Conflict in Macedonia: Exploring a Paradox in the Former Yugoslavia 9781626373129

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CONFLICT IN MACEDONIA

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CONFLICT IN MACEDONIA Exploring a Paradox in the Former Yugoslavia

Sasho Ripiloski

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Published in the United States of America in 2011 by FirstForumPress A division of Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.firstforumpress.com and in the United Kingdom by FirstForumPress A division of Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2011 by FirstForumPress. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ripiloski, Sasho. Conflict in Macedonia: exploring a paradox in the former Yugoslavia / by Sasho Ripiloski. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-935049-31-9 (hc: alk. paper) 1. Macedonia (Republic)—Politics and government—1992– 2. Political violence— Macedonia (Republic) I. Title. JN9679.5.A58R57 2011 949.7603—dc22 2011009428 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. This book was produced from digital files prepared by the author using the FirstForumComposer. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

List of Maps List of Acronyms Acknowledgments

vii ix xi

1

The Macedonian Paradox

1

2

The Path to Independence: Exception to the Rule

23

3

The International Response: A Model of (Operational) Prevention

77

4

Violence Grips the “Oasis of Peace”

99

5

Making Sense of Events

143

6

The Broader Significance of the Macedonian Experience

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7

Taking Stock

245

Appendix: Interviews Conducted by the Author Bibliography Index

v

259 263 287

Maps

1

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1946–1991

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2

Republic of Macedonia

xv

3

Geographic Concentration of Ethnic Albanians in the Southern Balkans

48

4

Conflict Areas, 2001

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vii

Acronyms

ANA ASEAN AU CFSP CIA DPA DUI ESDP ESS EU FDI FYROM GDP GSZ HCNM ICFY ICTY IMF JNA KFOR KLA KPC LPK MANU MPRI NATO NGO NLA NORDBAT OECD

Albanian National Army Association of South East Asian Nations African Union Common Foreign and Security Policy Central Intelligence Agency Democratic Party of Albanians Democratic Union for Integration European Security and Defense Policy European Security Strategy European Union Foreign Direct Investment Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Gross Domestic Product Ground Security Zone High Commissioner on National Minorities International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Monetary Fund Yugoslav People’s Army Kosovo Force Kosovo Liberation Army Kosovo Protection Corps Kosovo People’s Movement Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts Military Professional Resources Incorporated North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organization National Liberation Army Nordic Battalion Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

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Conflict in Macedonia

OSCE PDP RCC SAA SAP SDSM SEEU SFCG TDF UCPMB UN UNCIVPOL UNPREDEP UNPROFOR USBAT VMRO-DPMNE

WTO

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Party for Democratic Prosperity Regional Cooperation Council Stabilization and Association Agreement Stabilization and Association Process Social Democratic Union of Macedonia South East European University Search for Common Ground Territorial Defense Force Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac United Nations United Nations Civilian Police United Nations Preventive Deployment United Nations Protection Force United States Battalion Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity World Trade Organization

Acknowledgments

The path to this book has been a long and arduous one. It began in March 2005, when my colleagues, Associate Professor Paul Battersby and Professor Joseph Siracusa, encouraged me to explore the complexities of a small, seemingly obscure country, Macedonia, tucked away in the southern Balkans. Their reasoning appeared logical enough: Macedonia had not received the same level of scholarly attention in the English-speaking world as other former Yugoslav republics and, as such, was poorly understood. It also helped that my own background is Macedonian. Yet, my initial response to their proposal was one of apprehension. Despite the obvious personal connection, my knowledge of the country at that point was somewhat crude, shaped largely by the stories passed on by my parents, both of whom, as teenagers, had left what was then a constituent part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Growing up, I had little attachment to Macedonia. As a scholar, my interests had taken me elsewhere. However, the more I have studied Macedonia, the more attached I have become to it. I believe its story is a fascinating one, and I am grateful for being given the opportunity to tell it. The months I spent in the country conducting research hold a special place in my heart, as they enriched me both personally and professionally. I found a country of striking physical beauty, a land with a contested past, complex present, and at once uncertain and optimistic future. I also found extremely hospitable and generous people, across all ethnic communities, who needed little prompting to share their knowledge on the issues I was exploring. My interview respondents provided insights and analyses that no publication ever could. These people are too numerous to name individually; some wish to remain anonymous. I am grateful to each and every one of them. In their absence, this book would never have come to pass. Such a general acknowledgment, however, fails to do justice to several individuals who went above and beyond in their efforts to assist me. First of all, President Kiro Gligorov, whom I interviewed on multiple occasions, and his chief of staff, Zhivko Kondev, who facilitated our meetings. The privilege I felt in spending hours upon hours with a truly

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historic figure, the father of a modern country, cannot be put into words. The late Nikola Kljusev – again, a historic figure, Macedonia’s first prime minister – took time from his summer break to outline, with great passion, the struggles of the country he so dearly loved, and he provided me with various resources. Stevo Pendarovski, national security adviser to President Branko Crvenkovski, gave up several hours of his time to explain the political, economic, and social complexities of his country. He was a constant source of help throughout, and I am fortunate to have him as a friend. Professor Paul Mojzes, a magnificently learned and generous figure, and his wife, Elizabeth, extended great hospitality to me in Pennsylvania. Marshall Harris, formerly of the State Department and now a senior policy adviser at the Washington, DC, law firm Alston & Bird, provided me with precious leads in Washington, Brussels, and Macedonia. Marshall also introduced me to his boss, the eminent Republican senator and former presidential candidate, Bob Dole! One particular State Department official he put me in contact with, whose name I cannot disclose, proved a prodigious source of detail, analysis, and leads. A charismatic and affable figure, I consider him a friend. James Pardew, a member of Richard Holbrooke’s negotiating team that brought the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to a close and a former US special envoy to Macedonia and ambassador to Bulgaria, relinquished his time to offer invaluable insights and general assistance. Lord Owen, the former British foreign secretary, not only gave his time for an interview, but, at his own volition, also gave me access to his archived personal documents from his time as the European Union’s special envoy to the former Yugoslavia. His secretary, Maggie Smart, was magnificent throughout, arranging all of my dealings with Lord Owen and forwarding documents to my home in Melbourne. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the former foreign minister of Norway and Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s special representative to Yugoslavia, set aside infinitely more important commitments to honor his promises to me. As a former UN high commissioner for refugees, he was called on short notice to mediate between the Norwegian government and hunger-striking Afghan refugees whom the government was seeking to deport, forcing his secretary to cancel all of his immediate upcoming engagements, mine included. Yet once he was made aware that I had traveled from Australia to see him, Ambassador Stoltenberg personally intervened, rearranging his schedule to grant me an interview. Special mention should also be made to his secretary, Anne Elise Oppedal, who worked frantically to ensure that our meeting went ahead; a special thank you also goes to Henryk Sokalski, an esteemed diplomat within the Polish foreign service who later rose to the rank of assistant secretary-general at the UN, who shared his formidable

Acknowledgments

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erudition on Macedonia and the institution he served with such distinction and élan. He and his wife, Maria, were wonderful hosts, taking me into their home in Warsaw and laying on a magnificent feast. I truly consider them friends. Being in the exalted company of these people was an honor and a truly humbling experience. Similarly, I wish to place on record my thanks to Dr. Michael Hussey of the United States National Archives at College Park, Maryland, who directed me to relevant documents; the staff at the Sydney Jones Library Archives at the University of Liverpool, who arranged access to the David Owen Archive; Agnes Marcaillou, chief of the Regional Disarmament Branch at the Department for Disarmament Affairs, UN Secretariat, who afforded me great latitude to conduct research during my time at her branch; Dr. Alice Ackermann of the OSCE and Professor Cindy Jebb of the United States Military Academy, who examined my work; and Dr. Lee A. Young, who edited the manuscript. I also wish to thank my family for their encouragement and understanding. As always, they supported me without condition and rewarded and indulged me throughout. Likewise my host families in the United States, Macedonia, Germany, and Norway went out of their way to assist me in my endeavors. Associate Professor Battersby, as my academic mentor, helped guide and refine my research, giving it a clarity and purpose it would have otherwise lacked. The advice and support of Professor Siracusa was just as priceless. The intellectual and personal debt I owe them can never be repaid. Last but not least, it would be remiss of me not to thank the team at Lynne Rienner Publishers/FirstForumPress. I am particularly grateful to Jessica Gribble and Claire Vlcek, who guided me through the publication process in a most professional and understanding manner. They always made themselves available and explained every nut and bolt in a clear manner, so ensuring a stress-free experience – at least for me, anyway! Without them, and the confidence they invested in me, this book would never have seen the light of day. As per usual, any shortcomings within these pages are completely my own.

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Map 1. Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1946–1991

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40 mi

SERBIA

KOSOVO

BULGARIA Va rd ar

Tetovo •

Kumanovo •

• SKOPJE

• Gostivar • Lake Ohrid

• Veles

Kicevo Prilep •

Stip •

Va rd a

r

Strumica • Lake Dojran

Lake Bitola Prespa •

GREECE

ALBANIA

Aegean Sea

Map 2. Republic of Macedonia

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1 The Macedonian Paradox

Notwithstanding a broad range of internal and external stresses, Macedonia1 was the only republic to attain its independence peacefully from the otherwise violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Poor, landlocked, and ethnically fragmented, its existence contested in one way or another by larger neighbors and situated within a volatile region, the likelihood of conflict2 in the fledgling state appeared high. Given the ostensibly prodigious nature of these threats, Macedonia became subject of a high-profile international preventive response, that is to say, a deliberate effort by outside actors to preclude war within its borders. In many respects, Macedonia represented a laboratory of sorts, with much of the thinking on conflict prevention that emerged with the end of the Cold War being applied therein. For the international community, broadly defined,3 the country would be rightly lauded as a rare example of successful conflict prevention. Conscious of the potential regional implications stemming from an outbreak of violence, outside actors initiated a timely and innovative campaign in the latent, pre-conflict stage to mitigate the two immediate sources of instability confronting the new country: namely, the threat of spillover from the Yugoslav successor wars in the north, and internal tensions between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians – the country’s titular nation and largest ethnic minority respectively. The actions of the international community, allied to a moderate Macedonian leadership and a number of historical factors that were absent elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, certainly diminished the potential for conflict. Encompassing a range of actors and strategies, most notably the groundbreaking deployment by the United Nations (UN) of a preventive peacekeeping force, the international response underscored the value and cost-effectiveness of prevention. While not necessarily decisive, this action reinforced the peace attained by local protagonists and various domestic and regional factors. The stabilizing role played by external parties during this initial phase should not be

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Conflict in Macedonia

downplayed. Yet, much to the surprise of many outside observers, Macedonia would fall into conflict a decade after independence, when ethnic Albanian guerrillas launched an eight-month insurgency in the putative name of political and cultural equality in the northwest of the country. By threatening to push Macedonia toward civil war, the events of 2001 posed difficult questions of the international community, specifically why the much-feted preventive strategies it had pursued in the period following independence failed to engender a durable peace. International engagement in Macedonia, as Alice Ackermann identifies, may be compartmentalized into three distinct phases, each corresponding to the different stages of the conflict cycle: (1) the preconflict stage, designed to pre-empt an outbreak of violence, (2) the overt conflict stage, designed to manage and negotiate a resolution to the violence that ensued, and (3) the post-conflict stage, designed to ensure implementation of the attendant peace agreement and monitor postconflict dynamics.4 The initial engagement – a qualitative departure from traditional international approaches to conflict – may be deemed a success insofar as it achieved the dual objective of helping Macedonia avoid the violence that befell other breakaway Yugoslav republics, on the one hand, and maintain internal peace thereafter, on the other. Yet core, underlying stresses – a large, disenfranchised ethnic minority with an ambiguous loyalty to the state, economic underdevelopment, a weak rule of law, and unresolved regional issues – remained. External actors succeeded only in mitigating near-term conflict sources, meaning root factors were left to fester and develop dangerous new dimensions, before ultimately manifesting themselves in violence. While it should be commended for its innovative approach in the immediate postindependence period, the international community failed to adopt a sufficiently long-term approach to prevention in Macedonia. In essence, its policies equated to a Band-Aid solution that merely papered over Macedonia’s cracks, achieving an unstable peace as opposed to a (more) permanent one. Key Arguments

First and foremost, the lessons stemming from Macedonia’s peaceful emergence as an independent state must be re-evaluated in light of the 2001 conflict, which dispelled popular assumptions of the country as a model of conflict prevention. Macedonia, put simply, is not the success story it is widely assumed to be. In the period 1991–2001, it may be considered a success only from a near-term perspective, and not a long-

The Macedonian Paradox

3

term one. Above defusing immediate tensions, the international community, preoccupied with peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, never articulated a long-term strategic vision for Macedonia. While near-term approaches to prevention are essential in and of themselves, they are ultimately futile if the greater – that is to say, long-term – peace is not attained. Of course, a structuralist, long-term approach cannot guarantee peace; however, by altering entrenched, conflict-conducive patterns and mindsets, it can increase its likelihood, and directly diminish the potential for future violence and the concomitant need for costly outside intervention. Conversely, when the root causes of, and conditions for, conflict within a society remain, as in Macedonia, violence is always likely. Second, underlying risk factors were sustained and exacerbated by the mistakes of a complacent international community, whose engagement in the country receded over time. This process of disengagement, beginning with the signing of the Dayton Accords in December 1995 that ended the first Yugoslav wars, created a vacuum in which destabilizing influences were able to solidify, so enhancing the prospect of future conflict. Convinced of its own hype of Macedonia as a preventive success, the international community divested time and resources from the country at the very juncture that sustained, ongoing engagement was needed to consolidate post-independence gains in the Balkans’ self-styled “oasis of peace.” Weak and fractured, Macedonia, in reality, represented anything but. The international community’s inability to resolve through peaceful methods the political deadlock in neighboring Kosovo, with which Macedonia is bound by dint of the ethnic, familial, and political ties of a cross-border Albanian community, had particularly adverse consequences. Alongside its bilateral dispute with Greece relating to the use of historic names and symbols, a spillover of instability from Kosovo always represented the greatest external threat to Macedonia’s security. Likewise, more could have been done to strengthen Macedonia’s fragile economic base, which served to aggravate all other risk factors, including interethnic tensions. As it were, external actors overemphasized ethnic sources of conflict, when, in fact, most of the underlying factors promoting instability – economic decline, organized crime, corruption, regional uncertainty – were non-ethnic in character. For instance, gradually integrating Macedonia into Euro-Atlantic – that is to say, European Union5 (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – political and security structures would have helped alleviate some of these threats. Yet for all its rhetoric, the EU only belatedly

4

Conflict in Macedonia

outlined a (genuine) pathway to membership for the countries of the Western Balkans,6 a policy that proved inherently counterproductive. In parallel to this, NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and its management of the province thereafter, directly or indirectly increased the likelihood of violence in Macedonia. Indeed, to the extent that the international community miscalculated the consequences of its actions on Macedonia, and so failed to adequately insulate the country from spillover, this event would come to represent a lightning rod for what was to follow in 2001. Of course, by no means can the outbreak of conflict in Macedonia be attributed exclusively to the failings of the international community. Part of the problem in the Balkans is the tendency to apportion blame to others, and the expectation of outsiders to solve all internal problems. Responsibility for what occurred in 2001, first and foremost, lay with the Macedonian state and its institutions. Despite a commitment to political power sharing and the provision of extensive minority rights, many discriminatory Communist-era policies and practices toward the Albanian-Macedonian community were perpetuated. Institutional efforts to address their legitimate demands were also slow. Nevertheless, while the international community can only do so much, it was particularly culpable in this instance given Macedonia’s inherent weakness, and, ipso facto, the ability of outsiders to leverage it into undertaking necessary reforms. To be sure, an important opportunity was missed in the pre-conflict stage to pressure and reward a weak state highly dependent on external assistance into addressing core Albanian grievances in a more expeditious manner. The EU’s initial failure to articulate a clear European “perspective,” or the prospect of integration based on political, economic, and social progress, for Macedonia and the broader region was a major oversight in this respect. This process of long-term Europeanization would have obligated Skopje to advance minority rights and combat organized crime and corruption – issues that directly contributed to the 2001 conflict – in a more robust manner, while simultaneously giving its people, immaterial of ethnicity, a mutual interest in a peaceful, functioning Macedonia. Rather than offering such a perspective upon the outbreak of violence, this long-term process of alignment should have commenced years earlier, slowly but surely transplanting European norms and values to the country and region. Yet Brussels underestimated the enormous soft power leverage it wields over Macedonia, for which accession into the EU has always represented the key to a stable and prosperous future.

The Macedonian Paradox

5

Though the international response to the 2001 conflict was ultimately an effective one, particularly through the use of incentives and disincentives to alter entrenched positions and guide the protagonists to a political settlement, this was, to some extent, beside the point – conflict should never have been allowed to materialize in the first place. Be that as it may, the international community, with the EU, as regional guardian, in the vanguard, has seemingly heeded the lessons of its previous failings, as, while the root causes of instability within Macedonian society largely remain, they are slowly, albeit belatedly, being eroded through the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. What Is Conflict Prevention?

The underlying logic of conflict prevention is simple: address conditions conducive to conflict within a given society before they manifest themselves in overt and protracted violence, and pre-empt the need for costly and dangerous international interventions – be they during or after hostilities – in the process. The idea of preventing intrasocietal disputes from escalating into violence is an eminently rational one, not least from a cost perspective. By logical extension, a universal consensus has emerged that prevention is better, and easier, than cure. And as the scholarly and policy debate has shifted from reaction to pro-action, so a normative presumption of prevention and its associated accoutrements, including, most controversially, humanitarian intervention, has slowly taken root.7 Contrary to popular belief, bred by the scope and intensity of those conflicts that broke out immediately following the end of the Cold War, the incidence of war – inter- and intrastate – has, in fact, declined since 1989, a trend that can partly be attributed to growing recognition of the value of prevention, and the concomitant ability of regional and international institutions to respond to flashpoints in a timely and decisive manner. In this respect, then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “An Agenda for Peace,” published in June 1992, was an important watershed, the first major, systematic international endorsement of the practice as understood in the post-Cold War era. Yet for all the intellectual and institutional traction the idea of conflict prevention has gained, much conjecture continues to surround the term, its scope and application. The first task, therefore, is to eliminate any terminological and practical ambiguity. One term used to describe conflict prevention is “peacebuilding,” a misleading description given the logic of prevention is to preclude the outbreak of violence in the first instance.

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Peacebuilding, conversely, is a rehabilitative process initiated in the post-conflict phase, so defeating the purpose of prevention, which, by definition, has failed. Similarly, terms such as “conflict management” and “conflict resolution” are processes applied after the event, and thus correspond to the post-, as opposed to pre-, conflict stage of the conflict cycle, intended to contain and ultimately settle instances of intrasocietal violence respectively. In particular, it is important to differentiate “conflict prevention” from “preventive diplomacy,” a vague term that can cause confusion when used interchangeably with the former: where conflict prevention, as defined in these pages, focuses on structural as much as proximate sources of tension, preventive diplomacy8 is considered a distinct operational response strategy, applied in the advanced pre-conflict stage, when violence is imminent or, indeed, has erupted, to address immediate conflict catalysts. In essence, it constitutes a form of short-term crisis management, designed to defuse and/or contain an immediate crisis from escalating both vertically and horizontally, that is to say, from evolving to encompass more intense, destructive means of warfare and additional actors and issues respectively.9 In the context of their shortterm nature, operational strategies are invariably implemented in isolation from long-term responses that strive to establish a structural foundation for more permanent peace. As such, “preventive diplomacy” should be understood as a critical component of the broader conflict prevention process, rather than as a synonym for it. Using the term as a synonym for conflict prevention is particularly problematic given that preventive diplomacy implies that prevention is limited to diplomacy, when, in fact, it also entails long-term development and numerous other strategies. Conflict Prevention Types

One can thus distinguish between three types of prevention: (1) operational, (2) structural, and (3) post-conflict. Operational prevention is underscored by the targeted implementation of proximate, near-term strategies that are designed to mitigate immediate sources of conflict,10 particularly through the use of incentives and disincentives to positively transform conflictual behavior. Operational prevention attempts to contain or reverse conflict accelerators, and is applied in response to an immediate crisis, when violence is imminent or has erupted.11 Structural prevention, conversely, is more proactive, advocating a long-term approach through the implementation of policies that mitigate

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underlying conflict sources. The basic premise guiding this approach is that addressing root sources will reduce the likelihood of future violence. Post-conflict prevention, or peacebuilding, meanwhile, refers to those initiatives designed to preclude a relapse into violence.12 As per structural prevention, it aims to diminish underlying sources of conflict, albeit after the cessation of hostilities. Given the complexity of reconstructing war-torn, polarized post-conflict societies, while concurrently attempting to put in place the structural foundations for long-term peace, this type of prevention is arguably the most difficult. Of course, each form of prevention has its unique challenges, and relies on specific measures, both coercive and noncoercive in character, to achieve its objectives. Where structural and post-conflict prevention speak of democracy, inclusive institutions, economic development, human rights, and interethnic harmony, operational prevention speaks of mediation, good offices, sanctions, and preventive peacekeeping. Definition and Application

Taking its point of departure the findings of the seminal Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict,13 this book conceptualizes conflict prevention in broad, holistic terms, taken to mean a proactive, systematic endeavor to identify and mitigate proximate and, in particular, structural conditions of conflict prior to their manifestation in violence. Involving numerous official and non-official actors,14 conflict prevention should be understood as an ongoing process that strives to create the enabling, structural conditions for long-term intrasocietal peace. As such, it emphasizes the underlying sources of instability that give rise to violence, moving beyond immediate catalysts in the search for durable peace through developmental, governance and capacitybuilding assistance.15 While precipitating, near-term factors are critical in themselves, prevention cannot be adequately understood without an awareness of the fundamental conditions that provide the impetus for the violent expression of grievances. If ignored, one is merely addressing the symptoms of conflict, and not, critically, its root causes.16 In essence, conflict prevention should be understood as an investment, a form of insurance and risk minimization, against future violence and intervention. As Peter Wallensteen argues, prevention ‘involves building societies with little likelihood of violent conflict.’17 It is a process that rests on two key factors: (1) responding early to signs of impending conflict, and (2) committing to a long-term effort to eradicate underlying conflict sources.18 In this context, international intervention

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Conflict in Macedonia

should not necessarily be equated with the arrival of foreign peacekeepers or with external military action, but should be understood as a sustained, largely pacific engagement – by governments, international security and financial institutions, regional organizations, NGOs – targeting root sources of conflict within a given society, and so creating conditions that diminish the propensity to violent recourse. This is not to say, however, that conflict prevention completely shuns military measures: while, by definition, “conflict prevention” aims to resolve crises without the use of military force, it nevertheless reserves the right to resort to it, or at least threaten to do so. Agents of Prevention

The challenge of augmenting the structural foundations for intrasocietal peace cannot be understated; indeed, the time and resources required are realistically beyond the means of any single state or institution. Effective prevention necessitates a collaborative effort between a range of internal and external agents. The most effective preventive response is an integrated one that encompasses a plurality of actors, and, by extension, allows for a pooling of resources and expertise, burden sharing, division of labor, and comparative advantage.19 Though primary responsibility for prevention, for all the efforts of outside actors, ultimately rests with local governments, each third party preventive agent brings to bear unique strengths, as well as weaknesses. NGOs, for instance, can monitor local trends, promote nonpartisan research, and lobby governments, while providing critical grassroots contact and intimate local knowledge; in effect, they stand on the front line of prevention. 20 NGOs are often the first external actors to recognize imminent conflict, and, as such, serve a critical early warning function.21 Given the longterm, grassroots nature of their work, NGOs can be just as important as diplomats and peacekeepers. The work of NGOs, however, is often compromised by financial restrictions, security fears, and host government intimidation, as well as an absence of formal, systematic channels through which to convey their conflict warnings.22 The UN, by contrast, as the apogee of international multilateralism, provides unparalleled collective legitimization of external intervention in the jurisdiction of a sovereign state, plays an eminent role in global norm creation, and, through its collection of specialized agencies, funds, and programs, possesses a unique reach and capacity.23 As the only truly global collective security organization, the UN represents the obvious and natural focal point for building consensus and mobilizing the

The Macedonian Paradox

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resources for multilateral action.24 Inasmuch as it was established for the precise purpose of maintaining international peace and security, it is empowered to deal with pertinent violations, including through coercive measures, as per Chapter VII of its Charter.25 Yet budgetary restraints and competing national interests, allied to the undemocratic composition and processes of the Security Council, its principle decision-making organ, have undermined such efforts in the past. Given the size and diffuse character of its membership, decision-making is naturally slow. Regional organizations, with smaller memberships, theoretically possess more streamlined decision-making processes. Further, to the extent that such groupings are usually bound by common values and a shared culture and history, preventive action authorized by a regional body may appear more amenable to the target state, thus pre-empting accusations of Western neo-imperialism. Allied to geographic proximity and influence, regional organizations – such as the EU, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe26 (OSCE), and African Union (AU) – represent major centers of early detection and response.27 Yet, similarly to the UN, financial limitations, disparate interests, and often unwieldy procedural processes can undercut policy coherence, and so militate against effective – if not early – action. In this sense, individual states, provided they possess a direct interest and can justify intervention on legal and/or moral grounds, can respond markedly more expeditiously than multilateral organizations encumbered by unanimous or majority decision-making practices across diverse memberships. 28 Individual countries, particularly the United States, as well as regional powers, can also bring to bear significant diplomatic, economic, military, and technical resources and influence on a given situation. 29 That said, unilateral action can be highly problematic, as underscored by the American experience in Iraq, where a lack of international authority and resources served to aggravate the security situation. Conflict Prevention Methods

While advocating a structural approach to prevention, the precise strategy to be employed will necessarily depend on the exact phase of the particular conflict cycle. As Edward Azar explains, conflict should be understood as an organic process that evolves over a natural, historical life cycle, incorporating periods of genesis, maturity, reduction, and, ultimately, termination.30 Conflict should thus be conceptualized in distinct stages: pre-conflict, or the incipient/latent stage; intra-conflict, or the manifest/overt stage; and post-conflict. 31

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Conflict in Macedonia

Each phase will naturally possess different dynamics, and so demand a different approach. From the perspective of policy, it is important to define the conflict cycle, and be cognizant of the different stages therein, as well as of the factors that can accelerate or de-accelerate a given conflict’s development along this continuum. The key to prevention is that of timing. Ideally, opportunities for prevention will be seized in the incipient stage, when advanced conflict conditions are absent, the issues in dispute are fewer and less complex, conflict parties are less motivated, polarized, and armed, the desire for vengeance is less intense, and moderate leaders still maintain control. 32 This represents the largest, and most important, entry point for outside actors. In contrast, policy options progressively narrow as a conflict escalates vertically and/or horizontally, and is imbued with dangerous new dimensions, including revenge and retribution, thus making containment and resolution significantly more problematic. 33 Progression along the conflict continuum may render a situation intractable and therefore less amenable to international intervention – Bruce Jentleson’s Rubicon effect,34 or the theory of “ripeness,” which postulates that certain points in a conflict cycle are more conducive to intervention and resolution than others.35 Put another way, policy options do not stay open over time. As such, the critical question is precisely when and how to intervene.36 Limits to Prevention

While the logic of prevention is clear enough, important obstacles to its effective application remain. Indeed, for all the normative headway it has made, these limits – political will, consensus building, policy coordination, comprehensive institutionalization – continue to inhibit its systematic application. Prevention, moreover, is difficult when locals are seemingly intent on violence. For the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, prevention is contingent on six distinct capacities, which should be understood as links in an interdependent, reinforcing chain: (1) analytical, to predict and comprehend intrasocietal conflict, (2) early warning, to trigger a response, (3) operational, that is to say, the preventive tools available to policymakers, (4) strategic, or determining which methods to use when, (5) institutional, to formulate a coordinated response, and (6) political will, which remains the weakest link in this chain.37 In an ideal sense, intervention will be forthcoming prior to the outbreak of violence; in reality, the international community will

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invariably respond after the event, once people have died in large numbers, physical and environmental destruction has been incurred, and further seeds of hatred and vengeance sown. This reactiveness can be attributed to a number of factors, from established Westphalian principles of international relations and an absence of geo-strategic and national interest on the part of major powers, to financial restrictions and the nature of the UN system, which – given ideological divisions and divergent interests within the Security Council – lends to decisionmaking paralysis. Collectively, these factors limit the ability of the international community to build the political will and the resources for timely action, and so militate against coordinated, multilateral responses to emerging crises, whether inter- or intrastate. In this respect, the present system of global governance, and international responses to real or emerging crises within it, remain deficient. Of course, undertaking prevention in a foreign country is a risk, not least politically, particularly if it involves the deployment of forces. If imprudently designed, it may exacerbate a given situation. What cannot be denied, however, is that pro-action in forestalling the human cost of war is more efficient and cost-effective than inertia and, ultimately, reaction. Even a modest political and economic intervention in the incipient stage of a conflict can make a substantive difference. The appeal of prevention – as a policy, strategy, and paradigm – is therefore enhanced by the comparatively smaller risks and costs associated with it.38 Preventive measures can preclude a need for costly peace operations and ambiguous humanitarian interventions, while insulating neighboring countries from a spillover of refugees, arms, and general instability. In this sense, the concept of prevention is logical from both a liberal humanitarian ethos and Realpolitik, national security perspective.39 As such, conflict prevention should be conceptualized as a cost-effective way to protect and advance national interests, even when such interests are not directly at stake. Inaction diminishes the credibility of multilateral institutions and powerful states. Rwanda and BosniaHerzegovina, for example, will always haunt the collective conscience of the international community. Conflict Causation

An understanding of the factors that give rise to internal conflict is fundamental to effective prevention. Certainly, a large body of scholarly literature has emerged to expound the dynamics driving this phenomenon. For the purposes of policy development, a theoretical

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distinction can be made between three sources of violence: (1) structural – the underlying socioeconomic, historical, and systemic conditions that make a society vulnerable to conflict, (2) precipitating/accelerating – the enabling resources, policies, institutions, and processes that transform underlying conditions into violent action, and (3) triggering – the immediate acts or catalytic events that provoke violence and directly tip a society over the edge.40 As the Carnegie Commission argues, few, if any, internal conflicts are spontaneous or unexpected.41 To the contrary, they represent violent expressions of simmering, long-standing grievances fuelled by fundamental, structural sources of tension. Yet root factors, in isolation, may not be sufficient to provoke violence. Rather, overt conflict tends to be triggered by an immediate, unexpected event that ignites underlying grievances,42 such as an assassination or coup attempt, fixed elections, the suspension of constitutional law or a heavy-handed security response to opposition dissent, and/or the confluence of multiple factors that, collectively, transform tensions into physical violence. For conflict to occur, a number of structural, proximate, and triggering factors must necessarily converge. In other words, intrastate conflicts are rarely mono-causal, but the consequence of structural and proximate, internal and external sources – ranging from political/institutional, socioeconomic, historical, and cultural, to environmental, regional, and global – that increase the likelihood of instability and violence within a given context. Knowledge of these factors is well advanced: violence is most likely in countries characterized by corrupt and unrepresentative institutions, human rights violations, political and economic inequality, poverty, social injustice, intergroup divisions, and porous borders, than those where democracy, civil society, economic stability, political moderation, tolerance, the rule of law, and good neighborly relations are entrenched. Strategies to address multidimensional crises must, by extension, be multidimensional in character. The concept of human security offers an important framework for analysis and action in this respect. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty defines human security as ‘the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.’43 One can say, in broad terms, that if groups or individuals have the right to political participation and cultural expression, and possess genuine economic prospects, equal rights under the constitution, access to adequate shelter, food, and water, reliable social services, a fair

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judicial system, and recourse to address their legitimate grievances peacefully, they are less likely to adopt violent methods to resolve their political and socioeconomic ills.44 As Michael Lund notes, intrasocietal conflict tends to be the result of deep-rooted socioeconomic and historical conditions which, persisting over a sustained period of time, reduce human security and create a niche for violence.45 Certainly, the sense of injustice and human insecurity must be acute for groups or individuals to take up, and attempt to rationalize, violence. While it can be an important source of conflict, ethnic diversity need not be read as synonymous with instability and violence. Ethnically heterogeneous societies are not necessarily more prone or susceptible to violence, just as ethnic homogeneity does not represent a guarantee of peace and stability. Even in those cases where interethnic violence has erupted, it is misleading to attribute its outbreak simply to ethnic difference, a reading that can have negative policy implications. Though such distinctions may aggravate tensions, they are insufficient, in and of themselves, to produce violence, and so fail to adequately explain why people kill each other in a given social context. As Barnett Rubin posits, ethnicity can structure conflict, without causing it.46 Conversely, it is the nationalist rhetoric and calculated decisions of political elites willing to mobilize ethnic difference for their own gain, particularly in times of social stress and insecurity, which compel people to fall back on primordial identities and group solidarity, that largely determine if and why such differences manifest themselves in violence. As such, the state’s management of ethnic diversity, as opposed to its very presence, is key. In a major departure from this (conventional) reading of conflict causation, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler conceptualize intrasocietal violence not in terms of grievance, but greed and opportunity. According to this model, conflict stems not necessarily from grievance, but from opportunities, or the circumstances in which groups are able to rebel against the state.47 While political and other grievances may provide a motive for war, it is the presence of opportunities, particularly economic, which provide both the means and incentive for war, that catalyze internal conflict. In this respect, the availability of finance, which may come from any number of sources, from diasporas to neighboring governments; access to cheap conflict capital, including arms; a large pool of potential recruits; favorable terrain that can insulate rebels from the state, and provide a sanctuary for training and planning; and a weak state military capability render a society at extremely high risk of conflict.48 In particular, Collier and Hoeffler identify the presence

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of primary commodities, a powerful source of finance and extortion, as a fundamental conflict-inducing factor.49 From this perspective, weak states with abundant natural resources are particularly vulnerable to violence. In many such instances of opportunity, criminal elements may assume and exploit the grievances of a particular identity group as a façade for rebellion designed not to redress these grievances, but, conversely, to further their own criminal, economic interests. Certainly, conflict constitutes a profitable industry,50 creating an environment advantageous to organized crime and other nefarious activity. For Collier and Hoeffler, it is the presence of such atypical opportunities – more so than grievances relating to governance – that determines a country’s susceptibility to violence.51 Conflict Early Warning

The concept of early warning is likewise fundamental to the practice of conflict prevention. In simple terms, early warning refers to the process of anticipating impending violence through the observation of conflict indicators, and, based on this information, generating warnings to trigger a preventive response. Early warning comprises three fundamental elements: (1) information, (2) analysis, and (3) communication.52 A precondition for timely intervention, early warning of developing crises can be derived from a plethora of sources, from governments, intelligence bodies, and regional and international organizations to NGOs and the media. As a concept, it raises several issues, including how far in advance warnings can and should be issued, and precisely which factors this analysis should be based on, and thus monitored. Ideally, warnings will be communicated to decision-makers months, or, in the case of structural prevention, years, in advance to facilitate the formulation of an appropriate response.53 Yet, traditionally, a centralized system of early warning – or some sort of international clearinghouse, located, for instance, within the UN system54 – has been lacking; conversely, the process of early warning has been undertaken on an ad hoc basis by an unstructured network of official and non-official actors.55 While they will naturally diverge from context to context, a broad set of common trends or precursors of imminent intrastate violence, both proximate and structural, as noted, can be identified and monitored. For all the forecasting utility of such alarm signals, however, unstable and at-risk societies, and the underlying causes giving rise to them, are well known; as Rubin observes, conflict principally occurs in impoverished, poorly educated, polarized, isolated societies with weak institutions and

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limited resources.56 The challenge, in this sense, is to be attentive to the immediate catalysts – or conflict triggers – that transform structural factors into violent expression, or escalate a conflict from mere crisis to full-fledged war. As Jentleson posits, the challenge from the perspective of early warning is not necessarily identifying societies at risk, which are well known, but recognizing the processes and patterns of change that accelerate conflict.57 In a policy sense, therefore, it is critical – as noted elsewhere – to differentiate between underlying, escalating, and triggering conflict factors. Although significant progress has been achieved in understanding conflict causation, and early warning response mechanisms established by governments and multilateral institutions, the impediments to early warning receptivity and early action remain great.58 These obstacles can be situated on multiple levels: informational, analytical, bureaucratic, political, and operational. The first challenge to early warning is informational, that is to say, the process of procuring the necessary information – both in terms of quantity and quality – and transmitting this in a reliable and timely manner to decision-makers.59 In this regard, as John Cockell argues, the proximity of the analyst to the decisionmaker can often be decisive, and so represents an important link between warning and actual response.60 In addition, there is a need to eschew excess information, which can make it difficult to discern between quality warning and flawed analysis.61 Linked to this is the accurate analysis of conflict indicators, and, in particular, the issue of bias entering the analytical and/or assessment process, which can distort the accuracy and credibility of available information.62 Perceptions of the seriousness of a given situation, possibly informed by a particular policy position, may differ. The construction of informed policy choices based on available early warning information, or precisely when to act and which instruments to utilize, represent another significant bureaucratic challenge. With finite resources, this raises the issue of opportunity cost, or determining which crises are most pressing, and therefore demand the most time and resources. As Lund observes, a policy of prevention that acts on any and all signs of trouble would only serve to exhaust resources and credibility, while leaving real dangers unchecked.63 To that end, it is critical to ascertain where and when the most destructive conflicts are most likely to occur, commit necessary resources, and formulate appropriate responses accordingly.64 Indeed, the problem of overload represents the other chief bureaucratic challenge: policymakers may simply be too preoccupied with manifest

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or more pressing crises to devote attention and resources to latent, lowlevel ones.65 Naturally, certain trouble spots will take precedence over others. It was the former Yugoslavia’s great misfortune, for example, to be disintegrating just as Saddam Hussein was invading Kuwait and the Soviet Union was deep in its death throe. While formidable, the informational, analytical, and bureaucratic obstacles to early warning can generally be overcome. Rather, the principal barriers to early warning and response are political and operational, or catalyzing the will and resources to mobilize a timely and coordinated multilateral intervention in response to the information at hand. In the first instance, leaders may be unwilling to commit to costly and potentially risky action when violence is not overt, but remains a mere possibility, particularly in those contexts deemed marginal to a state’s geo-strategic interests. If a given conflict fails to adequately impact on a state’s national interests, policymakers are less inclined to respond to early warning signs. For all the normative advances made by conflict prevention and humanitarian intervention, the fact remains that – in the absence of core national interests – governments remain reluctant to act, meaning signals of imminent conflict, even if audible, are not guaranteed to trigger a policy response. Intervention may also be considered politically inexpedient, largely borne of a fear of becoming entangled in an intractable situation, and incurring heavy political costs at home. Thus, while an emerging crisis situation may be taken seriously, the potential costs of intervention – financial, human, political – may simply be too great to warrant early, substantive action. In the final analysis, the problem of early warning is not one of a lack of accurate information or integrated, institutionalized systems of analysis, but, essentially, an absence of political will for early action. Those societies at risk of internal violence are well known. There is little element of surprise when a conflict does erupt. Generally speaking, warnings of impending violence are plentiful, though all too often still insufficient to prompt early intervention. As William Zartman argues, ‘the biggest problem in the early warning debate is not whether an event is preceded by warning signals but whether warning signals are followed by an event.’ 66 The gap between warning and response remains significant. Closing this gap represents the greatest challenge to early warning and, by extension, effective conflict prevention.

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Purpose and Structure

This book has three principal purposes. First, to determine why Macedonia, in spite of various stresses, avoided violence during the process of Yugoslav fragmentation, with strong emphasis on the international response, yet fell into conflict some 10 years later. As such, it will examine conflict prevention processes in the period 1991–2001, from the time of Yugoslavia’s collapse through to the end of armed insurgency in post-Yugoslav Macedonia. While the history of the country and region is complex, events preceding this era fall outside the book’s scope, and thus do not come under analysis. Second, to advance knowledge of a poorly understood country, one that – certainly in comparison to other former Yugoslav republics – has largely been neglected by Western scholars. And third, to extract lessons from the Macedonian experience that will advance understanding of the practice of conflict prevention, particularly of the factors that promote internal wars and the nature and timing of international responses to them. A note on the structure of the book. Chapter 2 examines the period of Yugoslavia’s collapse and Macedonia’s peaceful extrication from it. Chapter 3 evaluates the response of the international community, which – timely, innovative, and multitrack – played an important role in assuaging immediate threats to Macedonian security. Chapter 4 outlines the events of 2001, and the subsequent international response, which, in the final analysis, proved decisive in heading off a wider war. Primarily narrative based, these chapters describe and examine the events from which broader theoretical conclusions are drawn. This is done in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 enters into a detailed discussion of the factors that facilitated peace then war in Macedonia. In addition to international intervention, it identifies various historical factors and the leadership of Kiro Gligorov as key mitigating dynamics. In parallel to this, certain (external) threats were not as robust as originally feared. Nevertheless, important failures on the part of successive Macedonian governments and the international community served to legitimate the politics of violence, so giving rise to an insurgency that threatened to push the country toward civil war. In the event, what occurred in 2001 was as much an intra-Albanian putsch as a struggle for group rights. Its timing, ultimately, can be explained by a confluence of internal and external forces, and the coalescence of political, nationalist, ideological, and criminal interests. Chapter 6 then develops general conceptual formulations and policy lessons from the international community’s Macedonian experience.

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In addition to explaining why Macedonia fell into violence, Chapters 5 and 6 address the core conceptual concerns of the book: what is the significance of the Macedonian context from the perspective of conflict prevention? What are the underlying and immediate causes of intrastate, ethnopolitical conflict? How can such phenomena be anticipated? Can generic conflict signals be developed as a guide to early intervention? Which third-party strategies are most effective in such situations, and when should they be applied? In the final analysis, conflicts such as Macedonia’s highlight the interconnectedness and transnational nature of contemporary security threats. As such, the major powers have a practical interest in addressing emerging intrastate crises, even in instances where the putative national interest may appear marginal. To facilitate more timely multilateral responses, security, in effect, must be de-nationalized, and conceptualized in international – as opposed to strictly national – terms.

Notes 1 Greece strenuously disputes its neighbor’s use of the name “Macedonia,” which it considers exclusive Greek property. To that end, it has used its leverage within regional and international institutions to obstruct the country’s recognition under its formal constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia. Thus, in regional and international circles, the country is formally known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the provisional name under which it was admitted into the UN in 1993. For the purposes of brevity, however, it will be referred to as “Macedonia” throughout the book. Similarly, the term “Macedonian” is taken to mean all citizens who reside within the territory of the Macedonian state, regardless of ethnicity. Where distinction is sought between ethnic communities resident in Macedonia, the prefix “ethnic” is used, followed by the name of the community in question (for instance, ethnic Macedonian, ethnic Albanian, ethnic Serb). 2 The typology of conflict is vast. As Michael Lund notes, it can take numerous forms: global, regional, interstate, intrastate, or interpersonal: Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: Conflict-Sensitive Development in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), 10. Conflict can be fuelled by any number of factors, and can be destructive or constructive in nature; certainly, “conflict” does not have to be characterized by physical violence. This book deals specifically with destructive, intrasocietal conflict, which, among other things, may be based on ethnicity, ideology, the pursuit of political power, control of natural resources, and/or self-determination. In particular, it will

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focus on ethnopolitical conflict, or those situations where ethnically based groupings challenge the political and social status quo within a given society. 3 In the context of this book, “international community” is taken to mean those external actors – countries, supra-national entities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) – engaged in Macedonia in a preventive capacity in the period 1991–2001. In particular, it refers to the UN; EU; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); NATO; and the United States. Also note that, throughout the book, “international community” is used interchangeably with “third party,” “external actors,” and “outside actors.” 4 Alice Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia: From Preventive Engagement to Peace Implementation,” in International Intervention in the Balkans Since 1995, ed. Peter Siani-Davies, 106 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003). 5 The European Union (EU) was formally established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993; prior to this, the entity was known as the European Community (EC). To avoid unnecessary confusion, it will be referred to as the EU throughout the book, even when discussing pre-1993 events. 6 “Western Balkans” is widely accepted as encompassing Croatia; Serbia; Montenegro; Kosovo; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Macedonia; and Albania. 7 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: Conflict-Sensitive Development in the 21st Century, ii. 8 The term “preventive diplomacy” was originally coined by UN SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjöld in 1960, during the height of the Cold War, to describe the organization’s efforts to prevent distant Third World conflicts from escalating into wider superpower confrontation. The concept evolved with the end of the Cold War, and was broadened by Boutros-Ghali in “An Agenda for Peace” to emphasize the importance of early international responses to incipient conflicts, be they inter- or intrastate in character: Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 33–34. 9 William DeMars et al., Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1999), 99. 10 Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), 9. 11 Barnett R. Rubin, Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action (New York, NY: Century Foundation, 2002), 131–132. 12 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 32.

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13

Published in 1997, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict brought together 16 of the leading scholars and practitioners in the field. 14 Official actors are those operating at a governmental level, and include conflict parties, states, and supra-national organizations. These are also referred to as Track One actors. Non-official, or Track Two, actors, conversely, operate at the nongovernmental level, and may include NGOs, academia, independent media, and the private sector. 15 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 31. 16 Ibid. 17 Peter Wallensteen, “Reassessing Recent Conflicts: Direct vs. Structural Prevention,” in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System, eds. Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, 213 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). 18 Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report, xiii. 19 Ibid., xiv. 20 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, 178. 21 Bruce W. Jentleson, “Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework,” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson, 11– 12 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). 22 Ibid., 12. 23 Bruce W. Jentleson, “Preventive Diplomacy: Analytical Conclusions and Policy Lessons,” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized, ed. Jentleson, 338–339. 24 Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report, 129–130. 25 Terry Nardin, “Introduction,” in Humanitarian Intervention, eds. Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams, 18 (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2006). 26 Until 1995, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). For the purposes of this book, it will be referred to as the OSCE throughout. 27 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, 176–177. 28 Ibid., 179–180. 29 Ibid. 30 Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1990), 6.

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21

DeMars et al., Breaking Cycles of Violence, 47. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, 15. 33 Jentleson, “Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework,” 8. 34 Jentleson, “Preventive Diplomacy: Analytical Conclusions and Policy Lessons,” 330. 35 Ibid., 331. 36 Jentleson, “Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework,” 9. 37 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 43. 38 Ibid., 27. 39 Ibid. 40 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: Conflict-Sensitive Development in the 21st Century, 12. 41 Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report, 23. 42 Rubin, Blood on the Doorstep, 29. 43 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 15. 44 Rubin, Blood on the Doorstep, 25. 45 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: Conflict-Sensitive Development in the 21st Century, 16. 46 Rubin, Blood on the Doorstep, 12. 47 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001), 2. 48 Ibid., 6. 49 Ibid., 2. 50 Ibid. 51 Though it offers a fresh perspective on conflict causation, the greed paradigm neglects the role of individuals and personalities, and the calculated actions of political elites to lead a people to war. Further, while the emphasis on natural resources helps to explain certain conflicts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, it overlooks the developmental potential of such resources, namely, their ability to augment state capacity and further a country’s economic development. At the same time, by rationalizing conflict, in large part, as a form of criminal violence and economic enterprise with little political basis, and thus portraying rebels as opportunists and criminals, this approach de-legitimizes the activities of legitimate rebel groups. As such, the theory of conflict causation propounded by Collier and Hoeffler is overly cynical, neglecting the justifiable grievances and historical injustices that groups may harbor against a state. From a policy perspective, such an interpretation, by definition, necessitates a military/police 32

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response to crush putative criminals, but which, in fact, may only sow the seeds for further conflict. 52 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: Conflict-Sensitive Development in the 21st Century, 62. 53 David Carment, “Anticipating State Failure,” in Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality: Opportunities and Innovations, eds. David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, 91 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). 54 The UN did establish the Office for Research and the Collection of Information within its Secretariat in the 1980s for this purpose; however, this was disbanded in 1992: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 35. 55 Ibid., 35–36. 56 Rubin, Blood on the Doorstep, 18–19. 57 Jentleson, “Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework,” 11. 58 Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, “The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy,” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized, ed. Jentleson, 28. 59 Jentleson, “Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework,” 11. 60 John G. Cockell, “Early Warning Analysis and Policy Planning in UN Preventive Action,” in Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?, eds. David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, 185 (Tokyo and New York, NY: United Nations University Press, 2003). 61 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 36–37. 62 Jentleson, “Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework,” 11. 63 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, 108. 64 Ibid. 65 George and Holl, “The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy,” 28. 66 I. William Zartman, Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 5.

2 The Path to Independence: Exception to the Rule

While Macedonia was the only republic to extricate itself peacefully from Yugoslavia’s violent collapse, this southernmost republic in the south Slav federation was a powder keg upon independence in 1991. The range of stresses that threatened to undermine the new country was extensive, and raised serious questions of its viability. Macedonia was, after all, a weak, poor, multiethnic entity with no previous experience of statehood, situated in a war-torn region, and landlocked by larger neighbors who contested its right to exist based on historical claims to its territory, people, and/or language. If ignited, any outbreak of violence had the potential to provoke a wider regional war. Against this backdrop, Macedonia became the subject of a concerted regime of preventive intervention from the international community. Consensus on the part of the UN Security Council vis-à-vis the nature and gravity of the threat prompted a timely response, as underscored by the deployment of preventive peacekeepers. Allied to the work of other third-party actors, and, critically, the early projection of American power, the international community helped Macedonia make a nonviolent transition to independence by providing reassurance, deterring potential aggressors, and strengthening moderate forces at an uncertain historical moment. In so doing, it showcased an international community in active conflict prevention mode. As such, Macedonia represented a marked departure from the disheveled approach propagated by the international community to the conflicts elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia at the time of its dissolution, an approach characterized by initial apathy, disunity, and lack of purpose.

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Clinging to Yugoslavia

Macedonia, to all intents and purposes, obtained its independence by default. In contrast to Slovenia and Croatia, where it was driven by popular national movements, statehood was effectively imposed on Macedonia by Yugoslavia’s collapse. The Macedonian leadership at the time, Vasil Tupurkovski, its representative to the Yugoslav collective presidency, and, in particular, Kiro Gligorov, the republic’s president, advocated Yugoslavia’s continued existence. This apprehensiveness was rooted in a fear that an independent Macedonian state, in the political, economic, and military climate of the day, and in the context of the internal and external threats confronting it, was not viable, its interests, conversely, better served within a Yugoslav framework. Indeed, Gligorov, in collaboration with Alija Izetbegovic of BosniaHerzegovina, campaigned for Yugoslavia’s preservation. In June 1991, in a last-ditch bid to reconcile Serb, Croat and Slovene constitutional differences, Gligorov and Izetbegovic proposed a compromise formula which – in an attempt to satisfy Serbian demands for Yugoslav unity, on the one hand, and Slovenian and Croatian desires for greater autonomy, on the other – would have transformed the country into a loose confederation of sovereign, de facto independent states.1 However, while the Gligorov-Izetbegovic proposal may have represented a pacific solution to the Yugoslav impasse, their respective republics, individually and collectively, lacked the influence to affect Yugoslavia’s future direction, a course that only Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia could chart. Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, quite simply, had most to lose from Yugoslavia’s dissolution: the latter because of its ethnic composition, which, as a Yugoslav microcosm, would likely push it to violence; the former due to the financial assistance and security guarantees Yugoslavia provided. Certainly, the Yugoslav arrangement had served Macedonia well. In the first instance, the modern-day Macedonian nation was only officially recognized as a distinct ethnic, religious, and linguistic community, and assigned its own territory, by Josip Broz Tito.2 While it would be misleading to portray Macedonian national consciousness as an artificial creation of Tito’s, his policies helped solidify and formalize it, giving ethnic Macedonians a sense of national identity they had hitherto largely lacked. Externally, Yugoslav membership sidelined the age-old Macedonian Question, or the territorial pretensions of neighboring countries on historic Macedonia. Internally, federal redistributive policies helped sustain the poorest and least developed Yugoslav republic. Just as fundamentally, membership of the Yugoslav federation was an important tool for the suppression of

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ethnic Albanian dissent. Concentrated heavily in Kosovo and west and northwestern Macedonia, the Albanian community, given its size, demanded the status of a constituent Yugoslav nation, and, in the event of state collapse, would conceivably seek secession and incorporation into a Greater Albania, just as the Krajina- and Bosnian-Serbs and the Bosnian-Croats ultimately sought union with their respective motherlands.3 The Macedonian authorities, wary of growing Albanian agitation, as manifested in protests in Kumanovo and Gostivar in 1988, and conscious of the close ties Albanian-Macedonians shared with their restive and assertive brethren to the north, encouraged Serbia’s crackdown in Kosovo, and tacitly supported Slobodan Milosevic’s decision to suspend the province’s autonomy the following year.4 Indeed, during Yugoslav times, the Macedonian Communist leadership was one of the most conservative and pro-Serb.5 By extension, a stronger sense of pro-Yugoslavism prevailed in Macedonia than it did in the other republics. Where the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Montenegrins increasingly attributed the perceived ills of their respective nations to Tito and his Yugoslavia, ethnic Macedonians largely revered him and his Yugoslav concept.6 Republican Multiparty Elections: Yugoslavia or Macedonia?

Pro-Yugoslav sentiment was reflected in Macedonia’s multiparty election of 1990, where political parties advocating south Slav unity fared significantly better than in Slovenia and Croatia, and brought to power a center-left coalition dominated by ex-Communists loyal to Yugoslavia.7 As elsewhere in the federation, Macedonia’s League of Communists responded to the imminent collapse of Communism by amending the republic’s constitution in 1989 to allow for multiparty elections, which were staged in November 1990.8 The Macedonian electorate, as Susan Woodward outlines, proceeded to split into three distinct tendencies: (1) a pro-Yugoslav alliance, led by the reconstituted League of Communists of Macedonia, now the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM). Championing Yugoslav unity, it captured 30 of the 120 parliamentary seats, supplemented by the 19 seats won by the Alliance of Reform Forces of Ante Markovic, the federal prime minister, (2) a right-wing, nationalist coalition, the Macedonian National Front, led by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary OrganizationDemocratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). Demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) from its territory and Macedonian independence, it took 37 seats,

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the single largest amount, and (3) the Albanian vote, which was monopolized by the community’s newly established political parties, the largest of which, the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), won 24 seats.9 Over and above the pro-Yugoslav/pro-Macedonian dichotomy it exposed, the election portended a far more profound, permanent cleavage within Macedonian politics, namely, the organization of parties – and the subsequent split of the vote – along strictly ethnic lines. The strong showing by the right-wing coalition highlighted the emergence of a more assertive Macedonian nationalism. In part, this was provoked by the aggressive rhetoric and policies coming from Serbia. Milosevic alienated the Macedonian people and political elite, which was largely gravitating toward him, with a 1989 draft law allowing Serbs who had settled in Macedonia during the interwar period, when Macedonia constituted a part of Serbia, but who were expelled after World War II with Macedonia’s recognition as a constituent Yugoslav nation, the right to reclaim their land.10 His proposal to declare December 1 a national holiday, the day the south Slavs were first united, in the form of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, an arrangement that did not recognize the Macedonian nation, likewise provoked consternation in Skopje.11 Nevertheless, given the late emergence of a modern Macedonian nation and the diverse character of its population, Macedonian national consciousness remained relatively weak. In comparison to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonian nationalist parties fared poorly in the multiparty election. A poll conducted in 1991 indicated that some 60 percent of Macedonians remained loyal to the Yugoslav concept, favoring a restructured Yugoslavia of sovereign republics to an independent Macedonia.12 In essence, the Macedonian people were caught between two futures, one within the Yugoslav framework that had served them so well, in whatever future form, the other statehood – an ambiguity reflected in the result of the 1990 election. The process of establishing Macedonia’s first post-Communist government was complicated by this malaise. Espousing diametrically opposite views on Macedonia’s future direction,13 the ex-Communists of the SDSM and Ljupco Georgievski’s VMRO-DPMNE failed in their attempts to form a ruling coalition, the latter withdrawing in protest over the former’s continued support of Yugoslavia. With neither party possessing a clear majority to form a government, a temporary, nonpartisan institution, a so-called “cabinet of experts,” was established in March 1991 under the premiership of Nikola Kljusev, an eminent economics professor, to manage the initial transition.14 Preceding the

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creation of this provisional government, the Macedonian parliament, in January 1991, elected the former Communist Gligorov as republican president.15 The appointment of the prominent 72-year old was particularly noteworthy: a Belgrade-educated nouveau democrat, Gligorov had lived in Belgrade since the 1940s, rising high within the federal apparatus, serving as Tito’s economic adviser, federal finance minister, and president of the federal parliament, before retiring from politics in 1978.16 One of the most respected Yugoslav politicians of his generation, Gligorov was referred to as “the fox” for his survival through four decades of Communism.17 Yet, as Gligorov himself recounts, his appointment was a controversial one, particularly among nationalists, who, given his ties to Belgrade, perceived him as an outsider.18 Treading an Uncertain Path

With its compromise proposal of a union of sovereign republics rejected, Slovenia and Croatia now openly pushing for secession, and Yugoslavia thus on its deathbed, Macedonia, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, had little choice but to pursue secession of its own, calling a referendum on independence for September 8, 1991.19 Yet the referendum, specifically the cautious wording of the question put to the Macedonian people (‘do you agree to a sovereign or an independent State of Macedonia, with the right to join a future union of sovereign states of Yugoslavia?’20), was indicative of the reservations the Macedonian elite continued to harbor about independence. Indeed, this question, and the implicit caveat accompanying it, above all else, encapsulated Macedonian insecurities. Again, it reinforced the predicament Skopje was caught in: remain in a Serb-dominated Yugoslav federation and, despite being a nonaggressor, share its tarnished image and international isolation, or aspire to a statehood which, once obtained, would expose it to a raft of threats the federation had hitherto provided guarantees against. By remaining amenable to a future south Slav union, Macedonia, in effect, was hedging its bets, preparing for – and ultimately accepting – independence, yet, in the event that it was unable to fend for itself, leaving open the possibility of rejoining a larger Yugoslav state. Certainly, the challenge facing an independent Macedonia appeared a daunting one. On the one hand, it would require developing and consolidating a new state, and undertaking the transition to democracy and a market economy from a weak base. On the other, it would mean reorienting trade flows, managing a complex multi-ethnicity,

28

Conflict in Macedonia

establishing cordial relations with often-hostile neighbors, and, least of all, remaining disentangled from the Yugoslav wars.21 This is not to say that small states are not feasible; if political structures are stable, the economy is viable and well organized, the state has legitimacy in the eyes of its people, and is accepted by its neighbors, they can not only survive, but also thrive. Yet Macedonia had none of these conditions. In this context, it is interesting to note that keeping open the option of returning to a future Yugoslav fold was encouraged by some Western states, including the United Kingdom, which was particularly apprehensive at the proliferation of what it perceived as unviable ministates in the Balkans.22 According to Vlado Popovski, former Macedonian defense and justice minister, the ambiguous wording of the referendum question was encouraged by Lord Carrington, the British head of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia.23 Of course, Macedonia’s pro-Yugoslav inclination should not imply that it was willing to remain within a Yugoslav arrangement at any cost. To the contrary, its membership was very much conditional on the regulation of Serbian power. Gligorov’s proposal for a confederal constitution highlights this point. In private correspondence with Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, the co-chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), dated November 1992, Sir Peter Hall, the British ambassador to Yugoslavia and adviser to Owen, describes how Gligorov, in principle, was willing for Macedonia to join a “better” Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ‘one run by the sort of younger guys who run Montenegro.’24 Though relatively weak, Macedonian nationalism was firming, as underscored by the performance of VMRO-DPMNE in the 1990 parliamentary election. Politically, remaining part of a Serb-dominated arrangement that would have put Macedonia at war and perpetuated its position as a peripheral unit was not viable. Indeed, Macedonia was taking an increasingly more assertive stance within the federation, and, with it, laying the foundation for its ultimate withdrawal. In January 1991, in line with the other republics’ declarations from the previous year, the Macedonian parliament declared its full sovereignty and right of self-determination. 25 In October, following the departures of Slovenia and Croatia, Macedonia proclaimed it would no longer abide with the decisions of the Serb-dominated federal presidency.26 In parallel to this, Skopje announced its intention to defend the republic’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while, in accordance with the posture of active neutrality it had assumed over the war in Croatia, ceased its supply of soldiers to the JNA.27

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Despite their pro-Yugoslav tendencies and the reservations of its leadership, ethnic Macedonians accepted that the Yugoslav concept was finished. Allied to growing nationalist sentiment and reluctance to die for what was perceived as a Serb war effort, they became unequivocal in their desire for Macedonian statehood: 95 percent of those who voted in the referendum opted for independence.28 However, the vote was largely boycotted by Macedonia’s Serbian and Albanian communities, the latter expressing dissatisfaction with its perceived second-class status, the former maintaining its desire to live under a jurisdiction closely tied to Belgrade.29 The referendum thus crystallized an emerging – and potentially destructive – fault line between Macedonia’s major ethnic communities over the post-Yugoslav direction of the country. The ethnic Macedonians sought a unitary entity defined as belonging to the Macedonian nation, the culmination of a long struggle against foreign rule. The Serbs, conversely, insisted on union with Serbia, in whatever form. The Albanians, the most vociferous of all minorities, demanded the status of a constituent nation alongside the ethnic Macedonians, and some degree of territorial and political autonomy. Notwithstanding these tensions, the Macedonian parliament affirmed the electorate’s desire for independence, and initiated the formal process of its extrication from the Yugoslav federation, which, by this stage, had been diluted by the departures of Slovenia and Croatia. Macedonian independence was duly declared on September 17, 1991. The first post-Yugoslav constitution was approved the following month, though it left open the possibility of Macedonia joining another (Yugoslav) state.30 Macedonian representatives were removed from all federal organs and bodies, and, in December, negotiations commenced with the JNA over the withdrawal of its local units.31 In September 1992, a four-party governing coalition led by Branko Crvenkovski, a 30year old former engineer who had been elected to parliament in the 1990 multiparty election, took office.32 Comprising the SDSM, the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, and, notably, the Albanian PDP, it succeeded the transitional body that had governed Macedonia since the previous year.33 VMRO-DPMNE, unable to reconcile its differences with the SDSM and refusing to enter into a coalition arrangement with an Albanian party, went into opposition. The inclusion of the PDP at the expense of VMRO-DPMNE was significant for two reasons. First, it symbolized Macedonia’s commitment to political power sharing, and imbued the new polity with a degree of pluralistic legitimacy. Second, it facilitated the adoption of a more cautious and circumspect posture in its withdrawal from the Yugoslav federation, and subsequent policies

30

Conflict in Macedonia

toward its northern neighbor. It is not inconceivable to think that the more aggressive and confrontational rhetoric of VMRO-DPMNE, the modern-day political incarnation of the revolutionary nationalist organization that had unsuccessfully fought for Macedonian liberation from Ottoman rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 34 may have incited Belgrade and the JNA. Macedonia accompanied these steps with formal requests for UN membership and EU recognition, a process that would prove problematic and protracted. Like Slovenia, Croatia, and BosniaHerzegovina, Macedonia applied for recognition to the EU’s Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, or, as it was popularly known, the Badinter Commission, after its chair, the renowned French constitutional judge Robert Badinter. The mechanism had been established to assess the legal merits of each republic’s suitability for statehood, based primarily on the provision of sufficient guarantees vis-à-vis political, territorial, minority, and other human rights.35 The commission’s final report, issued in January 1992,36 concluded that only Slovenia and Macedonia satisfied its criteria for independence. As such, it recommended they be the only Yugoslav republics to be granted European recognition, while that for Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina be withheld until such time as certain conditions were satisfactorily met. However, under Greek opposition, on the one hand, and German pressure, on the other, Brussels, careful not to alienate Athens and Bonn in the context of the impending vote on the Maastricht Treaty,37 chose to ignore Badinter’s recommendations, refusing to extend recognition to Macedonia, while bestowing it upon Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The latter, for instance, had failed to provide adequate guarantees for the protection of minority rights, particularly as they applied to its large Serbian population, while approximately one-third of its territory was in rebel hands and thus outside the sovereignty of Zagreb,38 yet was still deemed fit for statehood. In this regard, the Macedonians – having promoted nonviolent solutions to the Yugoslav crisis, gained their independence peacefully and democratically from the country’s subsequent collapse, satisfied all of the EU’s conditions for recognition, adopted a constitution that upheld European standards, and promoted inclusiveness through its commitment to power sharing and provision of extensive minority rights39 – had every right to feel aggrieved. To be sure, with this decision, the EU, by denying it legitimacy, undercut Macedonian efforts to carry out a smooth post-Yugoslav transition. In many respects, independence represented a Pyrrhic victory for the Macedonians: over and above being placed in diplomatic quarantine by

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the international community, the country possessed multiple sources of potential conflict. Externally, Macedonia was now encircled by hostile, more powerful neighbors, including an unpredictable and aggressive rump Yugoslavia and belligerent Greece. Further, Macedonia was susceptible to a spillover of conflict from an increasingly combustible Kosovo. Internally, in addition to a depressed economy, Macedonian society was fractured along ethnic lines, particularly between its two largest communities, the Macedonians and Albanians, who advocated competing visions for the new state and remained mutually suspicious of each other’s intentions. In parallel to this, it was confronted by provocative rhetoric from Macedonian-Serbs, who threatened to break away from the country. Certainly, from an internal perspective, Macedonia possessed important pre-conditions for violence. For the eminent Balkan analyst Misha Glenny, ‘Macedonia was Europe’s most enduring and complex multicultural region. When the process of fragmentation in the Balkans began, the potential for violence in this region was greater than anywhere else.’ 40 Essentially, Macedonia became freer but smaller, weaker, and more vulnerable.41 In particular, conflict could manifest itself in four conceivable scenarios: (1) military intervention from Belgrade, with Serb nationalists pushing Milosevic to recover “south Serbia,” (2) economic collapse stemming from Greek and Yugoslav sanctions, (3) armed clashes between the state and Albanian-Macedonians demanding greater rights and/or secession, and (4) uprising in Kosovo, which could trigger a large-scale influx of refugees and entangle Macedonia into a regional war. The JNA’s Withdrawal

Ostensibly, the most immediate threat confronting Macedonia as it extracted itself from Yugoslavia was a military reaction from the JNA in defense of the federation’s territorial integrity. In this respect, the orderly withdrawal of the army’s Macedonian units, comprising some 36,000 troops,42 represented the key to a peaceful transition; in the words of Gligorov, We could not be an independent state while such an armed presence remained on our territory. . . . As long as the JNA was present on Macedonian territory, it could launch an attack at any moment. Its withdrawal represented our independence.43

