Collected Works of Florence Nightingale : Florence Nightingale's Suggestions for Thought [1 ed.] 9781554582525, 9780889204652

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Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Volume 11 of the Collected Works of Florence Nightingale

The Collected Works of Florence Nightingale List of Volumes Note: Short title denoted by bold. Edited by Lynn McDonald, except as indicated. Volume 1 Volume 2 Volume 3 Volume 4 Volume 5 Volume 6 Volume 7 Volume 8 Volume 9 Volume 10 Volume 11 Volume 12 Volume 13 Volume 14 Volume 15 Volume 16

Florence Nightingale: An Introduction to Her Life and Family, 2001 Florence Nightingale’s Spiritual Journey: Biblical Annotations, Sermons and Journal Notes, 2001 Florence Nightingale’s Theology: Essays, Letters and Journal Notes, 2002 Florence Nightingale on Mysticism and Eastern Religions, ed. Gérard Vallée, 2003 Florence Nightingale on Society and Politics, Philosophy, Science, Education and Literature, 2003 Florence Nightingale on Public Health Care, 2004 Florence Nightingale’s European Travels, 2004 Florence Nightingale on Women, Medicine, Midwifery and Prostitution, 2005 Florence Nightingale on Health in India, ed. Gérard Vallée, 2006 Florence Nightingale on Social Change in India, ed. Gérard Vallée, 2007 Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought, 2008 Florence Nightingale: The Nightingale School, 2009 Florence Nightingale: Extending Nursing, 2009 Florence Nightingale: The Crimean War Florence Nightingale on Wars and the War Office Florence Nightingale and Hospital Reform

Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Lynn McDonald, editor

Volume 11 of the Collected Works of Florence Nightingale

Wilfrid Laurier University Press

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www.wlupress.wlu.ca

We acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program for our publishing activities.

Librar y and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Nightingale, Florence, 1820–1910. Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for thought / Lynn McDonald, editor. (Collected works of Florence Nightingale ; v. 11) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-88920-465-2 1. Nightingale, Florence, 1820–1910 — Religion. 2. Religion. 3. Ethics. 4. Women — Great Britain — Social conditions — 19th century. I. McDonald, Lynn, 1940– II. Title. III. Series: Nightingale, Florence, 1820–1910. Collected works of Florence Nightingale ; v. 11. HQ1593.N55 2008

200

C2008-906519-0

© 2008 Wilfrid Laurier University Press Cover design by Leslie Macredie. Front cover image: Florence Nightingale at Embley, photograph by William Slater and William Frost, May 1858. Courtesy of the Florence Nightingale Museum. Front flap: The first page of the text of Suggestions for Thought sent to J.S. Mill for comment. Courtesy of British Library Reproductions. Back cover image: Combe Hurst, in Kingston, Surrey, home of Nightingale’s Aunt Mai and Uncle Sam Smith. Courtesy of Haley McDonald. Back flap: Florence Nightingale’s side of the family gravestone at St. Margaret’s Church, Wellow. Courtesy of Ronald Francis. ∞ Printed in Canada Ever y reasonable effort has been made to acquire permission for copyright material used in this text, and to acknowledge all such indebtedness accurately. Any errors and omissions called to the publisher’s attention will be corrected in future printings. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior consent of the publisher or a licence from The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright). For an Access Copyright licence, visit www.accesscopyright.ca or call toll free to 1-800-893-5777.

Wilfrid Laurier University Press Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.wlupress.wlu.ca Collected Works of Florence Nightingale website: www.sociology.uoguelph.ca/fnightingale

Contents

Acknowledgments .............................................................................

vii

Dramatis Personae ............................................................................

ix

List of Illustrations ............................................................................

x

Florence Nightingale: A Précis of Her Life .....................................

xi

Introduction to Volume 11 ...............................................................

1

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought ............................................ Philosophical and Theological Sources ............................................ Main Themes: Religion, Women and the Family ............................... Drafting and Printing of Suggestions for Thought ................................. Why Nightingale Did Not Publish Suggestions for Thought ...................

5 8 18 23 51

Key to Editing ....................................................................................

55

Volume 1 ............................................................................................ 59 ‘‘Man’s Will and God’s Law’’ ............................................................ 209 Appendix ........................................................................................ 267 Volume 2 ............................................................................................ 271 Cassandra ........................................................................................ 547 Volume 3 ............................................................................................ 593 Related Texts ..................................................................................... 689 Original Exchange between Nightingale and Sutherland .................. 698 Bibliography ...................................................................................... 782 Index .................................................................................................. 785

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Acknowledgments

A

cknowledgments are due to a large number of individuals and organizations for assistance on this volume, and even more for assistance at earlier stages in the Collected Works project. First of all, the Henry Bonham Carter Will Trust gave permission to publish the Nightingale manuscripts and, indeed, aids scholarship by treating the Nightingale material generally as being in the public domain. To the owners of Nightingale manuscripts thanks are due for their important role in conservation, for permitting scholarly access and for permitting copies to be made for this Collected Works. Archivists and librarians around the world provided skilled assistance. Many people worked on the preparation of the texts, many as volunteers. Thanks are due to transcribers Gwyneth Watkins and Marion Filipiuk; volunteer verifiers of texts: Linda Elliot, Mary Par fitt, Marcia Macrae and Joan MacKay. For assistance with proofreading, Anna Louise Penner, Arun Dhanota, Mary Boyce, Aideen Nicholson and Susan James. Special thanks are due the late Cherry Ambrose, who assisted in the project in many ways, for this volume both in volunteer verification of texts and proofreading. At Wilfrid Laurier University Press thanks are due to Dr Brian Henderson, director; Rob Kohlmeier, managing editor; Doreen Armbruster, typesetter; Leslie Macredie and Penelope Grows, marketing; Steve Izma, production; and Lisa Quinn, peer review. Thanks are due to the anonymous peer reviewers, and to Dr Gérard Vallée, for helpful comments. The copy editing was done by Kristen Pederson Chew. Acknowledgments for photographs and other illustrations are given where they appear. In spite of the assistance of so many people errors undoubtedly remain, which are the responsibility of the editor. I would be grateful for notification of any errors, and for information on missing identifications. Corrections will be made in the electronic text and any later print publication. Lynn McDonald University of Guelph September 2008 / vii

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Dramatis Personae William Edward Nightingale (1794-1874), father Frances Nightingale (1788-1880), mother Parthenope Nightingale (1819-90), later Lady Verney, sister Mar y Shore Smith (1798-1889), ‘‘Aunt Mai,’’ collaborator Samuel Smith (1794-1880), ‘‘Uncle Sam’’ Arthur Hugh Clough (1819-61), friend, husband of cousin Auguste Comte (1798-1857), positivist philosopher Benjamin Jowett (1817-93), priest, friend (Sir) John McNeill (1795-1883), surgeon, friend John Stuart Mill (1806-73), philosopher Julius Mohl (1800-76), Orientalist, family friend L. A.J. Quetelet (1796-1874), statistician (Dr) John Sutherland (1808-91), public health expert, collaborator (Characters in the Dialogues) Jacob Abbott (1803-79), Congregational minister John Calvin (1509-64), Protestant reformer Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), priest, Jesuit founder Harriet Martineau (1802-76), author Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822), poet

/ ix

List of Illustrations Title page of first volume of Suggestions for Thought (facsimile), p xiv. Dedication to the Artizans of England, p 58. Illustrations facing page 402. 1. Florence Nightingale, 1858. 2. Mary Smith (‘‘Aunt Mai’’); Arthur Hugh Clough. 3. John Stuart Mill; Sir John McNeill. 4. Auguste Comte; Harriet Martineau. 5. Benjamin Jowett; Ignatius of Loyola. 6. Nightingale’s handwritten draft, with John Sutherland’s comments. 7. Nightingale’s handwritten draft, with instructions to printer. 8. First page of Jacob Abbott’s The Corner-stone.

x /

Florence Nightingale: A Précis of Her Life

F

lorence Nightingale was born in Florence, Italy, 1820, the second daughter of wealthy English parents taking an extended European wedding trip. She was raised in England at country homes, Lea Hurst, in Derbyshire, and Embley, in Hampshire. She was educated largely by her father, who had studied classics at Trinity College, Cambridge. At age sixteen Nightingale experienced a ‘‘call to ser vice,’’ but her family would not permit her to act on it by becoming a nurse, then a lower-class occupation and thoroughly unthinkable for a ‘‘lady.’’ Lengthy trips to Rome and Egypt were allowed (1847-48 and 1849-50 respectively). She had earlier (1837-39) been taken on a long trip with her family, mainly to Italy and France. These European trips not only improved her language skills (she was fluent in modern French, German and Italian, as well as competent in ancient Latin and Greek) but exposed her to republican politics and Italian independence (she was in Rome and France during the revolts of 1848). Nightingale was finally permitted to spend three months in 1851 at the (Protestant) Deaconess Institution in Kaiserswerth, near Düsseldor f, Germany, and several weeks with Roman Catholic nursing orders in Paris in 1853. Her father gave her an annuity in 1853 to permit her to become the superintendent of the Establishment for Gentlewomen during Illness, Upper Harley Street, London. She left there in 1854 to lead the first team of British women nurses sent to war. The British Army was poorly prepared for that war and the death rate from preventible disease was seven times that from wounds. The Barrack Hospital at Scutari where she was stationed was structurally unfit to be a hospital, had defective drains and had to be re-engineered by a team of visiting experts before the death rate could be brought down. Nightingale’s work as a social and public health reformer effectively began on her return from the Crimean War in 1856. Recognized as a national heroine, she chose to work behind the scenes for structural changes to prevent that war’s high death rates from ever recurring. She / xi

xii / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought began by lobbying to get a royal commission established to investigate the causes of the medical disaster and to recommend changes. She also briefed witnesses, analyzed data and strongly influenced the thr ust of the official report, despite falling ill even before it was finished. It is thought that Nightingale suffered from the chronic form of brucellosis, after nearly dying from the disease during the war. She spent most of the rest of her life as an invalid, seeing people on a oneto-one basis and continuing to exert influence through her research and writing. The illness was painful and incapacitating, but Nightingale learned how to work around it, to focus on the most important projects, those that had the best prospect of saving lives. Nightingale was baptized in the Church of England and remained in it for the rest of her life, although often despairing of its paltry role for women, the minimal demands it made of its adherents generally and its social conservatism. Her experience of religious conversion in 1836 and call to service in 1837 (the latter specifically dated 7 Februar y and frequently referred to) were both shaped by reading the work of an American Congregational minister, Jacob Abbott, notably The Corner-stone, who became a character in a draft for Suggestions for Thought. Her faith was nourished by broad reading, from the medieval mystics, liberal theologians and the German historical school to sermons, devotional books, tracts and religious novels. The family had been largely Unitarian in earlier generations, but a grandmother was evangelical Church of England. Her parents took the family to the Church of England while at Embley, Wesleyan chapels while at Lea Hurst. There are Lutheran influences also on Nightingale from her Kaiserswerth time. God for Nightingale was a perfect Creator who made and runs the world by laws, which human beings can ascertain by rigorous, preferably statistical, study. With the knowledge gained we can then intervene for good, thus becoming God’s ‘‘co-workers.’’ Ongoing research is required, for human interventions, however well-intentioned, may have negative, unintended consequences. This approach appears in all the work Nightingale did, whether in health care or social reform more broadly. To guide her in the research to discover ‘‘God’s laws,’’ Nightingale developed an effective methodological approach. Her sources were statistician L.A.J. Quetelet, on the conduct of research, and J.S. Mill on its philosophical grounding. Society and Politics shows what Nightingale learned from these two persons and how she further developed

Florence Nightingale: A Précis of Her Life / xiii

their ideas. The successful use of this methodology is evident in Public Health Care and in all the later volumes in the series. Nightingale’s ardent and consistent liberal politics are another theme informing her social reform work. Her family (and the Verney family, into which her sister married) were strong Liberals. Her brother-in-law was a Liberal mp, as were cousins and family friends. She herself gave money to the Liberal Party and even wrote campaign letters for a small number of Liberal candidates. At a time of considerable political flux Nightingale’s politics were consistent: she was a thorough ‘‘small l’’ liberal in her ideas, a supporter of freedom of inquir y and expression and an advocate of religious toleration. The Liberal Party seemed to be the best political manifestation of these goals. Again, as with the Church of England, the Liberal Party often failed to live up to its principles—she desperately wanted Liberal governments to be liberal on India as well as on Ireland. For most of her long working life Nightingale was confined to her room, describing herself variously as ‘‘a prisoner to my room’’ or ‘‘a prisoner to my bed.’’ Some days she could not see anybody but usually she had interviews, sometimes several and sometimes lengthy ones, with nursing leaders, medical experts, politicians and Indian officials. Many people who requested interviews were turned down. Time with family and friends took second place, fitted around this ‘‘business,’’ God’s business, ‘‘my Father’s business,’’ in her understanding. People who did not get interviews, however, normally got letters in reply, often long and careful explanations, and offers of assistance. Nightingale’s own network of colleagues and advisors was impressive and she continued to add to it as newer, younger experts and officials came into office. She always worked collectively, seeking advice and getting her own questionnaires, draft articles and reports vetted by knowledgeable people. When she herself could not aid someone’s cause, she suggested someone who could. Nightingale continued to produce papers and reports of various kinds well into her seventies. She did not do any serious writing in her eighties, when blindness and failing mental faculties stopped her. There are brief messages only from 1902 on. She was given honours in her last years (the Order of Merit in 1907) and enjoyed the company of younger relatives and several close nursing friends. She died at ninety and was buried in the churchyard of St Margaret’s, Wellow, the family’s parish church. Consistent with her wishes, the family declined an offer of burial in Westminster Abbey.

xiv / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

SUGGESTIONS FOR THOUGHT TO

THE SEARCHERS AFTER TRUTH AMONG

T H E A RT I Z A N S O F E N G L A N D .

LONDON: PRINTED BY GEORGE F. EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE, P RI NT ERS T O T HE Q UEEN ’S MOS T EXC EL L E NT M A J E ST Y

1860.

Title page of the first volume of Suggestions for Thought (facsimile).

Introduction to Volume 11

S

uggestions for Thought, volume 11 of the Collected Works of Florence Nightingale, is the most philosophical of the sixteen volumes in the series. Indeed it is the only one not to report some amount of practical reform work. The writing of Suggestions for Thought dates to Nightingale’s early adulthood, beginning when she was not allowed to work, and was completed early in her active reform career. Conceptually it fits in with the three volumes on religion: Spiritual Journey, Theology and Mysticism and Eastern Religions, volumes 2, 3 and 4 in the series. In another sense it forms the bridge between the more personal Life and Family and European Travels, volumes 1 and 7 respectively, which report more on the preparation for her work than the work itself. All the other volumes in the Collected Works are rife with material from that long life of research and practical application: Society and Politics, Public Health Care and Women (volumes 5, 6 and 8, respectively), then the double volumes on nursing and war, and the last volume, Hospital Reform. The stated purpose of Suggestions for Thought was outreach to the unchurched working class, the ‘‘artizans of England’’ of the subtitle. ‘‘Theism and atheism are creeping through our manufacturing towns,’’ Nightingale explained to a distinguished American doctor, Samuel Gridley Howe, ‘‘and the best and most moral of our operatives are invariably the theists’’ (see p 23 below). Only about 3 percent attend church of any kind, she noted, ‘‘whether Church of England, Wesleyan or other.’’ The Church of England ‘‘never’’ had any hold upon them, while the Roman Catholics and Wesleyans did somewhat better. She wanted for working people ‘‘a God whose attributes did not revolt their reason and their feeling, a perfect Being whom they could recognize as perfect’’ (see p 24 below). Rather than a secular philosophy, as those put forward by Voltaire, Thomas Paine and Auguste Comte (Paine, for example, argued in The Age of Reason, ‘‘my own mind is my own church’’), she sought a defensible set of religious beliefs. / 1

2 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought That this was the stated purpose of Suggestions for Thought is clear enough in early correspondence about her ‘‘stuff,’’ as she called it to friends. The reader of the eventual text might wonder, however, for the content bears little reference to the lives of workers, and the vocabular y and learned allusions show no consideration for readers of limited education. The copious material Nightingale wrote on the status and role of women in Suggestions for Thought includes nothing on working-class women, although she would take up their plight in later work. Instead she focused on the boring lives of privileged women, moving material obviously derived from Nightingale’s own life, in which no one had to work at even the most genteel occupation. Whatever the ostensible purpose for its writing, Suggestions for Thought arguably forms the basis of Nightingale’s intellectual preparation for her own social reform career. It deals with such basic issues as the nature of God and humanity, God’s laws and human liberty, rights for women and the proper role of the family. When Nightingale began the drafting, in 1852, she was well past her 1837 ‘‘call to service,’’ had read widely and understood that a significant knowledge component was essential for any work she might do. When she went back to the drafting, post-Crimea, she had a clearer understanding of her calling to save lives, understanding that a knowledge of political and economic structures was necessary to do so—including research methods and statistics. Again, there was reason for her to explore the philosophical foundations needed for this work. Other great thinkers devoted considerable efforts early in their careers to establishing a philosophical foundation for their life’s work. In some cases the theorists left this exploratory writing unpublished, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels did with their German Ideology, and David Hume did with his A Treatise of Human Nature, which he excluded from the edition of his Works. Apparently the process of clarification could serve without publication, and this seems to have been the case for Nightingale. Other reasons as to why she did not ever publish the material will be explored shortly. Suggestions for Thought then is a printed, but not published, work in three volumes, totalling 829 pages plus a lengthy table of contents and a digest (the latter are not reproduced here). What is not at all known about Suggestions for Thought, however, is that a massive number of surviving drafts exist in manuscript, which have not heretofore been published, apart from a small amount in volume 8 of this series, Women.

Introduction to Volume 11 / 3

Nor has this fascinating material even been referred to in the secondar y literature on Nightingale. These manuscripts reveal that Nightingale not only first wrote up much of her philosophical-theological reflections in novel form, but in fact wrote two distinct versions, with different characters and settings. The significant characters in both versions are women. In the longer version they are the intellectual daughters of a propertied English family, like her own. In the shorter, more exotic, version the heroine is an anguished single woman, Nofariari, whose brother Fariseo tells her sad tale after her death at age thirty. The English daughters in the longer version also debate religious matters at great length, especially Roman Catholicism versus Protestantism, the role of women in the church, marriage, the family and society in general. Discussion in the novel about the right of women to inherit money reflects circumstances that existed in the Nightingale family. The best-known part of Suggestions for Thought is the essay ‘‘Cassandra,’’ placed at the end of the second printed volume. It is the painful cr y of a woman desperately wanting to break out of the stifling confines of an upper-class English family. ‘‘Cassandra’’ is also the printed version of Nofariari’s tale from the shorter draft novel, but now edited into the third person and with the names omitted. This second volume has copious further material on women, daughters, the right to an independent life, etc., that were also drawn from the English family version of the original novel. This appears as ‘‘Theor y of Daughters,’’ section 7 of volume 2. As well, there is further material on gender issues in (the unnamed) section 6 of that volume. There is also much draft material of another debate, this time among specified, real persons with differing theological positions. The characters are the American Congregationalist minister and educator Jacob Abbott, Jesuit founder Ignatius of Loyola, Protestant reformer John Calvin, the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley, or rather his philosophical poem, ‘‘Queen Mab, a Philosophical Poem,’’ and the then-agnostic author Harriet Martineau. Countering all their arguments is a nevernamed ‘‘M.S.,’’ who probably represents some combination of Nightingale’s own views and those of her aunt, Mary Smith, whose initials were M.S. and which she typically used in family correspondence. Nightingale at some stage gave up the dialogue form in all three attempts and reworked the material in the third person. Neither version of the novel of ideas, one might politely say, ever worked, and the

4 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought contrived philosophical dialogue did not serve well either. Quite when or why she changed her mind is not clear. Some time before she sent the material to the printers, she crossed out all the names of her characters, both fictional and real, and substituted expressions like ‘‘It is said,’’ or ‘‘It is objected that’’ for their quoted remarks. Nightingale did not write out a revised text (or if she did it is not extant) but inserted the wanted changes, a massive number, over hundreds of pages. Extensive as the surviving manuscript materials are, however, they do not cover the entire printed text. There are sections for which no manuscript has survived, and where the printed text is sufficiently different to make one suspect a rewrite, so that there are likely intermediate drafts missing. To add to the complications, there are also manuscript drafts which never made it into print, several sizable sections in the first manuscript volume at the British Library. Nightingale had Suggestions for Thought printed in three separate volumes, with a change in title after the first. J.S. Mill suggested that it not be confined to ‘‘artizans,’’ and she accordingly changed the title from the initial Suggestions for Thought for the Searchers after Truth among the Artizans of England to the more descriptive Suggestions for Thought for Searchers after Religious Truth. The first two volumes are longer and have distinct subsections. Nightingale considered the third to be a ‘‘summar y’’ of the first two, although it may have been written earlier (on which more later). Finally, there is a section of surviving manuscript pages that Nightingale did not include at all in the printed volumes. They are all undated, and it is not at all apparent, if they were written when the other material was, why they were not. It is possible that the material might have been written in response to the demand by some of her readers for a shorter version of Suggestions for Thought. Her friend, Benjamin Jowett, in particular, had urged Nightingale to write briefer essays or even tracts (see p 38 below). Several examples of this sort of writing are given at the end of this volume as Related Texts (see p 689 below).

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought

E

ven without publication, Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought attracted much scholarly attention. Several editions of excerpts have been published, beginning in 1928 with ‘‘Cassandra,’’ as an appendix to Ray Strachey’s book on the suffrage movement, ‘‘ The Cause’’: A Shor t Histor y of the Women’s Movement in Great Britain, a fitting place for it is a strong feminist statement. Three books of excerpts, and a separate edition of ‘‘Cassandra,’’ were published later in the twentieth century.1 As usual the official biography, E.T. Cook’sThe Life of Florence Nightingale, can be counted on for excellent background on the purpose and writing of Suggestions for Thought, although its treatment is brief (1:468-85). The derisory treatment of Suggestions for Thought in the secondary literature began with Lytton Strachey’s essay on Nightingale in Eminent Victorians, 1918. There Strachey had J.S. Mill acknowledging the copy Nightingale had sent him with ‘‘an extremely polite letter.’’ Strachey then gave a mocking paraphrase of the Mill-Nightingale exchange. In fact Mill sent Nightingale two highly complimentary letters about Suggestions for Thought, in both of which he urged that it be published. He repeated his desire for its publication in his next book, The Subjection of Women, and left instructions for their exchange of letters to be published after his death.2 Cecil Woodham-Smith’s Florence Nightingale 1820-1910 (1950), does not mock, but does follow Strachey in emphasizing negative comments about the work and ignoring the more numerous favourable com-

1 Michael D. Calabria and Janet A. Macrae, eds., Suggestions for Thought by Florence Nightingale; Mar y Poovey, ed., Florence Nightingale: Cassandra and Other Selections from Suggestions for Thought; Rosemary Hartil, ed., Florence Nightingale: Letters and Reflections; Myra Stark, ed., Cassandra, 1979. The introduction to the Calabria and Macrae edition is particularly good; Poovey’s introduction has useful background information on the period. 2 Society and Politics (5:382).

/ 5

6 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought ments and encouragement to publish (349-50). Myra Stark’s introduction to Cassandra, while providing some good context on the period, relies on Strachey and Woodham-Smith and repeats their negative portrayal. She also adds an extraordinar y charge, quite unbelied by the years of work Nightingale did to improve opportunities for women in education and the professions: After ‘‘Cassandra’’ Nightingale turned away from the subject of the condition of women. As a Victorian recluse dedicated only to work, she lost sight of the crippling disabilities—economic, social, educational, political—under which most women continued to suffer. (19)

Other secondary sources on Suggestions for Thought tend to be similarly negative and factually unreliable. F.B. Smith makes only a few comments in Florence Nightingale: Reputation and Power, the most hostile and inaccurate secondary source on Nightingale, including the absurd claim that she ‘‘coerced’’ people into reading it for her! There is extensive coverage of the work in Val Webb’s Florence Nightingale: The Making of a Radical Theologian, but which is marred by numerous factual errors and an irritatingly sexist style. For example, Webb routinely promoted (Mr) Sidney Herbert to ‘‘Sir Sidney Herbert,’’ while demoting (Mrs) Elizabeth Herbert to ‘‘Liz’’ (who would have been ‘‘Lady Herbert’’ had her husband possessed the title Webb claimed for him). The printed text represents a series of attempts for which we have var ying amounts of preparator y manuscript material. Table 1 sets out an overview of the components. Volumes 1 and 2 have two and four subsections, respectively, each with its own history of composition. In addition there is a two-page ‘‘Dedication’’ at the beginning of volume 1 and a four-page Appendix at the end, for which there is no manuscript. Volume 3, the ‘‘summar y,’’ necessarily repeats much of the earlier material, but covers only the theological arguments. There is nothing of the plight of unmarried daughters or their oppression by their families. Yet another complication is that, while there are no manuscript drafts, there are two somewhat different printed versions of volume 3. Nightingale herself loved adventure stories, and that love of thrilling writing influenced her own. Even her most serious writing on health issues is laced with humorous asides and facetious remarks, and she would become known for her pithy writing and vivid images. The two novel attempts here however reveal earnest dialogue, with little description of character or setting. There is almost no action, except that the protagonist dies young in the shorter, exotic novel and in the printed form of ‘‘Cassandra.’’ The longer, English family novel

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 7

ends, or breaks off, with one daughter becoming a Roman Catholic and entering a convent. Table 1 Printed volume 1:3-202 1:2031:289-92 2:1-17 2:18-37 2:38-76 2:77-101 2:102-80 2:181-228 2:229-92 2:293-342 2:343-73 2:374-411 3:1-126

Contents 1. Belief in God, fictional dialogue 2. Man’s Will and God’s Law, real exchange, FN & JS 3. Appendix on Sir William Hamilton 4. Practical Deductions. section 1, fictional dialogue 5. section 2, fictional dialogue 6. section 3, English family novel 7. section 4, English family novel 8. section 5, English family novel 9. section 6, (lesser) English family novel 10. section 7, Theory of Daughters 11. section 8, English family novel 12. Sermons 13. Cassandra 14. Summary (no dialogue or novel)

Ms source 45837 ff 36-246 45838 ff1-93 no Ms 45838 ff 94-117 ff 120-47 ff 148-83 ff 185-214 ff 214-319 45839 ff1-66 ff 67-32 ff 134-95 ff 198-232 ff 236-88 No Ms Cup.1247.p48 (printed)

The dialogue in the exotic novel is between Nofariari, a young woman roughly Nightingale’s age, and her brother, Fariseo, who recounts her unhappy life and death at age thirty as a memorial to her.3 The setting is suggestive of Nightingale’s letters from Italy, in 1847-48. In the English family version the dialogue is mainly between the three unmarried daughters of a cultivated family, Portia, Columba and Fulgentia (!!!). They represent, perhaps, if not different aspects of Nightingale’s own self, then the range of options open to a young woman of her class. Two married sisters of the family are more conventional, and the parents, naturally, defend the status quo, in which

3 Examples of the text, reconstructed from struck-out sections of the manuscript, appear in Women (8:110-38).

8 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought the obedient daughter stays at home. There is much more discussion about religious belief in the English family novel than in the exotic version. Both give lengthy and passionate coverage of the unhappy and limited life of a young woman trapped by her (highly privileged) family. Religious differences in the English family version are treated as problems for the family, with advice to stay in the religion in which one was born (the conventional parental advice). At the end Columba converts to Roman Catholicism and becomes a nun of the Sisters of Charity, the order Nightingale knew best from her stays in Paris in 1853. Portia and Fulgentia variously try to dissuade Columba from her religious choice or defend it to their parents as being necessary that their sister follow her convictions. There is nothing equivalent to any of this in the exotic version.

Philosophical and Theological Sources We do not know when Nightingale did the reading from which she drew for the more philosophical and theological parts of Suggestions for Thought. However, we can surmise that it was likely in the 1840s, that horrible period of her life when she was acutely aware that the ‘‘call to service’’ she had experienced in 1837 continued to be unrealized, as her family would not permit her to work. She read widely. Her travels in 1848-49 in Europe, and in 1849-50 in Egypt and Europe, also broadened her intellectual horizons, but she then had to return to the same boring family life that she so protested against in ‘‘Cassandra.’’ J.S. Mill’s System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, the major secular, philosophical source for Suggestions for Thought, was published in 1843. Nightingale evidently read it thoroughly and reread it. To her friend Benjamin Jowett she described herself as ‘‘Mr Mill’s profoundest admirer. If ever I open his Logic, the second volume, I read straight through to the end, or as long as I can. It is so amusing.’’4 That second volume contains Mill’s chapter ‘‘On the Logic of the Moral Sciences,’’ which deals extensively with the concepts of liberty, necessity and causality, key concerns in Suggestions for Thought. Nightingale told Mill himself that it was ‘‘the forming influence’’ on her views, especially ‘‘on law, free will and necessity.’’5

4 Letter [c1865], Add Mss 45783 ff48-49. 5 Society and Politics (5:373).

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 9

Another key source for Nightingale’s treatment of the will or mind of God was The Constitution of Man, Considered in Relation to External Objects, by George Combe.6 Published in 1828, it was reissued in 1843 with three further chapters. That book makes a cogent case for God governing the world by moral laws, human duty being to learn what they are so as to subordinate positive, enacted laws to them, ‘‘to turn them into account’’ (vi). Further, Combe held that the violation of God’s laws leads to ‘‘inevitable misery,’’ for God wishes the happiness of His creation. Combe cited the natural theology of William Paley (37) and quoted John Locke on God’s use of punishments solely to ‘‘restrain humanity’’ from greater misery and destruction, so that God’s justice ‘‘is nothing but a branch of His goodness’’ (109). Nightingale clearly drew upon these ideas in her arguments. Combe’s Constitution of Man was, for Nightingale, a sympathetic authority for her view that God was intelligent, benevolent and powerful, and creation a harmonious system (357). For people to live well, it followed, they had to obey God’s laws. Nations must obey the moral law of God, or suffer the consequences (256). Nightingale was to repeat this theme frequently in her later theological and political essays:7 God governs by moral laws, and so do we when we learn them (by doing research) and act on them (by careful application). This was Christianity combined with utility theory. As Combe argued in his first chapter, the greatest good of the greatest number was the proper goal of government, which would best be achieved by finding out what God, the Creator, intended. Nightingale made brief mention in her work of another of Combe’s intellectual interests: phrenology, which was also discussed in The Constitution of Man (although Combe argued that his key ideas held without any reference to it). Without using the actual term ‘‘phrenology,’’ at least, she discussed the relation between ‘‘a certain appearance of the skull’’ and certain aspects of ‘‘character’’ (see p 518 below). She would never later make such a point. Nightingale argued at one point that theocracy was a ‘‘sublime idea’’ of the Jews, where one would be governed ‘‘not by kings and presidents but by God,’’ when Cabinet ministers would be selected to discover and carry out ‘‘the purposes of God in politics’’ (see p 513

6 George Combe (1788-1858), Edinburgh doctor with whom Nightingale discussed medical education in 1856. 7 Published for the first time in Theology (3:54-170).

10 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought below). Here she was likely drawing on Johann Gottfried Herder’s Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie, for she made the same point in her biblical annotations.8 To readers in the twenty-first century, the word ‘‘theocracy’’ might conjure up the image of (male) religious thugs enforcing their interpretation of divine writ, or of the Puritans closing down theatres and cancelling Christmas in seventeenth-century Britain. However Nightingale was a lifelong exponent of free speech and freedom of religious expression, and an opponent of censorship, and such images do not fit in with her notions of a noble theocracy. Thomas Arnold (1795-1842) was another influence on Nightingale on the government of God. He had hoped to write a political book: to apply the principles of the gospel to the legislation and administration of a state. It would begin with a simple statement of the τε´ λος [end] of man according to Christianity, and then would go on to show how the knowledge of this τε´ λος would affect all our views of national wealth, and the whole question of political economy, and also our practice with regard to wars, oaths and various other relics of the στοιχε`ια του κο´ σµου [first principles of the universe].9

Arnold further described this projected book as: a work on Christian politics, or the application of the gospel to the state of man as a citizen, in which the whole question of a religious establishment and of the education proper for Christian members of a Christian commonwealth would naturally find a place. (28)

Arnold was a clergyman and later headmaster of Rugby School, not an expert in political science, and he did not proceed with the projected book. His sermons and articles, however, show that his political and economic views were thoroughly liberal. Nightingale was serious about the idea that, to understand how best to govern a society, God’s intentions for it should be heeded. This principle certainly informed her ‘‘social physics’’ in general, and her approach to public health in particular. She would apply this understanding to the end of her working life, to no less a challenge than the prevention of famine in India (surely not God’s wish), which she thought was achievable by scientific agriculture and advances in irrigation, transportation and public administration.

8 Spiritual Journe y (2:119 and 147). 9 Letter to Richard Whately, in Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold 28.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 11

French positivist philosopher Auguste Comte’s four-volume Système de politique positive, ou traité de sociologie, instituant la Religion de l’Humanité came out in 1851-54. It does not figure in the 1852 correspondence explaining the purpose of Suggestions, outreach to the artisans, presumably because she had not yet read it (only the first volume was published in 1851). However, she clearly read the work thoroughly at some point, for she devoted a great deal of space in Suggestions for Thought to demolishing its arguments. Comte only tells us what is, but not why, she objected, affirming the rule of law in the universe, but stopping there. His ‘‘Grand-Être’’ was humanity, the object of worship in his system, but for Nightingale this was too abstract, and unintelligible (see p 106 below). His system lacked ‘‘spirituality,’’ in her mind (see p 101 below). In her argument with her close collaborator, Dr Sutherland, Nightingale would credit Comte (and Henry Thomas Buckle) only with having ‘‘powerful minds’’ that gained insight into ‘‘certain important tr uths’’ and perceived ‘‘certain errors’’ in common beliefs, but ‘‘stopped short of any true view’’ of God’s thought (see p 253 below). Comte’s ‘‘religion of humanity’’ included a catechism, calendar of saints and liturgies, all expounding his philosophy while using the conventions of Christianity. Positivists at this time were active in England and French positivist materials were translated into English. In the period of writing of Suggestions for Thought, baptisms into the positivist faith were conducted in Mecklenburgh Sq., London. Nightingale’s informal meetings with workingmen were clearly part of the process of preparation for writing Suggestions for Thought. Cook describes her as frequenting ‘‘The Literary and Scientific Institution’’ in John St., Fitzroy Sq., a ‘‘hotbed of Owenites and freethinkers.’’10 The publisher and bookseller Edward Truelove was its secretar y, and Nightingale was friends with Mrs Truelove.11 Nightingale told her friend Richard Monckton Milnes12 that she had read parts of the material ‘‘to one or two of the workingmen,’’ and that ‘‘they have liked them’’ (see p 25 below). The educatedworkmen idea might also have been encouraged by the publication of Charles Kingsley’s Alton Locke, Tailor and Poet: An Autobiography, 1850.

10 See E.T. Cook, The Life of Florence Nightingale 1:119-20. 11 For Nightingale’s correspondence with her see Women (8:786-89). 12 Richard Monckton Milnes (1809-85), former suitor, later trustee of the Nightingale Fund.

12 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Kingsley, a Christian socialist and a Church of England clergyman, was an author Nightingale read and liked (she gave copies of his books to friends and reading rooms). Yet Nightingale’s concern about workers, or ‘‘artizans,’’ appears more in the early correspondence than the text itself. The term ‘‘artizan,’’ implying a skilled worker, appears only four times, apart from the title, and there is one ‘‘artisan’’ in Suggestions for Thought. There are six references to ‘‘operatives,’’ again signifying skilled workers, and one each to ‘‘workingmen’’ and ‘‘working classes.’’ There are no references to workingwomen. It is not easy to determine the extent of the influence Nightingale’s aunt, Mary Smith, had on the composition. Cook points out that her letters to Nightingale give clear statements of central themes that Nightingale took up in the writing.13 The more sceptical assertions, or denunciations of conventional doctrine, may also reflect her aunt’s Unitarianism. (Both aunt and uncle were raised Unitarian and continued to attend Unitarian chapels into adulthood. They were, however, mar ried in the Church of England and, at least from when they took over Embley in 1874, attended the Church of England.) Letters to Nightingale from her aunt, although it is hard to read Mary Smith’s script, suggest a considerable degree of common thinking between the two on the nature of God. For example: Thanks, dearest, for your bit, most welcome, for my thoughts are more and more bent on such things, are more and more impressed with the truth, beauty, love, wisdom, righteousness of God’s ways, and how by trying to look into His thought and purpose we may practically help ourselves and others. More and more I feel the oneness in mankind and wish that they may have one will and that God’s will.

That same letter contains what appears to be advice as to the dialogue form of the work: ‘‘I find dialogue, I think not between teacher and pupil, but between friends the wisest.’’ It closes with another philosophical reference to ‘‘the organic unity of things,’’ as described by the German Enlightenment writer Johann Wolfgang Goethe, as to ‘‘how the future is growing organically, habitually, beautifully out of the past.’’14

13 Cook, The Life of Florence Nightingale 1:120-21. 14 Letter of Mary Smith [July-August 1851], Add Mss 45793 ff77-79.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 13

Certainly the idea that people are to work out solutions to problems themselves, instead of praying to be delivered from them, was one Nightingale shared with her aunt. Moreover Mary Smith seems to have been the source of the stern determinism of Suggestions for Thought that led to the contention that punishment could not be justified in the case of thoroughly determined criminal acts. A letter Nightingale wrote her aunt from Athens in 1850 states that she had seen a great deal, at home, abroad (in Europe) and in Egypt, which would have been ‘‘almost insupportable, had it not been for your truth, that the doctrine of responsibility, such as we hold it, is not holdable, but that what man does is as much God’s will as what he has.’’ She went on to relate that the Egyptians did not admit the theory of repentance ‘‘as we hold it’’: To be sorry for anything that has happened is clearly, according to all that you say, untrue, and Christians, in all their ages, Stoics, in previous times, have been searching after this state of mind darkly, under different names, resignation, Stoicism, etc., but without clearly seeing why there can be no regret. . . . And I do earnestly try to have done with those untrue things, hopes and regrets. Thanks to you, I believe them to be untrue—more and more, I feel them to be untrue.15

A letter in 1852 is even more appreciative of her aunt’s views: I have not time to tell you what a help for all eternity your visit to me has been, what new ideas and motives and support it has opened to me, what a new prospect, what a new past, a whole new and helpful theor y of life to think out. God bless you and yours.16

The role of Nightingale’s uncle Samuel Smith is not entirely clear either, although it could not have been so significant. He certainly took part in discussions, as correspondence from him shows him au courant with the issues. He may have participated in the drafting, which is intimated in his admitting, on the controversy over free will, that ‘‘we had, unfortunately, written a great deal’’ (see p 40 below). He evidently handled relations with the printer, as a letter to him from Nightingale indicates (see p 30 below). However heterodox she was, and however much Nightingale disparaged her own Church of England, Unitarianism, the faith of three of her grandparents, was not an option to her. All the refer-

15 In European Travels (7:390-91). 16 Letter [before December 1852], Add Mss 45793 ff89-90.

14 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought ences to Unitarianism in Suggestions for Thought are unflattering (see pp 96, 181, 235, 393, 410 and 499 below), and any suggestions to the contrar y in the secondary literature which would have Nightingale as Unitarian in her views are simply wrong. Woodham-Smith’s quite unreliable biography seems to have been the source for this error, and mistaken attributions of Unitarianism were repeated in Widerquist’s article on Nightingale’s spirituality. The error was taken up by the most hostile and error-prone of the other secondary authors, F.B. Smith, who ascribed a ‘‘Unitarian core’’ to Nightingale’s religious beliefs, ‘‘insofar as she recorded them’’ (in fact she recorded her beliefs massively). Smith’s followers, in turn, embellished that incorrect statement. Thus Mark Harrison refers to Nightingale’s ‘‘strongly-held Unitarian beliefs’’ as being important in guiding her work.17

The Fictional Dialogue A substantial portion of Suggestions for Thought in both volumes 1 and 2 was written initially as a fictional dialogue among people with radically different theological views: Jacob Abbott, Protestant, evangelical Ignatius of Loyola, Roman Catholic, Jesuit Harriet Martineau, former Unitarian, agnostic John Calvin, Protestant, predestinarian Percy Bysshe Shelley, philosophical poet The main debater in the dialogue is the never named M.S., who effectively won all the exchanges. Clearly much of what M.S. said did reflect Nightingale’s own views, although possibly not the extreme determinism, as Nightingale would soon repudiate that position. Some things said by M.S. could only be by Nightingale, for example, her references to being on the Nile, a trip Nightingale took with family friends (her aunt was never there). The observations made in the exchanges are almost entirely made up by Nightingale, and include neither quotations nor even close approximations of the published views of the participants. (Shelley’s philosophical poem, however, is quoted directly.)

17 Cecil Woodham-Smith, Florence Nightingale 1820-1910 34; J.G. Widerquist, ‘‘The Spirituality of Florence Nightingale,’’ Nursing Research 11 (1992):50. F.B. Smith, Florence Nightingale: Reputation and Power 183; Mark Harrison, ‘‘New Countries and Old Medicine: Proceedings of an International Conference on the History of Medicine and Health,’’ Medical History 40,4 (1996):524.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 15

Following M.S., the speaker with the greatest quantity of speeches, is Jacob Abbott, two of whose books were enormously influential in Nightingale’s life. She credited his Corner-stone, or, A Familiar Illustration of the Principles of Christian Truth, 1834, with her experience of ‘‘conversion’’ in 1836, a point that Nightingale mentioned, only in retrospect, in 1895.18 Abbott’s The Way to Do Good, or, The Christian Character Mature, published in 1836, is also cited in connection with her ‘‘call to service’’ of 7 Febr uary 1837, as she recalled it years later on the anniversary of that event, 7 Februar y 1892.19 Another Abbott book, Fire-side Piety, or, The Duties and Enjoyments of Family Religion, was one Nightingale read to her favourite cousin William Shore Smith in 1845, and she is known to have gone back to it in 1877.20 These books, then, were positive sources for her at various times from 1836 to 1895. In the dialogue he represents a conventional Christian position, often rewritten into a question, which is firmly answered by M.S. Ignatius of Loyola appears next most often, but Nightingale probably read only one of his works, his still-much-used Spiritual Exercises. An excerpt from them is recorded in her Bible, dated Rome 7 March 1848, suggesting that she used it then when she did a form of retreat.21 When reading at the Royal Library in Berlin, Nightingale was intrigued to see ‘‘an original letter of Ignatius Loyola’s’’ beside a work of Martin Luther’s: ‘‘They were quite friendly and quiet together. So are they now perhaps in another world, collaborateurs perhaps in some great work.’’22 Nightingale noted that Ignatius of Loyola did ‘‘not intend his spiritual disciples to go on sinning and repenting any more than Christ did,’’ but no such attempt occurred in normal, secular life. Yet, he whom we call our Master appears to have expected His disciples, all Christians, to repent and then to lead a new life in God’s service—‘‘Be ye perfect,’’ he says. . . . We cannot think that it is the purpose of God that this, this cheap sinning, this puny repenting, this idle absolving, should be our life.23

18 19 20 21 22 23

See Women (8:927-28). See Spiritual Journe y (2:516). See Life and Family (1:432) and Spiritual Journe y (2:486), respectively. See Spiritual Journe y (2:100). Letter fragment 21 July [1850], Claydon House Bundle 122. Spiritual Journe y (2:29).

16 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought In one place Nightingale joined Francis of Assisi in with the credit she gave to Ignatius: But, though they thought a great deal, thought perhaps solely of what God thinks, of how God sees, of what He would like, yet the enormous mistakes they made as to His character, His intention in our creation, were so incorporated in the orders they founded as to blaze out immediately after and even before their own deaths.24

She clearly agreed with Ignatius’s stern measures for eradicating sin: Now, Ignatius [of] Loyola was too great a genius in understanding and controlling the springs of the human heart, if he had either observed or intended that this process should not or did not take place, that we should go on sinning and repenting every day to the end of our lives, to institute such a practice. There is some meaning in confessing our sins to God, when it is done with such agonies of grief and shame as we read of in the lives of the early Puritans, of the founders of religious orders—where, we see, it is the beginning of really living an entirely new life, outward as well as inward—where it is really the entrance into the kingdom of heaven. That is, going at it ‘‘like a man.’’ But such petty whining as we hear nowadays once a week, or three or four times a year—the intermediate time being spent exactly as it was before— that leads indeed to nothing but despair or indifference.25

Nightingale even credited Ignatius, now along with the founder of Western monasticism, St Benedict, with having: taught the right end, namely, that to work out God’s purpose is all we have to do. But they mistook the means in a measure and this became a more immeasurable mistake with each succeeding generation of their followers—they thought that the purpose of God is to be forwarded by our being ‘‘like dead bodies,’’ by our ‘‘preferring the office we dislike most,’’ by our ‘‘disregarding natural inclinations and friendships especially.’’26

24 Notes, Add Mss 45843 f195. 25 Notes, Add Mss 45843 ff201-02. 26 Notes, Add Mss 45843 f229.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 17

In addition to the above examples, passing references to Ignatius are always favourable, never negative.27 The situation was more complex with respect to her treatment of Harriet Martineau (1802-76), who was eighteen years Nightingale’s senior, an acquaintance of other members of her family, and later a close collaborator and friend. Nightingale knew and admired Martineau’s work from childhood, notably her Traditions of Palestine and Illustrations of Political Economy, and had read and quoted from Martineau’s Eastern Life: Present and Past while on her Nile trip. This lastmentioned book witnesses Martineau’s departure from her early Unitarian faith and movement into a frank agnosticism that was still reverent, but effectively treated religion as a sociological phenomenon, à la Comte. When, in 1851, Martineau co-published a book with the notorious agnostic Henry Atkinson (c1815-84),28 she had gone too far. Martineau figures both as a (minor) character in the fictitious dialogue, and is referred to negatively for the book with Atkinson. In real life this difference in religious outlook did not stop the two women from working together productively and amicably for years. The only actual work of these dialogue authors quoted inSuggestions for Thought, and then only briefly, is Percy Bysshe Shelley’s ‘‘Queen Mab, a Philosophical Poem.’’ This long poem gives a nasty portrayal of all religions, especially Christianity. It seems to have been informed by ancient Greek materialism, along with a strong dose of determinism. In it, God is subject to necessity as are we; He could not have done otherwise. On her visit to Rome in 1847, she said it was a place where one could ‘‘grow’’ a Shelley, and likened him to Aeschylus.29 Of course Nightingale knew other Shelley poems: she quoted his ‘‘Lament’’ elsewhere, and there are flattering references to him as a romantic poet in her writings. But his view that we cannot have religion until we get rid of the word ‘‘God’’ she condemned in an 1871 draft sermon. Her idea was to substitute ‘‘belief in God’’ with ‘‘belief in a perfect God.’’30

27 For example, in Spiritual Journe y (2:394); Theology (3:240 and 249); European Travels (7:723); and Women (8:45). 28 Henry G. Atkinson and Harriet Martineau, Letters on the Laws of Man’s Nature and Development. 29 European Travels (7:133); see also Society and Politics (5:235) and Women (8:136). 30 See Spiritual Journe y (2:336).

18 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought John Calvin is the least quoted of Nightingale’s dialogue participants and it is likely that she never read him directly. There are no references in Suggestions for Thought to any specific Calvin source, but only a blanket condemnation of the burning at the stake of Servetus . This atrocity Nightingale attributed without qualification to Calvin. He agreed that Servetus should die for his heresy, but recommended beheading rather than the more painful burning at the stake. He is the only Protestant reformer, incidentally, to receive negative remarks in Nightingale’s writing. For Martin Luther and John Wesley, all her comments were favourable, for Wesley very much so.

Main Themes: Religion, Women and the Family Nightingale understood God to be perfect, just, loving and powerful, and in Suggestions for Thought exposed and even ridiculed portrayals to the contrary, however orthodox they were as doctrine. She did not believe that God would damn unbaptized babies, for that would be unjust. Nor would a just God require for salvation belief in a doctrine that had not yet been revealed—thus condemning all those born in the thousands of years before the revelation occurred. This would be ‘‘insulting’’ to God (see p 340 below). Prayer too often consisted of ‘‘flatter y’’ of God, and the making of ‘‘selfish or unwise requests’’ (see p 294 below). The litany told God what to do, effectively, to fulfill the laws that He had made. The conventional teaching of the atonement made God out to be unjust and vengeful, requiring the sacrifice of His innocent Son. Christ’s role as intercessor with a (vengeful) Father was abhorrent to Nightingale: ‘‘What an existence’’ is ascribed to God! always ‘‘weighing and balancing our sins.’’ In the original draft it was even stronger: ‘‘What a weary life God must have of it!‘‘ (see p 329 below). What an idea . . . of God . . . not [to] give us what we ought to have to fulfill His plan . . . but only because Christ asks Him. . . . Why they had better not exist at all than exist that way! (see p 356 below).

Rather, thought Nightingale, God wanted a dignified, co-operative relationship with humanity, where they were to be ‘‘one with Him. . . . not prostrate before Him’’ (see p 288 below). He did not want people to think ‘‘meanly,’’ but to have ‘‘a true estimate’’ of ourselves (see p 288 below). We should not act like paupers asking for relief at the Poor Law Board, she said (see p 293 below). Rather we should work

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 19

with God to provide for ourselves, solve problems ourselves. We could count on God’s laws being invariable, so that by acting on them we could do good. If God’s plans entail suffering for us, we know that God suffers with us, Nightingale argued. She could not believe in a God ‘‘who likes human beings to suffer’’ (see p 361 below). A strong confidence in eternity pervades Suggestions for Thought, an essential component of Nightingale’s argument for a just God. The afterlife served to continue the process of human reform into perfection. Nightingale held that there could be ‘‘no righteous Ruler, unless human life is a road to righteousness, even though it may be a circuitous one’’ (see p 76 below). The afterlife evidently would be an active one, according to her, involving learning and experience for those still requiring it. Elsewhere we see her describing some (extremely virtuous) people as fit for the ‘‘immediate presence’’ of God.31 There was no role in her view for a nasty hell or purgator y. Nightingale thought that a God of law was better than a God of caprice, who listened to petitions and then broke His own laws to grant some of them (see p 29 below). Belief in miracles meant that God would break His own laws, but He would not be a God of law, she held, if He did. Yet, even on miracles, she later mellowed. By 1873 she referred to Christ’s ‘‘miracles’’ matter of factly, alongside with his preaching, in a letter to nurses of the Edinburgh Royal Infirmar y.32 In that same letter Nightingale told them not only that they had been ‘‘called’’ to nursing, but to nursing specifically in Edinburgh. That God was a God of law had the important consequence that, by learning His mind, people could learn how better to run human society on earth. The ‘‘character of God’’ was a guarantee of God’s benevolence that could be depended upon as being consistent. Nightingale would use the expression ‘‘character of God’’ frequently not only in Suggestions for Thought but in her later theological essays. On this conception she never wavered. Her idea of the incarnation (or at least M.S.’s) would have been deeply scandalous at the time. The Son (said M.S.) was ‘‘the divine in man’’ and there could be ‘‘many Christs’’ (see p 295 below). The Holy Spirit was ‘‘the divine in us,’’ telling us what to do (according to M.S.), a voice ever beyond and above us, calling us to do ‘‘more and more good’’ (see p 295 below).

31 See Theology (3:183-97). 32 Letter 5 December 1873, Edinburgh University #1.

20 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Nightingale’s radically unconventional views on prayer in Suggestions for Thought would soften with life and experience. She would never pray for God to break the laws of nature, but she did often pray for such practical things as that the right person would be selected for important jobs. Of course she encouraged careful procedures for the consideration of applications. Nightingale’s views of the Bible would have been shocking in her time except to a small number of biblical scholars. The Bible had ‘‘contradictor y things’’ in it, she stated (see p 347 below). Yet it was more than any other book the source of ‘‘spiritual truth,’’ and she herself remained a devout reader throughout her life. The Bible of course was the source for such key teachings as that God was a God of law. She frequently quoted the statement in James 1:17 that in God there was no ‘‘invariableness’’ and ‘‘no shadow of turning’’ (see p 544 below). Suggestions for Thought contains much discussion about the superiority of Roman Catholicism to Anglicanism, reasonable enough as the Church of England was then in a particularly decadent period. To Nightingale, the Roman Church made serious demands on its adherents, her own church did not. The Roman Church provided a serious and demanding role for women through its religious orders, though denying them the priesthood. Her own church had no role for women, as she saw it. Anglican religious orders for women were only then in the early stages of formation, a point Nightingale did not acknowledge (she later worked with Anglican nuns). By the late twentieth centur y the roles of the two churches would be reversed, with Anglican women being admitted into the priesthood and even into the episcopate, while Roman Catholic women continued to be excluded from the priesthood, and were forbidden to preach or to teach theology in seminaries. Nightingale frequently pointed out that Protestants professed to be upholders of the Bible, but were not. Workhouse authorities hardly took Christ’s counsel of poverty seriously (see p 488 below). The command ‘‘to sell all thou hast’’ was fulfilled in the Catholic orders (see p 364 below), but not anywhere in the Church of England. The Catholic scheme was ‘‘not nearly so fine as God’s thought. But it is the next fine idea to it’’ (see p 502 below). Nightingale would always respect women who made the commitment to a religious life, but the high opinion of it that she held in Suggestions for Thought would not last. Religious orders (with very few

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 21

exceptions) put their schedule of devotions ahead of practical duties, thus precluding (or at least seriously interfering with) such important work as hospital nursing. This remained a problem in the late 1890s, when Nightingale was working on bringing in trained nursing to the Irish workhouse infirmaries (the attempt was given up). Nightingale, in short, abandoned her high view of religious orders and never regained it. Next to religion, both in importance of subject matter and number of pages, is the plight of upper-class women in the family. Nightingale knew that working-class women had to work too hard, and would later advocate better pay, improved working conditions and holidays for them. At this point, however, her concern was confined to the narrow life endured by women of spirit in her own class. Men of her class, who did not have to work to support themselves, could nonetheless take on a profession—the military, medicine, law, university, the church, or go into politics, without losing face. For women this was unthinkable, and Nightingale’s pleas to be allowed to work were rejected. Of course, the sexual discrimination prevalent at the time meant that she could not have entered any of the professions anyway. The activities permitted to her gender and class were unchallenging: attending parties, assisting her mother with their planning, visiting family and friends, music and drawing, and some charitable visiting. Yet Nightingale had received a ‘‘call to service’’ and believed that she was meant to work and save lives. It must be remembered that the daughters of wealthy men were not necessarily wealthy themselves. When Nightingale started drafting Suggestions for Thought she had no more money than a dress allowance, and had to ask her parents for extras for travel. The need for daughters to have money of their own appears numerous times in the text. The ‘‘right’’ of daughters to acquire their share of an inheritance during their active lifetimes is also a theme in the English family novel, Nightingale making the point that a daughter might be sixty before she inherited if she had to wait for her father’s death (see p 476 below). A married daughter, by contrast, was given a dowry on marriage. There should be some equivalent for unmarried daughters, the fictional daughters argued. One section of Suggestions for Thought, from the English family novel draft, bears the title in print of ‘‘Theor y of Daughters.’’ It deals with the constraints parents put on daughters, although with some sympathy for the parents, as they must be concerned that their daughters

22 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought married well. There is much on the ‘‘duty’’ daughters owe their parents, along with the point that said daughters did not ask to be born. The importance of ‘‘sympathy’’ is also treated in this section. Nightingale here makes the plea for genuine, deep sympathy, which cannot be manufactured but must come from a sharing of ideas and goals. Sympathy cannot be ‘‘willed’’ (see p 447 below). Juxtaposed with this argument is reference to ‘‘solitar y confinement’’: ‘‘To be alone is nothing, but to be without sympathy in a crowd, this is to be confined in solitude’’ (see p 447 below). Earlier in Suggestions for Thought was the equally provocative reference to people being ‘‘robbed’’ and ‘‘murdered’’ by their families, by having their time taken from them, slowly, and even in ‘‘an estimable and virtuous home’’ (see p 319 below). ‘‘Theor y of Daughters’’ also makes the point that marriage does not provide financial independence for a woman, whatever the dowry, for the law then gave husbands control over a wife’s money. (This state of affairs would end with the passage of the Married Women’s Property Act in 1888; Nightingale was a signatory to the first petition for it, in 1867). She was quite correct in asserting that ‘‘a married woman does not exist in the eyes of the law’’ (see p 476 below). Marriage had a very different meaning for women and men in her time: ‘‘A man gains everything by marriage. He gains a ‘helpmate.’ But a woman does not’’ (see p 571 below). Nightingale took up these themes again in 1870, in an unpublished essay entitled ‘‘The Family.’’33 She repeated the ‘‘robber y and murder’’ claim she made in Suggestions for Thought, but at this point relied mainly on positive arguments to justify a different view of the family. Instead of lamenting the narrowness of the woman’s role, she explained how the whole family suffered if one of its members suffered. Hence, it was obviously in the family’s best interests to allow daughters to follow their own callings. She saw a role for ‘‘virgin mothers,’’ ‘‘tr ue fathers’’ and ‘‘spiritual fathers and mothers,’’ i.e., women and men who influence the young in their sphere, in the case of men at a school or college (3:153). Nightingale would herself play that role as mentor to numerous nurses and younger social reformers. While the ‘‘Theor y of Daughters’’ does not mince words, it is mild in expression compared with ‘‘Cassandra.’’ The two of course come from different manuscript drafts, the former from the English family

33 In Theology (3:140-56), quoted at 3:151.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 23

novel, the latter from the exotic, Nofariari novel. Death, or the desire for it, is mentioned frequently enough in the ‘‘Theor y of Daughters,’’ but in ‘‘Cassandra’’ the heroine actually dies of her sorrows.

Drafting and Printing of Suggestions for Thought Nightingale was working on Suggestions for Thought when the novelist George Eliot (Marian Evans) visited Lea Hurst in 1852.34 Also in 1852 Nightingale’s family entertained the famous American doctor, Samuel Gridley Howe, then on honeymoon with his (later famous) wife, Julia Ward Howe.35 Dr Howe encouraged Nightingale’s vocation and was a sympathetic ear for her deepest concerns. Her letter to him (the first item below) shows her appreciation. A reflective letter to her father on her birthday in 1852 shows Nightingale offering to read him any of her ‘‘works’’ if he had any desire to hear them.36 The offer was repeated in 1859 when she did her next work on the ‘‘stuff ’’ (see p 28 below). The other person to see the 1852 version of Suggestions for Thought was Nightingale’s friend, Richard Monckton Milnes. It seems that she sent him the material early in 1853 (see p 25 below). Excerpts from this earliest correspondence follow here. Source: From a letter to Samuel Gridley Howe, in Laura E. Richards, ed., ‘‘Letters of Florence Nightingale,’’ Yale Review 24 (December 1934):326-47

Embley 20 June 1852 My dear Dr Howe, As for us, it would be very difficult to give any idea of the real state of the country to a foreigner who should ask the question. Slowly and unknown to our church or aristocracy, theism and atheism are creeping through our manufacturing towns and the best and most moral of our operatives are invariably the theists. About 3 percent attend any place of worship, whether Church of England, Wesleyan or other. I have heard this average given by so many operatives of the most different opinions, Roman Catholic, Methodist, atheist, that I can hardly disbelieve it.

34 Marian Evans (1819-80); her letters about Nightingale are in Gordon S. Haight, ed., Selections from George Eliot’s Letters, 99-103. 35 Samuel Gridley Howe (1801-76), pioneer of the care of the blind and deaf; Julia Ward Howe (1819-1910); Nightingale was godmother to their daughter, Florence Howe, later Hall. 36 Copy of a letter 12 May 1852, Wellcome (Claydon copy) Ms 8993/85.

24 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Science is increasing so rapidly among the workmen that all scientific lectures in London are thronged by them. The best botanists and entomologists in England are among the Manchester operatives, and there is a per fect rush to chemistry. The northern manufacturing towns are those where the best class of operatives is found, Halifax, Huddersfield, Bradford. In London and Liverpool are the very worst. The Roman Catholic Church is the only one that maintains the slightest head against the tide of educated infidelity among the artisans. . . . As long as our operative classes were uneducated, and even now they are far, far from being educated in the way yours are, Wesleyans and Methodists could make them believe what they chose (the Church of England never had any hold upon them) but now when these men have all the arguments of Locke, Mirabeau, Tom Paine and Voltaire37 at their fingers’ ends, a ‘‘home missionary’’ can make no head against them. Meanwhile, the national church, as she calls herself, all unconscious of the state of the nation, is giving away her livings to Bennett and such as Bennett, to discuss whether you should turn to the east or the west, or put on a black or a white surplice. Mr Horsman brings it up in the House of Commons, and is told there is no remedy but impeaching a poor old man, the bishop,38 who, long before his sentence, will be beyond the reach of earthly trials, and so he, Horsman, lets it drop. I cannot help thinking that a country whose great heart (her operative blood) is in this state must erelong show symptoms of decay. We send over our people to you to make their temporal bread. If you would send over to us a preacher who would preach to the manufacturing people a God whose attributes did not revolt their reason and their feeling, a perfect Being whom they could recognize as perfect, you would be giving to us that bread without which England may very soon starve. When the moral feelings of a people have advanced beyond their old mythology, scepticism follows. No proof, no evidences, can make the old religion, the old Divinity, credible again. It is a dis-

37 All political reformers in their time: John Locke (1632-1704), advocate of the liberal social contract; Mirabeau (1749-91), French revolutionar y leader; Thomas Paine (1737-1809), British born, defender of the American Revolution; Voltaire (1694-1778), French Enlightenment advocate of toleration. 38 Edward Horsman (1807-76), mp, who attacked Lord John Russell’s policies as too favourable to bishops.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 25

agreeable fact that Egypt fell, that Rome fell, when they had ceased to believe in their old mythology and were incapable of discovering another. Meanwhile our government is doing what they can to hinder education, absorbing the revenues intended for it for the profit of the church. I went for three months to an institution of Protestant deaconesses in Germany last year, at Kaiserswerth. Perhaps you may know it. It is first rate; I wish the system could be introduced in England, where thousands of women have nothing to do and where hospitals are ill nursed by a class of women not fit to be household servants. Source: Letter to Richard Monckton Milnes, Trinity College, Cambridge Houghton 18/130, published in T. Wemyss Reid, ed., The Life, Letters, and Friendships of Richard Monckton Milnes, First Lord Houghton (London: Cassell 1890) 1:475

Mrs Shore’s Tapton, Sheffield 16 January [1853] I am going abroad soon—before I go I am thinking of asking you whether you would look over certain things, which I have written for the workingmen on the subject of belief in a God. All the moral and intellectual among them seem going over to atheism, or at least to a vague kind of theism. I have read these to one or two and they have liked them. I should have liked to have asked you if you think them likely to be read by more. But you are, perhaps, not interested in the subject, or you have no time, which is fully taken up with other things. If you tell me this, it will be no surprise or disappointment to me. I hope Mrs Milnes and your child39 are well. Pray believe me, yours ver y tr uly Florence Nightingale Editor: Milnes’s prompt reply stated that he would be ‘‘ver y grateful for anything in which you may think that I can be of any use to you. . . . I would read them and let you know what I thought of them

39 Annabella Hunger ford Crewe Milnes (1809-74), whom Milnes married after Nightingale declined him; their first child, Amicia Henrietta (c1852-); the second was named after Nightingale, Florence Ellen Hungerford Milnes (1855-?).

26 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought with scrupulous sincerity.’’ He was fearful, however, of touching on the subject of the ‘‘lower classes.’’40 Again in 1861 Milnes wrote Nightingale asking what she ‘‘meant to do with the papers you have written on social and speculative objects.’’ (She was then not expected to live long.) His (hard-to-read) letter includes an offer to look after publication himself: They surely should not be destroyed and yet I hardly know to whom you could entrust [illeg] misunderstand, misinterpret and misuse them. If you choose to leave them in my hands they would be at any rate safe from irreverent handling and crude exposure and could be used in any way more or less [illeg] you might think fit. . . . Of course there is no answer wanted to this letter; it is merely thrown out for you to think about.41

Milnes’s letter of condolence to Nightingale on the death of Sidney Herbert in 1861 includes a reference to the ‘‘Cassandra’’ material, which he also mentioned that no one knew he had seen: ‘‘I have as vivid a recollection of them as of anything I ever read.’’42

‘‘Man’s Will and God’s Law,’’ 1858 Draft Editor: In 1853 Nightingale dropped the drafting she had begun in 1852, for she was finally allowed to do real work: first as superintendent of the Harley St. institution, and then as superintendent of nurses for the British Army in the Crimean War, 1854-56. In Edinburgh in April 1857, to consult Sir John McNeill on army reform and other public health issues, she had the opportunity to return to her concerns about the artisans and their lack of religion. She took up serious drafting again only in 1858, when she might have felt that she had discharged her immediate obligations arising from the Crimean War. The Report of the Royal Commission on the Sanitar y State of the Army was published that year and her work on health in India had begun. The section titled ‘‘Man’s Will and God’s Law’’ dates from 1858. It was subsequently printed as Part 2 of the first volume. Nightingale’s aunt appears to have sent a draft to Dr Sutherland, who was then

40 Letter 11 March [1853], Add Mss 45796 f9. 41 Letter of Richard Monckton Milnes to Nightingale 11 March [1861], Add Mss 45797 f173. 42 Letter 21 October [1861], Add Mss 45798 ff14-15.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 27

working closely with Nightingale on health care reforms. This draft, the writing confined to one column of each page, allowed room for detailed comments. Sutherland wrote extensive, often acerbic comments, corrections, exclamations and objections. When Nightingale came to have Suggestions for Thought printed, in 1860, she gave directions to the printers as to how to use these objections. Obviously she had the last word. There were ver y few places where she accepted Sutherland’s point, although she did tone down a few outrageous statements, as indicated. Many of Sutherland’s arguments never made it into the printed text in any form, nor was any of this interesting exchange included in the two published selections from Suggestions for Thought (Poovey; Calabria and Macrae). Sutherland probably never saw the printed version, likely because Nightingale’s one-sided use of his material would have been offensive. Sutherland himself apologized for the ‘‘harsh’’ tone of his remarks, even admitting, ‘‘I am sorry to say my charity fails miserably . . . when I am required to surrender what I know to be true’’ (see p 738 below). He even took the precaution of returning the material, in July 1858, to her aunt, Mar y Smith, hoping to avoid confrontation with Nightingale. In his covering letter he emphasized that in practical matters he and Nightingale were in great agreement. The exchange is reproduced in entirety at the end of this volume and cross-referenced by page number (see p 698 below). In referring to Dr Sutherland’s objections to her aunt, Nightingale dismissed them as being what ‘‘ordinar y evangelicals’’ would say, but the differences were really philosophical. Sutherland, scientist and rationalist that he was in his professional work, insisted that God’s laws governed human behaviour but not human will, a distinction that Nightingale, with J.S. Mill, found preposterous. Yet Sutherland was not only an ardent Christian believer but a welleducated man with a fair knowledge of philosophy, theology and histor y of science. He was reacting to Nightingale at her most extreme rationalist self, aided and abetted by her more extreme aunt and possibly her uncle. Nightingale would soon come to realize, after a careful reading of the ‘‘social physics’’ of the Belgian statistician, L.A.J. Quetelet,43 that the position they took was wrong. In the meantime Sutherland was the believer defending a conventional understanding of God, the Christian faith and the church to a rabid sceptic.

43 Her extensive comments on Quetelet, and an essay on him, are in Society and Politics (5:11-124).

28 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought A comparison of the printed and the earlier handwritten texts of ‘‘Man’s Will and God’s Law’’ shows that Nightingale sometimes softened her argument. For example, when stating that ‘‘Conscience told the old Romans to kill themselves,’’ she omitted the more provocative example that ‘‘Conscience told the Jews to marry many wives and more concubines. Conscience told Abraham to marry his wife’s maid and then to murder his own child.’’ She replaced this statement with a shot at Muslims for having four wives (see p 230 below). ‘‘Man’s Will and God’s Law,’’ along with other parts of Suggestions for Thought, make Nightingale out to have been much more of a sceptic or free thinker than she ever was. She may simply have been giving her aunt’s more heterodox views. Inasfar as the extreme positions represent her own views, we might perhaps take them as experimental writing, a young intellectual lacking opportunity to test her ideas at a university or like setting, working out basic principles, and taking them to their logical conclusion, whatever other difficulties those conclusions might entail. A number of the points on which she was most insistent in Suggestions never appeared again in her writing. Indeed, we will see years of writing on religion with ideas, beliefs, prayers and so forth much more in line with conventional faith, and entirely contradictor y to the material seen here. Accordingly, care will be taken in the analysis to distinguish enduring themes, for such key points as the God of law and the call for human co-operation with God, which reappear, and themes like the heavy determinism that eliminate human guilt and the need for forgiveness which she abandoned. Nightingale joked with her uncle Sam Smith that she did not want to be found out for having written the ‘‘stuff.’’ In giving a donation to a charitable organization, without being identified as an ‘‘honorar y member,’’ she compared herself with the murderer in Caroline Clive’s novel Paul Ferrol, ‘‘who never would engage in anything, knowing that he was a murderer and might be found out any day. So I think qua ‘stuff.’ ’’44

44 Letter to Samuel Smith, Add Mss 45792 f247.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 29 Source: From an incomplete letter to W.E. Nightingale, Add Mss 45790 ff 186-93

6 July 1859 I shall be so pleased to send you some of my ‘‘works,’’ as you are so good as to wish to read them. They are, I believe, all extant and all in the possession of Aunt Mai at Combe. I have asked her to send you the last, which is also the shortest [presumably vol. 3]. I think the subject is that, granted we see signs of universal law all over this world, i.e., law or plan or constant sequences in the moral and intellectual as well as physical phenomena of the world, granted this, we must, in this universal law, find the traces of a Being who made it, and, what is more, of the character of the Being who made it. If we stop at the super ficial signs, the Being is something so bad as no human character can be found to equal in badness. And certainly all the beings He has made are better than Himself. But go deeper and see wider, and it appears as if this plan of universal law were the only one by which a good Being could teach His creatures to teach themselves and one another what the road is to universal perfection. This we shall all acknowledge is the only way for any education, whether human or divine, to act, namely, to teach men to teach themselves and each other. If we could not depend upon God, i.e., if His sequences were not always to be calculated upon in moral as well as in physical things, if He were to have caprices, by some called grace, by others answers to prayer, etc., there would be no order in creation to depend upon. There would be chaos. The only way by which man can have free will, i.e., can learn to govern his own will, to have what will he thinks right, which is having his will free, is to have universal order or law, by some miscalled necessity. I put this thus brusquely because philosophers have generally said that necessity and free will are incompatible. It seems to have appeared to God that law is the only way, on the contrary, to give man his free will. This I have attempted to prove. And, farther, that this is the only plan a per fectly good omnipotent Being could pursue. Aunt Mai showed this thing to Sutherland and he wrote in the margin his refutations. They are those of ordinar y evangelicals—whose world is chaos. In a famous political trial at Rome, the accused was asked to call his witnesses. ‘‘I want none,’’ he said, ‘‘the witnesses for the prosecution are enough.’’ So I say. The evangelical arguments against me are enough to prove my case. J. Stuart Mill [breaks here]. Nor do I see anyone doing so. Those who do believe in law are absolutely farther off from the idea of a perfect God than the poor lit-

30 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought tle Methodists who roar and pray. No one connects the study of law with that of the character of the Law-giver. And without that, what is it worth? Then the religionists go on at their old trade of texts. Then there are a few to whom Christ is half imposter, half saint, like Muhammad. Vie de Jésus p 21. Les natures ardentes ne se résignent jamais à voir un hasard dans ce qui les concerne. Tout pour elles a été réglé par Dieu, et elles voient un signe de la volonté supérieure dans les circonstances les plus insignifiantes. [Ardent natures do not resign themselves to see chance in what concerns them. Ever ything for them is regulated by God, and they see a sign of a superior will in the most insignificant circumstances.]

