Conditions and Conditionals: An Investigation of Ancient Greek (Amsterdam Studies in Classical Philology, 3) 9050631967, 9789050631969

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CONDITIONS AND CONDITIONALS

When Protagoras remarks "if you like, let us assume that justice is holy and holiness just", Socrates replies "No, I do not want this 'if you like' or 'if you agree' sort of thing to be put to the proof(-); our statement will be most properly tested if we take away the 'if" (Plato, Protagoras 331c3-dl). This passage may be considered one of the oldest passages reflecting on the pragmatic functions of 'if', and the importance of 'if' in human reasoning. Whereas the study of conditionals has a long history, by far most attention has been given to the logical side. This book develops a linguistic framework to analyse conditionals, for which the apparatus of Functional Grammar provides a basis. Within this framework a detailed analysis is given of conditionals in Ancient Greek, in which syntactic, semantic as well as pragmatic factors are used to explain the multifarious uses of the important but elusive conjunction ei.

AMSTERDAM STUDIES IN CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY EDITORS

ALBERT RIJKSBARON HARM PINKSTER IRENE J.F. DE JONG VOLUME THREE

PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED

1. A. Rijksbaron, Grammatical Observations on Euripides' Bacchae. 1991. 2. R. Risselada, Imperatives and other Directive Expressions in Latin. A Study in the Pragmatics of a Dead Language. 1993.

GERRY WAKKER

CONDITIONS AND CONDITIONALS AN INVESTIGATION OF ANCIENT GREEK

J.C. GIEBEN, PUBLISHER AMSTERDAM 1994

No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. © by G.C. Wakker, 1994 / Printed in The Netherlands / ISBN 90 5063 196 7

To my mother and the memory of my father

CONTENTS Acknowledgements xi

1.

Introduction 1 1.1 Preliminary remarks 1 1.1.1 Subject matter 1 1.1.2 Theoretical framework 2 1.1.3 A note on the terminology and data used 3 1.2 A survey of the contents of the present study 6 1.3 Introduction to Functional Grammar 12

2.

Conditional clauses in general: state of research 21 2.1 Torminology: condition vs. hypothesis 21 2.2 State of research: theories about conditionals in general 23 2.3 State of research: studies on conditionals in Ancient Greek 35

3.

Theoretical preliminaries for a linguistic description of conditionals in Ancient Greek 43 3.1 Definition of a conditional relationship 43 3.2 Position and function of conditionals 50 3.2.1 Factors adduced to explain Greenberg's Universal of Word Order 14 50 3.2.2 Claims in later studies 52 3.2.3 Position of Greek conditionals: statistics 57 3.2.4 Predicational conditionals 61 3.2.4.1 Predicational conditionals preceding the main clause 61 3.2.4.2 Predicational conditionals following the main clause 72 3.2.4.3 Predicational conditionals interrupting the main clause 77 3.2.4.4 Summarizing remarks 82 3.2.5 Propositional and illocutionary conditionals 84 3.2.6 Main conclusions 88 3.2.7 Excursus: An FG representation of conditionals 90 3.2.7.1 Conditionals and the typology of satellites 90 3.2.7.2 Restrictive conditionals within the layered typology of satellites 95 3.2.7.3 Non-restrictive conditionals and illocutionary operators 98 3.2.7.4 The underlying structure of conditionals 100 3.2.7.5 Conclusion 103

viii

CONTENTS

3.3

4.

Concluding remarks: factors relevant to a formal classification of Ancient Greek conditionals 104 3.3.1 Restrictiveness vs. non-restrictiveness 104 3.3.2 Hypothesis vs. condition 105 3.3.3 Necessary vs. sufficient condition 105 3.3.4 Specific/particular vs. generic/general conditionals 106 3.3.5 Choice of the moods: degrees of probability 111 3.3.6 'fype of discourse 113 3.3.7 'Ilme reference 116 3.3.8 Semantic types of conditional 116 3.3.9 Conclusion: basic factors for a classification of Greek conditionals 117

Predicational conditionals .and temporals 121 4.1 Introduction 121 4.2 Interactive speech: subordinate clauses with present reference 125 4.2.1 ei with.present indicative 125 4.2.2 btei etc. with present indicative 130 4.2.3 Counterfactual conditional with present reference 132 4.3 Interactive speech (continued); subordinate clauses with past reference 142 4.3.1 ei with secondary indicativ" (neutral value) 142 4.3.2 ei with secondary indicative (counterfactual value) 144 4.3.3 Form of counterfacruals 146 4.3.4 The implications of counterfacruals 150 4.3.5 Neutral or counterfacrual interpretation 154 4.3.6 £1tei etc. with secondary indicative 155 4.3.7 Potential conditional with past reference? 156 4.4 Interactive speech (continued); subordinate clauses with future reference 167 4.4.1 £i with future indicative 167 4.4.2 Mv with (furural) subjunctive 174 4.4.3 ei with optative 176 4.4.4 bteav with (futural) subjunctive 179 4.4.5 btei etc. with optative 186 4.4.6 Concluding remarks 188 4.5 Interactive speech (continued): pseudo-conditionals 189 4.5.1 'Pseudo-self-damnation' 189 4.5.2 Obviously realized conditionals 190 4.5.3 Sarcastic conditionals 191

CONTENTS

4.6 4.7

4.8 4.9

4.5.4 Tautological conditionals 192 4.5.5 Conditional periods in inducements and deterrents 193 Narrative Speech 195 Descriptions of manners and customs 197 4.7.1 Non-past descriptions 197 4.7.2 Past descriptions 203 Some Homeric peculiarities 205 Conclusions and implications for FG 214

5.

Propositional and illocutionary conditionals 227 5.1 Propositional conditionals 228 5.1.1 Standard propositional conditionals 228 5.1.2 Rhetorical use of propositional conditionals 231 5.1.2.1 'Attitudinal' conditionals 231 5.1.2.2 Obviously realized conditionals 233 5.1.2.3 Comparative conditionals 235 5.2 Illocutionary conditionals 236 5.2.1 General semantic characterization 236 5.2.2 Subtypes of illocutionary conditionals 241 5.2.2.1 Declaratives 242 5.2.2.2 Interrogatives 254 5.2.2.3 Directives 255 5.2.2.4 Expressives 256 5.3 Shared features of propositional and illocutionary conditionals 256 5.4 Conditionals with a double nature 257 5.5 Summary and concluding remarks 269

6.

Some peculiar usages of conditionals 275 6.1 Enumerations of the type 'a, b and if there is a c' 275 6.2 Ei meaning 'in case' 277 6.3 Elliptic conditional periods 282 6.3.1 Ei 6£ µ11 282 6.3.2 £i µ11 283 6.3.3 £i 6e µT)/Ei µTl p, (alla) q 'if not p, (then at least) q' 285 6.3.4 Et(1tEp) 't~ ( ~ 285 6.4 Bi-clauses with subject or object function 286 6.5 Ei with oblique optative 294

ix

x 7.

CONTENTS

The function of particles in ei-clauses 303

7 .1 7 .2

7.3

7.4

Introduction 303 Scope particles 308 7.2.1 ei ye 308 7.2.2 ei11:ep 315 7.2.3 ei Kai and Kat ei 329 7.2.4 Some final remarks 339 Modal particles 343 7.3.1 ei apa 343 7.3.2 ei mt 351 7.3.3 £\ (.. ,) 11:0U 357 7.3.4 £\ 'tO\ 360 7.3.5 Summarizing remarks 362 Concluding remarks and summary 363

8.

Other usages of ei: the relationship between all types of ei-clause 365 8.1 eVe&v-clauses with 'purpose' value 365 8.1.1 Relationship with conditional clauses 367 8.1.2 Relationship with indirect' questions 369 8.1.3 Relationship with purpose clauses 372 8.1.4 Homer versus later authors 375 8.1.5 Concluding remarks and questions for further research 377 8.2 Indirect yes/no-questions introduced by ei 379 8.3 Wishes introduced by ei 384 8.4 The diachronic relation between the different usages of ei 385 8.4.1 The origin of conditionals 385 8.4.1.1 Theory 1: conditionals developed out of wishes 386 8.4.1.2 Theory 2: wishes are derived from conditionals 394 8.4.2 The origin of other el-clauses 396 8.4.3 Conclusion 399 8.5 The synchronic relation between the different types of ei 400 8.6 Conclusion 401

9.

Overview 403

Bibliography 413 Index of terms 428 Index of Greek words 435 Index locorum 438

Acknowledgements In 1980, when still an undergraduate student, I submitted a paper about conditional clauses with 'purpose value' to Professor Dr. C.J. Ruijgh; and already at that time he suggested to me that I should write a thesis on conditional clauses in Ancient Greek. Truth to tell, the notion then seemed far-fetched to me; but when I was appointed as a student-assistant to Dr. A. Rijksbaron for research on this very subject, my ideas changed, which was mainly due to the heated and stimulating debates we had. I was able to do some preparatory research during a stay at the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris (1986), thanks to grants of the Netherlands Organization for Research (NWO), the AUV (Amsterdam University Society) and the Groesbeek-Assenbroek Foundation; and during a further stay as a 'Stipendiatin' at the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae in Hamburg (1987-1989), again financed by NWO. An additional grant of the NWO enabled me to continue the work on this thesis at the University of Amsterdam during the period of 1989-1991. When I was appointed a staff member at the University of Groningen I was given the opportunity to finish off the research; especially during the last few months my colleagues Professor Dr. M.A. Harder and Dr. R.F. Regtuit have often helped me by taking over many little jobs, for which I am very grateful. I would not have managed to complete this book without the help of very many people. Among them special thanks are due to the following persons. Both Professor Dr. C.J. Ruijgh and Dr. A. Rijksbaron, each in his own way, have shaped and stimulated my interest in Greek linguistics. Professor Ruijgh's vast knowledge of this subject never ceases to surprise me. He was always able immediately to comment upon my texts with great interest and great precision, offering many useful parallels and references, as well as constructive criticism. With Dr. A. Rijksbaron I have discussed literally every word written during my research period. As has been said already, this gave rise to at times heated debates. I will always remember his dictum "I wholly agree with you, but everything must be put differently". It is his penetrating criticism which has to a large extent influenced the definitive shape of the book. I am very grateful that I have been enabled to discuss its first six chapters with Professor Dr. S.C. Dik. His professional and personal concern has been a great inspiration. Moreover, he showed the admirable capacity of finding

xii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

positive points in what I initially thought to be weak arguments, and to persuade me that what I wanted to say was not absolute nonsense. I am greatly indebted to Dr. M.E. Keizer, who swiftly and expertly corrected my English; and to Noor Kegel, who cheerfully made my amateurish typescript camera ready, at the same time correcting many errors and commenting on details overlooked by everybody else. I also wish to· thank the editors of this series and the publisher, J.C. Gieben, for their assistance. And then there have been many friends who have provided moral support; two of them should mentioned in particular. Remco Regtuit, who happened always to be in the same train to Groningen and with whom I shared a room at the University of Groningen, may well at times have been driven slightly crazy by the ins and outs of this thesis; and Hotze Mulder was always available to proffer advice when something bothered me. Finally, I am very glad to have the opportunity here to express my gratitude for the patience shown by my husband Lex while this study was being written, and to every one who has taken care of the children, es~cially to my mother and Lex, Anneke and Bob, Monique, and Ingrid. During the whole of their lives up to now my children, Nicolaas and Annemarie, have had to share their mother with 'the book'; they had often to take second place to its writing. I dedicate this book to my mother and the memory of my father, since my parents always stimulated my inquiring mind and have enabled me to start on the academic path. Haarlem, december 1993

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION 1.1 Preliminary remarks 1.1.1 Subject matter

In view of the host of literature that has already been published on conditionals and kindred subjects1 a study of ei, a subordinator one of whose main functions is to introduce conditional clauses, might seem rather superfluous. Below, however, I will explain why, on the contrary, a study on Ancient Greek ei will fill a gap. First, although the handbooks on Ancient Greek contain many observations about the complex system of ei-clauses, 2 these observations are scattered all over these books; a coherent description, encompassing all usages of ei, is lacking. Moreover there are no recent monographs on ei that aim at giving a description within the wider framework of (one of) the modem general linguistic theories. The existing monographs mostly date from some or a long time ago,3 and the only recent one (Houben 1976) is, in my opinion, not satisfactory (see further ch. 2.3). There are, to be sure, some other recent publications, but none of these deals with ei on a grand scale. 4 All in all, then, as for Greek linguistics, a study of ei would certainly fill a gap. Second, whereas in the general literature the conditiona1/hypotheticals clause has received a fair amount of attention, by far most attention has been given to the logical side of conditionals, compare Van der Auwera (1983a: 243), who observes that "on the logical side, conditionals constitute a major

1. My bibliography contains only the titles of publications referred to in the text. It is, therefore, no more than a summary of all the literature on this subject. 2. Compare, for instance, (and here I only mention the most detailed and important ones) Cbantraine (1963), Goodwin (1889), Humbert (19542), Kllhner-Gertb (1904), Monro (1891 2), Schwy7.er-Debrunner (1950), Stahl (1907). 3. Examples are Lange (1872/3), Gildersleeve (1876), van Pottelbergb (1939), Tabachovitz (1951), Pritchett (1955). 4. Bakker (1988a,b); Brunel (1980); Greenberg (1986); Rijksbaron (1980, 1986). - Cf. also my own preliminary publications dealing with aspects of the description of El-clauses: Wakker (1980, 1986a,b, 1987, 1988a,b, 1989, 1992b,c). 5. For a definition and discussion of these terms see ch. 2.1.

2

INTRODUCTION

research theme [... ]. On the linguistic side, conditionals have not been in the forefront of investigation at all." He speaks of only "few and isolated studies (e.g. Schachter 1971; Geis 1973; Lauerbach 1979)".6 This also _holds true for the study of conditionals within the framework of language universals. Compare, again, Van der Auwera (1983a: 244), according to whom "Little has yet been done on the universals of conditionals (cf. Lehmann 1974; Haiman 1978; Salon~ 1979)". Since 1983 a few other studies have appeared: Journal of Pragmatics 1 (1983; a special issue on conditionals); Traugott et al. (1986; several logical, psychologic and linguistic articles on conditionals); and also the studies mentioned in n.4, dealing more specifically with Greek. Yet Van der Auwera's statement is hardly less true in 1993 than it was in 1983. In view of this situation it is my aim to give a linguistic description of the subordinate clauses introduced by ei, a description that will pay attention both to the relationship between the various types of subordinate clauses introduced by ei, and to their relations with (syntactically and/or semantically) comparable subordinate clauses or expressions. Since the main (and most complex) usage of ei is its use as a conditional subordinator, inevitably the focus will be predominantly on this clause type. By 'linguistic' I mean that the clauses involved will be investigated from a syntactic and semantic, as well as from a pragmatic point of view. It is particularly this last domain that has often been neglected in the existing studies.

1.1.2 Theoretical framework This investigation will be carried out within the overall framework of Functional Grammar (henceforth: FG) as it was originally formulated in Dik (1978) and further developed in, among other works, Dik (1989). The reason for this choice is the fact that of recent theoretical approaches, FG appeared to provide the most fruitful apparatus for the description of Greek ei-clauses. Since the emphasis will be on the practical rather than on the theoretical side of FG, no foreknowledge of FG will be required (see ch. 1.3). In other words, although this study primarily aims at giving an adequate description of an important phenomenon in Ancient Greek, I hope that it will also serve to refine the theory of FG in the relevant areas. 6. I will come back in more detail to the difference between logical and linguistic treatments of conditionals in ch. 2.2.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

3

1.1.3 A note on the terminology and data used

Since the terminology found in the literature is rather confusing, I will start by specifying the key terms of this study: conditional period: (the whole of) a (conditional) subordinate clause and main clause ( protasis and apodosis antecedent and consequent). Notice that the traditional terminology (protasis - apodosis, antecedent - consequent) reflects the idea that ei-clauses prefer sentence-initial position. Since the use of these terms is of a long standing I, too, will often use them, even where the ei-clause does not precede the main clause. For a discussion of the relative order of ei-clause and main clause I refer to ch. 3.2.

=

=

conditional = conditional clause: protasis of a conditional period. subordinate clause: the whole of a subordinator and an embedded construction. 7 embedded construction: a construction introduced by a subordinator, i.e. a subordinate clause without the subordinator. condition (sometimes: hypothesis): the stipulation, terms or supposition expressed in the protasis · of a conditional period (for a more elaborate discussion of these terms see ch. 2.1).

My research is based on a representative number of instances in classical and preclassical Greek literature. The following works have been studied: epic: Homer (both Iliad and Odyssey); drama (i.e. the extant plays without the fragments): Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes; historiography: Herodotus, Thucydides; philosophy: Plato; oratory: Lysias. Of these authors all ei-clauses have been studied, as well as a representative number of those clauses that in some way or other appeared to be comparable with ei-clauses, viz. temporal, relative, concessive and purpose clauses. To check my results I have used the examples in the other Attic orators (notably

7. I use the term construction as a cover term ranging over the PG-terms predication, proposition, and clause (for a definition of these terms, see ch. 1.3).

4

INTRODUCTION

Demosthenes, Isaeus, Isocrates, Lycurgus) and in Xenophon that are cited in the grammars of Ancient Greek. The corpus used is, therefore, a vast one, covering not only different periods in the development of the Greek language but also different discourse types. It goes without saying that, if one is to achieve reliable analyses, 8 such a vast corpus with examples of various discourse types is indispensable, especially for an elusive conjunction like ei, which behaves differently in different surroundings. The vastness of my material makes it impossible to give an exhaustive list of all examples. Usually one or a very small number of examples will be given in the main text, while similar ones will be referred to in the notes. To make this book accessible for those who have a limited or no knowledge of Greek, all examples are provided with a translation. The translations are primarily meant to clarify the phenomenon concerned as carefully as possible, and should not, therefore, be judged in terms of literary merit. All authors are quoted from the editions of the Oxford Classical Texts series,9 with the exception of Aristophanes (edition in the Bud6-series). Textual problems are only dealt with insofar as they are important for the interpretation of the subordinate clause in question. Greek authors and their works are cited in accordance with Liddell, Scott & Stuart Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon. Periodicals are referred to in accordance with Marouzeau. L'Annee Philologique. Works frequently referred to are abbreviated as follows: Chantraine

= Chantraine, P. (1963). Grammaire homerique, tome II: Syntaxe. Paris: Klincksieck.