As Gligorov notes, with the JNA still present, the potential for military intervention in what was now a breakaway republic was clearly

32

Conflict in Macedonia

higher. Indeed, it was precisely this scenario that had transpired in Slovenia, where the JNA mobilized in response to local secessionism. In the case of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, meanwhile, the Serbdominated institution conspired with Milosevic and local populations to capture Serb-inhabited territories. Having rejected initial Serbian demands to conduct the talks within the framework of the federal presidency, by now reduced to representatives from Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina,44 negotiations between Gligorov, Prime Minister Kljusev, and Defense Minister Trajan Gocevski, on the Macedonian side, and JNA Chief of General Staff Blagoje Adzic, on the Yugoslav side, commenced in Skopje in December 1991. Following lengthy – and, at times, tense45 – discussions, an accord was reached whereby the Yugoslav military would completely withdraw its Macedonian units, together with all of its arms and equipment, excepting that weaponry belonging to the local Territorial Defense Force (TDF), prior to April 15, 1992.46 This process was completed on March 26, 1992.47 The terms of agreement governing the JNA’s withdrawal, however, seemed to further diminish the likelihood of Macedonia surviving for long as an independent state. While it ensured the JNA would depart the country peacefully, the agreement essentially deprived Macedonia of a defense capability. Macedonia – subject to the blanket international arms embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia, its borders guarded by small and poorly equipped units from its Yugoslav-era TDF48 – was left virtually defenseless against any potential outside attack. As Michael Lund notes, the JNA took everything it could,49 systematically stripping the country of all military equipment and supplies, including its border monitoring equipment and, most controversially, the main radar system at Skopje airport, as well as food and medicine reserves. This prompted the Macedonian authorities to lodge a complaint with the international community over actions it perceived as hostile, and as running counter to the spirit of the earlier agreement.50 Nevertheless, the departure of what now constituted a foreign military was a major victory for the Macedonians, overcoming what represented the first hurdle to keeping the country from war.51 Clearly, in this tense situation, one factor that contributed to the JNA’s peaceful withdrawal was the negotiating capacity of the Macedonian leadership, in particular that of the experienced and highly respected Gligorov. As he acknowledges, the Macedonians were proceeding from a position of weakness, which dictated a permissive negotiating posture.52 Gocevski,

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for instance, recounts how the JNA responded with threats after Skopje objected to the removal of its radar system: When I informed them of our position, the reply from the JNA in Belgrade was, what do you mean you won’t allow it? You want to fight with us? We can have fighter planes over 14 Macedonian cities in 30 minutes. What were we supposed to do? We had no choice. Our sole objective was: no blood.53

In order to facilitate a peaceful transition, the Macedonian position, quite simply, was to avoid confrontation at all costs. As a trade-off, argues Gocevski, satisfying all JNA demands – including giving up its weapons – for nonviolence represented a favorable outcome.54 As Gligorov notes, JNA units in Macedonia were extremely well armed: as the southern theater defending Yugoslavia, they had the means to sustain a six-month war with NATO.55 In this context, the Macedonians had no option but to tread carefully. Whatever the motivation for the JNA’s departure, the significance of its withdrawal should not be downplayed. It symbolized, above all else, Macedonian sovereignty, and effectively neutralized any perceived Serbian threat.56 While its departure did indeed leave the country defenseless and its borders largely unprotected, this was a price worth paying, particularly as UN peacekeepers would partly fill the subsequent security void. In any event, Gligorov calculated from his negotiations that Serbia and the JNA were unlikely to return: I realized what the idea was – they [the Serbs] lack an army. They have fronts to the north, yet have an entire army, armed to the teeth, sitting here idle, doing absolutely nothing. And now the Serbs wanted to take this army to Bosnia, where it would be crucial to victory. This was understood by all.57

External Sources of Conflict: The Specter of the Four Wolves

With the JNA’s withdrawal effectively leaving it defenseless, Macedonia became vulnerable to the irredentist ambitions – real or perceived – of its larger neighbors, Serbia to the north, Bulgaria to the east, Greece to the south, and Albania to the west. Depicted as the “Four Wolves,” each lay some sort of historical claim on Macedonia, and, in one way or another, questioned its existence. As such, Skopje’s declaration of independence threatened to resuscitate the Macedonian Question, the territorial struggle of the late nineteenth and early

34

Conflict in Macedonia

twentieth centuries that had made Macedonia the most historically volatile area of the Balkans,58 and spawned two regional wars in 1912 and 1913, the brutality of which were obscured only by their temporal proximity to World War I. The three principal parties to these conflicts, Serbia, Bulgaria, and, in particular, Greece, which, as recently established nation-states had fought alongside and/or against one another to expand their territories through the annexation of Ottoman Macedonia, were now questioning, if not dismissing, the existence of a Macedonian state and nation, prompting fears they would revive dormant territorial demands. Rumors circulated in the foreign media and diplomatic circles that Milosevic proposed the division of Macedonia to his Greek counterpart, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, and Zhelju Zhelev, the president of Bulgaria, which either of the latter two, depending on the source, rejected. According to the veteran German journalist Viktor Meier, the allegation that Milosevic had made such an offer was ‘explicitly confirmed’59 to him by Mitsotakis some six months after its rejection. The controversial Greek journalist Takis Michas reinforces Meier’s claim, arguing that ‘there is . . . much hard evidence indicating that political leaders in Athens and Belgrade seriously entertained this adventurous scenario.’60 While such claims are difficult to corroborate, Gligorov, Kljusev, and Deputy Prime Minister Blaze Ristovski note that Milosevic and Mitsotakis proposed a meeting of the four signatories of the Treaty of Bucharest – scheduled for Athens on September 22, 1991, a mere two weeks after Macedonia’s referendum on independence – to “discuss” the new country’s future.61 Once alerted to the invitation, Gligorov despatched a delegation, led by Kljusev, to Sofia and Bucharest to lobby against Bulgarian and Romanian participation. According to Kljusev, Zhelev and Petre Roman, the Romanian prime minister, offered guarantees they would not attend any gathering without Macedonian participation, and declined the invitation. The proposed meeting was subsequently cancelled.62 History is an aspect of conflict that is often overlooked in contemporary conflict analysis. While, for many, the threat from the socalled Four Wolves was deliberately overstated by the Macedonians, such an argument takes into account neither the history of the region, nor the volatility and uncertainty of the day. Small and defenseless, it was only natural that Macedonia be wary of its neighbors’ intentions. Whether these threats were real or not, the rhetoric and rumors emanating from various quarters heightened Macedonian insecurities. Alleviating these historic tensions thus represented a priority in consolidating Macedonia’s fragile existence. Such concerns were

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evident in Macedonia’s foreign policy, which centered on the notion of equidistance, a form of regional neutrality that sought to forestall the hegemonic ambitions of its neighbors by establishing cordial relations with each. Given its limited defense capability, a central element of this policy was Macedonia’s ultimate integration into Euro-Atlantic political and security structures and close alignment with the United States. For Skopje, EU and NATO accession, coupled with the development of a strategic partnership with Washington, represented the guarantor of Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and hence its principal long-term foreign policy objective.63 Much to the chagrin of Belgrade, Gligorov oriented Macedonia’s foreign policy westward accordingly. In spite of this shift, and notwithstanding the fact that rumors of its territorial division were never substantiated, each of Macedonia’s neighbors, in their own way, would complicate its transition to statehood; indeed, independence would mark the beginning of a protracted dispute over Macedonian statehood and identity. On the surface, at least, the greatest external threat to this statehood came from an antagonistic and unpredictable Serbia, whose aggressive policies in pursuit of recentralization had effectively destroyed the Yugoslav federation in the first place, and which, through JNA complicity, had seized much of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in its purported attempt to establish a Greater Serbia. For radical Serbs, this entity would necessarily comprise Macedonia, or “south Serbia,” sight of the Serbian nation’s two greatest military victories, during the Balkan wars of the early twentieth century.64 Despite being predominantly nonSerb, Macedonia has historically been perceived as Serbian, by hardliners and liberals alike.65 Tsar Dusan, the medieval Serbian emperor, had ruled parts of Macedonia, establishing his court in Skopje.66 Modern-day Macedonia, of course, had constituted part of Serbia from the end of the second Balkan war in 1913 to the Axis occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941, attaining nationality and republican status from Tito only at the end of World War II. Likewise, the Macedonian Orthodox Church spent much of the twentieth century under the authority of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch.67 Post-independence, the Serbian Orthodox Church, which had aligned itself closely to Milosevic, held on to the interwar designation of Macedonia as south Serbia, and ethnic Macedonians as renegade south Serbs.68 These views were shared by many Serb politicians, most prominently the voluble ultranationalist Vojislav Seselj, as well as various individuals from the leading parties.69 While Milosevic

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Conflict in Macedonia

remained reticent on the issue, and never explicitly hinted at Serb military intervention, certain political voices – just as in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina – called on Belgrade to protect its brethren in Macedonia,70 and encouraged the creation of a breakaway republic, or, at least, an autonomous Serbian region. Certain policies by the rump Yugoslavia, allied to rumors and hearsay, further stoked Macedonian anxieties. Belgrade refused to recognize the new state, and continued to contest sections along their common border, which it considered internal and administrative, as opposed to international, and hence open to change.71 It declined to participate in a joint commission to resolve the border question at Macedonia’s independence, and, by 1994, still challenged as much as half of the 240-kilometer border, from 100 meters to some 3 kilometers deep into Macedonian territory.72 Serbia’s intentions toward Macedonia, at the time, appeared ambiguous. Some of the rhetoric coming from Belgrade, together with regular cross-border incursions by its troops,73 lent credence to suspicions that Serbia harbored territorial designs on its neighbor. The Serbian Orthodox Church, meanwhile, continued to reject the autocephalous claims of the Macedonian church, and stressed its right of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the new country, or, at the very minimum, the right to organize parallel religious structures to cater to the spiritual needs of Macedonian-Serbs.74 Against this backdrop, the fear remained that military gains in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina could embolden Serb ultranationalists to pressure Belgrade into annexing Macedonian land. While he publicly said very little, Milosevic, as Gligorov professes, was angry at Macedonia’s decision to secede from the federation, feeling a sense of betrayal, as he had with the departures of Slovenia and Croatia before it.75 Within international circles, the threat from the north was considered real; according to internal ICFY correspondence from November 1992, ‘of the four countries surrounding Macedonia, Serbia posed the greatest threat . . . [given Milosevic’s] disregard for international opinion, and his track record of military expansionism.’76 Macedonia’s claim to independent nationhood was similarly challenged on sociocultural grounds by Bulgaria. Like Serbia, Bulgaria possessed historical claims on Macedonia and its titular nation, and had gone to considerable length and sacrifice toward the realization of this claim: it participated in the first Balkan war, ignited the second, and then unsuccessfully fought against the Allied Powers in two world wars specifically over the territory of Macedonia and its people.77 Unlike Greece, which refused to recognize the Macedonian nation and the state

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it now claimed, and Serbia, which refused to recognize the Macedonian church, and, in deference to Athens, withheld formal recognition of the state, Bulgaria recognized Macedonia’s statehood – indeed, it was the first country to recognize it under its constitutional name78 – but not the existence of a Macedonian nation or language.79 While denying it harbored any territorial pretensions, Sofia was steadfast in its insistence that the ethnic Macedonian people were western Bulgarians who spoke a dialect of Bulgarian. Despite these bilateral tensions, however, relations between Skopje and Sofia steadily normalized: trade between the two countries increased significantly post-independence,80 with Bulgaria serving as an important economic outlet for Macedonia in light of international sanctions on the rump Yugoslavia and the Greek trade embargo. In the words of Gligorov, Macedonia and Bulgaria entered into a mutually beneficial process of ‘positive cooperation.’81 Albania was the only neighbor to recognize the Macedonian state and nation without qualification.82 Nevertheless, Skopje questioned Tirana’s sincerity given its links to the Albanian-Macedonian community, and the perceived meddling of its president, Sali Berisha. According to Popovski, the founding director of Macedonia’s Intelligence Agency, Berisha encouraged Albanian-Macedonians to agitate for autonomy and eventual secession, and supported the formation of an Albanian paramilitary structure in the northwest of the country.83 Gligorov puts forward a similar argument, accusing Tirana of coordinating the activities of Albanian political parties across the Balkans.84 In 1995, Albania declared it would reassess its foreign policy toward Macedonia if Albanian-Macedonian demands remained unmet. 85 Though such proclamations exacerbated suspicions in Skopje that Albania was covertly promoting the breakaway of Albanian-inhabited lands in Macedonia, Tirana understood the impracticality of a so-called Greater Albania. Moreover, it remained conscious of Macedonia’s importance to regional stability. To that end, various bilateral agreements were concluded between Tirana and Skopje, on, among other things, border and economic cooperation.86 In an attempt to weaken secessionist elements within the Albanian-Macedonian community, Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano lauded Macedonia as an example of a stable multiethnic society.87

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Conflict in Macedonia

Greece: International Recognition Postponed

While Albania and Bulgaria represented potential sources of destabilization, and an unpredictable Yugoslavia ostensibly threatened Macedonia’s territorial integrity, the greatest immediate external danger – certainly in retrospect – came from the south. Indeed, the dispute with Greece stemming from Athens’ objection to the existence of a “Republic of Macedonia” threatened to spawn state collapse. On the one hand, Greece’s imposition of a trade embargo aggravated Macedonia’s economic fragility by depriving the country of its only sea outlet, at Thessaloniki. On the other, Greek leverage within the EU and other regional and international organizations, together with an influential Greek-American lobby, ensured international nonrecognition and stalled entry into multilateral institutions and programs, and thus eligibility for financial and other assistance. Nonrecognition left Macedonia in political limbo, and, allied to sanctions, seriously undercut its viability and legitimacy as an independent state. For Athens, Macedonia represented a direct threat to Greek identity and territorial integrity. In the first instance, it considered the erstwhile Yugoslav republic historic Greek territory, predating the arrival of the Slavs, and the Macedonian people as either northern Greeks or Slavic impostors manufactured by Tito.88 In particular, Greece objected to the new country’s perceived appropriation of names and symbols considered sacrosanct to ancient Hellenic culture, including the name “Macedonia” and the Star of Vergina, the 16-point star Macedonia adopted as its flag. Where for Macedonia this represented a legitimate attempt to define its postYugoslav identity,89 using a name and symbol belonging to its historic nation, and which in no way sought to question its southern neighbor’s cultural heritage, for Greece this was a flagrant attempt by a foreign country to associate itself with – by falsely laying claim to aspects of – its ancient civilization. For Athens, the dispute went beyond the misuse of names and insignia it deemed historically exclusive. More fundamentally, Macedonia was accused of harboring territorial designs on Greece’s northern province, also known as Macedonia. The latter, together with present-day Macedonia, western Bulgaria, and small sections of eastern Albania, had constituted historic Macedonia, the disputed Ottoman territory partitioned in 1913 by Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania. Greek mistrust, in particular, stemmed from the contentious wording of sections of the Macedonian constitution, namely, Article 3 (‘the borders of the Republic of Macedonia may be changed only in accordance with the Constitution’90) and Article 49 (‘the Macedonian government “cares

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for the status and rights” of Macedonians living in neighbouring countries’91). From Athens’ viewpoint, this was proof of Macedonia’s territorial aspirations, and its intention to interfere in Greece’s internal affairs. In calling itself Macedonia, allied to the wording of its constitution, Athens reasoned that its neighbor was laying the basis for the future annexation of northern Greece.92 Athens adopted a hard-line posture in response to this perceived threat, designed to economically and diplomatically isolate the new country. To appease the sensitivities of its larger neighbor, Macedonia expressed its willingness to explicitly renounce any claim to Greek territory and amend disputed passages of its constitution, but declined to change its name. This refusal entrenched Greek belligerence, culminating in the decision by the Mitsotakis government to impose a trade embargo on the country in August 1992, blockading shipments to Macedonia passing through Thessaloniki.93 In this sense, Greece calculated that the imposition of sanctions would ostracize its landlocked northern neighbor, and, ipso facto, force a change in policy.94 However, while the Greek blockade, coupled with the international sanctions regime already in force on the rump Yugoslavia, weakened what was an already poor economy, the move only hardened Macedonia’s own belligerence. Though Mitsotakis lifted the embargo with the commencement of bilateral talks, sanctions were re-introduced and strengthened in February 1994 following his loss to Andreas Papandreou in the Greek parliamentary election of the previous October.95 Yet, for the Macedonians, yielding to Greek pressure was politically unacceptable; as Gligorov explains, Athens’ logic was that, by closing the border, from an economic perspective, the pressure would be such that we would have no choice but to cave in to their demands. . . . That was never acceptable to us. And I told Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, if I acquiesced to this demand, I would need to find somewhere else in the world to live! That would never pass in Macedonia.96

The dispute proved a major policy dilemma for the international community. To the extent that it represented a Balkan model, both in the peaceful manner in which it obtained its independence and in its attempts to promote multiethnic power sharing thereafter, the international community was cognizant of the need to legitimate Macedonia’s existence. As highlighted in a confidential ICFY cable dated November 1992, genuine concerns emerged within international circles that Macedonia could collapse, either internally or provoked by

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an outside attack, if recognition was not forthcoming.97 Yet it was also apprehensive of alienating Greece, Cold War partner of the West, EU and NATO member, and close Serbian ally. Political expediency dictated that it take the side of Greece, thus delaying Macedonia’s recognition and accession to multilateral institutions. Macedonia was denied membership of the UN until April 1993, when it was admitted under the cumbersome provisional name of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). American98 and European recognition – contingent on the resolution of the dispute – was not forthcoming until the following year, some three years after Yugoslavia’s collapse and Macedonia’s declaration of independence. In the case of Washington and Brussels, Athens utilized the influence of the Greek-American lobby and its right of veto respectively to preclude recognition of the country under its constitutional name. The decision by the Papandreou government to strengthen the economic blockade, for instance, was prompted by the State Department’s announcement that it would establish full diplomatic relations with Macedonia – a decision retracted by the White House one month later, after the Greek-American lobby, including prominent Democratic senators of Greek descent, applied pressure on the Clinton administration.99 The EU similarly refused to recognize Macedonia out of deference to Greece, which, in any case, as a member, had the right to veto any decision. As noted elsewhere, Brussels ignored the legal advice of its own Badinter Commission, which had sought to allay Greek concerns over perceived Macedonian irredentism and interference by establishing certain pre-conditions for recognition. These pre-conditions obliged Skopje to amend passages of its constitution and/or make public statements to explicitly renounce such putative objectives.100 Despite undertaking the necessary provisions to satisfy these conditions, which were set on December 16, 1991 and adopted by the Macedonian parliament as soon as January 6, 1992,101 the EU again refused to extend recognition, acquiescing to Athens’ contention that use of the name “Macedonia” implied irredentism. In its Lisbon Declaration of June 1992, Brussels – in a major victory for Athens – made diplomatic recognition of the country conditional on it excluding the term “Macedonia” from its official designation.102 While the EU, in the name of community cohesion, naturally aligned itself with one of its members, this is not to say that it approved of Greece’s policies. Given its veto power, Greece was in a position to dictate European policy – Brussels, in effect, had little choice but to yield to Greek demands. As Owen describes it, ‘Greece was in a

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minority of one over the Macedonia question.’ 103 Athens alienated the majority of fellow members with its increasingly punitive stance, particularly through the imposition of sanctions and the blocking of Macedonia’s OSCE membership.104 This tension reached its peak in April 1994, with the EU’s decision to take Greece to the European Court of Justice over its refusal to lift the trade embargo. In June, however, the court ruled in favor of Greece on the basis that the blockade did not harm the interests of other EU members, so legitimating its perpetuation.105 Be that as it may, Greece’s actions, as Glenny observes, ‘caused severe embarrassment to its partners in the European community.’ 106 For the organization more broadly, it highlighted – as it did during Yugoslavia’s collapse – a major institutional flaw, namely, the difficulty of obtaining consensus across a diffuse membership, and, accordingly, articulating coherent positions to emerging problems. Ultimately, with Greece holding a right of veto, the EU, however unpalatable it deemed Athens’ actions and Macedonia’s international ostracization, could do little. In reality, Greek insecurity was borne not so much of a fear that its northern neighbor would attempt to seize its territory as the potential geopolitical implications arising from the international recognition of a “Republic of Macedonia.” The idea that Macedonia, poor and virtually defenseless, would countenance the annexation of territory belonging to a NATO member appeared far-fetched. In 1993, Macedonia had 12,000 troops to Greece’s 113,000; four tanks to Greece’s 1,842; no military aircraft to Greece’s 855; and no heavy artillery pieces, missiles, or navy.107 To the contrary, Athens’ objections to a Macedonian nationstate were rooted in a fear that the existence of such an entity would destabilize Greece internally, as recognition of a Macedonian state on the basis of a Macedonian nation108 could embolden the Macedonianspeaking minority of northern Greece, which Athens does not recognize, to affirm their identity, and, backed by Skopje, more assertively demand recognition as a distinct ethnic community. Culturally repressed and forcibly Hellenized, this community – described by Athens as Slavophone Greek, that is, speaking a Slavic language but possessing a Greek national consciousness – numbers approximately 50,000.109 The consequences of a Greek recognition of the existence of a distinct ethnic minority within its borders, in turn, would be far-reaching. In the first instance, to acknowledge a multiethnic society would be to contradict official policy designating the country as ethnically homogeneous, so altering the very character of the Greek state.110 This admission, by extension, would bind Athens to EU regulations relating to the treatment

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of ethnic minorities and the provision of minority rights.111 Second, as Gligorov notes, it would leave Greece open to mass litigation from those ethnic Macedonians – scattered throughout the world – who, having fought on the losing Communist side, were expelled from the country after the Greek civil war of 1946–1949, and whose abandoned land and property was subsequently seized.112 Finally, and just as fundamentally, recognition of a Macedonian community would set a dangerous precedent, and encourage Turkish and Albanian-speaking minorities, situated in the border regions of Thrace and Epirus respectively, to demand similar rights, thus undermining internal cohesion. Greek sensitivity was understandable to an extent, particularly over the wording of Macedonia’s constitution. Yet its response, if not irrational, was certainly incommensurate to the putative threat posed, and damaged its international reputation. The popular interpretation of the dispute was that of a large and powerful country bullying its smaller neighbor, and deliberately undercutting its transition to statehood. To be sure, the Macedonians should have displayed more sensibility and foresight, but, in the event, were quick to acquiesce to Greek objections relating to its constitution, which was amended, and its flag, which was replaced. The fact that these concessions failed to assuage Athens seems only to give credence to the argument that Greece was more concerned with the internal ramifications stemming from the recognition of a “Republic of Macedonia” than it was with the fear of its northern neighbor annexing its territory or appropriating its ancient cultural heritage. In some respects, moreover, Greece was blatantly hypocritical, demanding Macedonia amend Article 49 of its constitution on the basis that this would promote its meddling in Greek internal affairs, when its own constitution contains the provision that Athens ‘shall care for Greeks residing abroad and for the maintenance of their ties with the Mother Fatherland,’113 and despite its insistence that no Macedonian minority exists in Greece.114 The fact that the ancient Macedonians, meanwhile, the civilization both nations claim to be the direct descendants of, were a distinct peoples, who spoke a distinct language from the Greeks and, later, the Slavs who migrated to the region, was overlooked amid the nationalism whipped up by populist politicians in Greece, as well as, it should be said, in Macedonia. In the subsequent debate over what ancient name and insignia belonged to whom, the Greeks, in particular, were – and continue to be – culpable; in the words of Sabrina Ramet,

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The Greeks assumed what has never been proven, namely, that no two people can ever have any cultural artefacts, history, symbols, historical figures, or images in common. If the Greek assumption is correct, then it is time for France and Germany to go to war over the question of whether Charlemagne was “French” or “German,” and for Austria, Albania, and the United States to initiate a three-sided war over who is “really” entitled to use the eagle as a symbol of state.115

That said, Macedonia, while unfairly treated in many respects, was not without fault, and certainly not the totally innocent victim it portrayed itself as being. The triumphalist proclamation of VMRODPMNE at independence that the unification of historic Macedonia represented its ultimate objective,116 and the subsequent distribution of “Greater Macedonia” maps, was ill-judged, and naturally provoked Greek hostility. Through such irredentist rhetoric and inflammatory actions, Macedonia – as Spyros Economides argues – allowed radical elements in Greece, led by Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras, to hijack the issue, and, in effect, provided a pretext for their actions.117 The nationalist hysteria that ensued irrevocably altered the dynamics of the dispute; in this context, any perceived moderation on the Greek side would have brought down the government. Put simply, Macedonia should have known better. The issue should never have been allowed to get to the point of sanctions and mass rallies. Amid the nationalism and political point scoring, the fact that strong bilateral relations between the two countries were logical and natural extensions of their geographical and cultural links was completely ignored. In the final analysis, both sides lost: Macedonia was isolated diplomatically and economically, its national dignity questioned and transition to independence compromised. The Greek blockade, in particular, exacerbated already weak economic conditions, which, in turn, aggravated interethnic tensions. Moreover, as Geert Ahrens of ICFY notes, foreign policy defeats at the hands of Greece emasculated the Macedonian government, and made it politically unfeasible for Skopje to acquiesce to Albanian demands, so undermining international preventive efforts elsewhere.118 Greece, over and above the sullying of its international image, lost a unique opportunity to assert itself – politically, economically, and culturally – in Macedonia, and, by extension, contribute to regional stability.119 Where Greece was imposing a trade embargo on a poor country, and refusing to yield from its belligerence, it ought to have been promoting Macedonian stability, and cultivating political and economic ties therein. As such, it missed an opportunity to establish a new sphere of influence, instead emboldening

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Bulgaria and, in particular, Turkey to step into the breach. With no natural allies in the region, Gligorov increasingly looked to Ankara for political and economic support, which he duly received – Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Macedonia, and provided it with significant levels of diplomatic, financial, and technical assistance.120 Athens certainly appeased nationalists with its strong approach; however, it ultimately understood that a stable Macedonia is in the Greek and regional interest, something it has since (belatedly and partially) sought to encourage. While resolution of the name dispute remains ongoing under UN mediation, bilateral relations have slowly normalized, particularly in the economic sphere. Following the September 1995 provisional agreement between the countries, Greece has established itself as the principal foreign investor in Macedonia, and a chief trading partner. In the absence of Greek trade and investment, the Macedonian economy, largely, would not be viable. Reached under the joint auspices of the UN and the United States, the interim accord facilitated the stabilization of bilateral relations, with Macedonia agreeing to change its flag in exchange for a lifting of the Greek embargo, a commitment by Athens to open trade, and a guarantee not to block Macedonia’s future entry into multilateral institutions through the use of veto.121 The accord also facilitated Macedonia’s international recognition, albeit under its provisional name, with the United States and the EU immediately establishing full diplomatic relations. Macedonia subsequently joined the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, and became eligible for International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank loans.122 In May 2002, in another major sign of rapprochement, Athens and Skopje concluded a military cooperation agreement in the aftermath of the previous year’s insurgency.123 For all this progress, however, the dispute seemingly remains as intractable as ever. Political relations have deteriorated, particularly since the election of the center–right Nikola Gruevski as Macedonian prime minister in 2006. In April 2008, at the urging of Greece, Macedonia was not extended an invitation to join NATO in the alliance’s latest round of enlargement, despite satisfying all political and military benchmarks for membership – a decision that appeared counter to the 1995 interim accord. In response, Macedonia launched a lawsuit against Greece at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, further adding to the deadlock.

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Endangering Macedonia: War and Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo

Notwithstanding the normalization of relations with its neighbors, the precarious situation in Kosovo and the failure of the international community to force local actors into a satisfactory political solution continued to pose a major threat to Macedonia. Kosovo constituted a threat on two distinct, yet reinforcing, levels. On the one hand, a Kosovar-Albanian uprising against draconian Serb rule would provoke a major refugee crisis and, potentially, a wider regional conflict, one plausibly drawing in Macedonia, Albania, Turkey, and Greece. On the other, it would mobilize Albanian nationalism in the region and the wider diaspora, and, conceivably, embolden restless AlbanianMacedonians to launch a rebellion of their own in the name of greater rights and possibly secession, or, at the very minimum, prompt many to take up arms in support of their fellow Albanians across the border. Together with a large-scale influx of Kosovar-Albanian refugees, this would push Macedonia dangerously deep into any conflagration. This scenario would be partly realized in 1999 with NATO’s military intervention to liberate Kosovo from Serb suzerainty, the fallout of which constituted, at the time, the single greatest crisis to face Macedonia in the post-Yugoslav era. International intervention, carried out on humanitarian grounds, had a profound impact on Macedonia on multiple levels. Socially, it drove another wedge between the country’s two largest communities. Ethnic Macedonians stridently opposed military intervention against their fellow Slavs and co-religionists,124 who had suppressed the secessionist tendencies of a widely perceived common enemy, and, by extension, helped neutralize any prospect of pan-Albanian territorial unification. Ethnic Macedonian opposition stemmed from a conviction that NATO intervention was illegitimate in the absence of UN Security Council approval, and, more importantly, would destabilize Macedonia by creating a refugee crisis and embolden Albanian-Macedonians in their own demands. The latter, conversely, naturally supported NATO’s decision to intervene on behalf of their brethren, the two communities bound not only by a mutual ethnicity, but also strong familial and political ties. Whether this position originated from a genuine belief that Kosovo’s liberation – and ultimate independence – from Serbia would pave the way for its own secession, and eventual unification with Kosovo and Albania proper, is debatable; however, AlbanianMacedonian political leaders certainly calculated that international intervention would provide impetus for their own demands. First, it

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would internationalize the “plight” of Albanian-Macedonians, and, second, in light of the precedent established in Kosovo, give warning to the Macedonians of the potential consequences of neglecting and violating the community’s political and cultural rights. To be sure, humanitarian intervention in Kosovo created an expectation among many Albanians in Macedonia that, in the event of conflict, NATO would similarly intervene on their behalf. NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia had a similarly detrimental impact on Macedonia from an economic and border security perspective. Trade with Yugoslavia, Macedonia’s largest trading partner, collapsed. 125 Trade relations with the EU were severely disrupted, as Macedonia was forced to arrange more lengthy and costly routes for its European exports, 90 percent of which had hitherto transited through Yugoslavia.126 The withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo, moreover, exacerbated the lawlessness of the border region, and, in the absence of UNPREDEP, placed an extra burden on an already stretched Macedonian army and police. Over time, the security vacuum created by the Yugoslavs’ departure would – in part, at least – be filled by militants and criminals, with both the capacity and motive to destabilize neighboring countries.127 The Macedonian government was certainly caught in a bind. Cooperating with NATO would antagonize Belgrade and defy the wishes of the majority of ethnic Macedonians, and undermine the country’s short-term – and, quite plausibly, long-term – stability. Conversely, obstructing and explicitly renouncing the operation would damage Macedonia’s NATO membership aspirations. This foreign policy imperative was ultimately deemed of greater longterm national importance to Skopje, which agreed to provide necessary logistical support, including the use of Macedonian territory and air space; immediately prior to intervention, some 30,000 NATO troops were deployed to the country.128 Relations between Skopje and the West, however, were not as comfortable as this acquiescence seemed to suggest, as the tense confrontation over Macedonia’s accommodation of Kosovar-Albanian refugees attests. The spillover of refugees, by threatening the country’s delicate ethnic balance, aggravating social tensions, and placing additional strains on a weak state, constituted a major security crisis for Macedonia. By May 1999, approximately 250,000 Kosovar-Albanians had crossed into the country, sparking fears of an inexorable demographic shift.129 In less than three months, Macedonia’s Albanian population had increased by one-third to as much as 37 percent of the country’s total.130 Given that many of the refugees carried no

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identification papers and opted to stay with family rather than in refugee camps,131 allied – in the first instance – to the fact that the state simply lacked the capacity to handle such a large influx of people, Skopje’s concerns were understandable, and the subsequent perception in the West of Macedonia as xenophobic largely erroneous, masking the reluctance of Western governments to assume the refugee burden. In response, Skopje signaled its intention to close its border with Kosovo. This generated a local political crisis, as ministers from the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) threatened to withdraw from the VMRO-DPMNE-led coalition government, which had comprehensively defeated the SDSM in the previous year’s general election.132 In the face of such pressures, the government backed down, with the majority of refugees returning to Kosovo within one month of NATO’s occupation. Yet the reputation of the international community among ethnic Macedonians, previously positive, was severely damaged, and the divide between the country’s Macedonian and Albanian communities further amplified. For ethnic Macedonians, the crisis seemingly confirmed the suspicion that Albanian-Macedonians identified not with their country of residence and, in most cases, birth, but with their ethnic community.133 For Albanian-Macedonians, conversely, it highlighted the underlying contempt in which the Albanian people were held by their fellow Macedonians, who were seen as sympathizing with an aggressive, pro-Greek regime that had wrought untold harm to the region, and which, through its very actions, was now destabilizing Macedonia, rather than with the people it was persecuting. Internal Sources of Conflict: State-Building in a Multiethnic Polity

Though certain external threats confronting Macedonia appeared formidable, in reality, with the exception of the Greek dispute and the Kosovo crisis, which did not materialize until 1999, they proved significantly less robust than portrayed. Rather, it was Macedonia’s internal dynamics that posed the more serious threat to immediate- and long-term stability. Ethnic difference presented the most salient challenge to the new state’s internal legitimacy. Elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, mismanagement of this multi-ethnicity had proved deadly.

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Certainly, a dangerous parallel – the presence of a large, geographically compact minority whose demands clashed with that of the titular nation – could be established between Macedonia and the likes of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The national census of March 1991 reflected the country’s diversity, and, by extension, the potential for instability: of its approximately 2 million people, 65 percent were ethnic Macedonian; 21 percent Albanian; 3 percent Turk; 2 percent Serb; along with small Roma and Vlach communities, among others.134 The census results themselves proved a major source of tension, with the Serbian, Roma, and Albanian communities disputing the official figures, arguing they understated the size of their respective communities. Macedonian-Serbs claimed they numbered between 300,000 and 400,000, or up to 10 times the official estimate, while Macedonian Roma – who, according to the census, were 50,000-strong135 – estimated their number at 220,000. Most controversially, Albanian-Macedonians, many of whom had boycotted the census, declared that they comprised as much as 40 percent of the total population.136 To disprove these claims, the Macedonian authorities organized a second census, held under international supervision in mid1994, which found that the size of each community, with the exception of the ethnic Macedonian and Albanian, had actually contracted from 1991.137 However, while the size of the Albanian-Macedonian community appreciated to 22.9 percent,138 and some again chose to boycott the census, the increase was inconsistent with the figures purported. Where the ethnic Macedonians underestimate their number, the Albanians – who invariably include non-Albanian Muslims in their calculations – overestimate it; in reality, the Albanian community likely constitutes 25 percent of Macedonia’s total population. Regardless of the precise figure, Macedonia possesses the largest concentration of ethnic Albanians outside of Albania and Kosovo, the majority of whom are concentrated in the west and northwest of the country, centered on the city of Tetovo, in areas adjoining the aforesaid. For a new state seeking to undertake a process of national identity formation, on the one hand, and balance the desires of its titular nationality with the competing political and cultural demands of its largest minority, on the other, the presence of such a sizeable ethnic group was always going to be problematic. While the authorities in Skopje sought to project to the rest of the world an image of an inclusive, multiethnic society where ostensibly distinct and antagonistic communities lived harmoniously alongside one another, reality suggested otherwise. Though co-existing peacefully, the two communities have historically pursued highly segregated lives,

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characterized by minimal interaction and few cross-cutting interests. During the Yugoslav era, ethnic Macedonians dominated urban areas and the public sector, whereas Albanians were largely excluded from the state system and formal economy, and remained concentrated in rural areas, with low levels of education and employment.139 Together with their cultural differences and Skopje’s tacit support of the Serb crackdown in Kosovo, such marginalization and discrimination ensured an uneasy relationship. While independence began to (slowly) redress these structural inequalities, it did little to narrow this internal cleavage. As Marshall Harris points out, post-Yugoslavia, ethnic Macedonians and Albanians remained divided into separate social, cultural, and geographic systems, bound only by a common statehood.140 Indeed, very use of the term “co-existence” may be misleading, as – with the possible exception of Skopje – there has traditionally been little co-existence as such between the two communities; certainly, no comparison can be made between Macedonia and pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats lived side by side, and enjoyed high levels of intermarriage. Even in Skopje, Macedonians and Albanians largely inhabit different sides of the Vardar River. As Cvetin Chilimanov, former editor of Nova Makedonija newspaper, stated to the author, ‘I would have much more to talk to you about, coming from across the globe, than an Albanian that comes from just across the street.’141 At independence, this intergroup tension represented the principal fault line in Macedonian society. In the event of violent collision, it threatened to plunge the country into protracted war. At its core lay a deep mistrust of the Other and divergent visions of Macedonia’s constitutional identity. Where the ethnic Macedonians perceived the Albanian community as a fifth column that would seek unification with Kosovo and Albania as soon as the circumstances permitted, 142 Albanians suspected the intentions of Macedonia’s ex-Communist ruling elite and their willingness to share political power. Likewise, while ethnic Macedonians advocated a unitary nation-state, Albanians sought a decentralized, bi-national one that recognized the Albanian community as a constituent nation, and allowed for territorial and political autonomy. Yet despite parallels with former Yugoslav republics that plunged into war, Macedonia diverged in several important respects. First, there existed no tradition of armed struggle between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. This stood in contrast to the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, whose wounds from the internecine conflicts of World War II remained fresh. In the Macedonian case, the absence of historical fears and grievance deprived nationalists of a key exploitative,

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mobilizing tool. Second, Macedonia, unlike Serbia, did not inherit any overt political conflict with its Albanian population from Yugoslav times.143 Third, unlike Kosovar-Albanians or Croatian-Serbs, AlbanianMacedonians had no history of territorial autonomy.144 Finally, and possibly most fundamentally, the Macedonian state sought order through political accommodation, committing itself to power sharing and offering significant concessions to minorities. Where Croatia and Serbia sought to dilute minority rights that had hitherto been guaranteed under the Titoist doctrine of brotherhood and unity, Macedonia made a deliberate attempt to address ethnic minority demands, conscious that any triumphalism and diminution of rights could incite the Serbs – as happened in Croatia – and, in particular, the Albanians, to rebel. As such, the Macedonian constitution guaranteed extensive political and cultural freedoms for all minority communities. In effect, this moderate approach was the key to precluding intrasocietal conflict. The Serb community was a case in point. Despite its negligible size, numbering approximately 45,000,145 the Macedonian authorities – wary of alienating it and providing Belgrade with a pretext for intervention – took Serb demands seriously. Some of the rhetoric from within the community was dangerously reminiscent of that propagated by its brethren in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to outbreaks of violence there. Many Serbs chose to boycott Macedonia’s referendum on independence, while a breakaway Serb republic – Macedonian Krajina – was tentatively proclaimed.146 Emboldened by an ascendant Serbian nation, demands included, inter alia, territorial autonomy, the status of a constituent nation, education in Serbian, including the establishment of a Serbian-language university, and Serbian-language television and radio broadcasts.147 The majority of these demands were clearly incommensurate with the community’s size. In reality, they were either the hollow rhetoric of nationalists encouraged by Serbian territorial gains elsewhere, or a deliberate ploy designed to attract attention to the Macedonian-Serb cause. The Macedonian government’s acquiescence to Serb educational demands in August 1993, which guaranteed Serbian-language instruction at primary and secondary school level once a certain threshold of students was reached in a given class,148 was a particularly important concession, and served to gain the goodwill of the community. The fact that Macedonian-Serbs were assimilated into the mainstream, and largely integrated with their co-religionists, in contrast to the Albanians, was another factor in the community’s moderation, and its willingness to pledge its allegiance to the Macedonian state. The

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real internal challenge came not from the Serbs, who – unlike in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina – were clearly too small to exert political pressure and threaten the country’s survival, but from the Albanians, whose demands and perceived grievances, given the community’s size, would have a far more profound impact on Macedonia’s post-Yugoslav future. Albanian-Macedonians: A Disloyal Fifth Column?

Lying at the immediate core of Albanian demands was the claim to equal constitutional status as the ethnic Macedonians, a legal recognition to reflect the size of the Albanian-Macedonian community, and the country’s multiethnic reality more broadly. At issue, therefore, was whether the new state would be defined in ethnic or civic terms, that is to say, whether it constituted a nation-state belonging to a certain nation, with minorities enjoying protected rights under the constitution, or whether it was a multicultural, civic state based on citizenship, one that eschewed recognizing the collective rights of any national group. 149 Notwithstanding the protestations of the Albanian community, Macedonia was defined as a national state in its constitutional preamble, with titular status being conferred on ethnic Macedonians and all other communities relegated to the legal status of minorities.150 In so doing, the authorities in Skopje chose to perpetuate the Yugoslav-era model of distinguishing between ethnic communities according to constitutional status (in descending order, constituent nation, nationality, ethnic community), and codifying the positions and privileges of each.151 The move toward an ethnic definition of the state, in fact, had begun as early as 1989, when Macedonia revised its constitution – like Slovenia and Croatia – to proclaim itself a national state, or a state belonging to a certain nation, where it had hitherto belonged to all constituent Yugoslav nations and nationalities living within it.152 By redefining Macedonia as a state of the Macedonian nation, this amendment demoted its constituent nations, for example, the Serbs, and nationalities such as the Albanians to the status of ethnic minorities,153 and, with it, diluted certain rights – particularly in relation to language – they had hitherto been guaranteed. Though affirming full equality for all Macedonian citizens, the constitution clearly antagonized Albanian-Macedonians. The community rejected the document, with Albanian MPs abstaining from casting their vote on its passage through parliament.154 Two factors underpinned Albanian objections. First, the majority/minority paradigm

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it legitimated, and the power relation between the two it subsequently implied.155 Second, the conviction that it denied the Albanian community the national status, and the attendant right to selfdetermination and self-governance, its size deserved.156 This solidified the perception among Albanian-Macedonians that the Slavic primacy and discriminatory practices from the Yugoslav era, when they had been excluded from state structures, would be perpetuated. For the Albanians, the Macedonian constitution represented, as elsewhere in the region, an attempt, albeit a much more subtle one, to create a nation-state from an ethnically mixed territory. In the Macedonian case, this took the form not of physical ethnic cleansing, as in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, later, Kosovo, but through legal instruments, namely, amendments to the constitution that distinguished between the majority nation and others.157 Defining the state along ethnic lines was always going to be problematic given the presence of such a sizeable Albanian community. For ethnic Macedonians, the constitution represented the legal culmination of their nationalist struggle. In the context of their historic insecurities and contemporary demographic realities, Macedonia being “surrounded” by some 4.5 million Albanians in Kosovo, southern Serbia, and Albania proper,158 the proclamation of a Macedonian national state was of little surprise. For Albanian-Macedonians, however, the constitution was legal confirmation of their second-class status, and of the reality that this would be a state for the ethnic Macedonians, who would dominate its institutions and control its levers of power. Certainly, the wording of the constitutional preamble would be profound: it would alienate the Albanian community, prompt it to question its allegiance to the state, and cultivate a deep-rooted grievance that would linger in the years to come. The Macedonian authorities were faced with a major dilemma. In one sense, it was politically toxic to grant equal status to the Albanians, a reluctance intensified by the refusal of neighboring countries to recognize the existence of its own nation and of ethnic Macedonian minorities therein,159 and the suspicion that the loyalty of this community was not absolute. In this regard, it feared that the conferral of constituent nation status could presage federalization and, ultimately, secession. Yet, in another sense, Skopje remained cognizant that a refusal to grant equal constitutional rights would disenfranchise Albanian-Macedonians and embolden secessionist elements, hence the creation of a constitutional mélange, one combining national and civic elements, designed to partially satisfy all. Indeed, excluding the wording of the preamble, the rights established in the constitution were consistent with those of a civic state, in which citizens

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are guaranteed universal and equal rights as individuals.160 As Popovski, who co-authored the constitution, points out, the document ensured that all citizens could participate equally and without discrimination, and was recognized by the international community as fair and democratic.161 The perception that the new state betrayed its expectation that things would be different post-Yugoslavia lay at the crux of AlbanianMacedonian grievances. Prompted by this sense of exclusion, the Albanian community demanded regional autonomy, or the creation of a space in which it could exercise self-governance and express its legitimate nationalism.162 For the two principal Albanian political parties, the PDP and DPA, the creation of a bi-zonal federation, or, at the very minimum, a bi-national state,163 was fundamental to the protection of Albanian nationhood and equal rights. In this sense, a parallel could be drawn with Croatia, where the move toward majority rule on national grounds buttressed an autonomist movement among a geographically concentrated people, in this case the Serbs.164 Certainly, ethnic Macedonians always equated Albanian calls for autonomy with secessionism. From their viewpoint, acquiescing to this demand – by de facto federalizing the country and encouraging an Albanian breakaway, on the one hand, and setting a dangerous precedent for other minorities adjoining their motherlands, on the other – was to endanger the country’s very existence. As such, while Skopje was willing to confer extensive political and cultural rights to balance ethnic Macedonian domination of the state, granting the Albanian community regional autonomy – and, for that matter, elevating it to the status of a constituent nation – was out of the question on the grounds that it would undermine the unity of the country, and, ultimately, represent a precursor to its territorial division. A number of actions lent credence to the perception that the Albanian community was not committed to the Macedonian state, and to the conviction that its ultimate objective was to unify with Albania and Kosovo. The boycott of Macedonia’s referendum on independence and subsequent censuses, large-scale demonstrations, the refusal by many young Albanian-Macedonian men to serve in the army, the insistence of flying the Albanian flag, and the staging of an illegal referendum on regional autonomy did little to allay ethnic Macedonian fears. The latter event was particularly provocative: held in January 1992, it sought to gauge Albanian receptivity to the creation of an autonomous entity in northwestern Macedonia, a so-called Ilirida.165 Organized by AlbanianMacedonian political parties, it crystallized the community’s desire for

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territorial and political autonomy. According to Ramet, 74 percent of those who went to the polls voted in favor of its creation.166 More significantly, it again drew parallels with pre-war Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina, where Serbs had objected to Croatian and Bosnian sovereignty in areas they dominated on the grounds this would endanger their nationhood. The government’s refusal to recognize the result provoked large-scale protests in Skopje and, alarmingly, prompted Albanian ultranationalists to declare an Ilirida Republic,167 which was soon retracted. Be that as it may, the staging of the referendum and subsequent declaration entrenched ethnic Macedonian resentments of the Albanian community. Having rejected their demand for autonomy on the grounds that it would undermine Macedonia’s unity and social coherence, the government sought to placate Albanian-Macedonians through various political and cultural concessions. Given its inherent weakness, Skopje had little choice but to cooperate with the Albanian community. Indeed, it understood that addressing Albanian demands would be crucial to precluding potential uprising. A conscious decision was therefore taken to integrate the community in the political running of the country through the right to establish political parties, parliamentary representation, and – in a highly symbolic gesture of the country’s unity – the presence of an Albanian political party in the government coalition. The PDP, for example, held 22 parliamentary seats in 1994, while, in the same period, five Albanian-Macedonian ministers formed part of a 22-man government cabinet.168 The political freedoms afforded the Albanian-Macedonian community cannot be denied. As Gocevski notes, Albanians were represented in all state institutions, and enjoyed equal political rights as ethnic Macedonians.169 Albanian-Macedonians were also afforded extensive religious, media, language, and educational freedoms. Among other things, this included the right to religious freedom, the right to operate an extensive Albanian-language media, the right to use Albanian – along with Macedonian – in local self-administration where an Albanian majority existed, and the right to Albanian-language primary and secondary education in state schools.170 Juxtaposed with their brethren in Kosovo, Albanian-Macedonians enjoyed considerably greater political and cultural rights and freedoms. Proceeding from the premise that equal representation would require a gradual, long-term approach, two Albanian justices were appointed to Macedonia’s nine-man Constitutional Court, four to its 16-man Supreme Court, one to the rank of army general, and three ambassadors.171 The percentage of Albanian

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cadets in the military academy increased from 2 percent to 12 percent, while that in its officer class appreciated from 0.1 percent in 1992 to 3 percent in 1995.172 In a cable to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, dated January 19, 1993, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the special rapporteur of the UN’s Commission on Human Rights, described how it is ‘obvious to an objective observer that the Government of Macedonia is making considerable efforts aimed at guaranteeing human rights and in particular protecting the rights of minorities, for which the necessary legal and institutional framework has already been established.’ 173 The rights granted Albanian-Macedonians were undoubtedly extensive, certainly in comparison to elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, and, together with increments in representation, helped (partly) legitimate the state. Yet the actual influence wielded by the Albanian community, particularly at the elite level, remained incommensurate to its size. As Kyril Drezov contends, moderate Albanian politicians with former Communist backgrounds were coopted into central government, and effectively bribed with token ministerial portfolios and diplomatic positions, while key decisionmaking remained concentrated firmly in the hands of ethnic Macedonians.174 While the government sought to portray a plural, multiethnic society in which all citizens were equal, one underpinned by a commitment to power sharing between its two largest communities, reality suggested otherwise: Albanian-Macedonians, as in Communist times, were clearly under-represented in state structures, with the main levers of power controlled by ethnic Macedonians, giving further currency to the widespread perception among Albanians that this was a state belonging to its majority, titular nation as opposed to all Macedonians. The composition of the core institutions of state augmented this claim. Ethnic Macedonians dominated the central government and, in particular, institutions of national security, that is to say, the police, military, and intelligence, an imbalance that seemed to highlight, more than anything, ethnic Macedonian distrust of the Albanian community.175 Albanian-Macedonians constituted 3 percent of the country’s police officers and 7 percent of its military personnel.176 In 1993, there was not a single Albanian general in the Macedonian army.177 Over and above their exclusion from high political office and national security institutions, Albanian-Macedonians remained underrepresented in the civil service, judiciary, and state media. By 1993, a mere 3 percent of public servants were Albanian.178 As of 1995, only four Albanian professors taught at Macedonia’s two universities, in

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Skopje and Bitola, while of the 22 employees at Radio Tetovo, only two were Albanian.179 This state of affairs left Macedonia open to criticism, and deflected attention from the various policies pursued by its institutions in the name of political and cultural equality. As such, Albanian under-representation eroded the sense of legitimacy the powersharing principle and the provision of political and cultural rights had lent to the new state. As Ismet Ramadani of the PDP argues, We never said we did not recognize the Republic of Macedonia as our country. But, after a while, we began to doubt if the Macedonians wanted us as Macedonians. This is my country too. . . . If we had enjoyed equal rights, we would have played a more positive role. Let’s be clear: the loyalty of the Albanians toward the state will depend on their rights – bigger rights equal bigger loyalty. When I feel politically and culturally liberated, then I will be satisfied with this country. And that satisfaction is translated into loyalty toward the country. If I’m marginalized, and if I’m sidelined from institutions, if I feel inferior, it is natural I will not be as loyal.180

Once it became apparent that its demand for constituent nation status and regional autonomy would not be met, the Albanian community chose to pursue a sort of quasi-autonomy instead. Designed to protect and advance its nationhood, this plan centered on three key areas: (1) administrative autonomy, or the decentralization of government and empowerment of municipal bodies, (2) cultural insignia, and the right to display Albanian national symbols, including on public buildings, and (3) language, specifically the recognition of Albanian as an official second state language, including the freedom to exercise its use in parliament, and the right to Albanian-language instruction at all levels of education.181 It was in the sphere of education that intergroup tensions were most prominently played out, underlining the competing, mutually exclusive positions of the two communities, and the concomitant political impasse ensuing from it. While the Macedonian constitution allowed for Albanian-language instruction at primary and secondary school level, tertiary education was strictly limited to Macedonian. Accordingly, the government adopted an unambiguous stance on the issue of Albanian-language Higher Education, which it dismissed on legal grounds; for the authorities, this was both non-negotiable and unreasonable, for tertiary-level instruction in a language other than Macedonian would aggravate the chasm between communities, and weaken the coherence of the country.

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To resolve the impasse, the government floated a number of compromise proposals, intended to placate Albanian educational demands yet preclude the establishment of an Albanian-language university. For Albanian-Macedonians, the establishment of an independent Albanian-language university and right to tertiary education in their mother tongue was perceived as central to the community’s cultural autonomy, and the government’s belligerence as further evidence of Skopje’s desire to repress Albanian nationhood. Moreover, argues Burim Sadiku, a local activist, the inability of AlbanianMacedonians to access Higher Education in their native language undercut their social mobility and capacity to gain employment in the public administration, and so represented a means to perpetuate ethnic Macedonian domination of the state.182 In this regard, Macedonian policy was more intransigent that that of the Serbs in Kosovo, who, during the same period, while having closed the Albanian-language University of Pristina, tolerated Albanian-language Higher Education so long as it was conducted in private facilities.183 In essence, this dispute represented a microcosm of the broader issue at hand: for the Albanian community, denying it access to tertiary-level education in its mother tongue reinforced the perception of ethnic Macedonian primacy of the state, and of Albanian repression therein; for the ethnic Macedonians, the suspicion that any such university would be used to promote nationalism and secession, and the belief that the loyalty of AlbanianMacedonians to their country was strictly conditional. Proceeding from such mutually exclusive positions, confrontation between the Macedonian authorities and the Albanian community was inevitable. Frustrated with the unyielding stance of the state and by the rejection of a government proposal by the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius to establish an Albanian quota at the institution,184 AlbanianMacedonians, facilitated by private funds, unilaterally established the University of Tetovo, a private, Albanian-language institution, in February 1995.185 Underscoring the sensitivity of the issue, the government – in a major statement of intent, designed to appease ethnic Macedonians and give warning to disobedient Albanians – responded in no uncertain terms to a move that had undermined its authority. Police immediately moved in, bulldozing the facilities, arresting the university’s rector, and dispersing the gathering crowd, resulting in one Albanian death.186 This would constitute the biggest flashpoint and most serious physical confrontation between the two communities prior to the 2001 insurgency. For Owen, at this particular juncture, an outbreak of conflict was more likely in Tetovo than it was in Kosovo. 187

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Notwithstanding the government’s hard-line stance, however, and despite reinstituting Albanian-language sections at the Pedagogical Faculty at the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius for the training of Albanian teachers,188 the University of Tetovo, funded by local Albanians and the diaspora, was reopened in 1997. Though it refused to accredit the institution, Skopje was willing to tolerate its existence. Under international pressure, the government eventually accepted a compromise solution, which has since been lauded as an educational model for the future, with the opening of the South East European University (SEEU) – a private institution of Higher Education based in Tetovo in which instruction is provided in Albanian, Macedonian, and English.189 In addition to the University of Tetovo crisis, several other flashpoints aggravated the sense of mutual mistrust between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, and threatened to push the country toward violence. In November 1992, a police crackdown on smuggling activities in Skopje’s Bit Pazar, a predominantly Albanian marketplace, yielded several Albanian arrests, one of whom, a young boy arrested for selling cigarettes, was beaten to death while in police custody.190 In November 1993, the Macedonian authorities arrested nine high-ranking Albanian-Macedonian officials – including a former general secretary of the PDP and two deputy government ministers – on the suspicion of smuggling arms into the country for the purpose of establishing a communal paramilitary organization.191 While the Albanians claimed the formation was being established strictly for self-defense purposes in the event of a Serb invasion, the gravity of this incident could not be denied. The very idea of ethnic paramilitary structures evoked unpleasant memories of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and stoked the anxieties of ethnic Macedonians already suspicious of the future intentions of Albanian-Macedonians. And while the scandal was closed with the imprisonment of those arrested, the incident reinforced the ethnic Macedonian perception that the Albanian-Macedonian community was working toward the territorial division of the country, and, therefore, could not be trusted. Further underlining ethnic Macedonian suspicions of the Albanian community and its perceived disloyalty came in 1997, when the mayors of Tetovo and Gostivar, two predominantly Albanian cities in the northwest of the country, defied the constitution, which outlawed the flying of foreign flags on public buildings, to fly the Albanian flag over their respective city halls.192 Given the political symbolism it carried, this was an extremely provocative act by the individuals in question.

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Resisting the Constitutional Court’s demand to remove the flags, Macedonian antiterrorist forces were ordered into the cities to confiscate the flags and arrest the mayors responsible for the illegal decrees, which they successfully managed in Tetovo, though not immediately in Gostivar, where they were confronted by several thousand Albanian protestors, several hundreds of whom were arrested.193 In April 1998, Rufi Osmani, the mayor of Gostivar, was imprisoned for seven years, while Alajdin Demiri, the mayor of Tetovo, was sentenced to two-and-ahalf years prison.194 From an ethnic Macedonian viewpoint, this incident epitomized the negative influence of a community that possessed no allegiance to the country, its constitution, or flag. For AlbanianMacedonians, conversely, it again highlighted the punitive policies they were subject to by the Macedonian authorities.195 In terms of rights and levels of prosperity,196 the lot of AlbanianMacedonians was not as stark as they themselves portrayed. According to an anonymous OSCE official from its Skopje mission, they often overplay the role of victim.197 Post-independence, among other rights and privileges, Albanians had their own political parties, were represented in parliament and central government, controlled several ministerial portfolios, were governed by Albanian mayors in municipalities where they constituted a majority, had use of the Albanian language with official status in Albanian-majority areas, and enjoyed extensive media rights, including Albanian-language newspapers and television and radio programs.198 The argument that the Macedonian government was repressive and unaccommodating loses all currency in this context. Despite not having full access to the organs of power and being under-represented in state institutions, AlbanianMacedonians had recourse to legitimate democratic channels to address their grievances. Against this backdrop, they could have done more to integrate into the mainstream. When discussing Albanian underrepresentation in the public sector, one must also take into account cultural factors. For instance, the patriarchal nature of Albanian society has traditionally militated against female participation in the workplace and education system. As Gocevski – now dean at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius – argues, by disallowing such a large segment of the population, figures pertaining to Albanian representation and level of integration become misleading.199 Claims that they were being repressed more than their brethren in Kosovo post-independence were disingenuous, designed to garner international sympathy than reflect actual, objective reality. In fact, minority rights were more advanced in Macedonia than elsewhere in the

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region, with its constitution meeting all international standards in this regard. Kosovar-Albanians, in contrast, effectively resided in a police state, and resorted to establishing parallel institutions in protest at Serb repression. In a memorandum to Owen dated November 27, 1992, Hall, following visits to Macedonia and Kosovo, observes that ‘one cannot compare the plight of the Albanians in Macedonia with that in Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanians have not got around to complaining about the lack of an Albanian-language ballet school.’ 200 For a small, multiethnic country such as Macedonia, moreover, conferring autonomy to a particular ethnic community was never realistic. Various provocative instances in the immediate post-Yugoslav period did not help the Albanian-Macedonian cause: instead, they detracted from the community’s just demands and solidified ethnic Macedonian suspicions. As Stefan Troebst, an OSCE observer in Macedonia in the early 1990s and now professor of East European Cultural Studies at the University of Leipzig, contends, the Albanian-Macedonian elite, with no previous experience of political participation, often showed their inexperience. 201 Likewise, Henryk Sokalski, former civilian head of UNPREDEP, describes certain statements and actions by Albanian political leaders as ‘totally irresponsible.’ 202 Clearly, however, mistakes were also made on the ethnic Macedonian side: the decision to proclaim a national state was ill judged, and served to antagonize and alienate the Albanian community. By proclaiming a national state, and defining the rights and privileges of each community, the constitution codified a distinction between, and exacerbated a segregation of, ethnic groups that exists to this day.203 In a sense, Macedonia missed an opportunity to cultivate a civic identity in which solidarity lay not with one’s primordial ties, but with the larger social unit.204 It also lacked foresight in excluding Albanians from state institutions, particularly the police and military, reversing many of the gains achieved through power sharing and the granting of sundry political and cultural rights. Given the community’s size, it cannot be denied that Albanian-Macedonians were under-represented in state institutions. Their marginalization from security structures was particularly galling. At the same time, progress in addressing their legitimate demands was often glacial. Structural inequalities from the Communist era clearly persisted. Deliberate procrastination vis-à-vis reforms pertaining to education, representation in state organs, and the use of Albanian in local self-administration contributed to the community’s radicalization. Similarly, instances of heavy-handed responses to Albanian dissent, as in Tetovo and Gostivar in 1997, which

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Human Rights Watch subsequently detailed,205 emboldened radical elements, and strengthened Albanian resentment of the state. Put simply, the problem in Macedonia, as in many newly independent, multiethnic states, was that of perceptions, of clashing expectations of new states, and the place of ethnic communities within them. In the nationalist climate of the day, and the propagation of rhetoric designed to exploit people’s historic fears and demonize the Other, no ethnic community wanted to be a minority within a state designated as the homeland of another nation, particularly if the two had a history of conflict – hence the reluctance of Croatian Serbs to be part of a “neo-Ustashe” Croatian state, or Bosnian Serbs’ unwillingness to remain part of an “Islamic fundamentalist” Bosniak state. The fact that state borders cut across ethnic communities, and the paranoia of persecution stemming from it, represented the essence of the political problem in the Balkans at the time.206 As Vladimir Gligorov famously put it, ‘Why should I be a minority in your state when you can be a minority in mine?’207 At Yugoslavia’s collapse, the status of ethnic minorities, and multi-ethnicity more broadly, became the root of the regional problem. Macedonia’s history, in many respects, only served to exacerbate matters: to a large extent, the Macedonian ruling elite’s rigidity toward Albanian demands could be explained by historic insecurities. Clearly, in such a sensationalistic and insecure environment, mistakes were made by both communities, which unnecessarily reinforced mutual suspicions and heightened internal tensions. Post-Yugoslav Economic Decline: Casting Doubt on Macedonia’s Viability

Macedonia’s depressed economic situation further aggravated these internal pressures. Starting from a low economic base, Macedonia constituted the poorest and least developed republic within the former Yugoslavia, relying heavily on the federation’s redistributive policies for economic survival. As Owen points out, Gligorov’s initial apprehension toward independence could largely be understood in the context of its economic linkage to Yugoslavia.208 Macedonia possessed little by way of mineral resources, industry, or infrastructure, with its economy dominated by the agricultural sector. Like the rest of the federation, it was in economic decline prior to dissolution. Upon independence, Macedonia’s economic plight was made more pronounced by malignant external forces. The wars to the north, international sanctions on the

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rump Yugoslavia, the Greek trade embargoes, and the collapse of traditional markets in the former eastern bloc cut off access to Macedonia’s main trade vessels, and so threatened to induce economic collapse. For instance, the sanctions on Yugoslavia, imposed in May 1992, deprived Macedonia of its largest export market and chief overland trading route to northern Europe.209 Prior to the Yugoslav wars, this market accounted for as much as 70 percent of Macedonia’s total exports.210 With nearly all of its road, railway, energy, power, and telecommunications links running through Serbia,211 Macedonia was effectively cut off from the north. By 1995, Macedonia, with a budget of $1.2 billion for that year, had lost in excess of $3 billion in revenue as a result of economic sanctions on Yugoslavia.212 The blockades imposed by Greece in 1992 and 1994 likewise had serious implications for the Macedonian economy. By depriving it of access to its only sea outlet, they provoked shortages in basic necessities such as food, oil, and medicine, which Macedonia imported via Greece. With trade routes in the north and south blocked off, and given the absence of rail links and poor existing road transport infrastructure with Albania and Bulgaria, Macedonia was left in economic limbo. As Gligorov notes, with no sea outlet, Macedonia was unable to transport key exports such as metal, zinc, and nickel to international markets. 213 Its foreign trade subsequently contracted as much as 60 percent, 214 losses that accelerated social tensions and undermined the transition to statehood. International nonrecognition, meanwhile, meant Macedonia was denied access to outside financial assistance. Allied to the process of privatization and economic reform, these factors seriously undercut an already weak economy: by 1994, unemployment stood at approximately 30 percent,215 increasing to 38 percent in 1996.216 Between 1990 and 1994, real GDP contracted nearly 35 percent; in 1994, per capita income stood at $790.217 As Ramet argues, the Macedonian economy resembled that of a Third World country.218 In internal ICFY correspondence from November 1992, Ambassador Robin O’Neill, who mediated between the Macedonians and Greeks over the name dispute, describes the economic state of the country as ‘quite desperate.’219 By forcing competition for limited resources and enhancing the appeal of nationalist politics, economic distress did little for interethnic harmony. Further, it bred organized crime and corruption, problems that persist to this day, and continue to constrain Macedonia’s ability to attract FDI. Much of this nefarious activity has its roots in the

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international sanctions regime imposed on Yugoslavia, which spawned a flourishing black market economy in Macedonia, as it did elsewhere in the region. Established to service the economic needs of Belgrade, particularly its demand for oil, it gave rise to a new oligarchic elite that derived its wealth from large-scale sanctions-busting.220 Together with those who benefited from Macedonia’s privatization process, this sector of society thrived more than any other amid the hardship and dislocation that predominated throughout the rest of the country. Macedonia’s economic survival, given its heavy reliance on Serbia and the adverse pressures arising from the Greek embargo, was effectively contingent on the functioning of this shadow economy. As such, sanctions-busting was tolerated by the Macedonian authorities and the international community. Despite the presence of the Macedonian Sanctions Assistance Mission – a 28-man-strong OSCE monitoring team – the Serbian-Macedonian border was porous: in the six-month period up to September 1993, an estimated $2.8 billion of goods, ranging from agricultural produce to oil and steel, were smuggled between the two countries.221 Charting Post-Independence Peace

Taken together, the risk factors confronting Macedonia as it emerged from the ashes of the former Yugoslavia called into question its ability to sustain itself as a stable, multiethnic state, while at the same time keeping itself disentangled from the wars in the north. In light of the nature and potential gravity of these threats, one can begin to understand the Macedonian leadership’s apprehension vis-à-vis the breakup of Yugoslavia. Its inherent weakness meant Skopje had little choice but to adopt a cautious approach toward the Yugoslav crisis and its eventual extrication from the federation. This weakness also dictated that, postindependence, it pursue moderate policies toward its ethnic minorities and neighbors. Given regional volatilities and its complex history, the early 1990s were an uncertain period for Macedonia, susceptible to the irredentist ambitions of its larger neighbors and to the agitations of its ethnic minorities, the largest of which diverged from the titular nation in its vision for, and expectations of, the new state. Further reinforcing Macedonia’s sense of vulnerability was a depressed economic milieu, exacerbated by the transition to a market economy, international sanctions on the rump Yugoslavia, and Greek trade embargo. Yet with the international community, as Chapter 3 will outline, seemingly deterring outside aggression and mediating between Macedonia’s ethnic

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communities, and local political power sharing arrangements offering minorities institutional, nonviolent means to address grievances, a postYugoslav equilibrium that many doubted was attained. That said, Macedonia was guilty of several mistakes. Though eschewing extreme nationalism, the proclamation of a national state, delays in implementing political and cultural reforms, and heavy-handed security crackdowns on instances of Albanian dissent radicalized elements of the community, and provided a rationale for violence. More than anything, these actions reflected a quasi-denial on the part of Skopje of Macedonia’s multi-ethnicity, and the reality that the country possessed such a sizeable Albanian population. Yet a number of events seemed to justify the government’s intransigence, and reinforced the suspicion of ethnic Macedonians that the Albanian community was not committed to the country. In essence, the post-independence Macedonian problem was one of how to dispel popular misperceptions of the Other, propagated by nationalist politicians and ethnic-based media, and exacerbated by spatial distance, and bridge the gulf between mutually suspicious groups. Be that as it may, Macedonia’s achievement of withdrawing peacefully from the former Yugoslavia, and avoiding intrasocietal violence immediately thereafter, should not be downplayed. If nothing else, it dispelled the myth that the wars in the former Yugoslavia were historically predetermined manifestations of primordial tribal hatreds between its disparate peoples. Yet, as the following chapter will explain, Macedonia also emphasized how timely action by the international community can diminish the likelihood of conflict in fragile states.