What can be much worse than this? Why, here Renan45 is positively finding fault with Jesus for what little belief in law he had. [breaks off] Source: From a letter to Samuel Smith, Add Mss 45792 ff118-19

30 May 1860 I sent on Saturday to the first instalment of the second volume of stuff, του
στυ´ φφος ‘‘more shame for you,’’ you will say. The first twenty-four pages you had done twice, and they are already printed off. Pages 25 to 119, marked ‘‘revise’’ you have done once. (I put ‘‘diabolical dignitar y’’ but the printer would have it ‘‘distinguished dignitar y’’ [2:77] so I gave in.) Pages 1 to 32, marked ‘‘proof,’’ are new, i.e., I am afraid they are ver y old indeed. They were meant to come on as p 120. There is more coming, worse than the first.47 ever yours gratefully F.N. Combe46

45 Ernest Renan (1823-92), French author on religion, who had left seminary training on account of his doubts; for further negative comments on his Vie de Jésus see Theology (3:366-69). 46 Combe Hurst, the Smiths’ country home in Surrey. 47 An allusion to Matt 12:45.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 31 Source: From a letter to W.E. Nightingale, Wellcome (Claydon copy) Ms 8998/30

16 July 1860 I send you, as you say you wish for metaphysics, the first volume of my ‘‘stuff.’’ The first 131 pages are new to you. I have had it printed in a fine print for you. There is a second volume in course of printing.48 This is one of six copies printed on half-margin, on purpose for the reader’s written remarks. It is being done also in a tidy octavo form, which you shall have when it is ready, when perhaps I may ask for this copy back again. I have looked at your little green tract. There are some philosophical books, like Mansel, Sir W. Hamilton,49 etc., which I read in order to see what I do not think. I look at this book in order to see what I do not feel, what one never shall feel, never could feel and never ought to feel. If God is like that, how much better not to ‘‘know Him’’! ever dear Pa your loving child F.

The Appendix on Sir William Hamilton Editor: Nightingale’s negative views of the anti-empiricist philosopher Sir William Hamilton, mentioned in the letter immediately above to her father, were expanded into an appendix placed at the end of volume 1 of Suggestions for Thought. There is no extant manuscript so the timing of the writing can only be surmised. Hamilton had been professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh; he died in 1856.50 His lectures were published posthumously in four volumes, only the first two of which had appeared in time for discussion in Suggestions for Thought, 1859-60, and even then only as an appendix. Extensive reviews in journals had appeared by early 1860. Nightingale ranked Hamilton’s work with what she read ‘‘in order to see what I do not think,’’ as she put it to her father in the preceding letter. J.S. Mill in 1865 went much further, publishing a full, booklength, devastating critique, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, which greatly diminished Hamilton’s reputation.

48 How soon he read the material is not clear, but a letter he wrote to her a year later shows him reading it then (Cook, The Life of Florence Nightingale 1:504). 49 Henry Longueville Mansel (1820-71), professor of moral and metaphysical philosophy, Oxford; William Stirling Hamilton (1788-1856). 50 William Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, ed. H.L. Mansel and John Veitch, in four volumes, published 1859, 1865 and 1866.

32 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Printing and Circulation of Suggestions for Thought, 1860 Editor: The handwritten papers, with copious crossings out and additions, went to the press in clumps, on 29 December 1859, 5, 13 and 14 Januar y, 24 Febr uary and 15 March 1860.51 The second, and longest, volume went to the printers in May,52 and was apparently still being printed in July. The importance of the work to Nightingale can be seen in the prodigious amount of money, £300, she devoted to its printing—the sum is noted in a letter to her father.53 The material was printed in two formats, one on ‘‘half pages,’’ or with wide margins to permit comment, the other in regular ‘‘octavo’’ book size. Extra copies of both versions were kept, with directions for their disposal on Nightingale’s expected death in 1862. In fact she did not die then and the printed volumes remained with her, probably until her actual death in 1910. They were then taken over, with much other material, by her cousin, Rosalind Nash, who gave copies of the regular book volumes to selected libraries.54 In 1860 Nightingale asked four people for their comments on the printed text. First of all she asked her friend and collaborator, Sir John McNeill, who got his copy in May. McNeill was medically trained, a Christian believer and a collaborator on social reform matters, but not, in short, either a philosopher or theologian. His appreciation of the originality of the work, and its possible interest in a later age, is quite different from the other comments she received. Next Nightingale sought the advice of two experts, one theological in the person of Benjamin Jowett, the other the agnostic philosopher J.S. Mill, neither of whom she then knew. The intermediar y with Jowett was her friend Arthur Hugh Clough,55 with Mill a fellow ‘‘sani-

51 Add Mss 45837 ff34 and 90; 45838 ff119, 93 and 322, and 45839 f1, respectively. 52 Letter to Samuel Smith 30 May 1860, Add Mss 45792 f118. 53 Letter 23 January 1862, Add Mss 45790 f245. 54 There are copies at Girton College (pages uncut), the London Library, Nottingham University Library, New York Public Library, Yale Medical Center and the Columbia University Presbyterian Hospital School of Nursing, as well as at the British Library and the Florence Nightingale Museum. 55 Arthur Hugh Clough, secretar y of the Nightingale Fund Council and spouse of Nightingale’s cousin, Blanche Smith.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 33

tarian,’’ Edwin Chadwick. Jowett became a lifelong friend and collaborator on many issues, and also, in effect, her personal priest, for he regularly brought her communion at home. Mill also became a friend, although through correspondence only, and a collaborator on public health issues.56 Nightingale also sent the manuscript to Christian and Frances von Bunsen,57 family friends, who had returned to Prussia (he had been Pr ussian minister in England and was a much-published author). However it seems that neither provided any comments. Nightingale’s letter to the Bunsens was addressed to Baroness Bunsen (she often wrote to the wife when she knew both): M Bunsen wrote to me some year and a half ago—he wished I would do something besides ‘‘army regulations.’’ I have written Suggestions, etc., which I enclose to you—because they are really only for his eyes and yours. If you think it will bore him to see them (the Suggestions), etc., or a bore to him not to let anyone else see them, please send them me back without letting even Mrs Schwabe58 know what they are. (She thinks they are Crimean experiences.) If you think it would interest him a moment to look at them, I have had them printed on half margin, on purpose for his remarks, if he ever feels inclined to make any upon the margin. (They, the Suggestions, will probably never be published, certa i n ly not during my life.) ever my dear Mme Bunsen’s most faithful and loving Florence Nightingale59

Nor it seems did Nightingale receive anything of substance from her father or from Arthur Hugh Clough. Clough recorded his observations of the composition process from discussions with Nightingale. Notes in 1859 show that he and Nightingale discussed her reading of Edgar Quinet, ‘‘notably volume 4 of his works,Mes idées,’’60 and J.S. Mill: ‘‘the 56 See Public Health Care (6:418-19). 57 Christian von Bunsen (1791-1860) and Frances von Bunsen (c1791-1876); it was through them that Nightingale first heard of Kaiserswerth, and they encouraged her to visit it. 58 Julie Schwabe (1818-96), a German-born friend, Unitarian, philanthropist with whom Nightingale later worked on aid in the Franco-Prussian War. 59 Letter to Frances von Bunsen 18 August 1860, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preussischer Kulturbesitz. 60 Edgar Quinet, Histoire de mes idées.

34 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought two men who had the true belief about God’s laws.’’ There is a note that ‘‘the English like power not liberty.’’61 However, there is no extant material to indicate that Clough gave any comments of his own. The longer exchanges with McNeill, Jowett and Mill have been given separate subsections in this introduction.

Exchanges with Sir John McNeill, 1860 Source: From a letter to Sir John McNeill, Florence Nightingale Museum (LMA) H1/ST/NC3/SU130, typed copy Add Mss 45768 ff112-13

17 May 1860 I sent you by post yesterday a packet which will puzzle you. Do you remember (I am sure you do not but I do) a conversation we had some three years age at your house about religions one evening? Eight years ago, I had a large and very curious acquaintance among the operatives of the north of England and among those of what are called Holyoake’s party62 in London. The most thinking and conscientious of our enormous artisan population appeared to me to have no religion at all. I then wrote the first part of what I have ventured to send you, without the least idea of ever publishing it. It was read in manuscript by some of them. The conversation I had with you awakened all my thoughts of the artisans. And, about 11⁄2 years ago, I wrote the second part (‘‘Man’s Will and God’s Law’’) in the packet sent you. Till this last spring I never thought for a moment of printing it. But just now I have had six copies done, of which I send you one. No one knows of it, and, till after my death, I would never have it published, certainly not with my name. My reason for sending it you is to ask you, should the subject interest you enough, to be so good as to say, at your leisure, whether you think after my death it would be at all useful among the ‘‘atheist’’ operatives, as they are called. Believe me, ever sincerely and gratefully yours Florence Nightingale I need not say that the half margin is made to be written on, if you will be so good as to write any remarks of yours upon it. F.N.

61 Notes 2 and 4 March 1859, Wellcome Ms 7204/2 and 3. 62 George Jacob Holyoake (1817-1906), leader of the group who met as ‘‘The Literar y and Scientific Institution’’ in the 1840s (Cook, The Life of Florence Nightingale 1:119-20).

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 35

Editor: McNeill replied promptly to the first instalment: The work is not one which any honest man will pretend to judge of at a glance. It requires careful and deliberate perusal and thoughtful consideration. I shall not venture therefore to say more at present than that I like what I have seen of it very much, and I have dipped in here and there at random as is my wont—just to catch some notion of the tome. . . . When I have examined it more carefully I shall let you know what may occur to me regarding it.63 Source: From a letter to Sir John McNeill, Florence Nightingale Museum (LMA) H1/ST/NC3/SU133, typed copy Add Mss 45768 f118

29 August 1860 I send you parts second and third of the religious ‘‘stuff’’ (confidential), of which I sent you the first part some time ago. I don’t expect you to read it. I am afraid you will be terrified at the bulk of it, but I could not refrain from sending you what (the printing of it at least) was the result of a conversation with you, an untoward and undesirable result, I am afraid you will say, when you see it. . . . Mr and Mrs Clough are going north on Thursday (tomorrow) for their holiday. They will be at Edinburgh on Wednesday the 5th, at the Caledonian Hotel in Prince’s Street, opposite the Castle. I have persuaded them (they are shy) to call upon you, and they are good enough to bring for me a little offering to my own peculiar ‘‘godson,’’ your younger grandchild,64 and the printed ‘‘stuff.’’ Source: From a letter of Sir John McNeill to Nightingale, Add Mss 45768 ff 120-23

31 August 1860 Do not doubt that I shall read with deep attention what you are sending me confidentially. . . . I doubt whether it is now in such a form as to be extensively studied by the classes for whose use and benefit it is chiefly designed, but I do not doubt that it is a mine which will one day be worked by many hands, and that much precious metal will be drawn from it. I know that amongst the more intelligent of the artizan classes are to be found men of large capacity—profound thinkers capable of mastering abstruse subjects, and it may be that some of them might be fit exponents to their fellows of the views which you

63 McNeill letter to Nightingale 18 May 1860, Add Mss 45768 ff114-15. 64 Archibald Stewart, who died in infancy the next year.

36 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought advance, but my experience of the masses leads me to believe that, with rare exceptions, they are mere imitators, and that even when they reject dogmatic teaching they do so in imitation of someone else, and thus only substitute one set of dogmas for another. When I speak of the masses I by no means confine myself to workingmen—I include the wealthier as well as the less wealthy. With rare exceptions all are following some leader—believing on the authority of someone’s dictum. And there may arise men who will extract from your pages the dicta which their disciples will be required to accept and believe. But until such exponents are at work I do not think that any system of religion or of morals can be made to exercise any practical influence on the masses. The time may come when the rational and intelligible will be accepted in religion but, so far as I can see, that time is yet distant with reference to the great bulk of our people. They love mystery and are apt to think meanly of what their reason fully comprehends and, above all, they are cold in their feelings towards any teaching that does not make strong and even extravagant appeals to the imagination. In England it may be different, but in this country, which I know better, I think that I am not mistaken in believing that it is through the imagination rather than through the reason that the masses are influenced, especially in matters of religion. . . . [But] the time may come when these [rational views] will prevail. When that time comes—though neither you nor I may see it—what you have written will be reverted to and commented upon and will find fitting exponents as well as bitter assailants. Editor: Nightingale referred again to the material in a long letter to McNeill about what she was going to do after the completion of the royal commission on India (which pointedly included not interfering in actual nursing work in hospitals): I have thought of occupying myself among the artisans of the east of London this September and October and next autumn (if I live so long) in the way of teaching those printed Suggestions, which you were so good as to read (which Mr Clough took to you). And if I could be there hidden, so much the better for me.65

65 Letter 21 August 1861, Add Mss 45907D.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 37

Exchanges with Benjamin Jowett, from 1860 Editor: Arthur Hugh Clough, who had been a fellow at Balliol College and knew Benjamin Jowett, then professor of Greek, later master of the college, was a suitable emissary. It is evident from Jowett’s first response that either he did not know that the writer was Nightingale (the references are to ‘‘your friends’’) or considered the work to be a joint work. Certainly Mar y Smith, Clough’s mother-in-law, was closely involved in the work, and Samuel Smith had at least some, lesser, connection, too. One might imagine that Clough would have known about their involvement. Jowett obviously provided extensive comments on the printed texts themselves, as other references indicate. Nightingale kept them, but it seems that they were destroyed ( Jowett ordered that his papers be destroyed after his death and vast quantities were). Nine letters to Nightingale herself have substantive comments on Suggestions.66 As well there are comments in his letters to Clough, immediately below. Although the comments must have frustrated Nightingale, they were over whelmingly warm and admiring. Jowett was impressed and intrigued, but he wanted clarifications in many places, and overall a better, tighter organization—all quite reasonable concerns. He noted that the book was ‘‘full of antagonisms,’’ both to those who believed more, and to those who believed less (see p 39 below). Again, this is a fair comment. He suggested remedies, in the last case of softening her remarks. Source: From two letters of Benjamin Jowett to Arthur Hugh Clough, Add Mss 45795 ff19-23

22 July [1860] I thought I understood that your friends wished me to write to you about the papers which they entrusted to me. I know that they do not want compliments and therefore I shall not offer them. I must, however, say that their work appears to me to be of remarkable metaphysical and dialectical power. Nothing that I have read for a long time has suggested to me so many thoughts. I hardly know how to set about the ungracious task of criticism. Shall I offer a few remarks (they will excuse the want of connection), first on the style and form, and secondly on the subject?

66 See Vincent Quinn and John Prest, eds., Dear Miss Nightingale: A Selection of Benjamin Jowett’s Letters to Florence Nightingale 1860-1893 #1-6, 8-9 and 11; several later letters come back to the issue of revision and publication (#53, 254 and 337).

38 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 1. To give full effect to these papers they require to be rewritten. Each sentence and each paragraph is very clear and forcible, but I often found a difficulty in following the connection through a whole section. Writings on metaphysical subjects require to be ver y severely put together, or else what is quite clear to the mind of the writer is hazy to the reader. I say this (excuse the egotism of referring to it) from experience of the charges which my friends often justly make against what I write myself. It appears to me (in a certain sense) to be a work of art to express philosophical or theological ideas when they are not merely the received saws of the day so that they may be understood. 2. In a few places these appeared to me a tract of passion (shall I say?), which weakened the form of what was said. Feeling there should be, for feeling is the only language which many can understand. But I thought that here and there I traced some degree of irritation in the tone. I hardly like to notice it, for it is probably only the unavoidable weakness of illness, which always impairs the power of expression much more than the power of mind or thought. 3. With a view to the working classes, it struck me that it would be better to break the papers up into a series of tracts, also perhaps to omit the headings at the beginning. And generally, throughout, to keep quite distinctly in view what the intelligent artizans are capable of understanding. Shall I venture also on a few remarks about the subject? I agree entirely with the writers of the book in thinking (a) that religion must be a thing of the present and not of the past if it is to exist at all; and (b) that the idea of law is the foundation of all worthy notions of God; also (c) that the idea of law, although often confounded with extremist necessity, is really in no way inconsistent with the free agency of finite beings. I am doubtful whether the first of these points is sufficiently worked out. The great question of all is a future life, which I gather to be deduced from the progress of the world towards perfection, by an argument which is similar in character to that of Butler67 respecting the incipient tendencies of things in this life. But the question has so near an interest to me and the void left by giving up or not insisting on the external fact of the resurrection of Christ so great that I think it needs to be treated more fully.

67 Samuel Butler (1774-1839), theologian and bishop of Lichfield.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 39

(b) I thought that the argument from a law to a legislator was too much dwelt upon, also that the conception of ‘‘the will and purpose of the Divine Being’’ was used too literally and absolutely. Imagine Spinoza68 reasoning against the first of those: would he not have said, and could we deny, that here is a figure of speech? The Legislator is an individual who can be defined by many characteristics: time, place, consciousness, character of mind. But God is universal; neither the law nor the individual who made the law and continues to exist apart from it, but infinitely extended through all law. I should be inclined to look for some meeting point of theism and pantheism rather than to oppose them. It must be remembered that pantheism has a great many senses from the highest idealism or spiritualism, down to the lowest fetishism or materialism. When we clear away figures of speech which imply succession of time or separation of place, monotheism and pantheism are not so distant as they appear in the common opposition of language or logic. They seem to me also so opposed more nearly than divines allow in the language of scripture (‘‘Then shall the Son also give up the kingdom and he shall put all things under him that God may be all and in all.’’) I don’t agree with, I feel this. The writers must expect that it will be bitterly attacked. And this is a reason not for withholding it but for making it as complete and forcible as possible. [9 August 1860] I send the first thirty-two pages of the Suggestions with a number of notes. (I will go on with them from time to time if they are thought to be of any use.) I do not expect the criticisms to be followed, but it appeared to me that they would be no good unless I said freely what I thought, whether right or wrong. I think it is absolutely necessary that the book should have some regular plan . . . [or the] quest from which there is in particular passages will be lost. . . . I do not know in what state of health the writer of the paper is likely to be. You can show the remarks or not just as you think best. The book appears to me to be too full of antagonisms to those who believe more and to those who believe less. Perhaps these could be softened.

68 Benedict Spinoza (1632-77), philosopher; for Nightingale’s views on him see Society and Politics (5:631-38).

40 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Editor: A few months later Jowett sent back ‘‘another packet’’ of the papers, with the comment that: On reading them again, after six weeks’ interval, I retain the same impression of form and originality. But they appear to me to be too emphatic, ecstatic and positive in style. . . . I wish it were possible that the subject could be made the study of a life. The writer has abundance of power, but intensity and calmness can only be acquired by long pondering of these subjects on many sides. I do not expect that my annotations can be of much use, but I send them gladly.69

Samuel Smith late in 1860 wrote Nightingale that they (he and Aunt Mai) had gone through Jowett’s comments, of which some are practical (worth attending to), but on the whole I will say that, on recurring to the text, we felt increased satisfaction with it, and that Jowett does not on the main subjects criticize with sufficient grasp of mind. Far from thinking your letter to him ‘‘all jaw,’’ we think it very easy, vigorous and much to the purpose. I do not think that anything we had written (and on the subject of ‘‘free will’’ we had, unfortunately, written a great deal).70

In this letter also Nightingale’s uncle passed on his wife’s objections on a theological point concerning the abbess of the Convent of Port Royal, Mère Angélique Arnauld (1591-1661). Again this suggests, if not participation in the drafting, his familiarity with the content. Again in 1862, Jowett asked Nightingale about publication of the material. This prompted an extensive reply from Nightingale about the original motivation for the analysis, now from the point of view of her current standpoint. Source: From a typed copy of a letter to Benjamin Jowett, Add Mss 45783 ff1-13

[July 1862] You are so good as to inquire after the ‘‘stuff.’’ There has been nothing done to it (or about it) since you heard of it last. My War Office life is drawing to a close71 and then, if I have any life left, I shall turn

69 Letter of Benjamin Jowett to Clough 14 October [1860], in Frederick L. Mulhauser, ed., The Correspondence of Arthur Hugh Clough 2:579. 70 Letter of Samuel Smith to Nightingale [late 1860], Add Mss 45792 ff123-25. 71 A reference to the death of Sidney Herbert in 1861, when he was secretar y for war and Nightingale’s chief ally in getting reforms through government.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 41

to the ‘‘stuff,’’ and if I do anything with it, it will be owing to your encouragement. . . . If I were what I was eight years ago, I would have a workingmen’s children’s school, like Mr Ellis’s, but, unlike his, to teach them all the laws of nature (known) upon this principle, that it is a religious act to clean out a gutter and to prevent cholera, and that it is not a religious act to pray (in the sense of asking). I have such a strong feeling that he who founds a soldiers’ club (to keep them out of vice) is doing more than he who teaches abstract religious truth, that I would not teach ‘‘the stuff’’ if I could do anything else practical, but I can’t now. Why I think of the workingman is that I would not try to call anybody out of any church or sect. Because I do not believe that any organization entailing any practical duty on men is better than none. This is not to say that I consider the stuff a pis aller [last resort], inasfar as it lays a grain of truth about the character of God that surely has immeasurably more importance than anything else. I speak for myself: if it were not for the character of God I should shirk work. I could not go on for the sake of mankind doing the immeasurably little I can for them, if I did not believe myself part of a plan by which God is doing immeasurably much for them. If I did not believe that God’s plan intended the ultimate perfection of every human being, that if one of His laws were different from what it is, ever y individual on whom these laws seem to bear so hardly now would be less happy in eternity than he will be, I could not work. For other wise it would seem as if I had been trying to work for God and He to thwart my work (I have often told Him so). He brought about the most extraordinar y combination, one which could hardly ever happen again, by which a woman obtains all the practical knowledge of army organization, and a secretar y of state is willing not only to listen to her, but to devote every instant of five years to it—and He breaks this up. It is not on the temporary grief of separation, even supposing this to rise to any dreadful consequence you may imagine, that I wish to dwell; it is upon the physical and moral welfare of half a million of men put back by this event. Now nothing but a study of the character of God could make one think that still one’s little work was part of the infinite plan to bring everyone to perfect happiness, and that His is the only plan by which it can be effected. Therefore I think the study of His character must always be of the first importance to all. I hope you will be able to understand me if you get so far. I lose my own

42 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought thread because I cannot now hold my pen for more than a few minutes at a time, but I always am, believe me, yours most gratefully and ever lovingly F.N. I would not be supposed to mean that the cleaning out the gutters is to be all our religious acts. [missing words] might be some manifestation of our feelings towards our Creator, some religious ‘‘ser vice,’’ in short whether a form of religious service I know not. I am sure I do not want any dissenting minister I ever heard to express out of his own head my feeling towards my Creator. I am sure that it is a dangerous mistake the taking merely the negative, as my dear Clough did72 (though it was not dangerous to him), namely, not going to church, because you don’t like to hear that said to God without settling what should be said to God. I don’t want the ‘‘stuff’’ to enter anyone’s mind without its having for a result to settle what to say to God, and I am sure I cannot do this, at least not for others. I don’t want the ‘‘stuff’’ to enter anyone’s mind without improving his life. I always recur to the working religious orders as being the only people who have said: that is what we think God says to us; we are going to do it. Now the only satisfactory result of this (or of any) ‘‘stuff,’’ would be to do something like that. The most religious mind I ever knew was that of a Roman Catholic reverend mother,73 who was so good as to go out with me to the Crimea. After we came home I found her one day cleaning out a gutter with her own hands. I know she did it on no theor y. I think she had much better have employed a man to do it, but that is what I mean by a true idea of religious life, and she the only Roman Catholic, too, I have ever known who never tried to correct me. But this (forming a religious organization) is just what I am not able to do, and therefore I have so little heart about the ‘‘stuff.’’ I do not understand the words freedom of thought (1) because I don’t see how anyone can prevent my thought being free they can prevent my speaking or acting; (2) because I don’t know what good they could do me when they have ‘‘granted’’ freedom of thought, if freedom is the power of me over me, my thought is a very small portion of me; (3) I dislike the phrase freedom of thought altogether—

72 A.H. Clough became an agnostic. 73 Mar y Clare Moore (1814-74), for correspondence with her see Theology (3:276-98).

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 43

freedom to think what is untrue I don’t want, freedom to seek of tr uth is the thing, and all the phrases, liberty, of private judgment, etc., encourage a fatal mistake, namely, that there is no absolute truth to be sought with all our might, to be found not by the efforts of one, but of all. I don’t want freedom to think my thoughts but freedom (or rather power) to find God’s thought. Editor: Jowett’s letter to Nightingale thanked her for the second and third portions of the ‘‘stuff,’’ and ventured ‘‘to add the epithet ‘precious.’ ’’ He had ‘‘found great pleasure and interest in reading your work,’’ offering to ‘‘do anything that I can for you at any time.’’ He thought that the work would ‘‘give great offence and at the same time be of real use.’’ His suggestions, and he gave a number of specifics, were to ‘‘add to the effect of what is said.’’ He even asked Nightingale to consider writing two or three pages at the end of the Cassandra section, or elsewhere, ‘‘of what the reviewers will probably say of the speculations of these papers about society.’’ Finally, he counselled: ‘‘do not let Cassandra die, but live and declare the works of God.’’74 It seems that Nightingale in 1865 asked Jowett to undertake the editing of the papers, which he declined, explaining that he did not think the papers, ‘‘unless greatly altered,’’ would do her or her opinions ‘‘justice.’’ He suggested an alternative, that she write a series of shorter essays or memoranda or, if she could not, to ‘‘extend what she wrote anyway to him and Julius Mohl.’’ They could decide later if the material would be published or not, or it could be published anonymously, even under the name of a member of a family. Jowett did not want ‘‘so much good and earnest thought being lost, or of no memorial of your life remaining for the encouragement of others.’’75 Jowett returned to the question of publication of the ‘‘stuff’’ in the 1880s, now, oddly enough, with a view to Nightingale’s sister doing the editing, along with a biography. This was not a wholly preposterous idea for Parthenope Verney was then editing the Verney papers and had published a number of periodical articles. Jowett’s (hard-toread) letter to Parthenope Verney states:

74 Quinn and Prest, eds., Dear Miss Nightingale #3 p 4. Jowett gave further detailed comments in a letter [23 July 1861], in Quinn and Prest, eds., Dear Miss Nightingale #6 pp 7-8. 75 Letter 24 April [1865], in Quinn and Prest, eds., Dear Miss Nightingale #65.

44 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought It occurs to me to offer you a suggestion for a book, when you have finished the arrangement of the Verney papers:76 it is the life of your sister on earth. . . . I think that a life of her should be written and who of the generation which is contemporary. . . . [has the] necessar y knowledge . . . and [would be able] to understand her remarkable character? She once spoke to me on the subject; she said that she supposed her life would be written and that, if it was, she wished us to take care that the printed writing, which she used to call ‘‘stuff,’’ was not published indiscriminately. (My own impression is that this meant use could be made of it.) This was almost twenty years ago; she has never returned to the subject since.

Jowett ended with the (prudent) suggestion that if Lady Verney did undertake this work, ‘‘it might be done without her [Nightingale’s] knowledge.’’ He then asked that she not mention it to Nightingale as his suggestion, or ‘‘if you must’’ to let him, Jowett, communicate it.77

Exchanges with John Stuart Mill Editor: Nightingale’s cor respondence with Mill, which began with Sug-

gestions, went on to general issues of the status of women, and women in medicine in particular.78 Her first letter to Mill asked him if he ‘‘would consent to read a religious work confidentially’’ and return it ‘‘with your remarks,’’ for which purpose, she explained, she had had the material printed on ‘‘half margin.’’ She gave as her purpose the need to bring religion to the artisans of the north of England and London, from having learned by contact with them that ‘‘they were without any religion whatever, though diligently seeking after one, principally in Comte and his school’’ (5:373). The material was sent in sections and Mill responded to each. As to the ‘‘desirableness of its being published, I have no difficulty in giving it strongly in the affirmative,’’ he said. He went on in some detail as to their differences, but clearly considered the work ‘‘calculated to do good to many persons besides the artisans to whom it is more especially addressed’’ (5:376). When the second lot arrived he declared

76 Memoirs of the Verney Family during the Civil War, finished in fact by Margaret Verney. 77 Letter of Benjamin Jowett Christmas Day [1887?], Claydon Trust, Verney Papers. 78 In Society and Politics (5:369-86).

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 45

himself even more desirous that it should be published, and would have been ‘‘ver y sorry to miss the sequel of your book.’’ He went so far as to say that he had ‘‘seldom felt less inclined to criticize than in reading this book,’’ again noting specific philosophical differences (5:380-81). A later note he made gave permission to publish the correspondence between them, ‘‘but not unless and until the manuscript to which it relates shall have been published,’’ and, if published anonymously, the name ‘‘must of course be suppressed’’ (5:382). Nightingale used Mill’s definition of empirical laws early on in Suggestions for Thought, although without giving the source (see p 68 below). Mill himself profited from reading Suggestions for Thought on the painful limits to women’s lives when he wrote The Subjection of Women, published in 1869. He sent Nightingale a copy, which she read and marked. She wrote ‘‘bravo’’ in the margin next to his statement ‘‘Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our law. There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every house.’’79 There is a complimentar y reference to Suggestions for Thought on the point of women having to do their work at ‘‘odd moments,’’ with the hope that the book, by a ‘‘celebrated woman,’’ would be published.80 A letter to her father in 1864 records Nightingale’s disagreement with Mill’s comments on the ‘‘stuff.’’ She was objecting to a point her father had made, which to explain, she said, ‘‘I must write again the whole of my ‘stuff,’ which you have (printed) by you to answer Mill. And, if experience were exactly the contrary of what it is, then J.S.M.’s letters would be worth attending to.’’81 Most of Nightingale’s letters to her father on theology show her to be much more the believer than he, and indeed an ardent defender of the Bible.82 Correspondence with her aunt shows that Nightingale continued to disagree substantially with Mill’s approach to her work, while admitting some points. A letter in 1873 to her friend Mme Mohl (1793-1883), spouse of Julius Mohl, while touching on several subjects, revisits the differences with Mill on the publication of his Autobiography, shortly after his death in 1873.

79 Copy at the archives of Girton College, Cambridge, with underlinings, comment at p 147. 80 J.S. Mill, The Subjection of Women 75. 81 Letter 5 November [1864], Add Mss 45790 f329. 82 See Theology (3:358-91).

46 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Source: Florence Nightingale letter to Mary Clarke Mohl, in E.T. Cook, The Life of Florence Nightingale 2:316

19 December [1873] You asked me what Mill’s Autobiography was like, and as it is a book impossible to describe, I send it to you. I think it almost the most curious and interesting of modern books I ever read, but curious just as much for its nonsense as for its sense. I should think the account he gives of his intellectual and moral growth from the age of three quite unique: quite as singular as if a man were able to describe all his anatomy and physiology in a state of growth from the time he was three. But quite, quite as extraordinar y as this is his own stupidity in not seeing that very many of his moral and intellectual, and especially of his religious opinions, were fixed inalterably for him by the process he underwent, so that all his reasoning afterwards upon them was unreasoning, fixed as much beyond his power to change, or even to see that a change was desirable or possible, as the eyes of a man who becomes stone-blind in his youth, or the right arm of a man who is paralyzed on that side, or, etc. He has written me pages and pages, which I never could understand—from a man so able—till I read his Autobiography, that, there being laws was no proof of there being a Law-giver, that if evil were to produce good, there ought to be more of it! Then, you see, he says in his book that his wife83 was to be applauded, because she had thrown aside the ‘‘monstrous superstition’’ that this world could be made on the best possible design for perfecting good through evil! x x And I still think the Autobiography, its high tone, its disinterested nobility of feeling and love of mankind, one of the most inspiring (modern) books I know. But then please to remember: when Mill left the India Office he might most materially have helped all my sanitary commissions, irrigation and civilizing schemes for India. He did nothing. He was quite incapable of understanding anything but schemes on paper, correspondence, the literary office aspect, in short, for India. As for that jargon about the ‘‘inspiration’’ coming from ‘‘woman,’’84 I really am incapable of conceiving its meaning, if it has any at all. I am sure that my part in administration has been the very reverse of ‘‘inspiration’’: it has been the fruit of dogged work, of hard experi-

83 Harriet Taylor Mill (1807-58), co-author of part of Principles of Political Economy. 84 Mill acknowledged the enormous contribution of his wife to key ideas, although the actual writing was his.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 47

ence and observation, such as few men have undergone, correcting by close detail work the errors of men which came from what I suppose is called their ‘‘inspiration,’’ what I should call their theory without practical knowledge or patient personal experience. Source: Undated notes on J.S. Mill and law, Add Mss 45837 ff16-17

I think, in defining law, I confused the two meanings of the words which, if we come to think what we do mean when we use the word in common parlance, we shall find that we attach to it. When we use the word law, in reference to physical things/Nature, we simply mean to generalize. There is nothing more, absolutely no other meaning in the word—law is not a sequence, nor a cause, nor a reason, nor a power, but simply a generalization. For instance, the law of gravitation or categorization of a number of phenomena. To say that a stone must fall because of the law of attraction, i.e., that one stone must fall to the ground because another does, or because the earth is attracted by the sun, is simply absurd. The law of gravitation is merely a general formula, embracing all these facts. But law has another meaning in our minds and we confuse the two. This other has a compelling meaning. Thou shalt do no murder which means, If thou doest murder, such and such consequence shall follow. But this has obviously quite a different meaning from the other. Murders are done and the consequences do follow. But stones do not not fall to the ground. It is not, If thou dost not attract the earth, such and such consequences will follow. The law is simply an expression of a fact. The sun attracts the earth, the stone falls to the ground, and our law is the expression of all these facts in one. If we could have two words to signify these two very different things, it would be desirable—meanwhile it is important to keep in mind that the word has two meanings. We must not say, This law cannot be broken, that can—there is no generalizing the two kinds of law in one—excepting in this way. Both are expressions of the thought of God. It is obvious that the physical law is nothing but the unvarying thought or will. There is no cause—none but His will. The second kind of laws might almost be called a deduction from the first—secondar y laws. In this way, Thou shalt not cast thy child into the lake simply means—not a fact but if thou castest thy child into the lake the law of gravitation will be there, the child will fall. This fact will become ranged among the other facts. Thus there are two definitions of the word ‘‘law,’’ first an intention or will in a conscious intelligent Being, and, second, a generalization

48 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought of facts. To talk of a law, in this latter sense, as coercive is the mistake which, it would seem, has led all the materialists so far afield. The statement of a law is no explanation of the facts—it is merely a general expression of them. Newton85 did not explain the Universe—he simply expressed it under a formula. The ‘‘law’’ of the legislators of England, again, is quite a different thing and ought to be called by quite a different word—that is no statement of facts. I think that perhaps we confuse the word ‘‘law’’ and the word ‘‘power.’’ Law is not the power of God. The law cannot make the stone fall, is not the cause of the stone falling. It is the expression of the Power which makes the stone fall.

Plans for the Disposal of Suggestions for Thought, 1862 Editor: In 1862, when Nightingale thought she was dying, she wrote the following instructions to her father, to be placed in her will. Source: From instructions for W.E. Nightingale, Add Mss 45790 ff248-29

2 Febr uary 1862 I leave to Aunt Mai and Papa the little trunk (once belonging to Miss Coape) which contains the copies of the ‘‘stuff,’’ annotated by Mr Jowett and Mr Mill in pencil, with their letters, etc., upon it. Also the stack of (half-bound) copies of ‘‘stuff.’’ I should greatly have wished that it could have been revised and ar ranged according to the hints of Jowett and Mill, but without altering the spirit according to their principles, with which I entirely disagree. But he who would have done this is gone [A.H. Clough]. I think however that some errors pointed out in these pencil notes (as, e.g., Mill says that Descartes86 is misrepresented and Jowett that the Stoics are so) might be taken out of the ‘‘stuff’’ in a revision, without giving anyone much trouble. M Mohl would be a capital advisor, if he would consent. Florence Nightingale

85 Isaac Newton (1642-1727), in Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. 86 René Descartes (1596-1650), philosopher of dualism.

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 49 Source: From a letter to Samuel Smith, Add Mss 45793 f2

9 Febr uary 1862 (About the ‘‘stuff’’) you know about. Alas! it was to have been given to Clough. It would be a great relief to me to know that, whenever I die, these things will be attended to.

Nightingale’s Revised Views on Determinism, 1872 Editor: In 1872 when Nightingale became acquainted with new scientific material about the genetic influences on character, she revisited the issue of determinism with her aunt. A letter explains that the ‘‘facts which Quetelet’s book (which I have) indicate, modify—indeed transmogrify—the whole of our theory—of what you and I have talked so much about, about fathers and mothers, about God’s plan in creating their children in creating mankind.’’ She went on to discuss the work of eugenicist Francis Galton on blood relationships, as showing the physical basis of character, in inherited qualities from ‘‘progenitors.’’87 A second and more vehement letter setting out Nightingale’s change of views is reproduced here. Source: From a letter/draft/copy to Mary Shore Smith, Add Mss 45793 ff208-14

25 August 1872 Calling the order of nature a sufficient account of its cause. I have no doubt you read Dr Carpenter’s speech.88 Is not the latter part of it marked in red a remarkably good putting of the metaphysical error in which are so many at the present day? It seems to me that to revolve round a metaphysical formula/idea without ever developing it into the innumerable laws which, if it is true at all, are the only true expressions of it is simply the bar to all progress. (You object to the word metaphysical; I am quite willing to change it. Metaphysical is the operation of reflecting upon one’s own consciousness. Say what word you please, ‘‘an intellectual conception.’’ You object to the word law. I am quite willing to change it. It is a matter of absolute indifference whether when I say: sewer gas breeds typhoid fever; purify your water and you remove cholera. I call these sanitary laws or sanitary anything else.) But what I contend is that if, during these nineteen years, I had gone on repeating ‘‘laws of sanitary reform will obviate all disease,’’ without

87 Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911), correspondence in Society and Politics (5:578). 88 William Benjamin Carpenter (1813-85), as president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

50 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought discovering the laws, I should not only not have been promoting progress, I should have been absolutely preventing it. That ‘‘sanitar y reform prevents disease’’ or ‘‘the observance of sanitar y tr uths or laws prevents disease’’ is a formula, a metaphysical idea, that is, an idea of my own mind, evolved out of my consciousness as it were. It is only what I think. But if I proceed to say what these truths, what these laws are, then it ceases to be a mere metaphysical formula, and it becomes a living truth. 1. When I talk with positivists, it appears to me that they have not a leg to stand upon. Their more than flimsy metaphysical formulae, as ‘‘Everything is governed by laws,’’ which is true, but they never get any further. It remains a formula as ‘‘we have no faculties to enable us to apprehend God,’’ which is not only not true but is absolutely absurd, the fact being that we have no one more intimately present to (every one of ) us or more constantly present than God. Then they expect me to believe in their Dr Congreve89 (of whose existence I have no proof ), and not to believe in God. When they come to their duke of Somersetting, only my excessive civility prevents me from laughing. 2. But it does not appear to me that to say ‘‘ever-increasing evidence shows us that by the laws or order of a perfect Being we are all of us approaching to perfection, directly or indirectly’’ (though this is true) is at all less of a mere metaphysical formula than what the positivists use. Metaphysical is what I think. This is only what I think, unless I show the evidence, the laws one by one, the paths to perfection by which we are being led. As to the ‘‘ever-increasing evidence,’’ it appears to be nothing but the ‘‘ever-increasing’’ number of mornings in which I have thought this before getting out of bed. (I do not say there is not ‘‘evidence.’’ On the contrary, no one believes the above proposition as I do. I only say that to repeat the formula is not to give evidence.) 3. It appears to me that St Teresa90 did exactly what the positivist does (though there can be no two people more unlike), exactly what we do. She worked herself into a rapture over an idea of her own consciousness: there is a God, exactly as the positivists work themselves into a rapture over there is no God, exactly as you work yourself into a rapture over there is a per fect God. Neither they, nor we, nor Mr

89 Richard Congreve (1818-99), former clergyman, who became a positivist leader and translator of Comte’s books on positivism. 90 Teresa of Avila (1515-82); for Nightingale’s comments on her see Mysticism and Eastern Religions (4:66-70).

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 51

Jowett, nor any have ever gone on to find what are the laws or paths or order by which He is leading each of us to perfection, or by which the moral world is governed at all, though the word ‘‘law’’ is now in everyone’s mouth. And this, it seems, is what is wanted. When Emerson91 goes into a rapture over the ‘‘feast of law,’’ I go into a rage. It is as if I had gone into a rapture over ‘‘there is sanitar y law’’ all these nineteen years and left all India, all the Crimea, all the British Army at home, all the American Army to die of fever and cholera. People who go on about ‘‘God governing by law,’’ or ‘‘the moral world being all law,’’ etc., without finding out or attempting to find out the laws which are to save us, but stopping at the formula, also seem to me to be leaving the world to die of (moral) fever and cholera. Or as if, when I was starving, they offered me not bread but the formula that ‘‘bread is the staff of life.’’ Yet nothing can be more practical than if we were to go on finding out these laws, nothing more impractical than sticking at the formula.

Why Nightingale Did Not Publish Suggestions for Thought Editor: The secondary literature on the subject would have us believe that Nightingale was discouraged from publication by the people who commented on the work for her.92 The correspondence with these readers, however, shows a much more complicated set of reasons. Some obvious ones are that there were people who were dear to her who would have been hurt by her comments—her parents, certainly, for her revealing portrayal of unhappy family life, or at least unhappy to the daughter who wanted to devote her life to useful service. There are unflattering remarks about Harriet Martineau’s co-published work with Henr y Atkinson, yet Martineau became a valued collaborator with Nightingale on practical issues (the two cheerfully agreed to disagree on points of contention). Nightingale’s dismissal of, or flagrant rewriting of, Dr Sutherland’s views would have been all too obvious if she had published Suggestions for Thought, he her most dedicated collaborator. Both McNeill and Jowett warned Nightingale of ‘‘bitter’’ attacks if the work were published. Jowett, however, called this ‘‘not a reason for withholding . . . but for making it as complete and forcible as pos-

91 Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82), transcendental author. 92 As well as those noted in footnote 1 above, see Hartil, Florence Nightingale: Letters and Reflections 31.

52 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought sible’’ (see pp 36 and 39 above). Calabria and Macrae suggest that if Suggestions for Thought had been published at the time, it would have joined the list of books that ‘‘rocked the fabric of Christendom and sent believers scuttling for shelter.’’93 It also seems that Nightingale changed her mind on key arguments in Suggestions for Thought, notably on the matter of human liberty and determinism, which make up a substantial part of the work. Her reading of Quetelet was crucial here, and once the question was satisfactorily settled for her there was simply no need for protracted argument. Correspondence with her aunt in 1872 shows Nightingale frankly stating that they were wrong in their earlier views.94 On other matters one might conjecture that Nightingale simply moved on. There is a great deal in Suggestions on what one ought to believe about God and the human being’s obligation to his or her Creator, but abstruse argument declined as a matter of interest to Nightingale. Hospitals, nursing and famine prevention in India took up her time and intellectual powers. Outreach to the unchurched working class, similarly, found other means of expression. Soldiers’ clubs, she argued, did more to prevent vice than the teaching of abstract religious truth (see p 41 above) and, in fact, for decades she promoted soldiers’ and workingmen’s clubs, reading rooms and coffee houses to just that end. Considerable space is given in Suggestions for Thought to determining the proper sphere for prayer, and what it is licit to pray for. If God was all-knowing and unchanging, then prayer in the sense of petition would be futile, Nightingale argued. At one place she even gave details of things she had prayed for, to no avail, and accordingly abandoned the practice of request prayers. Yet a vast amount of later correspondence shows that Nightingale prayed for all kinds of practical matters, and asked others to do so as well, and especially to pray for her. Considerable rewriting would have been required if she were to incorporate her later views and own practices on prayer, quite apart from her views on determinism in general. Nightingale’s views on the paltry role accorded women in English society did not change over time, but again she found other ways to

93 Notably Dar win’s On the Origin of Species; Calabria and Macrae, eds., Suggestions for Thought by Florence Nightingale, citing Basil Willey, Dar win and Butler: Two Versions of Evolution, in their Introduction xxxv. 94 In Society and Politics (5:657).

Introduction to Suggestions for Thought / 53

deal with the problem. The nursing profession to which she gave so much of her energy was a practical outlet for women who wanted, or for financial reasons needed, a job. She supported better education for girls, and the drive for university education, the vote and property rights for adult women. Much of her personal correspondence went to encouraging individual women to pursue their own calling, as is well evident in the correspondence published in Women. Her role in mentoring nurses, especially senior administrators, in America and Europe as well as Britain, is covered in the nursing volumes. Nightingale herself vacillated as to the desirability of publishing Suggestions for Thought. To Frances von Bunsen she said, ‘‘probably never, certa i n ly not during my life’’ (see p 33 above). To Sir John McNeill she seems to have seriously contemplated publication after her death (see p 34 above). Yet she continued to explore publication with Jowett, who certainly encouraged it, albeit with revisions. He offered, more than once, to undertake some form of publication by recasting the work. It seems both shrank from the task of a full-scale revision. McNeill politely doubted whether it was ‘‘now in such a form as to be extensively studied by the classes for whose use and benefit it is chiefly designed,’’ but he thought a time might come when ‘‘the rational and intelligible’’ would be accepted in religion (see p 36 above). Certainly, although she did not publish Suggestions for Thought, Nightingale never lost her interest in the ‘‘moral government of God.’’ A letter to Margaret Verney in 1894 (immediately below) shows this. The occasion was a reference to the historian Samuel Rawson Gardiner, whose ten-volume Histor y of England was published 1884-86. Nightingale took note of his remarks on ‘‘the faith in a divine order in political, in social and in domestic life which has stamped itself indelibly on the English mind.’’95 Evidently she and Gardiner had met, although there are no specifics mentioned in the letter itself. Source: From a letter to Margaret Verney, Wellcome (Claydon copy) Ms 9014/161

27 April 1894 Thanks for mentioning Mr Gardiner. I should so have liked to have seen him whom probably I shall never see again. There was not time for me to get what I wanted from him. I wanted to ask him about the

95 Note, Add Mss 45845 f183.

54 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought moral government of God—the subject I have cared about almost ever since I can remember anything. Is not the great object in studying history to find out what we can about this from it? History is the biography of God. A great friend of mine, Professor Mohl, learnt all the Eastern languages in order to be able to write a Histor y of God. To learn from a man like Mr Gardiner what traces he finds of God’s moral government would be a thing indeed. In this sense God’s moral government or this particular branch of it would mean how He brings good out of evil—evil as an essential of the highest qualities. The eight Beatitudes all presuppose evil. Evil brings its own unavoidable consequences, but these again bring the highest good. He makes use of people the most unlikely. Our own personal recollections, historical facts, all assure us of these things. The marching of Russia in to subdue Hungary (in 1848, was it?) brought about the reform of nursing. The people of England were so furious with Russia for that scandalous act that in 1854 nothing would satisfy them but war with Russia. It was not the ‘‘holy places,’’ it was our rage with Russia that brought about the Crimean War. And it was the Crimean War that brought about the reform of nursing. Mr Gardiner could give the strongest instances out of the Civil War which was for darkness. And out of it came light.

Key to Editing

T

he main source of material for this volume is the Suggestions for Thought, three volumes of manuscripts held at the British Librar y, and some correspondence, most of it from the British Librar y. For the small amount of correspondence see Appendix E: Research Methods and Sources in Life and Family for a description of the process of obtaining and processing letters in manuscript. To avoid use of ‘‘ibid.’’ and ‘‘op. cit.,’’ and to reduce the number of footnotes generally, citations are given at the end of a sequence if the same source is cited more than once. Subsequent citations are noted in the text with the new page or folio number given in parentheses. References to material that appears in earlier volumes of the Collected Works are identified by our title, volume number and page number, rather than the archival source. To make the text as accessible as possible, spelling, punctuation and capitalization have been modernized and standardized, and most abbreviations replaced with full words. British spellings have been maintained and standardized (labour, honour). We have kept Nightingale’s old-fashioned ‘‘farther,’’ by and bye and discrepance, but change ‘‘shew’’ to ‘‘show,’’ ‘‘civilise’’ to ‘‘civilize’’ and ‘‘connexion’’ to ‘‘connection,‘‘ and her occasional abbreviation ‘‘ye’’ to ‘‘the.’’ We maintain Nightingale’s archaic spelling of ‘‘artizan’’ in her own texts, to switch to ‘‘artisan’’ in editorial notes. The electronic text gives a full glossary of edited words. Roman numerals are replaced with Arabic (except for royalty, popes and the citation of classical texts). We have left Nightingale’s use of masculine generics as they are, hence ‘‘man,’’ ‘‘men,’’ ‘‘he,’’ etc., refer ring to human beings generally, but use gender-inclusive terms in editorial comment. Some, but not all, excessive ‘‘and,’’ ‘‘but’’ and of the uses of ‘‘the’’ have been excised. Any words the editor has added to make sense (for rough notes or faint writing) appear in square brackets. / 55

56 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Nightingale was not consistent in the use of capitals or lower case for synonyms or pronoun references to God and Jesus. For editorial comments here we standardize her most frequent usage (He and Him, Thy and Thine for God), and leave references to Jesus as she wrote them (Son of God, but varying between upper and lower case in pronouns). In the text of Suggestions for Thought we reproduce her (not entirely consistent) usage exactly as it was. Italics are used to indicate underlining and small capitals for double (or more) underlining. All indications of emphasis in texts are Nightingale’s (or that of her correspondent or source), never the editor’s. The only use of (sic) is Nightingale’s. Her omissions in quotations are indicated by x x. Editorial omissions are indicated with the usual. . . . She indicated the (usually polite) omission of a name with - -, which practice we follow. We refer to Nightingale and indeed all adult women by their surnames, the normal practice for references to men. We note with some dismay the frequent practice in the secondary literature of using first names for women, reser ving surnames, initials and honorifics for the (apparently) superior sex. We use correspondents’ names in the source but refer to them by the name Nightingale used: e.g., Dr Sutherland, Mme Mohl. Editorial notes appear in footnotes or, if ver y brief, in square brackets in the text. Articles (the, a, an) and the appropriate form of the verb to be have been supplied to make sense. Persons who changed their names (usually through marriage or the acquisition of a title, sometimes for purposes of inheritance) are referred to by the more commonly used name, cross-referenced in the index to the other if another name is also used. Dates to identify people are given at the first appropriate moment, and these entries are identified by italics in the Index. Of course, for many people identifying information is not available. The bibliography provides full information on most books cited. References to classical and other works available in many editions (now often on the Internet) are by book, chapter, canto, scene, line, etc., as appropriate, and are not repeated in the bibliography. The printed volumes are treated as the basic text here, with pertinent differences from the manuscripts added, with the folio number. Where the manuscript has comments attributed to someone this is indicated as, for example, [MS:]. Where the printed text was changed from the manuscript, this is indicated as much as possible. For exam-

Key to Editing / 57

ple, {Omitted: JA:} where material attributed to JA had been written, but then was omitted. Where only a word has been changed the printed word Nightingale chose is followed by the one dropped, indicated also with braces { }. Changes requiring more explanation are given in footnotes. Comments J.S. Mill made on the printed volumes (all in Add Mss 45840) are given in footnotes, indicated by JSM. The running heads in the original printed volumes have been inserted at the most appropriate place, as centred, italicized headings. (Repeated headings and insignificant changes are omitted.) Wherever possible the original source is indicated. Thus, in the fictional dialogue sections the initials of the speaker are given, exactly as Nightingale had written them (but crossed them out for the printing): MS (probably Mary Smith) JA Jacob Abbott St Ig Ignatius of Loyola HM Harriet Martineau (Shelley and Calvin are spelled out). Nightingale’s directions to the printers, dated 29 December 1859, include a Latin saying: ‘‘Non quaeras, quis hoc dixerit, sed quid dicitur attende’’ [Don’t be concerned about who said something but pay attention to what is said].

58 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

First text page of the ‘‘half-page’’ printing Nightingale had done to facilitate comments. She sent this one to J.S. Mill. Courtesy of the British Library.

Suggestions for Thought Volume 1

Source: Suggestions for Thought to Searchers after Truth among the Artizans of England (London: George E. Eyre & William Spottiswoode 1860): 1:1-202, drafts from Add Mss 45837 36-251

Dedication To the Artizans of England

F

ellow Searchers, I come to you not to declare the truth; I come to ask you (if subjects of moral truth have an interest with you) to join in seeking it with those capabilities which God has given to us. I offer the result of my own endeavours, and what I am able to gather from the endeavours of others. But what are the many to do, who have no inclination to study such subjects? What are the ‘‘poor and ignorant’’ to do for a religion? Is the object of our desire in religion to be a religion suited to the ‘‘poor and ignorant?’’ The object of our desire is to be Truth. All should have their faculties exercised and educated, for the purpose of forming a judgment of what is God’s truth. It is thought desirable for all to learn what is necessary to gain a livelihood. Arithmetic and other matters of instruction are taught for this purpose. But education is not pursued altogether with a right spirit and purpose. Man’s education should be given for the purpose of re-generation; of putting him in possession of the capability of exercising his powers, so that those powers may reveal to him what, among the labours of mankind after truth, is really truth, may enable him to judge of the nature of God, the nature and destination of man, and how practically to pursue that destination. But how forlorn, many say, thus to be left without an authority on the awful subject of religion! We are not left without ‘‘authority.’’ The Spirit of Truth will be our authority, if we will faithfully seek Him. Can there really have / 59

60 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought been an ‘‘authority,’’ when such different Gods have been believed in; such different modes of serving God pursued? Truth is, indeed, one; but the only way to ‘‘unity of faith’’ is a true cultivation of the nature, and a true life in which to exercise it. If this can be discovered, unity of faith will exist. Moses and Paul came forth from their desert, saying, ‘‘this and this is miraculously revealed truth, which the world is to believe.’’ Should it not rather be said, ‘‘this is truth, viz., that man is to discover from the means within and without his nature, all the truth to find which that nature is competent’’? We offer you what we believe to be truth. We offer our reasons to your reason, our feelings to your feeling. Judge ye if it is truth. Do we speak of what is important? Then consider it. Is it important? If not, hear us no further in this matter. 1 Belief in God [A dialogue between Jacob Abbott and M.S.] 1. Belief in God.

What does ‘‘belief ’’ mean?

{Omitted MS: You ask me why I believe in a God. JA: Yes, I don’t know why you, who disregard the authority of revelation, should believe in a God at all, still less why you should believe Him perfect. f36} [MS:] 1. You ask if we believe in God? If those who disregard authority believe in a God at all, and why they believe Him perfect? The two questions have one and the same answer. I believe in a perfect being, whom you call God. [JA:] But why do you believe in Him? [MS:] If you ask that question, we come immediately to the definition of the two words ‘‘believe’’ and ‘‘God.’’ What does ‘‘I believe’’ mean? {Omitted JA: It means the strongest conviction. f36} [MS:] It means, in common language, sometimes doubt and sometimes affirmation. ‘‘Is A.B. in London?’’ ‘‘I believe so.’’ Here it means, ‘‘I do not know, but I think it probable.’’ ‘‘Why do you think he has been there?’’ ‘‘I believe his word.’’ Here it means firm persuasion. But even here the belief is qualified by the modest ‘‘I,’’ which means, ‘‘It is I who believe, I don’t know whether others do.’’ What is therefore to be understood by ‘‘belief ?’’ Sometimes a sense of certainty, sometimes of uncertainty. {Omitted JA: I think we might as well look in Johnson. f36} [MS:] What will Johnson tell us? The sense in which the word has been used by certain writers, called classic. Johnson says that

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‘‘belief ’’ is credit given on account of authority.1 But have we really no other sources of belief than authority? There are means of belief in the capabilities of human nature, and human nature makes progress. At least in some things, ideas make progress. And the meanings attached to words which express ideas cannot, therefore, remain the same. A house may mean a house in all ages, though even in the case of words which express things, the house which we build now signifies a very different thing from the house built by the painted Briton. How much greater must be the difference in the sense of a word used to express a religious or a political idea! Either we must have new words or new meanings. {Omitted JA: Name, name. To give instances. MS: Their name is Legion.2 f37} [MS:] Johnson will define religion as ‘‘virtue founded upon reverence of God and expectation of future rewards and punishments,’’ and will quote Milton, South, Watts and Law3 for this sense of the word. Another theologian (belonging to an African tribe) thinks religion means jumping over a stick. If either of these be really religion, we want a new word to express so different an idea as the sense we have of our tie to God. [JA:] With what meaning, then, do we ‘‘believe’’ in God? [MS:] Man advances to a consciousness and conviction that there does exist a perfect being (whom we may call God), exactly in proportion as his nature is well-constituted, well-educated, wellexercised. Human nature, when thus well-born and well-bred, will admit of his sense of this truth, and of others inferred from it, being as strong and complete as the sense of truth with which he asserts that the tree before his eyes is a tree, and not a house. But we must be careful to know that the God whom we believe in is a per fect being. Men often think that they believe in a perfect God when, in fact, they do not—when they are really wholly incapable of even conceiving of a perfect being. For instance, in the

Ideas make progress.

Words gain new meanings.

The same words express different ideas.

Meaning of ‘‘belief ’’ in God.

1 Samuel Johnson, Dictionar y of the English Language. 2 Mark 5:9. 3 John Milton (1800-84), Puritan mp and poet; Robert South (1634-1716), public orator of Oxford and publisher of sermons; Isaac Watts (1674-1748) hymn writer; William Law (1686-1761), priest, influenced the Wesleys with his A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life, 1728.

62 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought earlier nations, where revenge was considered a virtue in man, it would naturally be thought so in God. Many imperfections, as we now think them, were once deemed virtues, and consequently attributed to a God who was called per fect. The religious history of the Hebrews is especially curious on this account. Meaning of ‘‘Belief in God’’

Advanced state of knowledge and virtue necessar y for a nation to conceive of a God as perfect.

Again, the God ‘‘of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob,’’ was certainly not the God ‘‘of the whole earth.’’ It is true that the Hebrews ser ved but Him alone; they believed, however, in the existence of many Gods.4 Their own God they reverenced, and despised the other Gods. But it was not till long afterwards that they rose with increasing knowledge to the belief that there was but one supreme. Yet He cannot be perfect if there be more than one. Is it, perhaps, that a knowledge of natural philosophy, such as cannot be attained by an infant nation, is necessary for the conception of one supreme being? The more we learn the more cause we find to think that the whole system of the universe is one scheme. Astronomy leaves no room, so to speak, for more than one throne. The same legislation prevails everywhere. All becomes one whole, with one ruler. {Omitted JA: But illustrate what you say of the advanced state of knowledge and virtue necessar y for a nation to conceive of a God as perfect. f39} [MS:] Take those very Hebrews. Moses had learnt in Egypt, had matured in the desert, his noble conception of a Divine Spirit.5 But his savage Hebrew tribe was incapable of it, and he himself was obliged to allow it to deteriorate to their level. Whenever one man has endeavoured to impose the more per fect idea of a supreme being, which has had its origin in his own more advanced mind, upon a nation less developed than himself, we see it degenerate. If the stage of civilization be very low indeed, the race is incapable of conceiving of a God at all. One of the French ‘‘Sisters of Charity’’ (the only real ‘‘women of the world’’) who see all nations and all conditions, told me that the single race within their knowledge who did not possess the idea of any supernatural being was a tribe in Australia, not far from Perth. They were in the lowest conceivable state of animal existence.

4 JSM: They believed that their God was superior to the others and was the Creator of the world. 5 On what Moses learned in Egypt, see Mysticism and Eastern Religions (4:286, 434-36).

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She had with her one of their children, which she had bought for a shilling, when about to be eaten by its tribe, and which appeared little above an animal, except that it stood on two legs and had no wings. It imitated like an ape, and stole like a magpie. (This child is now at a school in England {Isleworth}, where it has advanced by the most rapid strides from an animal into a human being. It now believes in a God.) I related this to an operative engineer, and he said slowly and thoughtfully, ‘‘That is just the condition in which most of my fellow workmen are, and they do not know whether they believe in a God or not. Sometimes they do and sometimes they don’t.’’ Meaning of Word ‘‘Belief ’’ I am trying to arrive at the meaning which we shall attach to the word ‘‘belief,’’ to prove that the highest state of belief (viz., in the signification of the strongest conviction), must be the result of the highest stage of development; that, therefore, we cannot be said to ‘‘believe’’ in this sense, except when we have reached that state; and that at an earlier stage of development in man, ‘‘belief ’’ will mean a sense of uncertainty; at a later, a sense of certainty. Is it not possible that this sense of uncertainty it is which has led so many lately into the Roman Catholic Church, and some the most learned, the most earnest? Scepticism, not belief, has brought them there. They required their sense of a truth to be stronger and more complete than it was. The more they urged themselves to believe, the less real was their feeling of belief, till, at last, they took refuge in the belief of others to supply that which they had not in themselves. {Omitted JA: But you cannot be ignorant that f41} [JA:] In this age, however, by far the greater proportion of mankind have gone the other way; in England, most of the educated among the operatives, especially in the northern manufacturing towns, have turned their faces to atheism or at least to theism6—not three in a hundred go to any place of worship, the moral and intellectual among them being, almost without an exception, ‘‘infidels.’’ {Omitted MS: I am quite aware of it. Even f41} These poor fellows, thinking so hard and so conscientiously, leave out the best element in the food which they so earnestly seek; the most divine element, that which makes confusion into order, that which makes the lowest into the highest; for the highest discoverable principle in existence,

Meaning to be attached to the word ‘‘belief.’’

Tendency of this age.

6 JSM: Quer y deism. It seems better to reser ve ‘‘theism’’ for the reverse of atheism.

64 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

How it begins.

To find the existence of God in law.

perhaps, is the feeling residing in the perfect One, which wills happiness; the thought of the perfect One, that happiness is, by its essence, worked out for the happy by exercise of their own natures and of other natures like theirs. Time is all that intervenes between man as he is and man made one with God. Time intervenes only because that would not be the spirit of wisdom to which it was possible to will man to be one with God otherwise than through the exercise of man’s faculties. {Omitted JA: You are wandering from your subject. You see that, f42} [JA:] Whenever man rejects revelation, however, he is too apt to say immediately, ‘‘God is incomprehensible, we will not seek for Him, because we shall not find Him.’’ And he is left without a God, even where he does not deny the existence of one. Such a one will think it fanciful to look upon the ‘‘Holy Ghost’’ as a real existence.7 {Omitted MS: I believe we shall find the ‘‘Holy Ghost’’ a real existence. f42} Hitherto we have rather looked for it, because it exists in the belief of so many, than felt it to be essential; but the love, the wisdom, the goodness, the righteousness, the power which we can, with our thought and feeling, recognize in law and its expression in the universe: these we may perhaps better call the ‘‘Holy Ghost’’ than God, whom (as so much of the intellect of the present day says) we cannot understand. A distinction is necessary between what we can understand and feel, and what we cannot. Ver y much mischief has arisen from what has been said and written about the latter. That a Father of the universe exists, but incomprehensible to us, may be shown, not by mathematical proof, but by such strong presumptive evidence (by evidence, too, increasing with our knowledge and the improvements of our being) that man may live and feel in accordance with the fact, as with much else not mathematically provable. But, with truth, it is said that we cannot comprehend Him and, disgusted by the dogmatizing of theologians and churches, many are refusing to believe His existence. Instead of saying, ‘‘I cannot understand the Holy Ghost,’’ as we with many have said—instead of His appearing in the Trinity one knows not why—perhaps it is a

7 JSM: If these paragraphs be retained at all, would it not be better to convert them into a note? In the text, they interrupt the tenor of the argument and send the reader’s mind wandering among the mysteries of Christianity.

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Holy Ghost only that we can understand; perhaps we may find in these words the expression we want for that which each man can feel and comprehend of the Father. Large Schemes built upon few Words Perhaps Paul unwisely said what we have beforetimes so often admired, ‘‘Whom ye ignorantly worship, Him reveal I unto you.’’8 He could only reveal that which he had himself felt and understood of God’s truth, and only to natures capable of receiving that revelation. (This is the ‘‘treasure which we have in earthly vessels,’’ ‘‘that the excellency of the power may be’’ not ‘‘of God,’’ but of man.9) {Omitted JA: Then you quite agree with these infidels that we cannot comprehend God, and that it is no use looking for Him. MS: If we were capable of understanding the laws, that is, the thought, feeling, purpose of the All-Perfect, we should not require to be told what is doing at this present in Spain. We should know that the Perfect would not be perfect unless one definite Something, which is going on there, were as it is and consequently we should know what it is—the same as to any past time in any part of the universe throughout eternity. We should know what God was doing 100 years ago. Throughout eternity the Son, in successive generations, will be working his way from ignorance and imperfection towards perfection. We cannot understand God. f44} Let us distinguish God the Father as the spirit of perfection, incomprehensible to us, God the Holy Ghost, as what is comprehensible to each man of the perfect spirit. To ‘‘receive the Holy Ghost,’’ what a remarkable expression that was! No wonder that those to whom it was addressed said they did not ‘‘so much as know that there was a Holy Ghost.’’ This is just the state of those among the men called atheists in the present day, who are thinking and conscientious. {Omitted JA: I do not understand the gist of your observation. What connection is there between ‘‘receiving the Holy Ghost’’ and understanding or denying the existence of Jehovah? Why should we go back to the beginning of things? We have attained MS: attained to what? JA: To a knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ, His son, our Lord. MS: You think so? Do not you think that people have

8 Acts 17:23. 9 2 Cor 4:7, where ‘‘earthly’’ is ‘‘earthen.’’

66 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Immense schemes built upon a few words.

dogmatized about religion, building upon a few words in a book (and a book written by whom there is little evidence to say), the evidence of whose authenticity is necessary to master? JA: As for instance? MS: Upon the words, ‘‘Lo! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.’’10 The bishop of Winchester has his £20,000 a year, and the bishop of London his two footmen in purple liveries behind his carriage. JA: But is that the reason? f44} [MS:] To ‘‘receive the Holy Ghost’’ is to exercise the capabilities of man, inasfar as each is able in apprehending the spirit of perfection. Truly do these atheists say, ‘‘We cannot understand God,’’ so they leave the subject entirely as irrelevant. This true conscientiousness of not being able to understand, to feel God, has led, on the one hand, to being ‘‘without’’ the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, ‘‘in the world’’; on the other, to the making Christ an anomalous being, called God, called not God. We cannot be too careful to admit our present ignorance and any essential incapability in our nature. Neither can we be too careful to admit no incapability of attainment in human nature, while the individual human being, or successive generations of man, can advance towards attainment. {Omitted JA: Then you will say, I suppose, that the knowledge of the existence of God is an empirical conjecture? MS: Well, I suppose, if you were to ask the bishops of London and Winchester why they are there, will they not say because of those words? JA: But not all churches are the same. MS: Not quite. ff45-46} People have dogmatized about religion, building upon a few words in a book (and a book the evidence of whose authenticity it is necessar y to master) immense schemes. Upon the words, ‘‘Lo! I am with you alway even unto the end of the world’’ (partly at least, if not entirely), rests the fabric of the church, with its high pretensions, its splendid temporalities. If we were to ask the bishops why they are there, will they not say, mainly because of those words? If we ask the Roman Catholic Church why they are there, they will say to hear confessions and absolve sinners. They have founded their scheme upon ‘‘Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.’’11

10 Matt 28:20. 11 Matt 16:19 and 18:18.

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We must admit that people have founded vast schemes upon a ver y few words. Feeling the folly of this, others say that we are incapable of knowing anything about God. We cannot be too careful to draw a line of distinction between what we can know positively and what we can only conjecture empirically (i.e., see reason to guess is true), and leave to be confirmed by the exercise of the faculties of ages to come; at the same time acknowledging our ignorance where it exists on those subjects on which it has been asserted that mankind has certain knowledge. What is Empiricism? It is impossible to observe and reflect on what does exist and has existed, as cognizable by our various faculties, without tracing a being of benevolent will, a wise will and a powerful will. Can it be denied that the signs which make us assert that human will has been or is at work when we see machinery in action (even though no possessor of human will is manifest to the senses)—can it be denied that the same signs exist to manifest a will, differing from the human in possessing more wisdom and power, to effect those same purposes which human will tries for? But let us not go on to dogmatize, to asser t that this will is perfect and eternal. Supposing the thought and purpose of God to be perfect, its perfect realization is the work of eternity. Therefore, no per fect realization can have been recognized by man. Man can only recognize, in what he can learn of present, past and future, tendencies from which he implies the perfect purpose. Let us be most careful to keep to accuracy in what we say we know, especially with reflective and conscientious men, who disbelieve what may be known, because required to believe what cannot be known. {Omitted JA: Then you admit that something may be known about the Eternal? f48} [MS:] Evidence may be brought of a will for long time past active, in which we trace some benevolence, wisdom, power. But we are seldom called upon to act and feel only by that of which we have certainty; we often have to act empirically. {Omitted JA: But empirically you might suspect the existence of an imperfect God, who produces the suffering, as well as of a good God, who produces the happiness. MS: Why should we be driven to this? JA: But that only proves that man is the artisan of his own happiness, not God. f49}

Is all our knowledge of the existence of God an empirical conjecture?

What may be known about the eternal?

68 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought What is acting and feeling empirically?

Empirically the existence of an imper fect God might be suspected.

Is man the artizan of his own happiness, not God?

The empirical must lead the way to the certain. Empirical laws are ‘‘those uniformities which observation or experiment has shown to exist, but upon which we hesitate to rely, for want of seeing why such a law should exist. The periodical return of eclipses, as originally ascertained by the persevering observation of the early Eastern astronomers, was an empirical law, until the general laws of the celestial motions had accounted for it. An empirical law, then, is an observed uniformity, presumed to be resolvable into ultimate laws, but not yet resolved into them.’’12 We find signs of benevolence, wisdom and power, which appear to indicate that the will, in consequence of which that which exists does exist, desires the well-being of that existence at some time present or future. But there is and has been much suffering in every present with which we are acquainted, and we often cannot discern how it can be leading to a happy future in detail. Evidence may be brought to show, however, that it is leading, in principle, to a happy future— that, to the best happiness, the present is essential. [MS:] One and another cause of suffering disappears from time to time by the exercise of man’s capabilities. We can see glimpses of how others might disappear, if he used these capabilities differently from what he has done. Great increase of enjoyment has been opened in certain directions by exercise of man’s capabilities, and here too we have glimpses into immeasurable enjoyment attainable by man. Do not such observations lead to the conjecture that the higher will intends man to work the way from suffering into happiness by exercise of capability? The capability of each individual when born, the development and improvement of this capability, are obviously left in large measure to mankind. In no other race is there this dependence on the race itself. Do not these considerations point (shall we say empirically?) to the suggestion that man shall perfectionize man? Belief in a perfect God not general And since experience is evidence that exercise of capability is enjoyment, that without it there is none, does not this experience point to the belief that the Great Will made the happiness of mankind to depend on the exercise of the capability of mankind, thus calling forth the greatest degree of exercise, and with it the greatest happiness, in truth, possible?

