Concealed Chains : Labour Exploitation and Chinese Migrants in Europe [1 ed.] 9789221219941, 9789221219934

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CONCEALED CHAINS Labour exploitation and Chinese migrants in Europe

CONCEALED CHAINS Labour exploitation and Chinese migrants in Europe

Edited by Gao Yun

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE • GENEVA

Copyright © International Labour Organization 2010 Cover illustration: © Gill Button - Cover photos: © Ronald Bedard - © Ooyoo - © Archana Bhartia © Grafissimo First published 2010

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Gao, Yun (ed.) Concealed chains: Labour exploitation and Chinese migrants in Europe Geneva, International Labour Office, 2010 ISBN: 978-92-2-121993-4 forced labour / trafficking in persons / irregular migrant / migrant worker / Chinese / China / EU countries / France / Italy / UK 13.01.2 ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data

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SCR/GEN

PREFACE

There has been growing international concern that, unless adequate safeguards are taken, in a context of globalization, migrant workers can be subject to trafficking for labour exploitation and to forced labour in destination countries. One country that now places large numbers of its workers overseas, and to an increasing number of destination countries, is China. While many of its workers migrate through legal and regular channels, at least some of this movement is taking place through organized smuggling and trafficking syndicates. The stereotype is that of a criminal “snakehead”,1 the first link in the chain of an organized crime network, smuggling victims into a criminal Chinese underworld in a remote destination country where they work in slavery-like conditions in hidden sweatshops far removed from the rest of the national economy. The reality is far more complex. In recent years, in Europe and throughout the world, some of the most serious cases of human trafficking and smuggling have indeed involved Chinese criminal networks exploiting their own fellow citizens. In other cases, Chinese workers are able to leave their country through legal channels, albeit often paying high charges to a myriad of recruiting agents and intermediaries, and nevertheless still find themselves enduring harsh working conditions and severe indebtedness in the destination country. In yet other cases the Chinese migrant workers, particularly those in an irregular situation, can be part of the underclass of migrants in the destination country who do casual work in a range of dangerous and poorly paid jobs in agriculture, food processing, construction and other sectors, without forming part of a specifically Chinese “ethnic niche”.

1

Term used by migrants from Fujian to refer to people smugglers.

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Concealed chains

Are Chinese abroad particularly vulnerable to forced labour and trafficking, and, if so, why? When they work for long hours in difficult conditions that by most national standards would be tantamount to severe labour exploitation, by what criteria should this be judged? Should this be seen as consensual behaviour between the workers and their employers, because the workers can pay off their substantial debts only by enduring these conditions for a certain period of time? Or could this be seen as part of the trafficking for labour exploitation that many countries are now keen to prosecute and punish? Ten years ago, in 1998, the ILO adopted its Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which requires its member States to respect and promote core labour standards, including the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour. In 2001, the ILO established the Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL) as one of several measures taken to promote the 1998 Declaration. SAP-FL’s mandate is to raise global awareness on forced labour and trafficking, to press for changes in policy and laws in cooperation with governments and social partners, as well as to increase the knowledge base on the scope and forms of forced labour throughout the world. Since then, it has directed a lot of attention to the forced labour outcomes of human trafficking and irregular migration. Research studies have focused on the root causes of trafficking, recruitment mechanisms, demand factors and forms of exploitation in major economic sectors. Guidance manuals on forced labour and trafficking have also been prepared for labour inspectors, employers and the business community, the legal profession and others. The present research was undertaken as part of a cooperation programme between the ILO and the Government of China on forced labour and trafficking and the role of labour institutions in law enforcement and international cooperation in China. The four main objectives of this project were to: strengthen the law and policy framework on forced labour and trafficking for labour exploitation; address source areas of migration through the implementation of pilot programmes to prevent forced labour and trafficking; improve the transparency of the migration process and reduce the risk of potential migrants being trapped into forced labour and trafficking; and promote communication between the governments of China and destination countries to combat forced labour and trafficking for labour exploitation. Over a period of several years this project has involved a rich experience in China itself. Activities have included national and provincial seminars on trafficking, with participation by officials from a range of different government agencies; a successful pilot awareness-raising programme in the provinces of Fujian, Jilin and Zhejiang; the distribution of training materials for private employment agencies; extensive research on the recruitment mechanisms in source areas; and inputs to the five-year National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–12).

vi

Preface

The research studies in European countries have proved to be an invaluable resource input to the activities in China, generating the necessary knowledge base for the awareness-raising and training activities to prevent trafficking. Since early 2007, the ILO and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have been jointly implementing a follow-up project, financed by the European Union (EU), to promote cooperation between China and EU Member States to stem irregular migration and trafficking by building the capacity of government and local authorities to manage migration. Further studies are now being undertaken in other European countries to complement those in the present volume. We very much hope that this book will contribute to enhanced cooperation between China and Europe on this important subject and that it will also improve the general understanding of the patterns of labour exploitation that must now be firmly confronted in European and other labour markets. Roger Plant Head, Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL) International Labour Office, Geneva

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii About the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Introduction (Gao) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Focus of research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Structure and methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Overview of content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Migration costs and debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 The journey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Vulnerability in destination countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Working conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Amnesties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Exploitation as abuse of vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The international legal framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Forced labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Human trafficking and smuggling of migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1. An overview of the migration mechanism between China and Europe (Li Minghuan) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The re-emergence of the brokerage market: A historical review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . From snakehead to tail: The emigration brokerage hierarchy . . . . . A highly profitable business: Debt and repayment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Playing edge ball: Operating between regular and irregular approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19 19 20 23 27 31

2. Exploitation of Chinese immigrants’ vulnerabilities in France (Gao and Poisson) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

ix

Concealed chains

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The legal and policy framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Human trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forced labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Illegal labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conditions of departure: The main triggers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The socio-economic situation in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main source areas of migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The journey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arranging and financing the journey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Profile and typology of people smugglers/traffickers . . . . . . . . . . Risks and logistics of the clandestine journey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The vulnerability of Chinese immigrants in the destination country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The burden of debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Violence and racketeering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Integration into the economy of the diaspora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Concentration in certain economic sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The ethnic Chinese niche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bringing workers into France legally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Working conditions by sector of activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Legislation, policies and enforcement challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Immigration policy and legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The criminalization of human trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Measures to combat organized crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Efforts to combat employers using illegal labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Labour Inspectorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Training individuals to prevent forced labour and trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Compensation for victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Targeted sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opening up the ethnic niche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Broadening access to legal work opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Training Chinese entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An information campaign to prevent illegal emigration . . . . . . . . 3. Exploitation of Chinese immigrants in Italy (Ceccagno, Rastrelli and Salvati) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The legal and policy framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

34 36 37 37 38 39 39 40 43 43 45 46 50 51 51 56 57 58 59 59 61 70 70 74 75 76 78 80 82 84 84 85 86 86 87 88 89 89 90 91

Table of contents

Regulating migration flowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 The fight against trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Immigration and public opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Understanding the irregular aspects of Chinese migration . . . . . . . 98 Legal investigations into trafficking and smuggling . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Smuggling as a service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Illegal activities and risks of the journey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 The evolution of Chinese immigrants’ activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Manufacturing activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Commercial activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Working arrangements in the Chinese ethnic niche . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Chinese workshops and pronto moda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 The organization of work in ethnic workshops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 The effect of regional origins on opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Flexibility: The compression of personal and family life . . . . . . . 115 Competition and conflict management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Exclusion of zagong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 The adverse effects of amnesties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Irregular workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 The costs of legalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Amnesties and irregularities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Links with local society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 Irregularities, self-exploitation and forced labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Irregularities in Chinese workshops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 The “Marco Polo” operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 The spectrum of labour practices and worker vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Between business and exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 The disconnection between the journey and the workplace . . . . . . 132 Conclusions and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Forced labour or “extreme flexibility” in an era of globalization? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 4. Migration journeys and working conditions of Chinese irregular immigrants in the United Kingdom (Pieke) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 The legal and policy framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Recent irregular Chinese immigration to the UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 Pattern of immigration and background in China . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 Methods of immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Trafficking, abuse and deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

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Sectoral demand for irregular Chinese labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 Insertion into the labour market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 Exploitation and working conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Media reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Conclusions and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 5. Conclusion (Gao) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Annex: Glossary of Chinese terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 List of tables Table 1 Chinese workers overseas, 2004–06 (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Table 2 Transnational brokerage fees, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Table 3 Chinese migrants region of origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Table 4 Debt incurred by Chinese migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Table 5 Permanent workers of Chinese nationality entering France by legal channels, 1990 and 1999 . . . . . . 60 Table 6 Convictions for assisting the legal entry or residence of a foreigner, France, 1997–2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Table 7 Residence permits granted to Chinese citizens, Italy, 1996–2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Table 8 Chinese operated businesses in Italy in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Table 9 Chinese manufacturing activities in selected Italian regions, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 Table 10 Chinese non-manufacturing activities in selected Italian regions, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 List of figures Figure 1 Principle centres of migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Figure 2 Nationalities of employers utilizing illegal labour in the textile and garment industry, France, 2002 . . . . . . 61 Figure 3 Nationalities of employers utilizing illegal labour in the hotel and restaurant industry, France, 2002 . . . . . . 67 Figure 4 Sectors employing illegal labour in France, 2002 . . . . . . . 77 Figure 5 Regional operation of Chinese-operated businesses, Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Figure 6 Distribution of selected media reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

xii

ABBREVIATIONS

ASLC

BBC DILTI

DPM DVD ECHR ECtHR EU GLA HM ILO IOM MIRE NGO OCRIEST

OCRTEH

Association franco-chinoise de soutien linguistique et culturel (Franco-Chinese Association for Linguistic and Cultural Support) British Broadcasting Corporation Délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le travail illégal (French Inter-Ministerial Delegation for the Prevention of Illegal Labour) Direction de la population et des migrations (French Population and Migration Department) Digital Video Disc European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights European Union Gangmasters Licensing Authority Her Majesty’s International Labour Organization International Organization for Migration Department in charge of migration within the Ministry of Labour Non-governmental organization Office central pour la répression de l’immigration irrégulière et de l’emploi d’étrangers sans titre (French Central Agency for the Suppression of Illegal Immigration and of the Employment of Foreigners without Permits) Office central pour la répression de la traite des êtres humains (French Central Agency for the Suppression of Human Trafficking)

xiii

Concealed chains

ODIHR OFPRA

OMI

OSCE SAP-FL SDSED

SSLEI UK

xiv

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (French Agency for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons) Office des migrations internationales (International Migration Agency in France), known since April 2009 as the Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration or OFII Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour Sous-Direction de la statistique, des études et de la documentation (Division for Statistics, Surveys and Documentation in France) Section spécialisée de lutte contre l’emploi illégal (special section for the prevention of illegal employment in France) United Kingdom

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

GAO Yun is Legal Officer of the Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour at the International Labour Office in Geneva. She received her LLM in International and European law from the University of Geneva, and LLB from the Political Science and Law University in China. Ms. Gao worked as a lawyer in China for five years before joining the ILO in 2004. She is the author of various publications related to ILO core labour standards, including the protection of Chinese migrant workers overseas. Véronique POISSON has a doctorate in social sciences from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (HESS, Paris) on contemporary Chinese migration. Her field work began in the 1990s, when she founded a Franco-Chinese association in a Chinese community in Paris. After obtaining a degree in Mandarin from INALCO (Paris) she collected over 10 years of ethnographic data from Chinese migrants in Paris and set up a project focusing on their integration. She also regularly visited the village of Zhejiang, a major source of Chinese migrants, to continue her field research. LI Minghuan is Professor of Sociology Department, Xiamen University, China, and works as a consultant to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of State Council, China. Prof. Li majored in Migration Studies at the Institute of Population Studies, School of Public Affairs, Xiamen University, and continued her graduate studies in universities in China and the Netherlands, receiving her Ph.D from the University of Amsterdam. She is the author of many articles and books. Recent publications include A fieldwork report of Fujian qiaoxiang [in Chinese] (Xiamen University Press, 2005), A history of Chinese immigrants in Europe [in Chinese] (Zhongguo Huaqiao Chubanshe, 2002) and We need two worlds: Chinese immigrant associations in a Western society (Amsterdam University Press, 1999).

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Antonella CECCAGNO is Associate Professor of Chinese Language and Culture at the University of Bologna, Italy, where she also teaches Modern Society of China. She was Director of Research at the Centre for Immigration Research and Services in Prato, Italy, until 2007. She has acted as a consultant on businesses operated by Chinese immigrants and on the formulation of immigration policies. Her recent publications include Shuobuchulai: La formulazione delle parole in cinese [Shuobuchulai: Word formation in Chinese] (Serendipità 2009, with Bianca Basciano) and Ombre cinesi? [Chinese shadows?] (Carocci, 2008). Renzo RASTRELLI is founder and Director of the Centre for Immigration Research and Services in Prato, Italy, and Professor of International Relations at the University of Florence, Italy. His research focuses mainly on deviancy, illegality and criminal activities of the Chinese in Italy. He advises Italian institutions active in crime prevention, namely the National Anti-Mafia Unit (DNA), the division of the Italian Carabinieri in charge of labour inspections, the Prato and Florence Financial Police, and Florence’s Anti-Mafia Investigation Department (DIA). His most recent publication, together with Antonella Ceccagno, is Ombre cinesi? [Chinese shadows?] (Carocci, 2008). Alessandra SALVATI worked as junior researcher at the Centre for Immigration Research and Services in Prato, Italy, from 2002 to 2007. She has authored a chapter on Italian legislation on migrants included in the book by Ceccagno and Rastrelli Ombre cinesi? [Chinese shadows?] (Carocci, 2008). She works with the Network Migration in Europe, the University of Venice and the Municipality of Prato on policies aiming at the integration of migrant students in state-owned schools. Frank PIEKE is University Lecturer in the Modern Politics and Society of China at the University of Oxford and Fellow of St Cross College. He is also the Director of Oxford’s China Centre and the new British InterUniversity China Centre. Between 2003 and 2006 he was adjunct Director of the ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), where he was also head of the research programme on sending contexts of migration. His recent publications include The good communist (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) and Transnational Chinese: Fujianese migrants in Europe (Stanford University Press, 2004, with Pál Nyíri, Mette Thunø and Antonella Ceccagno).

xvi

INTRODUCTION Gao Yun

As China’s booming economy has continued to record huge growth over the past two decades, the world’s attention has increasingly focused on protecting the labour rights of the Chinese workers who are creating and contributing to its economic power. Compared with China’s spectacular scale of development, economies boosted by the labour of expatriate Chinese may only account for a relatively minor place in the global market. The role and position of Chinese workers overseas in the global production chain also appears to be a subject neglected by the public and by labour rights researchers. In many countries little is known about the goods that are produced locally, but by Chinese workers. Even less is known about the working conditions under which these goods and services are produced and provided. Chinese migration is now becoming global in scale and is reaching an increasing range of destination countries. It is a complex and diverse process, involving many different types of migration and channels of recruitment. Some are recruited through organized group contractors, others migrate individually. In some cases the migration is lawful through officially recognized recruiters, in other cases it is irregular. As of 2005, China was the top migrant-sending country in the world, with an estimated diaspora of 35 million people (IOM, 2005). Certain countries, such as Israel and Jordan, are the new destination points for Chinese migrants. Others, such as Argentina and Panama, which have recorded a steady pattern of Chinese migration over the past century, are now experiencing a significant new influx of Chinese migrants. As table 1 shows, the majority of Chinese working abroad still remain concentrated in Asia (primarily Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore).

1

Concealed chains

Table 1 Chinese workers overseas, 2004–06 (%) Year

Asia

Africa

Europe

North America

South America

Oceania

Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan

2004

73

15

5

2

2005

78.6

6.9

6.5

3.8

0.7

3

1.3

1.3

0.6

2006

76

4.4

9.6

3.2

1.6

2.3

1.3

3.9

Source: Li Mingfu, forthcoming.

However, in recent years the number of Chinese working in Europe has grown faster than other areas. Although it is difficult to measure irregular migration, according to estimates published by the World Bank (Mansoor and Quillin, 2006), there were over 3 million undocumented migrants in the European Union2 as of 2004. Other statistics for slightly earlier periods suggest numbers between 2.6 and 6.4 million (Jandl, 2003). It has been estimated that around 1.9 million Chinese residents and workers and 134,000 irregular migrants were living in Europe in 2005.3 Many Chinese immigrants, especially those that are highly qualified, are quickly absorbed into the local labour market, integrated into the host society and recognized for their contribution to the development of destination countries. Others, working overseas on temporary contracts, will return home with their savings after perhaps two years of hard work in sectors with harsh working conditions, such as construction or domestic service. In addition to the registered Chinese workers, who enjoy a degree of social protection, there is a special category of clandestine Chinese migrants whose exact numbers are unknown and whose plight periodically makes the media headlines. These include the Chinese victims on the Golden Venture boat which was wrecked in New York in 1993, the 58 Chinese who suffocated in a lorry in Dover in 2000, the victims of the biggest human trafficking case ever to be prosecuted in the history of the United States, and the approximately 23 Chinese cockle pickers who drowned at Morecambe Bay in the United Kingdom in 2004. These tragedies bring to mind the trafficking of the Chinese “coolies” in the nineteenth century. At that time, hundreds of thousands of Chinese indentured workers were kidnapped or tricked into bondage to work in the sugar and cotton plantations in Cuba and Peru, if they survived journeys

2

These estimates are the result of combining estimates from the Pew Hispanic Center, IOM, ILO, the World Bank, the UK Home Office, and others. 3 Based on research conducted in 2006 by Dr Pierre Picquart and Dr Li Minghuan for Impact Assessment and Monitoring Mechanism for the EU – CHINA Tourism Agreement (ADS), a report to the European Commission (unpublished).

2

Introduction

of several months across the Pacific Ocean where as many as 14 per cent of their kinsmen died. Although today’s Chinese migrants make a choice to emigrate rather than being forced to depart, they can still end up in exploitative conditions, which in the severest cases amount to forced labour. In China itself, the Government has taken a range of measures to dissuade people from migrating through irregular channels. Passport formats have been changed no less than 11 times over the past two decades in an effort to combat the use of fraudulent passports in irregular migration. Nevertheless, people continue to leave. In 2004 alone China stopped around 6,000 people intending to leave China illegally and readmitted 25,241 irregular migrants returned by various countries.4 Serious research has been done in the United States to examine both the human trafficking and smuggling that occurs alongside the Chinese migration. Peter Kwong’s provocative and alarming book (Kwong, 1999) is one of the most important, as its pioneering research explores the labour dimension of modern Chinese migration. The author suggests that the problem of illegal immigration must be viewed and understood as a labour issue within the context of the underlying principle of supply and demand. Another in-depth study, carried out in the United States by Ko-Lin Chin (1999), describes a flourishing industry in which smugglers command exorbitant fees to move desperate but hopeful men and women around the world. The study employs several noteworthy research strategies, including a survey of 300 smuggled Chinese in New York City, interviews with key informants familiar with the lifestyle and social problems of illegal Chinese immigrants, a field study in the Chinese immigrant community of New York City, two research trips to sending communities in China, and a systematic collection of media reports. In comparison, few serious studies have been carried out on these subjects in Europe. From the small amount of existing literature, a striking similarity can be noted between the situation of Chinese migrants in the United States and in Europe. This similarity is no accident. There are a number of scattered indications that serious exploitation exists in the Chinese “silent communities” in Europe, which are seen as hard to penetrate and as having their own “mysterious” way of doing things in niches largely separate from the rest of the economy. In France, owners of Chinese restaurants and textile workshops have been brought before criminal courts for the serious exploitation of their compatriots in irregular situations.5 In Belgium, an organization designated by the Government to assist victims of human

4

From a speech note from the Chinese Ministry of Public Security on the National Workshop on the Labour Exploitation Outcome of Trafficking held in April 2005 in Beijing, organized by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the ILO. 5 Cour de Cassation, Chambre criminelle, Hu/Chang, Decision No. 97-85762; Cour de Cassation, Chambre criminelle, Touang, Decision No. 95-82746.

3

Concealed chains

smuggling and trafficking has regularly put migrants of Chinese origin at the top of their list of victims subject to economic exploitation.6 In the Netherlands, the 2007 and 2008 reports of the Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings point to the emergence of China as an important country of origin for victims of trafficking (Dettermeijer-Vermeulen et al., 2008). Much of the existing literature about Chinese migration is concerned with cultural issues or with the impenetrable criminality among Chinese migrants. The integration of the Chinese community into local society has been made a priority in some European countries or regions where Chinese migration is strongly concentrated. A significant number of the Chinese migrants targeted by such integration programmes were living and working clandestinely for years before their status was regularized and continue to remain in a situation of isolation even after their regularization. In these integration programmes, a certain amount of attention is given to employment issues, such as reducing the strong concentration of Chinese migrants in certain sectors and diversifying their access to employment opportunities in the local labour market, in order to better incorporate them into local society. The focus of these efforts is to promote intercultural exchange between Chinese migrants and local society, and to improve Chinese migrants’ understanding of the host society. The programmes sometimes include an anti-discrimination component aimed at eliminating discrimination against Chinese migrant workers in the labour market. Irregular migration from China remains a continuing concern for European countries. However, there is a dearth of information on the employment conditions of both regular and irregular Chinese migrant workers, especially the latter, who are hidden in the shadow of their illegal status. Questions arise as to how they come to Europe without legal travel documents and survive in a society completely unknown to them. What recruitment mechanisms help them find jobs? What price do they pay to stay employed? What are their employment conditions, compared with legal migrant workers and nationals?

FOCUS OF RESEARCH The studies contained in this book form one part of a broader ILO pilot programme of technical cooperation to help China tackle forced labour and

6

Annual reports (2000–07) of the Centre pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme (Centre for Equal Opportunity and Opposition to Racism).

4

Introduction

labour exploitation. China has collaborated with the ILO in preventing and combating different forms of forced labour and has indicated a need for more information and data on the transnational trafficking of Chinese migrant workers for labour and sexual exploitation. The studies are not criminal investigations and do not seek to replace or duplicate the role of relevant national competent institutions. Researchers were expected to provide a picture of the situations under which irregular, and occasionally regular, Chinese migrants are working, with a focus on identifying any form of labour exploitation. The book’s main objective is to improve the understanding of the social and economic aspects of this migration and work experience, as well as the legal and judicial ones, and to explore possible solutions through improved monitoring of labour markets by both China and the European destination countries. It is generally known that migrant workers are a group that is vulnerable to exploitation in a globalized labour market. These studies stress some of the particular characteristics common to Chinese immigrant workers in various destination countries. The studies note the significant increase and diversification of Chinese irregular migration over the last two decades and the existence of an “ethnic business” that has become an integral part of the national economy in destination countries. They address a number of questions: how is the migratory process organized and what are the risks to which migrants are exposed on the journey; what are their working conditions within the Chinese “ethnic economy” in destination countries; what economic forces influence these conditions; how are they affected by an individual migrant’s legal status; what forms, if any, does coercion take and what factors make some migrants, such as the zagong, more vulnerable than others to exploitative working conditions; and why do migrants remain in exploitative conditions?

STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY This book is structured primarily around four chapters, each written by different authors. In the first chapter Li Minghuan draws on her years of research to provide an overview of the migration mechanism between China and Europe, detailing the structures and social conditions that facilitate the departure of migrants from China. The three chapters that follow each examine the situation of irregular Chinese workers in a specific country. In Chapter 2, Gao Yun and Véronique Poisson look at France, providing substantial information about the migration journey. Italy is covered in Chapter 3 by Antonella Ceccagno, Renzo Rastrelli and Alessandra Salvati, who explore, among other subjects, the illegal aspects of irregular migration and discuss the implications of amnesties. Lastly, Franck N. Pieke looks at the United Kingdom in Chapter 4, focusing on the living and working conditions of migrant workers once they reach that country. Each of the three

5

Concealed chains

studies provides policy recommendations, which are discussed in the book’s final concluding chapter. Interviews with Chinese migrants in an irregular situation are one of the main sources of information for the case studies. A total of 94 migrants were interviewed between 2004 and 2006 for the case studies on France and the United Kingdom; the case study on Italy also incorporates interviews from earlier fieldwork. Finding immigrants willing to be interviewed and establishing relationships of trust was a challenge; aliases have been assigned to all interviewees cited in the text. In addition to individual case studies based on the interviews, the French and Italian studies make detailed reference to academic writing, official statistics and data, interviews with police and labour inspectors, the findings of police investigations and court proceedings. The methodology used in each case study is explained in greater detail in the relevant chapter.

OVERVIEW OF CONTENT While each of the studies details conditions that are particular to the context in each country, they also reveal many common themes and issues.

Migration costs and debt Chinese migrants pay a high price to emigrate; high brokerage fees are the foremost malpractice in the transnational movement of labour. Once the decision is taken to leave, potential emigrants need to find a specialized intermediary, either a tourist agency or professional smuggler, to help them leave their country. Brokerage fees vary greatly from region to region. In some well-known emigration regions of the Fujian and Zhejiang provinces Chinese pay up to US$70,000 (€57,400) to snakeheads. Although this is an astronomical amount for an ordinary breadwinner, up to 50 per cent of irregular migrants turn to snakeheads to facilitate their migration. The studies look at why migrants are willing to pay such high costs for these illegal migration “services”, how they fund their emigration and the subsequent implications of these migration costs on their choice of, or access to, employment. The overview chapter provided by Li Minghuan compares the brokerage fees paid by migrants in different regions for different destinations and seeks to give a rational explanation of the “repayment system”. The chapter examines how “a service among friends” has evolved into a “repayment system”, which has effectively become a kind of investment. It also examines how “the migration credit and loan system” functions and how the system, although not legally binding, is nonetheless powerful as it entails many social consequences. Bound by a set of unwritten rules adopted by traditional overseas Chinese communities, migrants are under pressure 6

Introduction

to earn money within the shortest period of time to repay not only their monetary debt, but also their “interpersonal” one. The migration costs become a debt as soon as the migration process begins. Migration to Europe is a one-way trip. Migrants have no way to return home, even if they regret their decision when suffering from harsh conditions en route. This dual obligation – monetary and moral – creates a situation of vulnerability likely to be exploited in whatever job they obtain upon arrival in Europe. There is little room to bargain with employers with regard to working conditions, wages, working time, safety and health, and other labour standards that should be respected. How heavy is the debt? Li Minghuan suggests that, although the recruitment fees vary from one country to another depending on the wage level in the potential local labour market, it takes on average two years for migrants to repay the recruitment fees. Gao and Poisson, however, note from the experience of one woman in France that debt repayment can take far longer. The woman’s relatives used smugglers to join her, resulting in a total debt of €57,000 for the entire family. After 13 years her status remained irregular and the debt was still not completely repaid. Wages are driven even lower by the saturation of certain sectors by the less qualified Chinese labour force.

The journey The studies examine the journey: methods and organization of travel, how the fee is calculated and paid, and the risks of abuse at the hands of intermediaries and rival snakeheads in transit countries. Gao and Poisson distinguish between safer and more dangerous journeys. The safest route is by direct flight, using documents – passports and tourist or business visas – which may be genuine or forged. In some regions, the majority of migrants arrive by air and with a visa. The more dangerous option is the indirect overland route, which often passes through a number of countries, lasts many months, and involves transport by train, car, motorbike, boat, raft, cart, walking and even swimming down a river or in the sea. Many factors are beyond the migrants’ control. The studies find that the risk of violence and abuse is highest when migrants are detained in safe houses along the way. Pieke notes that many Fujianese interviewees who had been smuggled by snakeheads reported extreme hardship and experienced danger while in transit, compounded by the fear of retaliation against family members back in China and occasional violence from the snakeheads. But here, too, the picture is complex. Conditions of travel, and the outcomes in terms of the working conditions upon arrival, are influenced not only by the route, but also by migrants’ regions of origin in China, their relationship to the organizers and whether they have a support network within the diaspora. Gao and Poisson point to different organizational relation7

Concealed chains

ships, ranging from smuggling by relatives and friends to transportation by criminal groups operating internationally. Organizers are involved in all stages of the smuggling and trafficking process. Sometimes the agreed fee is increased during travel and migrants may be held in detention en route until their debts have been paid. Ceccagno, Rastrelli and Salvati’s analysis of police investigations documents the activities of criminal groups, who often work side by side with traditional family networks but use violence, intimidation, kidnapping and ransom. In these situations, violence is particularly (but not exclusively) directed towards women and those without significant social relationships, such as those from China’s north-eastern provinces, which lack a migratory tradition or family networks in the destination country. Once in Italy, the connection between immigrants and trip organizers dissolves and immigrants have to find a way to insert themselves into the labour market.

Vulnerability in destination countries The studies emphasize the vulnerability of migrants in the destination countries and identify various elements contributing to the particular vulnerability of Chinese immigrants. Supported by both case studies and detailed data, the studies analyse the elements and factors that constitute the precariousness of Chinese irregular migrant workers, including language barriers, lack of information and assistance, lack of access to the legal system and isolation from the host society. Central to these are their irregular immigration status and the debt generated by the illegal migration process. It is clear that illegal entry typically involves criminal acts, including, in the case of snakeheads, violence against migrants who do not promptly pay their smuggling fees. But the connections between snakeheads, whether in China or overseas, and employers in the Chinese ethnic enclaves are complex, and there is little evidence to show that formal linkages exist between the organizers (whether smugglers or traffickers) and employers in destination countries. Pieke found that only a few interviewees had reported indebtedness to snakeheads who had subsequently organized jobs for them, which would then constitute a triangular employment relationship. More generally the situation is one in which Chinese employers simply take advantage of the vulnerability of their compatriots. Gao and Poisson found that practically all immigrants from Zhejiang were in debt. In exceptional cases, trafficked migrants who were unable to pay had to work for several years in the service of an employer who withheld their wages in order to transfer the money to the smuggler and thus pay back the travel expenses. In some instances, the debt repayment period ran from three to ten years, with monthly instalments based on a standard French wage, despite the fact that the actual wages earned by migrants are much lower. If an immigrant were to be sent back to China, where wages are much lower, it would 8

Introduction

take longer than a lifetime to pay the money back. As long as the status of Chinese immigrants remains illegal and this debt hangs over them, they can be trapped in forced labour.

Working conditions Sector by sector, the studies further explore the working conditions and extent of exploitation to which Chinese migrant workers are subject in a highly developed underground economy. This underground economy penetrates both formal sector activities, such as hotels and restaurants, and informal ones such as domestic services. Some sectors, such as construction, are labour-intensive industries where nationals are reluctant to be engaged because of hard working conditions and low wages. Other sectors, such as garment making and textiles, though largely outsourced, cannot avoid a certain amount of seasonal local production and therefore require a highly flexible labour force. Through expert interviews, the studies succeed in collecting evidence showing how this underground economy has become an inseparable part of the local economy in the host country and how it continues to absorb an ethnically uniform labour force. The studies show how labour practices in the Chinese ethnic niche are driven by their wider economic context. The textile and garment-making industry has responded to new global competition with a fundamental shift in employment patterns. Many enterprises have been relocated, and the surviving enterprises have had to apply highly flexible production methods in a sector where the key to successful competition is low labour costs and swift adaptation to consumer demand. This is the background against which ethnic niches have developed; these enterprises and workshops have their own operating rules, push down wages, and work against tight delivery deadlines in poor and unsafe conditions. The subcontracting system is also identified as a key factor underlying the exploitative conditions in Chinese garment-making workshops. Profit depends on the rapid response to market demands and new opportunities through the use of flexible work systems. This “flexibility” involves tight deadlines – ganhuo – to cut delivery times and the lengthening of working hours. Taking advantage of the abundant data accumulated from fieldwork over a period of several years, which provides a solid ground for the indepth analysis of the profile of migrant workers, their migration process and modalities, and especially their employment relationship with employers, Ceccagno, Rastrelli and Salvati focus on labour arrangements in the Chinese ethnic niche in Italy. This niche is not isolated in the economic sense, since it is well integrated into the local economy, either as subcontractors supplying Italian brands (including very well-known ones) or as pronto moda producers attracting mainly European clients. But this niche is isolated in the sense that working arrangements are made exclusively between the Chinese themselves. These arrangements involve a high degree of flexibility, 9

Concealed chains

which allows employers to obtain a hugely competitive position in the Italian market by circumventing local laws. Interestingly, the authors note that Chinese contractors, though employers themselves vis-à-vis their downstream subcontractors, are also vulnerable to exploitation by their upstream contractors in a “race to the bottom” driven by intense competition. The production price is determined by the degree of this competition, rather than by a calculation of labour costs with due respect for labour standards. The authors argue, however, that the relationship between employers and employees evolves from exploitation to dependence and finally to interdependence. The authors observe a common shared willingness and consent from workers to accept any working arrangements whatsoever from employers: 20 hours a day, wages below the minimum, obligations to pay back the debt resulting from smuggling services, a compressed family life, child labour, and long night shifts. Costs are cut by low rates of pay, the transfer of tax and social security payments from employer to worker, and disrespect for labour entitlements, such as sickness or maternity leave, or even rest breaks. In comparing the conditions of Chinese working for British or other non-Chinese employers in the United Kingdom (UK), Pieke finds a slightly different situation. While Chinese still experience harsh and unsafe working conditions, none reported physical violence from Chinese employers and rarely were their wages left unpaid. In contrast, Chinese working for British or other non-Chinese employers or gangmasters quite frequently feared verbal or physical abuse, general ill treatment, non-payment of wages and arbitrary deductions of fees. Through long hours and unsafe and unhealthy working conditions, these operations can exact a high cost on workers’ health, safety and family life. Ceccagno, Rastrelli and Salvati describe this effect on the personal lives of workers as the creation of a “vacuum” around work to exclude anything that hinders production and reduce all aspects of personal and family life to bare essentials. The lack of separate housing and social welfare benefits correlate with a high use by Chinese women of pregnancy termination services in Italy. Children do not stay with their parents, but are sent to and left with relatives in China, and women risk expulsion from the workshop and their accommodation when they become pregnant or when the child is born. Gao and Poisson describe the “Sentier system” in the garment trade in France, in which the agreement is made by a donneur d’ordre (placer of orders), with the façonnier (the workshop boss). The system uses an extremely flexible labour force, which can work up to 20 hours a day in order to produce goods within a very short time. It is related almost exclusively to women’s fashion, which requires a rapid response as soon as a model attracts a buyer. Prices are imposed by the donneur d’ordre on the façonnier. The façonnier then organizes production and manages the labour, using foreigners who are employed without proper employment procedures. The

10

Introduction

donneur d’ordre pays up only when the work carried out by a subcontractor has been performed. A manufacturer can place an “urgent” order on a Friday evening and 2,000 items of clothing will be ready for the following Monday. With its unlimited flexibility and unquestionable vulnerability, irregular status labour can meet the requirements of this system: an employee works 12 to 15 hours a day in an enclosed space, in artificial lighting, breathing in the dust of the fabrics, and earns on average €770 a month during the high season. The last link in this subcontracting chain is “home work”, where living and working accommodations are combined, often in poor, acutely crowded and unsanitary conditions. Not satisfied by the rather simplistic conclusion that Chinese workers are exploited by their compatriots in ethnic business, the authors extend their analysis to the employment relationship between different labour market actors. They examine how the situation of these vulnerable workers interacts with the demand of local labour markets, especially when local businesses, including world-renowned French brands, also have recourse to a production system in which the workers are hidden and exploited. Gao and Poisson analyse some of the reasons why efforts by the police and the labour inspectorate to prevent illegal work and enforce health and safety regulations are not more effective. They describe the strategies adopted by employers to avoid inspections and checks, including moving production into workers’ homes. As a consequence of the complex organization of a system of multiple subcontracts, which is sometimes made deliberately complicated by different layers of contractors to allow employers to avoid their labour responsibilities, law enforcement agents find it an impossible task to trace the genuine employers responsible for exploiting the most vulnerable group.

Amnesties Ceccagno, Rastrelli and Salvati’s analysis of the adverse effects of amnesties shows how migrants wishing to legalize their immigration status in the 1990s found themselves dependent on the sponsorship of employers, who exacted work by threatening to not support applications for legal status. Workers’ passports were confiscated by employers and workers paid the costs of their own regularization. Employers demanded payment in return for their assistance in the regularization process and kept employees’ national insurance contributions. In some instances, employees were asked to work for no salary and to remain in the job for prolonged periods, so their dependency continued even after they had regularized their status. Many employees who had obtained legal status but who still needed to maintain their working permit also accepted this situation, as the pay cheque that showed that they were in possession of a fixed-term contract was (and remained) their only guarantee that they would not lose their work permit. When employers use their power to squeeze both money and labour from these workers, 11

Concealed chains

especially when they require workers to work for free under the threat of terminating their contract, a situation of de facto debt bondage7 can very well occur. Using a combination of case studies and police records, Ceccagno, Rastrelli and Salvati emphasize the implications of national immigration policies. Some of the policies designed to increase transparency in the monitoring of migration flows are having the unintended effect of worsening the situation of migrant workers: criminal networks have emerged, managed predominantly by Italians, which specialize in providing illegal services and false papers for regularization.

Exploitation as abuse of vulnerability One question asked in these studies is why Chinese workers remain in exploitative conditions. Gao and Poisson’s case studies illustrate a range of situations involving forced labour, which include psychological as well as physical coercion. One interviewee worked first without pay, then a 19-hour day for low pay, was locked in the workshop, and allowed out once in 23 days to telephone his family. Others remained in abusive work because of their irregular immigration status, because of their fear of detection and deportation, because they could not speak French, and because of ill health and isolation. An Italian court found the existence of “psychological coercion” in a situation involving kidnapped migrants, based on the fact that they were thousands of miles from their home country, in places where foreign languages were spoken and where they could not make themselves understood; that they had paid for part of the trip and, if they escaped, would lose what they had already paid; and their fear of reprisals against family in China. Ceccagno, Rastrelli and Salvati show how newly arrived Chinese migrants saw integration in the ethnic niche as a means of protection in a foreign environment, but found themselves in a vulnerable situation inside that niche because they lacked legal status. At a time when few Chinese worked outside of the workshops run by fellow nationals, this meant losing both their jobs and their housing. With the passing of time and an increase in the numbers of Chinese working legally, these extreme conditions have become less frequent. The studies show that workers accept long working hours, low pay and bad conditions because they are not in a position to refuse, because this working arrangement is required by the market, and because these jobs are better than not having a job or having a job that delays the realization of 7

The United Nations 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery (Art. 1 (a)) defines debt bondage as “the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined”.

12

Introduction

their entrepreneurial dream. The argument is also made that exploitation and “self-exploitation” are sometimes accepted because both employers and employees see it as temporary and as a price to be paid for the end result of longer term economic gain. Fully recognizing the vulnerability of immigrants, the authors use diverse cultural, economic and social approaches to explain this willingness of workers to accept working conditions at variance with labour rights. Different viewpoints on this important issue are put forward by the authors of the studies. Ceccagno, Rastrelli and Salvati, writing from the perspective of northern Italy, emphasize what they see as a situation of “mutually advantageous” exploitation, in which migrants will accept an exploitative situation for a period of time because they consider that the end result will be a relative improvement for themselves or their dependants. Gao and Poisson, in contrast, have placed more emphasis on the coercive aspects of the relationship, as linked to the concept of abuse of vulnerability.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK The three countries that are the subject of this report are party to international instruments which represent a common legal framework to address forced labour in the context of irregular migration. This framework has two elements: the prohibition of forced labour through international labour standards and in international human rights law; and the more recent definition of human trafficking and smuggling as offences under international criminal law. Both should be implemented through national law.

Forced labour International labour standards – the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 129) and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) – prohibit forced and compulsory labour, which is defined as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under any penalty and for which the person has not offered himself voluntarily” (Art. 2(1)). ILO Members, regardless of whether they have ratified these Conventions, have nonetheless committed themselves to eliminating all forms of forced and compulsory labour, through the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. International human rights law prohibits forced labour. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides that “[n]o one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour”.8 The Convention protects

8

Art. 4(2). The same provision is found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 8).

13

Concealed chains

“everyone” – irrespective of immigration status – and is absolute, meaning that it contains no exceptions or derogations.9 More specific protection is contained in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which protects every person under the age of 18 “from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development” (Art. 32). The ILO has identified six component elements which may indicate a situation of forced labour; each is likely to be an offence under the criminal law of most countries. They are: the threat and/or application of physical or sexual violence; restriction of movement; debt bondage/bonded labour, where the worker works exclusively to pay off a debt to (or a loan from) the employer and is not paid for his or her services; withholding of wages or no payment at all; retention of passport and identity documents, so that the worker cannot leave, or prove his or her identity and status; and the threat of denunciation to the authorities, where the worker is in an irregular immigration status (ILO, 2005a). It has been rare for courts to be asked to decide whether a particular situation constituted forced labour. One recent case involved an irregular migrant, a teenage girl, who had been required to do domestic work for 15 hours a day over a prolonged period without pay. The European Court of Human Rights held that the fact of her unlawful presence and fear of arrest in France, which prevented her leaving her employers, led it to conclude that the work had been “exacted … under the menace of a penalty” for which she had not offered herself “voluntarily”. It was thus forced labour and in breach of the ECHR.10 Forced labour can exist within or beyond national boundaries, and the forced labourer can be a national or a foreigner. In the latter case, the person may be an irregular immigrant who has been trafficked or smuggled into another country and forced to work. In addition to being protected against forced labour, migrants in the three countries considered in the studies have rights under regional and international human rights law, which – with narrow exceptions – protects both citizens and non-citizens. In addition to their duties under this Convention, European states have undertaken to protect the human rights of all non-citizens under international agreements, which protect social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights generally, and give specific protection to women and children.11 The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary 9

Art. 15(2). Siliadin v. France, 73316/01 (2005), para. 118. 11 Including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention Against Torture; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 10

14

Introduction

Assembly has identified the minimum civil, political, economic and social rights to which irregular migrants are entitled.12 Moreover the ILO has important Conventions on the protection of migrant workers. Of the European countries covered by the case studies in the present volume, France, Italy and the United Kingdom have each ratified the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97); only Italy has ratified the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143). Although few European states have yet ratified the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, this does not affect their duty to protect migrant workers’ rights, since this Convention essentially mirrors rights that are also protected in those human rights treaties already binding these states. The Convention’s importance lies in the fact that it articulates these rights in ways which take into account the particular situation of migrant workers, including irregular migrant workers. It also provides a framework for state cooperation, including collaboration to prevent and eliminate illegal movements.

Human trafficking and smuggling of migrants Trafficking is a complex phenomenon, and it can be difficult to identify the exact conditions in which migrant workers, particularly those with an irregular status in the destination country, can become victims of human trafficking. In order to delineate trafficking, one has to examine how migrants have entered the host country, how they were smuggled or whether or not they consented to work in very difficult material and psychological conditions. The most important criterion to be used to distinguish trafficking and smuggling is the continuity of exploitation: the definition of trafficking in human beings contains a complete and continuous process consisting of “recruiting”, “transporting” and then “exploiting” persons. The 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime defines human trafficking and smuggling of migrants as international criminal offences. This is done through two Protocols: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (also known as the “Palermo Protocol” and referred to as the “Trafficking Protocol”), and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants (the “Smuggling Protocol”). France and the UK ratified the Protocols in 2002, as did Italy in 2006. China is not yet a Party to either Protocol.

12

Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe Resolution 1509 (2006), Human Rights of Irregular Migrants.

15

Concealed chains

The Trafficking Protocol defines the offence of trafficking as having three elements: the act, the means employed, and the purpose.13 Therefore, trafficking takes place when there is: 1.

recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons;

2.

the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person;

3.

a purpose of exploitation, which includes sexual exploitation and forced labour.

The consent of a victim of trafficking to exploitation is irrelevant where any of the listed means have been used. Where it involves a child, it is a punishable trafficking offence even in the absence of deception or any of the other listed elements. The Smuggling Protocol defines the offence of smuggling as procuring the illegal entry of a person into a state of which she or he is not a citizen or resident, for a financial or material benefit. Illegal entry involves crossing borders without complying with the requirements for legal entry into the receiving state. States are required to criminalize the use of fraudulent travel or identity documents for migrant smuggling, and to punish as “aggravating circumstances” actions which endanger migrants’ lives or safety, or entail their inhuman or degrading treatment, including for exploitation. The Protocol does not make migrants liable to prosecution because they have been smuggled.14 As EU members, France, Italy and the UK are also bound to apply the Protocols under European law. They are required to prohibit illegal immigration and to sanction smugglers, who are defined as “any person” who intentionally assists any one who is not a national of an EU Member State to enter, be in transit or reside there in breach of national immigration laws.15 They are also required to punish trafficking, and to develop the concept of abuse of vulnerability, which is contained in the Trafficking Protocol, to include situations where the victim “has no real or acceptable alternative” except to submit to the abuse.16

13

Trafficking Protocol Art. 3(a) and Art. 3(b). Smuggling Protocol Art. 3(a), Art. 5 and Art. 6. 15 EU Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence. 16 EU Council Directive Decision on combating trafficking in human beings (2002/629/JHA), Art. 1(c). 14

16

Introduction

“Abuse of vulnerability” was included in the Protocol as a means of coercion in recognition of the propensity of traffickers to coerce individuals into providing labour or services, including sexual services, even without resorting to direct physical abuse, threats or fraud. It is thus a broad concept (Malpani, 2006). The Council of Europe takes the view that it applies where there is: abuse of any situation in which the person involved has no real and acceptable alternative to submitting to the abuse. The vulnerability may be of any kind, whether physical or psychological, emotional, family related, social or economic. The situation might, for example, involve insecurity or illegality of the victim’s administrative status, economic dependence or fragile health. In short, the situation can be any state of hardship in which a human being is compelled to accept being exploited. Persons abusing such a situation flagrantly infringe human rights and violate human dignity and integrity, which no one can validly renounce. … A wide range of means therefore has to be contemplated … [including] abusing the economic insecurity or poverty of an adult hoping to better their own or their family’s lot.17 Both Protocols recognize that prosecution of the two offences of trafficking and smuggling should be accompanied by due respect for human rights and by prevention measures. The Trafficking Protocol sets out measures of assistance which the state may provide to victims and acknowledges the right of victims and the obligations of states under international human rights law.18 The Smuggling Protocol explicitly requires states to protect the human rights of smuggled migrants under international law, “in particular the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. States are also required to protect smuggled migrants against “violence that may be inflicted upon them, whether by individuals or groups”, to assist smuggled migrants whose “lives or safety are endangered”, and to take into account the special needs of women and children.19

17

Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and its Explanatory Report (2005), paras. 83–84. 18 Art. 6, Art. 7 and Art. 14(1). See also: Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking (Geneva, OHCHR, 2002). 19 Art. 16.

