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COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE: From the Vietminh to the Viet Cong
George K. Tanham
Praeger Security International
Communist RevolutionaryWarfare
PSIClassicsoftheCounterinsurgencyEra CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice DavidGalula CommunistRevolutionaryWarfare:FromtheVietminhtotheVietCong GeorgeK.Tanham ModernWarfare:AFrenchViewofCounterinsurgency RogerTrinquier Counter-GuerrillaOperations:ThePhilippineExperience NapoleanD.ValerianoandCharlesT.R.Bohannan
COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARYWARFARE FromtheVietminhtotheVietCong
GeorgeK.Tanham ForewordbyMichaelA.Sheehan
PSIClassicsoftheCounterinsurgencyEra
PraegerSecurityInternational Westport,Connecticut • London
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Tanham,GeorgeK. Communistrevolutionarywarfare:fromtheVietminhtotheVietCong/GeorgeK. Tanham;ForewordbyMichaelA.Sheehan. p.cm.—(PSIClassicsoftheCounterinsurgencyEra) Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN0–275–99263–2(alk.paper)—ISBN0–275–99264–0(pbk:alk.paper) 1.Vietnam—History2.Guerrillawarfare3.Communism—Vietnam.I.Title II.Series DS557.A5T31967 959.7’04 67021379 BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataisavailable. Copyright©1961,2006byPraegerSecurityInternational Allrightsreserved.Noportionofthisbookmaybe reproduced,byanyprocessortechnique,withoutthe expresswrittenconsentofthepublisher. LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:67021379 ISBN:0–275–99263–2 0–275–99264–0(pbk.) Firstpublishedin1961 PraegerSecurityInternational,88PostRoadWest,Westport,CT06881 AnimprintofGreenwoodPublishingGroup,Inc. www.praeger.com PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
Thepaperusedinthisbookcomplieswiththe PermanentPaperStandardissuedbytheNational InformationStandardsOrganization(Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
Foreword byMichaelA.Sheehan PrefacetotheRevisedEdition PrefacetotheFirstEdition Acknowledgments Introduction
vii xi xiii xv xvii
1. VietminhMilitaryDoctrineandtheWar VoNguyenGiapandtheFormulationofVietDoctrine TheUseofMao’sTheory TheTimeofSelf-Appraisal
1 3 8 11
2. TheVietminhMilitaryOrganization ThePoliticalBureau TheGeneralDirectorateofSuppliesandMaintenance TheHighCommandandGeneralStaff TheGeneralStaffAfter1953 TheRegularUnits TheRegionalTroops ThePopularTroops Reorganization
15 16 17 17 18 19 21 22 22
3. VietminhPersonnelandLogistics Recruitment Training MedicalServices
29 29 30 34
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CommunicationsandLogistics
34
4. VietminhOperationsandTactics PrinciplesandPrerequisites IntelligenceandReconnaissance TheInfantryandtheMobilityFactor TheOffensive ControllingtheLinesofCommunication TheDefensive TheCaseofDienBienPhu
39 39 42 44 45 47 48 50
5. VietminhReactionstoFrenchTacticsandAirPower UnderminingthePolicyofPacification PuttingtheFrenchontheDefensive NeutralizationofAirPower
53 53 54 56
6. TheRiseoftheVietCong TheSituationAfterGeneva BeginningsofInsurgency FormalOrganizationforInsurgency
61 62 65 68
7. TheVietCongMilitary TheMilitaryApparatus Strategies OffensiveTactics DefensiveTactics TheSituationPriortotheIntroductionofAmericanTroops
77 78 81 85 93 94
8. AmericanMilitaryParticipationandtheVietCong TheImpactofAmericanPower VietCongResponses VietCongStrategicAlternatives
97 100 102 108
Epilogue SelectedBibliography Index
113 119 125
FOREWORD
GeorgeTanhamwasamongtheveryfirstAmericanstudentsofthecounterinsurgencyerainthe1950sand1960s.AnartilleryofficerinWorldWarII,he wentontoearnadoctorateinmilitaryhistoryandpoliticalscience.Thiscombinationofexperienceandknowledgeservedhimwellinanalyzingtheriseof guerrillawarfareasitrapidlybecameapreoccupationfortheUnitedStates. Tanhamknewthatinsurgencywasnotsomethingnew,butratheravariantof an age-old form of irregular warfare designed to overwhelm conventional forces. AfterteachingforanumberofyearsTanhamjoinedtheRANDCorporation, athinktankcreatedbytheAirForcetoconductsponsoredresearchondefense andmilitaryaffairs.Hisfirstbook,CommunistRevolutionaryWarfare:the VietminhinIndochina,appearedin1961andthenwasrevisedtoincludethe earlyAmericanexperienceinfightingtheVietCong. ThecommuniststrategyhaditsrootsinChinawithMaoTse-tung,butit wasadaptedtoresistFrenchattemptstoregaincontrolofVietnamafterWorld WarII.AlthoughHoChiMinhwastheunchallengedleaderofVietnamese communistmovement,theconflictwasdirectedbyhismilitarycommander, Vo Nguyen Giap. He modified Mao’s thinking in a brilliant, flexible, and ruthless way to pursue his own brand of revolutionary warfare. Tanham describedhowtheFrencharmywasbestedateveryturnandwarnedthata versionofthatsamestrategywasbeingusedagainstthegrowingAmerican militarypresenceinVietnaminthe1960s. Thedoctrineofinsurgentwarfarewasconductedinthreedistinctphases. Thefirst,thestrategicdefensive,callsforawithdrawalinthefaceofsuperior conventionalforcestostretchoutenemylinesofcommunicationandtestits
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political will. The second or guerrilla phase is employed against an overstretchedenemybyirregularwarfaretofurtherweakenitsresistance.During thisphaseirregularforcesareorganizedintoaconventionalarmy.Thethird andfinalphase,theconventionalorcounteroffensivephase,isimplemented as revolutionary forces gain military and moral superiority and set out to defeatanenemyonthebattlefield. But the Chinese model was tailored to the conflict inVietnam. Tanham outlines Giap’s planning to deploy a combination of regular and guerrilla forcestomeetpoliticalandmilitaryobjectives.However,bothMaoandGiap recognizedthatthelastphaseofinsurgencyrequiredpropertimingtogarner international support and be victorious on the ground. Giap mimicked the Chinesebycreatingdifferenttypesofunits:aregulararmy,regionalforces, andpopularorlocaltroops.Eachhadparallelpoliticalorganizationsonevery levelofmilitarycommandandemphasizedtroopindoctrinationorpolitical workinthearmybypartyfunctionaries. Giapwasadeptinmanagingthepolitical-militaryimplicationsofthewar. Forinstance,heappliedthewesternconceptofsecurityoftherearnotonlyto linesofcommunicationbuttowinningoverthepeopletotherevolutionary causeandensuringhisarmyhadpopularsupport.Conversely,heunderstood theenemyrearmustbeattacked—acrossthepaddyfieldsandruralvillages ofthecountrysidetotheprovincialtownsandcitiesofSouthVietnam. The communists also adhered to the primacy of the political in warfare. UnlikearmiesintheWest,whoseprincipalmissionisfightingandwinning wars, the Viet Minh had two missions, creating ideological uniformity throughoutthecountryanddevelopinganefficientmodernarmy.Moreover, politicaltrainingwasregardedasimportantasmilitaryskills,andthearmy performedmanytasks,fromdoingagriculturalworktosocialmobilizationat hamletlevel. TanhamrecountsthefutileattemptsbytheFrenchtorespondmilitarilyand politicallytotheenemy,astrategythatwasfocusedonpacifyingthecountrysidebybuildingpoliticalsupport.InresponseGiapfortifiedvillageswhere his forces were strong and withdrew from others where his forces were weak—resorting to ambushes and the selected use of terror whenever the Frenchmadeprogress.But,accordingtoTanham,theFrenchmilitaryproved less flexible and followed their established methods of fighting even when theywerenolongereffective. TanhamanalyzedthelongsiegeoftheFrenchatDienBienPhu,the kindofcombatthatpresagedtheAmericanexperienceinthesecondIndochina war.Frenchcasualtiesandprisonersinthatdefeattotaled12,000men—only sixpercentofFrenchforces.However,theimpactofthatbattlewaspolitical, notunliketheTetoffensivein1968.Butinbothmilitaryandpoliticalterms, itsignaledacriticalturningpointfortheFrencharmedforcesandthebeginningoftheirwithdrawalfromIndochina.
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In addition to combining guerrilla and conventional forces on the battlefield,Giapalsounderstoodthetacticalvalueofterrorinachievingvictory. WhentheSouthVietnameseandAmericanmilitarysentmedicalcadresinto the countryside to eliminate malaria, for example, they were brutally murderedbyVietCongguerrillas.Andlater,whentheSouthVietnamesegovernmentattemptedtospreaddemocracythroughtheballotbox,thecommunists routinelyassassinatedpoliticalcandidates.Moreover,Giapknewthatinternationalpublicopinionwaskeytovictory,butheriskedcommittingactsof terroragainstnoncombatants—realizingthattheywouldbecondemnedbut notenoughtooff-setthepoliticalbenefitsofthistactic. Terrorismandinsurgencyarerelatedyetdistincttypesofirregularwarfare. Theformeroftenisusedbyguerrillasandrevolutionariesasatacticwhich when properly targeted also can have an impact on the strategic level. Terrorism and insurgency also differ legally and morally.Terrorism is normallyconsideredtobeacriminalactwhereasinsurgencyiscoveredunderthe GenevaConventionandhasoccurredinlegitimaterevolutionarymovements throughouthistory.TheFrenchandAmericanexperiencesinIndochinaare important case studies in appreciating the operational distinctions between counterterrorismandcounterinsurgency. ImetGeorgeTanhaminthe1980swhileattendinggraduateschoolaftermy returnfromanadvisorytourinElSalvador.InmyattempttounderstandU.S. strategy in CentralAmerica he encouraged me to study the lessons of past insurgencies.CommunistRevolutionaryWarfareremainsavaluableprimer onirregularwarfare—asrelevanttodayaswhenitwasfirstpublishedinthe midstofthecounterinsurgencyera. MichaelA.Sheehan June2006
AmbassadorMichaelA.SheehanservedasCoordinatorforCounterterrorismatthe DepartmentofStateand,mostrecently,asDeputyCommissionerofCounter-Terrorism withtheNewYorkPoliceDepartment.
PREFACETOTHE REVISEDEDITION
Thisbook,originallywrittenasaprimerforthoseinterestedprincipallyinthe militaryaspectsoftheVietminhstruggleagainsttheFrenchduringtheyears 1946-54,hasnowbeenupdatedtoincludethreechaptersontheVietCong. Thefirstfivechaptersoftheoriginalversion,nowPartOneofthisrevised edition,focusonthemilitaryapparatusoftheVietminh;noattempthasbeen made to present a narrative history or a description of all aspects of the Vietminhregime.However,evenwithinthislimitedscope,thecentraltheme oftheCommunisteffortemerges:namely,theintegrationororchestrationof allmeans—political,economic,psychological,andmilitary—tocontrolthe peopleandseizepoliticalpower.PartOnethusprovidesthebasisforanunderstandingoftoday’sVietCong,whoareinsomecasesthesamepeopleformerly active in the Vietminh, plus new adherents strongly influenced by Vietminhdoctrineandleadership. In the new Part Two, Chapter VI traces the revival of insurgency in the SouthandtheevolutionoftheCommunistorganizationtoincludetheNational LiberationFrontandthePeople’sRevolutionaryParty.ChapterVIIdealswith thebasicVietCongmilitaryapparatusandanalyzestheroleoftheNational LiberationArmy and theViet Cong paramilitary forces, their organization, strategy,andtactics.TakingaccountofthemassiveU.S.participationwhich beganinearly1965,ChapterVIIIexaminestheimpactoftheAmericanarmed forcesontheVietCongmilitary,especiallyontheNationalLiberationArmy andontheNorthVietnameseregularsoperatingintheSouth. Asintheoriginaledition,theemphasishereremainsonthemilitaryaspects ofthestruggle.Butitisclearthatthesameorchestrationofeffortappliesto theVietCongandthereforefewconclusionsabouttheover-allcoursecanbe made from an examination of the military portion alone. Furthermore, the
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exactnatureanddirectionoftheconflictdifferfromplacetoplaceandtimeto time,anditisthusdifficulttogeneralizeabouttheVietCongmilitary.The attemptismade,however,todistillthemaincharacteristicsoftheVietCong. Thereisfullrecognitionofthemanyexceptionstothesegeneralizationsand also of the fact that Viet Cong organization and tactics are constantly evolving—asisthestrategyoftheenemyandoftheallies.Butitishopedthat thisbriefsummarywillmakeacontributiontoourunderstandingofthebitter strugglebeingwagedinVietnamtoday.
PREFACETOTHEFIRSTEDITION
RecenteventsinLaosandSouthVietnamindicatethattheCommunistsare continuingtheirexpansioninSoutheastAsia.Althoughnoformalinvasions ordeclarationsofwarhavebeenmade,militaryactionsrangingfromambushes tobattalion-sizeengagementshavetakenplace.Evenmoreimportant,politicalindoctrinationhasbeencarriedonextensively,withaconsequentweakeningoftheauthorityofthelegalgovernments.Althoughpredictionoffuture events in this area must necessarily be uncertain, an examination of past Communistactivitiesthereshouldprovidecertaininsightsandtherebyindicatemeansofcopingwiththiscontinuingthreat.Thisstudyfocusesprimarily onmilitaryaspectsoftheearlierwarandattemptstoprovideinsightbymeans of an analysis of Vietminh military doctrine, tactics, and organization as revealedduringtheearlierwarinIndochina.Althoughnoattempthasbeen made to present a narrative history or a description of all aspects of the Vietminhregime,thestudyclearlyrevealsthecoreofCommunistrevolutionarywarfare,namelyitsemphasisontheintegrationofallmeans—political, economic,military,andpsychological—towinthewar,and,aboveall,towin themindsofthepeople. TheVietminhsuccessinIndochinaclearlydemonstratestheeffectiveness ofrevolutionarywarfareinanunderdevelopedarea.Inboththestrategicand tacticalareas,itofferedtheCommuniststhegreatestpotentialgainattheleast possible risk. The initial low level of violence tended to preclude Western intervention,andatthesametimeinvolvedtheleastriskofanypossibleloss ofprestigefortheCommunists.ItalsoenabledtheVietminhtoposeasleaders of the insurgent nationalist movement and to gain popular support, while behindthescenesconsolidatingtheirpower,whichledtoeventualcontrol.
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Tactically,guerrilla-typewarfareenabledtheVietminhtoretainmobilityin thedifficultjungleterrain,facilitatedthegatheringofintelligenceinformation,andattritedtheFrenchforces,whilepermittingtheVietminhtobuildup theregularforcesnecessaryfortheformalbattlesofthefinalstageofthewar. Thus,themajorlessontobelearnedbytheWestisthatguerrillaoperationsof theVietminhtypewillprobablycontinuetobeimportant,andthatnuclearand other modern weapons have by no means rendered obsolete the more “primitive”formsofwarfare. Countrieseconomicallyunderdeveloped,andwithstrongfeelingsofresentment and dissatisfaction along with impatient aspirations, provide fertile groundforrevolutionarymovements.Thiscombinationofmaterialneedsand ideologicalpovertymakessuchcountriesparticularlyreceptivetoCommunist aidandideas. IfthefreeworldistoprevailinthestruggleagainstfurtherCommunistexpansionandistoassistthesecountriesintheirownindependentdevelopment,it mustbetterunderstandtheirneedsandtheappealandtacticsoftheCommunists. Itishopedthatthiscasestudywillassistinmeetingthepresentchallenge.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It gives me pleasure to acknowledge the contribution of a number of individualsandorganizationswithoutwhosehelpthisbookcouldnothave beenwritten. Most of the research for Part One was done in Paris, where the French Armywasmostcooperativeingivingmeaccesstoitswarrecordsandspecial studiesonIndochina.IamindebtedtoGeneralCossé-Brissac,Directorofthe Service Historique de l’Armée; General Larroque, Director of the Centre d’EtudesAsiatiques etAfricaines; and to many other French officers who mustremainanonymous,fortheirvaluableassistanceandmanycourtesies. My RAND colleagues—Victor M. Hunt, William W. Kaufmann, Edwin W.Paxson,HansSpeier,andAnneM.Jonas—deservespecialthanksfortheir warmencouragementandvaluablecommentsonthemanuscript.Andwithout theunstintingandexperteditorialassistanceofSibylleCrane,thisworkmight neverhavebeencompleted. I am deeply grateful to the United States Air Force and to The RAND Corporation for supplying the opportunity and the support that made this studypossible,andforenablingmetovisitVietnamandthusgainfirst-hand knowledgeofthephysicalconditionsunderwhichthewarinIndochinawas foughtandofthepeoplewhofoughtit. PartOneofthisbookwaswrittenasapartofProjectRAND,theresearch program conducted by The RAND Corporation for the U.S. Air Force. Needlesstosay,theopinionsandconclusionsexpressedhereinareentirely myownanddonotreflectandofficialpositionofeithertheU.S.AirForceor TheRANDCorporation.
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PartTwo was written as a personal effort and is based on my work and studyinVietnamsince1958,aswellasonthereadingofmuchofthevast literature on Vietnam. I had the opportunity to make trips to Vietnam in FebruaryandJuly,1967,andtoevaluateformyselfthecurrentsituationthere. Iamindebtedtoanumberoffriends,mostlyveteransofVietnam,withwhom IhavehadlongandfruitfuldiscussionsabouttheVietCongandthewar.I wanttothankGaryMurfin,myresearchassistant,whohelpedinavarietyof ways. Professor Joseph Zasloff and GeorgeAllen have read Part Two and madeusefulcriticismsandsuggestions.Mysecretary,MissLeeRademaker, onherowntimehasnotonlytypedthemanuscriptbutmadehelpfulsuggestions.AsinthecaseofPartOne,however,theopinionsandviewsexpressed aremyown.
GeorgeK.Tanham
INTRODUCTION
DuringWorldWarII,anundergroundresistancemovement—theVietminh— developedinIndochinaundertheleadershipofHoChiMinh.Althoughthere canbelittledoubttodaythatthismovementwaslargelyCommunist-inspired andthatHohimselfwasanoldCommunist,thespiritofnationalismwaspredominantatthetime,andtherevolutionaryaspirationsofthemovementseemed confinedtooustingtheJapaneserulers.Bytheendof1944,theVietminhhad setupaguerrillahighcommand.But,althoughsupportedandsuppliedbythe UnitedStates,itsrelativelysmallforceofpoorlyequippedguerrillafighters wasquiteincapableoftakingsignificantactionagainsttheJapanese. In the spring and summer of 1945, the situation changed. On March 9, 1945, the Japanese disarmed and interned the French troops in Indochina, whountilthenhadremainedatlibertythereinspiteoftheJapaneseoccupation.ThisactresultedingreatlossofFrenchprestige,particularlysinceitwas becomingincreasinglyevidentthattheJapanesewerelosingthewar.Thusthe stagewassetforreleaseofalltheforcesforindependencethathadbeengatheringmomentumovertheyears.AlmostimmediatelythemoderateBaoDai, formerEmperorofAnnam,proclaimedhimself“emperor”ofanautonomous Vietnam.Andtwoweekslater,GeneraldeGaullehimselfmadesomevague references to Vietnamese autonomy, hereby adding to nationalist hopes of gainingindependencepeacefully.Eventsshatteredthesehopes. OnAugust 10, the Vietminh High Command gave orders for a national uprisingagainsttheJapanese.AlthoughofficiallydirectedonlyagainstJapan, themovewasalsoobviouslyintendedtoforestallanysubsequentreturnofthe French.TherevoltwassoimmediatelysuccessfulinthenorththatBaoDai abdicatedhispostofself-appointedtitularheadofthecountry.HoChiMinh
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formedaprovisionalgovernmentonAugust29,andfourdayslaterproclaimed completeindependenceforVietnam.Withthesuccessofthisinsurrection,the CommunistelementamongVietnamesenationalistsgainedastrongholdon theleadershipoftherevolutionarymovement. TheFrench,althoughdeterminedtoreoccupyVietnam,wereforthemoment stymiedbytheirlackoftroopsandtransportation.TheAllies,however,came totheiraid.Inmid-September,Britishtroopsoccupiedthesouthernhalfof Indochina, and Chinese Nationalists the northern portion.The population’s anti-BritishsentimentransohighthattheBritishcommander,GeneralGracey, thenfounditnecessarytoproclaimmartiallawinhisarea.OnSeptember23, afewFrenchtroopsarrivedatSaigon,seizedthepublicbuildingsthere,and immediately set about reestablishing French authority. Large French reinforcementsarrivedduringOctober. HoChiMinhrealizedthathefacedadifficultsituationandthatifhewere tosucceed,itwouldbenecessarytorallyallVietnamesenationaliststohis cause.InanefforttodisguisehisCommunistbackingandinordertogivehis movementapatrioticstamp,hepubliclydissolvedtheCommunistPartyon November11andformeda“nationalfront.”Actually,thePartywentundergrounduntil1951. Beforeattemptingthereconquestoftheinsurgentstrongholdinthenorth,it was first necessary for the French to obtain the withdrawal of the Chinese Nationalists.InFebruary,1946,theFrenchreachedanagreementwithChiang Kai-shekthatstipulatedthatChinesetroopswouldleavenorthernVietnam,in return for which the French would give up all special rights in China. Ho appearstohavebeensufficientlyimpressedbythisaccordtodecidethatconcessionstotheFrenchwerenecessaryifheweretoavoidthehead-oncollision for which he was as yet unprepared.At any rate, he agreed to French occupationofcertainpositionsinnorthandcentralVietnam.WhenFrench troopsenterednorthVietnam,theyencounteredbothChineseoppositionand sporadicVietminhattacks. Effortstoarriveatapeacefulsolutioncontinued.OnMarch6,1946,amodus vivendiwasworkedoutwherebyHoallowedFrenchtroopstoenterHaiphong andHanoi,whileFranceagreedtorecognizeVietnamasa“freestate.”The French,perhapsdeliberately,madenoattempttodefinethistermprecisely,a failurethatlaterprovedtobethegermofveryseriousdifficulties.Neitherside everreallyacceptedtheMarch6agreement,andaseriesofconferencesinthe springandsummerof1946servedmerelytounderlinetheirreconcilabilityof thetwocamps.Theonlytangibleaccords(suchastheso-called“September agreement,”whichdealtchieflywitheconomicandculturalquestions)tended toignorethevitalissues.WhiletheFrenchcontinuedtheirmilitaryre-occupation, theVietminhlaidplansfortheeventualousterofallFrenchtroops. OnNovember23,1946,afteraseriesofincidentsinHaiphong,theFrench orderedtheVietnamese,underthreatofreprisals,toevacuatetheirsectionof
INTRODUCTION
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thecitywithintwohours.Compliancewithsuchanorderwasclearlyimpossible, and the French, true to the letter of their ultimatum, bombarded and wipedouttheVietnamesesectionsofHaiphongthatsameday. Thisevent,coupledwiththepatentinconclusivenessoftheyear’snegotiations,apparentlyconvincedtheVietminhofthehopelessnessofthisapproach, andonDecember19,theVietminhorderedasurprisenationwideattackonall Frenchforces.ThoughDecember19hasbecomethecommonlyaccepteddate for the outbreak of the war, it is clear that intermittent hostilities between FrenchandVietnameseprecededthisdatebymorethanayear. Throughoutthewar,Vietnameseindependenceremainedthemajorpoliticalissue.Intheearlierphase,themoderatesinthenationalistcampwerestill opentoacompromisewiththeFrench,underwhichtheymighthavebeen readytoacceptmodifiedautonomy,haditbeencoupledwiththepromiseof eventualindependence.ButtheFrench,intheirunderstandableunwillingness tosurrenderaprizedpossessionandwithshortsighteddeterminationtoavoid concessionsinthedirectionofindependence,remainedblindtothepossibilityofanallianceagainsttheCommunistthreat.Frenchfailuretosupportthe moderateelementthusvitiatedanattemptbymoderatenationalists,inMay, 1947,toestablisha“FrontofNationalUnion”inSaigon.Bythisandother evidence of their intransigence, the French slowly but inevitably alienated eventhemostconciliatoryofthenationalistsanddrovemostofthemeither intotherevolutionarycamporintoexile.InSeptember,1947,theFrenchHigh Commissionermadeamodestmoveintherightdirectionbyoffering“liberty withintheFrenchUnion”tonationalistleaders,aproposalthatwasaccepted bysomeofthemoderates.Again,however,hefailedtospecifypreciselywhat thisphrasemeantinpracticalterms.Moreover,theirateVietminhtookpunitiveactionagainstthoseVietnamesewhohadsupportedtheproposal.Still,as lateas1948,themoderateNgoDinhDiemproposedtotheFrenchthatthey grantdominionstatustoVietnam,asuggestionthatwasrejected. InJune,1949,theFrench,perhapsingrowingawarenessoftheirerror,invited BaoDaitoheadaVietnamesegovernment,butbythenmostnationalistshad becomethoroughlydistrustfulofFrenchmotives,andtheCommunistVietminh hadclearlyattainedcontroloverthenationalistmovement.BaoDaihadneither popularsupportnorauthorityandshowedlittleinterestingovernmentalaffairs. Tohaveunderratedtheforceofnationalistfeelingsandtohavedisregarded allopportunitiesforgenuinecompromisemaybecalledthebasicFrenchmistakesinIndochina.Failingtorealizeintimethecrucialimportanceofpopular supportinthistypeofwar,theyremainedoblivioustothefactthattheirdisregardofpopularwillhelpedtheirenemytoconsolidateforcesandledthusto theinevitablesuccessoftheVietminh. Since1950,whentheU.S.GovernmentbegantoprovideaidtotheFrench intheirstruggleagainsttheVietminh,theUnitedStateshasbecomemoreand moreinvolvedinIndochina.Theamountofaid,bothmilitaryandeconomic,
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as well as the number of advisers has steadily increased.The United States refused to intervene to save the French from defeat at Dien Bien Phu; and althoughitwaspresentasanobserver,itdidnotparticipateasamemberofthe GenevaConferencein1954.However,theU.S.Governmentprovidedmaterial aidandmoralsupporttoPremierDiemandhisnewgovernmentinaneffortto help build a viable regime in the South. It seemed for a few years that this attemptmightsucceed,butinthelate1950’s,theregimebegantoflounderand theinsurgencyrevivedandgrewstronger.NeitherDiemnortheUnitedStates fullysensedorperceivedtheemergingdangeruntilitbecameapparentin1961. High-levelmissionsfromtheUnitedStatesinthatyearrecommendedsteppedupaidandmoreadvisers.Thesewereprovided,butthesituationcontinuedto worsen.InNovember,1963,Diem’sregimewasoverthrownandaperiodof politicalinstabilitybegan,withconsequentmilitaryandpoliticaldeterioration throughoutthecountry.By1964,thereweremorethan25,000AmericanadvisersinSouthVietnam,allbutabout1,000ofwhomweremilitary,andthetotal aidamountedtoabout$1billionperyear.ThisefforttohelptheG.V.N.didnot seemtoslowtheinsurgency,whichwasaidedandabettedfromtheNorth,and inearly1965theUnitedStatesfeltcompelledtobeginbombingtheNorthand tosendtroopstotheSouthinordertosavethesituation.Therearenownearly 500,000groundtroopsinVietnam,plusthousandsofAirForceandNavypersonnelinVietnamandelsewhereinSoutheastAsiasupportingtheeffort.The cost is currently running about $25 billion and well over 50,000American casualtiesayear.Stillthereappearstobenoendinsight.
Chapter1
VIETMINHMILITARY DOCTRINEANDTHEWAR
In1945,evenbeforetheJapanesesurrender,HoChiMinhbegantodevelopa regulararmyforthenewlyconstitutedCommunistVietminhgovernment.The guerrillasofWorldWarII(whohadbeentrainedandsuppliedmainlybythe UnitedStates)wereenrolledinthisarmyandtrainedforconventionalwarfare. TheCommunistleadershipbelievedthat,givensometimetobuildthiskindof army,itcouldaffordtowagewarontheFrench,bythengenerallyweakened,and drivethemoutofthecountry.JapaneseandAlliedarmaments,thoughuseful, wereinsufficientforthearmy’sneeds;ithasbeenestimatedthat,inlate1946, Ho’sforceof60,000menhadonly40,000rifles.Nevertheless,onDecember19, 1946,HosuddenlylaunchedattacksontheFrenchforcesinHanoiandother garrisontownsthroughoutthecountry.TheinferiorityoftheVietminhforces wasveryquicklyrevealed,andbyspring1947,theVietminhgovernmentandthe remnantsofitsarmyfledtothemountainousareanorthofHanoi.AFrench operationinthefallof1947narrowlymissedcapturingHoanddestroyingthe remainsofhisarmy. TheinabilityoftheVietminhtoachieveaquickvictory,followedbytheFrench failuretoannihilatetheCommunistforces,indicatedthatalongwarwaslikely. However,theVietminhrecognizedthisfactfarmorequicklyandmoreclearly thantheFrench.Consequently,theVietminhleadersturnedtotheworksofMao Tse-tungforatheoryofwar.Theirstrategicconceptsweretobestronglyinfluencedbyhisideas,whichweresingularlywellsuitedtotheirownstruggle.In StrategicProblemsofChina’sRevolutionaryWar,Maodefinedasbasictoall revolutionarywarthefourmaincharacteristicsofthewarinChina:(1)asemicolonialcountryofgreatsizeandofunevenpoliticalandeconomicdevelopment; (2)thepresenceofapowerfulenemy;(3)aRedArmythatstartedoutbybeing
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weakaswellassmall;and(4)aCommunistleadershipthatcouldrelyonpopular acceptanceoftherevolutionaryidea,atleastinthesenseofanagrarianrevolution.Whereasfactors2and3pointedtoalongwarand,Maowarned,might even spell defeat if there were bunglingbytherevolutionaryleadership, factors1and4stronglyfavoredultimatesuccess.Startingwiththeseassumptions, which today may appear rather obvious premises, Mao went on to develophistheoryofaprotractedwarinthreestages,culminatinginvictory fortherevolution. InhisOnProtractedWar,MaoagainstartedwiththespecificcaseofChina. WhilerejectingtheideathatChinacouldbesubjugatedbycounterrevolutionaryforces,hewarnedthatitwouldbeequallyfalsetobelieveinaquickand easyvictoryfortherevolution.Thewarwillbelong,andwillbedivisibleinto threedefinitestages,whoselengthcannotbepredicted.Inthefirst,giventhe initialmilitarysuperiorityoftheenemy,therevolutionaryforcesmustbeon thestrategicdefensive,whiletheenemyholdsthestrategicinitiative.During thisphase,theCommunistsmustbewilling,ifnecessary,totradeterritory, industries,andpopulationforthepreservationoftheirweakmilitaryforces. Theymustbepreparedforlongretreats,duringwhichtheymaytemporarily growevenweaker.Theenemy,however,willalsobegrowingweakerbecause of lengthening logistic lines, harassment by the Red guerrillas, weakening morale,andincreasingunfriendlinessofthepopulation.Thenextstagewill beginwhentheenemystopshisadvanceandconcentratesonholdingterritory andconsolidatinghisgains.Duringthissecondperiod,asinthefirst,guerrilla actionwillbethechiefformofwarfare,whiletheregularrevolutionaryforces arebeingtrainedandequippedforthefinalstageofthewar—thecounteroffensive,theobjectiveofwhichwillbetoannihilatetheenemy.Inthecourse of the second phase, the revolutionary forces, though perhaps strategically inferiortotheenemy,mustgainthetacticalnumericalsuperioritythatwill enable them to win battles.The crucial timing of the counteroffensive will dependnotonlyontheinternalsituationofthetwowarringsidesbutonthe internationalsituationaswell. Mao’sconceptoftheprotractedwarinthreestagesservedasthetheoretical basis for the revolutionary war in Indochina.The scope of the present study precludesadetailedcomparisonofChinain1936withIndochinaafterWorld WarII,butitmaybehelpfultoexaminetheextenttowhichMao’sfourmain characteristicsoftheChinesesituationappliedtoIndochina. Aboutone-thirteenththesizeofChina,Indochinahasaboutone-twentieth itspopulation.Outsidethetwopopulousdeltaregions,therearelarge,sparsely populatedareaswhichaffordshelterforirregularforcesandcreatedifficulties foramodernarmy.Acolonialcountry,unevenlydevelopedbothpolitically andeconomically,Indochinawasinitiallyunabletoputintothefieldamodem armythatcouldstanduptothestrongFrenchforcesstationedonitssoil. Thus,Indochina,likeChina,providedtheopportunityforastrategicdefensive
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3
andtheevolutionoftheprotractedwar.However,theVietminhdemonstrated thatguerrillascouldoperatenotonlyinthemountainsandthinlypopulated areas but also in the heavily populated enemy regions, and, indeed, that to some extent it was possible clandestinely to develop a military machine in suchareas.Whilerecognizingmajordissimilaritiesbetweenthetwocountries andcertainfactorsspecifictoeach,onecanseethestruggleinbothwarsprimarily as one between an underdeveloped regime with limited arms and resourcesagainstamoremodernpowerbackedbyhighlydevelopedmilitary forces, though in the case of Indochina the French were 8,000 miles away fromtheirindustrialbase.However,itisalsoclearthattheChinesestruggle tooktheformofacivilwaramongtheChinese,whileinVietnamthewarwas wagedagainstaforeignpower. LittleseemstobeknownofwhatVietleaderswerethinkingduring1948. Theavailableinformationindicatesthattheyhadacceptedthetheoryofthe protractedwarandresignedthemselvestothefactthattheywereintheharsh firstphase.Theyconfinedthemselveschieflytoguerrillawarfarethroughout thecountry.Attacksbyregularunitsthefollowingyearshowed,however,that theyhadsecretlybeenbuildingregularforces. VONGUYENGIAPANDTHEFORMULATION OFVIETDOCTRINE For1949,reportsofmeetingsandspeechesbyVietminhleaderspermitusto formamorepreciseideaoftheemergingstrategy.AtamilitarycongressinmidMay,topmilitaryleadersexpoundedthedoctrineoftheprotractedwarandstated atwhichstagetheyconsideredthewarinIndochinatobe.AccordingtoColonel LyBan,anofficerintheMinistryofNationalDefense,themilitarymission oftherevolutionaryforceswouldbeaccomplishedinthreephases:passiveresistance,activeresistanceandpreparationforthecounteroffensive,and,finally,the generalcounteroffensive.HoangVanThai,ChiefoftheGeneralStaff,echoedthe sameidea.Speakingparticularlyofthepassingfromthesecondtothefinalphase, hestatedhisbeliefthatpartialoffensivesshouldprecedethegeneralcounteroffensive,andthat,beforelaunchingthelatter,theVietminhwouldhavetohavea tacticalforcefarsuperiortothatoftheenemy.VoNguyenGiap,Commanderin ChiefoftheVietminharmy,stressedtheneedtoconsolidatetheprincipalrevolutionaryforces.Praisingthetroopsbutcriticizingthequalityofhigherofficers,he calledforimprovementinthecadresandthecommandsandforfullestdevelopmentofpopularsupportfortheregulararmy.Thestruggle,hesaid,wasinthe second stage, where guerrilla warfare was most important and the war of movementofsecondaryvalue.Yethethoughtthatthereoughttobeprogressivelymoreandlargeroffensiveactionsinpreparationforthegeneralcounteroffensive,andinsistedthat,beforeonecouldaffordtopassintothefinalstage,the warofmovementwouldhavetobecomeequalinimportancetoguerrillaaction.
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As Colonel Ly Ban pointed out,WorldWar II had shown that guerrillas alonecouldnotwinwars,andthereforeawarofmovementbecameanecessity.Thewarofmovement,asVietminhleadersconceivedit,wascharacterizedchieflybytheabsenceoffixedfrontsandrearareas,quickconcentration foraction,andimmediatedisengagementafterfighting.Inaseemingparadox, althoughtheVietminhalwaysspokeofawarofmovementandoftheimportanceofavoidingpitchedbattles,thewarwasessentiallyoneofattrition,in the sense that all efforts, military and nonmilitary, were aimed at wearing downtheFrench.Thiswasparticularlytrueofthefirsttwophasesofthewar, whentheenemywasbeingweakenedforthecoupdegrâceofthethirdstage. Butanessentialpartofthisoverallstrategyofattritionwasthemultitudeof tacticaloperations,aswellasthedecisiveoffensiveofthethirdphase,all ofwhichwerebasedonmovementandmobility. TheoutstandingmilitaryfigureoftheVietminhwasVoNguyenGiap.Born in1912,hebecameaCommunistatanearlyageandwasaveteranofFrench jails before World War II. His anti-French feelings were further intensified whentheFrenchpolice,heclaimed,killedhiswifeandsister-in-law.Giap studiedrevolutionarytacticsinChina,gainedexperienceinorganizingguerrillasinWorldWarII,andbecameheadoftheVietminhguerrillacommandin 1944.Aformerhistoryteacherandholderofanadvanceddegree,heurgedhis troopstostudyandreflectontheirowncombatexperiencessoastoimprove themselvescontinuously. Moreover, Giap took his own advice, and the fruit of his reflections and self-critiquewasabook,publishedin1950,entitledLaguerredelalibération etl’arméepopulaire(TheWarofLiberationandthePopularArmy),which stillremainsoneofthefullestexpressionsofVietminhdoctrine.WhileacceptingMao’sconceptofathree-phasewar,Giapfeltuncertainaboutthepossibility of drawing clear divisions between the several stages. This uncertainty mayhavearisenfromhisawarenessoftheuniquesituationofIndochina,with hertwomajortheatersofoperations—thesouthernareaaroundtheMekong DeltaandthenorthernonearoundtheRedRiver(orTonkin)Delta.Progress inthetwoareashadbeenquitedifferentandwastocontinuesototheendof thewar.Inthenorth,theVietminhin1945–46builtuparegulararmy,which tookthefieldagainsttheFrenchbutwasquicklydefeated.Nothinglikethis happenedinthesouth.Bytheendofthewar,thenorthwasenteringphase three,whilethesouthhadhardlyemergedfromphaseone.Onlyinthenortherntheaterofoperations,therefore,canthedevelopmentofthethreephases betracedfairlyclearly. GiapclaimedthatthefailureoftheFrenchtodefeattheVietminhinthenorth in1946–47hadmarkedtheendofanyhopeforashortwarand,heimplied,had allowedthefactorsdeterminingaprotractedwartocomeintoplay. To understand Giap’s critique of Vietminh strategy, one must recall the developmentsoftheearlywarperiod.Duringthefirstphaseoftherevolution,
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whichbeganinthesouth(CochinchinaandSouthAnnam)in1945,theVietminhtookthestrategicdefensive.Inthenorth,ontheotherhand,various agreementswiththeFrenchaccordedHo’sgovernmentdefactorecognition, andtheuneasypeacelasteduntilthesurpriseVietminhattackofDecember, 1946.Bytheseagreements,theVietminhgainedtimeinwhichtopreparetheir militaryforcesandtowinpopularsupport.Intheirpropagandacampaign,they couldpointtotheseaccordsasindicationsoftheirownloveofpeace,andwhen itbecameexpedienttobreakthem,theyarguedthatitwasinfacttheFrench whohadbrokenthemandsoprecipitatedthewar.Thefailureoftheattacksof 1946–47forcedtheVietsintothedefensiveinthenorthalsoandusheredinthe firstphaseoftheprotractedwar.Aftertheregularforceshadbeenbeatenand theirremnantscompelledtodisguisethemselvesasciviliansortoseekshelter in the area northwest of Hanoi, the war continued clandestinely. While the Viets were sacrificing—carefully, however—territory, people, and economic assetsinordertopreserveahardcore,theyneverrelaxedtheireffortstowin overthepopulation.Theactivitiesofclandestinecells,guerrillas,andpropagandaagentsprovedincreasinglydamagingtotheFrench,andslowlytheVietminh gained the loyalty of many of the people. Ho and Giap clearly had acceptedMao’spreceptsregardingtheimportanceofpreservingthecadresand winningpopularsupport. AlthoughGiapnevermentionsthedisastrousattacksofDecember,1946, inhisbook,heobviouslyfoundprofitablelessonsintheVietfailuresofthis earlyperiod.Inthefirstplace,hesawthatasoundstrategyalonewasnot enough;goodtacticsalsowereanecessity.Amongthetacticalmistakes,he includedpoorlyconceivedambushes,effortstoholdcertainterraintoolong, andattemptsatencirclementaftertheenemyhadreceivedstrongreinforcements.Inthisconnection,Giapnotedthedangersconventionalwarfareheld forweakforces:“Foranarmyrelativelyfeebleandpoorlyequipped,theclassicalconceptofwarisextremelydangerousandoughttoberesolutelyrejected.” HepointedoutthatthegreatestfailureshadcomeaboutwhentheVietminh haddepartedfromguerrillatacticsandattemptedformalbattles.Failureinthe south,hebelieved,wasduetoinadequatepoliticalguidanceforthetroopsand ineffective training, while in the north it was attributable more to improper militarytrainingandinsufficientunderstandingofthetruenatureofguerrilla warfare.Lastly,Giapthoughtthatithadbeenastrategicmistakenottoregard Indochinaasasingletheaterand,consequently,thattheneglectofCambodia andLaoshadbeenabasicerrorintheconductofthewar.(Inthisrespect,the writerbelievesthatGiapwasmistaken:Geographically,racially,andhistorically,Indochinawasnothomogeneous,andthesubsequentattemptstomakeit intoonestrategicareafailed.) AccordingtoGiap,thesecondphaseofthewarhadbegunin1947,andatthe timeofhiswriting(in1950)wasstillineffect.1Theinterveningyearshadbeen favorabletotheVietminh,bothintheirownrevolutionaryachievementsandin
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thedevelopmentsthatweretakingplaceintheFrenchcamp.TheVietminhhad continuedtheirstrategyofdefenseandhadbuiltupthesizeandqualityoftheir forces.Hewrote: Theactivitiesoftheindependentcompaniesconductedatthesametimeasthose ofthearmedpropagandateams,theguerrillaunits,andthevillagemilitiawere the principal forms of combat used to advance our guerrilla war, to destroy enemyreserves,andtoprotectourownreserves.Sincepopular“bases”were indispensabletothedevelopmentoftheguerrillawar,wedispersedthecompaniesofeachbattalionandwepermittedthemthenecessarylibertyofactionso that they could infiltrate different regions and cement their friendly relations withthelocalpopulace.Sincethecompanieswererelativelyweak,theyhadno difficultyinunderstandingthenecessityforfirmpopularbases.Thankstotheir intimateacquaintancewiththedifferentregions,theyeasilywonthesupportof thelocalpopulation.Theircloseconnectionwithpopularbasesgaveastrong impetustothearmedconflict.Whentheguerrillaunitsacquiredenoughexperience,whenthelocalmilitiabecamepowerfulenough,thedispersedelementsof thecompaniesinthedifferentlocalitiesgraduallyregroupedthemselves.
