secret negotiations in B eijing in the fall o f 1958, and in the first m onths o f 1959 during an official visit to the C hinese capital o f a DRV delegation headed by Le Thanh N ghỉ, m inister o f industry and director o f tile in­ dustrial section o f the D RV ’s office o f the prem ier. The Soviet em bassy in B ei­ jin g reported that these negotiations resulted in a long-term credit o f 300 m illion yuan at 1 percent interest for 10 years beginning ỉn 1967.51 The Chinese also gifted the N orth V ietnam ese w ith another 100 m illion yuan to be used for eco­ nom ic developm ent32 China was also N orth V ietnam ’s leading trading partner, 27.3 percent o f the N orth V ietnam ese trade was w ith the PRC.53 Sino-N orth V ietnam ese m ilitary cooperation w as well established. China as­ sisted the People’s Army o f V ietnam in establishing antiaircraft, engineering, tank, and infantry units. The C hinese also supplied the PAV w ith assault guns; m ilitary vehicles; and engineering, com m unications, and reconnaissance equip­ m ent.54 The Soviet foreign m inistry noted that in the realm o f culture, C hina’s influ­ ence in the DRV was grow ing. Hanoi and B eijing had signed an agreem ent that envisaged the developm ent o f cultural exchanges; how ever, the Soviet foreign m inistry stated, “in practice cultural ties surpass the planned fram ew ork.’’55

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The DRV im ported a large num ber o f C hinese books, m any o f w hich w ere translated into the V ietnam ese. Between seventy and one hundred delegations from N orth V ietnam traveled to C hina every year, and C hina hosted the ma­ jo rity o f the V ietnam ese w ho w ere sent abroad for education (957 out o f 1711 in 1959).36 Com pared w ith C hina, the Soviet Union lagged far behind in its cooperation w ith the DRV. A lthough cooperation betw een the tw o countries developed in econom ic as w ell as in m ilitary and cultural m atters, and M oscow provided ever-grow ing assistance to the DRV, the scope o f this assistance could not com ­ pete w ith C hina’s. This situation was the result o f the Soviet policy o f division o f responsibility, initiated soon after the G eneva conference, and ỉn 19S7-Ỉ9S9 M oscow still saw no reason to m odify it. In vain the Soviet diplom ats in Hanoi appealed to theữ superiors, draw ing theừ attention to the “grow ing role and im ­ portance o f the D em ocratic Republic o f V ietnam , which stands at the extrem ity o f the socialist cam p in Southeast A sia and becom es an im m ediate object o f provocations on the part o f A m erican im perialists and theừ lackeys.” They even em phasized the im portance o f the DRV for the policy o f neutralization o f other countries in Indochina and for “dragging them aw ay from the sphere o f the ac­ tivity o f the U nited States.”57 The K rem lin did not budge. Janos Radvanyi, a H ungarian diplom at w ho later defected to the W est and who was a m em ber o f his country’s delegation to N orth V ietnam ỉn 1959, rem em bers his delegation’s m eeting w ith Khrushchev on its way back from Indochina. W hen M unnich, the H ungarian prim e m inister, “enthusiastically” tried to tell the Soviet leader “about som e o f the highlights o f our Hanoi visit, K hrushchev all but yaw ned in his face.” Instead, m ost o f his talk was devoted to W est B erlin and C hina.38 Evidently, K hrushchev did not yet see in Indochina a pressing issue that de­ m anded his attention. The Soviets w ere convinced that “the G eneva agreem ents on Indochina keep theừ legal force and represent an im portant instrum ent o f preserving peace in that region.” Soviet diplom ats supported this optim istic view by theừ analyses o f the attitudes o f the m ain participants in the 1954 G eneva conference. The tw o principal opponents o f the G eneva agreem ents, the U nited States and South V ietnam , w ere avoiding a d irect violation o f the G eneva agreem ents and w ere cooperating w ith the ICC. France, although it con­ tinued to refuse to fulfill its obligations under the agreem ents, was concerned w ith the grow ing U.s. penetration into Indochina and wanted to counterbalance it by augm enting its own influence. The B ritish, in spite o f theữ opposition to all-V ietnam ese elections and theữ tacit support o f u.s. policy in Southeast A sia, had to take into account theừ interests in the region and theừ obligations as a cochaừ o f the G eneva conference. These considerations served to “keep, in gen­ eral, England in the fram ew ork o f the struggle for the observance o f the G eneva

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agreem ents.” Even the C anadian p o sitif» w as not, in die Soviet view , w holly pro-A m erican.39 This assessm ent o f the developm ents in Indochina perm itted M oscow to con­ sider a step such as the establishm ent o f direct relations w ith the Saigon regim e. In its political report fo r 1958, die Soviet em bassy in H anoi recom m ended that M oscow “already at the present tim e . . . discuss m easures aim ed at die m ain­ taining o f econom ic and cultural relations betw een South V ietnam and the coun­ tries o f the socialist cam p (apartfrom the DÄV).”60 This proposal w as justified by the need fo r the Soviets to have first-hand inform ation about the situation in South Vietnam . A t the sam e tim e the Soviets, acting through the ICC and the Polish representatives to it, pressed th en N orth V ietnam ese allies to continue at­ tem pts to establish direct com m unications w ith the regim e in die South. D uring 1958 plans w ere nurtured for a m eeting o f representatives o f the tw o parts o f V ietnam in the dem ilitarized zone. The South V ietnam ese consented to such a m eeting and the date o f the m eeting, January 12,1959, was agreed to by both sides. D espite th en agreem ent to avoid publicity, how ever, H anoi broad­ cast the inform ation on the forthcom ing negotiations and asserted that Saigon had consented only under pressure o f public opinion. H anoi’s revelation imme­ diately incited a flow o f protests from Saigon as w ell as from W ashington and London. The A m ericans and the B ritish dem anded a postponem ent o f the m eet­ ing, saying it was untim ely.61 As a result, this im portant event that m ight have led to the som e sort o f collaboration betw een the N orth and the South did not take place. On the one hand, Hanoi had spoken in favor o f the developm ent o f relations betw een the zones; and Pham Van D ong’s letter o f D ecem ber 28, 1958, that spelled out a four-point program that could have becom e a basis fo r the nor­ m alization o f relations w ith South V ietnam could be taken as proof o f N orth V ietnam ’s intentions. O n the other hand, the N orth V ietnam ese had jeopardized the very step that could help to realize im proved relations. In fact, by the end o f 1958 H anoi had decided to abandon its policy o f reliance on only peaceful m eans in order to achieve the unification o f the country, and it raised violence to a level equal w ith the political and the propaganda straggle. In Decem ber 1958 and January 1959, the C entral Com m ittee o f the Lao Dong Party held its fifteenth plenary session.62 U nlike previous party sessions that had gathered in Hanoi after the 1954 G eneva conference and that had been devoted to the topic o f peaceful unification, this plenary session cam e to the conclusion that “the m ain direction o f the developm ent o f the revolution in South V ietnam is that o f violence.”63 This m eant a com bination o f the political struggle o f the popular m asses w ith an arm ed struggle aim ed at “the overthrow o f the pow er o f im perialists and feudal lords and the establishm ent o f the revolutionary pow er

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o f die people.”64 In his d o sin g address. H o Chi M inh em phasized that the south­ ern region o f V ietnam w as a part o f “our country’s revolution,” w hile die revo­ lution in V ietnam w as a “part o f the w orld’s revolution.” Ho declared that arm ed struggle w as a supplem ent to political activity. "Peace does not m ean that w e do not prepare our m ilitary forces,” H o declared. “If w e organize our political strength w ell, when die need com es to resort to arm s, it w ill not be d ifficu lt”63 Thus, the dedsions o f the fifteenth plenum constituted a m ajor departure from the prior policy o f the Lao D ong Party tow ard the South. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hanoi did not announce its decisions until M ay Ỉ9S9. B ut even when its decisions w ere m ade public, theừ w ording was apparently so vague that the Soviet em bassy did not at first recognize theữ im pact on Soviet policy in the region. The em bassy’s annual report for 1959 sim ply noted that “fo r the first tim e in the postw ar period a vitally im portant problem o f the reunification o f the country w as considered in the w hole and in som e aspects. The plenum outlined revolutionary tasks for the w hole country and as it is applied to N orth, as w ell as to South V ietnam .”66 A lthough the Chinese w ere w ell inform ed about N orth V ietnam ese intentions to reconsider th eừ strategy tow ard the South,67 the Soviets rem ained ig n o ran t In conversations w ith Soviet officials, the V iet­ nam ese “friends” deliberately m isled M oscow, revealing only decisions o f the fifteenth plenum that em phasized the im portance o f peaceful struggle. For ex­ am ple, one m em ber o f the V ietnam ese Politburo, Pham Hung, told the Soviet am bassador in H anoi, Leonid Sokolov, in June 1959 that the “plenum arrived at the unanim ous opinion that it is necessary to unfold a political straggle aim ed at the overthrow ing o f the Diem regim e by peaceful m eans and, at the sam e tim e, to take into account a possibility, under certain internal and external conditions, o f the fulfillm ent o f this task by m eans o f arm s.” H e reiterated H anoi’s adher­ ence to the G eneva agreem ents because they “represent an im portant basis for the unfolding o f the revolutionary struggle in South V ietnam .”68 Thus M oscow heard from the V ietnam ese w hat it w anted to hear and did not perceive the in­ tensified struggle in the South as a threat to its Indochina policy. This struggle w as gaining m om entum , how ever, and uprisings took place in various parts o f South V ietnam . In the sum m er o f 1959, sixteen thousand memb o s o f an ethnic m inority in Tra Bong launched an uprising under the leader­ ship o f the district party com m ittee and the provincial party com m ittee. In Jan­ uary o f 1960, forty-seven villages in Ben T re province revolted sim ultaneously. A lso beginning in 1960, concerted uprisings sw ept across the province o f Nam Bo.69 N orth V ietnam began training cadres to be sent to the South on an im ­ pressive scale. In M ay 1959, the South V ietnam ese governm ent adopted Law 10/59, w hich intensified repression against com m unists and those w ho w ere suspected o f sup-

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potting them ; and in 1960 the South announced a doubling o f the num ber o f u.s. instructors in V ietnam serving in the u.s. m ilitary assistance advisoiy group (M AAG). These m easures cem ented H anoi’s determ ination to broaden the struggle against the Diem regim e. H anoi m ade special efforts to provide the South V ietnam ese guerrillas w ith arm s, am m unition, and other support for op­ erations against the South V ietnam ese arm ed forces. H anoi decided to build a system o f roads that could link the N orth V ietnam ese w ith theữ southern com ­ rades-in-arm s. Starting in A ugust 1959, the DRV sent to the Com m unist insur­ gents in the South ever-grow ing num ber o f rifles, bayonets, explosives, and other m atériel. In D ecem ber 1959, the Lao Dong Central Com m ittee approved fo r the first tim e the dispatch o f a team o f tw enty-five regrouped southern cadres, who had been based in the N orth after the G eneva settlem ent, to cross back over the dem ilitarized zone to assist in the training o f anti-D iem forces.70 By this tim e, H anoi had received C hina’s blessing for its m ilitary plans in the South.71 These developm ents did not go unnoticed by Soviet leaders, who w ere aw are that “the population o f the South in the recent m onths began to pass from polit­ ical and econom ic form s o f the struggle to the arm ed struggle” and that “in a num ber o f regions (especially in the extrem e South) real fighting raged” be­ tw een local guerrillas and South V ietnam ese governm ent troops. They also knew that there w ere “revolutionary bases” in South Vietnam , established after the G eneva conference.72 B ut M oscow did not accurately perceive the extent o f N orth V ietnam ese involvem ent in these developm ents. H anoi assured its Soviet allies that, in spite o f the difficulties that the N orth V ietnam ese experienced in keeping theữ com rades in the South from resorting to arm s, “the general line o f the [Lao Dong] Party in the South rem ains as before,” that is, the preservation o f peace “at any price.”73 M oscow was therefore surprised w hen, during a M ay 1960 visit to the USSR, Vo Nguyen G iap, the DRV m inister o f defense w ho had been regarded as the m ost faithful Soviet ally in the N orth V ietnam ese leadership, openly spoke to the Soviet deputy foreign m inister, G eorgii Pushkin, in favor o f a revision o f the G eneva agreem ents. G iap w anted to m odify the part that concerned the ICC, w hich the K rem lin considered “an im portant factor o f peace and further obser­ vance o f the G eneva agreem ents in V ietnam , Laos, and Cam bodia.”74 Hanoi, how ever, w ith its new outlook on violence, saw the ICC as an im pedim ent to its plans for arm ed struggle in the South. G iap criticized the recent decisions o f the ICC regarding Law 10/59 and the increase o f the num ber o f u.s. m ilitary ad­ visers in Vietnam 73 and stated, on these grounds, that “the International Com ­ m ission is becom ing m ore and m ore a body supporting the interests o f the South V ietnam ese authorities. The activity o f the International Com m ission, though it

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retains its significance fo r the cause o f keeping peace in Indochina, practically starts to becom e, in som e respects, disadvantageous to US.” H e added that the IC C ’s stationary groups “in reality are o f no benefit: they are not capable o f im ­ posing any lim its on South V ietnam and, at the sam e tim e, they lay restraint on the DRV.”76 The full extent o f H anoi’s departure from previous policy was revealed dur­ ing the June I960 visit to M oscow o f Le D uan, who brought w ith him for the approval o f the Soviet com rades abstracts o f the Lao D ong Central Com m ittee report to the forthcom ing V ietnam ese Com m unist Party congress. A lthough it w as norm al practice for Soviet allies to visit M oscow to receive the K rem lin’s blessing before im portant events, Le D uan’s trip to the Soviet capital was de­ term ined not so m uch by considerations o f loyalty as by tile N orth V ietnam ese desire to secure Soviet econom ic support for building socialism in die DRV. D uring his conversation w ith the Soviet am bassador on M ay 17, Pham Van D ong openly linked the issue o f aid w ith Le D uan’s visit.77 Le D uan, w ith the sam e goal, also stopped o ff in B eijing on his way to M oscow. The Soviets supported the V ietnam ese Com m unists in theứ plans for a so­ cialist buildup in the N orth and readily agreed to sign an agreem ent w ith the DRV. The Soviet U nion assum ed obligations to assist the N orth V ietnam ese in tile production and processing o f tropical crops, provide technical assistance in agriculture, and build a tea factory and enterprises for processing coffee and canning fruits. M oscow also provided a long-term loan o f three hundred fifty m illion rubles to cover the supply o f Soviet equipm ent, m achines, and other ma­ terial.7® M oscow had no objection to reported plans79 o f the V ietnam ese Com m unists to outline at theừ upcom ing congress the course o f the socialist revolution in the N orth. W hat caused concern on the part o f tile Soviet leaders was the other part o f the tw ofold task o f die W orkers’ Party o f Vietnam , that is, the people’s dem o­ cratic revolution in the South. A lthough Le Duan stressed that the V ietnam ese strongly adhered to the course o f peaceful unification o f tile country, “for it cor­ responds to the w ishes o f the people o f our country,” Hanoi w arned that “if A m erican im perialists and their underlings in the South, contrary to the w ishes and desires o f our people, as w ell as o f the peoples all over the w orld, take a risk to unleash aggressive w ar, our people w ith sym pathy and support o f the peoples o f the w orld, one and all, w ill rise to the struggle for theừ defeat and thus w ill realize the unification o f the country.”80 The section o f the abstracts o f the Lao Dong C entral Com m ittee report entitled “The Struggle for tile R ealization o f the U nification o f the M otherland, for the Com pletion o f the People’s D em ocratic R evolution in the W hole Country” elaborated H anoi’s m ilitancy. A nalysts in the Soviet Foreign M inistry concluded that this section “represents essentially clear

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directions to unfold arm ed straggle in South V ietnam aim ed at tile overthrow ­ ing o f the regim e o f Ngo D inh Diem .”81 This news was an unpleasant surprise for M oscow. The H anoi leadership had concealed from the Soviet com rades its plans concerning tile South. N orth V iet­ nam ese leaders seem ed to have decided to abandon theữ policy o f support o f tile G eneva agreem ents and to do this openly. M oscow did not agree w ith H anoi’s rationale. The Soviets criticized the overly optim istic views o f theừ friends in H anoi on the situation in Indochina and doubted that “the U nited States and the bloc o f SEATO nations could allow the unification o f V ietnam on dem ocratic foundations and thus agree to the loss to the socialist cam p o f such a first-class strategic position as South Vietnam .”82 The Soviet U nion, as a great pow er, had to take into account geopolitical considerations, not only ideological preferences. M oscow did not object to V ietnam ese Com m unist intentions to initiate and support the arm ed struggle in the South. It becam e clear from Le D uan’s report, how ever, that H anoi was going to announce its intention from the podium o f the congress. The Soviets predicted that this w ould m ean a declaration o f w ar to the Saigon regim e and w ould be perceived as indirect aggression by the m embers o f SEATO. W ashington and D iem could then expedite the suppression o f the liberation m ovem ent in the South. The Soviets believed that the m ore justifiable course was the one the N orth V ietnam ese had follow ed theretofore— that the DRV had nothing to do w ith the arm ed struggle in South V ietnam and that the guerrilla w ar there w as a result o f the m ass discontent o f the South V ietnam ese and theữ desire to replace the Diem regim e w ith one that w ould guarantee in­ dependence, dem ocracy, and progress. Because o f this ongoing policy, the So­ viets claim ed, “the DRV occupies now the advantageous position o f the coun­ try who legitim ately renders m oral support to the right o f the population o f South V ietnam to choose a dem ocratic regim e instead o f the dictatorial govern­ m ent o f Ngo D inh Diem .”83 This traditional DRV policy was especially w ellgrounded in Soviet eyes because the N orth V ietnam ese, as they had claim ed be­ fore, did not need to provide arm s to the guerrillas in the South, w here arm s were plentiful.84 The highest Soviet officials argued for the continuation o f this policy during their m eetings w ith Le Duan in M oscow. B ut, unfortunately, they w ere not the only advisers to the N orth V ietnam ese in policy tow ard the South. In m id-M ay, N orth V ietnam ese and Chinese leaders had a num ber o f discussions— first in H anoi, then in Beijing—concerning the revolutionary struggle in South V iet­ nam . Zhou Enlai told his V ietnam ese counterparts that the South m ust be liber­ ated. A lthough the Chinese believed there m ust be a com bination o f political and m ilitary straggle, B eijing firm ly supported the V ietnam ese position in favor o f arm ed straggle in the South and pledged to assist H anoi in i t 85

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In M ay M oscow w as inform ed about Zhou E nlai’s visit to the DRV. The So­ viet leaders tried to find out through theừ am bassador in Hanoi w hat w as dis­ cussed during the visit o f the Chinese prem ier to the N orth V ietnam ese capital. A m bassador Sokolov “carefully” raised this issue during his conversation w ith Pham Van Dong, and Dong “eagerly” inform ed his interlocutor that “w e eluci­ dated at great length the problem s o f socialist reform s in the N orth o f V ietnam , our difficulties in econom ic developm ent, as w ell as the issue o f the develop­ m ent o f the patriotic revolutionary m ovem ent in the South.” Pham Van Dong had m ade it clear to Zhou Enlai that the DRV w ould need further Chinese aid for its econom y, perhaps even on a larger scale. In his turn, Zhou Enlai let it be understood that “the Chinese governm ent agrees in advance to render necessary assistance o f sufficient proportions.”86 This news did not help alleviate Soviet concerns. It becam e obvious to the K rem lin that China had acquired a strong po­ sition in N orth V ietnam and w as playing an increasingly im portant role in the life o f the DRV. Now the Soviet leaders w ould have to pay increased attention to the reports o f theừ diplom ats in Hanoi about C hinese influence in N orth V iet­ nam. The Soviet em bassy inform ed M oscow that the V ietnam ese and C hinese Com m unist parties w ere engaging in perm anent contacts in the form o f consul­ tations and m utual supplies o f inform ation. “Preparing for the T hird W PV Congress, the V ietnam ese friends have consultations w ith the Chinese Commu­ nist Party C C . . . on all principal propositions” o f the political re p o rt In foreign policy, both countries “regularly exchange opinions on all m ain problem s o f the international situation and render active support to each other, particularly in their relations w ith the countries o f Southeast A sia and Far East.”87 Especially im pressive was Sino-N orth V ietnam ese econom ic cooperation. The Chinese provided 52.9 percent o f socialist aid to the DRV,88 and they w ere prepared to increase the volum e o f this aid, as Zhou E nlai’s visit to H anoi dem onstrated. M oscow suspected that B eijing’s eagerness to help N orth V iet­ nam w as part o f a larger strategy to tie N orth V ietnam , along w ith Com m unist K orea and M ongolia, to C hina.89 The Soviet leaders view ed any dem onstration o f support for C hina in V ietnam w ith concern, especially when the Sino-Soviet conflict flared up again in the spring o f 1960. In A pril 1960, the C hinese Com m unist Party new spaper Renminh Ribao and the theoretical journal Honqi com m em orated L enin’s ninetieth birthday by pub­ lishing articles by Chinese leaders who expounded on the principal problem s o f com m unism and the international situation. This Chinese propaganda criticized the Soviet thesis about w ar and peace as a vital problem o f m ankind, denied that it was possible to avert w ar, and justified the increase in international tensions as a favorable factor fo r the acceleration o f the w orld revolutionary process. In

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response, the CPSU C entral Com m ittee circulated a m em orandum am ong Com ­ m unist and w orkers’ parties in w hich the Soviets condem ned these Chinese ar­ gum ents. This did not deter the Chinese leaders from strongly criticizing the So­ viet Union at a m eeting in B eijing o f the W orld Federation o f Trade Unions. Such outright defiance tow ard Soviet prestige only added fuel to the fire o f conflict. Soviet leader Khrushchev seethed w ith indignation. He decided to use the participation o f the Com m unist parties o f other countries, including the C hi­ nese party, in the third congress o f the Rom anian Com m unists in Bucharest in June 1960 for the clarification o f the positions o f the sides in the conflict. A t the congress in Rom ania, Khrushchev accused the Chinese Com m unists o f reneg­ ing on w hat had been agreed at the 1957 M oscow conference o f the Com m unist parties and was able to rally m ost Com m unist leaders to the Soviet position. K hrushchev also had the opportunity to discuss the disagreem ents betw een M oscow and B eijing directly w ith the m em bers o f the C hinese delegation headed by Peng Zhen. These discussions took place in M oscow, where the Chi­ nese delegation stopped on its way to Bucharest, as w ell as in the Rom anian cap­ ital. K hrushchev’s m eetings w ith the Chinese m ade it clear that the conflict had gone too far to be easily overcom e. The Soviet leaders concluded that their for­ m er allies “have chosen the road o f the revision o f the m ain principles o f the [1957 M oscow] D eclaration and the M anifesto o f Peace.”90 Frol K ozlov, a m em ber o f the Soviet Com m unist Party Presidium , w arned his colleagues at a CPSU plenum that the actions o f the “C hinese com rades,” if not rebuffed in a tim ely w ay, “could create serious difficulties fo r the im plem entation o f the peace-loving course o f the socialist cam p and for the building o f socialism in such a huge country like C hina.”91 It is notew orthy that K ozlov spoke about the obstacles that could arise fo r So­ viet policy in the international arena. Soviet leaders w ere w ell aw are that C hi­ nese “erroneous” view s could exert an influence on foreign com m unists. It is im possible to say w ith certainty w hether the K rem lin’s fears w ere based on its recent negotiations w ith the N orth V ietnam ese concerning the political report to theừ congress, but the Soviets could not help but suspect the Chinese hand in som e o f the V ietnam ese argum ents. Soviet officials, fo r exam ple, noted the pas­ sage in Le D uan’s abstracts o f the political report that justified the intensifica­ tion o f the revolutionary struggle in South V ietnam : “[S]ince the socialist cam p is stronger than the im perialist cam p and is getting stronger each day” and “the forces o f peace are prevailing over the forces o f w ar,” there existed “exception­ ally favorable conditions for the struggle” in die South. In other w ords, Hanoi m aintained that “the arm ed revolutionary m ovem ent in the South should not worry about the involvem ent o f international im perialism , for the correlation o f forces do not favor the latter.”92 W ith this radical view on the w orld situation.

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the N orth V ietnam ese leaders w ere convinced that theừ “people w ould not un­ derstand an appeal for coexistence w ith this enem y.”93 V ietnam ese Com m unist leaders w ere also apprehensive about the aggrava­ tion o f the crisis betw een M oscow and Beijing. Because the DRV needed sup­ port and assistance from both allies and taking sides in their dispute w ould un­ avoidably lead to the loss o f support from one o r the other, the only solution for the V ietnam ese was to try to preserve close relations w ith the Soviets as w ell as the C hinese, w ithout alienating either o f them . This policy had its lim its, how­ ever, because as the gap betw een the opponents w idened and each pressured the DRV, it w ould becom e m ore and m ore difficult to occupy a neutral position. The N orth V ietnam ese leadership began to undertake efforts to reconcile its allies. Before the conference in B ucharest, Hanoi perhaps did not recognize the se­ riousness and the scale o f the Sino-Soviet dispute. But Le Duan attended the third congress o f the Com m unist Party o f Rom ania, w itnessed the heated ex­ changes betw een K hrushchev and Peng Zhen, and certainly inform ed his col­ leagues in the Lao Dong Party.94 Soon after Le D uan’s return from abroad, the DRV deputy foreign m inister, Ung Van Khiem, who was also a m em ber o f the Lao Dong party C entral Com m ittee, m et w ith the Soviet chargé d ’affaires, N. I. G odunov. A t theữ m eeting, they touched upon the issue o f the conflict betw een the Soviet U nion and C hina, am ong other problem s. Khiem offered that his col­ leagues w ere “concerned to som e extent” over the differences o f the view points o f the CPSU and the Chinese Com m unist Party “on cardinal questions o f the present international relations.” Khiem referred to the interest o f the V ietnam ese Com m unist cadres in this issue and rem arked that the V ietnam ese Central Com ­ m ittee had not yet m ade a final decision on it. Khiem then spoke at length about the im portance his party attached to the question o f unity in the com m unist m ovem ent: “O ur C entral C om m ittee alw ays adhered to the necessity for all Com m unist parties to have identical view s on the m ain problem s o f the present, which is a solid guarantee against com m itting m istakes in practical activities and against the appearance o f deviationist tendencies.”95 The V ietnam ese deputy foreign m inister asked the Soviet diplom at for any additional inform a­ tion on this problem . But a Soviet diplom at, despite his prom inent position in the em bassy hierarchy, could not enlighten his counterpart on as thorny a ques­ tion as the Sino-Soviet quarrel. The only thing he dared to do was com m ent on the official com m uniqué o f the Bucharest conference “along the lines o f an ed­ itorial from Pravda,"96 It becam e clear to the Hanoi leadership that this issue needed to be discussed at a higher level. In A ugust, Ho Chi M inh m ade a secret trip to M oscow.97 A fter visiting the Soviet capital, the V ietnam ese leader w ent to Y alta, w here he m et w ith K hrushchev. H e o f course discussed w ith the Soviet leader the

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forthcom ing congress o f his party, but his m ain preoccupation no doubt w as an attem pt to reconcile the Soviets and the C hinese. H is efforts led now here. K hrushchev constantly interrupted the soft-spoken H o, and he did not budge from his anti-C hinese position.98 In the m eantim e, the V ietnam ese Com m unists w ere preparing fo r tire third congress o f theừ party. In late July and early A ugust o f I960, after being in ses­ sion m ore than tw o m onths, the eighteenth plenum o f die Lao Dong Party ad­ journed.99 O n A ugust 14, a party conference w as convened as a dress rehearsal for the forthcom ing congress; the conference approved principal reports and res­ olutions o f the congress and outlined the list o f future leaders o f the Workers* Party o f Vietnam . On Septem ber 5, Ho C hi M inh opened the third congress o f tile Lao D ong Party and delivered an introductory speech. The principal event o f the congress was Le D uan’s report. Le Duan, the num­ ber-tw o person in the Lao Dong Party, review ed developm ents in V ietnam in the nine years that had passed since the previous party congress and outlined the tasks that the party should resolve in the forthcom ing years. A ccording to Le Duan, the V ietnam ese Com m unists m ust “develop the cause o f socialist buildup in the northern part o f the country; strengthen N orth V ietnam , establishing it as a reliable stronghold o f die struggle for the unification o f the M otherland;. . . lib­ erate South V ietnam from the severe yoke o f the Am erican im perialists and theữ lackeys; realize the unification o f the country on the basis o f independence and dem ocracy; and establish a peace-loving, united, dem ocratic, and flourishing Vietnam .” 100 Thus from the outset Le Duan openly spoke about die liberation o f the South, though w ithout specifying m eans. Recurring throughout Le D uan’s re­ port was the hatred o f the V ietnam ese tow ard the A m ericans and N go D inh Diem. Le Duan never m issed an opportunity to em phasize the im portance o f the overthrow o f the Saigon regim e as a task equal to the socialist reconstruction in the N orth. In one place he even claim ed that the successful developm ent o f N orth V ietnam depended on the elim ination o f tile threat from the South.101 The N orth V ietnam ese clearly had taken into account only part o f the Soviet recom m endations. A lthough they did not openly speak o f H anoi’s support for the struggle in the South, all theừ pronouncem ents blessed the struggle. A fter Le D uan’s speech no one doubted that the DRV stood behind the insurgents in the South. M oscow noted the fact that, w hile the N orth V ietnam ese approved o f tile revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam , they w ere silent about the principles that had been put forw ard by the Soviet leaders at the m ost recent CPSU con­ gresses and at the conference o f the Com m unist parties in B ucharest Soviet of­ ficials attributed this to C hinese influence on “som e problem s o f the building o f socialism in the DRV, as w ell as issues o f the struggle for the unification o f V ietnnam. o m **102

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The N orth V ietnam ese w o e careful not to dem onstrate at the congress their preference tow ard either ally. Ho Chi M inh, Le Duan, and other V ietnam ese leaders never m entioned C hina w ithout m entioning die Soviet Union and vice versa. They congratulated the Soviets on theữ overfulfilm ent o f the seven-year plan and em phasized the success o f the G reat Leap Forward in China. They thanked both countries for the help and support they had provided to die DRV, and they stressed the necessity o f die “strengthening o f solidarity, unity, fraternal m utual aid o f the countries o f the socialist camp” as the m ain condition o f the suc­ cesses o f com m unism .103 Som etim es, som e observers noticed,104 the N orth V iet­ nam ese m ight even have been m ore enthusiastic about the Soviet U nion, but this was perhaps overcom pensation for theữ actual neglect o f Soviet opinion on the struggle in the South. In any case, it was not great enough to alienate China. H anoi w as concerned that the tensions betw een the Soviets and the Chinese w ould be repeated at the Lao Dong Party’s congress. That possibility certainly existed. D elegations from both countries cam e to the DRV. The C hinese dele­ gation w as headed by Li Fuchun, B eijing’s top econom ic official; and the Soviet delegation w as headed by a full m em ber o f the CPSU C entral Com m ittee Pre­ sidium , N uritdin M ukhitdinov. A m em ber o f the East G erm an delegation to the congress, W illie Rum pf, confided to the counsellor at the Soviet em bassy in the DRV that his delegation had learned about the Chinese intention to use the V iet­ nam ese Com m unist forum for unleashing criticism o f the Soviets. The E ast G er­ m an delegation had even prepared a speech to rebuff any Chinese attacks. The C hinese, how ever, w ere restrained in their pronouncem ents at the congress. W hat w ere the reasons for C hinese restraint? The G erm an delegate suggested that B eijing had decided to w ait until the M oscow conference o f the Com m unist parties that w as scheduled for N ovem ber I9 6 0 .105 The Soviets likew ise avoided open criticism o f C hina. Perhaps it w as a result o f Ho Chi M inh’s A ugust m eet­ ing w ith K hrushchev in Y alta and theừ secret agreem ent: the V ietnam ese leader, having failed to reconcile the tw o parties, obtained from K hrushchev, at least, a prom ise to restrain his representatives’ em otions against the Chinese for the rim e being.106 But it w as obvious to everybody that, despite this tem porary truce, a showdown betw een M oscow and B eijing w as im m inent A fter the B ucharest conference, tensions betw een the tw o countries continued to heighten. On July 16,1960, the Soviet U nion notified B eijing that all Soviet advisers and experts in China w ould soon be w ithdraw n. K hrushchev justified this decision by citing the poor treatm ent received by the Soviet citizens who w orked in the PRC: they w ere not trusted and “literally scoffed.” Khrushchev said that the Chinese “deliberately discredited our technical proposals, our ma­ chines, our equipm ent.” 107 As a result, w ithin one m onth, alm ost fourteen hun­ dred Soviet advisers and experts left China. M oscow cancelled tw elve agree­

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m ents on econom ic and technological aid and abrogated m ore than tw o hundred projects for scientific and technological cooperation.108 In July, Soviet authori­ ties prohibited dissem ination in the Soviet Union o f the m agazine Friendship published by B eijing and ceased publication o f The Sơviet-Chùưse Friendship destined to be circulated in C hina by the U SSR.109 K hrushchev concurrently suggested holding bilateral negotiations betw een the CPSU and the CCP in order to discuss controversial issues. In reply, Beijing sent M oscow a letter that w as essentially a response to w hat the Soviets had cir­ culated at the B ucharest conference. In theừ letter, the Chinese leaders, although changing the form ulation o f som e o f theừ view s, continued to attack the Sovi­ ets and even accused them (and this especially aroused indignation in M oscow) o f abandoning M arxism -Leninism and the 1957 M oscow declaration.110 H ie Sino-Soviet negotiations nevertheless took place on Septem ber 17-22. The Chinese delegation was headed by D eng X iaoping. On the Soviet side, the delegation included CPSU Presidium m em bers M ikhail Suslov, the leading So­ viet ideologist; Frol K ozlov; O tto K uusinen; Boris Ponom arev; and Yuri An­ dropov. The Soviet am bassador to the PRC, Stepan C hervonenko, was also pre­ sent. But the five days o f talks did not lead to reconciliation. In fact the Chinese tried to blam e all the disagreem ents betw een the tw o countries on K hrushchev personally. The Soviet leaders assessed the negotiations as a “reconnaissance in force” on the part o f the C hinese.111 Soon a com m ission that included both Soviet and Chinese representatives was assigned to w ork out drafts o f final docum ents for the conference o f Com­ m unist parties. The Chinese continued to expound theừ differing view s at these sessions as w ell. TTiey also dem onstrated their unw illingness to com e to agree­ m ent during direct talks— initiated by the Soviets and held on N ovem ber 9—be­ tw een Khrushchev and Liu Shaoqi, who headed the Chinese delegation at the conference.112 There w as a real danger that the conference, instead o f dem onstrating tile unity o f the w orld com m unist m ovem ent and reconciling opposing view s, m ight lead to an even deeper crisis. The V ietnam ese felt this im m inent failure m ost acutely. Ho Chi M inh continued to play the role o f m ediator. W hen the C hinese failed to subscribe to the final declaration, refused to recognize the im portance o f the tw entieth CPSU congress, and disagreed with the condem nation o f any actions that underm ined com m unist unity (K hrushchev w as adam ant about tile latter tw o propositions113), Ho visited K hrushchev and tried to persuade him to concede in order to avoid a split. The Soviet leader refused and instead proposed that Ho Chi M inh and other leaders who vacillated betw een M oscow and Bei­ jin g try to convince the Chinese o f the correctness o f the Soviet position. “And they w ent, and especially Ho Chi M inh insisted on this,” reported K hrushchev

If the Fractured Friendship Collapses

at die CPSU plenum that discussed the results o f the M oscow conference. “I was urging him : go. Com rade H o Chi M inh, go. And this had an effect, finally the Chinese agreed on concessions.” 114 K hrushchev all but adm itted that Ho Chi M inh’s efforts (though apparently not only H o’s) helped prevent a com plete failure o f the M oscow m eeting and, consequently, an irreparable split in the w orld com m unist m ovem ent Schism w as averted, and Hanoi p re sav e d its freedom to pursue a m iddle course betw een the tw o parties w ithout alienating either o f them . The feeling o f relief was reflected in the “alm ost hysterical reception o f the news” in the N orth V ietnam ese capital. From D ecem ber 6 onw ard, Hanoi Radio broadcast the final docum ents o f the M oscow conference in full and in p a rt day after day. Praises for the declaration continued interm inably, and “no adjective w as considered too extravagant by the broadcasters and journalists.” 115 N orth V ietnam ese lead­ ers rightfully regarded the outcom e o f the conference as their victory, and they did not w ant to think about the shortcom ings o f the M oscow declaration that was a result o f a com prom ise and, as A llen D ulles put it during a m eeting o f the Na­ tional Security Council on D ecem ber 8,1960, could “be cited by both parties to substantiate the ideological view s they had previously held.” 116 It is unlikely that H anoi did not understand the w eaknesses o f the truce reached in M oscow. B ut N orth V ietnam got som e breathing space and perhaps sincerely believed that the fragile peace betw een the leading Com m unist coun­ tries w as, after all, better than a quarrel, especially as a crisis in Laos threatened to explode into a hot w ar.

7. Crisis in Laos I have not the slightest interest in this affair, because this iffa ir itse lf is sm all, but there is m uch n oue around if.

Nlldta s. Khrushchev to Mao Zedong October 2,1959'

U n t i l the late 1950s, events in V ietnam overshadow ed developm ents in Laos, a neighboring country also part o f m e G eneva agreem ents. Preoccupied w ith the issues o f the V ietnam ese elections and the strengthening o f each half o f V iet­ nam , me great pow ers did not pay m uch attention to that sm all and underpopu­ lated land w ith few strategic advantages. True, the u.s. politicians w ere m ore attentive to Laos and probably m ore prescient than w ere theừ Soviet counter­ parts for they continued to supply aid to the royal Lao governm ent (RLG ) under me 1950 agreem ents and even established an aid m ission, the U nited States op­ erations m ission (USOM ), in January 1955. M oreover W ashington included Laos in the list o f the countries, along w ith South V ietnam and Cam bodia, that w ere to be defended by SEATO in case o f aggression by an outside pow er. The m ain concern o f the u.s. governm ent was, o f course, the Laotian arm y, but the U nited States undertook efforts to strengthen the country’s econom y as w ell. A s a result, Laos soon received m ore u.s. aid per capita than any other Southeast A sian country.2 These m easures should have guaranteed the country against a possible Com m unist takeover, especially since in G eneva the pro-Com m unist resistance m ovem ent known as the Pathet Lao had been granted control o f tw o Laotian provinces, Sam N eua and Phong Saly, as regrouping areas. M oscow, unlike W ashington, did not provide any direct assistance to Laos m ainly because me Soviet U nion did not have diplom atic relations w ith the country. Even if it had, me pro-W estem Laotian governm ent under the pre­ m iership o f Katay D an Sasorith w ould not have encouraged cooperation be­ tw een M oscow and V ientiane. The Pathet Lao received support from the V iet­

C risis in Laos

nam ese C om m unists, w ho shared w ith theữ Laotian com rades w hat rem ained o f C hinese and Soviet aid to die DRV. This practice had been established during the w ar w ith the French. O w ing to N orth V ietnam ese support, the Pathet Lao, w hich had had only three com panies in January 1954,3 w as transform ed into a strong political and m ilitary organization w ith an arm y, training centers, and provincial adm inistration under its control, a control that w as strengthened when the tw o provinces w ere conveyed to i t M oscow ’s only interest in Laos was that it rem ain neutral and free o f u.s. m ilitary bases, according to die provisions o f the final declaration and the dec­ laration o f die Laotian governm ent approved by die G eneva conference.4 A s long as these conditions rem ained in force, M oscow w as prepared to reconcile itself to V ientiane’s orientation tow ard the W est In theữ desire to enforce the G eneva agreem ents and to elim inate any pretext fo r u.s. involvem ent in Laos, die Soviet leaders w o e even ready to sacrifice die interests o f their Laotian sym­ pathizers. They constantly pressed the Pathet Lao and its V ietnam ese allies to negotiate w ith the RLG in conform ity w ith the solutions reached at Geneva. In its instructions fo r Ho Chi M inh’s visit to M oscow in July 1955, the Soviet For­ eign M inistry stated its intention to “em phasize that the m ost correct way o f setdem ent in Laos is that o f direct negotiations betw een the Royal governm ent and the Pathet Lao and o f m utual concessions.”3 Soviet leaders enjoyed C hinese support for th eữ approach to the Laotian problem . B eijing was m ore interested than M oscow in favorable developm ents in Laos, not least because C hina had a com m on border w ith Laos and any threat from Laos w ould be m ost im m ediate. D uring the G eneva conference, Zhou Enlai was anxious to secure on C hina’s southern borders a buffer that consisted o f independent and neutral states w hose territories w ere free o f any m ilitary in­ stallations. Zhou did not conceal this objective from his W estern counterparts.6 It is therefore not surprising that after G eneva B eijing tried to avoid any event that could provide justification for the U nited States to establish bases in coun­ tries bordering C hina. The C hinese, like the R ussians, w ere not eager to sacri­ fice long-term security in favor o f illusory prospects o f a Com m unist Laos un­ der the control o f the P athet Lao. C hina therefore supported negotiations betw een the Lao governm ent and the Pathet Lao and the eventual reintegration o f the tw o provinces under the Pathet Lao’s control. Facing theừ allies’ firm po­ sition on this principle, the V ietnam ese had to com ply even if they had reserva­ tions. The process o f reconciliation in Laos, how ever, was not as sm ooth and efficient as tile Soviets and Chinese w ould have liked. Negotiations between the RLG and the Pathet Lao dragged on and failed to produce an agreem ent. As a result, a gen­ eral election took place on D ecem ber 25,1955, w ithout the Pathet Lao’s partici­

Crisis in Laos

pation. It is unclear w hether Hanoi was behind such stubbornness on the part o f the Pathet Lao, but on D ecem ber 24 the N orth Vietnam ese condem ned the im m i­ nent elections as undem ocratic and “entirely contrary to the letter and spirit o f the Geneva agreem ents.“ A t the same tim e they professed the desire to develop good neighborly relations w ith Laos.7 In addition to the failure o f the Pathet Lao to reach agreem ent w ith the RLG, tile Soviets learned w ith uneasiness that the Pathet Lao was developing a guerrilla movement in Laos and had even scored suc­ cesses. The North Vietnam ese w ere displaying no concern over this course o f events. W hile they did not exclude the possibility o f agreem ent betw een the RLG and the Pathet Lao, they were not against the preservation o f the status quo. The N orth Vietnam ese w ere w illing to allow som e RLG representatives in the ad­ m inistration o f the provinces o f Phong Saly and Sam Neua, controlled by the Pathet Lao, but they would not allow theừ transfer to RLG authority.8 The situation changed for the better in M arch 1956 when Prince Souvanna Phoum a becam e the new Laotian prim e m inister and declared his intention to bring about national reconciliation in accordance w ith the G eneva agreem ents. On A ugust 1, talks betw een Souvanna Phoum a and his h alf brother, the leader o f the Pathet Lao, Prince Souphanouvong, took place in the Laotian capital o f V ientiane and eventually led to agreem ent betw een the RLG and the Pathet Lao on alm ost all principal issues. The Pathet Lao agreed to the restoration o f the pow er o f V ientiane in the tw o provinces and the extension o f RLG com m and over Pathet Lao fighting units. On Decem ber 28, the tw o princes agreed that in a future coalition governm ent, w hich w ould be form ed prior to supplem entary elections, the Pathet Lao was to be given tw o portfolios. Some observers suspected that the Pathet Lao’s tractability during the nego­ tiations in A ugust-D ecem ber 1956 was the result o f pressure exerted on its lead­ ers by the Soviets and the Chinese.9 A t least it corresponded w ith the line both Com m unist pow ers w ere follow ing on the Laotian question. In fact, soon after concluding the negotiations w ith Souphanouvong, Souvanna Phoum a w ent to China and the DRV for official visits. In C hina he spent a w eek and received from his hosts full approval for the agreem ents reached at the V ientiane talks. The Chinese stressed their desire to develop friendly cooperation w ith Laos on the basis o f the five principles o f peaceful coexistence but did not press fo r the im m ediate establishm ent o f diplom atic relations betw een the tw o countries. The V ietnam ese follow ed the Chinese exam ple. They hailed the Sino-Laotian jo in t statem ent and also expressed theữ desire to base theữ relations w ith Laos on the five principles o f peaceful coexistence.10 The Soviet U nion joined in the Com­ m unist countries’ efforts tow ard rapprochem ent w ith Souvanna Phoum a. As early as June 7 ,1 9 5 6 , the Soviet am bassador to Thailand, I. N. Y akushin, m et w ith his Laotian counterpart and discussed w ith him the prospects for the estab­