12 Mill, System of Logic 8:516-17.

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{Omitted JA: We are wandering from our subject. Let us sum up— the gist of our argument was, was it not? to attach some meaning to the two words ‘‘believe’’ and ‘‘God.’’ f50} [MS:] I have tried to show that the highest state of ‘‘belief ’’ founded on conviction could not exist in some stages of national or individual development, but must belong to more advanced stages. Undoubting belief, indeed, can easily exist in an early stage of development, which is ignorant of the sources of doubt presented by the advance of knowledge in the exact sciences. To this state of doubt, prevailing widely, as it does, in our present stage of progress, will succeed a more comprehensive, more impressive belief, as moral philosophy becomes fathomed by the understanding and raises the feelings. I then tried to consider ‘‘empirically’’ what a perfect being would do, if there be one, and to prove that he would appoint man to work out his own happiness. I now try to deduce from this the ‘‘belief ’’ that there is a per fect being, a God. Here we come to consider the meaning or rather the meanings with which the word ‘‘God’’ is used. It has been used to signify the most different ideas in different ages and nations. Can you attach any similarity of idea to the God whom his people whipped to make him do what they liked, and to the God who sat enthroned in the mystic phrase of Zoroaster? Nothing is more common than to say, there never has been a race nor an age which did not believe in a God. A God certainly. But what God? What does the word mean? A cat?—a lamb?—a spirit?—a statue? These words are as synonymous as the different Gods in which different races and different ages of the same race have believed. When you ask, why do you believe in God? I must ask, which of the ideas of God do you mean? whether the God of the Old Testament, who commanded the extirpation of the Canaanites? or the God of the New Testament, {Romans? f57} who commanded submission to the yoke in many things in which, as we worship Him now, we believe that He commands the struggle for freedom? {Omitted: In the God whom we worship now, who commands the expulsion of the Austrians, liberation of Hungary from the yoke. JA: How do you know that He does this? MS: I do not think I should be able to believe Him a perfect God, if He did not. JA: But why do you believe in a perfect God? You have no authority for believing your God to be perfect. f52} We could not believe Him a per fect God, if He did not.

Summar y of the meaning of the words ‘‘belief ’’ and ‘‘God.’’

What is the word ‘‘God’’ used to express?

70 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Does ‘‘Authority’’ teach of a perfect God? Authority does not teach of a per fect God.

Universal consent does not teach of a perfect God.

Intellectual cultivation does not teach of a per fect God.

[MS:] Authority does not teach belief in a perfect God. It is evident that very few have believed that their God was perfect. Some nations have not professed to do so; others have attributed to him qualities essentially imperfect, while giving him the title of perfect. For instance, the Greeks did not suppose their Zeus, Athene, etc., per fect. They attributed to them merely human qualities with superhuman power. In these earlier nations, power seems to have been the principal characteristic of a God. He or she was merely an engine to account for creation. Take all the thousand different meanings which have been attached to the word ‘‘God’’ by different nations and individuals in different ages, and some kind and degree of power above human seems to be all that is common to them. In these days we profess that we believe our God to be perfect, but we attribute to him all kinds of qualities that are not—love of His own glory, anger, indecision, change of mind—and we try to believe, if we think at all, that a God with these qualities is perfect. If you would, therefore, let me leave the question, why do you believe in God?—as not knowing which of these ideas of God you mean—I would say instead, I believe that there is a Perfect Being, of whose thought the universe in eternity is the incarnation. {Omitted JA: And why do you believe in a perfect Being, if you set aside authority, antiquity, universal consent? If none of our Gods, as you call them, will satisfy you, I don’t know why you believe in one at all. ff52-53} [MS:] It is evident that every nation, every age, could not believe in a Perfect Being—that it required cultivation, development to conceive the idea of perfection, and that the higher all the faculties of an individual, as also of a nation, have been, the higher has been his conception of God, the nearer perfection. [JA:] It is true, some of those called the most highly cultivated of the human race, Descartes,13 Laplace, Hume,14 have not been able to conceive of a God at all. [MS:] But, have they been the most highly cultivated? Only intellectually so. And it seems evident that the intellectual idea of Him is not the highest. That is merely reducing Him to a master engineer, a

13 JSM: There must, I think, be some mistake here about Descartes. He not only believed but thought he had proved the existence of a God a priori. 14 Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace (1749-1827), French mathematician; David Hume (1711-76), Scottish moral philosopher and an atheist.

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mechanician-in-chief. Is not goodness for this purpose higher than intellect? Has not the innocent child probably an idea of God nearer the truth than that of Voltaire or Gibbon?15 ‘‘Unless ye become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of Heaven.’’16 We believe the carpenter’s son, who humanly did not know that the earth moved round the sun, to have had a truer conception of deity than the philosopher who had fathomed the laws of creation. [JA:] But he would have had a still truer, if he had known all that Laplace could have told him. [MS:] The more highly man’s moral, intellectual and spiritual faculties are cultivated, the more nearly will he approach a true conception of God. But of reason, feeling and conscience, feeling, tr uly cultivated, is that which gives us the truest conception of God, though, of course, a harmonious development of all these faculties would give us a truer still. Thus the goodness of God is a higher attribute than His wisdom or power. The question, Why we believe that there exists at all an Eternal Spirit of perfect goodness, wisdom and power, [MS:] I can only answer, by experience, and experience only. What mankind can learn of the past, the present and the future is in harmony with the existence of such a spirit; without it, is unaccounted for. In earlier ages it was thought that what we see about us could not be accounted for, except by supposing imperfect qualities in the Eternal Spirit. But if, as we make progress, we find a great many marks that He is perfect, if by degrees we should find that that very evil which had made us doubt His perfection is one of the truest proofs of it, shall we not come at last to think that He has done in the universe what we should have done, had we been perfect? Experience teaches of a perfect God Thus increased knowledge, knowledge of the laws of God, is essential to our forming this idea of His perfection. Although a man in a dark room may often form a tr uer idea of Him than a philosopher obser ving the rotation of the sun, still, besides a man’s feeling of what is right, his power of comprehending providence depends on his knowledge of the past, the present and the future.

15 Edward Gibbon (1737-94), British historian of the Roman Empire. 16 A paraphrase of Matt 18:3.

Intellectual cultivation contributes to a tr uer conception of Him.

Experience only teaches of a per fect God.

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Not the experience of one, but of mankind.

Is the idea of eternity unattainable?

Instead, therefore, of directly answering the question, Why do you believe in a God? I would endeavour to set forth: (1) whatever exists, exists because there is one will and one power, which determines such existence to be; (2) the nature whence springs this will, in which resides this power, is eternal, is perfect, is goodness, wisdom, omnipotence, etc. {Omitted JA: But separate your questions/propositions, say, first why you consider your God eternal. If you consider Him. f57} If it be said that this is reducing the wise and good God to the measure of my own understanding and heart, I answer, Not to mine, but to the accumulated and accumulating experience of all mankind. Sometimes the ancients may have been wiser than we are. Surely the ancient expressions of wisdom, justice, truth are much tr uer than ours of a wise, a just, a tr ue God. Athene was the goddess of wisdom, not the wise goddess. Themes was the goddess of justice,17 not the just goddess. So our Perfect Being is goodness, is wisdom, is power, not a good, wise and powerful God. It is often said that we cannot conceive of God as eternal, because, however remote the first creation may have been, there must have been beyond it, so far as we can see, an eternity of solitude and inaction. Unless we admit therefore that we receive the fact of His eternity from inspiration, we plunge into innumerable difficulties. For instance, we may say that God may have been employed from all eternity creating, and that though the whole series of creations has been eternal, yet every particular creation may have been at some definite point of time. But this makes some matter itself eternal. MS:] In answer, we admit, first of all, that the idea of eternity is wholly inappreciable by the finite mind. A part cannot contain the whole. But the difficulty about creation is far-fetched. Matter is the incarnation or manifestation of God’s thought—God’s thought has been eternal, and therefore some manifestation of it may, must, perhaps, also have been eternal. With regard to the question, whence the belief in eternity in those who wrote the sacred books, whether Egyptian, Hebrew, Persian or Indian, that is indeed a difficulty. The idea has been so dinned into us from earliest infancy that we can scarcely conceive of the stupendous effort requisite in the first human mind which imagined eternity—an eternity behind him, an eternity before him. It would be a curious inquiry to ascertain the first trace

17 Themis, daughter of Gaia, later considered the personification of justice.

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we can find of such a belief. The purely intellectual arguments, ‘‘Something cannot come out of nothing,’’ ‘‘Nothing cannot come out of something,’’ probably do not convince the feeling—do not make the belief present to us. Could we conceive the idea of eternity, of an Eternal Being arising in the minds of the first believers thus? Look at the present state of things—whence came it? Whither is it tending? Is it all confusion, springing from no will, tending to accomplish no will? In some aspects it does, indeed, appear so. In others, distinct, though imperfect, glimpses of law are discernible—of law, that is, of will determining the essential constituents of what is. Determining them with what purpose? we next ask. Here again, in some respects, all appears confusion. Sometimes there is the appearance of benevolent purpose, sometimes the contrary, or the absence of it, or the absence of power to fulfill it. By the Idea of Eternity alone we come to Consistency Is there consistency, and is there unity of purpose? becomes the question. All historical religion shows the search of man for this consistency. The devil, the atonement, have been fruits of this search. It would appear that the idea of eternity has been its greatest result. There are many signs of benevolence in the creation, and yet, without the idea of eternity, they would be incomplete. Through eternity alone you come to consistency. [JA:] Where we recognize nothing but the finite and imperfect, we can discern infinity and perfection [MS:] only through the idea of eternity. When the moral feelings predominate in ourselves, we begin to attribute to God the principles by which we should rule the universe, were it ours. We conceive of Him as like, not our actual, but our ideal selves. When the moral feelings of a people have advanced beyond their old mythology, scepticism follows, and no proof, no ‘‘evidences,’’ can make the old religion, the old divinity credible again. It is only by raising the moral condition of a people that we can raise their idea of God, but we cannot always by raising the moral condition of an individual persuade him to believe in a nobler God. The traditions of his childhood adhere to him, and he perhaps thinks it wrong even to examine them, or it may be that they are so repulsive to his improved feeling that he rejects the subject altogether. But with a nation this cannot long be the case. Mankind enlightens mankind. When the north of Africa was civilized, Christianity took root and flourished there. When civilization became

The idea of eternity alone enables us to discern in the finite and imper fect infinity and perfection.

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How has mankind arrived at the idea of eternity?

The more we know the more we perceive God to be per fect.

extinct with the Moorish invasion, the burning of the libraries and the destruction of the schools, Christianity disappeared. The questions, how has mankind arrived, first, at the idea of an Eternal Being with a past as well as a future eternity? secondly, at the idea of a future eternity for ourselves? can be only answered thus: first, that the more we learn of the laws of the universe the less we can imagine a time when goodness, power and wisdom were not. Second, perceiving as we do such proofs of wisdom, power and goodness, and also such innumerable beings to whom existence cannot be said to be worth having, we can only reconcile such suffering with our idea of perfect goodness, by supposing that there is an eternity for each, where the purposes of perfect goodness will be worked out. {Omitted JA: But that brings us back to the old question, why do you consider Him perfect? MS: I cannot prove it, but I believe that I can perceive it—and that the more we know, the more we do perceive Him to be perfect. f60} It is said by one class of philosophers that we know nothing of any first cause, while religionists say we know everything. The more we advance from ignorance to knowledge, from imperfection towards perfection, the more we find that which exists referable to one cause, this cause being a wise and benevolent will. 2 Questions relevant and irrelevant to this inquiry—what are the y?

Questions of little importance.

[JA:] 2. How came this wise and benevolent will into existence? Was there ever a time when it did not exist, or is it eternal? are questions often asked. {Omitted MS: It seems to me that we may have all the peace religion may give without being able to answer these questions. f61} [MS:] We do not see why they are held of such importance, why it is feared that religion must fall if they are not answered, and why, therefore, religionists attempt absurd answers, or why some philosophers think that there can be no religion, because they hold these questions to be unanswerable. The capabilities of our nature truly exercised reveal to us a very wise, powerful and benevolent will, in many instances. In looking through existence we are led to question the existence of such a will in other instances. But the tendency of improvement in the knowledge and the being of man is to increase the number of the former, to decrease the number of the latter instances. Moreover, this most important observation opens upon us from actual experience, that much evil, which looked like absence of a good, wise and powerful superintending will, is remedied by man. This leads to

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the question, may not all evil to man be remedied by man? And to the farther question, if this is so, may not all evil point to a wise and good superintending will, to a will that man shall have the means and be the means of rising from the ignorance and imperfection whence (alone) evil comes, to the knowledge and excellence whence wellbeing comes? If such a will exists, is it not a wise and benevolent will? One man places a child in circumstances where he will have means to exercise his faculties aright; another man does the child’s work for him; which man’s is the wiser will? Would you be of the bird’s kind, which builds its nest unerringly with a smaller range of faculties, or of man’s kind, wanting and suffering, as he has been, before his habitation was skillfully built? Would you be as the bird with its small range of duties and affections, or as man, with his aching heart, his wounded conscience, wringing other hearts while his own is wrung, all in ignorance? But is not the ignorance blessed which points to the possibility, in removing it, of rising to the divine and perfect? Oh, man! bless your sufferings, even your agonies, while gallantly you strive to work out, through them, peace and bliss to mankind. Rather we would hope that the bird, in another mode of existence, may rise to learn through suffering, than that man may find peace in being instinctively taught his path. {Omitted: ‘‘Err bravely’’ then, so long as you are conscious that all evil to man comes from error, that nothing but the utmost possibility of each exercised to find the road from error to truth will suffice. JA: You think now that you have proved as much as you can prove your second proposition, viz., that the nature whence springs ‘‘the One will’’ is eternal, is perfect, is goodness, wisdom—but what have to say about his omnipotence? f63} [MS:] Does not a perfectly wise will include omnipotence, that is to say, all power to fulfill the will? Christ dwells constantly upon ‘‘faith.’’ He seems to have had the idea that you could do whatever you believed you could do. ‘‘If a man believes, he shall remove mountains.’’18 How singular seems this idea! If a man is wise, he will wish only what is wise; he will purpose to fulfill only the wise wish; he will not believe that he can fulfill the wish unless he really can do so. {Omitted JA: But what do you think of the Bible? Do you believe in it or do you not? Sometimes you quote it in the way of authority and sometimes in the way of contempt—I cannot tell what you believe. ff63-64}

18 A paraphrase of 1 Cor 13:2.

Omnipotence of God.

76 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought What is to be found in the Bible.

[MS:] Perhaps in no book is so much spiritual truth to be found as in the Bible. ‘‘In Him is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.’’19 What an insight do these words show! Is not law the ‘‘invariable’’ wisdom, modifying and modified by the succession of events? The sun rises every day: wisdom wills no change in that. One day is fine, another rainy: wisdom wills changes in this. The changing and the unchanging alike come from the wisdom which never changes. The placid sunshine and the raging storm both spring from His will, yet in that will is no variableness. Time, or the succession of events (it matters not which we call it), makes the only difference in the nature of events. That is wise in this phase of succession, which would not have been so in a former. {Omitted JA: But can you leave such questions unsettled as those you have mentioned? f64} Eternity reveals a perfect God

Unimportant questions.

Without eternity for each and for all of us, there could not be a perfect God.

[MS:] In proportion as we stretch our natures to comprehend His, many questions which puzzle us now will appear unimportant. Such as, could there be existence without beginning? Is time what can be called an existence, or merely a succession of events? Is matter an existence? If we can make out to the satisfaction of our natures that the cause of whatever has been, is or shall be, is a wise and benevolent will, what matters it whether that will has been eternal? Probably we shall not be able to help believing that it has been so, but what matters it to us? Knowledge of all being, and improvement of our own, will bring into view eternity before us. The important question to us is, have we a righteous Ruler? The evidence that we have such a one stands or falls with the evidence that human existence is a portion of that progress which befits our nature, or of preparation for such progress. Such is the constitution of human nature, that thus only can existence be of real value to man. There are creatures to which the amusement of the hour, without connection with past or future, is all that they are fitted for; such is not man’s proper nature. But many live through their human existence in a state quite at variance with their nature. Many, if this life were all, had better not have been born, supposing it true that righteousness is the soul’s health.

19 Jas 1:17.

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Yet God’s laws determine the constitution which befits human nature. God’s laws determine what each man has actually been. Such laws existing, there can be no righteous Ruler, unless human life is a road to righteousness, even though it may be a circuitous one. Many descend in this world to the hell of sin and ignorance; it may be that they have also to endure it in other worlds; but all will attain to be as it is befitting their nature to be; otherwise, there would be no righteous Ruler. We believe in a righteous Ruler, not because it is our desire. We seek Him because we desire Him above all desires. We have none that do not include His existence. We find Him in the tendency, the operation of His laws, which alone come home to us, as what could tell us that He exists. It is said that the desire, the tendency of mankind to believe in a future existence, is alone sufficient evidence for it. But this is no reliable evidence. We can have no desire to believe it or to preach it, if it is not tr ue. We cannot believe it so as to do us any good, unless from such examination that we should believe it because it is true, not because we wish it. We have a greater fear of believing what is untrue than readiness to believe what we should feel glad to believe. {Omitted JA: I myself do not see the use of any speculations about the existence of a God if you do not believe in the God of revelation. f66} [MS:] There is little use in speculations concerning the existence of a God, or concerning His nature, unless He may be discovered to be the object for trust, love, reverence. Unless the question be thus made practically helpful, we would rather say with the conscientious unbelievers of this day, ‘‘It is better to try to remedy the evils of man’s life than to confuse one’s self in metaphysical speculations concerning God’s life.’’ Let us, therefore, rather inquire whether there is such a God than whether there is a God, and what He is. All our Faculties needed to reveal God [JA:] But with what faculties are we to inquire? The Germans on the Continent, and Mr Newman20 at home, say that there is a spe-

Religion not revealed by one faculty, but by all the faculties.

20 Francis William Newman (1805-97) resigned his fellowship at Balliol College when he came not to believe in a future life (he later became a Unitarian, yet died a Christian), brother of Roman Catholic convert and later Cardinal John Henry Newman.

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Does law ever exist without a law-giver?

cial faculty which they call the soul, or ‘‘intuition’’ (Anschauung), which apprehends God, which knows Him, as the senses know the external world. There is a school (Unitarianism as it was) which says that this faculty is intellect, and that man apprehends religious truth by a process similar to that pursued in any other scientific investigation. Mr Martineau21 has looked to the moral nature of man, and shown that man cannot appeal to his conscience without coming to religion. [MS:] Why should Mr Martineau, or Mr Newman, or the intellectual school, expect to find religion revealed by one faculty, independent of others? If we wish to estimate a man rightly, to hold right intercourse with him, all our faculties are wanted. We shall not rightly estimate mankind, or live well among mankind, unless every faculty we have is in exercise. Should it not be so as to religion? A man will be really religious in feeling and act, will apprehend religion rightly, in proportion as all his capabilities are rightly exercised, and in proportion as the society in which he lives is organized so as to afford full and free exercise for his nature. [JA:] But the conscientious unbelievers of the present day say that, when all is said and done, and the whole of the faculties exercised, etc., all that we can discern with these faculties is the law of nature. [MS:] Is there not an absurdity in saying that all we can discern is that whatever is, is according to law? For is it not our experience of law that it always springs from a will, from a purpose?22 {Omitted: JA: Give me an instance. MS: There is a law that a person distilling without a licence shall pay a fine. Is it not inconceivable to us that (though we might not be able to prove any Being who made that law, whose will and purpose it was), we should say, ‘‘the existence of law is all that we can say of the fact that a man privately distilling is liable to a fine’’? f68} [MS:] If we went to some new country and found a law in operation, but could have no information, no trace of the person who willed, who purposed in that law, we should nevertheless feel an entire certainty, a consciousness that will and purpose had existed in regard to that law.

21 James Martineau (1805-1900), Unitarian minister, brother of Harriet Martineau. 22 JSM: Only appears true from the double meaning of the word law.

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When we discern a law of nature, we can generally at the same time trace purpose in it; is it, then, philosophical or reasonable to say, ‘‘We can know nothing as to whether there is or has been a will, a purposer,’’ we having so much experience that where there is a law and purpose, there is will and a purposer? In the laws of nature we can trace will and purpose of the same kind as exists in man; for instance, love of order, love of beauty, benevolence which wills convenience, ease, comfort. {Omitted JA: Then why, if it is so, do not the thinkers of the present day recognize it? f68} [MS:] Mankind has been jarred by circumstances unsuited to right constitution, right development, right exercise of the nature. The thinking part of mankind has been irritated and disgusted by dogmatic assertion of superstitious notions. A revulsion takes place. Many thinkers say in consequence, ‘‘I will do my work and believe nothing but phenomena recognized by my senses.’’ Reason and philosophy are now in arms against superstition and dogmatism rather than in peaceful search after truth. God the Legislator But does it not seem that reason and experience suggest, when we trace law, a will and a purpose? It is very evident that this will and purpose concerns mankind, for the whole of our existence (our existing at all as man and our mode of existing) is in accordance with these laws—springs, in fact, from these laws. All the power which we have to influence our own mode of existence, or that of any of our kind, or, indeed, to influence any mode of existence, material or other, is by working in accordance with some law or other, whether we know what it is or not. Can it then be uninteresting, can it be practically unimportant, to inquire into the nature of the willer, the purposer of these laws? We find in some cases marked unmistakable purpose to secure human well-being, as, for instance, in the laws of astronomy and anatomy, which concern human habitation and the human frame. In these instances, power, wisdom, above human in degree, though like human in kind, are evident in the will and purpose. In other instances, the effect of these laws on human habitation and the human frame is suffering. But can it ever be said that malevolence, or a wish for suffering, becomes evident? If it were so, would not the evil be irremediable and permanent? Can we point out any evil and say, ‘‘There is strong

Why the thinkers of the present day do not recognize this.

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What can we discern?

Practical benefit to life of this theor y.

Difficulty in the conception of an invariable will.

reason to believe that the united efforts of mankind never would be able to prevent its recurrence?’’ {Omitted JA: No, but we may say, ‘‘we see evil which, during the present mode of existence of the sufferer, is irremediable.’’ MS: But we know this mode of existence to be temporary. f70} [JA:] Prejudice is now setting in a contrary direction to credulity, and prompting to disbelieve what reason and philosophy would prompt us to believe, viz., that laws of nature are discernible; that reason and experience say that law implies a legislator with a purpose; that this purpose in the laws of nature is discernible to be a wise and benevolent one—benevolent where it causes well-being—benevolent where it causes suffering, which it does, unless man’s faculties are exercised aright. {Omitted MS: Oh! I am very glad you go so far as that. f71} Now suppose we discern: (1) law; (2) a legislator, implied by law; (3) a benevolent and wise purpose in the legislator—what then? If the whole of man’s nature were penetrated with this, as truth, there would be practical benefit to life, i.e., if he thought and felt and acted congenially, consistently, in accordance with this belief. In theory, the admitting thus much would lead not to proof, but to assurance (not differing in its practical effect from proof ), of an eternity to come, in which each individual would attain to the perfection of goodness and happiness through the exercise of his own nature and that of mankind. If not only the reason were convinced, but the feeling were imbued with this belief, man would, even in suffering and privation, feel himself sharing the omnipotence of God. He would feel, ‘‘I wish no law altered.’’ As to the present effect of law in causing suffering and privation, he would consider all this to arise from that part of God’s law, in consequence of which mankind are to make their own way out of ignorance to truth, out of imperfection towards perfection, by the exercise of their faculties—God in His various laws supplying means and inducement. Would not the practical effect of such a belief be to inspire vigorous effort, where effort can be made—calm patience where it cannot be made, not doubting but that the time will come when effort can be made? Would not love be inspired by One whose law was love—veneration by One whose law was wisdom? [JA:] There seems a difficulty in imagining the nature of God, when we try to think of Him as an Eternal Will, manifesting itself in law. We suppose all existence to depend on this will in order to be at

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all, to be what it is entirely by and through this will. But when we have said this, in relation to the nature of God’s existence, we have a dissatisfied feeling, as if we supposed something after the imagination of the Hebrews, who thought that victory in the battle depended upon Moses holding up his arms.23 One cannot hear this without an uneasy feeling at the barrenness of Moses’ task of holding up his arms. Our arms ache, and our spirits are wear y under the imagination. And we feel something of the same sort in reference to the nature of God’s existence, when we have read the words about law here used. {Omitted JA: Now really, even I can get over that. f73} [JA:] Go to the Sistine Chapel, however, and imagine the nature which painted that roof.24 There was a will without which that roof would not have been; that will determined each stroke of the pencil—but the first stroke had regard to the last and to every intermediate one. Was it a weary existence thus to will? Perhaps you will say, ‘‘No, because the artist varied as he advanced, and was occupied in thought.’’ But, in proportion as a man is a great artist (whatever be his work), he does not var y as he advances. Is he making a speech, organizing a society, arranging a battle, building a hospital, painting a set of pictures for a church, writing a book of history, poetr y or metaphysics—in proportion as he does well, will his first will determine the whole, his first word or stroke of the pen or pencil concern the whole. It is not because he varies in thought that he will not be weary of willing; on the contrary, the more oneness of purpose, the greater his interest and satisfaction. The great mind, through its work, is developing one will throughout, and that mind has most interest and satisfaction. May we not conceive that God’s present will is one with every stroke of the past and the future, which is and will be ever developing itself? The artist who begins upon twelve pictures to fulfill one purpose has one will throughout, by which will they are developed into being. He is not those pictures, but they are the manifestation of his will when done, its development while being done. Is it not so with all external existence, with regard to God? The God whom Oersted fancied ‘‘developing Himself into planetary geologies and polarized light.’’25 Why developing himself ? No more than Michel-

God is not ‘‘developing Himself ’’ any more than any human artist is developing himself in his creations.

23 In Exod 17:11. 24 For Nightingale’s day in the Sistine Chapel see European Travels (7:149-56). 25 Hans Christian Oersted (1777-1851), Danish physicist and philosopher, discoverer of electromagnetism.

82 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought angelo was developing himself when St Peter’s dome arose at his will;26 no more than a painter in his picture when his picture develops at his will, does it appear that God is developing himself. (For Pantheism we can see no evidence. The acorn develops into the oak—such is its nature. We have no reason to believe that there is any thought or purpose in the acorn, in consequence of which it so develops. If we had seen Michelangelo at work, we should have been quite sure that there was a conception in his mind of what was to appear on his canvas, a purpose that he meant to fulfill. We should have seen that he did not make stroke after stroke, like a child, pencil in hand, but no purpose in his mind; we should have seen purpose in process of realization. We may discern conception of something to come, purpose determining what shall come, in the history of the oak as it develops from the acorn, and lives through its centuries. Yet such conception, such purpose, does not reside in the oak. Therefore to talk of God developing Himself in the oak is an imagination, standing on no evidence, not consistent with what we see going on. To say that thought, purpose, manifests itself in the history of an oak is consistent with what is going on before us. In the oak itself, indeed the conception, the directing purpose, can be only imperfectly read, but in the connection of each with all in the universe, in successive time, it is to be looked for, and even from our limited point of view we may obtain a glimpse.) It is not more impossible to understand how God wills without hands than how an artizan wills his hands to work. The consistency and comprehensiveness of God’s will is what forms our difficulty in conceiving of Him, is what we are always seeking after in ourselves.

Er ror of Pantheism How it comes to be that the painter’s hands mediate between the will and the canvas, we understand no more than how the Highest, without hands, develops His pictures before us. ‘‘The whole universe a single intellectual aim,’’ we might add a single aim of the spirit of love, of beauty, of order, of righteousness, of benevolence, of every attribute which man can appreciate as right and good and tr ue; of others, it may be, which he cannot appreciate. The reason of our suffering the grievousness of inefficiency is the want in us of this consistency and comprehensiveness of will. [MS:] If I knew how, I too would have a single aim of righteousness, and love, and benevolence, and beauty, and order, but I have a

26 Michelangelo Buonarroti (1475-1564), sculptor, painter, architect of St Peter’s Basilica.

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different aim every half-hour, without comprehensiveness, connection, consistency. In this only can I be comprehensive and consistent. I can say, ‘‘thy will be done’’; I accord with that will; I acquiesce in waiting till we find out how to be comprehensive and consistent, till we attain that blessed oneness. [JA:] There is a oneness of seeking external amusement, of doing what it is conventionally agreed is to be done; this saves present suffering, but does not help on mankind. [MS:] Better than such a oneness there is a blessedness, even in the suffering of ignorance and inefficiency, in trusting that we shall work our way to light at last. Then when we remember these days of darkness, may it be with the wish to deliver others from suffering and privations which we have known by experience! [JA:] Is it an insuperable difficulty for us to believe that love, goodness, wisdom, which we can now trace as the spring of law, have always existed? Is the constitution of our nature such that we cannot help believing that whatever is must have begun to be? [MS:] To us it appears more difficult to suppose that wisdom and goodness began to be from not being than to suppose that the nature, which we discern to possess these attributes, is eternal, and that all other beginnings are merely changes of one present state to another (though all manifestations of one unvarying purpose), these changes arising from the existence of this eternal nature.

God without beginning.

What are our Witnesses of God [JA:] With regard to matter, it is probably impossible for natures like ours ever to prove that it exists at all. We see no means of approximating, of advancing one step towards proof. [MS:] Nor does it make the slightest practical difference to man whether it really exists or not otherwise than as the thought of God. Grant a nature eternally possessing perfect goodness and wisdom, and you account for all that is. One existence consists with, is harmonious with, another. All spring from the same will, tend to the same purpose. The more we penetrate into the characteristics of various natures, into the effect which they are calculated to have upon each other, the more traces we find of such a nature. The geologist, the antiquarian, as he opens the closed leaves of the histor y of existence, invariably shows us the will at work consistently, harmoniously with this one thought, viz., mankind, or preparation for mankind, i.e., for a race of beings whose nature it is to attain the

Does matter exist or not? and what is the practical importance of this question?

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Experience and consciousness, not revelation, our witnesses of God.

What is each mind to ask itself, then?

divine nature, God providing in eternity means and inducement for each and all. The true prophet will see vistas in the eternity before us, as the eye, which penetrates into the past, sees them in the past eternity, all disclosing the same will. [JA:] What are to be our witnesses, if not miraculous revelation, is often asked. [MS:] Experience and consciousness—are they not that to which we have to refer for truth, as to our feeling of the existence, the presence of a God? Many say, ‘‘our experience and consciousness tell us nothing of a God.’’ We are not to conclude from this that there is no God. It is man well-born, well-developed and whose present nature is in right exercise (when he tells you his experience and his consciousness) to whom you are to refer. And he cannot be well-born and well-bred and in present right exercise of his nature, unless many besides himself are and have been well-born and well-bred. [JA:] If each individual were to refer to his own experience and consciousness, and question whether there is a God, what would the answer be, supposing him to refer to no authority of book or word, merely to the spirit as interpreting itself, manifesting itself to his spirit, if it does so manifest itself? [MS:] A man is not to set himself down satisfied that there is no God, if his experience and consciousness tell him nothing of one. That the blind man is not conscious of trees and flowers does not prove their non-existence. That the farmer, who has looked at trees and fields, in reference only to value of crops, is conscious of no spirit of love and wisdom speaking in them, does not prove such a spirit a fable. Even the conscientious aspirant after truth, who says, ‘‘O God, if thou dost exist and dost intend that I should know thee, tell me of thy presence,’’ may not conclude that, if he receives no answer, therefore there is no God. For to ask that question thus may not be the way in which the spirit of truth and righteousness sees that it is to be answered. {Omitted JA: Then what are we to do? f78} [MS:] Let each mind ask itself, is there not, if I look through as much of existence as I can take cognizance of, some degree of wisdom and goodness and power above man’s, as the spring of some par t of that existence? If so, is it not important to try to make out something concerning this power and wisdom and goodness? If it is important, let us be ready to wait, still inquiring, while man is so imper fectly constituted and cultivated that we cannot trust his

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answer on a subject which requires the right exercise of all the faculties of all mankind to answer it. My own consciousness is that there is appreciable to my nature a spirit, a will of righteousness, goodness and wisdom in the universe—a spirit of the same nature as that of which I, at times, am conscious in others of mankind, and in myself. Thus much we can say without any straining after mysticism. When we seek truth, if we are not seeking it from man, it is from this spirit that we seek it. Of whom do we seek truth? Whether we seek truth as to a (comparatively speaking) great or a small thing, ‘‘is there a God?’’ or ‘‘what shall be my food?’’ or as to some scientific fact, or in order to arrange the intervals of music so as to produce a scientific and harmonizing effect, we are seeking tr uth of the source of truth. [JA:] Will it not be asked, are you not seeking it of yourself? [MS:] Have I any consciousness that I am the source of truth? I have a consciousness that I am a means of finding truth by the exercise of my faculties. [MS:] How much there is wanted a Baconian way of treating these subjects! Man studying physics says now, ‘‘My assertions and my conjectures shall be founded on phenomena recognized by man’s senses.’’27 May we say of subjects not recognized by the senses, ‘‘My assertions and my conjectures shall be founded on experience and consciousness?’’ To trust to the senses, they must be in a healthy state; to trust to the consciousness of a being, the being must be in a healthy state. But man does not say this, he does not go to his experience for facts, when studying these subjects, he goes to a book for authority. {Omitted JA: It is so dangerous to speculate upon religious subjects. f80} [MS:] That sort of exercise of the mind called speculation is indeed not suited to the nature of the case. But most of those who ‘‘speculate’’ have not a full consciousness that the time is coming, and now is,28 when on the exercise of man’s nature is to depend

Of whom do we seek truth?

Baconian method wanted in religion.

[JA:] ‘‘Speculation is dangerous’’—exercise of man’s nature essential on these subjects.

27 Francis Bacon (1561-1626), whose inductive methodology is set out on The Advancement of Learning, 1605, and The Great Instauration, 1620. 28 A paraphrase of John 4:23.

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[JA:] What will remain?

Religion in these days can be no ‘‘speculation’’ for the intellect: The question is come.

whether mankind have a religion or not. Scarcely any of us, who have been brought up under a supernatural religion, can feel ourselves absolutely dependent on the exercise of mankind’s nature for our conviction. On more or less impression of a supernatural revelation of religion, most of us who have any religion, depend. By degrees the astronomy, the geology, of the Old Testament have been generally rejected as not true. Some now see that the political economy, the moral philosophy, of the New Testament is not always tr ue. [MS:] It will remain that Christ will speak to all eternity the truth that is in him—but what is truth (of that which he is reported to have said) will be sifted by man—and it will be discovered to have spr ung from the exercise of his nature, as in other cases in which man attains truth. Let us bring ourselves clearly to see the state of the case; then we shall see that our consideration of these subjects is not mere speculation for the amusement or gratification of the intellect, but that the question is approaching, Have we, or have we not, a religion? Have we or have we not a Religion now?

Have we or have we not a religion?

Many speculators, probably, are not conscious that this is their question. Vague feelings, which the having taken for granted a supernatural religion has implanted in them, prevent this consciousness. Let us then awaken to a sense that our question is, Does religion exist?—That Christ’s words, or the words of the followers of Christ, contain much of mistake as to God’s nature and laws, as to man’s duty and destination, is proved by discoveries, since the time of Christ, as certainly as such discoveries prove that there are mistakes in the astronomy, etc., of the first chapter of Genesis. The discovery of such mistakes will in no wise prevent our appreciating that which was true and right and loveable in him, but the discovery of such mistakes will prevent our feeling that we may believe in God and a future state, because Christ speaks of God as existing, and of a future life for man as to exist. Let not what we say be supposed to mean that a mode of being, called man, is, by exercising its faculties, to discover a mode of being of different nature, called God. The exercise of the attributes of God, as existing limited by physical law, will reveal those attributes existing unlimited by physical law. God, working truth into the concrete—God, manifesting truth in life and work, thus reveals the thought, the sentiment, the purpose,

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the law, in accordance with which the imperfect lives tr uth progressively, till it rises to the perfect comprehension of the whole. Before belief in the supernatural is quite exhausted, let us strive to work out belief from the workings of our own nature. It is right life which must prepare true belief to be general. {Omitted: JA: And you, who feel such a shrinking from talking to almost anybody on these subjects, how can you expect your religious ideas to become general? MS: A few must work them out, and those few must endeavour to make life prepare others for them. JA: But that is as we should proceed with children. f82} [MS:] Are not almost all mankind children in religion and moral philosophy? If we knew how, we would endeavour to organize life for children, so that it would exercise all their nature. We would then endeavour to have ready at each step assistance for them to express the feelings which such exercise would naturally call out. The life would awaken the heart to ask (Comte’s idea) and the heart would awaken the intellect to answer its questions. We would have matins and vespers, such as the heart and the intellect, thus awakened, would want, as soon as the child was developed enough to accept assistance gladly, in order to express feelings beginning to want expression. The true feeling of the importance of the day begun upon, the true feeling of union in their common work, of the general purport of their common work, we would endeavour to awaken; as also a trueappreciation of God—the all-comprehensive nature, and, when awakened, we would endeavour to help it to the enjoyment of feelings of love, trust, sympathy towards this nature. The peace of the early morn, suitable music and singing, appropriate expression from architecture and painting, all the sources to give to children enjoyment of the religious feelings, which are natural to them, we would seek, with which to begin each day. Each should be a holy-day, a holy day for work pursued with zest, not the misnamed ‘‘holiday,’’ so often wearisome. {Omitted: It seems to me that the regenerate striving to help the unregenerate would look to the life to awaken the feeling, the divinity within, which works, in man, through physical modifications. The regenerate are to keep constantly improving, adapting, modifying life—the heart setting the intellect to work to find right life. In the unregenerate this right life, which the regenerate will organize, will awaken the heart. JA: However you have left the question with which you started, which was, what are we to depend upon for our

Mankind are children in religion and moral philosophy.

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What education in religion is given to children?

belief ? You have a wish to inquire how far we may depend on revelation. MS: Say rather an earnest wish to be awake to the consciousness that we are not depending on any supernatural revelation. f84} (Children are naturally early disposed to religion, and, if they had some help, would accept it gladly.29 [MS:] What is the help offered to them? Doctrines, sermons, prayers, like for the old and young, springing from the thought and feeling of ages ago. Children at eight or nine years old will sometimes find satisfaction in certain modes of their own, certain prayers, and the reading of certain books, but seldom show the least interest in any of the prayers or sermons prepared for them, though they do not object to them, but take for granted that it is right. {Omitted: A child of mine when, I should think, about that age or rather younger, said f87} [MS:] A child of six said to his governess quite simply, ‘‘You don’t think about God; I’m always thinking about God.’’ The husband of Lord Byron’s first nurse says of him that, when ‘‘a mere child,’’ he was ‘‘particularly inquisitive and puzzling about religion.’’ How was this tendency developed? ‘‘I was sent at five years old to school. There I learnt little, except to repeat by rote the first lesson of monosyllables (God made man, let us love Him), by hearing it repeated without learning a letter! Whenever proof was made of my progress at home, I repeated these words with the most rapid fluency, but on turning over a new leaf, I continued to repeat them, so that the narrow boundaries of my first year’s accomplishments were detected, and my ears boxed (which they did not deserve, seeing it was by ear that I had acquired what I had).’’30 {Omitted: I remember myself the feeling that grown-up people did not care about religion as I did. I should like to know how it is with other children. f88} Children generally have the feeling that grown-up people do not care about religion as they do. [JA:] Comte thinks that there is an inevitable resemblance between personal and social progression, and that the ‘‘individual’’ will pursue his ‘‘proper evolution’’ in rising from simple fetishism at the beginning to real polytheism, as did the race before him.31 {Omitted MS: I

29 Nightingale expanded on this in a sermon; see Spiritual Journe y (2:343-44). 30 Thomas Moore, ed., The Works of Lord Byron 1:306; Phyllis Grosskurth, Byron: The Flawed Angel 16. 31 Comte, Système de politique positive 2:84-86 and 3:6.

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recollect no confirmation to this in recalling my own state as a child, nor have I ever observed anything to confirm it in other children. f88} Is there any confirmation of this in any of our experience of children? Such an opinion goes against that which we find to be the case, viz., that it is a part of law that the nature is influenceable. ‘‘Social progression’’ is according to law. So is ‘‘personal progress.’’ But it is a part of law that the wise regenerate may develop truly the ignorant unregenerate. There is no law compelling the unregenerate to go through a definite course of error, as would be the case if each individual must be a fetishist and a polytheist. Till the influence of the regenerate can arrive at the unregenerate, he does so; he sees objects inverted and double, etc., but the purpose of education is to lead from ignorance to truth, not through falsehood. To present that which is truth to the regenerate, but incomprehensible to the unregenerate, would not indeed be leading from ignorance to truth. A true education will gradually develop, following the lead of the questions which seek answer, the feelings which seek gratification. Such an education will not drag each individual through fetishism and polytheism to truth.) Real Grounds on which to build a Religion—What? [MS:] The time is coming when, more and more, others as well as ourselves will discern the little dependence to be placed on supernatural revelation; consequently, let us search to the utmost the real grounds man will have for a religion when the unreal grounds cr umble away beneath him. The divinities of Greece and Rome, how powerful they were! But they are laid low. Hardly a trace of belief in them remains. The belief in all supernatural foundation for religion will give way in like manner. Many ideas in the present theology are more opposed to natural feeling than those which prompted the worship of some of the pagan deities. For example, law is traceable in all existence, in history of ever y kind, history of successive generations, of their opinions, their characters, their actions. In vain, then, should we expect the doctrines of particular providence and of forgiveness of sins to retain their hold on our belief. Yet these doctrines are the staples of religion, as now believed, or as taken for granted. Law is traceable, i.e., glimpses of it have been traced. When law was traced in astronomy and geology, Genesis ceased to be authority in those sciences. When law is traced in the history of events, and in moral philosophy, Christ will no

How far we may depend on revelation.

90 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought longer be considered as supernatural authority, speaking, as He does, of providential interference and forgiveness of sins. And when this day comes, where will be our religion? Religion might be more felt, more comprehended, infinitely more influential on life than it ever has been. But we must work that it may be so. Nothing comes without work. If your work helps another, it is by helping him to work. If circumstances of any kind help a man, it is by helping him to work. Let us not suppose that our highest and best knowledge and feeling and life can come but by work. All must work to reveal our common Father. All must work that the Father, in the Son, may live His thought—that the life of the Son may raise him to partake in the all-comprehending thought of the Father. Does Human Nature make Progress? Does human nature make progress?

Is then human nature so working as to make progress? We should indeed concern ourselves with this question far more than we do. How few ask it, how few care for the answer? But might not human nature make continual progress if mankind would but have it so? What is meant by progress? Advance in becoming what our nature is fitted to become. ‘‘L’éternel devenir’’ [the eternal becoming] is always going on. Mankind is always on the way to progress through God’s will. But there will be no actual progress until it is man’s will to find and pursue the road upon which he should be. Look at the aims of men in general. To earn a livelihood must be the object which mainly directs life in a large proportion of mankind. But how is it with those who are free to employ life as they please? What directs their course? Generally speaking, to live as others live in their line of life. To live thus passes for right, although one part of duty is to meet at church in order to say that all we do is utterly and entirely wrong. But what would we have men do? Could not ‘‘two or three be gathered together,’’32 not to say they do wrong, but to try to find out how to do right, to try to find out from God’s laws what a man should be, how mankind should live? Let us not be satisfied with what we are told by men, although believing themselves inspired to teach us, when we may learn from God Himself through His laws.

32 An allusion to Matt 18:20.

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Men have joined in the attempt to spread what they accepted as tr ue belief, to live according to it. Such were the Moravians, the Quakers, the Roman Catholic religious orders. We hold a different belief as true. We tell it in the hope that what there is of truth in it may sometime reach the minds of men, so that in like manner they may try to live and to gain others to live according to what they accept as truth concerning the nature of the Ruler, and concerning ‘‘the whole duty of man.’’ What is called speculation on religious subjects is now not uncommon. Such a word is entirely unsuited to the subject, which should engage our deepest thoughts, and should lie at the foundation of the whole of our practical life. (Scarcely a day passes but books, by the orthodox and the unorthodox, by men and by women, are advertised, with titles as follow—I take these at random: ‘‘Passing Thoughts on Religion,’’33 ‘‘Musings on Manifestations of God to the Soul of Man.’’34 As for the ‘‘Impressions,’’ the ‘‘Aspirations,’’ their name is legion.35 Now, can we call this anything but imper tinence to God? What should we say if we saw advertised, ‘‘Passing thoughts’’ on hydrostatics, ‘‘Musings’’ on clinical surger y, ‘‘Impressions’’ on life assurances? Ever ybody would laugh, and nobody would read the book. Is religion, confessedly the most important of all subjects, to be the only one on which anybody’s passing thoughts are good enough? Is the nature of God the only science not worth study? I am not aware that any book called ‘‘‘Fancies on Religion’’ has yet appeared, but the title would be by no means a misnomer, for much that is written consists of nothing but fancies. A life of the Virgin Mar y, which I have read, in eight volumes, called ‘‘La Cité Mystique de Dieu,’’ by a Spanish nun, who believed it to be the work of inspiration in her,36 is not more the work of fancy than are some of these Protestant effusions.) On such ‘‘speculation’’ we have no desire to enter. Our object is real practical progress for mankind through true religious belief. We hear of the ‘‘rise and fall’’ of empires. Now one country, now

Speculation on religion.

33 Possibly Charlotte Elizabeth Phelan’s Passing Thoughts, 1838; Nightingale scorned it further in ‘‘A ‘Note’ of Interrogation,’’ in Fraser’s Magazine, in Theology (3:19). 34 Mary Anne Schimmelpenninck, Sacred Musings on Manifestations of God to the Soul of Man, 1860. 35 Mark 5:9. 36 A six-volume French translation was published in 1857 by Marie d’Angreda, La cité mystique de Dieu, soit la vie de la T.S. Vierge Marie.

92 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought another, is in the ascendant. We hardly know why or wherefore. Real continuous progress for mankind at large will only be through men uniting to learn from God’s laws what man ought to be, how men ought to live—through their uniting to bring about that so men shall be, so men shall live. Not Criticism, not Speculation, but Search for Truth Criticism on Religion, not search for tr uth, characteristic of these times.

In our times there is also much critical observation on religious subjects, showing doubt or disbelief of creeds, of which the foundation is miraculous revelation, but there is no strong or united purpose to find out what is tr ue on religious subjects. There are reasons now increasing in force why the time is coming, and now is, when those who doubt or disbelieve are called upon to look for what they can believe, what they ought to believe if they can. The belief of universal and invariable law has necessarily gained ground gradually, because its foundation is observation and experience. To those who in past ages had not the possibility of recognizing law, it was natural to see superhuman power chiefly in the more interesting and startling events of life, and to seek help through prayer or other means, which human experience represented as likely to please or propitiate. Men could not then believe what now stands on evidence. They naturally imagined a revelation which satisfied their (then) moral and physical wants. But more light has been gained, more truth on morals, on physics, and now if we would look, we might find a revelation founded on evidence to all, not on hearsay to a few. People who inquire on religious matters generally take separate subjects, or whatever may have happened to attract their attention. ‘‘What is the evidence for the existence of a God?’’ We have endeavoured to show how vague is this question, since no one word has been used to express such different conceptions as have been included in the word ‘‘God.’’ ‘‘Is there a future state?’’ means often (perhaps generally) is the future state to be, which is alluded to rather than described in the Bible? Are we all to be called to account for our actions, and rewarded or condemned accordingly, to live above the clouds ‘‘in the bosom of Christ,’’ ‘‘to be called to glory,’’ or to suffer ‘‘everlasting damnation?’’ The intellect of the day rebels against such belief, but constructs no other.

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Or ‘‘have there been miracles?’’ or ‘‘how shall this or that passage in the ‘sacred writings’ be understood?’’ Or questions arise in the various existing churches or religious associations as to particular doctrines or modes of government. Criticism on Religion not Search for Truth All these questions, pertinent in their day, and to be respected while they were suitable to that phase of human nature, to that state of human knowledge, are left behind, if God’s universal, invariable law is recognized. And the questions which God’s laws reveal to us, as those which we ought to ask, which include all others, become those with which we set out. The answers to them refer to every human being: those with whose sufferings before we were born we have sympathized, those whom in our day we love or yearn to help, those whom we are to leave behind in the struggle of this life when our own is over. Will some answer, ‘‘I do not feel these struggles; life is joyous and pleasant?’’ Such have not known human life: their feeling is more that of butterflies than of men. The answers to these questions would be one truth for all, one principle in life for all, one truth lived, worked out in all human life, though in ever-var ying ways. ‘‘Unity of belief’’ has been fought for, str uggled for by fire and sword. The most grievous torments which man has inflicted on man have been, sometimes conscientiously, sometimes from selfish motives, inflicted to bring about unity of belief. From a spirit of truth and duty men have borne, and sometimes inflicted, these terrible sufferings. Now some satisfy themselves with excluding persons supposed to hold ‘‘dangerous opinions’’ from their society, and from certain employments, while others, called ‘‘liberal,’’ say ‘‘all men cannot think alike.’’ Rather say, all cannot believe certain doctrines which (they are told on human authority) stand on divine authority. There is truth referable to divine authority, for which there is evidence, which all may examine and understand, evidence which not only all men can believe, but which none can help believing (that is, none that have healthy well-developed minds), if it were only well explained. It is not the case now in astronomy, that some believe that the earth goes round the sun, others that the sun goes round the earth. If religion rested on evidence addressed to those powers and feelings in our nature which are capable of receiving it, as little would

94 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought some believe in the ‘‘atonement,’’ others not; some in ‘‘eternal punishment,’’ others not, etc. For the following propositions this section is intended to lay the way: 1. Evidence of the universal and invariable law on which our creed is founded. 2. How, if universal and invariable law be admitted, the questions hereafter proposed will arise. 3. How, if universal and invariable law be admitted, it will give answers to these questions. Our Creed—What is it? Our creed, what is it?

We have spoken of law as revelation, which stands on evidence to all mankind, who cannot all accept any of those revelations, each of which is by some believed in. Why do we expect so much from this ‘‘law’’? In the succession of phenomena, physical and mental—in the change throughout all that is susceptible of change, which the present exhibits from the past, what is now shows this relation to the past, viz., that it is conditional on the past; it is not merely that there is a change from the past. Even this is not at once obvious. We learn partly from what may be now observed, partly from inference from such observation, that since this world existed as a solid ball, it has had a past of ages, exceeding in number such number as our minds can form any conception of. We learn of changes taking place in what seems least to change, in the ocean’s bed, in what we call the ‘‘everlasting hills’’; we go on to learn that such great and remarkable changes come to pass by small and imperceptible changes, not to be conceived, only to be expressed by saying, that all that is, all that has existence (except the unchanging One, whose will is the source of all other being), is always changed in time present from what it was in time past. That present time, so quickly passing, that before we can say, before we can think that it is, it is gone; yet has changed all existence but the One who directs all. It is not merely to be observed that there is change. The ver y change may be observed to arise out of some definite conditions in the past, and in what co-exists with each change. What is, would not have been, if those definite past and co-existing conditions had not existed. Herein is exemplified what we mean by law. Preceding, simultaneous with each individual physical phenomenon, each state of mind, there have been and are conditions without which that particular phenomenon or state of mind would

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not have been. It would be again—the same conditions existing. But they never will exist again precisely. Mark the eternal road, without beginning, without end, in which all that is marches, ever the same in principle, tending all the same way. In all that is now there is repetition of what has been, but also variety, never exactly the same, never quite different. For the conditions which regulate the present are never quite different, nor quite the same, but enough the same, differing enough to reveal that the resemblance and the difference mark a relation, a connection, which is what we intend to express when we say that all change manifests law as the constitution of each individuality manifests law. The history of each individuality, the tendency of that history, manifests law. If this has been, that is invariably. If this is, that will be certainly. This is maintained on no man’s ipse dixit,37 or opinion, or belief, that it has been revealed by Omnipotence to men long ago departed from this world. It is open to all men to examine whether it is or is not so. Observe, examine, vast nature is before you. Your own thoughts, what you wish, what you will, the consciousness ever present to you (which is yourself ), all is there to answer the question whether this is true or not of law. But why should we ask? That there is good reason for asking may be shown. 2 Belief, and Belief as Including Spirituality [A dialogue among St Ignatius of Loyola, Jacob Abbott and M.S.] St Ig] What right has any human being to say ‘‘this will be,’’ ‘‘this will not be’’? [MS:] 1. Have we not certain faculties to guide our belief? or are we sent here to be in doubt about everything, to consider ourselves presumptuous whenever we do believe? Has not God given us means of belief? The senses assure us of some things, the reason, the feeling, the conscience, of others. [MS:] If the eye is diseased, we see falsely; if the reason, feeling, etc., are so, we judge and feel untruly. In both cases we must take care to keep our sources of information in a healthy state. ‘‘If thine eye be single thy whole body shall be full of light.’’38

1. Belief.

[St Ig:] How can we know that our reason, our feeling, our conscience tell us true?

37 ‘‘As he himself said,’’ a phrase used by the followers of Pythagoras, a statement resting on someone’s authority. 38 Matt 6:22.

96 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought [St Ig:] How are we to purify our sources of information to be sure that they are the oracles of God?

Atonement.

Worship.

Inspiration.

[MS:] ‘‘If any man shall do His will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God’’39 or not. If you will carry your belief into your practice you will soon find out whether it is true. How do we act with the impressions of our senses? We test their conclusions by comparing them with those of mankind. But do we act thus with regard to the conclusions of faith? We compare them with those of two or three who lived two thousand years ago, at a time when printing, science, philosophy, were unknown, when men had but little communication with each other, and scarcely any knowledge of the laws of God. {Omitted St Ig: Then you believe in no inspiration, no atonement and no Christ? f92} [MS:] Christ, indeed, came into the world to save sinners,40 to wash them in his blood. To deliver man from sin and its consequences, to establish the kingdom of Heaven within him, to at-one him with God—were truly Christ’s mission and that of many more upon the earth. These things will be attained, and would not have been attained without Christ. He suffered, and not only he, but all have suffered for the sin of men; we all bear their sins in our bodies and souls. If there be any gratitude, and if there be any love, to him must ever rise our love and our gratitude, when our hearts are warm and our feeling is true. {Omitted St Ig: But not our worship? MS: With regard to worship, I do not see what true feeling the word worship expresses. JA: Then are you a Unitarian? ff92-93} With regard to worship, what true feeling does the word worship express? [MS:] The Unitarians say that no man is divine, none an incarnation of God, the Trinitarians that there was one. What do we mean by a man being divine, or an incarnation of God? Are not all men ‘‘incarnations’’ of God, in proportion as they receive truth as truth is to God, as they think His thought, partake His consciousness, are one with Him? Do not all men partake this blessed oneness in proportion as in them are kept the conditions on which, in accordance with God’s will, it depends? So strong is our conviction of this that insofar as to recognize divinity in one man is better than in none, Trinitarianism is a truer doctrine than Unitarianism.

39 John 7:17. 40 1 Tim 1:15, quoted in the ‘‘comfortable words’’ spoken by the priest after confession, Book of Common Prayer.

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{Omitted St Ig: Oh! to be as you are without authority for a faith! I would not be in such a condition, no, not for worlds. MS: I think with you that it is dreadful to be without authority. . . . We are the vessels—He fills them and we have to keep the vessels pure. f93} Authority [MS:] We agree with the Roman Catholic, that it is dreadful to be without authority. But we have authority. Is not God Himself authority? We are but the vessels. He fills them, and we must keep the vessels unsoiled and pure. It is said that those who do not admit ‘‘authority’’ do not know when it is God that speaks, and when it is the excitement of a cup of coffee—that they cannot tell whether their vessel be pure. Swedenborg’s41 was pure, and St Francis of Assisi’s42 was pure, yet they came to different conclusions. (We may naturally be mistaken in what God says to us, because we have to construct for ourselves and each other the vessel into which the Holy Ghost enters, and often inevitably it becomes occupied with other ghosts. It is truly remarkable, indeed, how some have believed that Christ said to them what they said to themselves, and this with the printed book before them. Little, indeed, does that book probably represent Christ—as little as other books of men’s sayings and doings represent them. Still, it assures us that he did not think what he has since been said to have thought.) In many of these cases we can see what part of the nature it was which was left out in coming to the conclusions in question. Unless a proposition can be felt by the feeling, approved by the sense of justice, conscience or whatever other faculties we perceive in man, and unless we have evidence for it from the reason, it ought not to be admitted as a truth. Where one or more of these faculties are deficient, it ought not to surprise us, neither in ourselves nor in others, that a supposed tr uth is not perceived. It is probable that a man, without the idea of causation, which generates the impression of power or cause—without imagination, which gives the sense of reality, and invests our idea with form, ‘‘a local habitation and a name’’—which enables us

Authority.

41 Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772), founder of a Unitarian-like society. 42 Francis of Assisi (1181-1226), founder of the Franciscan order, which required a radically simple lifestyle.

98 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought to form a conception of something not perceived by the senses, and to give it a presence and life—without the faculties which produce the desire of accounting for phenomena, of finding an intelligent personal power, whose thoughts correspond to what we observe in the external world—it is probable that, without these faculties, man would not arrive at any idea of a God at all, and faith in Him would be impossible. [JA:] Let us suppose that we give up the usual means of receiving tr uth from church or book, [MS:] and that we seek it from God through our own faculties, including the spiritual, the affectional, the intellectual and the physical, and including what these can receive from God by means of the same faculties in mankind as well as in our individual selves. It seems important that the thinkers of the present day (men disgusted with church and book as authority) should be fully aware of this, understanding, however, that from book and church we may learn, inasmuch as therein is also to be found exercise of human faculty. [St Ig:] But each man individually is to be called upon to make out what his faculties can accept as true of the exercise of other men’s faculties. [MS:] And here is, in reality, no difference from the present state of things in one sense, though in another there is such an essential difference—for now every man in reality decides for himself. [St Ig:] It is said the church decides for him. [MS:] But if he does not decide by reason, he decides by feeling or by some exercise of his nature what he can or will accept, be he Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Quaker, atheist, deist, etc. We believe that all the faculties of all mankind should be exercised to receive the revelation of God to man. The Roman Catholic, the Anglican, etc., exercise a very limited number of faculties in what they receive as revelation. [JA:] When, indeed, we have settled with ourselves, what is the nature of revelation, we shall still unconsciously derive our belief from former sources of belief. [MS:] Great care will be necessary that it should not be entirely so derived. And, inasfar as it is, it will gain less hold upon those inquiring minds, whose strong impulse it is to doubt, to fear prejudice. {Omitted JA: Well then, let us come to the point—how much do you say that you can assert without the aid of church or book? f96}

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What can we assert concerning God? [MS:] Perhaps wisdom, superior to man’s, is the only attribute undoubtedly, distinctly revealed (not by inference) in the existences among which we find ourselves, and which we are capable of investigating. {Omitted JA: And not benevolence? f96} [MS:] To say that benevolence, greater than man’s, may be recognized in the universe, is an assertion not distinctly provable. There may be and have been, among mankind, some of infinite benevolence. Men have been found (and women too) eager, to the utmost possibility of each, in well-wishing or benevolence: ready to do, to sacrifice to their utmost possibility. How can we assert God to be more benevolent than this? For righteousness’ sake, too, men have been found willing to do, to suffer anything possible to them. {Omitted JA: But Power, you can assert without danger that Power, above human, is distinctly discernible. f97} [MS:] As to power, perhaps its essential is wisdom. In the course of eternity, we shall perhaps make out, in considering these subjects, that man will rise to perfection of wisdom, to entire union with the Father, to being, in fact, of the Father. But, at present, may we not assert that such wisdom, i.e., such adaptation of means to purpose, such conception of righteous and true purpose is not possible to man? {Omitted JA: I think we may safely assert that. MS: Do you know, I feel more doubt of the latter assertion than that the former cannot be made? JA: Do not say so—many will be shocked at this. f97} [MS:] Shall we be shocked at thinking that the perfectly Righteous, Wise, Benevolent, Powerful, should will that, in the course of eternity, His child, mankind, should partake in all He is and has— not as a gift to passive recipients (the notion of which would be a contradiction to wisdom and righteousness), but as worked out in and by themselves, for themselves and for each other. {Omitted St Ig: Well, then, in the way of assertion, all you come to is this, I take you upon your own showing to fix the limit of your assertion. . . . f98} [St Ig:] That we may discern, in the universe, wisdom greater than mankind has been or is capable of, is then, perhaps, the only assertion we can directly make. [JA:] We have a great, though confused, fear of referring to material nature to reveal God to man. [MS:] We see, indeed, that material nature, where its laws are best understood, frequently does not reveal God. It is notorious how little of spirituality, of feeling of religion,

What can we assert without authority? Wisdom superior to man’s. Benevolence greater than man’s?

Power above human?

Reference to material nature to reveal God to man.

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Intellectual appreciation of God.

there is among natural philosophers, generally speaking. The nature must be in a state to venerate, to admire, to love, to sympathize, to comprehend and distinguish purpose. Otherwise in one of its most interesting moments (that of dying), with great knowledge of material laws, it may be occupied (as was one of our most distinguished scientific men) in trying whether it can do a sum, instead of being, at such a moment, attuned to spiritual communication with God, to affectionate communication with man. {Omitted JA: And does not all that prove to you how unsafe intellectual appreciation of God is? f98} [MS:] It was the wisdom and benevolence perceptible in material nature which revealed God to the simple and feeling nature of an operative whom I once knew, and who had been an atheist. And he looked to this revelation for those other natures with which he was best acquainted. ‘‘I would lead them on to science,’’ he said, ‘‘and science would lead them up to God.’’ Such revelation by no means does away with spirituality. Perhaps wisdom, distinguishable as above that of man, as fulfilling a purpose which the spirit of righteousness and benevolence in man would fulfill if it could, may be the most distinct revelation of the all to the part, of the spiritual unconnected with matter to the spiritual connected with and limited by matter. In proportion as man increases in righteousness and benevolence, he will rejoice to trace a nature in existence, with which his own is in sympathy, but which has wisdom beyond his own present possibility, which present possibility, however, he may be constantly increasing. {Omitted JA: I have two questions to ask before I can let you go on. First, I must call upon you to define the word spirituality—for I think you are falling into the error which you deprecate in Newman. Secondly, are you not now in contradiction with yourself? Why have not natural philosophers more feeling of religion, if we are to look to a revelation in material nature? f99} As including Spirituality

2. Belief as including spirituality.

[MS:] 2. It has been truly said that a great advance in any one line of human thought demands ‘‘the parallel movement of all the rest’’; otherwise spirituality declines. Laplace, Comte and various natural philosophers, anatomists, political economists (who have acquired great knowledge of truth in one direction for mankind), have yet made ‘‘but an exchange of ignorance’’ for ignorance in a domain of truth more essential to well-being than that in which

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they have worked. [JA:] There is no part of truth in which ignorance of some other part does not impede the benefit of the former to man. [MS:] But it would seem that progress in some domains of truth may be made, irrespective of ignorance in others. The astronomer, for instance, may inform himself of the law while in ignorance of the Legislator. But he who studies the nature of the Legislator cannot advance so well without knowledge of the wisdom revealed by His laws. Whatever contributes to the advance of man’s nature from the imper fect towards the perfect, whatever helps ignorance to knowledge, helps us to know and feel the Father, to enrich His Holy Spirit as existing within each of us. It was wisely said by an atheist that ‘‘to try to remedy the evils of man’s way of life was a necessary preparation for the study of God’s nature, if there were a God.’’ But to carry on the study of His nature, at the same time, would help to remedy the evils of man’s life. [JA:] Great attempts are now being made to remedy the evils of man’s life by the philanthropic political economists, the enlightened educationists of the present day. Combe, Ellis, Owen,43 Mill, Comte, all, though of such different creeds, have made a decided advance in the line of benevolent social economy. [MS:] And if to the influence of all these could be added a religious influence, such a teaching might succeed in so uniting human beings in the sympathies of love, duty, trust, as to effect a right social state. But never will this be, while the Holy Spirit is banished, while the sun of man’s existence shines not within, while the Son is without reverence, love, trust, duty towards the Father, the Perfect. There is one singular similarity in the teaching of all those above mentioned, dissimilar as they are in other respects, a want of spirituality. Comte’s ‘‘Grand-Être,’’ what has it been if we read man’s histor y? Have we there food for reverence, love, trust? Can we live on the wish to improve this abstract ‘‘Grand-Être’’? Does Comte say, God is incomprehensible, this ‘‘Grand-Être’’ comprehensible?

Why have not natural philosophers more feeling of religion, if a revelation is to be found in material nature?

Decided advance in education, but not in the education of spirituality.

43 Robert Owen (1771-1858), leader of the co-operative movement, referred to above as the ‘‘Owenites’’; William Ellis, author of Outlines of Social Economy 1850.

102 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought What is Spirituality? Spirituality, what is it?

[JA:] How to obtain spirituality.

[JA:] What do we mean by spirituality? [MS:] Is it not feeling, as distinct both from intellect and from the affection of one human being to another? We do not call love, admiration, reverence, for a human being, spirituality, nor the trust which one human being has in another. These we call humanizing influences, but feelings called forth by the consciousness of a presence of higher nature than human, unconnected with the material, these we call spiritual influences; and this we are conscious is the highest capability of our nature. Whenever we love, admire, reverence, trust this higher presence—whenever we sympathize with, partake in the purpose, thought, feeling, of this highest presence—these are our best moments. Sympathy with man, interest in any right or innocent object, is not excluded by this higher state, is never indeed perfectly right and healthy, except in connection with it. [MS:] There are modes (all in accordance with law) of vivifying and strengthening spirituality or sensuality. The ‘‘Puseyites’’44 were among the first in England who revived the assertion of a perfect moral code as binding upon young men at college, and the possibility of maintaining it. They (those ‘‘holy youths,’’ as we may well call them), checked sensuality by means accordant with law. They had rules for the purpose. We might practise modes of increasing spirituality equally definite. [St Ig:] Fasting and prayer are usually supposed to be these modes. [MS:] All undue or inappropriate care for anything does indeed check spirituality. The saints discovered this, experimentally, no doubt. So they took to banishing agreeable food and cheerful converse, even where not wrong. Their idea has been very ill-appreciated in after ages, which the mistakes they made have sent wrong in a contrar y direction. Except in a few great instances (St Bernard, St Ignatius [of] Loyola, St Vincent of Paul,45 etc.) denying the flesh its due made it only cry out, instead of leaving the being free for highest things. But the wish, the seeking for spirituality, which inspired a few among the saints, was, perhaps, higher than anything

44 From the high church movement, ‘‘Puseyite’’ movement founded by Edward Bouverie Pusey (1800-82). 45 Bernard (1090-1153), abbot of Clairvaux and monastic reformer; Vincent de Paul (1581-1660), founder of the Lazarist order and the Daughters of Charity.

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now existing. {Omitted JA: But you surely think that there was something intensely selfish in the monastic life. f103} [MS:] Many went to convents and hermitages, hoping to win heaven or ward off hell, many to be applauded or to gain in some way in this world, many thinking to do God service, or give Him pleasure by sacrificing themselves or worshipping Him. But there is evidence that a few sought a spiritual state of being as their object, which no church, scarcely any individual, seeks now. Spiritualism is dormant, not dead, let us hope. How to revive it, to rekindle it into life, is the great question. {Omitted St Ig: But do you not find it among the Catholics? f103} [MS:] It is said that the Roman Catholic Church in France of the present day, Montalembert’s school,46 is trying to revive it. But it seems that safety is what mainly has attracted converts to Roman Catholicism {and Puseyism} here. {Omitted JA: Well, if you don’t see spirituality in the church, do you see it among your unbelievers? f104} [MS:] The spirit of our operatives is far from being spiritual. It is quite in an opposite direction. So are all the tendencies of the age. In a much more ignorant and savage age it does not appear to have been so. Man goes a weary course away from spirituality while learning the laws and capabilities of matter. Is not the time come when he may return to it, with reason and knowledge as a foundation for what was before unconscious impulse? {Omitted St Ig: But give us an instance in history of what you mean. f104}

Monastic life.

Safety the object of religionists now.

Spirituality in England.

Safety, not Spirituality, often sought [MS:] The Jews (perhaps naturally) showed examples of more than common spirituality, because they were less adapted (through their laws and government) to advance in improving the material world. They were a striking failure as a people, though they produced a few spiritual natures, not to be equalled elsewhere. Compare the words, which dropped unstudied from the lips of Jesus, with the words of Marcus Antoninus,47 thought out with care, wise in all but

Among the Jews.

46 Charles René Forbes Montalembert (1810-70), leader of a Catholic faction in the Second Empire. 47 Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121-80 ce), Roman emperor, whose Meditations Nightingale had studied.

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Among the saints.

Spirituality when man meets man is not sought after now.

Where is spirituality then to be found?

the highest wisdom. {Omitted St Ig: Ah! you know I can’t admit your comparison, because I think that Jesus was God. Let us return to the spirituality of the saints. f104} [MS:] Those who have desired to commune with God have generally fled from man. An old saint (who used to live alone, always writing, receiving any who wished to consult him), in answer to a question, ‘‘Have we nothing to do in life then?’’ said, ‘‘Yes, much to do, it is as if we were eggs; there is much to be done to keep off that which would destroy,’’—a natural error, since practically, as things are now, man destroys the spiritual in his association with man. Perhaps, in blessed moments, man (or rather I should say woman) is with God in lonely places. But is it often so in company? The prayer meeting of our poor Wesleyans48 is an attempt to unite in seeking the presence of God in the heart. But is there any such attempt, in or out of churches, in general, where man meets man now? We go to church as a ‘‘duty,’’ not to meet God. Do we not, in general, part with God (if we had somewhat realized His presence) when we enter man’s presence? {Omitted JA: That is a melancholy fact, if it is true. f105} [MS:] But we must enter man’s presence to do our work, and our work, though right to do it, is it not generally such, or in such circumstances, so ill-understood, either in theory or practice, that it separates us from Him? Sympathy, in high things, is, as life and companionship are now, impossible to most. Most do not even know what it is. Those who appreciate its worth seldom can have it. The convent was an attempt to secure training for God’s work, association in that work, sympathy in highest things for those who, then as now, without its support, could not have had these. {Omitted JA: I understand your enthusiasm for the monastic life better than I did. But I want to know, are then those who can appreciate sympathy in high things, but cannot have it, necessitated to starve? f106} Must, then, those who can appreciate sympathy in high things, but cannot have it, necessarily starve? [MS:] It is hard to be without such sympathy, but there remains within our reach ‘‘the peace of God which passeth all understanding.’’ ‘‘God is life,’’ ‘‘God is love,’’49 His peace shall dwell with us. 48 Wesleyans or Methodists, after John Wesley (1703-91); there were many Wesleyan chapels in Derbyshire and the Nightingales supported them. 49 Phil 4:7 and 1 John 4:8.

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His life and love shall be life and love to us, even when we cannot have sympathy: not to stand in place of it, but to keep us ready for it, to nourish us when we are without it. {Omitted JA: But there are so many now who don’t believe in a god and there will be more. f106} Is ‘‘the Name of the Lord’’ being lost? [MS:] It seems very strange that, when such men as St Ignatius [of] Loyola, St Bernard and Wesley could find no peace without finding God, and travelled up and down the earth in search of Him, very strange that there should be some now denying that there is a God, others saying that we cannot know anything of Him, if he exists. A large majority of our world, at least in England, is very near losing His name. In the minority we hear much of the Name, but how often it is but a name, without any conception, or any attempt at conception, of the character of God. We accept what men called God long ago. We do not care to inquire whether the human mind, through its progress in different directions, might not receive enlightenment concerning God beyond that of past ages. ‘‘To proclaim the name of the Lord’’50 was once felt a high mission. That name should now tell us of One more great and good than was then proclaimed. ‘‘Who shall by searching find out God?’’51 There is true feeling in those words, if we accept them as indicating that we cannot find him out ‘‘to perfection.’’ But there is great danger in them if they satisfy us in not seeking what more and more we may know and feel of God if we will. To proclaim the character of the Lord, how he reveals it to us if we will—what a mission that would be for a Saviour of this day! The most moral and the most intellectual of the English artizans are now learning to live satisfied without Him, and really seem to think it does not signify His not being there. And they are not likely to feel any want. They live in a state of triumph. And they have morality; they have sympathy; they have benevolence; they will not feel these wants. If a man were alone, he might come to feel the want of God. But these say, ‘‘I don’t know whether there is a God or not, but if there is, I cannot understand Him, and it is, therefore, no use to seek Him.’’ It seems curious that it should be so, while others in former times have felt His presence—felt that it was the one essen-

50 An allusion to Exod 33:19. 51 A paraphrase of Job 11:7.

Is the name of God being lost, or what we may learn of Him, in England?