8. There is yet another reason why a vast corpus is needed: there are, of course, no native speakers of a dead language to act as 'informants' and to tell whether a given construction is acceptable or not (for the criterion of acceptability in linguistic research, see e.g. Lyons 1977: 379-86). Therefore, a vast corpus is indispensable: it can be seen as a reliable reflection of what the speakers of Ancient Greek considered acceptable (cf. Utoublon 1985: 11). Moreover, Greek texts have been accepted and understood for over 2,000 years and as such they are, taken together, certainly a reliable basis for linguistic studies, whereas the value of the judgement of individual native speakers of a modem language cannot always be relied upon. 9. As for Sophocles, I have mainly used the OCT edited by Pearson (1924), since the OCT edited by Lloyd-Jones & Wilson (1990) appeared after I had collected my material. Only in the case of examples with apparent textual problems have I afterwards consulted this new edition.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Denniston

=

Goodwin

=

Humbert

KG

= =

LSJ

=

Monro

=

Ruijgh

=

SD

=

Stahl

=

Tabachovitz

=

5

Denniston, J.D. (1934). The Greek particles. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Goodwin, W.W. (1889). The syntax of the moods and tenses of the Greek verb. London: Macmillan (reprinted several times). Humbert, J. (19542). Syntaxe grecque. Paris: Klincksieck. Ktihner, R. & B. Gerth (1904). Ausftihrliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache II: Satzlehre. Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung (reprinted several times). Liddell H.G., R. Scott & H. Stuart Jones (19409). A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Monro, D.B. (1891 2). A grammar of the homeric dialect. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ruijgh, C.J. (1971). Autour de t£ epique. Etudes sur la syntaxe grecque. Amsterdam: Hakkert. Schwyzer, E. & A. Debrunner (1950). Griechische Grammatik. Zweiter Band: Syntax und syntaktische Stilistik. Mtinchen: Beck. Stahl, J.M. (1907). Kritisch-historische Syntax des griechischen Verbums der klassischen Zeit. Heidelberg: Winter Tabachovitz, D. (1951). Homerische ei-Satze. Lund: Gleerup

6

INTRODUCTION

1.2 A survey of the contents of the present study The conjunction ei occupies an important place among the subordinators of Ancient Greek. It shows quite a variety of uses, the most important of which can be classified, in a first approximation, under the following headings: 10 I. ei introduces a conditional subordinate clause:

IA. Pure conditional clauses, the interpretation of which, especially with regard to the chances of fulfilment of the condition, depends on the mood chosen:

a. with an indicative: neutral condition: the speaker11 does not express his opinion as to the degree of likelihood of the fulfilment of the condition, e.g. with future indicative (1)

ei (w.119~) 12 t11V 1t6Atv aiPTtaoµev, Pot>v toi~ 9eoi~ 9uaoµev ('if (really) we take the city, we will offer a cow to the gods')

10. It goes without saying that such a classification does not cover all instances in a neat, unambiguous way. Alongside prototypical instances showing all the defining characteristics of the category involved, there are various borderline cases which may have some characteristics of the prototypical category and others which belong rather to a different, somehow kindred, category. Compare Lehmann (1984: 35-7, notably 37), who says that " ... der Tatsache ..., da8 grammatische Kategorien auf Skalen angeordnet sind. Die Phanomene, die unter eine Kategorie fallen, verl>reiten sich Uber einen gewissen Bereich der Skala; und in der Mitte dieses Bereichs liegt die FOKALE INSTANZ des Begriffs, sein Zentrum. Hier angesiedelte Phanomene sind typische Beispiele ftir ·die Kategorie. Mehr am Rand der Begriffsspbllre liegende Pbllnomene repriisentieren den Begriff weniger gut und reprllsentieren teilweise auch schon den nlichst benachbarten Begriff." Cf. also Bakker (1988b: 14-8). A good example in this introductory chapter is (10), which will also be discussed in ch. 8.2. In the course of my study I will come back to this point several times. 11. A speaker is, of course, the person speaking or narrating, i.e. the person responsible for the utterance in question. In literary works (such as the works that are the basis of the present study) it must always be asked who is the speaker: the narrator, one of the characters or the author. Of course, in the last resort, it is the author who is responsible for the text, i.e. for all utterances, but in the fictional world of the story the narrator or a character is usually presented as being responsible for the words uttered. For the complex relationship between these three possible speakers in a literary work, cf. ch. 3.3 n.117 and de Jong (1987). 12. Whenever (by the use of an indicative) a speaker does not commit himself to the likelihood of the fulfilment of the condition, this often suggests a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker. Such a sceptical nuance may be explicitly expressed by the use of attitudinal adverbs (i.e. adverbs that indicate the speaker's attitude concerning the truth of the proposition presented), such as cu.118mc;; ('in truth/really').

SURVEY OF CONTENTS

7

b. with subjunctive and the particle av: the speaker indicates that he reckons with the (future) fulfilment of the condition; he presents fulfilment as 'very well possible'. I will henceforth call this use of the subjunctive with av the futural subjunctive (see ch. 4.4.2), cf. (2)

ew 'tTlV 1t6A1v £Acoµev, j3ouv tot~ 0eoi,~ 0uaoµev ('if - and I consider this very well possible - we have taken the city, we will offer a cow to the gods')

c. with optative: potential condition ('potentialis'): the speaker presents (future) fulfilment of the condition as possible and no more than that, as in (3)

ei 'tTlV 1t6A1v £A.01µev, j3ouv tot~ 0eoi,~ 8uo1µev av ('if we were to take the city, we would offer a cow to the gods')

d. with secondary indicative (and secondary indicative with av in the main clause): 13 counterfactual condition ('irrealis'): the speaker presents fulfilment of the condition as no longer possible (lost possibility), e.g. with regard to the past: (4)

ei 'tTlV 1tOAlV ev..oµev, j3ouv 'tOt~ 0eoi,~ e0umxµev av ('if we had taken the city, we would have offered a cow to the gods')

m.

A special subtype of conditional clauses are those referring to iterative States of Affairs (SoAs). 14 They are characteristically marked by the subjunctive with av (the so-called distributive-iterative subjunctive) when referring to the non-past, and by the distributive-iterative optative when

13. The nature of the main clause is mentioned only for this subtype of pure conditional clauses, first, because in Attic (for Homeric Greek cf. ch. 4.8) the main clause of counterfactual conditionals invariably talces this form (whereas the main clause of other subtypes can talce various forms), and secondary because it is precisely the form of the main clause that distinguishes the counterfactual conditional period from a period with a conditional with a neutral secondary indicative (subtype IAa). That is to say, in itself £i 'tlJV 1tAtv t:i'.AOµEV is ambiguous. Depending on the context, especially on the main clause, it means 'if we have talcen the city' (neutral interpretation) .or 'if we had talcen the city' (counterfactual interpretation). See further ch. 4.3.5. 14. I use the term State of Affairs as an all-encompassing term covering the entity to which the whole of the predicate with its arguments refers, irrespective of whether this entity is an event, an action, a situation etc. Thus, SoA is used in the wide sense of "conception of something which can be the case in some world" (Dik 1989: 89; cf. also Pinkster 1984: 18 ff.). In other words, a SoA refers to an entity that can be located in time and space and which occurs or takes place. Cf. Lyons (1977: 443), Hengeveld (1992: 108-9).

8

INTRODUCTION

referring to the past. 15 Whereas the conditionals of group IA have in common that the speaker presents it as inherently uncertain whether the (semelfactive) SoA mentioned in the conditional clause is/will be etc. realized, the conditionals of group m rather mention SoAs which actually obtain(ed). The discourse type (description, cf. ch. 3.3.6) and the nature of the main clause (present indicative in the case of eav + subjunctive, imperfect indicative or iterative verb form in the case of ei + optative) are essential for the iterative interpretation of the subordinate clause. For reasons that I will explain later (ch. 4.7) the notion 'likelihood of fulfilment' is not relevant to this type of conditionals. Here I limit myself to the observation that these clauses express the fact that the SoA mentioned in the conditional clause is/was sometimes realized. Two examples may illustrate this subtype: (5)

(6)

v6µoc; au,:oic; o6e fotiv · eav µev 'ttc; 1t0AlV µeyw..nv MU, £1C-toi~ o6e EO'tlV. O't q and (b) to the IC." The IC, in its turn, is conversationally implied, i.e. not in virtue of the meaning of if, but in virtue of the CP (with its various maxims). With regard to conditionals in general, the IC seems connected with a clash between two maxims, as Grice argues (1968: IVS): "to say that p > q will be to say something logically weaker than to deny that p or to assert that q, and so less informative; to make a less informative rather than a more informative statement is to offend against the first maxim of Quantity, provided that the more informative statement, if made, would be of interest There is a general presumption that in the case of p > q a more informative statement would be of interest; no one would be interested in knowing that a particular relation (truth-functional or otherwise) held between two propositions without being interested in the truth-value of at least one of the propositions concerned." The violation of the first maxim of quantity is best explained by the fact that if the speaker would observe the first maxim of quantity and would thus be more informative and would simply assert/deny p or assert q, he would be in conflict with the second maxim of quality (have adequate evidence for what you say). He does not know the truth of p nor of q, only the truth of their relationship. If p, then q is, thus, equivalent with p > q, together with the extra implicature of non-truth-functional reasons for the assertion p > q. Particular types of conditionals are also explained via the maxims and the CP, e.g. the type 'if you're thirsty there is some beer in the fridge'. Here the use of the if-clause is explained as a device not to violate a maxim, i.e. it is added by the speaker to be in agreement with the maxim of relation (be relevant). I will come back to this in ch. 5.

speakers are seeking to provide useful information.

32

STATE OF RESEARCH

Grice's theory may be considered -a first step towards a logic of the ordinary language, because he has developed a bridge between formal logic and natural language. In emphasizing the importance of the Cooperative Principle in language use he profoundly influenced the study of pragmatics. There will be ample occasion to point to his work in my description of Greek £i (notably in ch. 5). (iib) What (i) and (iia) have in common is that they both assume the relevance of the material implication for the description of if-then, whether they emphasize the difference ((i)) or the similarity ((ii)) between the two. Although in (iib), just as in (iia), it is assumed that there is no fundamental difference between logic and natural language, in (iib) the material implication is wholly rejected. The main representative of this second theory is S.C. Dik. He offers a synthesis between a logical and a linguistic approach (Dik 1990). Within the framework of FG (see ch. 1.3) he claims that there is no difference between the underlying grammatical form and the logical form of a linguistic expression.18 To explain this he introduces the notion picture .19 Functional Logic (FL) recognizes three truth values: T (true), F (false) and ? (uncer-

18. This view is expressed in the following two hypotheses (Dile 1990: 234): "Hl: underlying linguistic structures, pieces of non-perceptual knowledge, and logical forms can be expressed in one and the same unified cognitive representation language. H2: the representation language used for underlying predications in FG is a good approximation to this cognitive representation language." 19. Pictures are said to have the following properties (Dile 1990: 235-6): (i) they consist of perceptual representations ('images') and conceptual representations; the latter are coded in propositions of the format defmed by FG; (ii) they are subject dependent; any picture is somebody's picture; (iii) they are dynamic structures: they may be created, modified and discarded; (iv) they are fmite: they do not contain everything that can be known, but only what X knows at ti; (v) they can be nested: X's picture XP may contain an 'image' of Y's picture YP; (vi) more than one picture may be considered at the same ti.me. An example of a picture representation might run as follows:

YPfo __....T=a X~---T=a_________ In X's picture at to a is true and in X's picture of Y's picture at to, a is also true (Ta is shared knowledge of X and Y, according to X).

CoNDmONALS IN GENERAL

33

°

tain). 2 Conditionals are considered a means through which a speaker can create a hypothetical picture (HP) which differs in certain crucial ways from his current picture, e.g.

(8)

HP Ta. ➔ TB SP~--~?~a.a,__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

The speaker S is uncertain about the truth of a. at the moment of speaking (~) and creates a hypothetical picture (HP) in which the truth of a. entails the truth of ~- Dile makes thus a basic distinction between the current picture of a speaker and a hypothetical picture which he may create alongside his current picture. Apart from the speaker's picture there is also the addressee's picture (cf. n.19) as well as the general picture.21 All these may play a role in the understanding of a particular conditional. Different conditional types (often with different communicative effects) are distinguished and described in terms of different picture constellations. Dile thus provides a systematic account for the relations between form, meaning and communicative usage, while at the same time avoiding the notion of material implication with all its problems. Without going into detail here (see ch. 3.1) I will sketch Dile's main divisions (Dile 1990: 242):

20. 'Uncertainty' may be subdivided according to the degree of probability that is somewhere in the range between 1 and 0, e.g. 'p (fa) = n' means 'it is n probable that a is true'. 21. The general picture may be characterized as the picture which the speaker thinks 'everybody' accepts as being true, cf. Dik (1990: 236).

34

STATE OF RESEARCH

(9) conditional propositional

illocutionary

(condition for the truth of the apodosis)

(condition for the 'relevance' of the truth of the information presented in the main clause to the addressee, e.g. 'if you're thirsty, there is some beer in the fridge')

HP Ta

➔

TJ3

?a; HP Ta

potentialis ?a; HP Ta ➔ TJ3

➔

R (TJ3)

irrealis Fa; HP Ta ➔ TJ3

Although the notion 'picture' is not totally new22 and the term 'hypothetical' in 'hypothetical picture' is perhaps not wholly adequate (cf. ch. 2.1 and 3.1), Dik has, in my opinion, rather successfully created a theoretical framework that ties together logic and linguistics and that is not itself too complicated to function as a descriptive apparatus. I will discuss his division of conditionals in more detail in ch. 3.1 and will come back to his picture constellations when treating the various types of conditionals in Ancient Greek (ch. 4-5). All in all, one may conclude that most philosophical-logical theories about conditionals are not directly applicable to a description of ordinary language conditionals, not even if they try to account for the difference between logic and linguistics. This holds especially for the 'possible world' -approach (see (i) above), since it does not at all address the subject of the relationship between the if-clause and the main clause, which seems essential to account for differences between ordinary language conditionals such as 'if it rains, I'll take an umbrella' and 'if it rains, there is an umbrella in my wardrobe'. If one surveys all attempts to bridge the gap between logic and linguistics, 22. Cf. e.g. the notions 'mental model' model/representation', see Dile (1990: 258n2).

(Johnson-Laird

1986), and

'discourse

CONDITIONALS IN GENERAL

35

Dik's proposal (iib) seems to have the advantage of being directly applicable to linguistic analysis. Therefore, in the subsequent sections I will often refer to his theoretical framework, while using only those elements of the other approaches that are directly relevant for descriptive linguistics.

2.3 State of research: studies on conditionals in Ancient Greek Most studies on conditionals in Ancient Greek are descriptive, and largely synchronic (i.e. they describe Classical Greek, Homeric Greek or both). Nevertheless, nearly all of them also contain a more or less detailed description of the prehistoric origins and later development of ei-clauses (see ch. 8.4). As I have already indicated (ch. 1.1.1), most descriptive linguistic studies do not, generally speaking, bother about such theoretical questions as the exact definition of a conditional relation or its position and precise function in the sentence. This also applies to Ancient Greek: most grammars (Chantraine, Goodwin, Humbert, KG, Monro, SD, Stahl) and monographs or articles (van Pottelbergh 1939; Pritchett 1955; Tabachovitz; Ruijgh) 23 do not have a theoretical substructure. They limit themselves to the prototypical construction that expresses if-then-sequences in Greek (eVMv) and at best mention other possibilities of expressing conditional relations and other semantic values expressed by the ei/M.v-clauses.24 As for the description of the conditional ei-clause the above-mentioned studies take the morpho-syntactic form of the conditional as a starting-point: the morpho-syntactic form, especially the mood chosen in the ei-clause, is said to be essential in determining the semantic value of the conditional period as a whole; the description is thus based on the idea that there is a correlation between the (morpho-syntactic) form and the meaning of conditionals. There are, of course, minor differences in terminology and in the semantic values attributed to the different ei-clauses, but, all in all, the

23. Cf. Chantraine (274-84); Goodwin (137-95); Humbert (219-25); KG (2,463-88); Monro (265-7, 284-6, 290-1); Ruijgh (280-2; SD 682-8); Stahl (376-444). 24. Cf. Chantraine (245-6, 248, 319-25); Goodwin (173-5, 197-216); Humbert (241-3); KG (2,425-9, 483, 488-90); Monro (258-60, 278-9); SD (387-8, 683, 688); Stahl (414-8, 427-31, 531-3, 682-3).