Crisis in Laos

lishm ent o f diplom atic relations betw een the tw o countries. N othing resulted from these m eetings, how ever, perhaps ow ing to Souvanna Phoum a’s fear o f alienating the U nited States, on w hose aid Laos relied heavily. D espite the prom ising developm ents in Laos in the second half o f 1956, the situation changed for the w orse in early 1957. Souphanouvong did not return to the Laotian capital until February 4. In the m eantim e the RLG, under the influ­ ence o f form er prem ier Katay Sasorith w ho had visited the U nited States, de­ m anded additional guarantees from the Pathet Lao as proof o f good faith. V ien­ tiane also dem anded that the integration o f die Pathet Lao forces should precede rather than follow the form ation o f the coalition governm ent.11 In response, the leader o f the Pathet Lao dem anded that the RLG accept Chinese aid, w hich was virtually a condition o f the Pathet Lao’s further cooperation w ith V ientiane. Both sides refused to com prom ise. It has been unclear to observers and scholars why Souphanouvong abandoned die tactics o f com prom ise and w ho, if anyone, w as behind his dem and. Beijing did not pressure Souvanna Phoutna to accept Chinese aid. W as N orth Vietnam behind Souphanouvong’s dem and?12 A lthough the picture o f w hat happened in January and February o f 1957 rem ains incom plete, we now know that the Red Prince—as Souphanouvong was called because o f his sym pathy for Commu­ nism —did travel in January to H anoi w here he and his com rades had discus­ sions w ith the N orth V ietnam ese leaders about further tactics in negotiating w ith the RLG. Soviet am bassador M ikhail Zim yanin was inform ed o f Souphanouvong’s visit by Pham Van D ong.13 Several days after his conversation w ith Dong, Zim yanin m et w ith the C hinese am bassador in the DRV, Luo G uibo, and confided his concern over the V ietnam ese attitude tow ard the Laotian issue. Ac­ cording to the Soviet am bassador, “the V ietnam ese com rades are not in a hurry” in th eứ dealings w ith Souphanouvong and fo r him to put into practice the agreem ents w ith the RLG, particularly about the coalition governm ent. B ut Zim yanin pointed out that “the delay in the resolution o f this question could be dangerous for the Pathet Lao forces, for it creates conditions for the direct in­ volvem ent in the situation in Laos o f the U .S.A .” 14 Zim yanin could have been im plying that the m ain reason for Souphanouvong’s tactic o f delay w as the N orth V ietnam ese opinion th at representatives o f the Pathet Lao w ere not prom ised im portant portfolios in the future governm ent. A lthough the Soviet am bassador did not deny the necessity o f striving for im portant governm ent po­ sitions, he believed that it w ould be better to do this in V ientiane; hence the sug­ gestion tirât Souphanouvong return to Laos quickly.15 Luo G uibo agreed w ith Zim yanin. A pparently Hanoi turned a deaf ear to the view s o f its allies, and Souphanouvong w aited until February 4 to return to Laos and put forw ard new dem ands

Crisis in Laos

that stalled the process o f reconciliation. It also seem ed that Souphanouvong’s dem ands w ere not fully coordinated w ith B eijing by the N orth Vietnam ese and theừ Laotian friends. A lthough during Souvanna Phoum a’s visit to C hina in A u­ gust 1956 Zhou E nlai had announced tire PRC’s readiness to provide aid to Laos, the Chinese am bassador told Zim yanin that he rem inded tire N orth V iet­ nam ese and Laotians that Zhou “never told them that C hina w ill render eco­ nom ic assistance to Laos before tire form ation o f the coalition governm ent.” M oreover, the C hinese am bassador had queried B eijing, and B eijing had replied that it w ould be difficult for China to replace the u.s. econom ic assistance to L aos.16 B oth am bassadors agreed on the necessity o f settlem ent in Laos and the form ation o f a coalition governm ent. N evertheless, the Pathet Lao and its V ietnam ese supporters continued to drag out negotiations w ith V ientiane on the coalition governm ent, using as a pretext Souvanna Phoum a’s refusal to accept Chinese aid. The C hinese am bassador in H anoi believed that the Pathet Lao and the N orth V ietnam ese used this delay fo r the reorganization o f th en forces and the strengthening o f th en positions in the tw o Laotian provinces under contention. The Chinese am bassador rejected the accusation that Souvanna Phoum a w as tilting tow ard the U nited States and ex­ pressed his opinion that “Phoum a is the best prem ier fo r the negotiations and it is necessary to avoid creating difficulties fo r him .” 17 To bolster Chinese support o f the negotiated settlem ent in Laos, Zhou E nlai on M ay 13 told the DRV am­ bassador to C hina, N guyen Khang, that “Laos m ust be neutral and there should not be a revolution in Laos at this point in tim e.” 18 Perhaps this declaration, w rapped in revolutionary language, im pressed H anoi; but soon after, the gov­ ernm ent o f Souvanna Phoutna w as toppled and a political crisis took place in Laos that lasted from M ay 31 until A ugust 9,19 5 7 . The C hinese, w ho w ere concerned w ith the course o f events in Laos and feared that it w ould lead to u.s. interference, blam ed the “erroneous tactics o f the V ietnam ese and Laotians com rades.” 19 They continued to press fo r the for­ m ation o f a coalition governm ent, w hich they regarded as a guarantee o f Lao­ tian neutrality. The Soviets supported B eijing in its efforts to prevent the dis­ ruption o f the negotiating process and tried to persuade the Pathet Lao that it was possible to continue negotiations even w ith a pro-W estern leader such as K atay.20 Fortunately for the Soviets and the C hinese, on A ugust 9 the national assem bly approved a governm ent headed once again by Souvanna Phouma. The situation in the sum m er o f 1957 clearly dem onstrated to M oscow and B eijing how precarious the balance o f forces in Laos w as and how dangerous any delay in the form ation o f the coalition governm ent could be. B ut if the great Com m unist pow ers regarded Laos only from the perspective o f the preservation o f regional equilibrium in Indochina, the N orth V ietnam ese had other consider-

Crisis In Laos

atíons. T he DRV kept in m ind its interests in South V ietnam and approached the situation in Laos from that point o f view . Consequently, the DRV continued to hinder negotiations betw een Souvanna Phoum a and the Pathet Lao w hile it tried to im prove the Pathet Lao’s position in the country. W hen, in early Septem ber 1957, Souphanouvong again visited H anoi to discuss his tactics in the negotia­ tions on the coalition governm ent, the V ietnam ese w ere still o f the opinion that the Pathet Lao w as too w eak to influence the process o f the form ation o f the gov­ ernm ent Thanh Son, head o f the com m ittee on Laos and C am bodia o f the Lao D ong Central Com m ittee, discussed w ith the Soviet and Chinese am bassadors the w eakness o f the Pathet Lao and stressed that die struggle in Laos w as ex­ pected to be long and com plicated.21 It becam e obvious that greater pressure was needed to persuade the N orth V ietnam ese com rades to change theữ stalling tactics. Therefore, in Septem ber 1957 Zhou Enlai m et w ith H o C hi M inh, w ho w as returning hom e via B eijing after his trip to socialist countries, and expounded on the Chinese position on Laos. Zhou stated in plain w ords that the Laotian problem should be approached as a general task o f the strengthening o f peace in A sia, not as the problem o f tw o provinces in Laos; and Zhou said that it w as im possible to elim inate the Amer­ icans from Laos w ith the help o f only the Pathet Lao. The C hinese prem ier again pointed out that not a socialist revolution—not even a bourgeois revolution— w as possible in Laos, w here one could talk only about a feudal-nationalist rev­ olution. Zhou Enlai w arned H o against a m ilitary solution to the Laotian prob­ lem because th is could lead to u.s. involvem ent and, as a resu lt, to the consolidation o f U .S. positions and the establishm ent in Laos o f U .S. bases. He also confided d u t, in case W ashington interfered, socialist countries w ould not be able to render m ilitary support to the Pathet Lao as they had in Korea. There­ fore, any delay o f the settlem ent in Laos w ould be ’frau g h t w ith dangerous con­ sequences.” Z hou E nlai stressed th at it w as necessary to use Souvanna Phoum a’s prem iership and “apply all efforts for reaching agreem ent w ith him , w hile m aking m axim al concessions.” The C hinese p rem ia’ reiterated his gov­ ernm ent’s objective to have a neutral or even “sem ineutral” Laos that w ould be free o f m ilitary bases on its territory.22 It is possible that a conversation w ith Ho Chi M inh along sim ilar lines took place in M oscow as w ell. Pressure by die DRV’s Com m unist allies bore fru it N egotiations betw een the RLG and the Pathet Lao resum ed on Septem ber 16 and quickly led to an under­ standing on the form ation o f the coalition governm ent. This understanding was form ulated as a jo in t com m uniqué signed by Souvanna Phoum a and Souphanouvong on N ovem ber 1,1957. The com m uniqué was supplem ented by m ilitary agreem ents com pleted the next day. The sides agreed th a t on the day o f the form ation o f the new governm ent the Pathet Lao w ould return the tw o

Crisis in Laos

northern provinces under the RLG ’s control; the Pathet Lao fighting units w ould be integrated into the Royal Laotian Arm y; units in excess o f fifteen hundred m en to be integrated w ould be disbanded; the Pathet Lao w ould surrender all weapons in theừ possession; and the Pathet L ao’s political organization, the N eo Lao H ak X at (NLHX), w ould operate as a legal political party in V ientiane. Fi­ nally, both sides reaffirm ed that Laos w ould adhere to a policy o f neutrality.23 O n N ovem ber 19,1957, the national assem bly o f Laos gave its unanim ous ap­ proval to the new governm ent, which included tw o Pathet Lao members. The legalization o f the NLHX and its transform ation into a governm ental party gave rise to new problem s that confronted the Pathet Lao and its allies. N ot abandoning theừ revolutionary goals, Pathet Lao m em bers tried to com bine le­ gality w ith underground m ethods to further the revolutionary goals. They de­ cided to dem obilize a num ber o f m ilitary cadres from eight-thousand-m em ber fighting units and send them to various provinces w here they w ould w ork as civilians.24 This gave the Com m unists an opportunity to recruit new follow ers in those provinces that had been im m une to theừ propaganda and, at the sam e tim e, reliable and battle-hardened cadres w ere at hand in case o f need. The Pathet Lao soon learned that it is one thing to be in opposition to the le­ gal governm ent and criticize the current situation in the country w hile putting forw ard attractive slogans; but it is another thing to im plem ent those slogans as m em bers o f the governm ent. Soon after the form ation o f the Souvanna Phoum a-Souphanouvong coalition, the V ietnam ese detected a decrease in the popularity o f the NLHX. Ho Chi M inh openly talked about this during a January 1958 m eeting w ith the Soviet chargé d ’affaires. He said, “Before the signing o f the agreem ents w ith the royal side, Pathet Lao forces had enjoyed strong sym­ pathy am ong broad popular m asses, w ho expected certain im provem ents in theừ life. H ow ever, theừ expectations have not been realized, and theừ sym pathy to­ w ard the Pathet Lao began to cool dow n gradually. The situation is still good so far, but it can change to the w orse for the Pathet Lao by the election scheduled for M ay 1958.”25 The V ietnam ese leader also w as concerned over disagree­ m ents w ithin the Pathet Lao leadership and its lack o f unity. The Soviets and C hinese preferred a strong Pathet Lao to influence Souvanna Phoum a, prevent him from leaning too m uch on u.s. support, and com pel him to pursue a policy o f neutrality. In his conversation w ith the new Chinese am ­ bassador to the DRV, He W ei, the Soviet chargé d ’affaires A. M. Popov, w arned about the com plicated situation in Laos that could “be fraught w ith a serious danger” and pointed out that, in connection w ith this, the Laotian “com rades now need our help, and it is necessary to be in a hurry w ith it.”26 W hether ow ing to the efforts o f the Pathet Lao allies or the fact that disap­ pointm ent w ith the NLHX was not as w idespread as feared, in the supplem en­

Crisis In Laos

tary elections to the national assem bly in M ay 1958 the NLHX gained a con­ vincing victory. It won nine seats out o f tw enty-one that w ere contested. An­ other four seats w ere won by the neutralist party, Santiphab (Peace), led by Souvanna Phoum a’s protégé, Q uinim Pholsena. Some o b serv as w ere convinced that “the Pathet Lao w as about as surprised by its strong showing as the W est­ o n candidates them selves w o e .”27 The NLHX victory notw ithstanding, the election unleashed events that prac­ tically underm ined all Com m unist plans w ith regard to Laos. As early as M arch 2 0 ,1 9 5 8 , Souvanna Phoum a addressed the ICC established in Laos in confor­ m ity w ith the G eneva agreem ents; he stated that the G eneva agreem ents had now been fully im plem ented and asked fo r the term ination o f the com m ission’s activities after the M ay election, w hich he considered as the last act in the ap­ plication o f the agreem ents. On M ay 15, Souvanna Phoum a inform ed the ICC that the election had been held successfully and therefore there w as no reason for continuing ICC activities.28 Souvanna’s eagerness to get rid o f the ICC is explained, on one hand, by his disillusionm ent w ith tile com m ission’s policy in Laos and, on the other, by his desire to elim inate all non-Laotian influences in the country.29 The Canadian del­ egation in the ICC supported Souvanna on this issue. H ow ever, the Indian and Polish delegations objected. The Poles in theữ objections follow ed other social­ ist countries that had perceived the com m ission as an obstacle to unfavorable de­ velopm ents in Laos and a guarantor o f the Pathet Lao’s positions. Therefore the Polish delegate tried to prove that besides tile task o f national reconciliation the ICC in Laos had other obligations such as the supervision o f the im port o f arm s, m unitions, and m ilitary equipm ent The Polish delegate also required prior con­ sultation w ith the ICCs in the other tw o countries as well as a consideration o f the situation in Cam bodia and V ietnam before deciding to reduce the ICC’s ac­ tivities. The Indian delegation hesitated because the G eneva agreem ents had m ade no provision for dissolving any o f the three com m issions.30 A fter m uch de­ bate and considering India’s am biguous attitude,31 on July 19 die com m ission decided to adjourn sine die. The Polish m em ber dissented. The IC C ’s decision dealt a severe blow to Soviet plans w ith respect to Laos. M oscow regarded the international com m issions as an im portant part o f the G eneva agreem ents that represented a sort o f guarantee o f theữ im plem entation. The Chinese and the V ietnam ese generally shared this view . It is therefore not surprising that the Com m unist countries resisted the com m ission adjournm ent. They strongly criticized the Polish m em bers w ho, according to the new Soviet am bassador in the DRV, Leonid I. Sokolov, “occupied only a defensive position in the question o f struggle for the preservation o f the com m ission in Laos.”32 Then M oscow attem pted a diplom atic m aneuver during the negotiations in Lon­

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don on A ugust 26, but the B ritish, w ith the support o f the U nited States and Fiance, rejected Soviet references to S E A 7 0 aggression,33 and the m atter was left in suspension fo r die tim e being. In N ovem ber the Soviets had to inform Hanoi that “it appears inexpedient to raise at the London negotiations . . . die proposal that die tw o cochairm en recom m end die preservation in V ientiane o f a reduced secretariat o f the com m ission o r o f its pari.” M oscow decided to leave this issue at the discretion o f the ICC itself.34 W hat w orsened the situation in Laos was Souvanna Phouma* s failure to form a new governm ent after the M ay elections. The governm ent w as form ed on Au­ gust IS, by Phoui Sananikone, a staunch anti-Com m unist w ho soon abandoned die neutral policy o f his predecessor. He established closer relations w ith the regim es o f South V ietnam and Thailand and allow ed die installation o f a Tai­ w anese consulate general in V ientiane, thus reversing the country’s earlier stand o f noncom m itm ent on the China issue. These fixeign policy steps w ere m atched in dom estic affairs. Phoui gave four posts in his governm ent to m em bers o f the pro-W estern C om m ittee fix the D e­ fense o f N ational Interests (CDNI). Souvanna Phoum a him setf w as eased out and w ent overseas as Laotian am bassador to France. Phoui did not conceal that he w as eager to fight die danger o f com m unism in Laos. He openly w arned that “we m ust guard against die m ost threatening danger w hich w ill underm ine our independence and unification. This danger is Com m unism .”35 A ccordingly, die N orth V ietnam ese expected political repressions against die NLHX and the Pathet Lao to begin very soon. O ne DRV Foreign M inistry official, in a conversa­ tion w ith die Soviet chargé d ’affaires, A. M . Popov, drew attention to the reac­ tionary character o f die new Laotian governm ent and spoke about die possibility o f a resum ption o f Lao governm ent attacks against “progressive forces.”36 The N orth V ietnam ese w ere w orried about the ability o f theữ Laotian com ­ rades to adjust their tactics to the new situation. DRV deputy foreign m inister Ung V an Khiem felt that although the M ends in Laos had m uch experience in the struggle am ong the population, they needed help and advice w ith respect to issues o f policy. Com m unication w ith the Pathet Lao after the IC C ’s adjourn­ m ent w as com plicated because die Polish delegation in the ICC apparently served as an im portant channel betw een H anoi and V ientiane.37 H ie N orth V iet­ nam ese had to be cautious about m aintaining contacts w ith m em bers o f the NLHX in order to avoid accusations that both the NLHX and die Pathet Lao w o e but puppets in H anoi’s hands.38 N either the Pathet Lao nor its Com m unist allies w ere prepared fo r events as they developed in Laos after the national assem bly elections in M ay 1958, and it took som e tim e for diem to w ork out strategy that corresponded to die new conditions. Those conditions w ere becom ing m ore and m ore difficult for the Pa-

Crisis in Laos

thet Lao. In a letter sent to H anoi from Laos in late O ctober 1958, Laotian rev­ olutionary leaders com plained about m ounting repressions against them and m urders and arrests o f NLHX m em bers in various provinces o f Laos. They drew attention to the grow ing Ư.S. involvem ent in Laotian internal affairs. In partic­ ular, they referred to the im port from the U nited States o f m ore than sixty tons o f arm am ents that included the new est antiaircraft weapons. These facts, w rote the Laotian friends, dem onstrated the u.s. intention to transform Laos into its m ilitary base. The reference to bases was obviously aim ed at tile C hinese, for whom U .S. bases on theứ borders caused alarm . In closing, die letter supplied inform ation about a m eeting o f the C entral C om m ittee o f the People’s Party o f Laos, the clandestine M arxist organization behind the NLHX and headed by Souphanouvong’s long-tim e associate, K ayson Phom vihan. The party had de­ cided to organize arm ed struggle as it m aintained, at the sam e tim e, form al co­ operation w ith Phoui’s governm ent. The Laotian Com m unists also w rote o f plans to gather tile party’s m em bers and sym pathizers in die m ountains on the border w ith the DRV and establish a revolutionary base there.39 A C hinese diplom at who provided this inform ation to his Soviet colleague said that the V ietnam ese rejected these plans o f theữ Laotian friends. It was only a question o f tim e, how ever, before H anoi’s grow ing m ilitancy w ould cause the Lao Dong Party to reverse its decision. Chinese officials in the DRV also disagreed w ith the Pathet Lao’s opinion that all possibilities for legal activities had been exhausted. The Chinese continued to hope for the resum ption o f the ICC as a deterrent to W estern designs.40 The R L G -Pathet Lao negotiations o f 1957 m ade it seem unlikely, how ever, that B ei­ jin g could prevent H anoi from adopting a m ilitant stand w ith regard to Laos. The subsequent diplom atic row betw een Laos and N orth V ietnam — H anoi ac­ cused V ientiane o f violating the DRV border—only confirm ed this view. The diplom atic dustup began on D ecem ber 28,1958, w ith Pham Van D ong’s protest to Phoui Sananikone regarding alleged Laotian violations ofV ietnam ese territory and aữ space since O ctober 13. This m essage was follow ed by a flow o f accusations and counteraccusations concerning intrusions upon each other’s territory. It is now known that H anoi’s diplom atic ruckus was aim ed at con­ cealing secret m ovem ents o f N orth V ietnam ese troops in Laos. W estern intelli­ gence sources w ere learning that arm ed units from N orth V ietnam had started m oving into the Tchepone area o f Laos on about D ecem ber 20, Ỉ958.41 M em­ bers o f these units dug entrenchm ents and took positions in the highly sensitive area ju st w est o f the dem arcation line betw een N orth and South V ietnam .42 These actions, com bined w ith the m eetings o f the fifteenth plenum o f the W PV C entral C om m ittee in Hanoi that adopted the decision to begin an arm ed strug­ gle in South V ietnam , clarify that Laos w ould unavoidably occupy a prom inent

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place in the strategic plans o f the Lao Dong leadership in die South. H ie re­ sum ption o f arm ed straggle in Laos w as regarded positively in the DRV capital because it cloaked H anoi’s preparations for w ar against Saigon. It is quite prob­ able also that the diplom atic w ar initiated by the DRV against Laos in early 1959 aim ed at pushing the RLG to resort to a tougher policy inside the country to ju s­ tify this straggle. The N orth V ietnam ese succeeded in their designs. On January 14,1959, the national assem bly o f Laos voted to give Phoui’s governm ent special pow ers for one year. Ten days later, Phoui form ed a new cabinet that did not have any NLHX representatives in it. O n February 11, 1959, Phoui Sananikone added fuel to the fire w hen he declared that he considered “the application o f the G eneva agreem ents as fully accom plished and that, therefore, Laos w as no longer bound by its provisions.”43 A lthough six days later the Laotian govern­ m ent issued a new com m uniqué that essentially negated everything that had been said in the February 11 statem ent, Hanoi m ust have felt satisfied. The arm ed struggle in Laos and N orth V ietnam ’s support o f that straggle w ere now fully justified in the eyes o f the Chinese and Soviet allies. B eijing w as the first to change its policy tow ard Laos. In February 1959, tire Chinese w rote to the Lao Dong Party explaining theữ view s on the Laotian sit­ uation. They said, under the circum stances “when the reactionary forces are try­ ing to begin a broad offensive against progressive forces o f the country, further concessions on the part o f the N eo Lao H ak X at can only inflict dam age to the developing patriotic m ovem ent” The Chinese Com m unist Party C entral Com­ m ittee also drew attention to the necessity o f preparing the Laotian com rades for arm ed struggle. The Chinese took the view that “one should not fear arm ed struggle, fo r in the present conditions it w ill be o f defensive character.”44 A l­ though in the letter the C hinese subordinated arm ed struggle to other form s o f activity, it obviously w as ju st a tem porary reservation. H aving obtained B eijing's blessing, the N orth V ietnam ese quickly adopted a decision along sim ilar lines. It w as conveyed to the Soviet am bassador on M arch 9.45 A lthough D eputy Foreign M inister U ng Van Khiem referred num erous tim es to legal form s o f the struggle that, in his w ords, w ere still valid and he even tried to create the im pression that H anoi was m ore cautious than its C hinese friends in its approach to arm ed struggle, his interpretation w as m ainly a tribute to the w ell-know n Soviet reluctance to approve any drastic actions that could destroy a fragile equilibrium in Indochina. M oscow nevertheless had to bow before die logic o f events in Laos. It becam e increasingly clear to Soviet decision m akers that the Laotian governm ent headed by Phoui Sananikone and under the strong influence o f the pro-U .S. CDNI would hardly continue to adhere to the course o f neutrality and independence prescribed

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for Laos by the G eneva agreem ents. W hat m ost alarm ed the Soviets was the grow ing u.s. involvem ent in the situation, w hich the Soviets could regard only as another attem pt by W ashington to underm ine the 1954 settlem ent and its re­ sulting regional balance and to establish “aggressive” u.s. plans for this region. The Soviet em bassy reported from the DRV that “A m erican im perialists and their protégés in Laos are successful, to an extent, in the realization o f th en plans o f liquidation o f dem ocratic achievem ents o f the Ĩ .aotians after m any years o f the national liberation struggle, in the creation o f obstacles to the developm ent o f Laos along the road o f peace and neutrality.” The Soviet em bassy believed that the principal objective o f die u.s. efforts w as to use Laos “as an im portant strate­ gic springboard for staging arm ed provocations against the PRC and the DRV, exerting pressure on neutral Cam bodia, suppressing the national liberation move­ m ent in Laos itseư, as w ell as in the whole region o f Southeast A sia.”46 In other w ords, in M oscow’s eyes, the U nited States could subvert peace in Indochina in a roundabout way through Laos. Y et M oscow w as still reluctant to approve the resum ption o f arm ed struggle in the country and attem pted to restore the status quo through the ICC. The So­ viet governm ent sent tw o notes to the B ritish cochairs, on February 26 and M arch 21,1959, suggesting that the cochairs request the ICC in Laos to resum e its activities as soon as possible. The B ritish response to the Soviet appeal was expectedly negative.47 In the m eantim e the situation in Laos developed according to the w orst sce­ nario. A n attem pt by Phoui’s governm ent in m id-M ay to integrate fifteen hun­ dred Pathet Lao soldiers, form ing tw o battalions, in the national arm y w as only partly successful. A lthough the First B attalion that was settled south o f Luang Prabang agreed to integration, the Second B attalion deserted on M ay 19 to the jungles, taking w ith them theữ fam ilies and belongings.48 They then m oved to the L ao-N orth V ietnam ese border and, as Pham V an D ong “sm ilingly” in­ form ed the Soviet am bassador, all its soldiers reached the DRV safe and sound. H anoi had alerted its border guards about such a possibility.49 In fact, on June 12 the Soviets learned that the Second B attalion had crossed the border and set­ tled on N orth V ietnam ese territory.50 It was suspected that the w hole operation w ith the Pathet Lao battalion had been authorized by H anoi, and Souphanouvong had been bypassed entirely in the operation.51 A lthough in Soviet reports there w as no direct evidence o f N orth V ietnam ese involvem ent, the very fact that the DRV leadership possessed com plete inform ation o f w hat w as transpir­ ing in Laos could be regarded as evidence that Hanoi had been involved. These events w ere used by V ientiane for new repressions against NLHX and the Pathet Lao leaders. In an interview on M ay 21, the L aotian foreign m inister, K ham phan Panya, declared the R LG ’s intention to outlaw the N LH X .52

Crisis in Laos

Souphanouvong and other NLHX mem bers w ere first placed under house arrest and later, in July, w ere arrested and m oved to a police cam p on the northern out­ skirts o f V ientiane. Developm ents in Laos in M ay-July o f 1959 put an end to the relative peace in the country. They also strengthened the determ ination o f H anoi and Beijing to render support to the arm ed struggle o f the Pathet Lao in order to w ithstand w hat they considered u .s. m achinations. As early as M ay 25, the C hinese deputy foreign m inister, Zhang W entien, apprised the Soviet am bassador in China, Pavel Y udin, that at that m om ent fighting units o f the Pathet Lao w ere w aging defensive guerrilla w ar since “civil w ar w as initiated by the royal gov­ ernm ent o f Laos itself.” The Chinese diplom at declared that his leaders consid­ ered these defensive actions on the part o f the Pathet Lao as necessary and ap­ proved o f them .53 By late July the Chinese had assessed that the arm ed struggle w as playing a leading role in the events in Laos, and Hanoi and B eijing were preparing to render necessary assistance to the Pathet Lao.54 ư n g Van Khiem in­ form ed die Soviet chargé d ’affaires that die prim ary tasks w o e the strengthen­ ing and broadening o f revolutionary bases in various parts o f die country and die form ation o f three to five new Pathet Lao battalions. “It is necessary,” stated ư n g Van Khiem, “to com plete the w ork o f arm ing the Pathet Lao forces as soon as possible, before the beginning o f the rainy season.”55 Fighting betw een the governm ent troops and the Pathet Lao was already un­ der way in July in the provinces o f X ieng Khouang and Sam Neua, where die Pathet Lao w ere traditionally strong. Then, after a brief lull, m ilitary activities resum ed tow ard the end o f A ugust in w idely scattered areas o f the country ad­ joining the V ietnam border. On A ugust 26,1959, the Ư.S. governm ent decided that it w ould provide V ientiane w ith “em ergency aid” in the form o f w eapons and m oney.56 In this situation the Soviet U nion had no choice other than to fol­ low the lead o f its Chinese and N orth V ietnam ese allies in support o f die arm ed struggle o f the Pathet Lao. N evertheless M oscow m ade it clear to B eijing and H anoi that this struggle should be aim ed at the “strict im plem entation o f the G eneva and V ientiane agreem ents,” not at the overthrow o f the existing gov­ ernm ent. In addition, the action m ust be lim ited to guerrilla fighting com bined w ith political activities am ong the population. In the Soviet view , the broaden­ ing o f m ilitary action w ould bring no good,57 and Khrushchev strongly em pha­ sized this at the end o f an uneasy conversation w ith M ao Zedong on O ctober 2. If w arfare were to intensify, the Soviets anticipated possible Ư.S. interference. The Soviet leader argued that the A m ericans could appear on the borders o f N orth V ietnam and easily “crash” the DRV border, w hile the Soviets w ould have no tim e to undertake retaliatory m easures. K hrushchev appealed to M ao to jo in him in persuading the N orth Vietnam ese to act w ith restraint.58

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The Soviets w ere also concerned lest die support provided to the Pathet Lao by C hina and N orth V ietnam becom e known to the W est, especially in view o f die RLG ’s Septem ber 4 request to the U nited N ations to send an em ergency force to Laos to halt aggression by the DRV. On Septem ber 5 the DRV deputy foreign m inister, Ung Van Khiem , m et w ith Soviet chargé d ’affaires Popov and Chinese am bassador H e W ei and begged for support. “First o f all, we hope,’’ stated Khiem, “that the Soviet governm ent gives instructions to its representa­ tive in the Security Council to expose the lie w ith respect to the DRV and to im­ pose a veto during the vote on this issue, follow ing the experience o f discussions o f the Korean question.’’39 M oscow also should try to dissuade the B ritish from supporting the RLG ’s req u est In spite o f Soviet opposition, the Security Council m et on Septem ber 7, dis­ cussed Phoui’s charges against N orth Vietnam , and decided that a subcom m it­ tee com posed o f A rgentina, Italy, Japan, and Tunisia be sent to Laos to investi­ gate V ientiane’s claim s o f foreign aggression. The subcom m ittee’s appointm ent was considered a procedural issue so as to avoid a Soviet veto. D ie m ajority on die Security Council favored the W estern position, and die Soviet representative had to satisfy him self w ith form al protests against such a decision.60 H aving failed to prevent UN involvem ent in the Laotian conflict, M oscow w anted to m ake certain that the Security Council m ission w ould not find any ev­ idence o f the DRV’s participation in m ilitary operations in Laos. Soviet diplo­ m ats in H anoi and B eijing therefore inquired am ong th eừ V ietnam ese col­ leagues w hether V ientiane’s accusations had any substance. The V ietnam ese assured the Soviets that PAV troops did not participate in arm ed struggle in Laos and that this struggle was w aged only by the Laotian com rades. True, the DRV helped the Pathet Lao by sending food and w eapons, but not m anpower. Even the arm s that H anoi provided fo r Laotian guerrillas w ere o f A m erican and French origin captured by tile V ietm inh during the first Indochina war. Those N orth V ietnam ese who had been dispatched earlier to Laos w ith training m is­ sions w ere w ithdraw n from the country, and after that Pathet Lao cadres had to go to the DRV them selves to get support and advice.61 The only evidence that could be used against the DRV w ere w eapons captured from PAV deserters w ho fled to Laos as w ell as any cartridge cases and uniform s m ade in N orth V iet­ nam .62 The UN m ission was not able to find firm evidence in support o f the Phoui governm ent’s allegations against N orth Vietnam . It could conclude only that certain operations against the RLG “m ust have had centralized coordination.’’ Bernard Fall, w ho w as in Laos at that tim e as a correspondent for several u.s. and French new spapers, wrote: “It i s . . . notew orthy that the UN report does not m ake any m ention o f tile possibility that such ’centralized coordination’ m ight

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have com e from non-Laotian elem ents outside tile Pathet Lao,”63 even though the m ission w as o f a “solidly pro-A m erican character.” In other w ords. Fall noted, “if there w o e any evidence that a Com m unist invasion had taken place, th at m ission w ould certainly not have been loath to report on it a t g reat length.”64 W hile tile U.N. fact-finding m ission failed to register any proof o f Commu­ nist pow ers' involvem ent in Laos, there w as am ple evidence o f U .S. penetration in that country, which had only increased w ith the resum ption o f hostilities. O n July 23, in response to the request from Phoui’s governm ent, the U nited States announced that it w as dispatching additional technicians to conduct an em er­ gency training program aim ed at expanding die Royal Lao A rm y from 25,000 to 29,000 m en.69 W ashington poured into Laos an ever-grow ing am ount o f m oney and aid, predom inantly m ilitary aid. As a result o f tills aid, the per capita cost to the U nited States o f a Laotian soldier w as m ore than $1,000 per year as against a w orldw ide average o f $848, annual costs in Pakistan o f $485, and in G reece o f $424.“ U .S. activity in Laos could not rem ain a secret from M oscow. The Soviet em ­ bassy in Hanoi reported that U .S. m ilitary advisors “w orked out plans o f ‘m opping-up operations,* took part in the form ation o f new units o f the royal Arm y, pursued on-site inspections, etc.” The U .S. m ilitary ousted the French from training the Laotian arm y, and the arm y w as alm ost com pletely transferred into the hands o f U .S. instructors.67 The result w as the consolidation o f U .S. influ­ ence in Laos and an incipient coalition com posed o f South Vietnam , Thailand, Laos, South K orea, and Taiw an. In other w ords, M oscow regarded U .s. efforts as aim ed at building up a belt o f pro-U .S. regim es on the southern borders o f C hina and near the DRV that w ould greatly im paứ the existing balance and pose a direct danger for the Soviet A sian allies. D espite this concern, M oscow ’s attitude tow ard developm ents in Laos was not totally devoid o f optim ism . Throughout the sum m er o f 1959, according to B ritish sources, the Soviet position was that the R ussians w ould like to see the Laotian situation stabilized.68 For the Krem lin, Laos apparently did not have any value beyond the fram ew ork o f the G eneva agreem ents and was only one o f the factors im portant for m aintaining peace in Indochina. Soviet leaders did not lose hope o f convincing W ashington that the best possible solution fo r every country involved in those agreem ents w as to keep Laos neutral, independent, and free from the m ilitary presence o f an outside pow er. The Soviets w ere even prepared to see Laotian neutrality w eighted tow ard the W est, like A ustria, rather than have a conflict that could destroy the w hole G eneva edifice. This position corresponded fully w ith K hrushchev’s policy o f peaceful coexistence, w hich he advocated during his visit to the U nited States in Septem ber 1959.

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K hrushchev’s U .S. visit had had a generally favorable effect on the interna­ tional situation and w as regarded by M oscow as a sort o f guarantee against un­ expected developm ents in Laos. A t least the Soviet em bassy in H anoi w as eager to interpret it as such in its annual report for 1959: [T ]he thaw in international relations started a fter Com . K hrushchev’s trip to the USA has w ielded and w ill continue to w ield substantial and direct influence on the further events in Laos. In fact, the U .S. governing circles do not already dare to act openly, they are hiding behind the UN cover, are searching for new , m ore flexible w ays for the im plem entation o f th en plans in Laos.69 h i som e respects, this assessm ent w as not totally unjustified. For exam ple, on D ecem ber 25 the Laotian arm y under the com m and o f a CDNI m em ber, G en­ eral Phoum i N osavan, a U .S.-backed strongm an in Laos, tried to stage a coup d ’état against the Sananikone governm ent The U .S. am bassador in Laos, ac­ com panied by the am bassadors from G reat B ritain, France, and A ustralia, called on the Laotian king and m ade it clear that this far exceeded W esten plans in Laos and the prem iership o f Phoum i N osavan, w ho w as closely associated w ith a “hard” policy, w as not acceptable.70 A s a result, the prem iership w as entrusted to Khou Abhay, a sixty-seven-year-old court official o f m oderate view s.71 T his w as but only a b rief interlude in the grow ing crisis in Laos. A bhay headed a care-taker governm ent fo r the period before the new nationw ide leg­ islative elections, and these elections, w hich finally took place on A pril 24, 1960, w ere notorious fo r violations and m anipulations. By changing eligibility requirem ents and gerrym andering electoral districts, the RLG excluded m ost o f the NLHX candidates. The leadership o f the Pathet Lao w as still in ja il aw aiting trial and could therefore not take part in the electoral cam paign. Repression against NLHX m em bers and the suppression o f theữ propaganda only added to the overall atm osphere o f political oppression.72 A s a result, the candidates from the CDNI won the m ajority o f seats in the national assem bly, w ith the rem ain­ der going to candidates w ho w ere close to the CDNI. The neutralists and the NLHX won no seats and w ere defeated even in such strongholds o f the Pathet Lao as the provinces o f Sam N eua and Phong Saly. This outcom e w as also in m any cases due to large-scale fraud and election rigging that reached such pro­ portions that in one district the governm ent candidate got tw o thousand m ore votes than there w ere registered voters.73 The election victory o f the anticom m unist candidates alarm ed the Pathet Lao leaders and theữ allies in H anoi and Beijing. Prince Souphanouvong and his NLHX colleagues w ho w ere detained in the Phone Kheng police cam p had ev­ ery reason to expect repressions from the new governm ent and began to prepare

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fo r th eừ escape. The N orth V ietnam ese prepared to cooperate. F or m onths Souphanouvong and his associates, w hile tending theữ little garden and doing physical exercises in the police cam p, discussed politics w ith their guards. As a result, on M ay 23,1960, when they decided to break out o f prison, not only did they not m eet any resistance, but the m ajority o f then guards follow ed them right out o f town and into the jungle hideouts.74 Even H anoi could not hope for an outcom e better than this operation.75 A fter he escaped from the cam p, Souphanouvong traveled three hundred m iles on foot, visiting Pathet Lao bases in each province,76 and he was eagerly aw aited in H anoi w here the N orth V ietnam ese w anted to adjust theứ plans for Laos according to the new situation and coordinate them w ith the Pathet Lao leaders.77 But the Red Prince had not reached H anoi by A ugust 9, when they heard about the coup in V ientiane carried out by Kong Le, com m ander o f the Second Paratroop B attalion, w ho w as “sick and tired o f it all”— the graft and corruption, the fratricidal w ar, the loss o f Laotian values, and foreign control o f L aotian affairs.78 The coup w as alm ost bloodless and afterw ards K ong Le fram ed a provisional executive com m ittee that included, am ong others, Souvanna Phoum a, w ho was to govern the country until a new governm ent could be assigned. No one had anticipated this turn o f events. N evertheless, both H anoi and Bei­ jin g w ere quick to greet the coup and state that the policy o f peace and neutral­ ity w ere com patible w ith Laotian aspirations. The Chinese also hailed the coup as a blow to Ư.S. im perialism .79 W hen, on A ugust 15, it w as announced that the form er governm ent was voted out by the national assem bly and die king had ap­ pointed Souvanna Phoum a to form a new governm ent, the Com m unist pow ers w ere m ore than pleased. They expected that Souvanna Phoum a w ould continue on the course o f peace and neutrality that he had follow ed before. M ore than that, M oscow hoped that he had becom e w iser and m ore tractable in his attitude tow ard Com m unist countries. Instructions w ere even sent to the Soviet am bas­ sador in Cam bodia, A leksandr A bram ov, in A ugust to probe the issue o f the es­ tablishm ent o f diplom atic relations w ith Laos. The Soviet feelers w ere success­ ful, and in Septem ber Souvanna Phoum a addressed, through A bram ov, his governm ent’s proposal to the Soviet Union to continue negotiations on die ques­ tion o f diplom atic relations that had begun as early as 1956. O n O ctober 7, I960, M oscow and V ientiane published com m uniqués on the establishm ent o f diplo­ m atic relations betw een the tw o countries.80 Souvanna Phoum a’s negotiations w ith his political rivals inside Laos w ere not so fruitful. G eneral Phoumi N osavan, the leader o f the CDNI who initially had agreed to enter Souvanna’s governm ent as deputy prim e m inister and inte­ rior m inister but then reversed his decision, flew back to his stronghold in Sa-

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vannakhet, in the south o f the country, and announced the form ation o f a revo­ lutionary com m ittee headed by Prince Boun Oum. H e em barked on m ilitary plans to retake V ientiane by force, but his first offensive failed and his troops w o e forced by Kong L e’s paratroopers to retreat dow n the M ekong V alley to die south bank o f C a D inh river.81 The external situation was also com plicated fo r Souvanna Phoum a. A lthough it first recognized his governm ent, the U nited States soon shifted the bulk o f its aid to Phoum i N osavan because W ashington regarded the new governm ent in V ientiane as heavily dependent on the Pathet Lao and the N orth Vietnam ese. A fter m id-Septem ber, an increased num ber o f flights by A ứ A m erica—a Cen­ tral Intelligence A gency front—m anned by Ư.S. crew s brought m ilitary sup­ plies to Savannakhet. A t the sam e tim e, Thailand im posed an unofficial block­ ade on V ientiane. T his soon had a drastic effect on the capital’s econom y. V ientiane w as running out food, fuel, and other necessary supplies.82 This situation w as in many respects a result o f the policy o f polarization pur­ sued by the U nited States in Laos. This policy reflected die Pentagon’s and the C IA ’s inclination to support Phoum i N osavan out o f the conviction that “the en­ tire A m erican defense posture in Southeast A sia, and mené particularly in South V ietnam and Thailand, depended on unconditional support to anti-Com m unists in Laos.”83 Souvanna Phoum a’s m aneuvers after his accession to pow er—his negotiations w ith the Pathet Lao and die establishm ent o f diplom atic relations w ith the Soviet Union— convinced policym akers in W ashington that it w as nec­ essary to counterbalance them w ith m easures that w ould underm ine the position o f the new governm ent and w ould eventually lead to its dow nfall. It was there­ fore not surprising that the day after the announcem ent o f the establishm ent o f Soviet-Lao relations, the U nited States w ithheld its cash grant to the governm ent in V ientiane. W ashington sent to Laos the assistant secretary o f state w ho was responsible fo r Far Eastern affairs, J. G raham Parsons, to inform Souvanna Phoum a that to retain U .S. aid he should suspend negotiations w ith die NLHX, reconcile w ith the Phoum i N osavan faction, and transfer the Laotian capital to Luang Prabang.84 N either the conditions nor the m essenger, w ho had been “the m ost ardent and vocal advocate o f the ’hard line’ on Laos,”89 was m et favorably by Souvanna Phoum a. Therefore, instead o f bow ing to U .S. dem ands, the Lao­ tian prem ier turned for support to the Soviet Union and other Com m unist coun­ tries. u.s. efforts in Laos had been excessive. U nlike the U .S. governm ent, the Soviet U nion acted subdy and carefully to­ w ard Laos. Instructions given to A leksandr Abram ov, the first Soviet am bas­ sador to Laos, w ho w as also am bassador to Cam bodia, fo r his first visit to V i­ entiane reflect this. A bram ov w as instructed to em phasize during his m eeting w ith Souvanna Phoum a that M oscow fully supported the new governm ent's

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program th at proclaim ed a policy o f neutrality, observance o f the G eneva agreem ents, developm ent o f relations “w ith all states w ithout any differentia­ tion,” as w ell as national reconciliation and unity o f Laos by m eans o f negoti­ ations. M oscow also instructed its am bassador to offer Soviet econom ic aid to Laos if Laos requested it officially. A id to Laos w ould not differ from assis­ tance rendered to other underdeveloped countries: credits and loans on favor­ able term s, construction o f industrial and cultural objects, and supplies o f food and goods. The Soviet leaders handled w ith care the issues o f die 1954 G eneva agree­ m ents. The am bassador w as instructed not to raise questions on the im plem en­ tation o f these agreem ents in Laos at his ow n initiative, but he was to hint, in case such questions w ere touched upon by the Laotians them selves, that it w ould be in the interest o f Souvanna Phoum a to declare L a o s's adherence to the G eneva agreem ents. The am bassador could also im ply that the resum ption o f activities by tile ICC w ould favorably influence political settlem ent in the coun­ try and guarantee a policy o f neutrality.86 Soviet flexibility and Ư.S. rigidity bore th eữ respective fruits. C onfronted w ith W ashington’s unacceptable dem ands, the m ilitary danger from Phoum i N osavan’s faction, and the grow ing shortage o f econom ic resources in V ien­ tiane, Souvanna Phoum a announced at a {»ess conference on O ctober 27 that he had in principle accepted Soviet aid.87 A bram ov, w ho had a long talk w ith Souvanna upon his arrival in the Laotian capital and who em erged from it sm iling, had every reason to state: “H ad the A m ericans been our best friends, they could not have acted Otherwise.”88 In the m eantim e, various Laotian factions continued fighting w ith each other. On N ovem ber 10, the forces o f Phoum i N osavan gained control over Luang Prabang and captured the Laotian long. V iktor Likhachev, head o f Soviet Foreign M inistry’s Southeast A sia D epartm ent, had to inform the Soviet deputy foreign m inister, G eorgii Pushkin, that only tw o provinces out o f tw elve w ere under control o f the V ientiane governm ent. Likhachev considered the situation in the country “critical.”89 The Soviet official saw in the Pathet L ao’s intransigence during the negotiations on the form ation o f the coalition governm ent one o f the im portant reasons fo r the grow ing isolation o f Souvanna Phoum a. Likhachev w rote w ith concern that the m onth that had passed since the start o f the negoti­ ations had not brought substantial progress. Souphanouvong and K ayson Phom vihan did not w ant to lim it them selves to tile understanding reached ear­ lier and w anted m ore. A ccordingly, they w ere prepared to have long talks. “It is notew orthy,” Likhachev pointed out, “that the leaders o f the Pathet Lao regard as the principal objective o f their delegation not to reach an agreem ent, but to ‘push to the left’ the Souvanna Phoum a governm ent.”90 The Pathet Lao also re­