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Revelation of a spirit of wisdom by its manifestations.

tial to make life worth having, and that all else might be dispensed with if that remained. Oh! how to keep that sunshine in our hearts? Experience must show to each. Experience! a word misapplied by the Methodists, because their experience was not of what was wisely sought, but of what was ignorantly, unwisely sought. Thus they thought that that was come from God which came from distempered spirits. {Omitted JA: We have wandered far from your assertion. f107} [JA:] To return to the assertion that we are made conscious of the existence of a spirit of wisdom, above present human possibility by its various (and not only its material) manifestations. [MS:] Material manifestations may go on forever without man having consciousness of the spirit of wisdom—revelation of a spirit requires existence of a spirit to which it is revealed. Sounds are heard by many an ear, sights beheld by many an eye—the ear and the eye being formed with all cunning skill, but no chord is str uck on a spiritual existence. To some, the voice of time has no solemnity. It will simply announce the recurrence of the trifling routine observances of the day. To others, that solemn voice will seem to lay open divine things, high objects, a great presence in the coming day. We cannot take too much care to separate the questions, ‘‘What is?’’ and ‘‘What ought to be?’’ Yet we are perpetually confounding them. Sometimes the former really answers the latter; but how often it is supposed to do so when it does not—how often is the ‘‘what is’’ supposed to be the ‘‘what ought to be.’’ Revelation of a Spirit of Wisdom

What belief in God ought to arise from contemplation of material existence.

[JA:] How ought belief in God to arise from the contemplation of material existence? [MS:] Oersted’s aim is to establish that ‘‘throughout all worlds are beings fundamentally similar in their rational faculties, both to each other and to the eternal living reason of God.’’ This is intelligible, for wherever rational faculties exist, there exists God. But Comte, whose ‘‘Grand-Être’’ is mankind, is unintelligible. Does not what we recognize of existence call upon us to believe that there is a thought, a sentiment, a purpose which comprehends all existence? Such a thought and purpose certainly exists in no man, nor in all men put together. For all mankind long thought themselves living on a flat, stationary sur face. Whose thought and purpose, then, was this star among stars revolving round the sun? Can this

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question be avoided? In all cases where such thought and purpose have been manifested as consist with man’s faculties, we unhesitatingly answer that man has been the thinker and purposer. Why, when thought and purpose of the same nature are manifested, only exhibiting capability more than man’s, are we still to say, man is the only thinker and purposer, or to say, all that exists is developing itself into perfection by some self-resident nature? To account for this development, we want a thought, a purpose, a will, in which resides this development. The words ‘‘Father,’’ ‘‘Son’’ and ‘‘Holy Ghost’’ are wearisome to many, and certainly those with whom these words originated used them in a widely different sense from what we should wish to do. But thus only is there consistency in all existence, concerning which we know anything. And does not any attempt at accounting for what exists mean the finding one existence consistent with the same thought and purpose as another? This consistency is found only in supposing a perfect thought, sentiment, purpose, to exist, in supposing the nature of this existence to be perfect goodness, benevolence, wisdom, righteousness. If such a nature existed, what would be its will? To communicate such a nature. But would it be wisdom to communicate itself entirely into the finite and imperfect? Would not the development then want a thought, a purpose, a developer, whose will should be wise and right development? That developer, that will, may rightly be called Father, or ‘‘Grand-Être,’’ or God. That which is developing may rightly be called Son, or manifestation. Thus is consistency in all existence. If we may believe in this, all that we know of what is, what has been, or appears likely to be, is one consistent whole, attributable to one thought and purpose. We cannot, indeed, prove such a thought and purpose to exist. But the more man has learnt and done, the more evidence comes into view for it. Through much of man’s existence there has been such a want to believe in a Father, or there has been such a sentiment that a power above man’s did exist, and did influence man’s fate, that men have betaken themselves to sacred men and books for proof of such a power. As men grew wiser, in some respects, than these sacred men and books, they cast them off, and such men and books have now an actual influence against belief in a developer. But is this developer, this spring of the development, merely a will ? We cannot call it a superintending will, for, in each present time,

108 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought the whole of eternity exists as a will in the developer. To superintend implies to direct particulars. Perhaps, here we come to the acknowledgment that we cannot understand the Father. We cannot understand the nature of His existence. We can only say, per fect wisdom, goodness, power, wills the right development of all other existence in eternity. Is belief in a will possible? What is the communication between this Being and us?

We must put ourselves into circumstances to understand Him.

[JA:]Not wait passively for those circumstances.

[JA:] If there is such a nature, what would such a nature say to me? how would it direct me? what would it feel to me? how shall I at-one myself with it? [MS:] This may be called our intercourse with the Holy Ghost. [JA:] The Father exists as a will, willing that the whole shall thus develop itself, because thus only can being become well-being—the Father exists to communicate His nature, in proportion as the Son, the recipient, by development and exercise of his nature, fits himself to receive it—the Father is the thought and purpose and will which develops. The Father is the communicator, in proportion as the development of the Son makes it possible to him to receive the communication. The Father is wisdom, goodness, love, righteousness, power. But how shall I understand Him? how receive this communication, receive Himself? is our cry. [MS:] Ask yourself what would wisdom, love, righteousness, in each particular instance, say. Exercise your nature so as to be wise, loving, righteous. Thus you will understand Him. Thus He will become part of your being. It is true that for this you must put yourself in circumstances wholesome for your nature. Then you will discern the Father—then you will love the loveable—trust the wise and omnipotent—sympathize with the good and true. [MS:] We are not to wait passively for such circumstances; we are to think, to work for them; or, if we have not the opportunity to work directly for them in the present, we are to try to prepare our being, our nature, for the time in which the opportunity for such work is sure to come, {Omitted JA: Why sure? f112} [MS:] sure and certain, other wise there would be no Father, no per fect spirit. Try for accordance with that spirit—try to be consistently with what you believe. Then shall waters gush out of the rocky desert,52 which

52 An allusion to Ps 78:20.

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shall keep you alive till you have passed through it to rich and fruitful regions. 3 Plan of Creation [A dialogue among St Ignatius of Loyola, Harriet Martineau, Jacob Abbott and M.S.] (The word ‘‘creation’’ is retained here solely to mean manifestation of thought and purpose in human existence. There appears to be no evidence, physical or moral, for what the word was formerly used to express. No controversy is meant to be entered into here on the subject. But, till a new word is accepted, it seemed better to retain the old one—because the definition of it is not here practically necessar y.) [MS:] Wh at was God’s purpose in creating us? [St Ig:] Some say He created us for His glory, to honour and to serve Him. Others say that this is ascribing a motive, viz., vanity, to God—which we should not dare to assign to a good man—in whom all regard for his own glor y is supposed to be extinguished. {Omitted HM: For the glory, do you think? For the vanity, you mean. What a motive you ascribe to God. [St Ig:] By His glory we do not mean His vain glory. All things were created for His glory, that is, for the manifestation of Himself. Man is created to serve God and all other things are to help him to attain the end of his creation. The world was made too as a means for this end—to help man to serve God. f113} MS:] Some think that God created man for happiness. Others say that they see so much suffering that either happiness is not God’s purpose, or if it is, He fails in it. [MS:] The argument that suffering brings forth greater general happiness than there could be without suffering is met by the objection [JA:] that God is, in that case, wanting either in omnipotence or in benevolence. If He is benevolent, He will desire to avoid all suffering; if He is omnipotent, He will be able to do it, i.e., to secure the highest good without the suffering. {Omitted MS: But He will not desire to do it, if suffering is to be the best means of producing the highest general good. [MS:] This is really saying that there can be no existence but God’s—although, if there were no other existence, He would not be God. For there is no per fect happiness but God’s.

God’s purpose in creating us. For His glory?

For our happiness?

But how is this borne out by the fact? for we are not happy.

If perfect happiness is to be the creation of per fect benevolence, then there must be two Gods, the creator and the created.

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For without per fect goodness and perfect wisdom there can be no perfect happiness.

[HM:] It is vain to say, that ‘‘to each being must be its own happiness,’’ that the drunkard finds a different happiness from yours, and you again one different from that of the being whom you call God. This is merely the confusion of a word. You cannot call the dr unkard’s enjoyment happiness, nor indeed that of most of us. {Omitted HM: Then what a cruel Being you make your God, who denies to almost all His creation the happiness which He enjoys Himself. JA: What is happiness? f114} [MS:] For is not happiness the right satisfaction of all our capabilities, whether of mind, of soul, or of heart? Now the man does not exist, and has perhaps not yet existed, all whose faculties were receiving employment and satisfaction, including reason, feeling, conscience, imagination, or whatever other faculties may be assigned in our nomenclature to man. [MS:] Therefore, there is no per fect happiness but God’s, because He is the only spirit of perfect right and truth. And without per fect right and truth, there can be no perfect happiness. {Omitted HM: That is true and therefore f115} That is the very reason why, say many, we would not have created man, had we been God. Yet if He, the perfect benevolence, did not desire other happiness than His own, He would not be God. [JA:] And if He were to create other beings, perfectly good and perfectly wise, that would be creating other Gods. [MS:] For how can beings be perfectly good, if they are not perfectly wise? If we are to suppose a limitation of their faculties, there must be ignorance; and if there be ignorance, there must be error, and therefore sin, and therefore partial unhappiness. What beings should we then conceive that God would create? {Omitted: St Ig: Well, let us suppose God in the act of creation—no other being yet in existence. JA: But we know that such a state of things is impossible—that we can form no idea of beginnings. St Ig: Yes, I am only supposing ourselves cognizant of no other existence but God’s. What beings should we now conceive that God would create? f116} What Beings would a Perfect God create?

What beings should we suppose that perfect righteousness would create?

[MS:] Unless we admit that to will limited (though progressive) happiness is consistent with the spirit of perfect right, with the existence of perfect benevolence and wisdom, and of omnipotence to effect the will of perfect benevolence and wisdom, we come at

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once to a direct contradiction. We assert that no nature but that of God the Father can exist, and yet, if no other nature existed, He would not be God. For granting that a perfect nature is essential to perfect happiness, then in God the Father alone exist the attributes essential to per fect happiness, namely, per fect goodness, power, oneness with all truth. [JA:] And if you say that the Being would not be perfect who willed limited happiness, [MS:] then you assert that a perfect Being would not be perfect who willed other nature than His own; in other words, that either there is no per fect Being, or being perfect, there is no other; that is, that only God can be consistently with God, and that if only God is, God would not be; for that would not be perfect benevolence who willed only His own being, who, possessing omnipotence, did not will other nature than His own, to which to communicate His happiness. {Omitted St Ig: But might not the Omnipotent, by His will, cause all existence to be perfect as his own? f117} [MS:] Does it require explanation to prove that that would not be the spirit of truth to whom it were possible to will something to be and not to be? To will another nature like His own would be to will His own not to be, since, as has been said, that would be willing two infinite existences. Must we prove that two infinite beings cannot be? [MS:] God’s thought is truth, God’s feeling is happiness. God’s will is wisdom. How will he cause other beings to partake in these things is the question. Will His plan be to effect that they shall, by His decree, think His thought, feel His feeling, do His work? to oblige each thought, feeling, act, to be what it is. Will He make a creature which cannot go wrong, instinct, or the voice of God, always telling it what to do, and being always obeyed? [JA:] Such beings do exist (but we call them beasts), [MS:] which never make a mistake and never improve, and are incapable, as far as we know, of happiness, that is, of God’s happiness. [JA:] The problem, then, to solve appears to be how shall our thought, feeling, act, be like His, yet not through the exercise of His powers, but of ours, not by His will obliging each to be what it is, but by our own springing from our own nature. How shall God, in other words, communicate His own happiness, the essential of which is activity, without depriving our happiness of its essential, our activity?

Can God will something to be and not to be?

[St Ig:] What beings, then, shall God create?

112 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought {Omitted MS: You admit that the purpose of God’s Providence is that man should attain his happiness. Let us consider what His plan is for his attaining it. St Ig: But how can we, poor finite, miserable beings, have any insight into God’s plans? [MS:] God gives us reason, feeling, conscience, all of which, under the one name of faith, show us glimpses into eternity, while perception gives us glimpses into time. JA: Our faith would lead us to expect that God would desire each individual to be as happy as Himself—Heaven knows we are far enough off from this. How can we reconcile this desire, which we believe exists in the Spirit of Love and in which we cannot suppose the Spirit of Wisdom and Omnipotence to fail, with its apparent abortion, with the misery which we see and feel? MS: We admit then that His happiness and ours consists in the same thing, that our thoughts, feelings, etc., as to can only be happy inasfar as they are like His, which are truth. ff118-19} [MS:] Taking for granted, that is, the existence of perfect goodness, power and wisdom, what are likely to be the purposes of such a being, and what his plans for fulfilling them? Let us compare these plans with what we see and learn in his creation—the ‘‘what is?’’ with the ‘‘what ought to be?’’ What is the satisfaction, what the happiness, which perfect love desires, judging from what we see of the same attribute existing, to a limited degree, in man? [JA:] To this question answer is made: happiness in other beings than himself, and to God’s per fect love no degree of happiness can be satisfactory, short of the greatest which eternity can admit of. {Omitted HM: But how can infinite Love be satisfied with finite Happiness at any time? After all is said and done, there must always remain a want. f113} [HM:] The happiness it has created, being finite, remains inferior to the desires of its love, which are infinite. In perfect goodness there is no limit which can be satisfied, for infinite good cannot be communicated. [MS:] Not certainly by creating another being, to think His thought, to will His will, to be the being of God, by His direct volition. We at once perceive an essential difference between such a being and God, inasmuch as this being would think, feel and will, per form all, in short, in which happiness consists, not by his own will, for he has no will,53 but by that of another being.

53 JSM: It would be by his will, though that will might be regulated for him.

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To give man a will, an identity, a freedom of his own—and yet so to arrange that his will shall become freely one with the will of God, is the problem of human existence—for the will of God being the will of perfect love and wisdom, is the only will that can lead to perfect happiness. The will of man, therefore, in order to attain happiness, must be the same as the will of God. Can this problem be solved otherwise than by giving man such a nature, and such circumstances acting upon his nature, as shall induce it to be his will to do that which is for the happiness of mankind, in which his own is included? How can we reconcile the desire which we know must exist in the spirit of love—and in which we cannot suppose the spirit of wisdom and omnipotence to fail—with its apparent abortion—with the miser y we see and feel? [MS:] We admit that His happiness and ours consists in the same thing—that our thoughts, feelings, etc., can only be happy inasfar as they are like His, which are truth. Let us see what His methods are for communicating His happiness. All existence depends at each moment on God’s will. He wills not special decrees, but certain uniformities or constant relations of succession and of co-existence, which we call laws, and which we might call habits or rules of nature. These we can ultimately refer only to God’s will, explain only by saying that they are His thoughts. For example, each human being who has lived and lives, differs from every other. This arises not from God having decreed ‘‘A shall come into existence with exactly such and such ingredients in his character, B with such and such other ingredients,’’ but from these uniformities or laws willed by God; thus, the sparrow falls to the ground, not because God has decreed that that sparrow shall fall from that tree, but because God has willed that attraction should be a property, an essential of matter (i.e., without which matter would not be). That A is what he is at the moment he begins to exist, arises entirely and in every most minute particular from God’s having fixed ever y relation, whether of succession or of similarity, which concerns man’s existence. During every succeeding moment of A’s existence, his perceptions, thoughts, emotions, volitions, depend upon its having been and being the will of God that such shall be in constant coexistence with such organizations and such circumstances.

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What is the end or object of man’s creation?

According to Christianity?

According to the highest view we can conceive.

Exactly the same antecedents never arise, therefore never exactly the same perceptions, thoughts, emotions, volitions, in one individual as in another. But the relations are not the less constant. [St Ig:] All these relations are merely means and inducements supplied by God to enable man to attain his proper development, which is to be [MS:] one with God (‘‘I and my Father are one’’54), to have the same object, the same thoughts, feelings, wishes. The Son is to have everything that the Father has, not as a gift, but to be obtained by mankind for mankind. In this way man will partake even the omnipotence of God, when he desires nothing but what God desires. Then will he, by the laws of God, accomplish everything that he desires; and what can God do more? [St Ig:] The argument of Christianity is this: man’s end is to praise and to serve God, and all other things are created as means to help him to this end. All circumstances are means for this end; all are means fitted for this end; and those which He supplies to each of us are the means most fitted for this end for each of us. For God is omniscient, therefore He knows what are the means most fitted for us. He is omnipotent, therefore He can give us the means most fitted for us. He is love, therefore He will give us those most fitted for obtaining that end to which He has called us. And if we could see we should choose those (and none other) which He has chosen, for He chooses always the means best suited to the end. Therefore position, employment, health, place; all has come to us from the hand of God as means, and the fittest means to obtain our end. Every disposition of life, small or great, except sin, is a consequence of the will of God. Therefore we have no right to alter it. ‘‘Thy will be done’’55 means nothing, unless it means that we are to carry it out to its most minute and ultimate consequences. {Omitted MS: I don’t accept quite the whole of your argument, or rather I think it capable of being raised still higher. Will you let me say wherein I differ? While entirely appreciating the truth and beauty of this view as a whole, let me say wherein I feel it capable of being raised still higher. f121} [MS:] There is great truth and beauty in this view, but it is surely capable of being raised still higher. Can it be pleasing to God that

54 John 10:30. 55 Matt 6:10.

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man should be always praising Him? Can it be satisfactory to Him to hear us continually saying, how good Thou art, how great Thou art, and often when we do not feel it at all? It can be only flattery, for many of us have no feeling in saying so (unless, perhaps, when the expression is accompanied with music). He would have us in sympathy with Him. But repetition of praise is offensive or indifferent to a good man, and His is the perfection of human goodness, the same in kind, though higher in degree. To praise and honour Him, therefore, He cannot consider man’s object. And to worship Him is an expression without meaning now, dating from a time of oriental despotism. (The ser vice of God is still a proper expression, though now it should come from sympathy and understanding, not from blind obedience.) Surely in the mind of God it must be a much higher and truer destiny for man to be one with Him, in accordance with Him, than in servile subjection to Him, crawling before Him. According to the highest view God undoubtedly gives us only means and inducements. But the Christian proposition implies that God apportioned, by express and special decree, to each individual (whatever he may think) the means best fitted to communicate to him the attributes of God. Not that individuals are to discover, by the united sense of all mankind, these means. According to this doctrine it would be certainly wrong for any individual to alter or modify his circumstances in the least possible degree. As a consequence of God’s omnipotence, omniscience and love, it follows undoubtedly that ‘‘His will be done’’ extends to the most minute particulars. Without His will not a sparrow falls to the ground. Only, what is His will? That we, that is, mankind, should find out for mankind what are the circumstances to develop in man the attributes of God, and to satisfy them. [MS:] The proposition that the smallest circumstance comes to us from the will of God is true in this sense. A man is and does what he is and does, because it is the will of God that certain definite perceptions, thoughts, emotions, volitions, shall succeed or co-exist with certain organizations and circumstances. It is not true in the sense that each particular perception, thought, emotion, volition, is caused directly by the decree of God that so it shall be. In the former sense, it is our business to discover, to desire and to attain the circumstances and organizations which produce the right volitions, etc., that is, those which are one with God’s. This discovery we are

{St Ig: Is the proposition of universal law consistent with the proposition that the smallest circumstance comes to us from the will of God, and in what sense?

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Christian objection to this theor y.

intended to make by experience, not our own individual experience alone, but the collective experience of all mankind. If it were not invariable that definite characters flow from definite circumstances (and in many cases we can actually predict it), man would be acting at random; he would never discover with certainty, either for himself or others, what course would lead to right. God does not thus deal with us. In the latter sense, could we imagine what is probably a contradiction, viz., man necessitated to think or feel or desire this or that by the immediate will of God, he would be a machine with the attributes of a human being.56 But now, in the midst of the severest suffering which, by our ignorance of God’s laws, we have brought upon ourselves, we can still thank God that we are not machines (as this dreadful consequence plainly shows), and that we are capable therefore of the highest, i.e., of God’s own happiness. A machine never suffers. It is guided by another power than its own. Mankind is to have all that is God’s. Even His power of creation will He share with us. Mankind is to create mankind—cretins and Stuart Mills. It is in man’s power to deteriorate in race to cretinism. It is in man’s power to raise his race to the standard of Newtons and St Pauls. And can he do this if he remain a machine?57 [St Ig:] This view, it is said, makes a man’s sins attributable to God, imputes these to his Creator. They are then God’s fault. What mind, it is said, not utterly corrupt, will not shrink from such a conclusion? It is the Christian faith that everything which happens to us, sin excepted, is so by the disposal of Divine Providence. But sin God does not will, although He wills the effect of it. That you are in that position, that you have that employment, that success, that disappointment, is the will of God. Everything but sin comes to us direct from the hand of God.

56 JSM: This is an argument one would only have expected from the ‘‘free will’’ people. A ‘‘machine’’ with the attributes of a human being would be no machine in any but a good sense. A steam engine which wills to do what it does would be, as to action, like a highly efficient and capable man, intent on doing his duty. After all, you held that our volitions are as much ‘‘necessitated’’ as they would be in this hypothesis. 57 JSM: Why not, if it is done by the instrumentality of his feelings, intentions and will?

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Mankind is to create Mankind [MS:] Sin can be excepted only by a quibble. The hand which gives all that forms the character gives that which flows from the character, whether it be sin, or whether it be virtue. {Omitted St Ig: No, No, No. f125} [St Ig:] Man says the virtue is God’s, the sin is his own. [MS:] Oh, human nature! how much more beautiful in thy instincts than thy reflections! how true is thy intuition, how defective thy reasoning! how much better art thou than thy belief ! [JA:] It is said that this new doctrine makes man a complete slave and automaton. For, if ever ything that man is, is the consequence of foregone arrangement, how can he be other than he is? [MS:] But what is the foregone arrangement? The foregone arrangement is that man shall attain for himself. And what is it that man wants? Is it the sense of merit for what is right in him, the sense of guilt and repentance for what is wrong, that he thinks he ought to have, through a consciousness that what he is arises from himself? This will involve him in contradictions at once. It must have been he, then, who made all existences which have had an influence upon him, without his own consciousness or intention. Moreover, the common feeling of mankind is repugnant to any claim of merit. They even construct far-fetched theories, in order to satisfy their true feeling that man cannot claim merit when he is what he ought to be. They say, God has all the merit, I have all the blame. The same man who, with truth, repudiates the idea of claiming merit for himself, will be shocked at not believing all that is wrong in him entirely his own fault, for which he is to feel remorse and receive punishment. But there is much truth in this confusion, as in all popular feelings. It is true that the wrong a man does comes from within, that he must undergo suffering or privation till he is conscious that he is wrong—till that wrong becomes right. Take the case of disease. That disease arose, partly from physical circumstances which concerned the beginning of his existence, partly from those after his birth, before he could have any part in his own destiny, partly from those after he could know what was right, which prevented his knowing how to make his volitions right. It is one thing to know what you ought to do, and another to know how to do it, one thing to know the law, and another to know how to incline your heart to keep that law.58 But the

Sin cannot be excepted from the proposition that everything comes to us from the hand of God.

If everything that man is is the result of foregone ar rangement, how can he be other than he is? But what is the foregone ar rangement?

58 The response to the commandments read at morning prayer in the Church of England was ‘‘Incline our hearts to keep thy law.’’

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Must man suffer for faults he could not avoid?

sick man must be conscious that his physical frame is in a wrong state, must suffer the consequences of its being wrong, perhaps during life, perhaps till it can be put into a right state, and nothing can exempt him from them. It is, therefore, a true feeling that the wrong, whether physical or spiritual, which a man has within himself, must produce for him suffering, which no one can bear in his stead. [JA:] It is said that it is very hard that man must suffer for faults which, according to this theory, he could not avoid. [MS:] Hard that man should attain to perfect happiness? Man possesses reason, feeling, conscience, capable of unfolding, so as to be one with God, that is, to think His thought, to feel as He feels, to will that His will shall be done, and thus to share His happiness, His power. Is this hard? God, it is true, gave him no instinct how to cultivate these capabilities aright. Mankind has to learn by experience, first, what are his capabilities? second, what are all the various laws of God concerning them? third, that it is desirable to cultivate these capabilities aright; fourth, which of these laws enable him to do so? fifth, how to keep them? sixth, how to incline himself to keep them. All this man has to learn and to practise before he can be one with God. How Sin came into the World

Are the laws necessar y for the existence of mankind to be discovered only by experience?

But the first man had had no experience. He would be cer tain to be ignorant of most of these laws. It would indeed be impossible for him to discover them all. It is impossible for us now. Time is the key to God’s thought. It is the word. In time God’s thought is ever being worked out. Without a constant reference to ever passing time, we must misunderstand it. It requires united man in all time to discover all. When we pray to be ‘‘kept this day from all sin,’’59 to be ‘‘delivered from evil,’’ we utter a prayer for that which is impossible. Unless we have perfect knowledge of every one of these laws, we must err. Our prayer is a contradiction. If we were ‘‘delivered from evil,’’ the world would be ruined, its only safeguard gone—God’s plans are all for eternity. [JA:] If we wonder that, with this desperate ignorance, man does not come to an end—perhaps it may be answered, that [MS:] probably no experience is required to know those laws which are neces-

59 In the Te Deum morning prayer, Book of Common Prayer.

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sar y for the existence of mankind. The discovery of those necessary to his well-being God sees it best to leave to him, as well as of those necessar y for the continuance of each individual man (nearly all lives, perhaps, being shortened by ignorance of law). [MS:] But those laws, without the knowledge of which mankind must have come to an end, are probably taught by instinct—instinct being a teaching, not by experience, but by its being the will of God, that the being shall want and shall know how to satisfy that want. {Omitted St Ig: Perhaps so. But with regard to God’s plans, are you not inquiring into things which it is presumptuous in us to deal with, even in thought, profane of us to intermeddle with? ‘‘Such knowledge is too wonderful for me.’’60 f129} [MS:] If we inquire into God’s dealings with His creatures with tr ust that they will be found to arise from goodness and wisdom (since otherwise they would not be God’s dealings), we shall come to this question, may not sin have become introduced into the world from ignorance of one or more of God’s laws, sin being something untrue in our feelings, our thoughts, our wills; something unlike the feeling, the thought, the will, of God? {Omitted JA: The great question of the origin of evil I believe you never can tr ust. HM: But what is sin? f129} [St Ig:] How can He cause that which is unlike Himself? may be asked. [MS:] As an infant stumbles, and the mother sees it better that it should stumble rather than never learn to walk alone, so it may be said that the stumble is ultimately caused by the mother’s will; thus the sin may be caused by the will of God the Father, and yet be unlike His own. Now, all sin arises from ignorance of God’s laws at some time or in some individual. {Omitted: St Ig: But you say that our thoughts, emotions, volitions, are all, to the very smallest particular, caused by the will of God. f129} [St Ig:] From ignorance? it is asked, when ‘‘I knew it was wrong.’’ [MS:] You knew it was wrong to do what you did at a particular time, but there was a time when that in you which led to this sin was called out unknown to you, when there was nothing stronger than it in your character. {Omitted St Ig: But, with the grace of God, I could have resisted it. MS: What if there was nothing stronger than it in your character? f130}

60 Ps 139:6.

[JA:] Or by instinct?

Origin of sin.

How can sin be caused by ignorance?

120 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Remedy for Sin Remedy for sin.

Did this man sin, or his parents? implies a false idea.

Physical laws often disregarded in consequence of something wrong in the spiritual life.

[JA:] Is man ever to learn all the laws of God?

[MS:] The remedy is to find out God’s laws, and under which of these to place yourself. [St Ig:] On earth it may often be too late. [MS:] In eternity it will be possible for all, with regard to that in us which is eternal. [JA:] With regard to our physical being [MS:] also, all suffering, all privation of that enjoyment of which man is capable, arises from ignorance of God’s laws, either our own ignorance, or that of those who have preceded us. [St Ig:] ‘‘Did this man sin, or his parents?’’61 [MS:] That question implied a false idea. Sin regards those laws only which concern our spiritual and moral being, that is, our feelings and wills towards God and our fellow creatures. That a man is blind implies some ignorance of physical law, either on his own part or on that of those who preceded him.62 [St Ig:] Those physical laws may have been disregarded in consequence of something wrong in the spiritual life. [MS:] Disease in the spiritual being will often lead to indulgence in malpractices in the physical. But the immediate cause of blindness is a physical law. And it is untrue to regard a physical evil as a punishment, that is, an arbitrar y infliction for some spiritual evil. If the question is asked, shall we ever learn all these laws? Do we even know one of them? [MS:] In time, that is, in eternity, we shall. God has formed us in the image of himself,63 and therefore we cannot doubt that man’s happiness is to be the same as that of his Father. It is to be the happiness of love, and its exercise—of beauty, and its production by skill—of truth, and its production by wisdom. All that exists arises from the love and goodness of God, willing that others than Himself shall be happy as He is happy. They are words without meaning which would tell of the possibility that a Being possessing love and goodness could be happy without communicating happiness. God has provided that mankind shall attain, therefore, by their own efforts, progress towards being as He is and doing as He does. And if they fail, their will may still be one with His; and this oneness with Him in will shall give comfort where the finiteness of created nature prevents their being and doing as the Infinite.

61 A paraphrase of John 9:2. 62 JSM: What if he is struck blind by lightning? 63 An allusion to Gen 1:26-27.

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[MS:] ‘‘Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect.’’64 Yet will man never be God, but one with God, and when he suffers, he will yet have joy in feeling ‘‘Thy will be done.’’ {Omitted JA: You are falling into pantheism. f132} [JA:] This is not pantheism, which asserts that man will be merged in God and lose his individuality. [MS:] ‘‘The spirit returns to God who gave it’’ is pantheism. And this cannot be true in the sense that it ceases to have a separate existence. Why, in that case, its trials? Can we suppose that God sent forth a being to suffer and struggle, merely in order that it should be re-absorbed into God’s existence? Most lame and impotent conclusion. Why send it forth? To what end its suffering? {Omitted St Ig: But what right have we? f133}

Is each individual to be made per fect, preser ving his individuality?

In the perfecting of the Individual The human being comes into existence here with a certain degree of capability, depending not in the slightest degree upon himself, but entirely upon certain laws of God which regard the influences which make his being what it is. [MS:] And on the development and balance of these capabilities depends the man’s character, from which proceeds his life. We will not here attempt any explanation of what man’s faculties are, how much they depend on the brain, how much on the temperament, etc. But he is what he is at the moment of his birth in consequence of certain laws of God, of which he knows nothing, and over which he can have no influence. These powers do not remain as they were when he began existence. There are other laws which regard the manner in which they are developed, and the effect of these on the child after he is in the world is less distinctly and generally acknowledged than that of the laws which influence his organization at his birth, which is too obvious to be denied. {Omitted JA: But how can man be accountable when God has had such entire control in the formation of his character? MS: As for the word ‘‘accountable’’ I do not think it applies to this particular relation between God and His creatures. f135} [MS:] We may see into God’s plan, and see it to be not only one of entire and perfect goodness and wisdom, but the only one by which man could share in the divine happiness, become individu-

Plan of God in man’s existence continued.

Never let us give our belief unless reason, feeling and conscience are all satisfied.

64 A paraphrase of Matt 5:48. A draft sermon of Nightingale’s was entitled ‘‘Be ye perfect’’ and another used the text extensively; see Spiritual Journe y (2:335-43 and 329-35, respectively).

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What is the difference between the physical senses and the moral sense? Why do the former tell all men pretty much alike, while the latter gives many different opinions?

ally one with Him in will, yet while doing what God wills, remain an individual will, not a machine, and be forever advancing to share His power, His wisdom and love—the plan which gives us the strongest incitement to try to find out and to do what is right. All this may be proved by the reason, felt by the feeling and approved by the conscience. [JA:] Can it be brought home as satisfactory to my feeling and my reason that it is so? If not—if, though to my reason it appears so, yet, if its being so would be against my feeling and my conscience, it will be true in me to suspect that my reason has not mastered the subject. [MS:] Never let us give our belief unless our reason, feeling, conscience, are all satisfied, even though we cannot satisfy reason, feeling, conscience, by any other belief.65 Rather let us remain respectfully in doubt. We must not only compare our sources of belief with those of others, but we must compare each of our own sources among themselves. Feeling, if in a healthy state, is as important a source of belief as reason, which may also be distorted, but never self-derived. The phrase ‘‘human reason’’ is devoid of sense. Is reason more human than feeling, or less superhuman than conscience? Let us listen to them all, for these are the voices God has given to be our guides. [JA:] Everybody, it is true, feels and reasons differently, while all see and hear alike. Every man, unless he is blind, sees that this is a cow and that is a horse, while, upon this subject of moral philosophy, there are many different opinions. [MS:] It is necessary, in order to prevent mankind from coming to an end, that the physical senses should be developed earlier and with less cultivation than the senses of the soul. Still the Indian’s physical senses tell him a thousand things that yours do not, which shows that even these depend upon cultivation, that even these come to different decisions. If all human souls gave the same decisions, we should truly regard these as equally certain with the decisions of the physical senses. The latter are far easier to ascertain, but they will not be more certain than the former when ascertained. Among a thousand people, 999 will declare the grass to be green, and only one perhaps will call it red. He does not shake our conviction. We say that his sight is defective.

65 JSM: How do we know that the constitution of the world must be such as to satisfy our feeling and conscience?

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Difference between Physical and Moral Sense It is far more difficult to arrive at the decisions of the spiritual sense. If we give up the idea of there being any book or person constituted by God an infallible vessel for His truth to fill, for us to draw from, we have to enter into two questions. How must we cause our own vessels to be in a healthy state? How much must we take from other people’s vessels? In proportion as man’s capabilities have been developed in accordance with God’s laws for their healthy development, their dictates may be depended upon, in regard to any subject upon which they have been truly exercised. But, by many who possess much power, something has been set down for granted; something taken up from ‘‘sympathy, antipathy, authority or silent assimilation,’’ and the capability in such for arriving at the truth must not be taken as a guarantee that they have arrived at it. We often feel, how can I be so presumptuous as to believe what such and such a mind, far more power ful than mine, does not believe? But it would be a miracle, it would indeed be inspiration, if I were to have an opinion upon military matters equal in value to the duke of Wellington’s,66 and it would be perhaps equally beside the mark if his opinion were to be taken upon matters of moral philosophy. Yet moral philosophy is the only subject upon which men are supposed capable of judging without study, and deciding without reflection. Unless a man’s whole being has been cultivated, and unless the whole being has been at work upon the particular subject of inquir y, his belief ought not truly to have an influence in regard to that subject. To mankind, though not to one man, God has given the means of arriving at equal certainty in the domain of the soul’s senses as in that of the body’s. We may arrive at such certainty—i.e., we may know so as not to doubt, and to have always present to our belief and our feelings, such propositions as the following: 1st, That what we will arises from God’s laws, which regard our own being and that which affects it. 2nd, That we have power (i.e., not each individual, at all times, but mankind in eternity has power) to influence ourselves and others, through God’s laws, to will truly, i.e., in accordance with God’s laws for the promotion of true happiness, not ‘‘to will what we please,’’

66 Arthur Wellesley (1769-1852), 1st duke of Wellington, defeater of Napoleon.

124 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought or ‘‘to do what we will’’—that is not the question—but to will truly, and that it is for us to find out how to accomplish this influence. 3rd, That there is eternity for each individual, in which ever yone shall make these discoveries, and shall advance towards God’s perfection and happiness. It will be acknowledged impossible that a man could make himself, or be made by influences out of himself, exactly like another man in character—showing how great is the original diversity when the individual begins existence. It will also be acknowledged that any man, placed under different circumstances from those he is in, would have been different from what he is. His volitions would have been different from what they have been, had his life been passed in a different family, nation, age, climate; had his associates and his teaching been different. Out of volitions flow habits, out of habit character. Different Verdicts of the Moral Sense [JA:] What is habit?

When habit does not strengthen the nature.

[MS:] Perhaps one of the few spiritual laws we can point out is that a volition strengthens by repetition; the part of the nature from which sprang the volition is strengthened by exercise. This is habit. [JA:] But it does not follow that, in all cases, what we do becomes easier each time, because some other part of our nature which has been left unsatisfied may crave more loudly for satisfaction the second time of being thwarted than the first. [MS:] We must take into account the whole of our nature. Because I have got up early for two mornings, it perhaps may not follow that I get up more easily on the third; there may be more craving for sleep. For every change which takes place in the state of a human being there must be the antecedents, the necessary conditions or relations. One thought is in his mind at one moment; it leads according to the laws of his being to another. A person may also lie in bed in the morning, though neither sleepy nor enjoying in any way, because a change requires activity in some part of our nature. Everything in our spiritual and intellectual nature acquires a greater activity by exercise, but also requires a greater stimulus to excite activity, if not exercised, unless, indeed, some other law be called out, such as that long privation, in certain cases, acts as a stimulus. The question of habit, however, is here merely touched upon as an illustration of law.

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[JA:] The original difficulty of the origin of evil is not removed by merely stating that so it must be, that mankind is not responsible for evil, but God, or that man is so entirely under the influence of his organization and his circumstances that he cannot help himself. [MS:] A good natural constitution of the material framework; good development and exercise of every part of the nature; full and free communication of man with man; this would make earth into heaven—the ‘‘kingdom of heaven is within us.’’67 All this is in human capability. The Father is eternally offering means and inducements in His laws. Mankind, the son, has only to attune himself to receive them, so that they bring his nature into right exercise. What is the origin of evil? the question so often asked. The wisdom, goodness and righteousness of the Perfect, the Father, is the answer, who wills that man, the son, by the exercise of his nature in accordance with the laws of right, shall rise from ignorance to truth, from the imper fect to the perfect. [JA:] How can man (the son), it may be asked, exercise his nature at all, if he is a slave to his organization and his circumstances? It is they which do it for him. [MS:] To this question we must answer by other questions: what is the purpose of being? what is the purpose of wisdom in willing being? [JA:] What is wisdom? [MS:] Wisdom is right means taken for a right end, not merely right means for any end—for right (in the sense of appropriate) means may be taken to make an infernal machine. The end must be right in order to constitute wisdom. [MS:] What is a right end, or the right end of all being, capable of having a view or purpose? [JA:] The purpose of being is essentially well-being.

Difficulty of the origin of evil.

Is the ‘‘kingdom of heaven’’ within man’s capability to bring about?

What is wisdom? What is the purpose of wisdom in willing being ?

The purpose of being is well-being [MS:] The well-being of the finite and imperfect depends on the constitution of things established by the Infinite and Perfect. In inquiries concerning human nature, we are always driven to this point—so it is, because human nature has been so constituted. But when we speak of the Perfect nature, we no longer say, so it has been constituted. ‘‘Virtue,’’ it has been truly said, ‘‘is not a creation of the Divine will,’’ but the nature of the Divine will. ‘‘The mind of man is

67 A paraphrase of Luke 17:21.

The purpose of being is wellbeing.

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Let us be careful not to palm upon ourselves words without meaning.

What evidence have we for what is not recognized by our senses?

There is wisdom manifested which does not appertain to any material being cognizable to our senses.

a creation, and therefore indicates, by its characteristics, the character of him,’’ to whose ‘‘will it owes its existence.’’68 [JA:] We cannot be too careful not to palm upon ourselves, more than upon other people, words to which, in reality, we attach no meaning. [MS:] But we shall know what we mean, if we speak of an existence, not human, though powerful, wise and benevolent, which has thought and feeling (as we indistinctly call it), after the same manner as man has thought and feeling. [JA:] But if I am asked upon what evidence we speak of such an existence, since it is not recognized by our senses, [MS:] I answer, manifestations of thought and feeling are recognized by our senses, of thought and feeling of the same nature as that which we recognize in man, but not appertaining to any individual man or to any collective existence of mankind. It is not our senses which recognize wisdom, benevolence, in the material being which we call Sir Joshua Jebb or Dr Howe.69 The wisdom or benevolence which we do recognize as appertaining to them, we take not in our hand to examine it. It is a manifestation. It is manifested in what they do. It is manifested in their thought or sentiment, which reaches our nature through the intervention of articulate words, of the voice and the ear, or it is a manifestation by means of the intelligent eye, or the features telling of benevolence. But it is the manifestation which is recognized by our senses. Let us refer to the heavenly bodies and to the anatomy of man. Is not wisdom (i.e., right means in being, to attain well-being) manifest therein? This wisdom assuredly does not appertain to any material being cognizable to our senses. [MS:] In referring to the heavenly bodies and to human anatomy, we also recognize power above human. If man could form a living man, he certainly often would do so, but he cannot, and therefore we may say, in ever y man he beholds he recognizes a power beyond his own. The wisdom he recognizes includes benevolence, for, as we have said, wisdom is benevolence. For it is right means to a right end or purpose, and the right purpose of being is well-being.

68 Thomas Chalmers, Natural Theology, in The Works of Thomas Chalmers 1:306. 69 Sir Joshua Jebb (1793-1863), British prison reformer; Nightingale had originally also had Mrs Chisholm here, but omitted her name (f143).

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But what practical difference does this recognition make to our existence? is asked. Is it unconnected with our practical existence to recognize power, wisdom and benevolence, as manifested in our abode and in our material nature? If power, wisdom and benevolence are recognized by the various elements of our nature, by our thought, by our feeling, will not love and trust be the consequence? Does the Evil exist which Mankind cannot remove? [JA:] If we recognize this wisdom with our intellectual faculties only, no love or trust is the consequence. [MS:] We really loathe the ‘‘compliments’’ paid to the Creator in books of science. There is something to get over in every book which gives instances of God’s skill and wisdom, and makes for us the remarks which it is supposed we ought to make for ourselves. Nobody can do anything for anybody else—but least of all can one feel for another. But is there any true philosophy in saying, ‘‘I recognize power, wisdom, benevolent purpose (in the heavenly bodies and in the anatomy of man), of the same nature as power, wisdom and benevolence which I recognize in man, but greater in degree. But when I have said this, I have nothing more to say, nothing more to think, nothing more to feel, I will go back to my work.’’ And is it not a part of your work to think where, and what, and why you are, and where you are going, what you are going to be, since be you must, at all events unless you try to end some part of your being, try whether you can make yourself no longer conscious of it? You have learnt that you cannot destroy the material part of it. Do not be too sure that there may not be some other part of your being which you cannot destroy. If it is a part of your work to ask such questions, because, whatever else you may have to do, your manner of doing it may be influenced by the answers to them, then can we say that there is nothing practical in this recognition of power, wisdom, benevolence? [HM:] But I also recognize power without wisdom or benevolence. The heavenly bodies, do they always manifest benevolence? Men are sometimes struck in agony to the earth by the flaming sun. The severest suffering often arises from malformation of the system. But may we not assert that it is cer tainly in the power of mankind to prevent coups de soleil [sunburn] and, in all probability, defective organization? So strong is the evidence tending to that belief that we

If we recognize this wisdom with our intellectual faculties only, no love or tr ust is the consequence.

We also recognize power apparently without wisdom or benevolence.

128 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought are not conscious of any difference between the strength of our conviction in the former and in the latter case. And is there not evidence tending to the belief that the evil does not exist which mankind cannot remove? 4 Origin of Evil [A dialogue between Jacob Abbott and M.S.]

Question as to the origin of evil becomes irrelevant when we come to act.

[JA:] Is it not just as possible to human nature to extricate all mankind from ever y kind of suffering and evil, as to extricate a certain number from a bog or pond into which they have fallen?

[JA:] Does the evil exist which mankind cannot remove? [MS:] The difference between myself and myself is so great under different circumstances, and I observe it to be so great in other people, that I am led to ask whether all the sin and suffering in man is not removable. {Omitted JA: But that does not explain the origin of evil. f147} [MS:] If we saw men struggling in a bog, or in a pond, in which occasionally only they could raise their heads above water to breathe, should we stand speculating on the origin of evil? as thus: ‘‘How is it reconcilable with the power and benevolence of God to see men thus struggling and suffering?’’ ‘‘There must be a deficiency either in power or in benevolence, unless man is invariably infinitely happy,’’ etc. Yet this is exactly what we do with regard to moral evil. Men write and preach volumes to explain how God would have kept man out of the bog and the pond, but the devil invited him in, and he went, and there he must have stayed forever, but what did God do? Did He, through the faculties of man, reveal to him how he was to get out to safe and pleasant land? No, He committed suicide and murder. He caused to be put to death Himself and His Son. How man was thus to be extricated from the bog and the pond does not come home to the human faculties. It is a ‘‘myster y,’’ God has taken care of His own justice, Christ of His mercy. This is the orthodox theology. We respect this in it, that it alone embraces the idea that God goes through sin and suffering for man, that the work of the flesh can be of no avail unless accompanied by the work of the spirit, that what appertains to the flesh is only valuable as receptive of the spirit. [MS:] But we believe it to be just as absurd to be speculating on the cr ux, to the human understanding, of the existence of evil, as it would be to speculate if we saw men in the fire or the water. We have discovered the gas which will, in an instant, put out the fire, and leave them in safety, the lifeboat, which will enable us to rescue

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them. Should we have done so if we had stood by wondering how a good God could permit such sufferings? Physical suffering cries out so loud that mankind is summoned to the rescue, and he who rescues is called the friend of mankind. But moral suffering and privation are silent, are blamed, blame themselves, are avoided. We are preached to be contented, not to complain, if we are fainting with hunger and thirst. If we are morally diseased, we are avoided; or, with benevolent intention, something wholly inappropriate is brought as a remedy. {Omitted JA: Still I cannot but look upon the existence of evil as a great mystery. First, how did it come there? Secondly, how will it ever be removed? f149} [MS:] Divine and human nature, understood as far as man may understand, will reveal that there is no myster y in the existence of evil. God’s laws are ever in activity, ever open for the investigation of mankind. To understand them, and to act in accordance with them, these are our means to turn all evil into good. All existence, except the Perfect, is essentially finite; the Perfect would not be per fect unless He destined the finite to rise to the Infinite. Let us not lament and despise our finiteness, but rejoice to look upon it as the mark of our ‘‘high calling’’70 to ascend.

‘‘Myster y’’ of the existence of evil.

Does the Evil exist which Mankind cannot Remove? [MS:] There will be always evil, because there will be always ignorance. But there will not be always masses of evil, lying untouched, unpenetrated by light and wisdom (inasfar as man is concerned), except now and then a temporary improvement by chance, not after a type and purpose. [JA:] Each advance has always brought evil with good, [MS:] because each advance must, in some degree, be made upon a hypothesis. But mankind, when they work after a type, will, more and more speedily, turn the evil into good. We shall not wish to part with evil in the abstract, when it is understood to spring from ignorance, when all the faculties of all mankind are directed to expect evil from ignorance, and to remedy it. Then, though it will be the essential attendant on the imperfect and finite in its progress towards per fection and infinity (through exercise of mankind, of each for

70 An allusion to Phil 3:14.

JA: Will there be always evil?

Each advance has always brought evil with good. Why?

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Beginning of evil in this world.

each and for all ), there will be a perpetual and rapid change of evil into good, thence fresh temporary evil, thence fresh permanent good. And so on, through the universe, through eternity, the Perfect assisting, teaching, giving successive revelations to the imperfect, by His laws which furnish means and inducement by which the imper fect may advance towards the Perfect—thus it has been without beginning, is now and ever shall be. {Omitted JA: But all that does not satisfy me about the evil in this world—why it ever existed. f150} [MS:] If we see no evil, the possibility of removing which does not exist in mankind (as a whole), why are we to stand wondering that God permits evil? Do we want Him to give us no work? or to do our work for us? Would that be wisdom, benevolence, love in Him? Let mankind fulfill its possibilities. That will answer the question, is the existence of evil compatible with the existence of a Being of per fect wisdom and benevolence? When we see a man about to be drowned, saved by the wisdom and kindness of a fellow creature, we do not then say, can the Being be benevolent, who allowed man to be liable to be drowned? We admire in Him that He gave the saviour capability for the work of love, that man is saved by the exercise of the capabilities of man, by divine wisdom and love manifested in the ‘‘earthly vessel.’’ God has no mysteries for us, any more than the teacher has who commits a problem to his pupil to be worked out, the which could not benefit him but through the exercise of the pupil’s own nature. Thus much we know, viz., that a human being, constituted in a certain manner, and that constitution co-existing with certain circumstances, will manifest those attributes, the manifestation of which is all that we know of the Being whom we call God. We also know that it is in the power of human beings to affect the constitution and the circumstances of themselves and each other, that, in some instances known to them, they have power to affect the constitution and circumstances of themselves, of their children, of their fellow creatures, in such a way as to increase or lessen the manifestation of the divine attributes in them. And there seems every reason to think that we may learn more and more of such co-existences. At present, what we know as to the constitution is, perhaps chiefly, that certain co-existences, or successions, will have a bad effect, as the marriage of cousins, marriage where there exist certain hereditar y diseases, as scrofula, insanity, etc.

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No ‘‘Mystery’’ We can trace no connection, none is in fact comprehensible to us, between a certain state of the optic nerve and the consciousness in a human being of the presence of an object which is, as we say, seen. We cannot consider it as other than a fiat of the Almighty that this coexistence shall be. And we may be certain that every co-existence or succession will be which is right and wise and good to be. We may be certain that such co-existence or succession will be, as will involve continuation of the identity of existence, if that is right, wise and good to be. This is the one abiding will and law that, through eternity, there shall be such succession of present to past as effects well-being in eternity’s course. This is the law, this the co-existence, viz., that through eternity the present shall be that which, in the thought and feeling of the Perfect, effects well-being. There is but one mode of well-being. We have no occasion to talk of ‘‘greatest happiness to the greatest number.’’71 The law which cut off one forever would never promote the well-being of another. Our means, then, of judging as to whether there will be a future existence depend upon our means of estimating what is wise and right, for that which is wise and right is the law, the will of the Omnipotent. It is certain that we are capable of increasing our power of estimating what is wise and right. It is certain that there are means by which we may improve our estimation of what is wise and right. The more we learn of the nature of all existence, the more we learn of the histor y of existence, the more we shall be able to read the future. But to know truly we must elevate our being, we must feel truly. Let us not think it a praiseworthy humility to say that we cannot understand God’s ways, because ‘‘His ways are not as our ways.’’ Mankind understands His ways very imper fectly indeed, because they have as yet attained little comprehension of His thought, His sentiment, His purpose, His character. If they had, would they offer as a tribute to Him their ‘‘forms of prayer’’? It requires the union of mankind to seek Him. If they seek Him aright, more and more shall He be revealed to them. More and more shall love and veneration to Him, trust in Him, fill the heart with a true and peaceful rapture, the head and hand with work. {Omitted JA: But I do not see what all this has to do with the question of evil. f154}

71 This is the basic principle of utility theory.

132 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Question of evil.

[MS:] It will perhaps be said that a world of so much suffering, so little of what can be called present well-being, is not evidence for that one law, viz., that every co-existence or succession in the will of the Almighty is the will of wisdom and goodness, that it requires a miraculous revelation to assure us that, though now ‘‘we see through a glass darkly,’’72 nevertheless a future existence will reveal this to us. It is true that this evidence has to be worked out by time and experience. Some, deeply interested in these subjects, have felt that they were so important, that God is so great, man so small, that man could not learn concerning God’s nature, will and purpose, as he learns other things, that, therefore, it was to be expected that God would, in an especial, in a miraculous way, reveal His will and man’s future. And this expectation has led the earnest to believe that God has made this manifestation. This earnestness of the few has led to an energetic acquiescence in their belief by some, an indifferent acquiescence by others. Question of Evil It is evident that there can be but one perfect thought, feeling, will. Whenever more than one Being has been believed in as superior to human nature, those superiors have not been believed to be perfect. What are we led to believe, by such experience and consciousness as we have of what is good, to be the nature and will of the Perfect? It is in vain for the imperfect to attempt a full conception of the Perfect. That which comes home to our consciousness, that we may say. If we permit ourselves to look at the matter thus—if the observed uniformities, which, if proceeding from a will, we should call laws, are laws, the will from which they proceed can be estimated by us as righteous, as benevolent, as wise, as powerful. This we can assert upon the ground, that laws to the same purport are felt, when they proceed from human nature, to be righteous, benevolent, wise. Let us grant, for the present, that known existences, past and present, assure us of a righteous, benevolent and wise will, with power superior to man’s possibility, and that the more human knowledge improves, and the more the individual and collective nature of man improves, the greater appear the righteousness, wis-

72 1 Cor 13:12.

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dom and benevolence of this will, so that, irresistibly, arises the question, ‘‘if we knew all, might we not probably find this will to be per fect?’’ Then come questions as to what would be the mode of being and the will of perfection. Tr uth is the thought of the Perfect, the feeling of the Perfect. This our own individual experience and consciousness and those of mankind assure us. The more man’s thought and feeling harmonize with all those qualities which do not limit each other, such as righteousness, love, goodness, benevolence, wisdom, love of beauty and order, the more truth we are conscious of in his mode of being. But the more excellent is a man’s being (1), the more his thought and feeling seek to resolve themselves into, to manifest themselves in life and action; (2), the more he rejoices in, seeks the satisfaction of other happiness than his own—finds, in fact, one of his greatest sources of happiness in the consciousness of happiness in other being than his own. While we are distinguishing qualities the same in kind (though in a more power ful nature) as those appertaining to the best we know of human nature, our consciousness and experience lead us to expect that these qualities also will resolve themselves into, will manifest themselves in life and action. The Perfect will wish the greatest possible well-being to other modes of existence than His own. How can it be effected? It is susceptible of evidence that to will the laws of righteousness, benevolence, wisdom—leaving other beings (called into existence and existing in accordance with them) to work out a right life by the means and inducements they afford—is the only way of effecting this. Experience and consciousness teach us that that which comes to us through exercise of some part or parts of our nature is of more value than that of which we are passive recipients— or, rather, we may perhaps say that such is our nature that it is impossible for us to be passive recipients of any good thing. Solution of the Question Should we not expect, then, that the will of God, or of goodness, for the beings whom His will calls into existence, would be a good original nature, well exercised in life? It may be shown that such is His will. Suppose we were to imagine that those beings, whom His will calls into existence, possessed the best of natures, viz., His own, and that God’s laws were adapted to exercise these best of natures, as righteousness, benevolence and wisdom decree. It is susceptible of evidence that such is actually the case. Would it not be a contra-

Solution of the question of the origin of evil.

134 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought diction to suppose that Perfect Benevolence would will to other beings a nature less perfect than His own, less adapted to goodness and happiness? But it would also be a contradiction to suppose Him willing another perfection (since, essentially, per fection is one), or willing an eternal imperfect, with such degree of value as could be imparted to it by its being a passive recipient from God.73 Avoiding these contradictions, may we not, without contradiction or absurdity, pronounce that the Perfect would will limits to His own perfect nature, according to a law of right, these limits to be enlarged by the individual and collective exercise of mankind? That this is actually the fact cannot with truth be denied. There are laws with respect to the material nature, which material nature is the limit to the Divine nature. According as that material nature is after a certain type, and is exercised in a certain mode, the divine nature becomes more and more apparent. This rests upon fact—and could, otherwise, the expectation be realized that the Perfect would will His own nature to other than himself? Could the expectation be, otherwise, realized that, through exercise, not as passive recipients, God’s benefits should be attained by men? And let us observe how exercise, for each and for all, would thus be called forth. Man thus becomes, in some sort, the creator of man. Let him be deeply sensible of the power thus vested in him. Suppose the laws of the material nature discovered, suppose mankind, individually and collectively, through successive generations, earnestly seeking to keep them aright, can anyone doubt that the limits now existing to the exercise of the divine nature in man, would be enlarged? Is this fanciful? Does not experience warrant such a belief? Suppose that, instead of life being regulated, ignorantly, with little definite purpose, mankind, individually and collectively, aimed to organize life so as to improve character, i.e., so as to extend the limits of the divine in man, can we doubt that thus man would, by exercise for himself and his kind, become more and more divine? Thus will man advance to the utmost point which human nature permits in this mode of existence. Does not our consciousness of what is divine lead us to believe undoubtingly that, whatever limit exists, when physical human nature ceases here—opportunity, in accordance with the everlasting laws of right, and love and wisdom

73 JSM: If the will is perfect, the (moral) being is perfect, howsoever the will became so.

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will follow to work on forever and ever, till, through exercise in life, that perfection is realized and manifested, which, while existing only as thought and feeling, requires to be resolved into concrete work and life in order to be complete? Man to be the Creator of Man The divine nature in man is so ready to love, to venerate—what has it not loved and venerated? Christians are apt to despise the Pagan gods, and justice, benevolence, purity, self-sacrifice, have indeed been worshipped by Christians as they never were by Pagans—may we not say as they never were by any other religionists? But let us consider how justice, benevolence, purity, self-sacrifice (all-perfect as such qualities are), are supposed to have been manifested. The tr uth appears to be that God (i.e., wisdom and goodness) wills that, through exercise only, comes well-being to man. But current theology teaches that, through the sacrifice of Christ only, is man saved; saved from what? not from the ignorance and imperfection of a finite nature, but from God’s justice. {Omitted: If man has loved tenderly and earnestly, has suffered joyfully for the sake of a Being who, if examined, would appear incapable of calling forth his love, may he not, with all his being, devote himself to the Perfect, who lives and suffers for him, whose law is so perfect that it could not, except where there is want of knowledge or of feeling, but call forth all the veneration, all the tr ust of which he is capable? ff159-60} Let us take care not to abandon ourselves to fancies concerning the divine nature. Let us ever remember that the finite nature cannot comprehend the infinite. But let us not the less hold fast that which man’s experience and consciousness, the source of all our knowledge, can reveal to us concerning the divine nature. It will be asked, what is our intercourse with the Perfect? The sense of His presence, of His love, of His appreciation, harmony with Him, trust in Him. Let us not be driven by His law, which, in wisdom and love, drives those who go not with willing step, but let us heartily accept to be the workers-out of His holy will. Let us study His law, when unable to comprehend it; let us wait, not attempting impossible contradictions to His law in our nature, but seeking how we may keep His spirit alive in us for His sake. Thus let us be ready to rejoice in work, to rejoice in suffering, even in that hardest of suffering, if it must be, in waiting.

136 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Man to be the Fellow-worker with God That which we may learn concerning the Perfect reveals Him with none like unto Him. The higher and better human nature rises to be, the better it can support the absence of any like unto it, but the more it can enjoy the presence of an equal, though a different nature. There can be no equal communication for the Perfect, and it is because three of the highest enjoyments of a good nature cannot, without absurdity, be attributed to the Perfect, that we conceive that the Perfect must essentially include the imperfect. These three are (1), mutual communication of sympathy and affection; (2), exercise of the thought and feeling in work; (3), attainment of progress by work. All these, the better a man becomes, the more he enjoys. The perfect thought and feeling, then, will essentially limit itself, in order to partake of these, though remaining perfect as the eternal Guide, by willing the laws of right. The imperfect thought and feeling, the imperfect knowledge of truth, is ever, directly or indirectly, in progress towards the perfect. The perfect thought and feeling ever wills to resolve itself, to manifest itself, to communicate itself through life and work. So also that greatest bliss—two hearts working as one for God and for man—is destined for each; they may be separate; they may meet and be separated again, going through different phases of life, but they are eternally destined to each other. 5 Future Life [A dialogue among Jacob Abbott, Harriet Martineau and M.S.] 5. Future Life. Why are we not satisfied with supposing that our existence ends here, as our senses tell us?

The heart which mourns over death prevents us from resting satisfied.

[HM:] Whence does the question arise, whether human consciousness will be continued after the existence of man, such as he is in this world? The plant withers and dies: we never think of asking whether there will be any continuation of its individuality; we are satisfied with observing that matter never ceases to exist, but only changes from one mode of existence to another. Of this the senses assure all who attend to the subject. [JA:] But very many are not satisfied to take it for granted that, when man dies, the change in his material form is the only result. The heart which has loved and sympathized, revered and admired, asks, ‘‘Is this dust all that remains from qualities of the same nature as those to be recognized in the Perfect?’’ The heart which has watched suffering asks, when in vain trying to relieve it, ‘‘Is there no relief but unconsciousness?’’

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Still more, the heart which mourns over a vicious existence, conscious that, if this be all, for this man it would be better that he had never been born,74 since his existence is not worth having; yet, conscious also that he had no power to make it otherwise, asks whether there may not be future opportunity in which the experience of the past may lead to a better future? The capabilities of the nature of the plant are fulfilled, but man, to whose capabilities none can put a limit in themselves—man, full of high object, say Brunel, Jacob Bell, Macaulay,75 making discoveries, or otherwise exercising his faculties, so that his life is enriching mankind! Is he to share the fate of the plant?

Still more the heart which mourns over sin.

Without it, no Omnipotent, Love and Wisdom [HM:] But he bequeaths, it is said, the riches of his nature to posterity, when he himself becomes insensible dust. [MS:] Each individual is an idiosyncratic nature, different from ever y other that is, or has been, or ever will be. It is impossible that he should communicate all that he is, all that he has to communicate, except through himself. Whatever the possibilities of his nature, it is by exercise only that he can realize or communicate them. To his power of attainment or of communication it does not seem that there is any necessary close before death. Many live to old age, in healthy possession of their faculties till death. That many do not is owing to mistakes in the mode of life. The affection which anyone feels for another, whose life he has shared, can never be repeated by any other. Fresh affections may arise between individuals of fresh generations. But can succession equal, in kind or degree, continuity? During the space of a brief human life, what is there not to do? There is to prepare the nature for such attachments, to find out, by the experience of actual life, the persons capable of being mutually inspired with them; there are the mistakes to be made, each other’s characters to be felt after in the dark, [JA:] and heartaches from having misunderstood, or not adapted ourselves to the characters we are attached to.

If the existence of the individual when cut short for himself, benefits future generations, does this satisfy our moral feeling for himself?

74 A paraphrase of Matt 26:24. 75 I.K. Br unel (1806-59), railway engineer and hospital designer; Jacob Bell (1792-1852) engineer and Presbyterian minister. Nightingale also cited a funeral sermon written about him: ‘‘Riches in Death: A Discourse Occasioned by the Decease of Mr Jacob Bell of New York’’; Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-59), historian, statesman and poet.

138 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Mistakes which must be made during a temporar y existence.

Such destruction of what is valuable inconsistent with the existence of a spirit of love and wisdom.

What is inconsistent with love and wisdom does not become consistent by supposing that love and wisdom to be omnipotent.

[HM:] But granting that, each generation transmitting its experience, man will arrive at exemption from such mistakes, that, by dint of this experience transmitted by one generation to another, he will attain to a well-constituted nature, to good means of cultivating and exercising it, to a good organization of life, so that the most will be made of life, and thus that opportunity will not be lost by mistakes. [MS:] But then still more will it be felt that the ties of sympathy, of capability of communicating mutually, between any two, are different from what can be between any other two—that to put an end to such ties would be to destroy that which, by the laws of God, can never be again. Such destruction of that which is valuable—of that which can never be renewed, would not be consistent with the existence of an omnipresent spirit of love and wisdom. {Omitted JA: Shall the ‘‘clay’’ judge the ‘‘potter’’?76 f165} [MS:] That which is inconsistent with love and wisdom does not become consistent by supposing that love and wisdom to be omnipotent. To compel one man to sacrifice himself for others, would this be right in a human being? Yet a man of vicious life is sacrificed to a system, if his existence ends with this world, for such is the nature of vice that the life of a vicious man is not worth having to himself. The only way in which his existence can be reconcilable with the existence of an omnipotent spirit of love and wisdom is his attainment hereafter, by means of the exercise of his own capabilities and those of others, to well-being. {Omitted HM: But what is it that assures us that it would be contrary to right to compel one man to sacrifice himself to others? Is it the constitution of our nature? f165} We call God wise and good and omnipotent. We address ceaseless words to Him as if He were so. But if we have evidence that He is so, why do we attribute to Him that which we should attribute to no other good and wise being? Let us first discover His nature, and then attribute to Him that which is consistent with His nature. Consistent with God’s purpose But how can we tell what will be righteous and wise and good, in one so different from ourselves, we persist in asking. Different, how? As far as we are able to recognize Him, different only in

76 An allusion to Isa 45:9.

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degree. It seems as if we said, ‘‘How do we know that for one much wiser and better than we are it may not be right to commit murder or steal? to do evil to one that good may come to another? We have only to submit.’’ Whether our conviction come from intuition or experience, we are convinced that to put an end to the child we have brought into existence, after a life of suffering (when we might prolong its life), for benefits which we may foresee to others, would be wrong. [MS:] But what is it that assures us that it would be contrary to right to compel one man to sacrifice himself for others? Is it the constitution of our nature? [MS:] It has been thought right, in some stages of society, to compel one man to sacrifice himself for others, but experience teaches us that, whether our object be selfish or benevolent, it is not, in the nature of things, to be gained by sacrificing one for another. It is impossible indeed to sacrifice one for another, if we would. That which is good for all is essentially good for each. That which is bad for one is bad for all. It would, therefore, be bad for all, a loss to all, that any individual nature were put out of existence, for each individual nature has a capability of contributing to the whole, in a way that no other nature can. [HM:] To suppose that each individual does contribute his portion, and then retires from existence to make room for others, [MS:] is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a spirit of love and wisdom, i.e., such a Being would not bring into existence a capability which, from the nature of things, no other will have, and then destroy that capability. It is true that something is transmitted to another generation, but experience shows that no mode of existence is wasted or destroyed. It is all evolution, development, order, progress—never destruction. [HM:] But to this it is answered that a human being does not cease to exist at death. It is change, not destruction, which takes place. [JA:] Do you mean the change from a human being to dust and gases? Think what a human being is, think of the divine nature existing in kind, only limited in degree, and say if you can think dust and gases the development, the evolution, to a human being in the thought of the omnipotent spirit of love and goodness? [MS:] Is it not obvious, too, that the physical being exists, as the means or mode for the existence of the divine attributes, for the attainment of them by exercise, for their exercise when attained?

It is impossible to sacrifice one for another if we would. That which is bad for one is bad for all.

Is the change of a human being to dust and gases a satisfactor y conclusion?

Are the means to be indestr uctible, the end cut short?

140 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought The physical being is the means—the divine nature, or the attainment and exercise of the divine nature, the end. Shall we suppose the means indestructible, the end cut short? And why do we suppose so? Our senses do tell us about it Do our senses tell us nothing about it?

Is the omnipotent spirit of love and wisdom a Being of a different nature from man?

Are we to judge by our own wisdom what is wisdom in Him, by His what is wisdom in us?

[HM:] Because it is said our senses tell us nothing about it. [MS:] They do tell about it. They are the means by which we gain a comprehension of the nature of the omnipotent spirit of love and wisdom. They tell us, in the same way in which they tell me the character of Dr Arnold,77 of which you will not say that I know nothing. I feel cer tain that Dr Arnold was not influenced by interested motives in his conduct. I do not see a disinterested man as I see a fair or a dark man. But through my sight, and my hearing, and my feeling, etc., I come at the comprehension of the existence of a disinterested man, and having comprehended and felt this existence, I can be sure that such an existence will not act inconsistently with its own nature. In like manner, by the senses also, I come at the comprehension of the existence of an omnipotent spirit of love and wisdom, and having through the senses perceived such an existence, and through the feeling, felt it, I am assured that this existence will not act contrary to its nature. [HM:] Still we ask, can man comprehend what is love and wisdom in a being different from himself? [MS:] This spirit, though omnipotent, is not a Being of a different nature from himself. Progress in degree in the love and wisdom which we recognize without degree as unconnected with physical limits, is proved by experience to be possible with the physical limits of human nature. The more we attain of a wise love, the more we can judge of what would be the will of an omnipotent and perfectly wise love. [HM:] But how are we to know whether our love is wise or not? [MS:] By comparing it with the law, the principle, as far as we can discover it, of that other love. [JA:] This, it will be said, is judging by our own wisdom, what is wisdom in Him, by His what is wisdom in us.

77 Nightingale sent a copy of Thomas Arnold’s Life and Correspondence to a friend, Mrs Truelove, with a dedication: ‘‘this record of a truly great man who left his impress for good upon so many, many young minds and consciences and who is an old admiration of hers’’ (Women 8:786).

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[MS:] By observation and experience we trace that God makes the right exercise of the collective nature of mankind, the means and measure of the well-being of the individual and the race. And we find, by experience and observation, that this must be the means and measure of man’s benefit to man—that one man can only help another by helping him to some right exercise of his own nature. Having discovered this, we may infer that God will not destroy, when attained by exercise, that which can only, agreeably to His purpose, be thus attained. {Omitted HM: Each idiosyncrasy, being different from every other, and having passed through circumstances different from ever y other, there is that gained by the experience of each which cannot, in its nature, be transmitted to any other, and that therefore there would be waste of that which is most precious—if any of these idiosyncrasies were cut off. f169} [HM:] Granted that every material argument is against a future existence, that it is impossible to believe memory continued where the system of physical relations is changed—then we depend simply and solely upon moral evidence, upon the moral character of God, for our belief in a future state. [MS:] And this is thought a very poor dependence. Certainly, we have no other. But whatever co-existences or successions are obser vable, the only fundamental source of all or any of them is the will of the spirit of right. We ask, ‘‘Is this possible? is that possible?’’

Is it a very poor dependence to depend simply on the character of God for the argument for a future life?

Fundamental Question The fundamental question is, ‘‘Is this or that consistent with God, the spirit of right?’’ We are apt to think that those co-existences, which we believe to be invariable, arise from some connection in their own nature, but their nature springs from the will of the ruling spirit of right, from no other source. Experience proves to us the capability of man to make some advance towards the comprehension of the nature of love and wisdom. Experience proves that this capability increases by exercise. We have, therefore, reason to believe that it is in our power forever to advance in the comprehension and estimation of what will be the will of goodness and wisdom. And thus shall we advance in the knowledge of the future. Each mode of existence is, in the present, a development out of a past into a present, thence to develop into a future. We must

Fundamental question of humanity is not, Is this possible? but, Is this consistent with God, the spirit of right?

142 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

In what sense are ‘‘all things possible with God’’?

How is God to bring about the activity of more than one will, His own?

study that which is, always with this comprehensive view, that it is ever a development from a past towards a determinate future, existing in and determined by the thought of the righteous God. We cannot otherwise truly comprehend any mode of existence, and in proportion to our ignorance of past and future development must be our ‘‘respectful doubt’’ as to the interpretation of what is. From this study of what has been and is, and of what ought to be, shall we advance to the comprehension of that thought and feeling, which ‘‘was without beginning, is now and ever shall be.’’ Mankind believe God a being to whom there is no impossibility. [JA:] ‘‘All things are indeed possible with God,’’78 [MS:] which it would not be a contradiction to the nature of God to will. On the other hand, man is apt to suppose possibilities to depend on the nature of things, whereas each mode of existence, the nature of each mode of existence, depends on the spirit of righteousness, which determines all existence, co-existence, development. There exists eternally a thought and feeling which comprehends eternity. This thought and feeling is ever manifesting itself in activity. Thought, feeling, purpose, will, in the One are ever the same. Activity is the manifestation of that thought and feeling in a successive development. It would not be consistent with wisdom that its manifestation should, like its thought, be always the same. On the contrar y, its manifestation in each present varies from its manifestation in each past and future. That is not perfection which has not verified itself in activity, in life, in work. [JA:] But would one not expect to see the Perfect thought invariably manifesting itself in the perfect life? [MS:] Were it so, there would be only one will in activity. The activity of various wills, all omnipotent, all wise and good, is the will of the One. This is attained by the will which makes mankind selfcreative, self-developing. The course of each human being, however winding, is ensured to be towards perfection. But the Son must work his way from ignorance and imperfection to truth and perfection before he is one in being with the Father. The holy spirit developed within him by the law within and around him shall lead him onwards till his being is one with God. Then shall the spirit of God again set forth on the work of fresh development and manifestation.