Notes 1

Interview conducted by the author with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid, July 31,

2006. 2

Subject to Ottoman rule for five centuries, the territory of historic Macedonia was partitioned by Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania through the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest. Modern-day Macedonia constituted a part of Serbia in the inter-war period until its elevation as a constituent Yugoslav nation and republic in 1946. 3 In an unofficial referendum staged in Kosovo in October 1991, a majority of Kosovar-Albanians demanded the province’s secession from Yugoslavia, and its annexation to Albania: Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration

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of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 69. 4 The Serb provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were granted autonomy by the 1974 Yugoslav federal constitution, in an unstated attempt to undercut Serb power within the federation. This status was suspended by Milosevic in 1989. 5 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 1995), 193. 6 Allan Little and Laura Silber, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York, NY: Penguin, 1997), 57. 7 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 342. 8 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 192–193. 9 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 121–122. 10 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 43. 11 Ibid. 12 Alice Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 58. 13 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 133. 14 Henryk J. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 42. 15 Abiodun Williams, Preventing War: The United Nations and Macedonia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 22. 16 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 192–193. 17 Little and Silber, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 212. 18 Interview conducted by the author with Kiro Gligorov, Skopje, June 28, 2006. 19 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 59. 20 Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic

Conflict and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 379. 21 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 176. 22 James Pettifer, “The Albanians in Western Macedonia After FYROM Independence,” in The New Macedonian Question, ed. James Pettifer (London: Macmillan, 1999), 140. 23 Interview conducted by the author with Vlado Popovski, Bitola, July 27, 2006. 24 Cable from Sir Peter Hall to Lord Owen, Cyrus Vance, and Herbert Okun, November 2, 1992, “The David Owen Archive,” Sydney Jones Library Archives, University of Liverpool (accessed July 6, 2006).

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Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 140. Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 81. 27 Ibid., 81–82. 28 Michael S. Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999: From Containment to Nation Building,” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 176. 29 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 41. 30 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 184. 31 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 258. 32 Williams, Preventing War: The United Nations and Macedonia, 22. 33 The ruling SDSM-led coalition, inclusive of the PDP, was re-elected in 1994, Macedonia’s second parliamentary election, though the first it had staged as an independent state. Alleging voting irregularities, VMRO-DPMNE boycotted the second round of the election, thus excluding itself from parliamentary representation for the next four years. It was ultimately elected into government in 1998, when it formed an unlikely coalition with the Albanian DPA, which had splintered from the PDP four years earlier. Gligorov was re-elected president, albeit the first by popular vote, in 1994, defeating a famous theater producer, Ljubisa Georgievski (not to be confused with Ljupco Georgievski). Having served the maximum two terms permitted by the Macedonian constitution, Gligorov was succeeded by Boris Trajkovski, who controversially defeated Tito Petkovski in the presidential election of 1999; Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 42–44. 34 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 219. 35 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 82. 36 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 190. 37 Ibid. 38 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Penguin, 1996), 164. 39 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 48. 40 Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804–1999 (New York, NY: Penguin, 1999), 157. 41 Ferid Muhic, “Macedonia – An Island on the Balkan Mainland,” in Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth, eds. David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda (London and New York, NY: Longman, 1996), 241. 42 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 40. 43 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Skopje. 44 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 81. 26

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45

Interviews conducted by the author with Trajan Gocevski, Skopje, July 26, 2006; and Nikola Kljusev, Skopje, July 28, 2006. 46 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 82–83. 47 Ibid., 83. 48 Ibid. 49 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 177–178. 50 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 83. 51 Ibid., 82–83. 52 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Skopje. 53 Interview with Trajan Gocevski. 54 Among these demands, notes Gocevski, was the right of all JNA officers based in Macedonia to take up Macedonian citizenship: interview with Trajan Gocevski. 55 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Skopje. 56 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 81. 57 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Skopje. 58 Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York, NY: Picador, 2005), 70. 59 Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise, 193. 60 Takis Michas, Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic’s Serbia (Texas: A & M University Press, 2002), 48. 61 Interviews conducted by the author with Blaze Ristovski, Skopje, June 29, 2006; Nikola Kljusev; and Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid. 62 Interview with Nikola Kljusev. 63 Interview with Trajan Gocevski. 64 John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 91. 65 Ferid Muhic notes how the late Zoran Djindjic, his former PhD student who went on to become Yugoslav prime minister, always considered Macedonia as south Serbia; interview conducted by the author with Ferid Muhic, Skopje, May 31, 2006. 66 Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (New York, NY: Continuum, 1995), 197. 67 Ibid., 199. 68 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 176–177. 69 Ibid. 70 Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, 197. 71 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 61. 72 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 54.

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Alice Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia: From Preventive Engagement to Peace Implementation,” in International Intervention in the Balkans Since 1995, ed. Peter Siani-Davies, 108 (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2003). 74 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 257. 75 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid. 76 Private ICFY correspondence, November 26, 1992 (name of author withheld), “The David Owen Archive,” Sydney Jones Library Archives, University of Liverpool (accessed October 16, 2006). 77 Bulgarian disillusionment with Russia and the West, stemming from the terms of the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest, which left it with only a small fraction of historic Macedonia, prompted Sofia to align with the Central Powers during World War I, and the Axis Powers during World War II, specifically for the purpose of regaining “lost” Bulgarian lands. 78 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 55. 79 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 344. 80 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 75. 81 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid. 82 International Crisis Group, Macedonia Report: The Politics of Ethnicity and Conflict, October 1997, 3, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/ report_archive/A400176_30091997.pdf (accessed March 6, 2006). 83 Interview with Vlado Popovski. 84 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid. 85 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 74–75. 86 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 210. 87 Ibid. 88 Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, 195. 89 Richard Holbrooke, To End A War (New York, NY: Modern Library, 1999), 122. 90 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 185. 91 Ibid. 92 Holbrooke, To End A War, 122. 93 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 187. 94 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 363. 95 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 187. 96 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid. 97 Private ICFY correspondence, Robin J. O’Neill, November 1992, “The David Owen Archive,” Sydney Jones Library Archives, University of Liverpool (accessed October 16, 2006).

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While the United States extended diplomatic recognition to Macedonia only in 1994, it had established security cooperation with Skopje as early as 1992; Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, 36. 99 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 187. 100 The three pre-conditions were (1) constitutional amendments ensuring respect for existing state borders, (2) an explicit declaration that it possessed no territorial pretensions toward any of its neighbors, and (3) an assurance that it would abstain from interfering in Greece’s internal affairs. To that end, Macedonia amended Articles 3 and 49 of its constitution, which had caused Athens most concern, explicitly declared its commitment to existing borders, renounced any irredentist aspirations, and announced it would refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of neighboring states: Ibid., 185. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid., 185–186. 103 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace, 1995), 266. 104 Ibid. 105 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 187. 106 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 240. 107 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 186. 108 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 344–345. 109 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 186. 110 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 344–345. 111 Ibid. 112 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Skopje. 113 Article 108 of the Greek constitution; Ramet, Balkan Babel, 185. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid., 186. 116 Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, 36. 117 Interview conducted by the author with Spyros Economides, London, July 4, 2006. 118 Interview conducted by the author with Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Bonn, June 14, 2006. 119 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 209. 120 Interviews with Nikola Kljusev; and Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid. 121 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 194. 122 Ibid. 123 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 117. 124 The Macedonian Orthodox Church, despite its canonical schism with the Serbian Orthodox Church, was strident in its opposition to

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NATO intervention in Kosovo: Kyril Drezov, “Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War,” in Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, eds. Kyril Drezov, Bulent Gokay, and Michael Waller, 63 (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001). 125 International Crisis Group, Balkans Report No. 67, Macedonia: Towards Destabilisation? The Kosovo Crisis Takes its Toll on Macedonia, May 1999, 1, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/ A400196_21051999.pdf (accessed August 9, 2006). 126 Drezov, “Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War,” 63. 127 Robert Hislope, “Crime and Honor in a Weak State: Paramilitary Forces and Violence in Macedonia,” in Macedonia in the Aftermath of the Framework Agreement: Inventory, eds. Gordana Duvnjak, Nikola Gelevski, and Vladimir Milcin, 203 (Skopje: Foundation Open Society Institute, Macedonia, 2006). 128 Drezov, “Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War,” 62–63. 129 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 172. 130 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 201. 131 Ibid. 132 Drezov, “Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War,” 64. 133 Eran Fraenkel and Sarah Broughton, “Macedonia: Extreme Challenges for the ‘Model’ of Multiculturalism,” in Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, eds. Hans van de Veen, Paul van Tongeren, and Juliette Verhoeven, 265–66 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). 134 Keith Brown, The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 32. 135 Ibid. 136 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 188. 137 Ibid., 188–189. 138 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 41. 139 Mirjana Najcevska and Violeta Petroska-Beska, “Macedonia: Understanding History, Preventing Future Conflict,” United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 115, February 2004, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr115.pdf (accessed October 5, 2005). 140 Interview conducted by the author with Marshall F. Harris, Washington, DC, March 14, 2006. 141 Interview conducted by the author with Cvetin Chilimanov, Skopje, June 28, 2006.

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Raimo Vayrynen, “Challenges to Preventive Action: The Case of Macedonia,” in Developing a Culture of Conflict Prevention, ed. Anders Mellbourn, 95 (Stockholm: Gidlunds, 2004). 143 Fraenkel and Broughton, “Macedonia: Extreme Challenges for the ‘Model’ of Multiculturalism,” 265. 144 Drezov, “Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War,” 61. 145 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 40. 146 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 86. 147 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 191. 148 Ibid., 192. 149 Ibid., 193. 150 Michael S. Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted: How Macedonia Avoided Civil War, 1990–2001,” in Understanding Civil War (Volume 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions): Evidence and Analysis, eds. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, 232 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005). 151 Eran Fraenkel, “Changing Attitudes Through Children’s Television: Nashe Maalo in Macedonia,” in People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society, eds. Malin Brenk et al., 187–188 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005). 152 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 241–242. 153 Ibid., 103. 154 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 41. 155 Fraenkel and Broughton, “Macedonia: Extreme Challenges for the ‘Model’ of Multiculturalism,” 267–268. 156 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 340. 157 Ibid., 241–242. 158 Brown, The Past in Question, 32. 159 Fraenkel and Broughton, “Macedonia: Extreme Challenges for the ‘Model’ of Multiculturalism,” 267–268. 160 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 193. 161 Interview with Vlado Popovski. 162 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 42. 163 Drezov, “Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War,” 60–61. 164 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 108. 165 Brown, The Past in Question, 33. 166 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 189. 167 Ibid., 190. 168 Ibid., 189.

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Interview with Trajan Gocevski. Drezov, “Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War,” 60–61. 171 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 63. 172 Ibid. 173 Cable from Tadeusz Mazowiecki to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, January 19, 1993, “The David Owen Archive,” Sydney Jones Library Archives, University of Liverpool (accessed July 6, 2006). 174 Drezov, “Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War,” 60–61. 175 Ibid. 176 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 63. 177 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 382. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid., 189. 180 Interview conducted by the author with Ismet Ramadani, Skopje, August 3, 2006. 181 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 234. 182 Interview conducted by the author with Burim Sadiku, Skopje, August 7, 2006. 183 Drezov, “Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War,” 60. 184 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 190. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid. 187 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 345. 188 Fraenkel and Broughton, “Macedonia: Extreme Challenges for the ‘Model’ of Multiculturalism,” 271. 189 Ibid., 269. 190 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 342. 191 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 191. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 The use of Albanian national symbols, particularly of the Albanian flag, has always been a major source of tension. For Albanian-Macedonians, the use of these symbols represented the legitimate expression of their ethnic identity; for ethnic Macedonians, it constituted an affront to national identity, and reinforced the popular assumption that the allegiance of the AlbanianMacedonian community lay elsewhere; International Crisis Group, Europe 170

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Briefing No. 37, Macedonia: Not Out of the Woods Yet, February 2005, 9–10, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b037_macedonia _not_out_of_the_woods_yet.pdf (accessed May 3, 2006). 196 According to Glenny, by the summer of 1991, the Albanians of Macedonia were ‘without question the most prosperous of the three compact territories on which Albanians live’ in the Balkans, that is to say, Albania, Kosovo, and northwestern Macedonia; Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 70. 197 Interview conducted by the author with anonymous OSCE official, Skopje, June 20, 2006. 198 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Macedonia: A Conflict Analysis, October 2003, 7–8, http://www.sida.se/shared/jsp/ download.jsp?f=SIDA3044en_MacConfAnaWEB.pdf&a=2899 (accessed August 9, 2008). 199 Interview with Trajan Gocevski. 200 Memorandum from Sir Peter Hall to Lord Owen, November 27, 1992, “The David Owen Archive,” Sydney Jones Library Archives, University of Liverpool (accessed July 6, 2006). 201 Interview conducted by the author with Stefan Troebst, Berlin, July 7, 2006. 202 Interview conducted by the author with Henryk J. Sokalski, Warsaw, July 10, 2006. 203 Fraenkel, “Changing Attitudes Through Children’s Television,” 187– 188. 204 Brown, The Past in Question, 24. 205 Human Rights Watch, “Police Violence in Macedonia,” April 1998, http://www.hrw.org/reports98/macedonia/ (accessed February 18, 2007). 206 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 241. 207 Vladimir Gligorov, “Is What’s Left Right? (The Yugoslav Heritage),” in Transition to Capitalism? The Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe, ed. Janos M. Kovacs (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), quoted in Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 108. 208 Interview conducted by the author with Lord Owen, London, July 3, 2006. 209 Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 639. 210 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 261. 211 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 265. 212 William DeMars et al., Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1999), 158. 213 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Skopje.

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Ramet, Balkan Babel, 192. Fraenkel and Broughton, “Macedonia: Extreme Challenges for the ‘Model’ of Multiculturalism,” 266. 216 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 192. 217 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 234. 218 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 192. 219 Private ICFY correspondence, Robin J. O’Neill, November 1992. 220 Fraenkel and Broughton, “Macedonia: Extreme Challenges for the ‘Model’ of Multiculturalism,” 266. 221 Robert Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), 170. 215

3 The International Response: A Model of (Operational) Prevention

While Macedonia emerged peacefully from Yugoslavia’s collapse, its future remained uncertain given the historic claims of its neighbors, on the one hand, and its fragile ethnic mix, on the other. The threats confronting Macedonia at the time were real and evident. For Misha Glenny, it represented ‘the most fragile of the new states to emerge from the former Yugoslavia, less secure even than Bosnia-Hercegovina.’1 In his memoir, the late Richard Holbrooke, the United States’ chief negotiator in Bosnia-Herzegovina, describes the fear in Washington and Brussels that Macedonia ‘would be the next flash point in the Balkans.’ 2 Given its strategic location at the heart of the southern Balkans and the geopolitical consequences of any outbreak of violence, which, in the context of its history, could plausibly ignite a wider regional war, Macedonia’s transition to independence came under close international scrutiny. Contrary to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the fighting could be localized, war in Macedonia, in the worst-case scenario, had the potential to draw in NATO allies Greece and Turkey on opposing sides. According to John Phillips, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advised the administration of George H.W. Bush that a flare-up in Macedonia ‘would definitely involve Greece and Turkey.’ 3 Whether such a confrontation would have assumed a military dimension is debatable; Blaze Ristovski, deputy prime minister in Macedonia’s first post-Yugoslav government, claims that Ankara gave direct and indirect signals to Skopje it would come to its defense in the event of Greek military aggression.4 Certainly, a Greek-Turkish confrontation would have had adverse repercussions for NATO’s coherence as the alliance entered a new, post–Cold War dawn. In any event, the mobilization of an early, innovative, and multifaceted response underscored the international community’s belief that violence in Macedonia was imminent.

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At the heart of this response lay an evolution in the international community’s reading of the Yugoslav wars: where it initially interpreted them as historically predetermined events immune to outside intervention, the international community had now come to understand them as wars of Serbian aggression, which, accordingly, could be deterred from expanding southward into Kosovo and Macedonia. As such, the position of the international community shifted from one of containment to prevention, as underscored by subsequent policies. In July 1991, OSCE monitors, at the urging of Washington, were deployed to Kosovo to monitor escalating tensions in the province.5 Concurrent to this, successive American administrations warned Belgrade of potential military consequences in the event of aggression in Kosovo. In the most visible manifestation of this new assessment, the UN deployed “preventive peacekeepers” along Macedonia’s border with Serbia.6 This first phase of international engagement, commencing almost immediately after Macedonia attained its independence in September 1991, was thus very much preventive in nature, intended to manage potential sources of conflict at their nascent, pre-violence stage. This process incorporated a number of preventive policies, designed to mitigate the most obvious threats to Macedonian security at the time. From the international community’s perspective, three such immediate threats existed: (1) A spillover of the fighting from the north, which had the potential to manifest itself either in the form of Serbian expansionism in the name of Greater Serbia, or, in the more realistic scenario, as a result of war between Serbia and Kosovar-Albanians. As noted elsewhere, in the event of uprising in Kosovo, Albanian-Macedonians would likely enter the conflict in defense of their brethren and use northwestern Macedonia as a base for Albanian incursions into the province, so drawing Macedonia into direct conflict with Belgrade, and providing the latter with a rationale for military intervention.7 (2) Territorial fragmentation provoked by ethnic Albanian and Serbian desires to unify with their respective motherlands. (3) An outbreak of violence between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians during the transition to statehood. With a clear and precise objective established, international preventive strategies within this initial phase of engagement were developed around these threats. Internally, international policies sought to defuse intergroup tensions by assisting the Macedonian authorities in addressing the legitimate demands of ethnic minorities, co-opting their allegiance to the new state, and promoting interethnic cooperation.

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Externally, they were designed to monitor cross-border developments and deter external aggression. These strategies were formulated and executed by five principal preventive agents: (1) the UN, which, through its peacekeeping presence, constituted the most visible, high profile international actor, (2) the OSCE, (3) ICFY, in particular its Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities,8 (4) the United States, and (5) a network of international NGOs operating at the grassroots level. UNPREDEP: Deterring Aggression

Given the volatile regional security situation and the seeming unpredictability of Milosevic, the external dynamic was afforded priority by the international community, as underscored by the UN’s deployment of preventive peacekeepers. An innovative approach to conflict prevention in general, and to peacekeeping in particular, the idea was proposed by Vance and Owen, the ICFY co-chairmen. Following discussions with Gligorov, Vance and Owen recommended to BoutrosGhali that a small group of military and police observers from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina be deployed along Macedonia’s borders with Yugoslavia and Albania.9 Both the Macedonian president and UN secretary-general were amenable to the proposal. For Boutros-Ghali, the deployment of a preventive peacekeeping force would put into practice the preventive vision he outlined for the organization in “An Agenda for Peace.” For Gligorov, meanwhile, alarmed by regular Yugoslav incursions into Macedonian territory, a credible peacekeeping presence – by implying international security guarantees of Macedonia’s sovereignty, and reinforcing the inviolability of its borders – would represent a surrogate of sorts for his country’s limited defense capability.10 Just as importantly, a peacekeeping presence would internationalize the Macedonian context, and legitimate the existence of an independent Macedonian state. Although Skopje did not expect what eventually became the United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) to defend the country in the event of war, it remained aware of its own military weakness, and thus understood the psychological value of a peacekeeping presence. As such, Gocevski argues, peacekeepers were ‘absolutely necessary.’ 11 Following an official written request for troops from Gligorov on November 11, 1992, and a joint letter from Vance and Owen on November 18 formally recommending a preventive peacekeeping

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presence, Boutros-Ghali dispatched an exploratory mission to Macedonia to determine the viability and logistics of such a force. 12 Accepting the findings of his reconnaissance team, which delivered its report on November 28, 1992,13 Boutros-Ghali recommended the Security Council consent to a peacekeeping presence along Macedonia’s border with Serbia – which had yet to be legally defined – to monitor, report, and, through its presence, deter any hostile military acts; a group of UN civilian police (UNCIVPOL) along the Yugoslav and Albanian borders to monitor the actions of Macedonian border police; and a small, Skopje-based civil affairs team to observe internal developments.14 In a matter of days, on December 11, and in spite of the fact that Macedonia was not yet a UN member,15 the Security Council adopted Resolution 795 authorizing the secretary-general to establish a preventive peacekeeping mission in the country, inclusive of police monitors and civil affairs personnel, under the aegis of UNPROFOR, which had been established to oversee the ceasefire in Croatia and had since expanded into Bosnia-Herzegovina.16 The UNPROFOR mission, accordingly, was divided into a third, Macedonian command. Headquartered in Skopje, UNPROFOR FYROM Command, as the mission was initially known, became operational on December 22, 1992 with the arrival of the first contingent of UNCIVPOL personnel. 17 Consisting of 24 monitors, 10 based in Ohrid to monitor the Albanian border and 14 in Skopje to monitor the Yugoslav border,18 the reasoning behind their deployment was a sensible one, particularly along the Kosovo section of the Serbian border. Hitherto internal and open but now external and closed as a result of Yugoslavia’s dissolution and international sanctions, the border was susceptible to illegal movement by a cross-border Albanian population for whom freedom of movement had represented a given.19 In this context, the potential for Albanian casualties at the hands of an inexperienced, predominantly ethnic Macedonian army and police enforcing antismuggling regulations was high, which could, in turn, adversely impact intergroup relations. 20 While Albanian-Macedonian politicians vehemently objected to this particular deployment, arguing it implied a military threat from Tirana, their purpose, as Sokalski notes, was exclusively to monitor and deter human rights violations by Macedonian border police.21 The first “preventive peacekeepers” arrived in Macedonia on January 7, 1993 – a Canadian company deployed on a temporary basis pending the arrival of a joint Nordic battalion, NORDBAT, comprising Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina.22

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On January 25, Brigadier-General Finn Saermark-Thomsen of Denmark arrived in the country to assume his position as mission commander.23 On February 18, the Canadian contingent was replaced by the Nordic battalion, comprising 434 troops divided into three rifle companies, 24 operating 18 permanently staffed observation posts: four along the Albanian border and 14 along the border with Yugoslavia.25 In early July, the mission was strengthened with the arrival of an American peacekeeping contingent from Germany, following a voluntary decision taken the previous month by Washington to offer Boutros-Ghali a second battalion, USBAT, to operate alongside NORDBAT.26 Acknowledging a need to augment the trip-wire force already in place, the United States initially contributed 315 troops,27 reaching 550 at its peak,28 all of whom were deployed along Macedonia’s border with Serbia, thus relieving the Nordic troops, who were redeployed to the Kosovo section of the border and that with Albania.29 A year later, the American contingent increased to 535, nearly half of UNPREDEP’s total of 1,114.30 By September 1993, UNPROFOR FYROM Command – by now comprising some 1,190 military, police, and civilian personnel31 – had morphed into the single largest international mission operating in the country.32 For the UN, the UNPREDEP mission represented a radical departure from accepted peacekeeping principles: the first and, to date, only example of a peacekeeping mission with a purely preventive mandate. Comprising two principal components, military and political, the mission had a dual purpose, designed to mitigate the internal and, in particular, external sources of instability confronting Macedonia at independence: (1) to monitor its borders with Albania and Yugoslavia for any developments that may destabilize the country and threaten its territorial integrity, and (2) through its civilian staff, to monitor and analyze internal political, economic, and social conditions, and, concurrent to this, contribute to internal stability by promoting political pluralism, encouraging interethnic political dialogue, and serving as an impartial mediator between ethnic communities through good offices, or the negotiation and mediation services of the UN secretary-general, carried out in this instance by the chief of mission and special representative, the veteran Polish diplomat Henryk Sokalski.33 While Skopje was skeptical of the good offices function, fearing it would be used by the international community as a Trojan horse to interfere in internal matters, this political component – as Abiodun Williams, the mission’s political and humanitarian affairs officer, notes – was

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accepted as the price to pay for the international legitimation of Macedonia’s sovereignty.34 Despite being secondary to the more visible military-security function, UNPREDEP’s good offices, by actively engaging with local political forces and ethnic groups, and offering a channel for intergroup communication through various dialogue initiatives, played an important role in promoting internal stability. Indeed, with the threat of external attack having receded, UNPREDEP’s original military-oriented mandate evolved to increasingly afford primacy to internal sources of tension.35 The evolution of UNPREDEP’s mandate was very much consistent with developments on the ground. Having initially constituted – from December 1992 to March 1994 – a component of the Zagrebheadquartered UNPROFOR, the mission was granted a broader civilianpolitical mandate in April 1994, before commencing its third and final operational phase in April 1995 with Security Council Resolution 983, when the erstwhile UNPROFOR FYROM Command was made a separate mission, renamed UNPREDEP, and headed by a civilian chief of mission.36 This was significant in the sense that it differentiated Macedonia from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the international emphasis was very much on conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruction as opposed to prevention.37 The new status of the mission was a major victory for the Macedonians, who had long demanded an independent peacekeeping operation to symbolize their independence.38 However, with the threat of spillover having receded with Dayton and Macedonia having stabilized internally, Russia – from late 1996 – successfully lobbied the Security Council, ostensibly on financial grounds, to undertake a gradual reduction in UNPREDEP’s role and presence in the country.39 While this process of downsizing was suspended with the breakdown of law and order in Albania in March 1997,40 the mission’s mandate was terminated in March 1999 by a Chinese veto prompted by Macedonia’s imprudent decision to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Gauging the extent of UNPREDEP’s success is difficult given that Macedonia and, by extension, the mission were never directly threatened by external forces. As such, many have questioned the intrinsic worth of UNPREDEP, and the concept it represented, on the basis that the precise extent of its success cannot be quantified. For its critics, UNPREDEP simply did not matter. Yet, as with any form of prevention, precisely because nothing happened – UNPREDEP’s ultimate yardstick – can the mission be deemed a success. Clearly, this was a time of great uncertainty in the Balkans, with the intentions of an aggressive

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Yugoslavia difficult to predict. As Sokalski notes, the behavior of its troops along the border was often provocative and characteristic of imminent confrontation.41 Accordingly, the establishment of a military firewall, one that would put in place a trip-wire against outside aggression, made eminent sense. To the extent that it was perceived as an American force, UNPREDEP made Belgrade wary of instigating acts of cross-border aggression. Certainly, from Gligorov’s viewpoint, the presence of UNPREDEP was a positive factor, particularly given the undefined character of the Macedonia-Yugoslavia border; in his words, it ‘neutralized Serb adventurism and territorial incursions.’42 In the context of its size and preventive mandate, it is easy to dismiss UNPREDEP’s value. Undeniably, the UN presence in Macedonia was more symbolic than substantive, its strength lying more in its psychological function than military strength. In reality, had Belgrade wanted to intervene militarily in Macedonia, UNPREDEP would have proved little obstacle; note the disregard Serb forces showed UN peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As Owen notes, UNPREDEP was ‘a totally nominal force with no real power.’43 Yet the message this presence conveyed – that the international community fully supported Macedonia’s existence and territorial integrity, any violation of which would carry serious political and possibly military implications – cannot be denied. While it lacked the firepower and mandate to respond to any military threat with force, UNPREDEP was able to create a meaningful political and psychological barrier sufficient to the situation by signaling an international interest in Macedonia and providing an important early warning presence.44 What UNPREDEP represented was a confidencebuilding mechanism, a tangible expression of the international community’s commitment to Macedonian sovereignty that helped stabilize a difficult situation and raise the international stakes against external military interference.45 Though small in number, the psychological inference of its presence was clear, helping engender security conditions favorable to political, economic, and social development. As Sokalski argues, UNPREDEP ‘might have been symbolic in terms of figures, but politically it was an important deterrent . . . against possible invasion from the north.’46 This is not to imply that UNPREDEP failed to extend beyond its obvious symbolism. Its response to probably the greatest challenge to confront the mission, when, in June 1994, Serb forces took control of the contested, strategic mountaintop of Cupino Brdo in northeastern Macedonia,47 highlights this point. With the Serbs refusing to negotiate, and Macedonia mobilizing troops to the area, the incident threatened to

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draw the countries into direct military confrontation. The manner in which UNPREDEP resolved the dispute – the Serbs agreed to withdraw after the mission’s military commander undertook intensive shuttle diplomacy between Skopje and Belgrade, with Nordic peacekeepers being deployed to the area to act as a buffer between the two sides48 – underlined its ability to influence and coerce relevant actors, and catalyze positive outcomes. In addition to deterring outside aggression, UNPREDEP – through the reassurance its presence provided – augmented all other preventive endeavors in the country, creating an environment conducive to dialogue and, in the case of the Macedonian state, providing it with the breathing space to build and consolidate new institutions. Through UNPREDEP, Gligorov was, in effect, outsourcing his country’s external security, so enabling Macedonia to devote time and resources to undertaking the transition to independence, developing institutions, building interethnic harmony, and cultivating cordial relations with its neighbors. As Peter Siani-Davies argues, in comparison to Croatia, where it was incapable of preventing Croat offensives against Serb-held areas,49 and BosniaHerzegovina, where its peacekeepers were helpless in stemming the fighting, ‘only in Macedonia can the UN deployment be seen as an almost unqualified success.’50 Whether or not UNPREDEP would have made any substantive difference to the negative turn of events following its departure in 1999 is difficult to say; certainly, its withdrawal left the Kosovo section of Macedonia’s border virtually unprotected.51 The fact that conflict erupted so soon after the cessation of its mandate is telling. In effect, UNPREDEP’s presence was vindicated only upon the outbreak of violence. OSCE: Monitoring Spillover

Pre-dating UNPREDEP was the OSCE, which established a Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje in September 1992, the first international mission to become operational in the newly independent country. Under the leadership of the late American diplomat, Robert Frowick, the OSCE’s objective, similarly to UNPREDEP, was to monitor destabilizing movements along Macedonia’s borders with Serbia and Albania, and, as a secondary function, observe local political, economic, and social developments.52 While much of the OSCE’s initial work centered on external risk factors, its mandate was recalibrated to focus primarily on internal sources of tension once the outside threat had sufficiently receded. Though small in size, initially consisting of six to

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eight staff, the OSCE mission performed an important function through its monitoring activities and promotion of interethnic dialogue. As Troebst argues, the organization’s visibility and mobility provided reassurance to the Macedonian people, and so represented an important confidence-building measure.53 It monitored and reported Serbian crossborder incursions and helped defuse a number of interethnic flashpoints, including the University of Tetovo standoff. Moreover, as Troebst notes, the OSCE, given Macedonia’s nonrecognition, constituted the only source of diplomatic reporting in the immediate post-independence period, and, as such, served as a proxy for national embassies.54 As a civilian entity, the OSCE augmented the military-security function of UNPREDEP, with which it collaborated closely. As Sokalski recounts, this included weekly consultations at the head of mission level, regular exchanges of information, and coordination of movements.55 This close working relationship between the two primary external actors engaged in the country helped to define a clear division of labor, thus precluding any major duplication of functions and responsibilities. The work of the OSCE’s Skopje field mission was supplemented by the regular fact-finding and mediation visits of its High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).56 Indeed, the office of the HCNM represented a fundamental component in the OSCE’s approach to conflict prevention in Macedonia. Established in 1992, the institution was designed to augment the organization’s preventive capacity by providing an additional early warning mechanism with which it could identify and resolve emerging ethnic conflicts.57 Headed by Max van der Stoel, a former Dutch foreign minister, the HCNM served an important purpose in alleviating tensions between the Macedonian state and ethnic minorities, a function that became more pronounced with the dissolution of ICFY and its Working Group. Van der Stoel assumed an active, hands-on role in reconciling intergroup differences, visiting Macedonia in excess of 50 times between 1993 and 2001 to defuse various crises. 58 Of course, to what extent van der Stoel directly shaped Macedonian government policy is difficult to quantify. What cannot be denied is that he represented – through the office of the HCNM – a powerful neutral voice who had direct access to the Macedonian political elite and ethnic community leaders, and who, through his prestige and visibility, was able to influence local actors.59 Van der Stoel helped moderate the rhetoric of hard-line elements on both the Macedonian and Albanian side, and, in the case of the Macedonian government, pressed it to enact laws to enhance minority rights.60 A case in point is the university impasse in Tetovo, the peaceful resolution of which van der Stoel was

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largely responsible for. It was van der Stoel who convinced Skopje to modify its position that tertiary education could be instructed only in Macedonian, and accept the establishment of a multilingual institution as a compromise solution.61 While it constituted a back-down of sorts on the part of Skopje, the SEEU – since renamed the Van Der Stoel University – proved a satisfactory solution to both sides, one that helped preclude an escalation of tensions, and removed a source of potential violence that had been central to the Albanian community’s struggle against the Macedonian state since independence. ICFY: Addressing Minority Demands

Similarly preceding UNPREDEP was ICFY, which was established in September 1992 in succession to Lord Carrington’s Peace Conference on Yugoslavia with a broad mandate for conflict resolution in the former Yugoslavia. Focusing primarily on Croatia and, in particular, BosniaHerzegovina, ICFY was co-chaired by former American Secretary of State Vance, as the special representative of the UN secretary-general, and former British Foreign Secretary Owen, the chief EU envoy. A key element of ICFY’s mandate was to prevent the expansion of the Yugoslav conflicts southward, as underscored by its recommendation for the deployment of peacekeepers along the Macedonia-Serbia border. The Conference’s work in Macedonia, however, centered on mediating between the government and ethnic minorities on issues relating to minority rights. Indeed, ICFY constituted the primary mechanism for resolving interethnic disputes in Macedonia through the mediation and negotiation services of its Working Group, which – under the chairmanship of the German diplomat, Geert Ahrens – had been established to safeguard and promote minority rights in the former Yugoslavia.62 Unlike the OSCE and, in particular, UNPREDEP, the work of ICFY was significantly less visible, and conducted very much behind the scenes. As a result, its contribution to conflict prevention in Macedonia is often underacknowledged. Notwithstanding the relatively limited coverage it has received, ICFY was in the vanguard of international efforts to facilitate Macedonia’s peaceful transition to independence. Ahrens’ Working Group was the first of the major third party actors to intervene in Macedonia, having commenced its engagement as early as October 1991, immediately following the referendum on independence, while still a part of Lord Carrington’s Yugoslavia Conference.63 The importance of ICFY in contributing to the nonviolence in Macedonia

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cannot be understated. By promoting dialogue and moderation in the political process, and prodding Skopje toward expanding minority rights, ICFY enhanced the legitimacy of the Macedonian state in the eyes of apprehensive minorities. To be sure, ICFY’s function was just as critical, if not more so, as that of UNPREDEP and the OSCE to Macedonia’s peaceful transition to independence. As Owen argues, The flamboyant deployment was the troops. But the real activity was the diplomacy that was going on, which Geert Ahrens never got enough credit for.64

As Ahrens explains, the Working Group provided an organized structure for addressing minority issues, particularly in relation to the various Albanian communities residing in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.65 In the case of Macedonia, while one acknowledges the potential for spillover from the north, the inherent strength of ICFY – through its Working Group – lay in its appreciation that the more pressing threat to stability was internal in nature. For Ahrens, Macedonia’s unity and territorial integrity was largely contingent on reconciling differences between the Macedonian and Albanian communities vis-à-vis the constitutional personality of the state and other minority rights issues.66 In the Working Group’s calculation, violence and territorial division were more likely to be induced by internal, as opposed to external, factors.67 To that end, it relied on three preventive devices: (1) regular fact-finding visits to the country, (2) personal shuttle diplomacy, and (3) impartial trilateral forums for addressing minority demands.68 The latter function, in which Ahrens mediated between the government and ethnic minority leaders, was particularly significant, and represented a valuable channel for intergroup dialogue. It was through this forum that concessions were yielded on several issues.69 The Albanian community, for instance, dropped its demands for nation status and territorial autonomy, neither of which – according to confidential internal correspondence – ICFY supported, in return for government concessions on power sharing, constitutional changes, media access, and Albanian-language education following lengthy negotiations conducted under ICFY’s mediatory auspices.70 Macedonian-Serbs were likewise persuaded to drop their territorial claims in exchange for greater cultural, educational, and media rights within this framework.71 The Working Group’s dissolution, together with ICFY, in January 1996, following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords the previous month in Paris, left a void that the

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likes of UNPREDEP and the OSCE, lacking comparable mandates, could never adequately fill.72 Its termination, notes Ahrens, went against the wishes of both the Macedonian authorities and the political leadership of the Albanian community, who insisted on its continuation.73 Popovski observes that Skopje’s willingness to address Albanian demands diminished with the departure of Ahrens and his Working Group.74 With key Albanian demands still unresolved, the decision to dissolve the Working Group, argues Ahrens, was a major mistake: one that, in his estimation, would have prevented the events of 2001.75 NGOs: Building Bridges

The preventive efforts of these official actors were augmented by the work of various international NGOs. Operating below the elite, national political leadership level at which ICFY, UNPREDEP, the OSCE, the United States, and others operated, NGOs such as the Washington-based Search For Common Ground (SFCG) initiated conflict resolution training and civil society promotion projects at the national and grassroots levels.76 SFCG, in particular, made efforts to bridge the divide between ethnic communities by sponsoring and promoting intergroup contact and problem-solving dialogue at the grass roots, 77 including in the sphere of preschool education. To the extent that they articulated shared interests and ameliorated perceptions of mistrust, these programs helped reduce the potential for intergroup violence in the country. United States: Augmenting the Preventive Effort

While the work of these actors was significant in precluding the outbreak of conflict in Macedonia in the immediate post-independence period, just as important – if not more so, insofar as it augmented all other multilateral preventive efforts – was the early projection of American power. The received wisdom in Washington was that the Yugoslav wars were provoked by an aggressive Serbia seeking to annex Serb-dominated lands in the pursuit of territorial aggrandizement.78 The American request in 1992 for OSCE observers to be placed in the Sandzak, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Macedonia,79 the explicit warnings of military intervention in the event of Serbian aggression in Kosovo,80 and the Clinton administration’s decision to contribute troops to the UN preventive peacekeeping operation in Macedonia were all borne of this

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interpretation. For Washington, Serbian military expansion into Kosovo and Macedonia was a distinct possibility, one that, by potentially setting off a larger regional war,81 would directly impact American security interests. Containment, therefore, was key. American policy in Macedonia was thus based on ensuring that the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not spread southward. Unlike in the latter, Washington’s engagement in Macedonia was timely, its projection of power in line with evolving developments. This engagement was initially conducted through the promotion and staffing of multilateral missions in the country, most prominently the OSCE, which, in the absence of an American embassy, represented the chief mechanism through which the United States contributed to peace and stability in Macedonia.82 Washington subsequently increased its visibility through the deployment of peacekeepers along the MacedoniaSerbia border, a unilateral initiative intended to solidify UNPREDEP’s deterrent value. Significantly, as Nancy Soderberg, the third ranking official on Clinton’s National Security Council and former deputy ambassador to the UN, notes, this deployment validated – and represented a concrete American commitment toward – Macedonia’s existence and territorial integrity.83 Washington’s decision to deploy troops was significant on several levels. First and foremost, it represented a departure from traditional American attitudes toward UN peacekeeping and, more importantly, from Washington’s staunch refusal to deploy ground troops in the Balkans, the United States having consistently rebuffed European requests to contribute peacekeepers to Bosnia-Herzegovina. With no ground troops elsewhere, Macedonia represented an important exception to the rule in the United States’ behavior toward the former Yugoslavia. Second, it reinforced Washington’s commitment to Macedonia’s sovereignty, even though – until 1994 – it did not recognize the Macedonian state.84 And most importantly, this contribution represented a clear projection of American power, infusing UNPREDEP with greater military credibility, and implying punitive American retaliation in the event of Serbian aggression, which, critically, had initially been absent in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Put simply, the American presence served as insurance against Serb incursions into Macedonian territory. Gligorov, for instance, notes that Yugoslav incursions ceased with the American intervention.85 The American deployment signaled a stronger and more unequivocal statement to Milosevic than OSCE monitors, who had pre-dated UNPREDEP, or, for that matter, Nordic peacekeepers, could ever deliver. As Popovski, Macedonia’s defense minister at the

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time, observes, not for nothing did the Macedonian authorities insist that American troops, as opposed to Nordic ones, patrol the Serbian border.86 For the skeptics, Washington’s contribution of troops to UNPREDEP was a ploy by the United States to be seen to be doing something constructive on the ground in the Balkans, in an environment where the potential for war was comparatively small. In so doing, it could neutralize the criticisms from across the Atlantic, particularly from the United Kingdom and France, the chief troop-contributing countries in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which denounced the Clinton administration for its failure to display more commitment than air power.87 For Michael Lund, the American troop contribution was ‘a reflex action after its efforts to take a more robust approach to Bosnia failed.’88 With the American proposal for “lift and strike” 89 dismissed by the Europeans on the grounds it would provoke Bosnian-Serb reprisals against UN peacekeepers, Washington – unable to implement a policy it calculated would end the fighting – interpreted the deployment of preventive peacekeepers to Macedonia as an important contingency, a deliberate act to buttress containment.90 To be sure, the low likelihood of casualties, given the absence of overt conflict, was an important policy consideration. Indeed, while willing to deploy troops, Washington took particular care to minimize the potential for American loss of life. USBAT was limited in its operational activities, reflecting Washington’s reluctance to place its troops in combat situations, particularly after its experience in Somalia. Wary of the political cost of American casualties, the United States applied significant operational restrictions on its soldiers. This proved a major challenge for the mission; for example, American soldiers were not to be placed at Cupino Brdo, the observation point where the most dangerous confrontation between Macedonian and Serb forces had taken place; could not approach within 300 meters of the UN-defined Northern Limit (border) of the Area of Operation in their sector; could not patrol at night; and could not deviate from their assigned patrol route.91 Further, as American law grants American Command primacy over UN Command, USBAT came under only limited operational control of the UNPREDEP commander.92 Nevertheless, the contention that the American contribution failed to extend beyond symbolism neglects the pragmatic concerns and considerations that prompted the deployment. As Lund notes, the emerging peacekeeping doctrine among military analysts in Washington held that American troops should be deployed only in those instances where they could make a substantive difference.93 In this respect, the

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Macedonian milieu diverged markedly from the Bosnian one; in the latter, American troops would have been placed in an already unmanageable situation, where, in an absence of clear lines distinguishing warring combatants, they could have done little to alter the military equation.94 This contrasted to the situation in Macedonia, where a clear line for deterrence could be drawn in the sense that no open hostilities existed.95 UNPREDEP also needed urgent reinforcing, something which the French and British, stretched in BosniaHerzegovina, lacked the resources and political will to do.96 As Soderberg argues, no decision to deploy American troops, in whatever context and in whatever size, is taken lightly – it is simply too big a decision and commitment to make purely for tokenism.97 For the Clinton administration, the fear of spillover into Kosovo and Macedonia, the next targets in a perceived war of Serbian aggression, was genuine. The United States also brought its unique influence to bear in the dispute between Macedonia and Greece, playing a critical role in defusing the bilateral standoff. In the spring of 1994, Clinton appointed Matthew Nimetz as special envoy to strengthen the mediation processes already in progress under ICFY auspices. While belated, this move indicated an acknowledgment in Washington of the adverse impact the dispute was having on Macedonian’s ability to create and operate a stable, legitimate state. As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was only after the sustained application of American pressure that this dispute was (partially) resolved. Washington’s decision to assign the clout of Holbrooke and his Bosnian negotiating team to the issue98 gave the process an urgency and decisiveness it had previously lacked. Indeed, the engagement of Holbrooke proved decisive to the interim agreement between Skopje and Athens. Though it did not definitively resolve the name issue, the accord helped stabilize relations between the two countries, and removed the potential of military confrontation. While the UN – through Vance – played a key role in brokering the interim accord, the dispute, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, again reinforced the unique influence Washington yields when projecting its power in a sustained and decisive manner. Prevention in Practice

The challenge facing the international community in arriving at a consensus vis-à-vis the urgency of the threat/s facing Macedonia, then gathering the requisite resources and political will to address interconnected internal and external sources of conflict in a timely and

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effective manner, should not be understated. The timeliness of the international response was a significant feature, and stood in marked contrast to elsewhere: the OSCE mission was established in early autumn 1992 following Gligorov’s request in late summer for the deployment of international observers to monitor Macedonia’s border with Serbia,99 while the establishment of a peacekeeping mission was authorized by the Security Council by the end of the year. In addition to its timeliness, the international response was noteworthy for its complementarity and multidimensional character, which enabled the international community to succeed in Macedonia where it was failing elsewhere. The presence of multiple preventive agents with clearly defined responsibilities, over and above undercutting the ability of local protagonists to play external actors off one another for their own ends,100 facilitated burden sharing and an effective division of labor, with each bringing unique strengths and resources to bear on conflict dynamics. At the same time, the flexibility of the response, and the ability of preventive actors to modify and broaden their mandates in accordance with evolving developments, enhanced international responsiveness to emerging needs and on-the-ground realities. Preventive complementarity underscored the value of a multidimensional and integrated approach.101 Where UNPREDEP and the OSCE monitored Macedonia’s borders, ICFY mediated ethnic minority issues and the NGO community pursued confidence-building projects at the grass roots. On a separate track, the UN and United States provided good offices to resolve the impasse between Macedonia and Greece. The aggregate impact of this approach, taking in multiple actors operating at various levels and executing reinforcing functions, was an important element in Macedonia’s peaceful transition to independence. As such, the international community succeeded in its preventive efforts not due to the work of UNPREDEP per se, as many are wont to assume: while UNPREDEP was the largest and most visible external actor in the country, prevention could succeed only through a collective international effort. Taken together, these factors helped make Macedonia, during this initial period, one of the few examples of successful conflict prevention on the part of the international community. What Now?

The international response as Macedonia charted its post-Yugoslav course was significant on several levels. First and foremost, it illustrated

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the value and cost-effectiveness of preventive action, both in financial and physical terms. Moreover, it highlighted how the international community can act pre-emptively to arrest a society’s slide into war when the political will for action exists, and relevant risk factors are targeted in a timely, coordinated, and multifaceted manner. Though largely symbolic given its size, UNPREDEP played a vital role in Macedonia’s peaceful transition to independence, specifically by establishing an early warning function and psychological deterrence to outside aggression. The early projection of American power was particularly important – its deployment of peacekeepers symbolizing Washington’s commitment to Macedonia’s territorial integrity. While certain external threats may not have been as robust as first perceived, the international presence provided important reassurance at a fluid juncture in the country’s history, and strengthened an internal peace attained by local actors. To be sure, this initial period of engagement represented a major success for the international community, which finally translated the rhetoric of prevention into substantive action. Yet, while outside actors helped solidify the peace, dangerous, longterm sources of instability remained, including continuing regional uncertainty, a deteriorating economy, pronounced interethnic divisions, growing levels of organized crime, and entrenched corruption. Core, legitimate Albanian demands relating to language, education, state representation, and administrative decentralization continued to linger. Though Albanian-Macedonians may have exaggerated some grievances, the fact remained that a large segment of the population was (justifiably) disaffected with the state. At the same time, the prospect of EU and NATO integration remained distant. In spite of these ongoing stresses, international engagement gradually receded, beginning with ICFY’s termination and culminating with the withdrawal of UNPREDEP in 1999, just prior to the outbreak of war in Kosovo. Despite a timely and sustained international engagement, Macedonia remained fragile. While it constituted a model of how the international community can intervene effectively in an emerging or potential conflict situation to strengthen and facilitate peace, it also proved indicative of its penchant to focus principally on immediate, near-term sources of instability. The shortsightedness of this approach would ultimately be exposed in 2001 with the outbreak of an Albanian insurgency in the alleged name of political and cultural equality, realizing the fears of those who advocated a more nuanced, long-term approach to prevention in Macedonia. Indeed, despite the international community’s efforts, the

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Macedonian powder keg – as events would prove – had been only temporarily defused.

Notes 1

Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804–1999 (New York, NY: Penguin, 1999), 655. 2 Richard Holbrooke, To End A War (New York, NY: Modern Library, 1999), 122. 3 John Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 60. 4 Interview conducted by the author with Blaze Ristovski, Skopje, June 29, 2006. 5 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 295. 6 The United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) peacekeeping mission was operational in Macedonia from 1992 to 1999. What became known as UNPREDEP was originally part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeeping mission to the former Yugoslavia, which encompassed Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. UNPREDEP was not formally established as a separate mission until 1995; however, to avoid confusion, it will be referred to as UNPREDEP throughout, including during the UNPROFOR phase of its existence. 7 Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 63. 8 To be henceforth referred to simply as the “Working Group.” 9 Henryk J. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 95. 10 Ibid., 96. 11 Interview conducted by the author with Trajan Gocevski, Skopje, July 26, 2006. 12 B.G. Ramcharan, “Introduction,” in Conflict Prevention in Practice: Essays in Honour of Jim Sutterlin, ed. B.G. Ramcharan, 4–5 (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005). 13 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 295. 14 B.G. Ramcharan, “Preventive Peacekeeping Deployment: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” in Conflict Prevention in Practice: Essays in Honour of Jim Sutterlin, ed. Ramcharan, 140–141. 15 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 96.

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Alice Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia: From Preventive Engagement to Peace Implementation,” in International Intervention in the Balkans Since 1995, ed. Peter Siani-Davies, 109 (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2003). 17 Ramcharan, “Preventive Peacekeeping Deployment,” 141. 18 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 99. 19 Michael S. Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999: From Containment to Nation Building,” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson, 191 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). 20 Ibid. 21 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 97. 22 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 506. 23 Ramcharan, “Preventive Peacekeeping Deployment,” 141. 24 Ibid. 25 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 99. 26 Ibid. 27 Ramcharan, “Preventive Peacekeeping Deployment,” 142. 28 Holbrooke, To End A War, 122. 29 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 99. 30 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 506. 31 Ramcharan, “Preventive Peacekeeping Deployment,” 142. 32 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 191–192. 33 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 109–110. 34 Interview conducted by the author with Abiodun Williams, New York City, February 28, 2006. 35 Ramcharan, “Preventive Peacekeeping Deployment,” 142. 36 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 100. 37 Ibid., 101. 38 Ibid. 39 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 202. 40 Ibid. 41 Interview conducted by the author with Henryk J. Sokalski, Warsaw, July 10, 2006. 42 Interview conducted by the author with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid, July 31, 2006. 43 Interview conducted by the author with Lord Owen, London, July 3, 2006. 44 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 197.

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45

International Crisis Group, Balkans Report No. 98, Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, August 2000, 25–26, http://www.crisisgroup.org/ library/documents/report_archive/A400015_02082000.pdf (accessed November 28, 2006). 46 Interview with Henryk J. Sokalski. 47 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 178. 48 Ibid., 196. 49 Peter Siani-Davies, “Introduction: International Intervention (and NonIntervention) in the Balkans,” in International Intervention in the Balkans Since 1995, ed. Siani-Davies, 19. 50 Ibid. 51 Interview with Henryk J. Sokalski. 52 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, 63–64. 53 Interview conducted by the author with Stefan Troebst, Berlin, July 7, 2006. 54 Ibid. 55 Interview with Henryk J. Sokalski. 56 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 108. 57 Max van der Stoel, “Personal Story: Early Involvement,” in People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society, eds. Malin Brenk et al., 433 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005). 58 Eran Fraenkel and Sarah Broughton, “Macedonia: Extreme Challenges for the ‘Model’ of Multiculturalism,” in Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, eds. Hans van de Veen, Paul van Tongeren, and Juliette Verhoeven, 271 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). 59 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 190–191. 60 Ibid. 61 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 108–109. 62 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 107. 63 Ibid. 64 Interview with Lord Owen. 65 Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic

Conflict and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 3. 66 Interview conducted by the author with Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Bonn, June 14, 2006. 67 Ibid. 68 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 107.

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Alice Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 86. 70 Private ICFY correspondence, April 1994 (name of author withheld), “The David Owen Archive,” Sydney Jones Library Archives, University of Liverpool (accessed July 6, 2006). 71 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 107–108. 72 Ibid., 108. 73 Interview with Geert-Hinrich Ahrens. 74 Interview conducted by the author with Vlado Popovski, Bitola, July 27, 2006. 75 Interview with Geert-Hinrich Ahrens. 76 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999: From Containment to Nation Building,” 194. 77 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, 65. 78 Holbrooke, To End A War, 39. 79 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, 63–64. 80 Ibid., 88. 81 The National Archives Library, “Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of William J. Clinton, 1995” (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), 791. 82 Between 1992 and 1996, the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje was headed by a succession of three senior American diplomats; Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 190. 83 Interview conducted by the author with Nancy Soderberg (via telephone), October 5, 2006. 84 Ibid. 85 Interview conducted by the author with Kiro Gligorov, Skopje, June 28, 2006. 86 Interview with Vlado Popovski. 87 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 506. 88 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 193. 89 “Lift and strike” proposed to lift arms sanctions on the Bosniaks, while threatening the Bosnian-Serbs with air strikes. 90 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 193. 91 Aboidun Williams, Preventing War: The United Nations and Macedonia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 73. 92 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 132. 93 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 193.

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Ibid. Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Interview with Nancy Soderberg. 98 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 194. 99 Ibid., 190. 100 William DeMars et al., Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1999), 171. 101 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 216–218. 95

4 Violence Grips the “Oasis of Peace”

Confronted by a range of threats to stability in its first decade as an independent state, Macedonia appeared at the beginning of the new millennium to have escaped the violence that had afflicted other former Yugoslav republics. Against the backdrop of seemingly permanent regional unrest and economic adversity, the new state achieved a semblance of multiethnic stability. While internal social divisions and attempts by neighboring countries to de-legitimate its existence called into question Macedonia’s post-Yugoslav future, they failed to generate overt conflict. Likewise, Macedonia had seemingly overcome the threat of an aggressive and unpredictable rump Yugoslavia, as well as a failed assassination attempt on Gligorov and implosion in Kosovo. For the international community, which had engaged innovatively in the country, Macedonia represented an example par excellence of conflict prevention, the “poster child” of an emerging art, of a post-Cold War international community in responsive, proactive mode. Yet in January 2001, less than 10 years after independence, Macedonia was confronted by its greatest post-Yugoslav challenge, an eight-month insurgency launched in the putative name of human rights by the National Liberation Army (NLA), a guerrilla group claiming to represent the country’s Albanian community. Threatening to escalate into a wider war, the insurgency struck at the heart of Macedonia’s multiethnic existence, and shattered its image as an oasis of peace in a sea of regional violence. In the words of Biljana Vankovska, ‘Macedonia’s apparent success as a case of conflict prevention fell apart like a house of cards.’1 This, in turn, posed difficult questions of the Macedonian state and international community, namely, why and how the political, economic, and social foundation erected post-Yugoslavia failed to engender a long-term peace, and why Macedonia – hitherto a major preventive success – now seemingly stood on the precipice of civil war.

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Conflict Finally Arrives in Macedonia: A Narrative of Events

Map 4. Conflict Areas, 2001 Source: Wikimedia Commons: (http://commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/File:2001_Macedonia_insurgency.svg)

What Vankovska describes as the fifth Yugoslav War was the shortest and least costly in terms of human casualties to erupt on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.2 Juxtaposed with the wars of succession that preceded it, the Macedonian conflict seemed inconsequential. By most measures, it was incomparable to what occurred in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In the first instance, the fighting was largely concentrated in and around Macedonia’s border region with Kosovo. Second, more people were killed in single days of fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina than during the entire course of the Macedonian conflict.3 Upon its formal cessation in August 2001, between 150 and 250 people had lost their lives, approximately 650 had been wounded, and up to 180,000 displaced.4 Based on these figures, Macedonia cannot be said to have crossed the threshold of major war. Yet the fact that some 120 villages – or roughly 17 percent of its territory5 – lay in rebel hands means it would be inaccurate to portray the conflict as a low-level insurgency. For a country of 2 million people, the gravity of such figures cannot be understated – the total number of Macedonians displaced by the fighting, for instance, equated to 7 percent of its total population. 6

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Certainly, defining the events of 2001 is problematic. What is clear, however, is that, contrary to much of the Western media coverage from the time, the Macedonian conflict did not represent a civil, interethnic war, with the fighting being limited to paramilitary structures and state security forces. Similarly, in spite of their obvious discontent, it was not provoked by a popular Albanian uprising. Rather, the insurgency was a top-down, elite-driven process initiated largely by outside forces. Inspired and facilitated by multiple factors and drivers, of which the human rights dimension was the most salient, the conflict was simultaneously used to advance other, more discrete agendas. Though widely recognized as having begun in late February or early March in the village of Tanusevci, the Macedonian conflict, in fact, commenced in January 2001 in Tearce, an ethnically mixed village situated between Tetovo and Kosovo, when a grenade attack on the local police station claimed the life of a policeman.7 The following day, on January 22, the NLA, a hitherto unknown formation stating its number at 2,000 men, claimed responsibility for the attack in a public communiqué.8 Ethnic Macedonians immediately suspected the group – believed to have been established in 1999 by Ali Ahmeti and Fazli Veliu, the Swiss-based Albanian dissidents of Macedonian origin who had been instrumental in forcing the Serbs from Kosovo – of being motivated by territorial and/or criminal incentives, a perception that strengthened with the failure to articulate a clear justification for its actions. The NLA eventually cited constitutional inequality, and unsatisfied Albanian political and cultural demands, as the motive for its mobilization, stressing this was not an attempt to precipitate the territorial division of Macedonia. Yet the theory that the organization’s original motive was the breakaway of Albanian-inhabited lands, through, for instance, a Kosovo-type international response, cannot be entirely dismissed. Indeed, its initial discourse – framed in terms of liberating “Albanian” lands from Slavic “occupation” – seemed to suggest as much.9 With a weak Macedonian state, ascendant Albanian nationalism following the liberation of Kosovo, and perceived international sympathy, the perpetrators of the violence – as Vlado Popovski notes – may have interpreted 2001 as an historical moment for the realization of such an objective.10 James Pardew, the United States’ special envoy to Macedonia during the crisis, acknowledges that certain factions within the NLA probably harbored territorial ambitions.11 Scott Taylor, who briefly embedded himself with the organization, likewise claims that many of its fighters were motivated by territory.12 It is plausible to think that the NLA’s demands evolved to emphasize the

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political rights dimension with the realization it had miscalculated the international mood for military intervention, and/or as a result of pressure from elements in Kosovo wary of alienating the international community. Certainly, the NLA’s statements moderated over time. Whatever the precise motive, the situation assumed greater urgency in February following the first sustained round of armed clashes between Macedonian security forces and NLA rebels in the border region along the Macedonia-Kosovo border, which claimed the lives of three soldiers and one policeman.13 The fighting was centered on Tanusevci, a remote, mountainous, and largely lawless Albanianinhabited village straddling the Kosovo border. The village had previously served as a base for the KLA, and represented a major hub of organized criminal activity. Indeed, the initial confrontation in Tanusevci was largely a criminal matter, provoked by the kidnapping of a three-man crew from the A1 television station, which was investigating allegations the village was being used as a base for the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB).14 The latter, a KLA offshoot operating from Kosovo, infiltrated the Presevo Valley – the predominantly Albanian area of southern Serbia adjoining Kosovo and Tanusevci15 – in late 2000. The clashes between armed formations active in the area and Macedonian security forces escalated following the formal ratification of the Macedonia-Yugoslavia border on February 23, the negotiations for which deliberately bypassed Pristina, despite sections of the disputed territory being situated along the Kosovo sector of the border, causing anger among Macedonian- and KosovarAlbanians.16 Significantly, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the signing of the treaty, as then Macedonian Foreign Minister Slobodan Casule notes, by promoting the solidification of this border, threatened to disrupt lucrative illicit cross-border activity.17 The outbreak of violence caught Skopje and the international community – convinced of Macedonia’s multiethnic stability, and the capacity of its institutions to absorb minority grievances – by surprise. Yet various warning signs had appeared over the course of the previous year suggesting armed confrontation. Several violent incidents had occurred in and around the Macedonia-Kosovo border area, including armed attacks on police stations inside Macedonia, the same tactic the KLA had used to provoke Yugoslav security forces prior to NATO intervention in Kosovo. The targeting of police stations culminated in the slaying of three Macedonian policemen in the village of Aracinovo, an Albanian-inhabited village on the fringes of Skopje also known for its involvement in organized crime.18 Numerous other incidents – including

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gunfire attacks on Macedonian army patrols from the Kosovo side of the border, and the kidnapping of four Macedonian soldiers, who were eventually released in exchange for an ex-KLA commander held in Macedonia19 – likewise indicated a dangerous pattern of violence, stemming from former KLA elements within Kosovo and criminal structures operating in the area. The insurgency in Serbia’s Presevo Valley was the most audible signal of impending conflict in Macedonia. Comprising the three counties of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac, armed Albanian guerrillas20 – many of them originating from Kosovo – used the 5kilometer, demilitarized Ground Security Zone (GSZ) inside southern Serbia as a staging ground to occupy territory that, prior to World War II, had comprised part of Kosovo. The GSZ, surrounding Kosovo and Macedonia, had been established as a buffer between NATO and Yugoslav forces by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, where – under the terms of the Technical Agreement signed to end the Kosovo war in 1999 – the Yugoslav army could not deploy weapons or troops. 21 As in Macedonia, the motives for the insurgency ranged from territorial and criminal, to a violent reaction to unsatisfied Albanian grievances. Following negotiations with NATO, the UCPMB disarmed and withdrew from the area, enabling Yugoslav forces to re-enter the GSZ and the occupied territories in early 2001.22 From a Macedonian perspective, developments to the north suggested that its territory now represented the next target for regrouped KLA remnants. Indeed, many of the guerrillas, now displaced, found refuge over the border in Tanusevci.23 The fact that the onset of violence in Macedonia coincided with the termination of the Presevo Valley insurgency seemed to validate Skopje’s concerns. Regardless of the origins of the Macedonian conflict, the fighting in Tanusevci presaged a deterioration in the overall security situation in the predominantly Albanian north and northwest of the country. Having captured several villages along the Kosovo border, the NLA spread its armed struggle in mid-March to the urban areas of Kumanovo and, significantly, Tetovo, Macedonia’s second largest city, the political, economic, and cultural hub of the Albanian-Macedonian community. The inability of the Macedonian security forces to contain the fighting to the border region around Kosovo marked a dangerous new phase of the conflict, with the NLA – operating from mountain strongholds – capturing large swathes of territory in and around both theaters. With this escalation, the number of casualties and displaced persons increased.