36

STATE OF RESEARCH

description of the grammars may be summarized as follows (see also my sketch in ch. 1.2): ei with indicative: there is no indication as to the (chance oO fulfilment of the condition. This type is sometimes called 'realis', which is misleading since the term 'realis' might suggest that the ei-clause concerns reality. A better term is 'neutral condition'. ei with av and subjunctive: a) (main clause marked by a tense with future reference): fulfilment of the condition is plausible/expected/anticipated. b) (with present indicative in the main clause): the conditional expresses a repeated or generic event/action. ei with optative: fulfilment of the condition is thought possible, but exists only in the imagination. ei with secondary indicative (and secondary indicative with av in the main clause): fulfilment of the condition is not possible. Non-fulfilment is presupposed (counterfactual conditional). All in all, then, the mood chosen (the 'form') is thought to be the factor par excellence for the description of the 'meaning' of the conditional (formmeaning correlation). The choice of the mood is determined in its turn by the speaker, and depends on the view he has concerning the fulfilment of the condition. This choice does not, of course, necessarily correspond to the chances of fulfilment in the real world. Most recent studies adopt this kind of form-meaning based description and are mainly concerned with making some further refinements (Brunel 1980; Greenberg 1986; Rijksbaron 1980, 1986). In this study I will likewise adopt a form-meaning based method of description; however, I will argue that apart from the mood chosen there are at least three other factors which seem relevant to an adequate description: the level of the main clause to which the if-clause is attached, the time referred to in the subordinate clause, and the type of discourse (cf. ch. 3.3). Only a few recent studies show an interest in theoretical questions as well: Rijksbaron (1986); Houben (1976) (both accepting the above sketched traditional form-meaning based kind of description) and Bakker (1988a) (rejecting the traditional view). Rijksbaron (1986) elaborately discusses the sentence-initial position of (Dutch and Greek) conditionals within the framework of FG. I will discuss his ideas in some detail in ch. 3.2. In a transformational framework Greek conditionals have been studied as well,

CONDIDONALS IN ANCIENf GREEK

37

e.g. in Houben (1976). Because Houben's study exhibits a number of peculiarities I will discuss it here at some length. There are two essential points in Houben's study with which I wholly agree. First, he tries to show that even in the oldest extant Greek literature (i.e. Homer) conditional Ei-clauses are subordinate clauses (as against the view that Ei-clauses prehistorically were paratactic main clauses, and that this may still be seen in some types of Homeric Ei-clauses; see ch. 8.4 below). He subscribes to contemporary theories that consider the process of subordination as a) a device for sentence expansion in all languages and b) an operational fact pertaining to sentence-structure levels (Houben 1976: 2). Second, within this framework he suggests a disjunctive deep structure for Ancient Greek conditionals. 25 The idea of considering a conditional a (potential) disjunction will tum out to be very fruitful (cf. Lehmann 1977; see also ch. 8.4-8.6, where I suggest a kindred hypothesis). However, although I agree with these two general theoretical ideas about conditionals, I have my doubts about the validity of Houben's description of conditionals in Attic and in Homer (Houben 1976: ch. II and Ill). As is done in most studies that take as a starting-point for their description the idea that form and meaning of conditionals are interrelated, Houben divides the conditionals into several groups with each a different form and meaning. Although the factors he uses to make his divisions (mood, time referred to in the subordinate clause) seem relevant, I think his description as a whole is far from satisfactory: his method of describing and comparing Attic and Homeric Greek seems so inconsistent that his conclusions are, in my opinion, wholly unwarranted. First, starting with Attic Greek, he says that he describes only simple conditionals, not mixed ones (i.e. combinations of a protasis of one conditional sentence type plus the apodosis of another type).

25. He does so on the basis of the - comparable - surface marking (use of negation, modals, pronominals, etc.) of conditionals and prototypical disjunctive clauses with i\ ('or'), and the (semantic) interchangeability of £i (conditional 'if') and i\ (disjunctive 'or') (Houben 1976: ch. IV). To support his view he adduces the logical equivalence p > q = -p v q (cf. however also my note 9 above). The deep structure he suggests is said to be universal. He furthermore introduces language specific transformational rules that are responsible for the subordination of the protases and for their surface markings. As already said (ch. 1.3) a TG framework does not seem very fruitful for a study giving a description of language use. (To be fair, this is not Houben's principal aim; I will, therefore, not pronounce a judgement about the relevance of a TG framework for his aim). For some criticism on Houben's ideas, see also Pino Campos (1992).

38

STATE OF RESEARCH

As parameters he uses the moods used in the subordinate and main clauses, the time referred to, and (un)reality.26 The choice of the mood in the ifclause is said to be essential to determine the semantic value of the conditional as a whole. Houben subsequently describes the whole Homeric corpus and compares it with the Attic scheme. His conclusion is, first, that the Homeric conditional does not fit into the scheme for Attic Greek because there are too many mixed conditionals (which, however, he excluded from his description of Attic Greek!) and, second, that mood alternation in Homer is purely a syntactic-metrical phenomenon, and not a signal of differing degrees of likelihood of realization, unlike in Attic Greek. Because he compares incongruous corpora (the whole Homeric corpus vs. only simple conditionals in Attic Greek) his conclusions seem unwarranted, and I will, therefore, not take his description further into consideration.

26. Houben's scheme for Attic Greek runs as follows: I. non-unreal 1. contemporary: if Xis, then Y is: d + pr.ind., pr.ind 2. previous: if X was, then Y was: d + ind. Il, ind. n 3. subsequent: if X will be, then Y will be: d + fut.ind., fut.ind. II. half-unreal 4. contemporary: if ever X be, then Y is: tav + subj., pr.ind. 5. previous: if ever X were, then Y was: ei + opt., ind. Il 6. subsequent: if ever X be, then Y will be: iav + subj., fut.ind.

m. unreal

7. contemporary: if X were, then Y would be: d + ind. Il, ind. Il + &v 8. previous: if X bad been, then Y would have been: d + aor.ind., aor.ind. + &v 9. subsequent: if X should be, then Y would be: d + opt., opt. + &v Without going into details I advance the following points of criticism: - The scheme seems not apt to describe the Attic conditional, because mixed conditionals (i.e. a mixture of moods, e.g. d + ind, opt + &v; d + opt, pr./futind; d + opt, ind. II + &v; d + ind. II, opt + &v, or a mixture of tenses, e.g. 'if be did this yesterday, be will do it again tomorrow') constitute a large part of Attic conditionals. - I fail to see the reason why d + opt, opt. + &v is unreal. In terms of reality I should rather prefer the term half-unreal: this conditional type expresses a potential conditional and potentiality implies that at the moment of speaking the SoA involved is not realized, but that realization is presented as possible. - Group II seems to consist of heterogeneous types. Houben nowhere satisfactorily explains the similarities between 4-5 at the one band and 6 at the other (he only says that they are all marked by a non-indicative mood in the if-clause and translates them all by 'if ever'). In my terms 4 and 5 express iteration, 6 likelihood of fulfilment of the condition. They cannot be grouped together without comment. The characterization 'half-unreal' seems, moreover, doubtful in the case of 6. See further ch. 4.

CoNDmONALS IN ANCIENT GREEK

39

A view which is at variance with all studies mentioned above is proposed by Bakker (1988a). He rejects the widely-accepted view about the semantic value of the moods in conditional clauses. He mentions two difficulties in the current descriptions which make, in his opinion, the traditional view unacceptable: 1. the fact that eav has been split up in two "disparate and heterogeneous parts" (1988a: 6), i.e. into futural e&v which expresses anticipation as to the fulfilment of the condition; and distributive-iterative e&v, which expresses iteration; 2. the question of how to differentiate between eav with ·subjunctive and ei with - especially future - indicative. The current opinion (cf. ch. 1.2 and 4.4), namely that in the case of the indicative the speaker does not convey anything about the probability of fulfilment of the condition, whereas in the case of eav the speaker presents fulfilment as likely, is, in his opinion, unwarranted and circular, because it is crucially based on the interpretation of 'representative' instances, the characteristics of which thereupon get the status of a theory and are used as criteria to explain other instances (Bakker 1988a: 6-7). To start with the latter point, I do not believe that this point of criticism is justified. Thus, to mention only one thing, the relevance of a semantic difference between eav with subjunctive and ei with indicative can, in fact, be proved: adverbs like cv.:r18~ ('really', 'in truth') occur with the indicative (see ch. 1.2, n.12), but not with the subjunctive with av. From this fact we may infer that there is a semantic difference and in particular that the indicative does, indeed, indicate that the speaker does not commit himself to the likelihood of fulfilment of the condition. Moreover, I do not think Bakker's criticism that the existing descriptions are circular is justified either. Even if the characteristics of some instances are promoted to the status of a theory, what objections can be made if it can be proved that all instances have the same characteristics? I believe that such a proof can be found in recent studies like Ruijgh (1971) and Rijksbaron (1980, 1986) and usually also in older handbooks. 27 27. Sometimes objections may, however, be raised on minor points. Thus it is often suggested that d with future indicative has a minatory (or warning) value on the basis of instances like d 'tauta Ai~Ei~ tx()aPi\ µtv t~ eµou ('if you say that, you will be hated by me', S. Ant. 93). The minatory value of the future indicative only results from the context in question (fulfilment of the condition is not hoped for by the speaker; the apodosis refers to

40

STATE OF RESEARCH

As to Bakker's own solution, it may be criticized on several points. In summary his argumentation is the following. Bakker first argues (Bakker 1988a: 8-11) that at the syntactic level a distinction must be made between 'embedded' vs. 'non-embedded' subordination. He illustrates this claim with the following example: (10) If linguists hate formalism they love empiricism (10) is said to have two different readings. On the first reading, an implicative relationship is said to be expressed between two generic sentences (linguists hate formalism; linguists love empiricism), which are in themselves complete and convey information of their own. On the second reading (paraphrasable as 'linguists who hate formalism love empiricism'), "the main clause and the conditional clause together form a complete generic statement. In isolation they are not complete" (Bakker 1988a: 10). In the latter case embedded subordination is involved: "the subordinate, conditional, clause has a function within the main clause" (ibidem). The main clause is not complete without the addition of the conditional clause. Next Bakker (1988a: 11-3), wrongly, as I hope to show, links the notion of embeddedness to eav with subjunctive and of non-embeddedness to ei with indicative (or optative or secondary indicative with counterfactual value). He does so by means of the semantic notion of completeness. 28 His argumentation is as follows. The main clauses of M.v always have a generic or habitual or a future predicate, i.e. a non-fact modality. To create a complete reference to a specific, existing, factual SoA the subordinate clause is, therefore, needed. Consequently, such eav-clauses are embedded subordinate clauses. Main clauses of ei with indicative, on the other hand, have completed reference; the ei-clause, therefore, is non-embedded. My main objections run as follows: 1. In passages in which both ei with future indicative and with subjunctive occur I fail to see on the basis of which criteria a distinction can be made (in (11)) between the presumed completeness of -c{ cnpeac;; a1tatP11aeat

ea.v

something Wldesirable or unpleasant for the addressee). It is, therefore, unwarranted to use this example to prove that such a 'minatory value' is the semantic value of the future indicative in general or that it cannot be expressed by other moods. See further ch. 4.4. 28. A proposition is called complete if it has completed reference to a (specific, existing, factual) SoA and does not need additional information to refer to this (specific, existing, factual) SoA. See Balcker (1988a: 15-23).

CoNDmONALS IN

ANCIENT

GREEK

41

and the incompleteness of oaa &ya8a &1eol3we1~ or, to put it differently, between the presumed non-embeddedness of ei VtlCT)ae~ and the embeddedness of fiv Vt1CT18p~: (11)

touto µev &,, ei VtlCT)ae~. tt aq,ea~ &1ea1p11aea1, toia{ ye µTl eatt µ116ev; toutO 6£, TIV Vt1CT10p~, µa8e Onig (1986: 229-31). 2. See the definitions cited in ch. 2.2 of Strawson, Chipman, Ramsey, Stalnaker (ch. 2.2 (i)), Grice (ch. 2.2 (iia)), Dik (ch. 2.2 (iib)). To this collection of defmitions the following ones may be added: van Pottelbergh (1939: 22) (the English translation is mine): "[ ...] that of each hypothetical reasoning the conditio sine qua non is that what is expressed in the hypothesis (subordinate clause) is at least subjectively considered real by the speaker. For no consequence can be based on that what does not exist Even in the so-called irrealis the

44

THEoRETICAL PRELIMINARIES

tion, however, it turns out that, in spite of their manifold character, the current definitions all highlight two points as the essential features of the conditional relation in linguistic expressions: 1. In linguistic expressions the exact nature of the relation between p and q is unimportant. It suffices that p is the framework (or 'ground', 'cadre du discours', 'context') within which q is to be considered. The precise nature of the relation/connection between p and q is context-dependent (cf. Johnson-Laird 1986: 73; Akatsuka 1986: 334-5, 3493). The only thing that counts is that p is the framework for q, or, in more technical words, that p is a sufficient condition for q (cf. Ducrot 1972: 169-70; van der Auwera 1983b: 298; 1985a: 190-202). 2. Within the conditional period, p counts as true, i.e. the speaker asks the addressee to take for the time being p for granted, so as to constitute a basis for q. However, p itself is usually considered uncertain or not-true by the speaker (cf. Dik 1990: 242). This characteristic uncertainty is neatly captured by a term coined by Lehmann (1977: 238): disjunctive situation. All conditionals, he argues, point to disjunctive situations, i.e. to situations (or, in FG terms, to SoAs) which may or may not be realized. 4 To give an example, in 'if Peter comes, Paul will leave'. it is uncertain whether Peter will come or not. The only counterexample to this characterization may seem to be counterfactual conditionals, because they indicate that the speaker presents

speaker presents that of which be objectively knows that it does not exist for a moment as a reality [...] so as to base a consequence on it• Ducrot (1972: 167): "acte qui consiste lt demander la l'auditeur d'accepter pour un temps une certaine proposition p qui devient, provisoirement, le cadre du discours, et notamment de la proposition principale, q." Mackie (1973: 93): "[... ] to say 'If P, Q' is to assert Q within the scope of the supposition that P." Johnson-Laird (1986: 64): "The function of the antecedent of a conditional is to establish a context, i.e. a state of affairs that should be taken for granted in considering the consequent." 3. Akatsuka (1986: 349) argues: "Conditionals are discourse-bound because the fundamental question, 'What is a conditional in natural languages?' itself is unanswerable without postulating a specific speaker and that speaker's attitude towards the state of affairs expressed by the antecedent• 4. In slightly different terms essentially the same claim is made by Van der Auwera (1983b; 1985a: 203 ff.). He formulates a thesis, the APf (Antecedent Possibility Thesis), which claims that in each antecedent p is possible. He claims that, in English, indicative conditionals indicate that p is at least possible (i.e. possible if not true or necessary), whereas subjunctive conditionals indicate that p is at ,rwst possible (i.e. possible if not false or impossible). In this way Van der Auwera is able to account not only for indicative but also for counterfactual conditionals within his overall thesis that the antecedent p is possible.

DEFINITION OF A CONDmONAL RELATIONSHIP

45

realization as no longer possible. However, 'if he had come, he would have told us everything' can, actually, only be used if there was a moment in the past at which the content of 'if he comes, he will tell us everything' could still become true. This means that all conditionals involve situations that were disjunctive before their non-realization were decided upon. If one wants to emphasize this semantic aspect of counterfactuals one might conveniently characterize them as 'lost possibility-conditionals'. s The current terminology (counterfactual, contrary-to-fact, irrealis) is linked more to the pragmatic implications of this clause type, as in most contexts counterfactuals imply the non-realization of the SoA expressed in the if-clause: 'if he had come, he would have told us everything' normally implies that he has not come.6 Leaving aside minor differences, the current definition of a conditional relationship, as given in the most important literature, may be summarized as follows: the linguistic expression 'if p then g' means that whereas the speaker considers p uncertain or false, he asks the addressee to consider p for a moment true ('suppose that p is true'), thus establishing a (provisional) framework within which the subsequent utterance, g, is to be judged. Incidentally, p is hardly ever the only relevant condition for g: the antecedent must be taken in conjunction with general knowledge which is usually not explicitly formulated (so-called background conditions). The basic idea is that what stays fixed does not need to be made explicit. As for conditionals, they are usually not universally valid, but only under certain conditions, as in (1)

if you strike a match, it will light

Striking a match means that it will light, but, of course, only in the appropriate circumstances (e.g. the match is well made and not wet; enough oxygen is present, etc.). As long as, however, a given background condition X is in force, there is no reason for one ever to be aware of the dependence on X, let alone that the speaker will explicitly formulate X (cf. Settekom 1974: 152; Lauerbach 1979: 44-5; Barwise 1986: 40-2; Johnson-Laird 1986: 65,

5. Cf. Basset (1979a: 147, 177), who speaks of a "possibilitt perdue'. Cf. also Ruijgh (299301). 6. This implication is so common that in pragmatic studies it is considered a presupposition, counterfactuals being regarded as one of the so-called presupposition triggers (Levinson (1983: 181-5, esp. 184)).

46

THEoRETICAL PRELIMINARIES

71). The existence of background conditions, then, is not emphasized in the definition of a conditional relation, and rightly so. The current definitions do, in my opinion, indeed capture the main characteristics of most conditional types; yet I think that in their present form they do not capture all conditional types. Some refinements seem necessary, for the following reasons: (i) In the form in which they stand the definitions suggest that 'if p' must always precede 'q'. However, as I will argue in ch. 3.2, this is by no means the only possible clause order, cf.

(2) (3)

Peter will leave, if Paul comes (q precedes p) Tomorrow, if Paul comes, Peter will leave (p interrupts q)

Therefore, a formulation must be found which does not suggest this idea, or else it must be stated separately that the definition gives no indication concerning the relative order of 'if p' and 'q'. (ii) Most definitions make use of terms like 'hypothetical' or 'supposition'. As I indicated in ch. 2.1, I do not believe that hypothesis is suitable as an allencompassing term for if-then-sequences. Conditions are not necessarily hypothetical: there is at least one conditional sentence type with respect to which the existing definitions run into problems, namely the distributiveiterative conditionals. These are, admittedly, by no means a universal phenomenon (cf. Traugott et al. (eds) 1986: 7), but the phenomenon is too widespread to be ignored, cf. in Ancient Greek

(4)

iccxi i\v µh, a&n

VllfPOUCn., XPEO>V'tcxt cxi>tq>, i\v 6e µit 0.611, µe-neiO't ([When they are drunk they take their decision; when sober they consider it again] 'and if also when they are sober they still approve it, they act thereon, but if not, they cast it aside', Hdt. 1.133.4) lCCll

As I will argue in ch. 4.7, iterative conditionals in descriptive contexts like (4) imply that p is sometimes realized. We are, therefore, no longer dealing with a pure hypothesis, but with an actual SoA: the sentence could be paraphrased as 'Sometimes p is realized, in which case q is realized as well', i.e.