Thewinterof1949–50,inparticular,wasdescribedbyGiapasaperiodof visibleprogressfortheVietminh.Therateofpreparationincreased,offensive actionsbecamemorefrequentanddaring,andsmallunitsweredevelopinginto largerlineunits.Therewasincreasedemphasisontheregularforcesandthewar ofmovement.Theregionalandcommunalforces,however,werenotneglected, andguerrillawarfarewas,ifanything,intensified.2Hesummarizedtheeffortas follows: “We must work without stopping to improve the conditions of our forces,toattritetheenemyforces,tomakethebalancegraduallytipinourfavor inordertoproceedrapidlytowardthethirdphase.” GiapbelievedthattheFrenchatthistimehadturnedprimarilytodefensive warfareandhad reduced their goals in Indochina.To some extent this was true.AlthoughtheFrenchcontinuedtocarryoutclearingoperationsandlimitedoffensivesinthelateforties,theyneveragaincamesoclosetocomplete victoryastheyhadbeenin1947.Theyhadconsiderablesuccesswithpacificationeffortsinthesouth,andtheVietminhleadersadmittedthisfact.However,GiapclearlyrecognizedtheweaknessesoftheFrenchsituation.He predictedthat,asthewarworeon,theFrenchwouldhavetousecolonial troopsandevenVietnamese,3thattheywouldneverhaveadequatemanpower orsupplies,andthattheirmoralewoulddecline. BothGiapandHoChiMinhregarded1950asthedecisiveyear,andintimated thatphasethreewasnotfaroff.AccordingtoGiap,thethreerequirementsfor passagetothethirdphaseweresuperiorityoftherevolutionaryforces,afavorableworldsituation,andanoticeableweakeningoftheenemy.Hewrote:“We willnotmoveintoageneralcounteroffensiveuntilourstrengthinallareas[political,economic,andmilitary]isreflectedinourmilitarystrength.”In1950,the
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VietminharmywasapproachinginnumberthatoftheFrenchandwasdevelopingthecapabilitytoconcentrateandmaneuverinmajorcampaigns.ManyFrench troopswereincreasinglytiedtofortsandbases,permittingtheVietminhtoattain tacticalsuperioritymoreeasily.ThearrivalofChineseforcesattheborder,in December,1949,presagedoutsideaid.ThemilitarycapabilityoftheFrench,on the other hand, was suffering increasingly from lack of reinforcements, from dispersion,andfromlogisticdifficulties;theFrenchclearlywereonthedefensive,andtheirwilltofightwasweakening.Perhapsmostimportant,FrenchprocrastinationoverVietnameseindependencehadalienatedmoreandmoreofthe population. Giap’soptimismin1950,however,wasstillqualifiedbyseveralreservations. Foronething,heconsideredtheFrenchmilitaryforcesstillsuperiortohisown battlecorpsbecausetheypossessedamoreeffectivecommandsystem,more andbetterequipment,andgreaterfirepower.Furthermore,heconfessedthatthe executionofthewarofmovement,whichalonecouldbringvictory,hadproved morecomplicatedthanhehadforeseen.Ashortageofstaffofficersandspecialists made the solution of command, communications, and logistic problems unexpectedlydifficult.Lastly,andquitesignificantly,heindirectlyadmittedthat therewerestilllargesegmentsofthepopulationthathadnotbeenwonoverto theVietminhcauseandhencewouldnotprovideasecurebaseforregular-army operations.4 Giap’sviewofphasethree,whichhedescribedasthestageof“thegeneral counteroffensive,”whoseprimaryobjectivesweretoannihilatetheenemyand reconquer the national territory, was not as simple as Mao’s.The name was givennotbecauseitimpliedanattackonallfronts,butbecauseitledtofinal victory.Heconceivedofthisphaseashavingseveralsubdivisions,onlyinthe last of which would there be formal battles. Before progressing to the third phase,theVietminhwouldhavetobecertainof(1)theabsolutemoralsuperiorityoftherevolutionaryforces;(2)aconsiderableimprovementinthematerial positionoftheirarmythatwouldnarrowtheFrencheconomicadvantage(Giap describedtheagriculturaleconomyofIndochinaasidealforguerrillaactions but less so for larger, more formal operations); (3) an international situation moreandmorefavorabletotheCommunists;and(4)astrongandpurposeful directionofthewarbytheCommunistleadership,incontrasttolessandless sure command by the enemy. In all four respects, he thought, the Vietminh wouldbenefitgreatlybythewideningdisagreementsbetweentheFrenchand theAmericansandbythepoliticaldivisionswithinFrance. Allformsofwarfareweretobeemployedduringstagethree,butthewarof movement would become more and more important, while guerrilla warfare wouldassumesecondaryvalue.Therewouldalsobeanincreasingnumberof formalengagements.Thewarofmovement,inGiap’sopinion,wasbestsuitedto theCommunistforces,foritnotonlytookadvantageoftheirsuperiormoralebut allowedthemtocornerandannihilatetheenemy.Guerrillawarfare,however,
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wouldalwaysremainimportantbecauseit,too,dependedonhighmoraleand, moreover,waslesshandicappedbyinferiorityinmatériel.Furthermore,inthe finalphase,theirregularforceswouldbeamajorlinkinthelogisticsystemofthe regulararmy. GiapcontendedthatthefinalphasemightbelongorshortandthatitsdurationcouldnotbeentirelycontrolledbytheVietminh,thoughtheycouldinfluenceit.TheabsolutemoralsuperiorityoftheVietminhmightmakethephase shortbecause: Thiswillenableustoaccelerateourpace,aidedbythewillingsacrificeofthe population,theirresistanceandrevoltinregionsoccupiedbytheenemy,and becauseoftheincreaseinourforcesduetogeneralmobilizationandhelpfrom abroad.Thissuperioritycouldbringaboutgreatreversestotheenemy:dislocation of rebel troops, growth of antiwar sentiment among French troops. The FrenchdomesticsituationcouldbeseverelyaffectedbydefeatsinIndochina,by pacifism,andbyindependencemovementsinthecolonies.Graveerrorsmight bemadebytheFrenchintheirstrategy.
Ontheotherhand,thematerialpovertyoftheVietminh,continuedFrench resistance in the south, and more activeAmerican and British intervention couldprolongthephase.Ifthiswerethecase,thewarwouldtakeonthemore classicformofwarfare,withpitchedbattlesandlongcampaigns. THEUSEOFMAO’STHEORY Mao’stheoryoftheprotractedwarprovidedanoutlinefortheconductof therevolutionarywarinIndochina,andseveralprinciplesofhiswerestressed inVietminhdoctrine.Oneofthesewasthe“securityoftherear.”Thistermdid notmeantotheVietminhwhatitdoestoWesternmilitarypersons.InWestern terminology,itisawayofsayingthatprovisionshavebeenmadebythemilitaryforcestoassurethefunctioningoftherearechelonswithoutenemyinterference.TotheVietminh,“securityoftherear”meantthatthepeopleofthe countryhadbeenwonovertotherevolutionarycauseandthatwhereverthe army operated, it would receive warm support. The army depended on thepopulationtoformasecurebaseforitsoperations.Oncethepeoplehad beenindoctrinated,itwasnotenoughforthemmerelytobesympathetictothe cause.Theregulararmyreliedonthemforsuchpositivecontributionsasfood, shelter,intelligence,andtransport.Whennecessary,thelocalinhabitantsalso providedhidingplacesforthetroops,andoftenacceptedthemintotheirmidst forlongperiodsoftime. Popularsupportalone,however,didnotgovernthechoiceofareasofoperation. Thereareindicationsthatsuchothercircumstancesasterrainandenemyinitiative,andespeciallythecombinationofthesetwofactors,mayhavebeeneven strongerdeterminants.BecauseofFrenchconcentrationintheRedRiverDelta,
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theVietminhwereforcedtoremainandoperatechieflyinthemountainousareas outsidetheDelta,wherethevariousminoritieswerenotparticularlysympathetic. ThesepeoplebelievedtheVietminhtobeaVietnamesemovement,andastheyhad alwaysdislikedtheVietnamese,theynowdistrustedtheVietminh.TheVietnamese,ontheotherhand,whowerethemostsympathetictotheVietminhcause,lived intheDeltaandcoastalregions,wheretheVietminhcouldnotoperatefreely. Theprincipleofthesecurityoftherear—inreverse,asitwere—governedthe Vietminh’seffortstocreateinsecurityinenemy-heldareas.Tothisend,guerrillagroupswereorganizedintheFrenchareas,whichveryeffectivelynotonly harassedtheFrenchmilitaryforces,butpoliticallyindoctrinatedthepopulation andunderminedtheFrenchregimeand,later,theFrench-sponsorednational Vietnamesegovernment.TheseCommunistcellswagedpropagandawarand establishedshadowgovernmentsinthevillagesandsometimeseveninlarger administrative units. CertainVietminh adherents (known as Dich Van) even attached themselves to the French forces in order to defect as soon as their leadersorderedthemtodoso. The importance of the guerrilla fighter in the Vietminh theory of war can hardlybeexaggerated.Activeinallphasesofthewar,hewaseffectiveinconstructiveaswellasdestructiveways.WhereastheSovietshadconsideredthe guerrillaausefulauxiliarytotheRedArmy,theVietminhusedhiminmany morewaysandprovedthathecouldoperateanywhere.Asidefromtheirobvious tasks of sabotaging, harassing, ambushing, and attacking the enemy, the Vietguerrillaswagedpoliticalwarfareinbothfriendlyandenemyareas.Often theyprovidedsomeofthescreeningandsecurityforcesfortheregulararmy; theyalso“preparedthebattlefield”(whichinvolvedstockpiling,intelligencegathering,andsometimesfortification),andfoughtagainsttheFrenchclearing operations.Onmanyoccasions,theywerecalleduponforlogistichelp.The Vietminhexperienceshowed,furthermore,thatguerrillascouldbedeveloped eveninurbanareas,as,forexample,intheFrench-heldoutskirtsofSaigon.As willbeshownlater,Giapalsoinfiltratedregularunitsintothethicklypopulated TonkinDelta,wheretheyactedasguerrillas. AgainfollowingtheChineselead,theVietminhformed“bases”thatserved severalpurposes.InVietdefinition,thecharacteristicsofabaseareaare“aclosely integrated complex of villages prepared for defense; a politically indoctrinated populationinwhichevenchildrenhavetheirspecificintelligence tasks; a networkoffoodandweaponsdumps;anadministrativemachineparalleltothatof thelegalauthority,towhichmaybeaddedatwillanyregular[army]unitassigned to operations in the area.” The typical base thus was equipped to serve as a nucleus for Vietminh government and a strongpoint for military operations. Theseorganizationsmightbeclandestineoropen,dependingonthesituation. ThemostimportantoftheearlybaseareaswasnorthwestofHanoi. Maohadrecognizedthedifficultyofselectingtherightmomentforlaunchingthegeneralcounteroffensive,andtheChinesehadhadconsiderablearguments
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overthisquestionoftiming.TheVietminhexperiencedsimilardifficultiesand differences of opinion. Giap, while fully accepting Mao’s doctrine of the protractedwar,seemedimpatienttopassintophasethree.Althoughhisownanalysis ofthesituationin1950hadrevealedhisreservationsabouttheVietminhcapabilityatthattime,hepressedforgoingintotheoffensiveduringthefirstmonthsof thatyear.HewasopposedbytheheadoftheCommunistParty,whoarguedthat conditionswerenotyetfavorableforphasethree.Justhowwidelythisissuewas discussedisnotknown,butthemilitarycongressof1950approvedGiap’splans. Duringthelasthalfof1949,theFrenchhadshiftedtheirprimaryfieldof operations from Cochinchina in the south toTonkin in the north.The most importantreasonforthismovewasthearrivalofChineseCommunistforcesat theIndochinaborder.Furthermore,theFrenchwereconcernedoverthegrowingstrengthoftheVietminhinthenorth,andfeltthatthesuccessofpacification in the south rendered this transfer of the main effort possible and safe. Thereweredangersinvolved,however,astheshiftoflargenumbersoftroops tothenorthernareadetractedfromtheclearingoperationsandthemaintenance ofthestatusquointhesouth. Thenorthhavingbecomethemostimportanttheaterofoperations,Giap struckatthestringofFrenchfortsontheChinesefrontierintheautumnof 1950,and,inthefamousbattleofRouteColoniale4,nearlyannihilatedthe Frenchgarrisons.Giaphimselfappearedsurprisedbytheextentofhisvictory andwasslowtofollowuphissuccess.Accordingtomanyobservers,Giap’s forces,despitethissuccessfulaction,werenotreadyforopenbattlebecause theregulararmywasnotyetfullyformed.Thiscontentionseemstobeborne outbythesubsequentlimiteddefeatsinflictedonGiapbyFrenchforcesunder MarshaldeLattreatVinhYen(January,1951)andMaoKhé(March,1951), andbythepartialdefeatattheDayRiver(May,1951).Afterthesereverses, Giap withdrew his forces at the end of the fighting season and set about recruiting,equipping,andtrainingastrongerarmy. MarshaldeLattre,whotookcommandinIndochinainDecember,1950,not onlyfollowedbutimprovedonthetacticsofhispredecessor,GeneralCarpentier.CarpentierhadestablishedasystemofpostsandfortstoprotecttheTonkin Deltaandtoprovideasecurebase,relyingonmobileunitsforoffensiveoperations.Themarshalregroupedhistroopsandorganizedmobilegroupstoactas hisstrikingforcesandtoprovidemobilereserves.Thesemeasuresrequireda greatnumberofmen,andconsequentlysomeoutpostswererelinquishedand certainareasvoluntarilysurrenderedtotheVietminh.But,whereasDeLattre apparently had been trying to create a secure base from which to strike out offensively, his successors, after his death early in 1952, became more and moretiedtothedefensivefunctionsofthissystem.Also,DeLattrehadbeen singularly able to inspire his troops; succeeding commanders, on the other hand,wereincreasinglyfacedwithmoraleproblems.
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InNovember,1951,theFrenchstruckatandcapturedHoaBinh,thereby severingthenorth-southcommunicationsrouteoftheVietminh.Giapcounterattacked,buttheFrenchhadanticipatedhismoveandindeedhadplannedto attritehisforcesinasetbattle.Giapsufferedheavycasualtiesbutcontinuedthe battleforthreemonths,engaginginaprotractedcampaignofpositionwarfare thatwascontrarytoMao’sideas.5Facedwithincreasingsupplyproblems, heavylosses,andVietminhinfiltrationoftheDelta,theFrenchreluctantly abandonedHoaBinh.Theydeprecatedtheseriousnessofthiswithdrawalby claimingthattheyhadbythenaccomplishedtheirobjectiveofforcingGiap intopitchedbattles,withresultingheavycasualties. THETIMEOFSELF-APPRAISAL InAugust,1952,attheseventhanniversarycelebrationoftheVietminhrevolutionthathadledtotheestablishmentofthePeople’sRepublic,theVietminh leadersadmittedsomeoftheirmistakesintheinterveningyears;clearlyaware ofthesetbacksof1951,theyforecastalongwar.AsVicePresidentPhamVan Dongputit,“Resistanceisintheseventhyearofitsexistence.Itstillwilllast alongtimeandmanydifficultiesremaintobesurmounted.”TruongChinh stressedtheneedforguerrillaactivity,andevenGiapsaidthattheVietminh “mustenergeticallypursuethefightintheenemy’srear.”Allthespeakersagreed ontheneedtoweardowntheFrenchstillfurtherandtoconquertheruralmasses politically.Thetenorofthespeecheswasfarmoreguardedandlessoptimistic thanhadbeenthecasein1949–50;itwasevidentthattheVietminhhadunderestimated the enemy and miscalculated the timing of the counteroffensive (thoughHostillspokeofitas“cominginthenearfuture”). Evenduringthisperiodofrebuildingandself-examination,however,Giap apparentlyfeltcompelledtocontinuetheoffensive.Possibly,hebelievedthe situationtoberipeandattributedhisearlierfailurestoimpropertactics.Butit is equally possible that he had a correct estimate of the situation but found morecompellingreasonsforstayingontheoffensive,which,inviewofthe 1951defeats,meantabandoningthepreceptsofMao.Althoughwecannot besurewhathismotivationswere,scatteredevidencepointstotheimportant conclusionthat,foronce,therewereseriousmoraleproblemsintheVietminh campingeneralandinthearmyinparticular.Successintheautumnof1950 mayhaveraisedhopesthatmadethedefeatsofthefollowingspringallthe more disappointing. Some peasant unrest had been created by theVietminh land reforms and changed fiscal policies.According to the French, Ho had neverreallycapturedthepeasantsupportinthewayMaohadinChina,andhis supportersamongthepeasantswereadventurersandmalcontents.Whilethe Frenchchargeisobviouslyexaggerated,thereislittledoubtthatVietleaders hadsomeproblemsofmoraleinthearmyandamongthepeasantryatthistime.
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Giap now reverted to operational tactics that avoided pitched battles and attemptedinsteadtodrawtheFrenchoutoftheirstrongpointsintheDelta.This strategyofzonesexcentriques,astheFrenchcalledit,wasrathersimilarto LiddellHart’s“indirectapproach.”Giapdecidedtostrikeinareasthat,although lightly held, had certain political and psychological value to the French and calledforatleastatokendefense.Theobviouschoiceforsuchoperationswere thosemountainareaswherecertainethnicminoritieshadremainedsympathetic totheFrench.TheinvasionoftheThai6country,inSeptember,1952,wasan excellentexampleofthisstrategy,anditworkedexactlyasGiaphadplannedit. Exceptforthesingletacticalmistakeofstagingaprolongedattackononeofthe Frenchstrongholds,theoperationwasbroughtoffexpertly. AstheFrenchforceswereconcentratedintheRedRiverDelta,themountainousregionswereweaklyheld,butforobviousreasonstheFrenchwere reluctanttoevacuatethem.Theywerethusfacedwiththedilemmaofhaving eithertoabandonthesemountainpeopleortodispatchforcesfromtheDelta, therebyweakeningtheDeltadefenses.Eveniftheychosethelatteralternative,theycouldnotaffordtosendoutforcesadequatetocopewithGiap’s mainforceinthesedifficultareas,fortodosowouldhavebeentoleavethe Deltaopentomassiveinfiltration.Intheend,theFrenchavoidedmakingwhat mayindeedhavebeenanimpossiblechoice,andtried,instead,tofollowboth courses.Asaresult,theywereunabletomustersufficientstrengthineither area;theforcestheysentintothemountainsprovedinadequatethere,buttheir absenceseriouslyweakenedtheDeltadefenses.ThedefeatatDienBienPhu wasinlargeparttheresultofasimilarerrorinFrenchstrategy. Intheautumnof1953,theFrenchconcludedatreatywithLaosthatprovided formembershipofthismountainkingdomintheFrenchUnionunderconditions verysatisfactorytotheFrench.ThepossibilityofaVietminhinvasionofLaos, however,arousedFrenchconcern,and,inNovember,GeneralNavarredecided tooccupyDienBienPhuinordertoforceGiaptocopewiththisstrong-hold beforeinvadingLaos.Navarrealsohopedtocreatesuchastrongcampthatthe Vietattackwouldbenotonlyunsuccessfulbutcostly.Thus,theoccupationof DienBienPhuwastoservethedualpurposeofprotectingLaosandforcingthe Vietstoattackastronglyheldpositiontotheirowndetriment. Theannouncement,inJanuary,thatanAlliedconferencewastoconveneat GenevathefollowingApriltodealwiththeproblemofIndochinaapparently influencedtheVietminhtomakeanall-out effortagainstDienBienPhu— eventothepointofacceptingasiegelikebattleandheavycasualties—forthe sake of political gains at Geneva. Giap now recalled the 308th Division, which was even then engaged in the invasion of Laos that the French had meanttoforestall,andputitaroundDienBienPhu. April26markedtheopeningoftheGenevaConferenceandthebeginningof thefinal,bloodyassaultonDienBienPhu.Slowlybutsurely,VietminhsuperiorityofnumbersandfirepowergrounddowntheFrenchposition.OnMay8,the garrisonsurrendered,andtheVietminhhadwonatremendouspoliticalvictory.
VIETMINHMILITARYDOCTRINEANDTHEWAR
13
This battle, while violating one of the major tenets of Viet doctrine (namely, that pitched battles, and particularly sieges, must be avoided), confirmedcertainothers.Firstandforemost,itdemonstratedtheimportanceofsubordinatingmilitaryconsiderationstopoliticalends.ThoughthebattleofDien BienPhuclearlyhurtGiap’sbattlecorps(theFrenchestimatedthathislosses doubledtheirs),thepoliticaladvantagesandtheblowtoFrenchmoralein Indochina,andparticularlyinFrance,faroutweighedtheselosses.TheexperienceofDienBienPhualsorevealedthevirtueoftheVietminh’spainstaking preparationforbattle,theirskillanddiligenceincamouflageanddiggingin.It ishardtodeterminewhethertheuseofdirectartilleryfire,whichmayhavebeen decisive,wasforcedontheVietsbytheircrews’lackoftrainingintheconventionaluseofartillery,orwhetheritwasdeliberatelychosenasmostappropriate fortheterrain. Inastrictlymilitarysense,thedefeatatDienBienPhuwasnotnecessarily catastrophicfortheFrench.Giaphadsufferedheavily.Furthermore,theFrench garrison,whileimportantenough,accountedforonlyone-fifteenthofthetotal numberofFrenchtroopsinIndochina.Butthepoliticalrepercussions,asforeseenbytheVietleaders,weresuchthatParisdecidedtoendthestruggle.
NOTES 1. Mostobserverswouldplacethebeginningofphasetwoin1949,astheFrench retainedtheinitiativeduring1947–49andthefirstVietminhattacksofaformalnature didnotoccuruntil1949. 2. Foramoredetaileddiscussionofthedistinguishingcharacteristicsoftheregular army, the regional troops, and the popular forces, and of their relationship to one another,seepp.19–22. 3. ItshouldberememberedthatFrenchlawprohibitedtheuseofFrenchconscripts outsideFrance;hencethefullburdenofthewarfellontheFrenchregulararmyand theForeignLegion. 4. ItistruethatmoreandmoreofthepeoplewerealienatedbytheFrench,butthey didnotthereforeallrallyenthusiasticallytotheVietminhcause.Eventhose,however, who merely became indifferent thereby created difficulties for the French and thus indirectlyaidedtheVietminh. 5. TheFrench,bystrikingatoneoftheenemy’smoreweaklyheldkeypoints,may havetaughtGiapatrickhewaslatertouseagainstthem. 6. PartofIndochina,notThailand.
Chapter2
THEVIETMINHMILITARY ORGANIZATION
The twofold objective of the Vietminh military organization was to create ideologicaluniformitythroughoutthecountryandtodevelopanefficientmodernarmy.Totheseends,theCommunistleadershipsetouttodevelopamilitary machinewithstrictpoliticalcontrols,centralizedauthority,anduniformterritorialorganization.Almostfromthebeginning,themilitaryforcesweredivided intothreegroupsofvaryingcombatcapabilities:theregulararmy,theregional forces,andthepopulartroops.Furthermore,theCommunistPartymaintaineda politicalorganizationwithinthearmythatparalleledthemilitaryatallechelons. Thesewerethefewbasicorganizationalcharacteristicsthatremainedunchanged throughoutthewar.Fortherest,theVietminh’sdedicationtotheCommunist principlethatorganizationshouldnotbestaticbutshouldreflectprogress,and theiracceptanceofMao’stheoryoftheprotractedwarinthreestages,meant thatthemilitaryestablishmenthadtobeinaconstantstateoforganizational evolution.Theneedforpracticalexperimentationunderatypicalwarconditions furthercontributedtothisstateofflux.Inthecourseoftime,smallguerrilla groupsgrewintomoderndivisions,whichinturnunderwentmodifications.The simpleguerrillacommandof1944,afternumerouschanges,becamethecomplexgeneralstaffof1954.Thepoliticalorganizationwithinthearmy,cautious andlimitedinitspowersofcontrolduringthefirstyearsofstruggle,ultimately developedintoahighlyinfluentialorganism. In the last years of the war, the National Military Council, composed of PresidentHoandtheministersofDefense,Interior,andFinance,directedthe overallwareffort.Responsibilityforthemilitaryconductofthewarlaywith theMinistryofNationalDefense,whoseinternalorganization,too,wasaltered asoldproblemsweresolvedandnewonesarose.
16
COMMUNISTREVOLUTIONARYWARFARE
Early in the war, the Vietminh shared high government positions with leaders of nationalist groups. But gradually, as they perfected their Party organization, developed Communist leaders at the lower echelons, and gainedgreaterpopularsupport,theybegantoeasenon-Communistsoutof responsible positions. Certainly, by the early 1950’s, theViets had won a tightholdonthemilitaryapparatusandwerepursuingCommunistendsin additiontotheirnationalistobjectives.1 Atthetimeofthecease-fire,theMinistryofNationalDefensewasheaded byVoNguyenGiap.AsCommanderinChiefofthearmy,Giaphadoperational control as well as administrative responsibilities.The ministry was organizedontheChinesepattern,withthreemajorsubdivisions:thePoliticalBureau,theGeneralDirectorateofSuppliesandMaintenance,andthe GeneralStaff. THEPOLITICALBUREAU The Vietminh regime, like any other Communist government, attached enormousimportancetothepoliticalaspectsofwar.Apoliticalorganization withinthemilitaryestablishmentwasdesignedtoassureproperideological indoctrinationofthesoldiersandtheintegrationofmilitaryactionswithpoliticalobjectives.Intheearlyyearsofthewar,whenco-operationwithnational groupswaspolicy,thepowerofthepoliticalagents(commissars)wasstill limited;militarycommandershadthefinaldecisiononmilitaryissues,while theactivitiesofthepoliticalofficerswererestrictedtopurelypoliticalmatters. AstheVietminhelementinthegovernmentbecamemorepowerful,however, thebalanceshifted.By1950,therewerespecificinstructionsstatingthat,in caseofaconflictbetweenthemilitarycommanderandthepoliticalcommissar,thelatter’sviewwasdecisive.(TheRussianexperience,however,may leadonetooverestimatetheroleofthecommissars.InIndochina,asinChina, mostmilitaryleaderswerethemselvesCommunists,whohadfoughtlongand hardforthemovement,weregenerallyloyaltoitsgoals,andthusrequired relativelylittlepoliticalsupervision.) Bytheendofthewar,thePoliticalBureauhadbeenestablishedwithinthe MinistryofDefenseasthehighestorganforpoliticalcontrolinthearmed forces.Boththeterritorialcommandsandthedivisionshadwhatwerecalled “Delegated Political Commissars.” Even in temporary commands, such as the“fronts,”2politicalofficersmaintainedclosesupervisionoverallactivities.Inthehigherunits,thesemenwouldbeassistedbyvariouscommittees. Atthedivisionlevel,forinstance,therewerecommitteesforadministration, politicalinstruction,recreation,preparationofthebattlefield,propagandafor civilians,propagandaagainsttheenemy,andtheaffairsoftheParty.Atlower levels, the organization became simpler. No political commissars existed belowthecompanylevel,butineveryplatoonapoliticalcellworkedclosely
THEVIETMINHMILITARYORGANIZATION
17
withthecompanypoliticalofficer.Atcompanylevel,therewasapolitical organizationcalledtheMilitaryCouncil,composedofmenwhowereelected bythemembersofthecompanyforathree-monthtermbutweresubjectto recall.Thiscouncilwasa“democratic”device,whoseallegedpurposewas “toeducatethetroopsandprovidepoliticalguidance,nottoallowthemento argue or dispute with the officers.” When the company was divided, the variousplatoonshadtheirindividual,smallermilitarycouncils. Paralleltotheofficialpoliticalorganizationwithinthearmy,thereapparently wasaclandestinePartyorganization,whichatcertainlevelsmergedwiththe political organization. Every company and battalion had its Communist cell, withasubcellforeachcompanysection,andasecretarywhowasresponsible fortheworkanddisciplineofbothcellandsubcell.Ifthecellhadmorethan ninemembers,itelectedasmallergroup,calledtheCommitteeofDelegates,to workwiththesecretaryasanexecutivecommittee.Atregimentalandatdivisionlevel,thePartyorganizationmergedwiththepoliticalorganizationinthe SubcommitteeforPartyAffairsunderthepoliticalcommissar. WhilePartyorganizationmen,bydefinition,weremembersoftheCommunist Party,thiswasusually,butnotnecessarily,trueofofficialsinthepoliticalorganization.The political officers wore uniforms and were members of the armed forces,buttheyenjoyedaprivilegedposition. THEGENERALDIRECTORATEOFSUPPLIESAND MAINTENANCE The second major subdivision of the Defense Ministry, the General DirectorateofSuppliesandMaintenance,hadfourbureaus:food,clothing, and equipment; armament and ammunition; health; and transport. These services were nowhere as complex as their modern Western equivalents. Beforetheemergenceoftheregulararmy,thesupplysystemwaslargely decentralized; only with formation of the battle corps and the advent of massiveChineseaiddiditbecomemorecentralizedandcomplex.Littleis knownaboutitsorganization,buttheoperationofthelogisticsystemwill bediscussedmorefullyinthechapterfollowing. THEHIGHCOMMANDANDGENERALSTAFF TheVietminhHighCommand,fromitsinception,hadawidevarietyof responsibilities,someofthemnotnormallythoseofahighcommand.Inthe beginning, one of its major functions was that of guerrilla command. (Although there was a so-called General Staff, it was very rudimentary in form.)InApril,1947,theSupremeCommand,asitwasthencalled,hadfive majorsubdivisions:anIntelligenceService,aPoliticalService,aBureaufor PopularTroops,anInspectorGeneral,andaGeneralStaff.TheGeneralStaff
18
COMMUNISTREVOLUTIONARYWARFARE
wasverysimpleinitsorganizationandwasconcernedwithoperations,which at that time consisted mainly of small but numerous guerrilla actions. Its othermajorfunction,intheearlystageofthewar,wasthetrainingandorganizationoflargerunits,withtheultimateobjectiveofformingamodernfield army.OperationsandtrainingremainedtheGeneralStaff’sprimarymissions until late 1949 or early 1950, when planning, in the Western sense of the word,begantoplayamuchlargerroleintheworkoftheHighCommand. In1950,amoremodernGeneralStaff,basedlargelyontheFrenchmodel, wascreatedor,moreprecisely,reorganizedfromtheolderone.Thecabinetof this new General Staff had four sections: local security, communications, accounts,andadministration.Thefourmajorstaffofficerswereinchargeof personnel, intelligence, operations, and supply, much as is the case in the Americanarmy.UndertheGeneralStaffweretheterritorialcommandsandthe lineoutfits(thenregiments).Theorganizationalpatternmadeitapparentthat thestaffwasintendedtoplananddirecttheoperationsoflargeunits.Itsstrongest point was probably intelligence, its weakest, supply.Also, Giap lacked sufficientnumbersoftrainedstaffofficers,andmanyoftheweaknessesofhis organizationwereareflectionofthisshortage. THEGENERALSTAFFAFTER1953 By1953,thestafforganizationhadbecomestillmoreelaborate,andthe changesclearlyreflectedChineseinfluence.Thefourfamiliarstaffdivisions had been dropped and replaced by the more numerous Chinese “bureaus.” VietminhofficerswerebeingtrainedinChineseschools,andalargegroupof Chinese advisers was attached to the Viet army, especially to the General Staff.Thelatternowhadtenbureaus,inkeepingwithitsgrowthandthewideningscopeofitsactivities.ThetwomostimportantwerethePoliticalBureau of the Staff, listed first on the organizational charts, and the Directorate of Operations.Workingcloselywiththesetwo,butorganizationallyunderthem, wastheBureauofImportantAffairs,inchargeoftrainingandplanningforat leastsixmonthsahead. AstheVietminhdevelopeddivisionsandbegantoanticipateoperationsof larger scope, they had to plan much further ahead, not only for the usual militaryreasons,butbecauseofseveralfactorspeculiartothesituationin Indochina. One of these was the phenomenon of the “front,” temporary headquartersspeciallyestablishedforindividualoperationsinvolvingunits ofthebattlecorps.Everyfrontrequiredacertainamountoftimetomakeits plansandtobecomeoperational.Thesefrontsmustnot,however,beconfusedwiththoseinWesternterminology.AVietminhfrontwascreatedfor a precise tactical mission in a clearly defined area of action, and placed underacommanderwhowasgiventhemeanstodothejob,includingboth regularunitsandsuchregionalandpopulartroopsinthezoneofactionas
THEVIETMINHMILITARYORGANIZATION
19
were capable of doing auxiliary work and giving logistic help.After the operation,thefrontwasusuallydisbanded.TheVietminhalsoattachedgreat importancetowhattheycalled“preparingthebattlefield,”thatistosay,to the time-consuming task of assembling stockpiles, gathering intelligence, andsometimesbuildingfortifications.Lastly,theywerefondofpaperwork: ManyFrenchofficershaveremarkedontheincrediblenumberofcopiesof messages,orders,andinstructionsthatwereissued.Forallthesereasons, theVietminhneededevenmoretimethanmighthavebeenexpectedforthe planningoflargecampaigns.Onlyforsmall,regiment-sizeoperationswere theyabletoplanandactveryquickly,andeventhentheeffectiveuseof surpriseoftenmadeitappearasthoughtheyhadmovedfasterthantheyin facthad. The remaining seven bureaus of the General Staff of 1953 consisted of directoratesforIntelligence,Training,Administration,ArmedForces,PopularTroops,MilitaryAffairs, and Communications and Liaison. In addition, therewereaspecialEngineerandArtillerySection(suggestingtheexpected arrivalofengineeringequipmentandartilleryinevergreateramounts),anda Code Bureau. The main supply and maintenance functions had been taken awayfromtheGeneralStaffand,aftertheChineseexample,hadbeenplaced under a separate organization. The new staff was superior in training and experiencetotheGeneralStaffof1950.Itwasabletocontroltheactionsof severaldivisions,andprovedthatitcouldplanandexecuteoperationsofthe sizeandscopeofDienBienPhu. TheHighCommandnowassumedtheroleoffieldarmyheadquartersand staffaswellasthatofthehighestmilitaryplanningunit.Itcombinedthefunctionsofairforceheadquarters,airstaff,atrainingcommand,andnumbered airforces(or,inAmericanarmyterms,thedutiesofthegeneralstaff,ContinentalArmyCommand,andfieldarmies).Astheregulararmyremainedrelativelysmall(aboutthesizeofaU.S.fieldarmy),thiscombinationoftaskswas not so difficult as it might seem at first glance. Furthermore, shortages of trained personnel probably rendered this concentration of direction and responsibilityessential. THEREGULARUNITS DirectlyundertheHighCommand,initscapacityasfieldarmyheadquarters, were the regular units of the army. Until 1950, the largest unit had been the regiment,sometimesreinforcedandcalleda“group.”Therateofdevelopment fromthereonwassuchthat,evenwithoutChineseaid,linedivisionswould soonhavebeencreated.However,thesubstantialChineseaidthatbegancoming induring1950assuredbetterequipmentandspeededtheformationoflarger units.Towardtheendofthewar,thereweresixdivisionsandseveralregiments inNorthAnnam.
20
COMMUNISTREVOLUTIONARYWARFARE
ThefirstVietminhdivisions(in1950)weregood-sizeunitsofapproximately 15,000men.Theyappeartohavehadaveryhighproportionofcombatsoldiers classifiedasassaulttroopsandfirepowertroops,andtohavecontainedrelativelysmallcommandandserviceelements.Buttheorganizationalchartsare somewhatmisleading,for,aswillbeshownbelow,thecombatunitsincluded extraordinarilylargenumbersofsupplysoldiers. Almostimmediately,however,theVietminhbegantoreducethesizeofthe divisionquitesignificantly,fromabout15,000menin1950toabout9,500in 1953. Ostensibly, these smaller divisions were better for the war of movement,butonesuspectsthatanotherreasonmayhavecompelledthesereductions: After the costly battles of 1951 and early 1952, the Vietminh may actuallyhavebeenshortofmenwhowerewellenoughtrainedtobeinthe front-linedivisions. Savingsinmanpower—somerealandsomeillusory—werebroughtabout byorganizationalchangesandcertainotherfactors.Theearlyartilleryunits showedanunbelievablyhighratioofmentoweapons;forinstance,aheavymortar(120-mm.)company,equippedwithtwopieces,hadabout200men! Thoughtheweaponweighedonlyabout600pounds,therewere80porters perweapon.Again,a75-mm.–artillerybattalionarmedwithfourpieceshad nearly1,100men,ofwhomhalfwereporters.Thearrivaloftruckswasthe biggeststeptowardsolvingtheammunition-supplyproblem,thoughtoalimiteddegreethereductionsinmanpowermaybeattributedtoimprovedtrainingofthemen.Anotherapparentreductioninthesizeofinfantrydivisions wastheresultofremovingtheirartilleryunitsandconcentratingtheminone heavy division. And finally, wherever possible, civilian labor was used to replacesoldiers. Over90percentofthepersonnelofthenew,lighterdivisionweremembersofitsthreeregiments,leavingonlyabout1,000mentobedistributed over headquarters, the engineers, the liaison service, and the headquarters guards.ByWesternstandards,therefore,thedivisionwasnotcapableofsustainedcombat.True,thelackofmotortransportandothermodernequipment reducedtheneedforservicetroops,justasthehabitoflivingoffthecountry reducedpersonal-supplyneeds.Despitethefactthattheseshortcomingsin somewaysprovedtobehiddenassets,theVietminhbelievedthatallconsiderationswereoutweighedbytheadvantagesofhavingamodernarmy,which theycontinuedtotrytobuild. Thefirstheavydivision(the351st),formedin1953,thoughitssubordinate unitshadexistedforsometime,isbelievedtohavehadtwoartilleryregiments,oneengineerregiment,sometransportationelements,andprobably antiaircraftunits.Theindependentregimentswerelargelyassaulttroops,but mostofthemhadrecoillessweaponsandmortars.SeparateAAunits,armed with20-mm.and40-mm.guns,didnotappearuntilthelastmonthsofthe war.Therewerenotankunits,althoughsomesoldiershadreceivedarmored
THEVIETMINHMILITARYORGANIZATION
21
traininginChineseschools.Somespecialunits(e.g.,radiointercept)existed asearlyas1950,but,ingeneral,theVietminhwereweakinthisfield. THEREGIONALTROOPS TheHighCommand,inadditiontoitscontroloftheregulararmy,exercised commandovertheterritorialmilitaryorganizations,withtheirregionaland popularforces.Thefullestandmostefficientterritorialorganizationswere those of NorthAnnam andTonkin, the strongholds of theVietminh.They weresetupasfollows:Thehighestterritorialunitwastheinterzone,which, intheory,includedseveralzones.Inpractice,therewerecertainindependent zones directly under the High Command, and some interzones without subordinatezones.Belowtheinterzonesorzonescametheprovinces,which werecomposedofseveraldistricts.Atthebaseoftheorganizationwerethe intervillages(severalvillagescombinedforadministrativepurposes)andthe villages. TheExecutiveandResistanceCommittee,sometimescalledjustCommittee ofResistance,directedtheoverallwareffortofinterzoneorzone.Itdealtnot onlywiththepolitical,economic,andmilitaryaspectsofthewarbutalsowith localproblemsofhealthandculture.Oneofitsmemberswasatthesametime themilitarycommanderoftheinterzoneandthustookordersfromboththe HighCommandandtheCommitteeofResistance.Thelocaldirectionofmilitaryactivitiesforthearealaywithacommandcommittee,composedofthe interzone commander, his political counselor, and his adjutant, who were assistedbyastaff.Thecommanderandhiscommitteewereresponsiblefor recruitingandsupplyfunctions;theywereinchargeofalltheregionaltroops andanydetachedregularunitsintheirarea,andsupervisedthesubordinate territorialcommands. The provincial command, under its own Committee of Resistance, was somewhatlesselaboratethantheinter-zoneorganizationandcommandedthe subordinatedistrictunitsaswellastheprovincialbattalion.Itwascomposed ofacommandsectionsupportedbyasimplestaff,withanofficeforoperationsandtraining,oneforcommunications,andanintelligencesection.This committeealsohadsomelogisticresponsibilities. The district, in turn, had its own Committee of Resistance, which was expectedtoraiseacompanyofregionaltroops.Thoughsimilarinorganizationtothatoftheprovince,itwasevenlesscomplex.Acommandcommittee consistedofthecommander,hisdeputy,andaPartyrepresentative.“Technicalcells”reportedtotheCommitteeonmilitaryintelligence,specialespionage, political affairs, propaganda, arms production, communications, and administration.Butasthedistrictswereofteninefficientlyrunorpoorlyorganized,theprovincetendedtoassumegreaterpowersthanwouldappearfrom thetheoreticalorganization.
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COMMUNISTREVOLUTIONARYWARFARE
THEPOPULARTROOPS Atthelowestechelonofthemilitaryorganizationwasthevillage,withits individualfightersorsmallunitsofpopulartroops.Theimportanceofthese irregulartroopsshouldnotbeminimized;theywerethebackboneoftheVietminhmilitaryorganization,asreflectedintheveryexistenceofaDirectorate ofPopularTroopsattheministrylevel,andofCommitteesonPopularTroops attheprovinceanddistrictlevels.TheVietminh’sefforttoorganizetheentire populationforthewareffortwasrealizedinthevillages.Theso-calledpopular troopsconsistedoftwogroups:theDanQuan,composedofpersonsofboth sexesandallageswhoperformedauxiliarymilitaryduties,andtheDanQuan duKich,madeupofmenbetweentheagesofeighteenandforty-fivewhowere part-timeguerrillas.Thelatterwereorganizedintogroupsoffromeighttofifteenmen,whoelectedtheirleadersandwereverylightlyarmed.Inthestrong areas,somevillageshadseveralsuchgroups,whichwerecombinedintosections.TherewerealsotheDanCông,civilianportersfortheregularunits. Thevillageandintervillagecommandwasheadedbyacommitteeofthree orfourmembers(usually,thoughnotalways,includingaPartyrepresentative for each village), and a secretary who tended to dominate the committee’s affairs.Thegroupdirectedthedefenseofthevillageandtheday-to-dayactivitiesoftheguerrillas.Veryactivevillagesoftenhadasmallsupplyofweapons andguerrillamaterial. The foregoing description, as was pointed out above, applied chiefly to NorthAnnamandTonkin.InthesouthandinLaosandCambodia,theterritorialorganizationwaslessfullydevelopedandfarlesseffective.In1947, the Vietminh established a regular command for the south under Nguyen BinhandvirtuallyignoredLaosandCambodia.Butthelonglineofcommunicationstothesouthandtheapatheticorfranklyunsympatheticattitudeof muchofthesouthernpopulationmadethetaskofthecommanderdifficult, andtheseparatecommandwasabolishedin1952.NguyenBinh,whomthe Frenchdescribedasanableleader,hadpersonalambitionsandapparently tried to engage in large-scale warfare before he had developed a popular base. The circumstances surrounding his death in 1950 remain somewhat obscure,butitisgenerallybelievedthathewasliquidated.Towardtheendof thewar,theVietminhhaddevelopedsomemilitaryorganizationinLaos,but therewasstillverylittleinCambodia.Ingeneral,outsideNorthAnnamand Tonkin,theirorganizationlackedcontinuity,cohesion,andefficiency. REORGANIZATION Thedistinctionsamongthethreeechelonsofthemilitaryforces—theregular army,theregionaltroops,andthepopularforces—werebasedondifferencesin trainingandequipmentaswellasofmission.Itmightbesaidthatthethreeparts ofthisorganizationreflectedthetheoryoftheprotractedwar,withthepopular
THEVIETMINHMILITARYORGANIZATION
23
forcesrepresentingthefirstperiodofguerrillaaction,theregionalforcesparalleling the second stage, and the regular army dominating the third and final phase.Andjustasdividinglinesbetweenthestagesofthewarweresometimes indistinct, so also were the differences among these forces, especially those betweentheregularandtheregionalunits. Althoughtheregulararmywasconsideredtheultimateweaponforvictory, eachofthethreeforceshadanessentialfunctiontofulfill.AsGiapstated, “Wemustconcentratetheregularforcesandincreasetheregionalforces,or weshallmakeafalsestep.”Theregulararmy,orchuluc,wasapreciousunit, withaspecificandcrucialmission.Until1950,thisforce,thenstillinitsformativestage,wascarefullyhusbanded,anditrarelyengagedincombatwhen theissuewasindoubt.Inmanyoftheiroperations,therefore,theFrenchwere unabletomakecontactwiththeregularforcesbutmetinsteadtheregional troops.Byandlarge,theregulararmywaskeptfreetoengageinthewarof movementandtoselectboththefieldandthetimeforbattle.Inasmuchasit wasaneliteunitand,ofthethreeforces,hadthebestequipment,weapons, anduniformsaswellasthehighestpay,itwasheldstrictlytoitsprimarymission.Suchdutiesasbuildingfortificationsandpreparingthebattlefieldfellto theothertwoforces. Slowly,andforthemostpartpatiently,theVietminhbuiltuptheirinfantry intoafirst-classforce.Aftertheprecipitous1946engagementswhichended inalmosttotaldefeat,theyimmediatelybegantoreorganizeandrebuildtheir battlecorps,increasingboththenumberofunitsandthesizeandnumberof weaponsineach. AnexaminationofRegiment9,oneoftheirbestunitsbutnotanisolatedcase, showstheprogressandgrowththatfollowedreorganization.In1948,thisregimenthadsixbattalions,withatotalof1,800men;itwasequippedwithonlytwo mortarsandtwo75’s,plusafewrapid-fireweapons.Threeyearslater,ithadonly threebattalionsbut3,500men,andpossessedtwenty-fourmortars,ninerecoillesscannon,eighteenmachineguns,andoversixtyrapid-fireweapons. ThefollowingfiguresonregularandregionalbattalionsshowtheVietminh’s overallmilitarydevelopmentinthethreemainregionsbetweenApril,1949, andJune,1951: TheGrowthofVietminhRegularUnits
April,1949 Regular
June,1951
Regional
Regular
Regional
Tonkin
20
50
78
6
Annam
7
43
21
6
Cochinchina
5
44
18
25
32
137
117
37
TOTALS
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COMMUNISTREVOLUTIONARYWARFARE
Thesefiguresrevealastrikingincreaseinthenumberofregularunitsinall three areas, and a decline in the regional battalions that was particularly markedinTonkinandAnnam.Althoughtherewerealmostasmanyunitsin thesouthasinthenorth,thoseinthesouthweresmallerandofinferiorquality.Thesteadyexpansionoftheregularforcesreflectedinthesefiguresmay helponetounderstandwhyearly1951couldhaveappearedtoGiapasthe opportunemomentatwhichtotryhisbattlecorpsagainsttheFrenchinopen battle—anattemptthatcausedhimveryheavylosses.Thechartcanberead, moreover,asreflectingthepolicyoftakingregionalforcesintotheregular army by unit without always replacing them. This development seems in curiouscontradictiontoGiap’sownfearthatfailuretoincreasetheregional unitsmightcauseoneto“makeafalsestep.”Itmighthavebeenlessserious in1954,whentheFrenchwereclearlyonthedefensiveinthenorthandthe need for regional troops consequently was less urgent. But in 1951, especiallyinthelightofGiap’sownstatement,itcanhardlyhavebeenamatter of preferred policy for the Vietminh. The only explanation that suggests itself,therefore,isthattheywerenotfreetochoose,butweresufferingfrom a shortage of men with whom to replace those advanced from regional to regularunits. Theregionaltroopswerelesswellorganized,trained,andequippedthan the regular forces. For the most part, the largest unit was the battalion, thoughinthelatterstagesofthewarafewoftheinterzoneshadregiments. Themeninthebattalionsandcompaniesofregionaltroopsweregraduates ofthepopularforces,whohadcomeinwiththelimitedtrainingthatmembershipinthepopularforcesafforded.Afterfurthertrainingintheregional troops,theyadvancedtotheregularforces,individuallyorbyunit—ideally whentheywerereadyforit,butsometimesonlybecausetheywerebadly neededthere.AfterthearrivalofsubstantialChineseaid,manyoftheunits haduniformsandmoreequipmentthanbefore,butingeneraltheycontinued tolackheavyweaponsandequipment. Oneoftheprimarydutiesoftheregionalforceswastoprotectanareaand itspopulation.TheywerethetroopsthatmettheFrenchclearingoperations, launchedsmallattacks,andgenerallyharassedtheenemy;inshort,theywere the“matureguerrillas,”whokepttheenemyoffbalanceandambushedhis reinforcements. Their responsibilities extended both upward and downward in the total militaryorganization.Ontheonehand,theytrainedandassistedthepopular troops. On the other, they were what might be called the guardians of the regular army. Not only did they constitute a reserve and supply reinforcementstotheregularforceswhenneeded,buttheypreventedinterferencein the army’s training and planning, prepared the battlefield for impending operations,protectedtheregularforcesinretreatandadvance,andtookover someoftheirdefensivemissions.