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fused to transfer to die governm ent’s control die province o f Sam N eua and other regions occupied by fighting units o f the Pathet Lao. As a result, the pres­ tige o f Souvanna Phoum a w as being underm ined. Likhachev in his memo predicted the w orst prognosis fo r events in Laos, from the Soviet view point Likhachev believed that w ithout Souvanna Phoum a a new governm ent w ould be too leftist to get the long’s approval and could rely only on the Kong Le and the Pathet Lao forces: The result w ould be die official form ation in Savannakhet o f a reac­ tionary countergovem m ent approved by the king, w hich w ould com m and alm ost all Laotian arm y and w ould have recognition and broad m aterial support from the U nited States and SEA TO . In essence, the situation w ould go back to the status w hen, on one hand, thane w ere Pathet Lao fighting units com posed o f five battal­ ions and, on die other, a tw enty-five-thousand-strong Laotian arm y, acting on the order o f the law ful, that is, approved by the king, Lao­ tian reactionary governm ent----- The result o f such a developm ent w ould be a civil w ar in Laos under unfavorable conditions for the Pathet Lao and the transform ation o f Laos into a factor that w ould undoubtedly be used by the im perialist circles o f the U nited States to the detrim ent o f our struggle for the relaxation o f international tension, disarm am ent, etc.91 M oscow w anted to keep die Pathet Lao as a strong political force in a gov­ ernm ent headed by a neutralist politician such as Souvanna Phoum a who had been chosen in order to avoid the transform ation o f Laos into a factor for insta­ bility in Indochina. The Soviet solution w as concessions on the part o f the Pathet Lao and com pletion o f the negotiations “on die basis o f the restoration, to the full extent, o f principles and provisions o f the G eneva and V ientiane agree­ m ents.”92 Finally, Likhachev recom m ended the use o f Chinese and V ietnam ese friends, w ho w o e in M oscow participating in a conference o f Com m unist and w orkers’ parties, to arrange consultations on these issues. It is not known w hether such consultations really took place, but Likhachev’s recom m endation cam e a little late. On N ovem ber 16, it w as announced that the NLHX and Souvanna Phoum a had leached an agreem ent on the basis o f the 1957 accords. Final details o f this agreem ent w o e settled at a personal m eeting o f Souvanna Phoum a w ith Souphanouvong. B ut a coalition governm ent w ithout the participation o f the N osavan faction could not prevent the deterioration o f events in Laos resulting in m ilitary con­ flic t The country w as divided into tw o cam ps, each enjoying support and en­ couragem ent from opposing C old W ar blocs. If one accepts the definition o f an

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international crisis as “a sequence o f interactions betw een the governm ents o f tw o o r m ore sovereign states in severe conflict, short o f actual w ar, but involv­ ing the perception o f a dangerously high probability o f war,”93 it is obvious that by the end o f N ovem ber 1960 the situation in Laos had acquired all the charac­ teristics o f an international crisis. In early Decem ber, the Com m unist pow ers started delivering aid to Souvanna Phoum a in response to his request for supplies o f petroleum and oil that had been conveyed to M oscow som etim e during the last ten days o f N ovem ber.94 The request had stipulated that the aid should be sent via H anoi, and on Novem­ ber 23, I960, L ikhachev m et w ith the N orth V ietnam ese am bassador to M oscow, Nguyen Van Kinh, to discuss this issue.95 On D ecem ber 3, a Soviet test flight staffed by a Russian crew landed in V ientiane for the first tim e. N o cargo was on board, but the flight attracted m any curiosity seekers, journalists, and diplom ats. A fter it was decided that there w ould be tw o flights a day and other problem s were settled,96 regular flights delivering fuel from H anoi to V i­ entiane began on D ecem ber 4. The N orth V ietnam ese, w ho w ere concerned w ith developm ents in Laos, w ere o f the opinion that econom ic aid was not enough. On D ecem ber 4, Pham Van D ong stated to the counsellor o f the Soviet em bassy that it was the DRV that w as prim arily interested in providing assistance to Laos and that this assis­ tance m ust be im m ediately forthcom ing for Laos was changing so rapidly that “a situation m ight arise when nobody is to be helped.”97 The DRV prem ier seem ed to be im plying that it w as necessary to deliver w eaponry and m unitions to Kong L e’s units and the Pathet Lao. H anoi was alarm ed by new s o f a coup d 'éta t being prepared in V ientiane am id the offensive against the Laotian capi­ tal organized by the troops loyal to the Savannakhet group. In a few days N orth V ietnam ese fears w o e justified. On D ecem ber 8, the com m ander o f the V ientiane m ilitary region, Colonel K ouprasith Abhay, seized control o f the capital and forced Kong Le and his m en to w ithdraw w estw ard. Kong L e's forces w ere able to regain theừ positions, how ever, and reoccupied V ientiane. Now the Chinese w ere alarm ed and pushed the Soviets into action. The sam e day that the news about the coup apparently reached B eijing, C hinese foreign m inister Chen Yi m et w ith Soviet chargé d ’affaires N ikolai Sudarikov and raised the issue o f sending arm s to the governm ent o f Souvanna Phouma. Chen pointed out that it was best to deliver weaponry to V ientiane by air, and he inform ed the Soviet diplom at that B eijing was ready to provide the airport in Nanning for Soviet transports. However, since the situation in V ientiane was very unstable and Kong Le m ight not be able to control the Laotian capital, the best plan, according to the Chinese foreign m inister, w ould be to deliver arm s to H anoi and w ait until the situation was clarified.98

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The follow ing day Sudarikov participated in a reception at the airport for the C hinese delegation returning from the M oscow Com m unist parties conference. In the m idst o f the form alities, he w as invited to talk to Zhou Enlai, who assured the Soviet diplom at that the C hinese w ould do their best in facilitating the trans­ port o f Soviet aid through tile territory o f Com m unist China. He underlined the need to accelerate deliveries o f arm s, am m unition, and fuel to the governm ent o f Souvanna Phoum a in V ientiane. The crisis in Laos apparently caused the Chi­ nese to forget their disagreem ents w ith M oscow. Sudarikov noted that all mem­ bers o f the C hinese Com m unist Party Politburo who greeted him w ere in good spirits and expressed satisfaction w ith the outcom e o f the M oscow conference.99 The Soviets did not need urging to provide m ilitary assistance to Laos. Sudarikov’s rem arks during his conversations w ith the Chinese officials show that M oscow had already undertaken m easures to satisfy the needs o f theừ Laotian friends. By D ecem ber 10, eleven railw ay cars o f weapons and thirty-five o f oil and gasoline had been m oved to the Soviet-Chinese border, ready for delivery to L aos.100 Because it was necessary to deliver this aid to Laos in the shortest possible tim e, it w as transported by railw ay through C hinese territory to Nan­ ning and then airlifted to Hanoi and V ientiane. A ll these efforts notw ithstanding, the situation in Laos continued to deteri­ orate fo r Souvanna Phoum a w ho, having failed to reach an agreem ent betw een the w arring factions, departed V ientiane fo r Phnom Penh, the capital o f Cam ­ bodia. B ritish officials in V ientiane believed that one reason he had fled w as his disagreem ent w ith the leftists in his governm ent on the necessity o f asking the Soviets fo r arm s.101 T here w ere som e grounds fo r this assertion since Q uinim Pholsena, w ho rem ained the senior cabinet m em ber in V ientiane, flew to H anoi the next day aboard a Soviet transport and requested that the N orth V ietnam ese send his governm ent arm s and am m unition; in his w ords, “Souvanna Phoum a did not believe in the strength o f the people.” Pholsena de­ clared that he and his associates believed in the strength o f the people and th eừ victory. Pholsena returned to V ientiane that sam e day, bringing w ith him nine tons o f arm s.102 B ut this infusion o f m ilitary aid did not stop the course o f events unfavorable fo r the neutralists and the Pathet Lao. On D ecem ber 12, the national assem bly w ithdrew its support for the Souvanna Phoum a governm ent and set up a new regim e under G eneral Phoum i N osavan and Prince Boun Oum, w hich w as im ­ m ediately recognized by the U nited States and Thailand w hile the Soviet Union sent a note to the U nited States protesting its intervention in the internal affairs o f Laos. A t the sam e tim e, severe fighting took place in V ientiane betw een right­ ist and neutralist forces, resulting in the defeat o f those supporting neutrality. Kong Le had to retreat northw ard. B ut the battle for V ientiane, as this episode

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w as called, did not significantly im prove die m ilitary situation in favor o f die N osavan-B oun Oum governm ent A lthough they w ere now outside o f V ien­ tiane, Kong L e’s paratroops kept th eừ weapons and discipline, and the Pathet Lao fences had not participated in the fighting fo r V ientiane at all. The com bi­ nation o f Kong L e’s paratroops and guerrilla units o f the Pathet Lao only in­ creased theữ m aneuverability and gave diem com m and over die countryside. Soon they captured such strategically im portant areas as X ieng Khouang and the n a in o f Jars. B oth the C hinese and die V ietnam ese constandy prevailed upon die Soviets fo r fresh supplies o f weapons and am m unition fo r Kong Le and the Pathet Lao. The C hinese deputy foreign m inister, Jien Y unqiuan, said, “Now any delay w ith assistance can lead to a great detrim ent for the patriotic forces o f Laos.” 103 The Soviet U nion w as not deaf to these pleas and increased its deliveries to Laos. A ccording to the U .S. State D epartm ent, during the battle for V ientiane, Soviet IL-14 aircraft flew in how itzers, am m unition, gasoline, com bat rations, and other w ar m atériel. Soviet heavy transport aircraft w ere passing over China to H anoi and H aiphong, m aintaining the airlift into L aos.104 In his retreat Kong Le w as supported by a constant stream o f Soviet supply drops.105 It w as becom ing clear that Laos was plunging into a civil w ar w ith interna­ tional repercussions. C hen Y i predicted in his conversation w ith the Soviet chargé d ’affaires that, “the struggle o f the patriotic progressive forces against re­ actionary pro-A m erican forces in Laos apparently w ould lead to the diarchy in the country and to its split in tw o parts— northern and southern.” Chen said that this struggle w ould be prolonged and it w as therefore necessary to render assis­ tance to those w ho supported Souvanna Phoum a and Kong L e.106 By that tim e the Soviet leaders m ight have recognized that the continuation o f arm ed strug­ gle in Laos w ould result in a conflict that unavoidably involved the U nited States and the Soviet U nion and that buried all existing hopes fo r stabilization in In­ dochina. Thus, the K rem lin believed that a diplom atic settlem ent o f the Laotian problem , probably at a conference w ith the participation o f all interested states, seem ed to be the only solution. Khrushchev first m entioned this in Septem ber 1960; the Cam bodian leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, revived the idea in his speech in B eijing on D ecem ber 19.107 The problem o f an international conference was closely linked w ith the ICC in Laos, w hich had adjourned sine die in the sum m er o f 1958. Since then, M oscow had continued to insist on the resum ption o f its activities. On Decem­ ber 15,1960, Indian prim e m inister Jaw aharlal N ehru, in a note to the G eneva cochairs, proposed that the ICC for Laos be reconvened. The B ritish supported this proposal and addressed it to the Soviet governm ent. In response, on De­ cem ber 22, the Soviet U nion delivered a note to the B ritish governm ent propos-

Crisis in Laos

ing die convocation o f a conference o f die interested pow ers and die resum ption o f die IC C ’s activities in L aos.108 The Soviets expected a favorable reception by both allies and rivals fo r the idea o f the conference and the resum ption o f die IC C ’s activities. A s recently as N ovem ber 1960 in a conversation in M oscow betw een Le Duan and M ikhail Suslov, a m em ber o f the CPSU Presidium and chief ideologist o f the Soviet C om m unists, Le D uan insisted on the expediency o f contacting India on the question o f resum ing the ICC in L aos.109 He was joined on D ecem ber 16 by Pham V an D ong, w ho addressed a telegram to Khrushchev in w hich he spoke o f die dangerous developm ents in Laos and called fo r “positive and effective ac­ tions” that w ould lead to the “saving o f the present situation in Laos, the guar­ anteeing o f the policy o f peace and neutrality o f the royal governm ent o f Laos.” 110 Hanoi w as not opposed to Sihanouk’s idea o f the neutralization o f Laos and Cam bodia. Pham V an D ong noted both the positive and negative sides o f Sihanouk’s proposal and stressed that the DRV w as ready to support all that was positive in Sihanouk’s program .111 B eijing likew ise supported the idea o f a neutrality zone in Indochina, w hich Sihanouk had put forw ard during his De­ cem ber 14-26 visit to the PRC. A lw ays preoccupied w ith the danger o f Ư.S. bases on theừ southern borders, the C hinese could not but see in the neutralityzone idea a guarantee against a threat from this direction. Chen Yi confirm ed this in his conversation w ith tile Soviet chargé d ’affaires.112 A s a result, N orth V ietnam and C hina assented w hen, on January 1,1961, Sihanouk w rote to tile tw o cochairs and other heads o f states appealing for a new enlarged conference on Laos. H aving obtained tile consent o f its allies, M oscow w as hopeful that the U nited States w ould not oppose the idea o f the conference. The basis for such a hope w as grounded in the victory o f John F. K ennedy, the D em ocratic Party candi­ date in the 1960 U .S. presidential election. Soviet leaders expected that the new U .S. adm inistration w ould reverse the policy o f its R epublican Party predeces­ sors cm a num ber o f issues, including Laos. The Soviet am bassador in W ash­ ington, M ikhail M enshikov, confided to a close associate o f K ennedy that, “[h]is principals— especially Khrushchev—believed the com ing into pow er o f a new A m erican adm inistration presented an opportunity to resolve existing and dan­ gerous differences betw een our countries. The atm osphere had changed. Psy­ chologically, it w ould be easier fo r the U .S.S.R. to deal w ith the new A dm inis­ tration than w ith the old one.” 113 W hile the K ennedy adm inistration w as w orking out its ow n position on Laos, nuances appeared in the approach o f various countries tow ard the issue o f the conference. A lthough G reat B ritain and India stressed that the im m ediate ob­ jective should be the cessation o f hostilities and the reconvening o f the ICC, the

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Soviet U nion, China, and N orth V ietnam insisted that a conference should pre­ cede all these steps.114 A lthough K hrushchev declared in his January 20,1 9 6 1 , letter to the B ritish prim e m inister that his governm ent was ready to undertake steps needed to convene a conference and to reactivate the com m ission,115 he drew London’s attention to the fact that the existing situation in Laos differed from conditions in 1954 and that it was the conference that should be die prior­ ity for the cochairs if they w anted to settle die conflict in Laos. This argum ent was repeated in M oscow by the Soviet deputy foreign m inister, V asilii K uznet­ zov, in his conversation w ith the B ritish am bassador, R an k R oberts, the next day. In response to R oberts’s reasons why having the ICC in Laos was enough, K uznetzov stated that a conference was necessary for not only the tw o cochairs and m em bers o f the ICC but also all interested countries to discuss the existing situation in Laos. At such a representative conference it w ould also be possible to discuss objectives and tasks o f the com m ission as w ell as w ays and opportu­ nities for achieving them .ể16 Kuznetzov also expressed M oscow ’s conviction that the only legitim ate governm ent in Laos w as that o f Souvanna Phoum a, and he rejected any attem pt at com prom ise w ith the Laotian king on the grounds that the king was a captive o f the rebels. W hile K uznetzov, a high-ranking Soviet diplom at, expounded on these view s to the B ritish am bassador, there was actually no unity am ong the Com m unist pow ers them selves on the issue o f the ICC in Laos. The Chinese opposed re­ convening the ICC before the conference because, as Zhou Enlai explained to the Soviet chargé d ’affaires, the com m ission w ould unavoidably have to deal w ith the rebel clique o f Phoum i-B oun Oum, w hich was unacceptable.117 Bei­ jin g was also concerned about the am bivalent position o f India, lest the ICC be­ com e a tool o f the W est. On these grounds the Chinese did not fully concur w ith the Soviet proposal to reconvene the ICC outside Laos— for exam ple, in New D elhi— in order to facilitate preparations for the conference. They also insisted that the ICC’s sole obligation w ould be “to discuss the question o f the resum p­ tion o f its activities” and that this provision be included in the ICC docum ent. In an oral m essage spelled out by D eputy Foreign M inister Zhang H anfu during his m eeting w ith Sudarikov, B eijing drew the Soviet leaders’ attention to the possi­ bility that, after having obtained access to Laos, the ICC could dem and a cease­ fire if the “rebellious clique o f Phoum i-B oun Oum” prevailed over the “patri­ otic forces.” “This w ould not favor the developm ent o f the patriotic forces o f L aos and the strengthening o f Phoum a’s governm ent," the C hinese con­ cluded.118 U nlike the C hinese, it seem ed that Hanoi did not fear a resum ption o f ICC ac­ tivities in Laos. Vo N guyen G iap inform ed the Soviet am bassador, Leonid Sokolov, that the Lao Dong Party’s Politburo did not oppose the resum ption o f

Crisis In Laos

the IC C ’s activities o r its dealing w ith the Souvanna Phoum a governm ent, the Pathet Lao, and tile governm ent o f Bonn Oum all at the sam e tim e. The N orth V ietnam ese believed the com m ission should stay in a neutral zone w here nei­ ther the Pathet Lao forces nor Phoum i N osavan’s units w ere located. G iap did not even object to the possibility that the ICC could im pose die cease-fire al­ though he adm itted that it was not to the Pathet L ao 's advantage.119 N orth V ietnam 's friends coordinated theữ positions w ith H anoi's intention to use the opportunity to prolong the fighting in Laos. V o Nguyen G iap declared during the sam e conversation w ith Sokolov that “the best way to prepare the conference [on Laos] w ould be offensive and the capture o f Luang Prabang.” 120 Since the Pathet Lao did not possess enough resources for such an offensive, the N orth V ietnam ese regarded the reconvening o f the ICC as a way to w in tim e in the still unstable situation in the country. A few days later, Pham V an Dong was even m ore outspoken. He stated to the Soviet am bassador that “the convening o f the conference w ould depend, to a great extent, on the m ilitary situation in Laos, that is, the new successes achieved by the Kong Le and Pathet Lao forces could accelerate [the opening of] this conference."121 In the view o f the DRV prem ier, it w as necessary to take into account the fact that the conference w ould not be convened soon. In the m eantim e, “the patriotic forces" w ould proceed to strengthen theừ positions. Pham Van D ong repeated this several tim es during the conversation, w hile he also spoke o f the need to prevent the spread o f the Laotian conflict to other territories and o f the preservation o f peace in Southeast Asia. The N orth V ietnam ese did not conceal that they w ere sending their cadres to Laos. A total o f 12,000 N orth V ietnam ese troops w ere in Laos, serving as m ili­ tary advisers, political com m issars, and instructors. Hanoi increasingly regarded developm ents in Laos and V ietnam as a united struggle against the common en­ em y,122 a fact that could hardly please the Soviet com rades w ho w ere trying to find a solution to the Laotian problem in order to exclude Laos as a factor in the V ietnam problem . Because theừ allies' view s on reconvening the ICC differed but w ere not res­ olutely negative, the Soviets proposed an interim solution on February 18: that the C om m ission m eet im m ediately in New D elhi— not in Laos— and that it should w ork out instructions that w ould then be issued by the cochairs.123 It w as clear to the W estern countries that such a solution w ould only delay achieving a cease-fire in Laos. The B ritish again insisted that an arm istice ought to precede a conference, and it seem ed that discussions on this question— alm ost a chickenand-egg situation—had reached a deadlock. The new Ư.S. adm inistration could have played a decisive role, but the legacy o f the Republicans com plicated K ennedy’s approach to the problem o f Laos.

Crisis in Laos

W hile Eisenhow er regarded U .S. intervention as preferable to any other solu­ tio n ,124 die new president considered Laos “not a land ‘w orthy o f engaging the attention o f great p o w ers/ that die effort to transform it into a pro-W estern re­ doubt had been ridiculous and that neutralization w as the correct p o licy /’125 Ac­ cordingly, the new adm inistration w as negative about its predecessors’ actions in Laos in 1960, blam ing diem for giving the Soviet Union an excuse to inter­ vene in Southeast A sia and fo r letting N orth V ietnam m ake “m ajor gains” there.126 In sum , the State D epartm ent concluded in its m em orandum on Laos that the K ennedy adm inistration “inherited a thoroughly confused and alm ost insoluble Laos problem , albeit explosive. W hatever the last adm inistration hes­ itated to do as a ‘last act* w ith respect to Laos w as equally difficult fo r the new adm inistration to take as first act.” 127 In addition, W ashington had to take into account the view s o f its European al­ lies. The B ritish as w ell as the French w ere critical o f Ư.S. policy tow ard Laos under the Eisenhow er adm inistration and, especially, the unconditional adher­ ence o f the U nited States to Phoum i N osavan and his faction. B oth London and Paris w ere apprehensive about a m ilitary conflict over Laos and m ade it clear to W ashington that as SEATO m em bers they w ould not be prepared to get in­ volved in this conflict.128 In addition, the B ritish and French w ere m ore flexible than W ashington in th eừ interpretation o f the concept o f neutrality. W inthrop Brown, the u.s. am bassador to Laos, explained to tile new president that B ritain and France “w ere prepared to go m uch farther w ith a neutral Laos accepting aid from the Soviets and having Pathet Lao in the governm ent and not taking an anti-com m unist posture than w e w ould. They felt that the only hope o f uniting die country w as to support Souvanna Phoum a, and the B ritish a t least w ere w ill­ ing to accept Pathet Lao in die governm ent.” 129 The latter tw o conditions had al­ m ost been anathem a in W ashington. Thus the K ennedy adm inistration faced a dilem m a: either continue the proPhoum i N osavan policy in Laos and prepare fo r an eventual clash w ith the Com­ m unist pow ers over a country outside im m ediate u.s. geopolitical interests o r agree on a Laotian governm ent headed by Souvanna Phoum a that w ould pursue a policy o f neutrality not fully com patible w ith W estern interests in Southeast A sia. C haracteristically, K ennedy chose a m iddle course w hile he attem pted to find a solution m ore acceptable to the U nited States. In other w ords, W ashing­ ton did not stop considering m ilitary contingency plans relating to Laos but, at the sam e tim e, it put forw ard several diplom atic proposals. Its first proposal w as to establish a com m ission com posed o f neutral nations w ith the aim o f investigating the situation in Laos; this w ould replace the re­ convening o f the ICC. W ashington suggested including C am bodia and Burm a as w ell as m aintaining “suitable flexibility fo r additions.” 130 It w as clear that, by

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proposing such a com m ission, the U nited States took into account its Laotian al­ lies' vow “never” to accept again the return o f the ICC to L aos.131 In addition, as the State D epartm ent explained in its cable, “w hile neutral and som etim es troublesom e, C am bodia and Burm a are anti-C om m unist dom estically, are alive to Com m unist threat, desire a non-Com m unist Laos in theử ow n self-interest and have them selves taken initiatives consistent w ith approach we have in m ind. M oreover, Soviet B loc actively w ooing them and w ould find it difficult com ­ pletely rebuff their efforts on behalf o f peace."132 The U .S. adm inistration broached this proposal w ith the Soviets, w hose reac­ tion w as crucial to u.s. plans in Laos. O n February 20,1961, Dean Rusk, the new U.S. secretary o f state, m et w ith Soviet am bassador M ikhail M enshikov and in­ form ed him about tile neutral-nations-com m ission proposal. M enshikov’s im­ m ediate reaction was cool, to say the le a st He interpreted this proposal as one­ sided and insisted on the expediency o f an international conference.133 A w eek later, the Soviet am bassador delivered his governm ent’s response to the u.s. pro­ posal: M oscow considered it an abandonm ent o f die G eneva agreem ents and m aintained d u t there w as no legal ground for such a step. The Soviets suspected that one o f W ashington’s aim s w as to elim inate “socialist Poland” from the com­ m ission and declared that the “cooperation o f all countries is required and not the im position o f another group."134 N ikita Khrushchev reiterated tills view in his conversation w ith L lew ellyn Thom pson, u .s. am bassador to M oscow . Khrushchev described die U .S. proposal as unrealistic, expressed his support for Sihanouk’s call for a fourteen-nation conference, and insisted on a mechanism “devised along lines o f ‘Polish-Canadian-Indian Com m ission.’’’135 D uring the Khrushchev-Thom pson conversation, Khrushchev expounded So­ viet view s about the settlem ent o f die Laos crisis. “W e w elcom e, [K hrushchev] said, a Laos that pursues neutral policy on m odel o f A ustria.” The Soviet leader tried to persuade W ashington o f the acceptability o f the choice o f Souvanna Phoum a as head o f die Laotian governm ent, saying Souvanna w as “not Com­ m unist, nor candidate o f Com m unists but rather m an like Sihanouk o r N ehru and w ould not, in K hrushchev’s opinion, follow pro-Soviet policy.” 136 K hrushchev’s assertion probably helped the U nited States eventually m odify its position on Laos. W ith the rejection o f the proposal for a neutral-nations com m ission by die very countries—Cam bodia and Burm a—that w ere expected to form its core and the absence o f an im pressive m ilitary success fo r the Phoum i forces in Laos, President Kennedy w ent before television cam eras on M arch 23 and read a statem ent on Laos at the beginning o f a news conference. Kennedy stated that the U nited States “strongly and unreservedly” supported “the goal o f a neutral and independent Laos, tied to no outside pow er o r group o f pow ers, threatening no one, and free from any dom ination.” H e w arned, how ­

Crisis in Laos

ever, that his country and its SEATO allies w ould not rem ain indifferent if “arm ed attacks by externally supported Com m unists” did not cease. He spoke in favor o f the “constructive negotiation” and supported the B ritish call for a cease-fire and convocation o f an international conference on L aos.137 Behind Kennedy w ere m aps illustrating the extent o f Pathet Lao dom ination at various stages o f the conflict The third map dem onstrated the situation as o f M arch 1961: a red area on it showed the territory controlled by the Pathet Lao cover­ ing the entire region in and around the Plain o f Jars. A lthough inaccurate,138 this m ap sought to justify the adm inistration’s decisions relating to Laos, decisions that had been taken at a W hite House m eeting tw o days earlier. D ecision mak­ ers had created a tw o-track strategy, that is, they envisaged the preparation for m ilitary actions along w ith the pursuit o f negotiations.139 The Soviets nevertheless expressed theừ satisfaction that the U nited States had changed its position on the settlem ent o f the crisis in Laos. D uring his m eet­ ing w ith Kennedy in late M arch, Foreign M inister A ndrei Grom yko o f the So­ viet Union assured the U .S. president that M oscow w ould exercise restraint in its actions in Laos “in order to avoid exacerbation o f situation w ith consequent danger o f spreading o f conflict” and expected such a restraint from the U .S. side. Kennedy noted that “G rom yko’s presentation w as a serious one and devoid o f the deliberate evasion.” 140 Yet M oscow ’s subsequent steps dispelled w hatever optim ism the W est nour­ ished w ith regard to the Soviet attitude. On A pril 1, in response to the B ritish aide-m ém oire o f M arch 23,1961, M oscow suggested that G reat B ritain and the Soviet Union issue an appeal for a cease-fire sim ultaneously w ith the com ­ m encem ent o f the international conference. The Soviets obviously still held to the view s expressed in theứ note o f February 18.141 Furtherm ore, the Krem lin delayed its response to the drafts presented by A m bassador Roberts o f G reat B ritain, w hich contained an appeal for a cease-fire in Laos, a report to N ehru concerning the ICC, and an announcem ent o f the conference. O nly on A pril 16 did G rom yko reciprocate w ith the Soviet drafts,142 and his response apparently was precipitated by the u.s. dem onstration o f its determ ination to intervene on a greater scale in Laos. C onfronted w ith N orth V ietnam ese support for the ex­ pansion o f the Pathet Lao m ilitary cam paign into the region o f route no. 9 and southern L aos,143 W ashington issued an order to u.s. personnel in Laos lifting all restrictions on theữ participation in com bat operations and perm itting them to w ear uniform s.144 On A pril 19 the United States transform ed its m ilitary ad­ visory personnel in Laos from a civilian program s evaluation office (PEO ) to a m ilitary assistance advisory group (M A A G ).145 The Kennedy adm inistration interpreted the Soviet stalling tactics as aim ed at avoiding a “m ajor overt m ove until it is too late” for the U nited States “to m ove

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in,” as w ell as a “collapse o f the m orale o f the FAL [Forces Armées de Laos] forces and o f the present governm ent.” 146 M oscow’s policy had to take into ac­ count the opinions o f its N orth V ietnam ese and C hinese allies. Both H anoi and B eijing held to the view that die m ilitary situation favored the Pathet Lao and, accordingly, w ere reluctant to accede to m oves that could frustrate the m ount­ ing Com m unist offensive. N orth V ietnam ese Politburo m em ber Nguyen Chi Thanh inform ed Soviet am bassador Sokolov on M arch 25 that his colleagues in die Lao D ong Party believed that die Pathet Lao offensive w as developing sat­ isfactorily and that the fighting spirit o f the Com m unist troops w as at a high level. Therefore, Thanh stated, “die W PV CC Politburo adopted a decision to continue m ilitary actions.” 147 The Chinese expressed alm ost identical view s in a telegram to M oscow on M arch 31, 1961. They accused the U nited States o f insidious plans regarding Laos, aim ed at strengthening N osavan’s “rebels,” splitting the “patriots,” and striking a blow to “progressive Laotian forces." The Chinese believed that the W est w anted to tie up progressive Lao forces by m eans o f the ICC. A t the same tim e, the C hinese claim ed that die W est w as not interested in the conference it­ self and w ould be satisfied if such a conference w ere not held at all. U nder such circum stances, B eijing said, it was arm ed struggle that played the m ost im por­ tant role. A lthough the C hinese did not exclude that under certain conditions it w as possible to consider political m ethods o f struggle, “the highest principle for us should be the further grow th o f strength o f the Laotian people.” “In the pre­ sent situation,” the telegram continues, “w hen patriotic progressive forces o f Laos gained a significant m om entum , it w ould be advantageous for them to stop the w ar under the condition that this w ould not lim it them in the developm ent o f th eữ strength.” 148 In other w ords, the C hinese w ere against any action that would jeopardize the success achieved by the Pathet Lao forces. To understand the Soviet attitude tow ard Laos, a sum m ary o f M oscow ’s view s as they had developed by A pril 1961 m ight be useful. Laos w as not a ma­ jo r priority in Soviet foreign policy plans. K hrushchev him self m ade this clear in his letter congratulating Kennedy on his victory in the 1960 presidential elec­ tion. The Soviet leader did not even m ention Laos by nam e but, instead, w rote o f the necessity “to continue efforts to solve such a pressing problem as disar­ m am ent, to settle the Germ an issue through the earliest conclusion o f peace treaty and to reach agreem ent on other questions, the solution o f w hich could bring about an easing and im provem ent o f the entire international situation.” 149 Later, Soviet officials m ore than once assured the A m ericans o f theữ desire to elim inate the Laotian problem as an obstacle on the way to agreem ent w ith the U nited States on m ore im portant international issues. Such statem ents reflected a te al Soviet interest, as the Soviet Foreign M inistry’s internal docum ents

Crisis In Laos

clearly dem onstrate. A M arch 14, 1961, m em orandum en titled “O n Laos” states: “The principal task w ith respect to Laos is the struggle fo r the liquidation o f a hotbed o f international tension in that region and neutralization o f that coun­ try.” A nd fu rth er “The policy o f peace, neutrality and national reconciliation [in Laos] objectively serves die interests o f our cam p.” 190 Y et M oscow, like W ashington, im plem ented its Laos policy as a tw o-track policy. O n (me hand, die Soviets w ere prepared to search for a peaceful settlem ent to the Laotian crisis w hile, on the other hand, they w ere ready to render all possible assistance to the “patriotic forces o f Laos.” O n the diplom atic front, the Soviet U nion w as preoccupied principally w ith organizing an international conference, either w ith the participation o f only those countries that had taken part in the previous G eneva conference o r w ith the inclusion o f additional states proposed by Prince Sihanouk. O n tactical grounds, M oscow also regarded as necessary die reactivation o f the IC C in Laos. Pursuing these goals, die Soviets w o e concerned lest th en A sian friends w ould not ruin Soviet plans aim ed at the setdem ent o f the Laotian crisis. T hat is w hy they insisted on flexibility on the part o f the Pathet Lao, including the Pathet Lao’s policy tow ard Souvanna Phoum a, whom they regarded as the m ost acceptable politician in Laos at that tim e. M oscow rejected the leftist slogans o f the Laotian Com m unists as w ell as th en excessive dem ands, w hich the Soviets believed w ould “not only w eaken the united broad front o f struggle against the rebels, but also com plicate our struggle for the neutralization o f Laos.” 151 A t the sam e tim e, the Soviet Union continued to provide m ilitary and eco­ nom ic aid to the pro-Com m unist forces in Laos. M ilitary aid, according to the So­ viet Foreign M inistry’s Southeast A sia D epartm ent, was “one o f the decisive fac­ tors o f success o f the national-patriotic forces o f Laos in theừ struggle against the rebels.” A id included cannons, m ortars, recoilless guns, various types o f m achine guns, sm all arm s, tanks, arm ored troop carriers, artillery w orkshops, ammuni­ tion, and m edical supplies.152 The Soviets w ere evidentiy interested in the con­ solidation o f the Pathet Lao’s positions and wanted to avoid any deterioration in favor o f N osavan’s group, and this was regarded as an im portant prerequisite o f the future negotiations. The Soviet am bassador in the DRV intentionally stated to Ho Chi M inh that a “m ilitary success w ill help US at the fourteen-pow er con­ ference, as, in the past, the victory o f the Vietnam ese people at D ienbienphu had helped in the conclusion o f the Geneva agreem ents.” 153 As a consequence, the Soviets did not w ant the ICC to im pede the consolidation o f the Pathet Lao posi­ tions, and they insisted that ICC members gather outside Laos. Furtherm ore, the Soviets w anted to lim it the ICC’s activities as w ell, especially initially. Thus the Soviet leaders had m uch in com m on w ith the C hinese and the N orth V ietnam ese in theừ approach to the crisis in Laos. They all apparently shared

C risis in Laos

die concern dial die cease-fire and resum ption o f the ICC’s activities w ould re­ verse the Laotian situation in favor o f the anti-C om m unist forces w ithout set­ tling the conflict itseư. B ut M oscow w as less preoccupied w ith die question o f keeping die Pathet Lao’s gains intact, regarding those gains m ainly as future diplom atic bargaining chips useful as concessions. The Chinese and, especially, the N orth V ietnam ese differed from this Soviet point o f view . D uring his A pril 1961 visit to M oscow, die DRV deputy prim e m inister and m em ber o f the Lao D ong Politburo, N guyen D uy Trinh, underlined in his conversation w ith the So­ viet deputy foreign m inister, G eorgii Pushkin, that it was necessary to do one’s best so that “the Pathet L ao has an opportunity for strengthening its positions in the future and, in addition, die adm inistration in the regions now u n d o 1control o f the Pathet Lao rem ains in th e v hands.” 134 A sim ilar view w as form ulated in a telegram from B eijing on A pril 12 in which the Chinese leaders drew attention to the necessity for the Sou vanna Phoum a governm ent and the Pathet Lao fight­ ing units to “strengthen their positio n s. . . and to achieve the unification into one coherent area o f all those places that are now under theữ control.” 153 The substance o f die differences am ong the Com m unist pow ers w as in die Soviet opposition to a general tendency on the part o f the U SSR’s A sian allies to dow nplay die im portance o f the earliest settlem ent o f the Laotian crisis as w ell as the allies* related desire to postpone the conference and put forw ard new dem ands to the W est. The Chinese and the N orth V ietnam ese w ere not as con­ cerned as the Soviet U nion about the danger o f broadening the conflict For C hina, this corresponded w ith M ao’s recent approach tow ard foreign policy is­ sues that favored the grow th o f confrontation w ith the W est and even possible nuclear showdown. The Ư.S. fiasco at die Bay o f Pigs in Cuba in A pril 1961 only strengthened M ao. Laos becam e, in the eyes o f the C hinese, a trum p card in the struggle against the U nited States. O n A pril 19, Zhou Enlai in a conver­ sation w ith die Soviet chargé d ’affaires, N ikolai Sudarikov, touched upon the situation in Laos in connection w ith Cuba. Zhou said that “it w ould not be bad if it becom es a little m ore strenuous.” In other w ords, Laos could be a response to recent u.s. actions in the W estern hem isphere. Zhou insisted that the Soviets be firm in theứ positions on the international conference and agreed on conces­ sions to the B ritish only if all Soviet proposals w ere accepted. O therw ise it w ould be better to stall.136 Such view s w ere m et w ith full understanding in Hanoi. China and the DRV w ere in agreem ent about conditions for a cease-fire in Laos. They both thought that the cease-fire should be negotiated by the w arring Laotian parties. N either the tw o cochairs nor the ICC could order o r im pose a cease-fire; the cochairs could only appeal to the Laotians to cease hostilities.137 Furtherm ore, B eijing and H anoi insisted that the ICC be perm itted in Laos only

Crisis in Laos

after im position o f die cease fire, 138 for they both feared that, once in Laos, die ICC could check on the im plem entation o f the cease-fire and prevent the Pathet Lao from violating it w ith im punity.159 These dem ands w ere antithetical to the W estern requirem ents that the cease-fire should be im posed before die confer­ ence and should be verified by the ICC. M oscow’s attem pts to find a com prom ise to these and related issues evidendy delayed the Soviet response to the B ritish proposals in A pril. The Soviets m ight also have been w aiting for a firsthand account to be received during the visit to the USSR o f Souvanna Phoum a and Souphanouvong, w ho w ere there on A pril 16-21.160 In this light, the assertion o f M arek Thee, a m em ber o f the Polish del­ egation to the ICC, that the Soviet governm ent did not possess a correct under­ standing o f Laotian realities and had not consulted w ith the Chinese and N orth V ietnam ese on the IC C ’s tasks cannot be accepted as com pletely reliable.161 Consultations am ong the Soviet U nion, C hina, and N orth Vietnam , w ith die in­ volvem ent o f the Laotians, took place throughout A pril and covered the range o f issues concerning settlem ent in Laos; and the K rem lin had sufficient infor­ m ation about the opinions o f its A sian allies. It is also unlikely that the Soviets w ere deluded about developm ents in Southeast A sia. It is therefore unclear why D eputy Foreign M inister Pushkin was so optim istic in his conversation w ith the Polish ICC delegation that arrived in M oscow for prior consultations w ith So­ viet com rades. M arek Thee reported that Pushkin offered “a rather sim plistic form ula for the initial tasks o f the Com m ission” and suggested that the confer­ ence on Laos “w ould last no longer than six w eeks.” 162 It is possible that Pushkin w as expressing Soviet w ishful thinking and the desire to settle the con­ flict in Laos as soon as possible. In any case, on A pril 24, the Soviet U nion joined G reat B ritain in issuing die cochairs’ m essages that appealed to the three parties in Laos to cease hostilities, invited the ICC to reassem ble, and proposed that the interested parties gather at a conference.163 This opened the final stage o f preparation for the fourteenpow er conference on Laos. The prim ary objective for the Soviet leaders in late A pril was to confirm that the hostilities in Laos w ould be over by the tim e the ICC delegation arrived there. The dates proposed by Pham Van Dong, M ay 5 -6 ,164 did not satisfy the Soviets, especially in light o f the tw o B ritish w arnings that any further m ilitary m oves by the Pathet Lao w ould endanger the chances o f the conference and that the cease-fire should becom e effective at once.165 M oscow pressed Hanoi for an earlier deadline, not later than M ay 3 -4 .166 The N orth V ietnam ese conceded, and the m ilitary operation they had begun together w ith the Pathet Lao on A pril 11 was successfully com pleted by 8:00 a.m . on M ay 3 ,1961. Pathet Lao forces supported by the N orth V ietnam ese by that tim e controlled the provinces o f Sam

Crisis In Laos

N eua, Phong Saly, X ieng Khuang, a large part o f Luang Prabang, the M ain o f Jars, and highw ays 7 ,8 ,9 , and 12.167 Finally on M ay 11 the three delegations representing the w arring Laotian groups convened in the schoolhouse at the village o f Ban Namone for their first m eeting.168 This m eeting, although it w as m arked m ore by its cordial atm o­ sphere than by any form al agreem ent, justified the ICC report to die cochairs that a g en u al de facto cease-fire existed.169 The ICC report elim inated a signif­ icant obstacle to the opening o f the conference in Geneva. In the m eantim e, the Soviets held last-m inute preparatory talks w ith th ev al­ lies in order to w ork out a coordinated Com m unist position at the conference. A t the talks scheduled for M ay 9, because M oscow w anted to m ake sure that the principal points o f the Soviet position coincided w ith those o f the Chinese and N orth V ietnam ese, the Soviet Foreign M inistry planned to query its allies: W hat do the A sian Com m unist delegations regard as the principal task o f the interna­ tional conference on Laos? Do they agree w ith the objectives form ulated by the Soviets, for exam ple, the restoration o f peace in Laos, the independence and neutrality o f Laos w ith full guarantees for the interests o f the Pathet Lao? W hat issues should be discussed by die conference and w hat m ust be left to the Lao­ tians? In theừ preparatory talks, the Com m unist delegations w ere also to discuss certain provisions o f the declaration on the neutrality o f Laos, which tile Soviet U nion w as going to present in G eneva.170 A lthough the records o f these prepara­ tory talks have not been made available to the author, the Chinese view s on the eve o f the G eneva conference on Laos, w hich w ere generally shared— except for som e nuances—by the N orth V ietnam ese, are in an aide-m ém oire delivered to the Far East D epartm ent o f the Soviet Foreign M inistry by the PRC em bassy in M oscow. In it, the Chinese governm ent expressed its general agreem ent w ith the Soviet opinion that it was necessary to use “to the end” the favorable condi­ tions that existed at that tim e for guaranteeing the independence and neutrality o f Laos and, sim ultaneously, to do their best in defending the interests o f the “national patriotic and popular dem ocratic forces in Laos.” H ie C hinese be­ lieved that sufficient conditions existed for the successful im plem entation o f this task: the U nited States had suffered its third defeat in the East (K orea and tile G eneva conference on Indochina w ere the first tw o); the progressive forces in Laos had achieved im pressive victory; and the socialist cam p together w ith na­ tional dem ocratic m ovem ents in A sia, A frica, and Latin A m erica enjoyed supe­ riority over the im perialists. The Chinese felt that these favorable conditions should be used for a “gradual revolutionizing o f this region.” But because the victory o f the progressive forces in Laos had not yet been consolidated, the C hi­ nese conceded that, “it w as necessary, basing on tactical considerations, to strive for a peaceful situation in Laos, even a tem porary one.” 171

Crisis In Laos

Thus the C hinese repeated their previous argum ents concerning settlem ent in Laos. They continued to regard the G eneva conference on Laos only as an in­ strum ent to strengthen the NLHX positions and to guarantee its future dom ina­ tion o f Laotian politics. Hence B eijing’s prim ary objective a t the conference w ould be the establishm ent o f the neutrality and independence o f Laos “w ith the purpose o f helping the progressive forces o f Laos to develop further w ith the re­ liance on theữ ow n resources.” The Chinese advised their Com m unist allies to pay the m ost attention to the guarantees o f noninterference in the internal affairs o f Laos because it w as such interference on the part o f the U nited States that af­ te r Ỉ9S 4 becam e the principal m ethod o f underm ining the G eneva agree­ m ents.172 A ccordingly, B eijing— unlike M oscow—rejected A ustrian neutrality as a m odel for Laos on the grounds that such neutrality “could ham per the de­ velopm ent o f revolutionary forces” in L aos.173 Because the consolidation o f the Pathet Lao’s positions w as upperm ost in the m inds o f the Chinese (and N orth V ietnam ese) at the conference, they w ere not in a hurry, as w ere the Soviets, to reach an agreem ent on Laos w ithin six w eeks. M oreover, they w ere prepared to halt negotiations and return to arm ed struggle w henever the situation in G eneva o r in Laos appeared propitious. The C hinese deputy prem ier and foreign m inister, Chen Y i, w ho headed the PRC delegation at the conference, reaffirm ed these view s during his stopover in M oscow on the w ay to G eneva.174 The Soviets could not agree w ith som e o f the positions o f B eijing and Hanoi. The Soviets w ere concerned over approaching Southeast A sia as a w eak link in the capitalist chain that should be revolutionized. The Soviets w ere critical o f the C hinese adm ission th at arm ed struggle could possibly be resum ed in L aos.175 The K rem lin, how ever, concluded that the differences in die view s on Laos o f the Com m unist pow ers w o e not about principle, and som e o f diem could be reconciled w ith the Soviet position. On other issues the Soviet delega­ tion w ould rem ain aloof, neither supporting nor rejecting them .176 M oscow hoped that in the course o f the negotiations the Soviet delegates w ould prevail over th en C hinese and N orth V ietnam ese allies and advance Soviet ideas about the setdem ent. D irectives to the Soviet delegation therefore advised paying “special attention to the m aintenance o f perm anent contacts and consultations w ith the delegations o f the PRC, die DRV, and the PPR [Polish People’s Re­ public].” 177 A dhering to these directives proved to be a difficult task, one that fell upon the shoulders o f D eputy Foreign M inister G eorgii Pushkin, w ho had to w age a tw o-front struggle throughout the conference—trying to w in over the rivals as w ell as the allies. O ne m ight w onder w hich front w as the m ore exhausting.