DEFINITION OF A CONDITIONAL RELATIONSIIlP

47

in (4), 'Sometimes they approve their decision. In that case they act accordingly. Sometimes they do not; in that case they reject it'. The actual realization of p can, therefore, be said to be the condition for the actual realization of q. The definition of conditional must, therefore, be broadened so as to capture non-hypothetical instances as well. (iii)

Some definitions make use of the notion of 'truth' in saying something like 'p constitutes the framework within which the truth of q must be evaluated.' (cf. e.g. Stalnaker 1968: 102; Dik 1990: 242). The notion of truth, however, does not seem to apply to the majority of conditionals. Thus, it does not apply to conditionals with a directive or interrogative main clause, such as 'if it rains, take an umbrella', 'if there is good wine, will you come?'. Such main clauses cannot, of course, be judged in terms of truth, but only in terms of realization: 'if p has been/is realized, q must be realized/the question arises whether q will be realized'. This confusion between the categories truth and realization brings me to my next (and final) point. (iv)

In their present form the definitions seem to apply only to the group of conditional periods in which a relation is expressed between the condition expressed in the subordinate clause and the SoA denoted by the main clause. In (5)

if it rains, I'll take an umbrella

a clear conditional relation is expressed between 'it rains' and the SoA 'I'll take an umbrella'. Thus a paraphrase such as 'the realization of q, i.e. the taking of the umbrella, must be judged within the framework of p ('it rains')' is correct. Although this type of conditional seems to constitute the majority of cases, it is by no means the only conditional type. The current definitions do not apply to these other types. Compare (6) (7)

if you are thirsty, there is some beer in the fridge 601CECO 6£, Et 'tl 1tEpt 'tO)V 8dcov 1tp11yµa:'tCOV 6oKEEtV 6Et, ~ 8eoc; CXU't11 O"aet µCXA.1.CJ'ta itµa; btoµevouc; o{l-tm &'iv apµ6neiv 'tCX µ6pia 'tOU AO'yOU, cbc; EJCE{Vll j3ouM:tm

POSITION AND FUNcnON OF CONDITIONALS

51

2. The principle of what might be called argumentative iconicity: argumentation progresses step by step. Participants must gain common ground before going on. In this process of gaining common ground, conditionals indicate which of the possibilities involved in the, in principle, disjunctive situation is taken into consideration. It is only after this has been established that the argumentation (found in the main clause) can proceed (Lehmann 1974). 3. Conditionals often present given information. As a rule given information precedes new information (Haiman 1980: 528; 1983a). 4. (related to 3) Conditionals often resume information provided by the preceding context (anaphoric relation). As such they prefer initial position. 5. From crosslinguistic research it appears that, in conditionals with a nonfactual value, it is usually the if-clause that is overtly marked as non-factual, not the main clause. The placing of the if-clause in front of the unmarked main clause prevents the main clause from receiving a factual interpretation (cf. Comrie 1986: 84-5).13 6. Many languages have paratactic sequences with a conditional value, e.g. 'Do that and I'll punish you', cf. aµucpov A.a~ 1tapa6eiyµa, mi 1tav-ra eicrn & pou1.oµat ('take a small example, and you'll know all the ones I want', Pl. Tht. 154cl-2), cf. KG (1,236-7). Wishes followed by a clause which expresses the consequences of the fulfilment of the wish may also be interpreted as having a conditional value, cf. OU'tW vuv Zeuc; 8ei11 ... · I -rq, icEV -rot icai icei9t 9eq, roe; tuXE'tocpµ11v ('May Zeus bring that; then also there I will pray to you as to a god,' Od. 15.180-1). In such cases the 'conditional' clause always precedes the consequent. It is sometimes inferred that this

t 'Well, my notion was that we ought to follow nature to the utmost and to link together the Comp. 5.5-6); cf. also ett ical 1:6l>e q,µriv l>eiv µit 11:aptpy~ q>\)Ml't'tEtv, oococ; ,:a np6tepa 1:oic; xp6votc; ical ,:ft 1:a~Et np6,:epa MXµ~avtt'tat ('Moreover, I imagined that I ought always most scrupulously to

parts of speech [i.e. the words] according to her promptings', D.H.

observe the principle that things earlier in time should be inserted earlier in the sentence', ibid. 25-6). Demetrius introduces (Eloc. 199-201) the term 'natural order' (,:ft (l)'l)(Jticjl 't~Et (199); 1:0 q>\)£pe, µ6x8ov µev 'tOV exe~ ~£U"(V'U~ 'tOV 1tO'tJJ,. 't{ (e.g. Pl. Prt. 353a4-6, 357c7-8). 19. Coordinators such as and, but, and for (cf. wJ..' in (13)) are analysed as inter-clausal, and as such not occupying any position in the clause pattern (including the extta-clausal constituents). For the same view, cf. Mackenzie & Keizer (1990: 20). 20. Normally speaking, the negation used in conditional clauses is µfi. Sometimes, however, ou functions as a word negation: in (14) ou noifiaEic; may be considered one semantic unity (paraphrasable as apvfiGll 'you will refuse'), cf. Stein ad Joe. For the explanation of the occurrence of ou in conditional clauses, see Basset (1989), who thoroughly discusses the extensive literature on this subject, and Waller (1992a) (review of Basset). 21. Of course, from a logical point of view the real apodosis is not ijAiov btoµwµi but ~ µtv GE t:yd> ... KOptaco (btoµwµi might even be interpreted parenthetically). However, whether or not one interprets btoµwµi as a parenthesis, it nevertheless modifies the main clause only (in explicitly indicating its performative force, viz. an oath), and does not dominate the El-clause (the essential point of the oath being 'I'll give you your fill of blood', not 'if you don't do that'). 22. Some other expressions resuming the if-clause (and thus referring to the same circumstances as the if-clause does) are: 'tl\V\JCairt' 'then' (e.g. Ar. Pax 1175-6); 'tO'tE 'then' (e.g. Od. 11.112; Ar. Nu. 579-80); 'tO\JVEJCa 'therefore' (e.g. II. 1.290-1); 'tOU'tO\l EVEJCa 'therefore' (e.g. Lys. 3.40); 6ux 'tOU'to 'therefore' (e.g. Ar. Th. 540-3); 'tW'tq> 'therefore' (e.g. II. 15.49-52; Od. 4.732-3, 23.21-4, 24.284-6).

56

THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES

desire to essay the strength of the Massagetae, well, quit your present labour of bridging the river', Hdt. l.206.2)23 In (11)-(16) the main clauses are declarative ((14), (15)), interrogative ((11)) and directive (in (12) and (16) we have an imperative and in (13) a wish). Particularly in the case of interrogative and directive main clauses, the conditional clauses clearly do not share the illocutionary value of their main clauses. In (11) Pl is occupied by a question word (1t6-te) which does not dominate the conditional clause; in (14) the performative verb belongs to the main clause only; in (15) £1t£t'tcx resumes the if-clause; in (16), finally, a hesitation formula is found between the if-clause and the main clause. The above-mentioned phenomena24 and examples may be considered a proof that at least part of the Greek conditionals exhibit extra-clausal features, just like nominal Themes. On the basis of the same phenomena, however, some have claimed that (nearly) all conditionals are Themes. Haiman (1978) explicitly went as far as identify all conditional antecedents with 'Topics' (i.e. Themes in the PG sense of the word) and argued that the common factor was that they both presented 'given' information, i.e. old information, shared knowledge between speaker and hearer. 25 Rijksbaron (1986: 7-8) also strongly emphasizes the identification of conditionals with Themes. 26 I will now first examine the question whether the more general thesis, i.e. Greenberg's Universal 14, applies to Ancient Greek, next the question whether (all or some) Greek conditionals may be characterized as Themes.

23. Cf. Ar. Ee. 1079-80. Some other 'hesitation formulae' are ii>J.,a ('well'; e.g. Pl. Prt. 353a4-5, 357c7-8); el 6' aye etc. ('come now' e.g. II. 24.406-7; Od. 4.831-2). 24. Perhaps the phenomenon of the so-called apodotic 6e after conditional clauses, found especially in Homer and Herodotus (Denniston 180-1), also has to do with the Theme-like character of the if-clause: after the (Theme-like) if-clause, the sentence, or in FG terms the clause proper, makes a fresh start and 6e gets its regular, second, position in the sentence. Others (cf. Ruijgh 647-8) consider this apodotic 6e as evidence for their hypothesis that conditionals originally were paratactic main clauses. See, however, ch. 8.4.1. 25. For a much more refined version of this hypothesis, see Sweetser (1990: 126-33). 26. Rijksbaron (1986: 7-8), however, also mentions the possibility for conditionals of functioning as intra-clausal satellites or as Tails (a possibility I will discuss in ch. 3.2.4).

POSITION AND FUNCTION OF CONDITIONALS

57

3.2.3 Position of Greek conditionals: statistics Given the observations adduced above we may safely accept, I think, that conditionals often function as extra-clausal constituents (and in this respect closely resemble nominal Themes), but that - as I will argue below - there is not sufficient ground to claim (with Haiman) that all conditionals are Themes, at least not in Greek. Usually, in discussing the position of conditionals in relation to the main clause, all conditionals are taken together or only the group of predicational conditionals is studied (e.g. Ramsay 1987: 385-6). Since, however, predicational, propositional and illocutionary conditionals are, as I have argued in ch. 3.1, semantically rather different (specifying conditions for different layers of the main clause), I have studied them in two separate groups (i.e. a group of predicational conditionals, and a group of propositional and illocutionary conditionals), to see whether these groups show differences in their position vis-a-vis the main clause, cf. (17) and (20): 27

27. I have made a more or less random check of the following works: II. l-6; Od. 1-6; A. Ag.; S. Aj., Ant.; E. Ba., El.; Ar. Ach., Av.; Hdt 1-2; Th. 1-2; Pl. Pn. (915 conditionals). Since there appeared no significant difference in the relative position of predicational conditionals in interactive speech and in descriptions (cf. ch. 3.3.6), I have taken these two groups together. Of COUISe, another check might yield slightly different percentages, but the overall impression will be the same, namely that predicational conditionals only show a slight preference for the initial position.

58

THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES

(17) PREDICATIONAL CONDmONALS position cond.

cond. clause

cond. clause

cond. clause

precedes

interrupts

follows

author/genre

main clause

main clause

main clause

Homer

46,5%

tragedy

37,5

comedy

7%

varia28

45,5%29

1%

22

36,5

4

50

13

35

2

Herodotus

60,5

12,5

25

2

Thucydides

47

21

31,5

0,5

Plato

58,5

15

23

3,5

average perc.

50%

15%

33%

2%

Generally speaking, conditionals may be characterized as satellites, i.e. as optional constituents, specifying extra semantic properties of the SoA as a whole, of the proposition or of the speech act. Semantically, predicational conditionals, as argued in ch. 3.1, are related to the SoA designated in the main clause. They specify the condition for the occurrence of this SoA. Pragmatically, this specification may either be indispensable to the correct understanding of the (SoA designated in the) main clause (a so-called restrictive conditional) or it may simply be additional to the SoA as already defined (a so-called non-restrictive conditional). By way of illustration, consider: (18) A: On what condition will Peter come? B: He will come if Susie is invited as well

28. I.e. cases of ellipsis of a main clause of the type 'then it's all right' or of anacoluthon; cases of mcrnep el etc. 29. This group contains 10 examples (= 6% of all the Homeric predicational conditionals used for this schema) of the stereotypical expression 1Cal vu ICE + secondary indicative (or optative) el µit ... ('and now this would have happened, if not .. .', cf. ch. 4.3.8), in which the order main clause - subordinate clause is, of course, logical-iconical. The main clause expresses the SoA expected on the basis of the preceding events. Next the el µit-clause specifies the unexpected event that changed the normal and expected course of events.

POSITION AND FUNCTION OF CONDITIONALS

59

In (18) the conditional gives an answer to the preceding question, and is, as such, the main piece of information (it has Focus function, see ch. 3.2.4). As such it is indispensable to the correct interpretation of the main clause within the context. Pragmatically, it may, therefore, be called restrictive. As an example of a non-restrictive conditional consider (19) A: He has also invited Susie. B: If Susie is invited, Peter will surely come as well Whereas in (18) the if-clause is indispensable, providing the answer to the question, in (19) the if-clause is pragmatically not part of the Topic or Focus information of the main clause. Instead it is an additional statement, linked to the main clause via a conditional relationship. In this context the if-clause is not required for the correct understanding of 'Peter will surely come as well'. Even if it is replaced by 'then' (which is impossible in (18)), the main clause will be correctly understood. For this reason one may call this conditional a non-restrictive one. 30 Propositional and illocutionary conditionals, as argued in ch. 3.1, do not relate to the SoA designated in the main clause, but to the higher levels of the clause; they provide additional information pertaining to the speaker's evaluation of the (nature or occurrence of the fully-defined) SoA or to the speech act containing this SoA. This is in accordance with the fact that the task of representing/defining the SoA ends at the level of the extended predication (cf. ch. 1.3, esp. n.28). All propositional and illocutionary satellites are, therefore, inherently non-restrictive. In view of their inherently non-restrictive character as well as of the fact that there appear to be many

30. The distinction between restrictiveness and non-restrictiveness can be easily illustrated by means of relative clauses. In 'the boy who studies classics is my friend' the information in the relative clause is needed to identify the intended referent of 'the boy'. In that case the relative clause is restrictive. In 'the boy, who studies classics, is my friend', however, the information in the relative clause is not needed to identify the referent of 'the boy', but merely provides extra information about the boy. The relative clause is, as such, nonrestrictive. See Hannay & Vester (1987), who further point out that restrictive relatives would be represented in FG as a term restrictor, whereas non-restrictive relatives would belong to the extra-clausal domain. For the application restrictive vs. non-restrictive to adverbial clause, cf. Quirk et al. (1985: 1075-7); Hannay & Vester (1987); Hengeveld (1988: 28-32; 1989: 152-5); Diket al. (1990: 63-4). Cf. also Ducrot (1972: 117-22), who speaks of 'phrases !ires' (restrictive clauses) and 'phrases coordonnres' (non-restrictive clauses), and Haegeman & Wekker (1984: 48-9, 54), who use the terms peripheral vs. non-peripheral/central clauses instead of non-restrictive vs. restrictive clauses.

60

THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES

borderline cases between these two groups of conditionals (cf. ch. 5), I have taken them together for the present question of their relative position vis-avis the main clause, cf. (20) (20) PROPOSmONAL AND IUOCUTIONARY CONDmONAI..S31 position cond. vs. main clause

preceding

interrupting

following

author/genre

8%

59%

Homer

33%

tragedy

11

25

64

comedy

40

20

40

Herodotus

40

10

50

Thuc. + Xen.

36

36

28

Plato

22

44

34

average percentage

22%

34%

44%

On the basis of the percentages presented in (17) and (20), we may safely

conclude that Greenberg's Universal in its present form is far too strong. At least for Greek3 2 it should run: whereas predicational conditionals are in half of the cases placed in initial position, propositional and illocutionary conditionals clearly prefer to be placed in non-initial position. In the next sections I will turn to the details of the position and function of predicational (ch. 3.2.4), propositional and illocutionary (ch. 3.2.5) conditionals, respectively.

31. I have checked all 262 examples in my whole corpus (Homer 24, tragedy 64, comedy 5, Hdt. 10, Thuc. 11, Plato 148. Since, as I will show in ch. 5, such conditionals are often related to politeness, questions of formulation and truth etc., it is not surprising that most examples are found in Plato and tragedy). 32. Ford & Thompson (1986: 354) observe that both in written and spoken English, initial conditional clauses oublumber final ones by a ratio of about three to one. However, they have not taken into account conditionals placed within the main clause. These would surely have changed the results. The same objection bolds for the results attained by Ramsay (1987).

PosmoN AND FUNCTION OF CONDmONALS

61

3.2.4 Predicational conditionals

The above statistics (cf. (17)) make it abundantly clear that the question whether conditionals are Themes is much too simple and must be broken down into a number of more specific sub-questions: a) are all initial conditionals extra-clausal constituents or are some of them placed in Pl (i.e. as an intra-clausal satellite, possibly with Topic or Focus function), cf. ch. 3.2.4.1; b) are conditionals in final position extra-clausal (placed in P3) or intraclausal satellites (placed in the last position of the clause proper), cf. ch. 3.2.4.2; c) are conditionals placed within the main clause extra-clausal parentheses or essential parts of the main clause, cf. ch. 3.2.4.3. In other words, for all subgroups the question is whether they are extra- or intraclausal constituents, or, to put it differently, whether they are, pragmatically, non-restrictive or restrictive; the next question is whether or not they can be assigned any precise pragmatic function. 3.2.4.1 Predicational conditionals preceding the main clause

As is illustrated by (11)-(16), initial predicational conditionals may exhibit extra-clausal features on a formal level. This may be considered a reflection of the fact that at the pragmatic level they are non-restrictive conditionals. These conditionals serve as a framework for the following discourse, while at the same time either being in a direct reaction to something mentioned in the preceding context (types 1, 2 and 3 below), or exploring options relevant to the situation in the preceding context (types 4 and 5 below). Ford & Thompson (1986) distinguish (for both written and spoken English) the following relationships between preposed conditionals and the preceding context All these types seem relevant to Greek as well. I will only add some refinements: 1. The conditional resumes an earlier piece of information which then serves as a framework for the following discourse. 33 Schema: 'p. Assuming p, then q' (Ford & Thompson 1986: 356-7, 363-4), cf. (21):

33. Since in Greek assertions are normally expressed by declarative clauses in the indicative it is not surprising that especially d with indicative is used in such contexts, cf. ch. 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.1 (so-called 'resumptive' if-clauses).