78 A paraphrase of Matt 19:26.

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We depend simply upon God’s character 2 [JA:] It is true, however, that we have no real ‘‘foundation’’ but ‘‘faith’’ for believing in a future life. We are told that faith will remove mountains.79 [MS:] It has been supposed that the more contrar y to the usual course of things, the greater the miracle, the greater the power manifested by God, the greater is our merit in believing in His power. But, if the mountain is stable through God’s law, shall we conceive Him to exercise His power in violating that law? Christ seemed to conceive that a man would be empowered to do whatever he believed that he could do, but would there be any right in such a principle as this? [JA:] Yet faith will remove all the difficulties which, we acknowledge, lie in the way of believing in a future state. {Omitted JA: A future state is, in itself, so impossible that it is useless to reason about it. f174} [MS:] What is faith? (The following passages are from Mackay’s Progress of the Intellect: ‘‘Faith, as opposed to credulity and to that blind submission to inexplicable power which usurped its name in the ancient East, is an allegiance of the reason.’’ ‘‘Faith is not that belief of St Augustine, whose merit increased with the absurdity of the proposition, nor that which attributed to the instigation of God the real or projected murder of an only son.’’ ‘‘In its advanced stages, faith is a legitimate result of the calculation of probabilities; it may transcend experience, but can never absolutely contradict it. Faith and knowledge tend mutually to the confirmation and enlargement of one another, faith by verification being often transformed into knowledge, and every increase of knowledge supplying a wider and firmer basis of belief. Faith, as an inference from knowledge, should be consistently inferred from the whole of knowledge.’’ ‘‘The same experience which is the source of knowledge being therefore the only legitimate foundation of faith, a sound faith cannot be derived from the anomalous and exceptional. It is the avidity for the marvellous, and the morbid eagerness for a cheap and easy

79 An allusion to 1 Cor 13:2.

Faith this may be called, this dependence on a future state.

What is ‘‘faith’’?

144 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought solution of the mysteries of existence, a solution supposed to be implied in the conception of an arbitrary and unintelligible rule, which has ever retarded philosophy and stultified religion. Faith naturally arises out of the regular and undeviating. The same uner ring uniformity, which alone makes experience possible, was also the first teacher of the invisible things of God. It is this: Elder scripture, writ by God’s own hand, scripture authentic, uncorrupt by men,80

which is set before ever yone without note or comment.’’ ‘‘Here may be found commandments written on tables of stone, which man cannot break.’’ ‘‘Faith, the necessary evidence of the seen as well as the unseen, is the assumed basis of all inferential knowledge, for it is the only assurance we have of the reality of the world in which we move and live. The external something, whose existence we presume but cannot prove as the cause of our sensations, is as much an object of faith as the unseen Deity, or as the anticipated renewal of our existence.’’ ‘‘By faith, the companion of knowledge, the contradictory tendencies of our twofold nature are explained and reconciled. The condition of the world, the purposes of Providence, are no longer an impenetrable mystery.’’ ‘‘While we stood upon our mere knowledge, good seemed inextricably mixed up with evil, our world disfigured by a fall, and even knowledge itself doubtful or impossible. We lived in a world of phantoms, and all existence, even our own, might be made problematical.’’ By faith, ‘‘we see evil, yet believe in universal good: we see diversity, but believe in unity; we are surrounded by change and death, yet cling to the certainty of eternal stability and life.’’81 [JA:] Is it belief that God will break his own laws, that he will vary from the nature whence they spring? No, it is belief that his nature, and consequently his laws, are invariable. He has given us the means to recognize what goodness and benevolence and righteousness and wisdom are. Men have varied, indeed, and do vary, as to their conceptions of what these are. So they have done and do concerning

80 Edward Young, Night Thoughts IX.644, quoted in Robert William Mackay, The Progress of the Intellect, as Exemplified in the Religious Development of the Greeks and Hebrews 1:40. 81 Mackay, Progress 1:38-42.

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other truths, which are yet within human ken. But on every subject there is a truth, and unity of opinion will come just in proportion as mankind gain knowledge of truth and improvement of being. No Foundation for it but ‘‘Faith’’ With respect to religious truth, we have set it on a different footing from any other. We have supposed that it came to us in a different way. Why? A power above man was recognized before it was known what wisdom, goodness, righteousness, benevolence, really were. Power first comes home to human consciousness; might is right in an early state of human nature. It was discerned that there was an existence, or various existences, with power above human. This power was supposed to be used as the man of that day would have used it if he had had it. Religion then consisted of man’s interpretation of the phenomena within and without him, directed by a superior in power, using that power as he, man, would have used it. How important to man are the dealings of superhuman power, was more tr uly, because more intensely felt, in the earlier times of human existence than now, when man has gained by knowledge more power over good and evil. The many then could feel nothing but fear of power unseen, unknown—unknown except through the ver y limited view of its effects then possible. The few of more power ful minds or nerves, or more imaginative natures, noted their impressions, often believing themselves inspired by peculiar communication, saying what they themselves believed (as many do now in books and pulpits), and taking for granted that their belief was tr ue. Some feigned a belief for selfish purposes. Thus was a belief compounded for the many. Now, by some from reverence (in consequence of having been brought up from infancy to consider the subject of religion as not to be approached like any other subject), by some from indifference, by some from disgust at superstitions revolting to the understanding and the heart, and from taking for granted that religion offers nothing else, the subject is not inquired into. People habitually acknowledge that God is wise and good; they say so to Him when they address Him. But they do not examine whether the way in which they suppose Him to use His power is wise or good. {Omitted HM: But we can know nothing except through the senses, it is said, and therefore it is vain to dispute about anything else. f176} But we can know nothing except through the senses, it is said.

How have religious beliefs arisen?

What can we know except by the senses?

146 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought [MS:] It is true if I could not see, or hear, or feel, or smell, or taste, I could not come by the conviction that A is disinterested, but having that conviction I can, in certain respects, assert what he will do and what he will not do, with as much real ground for certainty as that the sun will rise tomorrow, viz., that every being, He who directs the sunrise, as well as every human being, essentially wills according to his nature. (People in general feel sure that the sun will rise tomorrow, because it has risen so many days, and never not risen, ‘‘often repeated, never contradicted,’’ as Comte says. But, if we trace the sun’s rising to will and power, the real dependable reason is the same for expecting the sun to rise, as for A. to be disinterested, viz., consistency with the nature of A. and with the nature of Him through whose will the sun rises. Comte’s ground of expectation is very super ficial. He ought only to say, ‘‘never contradicted’’ in human experience, as some say. They said otherwise in Joshua’s day.82 Surely it is a more fundamental reason for not believing them, that it would be contrary to the spirit of law, than that we have seen the sun rise so often. The principle of ‘‘often repeated, never contradicted,’’ is important to be observed, in order to direct us to the ruling spirit or will, but is not to be referred to as the foundation of our belief. That foundation of Comte’s it is which shuts out religion; it only tells of what is, it shuts out the why? from what spirit, feeling, will?) Revealed by the Senses?

What is benevolence?

Righteousness?

A.’s nature is such that his disinterestedness will not change while he has his senses, or, as we say, while ‘‘he is himself.’’ The nature of God never changes; it was, is and will be benevolence, goodness, wisdom, righteousness. [JA:] But how do we know that it is not consistent with these qualities to give man living thought and sentiment, for a time, then to put an end to it, in order to give place to another man? [MS:] Benevolence is wishing well, but it is not wishing well to a man to give him an existence which can be shown to be an evil to him, as may the existence of a wicked man. Righteousness, what is it? What it is not may be illustrated by imagining a being inflicting upon one man a life which is an evil to

82 In Josh 10:12-13, when the sun stood still until the people avenged themselves upon their enemies.

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him, in order that other men may live lives which are a good to them. Wisdom means taking the best means for the best end. The best end to a benevolent being will be the greatest possible happiness to as many beings as can exist without deteriorating from the amount of happiness. [MS:] Suppose that individuals profiting, as we know man does, by the experience which has gone before them, have attained a state of being really worth having, that they share the divine attributes, whence alone springs what may be called happiness. ([MS:] There are, indeed, sensual enjoyments in the animal creation. But can we ever call these, in themselves, ‘‘happiness’’? And as to intellectual enjoyments, Comte well says that these, or even intellectual exertion, are little higher than physical enjoyment or exertion, unless at the call of feeling.) Suppose them, then, in fullest pursuit and enjoyment of all that is right and good. Suppose them happy in love of God and love of man, then come old age and death and quench all! The affections towards each other, so keen, so strong, so tender, more vivid, though less elevated, than the feelings of which we are capable towards the Perfect, are these to be quenched? Much of life is spent before they are at maturity. Many are the difficulties, the disappointments which frequently attend all human affections. Is man but to have a glimpse how he can love, can sympathize, and is all over then? The noble nature of man may be capable of saying, ‘‘I willingly retire to make room for another. I go into nothingness. Another comes for a taste of God’s eternal joys.’’ But will the perfect nature of God be satisfied with this? ‘‘We know in whom we have trusted.’’ We do not know, if thus we can believe of Him. To know would be to believe in a future state of existence to mankind as much as to know Sir Henry Lawrence83 or the duke of Wellington is to know that what they will do will be beyond all low or interested motives. That which is wise and good and benevolent and righteous, that He who is the spirit of wisdom and goodness and benevolence and righteousness will do. {Omitted JA: But how do we know, it is again asked, what would be righteousness and wisdom and goodness and benevolence in an

Wisdom?

[HM:] How will the amount of happiness be best increased?

Man may be satisfied, but God could not for him, that he should contribute to the common stock of happiness, himself disappearing.

83 General Sir Henry Lawrence (1806-57), killed holding Lucknow in the Sepoy Mutiny.

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{Will God permit waste of what is most precious by destroying the individuals— while providing for a kind of general progress? f184}

{What is the greatest happiness? The exercise of all the nature in harmony with God.}

{Each individual is different from every other. This points to a future state for ever y individual—not to a future for humanity. f182}

omnipotent Being? MS: Have we, have we not the power of comprehending, of feeling what is absolute Righteousness, Wisdom, Goodness? The possessing Power does not alter the nature of absolute Wisdom and Goodness—degrees of power alter, indeed, what would be a wise manifestation of good feeling. But we are considering God to be omnipotent, i.e., powerful to effect whatever is His Will. We consider Him so, because that which is effected is so great, far beyond human power, that it leads us to suppose His Power to coincide with His Will. If this be so, His benevolence, which we consider also unlimited, because the more we learn and the more we improve ourselves to appreciate it, the greater we find it, will cause that He will desire and effect the greatest amount of good and happy consciousness possible. JA: But when we say the greatest amount possible, is there any limit to Divine possibility? [MS:] His will is to share His attributes. Is there anything which can be called happiness except in the exercise of those attributes? There are, indeed, sensual enjoyments in the animal creation. But can we ever call these happiness except in connection with such attributes? And as to intellectual enjoyments, Comte well says that such intellectual exertion either is little higher than physical enjoyment or exertion, unless at the call of feeling. [HM:] Grant, then, that from the exercise of the divine attributes in man alone comes happiness, we [you] have to prove. ff178-79} {Omitted [MS:] Love, we know, would desire the greatest happiness possible, without a contradiction—the greatest quantity and the best quality of happiness. Now experience must prove what is the greatest happiness. [HM:] And what does experience prove to be the greatest happiness? [MS:] Is it not the exercise of all the nature in harmony with God, in sympathy with individuals whom mutual attraction brings together to love and to work together? If this is the greatest degree and the best kind of happiness, will it not essentially be the will of Love and Wisdom to continue such natures, such ties, which, in their nature are adapted to happiness in the present, increased by, founded upon the past? Does not experience prove to us that the present owes its value to a conscious being from having a past and a future? And, is not the value of the Present in proportion to the attainment of the past, the scope for attainment in the future? f180} {Omitted MS: Improvement comes from exercise. This we learn from experience and observation. One person can help another

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only by calling some part of his nature into exercise one generation can help another only by calling into exercise the natures of its successors. . . . Take for example Watt.84 He invents the steam engine and sets the world to work after he is no longer in it. But the exercise of his nature in that invention has done for him what he cannot do for any one else. f184} Individuality sacred in God’s sight [MS:] Individuality appears to be sacred in the thought of God. Indeed, if we suppose man to be a modification of the attributes of God limited by the laws of physical nature, it seems natural to expect that individuality will be preser ved in every instance till perfection is attained. {Omitted JA: But what a fanciful theory! f187} [MS:] It is no fanciful theory to say that we can discern the same qualities or attributes manifested in the laws which govern the universe, existing in conscious living man. [HM and JA:] Man makes God, it is said—imagines a being like himself, but with each attribute which he finds in himself heightened in degree, heightened beyond what he can himself conceive, heightened infinitely. {Omitted MS: Do we not feel certain that a human character will not contradict itself? From the wise and tender human parent could we expect to be put to death when we had served some purpose of his by our lives? If we grant that all existence is in accordance with law, the sufferings and privations of the wicked as well as ever y other mode of existence are referable to Him as their origin. [HM:] Then you make heaven for the wicked, not for the virtuous? [JA: Will time have nothing to do with the subject? Would there be any wrong in an individual existence of misery lasting only a second, but in consequence of which millions were happy forever? f187} [MS:] But these attributes are really traceable in the laws of God. The senses, the reason, the feeling, may there appreciate them, and the more man, by exercise of his nature, discerns and appreciates these laws, the more of excellence does he find in them. {Omitted HM: But how can we discern that which is not appreciable by the senses? f188}

84 James Watt (1736-1819), inventor.

150 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought It is obvious that the tendency of the right exercise of man’s capabilities is towards perfection. (It is frequently maintained that the ordinar y normal course of human life is to be ‘‘progression of the mind from childhood to manhood, retrogression from manhood to second childhood.’’ See Dr Southwood Smith’s Philosophy of Health.85 Both our knowledge and our ignorance forbid us to accept this belief. All human ignorance, past and present, must be taken into the account in judging of the constitution of human nature. The instances are many in which the understanding has been as sound, the feelings as keen, the memory as distinct at ninety as at any age. There seems no inconsistency with what we know in expecting that man may discover how to maintain and to improve the divine in human nature, while life lasts. It seems most accordant with the spirit of God’s laws that it should be so. Change indeed, ceaseless change, takes place in human nature, as in all that is—a difference in the exercise of our faculties is fitting at the different stages of our human life. But there is no evidence on which to contradict the belief that it is in human possibility so to keep God’s laws that the mens sana in corpore sano [healthy mind in a healthy body] might exist, if those laws are kept aright, for whatever will be the natural term of human life. Each man may, by obser vation of God’s laws, and will to keep them aright, as far as he knows, contribute to solve the questions, What is the natural duration of human life? What the state, physical, mental, moral, which is right and possible while life lasts?) In whatever direction he wisely exercises his faculties he improves, and in no direction has come into view the point at which improvement must stop, except indeed improvement in physical power. A man may improve in physical strength up to a certain point, but he cannot even keep up permanently to that point, much less go beyond it. But it would seem that experience already gives prospect of endless improvement in various intellectual and moral directions, infinite prospect of removing ignorance and inability. Let it be remembered that happiness will be best promoted, not by exercise of skill and ability in a certain direction, irrelative to one general object to which all exercise of human nature should

85 Thomas Southwood Smith (1788-1861), pioneer sanitarian, author of a much-used two-volume Philosophy of Health, or, An Exposition of the Physical and Mental Constitution of Man, 1836-37.

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tend, viz., order, progress, living for others in accordance with the thought of righteousness, goodness, wisdom—happiness will be best promoted by each exercising himself according to his own individual nature so as to contribute to the purpose common to all. We have said that a man may improve his faculties indefinitely, except as to physical power. If it is asked, do we find improvement sufficient to authorize this belief? do we, for instance, find persons become more tender, more loving and affectionate as they go on with life?—Have they, we must ask in return, good opportunity of exercising such affections? If they have, each exercise of fellow feeling, each work engaged in with one heart, each difficulty borne in the same spirit, each sympathy renders affection stronger than it was before. (Comte says, ‘‘On se lasse de penser et même d’agir, jamais on ne se lasse d’aimer’’ [One grows tired of thinking, and even acting, but not of loving].86 That present right exercise increases the facility for future right exercise is a law applying to every part of our nature. The affections strengthen whenever they are in healthy exercise.) Infinite Progress for each and for all Both the highest and the lowest human natures, then, lead to the same conclusion, viz., a future state of infinite progress for each and for all. The higher natures, in proportion as they are high, teach that the spirit of perfect, omnipotent love and wisdom will never destroy that which is of highest value, which by the laws of the Perfect can never be replaced. The lower natures, in proportion as they are low, teach that there is a future through which that existence which is not now a boon will become so, otherwise such existence would not be consistent with the will from which it springs. {Omitted MS: It would be contrary to the Spirit of Righteousness to will that which should cause suffering to an individual for the sake of others, unless with the conviction that that individual would, on the whole, gain from it. HM: But what proves this? And would any degree of suffering for however short a time, for the benefit of any number of individuals for any length of time, be contrary to the Spirit of Righteousness? MS: I would first speak from impressions of what I conceive to be the plan of the Perfect, and then try to make out whether there be proof that it is so. To the imperfect and lim-

86 Comte, Système de politique positive 1:690.

Both the highest and the lowest human natures tell the same tale, viz., of a future state of infinite progress for each and for all.

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{The senses tell us that death kills the individual. But the senses also tell us of the Perfect Being who will not kill the individual. f199} {It cannot be right to will suffering to an individual for the sake of experience to others, without his profiting from that experience himself ? f200}

He Himself reveals Himself.

ited, each present differs from every other. The being, in all that constitutes it, is different. The physical being, the nature, as to each capability and as to the whole, is different. It has progressed, directly or indirectly, towards the Perfect. JA: Cries of ‘‘Oh! Oh!’’ MS: That is, even if directly it has retrograded, it has been going through that which will advance it. But to the Perfect, in thought and feeling, there is no change. It is change which constitutes a past, present and future. To the perfect thought and feeling there is no past and future, only present. But activity—the rendering into living action the thought and feeling—that in its nature is consecutive. The Eternal Thought and Feeling which is One and changes not, requires successive acts to realize itself in activity. . . . It would be contrary to the Spirit of Righteousness to will that which should cause suffering to an individual for the sake of others, unless with the conviction that that individual would, on the whole, gain from it. ff196-97} Our real, practical reason for believing in a future life is the same that men believe upon and act upon throughout their practical life, viz., that will will correspond with the nature of the character whence it springs, and that that nature exists in accordance with some law or principle. Why do I depend on finding my meal prepared this morning? on meeting my friend at noon? on finding the committee collected which I expect this afternoon? Is it not all dependence upon will, upon the nature whence will springs? I find it to be essential to will to pursue its greatest satisfaction, or, in other words, I find that, essentially, it does not dis-satisfy itself. I can give no mathematical proof that, at nine o’clock, I shall find breakfast on the table, at three I shall find collected a committee for a particular purpose. But I no more doubt it than I doubt the existence of the pen and ink which I see before me. Once assured that there exists a will, whence spring the successive phenomena or modes of existence in the universe; once convinced that the nature of that will is the same benevolence and wisdom of which I am conscious in human nature, and I depend on a continuation of existence. Because the Omnipotent willing otherwise would contradict the benevolence and wisdom which His universe reveals. {Omitted JA: But how may we be assured that we know what benevolence and wisdom are? f204} [MS:] He Himself, the spirit of righteousness, is ever declaring Himself to you. Seeing you shall see, hearing you shall hear,87 if you 87 A paraphrase of Matt 13:14.

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will take the means. Observe His work and way, His path through the universe; try to interpret one part by another; read the present, the past and future in connection with one another; compare what man can do for man, if he wills him a blessed existence; and you will find that one will, unlimited by man’s material bounds, is pursuing the same purpose by the same means in kind, differing only in degree. You will read of a nature and a will common with man’s best. If you will strive to observe, study and comprehensively interpret the universe in its eternal purport, you will discern more and more one will, one nature, upon which you may depend. You could not bring yourself to conceive that your friends in this house would leave you this morning without your daily meal. Stretch your thought to the revelations of the universe, and still less will you feel it a possibility that God will quench the spirit than that man will star ve the body. Experience of God’s presence [HM:] I have experience that my friends will provide my daily food. [MS:] Have I not experience of God’s eternal purpose? [JA:] Show it more plainly, Father, to my dim vision, my aching sight, is our constant prayer. [MS:] ‘‘Show us the Father,’’ said Philip.88 He is shown only in His eternal universe, His manifestation. How then shall we discern Him? The realization of this manifestation is eternity’s work. But His purpose even now man may discern. Look, if experience is not revealing to you that it is to share His own nature, to transmute His thought and feeling into life and work, to regulate that life and work by His law, which shall call into exercise all that it is good to be. [HM:] Experience shows us thought and feeling in connection with material limits; are we warranted then to suppose that they still exist, when we have evidence that those material limits no longer exist? [MS:] We have experience of thought and feeling without material limits. The more we improve our being, so as to be able to estimate what is, and to comprehend its scope, the more we learn of what is—so much the more consciousness and evidence do we gain of thought and feeling unconnected with material limits in the

88 John 14:8.

Have we not as much experience of God and what His purpose is, as we have of any of our friends and what their purpose is?

What experience have we of any thought and feeling existing without material limits?

154 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Being we call God. Hence we have evidence that the material accompaniments and limits with which we find thought and feeling connected in human nature are not essential to their existence. Let us try to understand, as far as we may, or, at any rate, not to misunderstand the connections in nature. Sight is the consciousness of a present state of being. Whether this consciousness is entirely subjective, or whether it is objective, and connected with an existence we call matter, we know not, nor can any means within our power advance us towards evidence for answering that question. It is entirely unimportant. For this we know, that certain means which are within our power are co-existent with or successive to certain states of consciousness. I wish for the consciousness of the presence of a certain man, a certain ship. I know perfectly the means for obtaining that consciousness, whether the man and the ship be matter existing objectively to me, or not. Certain co-existences or successions are essential to certain states of consciousness. This is proved to us by experience. This is all that is essential to what appears to be the purpose of all existence, viz., the perfecting thought and feeling by life and work, so as to produce the proper satisfaction of a grand existence—the eternal Father—the eternal Son. Some speak with a sort of humble ignorance, and unconsciously take a sort of credit for that humility, when they say, ‘‘We know not how light is essential to human vision,’’ and the like. But what if there be nothing to know, beyond this, that there exists a will for certain invariable co-existences with each definite consciousness? these being the means by which we learn to conduct ourselves, to exercise ourselves. No cause but God’s will for any law Right

This is not truly to be called an inexorable necessity, but accordance with right in the will whence spring such laws. By right we mean the thought of the Perfect which is effective for the welfare of eternal being. And such is the tendency of law, for these ‘‘constant relations of succession and similitude enable us to foresee them one after the other.’’ And can we not discern that hence the best of education, the only true education, for these laws ‘‘show us the means of directing our activity,’’ and thus ‘‘the practical effect emanates from an intelligent will.’’ One school of the present day has pronounced all causes radically inaccessible, all research into them consequently absurd. Let

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us look whether we may not learn, not that they are accessible, but that no cause exists, except one omnipotent and righteous will, manifesting itself in law. Experience, taking a more and more comprehensive view, may show more and more evidence that this would account for all that has been, is, and that we may discern is to be, while (without a belief in such a will) our consciousness of existence, present, past and future, presents us with contradiction and confusion. A glimpse of God’s thought appears in many of man’s str uggles to understand existence and its source, but often he directly contradicts that thought in his interpretation. That each shall work out the weal of the whole is God’s thought; that one shall be sacrificed to do away with the sin which arises from ignorance (which ignorance the work of all alone can transmute into wisdom) has been man’s frequent thought, or, rather, has been passively received by many. It has sprung from the thought of comparatively few, from the feeling of a greater number, but has been by most who believe, or think they believe it, accepted, not originated. {Omitted HM: But I do not see what all this tends to. You say that God is good. . . . f210} [HM:] Will it be said that our argument is that God is good, and therefore we believe in a future state. But we cannot prove that God is good, except by taking a future state for granted. [MS:] First, let us inquire what is proof ? Proof is an inference which it is not possible to doubt. We find much evidence in present and past existences that they spring from a spirit of love and wisdom. If they do not, how can we explain that the provision for welfare is made, which would be made if they did spring from love and wisdom? Is not this evidence or inference which we can hardly doubt? But, while finding this evidence of a wise and powerful benevolence, we find other circumstances which indicate either want of power or of benevolence, unless there is reason to believe in a plan of eternal development, which would render what seemed to be indications of the want of benevolence absolute evidence of its presence. Thus, seeking to avoid contradictions in the ruling spirit, seeking consistency, a continued existence suggests itself to us.89

God is good, and therefore I believe in a future state, but I am obliged to take for granted a future state, in order to prove that God is good. Is not this reasoning in a circle?

What is proof ?

89 JSM: But why must there be no contradictions in the ruling spirit? or why not a plurality of spirits, acting in different purposes?

156 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought No perfect God without it What can we know of a future state?

And what can we know concerning this state? concerning the change which takes place, when human life ceases in this world? 1. That it is in accordance with law, since every change which takes place may be traced to a definite law. 2. That it will be a state in which, directly or indirectly, man will progress by the exercise of his own nature and that of his kind, since we find indications of this tendency in all human existence. We find that, with this tendency, all is harmonious with the spirit recognized in some instances. 3. That man’s progress will be—improvement of being and lessening of ignorance—more of love, more of wisdom; for such, experience tells us, is the only real progress to welfare. Conclusion

Without eternity for each and for all of us, there could not be a perfect God.

What can we know of eternity, we who acknowledge that it is a word to us, that we cannot grasp the idea? Yet we have means to foretell an eternity of existence in connection with the present identity of all men. Means befitting the constitution of our nature; means which, if they do not gain assurance for us, it is because we are imper fect as human beings, in the knowledge and the nature humanity may attain. But how has it been with men in their real or supposed belief of a future existence? Some think it wrong and dangerous to admit any feeling of doubt, any desire of confirmation of what is called the doctrine of a future existence, considering that such a state of mind will offend the Being whom they believe to have informed a portion of mankind, among whom are themselves, of a future existence for man. Many, however, who would shrink from acknowledging doubt to themselves, are ver y far from believing all they think they believe. ‘‘Seventeen or eighteen years ago, I was to all appearance dying of fever. I firmly believed (if belief at second hand can be firm) that a blessed immortality, guaranteed by the resurrection and word of Christ, was about to open upon me, yet so feeble was the effect of this belief that it gave me not one throb of joy; calm resignation to an inevitable but unwelcome event, and thankfulness to that merciful love which had revealed itself to my spirit, were my highest emotions.’’ ‘‘But I will refer to another, a pure and passionate soul, living, breathing and moving in divine things, ever rejoicing in union with

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God in Christ, in theory anticipating eternal glory, and yet to my most certain knowledge, most thoroughly unwilling to die prematurely.’’ (‘‘The Soul,’’ F. Newman.)90 Such a state of mind is common among those who think it sinful to inquire what they believe and why they believe; and if the word belief is used by them to express assurance, they do not believe what they think they believe. Some say that it is a love of life inherent in our nature which leads to the thought of eternity, the wish that our present being should not cease. Is this why the desire that this world should not be the end of all to man is natural or befitting to the human mind? There is a higher reason, one which will strengthen as our nature improves and our knowledge advances. The advance of knowledge gives ever-increasing evidence of universal accordance with law, of which the results in human nature and human history are such that, unless our present existence is connected with a future, it is repugnant to our highest desires, to our moral nature; it contradicts the belief that we are the subjects of a righteous government; while, granting future progress, not only is this law consistent with a righteous ruler, it is the only course we can conceive consistent with a perfect Author. That our present existence is in connection with a future, in which the same process shall be carried forward, namely, that law shall afford inducement and means through which, in course of time, each individual, of whom moral progress is the fitting state, shall attain that state through his own will, his own work and that of his fellows; thus and thus only can we believe that mankind is under righteous government. The desire that no being should exist that is not perfect is a contradiction; such a conception, indeed, would exclude all conscious being, for that would not be perfection which existed alone. For those we love we wish that they should be under the direction of a per fect being, in such a sense that they shall cer tainly attain that state of progress in righteousness which befits their nature. We cannot wish to trust our own ignorance or the ignorance we find, even among the wisest and best of men, with human destiny, over which indeed the influence of each is so limited. All see imper-

90 Francis William Newman, The Soul: Her Sorrows and Aspirations, An Essay toward the Natural History of the Soul as the True Basis of Theology 190-91.

158 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought fectly, though all are capable of opening paths to ever-increasing light. To none can it be said, ‘‘You might have had the right will, and known the way to righteousness if you would.’’ Of many it is at once obvious that such will and such knowledge has not been possible to them. We can endure anything if we can believe that we are all on a road by which our affections, our sympathies, our desire to exercise successfully the various faculties we possess shall in course of time be satisfied, that is, shall be in a state of progressive satisfaction. Without this belief the contrarieties in human existence to what it is good for man to desire, are only tolerable if we shut our eyes to what is going on in the world, if our understandings and hearts speak not to us of ‘‘what is’’ and ‘‘what ought to be.’’ The actual history of man as he is and has been—even the portion of it which we have some partial knowledge, some faint conception of—would be terrible to us, if we did not believe that his will is subject to law, through which in course of time he shall desire and obtain to will righteously, and that meantime his erring will does not irremediably injure himself or others, but is a means to correct the future by the present. Yet, finding as we do, that human will does accord with law, again we should be in despair, if while believing that it has not been in human possibility that the terrible history of human sin and suffering should not have been, we believed these sinners and sufferers to come into existence for no better purpose than what is or has been, or to bridge over unconsciously, and without their own will or purpose, a better existence for future men. God deserves from us this Belief Yet as little can we desire men to be as machines, so constructed that every thought, every feeling, every wish, every act must be right as certainly, and as much without exercise of their own will,91 as in the chronometer, which never varies from true time. That the ignorance and imperfect nature of man should will, irrespectively of one higher and wiser through whom he is learning to will right, is unsatisfactory to us, yet to be rendered incapable of willing otherwise than right is neither a possible conception, nor does the attempt to conceive it represent it as satisfactory. Law

91 JSM: But it would be by their own will.

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alone is satisfactory which ensures that, according to certain conditions a man shall will right, according to certain other conditions he shall will wrong, which ensures also that in course of time, rather in course of eternity, each and all shall in accordance with law desire and obtain to will right, all sin and sorrow being but one of the processes through which mankind is learning and teaching. Hence it is that belief in a future in connection with human existence is essential to the belief that we are under righteous government. Mr Newman condemns the idea that a future state is necessary to redress the evils of this life, and adds, ‘‘Can I go to the Supreme Judge and tell him that I deserve more happiness than he has granted me in this life? Whither is the logician’s common sense or self-knowledge gone?’’ It is on quite a different logic and self-knowledge, on quite a different understanding of the subject from this, that we desire and expect a future existence. We are not thinking of what we ‘‘deserve’’ from God, but rather of what He ‘‘deser ves’’ from us, if we may use such a term. We find ourselves living under such a law that, if it is but carried out in a future, such as the character and tendency of this law would lead us to expect, we can believe that we are living under a righteous government. And does this righteous Governor ‘‘deser ve’’ from us that we should believe of Him that, after having given us some seventy years of an existence, which cannot certainly, without such a future, be called worth having to the great majority of us—merely, as it would then be, in order for Him to be the spectator of our playing out a part— He cuts us off, murders us, in fact, when we have played this part?

Does not God ‘‘deser ve’’ from us that we should believe in His giving us ‘‘eternal life?’’

Views of learned men concerning it Can we call Mr Newman’s ‘‘Supreme Judge’’ a righteous Ruler, if we use the faculties to judge which He has given us? How imperfectly thought out are the views of clever men, who yet have speculated without reser ve concerning a ‘‘future state.’’ Buckle,92 who attaches the greatest importance to this doctrine (which often clever and learned men do not), appears quite satisfied with saying that human affections prophesy it. Whewell, says

92 Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-62), historian of civilization.

Views of learned men concerning ‘‘a future state.’’

160 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought the Westminster Review, ‘‘gives greater weight to the need of a future retribution which is felt by man as a moral being.’’ His reviewer is ‘‘convinced that if any valid proof shall be found of a conscious individual immortality, it will be found in a further insight into the laws of existence.’’93 Plato argues that the soul which has cognizance of eternal truths must itself be eternal. F. Newman thinks we may ‘‘aspire’’ to a future existence. Theodore Parker and Greg94 think ‘‘intuition’’ assures us of it. To us it appears that it is the desire to find a righteous Ruler which makes us desire a future life. We cannot prove that there is no future existence, we can only say we are ignorant how it can be. If we could prove that there is none, we should prove the existence of law inconsistent with itself, that is, with the character and tendency of its results. 6 Law [A dialogue among John Calvin, Jacob Abbott and M.S.] Predestination.

Calvin’s view of Predestination.

In what sense we are predestinate?

[JA:] ‘‘Predestination’’ infers one of two things—either that whatever we may will, and whatever we may do, certain consequences, such as our state in the next world, will inevitably take place, by the decree of God. [Calvin] Or it means that God, at his appointed time, calls a certain number into that state of grace, which will have for its consequences hereafter salvation, and leaves the rest in the state in which they are by nature, of sin and death. [MS and JA:] In one sense indeed we are predestinate. We see a ragged creature, brought up in Field Lane or Saffron Hill, at the ‘‘thieves’ kitchen and seminary for the teaching of that art to children,’’95 and we truly say that he is ‘‘predestinate to sin and death.’’ We see the child of Lois and Eunice96 brought up amid great

93 William Whewell (1794-1866). For a lengthy, critical, anonymous review, but without the identical wording, see ‘‘Whewell’s Moral Philosophy,’’ Westminster Review 58,114 (1 October 1851:349-85. 94 Theodore Parker (1810-60), American transcendentalist; William Rathbone Greg (1809-81), author of Creed of Christendom, 1851. 95 Fagin, in Charles Dickens’s Oliver Twist, ran a thieves’ school in Field Lane, near Saffron Hill. 96 The apostle Paul saw Timothy’s faith first in his grandmother Lois, then his mother, Eunice (2 Tim 1:5).

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objects ‘‘unspotted from the world,’’97 and we can truly say he is predestinate to grace and salvation. [JA:] All children, however, brought up in St Giles’s98 do not grow up thieves; all who are carefully and piously educated, as we but too well know, do not grow up good men. Is there something besides the inevitable action of circumstances, as it is called? [MS:] These exceptions are also the subjects of law; the effects are also traceable to some circumstances, unknown to us, but which could have no other effects. [JA:] Then, it is said, this is implying an unbroken chain, held in the hands of God, from the first beginning of things, upon which is str ung ever y event, act, feeling, thought, will of a man’s life; effect following cause, as link follows link, immutable, pre-ordinate. None of the insulated phenomena of predestination. None of the recalcitrant exercise of free agency.

Apparent deviations from Law.

These deviations themselves the subjects of Law. Does this unbroken Law of God annihilate Man’s will?

Predestination [MS:] But there is no cause but God; all the rest is the effect of His laws or thoughts. A certain circumstance, brought into contact with a certain nature, must always have a certain, the same, and a definite effect. It will not have sometimes one effect and sometimes another. Nature and circumstances remaining the same, to say that any other effect will occur is contrary to experience. [JA:] The nature, however, it is said, remains under the free will of a responsible agent. [MS:] This is to say, in fact, that God interferes with some things and not with others, that He, by an act of arbitrary will, lays down certain landmarks, and leaves man to live as he likes during the meantime. How do you explain ‘‘insulated phenomena’’? Can such be? Phenomena are only the manifestation of God’s thoughts. Insulated phenomena are as much as to say that God thinks at one time and not at another. {Omitted Calvin: Yours is a far more thoroughgoing predestination than mine. f221} This, it is said, is a far more dangerous predestinarianism than that of Calvin. {Omitted MS: Oh! we are all predestinarians now, M Calvin, in the full force of the word. f221}

97 Jas 1:27. 98 A poor area in London.

There is no cause but God.

Does God inter fere with some things and not with others?

There is Predestination to universal happiness.

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Shall we lie still and wait till the laws whip us into happiness? What is meant by Free Will?

Two wills at the same time?

Am I free to will or not to will a thing as I please?

It is true, we are predestinarians, each in his own sense. The difference between this predestination and that of Calvin is that we believe all are predestinate ultimately to the happiness of the Creator himself: any idea of punishment, not intended to improve the creature, being inconsistent with a Being of perfect goodness. We believe cordially that the laws of God are so arranged as to flagellate us with our sins, and to attract us with their opposites, so as, at an appointed time (appointed, not by decree, which is an express volition of God, but by law), to bring us, i.e., all, into a state of grace, as it is called. [JA:] Then, it is said, we have nothing to do but to lie still and wait till ‘‘the laws’’ whip us into goodness. Free will, adieu! [MS:] But what is meant by free will? [JA:] A power to will whatever I please? [MS:] Certainly, you may will whatever you please, but the very question is, what you will please? What you will please is decided by your nature. Do you wish to include in the word a power to will contrary to your nature? [JA:] No, it is said, a power to choose whether I will will a thing or no. [MS:] That is to say, that you can have two wills at the same time. Two wills? Rather three. For you must have a third to decide between the two. [JA:] Is this to say that I am not free to will to go into that room or not as I please? [MS:] But you will not please—that very as you please is the bar. There are strangers in that room; your nature is not to please to go among strangers. In half an hour you have an appointment, and your nature is to be punctual, and therefore in half a minute you will get up and set out in order to keep it. You can certainly do as you please about going into that room—that is, there is no external force to prevent you—but you will not please. You will not will; the force is internal. No mysterious force, but the force of two qualities, punctuality and shyness, formed in you without your consent, and prior to any volition on your part. Free Will, Responsibility

Supposing you will a thing, to prove that you can will it, you are still willing according to your nature.

[JA:] Supposing that you were to go into that room at once to show me that you can will it, [MS:] still you will only be willing as your nature prompts you. Your nature is to be piqued, and you may be piqued into going into that room, but what does that prove? [JA:] But you say, I can bring my will into such a state as that it will choose to go into that room. There will be an exercise of free

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will. I can overcome my shyness and lay my punctuality aside for once. [MS:] We do not know each other always enough to predicate whether you can or cannot, that is, whether you will or will not. But if you do, it will only be because some other motive is strong enough to overcome your shyness or punctuality. {Omitted: And that other motive will have been formed by a concatenation of circumstances, unintentionally experience. f224} [JA:] Then where is our responsibility? is the final counter argument. {Omitted MS: Responsibility? I wish people would use some other word. f224} The word responsibility expresses but a low conception of the relation between man and his Creator. {Omitted JA: Do you think so? You may apply it to God Himself? f224} God himself may be said to have the ‘‘responsibility’’ of ruling the universe, to be accountable for us, [MS:] but what does responsibility mean? answering to—has God no higher motive in administering the universe than that he has to answer for it? Answer to whom? [JA:] To himself. [MS:] But does a mother take care of her child only because she will have to answer for it? Of such a mother, nay, even of a hired nurse, we should say that all love for the child must have ceased. {Omitted JA: But in what relations will you admit the word responsibility, if not in that between man and his God? f225} [MS:] The word ‘‘responsibility’’ is applicable where you take a housekeeper, and say, ‘‘there are so many towels in that closet, will you take the charge of them? Here is the inventory.’’ Where there is an express or even a tacit agreement, by which one party offers, the other undertakes a charge, there is responsibility incurred. The housekeeper expressly agrees to answer for that linen. In many human transactions a similar compact may be traced. Where men live together in states and societies, there is a tacit agreement that each shall not live by marauding on the rest; in return for which he claims the protection of the rest, and submits to certain penalties if he infringes this agreement. There is a farther agreement, not that each shall protect the rest, which would take up too much of his time, but that each shall pay something, so that one be appointed to protect all. By becoming a subject, you claim the support of your countr y, and you subscribe to its stipulations. Such compacts we can understand. You become responsible to your country, and your country to you. If you do not like the terms, you can leave the country.

If I know you well enough, I can predicate what your will will be. Yet this is not infringing upon your free will.

The word Responsibility expresses but a low estimate of our relation to God or of His to us.

What is Responsibility?

In what relations is it rightly used?

164 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought But between God and man there is no such agreement. Man did not ask to be born. God never asked man whether he would undertake the charge of himself or not. Many a one, if so asked, would certainly say, No, I cannot undertake this anxious existence, not even in view of the ultimate happiness secured to me. But He is too good a Father to put it into His children’s power to refuse it. If He were to do this, timid spirits would all resign at once. According to the theory of responsibility, suicide would be justified. For a man may put an end to his service, if dissatisfied with it.99 Responsibility How can I ‘‘account for’’ what I do not know is there.

What is our relation to God?

[JA:] But you must account for your talents, it is said. [MS:] How can I account for what I do not know is there? The housekeeper might justly say to me, You never told me you committed any tablecloths to me, if there were none upon the list. God does not tell man what talents he has given him. He furnishes him with no list of his powers. A man often finds out all at once at forty years of age that he has a talent for something which he had no idea of. {Omitted: that he has a talent for medicine. f227} It is degrading, it is debasing the whole relation between God and man, to put it upon the footing of responsibility. [JA:] Then what is our relation? our tie to our Creator? [MS:] It is a training by which we are to be gradually raised to share in all our Father’s powers, in all His happiness, in all His truth. Even in the relation between master and servant, so often insisted upon, if the interest of the servant becomes the same as the master’s, if an affection springs up, such as is seen between an old nurse and the children she has reared, and she espouses their cause as if it were her own, does not a higher relation take place? And when we come to have one cause and purpose with God, during the short moments even now in which we can feel, ‘‘I and my Father are one,’’100 is that responsibility? {Omitted JA: Well, if I am to have neither responsibility, nor free will, if I am to be trained into all manner of good without my own agency. (Here Calvin, who had been reading the Times newspaper, and had dropped off into a daze, suddenly woke up and argued.) And quite right too. f228}

99 JSM: Not if he has taken his wages. 100 John 10:30.

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The Calvinists tacitly admit that free grace implies irresponsibility. If we miserable worms are to be scaling heaven when and how we please, where would be our sense of reverence and awe when we look up to God, of humiliation and utter helplessness when we look down upon ourselves? they ask. God alone can call us, of His free grace and election, according to His purpose before the foundation of the world. [JA:] This predestinarianism reduces us to the level of animals. A man is no better than a dog to which its master all at once begins to teach tricks, and which has neither art nor part in them. [MS:] If this be so in partial pre-ordination, often called election, obser ve that, on the contrary, universal (not partial) pre-ordination is the only system of things by which any power at all can be given us from above. Without the laws of God, which pre-ordain the minutest connection (we will not say, consequence) of things, how could man have any power at all for carrying his will into effect? [JA:] But it is said his will is, according to this doctrine, the offspring of his nature, which is the offspring of previous circumstances; therefore his will itself is not free. [MS:] The word ‘‘freedom,’’ however, is improperly used in this case. For ‘‘freedom’’ should we not rather substitute the word ‘‘power’’? And this power to put his will into effect must be wholly dependent upon law. If circumstances were to have sometimes one consequence and sometimes another, how could we calculate so as to produce any effect which we desire? [JA:] Often we do calculate, and are deceived! [MS:] Not, however, because the law has failed, but because some other laws, unknown to us, are concerned, which, when we know them, will ensure our calculation, based upon absolute foreknowledge that effects can never vary, nor be uncertain or indefinite. When we know all God’s laws we shall be omnipotent like Him, for we shall desire nothing but what He wills.

The doctrine of Free Grace is Irresponsibility.

Partial preordination reduces us to the level of animals. Universal pre-ordination makes us free.

How does the fact that will is the offspring of our nature make our will, in any sense, not free?

When we are deceived in any expectation, it is not because the laws have not been constant and their effects not to be expected, but because we did not know all the laws.

Can Omnipotence effect a Contradiction? [JA:] This is a quibble upon the word omnipotence, it will be said. Killing every wish that cannot be satisfied is not omnipotence. Supposing we know and can employ all God’s laws, it does not follow that we shall not desire something which those laws will not give us. It is an old story: the child who cried for the moon. [MS:] But what is God’s omnipotence? To satisfy our idea of omnipotence, must it be able to do everything which tongue can

What is God’s omnipotence?

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Does the idea of omnipotence include the power of effecting a contradiction?

Can we share the omnipotence of God?

Rationalism takes the Creator away from his creation, and leaves only law. What is the difference between God and His law?

speak—to effect a contradiction—to effect that a thing should be and not be at the same time—that a thing should have been and yet not have been—to make the past not be—to make injustice justice, cr uelty mercy, wrong right? [JA:] Is all this necessary to satisfy the condition that ‘‘all things are possible with God?’’101 [MS:] If God repented, or wished to make the past not to be, He would not be God. He would have made a mistake. A Being who could wish to effect a contradiction or an absurdity would not be God, and that Being who could wish to make wrong right, we are quite sure, would not be God, but devil. Is it necessary to make God able to do that which he does not wish, to satisfy our idea of omnipotence? If not, the same definition which answers our conception of God’s omnipotence will also satisfy it in man’s case. When man knows all God’s laws he will perceive the full beauty of them; it will be impossible for him to wish one to be altered, for he will see that if one were other than it is, man could not attain the full happiness prepared for him; it will be impossible for him to wish other than what God wishes, because he will see the perfection of it. Is not this the meaning of what St John says, ‘‘We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is.’’102 Then shall we no longer say, ‘‘Father, not my will, but Thine be done,’’103 but ‘‘Father, Thy will is mine,’’ and therefore all that we desire will be done. Do we wish for a greater extension of omnipotence than this? Faith truly makes men omnipotent. {Omitted JA: But what a miserable universe you make of it. f231} [JA:] This drear y rationalism, it is said, strips the universe of the presence of God, and causes it to be inhabited only by His laws. [MS:] But what is the difference between God and His laws? His laws are, after all, only the expression of His thoughts. If thought is invariable in Him, so must His laws be also invariable. But we have got into our heads that law is some mysterious chain, which God creates and then leaves—a machinery like the watch, which the maker manufactures, and then sends to a distance out of his own hands. If, however, it is correct to define law as but the unvarying thought of God, law is the continuous manifestation of God’s presence—not a reason for believing him absent.

101 A paraphrase of Matt 19:26. 102 1 John 3:2. 103 A paraphrase from Matt 26:39-42.

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{Omitted MS: God and Law are the same thing. JA: I cannot admit your definition. We can break and are always breaking the laws of God and again, according to what you say, a prayer would be the breaking of His law, since an answered prayer alters a thought of God. MS: Let us discuss the subject of prayer another time. But with regard to breaking a law of God, I deny that we can. f231} [MS:] Great confusion arises from our using the same word, law, in two totally distinct senses, viz., as the cause and the effect. [JA:] It is said that to ‘‘explain away’’ ever ything by law is to enable us to do without a God. [MS:] But law is no explanation of anything; law is simply a generalization, a category of facts; law is neither a cause, nor a reason, nor a power, nor a coercive force; it is nothing but a general formula, a statistical table. Law brings us continually back to God instead of carrying us away from him. To say that a stone must fall because of the law of attraction, is but saying that one stone must fall because another does, or because the earth tends to fall towards the sun. The law of gravitation is merely a general formula, embracing all these facts. So Quetelet104 makes his computations that so many people will commit suicide, that so many widowers will marry three times; and we call it, and justly (supposing the computation correct), a law, and then, with our vague ideas that a law is a coercive force, we cry, ‘‘Oh! how horrid—then there is a law which compels so many people to commit suicide in a twelvemonth.’’ But the law, which is merely a statistical table, has no power to make people commit suicide. So you might as well say that Newton’s law has the power to make the stone fall as Quetelet’s table to make the people commit suicide. Newton’s law is nothing but the statistics of gravitation, it has no power whatever.

Law is no explanation of anything. Law does not dispense with God. It brings us back to God.

104 L.A.J. Quetelet (1796-1874), Belgian statistician; for Nightingale’s extensive excerpts from and comments on his Physique sociale, 1869, see Society and Politics (5:11-128). It is not clear which of his earlier works Nightingale used here: possibly the shorter first edition, Sur l’homme et le développement de ses facultés, 1835, translated into English as A Treatise on Man, 1842; or Lettres sur la théorie des probabilités, 1846.

168 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Law no coercive Force Law neither explains nor compels.105

But there is another sense to law.

Law is (1) an order of things, (2) a will in an intelligent being.

Let us get rid of the idea of power from law altogether. Call law tabulation of facts, expression of facts, or what you will, anything rather than suppose that it either explains or compels. [JA:] But there is another meaning to law besides this. The Divine Legislator makes a law, ‘‘Thou shalt do no murder’’; the human, that Jews shall not sit in the House of Commons.106 [MS:] Law, indeed, in the first meaning which we have been discussing, carries us back to another kind of law, a first cause, a conscious intelligent will. If law is in itself no cause, it must bring us back to the cause of law. If law has no power in itself, it must be the expression of a will or power, mental, not physical, and thus laws are only the expressions of the thoughts of God. {JA: The thought, however, ‘‘Thou shalt do no murder,’’ is quite a different kind of thought from ‘‘Attraction is proportionate to or diminishes as the square of the distance,’’107 for murders are committed, but stones do not remain hanging in midair. [MS:] ‘‘Thou shalt do no murder’’ means, if thou doest murder, such and such consequences shall follow. The law of attraction means, if the stone is not lodged in the fork of a tree it will fall to the ground. Where is the difference? We cannot break a law of God; we see that we do not; such education and such temptations acting upon such natures, we see by Quetelet’s tables that such a number of murders takes place. Is there any breaking of a law here? Such a body being brought within such a distance of such another body, such an attraction takes place. {Omitted MS: I do not see, after all, much difference in the legislative and in the physical sense—this law is the expression of the thoughts of God in either case. f234} [MS:] Law is, 1st, a general formula, expressing, not explaining facts which co-exist invariably with definite circumstances; 2nd, an intention, or will, in a conscious intelligent being, divine or human, for some uniform co-existence or succession.

105 JSM: Then how does Law prove a legislator? 106 Matt 19:18. The first Jew admitted to the House of Commons, in 1858, was Lionel de Rothschild. He had been elected in 1847 but it required an act of Parliament to change the requirement for taking the oath of office, and thus allow him to take his seat. 107 Isaac Newton’s inverse square law on gravitation, proposition 71.

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All calculation, all foresight, becomes impossible, if we admit no law or pre-ordination, no inevitable and unalterable connection of facts. If ‘‘the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning,’’108 governs the world, how can phenomena, which are but the manifestations of His thought, be variable and indefinite? {Omitted JA: Then you do away entirely with the whole doctrine of reward and punishment, sweep it off recklessly at a blow. f235} Law a Formula It is urged that the whole doctrine of reward and punishment is by this theory swept away, for how can the human being, whose will is formed for him, be, in any way, with justice, a subject of reward or punishment? He only does what he is made to do. The Creator has made his creatures what they are. How can He punish or reward them for it? {Omitted MS: How can He indeed? And how could anyone ever think He did? Why then f235} [MS:] Let us give up altogether the ideas and the words implying reward and punishment. In sermons and pious books, ‘‘sinful pleasures’’ are generally treated as the natural desire of the human heart. ‘‘The heart is desperately wicked and deceitful above all things.’’109 These words are quoted as reason for the belief. By the nature of man, the constitution of man, we mean the state which befits, which is appropriate to man according to the laws of his being—and thus understood, the proper, the healthy nature of man is averse to sin. It ‘‘thirsts after righteousness.’’110 In sickness, a man loses what is called his natural appetite. So it is with a corrupt mind, or a mind not constituted, or not developed so as to feel the natural wants of the human mind. Wrong is invariably suffering or privation of man’s proper well-being. Right is invariably well-being, or the road to it. This eternal immutable (we will not say connection, but) identity of right and happiness, of wrong and misery, is ver y commonly lost sight of, and it is thought that our nature tempts us to sin, that sin would be pleasant, if only God, by His arbitrary will, had not decreed that we should be burnt for it.

108 Jas 1:17. 109 A paraphrase of Jer 17:9. 110 In the sermon on the mount, Matt 5:6.

Doctrine of reward and punishment.

How erroneous.

170 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Erroneous theor y that ‘‘God makes allowances.’’

Why?

[JA:] How can there be any right and wrong if there is no ‘‘free will?’’ it is asked. [MS:] It is a law of God that a certain wind acting upon a tooth in a certain state, toothache shall be the consequence. Because you could not help it, does that toothache cease to pain? Do you say, it was not my fault; I will not care about it? On the contrary, the very pain is the motive which compels you to get rid of it and to avoid it in future. Right and wrong are as immutable as pain and ease, the one to produce happiness, the other misery. And we talk of ‘‘God making allowances for the frailty of his creatures,’’ ‘‘not being prone to mark what they do amiss,’’ ‘‘having mercy on His erring children.’’ This mercy would be the height of cruelty. As long as His laws have not inflicted evil consequences on our sin and ignorance till no vestige of either is left in us, mercy means to leave us in sin and consequently in misery. [JA:] Mercy for past sin would mean a change of mind in God. [MS:] What does it change in us? or in that which is past? [JA:] It is said to mean that God, knowing our weakness, makes allowances for it, and does not require from us more than we are able to do. [MS:] Allowances for what? Allowance to do wrong? allowance to be miserable? {Omitted MS: We don’t wish for such allowance. f237} [JA:] It is said to mean a remitting of the punishment for what we have done that is wrong. [MS:] Punishment, in the sense of suffering consequent on wrongdoing, and designed by the eternal laws to drive the criminal to another course, we can understand, and such punishment we cannot wish to have remitted. But punishment, when there is no further power of amendment, there is hardly a human being who would wish to inflict. {Omitted JA: Then burn for all licence! With your unaccountability, your passive obedience and exemption from all punishment, let everyone give a free course to every passion and say, I am not to blame—I hail the dawn of a new Era, a Millennium of Science. MS: Don’t be frightened. f237} Identity of Right and Happiness

Is there any danger of doing away with the feeling of right and wrong by these doctrines?

[MS:] It is said that removing the feeling of self-blame does away with all bar to every licence. There is no such danger. Could Bonaparte111 go on being Bonaparte to the end of time? Could a selfish

111 Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), Napoleon I, whom Nightingale considered the ‘‘archfiend.’’

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tyrant go on being a selfish tyrant forever? No, the laws are such by their essence that selfishness and tyranny bring their own fruits, their own inducements to goodness and benevolence. A man cannot go on being a Bonaparte if he would. Can a doctrine be immoral where goodness is happiness, not connected with or the cause of it, but identical with it?—where wickedness is misery? The other doctrine says that there is always a hope that God will forgive, that we may sin and yet escape the punishment. But the only happiness worth having is God’s happiness; and the divine happiness, that happiness which we are all to share, is not the consequence of goodness; it is goodness. But where happiness is made to depend upon some change of mind in God, and not in man, where, as in the case of the dying but repentant sinner, God is supposed to forgive, that is, to change His mind towards him, and bestow happiness as an arbitrary gift—can there exist than this any more immoral doctrine? God gives us nothing. We are to work out a happiness, like His, in ourselves, in accordance with His laws. [JA:] The story of the penitent thief,112 so often quoted, is not relevant. [MS:] It is very evident that the man was very far from being all evil. The very high state of spiritual perception necessary to believe in Christ’s kingdom at a moment when his nearest friends considered their hopes blasted and his kingdom destroyed; to pray not for life, not for being saved from the cross, but only for moral salvation, shows that he was already very far on the road to happiness. As far then as he was right he will enjoy happiness, identical with the right. In his wrong, not for his wrong, he will suffer till his evil becomes all good. But to obtain happiness complete, eternal, while there are any of God’s laws unknown, or unobserved by us, is an impossibility. [JA:] This conclusion is, it is said, contradicted by our everyday experience. We see the selfish man enjoying, the good man suffering, the criminal infinitely happier than the philanthropist. [MS:] Happier do we call him? Insensibility to privation is not happiness. As in a medical case, any pain is better than paralysis, inflammation more hopeful than mortification; so the murderer, who is conscious of no suffering, is in a worse state than the man who, know-

112 An allusion to Luke 23:43.

In what way does the story of the penitent thief support the doctrine of deathbed repentances?

Is the selfish man happy?

172 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought ing and observing some laws, suffers for his ignorance of others. Therefore we say, not that misery is the inevitable consequence of evil, but that evil is miser y, identical with it. {Omitted JA: Well, it matters little. If we have no free will, no power to avert this misery, it does not much signify what your laws and your identities are. Man is ‘‘predoomed to misery.’’ [MS:] The conception of a God among the ancients is not, we see, generally that of a perfect God. They did not require per fection in their Gods—power was the great characteristic, which they worshipped and they deified this quality, combining it with other imperfect, merely human, qualities. The moderns, on the contrary, require per fection as the attribute of deity. They call their God perfect and, having endowed Him with certain qualities, such as anger, revenge, changeableness, etc., believe, either by authority or indifference, that such qualities do not interfere with perfection. But whence do we obtain the conception of a perfect God? [JA:] Justice raised to perfection in God (which you call anger) must induce Him to punish sin, would induce him, if not tempered with mercy, to exterminate the sinner. [MS:] I cannot understand the antagonism of justice and goodness, as usually represented in God, ‘‘justice, tempered with mercy.’’ . . . [JA:] No . . . the phrase means it is said that God is inflexible in car rying out His laws and in awarding punishment to those who break them, but that repentance and faith will satisfy His justice, as well as the destruction of the sinner. But what does this mean? Either the consequences which God has attached to sin, for the purpose of weaning us from it are too great or they are not. If they are too great, it was injustice, not justice tempered with mercy. If they are not, we are not such fools as to wish the consequences remitted. For mercy would then be cruelty, even to our understandings. But what is the true state of the case? What is really God’s goodness? It is that which has organized the world so as to bring all to happiness by bringing all to His own tr uth and goodness. . . . [JA:] But sin deserves to be punished, it is said: its punishment is necessar y to satisfy man’s own sense of justice and to prevent the consequences which sin left unpunished would produce in the community. ff240-44}

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Doctrine of Deathbed Repentances [MS:] Man is ‘‘predoomed to misery’’ only on his way to something else, and in order to give him something else. What is the Creator’s own character? He cannot choose between good and evil. Cannot is indeed a wrong word, as implying that He would if He could. But, to suppose the Creator willing evil is a contradiction. In this sense God himself has no free will. The nature of the Spirit of Goodness is turned unvaryingly to good. What may we suppose is His object with His creatures? Not that they should attain a free will to choose between good and evil, but such a nature as that nothing but good will attract, no evil will attempt it. Surely if you were bringing up a child, you would not wish to educate it to make a free choice whether it will be a murderer or not,113 but to be one to whom murder is impossible. When, therefore, our natures, by the Creator’s laws, have been brought into that state that we not only know that right is happiness, but feel it—know how ‘‘to incline our hearts to keep this law,’’114 we shall not will to commit evil—not because we shall have acquired what is called ‘‘free will’’ to make a choice between good and evil, but because we shall no longer be capable of willing evil. As a means of attaining this state, the pre-ordination of inevitable consequences is essential. Without this, right would produce sometimes happiness, sometimes misery; calculation would be at fault, motive would be wanting. There would be nothing to incline the will more to good than to evil, without the pre-ordained connection between good and happiness, evil and misery. 7 Necessity [A dialogue among Shelley, Jacob Abbott and M.S.] Confusion and misunderstanding appear to arise from the use of the word ‘‘necessity,’’ unless its meaning be restricted to ‘‘a yielding to need occasioned by the intervention of some external power.’’ It is indeed often used in speaking of acts to which we are impelled, or from which we are deterred, merely by our internal nature— thus a man is said to be ‘‘necessitated’’ to act or refrain from acting

113 JSM: This answers the doctrine in p 50. 114 The response to the commandments in the Book of Common Prayer.

To will evil impossible to God’s nature, or to that of a righteous man.

174 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought by strong emotion. But if we would have a scientific precision in describing the operation of the will, it would be better to give up the use of the word ‘‘necessity’’ altogether in reference to that subject. A man’s will is never ‘‘necessitated,’’ if by necessity we understand an external power compelling a state of will contrary to his nature. He may indeed will contrary to a part of his nature, but his will invariably accords with the preponderating motive, or balance of power in its various elements, under the circumstances in which he wills. We shall also promote clearness of conception on this subject, if we consider ‘‘freedom’’ to signify simply ‘‘absence of external impediment.’’ No impediment ever exists to a man’s willing, as it is his nature to will. And in this sense, his will is free. Will accords with law. Given certain sensations, thoughts and emotions, one and the same will would always result. This is accordance with law. Accordance with Law Given a certain constitution and certain circumstances, the same sensations, thoughts and emotions would always result. This is accordance with law. Such law existing, whatever a man has willed, it has not been in possibility that, constituted and circumstanced as he was, he should have willed otherwise. If it be said that the common universal intuition of mankind cries out against this, on any occasion of crime, ‘‘I could have done otherwise if I would; no need of dis-proof ; I feel it; you can no more persuade me to the contrary than that I don’t feel pain,’’—we entirely agree. The fallacy lies in ‘‘if I would.’’ It was not his will to refrain from the act, not because any external power compelled him to will one way, when his nature would have willed another way, but because it was his nature, in those circumstances, to will as he did. If there were no pre-ordinated connection of motives and actions (i.e., no laws of the human mind), if a motive acted upon the same mind in the same circumstances, in one way today, in another tomorrow, we could not calculate upon ourselves or others. After years spent in cherishing my child, I could not be sure that tomorrow I might not abandon him. Mrs Fry might be robbing her female prisoners,115 and Cain might be preaching fra-

115 Elizabeth Fr y (1780-1845), prison reformer and an influence on Theodor Fliedner to found the Kaiserswerth Deaconess Institute.

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ternity to Abel.116 But these catastrophes do not happen. If we could entirely know the character and circumstances of a man, we might predict his future conduct with mathematical precision. You can, it is admitted, in some cases, but not in others. Some persons are proverbially vague and uncertain, and we often say, ‘‘for this action I can find no cause at all.’’ But even in saying this, we do not suppose that the action was without a motive—we use the phrase in a moment of unphilosophical impatience. Otherwise all that is true is, that we are unacquainted with the motive. ‘‘I could have done otherwise if I would.’’ ‘‘If I would,’’ does not that mean, ‘‘if I had had another will, another motive?’’ Let us guard ourselves from concluding that because whatever has been, it has not been in the possibility of man that it should have been otherwise, it follows that we are without power over the present and the future. Is it our wish to will, to do the right, now and in future? Then let us strive to discover, to bring about conditions, which existing, we shall be certain so to will, to do. Have a certain number of crimes of a particular class been periodically committed? Find out the conditions to which they are attributable—remove those conditions. As certainly as the crimes will continue to be committed, if the conditions remain, so certainly will they cease, if other conditions, inducing opposite dispositions of mind, are substituted. If the human mind be an exception to the operation of law, there could be no foundation for education—no science of history, political economy or legislation. In the immense chain of antecedent and consequent, no link could have occupied any other place, because the Omnipotent has willed the relations of antecedent and consequent to be such as they are, but the word necessity is not applicable to this fact, neither to God’s will in consequence of which this chain exists, nor to man’s will, which is what it is because this chain exists. Confusion between Decree and Law {Omitted Shelley: Suppose I were to say, I was born by chance in the county of Sussex—it happened to be the year 1792 and I fell upon parents of - - . . . [JA:] You would say there is no chance—if there is no chance there is no free will. . . . [JA:] Well, between you,

116 An allusion to Cain killing Abel in Gen 4:8.

176 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought you may rejoice in having made man as passive a tool in the hands of Fate as the plant or the animal. Then, it is said, man is obeying God’s decrees, alike when doing wrong and when acting right—is breaking a law of God as much when he resists temptation as he keeps one when he yields to good feeling. [Shelley:] Certainly, if God has decreed good, He has also decreed evil. f246} Is man then obeying God’s decrees alike when performing a virtuous act, or committing a crime? Such a question confounds decree with law. Were it a decree of God that Calvin should burn Ser vetus,117 there would then certainly be no right and wrong. It is true, however, that it was in conformity with the laws of God that Calvin was in such a state of mind as to burn Ser vetus. This, it is said, is only putting the difficulty one step further back. It makes God as much the author of moral as of physical evil—the cause of Bonaparte’s universal earthquake, as of that of Lisbon.118 {Omitted Shelley: Certainly he is, that is, the Spirit of the Universe is. . . . [MS:] Do not Bonaparte’s sins teach us the laws of God? With the animals it is different. They do act as heaven has willed they should. f247} God’s laws are the origin of moral, as of physical evil—that it is so is a part of his righteous rule. Through them, by our mistakes, we find truth; by our errors, knowledge; by our sufferings, happiness; by our evil, good. {Omitted JA: Yes, and so, your cruel God tempts. f247} The difficulty may be raised, that God’s law first induces man to sin, then punishes him for it. Is this justice? But what is the meaning of punishment? of justice? {Omitted Shelley: I must say, Jacob Abbott, your God makes man such as he is and then damns him for being so. MS: Not punishes nor condemns. How could man have learnt the essential difference between good and evil if he had not suffered the consequences of evil? Brutes never do learn it and they never suffer— they never make mistakes. They act by the will of God—instigated immediately by Him. [JA:] How much better then for us, if we had all been beasts. They always do right. Because they have no reason and we, with our

117 On this point see p 18 above. 118 The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 killed an estimated 100,000 people and destroyed the city.

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reason, as it is called, are always doing wrong. . . . Then how much better it will be said to put us beyond the possibility of mistake! The human race has done more mischief, you will allow, than all the br ute races put together. And all in consequence of this terrible curse of reason! f248} {[Omitted JA:] This is not instituting life merely as a foil for heaven to teach man by what he has suffered to appreciate what he has gained. [MS:] No, but as a means of teaching him what is suffering and what is happiness and how to avoid the former and gain the latter. [JA:] And Bonaparte and the other poor wretches you create, without their consent, as warnings to the rest, to suffer for the character of scarecrows. At least they ought to have double pay hereafter for having taken such a part here. [MS:] Mankind is to create mankind. And the best argument for a future state is undoubtedly the condition of the wicked here. That they are the greatest sufferers everybody will agree. Some might say, the existence of a good man, ever so much tried, is worth having, even should it end here. It is even possible that a good man might consent to sacrifice himself for his race and say, I will spend seventy years of suffering here, for the sake of benefiting mankind, though there be no other life. But is it possible that there should be created without their consent millions of unhappy wretches, of whom none can say their existence is worth having, if there be no eternity, in which that existence will become so? Is this consistent with any idea of justice? The good might do without another life, the bad cannot. f249} {[Omitted JA:] Then it is God, [it] will be said, not the devil, who makes us sin, and to refuse would be to disobey. He makes us play all manner of pranks for the public benefit. But why should it be me? And again is it not unfair that I should not have more than the others of glory and happiness in a future state, if I have been chosen to play the necessary but unpleasant part of rogue in this? The predestinated villain ought to be rewarded for performing well his part, and punished if he were to refuse it. [Shelley:] There is no reward or punishment at all in the case— desert is equally absurd. In the necessarians’ creed these words have no meaning. [JA:] It won’t do. It won’t do. The common universal intuition of all mankind it is said is against this. It cries out, I feel I could have done otherwise, if I would. No need to tell me or

{Does God create sinners without their consent as warnings to the rest? f249}

178 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought to prove it. I feel it. You can no more persuade me of the contrary than that I don’t feel pain. [MS:] What is called law in the world of matter, of which no one denies the existence, is, I believe, what Mr Shelley called necessity in the world of mind. As there could be no calculation, no foresight, no physical science, if the former did not exist, so there could be no metaphysical science, if it were not for the latter. [Shelley:] Certainly, all legislation, diplomacy, histor y, political economy would cease, if there were no laws of the human mind. An inducement would act upon the same mind one way today, another tomorrow. Mrs Fry would be killing or robbing her female prisoners and Cain would be preaching fraternity to Abel. But these catastrophes do not happen. Given the character and circumstances of a man and you can prove what he will do like a mathematical proposition. ff 249-50} As we arrive at a truer conception of God’s moral government, we shall find reason to modify the meaning of various words used in describing it. We find that punishment, if the word be used in the sense of suffering or privation consequent on sin or ignorance, does exist in God’s moral government, and we see it to be right, because its effect will be sooner or later to induce mankind to remedy the evils which incur it. But eternal punishment, or vicarious punishment, would be the satisfaction only of revenge, not of justice. It seems strange that under any interpretation of the rule of the Being whom we call perfect, it should be supposed that an eternity of suffering is destined for beings whom it cannot benefit, since their future knows no hope or possibility of amelioration. It seems strange to suppose that He whom we call love, righteousness, could only forego the satisfaction He would have exacted for sin, by substituting an innocent sufferer. (Our surprise is, however, diminished by the reflection that frequently, as the popular theology repeats the words ‘‘eternal damnation’’ in its services, the idea does not dwell in the understanding, in the heart, or even in the imagination. To hear the concluding quaver of a chant rest on those horrible words sufficiently brings home to us how little they affect their hearers.) Admitting, however, that law so operates that our passage to tr uth and right is through the evils incident upon ignorance, it is evident that no punishment but that which is remedial is consistent with justice.

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To escape God’s justice our ‘‘Common Prayer’’ appeals incessantly to His ‘‘mercy.’’ But ‘‘mercy’’ is a word without meaning, in the perfection of divine government. If the consequences attached by His law to sin, for the purpose of weaning us from it, are too severe, to inflict them would be injustice, to relieve us from them would be an act of simple justice, not of ‘‘justice tempered with mercy’’; if they are not too severe, their remission would be an injurious concession, equally derogator y to a perfect rule. Is God subject to Necessity In the feeling after truth, God has sometimes been conceived of as subjected to the dominion of an immutable ‘‘necessity.’’ God wills and acts consistently with His nature. No superior power ‘‘necessitates’’ His nature to be what it is, or ‘‘necessitates’’ Him to will or act contrary to His nature; therefore in no true sense can He be said to be under such dominion. God is the living spirit of right; this does not make Him undergo the ‘‘necessity’’ of right. Right is the word we use to express the consciousness of God; right is the word we use to express the consciousness of man when we suppose it to agree with that of God. {Omitted JA: But these are quite different things. There are thoughts and thoughts. f233} The question sometimes put, ‘‘can God make wrong right?’’ is sufficiently answered by saying that a being whose satisfaction was in wrong would be of different nature from that which we call ‘‘God.’’ The word ‘‘right’’ signifies one state of feeling, one mode of action, the word ‘‘wrong’’ another. Right is the quality which we trace in the character and tendency of the laws manifested in the regulation of the universe—a character and tendency such as to lead us to refer them to a will—which will we call ‘‘God.’’

Is God subject to necessity?

Can God make wrong right?

8 Communion with God [no dialogue] Feelings of love, trust, reverence, sympathy with the purpose of the Per fect, may exist towards Him in beings who, though imperfect, partake His nature. Nay, defects in some part of man’s nature can alone prevent these sentiments. By these, whether expressed in words or not, the true human heart is lifted up to God. In a rightly constituted, rightly exercised nature—not to recognize a spirit of righteousness, love and wisdom would be impossible. If it is said,

Communion with God.

180 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

God communicates with us through law.

‘‘we cannot love a law,’’ the mode in which God reveals Himself, the answer is, we can love the spirit which originates, which is manifested in the law. It is not the material presence only that we love in our fellow creatures. It is the spirit which that material presence bespeaks that we love. Shall we not then love the spirit of all that is loveable, which all material presence bespeaks to us? But can man sympathize with God? To sympathize is either to imagine a feeling not our own, or to share with another a feeling which is our own. We may imagine, though imperfectly, the feeling, the purpose of God. We may partake it, for it will be essentially our own, in proportion as we are in the state of development natural to the mature man. God, on his part, is constantly communicating to us His thought and purpose in law, which is ever revealing and interpreting to us the past, the present and the future. It is for us to attain, for ourselves and for each other, the state of our own natures and the knowledge of truth which shall enable this revelation to reach us. He gives it not to us, except through an appropriate exercise of our faculties. Communication through Law Christ says, ‘‘Seeing ye shall see, and shall not perceive, and hearing ye shall hear, and not understand.’’119 This is our state as to all that we do not see and understand as God sees and understands. But Christ seems to have had an idea that God prevented some from understanding, or intended the tr uth only for a favoured few. Such an idea seems to have been general. Moses had it of a nation. Christ had it of individuals. The Greek philosophers thought truth a delicious draught, intended only for God’s favourites. The spirit of priestcraft is that more is offered to some than to all. But all is being constantly said, taught to all. Time is the only difference; through eternity the imperfect may advance in receiving and comprehending the lesson. Thus inarticulately is God constantly addressing our feelings, our imagination.