8. Baek to Geneva Strange sight this Congress! destined to unite A ll th a t's incongruous, aU th a t's opposite.

George Byron The Age o f Bronze, XVI, 1,2

T h e Soviet delegation w ent to G eneva w ith firm instructions to use “to the end” favorable conditions to settle the Laotian crisis on the basis o f “m utually acceptable decisions” that w ould facilitate the “restoration o f peace and calm in Laos” and guarantee tile “real independence and neutrality o f that country.” The delegation w as also told to “do its best so as to guarantee the interests o f the na­ tional patriotic and national dem ocratic forces o f Laos.” 1 C onditions seem ed to be favorable indeed, the Soviet diplom ats soon confirm ed. M oscow w as w ell aw are that there w as no unity o f view s am ong the U nited States, G reat B ritain, and France on the m ethods o f settlem ent2 The Soviets learned that Paris and London w ere apprehensive o f W ashington’s plans to use arm ed force in Laos and w ere m ore inclined to find a peaceful means to resolve the Laotian crisis. The Ư.S. position had likew ise undergone significant change in the m onths pre­ ceding the conference, and K ennedy’s determ ination to send u.s. troops to Southeast A sia was not as firm as Eisenhow er’s. M oscow received signals that W ashington regarded Laos as a “lost position” and w as not opposed to neutral­ ization o f Laos, o r even its partition.3 In fact, the K ennedy adm inistration did not exclude the division o f Laos as a com prom ise solution during the course o f negotiations, and the u.s. delegation at G eneva w as so instructed.4 Secretary o f State D ean Rusk regarded such a so­ lution “a better outcom e than unity under leadership responsive to the Commu­ nists.”3 T o the Soviets, w ho had already tested this in B erlin, K orea, and V iet­ nam , p artitio n w ould also not be an unacceptable outcom e o f the G eneva conference. O n the eve o f his sum m it w ith President K ennedy in V ienna, K hrushchev confided to his C zechoslovak friends that a partitioned Laos could

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be advantageous to the socialist cam p and to the Laotian revolutionary forces; in his w ords, such a solution w as profitable in the long run. “O n the one hand,” the Soviet leader reasoned, “the A m ericans w ill once again unm ask them selves before the w hole w orld as an international gendarm e. A nd, secondly, the revo­ lutionary forces w ill consolidate and strengthen th en position inside the coun­ try. Then we w ill see w hat happens later.”6 A lthough at first all the conference’s m ajor participants shared th en desire to settle the crisis in Laos as soon as possible, several issues prevented them from gathering at the Palais des N ations in G eneva on M ay 12,1961, as scheduled. First was a controversy over representation at the conference. The Soviets and th en allies insisted that all three contending forces in Laos, including the Pathet Lao, be equally represented in G eneva. The W estern delegations objected to the Pathet Lao’s adm ission to the conference because participation w ould im ply its de facto recognition. They suggested instead an em pty seat for Laos, w ith the Lao groups coining to it when called upon to speak.7 This proposal w as abso­ lutely unacceptable to the Com m unist pow ers, w hich had to defend the interests o f theữ Laotian allies. Foreign M inister A ndrei Grom yko pointed out to Secre­ tary o f State Rusk that the “Pathet Lao after all w ere real Lao forces” and called his counterpart to look at the m ap o f Laos to convince him self.8 Rusk conceded only that the delegates from the Laotian factions w ere representatives from (not of) Laos, but since W ashington did not w ant to appear to be the force that w ould w reck the conference before it even started, the u.s. delegation had to give in. A lthough it seem ed now that all obstacles to the conference had been re­ m oved, the Soviets unexpectedly encountered problem s inside theừ ow n cam p. The Chinese firm ly opposed assigning to India the task o f proposing that the USSR and G reat B ritain act as chairs o f the conference. A t the m eeting o f the four Com m unist delegations on M ay IS, the head o f the Chinese delegation, Foreign M inister C hen Y i, expressed his dissatisfaction that G rom yko had agreed w ith Lord Home, his B ritish counterpart, on this issue and dem anded that this task be carried out by a representative o f another country, not by V. K. Kr­ ishna M enon, the Indian delegate.9 A lthough unexpected, this Chinese dém arche was not a com plete surprise and reflected the fact that during the preceding tw o years relations betw een the tw o countries had w orsened and w ould soon lead to an arm ed conflict. H ow ever, the Chinese defended them selves by asserting that the G eneva conference on Laos w as m erely a continuation o f the previous conference o f 1954 and hence there w as no need for a new proposal about cochairs, w hich m ust rem ain the same. Counterargum ents by other delegations seem ed only to annoy Chen Y i, w ho was known for his hot tem per.10 He was especially upset by Polish foreign min­ ister Adam R apacki’s rem ark that the C hinese w ere overly preoccupied w ith

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form al, rather than political, considerations. Chen Yi accused the Poles o f ex­ cessive criticism o f C hina’s position during prelim inary negotiations in M oscow and declared that China did not recognize Poland’s right to assess Bei­ jin g ’s actions.11 The fire in the C hinese attack against the Poles w as probably aim ed prim ar­ ily at M oscow, perhaps as a w arning that the Chinese were not going to be tile com placent allies the Russians w ould like them to be. O ne day before, in a con­ versation w ith Grom yko, Chen Yi had spoken o f the im portance o f unity be­ tw een the Soviet U nion and China and suggested holding bilateral Soviet-Chinese consultations separately from sim ilar m eetings o f all the C om m unist delegations because, he said, “it is som etim es easier for die representatives o f the PRC and the USSR to com e to agreem ent separately, rather than in the pres­ ence o f representatives o f other socialist countries.’’12 Chen Y i’s outburst the next day m ay have dem onstrated that he believed this w as really the case. G rom yko w as obviously stunned by the w rangle betw een the allies but, never­ theless, rem ained adam ant in his position concerning India, and Chen Yi had to yield.13 The discussion at tile consultative m eeting o f the Com m unist delegations had dem onstrated that China w as determ ined to play one o f the leading roles at the G eneva conference and w as not prepared to yield easily to Soviet pressure. Ev­ erything including the size and com position o f the Chinese delegation— num­ bering som e fifty m en and women w ho occupied m ore seats in the spacious council cham ber o f the Palais des N ations than any other delegation14— was to prove the seriousness o f B eijing’s intentions. A ccordingly the Chinese w anted to have a voice in m ajor decisions m ade by the Soviet Union on behalf o f other Com m unist delegations. For exam ple, in his conversation w ith G rom yko, C hen Yi expressed C hina’s desire to be acquainted w ith the draft o f the declaration on the neutrality o f Laos, which the Soviet delegation was planning to present at one o f the first sessions o f the conference in order to have an opportunity to m ake a necessary revisions in this and other docum ents.13 The Soviet foreign m inister had to agree, although reluctantly, w hile he referred to the lack o f tim e rem aining before the opening o f the conference. Tw o days later the C hinese delegation presented its proposals concerning the Soviet drafts. In addition to C hinese suggestions about international control over the introduction o f arm s and m ilitary equipm ent into Laos and over future general elections, the Chinese insisted on the inclusion o f the requirem ent that all Guom indang troops be withdraw n from the territory o f Laos. Rem nants o f Chiang K aishek’s units had operated in the Laos-Burm a border area ever since they w ere driven out o f Yunnan by the Com m unist forces in 1949. They w ere prim arily engaged in fanning and opium sm uggling, but occasionally these

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troops conducted operations against C hina in collaboration w ith Taiw anese and u.s. intelligence agencies.16 C om m unist China w as o f course concerned by the presence o f enem y forces in the close vicinity o f its b o rd a s and w as determ ined to elim inate them by m eans o f international agreem ents. The Soviet point o f view , w hich w as expounded to die C hinese deputy for­ eign m inister, Zhang H anfu, by the deputy head o f the Soviet delegation, G eorgii Pushkin, held that the inclusion o f such a provision in the text o f the G eneva agreem ents proposed by the Com m unist delegations “could only com­ plicate the reaching o f the agreem ent" Pushkin said the W est could use it as a pretext to refuse to settle the Laotian question.17 For the Soviets, die issue o f G uom indang troops represented an unnecessary irritation to the U nited States and could be om itted; but Pushkin encountered strong resistance from the C hi­ nese, who decided to teach Pushkin and, by im plication, M oscow, a lesson in revolutionary vigilance. “I w ould like to say,” Zhang H anfii stated, “that in our opinion in the course o f the preparation o f the draft o f the agreem ent it is not ex­ pedient to guess w hether it is acceptable to the U nited States and other W estern countries o r n o t In any e v e n t the Chinese delegation is guided not by these con­ siderations, but by its desire to guarantee peace in Southeast A sia.” 18 ư the U nited States w anted to w reck the conference, Zhang Hanfri continued, they could find m any pretexts, not necessarily the G uom indang bands. A nother m em ber o f the C hinese delegation, Q iao G uanhua, even presented the elim ina­ tion o f Chiang K aishek’s units in Laos as a part o f the struggle against im peri­ alism . Pushkin w as evidently taken aback by the intransigence o f the C hinese. He retorted that the Soviet people need not be persuaded about the necessity o f struggle against im perialism . ‘T o m ake the W estern countries to agree on the agreem ent advantageous to the socialist countries, to the dem ocratic forces o f Laos," the Soviet diplom at argued, “is not only struggle, but also victory. The question is how to w age this struggle, w hich tactical line to follow .” From this perspective, the issue o f Guom indang troops was counterproductive because the situation m ight arise that all other provisions o f the agreem ents w ould be ac­ ceptable to the W est except for this particular issue. In that case, the Com m unist delegations w ould have to abandon it, w hich w ould prove to be politically dis­ advantageous. 19 The Soviets felt that because one o f the articles o f their draft re­ quired the w ithdraw al o f all foreign m ilitary personnel from Laos, the question o f Chiang K aishek’s units w as covered. This debate again dem onstrated how different w ere die approaches to the Laotian problem in M oscow and in B eijing. W hile the Soviets did not consider Laos a vital issue to thefr foreign policy and w ere prepared to be satisfied w ith an A ustria-like neutral Laos or even w ith a divided country in order to elim inate

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die danger o f a global conflict involving the Soviet U nion and die U nited States, the Chinese w anted a friendly country on theừ borders and guarantees that it w ould not be again transform ed into a future springboard for U .S. aggression against the People’s R epublic. The C hinese did not regard neutralization as a perm anent solution to the Laotian problem and instead hoped for the augm enta­ tion o f theừ influence in Laos.20 These considerations lay behind C hina’s refusal to accept partition as a pos­ sible solution to the Laotian question. In an aide-m ém oire sent to M oscow on M ay 10, the C hinese leaders argued against both die com plete integration o f the provinces under the Pathet Lao’s control and the division o f Laos. The C hinese considered integration under Pathet Lao control not to die advantage o f the Pathet Lao; but division, the Chinese thought, w ould “tie our hands.”21 B eijing w ould not w ant even a part o f Laos to fall under the control o f the B oun O um -Phoum i N osavan governm ent because o f the U .S. presence there. That portion o f Laos, along w ith South V ietnam and Thailand, w ould create a coali­ tion o f enem y regim es w ith unpredictable consequences on the southern C hi­ nese borders. By contrast, a neutral Laos under the governm ent o f Souvanna Phoum a, even w ith the participation o f die Savannakhet group, w ould be m ore favorable fo r China. T he discordance o f Soviet and C hinese view s on die settlem ent o f the conflict in Laos w as influenced by die grow ing estrangem ent betw een the tw o countries, w hich broke into an open rift after the tw enty-second CPSU congress in O cto­ ber 1961, w hile the G eneva conference w as under way. B ut despite heated dis­ cussions betw een the Soviets and the C hinese on the eve o f the G eneva confer­ ence and som etim es during its course, never did die conflict o f the Com m unist parties prevent the cooperation o f die tw o delegations in Geneva, at least to the extent visible to other participants. For exam ple, A rthur L all, a m em ber o f the Indian delegation, w rote in his book on die 1961 G eneva conference: “W hile later revelations showed that already die ideological and other differences be­ tw een the C hinese and the Soviets w ere great, neither the C hinese nor the Sovi­ ets, by theừ w ords o r actions, gave the slightest indication o f any divergence o f view s in regard to the problem s before die conference. If the C hinese took, in general, a m ore forthright and extrem e position than the Soviets, the latter backed diem up, o r at any rate never uttered a w ord in opposition to the Peking governm ent"22 Such harm ony stem m ed m ainly from the fact that both M oscow and B eijing w anted to see the Laotian conflict settled, notw ithstanding their differences on the w ays and m ethods o f the settlem ent. T o achieve th eữ overall goal, they closely coordinated their steps at the conference and discussed various actions during bilateral negotiations as w ell as at periodic m eetings o f all the Commu­

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nist delegations. In fact, the clash o f view s that occurred at the first such m eet­ ings was not at all characteristic o f the gatherings o f Com m unist diplom ats. U sually the Soviets and the Chinese peacefully found com m on ground in their approach to the current conference issues. Thus die deadlock that arose in m idM ay was broken; and on M ay 16 Prince Sihanouk o f Cam bodia, at w hose ini­ tiative fourteen governm ents gathered in G eneva to discuss the question o f Laos, opened the conference at 5:00 p.m . Y et it w as obvious from the beginning that die going w ould not be easy. A t the opening session, contrary to the agreed schedule, Chen Yi m ade a speech in w hich he identified the U nited States as the m ain culprit in die crisis in Laos. C hen’s speech contained eighteen direct references to the U nited States and m ost o f them w ere highly critical.23 Everyone at the Palais des N ations under­ stood that this attack could not go unansw ered by D ean Rusk, and the next m orning die U .S. secretary o f state, in a m ore subde speech, condem ned C hina as the m ain threat to peace in Southeast A sia.24 Thus, a confrontation betw een die U nited States and the PRC w as em erging at die conference; it w ould not im ­ prove the prospects for a settlem ent o f die crisis. In addition, W ashington w as not satisfied w ith the situation on die batdefield in Laos. A lthough the ICC had reported before the conference that an effective cease-fire had been established betw een the w arring parties and negotiations at Ban Nam one had taken place, sporadic fighting continued. The Pathet Lao and neutralist forces concentrated th eừ efforts on the elim ination o f pro-N osavan strongholds at th en rear. Tow ard the end o f M ay, u.s. intelligence reported heavy Pathet Lao attacks in the area o f Ban Padong, w hich was held by M eo tribes loyal to the Boun Oum governm ent.25 A s a result, the U .S. delegation in­ sisted on discussing the conditions o f the cease-fire in Laos and the control over it. The Com m unist delegations, on the other hand, w anted to initiate discussion o f general issues o f Laotian neutrality and its guarantees. The tone w as set by G rom yko’s speech on the sam e day as R usk’s reply to Chen. The Soviet foreign m inister presented to the conference the Soviet drafts o f a declaration on the neutrality o f Laos and o f an agreem ent on the w ithdraw al o f foreign troops and m ilitary personnel from the territory o f Laos and the m andate o f the ICC.26 Re­ flecting the Soviet desire to m ove the conference from a propaganda exercise to a discussion o f questions o f substance, G rom yko’s proposals encountered resis­ tance from W estern delegations that suspected M oscow and its A sian allies o f supporting the Pathet Lao’s offensive. H ow ever, the Soviets too w ere concerned w ith the skirm ishes on the battle­ field and w ith their effect on the negotiations. A nd the Chinese generally shared this concern. A t the m eeting o f the C om m unist delegations on M ay 23, G rom yko insisted on not giving the W esterners a pretext to accuse them o f a

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lack o f desire to observe the cease-fire.27 Chen Yi agreed w ith his Soviet col­ league and recom m ended advising the Laotian “friends” not to undertake new m ilitary operations. “W e could cause accusations,” Chen asserted, “that here, in Geneva, we are dem anding m eetings and a discussion o f the question o f peace­ ful settlem ent in Laos, w hile in Laos itself, our friends initiate m ilitary actions. O f course, w hen rebels a tta ck . . . it is necessary to repulse them . Y et, at one’s own initiative, one should not create m ilitary conflicts.” The Chinese m inister also called for flexible tactics.28 Soviet diplom ats in Southeast A sia follow ed the recom m endations o f theữ Com m unist colleagues in G eneva and tried to warn theữ clients in the region against drastic actions on the battlefield w hile the negotiations w ere under way. They addressed theừ requests to the N orth V ietnam ese, who w ere really re­ sponsible for planning and conducting operations in Laos, including the opera­ tion at B an Padong. An official o f the Soviet em bassy in Laos, A. A. Skoryukov, m et on June 4 w ith the DRV chief m ilitary adviser in Laos, G eneral Thau Tian, and pointed to the necessity for prudence in conducting operations against proN osavan troops “so as to avoid giving an opportunity to the U nited States to use them w ith the purpose o f w recking the G eneva conference.”29 In addition to concern over the prospects o f the G eneva conference, M oscow evidently kept in m ind the adverse effect that such violations could have on the m eeting betw een Khrushchev and Kennedy that occurred at that tim e in Vienna. Laos w as not the only subject on the agenda o f the V ienna sum m it although the W est hoped that the m eeting o f the Soviet and u.s. leaders w ould help fa­ cilitate the negotiations in Geneva. The possibility o f such a m eeting had been raised in the first com m unications betw een M oscow and W ashington soon after K ennedy's election as Ư.S. president. In his letter to Khrushchev o f February 22,1961, the new president expressed his desire to m eet w ith the Soviet leader “fo r an inform al exchange o f views” on basic problem s that existed betw een the tw o countries, as w ell as on issues o f the international situation.30 Khrushchev accepted this proposal in his letter o f M ay 16 and suggested V ienna as a possi­ ble venue fo r the sum m it and June 3 -4 as the d ates.31 In the sam e letter K hrushchev nam ed the situation in Laos as one o f the subjects for the leaders’ negotiations, placing it ahead o f the problem s o f disarm am ent and G erm any. A nd, as Pushkin did during negotiations w ith the Polish representatives to the ICC, K hrushchev expressed his desire to see the Laotian problem resolved, as soon as possible, so that “from the m om ent o f our m eeting w ith you we could w ith pleasure state that the settlem ent o f the problem o f Laos had becom e a fa c t”32 K hrushchev’s statem ent in his letter to Kennedy w as how ever in striking con­ trast w ith K hrushchev’s later intim ation to the C zechoslovak leaders w ith whom

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he m et near B ratislava on his w ay to the A ustrian capital. Speaking (Ml die ques­ tion o f Laos, the Soviet leader stated that “w e w ill hardly com e to agreem ent on this question.. . . W e could not agree on th eữ dem ands.“ H e claim ed: “T his w ould m ean the negation o f successes achieved by the revolutionary forces. N eutral states, such as India, Cam bodia, and others, are afraid o f tile quick ad­ vancem ent o f the revolutionary forces and have m ade up their m ind virtually against US.” 33 Such a change o f m ood evidently reflected K hrushchev’s disap­ pointm ent w ith the lack o f success at G eneva and W estern dem ands fo r im pos­ ing strict control over the cease-fire in Laos. Com pared w ith the optim istic and m ilitant predictions about G erm any that he confided to the Czechs at tile sam e m eeting, K hrushchev's assessm ent o f die prospects o f the Laotian discussion looked defeatist, especially considering his readiness to accept the partition o f Laos. B ut this defeatism could only be explained by the fact that tile Soviet leader w as m ore interested in a favorable solution to the G erm an question, w hich he considered o f prim ary im portance, and was prepared to accept— how ­ ever grudgingly—any kind o f palliative for the problem o f Laos. The long ses­ sions he devoted to the discussion o f various actions by the Soviet Union in G er­ m any and the rather scarce synopsis o f choices on tile Laotian problem only em phasized K hrushchev's “im balance o f interests.” W hile the Soviet leader w as skeptical about prospects for agreem ent w ith the Ư.S. president, Kennedy cherished a hope that the sum m it w ith Khrushchev would help create a fram ew ork for Soviet-U .S. relations in the future. This hope was based on his overall approach to international politics. A ccording to A rthur Schlesinger Jr., the U .S. president: saw the w orld as in a state o f uncontrollable change, rushing in di­ rections no one could foresee. The equilibrium o f force, he believed, w as now roughly in balance betw een the U nited States and the So­ viet U n i o n . . . ; and the overriding need, he felt, w as to prevent di­ rect confrontations betw een R ussian and A m erican pow er in the chaotic tim e ahead. He intended to propose, in effect, a standstill in the cold w ar so that neither great nuclear state, in the inevitable com ­ petition around the planet, w ould find itself com m itted to actions w hich w ould risk its essential security, threaten the existing balance o f force or endanger w orld peace.34 In his desire to discuss w ith K hrushchev international problem s purely on the grounds o f geopolitics, Kennedy overlooked the ideological com ponent o f the Soviet leader’s thinking, which rem ained strong regardless o f his pragm atic in­ clinations. Kennedy neglected the substantial analyses o f the K rem lin’s views m ade by u.s. am bassador to M oscow, Llew ellyn Thom pson, a “pragm atic ide­

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alist” w ho developed intim ate relations w ith Soviet officials.35 Thom pson w rote in one o f his dispatches designed to educate the new U .S. adm inistration about die Soviet U nion and its leaders: Khrushchev probably m ost pragm atic and least dogm atic o f all, but he basically as devout believer as any. He is reported once to have said som ething to the effect that if Com m unism did not dem onstrate its superiority and prevail throughout w orld, his life w ould have lost its m eaning___ A s they [the Soviet leaders] look around w orld they can find plenty o f evidence w hich they can use to justify to them ­ selves their belief in class struggle. They pose everything in these term s and do not accept that our support o f rightist o r reactionary governm ents m otivated by our fear [of] theừ attem pt [to] obtain w orld dom ination for pow er reasons, and instead see it in term s o f e x p lo ita s banding together to m aintain exploited in subservience.36 T he discussions betw een K ennedy and K hrushchev in V ienna ju stifie d Thom pson’s opinion. W henever the Ư.S. president raised die subject o f the bal­ ance o f fa c e s in the w orld and the necessity fo r both countries to avoid upset­ ting it, the Soviet leader referred to the facts that proved, in his view , that it was the U nited States that tended to disrupt the w orld order to prevent tile spreading o f Com m unist ideas around the w orld. Khrushchev even lectured his u.s. coun­ terpart on the futility o f any efforts to build a dam on the way o f ideas. H e ac­ cused W ashington o f supporting “rotten and anti-popular” regim es in A sia and Latin A m erica,37 criticized u.s. actions against Cuba and C hina,38 and justified liberation w ars as “sacred w ars” supported by the Soviet U nion.39 D iscussions on B erlin and disarm am ent w ere likew ise unproductive.40 The u.s. president left the A ustrian capital “tense and tired,’*41 disappointed w ith the results o f his m eetings w ith Khrushchev. The only outcom e that m ight have alleviated K ennedy’s frustration w as an agreem ent on Laos. It turned out that neither the U nited States nor the Soviet U nion w anted to be involved in the situation in that country. Khrushchev bluntly told his u.s. counterpart that the “Soviet U nion has no vested interest in Laos, either political or econom ic, or o f any other nature. That country is far from Soviet borders.” Khrushchev sub­ scribed to K ennedy’s statem ent that the “U nited States w ishes a governm ent in Laos which w ould not be involved either w ith the U nited States o r w ith the USSR, but w ould rather be genuinely neutral” and spoke in favor o f finding a solution.42 H ow ever, he brushed aside U .S. com plaints about violations o f the cease-fire and insisted that other questions should not be delayed because o f this. H e also rejected the idea o f the ICC becom ing “a kind o f supergoveram ent ad­ m inistering the country” but assured K ennedy that the “USSR w ill exert efforts

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to solve the Laotian question.”43 Both leaders agreed that theừ countries “should use theừ influence so as to bring about an agreem ent am ong the forces partici­ pating in the Laotian struggle.”44 Y et reaching that agreem ent proved difficult to accom plish because the forces involved in the Laotian crisis w ere beyond the direct com m and o f the leaders o f the tw o great pow ers. Fighting in the area o f Ban Padong w ent unim peded, all adm onitions o f Soviet diplom ats notw ithstanding. The Left continued theữ at­ tacks and occupied the stronghold on June 6. This w as a m ajor setback for the governm ent forces, and the fall o f Ban Padong led to a crisis at the G eneva con­ ference. W estern delegations regarded the event as a flagrant violation o f the cease-fire, and they interrupted negotiations. The conference was suspended for several days. The u.s. representatives held M oscow responsible “because o f its role in supplying PL [the Pathet Lao] by aừ w ith m ilitary supplies and equip­ m ent.”45 By suspending the negotiations they w anted to im press on the Soviet governm ent that pressure on its allies was necessary in order to stop the fighting and continue the talks. B ut M oscow did not possess enough leverage to dictate its w ill in Laos. M arek Thee, a Polish m em ber o f the ICC in Laos w ho was a w itness to w hat was happening in 1961-1962 in that country, asserted that “the Indochinese w ere m asters o f th e ừ ow n strategy.”46 M ost decisions and plans fo r L aos w ere w orked out in Hanoi. N ot only w ere the N orth V ietnam ese responsible for m il­ itary actions in Laos, they w ere also directly involved in com bat operations against Phoum i N osavan and his troops. By m id-sum m er 1961, there w ere about eight thousand N orth V ietnam ese troops grouped into thirteen infantry battal­ ions and one artillery unit in Laos.47 These units o f the PAV w ere the vanguard o f the Pathet Lao arm y that com prised a force o f fifteen thousand arm ed w ith Soviet and Chinese w eapons.48 Hanoi did not conceal from M oscow its role and contribution o f troops to the fighting in Laos. The DRV chief m ilitary adviser in Laos, G eneral M an, revealed to a Soviet diplom at that “all the victories over the Boun Oum arm ies have been achieved by US. The royal troops [under the com ­ m and o f the Souvanna Phoum a governm ent] and the Pathet Lao arm ies have served US but a cover, that is, a m ask.”49 The N orth V ietnam ese did not think highly o f the fighting abilities o f theữ Laotian com rades-in-arm s, whom they characterized as afraid o f artillery fire and hand-to-hand com bat, slow in rushing to the attack, and fast to retreat. There w ere even accidents when the Pathet Lao soldiers w ho rem ained behind the ad­ vancing PAV units shot at theữ backs.50 Because they w ere carrying the m ain burden o f the com bat operations in Laos, the N orth V ietnam ese had the upper hand in determ ining strategy w ith re­ spect to the Laotian crisis. They w ere in charge o f all m ilitary, political, and eco­

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nom ic questions. Hanoi had its people in not only the Laotian arm y but also in adm inistrative organs o f the provinces controlled by the Pathet Lao. Pathet Lao leaders undertook no action w ithout first consulting their N orth V ietnam ese m entors.51 And the advice from the DRV w as often at variance w ith w hat was conceived in M oscow. A ccording to the Polish representatives to the ICC in Laos, Hanoi tended to regard the Laotian crisis in isolation from general developm ents in the w orld and from the process o f Soviet détente w ith the W est. On the other hand, the N orth V ietnam ese closely linked developm ents in Laos to w hat was happening in South Vietnam . One o f the highest DRV officials openly drew the attention o f M arek Thee to tins relationship, claim ing that events in Laos “influence fa­ vorably the rise o f revolutionary m ovem ent in South Vietnam and w ill help the earliest unification o f Vietnam.” The N orth V ietnam ese em phasized that “w e m ust by all m eans help Laos and, first o f all, patriotic forces o f Laos as the m a­ jo r driving force o f these events.”52 M oscow could not but be concerned about such an approach by the V iet­ nam ese friends. W hereas M oscow regarded the settlem ent in Laos as a neces­ sary precondition fo r the stabilization o f the situation in Indochina, H anoi w anted to use the Laotian crisis to instigate precisely the processes the Soviets w anted to prevent. The N orth V ietnam ese w ere not com pletely opposed to the solution o f the problem o f Laos, but they supported only a solution that allow ed them to continue theừ activities in South Vietnam . Consequently, H anoi w as skeptical about w hat success at the G eneva confer­ ence m eant and favored delays in the diplom atic negotiations, w hich they be­ lieved w ould help consolidate the NLHX position in the country. DRV leaders insisted on the retention by the Pathet Lao o f the territories under its control and upheld dem ands that key positions in a future coalition governm ent go to its rep­ resentatives. They denied the possibility o f a durable reconciliation betw een the w arring p arties in Laos and adm itted only the prospect o f a tem porary arm istice.53 The N orth V ietnam ese therefore did not display m uch enthusiasm about the outcom e o f the V ienna sum m it betw een the Soviet and u.s. leaders. They claim ed that the K hrushchev-K ennedy agreem ent “did not change actual priorities or the long-range appraisal o f events.”54 As a result, the news about the understanding reached in V ienna did not deter the Pathet Lao and theừ N orth V ietnam ese allies from the capture o f Ban Padong, which caused such dam age at the G eneva talks. The situation was even m ore com plicated for M oscow because the Chinese shared m ost o f H anoi’s view s on the Laotian settlem ent. Like H anoi, Beijing was suspicious about M oscow ’s inclination to com prom ise w ith W ashington. Even before the G eneva conference, Chen Yi w arned that C hina should be on

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the alert against the Soviet tendency for such a com prom ise.35 It is therefore not surprising that Chinese reaction to the V ienna sum m it was rather restrained. B eijing did not speak directly in support o f die Soviet U nion and, instead, tried to convey an im pression that nothing useful resulted from the K hrushchevK ennedy talks.36 The Soviet em bassy in the PRC attributed this attitude to B ei­ jing* s conviction that one should not negotiate w ith U .S. im perialism and to B ei­ jin g ’s desire to present itsetf as die m ost devoted revolutionary leader actively engaged in the class struggle. A t the sam e tim e, the Soviet em bassy adm itted that the Chinese m ight have been chagrined because they learned about the U .S.-Soviet sum m it from new spapers and w ere not inform ed o f it by Soviet leaders w ell in advance.37 This fact could not have helped good relations b e­ tw een the tw o Com m unist pow ers. The C hinese supported H anoi’s view on the expediency o f dragging out the negotiations in Geneva. Chen Yi raised this during his conversations w ith the Soviet leaders during a stopover in M oscow on his w ay back from Sw itzerland in early July.58 Chen said that the delay in the negotiations w as advantageous to the C om m unist pow ers because it provided an opportunity fo r strengthening the patriotic forces in Laos. He revealed Chinese plans to train the Pathet Lao troops in the m eantim e and concluded that even the resum ption o f hostilities in Laos w as also to the advantage o f the Com m unist pow ers because “it w ould give US an opportunity to drive out aggressors and rebels from the territory o f the coun­ try.”5’ A lthough Chen Yi claim ed that K hrushchev and G rom yko approved o f this approach, it is quite unlikely that they rem ained com placent about the m ilitant positions o f theứ A sian allies. T o the Soviets, the only justification fo r a delay o f the settlem ent in Laos was the Chinese foreign m inister’s reference to the need fo r tim e to consolidate the alliance betw een the Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phoum a60 and to form a coalition governm ent. A nd early July seem ed un­ prom ising for achieving these am bitions. O n June 22, 1961, the leaders o f the three factions in Laos— Souvanna Phoum a, B oun O um , and Souphanouvong— m et in Z urich and reached an agreem ent on the basic principles o f the future external and internal policy o f Laos as w ell as procedures for the form ation o f a governm ent o f national union. Participants in the G eneva conference regarded the Zurich m eeting as an im ­ portant step forw ard on the way to national reconciliation in Laos and the set­ tlem ent o f the crisis. The Zurich agreem ent did not lead to positive results, how­ ever. Instead, on the first o f July, the leader o f the rightist forces, Phoum i N osavan, declared in Bangkok that he doubted the success o f the negotiations betw een the w arring parties, and he provided inform ation about the m ilitary preparations o f his governm ent in case the talks failed and no solutions w ere

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reached.61 N osavan’s statem ent had its effect on die Pathet Lao. Souphanouvong, w ho had n ever been enthusiastic about a coalition w ith the rig h tist forces,62 only hardened his suspicion o f an agreem ent o f die opposing forces in Laos. W hile in M oscow, w here he w ent after Zurich, Souphanouvong rem ained unm oved by K hrushchev’s attem pts to convince him o f the need for a peaceful solution to the Laotian problem and, instead, he seem ed to follow a hard line w ith die Soviet leader.63 D uring his visit to B eijing, Souphanouvong openly fa­ vored m ore radical m ethods, declaring at a reception given by Zhou Enlai, “W e are proponents o f the faster realization o f progressive actions; to use the C hinese expression, w e are for ’great leaps forward*.”64 D eclarations like Souphanouvong’s, m ade by the Pathet Lao leaders w ith the support o f th e ứ C hinese and N orth V ietnam ese allies, not only dim m ed prospects fo r the form ation o f a coalition governm ent in Laos but also jeopar­ dized the existing cooperation betw een the NLHX and Souvanna Phoum a’s fac­ tion. H anoi’s distribution in Laos o f aid provided by die Com m unist countries, prim arily the Soviet U nion, also jeopardized cooperation. Starting in the spring o f 1961, M oscow received a constant flow o f com plaints from the Souvanna Phoum a governm ent about N orth V ietnam ese handling o f Soviet aid and its un­ even distribution am ong die governm ent troops and the Pathet Lao. The neu­ tralists suspected that Hanoi sent the bulk o f arm s and m aterials to the pro-Com m unist forces, w hile the rem ainder—not alw ays as good— w ent to them . Souvanna Phoum a him self raised this in his M ay 10 conversation w ith the So­ viet chargé d'affaires in Laos, V asilii C hivilyov, w hen he claim ed that his troops received little or nothing o f the Soviet shipm ents to Laos. “W e have understood from die conversation,” Chivilyov reported to M oscow, “that it w as the V iet­ nam ese w ho distribute aid and the bulk o f it is passed to the Pathet Lao.”63 W hen confronted, DRV officials referred to die difficulties w ith transportation, the lack o f sufficient m eans o f delivering aid, and the fact that the Pathet Lao took a m ore active part in com bat operations in Laos and accordingly needed m ore arm s and am m unition. Souphanouvong supported the N orth V ietnam ese logic: “There is nothing surprising,” reasoned the Red Prince, “that the governm ental forces have received less, since they are located predom inantly in the rear area and are not engaged in m ilitary actions. Besides, theữ num ber is less than the Pathet Lao troops.”66 N evertheless, com plaints continued and Soviet diplom ats soon discovered that H anoi had duped not only the neutralists but the Pathet Lao as w ell. Infor­ m ation provided to C hivilyov by leading m em bers o f the Souvanna Phoum a governm ent, K ham souk K eola and Sisoum ang, showed that the V ietnam ese kept m uch o f the Soviet aid for them selves w hile they sent to Laos outdated arm s and am m unition that belonged to tile PAV. For exam ple, the Kong Le

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troops received arm s that w ere used by the V ietm inh at the tim e o f D ienbienphu.67 C hivilyov’s inform ation was confirm ed by other sources. The C zech am ­ bassador to the DRV confided to his Soviet counterpart that “the V ietnam ese friends“ retained the w eapons delivered by Czechoslovakia specifically for Souvanna Phoum a and sent to Laos old foreign arm s. "The V ietnam ese do the sam e w ith other equipm ent,” confided the am bassador, including item s from the So­ viet U nion.68 M oscow stepped in to prevent the Souvanna Phoum a-Pathet Lao alliance from falling apart because o f the problem o f aid. K hrushchev him self touched upon this issue during his negotiations w ith Ho Chi M inh in A ugust 1961 in Pitzunda, near Sochi. He strongly criticized the N orth V ietnam ese approach and w arned the DRV leader about the consequences o f alienating Souvanna Phoum a. He bluntly said to Ho: “D epriving Souvanna Phoum a o f w eapons, you are playing into A m erican hands.” K hrushchev brushed aside H o Chi M inh’s excuses that the num ber o f the Pathet Lao troops exceeded those o f the govern­ m ent forces. "That is an arithm etical approach to the m atter,” K hrushchev re­ torted, “and it is absolutely inapplicable when politics is the question. In poli­ tics, it is necessary to consider phenom ena not from an arithm etical, but from a political, point o f view. W hat the V ietnam ese com rades are doing now frightens Souvanna Phouma. As a result o f such a policy, we have alm ost lost him .”69 The Soviet leader’s argum ent was further strengthened by a detailed A ugust 31, 1961, m em orandum to the C hinese and V ietnam ese friends on the problem o f Laos, w hich called the attention o f the Soviet allies to political errors com m it­ ted in the cooperation betw een the NLHX and the neutralists.70 The m em o charged that Souvanna Phoum a had received inadequate support, and it de­ m anded a reversal o f this treatm ent. M oscow again expressed its dissatisfaction w ith H anoi’s handling o f Soviet aid to Laos and cited exam ples o f its m ism an­ agem ent.71 Follow ing the Soviet m em orandum , a consultative conference was held in H anoi from Septem ber 22 to 25 that addressed the issues o f the alliance betw een the neutralists and the Pathet Lao as w ell as problem s o f Soviet aid to Laos. A t the conference, the N orth V ietnam ese and the representatives o f the NLHX con­ tinued expressing th en radical view s on the coalition governm ent, w hich they tended to regard as necessary only for a tem porary stabilization in the country; they continued to em phasize the developm ent o f guerrilla struggle. N everthe­ less, estim ated the Soviet diplom ats w ho attended, the discussions in Hanoi helped the Laotian friends determ ine "their attitude tow ard Souvanna Phoum a, Kong Le, [and] the form ation o f coalition governm ent w hich had not been con­ sistent and clear before.’’72 The Soviet em bassy reported to M oscow that, as a result o f the conference, the participants agreed w ith the Soviet view s on the

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questions under the discussion and occupied “generally correct positions.” The Soviet am bassador in the DRV, Suren Tovm asyan, stressed the need to follow the agreed policy in Laos, which was aim ed at the unity o f the NLHX and the neutralists. “It w as this agreed line,” rem inded Tovm asyan, “together w ith ren­ dering effective econom ic and m ilitary aid to Laos from our countries, as w ell as supporting Prince Souvanna Phoum a as the central figure capable o f rallying patriotic forces, that helped the patriotic forces achieve positive results at the first stage o f the struggle.”73 The Soviet am bassador once again called for the form ation o f a coalition governm ent at the earliest possible tim e; this reflected the preoccupation o f the Soviet leaders w ho believed the absence o f such a gov­ ernm ent w as the m ain stum bling block to the success o f the negotiations at G eneva. The G eneva conference by this tim e had long exceeded the duration o f six w eeks that had been anticipated by M oscow. For a prolonged period, partici­ pants in G eneva w ere unable to find solutions on procedural issues, that is, W hat should be negotiated first? The neutrality o f Laos or conditions o f cease-fire and control? The Soviet U nion and other Com m unist delegations insisted on dis­ cussing Laotian neutrality, especially because the Soviet draft o f the declaration on neutrality had been tabled during the first days o f the conference. The U nited States, in turn, was concerned w ith num erous violations o f the cease-fire in Laos and dem anded that the conference’s prim ary aim should be strengthening peace in Laos and clarifying the role o f the ICC. A lthough in the m eantim e the partic­ ipants did discuss Soviet proposals on neutrality, on the w ithdraw al o f foreign troops from Laos, and on the functions o f the ICC as w ell as proposals by France and India on the sam e issues, the deadlock rem ained unbroken. The Soviets suspected that u.s. intransigence on the question o f the priority o f the issues grew out o f W ashington’s desire to use the conference as an exposé o f the Com m unist countries’ lack o f cooperation on the settlem ent o f the Laos conflict. G eorgii Pushkin, w ho headed the Soviet delegation in the absence o f Foreign M inister Grom yko, confided to Zhang H anfu, w ho replaced Chen Yi at G eneva, that die A m ericans in the course o f discussions on the issues o f control w ere going to “pick US to pieces on the questions o f the cease-fire, the w ith­ draw al o f foreign troops, etc.”74 He believed that the Com m unist delegations should not budge from theữ position even though the negotiations m ight be transform ed as a result, “into a conversation betw een deaf m utes.”75 A t the sam e tim e, Pushkin spoke o f the need to prepare for the second phase o f the confer­ ence; thus he did not exclude som e eventual com prom ise. Pushkin him self provided the basis for this com prom ise. In a July 12 conver­ sation w ith his U .S. counterpart, w. A verell H arrim an, w ho headed the u.s. del­ egation, Pushkin suggested discussing proposals on neutrality and control as a

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"single entity" in the Older in w hich they appeared in the tabled drafts, w ith the provisions on w hich the delegates disagreed being put aside for further consid­ eration.76 Thus by m oving from one provision o f each docum ent to another and setting all disagreem ents “in one basket” for later bargaining the conference had a chance o f entering a “serious phase o f horse trading and com prom ise.”77 A fter discussing this proposal at form al m eetings o f the m ajor delegations, the tw o cochairs o f the conference prepared “Proposals o f die Co-Chairm en on the Procedure fo r Further W ork o f the C onference,” that w as read at the July 19 session. In addition to the announcem ent o f the com pletion o f the general dis­ cussion and the beginning o f a detailed consideration o f the draft proposals pre­ sented as a basis o f a settlem ent o f the Laotian crisis, the “Proposals” suggested holding “restricted m eetings” attended by only the heads o f delegations and th e ừ advisers and experts. O ther points o f the docum ent conform ed w ith Pushkin’s proposal to H anim an.78 Thus, thanks to the Soviet efforts, the conference participants finally m oved to a discussion o f questions o f substance, w hich took place throughout the fall o f 1961 at plenary and restricted sessions as w ell as during private m eetings o f the six delegations (B ritish, Soviet, U .S., C hinese, French, and Indian) and con­ fidential conversations betw een the heads o f delegations. Pushkin and H arrim an w ere especially active in engaging in inform al discussions o f controver­ sial issues during the second phase o f the G eneva conference. Pushkin reported to the collegium o f the Soviet Foreign M inistry that it w as during these con­ versations betw een the Soviet and u.s. representatives that agreem ents on m ost problem s w ere reached; they w ere then confirm ed at the m eetings o f other delegations.79 B oth the A m ericans and the Soviets dem onstrated a keen interest in how to guarantee the neutrality o f Laos. D uring a m eeting w ith Pushkin on Septem ber 12, H arrim an found out that—the preferences o f its A sian allies notw ithstand­ ing—M oscow did not object to the W estern kind o f neutrality based on the ex­ am ple o f Finland.80 Having conceded on this question, how ever, the Soviets continued to oppose the protection o f Laos by SEATO, w hich they regarded as an aggressive alliance. Pushkin paid no heed to H arrim an’s explanations that an agreem ent o f the parliam ents o f the m em ber states o f the bloc was required to discontinue this protection. Pushkin also rejected a com prom ise, suggested by H arrim an, that w ould perm it die Laotian governm ent to declare its rejection o f SEATO protection; SEATO m em bers w ould dien take the declaration into ac­ count and prom ise theừ noninterference in internal affairs o f Laos. Pushkin felt that such a com prom ise was not enough, and he stated that “if the U nited States really w ants an agreem ent on the Laotian question, it should revise its position” onSE A T O .81