62

THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES

(21) ei 6' E'tll'tUµco~ I µ6pov 'tOV a.uti\~ ofo9a., 1t~ ... I ... 1tpo~ ~coµov eu'toA.µco~ 1tet.'t£t~; ('But if you really know your own death, how can you courageously go to the altar?', A. Ag. 1296-8) It is the chorus who are speaking, just after the long rhesis in which Cassandra prophesies her own death. The ei-clause then resumes her (prophetic) assertions (cf. 1260 1C't£V£t µe; 1275-6 o µ6:vn~ ~, 6n-r' ouxt Iiµrov' evfapncrev ... ; ('And how, you idiot, if he really strikes perjurers, how then, that he hasn't set fire to Simon?', Ar. Nu. 398-9)67

61. Often, of course, the reason why the El-clause is not placed in first position is quite obvious, the first position being occupied by a Focus or anaphoric constituent which tend to be placed in initial position. Cf. also (53)-(54), (56). 62. Alternatively, one could call this function, for instance, Displaced or Postponed Theme. 63. Cf also e.g. II. 4.353-5; Hdt. 2.73.2. 64. Cf. also e.g. Hdt. 1.156.1. 65. Cf. e.g. Pl. Prt. 33lb3-4; Th. 1.71.1. 66. Ford a.pa ('if surprisingly') see ch. 7.3.l. 67. Cf. e.g. Ar. Nu. 340-1; S. El. 257, 1493 (the if-clause following directly upon the question-word in Pl); E. Ion 1435 (if-clause following a relative pronoun in Pl).

80

THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES

Like in (51)-(52), the conditional clauses in (53)-(54) may be characterized simply as Delayed Theme, which in (53) is placed after the (parallel) Focus constituent in Pl (~uµ(popa), and in (54) after the (Resumed) Topic constituent in Pl (otl'toc; µhr 5Tl oypaµµana'ttlc;). 68 As to (55) and similar examples,69 there are several possibilities. First, ol1eoc; 5' au'toc; might be considered a New Topic (as the preceding stretch of discourse is about the speaker himself: 'I will keep silent') and the eiclause a Delayed Theme. Alternatively, the nominal constituent may be Theme, in P2 position, and the conditional clause parenthetical. The noun phrase ol1eoc; 5' au'toc; may, indeed, very well be a Theme, since it indicates a change in perspective with regard to the preceding context. 70 Thus, ol1eoc; 5' au'toc; may be seen as the new domain of discourse with respect to which it is relevant to pronounce the following clause, which would yield the following emphatic translation: 'But as to the house itself, if.. .'. Whether the if-clause should be considered parenthetical or not depends on the description of the position and function a parenthesis may have. A detailed description is as yet not available in FG, see Ziv (1985: 194-7). In anticipation of such a description let me note the following questions: (1) is it possible to insert a parenthesis after a Theme (i.e. in between another extra-clausal

68. Oo-tos µev 61\ o -ypaµµa'tta't1\s is clearly a Resumed Topic. In Hdt. 2.28.i he has been introduced as a New Topic. We have been told that he is the only person who has some information about the source of the Nile. Subsequently (28.1-28.4), this information is provided. With ot'tOs µev 6ii o -ypaµµanv, ti ...); E. rr 463; Ar. Th. 1160. 72. Van der Auwera (1988: 29n6) mentions a double Theme consisting of a coordinating conjunction and a nominal constituent, e.g. 'en die man. die heeft bet begrepen' ('and that man, he has got it'). I doubt, however, whether one could call conjunctions like en Themes. - I have already argued earlier (Wakker 1987) that double Themes might exist. Cf. also Ruijgh (1990: 229-31), who, on the basis of the position of p' (which tends to occupy the second position in the clause), convincingly argues that in cases like 'to'iai 6e: K{plCl'I I nap p' O:lC'l>M>v pcU.av6v 't' i::PA£L) must be considered Theme-like. It seems natural also to assign Theme function to the subsequent ti-clause.

82

THEoRETICAL PRELIMINARIES

succession. It would be interesting (but it falls outside the scope of my study) to investigate whether there are restrictions, on the one hand, on the semantic nature of parentheses that can be thus combined (for illocutionary parentheses see Ziv 1985: 191-3) and, on the other hand, on the number of parentheses that can be thus combined, cf. (60a) (60b) (60c) (60d)

How, my dear Peter, if I may ask, did you come home? How, my dear Peter, if your car broke down, did you come home? ? How, if I may ask, if your car broke down, did you come home? • How, my dear Peter, if I may ask, if your car broke down, did you come home?

All in all, then, although most - if not all (cf. n.60) - internal conditionals are extra-clausal, it seems as if they are not all parenthetical, but also Theme-like (cf. (55)), giving further information about the preceding nominal Theme. 74 This implies that the FG principle that there is a one-to-one relation between a pragmatic function like Theme and a pragmatic position like P2 must be modified. 75 3.2.4.4 Summarizing remarks

If one considers all the possible positions a predicational conditional may take, we may conclude that in principle it may occur in five 76 different

74. Note that this claim might have serious implications for the analysis of the position of the El-clause, for if the El-clauses of the type exemplified by (55) are considered Themelike, they are placed in P2, in which case they might be considered initial conditionals. Since, however, even then they are placed after some constituent which plays a role in the main clause, they can still be said to interrupt the main clause. I think therefore that it is justified to include them, in the statistics of ch. 3.2.3, in the group of internal conditionals. 75. This may result in rather complicated descriptions (but as language itself is complex, this is not swprising). Take e.g.: it µh, yEVoµ£V11 vauµax{a, J, liv8pt:c; Il£A.01tovvftc:no1., et ·nc; apa 81' aim\v i>µ&v cpopei-tat -niv µElloooav, oi>xl 8uca{av qet 1:E1Cµapcnv 1:0 ticcpopfiaai ('The recent sea-fight, Peloponnesians, if, unbopefully, because of that one, any man among you is afraid of the one before us, affords no just grounds for your alarm', Th. 2.87.1). I propose the following analysis: it µh, yEV0µ£V11 vauµaxta (which is the opening of the rbesis) is Theme with regard to the ei-clause (cf. the pronominal resumption by 81' ai>-riiv). In between the Theme and the El-clause an Address is parenthetically inserted. The whole complex of Theme and El-clause functions itself as a Theme with regard to the main clause oi>xl 8iica{av £XEt 1:eicµapatv 1:0 E1CcpoJ3i\oa1., and it is an exceptional Theme, in that it is interrupted by the parenthetical Address. 76. Dile (1990: 237-8) mentions only four possible positions. He does not discuss conditionals in parenthetical position.

POSITION AND FUNCTION OF CONDITIONALS

83

positions. To show in which positions conditionals occur, the schema presented in (10) above should be modified as follows: (61) P2, [Pl ... ,(P0 ),

•••

X], P3

This schema differs from (10) in two respects. First, P0 is introduced to symbolize the various positions a parenthetical conditional may take, the brackets and commas indicating that this position falls outside the clause proper. Second, ... X is used to symbolize the final position in the clause proper. The if-clause may, first of all, be placed inside the clause proper as an essential component (restrictive conditional); in that case it is either in Pl or in final position of the clause proper (X). When placed in Pl the if-clause has either Focus-function (e.g. 'On what condition will Peter leave? :: If John comes (Peter will leave)', cf. (29)-(33)) or Topic function (e.g. 'If John comes, that is terrible', cf. (36)-(37)); when placed in position X in the clause proper the if-clause is focal in that it provides completive, restricting or selecting information ((43)-(46), (32)) or in that it specifies some pronominal constituent in the main clause the referent of which is not inferrable from the preceding context/situation (47)-(48). In addition, the if-clause is sometimes topical in that the SoA designated by the if-clause is evaluated by the main clause (49). Second, the if-clause may not belong to the clause proper (non-restrictive conditional); it may occur in pre-clausal (P2) or post-clausal (P3) position or in P0 interrupting the clause proper (n indicates that its position may vary). When placed in P2 the if-clause has Theme-like features: it specifies the framework within which the following clause must be interpreted (e.g. 'If John comes, will Peter leave?', cf. (11)-(16), (21)-(27)). Since if-clauses point to disjunctive situations these Theme-like if-clauses may be characterized as Provisional Themes, because unlike nominal Themes they do not present a factual entity, but a possible world as the framework for the following clause. When placed in P3 the if-clause has Tail function and presents - as an afterthought - information meant to clarify or modify (some constituent in) the main clause (e.g. 'In that case Peter will leave, if John comes, I mean', cf. (38)-(42)). When they are parenthetical, finally, the ifclause interrupts the main clause to add the framework within which the cooccurring clause must be interpreted (e.g. 'Will Peter, if John comes, leave the house?', cf. (51)-(54), (56)).

84

THEoRETICAL PRELIMINARIES

The picture sketched above of the positions and functions of predicational conditionals is for the greater part in accordance with the conclusions of a number of articles that deal with the discourse function of preposed and postposed predicational adverbial clauses in other languages (Chafe 1984; Thompson 1984; Marchese 1987; Ramsay 1987). Their conclusions may be roughly summarized as follows. Preposed conditionals (Marchese, Ramsay), purpose clauses (Thompson) and adverbial clauses in general (Chafe) are thematically linked to both the preceding discourse and to the main clause. They present a framework within which the following information is to be understood, i.e. within which the occurrence of the SoA designated by the main clause must be placed. Postposed conditionals etc., on the other hand, present an addition to the assertion in the main clause or modify part of what was stated there. They are thus linked to the main clause only. I fully agree with this description, but only on the understanding that it is not complete. The characteristics mentioned seem to hold true only for extraclausal preposed and postposed conditionals. The studies in question seem to ignore three categories of conditional (discussed above): 1. restrictive preposed conditionals with Topic or Focus function; 2. restrictive postposed conditionals; 3. internal conditionals ('Delayed Themes').

3.2.5 Propositional and illocutionary conditionals As argued in ch. 3.2.3, propositional ((65)) and illocutionary conditionals ((62)-(64)) are inherently non-restrictive and, consequently, extra-clausal. Therefore, in considering the question of their position with regard to the main clause, they may be dealt with together, cf. the following examples: 77

(62) eav 6e [300).:n eic; 0ena)..{av ievat, eiaiv eµoi e1eei l;evot o'i ae 1tepi 1t0Uou 1totiiaov'tat ('and if you wish to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you', Pl. Cri. 45c2-3) (63) o 6e O' -R__q._

SPfo ___N~o--=lo=n-ge=r~-R=p_ _ _ _ __

At the speech moment (fo) the speaker (SP) believes p to be no longer realizable any (no longer-R), but he nevertheless creates a hypothetical picture (HP) in which the realization of p entails the realization of q. Typical examples which illustrate this semantic value are (24), where the subordinate clause refers to the present in the strict sense of the word, and (25), where the subordinate clause has general reference, which, of course, includes the present In both examples the factual situation is presented afterwards, in (24) introduced by vuv 6e ('but now', 'but in reality'), while in (25) the subsequent description of the factual situation is announced by 'tOta.6e. ... vuv ei q,opep6v 'tt evcoproµev, 1t&.v av aot 1tpoeJ.ibv 6e EOV'tCOV oµo-cp6q,cov -coiat av8pcfutotat Ot,picov 1t0Uq, &v ett 1tA£CO £'YlV£'tO, ei µit ica-ceMµpave 'tOU~ aieA.oupou~ 'tOta6e ('whereas there are many domestic animals, there would be many more, if this didn't happen to the cats', Hdt. 2.66.1) (24)

The imperfect ica-ceMµpave should probably be taken iteratively: 'if this did not repeatedly happen'. Hereafter it is described how male cats kill the kittens of female cats, which do not want to copulate because they have kittens. In these contexts, in which a conditional period is afterwards contrasted with the factual situation, often marked by expressions like alla vuv or vuv 6e ('but now', 'but in reality', 'in fact, however'), not only counterfactual periods are found (cf. (24)-(25)) but also potential periods, cf. (26), in which vuv 6e has a purely present reference, and (27), where the reference is more general.

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PREDICATIONAL CONDITIONALS

(26) 1e6U' av ')J:yetv exotµt 1epoc; -ca -cou6' £1CT\, ei µot mxpei1eot· vuv 6' evoc; 1epa-cro M>yO'U ('I could say much in reply to his words, if it were possible for me; but now I have the power [i.e. leisure] to say one word only', S. Ph. 1047-8)24 · (27) ('tac; oupac; µa1epac;) 'tac; ei 'Ctc; £1C£i1l CJ(l>t £1CEA.1C£tV, U.1C£(X av £XOt£V ... vuv 6' a1tac; -etc; 'CWV 1C0tµ.£VO)V e1Cima-cat ;'UM>pyeetv ec; 'COCJOU'COV · aµa;i6ac; yap 1COt£UV'C£c; i>1to6to'UCJt µev av, d EXotµt, me; 'to:xima ooMX moio6µ11v naai ntpaatc; 'tote; 1tpoatouaiv ('if I could, I would make weapons as soon as possible for all the Persians who are coming here', X. Cyr. 2.1.9; there is a v.l. 1toto{µ11v which may be explained as a lectio facilior). In these instances of the potential optative the emphasis is not on the potential realiz:ation of the SoA mentioned in the subordinate clause, but rather on the non-occurrence at the speech moment, so that a combination with a counterfactual construction may occur.

INTERACTIVE SPEECH: PRESENT REFERENCE

141

311 b-d Socrates wants to know from his interlocutor why (i.e. to become what) he is planning to go to Protagoras. To clarify his question he asks him what he would answer if he was planning to go to the physician Hippocrates or to some famous sculptor. In these contrary-to-fact situations he uses the counterfactual (ei 'tt~ iipeto42 ... 'tt &v cxxeicp{vro, ibid. b7-cl, c5-7). He then returns to his original question about Protagoras. He puts this question into the mouth of a fictitious person (tt~) (ei ... tt~ ... epotto ... ti &v autq> cx1t01cpivaiµe8a, d4-el). Here Socrates uses an optative, because it is the interlocutor's actual intention to go to Protagoras. The question then is certainly a possible one (and more likely to be really asked than the other two). In other words, in such contexts in which both periods are contrasted, a counterfactual period is used for a question which does not belong to the proper subject of the discussion, but which is adduced to support the argumentation concerning the main issue (cf. also e.g. Pl. Grg. 447d3, Men. 72bl-c4), whereas a potential period is used for fictitious questions that are relevant to the main issue. In summary, then, the use of counterfactual and potential conditionals may be described as follows. (Imperfective) counterfactuals usually refer to the present (see further ch. 4.3.3), whereas potential conditionals refer to the future (including the immediate future). There are two areas of overlap in which both a counterfa~tual and a potential conditional period may occur, i.e. in cases of general reference, which includes the present and future, and in cases in which an optative refers to the immediate future, which comes very close to the present. In most cases the choice between the two constructions can be explained in terms of semantic-pragmatic factors: by their different semantic properties (a counterfactual expresses a lost possibility, whereas a potential conditional merely expresses a possibility) both conditional types prefer other types of context. As may be clear from the preceding, the two constructions are not freely interchangeable, and even in cases where at first sight this might seem to be the case, at closer examination the contexts appear to be different (cf. (24)-(25) vs. (26)-(27)); (34) vs. (35) (see also Brunel (1980: 234-6); Hodot (1981)).

42. Note the difference in tense stem between i,pt:'tO (aorist) and iipclYca; (imperfect) in (35). Whereas t:t 'tt; i,pt:'to concerns 'asking' in the sense of 'ask a (specific) question', t:i iipclYca; concerns 'asking' in the sense of 'to be waiting for an answer'.

142

PREDICATIONAL CONDmONALS

4.3 Interactive speech (continued): subordinate clauses with past reference This chapter will focus successively on neutral conditionals (4.3.1), counterfactual conditionals (4.3.2), the form (4.3.3) and implications (4.3.4) of counterfactuals, the difference between neutral and counterfactual conditionals (4.3.5), e1t£i + secondary indicative (4.3.6) and the so-called past potential (4.3.7). 4.3.1 ei with secondary indicative (neutral value) The ei-clauses of this kind mark neutral conditions concerning the past,43 i.e. the speaker expresses indifference or indeterminacy as to the likelihood of the realization of the past SoA in question. The main clause may contain any mood or tense. Apart from the temporal reference the characteristics are the same as those of ei with present indicative. Just ei-clauses with present indicative (ch. 4.2.1), such clauses are used in two ways. First, they often have a resumptive function. The speaker takes up an utterance of someone else concerning a past SoA ((36) and (37)), or he refers to a factual past situation ((38)) without committing himself to the truth of the information presented. This neutral value may receive different interpretations, from simple indeterminacy to scepticism on the one hand and near-causality on the other. The source of the information may be indicated explicitly, as in (36). Not only the words of the direct addressee may be taken up, but also those of another interlocutor, as is shown by (37).

like

(36) aye

6Jt O'U 't\Va VOUV Tl 'ttVa -yvcoµtlV

£X£t/1,in:ov, aov epyov ... &van:).11proaat ('It may well be that I have omitted many points. But if I have left any gaps, it is your business to fill them', Pl. Smp. 188d9-e3) (40) 'COU'CQ)V ••• £µ£AAOV µv11µ11v £~£tV, e'{ n:ep lCv µ{av u1tep, cruyyvrocn' &v ~v • vuv 8' ouvex' 'EMVTt µapyo~ ~v ...I ... 1tai8' EµflV 81.CMeaev ('If he had - to exalt his house - slain one for many, it were not past forgiving. But, for that Helen was a wanton, he murdered my child', E. El. 1024-9) Note that the factual course of events is afterwards presented (introduced by vuv 8e). The presentation of such an alternative is often used in argumentations for rhetorical reasons, as shown in ch. 4.2.3. Thus, it may be used to substantiate one's own ideas, cf. (42), which is one of the means to prove that Agamemnon had a strong naval power:

av

(42) O'l>lC o-ov VllO'COV ... £1Cpatet, ei µ11 'tl !Cat vau'tllCOV etxev ('he would not have ruled over the islands [as Homer says he does], if he had not had something of a fleet', Th. 1.9.4) Or it may be used to contradict a current opinion (type of argumentation:

'people say p. But if p, q. q is evidently not true, therefore p is not true'): (43) ei yap 8T1 tauta O'U't~ eipffirt EiC 'tOU lCUf}epvftteco 1tpo~ :Sep;11v, ev µupt'flO'l yvroµ'flO'l µ{av O'l>lC exco avti;oov µTl ()'\)IC 1t0l'J10'at f}aat" , , £ .!.""' • , • £ ~ , ' , ' ' 11,ea 'tOlOVoe ... Ul\,11, 0 µev ... Ourp xpecoµevo~ ... a1t€VOO"tl10'€ ~ 'tllV 'AaiT1v ([It is told that during a storm, on the advice of his pilot, the king ordered the Persians on deck to leap into the sea in order to make the ship lighter. I do not believe this] 'for if indeed the pilot had so spoken to Xerxes, I think that there is not one in thousand that will deny that the king would have done thus [i.e. let the Persians go into the hold of the ship and to cast into sea an equal number of Phoenician rowers]. Nay, the truth is that Xerxes returned to Asia by road', Hdt. 8.119)

av

In (43) the argumentation is partly implicit. People say 'on the advice of his pilot Xerxes ordered the Persians to leap into sea in order to make the ship lighter'. However, if the pilot had given this advice, Xerxes would have ordered the Phoenicians and not the Persians to leap into sea. The next step ('there is no evidence for the latter, ergo the story is not true') is left

146

PREDICATIONAL CONDITIONALS

implicit, because the argumentation is broken off by a)..'),.', which introduces what in Herodotus' eyes was the true reason of Xerxes' safe return home. 4.3.3 Form of counterfactuals

In the preceding I have noted that, as a rule, the imperfect (or pluperfect) is used in present counterfactual periods, the (secondary) aorist indicative in past counterfactual periods (in both subordinate and main clause). In fact, however, the imperfect is rather often found in either subordinate or main clause or in both when the past is clearly referred to, whereas the aorist indicative is sometimes used when the present is referred to. This variation of tenses is briefly mentioned in most handbooks47 and is rather extensively dealt with by Goodwin (147-8, 151). With the exception of Goodwin, all scholars discuss this phenomenon as an exception to the general rule that imperfects occur in present counterfactuals and aorist indicatives in past counterfactuals. However, if one looks at the semantic character of the imperfect and the aorist indicative,48 the correctness of such a description of the variation of tenses may be doubted. Both secondary indicatives are past tenses. The present stem expresses the fact that at some moment given in the context or situation the SoA still continues (so it is described as not-completed or, using a different terminology, as not-closed). In the case of an imperfect the moment given is a moment in the past. The aorist indicative, on the other hand, describes a SoA as completed or closed: the completion is attained before a given moment ('moment' of speaking or a moment in the past given in the context or situation). The main uses of both indicatives find their origin in this difference. Thus an imperfect in a narrative context is often used to describe simultaneous SoAs (e.g by creating a framework within which other SoAs may occur) or repeated SoAs. The aorist indicative simply describes a SoA as completed before the 47. Humbert (223-5), KG (2,469-71), SD (686). Moreover they all discuss counterfactuals in which there is a combination of present and past reference (and a combination of tenses), e.g. Ii).).,' av, el 'tOV £~ Eµi\c;; I µ1\'tpoc;; 8avoV't' &eamov -ftvax6µ11v VEICW, I KE{voic;; av i\),:yow· 'to'ia6E 6' ouic ciJ.:yuvoµai ('but if I had suffered my mother's son to lie in death an unburied corpse, that would grieve me; for this, I am not grieved', S. Ant. 466-8). Whereas the el-clause has past reference, the main clause has present reference. Cf. also (32) above, in which the main clause has past reference and the El-clause present reference. 48. I will not enter into the interesting but difficult question whether the difference between the present and aorist stem is one of tense, aspect or of a combination of both. For a discussion and bibliography see e.g. Ruijgh (1985a); Sicking (199la/b).

INTERACTIVE SPEECH: PAST REFERENCE

147

'moment' of speaking or before another SoA mentioned in the following or preceding context (thus creating a 'past in the past'). On the basis of these semantic values we might explain the fact that in most cases a secondary present indicative (imperfect) is used in present counterfactuals, for a present counterfactual inherently implies that the SoA involved would be going on at the 'moment' of speaking (which is fully compatible with the value of the present stem), if in the past its realization had not become impossible. Since the decision about the non-realization has been made in the past, it is the secondary present indicative which is used. The aorist indicative is preferred in past counterfactuals: the decision about the non-realization of a SoA in the past was already taken at some earlier moment 49 The general use of the tense stems in counterfactuals may, thus, be explained by the semantic character of the present and aorist stems. In the same way, the far less frequent use of the imperfect. in past counterfactuals and the aorist indicative in present counterfactuals can be shown not to be an exceptional use of these indicatives, but a consequence of their semantic character. An imperfect in past counterfactual periods characterizes the SoA involved as, for instance, a continuing (situation in the past) or an iterative one. In these cases it is not the speech moment that is taken as the moment at which the SoA involved would be going on, but some past moment given in the context. In such cases it has to be clearly indicated by other means that the past is referred to_ (this restriction is not explicitly mentioned in the handbooks). This is done by the use of an aorist in either the main clause or the subordinate clause (in addition to the imperfect) or especially by contextual or situational indications (cf. (44)-(46)). (44)

ecp11 Kcv.m6ov{ou~ 'tOU'tOV 'tOV XPOVOV 't'l>-yxcxveiv EOV't~ 't'l>(j)M>U~ • OU yap &v 'tOU lC(XAA.toVO~ 1tape6vto~ lC'tt~etV xcopou 'tOV aiaxfova ruo8ai, ei µT) ~aav wq,lo{ ('He said that the Calchedonians happened to be blind at that time; for they would never have chosen the meaner site for their city when they might have had the fairer if they had not been blind', Hdt. 4.144.2)

49. For a different explanation, see Weinrich (1971: 205-21, 288-93) and (contra Weinrich) Fayen (1971).

148

PREDICATIONAL CONDITIONALS

naav

The imperfect denotes a (past) quality.so By 'tOU'tOV 'tOV XPOVOV ('at that time' )s1 and the aorist Ufo8at it is sufficiently indicated that the past is referred to. Compare also (42) where a past situation is discussed: did Agamemnon have a strong naval power or not? Since Agamemnon is concerned, the past reference is sufficiently clear. The imperfects eicpa't£t and £1:XEV explicitly express the fact that a past situation is sketched. s2 (45) Ei yap ffl1 µT) n:ape1tP11~£ µn6ev, en:' 0 6£ £0"ta,.Tl £1t0\££, £lA£ a.v 'tT)V ... xcopnv ('for if he had not done anything beyond, but had kept on doing that for which he set out, he would have taken the region', Hdt. 5.45.1) Here we see an imperfect (en:ofaE) which has a continuative value ('if he had kept on doing'). In the context involved (dealing with the cause of the death of Dorieus, which occurred in the past) the conditional itself clearly has past reference.

naav

(46) lC q>\1~. O'UlC av 71:0'tE 't v6µcp 1tEtp&o8ext uµrov "CTI~ hacnou J3ouAT}O'E~ -ce Kat 66~11~ -cuxeiv ('However, since our forefathers approved of this practice (i.e. that a funeral oration must be delivered) as right and proper, I also, obeying the law, must try to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of each of you', Th. 2.35.3)69

This sentence constitutes the transition between Pericles' introduction, in which he tells about the custom of the funeral oration and his opinion about it, and the oration proper. With the £1tei6ft-clause he refers to 2.35.1, where he tells his audience that previous orators praised the custom "feeling that it is right and proper to deliver at their burial an oration on those who have fallen in war". 4.3. 7 Potential conditional with past reference?

As shown in ch. 4.2.3, in the domain of the present/future, Greek disposes of different means to express a condition that is presented as no more than possible and a condition presented as contrary-to-fact. The question arises whether the same holds for the domain of the past. Whereas it is beyond doubt that Greek has a past counterfactual conditional (cf. ch. 4.3.2), problems arise as to the existence of a past potential. I will first discuss the problem in general: does a past potential exist as a separate type, and, if it does, in which respect(s) does it differ from a counterfactual? In the English grammar of Quirk et al. (1985: 233)70 there are two examples of a 'past potential' in an independent clause: (54) They might have become champions (55) We could have borrowed the money

fad only in interactive speech. 68. An aorist is called 'constative' when it is used in interactive speech and when it indicates that the SoA involved is completed before the speech moment, cf. e.g. Rijksbaron (1984: 28). 69. Some other examples: A. Pers. 691; Ar. Ach. 437; Hdt. 5.91.3; Lys. 3.3; Pl. Grg. 522e7; Th. 6.18.1. There are only few instances with an imperfect, e.g. Hdt. 3.71.5 (the situation described by ro61C££ being simultaneous with the aorist imt8ea8e)), 4.136.4 (the situation described by tµEV£t£ lasts till the speech moment); Lys. 13.93. 70. Cf. also the English Grammar of Collins Cobuild (1990: 226).

INTERACTIVE SPEECH: PAST REFERENCE

157

Such 'past potentials' are not purely hypothetical statements, but establish and assert the fact that at some time in the past the possibility existed that they would become champions (54) or that we would borrow the money (55). It is not indicated whether this possibility was or was not effectuated. The question as to the effectuation of the possibility simply doesn't arise. Semantically, then, a past potential in an independent clause expresses the existence of a real possibility. Pragmatically, however, in most contexts it is suggested that this possibility has not been effectuated (cf. Quirk et al. concerning (55) "usually with the implication •... but we didn't'"). It is precisely the latter suggestion (which is not an aspect of meaning, but an invited inference) which brings it close to a counterfactual. This invited inference of counterfactuality is not surprising: past SoAs are qualitate qua facts. Thus, unless it is explicitly indicated that the speaker is not acquainted with the past course of events, stating that there was in the past a possibility is, from a pragmatic point of view, more likely to imply that the possibility has not been realized than that it has been realized, for in the latter case one would preferably not say 'it was possible for p to be realized/happen', but rather 'p was realized/happened'. Mutatis mutandis the same holds good for conditionals, cf. (56) If United could have won that game, they might have become league champions (Quirk et al. (1985: 232)) As is rightly observed by Quirk et al. (ibid.), (56) usually has a counterfactual interpretation, implying that United did not win the game. That such examples are usually interpreted as counterfactual may be explained as follows. The realization of a past SoA is made dependent on a past condition, which is most likely interpreted as implying that the condition was not realized. For past SoAs are qualitate qua facts. Facts cannot be the subject of a hypothesis. Thus, unless it is explicitly indicated that the speaker is not acquainted with the past course of events, a hypothesis concerning the past is interpreted as a hypothesis concerning a SoA of which one knows that it has not been realized (counterfactual). In other words, the fact that a past condition is used is normally interpreted as implying that it is a counterfactual condition, for otherwise it would not have been mentioned as a condition: rather a temporal ('when United had won that game') or causal clause ('since United had won that game') would have been used, cf. Goodwin (83-4), Van Pottelbergh (1939: 24-5).

158

PREDICATIONAL CONDITIONALS

(56) may, then, only be interpreted as a past potential if it is clearly indicated that the speaker does not know whether or not the SoA in the ifclause (and hence also that mentioned in the main clause) has or has not been realized, e.g. (56a) I don't know anything about that game. But if United should have won it, they might have become league champions71 Such contexts, however, seem rare and rather marked. Generally speaking, one could say that the prototypical use of a potential period concerns the future (future SoAs are inherently non-observable and thus non-facts), whereas that of a counterfactual period concerns the past (past SoAs are inherently observable and thus facts). For both types the present (present SoAs may or may not be observable) is a borderline case. 72 All in all, then, one may draw two conclusions: first that from a logical point of view a past potential may exist both in independent clauses and, be it as a marginal phenomenon, in conditional periods; and, second, that English at least seems to have a linguistic means to give expression to the notion of past potential (viz. the past tense modals could and might). We must now ask ourselves whether this holds good for Ancient Greek as well. I will first briefly summarize what has been said about this topic in the existing literature. It has been stated73 that in post-Homeric Greek the 71. Another, perhaps more natural, expression in such a context is a neutral condition with indeterminate reading: 'I don't know anything about that game. But if United has won it, they will have become League champions'. 72. Just as one may ask whether a past potential period may exist, one may ask whether a future counterfactual may exist. Here again the answer is positive, although it is a far from prototypical use. The following quotation is from Jarvis (1972: 69), who offers a very apt description of the future counterfactual in English: "a. If I were going to New York (and not to Paris) next year, I could stay with my aunt. b. If Abebe Bikila were running in the marathon at the next Olympics, he'd win. There may be philosophical objections to equating future time and counterfactuality, since, in an absolute sense, it may be impossible to utter any prediction in the knowledge that it will prove false (counterfactual). But what matters for language (and the particular means of expression selected) is the speaker's presupposition at the time of utterance. He knows that be will go to Paris and that Abebe's career bas been finished by an accident and it is obvious that these examples must be regarded as counterfactual. However, for a future-time conditional to be understood in this way aspectual marking with an -ing form is usually obligatory. Otherwise the statement could only be interpreted as an (unlikely) noncounterfactual: 'If I went to New York. I could stay with my uncle'." Cf. also ch. 3.3n125. 73. Goodwin (81-6); Humbert (112-3, 224); KG (1,212-4; 2,477-8); McKay (1981: 42); Moorhouse (1982: 215-6); Orlandini (fc); SD (346-8); Stahl (354-5).

INTERACTIVE SPEECH: PAST REFERENCE

159

secondary indicative + av is used in independent clauses to express a past possibility; e.g. e1toinoev av - 'he could/might have done', where av has the value 'under some past circumstances'. This expression is said to have one of the following three nuances, depending on the context (cf. esp. Moorhouse (1982: 215-6)): 1. purely potential, expressing what might have happened without implying

either that it did or did not. 2. counterfactual, expressing what might have happened, but did not. 3. iterative, expressing what might have happened and if so, did so more than once.74 Whereas the third interpretation applies in descriptive contexts, it seems difficult to define in which contexts the first and in which the second interpretations apply. All that is usually said is that the first interpretation applies mainly in fixed expressions such as qSs-t6 av w; ('one could/might have thought') or qSou av ('you could/might have thought'),75 but that it is sometimes also found elsewhere, e.g. (57), an example adduced by KG (1,212), SD (347) and Moorhouse (1982: 215): (57) Kai-tot 1t68ev KAEOOV ev tacpcp tt8eioa; ('and yet whence could I have won more honourable glory than by burying my brother', S. Ant. 502-4)

74. Iterativity implies that at the 'moment given' the SoA in question does not necessarily obtain, but that it has repeatedly obtained, and will repeatedly obtain. This last part of the implication is in fact a prediction, belonging to the 'possible world'. In the same way the past-iterative use of the secondary indicative + lxv may be connected with the past potential: at some past moment one could expect that the SoA in question would once again obtain. The problem, however, is that - unlike iterative ind. II + lxv - the past potential seems to be limited to idiomatic expressions (see below). Pedlaps, in a diachronic perspective, the vague ·rn; in idiomatic expressions like el1t£V lxv 1:i; ('one could have said') has furthered the iterative interpretation of ind. II + lxv, cf. also 1:u; in the iterative formula iL6e 6e 1:i; eY1t£01C£V 'and thus people (i.e. one after another) spoke' (cf. also 1:ic; in expressions with future reference such as 1ea{ 1t01:e 1:ic; eY7t11oi(v ), 1Ca{ 1t01:E 1:i; iptei, 1ea{ ICE 1:ic; iL6' ipai, in which contexts ·tic; 'somebody' is easily interpreted as 'many a person'). 75. I.e. expressions with 'many a person' or 'you' (in the sense of 'one') as subject and with a verb meaning 'observe, think, say'. For examples see Goodwin (82-3), KG (1,212-3). Cf. also (59)-(61).

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PREDICATIONAL CONDITIONALS

The nuance of possibility is said to result from the fact that the SoA is presented as having been realized under certain circumstances (av), and that in the context involved the actual occurrence of these circumstances is left out of consideration (KG 1,212).76 From examples like (57) it is but a little step to assume, as several handbooks do, the existence of a separate category of 'potential conditional period with past reference' in which the circumstances are said to be explicitly added by an ei-clause with secondary indicative,77 e.g. (58)

'"

1',

,

,

,,,,,

,,

\

'

OUlC av ouv VllO'OlV ... ri1tetprot11~ rov eicpa:tet, et µri 'tt lC(Xt VVE 6e trov6e ElVEX:£V, O'tt ... ei 'tE VtX:q>tO auµPw..cov, µtAT\lC~ £tf\ ('Even if he was not a Malian, Onetes might know this path, supposing him to have had much acquaintance with the country', Hdt. 7.214.3) the full optative period is often said to have an unmistakable past reference. The optative has been explained as a Homerism (Goodwin 163).87 However, it may perhaps be better to explain it like Hdt. 1.2.1 £tf\, nv 6e µyt a.6n, µenetat ([when drunk they take their decisions] 'and the following day when they are sober the master of the house submits that which had pleased them for reconsideration: and if also being sober they still approve it, they act thereon, but if not, they cast it aside', Hdt.

(115) 'to 6'&v &6!1 crept ... , 'tou'to

't1l uO"tepcx{n

1.133.4) (116) lCCXt Oi>'tOt CX1t0 8rip11c; ~IDV'tec; 'tp61tcp 'tOtq,6e· A.OX~ £1tt 6ev6peov

' A..~ ... · "t1t1toc; 6'e €1CCXO"t(jl • ' " ' £0''tt ' ... • £1t£CXV ' ' 6'e CX1tt ' '6ll 'tO' CXVCXpu,c; ... e'tOtµoc; ~pfov ... , ... £1ttf3ac; e1tl 'tov i'.1t1tov 6tcoKet ([next to them live the Iyurkai,] they too living by the chase in the following way: a man climbs a tree and he lies in wait; each h'as a horse at hand; and when he has caught sight of the animal, he jumps on his horse and pursues it', Hdt. 4.22.2)

In both cases the main clause has a generic or habitual present indica-

tive, 134 which implies that the subordinate SoA, too, occurs repeatedly. Moreover, the contexts are highly similar in that a series of SoAs is described that together constitute one complex and all-embracing SoA, which one could call an 'umbrella-SoA'. 135 In (115) this 'umbrella SoA' is the reconsideration of their decision, in (116) it is the hunting.