17

Concealed chains

In practice, trafficking and smuggling differ in a number of ways: ●

Smuggling is always transnational, whereas trafficking may take place within a country.

●

Smuggling involves migrants who have consented to emigrate, whereas trafficking victims have either not consented or their consent has been vitiated by the use of force or other means, such as coercion and deception.

●

Smuggling ends with the arrival of migrants at their destination, whereas trafficking involves the ongoing exploitation of the victim in some manner to generate illicit profits for the traffickers. Implicit in the concept of trafficking is an element of forced labour, which is not the case for smuggling: a smuggled person may, however, suffer inhuman or degrading treatment or other human rights abuse during transportation.

The trafficking cycle can be divided into three stages: ●

recruiting of potential migrants;

●

movement, transportation or harbouring;

●

integration into the destination country’s labour market.

ILO research has looked at the practical realities and found that, in the first stage, migrants generally consent to emigrate. Coercion is rarely used prior to departure. It is usually in the second or third stages that force or coercion is introduced, when migrants realize that they are facing danger or deception and resist. For this reason, it may be difficult to identify victims of trafficking because migrants apprehended while they are being transported may not be aware that they have been deceived about the purpose or conditions of their journey. In this situation, they are often identified and treated as “smuggled migrants” rather than “trafficking victims”. It is at the third stage that the problem of forced labour generally arises. Each of the three countries under review has taken legislative measures to incorporate the Trafficking Protocol into domestic law. But because these are so recent, few cases have yet been prosecuted, and the courts have yet to interpret specific provisions and apply them to the practical realities of migrants’ lives. Protecting migrants whose vulnerability has been abused is an essential step in the fight to combat both trafficking and forced labour. Preventive measures are of equal importance, as part of an integrated strategy against human trafficking.

18

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MIGRATION MECHANISM BETWEEN CHINA AND EUROPE

1

Li Minghuan

INTRODUCTION The 15th Congress of the European Federation of Chinese Organizations, held in Berlin on 10 September 2008, was attended by some 500 Chinese association leaders from all over Europe. At the event’s closure, the organization presented a public manifesto underlining their aspiration of “Love China, love Europe”. The manifesto also contained some interesting statistical data on the Chinese in Europe: Nowadays, there are about 2.5 million Chinese migrants and their descendants across Europe. They have set up more than 800 associations; more than 43,000 Chinese restaurants. They have published 101 Chinese newspapers and journals. Also, they have established about 340 Chinese schools, which have recruited about 55,000 Chinese pupils to learn the Chinese language at the weekend. (Il Tempo Europa Cina, 2008) According to 1955 statistics, 11,491 Chinese migrants lived in Europe at that time (Li Minghuan, 2002a). At the end of the 1990s the total number of Chinese in Europe had risen to about 1 million. From 2000 onwards this number has more than doubled. Although statistics on transnational migrants are guesstimates rather than reliable data, the upward trend of Chinese migrant flows into Europe is an indisputable reality. China has never considered itself an emigration country. The legislation regarding people going abroad is strict and comprehensive. Meanwhile, most European countries have difficulties coping with the incoming flows, both at the level of discourse (“Are we an immigration country or not?”) and at the practical level of managing immigrants. The migration door to low-skilled or unskilled labourers closed after the oil crisis of the late 1970s. However, during the last decades selective measures have been taken in

19

Concealed chains

different EU countries to ease labour shortages in certain sectors and in the so-called bottleneck jobs, and to streamline the large inflows of non-EU citizens. Among the newly arriving migrants, Chinese migrant labourers constitute a visible group. How did thousands of Chinese labourers who did not meet the basic requirements of the selective immigration system manage to enter Europe? Is there a special migration mechanism between China and Europe? Who functioned as the migration brokers and in what way did they facilitate the migration process and circumvent the restrictive regime? Based on the author’s research conducted over ten years (including interviews conducted for the ILO on recruitment mechanisms in 2005–06), this chapter provides an overview of some of the main themes related to the migration mechanism between China and Europe, from the perspective of sending areas. It first traces the re-emergence of the transnational brokerage market, then maps the composition of the institution of labour brokerage in today’s China. The chapter also analyses who is active in the transnational migration brokerage market and how they operate, the fees charged by migration agents and how potential migrants manage to pay them, and the implication of these charges on migrant workers’ lives overseas.

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE BROKERAGE MARKET: A HISTORICAL REVIEW Transnational labour brokerage is by no means a new phenomenon in China. Although there is a general shortage of records on transnational labour brokers, many documents on migrant workers have touched upon the subject. Its emergence is one by-product of the institutional barriers to transnational migration. Reliable historical sources have shown that the brokerage of transnational labourers between China and Europe emerged, at the latest, in the early twentieth century. At that time, certain people walked around the rural areas of south Zhejiang to either induce parents to send their sons abroad or to encourage potential adult migrants to emigrate abroad. Among these intermediaries, some were returned migrants who wanted to sell a specific kind of document that could be used to enter Europe, but more were employed by a particular firm to convince people of the economic opportunities of migration. When a group of candidates was recruited, the firm would arrange travel to the harbour cities such as Xiamen (formerly Amoy), Shantou (formerly Swatow) or Shanghai. One record showed the existence of some small hostels in Xiamen to shelter the potential migrants before they went abroad. Sometimes the migrants had to wait for months for the necessary document to be prepared and for a sailing date to become available. All of these services were presented as one service, namely the “migration package”, which the migrant could purchase.

20

An overview of the migration mechanism

The service fee charged for the migration package was high. For instance, in the 1930s those who went from Wenzhou to Europe had to pay a “package fee” of 300–500 silver yuan. At that time, 3 silver yuan was equal to 1 dan of rice (about 50 kg). Many elderly migrants recalled that they had had to sell their house or land to pay for brokerage. The elderly interviewees, who were still alive in the 1980s, had different feelings towards the brokers. Those who cheated were denounced, but those who did arrange the migration passage were respected, notwithstanding the high service fee. To illustrate: “We would not be able to be in Europe without their help” or “They were experienced persons and we completely relied on their support.” Emigration was interrupted after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and was even condemned as counter-revolutionary during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). At that time, besides a few people who were able to get permission to go abroad for family reunion, the only official possibility of going abroad was as a contract worker on Chinesesupported national projects taking place in other countries. In Wencheng County, the original home town of many Chinese who settled in Europe, in the 20 years between 1950 and 1970 only 150 people were granted permission to emigrate abroad. On average, only about seven people per year went abroad. Although most managed to eventually settle in Europe, many had to spend a couple of months or even years in Hong Kong or Macau to get the necessary documents to go to Europe. It is now an open secret that the documents migrants needed to enter Europe were often made or “remade” in the “grey market” of Hong Kong or Macau because there was no regular way to deal with migrants from China during the Cold War. Since the late 1960s, when the country was highly disorganized as a result of the Cultural Revolution, some returned overseas Chinese who had powerful relatives abroad asked to be allowed to re-emigrate. In June 1971 the Chinese Government enacted a special policy for this group. They were granted the right to go abroad provided that they could prove that they had returned from abroad and that they would be accepted by the country where they had previously settled. In addition, family members were allowed to apply to emigrate as dependants. Emigration permission was severely restricted, but at least the possibility of going abroad existed. After the reform movement established itself in 1978 more regulations on regularized emigration rights were proclaimed and implemented. The right to emigrate was extended to Chinese with relatives abroad. In other words, the principle of the regulations was to give priority to returning migrants and those who had family members abroad by granting these two categories a “green light” to emigrate. At the time, applying for a Chinese passport proved to be more difficult than obtaining permission to enter Europe or North America, as China had extremely strict controls on the issuing of passports. Only after one had first obtained permission to enter another country or special region, like Hong Kong or Macau, would a Chinese passport be issued. Within the Cold War logic, Western countries

21

Concealed chains

at the time welcomed Chinese migrants as they defected from the communist world in favour of the “free” Western world. As most applicants in China were unfamiliar with the necessary formalities and the application document had to be submitted abroad, most applications were arranged by the applicant’s relatives or close friends abroad. In the major sending areas, such as the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang, some who had relatives who had already settled in the United States or Europe quickly seized the opportunity to emigrate, although it was not easy to get the necessary help. In the Netherlands in the mid-1980s, for instance, helping people to emigrate to Europe was first motivated by friendship and empathy. When there were few immigrants, generally no brokerage fee was charged. As realizing the dream of migration was a happy event, new arrivals were often warmly welcomed with “red bags”20 provided by the new arrival’s relatives, friends or even co-villagers who had already settled in Europe. In return, the beneficiary worked as a “volunteer” for the sponsor during a certain period. This was an unwritten rule among the Zhejiang migrant community. In interviews conducted in a village in Wencheng County in the mid1990s, a surprising number of people praised a Mr Hu of the Netherlands (the Hu clan constitutes the majority of the village). In the 1980s, when the emigration wave had just started, Mr Hu had arranged for at least one person from each household in his village to emigrate to Europe without charging them a migration fee. In exchange for his assistance he is held in high esteem among his co-villagers and is treated as the “God of the village” whenever he returns. Another Mr Hu of Wenzhou, interviewed in 1997, is another example. He emigrated to Italy in the 1930s with the “help” provided by the brokers of the time. Between the time of his arrival and 1997, he had directly or indirectly helped 415 family members, relatives, friends and other co-villagers emigrate to Europe. In 1997 a book entitled The genealogy of Hu’s lineage residing abroad was published in the name of his clan. The main core of the publication was the personal life stories of all of the people who had benefited from Mr Hu’s help and “had made it in Europe starting from scratch”. Each narrative expressed gratitude and appreciation towards Mr Hu, who, as the pioneer of the Hu lineage and someone who had facilitated the extension of the lineage network in southern Europe, was highly admired and revered as the great master of the Hu lineage. A booklet entitled The history of Wencheng overseas Chinese, which was distributed locally, introduced the life stories of 48 successful Wencheng

20

A small red paper bag with money inside. The money is a kind of reward and expresses good wishes to the receiver.

22

An overview of the migration mechanism

Chinese in Europe. At the end of each life story there was a list of the names of all of the hosts who had helped to bring others over to Europe. It is obvious that the hosts gained more respect in accordance with the number of people that they had managed to help emigrate to Europe. Among the early settlers in Europe, many of those who helped numerous co-villagers emigrate to Europe had become Chinese community leaders. Those who have made it in Europe but who fail to extend assistance to others are, however, denounced and cast aside by their own community. Since the late 1980s people like these two Mr Hus had become rare. The practice of “free service” was abandoned and it became a well-known secret that “it takes money to buy every step of emigration”. Emigration has become a market-driven practice through the introduction of brokerage fees. At least two main factors explain this new development. First, the flow of would-be emigrants has increased in scope and nature. An increasing number of these potential migrants do not have direct contact with Chinese settled in Europe. Moreover, migration controls in destination regions have become stricter. As a result, the free service provided by compassionate hosts has become history. As demand for assistance increased, the market mechanism related to emigration practices also became more complex. Most countries in the West, and especially in Europe, endorsed family reunion on humanitarian grounds. Therefore, family members and relatives of the Chinese settled in Europe could easily obtain passports and entrance visas. Some saw a business opportunity in this legislation and became brokers themselves. Besides helping family members to migrate, they also started to arrange transnational marriages and adoptions to “create new family links”. Though this trend began with real marriages and adoptions, false arrangements soon appeared. As few gained sufficient insight into the complicated procedures, it became a business for experts. The market of transnational migration brokerage reemerged and expanded rapidly.

FROM SNAKEHEAD TO TAIL: THE EMIGRATION BROKERAGE HIERARCHY In the 1980s only a few state-owned companies were authorized to deal with the business of exporting labour. For instance, in Xiamen, the Xiamen International Economic and Technical Cooperation Company (XIETC Company) was the only company authorized to deal with labour recruitment for labour export under the name of the foreign aid programme. As an important state-owned company, its high-ranking managers, often former officials, were designated by the Xiamen Municipality. Since the early 1990s, however, the XIETC Company’s recruitment business has been seriously challenged. When China started to transform its former planned economy

23

Concealed chains

into a market economy an increasing number of companies entered the transnational migration brokerage business. In China, two national ministries supervise the labour export business: the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and the Ministry of Commerce. According to the information on the web site of the Ministry of Commerce, by 4 October 2008 there were 594 companies authorized to deal with labour export business and 1,609 companies across China authorized to contract construction projects abroad.21 The web site of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security listed 511 companies certified to conduct transnational brokerage business.22 In total, there are 2,714 officially authorized companies active in the transnational brokerage business. In addition to the officially authorized companies, many more informal entities, in various forms, are also active in the transnational brokerage business. The first category is the authorized company conforming to the description above. They obtain an official labour exportation quota from the state, based on contracts between China and other countries. Moreover, they have access to large-scale projects sponsored by the state, as well as state-owned companies. They often send migrant workers abroad in a group. In the second category are private firms or agencies holding some kind of certificate, such as a copy of a certificate to show that they are a branch of an authorized firm or agency, or a certificate of commerce or consultancy dealing with migration affairs. Many mention in their advertisement that their business has involved a wide range of transnational affairs all over the world, although in reality the scope of the certificate concerns business within a certain field. A consulting company in overseas education may also provide services to obtain a worker’s visa, while a company for recruiting contract workers may provide services in the area of independent migration, skills-based migration or help to get the points required for the relevant country’s points-based system of immigration. The third category involves small migration agencies whose legal authorization is uncertain. Various advertisements of such agencies can be found here and there, from placards posted on the wall to flyers sent to private mailboxes or distributed along the street. In these advertisements the proposed income abroad is often attractively high and the transnational service fee is extremely high. Some agencies may have a small office, but many just provide a contact person’s surname and telephone number.

21

Ministry of Commerce: http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/. Ministry of Labour and Social Security: http://www.molss.gov.cn/gb/ggfw/jwjy.htm. The company list shows 582 companies in 25 provinces and four municipalities directly under the jurisdiction of the Central Government. Among them, the licences of 71 companies are expired or have been terminated.

22

24

An overview of the migration mechanism

All of these different brokers function in the transnational migration brokerage market. On the Internet, thousands of relevant homepages can be found with links spread all over the world. Bona fide as well as mala fide companies exist in juxtaposition; legal and illegal practices blur the total picture of the labour brokerage market in today’s China. When the labour export market was dominated by state-owned companies they generally did not charge a migration fee, but made profits from “sharing” workers’ wages abroad. The XIETC Company, for example, dealt with labour export under the special authority of the municipality with which it is affiliated. According to the company’s reports, from 1981 until 1995, the total turnover was about US$161 million (€132 million) and profits reached US$30 million (€25 million) (XMMYZ, 1998). Since the early 1990s, however, the XIETC Company’s recruitment business has been challenged. When China evolved from a planned economy to a market one and the pursuit of commercial profits was no longer a taboo, more companies attempted to enter the labour recruitment business. Among the newly established companies or agencies, many are private entities that may or may not be authorized. Many potential migrants cannot meet the requirements of the destination country. In addition, many are not satisfied to be contract workers on state projects abroad (which is the major business of state-owned companies). Consequently, the transnational migration market has become a vast area where private firms adopt both regular and irregular approaches. These unauthorized emigration brokers or agents, labelled as “snakeheads” by the state media in China, comprise at least a three-tiered hierarchy linking source and destination countries. This hierarchy generally operates outside of the law and may or may not have contact with the first hierarchy described above. At the top are a few “big snakeheads”, who generally live and have legal status in countries outside of mainland China. Some are settled in Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan, but others reside abroad and hold multiple nationalities. They have large sums of money at their disposal, which allow them to provide services to potential migrants to “pave the way out” of China and into the destination country. They organize and expand transnational migration networks, take care of documents or facilities for clients, and/or bribe officials in China and the relevant countries. The middle tier is comprised of institutional brokers who often work for officially registered companies in the migration source area. Authorized to procure labour exportation and to assist participants in study abroad programmes and internationally contracted projects, these companies/agencies provide training courses for their clients in languages, cooking, nursing, basic computer skills, job interviewing, document preparation and sometimes how to apply for legal status after arriving clandestinely or overstaying their legal visa. Clients pay for all training and receive a certificate upon completion. The certificate is designed to be used to prove that the holders are qualified people who meet the immigration requirements of the destination country.

25

Concealed chains

These institutional brokers may also help to “create” some of the documents requested by the destination authorities, thereby operating between legal and illegal approaches. The bottom tier of brokers consists of local agents who act on an individual basis. They have connections to the middle tier, but some also have access to big snakeheads through intermediary contacts. Their task is to find potential customers and introduce them to relevant companies or snakeheads. For each migrant recruited, the company or snakehead pays the local agent a commission ranging from a few hundred to tens of thousands of Chinese dollars. When asked why they would go to a private informal agent instead of a formal one, the most common answer that people give is that they simply could not distinguish the difference. The potential migrant often chooses the agent based on personal contacts, as they are felt to be more reliable and trustworthy. For instance, the migration package fee proposed by some private units is flexible and open to negotiation. In one instance, a customer had a good friend who knew the agent and because of this close relationship received a discounted price. It is generally understood that personal connections may help potential migrants jump the queue, choose better destination countries and find higher-income jobs. Ambitious migrants with a sound migration plan consider payment of the broker’s fee as an investment. The actual amount depends first on the anticipated income in the destination country. For instance, the brokerage fee for expediting migration to the United States is always higher than the fee for Europe. Second, it depends on how difficult it is to arrange the migration trajectory and settlement in the destination country. The general principle is: the more difficult the arrangements, the more expensive the costs. Settling in Western destination countries, which is considered difficult, includes acquiring official immigration status either by marriage, holding the status of a specially needed professional or qualifying under a migration quota. But the charge will be lower if the applicant agrees to go abroad as a contract worker to countries such as Israel or Kuwait. Lastly, the fee depends on the applicant’s status. The fee will be lower if the applicant is more or less qualified to meet the immigration requirements. If the applicant needs to be “trained” to become more qualified, the price will rise accordingly. Since the late 1990s the Chinese authorities have stated that human smuggling is illegal and local police are hunting down the smugglers. After the Dover tragedy in England, where 58 Chinese stowaways were found dead in a truck, dozens of snakeheads were arrested and incarcerated. However, many of the ones arrested were at the bottom of the hierarchy. They had direct connections with the victims and could therefore be easily identified. The big snakeheads, however, live abroad and have several passports in hand. Their criminal activities cannot be stopped without transnational cooperation.

26

An overview of the migration mechanism

In interviews conducted with local officials and “regular people” in the home town of a big snakehead who is still jailed in the United States, none of the interviewees regarded this person as a criminal, although some preferred not to comment. One man said that this so-called snakehead had given him a special discount to channel his son to the United States because he was a former classmate. “This person was always kind in providing the necessary help and assistance,” he said. “My son could not have gotten into the States without her help. I could not have built this five-storey house without my son’s money.” When asked whether it was criminal that the snakehead charged a huge amount of money for emigration, most interviewees gave similar responses: “It is reasonable because she needed money to buy the way for us. The money can be earned back, as long as the person can get into the States.” Another said, “All companies charge money for labour export. Only those who received money but who did not send the payers to the destination state are criminal.” It is worth pointing out that the people in sending areas normally evaluate transnational migration brokerage from three perspectives: first, whether the broker delivered the clients to the destination effectively; second, whether the journey was safe; and third, whether the broker charged a reasonable fee. According to a local saying, it is more difficult to find the right broker than to borrow enough money to pay the brokerage fee. Taking these grassroots opinions and sentiments into account, it is understandable that quite a few snakeheads are able to escape government reprisals and continue running their business, balancing both regular and irregular practices.

A HIGHLY PROFITABLE BUSINESS: DEBT AND REPAYMENT The popular practice of the brokerage fee has evolved from a service among family members, relatives and friends towards a repayment system, and again to high brokerage fees. As mentioned earlier, the original practice of helping relatives and friends needs to be contextualized within the cultural framework of the Chinese lineage, which is based on common descent. Helping family or lineage members to migrate abroad includes providing information concerning immigration policies in destination countries and financial guarantees, if needed. The assistance also includes applying for different types of visas or getting specific residence statuses: as an overseas student, for visiting relatives, or as a tourist. Some also arrange procedures for the adoption of youngsters or seek suitable marriage candidates, which makes immigration legally possible. When helping people to migrate becomes a business, paying an emigration fee becomes a kind of investment. In the well-known sending areas, such as Zhejiang and Fujian, paying a fee to go abroad first started informally within the confines of the private network. The transaction was not

27

Concealed chains

seen as a human trafficking practice, but as a sort of necessary exchange. The successful stories of the early twentieth century served as examples to be emulated and quoted by many migrants. In Wenzhou in the early 1990s the commonly quoted price for helping a person to emigrate to Europe was about 60,000 yuan (€7,200). By the end of the 1990s, the price had skyrocketed to 300,000–400,000 yuan (€36,000–€48,000). The recruitment fee appears to fluctuate with the wage level in the destination market, using the tacit standard that, on average, migrant workers will spend about the equivalent of two years’ salary to cover the recruitment fee. Table 2 shows information on transnational brokerage fees. It is clear that the brokerage fee is very high, although a gap exists between different provinces of origin and destination countries. Table 2 Transnational brokerage fees, 2008 Emigration region

Destination country

Wenzhou (Zhejiang province)

Europe

Sector

Chinese restaurants, textile factories

Agreed duration of labour

Brokerage fee in yuan

No

300 000– 400 000

Fuzhou region (Fujian USA province)

Chinese restaurants, supermarkets

No

Minqing region (Fujian Israel province)

Construction

No

Qingzhou (Shandong province)

Singapore, Electronics, Japan, machinery, Rep. of Korea etc.

3 years

Xincun (Henan province)

Japan, USA, other

3 years

Electronics, machinery, drivers, etc.

Expected annual income in yuan

200 000

(€27 000– €36 000)

(€18 000)

500 000– 700 000

200 000– 300 000

(€45 000– €63 000)

(€18 000– €36 000)

80 000– 170 000

100 000– 200 000

(€7 200– €15 300)

(€9 000– €18 000)

30 000– 40 000 (€2,700– €3,600)

30 000– 50 000 (€2,700– €4,500)

40 000– 50 000 (€3,600– €4,500)

120 000– 180 000 (€10,800– €16,200)

Note: All information is based on interviews conducted in 2008. The brokerage fees include both official and irregular or illegal charges. The expected annual income is a rough amount cited by the interviewees.

28

An overview of the migration mechanism

Often, the high brokerage or package fee was paid at given times and in instalments, in accordance with the contract between the recruiter and the migrant. According to research data, some had to pay a certain amount of money in advance (10 to 50 per cent) to bind a contract. This is highly dependent on whether the recruiter knows the migrant personally or not; prepayment may not be required if a local person with a good reputation agrees to be the guarantor. In cases where migrants have been transported from one country to another before reaching their final destination, a certain amount of money would be charged for each step and would have to be paid before the next step was started. In one case, about one-third of the fee had to be paid when the migrant landed in the Russian Federation. In another, two-thirds was paid when the migrant finally reached Italy. The high brokerage fee is the foremost malpractice in transnational labour movement. The information in table 2 shows that migrants from Zhejiang and Fujian have to pay an enormous amount of money (up to several hundred thousand yuan) to be channelled abroad. Outsiders often do not understand: for such an amount of cash in hand, one can live comfortably in China. Why then spend the money on something dangerous and criminal? For the majority of migrants, however, the brokerage fee is in fact borrowed money. They cannot borrow the money if they do not have an intention to “make it abroad”. And they cannot repay the money if they do not make a journey abroad. In other words, their credit for borrowing money lies in the intention to emigrate and to work hard abroad. They count on the high income they intend to make abroad in order to repay the loan. The question then remains: from whom do they borrow such a large amount of money? What are the conditions of borrowing and repaying? The migration credit and loan system functions as follows. After one’s illicit passage abroad, one’s relatives, whether they are in China or abroad, all have a duty to help raise the money to repay the loan. Lending money to a family member or friend is considered “helping out” and one should not ask for interest. Once migrants have worked abroad, they need to start repaying those that have helped them. Normally, the person closest to the borrower will be the last to be repaid. When migrants have cleared their own debts they then need to help out other would-be migrants whom they know and with whom they share ties within a larger social network. Looking at this set of unwritten rules, one sees that the migration credit and loan system is basically sustained by the firm belief that transnational migration makes repayment possible because of the principles of “providing a guarantee” and mutual benefit. The conditions are not clearly formulated and there is no fixed period of time for repayment. There is also the possibility that the expectation based on mutual benefit will not be respected. The migration credit and loan system is based on mutual trust and does not follow liberal market economic principles and practices. It represents an exchange pattern based on social or community resources. The village community can be seen as a kind of “social norm” that functions

29

Concealed chains

not only according to the economic exchange principle, but also according to rational and moral principles. It is a joint product of the “moral economy” and rationalism. The ability to raise funds for overseas migration depends on the trustworthy reputation of one’s family. While one does not need to pay interest when borrowing money from family and friends, one does, however, incur not only a measurable monetary debt, but also an interpersonal debt. Though not legally binding, it is nonetheless powerful and influential among community members. Thus, when migrants have become successful they need to reciprocate (huibao) and share their earnings with other members of the home community. This is the unwritten rule of “mutual benefit” in traditional Chinese communities, both in China and abroad. The rule of mutual benefit has social ramifications, since the reciprocity is not just a straightforward repayment of the incurred monetary debt, but includes many social dimensions and consequences. For instance, when someone is not successful abroad and does not succeed in repaying the debt, this person will not be reprimanded and scolded for being “ungrateful”. Instead, the villagers will pity that person as “someone with bad luck”. In contrast, when someone has become wealthy abroad they not only have to clear the monetary debt as part of their terms of reciprocity, but also have a wide range of duties: raising money, making the necessary arrangements for new migrants, donating money and doing charitable works for all members of the village and lineage. These acts of reciprocity and “re-reciprocity” need to be repeatedly fulfilled during a successful migrant’s entire lifetime. This phenomenon, however, exists among people who have the close community ties that usually exist in villages and traditional lineages. Recently, an expansion of sending regions has taken place. The region of north-eastern China (Dongbei) has become a migration area, although the traditional migration provinces such as Fujian and Zhejiang continue to produce significant flows to Europe. One remarkable research finding is the highly accidental and random nature of new migrations, especially migrants from Liaoning, Jilin, Shandong and other areas. The migrants who come from these regions with no tradition of transnational migration often do not have a specific destination country in mind. Thus, there is no social network to provide support in the receiving country. Many Dongbei migrants were former employees of state-owned industries. When they were laid off, they received a certain amount of money (about 30,000–60,000 yuan (€2,700–€5,400)) as compensation to be trained for re-employment. Some used this money to go to Europe, opening up a new migration niche for brokerage firms or snakeheads. However, the snakeheads and brokerage firms had to adjust to the conditions of the Dongbei, who could not pay the same amount as the people from Zhejiang or Fujian. The Dongbei normally had to pay the full price before they started their migration passage, since they could not provide any kind of community guarantee. Since many Dongbei do not have the status required to work in Europe, they have to work irregularly for established people from Zhejiang and some-

30

An overview of the migration mechanism

times even for irregular Zhejiang migrants. In an ethnic market in Europe dominated by people from Zhejiang, people from Dongbei and other non-Zhejiang migrants often find themselves in an even more vulnerable position.

PLAYING EDGE BALL: OPERATING BETWEEN REGULAR AND IRREGULAR APPROACHES In Chinese, “playing edge ball” is a popular saying that refers to an activity that intentionally challenges the existing rules while avoiding punishment. In table tennis, a ball hitting the edge of a tabletop is a challenge to both hit and receive, and the player who successfully hits an edge ball will usually win the point. This concept illustrates the ambiguity of the regular and irregular aspects of the migration mechanism between China and Europe, where relevant actors make a profit by successfully operating at the edge of the law. The appeal of working abroad – regardless of one’s legal status – is the reward of high income for hard work. However, for the average person who is not qualified enough to meet the entrance criteria of destination countries, upgrading one’s economic status through emigration cannot occur without a broker’s help. If brokers are able to make emigration possible they are socially accepted. And if their business is successful, they will even be admired. Brokers form part of an indispensable node that has made transnational migration prevalent among average people. Some scholars have correctly pointed out that “the [state’s] ability to control migration has shrunk as the desire to do so has increased” (Bhagwati, 2003, p. 98) and that undocumented migration keeps growing despite efforts by states and supranational bodies to control it (Castles, 2004). After two decades of these types of migration flows, a kind of transnational migration industry has developed in China. Due to the contradictions between official migration policies and the practical labour needs in the relevant states, the transnational activities of average people are often considered acceptable (licit) by participants, but are illegal in a formal sense at the national level. Therefore, the whole process of transnational migration brokerage is balanced between regular and irregular approaches, both in China and in Europe. None of the countries, whether sending or receiving, declare their support for any irregular practices. Yet in practical terms they have more or less, consciously or unconsciously, been involved in these activities. From the perspective of the sending area, there is no doubt that the Chinese Government has made great efforts to fight human smuggling. Severe penalties have been imposed, especially on snakeheads. In the major sending regions, posters and pamphlets can be seen everywhere announcing the Government’s decision to fight human smuggling and educating villagers

31

Concealed chains

against participating in any illegal emigration activities. However, when the successful overseas Chinese return to their home area, especially after making a significant investment or providing generous donations, they are met with great honour and welcomed as heroes. No one cares about how the person emigrated, but only about the successful outcome of the migration itself. For this reason, the underlying message expressed by the end result of the migration is itself highly compelling. All receiving countries have strengthened official control of immigrants. Most governments welcome highly skilled migrants, such as entrepreneurs and professionals. Meanwhile, the labour market and employers are in search of cheap labour. The relevant authorities often leave irregular workers alone simply because they are the first group to take low-paying, 4D (difficult, dirty, dangerous and demeaning) jobs. Moreover, in some EU states, particularly France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the amnesty or regularization movement constitutes a pulling effect. Although the government’s purpose with respect to regularization is to respect the legal rights of employed irregular immigrants, the underlying message of such an opportunity is to give irregular immigrants a reasonable hope that their irregular status is temporary and may change overnight. From the perspective of the brokers, it is often not an easy task to clearly demarcate the thin line between a smuggler (snakehead) and a legal agency dealing with emigration matters. For instance, a regulation issued by the Ministry of Finance stipulates that the brokerage fee for transnational labour cannot exceed 12.5 per cent of the migrant’s total wages. But it has been “understood” that each firm/agent can charge 12.5 per cent of the total earnings. Therefore, if the migrant has been “introduced” through two or three firms/agents before reaching his destination, then the 12.5 per cent will be doubled or tripled. Given the complexity of migration legislation and procedures, it is not unusual for legal agencies to channel their clients illegally and for undocumented brokers to channel their clients legally. Finally, in the eyes of the migrants and many others, being channelled to another country is not a criminal act, but a worthwhile enterprise of firmminded people who aspire to make a fortune abroad but who lack the legal entitlement to do so. The most attractive point of working abroad – regardless of its regular or irregular status – is that one can expect a high income if only one is hard working. The main concern is the final outcome of success. As long as the migrant one day returns as a successful overseas Chinese, all experiences, no matter how frustrating and painful, or whether the migration process was legal or irregular, do not matter at all. Information, capital and commodities are moving more actively than ever in the current era of globalization, which will surely encourage a greater flow of people. This reality can be neither denied nor stopped. Therefore, the existence of the brokerage function at the transnational level will be indispensable. Although it is easy to declare some transnational activities illegal, more efforts are needed to explore their long-standing and wide acceptance.

32

EXPLOITATION OF CHINESE IMMIGRANTS’ VULNERABILITIES IN FRANCE

2

Yun Gao and Véronique Poisson

INTRODUCTION In France, the issue of “modern slavery”, in all its various forms, came to the forefront of government attention and public discussion at the end of 2001, when a special task force appointed to look into this issue presented its report to the French National Assembly. In its report, the task force recognized the existence of Chinese migrants working in sweatshops and the sexual exploitation of Chinese women in France, in conditions which it considered to be modern slavery. The task force recognized the extreme vulnerability of Chinese irregular migrants, acknowledging that some could be considered as victims of human trafficking. The task force’s criticism of French legal provisions, which it found to be insufficient as deterrents, accelerated France’s ratification of the Palermo Protocol in 2002 and contributed to its adoption of new legislation to criminalize human trafficking and modifications to the law related to labour exploitation offences. Despite these important steps, addressing the Chinese dimension of these issues requires a greater insight into the labour dimension of migration between China and France. This chapter surveys the possible human trafficking and forced labour situation in France, based on testimonies of Chinese migrants and evidence from French institutions, experts and migrant associations. In addition to compiling and analysing empirical data, the study considers the elements which, under certain circumstances, can constitute human trafficking and forced labour situations. The reform of the state welfare system in China, and its impact on agriculture and employment in the state industrial sector, has contributed to a deterioration of the social situation for some rural dwellers with family connections overseas and urban residents without comparative employment options. Emigration is seen as an alternative to unemployment and an escape from the costly elitist and segregationist education and health system. The new wave of migration involves mainly the

33

Concealed chains

underclass that has emerged from China’s transition to a socialist market economy. In the era of globalization, migration from China to European countries is increasingly being integrated into the complex global system of production. The change in the local economy, which has impacts overseas in the form of the development of economic niches, has encouraged Chinese immigration. This chapter looks at the linkages between these “niches” and local economies, as ethnic businesses are not as isolated from the host society as they appear to be. They have progressively become an inseparable link in the supply chain of a complex production system, particularly when they meet the need for great flexibility in both production patterns and delivery schedules in certain economic sectors in the host country. In order to gain competitiveness in a tight market some businesses turn to the exploitation of vulnerable migrant workers. Referring to these migrants as “illegal immigrants” and “illegal workers” conceals their status as victims whose human rights are being flouted. This case study examines both the factors that create a situation of vulnerability in which Chinese migrant workers are likely to be exploited by employers and the multiple abusive practices used by employers to exploit migrant workers. The study also surveys the different challenges facing policy-makers as they struggle to harmonize labour market supply and demand, and law enforcement agencies as they attempt to sanction the genuine exploiters. The chapter first presents the methodology used, followed by a brief overview of France’s legal framework regarding human trafficking, forced labour and illegal labour. The subsequent two sections explore the departure of migrants from China, including their reasons for leaving, the means used to reach France, the risks of the journey and the networks that facilitate it. The latter part of the chapter focuses on life in France: living and working conditions, the impact of debts incurred during migration and the daily fear that immigrants live under due to their illegal status. Through this qualitative approach, the human and psychological aspects of the migration process form a basis for understanding the concepts of vulnerability and victimization. The chapter ends by reviewing the mechanisms for preventing human trafficking and forced labour, and makes some concluding comments and recommendations.

METHODOLOGY This study is based on a field survey, as well as recent qualitative studies and research. The field survey used two parallel lines of enquiry: interviews with both immigrants and experts. This dual approach enabled researchers to obtain firsthand information and to compare viewpoints, including

34

France

migrants’ accounts of the facts, official reports, and academic discourse. The study’s main constraint was the limited amount of time at the researchers’ disposal: empirical data from the field had to be collected within four months. Interviews were conducted with 20 experts in the field of Chinese migration, including researchers, the Chinese embassy and French authorities.23 Chinese migrants were also interviewed through 59 semi-structured interviews. Of these migrants, two-thirds were from Zhejiang, and one-third were from Dongbei and Fujian. The proportion of migrants interviewed from each region was based data on regions of origin (see table 3, p. 42). Of the 59 interviews, seven case studies were selected (a “gatekeeper”24 and six irregular immigrants).

Case study no. 1 (the gatekeeper, “Mr Adong”) will serve as a guideline for studying economic niches and how human smuggling/trafficking is organized. This key informant’s testimony is highlighted as here.

These case studies cannot necessarily be taken as representative of the experiences of the whole community, but serve to illustrate the particular aspects of irregular migration highlighted in this chapter. A questionnaire was drawn up for the interviews with immigrants, which served as a guideline and was adapted as needed. The interviews were conducted by two Chinese-speaking interviewers. One was Chinese but did not come from the same provinces as the interviewees, which proved to be an asset and helped to win the interviewees’ trust. The other interviewer was familiar with Chinese networks in France and had been working in Chinese association circles in Paris for the last ten years. Establishing a relationship of trust with the target group of Chinese immigrants was a challenge. This group is composed of people who do not speak French and who come from several different regions. Most have neither French residence nor work permits for France; they live in insecure and unstable circumstances, are housed in cramped apartments and work until they drop from exhaustion.

23

The French authorities interviewed were: the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Labour Inspectorate and the Paris Public Prosecution Department. 24 In this case, a gatekeeper is a person who has in-depth knowledge of the Chinese community, but who is not involved in any aspect of irregular migration.

35

Concealed chains

Interviewers established relations with Chinese immigrants through places where a relationship of trust existed because of the services provided, through intermediaries, and by befriending immigrants in Franco-Chinese associations. The survey depended on the assistance of key people to make these connections.25 Most migrants refused to introduce interviewers to other people, due to the sensitivity of the research subject, but it was sometimes possible to get in touch with the families of the people that had been met in the course of the survey. While the hope had been to meet some of the traffickers, this proved too difficult. Although they were well known in migrant circles and migration centres, it was not possible to obtain a single interview. This study therefore contains very little precise information about the smugglers’ shifting organizations or about the breakdown and distribution of the proceeds of the human trafficking business. The research for this study reveals the gap between political will and the results obtained in actual practice and underlines the contradictions that currently exist between law enforcement and the side effects that law enforcement sometimes produces. By comparing the accounts of irregular Chinese immigrants and the attitudes of certain institutions towards these people, the study’s analysis introduces a third point of view, which integrates human rights and the legal tools that France has at its disposal.

THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK Human trafficking After having ratified the Palermo Protocol, France adopted legislation on human trafficking by introducing article 225-4-1 into the Penal Code26 in 2003, which defined human trafficking as: …the recruitment, transport, transfer, harbouring, or reception of a person in exchange for remuneration or any other benefit or for the promise of remuneration or any other benefit, in order to place that person at the disposal of a third party, whether identified or not, so as to permit the commission against that person of offences of procuring, sexual assault or abuse, exploitation for begging, or the imposition of degrading living or working conditions, or to force that person to commit any felony or misdemeanour.

25

In particular: the manager of a company in Belleville that provides translation and interpretation services and the director of ASLC, an association providing various services to immigrants. 26 Inserted by Act No. 2003-239 of 18 March 2003, Article 32, Official Journal of 19 March 2003.

36

France

According to the Délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le travail illégal (DILTI),27 the scope was limited to recruiters, transporters and harbourers. The people who escape the offence of trafficking in human beings are those who employ the victims made available to them by the perpetrators. Where the purpose of trafficking is to place an individual at the disposal of a third party (an employer or a procurer), it is difficult to establish the relationship between the smuggler and that third person in practice. This is one of the reasons why the law was so rarely applied between 2003 and 2007. Its definition was modified in 2007 to insert “place the person at his/her disposal” before “at the disposal of a third party”,28 which allowed for punitive measures against the person exploiting the victims. In most cases, the smuggler does not place the migrant in employment and the employer does not get involved in organizing the journey, but there is a chain linking the two situations. The journey generates an exorbitant debt; the exploitation of forced labour is the result of that debt and is combined with other factors that make the migrants vulnerable. Vulnerability can be a physical or mental weakness and a judge must take various factors into account – such as age, state of health (mental or physical), and social or cultural background – which, theoretically, can allow the inclusion of irregular immigrants. Dependence can result from a legal link or a de facto situation and can involve economic, financial and/or emotional dependence.

Forced labour France is bound by the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and its Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105). The term “forced labour” as defined in the Convention does not appear in the French Criminal Code, but the code includes two offences that are considered comparable to forced labour. Articles 225-13 and 225-14 punish the obtaining of unpaid services or services for which the payment is clearly insufficient for the work performed. These articles also make degrading working or living conditions a punishable offence. The two offences are based on the concepts of “abuse of vulnerability” and “abuse of the dependence of an individual”. By incorporating the concept of forced labour into French legislation through articles 225-13 and 225-14, French law-makers converted the subjectivity of the “willingness” of an individual into tangible circumstantial

27 28

French Inter-Ministerial Delegation for the Prevention of Illegal Labour. Act No. 2007-1631 of 20 November 2007, Article 22, Official Journal of 21 November 2007.

37

Concealed chains

factors: unpaid work obtained by taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person in question or the subjecting of a person to degrading working or living conditions constitute an offence. Whether or not the victim performs the work voluntarily is irrelevant, since consent given by a person in vulnerable circumstances is not considered valid. In practice, the combination of negligence and the lack or absence of comfort, cleanliness or protection constitute categories of offence that can be identified by specific criteria, such as: ●

living accommodation that is not serviced (no electricity, heating or running water);

●

no lavatories, hand basins or showers;

●

very limited sleeping space;

●

too few beds or no real mattresses;

●

dilapidated and unhealthy premises.

Although the term “modern slavery” is frequently used, French legislation does not define an offence of slavery.

Illegal labour Act No. 97-2-10 of 11 March 1997 concerns measures to step up efforts to counter illegal labour, the concept of which is covered in France through the following categories of offence (DILTI, 2002): ●

undeclared labour (concealment of an economic activity or of a paid job);

●

unlawful labour subcontracting and lending;

●

instances of fraud in the bringing in and employment of foreign labour;

●

instances of fraud in the operations of foreign undertakings;

●

moonlighting;

●

placement services for which fees are charged;

●

illegal simultaneous drawing of income substitution benefits and income from gainful employment.

Such infractions are viewed as destructive to the social rights granted by collective Conventions and to individual rights agreed upon in labour contracts. Workers engaged in illegal employment are put into a situation of strong precariousness and vulnerability. French law views irregular migrants primarily as victims and extends certain rights to them. These include

38

France

the option to sue employers for exploitative working conditions and unpaid wages, to collect unemployment compensation and to benefit from social welfare conventions. Nevertheless, irregular migrants will face legal action, including potential deportation.

CONDITIONS OF DEPARTURE: THE MAIN TRIGGERS The socio-economic situation in China The research for this study showed that while the socio-political system was not cited as a migration factor per se, its injustices were mentioned spontaneously by most migrants, either when they listed the reasons for their discontent or when they described their living conditions in China. Migrants from Dongbei most often mentioned endemic unemployment in their explanation of why they had left China. This followed the restructuring of state enterprises in the 1990s, when many employees were obliged to “leave their jobs” (xia gang zhi gong) while continuing to receive a small proportion of their salaries. Some enterprises paid a lump sum as a final settlement, thus releasing themselves from all obligations and responsibilities to their employees (yi ci mai duan). This measure was regarded as a means of “streamlining” surplus labour. Since the beginning of the 1990s, between 50 and 60 million city dwellers have lost their jobs in one way or another. They have also had to compete with the 50 to 80 million peasants who have moved to the cities (Rocca, 2001). These people had to cope with steadily rising rents, which had formerly been paid by companies, the high cost of schooling for their children, and the loss of medical coverage. This process of restructuring and reforming state enterprises created a “new urban poverty”. According to official statistics, in September 1996 some 908,000 inhabitants of the urban zones of Liaoning were earning less than €12 a month, and 367,000 people had less than €8 a month to live on (Kernen and Rocca, 1998). The restructuring affected women in particular: in the textile industry, women accounted for over 70 per cent of the workforce. An incomplete statistic for 2005 shows that over 100,000 migrants from Jilin province were living overseas irregularly, at a time when over 5 million people in the province were recorded as being unemployed.29 In Belleville (the Chinese quarter of Paris with the highest concentration of immigrants from Wenzhou and Dongbei), several people used

29

Conference paper presented by the Labour Department of Jilin (China) on 1 November 2005 during a seminar on the prevention of illegal employment, organized by the ILO and the Chinese Ministry of Labour and Social Security.

39

Concealed chains

the expression “the three taos” to describe their reasons for going abroad: tao zhai (fleeing from debt), tao hun (leaving after becoming divorced) and tao jin (sifting gold). No social assistance was provided in the small towns of Dongbei and the minimum allowance was quite often paid late or only in part. Most migrants from Zhejiang and Fujian came from rural areas and the “family chain” was the main driving force behind their decision to leave for an unknown destination. Their status is established by the hukou, a book that records people’s place of residence and establishes their right to live in either a rural or urban area. Unlike many city dwellers, those assigned to rural areas have limited access to social benefits or public services. Although migration can be one way of overcoming the hukou barrier, which has been considerably softened in recent years, in practice many bypassing strategies also exist. However, for many Zhejiangnese and Fujianese the migration of family to Europe has opened a new window of possibility and they prefer to turn their eyes to this more attractive labour market. Since the early 1980s the pressure of internal migration has also played a role in external emigration. In the 1990s the area around Wenzhou in southern Zhejiang was at the height of its economic development as a result of the dynamism of the non-state sector. Many factories in the coastal provinces produced goods for export, which attracted millions of migrants from the poorest regions in western China who were prepared to accept any job for ludicrously low wages. Thousands of peasants also flocked to the port of Wenzhou, where they formed a class of small businesspeople. In this region, which is saturated with shops and boutiques, standstill social mobility and competition push the rural population to go abroad, where they turn to their overseas families. The reason immigrants most frequently give for leaving China is the desire to get rich in western countries. Some successful immigrants serve as models for a “dream trap”. These symbols foster the hope of new wouldbe emigrants, who are willing to chance their luck. The waves of regularization in France and Italy (or rather the rumours of such waves) also encourage people to emigrate. In 1997, for example, when the regularization period was at its height in France, the fare charged by facilitators (smugglers) back to China by overseas Chinese has steadily increased. The OECD estimates that, in 2004, investments made by overseas Chinese in China accounted for some 45 per cent of the country’s total foreign direct investment (UN, 2005).