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The response of the Macedonian government and the international community to the violence was unanimous and unequivocal: this was not a struggle for Albanian national rights, as the NLA claimed, but an illegitimate campaign of violence perpetrated by a few hundred terrorists from Kosovo looking to destabilize Macedonia. The response of the Albanian-Macedonian political elite was equally robust: Arben Xhaferi, whose DPA formed part of the coalition government, denounced the NLA’s actions, rejecting the use of violence as a means to political ends. Xhaferi’s deputy, Menduh Thaci, accused Pristina of meddling in Macedonia’s internal affairs, while Imer Imeri, the leader of the PDP, criticized the NLA for its failure to articulate a coherent political program.24 A joint declaration released by Albanian-Macedonian political parties condemned the use of violence for political purposes, and implored all illegitimate military structures to lay down their arms.25 Macedonia’s neighbors, including Albania, were also quick to denounce the violence, with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece offering military and intelligence assistance.26 While its position would evolve over time, the international community was similarly clear in its denunciation of the NLA. On March 21, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1345 to condemn the violence and express its support to Macedonia.27 NATO and the EU issued similar declarations, depicting the insurgents as terrorists who were seeking to replace ballots with bullets.28 George W. Bush, meanwhile, described the NLA as ‘a small group of extremists trying to destabilize . . . [Macedonia’s] democratic, multiethnic government.’29 With Macedonian security forces failing to localize the violence, senior foreign emissaries, led by NATO SecretaryGeneral Lord Robertson, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana, EU Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten, and OSCE Chairman in Office Mircea Geoana, began arriving in the country to offer their support.30 In the famous words of Robertson, the NLA were nothing but a bunch of criminals, terrorists, and ‘murderous thugs whose objective is to destroy a democratic Macedonia.’31 As such, according to the defense minister, Ljuben Paunovski, and Nikola Dimitrov, the national security adviser to President Boris Trajkovski, Macedonia was given tacit international approval to suppress the rebellion through military means.32 Emboldened by the backing of the international community, Skopje adopted an aggressive posture toward the rebels, one designed to achieve a swift resolution to the crisis. Rebel strongholds were shelled, primarily via helicopter gunships leased from the Ukraine, forcing the

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NLA to withdraw over the Sar mountains into Kosovo.33 On March 21, with the violence spreading to Tetovo and Kumanovo, the Macedonian government – having mobilized reservists and stockpiled large amounts of new weaponry – issued the rebels with a deadline of 24 hours to lay down their arms and leave the country, or face a military assault.34 The NLA responded to the ultimatum with the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire and a demand for dialogue; however, this was immediately rejected, the government insisting it would not negotiate with terrorists. Having ordered all civilians residing in villages between Tetovo and Kosovo to evacuate their homes, Skopje launched its promised counteroffensive, though not until March 25.35 The following day, the government announced that its military operation had succeeded in pushing back the rebels.36 Following a brief lull in hostilities, clashes resumed between Macedonian security forces and a regrouped NLA. Significantly, however, a growing apprehension began to emerge within international circles over Skopje’s handling of the crisis, the heavy-handedness of which threatened to provoke grassroots Albanian mobilization. Highlighting this concern, the EU, in a calculated attempt to moderate its approach, rewarded Macedonia with a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), the first formal step toward accession. In early April, during a period of relative calm, Macedonia became the first Western Balkan state to sign an SAA.37 Likewise underscoring international skepticism of Macedonia’s management of the conflict, Solana and Robertson applied pressure on the Ukraine, its largest external military backer, to suspend shipments of arms and helicopter gunships.38 With the government rejecting external requests to resolve the crisis through nonmilitary means and address legitimate Albanian demands, which were now slowly being interpreted as lying at the root of the insurgency, the international community became more sympathetic to the rebels.39 Notwithstanding these latest developments, the conflict escalated on April 28, when eight Macedonian soldiers were killed after their patrol was ambushed by NLA guerrillas near Vejce, a mountain village just inside Macedonia’s border with Kosovo.40 What constituted the single biggest death toll of the conflict at the time provoked civilian retaliations against Albanian property in Skopje and, in particular, Bitola, where schools and shops were ransacked and set ablaze,41 imbuing the conflict with a dangerous new dimension. In early May, the NLA captured two villages north of Kumanovo, near the Presevo Valley, and ambushed an armored personnel carrier belonging to the Macedonian military, killing

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two soldiers and kidnapping one.42 In response, the government cordoned off Kumanovo, mobilized extra military and police reservists, and ordered the evacuation of Albanian villages surrounding the city in preparation for a counteroffensive against NLA strongholds.43 However, with many civilians ignoring the directive to evacuate, the government was forced to delay the assault, accusing the NLA of using locals as human shields to prevent a full-scale military response.44 On May 13, under international pressure, and following weeks of politicking, during which the NLA steadily gained more territory and influence, Macedonia’s four major political parties –VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DPA, and PDP – established a government of national unity. 45 Transcending political and ethnic lines, the purpose of the new coalition was to promote a united approach to the crisis. Despite the initial renunciations by the DPA and PDP, however, this was a unity government in name only, with coalition members holding divergent views on the roots of the insurrection, and thus espousing competing approaches vis-à-vis its resolution. On the one hand, Xhaferi and Imeri warned of the dangers inherent in a military approach, insisting, conversely, on the need to engage with the legitimate grievances of the Albanian community. On the other, the ethnic Macedonian parties remained steadfast in their conviction that any attempt to bring “terrorists” into the political process would legitimate the use of violence in the pursuit of political objectives, and, accordingly, reiterated the importance of isolating, and ultimately crushing, the NLA. This division was aggravated with the revelation that Xhaferi and Imeri, by now vacillating toward the NLA in line with AlbanianMacedonian popular opinion, had secretly met with Ahmeti, the rebels’ political leader, in Prizren, Kosovo on May 22. The purpose of the covert meeting, which was also attended by political representatives from Kosovo and Albania, was to formulate a peace plan and common political program that the community’s elected representatives could advance through legal, democratic channels.46 Facilitated by Robert Frowick, the veteran American diplomat who had served as the first head of mission of the OSCE in Skopje, and who, given his Balkan experience and extensive regional contacts, was brought out of retirement as the personal representative of the OSCE chairman in office, the meeting culminated in the signing of the so-called Prizren Agreement. Under its terms, the NLA would cease its insurrection in exchange for greater political and cultural rights for AlbanianMacedonians and an amnesty for all its fighters.

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The political fallout from the revelation that the elected representatives of the Albanian community had covertly negotiated an agreement with the very “terrorists” the Macedonian state was trying to eliminate was great. For the ethnic Macedonians, this represented a major betrayal of trust: the prime minister, Ljupco Georgievski, accused the DPA and PDP of collaborating with terrorists, while President Trajkovski, a close friend of Frowick’s, demanded they renounce the meeting and the agreement arising from it, claiming the coalition government would collapse if a repudiation was not forthcoming. 47 Xhaferi and Imeri, initially so critical of the NLA, refused to disown their actions, mindful that any back-down would be received negatively by the Albanian-Macedonian electorate.48 Under international pressure, the government survived; significantly, however, the consequences of the Prizren meeting reinforced the growing suspicion – certainly within nationalist circles – that the international community was collaborating against the ethnic Macedonians in favor of the Albanians. The international community, wary of provoking a backlash from the ethnic Macedonian side, countered by arguing that Frowick had utilized his strong connections to the Albanian elite in the region to independently broker the agreement. Immaterial of whether Frowick had acted on his own or not, the Prizren initiative was guided by the premise that engagement of the NLA, while unpalatable, was necessary given the dangerous new dynamics the situation was assuming with Skopje’s failure to resolve the crisis, and the general position of strength the NLA was now operating from. Nevertheless, the United States and the EU quickly distanced themselves from the American diplomat, and denounced his attempt to bring the NLA into the political process.49 The Macedonian authorities threatened to declare Frowick persona non grata, prompting him to leave the country and return to the United States before he was expelled. On July 1, Frowick was replaced by Max van der Stoel – its former HCNM – as the OSCE chairman’s special envoy.50 Even if he had acted independently, Frowick’s actions, though well intentioned, neglected the fundamental concern of the ethnic Macedonians, namely, that, politically and morally, it was impossible for them to engage with, and be seen to be dictated by, individuals they had caricatured without fail as terrorists. The decision of the DPA and PDP to meet with the NLA meant it was doing exactly that, and therefore legitimated the organization’s agenda and actions. Put simply, Frowick was bold but insensitive. An anonymous United States State Department official describes him as ‘an honest man with honest intentions who was a true friend of Macedonia.’51 Zoran Jolevski,

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Trajkovski’s chief of staff, acknowledges that, while Frowick was genuine in his efforts to bring about peace, involving Ahmeti in the political process was unacceptable.52 Yet the underlying premise guiding Frowick was validated by NATO’s subsequent engagement of the NLA, through its special envoy, the Dutchman Pieter Feith, who negotiated various ceasefires with Ahmeti at his Sipkovica base, the mountain village in the northwest of the country, and, ultimately, the final peace settlement negotiated in Ohrid in August, which was virtually indistinguishable from the agreement Frowick had brokered in Prizren in May. On the same day of the Prizren meeting, the Macedonian military – following a temporary ceasefire announced by Skopje to co-opt the DPA and PDP into the national unity government, which the Albanian parties had demanded as a condition for their participation – renewed its shelling of rebel-held villages.53 The continuing search for a military solution, however, only highlighted the limited capability of the Macedonian armed forces, whose failure to suppress the insurgency was emboldening the NLA, and prompting further international disquiet. By the summer of 2001, the country seemed to be heading toward civil war: significant tracts of territory in the north and west of the country lay in rebel hands; approximately 60 Macedonian soldiers and policemen had been killed either in combat or NLA ambushes; tens of thousands of civilians – ethnic Macedonian and Albanian – had been displaced by the fighting; Albanian villages in and around NLA strongholds had incurred significant damage as a result of military assaults; and intercommunal clashes, while still relatively isolated, were nevertheless dangerously on the rise.54 With this, the tense co-existence between the two communities appeared irreparable. Certainly, and quite dangerously, this was a theory subscribed to by elements within the ethnic Macedonian political and intellectual elite, most notably Georgievski, who privately canvassed a partition of the country along ethnic lines as a solution to the insurgency, and to the broader enmity between the Macedonian and Albanian communities. 55 On May 29, at the height of the crisis, state-run media published details of a leaked document by the influential Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (MANU) proposing a territorial and population exchange with Albania.56 Under the plan, prepared by then MANU Chairman Georgi Efremov, predominantly ethnic Albanian western Macedonia would have been ceded to Albania in exchange for a Macedonian-inhabited area of Albania situated on the common border near Lake Prespa with access to the Adriatic Coast.57 Though MANU

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denied its existence, it was widely assumed that VMRO-DPMNE was behind the document. It is instructive to note that, while the SDSM and PDP immediately denounced the proposal, Georgievski remained silent.58 According to then Defense Minister Paunovski, Georgievski gave ‘serious indications’ that he perceived partition as an option for resolving the conflict.59 Some two years later, on April 18, 2003, Georgievski, now in opposition, published an article in the daily newspaper Dnevnik publicly championing such a “solution,” or, failing that, the erection of a concrete wall – as per Israel – to separate the two peoples.60 This proposal, however, proceeded from the dangerous, and incorrect, premise that ethnic Macedonians and Albanians cannot peacefully co-exist, an incompatibility that can be solved only through the exchange of populations and territories. While having antecedents in the region, it represented an outdated method to a modern problem, and neglected several important facts: the historically peaceful co-existence between the two peoples; the ability of political elites, media, academia, and NGOs to promote and foster mutual understanding between ethnic communities; and the role of Georgievski’s own nationalist rhetoric in aggravating intergroup tensions, and thus to contributing to a climate of mistrust. Nevertheless, it remained disturbing that such an obsolete idea had been championed at the very top level of government and academia. Aracinovo: Staring into the Abyss

Despite the deteriorating security situation, and the perception – certainly from an outsiders’ perspective – that Macedonia was sliding toward civil war, the mood outside of Tetovo and Kumanovo did not resemble that of a country approaching the abyss. In the first instance, the fighting remained geographically contained. Similarly, while many civilians had been displaced, the conflict, and its casualties, remained limited to armed structures. Intercommunal violence on a large scale also had yet to eventuate. With the onset of summer, most Macedonians departed for their vacations. This sense of relative calm was shattered in June when the NLA, emboldened by their territorial gains, seized the village of Aracinovo, situated 10 kilometers from Skopje, on the eastern outskirts of the capital.61 By bringing the conflict to the doorstep of Skopje, the NLA struck a major psychological blow, and awoke average Macedonians not directly affected by the fighting from their slumber. With the capture of Aracinovo, the NLA offered to cease its insurrection on the condition that all military counteroffensives be abandoned and its political demands met.62 The ethnic Macedonian

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leadership, however, conscious that any acquiescence would represent a capitulation and validation of violence, immediately rejected the offer. Indeed, the latest turn of events only strengthened the resolve of hardliners to crush the insurgency through force, with Georgievski advocating the declaration of a state of war.63 According to Jolevski, Skopje was given 48 hours by the international community to “resolve” the standoff.64 The response of the military, accordingly, was to shell the village. Having had its ceasefire offer spurned, the NLA, in a show of strategic strength, threatened to attack Skopje’s international airport, the parliament building, and the country’s petrol refinery, all of which now stood within its rocket-firing range.65 With the NLA thought to be in possession of antiaircraft weapons, all commercial flights to and from Skopje were immediately cancelled.66 Macedonian security forces cordoned off the village and ordered all civilians to evacuate the area, while helicopter gunships contained the rebels and cut off their supply lines,67 as a chastened government prepared to execute a military assault to recapture Aracinovo from NLA control. With the likelihood of substantial collateral damage high, most civilians having ignored the directive to evacuate the village, and the DPA and PDP threatening to withdraw from the national unity government, a full-scale military offensive threatened to plunge the country into further crisis, and, ultimately, wider war. The relative ease with which the NLA seized control of an area so close to Skopje reinforced the inherent weakness of the Macedonian security forces in containing and suppressing the insurgency, and, by extension, cast doubts over its ability to retake Aracinovo. In this context, NATO and the EU – conscious that any further escalation in and around Skopje would compromise Kosovo Force (KFOR) supply lines, its supply center situated immediately adjacent the international airport68 – initiated a major diplomatic effort to dissuade Skopje from carrying out its planned assault. Despite the tough-talking rhetoric of nationalists, who insisted they were on the verge of victory, in reality, Macedonian armed forces had made little progress in recapturing Aracinovo. Following three days of shelling, Skopje agreed to abort its counteroffensive, and, even more controversially, allow the rebels, thought to number as many as 500, safe passage from the village.69 Under the terms of the agreement negotiated by foreign diplomats, American KFOR troops evacuated the NLA and its weapons from Aracinovo, and escorted them to a KFOR base near Kumanovo.70

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For the NLA, the outcome from Aracinovo represented an important symbolic victory, a voluntary withdrawal as opposed to surrender.71 The ethnic Macedonians, on the other hand, were incensed, portraying the international community as pro-Albanian. With Georgievski and hawkish Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski in the vanguard, they accused Western diplomats of forcing it to abandon an operation that was set to deliver a decisive setback to the NLA, and of imposing a ceasefire that undercut Macedonia’s sovereignty. Certainly, this was the version of events promoted by hardliners through the media. For the ethnic Macedonian people in general, who sought a military victory to restore lost pride, Aracinovo was a major humiliation, prompting attacks on Western embassies and the OSCE headquarters in Skopje. In the words of Mark Laity, a special adviser to then NATO Secretary-General Robertson who was seconded to Skopje as a personal adviser to President Trajkovski during the course of the crisis, abandoning the military counteroffensive in Aracinovo amounted to ‘a dagger in the heart’72 of ethnic Macedonians. That night, June 25, a crowd of up to 7,000 ethnic Macedonians, including soldiers and large numbers of armed police and army reservists, staged a violent protest outside parliament renouncing the West and demanding the resignation of Trajkovski, who – under the combination of international pressure and his own moderate instincts – had modified his posture to champion restraint.73 Calling for a military solution, several protestors fired shots, attacked foreign journalists, and stormed the parliament building, raising fears of a coup. Laity, for instance, suspects the protest and subsequent violence were perpetrated by hard-line elements within VMRODPMNE.74 Trajkovski eventually addressed the crowd, defending the decision to abort the assault on Aracinovo, claiming it had pulled Macedonia back from the brink of civil war. While the sense of injustice was understandable, particularly given the assistance Macedonia had provided NATO prior to and during its intervention in Kosovo two years earlier, and the government backdown embarrassing, Trajkovski was ultimately correct in his assessment. In reality, the international community applied pressure on the government not because it was inherently pro-Albanian and antiMacedonian, but because it was convinced that a military offensive on Aracinovo would ignite civil war. The United States, for example, had ordered all non-essential embassy staff to leave the country. And in spite of the rhetoric emanating from hardliners that the ceasefire was imposed on it just as the military was preparing to crush the NLA, it was Skopje that requested international mediators obtain a ceasefire.75 Dimitrov,

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explaining how the Macedonians sought international assistance in order to end the stalemate and avoid casualties, notes that Aracinovo ‘was probably the biggest misperception in the whole of 2001.’76 Yet given the subsequent humiliation, particularly for hardliners such as Georgievski and Boskovski, the international community represented a convenient scapegoat for their own failings. However unpalatable this resolution was to ethnic Macedonians, it was the only one if the insurgency was not to escalate into wider war: for Laity, a full-scale military assault on Aracinovo would have precipitated an almost certain collapse of the unity government, provoked civilian mobilization, particularly on the Albanian side, and incited more sustained levels of intercommunal violence.77 As such, convincing Skopje to abandon its counteroffensive in Aracinovo was the turning point of the conflict. The fact that American soldiers had escorted the rebels sparked more controversy, and strengthened the growing sense of antiAmericanism among ethnic Macedonians. Moreover, it fed numerous media-fuelled conspiracy theories, the most popular of which held that 16 advisers from Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) – a private American company established by retired United States military officers to train armies in modern warfare – had been attached to the NLA, hence the peaceful, American-conducted evacuation. For Taylor, the use of American mercenary advisers explained the professionalism, effectiveness, and discipline of the NLA.78 Sources within the American embassy in Skopje, however, as well as Trajkovski’s then national security adviser and chief of staff, categorically deny these rumors.79 As Dimitrov notes, MPRI, at the time, was working for the Macedonian government to adapt its armed forces to NATO standards.80 According to Laity, American soldiers were used in Aracinovo only because no other KFOR-contributing countries were willing to offer troops for the task, and agreed to oversee the evacuation only following the last-minute personal intervention of Robertson.81 A more rational explanation for the efficacy and discipline of the NLA could be found in the fact that many – if not most – of its fighters, and all its commanders, had previous combat experience in Kosovo, and were able to outmaneuver a poorly trained and inexperienced Macedonian army. Nevertheless, such a revelation, coupled with the perceived pro-Albanianism of American envoy Pardew and unsubstantiated rumors that the United States was supplying the NLA with arms and intelligence,82 provoked ethnic Macedonian mobs to attack the American embassy and a McDonald’s store.

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In spite of the recriminations emerging from Aracinovo, the peaceful resolution of the standoff engendered a fresh will among moderate elements in Skopje and the international community to resolve the insurrection through political means, thus imbuing the peace process with new urgency. As such, Aracinovo proved a major wake-up call, including for the international community, whose engagement had hitherto been limited to the shuttle diplomacy of Robertson, Solana, Patten, and Geoana.83 The fighting between Macedonian security forces and NLA rebels began to decline as a number of ceasefires were reached and broken. Simultaneously, negotiations between VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM, on the one hand, and the DPA and PDP, on the other, intensified at the lakeside resort of Ohrid.84 Following from his suggestion of partial amnesty for NLA rebels in early June,85 President Trajkovski – firmly established as the international community’s focal point in light of Georgievski’s intransigence86 – unveiled a peace plan under which the NLA would cease its insurrection and disarm in exchange for amnesty and relevant constitutional reforms, to be negotiated with the elected representatives of the Albanian-Macedonian community. 87 Ironically, this plan, which would culminate in the final peace settlement in Ohrid in August, was almost identical to Frowick’s discredited Prizren Agreement. International Engagement: Averting Civil War

The high-level international response reflected the fragile political, social, and security situation in the country, and the growing sense of crisis enveloping it. Indeed, Macedonia was arguably the premier crisis for the international community at the time, as highlighted by the intensive shuttle diplomacy of Robertson, Solana, Patten, and Geoana. Robertson and Solana, in particular, devoted considerable personal commitment to Macedonia, and so brought to bear their prestige – and the institutional machinery of their respective organizations – on the situation. Certainly, it was in the international community’s interest to contain and resolve the crisis quickly. As at independence, the implications of protracted violence in Macedonia would potentially be profound, and adversely impact on the international community’s considerable investments in the region. In the context of the political and military capital expended elsewhere in the Balkans, war in Macedonia, as Richard Gowan of New York University argues, was fundamentally unacceptable.88 Already stretched in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, another long-term, expensive deployment of troops was clearly not in

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NATO’s interest. Just as importantly, as the logistical base for KFOR, war in Macedonia would adversely impact NATO operations in Kosovo. Prompted by the events in Aracinovo and the subsequent storming of the Macedonian parliament, the international community intensified its mediation efforts in June, with the EU and United States appointing fulltime special envoys – Francois Leotard, the former French defense minister, and Pardew, who represented the Department of Defense in the negotiating team led by Richard Holbrooke to end the war in BosniaHerzegovina, respectively – to guide the respective parties to a political settlement. In parallel to this, NATO continued to negotiate ceasefires, and ultimately agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force to disarm the NLA. This engagement was significant for a number of reasons. First, it signaled a resolve within Brussels and Washington to settle the crisis. The American engagement was particularly notable, given Washington’s initial apprehensiveness: only with the (reluctant) appointment of Pardew in late June did the United States become directly engaged in the conflict.89 Over and above enhancing the credibility of the international response, American engagement was crucial to obtaining the trust of the Albanians, given the traditionally strong relationship between the two nations, solidified after the American-led intervention in Kosovo two years earlier. As Ismet Ramadani observes, Albanians always react positively to the United States.90 In this context, Washington could apply unique influence on the Albanian-Macedonian side. Second, by bringing to bear such highlevel pressure on local actors, it imbued the peace process with a new sense of urgency. Of course, the shuttle diplomacy of Robertson, Solana, et al. was vital to the final outcome, and laid the groundwork for the successful resolution of the crisis. It is instructive to note, in this regard, their role in helping to establish – and, following Prizren, preserve – the government of national unity, and their efforts in moderating the stance of hard-line elements. Nevertheless, the permanent, high-level presence of Leotard and Pardew gave the peace process renewed energy and unity of purpose. Finally, and quite significantly, it marked a definitive shift in the international community’s interpretation of the conflict: where it had initially supported the actions of the Macedonian government in response to a perceived terrorist threat, foreign mediators now applied pressure on Skopje to change course in its management of the insurgency, namely, to desist from heavy-handed military assaults, particularly in instances where the likelihood of collateral damage was

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high, reduce its build-up of weaponry, and seek a political solution in exchange for post-conflict reconstruction aid and a NATO peacekeeping force to implement any settlement. This re-evaluation could be attributed to the large and relatively easy territorial gains made by the NLA, which exposed the shortcomings of the Macedonian security forces, and the conviction that the continued search for a military solution would only aggravate the crisis. Put simply, the international volte-face was a matter of realism and political expediency: with the NLA growing as a force, and Macedonian institutions unsuccessful in their attempts to suppress it, the organization could no longer be ignored. A new ceasefire was brokered by international mediators on July 26.91 Under its terms, the corridor between Tetovo and Kosovo was to be demilitarized while a comprehensive peace settlement was negotiated between relevant parties in Ohrid.92 A new wave of violence, however, threatened what were now advanced peace negotiations. Just as political compromise was being reached, on August 8, five suspected NLA rebels were executed in a police raid on an Albanian district of Skopje. 93 Within 48 hours, the NLA responded by killing 18 Macedonian solders in two separate incidents: on the same day as the police raid, a 10-man army convoy was ambushed on the Skopje-Tetovo highway, just outside the village of Grupcin, while two days later eight soldiers lost their lives when a military truck ran over two antitank mines on a remote country road north of Skopje.94 In retaliation, the Macedonian government ordered its armed forces to resume shelling of NLA strongholds, while ethnic Macedonians rioted in Skopje and, in particular, Prilep, from where most of the dead soldiers had originated.95 On August 12, in a supposed security sweep, 10 Albanians were killed in the village of Ljuboten in what was widely considered to be a revenge act carried out on the orders of Boskovski; according to Human Rights Watch, this was a summary execution of civilians that had no military justification.96 In 2005, following investigations by the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Boskovski was indicted by The Hague for war crimes, of which he was acquitted in July 2008. Ohrid Framework Agreement: Laying the Basis for Peace

The fact that the new wave of sustained violence coincided with imminent breakthrough at Ohrid seemed to suggest that certain groups or individuals were not interested in peace, or at least were looking to derail the negotiations in favor of a military solution. Political hardliners

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such as Georgievski and Boskovski, elites who advocated a territorial division of the country as a panacea to Macedonia’s ills, and organized criminal structures for which the instability represented a boon to business immediately spring to mind. To their credit, however, the participants at Ohrid knew that simply too much was at stake – and the international community had invested too much time and resources – to abandon the peace process at such a late stage. On August 13, one day after the Ljuboten incident, a comprehensive peace settlement, the Ohrid Framework Agreement, was signed, under the auspices of President Trajkovski, by the four political parties comprising the national unity government to end the conflict. Based on the earlier peace plan formulated by Trajkovski, itself based on Frowick’s Prizren Agreement, the settlement accepted all NLA demands, including amnesty and right of societal reintegration for all rebels, in exchange for an end to the insurrection, disbanding of the organization, and NATO-supervised disarmament of its fighters. On August 27, following a formal request from Skopje, a 3,500strong British-led NATO peacekeeping force, Operation Essential Harvest, was deployed to disarm and demobilize the NLA.97 The mission concluded its 30-day mandate on September 26, having collected approximately 3,875 weapons and 200,000 mines, explosive devices, and ammunition.98 While ethnic Macedonians, now firmly entrenched in their anti-Western sentiments, derided the NATO mission, claiming it had failed to comprehensively disarm the group, the following day, September 27, Ahmeti made the symbolic announcement that the NLA had officially disbanded.99 On October 11, parliament declared a full amnesty for all disarmed former rebels.100 The purpose of the Framework Agreement was two-fold. First, to enhance the status of Albanian-Macedonians by addressing core grievances that had remained unmet since independence. And second, to promote a civic state that all Macedonian citizens, regardless of ethnicity, could identify with. Taking as its point of departure the denunciation of violence for political ends, while recognizing the sovereignty of the Macedonian state, the inviolability of its borders, and the multiethnic character of its society,101 the Framework Agreement, which was ratified by parliament on September 6,102 committed Macedonia to the following: 1. Amending key passages of its constitution, including the wording of the preamble – the term “ethnic” being replaced by “citizens of Macedonia” and “peoples,” and “nationalities” by “communities” – to

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give the state a civic definition, so making it a state of all its citizens, as opposed to the ethnic Macedonians per se.103 2. Elevating the status of the Albanian language to that of a second official state language, and an official language – along with Macedonian – in those areas where Albanians comprise in excess of 20 percent of the population.104 3. Legalizing the Albanian-language university in Tetovo. 4. Decentralizing power, with greater authority and responsibility being devolved from the center to the municipal level. 5. Ensuring equitable representation for Albanian-Macedonians in state institutions.105 6. Recruiting 1,000 Albanian officers to the Macedonian police force, increasing their proportion from 6 percent to 20 percent of the total.106 7. Affording greater latitude to the use of Albanian national symbols. 8. Reforming parliamentary procedures through the introduction of a “double majority” rule on legislation affecting the rights of ethnic minorities. For such legislation – for instance, relating to language or education – to pass, a majority is simultaneously required from all MPs and from those MPs representing ethnic minority communities.107 The Framework Agreement represented many things. First and foremost, it helped prevent a wider war, and maintained Macedonia’s unitary, multiethnic character. For the international community, it was a major breakthrough in the search for long-term peace in the country. Erwan Fouere, the EU’s special representative for Macedonia, describes it as an important step in the creation of a system that reflects the country’s multi-ethnicity.108 For Alexis Brouhns, one of Fouere’s predecessors, the Framework Agreement creates a country more acceptable to the Albanians.109 By fulfilling demands relating to language, education, public sector employment, and local administrative autonomy, it enhances the social position and political rights of Albanian-Macedonians, and, with it, resolves many of the tensions from the previous decade.110 With this agreement, argues Burim Sadiku, the dissatisfaction of Albanian-Macedonians is largely finished: Now it’s normal, and so we are happy. We have a totally different situation now. . . . We believe in this type of Macedonia; this type of Macedonia is not a problem. But in the past, in the 1980s, these events, these limitations of rights, not having a university. . . . The ethnic

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Albanians today have two universities. Is that such a bad thing for this country? No. People can go to school, they can finish school, and then, after that, they can join the public administration or they can work in business. The Albanian Diaspora brings millions of euros here, so that the state can keep its financial balance. Ethnic Albanians only contribute to this country. In the past, they were contributing a lot, but not getting anything in return.111

For the Albanians, the Framework Agreement represented belated recognition of the multiethnic character of the country, and a culmination of their struggle for political and cultural equality. For the ethnic Macedonians, however, the agreement, by producing constitutional reform, political decentralization, parallel education systems, and de facto bilingualism, symbolized another step toward federalization, and the ultimate division of the country. Further, to the extent that it was perceived to have been imposed by a pro-Albanian international community, it was a blow to the country’s sovereignty. Accusing outside actors of abetting terrorists, anti-Western sentiments among ethnic Macedonians reached unprecedented levels, fostering a sense of bitterness and injustice that prevails to this day. Most significantly of all, in the eyes of ethnic Macedonians, it rewarded the perpetrators of aggression and legitimated the politics of violence, reinforcing the assumption – particularly after events in Kosovo two years earlier, when the international community intervened decisively only with Kosovar-Albanians’ renunciation of their erstwhile policy of Gandhian nonviolence – that violence pays. In the words of Casule, the Framework Agreement ‘is the document, par excellence, that recognizes that if you are strong enough and convincing enough, you can use violence for political goals.’112 However unpalatable the final settlement was to ethnic Macedonians, it represented the only viable, long-term solution to the crisis. Of course, it can be criticized for rewarding violence, and, in effect, gives preferential treatment to Albanians over other minorities. Whether it has strengthened or weakened Macedonia’s social coherence is open to question. Accusations of double standards on the part of the international community were not without justification. Though it never directly engaged the NLA politically, the fact remains that Ahmeti was in permanent contact with the elected representatives of the AlbanianMacedonian community throughout the negotiating process, and thus – de facto – was shaping the agenda at Ohrid. The public relations of the international community could certainly have been better. Yet, in the final analysis, the Framework Agreement resolved, through political

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means, a potentially explosive situation that had the ability to incite more widespread and protracted violence, and preserved the unitary character and territorial integrity of the country. In contrast, the territorial division and population exchange mooted by some represented neither a rational nor practical alternative, and belied the very ideal of European integration Macedonia was aspiring toward. By addressing a broad range of legitimate Albanian grievances through a constitutional framework, the agreement represented an investment in the country’s future, and, by extension, enhanced its prospects of EU accession. In the words of an anonymous European diplomat who was involved in the negotiations, the Framework Agreement was ‘winwin.’113 In any case, Skopje would have been obligated to implement the reforms it agreed to at Ohrid through the EU integration process. While tempting for the government to proceed with a military approach, the only permanent solution to the crisis was political. To paraphrase Henryk Sokalski, the Framework Agreement represented a national roundtable in which the country’s democratically elected representatives arrived at a social contract for Macedonia.114 Indeed, to some extent, the 2001 conflict – by addressing structural inequalities and strengthening the platform for long-term stability – may be interpreted as a positive development. Regardless of its perceived merits, the agreement was steadily implemented with the passing of relevant legislation, and slowly accepted by ethnic Macedonians. The pace of reform vis-à-vis the more controversial elements of Ohrid was slow, particularly regarding the use of Albanian national symbols and the devolution of power to local government. The implementation of the latter proved highly problematic, particularly as the issue – as with most things in Macedonia – was ethnicized. For ethnic Macedonians, the empowerment of local (Albanian) governments was immediately associated with federalization, despite the fact that the objective of the law on local self-government was not ethnically motivated. By expanding the responsibilities and functions of municipal authorities,115 its ultimate purpose was to streamline the functioning of the state, encourage greater civic participation, and, with it, promote a sense of ownership of the state, immaterial of ethnicity. From a practical perspective, moreover, the law on decentralization proved the most difficult to implement given that, as a pre-condition for decentralization, it required the redistricting of Macedonia’s 123 municipal boundaries.116 The process also involved reducing the number of municipalities to 76 by 2008.117 This law was

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not passed by parliament until August 11, 2004,118 some three years after the signing of the peace settlement in Ohrid. In spite of its ratification by parliament, VMRO-DPMNE, now in opposition, threatened to derail the decentralization process when it successfully proposed a referendum on the planned territorial reorganization. By transforming Struga and Kicevo into Albanianmajority cities, and increasing Skopje’s Albanian population to in excess of 20 percent,119 a threshold with wide-ranging implications, decentralization amounted to national treason in the eyes of nationalists. For the international community, a popular rejection of the proposed law would endanger Macedonia’s short- and long-term stability by reversing many of the gains made in the preceding three years, stall implementation of the Framework Agreement, and, in so doing, aggravate interethnic tensions and undermine the country’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.120 Highlighting these concerns, the United States, in the most symbolic gesture, took the calculated decision to recognize Macedonia under its constitutional name, on November 4, 2004, the final day of campaigning, and only three days prior to the vote, as a means to dissuade Macedonians from participating in the referendum.121 Allied to calls from ruling coalition parties to boycott the vote, and the threat of then Prime Minister Hari Kostov to resign if the referendum was successful, only 26 percent of registered voters turned out, falling well below the 50 percent threshold needed to make the vote valid.122 Post-Ohrid: Consolidating Peace

Although many questioned whether Ohrid would produce a lasting peace, the Framework Agreement – by placating AlbanianMacedonians, and seemingly expediting the country’s EU-NATO integration – had the desired effect of engendering near-term peace, while concurrently establishing conditions and incentives necessary for long-term stability. In spite of the bitterness generated in 2001, Macedonia slowly returned to normalcy – the majority of displaced persons returned to their homes, and, in a sign of the country’s democratic and multiethnic maturity, it successfully negotiated a number of political and social crises post-Ohrid. Several violent incidents failed to derail the peace implementation process. A threatened offensive in the spring of 2003 by the Albanian National Army (ANA) – a splinter group established by former NLA fighters dissatisfied with the pace of legislative reform, and, in the first instance, with the final peace

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settlement and with Ahmeti himself, whom it accused of selling out to the ethnic Macedonians – never materialized.123 Similarly, several planned security sweeps of former rebel strongholds by the interior ministry were abandoned under international pressure. An earlier sweep of Trebos, for example, had provoked an ambush of a police convoy, resulting in three police deaths and the kidnapping of civilians. 124 Nevertheless, clashes remained isolated, which seemed to suggest that Macedonians were more concerned with peace and stability, and, ultimately, European integration, than with war and nationalism. The behavior of Ahmeti post-conflict also lent credence to the NLA contention that the purpose of the insurgency was not territorial, but, conversely, political, intended to enhance the constitutional status of Albanian-Macedonians and, concurrently, the political clout of the demobilized NLA leadership. In March 2002, some six months after the signing of the Framework Agreement, Ahmeti announced his intention to enter Macedonian politics, and established a new political party, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). Ahmeti’s metamorphosis from guerrilla leader to politician culminated in his election to parliament in September 2002; DUI, together with Branko Crvenkovski’s SDSM, won the majority of the general vote, and established the first post-Ohrid coalition government. With both parties advocating the full implementation of the agreement, reconciliation, economic renewal, and ultimate EU integration, this was, in effect, a vote against political extremism.125 Significantly, the outcome of the 2002 election again seemed to corroborate the perception that Macedonians were more interested in political stability, economic prosperity, and Europeanization than nationalism and marginalization. Though his political transformation gave sustenance to ethnic Macedonian nationalists who argued that the West had elevated terrorists to political authority, Ahmeti, to his credit, proved a constructive politician, fully committed to Ohrid and national unity whereas the likes of Georgievski and Xhaferi were championing territorial division.126 Indeed, the aforesaid – two of the four signatories at Ohrid – distanced themselves from the agreement, with Georgievski, in particular, seeking to obstruct its implementation on the basis that it rewarded terrorism. Xhaferi claimed he had lost hope for a multiethnic Macedonia, and, together with Georgievski, is believed to have advocated, privately if not publicly, the country’s partition. In addition to these subversive elements, Macedonia suffered a major setback on February 26, 2004, when Trajkovski, the key domestic architect in the insurrection’s ultimately peaceful resolution, was killed – along with six

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staff and two pilots – when his plane, en route to an international investment conference in Bosnia-Herzegovina, crashed near Mostar.127 As with preceding shocks, Macedonia was able to absorb Trajkovski’s death, and, in a testament to the growing maturity of its democracy, undertake the concomitant transition in a peaceful and orderly manner without undercutting the Ohrid implementation process.128 While the actions and rhetoric of local actors such as Trajkovski, Crvenkovski, and Ahmeti were critical to post-Ohrid peace, Macedonia’s stability continued to depend in large part on an ongoing international commitment. Though the potential for neglect in the post9/11 epoch was great, international engagement in Macedonia remained strong, with the EU, through the good offices of its special representative, firmly in the vanguard. This third, post-conflict phase of international engagement has been characterized by a sustained will on the part of external actors to ensure Ohrid’s full implementation, and, with it, enhance Macedonia’s prospects of EU integration. With the United States looking to disengage from the region, NATO, the EU, and OSCE assumed primary external responsibility for peacebuilding in Macedonia post-Ohrid. The EU and OSCE oversaw the implementation of the Framework Agreement and, more broadly, made efforts to reconcile differences between ethnic communities through various confidence-building measures.129 The OSCE expanded its mission and revised its mandate to reflect its new post-conflict responsibilities, including reporting on the return of displaced persons, monitoring the flow of illicit arms, and overseeing – with the assistance of NATO troops and EU monitors – the phased redeployment of police into former crisis areas and the training of the country’s new multiethnic police force.130 Given that its monitors cover the entire former crisis region, and possess extensive contacts with local actors in the field, notes Bernard Segarra, head of its Confidence Building Department, the OSCE, whose Macedonian mission now constitutes the organization’s longest serving field mission, has played a vital trust-building, information-gathering, and early warning function in the post-conflict phase.131 The EU, in particular, played a key role in strengthening postconflict security, with Macedonia becoming the recipient of important policy instruments within the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) framework, including military and police missions. In parallel to this, the EU prodded the government into implementing disputed provisions of the Ohrid settlement by making long-term integration and short-term financial assistance conditional on the agreement’s

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satisfactory implementation. This system of incentives and disincentives ensured that necessary provisions were passed: Alain Le Roy, who succeeded his countryman Leotard as EU special representative, played a decisive role in reviving negotiations on the law on local selfgovernment with his promise to convene an international donor’s conference for Macedonia.132 NATO, meanwhile, despite objections from Skopje, replaced Operation Essential Harvest, upon the cessation of its mandate, with Operation Amber Fox, a 700-strong peacekeeping force with a mandate to ensure a secure environment for international monitors overseeing Ohrid’s implementation.133 In addition to foreign diplomats, former NLA fighters, fearing reprisals from Macedonian security forces, were particularly anxious for an ongoing international troop presence. In March 2003, Macedonia was subject of another preventive innovation when Amber Fox was replaced by the EU’s Operation Concordia, the organization’s maiden military deployment.134 Frenchled, it comprised 320 lightly armed troops and 80 civilian staff, and was mandated the task of contributing to post-Ohrid stability and, through its presence, instilling confidence in the peace implementation process. 135 In December 2003, the EU established a police mission, PROXIMA, to develop the Macedonian police force according to European standards and strengthen its capacity to combat organized crime.136 Over and above representing a tentative step toward the establishment of a military arm for the EU, Concordia’s significance lay in the fact that it signified a wider recognition of Europe’s responsibility for stability and reconstruction in Macedonia.137 Indeed, this broad EU engagement, as underscored by the Stabilization and Association Agreement of April 2001, represented a belated acceptance, in effect prompted by violence, on the part of Brussels that Macedonian and Balkan problems are indeed EU problems, the amelioration of which requires closer ties and, ultimately, integration. As such, post-Ohrid, the EU has assumed an active role in long-term peacebuilding, as embodied by the presence of successive, high profile special representatives, and, through the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP),138 articulated, for the first genuine time, a long-term EU perspective for the country. This process has enhanced relations between Brussels and Skopje, facilitated greater levels of financial and technical assistance, and, through the presence of a permanent representative, generally promoted a more coherent and decisive approach to the country.139 This new commitment is significant for two reasons. First, it marks a qualitative shift in Brussels’ approach to Macedonia, and to the

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region more broadly: ultimate integration into the European mainstream usurping the previous policy of reaction and containment.140 Second, it seems to suggest that the international community – through the EU, in this instance – has learnt the fallacy of previous, short-term commitments, which, though they addressed immediate threats, failed to mitigate underlying sources of conflict. Macedonia made sufficient progress to submit its formal application for membership in March 2004, was granted EU candidate country status in December 2005, and now awaits a date for the opening of accession negotiations. In October 2009, the European Commission recommended commencement of these negotiations. As of October 2010, however, a start date for negotiations had yet to be set, delayed by the inability to resolve the name dispute with Greece. While having to shift its posture from prevention to conflict management, the response of the international community to the 2001 crisis was extremely effective. On-the-ground civilian diplomatic representation was strong. The personal engagement of the likes of Robertson and Solana was intense throughout. Being a pre-9/11 crisis, considerable time and attention were devoted to the situation. As a form of crisis management, the international response was coordinated and multitrack, characterized by a clear division of labor between third party actors. The EU and OSCE, as the regional stakeholders, assumed external ownership of the peace process and ultimate implementation of the Framework Agreement; the United States imbued it with political credibility; while NATO helped facilitate political progress by negotiating ceasefires and stabilized the situation through its demobilization function and general presence. Though NATO forces, with the exception of Aracinovo, never interfered in the conflict, the alliance’s hard power nevertheless augmented the soft power of the EU and United States.141 The latter two, in particular, projected a conviction and singular unity that was crucial to the final outcome. As Pardew notes, Washington and Brussels spoke with a single voice throughout. 142 For an anonymous European diplomat heavily involved on the ground during the course of the crisis, international unity gave the process added legitimacy, and ensured there was no ambiguity that local actors could exploit.143 The EU and United States proved a formidable combination, bringing to bear prodigious political and economic clout to the peace process, reinforcing the virtues of a united trans-Atlantic approach, and their ability to collectively solve common security problems. In particular, the contrasting styles and personalities of Leotard, the suave French diplomat, and Pardew, a physically imposing

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American military man, brought a decisive synergy and dynamism to the conflict resolution process. In the words of Laity, Leotard and Pardew represented a ‘great combination.’ 144 Another prominent feature of this response was the use of calculated sticks and carrots to soften the entrenched, mutually exclusive positions of local protagonists.145 Pardew notes that serious pressure was applied on both sides in order to facilitate a comprehensive political settlement.146 In particular, explains an anonymous State Department official, belligerents – notably Georgievski – were explicitly threatened with exposure for corruption and the freezing of their foreign bank accounts, Ahmeti was enticed with the prospect of political office in the next election, and combatants on both sides were warned of possible indictment to The Hague for war crimes.147 As such, the international community was able to leverage key actors into becoming part of the political process. Similarly, the so-called European perspective was used as both a stick and carrot to pressure the parties into a resolution; as an anonymous European diplomat involved at Ohrid recounts, while membership was never promised, ‘all the parties understood that if they wish to get closer to the EU, then they must act reasonably, and work toward a negotiated political settlement.’ 148 For Jolevski, the inducement of future EU – as well as NATO – integration represented the biggest incentive for the Macedonians.149 This was also an important disincentive for partition of the country, which, as an idea, ran counter to the EU’s core principles; as Pardew describes, the international community, stressing Macedonia’s unity and the inviolability of its borders throughout, made it ‘unequivocally clear’ to both sides that a territorial solution was simply not an option.150 Talk of international aid, moreover, was routine throughout the course of the conflict, with all post-conflict reconstruction assistance being made conditional on parliament’s full ratification and implementation of the Framework Agreement.151 Whenever the peace process appeared to stall, new promises of foreign aid were made.152 Just as importantly, argues Pardew, the international community consistently emphasized to the Macedonians what they stood to lose in the event of a protracted war: for the ethnic Macedonians, the very future of their country was at stake (‘if it collapses, it can never be put back together again’); for the Albanians, their international reputation.153 As such, the consequences – in the eyes of Pardew – were more important than specific sticks and carrots.154 For Dimitrov, no incentives from outsiders were needed when people’s lives and Macedonia’s very future were at

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stake.155 Though international mediators were used as a scapegoat by nationalists such as Georgievski and Boskovski to mask their own shortcomings, in the final analysis, without high-level international intervention, and the leverage brought to bear by such as the EU and United States, the likelihood of a protracted phase of intrasocietal violence would have risen markedly. In short, international intervention was decisive in resolving the conflict. Facilitating Factors: Moving Toward Wider Conflict

Notwithstanding this engagement, several factors helped aggravate the crisis, and hampered the ability of outside actors to resolve it in its latent stage. In the first instance, political rhetoric from hard-line elements intensified intergroup tensions. Second, sensationalist – and often inaccurate – reporting by ethnic-based media with connections to the various political parties reinforced mutual misperceptions of the Other. According to Ibrahim Mehmeti, director of media programs at SFCG Skopje, the Macedonian media were unprofessional and inflammatory throughout.156 Third, splits within the coalition government, both across the obvious Macedonian-Albanian divide and between hard-line and moderate factions within the ethnic Macedonian body politic, ensured a fractured response, so helping facilitate and solidify NLA gains. Dimitrov notes that no unified strategy at the level of government could be discerned.157 It was a major anomaly, for instance, that the hawkish VMRO-DMPNE controlled the interior ministry, while the more moderate SDSM controlled defense. As Vankovska argues, the relationship between the two ministries, particularly in the initial phase, was characterized by a total lack of coordination.158 In parallel to this, a major cleavage emerged within VMRODPMNE, between President Trajkovski, on the one hand, and Prime Minister Georgievski and Interior Minister Boskovski, on the other. While Trajkovski, wary of the political repercussions of any public perception that he was appeasing terrorists, vacillated between a military solution and submitting to international pressure, he remained realistic about the military’s ability to win a guerrilla war, and cognizant of the bitterness a hard-line approach would create among AlbanianMacedonians. Trajkovski, a former deputy foreign minister who had relied heavily on the Albanian vote in the disputed 1999 presidential election, ultimately fell back on his moderate instincts and (atypical) Methodist background to champion a political solution. Ferid Muhic, professor of Philosophy at the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius,

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contends that Trajkovski’s spiritual principles, and his respect for the virtues of peace, tolerance, and reconciliation, made him open to compromise, and so constituted a key factor in the conflict’s ultimate resolution.159 Mehmeti describes him as a ‘humanist president who was accepted equally by the Albanians. . . . In his absence, things would have gone in a very different direction.’160 For Jason Miko, an American national and confidant of Trajkovski’s, his Methodist values gave him a level-headedness that other Macedonian politicians lacked.161 Paul Mojzes, professor of Religious Studies at Rosemont College in Pennsylvania and close friend of Trajkovski’s, similarly emphasizes the importance of his religious background: Boris really meant his Christianity. . . . Everybody now claims to be religious, but the only religious person was Trajkovski. The others did it in order to bolster their political stature. . . . Boris felt that, since he had been elected president of Macedonia, that God had a task for him to save his country.162

Though he lacked the experience and charisma of Gligorov, and was perceived as being easily influenced by the international community, 163 Trajkovski consciously worked toward a nonviolent resolution and ultimate reconciliation between the two communities, to the chagrin of ethnic Macedonian nationalists. Criticized in life, the seminal role he played in warding off civil war has come to be appreciated by his own people – who never embraced him because of his religion – only with his death. Certainly, Trajkovski’s Methodist background made him a polarizing figure. Elements within the political establishment and the Macedonian Orthodox Church, who could never accept a non-Orthodox head of state, actively sought to discredit him, and promulgated biographical inaccuracies that came to be widely accepted in the West. Contrary to popular belief, Trajkovski never studied theology in the United States. Second, he did not convert from Orthodoxy to Methodism; as Mojzes notes, Trajkovski was born into the religion, his ancestors having converted in the early twentieth century, and had been active in the church since his youth days.164 Third, Trajkovski was not an ordained Methodist minister; rather, he had obtained a “local preacher license,” a licensing system for laypeople used by the Methodist Church to compensate for a shortage of ordained ministers. This subsequently allowed him to preach and help organize the work of local churches, but not to administer sacraments or rituals. Ultimately, his religious background may have represented a blessing in disguise.

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Besides his respect for values of peace and tolerance, Trajkovski, through his religion, had developed important networks in the United States, including among Christian groups, many of which lobbied Washington for assistance on his behalf.165 According to Pardew, Trajkovski was ‘undoubtedly the key to holding it all together. His instincts were positive: in his heart of hearts, he wanted peace.’166 Patten describes him as honest and courageous.167 Laity, who worked closely with Trajkovski throughout the crisis, notes that he lacked the bloodymindedness of so many Balkan politicians.168 For John Phillips, Trajkovski, ‘by his courage and sheer force of character, could be said to have headed off a fifth Balkan war virtually single-handed.’169 Where Trajkovski was a political moderate who championed restraint, the powerful Georgievski and Boskovski were hard-line nationalists who wanted to crush the NLA militarily, and, to that end, worked to undercut the president and the conflict resolution efforts of the international community. The populist rhetoric of Georgievski stood in contrast to that of Trajkovski. Seeking the declaration of a state of war, Georgievski demonized the international community for interfering in Macedonia’s internal affairs.170 To the extent that it pressured Skopje into abandoning its military campaign in favor of a political solution, Georgievski accused the international community of rewarding terrorism. While such rhetoric was received well by his core political constituency, in reality it only served to weaken the peace process and aggravate interethnic tensions. For skeptics, Georgievski deliberately mismanaged the crisis to provoke civil war and ultimate division of the country, a theory that gained credence following his subsequent revelations. As an anonymous State Department official puts it, ‘if Georgievski’s plan was to divide Macedonia as a country, then almost everything he did was good.’171 Though he eventually facilitated peace by signing the Framework Agreement, Georgievski was, in the words of Patten, a politician ‘devious even by Balkan standards.’172 Stevo Pendarovski, national security adviser to President Crvenkovski, describes him as a ‘completely inward-looking, corrupted manipulator.’173 Similarly to the prime minister, Boskovski, an ethnic Macedonian entrepreneur resident in Croatia who had risen through the political ranks largely by dint of his large financial donations to VMRODPMNE, culminating in his appointment as interior minister in May 2001, proved a major impediment to peace, particularly through his establishment and funding of nationalist paramilitary units. For Pardew

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and Laity, Boskovski was a dangerous figure, who – together with Georgievski – systematically sought to undermine the peace process.174 The emergence of irregular forces imbued the conflict with a dangerous new dimension, one that provoked Albanian-Macedonians and alienated the international community. The greatest concern related to the Lions, a 2,000-strong force comprising former police and military reservists.175 Unlike the Tigers, a special forces unit within the interior ministry, the Lions did not have official status, and contained many criminals in its ranks.176 In effect, the group constituted a private militia, under the patronage and control of Boskovski. By inciting disorder through the promotion of violence and the intimidation of AlbanianMacedonians, the Lions played directly into the hands of an NLA desperate for local mobilization. Taylor, an expert on military affairs, describes them as ‘gangsters. . . . They weren’t special forces. They were guys with gold chains and Ray-Ban sunglasses carrying Kalashnikovs.’ 177 An anonymous State Department official depicts them as ‘semi-thugs.’178 Operating with little discipline, the Lions were heightening tensions rather than contributing to security. For Islam Yusufi, deputy national security adviser to Trajkovski,179 the use of irregular forces damaged Macedonia’s image internationally, and prompted external actors to question Skopje’s management of the crisis.180 Despite its role in aggravating tensions and unanswered questions relating to its legality, the Lions assumed an almost mythical place in the psyche of ethnic Macedonians: the Macedonian Orthodox Church, for instance, conferred Medallions of Christ to its members in January 2002, by which time the group had become an official police unit within the interior ministry.181 The Lions were dissolved one year later, and many of its members incorporated into the defense and interior ministries.182 The disproportionate military response similarly allowed the crisis to escalate, and, above all else, threatened to push the country to civil war. First and foremost, the use of heavy artillery and the indiscriminate shelling of rebel-held villages – and the destruction and displacement stemming from it – to root out enemy combatants, when a more subtle approach toward what constituted an asymmetric, guerrilla war was required, played directly into the hands of the NLA. Tactically ineffective and strategically counterproductive, this approach served as a recruiting sergeant for the NLA.183 Pendarovski estimates that, in the first stage of the conflict, the NLA comprised between 100 and 150 combatants, the majority of whom emanated from Kosovo; by May,

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with local recruits, this figure had increased to between 800 and 1,200.184 By the end of hostilities, he argues, the NLA had transformed into a largely indigenous force, with at least 3,500 fighters.185 Clearly, in this regard, old attitudes toward armed rebellion – namely, that the suppression of such phenomena, even if instigated by only a small fighting force, requires the application of robust military power – prevailed among the Macedonian political and security elite. Dimitrov notes that the military response was undermining parallel political efforts to isolate the NLA.186 For Paunovski and Jolevski, a more elegant and coordinated security response in Tanusevci, in the initial phase of the conflict, when it remained at a very local, largely criminal level, would have been sufficient to resolve the issue.187 In the event, the inability of the interior and defense ministries to decide who was in charge, combined with the decision to shell the village, ensured its spread. As Aleksandar Matovski, who was employed in the defense ministry at the time and later became national security adviser to Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski, argues, The military response was terrible. It was counter to all of the global experiences of how you handle insurgency. . . . The key to fighting any insurgency is to dislocate the linkage between the insurgency and the population, and, in effect, make the security forces the best friend of the population. You don’t do that by shelling their villages.188

On a social level, the security response accentuated yet further the fissure between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, and threatened to incite intercommunal violence. Politically, it alienated the Albanian parties, which, stressing a need for dialogue, urged the government to temper its heavy-handedness, a split that weakened Skopje’s ability to resolve the crisis through political means. The offensive of late March, for example, prompted the PDP, the main Albanian-Macedonian opposition party at the time, to suspend its participation in parliament, while pressure mounted on the DPA to withdraw from the governing coalition.189 Just as significantly, the Macedonian response, as noted, forced a re-think by outside actors – who had initially lauded the government for its restraint, and described its military response as being proportional to the threat – on their reading of the crisis. Contrary to its initial declaration of support, the ineptness of the response prompted the international community to re-evaluate its stance and modify its rhetoric. This change in posture was reflected in the evolution of outsiders’ use of terminology to depict the NLA, whose fighters went from “terrorists” in

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March to “extremists” in May, and “guerrillas” by July,190 a shift that played directly into the hands of ethnic Macedonian hardliners who were attributing the inability to suppress the insurrection to the proAlbanianism of foreign mediators. Put simply, the Macedonian military did not represent a prepared and credible fighting force.191 Trained in conventional tactics, notes then Defense Minister Paunovski, it was ill-prepared to fight a guerrilla war,192 as its inability to contain the insurgency – in spite of its numerical superiority – testified. On the one level, it was poorly equipped and trained, lacking in funds to modernize an antiquated military structure. Much of the weaponry it did possess was obsolete, donated by foreign countries in the form of aid.193 On a second level, unlike the NLA, it was inexperienced, dominated by conscripts and led by officers with little previous combat experience.194 On a third level, it lacked a coherent security doctrine and functioning chain of command: the fact that it implemented multiple command changes throughout the course of the conflict,195 and executed its response with little – if any – coordination between the various branches of its security forces, 196 suggests as much. As Paunovski argues, no single strategy for containing the NLA existed.197 The formation of irregular security units only exacerbated this incoherence. The hastily arranged purchase and lease of military hardware, including helicopter gunships, fighter jets, and armored vehicles, and the hiring of foreign military advisors and fighter pilots,198 highlighted a lack of preparedness. The decision to initiate a large-scale program of national conscription and issue assault rifles to the civilian population suggested a sense of desperation on the part of the authorities.199 Similarly, low morale within the military ranks, arising from inexperience, inadequate training and equipment, and ethnic Macedonian soldiers’ distrust of Albanian soldiers and, in particular, officers within the chain of command,200 adversely impacted its ability to defeat the NLA. Many ethnic Macedonian professionals, for example, quit the army to join paramilitary units.201 As such, Macedonia’s armed forces were ill-equipped for battle against a highly mobile, well-armed, experienced, and motivated guerrilla force. What Can We Learn?

While Macedonia made a peaceful transition to independence, the potential for intrasocietal violence remained. Unmet grievances, interethnic mistrust, and regional instability, among other things,

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ensured a climate favorable to conflict. Its ultimate outbreak reversed many of the post-independence gains achieved in the country, and challenged popular assumptions of Macedonia as a preventive success. At the same time, it solidified anti-Western sentiment among ethnic Macedonians. However, for all the complaints that the peace settlement was imposed by outsiders, the Framework Agreement averted civil war and preserved Macedonia’s territorial integrity and multi-ethnicity. Moreover, it transformed armed hostilities into political dialogue and absorbed the grievances that gave rise to it into democratic institutions and processes. And although it essentially legitimated violence, by elevating the status of the Albanian community, and institutionalizing greater political and cultural rights, it helped expedite necessary reforms that strengthened the country’s foundation for long-term peace, and, directly linked to this, placed it on the road to eventual Euro-Atlantic integration. Macedonia returned to normalcy almost immediately, which reflected the relatively low-level nature of the fighting, and the fact that – although certain elements within the NLA may have perceived the conflict in territorial terms – the insurrection, ultimately, was not a struggle for territory. The fact that Macedonia did not relapse into conflict, coupled with Ahmeti’s transformation into a constructive politician championing reconciliation and long-term European integration, suggested that the insurgency had, first and foremost, been a struggle for greater inclusiveness and political authority. Significantly, it also highlighted the stabilizing influence of substantive post-Ohrid EU engagement, which, for the first time, presented the country with a genuine prospect of future membership. In this respect, Macedonia reinforced the growing maturation of EU foreign and security policy, and emphasized the soft power leverage of enlargement. To be sure, the Ohrid agreement, and the new level of European engagement flowing from it, have reduced the potential for violence in Macedonia. The qualitative difference post-Ohrid is that Albanian-Macedonians now lack a motive for armed agitation against the state, on the one hand, and, on the other, the country possesses a genuine incentive of EU membership to strive toward – a long-term perspective that cultivates a common interest in a stable, multiethnic Macedonia. As such, the international community seems to have heeded the lessons of its earlier mistakes, namely, the need to maintain sustained engagement and advocate a long-term approach that targets underlying conflict dynamics, something which the process of EU accession addresses. By strengthening the country’s capacity to withstand negative political,

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economic, social, and regional pressures, and erode the ability of these factors to cultivate violence, this approach, ipso facto, diminishes the possibility for future conflict.

Notes 1

Biljana Vankovska, “Current Perspectives on Macedonia, Part 1: The Path from ‘Oasis of Peace’ to ‘Powder Keg’ of the Balkans,” Heinrich Boll Foundation, http://www.boell.de/downloads/konflikt/vankovska_pt1.pdf (accessed October 6, 2008). 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Macedonia: A Conflict Analysis, October 2003, 8, http://www.sida.se/shared/jsp/ download.jsp?f=SIDA3044en_MacConfAnaWEB.pdf&a=2899 (accessed August 9, 2008). 5 John Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 196. This figure is disputed; some, including Scott Taylor, claim that as much as 30 percent of Macedonia’s territory fell in NLA hands: Scott Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War: The Violent Aftermath of the Kosovo Conflict (Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 2002), 163. 6 International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing No. 20, Macedonia: Still Sliding, July 2001, 2, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/ report_archive/A400369_27072001.pdf (accessed November 24, 2005). 7 International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 109, The Macedonia Question: Reform or Rebellion, April 2001, 2–3, http://www.crisisgroup.org/ library/documents/report_archive/A400268_05042001.pdf (accessed November 25, 2005). 8 Ibid. 9 In an interview with Newsweek, dated March 22, 2001, Ali Ahmeti stated ‘our aim is solely to remove Slav forces from territory which is historically Albanian’: David Binder, “A Troubled Dream,” Newsweek, March 22, 2001, http://www.newsweek.com/id/80016?tid=relatedcl (accessed April 19, 2007). 10 Interview conducted by the author with Vlado Popovski, Bitola, July 27, 2006. 11 Interview conducted by the author with James Pardew, Brussels, July 17, 2006.

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12

Interview conducted by the author with Scott Taylor, Ottawa, March 30,

2006. 13

Henryk J. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 230. 14 International Crisis Group, The Macedonia Question: Reform or Rebellion, 4–5. 15 Ibid., 1–2. 16 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 234. 17 Interview conducted by the author with Slobodan Casule, Skopje, June 29, 2006. 18 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 229. 19 Ibid. 20 According to Ramet, the UCPMB numbered 400: Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia From the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 360. Taylor, conversely, claims it was 1,500-strong: Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 40. 21 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 40. 22 Cindy R. Jebb and P.H. Liotta, Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 38. 23 Mark Laity, Whitehall Paper 68, Preventing War in Macedonia: PreEmptive Diplomacy for the 21st Century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 19. 24 Michael S. Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted: How Macedonia Avoided Civil War, 1990–2001,” in Understanding Civil War (Volume 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions): Evidence and Analysis, eds. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, 246 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005). 25 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 230. 26 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 97. 27 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 231. 28 Vankovska, “Current Perspectives on Macedonia, Part 1.” 29 The National Archives Library, “Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of George W. Bush, 2001” (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), 339. 30 International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 113, Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, June 2001, 3, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/ report_archive/A400318_20062001.pdf (accessed November 26, 2005). 31 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 231. 32 Interviews conducted by the author with Ljuben Paunovski, Demir Hisar, August 5, 2006; and Nikola Dimitrov, Skopje, June 22, 2006. 33 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 94.

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International Crisis Group, The Macedonia Question: Reform or Rebellion, ii. 35 Ibid., 7–8. 36 Ibid. 37 Peter Siani-Davies, “Introduction: International Intervention (and NonIntervention) in the Balkans,” in International Intervention in the Balkans Since 1995, ed. Peter Siani-Davies, 24 (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2003). 38 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 200. 39 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 247. 40 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 92. 41 Ibid., 83. 42 Ibid., 98. 43 Ibid., 99–100. 44 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, 3. 45 Ibid., 4. 46 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 246. 47 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 118–119. 48 Interview conducted by the author with Ismet Ramadani, Skopje, August 3, 2006. 49 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 118–119. 50 Alice Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia: From Preventive Engagement to Peace Implementation,” in International Intervention in the Balkans Since 1995, ed. Siani-Davies, 118. 51 Interview conducted by the author with anonymous United States State Department official, Skopje, July 26, 2006. 52 Interview conducted by the author with Zoran Jolevski, Skopje, August 7, 2006. 53 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, 4. 54 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 232. 55 Interview conducted by the author with anonymous United States State Department official, Skopje, July 28, 2006. 56 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, 12. 57 Eben Friedman, “The Spectre of Territorial Division and the Ohrid Agreement,” European Centre for Minority Issues, ECMI Brief No. 9, July 2003, 3, http://www.ecmi.de/doc/download/brief_9.pdf (accessed June 23, 2006). 58 Ibid. 59 Interview with Ljuben Paunovski.

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60

Friedman, “The Spectre of Territorial Division and the Ohrid Agreement,” 1–2. 61 Jebb and Liotta, Mapping Macedonia, 64. 62 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 122. 63 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, 4. 64 Interview with Zoran Jolevski. 65 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, 1. 66 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 120–121. 67 Ibid. 68 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, 4. 69 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 120–121. 70 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 113. 71 Laity, Preventing War in Macedonia, 25. 72 Interview conducted by the author with Mark Laity, Brussels, July 18, 2006. 73 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 129. 74 Laity, Preventing War in Macedonia, 32–33. 75 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 125. 76 Interview with Nikola Dimitrov. 77 Interview with Mark Laity. 78 Interview with Scott Taylor. 79 Interviews with Nikola Dimitrov; anonymous United States State Department official, July 26, 2006; and Zoran Jolevski. 80 Interview with Nikola Dimitrov. 81 Interview with Mark Laity. 82 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 127. 83 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Still Sliding, 5. 84 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 121. 85 Ibid. 86 It should be noted that under the Macedonian constitution, as with most classical parliamentary systems, the prime minister is often more powerful than the president in political decision-making. During the course of the 2001 crisis, these roles, in effect, were reversed: increasingly disillusioned with his actions, the international community sought to marginalize and bypass Georgievski in favor of Trajkovski, who, de facto, became the more powerful and decisive figure. 87 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, ii. 88 Interview conducted by the author with Richard Gowan, New York City, February 16, 2006. 89 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Still Sliding, 5.

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137

Interview with Ismet Ramadani. International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Still Sliding, 7–8. 92 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 121–122. 93 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 135. 94 Ibid., 137. 95 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 140–141. 96 Human Rights Watch, “Crimes Against Civilians: Abuses by Macedonian Forces in Ljuboten, August 10–12, 2001,” HRW Index No. D1305, September 5, 2001, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/macedonia (accessed March 9, 2007). 97 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 115. 98 Ibid. 99 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 167. 100 Ibid., 199. 101 Proceeding from five basic principles, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (1) unequivocally rejected the use of violence in the pursuit of political aims, (2) emphasized the sovereignty of the Macedonian state and the inviolability of its borders, (3) stressed the importance of preserving, and reflecting in public life, the multiethnic character of Macedonian society, (4) underscored the need for the Macedonian constitution to fully meet the needs of all its citizens, and (5) highlighted the importance of developing local self-government as a vehicle for promoting civic participation and respecting the identity of all communities: Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 237. The full text of the agreement can be found at the Council of Europe: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/police_and_internal_secu rity/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp. 102 Ninety-one legislators voted in favor of the agreement; 19 opposed; and two abstained: Ramet, Balkan Babel, 384. 103 While it did not elevate the Albanian community to constituent nation status, the amendments – by giving primacy to the concept of citizenship – removed the perception of ethnic Macedonians enjoying preferential legal status under the constitution: International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing No. 21, Macedonia: War on Hold, August 2001, 4, http://www.crisisgroup.org/ library/documents/report_archive/A400386_15082001.pdf (accessed November 28, 2005). The constitution now describes the Macedonian state as comprising all citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, which includes the Macedonian people, and Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, and Serbs residing therein: Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 248. 104 Macedonian remains the official language for government sessions and at the international level; however, Albanian may now be spoken in parliament 91

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and parliamentary committees (with concurrent Macedonian translation) – a key Albanian demand since independence; International Crisis Group, Macedonia: War on Hold, 4. 105 Public administration jobs, for example, were reserved for ethnic minorities based on their proportion of the population according to Macedonia’s most recent census: Ibid. 106 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 134. 107 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 113–114. 108 Interview conducted by the author with Erwan Fouere, Skopje, August 4, 2006. 109 Interview conducted by the author with Alexis Brouhns, Brussels, July 17, 2006. 110 Raimo Vayrynen, “Challenges to Preventive Action: The Cases of Kosovo and Macedonia,” in Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? eds. David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, 52–53 (Tokyo and New York, NY: United Nations University Press, 2003). 111 Interview conducted by the author with Burim Sadiku, Skopje, August 7, 2006. 112 Interview conducted by the author with Slobodan Casule, Skopje, July 26, 2006. 113 Interview conducted by the author with anonymous European Union diplomat, Brussels, July 19, 2006. 114 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 238. 115 In the context of its Communist past, political authority in Macedonia was highly centralized. Pre-Ohrid, the purview of municipal governments was extremely limited. Post-Ohrid, local governments have been devolved greater authority in such spheres as infrastructure, education, health care, and fiscal jurisdiction; SwissPeace, Macedonia: Quarterly Risk Assessment, FAST Update: May–July 2004, http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/ user_upload/pdf/FAST/archive/macedonia/Macedonia_Update_2004_3.pdf (accessed October 23, 2005). 116 International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing No. 37, Macedonia: Not Out of the Woods Yet, February 2005, 2, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/ documents/europe/balkans/b037_macedonia_not_out_of_the_woods_yet.pdf (accessed May 3, 2006). 117 SwissPeace, Macedonia: Quarterly Risk Assessment. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Not Out of the Woods Yet, 3–5. 121 Ibid.