133. Cf. Rijksbaron (1984: 71, 84-5; 1986: 25-9). 134. Less often a gnomic aorist indicative occurs, e.g. E. Med. 129-30; Hdt. 1.132.2. 135. Alternatively, one could call this all-embracing SoA, with Rijksbaron (p.c.), a hyperonym.

198

PREDICATIONAL CONDmONALS

These similarities have sometimes led to the incorrect view that there is no difference between eav and e1teav 136 in such cases and that they are interchangeable. 137 However, on the basis of the semantic values of the conjunctions (ei pointing to a disjunctive situation, e1eei presupposing the realization of the SoA in question; cf. ch. 4.1) the two clause types may be shown to be semantically different also in habitual contexts. Since e1teav-clauses inherently presuppose the realization of the SoA concerned, in habitual contexts with a generic/habitual present indicative in the main clause, like that of (116), they express the repeated realization of the SoA in question, which means specifically that on all possible occasions in the given situation, i.e. every time the 'umbrella-SoA' occurs, the SoA designated in the e1teav-clause always obtains. In combination with the factual modality of the (habitual) present indicative in the main clause and with the habitual context in general, the disjunctive character of eav, on the other hand, is interpreted as indicating that the SoA involved is sometimes realized. On all possible occasions in the given situation (once again, _every time the 'umbrella-SoA' occurs) the question arises whether the SoA p, designated by the eav-clause, is or is not realized (disjunctive situation). In other words, in such contexts 'p is possible' entails 'p sometimes occurs'. Van der Auwera (1983b: 301) shows that something very similar holds for 'it can be cold in Berlin', which entails 'it is sometimes cold in Berlin'. He gives this example to illustrate the notion of contingency, which he defines as the notion inbetween necessity and impossibility. One could say that coldness is a contingent feature of the Berlin climate. Analogously, one could say that the SoA designated by a descriptive eav-clause is a contingent feature of the 'umbrella-SoA', whereas the SoA designated by an e1eeavclause is a necessary feature of this 'umbrella-SoA' .138 The difference between descriptive eav and e1eeav may also be described in terms of quantification. 139 In the discourse type concerned, eav

136. In Homer av or ice is more often absent than present in descriptive contexts (see further ch. 4.8). In post-Homeric Greek, mainly in tragedy, av is only rarely omitted (as a homerism or a poetic license). 137. E.g. KG (2,474); Goodwin (171). 138. Interestingly, Powell (1938), in his lexicon to Herodotus, describes one group of i\vclauses (bis group 2) as indicating "repeated contingencies in the present". 139. Cf. Fabricius-Hansen & Saeb!II (1983: 19).

DESCRIPTIONS OF MANNERS AND CUSTOMS

199

involves what may be called 'partial' or 'restricted' quantification, while e1teav rather involves universal quantification. Unlike other ei-clauses, Mv-clauses in descriptions refer to real SoAs, i.e. to SoAs that are repeatedly realized. The disjunctive character of Mv-clauses may be explicitly indicated by the presentation of an alternative situation (cf. (115), but the alternative situation may also remain implicit, cf. ( 117) 'Cep6µevov uxo ioxuo~ -cou p6ou ('Here one must pass with the boat roped. And if the rope breaks, the boat is carried away by the strength of the current', Hdt. 2.29.2) When one travels with the boat roped (which may be characterized as the 'umbrella-SoA') it is possible for the rope to break, but it does not necessarily occur. (117) may then be paraphrased as 'when one travels there with the boat roped, the rope sometimes breaks. In that case the boat is carried away'. The other alternative, i.e. the possible case that the rope does not break, is not presented as such. It is this semantic difference that explains why, pragmatically, Mv and e1teav tend to occur in contexts that, despite their generic or habitual character, are not wholly identical: - It is only e1teav, and not Mv, that is found in contexts with anaphoric reference. 140 The SoA designated by the exea.v-clause has already been presented as a fact. For that reason it would be impossible to take up the information with Mv, since this conjunction would invalidate the information which had been presented just before as certain. Take, for instance, (118), which belongs to a passage where it is described how the Scythians prepare their milk with the aid of blind slaves (this preparation of the milk may be characterized as the 'umbrella-SoA'). It has just been said that they insert a tube into the mare's genitals and blow:

140. Other btd-clauses have the same characteristic, as observed above (ch. 4.2.2, 4.3.6, 4.4.4, 4.6).

200

PREDICATIONAL CONDmONALS

(118) &Uot 6e &Ucov qruac.ovtcov aµu:youat ... e1eeav 6e aµ~rocn to

y V1tep euxoµat ('for I shall pass to the horror of the knife, if I am of the father that I boast mine', E. Heracl. 562-3) 5.1.2.3 Comparative conditionals Consider: (14) Si la Cit:6 est le coeur de Paris, le quartier latin en est l'Ame In this example there are two parallel propositions, without any implicative relationship between p and q. Proposition q is as it were compared to proposition p: if (one can say/you accept the speaker saying) p, (one can also say/you must also accept the speaker saying) q. Since in this type of conditional two propositions are as it were compared I call them comparative conditionals.1' In Greek the following example may be adduced as an illustration: (15) ei 6e lCCXAOV eupttµa &.v8pro1tot~ ma8µtt Kat lCQVOlV 1tpo~ 't(X o'p8a (v.l. &.ya8a) epya~ea8at, lCQMIV CXV µot 601Cei Tl 'AYTtA.Oµ£V0t~ ('If line and rule are a noble discovery of man as aids to the production of good work, I think that the virtue of Agesilaos may well stand as a noble example for those who wish to make moral goodness a habit', X. Ages. 10.2)

From the acceptance of the proposition 'line and rule are useful to the production of good work' it is inferred by comparison that one must also accept the proposition 'Agesilaos' virtue is a good example for people who want to be good'.

17. Ducrot (1972: 176) describes this example as a case of si contrastif. I do not find this term felicitous since there is no real contrast between the two propositioos.

236

PROPOSITIONAL AND ILLOClITIONARY CONDITIONALS

5.2 Illocutionary conditionals 5.2.1 General semantic characterization

Examples such as (16) are given in the literature as more or less standard examples of illocutionary conditionals: 18 (16) if you're hungry, there's a hamburger in the fridge 19 In Greek comparable examples occur, cf. e.g. (17) and (18): (17) EW/ 0£ ~OUA11 ei~ 0et'taAlCXV ievat, eialv e.µol EiC£\ 1;€vot 01 0'£ 1tepl 1t0Uou 1toiftaov'tat ('and if you wish to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you', Pl. Cri. 45c2-3) (18) xpuao~ mxpea'tiv, ei 'too' cxi'tftaei~ yepcx~ ('there lies gold ready, if you'll ask this gift', E. Rh. 169)

In (16) the presence of the hamburger is in no respect dependent on the addressee's being hungry or not, nor is it possible to argue that in (17) the presence of the friends depends on the addressee's desire to go to Thessaly, or, in (18) that the presence of the gold depends on the addressee's asking for it. Rather, the main clauses are tru~. independently of the realization of the conditional clauses. 20 That is to say, in (16), the hamburger is in either case in the fridge, whether the addressee is hungry or not. 21 The conditional clause, then, does not specify a condition for the realization of the SoA mentioned in the main clause, nor for the truth of the proposition presented in· the main clause, but it specifies the circumstances under which the assertion being made in the main clause is - in the speaker's opinion - likely to contain useful or relevant information for the addressee.

18. Other names currently used for this type of conditional are: pseudo-conditionals, commentative conditionals, relevance conditionals, speech-act conditionals. 19. Cf. e.g. Akatsuka (1986: 337); Dik (1990: 253); Ducrot (1972: 176-8); van de Griend (1988: 1; 1989: 448); Johnson-Laird (1986: 61); Veltman (1986: 163). 20. Cf. Johnson-Laird (1986: 69). 21. In (18) the context shows that in fact it is unlikely that the addressee will ask for gold: cxit~aeti; yepcxi; Hektor: xpvaoi; mxpeanv, ei ~10\J 'A1t6Ucovt llUX£'tO, "CO:iatV ot6v 't8 8v ev 1tA:118e1. ei1teiv, ei 'tl. 1C.Dtcl>tepov av £\fl ('The assertion you happen to have made is indeed a dangerous one, if at any rate it stood alone; but now that such assertions are many the danger is still greater', Pl. Lg. 886e3-5). Here too there is a kind of a foniori-argumentation (xCXA.£1t6v - xa.'>.DtcirtEpov ). The easiest way to interpret the El-clause here

314

THE FUNCTION OF PARTICLES IN El-CLAUSES

The above group of examples all concern et ye-clauses in isolation, ye characterizing the condition as particularly relevant for the speaker's present purpose (i.e. for the realization of the main SoA). There is also a minority of et ye-clauses (only 9 in my corpus) where the et ye-clause is in contrast with another ei-clause (this group is not dealt with as such by Denniston). They are always found in monologue and pertain to the presentation of contrasting situations or enumerations of situations. The speaker uses ye to single out units which may strike the addressee as paradoxical, unexpected, or surprising (ye thus often marks a climax) or units which he wants his addressee to pay particular attention to, for instance, because it is important for what follows. Two cases in point are: (17) 1tpfutov µev' 01tot' et1toi 'tl~ ... I cl) Ai,µ'' EpCXO'tTJ~ eiµi ... I 2vv I cxvrop'taAi,e~ 1C, Et'tE 1ml W'tq> EOO~E ... 'tOV 8Eov E1tEtpfo8m ('he sent messengers to Delphi [which he did] either because some man so counselled him or because he himself thought good to question the god', Hdt. 1.19.2).

MODAL PARTICLES

343

7.3 Modal particles In the following sections I will discuss the main modal particles (as far as they are used in conditional clauses), i.e. those particles by means of which a speaker may signal his own attitude towards the proposition he presents: apa (ch. 7.3.1), mi (ch. 7.3.2), 1tou (ch. 7.3.3) and -cot (ch. 7.3.4). A summary is presented in ch. 7.3.5. 7.3.1 ei apa

To begin with, since most scholars explain the synchronic use of apa on the basis of its origins, some remarks about the etymology of apa may be in order. The etymology of apa is uncertain: its root ap- has been said to occur in such widely divergent words as apapfo1ero (yielding as the original meaning of apa 'fittingly', 'accordingly'),78 ap1tei~ro (yielding 'quickness', 'surprise' as the basic element of the meaning of apa),79 and ap-1cno.;; (yielding 'well' as the original meaning of apa). 80 In other words, the etymology will be of no use in trying to establish the (synchronic) basic semantic value of apa. Instead, this value must be established on the basis of an analysis of its use, as rightly observed by Denniston (33) and Ruijgh (434). The Homeric material allows us to give the following rough characterization. "Apa is a modal particle, by which the speaker signals his lively interest in the (new information contained in the) proposition uttered. In other words, by using apa the speaker characterizes the propositional content of the clause as 'interesting' and thus invites the addressee to pay attention to this interesting fact. This characterization comes very close to Hartung's remark (i 430) that a.pa signals the impression made by anything 'neu und interessant'. 81 If one assumes that apex expresses interest, one may satisfactorily account for the variety of the Homeric uses (cf. Denniston (33-4), Ruijgh (432-8)). In all cases, apa is used to signal the speaker's interest (which

78. Cf. Monro (316), KG (2,317), SD (558-9), Humbert (380). They all argue on the basis of what they take to be its etymology that lxpa denotes connexion (mere succession or consequence); cf. also Grimm (1961; 1962: 3-41), who argues that lxpa marks a fact which is well-known ('as you know/can see'). 79. Cf. Hartung (1832: i 419 ff.). 80. Cf. Ruijgh (433-4). 81. By way of comparison Hartung adduces German 'siehe', whereas Ruijgh (434) adduces French 'eh bien'. It is, however, difficult to provide one ready-made translation of lxpa which applies in all cases.

344

THE FUNCTION OF PARTICLES IN EI-a..AUSES

often implies his surprise) vis-a-vis the· proposition presented. In Homer approximately 91 % of the examples of lipa are found in clauses with a secondary indicative. This means that the interest or surprise expressed by lipa mostly concerns an established fact. 82 Although in post-Homeric Greek the use of lipa is no longer limited to established facts, the element of 'surprise' about the proposition is always present in a.pa. 83

It is within this general framework that eVeav a.pa must be discussed. Two preliminary remarks are in order. Firstly, Denniston (37-8) observes that "lipa in a conditional protasis [...] is almost confined to prose". In fact, in my corpus only 23 (15 in Homer, 8 in Aristophanes) out of the 224 examples studied (i.e. 10%) are found in poetry. The other examples are found in Herodotus (16), Lysias (2), Plato (148) and Thucydides (35). 84 Secondly, in some eVeav &pa-clauses a.pa has the whole of subordinate and main clause in its scope, not just the proposition uttered in the conditional clause. This is notably the case when an ei/eav &pa-period constitutes a new step in the argumentation (which logically follows from the previous step). Usually inferences or conclusions are concerned. With lipa the speaker expresses his surprise with regard to the inference or conclusion which he apparently cannot but draw on the basis of the preceding argumentation, cf. (64) - O'tOU 'tt; a.pa 6eivo; (p'\)MX~, 'tOU'tOU ical (prop 6eiv6; ., -

£0\1C£V

- ei a.pa

o6{icato; apyuptov 6eivo; (pUAtouc; 6ei ('well, if the Thebans are defeated in war, as they should be') is contrasted with av 6' &veve-y1ecoow lip' oi 0rtPaiot 1eal aco0&aiv ('but if the Thebans - surprisingly - recover and are saved').92 Whereas the use of apa in ei-clauses in direct and indirect speech seems always to be connected with the speaker's interest, e.g. surprise, the use of a.pa in present and past descriptions is more difficult to account for, cf. (70) nv 6' apa 'tO'U Kat 1t£lP'f mpaA.&atv, µE8a aui:ooc; i\ 00tpCllC'tooc; Jw bp{EVtat cincoomµev ... KciUtcrtov mi lpyov itµiv l;uµJnloetai, Kal O'UK civu.mmov i!µoiye ('and if swprisingly we either overpower them or drive them off baffled in their designs, it will prove the most glorious of achievements for us and one which I at least do not despair of, Th. 6.33.4). "Apa clearly marlcs a pleasant swprise. which raises the question of how this swprise can be compatible with OUK civu.niO"tov eµoiye and with the value of the futural subjunctive. My explanation is that in using Ii.pa the speaker includes himself for a while in the group referred to as 'we', who (cf. the preceding context) do not expect a positive outcome, unlike the speaker himself (cf. i!µoiye, which, due to the use of ye, implies contrast to others).

MODAL PARTICLES

349

it, they consider it little in comparison with future plans.] 'If unexpectedly they actually fail in a trial, they form new hopes instead and thus make up the loss', Th. 1.70.7)93

It is the narrator who provides the description. As noted in ch. 4.7, it is a characteristic of £aVT\ OOO'a ('the use thereof does not seem important to me, if indeed there is any use at all, for in our previous argument it was nowhere to be found', Pl. Grg. 481b3-5) These examples have a highly sceptical tone, as the speaker himself shows in (83) by the addition of the ~-constituent. A11 draws special attention to a view about which the speaker has strong doubts. This doubt might be rendered by 'if really', 'if indeed'. To return to my starting point, firstly, ye and 611 are, in my opinion, not interchangeable (cf. esp. (78)), and, secondly, a.pa and 611 are not really equivalent, despite the fact that they show some resemblance in that they both present the proposition as 'interesting'. In Classical Greek this rough, rather vague value has developed into different directions. "Apa means 'surprisingly' mainly in the sense of 'unexpectedly', 'unwished for'; it is frequently found with the indicative and (futural) subjunctive (cf. n.91); 611, however, is preferably found in indicative ei-clauses, often with a sceptical value 'if indeed', 'if really'. Thus, both particles tend to be used in different contexts. This applies in particular to Homeric Greek, where, as argued above, a.pa is mainly used with established facts. There are, however, three examples in which both particles occur and where cxpa is not connected with an established fact. One of these is: 107. Mtv may be explained as µEV-solitarium (Denniston 380). Since Zeus does not really believe Hera's promise and expresses this by the use of the optative, the alternative (e.g. 'but if you don't, something terrible will happen') remains implicit 108. The other examples are: E. HF 41, Heracl. 592, Or. 17, 744; Hdt. 4.32; Pl. Ap. 20e7. Occasionally, &ti is used in this sense in propositional conditionals, cf. Hdt 5.32.

MODAL PARTICLES

357

p' £'tEOV "{E ical a'tpE1CE~ ayopeuEtc; (but if really what you say is true and you speak truthfully', ll. 15.53)109

(84) a.U' Ei &,

Here both&, p' and e-tE6v "fE (which, given the word order, must be connected with ayopeuE~) signal that Zeus has strong doubts about Hera's sincerity: 'if really unexpectedly'. Summary The general value of Mt may be described as 'drawing special attention to the (interesting) proposition presented. Accordingly, in an Ei-clause it draws special attention to the embedded proposition. Of course, a speaker may draw this attention for several reasons. Both in Homer and in post-Homeric Greek &, is preferably placed in resumptive, indicative Ei-clauses with a 'sceptical' value, where it marks the speaker's disbelief or scepticism about the truth of the proposition in question. It is this use of Ei &, that seems to have led to the unjustified opinion that £i &, means 'if really', 'if indeed'. Other nuances, too, may, however, be expressed. Lift may, for instance, signal that the speaker thinks the conditional proposition important (cf. (77-8)) or that he is indignant about it (cf. (76)), in which case Dutch 'als notabene' seems nearer to the value of Ei &, than 'als werkelijk' /'if really'. 7.3.3 Et (... ) 1tOU As far as 1tou is dealt with in the literature 110 it is described in a fairly uniform and satisfactory way. For this reason I will not deal with 1tou in detail, but will merely discuss some cases of Et 1tou by way of illustration. Ilou (in Homer also 1to8t) is originally an indefinite pronominal adverb meaning 'somewhere', from which value it has developed the value 'I think/suppose', 'perhaps', 'perchance', "conveying", as Denniston (490-1) says, "a feeling of uncertainty in the speaker." Using FG-terminology, one may say that 1tou is

109. Cf. 11. 14.337, 15.724. Note that the use of p' may also have to do with the metre: it is a means of avoiding an hiatus when the next word starts with a vowel. Cf. Ruijgb (1990: 2223). 110. Cf. Denniston (490-5); Humbert (434); Ebeling s.v.; LSJ s.v.; Sicking (1986: 132-3, 137); Sicking & Van Opbuijsen (1993: 57-61).