Main source areas of migration Figures from France’s Agency for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) suggest that Chinese migration flows are changing. These changes include: 40

France

●

the end of immigration from urban areas in the south of Zhejiang, with immigrants now coming predominantly from rural areas;

●

an increase in the arrival of minors and young people from Zhejiang;

●

the predominance of urban immigration from northern China;

●

the emergence of migration centres from which the majority of the northern Chinese come: the Dongbei region, the province of Shandong and several other focal areas, such as the provinces of Guangxi, Jiangsu and Henan;

●

a preponderance of women among those arriving from the northern areas.30

Unlike migration from Zhejiang, which is marked by the role of the family group, migration from the north and from large metropolitan areas does not seem to be connected with a family migration project. It is often motivated by a divorce, with the aim of making a break rather than reuniting a family. France is rarely a deliberate choice for the northern Chinese (the first-choice destinations are Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States), but is a stopgap solution. The main objective is to get away and the final destination is unimportant (DPM, 2002). But for Chinese from Zhejiang, emigrating to France seems to be the obvious choice, since they have relatives who have settled there. As for married Chinese migrants, one third of their spouses stay in China, as do their children. The majority of Chinese immigrants (70 per cent) arrive in France by air with a visa. The literacy rate is low (20 per cent in the case of women) and they generally speak only their own dialect (DPM, 2002). As illustrated in figure 1 and detailed in table 3, we can identify three significant regions of origin for the Chinese in France, which correspond to three principal migration centres: ●

Dongbei, including the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang;

●

Zhejiang, and more specifically the villages of the semi-industrialized plain around Wenzhou, particularly the districts of Li’ao (20 km from Wenzhou) and Qingtian (60 km from Wenzhou);

●

Fujian, which is south of Zhejiang, where the migration tradition is as old as that of Zhejiang and the destination countries are the United States and the United Kingdom.

30

Among the new arrivals, the gender distribution by province of origin shows that the number of men and women is approximately equal in the case of immigrants from Zhejiang. The proportion of men from Fujian is larger than that of women, but in recent years more women than men have migrated from Liaoning (Li, 2002).

41

Concealed chains

Table 3 Chinese migrants’ region of origin (based on three sources)

Sample (no. of people) Zhejiang Northern region

b

Large metropolitan areas Southern provinces Other

MIRE (2000)

DPM (2001)

ASLC (2002) a

ASLC (2003–04)

987

149

15 232

5 831

58%

61%

62%

48%

26%

—

17%

22%

8% c 5%

d

—

31%

8%

— 8%

8% g

—

6% e

18% f —

Notes: a. Survey conducted by Li Minghuan for the National Scientific Research Centre and carried out at the ASLC, based on a sample of people who arrived between 1999 and 2002 (Li Minghuan, 2002b). b. Liaoning, Shandong, Heilongjiang and Jilin. c. 5% from Shanghai and 3% from Tianjin. d. 2% Fujian, 3% Guangxi, Jiangxi and Hunan. e. Mainly from Fujian. f. Only from Fujian. g. Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi and Jiangsu.

Figure 1 Principal centres of migration

Heilongjiang Jilin Liaoning Tianjin Shandong

Key: Provincial capitals Megalopolises More than 10% migration

42

Shanghai Zhejiang Jiangxi Hunan Fujian Guangxi

France

THE JOURNEY Arranging and financing the journey By analysing the flow of Chinese migrants we can identify two forms of financing and two types of itinerary. Migrants from Zhejiang rely on people smugglers, who provide the routes and administrative documents to enable migrants to arrive at their destination. The northern Chinese and those from the large metropolitan areas go through an intermediary company (zhong jie), which provides a Schengen business visa. Their savings generally suffice to pay for most of the passage before their departure. There are also two migration profiles, which correspond to two geographical contexts. In the region around Wenzhou, most would-be emigrants meet a recruiter/smuggler who is recommended by friends or family. In other cases, the migrants are recruited through small notices posted on telephone kiosks, near secondary schools or in certain shops in working-class districts, which offer a “trip to Europe, visa guaranteed” (Pivois, 2004). According to Mr Adong, there are three ways to arrive at one’s destination:

●

Using a tourist or business visa: where the immigrant arrives on a direct flight;

●

“Parachuting”: leaving China with a real passport containing the immigrant’s own photograph, along with a forged residence permit or a real transit visa, or a passport from the Schengen area (mainly Spain and Italy);

●

By land (pa shan): the most complex method, involving various modes of transport that are often combined with waterway transport. It is generally regarded as the most dangerous option. Routes are long and complicated and may involve many factors that are beyond the immigrants’ control. Migrants may have to hide in places where there is a high risk of asphyxia or dive into the water at dangerous points (including at night), even if they cannot swim.

According to interviews conducted with Chinese migrants, in 2004 the fare to Europe for people from Wenzhou ranged from €13,000 to €22,000. Getting to England cost a further €11,000 and the rate tripled for the United States. This covered travel costs: accommodation, transport and all expenditures during the journey, including additional expenses such as tourist visas. Migrants are provided with board and lodging, clothes and transport. They generally buy their passage in one single payment, which may

43

Concealed chains

even include the cost of a lawyer, appeal proceedings and cover costs upon release from the detention centre. The smugglers look after every aspect of the operation from beginning to end and the migrants are completely in their hands. The would-be migrants negotiate the price and terms of their passage with the smuggler and pay with their savings. Where these are insufficient, they turn to friends and family members and even resort to money-lenders to borrow the difference (see Chapter 1 for additional details on this mechanism). Part of the amount is forwarded to the smuggler/recruiter and serves as a guarantee. The rest of the fee is deposited with close family. The migrants then leave, following the itinerary determined by the smuggling network. They telephone their families en route, when they are allowed to do so. At the end of the journey, the family in China pays the outstanding balance as soon as the migrants phone to confirm that they have arrived at their destination safe and sound. In rare cases where there is a longstanding relationship of complete trust between the migrant and the smuggler, the migrant borrows money from him or her. This was the case with one interviewee: on arrival in France in 1992, he paid only half of the total cost of the journey but undertook to pay his debt in full by working for three years in his smuggler’s workshop in France. Most migrants are more or less aware of the risks they are taking: that they can be attacked by strangers en route, subjected to racketeering, kidnapping, unlawfully detained, or even suffer starvation. They know that the service provided by smugglers is illegal, but they are willing to take the risk. Smugglers who have provided efficient services are well known and respected among the Chinese from Zhejiang. A smuggler can be a member of the immediate family and charge a reduced price. The more removed the would-be migrant is from the family circle, the higher the rate charged. Arrangements can also concern passports, which in most cases are confiscated by the smugglers when the migrants arrive at their destination. If a smuggler is on friendly terms with a migrant or a member of the migrant’s family, the passport may be returned. If things do not go well or if the operation fails, smugglers can lose their reputation in the community and can cut themselves off from a network that they need, and from a whole system of commercial activities. When plans are unsuccessful the smugglers have to pay all the expenses incurred, and in the case of a serious incident (illness, disappearance or death) must compensate the family. Mrs Didi (case study no. 3) reports the case of the family of a person from her village: the person disappeared and the family was paid compensation equivalent to the fare, i.e. 120,000 yuan (€12,000). The dividing line between “providing a service” and human trafficking reflects a number of variables, the main ones being the would-be emigrant’s

44

France

familiarity with the smuggler, the itinerary (which may involve a high level of risk), and the violence and pressure suffered during the journey. As the Office central pour la répression de l’immigration irrégulière et de l’emploi d’étrangers sans titre (OCRIEST) notes,31 if the migrant is arrested during the journey or at the border, the case is treated as smuggling – a criminal offence. Only when the migrant arrives in the destination country can a determination be made as to whether or not he or she has been trafficked. Authorities must work back up the chain to find the trafficker and must analyse the conditions of the journey to determine whether a network was involved.

Profile and typology of people smugglers/traffickers In the French media, Chinese smugglers – known as “bosses” or “snakeheads” in Chinese jargon – are often considered to be the same as mafiosi or triad members. In the eyes of the public, the terms “mafia” or “triad” denote organized crime. What the immigrants themselves know about the smugglers’ organizations comes from their contact with them, their own experience of human smuggling and the information that circulates among acquaintances, friends and family. Two points of view emerge from their limited knowledge: ●

The smugglers constitute a “spider’s web” network that is established in various countries and includes some form of cooperation.

●

The smugglers’ organization is structured and has a hierarchy, with gang leaders in Hong Kong and Macau who control everything from a distance without moving around.

The French agency (OCRIEST) that investigates clandestine smuggling chains is categorical that the chains “are extremely well organized and are established on very sound structures”.32 They operate in a pyramid with a vertical hierarchy and through horizontal solidarity networks. Chinese immigrants’ travel documents are forged, stolen throughout the world, collated and sent back to Thailand, where they are redistributed. They note that “the facilitators are composed of recruiters, gang leaders, harbourers and guides”. The people whom migrants meet in their villages or regions are only local recruiters whose immediate superiors can be established in any country or city. According to Section 12, the Intelligence Service branch

31

French Central Agency for the Suppression of Illegal Immigration and of the Employment of Foreigners without Permits, in interviews conducted on 26 September 2003 and 28 November 2003. 32 From interviews on 26 September 2003 and 28 November 2003.

45

Concealed chains

of the Ministry of the Interior, “the people facilitator/smuggler bases are in Hong Kong and Singapore, and they have branches in every capital”.33 As far as the immigrants are concerned, their only contractual relationship is with the original smuggler. That smuggler’s relationship with his or her accomplices remains untouchable, confidential and mysterious – in most cases the smuggler claims to be working for superiors who operate elsewhere. The immigrants generally consider the role played by local smugglers in the transit countries to be unequivocal: to deliver the human “goods” to the next relay person. In order to provide the best possible service, they hire guides, interpreters, drivers, harbourers and guards: all are links in a chain.

Risks and logistics of the clandestine journey Access to destination countries depends on both the contacts that the smugglers can establish and the general political context. The methods used depend on the smugglers and the itineraries are organized mainly according to the border controls in the transit and host countries. In the case of pa shan (overland) journeys, migrants must rely on their physical strength when faced with a series of natural hazards and cope as best they can with the physical threats and psychological pressure exerted by the smugglers. The daughter of one interviewee (case study no. 3), who completed a three-month overland journey to reach France, spent several nights walking in the mountains. She nearly died on two occasions, when she almost drowned in a river and nearly suffocated in a freight car. The story of Zhang Jr (case study no. 2), a 19-year-old migrant who travelled in a small group to Europe, also shows the complexities and dangers of the pa shan option: …each handed over their baggage to the smuggler, keeping only one pair of trousers, one shirt, and one plastic bag with a few bits and pieces and some money. The smuggler took Zhang’s dollars and ID card, promising that he would send them to Zhang’s family, leaving him four dollars for cigarettes. Another smuggler took over and brought the group to the river bank where there was a motor raft, which the passengers and smuggler boarded. The crossing took four hours, during which time everyone lay down flat. When they reached the other side of the river they were in Viet Nam. The smuggler jumped into the water and swam off. The migrants waited in the raft for four hours before the smuggler reappeared, the tide went out, and they could walk ashore.

33

From an interview on 10 October 2003.

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France

A small bus arrived, carrying four Vietnamese men and one Vietnamese woman. … They stripped the migrants of what little they had left and took them to a house where they were able to rest. Three were collected; one after the other, on a motorbike during the night, but Zhang and three women were left behind. An old woman, who seemed to be the owner of the hideout, brought them Vietnamese clothes. The next day, Zhang Jr was the first to leave. After only a few minutes the motorcyclist pushed him under a bridge and kept him in the water by pushing him down with his feet. The motorcyclist then left, abandoning Zhang Jr, who could hear traffic going by above his head. After an hour, the motorcyclist came back. He asked Zhang Jr for money, but Zhang told him he had none. The motorcyclist did not believe him and started to hit him, so Zhang Jr gave him some of the 500 yuan (€50) he had hidden. The driver seemed satisfied and drove him into the mountains, where the other Chinese had already arrived. … A Vietnamese man gave them two litres of water and biscuits. The next day they took a local bus and arrived at the home of a person who fed them. They were then taken by motorbike to Hô Chi Minh City, to the home of a woman who forced them to go into the lavatory, one by one, where they were undressed and intimately searched. She even wanted to cut open Zhang’s belt to check that he was not hiding any money, but Zhang shouted and his belt was returned to him intact. He had fortunately had the time to hide some money under a wardrobe before the inspection. The migrants then took a bus to Hô Chi Minh City in order to travel to Hanoi, a journey of 48 hours. There they were taken by motorbike into the mountains, where they crossed flooded paddy fields on foot in the middle of the night. Any of the Chinese women who were unfortunate enough to slip were hit. After a four-hour march they saw searchlights and heard shots in the distance: they had arrived at the Cambodian border, which they crossed on all fours crawling through mosquito-infested swamps. There they boarded a raft and were collected by soldiers, who took them by car to a large building. The building probably belonged to a military chief, who had scores of servants working for him. They were brought clothes, which had obviously come from other migrants. The chief asked each of the women to change in his bedroom. There were three women in the group, two of about 30 years of age and one younger woman, who was ill. The two older women refused to undress in front of the chief, but the youngest woman went into the bedroom. Zhang Jr sensed that

47

Concealed chains

something was happening and stayed outside in the corridor. After about half an hour he heard the girl crying and shouting and when he went inside she was sitting on the floor and her clothes were dishevelled. The chief went out by another door, leaving his gun on the bed with a sheaf of dollars. Zhang left and took the girl with him. The next day they got into a jeep, again accompanied by armed soldiers. The women hid under the back seats and Zhang Jr was wrapped up in a coat and put up on the roof, concealed behind a soldier’s legs. In Cambodia it is still very hot in September and by the time they arrived in Phnom Penh two or three hours later Zhang’s hands and feet were completely paralysed and he was bathed in perspiration. All the immigrants we met in Paris had friends, families or acquaintances who had climbed mountains and crossed marshes on foot. Some had had to have a limb amputated; others were struck down by tropical diseases, or were lost, while others died during the course of their journey or from its after effects. Many also suffered assault and humiliation while in transit. “Leech Mountain” in Viet Nam, the “mine zone” in Poland and the war zone in The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1992 were some of the most difficult stages they cited. Immigrants who used this arduous method either had no passports or held false papers. Passports were only provided by the smugglers at the specific moment when they had to be presented and were immediately confiscated once they had been used. Some people preferred to pay more in order to avoid this arduous option, but others who had paid a lot for their passage had to travel by land nonetheless. Emigrants can be turned back at any moment in the course of their journey. Of the 4,242 Chinese who passed through the waiting area in Roissy Airport (Paris) in 2003, 3,282 were sent back to China or to the country from which they had arrived.34 On Didi Jr’s trip (case study no. 3), he and three others managed to get through customs at the Moscow airport while several dozen others were arrested for holding false travel documents. The route may be punctuated with reversals and changes, and the interviews describe how the logistics changed. In order to cope with tighter controls and other circumstances that block or slow down travel, the smugglers set up “camps” to accommodate migrants in transit. Premises are converted into reception centres, sometimes equipped with monitoring devices and security systems. Owners tend to be influential people who can avoid local government controls. Migrants may be confined for indefinite

34

Agence France Presse, 8 January 2004.

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periods in these ya zi lou (duck houses), as illustrated in the journey of Zhang Jr (case study no. 2), who passed through Cambodia (among numerous other countries) en route to Europe: A man from Wenzhou then took them to his ya zi lou, a threestorey building that served as a “reception centre” for illegal immigrants. It was nicknamed “the ducks” (yi zi) by local people, because – like ducks – the migrants were “constantly shouted at, chased from behind and forced to move on far ahead of our pursuers”. Two storeys of the building were used as accommodation, with about ten people in each bedroom. Over 100 people were waiting in transit at this “centre”. There was a well in the yard where the men washed, but the women had to make do with just a plastic bucket of water in their room. People slept on mats and the place was infested with mosquitoes. The wall around the building was two metres high; the gate was locked and watched by Cambodian guards. Zhang saw people who tried to escape and were caught and beaten up by the smugglers. People were waiting to go to the United States, England and several other European countries – some of them had been staying in the hideout for over nine months. Zhang Jr was allowed out only once in four months, to have photographs taken for his false passport. The smuggler may also have to wait in order to gather up a certain number of migrants or to obtain forged passports that best fit the migrants’ profiles and physical appearance. The testimonies suggest that human beings are transported like freight. In order to evade border controls people are “packed up” and hidden in confined spaces (car boots, railway wagons, etc.). Migrants are sometimes even stolen, like goods. The people who are supposed to meet migrants when they get off a plane may not show up, and migrants may only realize this once they have been locked up: kidnapping, torture and abuse by rival smugglers is a frequent occurrence. In certain circumstances the families are informed by telephone and forced to pay a ransom to have their relative returned to the initial “consignee” (Chambon and Smolar, 2003). The geographical organization of these operations is as complex and diversified as the transportation. Chinese migrants frequently cite these transit countries: the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Russian Federation, Spain and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The most common destination and transit countries in Asia are: Cambodia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Republic of Korea and Viet Nam; Morocco and the Frenchspeaking sub-Saharan countries are also cited for the African continent. In the case of those who came “by parachute”, transit visas for France were issued in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire.

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Concealed chains

●

In the MIRE35 survey (Pina-Guerassimoff, 2002),36 three-quarters of the people interviewed had flown to Europe: 30 per cent flew to France directly and 35 per cent had gone through another European country. The remainder had come by air and rail or by air and boat. The duration of their journey ranged from 24 hours to several months, including waiting periods and delays.

●

According to the results of the survey by the Direction de la population et des migrations37 (DPM, 2002), 69 per cent of people had travelled only by air, while the remaining 31 per cent had used various means of transport – land, air and sea. The survey also revealed the wide diversity of itineraries. Some were direct to the Schengen area, while others went through Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East or South America. Migrants often do not know all the details of their journey because of its complexity and because they are transported back and forth several times. So it is extremely difficult to map the typical route of a Chinese migrant from Zhejiang, whose journey may involve many different smuggling routes and trips.

THE VULNERABILITY OF CHINESE IMMIGRANTS IN THE DESTINATION COUNTRY Foreigners who are not EU citizens may stay in France without holding a work permit (for example, as asylum seekers or students) but they cannot obtain a work permit unless they are authorized to reside in the country. Asylum seekers may not work, except in exceptional circumstances. In the first case, offences are sanctioned under the Labour Code, whereas in the second case criminal sanctions are imposed on migrants and any person who has assisted them. When Chinese migrants arrive in France illegally without passports or with false passports, this aggravates their already precarious position and contributes to a clandestine existence. For those whose passports have been stolen or confiscated by a people smuggler the situation is no easier. In order to address this, the Chinese Embassy introduced rules in 2004 that allow “illegal immigrants who have been smuggled into France” to apply for a passport if they can prove that they have been in France for over five years. 35

Department in charge of migration within the Ministry of Labour. Survey based on information from 987 questionnaires, which were filled out at the ASLC in 1998 and 1999 during the registration of asylum seekers’ place of residence. 37 French Population and Migration Department. 36

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Isolation Many Chinese irregular migrants are at constant risk of being reported to the police or stopped for questioning38 and therefore do not dare to go out for fear of being arrested and sent back to China. The resulting isolation is increased by the fact that most do not speak French. In 1999 a survey of 500 Chinese in France conducted by the Association franco-chinoise de soutien linguistique et culturel (ASLC)39 found that the rate of illiteracy or virtual illiteracy was approximately 20 per cent (Pina-Guerassimoff, 2002). Low levels of education in China and very long work hours in France make it difficult for migrants to learn French. But without it they need an interpreter for every procedure and for every contact with the host society. This makes them dependent on the Chinese community in terms of language and information. They then have to rely on people who speak Mandarin in order to find a job, so every step they take is costly. Because of this vulnerability, the rent paid by an irregular immigrant for accommodation is often twice as high as the rent paid by people residing legally in the country. Other expenses involve the translation of official letters, occasional lawyers’ fees and payments made to all of the people who act as intermediaries in the immigrant’s search for work and accommodation, or in the purchase of a false residence or work permit, etc. This isolation explains the fact that migrants rarely ask for assistance from the host society. In interviews, labour inspectors observed that, unlike migrants of other nationalities, Chinese workers rarely lodge complaints about their working conditions. They are at a disadvantage when it comes to accessing their basic rights, due to their fear of being forced to return to China and the consequences of repatriation. The burden of debt Debt also adds to the vulnerability of Chinese migrants, who pay a higher price for their journey than other nationalities (Laczko and Thompson, 2000). The debt they incur is not “normal”, since it is the result of an illegal activity or service. Most Chinese immigrants contract a debt by the time they arrive in France (table 4). In the 2002 MIRE survey, 75 per cent of the Chinese migrants interviewed said that they had borrowed money to finance their departure and most also had debts. Migrants from the Wenzhou region of the Zhejiang province contracted debts that were twice as heavy as those

38

Art. 40, para. 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that any public official or civil servant who realizes that an offence has been committed must report it to the public prosecutor. 39 Franco-Chinese Association for Linguistic and Cultural Support.

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Concealed chains

of migrants from the other provinces. Most of the Chinese from Zhejiang still owed between €14,000 and €20,000. While migrants from the Dongbei region (corresponding to the Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces) may have saved enough in China to avoid having to borrow money, practically all immigrants from Zhejiang are in debt. In exceptional cases, migrants who cannot pay have to work for many years in the service of an employer who withholds their wages in order to transfer the money to the smuggler and thus pay back the travel expenses. Some Chinese immigrants work directly for the smuggler’s organization as members of gangs involved in racketeering, prostitution, etc. (Ma Mung, 2002a). As immigrants from Dongbei are often able to obtain a valid visa, they can avoid the most arduous conditions by travelling on a direct flight. The debts of these immigrants range from €3,000 to €5,000, lower than those from Wenzhou. But it is still very difficult for those from Dongbei to pay back the price of their passage. Although they generally have a good level of education, they lack both concrete skills and a network of acquaintances in France and have trouble finding work. People from northern China are considered unsuitable for garment making. Unless they have actually worked in the field, they do not generally find jobs sewing in garment workshops and instead do ironing work and other more menial jobs. At worst, they are recruited in Belleville for temporary unskilled jobs or “live” off casual work that earns them an average of €200 a month. Many of the women from this area of China engage in prostitution to earn extra money or as a principal activity to avoid working as a nanny. When several members of a family emigrate, the debt is extremely heavy: Mrs Didi still lives in hiding, although she has been in France for 13 years. She arrived with her younger son in 1990; each paid €11,500. Since Mrs Didi was unable to bring her family over legally, when her husband joined them in 2001, he came on a business visa and his travel expenses were even higher (€15,000). The family wanted him to travel in the best possible conditions and he came by plane. Mr Didi is 60 years old, in poor health and unable to work. He currently holds a residence permit for reasons of illness. Two of his children also came in 2001, paying €12,000 each to complete arduous overland journeys taking two to three months. The total price for the entire family was €57,000. Mrs Didi and her younger son paid back the cost of their passage between 1990 and 1993. The outstanding balance for the rest of the family amounted to €10,000 in 2003. (Case study no. 3)

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Table 4 Debt incurred by Chinese migrants

14 000

13 000

8 000

12 000

6 000

11 000

5 000

10 000

4 000

0–3 000

Debts incurred (€)

Zhejiang

13

2

2

5

8

37

29

73

91

31

Shandong

9

13

9

2

1

—

—

—

—

—

Liaoning

7

12

25

14

3

1

—

1

—

—

Jilin/Heilongjiang

3

2

2

9

3

—

—

—

—

—

Tianjin

5

2

5

2

1

1

—

—

—

—

Shanghai

8

6

9

5

1

1

—

—

—

—

Hebei

1

1

—

—

1

—

—

1

—

—

Fujian

1

—

1

1

1

1

—

1

3

—

Guangxi

1

2

5

2

2

—

—

—

—

—

48

40

58

40

21

41

29

76

94

31

Province

Total number of migrants

Source: Data provided by the ASLC in 2002.

Once Chinese migrants have arrived in France they have to work to pay off the debt for their passage. Irregular Chinese immigrants spend as little as possible when living abroad in order to pay their debts as quickly as possible and financially support their families in China. They glean the leftovers when markets are closing, frequent soup kitchens and share cramped accommodation with several other migrants. They make calculations along the lines of: “If I save €1 in France, that’s worth 10 yuan in China. You can’t do anything with €1 in France, but in China you can buy a day’s food with 10 yuan.” One immigrant made a list of his monthly budget in Paris: €130 for sharing a 50m2 apartment with about 20 people, €50 to €60 for food, which he picked up at markets at closing time, €50 for the transit pass that was essential for travelling to the restaurant where he worked as a dishwasher, and €20 for a prepaid phone card so that he could talk to his wife and two children back in China from time to time. The only large sum that he had spent – €615 – was to purchase a false tenyear residence permit, which enabled his boss to “declare” him. It took him three years to pay back the debt for his passage. The debt repayment period is likely to be from three to ten years. Monthly instalments are calculated based on a standard French wage, despite the fact that the actual wages earned by migrants are much lower. If an immigrant were to be sent back to China, where he or she would earn

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Concealed chains

a wage of €45 to €60 a month, it would take longer than a lifetime to pay the money back (Mauriac, 2003)! The combination of debt and irregular status can trap migrants in situations of vulnerability. One interviewee (case study no. 4) endured extremely difficult working conditions in repaying the debt owed to her sister, who also lived in France and who had financed her trip: As agreed in the “verbal contract”, Mrs Ming immediately started to work for her sister in order to repay her financial and personal debt. She had to get up at 7 o’clock in the morning to take her nephews to school and then work in her sister’s workshop until 1 a.m. She worked seven days a week and over 17 hours a day, looking after everything: the children, the housework and the preparation of meals for the seven garment workshop staff. As a nanny, Mrs Ming received bed and board plus €75 of pocket money, but her sister deducted the same amount for feeding her [Mrs Ming’s] son. Mrs Ming did not understand her sister’s calculation; the only thing that had been laid down and was imperative was the fact that she had to work for two years. The quality of food and accommodation was relatively good, but her sister was very hard on her. She told Mrs Ming that if she went out into the street the police would arrest her, so Mrs Ming only went out to take the children to school. Her sister was careful to remind her that, if she left, no one would employ her with a child on her hands. After a year and a half of hard labour Mrs Ming could stand it no longer and broke the contract during a quarrel. She thus found herself on the streets with her child, where she discovered that, contrary to what her sister had had her believe, there weren’t police checks everywhere. But it was difficult to find another job, since she did not know anyone and spoke no French. After finally finding work preparing and delivering ravioli for €615 per month (which included shared accommodation with six other people), Mrs Ming again found herself on the streets with her son. […] a workshop boss in Belleville agreed to give her work for a few days. On the very first day of her trial period the workshop was inspected and she was taken to the police. Mrs Ming explained to the interpreter that her son was at school and that she would have to go and collect him. The interpreter talked to the police, who released her.

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She then found a Turkish garment workshop, which gave her work to do at home. She found a one-room apartment to share with a couple and lived there with her son in disgraceful conditions. Her fellow tenants used the room and sublet the kitchen to Mrs Ming, which served as a bedroom for herself and her son. The work she did at home was piecework. The quantity to be produced varied widely and she worked hard during the high season, finishing at midnight. Often, the only meal she could give her son was a few biscuits, for lack of time and money. This example also illustrates the effect of isolation (fear of arrest, lack of connections, language barrier) that, in addition to the debt, can keep migrants in unacceptable working conditions. The garment sector is the most important job provider for Chinese expatriates. Garment manufacturing is a boom–bust business: immigrants work 15 to 18 hours a day on average in the high season, which lasts five or six months. With an average monthly wage of €310 to €460, approximately €1,550 of savings (per year) can be devoted to paying off a migrant’s debt. According to migrants’ statements, the debt repayment term varies, depending on how much they can save before leaving China and on the family network that can be mobilized in France to find work. One recent Chinese immigrant calculated that it would take him about ten years to pay back his debt, in view of the current labour market situation. “There are too many illegal immigrants,” he said, “and the police have tightened up on controls. Garments are being produced more and more in China, and the labour demand in this sector has decreased considerably compared to previous years.” For immigrants who cannot use a sewing machine, the workshop boss either offers them an apprenticeship (one to six months without pay) or they have to seek work in other sectors such as the hotel and restaurant business. In the past few years, Chinese immigrants have also been finding work in the building industry, the interior decorating business and in supermarkets. The lower wages prolong the debt repayment period, causing immigrants to work harder and longer in substandard conditions. The French authorities consider that this “vicious circle” of vulnerability and dependence promotes the conditions for forced labour: They are forced to work 16 hours a day for some time. When they manage to get papers and have no further debts to pay back, they stop working or work much less. They return to normal life within six months. They perhaps work harder than the French – they work ten hours a day, but they stop during certain periods. The period before they obtain their papers is when they work hardest,

55

Concealed chains

because they only earn half of what legal migrants earn. It’s a vicious circle.40 Once the debt has been paid off, and even after they have obtained a residence permit, Chinese immigrants may have to agree to other forms of exploitation in order to keep their job. The residence permit that is issued following legalization is generally short term and its renewal depends on the migrant finding a job. Following legalization migrants may earn even less than before, not only because they are working fewer hours per day, but because their employer arbitrarily deducts part of their wages (approximately 40 per cent). This may mean that the most vulnerable migrants remain in a cycle of dependence. But many irregular status immigrants hope to become bosses themselves one day and prefer to say nothing rather than complain about a system that they will eventually be reproducing themselves.

Violence and racketeering Violence, fear and isolation are topics that came up frequently when Chinese immigrants described relations among their compatriots. The Chinese are also often victims of assault, violence and lack of security, but few people report incidents to the police. Of the 500 migrants interviewed in the ASLC survey, 120 – i.e. 24 per cent – stated that they had been robbed on one or more occasions in 2002. There were also clashes between various ethnic groups, particularly in Belleville. The aggressors know that the Chinese with irregular status will not report them to the police. Pay day is the most dangerous day, as Chinese immigrants are paid in cash. Chinese passports also have a monetary value, particularly those that have a valid visa and can be sold to Chinese people smugglers for a small fortune.

Mr Adong stated that quite a few passports are stolen in Paris, where people specialize in this type of theft and assault. The passports are sold to smugglers for approximately €500, but the price can vary depending on the expiry date of the visa.

40

Interview with Section 12, Ministry of the Interior.

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Several murders had been committed in the Chinese community in June and July 2003, just a few days before the field research was conducted. When incidents of violence among the Chinese are reported, the French media often make no distinction between Chinese criminals and members of the triads infiltrating French territory. In fact, Chinese gangs are developing in parallel with organized irregular immigration; they react to assaults from outside the Chinese community and also take advantage of their compatriots’ vulnerability. Immigrants with irregular status are the most vulnerable target: they have no bank account, live in collective dormitories and hide what little money they earn under the mattress or on their person. Assaults in the home are a frequent occurrence. Gangs go around the streets in small groups and find out from Chinese prostitutes who the easiest victims are. They force the prostitutes to pay protection money or “borrow” money from them. One of our interviewers was approached in Belleville by armed members of the Chinese underworld demanding a financial contribution. After refusing several times, she received a phone call from one of the gangsters ordering her to pay €2,000, without giving any reason.

INTEGRATION INTO THE ECONOMY OF THE DIASPORA The Chinese immigrant population in France is one of the largest in Europe. Its estimated size ranges from 300,000 people (according to the Chinese Embassy)41 to 500,000 people (including 13,500 students) in 2005.42 Chinese immigration is concentrated mainly in Paris; 70 per cent of Chinese live in the north-east of the city and 30 per cent in the inner suburbs. In the underground economy, Chinese irregular immigrants supply cheap labour, and are vulnerable, dependent, docile and obliged to be flexible. The Chinese labour market is mainly a community market specializing in certain branches of activity (garment making, hotel and restaurant, shopkeeping). This concentration is not the result of a deliberate choice. The expansion of the ethnic business includes a niche of extreme economic exploitation. Although the employers (who are mainly from Zhejiang, South-East Asia and Turkey) are directly responsible for working conditions, ethnicity is not the only factor that contributes to exploitation. Other

41

The figure includes only people in possession of Chinese passports: 100,000 holders of Chinese passports and 200,000 people who are of Chinese descent but have French nationality, including the Chinese from Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam. 42 Based on research conducted in 2006 by Dr Pierre Picquart and Dr Li Minghuan for Impact Assessment and Monitoring Mechanism for the EU–CHINA Tourism Agreement (ADS), a report to the European Commission (unpublished).

57

Concealed chains

important factors include the way in which production is organized and the structure of the French labour market. In the garment-making sector, for instance, French manufacturers and big commercial companies are at the top of a subcontracting pyramid: “We can say that all the French manufacturers are involved … the donneurs d’ordre, which place orders, can be the big garment brands.”43 It would be too easy to accuse only the Chinese employers and disregard the connection between this ethnic economy and the local French labour market: The ethnic Chinese economy would not exist if it were not for the essential network that has been created between this small-scale entrepreneurial business activity and local clients. ... In a local market marked by strong competition, sizeable profit margins can only be achieved through illegal employment relationships and conditions. The laoban (employers) take advantage of the extreme flexibility of the labour force and of the tacit agreement of the Chinese workers. ... It is the rules of the local market itself that prevent the Chinese firms from abandoning improper practices. (Rastrelli, 2001, p. 134) French law enforcement records confirm that almost all the French garment brands are present in Chinese clandestine workshops, so it is not surprising that Chinese ethnic businesses can expand so quickly and be constantly short of labour. The only way for small Chinese family firms to earn more is to employ more workers in order to increase output: “[V]ery small family firms make use of their comparative advantages: abundant cheap labour, working hours much longer than statutory working time, small profit margins. This type of practice is conducive to the development of clandestine immigration, since the only way to raise income is to intensify the labour factor” (Béja and Wang, 1999, p. 64).

Concentration in certain economic sectors Work is of crucial importance for integration. Data on first-arrival migrants shows a tendency to concentrate in certain sectors where the entrepreneurs are mainly Chinese. The rapid increase in the number of firms creates a labour demand, which is met by immigration whenever the local Chinese

43

From interviews with OCRIEST and labour inspectors on 26 September 2003 and 26 October 2003, respectively.

58

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labour supply is inadequate (Ma Mung, 1991, 2002b). The ethnic economy creates an ethnic labour market, and vice versa.

The ethnic Chinese niche The 1999 census recorded a higher proportion of entrepreneurs among the Chinese than the French national average: 2.7 per cent for the total working population and 10.6 per cent for ethnic Chinese (Ma Mung, 2004). At the same time, the number of Chinese firms employing more than ten wage earners is lower than the national average, since they are often small familyrun enterprises. The workers are steeped in an entrepreneurial philosophy, and some prefer to be paid a piece-rate rather than an hourly rate. The majority of ethnic Chinese immigrants (76.7 per cent) work in the consumer goods industry, commerce and services for private individuals – 30.2 per cent work in the hotel and restaurant sector and 23.8 per cent in commerce (Ma Mung, 2004). The MIRE sample corroborates these figures and also shows a high proportion of Chinese immigrants in three main sectors – 38 per cent in garment making, 26 per cent in the hotel and restaurant sector, and 15 per cent working as domestic help or nannies – as well as 9 per cent in the building industry and less than 5 per cent in hawking and the leather goods sector. Also, 5 per cent of the sample said that they had no job. Through the subcontracting system, the majority of migrants are employed in the formal economy. In the ASLC survey on working conditions (based on questionnaires completed by 910 asylum seekers, who are not entitled to work), three main sectors of activity emerged: the garment industry (43 per cent), the hotel and restaurant business (23 per cent) and domestic service (17 per cent). Irregular status Chinese immigrants also worked in the building industry (7 per cent), the leather goods industry (2.6 per cent) and hawking (2 per cent). Chinese immigrants almost always recruit and are recruited from their own community. The concentration of Chinese immigrants in certain economic sectors is also apparent from the results of the inspection of illegal labour. Between 1997 and 2002 the vast majority of the ethnic Chinese detained for questioning in connection with this offence were working in the garment-making sector, the hotel and restaurant business, and the building sector. Bringing workers into France legally Statistics from OMI (known since April 2009 as the Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration or OFII44), which used to be the only body 44

French Office for Immigration and Integration.

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authorized to recruit and bring foreign workers into France, show a downward trend in the number of permanent Chinese workers who entered France from 1990 to 2003 (OMI, 2004). More specifically, 201 Chinese entered as permanent workers in 2002. Only one was registered in the domestic service sector, while 59 were registered in the hotel and restaurant sector. Of the total, 112 obtained their work permits through regularization procedures and only 89 came directly from China (OMI, 2002). By way of comparison, between 1993 and 1999 the number of Chinese stopped on the street or arrested at work because of their irregular status increased from 3 to 10 per cent of the total number of foreigners apprehended for this offence, rising from 765 to 2,439 people (Béja and Wang, 1999). Over three-quarters of the Chinese who obtained the status of permanent worker in France were already in the country and had regularized their immigration status. We are witnessing a sort of statutory immigration process in which people who have physically arrived in France on a given date do not appear in the statistics until they have been granted legal status (DPM, 2002).

Table 5 Permanent workers of Chinese nationality entering France by legal channels, 1990–1999 Year of arrival in France

No. of permanent Chinese workers entering France (A)

No. of permanent workers entering France (B)

Ratio of Chinese to permanent workers (A/B)

1990

516

22 393

2%

1991

894

25 607

3%

1992

809

42 255

2%

1993

284

24 388

1%

1994

528

18 349

3%

1995

149

13 106

1%

1996

106

11 450

1%

1997

107

11 004

1%

1998

129

10 324

1%

1999

111

10 895

1%

Total

3 633

189 771

2%

Source: OMI, 1991–2004.

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Table 5 shows that during the 1990s, a period when Chinese ethnic businesses were suddenly created en masse, only a few workers were introduced into the economy via migration services. Strong demand for the Chinese labour force pushed employers to turn to irregular workers. All of these factors demonstrate that the Chinese labour force has little opportunity to legally access the French labour market.

Working conditions by sector of activity The last census reported the existence of 1,700 Chinese businesses in France, 850 of which were restaurants in Paris (Chabrun, 2003). It is not clear what criteria were used to determine these figures or what type of commercial structures they concern. Furthermore, it is often not possible to establish the nationality of entrepreneurs or shareholders where “front” companies are used, so these figures are probably much lower than the actual figures.

The garment-making sector and the subcontracting chain Figure 2 Nationalities of employers utilizing illegal labour in the textile and garment industry, France, 2002

Other 26.32%

French 42.11%

Chinese 10.53%

Belgian 5.26%

Algerian 5.26%

Turkish 10.53%

Source: Data provided in 2002 by La Direction générale de la Police nationale and La Direction centrale de la Police aux frontières.45

45

General Directorate of the National Police (DGPN)/Central Directorate of the Border Police (DCPAF).

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Traditionally, the Chinese community has not worked in the garmentmaking sector. The development of this sector is closely related to the progress of the textile industry within China, which has become the world’s leading textile producer. Until January 2005, a system of quotas limited the quantity of textile products entering the European Union from China and most purchasing centres in Europe used intermediaries to import Chinese products. The development and continuation of textile manufacturing in France by Chinese immigrants can be partly explained by these administrative complications, as well as the wave of immigration in the late 1980s. As a result, this economic sector grew in significance. With China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2004, the quota system was abolished and there was a sharp increase in textile imports by Chinese firms established in France. Theoretically, this change should gradually lead to the disappearance of workshops on French territory. These garment workshops may well continue to operate during “busy periods”, but it is hard to know whether they will continue to absorb exploitable labour, since the “Sentier system” (see explanation below) does not operate the same way. For Chinese dealers established in France, there are two major drawbacks to importing garments manufactured in China. First, importers in France run higher commercial risks than manufacturers in China, as they have to import and warehouse substantial amounts of goods and absorb the loss if they don’t sell. Second, a relocated production chain takes time, while fashions change rapidly in France. This results in the following system, as described by Mr Adong:

Small workshops still exist to compensate for these two disadvantages. When a model is out of stock in France and the distribution chain has to meet a demand within a few days, Chinese labour in Paris and the surrounding area is mobilized. Whenever a dealer presents a sample or a model to a client, the client may order a large quantity, which has to be manufactured within a short period of time (3,000 items within a week, for example). One of the best ways to cope with this sort of situation is to distribute the work around the small workshops in the surrounding area, since the wholesaler will not take the risk of stocking garments.

When the work is being shared out the dealer becomes what is known as the donneur d’ordre, and the workshop boss to whom the work is given is the façonnier. This system, which is called the “Sentier system”, has been

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operating in the garment-making trade in France for 20 or 30 years. In order to function it has to be very flexible and rely on an extremely flexible labour force that can work up to 20 hours a day in order to produce the goods within a very short time. This system is related almost exclusively to women’s fashions, which require a rapid response as soon as a model attracts a buyer. The Sentier system is also a “Dutch auction” system: the prices are imposed by the donneur d’ordre on the façonnier, who has no choice but to accept. The façonnier then organizes the production of the goods and manages the labour, using foreigners employed without proper employment procedures. The donneur d’ordre only pays when the work carried out by the subcontractor has been performed. There are more small clandestine structures in Paris, organized on the family model and usually employing no more than ten people. This is because the large garment workshops have been relocated to the suburbs, where there are fewer police detectives and labour inspectors. These garment workshops are often located in the large basements of private houses, which have several entrances and thus make inspection operations and detaining for questioning more difficult. As for the small work premises, the workshop is either where the workers go to work, or a private home equipped with machines bought with the family’s own savings. Section 12 estimates that almost 1,500 garment workshops were set up in France in 1997 alone. In addition to these listed workshops, many small workshops are not listed and it is difficult to establish whether these unlisted workshops are undeclared and illegal, or are “home-work” workshops. This loophole, which is compounded by the absence of employment contracts, makes it impossible to distinguish between clandestine wage earners and a self-employed worker, such as a workshop boss. This ambiguous situation means that home workers are liable to be heavily fined, and even sent to prison, if the authorities consider them to be their own employers. The turnover during the high season is almost €23,000 per month for a workshop boss, with a monthly profit of approximately €4,600–€6,200. But there is a considerable difference between the high season (January, February, July, August, September and December) and the quiet season, when workers along the entire production chain, from boss down to worker, earn much less or indeed nothing at all. According to Ma Mung, the Sentier system traditionally recruits immigrants who have just arrived, because they are more vulnerable. “In the 1980s it was mainly Yugoslavs who worked in the garment sector and less frequently the Chinese. … Immigrants end up in the ‘Sentier system’ sooner or later, and often the immigrants involved are fairly recent arrivals.”46

46

From the transcripts of a recorded interview with Emmanuel Ma Mung on 7 June 2003.

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The work of a sewer is marked by periods of intensive activity followed by lulls. Consequently, it is costly to manage staff throughout the year, particularly when business is at its lowest ebb. Donneurs d’ordre and manufacturers keep the number of employees to a minimum and use façonniers to assemble the garments. A manufacturer can place an urgent order on a Friday evening and 2,000 items of clothing will be ready for the following Monday. With its unlimited flexibility and unquestionable vulnerability, irregular labour meets these requirements and is also paid a meagre wage: an employee works 12 to 15 hours a day in an enclosed space, in artificial lighting, breathing the dust of the fabrics, and earns an average of €770 a month during the high season. It is the inability of these workers to defend their rights, or their fear of doing so, that has allowed these abusive practices to continue. The subcontractor does not necessarily have legal status and can hire other irregular status immigrants through a front company. Section 12 describes the donneurs d’ordre as follows: [They can be] manufacturers of all nationalities, but the vast majority are Chinese. There is generally a purchasing centre which places orders with the dealers in the 11th arrondissement or the Sentier district. The work is given to a workshop which has a legal façade, and then the person in charge of the workshop that is declared distributes the work to home workers. The people at the bottom of the production chain are 99 per cent Chinese; the workshop bosses are 80 per cent Chinese; half of the wholesalers are Chinese; and the other half are of the other nationalities represented in the Sentier district (mainly members of the Tunisian Jewish community). The subcontractors can specialize in various links in the production chain: there are sewing workshops, ironing workshops, assembly workshops and “buttonholes”. Home work is the last link in the subcontracting chain, as is illustrated by the experience of the Li family. Mr Li, a former businessman in the oil sector, came to France with this wife after losing a number of investments during the 1997 Asian crisis. Today, the couple and their 3-year-old daughter live in one room, well hidden on the top floor of a small building in a suburb just outside the Paris boundary, where police controls are less frequent. There are five sewing machines in their 10 m2 room since “it’s safer to work at home”. Mr Li keeps several bottles of wine to offer to neighbours so that they won’t report the family to the police because of the noise the sewing machines make at night. He collects the garments, which have already been

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cut out, and sews them up at home. Although the price paid per item has dropped considerably in the past few years because of sustained competition, his basic expenses (food and lodging) have not decreased. The only solution that Mr Li can see if he is to stay solvent is to work even harder. He is also employed in the building industry and sometimes does decorating work in Chinese restaurants, shops or homes. He works on building sites from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. and comes home at 8 p.m., when he has something to eat, and then sews until midnight. The couple leave their little girl with a lady during the day, so that she does not breathe the fabric dust. Mr Li has fixed several wooden planks to the middle of the wall to serve as beds, with plastic netting all the way round to prevent the little girl from falling out. He is proud of the furniture, which he has made himself thanks to his experience on building sites in France. Mr Li pays a very high rent for his room because he has no papers and thus cannot sign a lease. A “friend” signed the contract for him, but Mr Li also had to pay this friend for signing. (Case study no. 5) Once they have paid off their debts and their status is regularized, immigrant workers often want to open their own business; opening a garment workshop is the first mark of entrepreneurial success. A garment workshop requires a fairly limited outlay (less than €30,000), compared to other businesses such as cafés or restaurants (at least €230,000), and is often the first choice of the future manager. The funds required to open the workshops are typically acquired through an informal Chinese money-collecting system (tontine), where people contribute and borrow money from other members of the group.