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H arrim an expressed U .S. concern over the N orth V ietnam ese use o f Laotian territory for penetration into South V ietnam ; this concern only increased at die end o f the rainy season in Southeast A sia w hen W ashington expected an in­ crease in H anoi’s activities in die area.82 In addition, the A m ericans w ere aw are o f the presence o f N orth V ietnam ese troops in Laos and insisted on th en w ith­ draw al. Pushkin assured his Ư.S. counterpart that “N orth V iet-N am ready to live up to agreem ent” on Laos, and the Soviet U nion w as prepared to guarantee i t He even proposed a sort o f a quid pro quo to the U nited States. In a conversa­ tion w ith H arrim an on O ctober 25, the Soviet diplom at suggested that “if die W esto n countries give US a satisfactory form ula on the issue o f defense o f Laos on die part o f SEATO, w e are ready to agree to die inclusion in the declaration o f die thirteen pow ers participating in the conference, at the appropriate place, die follow ing provision on the nonuse o f die territory o f Laos: 'T hey (the thir­ teen states participating in die 1961 G eneva conference) assum e the obligation not to use the territory o f Laos w ith the purpose o f interference in internal affairs o f other countries'.”83 H arrim an adm itted that this form ula w as acceptable. This and other suggestions Pushkin m ade during his conversations w ith Harrim an w ere undoubtedly approved by his superiors in M oscow. Pushkin read a letter to H arrim an on O ctober 10 in w hich K hrushchev him seư expressed his satisfaction w ith the course o f discussions. H ie Soviet leader professed his ad­ herence to a “fully sovereign and neutral Laos” and em phasized die im portance o f U .S.-Soviet efforts to this end. “If US and U SSR act jointly on Laos ques­ tion,” the letter read, “this w ill have decisive influence on getting agreem ent It w ill have favorable influence not only in reducing tension in Laos and in SE [Southeast] A sia, b u t to certain degree, throughout w orld.”84 This particular passage dem onstrated how eager M oscow w as, after the confrontation over B erlin that had led to the division o f the city by the construction o f a w all, to elim inate the hostile atm osphere through settlem ent o f the Laos issue, even at die price o f the interests o f its C hinese and V ietnam ese allies.83 The N inth V ietnam ese and the Chinese suspected that die Soviets w ere liable to collude w ith the U nited States behind th en backs. In his internal report on the G eneva conference, Zhang Y an, a senior associate o f Chen Y i, stated that the Soviet U nion w anted to reach a com prom ise w ith W ashington in order to dem onstrate die success o f its policy o f peaceful coexistence. Zhang reported that during the conference the Soviet delegation w as in a hurry to conclude an agreem ent w ithout m aking sure that the Pathet Lao w as in a strong m ilitary po­ sition at the negotiation table. The Chinese explained the Soviet behavior by cit­ ing the Soviet desire to lim it C hina's intervention in Laos and thereby lim it C hina's influence.86 This w as possibly true, especially in light o f the grow ing estrangem ent betw een M oscow and B eijing that led to Zhou E nlai’s w alkout

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from the tw enty-second CPSU congress in O ctober 1961, w hich dem onstrated the rift betw een the tw o parties. H ow ever, concern about the preservation o f peace in Indochina on the basis o f the 1954 G eneva agreem ents was equally prevalent in the K rem lin’s thinking.87 A nd M oscow , using its diplom atic prow ess and exerting pressure on its m ilitant friends, m aneuvered am ong its al­ lies in order to achieve this goal. W hile Pushkin was dem anding greater concessions from the W est, in his pri­ vate conversations w ith his colleagues from China and V ietnam as w ell as dur­ ing the m eetings o f all Com m unist delegations at the conference, he tried to convince them that W estern concessions w ere acceptable or at least w o e w orth taking into account. For exam ple, the Soviet representative had told H arrim an that a unilateral declaration by die Laotian governm ent about its rejection o f SEATO protection com bined w ith a declaration o f noninterference by the mem­ bers o f SEATO w as not enough to solve this problem . A t a m eeting o f Com ­ m unist delegations on O ctober 13, how ever, he insisted that such a proposal was quite satisfactory, for “this concession on the part o f W estern countries m eans our considerable victory and a blow to SEATO.88 Pushkin also rem ained vigilant lest unilateral actions o f the Soviet allies did not underm ine agreem ents already reached by the conference. W hen the N orth V ietnam ese representative, Nguyen C o Thach, told Pushkin o f a C hinese rec­ om m endation to keep som e DRV troops in Laos after the settlem ent, Pushkin reacted negatively. “The idea o f keeping DRV troops in Laos after the conclu­ sion o f the agreem ent at G eneva is a very questionable thing,” he stated to his counterpart. “W e have to counton political w ork in Laos, on internal dem ocratic reform s in that country, not on a m ilitary solution o f this problem . If we sign an agreem ent at G eneva, we should unconditionally observe the neutrality o f Laos. Therefore, there m ust be no DRV troops in Laos.”89 W hile pressuring its allies to reach an agreem ent on Laos that w ould be ac­ ceptable to the USSR, M oscow also used the rew ard o f Soviet aid to assure com ­ pliance. N otw ithstanding the protestations o f Soviet diplom ats in Geneva, the USSR did not cease its m ilitary shipm ents to Laos. Soviet w eapons and ammu­ nition continued to arrive in the DRV, and the N orth V ietnam ese then trans­ ported them to Laotian territory. In N ovem ber 1961 alone, the Laotians received 38 Soviet tanks,90 m ost o f w hich w ere apparently delivered to the Pathet Lao. N ot long before, the Pathet Lao delegation to the CPSU congress in M oscow had received assurances from Soviet leaders that the Soviet Union w ould con­ tinue to provide open, as w ell as secret, assistance to the “patriotic forces” in Laos,91 assistance that, at Laotian request, included m ortars, guns, firearm s, am­ m unition, and transport.92

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In addition to encountering resistance from its Com m unist allies in its efforts to reach agreem ent on Laos, the Soviet Union also enjoyed theừ cooperation. D espite differing approaches to m any issues concerning Laotian settlem ent, China and N orth Vietnam shared w ith M oscow a com m on concern over the dan­ ger o f w ar in Indochina. B eijing was especially anxious to see the conflict on its southern borders resolved because that w ould elim inate a pretext for the U .S. presence in the close vicinity o f China. It was also im portant for the C hinese leaders to dem onstrate theừ w illingness to cooperate w ith the international com ­ m unity on the pressing issues o f w ar and peace in order to increase C hina’s pres­ tige in the w orld and reassert its traditional influence in Southeast A sia.93 Soviet efforts finally brae fruit and, by the end o f N ovem ber, participants at die conference reached an agreem ent on alm ost all aspects o f the Laotian prob­ lem . A t the m eeting o f the Com m unist delegations on N ovem ber 29, Pushkin announced that “practically, the conference has already com pleted its w ork and w hat rem ains can be resolved in one day.“94 A t the forty-thud restricted session, on D ecem ber 18, 1961, tile cochairs presented to the conference the tentative texts o f the declaration on the neutrality o f Laos and o f the accom panying pro­ tocol on the functions o f the ICC.9S But for these conference docum ents to be enforced, it w as necessary that the coalition governm ent o f Laos m ake its own declaration on neutrality and confirm its desire to cooperate w ith the ICC.96 There w as still no coalition governm ent in Laos, how ever. A ll negotiations am ong the rival Laotian factions in Zurich, then at Ban H in Heup in Laos, and later in G eneva in January 1962 cam e to nothing because o f the intransigence o f the Boun O um -N osavan faction. Both the Soviets and the Chinese displayed their concern about the lack o f success in form ing a coalition governm ent. In his report in M oscow in late De­ cem ber 1961, Pushkin em phasized that for the com pletion o f the settlem ent o f the Laotian question “it is necessary to undertake all m easures in helping the Laotian friends to form , as soon as possible and under acceptable conditions, the governm ent o f national union, to work out the declaration on the neutrality o f the country and to send to G eneva a unified Laotian delegation fra the signing o f the adopted decisions.“97 B eijing concurred w ith the Soviet determ ination to finish w ith the Laotian crisis. Chinese deputy foreign m inister Jie Penfei assured a Soviet diplom at that C hina’s “unfailing course” w as the achievem ent o f an agreem ent in G eneva and the form ation o f a coalition governm ent headed by Souvanna Phoum a.98 The Com m unist allies w ere determ ined to exert pressure on the U nited States to tills end. In a conversation w ith W illiam Sullivan, aide to the head o f the U.S. delegation, A verell H arrim an, Pushkin did not conceal that the Soviets believed the only reason why the Laotian crisis was not yet set-

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tied w as the ‘“ N osavan clique* and its supporters, am ong w hich he listed U S m ilitary advisers, w ho w ere counseling stubborn resistance rather than cooper­ ation. . . . H e [Pushkin] advised pressure be brought on Phoum i by curtailm ent US financial assistance.**99 W ashington no less than M oscow w as interested in tire settlem ent o f die Laos crisis. H ow ever, as the Soviets had problem s w ith the intransigence o f th eừ A sian allies, the Am ericans had sim ilar problem s o f th eừ own. Phourni N osavan consistently refused to com ply w ith W ashington’s dem ands to com e to agreem ent w ith Souvanna Phoum a, and N osavan accused die K ennedy adm in­ istration o f betrayal. 100To bring its client into line, W ashington had to authorize its am bassador to Laos, W inthrop Brown, to exert pressure on N osavan to m ake him m ore am enable to cooperation. Brown reported to his superiors: “ 1) I have no pressures left to use on Phoum i and Boun Oum. 2) I have m ade all die threats that w ords alone can convey. Though m y w ords have been general, they have been interpreted as saying aid w ould be cut off.**101 The am bassador recom ­ m ended im posing m ilitary sanctions on N osavan; how ever, it w as difficult for the Kennedy adm inistration to follow his advice because it w as receiving at die sam e tim e inform ation on the Pathet Lao’s preparations for a m ilitary offensive. In fact, tow ard the end o f January 1962, fighting broke out around the village o f N am Tha in northw est Laos, not far from the Laos-China border. Contrary to the advice o f his U .S. backers, N osavan had built up a large concentration o f troops there, and in the last w eek o f January 1962, his fighters carried out sm all-scale offensive operations in the area in an effort to cut the Pathet Lao supply lines be­ tw een northern and southern Laos. Com m unist forces had to respond; they had to counter N osavan’s m ilitary op­ erations in the rear o f the Pathet Lao. In addition, N osavan’s sm all offensive provided the Pathet Lao and its N orth V ietnam ese supporters an opportunity to influence m ilitarily the course o f negotiations on the coalition governm ent, for they believed that success in the arm ed struggle against the Boun O um -N osavan faction w ould encourage N osavan to negotiate. The Chinese agreed. They also believed that a m ilitary advance w as a precondition fo r a political solution and that m ilitary and political instrum ents should be used sim ultaneously. In a January 28, 1962, conversation w ith Souphanouvong in Beijing, Zhou Bnlai stated: “It w ill be fine if a coalition governm ent can be organized___ Y ou m ust be prepared to carry out struggle w ithin the coalition governm ent. In any case, to increase your ow n strength is the m ost im portant m atter. The final settlem ent w ill be decided by force.” 102 Soon after that, Hanoi began preparations fo r the m ilitary cam paign. Seven battalions and a num ber o f other units from the N orth V ietnam ese 316th, 335th, and 330th brigades crossed into Laos to fight alongside the Pathet L ao-neutral-

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ist Souvanna Phoum a governm ent forces at N am T ha.103 Patbet Lao leaders asked fo r assistance from China as w ell. B eijing im m ediately directed its Kun­ m ing M ilitary Region to im plem ent an aid program , and die m ilitary region as­ signed 2,149 soldiers, 1,772 civilian w orkers, 203 trucks, and 639 horses and m ules to collect and transport m ilitary supplies to die Pathet L ao.104 M oscow w as aw are o f the planning for Nam Tha and apparently agreed that a m ilitary blow m ight push N osavan to the negotiating table. Early in M arch, the Soviet am bassador in the DRV, Suren Tovm asyan, participated in a conference in Hanoi that decided the situation in Laos was not yet ripe fo r the form ation o f a coalition governm ent, efforts m ust be m ade to overcom e the difficulties, and the m ost im portant tasks for the NLHX w ere to strengthen the alliance w ith Souvanna Phoum a’s neutralists and expand its m ilitary and political forces.109 The C om m unist Party o f die Soviet U nion reached sim ilar conclusions to the Lao­ tian problem and sent letters stating this to the parties o f China, N orth V ietnam , and Laos, w hich the Soviet am bassador to Laos, A leksandr Abram ov, carried from M oscow. The letter to H anoi, w hich Abram ov showed to M arek Thee, cited the V ietnam ese comrades* belief in die necessity for undertaking m ilitary actions in defense o f the liberated areas o f Laos and forcing the adversary into negotiations aim ed at die establishm ent o f a coalition governm ent favorable to die national-patriotic forces. The letter stated dun the Soviets accepted this con­ clusion, shared by the Chinese and Laotian com rades, and treated it w ith due un­ derstanding, for they w ere nearer Laos and knew local conditions better.106 M arek Thee regarded this as “a clear statem ent o f disengagem ent as far as in­ ternal Laotian developm ents w ere concerned,” 107 and he believed the Soviet leaders had been disengaging since die autum n o f 1961. A lthough the USSR’s gradual disengagem ent w as undoubtedly a result o f M oscow’s assessm ent o f the overall situation in Indochina and w as based on the K rem lin’s foreign policy priorities and the situation in Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet leaders could have genuinely believed that m ilitary success for the Com m unist forces w ould facilitate diplom atic negotiations.108 If so, they w ere c o rre ct On M ay 6 ,1 9 6 2 , the Pathet L ao-N orth V ietnam ese forces captured N am Tha. D espite W ashington’s announcem ent on M ay 11 about dispatching troops to Thailand and sending elem ents o f the U .S. Seventh Fleet to the G ulf o f Siam , W ashington had been m ade to understand that the longer the negotiations over a coalition governm ent continued, the greater the likelihood o f m ore incidents like N am Tha. The U .S. adm inistration confronted N osavan w ith this and pressed him for concessions.109 A t the sam e tim e, the K ennedy adm inistration received firm assurances from M oscow that K hrushchev continued to adhere to the concept o f a settlem ent in Laos and had “not changed his policy o f achieving an independent and neutral Laos.” 110 A s a

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result, negotiations betw een die three factions resum ed in Laos, and die three Laotian princes finally reached agreem ent on a coalition governm ent at a m eet­ ing at the Plain o f Jars on June 12. On June 23, the date o f its form ation, die new G overnm ent o f N ational U nion issued a statem ent o f neutrality, announcing that Laos w ould not “recognize the protection o f any alliance or m ilitary coalition, including SEA TO .” 111 The fourteen participants in the G eneva conference signed the D eclaration on N eutrality o f Laos and adopted a protocol containing provisions about the role o f the cochairs and the ICC. The G eneva conference on Laos thus com pleted its work. D uring the final days o f the conference, how ever, one im portant m eeting took place betw een the head o f the u.s. delegation, A verell H arrim an, and ư n g Van Khiem, the foreign m inister o f the D em ocratic Republic o f Vietnam . A t the start o f the conversation H arrim an brought up the agreem ents on Laos and affirm ed his country’s determ ination to carry them out “in the letter and in the spirit.” A f­ ter this statem ent, he asked w hether the N orth V ietnam ese w ere going to do the sam e thing. Ung Van Khiem inform ed his counterpart that the DRV governm ent had assured Souvanna Phoum a “that they w ould abide carefully by the term s o f the Laos agreem ents. They w ould do nothing w hich w as contrary to the provi­ sions o f those agreem ents.’’112 Y et he w arned that if the United States did not re­ frain from attem pts to “instigate anti-com m unist forces in Laos,” it would dis­ cover “that the NLHX was a very strong organization w hich could defend the interests o f the Lao people.” 113 A t the initiative o f the North Vietnam ese foreign m inister, the conversation dien turned to Vietnam. He accused the United States o f intervening in South Viet­ nam, an intervention that had prevented the reunification o f the country in 1956. “US intervention had in recent years grown worse until it was now a fact that American forces were m ercilessly killing Vietnam ese citizens.” 114 Brushing aside H anim an’s counterargum ents that the United States had increased its m ilitary presence in the South only because o f the increased guerrilla activity directed from the North, ư ng Van Khiem insisted that there was a popular revolt against the regim e in South Vietnam and there were “no North Vietnamese airplanes, ships or m otor vehicles w hich can bring guerrilla forces or weapons into Vietnam .” 113 The conversation concluded w ith an obvious w arning to the U .S. govern­ m ent. Responding to H arrim an’s rem inder that “clear undertakings on the part o f the US Governm ent and on the part o f the N orth V ietnam ese to can y out scrupulously all the provisions o f the G eneva A greem ents on Laos w ould result in peace in Laos," Ung Van Khiem expressed his hope that “G overnor Harrim an w ould not forget the second part o f the conversation, and particularly w hat the Foreign M inister had had to say about Am erican m ilitary intervention in V iet­ nam .” 116

Back to Geneva

For the N orth V ietnam ese, the agreem ents on Laos had settled nothing. Hanoi w as o f course interested in the resolution o f the Laotian crisis; ongoing chaos could result in open W estern m ilitary involvem ent in the form o f SEATO’s full support for N osavan and a w ar w ith unpredictable consequences for the Pathet Lao. On the other hand, continued instability in Laos w as not disadvantageous to the DRV because under cover o f internal struggle in Laos the N orth V iet­ nam ese could m aintain perm anent contacts w ith theứ com rades in South V iet­ nam and provide them the resources necessary for guerrilla w ar against the Saigon regim e and its Ư.S. supporters. Settlem ent could lim it H anoi’s freedom o f action for it im plied certain obligations and international control. A situation o f neither w ar nor peace was therefore m ost preferred in the eyes o f the N orth V ietnam ese leadership as long as the V ietnam ese problem re­ m ained unresolved. H anoi’s preference for a fluctuating situation likely caused disillusionm ent in M oscow over the future o f the Laos agreem ents. In the spring o f 1962, A sian experts in the Soviet Foreign M inistry prepared a report that de­ scribed the role o f Laos in die N orth V ietnam ese strategy tow ard South V iet­ nam. The m inistry report noted that the V ietnam ese friends’ orientation toward arm ed struggle in the South was influenced by the “favorable situation,” w hich included “the m aintenance o f an open w ay from the DRV to South Vietnam through som e southern provinces o f Laos that are under control o f Pathet Lao forces.” The V ietnam ese friends in this way dispatched troops, arm s, and am­ m unition. They even used the Soviet planes engaged in the airlift to Laos. “D ur­ ing the sum m er o f 1961,” the report said, “the friends have transferred to the South three fully equipped infantry battalions and a significant num ber o f offi­ cers for tw enty battalions___ 17 Knowing o f H anoi’s activities in Laos and its position tow ard the settlem ent there, the Soviet leaders could hardly have had illusions about the effectiveness o f the agreem ents reached at Geneva. N evertheless, they displayed theừ satis­ faction w ith the agreem ents118 and w ere determ ined to observe them strictly, perhaps w ith the lurking hope that th en allies w ould follow theừ lead.119 As soon as the G eneva conference on Laos ended, the Soviet U nion cancelled its deliveries o f supplies to Laos and dism antled the airlift. In reply to the Chinese, who urged the USSR to continue its assistance to the pro-Com m unist forces in Laos, D eputy Foreign M inister V asilii K uznetzov on Septem ber 3, 1962, handed a note to the Chinese em bassy elaborating on the Soviet position. The note insisted on the need to concentrate on a political struggle in Laos and de­ nounce u.s. actions there. It praised the G eneva agreem ent and em phasized the im portance o f observing it. The note therefore rejected requests for Soviet m il­ itary aid to the NLHX and asserted that “any o f our steps which m ight violate the G eneva agreem ent w ould create difficulties for the socialist countries in

Back to G eneva

Other international problem s, too. W e w ould put in the hands o f our enem ies a great political trum p, enabling diem to say in th en propaganda that socialist countries do not m eet theừ obligations.” How w ould Soviet initiatives on B erlin lode, asked the note, if M oscow began to violate tile recently signed G eneva agreem ent?120 If the conference on Laos had been im m ediately follow ed by negotiations on the settlem ent o f the V ietnam problem , an exit from this situation could have been found. Both H anoi and B eijing supported V ietnam negotiations. As early as M ay 1961, on die eve o f the conference on Laos, Chinese foreign m inister Chen Y i raised the question o f V ietnam during a m eeting o f the heads o f Com­ m unist delegations. ‘T o US, the posing o f the question o f South V ietnam ,” C hen stated in response to Polish foreign m inister R apacki, “is quite understandable. It is explained by the situation w hich exists in Vietnam . W e find it necessary. . . to raise questions o f South V ietnam and Taiw an after the resolution o f the ques­ tion o f Laos.” 121 Thus, for the C hinese, the issue o f V ietnam w as but a part o f a w ider problem o f divided countries. The N orth V ietnam ese also nourished hopes that a favorable resolution o f the conflict in V ietnam w ould com e on the heels o f the conference on Laos. Ung V an Khiem tried to discuss this issue during his conversation in G eneva w ith H arrim an. Pham V an D ong broached the subject o f a neutral zone in Indochina, including South V ietnam , during his m eeting w ith Souvanna Phoum a, and he confirm ed the N orth V ietnam ese interest in a conference that w ould ratify this idea.122 A lthough plans for som e sort o f a conference on V ietnam w ere discussed in the K ennedy adm inistration at this tim e,123 W ashington was too afraid to lose South V ietnam to Com m unists to agree on its neutralization. Instead, the u.s. governm ent considered m ilitary schem es aim ed at the strengthening o f the Saigon regim e. A s a result, tim e passed and the situation in Indochina rem ained explosive. The settlem ent o f the Laotian crisis, though it cleared the air som e­ w hat, did not have a positive influence on processes in the region. Q uite to the contrary: the deepening o f the crisis in V ietnam underm ined the G eneva agree­ m ents on Laos. N either H anoi nor W ashington abandoned its plans to use Lao­ tian territory for arm ed confrontation in South Vietnam . W hile the N orth V iet­ nam ese continued to m aintain th e ữ routes through Laos fo r pouring arm s, am m unition, and troops into the South, the U nited States supported its clandes­ tine forces in Laos under O peration M omentum initiated in early 1961.124 Thus M oscow’s hopes to consolidate prospects for peace in Indochina by m eans o f the settlem ent in Laos proved to be futile. In the early 1960s, arm ed struggle in South V ietnam becam e the focal point o f the developing situation in Indochina.

9. A Disposition to War F or War, consisteth not in B attle only, o r the a ct o f fighting; but in a tract c f tim e, wherein the W ill to content by B attle is sufficiently known. . . .S o the nature o f War, consisteth not in actualfighting, but in the known disposition thereto, during a ll die tim e there is no assurance to the contrary.

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 13

D e b a te s over John F. K ennedy’s policy tow ard V ietnam continue today. One group o f scholars has attem pted to prove that Kennedy, w ho avoided sending com bat troops to South V ietnam and resisted pressure from the Ư.S. m ilitary for such a step, w ould ultim ately have disengaged from Southeast A sia had he sur­ vived the gunshots in D allas and been reelected in 1964.1 These assertions are rejected by those w ho em phasize the consistency o f the V ietnam policy during the K ennedy adm inistration and the president's full know ledge and approval, w hich led to greater U .S. involvem ent in the Indochina co n flict2 H ow ever use­ ful these debates are for our know ledge o f the p a st they rem ain hypothetical be­ cause Kennedy after all did not survive his trip to D allas in N ovem ber 1963, and it w as the new U .S. president Lyndon B. Johnson, who made a series o f fateful decisions concerning Ư.S. participation in the V ietnam ese co n flict N evertheless, for a better understanding o f Soviet policy tow ard the V ietnam conflict as it developed in the early 1960s, it is necessary to reconstruct briefly the sequence o f decisions and actions by the Ư.S. governm ent and then analyze theữ im pact on decision m aking in M oscow. C om m itm ent credibility, consequences, and counterinsurgency—these w ere the w atchw ords o f the K ennedy adm inistration V ietnam policy, w hich was based on the conclusion that South V ietnam ’s survival w as vital for u.s. na­ tional security.3 The Eisenhow er adm inistration—predecessor o f the K ennedy adm inistration— left Kennedy a legacy that regarded Indochina in to m s o f the

A Disposition to W ar

dom ino theory: the fall o f any one country to Com m unists w ould inevitably lead to the collapse o f a w hole region and to the u.s. loss o f influence. Kennedy and his associates could put forw ard no other theory in place o f the prim itive dom ino com parison (involving chess o r even poker) prim arily because, as R obert s. M c­ Nam ara, K ennedy's secretary o f defense, stressed several tim es in his m em oir, the new adm inistration had “sparse know ledge, scant experience, and sim plistic assum ptions” about the crisis in Southeast A sia.4 President Kennedy regarded the situation in V ietnam through the prism o f the balance o f pow er that existed in the w orld by the tim e o f his election to the Ư.S. presidency. A t the sam e tim e Kennedy w as convinced o f the advantage that W estern values had over Com m unism . This conviction was shared by other m em bers o f his adm inistration. C onsidering the existing equilibrium betw een the W estern and the Com m unist cam ps fragile, the Kennedy adm inistration was determ ined to prevent any change in favor o f the rivals. Any distinction betw een key regions and peripheral areas did not m atter very m uch.5 The zero-sum ratio w as upperm ost in the Cold W ar com petition. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kennedy could not allow the loss o f South V ietnam to the Com m unists, especially after he had suffered hum iliation as a re­ sult o f the C uban invasion fiasco and agreed to the neutralization o f Laos, which w as already regarded by Ư.S. conservatives as an unjustified concession to Communism.6 The further strengthening o f relations betw een the Soviet Union and Cuba, as w ell as “a new w ave o f Soviet provocations in B erlin" added to W ashington policym akers’ conviction that, in M cN am ara's w ords, it w as “rea­ sonable to consider expanding the u.s. effort in V ietnam .”7 The U .S. president w as nevertheless am bivalent as to which course o f action should be adopted tow ard South Vietnam . This am bivalence was very m uch in­ fluenced by the lack o f unity w ithin the K ennedy adm inistration itself. One group o f advisers, whose m outhpiece in the early days o f the new adm inistra­ tion was Col. Edw ard Lansdale— G raham G reene’s “ugly A m erican,” w ith his long history o f experience in covert operations in A sia—pressed for unqualified support for N go D inh D iem as w ell as the dispatch o f Ư.S. com bat troops to South Vietnam . This group had the strong and grow ing backing o f the u.s. m il­ itary establishm ent and tacit support from Secretary o f D efense M cNam ara and Secretary o f State Rusk. This group developed a so-called conspiracy com plex stem m ing from an aversion to any changes that, in their eyes, resulted from the “m ysterious influence or control o f internal and external 'enemy* agents.” Paul B lackstock, author o f a book on subversion and its form s, w rote that “these changes had created an explosive undercurrent o f frustration in conservative cừcles, especially am ong m ilitary leaders who fought a losing battle against native nationalist movem ents in Southeast A sia and A lgeria. In such circum stances,

A Disposition to W ar

nothing could be m ore plausible than to ascribe failure exclusively to ‘the Com­ m unist C onspiracy/”8 A nother group o f K ennedy advisers, represented initially by the U.S. am bas­ sador in Saigon, Elbridge D urbrow , did not oppose Diem but insisted that U.S. m ilitary aid to South V ietnam be tied to reform s there. Some in W ashington fa­ vored a coup d ’état against Diem. The person w ho first advocated a coup was the director o f the State D epartm ent’s B ureau o f Intelligence and R esearch, R oger H ilsm an. Later he was joined by such influential figures as w. A verell H arrim an and the new Ư.S. am bassador to South V ietnam , H enry C abot Lodge Jr., am ong others.9 The u.s. establishm ent also included a few people who questioned the ratio­ nale for u.s. policy in Indochina. They refused to see South V ietnam as a coun­ try im portant for Ư.S. national interests and rejected as sim plistic the view that Ho Chi M inh and his regim e w ere puppets o f M oscow and B eijing; they argued instead that it w as nationalism that w as prevailing in the m inds o f A sian leado s , not com m unism . A n em inent econom ist, teacher and author w ho was serv­ ing as Ư.S. ambassade»’ in New D elhi, John K enneth G albraith, was am ong this group. He w orried over grow ing u.s. m ilitary com m itm ent in V ietnam and, in a letter to the president, asked: “Incidentally, w ho is the m an in your adm inis­ tration w ho decides w hat countries are strategic? I w ould like to have his nam e and address and ask him w hat is so im portant about this real estate in the space age.” 10 W ith such a divergence o f opinions am ong his closest advisers, Kennedy— instead o f m aking clear-cut decisions— chose to im provise, tem porize, split the difference. H is adm inistration “took the m inim um steps judged necessary to sta­ bilize the situation, leaving its resolution to the longer future, w hile alw ays con­ scious that harder decisions lay ahead.’’11 R obert Kennedy, w ho occupied the post o f attorney general in his brother’s adm inistration and was close to m any foreign policy decisions, described his elder brother’s policy as “W e’d cross that bridge w hen we cam e to it,” 12 im plying that W ashington postponed crucial de­ cisions on V ietnam until the situation becam e intolerable from the U.S. strate­ gic point o f view. Y et even those decisions that Kennedy did adopt played a fateful role in the later u.s. policy tow ard Vietnam . A lthough w ithstanding m ilitary pressure in favor o f sending com bat troops to South V ietnam , he significantly increased u.s. presence and influence in that country. In N ovem ber 1961, the u.s. presi­ dent agreed to a greater role for U.S. advisers in the South V ietnam ese struggle against Com m unist guerrillas on theừ territory. Kennedy substantially strength­ ened the advisory role o f the u.s. A ữ Force in V ietnam and authorized the course that resulted in dispatching nearly sixteen thousand u.s. m ilitary per­

A Disposition to W ar

sonnel to V ietnam w ithin the next tw o y e a n .13 In addition to sending m ilitary personnel, W ashington decided to render m ilitary assistance to the South V iet­ nam ese arm ed forces. Saigon w as receiving u.s. aircraft, arm ored personnel carriers, and other equipm ent, and the U nited States provided South V ietnam w ith financial support fo r increasing its arm y to tw o hundred thousand. A m eri­ cans w ere also closely involved in activities o f tile D iem regim e such as tile strategic ham let program , initiated by D iem in the spring o f 1962, w hich re­ sulted in the forced resettlem ent o f thousands o f peasants in som ething resem ­ bling concentration cam ps. The strategic ham let program led to increased es­ trangem ent o f the rural population and its support o f the C om m unist guerrillas.14 An indication o f the increased U .S. role in South V ietnam was the transform ation on February 8, 1962, o f the u.s. m ilitary assistance advisory group (M AAG) into the U .S. m ilitary assistance com m and in V ietnam (M ACV) under G eneral Paul D. H arkins. These Kennedy adm inistration actions added up to a clear violation o f the 1954 G eneva agreem ents. The U nited States had abandoned its form er course o f com pliance w ith the G eneva A ccords and ignored its obligation to “refrain from the threat o r the use o f force to disturb them .” 15 As early as the end o f 1961, the strength o f the M AAG in South V ietnam w as three tim es the num ber allow ed in the G eneva agreem ents.16 The developm ent o f V ietnam policy in the Kennedy adm inistration m akes futile any discussion o f w hether K ennedy “w ould have pulled us out o f V ietnam ,” as M cNam ara, one o f the architects o f the U .S. V iet­ nam policy, argued in his m em oừ.17 W hatever K ennedy’s intentions, he had set up a policy that w ould be difficult to discard later. The difficulty w as exacer­ bated by the fact that W ashington’s actions triggered changes in the policies o f other countries that had played an im portant role in the V ietnam affair and that now had to reconsider their approach tow ard the V ietnam conflict in response to the u.s. actions. O ne o f the m ost prom inent o f those countries w as the Soviet Union. M oscow was concerned w ith the prospect o f deterioration in the situation in Indochina. H anoi’s m ilitant pronouncem ents m ade M oscow apprehensive, and Soviet leaders tried to restrain their N orth V ietnam ese allies from taking w hat M oscow regarded as prem ature action aim ed at the instigation and support o f arm ed struggle in the southern half o f Vietnam . Soviet leaders w ere successful in discouraging the DRV leaders from openly endorsing this struggle at the third congress o f the W orkers’ Party o f V ietnam in Septem ber 1960, when the Chi­ nese sharply criticized the Soviet “appeasem ent” policy tow ard the W est. M oscow m ade a concession to B eijing in approving only the struggle o f indige­ nous m ovem ents in the T hird W orld, w hich the Com m unists called national lib ­ eration m ovem ents because they fought for the liberation, sovereignty, and in­

A Disposition to W sr

dependence o f their countries from foreign dom inance. O n January 6, 1961, how ever, w hen Khrushchev spoke at a m eeting o f the party organizations o f the H igher Party School, the A cadem y o f Social Sciences, and the Institute o f M arx­ ism -Leninism o f the CPSU C entral Com m ittee, he subordinated the struggle o f indigenous m ovem ents to the general problem o f w ar and peace. The Soviet leader w arned about the danger o f the local w ars that could grow into a w orld conflict and stressed that it w as necessary to fight against w orld w ars and against local w ars.18 In its efforts aim ed a t the settlem ent o f the Laotian conflict, M oscow likew ise tried to prevent the disruption o f peace in Indochina as w ell as dem onstrate that the V ietnam problem could be resolved along lines sim ilar to the settlem ent in Laos, that is, by neutralization. A t the 1961-1962 G eneva conference, tile Sovi­ ets not only contained the revolutionary zeal o f tile Chinese and N orth V iet­ nam ese to fight im perialism ; they also tried to convey explicitly to the W est— for exam ple, during K hrushchev’s m eeting w ith K ennedy in V ienna—as w ell as im plicitly that M oscow did not regard Indochina itseff as an area o f strategic im ­ portance and, accordingly, it w as prepared to search fo r an arrangem ent that w ould satisfy both opposing cam ps. N ew s from W ashington about U .S. m ilitary plans for South V ietnam there­ fore could not be received in the K rem lin w ithout disappointm ent and disdain. It m ust have been discouraging for M oscow til discover that all its efforts aim ed at the preservation o f peace in Indochina had borne no results. M oreover the So­ viets now felt com pelled to engage on tw o fronts, in the W est and in the East— in the E ast trying to discourage N orth V ietnam from w ar. In early O ctober 1961, the Soviet em bassy in the DRV inform ed M oscow that the K ennedy adm inis­ tration continued “to follow the form er political course [in V ietnam ]: to prevent peaceful unification o f the country, to put brakes on the developm ent o f the pa­ triotic m ovem ent in the South, and to tie South V ietnam to itself even m ore strongly.” The em bassy explained the increase in U .S. aid to South V ietnam by citing the U .S. governm ent’s concern about losing “this strategically im portant region as a result o f the grow th o f the patriotic m ovem ent in the country.” 19 Soviet diplom ats in H anoi pointed to recent u.s. steps in South V ietnam —for exam ple, V ice President Johnson’s visit to Saigon; and the establishm ent o f a special com m ittee to cooperate w ith the Pentagon and G eneral Lansdale, which w as to be headed by Sterling C ottrell,20 w ho the Soviet diplom ats described as “a w ell know n expert on the struggle against guerrillas”—as evidence o f W ash­ ington’s support for D iem ’s regim e. They drew the attention o f th en superiors to the increase in casualties am ong the guerrillas as a result o f Saigon’s punitive expeditions arranged w ith the “active support o f the A m ericans." They reported that D iem , in addition to his m ilitary m easures against guerrillas, intensified po-

A Disposition to W ar

lỉtícal struggle against die Com m unists and the patriotic m ovem ent “on the ad­ vice o f the A m ericans.“21 The em bassy’s report referred to all these facts in or­ der to support the conclusion that it w as the punitive m easures o f the Saigon regim e that had provoked the intensification o f the arm ed struggle in South V iet­ nam . H anoi, the em bassy reported, on the contrary occupied a radier reasonable po­ sition: N orth V ietnam ese leaders believed the ouster o f the A m ericans from V ietnam and the overthrow o f Diem should be undertaken by the South V iet­ nam ese them selves, w ithout “direct m ilitary interference on the part o f the DRV.’*A new South V ietnam ese governm ent adhering to the principle o f neu­ trality w ould initiate negotiations w ith H anoi (Ml the w ays to realize peaceful unification o f the country.22 The em bassy did adm it that the N orth V ietnam ese undertook m easures to strengthen guerrilla bases to the south o f the seventeenth parallel, form ed “large m ilitary units” such as battalions and regim ents and sup­ plied them w ith arm s and equipm ent, and used Laotian territory to help carry out som e o f these activities. Soviet diplom ats in the DRV justified these actions by citing the increasing Ư.S. and South V ietnam ese suppression o f the patriotic m ovem ent in the South.23 The Soviet em bassy in Hanoi had obviously taken at face value the declara­ tions o f the N orth V ietnam ese leadership about its desire, follow ing the exam ­ ple o f Laos, to settle the V ietnam conflict by peaceful m eans. The diplom ats did not see a contradiction betw een such declarations and the intensification o f guer­ rilla operations in South V ietnam authorized and supported by the N orth. There­ fore, the em bassy’s recom m endation, m ade in its O ctober 1961 political letter signed by A m bassador Suren Tovm asyan, corresponded w ith its overall con­ text: N ot excluding the possibility o f the V ietnam ese friends’ appeal to US for help to the patriotic forces in the South, the Em bassy finds it pos­ sible to consider prelim inarily a question o f w hat kind o f arm s, am­ m unition, and other equipm ent o f A m erican m anufacture the Soviet Union could provide to the South V ietnam ese patriots through the DRV.24 The em bassy’s interpretation o f the developm ents in V ietnam did not fully coincide w ith M oscow’s assessm ent o f the situation. The Soviet Foreign M in­ istry, undoubtedly basing its view s on inform ation received from other sources, including intelligence, did not fail to draw Tovm asyan’s attention to this dis­ crepancy. The m inistry criticized its em bassy in the DRV for the “tacit accep­ tance o f the logic o f the N orth V ietnam ese actions in die South,” for relying too heavily on N orth V ietnam ese propaganda that em phasized only one aspect o f

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the problem —the intensification o f u.s. involvem ent in V ietnam —w hile it un­ derestim ated facts that led to the conclusion that die V ietnam ese friends w ere “choosing the w ay o f transition tow ard active arm ed struggle in the South, try­ ing to realize the policy o f unification o f V ietnam by m ilitary m eans.”25 A t the sam e tim e, the m inistry in M oscow believed that the Soviet diplom ats in the DRV underestim ated U .S. determ ination to suppress the liberation m ovem ent in South V ietnam as w ell as u.s. assistance to the regim e o f N go D inh Diem . M oscow asked “w hether the transition tow ard an open arm ed struggle against the N go D inh D iem regim e would not put the revolutionary forces o f South V ietnam under threat and, on the other hand, w hether tills w ould not lead to an even deeper u.s. intervention in South V ietnam that is fraught w ith the com pli­ cation o f the political situation in that region and could lead to the transform a­ tion o f South V ietnam into a sharp ganglion o f international tension.”26 The So­ v iet F oreign M inistry doubted the expediency o f even a prelim inary consideration o f m ilitary aid to the South V ietnam ese guerrillas. Soviet reaction to V ietnam developm ents clearly reveals M oscow ’s appre­ hension about the V ietnam situation. N ikita Khrushchev expressed M oscow 's concern in a N ovem ber 10,1961, letter to President Kennedy in w hich the So­ viet leader criticized u.s. support o f N go D inh D iem and Ư.S. econom ic and m ilitary assistance. K hrushchev referred to reports o f “som e new s agencies” about W ashington’s intention to send Ư.S. troops to South V ietnam , and he stressed that this action w ould not im prove the situation in Indochina. Khrushchev w arned Kennedy: “Sending troops to suppress national-liberation m ovem ents in other countries is by no m eans a way that corresponds to the in­ terests o f peace and, besides, w hat are the guarantees that the A m erican troops w ould not get tied up in South Vietnam . I think that such a perspective is m ost real.” A ccording to K hrushchev, this type o f involvem ent w ould only add to the difficulties both countries had to deal w ith in the international arena.27 The Soviet leader’s prophesy m ust have struck a sour note for K ennedy be­ cause it cam e at a tim e w hen the u.s. adm inistration w as considering a recom ­ m endation from G eneral M axwell Taylor, the president’s m ilitary representa­ tive w ho had ju st returned from his m ission to Saigon, to introduce Ư.S. com bat forces in the South to prevent the fall o f South V ietnam to Com m unism .28 The initial num ber o f U.S. troops necessary to fulfill this task was estim ated at eight thousand to ten thousand.29 A lthough one cannot say for sure, it is quite proba­ ble that K hrushchev's letter influenced K ennedy’s decision to not send Ư.S. troops to South Vietnam . M oscow ’s appeal to the com m on sense o f Ư.S. policym akers did not have m uch effect, how ever. W ashington’s N ovem ber 1961 decisions, though short o f com m itting com bat troops, becam e “a vitally im portant step tow ard ‘A m erican­

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ization’ o f the conflict.’*30 O ne m onth later the Soviet Foreign M inistry noted that the U nited States w as continuing its m ilitary preparations. A m em orandum prepared by die m inistry’s Southeast A sia D epartm ent on the basis o f inform a­ tion from m ilitary intelligence and the S oviet civilian intelligence service (KGB) reported how the U nited States kept on alert in the area o f the Philippines one aircraft carrier w ith thirty-nine low -flying attack aircraft that could carry nuclear w eapons, tw enty-eight je t fighters, and other planes. The U nited States also had in the Philippines one cruiser, four destroyers, one frigate w ith antiair­ craft guided m issiles, one helicopter carrier, and several ships o f the Seventh Fleet that carried up to fifteen hundred paratroopers and tw enty helicopters. U n­ der such conditions, die m em orandum concluded, the continuing efforts o f N orth V ietnam to intensify arm ed struggle in the South “w ithout corresponding political education o f the m asses in the situation when the U nited States under­ takes active m easures for m ilitary support o f Ngo D inh D iem could have nega­ tive consequences, internal as w ell as international.” This policy could lead to the suppression o f the national liberation m ovem ent in South V ietnam , on die one hand, and the developm ent o f the w ar in the South into an international con­ flict, on the other.31 Thus, in addition to its efforts aim ed at persuading the U .S. adm inistration to stop its interference in V ietnam , M oscow obviously had to ap­ ply even m ore pressure to its V ietnam ese friends to convince them to take a less m ilitant line in theừ policy tow ard South Vietnam . Y et prospects for Soviet suc­ cess in pressuring the N orth w ere dim inishing. Soviet-V ietnam ese cooperation in various spheres appeared to continue un­ abated after the 1960 M oscow conference o f Com m unist parties. In 1961, as be­ fore, the Soviet U nion retained its strong position am ong socialist countries for econom ic assistance provided to the DRV.32 The num ber o f delegations travel­ ing back and forth betw een the tw o countries increased, according to the Soviet em bassy in the DRV, and they included industrial, youth, and m ilitary delega­ tions.33 In June, a Soviet m ilitary delegation visited H anoi to study how to strengthen the DRV m ilitary potential.34 A lso in June, soon after the V ienna m eeting betw een K hrushchev and K ennedy, N orth V ietnam ese prem ier Pham Van Dong visited M oscow to discuss questions o f Soviet-DRV cooperation and the international situation. The Soviet leader gave a breakfast in the K rem lin in honor o f the DRV delegation, at which he declared that N orth V ietnam had in the Soviet U nion a “trustw orthy and staunch friend in the struggle fo r the buildup o f socialism and fo r peaceful unification o f the country.”35 The DRV prem ier w as follow ed by H o Chi M inh w ho, as usual, visited the Soviet Union in A ugust to have a vacation in C rim ea w here he m et K hrushchev for a lengthy discussion on the international situation and problem s o f the w orld com m unist

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m ovem ent36 A s w as tradition at diese m eetings, both leaders assured each other o f their m utual respect and am ity. These leaders* declarations, how ever, concealed th en grow ing estrangem ent, a process under way since Hanoi *s reorientation tow ard a m ilitary solution to the V ietnam problem evident as early as the 1960 M oscow Com m unist parties con­ ference, w hen die N orth V ietnam ese supported m any Chinese declarations that contradicted the principles o f K hrushchev’s internal and external policies. A fter die conference, the N orth V ietnam ese leaders kept silent about decisions that had stressed die role o f die Soviet Com m unist Party as the vanguard o f w orld com m unism . Instead, they began to call the CPSU “the center o f the interna­ tional com m unist m ovem ent, and the USSR the center o f the socialist cam p.” The Soviets im m ediately perceived this m odification as a “dem onstration o f in­ sincerity” on the part o f the V ietnam ese friends.37 N orth V ietnam ’s insincerity w as especially evident in H anoi’s policy tow ard South Vietnam . A w are o f the Soviet negative attitude tow ard intensification o f arm ed struggle there, the N orth V ietnam ese tried to avoid discussing this sub­ je c t during theừ contacts w ith M oscow and accordingly refused to elaborate on th en plans in the South. They apparently did not inform th eừ Soviet friends in advance about the D ecem ber 20, 1960, form ation o f the N ational Liberation Front o f South V ietnam (NLFSV) for no report from the Soviet em bassy in Hanoi m entioned this event until after it had taken place. In 1961, the Soviet diplom ats in the DRV began com plaining that they had “lim ited opportunities fo r receiving com plete and tim ely inform ation on the situation in the South.” They asked M oscow to send them necessary m aterials that could be used in theừ conversations w ith N orth V ietnam ese officials.38 By failing to provide the So­ viets w ith inform ation on developm ents in South V ietnam , H anoi w as in fact re­ fusing to get prelim inary approval fo r its actions from M oscow.39 M oscow suspected that behind the deterioration o f the Soviet position in the region lay the concurrent grow th o f C hinese influence on the policy o f the N orth V ietnam ese leadership. The w idening gap betw een how M oscow and B eijing approached international relations w as detrim ental to the Soviet role in the In­ dochinese conflict. A s predicted by u.s. analysts in th eừ reports on Sino-Soviet relations, the 1960 M oscow conference “did not produce a com plete agreem ent, o r one w hich is likely to be lasting. The estrangem ent seem s likely to con­ tinue.”40 A lthough the I960 conference did tem porarily stop the public recrim ­ inations betw een the tw o parties, it did not reconcile theừ divergent objectives. The Soviet em bassy in China reported that after the conference the Chinese po­ sition did not undergo serious m odification. B eijing refused to criticize itsetf for erroneous view s. M ao’s cult o f personality rem ained strong. In the m iddle o f