THEVIETMINHMILITARYORGANIZATION
25
Thepopulartroopsweredividedintothetwogroupsalreadymentioned:the DanQuan,whichtheoreticallyincludedalmosteveryone,andtheDuKich,a smallergroupthatundertookguerrillaactions.Themembersofbothgroups servedintheirsparetime,withoutinterruptingtheirciviliantasks.TheDan Quanwereessentiallyalaborforcewithatingeofmilitarytraining.Though occasionallytheyperformedsabotage,theirmainresponsibilitywastocollect intelligence,serveasguards,makeroadrepairs,buildbases,fortifythevillages,and—veryimportant—actasporters.Theyworenouniformsandhad virtuallynoweapons,exceptforsomesabotagematerials.Themoreselective DuKichhadsomearmsandundertookguerrillaactionsonasmallscale.They received rudimentary military training and were expected eventually to becomelinesoldiers.Thoughgenerallyforbiddentoassembleinlargegroups, they were called together in emergencies when it was essential to prevent Frenchclearingoperationsortointensifyguerrillaactivity.Sometimesafew DuKichwereinfiltratedintoenemy-heldvillages,inordertopreparetheway foraVietminhassault. But, important as the labor and guerrilla activities of the popular troops were,theVietminhattributedstillgreatersignificancetotheirideologicalmission.Themajorpurposeofthesetroopswastolendtheideologicalwarofthe Vietminhtheaspectofanationalstruggleinwhichtheentirepopulaceparticipated.Thepopularforceswerealsousedtorecruityoungpeasantsforthe militaryserviceoftheVietminh. Whileapparentlyquitesatisfiedwiththeevolutionandperformanceofthe regularforces,Vietminhleadersseemtohavefeltlesshappyaboutthefunctioningoftheterritorialorganization.AtPartycongressesandinmessagesto subordinateorganizations,theyfrequentlycomplainedabouttheinefficiency andmistakesofthelowercommands.Amongotherthings,thelowerechelons weresaidtochangepersonneltoofrequently:Menwereassignedtodifferent unitseveryfewmonths,withdetrimenttothestabilityandefficiencyofthe organization.Anotherchargewasthatinterzoneandprovincialheadquarters avoredthetechnicalcellsoverthecombatunits.TheHighCommandadmitted theimportanceoftechnicalgroupsbutinsistedthattheynotbeoveremphasizedattheexpenseofthefightingunits.Andfinally,theterritorialcommands wereconstantlyurgedtomakemoreefficientuseofthepopulation. In1952,Hoexpressedsomeofthesamemisgivingsinaseverelectureon theshortcomingsoftheVietminhorganizationingeneral.Thepeople,hesaid, wereanxiousandreadytoserve,buttheyhadnotbeenusedinthemostrationalandefficientmanner.Furthermore,whilenotingtheprogressthathadbeen made,Hoblamedtheleadersforbureaucraticexcessesandfortheincreasein wasteandcorruption(familiarchargesinanyCommunistregime).Someof thecadres,hewarned,werenotsincerelypracticingtheprinciplesoftheParty andwereretardingprogress,andafewlocalleaderswhonourishedpersonal ambitionsanddeviationisttendencieswouldhavetoreformorberemoved.
26
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Asidefromthesedefectsinleadershipandorganization,theVietminhhad tograpplewithcertaininevitableproblemsinherentinthesituationinIndochina,whichmadetheformationandefficientoperationoforganizationsdifficult. As in any underdeveloped area, there was a shortage of trained personnel, technicians as well as administrators. For lack of lower-echelon administrators,thecentraladministrationtendedtokeepmuchofthepowerin itsownhandsandtoissueincrediblydetailedinstructionstothelowerlevels. Notonlydidthisseverelycurtailtheinitiativeoflowerofficials,butitalsoput agreatburdenoftimeandlaboronthetoppeople.Astimewenton,however, theVietminhsucceededintrainingnewpersonnelandthuseliminatingsome oftheworstbottlenecks. Another serious obstacle to Viet progress was created by the minority groups, most of whom lived in the mountain areas.As mentioned earlier, thesegroupsregardedtheVietminhasaVietnamesegovernment,andthusas onetobefearedanddistrusted.ThoughGiaphadsucceededinovercoming someoftheseprejudiceswhenheworkedinthemountainousareasduring WorldWarII,hecontinuedtomeetacertainamountofoppositionallthrough therevolutionarywar.However,theFrenchwereslowtoexploittheiradvantageinthisrespect.Itwasnotuntil1953thattheyorganizedguerrillagroups inthemountainstostrikeattheVietminhlinesofcommunications.Bythat time,theirdilatorytacticsoverthegrantingofindependenceandtheirinabilitytoprotecttheminoritieshadlostthemmuchofthelatter’ssupport. AnotherdifficultyfortheVietminhlaywiththenationalistswhowerenot Communists,yetwhosesupportwasessentialifthewarwastobewon.Therefore,evenastheCommunistsbecamestronger,theywerecarefultodisguise orsoft-pedaltheirpurelyCommunistobjectivesandtoemphasizenationalist andreformideastothegeneralpopulation.Aslateas1952,whentheyclearly hadcontrolofthemovement,theywerestillcautiousaboutpreachingpure Communismoutsidetheirownorganization. The Vietminh ultimately perfected an organization that allowed them to defeattheFrench,andtheymustbegiventheirduefororganizationalachievement.Yettherewereflawsintheoperationofthesystem,andthespeechesof Hoandotherstestifytothepresenceofinternaldifficulties.Indealingwith manyoftheseproblems,theVietminhwereaidedbytheinertiaandinflexibility of the French. There were opposition groups, for example, whom the French,hadtheybeenalerttothesituation,mightwellhaveusedeffectively toweakentheVietminh.Also,iftheFrenchhadbeenquickertorecognizethe tremendoussurgeofnationalismandtheopportunityitaffordedthemtomeet thedemandforindependenceingoodfaith,theycouldhaveincreasedthedifficultiesoftheVietminhmanytimes.Evenaslateas1950,manyVietnamese werewillingtogivetheFrenchachancetoshowthattheymeanttostandby theirstatementsinfavorofindependenceforVietnam,buttheFrenchcontinuedtoprocrastinate.Vietnamesenationalistswerethusslowlydiscreditedand
THEVIETMINHMILITARYORGANIZATION
27
forced into the Vietminh camp. It was similar with the potentially strong oppositionoftheminoritiesinthemountainareas.Hereagain,Frenchprocrastination,lackofunderstandingoftheneedsofthesegroups,andevidence, nowandthen,ofFrenchduplicityeventuallyturnedthoseminoritiestothe Vietminh.With this failure to exploit all opportunities for undermining the Vietorganizationandmovementthroughpoliticalandpsychologicalaction, theprospectsofaFrenchmilitaryvictorybecamemoreandmoreremote. NOTES 1. In1951,HoChiMinhannouncedthecreationoftheLaoDong(Workers’)Party, essentiallythefirstovertappearanceoftheCommunistPartysinceits“dissolution”in 1945. 2. Seepp.18–19.
Chapter3
VIETMINHPERSONNELAND LOGISTICS
FewregimeshaveemphasizedasstronglyastheVietminhtheimportanceof thetotalmobilizationofthepopulace.Theconstitutionof1946providedfor universalmilitaryconscription,andin1949thegovernmentactuallyordered the draft. In practice, however, it did not prove feasible, for the Vietminh governmentwasfarfromhavingthebureaucraticmachinerynecessarytoput suchalawintoeffect.RecruitingfortheVietminharmy,therefore,remained informal.Bytheendofthewar,Vietminhforcesnumberedabout300,000men, asmallpercentageoftheestimated28milliontotalpopulationofVietnam.It istruethattheVietminhcontrolledthelesspopuloussectionsofthecountry; but, on the other hand, they were able to draw many of their recruits from French-heldareas. RECRUITMENT Sincenoattemptatconscriptionwasreallyevermade,theVietminhhave alwaysclaimedthatthemenwhoservedhadvolunteered.Infact,theVietminh put great effort into sporadic recruiting campaigns, which combined pressurewithpropagandaandenticement.Itisknownthatsomeyoungmen wereforciblydraggedintothearmedforces,andthatinothercasesindirect pressurewasbroughttobearonfamiliesorvillageleaderstosupplyrecruits. Usually,strong-armandotherpressuremethodswereaccompaniedbypropaganda appeals to the prospective recruits to serve their country against the Europeanimperialistsandforthebettermentofsociety.OpenlyCommunistic appealsweregenerallyavoided.Inducementsforthosewhojoinedincluded thepromiseofimprovedlivingconditionsandageneraleducation.Deserters
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andprisonersofwarwereacceptedaftercarefulpoliticalindoctrination,but theirnumberalwaysremainedsmall. ThemotivesofthemenfreelyjoiningthearmedforcesoftheVietminhwere probablyoftenmixedandcannotbedeterminedaccurately.Certainlypatriotism and,insomecases,Communistbeliefswerethedominantmotivations.Inother instances,theattractionofgoodfoodandclothingandpossiblefutureeducation mayhavebeentheincentives.Thelureofadventureandescapefromadreary life probably caused some to join. A French poll of Viet prisoners of war attemptedtodiscoverwhytheyhadjoinedthearmy.Inthisgroup,38percent statedthattheybelievedintheVietminhcause;25percentexpressedresentment at having been forced into the army against their wishes; 23 per cent indicatedthatthey,too,hadbeencompelledtojoin,butdidnotseemtoresent theuseofforce;finally,6percenthadfeltthearmyprovidedaninteresting career.The survey results should be judged with reservations, because those capturedprobablyconstitutedtheleastreliableandmostpoorlyindoctrinatedof thearmyandhencewerenotafullyrepresentativesegment.Periodically,the Vietminhseemedtosuffershortagesofman—power—anindicationthattheir means of compulsion and persuasion were not wholly successful. (Women volunteersmadeuponlyasmallminorityofthearmy’stotalstrength.) Throughtheirprisoners,theFrenchalsosoughttodiscoverthesocialcompositionoftheVietminhforces.Theresultsoftheinquiryshowedthat46percent ofthearmywascomposedofpeasantsandlaborers,withlaborersinthemajority. (It is not clear why the French did not classify these two groups separately.) Accordingtotheprisoners,48percentwerepettyofficials,andtheremaining 6percentcamefrommiscellaneousprofessionsandtrades.Thepettyofficials thusconstitutednearlyhalfthearmy,althoughpeasantsmadeupthemajorityof thepopulation.ItshouldbenotedthattheFrenchcontrolledmostoftheurban areaswheremostpettyofficialslived.Thepercentagesseemtosuggestthatthese officialsweremoreattractedbyCommunistpropagandathanwerethepeasants, whowerealsoexposedtotheVietminhterrortactics.Itislikely,however,that theseFrenchstatisticsapplytoheadquarterandelitegroups,notthelineunits. Recruitingbeganatthevillagelevel.TheVietsattemptedtoorganizethe peopleofeveryvillageandgroupofvillagesintopart-timesemimilitarized workersfortheVietminhwareffort.Althoughthesepeoplewereneitherin uniformnoractuallypartofthemilitaryforces,theywerepotentialsoldiers. Once they had been politically indoctrinated and had received some very rudimentarydiscipline,theygraduatedtothevillageguerrillacellandfrom theretotheregionalforces. TRAINING Trainingvariednotonlyinthethreetypesofforces,butwiththedifferent echelons in each. The popular forces, or guerrillas, had a self-training
VIETMINHPERSONNELANDLOGISTICS
31
program,withassistancefromtheregionaltroopsandoccasionalaidfrom noncomsandofficersoftheregulararmy.Theirtrainingwaslargelypolitical, butitincludedsomeinstructionintheuseofpersonalweapons,aswellas lessonsinsabotage.Someofthemoreadvancedvillageunitshadclose-order drillandeveninstructiononautomaticweapons.Atthedistrictlevel,companies underwent additional training, with continued emphasis on individual arms, more instruction in the use of automatic weapons, and elementaryeducationinsmall-unittactics. Themembersoftheregionalunitsusuallyweregraduatesofthepopular forces and thus had had some of the training outlined above. Once they joined the regional forces, they received more individual instruction and begantostudyunittactics.Regulararmyofficersassignedtotheregional unitsprovidedtheformaltraining.Inaddition,“regionalschools”instructed soldiersintheuseofthemoredifficultweaponsandinspecialskillsand lower-level staff duties. During this phase of training, the individual not only gained considerable military knowledge but had the opportunity to experiencecombatandtolearntoadapthimselftomilitarylife.Fromthese regional troops were eventually chosen the members of the regular army. Theprocessofrisingthroughthissystemoftentookseveralyears. Uptothispoint,theirregularfighter’straininghadbeensporadicandhad inmostcasessufferedfromalackofweaponsandashortageofinstructors. Butassoonashegraduatedtotheregulararmy,hewasexposedtoformaland intensivedisciplineunderhighlytrainedVietminhofficersandoftenChinese instructors.Moreover,hereceivedauniform,individualweapons,andbetter foodandequipment. Uponenteringtheregulararmy,thesoldierwasobligedtotakeaten-point oath,inwhichheswore(1)tosacrificeeverythingforthegoodofthecause; (2) to obey his officers completely; (3) to fight resolutely and without complaint;(4)totraindiligently;(5)tokeepsecrets;(6)tobeartortureifcaptured;(7)nevertorevealinformation;(8)totakecareofhisequipment;(9)to respect and help the civilian population; and (10) to maintain high morale. Theoathwasnotonlythesoldier’sguideastowhatwasexpectedofhim,but alsoanindicationoftheVietminh’schiefpointsofconcern.Thefactthattwo ofthetenpointsdealtwithsecurityorthepreservationofthe“secret”reveals thateventhesternlyindoctrinatedVietminhsoldiers,likemeninotherarmies, couldnotresistthetemptationtotellwhattheirunitwasgoingtodo.Morale seemedtobeanotherspecialconcern,andthewordingofpoint9underlined thecloseassociationofthesoldierwiththecivilianpopulation. Beyondtherequirementoftheoath,remindersofthevirtuesandqualities oftheVietsoldierwerepartofthemen’straining.Acaptureddocument—The PopularArmyofVietnam—whichoriginatedwiththeOfficeofPropaganda andInstruction,containsalesson-by-lessonoutlineofatypicalindoctrination course. It lists such obvious prerequisites as bravery, patriotism, and the
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willingacceptanceofmilitarydiscipline,andfurtherdemandsofeverysoldier anendeavortoservethepeople,toacquiretheproperpoliticalideas,andto improvehimselfinallways.Inaddition,themanualcallsoneachmantohave feelingandaffectionforhisfellowsoldiers,andliterallyconcludeswiththe statement:“Thearmyisonegreathappyfamily.” Vietminhleadersalwaysmaintainedthattheirsoldiersfoughtwillinglyand happily. In practice, despite their condemnation of discipline in the enemy army,theVietminhthemselvesinsistedonverystrictdiscipline.Butasthe above-mentionedmanualexplained,whereasdisciplinewastyrannicalinthe imperialistarmies,itwasgoodandproperintheVietminharmy.Communist discipline, according to the pamphlet, was self-imposed, and assured the properpoliticalindoctrinationofthesoldiersandthustheefficientfunctioningoftheliberationforces. Since the Vietminh considered infantry the decisive arm of combat, all soldiersreceivedatleastbasicinfantrytraining.Close-orderdrilldeveloped precisionandquickresponsetoorders;instructiononsuchpersonalinfantry weaponsasrifle,grenade,andbayonetfollowed.Greatemphasiswasplaced on camouflage and personal protection, and a considerable amount of time wasspentonterrainstudiesandmethodsofgeographicorientation. Some soldiers were trained as assault troops and were strictly riflemen; otherswereslatedtobecomemembersofthefirepowerorsupportelements and were, therefore, concerned with heavier weapons, i.e., machine guns, bazookas, recoilless rifles, and mortars. Careful and intensive training was providedontheseweapons,andtheVietminhsoldierdevelopedgreatskillin theiruse,particularlyinthehandlingofrecoillessriflesandmortars,which, particularlyintheearlystagesofthewar,tooktheplaceofartillery. Oncethesoldierhadbecomecompetentwithweaponsandfamiliarwith small-unittactics,hewastaughtlargerunittacticsandtheintricaciesofmaneuveringwithheavy-weaponsupport.Battalionandregimentalassaulttactics were rehearsed over and over, often with models of French posts and forts simulatingtheobjectives,untilthesoldierknewhisrolesowellthatithad becomepracticallyautomatic.Actually,however,unittacticsneverbecameas rigidasthismightindicatebutwereadaptedtospecificsituations. A small portion of the soldiers’ time was devoted to obtaining a general education.Manyoftherecruitswereilliterate,andthearmyprovidedtheirfirst basicschoolingandevenofferedsomecoursesinliteratureandphilosophy. Inthecourseofthewar,theVietminhdevelopedanextensiveschoolsystem, partlyinVietnamandpartlyinRedChina.Therewereschoolsforthevarious weapons,andtwoschools—atHaGiangandBacKan—trainedofficersfor regimentalduty.EvenbeforetheRedChinesereachedtheborder,somemen hadbeentrainedintheCommunist-heldareasofChina,andafewhadbeen trainedbytheChineseNationalists.However,astheVietminhbegantoform regimentsandtothinkintermsofdivision-sizeforces,theirtrainingneeds
VIETMINHPERSONNELANDLOGISTICS
33
grew. Red China provided schools for noncommissioned, company-grade, andstaffofficers.ParticularlywelcomedbytheVietminhweretheschoolsfor specialists,whoweredesperatelyneededforthemoremodernarmythatwas being formed: Engineers were trained at the engineers’ school at Nanning, whiletanktroopsstudiedatthearmoredschoolatWuMing,bothinChina. Reportedly,somemenwenttoChinaforpilottraining,althoughtheVietminh neverhadanairforce.Ithasbeenestimatedthat,bythetimeofthecease-fire, in1954,upto40,000VietminhsoldiershadreceivedtraininginRedChina.In additiontoprovidingschoolfacilities,theChinesealsosentalargenumberof instructorstoIndochinafordutywiththestaffandregularunitsand,insome cases,withtheterritorialcommands. Themostimportantaspectofthesoldiers’training,however,andthatwhich consumedthemosttime,wasthepolitical.Itstwoobjectivesweretoproduce politically reliable and enthusiastic soldiers and to provide effective propaganda agents. (Giap stated repeatedly that the soldier’s work as a political agentwasatleastequalinimportancetohisdutyasafighter.)Theopportunities for agents were varied and many, since regular units frequently lived amongthepeopleandinfiltratedenemy-heldareas.Thecustomofassigning regular-armymentodutywiththeregionalandpopularforcesalsofurnished wideopportunityforindoctrination. TheaforementionedmanualonThePopularArmyofVietnamtellsagood dealaboutthenatureofthesoldiers’politicalindoctrinationandrevealsthe themesthatwerestressedmostheavily.Itbeginswithabriefhistoryofthe army,towhich,significantly,itrefersasthe“troopsofpropagandaandliberation.”This thought is restated in the definition of the army’s two principal missionsasbeing,first,tospreadpropagandainordertowinpeopletothe causeandtogainrecruits,and,second,towagethearmedstruggleagainstthe enemy.ThemainargumentsofthepamphletarethattheFrenchhavedeprived theVietnameseoftheirindependenceaswellastheirindividualliberties,and thatthetyrannyofimperialismmustbesmashed.Thereareonlysubtleand minorreferencestoCommunistaims,thoughtheCommunistWorkers’Party (DangLaoDong)ispraisedforitseffectiveleadership. AfavoriteCommunistdevice—self-criticism—waswidelyusedinpolitical training.CapturedVietminhmaterialisfullofsuchself-critiques,painstakinglywrittenbysemi-literatesoldierswhohadbeenforcedtolookbackinto their lives and to confess any crimes they might have committed against society.Thesereportswentintoconsiderabledetailandcoveredallfacetsof life.Oneyoungsoldier,forexample,admittedthathehadstolensomericeat theageofsixandhad,inlateryears,beenselfishinhisdealingswithother membersofthevillage.Themoralwasalwaysthatonemustbewillingto sacrificeoneselfforthewelfareofsociety. The large amount of time and careful planning devoted to political indoctrination brought results.There is no question that theVietminh were
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able to create a large and dedicated army. Desertions were very rare, and moraleproblemsrelativelyfew.1 MEDICALSERVICES Inthisunderdevelopedcountrytherenaturallywerefewdoctors,andcertainly notenoughtoanswertheneedsofthearmedforces.However,theVietminh attemptedtoprovidemedicalservicefortheirregularunits.Theirgoalwasan ambitiousone:Abouthalfamilefromthebattlefieldtherewastobeacollection point where all the wounded men would be assembled and given a cursory examination.Atasortingarea,aboutthreetosixmilesfromthefront,doctors wouldseparatethemoreseriouslywoundedfromtheslightlyinjuredandevacuatethemtoahospitalsomefivetotenmilesfarthertotherear.(Thehopeless caseswouldnotbemovedandwouldbelefttodie.)Approximatelytwelveto twentymilesfromthefront,therewastobeanoperatinghospital.Inpractice, nothinglikethisexisted.However,everyregulardivisionhadamedicalcompany, usuallywithatleastonedoctor,andmaintainedanevacuationandhospitalservice.InseveraloftheViet-heldareastherewererecuperationpoints.Bythe timeofthecease-fire,theChinesehadsentlargeamountsofmedicalsuppliesto Indochina,buttheyhadnotbeenabletotrainthenecessarymedicalpersonnel, orspareenoughoftheirown,tosupplytheVietminhwithanadequate,wellfunctioningorganization.Medicalservicefortheregionalandpopularforces wasvirtuallynonexistentandatbestveryprimitive. COMMUNICATIONSANDLOGISTCS ThereislittlepreciseinformationontheVietminhcommunicationsystem. Vietleaderswerequicktorecognizetheimportanceofcommunications,and earlyinthewartriedtopurchaseradiosfromforeigncountriesandtorepair captured or abandoned Japanese equipment. At the beginning, before the adventofmassiveChineseaid,thegreatdiversityofequipmentcomplicated therepairandmaintenanceproblems,particularlyinviewoftheshortageof trainedtechnicians.TheVietminhdidsucceedinrepairingtheciviliantelephoneandtelegraphlinesofthecountryandusingthemforroutinemessages. Butwhiletheyemployedthecivilianradionet,theywereanxioustodevelop theirownmilitarynetworkasfaraspossible.Bytheendofthewar,thanksto Chineseaid,evenunitsassmallascompaniesandplatoonshadatleastone radio and were thus in communication with their adjacent units and higher headquarters.Semaphoreunitswereusedattimes,andmessengersremained averyimportant element of the communication system.There was also an elaboratesystemofrunnerswithrelaystations. Throughoutthewar,ontheotherhand,theVietminhwastroubledbythe variousphasesoflogistics—theproduction,acquisition,andtransportationof
VIETMINHPERSONNELANDLOGISTICS
35
arms,food,andequipment.TheyhadstartedoutwithsomeJapaneseequipment, partofitstolenandtherestfreelygivenatthetimeoftheJapanesesurrender. SomematérielhadalsobeenparachutedtothembytheAlliesduringthefight againsttheJapanese.Earlyinthewar,aconsiderableamountofequipmentwas shippedfromThailandtotheVietminh,butin1948,achangeinThaiforeign policyclosedoffthissupply.NationalistChinasentaidbylandandsea(even thoughtheFrenchostensiblyhadcontrolofthesea),2andsomematérielcame fromthePhilippines.WiththeexceptionofwhathadbeenacquiredfromJapan, mostoftheequipmentwasofAmericanmake.Othermatérielwascapturedor stolenfromtheFrenchinthecourseofthewar.Indeed,theVietminhsetupa pricescaleforsuchstolenequipment,bywhichtheywerewillingtopayupto threehectaresofnationallandforcertainspecialitems. Localproductionwasamajorsourceofarmsandequipment.Manysmall shops,employingfromtentofifteenworkers,wouldoperateinagivenarea. Partlyorwhollymobile,theycouldbemovedfromplacetoplaceaccording to the threat of the French advance. These shops made the crudest sort of equipment,withmanpoweroftentheonlysourceofenergyandautomobile motorsandsimpleenginesavailableonlyattimes.Someworkshopslimited themselvestomakingminesandexplosives,whichwereusedheavilybythe guerrillas.Productionintheseworkshopswasgearedtolocalneeds,andeven at the end of the war, there were few factories producing for nationwide consumption.Anotableexceptionwasthemanufactureofbazookas,which was centered entirely in the Tonkin area. The larger shops and factories (employing up to 500 persons) were more or less permanently located in firmlyheldVietminhbases. Therewerefewfactoriesinthesouth,thoughsmallanddispersedshops existedinthePlainedesJoncs,Cochinchina.CambodiaalsohadsomeimportantshopsnearAmpil,butLaoshadvirtuallynone. Despite the shortage of precision tools, power, and raw materials, the Vietminhmanagedtoproducefairlylargequantitiesofmaterials.Inthefirst sixmonthsof1948,forinstance,theVietsreportedthatshopsinoneintersector produced 38,000 grenades, 30,000 rifle cartridges, 8,000 cartridges for lightmachineguns,60roundsforabazooka,and100mines.Anothersector produced 61 light machine guns, 4 submachine guns, 20 automatic pistols, and7,000cartridgesintheentireyear1948.Besidesmanufacturing,someof theseshopsexcelledinrepairingandmodifyingweapons.Noneofthem,of course, was able to produce any heavy equipment, though one factory in Tonkinwasmaking120-mm.mortarsasearlyas1949. Only with the arrival of Chinese aid did the logistical problems of the Vietminhbegintobesolved.Accordingtoreliableestimates,petroleumproductsandmunitionscomprised75percentofChineseaid,whiletheremaining 25percentconsistedofarmsandmedicalandsignalequipment.Thoughthe preciseextentofChineseaidisnotknown,thefollowingfiguresseemtobe
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generallyaccepted:In1951,therateofaidfromChinawasabout10to20 tonspermonth.Bytheendof1952,theflowhadrisento250tons,andin 1953,itaveragedbetween400and600tons.Atthebeginningoftheassault onDienBienPhu,Chineseaidwassaidtobeupto1,500tonsamonth,and byJune,1954,itreportedlyhadreached4,000tons. Ithasbeenestimatedthat75percentofChinesesuppliesenteredIndochina atTaLungandwentbywayofCaoBang,NguyenBinh,BacKan,andThai NguyentoVietminhinthewestoraroundtheFrench-heldDeltatoforcesin the south.A secondary route led from Pinghsiang in China to Dong Dang, LangSon,andfromtherebypoorerroadstoThaiNguyen.Twootherentrance points,LaoKayandBanNamCuong,wereconsideredoflittleimportance. TheChinesehadbuiltarailroadtotheIndochinaborderintheeast,butthere wasnonetotakethegoodsfromtheborderintoIndochina.Materials,therefore, hadtobestoredwhenevertheViettransportschedulefellbehind,particularly aftersupplyrouteshadbeenhardhitbyairattack. Inthisunderdevelopedcountry,withitsoneortworailwaysandfewroads, transportationwasboundalwaystoposeaproblem,andtotheveryendofthe war,thecoolieswereitsmainstay.TheVietminhorganizedwhattheycalledthe “auxiliaryservice,”whichwasessentiallyalaborforceoflocalinhabitants.It provided transportation facilities by coolies and whatever equipment was available.Inanattempttocontrolthisorganizationclosely,theVietminhallowed only certain units or headquarters—such as the General Staff, the General DirectorateofFood,interzonecommands,andotherhighechelons—tocallon itsservices.Theauxiliaryforcewasorganizedingroupsof15meneach,with 3groups making up a section and 3 sections a company. With this simple organization,theVietminhaccomplishedalmostincrediblelogisticalfeats. Logisticsexpertshaddrawnuptablesshowingwhatcouldbeexpectedfrom thisprimitivetransportationsystem.Forinstance,ontheplainsoronreasonably levellandwithfewobstacles,thecoolieswereexpectedtodo15.5milesperday (12.4 at night) carrying 55 lbs. of rice or from 33 to 44 lbs. of arms. In mountainousareas,theday’smarchwasshortenedtoabout9miles,or7.5miles atnight,andtheloadwasreducedto28.6lbs.ofriceand22to33lbs.ofarms. Itwasestimatedthatbuffalocartscouldcarryapproximately770lbs.andtravel about7.5milesperday,whileahorsecartcouldcarryonly473lbs.butcould travel about 12.4 miles a day. The Vietminh made important use of mule companies,andalsoofbicycles,whichwereloadedwithasmuchas150pounds and pushed by coolies. Wherever possible, they also took advantage of the waterways. AftertheChineseCommunistshadreachedtheborder,theVietminhslowly builtuptheirmotortransport,anditwasestimatedthatby1953,theyhada total of close to 1,000 trucks. About a third of these were organized into Regiment16.Thisunit,whosetaskitwastocarrysuppliesfromtheborderto themaindepots,wasdividedinto9companies,eachwith90to100menand
VIETMINHPERSONNELANDLOGISTICS
37
approximately 35 trucks. The 9 companies operated independently of one another,ratherthaninthemotor-poolfashionoftheAmericanarmy.Thiswas dictatedbythefactthattheFrenchairforce,initsattemptstointerdictthe supplysystem,hadsucceededincuttinganumberofbridges,andtheVietminhdidnothavetheengineerstorepairthesebridgesrapidlyenough,sothat theareaofsupplyandcommunicationhadbeencutintoanumberofsegments. TheVietminhsimplyputatruckcompanyofRegiment16intoeachofthese segments, which thereupon became a self-sufficient transportation sector, withitsowngasolinestocks,supplies,andrepairshops.Thoughthissystem involvedinnumerabletransfersofequipment,theplentifulsupplyofmanpower enabledittooperatesuccessfully. As the need arose for new roads or supplementary routes, the Vietminh marshaledthenecessarylaborforceandconstructedthem.Thus,inthelate fallof1953,aroadwasbuiltfromTuanGiaotoapointnearDienBienPhuto assurethedeliveryofsuppliesfortheimpendingbattle. Whilethisprimitiveuseofmanpoweryieldedresults,itcausedaserious drainontheavailablelaborforce.OneVietminhdivision,inasimpleoperation,isestimatedtohaverequiredabout40,000porterstosupplyitsminimum needs.Whenoneremembersthatthesedivisionshadverylittleheavyequipmentandwerenotmotorized(thusrequiringnoPOL3),thiswasanenormous supportforce.Oneoftheobviousreasonsforthestaggeringnumberofporters wasthefactthat,inadditiontoarmysupplies,theportershadtocarrytheir personalprovisions.Andespeciallywherethelinesofcommunicationwere long,thecoolies’ownsuppliesoftenmadeupthebulkoftheirburden.However,therewereadvantagestothisprimitivesystem.Coolieswerenotonly plentiful,butabletotravelcross-country,andtheireasilyconcealedcolumns werealmostimmunetoairattack. NOTES 1. OnemajorexceptionwastheperiodoflowmoraleaftertheVietminhdefeats earlyin1951.Seep.11. 2. AsrecalledintheIntroduction,theChineseNationalists,aftertheJapanesesurrenderinWorldWarII,agreedwiththeAlliestooccupynorthernVietnam,ostensibly toholdthatterritoryuntiltheFrenchwereabletoreturntoIndochina.Actually,however,theChinesewerenotunwillingtohelptheVietminh.Theyhaddesignsonthe harborofHaiphong,importanttoChinesecommerce,andindeedhadhopesofreplacingtheFrench,oratleastofretainingcontroloftheTonkinarea.Hencetheyplayed theVietminhoffagainsttheFrench. 3. Petroleum,Oil,andLubricants.
Chapter4
VIETMINHOPERATIONS ANDTACTICS
AbroadpoliticalobjectiveunderlaytheVietminh’stactics,asitdidtheirstrategy. WhereWesternwaraimsweremerelytooccupyacertainterritoryortobreak thewilloftheenemy,theVietrevolutionarieswantedtowinthesupportor gain control of the populace. In their tactical teachings, they continually emphasizedthatthegoalofanattackwasnotalonetodestroyagivenFrench postbuttoliberatetheinhabitantsinthesurroundingareaandgaintheirsupport.“Someofourcadresharborthemistakenidea,”saidGiapin1952,“that armeddeedsconstitutetheonlymissionofarmedforces.Theydonotfocus attentiononservingtheplanoftotalconflictandespeciallypropaganda.”He wentontocomplainthatthismisconceptioninVietminhquartershadallowed theenemytomakeprogressinhispropagandainsomeareaswherethepopulationremainedsympathetictotheFrench,andVietrecruiting,intelligence, andotheractivitieshadbeencorrespondinglyhampered. On the strictly military plane, a study of theVietminh’s successes suggeststhattheyrestedchieflyonthreeinterrelatedfactors:(1)asetoffive simpletacticalprinciples;(2)full,accurate,andup-to-dateintelligence;and (3)detailedplanning. PRINCIPLESANDPREREQUISITES TheVietminhtaughtfiveprinciplesoftactics.Thefirstofthesewasspeed ofmovementinallphasesofcombat.Forcesweretoconcentratequickly,take positions at once, and not linger in any one area.They usually would start fromagivenpointandmarchfortwoorthreenightstotheareaofattack, creatingastrongelementofsurprisefortheFrench,whowerenotawareofthe
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directionoftheVietmovements.Thepositionwouldbedevelopedinonenight, andtheattacklaunchedintheveryearlymorning.Inpursuit,speedwasperhaps evenmoreimportant.“Oncetheenemyisdisorganized,”wroteGiap,“itisnecessarytoignorefatigueinorderautomaticallytobeginthepursuitwithoutawaiting orders.”Hecitedthelackofvigorinthefallcampaignof1950asacaseinwhich Viettroopshadnotbeensufficientlyimbuedwithmotivationfortheenemy’s total destruction and had thus wasted the sacrifices already made. Giap went furtherthanAmericandoctrineinbeingwilling,ifnecessary,toforgoreorganizationafterbattle,forheconsidereditmoreimportanttoseektoovertakethe enemyatonceandtocontinuestrikinghim.IfGiap’sapproachwassuccessful, thiswasattributablepartlytohistroops’intensedesiretoannihilatetheenemy (ratherthanconqueragivenpieceofterrain).Butinpartitwasduetothefactthat theVietarmy,beingessentiallyaninfantrybody,wasrelativelysimpleinstructure,andreorganizationthereforewasnotagreatproblem.Inretreat,too,speed was all-important. First of all, the Vietminh emphasized, one must never be caughtwithoutawayofretreat.Thewaymightbeeitheradefinitelinefromthe battle area or a plan by which soldiers would melt into the population and “disappear,”sometimesindividuallyandsometimesinsmallgroups.Troops thusdispersedwereeitherreconcentratedlaterorwerelefttosustainandaidthe guerrillasofthearea,dependingonthesituation. Surprise,thesecondprincipleofViettactics,combinedtheelementsofspeed, secrecy,andthechoiceofunsuspectedobjectives.Afavoritedevice,“intoxication of the enemy,” involved a series of deliberate deceptions.TheViet side woulddeliberatelyleakinformationtotheenemythatwouldmisleadhiminto expectinganattackinacertainplaceatacertaintime.Tothisend,theywould makeupfakedocumentsandplantthemondoubleagentsandonpersonswho apparentlyhad“rallied”totheFrenchcause.ThenumericaldesignationofregularunitswouldbeattachedtoregionalunitsinordertoconfusetheFrench.All unitswouldbemovedbackandforthtogiveanimpressionofthemovementof largenumbers.Asmentionedbefore,nightmarchesthatavoidedvillagesand inhabitedareaswereanothermeansofcreatingsurprise.Inalarge-scalecampaign,allthesedevicesmightbeemployedincombination. Anothertacticalprinciplewastoundermineenemymoraleineveryway possible.VietagentswereinfiltratedintoFrenchcampstoencouragetreason andspreadpropaganda.Also,theVietminhdidnothesitatetomakethreats againstpro-Frenchfamilies.AlthoughGiapwasratherreluctanttopaybribes or to use women for black-mail and bribery, these means were not always neglected.Asageneralrule,theVietminhwouldattackonlyifthemanpower ratiowasintheirfavor,buttheybelievedthatwiththerightcombinationof surpriseandruse,ahighlydisciplinedsmalloutfitcouldoftenprevailovera largerforce.Theywouldrelyonthosemeansinexceptionalcircumstances, butonlywhentheyfeltcertainofbeingabletherebytooffsetashortagein manpower.
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MuchthoughtwasgiventosecurityfortheVietforces.Speciaiintelligence units,whosefunctionsweremuchbroaderthan,forexample,thoseofAmericanintelligenceunits,playedtheroleofsecurityandreconnaissanceforces, andwereusedtoscreenregularforcesaswellastocoverthem.Theyalso infiltratedtheenemyfronttogaininformationonthepreparednessandmorale oftheenemy.Regionalandpopulartroopswereusedtoprotecttheregular forces and permit them to fight under the most advantageous conditions. Regionalandpopularforces,inturn,werecoveredbysmallgroupswithlittle formalorganization,infact,bythelocalinhabitants. Thelastprincipleoftacticscalledforthecollaborationofthepopulacein allmilitaryactions.Theparadoxhereisthatsupportfromthepeoplewasno longermerelyanaimofViettacticsbutanintegralpartofthem.Amonthly reportofthe80thRegimentre-emphasizedtheimportanceofthisprinciple bystatingthattheaimofregimentalattackswasnotsomuchtotakeFrench postsastogaincontrol over the population.The 80th Regiment, although part of the regular forces, was detached to a territorial command, and its reportspecifiedfurtherthattheraisond’êtreoftheguerrillaunit,nomatter whatitssize,wastoestablishandmaintainapolitical-militaryorganization initsarea,whichformedabasisforregularoperations.Giapelaboratedon thispointinaSeptember,1952,directive: Inordertointensifyguerrillaactivityourattentionmustbefocusednotonlyon theregionaltroopsbutalsoonthearmedbasesofthecommunesandthecommunalguerrillas.Theprincipalquestionisthatofpopulartroopsandtheguerrillas.Incertainregionsonestrivestoreinforcethesetroopsbutisfacedwith greatdifficulties.Themoraleofthepopulation[there]isnotassolidaselsewhere. The bases of the popular troops and the cells of the party have been largelyannihilatedbytheenemyandnolongerpresentasatisfactorysituation. These armed bases cannot perform their activities and are safeguarded only withgreatdifficulty.Thus,ourmissionoffirstpriorityistoreinforcethepopularbases.
OnanotheroccasionGiapremarked: Guerrilla[warfare]isanarmedstruggleofallclassesofthepeople.Aslongas thepeopledonothaveastronghateoftheenemyintheirhearts,donothavean energeticfightingspirit,aslongasthemechanismoftheregionalauthorityand theactionofthepartyarenotbasedonasolidorganization,oneisnotableto createamovementforalargebattleorforintensifiedguerrillaaction.
IntheVietminhinstructionsforDichVangroupsthathaveinfiltratedenemyheldareas,thereisthesentence:“Itisthedutyofthosewhoareintheenemy zonetocreateactionaroundthem,tostriketheenemywithprecisionandspeed whereverheis,destroyingallopponentsandappropriatingstocksandmateriel,
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andresortingtoambush,attacks,andothermeasuresthatcreatedisorderand discontent.” Theofficeofthepoliticalcommissarforeveryunithaditspropaganda sectioninchargeofpsychologicalwarfare.Itpreparedpamphletsandnewspapersfordistributiontothecivilianpopulationaswellasthetroopsand workedouttopicsforthepropagandaeffortoftheindividualsoldier. ApropagandainstructiontothetroopsthatweretoinvadeLaosin1953 reflectsthemainthemesofVietminhpropagandadirectedtowardinhabitants of the mountain areas. Beginning with the usual condemnation of French imperialistsandtheirdesiretokeepalltheracesofIndochinainslavery,the documentgoesontostressthebrotherhoodoftheseracesandtheircommon causeagainstcolonialism.Hoisportrayedasakindlyandforgivingleader, untiringlyworkingfornationalindependenceandthegoodofallpeoples.The propagandainstructionfurthermoresuggestsstressingthearmy’sloveforthe peopleandthepeople’saffectionforthearmy,andsuppliesalonglistofways inwhichthepeoplemighthelpthearmy.Reassurancetothenativestakesthe formofhelpfulhintsonairsheltersandotherself-defensemeasures,aswell asthepromisethatontherareoccasionswhenthearmyisshortoffood,the governmentwillpaywellforanysuppliesseizedbythetroops.