The hotel and restaurant sector The hotel and restaurant sector and the building industry are the sectors that use the largest number of illegally employed workers, including Chinese (see figure 3 for nationalities of these employers). As a member of Section 12 put it, “I don’t think there is a single Chinese restaurant in Paris which doesn’t have an illegal immigrant.” Like employers in the garment sector, restaurant managers have adapted to the increase in police checks and inspections by encouraging employees to work at home. Chinese ravioli workshops enable caterers to organize their businesses so they can avoid paying social contributions and taxes or meeting hygiene requirements. The structure is similar to that of the garment workshop: they are small, employ four or five people, are responsible for a large output and sometimes have a large number of donneurs d’ordre. The Intelligence Service reports that these workshops also prepare

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fish kebabs and sushi for Japanese restaurants in Paris, 90 per cent of which are run by Chinese. Referring to these homeworkers, one inspector explained: They may indeed be self-employed when they make the ravioli, which they then sell to the restaurants, but there can also be a situation of subordination. It depends on the scenario: in some cases it is understood that the person had autonomous clandestine business premises, whereas in others the ravioli manufacturers have been considered to be employees of the restaurant. Both situations exist. In all cases, the working conditions are appalling: small apartments are used where an impressive volume of ravioli etc. is produced in a day in deplorable hygiene and preservation conditions. It’s exploitation from beginning to end, because the caterer buys each piece of ravioli for €0.50 and then sells it in his shop for at least €3. The experience of Mr Guo, who had just arrived in France, is representative: Mr Guo began to look for work as soon as he landed in Paris and was recruited by a garment workshop. Since he did not know how to sew he had to serve a one-month apprenticeship without pay. He was then paid a wage of €460 per month. He worked from 8 a.m. to 3 a.m. the following morning. There were three people in the workshop. The boss forbade them to go out, locking them in the workshop each time he went out himself. Mr Guo suffered from frequent nosebleeds. During the 23 days that he worked in that workshop he was allowed out only once to telephone his family. He finally could stand it no longer and left. In his efforts to find a new job he met another employer who required him to deposit his passport in exchange for six months of work. Mr Guo refused to do so. His situation today is hardly any better: “I now work in a restaurant washing dishes. I work 12 hours a day there, six days a week, and my wage is €300 per month. I eat and sleep in the restaurant. It’s like a death penalty for me. My hands are in a terrible mess. I still have €9,000 of debts to pay back.” (Case study no. 6)

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Figure 3 Nationalities of employers utilizing illegal labour in the hotel and restaurant industry, France, 2002

Sri Lankan 3.70%

Chinese 5.93%

Italian 4.44%

Other 8.89%

French 55.56%

Tunisian 5.19% Moroccan 2.96%

Algerian 5.19% Turkish 8.15% Source: Data provided in 2002 by La Direction générale de la Police nationale and La Direction centrale de la Police aux frontières.

Domestic service The domestic service sector also employs vulnerable workers – undocumented migrants and people who do not speak French. Women from Dongbei who have no significant community network in France often work as nannies or general helpers in the service of the Chinese from Zhejiang or people from South-East Asia. These Dongbei women are between 35 and 50 years old and have acquired experience with their own children. They generally come from towns or cities and most have a fairly good level of education. Furthermore, they speak Mandarin, which is highly valued by their employers who do not always have a command of the language. For these women from the north of China, working for compatriots of peasant origin, who are often illiterate, is a social and cultural shock. The relationship of economic interdependence and the socio-cultural gap between women from Dongbei and people from Zhejiang give rise to deep hostility. The ASLC survey and the two case studies that follow illustrate the fact that, of all of the sectors – both formal and informal – where immigrant labour is concentrated, domestic service is the sector in which women work the longest hours, often 21 hours per day. They are typically given bed and board, are paid between €400 and €500 a month, and live in

67

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extreme conditions: they are underfed, sleep on mattresses on the floor, and are at their employers’ disposal 24 hours a day. The Chinese maid who lives in the apartment above mine works 365 days a year, from 7 a.m. until after midnight. … She does not speak a word of French except “good morning” and “good evening”. … All I know is that she has been there for at least five years. … She is … being kept in a situation of dependence because of the language, continuous work and isolation. … That maid is a veritable slave. There are many cases like hers, because they escape the control of the Labour Inspectorate. Sister A comes from a small town in the province of Jilin. The business where she worked closed 15 years ago and she received no compensation. Her husband’s firm closed six years ago and he then worked as a street porter, earning €42–€56 per month. They have a 15-year-old son, who is at secondary school. After paying a “travel agency” over €8,400, she came to France on a business visa for the Netherlands, with a transit visa for Paris. She sold her own house and her mother’s house for a total of €6,300, and her sister lent her the rest of the money. The family no longer has any accommodation in China; her husband moved in with his mother, and their son went to live with an aunt. When she arrived in Paris she found work as a nanny with a couple from Wenzhou, who had two children. Sister A had to get up at 5 a.m. and went to bed at midnight, six days a week, for a monthly wage of €615. One day she lost consciousness during her work and was taken to hospital by ambulance. She had to stay in hospital for over two months and when she was discharged the family no longer wanted her. So she found another job in the garment industry with an employer from Wenzhou, who hid his irregular status workers in a garage converted into a workshop. Sister A’s work consisted of stamping snap fasteners into garments. It was wintertime and the garage was not heated. She worked 18 hours a day and the joints on her arm became deformed. One day she had a terrible pain in her abdomen and her employer asked her to leave the premises immediately. Sister A lost consciousness again before reaching her home and was taken to hospital, where she had an operation, which did not go well. The doctors diagnosed another serious condition requiring long-term treatment for thrombosis; she was able to obtain a residence permit for reasons of illness. Meanwhile, a Chinese girlfriend from her home town introduced her to a 60-year-old French gentleman. Sister A went to live in his home and took care of the housework as far as her

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state of health permitted. This gentleman gave her bed and board and sometimes also some pocket money (€60–€70 a month). By the time Sister A had been in France for three years she had only sent €1,100 back to China, which was not enough to pay off the debt owed for her passage. (Case study no. 7) The Committee Against Modern Slavery was set up in 1994 to expose and combat these sorts of the situations, and provides social and legal assistance. Of the 375 cases recorded between 1998 and March 2003, fewer than 10 (approximately 2.5 per cent) concerned victims of domestic slavery who were of Chinese origin.

Prostitution Chinese prostitution in France increased considerably with the arrival of women from Dongbei around 1997 and has since grown steadily (TF1, 2006). In contrast to those from Zhejiang, most women from Dongbei suffer a considerable drop in social status and have no community contacts. The work they are able to obtain is either casual (as in the garment industry) or unbearable (as in the field of domestic service), and both in many cases. For many, prostitution seems the easiest way to make ends meet and sometimes becomes their main source of income. Sister B’s sister came to collect her at the Paris airport and the first thing she said was: “You have no idea how hard life is here. I can’t tell the family the whole truth – they’d worry about me. I tried to persuade you not to come but you wouldn’t listen to me…” She admitted she was working as a prostitute and suggested that Sister B choose between xia hai (becoming a prostitute) and working as a nanny – in that order. Sister B was insulted by this proposal and decided to work as a nanny for a family from Wenzhou with two children, one of whom had Down’s Syndrome. The mother never gave her a minute’s rest and she was only paid €500 a month. Four months later, Sister B could stand the situation no longer; she and her sister calculated how long it would take to pay off the debt if she continued to work as a nanny. Disheartened by the hard work and meagre wage, Sister B decided to become a prostitute in the hope of clearing the debt as soon as possible. A Chinese woman from the same region accompanied her every day for the first month in the République district and taught her the ropes. Sister B charged €20–€30 a time, but she did not have the knack for selecting clients. Some left without paying her; others attacked her and stole money, her mobile phone or even her metro ticket.

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For Chinese prostitutes a mixed marriage seems the only way out of their clandestine existence or indeed out of prostitution. The gentleman with whom Sister B is now living is a former client of Turkish origin but with French nationality. He suggested that she come and live with him after meeting her three times. She accepted, since she can save €100 on accommodation expenses and she feels protected. Living with a Frenchman means that she can escape the false “protection money” or “loans” demanded by Chinese racketeers. Sister B continues to work as a prostitute during the day and goes back to the Frenchman’s apartment in the evening. She earns much less than she used to earn, as her “partner” does not want her to go out at night. She has to listen to what he says because she hopes that he will marry her. Her only wish is to obtain a residence permit as soon as possible so she can work “like everybody else”. (Case study no. 7)

LEGISLATION, POLICIES AND ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES Immigration policy and legislation Measures to combat illegal labour (where the aim is to identify the person responsible – the donneur d’ordre) sometimes run parallel to efforts to combat irregular immigration (where the objective is to expel such people from France). Steps are being taken to establish and improve institutional coordination, communication and assistance to victims, as well as to strengthen enforcement in the legal field through criminalization, selective suppression, etc. French law protects particularly vulnerable people, such as foreigners with an irregular immigration status, against degrading working and living conditions.47 It is an offence to obtain services that are either unpaid or for which “a payment is made which is clearly out of proportion with the extent of the work performed by a person whose vulnerability or dependence is manifest or known to the offender”. It is also an offence to subject “another person whose vulnerability is manifest or known to the perpetrator to degrading working or living conditions”. Thus, two elements must be present to constitute the offence: the vulnerability or situation of depen-

47

Articles 225-13 and 225-14 of the Criminal Code, as amended in the new Criminal Code, which entered into force on 1 March 1994.

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dence of the victim and abuse of that vulnerability or dependence by the perpetrator. A minor is automatically considered to meet the criteria of vulnerability or dependence, but in most other cases the judge has a wide margin of discretion in assessing whether the offence has been committed. It has proven extremely difficult to implement these provisions, because the concepts of “vulnerability” and “dependence” were not precisely defined and the offences were criticized as containing “ambiguities that could be prejudicial to their application”.48 The courts have been extremely cautious; there were only 114 convictions between 1994 and 2003.49 Of these convictions, 86 people were of French nationality and four were Chinese. Legislators therefore changed the definition of the offence by replacing the phrase “by taking advantage of that person’s vulnerability or situation of dependence” with “whose vulnerability or dependence is manifest or known to the offender”.50 Prior to this modification, the law was challenged by the ECtHR as an improper interpretation of forced labour in national law. This was likely because, as a fundamental human right, forced labour cannot be equated simply with low wages or poor working conditions. In the Siliadin v. France case,51 the ECtHR noted that the purpose of the provisions was primarily to combat unscrupulous entrepreneurs who exploit foreign irregular workers. However, the court also noted that: [the] current wording of the Criminal Code, especially that of Article 225-14, is highly ambiguous, since it requires, on the one hand, that the victim has been subjected to working or living conditions that are incompatible with human dignity and, on the other, that those conditions have been imposed through the “abuse” of his or her vulnerability or state of dependency, while undermining human dignity ought to be an offence in itself already.52 The court thus concluded that the provisions in articles 225-13 and 225-14, at material time, did not deal specifically with the right to freedom from forced labour, but concerned, “in a much more restrictive way, exploitation through labour and subjection to working and living conditions that are incompatible with human dignity”53 and judged that there had been a violation of the French Government’s obligations to protect citizens

48

Information report by the French National Assembly’s joint fact-finding taskforce on the various forms of modern slavery, tabled on 12 December 2001. 49 National Criminals Records, SDSED, Ministry of Finance. 50 The wording of articles 225-13 and 225-14 was changed using sections 33 and 34 of the Act of 18 March 2003. 51 Siliadin v. France, Application No. 73316/01, Strasbourg, 26 July 2005. 52 Ibid., para. 48. 53 Ibid., para. 142.

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against forced labour. The question is open as to whether the modification has brought French legislation in line with the requirements of international law as far as forced labour is concerned. However, it is now sufficient to show that the employer was, or should have been, aware of the situation of vulnerability or dependence in order to establish that the offence was committed, without having to prove that the employer took advantage of it. But proving that employers were aware of such a situation remains difficult, because many victims present false papers in order to find a job, allowing employers to claim not to have known that the papers were not genuine. In practice, foreigners who are employed without proper administrative procedures may be asked by their employer to spend €615 to purchase a false residence permit, which then enables them to find a job and “covers” their boss. This was the case with one of the migrants in our panel, who had debts amounting to €12,300 and only earned €460 a month. These difficulties are compounded by the ponderous nature of legal proceedings and sometimes by clemency on the part of judges, which is more or less proportionate to the gravity of the offences. Proceedings may be slow because of the complexity of the cases, the meticulous work of the investigators, the need to start a criminal investigation, or bottlenecks in court hearings, as shown in the following: “When we inspect a workshop, what do we do?” asks an OCRIEST commander. “We make excellent observations and take photographs. We create photograph albums to expose the deplorable conditions. We, as police officers, might imagine that when we show this to the magistrates the penalty will be at least doubled. But, no! They take note of this evidence, but when it comes to making a ruling it is completely forgotten. We once inspected a workshop where there were two children suffering from tuberculosis who were practically attached to the machine because their mother was working. Did the fellow, the workshop boss, get a heavier prison sentence? No! The sentence he got was not any more severe.” In the Labour Inspectorate, it usually takes two years (18 months at best) before a decision is made to prosecute:54 “[P]roceedings at the prosecution level are generally very complex, very long and ineffective. … The workshop has time to disappear, or the manager has time to become an employee.”

54

The departments of the Intelligence Service, on the other hand, have a maximum of two months and merely need to telephone the public prosecutor directly to have people be summonsed rapidly.

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Migrants in an irregular situation tend to confuse the Labour Inspectorate with the police, which is perhaps why so few Chinese wage earners file complaints. A labour inspector whose responsibility covers 5,000 Chinese wage earners stated that in ten years he had only received five complaints of physical violence by an employer (DPM, 2002). Other labour inspectors that were interviewed described widespread substandard labour conditions, while noting factors that prevented workers from pursuing arbitration or other channels: Inspector 1: There are all sorts of working conditions. … There are people who are in basements, in cellars, with the machine for preparing rice in the middle of the room. In other places, people are sleeping on a mattress while a 12-year-old child is busy sticking little labels on garments. Inspector 4: I often see reports of Chinese establishments with appalling hygiene conditions. There is generally no lavatory at all or there is a kitchen with a lavatory corner without any partition wall and without any flushing system and often nothing for washing one’s hands. I receive apocalyptic descriptions of squalor from my inspection officers. I remember one case … in Val de Marne [an outer Paris suburb]: there was one main room with a sewing machine and in one corner there were mattresses piled one on top of the other where people were sleeping […]. And then there was a second room, but the only separation was a transparent plate-glass window, and that room served as a canteen with a lavatory in one corner. Which meant that when you were using the lavatory you were sitting opposite your colleagues who were at the table. … They went out very little, ate their meals and slept on site in deplorable conditions with a high risk of contracting a disease. It was unbelievable! You don’t see that so often in Paris these days, probably because they’ve gone to the suburbs. Interviewer 1: […] Were they locked in by the boss? Inspector 4: Yes, apparently. They were terrorized by those people [the bosses] – I can still see them […]. The police took them [the workers] away and I don’t know what happened to them afterwards. Inspector 2: I would like to tell you about a garment workshop in Belleville. This case is connected to the problem that holiday regulations are not always complied with. It involved a woman who had a stroke caused by extreme fatigue. She had been working 12 hours a day for three years without a single day’s leave. When she wanted to go back to her job, the employer no longer wanted to take her on and so she filed a complaint with the labour arbitration board. She obtained six months’ wages. … We see a lot of similar cases…

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Interviewer 2: Can an irregular status worker also receive that compensation? Inspector 2: Yes. But he has to go to the arbitration board – and he’s already afraid of us. …. Inspector 4: They are in a situation of dependence. Since they live in a closed community, many of them can spend years in France without speaking any French or knowing what their rights are. Under the Labour Code, a foreigner who is employed illegally is in the same position as a worker who is working legally with regard to pay, years of service and severance pay.55 Workers who are not paid or sufficiently remunerated for their work may apply to the Labour Arbitration Board, whose task is to determine their pay in accordance with the law. But although an illegally employed foreigner who brings a case before the Board is entitled to remain on French territory during the lawsuit, there is no guarantee that the police will not be waiting when he or she walks out of the court. Irregular immigrants can be prosecuted for entering, residing or moving in France illegally, and may be sentenced to imprisonment for one year and fined €3,750.56 The court also has the power to ban such foreigners from French territory – in effect, expulsion. For all these reasons, foreigners who are employed illegally generally do not draw attention to themselves by reporting their working conditions. They prefer to sacrifice wages for several months of work, for which they have either been badly paid or not paid at all, in exchange for relative security.

The criminalization of human trafficking The mechanisms for combating illegal labour and the law criminalizing assistance for illegal entry or residence were, for a long time, the only means of cracking down on labour exploitation and irregular immigration, which were treated as two separate issues. In 2003 a new law was passed which made human trafficking a criminal offence and granted the victims an immigration status.57 Prison sentences for those convicted of trafficking range from seven years and a fine of €150,000 for simple cases to life imprisonment and a fine of €4,500,000 in cases involving an organized gang, or where torture or acts of brutality have been inflicted. 55

Art. L. 341-6-1 of the Labour Code (Act No. 81-941 of 17 October 1981; Act No. 90-613 of 12 July 1990). 56 For non-compliance with sections 5 and 6, and 19, of the Ordinance of 2 November 1945. 57 Act No. 2003-239 of 18 March 2003, which reflects France’s obligations not only under the Palermo Protocol (ratified in October 2002), but also by virtue of the EU Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings.

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A temporary residence permit can be withdrawn from foreigners who are liable to prosecution for human trafficking or the exploitation of begging.58 In September 2007, a decree was adopted that specifically addressed the rights and protection of victims of human trafficking. For the first time, provision was made for a period of reflection, which allows victims to legally remain in the country while deciding whether to collaborate with authorities. This provision enhances the victims’ access to their rights while in France.59

Measures to combat organized crime In 2004 the French Parliament adopted a far-reaching reform of the Criminal Code60 to cope with the evolution of transnational and national crime. The law created eight interregional courts, which specialize in organized crime and have jurisdiction in the judicial districts of several courts of appeal. Specialist magistrates and special assistants, who are able to advise in very technical prosecutions, were appointed to the courts. New investigation techniques are also available to magistrates and investigators. They include surveillance, infiltration, night searches, the interception of telephone communications in the context of an inquiry (and not only in the context of a criminal investigation), installation of sound and image recording equipment, and the power to hold suspects in police custody for an extended period (up to 96 hours). The Act of 9 March 2004 extended the definition of an organized gang and increased the penalties for many offences committed by those gangs, including human trafficking and procuring, and assisting in the illegal entry, movement or residence of a foreigner in France. Between 2000 and 2003, three cases concerning Chinese smuggling chains were reported to the Office for Combating Organized Crime, Terrorism and Money-Laundering (in the Ministry of Justice), including one connected to a prostitution network. This number did not reflect the number of cases brought to court, since whether or not a case is reported is left to the discretion of the magistrate. As several experts from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice point out, the legislative “arsenal” is no longer deficient in relation to human trafficking because the 2003 law filled a legal gap by defining “human trafficking” in the Criminal Code (though only one case was

58

Ibid., art. 75. Decree no. 2007-1352 of September 2007. 60 Act No. 2004-204 of 9 March 2004 adapting the law to developments in crime, published in the Official Gazette on 10 March 2004. 59

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recorded as of January 2008).61 By way of comparison, convicting a defendant for assisting in the illegal entry or movement of a foreigner, or in securing residence for a foreigner, is still the only means of cracking down on the smuggling of migrants, although the networks of organized crime have been expanding in the last few years (see table 6). Of the 4,566 people convicted of the offences below, 1,018 were of French nationality and 190 were Chinese. As mentioned earlier, the legislation was recently modified, but its enforcement remains to be assessed. Table 6 Convictions for assisting the illegal entry or residence of a foreigner France, 1997–2003 Description of the offence

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003*

Assisting the illegal entry, movement or residence of a foreigner in France

611

668

684

745

538

512

612

0

1

2

0

12

8

26

0

0

0

3

54

35

55

611

669

686

748

604

555

693

Assisting the illegal entry, movement or residence of a foreigner in a State party to the Schengen Convention Assisting the illegal entry, movement or residence of a foreigner in a State party to the Schengen Convention, in an organized gang Subtotal Total

4 566

Note: * Incomplete figures. Source: National Criminal Records, SDSED, Ministry of Justice (data provided to authors).

Efforts to combat employers using illegal labour Illegal labour can lead to serious economic and social disorders, such as the deterioration of working conditions, non-payment of wages or payment that is lower than the legal minimum, and loss of revenue for the State and welfare agencies. It also generates unfair competition with enterprises that comply with the law. Illegal labour is also a contributing factor in encouraging irregular immigration, as is explained by DILTI:

61

Figure given to the authors on 7 February 2006 by the Ministry of Justice (research and information circulation office, DAGE/SDSED), which showed that there had been no recorded conviction of offence as defined by art. 225-4 of the Penal Code. However, a case relating to the trafficking of babies of Bulgarian origin was prosecuted in November 2007.

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Illegal labour fosters illegal immigration and vice versa. Unscrupulous employers thus have a labour force at their disposal which is particularly docile and undemanding because it is vulnerable. This vulnerability results in working conditions which are often degrading. Although a clear distinction must be made between illegal labour and illegal immigration, measures to pursue a policy to control migratory flows must inevitably include action to deplete the resources of concealed employment practices as a sine qua non.62 In France, illegal labour is generally concentrated in three sectors: building and civil engineering, commerce, and the hotel and restaurant sector (see figure 4). All of these sectors employ many Chinese workers. On the basis of the number of inspections and police checks, it might seem that certain employers are using less clandestine labour. Statistics from several institutions show an increase in the number of oral hearings taken since 2002 and a decrease in the number of offences involving the employment of foreigners without work permits. But a DILTI memorandum on the underground economy attributes this decrease not to the deterrent effects of fines or prosecutions, but to the greater “sophistication of offences” (Zappi, 2003). Figure 4 Sectors employing illegal labour in France, 2002 Metal manufacturing and mechanical work 2.29% Hotel and restaurant 14.08% Textiles and clothing 1.98%

Agriculture 4.38%

Other services 32.12%

Wholesale/retail 13.97%

Construction and public infrastructure 31.18% Source: Data provided in 2002 by La Direction générale de la Police nationale and La Direction centrale de la Police aux frontières.

62

Internal DILTI memorandum (14 Apr. 2002, pp. 1–3).

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Both the Labour Inspectorate and the police are responsible for combating illegal labour. Theoretically, their mandates could set them against each other, since one protects wage earners’ rights and the other takes action against illegal workers. But in fact their work is complementary: both share the overriding mission of working back up the chain to find the donneurs d’ordre. Unlike the Labour Inspectorate, the police cannot enter a workplace that has been legally registered. But police officers can act promptly when it comes to criminal procedures. Taking action against illegal work results in reorganization by the façonniers, so arrangements are made for people who have no residence permits to work at home. The strategy of chain subcontracting and fragmenting production structures makes it difficult to work back up the chain to identify the donneurs d’ordre, who defend themselves by claiming not to have known that their façonniers were employing illegal labour. The façonniers are not obliged to present their order books and instead pass the buck to the home workers, whom the inspection officers do not see.

The Labour Inspectorate The Labour Inspectorate employs 1,500 inspectors. Its primary duty is to protect wage earners within the framework of the Labour Code. The nonspecialist section is made up of inspection officers; a special section for the prevention of illegal employment (SSLEI) has two inspectors, whose job is to detect forms of illegal labour, the employment of irregular status foreigners and labour smuggling. The general policy since 1998 has been to work back up the production chain to the donneurs d’ordre, rather than to inspect clandestine workshops. So it is the “silent partners” in the manufacturing chain who are now being targeted. In this specific context, the inspectors’ objective is to enforce joint financial liability as an additional guarantee for covering the sums owed to the tax administration, the wage earners and the welfare agencies in the event of default, insolvency or the disappearance of a firm using undeclared labour. It is also a means of making the donneurs d’ordre aware of their responsibilities: that it is their duty to ensure that the conditions in which the subcontractors carry out their activities are lawful. The law makes provision for two situations in which joint financial liability can be imposed: ●

where a donneur d’ordre has been convicted of knowingly using the services of an entrepreneur who employs undeclared labour. But from the legal point of view it is difficult to prove that the donneur d’ordre acted “knowingly”;

●

where the payment amounts to €3,000 or more and the donneur d’ordre has not carried out any checks concerning the façonnier, or taken

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account of the fact either that the offence of undeclared labour is being committed or that there is a strong probability it is occurring.63 The donneur d’ordre is required to obtain certain documents from the façonnier, i.e. a “K bis” certificate64 or a Trades Register enrolment card, a tax administration certificate, and a sworn statement confirming that the work will be done by legally employed workers. The donneur d’ordre may be made jointly liable if any one of these documents is missing, but is not required to check that the documents presented by the façonnier are authentic or that the façonnier is telling the truth. The judge has the authority to apportion the financial burden between the various individuals in the chain of production (the manufacturer, the purchasing centre, the façonnier, the garment workshop and any clandestine structures involved). In most cases, the donneur d’ordre is implicated at the level of the façonnier. Where the inspectors have difficulty obtaining delivery slips and invoices, they approach the companies whose trade names are on the garment labels. In terms of labour regulations, employees who have no work permits enjoy the same rights in relation to level of wages, years of service, etc., as those who are legally employed. They are liable only to administrative penalties, except in the case of fraud or use of false documents. If the employment relationship is terminated they must be paid one month’s wages unless a more favourable solution is found.65 Situations of abuse of vulnerability66 are, in practice, identified by government criminal investigation agencies. Other civil servants, such as labour inspectors, should submit a report to prosecutors,67 since if they witness inhuman working conditions they have neither the authority nor the “muscle” to intervene. Describing his field experience, an inspector from the SSLEI in Paris reported that in three years he had never submitted a case to the prosecutors involving the abuse of vulnerability or disgraceful working and living conditions. Few officials use the Criminal Code as a basis for identifying victims of human trafficking. This account was given by officials from the Paris Labour Inspectorate:

63

Art. L. 341-6-4 of the Labour Code. Official document issued by the registry of the Commercial Court which proves that a commercial firm is duly enrolled in the Register of Trades and Companies. 65 Art. L. 364-2 and art. L. 341-6-1 of the Labour Code; and art. 441-1–441-3, art. 441-6, art. 441-7, art. 441-9 and art. 441-111 of the Criminal Code. 66 Violations of art. 225-13 and art. 225-14 of the Criminal Code. 67 “Every … public officer or civil servant who, in the performance of his duties, has gained knowledge of the existence of a felony or of a misdemeanour is obliged to notify the public prosecutor of the offence forthwith” (art. 40, Code of Criminal Procedure). 64

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Interviewer A: Do you sometimes detect abuse of vulnerability in the course of your inspection missions? Inspector 2: No. Inspector 5: No. Interviewer B: Is there a specific department with which you cooperate, which you inform? Inspector 5: We have to inform the public prosecutor – that’s laid down in Article 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure… Inspector 2: That’s right - we talked about that last year. We don’t have the muscle. Inspector 5: I can tell you that over a period of 15 months there has not been a single request of that nature.[…] Inspector 3: The hygiene conditions in the garment workshops to put it bluntly, the problem is so commonplace that it can happen that we don’t do so many hygiene inspections. […] When we implement a measure, firms or people disappear and then they turn up again. It’s very difficult to get the better of them. Inspector 1: They move away… Inspector 2: As soon as you initiate proceedings… you could report people, but it’s sometimes in vain… Inspector 4: And then, the workshop premises are rented. We only intervene further down the chain. … We can’t intervene higher up, and that’s a real problem.

The police The Ministry of the Interior’s operations to combat illegal labour reflect the difficulty in working back up the chain to identify the donneurs d’ordre at a time when clandestine structures are becoming increasingly fragmented and scattered. On the one hand, the operations seem to have contributed to the reorganization of labour in the garment trade, but on the other hand they have not yet significantly reduced undeclared work in this sector. When OCRIEST was created in 1996, illegal employment of foreigners was found mostly in large business structures, which were concealed behind the legal façade of a private limited company. Suburban houses were generally used where around 20 foreigners with illegal status would be employed. Today most of these big business structures have been replaced by smaller legal microstructures of two or three people, organized on a family basis. When the order book is full the business engages several irregular immigrants. If there is more work it is distributed down the chain; irregular immigrants working at home carry out any surplus. They are generally paid a piece rate, which is 50 per cent of the amount that the façonnier has agreed to with the donneur d’ordre. When the police intervene at this lowest level of the structure they find only two or three people; questioning them is not going to harm the chain 80

France

as a whole. Production has become “a multi-tier system of subcontracting”, where each level provides a further cover for the donneur d’ordre. The police may locate several microstructures and make arrests without the donneur d’ordre losing any profit, since production continues elsewhere. The chain subcontracting system is the result of employers adapting to avoid being caught by the new measures for preventing illegal labour. Illegal labour does not disappear; it changes and develops in new, more complex, forms. The donneurs d’ordre reduce their costs by relying on flexible personnel management, while the façonniers set up companies that do not have any real activity. This way, they adapt to increased police checks and inspections and line their pockets while reducing risk. The main concern for most foreigners who work without papers at the end of the illegal labour chain is to pay off their debts. The donneurs d’ordre both take advantage of their vulnerable situation and wash their hands of all responsibility. So it is the façonniers and their subordinates who bear all the risks, including the police checks. A foreigner who is working illegally at home can be identified as an employer and punished more severely than the person on the next rung up the ladder, at the level of the donneur d’ordre, who is more difficult for law enforcement to hold responsible. When an inspection is carried out, the police take statements from the façonniers who are in breach of the law because they are employing workers who have no work permits. Foreigners who are employed illegally at home are liable to receive a double penalty, both as the bosses of an undeclared workshop and as foreigners who are working illegally. Although the premises that are inspected can be regarded as an undeclared organization, in practice the situation is generally treated as a case of illegal labour. The inspection departments decide whether they are dealing with a case of undeclared labour or of an undeclared structure based on empirical evidence, according to the number of sewing machines they find and the number of people employed. Despite all of these difficulties, it is still possible to identify and incriminate the real beneficiaries (the donneur d’ordre, the manufacturer) behind these “straw men”. But in order to establish the managers’ liability, the police must be able to prove that they knowingly used the services of a façonnier who was using illegal labour. The most difficult part is proving that the decision-makers were aware of the illegal activity of their subcontractors. It is becoming increasingly difficult to find field operations in the garment sector, as this account by Section 12 illustrates: Superintendent: It used to be easy. Within the framework set out in the law we rang the bell, knocked on the door, went in and took everything away. In order to avoid this, they’ve made things more complicated and, instead of finding 20 illegal immigrants, we now find a dozen clandestine structures.

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Interviewer: So how do you see this outcome – do you regard it as a more negative result? Superintendent: Yes, it’s awkward for us. It used to be the person in charge of the workshop who had to buy the machines. Now he employs the poor clandestine workers who use their own machines – it’s even cheaper. … They push the prices down, and that’s how they manage to manufacture goods at prices that are almost the same as the prices of goods made in China. If the workers were paid the normal wage in France they could never produce a T-shirt at €2, which is the assembly workshop cost price. The same department observes that working conditions have been deteriorating in the past few years: Interviewer: As regards working conditions, the … exploitation of a worker by an employer, is it better to be working in a workshop or in one’s own home? What’s the hardest? Superintendent: Working at home is the hardest. There is generally one room with a bathroom and a kitchenette. And in that room you have to install three machines and a fairly narrow table … and you also have to sleep and live there. So that means that you put the beds above the machines. It’s really appalling, and the people working in these conditions earn a pittance into the bargain. They are paid a piece rate, which means that if they want to earn money they have to work non-stop. … Since they have no papers, the room is sublet to them at a much higher rent; they have to pay the middleman – they have to pay everybody.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS This research explores the circumstances which either independently or together promote the practice of forced labour. It is up to the French authorities to carry out a case-by-case examination on the basis of national law to determine whether a person is a victim of human trafficking or simply an irregular status migrant, taking into consideration the individual’s circumstances prior to migration and work situation following migration. The question of forced labour and human trafficking – seen through the situation of Chinese migrants – is both a topical and a crucial issue in France, given the degrading working conditions to which people in a situation similar to debt bondage are subjected. Partners in the field have reported other situations of extreme working conditions involving Indo-Pakistanis and Thais. At a time when France, like other developed countries, is feeling the effect of globalization in the form of an upsurge in

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migratory flows, it is crucial to devote attention to the status of these migrant workers. There is no single answer to the many questions involved in managing international migratory flows. Action to combat human trafficking will inevitably involve wider efforts to prevent irregular immigration; experts most frequently recommend the need for trans-border partnerships. France’s 2004 legal reform68 regarding organized crime aims specifically to bring the most complex cases under a centralized judicial authority. Centralization can help the French ministries take into account the many different facets of human trafficking, which cut across various domains. Structures of this nature already exist, such as France’s OCRTEH,69 which was noted by the EU Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings. There may be some reluctance in China to accept the fact that Chinese nationals abroad are involved in forced labour situations. It is commonly agreed that these workers leave China voluntarily and that they can regard their working conditions in the host country as better than those back home. This research does not question the fact that most migrants go abroad voluntarily; both migrants and their families will pay vast sums of money to “snakeheads” and other middlemen in order to get to Europe. The research conducted for this study does illustrate the difficulty in drawing a clear line between human smuggling and human trafficking. Although immigration statistics are approximate, the fact remains that the number of illegal Chinese migrants in France and other European countries has increased significantly over the last ten years. However, legislative measures in China and France and better cooperation between the two countries can modify – and have perhaps already modified – the irregular immigration curve. It is recommended that both the supervision of the labour market, including recruitment and transfer mechanisms, and conditions of employment in France as the host country, should be improved. This will require more cooperation between the main players in the labour market in China and France, as well as cooperation between labour inspectorates and the other administrative departments in charge of law enforcement. Too little is known about how potential Chinese migrants seek work in France or other destination countries. Some go through approved private or public recruitment agencies. Others travel alone or rely on the services of middlemen or smugglers. There may also be little or no direct contact between the smuggler and the employer in the destination country. An important measure towards eliminating potential problems of forced labour and human trafficking would be to adjust supply and demand. It would be advantageous to collaborate with employers’ and

68

Introduced by the Act of 9 March 2004. Office central pour la répression de la traite des êtres humains (French Central Agency for the Suppression of Human Trafficking).

69

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Concealed chains

workers’ organizations to find ways to enable a number of Chinese migrants to work legally in France and elsewhere. It is important to promote dialogue on these subjects between the Chinese business community in France and the French labour organizations, and also between the labour organizations in both countries. The participation of employers’ and workers’ organizations in both countries would help tremendously with the design and establishment of structures to monitor the recruitment and working conditions of Chinese migrants so that cases of abuse can be documented and remedies can be found. These observations lead to the following recommendations and issues for consideration.

Training individuals to prevent forced labour and trafficking As a result of the new definition given to trafficking in 2003,70 abuse of vulnerability and extreme working conditions are now recognized as factors constituting human trafficking. But although those involved in combating forced labour and trafficking are required to identify these offences in the course of their inspections, few cases have yet been reported. The law could be enforced more effectively if measures were taken to promote awareness among key players, such as police and labour inspectors, of the new legal provisions and of the issues related to the ethnic groups that they meet in the course of their duties. Compensation for victims The rapid mobilization of funds would make it possible to remove victims and shield them from the person who is exploiting them. Cooperation between associations specializing in emergency and social support services would seem to be essential. In order to prevent migrants from entering into new relationships of economic dependence in their community, an application could be made to the Ministry of Labour for a residence permit as soon as legal proceedings have been initiated. A lump-sum allowance of six months’ wages is payable to any undeclared worker by the employer, whether that worker is a French national or a foreigner, as soon as the illegal employment relationship ends, even if the worker’s residence or work status is irregular.71 One expert suggested that the lump-sum allowance should be automatically paid to the victim as soon as the initial phase of the judicial proceedings is opened and that it should be doubled for “a person who is the victim of modern slavery”. 70

Act of 18 March 2003. Cass. Soc. 06/02/2001, EL GHOUL, Bulletin Criminel, No. 32, p. 85: http://ledroitcriminel.free.fr/jurisprudence

71

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Assisting victims does not simply mean making facilities available, because the immigrants often do not regard themselves as victims. Two inspectors from the Intelligence Service stated that, while thousands of immigrants had been “freed” from sweatshops as the result of their actions, none of the immigrants – paradoxically – had ever thanked them. This can be mainly explained by the immigrants’ indebtedness. Most have to pay back a debt and an intervention by inspectors means that they will lose their jobs. So they do not feel freed from their debt and inevitably remain the forced accomplices of their bosses. Better and easier access to facilities providing assistance would enable migrants to become more familiar with the values of the host country. It is important that both institutional and non-institutional partners be mobilized and cooperate in this lengthy process.

Targeted sanctions Some institutional partners have recommended targeting the donneurs d’ordre in order to “deplete the illegal immigration chains that promote the chain subcontracting system”.72 Measures to work back up the chain to find the donneur d’ordre could include: ● Improving detection by determining workshop outputs. In order to quantify the output of a workshop and check whether the order can be delivered by the declared business structure alone, the workshop’s production capacity could be calculated on the basis of available goods and machines. Situations where there is a chain subcontracting system and employment of illegal labour could be detected by evaluating the capacity of the structure in mathematical terms, looking at the stock on hand. But OCRIEST warns that calculating output on the basis of materials or existing stock is difficult, since the results vary depending on the type of fabric. ●

Making the order book reliable. Operators in the garment industry could be required to comply with a charter requiring order book transparency and the presentation of the list of orders in the event of an inspection. At present only a sworn statement is needed.

●

Using the media. Whenever the media report a court case against a trade-marked brand, the manufacturers are forced to react. Section 12 of the Intelligence Service stresses the psychological effect of adverse publicity on these brands. For example, after appearing in court, Morgan and La City set up purchasing centres in order to monitor the work of the façonniers.

72

DILTI, internal memorandum, 14 April 2002, pp. 1–3.

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Opening up the ethnic niche Mixing ethnic groups in work environments could help to bring working conditions in line with national standards. This would be possible in those firms with the largest concentration of Chinese workers, such as garment making, leather goods and Asian hotel and restaurant businesses. But calculating the quotas would be difficult, and imposing ethnic diversity would amount to challenging the fundamental principles of the French Republic. The City of Paris is the French partner in a three-year programme to achieve employment diversity in three sectors: the hotel and restaurant business, the garment industry and the leather goods trade. In France, a vocational training scheme is being offered to women and people between the ages of 16 and 25, with a view to dispersing ethnic niches. It requires students to take French lessons and become familiar with French legislation, particularly labour law. There are difficulties in implementing this scheme at several levels: ● A minimum of two years’ schooling in France is required in order to enrol for a course leading to a qualification. ● Young migrants do not always have a residence permit, which is required to enrol and obtain the status of a vocational training student.73 This is one of the reasons why young Chinese immigrants are forced to seek assistance among their compatriots. A new measure will considerably improve facilities for minors: the “Borloo” Act74 makes it possible for immigrants under 18 years old to obtain a provisional work permit under certain conditions, irrespective of their employment situation – which cannot be invoked to justify refusal – if they want to take advantage of an apprenticeship or work contract.

Broadening access to legal work opportunities The number of work permits issued to Chinese workers is generally low and in the sectors in which Chinese activities are concentrated it is virtually negligible. There is a real demand for unskilled labour in certain sectors which, it would seem, cannot be satisfied by recruiting workers legally. The quota system experiments carried out in certain countries, particularly in Italy, did not obtain the results that were expected in terms of controlling the flow of labour. The French authorities are paying close attention to the European Commission debate on “An EU Approach to Managing the Economic Migration”, which opened in January 2005 following the publication of its Green Paper (European Commission, 2005). 73

A possible option, however, would be to request that an exception be made for people under 18 years of age who cannot present a work permit. 74 Section 28 of the Social Schemes Act of 18 January 2005.

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Introducing a limit for the number of work permits issued, based on predefined criteria (geographical zone from which the migrants come, sector of activity, etc.), would call into question the French principle of examining applications individually and would promote a global policy. In this global policy, needs would be determined in advance at the national or European Community level. The option to justify a refusal based on the employment situation, which currently governs the entry of foreign workers into France, would then no longer be examined in the context of the specific situation in an area of employment, but would correspond to a broader approach, such as an “ethnic” criterion. Under these circumstances, bilateral agreements would enable authorities to more effectively control the labour market and the activities of workers brought into France. The European Commission unveiled a “Blue Card” plan in 2007 for skilled immigrants, based on the US Green Card system, to be approved by all 27 EU Member States. The plan would allow qualified people and their families to live and work within the European Union. However, the scheme does not intend to address non-qualified workers.

Training Chinese entrepreneurs Because of their activity in the textile industry, the services sector and the hotel and restaurant sector, entrepreneurs of Chinese origin have an important place in the French economy. Paradoxically, the ethnic Chinese economy is both well and poorly integrated into French society. On the one hand, the commercial success of Chinese entrepreneurs shows that they are well able to become integrated into the host society. On the other hand, the gap between the worker status of an illegal Chinese immigrant and the status of the entrepreneur curbs upward social mobility. It also illustrates the fact that in the host society both the monopoly of information and the weight of paying the middlemen contribute to the migrant’s isolation. Most Chinese entrepreneurs do not have a high level of education, are often unaware of French legislation and are even negligent as far as the law is concerned. The French Government has introduced an integration scheme in the form of an “integration contract” for migrants of any nationality who are permanently residing in France in regular circumstances. The contract stipulates certain requirements related to respect for French values and also provides information to migrants, including language classes for every adult migrant, and a two-day session on the fundamental principles governing life in France. Building on this scheme and on the EU programme, “Integration of Chinese Migrants in Europe”, Chinese migrants who have legal status could be provided with training that could include instruction in the French language, basic principles of labour and tax law, social and commercial regulations, and criminal law. A better knowledge of French legislation could lead to better compliance by Chinese migrants. 87

Concealed chains

An information campaign to prevent illegal emigration The Palermo Protocol includes an important section on prevention and international cooperation, and provides for information and mass media campaigns, as well as information exchange, border control measures, security and document controls. When would-be emigrants leave China, most are unaware of the conditions in which they will be living and working in France. It is important to provide more information about everyday life in the host country. Would-be emigrants should also know that it is an offence to enter and work in France, and that if they do so they will be liable to expulsion, fines and prison sentences. Circulating information in China is not enough to prevent irregular immigration. The Chinese concept of life in France is still a mixture of vague notions, concrete factors that are partly realistic, and fantasies. Many are attracted by a wage that is high compared to what they earn in China, but do not know that there are also obligations which they must fulfil. Although middlemen select the information that they give to migrants, and although most would-be emigrants are victims of deceit or fraudulent promises, they are also to a certain extent the victims of their own ignorance of developed countries – whether it be a lack of knowledge of the language, the culture, the legislation, the economy or the political system. Maintaining this ignorance fosters a certain degree of gullibility, giving a free rein to smugglers and those who benefit from forced labour and human trafficking (DPM, 2002).

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EXPLOITATION OF CHINESE IMMIGRANTS IN ITALY

3

Antonella Ceccagno, Renzo Rastrelli and Alessandra Salvati

INTRODUCTION In Italy, the change from being a country of net emigration to one of net immigration took place at a time when internal migration from southern Italy, which had provided factories in northern Italy with the labour force needed for economic growth, was coming to an end. At the same time, productive decentralization was beginning and small businesses were re-emerging. Today, small, dynamic businesses, which are mainly clustered in industrial districts and specialize in particular products, are a distinctive feature of the Italian economy. Since the 1980s these types of productionoriented businesses have created opportunities for low-skilled workers and for new immigrants. At the same time, “niche” opportunities for self-employment in workshops producing goods for Italian suppliers were appearing or expanding (Ceccagno, 2003a). At the end of 2005 the immigrant population in Italy was estimated at 3 million people, or almost 5 per cent of the country’s total population. In 2004 the Chinese were the fifth-largest immigrant population group (Caritas, 2006). This research brings together information and analysis from different sources in order to analyse the trafficking and smuggling of Chinese immigrants, the characteristics of the Chinese ethnic niche, and the controversial issue of forced labour as an outcome of trafficking. Within a legal context, it looks at a spectrum of labour practices ranging from self-exploitation to more extreme situations that include the coercion of workers by employers. The report analyses the legal and irregular activities of Chinese immigrants, using data from legal documents, research literature and information obtained through direct contact with migrants. It examines the characteristics of Chinese immigrants in Italy and, in particular, working conditions in the ethnic workshops; irregular immigration, including the nature and characteristics of labour trafficking; and the relations between

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trafficking/smuggling, illegality and the working conditions of Chinese immigrants.

METHODOLOGY The research for this chapter aimed mainly to explore the complex links between immigration, illegality and crime. This approach was used in order to understand, on the one hand, how and to what degree deviancy, illegality and crime influence the life and work of immigrants and, on the other, if and how the complexity of the migratory phenomenon can, in itself, encourage the development of illegality (Rastrelli, 2000). The research therefore focused on the legal and illegal activities of Chinese immigrants, tackling these complex issues from different points of view, using data and information from the following sources: ● analysis of legal and court documents; ● fieldwork on illegal and criminal activities; ● fieldwork on working conditions within the ethnic workshops and among Chinese entrepreneurs in general; ● analysis of the dynamics favouring exploitation, illegality and crime that emerge from the interaction between immigrants and the local society. This involved an analysis of all the documents collected at the Centre for Immigration Research and Services in Prato (the Prato Centre) from the 2002 amnesty period onward. The authors were working at the Prato Centre as migration consultants for the local government during the 2002 amnesty period, and were therefore able to access a huge amount of previously untapped materials that had been created over the years. All documents and notes taken by social workers, lawyers, migration consultants and linguistic facilitators on the services provided to Chinese migrants during their legalization process (and for other needs) were studied and thoroughly discussed with social workers and lawyers at the Prato Centre. Through these sources it was possible to uncover the dynamics taking place, in particular during the amnesties, among the Chinese in Italy and between the Chinese and Italians. It was also possible to identify the range of relationships that developed between employers and workers when workers needed to legalize their status. From the vast amount of data collected, and after discussing the implications of different cases with social workers and lawyers, 11 cases were chosen for inclusion in this chapter. Another central part of the research consisted of qualitative fieldwork on the illegal and criminal activities of the Chinese in Italy, conducted from 1996 to 2006. This included a series of meetings with informants and migrants involved in illegal situations. Given the sensitivity of the issues

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discussed, this part of the research was not conducted as interviews, but as private meetings conducted by an expert on deviance and criminality (Rastrelli). There was also regular interaction with the police and all of the Italian institutions active in crime prevention, namely the National Anti-Mafia Unit (DNA) and DNA workgroups composed of the Central Operations Service, the Special Operations Task Force, the Organized Crime Department and the division of the Italian Carabinieri (Italian military police) in charge of labour inspections, the Prato and Florence Financial Police and the Florence Anti-Mafia Investigation Department. While this made it possible to obtain access to police investigations and intelligence on Chinese deviancy and crime, researchers were also able to give police and intelligence centres suggestions for new approaches and methodologies linking deviancy to social conditions. Documents relating to court cases against Chinese citizens in the Milan, Florence, Ancona and Bari tribunals were also analysed. In assessing the living conditions and the role of the national context in shaping the modus operandi of Chinese migrants in Italy, this chapter drew from the results of the research and action programme of the Spinner group on irregular forms of work. The programme was active in Emilia Romagna from 2000 to 2005 and focused particularly on businesses operated by Chinese immigrants. The Spinner group organized several meetings each year with over 30 Chinese entrepreneurs and conducted some 100 qualitative in-depth interviews, mainly on the internal organization of ethnic workshops, irregular labour and irregular forms of work. Lastly, this chapter draws on some 100 in-depth interviews with Chinese entrepreneurs and workers conducted by one of the authors (Ceccagno) between 2002 and 2006. The interviews focused on new working trends among Chinese entrepreneurs, working conditions in the ethnic workshops, interaction with local entrepreneurs, the compression of personal time within the ethnic niche, and the conditions of second-generation migrants and their role in family businesses.

THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK Regulating migration flows The arrival and stay of foreign citizens in Italy is governed by the Single Act on Immigration (Law 40/98), as modified by Law 189/02. The main features of the legal framework regulating migration are: a yearly quota system, largely for foreign seasonal workers; residence and family reunification permits; and amnesties.

Residence and family reunification permits Applications for the renewal of residence permits have to be presented within two months and immigrants are required to prove that they have work or

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a source of continuous income. Immigrants who are unemployed are allowed six months to find a new job. Foreign citizens in possession of a residence card, or a residence permit for employment (for a period of at least one year) or self-employment, may ask for family reunification for their spouse, underage children, dependent parents or children who meet certain criteria.

The quota mechanism The Italian quota mechanism, which allows a fixed annual number of foreign workers to enter the country, contrasts with the practice of other European countries, such as France, Germany or the United Kingdom, which use a system of work permits involving the discretionary regulation of entries on a case-by-case basis. Italy has adopted a quantitative mode of selection, like countries with an immigrant tradition (Australia, Canada, United States). In these countries, the mechanism has led to selection policies that avoided social conflict (by privileging entries from countries perceived as linguistically and culturally close) and favoured economic development (by promoting the immigration of skilled workers). In Italy, the quota mechanism has not produced the same results and has been criticized for reflecting neither the actual needs of the Italian economy nor the volume of migratory pressure. In fact, Italy shows a clear discrepancy between the small number of entry permits for auxiliary75 (non-seasonal) work and the actual demand for immigrant workers from small and medium Italian manufacturers. The emergence of almost 700,000 irregular auxiliary workers during the last amnesty demonstrates the limits of planning provisions, which in previous years had provided only a few thousand entry permits for auxiliary work. The reasons for the policy can probably be found in the persistent difficulties that Italians and legally resident foreigners encounter in finding employment. Another reason lies in the fact that employers can turn to a widespread immigrant workforce in the underground economy to keep the cost of work under a certain threshold, which permits them to compete with domestic and international rivals. The Italian manufacturing system is less competitive than the systems of other European countries, with its rigid employment legislation and an underground economy that amounts to 30 per cent of the gross national product (Franceschetti, 2004). In this context, it is easy to understand why entrepreneurs prefer to employ new migrant workers instead of the available Italian workforce (Cesareo, 2004) or established immigrant workers.

75

Auxiliary work refers to work conducted for an employer, as opposed to being selfemployed or employing others.

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From the employers’ perspective (both Italian or immigrants), newly arrived immigrants represent a constant supply of flexible labour because recent immigrants do not make the same demands as those who have spent a certain period of time in Italy, in terms of job stability, regular working conditions, family reunion, social insertion, etc.

Amnesties Since 1986 there have been a series of amnesties for foreign workers in an irregular situation: in 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002. On the one hand, these amnesties have “remedied” the adverse effects of official border closures and the formation of enclaves of irregular-status workers, but on the other hand they have indirectly attracted new immigration by encouraging the belief that once migrants were in the country it would be possible to gain legal status (Ambrosini, 2001). Most of the amnesties were widely preannounced, and information circulated among immigrants in Italy and among relatives in their countries of origin and elsewhere in Europe. In the course of just one day in September 2002, the town of Prato saw more than 3,000 undocumented Chinese immigrants arrive at a temporary office opened by the Chinese Consulate to accommodate the unforeseen number of passport applications (passports were required in order to be eligible for the amnesty). In the queue were Chinese who had already entered Italy through irregular channels, but also many who had come from France, the Netherlands, Spain and other European countries, attracted by the prospect of legalization (Ceccagno, 2003a). The 2002 amnesty76 was by far the largest ever granted in Italy. While the amnesties of 1995 and 1998 allowed the regularization of 246,000 and 217,000 immigrants respectively (Carfagna, 2002), almost 634,728 immigrants obtained legal status in 2002. Of the approximately 1.8 million immigrants who benefited from amnesties in EU countries from the 1970s to 2000, some 750,000 were regularized by Italy alone between 1986 and 1998 (De Bruycker, 2000). Data on residence permits and on the number of immigrants whose status was regularized highlight the fact that around two-thirds of all residence permits (1,480,000 out of 2,193,999, which includes permit renewals)77 have been obtained through amnesties. Between 1990 and 2003, there was a 181 per cent increase in the number of permits issued.

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Law 189/02 and Decree 195/02. Although foreign citizens must be in possession of a residence permit issued by the police, they have the right, but not the obligation, to register themselves in the council registry offices. References in this study to residence permits issued following legalization acts refer to residence permits issued by police headquarters.

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The 1998 immigration law (Law 40/98) introduced annual quotas for foreign workers and a guarantee system by which a company or an individual – not necessarily an Italian citizen – legally resident in Italy could sponsor a maximum of two foreign workers. This policy encouraged the arrival of a workforce that carried out low-grade work. In contrast with the trend in other European countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, where highly qualified foreign workers are favoured, Italy received predominantly low-skilled immigrant workers (Ceccagno, 2003a). Unlike certain other European countries, asylum has never been considered by immigrants as one of the most convenient ways of legalizing their status in Italy. By the end of 2004, only 15,674 immigrants held a residence permit for asylum in Italy, compared with 139,852 in France, 876,622 in Germany and 289,054 in the United Kingdom (Caritas, 2005).

Difficulties in maintaining legal status There are a number of reasons why it is difficult for immigrants to be hired on regular contracts, and to meet the requirements for renewal of residence permits; these reasons increase the risk that they will become irregular. Immigrants often become irregular when they lose their job and therefore are unable to renew their residence permits. Law 189/02 strictly links the residence permit to the possession of a regular working contract. According to Dal Lago, employers risk less by hiring and not registering migrants who do not hold a permit than by failing to register migrants who are in possession of a permit (Dal Lago, 1998). In the former instance, detection of this irregularity leads to criminal lawsuits and the employer risks being charged a modest fine, but the related evasion of social security contributions and taxes is not taken into account. Italy, however, does recognize undocumented migrants’ social security rights. In the latter case, an administrative lawsuit would concentrate on the avoidance of these charges, which are much more expensive. Moreover, “undocumented migrants are less likely than holders of a permit to ask labour inspectors to perform checks as they generally intervene only by request” (Reyneri et al., 1999, pp. 79–80). In order to renew their residence permits, immigrants must also prove that they have sufficient accommodation for the number of people in their families. This problem is made more significant by the fact that foreigners with one-year residence permits – that is, the majority of immigrants – are not eligible for public housing.

Measures to prevent irregular migration A significant number of migrants, and in some periods even the majority, entered the country through irregular means, or by overstaying their legal means of entry. Domestic legislation does not criminalize illegal entry, in 94

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the sense that irregular migrants cannot be charged and detained, though they can be expelled or rejected at the borders. Irregular immigrants caught on Italian territory after having received an expulsion order can be imprisoned for up to one year for a first offence and from one to four years if intercepted a second time. A migrant who has been expulsed does not have the right to return to Italy for a period of ten years. Italy has taken measures to combat and prevent irregular immigration by strengthening police controls and border patrols. An agreement to improve the interception of boats on the high seas was signed by the police force in 2003 and introduces new technological instruments, such as radar and biometric scanning devices, to check land and sea borders. Collaboration with the Albanian and Slovenian police (joint border controls) has led to a visible reduction of immigration influxes from these two countries. Stricter individual controls have also been introduced through the Eurodac programme, which involves the mandatory recording of fingerprints for all immigrants entering Italy and establishes a European-wide database. Since 1998, the Italian Government has signed agreements with a number of transit/origin countries with the objective of intercepting and stopping immigration flows and has signed readmission agreements with non-EU countries. China is not among them. Despite these measures, repatriating an immigrant who has entered Italy through irregular means is not an easy task. Some 70 per cent of official decisions concerning foreigners found in an irregular situation take the form of expulsion orders, which require the individual to leave the country. But many orders are not executed, and coercive measures are only taken for those who have entered the country illegally. Research shows that stronger controls have had only a limited impact on the volume of irregular immigration (Sciortino, 2004). Research has also suggested a negative correlation between the number of job offers in occupations typically carried out by immigrants and the expulsion of irregular immigrants. A study of the geographic distribution of expulsions – both ordered and executed – found a higher level of tolerance in provinces where the demand for immigrant labour was strongest (Fasani and Pellizzari, 2003).

The fight against trafficking Italy is a State party to the Palermo Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, and has ratified all core ILO Conventions, including the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). It has also ratified the ILO’s Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), and has signed the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. Over the last five years, anti-trafficking policies have rested on three interconnected “pillars”: victim assistance through partnerships with 95

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government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), anti-mafia policing, and regional/international cooperation (Nardi and Ososkova, 2003). Before 1998, a trafficked person without legal residence could request a six-month residence permit in exchange for cooperating with the police and prosecutors. Since 199878 victims have had the right to state assistance and protection, as well as to a temporary six-month residence permit. They can seek assistance from an NGO, which then makes a request to the police for a “social” residence permit, in which case there is no legal requirement for the victim to testify. NGOs provide shelter, counselling, language and employment-related training to the victims. The permit is renewable for another six months and may be renewed if the person is able to find employment. Assistance for victims and law enforcement are seen as inextricably linked: .

…victims are willing to cooperate with the authorities in charge of investigation and prosecution when they are assisted and protected, especially when provided with safe housing, psychological and medical assistance, residence status, legal counselling and representation in criminal proceedings. Generally speaking, the testimony of the trafficked person is helpful for investigation; in the majority of cases it leads to the conviction of offenders. (Giammarinaro, 2002, p. 4) Protection for victims has been accompanied by measures to strengthen the prosecution of traffickers. In August 2003 the Penal Code was amended to give a wider definition of human trafficking, through Law No. 228 on Measures against Trafficking in Persons. The provisions are very broad in scope and cover the exploitation of people in general, as well as, in particular, incitement to and exploitation related to prostitution, begging and the performance of work where the worker is exploited by, or experiences coercion from, the employer (ILO, 2007). High penalties were introduced for traffickers. The law considers trafficking and smuggling as two distinct and different types of crime. Trafficking is seen as a crime against the fundamental rights of human beings; the offence covers the recruitment, transportation or transfer of persons, including harbouring, subsequent reception and the exchange of control over the person with the purpose of exploitation in the provision of services or the production of goods. Smuggling is seen as a crime against the state, involving the facilitation of unauthorized entry and transit in the country.

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Art. 18 of Law 40/98.

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The two offences carry different penalties: eight to 20 years for trafficking; up to three years for facilitating undocumented entry, plus a fine of €15,000 for each person; and up to 12 years for smuggling, with possible financial penalties. Penalties are higher if the smuggled person has been exposed to danger or to inhuman or degrading treatment. Until recently, more law enforcement efforts and government and NGO anti-trafficking resources were dedicated to addressing the problem of prostitution rather than other forms of exploitation, such as forced labour and domestic servitude. Few social and NGO services were available to victims of these forms of exploitation and few official resources were committed to prosecuting these activities (Nardi and Ososkova, 2003). Although Italy has ratified the ILO’s forced labour Conventions (the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)), it has no national law explicitly referring to forced labour as defined in Convention No. 29. Its national legal framework is outdated and not fully adapted to the evolving national situation. For example, national laws cover only the sexual exploitation of women and children and not their labour exploitation. Forced labour is also prohibited under international human rights treaties, by which Italy is also bound.

IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC OPINION In Italy, a country of recent immigration, the arrival of immigrants and the related social, cultural and economic problems have led to public unease and disorientation. At the same time, a clear structure of laws and policies capable of managing the complexity of the migration phenomenon has not yet been developed. From a cultural point of view, there are deep-rooted fears about possible loss of identity. But from an economic point of view, immigrants are involved and play an important role in many sectors of the national manufacturing system. The term “useful invaders” (Ambrosini, 2001) sums up the way foreigners are often perceived in Italy. From a legal standpoint, Italy only recently developed a complex body of immigration regulations, which are mainly influenced by preoccupations regarding safety and public order. In this context, the way in which Chinese immigration is perceived by public opinion and the media, but also by legal institutions, is particularly significant and revealing. Above all, general knowledge of China, its history and culture, is scarce. As a result, analyses of Chinese immigrants tend to favour simplifications and stereotypes. The term “slavery” is often used in public discussion to describe working conditions inside the closed world of the ethnic economy. Companies run by Chinese citizens are seen as self-regulated, detached from Italian regulations and alien to the local market and territory. The term “parallel world” is used to describe the group of Chinese businesses

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operating in Prato, which has Italy’s strongest concentration of Chinese immigrants (Rastrelli, 2003). In this situation, the economic success of Chinese small workshops is attributed to a disrespect for regulations that is assumed to be widespread and dominant in both manufacturing activities and in employment relationships among Chinese immigrants, most of whom are believed to live in clandestine conditions. These perceptions dominate the media and are largely shared by political, legal and investigative authorities. An irregular immigrant’s submission to traffickers/smugglers on the journey from China is often seen as a prevalent condition which is then perpetuated in the living and working conditions of the closed world of the ethnic economy. An article from La Nazione, which is widely read in the Prato / Florence area, illustrates this attitude. The journalist, commenting on the kidnappingrelated death of a young Chinese person in the Marche region, paints a black picture of Chinese immigrants, illustrating a widely held view. The investigators meet with walls of silence and diffidence from the Chinese community: bitter and monolithic, they are little inclined to integrate … a community accused … of disregarding every commercial and tax regulation. Of transforming the workplace by enforcing long working hours at slashed prices, and by counterfeiting the most prestigious brands. … The Chinese community is a synonym of complete closure; willed by the bosses in charge, who with their thugs go around in expensive, powerful cars, an impenetrable cutting look in their eyes, their pockets full of euros; dominating documented workers as well as undocumented ones, children included. Poor terrorised people, obliged to work 12–15 hours a day. … Hundreds of respectable, decent individuals unable to revolt. (La Nazione, 2004) Crime among Chinese has paralleled the growth in immigration from China, and the number of Chinese citizens who have been charged, convicted and sentenced has increased in the last ten years. Crimes most frequently relate to encouraging irregular immigration and taking advantage of the workforce; in 2004 “crime relating to illegal migration” was the category for which the highest numbers of Chinese citizens were under investigation (communication by the Ministry of the Interior, 2005).

UNDERSTANDING THE IRREGULAR ASPECTS OF CHINESE MIGRATION This section examines criminal investigations, legal proceedings and field research to understand whether the irregular characteristics of Chinese

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migration should be considered as trafficking or smuggling. Immigrants from China arrive in Europe or America by means of long and complicated trips, after paying significant sums of money to groups specialized in this business. The last decade has witnessed the emergence of these specialized groups, working side by side with traditional family networks that facilitate the migration of family and friends. Over the years, trafficking and smuggling organizations have adopted criminal characteristics, such as the use of violence, coercion and extortion towards irregular immigrants. This research shows how an agreement is made in China between a smuggler and the individual who wishes to leave the country. Payment is agreed upon, and paid partly in China and partly upon arrival. As a rule a guarantor is named, either a relative or a friend who has already emigrated. The journey often includes several stopovers and false papers. From one stopover to the next, the immigrants remain in the hands of the smugglers until they arrive at the final destination, where they make contact either with family members or fellow Chinese with whom they can find work, shelter and the resources to repay the amount owed to the smugglers. The existence of these journeys is confirmed by the international literature cited in this report, as well as by legal sources (De Leo, 2005). Clearly, this is not the only means of emigration. Many individuals, notably those originating from north-east China, emigrated legally but then overstayed their visa. However, the main theme dealt with in this chapter is the journey organized either by traffickers or smugglers.

Legal investigations into trafficking and smuggling In June 2001 a Milan court giving a judgment in the case of a trafficking/smuggling organization described it as “a criminal association facilitating illegal immigration”.79 The case concerned a group operating from Hong Kong, which worked mainly with immigrants travelling to the United States via Milan. The judge highlighted the association’s “regular and continuous activity, organizing the illegal immigration of numerous Chinese citizens who it provided with false papers, airplane tickets, food and shelter and mobile telephones with which to coordinate their trip to train stations and airports”. The association also took charge of irregular immigrants in Italy who had been returned to the border and organized new departures, providing other false identity papers and new airplane tickets.80 The investigation described an efficient organization with leaders, messengers, escorts, a network of mobile telephones, meticulous and precise accounting for the requested sums of money, payments collected or still to 79

Milan Court of Law, Proc. N° 13739/01 R.G.N.R. (General Register Role Number); Proc. N° 2884/01 R.G.G.I.P. (General Register of Judiciary Preliminary Inquiries), Verdict G.I.P., 26 June 2001, p. 10. 80 Ibid., p. 56.

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be collected, and a series of resting places for immigrants in transit. The complex logistic system involved explains why the organizers are described as “snakeheads”, as their complex movements resemble the uncoiling of a reptile. One immigrant told the Milan court how a friend of her mother’s contacted the “snake”, a representative of the organization in charge of expatriating irregular immigrants, agreeing to a price of 110,000 yuan (€11,000). The mother herself paid around 30,000 yuan [€3,000] before her daughter left the country and 25,000 yuan [€2,500] on her departure. According to the agreement, the remaining amount was to be paid by the mother in China upon her daughter’s arrival in Italy, after hearing from her daughter that she had successfully reached family in Italy. The representative gave a date of departure from the girl’s home town, provided a passport with the girl’s own photograph and a plane ticket to Hong Kong, which she reached travelling with another girl on her way to Holland. At the Hong Kong airport they were … taken charge of by another member of the organization who supplied another plane ticket and helped them board a plane to Moscow (this time not accompanying them). In Moscow they were met by another representative who took them to a hotel, from which they were collected the next day and taken to a train station from which they travelled, accompanied by a Chinese escort, to Czechoslovakia.81 They stopped at a train station and waited for a vehicle driven by a foreigner, who accompanied them to a place in the countryside where they found a bus with around 40 other foreigners. They travelled for about two hours, and reached an unknown place where the girl, her friend and their escort were picked up by a car, and taken to a house where they stopped for a day before driving to another, completely closed house, accompanied by another foreigner. They did not stay but continued their trip by lorry, stopping in different houses on the way, before being picked up and driven through the mountains, across the Austrian border, where “they continued their trip first by car and then by train, travelling towards Vienna. They were stopped and arrested on the train, together with their escort as they were found to be travelling with false papers.” 82 This account sets out the different stages of a trip that many immigrants have made in a more or less similar way, and which is described in 81

Milan Court of Law, I° Criminal Section, sentence 17-12-1999, N° 6/98 Reg. Gen. Tribunale (Tribunal General Register), deposited on 17 March 2000, pp. 4–5. 82 Milan Court of Law, I° Criminal Section, sentence 17-12-1999, N° 6/98 General Court Regulations, deposited on 17 March 2000, pp. 4–5.

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many other legal proceedings, conversations and interviews with Chinese immigrants. The links between individuals involved in irregular migration activities are likely influenced by the guanxi culture: a traditional system of social relationships that unites people on the basis of reciprocal obligations and favours and which often includes the loan of money.

Smuggling as a service Many of the conclusions from the legal investigations are confirmed by researchers (Chin, 2003; Rastrelli, 2005; Xiang, 2003 ) who agree on the scale of the trafficking/smuggling phenomenon. Scientific literature highlights the importance of the structural, social, cultural and economic factors that cause individuals to emigrate. These make it easier to understand how the methods, groups and structures that make it possible to leave China and arrive in another country are seen by potential emigrants as a means of successfully carrying out their project. The snakehead becomes “our only real friend” able to help those who want to reach family abroad, in exchange for payment of a reasonable sum of money guaranteed by the good chance that the project will succeed (Chin, 2003; Soudijn, 2004). In other words, the network is seen as a facilitator. The journey can be organized and financed through family networks, although this was more common in the past, before the organization of travel became a specialized service. Many Chinese individuals, contacted through the Prato Centre, told us how they arrived in Italy with the help of organizers linked to family networks, without seeking “professional” aid. It is significant that the immigrants do not see themselves as victims of criminal organizations, even when the trip is organized by groups with no links to friends or family. The issue is complex, and it is limiting to attribute irregular immigration to groups with criminal links without taking into consideration the social, economical and political context. As suggested by Soudijn (2004), “smuggling” and “organized crime … are very imprecise terms or, from a different point of view, labels that can project a wrong image”. The hypothesis that the people organizing the journeys are facilitators rather than traffickers is confirmed by the findings of the judges and investigators cited in this report, as well as by information collected through our fieldwork and by researchers. Groups of traffickers or smugglers are almost unanimously described as “travel agents” and as part of a flexible, efficient, business-like organization. They appear to have more in common with businesses taking advantage of market conditions than with criminal organizations (disregarding the illegal acts committed). Trafficking and smuggling can thus be seen as consisting of two separate activities. If we consider trafficking to be the buying and selling of individuals for the purposes of exploitation, and smuggling to be the facilitating of irregular immigration (Beccucci and Massari, 2003), in the case 101

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of China, trafficking can be categorically excluded. We agree with the analysis of Chinese immigrants from Fujian, by Pieke et al. (2004), who depict the organizers as “immigration facilitators” who are “best seen not as hardened criminals, but as professionals who offer a range of services, some of which may be in breach of the law, whilst others may be perfectly above board” (p. 195). We too consider that these organizations should be considered first and foremost as providers of services. This enables us to see the immigrants in a different light: “they are, on the whole, neither hapless victims of unscrupulous smugglers, nor political refugees fleeing political persecution” (Pieke et al., 2004, p. 32). Rather, they make use of the most efficient means and organizations in order to reach their destinations so that they can generate their own employment and wealth (Pieke et al., 2004). This and other research (Xiang, 2003) shows how, in order to develop business, these organizers actively promote irregular emigration, encouraging new departures and contributing to migration flows. Legal investigations confirm the existence of a business-like relationship between immigrants and facilitators: I pay you; you help me to reach my destination so that I can carry out my projects. The Milan court took a similar position when it convicted several Chinese citizens of assisting the illegal entry of fellow Chinese into Italy, as well as several defendants of kidnapping for ransom.83

Illegal activities and risks of the journey Researchers (Chin, 2003; Soudijn, 2004), like the criminal investigators, describe the groups as generally small organizations that can maximize their effectiveness because of the extreme flexibility of the “workforce”. Many legal documents attribute this flexibility to networks of friends and acquaintances and to guanxi. The leader of the organization is often based outside of China and the representatives work in an organizational structure that allows the rapid grouping and replacement of individuals, on an ad hoc basis, whenever there is an opportunity to make money. Small groups are also able to avoid the ever-increasing attention directed by the Chinese police towards traffickers/smugglers. The use of false papers (and the bribery of civil servants who falsify or issue visas) to facilitate entries into a foreign country confirms that the activities carried out by the organizers have an illegal and sometimes criminal aspect. In some cases this takes the form of violence or links and collaboration with local gangsters (Chin, 2003). Italian police investigations have shown how violence is used as a method of managing migrants. Other legal documents describe a woman 83

Milan Court of Law, N° 6/98 General Court Regulations, op. cit.

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who “cheated” the organization and how they hoped she would be “beaten to death”.84 They also mention a young girl who “attempted to commit suicide … probably due to being raped on the trip from China to Italy”.85 Instances of rape by organizers during the journey were frequently described to the Prato Centre’s workers, especially in the 1990s. The Special Operations Task Force of the Carabinieri from the Marche region’s “New Era” operation (2002–05) was told the following by a Chinese migrant who reached Italy illegally through Turkey and Greece: I personally witnessed the beating up by the “boss” of two people who had tried to escape in Istanbul. The boss had met the two people and brought them back to his house. They were then badly beaten in the presence of the others as an example. Regarding the boss’s possession of weapons, I personally saw a gun which was shown to me, along with others in the apartment, by one of the collaborators, with the clear intention of intimidating us to dissuade further escape attempts. The story of another immigrant appears in the same legal document: “The beating of the two people who had tried to escape, by the ‘Istanbul boss’ named XXX, was very violent. After having kicked and punched various parts of their bodies, the ‘boss’ then hit their legs violently with a metal pole.” Information collected through the Prato Centre confirms that women travelling alone and individuals lacking the necessary family or guanxi connections are particularly at risk of violence, because as a rule the traffickers/smugglers recognize and respect the social network to which the immigrants belong. The reports of violence seem to confirm a tendency of networks, which were originally held together by family or clan-type links or by reciprocal guanxi, to degenerate. Some degeneration also arises from connections with criminals in transit countries who assist in the organization of travel. This leads to the involvement of people who are unknown to the organizers and who do not respect the Chinese immigrants’ social networks. Chinese immigrants from the north-east provinces are less able to rely on the support of established family networks when emigrating. These groups of immigrants, made up mainly of women, arrived in Europe and Italy from the mid-1990s onwards. Unable to rely on family or geographical links, they lived in conditions of vulnerability and marginality and produced the first groups of Chinese prostitutes in Italy (Cologna and Mancini, 2000; Tolu, 2003). 84

Milan Law Court, Proc. N° 13739/01 R.G.N.R. (General Register Role Number), op. cit. N° 4572/02 R.G.N.R. (General Register Role Number) and N° 2104/03 R.G.N.R. (General Register Role Number), Injunction for the application of precautionary measures, 24 June 2006, pp. 70–71.

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This helps to show the different levels of illegal activities connected to trafficking and smuggling. Those who organize the prospective immigrants’ trip abroad range from informal networks of friends and relatives who help individuals leave China and enter the country of their choice, to small and flexible organized groups, and then to criminal networks that operate on an international level and treat the trafficking of irregular immigrants in a similar way to the trafficking of drugs or weapons. These different levels of facilitation should not be mixed up because “by paying excessive attention to the third group, we end by losing all sense of perspective” (Soudijn, 2004, p. 8). Indeed, it becomes difficult to identify the line dividing the three different levels of trafficking/smuggling and their respective weights in relation to the phenomenon as a whole. The central question that emerges from an examination of the criminal aspects of the organizations managing travel is whether there is a link between this illegality and violence, and the living and working conditions of immigrants at the end of their trip. Even if the organizers of immigrants’ travel are seen as facilitators and their activity as a service, the criminal character of certain organizations cannot be underestimated. Investigations by the New Era operation established the existence of organizations of a criminal nature, with criminal aims, and clarified their organization and use of criminal methods, including violence, kidnapping and ransom. It also examined the nature of these groups’ control over irregular migrants, and analysed whether or not the facts should be seen as trafficking and a new form of slavery. In an injunction against a number of Chinese defendants86 in a kidnapping case, Ancona magistrates established the factual basis for believing that a criminal, mafia-type organization existed, but decided that trafficking could be directly excluded. Italian law87 sets out two forms of trafficking: …first the illegal transportation of a person already in a condition of slavery, and second, inducing a person to enter the State’s territory in order to reduce the person to slavery – through deceit, violence, threats or other actions. Therefore, either for trafficking, or the forced transportation of individuals, the person in question must already be in a condition of slavery or the kidnapper must intend to reduce them to slavery. A slave is not only a person deprived of their freedom, but is also a person used as an object, who has no or very little power to make decisions and thus no human dignity. 86

Ancona Tribunal, Proc. N° 4572/02 R.G.N.R. (General Register Role Number), N° 2104/03 R.G.G.I.P. (General Register of Judiciary Preliminary Inquiries), Injunction for the application of precautionary measures against Kuo Jong, 8-4-2005, against Dong Yunjian, 12-5-2005, against Wu Xianzhu, 25-5-2005. The magistrates referred to articles 416b, 600 and 601 of the Penal Code. 87 Law 228, 11 August 2003, which modifies articles 600, 601 and 602 of the Penal Code, according to the Palermo Protocol.

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The judges went on to draw a distinction between slavery and the “state of psychological coercion in which the kidnap victims found themselves … which prevented them from escaping”, and thus excluded trafficking. Elements of this coercion included the fact that victims were thousands of miles from their home country, in places where foreign languages were spoken and where they could not make themselves understood; that they had paid for part of the trip and, if they escaped, would lose what they had already paid; and their fear of reprisals against family in China. Their opinions are significant because they demonstrate the difficulty of applying the new law on slavery and, most importantly, because they confirm that, even in a case characterized by criminality, the fundamental character of the relationship between traffickers and smugglers and irregular immigrants was that of reciprocal gain. The police force now shows signs of reconsidering their earlier belief that the arrival of a Chinese workforce involved exclusively the trafficking of human beings. Interviews in 2006 with an investigator from the Anti-Mafia Investigation Department in Florence, a national expert in crime involving Chinese citizens, confirm the difficulty of characterizing the majority of irregular immigration from China as trafficking. Similar views emerged during interviews in March 2006 with officials from the Carabinieri division in charge of labour control based in Rome, at the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and with the Carabinieri Special Task Force officials.

THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE IMMIGRANTS’ ACTIVITIES The amnesties of 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002 enabled many irregular migrants to shake off their clandestine status. The majority of Chinese came to Italy as irregular migrants, arriving both from China and from other European countries where they had no legal immigration status. As shown in table 7, the number of Chinese adults holding residence permits grew from around 29,000 in 1996 to 186,522 in 2006. During the 1990s a growing proportion of the immigrant population entering Italy did so legally: the number arriving for family reunion increased and the 1998 Immigration Law introduced annual quotas for foreign workers. For instance, the Government issued 16,595 visas for family reunion in 2001 (29 per cent of total permits/visas issued), 5,334 in 2002 and 7,185 in 2003. In 2000, 71.7 per cent of residence permits for people of Chinese origin were issued for work purposes. In the 20 years following the arrival of these “new Chinese immigrants”, most Chinese in Italy were low-skilled workers. After 2000, when growing numbers of Chinese immigrants entered the import–export business, and more recently, in 2005, when the Italian Government started attracting Chinese students, the composition of Chinese immigrants began to change.

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Table 7 Residence permits granted to Chinese citizens, Italy, 1996–2006 Year

Chinese citizens

Foreigners

% of total foreigners

1996

29 073

1 095 622

2.65

1997

37 838

1 240 721

3.05

1998

31 436

1 033 235

3.04

1999

47 108

1 251 994

3.76

2000

60 619

1 388 153

4.37

2001

56 566

1 362 630

4.15

2002

62 312

2 469 324

2.52

2003

100 109

2 598 223

3.85

2005

112 358

2 271 680

4.95

2006

186 522

3 690 052

5.05

Note: Data for 2004 unavailable. Source: Caritas, 1997–2007.

Chinese immigrants have now arrived in almost all regions of Italy, with higher numbers in certain areas. The largest number is in Prato, which has the highest density of Chinese relative to the local population. Prato is also the industrial district with the highest number of Chinese-operated production businesses (1,975 businesses active in knitwear and garment production in January 2006 (Infoimprese, 2006)) and is the area where Chinese immigrants first established manufacturing firms. Other areas with a large number of Chinese immigrants are: Florence and its leather industry (over 10,700 residence permits); the Carpi clothing industry, including the provinces of Reggio Emilia and Modena (5,400 Chinese adults); and the urban areas of Milan and Rome (about 10,600 and 6,300 Chinese immigrants, respectively). Chinese pioneers have been active in the clothing sector in Italy since the early years of the twentieth century. In the second half of the 1980s newcomers began to enter the business and expand operations. Nearly all of these new immigrants were employed in the ethnic economy in workshops that contracted for Italian suppliers of garments, knitwear, leatherwear and handbags. Powerful ethnic networks helped newcomers to find work in businesses run by fellow Chinese. This system of job placement within a nascent ethnic niche offered significant benefits: a job immediately upon arrival in Italy, employment in a field in which it was possible, in a short span of time, to progress from manual labourer to self-employed businessperson, and a milieu that cushioned the impact of the new linguistic and cultural environment (Ceccagno, 2007a). Such situations are commonly described as “ethnic niches” (Portes and Jensen, 1987).

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During the 1980s and 1990s the predominant model of upward social mobility among the Chinese in Italy culminated in the ownership of a contracting workshop or a restaurant. Despite the fact that from 1990 to 1998 Italian immigration laws did not admit immigrants for self-employment except from countries with which – unlike China – Italy had signed reciprocal agreements, a growing number of Chinese immigrants in Italy managed to become self-employed. But many others remained manual workers. In the last decade, the growth in imports from China has coincided with the opening of wholesale and retail businesses among the Chinese. Their activities have evolved from a specialization in manufacturing to a situation in which commercial activities outnumber manufacturing, at least in terms of number of businesses. In September 2005 there were 21,743 Chinese firms (sole proprietorships) in Italy. The firms experienced a growth index of 21 per cent over the last five years (based on an average annual variation for 2000–05) and a 17.4 per cent increase over 2004. In 2004, a watershed year, the number of Chinese businesses in trade and services overtook those in manufacturing, outnumbering them by 9,582 to 8,972 (Ceccagno, 2007b). This trend continued in 2005, when 9,669 out of a total of 21,743 businesses were in the manufacturing sector (table 8). Of the Chinese-operated firms in Italy, 46.5 per cent are commercial businesses, while 44.4 per cent are specialized in manufacturing (Spinner, 2006). Table 8 Chinese-operated businesses in Italy in 2005 Type of business

Agriculture Manufacturing (total) Food and beverage Textile and clothing Leather and leather goods Furniture manufacturing Other Construction Wholesale and retail of personal and home furnishing products Hotels and restaurants

No. of businesses

27 9 669 320 6 783 2 268 167 131 153 10 114 1 290

Transportation, stocks and communication

145

Real estate, computers

188

Health and other social and personal services

51

Other

106

Total

21 743

Source: Spinner, 2006.

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Concealed chains

A caveat is needed: this data refers to registered business owners, not employees. Fieldwork conducted in Rome and the industrial districts of Prato and Carpi (Emilia Romagna) has found that most Chinese businesses in trade and services employ very few workers. In many cases they are limited to members of the owner’s family (restaurants may be an exception), while Chinese workshops employ an average of ten workers (Ceccagno, 2003b; 2007b; Spinner, 2005. The majority of Chinese immigrants are still employed in manufacturing. This data offers a new picture of Chinese immigrants. Long associated with subcontracting in the textile and clothing industry, they are now repositioning themselves en masse in sectors outside of manufacturing across Italy, engaging primarily in importing and distributing goods made in China.

Figure 5 Regional distribution of Chinese-operated businesses, Italy Other regions

16.81%

Campania

4.54% 4.86%

Piedmont Sic ily

5.29%

Laz io

7.01% 9.47%

V eneto Emilia Romagna

10.56%

Lombardy

18.57%

Tus c any

22.89% 0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

Source: Spinner, 2006.

The regional distribution of Chinese sole-proprietor firms in Italy (figure 5) shows that almost a quarter of Chinese-run firms in Italy are located in Tuscany. However, the Italian regions with the highest growth are in southern Italy, specifically in the regions of Campania, Lazio and Sicily. Chinese immigrants’ choice of location differs from those of other immigrants. Other non-EU businesses, concentrated on commerce and construction, tend to cluster in big metropolitan areas (Spinner, 2006). Chinese businesses, on the

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other hand, have tended to invest in new territory, including both metropolitan areas and more peripheral ones.

Manufacturing activities New Chinese immigrants, who left China in the 1980s, entered the clothing and leather goods sectors en masse, often opening businesses in areas that specialized in textile/garment production. As shown in table 9, most Chinese manufacturing activities are still concentrated in the garment and leather goods sectors, with 6,783 and 2,268 businesses respectively. In Italy as a whole, Chinese sole-proprietor firms account for 8.8 per cent of all firms active in the textile/clothing sector. Their share of this sector, which was 4 per cent in 2000, had doubled by 2005. Chinese-operated businesses (sole proprietorship) accounted for 9.5 per cent of all businesses in the leather/leather goods/footwear sectors in 2005, compared to 5.8 per cent in 2000 (Spinner, 2006). Among the activities operated by people who are not from the EU, the Chinese head up 81 per cent of textiles/garment production businesses and 88.4 per cent of those producing leather, leather goods and footwear (Spinner, 2006). As tables 9 and 10 show, the majority of Chinese sole-proprietor firms (60 per cent) are concentrated in a number of Italian regions, particularly Tuscany, Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Veneto. In these areas, the proportion of Chinese firms relative to the total number of active firms reaches significant percentages in specific sectors. In Tuscany, the proportion of Chinese immigrant businesses reaches 19 per cent of the total number of businesses for textile/garments and 22 per cent of those for leather/leather goods/footwear. Both manufacturing and commercial/services businesses in Tuscany are growing compared to the previous year; in 2004 there were 3,664 manufacturing firms out of a total of 4,518 firms (Ceccagno, 2008). If specific industrial districts are singled out by region, the percentage of Chinese-owned businesses is even higher. This includes: the textile district of Prato (23 per cent), the knitwear and garment district of Carpi (7 to 11 per cent), the provinces of Verona and Treviso (15 and 11 per cent) and the garment centre of San Giuseppe Versuviana in Campania (21 per cent of local firms) (Spinner, 2006). Commercial activities Between 2000 and 2005, commercial activities run by Chinese individuals have shown the highest growth rates, particularly between 2003 and 2005, where the average annual variation was 43.7 per cent. During the same time span manufacturing businesses run by Chinese immigrants had an average growth of 12 per cent.

109

4 977

Lombardy

4 038

32

239

1 450

74

1 820

2 295

Source: Spinner, 2006.

–

107

1 227

73

1 475

Emilia Romagna

Note: The totals listed are for all of Italy, and include figures not listed in this chart.

Total Chinese businesses

55

1 497

Leather and leather goods

Home furnishings

2 319

15

3 903

Tuscany

Textiles and clothing

Food sector

Manufacturing activities (total)

Veneto

2 060

9

79

1 022

35

1 173

Lazio

1 524

4

3

96

27

132

1 056

3

6

115

55

200

Piedmont

110 988

43

5

94

3

102

Campania

Table 9 Chinese manufacturing activities in selected Italian regions, 2005

Marche

640

2

21

197

4

422

Abruzzo

549

3

102

184

4

295

Total in Italy

21 743

167

2 268

6 783

320

9 669

Concealed chains

32

1

29

Transportation, stocks and communication

Financial and banking services

Real estate, computers

Lombardy

4 038

53

6

35

404

1 646

Emilia Romagna

2 295

11

1

16

106

664

Veneto

2 060

6

1

8

148

706

Lazio

1 524

60

4

12

191

1 065

Sicily

1 151

–

–

1

16

1 124

1 056

12

–

5

178

615

Piedmont

988

10

–

25

14

831

Source: Spinner, 2006.

Puglia

601

–

–

1

29

531

Note: Only regions with more than 400 commercial activities are included. The totals listed are for all of Italy, and include figures not listed in this chart.

4 977

56

Hotels and restaurants

TOTAL Chinese manufacturing and non-manufacturing businesses

909

Tuscany

Wholesale and retail of personal/ home furnishing products

Campania

Table 10 Chinese non-manufacturing activities in selected Italian regions, 2005

Calabria

456

–

–

–

7

446

Sardinia

456

–

–

–

7

445

Total in Italy

21 743

181

13

145

1 290

10 114

Italy

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The activities of Chinese immigrants, particularly commercial ones, are concentrated in 11 Italian regions. Lombardy has the highest number of service activities and the largest number of wholesale and retail businesses (totalling 1,646 in 2005, as shown in table 10). Compared with the previous year, their growth rate is impressive (1,312 businesses in 2004). However, the number of service-oriented businesses did not increase during this period (Spinner, 2005, 2006). In terms of commercial activities, Rome (Lazio) stands out with 1,065 wholesale and retail shops. From the early 2000s onwards Chinese wholesalers based in Rome started selling goods imported from China (Ceccagno, 2007b). The most striking evolution can be seen in Sicily, where 1,124 Chinese wholesale and retail shops have opened. Although the Chinese arrived only recently, between 2000 and 2005 their businesses have seen dramatic growth averaging 51.5 per cent per year. Businesses averaged a yearly growth of 48.9 per cent in Campania and commercial activities have soared (table 10) in other southern and tourist regions (Puglia, Calabria, Sardinia), although less spectacularly than in Sicily. This evolution of Chinese immigrants who are now repositioning themselves en masse outside manufacturing reflects the evolution of China as an increasingly strong global exporter. Immigrants have taken advantage of this evolution and have themselves started to import goods from China, often setting up their own production facilities in China to export goods.

WORKING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CHINESE ETHNIC NICHE In the last 15 years, the existence of Chinese subcontracting workshops has been fundamental to the continuing competitiveness of the Italian fashion industry. Whereas manufacturers had previously relied on Italian subcontractors located elsewhere (especially in the south of Italy), the presence of Chinese labour has made it possible to rely on contractors located within the district. The low prices charged by Chinese contractors are the central competitive advantage, made possible through a combination of low wages based on piece-rate pay, working hours far longer than those allowed by national labour contracts, non-compliance with social security and tax legislation, and the use of clandestine workers. According to a study conducted in the Emilia Romagna region, the direct cost of processing a medium-quality garment by a Chinese shop was equal to 5 per cent of the final market price, or just half the average processing cost in workshops run by Italians (Spinner, 2005).

Chinese workshops and pronto moda The typical garment workshop operated by Chinese immigrants in Italy is set up as a sole proprietorship or family business. There are few general or limited partnerships and even fewer limited companies. 112

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The typical workshop’s human resources consist of the owner (a third of whom are women, in the Prato and Carpi districts), the owner’s spouse and children, and about ten workers. As the employer has to provide lodging as well as meals for all employees, he or she also employs a full-time maid. It is less common to have workshops staffed only by the owner and members of the immediate family; these are found either in the more sophisticated or in the more marginal phases of production (Ceccagno, 2006). Operations with between 30 and 40 workers are rare; when they reach this threshold the family/owner tends to divide staff among several workshops (Ceccagno, 2003b; Spinner, 2005). Although Chinese workshops generally assemble garments and knitwear and do not cover the full gamut of processing, an increasing though still limited number have equipped themselves to handle more complex processes, working for higher, more profitable prices and attaining a standard of quality that has attracted the big names in fashion. In the past years, growing numbers of Chinese firms in the Prato district have turned out garments for many internationally known labels (Ceccagno, 2003b). Most Chinese workshops do not do design work, manage production flows or market final products. A striking exception is the Prato district, where the 250 to 300 firms that have emerged since the late 1990s have extended their activities both upstream and downstream, from design to distribution, becoming firms that sell final products and outsourcing the various stages of production to other Chinese firms. The district, which previously specialized only in textile production, has expanded its fields of activity and has also become a new and dynamic fashion centre, attracting clients from most of Europe. The new production and market centre in Prato simultaneously takes advantage of the industrial culture and modus operandi, while pushing the core textile component of the district to reshape part of its production and organization to fit into the new driving sector of pronto moda (ready to wear) clothing.

The organization of work in ethnic workshops Workers begin by doing odd jobs (zagong), which include cleaning, cutting loose threads from clothes, folding the finished garments and sometimes preparing meals. They earn around €7,200 per year. Within a few months, a worker who learns quickly can move up to become a manual worker (shougong). This work requires basic skills (a shougong irons and can sew, but not expertly) and can earn the worker about €8,400 per year, either at piece rates or as a fixed wage. When the worker becomes a tailor (chegong), the pay is by the piece and roughly equal to an average monthly wage of €1,000. As with zagong and shougong, wages are unevenly distributed over the year.88 88

Based on wages for workshops located in the Emilia Romagna region in 2004 (Spinner, 2005).

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Chinese men and women participate equally in the work; bosses and their spouses also do manual work and work the same hours, although their schedules are more flexible.

The effect of regional origins on opportunity The arrival of workers from new areas of China changed the composition of the Chinese workforce. Until the end of the 1980s almost all Chinese workers were from Zhejiang. Today, the vast majority of those who have started their own business, and, in general, those who have succeeded in diversifying their activity, are from Zhejiang. In the Prato district, most Chinese businesses that have made the leap from subcontractor to final firm originate from Zhejiang. In the late 1980s and early 1990s Chinese began to arrive from Fujian and entered the ethnic economy established by Chinese from Zhejiang, adopting its models of business operation. After a period in which they filled the lowest positions in firms run by the Zhejiangese, they began opening small businesses of their own, often employing workers from their home area. The last to arrive, who hold the bottom jobs and are in the weakest bargaining position, are from the provinces of north-east China: those who arrived from Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning in the late 1990s. Unlike other Chinese in Italy, most come from major industrial centres that were hit hard by the reorganization of state-owned enterprises. The first women to arrive from this region became involved in prostitution, while others worked as babysitters, where they are much in demand within the Chinese community for their greater proficiency as speakers of standard Chinese. Those from the north-east tend to have an aversion to the prevailing work model of the Zhejiangese-dominated ethnic economy. Their ambition appears to be to leave the ethnic economy as soon as possible and work for an Italian employer. But most are still stuck in the ethnic workshops with zagong work, which is the worst paid, has the longest working hours and does not offer opportunities for upward mobility (Ceccagno, 2002, 2003b; Pieke et al., 2004). In the 1990s zagong employment was widespread among newcomers, regardless of their area of origin, and was perceived as a temporary occupation. But it has recently become more and more of a job for those from north-east China – and from other regions such as Henan and Jiangxi – who are trapped in the lowest position. The Chinese labour market has changed over the years, and the competitive advantage of those who arrived first and had an existing network of relationships is evident. According to recent research in Prato, working conditions are deteriorating for the zagong in the ethnic niche, who often face discrimination from Chinese from Zhejiang and Fujian and who could end up becoming a new underclass (Fenn, 2007). 114

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Flexibility: The compression of personal and family life Chinese work in Italy is extremely flexible. The flexibility is both production oriented and organizational, involving faster processing and shorter lead time before delivery. When necessary, Chinese workers work at night or at a constant pace on shifts that may reach 30 hours in the high season, interrupted only by short naps leaning on the sewing machine. These conditions generate savings and profits for customer firms, which can organize their operations without lulls and thus economize on staff time. They also allow final firms to respond rapidly to the demands of the market, seizing new opportunities as they arise. The flexibility of organization and production implies a radical compression of personal living time: within the ethnic niche, married life, parenthood and childcare are reduced to the minimum (Ceccagno, 2007a). This flexibility creates a sort of vacuum around workplace activities that keeps out anything that could hinder production. The tendency over the past two decades has been to reduce all aspects of personal and family life to the bare essentials. This compression takes on different aspects depending on the status of the couple (i.e. workers or employees, families with or without access to housing, and those with or without financial means). There are three main outcomes of this flexibility on family life: 1.