358

THE FUNCTION OF PARTICLES IN Bl-CLAUSES

originally a predicational satellite,111 specifying the place of occurrence of the SoA, but that it came to function as a propositional satellite as well, specifying the speaker's attitude towards the proposition presented. In using 1tou the speaker indicates that he is not sure whether or not the proposition is true {'perhaps', 'I think'), e.g. (85) el1ttoiat ... ('they said, I think, among themselves', Hdt 5.1.3) Quite often, however, the speaker only feigns doubt, being, in fact, quite sure of his ground; in this way an ironic nuance is conveyed, as in (86)

ic&.icei tov "At6T1v ov µ6vov aiPet 8e&v, aitouµEVTI 1tou teu~etat to µTl 8aveiv ('and there by praying to Hades, the only god whom she worships, she will perhaps succeed in escaping death', S. Ant. 777-8)

Kreon is speaking here. He has just said that Antigone must be buried alive in a cave in the rock. In using 1tou in (86) ~on marks the savagely ironical (or perhaps even the heavily sarcastic) nuance of his assertion: Hades, to whom the Greek did not normally pray, would be the last god who could be expected to rescue anyone from death. By far most examples of attitudinal 1tou occur in assertions (like those above), which is not surprising for it is especially in making an assertion that speakers want to specify their attitude towards its propositional content. Not infrequently, however, 1tou is also found in conditionals. As I have argued earlier, the element of 'uncertainty' is inherent in if-clauses, which indicate so-called disjunctive situations. 112 As such there is a natural affinity between 1tou 111. The same can be said about the pronominal adverb 1tO'tE, which specifies the time of occurrence of the SoA ('ever'). As such it regularly occurs in conditional clauses, e.g. Ar. Eq. 579 ('ever' i.e. in the future) and Ar. Ra. 242 ('ever' in the past). The other pronominal adverbs, noi ('to somewhere'), iro8EV ('from some place or other'), m.i ('by/to some way', 'in some way') and moc; ('somehow'), could be characterized in FG as predicate satellites, since they specify additional features of the SoA, namely direction, source, path and manner, respectively. All these categories are said to belong to the predicate level, cf.Diket al. (1990: 30-2). As such they may also occur in conditional clauses, e.g. Th. 1.53.2 (noi); E. Or. 1173 (1to8EV); Lys. 28.14 (ffl,1); E. Hipp. 871 (1tmc;}. 112. It is worth noticing that noo is also often found in indirect questions introduced by El (e.g. Ar. Av. 47-8) and in £av-clauses meaning 'in the hope that' (e.g. fl. 16.39). Both clause types, just like conditionals, inherently indicate disjunctive situations (cf. further ch. 8).

MODAL PARTICLES

359

'perhaps' and conditional clauses. Usually, xoo in a conditional clause expresses the speaker's doubt in a neutral way, without further overtones, cf. (87) OUIC aveu 6-fiµoo ta6e I xpal;atµ' av ... µTl 1ea{ 7CO't£ I £t1t'{l A£~, ei xou tt µTl toiov cixoi, I ('I cannot do this without my people, in order that never, if perhaps such a thing (i.e. here: a good judgement) should not befall us, my citizens say A. Supp. 399-401) 11

11

•••

11

•••

11

',

Sometimes xot> in a conditional clause has an ironical nuance (cf. (86) above), as in: (88)

1ea{ µ' otov eaaate xev9et ).uypq, teipea9', ei µ11 7COU 'tt 7tCX't'JlP eµo~ ... 6uaµevecov lCCXlC' epel;ev ... 'Axaiou~ ([Telemachos to the suitors:] 'leave me alone to pine away in my bitter grief, 1.J11less perhaps my father did in malice some harm to the Achae. ans' [sc. for which you take your revenge on me], Od. 2.70-2)

Telemachos knows for certain that Odysseus has done no harm at all. Ilot> in conditionals is not always an attitudinal particle. It is also used as a local adverb ('somewhere'), and thus as a predicational satellite. This use is mainly restricted to the idiomatic expression ei(xep) xoo (aUo9t) 'if anywhere (else)', for which see also ch. 7.2.2, cf. (89) 'flV 6e 7tO'U 6£t7tVi\t£, xp11yoperova~ i>µiv xeµ'ljfoµev ('if you're dining out somewhere, we'll send you each a crop', Ar. Av. 1113)

(90) ).dxe-tat 6Tt £V 'tO~ tot0ia6e, £l7t£p 7t0'\) aUo9t, 't0 'tOlOU'tOV yevea9at ('it remains, then, that in such cases, if anywhere else, that sort of thing happens', Pl. Tht. 192c6) Sometimes xot> is ambiguous, e.g. (91) ei xoo 1eat' ot1e6v µot KAt>taiµv11mpa, 1CM£t ('if perhaps Clytaemnestra is in the house for me, 113 call her' or 'if she is somewhere in the house for me, ...', S. El. 1473) In ei (...) xot>-clauses all moods are found except the counterfactual indicative,

perhaps because the semantic value of the counterfactual conditional 'if p had 113. For (the difficulty of translating) µoi see Jebb ad /oc.

360

THE FUNCTION OF PARTICLES IN BI-CI.AUSES

been realiud - but it is no longer possible' leaves little or no room for the speaker to use 1tou to express his uncertainty with regard to the truth of the proposition (and the realization of the SoA in question). All in all, then, 1tou in its function as attitudinal modifier has the same value in conditional clauses as elsewhere. It signals the speaker's attitude (i.e. his uncertainty) towards the truth of the proposition presented. It thus has the same function as attitudinal adverbs meaning 'perhaps': ia~. -caxa, 1t0Ua.1ei~. µft1eo-ce (later Greek). Of these, only 1e0Ua.1ei~114 is found in conditional clauses, twice in Ar. (Eccl. 791, 1105), and seven times in Plato (always combined with apa,115 cf. n.98 above). As to the use of the moods in clauses with these expressions, the same may be observed as in the case of 1tou: all moods are found except the counterfactual indicative. 7.3.4 Et "COt

The last attitudinal particle to be discussed is -cot. As in the case of 1tou, its discussion in the literature (as far as it is discussed at all) is fairly uniform and satisfactory,116 for which reason I will be very brief about it. It is very plausible that the particle -cot finds its origin in the (ethical) dative of the personal pronoun au: 'I tell you', 'you know'. Note that in Ionic -cot is still used as the enclitic variant of ao{, whereas in Attic -cot always functions as a particle. It is preferably used in dialogue. In using -cot a speaker makes a strong appeal to the addressee to pay attention, often with the suggestion that the proposition in question concerns the addressee personally, e.g. as a threat or provocation (cf. (92)-(93)).117 As the following examples show, -cot is found both in conditionals (93) and in other constructions (92): (92) au "COt -cax' ... I eµft "C0V iov ou6ev ex8poiatv jnpuv

114. In S. Tr. 666 ta:x;a is, in my opinion, used in its temporal sense 'soon'. 115. A difficult case is i,)J..,' noUani; f{acoi; 1Cal] ~EA.tlOV tauta tauta 6iaG1C07tC0µ£8a, miia&ficn.t ('but if we examine these same things better, you will believe me', Pl. Grg. 513c8dl). The problem is twofold: 1) the position of iacoi;. Editors usually delete iacoi; 1Cal, regarding noUani;: does it mean if often or if perhaps. it as a gloss on noUa!Cii;. 2) the meaning of The meaning if often/many times certainly makes sense; moreover in the other cases of i/ perhaps noUani; is always accompanied by lxpa. 116. Cf. Denniston (537); Ruijgb (197-8); LSJ s.v.; Sicking & Van Ophuijsen (1993: 64). 117. Cf. Denniston (537-555); Humbert (440-1); Sicking (1986: 133).

eav

eav

MODAL PARTICLES

361

('you, I tell you, will soon spew your venom without harming your enemies', A. Eu. 729-30) (93) TlV yap 'tO\ ec; f3aatA£a &vevetx&n 't(X £1t£a 'tauta, &1tof3aUe1c; 'ttlV 1C£(p(XAT}V ('for if, I tell you, those words are reported to the king, you will lose your head', Hdt 8.65.5) 118 The desire to catch the addressee's attention may, however, have many reasons, and consequently tot may express quite a number of nuances, depending on the context Thus, in (94), it enhances the promise and in (95) the request. In (96) it underlines Kreon's protesting rejoinder to Antigone's claim. 119 In (97), finally, it underlines the assenting character or the reply. Note that usually tot is directed to one addressee, but sometimes it may be directed to more than one person ('I tell you' - plural), cf. (97).

6£ 'tO\ ATtq,9u te icat µ11, ..., OUK fo9' 01troc; O'lfil au 6eup' £A.96vta µe ('but most of all, may she be found; but whether - I can assure you she is caught or not, in no way you will see me come hither', S. Ant.

(94) a'AA' eupe8e{11 µ£V µoiµt ica\ ~dvia, el'. µoi &ht or as a contamination of lScpp' au'tov 'te Uiotµt ica{ µot ~dvta &{11 and lScppa 't' ui>'tov l'.&tµt icat el'. µot ~dvia &{11. (Another - in my opinion less attractive - solution would be to consider both ui>'tov and el µot ~dvta 00{11 objects of t&iµi. Such a varietas, however, strikes me as llllHomeric). Cf. also Pl. Lg. 900b4 (eav-clause on a par with a l'.va-clause); X. An. 7.1.31 (i\vclause on a par with a future participle with purpose value).

BJ/BAN-Cl.A.USES WITH 'PURPOSE' VALUE

373

Furthermore, both cataphoric pronouns and prepositional phrases meaning 'therefore' and preparing the purpose clause are found in the main clauses of both types, cf. (16) and (17) (16) 'tOUV£1Ca yap 1eal 1tOV'tOV £1t~, oq,pa 1t'U&rta1 1ta'tp6c; ('for therefore you sailed over the sea, in order that you might ask about your father', Od. 3.15-6) (17) 't0UV£1Ca vt>v 'tel youva8' i1eavoµa1, ai IC' e8u:na8a ... evta1teiv ('therefore I have come to your knees now, in the hope that you may be willing to tell ... ', Od. 3.92-3)14

aa

A further argument against the correctness of a translation by 'to see whether' is the following. 'To see whether' is more neutral than 'in the hope that', which explicitly has purpose value and conveys the idea that the subject of the main clause has a positive attitude as to the realization of the SoA designated by the subordinate clause. If eav-clauses had the meaning 'to see whether', one might expect that they could designate a SoA the realization of which is not hoped for (e.g. 'let us fight, to see whether the enemy will conquer us'). There are, however, no examples of such a use of eav-clauses. 15 A final argument in favour of assuming a resemblance between eav and pure purpose clauses is the fact - already mentioned - that in both clause types the SoAs of the main clauses are controlled. If the above analysis is correct, the question that arises is, of course, what difference there is between eVeav and all other purpose subordinators. The most important difference seems to be the following. Although the realization

of a purpose is inherently uncertain, in pure purpose clauses it is presented as unproblematic, i.e. the question as to whether the purpose will be realized or not does not arise. This lack of doubt may be due to the fact that the person whose purpose is stated has the power to realize it, 16 as in:

14. Another interpretation might be that touv£1Ca refers to the preceding context. 15. The only example in which realization of the SoA in question is not hoped for in its entirety is yAa\lnoow 6' i8u; cpfpttai µfve1., i\v ttva nfcpY'{I I av6p(l)V, i\ ai>t~ cp8£ttat (with glaring eyes he rushes straight on in his fury, whether he slay some man or he himself is slain', II. 20.172-3). Of course, only the first member of the disjunction is hoped for. It is the only disjunction found in this type of eUtciv-clause. 16. For similar observations concerning on~ see Amigues (1977: 163-71).

374

0rHER USAGES OF EI

(18) aU' &ye 6eup', '08uaeu, iva

'tO\ ,cap ~eivia Oeico ('come here, Odysseus, in order that I may give you gifts', Od. 9.517)

Elsewhere, the aim may, normally speaking, be expected to be attained, because, for instance, a more important person gives an order to a subordinate person or a god performs an action with respect to a human being, cf. (19)

opa', 'AalCATt1Cl~ 8efr1 ... -cq, Kev -cot Kcxl Kei0t 0eq, ~ euxE'Coq>µTIV ('May Zeus now bring to pass it in that way; then I would there too pray to you as to a god', Od. 15.180-1) (48) ~ 611 µiv aq, EV xpot 1t&.v x:oµiacxto. x:cx{ Kev EACXOYto'to has been created by analogy with yevoito 'tO\YtO.

I must confess that I have my doubts about the validity of this argument If one discusses unrealizable wishes with a secondary indicative this means that one is dealing with a later stage of the language than Homer. At that stage there may have been other reasons for the existence or non-existence of certain constructions. In this case, for instance, it is, I think, quite understandable that eyeveto touto is never used as a wish: it would bring about confusion with the regular use of the secondary indicative (whereas in the case of the optative this ambiguity does not arise). 3. Conditional protases clearly also often have the nuance of a wish (Tabachovitz 40-2, 113-38). Thus, if the apodosis is omitted, it is only the wish that remains. 64 Although their explanation has some weak points, I think the adherents of the second theory are basically right. On a synchronic level wishes introduced by ei (yap) etc. can very well be considered conditional clauses without an da wllre ... Sic ist abet nicht da'; cf. for French P. Robert, Dictionnaire alphabitique & analogique de la langue franfaise ('Le petit Robert'). Paris 1978: S.N.L., page 1811 sub verb. si B4V: 'Si seulement je pouvais dormir'. - According to Ruijgh (294), a supporter of the first theory, the view that such wishes may be considered conditionals without apodosis only applies at the moment that conditional periods are fully established (after they developed out of wishes). 62. Simple d with indicative II does not occur in this sense (Goodwin 295). 63. Goodwin (379), Tabacbovitz (10).

64. Of course, non-optative conditional clauses may also refer to SoAs whose realil.lltion, we must assume, is wished for by the speaker, e.g. wtotdooµev, at IC£ 7to8i ZEu; I 6ij,cn 7tOAW Tpo{11v •.• E~UA.a7ta.~m ('we will make atonement if ever Zeus grants us to desttoy the city of Troy', fl. 1.128-9). There are a few examples of d with other moods where the apodosis is omitted, e.g. all' d µev 00>0ouoi yepa; ('Nay, if they give me a prire', fl. 1.135). Here we cannot, of course, take the el-clause as an independent wish. Rather, the omission of the apodosis suggests that Agamemnon is getting more and more angry while be speaks and hastily proceeds to the second alternative d 6e ICE µit Moxnv ('but if they give it not', fl. 1.137), which be considers more likely. Cf. the contrast between d with future indicative and d ... ICE with subjunctive, as discussed in ch. 4 (notably (133)).

396

OfHER USAGES OF El

apodosis. I fail to see why the situation should originally have been different The hypothesis that conditionals developed out of wishes has a very insecure foundation; it rests, moreover, on an evolutionary hypothesis about the development of language in general which is highly debatable, as the assumption that parataxis preceded hypotaxis cannot be proven. 8.4.2 The origin of other ei-clauses

The origin of the other (non-conditional) uses of ei has received far less attention in the literature than the origin of conditional ei and its relationship with ei-wishes. The scanty remarks that have been made concern the following constructions. EVeav- 'in the hope that' As regards the origin of eVeav- 'in the hope that' I have already discussed at some length its possible (diachronic) relationship with conditional clauses (ch. 8.1). 'In the hope that'-clauses possibly developed from elliptical conditionals (cf. the ideas of Goodwin and Stahl). Others (KG, Tabachovitz, SD) argue that 'in the hope that' -clauses developed out of indirect questions with an elliptical 'to see/try whether' (cf. ch. 8.1 with n.8). As stated before, it seems entirely ad hoc to assume such an ellipsis. Moreover, how are we to explain the exclusive use of the subjunctive with av and the optative (in the case of a past main clause) in 'in the hope that' -clauses, if these clauses developed from indirect questions which (cf. ch. 8.2) may contain all moods and tenses used in direct questions? Indirect questions introduced by ei Since in many unrelated languages (cf. Haiman 1986: 215; Traugott 1985: 291, 294-5) conditional markers and interrogative markers (especially markers of interrogative complements of verbs like know) appear to be the same, a close relationship between the two clause-types is often assumed. The following explanations have been offered to account for the fact that the same markers in both clause types. 1. Conditionals are assumed to be 'given' (cf. ch. 3.2), i.e. they are assumed to provide information whose validity is - at least provisionally - agreed upon by all parties partaking in the discussion. To reach this agreement it is also possible to ask for assent from the addressee by means of a question. Conditionals are thus assumed (e.g. by Haiman 1986: 215; Traugott 1985: 294)

DIACHRONIC RELATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT USAGES OF BI

397

to be equivalent to questions with an implicit positive answer, cf. the following sequences of sentences which seem to have roughly the same meaning: (50a) A. Is he coming (?) (B. Yes) A. Well, then, I'll stay (50b) A. Is he coming(?), then I'll stay (50c) A. If he is coming, well, then, I'll stay It may be objected, however, that questions with an implied positive answer are 'marked' questions. Usually the speaker does not know the answer in advance. In questions that are interchangeable with conditionals the information, unlike in normal questions, must be contextually given, cf. (51a) B. He is coming. A. Is he coming? In that case, I'll stay (51b) B. He is coming. A. If he is coming, then I'll stay Because of the special character of the direct questions that can replace conditionals it seems to me unlikely that this near-equivalence may explain the origin of ei as a marker of indirect questions. 2. It is often said that interrogative ei is derived from conditional ei on the basis of ambiguous sentences like (52)

ciU' aye µot 't68e eixe 1Cat CX'tp81C£