INTELLIGENCEANDRECONNAISSANCE Not only a careful propaganda plan but painstaking and detailed intelligencecoverageformedpartofthepreparationofeveryVietminhoperation. Priorto1948,therewereonlyaSûretéandaPoliticalIntelligenceService,but their findings were not always readily available to the High Command. In responsetothegrowingneedforapurelymilitary,operationalintelligence service,theQuanBao(MilitaryIntelligence)wasformedabout1948. An elite corps within the army, the Quan Bao was composed of Party memberswhohadbeenespeciallychosenfortheirphysical,mental,and moralqualifications.Aftertheirselection,therecruitswentthroughthree months of special training in schools that frequently changed location. Eachschoolhadatotalofabout150students.Thecourseswerebroadly conceived,andstudentsweresubjectedtophysicalconditioningandselfdefense, sensory training, background information on the French, and reconnaissancework.Astheintelligencecorpswasalsothereconnaissance element of the Vietminh army, the schools placed special stress on the refinementofthephysicalsenses,andfutureagentsweretaughttoimprove theirhearinginordertodeterminenotonlythedirectionofanoisebuttheir own distance from it, and learn to distinguish the dominant from lesser noises.Studentsalsolearnedtoobserveveryquicklyandtogaugeweight without measuring aids. The course included a whole system of helpful tricks,someofthemaselementaryasputtinganeartothegroundtodetect
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noises,orbreathingoutbeforespeakinginordertomakethevoicelower and more distinct.Agents were also instructed in ways to disguise their feelings and were shown how to improve their memory.They learned to writeaccurateandcompletereports,whichwouldgivethesourceaswell asthetimeandcircumstancesofthematterreportedandwouldincludean evaluationbytheagent. Afterthistraining,intelligencerecruitswereassignedtotheirunits.Usually,theseweredividedintotheQuanBao,concernedwithintelligenceina narrowsense,andtheTrinhSat,responsibleforreconnaissance.Companies andbattalionshadonlysmallTrinhSatunits;atregimentanddivisionlevel, however,therewouldbeintelligencecompanies,eachofwhichincludedone QuanBaosectionandtwoTrinhSatsections.TheQuanBaowasthedirecting element,whichplannedandco-ordinatedtheintelligenceeffort,utilizedthe informationgathered,andforthemostpartsuppliedtheintelligenceofficers fortheterritorialcommandsandtheGeneralStaff. While the intelligence service employed such comparatively modern methodsasradiointerceptandtriangulationasmeansofobtaininginformation, it counted heavily on direct personal interrogation of both the local civilians and enemy personnel, and its training schools therefore emphasizedthevalueofobtainingprisoners.Specialgroups,organizedtolaunch attacks for the express purpose of capturing prisoners, usually comprised foursubsections:afiregroup,whichwastocauseconfusionintheenemy ranks;acapturinggroup,whichroundeduptheprisoners;asupportgroup, whichhelpedthecapturinggroupandwatchedforreinforcements;andan escortgroup,whichtooktheprisonerstotherearforinterrogation.Inaddition to these more or less formal assaults, the Vietminh resorted also to ambushandsurpriseattacksonsmallunitsandtriedtoseizeisolatedsoldierswhereverpossible. Fromallaccounts,theVietminhwerepsychologicallyveryadeptatinterrogation.Theywouldinterviewprisonersofwartwoorthreetimes,forlong periodsatastretch,andpreferablyathourswhentheprisoners’resistancewas lowest.Theyhadbeentaughttobeveryobjective,andtoapproachtheprisonerswithoutanyshowofpreconceivedideas.Afavoritepracticewastoemploy ironyorsarcasm,whichtendedtomaketheprisonerlosehispatienceandgive out more information than he intended. Sometimes, Viet agents would be slippedintoprisoners’cellsorenclosures.AccordingtoaccountsbyFrench prisoners,theVietminhseldomresortedtoforce. Asthewarwenton,intelligenceunitstookovermoreandmore,thoughnot all,ofthereconnaissanceandsecuritydutiesformerlyperformedbytheregional andpopulartroops.Atbattalion,regiment,anddivisionlevel,intelligenceunits providedcoverforthemovementsoftheseforcesaswellasthereconnaissance for all operations. In the effort to obtain information they used all possible devices:theywoulddisguisethemselvestoinfiltrateenemyareas,sendarmed
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patrols to contact the enemy and ascertain the location of his positions, and engageincombatifitpromisedtoyieldvaluableinformation. AnyonefamiliarwithUnitedStatesarmyreconnaissancewouldrecognize many of the Vietminh reconnaissance functions, but there were also some ratherimportantdifferences.Responsibleforthesecurityofthetroops,reconnaissanceunitsreconnoiteredbothretreatandadvanceroutesandsearchedfor placessuitableforambush.Agentswereplantedinsuspectzonestokeepthe units informed. Both the teaching and the execution of camouflage were amongthefunctionsofVietreconnaissance.Aftercombat,itwasuptothe reconnaissanceunitstodiscoverwhatlossestheVietminhhadsufferedand what arms had been taken from the enemy.Also, at this point, they were responsibleforrecordingtheirownmistakes,leadingtroopsbacktotheconcentrationarea,guardingtheprisoners,andauthorizingcivilianstoreturnto theirhomesarmedwithpropaganda.Forunitsincamp,theyhadtoinvestigate thecookingareas,examinegiftsfromthelocalpeople,andkeepacheckon relationsbetweentroopsandnativepopulation.Itwastheirduty,furthermore, toguardautomaticweaponsaswellasdocuments,tokeepaneyeonsoldiers in public places, and to prevent desertion. On festive occasions, they were responsibleforthebehavioranddisciplineofthetroopsintown,atthesame timethattheyhadtopostguardsandlookoutsforenemyaircraftandprepare forquickevacuationincaseofattack. CapturedVietminhdocumentshavebroughttolightpainstakingintelligence surveys of French troop dispositions, habits, and activities, which obviously servedtheVietminhasaverygoodplanningbasefortheiroperations.OneintelligencestudypreparedbytheVietminhfortheirnorthwesternoperationsin1952 impressedtheFrenchgreatlybyitsscopeaswellasbythedetailandaccuracyof theinformation.Thedocumentincludedaverycarefulsurveyoftheterrainand its trafficability for all types of vehicles and for coolies. It also contained an objectivestudyofthevarioustribesintheareaandtheirattitudestowardthe VietminhandtheFrench.PartofthissectionwasgivenovertoadetaileddescriptionoftheVietminh’ssecretbasesintheareaandtoaloyaltyestimateofthe peopleinthem.IntheGiaHoi–SaiLuongbase,forinstance,ninetypersonswere markeddownasVietminhsympathizers,ofwhomthirtywereregardedascompletelyreliable.Again,inthePhuNhan–SonThinarea,thereweretwenty-five faithfuladherentsscatteredthroughseveralvillages.Thestudyconcludedby statingthat,althoughthesefiguresdidnotadduptostrongpopularsupport,the basesdidofferacertainhospitalitytotheVietminhtroops.
THEINFANTRYANDTHEMOBILITYFACTOR Vietminhtacticswereessentiallyinfantrytactics.Asignificantamount ofartillerybecameavailableonlyinthelastmonthsofthewar,andarmor waslackingthroughout.Butevenhadtherebeentheheavyequipmentthat theVietminhcontinuedtowishfor,armorandartilleryobviouslyhadvery
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limitedmobilityinanunderdevelopedcountrywiththedifficultterrainof Indochina.Furthermore,Giaprealizedthatitwasquickerandeasiertoturn aguerrillaintoaninfantrymanthanintoatankerorartilleryman. TheViet army’s heavy reliance on infantry meant, first of all, that their combatunitswerenotencumberedwithmanytanksormuchartilleryand thatthebattlecorpswasmoreorlessfreeofcombattrainsandheavyservice units. The army was thus quite mobile and not tied to particular areas or bases.Bythesametoken,itwasnotboundtosticktotheroads,butcould executecross-countrymarcheswithconsiderableeaseandspeedandmanaged to perform great feats of infiltration. Finally, this primarily infantry armywasabletoescapedetectionandattackfromtheair. Mobility—inoffensiveaswellasdefensiveaction—wasthekeytoalloperations,fromthesmallactionsoftheguerrillastothelargercampaignsofthe regularforces.Asmentionedearlier,theregularforceswererarelypermitted to accept battle in unfavorable situations, and were supposed to slip away when in danger of attack from superior French forces. These tactics were essentially like those of guerrillas, who strike and run and avoid battles at almostanycost.Butunliketheguerrillas,whohitinordertocauseconfusion, destroycertainproperty,andkeeptheenemyoffbalance,theregularforces strucktoannihilate.
THEOFFENSIVE TheVietstaughtthattherewerefourimportantprerequisitesforasuccessfulattack:theproperchoiceoftime,acarefulplan,adequatepreparation,and highcombativespirit. Timingoftheattackwasobviouslydependentonthetimeneededforplanningandforconcentratingthetroops,aswellasonthegeneralsituation.To a great extent, however, it also depended on the enemy. When the Viets decidedtoattackapostorfort,itwasnotjustamatterofpreparingaplanand thenexecuting it.They would watch the garrison over a period of time in ordertodiscoverenemyhabitsandweaknesses.Forinstance,theywouldtry to determine when the guards were changed, whether certain guards were habitually not alert, and at what times key officers or noncoms might be expectedtobeabsent;andtheywouldlookforanysignsofcomplacencyor laxity among members of the garrison.All such intelligence information wasthenincorporatedinthefinalplan,whichspecifiedtimeandlocaleof themaineffort,pointsofsecondaryattacks,installationstobeneutralized byfirepower,andprovisionsforretreat.Eachsubordinateunitwasassigned aspecificjob,andalldetailswereworkedoutanddiscussedwiththeofficers andnoncoms.SometimestheVietminhwouldhavearehearsaloftheattack, usingspeciallyconstructedfacsimilesoftheFrenchpostorfort.Allnecessaryequipment,arms,andammunitionhavingbeenprocured,theVietsthen
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setaboutexplainingtothetroopsthereasonfortheattackandtheimportance ofitssuccess,rousingthemtoahighpitchoffanaticismandself-sacrifice, foracombatspiritequaltothetaskathandwasregardedasanindispensable elementinthepreparations. The Viet units often moved to and from the battlefields by infiltration, whichtheypracticedwithgreatskill,therebyescapingairandgrounddetectionandavoidingthedangerofprovidingatargetforairattack.Theyoften infiltratedrightthroughtheFrenchunitssoastocreategreatersurpriseby attacking the enemy from both sides.The French have estimated that the Vietscouldinfiltrateseveralindividualsthroughazonewitha1,300-yard perimeter, several platoons if the perimeter was 2,200 yards, and several companieswhereitwas4,400yardslong.Iftheperimeterwasstilllonger, theymightsucceedininfiltratingabattalionandevenaregiment.TheHanoi Deltaperimeter,forexample,withitspostsabouttwo-thirdsofamileapart, hadvirtuallynoprotectionagainstVietminhinfiltration.1 TheVietminhusuallyattackedatnight,becausethisgavethemseveral advantagesovertheFrench.NotonlyweretheFrenchconsideredpoornight fighters, but in the darkness they lacked air support, and artillery support was difficult.A typical attack would begin at midnight or soon thereafter andbreakoffatnineorteninthemorning.Wheneverpossible,theViets wouldaimatcompletesurprise,oftengivinguppreparatoryfirestothatend. Themaineffort,sometimesasmuchasnine-tenthsoftheattackingforce, usuallywasconcentratedonaverynarrowfront.Theremaindermadediversionaryandnoisyattacks,oftenbeforethemainassault(especiallyifsurprise wasimpossibletoachieve),andtheirfirepowerwouldbedirectedatafew criticalpoints. Normally,fourgroupswereinvolvedintheattack.Thefirstofthesemanned theheavysupportingweapons(usuallyautomaticweapons,mortars,andrecoillessrifles),whoseaimwastoneutralizeoneortwoimportantenemypositions, suchastheradio,thecommandpost,orheavyweapons.Iftheattackwereunsuccessful,theirfirewastocovertheretreat.Thesecondgroupwouldbetheassault engineersordynamiters.Thesemen,whomightbeacompanyoraplatoon,ran forwardorinfiltratedtheenemylinesandexplodeddynamiteincriticalareasof thefortorpostsoastocreateabreach.Leavingallpersonalweaponsbehindin their trenches, the dynamiters were armed only with explosives, which they sometimescarriedontheendsofbamboopolesthatcouldbeforcedintowire entanglements,andonoccasioneventiedtotheirownbodiesinordertohurl themselveswiththechargesintoenemywireorwalls.Iftheywereabletoreturn, theyretrievedtheirweaponsandassistedinthegeneralattack.Oncetheenemy weaponshadbeenneutralizedandthedynamitershadcreatedabreach,thethird group—shocktroopsorassaultinfantry—movedforward,usuallyinthreegroups andonanarrowfront,andattemptedtooverwhelmthepost.Thefourthwasa
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reservegroup,whichcoveredtheshocktroopswithfire,assistedintheattack, andeitherexploitedthesuccessorcoveredtheretreat. Althoughfightingintheattackedenemypositionswasadmittedlydifficult, the Vietminh felt that it could be done successfully if four principles were observed:(1)Carefulplanningandtrainingwereessential.Theplanningwas usuallydonewiththeaidofsandboardsorotherreplicasoftheFrenchposts, and the attack was rehearsed many times. (2) In order to destroy the main enemyinstallations,thetroopshadtopenetrateasdeeplyaspossibleandcould notallowthemselvestobekeptoutontheperipheryofthefort.(3)Therehad tobecloseco-operationandco-ordinationamongthedynamiters,fire-support units, and shock troops. (4) A successful operation required close liaison betweentheattackingunitanditsregimentandneighboringunits. The Vietminh were careful, also, to anticipate strong enemy reactions andcounterattacks.Counterattacks,especially,wereconsideredexcellent opportunities to destroy an enemy who had left his shelter, and special plansweremadeforthiscontingency.Ontheotherhand,ViettacticaldoctrinedemandedthatiftheViets’ownattackingtroopswerecaughtinthree enemyfires,theyconcentrateononeandignoretheothertwo.Whenever they were themselves caught by a frontal attack, they were to avoid the strong places and counterattack the weak. When stopped by an artillery barrage, they were instructed either to retreat, dig in, and await artillery support,oriftheywereclosetotheenemy,to“cling”tohim.Whencutoff orencircled,theyweretotryeithertobreakthroughatonepointortodisband andseektheirwayoutindividually. TheVietminhbelieved(andtheirtraininginstructionssaidsoquiteexplicitly) that if the secret of an impending attack was well kept and the action instantaneous,evenahandfuloflightlyequippedbutwell-armedassailants, undercoverofnightorexpertcamouflage,couldsometimessmashanumerically superior enemy even in an attack on a post. This presupposed being informedtothehourandeventotheminuteofallactivitiesinthepost,soas tobeabletoprofitfromthemomentwhentheenemyrelaxedhiswatchin ordertolaunchtheattack.
CONTROLLINGTHELINESOFCOMMUNICATION Muchofthewareffortonbothsideswasdevotedtothebattleforcommunications.TheVietminhtriedtoparalyzetheFrenchbydenyingthemtheuse of roads, paths, and waterways. The greatest part of guerrilla activity was devotedtomininganddestroyingroads.Incertainareas,theVietminhregularlycuttheroadsatnightandtheFrenchattemptedtorepairthemduringthe day.Nearlyeverywhere,Frenchsoldiershadtochecktheroadsforminesand cutseverymorningbeforetheycouldbeused.
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TheambushwastheVietminh’sfavoritemeansofattackoncommunications.Thiswasnotaspur-of-the-momenttacticbutentailedconsiderable planningandpreparation.Notonlydidguerrillasandregionaltroopsambush isolatedFrenchvehiclesandunits,butthereweremajorambushesoflarger French formations. The Vietminh particularly liked to ambush relief units, usingthefollowingtactics:Astationaryelement,oftencomposedofonecompany(whichweshallcallthe“secondelement”),wouldstraddletheroadata givenpoint,whereitcouldeffectivelyblockoffanyadvance.Approximately 500to1,000yardsfartherinthedirectionfromwhichthereliefcolumnwas coming,the“firstelement,”composedofperhapsfiveunits,wasplacedon bothsidesoftheroad.Finally,a“thirdelement,”aboutthreecompaniesstrong andcalledthe“rearambush,”waitedatadistanceofstillanother1,000yards behindthefirstelement.Positionswerecarefullychosenandweaponsartfully concealed.Astherelievingforceadvanceddowntheroad,itpassedunhinderedandunsuspectingbythethirdandfirstelements,butwasstoppedbythe secondelementblockingtheroad.Assoonasitwasdemobilized,theother two elements struck. The major element, in the middle, attacked the main force,whilethethirdelement,intherear,attemptedtocutoffanyretreatas wellaspossiblereliefforces.2TheFrenchhavecomplainedthat,inspiteofair andotherobservationmeans,theyfounditalmostimpossibletodetectthese ambushesandwerenearlyalwaystrappedinthem.Theonlydefenseagainst them was to devise means of reducing their effectiveness. Sometimes the Frenchwouldmaketheircolumnslongerthanthestretchcoveredbythe ambushing elements, thereby enabling part of their forces to escape and anotherparttocometotherescueofthetrappedunits.Also,theyequippedthe reliefcolumnswithartilleryandarmortohelprouttherebels.Then,too,they discoveredthattheycouldsendasinglevehicle,andeventwoorthreevehicles,downtheroadwithouthavingthemmolestedbytheVietminh,whowere waitingforlargerprey.Duringclearingoperations,theytriedtoprovideair cover,which,theyhoped,woulddiscoverordiscourageanyambush.Mostof thesemeasures,however,fellshortofsuccess,andtheFrenchlivedinfearof ambushestotheendofthewar.
THEDEFENSIVE Following the precepts of Mao, “If the enemy attacks, I disappear; if he defends,Iharass;andifheretreats,Iattack,”theVietminhavoideddefensive combatwheneverpossible.Thefactthattheirfewvitalinstallationswerein distantanddifficultareasbeyondthereachofFrenchgroundforcesusually allowedthemtorefusecombatiftheywished. Vietminhunits,nomatterwhatpositionstheywerein,hadplansforretreat. AclassicexampleofthistacticwasfurnishedinAugust,1948,onthePlaine desJoncs,agreatswampyareainCochinchina.TheFrenchhaddiscovered thelocationofthecommandpostofNguyenBinh,theVietcommanderof
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Cochinchina,andmountedalandandairoperationwiththeobjectiveofseizing orkillinghimandhisstaff.Severalbattalionsplowedthroughthemud,while morethantwocompaniesofparatroopersjumpedrightonthecommandpost. Surprise was complete.A few shots were fired at the paratroopers as they descendedandashortskirmishensuedastheylanded,butalmostimmediately,atagivensignal,allcombatbrokeoff.TheVietenemyjustdisappeared, andneitherthesurroundingFrenchlandforcesnortheparatrooperscouldfind anyofthedefenders.ItwasclearthattheVietminhhaddetailedplansforsuch anoccasionandhadexecutedthemperfectly. Thereweretwopossiblemethodsfordisappearing.Onewastoretreatinto previously prepared hiding places in the area, such as subterranean caves, speciallyconstructedholes,andpositionspreparedinthebanksofriversand originatingbelowthewaterlevel.Allsuchplaceswerecleverlycamouflaged, andonlyveryfewpersonsknewoftheirlocation.Theothermethodwasto retreatinsmallgroupsorindividually,andeitherdisappearintothewoodsor meltintothepopulationofaneighboringvillageorcity. WhentheVietminhdiddecidetodefendaplace,theyproceededbyavery carefulplan.Theirtechniquesandtacticsofdefensewerebestillustratedin thevillages.Havingdecidedtodefendagivenvillage,theywouldworkouta detailedprogramforitsfortificationandactivedefense.Individualshelter andhidingplaces,usuallyundergroundandconnectedbytunnels,wereconstructedinsuchawaythatadefendercouldfirefromoneplace,disappear, andthenfirefromanother.Someoftheindividualholesweresuppliedwith foodandwater,incaseconcealmentwasnecessaryforseveraldays.They weresowellcamouflagedthattheFrenchoftenuseddogstosniffthemout, andtheViets,inturn,hadtouselimeintheentrancestostopthedogs.Even goodfieldsoffireoftenweresacrificedforthesakeofbettercamouflage,and thedefenderswereallowedtodisclosethelocationoftheirhidingplacesonly totheirleaders. VillagesintheTonkinwerealreadypartiallyfortifiedagainstpiratesand animals,andtheVietminhimprovedtheseexistingdefensesbyaddingantitankobstacles,mines,andothermoderndevices.Duringthefirstyearsofthe war,theytriedtomakeeveryvillageimpregnable,buttheysoonrealizedthat thiswasimpossible,andrestrictedthemselvestomakingitasdifficultaspossiblefortheenemytoadvanceintoavillage.Theirfirstfortifiedvillagesall hadidenticaldefenseplans,astheFrenchsoonfoundout.Thereafter,theViet variedtheirplansfordefenseandthuscomplicatedtheattackers’problem. Anetworkofguardsprotectedeachsuchvillageandthesectorswithin it.Duringdaylighthourstheguards,disguisedaspeasantsorworkers,were placed at a half-mile to a mile from the village. Their positions were changedfrequently,andamessenger,alsoindisguise,wasalwaysathand totakenewsofanenemyadvancetothevillage.Atnighttheguardswere pulledinclosertothevillageandpostednearthegates.Eachsectorhadits ownguardsystemandanacceptedwarningsignal.Atalltimesstrangers
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werewatchedandtheircredentialscarefullychecked.Therewereliaison channelstoneighboringvillagesandhigherheadquarters. TheVietsmadeeveryefforttoconfusetheFrenchastothelocationofthe defenders,andoftenenticedthemintopreparedtraps,wheretheywerethen surrounded. When attacked, the village defenders were to hit at the enemy continuouslyasheapproached,entered,andpenetratedthevillage.Itwasnot expectedthattheenemywouldbeannihilatedintheinitialphase.Assoonas heweakened,however,acounterattackwaslaunchedwiththeaimofannihilation.If,ontheotherhand,theFrenchcontinuedtopressforward,retreatwould beordered. Inthedefenseofvillages,asinallsituations,theVietminh,reluctanttolose evenirregularguerrillas,laidcarefulplansforretreat.Inahopelessfight,the defenderswereinstructed,uponaprearrangedsignalfordisengagement,to retreattotheirholesorabandonthevillagesbyroutesindicatedinadvance.
THECASEOFDIENBIENPHU ThebattleofDienBienPhudeservesspecialmention,asitwasnottypical ofthefightinginIndochina.Intheautumnof1953,theFrenchgovernment determinedthatLaosshouldbedefendedand,almostsimultaneously,negotiatedadefensetreatywiththeLaotiangovernment.TheFrenchcommander inIndochina,GeneralHenriNavarre,wasinstructedtodefendLaosbutnot toendangerthesafetyoftheExpeditionaryCorps.Navarreknewhecould notdefendLaosbyawarofmovementorbyanydefensivelineanddecided thattheonlywaywastoestablishastrategicallylocatedaero-groundstrong point,which,hehoped,wouldpreventamassiveinvasion.Furthermore,there wassomeexpectationthatGiap’sforceswouldtherebybedrawnintoaset battlewithresultingheavycasualtiesfortheVietminh.Herecognized,however,thatsuchastrongpointwouldnotpreventallenemymilitarymovementsintoLaos. ThevillageofDienBienPhu—locatedinavalleyroughlytenbyfivemiles and more than two hundred miles from the French air bases in Hanoi and Vientiane—wasselectedasthesiteforthisstrongpointandwasoccupiedlate inNovember,1953.AlthoughNavarrerecognizedthatthiswasnottheideal siteforsuchanoperation,heconsidereditthebestinthearea.Hewascriticized at the time for selecting Dien Bien Phu, and has been since, for this meantthattheenemywouldoccupyallthesurroundinghighground.French airforceofficershavealsostatedthathadtheybeenconsulted,theposition wouldnothavebeenagreedto,asitwasattheextremerangeofthefighter aircraft which were to support the base.The controversy over these points continuedevenafterthewarandcanneverreallyberesolved,though—with thewisdomofhindsight—Navarre’scriticsmaybesaidtohavebeencorrect intheirassessmentoftheposition.
VIETMINHOPERATIONSANDTACTICS
51
TheFrenchseriouslyunderestimatedtheartilleryavailabletotheVietminh andthemethodinwhichitwouldbeemployed.TheChinesehadprovidedGiap withfarmoreregularartillerythanFrenchintelligenceknew.ButthemostsignificantdevelopmentwasthattheVietminhusedtheirartilleryindirectfire,and notindirectly,astheFrench—andforthatmatterAmerican—artillerymenhad predicted. Instead of positioning behind the hills, which would have put the Frenchfortsoutofrange,theVietminhmovedtheirgunsatnightontotheforwardslopesofthehills.Theretheycarefullyduginandcamouflagedsingle pieces,whichwerefiredpoint-blankattheFrench,andwithdevastatingeffect. Usingthistactic,theVietminhsoonknockedoutorneutralizedtheFrenchartilleryandthuswereabletocreepclosertotheFrenchfortsandlaunchmassive attacks.WiththeFrenchartilleryoutofcommission,theVietminhwerethen abletobringtheirownantiaircraftgunsmuchclosertothefortsandthusmake airresupplyverydifficultanddangerous.Indeed,byApril,onlyparachutedrops werepossible,andthoseatsuccessivelyhigheraltitudes.TheFrenchfighteraircraft,whichcouldremainintheareaforonlyashorttimebecauseofrange limitations, had to be used mainly for flank suppression instead of close support. A second major miscalculation of the French was that Giap would not engageinasiegeoperation.Butthisisexactlywhathedidinfactundertake. AspecialroadwasconstructedtotheDienBienPhuarea,sothatsupplies couldbebroughtdirectlyfromChina;and,beginninginDecemberandJanuary, suppliesandammunitionwerestockedforalongsiege.TheFrench-ledmountaintribesthatweretosabotagetheVietminhsupplyroutesfailedcompletely inthismission.AstheVietminhartillerysmashedtheFrenchartilleryand defenses, Giap pushed forward a complex system of trenches and dugouts. FrenchaerialphotographyoftheareainFebruaryandMarchrevealedamass oftrenchesthattightenedincreasinglyaroundthebeleagueredfortsinthe mannerofatrueeighteenth-centurysiege. InMarch,afterartillerysupremacyhadbeenlargelygainedandsupplies assembled,GiaplaunchedthefirstofhismassiveattacksonDienBienPhu. GabrielleandBeatrice,thetwooutpostsonthehighgroundwithinthevalley, werethefirsttofallunderthewavesofGiap’smassedinfantry.Thelossof thesefortsconfirmedtothedefendersthatGiaphadinfactgainedfullartillery supremacyandthattheycouldnoteffectivelyreplytohisfire. InMay,theVietminhlaunchedtheattackthatfinallyoverrantheposition, andonMay8,thelastFrenchtroopssurrendered.ThusthebattleofDienBien PhuwasoverandGiaphadwonadecisivevictory. French casualties, including prisoners, totaled about 12,000 men, which wasonlyabout6percentofthetotalexpeditionaryforce.Giap’scasualties werenumericallyprobablytwicethoseoftheFrench.ThoughthelossofDien BienPhuanditsgarrisonwasabitterandunexpecteddefeatforFranceanda blowtoWesternstrength,itwasnotinthemilitarysenseadecisiveone.Its
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mainimpactwasinthepoliticalarena,whereitwassufficienttopersuadethe Frenchtonegotiateandendthewar.
NOTES 1. However, French artillery, with massed preplanned fire, was able to interfere withattacksandlarge-scaleattemptsatpenetration. 2. ObviouslynoteveryVietambushfollowedthispatterntotheletter.Thisillustrationisprovidedchieflytoshowthecareandplanningthatwentintoatypicalambush.
Chapter5
VIETMINHREACTIONSTO FRENCHTACTICSAND AIRPOWER
Particularlyimportantinastudyofthisnaturearetheresponsesofeachsideto newtacticsandtechniquesoftheother.Thepresentchapterwilldealprimarily withVietminhreactionstoFrenchinnovations,butitwillexaminealsosome ofthewaysinwhichtheFrenchrespondedtothetacticsandcountertactics oftheVietminh. UNDERMININGTHEPOLICYOFPACIFICATION Until1950,themajoreffortoftheFrenchwasinthesouth,inCochinchina, theregionoftheirgreatestsuccesses.HeretheFrenchhadadoptedapolicyof pacification,withthethreefoldaimofcrushingrebelbands,helpingthelocal peopleestablishdefensesoftheirown,andrestoringnormallifetothevillages andcities.Pacificationthushadbothamilitaryandapoliticalaspect.While therewasconsiderablemilitarysuccess,theFrenchtendedtofallshortonthe political side. Their reluctance to grant independence to Vietnam and their frequent failure to follow up military successes by re-establishing regular administrationandservicesinthepacifiedregionspreventedtheirvictories frombeingclear-cutandpermanent. From a military point of view, pacification actions were mainly of two types:sweepingoperations,toclearanareabetweentwoormorepointsheld bytheFrench;andextendingoperations,tospreadFrenchcontrolfurtherout intoVietminhterritory.Thepacificationforces,whichvariedinsizefroma fewcompaniestoseveralbattalions,weremadeupprimarilyofinfantry,but includedalsoengineers,artillerymen,andtanks.Theyusuallyoperatedincolumns, asthenatureoftheirequipmentandarmamentforcedthemtosticktosuch
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primarymeansofcommunicationasroadsordikes.Thisrequirementnotonly exposedthemtocertainVietminhtacticsbutlimitedtheeffectivenessoftheir actions.Occasionally,theFrenchengagedinsweepingoperationsinwhich the infantry would comb the countryside. However, in swampy terrain and mountainousorforestedregions,thiswasexceedinglyslowanddifficult,and the enemy usually escaped. Quite often, the French tried first to cut off all meansofescapebyencirclementandthentosweeptheenclosedarea,butthe Viets’skillatinfiltrationfrequentlyfoiledtheseefforts. Certainotherfactorscontributedtomakingtheseoperationslesssuccessfulthantheymighthavebeen.FrenchintelligencewaspoorandmostVietminhareasseemedtohaveforewarningoftheenemy’scoming.TheFrench soldiersfrequentlyconductedthemselvesinamannerthatalienatedthenative population,anddidnotseemtorealizetheimportanceofwinningthelocal peopletotheirsidethroughpositiveacts.Asalreadypointedout,inadequate political follow-up of military victory slowed down the return to normal administrativelifeinvillagesandtownsinwhichFrenchcontrolhadbeen re-established.The French also were a long time developing an adequate psychological program for either the civilians or the military. Finally, the difficultterrainanddebilitatingweatherprovedaserioushindrancetothe Frenchadvance. Nevertheless, pacification made considerable headway in the south, particularlybefore1950.Recognizingitasathreat,theVietminhdevisedtacticstoundermineit.Firstandmostimportantwasthepoliticalcounteraction. Viet agents would infiltrate a village or an area and establish a cell, which becamethecenterforcounterpacification,spreadingpropagandaandrecruiting adherents to the Vietminh cause among the population. Having once gainedafootholdandwonsomesupportforthestruggleagainsttheFrench,the Vietminhwould proceed more aggressively.They often attacked and killed nativeswhoattemptedtoco-operatewiththeFrenchortoopposeVietminh penetration. These examples succeeded in terrifying the local people and provedastrongdeterrenttopro-Frenchactivityinthearea. PUTTINGTHEFRENCHONTHEDEFENSIVE Onthemilitaryside,theVietminhimproveddefensesorfortifiedthevillages so as to make French clearing operations more difficult.Also, since they especially fearedtheFrenchencirclingactions,theyissueddetailedinstructionsoncounterencirclementtactics.Onthemajorpoints,thesefollowedthe generaltacticalrulesthatVietcombatantsmusttrytoavoidanyconflictnot intheirfavoror,ifcaughtinatightencirclement,mustconcentrateonthe weakpointoftheencirclingforcesandfighttheirwaythrough.Themanuals stressedagainandagainthatencirclingforceswereneverstrongatallpoints andthatadeterminedattackcouldalwayseffectabreak.Ifindangerofbeing
VIETMINHREACTIONSTOFRENCHTACTICS
55
encircledbyaparticularlystrongFrenchforceoneasyterrain,theVietunits wereurgedtowithdrawfromtheareaintimeandleavenoonefortheFrench tocapture. Developments in the Tonkin area in the north were a particularly good exampleofVietmilitarycountertacticsthatsucceededinforcingtheenemy fromtheoffensiveintoadefensiveposture.WhiletheFrenchhadoccupied certainborderpositionsinordertocuttheVietminhofffromChineseaid, theirprimaryaimwastocreateastrong-holdintheRedRiverDeltaregion thatwouldnotonlyserveasasecureoperationalbasebutwouldalsoenable themtocutofftheVietfoodsupplyandthusforcetheVietminhtofightfor itintheDelta.Tothisend,GeneraldeLattreattemptedtoformafront,inthe Westernsense,composedoffortsandposts,thesmallestofwhichwereonly abouthalfamileapart,whilethelarger“mother”fortswerespacedatseveral milesfromoneanother.Thefortsrangedfromsimpletowers,surroundedby barbed wire and held by a few dozen men, to elaborate fortifications with heavy arms and garrisoned by several hundred men. However, the French recognized that static defenses alone were rarely successful, and, furthermore,DeLattrehadnointentionofassumingadefensiveposture.Oncethe basehadbeenmadesecure,fortificationsproperlyprovided,andtheforces redeployed,so-called“mobilegroups,”composedofinfantry,armor,andartilleryandrepresentingthecreamoftheFrenchtroops,weretobeusedasoffensivestrikingforcestoattackkeyVietminhinstallationsandforcecombaton theirownterms.Thisstrategy,however,wasfoiledbyaseriesofViettactics, whichsucceededintyingupsomanyFrenchtroopsthatonlyfewoffensive actions could be undertaken, and the French posture remained essentially defensive. Aftertheirsurprisingvictoryontheborderpostsin1950,theVietminhat firsthadcontinuedtolaunchmajorattacksaroundtheedgesoftheRedRiver Delta but had given up when they suffered heavy casualties.Thereafter, they infiltratedlargeunits,uptodivisionsize,throughtheFrenchpostsandfortsto assist their guerrillas within the Delta. It was said that the French held the DeltainthedaytimeandtheVietminhhelditatnight.Evenwithinthiscenter of the French defenses, theViets used mines and ambushes, and destroyed portionsofroads,inordertodisruptFrenchcivilianandmilitarytraffic.There wasexcellentco-ordinationbetweentheclandestineactivitiesinsideandthe operationsoftheVietminhforcesoutsidetheDelta,asresistanceactivitywithin was intensified whenever the French struck at the Vietminh outside. It has been reliably estimated that in 1953 about 35,000 Vietminh were tying up threetimestheirnumberofFrenchforcesintheDelta.Asinthecounterpacificationeffortinthesouth,theVietsmadeexamplesofindividualsinorderto frightenanynativeswhomightwanttosupporttheFrench.Theyalsoattacked many of the posts or forts, particularly the more isolated ones.These were usuallysurprisenightattacks,whichhadbeencarefullyplanned,withhigh
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superiorityinmanpower.AfterthearrivalofChineseaid,andwithitsome heavierguns,theVietswereabletousearmor-piercingshellsagainsttheforts, many of which were old and somewhat flimsily constructed and could not standupagainstthistypeofaction. TheFrench,ofcourse,didnotacceptthesecountertacticspassively.They broughtindogsfromFrance,whichtheyusedtodetecttheapproachofany enemy,particularlyduringthenight,butthedogswereoftenunabletodistinguishbetweenfriendandfoe.Onaverylimitedscale,theFrenchattemptedto reducethedifficultiesofnightcombatbyilluminatingtheareaafterdark,but theirsupplyofequipmentwasinadequateforthispurpose.Then,also,they constructedtheirnewerfortsunderground,withjustafewobservationpoints above ground. This did indeed make attacks more difficult and the use of armor-piercingshellslesseffective,butmostforts,unlessrelievedbymobile columns,fellbeforeadeterminedVietminhattack. Inthecourseofthewar,astheVietminhdevelopedtheiroffensivepower, includingunitslargeenoughtoundertakemajoroperations,theFrenchwere putmoreandmoreonthedefensive,andwereforcedtofindwaysofcounteringcertainVietminhtacticsandtechniquesbydevelopingnewtechniquesof theirown.Oneoftheirmostimportantinnovationswastocreatewhatthey called“air-groundstrongpoints”inthemountainareascontrolledbytheVietminhbutinhabitedbypeoplegenerallysympathetictotheFrench.Sincethe Frenchneededtokeepsometroopsandstrongpointsintheseareas,andtheir landcommunicationswereextremelyunreliable,theyputindividualgarrisons in the vicinity of their airstrips and supplied them by air.With these strong pointsasbases,andsometimeswithparatroopsupport,theywereabletobeat offmanyVietminhattacksandmaintaintheFrench“presence.”However,the smallnumberofavailablecargoplanesandthegreatneedforFrenchtroopsin theDeltalimitedthenumberoftroopsthatcouldbeusedinstrongpoints,as wasshown,ofcourse,atDienBienPhu. Asecondcountertechnique,basedontheexperiencegainedinFranceduring WorldWarII,wastoformpartisangroupsinthemountainousareastoactasa maquisagainsttheVietminh.DuringthebattleofDienBienPhu,theFrench claimtohavehadintheareatheequivalentofaboutfifteenbattalionsofpartisan guerrillaswhoweretohaveinterferedwithVietminhsupplylines.Theaction remainedverylimited,andmostFrenchofficersweredisappointedattheresults. ButitistruethatonseveraloccasionstheVietminhhadtodetachregimentsto cleanoutareaswheretheFrenchhadpenetratedwiththeirguerrillas. NEUTRALIZATIONOFAIRPOWER Throughoutthewar,theVietminhadmittedthatoneofthegreatestadvantagesoftheFrenchwasthatofairpowerand,indeed,ofabsoluteairsuperiority.Havingacknowledgedthis,however,theyexplainedinnumerousmanuals
VIETMINHREACTIONSTOFRENCHTACTICS
57
andpropagandapamphletshowthisFrenchadvantagecouldbeneutralized. BeforeexamininghowtheywentaboutminimizingtheeffectsofFrenchair power,itiswelltolookbrieflyatthekindofairpowertheFrenchhadinIndochina,themannerinwhichtheyemployedit,andthedifficultiesofoperation underwhichtheylabored.Whilepublishedstatisticsareinexact,thefollowing seems to be a fairly accurate estimate of French aircraft in Indochina: InNovember,1951,therewere158fighters,42lightbombers,75transports, 28reconnaissanceplanes,and105lightaircraft.Twoyearslater,inNovember, 1953,theFrenchhad120fighters,42lightbombers,84transports,16reconnaissancecraft,andapproximately237otherplanes,includinglightcraftand trainers.InMarch,1954,atthebeginningofthebattleofDienBienPhu,there were123fightersplus40carrier-bornefighters,41lightbombers,124transports,16reconnaissanceplanes,and230otheraircraft.1Thesefiguresdidnot includesomehiredciviliancargoplanes,whichhelpedwithairsupply. TheFrenchairforceinIndochinaoperatedunderseveredifficulties.Inthe first place, there were only about five first-class airfields, which, for some timeatleast,putaceilingonthenumberofaircraftthatcouldbeoperatedin thistheater.Constructingnewairfieldswasaslowanddifficultprocess.In thedeltaregions,itwassaidtotakeonetonofcrushedrockforeverysquare yardofrunway,andthisrockhadtobeallowedtosettleslowly.Asaresult, even under a “crash” program, airfields could not safely be constructed quickly.ThemountainareasweregenerallyinVietminhhandsand,besides, presentedconstructionproblemsoftheirown.Thesecondmajordifficultyin planningforFrenchairoperationswasthattheweatherwasbadmuchofthe yearandvariedgreatlyfromonepartofIndochinatoanother.Therewere fewweatherstations,andeveniftheweatherwasgoodatHanoi,itmightnot be good over the target or between target and take-off point. Thirdly, the Frenchairforcecomplainedthattheirmapswereunreliable.Heightsofpeaks andotheressentialterraininformationwereinaccurate,andincertainareas, therefore,planescouldnotoperatesafely.Andlastofall,radioguidanceand navigational aids were inadequate for normal flying, and still more so for nightandbad-weatheroperations. Frenchairforce officers were almost unanimous in their criticism of the command structure. Serving under an army commander in chief who was responsible for the entire Indochina theater, they felt that they were rarely involvedintheplanningandthathadtheybeenconsulted,manyoperations wouldhavebeencarriedoutdifferentlyandmoreeffectively.Theybelieved that,ingeneral,airpowerwasmisused.Oneoftheircomplaintswasthatit wastiedtoomuchtothearmy;itwas,forexample,oftenusedfordirectsupport when it could more properly have been employed for interdiction and otherairtargets. SincetheVietminhdidnothaveanyairforce,thebattleforairsuperiority nevercameintoplay;totheendofthewar,theFrenchwereabletousetheir
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limitedairpowerinavarietyofways,includinginterdiction,directsupportof thearmy,airsupply,andthelaunchingofairborneoperations. Vietminhantiaircraftcapabilityimprovedinthecourseofthewar,especially aftertheadventofChineseaid.DuringthesiegeofDienBienPhu,aswehave seen,theVietswereabletoknockdownanumberofFrenchplanesandtokeep mostoftheothersataltitudestoohighforeffectiveassistanceandaccuratesupply drops to the troops.Though apparently antiaircraft guns were not radarcontrolled,thereweresomeexcellentRussianpiecesthatwereskillfullyused. Evenbeforetheyacquiredantiaircraft,however,theVietminhhadmanagedto shootdownquiteafewplanessimplywithriflesandmachineguns,andguerrillashadtriedtoincapacitateplanesontheground.Itisinterestingtonotethatthe Vietminhattackedchieflythetransportplanesandrarelymolestedthefighters. WhiletheFrenchhadmadesporadicinterdictioneffortsallalong,itwas notuntil1952thattheyreallyplannedanextensiveinterdictionprogram against theVietminh’s supply routes, particularly those leading from the Chinese border. In this campaign, they concentrated on two types of targets:truckgaragesandwarehouseswheresuppliesmightbestored,and difficult stretches of road that were hard to bypass. Most of their targets were within the Lang Son–Bac Kan–Cao Bang triangle. The French air forcemademuchofthesuccessofthisoffensiveand,atonetime,claimed tohavereducedtheflowofChineseaidfrom1,500to250tonsamonth. TheVietminhreactedtothisintensifiedinterdictioneffortinseveralways, noneofthemparticularlynovel.Inthefirstplace,asmosttransportation tookplaceatnightandtheFrenchhadpracticallynonightcapability,the cooliesremainedrelativelysafethen.Ifthetacticalsituationonthebattlefield madeitnecessarytomoveduringdaylighthours,cooliestried,whenever possible,toemployunknownpathsandnewroutes.ThismadetheFrench aireffortmoredifficult,sincesmallpathswithcooliecolumnswerevery hard to spot, and the French reconnaissance capability had declined by 1952. At critical points on the roads, the Vietminh sometimes stationed repaircrewsthatwouldrebuildanybridgesthatweredestroyed.Atother times,theymerelyusedboatstomovethesuppliesacross. DirectairsupportfortheFrenchgroundforceswasusedtoaconsiderable extent.ManyoftheFrenchthemselveshavefeltthatthiswasamistakein view of its admittedly limited value. Except in battle, the Vietminh units wereextremelydifficulttolocate,astheywereusuallywellduginandwere veryartfulwhenitcametodispersal,camouflage,andconcealment.Also, theywouldoftenminglewiththepopulace,andtheFrenchairforceeither couldnotdistinguishthemfromtheciviliansor,ifitcould,wasunableto strikeatthemforfearofhittingsomeofthevillageorcitypeople.Vietminh attacks,asstatedearlier,alwaysbeganatnight,whentheFrenchairforce hadverylimitedcapability.Ifthebattlecontinuedintothedaylighthours, aneffectivemethodbywhichtheVietsavoidedairattackwasto“cling”to
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theenemy,thatis,tostaysoclosetotheFrenchforcesthatairfirewouldhit bothfriendandfoe. Inthefinalstageofthewar,airsupplyoftheFrenchgarrisonsbecame increasingly important and lacked only an adequate number of transport aircrafttohavebeenstillmoreeffective.TheFrenchadvantageinairsupply went virtually unchallenged in view of the opponent’s limited antiaircraft capability.TheVietminhmadeeveryefforttoinfiltrateagentsintoFrench airbases,andeventhemostheavilyguardedplaneswerefoundsabotaged. DuringthebattleofDienBienPhu,whenairsupplywaskeepingtheFrench garrisongoing,theVietminh,inanoteworthyexampleofco-ordinationin their war effort, conducted a special sabotage campaign in the Delta to destroythesecargoplanes.Itwasindicativeoftheimportancetheyattached totheairsupplycapabilityoftheFrench. ThoughairborneoperationswereimportantinIndochina,thelimitedFrench airliftcapabilityprecludedlargeoperations.Usuallyonlyonebattalion,and eveninthelatterstagesofthewarnevermorethantwoorthreebattalions, could be airlifted for a single operation. Despite this, the French rarely achievedsurprise,fortheirreconnaissanceplanessurveyingtheareapriorto attack,andtheadvanceofFrenchgroundunitstowardagivenarea,would oftenalerttheVietminhtoapossibleairborneattack.Also,theverynatureof thewarmadeparatroopoperationslesseffectivethantheywouldhavebeenin aconventionalwar.Astherewasnofront,therewasnobodytocutoff,and paratroopers therefore were usually employed against a key point with the hopeofdestroyingit.Inmostcases,abattalionprovedtoosmalltodothejob, particularlyduringthelatterphasesofthewar,whentheVietminhunitswere large.Occasionalplanstohavetheparatrooperslinkupwiththegroundforces usuallyproduceddisappointingresults. Nevertheless,theVietminhfearedairborneoperationsandtookprecautions againstthem.Alloftheirunits,fortifiedvillages,andotherimportantareas postedguardswhosemissionitwastolookoutforaircraft,andparticularly paratroopers.Incertainspotsthatseemedespeciallysuitableforlandings,the Vietminh put up pointed bamboo sticks on which the paratroopers would impalethemselves.Thenagain,ifthreatenedbyparatroopattack,theViets wouldjustdisappearandleavenoonefortheparatrooperstofight.Andlastly, the French were compelled to gather up their chutes after every jump, and one-fourthtoone-thirdofthejumpingunitwouldbetiedupinthistask,often forhalfaday,reducingthenumberofeffectiveswhowerefreetofight.The Vietminhtookadvantageofthisopportunitytoattackthechutecollectorsand thusmakethelandingmoredifficultandcostlyinlives. *** Asinallwars,therewasthusaconstantinterplaybetweenthecombatants: Eachdevisednewtacticsandstrategiesandtheotherattemptedtofoilthem.