A segment of Chinese women access pregnancy termination services to a greater extent than Italian women. This seems to be linked to an ethnic economy based on piece-rate work that provides limited access to social welfare benefits to support the period of childbirth and the subsequent care of the newborn baby. The lack of separate housing in the ethnic workshops can add to the delay in having children.

2.

The vast majority of women who work in ethnic workshops do not breastfeed and do not keep their children with them for the first few years of their life. This choice, which is made by both parents, means that the baby is separated from the parents after the first three or four months. The solution has been to send children to their grandparents in China, but increasing numbers of Chinese are now looking for childcare in Italy. Some employ in-house Chinese babysitters, while others opt for Italian childcare providers who look after the children in their homes.

3.

Children whose parents manage a family-type business often work in the workshop, where they carry out general tasks on a regular or irregular basis. Research on Chinese immigrant youth shows how this represents one of the reasons for the area’s high Chinese drop-out rates from middle and high school (Ceccagno, 2004).

This extremely flexible organization of work and use of the workforce weighs most heavily on the most vulnerable workers. During the 1990s the

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Concealed chains

Prato Centre registered many cases of pregnant women or people who were sick and who had to continue working when they should not have done so. At the birth of their baby, or when the sickness worsened, these people were expelled from the workshop, losing both work and lodging. Flexibility is also ensured by high employee mobility. When there are no orders, workers feel free to go to other workshops where there is work or even to find job opportunities in other towns. In recent years, this mobility within Italy and Europe has characterized not only Chinese workers, but also those operating workshops producing goods and those working as importers, wholesalers and retailers. This mobility can be seen through data for some of the denser areas, such as Prato or Milan (Centro di Ricerche e Servizi per l’Immigrazione, 2003; 2004; 2005). It is also evident from this study’s fieldwork (Ceccagno, 2005) and can be deduced from the increased Chinese presence in areas where previously very few Chinese had settled, such as Sicily or southern Italy. The high mobility of workers also emerges from interviews among the Chinese pronto moda manufacturers that contract production to Chinese workshops in Prato (Ceccagno, 2009). The manufacturers interviewed outsource the assembly of products to four to eight Chinese workshops, according to the volume of production. The main problem identified by the pronto moda manufacturers with regard to suppliers, as indentified in interviews, is linked to the high mobility of labour in the contractors’ workshops, which can yield products of unpredictable quality. The sudden loss of highly skilled workers can interrupt work relations, even in the middle of the production process.

Competition and conflict management Fierce competition exists between Chinese subcontractors, which has driven down the price of outsourcing and reduced unit costs. A study in Emilia Romagna has brought to light widespread competition among Chinese firms (Spinner, 2005). Such field studies serve to dispel what had previously been a common misconception that Chinese firms were part of a cupola-like organization, with powerful “lieutenants” acting as middlemen and where production processes are farmed out to subcontractors. Not only does no such ethnic cupola exist, but competition prevails over cooperation, fragmentation over coordination. Although the Chinese in Italy are perceived from the outside as having a strong national identity and a tendency towards ethnic aloofness, in reality they lack a cohesive collective identity in the economic sphere and appear to be unaware of their potential bargaining power (Ceccagno, 2005). This lack of cohesiveness is the result of several factors. First, constrained by limited knowledge about the social and economic environment in which they operate (Spinner, 2005), Chinese workshop owners usually do not possess clear data and often do not have even approximate information 116

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on the increments of value added in the supply chain of which they are a part. They have no notion of the costs that their customers bear in turning out a final product or of the factors that combine to determine the final price. Second, their failure to coordinate a strategy for dealing with customers appears to be a reflection of high territorial mobility and local opportunities. For more than a decade, whenever domestic competition undercut their selling prices, Chinese businesspeople could move their operations to areas where conditions were ripe for new workshops and selling prices were more remunerative. Today, by contrast, there is little if any scope to escape the squeeze of domestic competition by relocating production. In the first decade of the new Chinese immigrants’ presence in Italy – when Chinese immigrants were starting to set up their businesses as contractors in the garment and leather goods industry, and when the majority of the workers were irregular and therefore more subject to pressure and even coercion – the relationship between employer and employees was mainly a relationship of exploitation and dependence (Ceccagno, 2007b). At that time, ethnic solidarity was meant to legitimize paternalistic working arrangements (Portes, 1981). Until the mid-1990s, widespread ignorance of labour laws resulted in workers not daring to change workshops, as they assumed that this required permission from their employer, or workers being told that they had to work without pay for a year and a half as compensation for being sponsored for regularization. This situation of dependence prevented the airing of open conflict or dulled nascent ones (Bélanger and Pinard, 1991), as was evident in the mid1990s when the immigration amnesty allowed the legalization of dependent workers. Open conflicts broke out between employers (who had the power to assist the legalization of irregular workers) and the workers (who at the time were mostly irregular immigrants) within the Chinese community in Prato. Significant sums of money and even years of unpaid labour were the conditions imposed by most employers in exchange for legalization. Some workers felt that they were being exploited and turned to labour unions or lawyers for help. However, the conflict was short-lived: workers discovered that fighting for union rights was unrealistic in an ethnic economy dominated by small, informally organized family businesses. An evolution from complete dependence towards negotiated conditions can now be seen. In recent years, although pregnant women and workers who are sick often continue to work, workers are more aware of their rights and no longer view their boss as the person who has absolute power over their destiny in Italy. With the passing of time it has become clear that both entrepreneurs and workers perceive this organization of work as the best and quickest way to become successful entrepreneurs. Workers are willing to work long hours not only because they are not in a position to refuse or because the market requires this working arrangement, but also because they aspire to the role of the employer. They therefore see temporary exploitation and self-

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exploitation as the main road to self-fulfilment (even though in reality success is not accessible to everybody). This kind of niche also guarantees mutually beneficial agreements between those operating the business and the workers: the entrepreneur takes care of administrative and bureaucratic tasks on behalf of the workers (thanks to their better knowledge of the Italian language and the cultural environment) and usually provides the workers with board and lodging. To see only the paternalistic, exploitative and dependent relationship between employers and employees is to miss part of the picture. It is also important to take into account the mutual interest that keeps employers and employees together – for a limited period of time (Ceccagno, 2007a).

Exclusion of zagong However, these dynamics do not seem to be true for the majority of zagong workers. There has been no recent in-depth investigation of the conditions for the zagong in Chinese workshops, but a preliminary enquiry in Prato suggests that their economic situation has not improved and that their mobility appears to be blocked (Fenn, 2007). In the past, the upgrade to specialized worker was the natural consequence of an expanding labour market. But today the condition of the zagong seems frozen. Although the zagong may move from one employer to another, this does not necessarily mean that they acquire greater skills or obtain better working conditions. These workers find it hard to pay back the debts incurred by the journey, to remit money to their home country, or to arrange for their families to join them. This situation creates dissatisfaction and frustration among workers, a sense of exclusion from the Chinese community, and a strong sense of being exploited by employers. Further research is needed to investigate the magnitude of this problem. Working conditions in Chinese workshops: An empirical study in textile, garment and leather sectors in Veneto, Italy In 2006, Chinese migrant workers in 25 Chinese-owned and three Italian-owned textile, garment and leather workshops in Veneto were surveyed by Padova University to assess the working conditions in Chinese-owned workshops and compare them to those in Italian-owned workshops, where an estimated 10 per cent of Chinese migrants work. The survey results showed that the working environment, hourly wages (though not monthly wages due to long hours), benefits and working hours were better in the Italian-owned workshops than in the Chinese-owned workshops. More than two-thirds of the Chinese-owned workshops were located in converted houses in residential areas or in outdated or abandoned buildings for industrial production; these workshops had poor ventilation, overcrowding of

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machines and people, poor lighting, and low safety standards due to old machines and a lack of protective equipment. Nearly one-third of the Chinese-owned workshops were more like the Italian workshops, with large rooms, high ceilings and good lighting and ventilation that met national standards for health and safety. In the Chinese-owned workshops surveyed, workers worked at least 14 hours per day, seven days per week, and often at night. In some workshops, workers were required to work for as much as 24 to 36 hours at a stretch in order to meet the tight production deadlines. In the Italian workshops, workers worked only during the day, five days per week, for eight to nine hours per day; while they might opt to work extra hours on weekends with overtime pay, there was no mandatory overtime work. Skilled workers (chegong) in the Chinese-owned workshops earned €900 to €1,100 per month based on a piece-rate system, about €200 to €300 more than those in Italian workshops where earnings were based on an hourly wage. Taking into account free food and accommodation, the total income of workers in Chineseowned workshops was €1,100 to €1,400 per month, or 40 to 60 per cent more than those working for Italian workshops. However, when wages were calculated based on hours worked, those in Chinese workshops earned only about 60 per cent of the hourly wage in Italian workshops. In addition, Chinese workshop owners did not pay taxes, pension or health or unemployment insurance for their employees, unlike the Italian workshops, which paid for holidays, illness and maternity leave, injury and unemployment insurance, and income taxes (although some workers complained that they received less in welfare and benefits than native Italians). Researchers observed that there were signs of awareness among Chinese workers about their right to decent work and pay. A number of Chinese workers expressed the desire to seek legal assistance and protection from exploitation and labour abuse. One Italian trade union in Venice had Chinese members, and some Chinese workers in Chinese-owned workshops expressed their desire to contact local trade unions in cases of labour abuse but did not know how to reach them. In addition to looking to labour unions as a way to fight exploitation and labour abuse, workers interviewed had used collective striking action and movement to other workshops to a means to protect themselves. Researchers concluded that the Italian subcontracting system and the Chinese Jiating (family) factory contribute to the working conditions in Chinese-owned workshops. Veneto enterprises save warehousing costs by ordering goods to be produced only as they are needed. As a result of intense competition for these subcontracts, Chinese workshop owners accept reduced prices per piece of work and ever tighter deadlines. Jiating or “total institution” factories are run on a management system modelled after the traditional organization of Chinese households. They provide workers with all work, meals, accommodation and social life. Migrant workers in these workshops are isolated by their location and long working hours, and they depend heavily on owners for information, language,

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legal documents, social networks, transport and other resources. The Jiating system maximizes profit for workshop owners because workers give all their waking hours to production, but it can also be attractive to newly arrived, undocumented migrants and those who do not have Italian language skills or lack social networks to collect information. In the context of the Italian subcontracting system, Jiating factories are prone to labour abuse. The per-piece rate can be continually reduced and the deadline shortened in order to increase workshop competitiveness for subcontracts. In addition, opportunities are almost nonexistent for unskilled workers (zagong) to learn the skills needed for higher wages. These unskilled workers earn half of the income of skilled workers and are particularly vulnerable during peak production times as they are worked to the point of complete exhaustion and not paid for extra work. While most workers interviewed had residential permits, almost all of the unskilled workers who were interviewed were irregular migrants. As a significant gap can be seen between Chinese and Italian-owned manufactories, an increasing flow can be observed from the former to the latter once workers get a valid resident permit and a minimum competency in Italian language. Researchers concluded that the poor working conditions of Chinese migrant workers are essentially rooted in the needs of the Italian economic transition for cheap and flexible labour, which has led to the development of an ethnic business within a subcontracting system. Further research is suggested in order to understand the development of the subcontracting system in the western world and its impact on migrant workers and their working life. Source: “Exploring links between international migration and Wenzou’s development” (Discussion Paper 25) by Bin Wu and Valter Zanin, November 2007 (China Policy Institute, China House University of Nottingham, University Park).

THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF AMNESTIES89 Irregular workers Most amnesties have been announced in advance and detailed information has circulated widely beforehand among the Chinese in Italy and their relatives in China and Europe, allowing immigrants living in other European countries to reach Italy in time to qualify for the amnesty. Despite frequent amnesties, not all Chinese have legalized their position. Estimates for the early 2000s suggest that 15 to 20 per cent of Chinese were irregular (Blangiardo and Farina, 2001). This figure is confirmed by research (Ceccagno, 2003b) on Chinese businesses in Prato, where entrepreneurs agreed that in many small firms one or two out of eight to ten workers were 89

The information in this section, including case studies, is drawn from the records of the Prato Centre. From 1994 onwards, the Centre advised immigrants from all over Italy on the amnesties.

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often clandestine. Fieldwork in the Emilia Romagna region showed that 11 per cent of workers in the garment and leather goods sector were irregular in 2003 (Spinner, 2005). This situation appears to be the exact opposite to that of the early 1990s, when often only the employer had a residence permit and most workers were irregular. Chinese immigrants are well aware that the lack of documents entails a situation of great vulnerability vis-à-vis both local society and the ethnic niche. Clandestine workers can be exploited by almost everybody: the word heigong (literally a “black” or undocumented worker) is used among Chinese immigrants for clandestine workers, not for those who cannot count on a regular work contract. Italy has also been seen as a desirable place to settle in Europe because of these amnesties. Legalization is considered as a watershed that marks the end of a Chinese migrant’s odyssey and the acquisition of a series of residency rights (including the chance to visit China and reunite with family in the new country). But by giving a few people (both Chinese and Italians) the power to facilitate the legalization of a large number of individuals, the amnesties in the last decades have facilitated irregularities. This section examines the effects of the most recent amnesties of 1995, 1998 and 2002.

The costs of legalization Candidates for regularization have often had to meet costs that were the employer’s duty to pay. For example, a pay cheque listing a monthly net salary of €948 would include €324 of tax contributions to be paid by the employer. But instead of receiving €948, the worker would receive only €624. This reduced the salary to which the worker was entitled and meant that the employer’s contributions were met by the worker and not the employer (Ceccagno and Omodeo, 1997). One example from the Prato Centre’s records, involving a couple (a woman from Zhejiang and a man from Pakistan), illustrates this process and the vulnerability of those whose status is irregular: They reached an agreement with their Chinese employer, by which the employer committed himself to presenting a regularization request declaring that the couple had begun working for him before July 2002. In return, the workers would work at a piece rate of 70–80 cents per pair of trousers and deduct national insurance contributions from their salaries. Their net pay officially amounted to €948 (based on a contract for 20 hours per week), of which €324 was deducted for national insurance contributions each month. But the employees hoped to obtain their residence permits and believed that the regularization period would only last for a few months. Their employer sometimes required them to work for 25 hours non-stop. When they protested, he replied that “this is the way Chinese firms work”.

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From October 2002 to March 2003 the couple earned just a few hundred euros; their employer held back the rest of their salary as payment for their regularization. In January 2003 it became clear that the paperwork would not be examined within the threemonth period. At the beginning of March, a disagreement between the couple and the employer resulted in them losing their jobs and their housing. The employer then proposed changing the terms of their agreement and proposed continuing the regularization process in return for €5,000 and two years of unpaid work. On 19 February the couple complained to a trade union. The trade union representative asked them to file a complaint with the Financial Police and contacted the owner of the firm, who contacted the couple and informed them that the firm’s accountant had prepared letters of dismissal for them. They picked up the letters on 17 March. At this point the Home Office’s new circular permitted those waiting for work to obtain residence permits.90 The following day the employer invited the couple to discuss the matter, but they were met by ten Chinese who threatened them. They managed to escape and alerted the police. The couple then tried to take legal action against the employer for threats, but without success. In the end, the man obtained a residence permit for the purpose of awaiting employment. No legal proceedings were ever taken against the employer. Workers have also had to make a lump sum regularization payment to the employer as compensation for sponsoring them. Although the amount has varied by amnesty and employer, the practice was widespread to the point of becoming the norm. Only close relatives would occasionally be exempted from having to pay their employer. The lump sum payment could be made at the beginning of the regularization procedure; more commonly the employer would hold back part or all of the employee’s salary each month until the debt was paid in full. In most cases Chinese employers also asked workers who had been regularized to pay the costs of the accountant who prepared the pay cheques. [A man from Wenzhou] told the Prato Centre how he had gone with his Chinese employer to sign the residence permit in July 2003 – a condition for its issue. On leaving the Immigration Desk, the employer (who ran a manufacturing workshop) took the 90

The 48331/30 circular letter issued by the Home Office on 16 January 2003, which completes note 48145/30.1.a of 4 December 2002, and circular DCPIA 9/2.2 of 3 April 2003, n. 2, permitted the closure of regularization requests and the issuing of 12-month residence permits for the purposes of awaiting employment for those who had lost their jobs during the amnesty.

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permit, saying that he would return it if the worker paid him €9,500 as “compensation” for having made it possible for the worker to obtain a residence permit and for national insurance contributions paid between the regularization request and the issue of the permit. The worker could not make the payment. Soon afterwards he found work at an Italian laundry, but could not be hired because he could not show his residence permit. The Centre telephoned the employer, who first denied withholding the residence permit or asking for money, but then directed the Centre to his accountant. The accountant initially denied knowledge of any unpaid debt or of withholding the residence permit, but eventually arranged for the employer to return the residence permit. Often, workers who had to make payments each month (repayment to their employer for regularization, national insurance contributions, payment of the accountant, travel from another European country) found themselves spending months or even years with minimal or no pay.

Amnesties and irregularities Amnesty of 1995 (Law 489/95) During the 1995 amnesty immigrants could legalize their presence in Italy as employees only. The amnesty also gave entrepreneurs – Italians or foreigners – the power to sponsor the legalization of clandestine workers. Most Chinese entrusted themselves to fellow Chinese for regularization, relying on their actual employer, a potential employer or someone pretending to be so. Because many Chinese wanted to legalize their status and the number of employers able to sponsor other Chinese was limited, a small minority was able to wield huge power inside the Chinese community. A few workers realized they were being exploited and turned to labour unions or lawyers, but these were isolated cases. Several themes emerged at the time of the amnesty:91 1.

In the great majority of cases, the six-month advance payments to the Italian National Social Security Institute set out in the amnesty were paid by employees, not employers. Many employers also demanded to be paid several million liras in return for their assistance with the regularization process. They also retained the national insurance contributions that employers are required to pay the state from their employee’s pay cheque. This started on the first day of regularization, despite the fact that the workers had already paid the first six months of contributions themselves and no further payment was therefore due for that period.

91

From research conducted by Ceccagno and Omodeo when they were consultants at the Prato Centre at the time of the amnesty.

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2.

Numerous Chinese contacted the Prato Centre claiming that their employer required them to work without salary and that they had committed themselves to remaining with the employer for a period of up to two years.

3.

In some cases, the dependency continued for a long period of time after workers had regularized their status. In extreme cases, workers worked for nothing and became indebted month after month as the employer demanded they repay both the national insurance contributions and the tax deductions. This type of case, with small variations, was frequent. Many employees accepted such a heavy burden because the pay cheque that showed that they were in possession of a fixedterm contract was (and remains) their only guarantee against losing their working permit.

4.

The prevalence of completely irregular conditions was obvious among the groups of Chinese who turned to Italian employers to regularize their presence. Many Chinese employed by Italians worked for months after they had paid both national insurance contributions and their employer for the “service” offered, without ever receiving payment or a pay packet to show to the authorities if checks were made.

5.

At the time, basic workers’ rights – protection from unfair dismissal, from dismissal without notice, maternity benefits and sick leave, holiday entitlement, and freedom to resign – were unknown to the majority of Chinese.

6.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the majority of workers – almost all of them at that time – lived with their employers, who took them into their houses or their workshops. At the time of the amnesty many employees were in conflict with their employers. But when employees abandoned individual negotiations and decided to begin legal proceedings they risked losing the room and board that, until then, had been guaranteed. Many found it impossible to believe that their employers had the right to turn them out of their houses.

Amnesty of 1998 (Law 40/98) The 1998 Immigration Law allowed immigrants to be self-employed. But the application of the law and the regulations implementing it were complicated by the fact that the situation was, in reality, larger and more complex than the one envisaged when the law was passed. The number of immigrants allowed to regularize their status was increased and the regularization requirements were modified through regulations, circulars and other minor legal documents. While these successive adaptations eventually led to the regularization of many immigrants, they also resulted in the creation of high numbers of false papers, partly to meet the unrealistic requests included in the amnesty. For example, candidates for regularization were asked to pro-

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vide official evidence of their residence in Italy, something which was often incompatible with the low profile cultivated by irregular immigrants. Amnesty of 2002 (Law 189/02) The Prato Centre provided assistance to around 5,000 irregular immigrants, half of which were Chinese immigrants. Based on an examination of the files recorded by the Centre, the following issues arose during this amnesty, with varying degrees of frequency: 1.

In one case in 20, the employer confiscated employees’ passports; in one case in ten the employer confiscated the employees’ receipts,92 as in the case of this woman from Fujian: The woman’s Chinese employer made the regularization request, and kept the coupon that proved that the request had been made. She was not paid, but was given board and lodging and had to pay national insurance contributions. These were then registered in her wage packet, which had to be shown at the time of regularization. When the residence permit was issued almost a year later she had not yet finished making the agreed payments. So when her two employers went with her to the Immigration Desk to sign the residence contract and receive the residence permit, they took her residence permit as a guarantee for the debt. By the time the Centre arranged for the employer to bring the residence permit, the woman had worked without pay for a year. About 60 per cent of immigrants paid the costs of regularization; amounts varied from €2,000 to €7,000, with some immigrants paying up to €12,000. In around 70 per cent of cases, the immigrant paid national insurance contributions in the place of the employer, while in 80 per cent of cases, immigrants worked for free to pay for regularization and national insurance contributions. The payment of the outstanding national insurance contributions93 by workers was so frequent that it was considered by many as normal and not a matter of scandal. Some employers even demanded that employees pay additional amounts of money in return for regularization, a practice which can be considered as extortion.

92

A receipt from the Italian Post is used as legal certification to prove that the application for regularization has been sent. The amnesty required a receipt from both the employee and the employer. 93 This lasted from the moment irregular immigrants began work for their employer until the application for regularization.

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2.

Another widespread illegal practice occurred when the work contract did not exist. In this case regularization was not based on anything and consisted merely of an agreement between the “employer” and the immigrant, who generally paid between €3,000 and €6,000, and sometimes as much as €12,000. After they had been regularized, immigrants continued to pay between €300 and €600 each month in return for false pay cheques that proved that they were in possession of work. These immigrants expected to begin a proper job, as promised or indicated by the employer. However, the job often did not exist.

3.

Other irregular practices related to the fact that the regularization procedures were established with either non-existent companies or with companies that were unknown to workers. The workers continued to work for their Chinese employer, with whom they had begun the regularization process (after having made a payment), and had no way of knowing that they had entrusted themselves to people acting in a completely illegal manner.

4.

One of the main illegal activities linked to regularization concerned rents. Dilapidated warehouses that did not meet health and safety regulations were rented at high prices. The contracts, which were apparently properly registered, came without the use of an apartment. Formal rent contracts, which were needed for regularization, were often sold to several people at a time. In some cases the same apartment was “rented” to as many as 15 people.

Links with local society It is important to understand the links between immigrants and local people that give rise to illegal activities, and that this illegality is not the result of activities and choices made exclusively by immigrants. For some time, an illegal market to provide foreigners with everything that they need to legalize their presence and keep their residence permits has flourished throughout Italy. While this activity can be seen as the provision of services to immigrants – a business opportunity – the business is completely illegal and, in many cases, criminal. The existence and growth of these illegal businesses in the regularization sector is confirmed by police investigations, including two operations conducted by the Prato Financial Police, “Surprise 1” and “Surprise 2”. Similar operations were also carried out elsewhere in Italy (Mazzesi, 2004). The Surprise 2 operation of July 2004 led to the arrest of 23 people, of whom 18 were Italians and five were Chinese. The sale of false work contracts that cover up off-the-books labour relations and the selling of false certificates confirming a person’s presence on Italian territory are widespread illegal acts. In January 2001 the Surprise op126

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eration found that more than 1,000 permits (out of a total of 15,052)94 had been issued on the basis of false papers to immigrants or to Italian intermediaries who had sold rent contracts, false certificates, false tax documents, etc. In the majority of these complex crimes, Italian intermediaries, known to the Chinese as kuaijishi (accountants), had directed the regularization proceedings. At the centre of this were people who, in return for payment, supplied “fully comprehensive” packages that included everything immigrants needed to regularize their status: kits supplied by the Ministry to begin the legalization process, payment of national insurance contributions, names of real or phony companies, real or fake pay envelopes, false addresses, etc. From the records of the Prato Centre, as well as the results of legal proceedings, it seems that a well-tested network of illegal services exists, with individuals who specialize in different types of false documents. Immigrants are sent to these people, who are widely known among the immigrant community, by their employers or by intermediaries. Many businesspeople also use these individuals to manage tax matters. The attitude towards those operating illegally is similar to the one that would be held towards a legitimate, well-tested structure of services. We have not been able to establish how the amount paid by the worker is distributed among the different actors involved (intermediaries, real or sham employers, sham renters, etc.). But we do know that sometimes immigrants are aware that the agreement with their employer or with the kuaijishi, to whom they have to pay a considerable amount, is wholly or partially illegal. At other times, immigrants are unaware of the illegality of the procedure. Apart from the payment, they are convinced that they have followed the path set out by the law. A man [from Wenzhou] arrived in Italy in May 2001. He stayed in Prato for about six months, living off money his parents sent from China. He then went to Naples where he worked in a Chineseoperated manufacturing workshop. In 2002 he was stopped by the police and the Naples prefecture issued an expulsion decree. So he moved to Prato in July, where a friend gave him the telephone number of an Italian – “BS” – who provided consultancy services for the regularization of irregular immigrants. On the telephone BS asked for an immediate cash payment of €2,000 and the payment of a further €1,500 when the residence permit was issued. BS offered to find him somewhere to stay. The following day the immigrant took the money to the consultant and was told that he should collect the regularization documents several days later. In December he received wage packets for the months of

94

Data from Prato Police Headquarters (31 December 2000).

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September, October and November and in February he received wage packets for December, January and February. He paid €300 for each wage packet. When he returned to the office that had issued the wage packets in March, BS told him that he had to sign a letter of dismissal and then go to the prefecture. At this point the immigrant understood that he had been cheated, as the consultant had found him neither work nor shelter and his regularization was not guaranteed. The wage packets were false, and the person the immigrant had considered to be his future employer (he had only seen his photograph) was the person who had pretended to take him on and who now dismissed him. BS was later convicted of fraud. He had organized a group of 22 people to act as phony employers and provide false declarations concerning accommodation. They included a couple of minor Chinese businesspeople, but the majority were Italians in difficult social and economic situations. Each phony employer was used to regularize around 20 immigrants. The people who were regularized were often unaware of the illegality of the procedure and were then faced with huge debts. It is possible to find other signs of this traffic: numerous dismissals are reported to the police (the false company that the immigrant “worked” for often appears to have closed) before the different parties are summoned to draw up the work contract. The termination of employment means that those organizing the crime manage to avoid verification of the regularization application. The organizers, relying on the apparent regularity of the documents presented, then make themselves scarce, leaving the immigrants unemployed. In looking at the effect of the above amnesties, three points can be highlighted. First, it is clear that the amnesties and regularizations encourage the use of illegal practices and offer incentives to a network of shady operators, leaving the immigrants who rely on them open to coercion and exploitation. The case studies illustrate immigrants’ vulnerability and show the ways in which they can be exposed to coercion at the time of amnesties. Second, it is clear that a considerable amount of irregularity exists. The networks that manage these illegal activities, and which, in the initial phase at least, are generally run mainly by Italians, control and manage the movement of “dirty” money. These activities are thus a threat to the entire social fabric. In fact, the number of people aiming to exploit the intrinsic vulnerability of immigrants has increased. It is also possible that groups of Italians, with the complicity of foreigners, carry out activities that can be assimilated into organized crime. Third, although this phenomenon is probably limited to restricted parts of local society, we must presume that a large number of immigrants come

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into or have already been in contact with it and that they depend on it in order to remain legally in Italy. Today, the great majority of Chinese immigrants, and not only those involved in repeated regularizations, live in a situation of “minor” illegality: off-the-books or marginal work, false rents, missing national insurance contributions, etc.

IRREGULARITIES, SELF-EXPLOITATION AND FORCED LABOUR Irregularities in Chinese workshops Off-the-books work is not limited to the Chinese ethnic economy, but it is widely believed that irregularities are more common among Chinese firms than Italian ones. Breaches of the law in Chinese workshops are often linked to the presence of irregular workers within the workforce. Other irregularities involve violations of labour and safety regulations or of social security and tax law. As far as labour laws are concerned, Chinese workshops do not usually respect contractual provisions, such as the recognition of overtime, night shifts, work on Sundays and public holidays, and paid holidays. As we have seen in the description of working arrangements in the ethnic niche, workers are paid at a piece rate and work according to the manufacturer’s needs, not according to labour regulations. Since employing workers with regular contracts involves higher costs for the workshops, which would reduce their competitiveness, the customary arrangement is that legalized workers, and not their employers, have to pay all or part of taxes and national insurance contributions. Every month, workers have to give their employers the amount owed to the state for health insurance and pension contributions. If this is paid in full it often accounts for a considerable part of their earnings. In practice, time worked is underreported in order to reduce income tax. Whatever the percentage paid by employers and workers, it is common for contributions to be paid – and contracts signed – only on an intermittent basis when required for some important reason, such as the renewal of a residence permit or an application for a family member to come to Italy. In Italy it is necessary to show legal employment documents and (sometimes) to prove that one is receiving a minimum annual wage. Many workers, once regularized, are formally dismissed by their employer yet continue working for the same company off the books. Three or four months before the expiry of the residence permit, the worker will be hired again with a fulltime contract. This alternation of legal and off-the-books work is adopted on a widespread basis in workshops all over Italy. Fieldwork in Prato (Ceccagno, 2002) and in Emilia Romagna (Spinner, 2005) shows how this is perceived by both Chinese employers and workers as a bureaucratic procedure linked to obtaining residence permits and not as a negation of workers’ rights. The practice of not generating an invoice (with the agreement of clients) or the incomplete registration of invoices is widespread. 129

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The “Marco Polo” operation During 2005 the division of the Italian Carabinieri in charge of labour inspections carried out two extensive inspections of Chinese firms. The first “Marco Polo” operation took place in the provinces of Ancona, Ascoli, Bari, Brescia, Como, Padova, Piceno, Pistoia, Prato and Treviso. It focused on labour exploitation, including under-age labour, and irregularity. Of the 119 firms that were inspected, 82 per cent had elements of irregularity; in Tuscany and Veneto irregularity reached 100 per cent and 91 per cent respectively. Checks were made on 914 workers, of which 533 (58 per cent) were found to be in irregular positions. Of these, 66 per cent (352) were off-the-books workers and the remaining 34 per cent (181) were irregular immigrants. Violations were also found with respect to nine Chinese minors who had been illegally declared fit for work, of which two had no residence permit.95 “Marco Polo 2” had the same aims but involved a larger number of provinces. It included the previous provinces (except for Como), as well as Naples, Rome, Taranto, Turin and Venice. The operation inspected 480 firms, of which 82 per cent (394) were found to show elements of irregularity. Checks were made on 2,633 workers, of which 1,495 (57 per cent) were found to be in irregular positions; of these, 502 (34 per cent) had no residence permit. Violations were also found regarding 22 minors who had been illegally declared fit for work, five of whom had no residence permit. This complex operation showed the existence of very widespread irregularity in both the running of firms and in working relationships. In the regions with the highest number of Chinese settlements, irregularities were near the 100 per cent mark. However, this data can be read in a different light if we consider that a recent inquiry by the Inland Revenue of the Veneto region showed that, out of 38,000 Italian-owned businesses, 96.3 per cent were found to have elements of irregularity (Statera, 2006). In many parts of Italy irregularity seems to be not the exception, but the rule. Chinese-run businesses can thus be seen as adapting to local habits. In both operations, 43 per cent of workers were irregular migrants, more than what had been estimated by the Prato Centre or Emilia Romagna researchers. But the percentage of under-age workers employed was low (less than 10 per cent in both cases). Although the 2004 inspections by the Financial Police were aimed mainly at stopping the trade in counterfeit goods, they put 3,308 Chinese citizens on record for the following acts: 868 for counterfeiting (26.2 per cent), 485 for working off the books (14.7 per cent), 331 for not observing rules for foreigners (10 per cent) and 357 for economic, industrial and commercial crimes and violations (10.8 per cent).96 It is therefore clear that forms 95

Information from Carabinieri Headquarters, 2005. Information from the Special Operations Task Force, Central Operations Service and Organized Crime Investigation Department, 2005.

96

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of illegality are widespread. In this context, the development of extreme forms of labour exploitation is both possible and probable.

The spectrum of labour practices and worker vulnerability The forms of exploitation present in Chinese firms can be seen as following an imaginary line that begins with regular businesses, is followed by selfexploitation and contra or extra legem97 agreements between the employer and worker, and ends with coercion by the employer. The research used in this study has investigated the part of this spectrum that exists between self-exploitation and the coercion of workers. In fact, this extreme point of complete subjugation can be reached if encouraged by a series of causal factors. The middle point along this imaginary line is occupied by those activities whose labour relations can be classified as self-exploitation. The information and research for this study suggest that the majority of Chinese businesses occupy this position. Self-exploitation is the result of a series of diverse and competing factors. On the one hand there is the existence of foreign labour models, based on piece-rate pay and extremely long working hours, which contrast strongly with the European trade union tradition. On the other hand, there are the conditions imposed by the current market. Chinese companies working in manufacturing, especially contracting firms, act as if they were part of the delocalization process begun by Italian companies to maintain their competitiveness. Indeed, Italian manufacturers using Chinese contractors speak of “local delocalization” (Istat, 2005). Self-exploitation, extreme flexibility, piece-rate pay and reduced costs are advantages that Chinese firms offer locally. The manufacturing crisis, increasing competition, and the need to reduce costs and increase flexibility – in other words, factors relating to the labour market and to globalization – have encouraged the move to working conditions that are in sharp contrast to Italian regulations. It can therefore be considered that beyond the agreements between employers and employees in ethnic contracting firms extreme conditions are at work, set by a market in which competition has become more intense in the last decade. In short, working conditions within the ethnic niche should not be considered as forced labour, but mainly as the result of the extreme flexibility that prevails in an era of globalization. Times are changing on the positive end of the line: a limited number of Chinese-managed manufacturing firms have moved towards fully legal status. In the “Spinner Emersione” project carried out in Emilia Romagna, 26 Chinese workshop owners voluntarily accepted inspection by social au-

97

A consensual agreement beyond what is normally stipulated by law.

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ditors, as a result of which three owners were given ethical certifications by internationally accredited organizations. One important point needs to be highlighted: field research has not yet focused on southern Italy, particularly the Campania region, where there are significant numbers of Chinese immigrants. Investigations by the Naples Anti-Mafia Procura Public Prosecutor (Saviano, 2006) suggest that garment manufacturing is monopolized by the Camorra clan.98 It is therefore probable that factors unrelated to entrepreneurial dynamics may have encouraged the degeneration of the working environment in those areas. Our belief that the coercion of workers is not predominant among Chinese immigrants in Italy does not necessarily apply to areas in which a mafia-type control could be exercised over businesses. A judgement on this cannot be formulated without extensive fieldwork. The presence or infiltration of criminal interests into firms can lead to a pattern similar to that seen in the smuggling process: coercion and serious exploitation of workers, especially those in irregular situations. Workers’ vulnerability thus becomes a structural resource in the hands of employers, who use it not only as a tool for remaining competitive in the market, but also to squeeze additional profits from workers in areas outside of the workplace. Links between smuggling networks and diaspora manufacturing structures can also arise from the need to invest and recycle the money earned from organizing irregular immigrants’ travel and their subsequent regularization. This can aggravate the widespread situation in which large numbers of immigrants are already exposed to coercion as a consequence of debt contracted for travel to Europe. This debt is the predominant factor inside the manufacturing business that leads to the acceptance of conditions of labour exploitation: the need to repay the debt is accepted as a condition of immigration and thus becomes a motivation for self-exploitation. The combination of economic difficulties suffered by firms, coercion by co-ethnic employers and the costs of regularization can make it difficult or even impossible for workers to repay their debt, and leads to the endurance of a high degree of exploitation in the workplace.

BETWEEN BUSINESS AND EXPLOITATION The disconnection between the journey and the workplace Generally speaking, there is no evidence suggesting that there is continuity between the immigrants’ journey to Italy and their living and working con-

98

The Camorra clan is a mafia-like organization originating in the region of Campania and the city of Naples.

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ditions on arrival. Once they have arrived and have paid the agreed amount of money, immigrants have no further relations with those who organized their travel; any conditions involving coercion are thus ended. The police investigations referred to in this report relate only to the journey. Interviews with Chinese immigrants at the Prato Centre also confirm that in most cases a sharp line of separation can be drawn between the coercion experienced by irregular immigrants from organizers on the journey and irregular working conditions after arrival. Research also shows that the slavery-type relationships frequently described by the press as present and even predominant inside Chinese firms cannot be assumed to be typical (Rastrelli, 2005). A recent police report underlines the fact that the conditions of irregular immigrants in the workplace differ from those endured during travel.99 Although trafficking of irregular workers is widespread and the illegal, lowcost workforce is of central importance to ethnic Chinese firms, interviews indicate that the illegal conditions and the exploitation widely suffered by clandestine Chinese immigrants, such as piece-rate pay and unhealthy, unsafe conditions, can be attributed to a conscious choice of self-exploitation rather than to conditions of slavery and coercion. At the same time, this study highlights the power of employers over their workers, especially where the employer acts as a sponsor for the immigrant’s regularization, and the effect that this has on the employee’s working conditions. A central question when exploring the links between the journey and working conditions is related to the payment of debts. Interviews show that immigrants manage to cope with these debts, usually discharging them through a combination of loans from their extended family or from China’s guanxi network, and their own hard work. But insolvency influences immigrants’ lives and can lead to the loss of freedom until their guarantors or their families pay the debts. Where debt combined with clandestine status motivates employers to use coercion, immigrants may find themselves in a position of extreme vulnerability and may be subjected to conditions that go beyond the exploitation/self-exploitation pact that is predominant in the ethnic community. Cases of this nature have come to light in criminal investigations and trials, as well as in the Prato Centre’s work, particularly during the different amnesties. When employers are directly involved in criminal networks or use illegal activities, irregular immigrants run a high risk of continuing to experience the types of coercion that characterized their trip from China.

99

Special Operations Task Force, Central Operations Service and Organized Crime Investigation Department, 2005.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Trafficking and smuggling are two separate phenomena. If by trafficking we understand the deliberately abusive recruitment and deployment of individuals for the purposes of exploitation100 and by smuggling the illegal introduction of immigrants into the country, in the case of migration from China to Italy trafficking can be categorically excluded. The majority of groups organizing travel from China are not criminal organizations but agile, business-like groups on whom migrants depend in order to achieve their goals. Our research has highlighted how the structures organizing travel for migrants are predominantly service based. Legal documents confirm the existence of business-like relationships between migrants and those specialized in emigration. Both sources confirm the use of violence during travel and the existence of international networks that carry out acts of violence, coercion, kidnapping and ransom. This violence is particularly (but not exclusively) directed towards those who are unable to rely on significant social relationships. Women are particularly at risk of violence, but so are immigrants coming from parts of China that do not have a migratory tradition or family networks in the country of destination, such as the migrants from China’s north-eastern provinces. This study has shed light on the nature of the control exercised by smugglers over potential immigrants. Italian judges have characterized the relationship, in certain individual cases, as one of reciprocal advantage, even though these relations are frequently punctuated by illegal or criminal activities. The international community has often described this domination as a new form of slavery to be fought with legal instruments such as the Palermo Protocol. However, research shows it is necessary to be cautious about applying the new articles on slavery to all Chinese migration and to judge each case individually. This study has shown how Chinese immigrants working within the ethnic niche have been forced to work in precarious conditions or risk being expelled from the ethnic economy which, at times when few Chinese worked outside workshops run by fellow Chinese, meant losing both their jobs and their housing. Today, the economic activities of Chinese immigrants in Italy are rapidly evolving. Fewer immigrants are now willing to associate themselves with subcontracting in clothing and other manufacturing workshops and most wish to reposition themselves outside of the manufacturing sector. However, despite the fact that since 2005 Chinese businesses in Italy have engaged primarily in importing and distributing goods made in China, the majority of

100

See the Introduction for a more comprehensive definition of trafficking, as listed in the Palermo Protocol.

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the workforce is still active in ethnic workshops producing goods for Italian manufacturers. This report has highlighted the adverse effects of amnesties, which have contributed to a degeneration of the relationship between immigrants and local society, and have encouraged illegality in relations between immigrants. When amnesties take place, migrants wishing to regularize their situation find themselves in vulnerable situations and frequently experience coercion from employers and others. This is particularly true inside the Chinese ethnic economy. In the 1990s, the amnesties and the restrictions on self-employment led to an increased social divide inside the community, where a few employers became wealthy by exploiting the regularization of their fellow Chinese. This study has brought to light the existence of well-established networks that specialize in providing illegal services and false papers for regularization. These illegal activities are predominantly managed by Italians and the networks are in charge of considerable amounts of “dirty” money.

Forced labour or “extreme flexibility” in an era of globalization? The existence of ethnic networks and organized groups has facilitated a supply of cheap ethnic labour that has allowed Chinese entrepreneurs to meet Italian manufacturers’ requirements for flexibility. It was the constant employment of new arrivals in loose contractual conditions, rather than the deliberate use of coercion, that brought advantages to employers. In the years immediately preceding the 1995 amnesty, the arrival of new immigrants in areas with a high concentration of Chinese immigrants, such as Prato, was so constant that many of the new arrivals offered to work for Chinese employers in return for only board and lodging. The high territorial mobility of workers suggests that Chinese ethnic workshops should not be seen as places where forced work prevails. Research (Ceccagno and Rastrelli, 1998, 2003a, 2004) has shown that from the mid1990s onwards, when amnesties legalized growing numbers of migrants, the situation changed dramatically and workers became increasingly mobile. Today, researchers are more likely to come across employers who complain about the difficulty of retaining their workforce than situations involving coercion (Ceccagno, 2009). However, high mobility does not appear to have created improved working conditions for the workers at the lowest levels (zagong). One possible indication of forced or compulsory labour is the high number of working hours within the ethnic community. The high flexibility of Chinese-operated workshops involves the extreme compression of personal and family life to a point where anything hindering the production process is excluded. It also involves a high level of exploitation and selfexploitation of the workforce and lack of compliance with Italian labour laws. 135

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This study concludes that, although there are moments in which workers are very vulnerable and exploited by their employers (particularly during the amnesties), in general workers and entrepreneurs share a common vision of future economic well-being and see this organization of work as the best and quickest way to successful entrepreneurship. Workers accept long working hours not only because they are often not in a position to refuse or because this working arrangement is required by the market, but because they aspire to the role of the employer. Exploitation and self-exploitation are seen as temporary and as a means to an end. This study has also shown a disconnect between the period in which migrants travel from China to Italy and their living and working conditions after they arrive. With the exception of a few cases, this disconnect occurs both when travel is organized by intermediaries, and when it is organized by criminal groups. Most legal investigations confirm the view that, after arriving at their final destinations and paying the requested sums of money, migrants have no further relations with the groups that organized their trip abroad. Any confinement or restrictions experienced by migrants during travel end upon arrival in Italy. The majority of cases discussed also distinguish between migrants’ travel, which can be characterized by some form of coercion by the organizers, and irregular working conditions. Different sources all point towards a clear separation between what takes places during immigrants’ travel and later experiences in the workplace. The study also concludes that a continuum exists in the Chinese productive niche, going from self-employment to a point where workers submit completely to the needs and practices of their employer. In the two main fashion areas – the Prato/Florence area and the extended district of Carpi – episodes where workers temporarily experience coercion from employers, although worryingly frequent, are not the rule and are mainly linked to the amnesties. Although serious, they appear to be transient. Until the mid-1990s, many clandestine workers were unaware of their rights under Italian law and saw the coercive practices used by employers as being in some way legitimate. More recently, Chinese workers have become aware that their employers’ demands are illegal, but believe that their application for regularization could be threatened if they resist. As a result of the amnesties, few oppose coercion from employers when they are dependent on their support for regularization. Generally, working relations within the ethnic niche are regulated by agreements that are seen as mutually beneficial to worker and employer. The entrepreneur’s family takes care of administrative and bureaucratic tasks on the worker’s behalf, the worker (instead of the employer) pays part or all of the national insurance contributions, and in most cases entrepreneurs provide board and lodging for workers. Working relations are governed by the frequency of orders and by opportunities for both employers and workers to better their position. Working hours are long, and at peak times around-

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the-clock work may even be required, with only very brief rests allowed. It is this model, under which workers consciously submit themselves to arduous conditions, that governs labour relations between Chinese immigrants. This mutual interest “pact” between employers and employees, which was evident during the 1990s and until some years ago, today seems to exclude most low-level workers (zagong). The ethnic economy no longer appears to offer any clear advantages to this group. While improvement in status from zagong to specialized workers had been the natural outcome of an expanding labour market during the 1990s, today the situation of the zagong seems frozen. This means that upward mobility is much rarer for them than in the past and that moving to a new employer does not necessarily imply a change or improvement in their working conditions. In-depth research on this issue is still needed. However, some preliminary information shows that the level of exploitation that they experience appears to be very high and that some fundamental rights are often unavailable to them. Until now no in-depth field study has been conducted in the southern parts of Italy, in particular the Campania area, where the presence of Chinese immigrants is significant. According to several inquiries made by the Naples Anti-Mafia Public Prosecutor, garment manufacturing in this area is monopolized by the Camorra clan. An extensive inquiry into the organization of garment production and the working conditions of Chinese immigrants in southern Italy is needed.

Recommendations This study has shown the benefit of collaboration between the police force, the legal system and academic research. It also shows the need to understand the economic and manufacturing activities of Chinese immigrants as the result of a combination of market factors, the dynamics of the Chinese diaspora and the mechanisms of the global economy. This avoids an “ethnic” approach, which only focuses on Chinese immigrants and ignores the role and interests of local society and the complex logic of the market. If these elements are ignored they will continue to generate irregularity and illegality. Attempts to fight irregular migration and smuggling require international collaboration between police forces and the coordination and exchange of information with the Chinese police and the authorities of those Chinese provinces particularly touched by emigration. An increased awareness of the Chinese diaspora and its recent dynamics should direct the police force’s attention towards the new migration flows from north-eastern China, as these immigrants are often in a position of greater vulnerability and dependency than those from areas with longer migratory traditions. This has clear repercussions on trafficking and smuggling, on working conditions in Italy and, above all, on the development of degenerative phenomena such as prostitution. 137

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Collaboration with the Chinese authorities could be a useful means of informing the inhabitants of these new migration areas of the risks linked to irregular immigration and smuggling, as well as the real living and working conditions of their final destination. This information should counter the propaganda spread by smugglers. It is also important to address the unforeseen and undesirable effects of the regularization mechanisms. This study has highlighted how amnesties are the source of much injustice and may subject irregular immigrants to extreme forms of exploitation, including forced labour, as well as other criminal activities. The complicated bureaucratic and administrative regularization procedures risk encouraging the use of illegal tools among migrants. Finally, it is important to impose sanctions on the illegal behaviour taking place during amnesties. This must be enforced on both a national and a local level. Without sanctions, the large number of individuals illegally profiting from the regularization of immigrants become convinced that they will likely remain unpunished. Those in charge of investigative activities and intelligence should keep in mind that illegal behaviour in relation to regularization also concerns the local population.