119 A paraphrase of Matt 13:14.

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Communication through Man God communicates with us by His nature actually becoming ours. (The Roman Catholic sacrament or communion has the most of meaning in it. All other receivings of the sacrament have less claim to the designation of communion. The Roman Catholic intends to receive God into himself—once a day, to receive a material substance, containing God. This is a feeble attempt at grasping at a tr ue communion, which consists in receiving the spirit of wisdom and truth and love, during as much of the waking hours of existence as possible. The other receivings of the sacrament—not Roman Catholic— are more or less vaguely divided between a commemoration of the death of Christ, and a receiving of Christ in the bread and wine, till we come to the Unitarian, which professes only a commemoration.) The Roman Catholic, who sincerely believes that he eats the body and drinks the blood of Him in whom God manifested himself— oh! well may he feel himself invigorated, ennobled, penetrated! What grand ideas; grand, because true, are these of the Divine manifested in the human—of the Divine received into, becoming part of the human! In these working days for money, for the external, for the intellectual, exclusive of the spiritual (we speak of the general, the prevailing spirit), such ideas become forms and when such are ridiculous. But how penetrated must those have been who first, genuinely, had the conception, who felt, who thought, whose imaginations helped them to conceive that the Divine verily manifests itself in the human partakes itself, becomes one with the human, descends into the hell of sin and suffering with and for the human, banishes sin and suffering by being ‘‘verily and indeed taken and received’’120 by the human. But this is all mysticism, it will be said. Is it not fact, revealed by experience and no mysticism, that, if man takes the appropriate means, wisdom, goodness, benevolence, love, righteousness, become himself: those very attributes, the very same which he recognizes in God’s laws, in the manifestations of God, in the communications with God? The spiritual and sincere Roman Catholic did receive these attributes, in receiving, as he supposed, the ‘‘body and blood’’ of the manifestation of the Perfect, for he raised his nature to think, not of

120 From the Anglican catechism on the sacrament of holy communion.

God communicates with us by His nature actually becoming ours.

Is this mysticism?

182 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

God communicates with us through men.

What is the difference of the communication between man and man, and of that between God and man?

How are we to car ry on our intercourse with God?

the body and blood, but of the spirit. Let us try to enlarge and purify our conception, to remember our privilege of being invited always to this sacrament, to partake, to receive, to become one with the Perfect. Is it possible to deny that we have this invitation? He is ready to manifest Himself in us, as He did in Christ, to make us also Saviours, to partake Himself with us. We may be one with Him and with each other. But, further, God is ready to communicate with us by articulate words, for the communication we might have with each other would be the communication of what each has received of the divine spirit. No two can receive the same, for no two original constitutions are or ever will be the same, nor will the experience of any two ever be alike. What do we communicate to each other? What might we communicate to each other? If it is true that mankind are to work together to find out truth of every kind, see how they set about their work! When they meet, what truth are they looking for? They meet to contrive sometimes how to get money, sometimes how to find amusement, sometimes to do the external business of life, with more or less (sometimes much) benevolent intention. But how little does mind meet mind to try to find out God’s nature and purpose, man’s nature and destination, the type of the future in God’s purpose and man’s destination! Who flock to these rich ‘‘diggings,’’ whence might spring peace and joy to all mankind, whence every want might be satisfied, by which the kingdom of heaven might be realized on earth? Is the communication between man and man and between God and man different? and, if so, in what way different? Individual men are part of a whole, of mankind, of the Son. They are attainers, acquirers of what the Father is and has. They are in Him, one with Him, in proportion as they attain to be and to know truth. Different parts of one whole are contributing to one purpose in the case of mankind. Mankind is transmuting itself into the divine by exercise through God’s communication of the divine. Man is utterly incapable of anything, except inasfar as he receives, but he can receive nothing except through exercise, appropriate exercise of his own nature. And if this is to be our intercourse with God, how are we to carry it on? We shall take all the means now taken as orthodox, but more wisely, more earnestly. In matins and vespers in the church (i.e., with assemblages of mankind), on sabbaths and on days selected as holy days, we

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shall commune with Him. We shall seek for this, viz., that whatever we undertake to exercise our faculties upon, that shall be communion, receiving of bread and wine. We shall lay out our lives for this purpose. Whether we think of marrying, whether we make arrangements for our expenditure of money or of time, whether we cultivate certain friendships and acquaintances, or avoid others, we shall seek in all to receive the bread and wine, the living water, not in a selfish spirit, but because thus only, thus nourished, can we work with God for man. It is objected that all this is not prayer, and prayer, in the sense of asking and receiving, is the legitimate craving of all mankind. We cannot imagine to ourselves, it is said, a religion without prayer. How are we to car ry it on? Let us think what we should ask God to communicate, if we believed He would hear us, and grant what we ask. Of that which is asked every day much is impossibility, because to grant it would be a contradiction to truth and wisdom. Much that we ask we shall certainly receive, because it is accordant with truth and wisdom that we should receive it, but is asking the true intercourse to hold with the Perfect, who is always telling, always offering all things? If we knew our parent to be saying that which we wanted to hear, to be stretching forth his hand to offer that which we wanted to have, should we ask him to tell us, to give us what we want to hear or to have? If we knew the means to hear all we want to know, to possess all we want to have, we should cease to ask of God; we should go forth to mankind, and ask them to unite with us, not only in insurance companies, and railway companies, and joint-stock companies, etc., but in associations for the acquisition of spiritual and moral truth. Tr uth and wisdom would not say, as has been thought, ‘‘Give up the products of the earth, and go and live in poverty and privation.’’ On the contrary, the earth would thus produce more than ever; more than ever would zeal and skill penetrate into the earth to bring forth her treasures; more rich and varied would be the earth’s cultivation; more coin would represent more of the riches spiritual and material which would exist. With money we have now associations of selfishness and vulgarity, but money sometimes does, and always might, stand for means for attaining truth and wisdom.

Is this a ‘‘religion without prayer’’? Is prayer, in the sense of begging, a legitimate craving? and will it be granted?

184 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

If it is development which we seek, how is this to come?

We will ask, then, nothing of God. How ungracious, how stupid it is to ask the Gracious, the rich Giver, the wise Father, who is always offering all. But we will seek continually (and stimulate mankind to seek with us) to prepare the eye and ear of the great human existence, that seeing it shall perceive, and hearing it shall understand. ‘‘Seek and ye shall find’’—seek wisely must be added—‘‘knock, and it shall be opened,’’121 knock, i.e., not against a stone wall made to remain a wall, but at a door made to open. It is development which we seek—development from the imperfect towards the perfect—from ignorance towards truth. And how is this to come? By the will of the All Wise it is to come by means, by the appropriate exercise of the nature. Prayer has sometimes been such exercise; it has been a wish after the right and good (for ευ’ χη´ is desire), a referring to God as the source of the true and good. We say, and say truly in this sense, what religion can exist without prayer? None can exist without reference to the Source of all for all—none without wish to partake what He is, and inasfar as prayer seeks Him and refers to Him, it is an essential of religion, but prayer degenerates frequently into expectation of being a passive recipient of something asked. The Perfect One answers every Question

What is religion?

Would Supreme Wisdom be wise in helping, except through law?

But what is religion? Is it not essentially an exercise of feeling? The human mind may recognize thought, purpose, in some Being (not of human nature, more powerful, more capable than human nature in all that human nature is capable of), without religion. The essence of religion is love of a living good and true and right, veneration, admiration, trust, sympathy in a good and true and right above human. But all mankind dwell (in the word religion) upon something more. Religion, as here set forth, is only an exercise of man towards God. But we want the intercourse of God with man, His communication of Himself. Go to Him in the hour of temptation, it is said, you will find a strength, not yours, but His, helping you. But we could not revere as wise the Being who helps us in any way but by law. The will of the Perfect is always law. That which the Per fect wills once, He wills through eternity. The imperfect wills for now, or for as many nows as at a future now, shall seem wise.

121 Matt 7:7.

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If it is said that He, the Perfect, knows, knowledge is hardly a word applicable to the Perfect. Perfect wisdom wills that which imperfect wisdom learns to know. There is a practical importance in determining this question. Practically, it makes an immense difference to feel oneself carrying on existence out of God’s past instead of out of one’s own past, and into God’s future instead of one’s own; to feel that, had anything in the past been different, the future would be less fulfillment of good for all instead of feeling, ‘‘if I had done differently in the past, the future would have been better.’’ This is truth, unless the words we have used have no meaning, and the more we realize this truth in feeling, the more we shall have of calm and strength. If my having a safe voyage to America depended on my prayer to Omnipotence, I should not revere the Omnipotent. If my feeling wise or good, or seeing truth of any kind, depended upon my asking to be good or to see truth, I could not revere the Giver. I know that at this moment He is telling me all things, what I ought to do, what has been in all the past, what will be in all the future, but I know that I cannot hear what He tells me till I have prepared myself to hear Him. I have no intercourse, I want no intercourse but that He should impart Himself to me. Can there be closer intimacy? Himself, His goodness, His wisdom, He will impart, verily im-par t, if I take the way. Am I not sure of this? Am I not practically sure that there are ways in which I shall become wiser, better, ways in which I shall become less wise, worse? I may put into words the thought or feeling He imparts if I wish; I may ask myself, what in my circumstances would a Perfect Wisdom say? and I may put into words what I believe a Perfect Wisdom would say. Still it is you who speak, not God—you who answer yourself, not God who answers you, it will be said. Not begging The Perfect answers every question in all time. Unceasingly, in each present time, His voice gives the answer to every question as to what has been, what is, what is to be, in spiritual or material existence. Do we complain that we cannot hear or understand? that he does not tell us as we often tell our children, what, the essential work not having taken place previously, they are not (and ought not to be) able to understand—what it would imply contradiction, unright, if they did understand?

Does the Perfect know?

Practical importance of the question—Are we working out of God’s past into God’s future, or out of our own past into our own future?

Could I revere the Omnipotent whose will depended on my prayer?

Does the Perfect answer ever y question in time?

186 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Could we understand the Per fect if He spoke to us directly? How do we receive power from God?

What is power?

What is wellbeing?

Are these faculties possessed by all, the exercise of which is necessar y to well-being?

‘‘Except ye eat my flesh and drink my blood, ye have no life in you.’’122 Except ye receive love and wisdom, receive it so that it becomes part of yourself, ye cannot hold intercourse with God. How do we receive from God His power, His strength? Love and wisdom are power—there is no other. Bonaparte, had he no power? No man ever had less than he at the head of his army. Then what is power? Is it not capability to promote well-being? That which promotes the eternal well-being of one man promotes that of all. They are inseparable. And what is well-being to man? Is it not the transmutation of ignorance into knowledge of truth, of imperfection into good, into the advance towards perfection? Man has not apparently cared to find out how most to increase in love and wisdom, not cared at least sufficiently to make it a definite object, as he has in regard to physical strength. Or he has not discovered that there are definite means for acquiring spiritual ner ve and sinew as well as bodily. But man has unlimited means for spiritual advance. The eternal source of truth, of goodness and wisdom is ever ready to supply the faculties of mankind with means of increase, so that today may always be richer than yesterday, if these means are taken. The bold metaphor, ‘‘Feed on Christ,’’123 is correct, if by Christ is meant the spirit of truth, love, righteousness. Tr uth, love, righteousness, benevolence, wisdom—we may interchange these words, for the perfect spirit of one cannot exist without the perfect spirit of all. Man tries frequently to gain riches, authority to say to this man, ‘‘do this, and he doeth it;‘‘124 yet, frequently, the more he gains of riches and authority, the weaker he is. For truth and wisdom are, as we have said, the only power. We might say to every human being, ‘‘Exercise certain faculties in a certain way, and you are certain to be happy, to help the happiness of mankind, to fulfill the purpose of God.’’ But some may be born so constituted, or by neglect or ill-treatment may have become so constituted, that it may be impossible to exercise these faculties. All natures have them—all being parts of the divine nature. But it is true that the material identity or idiosyncrasy may be so imper-

122 A paraphrase of John 6:53. 123 Said before the distribution of holy communion, Book of Common Prayer. 124 Matt 8:9.

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fect as to impede their exercise. It is therefore our business to watch over the original constitution and the education of the constitution with a sense of this truth, viz., that if the faculties are in a healthful state, a certain exercise, and that only and no other, of faculties (for which exercise the world offers opportunity) is necessar y for well-being. We have to find out what is this exercise. Is mankind trying to do so? No, it is taken for granted that a certain conventional mode of life, to those who have the means for it, is well-being, and that others, who have not the means, are to work for it, i.e., for the means for that conventional mode, which is almost universally adopted by all who can adopt it.

Is mankind trying to find out what is the exercise to these faculties necessar y to well-being?

Exercise of the Faculties ‘‘Whether ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.’’ ‘‘Whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord.’’125 To do it ‘‘to the glory of God,’’ ‘‘to the Lord,’’ must be to fulfill the Lord’s purpose. That purpose is man’s increase in truth, increase in right being. The history of mankind should be, will be one day, the histor y of man’s endeavours after increase of truth, and after a right nature. Right formation, right development, right exercise of all human faculty, working upon all material nature for these purposes: this will be mankind’s pursuit in existence. But with how little understanding of God has man sought knowledge of His will. God wishes us to know the past and the future. But how do we seek to know it? If He wishes us to know the future from the writings of Daniel, would not Daniel have told us plainly, ‘‘at such a period Christ will come,’’ not have left us to guess that, in the case of his writings only, weeks mean years? If in a book which I am to read, I am to gather whether I shall go abroad or stay at home, or if an inward voice is to direct in answer to my prayer, would not the Spirit of Truth speak plain? He always speaks plain in His laws—His everlasting voice.126 We abide in our ignorance, but it would be a glorious ignorance if mankind would strive to prepare the ear to hear, for it would tell of God having entrusted that preparation to man.

125 Col 3:23. 126 JSM: Laws many of which could not have been known to countless generations, and many are not yet known of.

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Tendency of mankind to suppose that the Perfect will answer in riddles and innuendoes.

But we choose poison rather than food. Partial wisdom (i.e., the taking appropriate means for a part of a purpose, which goes counter to God’s whole purpose) is false wisdom. Thus was Napoleon (the most partially wise, rich, powerful), one of the least wise, the poorest, the most powerless of men, even before men called him ‘‘the fallen.’’ There is, however, a constant want in the imperfect, as we call man, to receive from the Perfect. To enlighten darkness, to stretch the finite, to remove the evils and sufferings caused by ignorance, is man’s constant want. And for this he requires an answer from the Per fect. Man, very generally conscious of power beyond his own, in his weakness and his want, calls upon that Power. There has been a frequent tendency to suppose that that Power would answer in some manner addressed to the senses, something in the way that man addresses them—a sight, a sound, a sign, an immediate consciousness. Volumes of examples might be written of the ways in which man has fancied such communications. Most short-sighted seem such fancies, for surely, if thus the great and good Power chose to communicate, he would not speak in riddles and innuendoes. What does ignorant finite man want? How great, how suffering, yet how sublime are his wants! Think of his wounded aching heart, as compared with the bird and beast! his longing eye, his speaking countenance, compared with these! They show something of such difference, but nothing, nothing compared with what is within, where no eye can read. What, then, poor sufferer, dost thou want? God teaches for Eternity

We want to go to God as to a teacher to explain our difficulties.

I want a wise and loving counsellor, whose love and wisdom should come home to the whole of my nature. I would work, oh! how gladly, but I want direction how to work. I would suffer, oh! how willingly, but for a purpose. I once had some lessons (and only once) which I felt did me good; they directed me how to work (I am speaking of intellectual lessons, of course). I worked on gladly through some difficulties; at last I came to one I could not overcome. I worked and worked, but could not succeed. How pleasant to go to my master, to tell him the difficulty, and how I had tried, to hear him say, ‘‘Then now you must be helped.’’ This is what I want of the great and good Power. ‘‘Speak, Lord, for thy poor child yearneth to hear!‘‘127 But no, the 127 A paraphrase of 1 Sam 3:9.

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universe and the presiding Spirit, of which we are told, keep the ‘‘everlasting’’ silence. Is there, then, a presiding Spirit? What should I say of a master who (when I had worked and worked, and was wasting my time and my spirits were sinking with useless work), if I asked for help, which he could give, gave me no such help, nor any reason why he did not, nor any unmistakable testimony of love, and sympathy, and encouragement. In searching for an answer, let us first look at certain differences with regard to the problem given by the perfect and imperfect master. The former says, I give you a problem, with eternity in which to answer it. But, Lord, I am so powerless; so thick is the darkness around me, I feel as if I and many whom I love might wander in this darkness through eternity. Whence is to come power or light, which comes not now? I never can seek it more earnestly than I would now, if I knew how. There is a difference in what is essentially the best help, according to the problem, and the time given for man to solve it. If I were studying arithmetic, I should have a definite object. By such a period it would be desirable that I should be possessed of such knowledge; it would be mockery in a master to say, ‘‘Find that out for yourself,’’ when, if he comprehended my mind and my subject, he might know that I could not find that out, till the time was passed in which the discovery would be of value. If it is as we believe as to the Perfect, He has assured us that ever y human being shall solve the problems, the solution of which will ensure his own happiness, and that of every human being that is, was or ever will be. The means and the inducements are in existence. My poor child, He says, dost thou complain that I do not prematurely give thee food which thou couldst not digest?128 My son, I am always one with thee, though thou art not always one with me. That spirit racked or blighted by sin, my child, it is thy Father’s spirit. Whence comes it, why does it suffer, or why is it blighted, but that it is incipient love and truth and wisdom, tortured or suppressed? But law (that is, the will of the Perfect) is now, was without beginning, and ever shall be, as the inducement and the means by which

God teaches for eternity; the human teacher for time.

Cr y of the human being in some cases to God.

What is the nature of man’s intercourse with God?

128 JSM: Since man can only learn God’s laws progressively, why is he punished from the beginning for his ignorance of those which such punishing cannot possibly teach him?

190 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought that blight or suffering which is God within man shall become man one with God. All questions of ignorance to truth shall be answered by truth the instant that mankind has prepared ignorance to ask the right question, to hear the right answer. Through Law Does God ever speak to us directly?

God only imparts through law.

Thus far we feel clearly that we do not desire to receive anything except in accordance with law, except inasfar as, individually and collectively, by mankind, law has been kept as, in the thought of the Perfect, it ought to be kept. We could not revere, trust, love God as the Per fect if we received either physical or spiritual benefit otherwise. How is it, then, that we revere and love and trust those among mankind who impart actual benefits? These do not merely make laws by a certain mode of keeping which, on our own part and that of mankind, we are benefited. God shows his goodness here too. To bestow, to give, is essential happiness. All such happiness God makes over as it were to mankind. One who has more knowledge than another may impart it frequently to the benefit of that other. An individual imparts some fragment of knowledge, of truth, by which he benefits the race, or prepares, leads to future good for the race. Such imparting of truth is certainly different from the mode in which God imparts truth without the medium of man. Whatever God imparts without the medium of man, He imparts only by willing invariable law. And if we were attuned to sympathy with Him, would not His spirit of beauty, of order, of grandeur, of love, of justice, of firmness, of tenderness, be perpetually impressing us, though without an articulate word? Should we not feel Him the universal God, the God of our individual spirit? Words are a beautiful means of His between man and man, but would be vulgar and inadequate from God to man. Far more touching, more grand, is His voice to us without an articulate word! How sublime to think that, even now, stands before us the revelation of all that is ever ywhere, of all that has been, of all that will be! By no paltry contrivances will we strive to know Thy will. We desire that the veil should be lifted up, the voice become audible, only as Thy righteous conditions are kept by Thy child, mankind. Words, the sympathetic eye and smile, the communication of the truth which one has and another has not, all this is necessary, all this He gives us. But He gives to man through

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man. Man has the benefit of being the giver and the receiver. All the truth, the love, the wisdom which is spoken, or which is expressed—whether by eye, by voice, by feature—is all divine, is all by and from God, but through man. God therefore communicates by law, by manifestations of law, by human physical means; these are His communications to man. We know Him only as an active will. Of the mode of His being we know nothing. But, rightly understood and appreciated, our intercourse would be all that we could desire. It would seem that our dissatisfaction with it is that it is not what essentially it cannot be, mutual in its kind. We seek truth of Him, its source. He does not seek it of us, its recipients. With mankind we are essentially intended to seek truth mutually. No one, while man is man, will possess all truth. Each will have some truth to communicate, some to receive. One man does communicate (directly to another) knowledge, wisdom, tokens of affection, etc., and thus adds to his store. And when he does so, it is in fact God communicating, since it is through His laws. Intercourse with the Highest For the organization of man is the work of man, in accordance with God’s law. Not that man can organize a being according to man’s will, but to mankind it is given to organize a man more or less on the direct road to perfection. By God’s will and law, no man can exist without being on the road to perfection. But his advance from ignorance, from the state of imperfection with which begins his existence in this world, depends on mankind, on himself and his kind. In the communication of man to man, which is direct, it is still true that the recipient of communication must work or have worked. Mankind must have worked. For it often happens that man speaks, while he whom he addresses hears, but does not understand. If a man were to speak to an infant, to an idiot, to a man learned in classics but quite ignorant of mathematics, about the differential calculus, the person addressed would hear no more than man hears God, whose voice is ever speaking all truth. In this sense, then, may we not say that the communion with the Perfect is the same as the communion with man which we call direct? Man communicates with man through his organization only, this organization is what it is through the work of mankind, and if the appropriate work

We are dissatisfied because our intercourse with the Highest is not what essentially it cannot be, viz., mutual.

Is it the same whether our communion with the Perfect is direct or through our own organization?

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Do we receive any answer from God?

Does communion with the Per fect supersede the most per fect communion of human beings, viz., married life?

Though the fullness of joy is in the union of two in one, one with God, one with mankind, man will not be star ved without it.

has not taken place, in vain the speaker speaks, for the hearer does not understand. But the eye of love and sympathy which meets the eye of love and sympathy, how deep and full the satisfaction, the joy unspeakable to both! Man, if without that joy unspeakable, may show the void in his heart to his God, but can his God fill it, or rather is it in accordance with the will of his God Himself to fill it? God being the highest, the best, being not loveable but love, not righteous but righteousness, is to be the first. But it is not to be one man in God, it is to be two in one, and that one in all, and all in God. This is the purpose of God for man, in the course of eternity. And as to the two who are to be one? Here, as in other cases, experiments are tried. Many come together, but are not one, but God’s eternal purpose is that each one shall be one of two rightly adapted to be one. During the phase of existence included in one form of material organization, no two once united ought to separate. In reference to the communion with the Perfect, it is not intended to supersede the union of two in one, of that one to all, which all are to be one in God. Thus only can that which is the most exclusive become the most expansive of all affections. But if the union of two in one is an essential part of God’s purpose, is man, then, to suffer the agonies of starvation, if it does not take place, while he is capable of love and sympathy with that One who is to form the whole, of which the two in one who are to be one with mankind, who are to be one with God, are parts? No, for it is certain that love, benevolence, sympathy with one or other of mankind, interest in the pursuit of truth, prompted by love, benevolence, sympathy with mankind, active exercise of the faculties of man, for purposes in sympathy with God’s purpose: these are real happiness; these are not star vation, though the fullness of joy be wanting without that union of two in one. Thus much we say on the ground of man’s experience. Two in one, one with God, one with Mankind

Does a single example exist of that union of two in one, one with God and mankind?

But where is there an example of such a union of two in one? All the world must be without that fullness of joy. Of two in one, and that one one with mankind and with God, we have, perhaps, no experience, only occasional approximations. But there is no star vation for one who loves, trusts, reveres, sympathizes with the Perfect, exercises his faculties in sympathy with the pur-

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pose of the Perfect. Let it not be supposed, either that there can be any fullness of joy between two, unless those two are one in love and purpose with mankind and with God. Two in one, one in all, all in God. That is the fullness of joy which it was said ‘‘had not entered into the heart of man to conceive.’’129 For that let us all work, as it is to come by work. God will not leave us in an inevitable state of starvation, while we work for that fullness of joy. There is food in all love, sympathy, benevolence, search for truth, patient trust, in all righteous exercise of the faculties. 9 Law, the Basis of a New Theology [no dialogue] Comte says, the heart must always ask the questions, but it is always for the intellect to answer them. But the intellect is unable to fulfill its office, except after long and difficult preparation, and the heart, therefore, necessarily undertook its work in the earlier phases of life, supplying the want of objective ideas by its subjective inspirations, without which all human evolution would have remained indefinitely impossible. This absolute empire, though long indispensable, could not but become hostile to the just development of reason, in proportion as reason succeeded in working out conceptions founded on an appreciation, more or less true, of the exterior world. Such is the chief source of the modifications successively adopted in theology. Since theology has undergone all the amendments compatible with its essential nature, the intellectual conflict, becoming more and more severe by the progress of positive knowledge, has taken a character more and more retrograde on one side, and revolutionar y on the other, from the impossibility of reconciling two kingdoms so opposed as theology and positive knowledge. Such especially is the character of the present phase, in which the ancient dominion of theology, if it were susceptible of restoration, would directly constitute a profound intellectual degradation, and, eventually, a moral degradation also, by regulating all our opinions on exterior truth by what we think desirable and suitable—by our conventionalities.

129 A paraphrase of 1 Cor 2:9.

Comte’s view of what is theology.

194 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought The Heart’s Questions Where we think Comte wrong.

Questions the heart will ask.

At this point Comte, it appears, begins to mix up error with his tr uth. He considers theology as essentially arising out of the heart only. If this be so, of course as man develops and requires his reason to coincide with his feelings, theology must be dismissed. The heart, in what Comte calls its true office, asks various questions, weak and powerless as I am, is there no one more power ful than I who will help me? I see those whom I love suffering; I cannot help; is there no superior power who will help? Are there no means by which I can induce a superior power, if there be one, to help me? Death separates me from all I love; is there no power, when I seem to see so great power around me, which can restore my loved ones to me? I have been cruelly injured by one superior to me in power; is there any power superior to us both which will do me justice? Innumerable are the questions which the heart of man has thus asked in its course through life. These have been answered for the most part by the hearts, the passions, the imaginations of individuals. Individuals possessing, from nature or from circumstances, power to communicate to mankind their answers, have communicated them, not as the answers of their own hearts, or passions, or imaginations (sometimes we must add of their own self-interest), but as answers received from a higher power than man. Others, not prompted to seek an answer to these questions themselves, have adopted the answers made by such individuals. Thus, theology does not even ‘‘regulate by our desires and our proprieties all our opinions on external truth.’’ These opinions are regulated by individuals, modified by individuals, adopted by the mass. Theology being essential to man in his early stage of existence, being then the offspring of his feelings, his imagination or his selfinterest, sprang up without waiting for the labour of the mind, ‘‘which,’’ as Comte says, ‘‘could only fill its office worthily after a long and difficult preparation.’’ Look at the state of theology now. Multitudes of conscientious and feeling persons, terrified at the work in which the mind of the age is engaged, in sifting opinions long taken for granted as true, fearing that, if those opinions were lost, all religion would be lost, are ceasing to reason, sheltering themselves under authority. Many, finding aids to morality and general instruction in religious establishments, inquire no further, not perceiving that this very morality and instruction will lead to questioning the foundation of religious establishments and their doc-

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trines. Many are speculating, some as an amusement, some with real earnestness, on the very evident defects of theology as now taught. But may not the heart now ask its questions of the intellect, ‘‘upon external truth,’’ instead of regulating its opinions by its ‘‘desires and conventionalities,’’ and is it certain that these questions would not lead to the revelation of a theology in which heart and intellect might unite? If not, theology is doomed to die. Evangelicalism is a spasm, Puseyism, the calm before death. Let us search then; let us unite to search in a truth-seeking spirit, in a brave spirit, which fears not truth, all of us, whose hearts yearn for a righteous, wise love, to which to attribute the law, which is more and more discerned to govern all existence, to make it what it is. Of this law Comte has been the special declarer. But there he stops. The Heart’s Answers Comte says, law explains how all modes of existence are what they are. Reasoning on our experience and our consciousness, should we not rather say, wherever there is law there is will? Then we inquire into the nature of the will, by observation and examination of the law. We pretend not to a complete comprehension or knowledge of this will, but we discover it to spring from certain qualities. We are not here entering upon a mere speculative inquiry for intellectual amusement. We are so constituted that the heart asks its questions, and it is for the purpose of answering them that we inquire into the nature, whence springs the will, whence springs the law with which we either harmoniously accord, or by which we are necessarily governed, according to the state of our own nature. Comte says, but these are not the questions which the instructed heart will ask. What are the questions which it is in the nature of the human heart to ask? Whatever they are, it is quite consistent with the seeking of truth to seek answers satisfactor y to the heart, provided these answers do not jar with reason, observation, experience, consciousness. There is beauty in the phraseology which represents the heart as the spring of feelings, of affections. The flow of blood from the heart keeps up life through the frame; its beating is the signal for each pulse through the frame; when it stops, or soon afterwards, all stops, as to the material life. And so, our feelings, our affections, being the essential spring of life’s interests and wants, we figuratively place in the heart. ‘‘The

Comte says that law explains the universe.

Wherever there is law there is will.

Answers the heart will be satisfied with.

196 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought great human heart!’’ What a phrase that is! It seems to come naturally to us all. Alas! the heart of humanity is not great now. Its beatings are clogged by conventionalities, by forms, by habits, which have netted it round with imaginary wants, not those of its noble, its divine nature. Oh! ‘‘great heart!’’ how gladly would we see thee free to exercise all thy nobility! ‘‘I know no two things more different than one pea soup and another,’’ said a gentleman-friend of mine. ‘‘If you are wise, you will send your daughters to church, for, even when men don’t like to go themselves, they like to see their wives go, and will not be inclined to marry those girls who, they see, don’t go,’’ said a lady-friend. These observations were made by natures particularly benevolent and good, whence, I opine, that they sprang from the influences of life on the ‘‘heart’’ of humanity, not from anything idiosyncratic in the individuals. Let the heart set the intellect to work, to make out the nature and destination of humanity. Then let the intellect systematize that which will satisfy the heart, and let the heart, satisfied as to its destination, set the activities of all sorts in man to work to fulfill it. Comte says, according to the positive interpretation of the great organic principle, the intellect ought essentially to treat only the questions proposed by the heart, for the just, final satisfaction of our diverse wants. ‘‘Positivism’’ no Answer to the Heart’s Questions Has the human intellect ever been trusted to answer the questions the human heart asks?

Is ‘‘positivism’’ an answer to the human heart?

May not, then, these questions, asked by the heart, be our starting point in religious inquiries? Perhaps, in all systems of religion, they have been so. But the human intellect has not been trusted to answer them. It is the heart or the imagination of a few individuals which has answered them—answered them so that they respond not to the wants of the nineteenth century. Indifferentism, satisfied with conventional life, busy in gratifying man’s external pleasures, prevails largely. Among the earnest spirits, the resource is either a return to Roman Catholicism or ‘‘let us work at our lives, and leave alone this subject of religion, which only makes men quarrel.’’ Comte asks whether ‘‘positivism’’ is not a resource? the only true resource? (Positivism is limiting knowledge to phenomena, to ‘‘that which appears,’’ and to the ‘‘relations of that which appears,’’ with the admission that we can know nothing of ‘‘that which is.’’ That ‘‘we need not wish to do so’’ is maintained by the positivist, since ‘‘these relations of phenomena are all that concerns us, all that in

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any way affects our well-being or our duty.’’ ‘‘Man’s life, in short, is a life,’’ says positivism, ‘‘that has to do only with appearances and their relations; it is not his part to inquire concerning existence.’’) A profound mind and most feeling heart is making converts to a doctrine in no way calculated to satisfy the heart, which, however, needs only to cry aloud for its satisfaction, in order to find that which really exists and, at the same time, to keep all that the profound thought of Comte reveals. Let us try, then, to ask the questions natural to the healthy human heart. How did all existence come to be what it is? Comte answers, by law. And came not law by God? Comte says, there is no other God than law, or if there is, we can comprehend no other. This appears to us unintelligible. As little should we have understood if someone, showing us a manifestation of a law of Solon,130 had said, ‘‘In this manifestation of law, you behold Solon, or if you do not agree to this, at any rate his law only, not himself can you recognize.’’ If Solon had been existing, though not manifested to our senses, we could have revered, loved, his nature, if in his law appeared the manifestation of goodness and wisdom. But different from this is the mode in which we can be in relation with God. The Perfect has eternal relation to all, has all in His purpose, which comprehends the eternal existence, the ever-changing mode of existence of all that exists. One in purpose, but the present ever changing from the past in development of this purpose. Neither do we know what those mean who say that nature is God, more than we should if they said, St Peter’s was Michelangelo. In St Peter’s we see a manifestation of Michelangelo. The first stroke which he made in his design had reference to every other; each stroke had reference to each past and future one; or, if not, there was deficiency. It stands as his spirit or nature in manifestating by means of material nature, to other spirits. So the nature or spirit of God is ever manifesting itself in the change of the present from the past. The spirit which is ever at work, manifesting itself in accordance with perfect wisdom, goodness, righteousness, order, beauty— ever comprehending an eternal past and future in the will of the present—exists in perfect satisfaction, in constant activity. His will is

First question our heart will ask. To say that there is no other God but law, is it not an absurdity?

To say that nature is God, is it not an absurdity?

130 Solon (c639-c550 bce), the ‘‘law-giver,’’ who liberalized Athenian law after Draco’s ‘‘draconian’’ code.

198 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought law. His law manifests itself in the existence of the universe as it is, as it has been, as it will be. Of God’s Existence Is God’s existence isolated and dull?

Comte’s answer to the first question of our heart. Why all modes of existence are what they are, Comte points to law as explaining.

Were there such a Being, what isolation and dullness would be His existence! is often said. Let us look at that which is interest and happiness in the existence of man. There should be work. What should be its nature? It should be work at a consecutive purpose. The first stroke of work should have a reference to every other. The present should have a reference to all the past and all the future. The reason why an arithmetical genius answers a question unusually quickly is his reference in the part before him to the whole; he may be unconscious of it, but it is his comprehensive view of the whole which presents the answer readily to him. So it is with all work, and so in the parcelling out one work among many labourers, the view of the whole is only in the superintendent. This is not a reason why the making of a pin should not be divided among various workmen, but only why no man’s work should be only the making part of a pin. In regard to the existence of God, to the work, ever developing by His will, the present always has reference to the whole of a past and future eternity. Comte asks, what are the questions asked by the healthy human heart, and what the answers to them? He ascribes to law the power of explaining131 how all modes of existence are what they are, which is his answer to our ‘‘heart’s question.’’ But what does law mean? Law only means that a certain mode of existence involves another mode of existence always the same, e.g., a mode of existence which we call matter involves that a portion of matter not supported falls (till it is supported) at such a rate, etc. This is a divine law. A man ‘‘in the state of’’ having inherited property has the power to spend it, by England’s law, at the instant that he has lived twentyone years. The difference in his state of existence at twenty and twenty-one years of age, in respect to this power, springs from law. But this, and every human law which we can mention, springs or has sprung from will. Our minds are so constituted that with the

131 JSM: Not of explaining, only of stating.

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experience which we have, it is impossible to us to doubt, when we see the effect of those laws of which experience proves humanity to be capable, that they sprung from human will. Though we might be entirely ignorant of ‘‘who made the law,’’ of ‘‘when it was made,’’ of ‘‘why it was made,’’ still our conviction would remain the same. If we went into a foreign country and observed one uniformity invariably attendant upon another, we should be conscious that the invariableness of this uniformity sprung from human will, if human will were capable of effecting it. Law of itself explains nothing We trace uniformities which human will is, we know by experience, unable to effect. The various powers of our nature, healthily cultivated to maturity, healthily at work, and free from prejudice, will, as a matter of course, ask, ‘‘from what will these laws spring?’’ Comte profoundly says that the theology of particular providences comes first in the evolution of humanity. He calls this theology, as if there were and could be no other. He wisely does not despise it. It is a definite uniformity, invariably accompanying another definite uniformity. But he does not ask from what will does it spring, or has it spr ung? And here seems to be a want of the due exercise of the human faculties. If reason and observation were exercised appropriately upon experience, the result would be the query, ‘‘from what will springs this uniformity?’’ Comte says that the heart is to ask the questions which human life suggests, and that the intellect is to answer. These questions may be answered satisfactorily to the heart of the ‘‘Grand-Être,’’ humanity, by the search of the intellect into the nature of the will, whence springs this uniformity. Here must be no fancy, but a search into realities, which will reveal another ‘‘Grand-Être’’ (including the Grand-Être, humanity, which is progressing through order to perfection), which other Grand-Être is the spring of the law, according to which this order exists, this progress takes place. Comte places love as existing in humanity, and only there. In humanity it exists, limited by physical law, admitting of progress to per fection. In perfection it exists, as the will whence springs the law, in accordance with which the evolutions of humanity take place. Through these evolutions the Grand-Être lives out this thought, as the imperfect progressing to the perfect.132 The evolutions consist in eter132 See Comte, Système de politique positive 4:30.

200 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought nally living out His thought in successive phases of existence, the per fect becoming the imperfect, to live and work up to the perfect, the perfect again the imperfect, to live through ever new phases of life, but ever one whole in the thought, the view of the perfect. Experience proves that Comte is right in saying that the heart is to ask the questions which the life, into which humanity finds itself forced, suggests. But humanity will not be satisfied by the answer of the ‘‘immutable necessity’’ of law. This alone would not be reason sufficient to reject that answer, but reason, rightly exercised, will refer beyond law to will, and it will be a confirmation that humanity’s reason is right, if humanity’s heart is satisfied. Comte says, up to this time, religions could only propose a purely personal aim to each, viz., eternal salvation. Such, indeed, is the spirit of the salvation sought in religion, if one can say that what is so indistinct has a spirit. But Comte is the only man of thought and of excellent nature, in whom we realize the entire absence of belief in a Being superior to man,133 whose will influences man. And this brings home to us the state to which mankind are advancing, in which the question whether there is a God? must really be mooted. The ‘‘positive’’ in all existence will be proved. Where there is Law, there is Will Comte says that ‘‘Positivism’’ proves there is no God. No such God as is addressed by mankind, he may, indeed, say.

Comte says, ‘‘this is to prove that there is no God.’’134 He may indeed say, no such God as is addressed by mankind. For how many sentences in the prayer book, or in improvised prayers, are consistent with a belief in the ‘‘positive’’? The time is coming when we must close our Bibles and prayer books, and assure ourselves from other sources, why we believe in a God, and what is the nature of the God we believe in. Then we may again open our Bibles and prayer books with a sacred and holy interest. We may find in Christ’s words and deeds, in his life and character, what will inspire and assist us. But we must entirely give up believing, from the idea that he was sent to tell us, in any manner different from every other who becomes a revealer of truth. We do believe the more heartily, because we see how Christ’s nature harmonized with God’s nature, not because he was a ‘‘messenger’’ in any peculiar sense.

133 JSM: There have been and now are many such. 134 JSM: Comte distinctly says that we cannot prove that there is no God, and he rejects the title of atheist.

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‘‘God developing himself into planetary geologies and polarized light,’’ says Oersted. The case seems rather to be that we trace the Perfect as all-comprehensive thought, will, purpose, that we trace that this thought and purpose, by its will, modifies its own nature by physical limits, without, however, ceasing to exist as an all-comprehensive thought and purpose. Whatever can be said to have an existence is developed out of some other mode of existence in accordance with law. Experience reveals that, where there is law, there is or has been will. We examine into the purport of the law, which reveals the nature, whence springs the will, to be righteous, wise, benevolent. But, in whatever is physically developing, we do not find this allcomprehending will, thought, purpose. It is not recognizable in ourselves, nor in any other material nature, yet it is recognizable. How, then, can we resist the conviction of an all-comprehending will, thought, purpose, not connected with physical limitations, which either exists or has existed as the will whence springs law? But even if this were true, the question still remains, does it exist now? Granted that this theory be correct, might not existences be as they are, if such a will had existed and annihilated itself, or willed itself not to exist otherwise than limited by physical modifications? No, because it would not be consistent with a nature, thus wise and good, to will to annihilate itself, to exist not otherwise than as limited by physical modifications. The Perfect, while willing to live His thought, to act His thought, to be His thought in the concrete, would not will to annihilate the contemplation of the whole, the appreciation of the whole, the love of all that is loveable, the estimation of all right and order and truth and beauty, which the Perfect consciousness only of the ‘‘eternal now’’ can give in perfection. The Per fect would will to par take this consciousness, not to annihilate it. Development in order, in accordance with law, by exercise of the various existing natures—this is God’s manifested will. These natures are God in activity, modified by physical nature, in accordance with law—yet are also other natures, through this modification by physical law. These natures, divine yet human, are progressing directly or indirectly to perfection. When attained, it will not be the will of Perfection to remain ever in passive contemplation and appreciation of activity, but to live and be through ever-new phases of the one eternal thought and purpose. Both pantheism and ‘‘positivism’’ have a truth, but they leave us still without the all-comprehending thought, sentiment, appreciation, purpose, will.

May not the will whence springs law have once existed, and be no more in existence?

202 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Does the Perfect annihilate Himself?

According to the theory that the Perfect wills law, that, if He were to manifest any other activity, He would not be perfect— does, then, the Per fect annihilate himself?

Obser vation exercised on the objective, reasoning and feeling on the subjective, reveal a comprehensive will, of the same nature as man, but without the limits with which that nature exists, when connected with, when acting in accordance with physical law. From our consciousness and experience of this nature, thus limited, we may infer what would be its will existing with the same attributes, not limited. Thus we may arrive at the knowledge of the existence and the nature of the all-comprehensive will. It strikes many as contradictory in this theory that, if the Perfect, as Perfect, were to manifest any activity, He would cease to be perfectly wise and benevolent. To will law, to contemplate and feel the ‘‘eternal now,’’ the effect of His law, is all that is harmonious with per fect being. Shall, then, the Perfect annihilate Himself? No. In accordance with the law of the Perfect, perfection becomes limited by physical, by material relations. Thus arises a variety of modes of being, all arranged for enjoyment of various kinds and degrees, present or future, to each individual and to the whole. In accordance with law, all these modes of being essentially pursue the satisfaction, each of its own nature, its general and its individual or idiosyncratic nature. In pursuing its own present satisfaction, each being does, through the effect of law, bring to pass the ultimate satisfaction of all being. The highest type of being with which we are acquainted, includes, in its satisfactions, the exercise of all the attributes of the Perfect, i.e., all the attributes which harmonize perfectly with each other, which can exist, each in unlimited degree, without being limited by any of the others. Such are love, goodness, benevolence, righteousness, wisdom. Out of the seeking of satisfaction of these attributes, when existing as the perfect being, but limited by material relations, arises the exercise essential to perfection, the exercise of the Per fect, as the imperfect attaining perfection. Thus does the perfect benevolence find the satisfaction of other well-being than its own. Were it not so, the Perfect would be the one inactive mode of being. In all other being we find, the greater advance towards perfection, the more activity. We cannot expect to find the result of our inquiries to be that activity entirely ceases in the Perfect. On the contrary, we shall find that all activity arises through the activity of the Perfect.

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Are we then, supposing God to make Himself imperfect, just for the purpose of being busy in perfecting Himself again? He does not make Himself imperfect. The qualities, the attributes, which, when recognized in living existence, we call God, never change. But it is accordant with these attributes to will those laws whence these attributes exist, modified by physical laws. But is not this mere fancy? Is it not as fanciful, does it not as much spring from an idiosyncratic imagination as any of the notions of existence which we find entertained? will be asked.

Does God make Himself imper fect merely to make Himself perfect again?

Are not all these views mere fancy? As much so as the fancies of the mystics?

Has God once existed and ceased to exist? We have carefully endeavoured to admit no notions which are not traceable to consciousness of the subjective, observation of the objective, or experience, which is past observation of the subjective or objective. But in all attempts to advance in science, it is considered legitimate and wise to take for granted, sometimes, a point not yet established, in order to see whether phenomena will agree with the point thus taken for granted. In the same way we must proceed, in endeavouring to enlighten ourselves as to religion. We recognize signs of law in the universe. This is now universally acknowledged by the thoughtful and informed. Where law is recognized among men, it is attributed universally to a past or present will, because experience proves such to be its spring. If this law, which is not man’s, were traceable to man, it would be attributed to wisdom, goodness, power. But its manifestations are so far above those which result from man, that we should think it absurd to ask, can these results have arisen formerly from man? Comte recognizes imperfection in the heavenly bodies. Still we recognize manifestations of a law which manifests power and wisdom above human. But Comte says that we cannot thus pass by the defects of the astronomical arrangements. We must know the purpose of the artist before we can appreciate his performance. If human physical ease were God’s purpose, He has failed. Is it proved that He has failed, if His purpose is a habitation on the heavenly bodies for the exercise of goodness, benevolence, wisdom, righteousness in man? for the attainment of perfection by imper fection, of knowledge by ignorance? We take as a hypothesis that this will, whence sprung law, is perfect, in order to examine whether phenomena would so accord with the hypothesis as to show probability that it will, in time, be proved

Comte discerns imper fection in the astronomical arrangements.

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Is man God, modified by physical law?

tr ue, or, that such is man’s nature that it will and ought to be believed without proof. But what reason is there, it will be asked, for believing that the imper fect is the Perfect limited by material relations? or, in other words, that man is God, modified by physical law. We acknowledge, at once, that perfect benevolence would not receive its satisfaction without other existence than its own. It would be absurd and contradictory to speak of benevolence and power existing—no other mode of being existing. Not so immediately, perhaps, but still it may be brought home to our consciousness that perfect wisdom will effect the satisfaction of per fect benevolence by the willing of law, in consequence of which the beings, whom benevolence calls into existence, are themselves the means, by the exercise of their own natures, of calling into existence their kind, of arbitrating, within certain limits, what their own existence and that of their kind shall be. Here, then, arises the question, is the perfect will solely occupied in passively willing law, in the contemplations and feelings called forth by its results? That, according to our experience, would not be goodness, righteousness, which found satisfaction in an existence merely willing and contemplating the effects of His will. His will is that there shall be a constant activity. Man and all other creatures with which we are acquainted find their well-being in activity—are, by God’s law, so constituted that, when they are in a healthy state, they want activity of every part of the nature, exercise of every part of the nature. What should we think of a man, whose existence was contemplation of others whom he had set to work? Does God ‘‘Work’’?

Does God work?

But may it not be an excellence of the divine nature that He does not require to (what we call) work? Do we not find that master minds influence the will of many to work rather than work themselves? They do both. They will law, they keep law in active life. To live, to be, to experience in actual life and being, as well as to contemplate and feel life from a vantage ground above it, seems the desire natural to the highest natures. Those who live actively, without thought, without contemplation, without type of the life they purpose to live, tend towards animal nature. Those who contemplate only have not the essence of truth for their contemplation.

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As far as we can judge from experience and consciousness, God’s thought, His feeling, is this: to right being it is essential to work the work of life, not merely to will and contemplate it. ‘‘My Father works,’’135 Christ says, but if He works, it cannot be otherwise than as perfection, limited by His own will, working in actual life towards per fection, attained by life and work. The truth to contemplative per fection would be, ‘‘I, whose will is law, will be the keeper of law in life. Hence shall spring varied being, varied identities, varied good and enjoyment.’’ It is truth, as revealed to us by experience, by observation, by consciousness (our only sources of truth) that exercise, which accomplishes attainment in the present, which was not in the past, is the only satisfaction of righteousness. It may be patience, it may be wisdom, it may be truth attained. In ‘‘God’’ is no variableness, nor shadow of turning.136 His spirit, His nature, invariably wills the law of right, wills to live through the eternal law of right. He contemplates this law as one through eternity. It is His thought. He lives through it. He realizes it. And thus, as perfection limited by physical modifications, He works through them, in accordance with them, again into perfection, unlimited by the physical. Thus, to all being possessing the divine attributes, it is given to advance to the thought, the view, the comprehensive view of the whole. He, whom we call God, reser ves not this view to Himself; He shares all. Would this benevolence other wise be perfect, or, if it were, would not His power or wisdom be limited, if there were any capability or enjoyment of His nature which He does not share? But the perfect which, limited by the material, has worked itself through the law of perfection to perfection, will essentially will to pursue the phases of life, which shall keep law in life in the actual, which shall realize law. Thus the Perfect in thought, in purpose, will be eternally enriched by fresh realizations. It is essential to realizations to require time, or a succession of events. The Perfect would not will it otherwise, for it would not be in the spirit of wisdom to will it otherwise. Thus there may be a truth in the thought of the poor Mormons, when they speak of improvement in the being of God. His thought, His purpose, His view, is per fect. There is this comfort in our struggles, His law is perfect; it is certain to conduct us on our course. But life, being—as the result, the real-

135 John 5:17. 136 Jas 1:17.

If God is unchangeable, how can He work?

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What is needed in Comte’s philosophy is to exchange a lifeless law for a living spirit of right.

Comte’s view of the religious state.

If we must ‘‘love in order to believe,’’ we must also believe in order to love.

ization, of living out thought, of transmuting the abstract into the concrete—is essentially progressive. The more we realized the truth of ‘‘positive’’ philosophy, the more it seemed that the spirit of perfection could not exist otherwise than willing. All interference was evidently the opposite of real wisdom or benevolence. Yet thus to exist was to our consciousness and experience inconsistent with perfection. It was supposing God to contemplate, as His whole existence, eternally, that present, past and future, which, being perfection, He viewed fully at each present. And so He has, at each present, that glorious view. That glorious view He wills for each individual being, into whose identity His nature has entered. But He works through all work to attain it for each, and then works again eternally to realize the eternal phases of being, essential to the satisfaction of love and wisdom and righteousness. Comte says: Love as the principle, order as the basis, progress as the aim—order and progress, to live for others—is not this the essence of religion?137 Most beautiful as most true. All that needs to be changed to satisfy our consciousness of truth is (but oh! what a change!) the change of a lifeless law for a living spirit of right and tr uth and love. Comte would not deny that the law has signs of right and goodness, is (in many respects at all events) what, if a right and good spirit did exist, with power to will such law, that spirit would will. Comte says: the religious state depends on the combination of two conditions which are equally fundamental, loving and believing. These, although profoundly different, must naturally concur. Each of these adds to the other a complement indispensable to its effect. Faith cannot be entire without love, however perfect the demonstration. But, inversely, the best heart cannot love enough an external power, the existence of which allows of habitual doubt. This is perfectly true. In that which concerns the heart, no demonstration would alone occasion the consciousness called belief. We must ‘‘love, in order to believe.’’ But also a healthy nature must believe in order to love. In Comte’s works, religion is nothing but the state of perfect harmony proper to human existence, collective as well as individual, when all its parts are fittingly co-ordinated. This is not religion, but that which would be the effect of religion. Religion is the connec-

137 Comte, Système de politique positive 2:65.

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tion of the heart of the imperfect with the Perfect. The seat of religion is in the heart. It will call forth all the energies of the intellect to demonstrate the Perfect, all the activities of all the nature to accord with the Perfect in life. Comte says: even supposing that there be such a Being, you cannot conceive of Him. To realize the existence of the attributes of qualities which we experience in ourselves and others, connected with matter, to conceive of these, unlimited by matter, is an impossibility to us. We must know what we believe in Perhaps so. But we may have a consciousness that, when the existence of these attributes is unlimited by connection with matter, the thought, the feeling, the purpose of such an existence would be the same as what experience shows is the purpose of existence in which those attributes are connected with matter. We may find these attributes existing as the thought, the feeling, the purpose, the will, which comprehends eternity, existing also (through this will) with physical limitations, according to the law of the All-comprehending—we may find that thus the thought, the feeling, the will, the purpose of the All-comprehending becomes concrete, becomes manifested, which essentially requires time or the succession of events. The All-comprehending is essentially perfect, but becomes (through the physical connection, which it is essential to perfection to will), the imperfect, working, living up to per fection. For the perfect thought and feeling is not the Per fect, till this thought and feeling has lived as the concrete—per fect thought and feeling must have been realized in life to be the Per fect. Our experience will teach us this. But, among the various contradictions which such inquiries bring into view perhaps none is greater than that of the idea of the Perfect as merely contemplating, feeling, estimating, willing work to be done, suffering to be lived through by other than Himself. Equally great is the contradiction of supposing perfect benevolence, with power, to exist without other existence than itself. Perhaps the attempt to realize such a conception, as avoids these contradictions, may help us to our best possible conception of the spring and the realization of that which ‘‘was’’ without ‘‘beginning, is now and ever shall be.’’ We may have a comprehension of how it is, together with a comprehension that we, being finite, cannot clear ourselves from certain difficulties in the conceiving of how it is.

Can we conceive of God?

208 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Is there an ‘‘immense regeneration reser ved for our age’’?

Comte says: In the immense regeneration reser ved for our age, there will be no reform greater than this, the leaving of such crude vague questions as come not within the sphere of our faculties, for those which are the legitimate inquiries of the human heart. We feel the force of those words the ‘‘immense regeneration reserved for our age.’’ Whether the immense regeneration required is reserved for our age, we are unable to prophesy. ‘‘I believe in God Almighty,’’ therefore I believe that that regeneration will come. If it does not come in this age, men, such as the Holyoake138 and Owen school, and the far more profound school which Comte has indirectly strengthened, will, in this age, immensely delay that regeneration, for both schools raise the intellect above the feeling. (We refer here not to the strange catechism, priesthood, and calendar of Comte, whose few adherents in Paris are now nearly forgotten, but to his advocacy of the existence of universal law.) No cause except Will

Comte’s creed does not address itself to the human heart, in spite of his assertion of the inferiority of the intellect.

Comte’s married love.

Comte’s answer to the heart’s question about immortality.

Though Comte has said that intellectual strength does not rank higher than brute force, though he was a man of the deepest feeling, and though the supremacy of the heart is the first dogma in his creed, yet that creed does not address itself to the heart of mankind. It is for the intellectual in his book that that book is read. His religion is so ‘‘bizarre,’’ it takes no strong or general hold on mankind. It does not excite the love and benevolent desires which he felt himself. Never, perhaps, has there been a love so true in its nature as Comte’s for his ‘‘Clotilde.’’139 The formality with which he philosophizes upon it, in his ‘‘dedication,’’ is easily turned into ridicule, but where can we find such a true realization of the true nature of love, of its true fruits? He understood, he felt that his love was to enrich him for humanity; he did not feel it as an exclusive enjoyment. Yet, as ‘‘high priest of nature,’’ Comte pronounces a criticism, at the funeral of Blainville, on his character,140 such as might become

138 Holyoake had been a minister, but became a rational secularist. 139 Clotilde de Vaux (1815-46), Comte’s lover and inspiration; on her death he turned to the writing of Système de politique positive. 140 The funeral of this eminent biologist, Henri-Marie Ducrotay de Blainville, was held 7 May 1850 and published as an appendix in Comte’s Système de politique positive 1:737-46. The speech acknowledged Blainville’s scientific

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an Edinburgh Review, if it were not so profound, without more of religious feeling than we should look for there. (Comte asserts the ‘‘pourquoi’’ of existence to be an illegitimate inquir y. Why? When there are modes of existence of which it may be said, ‘‘if a wise and benevolent will existed, with power to effect these, so it would be’’—when, the more we learn the more is revealed to us, which is, or which is in course of being, as it would be if a wise and benevolent will existed—why are we to be stopped short by being told that this inquiry is unphilosophical? On the contrary, we see that nothing can be properly called a cause, except will. We see that whatever is, and the change going on in all that is, are referable to will; that law is that which would essentially be the will of an omnipotent and wise benevolence, i.e., that that would not be an omnipotent and wise benevolence which did not will law.) And he seems to think that the ‘‘modest rank,’’ which he himself assigns to Blainville among immortal remembrances, is quite enough to reconcile man to the rightness of being obliged to live. And he thinks that a religion! So deeply wise, and yet so strange! With much feeling of the want of a religion, but satisfying it so curiously! He who says that the heart is to ask questions, the mind to answer them. Is this all the answer the mind can give? Alas! poor heart! thou hast asked thy question to little purpose!

‘‘Man’s Will and God’s Law’’ Editor: Background information to the writing of ‘‘Man’s Will and God’s Law’’ has already been provided in the Introduction at the start of this volume. One last item adds context, the following letter by Dr Sutherland, which explains the circumstances of his returning the papers and his comments. The full exchange between the two is given in Related Texts at the end of this volume and the pages cross-referenced. The bulk of the material here is Nightingale’s rearrangement (and often her refutation) of her colleague’s views. The manuscript for this section is extremely difficult to follow for arguments go back and forth and sometimes run onto the next page. Passages marked Objection are Nightingale’s rephrasing of Suther-

accomplishments, but noted that they were not in harmony with his retrograde social disposition—Blainville remained a Catholic and did not embrace the ‘‘religion of humanity.’’

210 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought land’s comments, and are normally followed by her own rebuttal. She also relegated some of Dr Sutherland’s comments to sidebars. Asterisks have been inserted in the text to show where Sutherland interjected. Some short examples have also been given here in footnotes, to give a sense of the vehemence of his objections. Source: From a letter by John Sutherland to Mary Shore Smith, Add Mss 45793 ff163-64

16 July 1858 Dear Mrs Smith I return you Florence’s papers with some running comments. I feel very deeply that there is no chance of any substantive agreement between us on the philosophical questions at issue. Nothing gives me more delight than to agree with her, and, feeling so closely alike on all practical matters, it perhaps matters little that in merely speculative points there should be a difference. I confess that perhaps I have expressed my opinions sometimes too strongly, but my excuse must be that I have felt strongly. The points at issue would never separate us in any practical work. They are therefore harmless so far as that is concerned. In other hands then hers they might not be so harmless and it is for such a reason that I have felt strongly about them. I have little more to say in the matter at issue than I have already said. Any scheme of the moral government of the universe which subordinates free will in the most minute degree I could not assent to because I know in as true a sense as I can know anything that volition is free. I can never be urged out of what I know. Again the whole Comteist method of inquiry is radically vicious. It is seeking the living among the dead who have no will and then asserting that the living have no will. To me it is astounding that the idea should ever be entertained or accepted. It could only have originated in such a slough of despond as Parisian society present and to tell you the truth I do not think it can ever take root in our healthy British nature. Not one of us would dream of going to the charnel house to learn philosophy. Why should we go among the phenomena of dead souls to learn what we can never get—the laws of living souls—when we have so many living souls of which we can learn? And why should we go into the abyss of human wickedness to learn God’s moral government when He has written His plan with the sunbeam? I have preferred sending this to you because yon Florence is very unwell and in our work we have enough of difference of opinion to

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make it desirable not to have more. I regret that on this most important of all subjects we should differ at all. Believe me to be, yours ever sincerely J. Sutherland Source: Suggestions for Thought 1:203-88, draft in Add Mss 45838 ff1-93

1 It is constantly said that ‘‘Necessity’’ and ‘‘Freedom of the Will’’ are subjects beyond human comprehension. Milton once clinched the nail. And now it has been repeated ‘‘usque ad nauseam’’ by the idle, the cowardly and the unthinking, who are miscalled ‘‘the world.’’ We believe the words ‘‘free will,’’ ‘‘necessity,’’ to be words without meaning, and therefore we had far rather not use them, but may we not consider the following question concerning human will, without touching these dangerous words? Does human will accord with definite and invariable laws? Do human volitions, in other words, manifest such laws? Or can human will be called a self-determining power, irrespective of any traceable law? *142 This is a question which bears directly on the moral government of mankind. It has frequently been admitted that the human will does bear traces of being in accordance with definite and invariable laws; but many writers, among others, Fichte,143 have recoiled from the admission, and said that it was so contrary to right that, although it appeared in accordance with fact, it could not really be so. Shall we, therefore, begin the inquiry with the two following questions: 1. What can we learn on this subject from actual observation and experience? [699]

‘‘Free Will’’ and ‘‘Necessity’’: words which have perplexed the human race, because they are mere ‘‘words.’’141*

Question. Is human will in accordance with law, as other things are?

1. What is? - With regard to human will: 2. What ought to be?

141 JS: On the contrary, ‘‘free will’’ has a very definite meaning . . . [698] the freedom of willing there could be no responsibility, no choice, no obedience. 142 JS: The use of the word ‘‘law’’ here requires careful definition. The idea of law was drawn first from social relations, and then when science arose the social idea was carried naturally into the material world. [699] 143 FN: Kant and Fichte. Nightingale commented that she liked her aunt Mai Smith’s ideas better than Fichte’s (in Theology 3:182), but which of two Fichtes is not clear: Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) or Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796-1879).

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1. What is?

2. What ought to be? Answers to 1. What is?

2. What would be most satisfactory to what we feel to be morally right? In other words, 1. What is? 2. What ought to be? (To those who say, ‘‘We can learn nothing with regard to these things from human observation, or with human powers of mind, we must have recourse to superhuman communications,’’ there is nothing to answer. *144 We think that by human observation and inquiry we arrive at moral evidence of an omnipotent and righteous being; that by what are called ‘‘superhuman’’ communications we arrive at what is called a ‘‘cer tainty’’ of a capricious and unrighteous being. But if it is desired to pursue the inquiry upon human observation and experience), we ask: 1. Does human will accord with definite laws? or may it be called self-determining, without dependence on law? 2. How would the government of the superhuman power, on which man depends, appear to be a right one to human comprehension? 1. When we say that we trace laws in the phenomena of nature, we mean either that we trace uniformities so invariable that they may be considered as the laws of a power which wills this invariableness; or that such uniformities are as invariable as they would be if attributable to a will and a power which render them so. What would a perfect God create? With respect to human volitions, it can only be said that the more widely and the more closely we observe, the more we shall find them to be examples of such uniformities as we call laws. *145 The phenomena of the will are so complicated that, without such wide and close observation, it is impossible—with *146 it, it is difficult to trace in them those relations of simultaneity and succession (or, in other words, those uniformities), which we call laws. * Human will is not, as it often appears to be thought, a separate force. Volitions originate in and exist in uniform relations with sensations, thoughts and feelings (or emotions). Sensations, thoughts

144 JS: I never heard this said. I don’t know who would say it. [700] 145 JS: This is the same proposition restated; it confounds the manifestations of will with the faculty. [702] 146 JS: It is not so difficult to arrive at the psychology of the matter.

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and feelings, and volitions originate in and exist in uniform relations with organization and circumstances. For the truth of this we can only refer to observation and experience. *147 2. If we consider phenomena only, they tell sometimes one way, sometimes another. But if we consider the character and tendency of law, we arrive at evidence regarding a perfect being. Granted a being omnipotent and perfectly righteous, the existence of other beings would follow, for a being would not be omnipotent and righteous, unless his existence became the source— 1. Of other beings. 2. Of other righteous beings (on the same reasoning), but not of other perfect beings, for such would be Himself. 3. Nor of other beings righteous through the direct will of the Omnipotent, because the being would not be perfect in righteousness who thus operated on other beings. 4. Of beings, therefore, righteous, through advance from limited and imperfect natures towards perfection, by exercise of the faculties of those natures individually and collectively;—the inducement and the means to such exercise being afforded by the laws of the omnipotent and righteous being.149 This is the only thing possible on the hypothesis of the existence of a being omnipotent and righteous. *150

2. What ought to be?

A per fect God must create *148 1. Other beings. 2. Other righteous beings. 3. Other beings righteous not through His direct will. 4. Other beings righteous by advance, through their own exercise of their own faculties, from imper fection towards perfection. Means and inducement to be supplied by His laws. Cer tainty of advance to be supplied by His laws.

147 JS: This is Combe’s argument stated in another form, but it arises solely from want of analysis and confounds manifestations with faculty. Experience teaches us that the will is absolutely free. Experience teaches us that its external manifestations are conditioned and that not even so constantly as to give the idea of ‘‘law.’’ 148 JS: This is simply a hypothesis founded on a hypothesis. Creation did not so originate, otherwise the Creator has no free will and was subject to ‘‘destiny.’’ [702] 149 FN omitted from Add Mss 45838 f4 (And here I must remark that there can be no ‘‘grace,’’ there can be no such word as mercy with a perfectly righteous being). 150 JS: Whence comes conscience? From God. Is it or is it not a fact that the entire human race, as a race, has sent up its prayers and groans and bloody sacrifices for ‘‘mercy’’ and its petitions for favour, ‘‘grace’’ to Heaven ever since the world began? Why so? Conscience. Your perfectly righteous being who could not be ‘‘merciful’’ or ‘‘gracious’’ has laid on all his creatures an instinct requiring both mercy and grace. [703]

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Object of God’s laws with regard to human will.

Man’s power over his own will defined.

If we are asked our ground for such a hypothesis, it is this, that the character and tendency of the laws manifested in the history of human nature becomes consistent only with, becomes inconsistent only without, such a hypothesis. It follows on this hypothesis, that human volitions shall accord with (be subject to) definite laws. The object to be obtained by such laws with regard to the human will is that the will shall be right, or rather that the nature and the knowledge shall be such that the will must be right. Not, as is often supposed, not, as is often expressed, that a man shall be free to choose between right and wrong, but that such choice shall be impossible to, i.e., inconsistent with his nature, as it is with God’s. * Volition being in accordance with law (a manifestation of law), *151 all the power which can be rightly used or desired by a man over human will (whether his own or another’s) is given to him, viz., the power to take means to render human will right, means cer tain when known, and the knowledge of which is attainable to human nature. * 2 Answers to Objectors (An attempt is made in the following sections to answer the most popular and often urged objections against these doctrines. These objections are given in the actual words of the objectors,152 and printed in italics.) Objection: ‘‘Freedom of willing is matter of experience.’’ Answer: It is so in this sense. It never happens that what we should will, if not prevented by a superior power, external to our nature, we are prevented by such power from willing. When we say we are free to act as we please, we mean no power above our own prevents our acting as we should act if we were not subjected to such superior power. *153

151 JS: Always the same fallacy; of late years; ‘‘law’’ has been gradually rising into ‘‘God.’’ We will not surrender our freedom! [705] 152 In fact, Dr Sutherland. 153 JS: I would still keep in view the distinction between simple ‘‘volition’’ and ‘‘acting.’’ [706]

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In this sense we may say that we have ‘‘freedom’’ to will as we please, i.e., no power above our own operates to prevent us from willing as we please, or, in other words, willing according to the state of our nature (when we will). *154 But where is there any contradiction in this to the proposition that a volition is a phenomenon which accords with definite laws, or, in other words, that, given a certain state of being and certain circumstances, the same volition will invariably co-exist or succeed? *155 (If the word ‘‘law’’ gives offence, we would gladly change it; shall we say plan? *156 But it is impossible even to conceive of the perfect Being ‘‘in whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning,’’157 without conceiving of law in his moral government, in the sense in which that word differs from decree. No other term will express the sense of the invariableness and perfection of his moral government, his plan, his ‘‘Theodicea’’ [Theodiké], call it what you will.) * ‘‘Without the freedom of willing, there could be no responsibility, no choice, no obedience.’’ ‘‘Responsibility.’’ We have never been able to see how the word ‘‘responsibility’’ applies at all to the relation between man and the source of his being, the ruler of his destiny. ‘‘Responsibility,’’ ‘‘choice,’’ ‘‘obedience,’’ are all secondar y conditions. Responsibility does exist between two beings, of whom one accepts from the other certain conditions—something being committed by one to another on the mutual understanding that the latter accepts conditions, upon the breaking of which follows some penalty or blame; e.g., I commit to my steward the charge of disbursing money on my behalf; he accepts the ‘‘responsibility,’’158 receiving an exact account of what is chargeable to him.

154 JS: I agree to this except to the last clause. ‘‘Acting’’ on ‘‘will’’ is confounded. [707] 155 JS: No! Because the proposition as thus stated subordinates volition to circumstances and introduces the idea of ‘‘necessity.’’ 156 FS: I only object to the word law in such discussion because it really means nothing. It is a stilt to help on the lame intellect. . . . The evil of it is that we are apt to make it a ‘‘leg’’ and worse to make it a God, or worse still to subject God to our law, or what we think a law. [707] 157 Jas 1:17. 158 FN: E.g., I give to my linen storekeeper the charge of certain articles of linen. She accepts the ‘‘responsibility,’’ receiving an exact list of what is in store. [708]

216 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought But no such engagement exists between man and his Creator. Man does not know what talents he has in store, what he is in charge of. God has not told him. On the contrary, by God’s plan, he has to find out this very thing. * If it be said that the Bible offers certain conditions, with the assurance that reward or punishment will follow, as they are kept or neglected, to such a decree the term ‘‘responsibility’’ does not apply. The human being comes into existence without choice of his own, without that acceptance of conditions which constitutes ‘‘responsibility.’’ * Or if, as we interpret the thought of the Ruler of the universe, man is to attain the welfare of himself and his kind, dependently on his keeping aright laws manifested to him through phenomena, still the word ‘‘responsibility’’ does not apply, for there has been no acceptance of conditions. * There being then no choice as to coming into existence, no conditions offered, we infer that no righteous being would, by his power, call beings into existence, except on the certainty that their true welfare is to be to all such beings the result of such existence. * ‘‘No choice, no obedience.’’ ‘‘Choice, obedience.’’ Men do choose, do obey. This is fact, whether the will be a selfdetermining power or a manifestation of law. The question is, whether a man’s ‘‘choice’’ or ‘‘obedience’’ proceed from a nature in which all the operations are manifestations of law, or in which one of these operations, viz., volition, is not a manifestation of law, but the result of what is called a self-determining power. * Will it be said that a ‘‘choice’’ which originates in a mind, the operations of which manifest law, has the character of a piece of machiner y? We deny it. A machine operates without consciousness, while law stimulates man through his consciousness. In accordance with law, conscious natures are called into existence, educated to exercise appropriate to them, which is carried on by and within themselves. They are not machines acted upon unconsciously by external power. * Suppose a child educated by his parent, and that, in a decision he makes, may be distinctly traced the effect of the education of that parent. Can it be said that, inasfar as the parent was the cause, the child was but as a machine in that choice? *159

159 JS: According to this, a man’s acts are the result of his organization, or in other words of God’s will. God is never the author of virtue and murder, of

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Law which, in educating human beings to a future destiny, is the origin of the decision a man makes, can no more be characterized as levelling man to a machine than can a parent who, in giving an education to his child, is traced as the cause of any decision made by that child. ‘‘Choice’’ (often a state of indecision) and ‘‘obedience,’’ are indicative of imperfection, beyond which even imperfect man should strive to advance. ‘‘Choice’’ (where there has been doubt) and ‘‘obedience’’ are inferior, secondar y states of mind; inferior, that is, to a state of accordance with the perfect will, to be one with which is the highest state. *160 ‘‘Obedience’’ to a per fect being involves the idea of imperfection in him who obeys; as he becomes less imperfect, it ceases to be obedience, it rises to accordance. Even in the most severe paroxysms of pain we may feel this. If the law is perfect which subjects me to this, let me not obey, let me second the perfect will, accord, agree with it. This is the perfect ‘‘love’’ of the ‘‘scriptures.’’ Is ‘‘Human Volition’’ a ‘‘self-determining Power?’’ ‘‘The use of the word law here requires careful definition. The idea of law was drawn first from social relations. And then, when science arose, the social idea was carried naturally into the material world. We talk of the common law, and of the law of gravitation. Now, in neither of these senses is volition under law at all. The very faculty is the opposite of law in that sense.’’ [712] We understand the word ‘‘law’’ to signify either a will that a definite state of things shall be always simultaneous with or successive to some other definite state of things, whenever the latter occurs, or to signify such uniformity of co-existence or succession, as, if not considered as attributable to will, yet is as invariable, as if it were the result of will united with power to effect its realization. * On this understanding of the meaning of the word ‘‘law,’’ we maintain that volitions accord with law, are manifestations of law, inasmuch as they are phenomena existing in uniform relations of simultaneity with or succession to other phenomena. * [712]

self-sacrifice and tyranny. It only removes the causation a step further off to introduce the idea of law. [710] 160 JS: This is passivity and is morally a lower state than activity. [711]

218 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Ever y volition is successive to or simultaneous with some phenomenon or assemblage of phenomena; if this again exist, the same volition will be co-existent or successive. In other words, each volition exists in such relation of simultaneity with or succession to some other phenomenon or assemblage of phenomena that, had this not existed, the volition would not have existed. *161 ‘‘Volition acts within bounds or limits, and there is a cer tain similarity in its manifestations in all men as beings of the same order. In this sense alone is there a law. Except in this sense, human volition is a self-determining power.’’ We refer to observation and experience to decide whether volition does not manifest that uniformity which entitles us to designate it as according with law (defined as above), or whether volition only manifests law in a limited sense, exhibits only ‘‘a certain similarity in its manifestations in all men as beings of the same order,’’ but is at the same time ‘‘a self-determining power.’’ * 3 Has God revealed Himself? [721] ‘‘The only question’’ humanity has to ask in reference to dependence on a higher power is, ‘‘Has He revealed Himself?’’ To us the question appropriate to humanity seems to be, Is the law— on which we find that human existence, human destiny, depend— satisfactor y or not to the wants appropriate to the human mind consequently on that law? viz., the wants of a spirit of love, of sympathy, of justice, benevolence, conscientiousness, of a desire to learn the truths within our ken, * and whatever else may be understood as the desire of a righteous mind, i.e., the desire appropriate through its laws to healthy human nature. In the desire to ‘‘submit’’ without question to any higher power (be that power God or man), we see nothing which the highest power (the power of right) should wish to constitute us for—constitute us, that is, to believe such ‘‘submission’’ to be the highest rectitude. This is ‘‘obedience,’’ not right. * We believe that he has fitted our minds to learn his laws and understand their object.