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SwissPeace, Macedonia: Quarterly Risk Assessment, FAST Update: August–October 2004, http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/ pdf/FAST/archive/macedonia/Macedonia_Update_2004_4.pdf (accessed October 23, 2005). 123 Jebb and Liotta, Mapping Macedonia, 100. 124 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 178. 125 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Macedonia: A Conflict Analysis, 4. 126 Interview with Alexis Brouhns. 127 Ironically, on the same day, a delegation led by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski was in Dublin to submit Macedonia’s formal application for EU membership. 128 Crvenkovski ultimately succeeded Trajkovski as president in May 2004, with Hari Kostov assuming the role of prime minister vacated by Crvenkovski. Kostov resigned his position in November 2004, and was replaced by then Defense Minister Vlado Buckovski. The latter was defeated by the current incumbent, Nikola Gruevski, in the 2006 general election. 129 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 115. 130 Ibid. 131 Interview conducted by the author with Bernard Segarra, Skopje, August 3, 2006. 132 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 114–115. 133 Ibid., 115. 134 International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 149, Macedonia: No Time for Complacency, October 2003, 32, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/ documents/europe/49_macedonia_no_room_for_complacency.pdf (accessed December 1, 2005). 135 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Macedonia: A Conflict Analysis, 10. 136 Jan J. Andersson, “The European Security Strategy and the Continuing Search for Coherence,” in The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe, eds. Jan J. Andersson and Sven Biscop, 131–132 (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2007). 137 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Macedonia: A Conflict Analysis, 10. 138 The Stabilization and Association Process is the EU’s official framework for Western Balkan integration. At the heart of this process is the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which, once signed, establishes a formal association between Brussels and the signatory country, and strengthens political and economic relations. Based on strict conditionality, it provides

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prospective member states with financial and technical assistance to advance political, economic, and social development: Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, “About the Stability Pact,” http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/ default.asp (accessed February 18, 2007). 139 Andersson, “The European Security Strategy and the Continuing Search for Coherence,” 131–132. 140 Siani-Davies, “Introduction: International Intervention (and NonIntervention) in the Balkans,” 1. 141 Chris Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths About World Affairs (London: Penguin, 2005), 173. 142 Interview with James Pardew. 143 Interview with anonymous European Union diplomat. 144 Interview with Mark Laity. 145 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 112. 146 Interview with James Pardew. 147 Interview with anonymous United States State Department official, July 26, 2006. 148 Interview with anonymous European Union diplomat. 149 Interview with Zoran Jolevski. 150 Interview with James Pardew. 151 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 237–238. 152 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 113. 153 Interview with James Pardew. 154 Ibid. 155 Interview with Nikola Dimitrov. 156 Interview conducted by the author with Ibrahim Mehmeti, Skopje, August 7, 2006. 157 Interview with Nikola Dimitrov. 158 Interview conducted by the author with Biljana Vankovska, Skopje, May 30, 2006. 159 Interview conducted by the author with Ferid Muhic, Skopje, May 31, 2006. 160 Interview with Ibrahim Mehmeti. 161 Interview conducted by the author with Jason Miko, Skopje, June 7, 2006. 162 Interview conducted by the author with Paul Mojzes, Rosemont, Pennsylvania, March 21, 2006. 163 An anonymous State Department official describes Trajkovski thus: ‘Boris Trajkovski was a good man, God bless his soul, but he spent half his meetings explaining what he had meant to say – he never used an interpreter. He

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was a Methodist: he was all about love, this and that, but no politics there. He was very easy to hammer because people quickly learned that he takes the advice of the last person that enters his office. So . . . the internationals would have a meeting with him just before he went to bed. And then he’d cut a decision influenced by his last meeting. He was not a very analytical guy. . . . And he was afraid of Ljupco Georgievski. He was so afraid of Ljupco Georgievski that, in the beginning of his mandate, he called Ljupco boss. The president calling the prime minister boss! And I know that in sessions of the National Security Council he was sometimes told to keep his mouth shut, and to go in the corner and finish his coffee – don’t mingle with the big boys when they play!’; interview with anonymous United States State Department official, July 28, 2006. 164 Interview with Paul Mojzes. 165 Interview with anonymous United States State Department official, July 28, 2006. 166 Interview with James Pardew. 167 Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat, 173. 168 Interview with Mark Laity. 169 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 200. 170 Ackermann, “International Intervention in Macedonia,” 113. 171 Interview with anonymous United States State Department official, July 26, 2006. 172 Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat, 173. 173 Interview conducted by the author with Stevo Pendarovski, Skopje, May 31, 2006. 174 Interviews with James Pardew; and Mark Laity. 175 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 157–158. 176 Ibid., 176. 177 Interview with Scott Taylor. 178 Interview with anonymous United States State Department official, July 26, 2006. 179 Interview conducted by the author with Islam Yusufi, Skopje, May 26, 2006. 180 Ibid. 181 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 176. 182 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Macedonia: A Conflict Analysis, 17–18. 183 Laity, Preventing War in Macedonia, 13. 184 Interview with Stevo Pendarovski, May 31, 2006. 185 Ibid.

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186

Interview with Nikola Dimitrov. Interviews with Ljuben Paunovski and Zoran Jolevski. 188 Interview conducted by the author with Aleksandar Matovski, Skopje, August 4, 2006. 189 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 96–97. 190 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 119. 191 Ibid., 158. 192 Interview with Ljuben Paunovski. 193 Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 99. 194 Ibid., 160. 195 Ibid., 161–162. 196 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 243. 197 Interview with Ljuben Paunovski. 198 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 140–142. 199 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 244. 200 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 99. 201 Ibid., 199. 187

5 Making Sense of Events

As a case study in conflict prevention, Macedonia provides important insights into the origins of intrasocietal conflict and international responses to them. The fact that it fell into violence despite being the subject of a concerted international preventive regime enhances its significance. As outlined in the preceding chapters, Macedonia, upon independence, was confronted with multiple threats to its stability and, indeed, its very existence. Small, economically underdeveloped, and effectively defenseless, the new country was landlocked by larger neighbors – including an aggressive Serbia – who laid historical claim to its territory and identity, and/or who disputed its existence. Internally, a major geographic and cultural fault line ran between its two largest ethnic communities. As such, questions were asked of Macedonia’s viability as an independent entity, and its ability to successfully undertake multiple transitions to statehood, democracy, and a market economy. Against this backdrop, the Macedonian leadership interpreted independence apprehensively, instead supporting a decaying Yugoslav political and economic arrangement that had hitherto provided countervailing security guarantees. In spite of these stresses, conflict failed to materialize, both in the process of Macedonia’s extrication from the Yugoslav federation and during its first decade as an independent state. To many observers, this defied conventional logic. Yet it would be simplistic to attribute the nonviolence to a “miracle.” To the contrary, the initial absence of conflict can be explained by a number of restraining – political, strategic, economic, historical – factors, both internal and external in character, which, by diminishing the incentive for violence, helped preclude confrontation and the outbreak of organized conflict. At the same time, certain (external) threats were never as robust as initially feared or, at least, portrayed. Taken together, these inhibiting factors ensured Macedonia would be the only republic to secede peacefully – at the time – from the Yugoslav morass.

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Given its preventive engagement, the international community received much of the concomitant acclaim, with Macedonia (rightfully) lauded as a rare success story, an example of what can be achieved when outside actors collectively respond to potential hotspots in the preconflict stage. However, while the most immediate threat to Macedonian stability – a spillover of violence from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia – was successfully addressed, underlying, internal sources of conflict remained. Linked to this, external actors’ emphasis on ethnic sources of instability meant that non-ethnic sources, often the most pressing and fundamental, were invariably overlooked. Just as they had originally facilitated nonviolence, several internal and external factors would contribute to the ultimate outbreak of conflict in 2001. Allied to a flawed preventive response on the part of the international community, failure by Macedonian institutions to address core Albanian demands, the organization of society along ethnic lines, a lawless cross-border region, individual interests, and, in particular, unintended consequences stemming from NATO military intervention in Kosovo would lay the foundation for conflict. Escaping Peacefully: The Collapse of Yugoslavia

Macedonia’s orderly departure from the former Yugoslavia and attainment of intrasocietal peace thereafter can be explained by a number of restraining factors that were often absent elsewhere in the region. These served to regulate the actions of potential outside aggressors, provide incentives for nonviolence, promote moderation among local protagonists, and generally strengthen the security of the new country. In particular, the absence of conflict can be attributed to pragmatic leadership, tactical and strategic imperatives, economic considerations, historical factors, and a timely international response, which collectively diminished the likelihood of war. In the first instance, a nonconfrontational, conciliatory republican leadership helped facilitate a smooth withdrawal from the Yugoslav federation. In contrast to the antagonistic postures of many of their contemporaries, particularly Milan Kucan and Franjo Tudjman, as well as Macedonia’s own VMRODPMNE, Vasil Tupurkovski and Kiro Gligorov sought to mediate between the feuding republics in the hope of preserving the south Slav arrangement, albeit in a diluted form. Given that it did not precipitate Yugoslavia’s collapse, the JNA had no reason to attack Macedonia. Once the rejection of its proposal for confederation rendered independence a fait accompli, Gligorov used his experience, and the

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respect he commanded within federal state structures, to negotiate the JNA’s peaceful withdrawal from Macedonian territory. The fact that the JNA had all of its demands met, was given several months to complete its pullout, and was not subjected to attacks by the local populace – unlike in Slovenia and Croatia – contributed to this outcome; in the words of Owen, it was able to leave Macedonia with its dignity intact. 1 For General Mitre Arsovski, then third in command of JNA forces in Macedonia, nonprovocation was a key factor in the army’s peaceful withdrawal.2 According to Gligorov, Blagoje Adzic made it clear during negotiations that the JNA would depart peacefully if not provoked; accordingly, a conscious decision was made on the Macedonian side not to antagonize it.3 While the terms of agreement left Macedonia with virtually no defense capability, Gligorov regarded the withdrawal of what was now a foreign force, and the perceived aggressor elsewhere in the federation, as the key to Macedonian sovereignty. The concomitant military void, therefore, was calculated as a risk worth taking. In any case, he was canny enough to request a symbolic international peacekeeping presence to step into this vacuum, while aware that potential Yugoslav aggression and the historic irredentist ambitions of its neighbors would be restrained by more pressing immediate concerns and strategic considerations. Certainly in hindsight, Gligorov acknowledges that Yugoslavia, at the time, was in no position to incorporate Macedonia through force, and so had little choice but to accept its independence. 4 The fact that Gligorov was held in high esteem in Belgrade, where he had spent most of his professional life, and – as Owen argues – was not viewed with the same suspicion as the neo-fascist Tudjman and perceived Islamist Alija Izetbegovic, was an important factor in this process.5 Indeed, Gligorov had developed a formidable personal network at the federal level, where he had been involved in various functions since the late 1940s. That said, the nonconfrontational posture of the Macedonian leadership may not have been sufficient, in and of itself, to facilitate a peaceful breakaway. Izetbegovic had also played the role of conciliator, having collaborated with Gligorov in lobbying the other republics to preserve Yugoslavia in a confederal structure. Yet Bosnia-Herzegovina plunged into the most violent and protracted of the successor wars. In this regard, an even more important factor in elucidating Macedonia’s peaceful withdrawal from the former Yugoslavia was its ethnic composition. While Serbs have historically perceived the territory of modern-day Macedonia as their own, and the Macedonian nation as an

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artificial entity, Macedonia – unlike Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina – possessed too few Serbs to justify military intervention, or at least military and moral support for any attempt at secession. Moreover, notwithstanding rhetoric from some quarters vis-à-vis the proclamation of a breakaway Serb republic, Macedonian-Serbs, as Gligorov notes, never agitated for secession or autonomy, seeking instead guarantees of political and cultural rights, which any confrontational language was designed to expedite.6 Small, free, and highly urbanized, many of them professionals based in Skopje, and sharing a common culture, language, and religion with the titular nation, Macedonian-Serbs had no desire or incentive to attach to the rump Yugoslavia. It is instructive to note that, once their demands were met, and political representation guaranteed, Macedonian-Serb agitation ceased.7 Unlike their brethren in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonian-Serbs never felt threatened by the state, and so lacked a rationale, and the will, for secession. In this sense, the close cultural and historical links between the Macedonian and Serbian nations are an important consideration. Certainly, Serbs possessed a deeper connection with the ethnic Macedonians, their coreligionists and fellow Slavs with whom they also shared a common history and, for many, a common (Islamic/Albanian) enemy, than they did with the Catholic, Western-oriented Slovenes and Croats, Bosniaks, and Muslim Albanians. Practical considerations likewise militated against Serbian expansionism in Macedonia. In the first instance, any attempt to annex Macedonia by force would have provoked its neighbors, and conceivably reignited the Balkan Wars of the early twentieth century. As such, insofar as its neighbors understood that any attempt to annex its territory would trigger a regional chain reaction, Macedonia’s contested history, ironically, worked to its advantage. In effect, Macedonia constituted a buffer state, which, for peace to prevail in the southern Balkans, could not be touched. Just as importantly, if proceeding from the (contested) premise that Belgrade did indeed seek the annexation of Serb-inhabited lands from neighboring republics, it would have been imprudent, from a military perspective, to open a third front in the south, divergent from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, theaters of far greater historical importance to the Serb nation than Macedonia. Regardless of whether it harbored designs on Macedonia or not, Belgrade lacked the military wherewithal to execute such a plan; note that most of the JNA’s arms and officers from Macedonia were redirected to the Serb war effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina.8 Indeed, war broke out in the latter a mere two weeks after the JNA’s withdrawal from Macedonia.9 In this context,

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argues Arsovski, the JNA simply had no intention to remain in Macedonia.10 Linked to this, Belgrade’s policy toward Macedonia was regulated by international sanctions and the negative image the rump Yugoslavia had acquired in the West. Belgrade was conscious that any military action in Macedonia would solidify its image as the regional aggressor, increase the likelihood of foreign military intervention against it, and generally augment its international pariah status. For Slobodan Milosevic, further international ostracization would have undercut his grip on power; in this respect, it is instructive to note that, under the strain of economic sanctions, he made a concerted effort to portray himself as international statesman and peacemaker at Dayton. Economic imperatives had a vital restraining effect, as it was clearly in Belgrade’s economic interest for an independent Macedonia, one which, free of international sanctions, could be used to circumvent a punitive sanctions regime. Slobodan Casule notes how Macedonia smuggled oil, food, and medical supplies to Serbia and re-exported its copper and crude during this period.11 Put simply, sanctions-busting along the common border meant Macedonia was sine qua non to Yugoslavia’s economic survival, as Yugoslavia was to Macedonia’s. If a Greater Serbia project did exist at the highest levels of government, and was not merely a fabrication of Serbia’s detractors or the hollow rhetoric of ultranationalists, Macedonia was incompatible with such a plan. Belgrade lacked the motive and means, as well as the will, to undertake direct or indirect military intervention for expansionist purposes against its southern neighbor. Notwithstanding the rhetoric from extremist Serb circles and its nonrecognition of the Macedonian state, church, and common border, a position partly borne of deference to its sole EU and NATO ally Greece, the military threat from Yugoslavia was minimal, if not non-existent. In many respects, it was largely overplayed by Skopje for foreign audiences as a means of internationalizing its situation and triggering an international response. It is interesting to note that Arsovski, who went on to become the Macedonian army’s first chief of general staff, was dismissed by Gligorov for questioning the value of preventive peacekeepers on the Yugoslav border on the basis that a military threat from Belgrade did not exist.12 In spite of rumors that Milosevic had proposed its partition to his Greek and Bulgarian counterparts, Macedonia never figured highly in the tactical and strategic considerations of Belgrade – a fact that, above all else, helps explain the peaceful withdrawal of the JNA from its

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territory. The military emphasis was very much on Serb-inhabited lands in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbs had lived for centuries, and for which Serbia had undertaken enormous human sacrifice during World War I to unite in a single state, on the one hand, and maintaining sovereignty in Kosovo, the historic and cultural heartland of the Serbian nation, on the other. This is not to say that Serbia was not frustrated and disappointed with Macedonia’s decision to depart the federation; indeed, Gligorov notes it was interpreted as an act of betrayal by the Serbian elite.13 As Gligorov recounts from his meetings with Milosevic, Borisav Jovic, the Serb representative to the federal presidency, and Vladislav Jovanovic, then Serbian foreign minister, held in Ohrid following Macedonia’s referendum on independence, Belgrade disapproved of Skopje’s decision to pursue statehood.14 Jovic, for instance, questioned why Macedonia would wish to depart the federation: Kiro, you have surprised us. We did everything together. We fought for you. We liberated you from the Turks. Why do you want your own country? What’s wrong with Yugoslavia? You have everything with us.15

Ultimately, Macedonia, together with ethnically homogeneous Slovenia, was always considered expendable. In any case, Milosevic calculated that an independent Macedonia was simply not feasible, and, under the weight of double sanctions, internal pressures, and a weak national identity, allied to an ex-Communist leadership and people that gravitated toward it, would return to a new Yugoslav federation at its own volition. As Gligorov recalls, Milosevic doubted Macedonia’s viability, asking, in one meeting, ‘where’s your army? Who’s seen a country without an army? Who will guard your borders? All of your neighbors will try to destabilize you. Only we can protect you. You will ask us to return. But it will be too late – we won’t return.’16 This policy of inaction, accordingly, rendered military action superfluous. As Owen explains, Milosevic was totally convinced that, ultimately, Macedonia and Serbia would come together, that their interests were so strongly linked and that this was just a matter of time. Therefore, deal with other more pressing problems, don’t pick fights, Gligorov is a man you can do business with. Ultimately, the history of this region was going to be that Macedonia would link back with Serbia. And he [Milosevic] wanted it. Therefore, why do anything to alienate them?17

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From Belgrade’s perspective, Macedonia, even if it survived as an independent entity, given its links and economic dependency on Serbia and absence of other natural allies, could, at the very minimum, be transformed into a quasi-independent, puppet state of Serbia’s that could be influenced and manipulated for Belgrade’s own ends. For instance, Stevo Pendarovski describes how Serbia maintained an extensive informant network in post-Yugoslav Macedonia – including within its security and intelligence services – based around former JNA officers of Serb origin who had settled in the country.18 Certainly, Belgrade assumed it could prolong its influence in Macedonia, whether in federal union or otherwise. The unpredictability of Milosevic cannot be denied: Serbian expansionism in Macedonia may very well have been on his agenda had Belgrade not suffered setbacks on the northern fronts. As Owen explains, Milosevic ‘never lacked for ideas. He had a fertile brain, quite a good brain actually. . . . It’s certainly compatible with the way he thought.’19 While this is now almost impossible to verify, such a course of action – based on the discussions conducted by the author with some of the most prominent local and international actors directly involved in the events of the time – was extremely unlikely. For instance, Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, who succeeded Cyrus Vance as UN special representative, recall how Milosevic never hinted at any military moves in Macedonia during the various negotiations they held with the Serb leader in their capacity as ICFY co-chairmen.20 Put simply, military intervention in Macedonia for the purposes of expansionism would have been risking too much for too little. The potential losses and the possibility of igniting a wider regional war would have far exceeded the gain of a poor, landlocked, multiethnic country. In the event, by the time a regrouped Croatian military reclaimed Serb-held lands and the Dayton Accords brought the fighting in BosniaHerzegovina to an end, the Greater Serbia idea, if it ever existed, was neutralized. Any territorial pretensions Belgrade may have harbored toward Macedonia disappeared with it. Moreover, it was no longer in Macedonia’s interest to rejoin Yugoslavia: where the latter was now militarily exhausted, economically weak, and internationally isolated, the former had slowly learnt to stand on its own two feet, having made the transition to democratic statehood, attained international recognition, albeit largely under its provisional name, normalized relations with Bulgaria and Albania, and moved toward rapprochement with Greece. Relations between Yugoslavia and Macedonia similarly normalized, the countries establishing full diplomatic relations and a commission to

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manage border demarcation in 1996. The border was defined in February 2001, following Milosevic’s ouster and the accession of Vojislav Kostunica, which heralded more frequent high-level dialogue between Belgrade and Skopje, though relations remained tense due to the disputed status of the Macedonian church.21 Nevertheless, Serbia was too preoccupied with its own rehabilitation, and, post-Milosevic and -Kosovo, grappling with its long-term identity, to be in a position to exert any sort of influence in Macedonia. The greatest external threat to Macedonia’s stability and territorial integrity came not from Serbian attempts at annexation, but from a spillover of conflict from Kosovo. Indeed, the only realistic scenario in which Yugoslav military intervention may have occurred was in the event of a Kosovar-Albanian uprising spreading into Albanian-inhabited territory in northwestern Macedonia. The pacifism of Kosovar-Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova, however, allied to a strong Yugoslav military presence, ensured an uneasy peace in the province. As such, the absence of armed conflict in Kosovo is central to understanding the nonviolence in Macedonia during this transition period. For Skopje, the potential outbreak of conflict in Kosovo – both as a catalyst to Yugoslav military intervention and secessionist spur for Albanian-Macedonians – constituted the greatest immediate external threat to the country’s security. In this sense, Macedonia, particularly in the context of Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis, which was enthusiastically embraced throughout the Balkans, represented a natural ally for Yugoslavia – belonging to a common civilization and sharing a common enemy – against the putative expansion of Islamic fundamentalism. The Remaining Wolves: Waiting to Pounce?

The (uneasy) peace in Kosovo did not completely allay Macedonian fears vis-à-vis the intentions of its other contiguous neighbors. Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia, of course, had been portrayed as the Four Wolves at tiny Macedonia’s doorstep. Yet despite historic irredentist ambitions and objections to the existence of a Macedonian state and/or nation, various constraining factors and diminishing incentives rendered the threat to Macedonia’s territorial integrity from these sources negligible. Over and above lacking the military means, Bulgaria was too preoccupied with more pressing internal concerns, that is to say, undertaking the transition to multiparty democracy and a market economy, on the one hand, and long-term foreign policy objectives, namely, aligning with the West and ultimately acceding into NATO and

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the EU, on the other, to realistically entertain the notion of recovering “lost” Bulgarian land. In effect, Bulgaria opted for Euro-Atlantic integration over historical revanchism.22 Instead, Sofia used soft power to entice Macedonia and its people eastward, as highlighted by its immediate recognition of the state, and its provision of economic assistance thereafter. In this sense, the establishment of Bulgarian hegemony was perceived as the next best alternative. While its emotional attachment toward Macedonia cannot be understated, Bulgaria, as Trajan Gocevski notes, posed no military threat to the new country.23 Albania, even more so than Bulgaria, was too weak and occupied with charting a post-Communist course, and, indeed, with ensuring its very political and economic survival, to be in a position to assert pressure on the Macedonian government vis-à-vis the status of Albanian-Macedonians, or provide their brethren with substantive moral or other support, including in any attempt at secession, let alone plot the unification of Albanian-inhabited lands in the region. The most insulated and draconian Communist country in Europe under Enver Hoxha, Albania was experiencing great upheaval. As Gocevski points out, the only threat Albania posed to Macedonia was in terms of its porous border, which it lacked the capacity to guard, and a potential spillover of criminality and general post-Communist chaos.24 Though expressing concerns over the status of Albanian-Macedonians, Sali Berisha reiterated to Gligorov on several occasions Albania’s respect for Macedonia’s borders and territorial integrity.25 Tirana may very well have harbored dreams of Greater Albania, as the Macedonian elite from the time – including Gligorov26 – suspected. This was an historic goal for the Albanian nation, just as the unification of lands overlapping state borders has been the historic goal of most nations on the Balkan Peninsula. Yet Tirana understood the impracticality and futility of such a concept. Just as fundamentally, it understood that the international community would not accept Albanian territorial expansion. In the first half of 1992, the United States stressed to the leaders of the three principal Albanian communities in the region that, while it supported the claims of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia for political and cultural rights, it would not tolerate Albanian unification.27 In any case, Albania, the poorest country in Europe at the time, lacked the capacity for absorption, assuming that Albanian-Macedonians – more prosperous than their brethren in the motherland and in Kosovo – desired unification in the first place. As opposed to the use of force and redrawing of borders, Tirana advocated the unification of Albanian-

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inhabited lands through the process of peaceful, long-term European integration. As Ismet Ramadani argues, I do not deny that some extremists believe in that. However, intelligent people know that if Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia are to be part of Europe, we Albanians will be together, as borders will become informal. The same applies for Macedonians. . . . Why would we be so naïve to open conflict with Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece for a Greater Albania? We, as politicians, would be so naïve to open four or five fronts to realize a classical, nineteenth century idea, when we have an alternative in the form of the EU?28

Greece, meanwhile, though directly undermining its transition to independence and de-legitimating its existence, never posed a military threat to Macedonia – Athens’ actions ultimately constrained by its membership of the EU and NATO, as well as its alliance with the United States.29 The opportunities Macedonia offered Greek business, coupled with international pressure, diminished Athens’ incentive for maintaining a trade embargo. Gligorov notes that Greek willingness to open negotiations with Macedonia was partly borne of pressures applied on Athens by Greek business, which lobbied the government to reconsider sanctions.30 This pragmatism ultimately produced a provisional resolution and a steady détente in bilateral relations. While Macedonia’s insecurity was understandable given its contested past, fears of external military intervention proved unfounded, the posture of the “Four Wolves” ultimately restrained by more important short- and long-term policy considerations and pragmatic interests. With the exception of the Greek embargo and continuing instability in Kosovo, the greatest threats confronting the new country were internal in character. Defusing Intrasocietal Tensions Post-Independence

Though the threat of outside military intervention was minimal, Macedonia was still confronted with formidable internal threats. Key conditions for internal conflict – economic hardship, a weak rule of law, intergroup tensions, a large, geographically concentrated ethnic minority disenfranchised with the state – were present. As with its departure from the Yugoslav federation, a number of endogenous and exogenous factors contained the potency of these threats. While the international response received much of the attention, several (more) important local factors were also at play. Indeed, in their absence, international intervention, per

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se, may have been insufficient to produce peace. In other words, domestic conditions and actors created a basis for third party agents to succeed in their preventive endeavors. First and foremost, the Macedonian state, unlike Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, exercised control over its entire territory. This facilitated a monopoly on the means to violence, and so weakened attempts to establish separatist institutions and/or paramilitary structures.31 Second, and closely related to the first point, no powerful outside country existed that could support and sustain a rebellion inside Macedonia, as the Serbs had done in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Third, aware that the country’s unity – in the context of its inherent weakness and demographics – hinged largely on accommodating ethnic minority demands, a pragmatic, moderate, and nonconfrontational postCommunist leadership committed itself to dialogue and political power sharing, thus depriving minorities of a motive for rebellion. Though certain policies were injudicious and shortsighted, particularly the decision to define the Macedonian state along ethnic lines in the constitutional preamble and the under-representation of Albanians in state organs, the government’s guarantee of political and cultural rights at independence, and general willingness to accommodate minority demands, helped legitimate – partly, at least, in the case of the Albanians – the new state, so reducing the incentive for violence. The creation of inclusive political institutions, including the incorporation of Albanian parties into coalition government, represented a tangible expression of ethnic Macedonians’ willingness to compromise and share power. While the evolving democratic system was certainly not beyond flaw, quasirepresentative institutions helped defuse tensions by enabling political participation and providing a channel for the nonviolent resolution of grievances.32 With representation in parliament and government, including the allocation of cabinet positions and ministerial portfolios, Albanian-Macedonians had a platform from which to promote their demands and influence public policy.33 In eschewing extreme nationalism and seeking to integrate ethnic minorities, the Macedonian government, contrary to elsewhere in the region, undercut radicals, depriving them of a political niche. Likewise, though certain hard-line elements within the Albanian-Macedonian community espoused a militant rhetoric and advocated secession, its political representatives discouraged it, instead pursuing compromise with the ethnic Macedonians. As such, a quality leadership, across both communities, that placed the political emphasis on moderation, dialogue, and

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compromise, allied to democratic institutions, pushed Macedonia in a nonviolent direction. Gligorov: The Fox as a Factor in Peace

The presence of Gligorov is particularly important in trying to make sense of Macedonia’s orderly separation from Yugoslavia and subsequent nonviolence. His experience and personal connections in Belgrade gave him an authority and respect that many of his contemporaries in the former Yugoslavia lacked.34 Having spent most of his professional life in Belgrade, Gligorov had a valuable sense of how the likes of Milosevic thought and operated. For the esteemed Macedonian journalist Sasho Ordanoski, Gligorov, in terms of understanding regional processes, ‘was a master of the game, equal and probably better than Milosevic. . . . Whenever a window was opened in Istanbul and a door in Belgrade, Gligorov would feel the draft. He understood the regional processes – politics, personalities, methodology – better than anybody else.’35 Post-independence, Gligorov, as president and, in effect, Macedonian father-figure, preserved the peace by refusing to deviate from his antinationalist instincts, and consciously eschewing the crude nationalism promulgated by the likes of Milosevic and Tudjman to develop and solidify his political power base. A liberal economic reformer in his previous ideological guise, Gligorov reincarnated himself as a democrat upon Communism’s collapse. Emphasizing the importance of equal access to the country’s political system for all Macedonians, he sought to accommodate difference, as embodied by Albanian representation in government, a principle he introduced. More than anything, Gligorov was a realist: just as he recognized that premature Slovenian and Croatian secession would ignite largescale war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he understood that Yugoslavia’s collapse would endanger Macedonia. Yet he was conscious that an outbreak of violence was not a fait accompli, and could be precluded if the transition to statehood was managed in a sensible manner. The subsequent moderation and enthusiasm for international engagement was borne of this conviction. According to Stoltenberg, Gligorov interpreted international intervention as a possibility, not a threat. 36 Owen and Geert Ahrens note that Gligorov was the most cooperative of all former republican leaders toward ICFY.37 Gligorov, mindful of Macedonia’s limitations, on the one hand, while acknowledging, and learning from, the mistakes of his fellow south Slav leaders, on the

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other, was pragmatic and conciliatory where so many of his contemporaries were reckless and bellicose. For Owen, Gligorov, above all else, was practical, which made him The complete antithesis to everybody else, except perhaps Milosevic. Gligorov was completely different in personality from all these other people. . . . Tudjman: deep-seated nationalist; Izetbegovic: nationalist; Milosevic was not a nationalist, but used nationalism. . . . So Gligorov bided his time, made friends with people, talked to everyone, totally distanced himself from Belgrade, but remained in good relations.38

Marshall Harris, one of the famous four State Department dissidents who resigned their positions in protest at Washington’s lackadaisical response to Bosnia-Herzegovina, hypothesizes what might have been had a leader of Gligorov’s ilk held the reigns of power in Belgrade, positing that Yugoslavia’s dissolution might have been managed in a peaceful manner in such an event.39 Certainly, Gligorov was one of the few Yugoslav leaders to emerge from the federation’s collapse with their honor and credibility not only intact, but also enhanced, as his nomination for the Nobel peace prize in 1996 attests.40 Abiodun Williams describes Gligorov as ‘an extraordinary man. . . . He was a real statesman.’ 41 Stoltenberg portrays Gligorov as a “brilliant” man and president; contrasting him with his fellow republican leaders, Stoltenberg notes that Gligorov Worked for the interests of the Macedonian people, and not for himself. . . . The difference was that I was never quite confident that they generally wanted an agreed peace, because they were personally, economically involved in the war. And to stop a war would mean loss of funds for them personally, and their families.42

Gligorov, of course, was not without his faults. Politically, he was a product of the Yugoslav system. Ordanoski describes him as the ‘worst possible democrat.’43 From a nationalist perspective, his conviction that a Yugoslav arrangement, in whatever diluted form, still had a future when such a concept had clearly lost all viability leaves him open to criticism. Supporting an idea that had lost all legitimacy meant time and resources that could have been devoted to the cause of Macedonian independence were squandered. Casule accuses Gligorov of being proSerb and, through sanctions-busting, abetting the Serb war effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina.44 For Ramadani, Gligorov was too rigid in his attitudes toward Albanian-Macedonians, and never made a genuine

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attempt to establish an honest relationship with them.45 Pendarovski and Vlado Popovski posit that instances of heavy-handedness toward Albanian dissent were instinctive reflexes of a Belgrade-educated and raised ex-Communist who, although politically reformed, had retained a Communist, anti-Albanian mentality.46 For Gligorov, however, while ensuring equal representation for all communities was fundamental to internal stability, this was a vision that could be brought about only through an incremental approach, one that required the reversal of obstacles and mindsets entrenched since Yugoslav times. Developing effective, legitimate institutions in a new, multiethnic state is a longterm process. In his words, ‘I did what I thought was necessary to help the Albanians. . . . We had a dialogue and understanding.’47 In short, Gligorov, trapped between the demands of ethnic Macedonian nationalists, on one side, and the competing demands of the Albanians, on another, sought to steer a middle way, or the creation of a hybrid national-civic state that guaranteed equal political rights, but also recognized the ascendancy of the Macedonian nation. In the final analysis, it was to Gligorov’s great credit that he was willing to imperil his political reputation, certainly among nationalist hardliners, for the immediate and future well-being of his country. The role of Gligorov in Macedonia’s peaceful departure from the Yugoslav federation, and subsequent transition to independence, in spite of the myriad threats, cannot be denied – he was a statesman of the highest class who adeptly guided Macedonia to statehood.48 Many outside observers feared that Macedonia’s post-independence political progress would be reversed with Gligorov’s assumed incapacitation following the failed attempt on his life in October 1995. He not only managed to survive the assassination, which killed his driver, but – in spite of his age and the injuries sustained, including the lodging of three pieces of shrapnel in his head, one of which penetrated his skull and entered his brain, and the loss of one eye49 – made a full return to the presidency. Undeniably, mistakes were made. Owen notes that Gligorov could have shown more understanding toward Albanian-Macedonians; yet, he argues, You have to be realistic. Gligorov was not a modern man. He was not a complete clean sweep – he was a continuation of the existing leadership. That element of continuing was one of the things that gave Macedonia the stability to survive and not have these problems. But it had its downside. It was not a go-getting, radical, innovative, modern government.50

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In a period of great uncertainty, the overriding objective was to ensure nonviolence and Macedonia’s very survival, which Gligorov achieved. It cannot be denied that Macedonia, during this period, indirectly contributed to the Serb war effort in the north through sanctions-busting. Yet this constituted a means of survival, and thus a necessary evil. As the father of the modern Macedonian state, Gligorov will go down as a historic figure. As Ahrens puts it, ‘at that historical moment, when he was needed, he was there. I could not think of any other Macedonian politician at that time who might have been able to resolve this crisis.’51 Other Restraining Factors

The absence of a history of organized violence between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians provides additional meaning to the initial peace.52 While the two communities historically existed parallel to each other, and, at times, enjoyed tense relations, they had nevertheless coexisted peacefully for centuries, and had never engaged in sustained warfare against one another. This stood in contrast to the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims during the course of World War II, for example. As such, negative historical legacies could not be manipulated by individuals – politicians or otherwise – to mobilize popular opinion in pursuit of a nationalist cause. The lack of physical contact between the two communities, with the exception of major multiethnic cities such as Skopje, also helped strengthen the peace. Though it exacerbated the sense of mutual mistrust, and would thus have negative long-term implications, the fact that they pursued largely separate lives diminished the likelihood of intergroup violence. It should likewise be noted that ethnic Albanians had never enjoyed a tradition of territorial autonomy in Macedonia, unlike Kosovar-Albanians and Croatian-Serbs. In the case of these communities, anything less than autonomy in the post-Yugoslav space would provoke war; in the case of Macedonia, Albanians, in the absence of such history, were always willing to settle for less. Though generally overlooked, a relatively weak Macedonian national consciousness, particularly in the context of its contested character and late development, also contributed to post-Yugoslav stability. Juxtaposed with other nationalisms in the region, it was probably the weakest. Accordingly, at independence, ethnic Macedonians chose peace and moderation over conflict and extreme nationalism. Importantly, this weakened the influence of radical parties. The rejection of VMRO-DPMNE, along with its more confrontational

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approach toward the Albanian community, in the presidential and parliamentary elections of October 1994 illustrates this point.53 By reelecting the moderate SDSM, the ethnic Macedonian people affirmed the non-nationalist course the country had commenced at independence.54 And when VMRO-DPMNE finally attained power in 1998, it did so based on a campaign to attract FDI and enhance economic stability, as opposed to a xenophobic, nationalist agenda. 55 Nationalism, in the words of Nicholas Whyte, former Europe Program director at the International Crisis Group, has consistently proven a voteloser in Macedonia, making it unique in the Balkans.56 It is instructive to note that the Macedonian electorate’s trend of rejecting nationalism at the polls continued in the immediate aftermath of 2001: in the following year’s election, those parties proposing a nationalist agenda were soundly defeated. Similarly, in the general elections of 2006 and 2008, the right of center VMRO-DPMNE won on a platform of fighting corruption, attaining economic growth, and proceeding with European integration. To the extent that they helped militate against secession, immediate Albanian political and economic interests are likewise crucial in understanding the initial absence of conflict. Politically, AlbanianMacedonians enjoyed equal rights as ethnic Macedonians, while, economically, they were more prosperous than their brethren in Kosovo and Albania. As such, they possessed the means and the institutional framework to advance their political and economic interests, so diminishing the attractiveness of a putative Greater Albania. Notwithstanding the fears of ethnic Macedonians, this idea never held significant resonance for the majority of Albanian-Macedonians, who were more interested in attaining greater collective rights and economic security as citizens of Macedonia than unification. In the first instance, as outlined elsewhere, in practical terms, a Greater Albania was never feasible; certainly, the international community would not countenance the redrawing of borders, which would establish a dangerous precedent, and the creation of an impoverished, unstable nation-state at the heart of the Balkans that would alter the regional balance of power. Any attempt at Albanian territorial expansion would, by definition, have necessitated the use of force, and so would have ignited another regional war. With a formidable Yugoslav military and police presence in Kosovo, and a destitute motherland struggling for mere survival, this concept represented nothing but a fantasy for those who seriously entertained it. Concurrent to this, its elite understood that Albanian-Macedonians would be peripheral figures in any such hypothetical entity, with

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political power concentrated in Tirana and/or Pristina.57 In diluting the political and economic base of Albanian-Macedonians, unification would have upset entrenched interests and hierarchies, and, as such, represented an important disincentive to secession. Indeed, it was in Albanian-Macedonians’ political and economic interest to remain part of Macedonia, and seek advancement of their rights and interests through the established institutional framework therein. The breakaway of Albanian-inhabited lands in west and northwestern Macedonia never represented a realistic scenario, both because the international community would never allow it, on the one hand, and, more fundamentally, because the majority of Albanian-Macedonians – out of pragmatism and self-interest – had important reason not to support the concept, on the other. Ferid Muhic contends that AlbanianMacedonians, ‘even given a free choice to become part of Albania, would strongly resist.’ 58 Ramadani likewise posits that the Albanian community in Macedonia opposes the redrawing of borders, noting that it explicitly denounced the idea emanating from certain (ethnic Macedonian) corners during the 2001 crisis to partition the country. 59 For Albanian-Macedonians, it was more desirable to remain within a state where they could fulfill their political and economic ambitions, and where they had lived for generations, than being marginal members of a new ethnic-based entity. As Burim Sadiku argues, We do not believe in that. . . . We are quite fine here. We just wanted our rights, and to be treated as normal citizens. . . . If we wanted to split, we would have done it by now. . . . I don’t believe in this concept. What I believe, as a young Albanian, as a 28-year old Albanian who lives here in Macedonia, I believe in a concept where all the ethnic Albanians, wherever they live, in Kosovo, Albania, Montenegro, Greece or here, to be in a good economic situation, to have good welfare, to have the right to do business, to have the right to be in the state, to have the right to be the president. Why not? This is what I believe in.60

The fact that the three cross-border communities diverged in their historical experiences, as well as in important clan, ethnic, and ideological respects, posed another roadblock to unification. While invariably portrayed as a monolithic entity, those who speak of Greater Albania tend to overlook important internal divisions and competing interests between the different centers of power. In the estimation of Ordanoski, the creation of a Greater Albania would produce civil war.61 Likewise, Gocevski notes the tensions between Albanian-Macedonians

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and more recent arrivals from Kosovo, who have tended to be more radical in their outlook and demands.62 Of course, this is not to deny that the unification of geographically compact lands separated by state boundaries represented a historic dream for the Albanians, just as it did for most other Balkan nations, including the Macedonians. In certain political and intellectual circles, Albanian unification has always been a popular idea. Reality and self-interest, however, simply dictated otherwise, hence why a so-called “Greater Albania” – or, for that matter, a Greater Macedonia or Greater Bulgaria or Greater Croatia – always lacked foundation. It represented a subjective, anachronistic idea, as opposed to a concrete political option, a fact the majority of people in the region, barring the most militant elements, accepted a long time ago. In the words of Ramadani, territorial expansion represents ‘obsolete politics.’63 The presence of multiple economic safety valves, by providing auxiliary sources of income and helping offset – at least, to an extent – the adverse impact of double sanctions and economic privatization, shed further light on Macedonia’s peaceful transition to independence.64 In particular, large-scale sanctions-busting along the Yugoslav border reduced the risk of economic implosion and concomitant violence. Ethnic Albanians were especially insulated from this shock; having dominated state industries in the Communist era, it was ethnic Macedonians who felt the brunt of the privatization process. Linked to this, given their exclusion from state structures, Albanian-Macedonians had developed entrepreneurial skills and a flourishing shadow economy that they were able to fall back on at independence. Alongside crossborder smuggling networks, remittances from abroad also helped mitigate the impact of economic hardship, and its ability to provoke intergroup violence. Another important factor, ironically, was the political impasse in Kosovo, which served to occupy the focus of the influential and politically active Albanian Diaspora,65 particularly in western Europe and the United States. As such, most of the diaspora’s time, resources, and lobbying efforts were directed at Kosovo, as opposed to any perceived political struggle by their fellow Albanians in Macedonia. Put simply, with Albanian-Macedonians generally lacking a motive for rebellion, the state maintaining control over its designated territory, an absence of outside patrons to initiate and support local unrest, diaspora attention focused elsewhere, and Kosovo heavily militarized through a formidable Yugoslav security presence, allied to strong international engagement, the conditions for conflict did not exist. In the

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context of these inhibiting factors, the incentives and clash of interests were simply too low to provoke intrasocietal violence at this particular point in Macedonia’s history. The International Response: Solidifying a Weak State

In spite of these restraining factors, Macedonia remained fragile. In this regard, the international community played an important function. While it did not necessarily make the difference between war and peace – indeed, conflict dynamics were largely regulated by the local protagonists themselves through various political arrangements and economic interests – a timely and multifaceted external response reinforced the equilibrium achieved by domestic and regional conflict inhibitors.66 The international community, through its presence and actions, was a vital stabilizing factor in Macedonia during this particular historical moment. First and foremost, its engagement legitimated Macedonia’s existence and territorial integrity, and, by extension, helped deter outside military aggression. In providing implicit security guarantees, it propped up a weak, contested state. Second, given that its response was initiated in the pre-conflict stage, it enabled third parties to target conflict dynamics while they remained amenable to outside intervention, and before they could assume an intractable character. For critics, Macedonia represented an easy challenge, one that required only a modest response. In some respects, the extent of the initial international response has been overstated. Relative to elsewhere, international engagement in the country was minimal; the civilian components of the OSCE and UNPREDEP, for instance, were severely under-resourced. Harris describes the international response as being of ‘the lowest common denominator.’67 Nevertheless, the point remains that preventive action was taken – that potential conflict scenarios were identified in the incipient stage and necessary action was taken – which proved sufficient to preclude overt violence at the time and the need for a larger, more expensive commitment in future. Indeed, this is the ultimate essence of prevention: deploy 1,000 troops now rather than 50,000 later. The fact that UN peacekeepers were active in Macedonia only two months after Skopje’s formal request reflected international concerns that conflict was a realistic possibility, the outbreak of which would be difficult to contain. Given the cumbersome manner in which the Security Council is wont to operate, and the numerous obstacles that exist to the operationalization of peacekeeping missions, this was no

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mean feat. While the prompt deployment was facilitated by Macedonia itself, which, by directly requesting blue helmets, ensured important normative constraints were overcome,68 political will on the part of external actors was still crucial. Linked to this, a guilty conscience on the part of the international community may also have influenced its pro-activeness in Macedonia; note that the UN and United States had rejected Izetbegovic’s request in December 1991 – several months prior to the commencement of war – for preventive peacekeepers to be deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the grounds that the UN did not recognize such a concept, that, in effect, peacekeepers could be deployed only after the outbreak and/or cessation of hostilities, and not before.69 In this sense, Macedonia offered the UN a chance to restore credibility to its peacekeeping operations after the Bosnian failure. Stoltenberg notes that the international community was desperate to avoid another Balkan failure, hence the enthusiasm for preventive action in Macedonia.70 The fact that the international community was already engaged in the region, and had seemingly heeded earlier lessons, also proved favorable to an early response. In the context of its small size and the ability to redeploy peacekeepers from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, UNPREDEP – as the centerpiece of the initial preventive engagement – was operationalized quickly and seamlessly. At the same time, the international community’s on-the-ground presence was an important moderating influence, helping solidify internal stability by strengthening moderate political elements, promoting and facilitating interethnic dialogue, maintaining pressure on government, defusing latent tensions, and generally providing an important early warning function. In addition to its timeliness, the international response was significant for the innovative nature of many of the instruments applied. This originality was underscored by the deployment of preventive peacekeepers, which represented a major departure from traditional UN peacekeeping principles. The mission was significant on multiple levels. First, it legitimated Macedonia’s disputed existence as an independent state. Second, it internationalized Macedonia’s situation, infusing it with an exposure it may have otherwise lacked. Third, it contributed to a climate conducive to mediation, and so strengthened all other preventive initiatives.71 Though small in number and adhering to a strictly preventive mandate, UNPREDEP, through its presence, served a critical deterrent function. By establishing a trip-wire against outside military intervention, it strengthened Macedonia’s borders, buttressing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country with a negligible

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military capability. In the context of the American troop contribution, it also implied a punitive military response in the event of outside aggression, so further diminishing the prospect of Yugoslav intervention. In the absence of a recognized international border, UNPREDEP’s presence, de facto, defined the contested MacedoniaYugoslavia border.72 Further, by allowing it, in effect, to outsource its external security, UNPREDEP gave Skopje valuable breathing space to carry out the process of state-building. From a psychological perspective, the value of the international peacekeeping presence cannot be denied. To be sure, the mission’s strength lay not in its size and military power, but, conversely, in its very presence.73 While the threat of Yugoslav military intervention was minimal, the international community’s decision to utilize this instrument, given the volatility and insecurity of the time, was an eminently sensible one. Whether it was deployed as a face-saving measure in light of peacekeeping failures elsewhere, or simply because Macedonia represented less of a challenge, is immaterial – UNPREDEP was an important stabilizing force, contributing, through its presence and multiple functions, to Macedonia’s internal and external stability. As a confidence-building mechanism, UNPREDEP, along with ICFY and the OSCE more generally, provided important reassurance to the Macedonian state and people in a period of great uncertainty. The Oasis of Peace, Continued

Despite undertaking a peaceful transition to independent statehood, and the signing of the Dayton Accords seemingly bringing the Yugoslav wars of succession to an end, Macedonia continued to be confronted with various sources of instability and potential conflict. However, with most of the restraining factors that had facilitated the initial nonviolence remaining constant, conflict never materialized. Moderation continued to define the local political landscape, even with the 1998 election into government of the more confrontational VMRO-DPME and DPA. Notwithstanding (continuing) high levels of corruption, the new governing coalition eschewed radical rhetoric that could inflame interethnic tensions, and achieved substantive progress in the advancement of Albanian-Macedonian rights. Rather ironically given its nationalist origins, VMRO-DPMNE arguably made greater progress in this respect than the ex-Communist SDSM. Just like its predecessor, VMRO-DPMNE had little choice but to moderate its nationalist instincts and appease its Albanian coalition partner lest it disturb the fragile status

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quo. Indeed, it had swept to power running not on a nationalist platform, but on an economic one.74 Albanian-Macedonian leaders, within both the PDP and DPA, also defused tensions through public statements urging restraint during various post-independence flashpoints. 75 Similarly, the retirement in 1999 of Gligorov failed to destabilize the country, reflecting – just as the unlikely alliance between the VMRODPMNE and DPA – a maturation of the country’s political institutions. While less charismatic and influential as the veteran “fox of the Balkans,” Gligorov’s successor, Boris Trajkovski, maintained the postYugoslav policy of political accommodation and interethnic reconciliation. Though Macedonian democracy was imperfect and still evolving, and Albanians remained under-represented in state organs, political power sharing and participatory institutions, allied to significant cultural freedoms and relative economic prosperity, continued to provide incentives for nonviolence. The immediate political and economic interests of the Albanian community continued to temper secessionist desires, and generally provide a disincentive to revolt. For the AlbanianMacedonian political elite, in particular, political office – and all the concomitant interests this entailed and helped advance – meant they had little reason to agitate for rebellion. Even with the putative liberation of Kosovo from Serb rule in 1999, which emboldened the vision of a Greater Albania for radicals, the concept remained a pipedream, and continued to be perceived by Albanian-Macedonians as such. In parallel to this, ongoing international preventive engagement continued to reinforce local restraining factors and domestic security. Max van der Stoel, the OSCE’s HCNM, in particular, played a vital role in de-escalating flashpoints that threatened to provoke wider confrontation, most prominently over the University of Tetovo. Externally, meanwhile, relations with Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania were gradually normalized, with common security and economic interests established. Albanian pacifism in Kosovo also contributed to Macedonian stability, with the province maintaining a monopoly on the attention of the Albanian Diaspora. The status quo in Kosovo, however, was clearly unsustainable. While Yugoslav repression of Kosovar-Albanians had short- to medium-term benefits for Macedonia, long-term, in the absence of a political settlement on power sharing, violence was inevitable. The inability to resolve this impasse slowly de-legitimated the nonviolent struggle of Rugova, and gave rise to the KLA, the emergence of which moved the province toward civil war. Coupled with the collapse of the Albanian state in 1997, when

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much of the weaponry looted from military garrisons during the subsequent chaos ultimately found its way into northwestern Macedonia, the outbreak of conflict in Kosovo would have serious implications for the Balkans’ “oasis of peace.” The Outbreak of Conflict: Internal Explanations

As with the initial post-independence peace, the outbreak of conflict in Macedonia can be attributed to a number of internal and external factors, which, collectively, engendered conditions favorable to armed rebellion. The 2001 insurgency cannot be ascribed to a single factor, nor simplistically depicted as another manifestation of ancient ethnic hatreds in the Balkans. To the contrary, it was facilitated by a complex range of sources, from unresponsive institutions, mutual suspicions, and individual agendas to criminal interests, ideology, cross-border lawlessness, and misjudgments on the part of the international community. While most of the inhibiting factors that had facilitated peace remained in situ, underlying sources of instability continued to simmer. Moreover, important conditions for insurgency that, hitherto, had largely been absent – most prominently outside patronage – became apparent, while key restraining elements were slowly eroded; areas along the Macedonia-Kosovo border, for instance, came to be characterized by general lawlessness, with the authority of Macedonian police gradually usurped by that of criminal structures.76 As such, the state no longer exercised complete control over its territory, an important factor in rationalizing the outbreak of violence. Given that structural risk factors remained constant, only an immediate, precipitating event was necessary to catalyze violence. This duly arrived in the form of NATO military intervention in Kosovo, which served to accelerate the likelihood of conflict in Macedonia, and, ultimately, armed clashes between Macedonian security forces and Albanian militants operating along the Macedonia-Kosovo border. First and foremost, the outbreak of conflict, insofar as it engendered disenfranchisement and provided a motive for violence, was the result of unsatisfied Albanian political and cultural demands. While the ethnic Macedonian political elite remained committed to pluralism and power sharing, and minorities continued to enjoy extensive freedoms, the actual power and influence wielded by the Albanian community was never a just reflection of its size. The most powerful state positions – president, prime minister, parliament speaker, interior minister, defense minister, army chief of general staff, et al.– remained the exclusive

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preserve of ethnic Macedonians.77 Against this backdrop, the projection of power sharing was somewhat of a façade. As Ramadani argues, in effect, the Macedonians were in denial, refusing to reconcile themselves with the multiethnic reality of their country, and unwilling to accept the fact that the Albanian community represented a major political factor in a democratic, post-Yugoslav Macedonia.78 Cvetin Chilimanov describes Macedonian policy toward the Albanians as ‘totally fake.’79 While, in theory, equal rights existed, in practice many of the discriminatory policies from the Yugoslav era, particularly relating to state representation, continued to persist. In this respect, contends Sadiku, the insurgency can largely be understood as ‘a hit at the remains of Communistic Macedonia.’80 In terms of advancing legitimate political and cultural demands, Macedonia failed its Albanian minority. The community’s core demands – greater representation in state institutions, recognition of Albanian as an official second language, the right to Albanian-language Higher Education, and administrative autonomy at a local government level – remained unmet some 10 years after independence. Though the democratic character of the state and the granting of political and cultural freedoms helped mitigate tensions, the failure to address these demands lent to the radicalization of the community, and cultivated a pent-up nationalism that, under the right conditions, was always likely to manifest itself in violence. In other words, the decade-long failure of the democratic system to sufficiently address the fundamental grievances of a large minority community legitimated the politics of violence as a valid – at least in the eyes of the NLA – alternative. Of course, the exact genesis of the events of 2001 are markedly more complex, encompassing a range of factors and interests; however, the key point is that, immaterial of precise origin, Albanian-Macedonians possessed the rationale to justify armed rebellion. The excessive use of force against Albanian dissent, such as in Gostivar and Tetovo in 1997, also helped radicalize segments of the community. In many respects, this heavy-handedness, and the long jail sentences that followed for the perpetrators, was a throwback to Macedonia’s Communist past; the interior ministry, for example, was dominated by ex-Communists until the SDSM’s defeat in the 1998 election.81 While for ethnic Macedonians the response was justified given that their actions violated the constitution, for the Albanians it represented – in the words of Ibrahim Mehmeti – a ‘humiliation. . . . Everybody believed that the Albanians would return this one day. It was something that was very, very provocative.’82 Coupled with

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unrepresentative and unresponsive institutions that failed to sufficiently resolve tensions, this would create a political space for radicals to exploit. The likelihood of extremist elements within the Albanian community resorting to force, argues Ramadani, increased with each Macedonian delay.83 For Mehmeti, pre-2001 conditions were simply unsustainable for the Albanians.84 Certainly, the community’s sense of marginalization and injustice ran deep. In this sense, though its methods were questionable, the (putative) justification for armed mobilization was clear. Had the necessary steps been taken earlier, and AlbanianMacedonians been more firmly integrated into state institutions, the raison d'être for conflict simply would not have existed. The fact that it took violence and loss of life to prompt necessary action was a sad indictment on the responsiveness of the Macedonian state to the demands of such a large and influential constituency. As the Belgian diplomat Alexis Brouhns puts it, Twenty-five percent of the population didn’t feel they were a part of this state. And you cannot run the country with such a feeling, with such a situation – it’s impossible. . . . It’s clear that if such a large percentage of the population does not feel properly represented in the different institutions of the state, that is very dangerous. Coming from a multiethnic country such as Belgium, I am very sensitive to this.85

The polarization of Macedonian society along ethnic lines – inclusive of political parties, media, and public policy debates – added to the climate of mistrust across communities. In the first instance, the post-Yugoslav Macedonian elite erred in differentiating between constituent nation and ethnic minorities in the preamble of the country’s original constitution. In recognizing the primacy of ethnic Macedonians, it projected a sense of exclusiveness that immediately antagonized and gave grievance to ethnic minorities.86 By solidifying their sense of victimhood and inferiority complex from Yugoslav times, it prompted many Albanians to question their allegiance to the new state. While the proclamation of a national state was understandable to an extent, particularly given Macedonia’s disputed history and identity and the regional climate of the day, in the final analysis it was the wrong strategy for a multiethnic country. Simultaneously, it encouraged and solidified the ethnic fragmentation of Macedonian society – a major barrier to internal cohesion that exists to this day. As such, Skopje missed an important opportunity to cultivate a cross-cutting, civic Macedonian identity inclusive of all, one that could slowly transcend and undercut traditional ethnic identifications. The absence of a

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common identity, and of common, non-ethnic avenues for intergroup cooperation and pursuit of shared interests, contributed to the mutual mistrust that characterizes relations between the Macedonian and Albanian communities. Indeed, every aspect of life is seemingly viewed through an ethnic prism. Similarly, while the pursuit of parallel lives helped defuse the potential for conflict in the short term, an absence of significant grassroots interaction weakened social cohesiveness and heightened intergroup misperceptions, key ingredients for intrasocietal violence; note, for example, the limited levels of intermarriage between Macedonians and Albanians. As Biljana Vankovska observes, this distance and profound sense of ethnicity have reinforced the falsehood that the respective ills of each community are the responsibility of the Other.87 The events of 2001 were likewise facilitated by a weak Macedonian state whose authority gradually failed to extend over its designated territory. Albanian-inhabited villages in and around the Kosovo border came under the control of local (invariably criminal) structures, described by an anonymous State Department official as ‘fortresses that are impossible to penetrate.’88 With their power supplanted, Macedonian security forces became absent from large tracts of the country; in Tanusevci and Aracinovo, for instance, police had long ago abandoned their duties, rendering NLA infiltration easy.89 The border region with Kosovo, in particular, became characterized by lawlessness, creating an environment in which organized criminal networks could flourish and, concurrently, armed uprising could be planned and launched. A transnational Albanian mafia syndicate – widely recognized as one of the most powerful in Europe – operated freely in the area, controlling a lucrative portfolio of criminal interests, ranging from human trafficking, prostitution, extortion, and money laundering to the smuggling of arms, tobacco, and, in particular, narcotics.90 Indeed, the mountainous borderland connecting the Albanian-inhabited lands of Macedonia, Kosovo, and the Presevo Valley – often referred to as the “Balkan Medellin” – is a major corridor for the smuggling of Southwest Asian heroin into western Europe.91 Undoubtedly, the 2001 conflict possessed a criminal element. The initial clashes in Tanusevci that presaged the wider crisis, for instance, occurred largely at a criminal level, between security forces re-entering lawless border areas following the belated demarcation of the Macedonia-Yugoslavia border and organized criminal interests protecting lucrative smuggling routes. Moreover, as Ali Ahmeti has himself admitted, some of the NLA’s funding came from criminal

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sources, which, as with the UCPMB and KLA before it, enabled the purchase of modern military equipment.92 The KLA, for example, was financed largely by drug money, a fact that, at the time, the West was willing to overlook.93 Certainly, in the estimation of many ethnic Macedonians, the conflict that afflicted their country was motivated by criminal interests, as opposed to legitimate political grievances, which were merely used as cover to justify violence and create further insecurity to advance these interests. According to this school of thought, the events of 2001 were perpetrated by criminal elements seeking to protect smuggling routes from Macedonian security forces, which had steadily encroached into the area, before ultimately morphing into a broader struggle for political rights with the emergence of Ahmeti. For Casule, conflict was the consequence of attempts to infuse order into the chaos of the border region.94 To be sure, criminal networks operating therein had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, that is to say, in a fluid security environment, and, accordingly, as Zhidas Daskalovski observes, had reason to instigate violence following the signing of the border treaty.95 Though not necessarily the immediate driving force, organized crime was an important facilitator, fuelling instability and cultivating a culture of corruption and lawlessness over a prolonged period of time, so adding another layer of complexity to the conflict. By helping finance it, the NLA, at the very minimum, was indirectly advancing criminal interests. Over and above organized criminal activity, another important factor, in this respect, was the mountainous terrain of the area, which enabled cross-border incursions and the smuggling of weapons, particularly with the departure of UNPREDEP.96 Entrenched corruption, meanwhile, undermined the legitimacy of government, and fostered public cynicism toward state institutions and elected officials. As Vankovska notes, politics in Macedonia has traditionally been about profit-making, as opposed to policy-making. 97 Though political grievances were used to justify the waging of insurgency, the 2001 conflict was just as much an intra-Albanian putsch designed to bring a new elite into power, an uprising against the existing Albanian-Macedonian political establishment, which had failed to advance the political and cultural rights of its constituency through peaceful, democratic means over an extended period. Incompetence and corruption were not limited to the ethnic Macedonians; according to an anonymous State Department official, Albanian-Macedonian political leaders took greater interest in the business interests – legal or otherwise – that political office helped facilitate than with fulfilling their electoral promises, and, as such, were as much to blame as the ethnic

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Macedonians.98 Describing them as lazy, he notes that the Albanian community’s elected representatives did not initiate a parliamentary motion to amend the constitution until just prior to the outbreak of conflict, once it became obvious that illegitimate actors were planning to launch violence and, in so doing, threaten their hold on power.99 The Albanian-Macedonian political elite, he argues, ‘used the system and the justified discontent of their constituents only to emphasize themselves.’ 100 Jason Miko describes these politicians as “lousy legislators” who, whether through design or default, never pushed hard enough for their people.101 Unresolved Albanian grievances, or the notion of perpetual oppression, he posits, gave the AlbanianMacedonian elite an important power base and rationale that kept them in power.102 Mehmeti likewise acknowledges that Albanian politicians were ‘easily corruptible.’103 In this sense, the insurrection amounted to an intifada of sorts against the elected representatives of the AlbanianMacedonian community as much as against the ethnic Macedonian political parties. Linked to this, another important factor in explaining the onset of violence, as Michael Lund points out, was the unfulfilled political ambitions of ethnic Albanian activists of Macedonian origin in postwar Kosovo.104 Based in western Europe and long active in the diaspora, from where they had established the KLA, this small cadre of individuals may have instigated conflict in Macedonia as a means to attain political office, which they had failed to obtain in Kosovo. For instance, Ahmeti, a leading student agitator in the province in the earlyto mid-1980s before his emigration to Switzerland,105 had been unsuccessful in his bid to establish a political foothold in Kosovo following NATO’s intervention, and, as such, may have perceived Macedonia as his final opportunity for political power.106 More hard-line elements within the NLA, for instance, suspected Ahmeti of having used the insurgency merely as a vehicle for political office.107 From this perspective, conflict was a manifestation of the individual interests and opportunistic actions of a small group of politically frustrated AlbanianMacedonians, who exploited popular grievances to advance their own personal ambitions. James Pardew acknowledges that the ambition of certain individuals was an important motivating factor.108 What is clear is that the initial violence did not represent a spontaneous, grassrootsdriven uprising; to the contrary, this was largely an elite-driven process. In this respect, it is important to note that the coalition government of the day had made genuine progress in addressing Albanian demands:

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opinion polls conducted immediately prior to the outbreak of conflict indicated that Albanian-Macedonians were largely satisfied with the state of interethnic relations.109 The fact that the violence was instigated largely by outside forces reinforces the Albanian power struggle theory. For all their frustrations, Albanian-Macedonians, generally speaking, were happy to persevere with the political process; certainly, they were ambivalent about waging an organized war to pursue their grievances. At the very minimum, the timing of the conflict can be questioned: Zoran Jolevski notes that Albanian demands had been – or were in the process of being – addressed prior to the instigation of violence, and thus contends that no critical need for conflict existed.110 Legislation pertaining to the use of Albanian in Higher Education had been passed by parliament months before the insurgency, steps had been taken to integrate more Albanians into the police force, while, under the constitution, Albanians had the right to use their mother tongue in an official capacity in municipalities where they constituted a majority. 111 As of April 2001, five of the 15 government cabinet ministers, plus two deputy ministers, for the key ministries of defense and interior, were Albanian-Macedonian; the community’s proportion of public servants stood at 10 percent, up from 3 percent in 1993; and three of the seven full generals in the Macedonian army were Albanian, up from zero in 1998.112 If anything, the status of Albanian-Macedonians was improving. While Jolevski acknowledges that the implementation process could have proceeded at a faster pace, This was no excuse to solve these open issues through the use of weapons and killings. They should have gone back to the institutions, which they had full access to, to advance these rights. . . . Implementation was a matter of time. I don’t believe that the situation was that bad . . . to take up weapons against the state. I’m not saying that the Albanians didn’t have a right to expect all of those rights, but I don’t believe they had to take up weapons.113

DUI’s revolt and implied threats of violence following the 2006 election, when Nikola Gruevski’s newly elected VMRO-DPMNE chose the DPA, its traditional Albanian partner, to form a government, lends credence to the putsch theory. Also note, in this respect, the armed clashes between rival DPA and DUI supporters in the run-up to, and during, the 2008 general election,114 as well as a suspected assassination attempt on Ahmeti, believed to have been carried out by DPA elements. Certainly, the Albanian body politic is highly polarized, and defined by increasingly dangerous levels of internal animosity. While the state’s

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lack of responsiveness to core Albanian grievances was at the forefront of the crisis, the genesis of the insurgency was not as clear-cut as it may have seemed on the surface. Indeed, it had more complex roots than a mere violent reaction to political disaffection. The Outbreak of Conflict: External Explanations

The outbreak of conflict in Macedonia can also be explained by the failures of a complacent and shortsighted international community, which indirectly helped create conditions for violence. In the first instance, most palpably, third-party engagement in Macedonia progressively contracted – both qualitatively and quantitatively – in the post-Dayton period, once the threat of spillover from the former Yugoslavia had receded. While its initial response represented a major, and rare, preventive success, the reduction in international engagement proved a fundamental error of judgment given Macedonia’s continuing fragility, made more pronounced by the continuing unrest in Kosovo. The untimely termination of ICFY’s Working Group and UNPREDEP – the latter, in March 1999, at the height of instability in Kosovo – created a vacuum that was never adequately filled. This disengagement could be attributed to naïve assumptions of Macedonian stability, and, linked to this, Yugo-fatigue,115 or the ambivalence of assuming additional commitments in a region where the international community had become exhausted over the course of the previous decade. With BosniaHerzegovina and, ultimately, Kosovo falling under international administration, Macedonia became the obvious starting point for a longterm process of Balkan retreat. Yet this contraction was initiated at the precise juncture when ongoing international engagement was needed to consolidate initial preventive gains through the systematic targeting of structural sources of instability, and, in the case of UNPREDEP, insulating the country from neighboring conflict. Rather than a model of multiethnic co-existence, Macedonia, in reality, remained an underdeveloped country comprising two segregated and mutually suspicious ethnic communities, weak, corrupt, and vulnerable to the malignant influences of organized crime and to spillover of violence from elsewhere in the region. In this respect, the precise absence of overt conflict worked against Macedonia, with international efforts centered on post-conflict BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo. Though Skopje was partly to blame given its recognition of Taiwan, the withdrawal of UNPREDEP was particularly shortsighted, borne of Great Power politics than on-the-ground realities.