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MIGRATION JOURNEYS AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF CHINESE IRREGULAR IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

4

Frank N. Pieke

INTRODUCTION Chinese trafficking, human smuggling, forced labour, exploitation and illegality attract a great deal of attention in the UK. The Dover incident in which 58 Chinese suffocated to death in the back of a lorry in 2000, and the Morecambe Bay incident in which 23 Chinese cockle pickers drowned in 2004, have set the parameters of public and government perception of the nature of, and issues surrounding, Chinese immigration. They also colour much of the debate, politics and policy-making around the “immigration issue” much more generally. Indeed, the cruelty, immorality and criminality of these two incidents provide the paradigm of the “new” irregular immigration that is widely perceived to be flooding the UK. This chapter summarizes preliminary research on the living and working conditions of Chinese irregular migrants in the UK. In particular, the report describes: (i) methods used by Chinese irregular immigrants to enter the UK; (ii) working and living conditions of Chinese irregular immigrants and their perception and attitude with regard to these conditions; and (iii) the insertion of Chinese irregular migrant workers into the labour market, fuelled by the demand for flexible and cheap labour in specific sectors (e.g. construction, hotel and restaurant, agriculture and food processing). The core of this report consists of excerpts from 35 interviews carried out with Chinese migrants between 2005 and 2006. The chapter will first discuss the research methodology employed. It then provides a brief overview of UK law and policies regarding irregular migration, including human trafficking. The following two sections present evidence on the routes of Chinese irregular migrants to the UK, their insertion into the labour market, demand in certain sectors as well as working and living conditions. In the last section, a brief summary of the media research results is provided before drawing conclusions and recommendations from this research project. Given the difficult nature of the subject and the

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limited time frame of the project, it has to be stressed that conclusions are preliminary and more research would be needed to achieve representative results. Definitions of human trafficking, smuggling and forced labour are based on international legal instruments and their interpretation as described in the introduction of this book.

METHODOLOGY The project’s methodology consists of three main parts. The main body of evidence collected for this research consists of interviews with 35 recent Chinese migrants in the UK who either crossed the border illegally or subsequently became illegal (i.e. visa overstayers). Accessing a sufficient number of recent – and particularly, irregular – immigrants was a major challenge. The interviewers employed for this project were Chinese journalists and social science students who each only had access to a limited number of migrants. Beyond this circle of immediate acquaintances, they had to rely on introductions from friends and earlier interviewees. This method of finding interviewees obviously is far from ideal, but given the nature of the topic and interviewees is the only possible one. The findings of the interviews have to be interpreted against this background: the interviewees do not in any way constitute a random sample. In particular, it is quite possible that the interviewers simply have not been able to access migrants in the most vulnerable positions, or who have suffered the greatest amount of abuse or coercion. The absence of this phenomenon in the interview data can therefore not be read as evidence for its absence in general. However, in important respects the interviews tended to confirm each other to the point of becoming repetitive, an indication that the research had indeed captured the scope of experiences of the majority of migrants. A detailed list of interview questions and topics was prepared beforehand, and was further refined in the course of several pilot interviews. Emphasis was put on the fact that the list was to be used as a guide for a qualitative, in-depth interview, rather than as a set of questions that the interviewers had to go through mechanically. Factual information yielded by such interviews is always partial: it constitutes the reality of migrating and living in the UK as understood and perceived by the migrants themselves. Important information on the exact nature (including its criminal aspects) of smuggling operations and the organization of the employment of migrants is simply not known by the migrants themselves. Furthermore, migrants may not be aware of, or may simply not care about, the fact that aspects of their treatment may be in breach of the law in the UK. Although the interviews constitute the main body of data for this project, in and by themselves they are not a sufficient basis to fully answer the

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central research questions of this project. Therefore, an attempt has been made to supplement the interviews with information from other sources, specifically UK media coverage since January 2005 and police information on smuggling, trafficking and forced labour. However, it should be emphasized that these sources, too, constitute insufficient evidence: by their very nature, they view the realities of immigration, life and work through the prism of their worst excesses. The migrants interviewed covered a fair variety in terms of origin in China, age, employment and sex. Indeed, towards the end of the project, the interviews became increasingly repetitive and predictable. Such a lack of new insights is a sign that the methodology has succeeded in exhausting the scope of migratory and employment experiences of recent irregular migrants and that it would have been unlikely that further interviews with Chinese irregular immigrants sampled through the same method would have added further value. In addition to the interviews with migrants, a background study of British media coverage of Chinese migration, forced labour and exploitation was conducted for the period of January 2005 to May 2006. The largest part of the media coverage in this period revolved around the Morecambe Bay incident in 2004 and particularly the trial of the main perpetrators in March 2006. Other events reported on included the beating to death of a Chinese man by local youth in Wigan, the trial of a Malaysian Chinese migrant smuggler, the withdrawal of the liquor licence of a famous Chinese restaurant in Liverpool after illegal workers had been found working there, a raid on a safe house for newly arrived irregular immigrants in London, and killings associated with rivalry between Hong Kong triads in Edinburgh. The principal investigator also held discussions with government officials in order to obtain access to police investigations and intelligence on Chinese trafficking and forced labour. Interviews or conversations with law enforcement officials included the Crown Prosecution Service, the Metropolitan Police Service and the Kent Police Special Branch.

THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK The UK has ratified the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children, as well as the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, which entered into force in February 2008. It has also ratified the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97). Like most other European countries, it is not a party to the ILO’s Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), which contains special safeguards for irregular migrant workers and requires States to

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“suppress clandestine movements of migrants for employment and illegal employment of migrants” (Art. 3). In recent years, the British Government has introduced a range of new measures to fight irregular migration, including human smuggling and human trafficking. It has also improved the protection of trafficked persons through numerous initiatives that are still under way in order to bring UK law in line with international and EU standards. A tragic incident at Morecambe Bay that led to the death of presumably 23 Chinese cockle pickers in 2004 has prompted a revision of numerous laws and policies. The Morecambe Bay case was widely covered by the media and raised public awareness of the exploitation of irregular migrants in the UK. In March 2006, Lin Liang Ren, a gangmaster of Chinese origin, was convicted on charges of criminal negligence, manslaughter and perverting the course of justice. He, his girlfriend and cousin were also convicted for breaches of immigration law. The buyers of the cockles collected by Ren’s labour gangs were cleared of all charges. Apparently, relatives of the victims were refused compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, which has very strict eligibility criteria (OSCE, 2008). The Gangmaster (Licensing) Act was adopted in 2004 and covers all labour providers based in and outside the UK supplying workers in a range of sectors, including agriculture, shellfish farming and food processing. The maximum penalty for operating without a licence is a ten-year prison sentence and a fine. Additionally, those employers (“labour users”) who use the services of non-licensed gangmasters will be equally punished. The Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA) was established in May 2005 and is responsible for licensing existing and prospective gangmasters. By August 2008 the GLA had issued 1,200 licences and revoked 70 others (GLA, 2008). It carries out unannounced inspections using a risk-based approach to monitoring. The new regulations on gangmasters are complemented by stricter enforcement of sanctions against employers who use irregular migrant labour. In 2006, the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act was adopted. Provisions to prevent irregular migrants from working came into force in February 2008. Since then, employers using irregular migrant workers can produce a “statutory excuse” against the payment of a civil penalty (up to £10,000/€14,600). This would require employers to check and copy certain documents of workers prior to their employment. Those found to have knowingly hired irregular workers could incur an unlimited fine and be sent to prison. At the same time, the UK Border Agency has increased its enforcement measures by 40 per cent. To facilitate migration of highly skilled foreigners, the Government has set up a new points-based system101 (Home 101

Under the points-based system, applicants must score a certain number of points in order to qualify for entry into the destination country. The points are awarded based on criteria intended to predict the applicant’s success in the new country, including skills (and demand for them), education and language proficiency.

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Office, 2008a). It is not clear, however, how these measures will respond to the obvious demand for low-skilled and flexible labour in certain economic sectors. In recent years, the Government has broadened its campaign against human trafficking. Human trafficking is a criminal offence specified in two different acts. Trafficking for sexual exploitation is a criminal offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. A separate offence was included in the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, which covers trafficking for all forms of labour exploitation. In March 2007 the Government adopted the UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking. The action plan identifies gaps in the existing anti-trafficking framework, highlighting, among other issues, the need to improve knowledge on forced labour and to further develop an enforcement response (Home Office, 2007). In a review of the literature on trafficking for labour exploitation, published by the Home Office, it was also pointed out that victim protection measures are insufficient to protect migrants from exploitation (Dowling, Moreton and Wright, 2007). So far, law enforcement action against human trafficking has focused on sexual exploitation, whereas cases of labour exploitation were mainly prosecuted under different charges. In July 2008, for example, the largest ever police crackdown on human trafficking resulted in the arrest of 528 suspects and the identification of 167 victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation (Home Office, 2008b). Claims against traffickers for breaches of employment law (e.g. unpaid wages) can be made to an employment tribunal. Irregular migrants, however, do not have this possibility since claimants who knew or should have known that the contract was unlawful are rejected by the tribunal. On the contrary, they can be subject to investigation for breaches of immigration or other laws. HM Customs and Excise has powers to enforce national minimum wage legislation. A special body, the Agricultural Wages Team, exists for this particular sector. Compliance with minimum wage legislation, however, is only mandatory for regular migrant workers. Inspectors would need to be mandated to investigate potential trafficking situations and to protect irregular migrants from abuse, in particular non-payment of wages or irregular wage deductions (OSCE/ODIHR, 2008). However, migrants, whether regular or irregular, working within the UK, will be subject to tax and national insurance deductions from their wages. Employers knowingly employing irregular migrants may be failing in their obligations to remit these deductions to HM Revenue and Customs. HM Revenue and Customs will and do investigate such non-compliance without exception. To conclude, the Government has introduced important legal and policy changes that could potentially benefit Chinese irregular migrants, especially those who are exploited by gangmasters. At the same time, it attempts to close opportunities for the illegal employment of foreigners, especially lowskilled workers. It remains to be seen whether the new points system will

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respond to the labour demand in the low-wage sectors in which many Chinese irregular migrants are currently employed. Measures to protect irregular migrants from exploitation and abuse, however, need to be strengthened.

RECENT IRREGULAR CHINESE IMMIGRATION TO THE UK

Pattern of immigration and background in China The interviews have provided clear evidence that the immigration of lowskilled Chinese to the UK has changed qualitatively since the late 1990s. Then, the vast majority of Chinese migrants came from central Fujian as part of a global Fujianese diaspora that had developed in the decade or so before. Since the 1980s, many parts of central Fujian have, with amazing speed, become fully specialized in overseas migration (Pieke et al., 2004). In earlier research into this phenomenon, the author found that there were, in fact, at least two distinct flows of Fujianese migration: one from the coastal areas and one from the interior of the province. The latter was of particular importance in continental Europe and was quite distinct. This flow had started only in the early 1990s and included both rural and urban Chinese. It happened with the support of the local government, which had made emigration an important plank of its developmental strategy. In the late 1990s, immigration from north-eastern China (mainly Liaoning province) had already begun as well, but it was as yet unclear what form and shape it would take (Pieke and Xiang, forthcoming). As of 2005–06, Chinese migrants originate from many more areas. The Fujianese are still a prominent group, but the north-easterners now appear simply as part of a much broader population of mainly urban Chinese immigrants from across China. Among the interviewees, the north-east of China and the city of Tianjin are particularly well represented, but that is likely to be an artefact of the snowballing method of accessing informants that was used. These developments are in line with what was expected based on the author’s information collected in the late 1990s: emigration from China has diversified in terms of areas of origin and socio-economic background, and now includes city dwellers as much as farmers. It is impossible to say based on the limited number of interviews whether the UK has become a main destination for a selected number of Chinese cities, or has become just one of many destinations for migrants from across China. However, what is clear from the interviews is that home-town bonds with a migrant already in the UK often play a vital role in the selection of the UK as a destination, or at least are important to many migrants in finding a place to stay and a first job upon arrival. Networks of migrants from the same city also grow after immigration and many migrants rely on other migrants from their own region or city that they got to know in the UK for friendship and support. 144

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The longer established flow of Fujianese migrants is mostly from rural areas of coastal central Fujian, near the city of Fuzhou. Similarly to the New Territories in Hong Kong that were the main source of Chinese migrants in the UK between the 1950s and the 1970s, these areas are highly specialized in overseas emigration to the point where villages are emptied of all men (and increasingly women as well) of working age, leaving households where only wives or grandparents raise the children or grandchildren. This is illustrated particularly well by the following case: Wang Yan’s father had gone off to Japan in the 1980s and made a considerable sum; afterwards, her brother also went to Japan. “Going to Japan is no longer as good as it was then, otherwise I would have gone as well.” Wang Yan’s family is rich, and in the 1990s had already built a villa that stood in marked contrast to the low and dilapidated houses of the neighbours. Under the influence of the mentality of “getting rich by emigrating”, Wang Yan had known since she was a child that her happiness would depend on emigration. “My father and brother are both abroad and life there is so good. Nowadays the men of almost all families in our area have left. Although emigration is hard, you can make several hundred thousand yuan in just a few years. That does not compare to working in our own area, where you would make just a few hundred a month.”As a little girl, Wang Yan did not like to study. Her mother didn’t care, as she would say, “Studying is useless. In future you can only make money by going abroad.” (Interview 35) In actual fact, many interviewees from Fujian had worked for some time in local employment or as migrants elsewhere in China or abroad. As might be expected, they had widely varying experiences. However, regardless of whether these experiences were good or bad, in view of the potential earnings in the UK they all found in the end that they had almost no choice but to follow in the footsteps of so many of their relatives, friends and neighbours. After graduation from high school in Fujian, Li Shuai went to Beijing to work, finding a job doing repair work in a private company that sold medical equipment. The owner was a good man who was mindful of everyone. The company provided lunch and lodgings for employees from outside Beijing in one of the boss’s own houses. The conditions were very good, with one private room for each of the three people living in the house. He worked there for almost four years. In the first three months of probationary employment he earned 800 yuan (€80) a month. Afterwards, this was gradually raised and in the end he earned 1,500 yuan (€150)

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a month. But prices in Beijing are high and 1,500 yuan (€150) would never be enough to save to buy a house. So in the end he decided to resign from his job. Irregular emigration was a decision that was influenced by his family. A maternal uncle of his emigrated to the UK in 1999 and now has permanent residency. According to Li Shuai, “My uncle sent us money each month, his family was really wealthy. Originally, their family was poorer than ours, but then after two or three years they built a new western-style house (yang lou). At that time, I was particularly envious and I also wanted to leave.” (Interview 3) The more recent flow of migrants from northern China, by contrast, is predominantly from large cities. Emigration is by no means an established pattern of life, although the opportunity to leave is now freely for sale and is no longer the privilege limited to a lucky few as it was in the 1980s or even the early 1990s (Pieke and Xiang, forthcoming). The majority of the interviewees from northern China stated that they decided to emigrate because they had lost their state sector job – formerly an “iron rice bowl” of lifelong employment – and few other promising opportunities presented themselves. Others, however, had left employment in the state or private sector voluntarily, and bought a UK visa in the hope of making more money. In some cases, emigration is about more than just money and is driven by a desire to improve oneself or to have the opportunity for a second start in life. Zhang worked in a state enterprise in Tianjin for more than ten years. After he was made redundant, Zhang did a number of casual jobs and tried to set up his own travel agency. His ambition was to be his own boss. The travel agency plan didn’t work out, so Zhang decided to leave China to find work elsewhere. He heard from a few of his ex-colleagues that Britain was a good place to go. He thought about this for a few months and in 2001 decided to leave China for Britain. He went to a local travel agent in Tianjin that dealt with business visa applications. He paid a fee of 40,000 yuan (€4,000) for them to arrange for a UK company to write an invitation letter for him. It was all very straightforward. Within a month, Zhang got his business visa. He had to borrow half of the money from relatives to pay the fee. Zhang was fully aware of the transaction because he knew many others had gone through the same channel to work in Britain. He said that people like him had no choice but to resort to illegal means to enter Britain, because of Britain’s immigration controls. Zhang flew to London. He knew a number of people from Tianjin and one of them went to pick him up at the airport. Zhang stayed with him for a while and then found a new place to live with eight other Chinese in north London. (Interview 12)

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Chen is from Tianjin, in northern China, where he lived before he left for Britain. Chen and his wife divorced a few years before he left China. He has no children. Before he left China, he ran seven restaurants in a period of three years. The largest restaurant had 27 employees. He also managed a garment company that produced for export. It made a loss and he had to give up the business. He became depressed and didn’t work for a long time. His last job in China was as a chef for the Sheraton Hotel in his city. It was good money (over 1,000 yuan/€100 a month), but he wasn’t happy – he wanted to become a successful self-employed person and not someone’s employee. Chen’s first work trip to the West was to Germany. He decided to leave China and go to work in Germany, not only for quick cash, but for the opportunities and good future prospects abroad. He said that there was a lot of social pressure in China and that competition was becoming so fierce. Chen went to Germany in early 1998 on a four-year work permit, but his working life there turned out to be disappointing. He worked in Chinese restaurants as a chef for three years, paying high taxes and getting a low wage. He also experienced a lot of racism from local people. In the worst case, he was spat on by a German man sitting in a car. Furious, Chen pulled the man out of his car and hit him in the face. For this, Chen was put in prison and returned to China upon his release at the end of 2000. Back in China he could not find a suitable job, let alone start a business. He then remembered what people had told him about England when he was in Germany, that things were much more free and flexible there. He decided to go to work in England in 2001. As it was easier to be granted a business visa than a tourist visa, Chen went to a local agency that arranged for a UK company to write him an invitation. Within a month, he got his business visa (for a fee of 30,000 yuan/€3,000) and flew to London. He spent the first few months getting adjusted and talking to other Chinese people. (Interview 12) Contacts with, or stories about, migrants from their city living in the UK often triggered the decision to emigrate. But these networks are as yet much less dense than in Fujian, where a true culture of migration has arisen. However, like in Fujian, none of the interviewees mentioned a curiosity about the West or a desire to live in a western democratic country as a factor in their decision: the “freedom” mentioned above by Chen is a recurrent theme in the interviews, referring to the lack of restrictions on the movement, employment and businesses of immigrants.

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Methods of immigration For the vast majority of irregular migrants, entry into the UK is made possible by the services provided by professional facilitators. However, while the Fujianese continue to use the services of snakeheads who take full responsibility for physically transporting migrants from China to the UK, urban Chinese report that they pay travel agencies that merely arrange for a business visa and an air ticket. The latter method revolves around a loophole in UK immigration that allows UK businesses to issue invitations to Chinese citizens as visitors to the company. Chinese travel agencies have been quick to catch on to this, establishing connections with businesses in the UK that issue such invitations on demand. Chinese migrants pay a fee in the order of 50,000 yuan (about €5,000), enter the UK perfectly legally on their own Chinese passport, and simply overstay their visa. According to interviewees, employing such an agency is a purely commercial transaction and they were fully aware of the illegal nature of entry into the UK. The travel agency had no other responsibility for the actual journey beyond issuing a valid visa and ticket. Compared to the operations of Fujianese facilitators (snakeheads) this is a convenient, low-risk and relatively cheap way of entry. The methods employed by snakeheads have been detailed by several other researchers and need not be repeated in detail here (Chin, 1999; Soudijn, 2006). Over the years snakeheads have developed a whole range of smuggling methods, from air travel using counterfeit documents and multiple transit points, to crossing borders in the back of a lorry or on foot in the middle of the night. As the snakehead usually gets paid only upon arrival in the destination country, he or she therefore has a clear stake in the safety and successful passage of the migrant. The fees charged by snakeheads vary considerably depending on the services offered, but interviewees usually reported sums in the order of 250,000 to over 300,000 yuan (€25,000 to over €30,000). On the basis of the information available, it remains unclear why this difference between Fujianese and urban Chinese travel arrangements persists. The fundamental difference suggests that the two migration flows have evolved independently. The Fujianese one predates the urban Chinese one by at least 15 years; at the time, the extensive links between China and the destination countries on which the more recent urban Chinese methods are predicated did not yet exist. However, why snakeheads in Fujian still have not been competed out of the market by entrepreneurial travel agencies remains a mystery. Gao Yun of the ILO102 suggests that it may have to do with restrictions on the delivery of genuine Chinese passports in high-risk areas, such as Fujian, that are part of attempts by the central government in China to curb irregular emigration.

102

Personal communication, 2007.

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Trafficking, abuse and deception The interviews contain not a single case of involuntary recruitment for migration or trafficking. All interviewees report that they took the initiative in finding a snakehead or agency to help them realize their ambition to travel to the UK, which in all cases was their chosen destination. A few others told us that the snakehead also helped them find their first job, sometimes for a (modest) additional fee. All other interviewees had lost contact with their snakehead, the relationship coming to an end as soon as they or their family had paid the agreed fees. The often very substantial sum needed to finance irregular migration comes in part from savings from previous employment (including some cases of earlier employment abroad), but most is borrowed from family and friends or local moneylenders. However, a few interviewees reported indebtedness to snakeheads, usually incurred because of involuntary extra charges made while in transit, although sometimes money had been borrowed directly from the snakehead. Sun says that the snakehead had to take care of him, because he owed the snakehead money. By contrast, some migrants had paid the snakehead up front in China; as a result the snakehead would not wait for them when they couldn’t keep up walking along with the rest. When he arrived in Britain his first job was organized for him in a restaurant, doing all kinds of things, mopping the floor, scrubbing pans, doing the dishes, whatever they told him he had to do. He was paid £180 (€263) a week for ten hours of work a day. The boss provided room and board. “I have now paid off my debt, both from my own earnings and from loans made by my family back home.” I ask whether he still stays in touch with the snakehead. “I would not be able to avoid him, but the money has been paid back, so we are even and have no contact.” (Interview 8) Although this seems to be the exception rather than the rule, one interviewee told us that he continued to live in fear of the snakeheads, who periodically tracked him down for repayment. Gao went to a local snakehead who had been operating in his town since 1998 and had his journey arranged for him. He said this snakehead had also arranged the trip for the Fujianese who suffocated in Dover in 2000. The snakehead went into hiding in China for a year, but travelled back to Britain soon after. Gao agreed to a fee of 200,000 yuan (€20,000), most of which he had to borrow from his relatives. But halfway through the journey, the snakeheads charged an extra fee of £1,000 (€1,460), saying it was for food and accommodation. On arrival in Britain, Gao’s family back home could only afford the agreed fee of 200,000 yuan

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(€20,000). Gao therefore found himself in debt to the snakehead. When the snakehead returned to Britain Gao’s life became much harder. He felt he was always being watched. The snakehead and his men had always known where he worked and they came to ask him for money almost every month. A monthly 5 per cent interest rate had been set by the snakehead, and Gao couldn’t keep up with the payments. He tried to change jobs and move, but they always found him. During all his years in Britain, Gao was only working to pay off debts to the moneylenders at home. In early 2005 his family had paid the moneylenders £10,000 (€14,600). But Gao still couldn’t earn enough to pay the extra fees charged by the snakehead. The snakehead sent people to come and warn him twice. They said to him, “If you don’t pay, you’ll have to be responsible for your own actions.” Then one day in the spring of 2005, a group of five men came to his place and again asked for payment. When Gao said he couldn’t pay yet they beat him up, kicked him, and burned his face with cigarettes. Although he was badly bruised, Gao was reluctant to go to the hospital for fear of exposing his irregular status, but a friend insisted and sent him to the hospital. Because of his injuries, he was unable to work for a long time. He was very frightened that they might come back at any time and decided to go to the police. Gao was surprised to find that the police weren’t very interested. They took a statement from him, but he has never heard from them since. (Interview 17) Many Fujianese interviewees who had been smuggled by snakeheads reported extreme hardship and danger while in transit, compounded by fear of retaliation against family back in China and occasional violence from the snakeheads. Twenty-eight-year-old Zhao borrowed money and set off from Viet Nam and from there to Cambodia, crossing through the jungle into Thailand. “On our way through the jungle we got to see the bodies of those who had died. Terrible! At the time I really feared that I would die as well.” After that he took a plane from Thailand to the Netherlands, and from there went by truck to Britain. In total, he spent £20,000 (€29,200). (Interview 32) Liu doesn’t want to talk in detail about the snakehead. She says she is afraid of retaliation by the snakehead, because she still has family in China. She only says that she first went to the Russian Federation and arrived in Britain by way of Eastern Europe, a journey that took almost a year. It was very hard and dangerous. (Interview 9)

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Lin paid 50,000 yuan (€5,000) up front to a snakehead in China. “It took seven months from when I left home until I arrived in Britain. … We ran into police who arrested us and locked us up for several months. But the police in Russia are easily fooled. If you pay them off they let you go. Some who got arrested paid US$10,000 [€8,200]; they had heard that they then let you go immediately. … We first took the train to Russia, and then went on to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, the Netherlands and finally arrived in Britain! Snakeheads used trucks to drop us off at the border and then handed us over to another snakehead. I remember that at that time each day I had to walk long distances and cross many mountains. It felt as if your legs were falling off, you were so tired that you really just wanted to lie down on the ground just to stop walking. But we had to, otherwise all that money would have been spent in vain. After crossing all these borders, a snakehead in Holland put us on board a cargo ship and sailed us to Britain. At that time I had paid a total of 200,000 yuan [€20,000]. Every time I arrived at a particular place I had to have my family send money to the snakehead.” When Lin arrived in Britain, the snakehead wanted a further 50,000 yuan (€5,000) and threatened to kill his family if he didn’t pay. Lin and one other person were locked up in a room. When the snakehead had gone, they climbed through a window and fled. “It was very cold that day, but fortunately we met a kind-hearted person who let us stay at her home for a few days until we had found our first job.” (Interview 5) Several informants suggested that female migrants also ran the risk of sexual abuse, although none of the interviewees had experienced or witnessed any concrete instances themselves. Furthermore, it should be stressed that many other Fujianese and virtually all of the northern Chinese, who flew to the UK rather than travelling overland, had an uneventful journey of at most a few days. The findings of this study confirm other research that showed that the period of highest risk of violence and abuse was while migrants were detained in safe houses along the way and particularly upon arrival. In order to expedite payment, snakeheads do not hesitate to use violence. However, only one of the interviewees (see the case above) reported suffering such abuse upon arrival, although several had experienced it in other safe houses while in transit, particularly when waiting times became long and both migrants and snakeheads grew increasingly anxious and restive. “Usually when we arrived at a particular place we were put in rooms by the snakehead for a good many days. Each day all we got was bread, and even that wasn’t enough: try to divide four

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loaves among more than 30 people! The snakeheads were fearsome, they all had guns. If you didn’t obey they would beat you up. I was beaten up because I wasn’t allowed to take luggage along. When I insisted, he hit me and blood was running from my nose. You should understand that luggage takes up space. When you are in a truck there isn’t even space for everybody to stand, let alone to put luggage. Some people cleverly wore many layers of clothes, even several pairs of socks.” (Interview 8) However, by far the greatest fear was that of detection and failure of the migration project. After arrival, several migrants also reported that the very high interest charged by local moneylenders in Fujian made it difficult to repay their migration debt and moneylenders back home regularly reminded their family of their obligations. None, however, reported that such moneylenders got violent or otherwise abusive.

SECTORAL DEMAND FOR IRREGULAR CHINESE LABOUR Insertion into the labour market In the late 1990s the first signs of diversification of employment among Chinese migrants were already visible. The research for this study shows that in 2005–06 the Chinese hotel and restaurant business and ethnic sector was still the main area of employment. But Chinese migrants have become highly entrepreneurial in exploring possibilities elsewhere, mainly in agriculture, cockle picking and food processing, manufacturing, construction, prostitution and hawking. Despite the very different operations of immigration facilitators in Fujian and travel agencies in urban China discussed in the previous section, the employment career of most of the migrants that were interviewed progressed in a strikingly similar way. Most immigrants had at least one contact in Britain upon arrival, usually a person from their own hometown or area, to help them get started. The minority of migrants who arrived without any contacts usually relied on their snakehead for a first job and a place to stay. However, this was definitely not a preferred option, as these people ended up in even lower paid jobs than other recent arrivals and sometimes even had to pay an additional fee to the snakehead for this service. In one case, an informant said he had to work for several weeks for just room and board before he got his first wage payment. Almost all immigrants’ first paid employment was in the hotel and restaurant business. They worked in mainly Cantonese-owned restaurants as kitchen help, usually in London. These jobs typically paid between £100 to £150 (€149 to €224) a week, plus a bed in a room above the restaurant and two meals. Working hours were the normal ones in Chinese restaurants: 152

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10–12 hours a day, six or sometimes even seven days a week. Most of the migrants interviewed left their first employment within months, weeks or even days. Some resigned, citing low pay, hard work, bullying by the owner or first cook and inability to understand either Cantonese or English as the main reasons. Others were fired when the owner or first cook found another even cheaper irregular migrant, or a friend, relative or somebody from their own native area to take their place. In the hotel and restaurant sector, both employer and employee were expected to give only a week’s notice. Since employees get paid by the week in cash there usually were no problems with unpaid wages, although the interviews do contain two cases where restaurant owners were unwilling or unable to pay. After their first job, some migrants continued with similar jobs in the hotel and restaurant sector, usually at marginal higher pay, interspersed with shorter or longer periods of unemployment. These migrants in particular felt utterly dependent on the vagaries of the market for cheap illegal labour, especially since relationships with employers in most cases continued to be purely transactional. Jobs were usually found through the migrants’ growing network of friends, often from the same area in China, but in other cases Chinatown agents were paid introduction fees of up to £200 (€298). However, many migrants very quickly began to explore the other types of employment outside the hotel and restaurant sector that have rapidly emerged since the mid-1990s. In their search, they drew upon their own network of contacts or Chinese agents. The latter sometimes also recruited Chinese immigrant labour for British employment agencies. This employment, which is often outside of the regular economy, offers pay comparable to the low-skilled jobs in the hotel and restaurant sector, or in some cases even less. A considerable number of interviewees had, at one point or another, been employed picking cockles in Morecambe Bay, both before and after the infamous incident in February 2004. Lu got his second-last job through a contact from his native area. It was cockle picking in the north of Morecambe Bay, three months after the tragedy of February 2004. At the time, there were still hundreds of Chinese workers picking cockles there. The gangmaster was a Chinese from Fujian working with an English boss, he said. This Chinese boss had no connection to the snakeheads who had smuggled him into Britain. Lu and others were provided with accommodation and two meals a day. He had only a mattress to sleep on and shared a room with ten other Chinese workers. He said the living conditions weren’t fit for human beings. Lu was paid £5 (€7.45) per 25 kg bag of cockles by the Chinese boss, who then got paid £7–£8 (€10–€12) per bag by the English man. He said there was not much supervision at work. “You just work as much as you can, and if you are not productive, you are the only one to bear the consequences. You are free

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not to go to work if you choose to, but you won’t be paid, of course.” Lu never managed to pick more than five bags a day. After the summer of 2004 it became difficult to continue cockling, because there were arrests and some people were taken into detention. There was also a certain level of violence on the sands between the competing groups of cocklers. Lu felt it wasn’t safe any more and started to look for work through Fujianese contacts in Liverpool. (Interview 19) Other such types of employment reported on include seasonal agricultural work (cherry picking, lettuce harvesting), food processing (slaughterhouse), cleaning, industrial assembly and garment manufacture (ironing or sewing). In all of these types of employment, Chinese immigrants are either part of a labour gang of a Chinese or non-Chinese gangmaster, or else individually join the larger informal labour force of immigrants from Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and South Asia. After several jobs in the hotel and restaurant sector, agriculture, food processing or the garment industry, and usually after two or three years in the UK, many Chinese immigrants manage to upgrade their employment. If street hawking is excluded, only one of the immigrants interviewed had managed to achieve the traditional token of success for Chinese migrants, namely starting their own business, which she subsequently had to abandon. This may, however, also be partly due to the research’s focus on exploitation and forced labour. Some immigrants followed the traditional path of upward mobility and became skilled cooks in a restaurant, particularly those with a background in the hotel and restaurant sector in China. However, many of the men branched out into construction, as they could quite often put skills learned in China to good use. Usually working for non-Chinese building companies, they could make at least double the amount that unskilled work in the illegal labour market would earn (typically £250 (€373) to £300 (€447) per week). Just as important, this type of work gave them much more independence, freedom of movement and security. Often, they also appreciated the greater contact with British society and the opportunity to learn some English. All of this added to a sense that their migration project had succeeded. They would work as part of an often entirely Chinese labour gang, were simply given particular jobs that they had to finish on time and were otherwise left to their own devices. Eventually, Guo discovered that building work was a good option. He got together three other Chinese and formed a team. They looked everywhere for building work. Guo was doing well as a builder. He took up contracts in Birmingham for many months, then back in London again, flooring and tiling in private houses. There seemed to be a lot of building jobs around and he

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was making around £50 (€75) per day. Although it was much lower than what Eastern European builders get, he said, it was a lot higher than working for gangmasters in agriculture or food processing. For one year, he and his team were provided with accommodation by their employer in the building they were working on in west London. The house had poor facilities, but Guo and his friends built a two-room extension there. He is enjoying his work. (Interview 10) Construction was not an option for women, though, and more than men they tended to remain in the hotel and restaurant sector or other forms of employment outside of the normal economy. However, for some women prostitution has become a way out of this type of employment in quite a similar way to construction work for men. Like in many other European countries, Chinese prostitution has become a common phenomenon, catering both to East and South-East Asian or British customers and working for or through Chinese or British brothels or pimps. The prostitutes that were interviewed had turned to this line of work only after having been in other types of employment in the UK: none had been trafficked to work in the sex industry. Kelly is 40 years old. She comes from the city of Tianjin in northern China. She was married and has a 15-year-old son. She graduated from middle school and worked as a shop assistant in her city for over five years. She was unhappy with her marriage and her work and felt she needed a change in her life. She felt that working abroad could bring her respect and decided to leave China to work in Britain in 2002. As it was easier for her to be granted a business visa, Kelly was taken to a local agency in Tianjin by a friend, and the agency (registered as an insurance company) coordinated with a UK company to write an invitation for her. Kelly paid 50,000 yuan (€5,000) for her six-month visa, which she received within a month or so. In Britain, Kelly moved from job to job in the catering trade. Her second-last job was as a placard holder for a Chinatown restaurant. She worked seven hours a day, six days a week, for £160 (€238) or essentially £3.80 (€5.66) per hour. She was paid in cash. She was allowed to take a short break for one to two minutes when she was thirsty and needed to go back to the restaurant to drink some water. The work package included two meals, but no accommodation. She found it difficult to survive on this wage, let alone pay off her debt in China. Then an opportunity came. Kelly became acquainted with a man from Tianjin through a friend from that area. This man had just opened a massage parlour in north London. There were only two women working there. She decided to take up the job without

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much thought, feeling that it was the right thing to do. As she said, “Why work like a slave for nothing, when you can work like a slave for much more?” Kelly moved into the room provided by the massage parlour owner. Work is hard, but she manages. She works eight to ten hours a day and has one day off during the week. She has her three meals cooked for her by the receptionistcaretaker. This massage parlour also provides escort services, but Kelly really doesn’t want to go to the customers’ homes. She feels unsafe, but her employer forces her into it. When she visits the customer in his home, she is usually sent there by a driver who waits around for her to complete her job and take her back to the premises. Once, the driver was not available, so the caretaker accompanied her to the customer’s flat. Once she and the caretaker entered the place, the customer began to act in a strange way and ended up locking them in his flat. Kelly and the caretaker had to jump out of the window to escape when the customer left. Kelly was shocked by the experience, but she didn’t leave the work. She said that she had gotten used to earning money quickly. She was able to pay off her migration debt within a few months and afford a reasonable standard of living. She has been in the trade for two years and has no plans for the future but stay in this line of work. (Interview 11) These forms of employment were not a long-term prospect for any of the interviewees, yet by no means did they all find their way into better types of employment. The risks, transience and low pay made it a form of survival and a means to pay back their migration debts. With no savings or social security to fall back on, irregular immigrants have to stay employed at all costs, and the people interviewed for the study tended to move back and forth between low-skilled jobs in the Chinese hotel and restaurant sector and the larger informal labour market. They remained at the mercy of the vagaries of that labour market, including those caused by the unpredictable changes in government policy and policy enforcement. After the incident in 2004, for instance, cockle pickers in Morecambe Bay were at a greater risk of being identified by the authorities as irregular immigrants, and many cockle pickers turned to other forms of employment, including in the hotel and restaurant sector, despite the requirement imposed upon employers in that same year to check the employment status of employees. Several of the interviewees reported that the clampdown on illegal employment and gangmasters had made them decide to explore other possibilities, sometimes on the other side of the law. Liu laughs: “In actual fact I have done a great many things. Originally I didn’t want to tell you, but it doesn’t matter. I have also grown weed … I lost a great deal of money on that! Almost

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£2,000 [€2,980].” He says that he has sold counterfeit cigarettes and shoes, and pirated DVDs. “The shoes were fake Nike, they were bought wholesale from Fujian for £13 [€19] a pair and sold for £18 [€26] a pair to a South Asian. They rented a storage room at the home of an Irishman. But this man stole what was entrusted to his care. They didn’t dare report this to the police and they had to leave it at that. Again I lost money. The counterfeit cigarettes were from Guangdong; we got them for £4 [€6] a carton. The pirated discs came from Malaysia, and they sold them in the streets, making £150 [€224] a day. But that was very unsafe. Sometimes they got robbed by black youth.” (Interview 6) Most frequently mentioned was hawking counterfeit DVDs, thereby arguably ending up even more in illegality. Hawking Chinese cigarettes has been common in London’s Chinatown since at least the early 1990s. But the market for DVDs is much greater, as it is not limited to the Chinese. Like hawking cigarettes in Chinatown, selling DVDs is highly opportunistic and individual: a hawker only has to deal with the supplier of pirated DVDs and on a good day can easily earn £50 (€75) or more. The main risks of this trade are being apprehended by the police and, much more seriously, robbery and beatings by local youth gangs.

Exploitation and working conditions None of the interviewees reported that they had been forced into any form of employment by snakeheads, illegal gangmasters or other criminals. The picture here is, in fact, identical to the situation regarding smuggling: all interviewees had entered into employment voluntarily and could leave without being retained by force. Even the interviewees who continued to be in debt to snakeheads were never forced to work, although they were reminded of their obligation to pay, which in two cases had led to severe beatings and injury. This includes prostitution: the prostitutes that were interviewed had entered the sex trade voluntarily and only some time after arrival in Britain. They felt that they could terminate their employment if and when they wished. While respondents were not forced into certain types of employment against their will, employers used subtle means of coercion, as will be illustrated by interview excerpts in this section. These means include irregular wage deductions, threats and non-payment of wages. One case among the interviewees illustrates that the lines between smuggling and recruitment for employment, and debt and debt bondage, can get blurred: On arrival in London Qiong was only able to pay half the fees through his family in China. The snakehead contact in London therefore got him a job in a King’s Lynn food processing factory where he knew the recruiter. During Qiong’s six months in King’s

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Lynn, the snakehead contact called him every month about his payment. This contact knew where Qiong lived, through the recruiter who paid his wages. There seemed to be no way to get out of their control. Qiong found it a great burden to be indebted and wanted to make money in the quickest possible way. He became acquainted with a few snakeheads around King’s Lynn and was persuaded to go into the same business. Qiong’s role was to get people that he knew in his home town to sign up for the snakeheads’ services. He would pick them up from the airport and arrange some of their work when they arrived in Britain. It was easy to do, Qiong said, and there was money to be made. Within a year, he was able to get more than 20 people to sign up. This helped him pay off a large part of his debt. But then a conflict over profits arose between Qiong and the snakeheads. When Qiong was threatened with violence he decided to leave the business. At this point, he had paid off all of his debt. (Interview 29) This conclusion from the migrant interviews is, in general, corroborated by the evidence given by the police officers who were interviewed for this project. They too had not encountered cases of involuntary employment or servitude among Chinese. The exception was the interview at the Joint Intelligence Unit in Kent. In the past two years, the unit has been working on eight Chinese cases of trafficking and abuse in prostitution. These cases usually involved women recruited in China for prostitution in the UK. Although their initial recruitment tended to be voluntary, once in the UK these women’s migration debt, along with threats and abuse, left them with little choice but to work for the Chinese or British brothel owners who had acquired them from their smugglers. Chinese prostitutes were, moreover, frequently trafficked within the UK, and were treated as commodities that could be traded, bought or sold. These cases proved to be extremely difficult to prosecute. The women involved refused to give evidence to the police and upon release always voluntarily returned to the brothels of their employment. In addition, the Kent unit also knew of cases of involuntary employment of Chinese outside of prostitution. In one such case, migrants, after having been smuggled into the country, were handed over to a Chinese gang who put them to work in a Chinese restaurant. In order to keep them under control, the original smugglers had arbitrarily raised their smuggling fee by £1,000 (€1,490) and charged a usurious interest rate. The Kent cases do show that there is, at the very least, a potential of bondage and forced labour. But the fact remains that in the vast majority of cases immigrants voluntarily enter and decide to stay in often seriously exploitative situations: the market forces simply make it unnecessary to retain workers against their will. If they decide to leave they will be quickly replaced by others who accept these exploitative working conditions.

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As has been the case for as long as the Chinese hotel and restaurant sector exists, working hours in Chinese restaurants are much longer than what is allowed for regular workers. No contracts are given to employees and work is only secure to the extent that a sense of obligation towards the worker exists. Since many recent immigrants are from completely different parts of China than the owners of the Chinese restaurant for which they work, usually no obligation is felt and workers can and are fired with often only a week’s notice. Several interviewees reported harsh treatment and bullying, often by the first cook rather than the owner, compounded by the migrant’s inability to understand either Cantonese or English. None of the interviewees reported personal experiences of physical violence or sexual abuse. Other work outside the hotel and restaurant sector was similar in many senses. Work in labour gangs was almost invariably extremely hard and physically demanding and, in the case of cockling, demonstrably dangerous. Although Chinese migrants sometimes fear Chinese gangs or snakeheads, none reported physical violence from Chinese employers, and only very rarely were wages left unpaid. By contrast, Chinese working for British or other non-Chinese employers or gangmasters quite frequently feared verbal or physical abuse, general ill treatment, non-payment of wages and arbitrary deductions of fees. This is an important point, as it shows that there are serious issues with the demand in certain sectors, fuelled by irregular immigrant labour in general. This is illustrated in some of the examples from the interviews: Guo got his second-last job via a Tianjin friend in London. It was a job in a seafood processing factory near Dundee. He went with other Tianjin friends to this factory. The workers were organized by gangmasters of Russian origin. The gangmaster treated them badly and subjected them to worse working conditions than the other workers, giving all the heavy jobs to the Chinese workers. The package included accommodation, for which the rent was deducted from his wages – just over £3 (€4.50) per hour. There were frequent other unexplained wage deductions, but none of the Chinese were confident enough to confront the gangmaster. Guo described the workplace as hell on earth. He felt intimidated and threatened by the presence of this gangmaster every day. Within three months he left the job. (Interview 10) A contact from his home town told Liao that there were jobs in the factories in Hartlepool where many Chinese workers were producing electronic goods for a non-Chinese Asian company. Liao immediately decided to try to get a job there. He went for an interview at a recruitment agency in north London and got a job. In the factory, Liao worked 12 hours a day, six days a week. He

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often worked two shifts, 24 hours, without a break in between. The longest he worked was 48 hours non-stop. The supervision was very harsh, and overtime was a necessity. The agreed pay was just over £2 (€3) per hour. The agency issued cheques to workers when they knew no one had a bank account. Many of the cheques bounced. The agency men, who were always around the factory, were frequently a threatening presence. (Interview 31) A Fujianese acquaintance introduced Ren to her second-last job in 2004, which was in a garment factory in London. There were quite a few Fujianese workers there, around 12 of them, so she took the job, thinking that she would not be alone. She worked ten hours a day and was paid £3 (€4.50) per hour. Her employer was originally from India. He didn’t check any documents and paid the Chinese workers in cash. There was little contact between Ren and her employer. All she knew was that he was quite aggressive towards the workers. He often shouted at people and when he was around Ren always felt tense. She and her co-workers were provided with accommodation, which they shared with ten people. That was a depressing time for her. Some of the people were having problems adapting to their working life in Britain and were constantly depressed. Ren became depressed, too. She met her boyfriend in the shared flat. Unfortunately, when she became pregnant and news spread in her workplace, the employer dismissed her without any notice or pay. (Interview 20) Zhan got a job via a home-town contact in a chicken processing factory in Exeter. A local agency in Exeter was his direct employer and paid him £4.80 (€7) per hour before tax. His working hours were 6 a.m. to 3 p.m. or 3 p.m. to 11 p.m., five days a week. His transportation fees were deducted from his wages. Zhan said this local agency issued cheques via Lloyds, charging the workers a 5 per cent administration fee. In the last several months, the local agency did not pay him or any of the other Chinese workers. Zhan was owed £800 (€1,192). He asked an English-speaking Chinese to act as his interpreter and went to the agency to ask for his wages. They refused to pay him, so he refused to leave the office. In the end, the agency paid him some of the wages, but still owed him £160 (€238). Zhan left the job. (Interview 22) Deng is from a small town in Henan province in central China. When he first arrived, Deng got in touch with an acquaintance from Henan, who had come to Britain a little earlier than him. Deng asked him for a job, but had to wait for two months before he was taken to an agency in Thetford. When he was registered

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at the agency, he was told that he would be informed of his shifts in a few days. He realized that this was temporary work and that there was no guarantee of work every day. Deng was given his first job as a cleaner for a duck processing factory in the area. He worked night shifts from 10 p.m. to early morning. He worked around 40 hours a week for £160 (€238) per week and the takehome pay was around £3.50 (€5) an hour. There were a few other Chinese people working alongside him. The bad thing about the job was that there was a lot of supervision. Deng doesn’t speak English and couldn’t understand when the supervisors talked to him. He noticed that their voices sometimes went higher. There was a lot of pointing, which was the only way they could communicate. Work was physically very tiring, he said, and he spent all his time off from work recovering. He also noticed that the employment agency gave Chinese workers the worst jobs and often was not paying them for overtime work. The agency registered the Chinese workers with photocopies of work permits bought from recruiters and others. According to Deng, this agency is notorious among the Chinese and has many branches all over the UK. Deng’s flatmates, ten other Chinese, were sent to various food processing factories in Norfolk and Suffolk. There was no health and safety training. Workers had to adjust and learn about the risks on their own. One day in 2003, Deng got injured when trying to escape from extortion by a Chinese criminal gang. The fees are set at random, and on that particular day they wanted £1,000 (€1,490) from him. When he said he didn’t have any money, they started to hit him and threatened to cut his feet with a knife. He had to jump out of the window to escape, breaking both his feet. He returned to work, but the factory sent him home because they said he was no longer able to work. (Interview 13) All interviewees insisted that they were always free to leave their employment. Only in a few cases can one speak of connivance between gangmasters and snakeheads to keep workers under control (although some snakeheads have indeed branched out into organizing labour gangs). The interviewees put up with squalid living conditions, hard work, threats and low pay simply because it was better than no work at all. As the interviewee in the last case above reveals, a further hazard is the protection rackets run by local Chinese criminal gangs that prey on Chinese with irregular status, particularly when they are concentrated in labour gangs and provide an easy target. Work for irregular migrants in cleaning, agriculture or industry through agencies entails overly long hours for little pay, abusive conditions and no job security. Work is sometimes also extremely physically demanding. For instance, ironing clothes in a garment workshop was considered so hard that

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it could not be done for more than one year at the very most. Ironically, one informant with admittedly very good experiences in regular employment back in China even unfavourably compared the lack of regulation and workers’ rights in Britain’s informal sector with Chinese conditions: Li says that in all his jobs in Britain he never signed a contract with his employer. There is a complete absence of employment security. This is very different from China, where there are the “three guarantees” of retirement, medical care and unemployment. “There is nothing that can be done, you are always working illegally.” (Interview 3) Hawking cigarettes or DVDs was perceived to give much greater freedom: unlike working for gangmasters, you can choose where and how long you work. Hawkers are only accountable to the criminals who provide them with smuggled Chinese cigarettes or counterfeit DVDs, and their real fear is police arrest or muggings by local gangs. Interviewee: My life is based in Chinatown now, we have so many people from our own area here, and I sometimes even forget I am in London. … A friend from our village introduced me here. Her sister’s husband is one of the main wholesale distributors of these cigarettes. We get cigarettes from them first. … The police have tightened their policy on us. It used to be safe to have several cartons on you, but not now. We can only bring two or three packs of cigarettes as samples. If you are caught, they can’t use these as evidence against you. … We sell for £21 [€31] a carton, which is half the price [of the cigarettes] in shops. No one wants or dares to accept a cheaper offer. We have three groups of Fujianese who sell cigarettes now, but all the cigarettes come from the same guy. We have our own rules. You would be kicked out from Chinatown if you try to take business from others by cutting the price. Interviewer: I saw a guy taking money from you several times. Who is he? Interviewee: It isn’t a protection fee, but we have to listen to him. No one could do business without his permission. He sets up lookouts who watch the police and us to ensure our safety. He told us how to deal with the police as well. All the hawkers work under his control. … He has been here for a long time and is quite influential in Chinatown. He dominates the market now, I guess. He might be the only one in Chinatown, or even London. (Interview 1)

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The illegal smuggling of Chinese can be extremely hazardous and may bring great suffering and hardship. Coercion and abuse occur in safe houses en route to keep migrants in check, and upon arrival in the UK to ensure swift and complete payment of the migration fee. Only a few migrants still owed debts to their snakeheads, usually because of arbitrary extra fees charged. For them, these debts were a considerable burden and these migrants often continued to live in fear of the snakeheads to whom they owed money. Others owed money to their families, which can place a moral burden on them to earn money quickly to repay the debt. Chinese migrants continue to find work in the Chinese ethnic sector, but increasingly also have to turn to low-skilled and irregular employment outside this sector, employment that is only partly accessible through specifically Chinese ethnic networks or agents. Chinese thus find that they have to compete with a highly diverse underclass of immigrant labourers, most of whom, like the Chinese, reside illegally in the UK or have only recently been granted legal residence or leave to remain. Both in the ethnic Chinese and the more general vulnerable segments of labour markets, conditions of employment and work for irregular immigrants are often extremely harsh and wages are well below the UK national minimum wage. Such jobs come without any employment rights and irregular immigrant labour is treated as fully expendable. Only the crude fact of the highly favourable exchange rate between the Chinese yuan and the British pound make all of this, at the end of the day, worthwhile. These findings regarding Chinese migration and employment are corroborated by several other studies in other countries in Europe and North America (Chin, 1999; Liang and Ye, 2001; Pieke et al., 2004; Soudijn, 2006).