161 JS: It has not and cannot be proved! ‘‘Will’’ is free and above all matter and phenomena. It is lord and master in its sphere. [713]

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( Job’s expression, ‘‘Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him’’162—Isaiah’s question as to the right of the ‘‘clay’’ to ask of the ‘‘potter’’ anything about its creation163—the Jesuit’s aspiration to be able to love God, though he be thrown by him into hell, *164 all appear to be utter confusions as to the character of God—echoes of the reverence for mere power embodied in Eastern despotism—the very reverse of the purpose of God in our creation.) There is a remarkable instance of this in St Paul: ‘‘Nay; but, oh, man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour? What, if God, willing to show His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, and that He might make known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy which He had afore prepared unto glory?’’165) Power without right is not an object of reverence, and it would be, probably, impossible to find in any savage superstition one more cruel than that contained in Calvin’s own words. But, indeed, it would be difficult to call Calvin’s a religion at all, if religion is the tie to a good Being. *166 ‘‘God, in predestinating from all eternity one part of mankind to everlasting happiness and another to endless misery, was led to make this distinction by no other motive than his own good pleasure (!) and free will.’’ *167 The abominable doctrine involved in that of baptismal regeneration168 (viz., that God condemns to endless suffering169 babes come into the world without any choice of their own, and which certainly could not get themselves baptized), is another superstition about the nature of God unparallelled for its atrocity in any savage tribe.

162 163 164 165 166

Job 13:15. JS: Only those can use such an expression who have been tried. An allusion to Isa 45:9. [714] JS: Such a question is not asked of us. The Jesuit asks it of himself. [728] Rom 9:23. JS: The whole of this is incorrect as regards Calvin. It is a partial statement. And even if it were correct it does not touch Christianity and the Christian ideas of God. [715] 167 FN omitted: (Note: ‘‘Good pleasure’’! and free will.’’) Of what devil could be said worse than this? 168 JS: The truth should not be condemned on account of error. 169 Reworded from ‘‘that God damns little babes.’’

220 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought What human murderer could be compared to Him if this were so? * The {omitted ‘‘wretched’’} Church of England, one day, some years ago, brought to look this thing fairly in the face, and to say whether God did thus condemn babes or not, answered, It was an open question. People might believe one thing or the other, as they liked, which is equivalent to saying, it did not signify. Did not signify whether God was the worst of tyrants and murderers or not! ‘‘This is the question of all ages and time, what ought to be?’’ ‘‘What is’’ and ‘‘what ought to be’’ [700] It has been so; and this is most important, as showing, in all religious and moral questions, that to know and to bring to pass what appears the right to the human mind, is one of its essential wants. ‘‘What ought to be would never have been asked, if the fundamental conception of God’s character and moral government had not varied in every individual man by light of nature. The very question grants the whole case, viz., that there is a striking discrepance between what various men think there ‘ought to be,’ and what the same men think ‘there is.’ ’’ * Now, if we look at phenomena, if we judge of single facts, as known to us from human experience, we shall indeed feel the discrepancy between what ‘‘is’’ and what ‘‘ought to be.’’ Man is forever contrar y to (or below) the best possibilities of his nature. We seek, then, a revelation to assist us to solve this difficulty. Some will answer, we find it in the Bible, others in the Koran [Qur’an], others in books supposed to be from superhuman sources. Our disbelief in these as direct revelations, i.e., as being other than man’s noblest attempts (up to the present time) in the course of his development, to understand God (in which attempts he has formed ‘‘God in his own image’’170), is founded on the contradictions in these to universal law. This once admitted, what have been supposed to be revelations, cease to appear so, because, on this admission, they fundamentally contradict both what ‘‘is’’ and what ‘‘ought to be.’’ Human will ‘‘is a separate independent faculty’’ [701] What is a faculty? Is it synonymous with power? e.g., we say, man has the faculty of speech; does this not mean that the power of

170 An allusion to Gen 1:26-27.

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speech exists in mankind? This faculty or power exists accordantly with or dependently on laws, i.e., it does or does not exist, it exists in one mode or another, according as certain definite pre-existences or co-existences have been and are, or have not been and are not. *171 With respect to the faculty or power of will, and how it is exercised, we can only refer as before to obser vation and experience, as to whether this faculty or power of willing differs from every other by not existing in and being modified by relations of simultaneity and succession with and to other phenomena; or whether, the more closely we observe, the more ground we find for believing that volitions do arise and vary connectedly, uniformly with sensations, thoughts, emotions, and that sensations, thoughts, emotions, do arise and vary with organization and circumstances. *172 Is human Will ‘‘a separate independent Faculty’’? Men fear to look this experience in the face, and to acknowledge it, because they imagine it is to acknowledge themselves powerless machines, or ‘‘animated stones.’’ *173 The very reverse is the fact. Law is the means always at hand to afford us power. Law is the inducement, if our minds are enlightened, our hearts true, to use the power aright. * 174 If I believe that a certain state of will is right; if I wish for that state of will which is right; * if I also believe that, in certain circumstances, upon which is consequent a certain state (as to sensations, thoughts, emotions), human will becomes right—is not the course obvious to endeavour to bring about these circumstances for mankind? * What is all that we are doing for sanitary reform but this? We know that disease, crime and death always go together. We know

171 JS: With regard to will, the faculty is willing, not doing. [717] 172 JS: No! This idea, which leads logically to pantheism and is in fact the ground of that idea. . . . Willing has nothing to do whatever with sensations, thoughts, emotions. Acting has a great deal to do with them. 173 JS: No on the contrary necessitarianism with its law-bound Creator and law-bound will is afraid to look at God’s freedom and men’s freedom and to take the consequence of both, and it shelters itself behind an ‘‘eternal order of things’’ and so saves itself all further trouble. [718] 174 JS: This is a perfectly logical result, but it should be carried further. What say you to this: ‘‘Law compels me to diminish human suffering, which is great upon the earth, in the only way I can relieve it, namely, by taking away human life.’’

222 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought that to preach to a man to do right, and to send him back to a pigsty, where he cannot but do wrong, is nonsense. We set about improving his pigsty. What are all our attempts at education, Poor Law reform, municipal institutions, but one assertion of this belief? The mode in which the will acts is subject for observation and experience, from which we may collect evidence. Will it be said that obser vation and experience teach us that we can ‘‘will as we please’’? * Granted, in some cases. Truly and justly a certain previous exercise of our nature secures us the power to ‘‘will as we please,’’ while error or neglect deprives us of this power. If we desire to will right habitually, or to help others to do so, we must study so to live that we shall bring about such volitions, * i.e., we must so keep God’s laws that this will follow. * In proportion as humanity desires the right, pursues the right, in accordance with law, human organization and circumstances will, by the power which law offers to man, be rendered such that human nature will progressively advance in what is right and true. * Can the imperfect have a greater scope to attain and exercise all power which can be tr uly, rightly desired? ‘‘A perfectly righteous and omnipotent being has created other beings with cer tain faculties’’ [719] On what ground is this asserted, unless on the admission of law of such character and tendency as manifests a perfectly righteous and omnipotent being? Do phenomena, or the separate facts of human life, enable us to assert it? * Does the Bible or any other (socalled) revelation really present to us a perfectly righteous and omnipotent being? What ‘‘the Lord’’ is there said to have said and done, if we now heard it for the first time, could the true human heart, the mind enlightened even to our present possibility, hear it for the first time—could it accept such as any conception of the character of a perfectly righteous and omnipotent being? Impossible. * Men ‘‘have, in all ages, recognized responsibility in some sense.’’ Responsibility [720] Does this prove that responsibility is the true term for the connection existing between humanity and a superhuman power? Responsibility, in the received understanding of the word, implies conditions offered and accepted, implies ‘‘answering.’’ How can there be an answer when no question has been asked? How can there be

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responsibility ‘‘recognized’’ (in any tr ue ‘‘sense,’’ at least), between man called into existence without a choice of his own, and the source of that existence? ‘‘If there be cer tainty of perfection, the will must will perfection, otherwise it is unattainable.’’ Undoubtedly {Nem con [nothing contrary].} Per fection must be the will of the imperfect before it can be attained. ‘‘It is surely possible for God to reveal himself to the creature he has made’’ The word ‘‘God’’ has been used to express such various conceptions that there is a degree of vagueness in this proposition, which, however, we admit to be undeniable, since all these conceptions include the idea of superhuman power. (It would be the greatest gain religion has ever made, if, for a time, the word God, which suggests such various and irreverent associations—irreverent, that is, to a spirit seeking right—could be dropped—and the conception substituted of a perfect being, the Spirit of Right.) * ‘‘If he has so revealed himself, the revelation must be a correct one; ‘He cannot deny Himself’ ’’ [721] This depends, in order not to be either a truism of a non-sense, upon what has been said before. If God has revealed himself to our understandings as a spirit of truth, to such a nature it is undeniably impossible to contradict himself. We find such a revelation in his laws, but we do not find any other harmonious or consistent revelation. * 4 Answers to Objectors [721] ‘‘The only question is, Has he revealed himself?’’ In what sense the only question? Another question, it appears, man will be impelled to ask; and the force of desire with which he seeks for answer will be exactly in proportion to the healthy development of his nature, exactly in proportion to the advance in his knowledge of human nature, of human history, and exactly in proportion as he realizes in his conception the actual history (with the intensity of its horrors and the sublimity of its beauty) of human nature. (To be a historian, even a Macaulay, does not necessarily imply this. A mere hold on the memory of facts which have occurred by

224 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought no means implies a realization in our consciousness of the consciousness of those to whom they occurred. Somebody had justly said that if we could realize the misery, the crime, the lunacy, the pain, the suffering going on at this one moment of our existence, we should go mad.) The question, then, that we shall ask eagerly, earnestly, unceasingly, in proportion as we do realize human history, will be, Does there exist such a power as causes man’s existence to be a road by which humanity shall attain to an existence of progressive righteousness without limit short of per fection? The answers to all questions concerning human nature, human destiny, concerning the superhuman power believed to be the source and ruler of human existence, will be modified according as we believe or disbelieve that all the phenomena of nature are manifestations of law. (We include in the word ‘‘nature’’ all modes of existence which have a beginning and are subject to change. Each of these modes is generally called a phenomenon.) We consider the beginning of and every change in each phenomenon to be a manifestation of law in the sense above defined of the word ‘‘law.’’ In other words, the relations in which phenomena exist to one another are such that no one would have existed unless some other, existing previously or simultaneously, had so existed. And, as often as these definite phenomena again exist, again will arise the same co-existing or successive phenomena. Whether there is any exception to this rule experience must decide. Being convinced of its universality, we can only consider questions in accordance with its admission. * [722] This view of humanity then follows: By the laws of man’s nature, righteousness of nature and of life is his appropriate desire for himself and his kind. Yet, through the laws of which all phenomena are the manifestation, such an existence has been to many impossible. A nature and life of sin has been inevitable. * Had it been thus to one only, the problem would have been the same. And this is what we mean when we say that, in proportion as we realize the horrors of human history, the righteous mind will feel utter repugnance at such conditions of existence, unless there is ground for belief that, 1. The law by which righteousness of nature and of life is made the appropriate desire of human nature, and

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2. The law by which it is to some impossible, * are both the manifestations of a righteous power—affording thus the assurance (1) that sin is an evil remediable in time to come; * (2) that righteousness is to be attained through, if not during, human existence. ‘‘Who can by Searching find out God?’’ [725] ‘‘Who can by searching find out God? Who can discern the Almighty to perfection?’’ 175 ‘‘The problem is a mightier one than you contemplate.’’ Let us be equally careful neither to be fools who rush into subjects on which evidence is unattainable, nor cowards throwing dust in our own eyes. If we ‘‘by searching’’ try to ‘‘find out’’ the nature of ‘‘God,’’ the beginning, the end, etc., we are fools. If we take for granted that we cannot learn, or must not inquire, where evidence is within our reach, we are cowards. * The finite is utterly incapable of understanding the mode of being of the Infinite, who reveals himself by his laws, as the source and ruler of our being. * But these laws, forever operating within and around us, seem to be expressly constituted in order to reveal to us the character, the thought, the plan, the will of man’s Creator and Ruler, as far as man is concerned. * It is consequent upon these laws that we have a consciousness of right and wrong; in other words, that we have a consciousness concerning some thoughts, feelings, objects, pursuits, expressed by calling them right, concerning others, by calling them wrong. * It is consequent upon these laws that love, benevolence, justice, the pursuit of truth and knowledge have to our minds the character of right, * that we include in right the attempt to realize, to the extent of our power, these qualities in ourselves and in others. Is not this practically admitted in our attempts to educate the ignorant, to reform the erring? * Are we presumptuous then (our minds being thus constituted by the will of the Almighty), in our conviction that, to that Almighty through whose teaching in his laws we reckon love and benevolence as essential to righteousness of character, it would be impossible to exist alone, while powerful to bring about goodness and happiness? * [726]

175 A paraphrase of Job 11:7.

226 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Are we presumptuous in the conviction that (since he has so constituted our natures that we feel, unless through defect or ignorance, that righteous existence is alone of real value) the Omnipotent will secure to our natures the realization of this righteous existence? It does not shock our sense of right, with regard to the rule, in conformity with which we find human nature exists, that sin and suffering are incident to it. * For we find that to learn, to acquire tr uth and knowledge, to attain righteousness (the means through which we shall certainly arrive at it being bestowed on our imperfection by the Perfect in Righteousness, the Almighty in Power), is the best which is possible for imperfect being. * (When we say, ‘‘which is possible,’’ we do not imply necessity; we mean, that it must be without contradiction or inconsistency, itself inconsistent with the Spirit of Truth.) If God’s plan for man is truth to be learnt, right to be attained by man for mankind through the teaching of God’s law (as means and inducement), to such a plan sin and sorrow are essential, but they will be remediable. * [727] The character and tendency of these laws are educational. As such they show, as their source, righteous power. Such a source assures us that the imperfect will attain to remedying each and all of our sins and our sorrows in the course of an existence, of which human life is but a part. * Such a plan does not admit ‘‘responsibility.’’ *176 These laws are not offered on conditions which we may accept or refuse. We cannot refuse to be the subjects of his laws. Well, for us, we cannot. For some of us, at least, would certainly have refused, had we known what life was. *177 But perfect love and wisdom decide for the imperfect. It is well. Since our refusal could be but the decision of ignorance. As we attain to the understanding of his plan, we shall accept it with all our hearts, though sin and sorrow may seem almost at times to overwhelm the fainting pilgrim walking in darkness and desolation. * But the Father never forsakes him.

176 JS: While at the same time it lands on the head of the Creator all the sin and sor row and suffering that ever has been or ever will be to the end of time. It is so shaking to my sense of right and justice, that if I could really think you entertained it, it would be the greatest miracle I ever heard of. [727] 177 JS: Your idea of good and evil has landed you in Pyrrhonism. [728]

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(‘‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’’178 is a mistaken cr y); *179 the Father conducts him surely to light, stirring up within him the will to use his own powers to gain all for his kind (including himself) which makes life of value. [728] Though we be comparatively in darkness, it is in us to see that law alone, without making us machines (‘‘animated stones’’) can secure our attaining, by and through the exercise of our own natures, to become one with God. When we say ‘‘can,’’ we again explain that we mean no necessity; we mean ‘‘can’’ without contradiction, absurdity, inconsistency. ‘‘To God all things are possible,’’180 viz., which are possible to God. To him, the Spirit of Truth, contradiction or inconsistency is impossible. For he would thereby cease to be the Spirit of Truth, to be God. We should say, reversing what Job says, Because I know thou canst not (wilt not) slay me, therefore will I trust thee.181

But the Father never forsakes him.

‘‘You desiderate a human being with certain faculties subordinated to certain laws, which you consider the best, and having so conceived of your man, you charge the Almighty with the duty of finishing a work he has left unfinished.’’ No desideratum of our own invention can affect the question, nor indeed has entered our mind, excepting this, we ‘‘desiderate’’ to learn what is. We believe what is is right, not because we submit without question to superior power, but because the healthiest promptings of the nature bestowed upon us yearn for right (to be realized in the existence of all our kind). We therefore search for a tr ue interpretation of what is, determined to accept nothing as tr uth unless it comes home as the accordance of what is and what is right. Where we can see no such accordance, we remain respectfully in doubt, trusting to learn here and hereafter what shall remove all doubt. *

178 Jesus on the cross, Matt 27:46. 179 JS: Little did I ever think that I should have met with a human hand who could have penned this. Pray God that in his mercy you may yet be compelled to utter the same cry. You will see more clearly then on some points than I fear you do now. [728] 180 A paraphrase of Matt 19:26. 181 A paraphrase of Job 13:15.

228 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Do we think with Comte and Miss Martineau? We find a man ‘‘with certain faculties subordinated to certain laws,’’ we do not invent him. The effects of these laws are such that (constituted as we are), we might admit their author to be almighty if he did not ‘‘finish his work.’’ We could not admit him to be righteous (constituted as he has made us) if he did not ‘‘finish his work.’’ * ‘‘You charge the Almighty with the duty of finishing a work he has left unfinished.’’ [729] This is a forced construction. Taught by his law, we interpret that it is his will eternally to carry on this work. ‘‘Left unfinished.’’ We believe that he never leaves it, but is carrying on in perfect wisdom, tr uth and love the work of right, which will never ‘‘finish.’’ * ‘‘There may be a world where such a process is to go on, but it is certainly not this world, except in the case of the lower animals, who are perfect in their kind.’’ This world’s work is merely a part of the realization of God’s plan (viz., the education of imperfection towards perfection), as shown by His laws. * How, indeed, can the thought of the Infinite and Eternal be carried out (or perfected) in the finite world? * Through infinity and eternity we are to advance towards perfection. In this world we are either to make some progress, or to prepare for future progress. ‘‘This is Comte, Miss Martineau and Mr Atkinson!’’ [730] Let not our friend give in to the common injustice of supposing that one who believes with another on one point believes with that other on all points. With Comte we believe in the universality of law, but we entirely differ herein, viz., that he thinks right to stop short when he has recognized law.182 With regard to Miss Martineau and Mr Atkinson, the following passages taken from their book explain their belief. If what we have already written does not prove our belief to be entirely, fundamentally opposed to theirs, protestation is useless. ‘‘Philosophy finds no God in nature, nor sees the want of any.’’ ‘‘All we know is phenomena, and that the fundamental cause is wholly beyond our conception. In this I do not suspend my judg-

182 FN omitted: (Miss Martineau and Mr Atkinson’s book is so weak, excepting in what they borrow from Comte, that I am really unable to say in what their propositions can be agreed with or in what differed from.) [730]

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ment, but rather assert plainly that, of the motive power, or principle of things, we know absolutely nothing, and can know nothing.’’ ‘‘The desire of a future existence is merely a pampered state of mind, founded upon the instinct of preser vation. It is a longing, and those who have it are like drinkers or children.’’ The desire for evidence of the existence of a righteous Source and Ruler of human life and (connected with this) the desire for evidence of a future to humanity, must arise in every understanding heart, by which law is once recognized as universal. Without such evidence human existence is repugnant, with it is satisfactory. The Term ‘‘Law’’ Irrational [731] ‘‘I cannot alter my will, or be other than I am.’’ The desideratum in morals is a science and an art, the object of which is to alter whatever is wrong in human will, in human being, to transmute the will, the being who wills, from wrong to right. Such science and art are possible to man through God’s law. ‘‘Either the possibility or the benevolence must be limited, if happiness is not complete, continuous and infinite.’’ The non-existence of imperfect happiness, the existence of no other than happiness ‘‘complete, continuous and infinite,’’ would be contradictory to the Omnipotent benevolence, truth, righteousness, which God’s law impels the human heart and understanding to seek, and reveals as its source and rule. Now, if we could get rid of the word ‘‘law’’ we would, and substitute for it ‘‘a thought of God.’’ For this is all that it means. Comte sees law manifested throughout the phenomena of the universe, and sees nothing more. We see ground for believing, as above said, that a law is nothing else than a thought of God. Without this staff, we cannot conceive how man can walk with brave and willing spirit through life’s difficult and dangerous paths. With it, we can conceive him thanking God even for his mistakes, from which he learns ‘‘right’’ for his kind. * Except to the child or the animal, life can have no real peace without this belief, viz., that the law, of which the phenomena of the universe are a manifestation, is itself a manifestation of the existence of omnipotent right. All other peace can be only insensibility towards the sin and suffering of our kind. * ‘‘There are, or rather alas! there were, spiritual laws, or, better and truer, a spiritual economy (for the term law is cold, frigid and irrational). This econ-

230 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought omy is the reminiscence of humanity of the time when the Father dwelt in his house. But we would not.’’ Let each speak for himself. We would that the Father should dwell in his house, or, rather, we do not wish, we believe that he does dwell in every part of his house of the universe. And we deprecate the use of the evangelical phrases, for they are phrases. They consist in saying that we are ver y bad, feeling all the while that we are ver y good for saying so.183 ‘‘The term law is irrational.’’ We should be glad to change it. We want a word to express the uniformity of the relations in which phenomena exist to one another, in proportion to our knowledge of which relations we can foretell and influence the future. * 5 Answers to Objectors Objection: ‘‘Whence comes conscience?—from God.’’ [731] Answer: Certainly. Like every other faculty. But what does conscience mean? Is it not a consciousness with regard to some thoughts, feelings, actions, expressed by calling them wrong; with regard to others by calling them right; consequently upon which consciousness we desire the latter, avoid the former? But what is right or what is wrong? Does conscience tell us this? In this matter conscience has given entirely different verdicts to different ages and nations. Conscience told the Egyptian Ptolemies to marry their sisters;184 conscience told the old Romans to kill themselves; conscience let the Muhammedans have four wives;185 conscience told Calvin to allow Servetus to be burnt. Many things now considered crimes were at other periods or by other races considered duties or virtues. * [732] Conscience tells many ‘‘to send up prayers and groans and bloody sacrifices for mercy and petitions for grace.’’ Conscience tells us the reverse, as long as we believe ourselves under the rule of a being whose love, truth, justice, wisdom are inconsistent with the

183 JS: This is a misunderstanding of the Christian religion altogether. [731] 184 Ptolemy XIII married his sister, Cleopatra. 185 FN omitted: Conscience told the Jews to marry many wives and more concubines. Conscience told Abraham to marry his wife’s maid and then to murder his own child.

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idea of ‘‘mercy,’’ and to whom ‘‘bloody sacrifices and petitions’’ would be but as the ignorance of his poor child awaiting for a better understanding of him. We do not ‘‘petition for grace’’; we ask for nothing; we rejoice always that His will is law through infinity and eternity. Believing thus, we can thank God even for suffering and sorrow, even while str uggling with the hardest suffering, our own ignorance and mistakes, past or present. * ‘‘All this is simply hypothesis.’’ Law, if it exist at all (and whether it does or does not must stand on evidence), is not ‘‘hypothesis,’’ but fact. Its character and tendency are developing, and will be understood more and more as we improve in being and advance in knowledge. We can trace no beginning and no end to the thought of the being who manifests himself in law; our glimpse at this eternal manifestation must be imper fect. But it is a revelation ever ready to unfold itself to our efforts to understand it. In this world, doubtless, it has the character of ‘‘hypothesis,’’ to be verified hereafter. (So have many other things, upon which nevertheless we act.) * ‘‘God, in creating, must have created other beings in one of two antitheses: (1) righteous, i.e., cognizant of and obeying every condition on which the welfare of the universal creation depends, and for this the gift of free will is absolutely essential; or (2) unrighteous, i.e., disobedient to the conditions, which is absurd.’’ [734] We see no evidence that man is created righteous or unrighteous, nor any reason why he should be created in one state or the other. The babe enters the world neither in one state nor the other, unless the diabolical doctrine be adopted of ‘‘baptismal regeneration.’’ The babe becomes the one or the other, according as its thoughts, feelings, character, in short, are developed by its circumstances acting on its organization. If we will, we can, to a certain degree, affect organization and, when we cannot affect it, adapt circumstances favourably to it. And if mankind at large attain to desiring the right, they will learn more and more to bring about this, viz., that both organization and circumstances shall ensure continual progress in righteousness, of being and of life. Can any evil be shown in human life not more or less remediable by power, wisdom and goodness attainable by man? Who shall say then what is the evil that is not remediable? *

232 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought ‘‘It is necessary that the soul should receive what it requires from the Father, other wise it would be independent of its source, which is impossible. Why should the soul be the only exception in the universe to dependence on its creator and upholder?’’ [734] Are we conceiving of human nature as ‘‘independent of its source,’’ when we conceive of man’s entire being as a manifestation of the divine thought and will? (This is not a forced construction, but a misconstruction of what we say.) It is the right wish of our nature not to be machines, ‘‘clay’’ in the hands of the ‘‘potter,’’186 yet to attain (by his help, given to our feebleness and ignorance) to be one with the spirit of love and wisdom. For this end we are entirely ‘‘dependent’’ on his help. He gives it in the teaching of his law. We are (and we rejoice to be) entirely ‘‘dependent’’ on him. * ‘‘The Golden Age has the authority of infinitely greater adaptation and acceptance than this hypothesis.’’ 187 We have yet to find any evidence that the ‘‘Golden Age’’ ever existed, still more, any reason why it ever ought to have existed.188 ‘‘Knowledge, a mastery over the will depriving it of its freedom.’’ Does it deprive us of free will (in the sense above given to it), that we certainly shall decide in some cases according to our ‘‘knowledge?’’ On the contrary, we are even indignant sometimes with others for supposing that we can decide otherwise than we do, having such or such a ‘‘knowledge.’’ ‘‘Could I decide,’’ we hear it said, ‘‘other wise, when I ‘knew’ this?’’ ‘‘Could I, when I ‘knew’ the soldiers were being murdered wholesale, decide otherwise than to give all I had to prevent it?’’ ‘‘Will presupposes freedom, or it is not will, but something else.’’ We must define will. Is it not inclination realizing itself, i.e., inclination of such a kind and degree, and existing in such circumstances as that it will realize or attempt to realize itself in the present, or determine to realize, or to attempt to realize itself in the future? In other words, will includes wish, intention and the belief

186 An allusion to Isa 45:9. 187 The fifth century bce in Athens. 188 FN omitted: or how (see Dr Sutherland) the ‘‘cross is the only key which opens the mystery of obedience and free will.’’ [735]

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that it can realize that intention. Such inclination or will is free in this sense: No power can prevent any inclination which a man would have (in the state in which he is at any particular time), if not prevented by any superior power. Fallacies about Free Will ‘‘Choice and the power of choice was the Creator’s final finishing touch to man.’’ [705] If ‘‘choice’’ means the unhesitating decision for right, as opposed to wrong, the righteous man will choose. (We have said nothing at variance with this.) Will does not mean merely choice after doubt. Inclination realizing itself without doubt is still will, as much as (or more so than) where doubt has preceded or accompanied. ‘‘Law has been represented as God.’’ Not by us, but the reverse. We have in no sense represented law as God, but as the thought of God. We think the error is where law is recognized, as manifested in phenomena, but where a mind is not recognized as the source, of which law is the manifestation only. All we know of law from its character and tendency is that it is the manifestation of an omnipotent righteousness, expressed by the word God. ‘‘The supreme fallacy of modern times, substituting law for necessity.’’ [736] We set out by avoiding the words ‘‘necessity’’ and ‘‘free will,’’ because, as now used, they convey misconceptions. Let us, therefore, not recur to them without definition. The possibility exists for mankind to attain for mankind the power and the will to will right. Can we desire anything else? [736] ‘‘Whenever it is impossible to do wrong there is no longer ‘man,’ but some other being.’’ Yet we know it to be impossible to some men to do wrong in some ways. We know that A could not tell a lie, whatever the temptation, nor B take his neighbour’s property, nor C neglect a sick person committed to her charge, nor drink his wine, nor take away his pillow. Where, then, are we to place the limit of how far it may become impossible to man to commit any wrong? We do not assert that it will be ever impossible to human nature to do wrong in any possible human circumstances. We cannot see so far into the possibility of human progress as to assert or deny it.

234 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought ‘‘Always the same fallacy. Of late years law has been gradually rising into God. We will not surrender our freedom.’’ [705] We have attempted to define the sense in which we ‘‘will as we please,’’ no higher power preventing, if it is in our nature to please. We have attempted to define how it is in human nature to attain to will as we please, if we attain to please to will right. The question remains, Is law a ‘‘fallacy?’’ or does it exist? ‘‘We will not surrender our freedom!’’ is an exclamation which seems to arise from a misconception of the question, from a misunderstanding of the nature of the ‘‘freedom’’ possessed by man, and of the power which man may attain, consistently with the existence of law, as manifested in all phenomena—in volitions as in other phenomena. Hence our power over our volitions, because hence our means to bring about certain volitions in our own minds or those of others. Whether law exists or not must be matter of evidence, and whether, if it exists, we may derive from it the power which will assist us to be and to live righteously. ‘‘The tenor of the principles in this paper is pantheism.’’ Pantheism attempts an explanation of the mode of being of God. We express the belief that the mode of being of Him who is manifested by law, as the source of law, is inconceivable by human nature. We maintain that phenomena (and laws manifested by phenomena) are open to human observation and are the subjects of human experience. These laws, in their effects, as known through this experience of phenomena, are unsatisfactor y to the healthy, the appropriate desires of man for mankind (healthy, that is, in accordance with law). Hence we are urged to inquire whether the character and tendency of these laws is such as to reveal a future, whether, considered in connection with a future, their rule becomes satisfactory to man’s best desires for mankind. The more we study them, the more we find them adapted to educate the imperfect towards perfection, to afford that education which, had we the power, we should give as the best boon to imperfection. Such character and tendency reveal them to be the manifestation of a righteous power (i.e., reveal them to be consistent with righteous power), and as far as we can see, reveal them as the only thought, the realization of which would be consistent with omnipotent righteousness. Consistent with the nature of omnipotent righteousness is a sequel to human life, which shall be the continuation of an educa-

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tion of the imperfect towards the perfect—an education for each and for all—an education in which this world has been for some a beginning, for others a preparation only. [737] 6 Law, Necessity, Free Will [738] The character of religious literature in these days is truly alarming. For the last 300 years its tendency has been mainly {purely f44} destr uctive, and hardly anyone has thought of reconstr uction. Before that time the Roman Catholic loved God and Christ and the Holy Ghost, the Virgin Mar y and the saints; then came the Protestant, and he annihilated {destr yoyed} as objects of worship the Virgin Mary and the saints, but he did not make God, Christ or the Holy Ghost more loved or more loveable; then came the Unitarian, and annihilated as objects of worship Christ and the Holy Ghost, but he did not make God more loved or more loveable. Now the conflict between Roman Catholic and Protestant is well nigh over, and no one reads ‘‘controversial’’ literature. The invectives of Cumming189 are listened to by a section, the cardinal archbishop190 has taken to lecturing on art in Hanover Square Rooms! * But what has taken the place of that controversial literature? We now have either a superficial defence of the doctrine of free will, urged by those (as e.g., Kant, Cousin191 and the Rev James Martineau) who are terrified at an equally superficial glance at necessity, or a doctrine rapidly becoming the only one which thinking men will entertain, viz., that represented by Comte, Buckle, Mill and Quetelet. This consists in directly establishing law (recognized as it is now being with unexampled completeness), as obtaining in every department, physical, moral, intellectual, of the universe, * not in establishing law as the thought of God, but in looking upon all farther research as being after a ‘‘barren theory.’’ Many authors seem to consider law, which is only a formula, as an explanation, a first cause, for phenomena. R = ✓ N. This is a for-

Direction the present theology is taking.

189 John Cumming (1807-81), pastor of a Scottish church in London, where Nightingale heard him preach in 1857. 190 Cardinal Nicholas Wiseman (1802-65), the first English cardinal since the Reformation. 191 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), German idealist philosopher; Victor Cousin (1792-1867, French historian of philosophy.

236 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought mula; it explains nothing. No one would say that writing down R = ✓ N ‘‘explains away’’ God in any department of his universe. Now no law which can be stated is anything more than this. But what makes the superficial recognition of Quetelet’s truths so dangerous is that they convey to the half-taught mind the delusion of necessity, whereas, so far from really supporting necessitarianism, they in fact show how these very laws place in our hands the power which God designs to give to man; for all that is his he designs to make ours, even his omnipotence. * [739] The religion of Comte, of Buckle, etc., and even (and this is most extraordinar y) of the puny reviewers, who have dealt after their puny fashion with these great minds, is mere aspiration, ‘‘imagination,’’ nothing more, ‘‘in other words, religion is a mere transitional form of thought.’’ Surely it cannot be intended to say that absolute truth depends on what state man is in at any given moment, and, if not, what Comte calls the ‘‘theological and metaphysical’’ stages of religion are only forms of the ‘‘imagination,’’ while the ‘‘positive’’ stage admits no inference of the will from which ‘‘law’’ proceeds. [740] ‘‘Free will in philosophy I define to be an inherent faculty of spirit, whereby it is capable of willing any order of sequences, whether such order is to begin to be, to cease to be, or to have its direction altered.’’ Definition of Freedom, Free Will ‘‘Free will in morals I define to be an inherent faculty of the human mind, whereby it is capable of willing any order of moral sequences or (so far as the physical capacities of man will permit) any order of physical sequences which it chooses to will.’’ *

Definition of freedom, free will.

‘‘Generally, that free will or liberty, as opposed to necessity, is under no condition, external to itself, to will or not to will, according as such external condition may require. That there is absolute freedom, in short, in the function or faculty of volition, while the introduction of the idea of necessary sequence in the functions of the will raises necessity into the rank of governing power in the spiritual kingdom, to which all freedom of activity in the highest as well as in the lowest realms of spiritual existence must be subordinated.’’ Before ‘‘we define’’ ‘‘free will,’’ let us define ‘‘freedom,’’ ‘‘liberty.’’ Are we to understand these words to signify absence of impediment to any wish which might, by possibility, enter into the human mind? * E.g., If a child were to wish to go to the moon, is it correct to say that the impossibility of going to the moon is an absence of ‘‘free-

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dom,’’ of ‘‘liber ty?’’ Or does the word ‘‘freedom’ not apply in this case, it being correct to say that human beings have not power to go to the moon, or, in other words, that, to beings constituted as we are, it is impossible, while it is not correct to say that human beings have not the freedom to go to the moon. But take another instance. If a man {Lord Derby f47} were to have wished, fifty years ago, to cross the Atlantic by means of steam, the inability to do so, arising as it did from ignorance or uncultivated capability, it would not be correct to call want of ‘‘liber ty,’’ but want of power. Power which an individual or a race does not possess at one period of existence may yet be attainable at another. * [755] Again, suppose I had wished to plan the dome of St Peter’s. Such impossibility, whether from incapability in the nature or absence of development and cultivation, it is not correct to call want of ‘‘freedom,’’ but want of power. Yet Michelangelo did it. To one individual is possible what is impossible to another. Again, if I am ill, and in consequence unable to go to see my mother, whom otherwise I should go to, this impossibility it is not correct to call want of ‘‘freedom,’’ but loss of power to go, though, in common parlance, it may be called ‘‘being a prisoner.’’ An injury to the brain from a fall is said to have deprived a man of the knowledge of three languages. As means were taken to promote his recover y, one after the other returned to his memory. This was not the recover y of his ‘‘liber ty,’’ but of his power. Take a further instance. The fall of a burning house prevents all egress to a man in the basement; such prevention is commonly called loss of liberty, but, if so called, what definite meaning can be attached to the word liberty? If a man is prevented by a storm from joining his ship at sea, we do not call this want of liberty, yet, if we use the word in the former cases and not in the latter, what is the distinction? If I am prevented by the will of another from the possibility of realizing an inclination, this is distinctly want of liberty; and there is no definite meaning which can be attached to the word, unless by thus limiting its application. [742] Such distinctions may be unimportant in common conversation, but are so important in such an inquiry as this, that if we would advance one step beyond the mere everlasting persiflage, for it is nothing better, which prevails about ‘‘free will’’ and ‘‘necessity,’’ we must begin by such careful definition. Otherwise we shall learn

238 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought nothing concerning the government of human nature by superhuman power. In the sense above defined of the word liber ty, freedom, man has absolute free will, i.e., no other will prevents his willing what is accordant with his nature. In other words, his will is not prevented by any other will from being what it would be but for another will. ‘‘The more modern development of the idea of law in the spiritual universe, so far as I can understand it, I take to be either that co-existent with the eternity of the divine or spiritual nature (as contra-distinguished from matter), there have existed certain necessary sequences by which the divine nature found itself bound’’ (quer y, who has said this? not we, certainly), *‘‘and that in creating spiritual intelligences, it became necessar y’’ (again, who has said this?) ‘‘to create them in accordance with these necessary sequences.’’ [743] (This is the definition of necessity, certainly not of law, which presupposes something laid down by the will of the law-giver.) *

Nature and tendency of law.

‘‘Or that the divine nature by an act of its own will established a certain order of sequences, and left these to follow all their evolutions forever, the divine nature by the condition of the problem having withdrawn itself from all connection with those sequences, and so to speak, beholding their evolution apart and from a distance.’’ Law is that which is laid down. * There is ground to believe that there exist relations of simultaneity and succession between phenomena (including among phenomena the volitions of the human mind), which have the uniformity which would exist if such relations were laid down by (or, in other words, were the regulations of) a power able to effect such uniformity. (The ‘‘established order of sequences,’’ which is complained of as showing that the power has ‘‘withdrawn’’ to a ‘‘distance,’’ is the proof that he is always there, ‘‘in whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.’’192) * Volitions are a manifestation of law, because, preceding (or coexisting with) every volition, there have existed (or exist) phenomena, without the existence of which such volitions would not have existed; but which, having existed in the same relation as to precedence or co-existence any number of times, those volitions would exist such number of times. *

192 Jas 1:17.

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Nature and tendency of Law [744-45] (Ever ybody knows and acknowledges this in practice. Everybody who has had at all to put himself practically into moral training, in order to manage his own will, has tacitly acknowledged it. A ‘‘Sister of Charity,’’ who had to go to South America to nurse the yellow fever, said that she took care to receive the invitation, not after she had been at ‘‘recreation’’ or in her laboratory, but after she had been at ‘‘meditation,’’ when she was sure to accept it. She did not attribute this to any supernatural ‘‘grace,’’ but to her having thus brought her will (by observing the relations of succession, which are constant), into that conformity with the will of God, which was essential to her performing such an act of ‘‘self-sacrifice.’’) These relations of simultaneity and succession are such as to justify us in actually considering them the regulations of a power and will, of a nature which can be inferred from their character and tendency. * [745] If it is ‘‘laid down’’ or determined by will, divine or human, that to a certain state of things a certain other state of things shall be successive, that with a certain state of things a certain other state of things shall co-exist; such determination we call law, and the word expresses will exercised in a different manner from that which is exercised by decree. The chief of a savage tribe wills the death of a man for theft, although thefts are habitually committed without punishment. A mother punishes a child193 for accidentally breaking a teacup by crawling over the tea table, although the child habitually crawls over the tea table without punishment. In either case this is a decree or order, but not a regulation or law. * A determination that every man detected in the commission of a theft shall be put to death; that a child, every time it crawls about the tea table, shall be put to bed, would be a law. We do not therefore say that either of these individuals has been deprived of liber ty, or that the governing power has ‘‘withdrawn to a distance.’’ On the contrary, law enforced is the means by which the governing power induces those who live under it to govern themselves. If a man or a child knows that by keeping a law in a particular manner he or it is certain to obtain some object of his or its desire, the law furnishes an inducement to him or it so to keep it. *

193 Reworded from ‘‘has a child’s ears boxed.’’

240 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought In fact, vacillation (which is what we want to see in God, if, at least, we hold the beggars’ doctrine towards him), is exactly what children, arrived at maturity, complain of having suffered from in their parents, viz., that their decrees were not to be depended upon. It by no means follows that law is necessarily an appeal to selfish feeling. Man, well-born, well-developed, well-bred, well-circumstanced, will not be a selfish being. * Such a man, discovering that there is a way of keeping law by which he may promote the health and virtue of his fellow creatures, is furnished by existing laws with inducement to keep them after that manner. (And here we must refer to a common confusion about the word law. ‘‘Thou shalt not kill’’ is said to be God’s law, * but this is not God’s law, for men do kill, while God’s law is never broken. Men do kill, and if they could not kill, there would indeed be no ‘‘liberty.’’ This is Moses’ law, not God’s law. * [747] Again, Quetelet shows that not only such a percentage of men will kill in a year, but such a percentage out of this percentage will use such weapon, such a percentage will use poison, etc. *194 This does not show that God decrees that a certain number of murders shall be committed every year, but that certain states of mind, and certain circumstances co-existing, murder will be committed. Again, it appears that boys between the ages of fifteen and twenty, although they constitute only one tenth of the population, afford an amount of crime which constitutes no less than one fourth of the total crime committed in that population. But these are the announcements of the statistician, not laws of God. It is the result of God’s law that, given such organizations and such circumstances, given such a state of society, such a number of murderers will there be; and further, such an amount of evil will be entailed on society, teaching it the truth about crime. It is the result of God’s law that, given such a state of society and such of education, such an amount of boy-crime will take place. But what is this but to say that we must bring about another state of society and of education? If, indeed, we were to see a spotless and virtuous generation of youth growing out of the present education and state of society,

194 JS: Again, there is no such law. This is an entire misunderstanding of the whole statistical argument. [747] FN: Either Moses or Quetelet must be wrong, or both. For one says, Thou shalt not kill, in God’s law. And the other says, Thou shalt kill, in God’s law.

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then indeed we should be at a loss to conclude anything else but that this God has ‘‘withdrawn himself to a distance,’’ and has laid down no law at all.) * All natures (possessing certain conditions of being, which if not realized, their appropriate well-being will not be realized), if not omnipotent, not possessed of all knowledge, not perfect in wisdom and goodness, want assistance or guidance. The history of mankind shows that the want of such assistance and guidance has led to the belief that it has been received from audible voices from an unseen world, from miraculously inspired teaching, from a cloud by day, a pillar of fire by night.195 * But as the mind has progressed, some find these teachings do not contain intrinsic evidence of truth; they are but the teachings of men of like nature to ourselves, though in some way superior to those they taught. * Obser vation, extending throughout the phenomena of nature, present and past, is presenting to us teachings of another kind, a governing power of another kind. * A government is good in proportion as it offers means and inducement to a man to realize for himself and for his kind a state of being appropriate or befitting to human nature; that is to say, a state of being in harmony with (or adapted to) its present type, but ever progressing towards a higher type. What this higher type is we do not yet know definitely. * But we do know, by experience, the capability of human nature for indefinite improvement. *196 Law, the Expositor of God [749] The character and tendency of law (as above defined), as manifested through the phenomena of nature, show it to be a process for thus governing human nature. This law, not written for the eye, nor spoken to the ear, is obser vable in the history of human existence as it passes before us. * Human existence becomes, within certain definite limits, one way or another way of being, one or another organization or constitution, according to, i.e., according with, certain co-existences or pre-existences. What else do all crime tables, sanitary tables, statistical tables show us but this? * What else do all the various organizations of the earth at different periods—the Greek, the Roman, the Hindu, the Eskimaux—show us

195 An allusion to Neh 9:12. 196 JS: Non mille fois non!! We hope, but we do not know. [749]

Law, the expositor of God, and the only expositor.

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Distinction, or rather opposition, between law and necessity.

but this? * viz., that if we possessed the knowledge of all facts and their connections, certain facts would be recognized as having, in ever y instance, existed in such connection with these organizations as that, without those facts preceding or co-existing, those organizations would not have been; and were those facts precisely again to co-exist or pre-exist, those organizations precisely again would exist. The soil upon which a man has lived may be told by his appearance. The water the Guardsmen drank, who died by the Guadiana,197 may be told by the record of their diseases. * And though we cannot yet prove, by actual experience, the whole of the case, prove, that is, that the above proposition obtains everywhere and throughout—yet it is experience and reasoning upon experience which lead all thinking minds to believe that it is so— that it is true universally, as we know it to be true par tially. [751] Inclinations of such kind and degree as induce the human being in whom they exist to realize or to attempt to realize them exist in ever y conscious human being. Such inclinations we designate as volitions. * What the volitions of each human being are is a manifestation of law, i.e., given a certain constitution or organization, which is in itself a manifestation of law * and given circumstances which affect that constitution or organization in a definite manner, there will exist definite volitions varying with (in uniform relation to) the organization and the circumstances. * Neither observation nor experience leads us to suppose that the power manifested in law ‘‘found itself bound by certain sequences.’’ To be so ‘‘bound’’ would be a state of things which we should call necessity. We see none of the characteristics of law in it. * Law is not necessitated on the ruler of the universe, * but is the eternal process of realizing the thought accordant with, harmonious to his nature, viz., the progressive advance of imperfection towards perfection by means and inducement afforded by his law. (These means and inducements act, not always, it is true, upon individuals, but upon the whole human race, which is, as the French term it, solidaire; e.g., it is not that the murderer is induced by the evils of murder to devote himself to improving murderers and to banishing murder from among mankind, but mankind is induced, sooner or later, to improve the state of society which produces murderers.) *

197 In 1809 when the British Army had 26,000 men on active duty in Portugal, in the Peninsular War, there were 10,000 ill from ‘‘Guadiana fever.’’

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Distinction between Law and Necessity When our limited nature attempts to conceive of a nature superior to our own, we conceive of a nature like our own in kind, having those attributes which we trace in his laws. ‘‘Only insofar as man is the image of God, and can think like God, can he give the reason of anything that God has made.’’ Yet, in attempting to interpret the thought of the ruler of the universe through our own, we are not open to the sarcasm that ‘‘man makes God.’’ We are to interpret, not invent. And if we find existing phenomena referable to laws manifesting thought, purpose, feeling, such as we are ourselves conscious of, though on a scale infinitely greater than our own, as infinity exceeds our sphere and as eternity exceeds our span of time on earth, we are justified in attributing such thought, purpose, feeling to a nature in kind resembling our own. * We learn from our own attempts at government and at education the advantage of law over decree. An education which furnishes means and inducement to its pupils to find their proper way through existence by the appropriate exercise and improvement of their faculties is the best boon an imperfect nature is capable of receiving. *198 A good education, a good government proceed on this principle when man attempts to educate man. *199 But man’s time, man’s knowledge are limited. He must point out his law, must enforce, otherwise than by experience, its being kept. The ruler of the universe in his wisdom proceeds by law alone in his teachings to man. * The existence of this law, which is to govern and educate man, has to be discovered by man; no voice reveals it; no finger points it out. Blindly and sadly man has wandered through his existence in ignorance of it. Blindly and sadly he suffers still, for it is little recognized, and how to keep it aright has still to be learnt. * But, if recognized, let us consider the means and inducements it would offer to man to become individually and socially what it is right, healthy, appropriate to his nature to become. [753] *

198 JS: I hardly know how to deal with you. There are passages such as this that are inconsistent altogether with certain other principles you lay down. [753] 199 FN omitted: (Louis-Napoléon proceeds on the opposite principle and therefore he is not governing, but cutting the throat of, France.) JS: Louis-Napoléon is a dear friend of Comte’s and Buckle’s philosophy.

244 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought God’s law our means and inducement in our progress from imperfection towards per fection.

From law man may learn the conditions appropriate to individual and social human life. * From law he may learn how to desire, to cause to be desired these conditions, how to realize such desire. * Granting organization and circumstances to be (by law) the conditions which determine the nature of a human being, what power does not such an admission offer to humanity? * For how great is not man’s power over organization? Unthinkingly he has hitherto exercised this power. * Are not agriculture, chemistry, navigation, geography, all that art or science puts into the power of man to render the earth healthy, to supply himself with appropriate food, etc., are not they all but means at hand to improve organization? What is all appropriate exercise of the nature, the emotional, the intellectual, the physical nature, but means directly or indirectly to improve organization? * And as to circumstances, what limits can we set to human possibility to discover and to realize the circumstances which will render human existence appropriate to human nature? Distant as seems such a possibility, the character and tendency of law reveal that God’s law shall, in time, have furnished to mankind the inducement and the means to unite as one brotherhood in the aim to keep God’s laws aright, which is human nature’s real paradise. * God’s Law our Means to Perfection

Mankind must create mankind by means of God’s law.

Yet there needs a future to human existence to satisfy the nature given by God to man as to the law by which God governs man. In consequence of this law vice and ignorance have degraded beings whose proper element is progress in righteousness. In consequence of this law all progress is cut short by death. [754] The educational character and tendency of God’s law, which reveal to us what man may do for man on earth, reveal also the opportunities which the righteous ruler, who is manifested in his law, will afford to all whose proper element he has made progress in righteousness, so that after death they shall continue (or attain) to make infinite progress therein. Law, in accordance with which righteousness is man’s proper element and desire, law, in accordance with which the conception, the desire, the attainment of righteousness have been impossible to a portion of mankind, can be consistent on this hypothesis only, viz., that of a future in which progress shall be attainable for all, attained by all.

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7 Objection: ‘‘I cannot but feel that there is still some difference that requires explanation in our definitions.’’ [755] Answer: It is essential to arriving at any tr uth that definitions should be distinct. We therefore repeat our definition of law, defining it still more closely. ‘‘The idea of law cer tainly involves the constancy of sequences without reference to the reasons of such constancy.’’ * This word law is used in two senses: 1. To signify any enactment, proposed or carried out, that a certain defined state of things shall be simultaneous with (or successive to) some other defined state of things, whenever the former occurs; 2. To signify constant relations of simultaneity or succession between phenomena or events, such as would exist if that constancy were the result of will and of power to effect such will. * In this sense the word law is used, sometimes with reference to a ruler to whom constancy in those relations is attributed, sometimes merely to express the existence of those constant relations. * Answers to Objectors In order to explain ‘‘the idea of law,’’ three ‘‘cases’’ or senses in which the word law is used are given. [756] 1. ‘‘God’s will is constant and unvarying, and in this sense it is God’s law.’’ 2. Supposing ‘‘God to have directed once and forever an order of sequences, and left (?) that order to evolve itself, this would be law in another sense.’’ 3. ‘‘There is a tendency to generalizing and classifying in most minds, and we all invest our own classifications and generalizations with more or less of the attributes of constancy and say we have discovered such and such a law.’’ ‘‘The first two cases come within the range of philosophy. The last case is purely one of reasoning on obser vation.’’ We do not find here the ‘‘explanation in our definitions’’ required. We respectfully ask for one. * 1. Taking the first case, ‘‘A constant and unvarying will’’ is not another way of expressing ‘‘law.’’ Louis-Napoléon’s ‘‘constant and unvar ying will’’ to have spies throughout France is not ‘‘law.’’ It is tr ue that, conversationally, the word law is sometimes used to express will. Conversationally, it might be said that Louis-Napoléon’s will is ‘‘law.’’ But if the word ‘‘law’’ is to have a definite meaning, so as to

246 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought be of any avail in an inquiry after truth, we must either keep to our definition, or ask to have some reason given us for attaching some other definite meaning to that word. To say ‘‘his will is law’’ generally describes a rule by decree, not by law. 2. Taking the second case, neither does will ‘‘directing’’ ‘‘an order of sequences’’ express ‘‘law.’’ To will that certain events shall follow in a certain succession would still be a decree, not a ‘‘law.’’ The essential character of ‘‘law’’ is not that a prescribed series of phenomena will certainly exist, a prescribed series of events take place. * [757] The essential character of law is that whenever certain definite phenomena exist, certain other phenomena will be simultaneous with (or successive to) the former, in other words, that with (or to) a certain event, another determinate event will be simultaneous (or successive). It is essential to keep this distinction in view. Without it, the whole bearing of this subject has been misinterpreted and distorted. * 3. Taking the third case, although a ‘‘tendency to generalize and classify’’ will accompany a tendency to search for truth, which is undiscoverable to any considerable extent without those operations, yet, of course, if men classify and generalize hastily and inaccurately, i.e., incor rectly ‘‘invest their classifications and generalizations’’ with the ‘‘attributes of constancy,’’ and ‘‘say’’ they ‘‘have discovered a law’’ without sufficient evidence, such ‘‘saying’’ can afford no instance of a ‘‘law.’’ And therefore this statement appears to be no definition, but a caution. * 8 [763] Objection: ‘‘Can it be shown that a certain invariable order of sequences has been discovered?’’ Answer: We would begin by defining the question, Is there ground for believing in the existence of a certain invariable order manifesting itself in every mode of existence which has a beginning and is subject to change? In other words, is there ground for believing that no beginning or change takes place without some co-existence or precedent (or assemblage of co-existences or precedents) which recur ring, such beginning or change will again take place; which not occurring, no such beginning or change will ever take place? Practically, it is upon this hypothesis that every one of our actions is based, viz., that all phenomena (i.e., whatever begins and changes) exist in such definite relations to other phenomena, co-

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existing with or preceding the beginning of, or whatever change takes place in, them. One specimen differs from another of any species of plant, in connection with some definite co-existing or preceding circumstance, and horticulturists study these concomitants. So with diversities of animal life and character, and breeders of stock study these concomitants. The farmer, gardener, physician, sanitarian, teacher, governor, artist, artisan, what is their whole activity for but this, in order to bring about some beginning, some change, some continuance of what is, to find the means by observing co-existences and precedents, in other words, ‘‘laws of nature,’’ or ‘‘obser ved order’’ in nature? The phrase ‘‘laws of nature’’ is undefined and confused, unless ‘‘nature’’ expresses a conscious entity which lays down the ‘‘order’’ we call ‘‘laws of nature.’’ By ‘‘nature’’ we understand the course of phenomena without beginning or end, but exhibiting ceaseless change, so that each present set of phenomena differs from what has been and what will be. Resemblances and differences in phenomena alike show ‘‘order’’ in nature. A ship, a musical instrument, may be made, to all appearance and according to measurement, exactly to resemble another, but the exact qualities in one cannot be secured in another. The inference is not that, co-existents and precedents being the same, results differ, but that circumstances so minute as to be imperceptible to us have differed, and that, so exact is ‘‘order’’ in nature, no difference in co-existing or preceding phenomena can exist, without difference in the result. Through such uniformity and variety only, classification and generalization become possible. [764] Sensations, thoughts, emotions, are to be classed as phenomena, i.e., they are modes of existence which begin and change, and such beginning and change are practically found to exist in relation to definite co-existences and precedents. Sensations, thoughts, emotions, are the co-existents or precedents from which volitions result, and according to which they definitely vary, i.e., given certain sensations, thoughts, emotions, certain volitions invariably ensue. Given a certain volition, certain sensations, thoughts, emotions have existed, co-existent with or preceding it, which not having existed, neither would that volition have existed. *

248 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought ‘‘The proper term for this’’ (a definition of law) ‘‘would be ‘obser ved order,’ for it can be only known through observation of the presumed sequences.’’ [766] We are quite willing to substitute ‘‘obser ved order’’ for the word ‘‘law.’’ ‘‘You and I should not differ, however, as to the principle, which from all we have discussed, appears to be the one which lies at the root of your idea.’’ * The ‘‘root’’ of our ‘‘idea’’ is this. Man, when he feels the desire that human nature, human existence, human destination, shall be satisfactor y to the moral sense (or the spirit of right) which is appropriate to healthy human nature, will desire to learn how to bring this about, as far as human possibility admits, but feeling the limits of human possibility, he will yearn to discover ground for believing that there exists a superhuman power of such a nature as to be an assurance that, in accordance with the will of such a power, the conditions of human existence are satisfactor y to a perfect spirit of righteousness. (The first authority on law in the kingdom, the attorney general, says that the existence appropriate to healthy human nature—with £20,000 a year—is ‘‘to be fond of horses and racing, of good eating and good drinking, and keeping a good table’’ (sic) * in re Sir Henr y Meux. There appears, therefore, to be some difference of opinion as to what is appropriate to healthy human nature.) Our ground for so believing is the ‘‘obser ved order,’’ according to which it is discoverable that phenomena and events co-exist with or are successive to each other. We believe this ‘‘order’’ to be a manifestation of power in a righteous nature, because such ‘‘order’’ affords means and inducements, by which the imperfect can advance towards perfection through the individual and social exercise of capabilities existing in the imperfect, fulfilling thus what is the appropriate desire of the moral sense or spirit of right in man. * Our opponent says, ‘‘that he should differ as to the application of the principle on which we agree,’’ unless ‘‘(1) it could be shown that a certain definite invariable order of sequences has been discovered; (2) That such invariable order was really God’s order and not man’s order.’’ [767] That the phenomena of nature exist in relations of simultaneity and succession to each other is universally now admitted. The only exception is supposed by some to be volition. This alone is said to originate in a ‘‘self-determining power’’ existing in the mind of man. *

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Others, indeed, suppose that here also exist the same constant relations. The existence of these relations, here, however, does not admit of the distinct proof which can be brought forward in cases where the identical instances of simultaneity and succession can be pointed out and repeated. * Has a definite Order of Sequences been discovered? Certain substances being introduced into the system of certain animals, they die. Certain external conditions existing, certain zymotic diseases follow. Till lately, such diseases were supposed to be an ‘‘inscrutable providence,’’ a ‘‘dispensation.’’ Such they are supposed still to be by the Horse Guards, by some secretaries of state and by the Army Medical Seniors. * In other words, such diseases were supposed to manifest a special definite will of God that they should exist, just as now cases of moral evil are supposed to originate in the will of man. These interpretations are errors equally dangerous, for this reason. They prevent man from (or at least they fail to stimulate him to the) taking means within his power to obviate physical disease or moral sin. While director general Andrew Smith was in power,200 it was ‘‘the gate to the kingdom’’ of the Army Medical Department to say that yellow fever was an ‘‘inscr utable dispensation,’’ and that nothing could be done to avert it. * [768] Many {much wiser heads f80} have believed that cholera was traceable to no other origin than the direct will of superhuman power that it should exist, and the means attempted to prevent it were prayer, which, it was hoped, would influence God’s will, or some changing of circumstances totally irrelevant to the case, i.e., the divine will as now proved to exist in respect to this disease. This divine will is now shown, by experience and observation, to be that wherever certain physical conditions (such as want of draining, of cleanliness, etc.) exist, cholera, in epidemic years, will exist; that these physical conditions ceasing to exist, cholera will cease to exist. So, while men continue to believe in no other origin for crime but human will, those efficient means which might be taken to remove vice, as to remove cholera, will not be taken. [769]

200 Andrew Smith (1797-1872), director general of the Army Medical Department 1853-58; Nightingale considered him responsible for the disastrously inadequate preparation for the Crimean War.

250 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought While the (so-called) ‘‘Evangelical’’ believes that ‘‘the heart of man is desperately wicked’’ (mark the word, which signifies ‘‘hopelessly’’ wicked) * that the ‘‘world’’ is ‘‘accursed,’’ that ‘‘many are called but few are chosen,’’201 that those few are ‘‘saved’’ by the sacrifice of an innocent being202—while the (so-called) ‘‘Catholic’’ believes that the ‘‘sacraments’’ are the means of—not reforming or recreating the world but—opening the door of a place called ‘‘heaven,’’ which does not appear to be the earth made heaven, but a segregated pen, again set aside for a few—while these things are, what hope can we have for the removal of the cholera of sin? * Crime, disease and death, by God’s law, always go together. Therefore, insensible but immense progress has been made through Dr Farr’s branding of a certain class of diseases with the word ‘‘zymotic’’203 (and its association of ‘‘preventible’’) towards the abolition of twin evils. But oh for a more direct acknowledgment and consequent effort! * Given the feeling of what vice really is, of what virtue really is, together with the conviction that vice will certainly prevail where certain organizations and certain circumstances co-exist—that virtue will as certainly prevail where certain other organizations and circumstances co-exist—then vice will cease and virtue take its place in propor tion to the force of that feeling and that conviction. *204 ‘‘Evangelical’’ and ‘‘Catholic’’ Belief Given the conviction of this invariable co-existence of definite organizations and circumstances, and definite vices and virtues, together with the conviction that human organization and human circumstances may be determined or modified by human will, or that, where organizations cannot be altered, circumstances may, then man will become what he is intended to be, viz., the creator, the modifier of human destiny, instead of being (what he was not intended

201 A paraphrase of Matt 20:16. 202 FN omitted: by the murder of one God by Another. JS: I never heard of such a doctrine as this being held in any Christian church. Some of the medieval Catholic theologies indulged in some such speculation, but it never was church doctrine. [770] 203 William Farr (1807-83), superintendent of statistics at the General Register Office and collaborator; Nightingale used this expression in her work on the royal commission on the Crimean War and on India. 204 JS: This is partly true partly not true as you state it. [771]

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to be) the creature ‘‘prostrate’’ at the foot of a priest, of ‘‘the cross,’’ of all those expedients born of hopelessness, for smuggling a man selfishly into heaven, instead of setting him actively to regenerate the earth. [771] (Last night a mob of people in the street was following, for its amusement, a poor drunken woman, who was violently resisting the policeman carrying her off. A lady was saying to her daughter205 ‘‘Don’t look that way to see those revolting sights, to hear those curses.’’ * Is this the moral precept to be given to the—so-called— children of fortune? [772] Oh, no! look and let your heart be wrung with the sense of human degradation contrasting with the sense of human capacity for all that is right and good, not for all that is ‘‘desperately wicked.’’ Could such scenes exist if the better educated felt that it lay in their power so to modify human circumstances as to prevent them? * Would the streets of London keep up their present sounds and pursuit of amusement if it were recognized that time and thought might be so spent as to prevent the wretched state of that woman, and of thousands of women? if it were recognized that man has power to realize all that is right and good, not by prayers to another Being to do his work, not by a mysterious ‘‘self-determining’’ power through which he shall ‘‘will’’ to do it, but by taking God’s appointed means to incline his heart to will aright?) * ‘‘We should differ as to the application of the principle which, from all we have discussed, appears to be the one which lies at the root of your idea. We should differ in its application to the subject of God’s government of the universe, unless, first, it could be shown that a certain definite invariable order of sequences had been discovered, second, that such invariable order was really God’s order and not man’s order.’’ [773] In considering these two questions, we must first define the nature of the ‘‘order’’ discoverable. It is an ‘‘order’’ of relation. Phenomena exist in relations of simultaneity and succession with and to each other, i.e., a given phenomenon or assemblage of phenomena existing, some definite phenomenon or assemblage of phenomena will co-exist or follow which never would have existed except in those definite relations of simultaneity and succession

205 Lady - - in her carriage was saying to her daughter, ‘‘Don’t look that way to hear those curses, to see those revolting sights.’’ [772]

252 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought with or to those given phenomena, and which always will exist should those conditions be repeated. ‘‘Order’’ discoverable one of Relation As to the hypothesis that ‘‘order’’ is discoverable in the succession of phenomena and events, those who deny it appear to misconceive the nature of the ‘‘order’’ which we assert to exist. * It is not expressed by representing that each phenomenon which succeeds another is what it is by the will of superhuman power, and cannot through human means be otherwise. This is the proposition usually controverted by those who disbelieve the existence of ‘‘order’’ in the succession of phenomena and events. This is the hypothesis which they persist in seeing therein. * That each phenomenon which exists, each event which takes place, and the ‘‘order’’ in which these succeed one another, is determined by one will, is undoubtedly true, but such a proposition does not explain the nature of the ‘‘order’’ by which this will manifests itself to man, nor the effect of such will on human nature and human will, nor the results attributable to it on human history, past and present, nor the expectation to be derived from it, as to human future. The proposition that each phenomenon or event which succeeds another is what it is by the will of superhuman power, and cannot by human means be made otherwise, is Fatalism—in other words, makes man’s existence a machine, and makes the man’s or machine’s existence represent only the will of another in what it is and does. * [774] Alarm at such an interpretation of the ways of God with man often disinclines men from giving any fair or full consideration to a hypothesis which leads to quite the opposite interpretation. Therefore, in considering the two questions above, we must examine: 1. Whether the result of such ‘‘order’’ as is discoverable in the past and present, and of such anticipations in regard to the future as are derivable from it, would be satisfactory to the moral sense? 2. What is the nature of the evidence to be produced for the existence of an ‘‘order’’ of simultaneity and succession in which phenomena (i.e., all modes of being which begin and change), shall universally exist with regard to each other?

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9 Comte’s Idea of Law not ours Objection: ‘‘This is Comte’s argument, stated in another form.’’ Answer: We repeat very distinctly that we are no disciples of Comte or of Buckle. We yet believe them to be powerful minds, who have obtained an insight into certain important truths, perceived certain errors in the ordinar y beliefs of mankind. But they have stopped short of any true view of that thought of God, which is in process of manifestation in human existence. The errors, of which they have become conscious in the minds of others, have subjected them themselves to prejudices of a different kind. Comte and Buckle may afford help to others in the attainment of truth which they have not reached themselves. But to stop short where they have stopped short is to leave to be supposed such conditions of human existence as could produce nothing but utter repugnance in a righteous mind. (Calvinism, and indeed Roman Catholicism, * the close ally of Calvinism now, leave on the mind the same effect as Comte and Buckle, viz., in representing the conditions of human existence such as would be impossible— because abhorrent—to the thought of a righteous Creator.) * If a law existed in any mind that a certain number of murders should be committed every year, we may safely say such a mind is not good or wise. The idea of God either under a ‘‘necessity’’ to make such a law, or making it of his own ‘‘free will,’’ is obviously a contradiction in itself, if by GOD we mean a spirit of wisdom and goodness. No being that could be called good would bring other beings into existence under such conditions as these, viz., of living under a law which compels men to be in such a state of mind as that they must commit murder. It is quite another thing to say that there is a being, whose thought is the progress of imperfect natures towards perfection, such progress being worked out through the exercise of faculties existing and regulated in accordance with his law or plan—the consequence of such law or plan being that a number of men of a certain organization, and in certain circumstances, will have the inclination to commit murder. Such are the conditions of human nature in this country in the nineteenth century, viz., that a certain number of persons are so circumstanced that it is their will to commit murder. This is a fact. No one will deny it. * To say that they are necessitated to commit murder would be again self-contradiction, for it is their determined will, the fulfill-

254 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought ment of that strong inclination without which no man ever committed murder. * The practical result of such a belief as that above stated would not be to induce us to cease the struggle to prevent or to reform sin, but the very reverse. The conviction that the existence of sin is decreed by a higher power would indeed be ‘‘belief in necessity,’’ or Fatalism. * But, in proportion as a mind feels some horror at the idea of a fellow creature murdered, and much more horror at the idea of the state of mind in which a man is who commits murder, such a mind will be urged to ask itself, Can I do anything to alter this state of things in England in the nineteenth century, consequent upon which this number of murders is committed? Can I, directly or indirectly, at once or in course of time, individually or with the help of others, raise the human mind to such a state as will prevent or lessen murder? * Comte’s Idea of Law not Ours We who are moralizing have no distinct impression of what the previous life is of anyone who has committed murder. Can we doubt that, if we had, if we understood the framework of the human spirit—in other words, its organization—if we could trace the various influences affecting a man from his birth to the commission of such a crime, we should perceive when and how the inclination to commit it might have been prevented, the mind opened to better influences? * Such would be the practical power of this belief, when united with any strong horror of sin—with any strong conviction of the power of man to raise man out of it—that it would be an imperative call upon the human heart and understanding so to improve man’s circumstances as to ‘‘incline his heart to keep God’s law’’206 aright. * Would sanitar y reformers cease their efforts under such a belief? The arguments which most men bring against the capability of man for such improvement have always appeared to me to tell in the opposite direction. * Buckle says, ‘‘In India slavery—abject, eternal slavery—was the natural state of the great body of the people, the state to which they were doomed by physical laws utterly impossible to resist.’’

206 A paraphrase of the response to the commandments, Book of Common Prayer.

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Granted, so long as circumstances rule man. But God’s laws will teach man to rule circumstances. While circumstances rule man, the majority in hot countries will be lazy slaves, because food is plentiful, without labour. But let man rule circumstances, and the abundance of food (without time and strength spent upon its cultivation) will set free that time and strength to be devoted to the cultivation of mental and spiritual food. Enough has been thought and felt and done in hot countries to prove that heat does not inevitably paralyze the exercise of the heart or mind. With regard to the horrors described in the pages of human histor y, let us listen to them well. It is the Eternal voice, ‘‘Not so, my children.’’ ‘‘Not so,’’ we hear also repeated in every cholera, massacre, vice, degeneration. Man usually replies to it by prayer (if he replies at all), prayer for the removal of the evil. And the Eternal voice answers again, Not so. Cease to spend yourselves in vain. What is this buzz of purposeless talk from thousands of reunions of such talent as might redeem mankind? * What is this rattle {buzz}—ceaseless in your cities yet purposeless for man’s divine nature—when such a purpose waits to be fulfilled? Will you stand by, or pursue these inane follies while the divine nature of man is being murdered or while he is murdering himself ? Or, as inanely, will you betake yourselves to prayers for the salvation of man to Another, whose express plan it is that it shall be your own noble work? *207 The poisoned, the paralyzed nature cannot help itself. Man must rise up and save. Three fundamental Questions for Humanity [775] ‘‘Neither Calvinism, nor Roman Catholicism, are necessarily Christianity. The species must not be taken for the genus.’’ For humanity the fundamental questions, of which all others are a part, or with which all others are connected, are the following: 1. Can human nature, its history and destination, be interpreted so as to be satisfactory to a righteous mind—out of what man can learn of what is, what has been, what is to be? 2. What is possible to man to do towards rendering human existence satisfactory to a righteous mind?