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As Henryk Sokalski argues, none of the threats that had prompted the mission’s deployment in the early 1990s – instability in the north, an undefined border with Yugoslavia, a poor defense capability, internal political, economic, and social stresses, and unsatisfied minority demands – had yet to be definitively eradicated.116 Whether UNPREDEP’s continued presence would have discouraged armed incursions and precluded the outbreak of conflict is debatable, particularly in the context of its preventive mandate and the mountainous terrain of the border region. The rugged topography of the area made Macedonia vulnerable to illicit flows irrespective of international presence. Yet, as Sokalski notes, UNPREDEP operated in many of these areas, which increasingly fell outside the purview of the state, including Tanusevci, and so was in a position to detect imminent trouble, both through its monitoring activities and grassroots-level contacts.117 At the minimum, UNPREDEP could have transmitted early warnings of cross-border incursions. As such, Aleksandar Matovski argues, UNPREDEP had always posed a barrier to the planning and execution of armed insurgency.118 By removing a deterrent and early warning mechanism, the departure of UN peacekeepers provided an important psychological fillip to groups involved in illicit cross-border activity. Second, while immediate threats to stability were seemingly mitigated and (relative) political and social stability attained, Macedonia remained fragile, in particular vulnerable to a spillover of conflict from Kosovo and various internal pressures. Indeed, the international community failed to sufficiently target root sources of instability, an inherently counterproductive approach. By focusing primarily on proximate, near-term sources, more fundamental underlying conflict causes were left to simmer. Continuing Albanian disaffection, economic deterioration, organized crime, corruption, and the uncertainty in Kosovo meant the likelihood of conflict remained high. As this initial engagement was not part of a broader, integrated plan systematically targeting structural conflict sources over and above immediate ones, external actors merely froze the situation in Macedonia, defusing tensions and achieving a temporary peace. In the context of its underresourced civilian component and restrictive political mandate, UNPREDEP, an innovative strategy for which the UN should be commended, proved emblematic of the international community’s emphasis on proximate – as opposed to the more important structural – prevention.

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Consistent with its approach to the rest of the former Yugoslavia, meanwhile, the international community overemphasized the ethnic dimension of Macedonian instability, neglecting the more dangerous (non-ethnic) threats – poverty, unemployment, organized crime, corruption, the status of Kosovo – in the process. The most underlying sources of insecurity in Macedonia were always non-ethnic in character. While relations between the Macedonian and Albanian communities were often tense, they never genuinely threatened to manifest themselves in overt intergroup violence, even during the course of the 2001 crisis, when the fighting failed to spread beyond the armed structures of the state and the insurgents in any systematic fashion. In the first instance, this approach emboldened Albanian-Macedonians in their demands,119 and created a negative culture within the community, one where it increasingly sought to address grievances through international actors, as opposed to the democratic institutions of the state, which only added to the intergroup distrust. More importantly, the failure to adequately address non-ethnic risk factors – particularly poverty and unemployment – directly undermined efforts to promote interethnic dialogue and reinforced the very cleavages external actors were seeking to narrow. This is not to say that ethnic tensions did not exist. They were real, and had the potential to provoke wider crises. The work of the international community, particularly within the framework of ICFY, in alleviating these tensions cannot be denied. Yet these activities were not sufficiently accompanied by efforts to boost economic growth and strengthen the rule of law, issues that transcend ethnicity. To a large extent, intergroup tensions were symptoms of Macedonia’s economic weakness. A functioning economy, job security, and a decent standard of living would have helped defuse political and ethnic tensions, as well as, conceivably, combat the rise of organized crime. The Macedonian people, irrespective of ethnicity, were always more interested in economic security than anything else; economic pragmatism always took precedence over nationalism, as underscored by the outcome of successive national elections. From an economic perspective, however, Macedonia was neglected by the international community, a process dating to independence. As Chilimanov argues, Their involvement here should have been economical. They should have been here with their trade missions, not with their guns. We needed General Motors, not General Clarke. . . . You can send troops and missions, but if you don’t address the underlying economic factors that cause conflict, you have done nothing.120

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Of course, this is not to attribute Macedonia’s economic ills exclusively to the international community. It is not the fault of outsiders that foreign investors have traditionally invested little in the country. It is the responsibility of the government to attract foreign firms by creating a climate favorable to investment, by strengthening the rule of law, and putting in place necessary legal frameworks. Yet, undeniably, Macedonia’s dire economic situation at independence was aggravated by the adverse consequence of certain international policies. Macedonia suffered great economic hardship from the collateral impact of international sanctions on the rump Yugoslavia, for which it was never compensated – a fate it would again suffer during the course of NATO intervention in Kosovo. Rather than receiving economic assistance, Macedonia was unjustly being penalized for the indiscretions of others.121 It is estimated that double sanctions and humanitarian intervention in Kosovo cost Macedonia approximately $8 billion in lost trade.122 According to private ICFY correspondence from the early 1990s, ‘Macedonia has been affected even more severely than Serbia by the sanctions imposed by the United Nations on the new Yugoslavia.’ 123 In the absence of formal compensation to redress losses, and given its precarious socioeconomic situation, the international community was willing to tolerate sanctions-busting in order to forestall economic collapse.124 Sokalski recalls how the authorities in Skopje made it clear to him that sanctions-busting would cease if international financial assistance were forthcoming.125 Yet, as Owen notes, the international community was never prepared to assist, which made it impossible for Macedonia to respect the sanctions regime.126 As Owen explains, The fundamental choice was: do you put the screw on Milosevic properly? If you’re going to do that, you have to fund Macedonia. The amount of money was not very high. And that’s the choice we should have done, but would not do.127

In addition to undermining its own effort to isolate Belgrade economically, this policy, by promoting sanctions-busting, created a vast grey economy in Macedonia, and solidified criminal structures. An absence of economic opportunities thereafter entrenched these networks, and provided incentives for organized criminal activity, which, over time, has eroded the rule of law and deterred foreign investors. In 2002, Pendarovski estimated the value of organized crime in Macedonia at one-fifth of the previous year’s budget.128

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To be sure, economic hardship and uncertainty represented – and continue to represent – the core destabilizing factor in Macedonian society, directly aggravating all other risk factors, and creating an environment conducive to organized crime, corruption, and nationalism. Unemployment levels remained consistently high; in October 2000, approximately 380,000 Macedonians – from a population of two million – were unemployed, with 22 percent of the population living below the poverty line.129 Some 10 years after independence, the standard of living was no better than it had been during the Communist era.130 Opinion polls conducted immediately prior to the outbreak of violence indicated that ethnic Macedonians were more concerned with poverty and corruption than with putative interethnic tensions.131 Given its dire economic situation, the Macedonian government, desperate for foreign investment, was reportedly offering state-owned assets at below their market value.132 As the root cause of instability, international efforts to strengthen the Macedonian economy – through loans, investment, capacity-building, et al., conditional on the implementation of necessary reforms – would have strengthened all other preventive initiatives in the country. Yet an absence of conflict meant Macedonia was not subject of a major long-term international economic assistance package, as in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. From an economic perspective, in the context of what it stood for as an emerging multiethnic democracy and its importance to regional stability, the international community could and should have done more to buttress Macedonia, particularly in the initial, post-independence period.133 The international community’s failure to leverage Macedonia and Greece into an immediate provisional agreement vis-à-vis the name dispute, and the subsequent inability of the United States and EU to dissuade Athens from imposing a trade embargo, contributed to Macedonia’s economic fragility. Together with the sanctions regime on Yugoslavia, the Greek embargo inflicted significant economic damage. Having lost in excess of $330 million in exports during the first year of Greek sanctions, and denied access to international financial institutions until 1994 and bilateral assistance from Western countries in the absence of diplomatic recognition, Macedonia was forced to rely on emergency loans from George Soros, the American financier, to overcome financial crises.134 Generally speaking, external actors’ initial approach to the impasse was not as urgent as it should have been, ensuring the Macedonians lost valuable time and resources that could have been devoted to other matters. Certainly in hindsight, the most immediate external threat to Macedonian stability and transition to statehood came

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not from an irredentist Serbia, but Greece, whose actions – by undermining internal stability, de-legitimating its existence and isolating the country both diplomatically and economically – threatened to provoke state collapse. In this context, the provisional agreement that ultimately arrived in late 1995 was belated. The United States, for instance, argues Marshall Harris, who worked at the State Department at the time, should have expended more political capital on the name issue, and applied greater pressure on the Greeks to moderate their stance; for Harris, What we did was shameful. The Greeks were clearly wrong, but, in the interests of helping an ostensible US ally, and a significant US political constituency, the Greek-Americans, we weren’t as active as I think we should have been.135

Put simply, many in the international community did not fully appreciate the potential implications of Macedonia’s nonrecognition. While the dispute was provisionally resolved, Macedonia, by adopting the interim title of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, was denied the right to break from its Yugoslav past, and all the connotations associated with it, of internecine violence, tyrants, and rabid nationalism, of bloodthirsty, uncivilized peoples predisposed to violence, ethnic cleansing and the use of systematic rape as a weapon of war – all the things Macedonia was not, and, as a Yugoslav republic, was in the vanguard trying to forestall. Continuing to leave this issue open has undermined good neighborly relations and eroded the national dignity of the Macedonian people. Further, by making resolution of the dispute a pre-condition for membership, it has forced Macedonians to increasingly question whether their country’s future lies in the EU and NATO. Though ultimate responsibility lay with successive Macedonian governments, the international community – in particular the EU – was similarly culpable for its failure to sufficiently pressure Skopje into addressing legitimate Albanian grievances in the pre-conflict stage. Given Macedonia’s weakness, the international community holds prodigious political and economic sway over the country, with considerable scope to manipulate policy, as its resolution of the 2001 crisis underscored. The EU was particularly guilty for its failure to use the incentive of integration as leverage to coerce Skopje into addressing core Albanian demands. Rather than articulating a genuine pathway to membership, Brussels – apprehensive of enlargement and unsure of its final frontiers – maintained a policy of ambiguity toward southeast

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Europe. In the words of Miroslav Hadzic, the EU’s approach to the region was piecemeal.136 In the case of Macedonia, this encouraged government procrastination, deprived its people of a common objective and destiny towards which to aspire, and undercut efforts to promote a European, non-ethnic identity. It constituted a sad indictment on the organization that Macedonia was offered a Stabilization and Association Agreement only when the country threatened to implode. This, more than anything, encapsulated the organization’s reactive approach to the countries of the Balkans. This is not to say that Macedonia should necessarily have been offered this reward prior to 2001; in the context of its internal situation, it was – and continues to remain – considerable distance from being in a position to accede to the EU. Instead of articulating a European perspective upon the outbreak of violence as an incentive to resolve the conflict, this long-term process should have commenced in the years immediately following independence, facilitating closer relations between Skopje and Brussels, and the transfer of European norms, values, and institutional practices. In other words, the EU should have made an explicit political commitment to Macedonia, and to the Western Balkans more broadly, that, in the event of tangible political, economic, and social progress, satisfactory fulfillment of relevant benchmarks, and adherence to “European” standards, membership would be forthcoming, be it in 10 or 20 years, so providing an incentive for reform and peace. Yet such a commitment was not definitively articulated until 1999, with the advent of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and, linked to this, the Stabilization and Association Process, which belatedly gave the countries of the region the concrete prospect of EU membership. In many respects, this initiative represented the first coherent attempt by outside actors to implement a comprehensive, long-term preventive strategy in the Balkans.137 The fact that this process has had a major transformative impact, catalyzing institutional, legal, and economic reforms in most countries, reinforces the argument that this commitment should have been proffered years earlier.138 In the absence of concrete assurances and incentives, however, the political will to advance ethnic minority rights and combat organized crime and corruption – all pre-conditions for ultimate accession – was generally, and unsurprisingly, lacking. Macedonia, for example, would have been required to implement all of the reforms contained in the Ohrid Framework Agreement as a condition for EU entry. Had the international community, in particular Brussels, applied its soft power leverage on Macedonia to implement necessary reforms, conflict may

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never have occurred; certainly, it would have deprived the NLA of a raison d'être for insurgency. Alas, such measures were taken only after the outbreak of violence, as a reflex action by external actors, when they should have been forthcoming more explicitly prior to it. The violence should never have been allowed to manifest itself in the first place, for this was not a spontaneous bearing of arms, but a confluence of events and conditions that had accumulated over an extended period of time. The fact that it took violence, loss of life, and heightened interethnic tensions to expedite constitutional and democratic reform, on the one hand, and provoke a new round of sustained outside engagement, on the other, reflected negatively both on the Macedonian state and the international community. Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo: A Seminal Moment

Insofar as an outbreak of war in Kosovo represented the greatest external threat to its security, half-hearted international efforts to resolve the province’s status post-Dayton directly endangered Macedonia. As Lund notes, the international community – by settling for a nonviolent but uneasy status quo – put Macedonia and the region at considerable long-term risk.139 In particular, the international community missed a large window of opportunity to force through a peaceful settlement on Kosovo, as part of a comprehensive solution to the crises of the former Yugoslavia, during negotiations at Dayton; however, political expediency – namely, obtaining the support of Belgrade – meant its status was completely ignored in the final settlement. Yet, as Vankovska argues, ‘everything is interrelated; how can you promote peace or multiethnic democracy in Macedonia when you have a time-bomb across the border?’ 140 In the event, war in Kosovo and subsequent NATO military intervention against Yugoslavia, allied to international management of the province thereafter, had a profound, and very direct, impact on Macedonia’s stability. Immaterial of justification, humanitarian intervention in Kosovo thawed the fragile status quo achieved by the initial international engagement in Macedonia, and, by neglecting its implications and aggravating key risk factors, ultimately precipitated the outbreak of violence. Without the chain of events it provoked, a logical argument can be made that internal factors, in themselves, would have been insufficient to provoke violence in Macedonia. Certainly, events in Kosovo would reverse many of the (significant) gains the international community initially achieved in the country. As such, outside actors neglected the interconnectedness of

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Macedonia’s security with that of Kosovo’s, erroneously assuming that conflict in the latter would not ultimately ignite violence in the former, and so failed to provide the military and economic assistance to sufficiently insulate Macedonia from spillover. In the first instance, the withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo, coupled with the ultimate ouster of Milosevic, altered the regional balance of power, stoking Albanian nationalism and increasing Macedonia’s vulnerability to armed incursions from the north. As noted in Chapter 2, the outbreak of violence in Kosovo induced immediate political, economic, and social crises in Macedonia, and, ultimately, increased the likelihood of war. From an economic perspective, the impact was pronounced, disrupting Macedonia’s trade with Yugoslavia and western Europe, deterring foreign investment, and generally emasculating an already weak economy. Politically, it undermined the unity of the coalition government of the day, and its ability to advance Albanian rights; as Pendarovski notes, NATO intervention engendered a climate that made it politically toxic to yield visible concessions to Albanian-Macedonians.141 Socially, it weakened internal cohesion by crystallizing divisions and reinforcing tensions between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. The mass influx of Kosovar-Albanian refugees – a formidable strain on a country ill-equipped to accommodate them, for which NATO had inexplicably made no provisions142 – further exposed this fissure, while simultaneously threatening to disrupt the country’s fragile ethnic balance. Significantly, international intervention in Kosovo emboldened Albanian-Macedonians in their own demands, radicalized elements advocating the unification of Albanian-inhabited lands, and established a dangerous precedent, that is to say, that violence – as opposed to pacifism – pays. On a psychological level, for many within the Albanian-Macedonian community, it created an impression that, as in Kosovo, NATO would come to its rescue in the event of an uprising provoked by Slav “oppression.” International management of the province post-conflict did little to allay Macedonian fears of spillover. This was underscored by NATO’s failure to adequately disarm and disband the KLA, and comprehensively reintegrate its former members into society, a key element of Security Council resolution 1244 that brought the conflict to an end. 143 Vankovska describes international efforts to disarm the KLA as a ‘farce.’144 Indeed, ex-KLA combatants proceeded to engage in – if not initiate – insurgency in the Presevo Valley and, ultimately, Macedonia. Post-1999, a ready-made pool of arms and idle, naïve fighters looking for a cause, many of whom may have perceived they were fighting for a

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Greater Albania when, in fact, among other things, they were fighting for the political and criminal interests of others, could be utilized for armed agitation elsewhere. Similarly, NATO’s failure to seal and patrol the Macedonia-Kosovo border – borne of its preoccupation with the province’s internal security, and wariness of provoking retaliations – provided conditions amenable to the exportation of violence. Granted, Macedonian criticisms of NATO deflected attention from its own border security failures,145 and ignored the difficulties of controlling such a rugged area. Yet the fact that well-armed guerrillas were able to initiate attacks in neighboring countries from inside Kosovo, an international protectorate occupied by a 40,000-strong NATO force, using weapons it was required to collect,146 did not reflect favorably on the alliance. Certainly, argues Major General William Nash (United States Army, Retired), a former NATO commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina and UN civil administrator in Kosovo, NATO could and should have done more in securing the Macedonia-Kosovo border.147 While, in this sense, the withdrawal of UNPREDEP was inopportune, the presence of KFOR troops on the Kosovo side of the border nominally helped fill the void created by the departure of UN peacekeepers. As the occupying force in Kosovo, NATO was legally obligated to prevent armed incursions into neighboring countries. Yet nationalist elements within Kosovo provided material and logistical support to the NLA, as they did to the UCPMB.148 According to Scott Taylor, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) – the civilian defense force created from the vestiges of the KLA – was an important source of supplies and intelligence.149 For instance, the KPC’s chief of staff, Gezim Ostreni, a Macedonian-Albanian, was dismissed from his post for his links to the NLA, which he later formally joined as its chief of staff.150 Though it would be inaccurate to portray the Macedonian conflict as having been exclusively exported from Kosovo, as such an argument would downgrade legitimate Albanian-Macedonian grievances, it was nonetheless inextricably linked to Kosovo on several, reinforcing levels. To be sure, the initial outbreak of violence in Macedonia had much of its psychological and logistical genesis in Kosovo. While its grievances were local in character, the NLA had its roots in the former Yugoslav province. Its leadership, though Albanian-Macedonian in origin, were leading figures within the KLA; as Paulin Kola points out, Ahmeti was a founding member of the organization, and served on its general staff, while Ostreni had been a senior KLA commander.151 Fazli Veliu, Ahmeti’s uncle and eminent figure in the Albanian Diaspora, effectively

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established the guerrilla group in his capacity as president of the Kosovo People’s Movement (LPK) abroad – the radical political entity that advocated armed insurrection in Kosovo.152 The group’s initial core of combatants also came from the province: former KLA rebels who had failed to reintegrate into society post-intervention, and had subsequently fought in the Presevo Valley. The fact that the NLA employed the same guerrilla tactics as its forerunners in Kosovo and southern Serbia is instructive. Whether this was a single, ideologically driven national movement to extricate “Albanian” lands from Slav control – which began in Kosovo in the mid- to late-1990s – is open to question. Certainly, it was often difficult to distinguish between the KLA, NLA, and UCPMB. Be that as it may, the key point was that, post-1999, outside forces with the ability to support a local insurgency were now present, an important factor in understanding the outbreak of conflict in Macedonia, just as their previous absence was crucial to making sense of the initial nonviolence. In sum, the confluence of these internal and external dynamics made the timing right for insurgency in Macedonia. Arms were readily available, a surplus stemming from the Yugoslav wars of succession of the 1990s and the implosion of the Albanian state in 1997. The latter, when the government collapsed following the failure of several large pyramid investment schemes proved an important catalyst for the subsequent guerrilla wars in Kosovo, southern Serbia, and Macedonia. In the chaos that ensued, the weapons facilities of the army were looted: an estimated 750,000 of these weapons, together with 3 million hand grenades, made their way into Kosovo,153 while approximately half a million stolen weapons circulated in Macedonia.154 Some 1 million Kalashnikovs were believed to have found their way onto the regional black market, selling for as little as $16 each.155 Certainly, large arms transfers took place between Albanian population centers in the region. NATO’s failure to adequately disarm the KLA likewise contributed to the availability of weaponry. Its inability to sufficiently reintegrate former KLA combatants into society, meanwhile, coupled with the presence of unemployed, disenfranchised youth in Macedonia and Kosovo who could be exploited to take up arms,156 ensured a ready pool of recruits, while the diaspora and organized criminal activity provided important funding streams. Indeed, the putative “liberation” of Kosovo focused the resources of the influential – and often more radical – Albanian Diaspora on the cause of its brethren in Macedonia. Collectively, all these factors ensured that the resources for war were firmly in place. With UNPREDEP and Milosevic gone, allied to a

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porous cross-border area, mountainous terrain, ascendant Albanian nationalism, outside patronage, and a (perceived) favorable international climate, the conditions were likewise in place for the waging of insurgency. And with a dithering Skopje and a complacent international community failing to coerce it into implementing necessary reforms, so too was the rationale. If an armed struggle was ever going to be launched, the timing was now. Civil War Averted

As discussed in Chapter 4, a number of factors allowed the fighting to escalate. In the first instance, divisions within the government undermined efforts to present a united front against the insurgents. At the same time, weak and inexperienced Macedonian security forces, and the injudicious use of irregular forces, aggravated tensions and enhanced the popularity of the NLA among Albanian-Macedonians. With the security situation deteriorating and the potential for intercommunal violence firming, the prospect of civil war became real. A combination of local, regional, and international factors precluded this outcome. The sustained high-level international response was decisive, and, in large part, made the difference between war and peace. The EU and United States used their political heft to restrain the government from persevering with a military solution, soften entrenched positions, keep negotiations on track when they threatened to collapse, and ultimately guide the relevant parties to a settlement. Above all else, the incentive of ultimate EU membership, by giving both sides of the ethnic spectrum a common aspiration and destiny, helped induce compromise. The response from Brussels and Washington was highly coordinated, reinforcing the synergy the two can engender when working in a cooperative manner, and the collective power and influence they wield. NATO reinforced EU and American diplomacy through its own initiatives on the military-security track, including, among other things, the negotiation of ceasefires and, upon the cessation of conflict, disarmament of the NLA. As with the initial post-independence engagement, the international response was defined by a clear, workable division of labor between participating third parties, who brought to bear significant resources and leverage on conflict dynamics. In many respects, this response was a model in conflict management and resolution. Local and regional dynamics also played an important restraining function. Lest they alienated the international community by promoting

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ethnic Albanians as the regional aggressors, and thus undermined Kosovo’s prospects of statehood, Tirana and Pristina pushed the NLA toward a political settlement and the pursuit of its grievances through legitimate, democratic channels.157 According to John Phillips, the Kosovar-Albanian leadership of Rugova, Hashim Thaci, Ramush Haradinaj, and Agim Ceku, and the prime minister of Albania, Ilir Meta, were all present at Robert Frowick’s Prizren meeting, and pressured Ahmeti to cease the NLA’s armed struggle, and formulate political demands that would be amenable to Skopje.158 The greater importance of Kosovo relative to Macedonia within the broader cross-border Albanian political community – that is to say, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania – was significant in this regard. On a local level, the Macedonian people, irrespective of ethnicity, had no interest in a wider war. The majority of Macedonians were more interested in peace and stability, and economic security, than a protracted conflict. This was underscored by a number of factors, from the isolated incidence of intercommunal clashes to the high number of ethnic Macedonian desertions from the army, and, on the Albanian side, the NLA’s need to resort to extortion as a recruiting tactic among AlbanianMacedonians.159 In this respect, argue Ordanoski and Casule, the history of co-existence between the two peoples was an important element in containing the violence.160 Put simply, at a grassroots level, the will for war, on both sides, was lacking. For all their peaceful co-existence, however, tensions clearly rose with every death and kidnapping. In this sense, ostensibly at least, the physical separation of the Macedonian and Albanian communities worked to the advantage of containment. Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations makes the contrast with Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, as a patchwork of ethnicities, was overcome with violence as soon as hostilities commenced.161 In Macedonia, this division, argues Kupchan, ‘provided a certain separation and safety . . . that would not have been there if more multiethnicity existed.’162 Macedonians’ cynicism of their elected representatives – borne of a decade of corruption and political scandal – proved another important inhibiting factor.163 Allied to their unfamiliarity with Ahmeti, who, though Macedonian-born, was largely an outsider, this natural skepticism prompted many Albanian-Macedonians to question the NLA’s motives. Indeed, while the tactics of the Macedonian security forces provided fresh grievances and local recruits, and the majority of Albanians supported the organization’s objectives, this support failed to translate into mass mobilization, as the KLA, for example, had managed

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in Kosovo. Ultimately, most Albanian-Macedonians were unwilling to mobilize for a cause many viewed with suspicion and/or were reluctant to die for. As such, the NLA miscalculated the mood of the people it was purportedly fighting for. Likewise, given the relatively extensive political rights and opportunities the Albanians possessed, a conviction that the conflict could be absorbed into democratic, political channels, and thus be resolved through nonviolent means, helped deter large-scale civilian mobilization. At the same time, as Raimo Vayrynen points out, the political settlement could partly be explained by the inability of the competing adversaries to achieve a definitive military victory after eight months of fighting.164 The respective sides may have calculated that conflict was simply no longer in their interest, hence the willingness to compromise. For those subscribing to the theory that the conflict was a calculated power struggle designed to bring about political change within the Albanian community, Ahmeti and his inner circle had no intention to provoke a civil war. Once assured of a political foothold post-conflict, they had no reason to continue with the insurgency. From this viewpoint, the conflict was carefully managed, at least on the Albanian side, with those who instigated the violence knowing precisely when to step back from the brink. While the risk of a broader war was real, this threat came not from the NLA, but, conversely, from the overreaction of the Macedonian security forces. The presence of a moderate Macedonian president who advocated appeasement, meanwhile, helped facilitate the final peace settlement. Some credit should also be extended to Georgievski, who, despite his rhetoric and post-peace machinations, ultimately yielded from his hardline position to sign the Framework Agreement, and to Xhaferi and Imeri, the other signatories at Ohrid, who rose above partisan and ethnic politics in the search for compromise.165 As Jolevski notes, the agreement could never have been implemented without the support of Georgievski and his party.166 The inherent weakness of the Macedonian state, insofar as it made international influence on the country more pronounced, was also important. The fact that Macedonia was highly dependent on external assistance meant the international community could dictate to key actors. However unpalatable they may have found the Framework Agreement, and the seemingly coercive methods by which it was arrived at, the ethnic Macedonian political elite simply had no power to resist international pressure to sign and ultimately implement the document.

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A Clearer Picture Emerges

As this chapter has highlighted, Macedonia’s peaceful extrication from the former Yugoslavia, and the initial nonviolence thereafter, can be explained by a number of inhibiting factors, which helped diminish the likelihood of war. First and foremost, a combination of strategic and economic considerations, together with a nonconfrontational Macedonian leadership, served to regulate the actions and behavior of the rump Yugoslavia, the perceived regional aggressor, toward Macedonia. In the context of these concerns, the threat of military aggression from Belgrade was never imminent. Except in the case of spillover from Kosovo, Yugoslavia simply had no reason to fight war in Macedonia. Similarly, more pressing internal preoccupations and longterm foreign policy objectives restrained the actions of Bulgaria and Albania, which, in any case, lacked the wherewithal to fulfill any irredentist desires and/or interfere in Macedonia’s internal affairs. The actions of Greece, though having a major destabilizing effect, were ultimately constrained by external forces. A moderate and pragmatic Macedonian political elite committed to political power sharing, meanwhile, deprived ethnic minorities of a motivation for secession, instead providing incentives for nonviolent participation in pluralistic political institutions. Critically, the Albanian community perceived its immediate political and economic interests as being best served within the post-Yugoslav Macedonian framework, which, allied to the fixation of the Albanian cross-border community and of the diaspora with Kosovo, tempered secessionist tendencies. In any event, the concept of a putative Greater Albania was simply not practical. In parallel to this, several important local nuances, such as a relatively weak Macedonian national consciousness, the pursuit of virtually separate existences by ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, an absence of a history of organized conflict between the two communities, and the presence of various economic safety valves, helped keep tensions below the level of violence. Likewise, peace – or, at least, an absence of large-scale violence – in Kosovo contributed to Macedonian stability. Domestic and regional inhibiting factors, in turn, were reinforced and solidified by a timely and sustained multilevel international preventive response, including, critically, the early projection of American power. While it may not have made the difference between war and peace, early international intervention and ongoing engagement contributed to stability by helping mitigate immediate sources of conflict, smooth the transition to statehood, defuse flashpoints, and generally provide security guarantees at an uncertain juncture in

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Macedonia’s history. Nevertheless, in the absence of local and regional restraining factors, international intervention may have proved insufficient. In many respects, it was local and regional dynamics that created the conditions for international intervention to succeed. All of these mitigating factors – local, regional, and international – would remain constant in the post-independence period, precluding armed confrontation and ensuring maintenance of the status quo. Yet with root, underlying sources of intrasocietal conflict also remaining constant, this status quo was always fragile. As with the initial period of nonviolence, the outbreak of conflict would be facilitated by a confluence of internal and external factors. In the first instance, procrastination on the part of successive Macedonian governments in implementing reforms to advance Albanian rights, coupled with instances of heavy-handedness toward dissent, alienated the community and its commitment to the Macedonian state, and provided a motive for violence. Similarly, an absence of common incentives and mechanisms for interethnic cooperation, allied to misperceptions of the Other, exacerbated by segregation and ethnicbased political parties and media, aggravated the sense of mutual suspicion between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. The conflict was also provoked by a number of hidden interests, political and criminal. In effect, the insurgency was as much an intra-Albanian coup d’état as it was a struggle for greater rights. Certainly, the insurgency was designed to advance more than just the political and cultural freedoms of the Albanian-Macedonian community. Just as it had strengthened restraining factors at independence, important failures on the part of the international community – EU marginalization; a failure to robustly apply its soft power on Skopje; a gradual process of disengagement borne of complacency and erroneous perceptions of Macedonian stability post-Dayton; key miscalculations; and, above all, a flawed approach to prevention – would sustain and aggravate risk factors, and, ultimately, increase the likelihood of conflict. The international community’s disproportionate emphasis on the ethnic dimension of conflict meant root (non-ethnic) sources of instability, particularly economic decline, were neglected, which served to directly aggravate other risk factors. At the same time, an inability to adequately recognize the interconnectedness of Macedonia’s security with that of Kosovo’s meant international failures to peacefully resolve the impasse in the latter had adverse implications on the former. In this respect, the international response was not multifaceted enough. Above all, the international community failed to sufficiently target underlying

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sources of conflict, ensuring root causes of instability remained. As such, only a catalyzing act was required to push Macedonia toward conflict, which was ultimately forthcoming in the form of armed clashes between security forces and armed elements operating in remote border villages, and, even more significantly, NATO military intervention in Kosovo before it. The adverse impact of the latter, and the subsequent failure to insulate it from spillover, radically altered Macedonian conflict dynamics, aggravated underlying risk factors, and weakened the resilience of those dynamics that had hitherto helped preclude violence. In short, humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, directly or indirectly, helped facilitate conflict in Macedonia. Though a wider civil war was ultimately averted, with external actors playing a decisive role, the fact that conflict was allowed to develop reflected poorly on the international community. While ultimate responsibility in any preventive endeavor lies with local stakeholders, the international community was culpable for its failure to leverage a weak Macedonian state into implementing relevant reforms. The extent of this leverage was demonstrated in 2001, when the EU and United States pushed the conflicting parties to a political settlement through various incentives and disincentives that should have been proffered well before the manifestation of violence. The fact that this influence was applied only after the event again highlighted an international community in reactive mode, in contrast to the much-feted proactive posture that characterized its original engagement in the country. While the initial prevention of conflict in Macedonia, and its ultimate outbreak a decade after independence, were brought about by certain exceptional circumstances and factors that, in many respects, were unique to the country, this does not necessarily detract from its general applicability. Indeed, the core factors that provoked intrasocietal violence in Macedonia – a weak state, porous borders, disaffected ethnic minorities, organized crime, corruption, poverty, unemployment, regional instability – are invariably common to all conflict contexts. As such, general lessons may be extrapolated from the Macedonian experience in order to advance our theoretical and empirical understanding of the practice, and applied to comparable contexts elsewhere.

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Notes 1

David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace, 1995),

2

Interview conducted by the author with Mitre Arsovski, Skopje, July 28,

42. 2006. 3

Interview conducted by the author with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid, July 31,

2006. 4

Interview conducted by the author with Kiro Gligorov, Skopje, June 28,

2006. 5

Interview conducted by the author with Lord Owen, London, July 3,

2006. 6

Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid. Interview conducted by the author with Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Bonn, June 14, 2006. 8 Interview with Mitre Arsovski. 9 Alice Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 83. 10 Interview with Mitre Arsovski. 11 Interview conducted by the author with Slobodan Casule, Skopje, June 29, 2006. 12 Interview with Mitre Arsovski. 13 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Interview with Lord Owen. 18 Interview conducted by the author with Stevo Pendarovski, Skopje, May 26, 2006. 19 Interview with Lord Owen. 20 Interviews conducted by the author with Thorvald Stoltenberg, Oslo, June 12, 2006; and Lord Owen. 21 Henryk J. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 207. 22 Denko Maleski, “Lessons Learned: The Balkans and Macedonia, Ten Years Later,” New Balkan Politics 1, No. 1 (2001–2002), http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/OldSite/issue_1/tekst.asp?id=maleski_en g (accessed April 7, 2006). 7

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23

Interview conducted by the author with Trajan Gocevski, Skopje, July 26, 2006. 24 Ibid. 25 Michael S. Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999: From Containment to Nation Building,” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson, 182 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). 26 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid. 27 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Penguin, 1996), 239. 28 Interview conducted by the author with Ismet Ramadani, Skopje, August 3, 2006. 29 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Skopje. 30 Ibid. 31 Kyril Drezov, “Collateral Damage: The Impact on Macedonia of the Kosovo War,” in Kosovo: the Politics of Delusion, Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, eds. Kyril Drezov, Bulent Gokay, and Michael Waller, 60 (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001). 32 Michael S. Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted: How Macedonia Avoided Civil War, 1990–2001,” in Understanding Civil War (Volume 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions): Evidence and Analysis, eds. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, 235 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005). 33 Ibid. 34 Mention, in this regard, should also be made of Vasil Tupurkovski, who, as the Macedonian representative to the federal presidency, played a crucial role in Macedonia’s orderly withdrawal from Yugoslavia. Similarly apprehensive of independence, Tupurkovski mediated between the larger republics in an effort to preserve and, ultimately, democratize Yugoslavia: Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia From the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 43. For Warren Zimmerman, the United States’ last ambassador to the former Yugoslavia, Tupurkovski stood out as a conciliatory, nonviolent, and democratic figure ‘against a background of opportunists and fanatics’: Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers (New York, NY: Times Books, 1996), 99. 35 Interview conducted by the author with Sasho Ordanoski, Skopje, August 3, 2006. 36 Interview with Thorvald Stoltenberg. 37 Interviews with Lord Owen and with Geert-Hinrich Ahrens. 38 Interview with Lord Owen.

Making Sense of Events

39

191

Interview conducted by the author with Marshall F. Harris, Washington, DC, March 14, 2006. 40 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 45. 41 Interview conducted by the author with Abiodun Williams, New York City, February 28, 2006. 42 Interview with Thorvald Stoltenberg. 43 Interview with Sasho Ordanoski. 44 Interview conducted by the author with Slobodan Casule, Skopje, July 26, 2006. 45 Interview with Ismet Ramadani. 46 Interviews conducted by the author with Stevo Pendarovski and Vlado Popovski, Bitola, July 27, 2006. 47 Interview with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid. 48 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 178. 49 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslvia, 262. 50 Interview with Lord Owen. 51 Interview with Geert-Hinrich Ahrens. 52 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 85. 53 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 43. 54 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 59. 55 Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804–1999 (New York, NY: Penguin, 1999), 656. 56 Interview conducted by the author with Nicholas Whyte, Brussels, July 18, 2006. 57 Interview conducted by the author with Islam Yusufi, Skopje, May 26, 2006. 58 Interview conducted by the author with Ferid Muhic, Skopje, May 31, 2006. 59 Interview with Ismet Ramadani. 60 Interview conducted by the author with Burim Sadiku, Skopje, August 7, 2006. 61 Interview with Sasho Ordanoski. 62 Interview with Trajan Gocevski. 63 Interview with Ismet Ramadani. 64 Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: Conflict-Sensitive Development in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), 392– 393. 65 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 237. 66 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 173–174. 67 Interview with Marshall F. Harris.

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68

Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Realism of Preventive Statecraft,” in Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?, eds. David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, 42 (Tokyo and New York, NY: United Nations University Press, 2003). 69 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 3. 70 Interview with Thorvald Stoltenberg. 71 Michael S. Lund, Barnett R. Rubin, and Fabienne Hara, “Learning from Burundi’s Failed Democratic Transition, 1993–96: Did International Initiatives Match the Problem?” in Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action, ed. Barnett R. Rubin, 91 (New York, NY: Century Foundation, 1998). 72 William DeMars et al., Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1999), 168. 73 Abiodun Williams, Preventing War: The United Nations and Macedonia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 42. 74 Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 656. 75 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 182. 76 Biljana Vankovska, “Current Perspectives on Macedonia, Part 1: The Path from ‘Oasis of Peace’ to ‘Powder Keg’ of the Balkans,” Heinrich Boll Foundation, http://www.boell.de/downloads/konflikt/vankovska_pt1.pdf (accessed September 12, 2005). 77 Interview with Ismet Ramadani. 78 Ibid. 79 Interview conducted by the author with Cvetin Chilimanov, Skopje, June 28, 2006. 80 Interview with Burim Sadiku. 81 James Pettifer, “The Albanians in Western Macedonia After FYROM Independence,” in The New Macedonian Question, ed. James Pettifer, 143–144 (London: Macmillan, 1999). 82 Interview conducted by the author with Ibrahim Mehmeti, Skopje, August 7, 2006. 83 Interview with Ismet Ramadani. 84 Interview with Ibrahim Mehmeti. 85 Interview conducted by the author with Alexis Brouhns, Brussels, July 17, 2006. 86 Denko Maleski, “The Causes of a War: Ethnic Conflict in Macedonia in 2001,” New Balkan Politics 8 (2003), http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/ napis.asp?id=10&lang=English (accessed April 7, 2006). 87 Vankovska, “Current Perspectives on Macedonia, Part 1.”

Making Sense of Events

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Interview conducted by the author with anonymous United States State Department official, Skopje, July 26, 2006. 89 Mark Laity, Whitehall Paper 68, Preventing War in Macedonia: PreEmptive Diplomacy for the 21st Century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 23. 90 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Macedonia: A Conflict Analysis, October 2003, 8, http://www.sida.se/shared/jsp/ download.jsp?f=SIDA3044en_MacConfAnaWEB.pdf&a=2899 (accessed October 14, 2005). 91 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 240. 92 David Binder and Preston Mendenhall, “Sex, Drugs and Guns in the Balkans,” MSNBC, June 2001, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3071971 (accessed January 8, 2006). 93 Robert Hislope, “Crime and Honor in a Weak State: Paramilitary Forces and Violence in Macedonia,” in Macedonia in the Aftermath of the Framework Agreement: Inventory, eds. Gordana Duvnjak, Nikola Gelevski, and Vladimir Milcin, 203 (Skopje: Foundation Open Society Institute, Macedonia, 2006). See, for instance, United States Senate, Republican Policy Committee, “The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton Policy Support Group with Terror, Drug Ties?” March 31, 1999, http://www.senate.gov/~rpc/releases/ 1999/fr033199.htm (accessed February 23, 2007). 94 Interview with Slobodan Casule, June 29, 2006. 95 Interview conducted by the author with Zhidas Daskalovski, Skopje, August 4, 2006. 96 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: Conflict-Sensitive Development in the 21st Century, 378. 97 Vankovska, “Current Perspectives on Macedonia, Part 1.” 98 Interview conducted by the author with anonymous United States State Department official, Skopje, July 28, 2006. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Interview conducted by the author with Jason Miko, Skopje, June 7, 2006. 102 Ibid. 103 Interview with Ibrahim Mehmeti. 104 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 241–242. 105 Laity, Preventing War in Macedonia, 22. 106 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 241–242. Information relating to Ahmeti’s political activities in Kosovo in the post1999 period is sparse and ambiguous; however, multiple anonymous sources in Pristina and Skopje, including within the Office of the President, confirm that

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Ahmeti did indeed seek to establish a political niche in the province – where he unsuccessfully contested elections – prior to the 2001 insurgency in Macedonia; interviews and email exchanges with anonymous bureaucrats, journalists, and activists, Skopje and Pristina, 2006 and 2008. 107 Interview with anonymous United States State Department official, July 26, 2006. 108 Interview conducted by the author with James Pardew, Brussels, July 18, 2006. 109 Zhidas Daskalovski, Walking on the Edge: Consolidating Multiethnic Macedonia 1989–2004 (Skopje: Zhidas Daskalovski, 2005), 185–186. 110 Interview conducted by the author with Zoran Jolevski, Skopje, August 7, 2006. 111 Ibid. 112 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 382. 113 Interview with Zoran Jolevski. 114 An early parliamentary election – the first in its history – was called in 2008 following Greece’s decision to block Macedonia’s NATO membership. VMRO-DPMNE was re-elected comfortably, and ultimately formed a coalition government with Ahmeti’s DUI. Nikola Gruevski continued in his role as prime minister. Branko Crvenkovski, who enjoyed a tense relationship with Gruevski, announced that he would not seek a second presidential term. Gjorgi Ivanov, the VMRO-DPMNE candidate, was elected Macedonia’s fourth president in April 2009. 115 Cindy R. Jebb and P.H. Liotta, Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 78. 116 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 206. 117 Interview conducted by the author with Henryk J. Sokalski, Warsaw, July 10, 2006. 118 Interview conducted by the author with Aleksandar Matovski, Skopje, August 4, 2006. 119 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 342–343. 120 Interview with Cvetin Chilimanov. 121 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 212. 122 Jebb and Liotta, Mapping Macedonia, 76. 123 Private ICFY correspondence (precise date and author not specified), “The David Owen Archive,” Sydney Jones Library Archives, University of Liverpool (accessed July 6, 2006). 124 Interview with Lord Owen. 125 Interview with Henryk J. Sokalski.

Making Sense of Events

126

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Interview with Lord Owen. Ibid. 128 Stevo Pendarovski, Contributions of the National Security System (Skopje: Office of the President, Republic of Macedonia, 2002), 23, quoted in Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 240. 129 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 382. 130 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 239. 131 Vankovska, “Current Perspectives on Macedonia, Part 1.” 132 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 382. 133 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 89. 134 DeMars et al., Breaking Cycles of Violence, 158. 135 Interview with Marshall F. Harris. 136 Miroslav Hadzic, “The Controversies of Euro-Atlantic Interventionism in the Balkans,” in International Intervention in the Balkans Since 1995, ed. Peter Siani-Davies, 63 (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2003). 137 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, “About the Stability Pact,” http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp (accessed February 18, 2007). 138 Marie-Janine Calic, “The Western Balkans on the Road Towards European Integration,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/id/03273.pdf (accessed July 29, 2006). 139 Lund, “Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999,” 199. 140 Interview conducted by the author with Biljana Vankovska, Skopje, May 30, 2006. 141 Interview conducted by the author with Stevo Pendarovski, Skopje, May 31, 2006. 142 Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 658. 143 Robert Hislope, “Between a Bad Peace and a Good War: Insights and Lessons from the Almost-War in Macedonia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 26, No. 1 (January 2003): 141. 144 Interview with Biljana Vankovska. 145 Laity, Preventing War in Macedonia, 13. 146 Scott Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War: The Violent Aftermath of the Kosovo Conflict (Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 2002), 163. 147 Interview conducted by the author with William L. Nash, Washington, DC, March 14, 2006. 148 Hislope, “Crime and Honor in a Weak State,” 201. 149 Taylor, Diary of an Uncivil War, 119. 150 Naser Miftari, “Policing the Protectors,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, June 30, 2003, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=bcr&s=f&o=156839&apc _state=henibcr2003 (accessed October 24, 2007). 127

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151

Paulin Kola, The Search for Greater Albania (London: Hurst, 2003),

378. 152

Nicholas Wood, “Albanian exiles threaten to escalate war,” The Guardian (London) May 21, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/may/ 21/balkans (accessed March 4, 2007). 153 Jebb and Liotta, Mapping Macedonia, 28. 154 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Macedonia: A Conflict Analysis, 16. 155 Tim Judah, “The Growing Pains of the Kosovo Liberation Army,” in Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, eds. Drezov, Gokay, and Waller, 22. 156 Hislope, “Crime and Honor in a Weak State,” 206. 157 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 246. 158 John Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 118–119. 159 Interview with anonymous United States State Department official, July 26, 2006. 160 Interviews with Sasho Ordanoski; and Slobodan Casule, July 26, 2006. 161 Interview with Charles A. Kupchan, Washington, DC, March 15, 2006. 162 Ibid. 163 Lund, “Greed and Grievance Diverted,” 239–240. 164 Raimo Vayrynen, “Challenges to Preventive Action: The Case of Macedonia,” in Developing a Culture of Conflict Prevention, ed. Anders Mellbourn, 97 (Stockholm: Gidlunds, 2004). 165 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 236–237. 166 Interview with Zoran Jolevski.

6 The Broader Significance of the Macedonian Experience

From the timely and multifaceted character of its initial intervention to the ultimate outbreak of conflict in 2001, Macedonia has been an important learning process for the international community. In many respects, the Macedonian experience constitutes a point of reference – significant for the initial pro-action of outside actors, and the innovative nature of their response, on the one hand, and the failure to adopt a sufficiently long-term approach to prevention, on the other. Of course, no two conflicts are ever the same. In the case of Macedonia, some exceptional factors were at play, which, collectively, helped facilitate a timely international response, initial peace, and then ultimate conflict. Nevertheless, this uniqueness should not take away from the broader practical and theoretical relevance of the Macedonian experience, and its applicability to high-risk societies in other parts of the world. As both conflict prevention success and failure, lessons may be deduced from Macedonia and applied to comparable contexts elsewhere. As an empirical case study, it offers valuable practical and theoretical insights into the factors and conditions that give rise to intrasocietal violence, particularly in multiethnic societies; into the possibilities and limitations of preventive practice; into when and how the international community should respond to incipient intrastate crises; and into the challenges facing external agents in identifying potential flashpoints, formulating appropriate strategies, and mobilizing timely responses. Extrapolating Key Policy Lessons

First and foremost, the Macedonian experience illustrates that prevention can work, that a timely, carefully designed, and coordinated international response can defuse tensions and consolidate peace in latent conflict contexts. It thus highlights the importance of pro-action,

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and of acting upon signs of impending crisis. It reinforces the value, inherent logic, and cost effectiveness – not only in terms of financial cost, but also in forestalling human, material, and environmental destruction and wider regional instability – of mobilizing a response in the formative stages of a conflict, before positions harden and dynamics assume an intractable character. As a conflict escalates, so policy options progressively narrow. As Gareth Evans puts it, prevention is about investing millions now to save billions later.1 Brad Thayer estimates the total cost of international preventive efforts in Macedonia by July 1997 at $255 million, while projecting the cost of an intermediate two-year conflict at some $15 billion.2 Undoubtedly, it is cheaper and easier to resolve a conflict prior to the outbreak of sustained violence, in contrast to the difficulties associated with repairing a society after it has been broken, and divisive legacies that can be exploited in future have been solidified. This is not to say that prevention is a riskfree exercise; to the contrary, it can be a dangerous, expensive, and timeconsuming undertaking. Yet, as Macedonia highlights, the costs and broader risks associated with protracted internal conflict are minuscule compared to that of sustained international action in the pre-violence stage. The central pillar of effective prevention, therefore, is pre-emption, understood not in the strategic war sense, but as a systematic and deliberate, long-term exercise intended to strengthen the structural basis for peace in a given society. Intervention should be conceptualized in broad, essentially nonmilitary terms, encompassing a diverse range of actors, from individual states, international organizations – security and financial – and regional bodies to the media, academia, and NGOs. It should be understood as a comprehensive, multidimensional process that combines a broad continuum of diplomatic, political, economic, social, humanitarian, environmental, regional, and, if necessary, military elements, implemented at various levels, from local to international. Designed to prevent situations from arising that will require future military intervention, it will promote political and economic development, enhance democratic governance and the rule of law, build confidence between divided communities, develop human capacities and ideas of nonviolent dispute resolution, foster civil society, and encourage regional cooperation. As such, conflict prevention should be understood in broad structural terms, as an ongoing process that attempts to diminish the likelihood of intrasocietal violence by augmenting the foundations for long-term stability, as opposed to a transitory, ad hoc reaction to emerging or existing crises.3 As Macedonia underscores, the

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purpose of prevention should not be merely to defuse immediate sources of instability, but to build the political, economic, social, and regional conditions for long-term peace. Of course, the precise approach and strategy will be determined by the exact stage of conflict: if a country is unstable and possesses strong risk factors, yet conflict is not imminent, a structural approach should be adopted, whereas, conversely, if dynamics have gestated to such an extent that overt violence is impending, a more immediate, operational approach to ameliorate near-term threats is appropriate. The key is to integrate short-term strategies into a more comprehensive framework that targets the root, underlying conditions that force a people to violence. Otherwise, as in the case of Macedonia, the situation will ultimately return to square one. The underlying lesson to be drawn from the Macedonian experience, therefore, is the importance of long-term international engagement in unstable societies. While such a commitment is expensive and time-consuming, it is markedly less so than post-conflict intervention and reconstruction. A short-term approach, in isolation, is inherently futile and counterproductive, a Band-Aid solution that – by treating the violent symptoms, rather than the root causes – merely postpones violence. Near-term instruments, such as preventive peacekeepers, diplomacy, good offices, and targeted sanctions, are certainly effective in de-accelerating conflict, but not in developing more permanent solutions to intrasocietal instability. If not incorporated into a longer-term approach designed to solidify the structural foundation of a given society, and to enhance its capacity to resolve disputes through institutional, nonviolent means, these instruments merely freeze a situation, as opposed to establishing the conditions for a more permanent peace. If a country continues to be weak and unrepresentative, economically underdeveloped, characterized by intergroup disparities, disenfranchised ethnic minorities, and regional instability, the likelihood of future conflict will remain high. The key is to capitalize on the space provided by operational strategies to initiate a more comprehensive, longer lasting peacebuilding process. UNPREDEP is a case in point, underscoring the importance of incorporating broader issues of peacebuilding into peacekeeping missions. As Major General William Nash observes, The real thing that was missing in UNPREDEP, and this is characteristic of too much of the way in which we handle the problem of conflict prevention, is that it’s too easy for us to make it a military problem, and not take the requisite political, economic, and social actions in parallel to that. So as we saw the ethnic divides cause wars

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elsewhere, we put up a shield to prevent a spillover into Macedonia, but there was no internal effort to address the political, economic, and social aspects that would bring about internal conflict. While the umbrella put up by the military was almost perfect, what happened underneath that umbrella did not prevent 2001. So it was a great instant of conflict prevention of one conflict, but not the essential conflict that posed a greater threat.4

In this respect, UNPREDEP raises the issue of the precise extent to which peacekeeping missions should engage in peacebuilding tasks such as political, economic, and social development. The latter is problematic, not least in terms of obtaining the necessary financial, material, and human resources, and acquiring host government consent. What is plain, however, is that, if not accompanied by substantive longer-term preventive policies, preventive peacekeeping can only defuse immediate tensions, as opposed to mitigate underlying conflict conditions. Accordingly, it is critical that such deployments are embedded in more comprehensive, multidimensional strategies. Nevertheless, with the innovative deployment of preventive peacekeepers, the UN undertook a paradigmatic shift in peacekeeping practice, and discovered a proactive, cost-effective instrument for managing tensions and strengthening short-term security in an unstable, transition society. UNPREDEP contributed to six years of peace at a relatively modest cost of $50 million per annum.5 Though strictly preventive in mandate, the deployment of blue helmets represented an important confidence-building measure whose presence provided breathing space for political and other progress in the country. A central element of this mission was the participation of American troops, a major departure from traditional attitudes toward peacekeeping in Washington. While the United States has not featured in peacekeeping operations under the UN banner since, the Macedonian experience underscores the symbolism and added credibility associated with an American contribution. From an American perspective, argues Nancy Soderberg, this is the key lesson to emerge from Macedonia.6 UNPREDEP, moreover, demonstrates that the success of any peacekeeping operation – preventive or otherwise – is contingent on how clearly defined, achievable, and adequately resourced its mandate is, on the one hand, and how quickly peacekeepers can be deployed, on the other.7 Yet bureaucratic processes pertaining to such as troop composition, procurement, rules of engagement, home country parliamentary approval, and host government consent do not lend to timely operationalization. As with every aspect of prevention, timing is

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key. In this respect, a rapid reaction capability may help overcome many of these obstacles. A foreign legion operating under the UN banner could, in theory, circumvent many of the operational and bureaucratic roadblocks associated with the deployment of blue helmets. In the case of UNPROFOR and Bosnia-Herzegovina, an ambiguous and underresourced mandate, borne of international disunity, and inflated expectations doomed the mission to failure. The fact that lightly-armed peacekeepers with limited rules of engagement were deployed in a context where there was no peace to keep is another important factor in explaining the failure of UNPROFOR; indeed, in some instances, the deployment of peacekeepers may be inappropriate, a compromise strategy in an absence of political will for the use of military force. Bosnia-Herzegovina, clearly, is a case in point.8 The underlying lesson from the Bosnian peacekeeping experience is that such troops are not designed to intervene during war.9 As Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis posit, the UN is poor at war, that is to say, imposing a settlement by force, but good at peace, or mediating and implementing a negotiated settlement.10 In the final analysis, UNPREDEP illustrates that, under the right conditions, preventive international action can work. From the perspective of its cost-effectiveness and the fundamental principle underpinning the concept that it is easier for the international community to intervene prior to – rather than after – the outbreak of violence, it represents a model of prevention, and an important benchmark for future UN peacekeeping. Macedonia is similarly instructive for highlighting the growing maturity of regional organizations as security actors, both in terms of their ability to manage and resolve conflicts within their neighborhoods, as well as – certainly in the case of the EU – their transformative power, or their capacity to leverage countries into institutionalizing defined norms and practices, through the incentive of future membership. This soft power influence is particularly pronounced in weak states – such as Macedonia – that perceive accession into collective institutions as the cornerstone of their long-term stability. The history of enlargement has illustrated Brussels’ ability to shape public policymaking in candidate countries, and facilitate the attainment of necessary political, economic, and legal standards. In the case of the EU, the process of integration is central to the stabilization of peripheral, unstable regions in the continent, and thus serves a key preventive function. Where its previous policy of reaction and containment dichotomized the EU-Balkan chasm, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the Stabilization and Association Process have been central to the stabilization and

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democratization of the region. It is through the incentive of membership, in effect, that the countries of the Balkans, including, crucially and belatedly, Serbia,11 have abandoned nationalism and irredentism for Europe. The lure of future integration has likewise been key to keeping a fragmented, post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina intact. As Marie-Janine Calic notes, the lure of EU membership is the most powerful political asset Brussels has to strengthen stability and good neighborly relations in the Balkans.12 As argued in Chapter 4, the prospect of EU membership proved largely decisive in averting wider war in Macedonia and maintaining stability post-conflict by ensuring implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Integration represents a critical peacebuilding instrument, a formidable vehicle for enhancing stability, facilitating norm alignment, consolidating responsible governance, liberal democracy, and the rule of law, promoting peaceful conflict resolution, strengthening institutions, guaranteeing minority rights, and encouraging regional cooperation.13 Moreover, as the Central European experience highlights, the establishment of a clear roadmap for accession enhances the attractiveness of aspiring countries to foreign investors.14 One only needs to observe the transformative and modernizing impact EU integration has had on the former Communist states of Central Europe and the Baltic Sea, or, indeed, on the likes of Spain, Portugal, and Greece before them. In the Western Balkans, the Stabilization and Association Process has facilitated tangible political, economic, and legal reforms, and helped diminish the prospects for future conflict. Abandoning enlargement, and thus forfeiting its principal lever of influence, would undermine this process, undercut the long-term stability of the region, and, by emboldening trans-border crime, illegal immigration, and interethnic tensions, directly harm Brussels’ interests. As Alexis Brouhns argues, the EU ‘can have no doubts about expansion into the Balkans. It cannot close this door due to an internal identity crisis.’15 The EU has invested too heavily and has too much to lose to abandon this process now; to be sure, the Balkans’ problems – interethnic tensions, organized crime, corruption – are the EU’s problems. Ghettoizing the region by removing the prospect of full integration would be inherently counterproductive.16 The belated granting in December 2009 of visa-free travel to the citizens of Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro was highly symbolic in this respect. Certainly, the EU constitutes an important security factor in the region. With the United States divesting resources post-9/11, as its foreign policy priorities have shifted elsewhere, the EU has naturally

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assumed primary external responsibility for the Balkans.17 The fact that EU states supply the bulk of peacekeeping troops engaged in the region as part of various NATO missions is instructive.18 Indeed, over and above the process of Europeanization through integration, the role of the EU as a security player is reflected in its various peacekeeping, military, and police missions,19 both in the Balkans and, increasingly, beyond Europe’s borders. In line with its growing diplomatic and economic clout, Brussels has adopted a more robust international security identity, underscored by the European Security Strategy (ESS), a document adopted in 2003 outlining the strategic reach of the organization. In parallel to this, mechanisms such as the ESDP give Brussels security coherence, and augment its capacity to deter and manage crises throughout the world. It has made a concerted effort to strengthen its military and civilian crisis management capabilities, launching security operations through military, police, rule of law, and election monitoring missions in, among others, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Aceh, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia.20 Its experience in the latter highlights the growing security capability of the EU, as well as underscoring the maturity of its CFSP. In both the immediate pre- and post-conflict stage, the EU has promoted a clear, multifaceted approach – characterized by its high commissioner for CFSP, and encompassing on-the-ground political, economic, military, and police elements – to consolidate peace in Macedonia and strengthen its alignment with the union.21 The EU’s experience in Macedonia in 2001 stands in contrast to its fractured response to the former Yugoslavia a decade earlier. As a test of its post-Cold War cohesiveness, and ability to articulate and implement a common policy, the EU undoubtedly failed. Yet for all the valid criticisms that followed, the organization’s failure in Yugoslavia must be viewed in the context of the circumstances of the day: grappling with its post-Cold War identity, the EU’s security personality and peacemaking capacity was still being defined. As a supra-national entity, it had yet to come to grips with the expectations of it as a political, economic, and military power. The mechanisms and institutional framework for the application of this power were still being developed: for all the talk of a common foreign and security policy, the concept remained more symbolic than substantive. Upon assuming leadership of the Yugoslav crisis, Jacques Poos, the foreign minister of Luxembourg, which held the rotating EU presidency, boldly – and, in the final analysis, infamously – claimed that ‘the hour of Europe . . . has dawned.’ 22 Such bombast, however, clearly belied, at the time, the

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organization’s actual capacity to respond effectively to a crisis of such magnitude. In short, Yugoslavia collapsed at an ill-opportune point in EU history. Its management of the Macedonian crisis, conversely, proved a vindication of the organization’s mission statement: by 2001, Brussels had developed a qualitatively more coherent foreign, security, and defense policy, giving it the institutional capacity to address the sort of challenges with which it was faced in the early- and mid-1990s.23 While the absence of a military remains a weakness, and perceptions persist that it lacks ambition in the sphere of foreign policy, particularly in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty and concomitant bureaucratic reconfiguration, the EU now has the means and confidence to engage in a variety of security functions, from conflict prevention, crisis management, and peace enforcement to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, in Europe and beyond.24 The EU is also significant for demonstrating how regionalism, by promoting ideological convergence, and, if necessary, the pooling of sovereignty, reduces the likelihood of conflict between member states, and, by extension, enhances national, regional, and global order. The creation of the EU, as Barry Buzan notes, was partly an international security strategy to mitigate Franco-German rivalry and its potential to provoke armed conflict between the two.25 By explicitly rejecting war as a policy instrument and dispute resolution mechanism in their relations with co-members,26 regionalization constitutes an important long-term prevention strategy. The establishment of common institutions, or – in the words of Karl Deutsch – pluralistic security communities,27 based on shared values and institutional practices, is an important means to reduce threat perceptions, and enhance cross-national trust and cooperation within a given region.28 In the Balkans, the prospect of European integration has helped eliminate historic irredentist desires, as countries have opted for future EU membership over revanchism. For weak states, moreover, regionalization may be the only means to genuine national security.29 Post-Cold War, security has increasingly been regionalized – EU, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, Shanghai Cooperation Organization – as states seek common solutions to common threats perceived resistant to national security strategies.30 In the case of the Western Balkans, the process of achieving a sense of community is ongoing, and will develop over time, facilitated by common interests and objectives, and norm and institutional convergence through the process of EU integration. What is sure is that economic interdependence and a common (EU) destiny provide an important basis for good neighborly relations. In this regard, the

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Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) that succeeded it in 2008, have established an important framework for promoting closer collaboration on issues of mutual concern and benefit. Indeed, ultimate accession demands it. For example, various bilateral Free Trade Agreements have been signed, and regional attempts to combat organized crime and establish a common energy market have been initiated, within this framework.31 While often underacknowledged in the literature, the OSCE, like the EU, has been an important stabilizing factor in Macedonia, monitoring its borders for signs of outside aggression, promoting peaceful coexistence between its ethnic communities through confidence-building projects and educational initiatives, and preaching political moderation. In the post-conflict phase, the organization helped consolidate the peace attained at Ohrid by overseeing the return of displaced persons and redeployment of police to former crisis regions. Consistent with a redefined mandate to reflect on-the-ground developments, it also assumed leadership of police sector reform, a process that encompassed the recruitment and training of 1,000 cadets from ethnic minority communities, a key provision of the Framework Agreement. Emphasizing the concept of “community policing,”32 the OSCE, among other things, advocated the creation of Citizen Advisory Groups, informal forums to facilitate dialogue between the police and citizenry, and renew public confidence – particularly within minority communities – in the Macedonian police force.33 The OSCE has similarly lent assistance to successive governments in other crucial aspects of the post-conflict reform process, including decentralization. For example, it has provided training to municipal civil servants in areas of leadership and public finance management, thus strengthening institutions of local self-government.34 In parallel to this, it has initiated various projects to buttress civil society and the rule of law; in the latter domain, the OSCE has trained judges and prosecutors, established legal aid services in remote areas, assisted the authorities in the establishment of a national ombudsman, and augmented local antitrafficking capacities.35 In so doing, the OSCE has been instrumental in capacity- and institution-building within the Macedonian context. In helping create a police force that more accurately reflects the country’s ethnic composition, it has enhanced the legitimacy of an institution that had traditionally been viewed with suspicion by large segments of the population. Put simply, the OSCE has been a reassuring constant and purveyor of values throughout Macedonia’s existence,36 promoting good governance, augmenting democratic processes, and moving the country

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toward Euro-Atlantic integration. The organization has performed a vital, sustained peacemaking function in Macedonia while other third parties often dithered and procrastinated. From the establishment of its field mission in 1992, it has cultivated a level of expertise and depth of contacts – from the grass roots to elite level – that other external parties active in the country have frequently lacked. It is instructive to note that, as the 2001 crisis unfolded, many of these actors turned to the OSCE for local know-how.37 Macedonia also illustrates the importance of clearly defined, coordinated, and multifaceted international responses to incipient crises, combining diplomatic, political, economic, regional, and other strategies.38 Increasingly complex crises such as that in Macedonia demand multidimensional policy responses that target conflict-inducing conditions at national, regional, and global levels, including neighboring instability and the regulation of small arms and conflict goods. A key lesson to arise from the Macedonian experience, for example, is the importance of adopting a regional approach to prevention, particularly if neighboring states are weak, conflict-ridden, and/or bound by ethnic, political, or economic ties. A local context cannot be approached in isolation, and divorced from the broader regional one: as Kosovo illustrates, an inability to resolve a dispute in one country can have a direct destabilizing influence on its neighbors. Regional factors, such as meddling from neighboring states or a spillover of conflict, can shape local dynamics and directly accelerate the potential for violence. National security cannot be obtained in a regional vacuum, in an absence of broader regional stability. Indeed, the outbreak of violence in Macedonia underscores how national securities are increasingly interlinked, particularly where ethnic communities overlap state borders. The example of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are linked by a crossborder Pashtun community, is pertinent in this sense: without order in the latter, particularly in the rugged tribal region, peace is unlikely in the former. Similarly, Macedonia highlights how the presence of multiple preventive agents can facilitate division of labor, the pooling of resources, and burden sharing; interorganizational and intergovernmental cooperation and coordination are essential in this respect. To be sure, complementarity and aggregate impact of response are critical to any preventive endeavor, enabling diverse resources and strengths to be brought to bear on conflict dynamics. For outside initiatives to succeed, however, local stakeholders must be receptive to international engagement, and ultimately assume ownership of the preventive process. In the absence of local cooperation,

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and a political and public will for peace, prevention is problematic, regardless of how well designed and proactive the external approach. The international community can only do so much: it can articulate solutions, offer incentives, and attempt to guide local actors in a nonviolent direction. Yet, ultimately, peace will prevail only if it is embraced by local elites and populations. Kiro Gligorov notes that no amount of money, nor the prospect of EU membership, could have softened the entrenched positions of Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, and brought Yugoslavia back from the edge of war.39 Linked to local cooperation, perceived international neutrality is critical; by attaining local trust, the ability of third parties to successfully execute relevant mandates is made considerably easier. The example of Macedonia is instructive: where, at independence, the international community was seen to be reinforcing the country’s sovereignty through its various preventive missions and functions, it was perceived – at least in the eyes of ethnic Macedonians – to be undercutting the authority of the Macedonian state with its actions in 2001. While this did not detract from the international community’s ability to coerce a weak state into accepting and implementing the peace settlement, negative public perceptions endangered the safety of its field personnel. Macedonia – and the former Yugoslavia more broadly – also reveal the importance of elite behavior and quality leadership. Indeed, the stability or otherwise of weak states, particularly if in a transition phase, depends much on the individual personalities, rationality, and leadership skills of its elite. While invariably shunned by academia given its immeasurability, the personality of a leader – by helping shape the aims and objectives of a country, including its commitment to power sharing and receptiveness to outside engagement – is often decisive. In some instances, local elites may desire conflict, perceiving war as a calculated policy decision, thus problematizing international efforts to bring about peace. In the case of Yugoslavia, Gligorov made qualitatively different choices to many of his fellow republican leaders, which helped guide Macedonia in a nonviolent direction. The same applies to Boris Trajkovski during the 2001 crisis, when his moderation clearly worked in favor of a resolution, in contrast to certain individuals within the government of the day. The importance of this quality is difficult both to quantify and to replicate; as Evans contends, When it comes to this crucial ingredient of leadership, there is an awful lot of pure chance in play. So much does seem to depend just on the luck of the draw: whether at a time of fragility and transition a country finds itself with a Mandela or a Milosevic or a Mugabe; an

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Ataturk or an Arafat; a Rabin who can see and seize the moment, and change course, or someone who never will. . . . Good leadership is probably the single most obvious and the single most important [lesson]. But it remains the hardest of all to get right.40

What Else We Have Learned

1. Insofar as it determines the nature of the response, outsiders’ interpretation of the dynamics driving a given conflict is crucial. In the former Yugoslavia, the international community’s emphasis – rightly or wrongly – was on the ethnic dimension. Yet, as Macedonia illustrates, there is a need to devote due attention and resources to non-ethnic sources of instability in putatively “ethnic” conflicts. These threats can often be the most pressing, and may adversely impact the ethnic cleavages third parties are attempting to resolve. Fatalistic and often simplistic interpretations, conversely, merely contribute to flawed policymaking. The haphazard international response in Yugoslavia can partly be explained by a misreading of Balkan history and divergent interpretations vis-à-vis the roots of the crisis on the part of external actors, which, based on the thesis that these were historically predetermined conflicts immune to international intervention, promoted inaction. Certainly, it ignored the long periods of peaceful co-existence between the various south Slav nations. Ethnicity per se was not so much the defining feature in the Yugoslav wars as the exploitation of this ethnicity for political purposes, a nuance key policymakers and academics in the West often misunderstood. As George H.W. Bush said at the time: ‘you have ancient ethnic rivalries that have cropped up as Yugoslavia is dissolved or getting dissolved. It isn’t going to be solved by sending in the 82nd Airborne.’41 2. Macedonia reinforces the importance of early and sustained American involvement. Immaterial of its Iraqi and Afghan experiences, the United States’ diplomatic and military credibility within the international system remains unique and unparalleled, respected like no other. With all deference to the EU and its evolving foreign and defense architecture, American leadership, and the projection of its power in an emerging crisis area, are invariably decisive, strengthening and legitimizing all other preventive initiatives. In Yugoslavia, the reluctance by successive administrations in Washington to project American power, and the concomitant decision to devolve leadership and responsibility to an emerging EU, emboldened the aggressors, and seriously weakened international efforts to resolve the conflict. American disengagement proved misguided, with Brussels, in its first real experiment in common

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foreign and security policy, lacking the consensus, authority, and institutional machinery to implement a coherent strategy that could influence the warring parties. Only once Washington belatedly assumed leadership, and brought to bear its unique civilian and military influence, was a political settlement reached. 3. Macedonia likewise highlights the continuing relevance of NATO as a post-Cold War security actor, including in geographic areas beyond its traditional scope, both in terms of peace enforcement – as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan – and conflict resolution, as in Macedonia. Well-equipped and -trained, and with the capacity to deploy troops quickly and efficiently, NATO has a crucial peacemaking function to play. Indeed, while beset by internal divisions and economic pressures to trim national defense spending, NATO remains the most formidable military alliance in the world. In the case of the Balkans, NATO – like the EU – has also promoted reform and stability through the process of enlargement. The alliance is an important security guarantor and threat deterrent in the region. This is clearly the case of Macedonia: with 8,000 troops and a defense budget half that of Luxembourg’s,42 the country’s long-term security is very much contingent on its coming under the Euro-Atlantic collective security umbrella. Both from a substantive and symbolic viewpoint, NATO integration is critical; by guaranteeing its borders, many of Macedonia’s historic insecurities will dissipate. Yet Greece’s decision to block Macedonia’s entry into the alliance, despite satisfying all objective criteria, problematizes this process, while simultaneously undermining NATO’s future strategic plans given that expansion into the former eastern bloc represents a key component of its future identity and relevance. 4. Macedonia demonstrates the need to stem the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and highlights the importance of effectively disarming and reintegrating former combatants into a post-conflict society, including in neighboring countries emerging from conflict. In Kosovo, the failure to comprehensively dismantle the KLA had adverse consequences for southern Serbia and Macedonia. To be sure, disarmament and demobilization are vital components of national and regional order. From a broad disarmament perspective, steps can be taken at national, regional, and international levels to ameliorate the illicit movement of small arms and light weapons within and across borders, and, concomitant to this, limit the ability of rogue actors – from criminals and terrorists to those who employ child soldiers and states that repress their own people – to obtain access to them. In a major development, in October 2009, the UN agreed to adopt a timetable for formal negotiations

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to craft an international treaty governing the transfer of conventional weapons. Ultimately, in the absence of guns, wars such as Macedonia’s cannot be fought. Linked to processes of demobilization, Macedonia highlights the issue of amnesty, and how its use can be essential to a durable, post-conflict peace. In the Macedonian case, amnesty and political integration of the rebels, however unpalatable to ethnic Macedonians, have been important factors in post-conflict stability, with the onus falling on former NLA elites to transform themselves from self-styled freedom fighters to serious political actors. 5. Macedonia also demonstrates how external forces can aggravate local conflict dynamics, in this instance malignant diaspora influences, cross-border arms flows, and weak, unstable neighboring countries and broader regions. 6. Similarly, Macedonia highlights the danger of lawless border areas, which are favorable to the planning and execution of insurgency, and, linked to this, the malign influence of organized crime. Certainly, Macedonia underscores how organized criminal networks can flourish in weak states. By engendering lawlessness, undermining the rule of law, fostering corruption, and deterring foreign investors, they weaken internal security and the legitimacy of state institutions. Organized crime is a major impediment to national development and long-term stability; in the words of Bernard Segarra, ‘the criminal aspect is a real cancer for the Balkans.’ 43 Criminal influences, rather than nationalism, now largely represent the greatest threat to regional stability. In Macedonia, post2001, in excess of 130 Albanians have been killed in crime-related incidents,44 many of them innocent bystanders caught up in turf battles fought out by Albanian criminal gangs. Indeed, it is these internecine wars being conducted in northwestern Macedonia that are now the greatest source of insecurity to Albanian-Macedonians, as opposed to discrimination from the state. 7. The 2001 insurgency, meanwhile, reinforces the value of transAtlantic cooperation. It underscores the importance of international coherence, and of external actors speaking with a single voice, which, in turn, enhances international credibility and effectiveness.45 Linked to this, it highlights the ability of third parties to positively impact conflict dynamics by proffering carefully designed and balanced incentives and disincentives to local protagonists. Based on the premise that conflict parties are rational actors, a package of sticks and carrots, applied early, can defuse tensions by softening entrenched positions, and thus facilitate compromise.