MEDIA REPORTS In total, the media search generated 67 individual reports. As figure 6 shows, coverage varies considerably over time, driven, as one might reasonably expect, by the occurrence of major events, in this case mainly the Morecambe Bay incident trials. The media reports included in the research for this case study vary enormously in quality. Some were very happy to simply regurgitate the hackneyed stereotype of the trafficked Chinese victim, cynically and mercilessly exploited by snakeheads and Chinese gangmasters, quite often even suggesting a link between people smuggling and drug trafficking or snakeheads and the “triads”. Even the best informed and most researched articles containing a great deal of factually correct information on the background of migrants in China and the operations of snakeheads insert stock references to the old stereotypes that undo much of the good work that could have been achieved. Reporting on the Morecambe Bay incident trials at the end

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Figure 6 Distribution of selected media reports 25

No. of med ia repo rts

20

15

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0 Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr- May- Jun05 05 05 05 05 05

Jul05

Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr- May05 05 05 05 05 06 06 06 06 06 Time frame

Total media reports Morecambe Bay reports Other relevant reports

of March 2006 reveals these patterns particularly well. The Daily Mail article below provides evidence of such sensational reporting: A secretive chain of organised crime began with young men and women in Fujian, a remote, impoverished region on the coast of the South China Sea, being smuggled to Europe via Russia by Snakehead gangs for up to £20,000 a head. Arriving in Britain with false or non-existent documents, they would join the minibus loads of cocklepickers driven to the sands from Liverpool. At the centre of the operation lay Ren, the ruthless gangmaster who cared nothing for the safety of his charges, only for the riches that the freely-available shellfish offered. He had total control of their every waking moment. Once rent, food and debts to the peopletraffickers had been deducted from their wages, the Chinese were often left with as little as £1 a day. (Craven and Tozer, 2006)

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The BBC, in a much less rousing and tendentious background article on Chinese people smuggling, reaches many of the same conclusions: Senior police officers who have studied Snakeheads say they are sufficiently business-minded to sub-contract transport to other ethnic groups (such as Turkish smugglers on the border of Asia and Europe) if it will improve the profit margin. The key step they do control, however, is arrival. Migrants who make it are allocated jobs by “recruiters” who have identified opportunities, be they in the Chinese catering trade, sweatshop labour or picking cockles at Morecambe Bay. But the handover to the recruiters turns the experience from a work-abroad scheme into something resembling kidnap. Many of these undocumented migrants quickly find themselves victims of extortion, with the price of the passage hiked and threats made to the families back home. Police officers who have raided restaurants, factories and businesses known to be using illegal workers have sometimes found up to 40 people sleeping in one room. Subtle humiliation techniques are often used, such as denial of shoes and socks, to maintain control over the workers. (Casciani, 2006) Some of this is at odds with the interviews, in particular the perceived link between smuggling and coercive job placement. It seems that journalists in the UK seem all too often quite satisfied to simply confirm and convey the opinion shared by policy-makers and the public when it comes to the political minefield of immigration policy. An undercover investigation carried out by a journalist of The Guardian is worth mentioning, as it attempts to shed light on the complexities of Chinese irregular migration and the fine lines between coercion and free choice. The article was published shortly after the Morecambe Bay incident. In other articles, the newspaper made strong claims against the Government’s immigration and employment policies. It also blamed English suppliers and their international clients for the exploitation of irregular migrants. It says, for example: Delayed payment by industry middlemen led directly to delayed wages by gangmasters. Frequent price cutting by the middlemen pushed gangmasters to impose a harsher regime to produce more, for lower wages. […] The Gangmasters Licensing Act will offer only the most limited protection, and tougher immigration-law enforcement may drive illegal migrant workers into even more dangerous conditions. Unless the government acts to protect all workers, regardless of their immigration status, tragedies like Morecambe Bay seem bound to be repeated. (Pai, 2006)

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Unskilled irregular Chinese immigration is currently much more diverse, in terms of areas of origin in China and employment sectors in the UK, than ten or even five years ago. Fujian province is still a major source area, but migrants also originate from many other provinces. Moreover, migrants from these new source areas are mainly from an urban rather than a rural background. However, the diversification of areas of origin appears not to have been the driver of the marked widening in areas of employment. Regardless of their background in China, recent immigrants now find employment in many other sectors outside the Chinese hotel and restaurant sector, including agriculture, food processing, construction, manufacturing and prostitution. Although Chinese gangmasters and recruiters clearly are active in these sectors, we found that many Chinese actually work for non-Chinese placement agencies or employers. Chinese are also active as self-employed street hawkers (mainly DVDs and cigarettes), while some have tried their hand at petty crime. In leaving, at least to a certain extent, the familiar surroundings of the Chinese hotel and restaurant sector, the Chinese have become part of a much larger immigrant labour force operating outside of normal society and the regular economy. This labour force is mainly made up of recent irregular immigrants from all over the world. These workers are employed in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, often under highly exploitative or otherwise illegal circumstances (taxation and health and safety, for instance). Working hours are routinely excessively long, wages are almost always far below the minimum, notice periods are non-existent, and the arbitrary withholding of wages or deduction of fees is commonplace. Furthermore, these workers are extremely vulnerable to threats, verbal or physical ill treatment by their employers, gangmasters or supervisors, and extortion and abuse by predatory criminal gangs. The material presented here provides vivid illustrations of excesses that appear to have become standard in those sectors of the British economy that tend to employ low-skilled and irregular immigrant labour, demonstrating the almost complete lack of state regulation and control over this sector. On the other hand, only limited evidence has been found of the trafficking of Chinese immigrants or the use of blatant coercion to keep Chinese immigrants in employment against their own free will. This does not mean that trafficking or forced labour do not occur, but there is no doubt that such practices are at present not a systematic and structural aspect of irregular Chinese immigration and employment. Chinese irregular immigration to the UK is currently driven by several factors. Most important is the “pull” generated by employment opportunities in the least protected segment of the British labour market and the artificially low exchange rate of the Chinese yuan. Perhaps slightly less important, but still very significant, is the “push” of readily available emigration

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opportunities in an increasing number of localities in China. Finally, the existence of opportunities for entry into the UK no doubt also plays a role, but does not appear to be the driving factor: many Chinese have entered the UK by way of Western European countries that are just as hard or easy to get in to, but do not or no longer present the opportunities for illegal work and residence. Hence, the presence of a large population of irregular Chinese in Britain is an employment as well as an immigration issue. This conclusion leads to the following policy recommendations: 1.

Irregular entry is facilitated by travel agents or professional smugglers, and their operations involve criminal acts. In the case of snakeheads, this includes violence against migrants who do not promptly pay their smuggling fees. However, agents and smugglers are, in the final analysis, only service providers to migrants who voluntarily and knowingly enter into an agreement with them. Demonizing snakeheads as evil traffickers or even the modern equivalent of slave traders may be politically expedient, but is not supported by the evidence, and directs the attention away from very serious problems and issues that do exist.

2.

Policy-making and implementation should not focus on curbing illegal entry itself. Illegal entry is generated by powerful pull factors in the British economy and equally powerful push factors in Chinese society that cannot be defeated by erecting ever higher walls around Britain. Instead, policy should tackle both pull and push factors at the same time. Such a two-pronged approach is essential: focusing only on either the pull or the push of migration may reduce immigration somewhat, but will not make it manageable, particularly in the longer term.

3.

On the push side of things, the British Government should seek to engage the Chinese Government for a ban on local government tolerance or even encouragement of the facilitation of irregular emigration that exists in many areas of China. However, in order to do so the Chinese Government will need to be able to offer local governments something in return, which it can only get from foreign governments: regular and predictable channels of legal, unskilled emigration.

4.

To complement this effort to regulate and control the push factors of Chinese migration, the British Government should also tackle the sector of the economy here that generates the pull of Chinese immigration. It is important to remember that in the final analysis Chinese irregular emigration is driven by a paradox: Chinese migrants come here because they can be employed illegally, even though that may involve exploitative conditions. Curbing exploitation will therefore also ultimately reduce

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the incentives to migrate here, and is therefore more than a moral obligation to any government that takes human rights seriously. Employment, health and safety, and taxation regulations should be much more strictly enforced in the growing informal economy of the UK. The objective here should not be to curb the employment of the irregular migrants themselves. When this was done recently it only increased the hardship and suffering of migrant workers and, if anything, gave unscrupulous employers even more leverage over them. Rather, enforcement should aim to put an end to the often Dickensian employment practices to which irregular workers are subjected. In the short term, this will make life much better for irregular workers and may in fact make Britain more attractive as an immigration country. However, in the somewhat longer term, this will remove the economic incentives to employ irregular workers, ultimately reducing the volume of irregular immigration.

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5

Gao Yun

The studies carried out in the three European countries offer a detailed picture of the treatment of certain Chinese migrant workers by various recruiters, smugglers, traffickers and employers. An underlying theme of all three case studies is that Chinese migrant workers in an irregular situation are subject to serious exploitation. The studies have explored the broad spectrum of situations in which Chinese workers become part of such exploitation, examining the factors that underlie and encourage it in European destination countries. The research explores the circumstances that either independently or jointly facilitate the practice of exploitative labour within the Chinese working community in these three countries. The legal principles dealing with forced labour, and the related practices of human trafficking and smuggling, are now well established. But the development of a legal framework has generally outpaced an empirical understanding of the experience of migrants and of the context in which exploitation occurs. This is particularly true in the case of Chinese migrants. At the same time, legal principles are only starting to be applied in national law and given practical interpretation by the courts; this will provide greater clarity on how to recognize these situations in practice and take the appropriate remedial action. The studies in this volume, based on primary data obtained through interviews with Chinese migrants, have hopefully contributed to deeper understanding of the reality encountered by them in destination countries. The studies contain comparable findings that enhance the understanding of the different phases of Chinese irregular migration, smuggling or trafficking. At departure, recruitment is rarely if ever involuntary. Most migrants are fully aware of the illegal nature of clandestine entry into Europe and of the duress that may result from this. Various travel or recruitment agencies, individuals, companies or even criminal organizations are seen as service providers who facilitate emigration for different levels of remuneration. The

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relationship of Chinese migrants with their “service providers” comes to an end upon arrival in destination countries and when they or their family have paid the agreed fees. The dividing line between “providing a service”, smuggling and human trafficking depends on a number of variables, the main ones being the wouldbe emigrant’s familiarity with the smuggler, the itinerary (which may involve a high level of risk), the violence and pressure suffered during the journey, and the situation that confronts a migrant on arrival. If the migrant is arrested during the journey or at the border, national authorities will likely treat the case as smuggling – a criminal offence in which migrants are also considered as having committed an illegal offence. Only on arrival in the destination country can a determination be made as to whether the situation is one of trafficking, by working back up the chain to find the trafficker and establishing the existence of factors such as coercion, deception and exploitation. Only then can migrants be identified as victims of human trafficking, instead of illegal aliens. When migrants arrive in the destination country, all three studies highlight the importance of the debt arising from the fees paid to smugglers and traffickers, as well as the difficulties that the migrants encounter in repaying these very substantial amounts. The nature of the debt, however, needs to be carefully studied. It does not easily fit into the concept of debt bondage defined in international law. Though the media often refers to the “debt slavery” of Chinese migrants, there is rarely a direct link between the person to whom the migrants are indebted and the employers who exploit them. Instead, the migrants are indebted to family and friends (with some exceptions, such as the amnesty period in Italy). The employer takes advantage of this situation of vulnerability, but is not directly responsible for the debt contracted by migrants. Nor does the employer use the debt as a direct instrument to gain control over the migrant. The situation is therefore difficult to identify as debt bondage in the legal sense of the term. Consequently, during investigations into smuggling, trafficking or illegal employment, most law enforcement agencies do not consider it relevant to inquire as to how, why and if the worker is in debt in China. In the few cases where investigators are more sensitive to this issue, there may be a lack of cooperation as well as a shortage of resources to enable them to follow the chain back to China in order to identify the potential vulnerability of irregular migrant workers. The studies have provided a multi-dimensional picture, in which the degree of vulnerability to exploitation is far from uniform, but is the outcome of different factors which can change over time. These include the way in which the journey is organized, the characteristics and behaviour of the agents who organize the journey, the region of China from which the migrants come, the networks that people from these regions share in the Chinese overseas diaspora, the extent of indebtedness on arrival, and the ability to pay off these debts. Other factors include migrants’ skill levels, immigration

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status in the destination country, and the economic pressures at play in particular sectors of work. Previous ILO research103 has recognized that, although a distinction is drawn in international law between human smuggling and human trafficking, in practice this distinction is often blurred because linkages between recruitment agents, transporters and employers in the destination countries are often tenuous or unclear. Migrants who enter destination countries illegally, but of their own volition, are highly vulnerable to exploitation, in particular when their status is irregular. Exploitative labour may thus be an indirect outcome of the smuggling process, rather than a direct result of abusive or deceptive recruitment in the origin country. At the same time, there are very real difficulties in identifying instances of trafficking, which require working backwards from the situation of present exploitation to establish prior deception and intent. These are complex matters which are now being widely debated in legal and judicial circles. Discussions concerning whether or not exploitation may be consensual can usefully be reviewed against the legal concept of abuse of vulnerability. Such abuse arises where an individual has no real and acceptable alternative to submitting to the abuse. Suffice it to say here that when States drafted the Palermo Protocol to define the offence of human trafficking they defined coercion to include not only physical force, but also the “abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability”. The vulnerability may be physical or psychological, family related, social or economic. Exploitation in circumstances involving abuse of vulnerability is a form of coercion. The “willingness” of the worker should in no case be misinterpreted as justification for exploitative practices by employers which violate fundamental labour rights; nor, as a matter of principle, should it constitute an excuse for exonerating employers from punishment in accordance with labour law and penal law. Determining the gravity of offences for different forms of exploitation is best left to the authorities of the countries concerned; this needs to be defined and analysed on a case-by-case basis within their respective jurisdiction. The studies nevertheless confirm the need for greater clarity in understanding – and discussing – trafficking and forced labour in practical situations. Trafficking is a complicated legal concept, with its requirement that three elements be present to link travel or transportation with coercion or deception, for the purpose of exploitation. Although France, Italy and the United Kingdom all now define trafficking as an offence in their criminal laws, as yet there have been very few prosecutions and little guidance from the courts on how to recognize the forced labour situations in which trafficking occurs. Even in the case of forced labour, which has a much

103

See, generally, A global alliance against forced labour (ILO, 2005b) for a summary of this research.

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longer history as a violation of workers’ rights, cases have rarely been prosecuted in national courts and only a handful of cases have come before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This is another indicator of the vulnerability of the victims and of the obstacles preventing their access to justice. In the landmark 2005 Siliadin v. France case, however, which examined the forced labour and trafficking of a migrant domestic worker, the ECtHR drew attention to the continued relevance of the European Convention on Human Rights, which was inspired by the ILO’s Convention on Forced Labour, 1930 (No. 29). The ECtHR referred back to its observation, first made in the Selmouni v. France judgment in 1999, that the Convention “is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions” and that “the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies”.104 An approach based on labour standards and the instruments of labour justice, rather than on those of criminal justice alone, is indispensable in addressing the majority of labour exploitation cases. While the studies describe both extreme and typical cases of forced labour, they acknowledge that there is a spectrum of labour practices related to the employment of Chinese migrants. At one end of the spectrum lies work that migrants freely consent to do, while at the other, forced labour and coercion exist. A broad range of exploitative practices by employers exists in the middle of the spectrum, occupying a grey area that is by nature difficult to define. As the use of coercion is usually somewhat indirect and less obvious, these practices may not amount to forced labour in the terms defined by the ILO’s forced labour Conventions. Such practices include excessive overtime, extremely low wages, exclusion from social welfare schemes, or even so-called “self-exploitation”. On their own, they can be considered as a matter of poor working conditions, but not as serious as a violation of human rights. But they still need to be addressed by improving the enforcement of international and national labour standards with regard to work time, wages, occupational health and safety, social security and other relevant subjects. The uniform pictures of extremely poor working conditions provided by the studies may also be considered as incompatible with human dignity (a characteristic of the offence of trafficking for exploitation in certain countries). The studies point to the weak functioning of labour markets in such sectors as textile and garments, hotel and restaurant, domestic services, construction and labour recruitment, and how they are susceptible to exploitation. These “high-risk” sectors, in terms of non-compliance with labour standards, absorb a pool of “newcomers”, who are the most badly

104

Selmouni v. France, ECtHR 1999-V, 29 EHRR 403 (2000), para. 101.

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informed, into the labour market. This is the case for the textile industry in France, which used to engage Yugoslavian migrants in the 1960s, after the removal of restrictions on emigration in that country. More recent changes in the pattern of production and structure of work, at both the national and sectoral levels, require even more flexibility in employment. The widespread use of subcontracting systems is one example of meeting this requirement. The system is unfortunately manipulated in such a way as to facilitate the evasion of employers’ responsibilities towards workers or, worse, the imposition of exploitation on workers. The complexity of the system has significantly increased difficulties for law enforcement to detect exploitative practices. There is a need to address these problems by tracing and making accountable the genuine employers in the system. The ILO has raised awareness that a disguised employment relationship occurs when the employer treats an individual in a manner that hides his or her true legal status as an employee, and that the use of other forms of contractual arrangements can have the effect of depriving workers of the protection to which they are due. The ILO’s Employment Relationship Recommendation (No. 198), adopted in 2006, encourages member States to consider defining specific indicators in their legislation regarding the existence of an employment relationship, as contained in the Recommendation. Countries such as France have taken necessary measures, such as tracing the genuine employer and imposing joint liability between the donneurs d’ordre and their subcontractors. However, measures still need to be taken to secure firmer law enforcement in overly complex production and recruitment systems. A problem that deserves special attention is the regulation and monitoring of labour brokers and intermediaries. Such mechanisms should be strengthened not only in China, but also in destination countries. The adoption of the Gangmaster (Licensing) Act in the UK was triggered by the death of Chinese workers exploited by a gangmaster in Morecambe Bay. However, the UK research shows that the exploitation of Chinese workers continues to happen, irrespective of the gangmasters’ nationalities, in agriculture and food processing. In this regard, it is up to the national legislator and social partners to identify the possible gaps in either legislation or practice and to find appropriate solutions. The ILO’s Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), and its accompanying Recommendation (No. 188), can serve as useful instruments for this purpose. In other sectors of the informal economy, such as cockle picking and domestic services, the lack of both regulation and inspection can explain the high ratio of exploitable workers. It is crucially important to develop labour standards in such sectors, to provide workers with access to trade unions and to extend the application of the scope of labour law, as well as law enforcement, to cover these sectors. At the international level, the item “Decent Work for Domestic Workers” has been included on the agenda of

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the 99th session (2010) of the International Labour Conference, at which the proposal for an ILO Convention on the rights of domestic workers will be discussed. The studies also point to the need for an awareness of the rights of smuggled migrants that is equal to that which exists for trafficking victims. International law explicitly protects smuggled migrants from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and requires states to protect smuggled migrants against “violence that may be inflicted upon them, whether by individuals or groups” (Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Art. 16). The studies both identify areas where more research is needed and underscore the need to set analysis of exploitation against legal concepts of abuse of power and abuse of vulnerability. The French and Italian studies also show the value of working with civil society groups and labour inspectorates, as well as using data from legal proceedings. All indicate that under existing conditions access to justice is not a realistic option for Chinese irregular migrants: this is an area for further research. More research is also required into the different experiences of skilled and unskilled workers, and of migrants with regular and irregular immigration status. Against the background of the global movement to promote corporate social responsibility, Chinese ethnic businesses have also started to join programmes to reinforce the self-regulation capacity of employers. This study has, for example, detected some positive practices in Italy, where some Chinese businesses have started to move towards full compliance with local labour regulations. Through a pilot project, some Chinese companies voluntarily accepted inspection by social auditors and were certified by internationally accredited organizations. Chinese workers have also become more aware of their rights under Italian law, though more work still needs to be done to strengthen their capacity of taking collective actions. While there has been a reported growth of cooperation between police and the law enforcement institutions in China and European countries to dismantle criminal organizations linked to smuggling and trafficking, the studies all advise that future cooperation needs to go beyond a narrow focus on criminal justice. Multi-faceted cooperation is needed in broader areas to address root causes. Researchers increasingly see globalization as a key factor motivating Chinese workers to seek opportunities abroad. If there are few channels for legal migration and many new Chinese migrants continue to have an irregular status with regard to both residence and employment, they will remain vulnerable to severe exploitation. For this reason, an ongoing technical cooperation project, implemented by the ILO and the International Organization for Migration with support of the European Union, is working to combat irregular migration between China and Europe by improving capacities for migration management and exploring channels for legal migration in the context of the continued demand for Chinese workers. The studies in the present volume are seen as an important contribution to this

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ongoing project, which should now move from analysis to practical cooperation between China and the European countries to ensure that Chinese migration works to the benefit of all concerned and includes full freedom of choice, movement and respect for human rights.

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184

ANNEX: GLOSSARY OF CHINESE TERMS

Several of the words and expressions in this glossary are used by migrants to describe migration and working conditions in the host country. Most of these terms are either neologisms (*) or adaptations of everyday and vernacular expressions (**) which have no equivalent in English.

Chinese term

Translation

Explanation

chegong

“machine worker”

Workers who operate sewing machines in a garment-making workshop.

Dongbei

“east-north”

The north-east part of China, corresponding to the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning.

ganhuo

“doing work”

Working intensively to meet a tight production deadline requiring long working hours in the garment and textile industry.

guanxi

“networking”

A traditional system of social relationships based on reciprocal obligations and favours, and which often includes the loan of money.

heigong

“black worker”

A clandestine or undocumented worker.

hukou

“household book”

A book that records the residency of people as being in urban or rural areas.

kuaijish

“account”

An accountant.

laoban**

“boss”

Refers to both the smuggler and the employer.

185

Concealed chains

Chinese term

Translation

Explanation

pa shan*

“to climb mountains”

This method of illegal border crossing involves numerous natural hazards. Although the term means literally “to cross a mountain on foot”, several other modes of transport are used (car, train, boat, etc.).

shougong

“handcrafter”

A person who does manual work that is above the level of zagong work.

tao zhai, tao hun, tao jin*

“to flee from debt, to flee after becoming divorced, to sift gold”

Reasons for which people in Dongbei leave China.

Wenzhou is a port and city in the south of the province of Zhejiang. The term is used for all the centres of emigration in the region, which are generally semi-industrialized villages and sometimes mountain villages.

Wenzhou

xia gang zhi gong*

“to leave one’s job”

A term which appeared in 1995, during the restructuring of the Chinese public enterprises, to describe the situation of employees who had been “made available” but who continue to receive a derisory proportion of their wages.

xia hai**

“to jump into the sea”

A term coined during China’s economic reforms of the early 1990s, meaning to leave a stable job and set oneself up in business at the risk of losing everything. This term is only used by people from Dongbei to refer to others from Dongbei who start working as prostitutes and have to accept all of the risks involved.

ya zi lou*

“duck house”

Place where the migrants are locked up during their journey until a ticket and passport have been obtained.

yi ci mai duan**

“to buy everything at once”

Lump sum paid in settlement by firms to employees who have been dismissed so that they can disclaim all obligations and responsibilities towards their employees.

186

Annex: Glossary of Chinese terms

Chinese term

Translation

Explanation

zagong

“miscellaneous workers” or “multiple functional workers”

Workers at the lowest level of the hierarchy in Chinese ethnic workshops in the garment and textile industry, who often perform low-skilled tasks.

zhong jie

“intermediary”

Intermediary company, used by northern Chinese and those from large metropolitan areas, which provides Schengen business visas.

187

INDEX

Note: Page numbers in bold refer to tables; those in italic refer to figures.

Agency for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), France 40–1 amnesties, Italy 11–12, 93–4, 105 1995 (Law 489/95) 123–4 1998 (Law 40/98) 124–5 2002 (Law 198/2002) 125–6 adverse effects of 120–6, 135 irregularities 123–6, 126–8, 138 Argentina 1 Association franco-chinoise de soutien linquistique et culturel (ASLC) 51 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) (2004) 143 asylum seekers, France 50 Italy 94 auxiliary work, Italy 92 BBC, media coverage 165 Belgium, measures against exploitation 3–4 brokerage fees 6, 26, 27–31 Chinese regulations 32 Dongbei migrants 30–1 “package fee” (historical) 21 regional variations 28, 29, 30 sponsorship 22–3 see also debt brokerage market, authorized companies 24, 25 emigration hierarchy 23–7 historical review 20–3 private agencies 24, 25–6, 43, 146 unauthorized 24, 25, 26, 43, 148 see also snakeheads; travel agencies Cambodia, transit camps 49 Cameroon, transit visas for France 49 Camorra mafia clan 132, 137 Carabinieri (Italian military police) 91

“Marco Polo” operation (2005) 130 Special Operations Task force 103, 105 Central Agency for the Suppression of Human Trafficking, France (OCRTEH) 83 Central Agency for the Suppression of Illegal Immigration and of the Employment of Foreigners without Permits (OCRIEST), France 45, 4531, 80, 85 Centre for Immigration Research and Services (Prato Centre, Italy) 90, 103, 116, 122–5 children, in Italy 10, 115 work in family businesses in Italy 116 working in France 73 China, brokerage market 20–3 collaboration with ILO 4–5 Cultural Revolution (1966–76) 21 destination of migrants 1–2, 2 economic change 34, 39–40 emigration from 1–2, 20–2, 33–4, 144–7 internal migration 40 measures to reduce migration 3, 31–2, 148, 167–8 migration to France 40–1, 42, 42, 59–61, 60 Ministry of Commerce 24 Ministry of Finance 32 Ministry of Labour and Social Security 24 need for information campaign 88 northern provinces 52, 99, 114, 134, 137, 146–7 see also Dongbei migrants returning migrants 3, 32 urban migration 41, 42, 43, 144, 146 welfare state reform 33 Chinese employers, in France 58 in Italy 9–10, 97–8, 106–8, 108 in UK 10, 159 coercion,

189

Concealed chains

Italy 89, 117, 128, 135–7 on journey 132–3, 163 psychological 12, 105 self-exploitation and 131, 132, 135 smuggling and 18, 165 trafficking and 16–17, 170, 171 UK 157, 165, 167, 172 see also exploitation commerce, Chinese businesses in Italy 109, 111, 112 illegal labour in France 77 Committee Against Modern Slavery (1994) 69 compensation, for victims of exploitation 84 competition, between Chinese subcontractors (Italy) 116–18 construction industry, France 56, 59, 77 labour markets in 172 UK 154–5 contract workers 26 Convention Against Torture 1411 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1411 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1411 Convention on the Rights of the Child 14, 1411 Côte d’Ivoire, transit visas for France 49 Council of Europe, Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 17 Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe Resolution 1509 (2006), Human Rights of Irregular Migrants 1512 counterfeit goods 157, 162, 166 credit and loan system, community 29–30 crime, among Chinese in Italy 98 organized 75–6, 130, 128 and regularization process for immigrants 130–2 see also illegal activity Criminal Code, France 37 Article 225-13 37, 71 Article 225-14 37, 71 reform (2004) 75, 83 Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, UK 142 Daily Mail 164 debt, interpersonal 6, 163, 170 migrants in France 51–6, 53 from migration costs 6–7, 170 repayment period 8, 53–4, 55–6, 156 and vulnerability 7, 133, 161 debt bondage 117, 12, 157–8, 170 Délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le travail illégal (DILTI) 37 dependence 56 and conflict 117–18 and legalization 124

190

detention in custody, France 75 Direction de la population et des migrations (DPM 2002) 50 divorce, as motive for migration 40, 41 domestic services 9 forced labour or servitude 14, 69, 97 France 59, 67–9 regulation of 172, 173–4 Dongbei migrants 30–1 debt burden 52, 53 France 39–40, 41, 52, 67, 69 in prostitution 69 donneurs d’ordre 10, 58, 62–4 liability of 70, 78–9, 80–2, 173 sanctions against 85 Dover tragedy 2, 26, 139 “duck houses” (ya zi lou) transit camps 48–9 economic sectors, Chinese in Italy 108 concentration in 9–10, 58–9 ethnic Chinese 59, 61–2 illegal labour in France 77 seasonal 154 working conditions, France 61–70 see also agriculture; construction; domestic services; food processing; garment-making and textiles; hotels and restaurants education, of migrants 86–7 employers, and amnesties 11–12, 123–6 in destination countries 8 exploitation 48, 68, 72, 118, 120–6, 131–3, 170 and legalization in Italy 120–6, 174 powers of 117, 133 use of illegal labour (France) 61, 61, 67, 71–2, 77–8, 77 use of illegal labour (Italy) 92–3, 94, 117 use of illegal migrants (UK) 143, 156 see also Chinese employers; gangmasters entrepreneurs, Chinese in France 59, 87 Chinese in Italy 106–7, 107 ethnic communities 58–9 dispersal of niches 86–7 Italy 106 lack of cohesiveness 116–17 Paris 39–40, 52, 56 EU Council Directive 2002/90/EC 1615 EU Council Directive Decision on combating trafficking 1616 EU Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings 83 European Commission, “An EU Approach to Managing the Economic Migration” 86 Blue Card” plan for skilled migrants 87 European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 95, 141

Index

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 13–14, 172 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 71, 172 European Federation of Chinese Organizations, 15th Congress (Berlin, 2008) 19 European Union 174 Chinese residents and workers 2, 19 “Integration of Chinese Migrants in Europe” programme 87 irregular Chinese migrants in 2, 3–4, 20 labour shortages 20 exploitation, abuse of vulnerability 12–13, 135, 170–1 by employers in Italy 120–6, 131–3 measures against 3–4, 96, 167–8 self-exploitation 131–2, 133 as temporary 12 UK 157–8, 165, 168 see also coercion façonnier (workshop boss) 10, 62–4, 85 liability of 78–9, 80–2 sanctions 85 family, and lineage 27 networks 8, 55, 101, 103, 104, 134 and repayment of loans 29 “family chain” 40 family life, effect of work flexibility on 115–16 family reunion 21, 23 Italian policy 92, 105–6 flexible work systems 9 Chinese work in Italy 115–16 compared with forced labour 135–7 flights, direct 43, 50 food processing 142, 152, 154, 159, 160–1 forced labour 12, 13–15, 131–2, 135–7, 169 definitions 71, 171–2 French policy 37–8, 55, 71–2, 83–4 Italian policy 97 trafficking and 18, 89, 171 UK 158 France 3, 33–4 Chinese immigrant population 57 Chinese regions of origin 40–1, 42, 42 Labour Code 74, 78 legal immigration 59–61, 60 legal and policy challenges 70–83 legal and policy framework 36–9 methodology 34–6 migrants’ ignorance of 88 passport applications 50 Penal Code 36 police checks and inspections 11, 51, 54, 65, 78 policy against trafficking 36–7, 74–5, 76, 83 racketeering and violence 56–7 recommendations 82–9 sentier system 10–11, 62–5

see also Criminal Code, France “free service” 22, 23 French Office for Immigration and Integration 59–60 Fujian province 6, 7, 22, 102 brokerage fees 28, 29 migrants to Italy 114 migration to France 41 migration to UK 144–6 snakehead facilitators 148 Gangmaster (Licensing) Act (2004) 142, 165, 173 gangmasters, UK 142–3, 154, 155, 159 Gangmasters Licensing Authority (UK) 142 gangs, Chinese, France 57 UK 161 garment-making and textiles 9, 62, 172 France 10–11, 55, 58, 59, 61–5, 61, 173 Italy 9–10, 106, 108, 109, 110, 132 pronto moda (ready-to-wear clothing) 112–13, 116 working conditions 61–5, 113–14, 118–20 workshops 62, 63, 64–5, 112–14 see also donneurs d’ordre; façonnier Genealogy of Hu’s Lineage Residing Abroad, The 22 Germany 147 Global alliance against forced labour, A (2005) 171103 Guangdong province 22 Guangxi, migration to France 41 guanxi (networking) 102–4, 133 Guardian, The 165 hawking, counterfeit goods 157, 162, 166 Henan, migrants to Italy 114 migrants to UK 160 migration to France 41 History of Wencheng Overseas Chinese, The 23 home working, clandestine 11, 63, 64–5, 66, 78, 80–3 Hong Kong 21, 145 hotels and restaurant sector 9 France 59, 65–6, 67, 77 labour markets in 172 UK 152–3, 155, 156, 159, 166 Hu lineage 22 hukou (status book) 40 illegal activity, associated with amnesties (Italy) 126–8, 135, 138 sale of counterfeit goods 157 illegal immigration 16 France 70, 74, 76 Italy 94–5 UK 146, 167 illegal migrants, and amnesties 11–12 in EU 2, 3–4 vulnerability of 12–13, 57 illiteracy 51

191

Concealed chains

ILO, Conventions, Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957 (No. 105) 13, 37, 97 Forced Labour, 1930 (No. 29) 13, 37, 95, 97, 141, 172 Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions), 1975 (No. 143) 15, 95, 141–2 Migration for Employment (Revised), 1949 (No. 97) 15, 95, 141 Private Employment Agencies, 1997 (No. 181) 73 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) x Recommendations, Employment Relationship, 2006 (No. 198) 173 Private Employment Agencies, 1997 (No. 188) 173 Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL) (2001) x Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act (2006) 142 Immigration Law, Italy (1998) 94, 105, 124 information campaign, to prevent illegal emigration from China 88 intermediaries, to find work 51, 173 illegal activity by (Italy) 127 to obtain visas 20, 43, 51 see also brokerage market International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights 1411 International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families 15 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1411 International Labour Conference, 99th session (2010), “Decent Work for Domestic Workers” 173–4 International Organization for Migration (IOM) xi, 174 Internet, brokerage market links 25 irregular labour, and conflict over legalization (Italy) 117 defined 38 France 38–9, 61, 67, 70–4, 77–8, 77 heigong (“black”, clandestine worker) 121 Italy 92–3 and low wages 53–4, 55–6 Marco Polo operation (2005) 130–2 UK 152–7 in workshops (Italy) 129–32 isolation, of irregular migrants (France) 51, 55 Israel 1, 26 Italy 9–10, 89 Chinese firms 106–8, 108 Chinese self-employment in 106–7, 124

192

decentralization 89 employment legislation 92–3 illegal intermediary activities 126–8, 135, 137 immigrant population 89 internal migration 89 investigation into illegal labour 126–7 investigations into trafficking and smuggling 99–101 legal and policy framework 91–7 measures against trafficking 95–7 methodology 90–1 perception of Chinese 97–8 pregnancy termination services 10, 115 public opinion on immigration 97–9 recommendations 137–8 regional distribution of Chinese immigrants 106, 108, 109, 112 regional origins of workers 114, 134 workshops 112–14, 118–20, 129–32, 135 see also amnesties; legalization Jiangsu, migrants to Italy 114 migration to France 41 job insecurity, UK 159, 160 Jordan 1 kidnapping 104–5 kuaijishi (Italian intermediaries) 127 Kuwait, contract workers 26 labour, semi-skilled (shougong) 113 skilled (chegong, tailor) 113, 118–20 unskilled (zagong) 113, 114, 118, 137 Labour Arbitration Board, France 74 Labour Code, France 74, 78 labour gangs, Chinese 154, 156–8, 159 Labour Inspectorate, France 72–4, 78–80 labour legislation, Italy 92–3 labour markets, Chinese community, France 57–8 ethnic 58–9 illegal 167–8 labour mobility, Italy 116, 118, 135 labour practices, in Chinese firms in Italy 131–2 labour standards 172 leather goods industry, France 59 Italy 106, 118–20 legal framework, France 36–9 international 13–18 Italy 91–7 UK 141–4 legalization (Italy), and compensation to employers 121–3 conflict over 117 costs of 121–3, 123–6

Index

illegal activity associated with 126–8 see also residence permits Macau 21 mafia, and garment-making industry 132, 137 manufacturing sector, Italy 106–8, 107, 108, 109, 110, media, UK coverage 141, 163–5, 164 migration, brokerage 20–3 emigration hierarchy 23–7 Italian quota mechanism 92–3, 105 policies 19–20 reasons for 39–40, 146–7 regular and irregular mechanisms 31–2, 102–3, 148 see also smuggling; trafficking migration costs 6 brokerage fees 27–31 Morecambe Bay, 2004 incident 2, 139, 142, 173 cockle picking 153–4, 156 media coverage 163–5, 164 mutual benefit, principle of 30 National Anti-Mafia Unit (DNA), Italy 91, 105 National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women in Children (2008–12) x National Social Security Institute, Italy 123 Netherlands, measures against trafficking 4 networks, in diaspora 7–8, 35, 106, 144, 170 family 8, 55, 101, 103–4, 134 to find work 153, 163 guanxi 102–4, 133 migration 25, 52, 67, 115, 147 smuggling 44, 45, 100, 101, 132 social 29, 30, 103–4 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Italy 96 Office for Combating Organized Crime, France 75 Panama 1 “parachuting” 43, 49 Paris, Belleville quarter 39–40, 52, 56 passport controls, China 21–2 passports, theft of (France) 56 Penal Code, Italy, Law 228 on Measures against Trafficking in Persons 96 police, France 80–3 checks and inspections 11, 51, 54, 65, 78, 80–2 Prato 93, 98, 106, 108, 109, 117 garment-making 106, 109, 113, 114, 116 Prato Centre for Immigration Research and Services 90, 103, 116 and 1995 amnesty 123–4 and 2002 amnesty 125 pregnancy termination services, Italy 10, 115 prostitution,

France 69–70 UK 155–6, 157 racketeering, and violence 56–7 recommendations, France 83–9 Italy 137–8 UK 166–8 recruitment 18, 169 repatriation, from Italy 95 residence permits, France 56, 60 Italy 91–2, 93–4, 9377, 96, 105–6, 106 see also legalization Schengen visas 43 self-employment, in Italy 106–7, 124 self-exploitation 131–2, 133, 135 Selmouni v. France (1999) 172 sentier system, in French garment trade 10–11, 62–5 Sexual Offences Act (2003), on trafficking for sexual exploitation 143 Shandong, migration to France 41 Siliadin v. France (2005) 71, 172 smugglers, financial risks for 44 organization of 45, 99–101, 134 relationship with migrants 44–5, 46, 101, 170 Zhejiang 43, 44 see also snakeheads smuggling 169, 170, 171 Chinese controls on 26, 31–2 defined 16, 18, 96, 134 as service 101–2, 134–5, 167, 169–70 see also trafficking snakeheads (unauthorized brokers) 6, 7, 25, 101, 148 attempts to control 26–7, 167 debts to 149–51, 157–8 and first employment 149, 152 in media coverage 164 Social Schemes Act (France 2005) (“Borloo” Act) 86 sponsors 22 subcontracting labour system 9, 26 detection of 85 France 58, 59, 61–5, 80–2 Italy 9–10, 112, 116–18 surveillance 75 textile and garment-making see garment-making and textiles Tianjin, northern China 144, 146–7 tontine (money-collecting system) 65 trafficking 169, 170, 171 19th-century “coolies” 2–3 cycle of 18 defined 16, 36–7, 96, 104–5, 134 French policy 36–7, 74–5, 76, 83

193

Concealed chains

international law on 15–18, 171 Italian policy 95–7, 104–5 for prostitution 143, 158 UK policy 143 see also smuggling training, for police and inspectors 84–5 transit camps 7, 48–9 transit countries, to France 49–50 transport, waterway and sea 43 see also flights travel, conditions of 7, 100–1 journey times 50 overland routes (pa shan) 7, 43, 46–8 risks of 46–50, 102–5, 150 transit countries 49–50 violence on journey 7, 103, 134, 151–2, 170 and working conditions 132–3, 136 travel agencies, Chinese 146, 147, 148, 169 “triad”, use of term 45 UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking 143 UK Border Agency 142–3 United Kingdom 139–40 Chinese employers 10, 159 exploitation and working conditions 157–8 first employment 152–7 Kent Joint Intelligence Unit 158 legal and policy framework 141–4 media reporting 163–5 methodology 140–1 methods of immigration 148 patterns of immigration 144–7 recommendations 166–8 trafficking 149–52 United Nations, Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) 15 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants (Smuggling Protocol) 15, 16, 17, 174 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (Palermo Protocol) 15, 16, 17, 33, 88, 95, 134, 141 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery (1956) 117 United States 3, 26, 27 Veneto, working conditions 118–20 Viet Nam, overland journey from 46–8 violence, during journey 7, 103, 134, 151–2, 170 and racketeering 56–7 use by criminal groups 8, 161 visas,

194

business 43, 146, 147 forged 43, 102 transit 49 UK loophole 148 vulnerability, abuse of 16–17 and costs of legalization 121–3 and debt 7 definitions 37 and dependence 56 in destination countries 8 exploitation of 12–13, 170–1 financial costs of 51 French legal protections 70–1 wages, China 39 low 53–4, 55–6, 153–4, 159–61, 163, 166 unpaid 160 withheld 52, 56 see also debt Wencheng County 21, 22–3 Wenzhou, Zhejiang province 28, 39 debt burden 51–2 travel fares 43 women, childcare in Italy 115 migrants to France 4130 travelling alone 103, 134, 151 work permits, France 50, 86 workers’ rights 124, 136 and irregular immigrants 143 working conditions 9–11, 118–20, 132–3, 136–7, 172 domestic services 67–9 garment-making 61–5, 113–14, 118–20 hotels and restaurant sector 65–6 UK 157–8, 166 zagong (odd jobs) 113, 118 working hours 135 workshops, France 62, 63, 64–5 Italy 112–14, 118–20, 129–32, 135 World Trade Organization, accession of China 62 Xiamen (Amoy) 23–4 migrant hostels 20–1 Xiamen International Economic and Technical Cooperation Company (XIETC) 23–4, 25 zagong, unskilled workers 113, 114, 118, 137 Zhejiang province 6, 20, 22 brokerage fees 28, 28, 29, 30 migrants to Italy 114 migration to France 41 use of people smugglers 43