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The Vietminh were seldom slow to spot a new French tactic and to issue instructionsonhowtocounterit.TheFrenchweresomewhatlessflexibleand tended to adhere to their accustomed methods of warfare even when these werenolongereffective.Therenewalofthewarseveralyearslaterinvolved againtheinteractionoftwoquitedifferentopponents.ThesubsequentintroductionofmajorU.S.elementsmadetheinterplayevenmoreinterestingand important. NOTE 1. GeneralL.M.Chassin,AviationIndochine(AirPowerinIndochina)(AmiotDumont:Paris,1954).
Chapter6
THERISEOFTHEVIETCONG
ThemilitarystrugglebetweentheVietminhandtheFrenchwasterminatedin July,1954.ItwashopedattheGenevaConferencethatthegeographicaldivisionofVietnamwouldbetemporaryandthecessationoffightingpermanent, butthereversehasturnedouttobethecase.Fightingwasresumedinthelate 1950’sandgraduallyincreasedinintensityandscalethroughthe1960’stothe presentbitterwarof1967,whilethedemarcationlinehasbecomefixedand thetwozonesgotheirseparateways. TheAgreements on the Cessation of Hostilities (July 20, 1954) and the FinalDeclarationoftheGenevaConference(July21,1954)—ortheGeneva Accords,astheyaregenerallyknown—officiallyendedthefightinginVietnam andattemptedtoestablishamodusvivendiuntilapoliticalsettlementcouldbe arranged.1Thecease-fireagreementswerebasicallymilitaryinscope.Aprovisionalmilitarydemarcationline,withafive-kilometerdemilitarizedzone onbothsides,wasestablishedroughlyalongthe17thparallel,thusdividing Vietnamintotwoseparatezones.Themilitaryforcesofthetwopartieswere toberegroupedintheirappropriatezoneswithin300days.Bothpartieswere enjoined not to undertake “reprisals or discriminations against persons or organizationsonaccountoftheiractivitiesduringthehostilities.”Theagreementsbannedthereinforcementofforces,theintroductionofmoremodern armsandequipment,andtheestablishmentofforeignbasesineitherzone. AlsocreatedundertheagreementswasanInternationalCommission,composedofIndia,Canada,andPoland,forthe“controlandsupervisionoverthe application of the provisions of the agreement.” The cease-fire agreements weresignedbymilitaryofficersfromFrance(fortheSouth)andtheCommunist Democratic Republic ofVietnam (for the North); France and the D.R.V.N.
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werethusresponsibleforenforcingthecease-fireintheirrespectivezones. TheagreementswerenotsignedbyrepresentativesofeithertheGovernment ofSouthVietnam(G.V.N.)ortheUnitedStates. The Final Declaration of the Conference, signed by no nation, noted and endorsedthemainprovisionsofthecease-fire.Whilethecease-fireagreements more or less assumed that there would be an election for the unification of Vietnam, the Final Declaration, being more politically inclined, was quite specific.Itcalledforafuturepoliticalsettlementandageneralelectionwitha secretballottobeheldinJuly,1956—thusallowingtwoyearstore-establish someorderinthetwozones.Italsospecificallyprovidedthateachpersonshould befreetodecideinwhichzonehewouldlive.Theparticipantsintheconference agreedtorespectthesovereigntyofLaos,Cambodia,andVietnam—thusrecognizing the supposedly temporary nature of the division of Vietnam—and to refrainfrominterferingintheirinternalaffairs.Theyalsoagreedtoconsulton anyquestionsreferredtothembytheInternationalControlCommission.2 TheD.R.V.N.hadsomereasontobedissatisfiedwiththissettlementand feltthattheSovietUnionandChinahadpressedittoagreetotermslessfavorablethanitdeserved.AlthoughthemilitarysignificanceofthedefeatatDien BienPhucanbeexaggerated,itistruethattheVietminhwereslowlychewing uptheFrenchmilitaryforcesinVietnam.Evenmoreimportant,thecontinuing casualties and the apparently unending nature of the struggle had convinced Paris that the conflict must end. Given this situation, the D.R.V.N. consideredthatithadreceivedlessterritorythanitshouldhave,hadgiven more generous overall terms to the French than they deserved, and had accepted,atleasttemporarily,thedivisionofitscountry.TheD.R.V.N.leadersalsorecognizedthattheimplementationoftheagreementsdependedtoa largeextentonthewillingnessandcapabilityoftheFrench.IfFrancesomehow failed, the promise of Geneva would be lost. They thus felt partially cheatedofthevictorytheyhadwon,andtheywereconcernedabouttheeventualenforcementofthesettlement. However,theprovisionforelectionsinJuly,1956,gaveHanoihopeofachievingaunitedVietnamunderitsleadership.Itwasmostprobablythisexpectation thatledtheD.R.V.N.tosigntheagreements.In1954,itseemedcleartomost observers, as well as to Hanoi, that such elections would be won by Ho Chi Minh’sregime.AsecondandevenmoreimmediatepossibilitywasthattheSaigonregimewouldneverconsolidateitspositionandmightevencollapsebefore theelections,thusgivingHanoivictorybydefault.Insuchasituationtheremight benoneedforanelectionexcepttoconfirmandlegalizethetakeover.
THESITUATIONAFTERGENEVA Inmid-1954,SouthVietnamwasindeedindisarray,andthelikelihoodthat aneffectivegovernmentcouldbeestablisheddidnotseemgreat.BaoDai,the
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Chief of State and former Emperor, did not possess the confidence of the people and was having trouble finding a leader to form a government. OnJune4, while the Geneva Conference was still in session, Bao Dai appointedNgoDinhDiem,along-timenationalistwhohadbeenabsentfrom thecountryforseveralyears,asPremieroftheGovernmentofSouthVietnam. Asyet,thereexistedpracticallynogovernmentalapparatus,andDiemdidnot controlalloftheSaigon-Cholonarea,muchlessthecountryside.Fewobserversexpectedhimtosurvivemanymonths,andalmostnoonegavehimmuch chanceofrestoringorderandcreatinganoperationalgovernmentintheSouth. However,withinayear,Diemmanagedtodefeattheparamilitaryforcesofthe politico-religioussects(HoaHao,CaoDai,andBinhXuyen)anddrivetheir remnantsunderground,tobuildanarmyandsomeciviladministration,andto begin to extend the control of the central government into the countryside. TheUnitedStatesofferedsupport,advice,andeconomicaidtothenewPremier.Diem’ssuccesses gained him some support and popularity within his owncountryandacertainrespectfromothercountries.Throughapopular referendumhewasabletooustBaoDaiasChiefofStateandproclaimthe Republic of Vietnam. The French withdrew their Expeditionary Corps and dissolvedtheirHighCommandaheadofschedule;thusoneofthesignatories of the GenevaAccords was no longer on the scene. Given his surprisingly strongbaseathome,Diemannouncedin1955thathewouldnotagreetoelectionsasprovidedforbytheGenevaagreements.Thus,as1956approached,it seemedunlikelythattheSaigongovernmentwouldcollapseandevenmore unlikelythattheelectionswouldbeheld. Atthesametime,itseemedclearfromthestatementsandactionsofthe leaders of the D.R.V.N. that they had not given up their intention to unify Vietnamundertheirrule.Earlyin1955,HoChiMinhcalledforcontinued effort in both the North and South for unification and final victory, and in September,1955,hecreatedtheFatherlandFrontofVietnam,whoseprogram wasclearlydirectedatunification.SomeoftheVietminhwhoremainedinthe SouthandwerelatercapturedhavesaidtheywereinstructedbytheFatherlandFronttosupporttheGenevaAccordsingeneralandspecificallytheelectionsasthesurestwaytounification.Thereseemstohavebeensomepressure onHanoifromtheSovietUnionandChina(whofordifferentreasonsdidnot wishtodisturbtheinternationalscene)toabidebytheGenevaAccordsandto waitfortheelections,whichalmosteveryonethoughtHanoiwouldwin.The VietminhmayalsohavebeenweakintheSouthimmediatelyafterthewithdrawal of so many troops and adherents to the North. In late 1955, Hanoi appearedtobeconcentratingonconsolidationofitsregimeintheNorthand striving for socialism and extensive social change through its drastic land reform,meanwhilehopingthattheelectionwouldsolvetheunificationproblemintheSouth.ButHanoihadalsomadesomeplansforactionintheSouth iftheelectionsdidnotmaterialize.
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In1954,theCommunistshadtakenNorthwiththemanumberoftroops andsomecarefullyselectedSouthernadherents—perhapsatotalof80,000to 100,000. (These are usually referred to as regroupees.) This action was in accordancewiththeprovisionsoftheGenevaAgreements.Hanoimayalso have wished to maintain as large an army as possible, and may have been planningtousetheseforcesintheSouthatalaterdate.Theyrepresenteda goodbasisfora“unified”VietnameseArmyandapotentialSoutherngovernmentalcadreifelectionswerewonbyHoChiMinh’sregime.Iftherewereno elections,theregroupeescouldbeusedasasubversivecadreforfutureactivity in the South. Hanoi had left 5,000 to 10,000 elite cadres and caches of weaponsandsuppliesintheSouth.Thesecadres,whoweremostlypolitical andadministrativepersonnel,blendedintothecountrysideanddidnotbegin their subversive operations until after July, 1956.TheVietminh also maintainedsomebases—notablyinQuangNgaiandBinhDinhprovinces,inthe mountainsbehindNhaTrang,inthenorthernportionofTayNinhProvince,in ZoneD,incertainareasofKienPhongandAnXuyenprovinces,andinthe highlands, which they never ceased to administer and which Diem never penetrated—buttheytookfewaggressiveactionsin1954–56.However,when HanoiwishedtorecommenceitssubversiveactivitiesintheSouth,localcadresandaskeletaladministrativestructurewereavailable,andtheregroupees representedpotentialreinforcements. Theelectionswerenotheldin1956.TheD.R.V.N.complainedtotheInternationalControlCommission,andtheCommissioninturncomplainedtothe co-chairmenoftheGenevaConference(GreatBritainandtheSovietUnion), butnoactionwastaken.InNovember,1956,asaresultoflongsmoldering hostility toward the regime caused by the so-called land reform, uprisings occurredintheNorthandwerebrutallysuppressed.Consequently,Hanoiwas hardlyinagoodpositiontopressforfreeelections.Onemightevenspeculate that Hanoi did not want elections at that time because of the unrest in the NorthandDiem’ssurprisingstrengthintheSouth.Inanycase,thedateforthe electionspassedwithoutgreatdemonstrationswithinVietnamorsignificant protestfromanyothercountry.Thustheprovisionalagreementmadein1954 tookonmoreaspectsofpermanence.Butthepromiseofelectionsapparently had been an important factor in persuading Hanoi to accept the Geneva Accords,andthefailuretoholdthemgaveHanoianexcuseforseekingother means of unification—and the chance to capitalize on unsettling developmentsintheSouth. NgoDinhDiem,inattemptingtoformastrong,largelydictatorialgovernment,notunnaturallyalienatedmanygroupsofpeople.Localofficials,often arrogant and inefficient, created or aggravated hostility toward the Saigon regime.The majority of the members of the politico-religious sects opposed Diemafterhisdefeatoftheirarmies;theywishedtostrikebackinanywaythey could.ThesectswereinnopositiontooverthrowDiemandregaintheirspecial
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privileges—their apparent goal—but by cooperating with other groups they couldharassandweakenhisregime.Othergroups,nationalistsanddissidents, whowereallowednopartinDiem’sgovernmentandwereincreasinglylikelyto bepersecuted,sawtwoalternatives:tojointherebelsortofleethecountry.They sharedthebitternessofthesectmembersbutdifferedintheirultimategoals: They wanted a role in the government, not special group privileges. Some membersoftheVietminhremainedstaunchrevolutionaries,whilemanyothers lostinterestandsettleddownaspeacefulcitizens,butallwerepersecutedand driven into the opposition by Diem’s repressive measures. The Communists werecertainlyadanger,buttheSaigongovernmenthadcreatedunnecessarily fertilegroundforarebellionintheSouthbylate1956. However,notallofthisfertilegroundwascreatedbyDiem’ssometimes exaggeratedrepressivemeasuresandpoliceforce.Initsentirehistory,Vietnam hasonlybeenunitedforafewyears.Itisadevelopingcountryandhasnever beenanation-stateintheWesternsense.Therearehistoricallydivisiveforces stillatwork.Theloyaltyofthepeopleisoftentoaspecificarea,suchasthe Hué area, or to one of the regions of Vietnam—Cochinchina, Annam, or Tonkin—ratherthantothenationasawhole.Thereisastrongtraditionof village autonomy.There are also unassimilated minorities such as the Chinese,themontagnards,andtheKhmers,whotogetherrepresentabout10to 15percentoftheoverallpopulationandareverynumerousinsomeportions ofthecountry.TheCatholicminorityhascreatedanotherforcefordivision, andtheBuddhiststhemselvesarenotahomogeneousgroup. The Hoa Hao and the eclectic politico-religious sect the Cao Dai—both offspringsoftheBuddhists—furthercomplicatetheproblem.Secretsocieties (stillunknownquantities)andparties—theDaiVietsandtheVNQDD,among others—havetheirownambitionsandcreatefrictionwithinthecountry.3All thesefactorsworkagainstastrong,unitedVietnam.
BEGINNINGSOFINSURGENCY Inthesecondhalfof1956,thereseemedtobethefirstdefiniteindications ofinsurgentactivityintheruralareas.Thereweresubversivepropaganda efforts,someterroristraids,andthemurderofafewofficials.Somehave argued that the responsibility for these acts lay with the remnants of the sects;othershaveheldthattheperpetratorswereimpatientCommunists, frustratedbyGeneva;stillothershavecontendedthattheCommunistcadreswouldhardlyhaveundertakensuchactionswithoutthecommand,much less the permission of Hanoi.4The Diem regime held the third view and producedmanycaptureddocumentsthatdemonstratedCommunistleadership of the subversion. Bernard Fall, hardly a Diem supporter, made a carefulcorrelationbetweentheareaswhereCommunistswereallegedby SaigontohavebegunsubversionandtheareaswhereHanoicomplainedto
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theInternationalControlCommissionofpersecutionagainsttheVietminh, and he demonstrated that they were largely the same. The information providedbyHanoi,hereasoned,wassuchthatitmusthavecomefroman agent in the South, and he was led to the “inescapable” conclusion that there was some coordination between the North and the Southern insurgents.5 Viet Cong prisoners interrogated recently indicate that these early years (1956–59) were spent in spreading propaganda that stressed the colonial (American)andcorruptnatureoftheDiemgovernment,andinworkingto reorganizetheVietminhanddevelopaninsurgentstructure.Intheireffortsto recruitnewmembers,theVietminhpenetratedandgainedsomesupportfrom remnantsofthesects.Theiroperations—illegalsincetheydidnotsupportthe GenevaAccordsbutadvocatedoverthrowofthegovernment—weremadedifficultanddangerousbyDiem’srepressivecampaignagainstallVietminhand theirfamilies,whethertheywereactiveornot. On the other hand, Diem was having trouble extending his power to the countrysideandre-establishingtheauthorityofgovernment.Hewasnotable toprovidesocialservicesandopportunitiesfortheruralpopulation—apoint constantlypressedbytheVietminh. By late 1957, the insurgents were making their presence known. The newspaperscarriedanincreasingandalarmingnumberofstoriesofterrorist activitiesinthecountryside.Attheendofthatyear,thenewspaperTuDo maintainedthat“thesecurityquestionintheprovincesmustbegiventop priority.”Atthesametime,smallnumbersofpeasantsbeganleavingtheir farmsbecauseofinsecurity.Oneobserverhasevenclaimedthat“thecream ofvillageofficialdom”hadbeenmurderedasearlyas1957.6Assassinations, kidnapings,andattacksonofficialsincreasedin1958.7Nooneknowsthe exactnumberofcasualties,aswhateverrecordsexistedwereinexact.One reliableestimateisthatin1957–60some2,000officialswerekidnapedand about1,700assassinated.8Thisisastaggeringtotalforanationofperhaps 14millionpeopletryingtorecoverfromwarandmoveintothetwentieth century. The reviving Communist apparatus led this terror campaign designed to destroytheG.V.N.,togaincontrolintheSouth,andtoachieveunification withtheNorth,butitgladly—iftemporarilyandcynically—acceptedsupport fromotherdissidents,someofwhomhavebeenmentionedabove.9 MostoftheinsurgentsreferredtothemselvesasVietminhormembersof TheResistanceduringthisearlyperiod.AftertheformationoftheNational LiberationFrontinlate1960,many,butbynomeansall,insurgentscalled themselvesmembersoftheFront.OthersreferredtotheinsurgentorganizationastheParty.In1956,theSaigongovernmentbegantocalltheinsurgents Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist); this term became common usage by 1958andhasremainedsotothepresentday.
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Whilethesectmembersandotherrebelsconsideredtheterrorcampaign primarilyasameansofharassingtheSaigongovernment,theCommunists mademuchmorecarefulandpreciseuseofterrorasonetoolintheirdrivefor totalpower.Thecampaignagainstlowerofficialswasdesignedtodiscredit theDiemgovernmentbyshowingthatitcouldnotprotectitsownofficialsand todisablethegovernmentbykillingordrivingawayitsofficialsandreplacing themwithCommunistpersonnel.TheseactionshelpedtheVietConggradually toexpandtheirbasesandwarzones.VietCongattackswerealmostalways accompanied or followed by a propaganda team which explained why the officialhadbeenkilled,howevilandcorrupttheDiemgovernmentwas,and howtherebelsintendedtoimprovethelotofthepeasant.Iftheofficialwasa badone,therebelstookcreditforriddingthepeopleofanoppressor;ifhewas agoodone,theysaidhewasmisguidedandworkedfortheevilDiem.The successoftheattackshadtheadditionaleffectofconvincingthepeasantsof thestrengthoftherebelsandencouragingtheirsupport. Thecombinationofskillfulpropagandaandterrorwithgreatorganizational abilitygavestrengthtotheVietCongmovement.Intheseearlydaysofthe insurgency, the Viet Cong were able to capitalize on the popularity of the VietminhandtoorganizetheagitpropteamsdevelopedsoskillfullybyGeneralGiapintheearlierwar.Theirtechniquewastonurturelatentgrievances anddislikeofSaigonintoactivehostilityandhatredagainsttheDiemregime. TheproselytizingoftheG.V.N.armedforcesaswellasthecivilianofficials wasoneofthemosteffectiveanddemoralizingweaponswieldedbytheViet Cong.Thisprogram(binhvan)wasdirectedparticularlyatthearmedforces (ARVN)withtheobjectiveofincapacitatingthearmyasthemainsupportof thegovernment.Therewasmoreemphasisonwinningthepeoplebysympathizingwiththeirlocalgrievancesandadvocatinganendtothe“oppressive andcorrupt”Diemregimethanonterrorizingthem.Terrorandcoercivemeasureswerereservedlargelyfortheofficialsofthegovernment,socialworkers andteachers,orotherkeypersonswhoopposedorrefusedtocooperatewith theVietCong—butthelessonwasnotlostonthepopulation. Beginningin1958,VietCongguerrillaunitswereformedandtrainedfor largeractionsthanassassinationsandkidnapings.Thisdevelopmentwasnatural in the evolution of the Communist insurgency. It made possible direct attacksonvillages,smallgovernmentoutposts,andtheagrovilles,10aswellas smallambushesonthehighways,railroads,andcanals.Theselargerattacks werenotonlydestructive,buthadtheevenmoreimportantconsequencesof furtherdiscreditingandunderminingtheSaigongovernmentanddemonstratingtheever-increasingpowerandauthorityoftheVietCong,whohadbegun toisolatethecountrysidefromSaigonbothphysicallyandinapsychological sense.SincetheSaigongovernmenthadalwaysbeenstronglyurban-oriented andlackedarealunderstandingandappreciationoftheproblemsintherural areas, this Communist strategy was bound to aggravate an already serious
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problem.Forthesamereason,inadequateattentionwasgiventheunrestand risingterrorinthecountryside. Thenatureofthegroupthatwasabletoorganizeskillfullyandclandestinely, expand its political action, increase its terrorist activities, and launch these guerrillaattacksupuntil1960isnotyetwellknown.11Somesourcescontend therewasnocentralorganizationbeforethecreationoftheNationalLiberation Front(NLF)in1960andthePeople’sRevolutionaryPartyin1962(seebelow). EmphasizingthevarietyandspontaneityoftheoppositiontoDiem,theyclaim thattherewereonlyvoluntarygroupingsthatmadesporadicattacksagainstthe Diemregime.12Thisargumentprovidesanecessarybasisfortheformationof theNationalLiberationFront—tofilltheneedforco-ordination.Butthereis muchcircumstantialanddocumentaryevidencethatevenbeforethecreation of the NLF there was one dominating and coordinating organization, composedofVietminhcadres,mostofwhomweremembersoftheLaoDongParty, whohadbeenleftintheSouthandhadblendedintotheruralareasandworked fortheelectionuntil1956.ThesecadresreceivedsomeinstructionsandguidancefromtheNorth,andbeginningin1959orevenearlier,Hanoibeganto orderafewoftheregroupeesbacktotheSouth.Theyinfiltratedalongcarefully prepared routes and returned to their original localities—often their own villages—wheretheybegantoorganizeorstrengthenanoppositionmovement. RegroupeescapturedlateinthewarhavetoldoftheirtrainingintheNorth, theircarefullyplannedtripSouth,andtheirinstructionstointensifythestruggle.TheCommunistssystematically,butwithdifficultyinthefaceofDiem’s repressivemeasures,revivedandexpandedtheoldVietminhanddevelopedan increasinglypowerfulinsurgentapparatus.
FORMALORGANIZATIONFORINSURGENCY Ithasbeenreportedthatinlate1958Hanoiwasdissatisfiedwiththedevelopmentoftheorganizationandtheprogressoftherevolution.(Itshouldbe notedthattheSouthhadneverreachedthesamelevelofparticipationasthe Northintheearlier“warofliberation”withtheFrench.)Inanycase,Hanoi sentLeDuan,SecretaryGeneraloftheLaoDongParty,totheSouthduring the winter of 1958–59 to gain firsthand information and to make specific recommendations. On his return to Hanoi in early 1959, Le Duan made a number of recommendations that led to actions in both the North and the South. In May, 1959, the Lao Dong Party Central Committee, meeting in Hanoi,statedthatthetimehadcometosmashtheDiemgovernment.13Le DuanhimselfannouncedattheThirdNationalCongressofthePartyinSeptember, 1960, that the meeting would define the line for carrying out the socialistrevolutionintheNorthandthenationalrevolutionintheSouth,or thestruggleforcompleteunificationofthecountryandtheoverthrowof“the semifeudal, semicolonial Diem regime.” He called for the creation of
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asuccessortotheFatherlandFrontintheSouth.Shortlyafterward,theLao DongPartycirculatedadraftoutliningthestructureandresponsibilitiesofa neworganizationtobecalledtheNationalLiberationFront.Finally,inJanuary,1961,RadioHanoibroadcastthenewsthattheNLFhadbeenformedon December20,1960.ThissequenceofeventsmaysuggestthatLeDuanwas sentSouthnotbecauseofdissatisfactionwithprogress,buttomakesurethat theorganizationwasreallyreadyforthenextphaseofinsurgency.Hanoi’s statementsthatthetimehadcometocrushDiem,anditsorganizationofa massfronttoleadtheinsurgency,indicatethattheCommunistPartyleadershipintheNorthbelievedthattheorganizationintheSouthwasprobablyin excellentshapeandreadytocreateandmanipulatetheNLFandthewhole revolution.Sincetheguerrillaactionsof1960andthelargerattacks(afewof battalionsize)of1961werealsonotorganizedbytheNLF—whichdidnot exist until the last days of 1960 and was hardly an effective organization readytolaunchfull-scaleguerrillawarfarein1961—itappearsthatitwas strength in the South, not weakness, which triggered the formation of theNLF. Inspiteofthisevidence,somecontendthattheNLFwasatotallyindigenousSoutherncreation.14Itisarguedbyitspresentchairmanthatitsorigins go back to the Saigon-Cholon Peace Committee of 1954 and that it expressestherevolutionarydesireofthepeoplesoftheSouth.Theformal organizationoftheNLFinSouthVietnamwascarriedoutbyaverysmall groupofSoutherners—perhapsfiftyorsixtypersons.NguyenHuuTho,a Paris-trainedlawyerfromSaigon,wasoneoftheleadersandwaselected Chairman,whilePhungVanCung,aphysicianandex-memberoftheDiem regime,wasnamedSecretaryGeneral—probablythemostpowerfulposition.CungwassucceededbyNguyenVanHieu,apropagandist;TranBuu Kien,alawyer,followed;andfinallycameHuynhTanPhat,anarchitect.(It wasreportedinMarch,1967,thatPhathadbecometheleaderoftheNLF; whatthismeansisnotentirelyclear.)OtherleadingmembersincludedLe VanTha,aradioengineerfromSaigon;JosephMauiHoHueBa,listedasa Catholicandprofessor;andHoThu,apharmacist.Itisinterestingtonote thatmanyoftheleaderswerewelleducatedandlivedinSaigon.Thetop leadershiphardlycamefromthepeasantry,thoughitdoesappeartounderstandtheirgrievancesandtodevelopappealsfortheirsupport.Therewere alsorepresentativesoftheoldVietminhrevolutionaries;e.g.,VoChiCong, from Quang Nam; Nguyen Thi Dinh, a peasant from Ben Tre; and Ami Doan,amontagnardwomanfromCheoReo.15TheNLF’sknownleadersare allSouthern,buttheimpetusforitscreationandtheorganizationalconcept camefromHanoi. Atfirst,however,theNLFwaslittlemorethanafrontforafewweakorganizations and groups. Small, inconsequential organizations of the ethnic minorities,peasants,students,anddissidentpoliticalleaderswererepresented.
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ItwasintendedthatmoreorganizationswouldjointheFrontandopeningsat thetopoftheorganizationwereleftforthepotentialmembersasaninducementforthem.Withtheorganizationaltalentavailable—Southernerstrained in the North,Vietminh, and a few Northern cadres—the Communists were ableslowlybutsurelytodevelopnotonlytheNLFitself,butalsotheassociated mass groups to support it.While the Communists did not deliberately hidetheirsponsorshipoftheNLF,theyinitiallytooksomepainstostressthe broadnatureoftheFrontandtoplaydowntheirownroleinit.ButitisabundantlyclearfrominterrogationofVietCongprisonersthattheNLFisthetool oftheCommunists,whodirectitseverymove. ThenewlyformedNLFannouncedabroad,uncontroversialten-pointprogram,whichhasremainedthebasicstatementofitsgoals.Itcalledforacoalitiongovernment—althoughinfacttheleadershiphasusuallyrefusedtoaccept theG.V.N.asaparticipatingmember—democracy,developmentoftheeconomy,andgreatereducation.Theprogramprovidedforadequatearmedforces andtheprotectionofminorityrightsandadvocatednonalignmentinforeign policy(althoughtheD.R.V.N.wasconsideredtobeinaspecialcategory,not coveredbythisphrase).Re-unificationwasanimportantpoint,butoneabout whichtheNLFhasvacillatedtosomeextent.Finally,theprogramcondemned war.This program—like the organization itself—was admirably devised to attractalargefollowing. TheNationalLiberationFrontservesmanypurposesfortheCommunists. ItrepresentedabroadnationalfronttowhichallopponentsofDiemwere expectedtorally,andithascontinuedtoprovideabaseforanti-G.V.N.elements. It was the Communist hope that the intellectuals, the peasants, membersofthesects,andtheethnicminorities,aswellasnewdissidents, couldallfindsomethingforthemselvesinitsbroadprogram.Second,by gatheringallgroupsinoneorganization,itiseasierfortheCommuniststo manipulatethemandoftentoplaythemoffagainsteachother.Third,the NLFbringstogethersomeofthenaturaldissidentleadersandsoprovides abaseforCommunistrecruiting.Finally,itwashopedthattheFrontwould providethebasisforafuturegovernment.TheNLFhasrepresentativesin afewforeigncountriesandtakesthelinethattheSaigongovernmentisthe illegal one, that the NLF reflects the true aspirations of the Vietnamese people. OnJanuary1,1962,littlemorethanayearaftertheannouncementofthe formationoftheNLF,theCommunistsannouncedtheformationofthePeople’s Revolutionary Party (PRP), an admittedly Communist Party, which “becameamember”andhasalwaysbeentheguidingforceoftheNLF.Itis notclearwhyHanoichosethistimetoannouncethePRP,fortheFrontwas successfully representing itself as a non-Communist organization opposing Diem.Someobservers,assumingthattheSouthwingoftheLaoDongwas ineffective, believe the Communists wanted to strengthen the NLF with
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aCommunistPartybackbone,togiveamoreideologicalslanttotherevolution,andtoprovidemoralsupporttotheCommunistsintheSouth.16 However,giventhefrailnatureoftheNLFinJanuary,1962,andthefact thatthewarwasgoingwellfortheinsurgents(boththeG.V.N.andtheUnited Statesbecameverydisturbedin1961,aswitnessedbybothEugeneStaley’s andGeneralMaxwellTaylor’smissionstoSouthVietnamduringtheyear),it ismorelikelythatbythistimetheCommunistsfeltconfidentenoughtoorganizeopenlyaCommunistParty.Evenmoreimportant,theyprobablywished toemphasizetheSouthernnatureoftheinsurgency,andthereforesetupan allegedlyindependentSouthernpartythatadmittedonlytheusualCommunist relationshipswiththeLaoDongPartyintheNorth.Thepartywas“formed” withgreatrapidityandskill,againrevealingthatitwasmoreofachangeof namethanthecreationofanewparty. EventhisopenlyCommunistPartydidnotstressitsCommunistgoals.Inits ten-point program, most of the NLF goals were repeated, but there was a muchstrongeremphasisonanti-Americanism.Threeofthetenpointswereto abolish the U.S. economic monopoly, eliminate U.S. cultural enslavement, andterminatetheAmericanadvisersystemandbases.Astimewenton,some Communistgoalswereaddedtothenationalisticones,andinmostcasesthe cadresannouncedthattheplanwaseventuallytointroduceasocialistsociety inSouthVietnam.However,thefirstmajorobjectivesremainedtheoverthrow ofDiemandhissuccessorsandtheejectionoftheAmericans. TheCommuniststhemselvesseemtorealizethatCommunismitselfcannotyetbeunderstoodbythepeasants,and—perhapsevenmoresignificant— thatitisnotanacceptablerallyingorenergizingforceformostVietnamese. IntheearlierwaragainsttheFrenchandnowintheoneagainsttheG.V.N., theyhaveconstantlyemphasizedthemessuchasnationalism,socialimprovement,andantiimperialism.TheyhavesoughttobuildasstrongaCommunist apparatus(PRP)aspossible,buthavemutedthoughnotdenieditsCommunistline. The NLF and the PRP have parallel organizations, permitting the PRP to controlandmanipulatetheNLFatallechelons.Atthetopofbothorganizations are large central committees that meet infrequently, but contain smaller subgroupings,presidiums,andsecretarygeneralswithsecretariatswhichcarryon theday-to-daywork.Therearestaffsectionsinbothsecretariatstodealwith organization, taxation, propaganda, military affairs, and administration. The NLFCentralCommitteeiscomposedofrepresentativesfromthevariousmemberorganizationsoftheFront,whileallmembersofthePRPCentralCommitteearededicatedCommunists.Thereis,however,aninterlockingdirectorateat thislevel,astopCommunistsoccupykeypositionsintheNLFCentralCommittee.Ateachlevel—throughregion,zone,province,anddistrict—thereisasimilarmatchingorganizationwiththesamerelationshipbetweenthebroadNLF andthetightlyorganizedPRP.Atthevillageandlowerlevels,theorganization
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issimplebutroughlyofthesamenature.InthegreatCholon—Saigon—Gia Dinhcomplex,theVietConghaveanelaborateorganizationwithahierarchy similartotheruralone,whosetopcommitteesreportdirectlytotheNLFand PRPheadquarters.Inadditiontothisverticalcommandstructure,theNLFhas its mass organizations—the most important of which are the farmer, youth, women, student worker, and intellectual associations—which are means of involvingasmanypersonsaspossibleintheorganizationandactivitiesofthe Front.Theseassociationsmobilizefunctionalelementsofsocietyfornarrower groupgoalsaswellasfortheNLFobjectives. ThisVietCongapparatushasgrowninnumbersandinfluence.In1961its successescausedconsiderableconcerninbothSaigonandWashington,and AmericaneconomicandmilitaryaidandthenumberofU.S.adviserswere greatly increased. The growing Viet Cong strength also induced the Diem regimetoinauguratethestrategichamletplan.Theprogram,largelyborrowed fromtheBritishexperienceinMalaya,wasanattempttogrouppeopleinto moredefensiblelocationsandatthesametimetoimprovetheirsocialand economic welfare. In 1962, this program caused the Viet Cong to become increasinglyconcernedaboutthegreatstrainbeingplacedontheirorganizationandactivities.Althoughtheyremainedcertainofvictory,theimmediate futureworriedthem.However,theireffortstodestroythestrategichamlets and to discredit the program—along with ineptitude, inefficiency, and mishandlingonthepartoftheG.V.N.—reducedthisthreatby1963. Internaldiscontent,especiallytheBuddhistoutbreaksofspring,1963,revealed theshakyfoundationsoftheDiemregimeandencouragedtheVietCong.Asthe possibilityofDiem’soverthrowloomedgreater,theVietCongleadershipgrappledwiththeproblemofhowtotakeadvantageofit.Diem’sassassinationin November,1963,turnedouttobenotanunmixedblessingfortheNLF.While thecoupeliminatedacorruptandincreasinglyinefficientregime,italsoridthe countryofthegreatestobjectofhateandhenceanimportantmotivatingelement forsomepartsoftheNLF.MembershipintheNLFdroppedafterthecoup,as manyopponentsofDiemthoughtthestrugglewasover.Ontheotherhand,the vacuumleftbytheremovalofDiemgavetheNLFagreatopportunitytoseize power.TheVietCongmilitaryforcestried,butfailed.VietCongactivityreached itshighestlevelimmediatelyafterthecoup.WhiletheNLFwasnotabletoseize powerevenduringtheparalysisofthecountry,itdidmakeconsiderablegainsas timemovedonandtherewasnofirmhandatthewheel.By1964,thecountrywideoperationsoftheVietConghadtheG.V.N.tottering.TheVietConghad nearlyachievedvictorybyearly1965,whenAmericanbombingandtheintroductionoflargenumbersoftroopsbegan. From1956to1964,HanoiseemstohaveplayedakeybutsomewhatsurreptitiousroleinthedevelopinginsurgencyintheSouth.TheD.R.V.N.has disguisedanddenieditsaid,butthereistoomuchevidencetodoubtitsexistence.InthespeechesofitsleadersandthebroadcastsofRadioHanoi,the
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D.R.V.N.constantlystressedtheunificationthemeandtheneedtooverthrow Diemandhissuccessors, and provided broad moral support for subversive actionintheSouth.Ithasbeentheguidingforceinoverallpolicyandstrategy andhasmadethecrucialdecisions.HoChiMinhhimselfprobablymastermindedtheformationoftheNLFandthe“new”PRP.Until1964,however, mostsupportwasofanintangiblenature;thereafter,actualmatérielandmanpowerassistanceincreasedgreatly.Althoughincitingtorebellion,aidingand abettinginsurgents,andprovidingsuppliesmaynotconstituteovertaggression, they certainly represent at the very least interference in the internal affairsofSouthVietnam.InfiltrationofD.R.V.N.troopsintotheSouthisquite anothermatterandisclearlyaggression.However,allofthisassistanceshould notovershadowthefactthattherewasconsiderableindigenousunrestinthe South,withoutwhichtherewouldhavebeenlittleinsurgency. This combined Northern and Southern, Communist-directed effort has produced a remarkable organization which is composed of three major groups,twoofwhichhavebeenpreviouslydiscussed.Thefirstistheavowedly CommunistPRP,thetightlyorganizedandsomewhatexclusiveunitwhichis responsibleforpolicydecision-makingandoverallcontrol.Itdominatesand directsthesecondgroup,theNLF,whichisthemassorganizationservingas abroadfrontfortheinsurgency.ThethirdgroupistheNationalLiberation Army,whichisthemilitaryarmoftheorganizationandisdiscussedinthe nextchapter.Itisthisefficientcombinationofamass-movementfrontanda tightlyorganizedCommunistPartywithitsownarmythatisthereallyimportant threat in Vietnam, as the Saigon government has no comparable organization.
NOTES 1. Thisbroadterm,theGenevaAccords,alsoincludesthemilitarycease-fireagreementsforLaosandCambodia,buttheyarenotdiscussedhereforobviousreasons. 2. ThisbriefsummaryoftheconditionsoftheGenevaAccordsisnotaddressedto themanyseriousquestionsarisingoutofthisconference,suchasthelegalityofthe Accords,whethertheUnitedStateswascommitted,andwhethertheGovernmentof SouthVietnamwasbound.Thoughimportant,thesequestionsarenotcriticaltothe subjectofthisbook. 3. TheDaiVietorDaiVietQuocDanHoi(theNationalPartyofGreaterVietnam) wasformedin1945innorthernAnnamasananti-Frenchgroup.Itisquitesecretive andhasmembersinthepresentSaigongovernment.TheVNQDDorVietnamQuoc DanDong(VietnamNationalistParty)isanoldernationalistpartywhichwasfounded in1927.ItismodeledaftertheChineseKuomintangPartyandlookedtotheChinese foraidinexpellingtheFrench.ThisgroupisalsoactiveinthepresentSaigonregime, especiallyintheICorpsarea. 4. BernardFall,inViet-NamWitness:1953–66(NewYork:FrederickA.Praeger, 1966),p.78,statesthatVietminhkillingsbeganimmediatelyafterJuly,1956.InThe
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TwoViet-Nams(2drev.ed.;NewYork:FrederickA.Praeger,1967),p.316,heargues thattheinsurgencystartedby“deliberateCommunistdesign”in1957.SeealsoGeorge Carver,“TheFacelessVietCong,”ForeignAffairs,XLIV,No.3(April,1966),p.358. Ellen Hammer, in “SouthVietnam:The Limits of PoliticalAction,” PacificAffairs (Vancouver), XXXV, No. 1 (Spring, 1962), p. 30, argues that Hanoi intervened in 1956becauseitcouldnottolerateabetterstandardoflivingintheSouth. 5. BernardFall,“SouthViet-Nam’sInternalProblems,”PacificAffairs,XXXI, No.3(September,1958),p.255. 6. Fall,TheTwoViet-Nams,p.281. 7. Hammer,op.cit.,p.32. 8. DouglasPike,VietCong:TheOrganizationandTechniqueoftheNationalLiberationParty[sic]ofSouthViet-Nam(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1966),p.102. 9. Some maintain that the sects did not cooperate with the Viet Cong, but remained separate and concentrated on their own organizational development. The HoaHaoappeartohavecooperatedwiththeVietConguntil1961,whentheyparted company.TheythenwereopposedbyboththeVietCongandtheSaigongovernment, butjoinedthelatterafterDiem’soverthrowinNovember,1963.TheNationalLiberationFront,however,includessomesurvivorsfromthetimeofcooperationbytheHoa HaoandBinhXuyen. 10. Thecreationofagrovilles,beguninmid-1959,wasanefforttoregroupscattered rural populations into new centers where they would be protected from Viet Congpropagandaandattacksandtheirlotcouldbeimproved.Theagrovillesdidnot workoutwell.Agrovillesweretheantecedentsinsomewaysofthestrategichamlets, whichwerebegunin1962.Themajordifferencewasthattheagrovillesweretobe newlivingcenters,intowhichpeopleweretobemovedfromtheirhomes,whilethe strategichamletsinvolvedlessermovementsofpeopleintosmallerandmoredefensible hamlet configurations. See Joseph J. Zasloff, “Rural Resettlement in South Vietnam,”PacificAffairs,XXXV,No.4(Winter,1962–63). 11. Ithasbeenestimatedthattherewereatleast5,000guerrillasactivein1959. Foronesource,seeibid.,p.329.Mostsuchfiguresarelargelyguesses,however. 12. SeeWilfredBurchett,Vietnam:InsideStoryoftheGuerrillaWar(NewYork: International Publishers, 1965), p. 152. Burchett is anAustralian Communist who frequentlyvisitsandwritesabouttheVietCong.Pike,inhisVietCong,contradicts himselfonthispoint:Hedescribestheuncoordinatedoppositionexistingbeforethe formationoftheNLF(p.76),butelsewherehesaysthatby1959an“over-alldirectional handwasapparent”andthat“thestrugglehadbecomeanimportedthing”(p.78). 13. Pike,op.cit.,p.78.HegivescreditfortheorganizationoftheNLFtoHoChi Minh,“Vietnam’sorganizationalgenius”(p.76). 14. Wilfred Burchett has long argued that the insurgency is purely Southern. Phillippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture are leaders of the French school that takes essentiallythesamelineandclaimsthatHanoibecameinvolvedwellaftertheinsurgencystarted. 15. LeMatin(PhnomPenh),November14and18,1964,carriedshortbiographies ofsomeoftheNLFleaders.Itindicated—evenbragged—thatmanyoftheseleaders hadpursuedtheirrevolutionaryactivitiessince1954andhadneverreallystopped. PikegivesmorecompleteandrecentbiographicalsketchesoftheNLFleadershipin AppendixDtohisVietCong.
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16. Pike,op.cit.,pp.143–44.Pikeisimpressedwiththepromptorganizationof the PRP and admits parenthetically that the Lao Dong cadres certainly helped, but doesnotindicatethattherewasagoodcovertCommunistorganizationinexistence. Without that basis, the organization of the PRP would certainly not have been as promptandefficientasheclaims.