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1961, the em bassy registered indications o f C hina’s abandonm ent o f its course tow ard reconciliation w ith the Soviet U nion. Chinese leaders ceased to em pha­ size the im portance o f the unity o f the Com m unist m ovem ent, kept silent about the draft o f the new CPSU program that was to be adopted at the foithcom ing congress o f Soviet C om m unists, and started to talk again about Chinese M arx­ ism .41 The period after the 1960 M oscow conference until fall 1961 w as clearly a lull before a storm . The storm raged at the tw enty-second congress o f the Soviet Com m unist Party, w hich took place from O ctober 17 to O ctober 31,1961. A t the congress, K hrushchev vigorously denounced A lbania for its adherence to Stalinism and for opposing the Soviet policy o f de-Stalinization. Zhou Enlai rose in defense o f the A lbanian com rades; he delivered a speech on O ctober 20 in w hich he criti­ cized K hrushchev for his public denunciation o f the A lbanians and pointed out that such public criticism did not help the unity o f the Com m unist m ovem ent, disagreem ents should be aired privately, and errors should be rectified during negotiations betw een respective parties. The Chinese leader also spelled out his party’s disagreem ent w ith the program proposed to the congress that contra­ dicted m any provisions o f the 1957 declaration and tile 1960 statem ent He left the podium w ithout shaking hands w ith Khrushchev. The next day Zhou Enlai laid tw o w reaths at the m ausoleum on Red Square that still had the nam es o f Lenin and Stalin on its façade. O ne o f the w reaths bore the inscription: ‘T o Iossif V issarionovich Stalin, the G reat M arxist-L eninist”43 Failing to resolve dif­ ferences w ith the Soviet leaders, Zhou Enlai left M oscow on O ctober 23, before die congress closed. A fter this open breach betw een the leadership, Sino-Soviet relations contin­ ued to deteriorate rapidly despite reconciliation efforts from both sides from tim e to tim e. O ne consequence o f the rift was the transform ation o f China from an ally to a rival o f the Soviet U nion in Indochina. Even before the co n flict C hi­ nese influence in the DRV w as relatively strong. W ithin the N orth V ietnam ese leadership, B eijing had an influential pro-Chinese lobby that w as eager to fol­ low the C hinese exam ple in m any instances. H anoi shared w ith B eijing its dis­ like o f Soviet criticism o f Stalin’s cult o f personality, M oscow’s policy o f rap­ prochem ent w ith the W est, and M oscow ’s denunciation o f the A lbanian Com m unists.43 The developing conflict betw een China and the Soviet U nion only strengthened the C hinese leaders’ desire to consolidate their position in neighboring N orth V ietnam . B uilding upon the ideological affinity o f the Chinese and N orth V ietnam ese, B eijing tried to guarantee its influence in the DRV by binding N orth V ietnam to C hina econom ically. Com m unist C hina had alw ays played an im portant role in assisting “dem ocratic V ietnam ,” and by 1962 it led all other countries in eco­

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nom ic cooperation w ith the DRV, leaving the Soviet U nion behind in som e ar­ eas. For exam ple, in trade, aid, credits, and technical assistance to N orth V iet­ nam , C hina w as out in front o f other socialist countries. Furtherm ore, Chinese credits and econom ic and technical assistance w ere concentrated in the key sec­ tors o f the N orth V ietnam ese econom y. B eijing helped the DRV in the largest construction projects and in light industries, in the creation o f a netw ork o f rail­ way lines, and in irrigation. The Chinese usually equipped the factories and en­ terprises they built in V ietnam w ith theừ own m achines and tools, w hich guar­ anteed continuing N orth V ietnam ese dependence on advice and support from China. In 1962 tile Soviet em bassy in tile DRV pointed out in its review o f SinoV ietnam ese relations that “[e]conom ic relations w ith the PRC w hich play such an im portant role in the developm ent o f the DRV people’s econom y are one o f those levers by m eans o f w hich C hina is able to influence, to som e degree, for­ eign and dom estic policy o f [North] V ietnam ."44 B eijing’s expansion in its neighboring country in tile early 1960s also cam e in the form o f visits o f various delegations from C hina to the DRV. The num ber o f delegations grew rapidly, prom pting the Soviet em bassy to express concern over the intensification o f C hina-N orth V ietnam contacts. The em bassy re­ ported to M oscow that the Chinese delegations w ere “very representative.” In the period from O ctober 1961 to M arch 1962 alone, H anoi hosted C hinese m il­ itary and trade delegations, trade union representatives, railw ay specialists, artists, and athletes.45 M oscow m ust have been m ost concerned about the de­ velopm ent o f m ilitary contacts betw een H anoi and Beijing. A Chinese m ilitary delegation led by M arshal Ye Jianying, w hich visited the DRV in D ecem ber 1961, w as the highest-pow ered m ilitary delegation to N orth V ietnam to date. It included a PRC a ữ force com m ander, representatives o f the general staff o f the People’s Liberation A rm y (PLA ) and the PLA ’s political departm ent, and a num ber o f senior officers.46 V arious sources reported that the delegation cam e to N orth V ietnam not solely for the celebration o f the seventeenth anniversary o f the PAV but also fo r discussions on the prospects o f arm ed struggle in the South.47 Soviet diplom ats regarded the visit o f the Chinese m ilitary delegation as a m anifestation o f the “aspiration o f the C hinese com rades to som ehow dem onstrate to the leaders and the people o f the DRV the PR C ’s readiness to lend them all-out support in case o f a possible arm ed conflict over South V iet­ nam .”48 N orth V ietnam ese leaders eagerly reciprocated the Chinese visits. Perhaps m ost irritating to M oscow was that visits o f the V ietnam ese com rades to China took place before o r after th en trips to the Soviet U nion and East European countries. The K rem lin suspected that the V ietnam ese not only asked for advice o f the Chinese leaders but also inform ed them o f w hat was transpiring during

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negotiations w ith the Soviets and theừ European allies. Therefore, it does not seem strange that K hrushchev w arned Ho Chi M inh, whom he m et in Sochi in A ugust 1961, that the V ietnam ese leader “should not pass over to die C hinese com rades w hat was told to him in confidence, for tins w ould lead to die deep­ ening o f the present discord, not the rapprochem ent betw een the C C P and CPSU.”49 Soviet observers reached the conclusion that relations betw een C hina and N orth V ietnam w ere strengthening and C hina’s im portance w as gradually grow ing.50 B ut M oscow definitely retained som e leverage in die DRV, and C hi­ nese influence in V ietnam had certain lim its. For exam ple, Hanoi w as not fully satisfied w ith C hinese econom ic aid because the factories built w ith C hinese help and the equipm ent provided by C hina w ere m ostly obsolete or at least could not com pete w ith the m ore m odem m achines and tools sent by the Soviet U nion and E ast European countries.51 As a result, Hanoi sought a continuation o f eco­ nom ic cooperation w ith M oscow and alw ays em phasized how im portant Soviet aid w as to the DRV. China and N orth V ietnam also had differing approaches tow ard the develop­ m ent o f the N orth V ietnam ese econom y. Because o f the failure o f H anoi’s pro­ gram o f agrarian reform —w hich had adhered to C hinese principles—H anoi w as cautious in follow ing other exam ples o f its northern neighbor. A ttem pts by som e provincial leaders to establish people’s com m unes in the DRV w ere not approved by the C entral Com m ittee o f the W orkers’ Party o f V ietnam . A nd N orth V ietnam ese enthusiasm about great leaps forw ard w as shattered as C hina entered a sharp dow nturn in its econom y in the early 1960s.52 Even in ideology, w here the correspondence betw een Hanoi and B eijing w as m ost apparent, the C hinese did not enjoy unquestioned authority. A lthough one group in the DRV leadership w as striving fo r a closer rapprochem ent w ith C hina—the Soviet em bassy included V ietnam ese Politburo m em bers Truong Chinh, Hoang Van H oan, and Nguyen C hi Thanh in this faction— the Soviet em bassy em phasized that the “pro-C hinese feelings” o f these leaders did not prevent them from supporting the developm ent o f Soviet-N orth V ietnam ese friendship and did not cause the V ietnam ese to play o ff one country against the Other.53 Furtherm ore, influential N orth V ietnam ese leaders— H o C hi M inh, Pham V an D ong, and Vo N guyen Giap— rem ained firm defenders o f relations w ith the Soviet U nion. G iap did not even shy away from expressing pro-Soviet sentim ents before the highest-level visiting Chinese m ilitary delegation. O ne observer rem em bered that G iap “barely rem ained w ithin the bounds o f polite­ ness” w hile delivering his speech at a banquet fo r the visitors. G iap counterbal­ anced all flattering references to the C hinese PLA w ith still m ore flattering ref­ erences to the Soviet arm y and praised Soviet “advanced m ilitary science.”54

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O ther N orth V ietnam ese leaders follow ed G iap’s exam ple ỉn theừ encounters w ith C hinese visitors.39 H anoi therefore still tried to m aintain its policy o f balancing betw een the pow erful allies and did not w ant to antagonize either o f them , leading officials from die Soviet Foreign M inistry’s Southeast A sia D epartm ent to be optim istic about die further developm ent o f Soviet-N orth V ietnam ese relations. In theừ view , M oscow only needed to take the “proper initiative” to broaden m ultiple contacts w ith the DRV, w hich “could have in the present conditions an im por­ tant positive significance.”56 Increased contacts and influence w ould be useful not only fo r bilateral relations but ultim ately fo r peace in Indochina, w hich the Soviets w ere eager to preserve. Soviet leaders, how ever, w ere not prepared to follow the proposals o f the of­ ficials o f the m inistry’s Southeast A sia D epartm ent. Preoccupied w ith other pressing problem s, prim arily their relations w ith the W est as w ell as th eừ quar­ rel w ith C hina, the Soviets w ere reluctant to be proactive w ith respect to V iet­ nam . K hrushchev could not even find tim e to visit the DRV although his visit w ould certainly have had a positive effect on bilateral relations. In 1961, in re­ sponse to H o C hi M inh’s in v itatio n to him to com e to N orth V ietnam , K hrushchev said, “W e are busy now w ith the p reparation o f the [party] congress and the solution o f the G erm an problem . W hen w e resolve it, w e w ill have m ore tim e and it w ill be possible to consider [sic] the issue o f the trip to V ietnam .”97 Thus, a t a tim e w hen both the U nited States and the DRV w ere intensifying activities leading to the underm ining o f peace in Indochina, M oscow pursued an increasingly passive policy in the region. Soviet leaders seem to have resigned them selves to the consequences o f th eữ N orth V ietnam ese and C hinese allies’ policies. W hat w ere the reasons for the Soviets’ apparent passivity? The Soviet position undoubtedly w as influenced by the Sino-Soviet rift and its im pact on Soviet-V ietnam ese relations. A nother reason w as M oscow ’s lack o f interest in that region and M oscow ’s belief that it w as devoid o f strategic im portance for the Soviet U nion. M oscow ’s policy w as also affected by the Soviet failure to gam er the support o f other countries responsible for the situation in Southeast A sia fo r Soviet ef­ forts to counter recent belligerent tendencies in the region. G reat B ritain, a cochair o f the 1954 G eneva conference, was unw illing to challenge the U nited States over V ietnam . F. A. W arner, head o f the Southeast A sia D epartm ent at the B ritish Foreign O ffice, sum m arized his governm ent's attitude: “The policy w hich w e have agreed w ith the A m ericans is to avoid international discussion cm V ietnam until the m ilitary situation has been restored.”58 The result was that although London continuously questioned the rationale fo r U.s. m oves in

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Southeast A sia, it never confronted its pow erful ally w ith its clear-cut opposi­ tion to U .S. policy and did not w ant to put forw ard any alternative. Soviet leaders w ere also skeptical about the position o f France. G eorgii Pushkin, w ho headed the Soviet delegation at the G eneva conference cm Laos, referred to the role o f the French delegation at the conference when he confided to the Chinese deputy foreign m inister, Zhang H anfu, that ‘T h e French display a striking conservatism on all issues. A pparently, they are overburdened w ith defeat in [theứ] colonies, in particular, the A lgerian problem w hich tied them hand and foot.”39 In addition, M oscow was receiving indications o f Paris’s neg­ ative assessm ent o f the effectiveness o f the G eneva settlem ent Louis D auge, the French representative to the U nited N ations, com m ented that the G eneva A c­ cords did not “stir *ip in France fond m em ories” and it w as hardly possible “to start up this rusty m echanism .”60 Soviet decision m akers therefore w ere not surprised when th eừ initiative on the neutralization o f V ietnam m et w ith failure. The evolution o f the Soviet neu­ tralization initiative illustrates the USSR’s grow ing passivity tow ard Indochina. The idea o f a neutral South V ietnam had em erged som e tim e before the G eneva conference on Laos and w as discussed am ong various countries in­ cluding C hina and the DRV as part o f a m ore general proposal fo r a peaceful settlem ent o f the V ietnam conflict and o f the establishm ent o f a neutrality zone in Indochina com prising Laos, Cam bodia, and South V ietnam . A s the negotia­ tions on Laos neared an end, both W estern and C om m unist diplom ats raised the subject o f n eu tralizatio n during priv ate conversations and in public p ro ­ nouncem ents. For exam ple, in A pril 1962, a senior N orth V ietnam ese official suggested publicly that the “Laotian m odel” could be considered as a possible solution o f the V ietnam ese problem at a new G eneva conference on V ietnam .61 Expectations w ere very high am ong m any delegates at G eneva that such a con­ ference w ould im m ediately follow the successful conclusion o f the Laos con­ ference.62 M oscow generally favored the ideas o f a new conference and the neutraliza­ tion o f South Vietnam . The Southeast A sia D epartm ent o f the Soviet Foreign M inistry included in its plan for 1962 the follow ing point: In the nearest future it would be expedient to put forw ard a thesis on a possible convocation o f an International C onference on South V ietnam and then, after consultations w ith the Chinese and V iet­ nam ese friends, to unleash a cam paign in support o f this proposal. The objective o f such a conference w ould be to w ork out concrete m easures on the suppression o f u.s. interference in the internal sit­ uation in South V ietnam and to guarantee the im plem entation o f the

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1954 G eneva agreem ents. A t die conference it w ould also be possi­ ble, w ith the concurrence o f the V ietnam ese friends, to raise the is­ sue o f a possible neutralization o f South V ietnam w ith correspond­ ing guarantees.63 A lm ost sim ultaneously w ith die 1962 plan, the Foreign M inistry issued di­ rectives to the Soviet am bassador to die DRV to look into N orth V ietnam ese at­ titude tow ard the issue: [0 ]n the one hand, die V ietnam ese friends, in die fram ew ork o f die N ational Liberation Front o f South V ietnam , officially speak in fa­ vor o f a peaceful unification o f V ietnam and adm itted die neutral­ ization o f South V ietnam as the first step___ O n the other hand, us­ ing the situation th at has arisen in spring and sum m er 1961 in connection w ith die developm ents in Laos, die V ietnam ese friends in practice have undertaken m easures aim ed at die intensification o f arm ed struggle against the D iem regim e, w hile not taking into ac­ count direct m ilitary support to N go D inh D iem on the part o f die U nited States.64 Sim ilar instructions had apparently been given to M oscow ’s am bassadors in W ashington, B eijing, and other capitals.63 By A ugust 1962, shortly after the G eneva settlem ent on Laos, M oscow had acquired enough inform ation on the issue few A natolii C histyakov, die head o f die Southeast A sia D epartm ent a t the Soviet Foreign M inistry, and A m bassador Suren T ovm asyan to subm it a m em orandum to D eputy F oreign M inister G eorgii Pushkin. In theữ memo they adm itted that, in general, there w ere “som e objective conditions” for a peaceful settiem ent o f the V ietnam problem : the U .S. agreem ent on the negotiated solution o f the crisis in Laos, die am bivalent posi­ tions o f the principal u .s. allies G reat B ritain and France, and the recognition by the V ietnam ese friends that it w as possible to bargain w ith im perialists. T heừ m em orandum also revealed M oscow ’s vision o f Indochina after the G eneva conference (H I Laos: A peaceful solution o f the South V ietnam ese question at the present tim e is acquiring a particular urgency because the observance o f the G eneva agreem ents on Laos by South V ietnam , Thailand, as well as by the DRV, w ill be dependent, to a considerable degree, on the sit­ uation in South V ietnam , and it goes w ithout saying that this would be the consolidation o f the achieved successes in the m atter o f the preservation o f peace in Southeast A sia.66

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The authors then contradicted th eừ prom ising ternaries by referring to infor­ m ation received from Soviet em bassies in countries involved in the situation in Indochina. C histyakov and Tovm asyan w rote that those countries w ere not pre­ pared to agree on a negotiated settlem ent o f tile V ietnam problem . W ashington did not w ant the neutralization o f South V ietnam , according to die Soviet em ­ bassy in the U nited States, out o f fear that the idea w ould be supported by a num ­ ber o f A sian countries. London w ould not venture to quarrel w ith the U nited States on this issue. The French w ould follow s u it Even India would not defi­ nitely support neutralization. The Soviet’s Com m unist allies’ position w as no m ore encouraging. H anoi, though not opposing the idea o f a conference (Ml V iet­ nam , believed that conditions for it w ere not yet ripe and was planning to use tills issue m ostly as a propaganda tool. The Chinese also paid only lip service to Prince Sihanouk’s initiatives on the settlem ent o f the conflict in V ietnam . There­ fore the conclusion leached by C histyakov and Tovm asyan w as logical: "The socialist countries should w ork out a single program o f settlem ent o f the South V ietnam ese problem in advance. H ow ever, an in itia tiv e in ra isin g th is issu e a s w ell a s th e ừ su e o f th e convening o f an in tern a tio n a l conference on South V iet­ nam sh o u ld b e releg a ted to th e D R V ."61 T hev conclusion fully reflected the Soviet tendency tow ard disengagem ent evident in its Indochina policy from mid-1961 onw ard, a tendency based on a pragm atic evaluation o f the situation in and around the region. W hen the prin­ cipal participants in the conflict opposed negotiations and other countries in­ volved avoided taking firm positions, M oscow also chose to be an (»looker and avoided putting forw ard initiatives concerning negotiations so as not to quarrel w ith the V ietnam ese o r provoke further accusations on the part o f the C hinese— apparently im portant considerations fo r the Soviets. M oscow was w ell inform ed about the DRV’s attitude tow ard negotiations. U nlike W estern observers who had taken at face value both H anoi’s public pro­ nouncem ents and the secret revelations m ade by unidentified N o th V ietnam ese diplom ats about theữ country’s desire to find a peaceful settlem ent o f the V iet­ nam problem ,68 the Soviet leaders possessed first-hand inform ation that they re­ ceived from the highest levels o f the DRV leadership. Exam ples o f such infor­ m ation included a letter Ho Chi M inh sent to M oscow on behalf o f the C entral Com m ittee o f the W orkers’ Party o f V ietnam on M ay 2 5 ,1962, that contained an exposure o f N orth V ietnam ese policy tow ard South V ietnam . Ho w rote that Hanoi follow ed a tw o-pronged course, sim ultaneously intensifying both the po­ litical and m ilitary struggles w ith a single purpose: “to force the enem y back, step by step, and to achieve partial successes, to w ear out and to elim inate m ost o f the enem y’s m anpow er.”69 D iplom acy w as only a part o f this strategy, and the m ilitary com ponent was predom inant: A lthough the DRV regularly called

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for negotiations in 1961-1963, Hanoi at the sam e tim e sent to the South m ore than 40,000 people and thousands o f tons o f am m unition and equipm ent in­ cluding 165,000 guns, and it m obilized during that period 73,000 people for die revolutionary arm ed forces that by 1964 totaled 150,ooo.70 W hile it w as undertaking efforts to intensify the struggle in South V ietnam , Hanoi w anted to avoid u.s. intervention in the conflict and the spread o f die w ar in the region. It was w ith this concern in m ind that the N orth V ietnam ese con­ tem plated diplom atic initiatives such as an international conference on V ietnam , an idea H anoi raised from tim e to tim e to dem onstrate to the w orld that it w as not opposed to a negotiated settlem ent. B ut diplom acy w as subordinated to the w ar against the Saigon regim e. “The friends believe,” the Southeast A sia De­ partm ent o f the Soviet Foreign M inistry stated in its m em orandum o f D ecem ber 25,1962, “that the m ore the w ar is dragged out, the m ore the enem y w ould suf­ fer a defeat and be w ould be persuaded o f the im possibility to w in over the pa­ triotic forces. In that case he w ould agree on a peaceful settlem ent.”71 Thus, ne­ gotiations w ere to b e an outcom e o f the arm ed struggle in the South; during the struggle they w ere purely a tool o f propaganda designed to prevent u.s. in­ volvem ent in V ietnam . M oscow surm ised correctly that this strategy fo r the South had been w orked out by H anoi under the strong influence o f the C hinese allies. In fact, w hile w arning the N orth V ietnam ese leaders against large-scale m ilitary operations in South V ietnam , B eijing insisted on protracted guerrilla w arfare and prom ised its support in arm s and equipm ent. For exam ple, in the sum m er o f 1962, C hina agreed to give the DRV, free o f charge, ninety thousand rifles and guns that could equip tw o hundred thirty infantry battalions. These weapons w ere to be shipped through the DRV to the guerrillas in the South.72 A t the sam e tim e, the K rem lin w ith its pessim istic attitude tow ard develop­ m ents in Indochina and its decision to give up attem pts to influence those de­ velopm ents, expressed hopes that the w ar in the region could still be averted w ith the help o f the m achinery established by the 1954 G eneva conference, w hich neither o f the rivals had ventured to renounce com pletely. The ICC was at the center o f that m achinery. M oscow ’s directives to the Soviet am bassador in the DRV in early 1962 pointed out that the ICC had not yet exhausted its po­ tential and its activities “m eet the interests o f the preservation and consolidation o f peace on the Indochinese peninsula” and could be used to the advantage o f the D RV .73 The obvious purpose o f these Soviet assertions was to conceal M oscow’s pas­ sivity, indecisiveness, and vacillations about events in Indochina and cover M oscow’s retreat in a situation when none o f the direct participants in the conflict regarded the Geneva agreem ents as an obstacle to theừ plans in V ietnam The

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Soviets were even ready to close theử eyes to the fact that the ICC had ceased fa­ vor the DRV as a result o f India’s changing attitude toward Hanoi’s policy in South V ietnam in 1962 and its growing suspicion about North Vietnam ’s support for sub­ versive activities in die South. The Indian delegation m ore and m ore often aligned itself with the Canadians, thus leaving the Polish representatives in the m inority. A diplom atic bom bshell exploded on June 2, 1962, w hen the ICC sent the cochairs a special report signed by India and Canada w ith a dissenting statem ent by the Polish com m issioner. The report accused both the DRV and South V iet­ nam o f violations o f “fundam ental provisions o f the G eneva agreem ents. . . re­ sulting in ever increasing tension and threat o f open hostilities.”74 These viola­ tions took the form o f the virtual m ilitary alliance betw een the U nited States and the Saigon regim e on the one hand, and H anoi’s increasing support fo r the strug­ gle against the South V ietnam ese governm ent, on the other. A lthough the IC C ’s special report condem ned both sides, the reaction o f the N orth V ietnam ese authorities w as especially negative. They issued denuncia­ tions and denials and attacked the ICC report and the com m ission itseư. The brunt o f the attack w as directed against the Indian chairm an o f the ICC, G. Parthasarathi.75 H anoi’s denunciations o f the ICC concerned the Soviet leaders, w ho w orried w ith the Poles that the N orth V ietnam ese w anted to cut o ff the com m ission’s activities in V ietnam . M oscow also disapproved o f H anoi’s ac­ cusations against India on the grounds that they w ould lead to D elhi’s further alienation and its closer alignm ent w ith the W est. Soviet diplom ats, together w ith theừ Polish colleagues, tried to persuade the N orth V ietnam ese o f the ad­ vantages o f the continuation o f the IC C ’s activity in V ietnam . A report o f the U SSR em bassy in H anoi shows that die Soviets reiterated to DRV officials the need to m aintain cooperation w ith the ICC, im prove relations w ith the Indian delegation, and sm ooth over several problem s in H anoi’s relations w ith the com m ission. M oscow still regarded the ICC as “a containing factor w hich helps die preservation o f peace in V ietnam .”76 A s M oscow tried to convince the N orth V ietnam ese o f the advantages o f co­ operation w ith the ICC, the Soviet Foreign M inistry w as w orking out plans to provide support to the N ational Liberation Front o f South V ietnam , an organi­ zation established by H anoi to facilitate its activity in the South. The Soviets w ere evidently attracted by the relative m oderation o f the NLFSV, w hich envi­ sioned an independent and neutral South V ietnam governed by a coalition gov­ ernm ent. The Soviets w ere also sym pathetic to the front’s objective o f rallying the support o f various South V ietnam ese social strata and political organiza­ tions— im plying a political rather than a m ilitary struggle— to form an effective opposition to the D iem regim e.77 M oscow w as not concerned, how ever, by the fact that the establishm ent o f the NLFSV did not prevent the developm ent o f

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arm ed struggle. The front in fact soon becam e a useful cover fo r H anoi’s m ili­ tary plans in the South. Soviet support to the NLFSV w as lim ited m ostly to diplom acy. M oscow planned to facilitate the N LFSV ’s entry into the international arena and its recognition as a representative o f the South V ietnam ese people.78 Soviet influ­ ence brought the front invitations to take part in various congresses and confer­ ences organized by Soviet-controlled associations and organizations such as the seventh congress o f the International U nion o f Students in Leningrad, the sixth assem bly o f the W orld D em ocratic Y outh Federation in W arsaw , and the fifth congress o f the International A ssociation o f Journalists in B udapest Som e East European countries began to consider perm itting NLFSV perm anent m issions in th d r capitals.79 The Soviet U nion also w as on the itineraries o f NLFSV delegations. O n July 5, 1962, a front delegation arrived in the Soviet U nion to participate in the W orld Congress fo r G eneral D isarm am ent and Peace. It w as received at the So­ viet A fro-A sian Solidarity Com m ittee, evidently to find out the NLFSV’s posi­ tions on controversial issues o f w ar and peace. W hat the Soviets heard could not have pleased them m ore; they reported that ‘*11)6 NLFSV delegation occupies the position o f com plete and unreserved support” o f the policy o f the Soviet Com ­ m unist Party and the U SSR governm ent on all issues touched on during the con­ versations. Front representatives reportedly shared Soviet view s on com plete disarm am ent, the struggle for peace, and the strength o f im perialism ; and they fully approved Soviet policy tow ard South V ietnam .80 The Soviets detected not the slightest desire on the part o f the delegates to express view s that differed from M oscow ’s interpretation o f Soviet-Chinese relations, the cult o f personal­ ity, and other controversial issues. In all their public presentations and private conversations, the NLFSV delegation em phasized the vanguard role o f the So­ viet U nion in the socialist cam p and expressed its appreciation for the support o f the Soviet people and their governm ent.81 W hen the NLFSV delegation visited Hanoi and B eijing later that year, how ­ ever, the South V ietnam ese Com m unists hardly m entioned the Soviet struggle fo r peace.82 It becam e clear that the NLFSV visitors to the Soviet U nion, under H anoi’s instructions, had deliberately m ade pronouncem ents that w ould please the K rem lin in order to obtain additional support—not only diplom atic sup­ port—from M oscow. N orth V ietnam ese hopes for Soviet support o f theừ struggle in South V ietnam w ere not realized, at least in the com ing year. Events surrounding the Cuban m issile crisis in O ctober 1962 discouraged M oscow from any risky m oves in the area o f foreign policy. The C uban crisis dem onstrated to Soviet leadership how dangerous a conflict betw een the superpow ers arm ed w ith nuclear w eapons

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could be. Soviet leaders, w ho had to rely on questionable allies, decided to avoid theữ country’s involvem ent in situations in rem ote areas o f the globe in w hich Ư.S. national interests, real or im aginary, w ere at stake.83 The Cuban m issile crisis had a great im pact on the Soviet attitude tow ard the conflict in Indochina. It accelerated the process, already under w ay, o f the K rem lin’s abandonm ent o f an active policy in the region. If M oscow had earlier tried som ehow to influence the situation w ith rem inders about the G eneva A c­ cords and the possibility o f peaceful negotiations in the form o f an international conference, during the period after O ctober 1962 the Soviet U nion rem ained m ostly a bystander to the dangerous developm ents in V ietnam . K hrushchev, w ho had been advocating the policy o f disengagem ent from V ietnam , w as m ote than ever prepared to sacrifice the illusory prospects o f a Com m unist victory in Southeast A sia in favor o f détente w ith die W est H e did not w ant to risk another showdown w ith the U nited States after tile failure o f his C uban adventure. In addition, his political standing w ithin the Soviet leadership w as now dim inished. Because o f the grow ing dissatisfaction am ong the Soviet Com m unist Party’s bureaucrats over his dom estic policy, any and new ill-con­ sidered steps in the international arena could cost Khrushchev dearly.84 H e also suspected the N orth V ietnam ese leaders o f duplicity because they refused to take sides in die Sino-Soviet dispute and align them selves w ith M oscow. A ll these factors probably contributed to the Soviet unw illingness to m eddle in die conflict in Vietnam . K hrushchev therefore turned a deaf ear to w arnings o f his A sian experts about the possible negative consequences o f Soviet restraint during the V ietnam con­ flic t For exam ple, the Foreign M inistry’s Southeast A sia D epartm ent drew the attention o f its superiors to the fact that Soviet restraint was “interpreted in the U nited States as the unw illingness to get em broiled” in the conflict. Such an as­ sessm ent could give birth to “dangerous illusions on the part o f the A m erican m ilitary clique w hose high level representatives declare boastfully that w ithin a b rief period o f tim e they w ill achieve a com plete ’pacification’ o f South V iet­ nam and liquidate the guerrilla m ovem ent in that country.”83 A nother consequence o f Soviet disengagem ent was H anoi’s accelerated drift tow ard China and the further erosion o f the Soviet position in the DRV. By 1963 C hina was prepared to m ake a m ajor com m itm ent to N orth Vietnam . D uring a M ay visit to the DRV, one o f the PR C ’s leaders, Liu Shaoqi, assured Ho C hi M inh, “W e are standing by your side, and if w ar breaks out, you can regard C hina as your rear.”86 This assertion w as coupled by new prom ises o f assistance to the ’’heroic struggle” o f the V ietnam ese C om m unists against the D iem regim e.

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Encountering M oscow ’s lack o f desire to support its policy tow ard South V ietnam , Hanoi had to abandon its previous policy o f balancing betw een the tw o C om m unist allies. It threw itself into the arm s o f China. Le D uan, in a speech at the N guyen A i Quoc party school in M arch 1963, com m em orating the eightieth anniversary o f K arl M arx’s death, openly defied fundam ental tenets o f the Soviet theory o f com m unism and revolutionary struggle. H e argued that “the proletariat has no alternative but to use violence to dem olish the bourgeois state apparatus and to establish one o f its ow n.” Le D uan also questioned the concept o f peaceful evolution tow ard socialism and pointed out that “the w orking class and M arxist-L eninist parties, w hile seeking to m ake revolution by peaceful m eans/ m ust m ake active preparations for the seizure o f pow er by violence.” He criticized aid supplied by the Soviet Union to bourgeois nationalist regim es like India and Egypt, and he called for tile exposure o f the Y ugoslav revisionists as a requirem ent “essential to tile sm ooth progress o f tile people’s revolutionary cause in nationalist countries.”87 Le D uan’s speech w as so m uch to the lilting o f B eijing that it w as printed in full by tile People’s Daily and broadcast by the New China N ews A gency.88 L ater H anoi joined C hina in its criticism o f the Lim ited T est Ban Treaty signed by the Soviet U nion, tile U nited States, and G reat B ritain in July 1963. On A ugust 6 and 9, Nhan Dan, the W PV new spaper, published editorials in w hich it supported C hina’s opposition to the treaty and dem anded com plete and total nuclear disarm am ent. In Septem ber, tile V ietnam ese Com m unist theoreti­ cal journal H oc Tap denounced the treaty as “the result o f a deal struck by the leaders o f nuclear pow er” and said it contradicted “the peace-loving peoples o f the w orld.”89 D espite H anoi’s apparent adherence to Chinese policies, N orth V ietnam ese leaders had not com pletely abandoned th en hopes for cooperation w ith the So­ viet U nion and for obtaining M oscow ’s support in th en struggle for the unifica­ tion o f Vietnam . Perhaps this w as one o f the reasons why H anoi, after firm ly de­ ciding in favor o f arm ed struggle in the South, did not cease its efforts in searching for a peaceful settlem ent o f the conflict. Beginning in A ugust 1963, the W est began receiving indications about the possibility o f som e kind o f diplom atic accom m odation betw een H anoi and Saigon. On A ugust 10, N go D inh N hu, South V ietnam ese president D iem ’s in­ fluential brother, confided to tw o B ritish diplom ats, Lend Selkirk and Donald M urray, that he had had regular m eetings w ith representatives from N orth V iet­ nam. He described a group o f patriotic individuals in Hanoi w ho w ere m ore na­ tionalist than com m unist and w ho sought a solution to the problem o f Vietnam . Nhu claim ed that som e from this group had visited him .90 Soon the new s about

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the D iem governm ent’s contacts reached W ashington, and W illiam C olby o f the CIA detailed them during a discussion that took place at the State D epartm ent w ith the participation o f highest officials o f the Kennedy adm inistration. C olby said that, in N hu’s contacts w ith tile N orth, N hu w as acting through French rep­ resentatives in Saigon.91 In fact, the French am bassador to Saigon, R oger Lalouette, w as am ong those w ho believed that neutralization w as the best solution fo r South V ietnam and that this could be negotiated w ith the NLFSV and perhaps H anoi.92 A nother per­ son who shared these view s w as M ieczyslaw M aneli, the Polish delegate to the ICC in V ietnam . M aneli also encouraged D iem 's brother to seek contacts w ith the N orth V ietnam ese. In early Septem ber talks w ith N hu, M aneli pretended to be authorized by Pham V an D ong to act as interm ediary.93 M aneli reported his activities to his superiors in W arsaw as w ell as to the Soviet em bassy in H anoi.94 W ashington believed that rum ors about a possible deal betw een Hanoi and Saigon w ere credible and that the Diem governm ent w as seriously interested in som e form o f rapprochem ent w ith the N orth. O f course, unification w as not con­ sidered an im m ediate goal o f the negotiations; hopes centered on som e kind o f cease-fire or neutralization.99 U .S. officials also suspected that N hu, perhaps w ith the tacit approval o f D iem him setf, w anted to acquire room to m aneuver vis-à-vis the U nited States and increase the South’s leverage to resist u.s. pres­ sure for political reform s in South V ietnam .96 W hy w as tile N orth V ietnam ese leadership interested in exploring prospects o f negotiations? A lthough tile idea o f negotiations served m ainly as a propa­ ganda tool fo r H anoi, the V ietnam ese Com m unist leaders had never discarded tile possibility that negotiations w ith Saigon could lead to som e kind o f accom ­ m odation w ith the southern regim e, the eventual establishm ent o f a coalition governm ent in South V ietnam , and u .s. w ithdraw al from Indochina. N orth V ietnam ese leaders believed that such an opportunity w ould arise only in a sit­ uation o f sharp contradictions and clashes betw een tile U nited States and die D iem regim e as w ell as w ithin the D iem governm ent itself.97 Because contra­ dictions betw een W ashington and Saigon reached a high point in A ugust and Septem ber 1963, and som e officials in the Kennedy adm inistration seriously considered the ouster o f D iem and his fam ily from pow er,98 H anoi believed that the situation could not have been m ore propitious for initiating contacts w ith die D iem regim e. The Soviet attitude tow ard the N orth-South exchanges in 1963 is not clear, m ainly because o f the lack o f declassified docum entary sources in the R ussian archives. B ut it is not difficult to infer, given M oscow 's general disposition to­ w ard negotiated settlem ent and its previous efforts to stim ulate N orth V iet­ nam ese contacts w ith the D iem regim e. The K rem lin had long advocated nego-

A Disposition to W ar

tiations betw een the N orth and the South that could lead to som e kind o f under­ standing, particularly if this w ould result in Ư.S. w ithdraw al from the region. How feasible w as such an outcom e in M oscow ’s eyes? M oscow had been in­ form ed about die contacts betw een the N orth V ietnam ese and N go D inh Nhu99 and m ight have tacitly approved the Polish diplom at’s m ediation to facilitate them .100 In this, the K rem lin follow ed a pattern that w ould becom e its m odus operandi afro* the U nited States began its direct m ilitary involvem ent in the w ar in V ietnam : die Soviets acted through th eữ E ast European allies w hen they found it inexpedient to intervene openly. W ould the Soviets have played m ore active role later if initial negotiations be­ tw een H anoi and Saigon had encouraged real prospects o f peaceful settlem ent? T his is an open question because these prospects never becam e a reality. A larm ed by the possibility o f a D iem -H o deal and the eventual w ithdraw al o f the U nited States from South V ietnam as w ell as dissatisfied w ith the Saigon regim e’s intransigence and its grow ing anti-A m ericanism , W ashington favored a coup d ’état against D iem in order to bring to pow er in South V ietnam m ore tractable ru lers.101 The coup took place on N ovem ber 1,1963. D iem and Nhu w ere arrested and soon shot; N hu w as knifed several tim es as w ell.102 T he overthrow o f D iem had im portant consequences for the V ietnam situa­ tion. M ost im m ediate w as that the N orth V ietnam ese leaders opted once and for all fo r a m ilitary solution to the conflict In D ecem ber 1963 the ninth plenum o f the W PV C entral C om m ittee took place in H anoi, and it placed arm ed struggle above all other form s o f Com m unist activities in South V ietnam and called for the creation o f pow erful m ilitary units there.103 A t the sam e forum , the N orth V ietnam ese C om m unists com pleted theừ party’s separation from the K rem lin’s international line. In his speech at the plenum , Le Duan dism issed the Soviet strategy fo r the socialist cam p as defensive and instead praised M ao Zedong’s theory o f revolutionary w ar.104 H anoi’s sw itchover to C hina led to som e changes in N orth V ietnam ese leadership. The plenum dism issed from im portant posts a num ber o f party officials w ho w ere know n fo r their pro-Soviet and antiC hinese sentim ents; som e w ere transferred to econom ic bodies o f the govern­ m ent, others w ere dism issed on grounds o f poor health.105 Soviet influence in V ietnam fell to its po st-1954 nadir. Soviet diplom ats fought on the front lines o f H anoi’s change in attitude. M ieczyslaw M aneli observed during tw o official receptions in Hanoi in those years how Pham V an Dong deliberately ignored the Soviet am bassador, Suren Tovm asyan. M aneli described Tovm asyan as “a caged tiger. He was helpless because he could not ‘teach’ these goddam ned V ietnam ese the way his col­ leagues in the 1940s and 1950s did in W arsaw , Prague, B udapest, and Sofia. He lost his ‘freedom ’ and ‘dignity,’ because in H anoi he w as a ‘paper tiger.’” 106

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Y et even then the N orth V ietnam ese leaders w ere not prepared to break w ith theừ Soviet ally com pletely. They still nourished hopes for obtaining support from the USSR, the m ost pow erful o f the Com m unist countries. They also un­ derstood the im portance o f unity in the Com m unist cam p for the success o f th eừ struggle for the reunification o f V ietnam . Therefore Ho Chi M inh continued to urge a Sino-Soviet dialogue and to s a id letters to both rivals. H is efforts proved futile, how ever. M ao’s reply on D ecem ber 2 7,1963, to H o’s several letters w as not encouraging. A lthough not rejecting outright negotiations w ith the Soviets, the C hinese leader expressed pessim ism th at reconciliation w ould soon be achieved and claim ed that it w ould take m ore than ten years to achieve an out­ com e that was “favorable to revolution and to a true solidarity.” 107 M oscow w as no m ore responsive to H anoi’s overtures; in addition, K hrushchev was evidently irritated by die decisions o f the ninth plenum o f die W orkers’ Party o f Vietnam . H e openly w arned the N orth V ietnam ese leaders w ho visited M oscow in January 1964 about the consequences o f W PV adher­ ence to Chinese precepts that did not “m eet die interests o f die unity and cohe­ sion betw een the W PV and the CPSU , the interests o f die socialist cam p and the w orld com m unist m ovem ent as a w hole.” 108 Thus Soviet-V ietnam ese relations rem ained frozen. O nly after the com m encem ent o f die hot w ar in V ietnam ’s Tonkin G ulf six m onths later did the N orth V ietnam ese-Soviet ice begin to m elt in the nam e o f proletarian solidarity.