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Certainly in the case of weak, peripheral states, the international community holds great leverage. Punitive collective measures such as sanctions or the threat – implied or otherwise – to resort to military force can transform immediate conflict dynamics by deterring or punishing undesirable behavior by local actors, and convince them to desist from a particular course of action. Note Libya, and the voluntary abandonment of its covert nuclear program, in this regard. Economic and arms sanctions, if applied early and consistently, and properly enforced and monitored, can undercut the grip on power of belligerent regimes and restrict their means to violence. It can represent an effective operational instrument for pushing conflict parties toward a negotiated settlement, a policy bridge between diplomacy and force designed to promote international compliance.46 The efficacy of a sanctions regime, though, is dependent on several factors. The precise design is critical: economic sanctions should be carefully targeted, ensuring their impact is most acutely felt by the local elite, as opposed to the population at large. If large-scale humanitarian consequences ensue, sanctions will prove counterproductive, solidifying negative perceptions of the international community and strengthening the popularity of the regime in question. 47 Similarly, during Yugoslavia’s disintegration, the decision of the UN Security Council to impose a blanket arms embargo inadvertently facilitated Bosnian-Serb advances by helping skew the distribution of arms further in favor of the Serbs. An ostensibly neutral strategy intended to contain the fighting, in practice, it merely reinforced the aggressors.48 The international community should likewise minimize the collateral impact on neighboring countries economically connected to the sanctioned state, and, if necessary, establish formal compensatory mechanisms to cover losses. Sanctions on the rump Yugoslavia, for instance, were placing a major strain on Milosevic, but also contributing to economic collapse in Macedonia. Ultimately, the success of any sanctions regime is conditional on international unity; however, given divergent interests, particularly among the permanent members of the Security Council, the imposition of effective and timely punitive measures – be they economic sanctions or military intervention – is highly problematic. Nevertheless, if conflict is imminent, or has erupted, and all other nonmilitary initiatives have failed, a credible threat to resort to military force represents a valuable deterrent instrument, particularly in instances of wars of aggression, gross human rights abuses, and/or state-sponsored genocide. Given its coercive function, such a strategy, while radical, should not be interpreted as antithetical to prevention.49 In some cases,

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where an aggressor respects only force, and diplomacy has consistently failed to produce a settlement, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a resort to punitive military action may be decisive in transforming conflict dynamics. This option, however, is contingent upon there being sufficient political will and justification for the international community to pursue such a course of action. As with any form of coercive diplomacy, a military threat must have sufficient credibility to have the desired effect. In the event of continued belligerence and hostility on the part of local protagonists, the international community must have the will and the resolve to make good upon its threats. False threats merely expose weakness, and embolden the aggressor. Yet, post-Iraq, the political and public will for military intervention in those countries with the wherewithal to undertake such action is clearly absent. In this respect, as with peacekeeping, a permanent multilateral rapid reaction force, situated within the UN system and/or within regional organizations, comprising troops from its member states and with the means to respond rapidly and decisively to emerging crises, could be established to fill this void. NATO has an important role to play in this sense; note the NATO Response Force, which is designed to give the alliance a rapid deployment capability. Regardless, the key point is that the threat to resort to military force can often prove a decisive short-term preventive strategy, one that serves to strengthen and legitimate diplomatic initiatives. In the Macedonian instance, this was implied through UNPREDEP and, in particular, the presence of American troops. In the absence of such a threat, diplomacy is rendered toothless – in the words of Herbert Okun, ‘like [playing] baseball without a bat.’50 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather than deploying neutral and lightlyarmed peacekeepers, the international community should have had the resolve to threaten the aggressors with military force. Not only did this indecisiveness undermine the authority of the foreign negotiators pushing for a political settlement,51 it also afforded the Bosnian-Serbs carte blanche. In the absence of a credible threat, they frequently violated UN-proclaimed no-fly zones, disarmed and kidnapped peacekeepers, stole weaponry from under their guard, and generally displayed ‘utter disrespect for the UN and the West.’ 52 While the UN, EU, and Russia harbored strong reservations, it was only through the belated exercise of NATO airpower that the war was brought to an end. NATO’s two-week aerial bombardment of Bosnian-Serb military targets – launched in late August 1995 – achieved in two weeks what three years of mediation had failed, namely, coercing the Bosnian-Serbs into

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negotiating an end to the war. As Warren Zimmerman, referring to Western reluctance to use air power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, contends, Those who practice diplomacy need constantly to be reminded of the human damage their efforts, or lack of them, can cause. For three years of the Bosnian war, the Western countries . . . attempted to rebuff the Serbian aggressors, bloated by their use of force, without making them fear that force would in turn be used against them. Western diplomacy was reduced to a kind of cynical theater, a pretence of useful activity, a way of disguising a lack of will. Diplomacy without force became an unloaded weapon, impotent and ridiculous.53

Additional Lessons and Theoretical Issues Arising from the Macedonian Case

The outbreak of violence in Macedonia in 2001 offers several instructive lessons about conflict causation and international approaches to the resolution of intrastate conflict. First and foremost, it underscores the importance of fostering inclusiveness and political parity in multiethnic societies, addressing minority grievances, and cultivating a common identity. The Macedonian experience raises important theoretical questions about national identity, state-building, and peaceful coexistence in newly independent, ethnically diverse polities. It illustrates that political, economic, and cultural equality represents the key to placating ethnic minorities, legitimizing the state, and, particularly in those instances when state borders are incongruous with the boundaries of ethnolinguistic communities, tempering secessionist tendencies. The accommodation of minorities, and the creation of a genuinely representative political system, one that gives a stake to all communities, are crucial to the long-term stability of any post-independence state. Concentrating political power in a single community, conversely, promotes only instability and secessionism. To be sure, ethnic identifications hold particular resonance in environments characterized by political disparities and perceived collective grievance. While internal stability is often difficult to attain in multiethnic states with weak national cohesiveness, often mere amalgams of tribes brought together by Great Power politics, common, cross-cutting identities can bind disparate peoples, and lend legitimacy to a central state authority. Certainly, deep ethnic divisions and societal inequalities make the definition and assertion of a national identity problematic. The absence of a shared identity undermines the construction of workable national institutions, while perceptions of exclusion and illegitimacy

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among segments of the population render a state unsustainable in the long term.54 In order to exercise authority and govern effectively, a state must have legitimacy in the eyes of its people. In this respect, political inclusiveness through appropriate power sharing arrangements and institutionalized decision-making processes, allied to the provision of adequate social services and the cultivation of a common (non-ethnic) identity based on shared interests and a shared destiny, represents an important basis for national stability. A state must provide political, economic, and cultural incentives to ethnic minorities to gain their loyalty. As Macedonia demonstrates, unrepresentative state organs and the legal classification of peoples alienate minorities by projecting exclusiveness. In this sense, the key is to establish inclusive institutions, on the one hand, and define the state in liberal, non-ethnic terms, based on the concept of citizenship and the rights of individuals, as opposed to those of groups, on the other. Representative institutions, coupled with the articulation of common interests and objectives, such as EU integration in the case of Macedonia, provide an important foundation and incentive for cooperation across ethnic cleavages. This, in turn, can enhance social cohesion by facilitating intergroup interactions, helping debunk misperceptions of the Other, and – proceeding from the premise that identity is fluid and malleable – ultimately transcending traditional (ethnic) identifications by promoting a common, cross-cutting (for instance, European) identity that cuts across ethnoregional distinctions. By entering into a system of shared values, argues Ismet Ramadani, European integration will narrow the chasm between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians.55 As Erwan Fouere notes, this process of EU accession is the one element that brings the country together, and, clearly, is contributing to a political culture conducive to interethnic dialogue and cooperation.56 Macedonia illustrates that multi-ethnicity should not necessarily be a hindrance to peace and stability in weak states: while it can make political consensus harder to attain, ethnic heterogeneity does not render conflict inevitable, just as ethnic homogeneity does not guarantee peace. As the former Yugoslavia demonstrates, ethnic conflict is not a historically predetermined process, but rather a manifestation of the choices and actions of individuals who make the calculated decision to lead a people to war. In the case of Yugoslavia, conflict was not provoked by putative ancient ethnic hatreds – with the exception of World War II, the various south Slav nations had co-existed peacefully, and enjoyed significant levels of intermarriage. To the contrary, it was the result of systemic decay and illegitimacy, partly brought about by an

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unforeseen external event, in this instance the end of the Cold War, and to the purposive actions of manipulative politicians. While nationalism played a seminal role in Yugoslavia’s destruction, the federation’s malaise and ultimate collapse were prompted by deeper, structural factors that, collectively, rendered the Yugoslav arrangement illegitimate and engendered an environment favorable to inter-republic rivalry and to the promulgation of extreme nationalist rhetoric. Attributing its collapse exclusively to nationalism is to offer a perfunctory explanation to a far more complex process of disintegration brought about by political and economic atrophy, which eroded the viability of the state over time, and helped create a void in which ethnic grievances could be articulated by republican elites. In particular, Yugoslavia’s collapse can be explained by the inability of a weak federal system, emasculated over a prolonged period, to satisfy the competing constitutional and economic demands of its major nations. The death of strongman Tito, in this respect, was critical: alive, he maintained order among a disparate group of peoples by suppressing all manifestations of nationalism; his passing resuscitated debates on national identity and the liberalization of Yugoslavia’s political and economic system. Post-Tito, power shifted from the center to the republics, giving rise to a diffuse system conducive to deadlock and inertia. The power vacuum created by Tito’s absence was exacerbated by sustained economic decline, borne largely of unsustainable levels of foreign debt, which had ensured almost unprecedented levels of prosperity in a Communist context, and, linked to this, the end of the Cold War and concomitant international patronage. This crisis directly aggravated inter-republican rivalry and the sense of political disorder, and gave rise to the individuals who would ultimately lead the country to its violent death. In such a depressed and fluid milieu, the nationalist politics of the likes of Milosevic, who exploited perceived historical injustices against the Serb nation to rise to power, and, once there, sought to push through policies designed to strengthen Serbia at the expense of the other republics, of Tudjman, whose aggressive policies gave Croatian-Serbs pretext for war, and of Radovan Karadzic, who played on his people’s fear of an Islamic fundamentalist Bosnian state, found great resonance. In all these instances, politicians made the conscious decision to appeal to putative racial hatreds and manipulate ethnic resentments and historic fears for their own political ends. The opening of this Pandora’s Box sealed Yugoslavia’s fate: it rendered the south Slav polity unfeasible, and ensured it would disintegrate violently as opposed to peacefully. In the final analysis, conflict – or a lack

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thereof – is contingent on how ethnic diversity is managed and power shared, not in its very presence; contrast, for example, accommodating Macedonia with triumphalist, antagonistic Croatia at independence. In some cases, though, as in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, durable interethnic co-existence may prove elusive. Indeed, the Iraq experience raises two important theoretical issues. First, regardless of the will and resources of external actors, and the confidence-building measures they initiate, groups that desire war – be they ideologically- and/or profitdriven – and seek to subvert the peace process will continue to exist. If such groups are present, international attempts to rectify the underlying sources of conflict – if not futile – certainly become more problematic. Moreover, intergroup differences may prove intractable, thus undermining international efforts to develop and consolidate peace. As such, clear limits exist as to what outside actors can achieve in a given context. In such instances, the attainment of peace may be impossible, immaterial of approach and method. Conflict understood as a form of catharsis, conversely, by allowing groups to release and ultimately exhaust their putative hatreds, may represent the only rational solution; repression of these pent-up hatreds, on the other hand, will merely make them dormant, and ensure their manifestation at a later stage. Ultimately, this goes back to the debate on conflict genesis, and the issue of whether interethnic wars are inevitable, historically predetermined processes that external actors can do little to influence. Yet the logic that one can tolerate war as a means – in effect – of letting off steam, while logical in one sense, is demonstrably unconscionable in another. And second, in certain cases, totalitarianism may be the only solution to the suppression of intergroup enmities and historical animosities. Rather than constituting the panacea, democracy may be a trigger for the violent expression of these differences, and/or may usher in an illiberal government to power, as in the Palestinian territories, for example. In this regard, where does the greater evil lie: in suppression or chaos? In the case of Iraq, in his absence, one could begin to rationalize the policies of Hussein. Invariably, however, a totalitarian model, with power concentrated in the personality of a single individual, is ultimately unsustainable. Reliance upon a charismatic individual, as opposed to a constitution with checks and balances, while effective in the short term, is a recipe for long-term instability. The former Yugoslavia underscores this argument, unraveling and ultimately spiraling into violence upon Tito’s death. Some states, put simply, should never have been formed in the first place: accidents of history that are unfeasible as unitary entities, such as

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Iraq, or have evolved into nonviable entities, such as Yugoslavia. Many “states” are a mere pretence: at the very minimum, a populace within a given geographical unit – as argued elsewhere – should accept the idea of the state, wherein grievances against it can be resolved without recourse to violence. In other words, a political consensus that a state is legitimate and should exist must be a pre-condition for state formation. Moreover, a state should exercise control and authority over its entire territory, and possess a monopoly on the means to violence. If such authority and acceptance do not exist, secessionism and war are ultimately likely. At the heart of post-independence tensions in Macedonia were conflicting interpretations of the basic idea underpinning the concept of the state, ethnic Macedonians and Albanians holding divergent expectations on, inter alia, the constitution, national census, laws on education, local self-government and use of minority symbols, and the composition of the police, army, and public administration. In some instances, it may be impossible for the international community to “fix” state failure. A valid argument can be made, however crude, that some states should be allowed to fail: while costly and painful, it may represent the most effective way to resolve seemingly intractable differences and historical injustices, and ultimately engender stability. Championing of the status quo – or the insistence that states that are illegitimate be preserved at all costs – is a major shortcoming in the state failure literature, and, rightly or wrongly, has guided policymaking. Governments have resorted to force to restore or retain a status quo that, invariably, will only produce further instability. This process does not necessarily have to be violent – a state can be dismantled peacefully, in an orderly and negotiated manner, under the aegis of the international community. However, by promoting the doctrine of status quo, and ignoring on-the-ground realities and the viability of different institutional models as long-term solutions, the international community has insisted on the preservation of states that are clearly no longer viable in their existing guises. Yugoslavia and, for some, present-day Iraq are classic examples of such a (counterproductive) doctrine. In the case of the former, the international community, by initially advocating Yugoslav unity, and thus supporting something that clearly no longer existed, missed a major window of opportunity to facilitate an orderly and peaceful division of the country.57 Thorvald Stoltenberg, then Norwegian foreign minister, for instance, describes how Western diplomats ‘worked night and day to try to keep the federation together.’58

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Similarly in Iraq, those who advocate a unitary, centralized state contend that federalization or partition would serve only to further destabilize the country and region. Yet, while the American surge of 2007 has improved the security situation and enabled a semblance of political progress, the prospect of Iraq descending into sectarian and/or ethnic war upon the withdrawal of American troops remains real. In this sense, federalization or partition is a more desirable outcome than protracted civil war within a unitary Iraq, which would have profound implications for regional and international security. Along similar lines to the proposal by Gligorov and Izetbegovic to preserve the former Yugoslavia, Peter Galbraith has proposed that Iraq become a loose confederation of three politically diffuse regions: a Kurdish area in the north, a Shiite region in the south, and a Sunni enclave in the center.59 The common Iraqi state would effectively be dismantled, and replaced by ethnically distinct territorial entities with independent decisionmaking authority.60 In effect, each region would become a de facto state, with its own president, parliament, and army; the central government in Baghdad would have few powers other than overseeing the equitable distribution of oil revenues, maintaining a national army, and managing foreign affairs.61 Autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, the most stable, democratic, and prosperous region in the country, and, to some extent, post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, where, in the face of intergroup tensions, state functions have been devolved to ethnically defined entities, give credence to this approach.62 While, in the case of BosniaHerzegovina, this has done little for the effective functioning of the state, it has nevertheless kept the peace. As Steven Burg argues, where irrevocable intergroup differences exist between ethnic populations distributed in territorially compact patterns, territorialized autonomy – whether in the form of devolution, federalization, or confederalization – may be the most effective form of conflict resolution and long-term management.63 Conflict Causation and Mitigation: Adding to the Empirical Knowledge Base

Macedonia – and the former Yugoslavia more broadly – shed important light on the factors and conditions that give rise to intrasocietal conflict. First and foremost, they demonstrate that the principal dynamic driving so-called ethnic conflict is not primordial, but purposive: just as it provoked war and multiethnic collapse in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina, Macedonia was guided in a nonviolent direction by the

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calculated decisions of its political elite. Of course, each context is distinct, and the precise factors that generate and sustain violence will differ accordingly. Preventive actors must be sensitive to the particular circumstances driving conflict in a given situation before deciding on policy. Local dynamics will respond differently to outside initiatives from context to context; for instance, military intervention – preventive, humanitarian, or strategic – may have a positive effect as a deterrent instrument in one country, yet exacerbate risk factors in another.64 While this makes the transferability of any preventive experience problematic, the fundamental factors and conditions that bred conflict in Macedonia are invariably common to all unstable, at-risk societies. Macedonia illustrates that instability and violence are most likely in an environment defined by political disparity between communities, economic distress, unresponsive and (perceived) illegitimate state institutions, interethnic divisions, endemic corruption, powerful criminal influences, a weak state that fails to exercise authority over its entire territory, a ready availability of arms, unstable neighboring countries, and porous borders. A logical and empirical connection can be made between these factors and conflict susceptibility. By extension, it stands to reason that targeting these “universal” factors will diminish the likelihood of future internal violence. Macedonia and the former Yugoslavia also highlight that internal conflict can be brought about, directly or indirectly, by (often unforeseen) external circumstances beyond the control of the state, such as a spillover of conflict from a neighboring country or, as in the case of Yugoslavia, a momentous international event that transforms global geopolitics, such as the end of the Cold War, or 9/11 and the subsequent international war on terrorism. Such conflict accelerators and triggers are crucial to understanding conflict causation – while underlying conditions can provide a motive for violence, they are often insufficient to provoke conflict. At the same time, Macedonia illustrates that conflict can often be as much about opportunity as grievance, or, at least, a combination of the two, giving some credence to the arguments put forth by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. In the Macedonian case, while not wishing to de-legitimate valid Albanian concerns, the outbreak of violence could partly be explained by certain hidden interests – political and criminal – that helped push the country toward war. This raises an important general point for policymakers to heed: many combatants are motivated not by religious conviction or political ideology, as may appear on the surface, but by money. One immediately thinks of the various paramilitaries operating in Colombia and republican remnants in

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Northern Ireland, or, likewise, the scores of former Sunni insurgents in Iraq whose allegiance the United States has been able to buy through the so-called “Sons of Iraq” program. The latter, in particular, should have resonance for American military planners seeking to halt the Taliban tide in Afghanistan. No group is monolithic; to the contrary, divisions will invariably exist – be it at a political, ideological, or cultural level – for policymakers to exploit. The potential for conflict cannot be completely eradicated. Conditions and incentives for nonviolence, however, can be established. Social stability is more likely in a milieu of representative democracy and political equality, economic opportunity, functioning social services, respect for fundamental human rights, social cohesion, the rule of law, institutional recourse to legitimate grievance, secure borders, and a stable region. It therefore follows that, while a one-size-fits-all approach to prevention is unfeasible given the unique historical circumstances and specificities of each context, underlying sources of instability common to all societies – as noted – can be identified, and targeted accordingly. While no two conflicts are ever the same, the incentive for groups to resort to violence, and the appeal of belligerents who desire war, will contract if structural conflict conditions are addressed, and the capacity of a country and its institutions to peacefully combat immediate destabilizing acts or events is strengthened, irrespective of context. In particular, Macedonia highlights the importance of political and economic development to stability. The latter provides clear inducements for nonviolence, and strengthens all other preventive initiatives. Further, by creating cross-cutting interests and upward social mobility, it can obscure traditional ethnic identifications. Economic deprivation, conversely, engenders and sustains grievance, which, in turn, can be exploited for mobilization purposes. High levels of unemployment, particularly among a youth bulge, create a ready pool of recruits. At the same time, economic distress strengthens group identities, and, by promoting nationalism and competition between groups for scarce resources, exacerbates intergroup tensions. Yugoslavia is a case in point, the initial crisis prompted largely by protracted economic deterioration, which fuelled inter-republican competition and ultimately nationalism. As argued elsewhere, over and above the presence of a final arbiter in the form of Tito, the viability of the Yugoslav system was largely contingent on economic prosperity, which masked the growing illegitimacy of the political system.65 Similarly in contemporary China and Russia, the state has effectively bought off the discontent of minorities in peripheral regions. Outside actors should

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certainly not delay sustained economic assistance until after the outbreak of conflict, which is self-defeating, and markedly more expensive. In Yugoslavia, as Henryk Sokalski observes, a developmental assistance package from the international community, at a fraction of the ultimate cost of intervention and reconstruction, may have allayed tensions and bought time for a peaceful division of the country.66 While it cannot guarantee peace, economic security diminishes the likelihood of violence and the appeal of poisonous ideologies; indeed, groups and individuals are less likely to take up arms if they possess economic opportunities and stable livelihoods. Economic assistance, in isolation, however, may be insufficient to quell instability; in many respects, it is tantamount to throwing money at a problem. In any case, in the absence of sufficient safeguards and oversight procedures, foreign aid might not be used for its intended purpose. Though it creates an environment more conducive to their development, legitimate political institutions and interethnic harmony cannot simply be bought. By encouraging participation in the political process, and empowering communities through the creation of institutional mechanisms for the nonviolent advancement of minority rights, democracy offers an alternative to violence. Arguably, pluralistic, participatory institutions and viable power sharing arrangements are more important to stability than economic security. In the Macedonian case, the country was economically fragile in the immediate postindependence period, yet conflict did not erupt until a decade later, ostensibly provoked by political and cultural grievances as opposed to economic ones. From the Macedonian experience, therefore, political inequality – rather than economic weakness – is more likely to trigger violence. Challenges to Prevention: Formidable Obstacles Remain

The chief practical challenges to prevention – deciding when to intervene, how to intervene, and who should intervene – have partially been overcome. Post-Cold War, the logic of prevention has made qualitative conceptual, institutional, and practical strides. The international community has endorsed the concept of peacebuilding and the principle of a “responsibility to protect.” The means to peace are well advanced. Of course, the resources at the disposal of the international community are finite. Some trouble spots will necessarily be prioritized over others. Yet the financial resources and depth of preventive actors exist to facilitate burden sharing and manage issues of

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overstretch. Individual states and supra-national entities have developed institutional mechanisms to respond effectively to emerging security crises. The empirical evidence highlights what invariably works and what invariably does not. Macedonia reinforces the importance of participation by multiple external actors in a given preventive exercise, and highlights the fact that structural approaches to prevention are the most effective in the long term. While the precise strategy will be determined by the extent to which conflict is imminent, in an ideal sense, intervention – as defined here – will be undertaken not when the shooting and killing starts, but years in advance of violence, giving outside actors the time and scope to target underlying sources of intrasocietal conflict. For critics of prevention, the practice is invariably dismissed on methodological and policy grounds, namely, that it is impossible to predict when and where violence will occur, on the one hand, and that certain conflicts are intractable processes immune to intervention, on the other.67 Yet the empirical evidence suggests that key trends can be monitored, and, if carefully designed, the immediate and underlying conditions that give rise to conflict mitigated. Our understanding of the immediate and underlying factors that induce violence is more advanced than it has ever been. Sources of information are vast. The problem of prevention is not inadequate analytical frameworks of conflict causation or insufficient early warning indicators. The problem of prevention, conversely, is that of missed opportunities, of an absence of political will for early action, and divergent national interests that preclude timely multilateral responses. As noted in Chapter 1, a key part of the preventive process is the monitoring of pre-conflict indicators of potential violence. The concept of early warning, and the feasibility of an integrated model underpinned by generic conflict signposts as a guide to early intervention, raise several important issues. In the first instance, such an approach clashes with local exceptionalism: while the underlying factors that provoke intrasocietal instability and conflict are well known, each milieu is characterized by specific historical circumstances and conditions. Given that conflicts will evolve and mutate differently from context to context, the ability to establish a generic methodology of conflict early warning is put into question. In this respect, forecasting internal conflict, as in Macedonia, may prove difficult. As discussed elsewhere, however, though each society is unique, certain destabilizing factors or conflict pre-conditions – political and economic inequality, high rates of unemployment, social divisions, availability of arms and natural resources, low levels of nutrition, limited access to education, endemic

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disease, corruption, porous borders, regional instability – are invariably common to all. Accordingly, these factors can be monitored well in advance of overt conflict by individual states, regional institutions, international organizations, and NGOs, among others. Those societies at greatest risk of violence or state failure, and thus most in need of preventive action, are easily identified. Yet, while we know which countries are most vulnerable to conflict, knowing precisely when violence will erupt, and thus being cognizant of the factors that transform a situation of extreme tension into open conflict, is problematic. As Macedonia illustrates, underlying conditions, in and of themselves, may be insufficient to produce violence. What is required, conversely, is a triggering event that tips a society over the edge. However, the immediate conflict trigger – be it a military coup or assassination attempt, or sudden economic decline induced by uncontrollable outside forces – is invariably the most difficult to anticipate and control given it is often unforeseen. It is in this respect that the particularity of each milieu becomes more pronounced, which, in turn, highlights the importance of field-based analysis and sustained monitoring of on-the-ground trends and developments, therefore facilitating context-specific information. While we acknowledge the difficulties associated with anticipating immediate conflict triggers, the problem of early warning is not a lack of information, which is plentiful, but, conversely, an absence of sufficient national interest and political will to catalyze action based on this information. Given existing international norms and decision-making processes, the gap between warning and response remains prodigious. Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur, to name but three, represent collective failures of political and moral will, as opposed to failures of intelligence or an absence of knowledge of impending conflagration. Ample evidence existed in each case to suggest imminent violence and large loss of life, from the emergence and propagation of rabid strains of nationalism to the formation of ethnic militias. These conflicts were not spontaneous manifestations; to the contrary, they gestated and evolved over a prolonged period of time. From a policy perspective, this meant crucial entry points and opportunities to promote nonviolence were missed by outside actors. For Susan Woodward, ‘few, if any, deadly conflicts in recent history have provided more opportunity for prevention than the wars that engulfed the Balkan Peninsula with the disintegration of Yugoslavia.’68 With policymakers distracted elsewhere, the political will to catalyze action was simply absent in a post-Cold War theater considered of marginal geo-strategic interest to the major

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powers. It is instructive to note, in this respect, that the Macedonian conflict occurred only months prior to 9/11. Conflicts develop gradually and methodically over time and, particularly in today’s globalized, electronic media age, rarely explode with little prior warning. We know which signposts and indicators to look for in incipient crises areas. To be sure, inaction has not been for a want of information. The problem of prevention is not one of resources or limited knowledge of conflict causation. Rather, the problem of prevention is that of summoning the political will for early action. This is not to say that conflict prevention does not sit high on the international agenda: in the post-Cold War era, the norm of prevention has gained considerable institutional traction, at national, regional, and international levels. Yet for all this progress, the normative and institutional barriers to the mobilization of timely and concerted international responses remain formidable, from established tenets regulating the conduct of international relations and the concomitant reluctance to intervene in the jurisdiction of other states, to a perceived absence of sufficient national interest on the part of key external actors and clashing interests among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Barring (rare) exceptional instances, ideological fractures and divergent state interests and threat perceptions within the organ will always militate against timely, coordinated multilateral action. Present-day Darfur and the former Yugoslavia are instructive examples in this respect; as then Secretary of State James Baker famously put it when explaining American inaction in Yugoslavia, the United States ‘did not have a dog in this fight.’ 69 While in an ideal sense the international community will respond prior to the outbreak of violence, in reality, it will invariably do so only once people have died in large numbers. If the core national security interests of the major powers are not at stake, or if they diverge, timely multilateral action is unlikely to be forthcoming. Put simply, the chances of the international community intervening in the nascent conflict stage remain small. Macedonia in the immediate post-Yugoslav period represents such an exceptional case, the timely multilateral response facilitated by the existing international presence in the region, the receptivity of local elites, and the fact that, given its size and relative stability, it constituted a lesser challenge relative to elsewhere. This is not to say that prevention cannot work, merely that the existing international machinery for responding to incipient crises is flawed, with key decision-making organs hamstrung by clashing interests and an absence of political will for action, and thus indisposed to timely mobilizations. With its

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normative emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention, and pragmatic focus on the national interest, the present system promotes inertia and paralysis, be it in dealing with inter- or intrastate conflicts, and lends to haphazard responses to emerging or actual crises. Certainly, clear limitations exist in current multilateral structures for the prevention of conflict and the maintenance of international peace and security. As such, there is a need to develop a more effective international system for precluding mass violence, one that is more systematic and efficient in its approach to prevention. What is required to catalyze political will and promote a more concerted approach to prevention is not so much the creation of a new multilateral institutional infrastructure as a recalibration of current norms and practices to enhance the international community’s responsiveness. Linked to this, a fundamental reconceptualization of traditional approaches to “security” and “the national interest” is required, one that recognizes the emergence of new, interconnected threats and vulnerabilities to national and international security. Reconceptualizing Security: An Emerging Imperative

Based on their ability to provoke crises beyond their borders, internal wars clearly fall into this category of interconnected threats. As Afghanistan underscored, the regional and global ramifications of states sinking into chaos can be profound. Crises such as that faced by Macedonia in 2001 can trigger humanitarian and security emergencies, destabilize entire regions, and, ultimately, by undermining the state as the basic unit of the international system,70 broader international security. Intrastate wars eat away at the state, and corrode its capacity to function.71 They blur the distinction between internal and external: increasingly difficult to contain within national borders, they spawn refugees and environmental destruction, facilitate the spread of arms and disease, and give rise to criminality and terrorism. Given the security threats stemming from failing states, it is in the interest of all countries to forestall their incidence, however distant and ostensibly marginal to the national interest the state in question may appear. By extension, defusing tensions and rebuilding a failing state in a small corner of subSaharan Africa or in the south Pacific increasingly represents an important national security strategy. Certainly, building sustainable societies has direct relevance in the context of the war on terrorism. Allowing intrasocietal conflicts – ethnic or otherwise – to germinate without taking concerted preventive action on the basis that a given

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conflict is inevitable or does not sufficiently impact the national interest is ultimately counterproductive. This reconceptualization is an emerging imperative that must be addressed. There are simply too many people in the world – 6 billion rising to as many as 9 billion by mid-century – and too many global risks emerging from unresolved security crises, for the international community to maintain the status quo. National security is contingent upon there being a secure regional and global context for each state to function effectively. As many modern conflicts stem from human insecurity, there is a growing need to shift the emphasis of security from that of states to groups and individuals, from military deterrence to political, economic, social, and environmental development. Alleviating the insecurities of peoples – the very insecurities that give rise to violence, crime, and terrorism – in distant developing countries is increasingly in the national interest of the rich and powerful. The violence in Macedonia, for instance, was provoked by insecurities largely stemming from poverty, marginalization, and criminality, both from inside and outside the country’s borders. By moving from national to human security, and by addressing the basic needs of peoples in situations of severe insecurity, individual states and the broader international system become safer and more secure.72 The interconnectedness of contemporary threats means the concept of security can no longer be thought of in strictly national terms. In an era of globalization and interdependence, distant threats may be nearer at hand – terrorists and criminals now operate on an international scale, global warming and infectious disease do not respect national borders, lawlessness along the Macedonia-Kosovo border may boost the availability of heroin on the streets of London, unrest stemming from disagreements over oil revenue distribution in Nigeria may force up the price of petrol in Australia, human insecurity in the Middle East may inspire terrorist attacks in the West, state failure in Central Asia, while seemingly a world away, can directly facilitate deadly attacks on the United States. The events of 9/11, more than anything, reinforced the new (interdependent) nature of security. As Paddy Ashdown puts it, ‘the United States discovered that even being the world’s most powerful nation did not confer invulnerability to the consequence of lawlessness and ungovernability in some remote country on the other side of the globe.’ 73 As such, traditional conceptualizations must be challenged and broadened so national governments think globally and laterally – rather than locally and narrowly – about conflict and security. They must emphasize the importance of human security, and recognize the

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nonmilitary sources of state insecurity. Put simply, a new paradigm of thinking must be established, one in which states internationalize the socalled national interest, and move beyond its narrow focus in the search for durable national and international security. Modern-day security threats – such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failure, economic underdevelopment, poverty, pandemic disease, environmental degradation, and organized crime – are transnational in character, increasingly representing a direct threat to all countries, and, ipso facto, require transnational responses to combat. Global in origin and consequence, they cross national borders and cut across regions – in the words of Kofi Annan, these are ‘problems without passports.’74 As Annan’s “High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change” puts it, ‘today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated and a threat to one is a threat to all. The mutual vulnerability of weak and strong has never been clearer.’75 Their alleviation is beyond the capability of a single state, however powerful: only a collective, multilateral approach can effectively regulate these risks. The challenge is to move beyond Realist worldviews, and redefine their perceptions of security and the national interest. Consistent with their state-centric, power-politics approach, Realists interpret security in national terms, based on the defense of one’s borders. Threats to security are understood as emanating from rival states, as opposed to individuals. Power is measured in military terms, in the extent to which a state can deter and influence another through its military capability. National security is therefore achieved through balance of power, deterrence, arms races, and war.76 Foreign policy is guided by the national interest, meaning states are loath to intervene in contexts that fall outside of their core strategic and national interests. Yet a Realist, state-centric approach to security is ultimately flawed; indeed, major gaps in traditional understandings of security emerge. Realism fails to sufficiently explain new threats to the state, and undermines collective security by inhibiting effective multilateral responses to common threats. While understandable during the Cold War, defining security in strictly military and geopolitical terms fails to address the human suffering and environmental degradation that give rise to new threats and demand multilateral, nonmilitary responses to resolve. In this regard, the five sectors of threats identified by Buzan and the Copenhagen School – military, political, economic, societal, and environmental77 – are instructive. Post-Cold War, security threats to the state have inexorably changed, as the security agenda has shifted from

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the state to individuals. Contemporary, nontraditional threats to state security increasingly stem not from rival states, but from nonstate, nonmilitary sources. They are not amenable to military solutions, as per the Cold War era. They emanate from the political, economic, societal, and environmental insecurity of groups and individuals, from oppression and persecution, hunger and deprivation, threats to culture and minority rights, and from degradation and natural disaster.78 As these threats do not respect borders and can strike at any country at any time, they bring into question Westphalian norms that distinguish between what is domestic and what is international. Traditional, narrow definitions of security and the national interest, based on the defense of state borders through military deterrence, are no longer realistic in a world characterized by global interdependence.79 A new, multisectoral approach to security is therefore required, one that recognizes modernday threats as emanating from multiple realms besides the military one, broadens the concept of security and the national interest to reflect this reality, and acknowledges the interconnectedness of contemporary threats, on the one hand, and the importance of human security, on the other. We need a fresh approach toward Realism, and its perception of power and security: measuring everything in strict power terms – and the military approach stemming from it – undermines, rather, than enhances, global security. In this context, “idealist” notions of security are increasingly real, possessing important practical value and security significance. Certainly, a human security approach can be justified on self-interest grounds over and above moral and legal ones.80 Of course, this is not to say that Realist perceptions of security are irrelevant. They continue to possess resonance, and continue to guide state thinking and foreign policy formulation. Power, states, and armies still matter in the international system. Force remains an important policy instrument; states will continue to feel insecure from the perceived military threats posed by others, and, accordingly, will build up their own military capabilities as a deterrent. Indeed, interstate conflicts and the military dimension of security threats maintain primacy in policymaking circles.81 Yet by defining security in narrow terms and neglecting the evolution of security threats, this approach is deficient. Restricting the definition of security to territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and the protection of narrow national interests neglects the new, interconnected, nonmilitary threats to which states are now vulnerable.82 As Michael Brown notes, threats to security increasingly stem not from the military power of other states, but from the disorder within them.83 In the words of the Carnegie Commission, ‘national well-

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being increasingly depends on the security and prosperity of other states and peoples.’ 84 What is required, therefore, is a broader security agenda that factors in these new threats: a middle way that combines realism with idealism; a mélange of state and human security approaches, military and nonmilitary strategies that address the underlying insecurity of individuals and recognize nontraditional threats to national security. What is plain is that many of these threats require multilateral, nonmilitary solutions, and that, by extension, national security cannot be pursued exclusively through unilateral, military means.85 Security and the prevention of conflict can no longer be thought of in strictly military terms. While force may be necessary to achieve initial peace, long-term stabilization ultimately depends on nonmilitary factors.86 Many contemporary threats to national and international security, such as global warming, demand nonmilitary approaches – as Joseph Nye points out, they are no longer ‘susceptible to solutions by armies firing high explosives.’87 Conflict prevention similarly requires more than military solutions: it requires meeting people’s basic political, economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian needs.88 Prevention means building schools and hospitals; increasing access to clean water, food, and modern technology; building human capacities; enhancing democratic governance and the rule of law; strengthening legal systems and developing effective dispute resolution mechanisms; creating a meaningful space for civil society; addressing social disparities; promoting reconciliation; creating livelihoods; and assisting resourcedependent countries diversify their economies. Linked to this, prevention also means streamlining national and international regulations concerning the supply of “conflict commodities” such as diamonds and timber; augmenting international controls against the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons; and strengthening economic and social development in unstable societies, through – among other things – debt relief and/or greater access to global trade. Insofar as they help build sustainable societies, diminish the likelihood of conflict, and directly minimize the need for future military intervention, these nonmilitary measures constitute vital national security strategies. A military approach in isolation is inherently counterproductive.89 Terrorism borne of religious fundamentalism, for instance, one of the most pressing security threats of our age, can ultimately be defeated only by addressing the underlying insecurity of individuals. As such, to the extent that they help mitigate the underlying conditions that give rise to conflict, international aid and development

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programs, and the conditionality associated with them, are key structural strategies. Certainly, a logical link exists between security and development. As Robert Muscat argues, international development agencies play a crucial preventive function: agents of political, economic, and social progress that contribute to poverty reduction through the provision of financial aid, and strengthen institutional frameworks and governance capacities through aid conditionality and technical assistance.90 While the assumption that societies that enjoy economic development and enhanced living standards are less vulnerable to violence is not as clear-cut as many may assume, groups and individuals have more incentives for nonviolence if they possess sufficient economic opportunity. It is no coincidence that most wars are fought in poor countries.91 The most cost-effective way to prevent conflict, in this regard, may be simply to raise the amount of foreign aid and development assistance to developing countries, tied directly to necessary reforms, and/or provide debt relief and trade concessions. Indeed, debt relief and trade concessions may be more effective measures given the capacity of aid to feed corruption. Regardless, industrialized countries need to place more emphasis, as a matter of national security, on development programs as a means of ameliorating the human insecurities in the developing world that directly breed conflict and terrorism. Alas, states continue to perceive security in traditional, Realist terms; according to the 2005 UN Human Development Report, in 2003, the donor countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) invested $642 billion in their militaries, compared to $69 billion in overseas development aid.92 Though the latter figure increased to $103.7 billion in 2007,93 worldwide military expenditure for the same period, notes the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, exceeded $1 trillion, a 45 percent increase from 1998.94 Humanitarian Intervention: Where to Now?

The concept of humanitarian intervention encapsulates the link between human and international insecurity.95 Certainly, genocide and systematic human rights abuses, by spilling across borders, represent threats to international peace and security. As such, tyrants and aggressors can no longer hide behind outdated Westphalian notions of sovereignty and non-intervention to justify acting with impunity. Sovereignty carries responsibility, both to ones people and to the broader international community. In the event of such heinous acts, collective punitive

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measures – political, economic, military – must be forthcoming. The international community has a legal and moral responsibility to protect the weak and powerless; standing idly by, as has traditionally been its wont, is a stain on its collective conscience. Yet Kosovo also highlights the unintended consequences that can stem from humanitarian intervention. Though it achieved its principal objective of ejecting Yugoslav security forces from the province, this came at the cost of civilian life, destruction of civilian infrastructure within Serbia, and economic dislocation in the broader region. Post-intervention, KosovoSerbs became victims of Albanian recriminations and ethnic cleansing, while former KLA elements destabilized the region by initiating and abetting armed insurgencies in adjoining jurisdictions, illustrating that the hard work of armed intervention invariably begins after the initial victory. Though it has made significant normative and institutional headway, and ostensibly lowered the threshold for international intervention,96 the evolving doctrine of humanitarian intervention – or at least that which involves a military dimension – has been undermined by recent events. Above all, it has been weakened by the Iraq experience, as well as by failures to mobilize a coherent and timely response to governmentsponsored atrocities in Darfur. If Kosovo emboldened liberal interventionism, Iraq and Darfur have discredited it. The Iraq experience, in particular, represents a watershed for large-scale military intervention, humanitarian-based or otherwise. By eroding the political will and public support for military adventures in distant lands, Iraq has effectively removed the doctrine of (military-based) humanitarian intervention from the international agenda, and put paid to hopes of the cosmopolitan, post-Westphalian international order seemingly presaged by Kosovo. Major military interventions based on putative humanitarian grounds – designed to prevent further suffering and foster regional and global order – are unlikely to be forthcoming in the foreseeable future, even when warranted. In the case of the United States, Iraq, coupled with a deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and domestic economic concerns, not least the need to rein in public debt, will preoccupy its policy attentions, and ultimately push Washington into a more inward, isolationist direction, diminishing its willingness to project its military power in future, just as its experience in Somalia deterred it from applying its hard power early in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In any case, the fact remains that states are likely to exercise the “responsibility to protect” only when national interests are directly at stake. Simultaneously, the principle of state sovereignty and divergent major

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power interests remain formidable obstacles to timely intervention. While the decision by the UN General Assembly in 2005 to adopt a resolution endorsing its obligation to intervene in instances of genocide and other state-perpetrated abuses was a landmark decision, one that recognized the seemingly shifting notion of sovereignty,97 the international community failed to translate theory into practice in Darfur – in the first test of its resolve to implement the responsibility to protect since its formal endorsement – for these very reasons. Preventive Actors: Some Final Thoughts

Ideally, preventive action will be conducted collectively through the UN, recognized as the focal point for multilateral action. In reality, given that national governments will always possess competing priorities and interests, the prospects for timely, coordinated international responses to future crises remain weak. Existing institutional arrangements and collective security approaches to security at the international level have largely proved inadequate. While regional organizations and individual states can ostensibly fill any international void, they too remain hindered by important shortcomings – limited capacity, clashing interests, issues of legality – that militate against the mobilization of effective responses. From a regional perspective, the EU in the early 1990s and present-day AU immediately spring to mind. Iraq, meanwhile, illustrates how unilateral action may prove unsustainable, and serve to undermine, rather than enhance, security. Undoubtedly, certain preventive agents will be better equipped to deal with certain crises than others. Ideally, recognizing the limitations of each in isolation, preventive action will be carried out by multiple actors – individual states, international organizations, regional bodies, NGOs – operating in tandem. The key is that each has the capability and credibility to effectively undertake preventive action, be it conducted unilaterally or multilaterally. Ultimately, the onus for prevention falls on individual states; certainly, the UN is only as strong and effective as its member states allow it to be. As a mere extension of the will of its members, it is states that will determine whether early action is forthcoming or not. To be sure, power continues to lie with individual states, which remain the highest authority within the international system: while their behavior may be influenced by organizations such as the UN, their power, at least in the case of the United States, ultimately cannot be restrained. If a state has the means to undertake unilateral action outside of the UN

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framework, and bypass multilateralism to mobilize unilateral action against a perceived threat, little can be done – rightly or wrongly – to deter it from such a course of action. Yet for all the paralysis within the Security Council and efforts on the part of some states to undercut its power, the UN is by no means irrelevant to global security: it remains an important unit of the international system, contributing to human security in the developing world through its peacekeeping missions, programs, and funds. The problem is that of perceptions: the gap between political and public expectations of what the UN can achieve, and its actual capabilities, is prodigious. In terms of resources, the UN remains limited. As such, when it suits their purpose, the UN is a convenient scapegoat for the failures of individual states. While by no means advocating world government, an effective and adequately resourced UN – one in which superpowers are truly committed – can play a valuable preventive function, and represent a formidable vehicle for an international order based on collective security and interstate cooperation.98 Reforming the Security Council to better reflect the geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century is vital in this respect. Whether or not this will enhance the organ’s effectiveness is open to debate; certainly, it will enhance its legitimacy. Further, the UN constitutes an important normative guide, one that, by influencing the behavior of states and establishing legal and normative standards to which they can be held to account, can contribute to a markedly less anarchic global order. Similarly, its various regimes – for example, pertaining to arms control and the management of conflict goods – help govern the sources and accelerators of war. Truly multilateral responses based on international consensus possess a legitimacy and aggregate impact that unilateralism can never hope to attain. As Evans argues, there is no substitute for cooperative internationalism.99 The UN – given its global reach – provides the natural institutional framework for developing global solutions to global problems beyond the capability of any one country, however rich and powerful, to resolve in isolation.100 In the context of transnational threats, an international system of collective security becomes more pronounced; indeed, international cooperation becomes a necessity. In any event, the scope for unilateral action is narrowing with power now more diffuse: with the steady emergence of such as China, India, Brazil, and the EU, allied to the re-emergence of Russia, it is increasingly problematic to speak of a unipolar world, one in which a seemingly declining United States can dictate to the rest. For Richard Haass, power is becoming dispersed – among both state and nonstate actors – to such

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an extent that the present international system is increasingly characterized by nonpolarity.101 International cooperation through multilateral institutions such as the UN is both possible and necessary. In short, the UN is the logical basis and point of departure for the international society of states – ‘when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions’ 102 – propounded by Hedley Bull. Remaining Realistic

It is important not to harbor exaggerated expectations of what conflict prevention can achieve; realistically, it is impossible to completely eradicate all conflicts, or the potential for them.103 While conflicts have declined in number in the post-Cold War era, political violence remains a reality and a prevalent phenomenon. Despite our greater understanding of conflict causation and prevention, unexpected events – like 9/11 – can still occur, and have profound implications for the international system. Seemingly irrational leaders like Milosevic, Kim Jong-Il, and Mahmoud Ahmedinijad are difficult to legislate for. Given (putative) intractable intergroup differences and various political and criminal interests, conflict will always occur, and undermine the best efforts of outside actors. Certainly, war is an extremely profitable industry. Yet prevention can help transform a given conflict, institutionalize it and push it into a nonviolent direction, and, just as importantly, create the conditions that directly diminish the appeal, and future likelihood, of organized violence. So long as the environment is right, the human condition does not have to be one of anarchy. This is the ultimate essence of conflict prevention. The practice of prevention has important limits, but its potential, as Macedonia has shown in glimpses, remains big. Prevention might be difficult, but it is certainly viable. The logic underpinning the concept – that it makes eminent strategic, financial, and humanitarian sense to pre-empt the outbreak of protracted violent conflict – cannot be denied. To be sure, it is markedly less challenging than responding after the event. The key policy lesson to emerge from the Macedonian experience is the need for preventive agents to act early, before tensions become intractable and policy options narrow, on the one hand, and adopt a long-term approach to prevention, one that ultimately moves beyond proximate causes of instability to underlying conditions that foster societal breakdown, on the other. Near-term, operational

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prevention can mitigate a problem, but not necessarily get to its core. Thus, prevention must be thought of in structural, holistic terms, as an ongoing process that is never entirely complete, rather than merely an ad hoc response to imminent or actual conflict.104 At the same time, Macedonia underscores the importance of coordinated, multidimensional responses that are tailored to local specificities, and incorporate a broad continuum of diplomatic, political, economic, social, regional, and, if necessary, military strategies. While the importance of prevention is recognized, formidable institutional and normative barriers to timely international responses to incipient crises remain. Notwithstanding the complexities of the early warning process, inaction is not the result of insufficient warning – information of likely violence is plentiful. We know which trends and developments to monitor. The factors and conditions that drive conflict are well known. Nor can inaction be attributed to a lack of resources. The problem of prevention, conversely, is an absence of political will for action, borne of calculations that the associated risks and costs are too high, and the national interests at stake too low.105 The reality remains that an early response will be forthcoming only when the core strategic interests of countries with the wherewithal to undertake necessary action are at stake, and, in the case of multilateral responses, when these interests do not clash. In this respect, one can only hypothesize as to what the international response would have been had violence erupted in Macedonia only a few short months after it did, in a post-9/11 world. Generally speaking, the international community remains reactive toward conflict, initiating concerted action only once people have died in large numbers. The principal challenge confronting prevention, therefore, is in bridging the gap between warning and response, or developing the political will for early and effective multilateral mobilizations to emerging conflicts. Central to this is a broadening of traditional conceptualizations of national and international security, and of the national interest stemming from them. The security agenda has evolved post-Cold War with the emergence of new, interconnected, and nonmilitary threats to national and international security that challenge classical thinking. Given that they increasingly pose a threat to all and are resistant to national solutions, the complex nature of these nontraditional threats – including internal wars and failing states – must be recognized, and the national interest reconceptualized in international terms, to facilitate effective multilateral responses to them. States can no longer pursue security in isolation: common threats can be resolved only

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through common approaches. More concerted international cooperation is thus crucial. It is similarly plain that states can no longer pursue security through strictly military, power means. Put simply, Realism, and the prescriptions underpinning it, are inadequate in both explaining and responding to contemporary security challenges. To the contrary, it is supposedly idealist notions of security that are increasingly realistic. To be sure, a moral, financial, and national interest case can be made for timely responses to modern-day threats. Internal wars are a case in point; indeed, it is increasingly difficult to characterize such phenomena as internal, the insecurities of peoples in developing countries increasingly being felt by those in the developed world in the form of refugees, organized crime, terrorism, and higher energy prices. In the context of the threats posed to broader regional and international security, intrastate conflicts demand more systematic approaches from the international community to pre-empt. Mitigating the potential for internal wars and state failure is in the national interest of all. Insofar as such threats are provoked by the insecurity of peoples, there is a growing need to reorient the locus of security from the level of the state to that of the individual. Strengthening human security through sustainable development and poverty alleviation is therefore key. Defining national security strictly in military and geopolitical terms is misguided and counterproductive. A new security approach is required, one that combines state and human security, realism with idealism. Until such time as Realist thinking is reconceptualized, comprehensive national and international security will remain elusive. While modern-day threats reinforce the need to pursue collective security through collective institutions, divergent national interests and the continued pre-eminence of Realist thinking undermine the prospects for effective multilateralism. Indeed, existing institutional mechanisms and collective approaches have proved inadequate in dealing with many of today’s challenges. Yet, given the costs and implications associated with inaction, prevention must remain at the forefront of the international agenda, a priority for national governments, regional institutions, and global bodies. The international community must collectively move beyond ad hoc approaches to more systematic responses, and continue to solidify an institutional culture of prevention. More robust international regimes regulating the means to conflict are required, as well as more substantive commitments to developmental goals. There is an urgent need to strengthen the conflict prevention and management capabilities of preventive actors, and engender greater synergies between the UN, regional and sub-regional bodies, individual

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states, NGOs, academia, and local networks in precluding the outbreak of protracted intrasocietal violence. For all this progress, states, in reality, will generally act only when core national security interests are at stake, and not merely out of altruism. This reality is reflected in the formulation of foreign policies, which continue to be Realpolitik-driven, guided and defined by selfinterest rather than moralism – a major flaw and gap in the present system of collective security, and the fundamental barrier to timely multilateral responses to latent crises. Yet an obvious national interest exists in confronting intrasocietal crises and failing states in contexts ostensibly marginal to this interest. Nevertheless, Realism rules. If and when action is forthcoming, moreover, the emphasis, for reasons of expediency, tends to remain on immediate conflict causes, an inherently self-defeating approach to prevention. The fact remains that the international community continues to be fixated on short-term fixes and outdated notions of security and the national interest that, while relevant in a by-gone era, have lost much of their currency today. Until such time as contemporary security realities are comprehensively recognized, and the innate folly of such approaches acknowledged, conflicts – and the concomitant threats emanating from them – will continue to proliferate, and undercut national, regional, and international security.

Notes 1

Gareth Evans, “Making Idealism Realistic: The Responsibility to Protect as a New Global Security Norm” (speech delivered at Stanford University, CA, February 7, 2007), http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm ?id=4658 (accessed April 15, 2007). 2 Brad Thayer, “Macedonia,” in The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena, eds. Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, 131–134 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). 3 David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, “Conflict Prevention – Taking Stock,” in Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? eds. David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, 20–21 (Tokyo and New York, NY: United Nations University Press, 2003). 4 Interview conducted by the author with William L. Nash, Washington, DC, March 14, 2006. 5 Donald Rothchild, “Third-Party Incentives and the Phases of Conflict

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Prevention,” in From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, 35 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 6 Interview conducted by the author with Nancy Soderberg (via telephone), October 5, 2006. 7 Interview conducted by the author with Abiodun Williams, New York City, February 28, 2006. 8 Marshall Harris describes UNPROFOR as ‘the West’s gift to the Serbs’: interview conducted by the author with Marshall F. Harris, Washington, DC, March 14, 2006. 9 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 3. 10 Ibid., 5. 11 In December 2009, Serbia, having arrested and extradited to The Hague Radovan Karadzic the previous year, and perceived to have made a genuine – albeit belated – effort to capture General Ratko Mladic, formally applied for EU membership. In October 2010, in a major victory for Belgrade, the Council of the EU agreed to forward Serbia’s request for membership to the European Commission. 12 Marie-Janine Calic, “The Western Balkans on the Road Towards European Integration,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/id/03273.pdf (accessed July 29, 2006). 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Interview conducted by the author with Alexis Brouhns, Brussels, July 17, 2006. 16 Calic, “The Western Balkans on the Road Towards European Integration.” 17 Amelia Branczik and William L. Nash, Forgotten Intervention: What the United States Needs To Do in the Western Balkans (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), 1–2. 18 Calic, “The Western Balkans on the Road Towards European Integration.” 19 Denisa Kostovicova, “Old and New Insecurity in the Balkans: Lessons from the EU’s Intervention in Macedonia,” in A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, Principles, Practicalities, eds. Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor, 43 (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2006). 20 Jan J. Andersson and Sven Biscop, “Conclusion,” in The EU and the

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European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe, eds. Jan J. Andersson and Sven Biscop, 167 (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2007). 21 Jan J. Andersson, “The European Security Strategy and the Continuing Search for Coherence,” in The EU and the European Security Strategy, eds. Andersson and Biscop, 131–132. 22 Richard Holbrooke, To End A War (New York, NY: Modern Library, 1999), 28. 23 Interview conducted by the author with David Phinnemore (via email), August 15, 2007. 24 Emil J. Kirchner, “Regional and Global Security: Changing Threats and Institutional Responses,” in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 9 (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2007). 25 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 334. 26 Michael Sheehan, International Security: An Analytical Survey (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 31. 27 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Pearson Longman, 2005), 47. 28 Neal G. Jesse and Kristen P. Williams, Identity and Institutions: Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), 20. 29 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 334. 30 James Sperling, “Regional or Global Security Cooperation? The Vertices of Conflict and Interstices of Cooperation,” in Global Security Governance, eds. Kirchner and Sperling, 264. 31 Calic, “The Western Balkans on the Road Towards European Integration.” 32 Harald Schenker, “The OSCE Mission in Macedonia 2002–2004: A Qualified Success,” Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH, OSCE Yearbook 2004, 114. 33 OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, “Mission Fact Sheet,” http://www.osce.org/publications/mms/2003/04/13998_229_en.pdf (accessed November 23, 2007). 34 OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, “Activities – Public Administration,” http://www.osce.org/skopje/13169.html (accessed February 12, 2009).

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35

Sebastian Dworack, “Macedonia and its OSCE Mission 2004–2006: Between Ohrid and Accession,” Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH, OSCE Yearbook 2006, 134. 36 Harald Schenker, “The OSCE Mission to Skopje – A Changing Field Mission in a Changing Environment,” Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH, OSCE Yearbook 2002, 179. 37 Interview conducted by the author with Bernard Segarra, Skopje, August 3, 2006. 38 Michael E. Brown, “New Global Dangers,” in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds. Pamela Aall, Chester A. Crocker, and Fen Osler Hampson, 48–49 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007). 39 Interview conducted by the author with Kiro Gligorov, Ohrid, July 31, 2006. 40 Gareth Evans, “Conflict Prevention: Ten Lessons We Have Learned” (speech delivered at the Peace and Conflict Society Conference, University of Toronto, February 4, 2007), http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id= 4653&l=1 (accessed April 29, 2007). 41 The National Archives Library, “Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of George Bush, 1992,” (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), 1,799. 42 Jolyon Howorth, “The European Security Strategy and Military Capacity: The First Significant Steps,” in The EU and the European Security Strategy, eds. Andersson and Biscop, 95. 43 Interview with Bernard Segarra. 44 Kostovicova, “Old and New Insecurity in the Balkans,” 51. 45 Ibid., 47–48. 46 Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 134–135. 47 Ibid., 140. 48 Holbrooke, To End A War, 30. 49 Bruce W. Jentleson, “Preventive Diplomacy: Analytical Conclusions and Policy Lessons,” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson, 340–341 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). 50 Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 229.

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Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 4–5. 52 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 222. 53 Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers (New York, NY: Times Books, 1996), 230–231. 54 Peter W. Galbraith, “Make Walls, Not War,” New York Times (New York), October 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/23/opinion/ 23galbraith.html?_r=1&th&emc=th&oref=slogin (accessed October 24, 2007). 55 Interview conducted by the author with Ismet Ramadani, Skopje, August 3, 2006. 56 Interview conducted by the author with Erwan Fouere, Skopje, August 4, 2006. 57 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace, 1995), 11. 58 Interview conducted by the author with Thorvald Stoltenberg, Oslo, June 12, 2006. 59 Galbraith, “Make Walls, Not War.” 60 Steven L. Burg, “Nationalism and Civic Identity: Ethnic Models for Macedonia and Kosovo,” in Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action, ed. Barnett R. Rubin, 26 (New York, NY: Century Foundation, 1998). 61 Galbraith, “Make Walls, Not War.” 62 Ibid. 63 Burg, “Nationalism and Civic Identity,” 26. 64 Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Realism of Preventive Statecraft,” in Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? eds. Carment and Schnabel, 39. 65 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 28. 66 Henryk J. Sokalski, “Perspectives on the Role of Prevention in Europe – Talking Points on the Subject: Lessons Learned from UNPREDEP,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ ccpdc/german/sokalp.htm (accessed November 12, 2005). 67 Alice Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 22. 68 Susan L. Woodward, “Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive Diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1985–1991,” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized, ed. Jentleson, 133. 69 Holbrooke, To End A War, 27. 70 Yuen Foong Khong and S. Neil MacFarlane, Human Security and the UN: A Critical History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 230.

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Pamela Aall, Chester A. Crocker, and Fen Osler Hampson, “Leashing the Dogs of War,” in Leashing the Dogs of War, eds. Aall, Crocker, and Hampson, 9–10. 72 Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor, “A Human Security Vision for Europe and Beyond,” in A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, eds. Glasius and Kaldor, 4. 73 Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), 98. 74 Gareth Evans, “Foreword,” in Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security, xiii. 75 United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2004), 14. 76 Brown, “New Global Dangers,” 44–45. 77 Buzan’s five threats are conceptualized in the following terms: (1) military, or the defensive capabilities of states, and states’ perceptions of each others’ intentions, (2) political, or the organizational stability of states, and the system of government and the ideologies that confer legitimacy upon them, (3) economic, or access to resources, finance, and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare, (4) societal, or the sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture, and religious and national identity, and (5) environmental, or the maintenance of the local planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all human enterprise depends: Buzan, People, States and Fear, 19–20. 78 Kirchner, “Regional and Global Security: Changing Threats and Institutional Responses,” 5. 79 “Annex: A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities,” in A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, eds. Glasius and Kaldor, 329. 80 Glasius and Kaldor, “A Human Security Vision for Europe and Beyond,” 10. 81 Brown, “New Global Dangers,” 48–49. 82 Kirchner, “Regional and Global Security: Changing Threats and Institutional Responses,” 5. 83 Brown, “New Global Dangers,” 44–45. 84 Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), 162. 85 Glasius and Kaldor, “A Human Security Vision for Europe and Beyond,” 3.