Chapter7
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Although they may represent the most obvious threat to the security and stabilityofSouthVietnam,militaryoperationsare,aswehaveseen,only oneofthetoolsusedbytheVietCongtowageinsurgency.Thecombination ofpropaganda,economicsubversion,andcivicactionsdirectedbytheViet Cong forms the basis of their struggle to gain control of South Vietnam. Theseeconomic,social,andpoliticalactionsconstitutethevitalsubstructureoftheinsurgency—difficulttoseeandevenmoredifficulttodestroy. Militaryactionshave,however,steadilyincreasedinsignificanceasthewar hascontinuedandthelevelofviolencehasmounted.1 LiketheotheractivitiesoftheVietCongintheirso-calledwarofliberation, militaryoperationsareundertakenwithpoliticalobjectivesinmind.IntraditionalWesternstrategy,militaryrequirementsareoftenallowedtooverride nonmilitaryconsiderations;VietCongdoctrine,however,requiresthatmost military operations be justified by definite political or psychological goals. LiketheVietminh,theVietCongbelievethatthearmyhasothermissionsat leastasimportantasfighting.GeneralGiap,whohasplayedavitalrolein both movements, has said that political action is the soul of the army.The individualsoldiermustunderstandthepoliticalandpsychologicaldimensions ofthewarandofhisactions;hemusttreatthepeoplecourteouslyandtryto helpthemintheirtasks.Armycadresoftenundertakespecificpsychological missionstovillagestolecturethepeopleontheevilsofSaigonandtheAmericans and the virtues of the “liberation” movement. Viet Cong propaganda constantly stresses the unity of the army and the people, even though each maybecalledupontoperformdifferentmissionsintheircommonstruggle. (In practice, of course, the Viet Cong troops are not always helpful to the
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people. In the next chapter, it will be pointed out that the Viet Cong have recentlychangedtheirbehaviortowardthepopulation.) Inordertoassurethesubordinationofthemilitaryforcestothepolitical objectives of the Party, its leaders have employed a number of measures, mostofwhichweretriedbytheVietminhintheearlierwar.Muchofthe timedevotedtotrainingthetroopsisspentinpoliticalindoctrination.The NationalLiberationArmyandtheparamilitaryforcesincludeanumberof PRPmembers(oftenconstitutingasmuchasone-thirdofthetotalstrength of the regular forces), organized in cells and larger units, who help with indoctrinationofthetroopsandevaluateandreportontroopmorale,reliability, and conduct. There are also Party committees at all levels of the militaryhierarchy,whichleadtroopdiscussionsandtrytoassureadherence tothePartyline.Formalcontrolofthetroopsisassuredbytheplacementof politicalofficers,orcommissars(whooftenoutrankthemilitarycommanders), witheachmilitaryunit.ThesecommissarsarePartymembers,areinvolved inthemakingofalldecisions,andcanoverrulethemilitarycommanders. “ThePartydecides,themilitaryexecutes,”asonecapturedVietCongdocument explained the relationship. Conversely, military commanders participate in—butneverdominate—meetingsofthevariousechelonsinthehierarchy ofthepoliticalorganization. THEMILITARYAPPARATUS TheViet Cong military organization differs from that of a conventional Westernarmynotonlyinitspronouncedpoliticalorideologicalcharacter, butalsoinitsstructure,whichisbasedlargelyonthatoftheVietminh.Atthe bottom of the hierarchy are the people’s forces or guerrillas, whom most Americanswouldnotconsideraspartofaregularmilitaryestablishment,but whoplaysuchanimportantandintegratedrolefortheVietCongthatthey mustbeincludedinanydiscussionoftheVietCongmilitaryapparatus.There are two types of “people’s forces”—the village guerrilla and the combat guerrilla. The village guerrillas are usually older men—largely untrained, poorlyequipped,andinadequatelyindoctrinated—whoperformthemissions oflocaldefenseandlogisticsupport.Thecombatguerrillasareyoungermen whoseemtobepromisingcandidatesfortheregularforcesandarebetter trained,equipped,andindoctrinated.Theyengageinsmallguerrillaoperations outside the village confines and are used as support forces for the regular units.Boththesegroupsareusuallyorganizedinsquadsandplatoonsandare controlledbythevillagePRPorganization. Therolesofthesepopularforces,especiallythecombatguerrillas,should notbedismissedlightly.Foronething,theirsocialroleisasimportantas theirmilitaryone,fortheytendtoinvolveandcommitmorepeopletothe struggle.MostVietnamesefamiliesfeelresponsiblefortheactionsofoneof
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theirmembers;manythereforetolerateorsupporttheVietCongbecausea brother,husband, father, or even a female relative is a member. Guerrillas performtheessentialserviceofspreadingtheideasofthemovementamong theirfamiliesandintheirvillages.Serviceintheguerrillamovementisnot onlyameansoftrainingandindoctrination,butalsoaperiodofapprenticeshipduringwhichmilitaryofficialscandeterminewhetheramanisfitfor higher-leveldutyintheregularmilitaryforces—andeventuallyformembershipintheParty.Insomecases,wholeguerrillabandsthathaveprovedtheir combatvalueareelevatedtothenextlevelinthemilitaryhierarchy.2 Guerrillasperformimportantlogisticfunctionsandassistinregularbattles inanumberofways:Theyactasacoveringforce,helpclearthebattlefieldof the dead, and stow the booty. Finally, they engage in limited paramilitary actionssuchasambushes,assaultsonofficials,andattacksonsmallenemy detachmentsandoutpostsintheirownlocale. These guerrillas are elusive and most difficult to deal attacks on small enemydetachmentsandoutpostsintheirhomeareas.Theyareknowntoand areanintegralpartofthepopulation.Theyare,infact,stillpeasants.Families andneighborsaremorelikelytohelpandprotectthemthantoturnthemover tothegovernment.Theirneedsarefewandsimpleandtheirlogisticsupport comes from their home or village. Most men prefer to join the guerrillas becausetheyaretoldtheycanstayintheirvillagesandoperateonfamiliar ground,andthusdonotfacetheemotionalupheavalofleavingtheirfamilies toanuncertainfate.Theythushaveasuperiorknowledgeoftheterrainand people.ThesearetheelementsoftheVietCongthatswimsafelyandeasilyin theseaofthepeople.3 Nextinthehierarchyarethelocalforces,sometimescalledregionaltroops, whichareorganizedinlargerunitsthantheguerrillas—usuallyofcompany orbattalionsize—andareunderthecommandofthedistrictandprovincial VietCongauthorities.Thesetroopsareoften,ifnotalways,graduatesofthe guerrillabands,andarethereforeatleastaswelltrainedastheguerrillas.At thelevelofthelocalforces,thereisgreateremphasisonunittacticsandsupportweaponsandawiderrangeofoperations.Theirarmsandequipmentare superiortothoseusedbytheguerrillas,butarestillnotalwaysplentifulor modern.Thelocalforces—whofallbetweentheguerrillasandtheregular troops in the military organization—carry out independent military operations, act as screening and support forces for the regular forces, and also engageinguerrillaactivities.Theyperformmanyofthesamelogisticfunctionsastheguerrillas,andlikethem,usuallyremainintheirhomedistrictor province(and,ofcourse,similaradvantagesaccruefromthefactthatthey operateintheirnativeterritory).Atthislevel,too,thereareopportunitiesto advanceindividuallyorcollectively.Theroleandimportanceofthesetroops are similar to those of the guerrillas, though they obviously operate on a higherlevel.
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Itwastheguerrillasandlocalforces—basicallyVietminhcadreswithsome new recruits—who launched the guerrilla war in the South in 1960.These forces represented a formidable problem for the unpreparedARVN and its Americanadvisers.IcanrecallU.S.Armyofficerscomplainingin1961that, iftheelusiveVietCongwouldjuststandstillandfight,orformlargerunits and stop using the ambush technique, theARVN could handle them—thus revealingtheintensefrustrationsuchirregularforcescancreate.TheseoriginalVietCongforcesexpandedandimproved,andmanyofthemdeveloped intotheregularforcesthatin1964andearly1965cameclosetoachievinga militaryvictoryinVietnam. TheeliteoftheVietCongmilitaryorganizationistheNationalLiberation Army, which has been organized and trained in the last five or six years. Thesetroopsarebetterarmedandequippedthantheguerrillasorlocalforces and are well indoctrinated and trained, having usually served in the lower echelons for some time. Until recently, most of the troops were literate, aspiredtoCommunistPartymembership,andweredeeplydedicatedtoand proud of their mission and organization. Newer members, many of whom have been drafted, often lack the skill, the zeal, and the dedication of the olderones. ThisNationalLiberationArmy,orregularforce,thoughpowerfulinmany ways,isquitedifferentfromaWesternarmy.Thereisamuchhigherratioof fightingmentologisticelementsintheseunitsbecausetheirsupplyrequirementsaresosmall.Theregularforcehasfewheavysupportweaponsandlittle gasoline-usingequipment,andleadsaspartanexistence.Someunitsraisesome of their own food, while many others get their food from the people in the locality; in both cases, the military logistic support required is very small. Someofthearms—mines,boobytraps,andevenmoresophisticatedweapons— arehomemade,andmanyweaponsofallkindsarecapturedfromtheARVN. Inthepastfewyears,however,moreandmoreweaponsandspecialequipment havebeenbroughtinfromtheNorth,andthishasmadetheNLFArmymuch moredependentonoutsidesourcesandinthatsense,liketheNorthVietnamese regulars,more“modern,”orWestern. The fact that the regular forces have so few logistical needs gives them greatmobilityaroundandnearbasesandfriendlypopulations,butthesimple logistic system restricts their longer-range mobility.The limited kinds and numbersofweaponsandammunitionreducesthecapabilityoftheregulars toengageinsustainedorpitchedbattles.However,theiroperationalconcepts aresomewhatlikethoseoftheguerrillasanddifferentfromthoseofWestern armies,whicharepreparedforprolongedcombatanduseawidevarietyof weaponsincludingairpower,armor,andartillery.ThesedifferencesinoperationaltechniquesandthefrequentdifferencesintheobjectivesofanengagementmakeitdifficulttocomparetheperformancesoftheVietCongregulars andthealliedforces—or,indeed,todeterminewhohaswon.
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STRATEGIES Theoverall,long-termobjectiveoftheVietCongis,aswehaveseen,the acquisitionofpoliticalpower.Itisvirtuallyimpossibletoknowwithcertainty whatstrategiestheyhavefollowedduringtheirlongstruggletoattainthisgoal, butonecanattemptsomeinformedestimates.Onestrategyappearstohave beentocreateasituationconducivetotheformationofacoalitiongovernment— oneoftheoriginaltenpointsintheNLFprogram.Thisstrategystressesthe importance of developing a strong insurgent political organization that can moreandmorefunctionasagovernment,meanwhilepromotingthenotionthat theSaigonregimeisnotthetruegovernmentofSouthVietnam.Theactual coalitioncouldcomeabouteitherthroughnegotiationsorbythecollapseofthe SaigonregimeandanNLFtakeover. TheNLFgenerallytendstointerpretacoalitiongovernmentasonedominatedbyitsmembers,apparentlynotincludingmembersoftheG.V.N.Some observers,however,arguethattheNLFisinfavorofatruecoalitiongovernment.Thisapparentcontradictionmaybepartiallyexplainedbythefactthatthe Frontbelievesitisalreadyabroadcoalitionofparties(itrepresentstwotiny partiesinadditiontothePRP),socialgroups,andethnicminorities,andthatthe Saigongovernmentisapuppetregimewhichdoesnotrepresentanyimportant elementinVietnamesesociety.Byblurringtheactualnatureoftheproposed coalition,theVietCong,confidentthattheyarethestrongestorganizationin Vietnamandcandominateanycoalitiongovernment,mayhopetogainsupport forthissolution.Inanycase,intheeyesoftheCommunists,acoalitiongovernmentisonlythefirststeptowardtheformationofaCommuniststate.4 AnalternativestrategythatsomeobserversbelievetheVietCongfollowed untilwellinto1963oreven1964isthatofthegeneralpopularuprising.5In thiscase,theemphasisisonthecreationofwidespreadsocialunrestanddissatisfaction.Ashostilityandangerincrease,itbecomespossibletofomenta popular action that is so overwhelming that the government and its armed forcesareunabletoresistit.VietCongproselytizingandpropagandainall sectionsofsocietyhaveattemptedtocreateasituationinwhichsuchageneral uprisingcouldoccur.However,thisisaslowprocessandinvolvesthemanipulationofmassesofpeople—somethingthatisextremelydifficulttoachieve and,infact,israrelyaccomplished. Inboththesestrategies—thecoalitionandthepopularuprising—themilitary playasecondaryrole,reinforcingandcontributingtothenonmilitarymeasures bydiscreditingtheG.V.N.Forexample,theVietCongclaimthattheirforces defendthepeoplefromtheundisciplinedbehaviorofsomegovernmenttroops, andtheygoadtheARVNintoactionsthatalienatethepeople. Characteristicofthesestrategies,andofVietCongmilitaryactionsaswell, istheemphasisonalongstruggle—essentiallyawarofattrition.Theterror campaignagainstruralofficials,VietCongmilitarytactics,andpropaganda
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allhelpslowlytoerodethewillingnessofthepeopletoservetheirgovernment, tounderminethewillandcapacityofSaigontogovernthecountryside,to reducethesupplyofableofficials,andtohelpbuildanopposingorganization. Thisinsidiouslyunnervinganddebilitatingcampaignconstitutesoneofthe majorproblemsofthisunusualwar. Whilethereisagreatemphasisonthelongwarofattritionandultimatevictory,notallCommunistleadershaveinfinitepatience.Giapneverbelievedthat guerrillascouldwinawaralone,andadvocatedthegeneralmilitaryoffensiveas themeanstofinalvictory.Wehavenotedthatin1946and1951,heoptedprematurelyforthemaximumuseofforcetohastenvictory.Ifheismasterminding therevolutionintheSouth,itisnotunreasonabletoexpectagreatemphasison theuseofforceand,attimes,impatiencewiththetempoofprogress. Themilitarysolutionasoutlinedandachievedin1954byGiapwasdescribed inChapter1.Thisstrategyinvolvesthegradualbuildupoflargemilitaryunits thatcaneventuallytaketheoffensiveagainsttheenemyanddefeathiminopen battle.Whilewarfareinthisphaseismoreconventionalthaninearlierphases, itisstillhighlymobileandiswagedwithoutfrontlines. ManyobserversbelievethatifitwerenotfortheintroductionofAmericantroops,itwouldnothavebeennecessaryfortheVietCongtoproceedto thethirdmilitarystageinordertoachievevictory.TheVietConginfrastructure and military forces were becoming increasingly powerful, and their political base was improving and broadening. In spite of vastly increased U.S. military and economic aid and some actual combat assistance in the formofairandhelicoptersupport,itappearedthattheVietCongwerewinningandthatonegreatmilitarypushwouldtoppletheSaigonregime.Giap probably had considerable influence on the 1964 decision to increase the military effort and try for a quick military victory. The possibility of the introductionofU.S.groundtroopsmusthavebeenconsideredandrejected bytheHanoiregime,whichprobablybelievedthatdirectU.S.participation wouldneveroccur,orifitdid,thatU.S.assistancewouldbetoolateand incapableofredressingthesituation.TheG.V.N.wasindeednearlytoppled inthewinterof1964–65,butthepresenceofsomanyAmericantroopshas nowmadesuchadevelopmentimprobable. SomeobserversfeelthatbothHanoianditssympathizersintheSouthhave alwaysadvocatedthemilitarystrategy.ItdoesseemthattheVietConghave allalongbeenpreparinglocalforcesandregularunitsforapossiblemilitary conclusiontothestruggle.Thisisnotsurprising,sincemostoftheVietCong cadreshavebeenVietminh,whosedoctrinewasbasedonthesuccessfultheoriesofGiap.Theregroupees,whobegantoreturninlargenumbersin1959, hadbeentrainedandindoctrinatedforyearsintheNorthbyVietminhleaders. Inmorerecentyears,ofcourse,youngerrecruitshavebeguntomatureandto assumemoreimportantpositionsinthePRP,NLF,andNLA,buttheyhave neverdominatedanyoftheseorganizations.Thustheinfluenceoftheearlier
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VietminhexperienceandthecurrentHanoileadershiphavemadethereliance onmilitaryoperationsgreat. Otherobservers,however,believethattheSouthernersintheNLFhavepreferredthepoliticalandsocialstrategiesdescribedabove.Thosewhoholdthis view have not made it entirely clear why the Southerners—probably the younger generation—may have leaned to these less militaristic solutions. It maybethat,becausethestruggleisessentiallyaciviloneintheirowncountry, theywishedtoavoidabloodymilitarystruggle;itmaybethattheywishedto devisetheirownindependentstrategyfortheirconflict,orthattheysawthe socio-economicandpoliticalproblemsasdominantandnotcapableofbeing solvedbymilitarymeans.Theseobserversassumethattherewassomesortof internalstruggle—probablyinlate1963—overwhichstrategywasright,and thatHanoiwontheargument.Thedecisiontotakethemilitaryrouteledtothe stepped-uptrainingofunitsformobilewarfareandlarger-scaleactions,both characteristicofthefinalstageofrevolutionarywarfare.Ithasbeenreported thattheD.R.V.N.sentregulararmyadviserstotheSouthasearlyasthefallof 1963tohelppreparetheNLFArmyforthisnewtask.Inlate1964,theD.R.V.N. begantosenditsownregularunitsSouthtoassistinthefinalvictory. IthasnotbeeneasytodistinguishtheoverallVietCongstrategy,particularlyinviewofthelackofinformationontheactualthinkingoftheleadersin HanoioratthehigherVietCongheadquarters.6Theattempttocreateanenvironmentforvictoryinallfields—gainingthesupport,or,ifthatfails,control ofthepopulation,discreditinganddisablingtheG.V.N.anditsmilitaryforces, andconstructingviablesubstituteorganizations—makestheprecisenatureof thefinalstageenvisionedinthestruggleunclear.Thisbroadpreparatoryeffort makesitpossiblefortheVietCongtomoveinanyoneofseveraldirections andtakeadvantageoffavorablesituationsastheydevelop.TheVietCongare quite aware of this flexibility: One captured document, dated 1963, stated quiteexplicitlythattheoptionsbeingconsideredatthattimeincludedprovokingageneraluprising,executingacoupd’état,goingtophasethree(themilitary solution),orenteringnegotiationsforeitherareturntothe1954settlement (withelections)oracoalitiongovernment. ThemilitarystrategyoftheNLF,liketheoverallpolicies,remainslargely unknown—exceptinthosecaseswherecaptureddocumentshaveprovided information. However, Viet Cong troop concentrations and actions have givensomeindicationastowhatthemilitarystrategymighthavebeenduring certainperiods.Itseemsthatin1962,theCommunistswereattemptingto seizethehighlandsandeventuallydrivefromtheretothesea,cuttingSouth Vietnaminhalfandsecuringaneasiersupplyroute.Thehighlandarea,which GiaphascalledthekeytoSouthVietnam,occupiesastrategiccentralpositionandprovidesaconvenientinfiltrationroute(partofwhichisinLaos), oftenreferredtoastheHoChiMinhTrail,bywhichtroopsandsuppliescan be brought into various parts of South Vietnam almost as far south as the
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Mekong Delta. The plateau, interlaced with jungles, highland plains, and mountains,issparselypopulatedwithmontagnardswhotraditionallydonot liketheVietnamese.SomeofthesemontagnardswentNorthwiththeCommunistsin1954andlaterreturnedafterbeingcarefullyindoctrinated.Inan attempttowintheallegianceofthesehighlandtribes,Communistagentswho remainedintheSouthwentsofarastofileofftheirteethlikethemontagnards andintermarrywiththem. HadtheCommunistsbeenabletogaincontrolofthehighlands,theplan seemstohavebeentointerdictthelocalroadsystem,mobilizethemontagnards, and attempt to construct a mountain stronghold composed of bases, liaisonstopsforinfiltrators,workshops,trainingcamps,andtheusuallogistic supportfacilities. Many observers believe that control of the highlands has beenacontinuingVietCongobjective,andthatanothermajorattempttocarry outthisplanwasmadein1964.IfthishasbeentheVietCongstrategy,ithas failed,althoughtheVietCongreachedtheseainsouthQuangNgaiandnorth BinhDinhandinPhuYenin1964—onlytobedrivenbacksubsequently. OthershavesuggestedthatVietCongstrategyhasasitsprimaryobjective controloftheMekongDelta,themostpopulousandgreatestrice-producing areaofVietnam.TheUnitedStatesandtheG.V.N.havestatedthattheDelta isthekeytothewar.Predictionsaremadeeveryyearofagreatmilitaryoffensive in the Delta at the end of the monsoon season, although none has yet materialized. The Viet Cong may consider a Delta offensive unwise, since additionalARVNtroopswhowouldthenbestationedintheareawouldinterferewiththeirrecruitingandsupply-gatheringactivities.Theymayevenhave achievedamodusvivendiwithelementsoftheARVNandmaybeconcentratingonlessobviouswaysofcontinuingthestruggle. Itisalsoentirelypossiblethatneitherofthesegeographicalalternatives accuratelyreflectCommuniststrategy.Thosewhowagerevolutionarywar mustrelyheavilyonthesupportofthepopulation,andarethereforemore concernedwithcontrollingpeopleandwithbreakingthewilloftheG.V.N. andtheARVNtoresistthanwithholdinganygivenpieceofterrain(atraditionalWestern criterion of military success).The highly mobile nature of thewarfurtherreducestheimportanceofholdingterrain,asdoesthelackof aconventionalVietConglogistictail.Infact,theVietCongmayevenfind ittotheiradvantagetochangethefocusoftheirmilitaryeffortsfromone geographicalareatoanother,whilepursuingotherstrategieswhichareless geographicallyoriented. Anoverallstrategy—notnecessarilyexcludingstrategiesemphasizinggeographicalconsiderations—isonebasedonMao’sconceptthatrevolutionary forcesmustbegintheirworkinthecountryside,wherethegovernmentauthoritiesareweakest,andavoidthecitiesuntiladequatepopularsupporthasbeen mobilized.Whentheinsurgentshavedevelopedenoughstrengthintherural areas, they gradually surround the few cities until the cities are completely
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isolated.Variousmapsofenemy-controlledareassuggestthattheVietCong are indeed attempting to surround the towns and cities—especially Saigon, whichtheCommunistshavesaidwillbe“strangledlikeadog.”In1964,U.S. andG.V.N.forcesmadeamajorefforttopushbacktheadvancing“Redring” from the Saigon area; the operation, called Hop Tac [“cooperation”] was unsuccessful.However,theCommunistshavenotfeltstrongenoughopenlyto assault Saigon or any other major city. On the other hand, they may have believedthatanassaultwasunnecessary—thatoncetheyhadgainedcontrol ofthecountryside,thecitieswouldbeunabletosustainthemselvesandso wouldfallintotheirhands.Thefallofthecitieswasnotlefttochance,however,asCommunistsubversionhascontinuedinSaigonandothercities. TheremaybeanadditionalreasonwhytheVietConghavenotmadeany directattacksuponthecitiesofSouthVietnam.Ifoneispreparedtoadmit thattheVietCongarereceivinglargeamountsofU.S.aidthrougheconomic subversion,itisunderstandablethattheywouldnotthinkofcuttingoffthis supply of money and goods until the last moment.This may explain why thereisrelativepeaceintheportsandonlylimitedharassmentofshippingon theSaigonRiver. OFFENSIVETACTICS UntilthearrivaloflargenumbersofU.S.troopsin1965,theNLFArmy andguerrillaswereabletomaintainthemilitaryinitiativeandconcentrateon offensiveactions.Theyfollowedtheusualguerrillapracticeofattackingatthe timeandplaceoftheirchoiceandnotfightingunderunfavorableconditions.7 Althoughtheattacksoftheregularforceshaveevolvedfromverysmallunit actionsagainstafewindividualstoregimental-ordivision-sizeoperations, theyhaveusuallyavoidedsustainedcombat,siegeoperations,andlongdefensivestandsinanattempttohusbandarms,equipment,andkeypersonnel. TheVietConghavethreeoffensivetactics,themostimportantofwhichis theambush,whichwaspracticedsosuccessfullybytheVietminhagainstthe French.An ambush may serve a variety of purposes. One of the foremost goals,asinmanyotherVietCongactivities,istodiscreditandunderminethe positionoftheSaigongovernment.Thefactthatthegovernmentcannotprovidecontinuingprotectionandisunabletokeeptheroadsopenfornormal commerce,topreventassaultsontrains,andtostoptheminingandblockage ofcanalsconvincesthepeasantthatitispowerless.Furthermore,thepsychologicaleffectonARVNunitsisthattheyarereluctanttomoveoutoftheir bases and thus tend to become static and ineffectual. Not only do these ambusheshaveapsychologicalimpactonbothpeasantsandARVNtroops, buttheyactuallyhalt,delay,andmakemoredifficultandexpensivethedeliveryofsupplies,theconductofbusiness,andtravelbycitizensandofficials.If carriedoutfrequentlyinagivenarea,suchattackscanrenderacityorregion
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inaccessible except by air—a means of travel not available to most private Vietnamese. Particularlyintheearlierphasesofthewar,ambusheswereoftenusedto obtainweapons.OutpostsmannedbylocalG.V.N.forcesandconvoysaccompaniedbysmalldetachmentsfromARVNwerefairgameandusuallyyielded anumberofweapons,ammunition,afewradios,andothersupplies.Villagers couldbeengagedorforcedtostandclosebyandhelpgatheruptheloot.The ambushmayalsobeusedtopreventreinforcementsfromcomingtotheassistanceofabeleagueredpostorvillage;infact,thistacticissosuccessfulthat theViet Cong often attack villages merely to provoke the sending of reinforcementsorreliefcolumnsthattheycanthenambush. TheVietCongambushesmaybedirectedagainstasingleofficial,civilians travelingonthehighwaysorcanals,trains,militaryunits,convoys,oreven helicopters.Goodtacticalintelligenceandanexcellentunderstandingofthe psychologyandhabitsoftheenemyprovidethebasisforasuccessfulambush. Intelligencemaybedrawnfromgoodreconnaissance,leaksfromtheloose talkoftroops,agentswithinARVNortheSouthVietnameseGovernment,or interceptionofU.S.orG.V.N.radio.Inmanycases,thepopulationprovides usefulinformation.ItisnotunusualfortheVietCongtowatchamobileunit oroutpostforweekstodetermineitsmostdetailedhabitsofchangingthe guards, travel, outposting, and weapon maintenance, the quality and vigilance of its leaders, and its morale. Once it has been decided to lay an ambush—say,alongahighway—theytrytoselectaspotthattheenemywill notanticipate.KnowingthattheARVNislikelytosuspectanambusharound curvesintheroadorinthickvegetation,theVietCongmayplananambush in a rice paddy or an open field. Their ability to dig carefully concealed implacements and to remain still for long periods of time enables them to executeambushesinunexpectedspots.Sometimestheywilllayminesand boobytrapsononesideoftheroadandpositiontheirtroopsontheother, thus forcing the ambushed personnel to leap out of their vehicles directly ontotheminesandboobytraps.Onotheroccasions,theymaystopacolumn by planting mines in the road and attacking from both sides of the road. There are so many variations of these tactics that it is difficult to develop precise techniques to counter them—especially as the enemy will always havemadeplansforaquickwithdrawal. Inadditiontoplanningambushesalongnormalroutesoftravelandsimply lyinginwait,theVietConghavedevelopedanumberofwaystolureorforce ARVNforcesintoanambush.SuddenfiringmaydrawARVNtroopstoward agivenarea,andtheymaybeambushedenroute.Aclearingforcemaybe goingthroughanareaandfindwhatappearstobeanareaofweakresistance; itmaythenmoveforwardrapidlyintothisvacuum,onlytodiscoverthatithas beenluredintoacarefullyplannedambush.IfanARVNunitiscrossingarice paddy,theremaybesporadicfiringfromoneside.TheARVNtroopswillthen
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tendtoveertowardtheothersideofthepaddy,wheretheywillbegreetedby intenseclose-infirefromwell-hiddenVietCong.Agentsposingaspeasants orevenasmembersofARVNmayprovide“information”thatwillleadgovernmenttroopsintoanambush;thesamedeceptioncanbeaccomplishedby theuseofcapturedradios. Mines and roadblocks are used extensively, either in conjunction with ambushesoralone(oneexampleoftheuseofminesinanambush—laying minesononesideoftheroadandstationingtroopsontheother—hasalready beenmentioned).Pressureminesareindiscriminate;otherminesareelectricallydetonatedandblowupselectedtargets.Someoftheambushtechniques describedabovemayalsobeemployedtolureARVNtroopsontominedareas. Roadblocksmaybemerelypilesofdebristhatcansafelybemovedwithlittle delay,ortheymaybeminedandbooby-trappedandthusmoredifficultand dangeroustocopewith.In1964,anAmericantravelingfromVinhBinhProvincetoMyTho—adistanceofaboutthirty-fivemiles—saidheencountered nineteen roadblocks. None were mined or accompanied by an ambush, but becausehehadtobecarefulingoingaroundthemorremovingpartsofthem, thetriptookoverfourhours.Suchtrapsarenaturallyunnervingaswellas difficultandslowtobypass,andtheycontributetothegeneralreluctanceto useroads. ThesamekindsoftacticsareusedagainstthesingleNorth-Southrailroad andagainstthenarrowriversandcanals—particularlyintheMekongDelta, where the waterways are a primary means of communication.The river or canal may be blocked, or mines may be laid to destroy or slow traffic and maketheambusheasier.Butmostwatertransportissoslowthatitisnotdifficulttoexecuteanambushwithoutblockingthewaterway.TheVietConguse personalarmsaswellasmachinegunsandrecoillessriflestoattackvessels fromthebanks.Ambushesagainsttherailroadandactsofsabotagehavebeen so easy and successful in spite of guards, air cover, special armored patrol cars,andotherdefensesthatportionsoftherailroadhavebeencloseddown indefinitely. To help counter ambushes and provide faster and more secure crosscountrymobility,theUnitedStateshassuppliedtheG.V.N.withincreasing numbers of aircraft and helicopters, which have been used to reconnoiter routes for possible ambushes, to fly cover over columns on roads, and to attackambushesoncetheyarelaunched.Thehelicoptershaveavarietyof other uses as well: They serve as flying firing platforms, transporters of assault troops and equipment, and reconnaissance vehicles. The medical rescue units are particularly valuable—not only for transportation of the wounded,butasmoralebuilders.8 The Viet Cong responses to helicopters and airpower have been varied. Theyhaveintensifiedtheireffortsatconcealmentandcamouflageandhave conductedevenmoreoftheirmovesandoperationsatnight.Ifitisnecessary
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forthemtomoveduringtheday,theyusuallygoinsmallnumbers,dressedas peasants,sothatitishardtodistinguishthemfromtherestofthepopulation. NLAtroopshavebeengivenadditionalspecialtrainingforusingregularrifles, aswellasmachinegunsandsmallantiaircraftguns,toshootdownhelicopters andaircraft.Concertedeffortshavebeenmadetostripdownedaircraftoftheir machinegunsandtocapturetheseweaponsingroundcombat.TheVietCong havebeenparticularlyactiveagainsthelicopters(aproblemtheVietminhdid nothavetocopewith),whichareinmanywaysmorevulnerablethanaircraft. Onefairlysuccessfultechniquehasbeentoenticethemintotrapsorthewrong landingzones.UsingcapturedU.S.radios,theVietCongareabletolearnof helicopterpilots’requestsforthemarkingofalandingzoneandthendirect themtoanareainwhichanambushhasbeencarefullylaid.Theymayusethe colororsmokemarkerrequestedorissuefalseordersontheradio.The“landingarea”maybecoveredwithpointedsticksandotherconcealedobstacles, oritmaybesurroundedbytroopswhowillopenfireonthedescendingor hoveringhelicopter.Theguerrillashavealsobeenknowntoplananattackon anoutpostinasmallvalleyinanticipationthatahelicopter-bornereliefforce would be dispatched; they deployed machine guns and small anti-aircraft weaponsonthehillsides—thusovercomingsomeoftheirrangeandaltitude problems—andambushedthe“choppers”astheycameintothenarrowvalley. Theyhaveconstantlyattemptedtodevelopnewkindsofam-bushesandways todefendthemselvesagainstU.S.airpower. AsecondmajoroffensivetacticoftheVietCongistheharassing,orhitand-run,attack,launchedusuallyagainstvillagesandlocaldefenseforcesand less often against theARVN.As in the case of ambushes, these generally serve several purposes, not all of which are strictly military. G.V.N. local forces—liketheguerrillasthemselves—arepoorlytrainedandequippedand scarcelyabletodefendthemselves,thusaffordingtheVietCongeasyvictoriesthatimpressthepeoplewiththeinsurgents’strength.Thelocaltroopsare partofthepopulationandtheimpactofsuccessfulVietCongattacksupon them, often accompanied by propaganda talks, is felt by the people. If the defensemilitiaiscowedbytheVietCong,theothervillagersareawareofthe situationandmaythenbemorewillingtocooperatewiththeVietCongthan toassisttheSaigongovernment. Among the strictly military objectives that hit-and-run attacks can accomplisharethedisruptionofpossiblelocaloffensives,thegatheringofintelligence, andtheseizureofweaponsandsupplies,evenifthesearenotofthelatestvintage.Radiosareparticularlyvaluableprizes,enablingtheVietCongtointercept callsforreliefandothermessagesandtobroadcastfalseinformation. Theseharassingattackstakemanyforms.Theguerrillasmaysimplyfire afewshotsintoavillageinordertounnervethepeopleandgivethema senseofinsecurity.OrseveralVietCongmayrunfromonespottoanother, firingtheirweaponsandraisingtheexpectationofanattack.Theywillnot
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attempttokillanyone,andsuddenlytheywillwithdraw,leavingtheanxious villagers to wonder what will happen next.Another variation is for terroristsorsniperstosneakinto,ornear,avillageandkilloneortwolocal officials,makingtheuneasyinhabitantsevenmorereluctanttoassumeany roleinthevillageadministration.Therehavealsobeenoccasionswhenthe VietConghavelobbedmortarshellsorprojectedlocallymadefirebombs intoavillage,causinglargenumbersofcasualtiesorsettingthevillageon fire. If the government does not respond to each of these attacks with a showofmilitaryforce,medicalassistance,andreliefforthehomeless,the villagers then tend to blame Saigon rather than the Viet Cong for their troubles. Notonlydotheseattackscreatefearanduncertaintyamongthevillagers, buttheyalsoaffectARVNandtheattitudesofpeopleandarmytowardeach other.Forexample,oneofthesmallerharassingactionsdescribedabovemay force the village chief to call for assistance from the nearbyARVN unit. WhenanARVNunitdoestrytocometotheassistanceofthevillage,itmay get ambushed on the way and suffer serious casualties as well as loss of equipment.Iftheharassingactionisnotfollowedbyanattack,theARVN unitmayresenthavingbeencalledoutforafalsealarmandhavingsuffered unnecessarycasualties.Itsnotunnaturalreaction,thenexttimeitreceives suchacallforassistance,mightbetoignorethecallentirelyortotakeits timeinresponding.Andthisisexactlywhathappens:Itisnottoouncommon forARVN to march into a village that had called for help twenty-four or thirty-six hours earlier—when bothARVN and the village know full well thatanypossibledangerhaslongsincedisappeared.Inthesecases,theARVN hasplayedintothehandsoftheenemy,andaprimaryobjectiveoftheViet Cong—toseparatethepeoplefromthearmyandthegovernment—hasbeen achieved.ThepeopledonotbelievethatARVNreallywantstodefendthem, andARVNfeelsthatthepeoplearecausingfalsealarmsandareunmindful ofthedangersinvolved.Thecreationofmutualdistrustbetweenarmyand people—a political and psychological objective—is thus brought about by theuseofmilitarymeans. ThethirdmajorVietCongoffensivetacticisthatofthemoreorlessconventionalattack,butanNLFArmyattackdiffersfromthefamiliarWestern attackinseveralimportantways.9First,aconventionalWesternarmyattackis normallyprecededbya“softeningup”byairandartillerybeforetheactual ground assault is launched. Since the Viet Cong have no airpower and no regularartillery,theycannotcarryoutsuchactions,butmustrelyinsteadon preciseintelligence,carefulplanning,andcompletesurprise.Theirpsychological personnel do seek to “soften up” the defenders by exaggerating the strength of theViet Cong and the inadequacy of the government defenses. Second,aWesternoffensiveattackusuallyhasasitsobjectivethecaptureand holding of a given piece of territory.TheViet Cong attack seldom has the
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objectiveofsecuringterritory,butratherinflictingcasualtiesandimpairing morale,whilealsoimpressingthepopulationanddiscreditingthegovernment. Althoughtheguerrillasdonotattempttooccupyaparticulararea,thatarea may, in effect, become lost to the G.V.N. because the Viet Cong have so affectedthepeople’sattitudesthatG.V.N.personnelareunwillingorunable to work there. Third, in conventional Western attacks the assaulting forces keephammeringatthetargetuntilitiscapturedoruntiltheyaredefeated.The VietCong,however,tendtobreakofftheirattacksmorequicklyiftheydonot seemtobegoingwell.Theyrarelyaresointerestedintakingorholdinga particularpieceoflandthattheyarewillingtoriskseriouscasualtiesbyfightingalongbattle.Eveniftheirattackissuccessful,theymaystayjustlong enoughtolecturethepopulation,gatherupafewweapons,takecareoftheir dead,andthenspeedilywithdraw.Theyhaveoccasionallyfoughtlong,bloody battles,butthesehaveusuallyoccurredwhentheirattackingforceswerecornered or when a significant political goal was at stake. Finally, Viet Cong attacksareessentiallyinfantryattacks,astheyhavenoairorartilleryorarmor support.Theydo,however,havemortarsandrecoillessrifles,whicharesometimesusedforasuddenbombardmentjustbeforetheattackandconventionally as infantry support weapons during assaults. Because of the difficulty of supplyingammunitionforsupportweaponsaswellasforpersonalarms,itis usuallyusedcarefullyandsparingly. Giventheinferiorityoftheirfirepowerandotherequipment,theVietCong cannotaffordtobesloppyorcarelessineithertheirplanorexecutionofattack. Furthermore, the more formal attacks are usually launched by the regular forces,andtheyprefertokeepcasualtiesaslowaspossibleamongtheseelite troops.Oneofthemostimportantelementsintheseattacksistheconviction ofthetroopsthattheirleadershavegoodintelligenceandacarefullythought outplan,andhavetrainedthemspecificallyforthisoperation.Theplanning foraregularattackissimilartothatforanambush.Afterthetargethasbeen selected,acarefulintelligencestudyismadeofit,includinganalysisofthe habits,strengths,andweaknessesofthedefenders.Thenextstepinvolvesthe developmentofaplanofattackandrehearsalsoftheattack,oftenusingmodelsoftheoutpostconstructedinthejungle.Insomecases,agentsmayalready havebeenplantedwithinthevillageorpost;theymaytryto“softenup”the inhabitants, provide intelligence, or surreptitiously cut barbed wire or give directionstotheattackers.Asinallotheractions,carefulplansaremadefor withdrawalincaseofvictoryordefeat. Theattackingforcemaybebrokenupintofivemajorcategories.Thefirst elementisusuallycomposedofdemolitionteamsorsappers,whoattemptto breachwalls,cutthroughbarbedwire,orprovidemeansofcrossingditches andmoats.Twoorthreeattackwaves,dependingonthesizeoftheoperation, follow.Therearesupportweapons—primarilymortars,recoillessrifles,and machineguns.Inmanycases,villagersorlocalmilitiafollowtheattacking
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elementstogatherweaponsandequipmentandhaulawaythedead.Finally, acoveringforceisusedtofacilitatewithdrawal—fairlyeasyiftheattackers arevictorious,butmuchmoredifficultifthereisdefeatandenemypursuit. Most Viet Cong attacks begin at 1 or 2 a.m., rather than at dawn as do Americanattacks.Thenightattack,althoughdifficulttoexecuteforobvious reasons,hascertainadvantages:Forinstance,thereisthepsychologicalimpact oftroopsemerging,shoutingandshooting,fromthedarknesswhilestorming aremotevillage—ortheevenmoreterrifyingeffectoftheirappearancesuddenly and silently at the village gates. The shock value of these attacks is expectedtohaveconsiderableeffectonthebattle—asitoftendoes.Airand helicopterreconnaissancearelimitedatnight,furtherincreasingthechances thattheattackwillcomeasacompletesurprise.Artilleryfireandairsupport are also more difficult at night, even though flares and other illuminating deviceshavebeenintroduced. The assaults are launched with massed troops, usually in overwhelming numbers,sincetheattackersaretryingtoachieveaquicksuccessandsuffer fewcasualties.Inmostcases,theVietCongceasebattleatdawnandwithdraw;ifthesituationprecludeswithdrawal,theymay“clingtotheenemy”as soonasitbecomeslight,makingitdifficultforairpowerandartillerytobe usedeffectively. Company-size attacks against provincial and village posts of the G.V.N. (usuallymannedbyoneormoreplatoons)havetakenaterribletollofthese G.V.N.paramilitaryforcesandhavebroughtconsiderablematerialgainsto theNationalLiberationArmy.IthasbeenestimatedthattheVietConghave inflictedtentimesasmanycasualtiesontheseforcesastheysufferedandhave always netted numerous weapons. Even when air or artillery support was available,theratioremainedunfavorabletotheG.V.N.Becauseofambushes, roadblocks,etc.,reinforcementswereunlikelytoreachthesiteofthebattlein timetobeofanyuse,andtheireffectwasgenerallynegligible,althoughwhen theydidarriveintime,theyofteninflictedheavycasualtiesontheattackers. The introduction ofAmerican airpower and troops, who have been able to engageVietCongmainforces,hasrelievedsomeofthepressureofthiskind ofattacks,butpriorto1965theyweredevastating—andtheymaybecomeso againiftheVietCongdecidetoreturntolow-levelguerrillawarfare. AcaptureddocumentwritteninOctober,1964,intheUMinhforestarea, givesabetterideaofthecomplexityofVietCongmilitaryplanning,revealing theadaptabilityaswellastheconsistencyofmanyoftheirtacticalprinciples. Designedtoserveasaguidefordevelopingtacticsofmobileattacksonmobile forces,thisplanningpaperrecognizesthatbothsidesareontheoffensivein theDeltaandthatthissomewhatunusualsituationraisessomenewtactical problems.Butthedocumentbeginsinthetraditionalmanner;firsttheplannersdiscusstheeffectsoftheterraininthisareaontheG.V.N.forcesandon theirown.ThemajorfeaturesoftheDeltaterrainarecanalsandwaterways,
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whichtend—accordingtothepaper—tocanalizeARVNattacks,restrictthe mobility of artillery, limit the use of armored personnel carriers, and make combinedoperations(infantry,armor,andartillery)difficult.Inotherwords, manyoftheARVNequipmentandarmamentadvantagesarereduced.Onthe otherhand,theVietCongbelievethattheterrainofferscertainadvantagesfor themselves: Vegetation, especially along the waterways, is excellent for concealmentandambushes;tacticalmobility,short-range,isgood,although long-rangemovementsareslowed;anditispossibleforlarge(battalion)Viet Congunitstooperate. IntheexistinghighlyfluidsituationintheDelta,accordingtothisdocument,ARVNintentionsarenotalwaysknowninadvance,butintelligence improvesastheenemyoperationsdevelop.Intelligenceandthemoremobile Viet Cong give the guerrillas the initiative in “strength, time, and place.” Theguerrillastrytoanticipateallenemyactionsandmovesandplanaccordingly,althoughtheyarenotabletoperformalloftheirusualpriorplanning inthesemobileengagements.Tocountersweepingoperations,theplanners state,smalldetachmentsmustseekouttheenemyandstartafight;theenemy willhaltandthe“remainder”oftheVietCongforceswillrushtotheattack. Aspecial“tail-locking”forcewilltrytopreventtheenemy’swithdrawal. Incaseswheretheguerrillasattackanoutposttotriggerareinforcementor reliefoperation,themostsuspectARVNroutestotheoutpostareambushed. Recognizingthattheymaybewrongabouttheroutes,theguerrillasalsoplan possiblequickmovestootherlocations,someofwhichmayhavebeenprepared,ifnotoccupied.Inmostcases,patrolsorsmalldetachmentstrytoentice theARVNtroopsintothemainambush. Inengagementsituationsinwhichbothsidesaremoving,small,lightly armeddetachmentsseektofindthegovernmentcolumn,preventpremature orunforeseenactions,andsupplyinformationsothataplanofattackcanbe drawnupand.quicklyexecuted.Individualfireandmaneuverbygroupsin smallseparateprongattacksattempttoseparateARVNarmorandinfantry andthusweakentheirdefense.Withdrawalplansandrallypointsareplanned inallcases.TheafteractionsaresimilartothosefortheusualVietCong combat:assessmentofthesituation,reorganizationofthetroops,peptalks, preparationstocontinueiftheseareappropriate,careofthewounded(the dead,interestingly,arenotmentionedinthisdocument),mobilizationofthe peopleifrequired,clearingofthebattlefield,andstowingofthebooty. Considerableattentionisgivenbytheplannerstotheproblemofairpower. Thetroopsareexhortedtofightairpower—especiallytheL-19spotters.Reconnaissanceiscarriedoutduringthenight.Carefulconcealmentandcamouflage are urged. The antiaircraft units are carefully deployed and move just like Americanunits—leapfrog,twounitsinplacereadytofirewhileonemoves. The critical role of the Communist Party in military operations is confirmedinthispaper.ThePartycommitteedecideswhethertoengageinbattle ornot,picksoutthebivouacareas,andselectsthebattlefieldandtheoverall
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operationalplan;themilitarycommandercarriesoutthedecisionsandworks outthedetails.Partyleadersparticipateinthebattle,followitcarefullyand closely,giveorders,andrallythetroops. Problemsareadmitted—implicitlyandexplicitly.Airpower,alreadymentioned,isoneproblemopenlyaddressed.Theguerrillasalsorecognizethat theirintelligenceisnotalwaysperfectinmobilewarfare,andthattheymaybe surprised. Patrols must attempt to fill this information gap and report their findingsquicklytohigherheadquarters.Additionally,thereisthedifficultyof proper allocation of the limited heavy weapons support, especially after a strong assault when smaller units must protect the withdrawal of the main forcesbycontinuedfiring.Inferiorityinartilleryandarmordoesworrythe VietCong,althoughtheyclaimthatitisfarlessimportantthantroopindoctrinationandmorale. Throughoutthisdocument,itisclearthattheCommunistplannerstryto provide maximum guidance for their operating units, in whatever circumstances,andthattheyareconstantlyattemptingtoimprovetheirtacticsand overcome new problems. The Viet Cong feel very strongly that they must retaintheinitiative—thatiftheyaretomaintainthemomentumoftherevolution,theydarenotgivetheimpressionthattheyarestandingstillorlosing ground.This does not necessarily mean, as will be shown in the following chapter,thattheymustmaintainaformalmilitaryoffensive;theycanstayon theoffensivebyincreasingterroristactivitiesandsmallunitactions,whichare mostdifficulttocounterandstillcontributetotheiroverallobjectives. DEFENSIVETACTICS Theinitiativeisobviouslycrucialinretainingtheallegianceofthepeople, butitisalsoimportantfromastrictlymilitarystandpoint.Surpriseandmobility areusedbytheguerrillastocompensatefortheirinferiorweaponsandequipment;defensiveoperationstendtorobthemoftheseadvantages.Foravariety ofreasons,however,VietCongunitsdoengageindefensiveactions.Sometimestheyarecorneredandcompelledtofight;atothertimes,ahotlypursuing enemymayforcesomeoftheunitstostandandfightrearguardactions.They mayalsomakedeliberatedecisionstoprotectcertainvillagesorinstallations thataredeemedvital.Therearealsopoliticalreasonsforstandingandfighting at times. The Viet Cong have been ingenious and tough in their defensives whentheyhaveengagedinthem;indeed,theyhavenotentirelylosttheinitiativeortheiruseofelementsofsurpriseevenwhenforcedontothedefensive. Thefortified,orcombat,hamletexemplifiestheVietCongdefense,which seemstohavesurpassedeventheVietminhefforts.Thesefortifiedvillagesare completelycontrolledbytheVietCong,andnoG.V.N.officialsarepermitted in them. Clever and painstaking preparations are made to keepARVN out. Thehamletconstructioncommitteemanufacturesthemines,boobytraps,and spike boards used for passive defense and to bolster and supplement the
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activedefensecarriedoutbythelocalguerrillas.Thedefendersplacemines andboobytrapsalongthenormalrouteofapproach,sothatifanenemy columnadvancesandisfiredon,itstroopswillleaptothesideoftheroad forprotection,onlytojumpontotheminesandothertraps.Peasantsand often children carry out an elaborate warning system. Well camouflaged andprotectedfiringpositionsarecarefullyplacedtocoverallapproaches; accesstothemisoftenbyamazeoftunnelsthatareanimportantcharacteristicofhamletdefense.Thetunnelsnotonlyallowconcealedandprotected access to the firing positions and lookout stations, but provide protection for the population and storage for food and military supplies. A hamlet may have many miles of tunnels and underground shelters. Generallyafewofthesetunnelsendfaroutsidethelimitsofthehamlet,so that the defenders can escape if the fighting gets too rough. Techniques suchasleavingdeliberategapsinthedefenseorfiringjusttoattractattentionareusedtodrawtheattackingforceawayfromthehamletandintoa channelwheretheremaybeminesoracarefullyplannedambush.Usually, thelocalguerrillascarryoutsuchadefense,butregularforcesinthearea mayprepareanambushfortheARVNwhenitdeparts,tiredandcareless, attheendoftheday. InZonesDandCandother“liberatedareas,”anetworkoffortifiedhamlets or even more strongly fortified bases makes sweeping operations difficult, slow,andoftendangerous.PriortothearrivalofAmericantroopsin1965, sweepsintotheseareaswererareandusuallyunsuccessful.SometimesdefensivepositionsweresowellconcealedthatARVNwoulddiscoverlittle—or theymayhavebeenanxioustoavoidtheseinstallations,sincewhentheydid discoveroneofthem,afuriousfightusuallywouldensue,withthedefender havingmostoftheadvantages.Atthattime,theVietConghadthegreatasset ofthesesecurebasesinwhichtheycouldstoresupplies,trainpersonnel,rest troops,manufacturearms,andconstructhospitals,andtheythusprovideda formidablebaseofoperationsinvarioussectionsofthecountry. THESITUATIONPRIORTOTHEINTRODUCTION OFAMERICANTROOPS Inthewinterof1964–65,thecombinedactionsofthePRP,NLF,andthe NationalLiberationArmyhadnearlydefeatedtheG.V.N.Conservativeestimates gavetheNLFcontroloveratleasthalfthepopulationandperhapstwo-thirds the area of SouthVietnam. Political stability was lacking in Saigon and the government was increasingly weak and ineffective in the countryside. On a visittotheICorpsareainthefallof1964,theauthorwastoldthatthewhole area“wasgoingdownthedrain.”Theonlyplacecontrolledbythegovernment inQuangTinProvincewasTamKy,thecapitalcity,andmostAmericansrarely left it except to accompany the fewARVN operations. Chinese merchants,
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convinced that the end was near, were not restocking their stores, and rich Vietnamese were frantically sending money abroad or leaving the country. Theattitudeofthechildrenhadchangedfromoneoffriendlinesstooneof arrogance,spite,andhostility.MilitarymapsshowedtheVietCongsteadily movingoutofthehillstowardRoute1andthecoast.ARVNmoralewasas lowasitslevelofoperations.BoththepopulationandtheAmericansfeltthe VietCongwereabouttotakeover.ThoughtheICorpsareamayhavebeenin theworstshape,mostofVietnamseemedtobeinadeterioratingstate.10The enemywasfarfromperfect,butpsychologicalattacksonthepeopleandon theG.V.N.hadweakenedmorale,whilethemilitaryblowshadARVNreeling.MostobserversthoughtdrasticmeasureshadtobetakenortheSaigon governmentwouldfallandtheVietCongwouldwinacompletevictory. NOTES 1. This chapter is concerned primarily with the period before the introduction of AmericantroopsandattemptsabriefsummaryofthebasicnatureoftheVietCong militaryapparatus.ThemilitaryeffectupontheVietCongofmassiveAmericanparticipationisdiscussedinthefollowingchapter.TheauthorisfullyawareofthedifficultyofgeneralizingabouttheVietCongmilitaryforces,sincetheVietCongdiffer fromregiontoregionandtimetotime,andotherfactorsmakethewarquitedifferent in the various parts of Vietnam. For a discussion of some of these differences, see GeorgeK.TanhamandFrankN.Trager,“ThreeWarsinVietnam,”Army,May,1964. 2. There is some evidence that, in 1964, guerrilla units were promoted in large numbersintothehigherunits,notsomuchwithrespecttomeritasinordertohelp launchthethird-phasewarofmovement. 3. Becauseoftheveryfactthattheguerrillasaredependentuponlocalassistance andprotection,theymaybeweakinareaswheretheSaigongovernmentiseffective andresponsivetotheneedsofthepeople.Thisweaknessnaturallytendstoreducethe capabilitiesofanyregularVietCongmilitaryforcesoperatinginthearea,astheyare dependentonguerrillasupport. 4. TherehasbeenthepossibilitythatatruecoalitiongovernmentmightbeinitiatedbyaSaigonregimethatwastiredoftheseeminglyendlessstruggleandactuallybelievedthatacoalitionandneutralgovernmentwasbestforVietnam.There were reports that Nhu was trying to negotiate such a settlement just before the coup; and there have been indications that the Buddhists would like to create a viablecoalitionregime.However,someinformedobserversarguethatatrueand lastingcoalitionwiththeCommunistsisunlikely.Othersholdthatacoalitionisthe onlysolutiontothepresentVietnamsituation.Atthetimeofwriting,thereappears tobesomenarrowingofthedifferencesoverafuturecoalitionintheSouth. 5. DouglasPikeisoneoftheleadingscholarswhosuggeststhisstrategy.Seehis VietCong. 6. RecentAmericanoperationshavecapturedhigh-levelandtop-secretdocuments thatarebeginningtofillthisgapininformation. 7. ThisportionofthechapterdescribestheVietCongapplicationoftheprinciples anddoctrinepreviouslydiscussedinChapter4.