Conclusion It is easier to make war than to make peace. Georges Clemenceau

July 20,1919

T h e tw o deaths in N ovem ber 1963 had a significant im pact on the develop­ m ent o f the conflict in Vietnam . The overthrow o f Ngo D inh Diem on Novem­ ber I, 1963, contrary to expectations o f Ư.S. policym akers, did not lead to greater stability in South Vietnam . Q uite the opposite occurred, for the coup d 'é ta t in Saigon w as soon follow ed by another, w ithout im provem ent in the prospects for prevailing over the internal insurgency. As a result, a few m onths later, Secretary o f D efense R obert M cNam ara had to report to President John­ son that "conditions in South V ietnam had unquestionably w orsened since the coup” against Diem . The South V ietnam ese regim e rem ained unable to w in political backing o r legitim acy; furtherm ore, it could not even rely on its ow n arm y.1 The desperate situation in South V ietnam alarm ed V ice President Lyndon B. Johnson, w ho becam e president after John F. K ennedy’s assassination in D allas on N ovem ber 22,1963. Johnson, who had from the outset voiced strong doubts about the necessity o f overthrow ing the D iem regim e, w as determ ined to pre­ vent the fall o f South V ietnam to Com m unists. He pursued the policy o f his predecessor in V ietnam but w ith m ore vigor and insistence.2 Soon after he be­ cam e president, he said in strongly personal term s: "I am not going to lose V iet­ nam . I am not going to be the President w ho saw Southeast A sia go the way C hina w ent.”3 These words foretold increased u.s. involvem ent in the V ietnam conflict. A lready Ư.S. involvem ent w as not lim ited to South V ietnam and the support and encouragem ent o f the Saigon regim e. The u.s. adm inistration carried out various operations against the DRV in order to convince the Com m unist lead­ ership o f the futility o f its efforts to conquer the South and to retaliate for the

Conclusion

N orth’s support o f the V ieteong. C overt u.s. operations w ithin die so-called OPLAN 34A included die insertion o f airborne com m andos into the N orth, sab­ otage, diversionary operations, and the collection o f intelligence.4 Land opera­ tions w ere supplem ented w ith patrols along the coast o f V ietnam , under the code nam e D eSoto, conducted to gather inform ation on N orth V ietnam ese coastal de­ fenses. D uring 1964, how ever, it becam e apparent to W ashington that covert opera­ tions against N orth V ietnam w ould not bring the desired results. M cNamara, w ho returned from a trip to South V ietnam in M arch o f that year, described OPLAN 34A as “a program so lim ited that it is unlikely to have any significant e ffe c t” O ther members o f the Ư.S. adm inistration held sim ilar view s.5 Policym akers in W ashington began to consider planning m ajor m ilitary actions against the DRV, w hich included the bom bing o f N orth V ietnam ese territory. R eferring to his M arch 1964 visit to Saigon, M cNamara adm itted, “W hile I did not recom m end increased A m erican m ilitary involvem ent, I did agree to begin planning for U .S. aữ attacks in the N orth.” He sent such options to President Johnson.6 In early 1964, the situation in Indochina had reached a danger point and w as on the verge o f breaking out into open hostilities betw een the opposing parties. The determ ination o f the N orth V ietnam ese leadership to pursue unification o f V ietnam by any m eans, including the overthrow o f the Saigon regim e— ex­ pressed in the decisions o f the ninth plenum o f the W orkers’ Party o f V ietnam in D ecem ber 1963— m ade the com m encem ent o f w ar a question o f m onths, if not days. The incidents in the G ulf o f Tonkin during the first days o f A ugust 1964 that caused retaliatory u.s. strikes against N orth V ietnam w ere a prologue to open U .S. intervention in the conflict.7 A resolution adopted by the U .S. C ongress on A ugust 7, w hich granted Johnson broad pow ers to conduct com bat operations in the region, rem oved the last obstacles on the w ay to w ar. In Febru­ ary 1965, Johnson gave the order to begin the bom bing cam paign against the DRV, and in M arch the first Ư.S. m ilitary contingents landed in South V ietnam . The V ietnam W ar had begun. The Soviet U nion rem ained for the m ost part a passive observer. Even the Tonkin G ulf incident stirred only a w eak reaction from the Soviet leaders, w ho confined them selves to press com m ents about u.s. “aggressive actions.” N ikita Khrushchev sent President Johnson a form al letter w ith w arnings about the dan­ ger o f w ar in Indochina.8 It appears that M oscow had decided that w hatever w as happening in V ietnam was beyond its influence, a position that reflected the So­ viet leadership’s deep disillusionm ent w ith its policy tow ard the conflict in In­ dochina. This disillusionm ent w ent back to the 1954 G eneva agreem ent, w hich the So­ viets regarded as a guarantee against w ar in Southeast A sia for a m ore o r less

Conclusion

prolonged period o f tim e. W hile recognizing the w eaknesses o f these agree­ m ents, Soviet leaders believed that adhering to diem could help transform the agreem ents in to an im portant com ponent o f regional peace. F or exam ple, prospects for peace w ould be enhanced if the U nited States com plied w ith die decisions o f the G eneva conference and refrained from violating them , if the French m aintained a presence in die region, and if V ietnam w ere divided into tw o parts because die Soviets believed that had been a proved solution to dis­ putes betw een the tw o opposing cam ps during die C old W ar. Soviet efforts to bring peace to Southeast A sia w ere dictated not so m uch by a peaceful disposition on the part o f the Soviet leaders but by theữ desire to elim inate this thorny issue from M oscow ’s relations w ith the W est A lthough not averse to a Com m unist victory in the region, the K rem lin ascribed to In­ dochina no geostrategic im portance and did not w ant the crisis there to be an im ­ pedim ent to the process o f détente w ith the U nited States and its allies. This lack o f interest in Indochina also explains why, after the G eneva conference, Soviet leaders w ere eager to delegate the prim ary responsibility fo r the fledgling Com­ m unist state in N orth V ietnam to tbeữ Chinese allies, thus m aking the C hinese th eữ agents in A sia. H ow ever, die edifice created w ith Soviet help in G eneva began crum bling al­ m ost from the o u tse t The U nited States did in fact avoid open violation o f the G eneva A ccords, at least during the Eisenhow er adm inistration, but it supported and encouraged actions o f the N go D inh Diem regim e in South V ietnam that w ere aim ed at disrupting the im plem entation o f the accords. C laim ing that his governm ent did not sign the G eneva agreem ents, Ngo D inh D iem refused to hold consultations w ith H anoi on an all-V ietnam ese election and proclaim ed an independent state in the South o f the country w ith hỉm seư as its president. A l­ though these events w ere not o f great concern to Soviet policym akers, w ho seem ed to be m ore preoccupied w ith strengthening the DRV as a sovereign and independent state than w ith preparing conditions for reunification, the conse­ quences o f D iem ’s violations o f the G eneva A ccords and the tacit approval o f the U nited States w ere im portant U nlike theừ Soviet com rades, H anoi’s leaders w ere determ ined to achieve the unification o f V ietnam according to the provisions o f the agreem ents reached in G eneva. A lthough they had yielded to the pressure o f theừ pow erful allies in M oscow and B eijing in favor o f the division o f the country, the N orth V iet­ nam ese Com m unists never ceased to regard this division as tem porary and never abandoned th e ừ plans to unify the country under th e ừ authority. A fter the G eneva conference they tried to achieve this objective by peaceful m eans, through negotiations w ith Saigon and general elections. As it becam e m ore and m ore obvious to them that N go D inh D iem w ith the support o f his U .S. advisers

Conclusion

w as not inclined to com e to term s w ith Hanoi on the issue o f reunification, the DRV leaders becam e increasingly m ilitant and began to regard die support o f the insurgency in the South by hum an and m aterial m eans as the only w ay to overthrow the Saigon regim e and attain a unified Vietnam . In its quest for peace, M oscow could not lim it its efforts to discouraging the N orth V ietnam ese from th ev m ilitary plans in the South; Soviet leaders also had to appeal to the other countries involved in the G eneva settlem ent in order to prevent conflict in Southeast A sia. Y et, at the end o f the 1950s, it seem ed that no other G eneva participant w as prepared to undertake m easures aim ed at re­ viving the 1954 accords on Indochina. The U .S. objective o f transform ing South V ietnam into a bastion o f anticom m unism in the region had led to greater polit­ ical and, later, m ilitary involvem ent o f W ashington on the side o f Saigon. Even a neutral South V ietnam w as anathem a to u.s. policym akers who regarded neu­ trality as only a prelude to the inevitable eventual subm ission o f the country to the Com m unists. G reat B ritain, as a cochaứ o f the G eneva conference along w ith the Soviet U nion, did not w ant to quarrel w ith its U .S. ally over an issue o f m inor im por­ tance com pared w ith W estern solidarity and cooperation. W henever the issue o f V ietnam arose during the course o f international negotiations, London aligned itself w ith the U nited States, accusing the C om m unists o f being the principal vi­ olators o f the settlem ent or resorting to purely form al declarations in support o f the G eneva agreem ents. France was paralyzed by its defeat in the first Indochina w ar and its eventual loss o f its influence in the region. N o one had expected French pow er to disintegrate so rapidly in its form er Indochinese colonies, par­ ticularly Vietnam . Ngo D inh D iem openly aligned his regim e w ith the A m eri­ cans w ho had replaced the French as the principal advisers in all spheres o f life in the South. As a result, France’s voice w as hardly audible in V ietnam ese pol­ itics, at least until the early 1960s when France’s president, C harles deG aulle, put forw ard his initiatives on the neutralization o f Indochina. B ut the m ost severe blow to S oviet policy in Indochina w as struck by M oscow ’s C hinese allies. The Sino-Soviet dispute over the tenets o f M arx­ ism -L eninism and the place o f the tw o countries in the w orld com m unist m ovem ent had seriously affected the K rem lin’s actions in the conflict in V iet­ nam . By the early 1960s, Soviet leaders had to take into account the fact that they now faced in A sia not an ally to whom it w as possible to delegate re­ sponsibility for local affairs but a rival that w as w aiting fo r any blunder by M oscow that it m ight exploit to reap a profit fo r itself. M oreover, this rival, thanks to the Soviets* ow n strategy o f the division o f responsibility, enjoyed great influence over decision m aking in H anoi and used it contrary to the d i­ rection advocated by M oscow .

Conclusion

C onfronted w ith so m any adverse factors in the early 1960s, M oscow evi­ dently decided in favor o f disengagem ent from Indochina, an inclination already apparent during the G eneva conference on Laos in 1961-1962 that w as one o f the U SSR’s last active attem pts to avert w ar in the region. Soviet detachm ent contributed to the subsequent failure o f the agreem ents on Laos and, ultim ately, to die outbreak o f w ar in V ietnam . Had M oscow in fact used all m easures at its disposal to help prevent a regional conflict from grow ing into a serious interna­ tional crisis? If not, w hat prevented the Soviets from doing so? It seem s incontestable now , at the beginning o f the tw enty-first century, that M oscow w as not interested in the w ar in Indochina, and throughout the period after the 1954 G eneva conference it dem onstrated its desire to find a solution o f th e V ietnam ese co n flict. H ow ever, the very facto r th at m ade this co nflict unattractive in the eyes o f the Soviet leaders— the position o f Indochina outside o f the K rem lin’s geostrategic interests— preordained the failure o f Soviet policy aim ed at settlem ent o f the conflict. Indochina and V ietnam w ere on the periph­ ery o f the decision-m aking process in M oscow. The Soviet leadership never paid m uch attention to this issue, placing ahead o f it problem s relating to Euro­ pean affairs and détente w ith the U nited States. N ever during the 1950s and early 1960s— that is, before the V ietnam W ar—in th en negotiations w ith W est­ ern leaders had the highest officials o f the Soviet U nion discussed the issue o f V ietnam w ith a sufficient degree o f substance, as they did later during, for ex­ am ple, the K osygin-W ilson talks in February 1967 and the K osygin-Johnson talks at G lassboro in June o f that sam e year. In the course o f his visit to the U nited States in Septem ber-O ctober 1959, N ikita K hrushchev did not m ention the conflict in V ietnam at all although he paid m uch attention to such problem s as B erlin, u.s. policy tow ard C hina, disarm am ent, and the m aintenance o f var­ ious kinds o f cooperation w ith the U nited States. This negligence indicates that the Soviet leaders did not w ant to sacrifice theử im m ediate concerns and preoc­ cupations for possible advantages in a rem ote part o f the globe. A s a result, M oscow never seriously tried to influence the opinion o f u.s. and other W est­ ern leaders on V ietnam through high-level diplom acy. T hat som e form o f understanding w ith the U nited States on this issue could have been reached during the course o f diplom atic talks by the leaders o f the tw o countries w as dem onstrated during the V ienna sum m it betw een Kennedy and Khrushchev. In the A ustrian capital both the Soviet prem ier and the U .S. presi­ dent displayed determ ination to settle the conflict in Laos and felt an urgency to reach agreem ents to put an end to the Laotian civil w ar and guarantee Laos’s neutrality and sovereignty. The decisions m ade in V ienna stim ulated the nego­ tiation in G eneva and the search for a solution to the Laotian question. The pow­ ers unfortunately did not follow the Laotian exam ple in the case o f V ietnam , and

Conclusion

that deficiency becam e m uch o f die reason for die failure o f the Laotian settle­ m ent. Laos could not be solved w ithout a corresponding solution o f the V ietnam problem . U ndoubtedly, die personality o f the Soviet leader, N ikita s. K hrushchev, had an im pact on M oscow 's policy tow ard the conflict in V ietnam . Flam boyant and im pulsive, he lacked a consistent approach tow ard die outside w orld and often could not reconcile his contradictory attitudes about die processes in Indochina. A lthough he criticized Stalin for his arrogant attitude tow ard the V ietnam ese Com m unists and th en leader. Ho Chi M inh, K hrushchev essentially continued his predecessor’s policy. He had never attached due im portance to the conflict in Indochina, and he relegated the developm ent o f Soviet-N orth V ietnam ese re­ lations to a low place on his foreign policy agenda. D uring his eleven-year tenure as the first secretary o f the CPSU C entral C om m ittee and his slightly shorter tenure as Soviet prim e m inister, he never found tim e to visit the DRV for a first-hand im pression o f the country and its leadership. A s the Sino-Soviet dispute sharpened, K hrushchev increasingly view ed the outside w orld through the lens o f his quarrel w ith M ao Zedong. A follow er o f the traditions o f the Bolsheviks, he categorized other Com m unist leaders ac­ cording to theữ readiness to align w ith either M oscow o r B eijing, and the am­ biguous and am bivalent position o f the N orth V ietnam ese Com m unists in the Sino-Soviet dispute accordingly led to K hrushchev’s grow ing suspicion about their real intentions. He regarded w ith disdain H o C hi M inh’s efforts to find a com prom ise and openly derided them . K hrushchev had a “litm us test o f loyalty” for N orth V ietnam as w ell as fo r other countries: “If the DRV could not be counted as an ally against C hina, then the relationship should be dow ngraded.”9 K hrushchev’s disappointm ent w ith the N orth V ietnam ese failure to com ply w ith the G eneva agreem ents on Laos, w hich M oscow was obliged to guarantee, and H anoi’s continuing support o f the insurgency in the South contributed to his unw illingness to becom e enm eshed in Indochina. In addition, the C uban m issile crisis had cooled his enthusiasm fo r testing the U nited States in rem ote areas o f the w orld. Like an ostrich, he m ight have decided to elim inate the V ietnam ese question from the Soviet list o f priorities sim ply by ignoring i t The result w as that, w ith the beginning o f the u.s. bom bing o f the DRV and the introduction o f u.s. troops in the South, the V ietnam problem that confronted K hrushchev’s successors was already not a local conflict; it w as an international crisis and w ar. The new Soviet leadership that cam e to pow er after the O ctober 1964 party coup d ’état against Khrushchev had to revise its policy tow ard the conflict in In­ dochina because the situation there was rapidly m oving tow ard arm ed co n flict Tw o objectives stood before M oscow: im prove relations w ith die N orth V iet­ nam ese, thus increasing Soviet credibility and influence in that country; and re­

Conclusion

sum e a dialogue w ith W ashington and other W estern capitals, thus facilitating a solution o f die V ietnam problem . Soviet prem ier A lexei K osygin w orked on this tw ofold task and w ent to H anoi in February 1965. B ut it w as too late. W hile K osygin w as in die DRV, President Johnson gave orders to retaliate for the V ietcong assault against the Ư.S. base at Pleiku and start bom bing the territory o f the DRV. Y ears later K osygin regretted that W ashington had not consulted M oscow before this fateful decision.10 In spite o f die shift in M oscow 's attitude tow ard V ietnam after O ctober 1964, its basic tenet rem ained as it had been under K hrushchev: elim inate the V ietnam problem from the Soviet foreign policy agenda so it is not an im pedim ent to the solution o f other issues o f prim ary im portance to the K rem lin— Soviet-U .S. re­ lations and détente w ith the W est.11 It is in this light that one should regard all Soviet efforts w ith respect to the V ietnam W ar, w hich w ere die subject o f die au th o r's first book on die Soviet U nion and the conflict in Indochina.

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Notes

1. Arnold Toynbee, Experiences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 89. 2. Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 19%). 3. Some reviewers went as far as discrediting die author’s conception, pointing to the fact that most of documents the author used for this book were reclassified and therefore impossible to verify. They accused the author of “repetition of past Soviet interpretations of the conflict” and even blamed him for a wide use of documents from U.S. archives. Instead they themselves put forward the outdated conception o f die Soviet Union as the principal villain in international relations, responsible for all crises and conflicts. See Richard c. Thornton’s review in Am erican H istorical R eview (O ctober 1997): 1194-1195. 4. R. B. Smith, An International H ừtory o f the Vietnam War, 3 vols. (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1983-1991). s. Peter Lowe, ed., The Vietnam War (London: M acmillan, 1998). 6. Lloyd c. Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds.. International Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000). 7. Zhai Qiang, Chuta and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 2000). 8. Among other works I would like to mention a very substantial contribution to the study of the Vietnam W ar made by Fredrik Logevall. His book Choosing War: the Lost Chance fo r Peace and the Escalation o f War m Vietnam (Berkeley: University of Cali­ fornia Press, 1999) presents the best example of an approach toward the conflict in In­ dochina as an international crisis. 9. See, among others, Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: M oscow's Am bassador to A m erica's Six C old War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, 1995); Mikhail s. Kapitsa, Na raznykh parallelyakh: Zapiski diplom ata (On various parallels: The memoirs of a diplomat) (Moscow: Kniga i Biznes, 19% ); Andrei M. Ledovskii, SSSR i Stalin V su d’bakh Kitaia: Dokumenty i svidetelstva uchastnika sobytii, 1937-1952 (The USSR and Stalin in the fortunes of China: Documents and evidence by a participant o f events) (Moscow: Pam iatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 1999); Oleg A. Troyanovsky, Cherez gody i rasstoianiya: Istoriia odnoi sem 'i (Across years and distances: The history o f a fam ily) (M oscow: V agrius, 1997). See also the com plete edition of N ikita Khrushchev’s memoirs: Nikita s. Khrushchev, Vremia, Liudi, V last’. ( Vospominaniia V

N otes to Pages x ix -4

4-kh knigakh) (Time. People. Power. Memoirs in four volumes) (Moscow: Moscow

News, 1999). 10. For example, R. B. Smith in his An International H istory o f the Vietnam War; see also William Duiker, U.S. Contournent Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); George Herring, A m erica’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975,3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), among others. 11. Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy o f an Alliance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987). 12. Mari Olsen, Solidarity and N ational Revolution: The Soviet Union and the Viet­ namese Communists, 1954-1960 (Oslo: IFS, 1997). 13. Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1997). 14. p. Ỉ. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam: Its Role in the Sino-Soviet D ispute (W estport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973).

Notes to Chapter 1 1. See, for example, Sergei N. Goncharov, John w. Lewis, and Xue Ldtai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, M ao and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Odd Arne Westad, ed.. Brothers in Arms: The R ue and Fall o f the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow W ilson Center Press, 1998). 2. Philippov (Stalin) to Ho Chi Minh, ciphered telegram to Soviet chargé d’affaires in Beijing Shibaev signed by Andrei V yshinskii, February 1, 1950, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv SotsiaTno-Politicheskoi Istorii, formerly RTsKhIDNI (hereafter cited as RGASPI) (Russian State Archive of Social-Political History), fond 45, opis’ 1, delo 295, list 1. 3. Chen Jian, “China and the Vietnam Wars,” in The Vietnam War, ed. Peter Lowe (London: Macmillan, 1998), 153. 4. s . Divil’kovslrii and I. Ognetov, P u t’ k pobede. Ocherk b o r’by za natsional’nuyu nezarisim ost’, edinstvo, m ir i sotsialism VO V’etname (1945-1976 gg.) (The path to vic­ tory. An essay on the struggle for national independence, unity, peace, and socialism in Vietnam) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978), 31. 5. Ibid., 35. 6. Charles McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration o f Eastern P olicy under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 46. 7. Istoriia K itaia (History o f China) (Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1998), 472-485. 8. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, 266,274. 9. Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A P olitical and M ilitary Analysis, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1967), 1%. Emphasis in original. 10. Janos Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes, & D iplom atic One-Up­ manship in Vietnam (South Bend, Ind.: Gateway Editions, 1978), 4. 11. Nguyen Vu Tung, “Coping with die United States: Hanoi’s Search for an Effec­ tive Strategy,” in The Vietnam War, ed. Peter Lowe, 31,32. 12. See: Soveshchaniia Kominforma, 1947,1948,1949: Dokumenty i m aterialy (The

N otes to Pages 4 - 5

conferences o f die Cominfonn, 1947,1948,1949: Documents and materials) (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998), 154,157. 13. See Benoit de Tréglodé, “Premiers contacts entre le Viet Nam et l’Union Sovié­ tique (1947-1948): Nouveaux documents des archives russes.” Approches A sie 16 (1999): 125-135. 14. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asut, 367. 15. See Conrad Brandt, Staiin 's Failure in China, 1924-1927 (Harvard: Harvard Uni­ versity Press, 1958). 16. Niu Jun, “The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance,” in Brothers in Arms, ed. Westad,49. 17. N ikita s. Khrushchev, Vremia. Liudi. V last’. Vospominaniia V 4-kh knigakh (Time. People. Power. Memoirs in four books), vol. 3 (Moscow: Moscow News, 1999), 23. 18. Niu Jun, “Origins o f the Sino-Soviet Alliance,” 70. 19. According to Benôit de TréglodỂ, Liu Shaoqi informed die Soviet chargé d’af­ faires in Beijing about the Chinese intendon to recognize die DRV on December 25, 1949; see: Benôit de Tréglodé, “Les relations entre le Viet-Minh, Moscou et Pékin a travers les documents (1950-1954),” Revue historique des arm ées 4 (2000), 57. Never­ theless, Chinese documents indicate that Mao Zedong telegraphed his decision to China on this issue on January 17,1950, and instructed his subordinates there to broadcast it on die next day; see Shuguang Zhang and Chen Jian, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign P ol­ icy and the C old War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950 (Chicago: Im­ print Publications, 1996), 138. 20. Pravda, January 31,1950. 21. Philippov (Stalin) to Din (Ho Chi M inh), telegram, February 1,1950, RGASPL f. 45,op. l.d /2 9 5 ,1 .1. 22. Din (Ho Chi Minh) to Philippov (Stalin), ciphered telegram, February 7,1950, Ib id .,1.2. _ 23. The exchange o f telegrams between Philippov (Stalin) and Din (Ho Chi Minh), testifies that the Vietnamese leader came to Moscow in February 1950. However, B. de Tiéglodé in his article, “Les relations entre le Viet-Minh, Moscou et Példn,” page 58, pointed to other dates o f visits by die Vietnamese Communist leader. Tréglodé reports that Ho went to Moscow together with a Chinese delegation headed by Zhou Enlai and m et Stalin for the first time on January 20,1950. The possibility of the Russian docu­ ments relating to Ho’s visit bearing falsified dates is highly unlikely, especially because they are confirmed by documents from Chinese archives, as well as die chronology of events based on them; see Chen, “China and the Vietnam Wars,” 154). This confusion over Ho Chi M inh’s visit to Moscow can also be seen in bodes published in the Soviet Union and Russia, where the dates of the visit are moved to an even earlier period—De­ cember 1949. Perhaps the Soviet and Russian authors confused the visits of the Chinese and the Vietnamese leaders, which in fact were very closely related. See, for example, M. p. Isaev and A. s. Chernyshev, Istoriia so vetsko-v’etnamskikh otnoshenii, 1917-1985 (The history o f Soviet-Vietnamese relations) (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1986), 61-62; and M. s. Kapitsa, Na raznykh parallellyakh. Zapiski diplomata (On various parallels. The memoirs of a diplomat) (Moscow: Kniga i biznes, 1996), 260. The truth awaits the declassification o f the whole complex of materials—in Russian, as well as in Chinese and Vietnamese archives—relating to the Vietnamese leader’s visit to Moscow.

N otes to Pages 5 -1 3

24. Chen, “China and the Vietnam Wars,” 154. 25. de Tréglodé, “Les relations entre le Viet-M inh, Moscou et Pékin,” 58-59. 26. Khrushchev, Vremia, Liudi, V ỉast’, 114. 27. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast A sia, 436. 28. Chen, “China and the Vietnam Wars,” 155. 29. Niu Jun, “Origins o f the Sino-Soviet Alliance,” 78n. 30. Ibid. 31. Din (Ho Chỉ Minh) to Philippov (Stalin), letter. October 14,1950, RGASPI, f. 45, op. 1, d. 295,1.4. 32. Ibid., 1.5. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid., 1.4. Emphasis added. 35. Ibid., 1.5. 36. “Soviet Capabilities and Intentions,” National Intelligence Estimate, November 11,1950, National Security Archive, W ashington, D .c. 37. Stalin to Liu Shaoqi, letter, February 2,1951, RGASPL f. 45, op. 1, d. 313,11. 60-61. Soviet contacts with the Indonesian communists were maintained through the Chinese who hosted members o f die so-called Provisional Central Committee (CC) o f the Communist Party o f Indonesia. 38. Ibid., 11.58-59. 39. Ibid., 1.59. 40. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast A sia, 465. 41. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: R ethinking C otd W ar H istory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 84. 42. Chen, “China and the Vietnam W ars,” 156. 43. Din (Ho Chi Minh) to Philippov (Stalin), ciphered telegram, September 30,1952, RGASPL f. 45, op. 1, d. 295,1.10. 44. Ibid., 1.11. 45. Philippov (Stalin) to Din (Ho Chi M inh), Ibid., 1.12. 46. Ho Chi M inh wrote to Stalin: “Dear and Beloved Comrade. I am awaiting your or­ der so as to come, to kiss you, and to present a report on the question of Vietnam. In the expectation of the response, permit me to put forward one suggestion. W hile I will be making the report, it would be desirable that Com. Liu Shaoqi be present at the conver­ sation.” See V. Grigorian (head o f die CPSU c c foreign policy commission) to A. N. Poskryobyshev (Stalin’s aide), October 17,1952, with Ho Chi M inh's letter to Stalin at­ tached, RGASPI, f. 45, op. 1 ,4 295,1.14. 47. Ibid., 1.16. 48. Ib id , 1.18. 49. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast A sia, 479.

Nota« to Chapter 2

1. John Tahourdin (head of the Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office), memo­ randum, March 19,1954, Public Record Office (PRO), FO 371 112048. 2. Kapitsa, Na raznykh paralleUyakh, 267. 3. Pravda, September 30,1953.

N otes to Pages 1 3 -1 7

4. François Joyaux, La Chine et le règlement du prem ier conflit d'indochine ( Genève 1954) (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1979), 90. 5. Isaev and Chernyshov, Istoriia sovetsko-v ’etnamskikh otnoshenii, 61-63. 6. Pravda, August 9,1953. 7. Pravda, September 30,1953. 8. Robert F. Randle, Geneva 1954: The Settlement c f the Indochinese War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 4 -5. Citation is on page 5. 9. Laniel cited the list o f such presentations in his declaration at the French National Assembly on M atch 5, 1954; see: L ’Année politique. 1954. Revue chronologique des principaux fa its politiques, diplomatiques, économiques et sociaux de la France e t de l ’Union française du 1er Janvier1954 au 1er Janvier 1955 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1955), 565. 10. The literature about the French war in Indochina is impressive and would require many pages. I therefore refer to only a few books published in die West: Peter M. Dunn, The F irst Vietnam W ar (New York: S t M artin’s Press, 1985); Bernard B. Fall, H ell m a Very Small Place: The Siege o f Dien Bien Phu (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966); Melvin Gurtov, The F irst Vietnam C risừ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); George c . Herring, America ’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975,2nded. (New York: Knopf, 1985); Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A H istory (New York: Viking Press, 1983); Alan J. Levine, The United States and the Struggle fo r Southeast Asia, 1945-1975 (Westport: Praeger, 1995). 11. L ’A nnie politique, 299. 12. James Cable, The Geneva Conference t ý 1954 on Indochina (London: Macmillan, 1986), 35. _ 13. John Foster Dulles to President Eisenhower, telegram, January 27,1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, Ann Whitman file, Dulles-Herter series, box 2. 14. Vyacheslav Molotov-Georges B idault memorandum of conversation, February 11.1954, Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatzii (AVP RF), Moscow, fond 06, opis’ 13a, papka 25, delo 7, list 25. 15. Vyacheslav M olotov-John Foster Dulles, memorandum of conversation, February 13.1954, Ib id , 1.32. 16. See “Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion o f the Quadripartite M eeting o f the Four Foreign M inisters at Berlin,” February 18,1954, U. s . Department of State, F or­ eign Relations o f the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954: Indochina, vol. 13 (Washing­ ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), part 1,1057. 17. Philippe Devtilers and Jean Lacouture, End o f a War: Indochina, 1954, trans. Alexander Lieven and Adam Roberts (New York: Praeger, 1969), 58. 18. V. M. M olotov, verbatim record of report on results of the Berlin conference of ministers of foreign affairs of the four powers at the plenum of the CPSU CC, M arch 2, 1954, Rossiisltii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI) (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History), fond 2, opis’ 1, delo 77, list 75. Emphasis added. 19. Pavel Yudin-Zhou Enlai, memorandum of conversation, February 16,1954, A VP RF, f 0100, op. 47,379, d. 7,1.22. 20. Ibid. 21. Joyaux, La Chine, 105. 22. Vyacheslav Molotov-Zhang W entien, conversation at reception, March 6,1954, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 13a, p. 25, d. 7,1 .4 1 -6 6

N otes to Paces 1 7 -2 1

2 3 .186th meeting o f die U.S. National Security Council, memorandum of discussion, Friday, Fcbmary 26.1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 13. pt. 1,1080. 24. Ibid., 1080-1081. 23. L ’Année politique, 340. 26. Kirill Novikov-Nguyen Long Bang, memorandum of conversation, February 26, 1934, A VP RF. f. 079. op. 9, p. 6, d. 5,1.26. 27. Ibid., 1.33. 28. Ibid., f. 06. op. 13a, p. 23. d. 7,1.43. 29. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 13. p t 1 .1009n. 30. Tabourdin, memorandum, March 19,1934, m o , FO 371 112048. 31. H. A. F. Hohler, memorandum, Ibid. 32. Vyacheslav Molotov-Zhang W enden, conversation, March 6,1934. 33. Pavel Yudin-Hoang Van Hoan, memorandum of conversation, March 3, 1934, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 47, p. 379, d. 7,1.63. 34. H ie Vietnamese envoy *s arguments, however, resembled those o f the French prime minister in his speech before the National Assembly made on the same day of the con­ versation between the Soviet and Vietnamese ambassadors. But Joseph Laniel, unlike his adversaries, found it possible to resolve die Indochina problem on the basis of the exist­ ing situation, without dividing Vietnam. He suggested evacuating Vietminh troops from the Tonkin delta and creating around its periphery a sort of no-man's-land. He suggested that in central Vietnam, People's Army units should be concentrated in the established zones and, in the south of Vietnam where the Vietminh forces were much less numerous, they should be either disarmed or evacuated. See Joseph Laniel’s declaration on In­ dochina before the National Assembly of France, March 3,1934, L 'Annie politique, 367. 33. Tahourdin, memorandum, March 19,1954, PRO, FO 371 112048. 36. The British ambassador in Saigon, Hubert Graves, reported to the Foreign Office on March 23,1934: “. . . I believe B ench politicians are moving uneasily but percepti­ bly towards partition theory.. . . Partition would not be provoked by the French but it might be accepted.” PRO, FO 371 112048. 37. Lloyd c . Gardner, Approachmg Vietnam: From W orld W ar 11 through Diehbienphu, 1941-1954 (New York: Norton, 1988), 176. 38. There exists an abundant literature on die siege o f Dienbienphu and discussions within the U.S. government about intervening in the battle, including the use of atomic weapons (Operation Vulture). The classic work on the subject is Bernard B. Fall’s H ell In a Very Small Place (1966). For more recent publications see John R. Nordell Jr., The Undetected Enemy: French and American M iscalculations a t Dien Bien Phu (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), and John Prados, The Sky Would Fall: Op­ eration Vulture: the u.s. M ission in Indochina, 1954 (New York: Dial Press, 1983). 3 9 .192nd M eeting o f the u.s. National Security Council, memorandum of discussion, April 6.1934, FRUS, 1952-1954, VOL 13, p t 1,1260. 40. Ibid., 1182. 41. Gardner, Approachmg Vietnam, 173. 42. Vasilii Kuznetzov-Charles Bohlen, memorandum o f conversation, M arch 17, 1934, A VP RF, f. 026, op. 2, p. 4, d. 2,1.42. See also Bohlen’s report on this conversa­ tion in U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1952-1954: The Geneva Conference, vol. 16 (Washington: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1981), 467-468. 43. A VP RF, Ibid. Bohlen recommended to the U.S. government that “in replying to

N otes to Pages 2 1 -2 6

dûs aide-mémoire the point that die Chinese Communists were consulted by its own de­ sire and not by any right should be reemphasized." FRUS, Ibid. 44. “Geneva Conference: Indo-China” w. D. Allen, memorandum, M atch 20,1954, PRO, FO 371 112049. 45. These plans envisaged the writing o f directives for die Soviet delegation, collect­ ing documents of an analytical character, and preparing memoranda and reports on var­ ious aspects of the situation in Southeast A sia An integral part of all these plans was col­ lecting materials on u.s. involvement in the war in Indochina Various preparatory materials are located in the fond 022 (Gromyko’s Secretariat) in the A VP RF. 46. “Questions in Connection with the Forthcoming Geneva Conference,” memoran­ dum, top secret, M atch 15,1954, A VP RF, f. 022, op. 7b, p. 106, d. 7, u. 16-19. 47. Vyacheslav Molotov-22iang W entien, conversation, March 6,1954. 48. Ibid. The North Korean foreign minister, Nam n , also arrived in die Soviet capital for negotiations on the Korean phase of the conference. 49. “Plan o f Talks [for Molotov] with Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh,” memorandum, top secret, April 4,1954, A VP RF, f. 022, op. 7b, p. 106, d. 7,1.23. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., 1.25. 52. Kapitsa, Na raznykh paraUeUyakh, 261-262. 53. Joyaux, in La Chine, page 91, argued: The eventual opening of the negotiations on Indochina . . . fully corre­ sponded to the national interests o f China: it would promote the relaxation of toisions in the Far East which was necessary for China’s economic de­ velopment, eliminate, in die case o f success o f the conference, the danger o f a massive U.S. intervention in the conflict, give the Chinese government a possibility to put an end to ostracism whose victim it was in the United Nations Organization, illustrate the great-power status o f the People’s Re­ public on the international arena and, last, provide opportunity for trade ne­ gotiation with the W est In this situation China’s stakes obviously were too impressive to compromise in favor o f die Vietminh. 54. “Draft of the Directives on the Issue o f Restoration o f Peace in Indo-China,“ memorandum, top secret undated, A VP RF, f. 0100, op. 47, p. 389, d. 107,1.5. 55. Ibid., 1.6-7. 56. “On Positions o f the W estern Powers. Conditions o f the Cessation o f Hostilities in Indochina,” memorandum, top secret undated, A VP RF, f. 022, op. 7b, p. 106, d. 7,11. 27-31. 57. Randle, Geneva 1 9 5 4 , 125. 58. Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The M emoirs o f Anthony Eden (Boston: Houghton M ifflin, I960), 97. 59. John Tahourdin to Hubert Graves, diplomatic communication, M arch 10,1954, PRO, FO 371 112048. 60. Southeast Asia D epartm ent Foreign Office, “Policy Towards Indo-China,” April 1954, Ibid., FO 371 112049. This paper received Eden’s approval. 61. Cable, The Geneva Conference, 54. 62. For Eisenhower’s and Dulles ’s slips o f the tongue on this subject 900 Gardner, A p­ proaching Vietnam, 252-256. Gardner draws attention to the reasons why Dulles found

N otes to P a te s 2 6 -3 0

it possible to agree on partition. On the basis o f documents from British archives, Gard­ ner concludes on page 256 that “the Americans had something else in their mind when they talked about partition: a base for military operations to recapture the whole o f In­ dochina.” 63. “List o f Counselors, Experts, and Members o f die USSR Delegation,” April 12, 1954, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 2, p 1, d 1. 64. Devillers and Lacouture, End o f a War, 124. 65. “List o f Counselors,” A VP RF, f. 0445, op. 2, p. 1, 2n68

Index

D eSoto patrols, 206 détente: early proposals, 14; im portance, 2 1 1 ,2 6 4 n l 1; Indochina as obstacle, 207; M oscow negotiations (1955), 6 7 -6 8 ; Soviet-D R V alliance, 61; U .S. in Indochina, 62 dictatorship o f the proletariat,

100 D iem . See N go D inh D iem D ienbienphu: fall of, 33; as sym bol, 1 9 -2 0 ,3 3 ; U .S. on, 3 3 ,228n28; V ietm inh after, 33; w ounded evacuation, 30 D in. See H o C hi M inh diplom atic relations, 5 7 -5 9 ; South V ietnam , 71 disengagem ent policy, 177,196, 2 0 0 ,2 0 9 ,2 5 7 n ll7 division-of-responsibilities principle, 6 5 ,1 0 9 ,2 0 8 dom ino theory, 20; Eisenhow er, 20; 181-82; support o f allies, 8 -9 D R V -C hina aid agreem ent, 60-61 D RV. See D em ocratic R epublic o f V ietnam D ulles, A llen: M oscow declaration, 121; Sino-Soviet conflict, 106 D ulles, John Foster, 15; arrival in G eneva, 28; elections issue, 72; G eneva departure, 3 2 -3 3 ; G eneva participants, 30; G eneva preparations, 19; m ilitary alliance in Southeast A sia, 20; M olotov com pared, 5 2 -5 3 ; M olotov's behavior, 17; M olotov visit, 30; seven points, 41; “united action,”

20,22 D urbrow , E lbridge, 183

E astern E urope, 199,203 E ast G erm any, 119 econom ic aid, C hinese, 6 0 -6 1 ,9 0 , 1 0 3 -4 ,1 0 8 ,1 1 5 ,1 9 0 -9 1 ; Laos, 126; obsolete, 192 econom ic aid: dom ino theory, 9; partition effects, 59 econom ic aid, Soviet, 5 9 -6 1 ,9 0 , 113,188; agreem ents, 95; am ount increased, 65; cease-fire in V ietnam , 59; com pared, 260n32; industrial, 6 1 ,9 5 ,1 0 7 ; Pham V an D ong, 113; to L aos, 1 4 0,142 econom ic aid, U .S., L aos, 126 E den, A nthony, 15-16; D ulles annoyance, 32; elections, 74; French political situation, 41; G eneva breakdow n, 3 8 ,3 9 -4 0 , 229n51 ; G eneva participants, 30; im portance o f G eneva, 71; on M olotov, 52; partition issue, 25; peace after D ienbienphu, 34; return to G eneva, 43; role in negotiating G eneva, 25 education, C hinese aid, 109 Eisenhow er, D w ight D .: dom ino theory, 20; D RV recognition, 24 Eisenhow er adm inistration: crucial decisions, 61; Indochina policy, 181-82 elections in Laos, 137; Pathet L ao absent, 123-24 elections in V ietnam : B ritish on, 72, 7 3 ,7 4 ,7 7 ; consultative conference, 6 9 -7 0 ; D iem intransigence, 75; DRV on, 78; final DRV proposal, 83; G eneva A ccord w ording, 70; Polish view , 73; postponem ent o f solution, 77; South V ietnam , 6 9 -7 0 ,7 1 ,7 2 ;

Index

elections in V ietnam : (continued) Soviet view , 7 3 -7 4 ,8 1 ; unification approaches, 75; Ư.S. view , 72. See also all-V ietnam elections electrical generation, 95 Europe: C om m unist successes, 3 -4 ; Soviet (m entation tow ard, 57 European D efense C om m unity (ED C ), 13; French m em bership, 17; great-pow er negligence, 50; pressures on France, 51 FA L (Forces A rm ées de Laos), 151 F all, B ernard, 135-36 fam ine threat, 5 9 -6 0 Fedenko, F. A ., 3 8 ,4 4 five-pow er conference, 15 foreign policy: H anoi position, 93; Sino-Soviet differences, 102-5 fourteen-pow er conference on Laos, 154-55; C om m unist position, 155; Soviet directives, 156,157 France: A lgerian problem , 194; seen by B ulganin as kicked out by U .S., 6 2 -6 3 ; C om m unist successes, 3 -4 ; conservatism , 194; D iem on m ilitary w ithdraw al, 82; D ienbienphu as sym bol, 19-20; European D efense C om m unity, 13; G eneva A ccords, 1 2 ,7 6 ,1 0 9 ,2 0 8 ; M oscow conditions, 22; negative assessm ent, 194; neutrality o f South V ietnam , 195,196; N orth V ietnam ese cooperation, 6 4 -6 5 , 234n45; peace negotiations, 14; political situation, 41; secret m eeting w ith V ietm inh, 36-3 7 ; South V ietnam ese request fo r

troop w ithdraw al, 7 9 ,8 0 ; Soviet am bassador in V ietnam , 57; Soviet approaches, 15; Soviet approach to G eneva, 18; Soviet interference avoided, 50; Soviet overtures, 14-15; troop w ithdraw al, 6 1 ,7 9 ,8 0 ,8 2 , 236n45; Ư.S. aid, 13; W ashington negotiations, 39 Franco-A m erican policy tow ard V ietnam , 62 Frédéric-D upont, Edouard, 38 freedom o f expression, peasants, 93 “free zones,” 2 French colonialism , m anagem ent skills, 59 French C om m unist Party, 3 Friendship m agazine, 120 fuel delivery to Laos, 142 G albraith, John K enneth, 183 G eneva, as sym bol, 28 G eneva A ccords, 1 2 ,5 1 ; appearance o f functioning, 90; article 14(c), 8 8 -8 9 ; B ritish view , 7 5 -7 6 , 1 0 9 -1 0 ,2 0 8 ; C am bodia and L aos, 246n4; C hina on, 208; D iem ’s unilateral actions, 7 5 ,7 9 -8 0 ; D iem ’s violations, reactions to, 7 5 -7 6 ; D iem violation, 72; elections, 54; failure, 75-7 6 ; France on, 1 2 ,7 6 ,1 0 9 ,2 0 8 ; H anoi on m odifying, 112-13, 114; H o C hi M inh, 56; im plem entation, 71; im plem entation supported, 6 4 ,6 7 , 68 ; Laos, 140; m igration, 7 6 -7 7 ; as m odel C old W ar solution, 71; negotiation, 14; N orth V ietnam on, 8 0 ,2 0 7 -8 ; preserving status

Index

quo, 68; reviving, 208; shortcom ings, SS; significance for Soviets, 2 0 6 -7 ; South V ietnam dem onstrations, 72; South V ietnam rejecting, 6 9 -7 0 ; Soviet need to preserve, 1 7 4 ,2S6n87; Soviet optim ism , 109; Soviets underm ining, 8S -86; support for, 208; U nited States, 5 5 ,7 1 ; u.s. ignoring, 184; U .S. interference, 156; U .S. position, 5 5 ,7 1 ; Ư.S. supporting disruption, 207; V ietm inh, 56 G eneva conference on Indochina: aide-m ém oire, 20; arm istice com m ission, 3 5 ,3 6 ; battlefield conditions, 33; C am bodia, 4 8 -4 9 ; chairm anship, 3 1 -3 2 ; com position, 29; conclusion, 49; delegations arriving, 2 8 -2 9 ; Eden on, 3 8 ,229n51; elections, cochairs’ role, 71; fallback position, 24; final plenary, 49; im plem entation m echanism , 70; Indochina’s participation, 22; m axim al dem ands, 24; negotiations w ith A sian allies, 2 3 -2 4 ; partition principle, 24; political settlem ent, 70; possibility o f failure, 47; {»ess coverage, 2 6 -2 7 ; proposal fo r end o f hostilities, 22; restricted session, 47; significance, xvii, 4 9 -5 0 ; Soviet delegation, 26; Soviet gains, 51; Soviet strategy, 18,21, 2 4 ,3 4 ,226n45,228n32; successor conference, 83; tripartite m eetings, 46; U .S. stance, 40; w ar o f diplom atic notes, 21

G eneva conference on Laos: C hinese delegation, 159; C hinese view s, 1 5 5 -5 6 ,1 5 8 ,1 6 8 ; com pletion, 178,180; deepening V ietnam crisis, 180; fall o f Ban Padong, 166,167; inform al discussions, 172; N orth V ietnam on, 167; opening session, 162; prelim inary issues, 158; preparation, 154-55; procedural issues, 171-72; proposals by cochairs, 172; representation, 158; South V ietnam peace process, 195; Soviet detachm ent, 209; Soviet satisfaction w ith agreem ents, 1 7 9 ,258nl 18; Soviet view s, 1 5 6 -5 8 ,252-53n2; U nited States, 162; V ietnam ese problem , 194-95 G eneva conference on V ietnam , suggested, 194-95 G erm an m ilitarism , 13; K hrushchev on, 164; M olotov on ED C, 50; Soviet hopes, 55; V ietnam visit, 193 G iap (G eneral). See V o N guyen G iap G odunov, N. I., 117 G raves, H ubert, 25 G reat B ritain: cease-fire in L aos, 1 5 0 ,2 5 1 n l3 7 ; challenging U .S. policy, 193-94; C hina’s status, 21 ; C hinese relations, 32; first high-level Soviet-B ritish visit, 83; G eneva A ccords, 7 5 -7 6 ,1 0 9 -1 0 , 208; G eneva chairs, 32; G eneva conference as sw an song, 51; geopolitics, 25; ICC fo r Laos, 144-45; IC C reports, 70-71 ; intervention, 73; Laos crisis, 147,