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Sven B. Gareis and Johannes Varwick, The United Nations: An Introduction (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 118. 87 Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 254. 88 Carment and Schnabel, “Conflict Prevention – Taking Stock,” 20–21. 89 Brown, “New Global Dangers,” 48–49. 90 Robert J. Muscat, Investing in Peace: How Development Aid Can Prevent or Promote Conflict (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 26–27. 91 Pauline Kerr, “Human Security,” in Contemporary Security Studies, ed. Alan Collins, 93 (Oxford and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). 92 United Nations, Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads – Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World (New York, NY: United Nations Development Programme, 2005), 94. 93 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Debt relief is down: Other ODA rises slightly,” http://www.oecd.org/document/8/ 0,3343,en_2649_37413_40381960_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed July 26, 2008). 94 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Summary),” 10, http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/files/SIPRIYB08summary.pdf (accessed October 1, 2008). 95 Khong and MacFarlane, Human Security and the UN, 229–230. 96 Ibid. 97 Warren Hoge, “Intervention, hailed as a concept, is shunned in practice,” New York Times (New York), January 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 01/20/world/africa/20nations.html (accessed January 21, 2008). 98 Gareis and Varwick, The United Nations: An Introduction, 213. 99 Evans, “Conflict Prevention: Ten Lessons We Have Learned.” 100 Gareis and Varwick, The United Nations: An Introduction, p. 50. 101 Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs 87, No. 3 (May–June 2008): http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/ richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html (accessed April 19, 2008). 102 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1995), 13. 103 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 168. 104 Ibid. 105 Carment and Schnabel, “Conflict Prevention – Taking Stock,” 18.

7 Taking Stock

The Macedonian experience is important for a number of reasons. It demonstrates that multi-ethnicity in weak, contested states, so long as it is managed properly, need not represent a precursor to armed conflict. It illustrates how cross-border influences can help transform local tensions into overt violence. The Macedonian experience is also instructive for highlighting an international community in both proactive and reactive modes. It underscores the possibilities and limitations of conflict prevention, and highlights deficiencies in current methods and processes of identifying and responding to emerging intrastate crises. Above all else, from the perspective of conflict prevention, Macedonia is salient for two reasons: (1) the pro-activeness that characterized the international community’s initial response, and (2) the subsequent failure of outside actors to sufficiently target underlying sources of instability, so underlining the futility of short-term approaches to prevention. Key Arguments Revisited

Proceeding from the premise that popular assumptions of Macedonia as a preventive success must be reassessed, the fundamental lesson from the Macedonian experience is the need for external actors to embed short-term strategies of prevention aimed at defusing immediate tensions within a more comprehensive, long-term approach that targets underlying, structural sources of conflict in a given society. Certainly, the international community, allied to a moderate post-Yugoslav leadership and a combination of historical factors and strategic calculations, helped to diminish the likelihood of violence in Macedonia upon its independence. While peace might have conceivably been achieved without international engagement, indeed, the initial nonviolence was more the product of local and regional dynamics, external actors nevertheless played a key role in solidifying peace and

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providing reassurance at an uncertain juncture in Macedonia’s history. In their absence, peace would undoubtedly have been more tenuous. Borne of fears that an outbreak of violence in Macedonia could ignite a wider regional conflict, the innovative deployment of preventive peacekeepers, in particular, was an important stabilizing factor. Notwithstanding its size and mandate, UNPREDEP served an invaluable deterrent function. Yet the fact that it would fall into conflict a decade after independence dispels the myth of Macedonia as a preventive success for the international community. While it helped ensure the attainment of initial peace, the international community’s approach to the country was shortsighted, failing to systematically address root sources of intrasocietal instability over and above immediate ones. This failure to sufficiently accompany near-term strategies with longer-term measures intended to strengthen Macedonia’s political, economic, and social foundations, as well as broader regional stability, precluded the achievement of a more permanent peace. Instead, third parties merely froze the situation; UNPREDEP, for all its worth, was emblematic of the international community’s emphasis on operational – as opposed to structural – prevention. Though proximate threats to Macedonian stability were addressed, fundamental conflict factors remained, namely, interethnic divisions, a large, disenfranchised ethnic minority, perceived illegitimate state institutions, economic underdevelopment, high levels of organized crime and corruption, lawless cross-border regions, and unrest in Kosovo. Having defused immediate tensions, and seeking to curtail its regional commitments, the international community progressively scaled back its engagement in the country. In the context of continuing domestic and regional uncertainty, this disengagement was misguided. The termination post-Dayton of UNPREDEP and ICFY’s Working Group created a vacuum in which risk dynamics were able to simmer and eventually spread. The fact that the outbreak of violence caught the international community largely by surprise – in spite of numerous indicators that suggested imminent unrest – proved indicative of its complacency. Put simply, Macedonia represents a success of only one type of prevention, but not, significantly, of the more important, longterm one. Inherently futile, such a short-term approach, as Macedonia underscores, is ultimately self-defeating. The international community failed Macedonia in several important respects. Economic neglect and a failure to legitimate the new country’s existence had adverse influences, and undermined other preventive initiatives. The bilateral dispute with Greece problematized Macedonia’s

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transition to statehood, and served to aggravate already pronounced socioeconomic strains, yet was belatedly – and only then partially – resolved. The international community also failed to adequately compensate Macedonia for the collateral damage inflicted by economic sanctions on the rump Yugoslavia, its chief trading partner. Allied to the trade embargo imposed by Greece, double sanctions spawned a largescale smuggling industry as an economic safety valve, creating a niche for the germination of organized criminal structures that continue to obstruct the country’s development to this day. At the same time, preventive actors over-emphasized the ethnic dimension of societal instability, when many of Macedonia’s principal ills were clearly nonethnic in character. Certainly, immediately prior to the outbreak of violence in 2001, the most pressing dangers facing the country were persistently high levels of crime, corruption, and poverty. As such, the ethnic aspect of conflict, as elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, was overplayed. Meanwhile, a failure to sufficiently apply the formidable soft power leverage it wields over Skopje – particularly through the process of EU integration – as a quid pro quo for concessions to ethnic minorities encouraged government procrastination in fulfilling Albanian political and cultural demands, and so perpetuated internal conditions conducive to unrest. This lack of progress served to legitimate the politics of violence and ultimately give rise to an armed insurgency that threatened to push the country toward a protracted war. The EU’s initial reluctance to bring Macedonia and the broader region closer to the European mainstream was shortsighted, passing up an opportunity to promote necessary reforms and standards. Similarly, the international community’s inability to resolve the impasse in Kosovo through political means directly endangered Macedonia. International failures in Kosovo had a profound impact on Macedonia, aggravating other risk factors and inadvertently increasing the likelihood of violence. Ironically, NATO-led humanitarian intervention in Kosovo created conditions for the exportation of violence, first into southern Serbia and then Macedonia. While it would be misleading to portray the Macedonian conflict as a mere export from Kosovo, an argument that would downplay legitimate Albanian-Macedonian grievances and absolve successive Macedonian governments of responsibility, the 2001 insurgency had much of its footprint in the province, both logistically and in terms of emboldening such a course of action. Yet it would be wrong to heap the blame for Macedonia’s troubles on outsiders. Internal protagonists laid the foundation for future conflict

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through a number of shortsighted policies, particularly in the initial postindependence period. The failure to define Macedonia in civic, nonethnic terms, use of disproportionate force to quell instances of unrest, and perpetuation of discriminatory policies against AlbanianMacedonians from the Yugoslav era, particularly in relation to representation in state structures, are instructive in this regard. Legacies of its Communist past, these policies alienated and radicalized the country’s largest ethnic minority. Though the Albanian community can be criticized for imparting mixed signals vis-à-vis its allegiance to the state, so contributing to the sense of intergroup mistrust, the wisdom of Macedonia’s post-Yugoslav elite in defining the new country in ethnic terms can be questioned. Inherently misguided given the country’s multiethnic character, this decision solidified the sense of victimhood and perception of inferior status among Albanian-Macedonians from Yugoslav times, and, in so doing, put the community on a collision course with the state. Had Skopje, under international pressure, undertaken more concerted efforts to address legitimate Albanian grievances, the NLA would have been denied a justification for violence. The fact that it resorted to arms to advance political agendas underscored frustrations with the responsiveness of state institutions, as well as with the established Albanian political order. Indeed, the insurgency was as much a war against the incompetence and corruption of the Albanian-Macedonian political elite as against the “oppression” of the Slav state. Certainly, the genesis of the 2001 conflict is complex, encompassing the political agendas of individuals and a strong criminal element over and above the obvious, ostensible struggle for greater group rights. In many respects, it was a conflict borne as much of opportunity as grievance. Giving Meaning to Events

The initial absence of violence in Macedonia can be explained by a number of restraining factors, both internal and external in character. On the one hand, a moderate, pragmatic Macedonian leadership that was highly respected in Belgrade, non-aggressive in its posture within the federal presidency, and cautious in its extrication from the former Yugoslavia deprived the JNA of a pretext for aggression. Though Macedonia’s caution was dictated by its very weakness, the likes of Kiro Gligorov and Vasil Tupurkovski learnt from the mistakes of other republican leaders. Independent Macedonia’s subsequent commitment to political power sharing and guarantee of extensive minority rights, allied

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to its enthusiasm for international engagement, created an environment favorable to post-Yugoslav stability. Such policies helped undercut secessionist elements within the Albanian community, and provide important disincentives for violence. Macedonian politics during this period was characterized by moderation and the eschewing of nationalism, a trend that has remained constant throughout the country’s history. Just as importantly, the majority of Albanian-Macedonians, contrary to popular belief, did not desire a Greater Albania, which was neither in their political nor economic interest, but greater rights and representation in Macedonia proper. In any case, the unification of Albanian lands in the Balkans never represented a concrete political prospect. Likewise crucial to the initial peace was the nonviolence in Kosovo; indeed, the only realistic scenario in which a reconstituted JNA may have initiated military action in Macedonia was in the event of a conflagration in the province spreading south into Macedonia. On the other hand, a timely, coordinated, and multilevel international response, most palpably in the form of preventive peacekeepers, solidified the peace by deterring outside aggression and providing a moderating influence domestically. Particularly important in this respect was the early projection of American power, in marked contrast to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Washington’s decision to contribute troops to UNPREDEP strengthened the trip-wire effect of the peacekeeping presence along the Serbian border, imbuing the mission with a military credibility it may have otherwise lacked. Nevertheless, excepting the Kosovo scenario, the external threat – at least in hindsight – was overestimated. Bulgaria and Albania were too weak and poor, and too preoccupied with multiple political and economic transitions, to threaten Macedonia’s territorial integrity, while Greece was constrained in its actions by its membership of NATO and the EU. Meanwhile, the strategic considerations of the rump Yugoslavia, allied to Macedonia’s ethnic composition, deprived Belgrade of both the means and motive for southern expansionism. Further, an independent Macedonia was in Yugoslavia’s interest given Belgrade’s economic reliance on its southern neighbor through sanctions-busting. Large-scale cross-border smuggling simultaneously provided economic opportunities for Macedonia, partly offsetting the impact of double sanctions and lessening the prospect of economic and/or state collapse. Other less obvious factors also served important mitigating purposes, and help to explain the initial peace over and above the presence of moderate leaders and early international engagement. An absence of a history of violence between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians meant extremists

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were unable to exploit the past for mobilization purposes, unlike elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. A weak Macedonian national consciousness, particularly in comparison to other Balkan nationalisms, was also important in this regard. Similarly, at least in the short term, the fact that the Macedonian and Albanian communities lived parallel to one another reduced the likelihood of conflict. The ultimate outbreak of violence in 2001, meanwhile, can be attributed to a complex fusion of ethnic and non-ethnic, internal and external factors. In the first instance, unfulfilled Albanian political and cultural demands, and the concomitant failure to more comprehensively co-opt the community’s allegiance to the Macedonian state, meant the likelihood for armed confrontation always remained high. While mitigating forces such as power sharing remained constant, important countervailing factors – continuing economic distress and high levels of unemployment, corrupt and unresponsive state institutions, instances of heavy-handedness toward Albanian dissent, misperceptions of the Other borne of geographic segregation and ethnic-based political parties and media, absence of incentives and mechanisms for intergroup cooperation – ensured the post-independence peace was a fragile one. European marginalization and steady international disengagement post-Dayton meant important levers of influence and early warning capacity were lost. In parallel to this, the collapse of the Albanian state in 1997, which increased the already-widespread availability of arms in the region, and the criminality and lawlessness of the Macedonia-Kosovo border area, strengthened the conditions for armed activity. NATO military intervention in – and subsequent management of – Kosovo also played a vital facilitating function, on a number of important levels: it exacerbated the intergroup schism between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, emboldened visions of a Greater Albania among radicals, ensured a ready-made pool of combatants who had failed to reintegrate into post-conflict society, and enabled the politically active Albanian Diaspora and regional networks, including senior, Macedonian-born KLA figures whose political ambitions had been frustrated in Kosovo, to turn their attentions southward. In many respects, this event represented the turning point for Macedonia. Nevertheless, an immediate trigger was still necessary to transform enmities, and mobilize the resources and will built up over the preceding years, into overt violence. This duly came in the form of the belated delineation of the Yugoslavia-Macedonia border, and subsequent armed clashes between Albanian criminal elements operating along the Kosovo sector of the border and Macedonian security forces, which, by

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proposing to infuse order into the region, threatened lucrative smuggling routes. Put simply, where they may have previously been absent, the motives, means, and conditions were in place for the waging of insurgency in 2001. In the event, the conflict was managed poorly by a divided government and inexperienced security forces. The heavyhandedness and general lack of capacity of the Macedonian military, in particular, forced international mediators to rethink their perceptions of, and attendant policies toward, the crisis. High-level international engagement ultimately proved decisive, both in producing a peace settlement and ensuring its implementation thereafter. Allied to an absence of will on the part of the Macedonian people – irrespective of ethnicity – for war, international intervention was the key factor in containing and resolving the insurgency. Lessons Learned

As an example of prevention, Macedonia holds instructive lessons for scholars and policymakers. It demonstrates the eminent logic and costeffectiveness of timely and sustained international preventive action, prior to the overt outbreak of hostilities, and the inherent value of a long-term, ongoing approach that targets root sources of intrasocietal instability and strengthens human security. It illustrates the importance of clearly defined and multidimensional responses to incipient crises, encompassing diplomatic, political, economic, military, regional, and other strategies, coordinated among a range of official and non-official actors, so facilitating burden sharing and comparative advantage. It underscores the importance of quality leadership, the value of preventive peacekeeping, the unique power wielded by the United States, the transformative and stabilizing influence of the EU on aspiring members, as well as its growing maturity as a security actor, the importance of regional cooperative structures and collective security institutions, and the continued relevance of NATO. It reinforces the need for third parties to adopt a regional approach to prevention; indeed, the attainment of national security is problematic if the regional milieu is unstable and conflict-ridden. Certainly, Macedonia illustrates the destabilizing impact of external factors – such as weak neighboring countries, unregulated cross-border weapons flows, and diaspora influences – on domestic security. Similarly, Macedonia highlights the malign influence of organized crime and corruption, and their ability to erode a state’s capacity to function effectively and generally undercut national development. It

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illustrates that political disparity and economic deprivation are invariably at the heart of all instability, accentuating ethnic distinctions that can be exploited for political or other purposes in times of socioeconomic stress. As such, political, economic, and cultural equality is imperative to state legitimacy. A state perceived as illegitimate in the eyes of a large proportion of its population is simply not viable in the long term. Though the generalizability of any preventive experience is problematic given that precise dynamics will necessarily diverge, certain conditions – political disparity, economic underdevelopment, state illegitimacy, lawlessness, regional instability – are universal, and will feed instability and violence irrespective of context. Ameliorating these conditions, ipso facto, directly diminishes the likelihood of future conflict. While this is not to say that the potential for conflict can be completely eradicated, conditions and incentives for nonviolence can be established. Even allowing for local specificities, long-term stability is most likely in a milieu characterized by democratic governance, economic opportunity, legitimate and responsive institutions, the rule of law, functioning social services, and a stable region. To be sure, prevention is difficult when groups who desire war exist. Yet such elements can be marginalized and coerced into cooperation. Certainly, Macedonia highlights the importance of incentives and disincentives in softening bellicose positions. In this sense, though not directly applicable in the Macedonian case, a credible threat by outside actors to resort to military force can often be decisive. If the international response to the former Yugoslavia illustrated anything, it was that diplomatic action is rendered toothless in the absence of such a will. Macedonia also demonstrates that, while it can prove problematic, ethnic diversity in developing countries should not represent a pre-condition for violence. Sensible management of difference, the establishment of inclusive institutions that promote cooperation across ethnic cleavages, and the cultivation of a civic national identity that can bind disparate peoples are vital in this respect. Ethnic conflicts are not inevitable, historically predetermined processes; to the contrary, they are manifestations of the purposive, rational actions of political leaders who make the calculated decision to lead a people to war. Fatalistic interpretations on the part of external actors, as per the former Yugoslavia, only contribute to flawed policymaking, and neglect non-ethnic sources of conflict that may be just as – if not more – pressing. However, while underlying conflict conditions are well known, they may not be sufficient to provoke violence. Rather, it is an immediate

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factor or event that invariably triggers overt conflict. Nevertheless, inaction on the part of external actors is generally not the result of an absence of early warning information and an inability to anticipate impending crises, but, conversely, an absence of political will to transform conflict signals into concrete and timely action. Linked to this, established Westphalian norms of sovereignty and non-interference constitute major barriers to prevention. In this sense, more responsive and legitimate collective security institutions are required: existing structures at the international level are cumbersome and unrepresentative, and produce inertia and paralysis more often than not. Yet the chaos stemming from regional wars and failing states represents a direct threat to broader regional and international security. As such, all states have an interest in pre-empting internal conflict and state failure before they arise. Given the interconnectedness of contemporary threats and their growing resistance to national solutions, there exists an inherent need to de-nationalize the concept of security, in order to facilitate the mobilization of timely multilateral responses to emerging or actual crises, on the one hand, and to reconcile the central tenets governing the practice of international relations with the imperatives of prevention, which, by definition, demand intervention in the sovereign jurisdiction of others, on the other. To the extent that intrasocietal violence stems from the insecurity of individuals, human security – and the need to achieve a balance between the security of states and that of individuals, if not shift its emphasis entirely from the former to the latter – is particularly important. Contemporary security can no longer be viewed exclusively through a classical Realist lens, where threats to national security are conceptualized in narrow terms, as emanating from the military power of rival states. Rather, they increasingly stem from the disorder and insecurity within them, a disorder and insecurity provoked by poverty and want, disease and malnutrition, political repression, human rights abuse, inequality, and environmental degradation, and demand concerted multilateral efforts to address. This interpretation of security can no longer be dismissed as idealist; conversely, it possesses a pragmatism and relevance that Realism often lacks. Comprehensive national and international security simply cannot be attained when so much of the world lives in an environment of poverty and insecurity. Accordingly, a fundamental reconceptualization of security and the national interest, as a means of instilling greater urgency to multilateral mobilizations, is required.

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By Way of Conclusion

The Macedonian experience highlights the possibilities and limitations of prevention, the factors and conditions that force a people to violence, and the various obstacles to timely international responses to emerging crises, while simultaneously raising broader theoretical issues relating to international peace and security. Both in terms of what to do and what not to do, Macedonia can represent a model for the international community, an important reference point when approaching other at-risk societies. It reinforces the importance of early and multifaceted engagement and the value of different operational instruments, yet underscores the folly of short-term approaches to prevention divorced from longer-term strategies that address underlying societal tensions. As Macedonia illustrates, operational prevention strategies targeting immediate sources of conflict and instability are futile if not accompanied by structural measures that seek to create long-term peace. It is in this respect that popular assumptions of Macedonia as a preventive success may be challenged: attempts to achieve the more important (long-term) peace failed. As such, Macedonia underscores the importance of conceptualizing prevention as an ongoing process. Yet for prevention to succeed, to mobilize timely and sustained international responses to emerging or actual crises, political will is key. Alas, given insufficient and/or clashing national interests, this is all too often lacking. While the concept of prevention has made significant institutional inroads, the fact remains that the international community moves quickly and effectively against nascent crises only when key interests on the part of the major powers are at stake, and these interests do not markedly clash. In the final analysis, foreign polices continue to be guided not by moral considerations but pragmatic national interests. However, insofar as they threaten regional and international security, it is increasingly in the national interest of the rich and powerful to stem the outbreak of protracted intrasocietal violence, irrespective of how seemingly marginal the country in question may appear to the putative national interest. Preventive thinking must be strengthened at all levels, and, linked to this, traditional conceptualizations of national security reconsidered. In spite of the 2001 conflict exacerbating the mistrust between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, Macedonia represents the last remaining genuinely multiethnic state in the Balkans. The most formidable threats to Macedonian stability today are – as they arguably have always been – non-ethnic in character: economic stress, high levels of unemployment, regional uncertainty, and a weak rule of law.

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Individually and collectively, these factors are major barriers to longterm security, and limit the country’s ability to attract much-needed FDI and ultimately accede to the EU. While Macedonia has returned to normalcy post-2001, much work remains both for internal and external stakeholders in achieving long-term security. The Ohrid Framework Agreement resolved a potentially combustible situation, and represents an important basis for Macedonia’s future as a multiethnic democracy. Yet the country remains weak and fractured, vulnerable to malignant outside forces and internal pressures. Traditional insecurities persist. Its people remain poor, criminality and corruption endemic. Ethnic differences continue to be exploited for political and other gain. Internal Albanian divisions have become increasingly dangerous. Macedonian democracy, as the 2008 election highlights, still has considerable room for maturation. It is vital that the Macedonian political elite – across the entire ethnic spectrum – remain steadfast in their commitment to the Ohrid agreement, to necessary economic reform, and to the fight against organized crime and corruption, while promoting a civic, non-ethnic identity inclusive of all and, at the same time, desisting from nationalist rhetoric. Macedonians, as Erwan Fouere argues, must move beyond ethnicity to look at issues not from an ethnic basis, but from an economic and social developmental one, as issues common to all.1 Quality leadership, across all communities, is vital in this respect. Developing public confidence in state institutions, likewise across all communities, constitutes an arguably more important issue than perceived intergroup tensions. Ethnic minorities must remain committed to the Macedonian state, and to the common objective of Europeanization. Post-Ohrid, Albanian-Macedonians have little excuse for renewed political violence – in many respects, the onus now lies with them to demonstrate their loyalty to the Macedonian state, its constitution, and the rule of law. Dialogue and the political process should take precedence over bullets in the resolution of future intergroup conflict, if and when it arises. As for the international community, it must maintain a long-term commitment to what remains a weak country, and ensure it is insulated from any future instability – criminal if not political – from postindependent Kosovo. To date, the latter’s independence, insofar as it has seemingly pacified Albanian nationalism and brought the process of Yugoslav fragmentation to an end, has been a positive development for Macedonia and the wider Balkans. In parallel to this, the international community must continue to assist Macedonia in tackling underlying sources of tension within its society. A crucial element of this process,

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of course, will be reconciliation between the ethnic Macedonian and Albanian communities, something that economic growth and the process of EU integration can buttress. By articulating mutual interests, a common identity will develop and the scope for misunderstanding, by virtue of increased cooperation and communication, will narrow. What is often lost is that the Macedonian people, for all their differences, are united by common problems – organized crime, corruption, economic weakness – and common interests, such as Euro-Atlantic integration, which can be solved only through a collective, cross-ethnic effort. This process of reconciliation should culminate in Macedonia’s integration into first NATO and, ultimately, the EU, with Brussels serving as the anchor of the country’s long-term stability, and giving it the European identity that can subordinate ethnic distinctions. Keeping Macedonia – and the broader region – engaged in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration thus remains crucial. If, conversely, the pace of integration, and concomitant award of tangible benefits, is perceived as too distant, the Macedonian people may grow impatient and lose hope. The granting of visa-free travel to the Schengen Area is a positive development in this sense. Critically, the events of 2001 have seemingly jolted the EU into recognizing the fallacy of its erstwhile approach to the country, and to the region more broadly. In effect, EU membership – by de facto abolishing those borders that have provoked so much bloodshed – will liberate the Balkans from its troubled past. In the case of Macedonia, its long-term security is inexorably linked to integration into Euro-Atlantic structures: for its political elite and public, irrespective of ethnicity, NATO and, in particular, EU membership remain the be-all and end-all, the ultimate incentive for interethnic consensus and nonviolence, and the savior of a weak and insecure country. In the words of Nikola Dimitrov, its national coordinator for NATO integration, EU and NATO membership will represent an end of history of sorts, ‘the final confirmation of our stability and future as a nation.’2 However, in the event that membership of NATO and ultimately the EU is not forthcoming, disallowed by the tiresome and now trivial efforts of Greece to deny a country and peoples their fundamental right of selfidentification and/or the abandonment of the EU’s enlargement process, Macedonia’s future will remain uncertain, the likelihood of a relapse into conflict will increase, and the valuable lessons it has offered to those willing to listen since its attainment of statehood in 1991 will sadly go unheeded.

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Indeed, only once Macedonia accedes into these collective institutions can the international community truly consider it a (qualified) preventive success. As such, it remains very much a work in progress.

Notes 1

Interview conducted by the author with Erwan Fouere, Skopje, August 4,

2006. 2

2006.

Interview conducted by the author with Nikola Dimitrov, Skopje, June 22,

Appendix Interviews Conducted by the Author

Ahrens, Geert-Hinrich (chairman, Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities, International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia). Bonn, June 14, 2006. Anonymous European Union diplomat. Brussels, July 19, 2006. Anonymous OSCE official. Skopje, June 20, 2006. Anonymous United States State Department official. Skopje, July 26, 2006. ———. Skopje, July 28, 2006. Arsovski, Mitre (former chief of general staff, Republic of Macedonia Army). Skopje, July 28, 2006. Brouhns, Alexis (former EU special representative for Macedonia). Brussels, July 17, 2006. Casule, Slobodan (former foreign minister, Republic of Macedonia). Skopje, June 29, 2006. ———. Skopje, July 26, 2006. Chilimanov, Cvetin (former editor, Nova Makedonija). Skopje, June 28, 2006. Daskalovski, Zhidas (program director, Center for Research and Policy Making, Skopje; assistant professor, Political Science Department, University of Saints Cyril and Methodius). Skopje, August 4, 2006. Dedring, Juergen (professor, The City University of New York and New York University; former senior political affairs officer, UN). New York City, March 7, 2006. Dehnert, Stefan (director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Skopje Office). Skopje, June 29, 2006. Deliso, Christopher (American journalist and travel writer). Skopje, June 7, 2006. Dimitrov, Nikola (national coordinator for NATO integration; former national security adviser to President Boris Trajkovski, ambassador to the United States, and chief negotiator on name dispute with Greece). Skopje, June 22, 2006. Dzundev, Igor (former ambassador and permanent representative to the UN, Republic of Macedonia). New York City, March 23, 2006. Economides, Spyros (senior lecturer in International Relations and European Politics, London School of Economics and Political Science). London, July 4, 2006.

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Fouere, Erwan (EU special representative for Macedonia). Skopje, August 4, 2006. Gligorov, Kiro (former president, Republic of Macedonia). Skopje, June 28, 2006. ———. Ohrid, July 31, 2006. Gocevski, Trajan (dean of Philosophy Faculty, University of Saints Cyril and Methodius; former defense minister, Republic of Macedonia). Skopje, July 26, 2006. Gow, James (professor of International Peace and Security, and director, International Peace and Security Program, King’s College London). London, July 2, 2006. Gowan, Richard (associate director for policy, Center on International Cooperation, New York University). New York City, February 16, 2006. Guicherd, Catherine (visiting fellow, International Peace Academy). New York City, February 22, 2006. Harris, Marshall F. (senior policy adviser, Alston & Bird; formerly of the State Department). Washington, DC, March 14, 2006. Ismanovski, Sandra (United Nations Development Programme Skopje). Skopje, June 8, 2006. Jebb, Cindy R. (professor and deputy department head, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy). West Point, New York, March 27, 2006. Jolevski, Zoran (ambassador to the United States and chief negotiator on name dispute with Greece, Republic of Macedonia; chief of staff to President Boris Trajkovski). Skopje, August 7, 2006. Jovanovska, Svetlana (Brussels correspondent, Dnevnik). Resen, Macedonia, July 27, 2006. Kljusev, Nikola (former prime minister, Republic of Macedonia). Skopje, July 28, 2006. Kupchan, Charles, A. (professor of International Relations, School of Foreign Service and Government, Georgetown University; senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; former director for European Affairs, National Security Council, White House). Washington, DC, March 15, 2006. Lovrekovic, Marko (country director, Search for Common Ground, Macedonia). Skopje, June 7, 2006. Lund, Michael S. (senior specialist for conflict and peacebuilding, Management Systems International, Inc.; consulting program manager, Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; former senior scholar, United States Institute of Peace). Washington, DC, March 15, 2006. Matovski, Aleksandar (national security adviser to Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski). Skopje, August 4, 2006. Mehmeti, Ibrahim (director of media programs, Search for Common Ground, Macedonia). Skopje, August 7, 2006. Miko, Jason (American journalist and travel writer). Skopje, June 7, 2006. Mojzes, Paul (professor of Religious Studies, Rosemont College). Rosemont, Pennsylvania, March 21, 2006. Muhic, Ferid (professor of Philosophy, University of Saints Cyril and Methodius; social activities adviser to President Branko Crvenkovski). Skopje, May 31, 2006.

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Laity, Mark (chief of strategic communications, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO; special adviser to NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson; aide to President Boris Trajkovski). Brussels, July 18, 2006. Nash, William L. (senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; former NATO commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina and UN civil administrator in Kosovo). Washington, DC, March 14, 2006. Ordanoski, Sasho (director, Forum Plus). Skopje, August 3, 2006. Owen, David (Lord) (co-chairman, International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia; former foreign secretary, United Kingdom). London, July 3, 2006. Pardew, James W. (deputy assistant secretary-general for operations, NATO; United States special envoy to Macedonia, 2001). Brussels, July 18, 2006. Paunovski, Ljuben (former defense minister, Republic of Macedonia). Demir Hisar, Macedonia, August 5, 2006. Pendarovski, Stevo (national security adviser to President Branko Crvenkovski). Skopje, May 26, 2006. ———. Skopje, May 31, 2006. Phinnemore, David (via email) (senior lecturer in European Integration and Jean Monnet Chair in Political Science, Queen’s University Belfast). August 15, 2007. Popovski, Vlado (professor, Faculty of Law, University of Saints Cyril and Methodius; former defense minister, justice minister, and director of intelligence, Republic of Macedonia). Bitola, July 27, 2006. Ramadani, Ismet (member of parliament, PDP, Republic of Macedonia). Skopje, August 3, 2006. Ramet, Sabrina P. (professor of Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology). Washington, DC, March 15, 2006. Ristovski, Blaze (Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts; former deputy prime minister, Republic of Macedonia). Skopje, June 29, 2006. Sadiku, Burim (Albanian-Macedonian activist). Skopje, August 7, 2006. Segarra, Bernard (head of Confidence Building Department/Situation Center, OSCE Skopje). Skopje, August 3, 2006. Silber, Laura (senior policy adviser, Open Society Institute). New York City, March 23, 2006. Soderberg, Nancy (via telephone) (distinguished visiting scholar, University of North Florida, Jacksonville; former senior official, National Security Council, White House, and deputy ambassador to the UN). October 5, 2006. Sokalski, Henryk J. (UNPREDEP civilian head of mission). Warsaw, July 10, 2006. Stojanovski, Filip (Macedonian activist). Skopje, May 30, 2006. Stoltenberg, Thorvald (co-chairman, International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia; former United Nations high commissioner for refugees; former foreign minister and defense minister, Norway). Oslo, June 12, 2006. Sutterlin, James S. (lecturer and fellow in United Nations Studies, Yale University, and adjunct professor, Long Island University; senior aide to UN Secretary-Generals Javier Perez de Cuellar and Boutros BoutrosGhali). Larchmont, New York, March 4, 2006. Taylor, Scott (editor and publisher, Esprit de Corps). Ottawa, March 30, 2006.

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Troebst, Stefan (professor of East European Cultural Studies, University of Leipzig; formerly with the OSCE). Berlin, July 7, 2006. Uzunov, Sasha (Australian freelance journalist). Melbourne, December 5, 2005. Vankovska, Biljana (professor of Political Science and Military Law, University of Saints Cyril and Methodius). Skopje, May 30, 2006. Whyte, Nicholas (director, International Diplomat, Brussels Office; former Europe program director, International Crisis Group). Brussels, July 18, 2006. Williams, Abiodun (vice president, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, United States Institute of Peace; former political and humanitarian affairs officer, UNPREDEP; former director of strategic planning, Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General). New York City, February 28, 2006. Woodward, Susan L. (professor of Political Science, Graduate Center, The City University of New York; former head of the Analysis and Assessment Unit, UNPROFOR). New York City, March 20, 2006. Yusufi, Islam (international policy fellow, Center for Policy Studies, Budapest; deputy national security adviser to President Boris Trajkovski). Skopje, May 26, 2006.

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Index Aceh, 203 Ackermann, Alice, 2 Adzic, Blagoje, 32, 145 Afghanistan, 203, 225; EU in, 203; NATO in, 209; and United States, 208, 220, 231 African Union (AU), 9, 232 Ahmeti, Ali, 121, 171, 184, 185; 2001 peace process, 108, 118, 125; and KLA, 181; and Kosovo, 170, 193-194n. 106; and NLA, 101, 116, 133n. 9, 168-169, 170; in post-conflict period, 121, 122, 132, 194n. 114; Prizren meeting, 106, 108, 184 Ahrens, Geert, 43, 86, 87, 88, 154, 157 Albania, 43, 45, 49, 50, 53, 54, 150; and Albanian-Macedonians, 37, 151, 158; collapse of law and order in, 82, 164-165, 182; and Greater Albania, concept of, 37, 151-152; and Macedonia, 33, 37, 38, 63, 65n. 2, 104, 106, 108, 149, 150, 151, 164, 184; in postCommunist period, 151, 186, 249; and UNPREDEP, 79, 81, 82 Albanian-Macedonians, 26, 49-51, 52-62; and Albania, 37, 151, 158; and ethnic Macedonians, 1, 31, 47, 50; and Greater Albania, concept of, 158-160, 249; and Higher Education, 57-59; Ilirida Republic, 54, 55; internal divisions among, 171; and Kosovo, 3, 25, 45-46, 60-61, 74n. 196, 78, 158; political and cultural demands, 29, 50, 52, 5455, 57-58, 59; political and cultural grievances, 4, 52-54, 5657, 61-62, 166-167, 248; political and cultural rights, 55-56, 60-61, 158, 164, 170-171; population of, 49; University of Tetovo, 58-59

Albanian National Army (ANA), 120 ANA. See Albanian National Army Annan, Kofi, 227; and “High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,” 227 Arsovski, Mitre, 145, 147 ASEAN. See Association of South East Asian Nations Ashdown, Paddy, 226 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 204 AU. See African Union Azar, Edward, 9 Badinter, Robert, 30; and Badinter Commission, 30, 40 Badinter Commission, 30, 40. See also Badinter, Robert Baker, James, 224 Balkan Wars (1912-1913), 34, 35, 36, 146 Berisha, Sali, 37, 151 Bitola, 57, 105 Boskovski, Ljube, 111, 112, 115, 116, 126, 128, 129 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 122, 157, 203; ethnic Croats in, 25; ethnic Serbs in, 25, 62, 146, 148; independence, process of, 27; international arms embargo on, 211; international community in, 3, 11, 82, 86, 89, 113-114, 172, 176, 212, 212-213; international recognition of, 30; and Macedonia, 49, 50, 51, 55, 59, 91, 100, 145, 153, 155; multiethnicity in, 50, 184, 218; multiparty election (1990) in, 26; NATO in, 209; peacekeepers in, 79, 80, 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 162, 201, 212, 238n. 8; in post-conflict period, 202, 218; and United States, 89, 90, 91, 155, 231, 249; war in, 32, 33, 35, 36, 52, 53, 77,

287

288

Index

145, 146, 148, 149, 153, 154, 155, 184, 215, 218; and Yugoslavia, 24 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 5, 19n. 8, 56, 79, 80, 81; and “An Agenda for Peace,” 5, 19n. 8, 79 Brouhns, Alexis, 117, 167, 202 Buckovski, Vlado, 130, 139n. 128 Bulgaria: and Macedonia, 34, 36-37, 38, 44, 63, 65n. 2, 69n. 77, 104, 149, 150-151, 164, 249; Macedonian Question, 33-34; in post-Communist period, 150-151, 186 Bull, Hedley, 234; and international society of states, 234 Bush, George H.W., 77, 208 Bush, George W., 104 Buzan, Barry, 204, 227, 242n. 77; and Copenhagen School, 227 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 7, 12, 20n. 13, 228 Carrington, Peter (Lord), 28, 86 Casule, Slobodan, 102, 118, 147, 155, 169, 184 Ceku, Agim, 184 Chad, 203 Chilimanov, Cvetin, 50, 166, 174 China, 220, 233 Clinton, William Jefferson, 40, 88, 89, 90, 91 Collier, Paul: greed and grievance conflict theory, 13-14, 21-22n. 51, 219 Colombia, 219 Conflict: causes of, 11-14, 21-22n. 51, 213-221, 222, 248; early warning, 10, 14-16, 222, 223; ethnic conflict, 214, 218-219, 252; indicators of, 14-15; interstate conflict, 18n. 2, 5, 11, 225, 228; intrastate conflict, 5, 11, 12, 14, 18, 18n. 2, 225, 236; stages of, 2, 6, 9-10; triggers of, 15, 223; typology of, 18-19n. 2 Conflict management, 6, 124, 183 Conflict prevention: actors, nonofficial/track two, 7, 20n. 14;

actors, official/track one, 7, 20n. 14; advantages of, 5, 11, 198; agents of, 8-9, 232-234; challenges to, 10-11, 15-16, 221225, 235-237; definition of, 1, 510; Macedonia, lessons from, 197-208, 245, 251-254; operational prevention, 6-7, 199; post-conflict prevention, 6-7; structural prevention, 3, 6-8, 199; timing of, 5, 7-8, 10, 198-199 Conflict resolution, 6, 82, 88, 125, 202, 218 Croatia: ethnic Serbs in, 51, 62, 146, 157, 215, 216; independence, process of, 24, 27, 28, 29, 52, 145; international community in, 3, 82, 86; international recognition of, 30; JNA, 145; and Macedonia, 26, 36, 49, 54, 55, 59, 100, 146, 153; multiparty election (1990) in, 25; peacekeepers in, 79, 80, 84; war in, 32, 35, 36, 53, 146, 148, 149, 154, 218; and Yugoslavia, 25, 26 Crvenkovski, Branko, 29, 121, 122, 128, 139n. 127, 139n. 128, 194n. 114 Darfur, 223, 224, 231, 232 Dayton Peace Accords, 3, 82, 88, 149, 163, 179 Demiri, Alajdin, 60 Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), 54, 67n. 33, 163, 164, 171; and 2001 conflict, 104, 106, 107, 108, 110, 113, 130; and Kosovo war, 47; PDP split, 67n. 33; Prizren meeting, 106-107 Democratic Republic of the Congo, 203 Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), 121, 171, 194n. 114 Deutsch, Karl, 204; and pluralistic security communities, 204 Dimitrov, Nikola, 104, 111, 112, 125, 126, 130, 256 Djindjic, Zoran, 68n. 65 DPA. See Democratic Party of Albanians

Index 289

DUI. See Democratic Union for Integration Economides, Spyros, 43 Efremov, Georgi, 108 EU. See European Union EU Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia. See Badinter Commission European Union (EU), 3, 9, 19n. 5, 201-205, 232, 233; and 2001 conflict, 104, 105, 107, 110, 114, 122-126, 183, 188; in Aceh, 203; in Afghanistan, 203; Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 30, 40; Badinter Commission, 30, 40; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 202, 203, 212; in Chad, 203; Common Foreign and Security Policy, 104, 132, 203; in Democratic Republic of the Congo, 203; enlargement of, 201-202; European perspective, 4, 125, 178; European Security and Defense Policy, 122, 203; European Security Strategy, 203; in Kosovo, 203; Lisbon Declaration, 40; Lisbon Treaty, 204; Maastricht Treaty, 19n. 5, 30; in Macedonia, 5, 19n. 3, 132, 177179, 202, 203, 214, 247, 256; Macedonia, recognition of, 30, 38, 40-41, 44; Operation Concordia, 123; PROXIMA police mission, 123; recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia, 30; as security actor, 202-204; and Serbia, 238n. 11; Stabilization and Association Agreement, 105, 123, 139n. 138, 178; Stabilization and Association Process, 123, 139n. 138, 178, 201-202; transformative power, 201-202, 251; Western Balkans, 3-4, 178, 201-202, 139n. 138, 247; and Yugoslavia, 203-204, 207, 208 Evans, Gareth, 198, 207, 233 Feith, Pieter, 108

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 18n. 1, 40, 177. See also Macedonia Fouere, Erwan, 117, 214, 255 Frowick, Robert, 84, 106, 107, 108, 113, 116, 184; and Prizren Agreement, 106, 107, 108, 113, 116, 184 FYROM. See Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Galbraith, Peter, 218 Geoana, Mircea, 104, 113 Georgievski, Ljubisa, 67n. 33 Georgievski, Ljupco, 26; and 2001 conflict, 110, 111, 112, 125, 126, 185, 136n. 86; and Boris Trajkovski, 140-141n. 163; as obstacle to peace, 109, 113, 128, 129; and partition, idea of, 108109, 119, 121, 128; in postconflict period, 109, 121; Prizren Agreement, 107 Glenny, Misha, 31, 41, 74n. 196, 77 Gligorov, Kiro, 17, 27, 34, 127, 146, 154-157, 164, 207, 248; and Albania, 37, 151; and AlbanianMacedonians, 154, 155-156; assassination attempt on, 99, 156; and Bulgaria, 37; and Greece, 39, 42, 63, 152; and JNA negotiations, 31-33, 144-145; and Macedonian foreign policy, 35, 44; and OSCE, 92; and Slobodan Milosevic, 36, 148, 155; and UNPREDEP, 79, 83, 84, 89, 147, 154; and Yugoslavia, 24, 28, 62, 144, 145, 148, 154, 207, 218 Gocevski, Trajan: and Albania, 151; and Albanian-Macedonians, 55, 60, 159-160; and Bulgaria, 151; and JNA negotiations, 32-33, 68n. 54; and UNPREDEP, 79 Gostivar, 25, 59-60, 61-62, 166 Gowan, Richard, 113 Greater Albania, 25, 164, 181, 250; concept of, 151-152; unfeasibility of, 37, 151-152, 158-160, 186, 249

290

Index

Greece, 31, 33, 45, 77, 147, 150, 202; civil war (1946-1949) in, 42; ethnic minorities in, 41-42; Greek-American lobby, 38, 40, 177; Macedonia, economic sanctions on, 39, 41, 43, 63, 152, 176-177, 246; Macedonia, name dispute with, 3, 18n. 1, 38-44, 70n. 100, 91, 92, 124, 186, 209, 246-247, 249, 256; Macedonia, relations with, 36-37, 38-44, 104, 149, 152, 164; Macedonian minority in, 41-42; Thessaloniki, 38, 39; Treaty of Bucharest, 34, 65n. 2 Ground Security Zone (GSZ), 103 Gruevski, Nikola, 44, 139n. 128, 194n. 114, 171 GSZ. See Ground Security Zone Haass, Richard, 233-234 Hall, Peter, 28, 61 Hammarskjöld, Dag, 19n. 8 Haradinaj, Ramush, 184 Harris, Marshall, 50, 155, 161, 177, 238n. 8 High Commissioner on National Minorities, 85-86, 164 Hoeffler, Anke: greed and grievance conflict theory, 13-14, 21-22n. 51, 219 Holbrooke, Richard, 77, 91, 114 Hoxha, Enver, 151 Human Rights Watch, 62, 115 Human Security, 12-13, 226-227, 228, 229, 236, 253 Humanitarian intervention, 5, 11, 16, 230-232; in Kosovo, 46, 175, 179-183, 188, 231, 247; responsibility to protect, 221, 231-232 Huntington, Samuel, 150; and clash of civilizations theory, 150 ICFY. See International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia ICTY. See International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Imeri, Imer, 104, 106, 107, 185

IMF. See International Monetary Fund Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), 29-30, 67n. 33, 144, 157-158, 194n. 114; and 2001 conflict, 106, 109, 111, 113, 126, 128; accommodation of Albanian-Macedonians, 163-164, 171; and decentralization, 120; and JNA, 25, 30; and Kosovo war, 47; and Macedonia-Greece name dispute, 43, 194n. 114; in multiparty election (1990), 25-26, 28 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 10, 12 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), 36, 63, 92, 93, 149, 163, 175; and Kiro Gligorov, 28, 154; in Macedonia, 79, 86-88, 174; and Macedonia-Greece name dispute, 39-40, 43, 63, 91; Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities, 79, 85, 86-88, 172, 246 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 44 International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 115 Iraq, 212, 216-217, 231; American experience in, 9, 208, 220, 231, 232; federalization of, 218; Saddam Hussein, 16, 216 Ivanov, Gjorgi, 194n. 114 Izetbegovic, Alija, 24, 145, 155, 162, 218 Jentleson, Bruce, 10, 15 Jolevski, Zoran, 107-108, 110, 125, 130, 171, 185 Jovanovic, Vladislav, 148 Jovic, Borisav, 148 JNA. See Yugoslav National Army Karadzic, Radovan, 215, 238n. 11

Index 291

KFOR. See Kosovo Force Kicevo, 120 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 26 KLA. See Kosovo Liberation Army Kljusev, Nikola, 26, 32, 34 Kosovo, 31, 53, 65n. 3, 78, 113-114, 148, 172, 255; and 2001 conflict, 102-103, 104, 105, 129, 170, 179182; autonomy, suspension of, 25, 66n. 4; EU in, 203; and Macedonia, 3, 60-61, 150, 173, 179-183, 187, 206, 249; NATO intervention in, 4, 45-47, 118, 164, 231, 250; NATO intervention in, consequences for Macedonia, 45-47, 144, 165, 175, 179-183, 188, 231; OSCE monitors in, 78, 88; University of Pristina, 58 Kosovo Force (KFOR), 110, 112, 114, 181 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 102, 103, 164, 181, 184-185, 231; demobilization of, 209; disarmament of, 180, 182, 209; and NLA, 170, 181-182, 250; and organized crime, 169 Kosovo People’s Movement (LPK), 182 Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), 181 Kostov, Hari, 120, 139n. 128 Kostunica, Vojislav, 150 KPC. See Kosovo Protection Corps Kucan, Milan, 144 Kumanovo, 25, 103, 105, 106, 109, 110 Kupchan, Charles, 184 Laity, Mark, 111, 112, 125, 128, 129 Le Roy, Alain, 123 Leotard, Francois, 114, 123, 124-125 Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB), 102, 103, 134n. 20, 169, 181, 182. See also Presevo Valley Libya, 211 LPK. See Kosovo People’s Movement

Lund, Michael, 13, 15, 18n. 2, 32, 90, 170, 179 Macedonia: and Albania, 33, 37, 38, 63, 65n. 2, 104, 106, 108, 149, 150, 151, 164, 184; arms, availability of, 164-165, 182, 209-210; and BosniaHerzegovina, 49, 50, 51, 55, 59, 91, 100, 145, 153, 155; and Bulgaria, 34, 36-37, 38, 44, 63, 65n. 2, 69n. 77, 104, 149, 150151, 164, 249; cabinet of experts, 26-27; constitution, 25, 29, 30, 38-39, 40, 42, 51, 52, 53-54, 57, 59, 61, 70n. 100, 116-117, 136n. 86, 137n. 101, 137n. 103, 153, 167, 171; Constitutional Court, 55, 60; corruption in, 169-170; and Croatia, 26, 36, 49, 54, 55, 59, 100, 146, 153; decentralization, 117, 119-120, 138n. 115; economic decline, 6264, 174-176; ethnic Albanians, accommodation of, 163-164, 171; ethnic Albanians, perceptions of, 50, 54-55, 59-61; ethnic Albanians, suppression of, 24-25, 50, 59-60, 61-62, 166; ethnic composition of, 49; ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, relations between, 49-51, 157, 167-168, 184; ethnic minorities, policies toward, 51-54, 55-56, 5762, 153-154, 163-164; ethnic Serbs in, 29, 31, 35-36, 49, 51-52, 146; and EU, 5, 30, 38, 40-41, 44, 123-124, 132, 177-179, 202, 203, 214, 247, 256; and EU (2001 conflict), 104, 105, 107, 110, 114, 122-126, 183, 188; foreign policy, 35, 46; the “Four Wolves,” 33-44, 144-152; general election (1994) in, 67n. 33, 157158; general election (1998) in, 47, 67n. 33, 158, 163, 166; general election (2002), in, 121; general election (2006) in, 44, 158; general election (2008) in, 158, 171, 194n. 114, 255; Greece,

292

Index

name dispute with, 3, 18n. 1, 3844, 70n. 100, 91, 92, 124, 186, 209, 246-247, 249, 256; Greece, relations with, 36-37, 38-44, 104, 149, 152, 164; Greek economic sanctions, 39, 41, 43, 63, 152, 176-177, 246; High Commissioner on National Minorities, 85-86, 164; independence, attitudes toward, 25, 26, 27-28; independence, process of, 23, 24, 28, 29-33; interethnic flashpoints, 58-60; international recognition, 30-31, 38-41, 44; JNA withdrawal from, 25, 29, 31-33, 68n. 54, 144-145, 146-148, 248; League of Communists, 25; Macedonian National Front, 25; Macedonian Orthodox Church, 35, 36, 70-71n. 124, 127, 129; multiparty election (1990) in, 25-26; national census, 49, 54, 217; national consciousness, 24, 26; nationalism, 26, 29, 158; and NATO, 35, 44, 46, 93, 120, 122124, 177, 209; and NATO (2001 conflict), 104, 108, 110, 113-114, 116, 124, 183; organized crime, 63-64, 168-169, 175, 210; and OSCE, 79, 84-86, 88, 92, 97n. 82, 161, 163, 205-206; and OSCE (2001 conflict), 104, 106, 107, 122, 124, 164; OSCE membership, 41, 44; Ottoman Macedonia, 30, 34, 38, 65n. 2; Partnership for Peace, 44; postYugoslav peace, explanations of, 143, 144-152, 152-161, 163-165, 186-187; post-Yugoslav risk factors, 1, 23, 30-31, 143; presidential election (1994) in, 67n. 33, 157-158; presidential election (1999) in, 67n. 33, 126; presidential election (2009) in, 194n. 114; referendum on independence, 27, 28, 29, 51, 54, 148; sanctions-busting, 64, 147, 155, 175; and Serbia, 26, 31, 3334, 35-36, 63-64, 68n. 65, 145-

150; Stabilization and Association Agreement, 105, 123; Stabilization and Association Process, 123; and Taiwan, 82, 172; Territorial Defense Force, 32; Treaty of Bucharest, 34, 65n. 2, 69n. 77; and Turkey, 44; and United States, 23, 35, 40, 44, 70n. 98, 79, 88-91, 120; and United States (2001 conflict), 104, 107, 112, 114, 124-125, 126, 183, 188; University of Saints Cyril and Methodius, 58, 59; University of Tetovo, 58-59, 85-86, 164; UNPREDEP, 79-84, 161-163, 199-200, 246, 249; Yugoslav sanctions, 31, 62-64, 147, 175, 211; and Yugoslavia, 24-25; Yugoslavia, withdrawal from, 2733, 144-150; and Yugoslavia (rump), 35-36, 62-63, 146-147, 149-150, 186, 247, 249; Macedonia, conflict in (2001); Aracinovo, 102, 109-113, 114, 124, 168; explanations of, 17, 101-102, 144, 165-183, 219, 250251; facilitating factors, 126-131; government of national unity, 106, 108, 110, 114, 116; Grupcin, 115; 128; international response, 104, 105, 113-115, 122-126, 130131, 183; irregular forces, use of, 128-129, 131, 183; and Kosovo, 102-103, 104, 105, 129, 170, 179182; Lions, 129; Ljuboten, 115, 116; Military Professional Resources Incorporated, 112; military response, 104-105, 106, 110, 129-131; Ohrid Framework Agreement, 115-120, 132, 137n. 101, 137n. 102, 137n. 103, 137n. 104, 255; and organized crime, 165, 168-169; partition, idea of, 108-109, 119, 121; post-conflict period, 119-124; Prizren Agreement, 106, 107, 108, 113, 116, 184; regional response, 104; Tanusevci, 101, 102, 103, 130, 168, 173; Tearce, 101; Tigers,

Index 293

129; Trebos, 121; and Ukraine, 104, 105 Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (MANU), 108-109 Macedonian Question, 24, 33-34 MANU. See Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts Markovic, Ante, 25 Matovski, Aleksandar, 130, 173 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 56 Mehmeti, Ibrahim, 126, 127, 166, 167, 170 Meier, Viktor, 34 Meta, Ilir, 184 Michas, Takis, 34 Miko, Jason, 127, 170 Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), 112 Milosevic, Slobodan, 79, 149, 154, 155, 180, 182, 234; and BosniaHerzegovina, 32; and Croatia, 32; and Dayton negotiations, 147; and economic sanctions, 147, 175, 211; and JNA, 32; and Kosovo, 25, 66n. 4; and Macedonia, 26, 31, 34, 35-36, 8990, 147-149, 150; and Serbian Orthodox Church, 35; and Yugoslavia, collapse of, 207, 215 Mitsotakis, Konstantinos, 34, 39 Mladic, Ratko, 238n. 11 Mojzes, Paul, 127 Montenegro, 19n. 6, 28, 32, 152, 159, 202 MPRI. See Military Professional Resources Incorporated Muhic, Ferid, 68n. 65, 126-127, 159 Nano, Fatos, 37 Nash, William, 181, 199 National Liberation Army (NLA), 99, 103, 104, 105-106, 115, 133n. 5, 168; in Aracinovo, 109-113; demobilization of, 116, 210; disarmament of 114, 116, 183; funding of, 168-169; growth of, 129-130; and KLA, 181-182; and Kosovo, 181-182; motives of, 101-102, 104, 121, 130-131, 132, 184-185; organized crime, links

to, 168-169; origins of, 101, 170; and peace negotiations, 108, 116, 118; Prizren meeting, 106-107, 184 National security: reconceptualization of, 18, 225230, 253-254. See also Realism NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGOs. See Nongovernmental Organizations Nimetz, Matthew, 91 NLA. See National Liberation Army Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 19n. 3; limitations of, 8; in Macedonia, 79, 88, 92; as preventive agents, 8, 14, 20n. 14, 109, 198, 223, 232, 237. See also Search For Common Ground North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 3, 19n. 3, 35, 77, 203, 209, 212, 251; and 2001 conflict, 104, 108, 110, 113-114, 116, 124, 183; in Afghanistan, 209; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 209, 212213; in Kosovo, 4, 45-47, 144, 165, 179-183, 188, 194n. 114, 250; and Macedonia, 35, 44, 46, 93, 120, 122-124, 177, 209; NATO Response Force, 212; Operation Amber Fox, 123; Operation Essential Harvest, 116, 123; and Presevo Valley, 103 Northern Ireland, 219-220 Nye, Joseph, 229 O’Neill, Robin, 63 Ohrid Framework Agreement, 115120, 132, 137n. 101, 137n. 102, 137n. 103, 137n. 104, 255; and decentralization, 117, 119-120, 138n. 115; implementation of, 122-123, 205 Okun, Herbet, 212 Ordanoski, Sasho, 154, 155, 159, 184 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 9, 19n. 3, 20n. 26, 78, 88; in 2001 conflict, 104, 106, 107; High Commissioner on National

294

Index

Minorities, 85-86, 164; in Macedonia, 79, 84-86, 88, 92, 97n. 82, 161, 163, 205-206; Macedonian Sanctions Assistance Mission, 64; in post-conflict period, 122, 124; UNPREDEP cooperation, 85 OSCE. See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Osmani, Rufi, 60 Ostreni, Gezim, 181 Owen, David (Lord), 39, 61; and Alija Izetbegovic, 155; and Franjo Tudjman, 155; in ICFY, 28, 86, 87; and Kiro Gligorov, 154, 155, 156; and Macedonia, 58, 62, 145; and MacedoniaGreece name dispute, 40-41; and sanctions-busting, 175; and Slobodan Milosevic, 148, 149, 155; and UNPREDEP, 79-80, 83 Pakistan, 206 Papandreou, Andreas, 39, 40 Pardew, James, 101, 112, 114, 124125, 128-129, 170 Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), 29, 54, 55, 57, 59, 67n. 33, 164; and 2001 conflict, 104, 106, 108, 109, 110, 113, 130; DPA split, 67n. 33; in multiparty election (1990), 26; Prizren meeting, 106-107 Patten, Chris, 104, 113, 128 Paunovski, Ljuben, 104, 109, 130, 131 PDP. See Party for Democratic Prosperity Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, 28, 86 Peacebuilding, 5-6, 7, 199, 200, 202, 204, 221 Peacekeeping, 161, 199-201, 203, 212, 233; preventive peacekeeping, 7, 79, 162, 251. See also UNPREDEP and UNPROFOR Pendarovski, Stevo, 128, 129-130, 149, 156, 175, 180 Petkovski, Tito, 67n. 33

Phillips, John, 77, 128, 184 Poos, Jacques, 203 Popovski, Vlado, 28, 37, 54, 88, 90, 101, 156 Presevo Valley, 102, 103, 168, 180, 182. See also Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac Preventive diplomacy, 6, 19n. 8 Prilep, 115 Ramadani, Ismet, 214; and 2001 conflict, 114; and AlbanianMacedonian grievances, 57, 166, 167; and Greater Albania, 152, 159, 160; and Kiro Gligorov, 155-156 RCC. See Regional Cooperation Council Realism: approach to national security, 227-229; limitations of, 226, 227-228, 229, 235, 236, 253. See also National security, reconceptualization of Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), 205 Regionalism, 201-205 Responsibility to protect. See humanitarian intervention. Ristovski, Blaze, 34, 77 Robertson, George (Lord), 104, 105, 111, 112, 113, 114, 124 Roman, Petre, 34 Rubin, Barnett, 13, 14-15 Rugova, Ibrahim, 150, 164, 184 Russia, 69n. 77, 82, 212, 220, 233 Rwanda, 11, 223 Sadiku, Burim, 58, 117-118, 159, 166 Saermark-Thomsen, Finn, 81 Samaras, Antonis, 43 Sanctions: on former Yugoslavia, 37, 62-63, 64, 147, 175; as preventive strategy, 7, 199, 210-211 SDSM. See Social Democratic Union of Macedonia Search For Common Ground (SFCG), 88, 126

Index 295

Security: interconnectedness of contemporary threats, 18, 225, 253-254 Segarra, Bernard, 122, 210 Serbia: and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 32, 148; and Croatia, 32, 148; and EU, 202, 238n. 11; Greater Serbia, 35, 78, 88, 147, 149; and Kosovo, 25, 51, 61, 150, 158, 164, 231; and Macedonia, 26, 31, 33-34, 35-36, 63-64, 68n. 65, 145-150; Presevo Valley, 102, 103, 168, 180, 182; sanctionsbusting, 64, 147, 155; Serbian Orthodox Church, 35, 36; and Slovenia, 148; Treaty of Bucharest, 38, 65n. 2; and Yugoslavia, 24, 32, 215; Seselj, Vojislav, 35 SFCG. See Search For Common Ground Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 204 Skopje, 35, 50, 109, 110, 120, 146, Slovenia: independence, process of, 24, 27, 28, 29, 52, 148, 154; international recognition of, 30; JNA in, 32, 145; multiparty election (1990) in, 25; and Slobodan Milosevic, 36; war in, 32; and Yugoslavia, 24 Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), 26, 29, 47, 121, 158, 163, 166, 67n. 33; and 2001 conflict, 106, 109, 113, 126; in multiparty election (1990), 25 Soderberg, Nancy, 89, 91, 200 Sokalski, Henryk: and AlbanianMacedonian political leaders, 61; and Ohrid Framework Agreement, 119; and OSCE cooperation, 85; and sanctionsbusting, 175; and UNPREDEP, 80, 81, 83; and UNPREDEP withdrawal, 173; and Yugoslavia, 221 Solana, Javier, 104, 105, 113, 114, 124 Soros, George, 176

South East European University, 59, 86. See also University of Tetovo and Van Der Stoel University Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 178, 201, 205 Stoltenberg, Thorvald: and former Yugoslavia, 217; and Kiro Gligorov, 154, 155; and Macedonia, 162; and Slobodan Milosevic, 149 Struga, 120 Taylor, Scott, 101, 112, 129, 133n. 5, 181 Tetovo, 59-60, 61-62, 166; and 2001 conflict, 101, 103, 105, 109, 115; and Albanian-Macedonians, 49, 103; Radio Tetovo, 57; University of Tetovo, 58-59, 8586, 117, 164 Thaci, Hashim, 184 Thaci, Menduh, 104 Tito, Josip Broz, 25, 51, 220; and Kiro Gligorov, 27; and Macedonia, 24, 25, 35, 38; and Yugoslavia, collapse of, 215, 216 Trajkovski, Boris, 104, 111, 126-128, 139n. 126, 128, 67n. 33; and 2001 conflict, 111, 113, 128, 207, 136n. 86, 140-141n. 163; accommodation of AlbanianMacedonians, 164; death of, 121122; and Ljupco Georgievski, 126, 140-141n. 163; and Macedonian Orthodox Church, 127; Methodist background, 127128; and Ohrid Framework Agreement, 116; Prizren Agreement, 107; and Robert Frowick, 107 Troebst, Stefan, 61, 85 Tudjman, Franjo, 144, 145, 154, 155, 207, 215 Tupurkovski, Vasil, 24, 144, 190n. 34, 248 Turkey, 44, 45, 77 UCPMB. See Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac

296

Index

UN. See United Nations United Kingdom: in BosniaHerzegovina, 90, 91; in Macedonia, 116; and Yugoslavia, 28 United Nations (UN): as agent of prevention, 8-9, 232-234; “An Agenda for Peace,” 5, 19n. 8, 79; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 79, 80, 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 162, 201, 212, 238n. 8; in Croatia, 79, 80, 84; General Assembly, 232; “HighLevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,” 227; limitations of, 9, 232-233; in Macedonia, 33, 79-84, 161-163, 246; and peacekeeping, 7, 79, 162, 199-201, 251; and preventive diplomacy, 6, 19n. 8; and responsibility to protect, 231232; Security Council, 9, 11, 23, 104, 211, 224, 233 United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP), 7984, 87, 88, 92, 93, 94n. 6, 161163, 199-200, 201, 212, 246, 249; Canadian contingent, 80-81; Cupino Brdo, 83-84, 90; departure of, 46, 82-83, 84, 93, 169, 172-173, 182; NORDBAT, 80-81, 84, 89-90; OSCE cooperation, 85; UNCIVPOL, 80; UNPROFOR FYROM Command, 80, 81, 82; USBAT, 81, 90 United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 79, 94n. 6, 201, 238n. 8; FYROM Command, 80, 81, 82 United States, 9, 200, 208-209, 226, 232, 233, 251; and 2001 conflict, 104, 107, 112, 114, 124-125, 126, 183, 188; and Afghanistan, 208, 220, 231; and Albanian unification, 151; and BosniaHerzegovina, 89, 91, 162; and former Yugoslavia, 89, 208-209, 224; and Iraq, 9, 208, 220, 231, 232; and Macedonia, 23, 35, 79, 88-91; Macedonia, recognition

of, 40, 44, 70n. 98, 120; and Macedonia-Greece name dispute, 38, 40, 44, 91, 92, 176, 177; and Somalia, 90, 231; and UNPREDEP, 81, 83, 88-91, 163 University of Pristina, 58 University of Tetovo, 58-59, 85-86, 117, 164. See also Van Der Stoel University and South East European University UNPREDEP. See United Nations Preventive Deployment UNPROFOR. See United Nations Protection Force van der Stoel, Max: in 2001 conflict, 107; as High Commissioner on National Minorities, 85-86, 164; Van Der Stoel University, 86 Van Der Stoel University, 86. See also South East European University and University of Tetovo Vance, Cyrus, 28, 39, 79, 86, 91, 149 Vankovska, Biljana, 99, 100, 126, 168, 169, 179, 180 Vejce, 105 Veliu, Fazli, 101, 181-182 VMRO-DPMNE. See Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity Vojvodina, 32, 66n. 4, 88 Western Balkans, 19n. 6, 204-205; and EU, 3-4, 178, 201-202, 139n. 138, 247 Whyte, Nicholas, 158 Williams, Abiodun, 81-82, 155 Woodward, Susan, 25, 223 Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities, 79, 85, 86-88, 172, 246. See also International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia World Bank, 44 Xhaferi, Arben, 104, 106, 107, 121, 185

Index 297

Yugoslav National Army (JNA), 29, 30, 31-33, 249; in BosniaHerzegovina, 32, 35, 146, 148; in Croatia, 32, 35, 145, 146, 148; Macedonia, withdrawal from, 25, 29, 31-33, 68n. 54, 144-145, 146148, 248; in Slovenia, 32, 145, 148 Yugoslavia, Kingdom of, 35 Yugoslavia, rump, 31, 99; and Macedonia, 35-36, 62-63, 146147, 149-150, 186, 247, 249; sanctions on, 37, 62-63, 64, 147, 175, 211

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of; collapse of, 1, 24, 214-216, 219, 220, 223; Dayton Peace Accords, 3, 82, 88, 149, 163, 179; federal presidency, 28, 32, 248; international arms embargo on, 32, 211; international response to, 16, 23, 208-209, 211-213, 217, 223-224, 238n. 8, 252 Yusufi, Islam, 129 Zhelev, Zhelju, 34 Zimmerman, Warren, 190n. 34, 213

About the Book

How did Macedonia attain its status as the only Yugoslav republic to achieve a nonviolent transition to independence in the early 1990s? And why did the initial peace fail to endure? Sasho Ripiloski traces Macedonia's peaceful extrication from the Yugoslav morass and then examines the new country's subsequent statebuilding efforts and offers an explanation for its later collapse into violence. He also assesses the broader theoretical implications stemming from the Macedonian experience. His work both advances our knowledge of this little-known country and sheds important new light on its role in Yugoslavia's fragmentation. Sasho Ripiloski teaches in the International Studies Program, School of Global Studies, at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology.

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