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8. SirRobertG.K.Thompsonisoftheopinionthattheuseofhelicoptersalso offerssomedisadvantages,i.e.,theytendtostopasoldierfromwalkingandthuspreventtacticalsurprise.SeeSirRobertG.K.Thompson,“FeetontheGround,”Survival, VIII,No.4(April,1966). 9. Large-scaleattackshavebecomelesscommonsincethearrivalofU.S.troops, exceptintheICorpsarea;seeChapter8. 10. AsaresultoftheincreasedAmericanpresence,thisareahasnotfallentotheViet Cong,butthefightingtheretodayindicateshowstrongtheCommunistswereandhow muchimportanceisattachedtothisarea.
Chapter8
AMERICANMILITARY PARTICIPATIONANDTHE VIETCONG 1
In early 1965, the U.S. Government decided to participate directly in the insurgency by taking military actions in both North and SouthVietnam. In February,airattackswerelaunchedagainstavarietyofmilitarytargetsinthe southernmostportionoftheD.R.V.N.,andduringMarchAmericancombat troops,Marines,begantolandinnorthernSouthVietnam. ThereweremanyreasonswhytheUnitedStatesintervenedinthismanner and at this time. The primary reason—although it is generally not stated so bluntly—wastopreventthecollapseoftheG.V.N.andaCommunistvictory.To moston-the-spotobserverssuchavictoryseemedimminent.TheUnitedStates hadtriedeconomicandmilitaryaid,advisersbythethousands,smallunitsof combattroopswhoactedastrainersandadvisers(SpecialForces),andlimited airsupport,butnoneofthesemeasureshadpreventedtherapiddeteriorationof thesituationintheSouthduringthewinterof1964–65.Therehavebeensome indicationsthattheairraidsintheNorthwereinretaliationfortheVietCong attackonthePleikuairfield,butthatattackcouldonlyhavebeenatrigger.The mainreasonsgivenforthebombingsweretobolstermoraleintheSouth,tohalt orincreasethecostofinfiltrationofmenandsuppliesfromtheNorth,andto demonstratetotheD.R.V.N.leadershipthattheywouldhavetopayapricefor theircontinuedassistancetotheinsurgentsintheSouth.Itwashopedthatthe airattackswouldmakethewarsocostlytotheNorththattheywouldbring Hanoitothenegotiatingtable.U.S.troopsintheSouthweretobeusedtoprotectairbasesandcertainkeymilitaryinstallationsandtoprovideareservefor theARVNsothatallSouthVietnamesemilitaryforcescouldbethrownagainst theVietCong.U.S.troopsalsoprovidedtangibleevidenceofsupportforthe Saigonregime.
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In both North and South Vietnam,American activities have gradually expandedandintensified.In1966alone,theweightofbombsdroppedon theNorthexceededthatusedonJapanandtheentirePacifictheaterduring thefouryearsofWorldWarII.TargetsthroughoutNorthVietnam,includingsomesituatedveryneartheChineseborder,havebeenbombed,andthe sortie rate runs into thousands per month. The results are hotly debated. Manyobserversagreethatthebombingsinitiallyhadadesirableeffecton moraleintheSouth,butthatthiseffecthasdiminishedasthewarhascontinued. Infiltration of men has, until recently, steadily increased, though thereis,ofcourse,thepossibilitythatitmighthavebeenevenhigherwithouttheairattacks.TheU.S.Governmentclaimsthatthecostofthewarhas beenmademuchgreaterfortheD.R.V.N.,butthebombingdoesnotseem tohaveweakenedHanoi’sresolvetocontinuethestruggle.Asofthiswriting,thedirecteffectofairoperationsintheNorthonthewarintheSouth is hard to judge, but it seems to have been limited.Airpower supporters maintainthatrestrictionsimposedontheuseofairpowerhavekeptitfrom beingaseffectiveasitcouldhavebeen,whileotherobserverssaythatthe natureoftheterrainalongtheinfiltrationlinesandthetransportsystemare suchthatairpowercanneverstoptheflowofsupplies,andquestionwhether airpowercanbreakHanoi’swilltoresistandbringtheCommuniststothe conferencetable. In the South,American troops and airpower have gradually expanded their role. Their initial role as camp guards was soon forgotten as U.S. troopspushedtheirdefenseperimetersoutmilesfromthebasesandbegan tolaunchspoilingattacksagainsttheVietCongwhowerethemselvespreparingforattacks.SomeAmericanforceshavebeenandstillareengaged intryingtohalttheinfiltration,especiallytheMarinesatthedemilitarized zone and the Special Forces along the Laotian and Cambodian borders. However, more and more, the U.S. forces have assumed the mission of defeatingtheNationalLiberationArmyandNorthVietnameseregularunits operating in the South. The 1967 plan calls for a conversion of most of ARVNtotheprimarysecurityforcenecessaryforpacificationorrevolutionary development, and for the U.S. forces to assume almost complete responsibilityforthefightagainsttheregularCommunistforces,including thoseintheMekongDelta. AmericanmilitarystrategyhasbeenandstillistodestroytheVietCong andNorthVietnameseunitsthroughaggressivesearchanddestroyoperationscombiningairandgroundunits.Themainargumentsupportingthe strategyisthattheselargerandtougherunitsmustbecrushedorbrokenup before any serious pacification can be undertaken. There are just not enoughtroops,itisstated,toprovidesecurityalloverthecountryatone time.TheMarinesandtheKoreantroops,however,seemtohaveadopted adifferentstrategy:toclearandhold,thatis,totakeanareaandholdit
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untiltheVietConginfrastructurehasbeenwipedoutandthelocalpeople havebeenadequatelytrainedtoprotectthemselves.Thisstrategyassumes thatprovidingsecurity,gainingcontrolofthepeople,andbuildingasound basearethefirstandforemosttasksofthedefenders,andthataccomplishing these tasks will hurt the Viet Cong most.Although there is serious debateoverthesetwostrategies(andonesuspectstheremaybeabitof competitionbetweentheArmyandtheMarines),intheoverallsensethey maybecomplementary.TheU.S.Armyforcesmaybeactingprimarilyasa nationwide spoiling force by disrupting Viet Cong concentrations and attacks,whiletheMarines,theKoreans,andtheARVNprotectareasfor pacification—whichiscertainlytheonlylastingsolutiontotheproblem. SecretaryMcNamarawantstodoeverything,andhasstatedthatourcurrentstrategyistohelptheVietnamesefindanddestroytheenemymain forceunits,toextendG.V.N.controlovermoreandmoreareas,toproceed withrevolutionarydevelopment(pacification),andtointerdicttheinfiltration of men and matériel from the North. This is an ambitious and allencompassingprograminwhichnostrategicprioritiesseemtohavebeen established. Americancombatforceshavethreebasicadvantagesthathavepresented newproblemsfortheinsurgentsandhavechangedthenatureoftheconflict since1965.First,U.S.troopshavemoreaggressiveleadershipandarecapable ofexertingsustainedpressure—unliketheARVN,which,inspiteofAmerican advice and entreaty, has not in general shown the initiative and offensive strengthnecessarytocopewiththeVietCong,muchlesstoforcethemonto thedefensive.Second,Americangroundunitshavetremendousfirepowerand evengreateramountsofartilleryandcloseairsupportthatcanbecalledinif necessary.Thisfirepowerisusedtoitsfullestcapacityandthereisnoscrimping onammunition.Third,theU.S.forceshaveunrestrictedairmobilitythrough the use of transport aircraft and helicopters.Air mobility is not a complete substitute for the ground mobility of the Viet Cong—especially for short distances and in certain terrain and weather—but it does give U.S. troops great flexibility in mounting offensive operations, rescue and reinforcing missions,andspoilingactions. AirpowerinsizeandscopeneverpossessedbytheFrenchintheirbattleagainsttheVietminhexemplifiesthecharacteroftheAmericanforces inVietnam.U.S.tacticalaircraftareabletorangeoverSouthVietnamat will,dayornight,armedorunarmed,andB-52scanflyfromGuamor Thailand on specific bombing missions against Viet Cong strongholds. Airpowerisstillhamperedbydarknessandbadweather,junglefoliage,and ruggedterrain,anddoesnotalwayshavethedesirableprecision,butits abilitytoreachotherwiseinaccessibleareasandquicklycometothesupport of ground troops is a critical asset for U.S. forces and a constant threattotheenemy.
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THEIMPACTOFAMERICANPOWER There can be no doubt that thisAmerican military power has had some impactontheVietCongmilitaryforces,infrastructure,andpoliticalorganization,andontheirrelationshipwiththepeople.TheeffectsofAmericanmilitarypowercanbedescribed,butarealmostimpossibletomeasureprecisely orwithcertainty.Itisperhapseasiesttodeterminemilitaryeffects,butevenin thislimitedsphereonemayeasilydrawfalseconclusions.EvenunderAmericanpressure,theVietCongretainaflexibleorganizationandtheoptionof severaldifferentstrategies.Thefactthatmanyoftheirunitsmayhavebeen hurt in large-scale military operations does not imply that they have completelylosttheinitiativeorthewar. Inspiteoftheseimportantqualifications,someestimatesofhowtheViet Congmilitaryisfaringcanbemade.VietCongcasualties,evenifsomewhat exaggeratedinSaigon,areclearlymuchhigherthantheywerebefore1965. ThereisconsiderableevidencethatthesecasualtiesareinfacthurtingtheViet Congandcompellingthemtotakeunpopularmeasuresthataffecttheirpolitical structure and relationship with the population. For example, they must increasinglyresorttoconscription,whichwasbegunin1964,whentheHanoi regimeandtheNLFtriedtoincreasetheirforcesinexpectationofaquick victory.Forciblerecruitingofyoungteen-agedboysandevenofwomenis alienatingthepopulationanddemonstratingtheneedoftheNLFapparatus for manpower. However, most observers agree that recruiting—forced or otherwise—and infiltration from the North still provide enough men and women that the insurgents are not yet seriously weakened by a manpower shortage. TheVietConghavefelttheimpactofAmericaninterventionnotonlyin increasedcasualties;partsoftheirlogisticsystemhavebeendisrupted.Aggressivetacticsbyalliedgroundandairforceshaverenderedtheonceinviolable VietCongbasessubjecttoattackbygroundforcesinlargesweeps,parachute andheliborneforces,andfighter-bombers.Thepeoplelivinginornearthese areas,whoarenowexposedtoairandgroundattacks,mustcertainlyhavelost some of their faith in the Viet Cong as protectors and providers. The Viet Conghavenotonlyincreasedtheirconscription,buthavealsoraisedtaxes andbegunimposingfoodleviesonthepeople.Thesemeasuresarenotlikely toendeartheCommuniststothepeople;nordotheysustainabeliefthatthe VietCongarereallywinning.Thegreatfloodofrefugeestothegovernmentheldareasmaybeanindicationoftheirfearofattack,thehardshipoftheir life,andtheirdissatisfactionwiththeVietCongregime. ThebasesareakeytoVietCongmilitarystrength,anddamagetothem affectstheentiremilitaryapparatusoftheinsurgents.Whenthesebasesare nolongersecure,manyoperationscannotbeplannedascarefullyorrehearsed aswell,andthedestructionoffoodandothersuppliesmayforcechangesor
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cancellationsofoperations.Fewerrestandretrainingcampsareavailablefor combatunits,someofwhichhavebeenbadlymauled.Medicalfacilitiesare moredifficulttoprovide,andthereisincreasedillnessamongthetroopsand insufficient attention to their needs. There are food shortages because the peasantshavelefttheirfieldsorhavebeeninterruptedbyalliedsweeps,and becausethetroops,forcedtomovefrequently,cannotgrowtheirownfood. Rationshavebeenreduced.Theentirelogisticsystemisdisturbed. Americanstrategyin1967appearstobetodenythesevitalbaseareastothe enemy.Forexample,theobjectivesofthelargeoperationintheIronTriangle justnorthofSaigoninJanuary,1967,weretomoveoutthepopulationsoit couldnotassisttheenemy,destroytheinstallationsandsuppliesinthearea, and,bybulldozingwide,bareareasinthejungleanddestroyingthenetwork oftunnels,tomakethisarealessusefultotheVietConginthefuture.Toa certainextent,theseobjectiveswereattainedandinadditionmanyvaluable documentswerecaptured. Combatlosses,whichhavebeensevereinsomeunits,andtheinvasionof formerlysecurerestandretrainingbasesseemtohavehadanadverseeffect onthemoraleoftheVietCong.Afterthesuccessesof1964,mostVietCong troopsexpectedafairlyearlyvictory.WiththeadventoftheAmericansand theincreasedintensityofthefighting,thishopehasdisappeared.Prisoner interviews and captured documents give the impression that the fighting spirit of some of the troops is dampened, that there is increasing fear of combatanddeath(especiallyfarawayfromhome),thatmalingering,desertions,anddefectionsareup,andthatthereislessfaithinultimatevictory. Therearecomplaintsaboutreducedrations,andtheguerrillasfeelthecoolingattitudeofthevillagers.However,therearefewindicationsthattheViet Congorganizationhaslostcontrolofitsmenorthattheirfightingcapability hasbeenseriouslyimpaired.Becauseengagementsaregenerallyofanisolatednatureandthereisusuallysomeopportunityfortroopstowithdraw andrecover,theblowsarelesssignificantthantheywouldbeinawarwaged with battle lines, where broken units would mean a break in the line— amoreseriousmatter—andtheprobablereductionofmoraleallalongthe line.ItshouldalsobekeptinmindthattheVietConghaveusuallypredicted aprotractedwar,andthattheyhavebeenpreparedtoacceptalifeofhardshipanddanger.Inanycase,Vietnameselifeisnotsoabundantthatallof theseshort-agesconstituteassignificantmoralefactorsastheywouldseem toAmericans. ManyNorthVietnamesetroopsapparentlyarenotanxioustocomeSouth but accept the duty as good soldiers. The trip South is often a long and arduousonewhichleavesmanysick,weak,anddepressed,althoughthey recoverafterrestingintheSouth.Somearenotwell-trainedbasicallyorfor guerrilla warfare, and do not feel at home among the Southerners. They cannot desert and go home like the Southerners, nor are they likely to
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defect.Theytendtostickwiththeirunits,butmaywishtheywerebackin theNorth.ThereareafewindicationsoffrictionbetweentheSouthernViet CongandtheNorthVietnamesetroopsoverleadership,strategy,andposition, but no serious rifts have been discovered.The Northern troops still giveagoodaccountofthemselvesandarecompletelyresponsivetoorders fromHanoi. VIETCONGRESPONSES ConfrontedwiththeAmericanmilitarypresenceinVietnam,theinsurgents havehadtodevisewaystocompensateforsuchlossesastheinvasionoftheir baseareas,andtoneutralizeAmericanadvantages.Theirresponseshavebeen varied,andtheyareinmanywaysfightingadifferentwarfromtheonethey foughtbefore1965. American ground forces are able to bring much greater amounts of firepowertobearinabattlethantheVietCong.Americaninfantryunitshave numerousmachineguns,automaticweapons,mortars,andrecoillessrifles,as well as individual rifles and grenades.They may be supported by tanks or armoredpersonnelcarrierswhichhaveheavyweapons.Thereisalsotheartillerywhichhasconsiderablerangeandtheabilitytofireinalldirectionsfrom fixedpositions.TheVietCongsimplycannotmatchthiseffort,eitherinthe numberofweaponsorintheexpenditureofammunition,andhavebecome reluctanttoengageinsustainedcombat.Theyprefershortsurpriseattacksand ambushes,inwhichtheoverwhelmingAmericanfirepowercannotbesoeffectivelyusedagainstthem. Aswasnotedinthepreviouschapter,thehelicopterrepresentsaparticularlydangerousinnovationthattheinsurgentscouldnotanddidnotignore. HanoihasrespondedbybroadcastingdetailedinformationonthecharacteristicstrengthsandweaknessesofallAmericanhelicoptersandhowbestto counter them.Whereas guerrillas in the past often shot at the choppers as theyapproachedalandingzone,theynowwaituntilthehelicoptershave landedandbeguntodeploytroops.Thisdelayedfireismoreeffectiveand— evenmoreimportant—givestheVietCongtimetoshootandgetawaybefore fixed-wing aircraft can be called in. The Army has attempted to counter groundfirebyflyinginattreetoplevel,thusgivingenemytroopslesstimeto reactandfire. Captureddocumentsindicatethatintensetrainingisbeinggiveninhowto spot possible helicopter landing zones and how to deal with the choppers whentheyapproachandtrytoland.Trapsandpointedpolesinlandingzones areoftenskillfullycamouflaged.Attheendof1966itwasreportedthatthe insurgentswereplacingthin,innocent-lookingpolesinlikelylandingareas. Theback-washfromthedescendinghelicopterblowsoverthesesmallpoles which,whenfalling,detonateamineorexplosivechargestrongenoughto
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blowupthechopper.Otherboobytrapsandminesareoftenskillfullyplanted toblowupchoppersastheyland.Inspiteofsuchmeasures,helicopterscontinuetomakelifedifficultanddangerousforthewilyenemy. Measuresagainsttacticalairpowerincludemanyofthoseusedagainsthelicopters, but greater effort is needed as fixed-wing aircraft approach much fasterandcarryamuchheavierpayloadoffirepower.VietConghavebeen taughttoidentifyapproachingaircraftbythesoundoftheirengines.Specially dugholesareusedaslisteningdevices,andcarefullyplacedairsentriesare employedtogivewarningofapproachingaircraft.Radiointerceptalsohelps. ReplicasofU.S.aircraftareusedinteachingtroopshowtoidentifycertain planesandhowbesttoshootthemdown.Small-armsfirehasbeenthemost effective weapon against aircraft, according to the U.S.Air Force, but the insurgentsarealsotrainedinantiaircraftfire,using50-calibermachineguns, afew20-mm.antiaircraftguns,andassortedothersmallantiaircraftweapons. Onetechniqueusedtoprotectamanfiringanantiaircraftweaponistobuilda conicalhillofdirtandputthegunonthetop.Themanisabletomovearound thispileandshootinanydirection,butisalwaysprotectedbyhavingdirtin frontofhim.Anattackbytwoplanescomingfromdifferentdirectionswill, ofcourse,robhimofprotection.Finally,enemytroopsdonotfireindiscriminatelyataircraftasmuchastheypreviouslydid,sincetheydonotwishto attractattentiontothemselves. TheVietCongareparticularlyconcernedaboutthefirepowerthataircraft can bring to bear against their own attacks. They therefore stage as many attacksaspossibleatnightorinbadweather,whenairactivitiesarereduced ormayevenceaseentirely.Theyconcentratetheirfireonthelightplanesof theForwardAirControllers,who,astheyknow,findtargetsanddirectthefire of the fighter aircraft.They tend to deploy and advance in smaller groups, hopingtoavoidanattackoratleastcreatealessprofitableandmoredifficult target,andtrytodivertaircraftfromtheirmajorattackbystagingsidedemonstrationsorraids.Inactualcombat,theyclosewiththedefendersrapidlyand oftenengageinhand-to-handcombat,sothatairpowercannotbeusedeffectivelybecauseoftheriskofhittingfriendlytroops.Theseareonlysomeofthe measures being used to reduce the effects of U.S. airpower; others will no doubtbedevisedasthewarcontinues. TheB-52s,basedatGuamorThailand,causeevenmoredifficultdefensive problems.Thesestrategicbomberscanflyinunheardandunseen,sothatthe first indication of their presence is the crash of heavy bombs.At first, the effectontheVietCongwasdevastating.Theyseemedstunned,unabletoreact forhoursorevendaysafterward.Butastheylearnedmoreabouttheseattacks, theadversepsychologicaleffectsdiminishedandtheywereabletobearthem betterandtorecovermorequickly.Acaptureddocumentindicatesthatbylate 1965,theVietCongknewthataerialreconnaissanceusuallyprecededthe bombersbyadayortwo,andthattheB-52susuallycameinthreeflightsina
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straightline.Afterthefirstflighthaddroppeditsbombs,thetroopscouldrun laterallyveryfast,seekshelter,andavoidthebombsoftheothertwoflights. (Variationsinbombingtechniqueshavesincemadethissimpleescapeprocedurelesseffective.)Furthermore,thedocumentstated,helibornetroopscould beexpectedintheareaaboutahalf-hourafterthebombing.Therearenow reportsthattheVietCongarereceivingadvanceinformationabouttheB-52 attacks,althoughtheyarenotabletoascertaintheexactareaofthebombings inadvance. Reportsontheeffectsofthesebombingsareconfusing.Someclaimthatall tunnelswithinonekilometeroftheimpactareacollapseandthatmanysuppliesandstrongpointsaredestroyed.Otherreports,however,indicatethatthe damageislimitedandthattheVietConghaveemergedfromcavesandtunnelstoattacksavagelyandeffectivelygroundtroopsfollowinguptheraids. Somesurveyteamshavereportedthattheyfoundnodamage,andthattheViet Congemergedsoquicklythattheyhadtoleavetheareawithoutcompleting theirinspectionandevaluation.Bothreportsmaybecorrect,asthedefensive installationsmaydifferin“hardness”dependingontheterrain,careinconstruction,andtypeofordnancedropped.Todate,therehasbeennocareful overallsurveyoftheresultsofairattacksintheSouthorNorth.Suchasurvey probablyshouldbeundertaken. Aswasmentionedinthepreviouschapter,oneofthemajorreasonsforthe introductionofairpowerandhelicopterswastomaketheVietCongambushes lessdangerous.Theseairborneweaponplatformshaveincreasedthechances that the enemy troops will be defeated or will suffer heavy casualties. The enemymustmakeambushesofevenshorterdurationiftheywishtoescapeand tomovetheirvaluableandscarcemachinegunsandrecoillessriflesbeforethe air support arrives. They must also be more careful to dig positions in the ambush,providecover,andprepareescapetrenchesandtunnels.Sometimes ambushesandespeciallytheheavyweaponsusedinthemaresetupnearvillagesortemplessoastogainsomeprotectionfromthefactthatciviliansare alsointhevicinity. Despitethegreaterrisksnowinherentintheseattacks,ambushescontinue and are all too often successful.A December, 1966, report described a Viet Congambushof200governmenttraineesnearBaria.Ithappenedthatthetraineeshadonlyblankammunitionandnoradio—contrarytotheusualprocedures— and were unable to defend themselves or call for help. Neither were there securitypatrolstoprotectthetrainees.ItisreportedthattheAmericanadvisers lefttheareaseveralminutesbeforetheambushanddrovewithinsixfeetofthe waitingVietConghiddeninthethickscrub.Clearly,theVietCongknewthe trainingareaandschedule,butitalsoseemsprobablethataVietCongagentin theG.V.N.wasabletoarrangefortheissuanceofblanksandthelackofaradio. Anotherexampleofasuccessfulambush—thistimeofAmericans—tookplace inlateDecember,1966.Membersofaplatoononapatrolstoppedinaclearing
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torestandsmokeacigarette.Astheywerestandingandtalking,afewViet Congappearedandthendisappearedabout50yardsaway.Withoutthinking, thepatroldashedafterthesefewmen,onlytobeengulfedinbulletsfromall sides.Theplatoonwasalmostcompletelywipedout. There are indications, particularly as mostAmericans are learning about thiskindofwarfare,thattheVietCongcanpredicttheirlinesofmarch,rest andbivouacsites,andotherhabits.Reconnaissanceflights,artillerybarrages, andperhapschopperreconnaissancestillseemtowarnofanimpendingsweep orattack,allowingtheenemytimetosetupambushesortofadeaway.The battleofwitscontinuesastheVietCongdevisenewtechniquesforambush whileAmerican forces try to outguess them, vary their habits, and devise meansofbringingfirepowertobearmorequicklyandeffectively. TheVietCongtriedinlate1965andearly1966topreparelargetrapsfor Americanforces.Theprimarytacticwastodraworattracttroopsbyattacking apost,andthenprepareelaborateambushescompletewithheavyweaponson bothsidesoftherouteofanyreliefforces.Theattackingforcewasalsothe blockingforceandbothsidesoftheambushhemmedinthereliefforce.This tacticisoftencalledthedoubleenvelopment,ortheflexiblehorseshoe,asit canbeanysizeandcanexpandorcontractasthesituationdemands. TheIaDrangbattleinthefallof1965isanexcellentillustrationofthis tactic,andoneaboutwhichwehaveconsiderableinformationfromcaptured documents. The action itself was a gigantic ambush, carefully planned by threeNorthVietnameseregiments.Theactionwastriggeredbythe33rdRegiment’sattackonPleiMe,whichledtothedispatch,inthesizetheenemyhad predicted,ofARVNandU.S.reliefforces.Thesewereskillfullydrawntoward theCambodianborderandthetrap.The66thRegimentactedasablocking forcealongtheborder,totheeast,whilethe32ndRegimentwastheambushingunitonthenorth.The33rdwithdrewandformedthesouthernflankofthe ambush, thus creating the “U” into whichAmerican forces advanced. The enemysoughttocompletetheencirclementfromthenorthandsouth,butdid notsucceed.Inanycase,theAmericanFirstCavalryDivisionbeganmoving inhelibornereinforcementsandcalledformassiveairsupport.AsAmerican manpower,firepower,andmobilitybegantohurt,theVietCongtrieddiversionsattheMichelinplantationandotherareastokeepawayreinforcements. Afterseveraldays,however,thepressurebecametoogreatandtheNorthVietnamesequietlybegantodisappearbuttheyhitoneAmericanbattalionhardas they departed. Careful planning, surprise and deception, good troops, and favorableterraincouldnotmakeupforthepowerfuladvantagestheAmerican troopspossessed. Large attacks, such as the one at Ia Drang, have become less and less frequentbecauseAmericanfirepowerandairpowermakethemtoodangerousfortheVietCong.Thefiercefightingaroundthedemilitarizedzonein thespringof1967isanexception.However,VietCongintelligenceisstill
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verygoodandoftenallowsthemthechoiceofengagingornotengaging alliedoffensive,oroflaunchingsmallsneakattacksoftheirown.Workers used by theAmericans to help clear the area around a camp or prepare fieldsoffirefortheheavyweaponswilloftenleavecamouflagedmarkers indicating routes into the camp. Other workers at bases or airfields have beenknowntodrawdetailedandaccuratemapsoftheinstallation,tobe usedlaterforsneakattacks.IndicationsarethatagentsoftentipofftheViet Cong about large sweeps and the enemy simply disappear, even though they are usually forced to leave behind valuable supplies, which are destroyed.RadiointerceptionofAmericanmessagescontinuestoplayan importantintelligencerole. Thesmallsneakraid,orsapperattack,maygrowinimportanceaslargescale operations diminish in number. These attacks may be carried out by specialthree-mancellsagainstanAmericantheaterorbilletinSaigon,orby smallcellsofuptoseveralplatoons,calledsapperteams,againstanairfieldor base.Aspecialsquadmaybegiventhemission,say,ofblowingupatheater, andisallowedtoplanandexecutetheoperationonitsown.Normally,the squad makes a thorough reconnaissance and study of the building and its approaches,thendecidesonaplanthatincludestheapproachanddeparture aftertheattack,thekindofexplosivesandwheretheyaretobeplanted,the timingofattack,andtheprecautionstoavoidinterference.Oftenanalternate planisdevelopedincaseofunforeseenemergencies.Roughlythesametechniqueisusedagainstanairfield,althoughintheselargerattackstheinformationonthebasemaycomefromworkers’recollectionsorsketchesinsteadof personal reconnoitering. There are two basic kinds of sapper attacks; the stand-off and the infiltration.The stand-off one uses mortars and recoilless riflestobombardkeyspotsinaninstallation,aswasthecaseintheattack againsttheMarinesatDaNanginFebruary,1967.Theinfiltrationissimilar totheurbanattacks,asselectedpersonnelslipintoaninstallationandplace chargesonthetarget. TheVietCongprobablyaremoreinterestedinthepsychologicaleffectsof suchactionthanininflictingseveredamagetotheAmericanmilitaryapparatus,althoughtheattacksontheairfieldsarephenomenallysuccessfulfroma cost-effectivenesspointofview.Thesneakattackscreateinsecurityandare likelytoresultinincreasedguards,thusconsumingextramanpower.Thepopulationmayalsobeawedorfrightenedbysuchraids.Theyareallpartofthe war of nerves waged against Americans and Vietnamese in Vietnam and AmericansintheUnitedStates.However,theVietCongmaybelievethatthe urban terrorist attacks are potentially capable of backfiring and alienating various groups, so that they do not embark on them as frequently as they mightliketo.Inanycase,thesneakattacksonmilitaryinstallationswillprobablyincreaseandtherewillprobablycontinuetobesomesneakraidsinthe townsandcities.
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The Americans are placing increasing emphasis on defensive measures againstthesesapperattacks.Airpatrols,flyingirregularpatternsandusingthe most modern sensors (radar, infrared, and photographic equipment), are employedtospotunusualmovementsortheemplacementofweapons.Ground alertaircraftandchopperssupplementthisairsurveillance.Ontheground, passivemeasuressuchasfences,illuminationdevices,towers,dispersingof aircraft,andrevetmentsanddetectiondevices(anti-mortarradars)arereinforcedbyactivegroundpatrols,oftenusingdogs,specialalertunitsonthe base,andextendedperimeterdefenseandpatrols.Althoughthesedefensive arrangements have been considerably improved, even the most optimistic admitthatnotallsmallsurpriseattackscanbepreventedorstoppedquickly enough. TheVietConghavebecomeevenmoreingeniousthantheVietminhin theemploymentofminesandboobytraps.Afewoftheseminesarereported tobesopowerfulthattheyareeffectiveagainstpersonnelwithinaradius of150feet.Anti-armorminesareconcoctedfromcaptured105-mm.artillery rounds or are prepared by the Viet Cong from captured explosives. Americansdonotuseantitankmines,astheenemyhasnoarmororarmored vehicles;theVietCongarethereforeunabletosecuretheseminesforuse againstAmericantanks.Boobytrapsareproducedinamultitudeofforms, fromsimplepungisticks(boardswithlargenailsstickingoutofthem)to rather sophisticated explosive devices. Americans protected themselves againstthepungiboardbywearingheavyboots,butthentheVietCongput bulletsintheboardssothatfootpressureexplodedthemandheavyboots werenolongerprotection.Electricallydetonatedmortarshellsarehungin thejunglefoliageoveralikelyroute;whenexploded,theseresultindeadly showersofshrapnel.TheVietCongalsohangoldcansfilledwithexplosives in the trees and release them into advancing patrols, or build great heavyboardsfullofnailswhichswingacrossthepathoftroopsandripinto theirchestsandfaces.PsychologicalwarfareisoftenusedtogetAmericans to“trigger”boobytraps;Americansmayencounteraninsultingsignwhich theyripoff,onlytofindthatthe“sign”isaboobytrap.Theseweaponsare takinganunusuallyhightollofAmericans:IntheIronTriangleOperation of October, 1965, about 95 per cent of the American casualties were a resultofminesandboobytraps.Overall,thecasualtyratesfromthesekinds of weapons are several times higher than inWorldWar II or the Korean War.TheextensiveuseofsuchweaponshasledtheU.S.Armytoestablish specialcoursesonminesandboobytraps,andrecentreportsindicatethat this course, combined with field experience, is reducing such casualties somewhat.2 Caveandtunnelwarfare,somewhatreminiscentofthatusedbytheJapanese in World War II, offers a serious challenge. Some of the caves and tunnel systemsareusedassupplydepots,hospitals,headquarters,orrestandtraining
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areas,andtheirentrancesarecarefullycamouflagedorconcealed;thesehave considerablelogisticimportance.OthersareusedtolureAmericanforcesinto preparedtraps.Forinstance,theVietCongmayfireatafewtroopsandthen disappear—butnottoocarefully—intoacave,wheretheyhopetheywillbe pursued.Theentrancetothecavemaybeminedandbooby-trapped,orthe guerrillasmaythrowgrenadesanddefendtheentrancewithsmallarms;in othercasestheymaydescendintothebowelsofthecaveandhopethetroops willfollowthemintothelabyrinth,wheretheycanbedestroyed.Someofthe cavesare600feetdeep,withanumberofentrancesandpassages;eventhe man-madetunnelshaveseveralfloors,manyexits,andhidingplaces.These cavesandtunnelsarehardtodetectandevenmoredifficulttodestroy. Allthesetactics,ofcourse,havebeendevelopedinanattempttoredressthe imbalance on the battlefield. The struggle is one between air mobility and firepowerontheonehand,andguerrillawarfarewiththeemphasisonsurprise,speed,andelusivenessontheother.U.S.forcesseekbetterdetection andidentificationmeans;theguerrillasworkharderatconcealmentandcamouflage.TheVietCongstrivetoavoidairpowerandcatchtheAmericansoff guard;theU.S.forcesinturntrytoreducetheresponsetimeofhelicopters andfighteraircraftsothatunitswillreceivehelpfasterthanever.Atthiswriting,itappearsthattheU.S.forceshavereducedbutnoteliminatedlarge-scale enemyactions;theVietCongseemtorealizethattheycannotlaunchlargescaleoperationsormaintainlargeunitsincombatforlongperiodswithout heavycasualties—buttheymaybewillingtodosoincertaincases. VIETCONGSTRATEGICALTERNATIVES If the Viet Cong cannot find the answer in tactical changes then they undoubtedlywillturn—orperhapshavealreadyturned—tomajormodificationsofstrategy.Since1964,theVietConghadbeenmovingfromguerrilla warfaretomobilewarfarebylargeunits,orthethirdphaseofrevolutionary war,justastheVietminhhaddoneagainsttheFrench.Thisdevelopmenthas apparentlybeeninterrupted,ifnotentirelyhalted,bytheAmericanbuildup.If mobilewarfareseemstobefailing,aseventheVietCongappeartoadmit, whatmajoralternativesareopentotheCommunists? Becauseitisimportanttokeepupthemomentumoftherevolution,Hanoi andtheNLFcoulddecidetocontinueor,perhapsmoreaccurately,toresume large-scaleoffensivesinthebeliefthatoutsidefactorsmaycometotheiraid beforecasualtiesforcethemtostop.Theymightdecidetoacceptthelevelof casualtiesbeingsuffered,iftheycouldcontinuetoinflictsuchcasualtieson U.S.troopsthatAmericamightnotbewillingtotoleratethemmonthafter month.Worldopinionanddomesticoppositiontothewarmighteventually forcetheAmericanstodesist,eventhoughtheymightbewinninginastrictly military sense. In order to continue large-scale offensives, Hanoi, with aid
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fromtheSovietUnionandotherCommunistcountries,mightintroducemore modern weapons and even airpower into the war.A few surprise, perhaps kamikaze,raidsoneightortenairfieldswouldseriouslyreduceU.S.airpower, atleasttemporarily.However,suchraidswouldnotalterthebasicimbalance infirepower,andwouldinvolvenotonlyaseriousescalationofthewarby Hanoi, but a massive involvement (however indirect) of other Communist countries,andthisseemsunlikely.EvenifHanoitriestointroducemoremodernweapons,theUnitedStateswouldbemorelikelytogiveupthestruggle becauseofavarietyofdomesticandinternationalpressuresthanbecauseof suchescalation,andthereremainsthepossibilitythattheUnitedStatesmight inturnescalateitseffort. ItisalsopossiblethattheCommunistsmaycontinuetomaintainboththe large NLA units and the Northern regulars, but conceal and scatter them in ordertokeeptheU.S.forcesoccupiedinsearchingfortheseunitsoranticipatingenemyambushorattack.TheAmericanmilitarythencannotparticipate adequately in the constructive phase of the war—the pacification effort—or breakupintosmallerunitstotrackdowntheguerrillas.Inordertomakethis strategywork,theVietCongwillhavetoattackinlargeunitsoccasionallyand willhavetomakecertainthattheAmericansknowtherearelargeunitsinexistence.3Theymighteventuallybeabletoachievesomevictoriesbysurprise attacksonAmericantroopswhobecomeboredortoorelaxedbythequietwar. Thisstrategyalsohastheadvantageofnotdisbandingthelargeunits,which mightbeconstruedbythesoldiersorthepeopleasastepbackward.Thedecisiontodispersebutnotdisbandlargeunitscouldinauguratealongwarofattrition,largelycarriedonbyguerrillasandthepoliticalinfrastructureoftheNLF. Beforechoosingsuchastrategy,theVietCongmustdecidewhetherthelarge unitscouldsurviveadeterminedandprolongedAmericanefforttoseekand destroythem,andwhethertheNLFguerrillaandpoliticalorganizationcould continueitsundergroundeffortsunderthesecircumstances.Thepresentenemy answerstobothquestionsseemtobeaffirmative. A third and more drastic possibility is for the Communists to cease all attemptsatlarge-scalewarfare,disbandtheirunitsandperhapsevensendthe Northernoneshome,andreturnentirelytoguerrilla,terroristic,andpolitical warfare.Thisstrategywouldhavethepsychologicaldisadvantageofappearing tobeastepbackward—thoughitcertainlycouldbemadetoappearasashift instrategy.ItwouldcauseseriousproblemsforHanoiandtheNLF,butitdoes notseembeyondtheircapabilitytoachievethistransformation.Thisstrategy hastheadditionaldisadvantagefortheVietCongofallowingU.S.forcesto seektheguerrillasinsmallunits,andtoengageinmorecivicaction.Itmight, ontheotherhand,prolongthewarandmakeitunpalatabletotheAmericans, meanwhile arousing world opinion even more over the use of massive firepower—especiallyairpower—againstguerrillas,andthecivilianpopulation around them, and against the North. Although it is possible that a
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prolongedandunpopularwarmightcausetheAmericanstoleave,theHanoi regimemayhesitatetojudgeAmericandeterminationandpossibleAmerican coursesofaction,inasmuchasitmiscalculatedthemoncebefore.Togiveup completelylarge-scalewarfarewouldbeadifficultmaneuverfortheCommunists, with serious psychological and operational problems, and is not likelytobetheirfirstchoice. Thefourthalternativeistostopallfighting,evenguerrillawarfare,buttry tomaintaintheinfrastructurethathasbeenbuiltupsocarefullyovertheyears, andtocontinueonlythepoliticalstruggle.Itwouldbealmostimpossiblefor HanoiandtheNLFtodisguisethefactthatthiswasastepbackward,andit wouldreallymeanthecompletesurrenderofinitiative.Thiswouldbeadangerous,aswellasdemoralizing,choicefortheVietCong,asitwouldallow thefullweightoftheAmericanandG.V.N.militaryandcivilianefforttobe appliedagainsttheirinfrastructure.Thepacificationprogramcouldproceed unhindered,andtheG.V.N.wouldhaveafreehandtorebuildthecountry.On theotherhand,ifwarfareceased,theAmericansmighteventuallyloseinterest andgraduallywithdrawtheirforces.IftheNLFandHanoiweresureoftheir political organization, very discouraged about the military prospects, and quitecertaintheAmericansandG.V.N.couldnotsucceedinpacification,they mighttrythis“fadeaway”strategy. Thefinalandcontinuingpossibilityistoagreetoarmisticenegotiations andseektowinasmuchaspossibleattheconferencetable.Thedesireof theAmericanGovernmenttonegotiate,pressurefromothernations,andthe approaching Presidential election may convince the Communists that this alternativeofferssomeinterestingpossibilities.Theypossesssomestrong bargainingpoints:TheyholdorpartiallycontrolnearlyhalfofSouthVietnamandhavestrongmilitaryforcesthere.TheVietCong’sabilitytocontinuetheoverallstruggleseemssomewhatweakenedbutisstillconsiderable, andmostoftheNorthVietnameseArmy—oneofthebestinfantryarmiesin Asia,ifnottheworld—isfreshandready,afactoftenoverlooked.However, theHanoileadersmaybereluctanttoengageinnegotiations,believingthat theyweredupedbytheFrenchin1946andforcedintoconcessionsbytheir ownalliesatGenevain1954,andthatinthelongruntheywillwinthepresentstruggle. In the long run, however, negotiations remain the most likely possibility. Hanoicouldoffertonegotiateatanytimeifsuchanofferseemedadvantageous, regardlessofwhichoftheabovestrategiestheymightchooseatpresent. Iftherecentcourseofthewarisanyindication,theCommunistsseemto haveselectedthesecondstrategy:tomaintaintheirlargeunitsandusethem judiciously,andtoconcentrateonguerrillawarfare,sneaksapperattacks,terrorism,andpoliticalorganizationtowinalongwar.Withtheexceptionofthe bitterattacksintheICorpsarea,therehavebeenfewlarge-scaleVietCong attacksfornearlyayear,despitereportsthatunitsarestillcomingintothe
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South.ItseemsthattheVietCongaretryingtopreservetheirlargeunits,and mostly to increase the number of terrorist and small attacks. This strategy allowstheVietCongtomaintainthemaximumflexibility;inthefuturethey may de-escalate or escalate according to the situation and their intentions. Theirlargeunitsarestillavailableifinternationaldevelopmentsaresuchthat theCommunistsmayfinditusefultoputonmilitarypressurequickly. IftheVietCongretaintheirlargeunitsbutrelyprimarilyonguerrillawarfare,thesituationinVietnamwillresemblethatof1961and1962,butwitha mainforcethreateningasneeded.Suchasituationposesseriousquestionsfor theUnitedStatesandtheG.V.N.Whatsortofprogresshasbeenachievedin fiveyears?Doweknowbetternowhowtocopewithguerrillasandterrorists? Whatcanbedoneaboutthethreatsposedfromtheoutsidesanctuaries?Should alliedtroopsbeusedinsmallunitstoseekoutguerrillas,orshouldtheytoo engageinpacification?Doweknowhowtopacify?Therearenopreciseand generallyacceptedanswerstothesequestions. Inconclusion,itmaybesaidthattheAmericanmilitarystoppedthecollapse oftheSaigonregimein1965,haltedtheVietCongmovetowardamilitary solution,andhashurtmanyoftheirlargemilitaryunitsbuthasnotyetdefeated themasafightingforce.Thestrengthoftheirmilitaryforcesissomewhere around300,000andislikelytoremainatthatlevelorevenincreaseslightly during1967.Somemoremodernequipment,liketheSoviet120-mm.and 140-mm.rocketsarebeingsentSouthtoaidVietCong,especiallyinsneak attacks,andtoperhapsbolstermorale.Itwouldseemthatahighlevelofguerrillawarandterrorcanbecontinued.ThismeansthattheAmericanshavethe initiativeinmanywaysbutthattheVietCongcontinuetoalargeextenttobe abletochoosethekindofwartheywanttofightand,inmanycases,thetactics theywanttouse. NOTES 1. ThischapterexaminesonlytheimpactontheVietCongmilitaryandmakesno attempttoassesstheoveralleffectsofthepresenceoflargenumbersofforeigntroops orofthevastuseoffirepoweronVietnamesecivilians. 2. However,TheWashingtonStar,February22,1967,indicatedthatnearlyhalfthe Marinecasualtieswerestillcausedbyminesandboobytraps.BernardFall’suntimely deathresultedfromaboobytrap. 3. ThestationingofD.R.V.N.divisionsjustnorthofthedemilitarizedzoneis,in fact,keepingstrongMarineforcessouthoftheline,justincasethereshouldbean openinvasion.Recentlyafewunitshaveoccupiedpositionsinsidethedemilitarized zone. Using other sanctuaries, the Viet Cong can accomplish the same purpose in otherpartsofSouthVietnam.