Index

G reat B ritain: (continued) 1 4 8 ,1S4; London negotiations, 80; neutrality o f South V ietnam , 195,196; optim ism over negotiations, 17; partition o f V ietnam , 2 5 -2 6 ; peaceful solution, 25; regim e change, 73; on South V ietnam , 82; Soviet approach to G eneva, 18; U .S. policy in L aos, 148 G reat L eap Forw ard, 1 0 3 ,1 1 9 ,1 9 2 , 241n28 G reece, 136 G rigorian, V ., 10 G rom yko, A ndrei: G eneva conference on Laos, 158,159; G eneva delegation, 26; G eneva participation, 31; Laos restraint, 150; London negotiations, 80, 8 2 -8 3 ; neutrality o f L aos, 162; P athet L ao a t G eneva, 158; rotating chairs, 31 guerrilla w arfare: C hina on, 197; H anoi arm s, 112; Laos, 124,170; N orth V ietnam , 186; Pathet Lao, 134; South V ietnam , 179,186; Soviet preferences, 114; Stalin on, 8; strategic rear, 8; Ư.S. presence, 185-86; V ietm m h, 2 G uillerm az, C olonel, 4 7 -4 8 G u lf o f Tonkin: open u.s. intervention, 206; Soviets on, 206; Soviet-V ietnam ese relations, 204 G uom indang, 2; Soviet com prom ise, 4 H anoi, occupation of, 5 7 ,5 8 H anoi R adio, 121 H arkins, Paul D ., 184 H arrim an, w. A verell: coup

advocated, 183; Laos agreem ents, 178; neutrality o f Laos, 171-73; Sino-Soviet differences, 106 H arrim an-Pushkin talks, 173 H a V an L au, 3 3 ,3 6 ,3 7 H e W ei, 128 H ilsm an, R oger, 183 H oan V an H oang, 1 8 -1 9 ,245n98 H o C hi M inh, 1; on achieving socialism , 94; arm ed struggle. 111; on Chinese advisors, 7; CPSU congress, 9 -1 0 ; C rim ea vacation, 188-89; estrangem ent w ith Soviets, 188-89; first M oscow visit, 5 -6 ; fortieth anniversary o f O ctober R evolution, 96-97; French peace feelers, 14; G eneva A ccords, 56; G eneva A ccords underm ined, 85-86; as head o f state, 61; K hrushchev deriding, 210; K hrushchev w arning, 192; Laos w arning from C hina, 127; letter to Stalin, 223n46; M ao sim ilarities, 106-7; m ediator role, 120-21; M oscow negotiations, 64-67; M oscow visits, 9 -1 0 ,9 6 , 1 1 7 ,222n23,240nl 1 5 ,244n97; N orth V ietnam aid distribution, 170; Pathet Lao sym pathies, 128; reception in U SSR, 65-66; Soviet negotiations, 2 2 -2 3 ,6 4 ; Soviet relations, 192; Stalin on, 3 ,6 ; Stalin relationship, 106; S talin 's actions, 239n98; S talin 's cult o f personality, 91; tw o-pronged course, 196-97; unification pressures, 84; U .S. influence grow ing, 63

Hoc Tap, 201 Honqi, 115

Index

hundred-flow ers cam paign, 107, 2 3 9 n l0 0 H ungary: delegation, 109; M ao’s role, 100 im perialism : L e D uan on, 116-17; M ao on, 101 im plem entation o f G eneva A ccords, 81; M acm illan criticism s, 7 6 -7 7 ; m echanism s undefined, 70; N orth V ietnam , 89; obstacles noted, 78; Pham V an D ong request, 73 India, 3 5 ,3 6 ,3 9 ,4 7 ; article 14(c), 89; C hinese conflicts w ith, 103, 1 5 8 ,2 5 3 n l3 ; cochaứ m eeting, 7 8 -7 9 ; cochairs’ m essage, 7 7 -7 8 ; elections leverage, 82; France’s successor issue, 80; G eneva conference on L aos, 158; H anoi policy in South V ietnam , 198; IC C in Laos, 1 2 9 ,1 4 6 ,247n31; L aos crisis, 164; neutrality o f South V ietnam , 1 9 5 ,1 % ; SinoIndian conflict, 105; Ư .S. in Indochina, 6 2 -6 3 indigenous m ovem ents, 184-85 Indochina, C uba m issile crisis, 199-200 Indochinese C om m unist Party, 3 Indonesia: chances fo r success, 8; early Soviet attention, 4 ; IC C m em bership, 39; Soviet contacts, 8 , 223n37 industrial developm ent: C hinese aid, 108; N orth vs. South, 59; Soviet aid, 6 1 ,9 5 ; Soviets as m odel, 87; Soviets as source, 107 intellectuals, dissent of, 93 International C ontrol C om m ission fo r Laos, 1 2 9 -3 0 ,1 4 0 ,1 4 4 -4 7 ;

cease-fire, 153-54; reactivation as Soviet goal, 152; reconvening issue, 1 4 4 ,1 4 5 ,1 4 8 -4 9 ; Soviet attem pts to lim it, 152; Soviet interim solution, 147 International C ontrol C om m issions (IC C s): article 14(c) violation, 88; cease-fire agreem ent, 70; com position, 4 7 ,231n l0 1 ; D iem 's interest, 81; functioning jeopardized, 88; as im pedim ent to H anoi, 112-13; im portance to M oscow , 129; inability to act, 76; Laos crisis, 144-45; Law 10/59, 243n75; N orth V ietnam ese on, 80; South V ietnam , 80; South V ietnam dem onstrations, 72; South V ietnam ese jo in t m essage, 8 9 -9 0 ; South V ietnam ese lim its on m obile team s, 8 8 -8 9 ; Soviet hopes, 197,198; Soviet optim ism , 109; violations charged, 198 international crisis, defining, 142 international supervisory com m ission, 3 5 ,3 6 ; consultation m echanism s, 70; m em bership, 39 Italy, C om m unist successes, 3 -4 Jacquet, M arc, G eneva participation, 31 Jien Y ungqiuan, 144 Jie Penfei, 175 Jinm en Island, 102 Johnson, Lyndon B.: bom bing o f N orth V ietnam , 2 1 1 ,2 6 4 n l0 ; decisions, 181; increased involvem ent, 205 jo in t com m issions, 35 K atay D an Sasorith: Pathet Lao dem ands, 125; prem ier, 122

Index

K ayson Phom vỉhan, 1 3 1 ,1 4 0 K ennedy, John F.: approach to international politics, 164; assassination as w atershed, xvi; electoral victory, 145; K hrushchev letter, 187; K hrushchev letter on L aos, 151-52; Laos statem ent, 149-50; V ienna sum m it, 163,164, 165-66; V ietnam policy, 181-84, 258nl K ennedy, R oheit, 183 K ennedy adm inistration: C old W ar, 182; conference on V ietnam , 180; division o f Laos, 157; Laos crisis, 147-48; Laos diplom atic proposals, 148-49; policy process, 183; Ư.S. presence, 183-84; V ietnam policy, 181-84; w ithdraw al from V ietnam , 184, 2 5 9 n l7 KGB (S oviet civilian intelligence service), 188 K ham phan Panya, 133 K ham souk K eola, 169 K hiem . See ư n g V an K hiem K hou A bhay, 137 K hrushchev, N ikita, 6; on achieving socialism , 9 3 ,9 4 ; A lbania's Stalinism , 190; b elief system per Ư .S., 165; C hina chided, 116; C hinese double gam e, 101; Cuban m issile crisis, 2 0 0 ,2 1 0 ; cult o f personality criticized, 91; described, 165; dissatisfaction w ith, 2 0 0 ,262-63n84; DRV visit, 193; G ulf o f Tonkin, 206; H arrim an-Pushkin talks, 173; H o estrangem ent, 188-89; hopes for K ennedy era, 145; H o

reconciliation, 1 1 7 -18,119; H o visit, 65; India, 7 7 -7 8 ; indigenous m ovem ents, 1 8 5 ,2 5 9 n l8 ; lack o f interest, 109; Laos crisis, 144,146, 1 4 9 ,1 6 3 -6 4 ,1 6 5 -6 6 ; Laos partition, 157-58; M ao on, 99; on M olotov, 52; M olotov undercut, 51; M oscow conference, 120; N orth V ietnam ese distribution o f aid, 170; N orth V ietnam suspicions, 210; Pathet Lao, 134; peaceful coexistence, 91; peace zone, 87; personality, 210; separate states' recognition, 85; Sino-Soviet cooperation, 99; Soviet prestige defied, 116; u.s. support o f D iem , 187; U .S. visit, 1 0 3 ,1 0 5 ,1 3 7 ,2 0 9 ; V ienna sum m it, 1 6 3 ,1 6 4 ,1 6 5 -6 6 ; V ietnam ese C om m unists on, 9 2 -9 4 ; V ietnam as low priority, 210; w ar, inevitability of, 91, 238n94; w arning about C hina, 192 K ong Le: coup in V ientiane, 138; m ilitary aid, 169-70; retreat, 143; rural strategy, 144; V ientiane reoccupied, 142 K orean W ar, 6; A sia policy o f U .S., 9; G eneva conference, 29; G eneva conference chairs, 3 1 -3 2 ; im pact on Soviets, 9; Soviet aid in A sia, 11;U .S . response, 9 K osygin, A lexei, 2 1 0 -1 1 ,2 6 4 n l0 K osygin-Johnson talks, 209 K osygin-W ilson talks, 209 K ouprasith A bhay, 142 K ozlov, Frol, 120 K uznetzov, V asilii, 2 0 -2 1 ; aid to Laos, 179; G eneva delegation, 26; ICC in Laos, 146; Laotian

Index

problem , 256n85; reconvening G eneva conference, 78 L all, A rthur, 161 L alouette, R oger, 2 0 2 ,283n92 L aniel, Joseph, 14; fall of, 38; optim ism over negotiations, 17; proposals, 225n34 Lansdale, Edw ard, 182 Lao D ong Party. See W orkers’ Party o f V ietnam (W PV ) Laos, 26; anti-C om m unism , 130-31; A ssociated States, 29; C am bodia’s policy, 87; C hinese at G eneva, 42; civil w ar erupting, 144; conflict spreading, xvi; CPSU conclusions, 177; D eclaration on N eutrality o f Laos, 178; diplom atic w ar, 131-32; DRV participation, 133-35; factions fighting, 140-41; as factor o f instability, 141; FA L (Forces A rm ées de Laos), 151; fall o f B an Padong, 166,167; fourteen-pow er conference, 154-55; fuel flights, 142; G eneva deadlock, 35; G uom indang troops, 159-60; international crisis, 142; K ong Le coup, 138; partition issue, 26; Sino-Soviet conflict, 143,173-74; Soviet diplom atic relations, 138; Soviet interest, 123; Soviet rapprochem ent, 124-25; Soviets on V ietnam problem , 185; Soviet tw o-track strategy, 152; Soviet view , 136,141,151; Taiw anese consulate, 130; Ư .S. intrigues, 49; Ư.S. presence, 122; Ư .S. tw otrack strategy, 150; u .s. view s,

176; V ienna sum m it, 209; Z urich agreem ent, 168-69 Laos agreem ents: K hrushchev's disappointm ent, 210; N orth V ietnam on, 178-79; Soviets on, 179-80 Latin A m erica, C hinese influence, 105 Lavrishchev, A lexander: as am bassador, 57; background, 58; econom ic aid, 60; G eneva delegation, 26 Law 1 0 /5 9 ,1 1 1 -1 2 ,243n75 Le Duan: arm ed struggle justified, 116; IC C in Laos, 145; liberation o f South, 1 1 8 ,24 5 n l0 1 ; SinoSoviet conflict, 117; South V ietnam ese C om m unist head, 83; Soviet aid, 113; Soviet strategy dism issed, 203; violent revolution, 93 ,2 0 1 Le Thanh N ghi, 108 Li Fuchin, 119 Likhachev, V iktor, 1 4 0 -4 1 ,1 4 2 Liu Shaoqi, 1 -2 ,1 2 0 ,2 0 0 ,223n46 Liu X iao, 103 L i Zhim in, 86 Lodge, H enry C abot, Jr., 183 London negotiations, 80; partition issue, 82-83 Luo G uibo, 9 1 ,1 2 5 M acm illan, H arold: chairm an, 7 3 -7 4 ; G eneva im plem entation, 7 6 ,7 7 M cN am ara, R obert s.: bom bing attacks, 206; conditions in South V ietnam , 205; conspiracy com plex, 182; covert operations, 206; u .s. know ledge o f A sia, 182

Index

M alenkov, G eorgii, 5 6 -5 7 m anagem ent skills, 59 M aneli, M ieczyslaw , 2 0 2 ,2 0 3 M anila Pact, 62 M ao Zedong, 4; B ay o f Pigs, 153; concepts, 101; confrontation w ith W est, 153; cu lt o f personality, 1 00,189; defense o f Stalin, 100; H o sim ilarities, 106-7; independence from U SSR, 102; on K hrushchev, 99; M olotov cm, 228n22; national liberation m ovem ents, 104; new C om m unist ideologue, 101-2; Pathet Lao, 134; rapprochem ent w ith W est, 9 4 ; Stalin m eetings, 1 -2 ,9 8 ; Stalin on, 4 maximal demands, 34 M elkhior, R „ 73 M endès France, Pierre, 4 1 -4 3 ; French C om m unists, 42; M olotov m eeting, 4 3 ,4 4 -4 5 ; Pham V an D ong talks, 45; post-G eneva talks, 50-51 M enon, K um ar, 62 M enon, V . K. K rishna, 158, 231nl01 M enshikov, M ikhail, 145 m igration, G eneva A ccords, 7 6 -7 7 M ikoyan, A nastas, 9 2 ,2 3 9 n l 11 m ilitary aid, C hinese, 108; C hinese delegation, 191; fo r southern cadres, 243n71; to D RV , 192, 197; to Laos, 1 4 2 -4 3 ,1 7 7 m ilitary aid, D RV , to South V ietnam , 197 m ilitary aid, Soviet: C hinese technology, 9 6 ,1 9 2 ; m odernizing PA V , 9 5 -9 6 ; praised, 192; South V ietnam , 1 8 6 ,1 1 4 ,244n84; to

Laos, 1 4 2 -4 3 ,1 5 2 ,1 6 9 -7 0 ,1 7 4 , 179-80 m ilitary aid, U .S.: com bat forces, 187,188; Laos, 1 2 2 ,1 3 1 ,1 3 6 ; need fo r reform s in South V ietnam , 183; per capita average, 136; South V ietnam , 183-84 m ilitary assistance advisory group (M A A G ), 1 1 2 ,1 5 0 ,1 8 4 , 243-44n75 m ilitary assistance com m and in V ietnam (M A CV ), 184 m ilitary attachés, 5 7 ,5 8 -5 9 m ilitary bases, G eneva A ccords, 54 m ilitary cooperation: D R V -C hinese, 64; D R V -Soviet, 6 3 .6 4 ,6 5 m ilitary e x p a ts , C hinese to PA V , 64 m ilitary experts, C om m unist, at G eneva, 3 4 ,3 7 -3 8 m ilitary experts, difficulties in DRV talks, 4 3 -4 4 m ineral exploration, 95 m ineral resources, 59 M inistry o f Foreign A ffairs (U SSR): planning fo r G eneva, 17 M olotov, V yacheslav, 12; arrival in G eneva, 2 8 ,2 9 ; assessm ent of, 5 1 -5 3 ; B idault m eeting, 36; C hina’s im plied intransigence, 32; C hina’s status, 16; com prom ise a t G eneva, 39; diatribe at G eneva, 38; D ulles com pared, 5 2 -5 3 ; election tim ing, 4 6 -4 7 ; European security, 50; final speech at G eneva, 49; French In Indochina, 15; G eneva conference as sw an song, 51; G eneva delegation, 26; G eneva goals, 29; G eneva participants, 2 9 -3 0 ; G eneva speech, 34; G eneva strategy, 21;

Index

im portance o f G eneva, 71; K orean question, 29; M acm illan letter on im plem entation, 77; on M ao, 228n22; M endès France talks, 43, 4 4 -4 3 ; negotiations w ith A sian allies, 22; political situation in France, 41; ro le a t G eneva, 35; semi as intransigent, 46; successes a t concessions, 17; tripartite m eetings, 46; “united front,” 22; on U .S. stance a t G eneva, 4 0 -4 1 ; v isit w ith D ulles, 30 M ongolia, 115 M oscow conference: Sino-Soviet conflict, 120-21; Sino-Soviet rivalry, 101 M oscow declaration, 121 M ukhitdinov, N uritdin, 119 M urray, D onald, 201 N am B o province, 111 N am T ha (L aos), 176 nationalism , 183 N ationalists, 2 N ational L iberation Front o f South V ietnam (N LFSV ): creation, 189; H anoi front, 199; Soviet support, 199-200 national liberation m ovem ents: C hina on, 104; G eneva A ccords, 55; indigenous m ovem ents, 184-85; as international conflict, 188; K hrushchev on, 165; M ao on, 104; m aterial aid, 11; national uprisings, 2 5 9 n l8 ; Soviet influence, 104; Stalin, 2 ,1 0 ; u.s. suppression, 187,188 N ational Security C ouncil, N SC 5 4 2 9 ,6 1 -6 2 N avarre, H enry, 1 9 ,2 0

negotiations, N orth-South, 202 N ehru, Jaw aharlal: elections leverage, 82; L aos crisis, 144; Ư .S. policy, 63 neutralists in Laos. See Santiphab (Peace) neutralist party neutrality, 35; Soviet T hird W orld policy, 87 neutrality o f Laos: A ustria as m odel, 1 5 6 ,2 5 2 n l7 3 ; B ritish and French on, 148; C hinese view , 161; coalition governm ent, 175; conference texts, 175; D eclaration on N eutrality o f L aos, 178; draft declaration, 159-61; G eneva conference, 171; K ennedy adm inistration, 1 4 8 ,1 8 2 ,259n6; K hrushchev on, 1 6 5 -6 6 ,1 7 7 ; N orodom Sihanouk on, 145; peaceful coexistence, 136; Soviet declaration, 162; Soviets and C hinese on, 128; Soviets to D RV on, 174; Soviet view s, 140, 1 6 0 -6 1 ,1 7 2 ; U .S. view s, 157, 1 7 2 ,256n96 neutrality o f South V ietnam : France, 202; suggested, 194-95; U .S. anti-communism, 208; view s on,

1% neutrality o f V ietnam , Soviet passivity, 194 neutralization policy, 109; fo r V ietnam , 185,1 8 6 neutral-nations com m ission proposal, 149 N ew C hina N ew s A gency, 201 N ghe A n province, 93 N go D inh D iem : coup against, xviii, 2 0 3 ,2 0 5 ,2 6 3 n l0 2 ; elections issue, 7 2 ,7 3 ,8 1 ; elections

Index

N go D inh D iem : (continued ) rejected, 6 9 -7 0 ; epithets from D RV, 67; as France’s successor, 80; intransigence, 75; on M endès France, 230n75; norm alization rejection, 236-37n53; N orth V ietnam on, 1 1 8 ,2 0 7 -8 ; refusal to correspond w ith H anoi, 74; repression protested, 88; Soviet recognition, 86; strategic ham lets, 184; U .S. advice, 185-86; U .S. clash, 202; u .s . support, 7 4 ,1 8 2 N go D inh N hu, 2 0 1 -2 ,2 0 3 N guyen C hi Thanh, 151,192 N guyen C o T hach, 174 N guyen D uy T rinh, 9 2 ,9 3 ,1 5 3 N guyen Long B ang, 17-18; appointed, 57 N guyen Q uoc D inh, G eneva participation, 31 N guyen V an K inh, 142 Nhan Dan, 201 N LFSV . See N ational L iberation Front o f South V ietnam N LH X (N eo Lao H ak X at): agreem ent w ith Souvanna, 141; elections, 128,129; excluded, 132; legated, 128; outlaw ing, 133-34; repression, 130-31,137; u .s . view , 139 nonaligned approach, 87 non-C om m unist V ietnam ese: on M endès France, 41; partition issue, 40 N orodom Sihanouk: G eneva conference on Laos, 162; Laos crisis, 144,145; stability, xviii N orth K orea, 6 ,1 1 5 N orth V ietnam : anti-C hina traditions, 91; anti-S oviet

feelings, 91; article 14(c), 89; cadres to Laos, 147; cease-fire in L aos, 163; C hina relations, 91; C hinese delegations, 191; C hinese influence, 1 1 5 ,1 1 8 ,1 8 9 ,1 9 0 -9 2 ; as C om m unist show case, 95; foreign policy independence, 93; French troop w ithdraw al, 80; G eneva A ccords, 2 0 7 -8 ; handling Soviet aid to Laos, 169-70; ICC in Laos, 146-47; IC C report denounced, 198; IC C s, 78; keeping troops in Laos, 174; K hrushchev, 9 2 -9 4 ; Laos, 125, 126-28; Laos agreem ents, 178-79; Laos cam paign, 176-77; Laos crisis, 152-54; Laos m ilitary actions, 166-67; m ediator role, 108; m ilitancy on Laos, 131-32; neutrality o f South V ietnam , 195, 1% ; Pathet Lao, 123,153; Pathet Lao battalions, 133; Pathet Lao consolidation, 156; peasant uprising, 93; Politburo, 84; reaction in L aos, 1 3 0 ,247n38; reconciling C hina and U SSR, 1 1 7 -1 8 ,1 1 9 ; relations w ith South, 110; Sino-Soviet conflict, 106-8, 1 1 7 -1 8 ,1 1 9 ; South V ietnam ese C om m unist dem ands, 84; Souvanna Phoum a visits, 124; Soviet influence, 203; Soviet presence, 90; Soviets’ Saigon policy, 88; struggle in South, 93; supporting C hina, 189; tw o­ pronged course, 196-97, 2 6 ỉ-6 2 n 6 8 ; Ư.S. concerns about Laos, 173; U .S. influence grow ing, 63; u .s . intervention w arning, 178; on U SSR, 107;

Index

U SSR discouraging w ar, 184, 185 N ovikov, K irill, 17; DRV am bassador, 58; D RV assistance, 56; DRV epithets against D iem , 67; G eneva delegation, 26 NSC 5 4 2 9 ,6 1 -6 2 nuclear-pow ered subm arines, 102 nuclear w eapons: ban advocated, 55; M ao on, 101,153; Soviet view o f W est, 238n94; treaties, 201; w ar prospect, 1 0 1 ,1 0 3 ,238n94 O peration M om entum , 180 OPLAN 34A , 206 Pacific C harter, 62 Pakistan, 3 5 .3 6 ,3 9 ,1 3 6 Palais des N ations, 4 9 ,5 4 Parsons, J. G raham , 139 Parthasarathi, G ., 8 0 ,1 9 8 partition o f Laos: C hinese view , 161; K hrushchev on, 164; option fo r Ư .S., 157; Soviet view s, 1 5 7 -5 8 ,1 6 0 -6 1 partition o f V ietnam , 18-19; acceptability to Soviets, 51; B ao D ai regim e, 26; C hina, 3 7 ,8 8 ; econom ic aid, 59; Eden, 2 5 ,3 4 , 228n31; G eneva conference, 27; G reat B ritain, 2 5 -2 6 ; late-night m eeting, 3 6 -3 7 ; London negotiations, 8 2 -83; m ethods o f struggle, 74; M olotov on, 41; as negotiating position, 24; negotiations w ith Zhou E nlai and H o C hi M inh, 23; political issues, 41; provisional frontier, 43; reunification date, 4 5 -4 6 ; Soviet long-term policy, 86; troop regroupm ent, 37; understanding

on, 81; unification, types of, 7 4 -7 5 ; UN recognizing, 85; U .S. on, 2 6 ,4 0 ,227n62; V ietm inh, 37; V ietm inh concession, 38 Pathet Lao: battalions in Lao arm y, 133; C hina on consolidation, 156; C hinese training, 168; C hinese view , 151; coalition governm ent, 127-28; described, 122-23; DRV aid, 135; elections, 137; fighting, 134; gains, shoring up, 153; G eneva conference on Laos, 158, 162-63; guerrilla w arfare, 134; internal disagreem ents, 128; intransigence, 140-41; K ennedy m aps, 1 5 0 ,2 5 1 n l3 8 ; N LHX party, 128; N orth V ietnam on, 166-67; N orth V ietnam view , 151; N osavan’s offensive, 176; offensive, 151; popular support, 128; repression, 1 3 0 -3 1 ,1 3 3 , 137; RLG standoff, 125; rural strategy, 144; Souphanouvang escape, 1 3 8 ,2 4 8 n n 7 5 ,77; Soviet aid, 169-70; Soviet m ilitary aid, 174; Soviets on, 123,141; unfavorable events, 143 Patolichev, N ikolai, 86 PA V . See People’s A rm y o f V ietnam peace conference, 28 peaceful coexistence, 11 ; C hina on, 102-3; C hinese support, 101; H anoi position, 9 3 ,1 1 0 -1 2 ; K hrushchev on C hina, 105; K hrushchev on, 91; Laos, 124, 173; L aotian neutrality, 136; M ao on, 100; N orth V ietnam , 107, 186-87 peace zone, 87

Index

peasants: agrarian reform , 8 ,1 0 ,9 3 ; freedom o f expression, 93 People’s A rm y o f V ietnam (PA V ): aid to L aos, 133; D ientnenphu, 19-20; in L aos, 166; m ilitary advisors, 64; m odernizing, 9 5 -9 6 ; successes, 19 people’s com m unes, 1 0 3 -4 ,1 9 2 People’s D aly, 201 People’s Liberation A rm y (PLA ), 191 People’s Party o f Laos, 131 P eople’s R epublic o f C hina (PR C ), treaty, 1. See also mam entry w id er C hina Pham H ung, 111 Pham V an D ong, 2 4 ,3 8 ,4 6 ; assistance request, 5 6 -3 7 ; C hinese aid, 115; dem arcation line, 46; D iem conciliatory letter, 83; econom ic aid, 113; French negotiations, 4 2 -4 3 ; G eneva delegation, 2 7 ,3 1 ; IC C in Laos, 1 45,147; letter to cochairs, 76; M endès France talks, 45; m ilitary aid, 59; M oscow visit, 188; neutral zone in Indochina, 180; norm alization o f relations w ith South, 110; reconvening G eneva conference, 78; Soviet relations, 192; U N protest, 85; V ietnam border protest, 131 Philippines, 188 Philippov. See Stalin, Io sif V issarionovich Phone K heng police cam p, 137-38 Phoui Sananikone, 130,131, 1 3 2 -3 3 ,1 3 7 Phoum i Nosavan: CIA support, 139; coup attem pt, 1 37,248n71; gains in fighting, 140; Nam T hat offensive.

176; new regim e, 143-44; N orth V ietnam , 166; Souvanna’s negotiations, 138-39; U .S. aid, 139; on U.S. policy, 257nl00; Zurich agreem ent, 168-69 PLA . See P eople’s L iberation A rm y Poland, 3 5 ,3 6 ,3 9 ,4 7 ; C hinese opposing, 158-59; G eneva conference on L aos, 158-59; ICC in L aos, 129,154; M ao’s role, 100; m inority view , 198; postponed elections, 82; relations betw een N orth and South, 110; reconvening G eneva conference, 78; South lim its on m obile team s, 89; U .S. view o f IC C , 149 political problem s at G eneva, dem arcation line, 44 Ponom arev, B oris, 120 Popov, A. M ., 128,130 presidential archive, R ussian, XVỈ propaganda: about intransigent C om m unists, 75; elections issue, 72; H anoi’s dem and fo r new G eneva conference, 78; secret w ar against South V ietnam , 6 6 -6 7 public opinion, m anipulation of, 66, 234-35n55 “puppet regim es,” 21 Pushkin, G eorgii: fourteen-pow er conference on Laos, 156; French conservatism , 194; G uom indang troops in Laos, 160; H anim an talks, 173; ICC in Laos, 154; m odifying G eneva A ccords, 112; South V ietnam peace process, 195; U .S. at Laos conference, 171-73 Q uem oy Island, 102 Q uinim Pholsena, 129,143

Index

radio station, Sino-Soviet, 102 R advanyi, Janos, 109 R am adier, Paul, 3 R apacki, A dam , 138 R eading (L ord), 8 0 ,8 2 -8 3 reconstruction o f econom y, 60 regroupaient o f troops, 5 9 ,6 1 religious sects, 66 Renmùth Ribao, 115 R epublic o f V ietnam : declared, 80; political structure, 7 5 ,7 9 -8 0 . See also South V ietnam revolution in A sia: M ao praised, 203; Stalin on, 2 rice: C hinese to V ietnam , 5 9 -6 0 ; request fo r Soviet ships, 5 9 -6 0 ; shortage in N orth, 95 R LG . See royal L ao governm ent R oberts, Frank, 1 4 6 ,1 5 0 ,256n85 R odionov, 18 R om anian C om m unist C ongress o f 1 9 6 0 ,1 1 6 ,1 1 7 ,1 1 9 royal L ao governm ent (RLG ): coalition governm ent, 127; diplom atic w ar, 132; elections, 137; IC C , 247n31; N LHX outlaw ed, 133-34; Pathet L ao guarantee dem ands, 125; Pathet L ao negotiations, 123,124; Soviets on, 123; U .S. aid, 122 R um pf, W illie, 119 R usk, D ean: C hina as threat to peace, 162; conspiracy com plex, 182-83; division o f Laos, 157; neutral-nations proposal, 149; P athet L ao at G eneva, 158 R ussian Foreign M inistry A rchive, XVÌ.XỈX R ussian State A rchive o f C ontem porary H istory, xvi, xix

R ussian S tate A rchive o f Social P olitical H istory, xvi, xix Santiphab (Peace) neutralist party (L aos), 129,143 Sary, Sam , 48 SEA TO (Southeast A sia T reaty O rganization): aggression references, 130; D R V -Soviet com m uniqué, 67; L aos, 122,148; L aos IC C , 130; Laos protection, 172,174; unification o f V ietnam , 114; U .S. founding, 62; Ư .S. on, 150 Security C ouncil, Laos crisis, 135 Security C ouncil (U N ), separate states’ recognition, 85 Selkirk (L ord), 201 ships, request fo r Soviet: rice, 5 9 -6 0 ; troop transport, 5 9 ,6 0 Siam , partition issue, 25 Sihanouk. See N orodom Sihanouk Sino-Soviet conflict: beginning, 97; breach a t C PSU 1961 congress, 190; disagreem ents, 105-6, 242n41; early friction, 98; foreign policy differences, 102-5; G eneva conference on Laos, 158; H o on, 204; ideological aspects, 120; K hrushchev, 9 9 ,2 0 4 ,2 1 0 ; Laos crisis, 1 4 3 ,1 7 3 -7 4 ; M ao on, 204; M oscow conference, 120-21; N orth V ietnam , 1 0 6 -8 ,1 1 7 -1 8 , 119; reconciliation, 190; R om anian C om m unist C ongress, 119; Southeast A sia passivity, 193; Soviet “appeasem ent” policy, 184; Soviet prestige defied, 115-16; Soviet role in Indochinese conflict, 189; Soviets

Index

Sino-Soviet conflict: ( continued) ỉn V ietnam , 208; SSt passivity, 193; tensions heightening, 119-21; T hird W orld policy, 104-5; tim ing, 241n28 Sino-Soviet jo in t econom ic and m ilitary m issions, 65 Sisoum ang, 169 Skoryukov, A. A ., 163 Sm ith, W alter B edell, 26; French at G eneva conference, 2 3 0 -3 1 n 9 1; on M olotov, 3 5 ,5 2 ; M olotov m eeting, 36; negotiating the peace, 33; restricted session, 47; return to G eneva, 45 socialism , paths to: C hina, 101; K hrushchev on, 9 3 -9 4 ; N orth V ietnam on, 107; Soviet tenets rejected, 201 Sokolov, Leonid: peaceful struggle by N orth, 111; Polish IC C , 129; Zhou E nlai visit, 115 “Som e Issues o f the Im plem entation o f the G eneva A greem ents on Indochina,” 81 Souphanouvong (Prince): detained, 137-38; early agreem ent, 124; H anoi visits, 125,127; jo in t com m uniqué, 127-28; negotiations, 140; Pathet Lao guarantee dem ands, 125-26; Soviet aid, 169; U SSR visit, 154; Z urich agreem ent, 1 6 9 ,255n62 South A sia, u.s. predictions, 7 Southeast A sia, Ư.S. predictions, 7 South-East A sia A lliance proposal, 48 Southeast A sia D epartm ent, 193; dangers o f restraint, 200; objectives fo r H anoi, 262n71; V ietnam conference idea, 194-95

Southeast A sia T reaty O rganization. See SEA TO South K orea, in U N , 85 South V ietnam : A m ericanizing the w ar, 187-88; constituent assem bly, 7 9 -8 0 ; countering U .S. influence, 66; D iem overthrow , 2 0 3 ,2 0 5 ; D iem regim e set up, 75; elections issue, 72; French troop w ithdraw al, 7 9 ,8 0 ; G eneva A ccords, 109; guerrilla operations, 186; H anoi position, 93; ICC on repression, 8 8 -8 9 ; as independent entity, 7 9 -8 0 ; jo in t m essage on IC C , 8 9 -9 0 ; Laos crisis, 167; Law 1 0 /5 9 ,1 1 1 -1 2 ; liberation of, 118; N orth V ietnam ese insincerity, 189; opposition banned, 83; peace process after Laos conference, 195; peace zone, 87; reeducation cam ps, 83; relations w ith N orth, 110; relations w ith, 71; repression o f V ietm inh, 8 3 ,1 1 1 -1 2 ; Soviet de facto recognition, 8 4 -86; Soviet optim ism , 87; Soviet relations, 110; uprisings, 111; as W estern show case, 95. See also R epublic o f V ietnam South V ietnam ese C om m unists: arm ed uprisings criticized, 86; cadres and soldiers, 237n57; D iem repression, 83; N am B o action plan, 8 3 -8 4 ; Soviet struggle fo r peace, 199; underground, 84 Souvanna Phoum a (Prince): agreem ent w ith N LH X , 141; failure to form new governm ent, 130; fall of, 126; fleeing, 143; IC C activities, 129; isolation, 140,

Index

141Ỉ jo in t com m uniqué, 127-28; K ong Le coup, 138; N orth V ietnam ese handling o f Soviet aid, 169-70; prim e m inister, 124; Soviet acceptability, 152; Soviet aid, 1 4 0 ,1 7 0 ,1 7 1 ; Soviet view , 146; supplies from C om m unists, 142; Ư .S. acceptability, 149; U .S. dem ands, 139; U SSR visit, 154; visits, 124-25 The Soviet-Chinese Friendship, 120 Soviet-Indian jo in t com m uniqué, 78 Soviet-N orth V ietnam talks, 6 4 -6 7 ; objectives, 64 Soviet U nion. See USSR. S talin, Io sif V issarionovich: arrogance, 9 8 ,1 0 0 ,1 0 6 ; birthday celebrations, 1; C om intern reform ism , 8; death and softening o f priorities, 53; distrust o f H o C hi M inh, 11 ; H o’s letter to, 223n46; policy retained, 57; treatm ent o f M ao, 9 8 ,1 0 0 ; V ietnam ese C om m unists, 92 S talin collection, xvi, xix state enterprises, 2 Stockholm Expressen, 14 strategic ham let program , 184 Sudarikov, N ikolai, arm s to Souvanna, 142-43 Sullivan, W illiam , 175 sum m it, great pow ers, 7 2 -7 4 Suslov, M ikhail, 120,145 T ahourdin, John, 1 8 ,1 9 ,2 5 Taiw an: Laos stand, 130; troops in Laos, 159-60 Taiw an S trait crisis, 102,103, 241n26 T aylor, M axw ell, 187

T hailand, Laos blockade, 139 T hai N guyen, 58 Thanh Son, 127 T hau T ian, 163 Thee, M arek, 1 5 4 ,1 6 6 ,1 6 7 ,1 7 7 , 2 5 8 n l2 0 T hird W orld policy: C hinese influence, 104; described, 87; Sino-Soviet conflict, 104-5; in South V ietnam , 8 7 -8 8 ; Soviet influence, 104 Thom pson, Llew ellyn, 149; described, 164-65; on K rushchev, 165 T horez, M aurice, 3 T onkin offensive o f V ietm inh (1951X 9 T ourane (D anang), 44 Tovm asyan, Suren: coalition governm ent in Laos, 171,177; guerrilla operations in South V ietnam , 186; ignored by N orth V ietnam ese, 2 0 3 ,2 6 3 -6 4 n l0 6 ; South V ietnam peace process, 195 T ra B ong, 111 T reaty o f Friendship, A lliance, and M utual A ssistance, 1 ,9 8 tripartite m eetings, 46 troop regroupm ent, 3 7 -3 8 ; C hina on, 42 T ruong C hỉnh, 192; elections, 78; reconvening G eneva conference, 79; unification issue, 74-7 5 Tzygichko, N. p ., 3 8 ,4 4 UN C harter, 14 underground, 84 U ng V an K hiem : form s o f struggle, 132; L aos agreem ents, 178; new Pathet L ao battalions, 134;

Index

U ng V an K hỉem : ((continued) reaction in L aos, 130; Sino-Soviet conflict, 117; support w anted, 135; u .s. m ilitary intervention, 178; V ietnam negotiations, 180 unification o f V ietnam : arm ed struggle for, 94; by any m eans, 206; H anoi dom estic view , 83; H anoi’s reasonable stance, 74; H o as leader, 107; Laos seen by D RV , 167; m ethods to achieve, 75; m ilitary solutions, 83; negotiations, 202; N orth as base, 94; N orth V ietnam on, 9 4 ,2 0 7 -8 ; postponed indefinitely, 82; SEA TO , 114; Sino-Soviet conflict, 108; Soviet aid, 6 4 -6 5 ; Soviets as faithful ally, 76; Soviets on, 85; Truong C hinh, 7 4 -7 5 ; U N entry o f South V ietnam , 86; unity o f C om m unist cam p, 204; U .S. presence, in South, 113; W orkers’ Party on, 74-7 5 ’’united action” initiative, 20; B ritish resistance, 25; Soviet response, 22 U nited N ations (U N ): adm ission o f N orth V ietnam , 88; adm ission o f South K orea, 85; adm ission o f South V ietnam , 8 4 -8 5 ,8 8 ; both parts o f V ietnam , 237n71; L aotian conflict, 135-36 U nited States: anxiety o f Soviets, 63; C hinese shelling crisis, 102; D iem , 80; D iem clash, 202; gendarm e role, 158; G eneva A ccords, 5 5 ,7 1 ,1 0 9 ; G eneva conference on Laos, 162; G eneva conference preparations, 19; G eneva as sym bol, 28; influence

on G eneva allies, 40; intervention threatened, 3 6 ,4 0 ; involvem ent predicted, 23; Laos perspective, 175; N am T ha incident, 177, 25 7 n l0 9 ; neutrality o f South V ietnam , 1 9 5 ,1 % ; N orth V ietnam ese in Laos, 173; N orth V ietnam in Laos, 148; SinoSoviet differences, 105-6; South V ietnam , 71; strongm an im age, 63; third defeat in E ast, 155 U nited States operations m ission (U SO M ), 122 U .S. presence: after Laos agreem ents, 180; against D RV , 2 0 5 -6 ; am bivalence, 182; countering grow th of, 81; covert operations, 206; D iem refusal on elections, 74; early aid to D iem , 83; early M oscow probe, 63; guerrilla w arfare, 185-86; H anoi regim e as obstacle, 66; im perialism as enem y, 66; increased after K ennedy, 205; K ennedy adm inistration, 183-84; Laos m ilitary, 150; Laos threat, 125,127; m ilitary advisors, 112; m ilitary personnel, 243-44n75; N orth V ietnam ese diplom acy, 197; open intervention, 206; O PLA N 34A , 206; policies o f other nations, 184; South V ietnam as bastion, 71; Soviet diplom ats in H anoi, 109; Soviet-D R V alliance, 61; V ietnam W ar starting, 206 u .s. presence in L aos, 122,131; C hinese view , 134; influence consolidated, 136; interference as underm ining G eneva A ccords, 156; K hrushchev’s trip to U .S.,

Index

137; N orth V ietnam ese w arning, 178; O peration M om entum , 180; recognizing Phoum i N ovosan, 143; Soviet view , 133; training royal L ao arm y, 136 U SSR (Soviet U nion): C hina relations, 90; as counterbalance to C hina, 91; disengagem ent policy, 1 7 7 ,1 9 6 ,2 0 0 ,2 0 8 1 257nl 17; G eneva as sym bol, 28; geopolitical considerations, 114,209; ICC reports, 7 0 -7 1 ; Indochina policy before 1954, XVÜ; Laos crisis, 126, 132-33; NLFSV delegations, 199; N orth-South negotiations, 202 -3 ; orientation to people’s dem ocracies, 57; passive policy to regie«, 193; passivity in Indochina, 1 9 4 ,1 9 6 ,1 9 7 ,2 0 0 ; PR C ’s adventurist foreign policy, 103; reconvening G eneva conference, 7 8 ,7 9 ; U .S. actions reported, 184-86 V as’kov, V ., 43 V ienna sum m it, 163-66; C hinese reaction, 168; N orth V ietnam on, 167; possibilities, 2 09-10; strategic im portance o f Indochina, 185 V ientiane, battle of, 143-44 V ietcong, 206 V ietm inh: B order C am paign, 6; C hinese support, 2; exhaustion after D ienbienphu, 33; G eneva A ccords, 56; G eneva participants, 2 9 -3 0 ; G eneva participation, 27, 31; know ledge expanded, xvi; partition issue, 26; partition o f V ietnam , 18; repression by South,

8 8 -8 9 ; repression in South V ietnam , 77; secret m eeting w ith France, 36-37; sporadic contacts, 4; success, 2; U .S. prestige, 8; u .s. vs. Japan, 3 V ietnam : diplom atic recognition betw een tw o states, 2 0 1 -3 ; division of, 18; as tw o separate states, 84-85 V ietnam problem : negotiations possible, 180; Soviet apprehension, 187; Soviets on, 185 V ietnam W a r beginning, 206; C hinese involvem ent, 2 3 -2 4 , 226n53; international history, xv; real tragedy, 2 5 8 n l; studying background, xiii V inogradov, Sergei, G eneva delegation, 26 violent revolution: Le D uan on, 93, 201; M ao on, 101; N orth V ietnam on, 107,110-11 V olkov, B ., 86 V o N guyen G iap, 33; blackout on activities, 96; delegation to M oscow , 6 3 -6 4 ; G eneva A ccords m odification, 112-13; IC C in Laos, 146-47; m ilitary aid, 9 5 -9 6 ; M oscow visit, 96; proSoviet, 2 40nl 18; Soviet relations, 192 V oroshilov, K lim ent, 6 5 ,6 6 W ang B ingnan, 4 7 -4 8 ; separate states* recognition, 85 W an W aithayakon, 31 W arner, F. A ., 193 W ashington negotiations, 39; seven points, 4 0

Index

W orkers’ Party o f V ietnam (W PV ): arm ed struggle after anti-D iem coup, 203; cadres in South, 84; eighteenth plenum , 118; fifteenth plenary session, 110-11; French troops out, 61 ; K hrushchev on C hinese precepts, 204; m ilitary m odernization, 95; ninth plenum , 2 0 3 ,2 0 4 ,2 0 6 ; southern cadres, 112; Soviet “appeasem ent” policy, 184; third congress, 118; tw entieth CPSƯ congress, 92; tw ofold task, 113; unification by any m eans, 206; w ork w ith South V ietnam ese, 66 w orld com m unism : anti-party plot o f 1957,100; beginning o f rift, 97; C hinese “erroneous” view s, 116; C hinese leadership, 100; H anoi view o f Sino-Soviet conflict, 117; IC C view ed, 129; influence on T hird W orld, 104; K hrushchev’s 1956 speech, 91; Laos in regional equilibrium , 126; leadership o f C om m unist w orld, 100-101; N LFSV delegations, 199; policy options, x v ii-x ix ; schism averted, 119-21; Soviet vanguard role, 9 9 -1 0 0 ,1 8 9 ,1 9 9 ; unification o f V ietnam , 204; w ar, C hinese concept, 115-16 W orld Federation o f T rade U nions, 116 W orld W a rn , A sia, 2 W PV . See W orkers’ Party o f V ietnam Y akushin, I. N „ 124 Y udin, Pavel, 16; M ao confronting, 102; partition o f V ietnam , 18

Zhang H anfu: G uom indang troops in L aos, 160; ICC in Laos, 146 Z hang W entien, 1 6 ,2 2 ; partition o f V ietnam , 18; Pathet Lao, 134 Zhang Y an, 173 Zhdanov, A ndrei, 4 Z hivotosky, M ., 19 Z hou E nlai, 13; A lbania defense, 190; arrival in G eneva, 28; buffers and borders, 123; coalition governm ent in Laos, 176; concessions, 39; CPSU 1961 congress, 190; diatribe a t G eneva, 38; DRV supported, 76; DRV visit, 115; Eden approach, 16; election date options, 4 6 ,4 7 -4 8 ; G eneva delegation, 27; IC C in Laos, 146; Laos crisis, 126,127; Laos and C uba, 153; liberation o f South, 114-15; M endỀs France m eeting, 42; m ilitary alliances and bases, 48; neutrality o f Laos, 126; role o f m ediator, 34; Sino-B ritish relations, 32; Soviet aid to Laos, 143; on Soviet leaders, 103; Soviet negotiations, 2 2 -2 3 ; T hird W orld delegations, 105; U .S. involvem ent, 23; w alkout from C PSU C ongress, 173-74 Zhukov, Y uri, 27; on M olotov, 3 8 -3 9 ; reliability, 39 Zim yanin, M ikhail: cu lt o f personality, 92; Laotian issue, 125; London negotiations, 80; m ilitary aid, 9 5 -9 6 ; recognition o f tw o V ietnam s, 86 Z orin, V alerian, 57 Z urich agreem ent, 168-69