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TheCommunist-ledrevolutionarymovementinVietnam—punctuatedbythe short,relativelypeacefulperiodfollowingtheGenevaAccords—hasfollowed basicallyconsistentpoliciesandstrategiesinitsstruggletoachievecomplete political power in all of Vietnam. But the brief, Geneva-imposed armistice makesitconvenienttorefertothefirstandsecondVietnamesewars,andto notesomedifferencesaswellassimilaritiesbetweenthem,alwayskeepingin mindtheunderlyingcontinuityofthestruggle.Inbothcases,theCommunists started as the weaker group against an established authority—although the “authority,”whetheritwastheFrenchorthevariousSaigonregimes,never managedtoexerciseeffectivecontrolofVietnamoncetheinsurgencybegan. Operating in rural guerrilla movements at first, the Communists slowly attemptedtogaincontrolofmoreandmoreofthepeoplethroughacombinationofpropaganda,civicaction,andaselectiveuseofterror.Theirbasicstrategywasoneofattrition,ofslowlyunderminingtheestablishedregimesand wearingdownthewilloftheopposition.Inordertoappealtoandorganizethe mostdiverseelementsofsociety,theCommunistsformedandstrictlycontrolled frontorganizations,theVietminhandlatertheNationalLiberationFront. Inbothwars,theCommunistsdevelopedawell-disciplinedandresponsive insurgencyorganizationthatincludedcivilaswellasmilitaryelements.The coreofeachorganizationwasandisadedicatedandhighlymotivatedCommunistParty,whichdeterminespoliciesandstrategiestobeexecutedbythe lowerechelonsofthePartyorganizationandthroughthefrontsandthemilitary forces.ThepresentorganizationcoversmostofVietnamandisprobablythe strongestVietnameseentityintheSouthtoday.ThisCommunistorganization achieves the integration of all means of conflict—political, psychological,
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economic, and military—and this is the source of the insurgent strength. In spiteofthetremendousmilitarypowerintroducedin1965bytheAmericans, this entire apparatus continues to function and to constitute a threat to the securityandstabilityofSouthVietnam. Inbothwars,externalpowershaveprovidedvariousformsofassistanceto the insurgents. After 1949, when the Red Chinese reached the Vietnamese border,theytrainedandsupportedtheVietminhandgraduallyincreasedtheir military aid, which was particularly helpful in theVietminh victory at Dien BienPhu.Whenitbecameclearin1956thatnoelectionswouldbeheldin SouthVietnam,HanoihelpedtheinsurgentmovementintheSouthtorevive— ifitdidnotactuallyinstigateit—andhassinceincreasinglyprovidedencouragementandassistance.WhiletheNorthhasattemptedtohidetheseactions,it hasbecomedifficultandfinallyimpossibletodosoastheirscopeandsizehave increased.In1964,NortherntroopsbegantomoveSouthtoparticipatedirectly inthestruggle.Aerialphotographsaswellasotherevidenceindicatethatthe movementofmilitarysuppliestotheSouthisatalevelofbetween30to40 tonsperday.ThisisnotverymuchaccordingtoAmericanarmyneeds,butit representsquiteabitofsupportforthemorespartanandlessmodemCommunistmilitaryforces. AlthoughtheVietConghaveusedtheVietminhorganizationandpersonnel, haveprofitedfromtheearlierexperience,haveknownhowtogivetheirgoals considerableappeal,andhavehadvaluableassistancefromtheNorth,theydo notseemtohavegainedcomparablerespectorpopularity.Theyhavenotbeen abletodevelopamobilizingorcrystallizingissuethatwouldbeaseffectiveas thedesireforanindependent,unitedcountrywasfortheVietminhimmediately afterWorldWarII.TheVietminh,underthecharismaticleadershipofHoChi Minh,wereabletotakeoverthecontrolofthenationalistandanticolonialmovement and wipe out most of the rival nationalists.This able leadership and an undisputedcausegavethemgreatstrengthandpopularity.TheVietConghave attemptedtorevivetheanticolonial,anti-imperialistissue,thistimeagainstthe UnitedStates,andhaveaccusedthevariousSaigonregimesofbeingpuppetsor lackeysoftheU.S.imperialists,butthecampaignhasnothadthedeepappealof the earlier campaign.Actually, while the government in Saigon may be quite dependent on the United States, it is still an indigenous and free Vietnamese regime.The1966electionsandthepromulgationofanewconstitutioninearly 1967reinforcedthispoint.Therefore,thepresentwarhassomeofthecharacteristicsofacivilwar,althoughbothsidesareaidedandsupportedwithtroopsfrom outsidesources.VietCongpropagandahasnotsucceededinovercomingthis fact.WhetherthemassiveAmericanpresencewillyetgivecredencetotheirpsychologicalcampaignisnotclearatthistime,butthedangeriscertainlypresent. ThepresentdivisionofVietnamintotwocountrieshastendedtoaggravate theregionalismissue,whichwassubmergedafterWorldWarIIinthewaveof nationalfeeling.Theideaofreunification,althoughagreeduponinprinciple
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by all inVietnam, does not seem to generate great enthusiasm among most Vietnamese.Detailsofhowandwhenitshouldbeachievedareunclearand perhapscontroversial.Thereare,infact,signsthattheremaybesometension betweenHanoiandtheNLFonthisissue. BecausetheVietConghavenotbeenentirelysuccessfulinexploitingthe issue of anticolonialism, they have been forced to concentrate on domestic andlocalgrievancesandtoemphasizethecorruptionandevilsoftheSaigon government.ButG.V.N.effortsinthesocialandeconomicfieldshavetosome extentweakenedthisapproach.TheVietConghavethereforehadtointerfere with programs in education, health, and agriculture, and in doing so have impairedtheirimageashelpersofthepeople.AsAmericanmilitarypressure hasincreased,theVietConghaveincreasedtheiruseofterror,raisedtheir taxes, conscripted men, and exerted increasingly strict controls on the population.Thesemeasureshavereducedtheirpopularity,butuntilrecently didnotaffecttheircontrolofthepeople.1 Ingeneral,theproblemsoftheVietCongaremorecomplicatedanddifficult than those faced by the Vietminh. The French were a clearly defined and identifiableenemy,buttheG.V.N.anditsadherentsarelessso;nationalism and the desire for independence provided the Vietminh with a vital issue, while this same cause commands less enthusiastic support in the 1960’s. Finally,theVietCongareconfrontedwithanenemywhosemilitarystrength isfarmoreformidablethanthatoftheFrench. WhilethemilitarycharacteristicsoftheVietCongarestronglyreminiscentof theVietminh,theirstrategiesandpoliciestendtodivergebecauseofthedifferent natureofthetwowars.TheVietminhborrowedandadaptedMao’stheoryof protractedwar.TheytendedtoconcentratetheireffortsintheNorth(Tonkin), although they did not neglect the rest of the Indochinese peninsula. General Giapdevelopedhisill-equippedandinadequatelytrainedguerrillasof1946into thesuperbinfantrythatbesiegedandconqueredDienBienPhuin1954,and evenmoresignificantthanthisvictorywasthefactthattheseforceswereslowly gainingmilitarysuperiorityoveralltheFrenchforcesinVietnam.Thesame slowevolutionfromguerrillaforcestoregulartroopstookplaceintheSouthin 1957–64.AlthoughthereareindicationsthattheVietConghavetriedtodevelop andexecutenonmilitarystrategies,itseemslikelythattheyhavealwaysexpected andpreparedforaprotractedwarwithamilitaryfinale.TheVietCongandthe Hanoi regime, remembering the French experience, probably felt that it was safe in 1964 to move to seek a swift military victory over the G.V.N. in the South.TheycalculatedthattheU.S.Government,facedbysomedomesticand foreignoppositiontothewar,wouldnotdrasticallyincreaseitsinvolvement. ThismiscalculationofAmericanwillandintentionshasledtothevastlydifferent and larger war now being fought, in which the massive use of airpower, helicopters, and firepower by U.S. forces has forced the Viet Cong to make significantchangesintheirstrategiesandtactics.
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ThedeterioratingsituationinSouthVietnaminthewinterof1964–65posed a most serious question for the U.S. Government: Was it worth sending AmericantroopstotrytoredressthepositionoftheG.V.N.?Thisonequestion raised a host of subordinate questions and some cruel dilemmas.The direct participationofAmericantroopswouldbeanimportantmodificationofU.S. policy,whichhadbeenthattheSouthVietnamesemustwinthewarthemselves and that outsiders could not do it for them. How could Washington justify sendingAmericanboystofightinbehalfofagovernmentthatdidnotseem able,orattimesevenwilling,tofightitsownwar?Thepresenceofmoretroops (therewerealready25,000militaryadvisersinVietnam)wascertaintoadd fuel to the Viet Cong accusations of U.S. imperialism and of the complete dependence of Saigon on the Americans. If the United States constructed permanentbasesforitsforces,thechargesofimperialismwouldmount;ifit didnot,thecredibilityofitslong-termcommitmentmightbechallengedand someoftheimpactandmeaningofitsparticipationwouldbelost.Theeconomic effects—especially the dangers of inflation raised by the presence of free-spendingAmericantroopsandbythemoneypouredintothelocaleconomyforinstallationsandservices—hadtobeconsideredanddealtwith.Few of these problems have simple answers, or have been clearly resolved.The issueofimperialismisbeingusedbytheVietCong,theHanoiregime,and other Communist countries with some success both in South Vietnam and internationally. WhileAmerican-Vietnamese relations are surprisingly good throughoutVietnam,thetraditionalVietnamesexenophobiacouldbringabout someuglysituationsasaresultofthemassiveU.S.presence.Inflationisstilla very serious problem. In the United States a vocal opposition to the war continues.Thusthepolitical,economic,andpsychologicalproblemsresulting fromthedispatchofU.S.militaryforcestoSouthVietnamandthebombingof theNorthcontinueand,insomecases,growmoresevere. ThedirectresultofU.S.militaryactionintheSouth,aswehavealready noted, has been the prevention of the collapse of the G.V.N., a general improvementinmoraleforSouthVietnam,andsomeseriousdefeatsforthe Communist troops. The nature of the war has changed considerably. The Communistshavebeenforcedtomakemuchmorecarefuluseoftheirregular troops,andtorelymoreonguerrillaandsapperattacks.U.S.forces,using superiorfirepowerandairmobility,havelaunchednumerouslargeandsmall attacksaimedatdefeatingtheregulartroopsand,morerecently,atdenying thesetroopstheiressentialbaseareas.Airmobilityhastendedtoredressthe mobilityadvantageformerlyheldbytheinsurgents,buttheystillretainsome keyadvantages,suchastheabilitytooperateatnightandinanyweather,and tomovequietlyandincertainterrainswherelandingsorobservationfromthe airaredifficult.Intelligence,thoughvastlyimprovedonthealliedside,still seemstofavortheinsurgents.Thestruggleinitssimplesttermsisonebetween tremendousfirepowerandcompleteairmobilityontheonehandandguile,
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surprise, and concealment on the other—an interesting confrontation. AccordingtoexperiencedobserversinSaigon,thewarcouldcontinueinits presentformalmostindefinitely.TheJointChiefsofStaffhaverecentlystated that without more troops the United States may lose whatever initiative it nowhas. Anevaluationofthenonmilitaryoutlookisevenmoredifficult.The1966 elections,thewritingandpromulgationofaconstitution,localelectionsinthe springof1967,andthenationalelectionheldinearlySeptember,1967,areall hopefulsignsthatsomeprogressisbeingmadeinthepoliticalfield.However, mostofthesedevelopmentsaresymboliconesandtendtohidethefactthat littleornoprogresshasbeenmadeinthedevelopmentofVietnameseideologies, a meaningful party system, or national and local leadership. Perhaps the politico-religioussects(theCaoDaiandtheHoaHao),theethnicminorities, andtheoldpartiessuchastheVNQDDorDaiVietmaybecomeviablepoliticalforces,butthesituationwouldseemmorefavorableifthereweresignsof the beginnings of broader-based parties—for example, labor and peasant groups.Suchpartiesmighthelpcreatemeaningfulideolgiesordoctrinesand offerchoicestothepeopleofVietnam,aswellasprovidevehiclesforlocating anddevelopingpoliticalleadership.Therealsoseemstobeinadequateattentiontothedevelopmentofanefficientandresponsivecivilservice,whichisso essential to a modern government. It would clearly have been too much to expect the Vietnamese to form and run an efficient twentieth-century government—muchlessademocraticone—inthefewdifficultyearsofindependencetheyhavehad;itisonlytobehopedthatthepresentsearchforprogresswillcontinueandeventuallyleadtogoodgovernment. Pacification or revolutionary development, as it now is called, has been attemptedinoneformoranothersincethestrategichamletprogramwasinaugurated in 1962.This effort to provide better social services and economic betterment for the peasant has never been a great success, despite official pronouncementstothecontrary.ReportsemanatingfromtheGuammeetings inMarch,1967,indicatethatgreaterspeedinthiseffortwillbesought.Since haste has been a consistent weakness of the previous programs, this new emphasis is unlikely to produce significant results. Pacification includes changesinpeople’sattitudesandbehavior,notjusttheprovisionofcommoditiesandmaterials.Therehasbeenagreattendencytodealtoomuchwith materialthingsandmuchlesswithpeople.Forexample,therearestatisticson thenumberofschoolsbuiltbutinadequateattentiontothenumberandquality ofteachers,whoarestillsometimesdrafted.Peopleneedsocialassociations even more than buildings, and there has been little or no effort to develop organizations such as those associated with schools, parent-teacher groups, andstudentextracurricularorganizations.TheseAmericanexamplesneednot beimposedontheVietnamese,buttheyshouldbeencouragedtodeveloptheir own social institutions. The Communists recognize this fundamental fact
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clearlyandutilizeitfortheirownends.IftheG.V.N.andtheU.S.Government willtakethetimetoprepareplansthatwouldincludeinstitutionaldevelopment, notjustconstructionandbuildingprograms,totraincarefullyandthatprepares theirbivouaceachday,seestotheirprovisioning,andassurestheirsecurity. The commandos move about blindly, guided only by the reconnaissance elementstheysendahead.Atnight,evenwithsentinelsnearby,theirsecurity isprecariousatbest.Physicalandmentalwearandtearcomerapidly. Inaddition,theyareunabletovarytheiritineraryasmuchastheywould like,particularlyonthetripbackandiftheterrainisdifficult.Theycannot escapetheobservationoftheinhabitantsandthelookouts,whoareableto analyzetheirhabitsquickly.Theywillshortlyrealizethatapatrolonacertain pathwillnotleaveit—sometimesbyforceofhabit,oftenbecauseithasno wayofgettingout.Nothingwillhappenaslongasourenemiesareunableto bringtogethersufficientforcesforanattack.Butwhenthistimecomes,they willmakethebestofit. Patrolaction,unwearyinglyattemptedbymilitarymenwhostillbelieveit possibletobeattheenemyonhisownground,isoftenrewardedbyserious failures;atbest,itneverproducesconvincingresults. That is why outposts, when first established, attempt to carry out some externalactivity,butthenpullintheirhornsandnevertryagain. For the same reasons, isolated ambushes do not accomplish anything. Usuallytheyarebetrayedbeforetheytakeplaceandcometonothing;atother times,theyactuallydousharm. Pursuitcommandosorisolatedambushesarecombatoperationstheguerrilla can employ with the backing of the population and when he has a support organization on the spot. As long as we are unable to resort to the same methods,wewillachieveonlymediocreresults,whicharedisproportionateto therisksrunandtheeffortsdemandedfromthesoldiers. NOTE 1. OneVietCongdocumentcapturedinrecentU.S.operationsindicatesthatthe VietCongadmitlosingcontrolovernearlyamillionpeoplein1966.
SELECTEDBIBLIOGRAPHY
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Nemo (Colonel). En Indochine: Guérilla et Contre-Guérilla. Paris, 1952 (mimeographed). Newman,Bernard.ReportonIndo-China.London,1953. NgoVanChieu.Journald’uncombattantViet-Minh.Paris:EditionsduSeuil,1955. Osborne,M.E.StrategicHamletsinSouthViet-Nam.Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversity SoutheastAsiaProgram,1965. Pike,Douclas.VietCong:TheOrganizationandTechniquesoftheNationalLiberation Party[sic]ofSouthViet-Nam.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1966. Pirey,Philippede.OperationWaste:ParachutistsinIndo-China.London,1954. Raskin,MarcusG.,andFall,BernardB.(eds.).TheViet-NamReader:Articles and Documents onAmerican Foreign Policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis. New York:Vintage,1965. Read-Collins,N.ReportonWarinIndochina.London,1953. Rénald,Jean.L’EnferdeDienBienPhu.Paris:Flammarion,1954. Rénald,Jean,andOng-Chúa.HoChiMinh,Abd-El-KremetCie.Paris,1949. Riessen,René.JungleMission.NewYork:ThomasY.Crowell,1957. Roy,Jules.BataillesdanslaRizière.Paris:Gallimard,1953. ———.TheBattleofDienBienPhu.NewYork:Harper&Row,1965. Sabattier, G. Le destin d’lndochine: Souvenir et documents, 1941–1951. Paris: LibrairiePlon,1952. Sainteny,Jean.Histoired’unepaixmanquée.Paris:AmiotDumont,1953. Scigliano, Robert G. South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1963. Shaplen,Robert.TheLostRevolution:TheU.S.inVietnam.NewYork:Harper& Row,1965. Starobin,JosephR.Viet-NamFightsforFreedom.London,1953. Tanham,GeorgeK.,etal.WarWithoutGuns:AmericanCiviliansinRuralVietnam. NewYork:FrederickA.Praeger,1966. Thompson, Sir Robert G. K. Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of MalayaandVietnam.NewYork:FrederickA.Praeger,1966. Trager,FrankN.WhyVietNam?NewYork:FrederickA.Praeger,1966. Tregaskis,RichardW.VietnamDiary.NewYork:Holt,Rinehart&Winston,1963. U.S.Senate,CommitteeonForeignRelations.China,VietnamandtheUnited States.Washington,D.C.:PublicAffairsPress,1966. VoNguyênGiap.People’sWar,People’sArmy:TheVietCongInsurrectionManual forUnderdevelopedCountries.NewYork:FrederickA.Praeger,1962.
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Lacouture, Jean. “Military Situation in Vietnam,” The New Republic, May 22, 1965. ———.“VietCong:WhoAreThey,WhatDoTheyWant?”TheNewRepublic,March 4,1965. Langguth,J.“Ambush!SuccessofVietcong,”TheNewYorkTimesMagazine,June 27,1965. Linebarger,PaulM.A.(Major).“Indochina—TheBleedingWar,”ArmyCombat ForcesJournal,March,1951. Martin, H. “Guérilla, guerre en surface, guerre révolutionnaire,” Revue militaire d’information,August,1957. Martin,N.E.(LieutenantColonel).“DienBienPhuandtheFutureOperations,” MilitaryReview,June,1956. Penchenier,G.“Close-upoftheVietConginTheirJungle,”TheNewYorkTimes Magazine,September13,1964. Prestat (Captain). “La Guerre psychologique en Indochine: ses opérations et ses résultats,”textofalecturedeliveredonSeptember14,1955,inacourseon psychologicalwarfaregivenatBoblingen(mimeographed). Prosser,Lamar(Major).“TheBloodyLessonsofIndochina,”ArmyCombatForces Journal,June,1955. Rigg, R. (Lieutenant Colonel). “Red Parallel: Tactics of Ho and Mao,” Army CombatForcesJournal,January,1955. Rose,J.A.“TheElusiveVietCong,”TheNewRepublic,May4,1964. Sanders,S.W.“CantheU.S.WininVietnam?”U.S.News&WorldReport,January 11,1965. ———.“VietnamRevisited:ChangesintheWarasSeenbyaVeteranObserver,”U.S. News&WorldReport,March6,1967. Sheehan,S.“ReporteratLarge:theEnemy,”TheNewYorker,September10,1966. Sochurek,H.“SlowTrainThroughVietNam’sWar,”NationalGeographicMagazine, May8,1964. Spargo,L.,etal.“ProbingVietCongStrongholds,”AviationWeek,July12,1965. Steiner,H.A.“Viet-Nam:CivilWarAgain?”TheNewRepublic,July18,1955. Tanham,GeorgeK.,andTrager,FrankN.“ThreeWarsinVietnam,”Army,May, 1964. Thompson, Sir Robert G. K. “Feet on the Ground,” Survival, VIII, No. 4 (April, 1966). ———.“Vietnam’sGainsSpurRedTerror,”BusinessWeek,July18,1959. Warner,Denis.“BordersAreDissolved,”TheNewRepublic,November28,1960. ———.“CautionaryReportsonLaos:DevelopmentsAlongtheHoChiMinhTrail,” TheReporter,December2,1965. ———.“GettingtoKnowtheEnemy,”TheReporter,December30,1965. ———. “Indo-China: HaveWe Learned the Lessons ofWar?” The New Republic, December14,1959. ———.“PriceofVictory:VietcongManpowerandMaterialsInfiltrationMethods,” TheReporter,December16,1965. Zasloff,JosephJ.“RuralResettlementinSouthVietnam:TheAgrovilleProgram,” PacificAffairs,XXXV,No.4(Winter,1962–63).
INDEX
AAunits,20 Afteractions,92 AgreementsontheCessationofHostilities,61 Agrovilles,67 Airfields,inIndochina,57 Airpower,102–3;ambushesinfluenced by,104;attentiontoproblemof,92, 93;neutralizationof,56–59;ofU.S., 87–88,99 Ambush,48;airpowerinfluencing,104; American,104–5;ofVietCongmilitary,85–87.SeealsoSneakattacks; Surprisetactic AmericanFirstCavalryDivision,105 AmiDoan,69 Anti-Americanism,71 Armisticenegotiations,110 ArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam (ARVN),80,84;moraledecreasing, 95;VietCongambushand,85–87 Assaultengineers,46 Assaultinfantry,46 Assaulttroops,20,32 Attacks:groupsinvolvedin,46;harassing,88–89;hit-and-run,88;infantry, 90;atnight,46;offensive,45–47; principlesforsuccessful,47;sapper, 106,107,110;shockvalueinfluence
of,91;sneak,106;timingof,45;Viet Congcategoriesof,90–91;Vietminh prerequisitesforsuccessful,45;waterway,87 Attrition:strategyof,4;warof,81–92 “Auxiliaryservice,”36 B-52’s,U.S.,103 BaoDai,62–63 Basearea,9;damageto,100 Battalionassaulttactics,32 BinhXuyen,63 Bombings,byU.S.,72,103–4 Boobytraps,107 Breathing,trainingof,43 Bribery,40 Buddhistsects,64,65 Buffalocarts,36 BureauofImportantAffairs,ofGeneral Staff,18 Camouflage,44 CaoDai,63,65 Carpentier(General),10 Cavewarfare,107–8 Cease-fireagreements,ofVietnam,61–62 Children:changingattitudeof,95;intelligencetasksof,9;warningsystems carriedoutby,94
126
INDEX
China:artilleryprovidedby,51;characteristicsofwarin,1–2;schoolsof,33; Vietminhmilitaryaidedby,35 Chuluc,23 “Clinging,”toenemy,58–59 Combatguerrilla,78–79 Combathamlet,93–94 Combatlosses,ofVietCong,101 CommitteeofResistance,21 CommitteesofPopularTroops,22 Communications,ofVietminhmilitary, 34–37;controlling,47–48 Communism:disciplineof,32;peasant understandingof,71.SeealsoViet Cong CommunistDemocraticRepublicofVietnam(D.R.V.N.),61–62;dissatisfaction ofsettlement,62 CommunistVietminhgovernment.See Vietminh CommunistWorker’sParty,(DangLao Dong),33 Concealment,vegetationfor,92 Conscription,100 Counterattacks,47 Counterencirclementtactics,54–56 Counterpacificationefforts,54–56 DaiVets,65 DanCông,22 DangLaoDong(CommunistWorker’s Party),33 DanQuan,22,25 DanQuanduKich,22,25 DayRiver,10 Defensivetactics,48–50,54–56;ofViet Cong,93–94;villageillustrationof, 49–50 DemocraticRepublicofVietnam.See CommunistDemocraticRepublicof Vietnam Deserters,29–30,34 DichVan,9;Vietminhinstructionsfor, 41–42 DienBienPhu,13,19;assaulton,36; battleof,50–52;defeatat,12 DirectorateofOperations,ofGeneral Staff,18 DirectorateofPopularTroops,22
D.R.V.N.SeeCommunistDemocraticRepublicofVietnam Dynamiters,46 Education,ofVietminhsoldiers,32 80thRegiment,41 ExecutiveandResistanceCommittee,21 ExpeditionaryCorps,50 Factories,forequipment,35 Fall,Bernard,65 FatherlandFrontoftheSouth,69 FatherlandFrontofVietnam,63 FinalDeclarationoftheGenevaConference,61,62 Firepowertroops,20 Fortifiedhamlet,93–94 ForwardAirControllers,103 French:aircraftnumbersinIndochina,57; airforcecriticalofcommandstructure, 57;airsuperiorityof,56–59;ambush complaintsof,48;countertacticsreactionof,56;DienBienPhusurrender of,51;HoChiMinhandagreements with,5;Indochina,5–6,57;Laos treatywith,12;miscalculationsof, atDienBienPhu,50–52;pacificationpolicy,53–54;procrastinationof, 26–27;RedRiverDeltaconnectionto, 8–9,12;tacticsandairpower,53–60; Vietminhand,3–4,7,26,53–60 “Generalcounteroffensive,”7 GeneralDirectorateofSuppliesand Maintenance,17 GeneralStaff,ofVietminhmilitary,17–19 GenevaAccords,61,63 GenevaConference,61–62,64;situation after,62–65;Vietnamdivisionand,61 GiaHoi-SaiLuongBase,44 GovernmentofSouthVietnam(G.V.N.), 62,84;Americantroopsinfluence on,82;officialsinvillages,93;terror campaigntodestroy,66;tollofattacks on,91 Guerrillawarfare,7–8,9,111;intensifying,41;mobilewarfareinfluencing, 108;surpriseandmobilitytactics of,93;VietCong,67,78–79,92;
INDEX Vietminhtheoryofwarand,3,9;Vo NguyenGiapand,41,45,82.Seealso Populartroops
HaoBinh,11 Harassingattacks,88–89 Helicopters.SeeAirpower HighCommand,ofVietminhmilitary, 17–18 Hit-and-runattacks,88 HoaHao,63,65 HoangVanThai,3 HoChiMinh,1,11;anticipationofelectionswonby,62;Frenchagreements and,5;MaoTse-tungand,5;National MilitaryCounciland,15;NLF,PRP and,73;propagandafavoring,42;on shortcomingsofVietminhorganization,25;onthirdphase,6 HoChiMinhTrail,83 HopTac(cooperation),85 HoThu,69 HuynhTanPhat,69 IaDrangbattle,105 Indochina,4;airfieldsin,57;Chinese Communistforcesarrivingin,10; Frenchaircraftin,57;Frenchgoalsin, 5–6;guerillaactionsin,7;revolutionarywarin,2;Vietminhmilitaryand, 26 Indoctrinationcourse,31–32 Infantryattacks,ofVietCong,90 Infantrytactics,44–45 Infantrytraining,32 Infiltration,46,106 Insurgency,ofVietCong,65–72 Intelligence:assistingguerrillas,92;children’tasksof,9;modernmethodsof, 43;radiointerceptionofmessages, 106;ofVietCongmilitary,86;ofVietminhmilitary,42 InternationalCommission,ofcease-fire agreements,61 InternationalControlCommission,64,66 Interrogation,43 Interzones,21 IronTriangleOperation,107 Irony,asinterrogationtactic,43
127
JosephMauiHoHueBa,69 LangSon-BacKan-CaoBangtriangle,58 LaoDongParty,68,69,71 Laos,22;Frenchtreatywith,12 Large-scaleoffensives,asVietCongstrategy,108–9 deLattre,Marshal,10,55 Leapfrog,ofantiaircraftunits,92 LeDuan,68–70 LeVanTha,69 Logistics:U.S.disrupting,ofVietCong, 100;VietCongneedfor,80;Vietminh personneland,29–37 LyBan,3,4 MaoKhé,10 MaoTse-tung,1,2;conceptofrevolutionaryforces,84;counteroffensive launching,9–10;ondefensivetactics, 48;HoChiMinhand,5;protracted warconceptof,2,4,15;useoftheory of,8–11;VoNguyenGiapand,5, 10–11 McNamara(Secretary),99 Medicalservices,ofVietminh,34 MekongDelta,4,84;communicationby waterwaysin,87 MilitaryCouncil,17 Mines,87,107 MinistryofNationalDefense,15–16 Mobility:tacticofVietCongmilitary,93; ofVietminhmilitary,44–45,108 Montagards,84 Morale,decreasing,11,40,95 Mulecompanies,36 Mutualdistrust,betweenarmyand people,89 NationalLiberationArmy,73,78,82;as eliteofVietCongmilitary,80;materialgainsto,91;WesternArmycomparedwith,80 NationalLiberationFront(NLF),66,68, 69,82;militarystrategyof,83;PLP parallelto,71;ten-pointprogramof, 70,81 NationalMilitaryCouncil,15 Navarre,Henri,12,50
128
INDEX
Negotiations,110 NgoDinhDiem,63;alienatingpeople, 64;assassinationof,72;defeating politico-religioussects,63;disagreementofGenevaagreement,63;Lao DongPartytocrush,68–69;LeDuan planstooverthrowregimeof,68–70; propagandaagainst,67;repressive measuresof,65,66;sectspositioned tooverthrow,64–65;shakyfoundationsofregime,72 NguyenBinh,22,48 NguyenHuuTho,69 NguyenThiDinh,69 NguyenVanHieu,69 NLF.SeeNationalLiberationFront NorthAnnam,20,22 Offensivetactics:ofVietCongmilitary, 85–93,108–9;ofVietminhmilitary, 45–47 OfficeofPropaganda,31 OnProtractedWar(MaoTse-tung),2 Operations:intelligenceandreconnaissance,42–44;linesofcommunications for,47–48;mobilitykeyto,44–45; ofVietminh,39–52;Vietminhfearof airborne,59 Organization,ofVietCong,68–73 Pacification,99,109,110;actionsof French,53–54;counter-,54–56 Paperwork,Vietminhfondnessfor,19 Partisangroups,ascountertechnique,56 People’sRevolutionaryParty(PRP),68, 70,82;NLFparallelto,71;ten-point program,71 PhamVanDong,11 PhungVanCung,69 PhuNhan-SonThinarea,44 Physicalsenses,trainingofrefinement of,42 PleiMe,attackon,105 PoliticalBureau,16–18 PoliticalIntelligenceService,42 Politicaltraining,33 ThePopularArmyofVietnam,31,33 Populartroops,22;trainingof,30–34 “Preparingthebattlefield,”9 Pressuremines,87
Propaganda,41,42,81–82;HoChiMinh favoredby,42;againstNgoDinh Diem,67;VietCong,67,77 Provinces,21 PRP.SeePeople’sRevolutionaryParty Psychologicalwarfare,41,42,107 QuanBao(MilitaryIntelligence),42,43 Radios,88,106 Rallypoints,92 Recruiting,forVietminharmy,29–30 RedRiverDelta,4,55;Frenchconcentrationin,8–9,12 Regiment9,examinationof,23 Regiment16,36–37 Regimentalassaulttactics,32 Regionaltroops,21,41;organizationof, 24;trainingof,31–34;ofVietCong military,79 Regroupees,64 Regulararmy,19–21,23,24,41;logistics needsofVietCong,80;ten-pointoath of,31 Reservegroup,47 TheResistance,66.SeealsoVietminh Retreat,plansfor,48–49 Roadblocks,usedbyVietCong,87 RouteColoniale4,10 Routes,forsuppliestoentercountry,36 Saigon-CholonPeaceCommittee,69 Sapperattacks,106,107,110 Sarcasm,asinterrogationtactic,43 SecretSocieties,65 Secrets,preservationof,31,47 Security,forVietminhforces,41 “Securityoftherear,”8 Self-criticism,astrainingdevice,33 Semaphoreunits,34 Shocktroops,46 66thRegiment,105 Small-firearms,againstaircraft,102 Sneakattacks,106 SouthVietnam:afterGenevaConference, 62–65.SeealsoGovernmentofSouth Vietnam(G.V.N.) Soviets,onguerrillas,9 SpecialForces,U.S.,98 Specialintelligenceunits,41
INDEX
Speedofmovement,39,40 Staley,Eugene,71 Stand-off,106 Strategichamletplan,72 StrategicProblemsofChina’sRevolutionaryWar(MaoTse-tung),1 Strategy:attritionof,4;critiqueofVo NguyenGiap,4–5;hamletplan,72; ofNLF,83;ofU.S.,101;U.S.and Vietcong,108–11;VietCong,81–85, 108–9;zonesexcentriques,12 SupremeCommand,ofVietminhmilitary, 17 Sûrete,42 Surprisetactic,40;againstU.S.,109;of VietCongmilitary,93 Tactics:ambush,48;counterencirclement, 54–56;defensive,48–50,93–94;infantryandmobility,44–45;neutralizationofairpower,56–59;offensive, 45–47,85–93;surprise,40,93,109; underminingenemymorale,40 Tactics,ofVietminh,39–52 Taylor,Maxwell,71 “Technicalcells,”21 Telephone/telegraphlines,34 Ten-pointoath,31 Ten-pointprogram:ofNLF,70,81;of PRP,71 Terrorcampaign,67,81 33rdRegiment,105 351stdivision,20 Timing,ofattacks,45 Tonkin,4,21,22;countertacticsexample in,55;guerrillasin,9 Training:breathing,43;infantry,32; political,33;political,ofsoldiers,33; ofPopulartroops,30–34;inrefining senses,42;ofRegionaltroops,31–34; self-criticismasdevicefor,33;of Vietminharmy,30–34 TrinhSat,43 TruongChinh,11 Tunnelwarfare,107–8 UnitedStates(U.S.),71–72,82;airpower of,87–88,99;ambushesof,104–5; arrivaloftroopsfrom,85;B-52’sof, 103;bombingsby,72,98,103–4;
129 cease-fireagreementsand,62;on Deltaaskeytowar,84;disruptingViet Conglogistics,100;G.V.N.receiving aircraftfrom,87;impactofpowerof, 100–102;influenceofforcesof,108, 111;militaryparticipationof,97–111; VietCongand,87–88,94–95,100; VietCongresponsetotroopsof,82, 102–8;VietCongstrategicalternatives and,108–11
Vegetation,forconcealment,92 VietCong:Americanbombingof,72; Americanmilitaryparticipationand, 97–111;attackcategoriesof,90–91; beginningsofinsurgency,65–68;combatlossesof,101;guerrillawarfare reliedonby,111;influenceofU.S.on, 82;insurgencyof,65–72;organization andinsurgencyof,68–73;prisoner reports,66;propagandaof,67,77;responsetoU.S.,102–8;riseof,61–73; U.S.bombing,103–4;Vietminh popularitycapitalizedby,67;Western tacticscomparedto,89–91 VietCongmilitary,77–96;afteractions of,92;alternativesof,108–11;ambush of,85–87;Americantacticscompared to,92;apparatusof,78–80;CommunistPartycriticalrolein,92;complexityofplanningof,91;defensivetactics of,93–94;intelligenceof,86;logistics disruptedbyU.S.,100;logisticsneeds of,80;mobilitytacticof,93;National LiberationArmyaseliteof,80;offensivetacticsof,85–93,108–9;regional troopsof,79;roadblocksof,87;strategiesof,81–85;surprisetacticof,93; U.S.and,87–88,102–11;U.S.power impacting,100–102;U.S.radioscapturedby,88;beforeU.S.troopsarrive, 94–95;Westernarmycomparedwith, 78 Vietminhcamps,moraleproblemsin,11 Vietminhdoctrine:self-appraisalof, 11–13;VoNguyenGiapand,3–8 Vietminhfront,18–19 Vietminhmilitary,15–27;American tacticsdifferingfrom,39;antiaircraft capability,58;Chinaaiding,35;com-
130
INDEX
mitteesof,16–17;communications andlogistics,34–37;controllinglines ofcommunication,47–48;defensive of,48–50;DichVaninstructionsfrom, 41–42;disciplineof,32;educationof, 32;fearofairborneoperations,59; Frenchand,3–4,26,53–60;French andAmericandisagreementsbenefiting,7;Frenchondefensiveby,54–56; GeneralDirectorateofSuppliesand Maintenanceof,17;GeneralStaffof, 17–19;growthofregularunitsof,23; guerrillasof,3,9;HighCommandof, 17–18;HoChiMinhonshortcomings of,25;ideologicalmissionof,25;Indochinaproblemsfor,26;infantryand mobilityof,44–45;intelligenceand reconnaissanceof,42–44;lackofair force,57–58;leadershipandorganizationof,25–26;logisticsof,34–37; medicalservices,34;militarydoctrine of,1–13;minoritygroupsfearof,26; mobilityof,44–45,108;neutralization ofairpower,56–59;offensivetactics of,45–47;operationsandtactics, 39–52;organizationalachievementof defeatingFrench,26;paperworkof, 19;personnelandlogistics,29–37;politicalbureauof,16–18;populartroops of,22;preparationforbattleof,13;reactionstoFrenchtacticsandairpower, 53–60;recruitment,29–30;regional troopsof,21;RegularUnitsof,19–21; reorganizationof,22–27;security for,41;shiftofpowerin,16;success factors,39;SupremeCommandof, 17;trainingof,30–34;undermining Frenchpacification,53–54;VietCong capitalizedonpopularityof,67;Vo NguyenGiapcritiqueof,4–5 Vietnam,3;cease-fireagreementsof, 61–62;Chineseforcesarrivingin,7; Frenchprocrastinationofindependenceof,7
VietnameseCommunists.SeeVietCong Vietnamese,sympathetictoVietminh,9 Villageguerrilla,78–79 VinhYen,10 VNQDD,65 VoChiCong,69 VoNguyenGiap,3–8,24,77;308thdivisionrecalledby,12;onarmedforces mission,39;onconventionalwarfare, 5;DienBienPhudefeatand,12–13; onfinalphase,8;guerrillaactivity attention,41,45,82;infiltratingguerrillastoTonkinDelta,9;MaoTse-tung doctrineand,5,10,11;militarysolutionof,82;MinistryofNationalDefenseand,16;payingbribesand,40; onregulararmy,23;RouteColoniale 4and,10;thirdphaserequirementsof, 6–7;Vietdoctrineand,3–8;Vietminh strategycritiqueof,4–5 Warfare:cave,107–8;guerrilla,7–9,41, 45,67,78–79,82,92,93,108,111; psychological,41,42,107;tunnel, 107–8;VoNguyenGiapon,5 Warofattrition,81–92 TheWarofLiberationandthePopular Army(Giap),4 Warofmovement,107 Warofnerves,106 Waterwayattacks,87 Weaponsmanufacturing,35 Westernarmies:NationalLiberation Armycomparedwith,80;VietCong comparedwith,78,89–91 Withdrawalplans,92 Women:usedforblackmailandbribery, 40;inVietminharmy,30 WorldWarII,1,4,26 Zones,21 Zonesexcentriquesstrategy,12
AboutTheAuthor GEORGE K.TANHAM (1922–2003) graduated from Princeton University, servedasanartilleryofficerinEuropeduringWorldWarII,andthenearneda doctorateinhistoryandpoliticalscienceatStanford.HetaughtmilitaryhistoryattheCaliforniaInstituteofTechnologywherebecameatenuredprofessorandmasterofstudenthouses.Dr.Tanhamspentmostofhiscareerwiththe RANDCorporation,servingasthecorporatevicepresidentinchargeofthe Washingtonoffice.Dr.TanhammanagedruraldevelopmenteffortsinVietnam for the U.S.Agency for International Development, a program designed to pacifythecountryside.Afterwardhewasspecialassistantforcounterinsurgency at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, coordinating a campaign to defeat Chinese-inspiredguerrillasinThailand,anexperienceherecountedinTrialin Thailand.AmonghisotherbooksareSecuringIndia:StrategicThoughtand PracticeandIslamandConflictResolution:TheoriesandPractice.