207 JS: We are not workers instead of God, but fellow workers with God. [763]

256 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 3. Can man discover ground to believe that a power exists of such a nature as to afford assurance that those conditions of human existence, which it is not possible to man to change, are satisfactor y to a righteous mind? We cannot answer these questions by merely examining into what there is of true or of false in Roman Catholicism, or in Calvinism, or in any other professed form of belief which has arisen since the publication of the writings contained in the New Testament— we do not say since the publication of Christianity. For does not the way in which these writings have been rent and torn by disputants show how imperfectly the minds which lived after that time penetrated the thought with which they were written? The agonies endured at the stake—on the cross—in dungeons— in the homes of private life—do they not shriek, so to speak, the same tale? There is more of indifference now, there is less earnest belief, more concealment of unbelief, but is there a clearer and more unanimous conception of truth? Is it not the tendency of modern doctrine to say, with regard to religion, what with regard to any other subject would be felt to be monstrous and absurd, viz: ‘‘Let every man have his own truth’’? Far be it from us to allow any man to construct a railroad from north to south as he pleases. But in these (so-called) liberal days, the to l e r a n c e (what a word!) is admired which lets every man constr uct the road from earth to heaven as he pleases. * [777] Enough! The search after what is and what ought to be, the belief that they are one, by which we wish to shape all inquiry, forbid us to have any faith in those ‘‘revelations’’ (said to have been addressed to humanity by superhuman power), which in any way contradict our experience of what is, revolt our conception of what ought to be. * This same search after the true and the right directs us to the eternal, ever-speaking voice of the Almighty and the Righteous One, speaking to us through His laws, and their mighty results to be seen in the past, the present and the future. * Whether such laws really exist, and whether (such as we suppose them to be) they afford ground for belief in the existence of almighty and righteous power, we have to examine to the utmost of our possibility.

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What is ‘‘Christianity’’? That eighteen centuries ago there lived one most pure, most earnest in love to God and man, we believe without doubt, and with feelings of tender love and deep veneration. But most imperfectly do we know his thought communicated only through the words and writings of others eighteen centuries ago, * and, if we did, it is the thought of his Father and our Father that the knowledge of tr uth should progress. And it has progressed beyond that possible to him in his day. *208 [778] Let us read the words we can trace to him, because they are the words of love and wisdom, consistent with his life and death. Let us read them with deep interest, and rise up from them better prepared to love, to work, to suffer as he did. But, if we would speak the truth, deeper is the source of truth than those words, even the thought of his God and our God, to be studied now and forever in His laws. And now, with regard to ‘‘Christianity.’’ What is ‘‘Christianity’’? Some tell us it is a doctrine, some say, ‘‘No, it is not a doctrine, but a rule of practice.’’ Then, what is this rule of practice? *209 It has been the rule of practice of twelve men who went about as beggars, doing good. It has been the practice of men who lived alone in holes in the rocks, doing nothing—of men who lived in community apart from ever ybody else—of bishops who drove about with servants in purple liveries behind their carriages. But these cannot all be Christianity. [779] Then, is it a doctrine? We look in books of sermons and we find it is ‘‘the doctrine of man’s sin and Christ’s atonement.’’ Now, this is something tangible (but perfectly incompatible with that other doctrine of there being no absolute truth). *

208 JS: Read over what Jesus says about the redemption of man and point out what was true and what was false in that. The evil of such admissions as you have made above consists in this that you select what you agree with and reject what you disagree with. [778] 209 JS: All objections grounded in the aspects of Christianity at any particular period have been long since silenced by Rousseau, who though no Christian had the sagacity to show the hollowness of all of them. Christianity must be judged by its principles, not by the acts of its disciples. It professes to be light let in on darkness, or leaven put in meal. It is not to be judged by the darkness nor by the unleavened meal. It is a kingdom destined to subvert all Satan’s power and all human perverseness, and it will do it, and it is not ever to be judged by the wounds it receives in the contest. [779]

258 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Christianity then lays it down as an absolute truth that the scheme of God is the creation of a vast number of beings, called into existence without any will of their own, the fate of the greater number of which is to be everlasting misery, of the lesser number eternal happiness, and this after a period of ‘‘trial ’’ (quer y ‘‘trial’’ of what?) of the average duration of, as it was in Liverpool seventeen years, in the healthier districts of about double that time. (The only variation in this doctrine is a greater or less preponderance given by Calvinism to the ‘‘atonement,’’ by Roman Catholicism to a second period of uncertain duration—called Purgator y—before the everlasting happiness begins, and by other churches to different words, called ‘‘faith,’’ ‘‘works,’’ etc.) [779] This is a very positive proposition enunciated by Christianity. *210 As positive is the proposition that God has created a number of beings (called into existence by no will of their own), who are to be led by Him through infinite progress to perfection, which progress is however to be secured by mankind for mankind, in accordance with certain laws. Whichever of these two propositions be true, surely each implies as much a matter of fact as those other two of the motion of the sun round the earth, or of the earth round the sun. Now, if the first proposition be true, if there be a being who has done such a thing, nothing but the popular belief that power is in itself to be worshipped could induce men to worship such a being, much less to love him. If there be such a being, the only feeling a right mind could have would be to submit, because it must submit (and here ‘‘submission’’ is the right word), but to protect, inasfar as possible, its fellow creatures from such a Creator. * And doubtless the words, ‘‘submission,’’ ‘‘resignation,’’ etc., have sprung from such a belief as this, for ‘‘submission’’ to Perfect Goodness is absurd. * 10 What ought to be? The goal of human pursuit ought to be one will in man, and that God’s will.

The goal we look to for the imperfect moral nature which yet has capability for improvement is that all who have possibility of communication with each other should have one will; that this will

210 JS: Christianity does no such thing. [779]

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should be, as far as is possible to the imperfect, to be one with the Per fect, in feeling, in purpose, in will. Wherein man has progressed, nowhere is his progress more remarkable than in the communication he has accomplished between one part of this world and another. If we could see at one view the efforts of mind and body, by which from a helpless savage, knowing and using only the extent of ground over which his limbs can carry him, man has surveyed and used to his purposes the extent of this world now known to him, how wonderful, how ennobling would be the retrospect! To grasp at such an idea brings home to us the feeling of our imper fection, our finiteness. We cannot conceive it, even as far as we know it. What successive efforts have been necessary before animals were tamed for man’s use, ships and railways constructed, telegraphs invented! As far as we can have such insight into the past, how ennobling it is to human capability and what prospects it opens for the future! (Surely such insight must bring home to us the wisdom of the will through which we are to attain, not to be passive recipients of power and knowledge from the source of all power and knowledge. Here we may feel that in the counsels of God this principle of man’s ‘‘working out his salvation’’211 from ignorance, is ‘‘what ought to be.’’) Surely we may well hope that in time to come each part of this world will be in communication with every other. But wherefore has man been so abundant in energy, so patient in endurance? What motives have brought forth the capacities which have traversed the earth? Are those motives ‘‘what ought to be’’? Interest in science, hope of commercial advantages, of supplying physical wants, have been the main incentives to the wonderful efforts which have been made. From these motives men have dared suffering and death. England has sympathized as she rarely sympathizes with those brave spirits who went forth to tell her how it is in those frozen regions, to ascertain whether through them might be her road to the land of plenty. And these were right motives, a part of the right, as is ever y exercise of every faculty: every attempt to gain the knowledge for which

211 A paraphrase of Phil 2:12.

Considerations why this goal appears attainable.

Cause of success in other pursuits.

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How it may be prophesied that this will be.

man has a natural thirst. But there is a more comprehensive feeling wanted, which should send us forth to discover and communicate with all the regions of the earth. It is the wish to be on the road to one will in every human heart, the will to know such truth as is within the reach of humanity, concerning our common Father, our common Ruler, to have, as far as possible, one will with His. Does this seem a vain imagination? To recall what has been done through human resources in scaling the skies, traversing the earth, penetrating its depths, may encourage us hopefully to draw on human resources for every object, for the fulfillment of every desire which befits our nature. Not one man, indeed, not many men in one generation, can accomplish this, but many men in successive generations may do it, and many men, or one man in this generation, may lay stones essential to the building, which future times shall carry for ward. And this is what ought to be. The spirit of prophecy is said to have ceased. We still read in our churches what the wise men of times long past believed themselves miraculously inspired to prophesy, as men have since believed them, and we say, the gift of prophecy is no longer vouchsafed to man. Not thus does He ‘‘in whom is no variableness nor shadow of changing’’212 var y in His dealings with His children, with the subjects of His rule. If we would penetrate into the spirit, the character, the tendency of that law of God, with which every moment of the history of all other being is in accordance, we might prophesy in proportion as we read that law aright. Though we see not handwriting on the wall, though dumb creatures speak not to us of the future without any effort of our own to penetrate its depths, nevertheless it shall be unrolled to us; if we seek in the right direction, we shall find. In that law it is written that all the people of the earth shall recognize one omnipotent spirit of love and wisdom as their Father and Ruler, and shall unite in the attempt to have one will with Him.

212 A paraphrase of Jas 1:17.

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What have Missionaries Taught? It may be that those who went forth on scientific objects thus best worked out this purpose. Religion and morality should enter into all scientific pursuit, that is, every pursuit should have a connection with religion and morality, for religion is the tie, the relation, the connection between the Per fect and the imperfect; morality is the state of mind and external conduct which a right understanding of that connection will induce. And on this understanding every pursuit, every object, besides its peculiar interest, has an interest, should have an interest, in connection with religion and morality, but these have a science of their own, to which all minds are not adapted, as all minds cannot adapt themselves to any other science. The world in general must accept its belief on astronomy, on chemistr y, from those who make these sciences their study. We must not accept our belief concerning God and concerning the right from any man or number of men. Some are more especially adapted than others, by nature and circumstances, to seek out all that can be learnt of God and of right, and should set before others what they learn, but no teaching should be accepted which contradicts the spirit of the universal law. Divinity in its proper sense, the study of the Divine, should be the especial study of a portion of men; but as God and right concern all men, all must for themselves know the reason of the faith that is in them—must judge for themselves whether what others teach is true, which is not necessar y to all, in regard to other sciences. A higher vocation cannot be than to carry religious truth into other lands. We must hope and strive that it may penetrate into all regions of the earth. Men have been found willing, ardent, in this pursuit, ready to dare any suffering if they might forward it. But as we conceive of truth, wisdom and knowledge have been wanting in these noble sufferers. To offer salvation from an offended God, offended with them by the disobedience of a man they never heard of, to offer salvation through the blood and merits of his son (who was himself), this has been the message, the gospel, which missionaries have been chiefly eager to convey—sometimes to naked savages, sometimes to peoples in some respects developed beyond ourselves, even if inferior in others, who had their own sacred books, believed in and revered as deeply as Christians believe in and revere theirs. (People have been

Religion and morality ought to be studied by all, but to be the especial study of a few.

‘‘Give me the heathen for my inheritance.’’

262 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought asked to assist in making clothing for the Kaffir tribes whom missionaries were going out to address, that the feeling of decency might not be offended in addressing the naked.) These are ‘‘hard sayings’’ to believe in either case. Can it be expected that they will much further us on our way to that goal which all devout and conscientious minds would gladly advance towards, however much they may differ as to the way or the possibility of accomplishment? It is one of the real improvements, one of the signs of real advance in our age, that attempts are being made to introduce commercial relations and industrial improvements which can be understood among peoples more ignorant than ourselves. Such improvements are a fitting preparation for religious truth. We do not suppose that no progress has been made towards religious truth, though the ignorance of mankind in general on principles of religion and morality is what it was in the very infancy of mankind. Can it be otherwise if we accept as our teaching what Abraham believed, if we think with him that it was right to be willing to obey a command to kill his son as an offering to his God?—if we believe with Joshua that the Righteous One commanded to slay innocent children as well as men and women, that his favourite people might possess themselves of a country possessed by another people?213 And so on through misinterpretations of God and of duty natural to that age. And shall all this be taught as right to ‘‘the heathen’’? Can they, ought they to revere our God? The subjects of Juggernaut lie down that the wheels of his chariot may pass over them in order to please and propitiate him—but what is this to the doctrine of eternal punishment? The church which leaves it an open question whether unbaptized babes are to suffer eternal—punishment can we call it to those innocents?—is not perhaps very distinct in its decision whether all people who do not believe in a Saviour they never heard of, will be condemned to suffer everlastingly. There may be a difference in eternal justice, since parents might have baptized their children, who therefore will justly suffer through eternity, whereas the heathen has not had parents who might have baptized him. However this may be, salvation through Christ is the message of missionaries in general.

213 In Gen 22 and Josh 8 respectively.

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Infantine as is the general absence of principles on religious and moral subjects, it is traceable how the past has prepared the future (we hope the present) for the acceptance of these principles, and how it may be accounted for that man has been tardy in perceiving them. Men arrived in a summary way at their ideas of the power they found themselves dependent upon. They were too much interested in a subject which concerned them so nearly, to wait coolly to find out what to believe, as they did on other subjects of inquiry. They wished, they hoped, they feared; their wants and wishes brought home to them their dependence on some power above them; how to propitiate such power or powers, how to avoid offending them, was their first question. While observation and experience revealed to all the existence of some power, the nature of which was not manifest to the senses, some imagined themselves in direct communication with what they supposed to be that power. It said what they conceived the being of their imagination would say. It revealed what they should do, what they should teach. Some conscientiously believed themselves thus directed, others professed such belief to gain authority to direct others for their good, others again to gain power and distinction for themselves. These gained belief from other men, who, feeling themselves ignorant, were willing to believe what others said they knew. Hasty Conclusions concerning Him Thus arose all the religion taught by men believed to have peculiar communication with unseen power. Mankind have believed in various teachers, who believed or professed to believe themselves inspired. They differed in what they taught, but all said something which came home to men’s feelings as true, if it were only that there is, that there exists, conscious will and power irresistible to man. Whatever teaching was believed to come from this power was not to be questioned, under fear of offending the Power who had thus revealed himself. It was dangerous, it was irreverent, to question, and so men have gone on believing, or taking it for granted they believed, because they did not question what was contrary both to ‘‘what is’’ and ‘‘what ought to be.’’ One age believed what then indeed appeared to fulfill both these conditions; the next had more knowledge on both, but did not apply this knowledge to correct

Ignorance of principle in religion and morality, how accounted for in the past; future knowledge how prepared by the past. The necessity felt to answer religious questions at once induced mistaken answers.

264 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought and enlarge religious belief, as on other subjects of inquiry. Religion, indeed, was not a subject of inquiry, and is not so at this day, except to a comparatively few speculators, with no practical object; thus the mistakes of individuals have been perpetuated through ages. It did not signify whether the earth was stationary, or a star moving among stars, to men’s nearest interests, so they questioned fearlessly, and long ago left behind a mistake, which yet was believed in its day. Mistakes quite as contradictory to existing laws, and which fundamentally affect man’s highest interests, are believed or quietly left uncontradicted now. Those who are sensible of the mistakes of the popular creed—satisfied with their clearer perception of error, are not moved to find out and to make known all they can of truth. Occasionally some new light has broken forth, called by some reform, by some heresy, but it was only some different interpretation of books or teaching considered sacred. There was no inquiry beyond the true interpretation of such teaching. What in these days is called liberality, religious toleration, glad as we are to exchange for it the days when men were burnt or tortured for their opinions, arises, it may be feared, partly from the importance of truth in religious belief not being appreciated. Formerly a man was supposed to subject himself to eternal suffering if he erred in his belief; we do not now perceive or feel how the individual, how the world is kept back from the progress which befits human nature by ignorance or want of feeling concerning the eternal and universal source of being. We hear of the great truths of religion, by which is generally understood salvation through Christ from an offended God. There are great truths of religion, oh, that the world perceived them! but how true it is that seeing we perceive not, hearing we do not understand! If we did, these truths would have a share in all our thoughts, our affections—would direct our will, our actions. At certain times we confess, are absolved, or hope we are forgiven. And what difference is there in the lives of those who confess from week to week their utter, entire worthlessness, express to the awful Power they address, that they mean to live a new life? ‘‘Private Judgment’’ What does it mean? Intellectually, mankind have advanced beyond the belief they profess. Generally speaking, intellectual men believe nothing with any

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great interest or intensity on religious subjects; men highly respectable in moral character among the Jews often send their children to Christian institutions for education, anticipating willingly that they will become Christians, and thus escape disadvantages their parents have felt. Men disbelieving what the Church of England teaches, think it right to bring up their children to its belief, as facilitating their course of life. Is not this indifference to belief instead of the earnest, though narrow, bigotr y with which it was formerly cared for, an exchange of one evil for another rather than an improvement? Is there not another change to be looked for which will be improvement? Now, men are complacent in the feeling of ‘‘liberality,’’ which leaves all to their ‘‘private judgment,’’ as if it were indifferent whether a man believed one thing or another about the Father of our spirits, the Ruler of all that concerns us here and hereafter, if he ‘‘but satisfies his own mind.’’ Yet there can be but one truth. It cannot be that the earth goes round the sun and the sun round the earth. It must be important whether we have a ruler who makes innocent babes suffer through eternity because they have not been baptized, or whether we have a ruler to whom this is as impossible as it would be to a human father to torture his child for five minutes, not for its benefit, but to satisfy what he might call by the name of justice. Whatever might be his reason, it could not less partake of the quality of justice than the course attributed to God’s ‘‘justice.’’ The words ‘‘private judgment,’’ as applied to religion, involve contradiction and dangerous mistake.214 The idea originated in Protestantism. It is not ‘‘private judgment’’ but God’s ‘‘judgment’’ we have to seek after. The Roman Catholic Church, who declares herself to be in the possession of absolute and final truth, shows us the antipodes of this. It is hard to say which doctrine is the more dangerous. On the whole, however, both deduction and experience among the Protestant countries of Europe show that the doctrine of ‘‘private judgment,’’ by shaking the foundations of all truth, leads the more directly to absolute infidelity, i.e., to considering that there is no absolute truth to be discovered in religion, as there

214 FN omitted: Note. I have only here to show the absurd self-contradiction and most dangerous mistake of the Protestant words ‘‘private judgment.’’

266 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought is in all other sciences, but that it is a mere matter of ‘‘aspiration,’’ of ‘‘imagination,’’ of ‘‘private judgment,’’ in short. We hold that the first principles of religious knowledge are not yet received into the world. Yet we may distinguish how preparation for those principles has been going on throughout the history of man. Mankind are ruled by law It requires a long time to recognize a law, because not only the repetition of the same phenomenon, but the recognition of those definite peculiar antecedents and co-existences (with which it always, without which it never occurs) is necessary. It required many observers arduously at work through ages to discover the existence of law in physical nature, but this now is tr uth firmly established. That in all states of mind, in each thought, emotion, volition, law is exemplified, is scarcely yet accepted. That our power to bring about again, or to prevent what has been once, depends on our will and power to renew or prevent the recurrence of the same conditions is recognized in certain cases, seldom however as to our will. Nor is the power for good which the acceptance of such belief places in our hands at all appreciated. Those attempts to discover present conditions from which we may anticipate the future, which we now call superstitions, were preparation for the knowledge of the conditional relations which we now call laws. Much time and long experience are required to discover the benefits of law, when individuals rule a multitude. The earliest exercise of power enforces ‘‘thus it shall be on this occasion, because it is my will.’’ Whether such decree was right or wrong was not a question where might constituted right. Experience has changed this—has taught that it is best for ruler and ruled to go upon the principle—‘‘if this is, that shall be, because it is right.’’ Our quarter of the world has accepted the principle, however imper fect in its practice, for even the governments whose enactments we consider unjustifiable, pretend to right government. God’s rule, in early times, was supposed analogous to man’s. ‘‘This shall be done because it is my will; mine is the power, therefore mine the right.’’ Experience has carried us beyond this, even in man’s government of men, has taught us that it is for the benefit of all that the few should exercise rule over the many, but that those few must rule by law, and by right law.

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This, at least, the ruled will aim at, and the ruler too, or he will cease to rule. Not now indeed, but such is the law of progress, that so it shall be. But the species of rule which man, in his ignorance, accepted from his fellow creature as right, he still ascribes to God. He calls that ‘‘admirable justice’’ in God which he would deem ‘‘horrible injustice’’ in man; for ‘‘shall not the ruler of the earth do right?’’ We believe it, we expect it, but let us not say it is so, by calling wrong right, but by inquiring how we may satisfy the moral consciousness He has endowed us with, that His rule is right. We have elsewhere endeavoured to show that law is the only rule which it is consistent with a perfect moral nature to exercise over an imperfect moral nature. Observation and experience, if we will consult these teachers, will show us that mankind are thus ruled, and that our course, directed by such rule, is as it ought to be.

Appendix Sir William Hamilton, a man celebrated as a logician, and almost unequalled in learning, was ‘‘profoundly convinced’’ ‘‘that he had discovered the only satisfactory answer which can be rendered, on philosophical grounds, to those who impugn the mysteries of Christian verity—free will and free grace, evil permitted and prayer answered, the wonder of infinite united with infinite in the mystery of the Trinity, and the wonder of infinite blended with finite in the myster y of the Incarnation.’’ He thus explains, according to his reviewer, his process of reasoning: ‘‘We cannot conceive either the absolute commencement or the infinite regress of time, but we must believe either the one or the other.’’ ‘‘We cannot conceive either the absolute ending or the infinite duration of time, but we must believe either the one or the other. We cannot conceive either an indivisible minimum or the infinite divisibility of time, but we must believe either the one or the other. We cannot conceive infinity (the eternity of the past) either increased or not increased by the addition of another hour, and indeed of the whole eternity to come; but we must believe either the one or the other. Here are eight inconceivables, to four of which reason in the most peremptor y terms insists upon our giving an assent. All our real knowledge lies in the conditioned interval between the

268 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought two poles, which, as inconceivable, are unknown, but which, as contradictor y, compel the mind to the exercise of faith.’’ Sir W. Hamilton’s Argument for the ‘‘Mysteries of Christian Verity’’ Sir W. Hamilton’s view concerning free will is thus set forth by his reviewer: ‘‘If the law of cause is a universal law, and is positively seen by the mind of man to be universal, what becomes of the moral world? What prevents us from enforcing the law on the human will? Why exempt certain phenomena from the action of the law which we know to be necessary? There is no reasonable justification for asserting the privilege of mind, and, pushed to its legitimate consequences, a moral universe with a moral governor becomes an arbitrar y dogma, unworthy of reason and destructive of faith.’’ Here the ground for not admitting the universality of law is alleged to be the fear of ‘‘deranging the moral world,’’ and this fear, it appears, starts the notion, that because we must believe four of the eight inconceivables quoted, therefore the reason for not believing dogmas of faith, because inconceivable, drops from under us. But many things, such as this ‘‘infinite regress,’’ may be quite believed, though not conceived by us. We know our nature to be finite, and are not surprised by finding our conceptions finite. We know we can attach no conception to 100,000,000, when we speak of that number, but we yet know that number of individualities of various kinds to exist. But we disbelieve the ‘‘verity’’ of these ‘‘mysteries,’’ not because we cannot conceive them, but because, for reasons elsewhere explained, they are contradictor y to moral feeling, which the other ‘‘inconceivables’’ mentioned are not. Surely this age has been remarkable for swallowing absurdities, in order to retain other absurdities. For examples, take these, take the Roman Catholic belief! They appear alike to have been invented, in order to retain the Trinity, the atonement, etc., and powerful and learned minds are the leaders! All this bewilderment should make us cling to the thirst for right in our nature, and to law, revealing what right is, as our leaders. The very acceptance, however, of the supports which Sir W. Hamilton and which Father Newman215 accept, shows that men are begin-

215 John Henr y Newman (1801-90), formerly a Church of England vicar and fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, converted to Roman Catholicism in 1845, later cardinal.

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ning to feel a want of support, not before so much felt. The first step is to support absurdities by other absurdities, not to throw off the former. Still, that the mind is awakening to the absurdity in the received creeds is shown by these instances as by increasing unbelief. Sir W. Hamilton’s argument leads us to advert to the objection, often expressed, against inquiring or against accepting evidence, if there appears danger of contradicting our understanding of ‘‘what ought to be.’’ Sir W. Hamilton decides that ‘‘the law of cause’’ is not universal, not from inquiry into evidence as to whether it is so or not, but because to believe it true would be unsatisfactory to his moral feeling. It is not thus that we shall arrive at knowledge of what is, at true conception of what is right, at true interpretation of both, which will show us the great at-one-ment of the actual and the right. It is by fearless pursuit of fact, whatever difficulties it may lay before our moral feeling, by determination to accept nothing as tr ue which is not consistent with that reconciliation, or atonement. Let us ardently work, patiently wait, confidently trust, when we find it not, and never shrink from recognizing that which we cannot explain—not alarmed where as yet we see darkly along the path through eternity, which gradually leads us to behold the Sun of Righteousness.

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Suggestions for Thought Volume 2

W

hile the whole of the printed volume 2 is entitled Practical Deductions, there are different titles for the various parts in the manuscript. The first section is ‘‘A Short Account of God’s Dealings with the Author,’’ which returns to the dialogue format of much of the first volume. Again the most unconventional, even heretical, views are those of M.S. As before, comments by J.S. Mill are given in footnotes, labelled JSM. The changes indicated in the manuscript were so numerous as to make it impossible to incorporate them all here. Moreover, many merely repeat minor points or make trivial changes. Most of the time the name or initials of the person quoted in the manuscript is given, with some representative quotations. Omitted or reworded texts from the manuscript are indicated, if brief, in the text; otherwise they are in footnotes. Anyone wanting to see the entire lot should consult the original manuscripts at the British Library, or the transcriptions provided in the electronic publication of the Collected Works. Short editorial introductions are provided at major changes in the texts.

Source: Suggestions for Thought for Searchers after Religious Truth volume 2, with manuscript from Add Mss 45838 ff94-147 and 45839 ff1-232

In the hope of reaching different minds, the same subjects have been differently (and not always consecutively) dealt with in the several portions of this book. A feeling of their extreme importance has dictated, and it is hoped will excuse, this course, which has rendered repetition, even to the frequent use of the same phraseology, unavoidable. {Omitted: A Short Account of God’s Dealings with the Author, spr ung from such a belief as this. For submission to Perfect Goodness is absurd. f93}

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Practical Deductions 1 Is the idea that evil is pleasant a correct one?

Sufferers from sin do not consider themselves sufferers.

What is forgiveness of sin? What is granting forgiveness to faith?

It is a common idea that sin is so easy and pleasant that, if we did not believe it to be our own fault when we sin, and did not believe that we shall have to account for it and receive its punishment hereafter, ever y bulwark against sin would be broken down—and that this is the main check upon the successful enjoying sinner, while the expectation of future reward is the main support of the brokenhearted suffering saint. [MS:] Can we suppose this to be God’s view of it? What a confusion there is in men’s minds with regard to happiness! {Omitted: Let us look at a successful sinner—look at Louis-Napoléon. Do you think he is happy? His uncle was probably one of the most miserable men who ever lived. f94} The mind of low nature is incapable of imagining that which alone is happiness in the conception of God. Such may be satisfied with success in selfish ambition, or other gratification untr ue to our nature. There may be insensibility to suffering from sin. But if God’s happiness is the only real happiness, those who approach the nearest to oneness with Him are the happiest. Was Napoleon, who cared for no one person in the world but himself, the very type of selfishness, even at the height of his success, a happy man? [JA:] Perhaps, indeed, he did not think himself, and other men may not have thought him, unhappy. [MS:] Though insensible to suffering he was insensible to happiness. His was the privation inseparable from wrong. Now, as far as appealing to the selfish nature will keep man right, if he can be brought to perceive, believe and feel this as true, would it not do more to preserve him from sin than a vague fear of an indefinite future punishment, which besides may be escaped, if he repents in time, by means of something which is called God’s forgiveness? [JA:] But forgiveness can only be granted to faith, it is said. [MS:] Does that mean faith that the law of consequences will be altered—that the same course being pursued, different effects will follow? {Omitted MS: I confess myself so stupid that I, after reading nearly all the sermons on the subject, these thirty years, never could understand what forgiveness means. f95} What does Christian theology tell us that forgiveness means? Does it mean change in the mind of God? that He thinks one thing at one time and another at another? that He is what is called ‘‘just’’

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today, ‘‘merciful’’ tomorrow? What is the meaning of that cowardly prayer, ‘‘Hide thy face from my sins and blot out all mine iniquities.’’1 Rather let us say, put all my sins into the full light of thy countenance, let me see them as thou seest them. Teach me, by its consequences, that sin is not desirable; teach me what to desire— how to desire it—how to attain it. But happily for us, there is no more occasion for the one prayer than for the other. {Omitted JA: But is not that the meaning of ‘‘blot out all mine iniquities’’? MS: Well, it really is a shame for an old fellow like me, but I can’t understand the phrase. Why God could not, if He would, that is. f96} The Spirit of Right could not forgive without an absurdity. Will God make that which has been, not to have been? alter that which is past? The prayer would be impertinent, if it were not absurd. For it is asking the Spirit of Right to produce a contradiction, to be in opposition to Himself. But He is always the same: ‘‘yesterday, today and forever.’’2 {Omitted: JA: Then there is no mercy, no hope for the sinner. Your system is cruel at both ends—for it alike cuts him off from hope when he has sinned, from any motive to deter him from sinning. f96} Can I ‘‘help’’ my own ‘‘Sin’’? But the truth is that man’s advance in goodness will be extremely limited while it depends upon his selfish fear; that, if he individually is not good, he will not be happy; or his selfish hope, that if he is good, he will be happy. He cannot advance towards that oneness with the Divine Spirit, in which true happiness consists, by thoughts and feelings diametrically opposite to that Divine Spirit. ‘‘God is love and he that loveth not knoweth not God.’’3 To make happy is His happiness. And it is the beautiful arrangement of love, that happiness to the individual shall be the result of exercising his powers for the happiness of others. Appeals to the selfish nature do not touch the affections, the conscience or the spiritual nature; they do the part of the policeman, who will never help a man to be very happy, or ver y good.

1 Ps 51:9. 2 Heb 13:8. 3 A paraphrase of 1 John 4:8.

How can the Spirit of Right, of right law, forgive?

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Does the belief that ‘‘other than myself’’ is the ultimate cause of all evil, as of all good, in what I am or do, cut off any motive to deter me from sin?

If it were not that thief’s fault, was it God’s fault?

Can any reasoning convince us that God is the author of sin?

{Omitted JA: I quite agree, of course, in that. But I never return to the idea that if it were not the thief’s fault, it was that he should commit a theft, it was God’s fault. You cannot get out of that. f98} [MS:] If we really believed that not only sin, but every ignorance of God’s law (be it a spiritual, intellectual, physical, or if there be any other kind of law), brings certain suffering or privation, but that the keeping of particular laws brings equally certain and everincreasing happiness, which shall be beyond what the ‘‘eye hath seen, or the ear heard, or what it hath entered into the heart of man to conceive’’;4 shall we be induced to do wrong, and suffer for it, if we believe that, should we do so, we may say, ‘‘other than myself was the cause of it?’’ If another man knocks me down, does the being able to say, ‘‘I did not bring this misfortune upon myself, another did,’’ prevent me from trying to get up? {Omitted: Does the giving up the theory of forgiveness cut off the sinners from hope or from any motive to deter him from sinning? MS: If we also believed that we shall all learn the laws of God, and learn how to incline our hearts, that is, to bring about our wills to keep them. f97} It is not the want of belief that sin was entirely attributable to my individual self, but the absence of conviction that suffering or privation are certainly attendant upon it which prevents my going right. The thief, it is said, knows perfectly well, while he is thieving, that what he is doing is wrong and that he can help doing it, if he will. [MS:] Certainly he can help doing it, if he will, but it never has been possible to him not to will to do it; if we could disentangle ever y, the most minute, circumstance which has affected the will of the thief, we should perceive that it could not have been otherwise at any particular moment at which we contemplate him in the commission of his crime. No reasoning, it is often said, can ever convince the human mind of this. It would rather doubt the capability of its own powers than believe it. For it has that within, which tells it absolutely and authoritatively that God is good, and it could not consider him good, if through the effect of His laws it has been impossible, when a man commits a theft or any other wrong action, that he should have

4 A paraphrase of 1 Cor 2:9.

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done otherwise. It cannot believe this of a God who is omnipotent and benevolent, and it believes that there is more truth in doubting its own capability of meeting or understanding this subject (in which there are certainly difficulties) than in giving up its feeling and conviction that God is omnipotence and benevolence. [MS:] Unquestionably we should be more true in doubting our own powers of understanding any subject than in giving up our belief and our feeling that God is omnipotent and benevolent. But this belief may be weaker or stronger, and its degree will materially influence our present practice and our future progress. Is God the Author of Sin? Shall we not be able to give ‘‘a reason of the hope that is in us’’?5 Not indeed the isolated assertion that the sinner could not have done otherwise, but the right understanding of the laws, of which this is an instance, would contribute immensely to man’s belief in the benevolence and power of God, to his help and sympathy for his fellow creatures, and to his conduct of himself, would, in fact, as is elsewhere explained, influence the whole field of his practice with regard to his God, his neighbour and himself. Therefore in making any attempt to investigate those laws, if it is not conclusive to us, it is certainly more true to doubt our own finite capability of understanding the ways of the Infinite, than to doubt His infinite per fections, but inasfar as we can follow His track and learn the ways of His providence, no subject can be so interesting or indeed so practical. But people will discuss the merest trifles interminably, and leave such questions unsettled as why man is what he is, none caring to know. Could mankind but reach mankind’s sense upon the matter and compare each other’s opinions, some progress might be made. But everybody is afraid of everybody else on this subject, men of being thought to sap the ‘‘foundations of religion,’’ women of being thought pedantic and presumptuous, religious professions of saying anything but upon authority. (A profession is a set of men paid to profess some kind of opinions; the clergy are paid to profess one kind of religion, the Wesleyans another. In the medical profession, the allopath is paid to profess one system of medicine, the

5 A paraphrase of 1 Pet 3:15.

Not the isolated assertion that the sinner could not have done otherwise, but the right understanding of the laws, of which this is an instance, will teach man in what relation he stands to God, to others and to himself.

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In what sense is it true that a man could not have willed other wise than as he did?

Do children begin existence in a certain definite state, which could not have been other than it is?

Are the ‘‘sins of the fathers’’ thus ‘‘visited on the children?’’

homeopath another. And all have their small families to support.) Thus nothing is said and little thought upon the matter. {Omitted JA: Leave carping at mankind and womankind and come back to your own abominable assertion. f100} [JA:] To return to the assertion that no man who has committed a wrong action could have willed otherwise than to commit it. [MS:] It is not that God decreed it, i.e., that there was an absolute definite express volition to that effect, unconnected with any other, in the Almighty mind. If we could read in the thought of God, we should not see there, ‘‘Mrs Manning6 shall will to commit a murder’’: we should see certain unvarying laws, by which such circumstances and such natures being brought together, such effects will follow. Each human being who has lived differs from every other human being. What A is was not decreed by God, i.e., God did not will ‘‘A on coming into existence shall have exactly such and such capabilities,’’ but God’s laws (that such and such uniformities of succession and of co-existence shall be) made him what he is; or, in other words, that A is what he is at the moment he begins to exist, arises entirely, to the very most minute particular, from the laws of God, i.e., from the uniformities of nature, referable ultimately only to God’s will as a cause. Exactly the same circumstances never arise, therefore, never the same natures; therefore, one identity can never have exactly the same thought, feeling, will, as another. [JA:] We acknowledge that there are certain laws, the consequence of which is that the child’s physical, intellectual and spiritual nature is affected by the parents. [MS:] We acknowledge, therefore, that children begin their existence in a certain definite state, which would have been different from what it is, had the parents been different from what they were. In consequence of the first individuals being ignorant of some of God’s laws (which is the natural consequence of its being God’s plan that men should learn by experience), the children inherit some deficiency of organization. {Omitted JA: Then you do visit the sins of the fathers upon the children? f102} [MS:] The ‘‘sins of the fathers are visited upon the children,’’ not only ‘‘unto the third and fourth generation,’’7 but throughout 6 A remorseless Swiss murderess, Mrs Manning, was caught trying to flee the countr y (Times 4 September 1849:7). 7 A paraphrase of Exod 20:5.

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all generations. This process has been going on as long as man has existed. The laws which influence descent and which concern the well-being of man are almost unknown. Yet each has taken its natural effect since the beginning of the race. It is probable that, knowingly or unknowingly, from self-indulgence or inevitably from the state of society and circumstances, all parents have more or less disregarded the laws for securing a well-constituted nature to their children. [JA:] This is not supposing a constant degeneration in the race of mankind, [MS:] because another process is also going on, a process of regeneration. Man improves by experience. God and the divine spirit in man are ever at work to turn the evil into good. Had none of these laws been disregarded by the parents and ancestors of A, A would have begun existence with good and wellbalanced dispositions. Had all the wills which have influenced A been true, that is, known what experience only can teach, these dispositions would have been truly cultivated. [MS:] We may truly say that there is ‘‘original sin’’ in each of us, that is, sin which originated with our first parents, and the effect of which exists in us; we sin because the first man sinned. {Omitted JA: But what would be the practical consequence of sin? f103} Suppose, then, it were admitted that, wherever there is sin, there has been previous ignorance on the part of the sinner or of others, [MS:] ignorance of God’s laws; this has been the antecedent to his sin, of which it is the certain consequent, or, in other words, without which the sin would not have been, with which it could not but be. {Omitted JA: But I know, I know perfectly well that I am doing wrong in the very act of doing so. f103} But we often sin, it is said, with the clearest knowledge that we are breaking God’s law. [MS:] But we did not know how to incline our hearts to keep it.8 We knew it intellectually, but not by heart. Perhaps at one time we did not perceive the full consequence of what we were doing, and when we did the habit was so strengthened that we did not know how to overcome it. [JA:] It is acknowledged that each individual is, in some respects, what he is in consequence of the laws of God regarding the effect

Is there, then, a constant degeneration going on in mankind?

Is there any tr uth in the doctrine of ‘‘original sin?’’ Wherever there is sin, is it the consequence of ignorance?

Even when we know that we are sinning? Is it not acknowledged that the will of any individual would have been different from what it is, had his antecedents been different?

8 The response to the reading of the commandments, Book of Common Prayer.

278 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought of parents upon children, and that the will of any individual would have been different from what it has been, in some respects, had those antecedents been different. [MS:] Perhaps this is all we can say. We are so ignorant of what these laws or uniformities are, that modified as they are by other laws, we cannot with any accuracy assign the effects which arise from our immediate ancestors, still less from those who have preceded them, up to the beginning of the human race on this earth. We may safely affirm, however, that had these ancestors of A been different, A, and consequently A’s will, would have been differently affected. What is ‘‘Original Sin’’? What is a man’s will?

Can a man will what he pleases? What are the antecedents which make will what it is?

What is the effect of circumstances?

Whether a man’s will is a separate something, or whether it is merely some part of his nature in activity, or, rather, the effect of the balance of his various capabilities upon one another at the moment we speak of his will, is a separate inquiry. The question is often put, can a man will what he pleases? He is willing what he pleases; he cannot will anything but what he does please. But whatever the will be, let us now look for other antecedents which make it what it is. From the first moment of A’s existence in this world, he freely does, as far as power goes, what he wills; he stretches his limbs, he cries, he takes his food. But why does he will to do these things? At each moment of existence what his capabilities and wants are depends upon the laws of God, and out of these capabilities and wants arises the will of the man for all he wills. What he wills at any particular moment arises, not from a decree of God, ‘‘this man shall will so and so,’’ but from a will in God, ‘‘certain laws or uniformities shall be.’’ [JA:] The man’s will is thus really just as much occasioned by the will of God as if He decreed it. [MS:] Only what is God’s will? Not that A shall murder B, not that Calvin shall burn Ser vetus. But that man shall attain to oneness with God by the exercise of his own capabilities, and that God, the Spirit of Right, shall supply him with the means and inducements to do so, which are afforded by His laws. [JA:] Let us now see the effect of circumstances upon the child already in the world. [MS:] The nation, the age, the family, the education, we acknowledge produce an effect. Any individual would have been different from what he is, had he been differently placed in these respects.

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Where, then, is the line between what he wills through these and other influences, and what he wills because he wills it? [JA:] If we say that in that case man has no ‘‘free will,’’ and therefore can have no likeness with God, is it inferred that God himself wills arbitrarily? Are not His love, His wisdom, so to speak, the antecedents in consequence of which, or the nature in co-existence with which, His will is what it is? And it would be a contradiction to suppose that His will could be different from what He is. But God has formed us in the image of Himself.9 {Omitted JA: Is it not that God Himself is the subject of necessity? Shelley: Certainly, God can have no will. f106} [MS:] God wills the law of attraction to be in force at this moment, because His goodness desires the well-being of His creation, and His wisdom knows this to be a means of promoting it. That He should will otherwise may truly be said to be an impossibility, unless we suppose the absence of goodness and wisdom. But then He would not be God. This is not saying that another will than His own obliges God to will what He does will. It is not necessity. It is that He would not be God if He willed otherwise. Thus it is with man. No other being at any particular moment obliges his will to be what it is. But he would not be himself, he would be somebody else, if his will were different from what it is. It is not correct to say that he cannot, if he will, will to do what he knows to be cruel and foolish, inasfar as he is good and wise. Man is what he is by God’s Laws [MS:] He will not will. It is impossible that he should will. Will is only the emanation of the being. It is as impossible that a being should will contrary to itself as that a flint should emit carbonic acid gas, or charcoal silicine acid. And if he is selfish, and has not the wisdom to see that he cannot himself enjoy as much as if he were in a different state, is it possible, in the state in which he is, that he should will otherwise than as he is? May we not, then, conclude, 1st, that a human being, such as he enters the world today, is such in consequence of the laws of God, which regard the effect of the parents upon the child from the time that man began to exist upon the earth?

9 An allusion to Gen 1:26-27.

Is there any meaning in the word ‘‘free will’’ applied either to man or to God?

God wills what He wills, because He would not be God if He willed otherwise. It is not that God cannot, but that He will not, will anything contrar y to perfect wisdom.

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What are the laws which make man what he is?

2nd. That certain effects take place respecting that human being the first moment he is in existence, which influence his state the second moment, in accordance with certain laws of God, and so on, from one point of time to another through his existence, so that at any moment he is what he is from the operation of these laws. [MS:] To point out what these laws are, and to trace their effects in every instance and at every moment, is not in our power, and this inability leaves the subject in uncertainty. Moreover, the existence of law at all in the spiritual world is hardly yet acknowledged, and, therefore, it is not extraordinar y that we cannot, perhaps, as yet point out a single law. But the more we study human character and histor y, the more glimpses shall we have of law making it what it is. We acknowledge, generally, the effect of country, of soil, of climate, of age, of race, of family, of associates, of what we call education (a tr ue word, if we mean leading out of, for the circumstances of every kind which affect the nature of man, spiritual, intellectual and physical, do lead, or educate, out of the being which enters the world that which he is during his existence). We hear it said, even in common conversation, ‘‘there is the man who grows upon the green sand.’’ Do we doubt that a thief under certain circumstances would have been, under others, an honest man? What we see in a degree is perplexing and unsatisfactory with regard to God’s providence, unless we can see it pervade throughout. Either it is a defect, or it is, if rightly understood, complete—a part of a perfect whole. The Englishman has his national character; the member of a family his family character; the age has its character; so has the race; so has the soil, so has the climate, so has the profession. This does not mean that an individual cannot will as he pleases, because England, or his family, or the age, or the climate he lives in, wills for him. But his will is in some respects what it is because his nation, his family, the age and the climate in which he lives are what they are, and his will would, in some respects, have been different had they been different. Now, does it not seem improbable that the influences of Providence on the will should be so great and distinct in these instances, but that beyond these instances, another state of things prevails, and a man can will what he wills merely because it is his will, independent of any past or present influence on it?

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God’s Laws give Man his Power If we could trace each separate volition from the time there has been volition in a human being, we should see a spring for it, which, according to God’s laws, could not have had another sequence than it had; we should see the effect upon him of circumstances at a time when he is acknowledged to have no capability of ‘‘choosing to will one way rather than another,’’ as we call that supposed mysterious process; the effect of nation, age, climate, education, which he could not have made other than they were. {Omitted MS: Why then did He make that immuable identity of right and happiness, wrong and misery? Shelley: But if God Himself is the subject of necessity? You say that He could not do otherwise. Isaiah says that He ‘‘formed the light and created darkness, that He made peace and created evil, that He did all these things,’’ and we say that He could not do otherwise than create evil as well as good— murderers and tyrants as well as Howards and Fénelons.10 Even dropping the word ‘‘necessity,’’ in order not to affront you, therefore it will be said that He is Himself the subject of law. . . . JA: No better than the ancient Fate. Shelley: And if religion is our tie religio to God, part of our religion must be to hate Him for His evil as well as to thank Him for His good. If we thank Him for ‘‘our creation, preser vation and all the blessing of this life’’11 we must abhor Him for our sickness, destruction and all the miseries of this life. And of the two, I am sure our abhorrence will be much more sincere and extensive than our gratitude. JA: I think that Mr Shelley, though his words are strong, is right according to you. I do not see how you can escape the conclusion if, instead of saying that God made the good and man the evil, you say that God made both. For either you must come to this practical conclusion, or you must admit that God is Himself the subject of necessity. f108} {Omitted JA: You want to prove that it is not God’s plan to make man altogether by his own will the arbiter of his own will? f112} [MS:] Man is indeed the arbiter of his own will, in the sense that he wills for himself, and no one else wills for him. His nature determines his own will always, but as to determining his own nature, sometimes he does and sometimes he does not. The child does not,

[JA:] Is man not the arbiter of his own will by his own will? Is man’s will not, at all times of his existence, and in all that concerns it, determined by himself?

10 John Howard (c1726-90), prison reformer; François Salignac de La Mothe, known as Fénelon (1651-1715), archbishop of Cambrai. 11 In the ‘‘general thanksgiving,’’ morning prayer, Book of Common Prayer.

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Is it nation, climate, age, etc., which have power over us, or which give us our power?

How near are we to creating mankind?

Yet man determines his own will, it is not something else which determines it for him. Can man choose to will anything?

What is ‘‘will’’?

and ought not, but the object of law is to bring us to that point that we shall determine our own nature. [JA:] How can we do that, it is said, if we have no power over ourselves? if nation, climate, age, all these things, have power over us? [MS:] All these things are what give man his power. They give him the power of seeing the desirableness of certain things. God works out in man (we will not say, gives to man) such an organization as shall have the power of finding out, 1st, that not any but a well-constituted nature is desirable; 2nd, what is a well-constituted nature; 3rd, how to desire it; 4th, how to attain it, and this by the exercise of human nature. And all that he is suffering is to bring him to this. [JA:] And how near are we to that? it will be asked. [MS:] Ver y far indeed from it at present. In fact, in the sixth thousand,12 or perhaps a great deal more, of the world’s years, men are still carrying on life, without knowing any one of the four. But what are six thousand years to educate a being meant for eternity? Yet this system does not prove that man cannot determine his own will, that something else determines it for him. [MS:] Everyone will acknowledge that man cannot choose to will anything, i.e., that to every man there are conceivable volitions which are impossible to him. The uneducated thief could not will to be a man of cultivation and refinement. He could not even wish it. Some things we may will, but not be able to obtain. What is will? Will includes wish, purpose, conviction that you can effect your purpose. Now you ask, can I will as I please? Certainly: you are willing as you please. You will not please to will what you believe impossible, what you know that you cannot effect, or, in other words, what is contrary to the laws of God. Whether you can do as you will is another thing, and depends upon the knowledge with which you have previously willed. [MS:] If you have willed unwisely, that is, in ignorance of the laws of God, which alone will enable you to carry your will into effect, the want of knowledge with which you have willed prevents you from having the power to do as you will. The more knowledge you have, the fewer rash

12 James Ussher estimated the origin of the world to have been 2004 bce, using the life span of the patriarchs, in Annals of the Old Testament Deduced from the First Origin of the World.

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resolutions you will make. If ‘‘I will’’ includes, ‘‘I wish it, I intend it, I have the conviction that I can bring it to be,’’ the absence of any one of these three prevents the will; it does not prevent the ‘‘free will.’’ Yet Man determines his own Will In the thief the wish may be absent, but we do not include in ‘‘free will’’ the power of willing what we do not wish. Or the intention may be absent, but it would not be absence of free will if a person wished to have lived in the fourteenth century, and did not will it. Or the belief that he can obtain his wish may be absent; but then he would not will it, as we do not will to go up to the moon. Lastly, there may fail the knowledge, whether the laws of God permit his carrying his will into effect, and then he may will in ignorance, and not be able to do as he wills. What we would rather ask is, can a man always will what he wishes? Certainly not, because in the very definition of the word will there must be purpose, and there cannot be purpose unless with a belief that he can accomplish it. But the truth is that the whole controversy about free will and necessity is a jargon. Free will is the very definition of conscious intelligent being acting from within. Necessity is the law of inorganic or unconscious nature, being acted upon from without. This is the whole mystery of these oft-disputed words. {Omitted JA: Well, then, if you say the will be free, I say that your thief, at the moment an object standing before him which he feels tempted to steal, can will not to steal it. f115} [MS:] There are laws which concern each particular volition, and if at one moment a man wishes that a future volition shall be, or shall not be somewhat, he may, in accordance with these laws, take means to make his volition what he wishes it to be, that is, some can and some cannot. It depends upon the state of his knowledge of the laws of God, and upon his power of applying them. [MS:] This is a matter which comes within the proof of our own daily individual experience. How often have many of us resolved in this way—by this day next month or next year, I will have completely conquered such and such a particular fault. I may have taken means, too, for my end. But it was not within my will. Human nature was not in such a state, and my nature was not in such a state as to enable me to do what I willed. Either I was ignorant of the laws, or it was not possible within the time, or, etc. All that we assert here is that no past volition could, by the laws of God, have been other than it was; the laws of God must have been different, or it

Can a thief will not to steal, at the moment he is tempted?

[JA:] Can I know whether I can or cannot will a thing?

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As in the physical, so in the moral world.

could not have been different. And if they had been different, God would not have existed. If that speck of dust had not been on the table, the whole universe would have been different, and if the whole universe had been different, there would have been no God. And as in the physical, so is it in the moral world. [MS:] I once saw an extraordinar y storm on the Nile. The river seemed flowing bottom upwards, the whirlwind of sand from the desert literally covering it, and blowing up in ridges upon it.13 The Israelites might have almost passed upon dry land. Our eyes, mouths and ears were filled with sand, and it was impossible to drink, for, instead of water from the river, we drew up sand. To try to stand against the wind was useless. Presently five vessels floated past us, keel uppermost, and we saw a little whirlpool of oranges, the unfortunate passengers having broken open the cabin in their efforts to escape. At 3 p.m. it became quite dark and the waves were like a moderate sea in the Channel. The Arabs thought that the day of judgment was at hand and were quite helpless. As in the Physical, so in the Moral World Now we know that there was not one molecule of sand or water in that confused whirlwind which was there by chance, which had not a sufficient cause, so to speak, for occupying the place which it did, which was not rigorously where it ought to be according to the laws or uniform rules of God. No atom of this turbulence fulfills A vague and unnecessitated task, Or acts but as it must or ought to act.14

Has, then, ever y crime in histor y been brought about by the laws of God?

In other words, a natural philosopher, who knew the acting forces and the properties of the atoms acted upon, would demonstrate that each atom acted with precision in the way it ought to act, and could not act otherwise than as it did. {Omitted JA: Then every horrible war/revolution of 1848-4915/ has been brought about by the laws of God. Every atrocity committed has been God’s doing. Every life butchered has been God’s killing, will be said. f117}

13 Described in Mysticism and Eastern Religions (4:197-99). 14 Percy Bysshe Shelley, ‘‘Queen Mab, A Philosophical Poem’’ vi, 171-73. 15 There were uprisings throughout Europe in 1848, especially in France and Italy.

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In the terrible convulsions which have shaken Europe, have upset empires and annihilated liberty, there has not been one single action, one single word, one single thought or will or passion in the destroyers or the victims which was not the infallible sequence of its antecedent, which had not uniformly its allotted succession or co-existence in this moral whirlwind. An intellect which could appreciate the acting forces and the character of the nations acted upon could have demonstrated like a Q.E.D. the results. 2 [JA:] In order to see where our doctrines will lead us practically, we must push them to the extreme and ultimate limit which they will admit of. [MS:] This is the only test. Now, our whole real relation with God, with each other, with ourselves, is practically overthrown by what is commonly called the ‘‘free will’’ doctrine. These relations cannot be based upon any other idea than that of (not necessity but) law. [JA:] Take, first, our relation towards ourselves. {Omitted: It is the easiest and you are less profane than when you talk about God. f120} [MS:] Our belief amounts to this: that I may look back on any particular moment of the past and truly feel it was impossible at that moment (God’s laws being what they are and having operated on all preceding that moment as they did) that I should have willed other wise than as I did. [MS:] We believe this to be just as true as that it was impossible at any particular moment that the earth should not have pursued the course she did, God’s laws being at that moment and having been till that moment what they were. Superstition about the ‘‘Will’’ It is, therefore, untrue and useless for me to cry out, Oh! how worthy of blame, how deserving of punishment I was! My good friend, I should rather say to myself, Don’t be afraid, you will have suffering enough in what you have done. You exhaust the powers which you have in you for finding out the laws to alter nature or circumstances by these exclamations. ‘‘Come back,’’ I would say kindly to myself, ‘‘I know you could not help it. Let us have patience with ourself and see what we can do.’’ But it is the custom in our religion to appeal almost exclusively to the conscience. A wretched drunkard tries to awaken himself by tormenting this faculty. He says, I am

What is our relation towards God, towards others, towards ourselves?

Is it true that at any given moment it was impossible to us to will otherwise than as we did?

286 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Is sin not to feel repentance?

ver y wicked, I hate myself, I am a dreadful sinner. He exhausts himself till he too often flies to that very drink again to escape these terrors of his conscience which he has roused to save himself. A butler once denounced himself to his master, in great agony of mind, and before 12 o’clock the next morning, when he was to meet his master to be dismissed, as he had himself entreated in order to escape a temptation too strong for him, he was drunk again. [JA:] That we would not have him go on in his course without troubling himself about it, we need hardly say. [MS:] But take the common course of a drunkard. He may abstain once, by force of conscience or even feeling, or some other motive, but his physical state, which has been accustomed to stimulus, will want it more at the end of twenty-four hours than of twelve. We must consider the whole of the nature on which we wish to work, whether it be our own or anyone else’s. It is not enough to address yourself to the conscience, while, perhaps, the nerves, the spirits, which have also their laws, may be in a state of severe suffering, from want of the stimulus to which they have been accustomed. But what do we do? Twice a week, we say we have done nothing we ought to have done and we have done everything we ought not to have done (in order to make sure of leaving nothing out). And we mean to lead an entirely new life from this moment, to do something entirely different. But it is very certain that we do not, because we intend to say the same thing again in the afternoon. The science of moral recover y is at least as intricate as that of physical recover y. Imagine if a man with a broken leg, or an inflammation of the lungs, were to say there is not a fibre in my body that does not give me pain—every function I have is going wrong, but I mean, as soon as it is half past twelve, to walk about as if nothing had happened. I propose that nothing more shall be the matter with me (intending to repeat the same thing at a quarter before three). You would say, he may well say the same thing again, because there will be no difference. His intellects are affected, as well as his frame. {Omitted: He has an inflammation of the brain. f123} Of all the fatal mistakes that have been made to impede the progress of the human race, this perhaps has been the most fatal, viz., the superstition that we have nothing to do but to exert the will, as it is called, and all former error will be rectified, all future good secured. If this mistake had been made with regard to the physical health, mankind would probably come to an end. If we

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believed that a man with one diseased lung has nothing to do but to will in order to have two good ones; if we believed that a man when he is hungry has nothing to do but to will in order to eat, the human race would soon perish. Are not the laws of the spiritual world at least as numerous, important and worthy of study as those of the physical? What are the ‘‘Means of Grace?’’ [JA:] But we don’t only say ‘‘will’’! There are ‘‘means appointed’’ for our ‘‘growth in grace.’’ [MS:] The means usually enumerated are self-examination, observance of the Sabbath, public worship, including the communion of the Lord’s supper, reading the scriptures and prayer. Self-examination. We undertake the practice, over and over again, of examining ourselves once or twice a day, and insensibly leave it off from dislike to the operation. Which of us who have ever tried it cannot tell the same tale? Suppose you were to say to a man afflicted with tic douloureux, now twice a day examine yourself diligently for one quarter of an hour (that is not much) to see where the pain lies, whether it is better or worse. And be very sorry for it, remember to be very sorry for yourself while you are doing it, and reproach yourself bitterly that you are no better. Then make a resolution that you will be quite well for the rest of the day, and observe yourself carefully from time to time to see whether you are keeping your resolution. Why, it would be better to try and forget your pain or your sins altogether than to do this. But no, it would not, anything is better than to be altogether careless, because the pain you feel may drive you at last to take some means for cure. With regard to the Sabbath, one day in seven set apart by common consent of all the world for finding out the spiritual laws of God is indeed an inestimable advantage. We should like to have two. Even in discovering the material laws which everybody acknowledges to be ver y important, how many hindrances people find, in consequence of the consent of mankind not being with them. Some are hindered by hunger, others by the ‘‘laws of conventional society,’’ unfortunately not the same as those of God. Those who are prevented by the fear of starvation, and those who are frightened by that of being ‘‘thought odd,’’ are therefore equally out of the pale of true discoverers. Now, a Sunday which is granted by universal consent both to the ver y poor and the very rich is inestimable. Only let us use it as such.

What are the ‘‘means of grace?’’

1. Selfexamination.

2. Sunday.

288 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 3. Worship.

Is humility an essential of goodness in man?

As to a ‘‘common worship,’’ as it is called, instead of having it once a week we would have it every day, twice a day. The word ‘‘worship,’’ however, seems hardly to express what God wants of us. He does not want to be praised, to be adored, to have his glory sung. We can scarcely conceive a good man, a very limited edition of God’s per fections, wishing it. How inappropriate, then, to Him all this praise! And many only give it because they are afraid of Him, for how can He be really thought good, with such qualities as are ascribed to Him—vanity, anger, revenge. {Omitted JA: Well, then, what could you make your worship consist of? f125} [MS:] What He desires seems to be accordance with Him, that we should be one with Him, not prostrate before Him. It is said that the parallel between a good man listening to the singing of his own praises, and God doing the same, is no parallel, because humility is one of the essentials of a good man. {Omitted JA: Then you do away entirely with the virtue of humility. f126} What is meant by humility we do not well know. Great harm is done by striving after what is called ‘‘humility’’ by checking what is called ‘‘pride.’’ It is a cry of nature to wish to be something— to do something. To check it is to check the appetite for activity which God has placed in our nature. What is ‘‘Humility’’?

What is humility?

Are we to have pride, then, instead of humility?

[JA:] Humility is thinking meanly of ourselves, placing ourselves below others, and being willing that others should do so too. [MS:] Is not this rather absurdity and untruth? What I want is a tr ue estimate of myself, not a false one. I want to see myself as God sees me. If a man with great physical strength were to say to one who has none: you are stronger than I, you can cut down this tree better than I, we should say ‘‘how wrong!’’ If Macaulay were to persuade himself (for the sake of being humble) that he could not write history so well as any of the people at that moment walking down the Strand, would that be true or desirable? The maxim, let a man know what he can do and do it, is not compatible with that of humility. [JA:] Humility, if logically carried into our conduct, would lead to our giving up everything we do into the hands of those whom we are to strive to think can do it better than ourselves. Pride and conceit are not qualities either which will contribute to our oneness with God. [MS:] But pride and conceit become impossible when we have a knowledge of the laws of God. If his laws

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have made me what I am, if without them I could not be what I am, and with them cannot be than what I am, how can I possibly be proud of what I am? They do away equally with pride and humiliation. The laws of God have brought me where I am. His laws will carry me through. You wish to believe that God has done everything. We wish to prove it. You say, how horrible for man to think that he has merit— that his virtues are self-derived. We say, too, it is untrue, for God does everything (by means and inducements). {Omitted JA: Well, we have wandered far enough from our subject. You have summarily disposed of public worship. Now you may dispose of the Bible. f127} [MS:] What is morality to be referred to? Is it not to our sense of right? But we have referred it to a book, which book makes many contradictor y assertions. Discoveries are being made every day in physical science, but in the most important science of all no discoveries are made or can be made. Why? because the book is final. Supposing Moses had written a book about mechanics, and this book was regarded as the ultimatum, we should have made no progress in mechanics. Aristotle was supposed to have written such a book,16 and for 1800 years people disbelieved their own actual experience before their eyes, because they could quote chapter and verse of Aristotle to a contrary effect. Yes, with the sound of two weights falling simultaneously in their ears, they maintained that the weight which was ten times heavier than the other fell in one tenth of the time as the other, because Aristotle had said so. Is not this an exactly parallel case? Religion under this view, it will be said, will consist partly of assertions considered to be proved, partly of subjects for further consideration among mankind. Much is to be learnt from the Bible, and probably from all books which have been accepted by large portions of mankind as inspired, but man’s capabilities of observation, thought and feeling exercised on the universe, past, present and to come, are the source of religious knowledge. But how may we ever hope to accomplish such improvement of our capabilities? Let us look at our foundations for hope. We have principles to go upon:

16 The Mechanica, by Aristotle (384-22 bce), Greek philosopher and scientist.

4. Bible.

290 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 1. Religion is discoverable to man through the exercise of his nature. 2. Life ought to be the manifestation of the religion so discovered. 3. It is possible to man to make life the manifestation of religion. What is Prayer? 5. Prayer.

What is belief in prayer?

{Omitted JA: But what do you say about prayer, the greatest of all the means of grace? f128} [MS:] In the doctrine of prayer, unbelief and inconsistency reign triumphant in England. Did we really believe in the efficacy of prayer (in the sense of asking), there are things which we wish for so much that we should be all day and night upon our knees till we obtained them. But how many do we ever see on their knees in England? except twice a day, when they say what is called a ‘‘form of prayer.’’ That is a good word—a form of prayer. The Evangelical Germans17 are different; they really kneel down in the middle of what they are saying and go on, in the same voice, ‘‘Now, dear Lord, give me’’ so and so. They believe in prayer and they act upon their belief. But we say we believe and we do not. We care so little about it that we don’t even note what the effect is which follows our prayers. We don’t look to see whether it comes or not. The Prussian mystics believe that prayer has a distinct objective effect, that it influences an external will to do something for them which is beyond their control, and they act accordingly. We are not quite sure whether it does or not, but we think it as well to try and take the chance. {Omitted: We have not, however, sufficient belief in it even to watch whether the effect follows. JA: But how do you know that—what would you call having a belief in it? f130} [MS:] A clergyman once asked to be told a certain fact, on the plea that without such information he would not know which of two things to pray for. Here is a distinct practical belief. He believed that if he gave God certain information, and asked for one set of things, a certain definite effect would follow, different from what would follow if he informed God of something else. This is real belief, logically pursued to its practical consequences. But this we rarely find in England. (Mademoiselle du Vigean requested S. Vincent de Paul not to pray for her conversion, because, he having

17 Substituted for German mystics (f128); Nightingale described the practice of prayer at Kaiserswerth in European Travels (7:516-602).

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‘‘credit with God,’’ she might be converted against her will. But S. Vincent continuing to pray without her consent, she became a nun—according to her own account.18) This is real practical belief. At least it will be allowed that belief in the objective effects of prayer, in its changing something in the will of God, is less often found than it was. But belief in its subjective influence, in its changing something in our own wills, this, it will be said, still exists. [MS:] A religious mind in prayer is already observing the laws of God, is already one with Him. But to send a drunkard or a profligate to prayer would probably be to send him back to vice. He would be disgusted with an employment for which he was so little in tune, which had no relish for him. {Omitted JA: Then you disbelieve altogether in the power of prayer. f131}

Is there a ‘‘reflex’’ action in prayer?

As to Experience of Prayer [MS:] I gave up praying, in the sense of asking, from experience, and not from theory. When I was young, I could not understand what people meant by ‘‘their thoughts wandering in prayer.’’ I asked for what I really wished, and really wished for what I asked. And my thoughts wandered no more than those of a mother would wander, who was supplicating her sovereign for her son’s reprieve from execution. The litany was not long enough for me. I wished for all those things, and many more, and tried to cram in as many requests as I could before the spell at the end came in the form of St Chr ysostom’s prayer.19 I liked the morning service much better than the afternoon, because we asked for more things. In private prayer I wrote down what I asked for, specified the time by which I prayed that it might come, continued in prayer for it, and looked to see whether it came. It never did. [MS:] I have papers upon papers, ‘‘by the 7th of July I pray that I may be’’ so and so. When the 7th of July came, I looked, and I was not. Sometimes, indeed, I was, but then I knew very well how it was, and that it would have been just the same if I had not asked; I could

What is the ‘‘power of prayer’’?

Does God ever grant a definite request directly? Is prayer ever answered?

18 Recounted in Michel Ulysse Maynard, St Vincent de Paul: savie, son temps, ses oeuvres, son influence 4:381. 19 The ending prayer in both morning and evening prayer in the Church of England, which asks God to fulfill the petitions of the people, as promised when two or three are gathered together.

292 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought not bamboozle my own consciousness and say, as in the case of a sick man, ‘‘if I had not prayed, this laudanum would not have given me sleep, or my doctor would not have thought of it,’’ or else, ‘‘this sleep is the effect of my prayer, and would have been, whether I had taken laudanum or not.’’ I always prayed for something definite, specifying the how, the when and the where of my want. People generally take refuge in the indefiniteness of their prayers (so that they cannot say whether they have been answered or not), from the disappointment of finding out God has not heard them. I was always miserable if I was not at church when the litany was said. How ill-natured it is, if you believe in prayer, not to ask for ever ybody what they want. If the burning of the Amazon had taken place,20 and I had not prayed at the litany the Sunday before, with all my heart, for ‘‘all that travel by land or by water,’’ I should have felt bitter remorse and believed that their blood was upon my head, in proportion to my share among the prayer-sayers in England. I well remember when an uncle died, the care I took, on behalf of my aunt and cousins, to be always present in spirit at the petition for ‘‘the fatherless children and widows,’’ and when Confalonieri was in the Austrian prison of Spielburg, at that for ‘‘prisoners and captives.’’21 My conscience pricked me a little whether this should extend to those who were in prison for murder and debt, but I supposed that I might pray for them spiritually. I could not pray for George IV. I thought the people very good who prayed for him, and wondered whether he could have been much worse if he had not been prayed for. William IV I prayed for a little. But when Victoria came to the throne,22 I prayed for her in a rapture of feeling, and my thoughts never wandered. In short, I believed what I believed about prayer, and I should have thought it as disrespectful to God not to wait for the answer as if I had been a servant, which I truly believed myself, sent on a message.

20 A mail ship bound for the West Indies, burned with over 100 lives lost in Januar y 1852. 21 Count Frederico Confalonieri (1785-1846), imprisoned 1821 by the Austrians during the Italian wars of independence. 22 The dissolute George IV (1762-1830), succeeded by his brother William IV (1795-1837) and then by the virtuous Queen Victoria (1819-1901).

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I thought it rather absurd to pray every night, ‘‘Give us this day our daily bread,’’ but I supposed that people were not attending to what they said, and they meant, give us tomor row our daily bread. What is the Answer to prayer? Once a friend of mine, who died of scarlet fever, showed an intense anxiety to live through the Sunday, in order to be prayed for in church. She died immediately after the service. It did strike me as odd, sometimes, that we should pray to be delivered ‘‘from plague, pestilence and famine,’’ when all the common sewers ran into the Thames, and fevers haunted undrained land, and the districts which cholera would visit could be pointed out. I thought that cholera came that we might remove these causes, not pray that God would remove the cholera. At last, not from thinking what was likely to be, but from observing whether prayer was answered, and finding it was not, it occurred to me that this was not God’s plan, that His scheme for us was not that He should give us what we asked for, but that mankind should obtain it for mankind, that we were not paupers asking at a Poor Law Board for relief, but men working for themselves and their fellow creatures. It always comes as a surprise when a prayer is answered. We record it in little books. We print ‘‘Encouragement to Prayer’’; ‘‘Extraordinar y Answers to Prayer.’’ A man prays for ‘‘three and sixpence’’ overnight, and it comes by post the next morning; straightway it makes its appearance as being extraordinary in ‘‘Illustrations of Faith,’’ or some such like book. But is it not rather extraordinar y, if there are so many millions praying twice a day all through their lives, and if that is the way in which God imparts His gifts, that there should be so few of these instances, instead of so many? [JA:] It will be said, if we are to have no prayer, we lose our chief support and comfort in this painful world. [MS:] Never, never let us be understood to mean that there is no communion with the One Per fect. Is there nothing but asking? Can it be that man has nothing to say to the Perfect Spirit of Love, in whose presence he is always dwelling; to the Spirit of Power, of Wisdom, in whom is his trust, in the struggles which convulse his life, to whom he refers the bliss of existence to which he feels himself destined? Man is capable of love, reverence, sympathy with right and truth and goodness: shall he not feel these towards the only Being who can give them full exercise?

Prayer or communion, accordance with God, our chief support.

294 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought How are we to speak to God, if not in prayer?

[JA:] How are we to speak to Him, if we are not to pray? it will be asked. [MS:] We cannot dogmatize on this highest intercourse. There can be no ‘‘form of prayer’’ which will be the voice from all hearts. Yet (to man in his true state) to have intercourse with God, to be at one with Him, to feel devoted to His purpose, is the highest happiness that man can enjoy, is essential to give reality to every other interest. Unless we know what we are working for, and whom we are working with, we shall work with no zest or zeal. To be without God in the world leaves every joy without brightness, to be with Him makes every sorrow in some sense bliss. But what is the intercourse we now have with God? Prayer, in its present sense, is to give utterance, at stated times, to a form of flatter y and to selfish or unwise requests. It is, as in the litany, to say to God, ‘‘Don’t go this way, don’t go that way,’’ till we have marked out the whole line which He ought to go, and interdicted to Him the fulfilling of almost every law which He has made. As to intercourse with God

If we ask, we want an answer.

What ought to be our intercourse with God? It is not well with any man who does not desire such intercourse. What it is to be in private, each enlightened man’s nature must tell him. What it is to be in public, let us try to learn each other’s hearts and discover—in order that when that solemn period of an eternal existence called a day begins, we may meet with our fellow creatures and be sent forth to it with all that is within us of divine roused to activity by words of tr uth addressed to the reason, by music from the human voice expressing the wish to go forth with right purpose, with love and gladness to God’s appointed work, by sympathy with our brothers and sisters in this preparation for it, by true emotion resolved into tr ue work, in order that, when evening comes, we may again meet to thank God and hail our fellow workers before we sleep. [JA:] We want, it is said, the direct personal communication with God and Christ, that we may ask and hear them answer. Do not take from us, is the cry, our Saviour, the Christ who died upon the cross for us. [MS:] And does not God do much more than die upon the cross for us? Is He not, in every one of us, going through sin and suffering, ‘‘descending into hell’’ with us? Does he not suffer, not once for us, but every day in us? And can we want anything more than communion with the perfect and eternal Father?

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[JA:] I want, it is said, communion with Christ, my divine brother, who feels for me. [MS:] And you will have it with the Son, the divine in man, with many Christs, who suffer for all mankind. [JA:] But we want a Son ‘‘to make intercession for us.’’ [MS:] Do you suppose that Christ is ever ‘‘making intercession’’ for us? It is true He ‘‘ever liveth,’’ to work for us, but to ‘‘intercede’’ for us?23 He had better not exist at all, God had better not exist at all, than be employed in this way; the one in persuading, the other in being persuaded. [JA:] But we want an answer. It is no comfort to say that God may hear me, but He does not speak to me. Man wants an answer. [MS:] Can he receive it from the Eternal when he cannot comprehend what eternity is, from the Infinite and Perfect, when infinity and per fection are beyond his understanding? Were God to speak to him, could he hear? Were God to tell him His plans, could he comprehend them? {Omitted JA: Am I never to hear Him speak? f140} [MS:] But God does not refuse to answer the longing, devoted spirit, which says, Speak, Lord, for thy loving child heareth.24 He hears as the Father; He answers as the Son; and as the Holy Spirit. I could not understand God if He were to speak to me. But the Holy Spirit, the Divine in me, tells me what I am to do. I am conscious of a voice that I can hear, telling me more truth and good than I am. As I rise to be more truly and more rightly, this voice is ever beyond and above me, calling to more and more good. [JA:] But you have to invent what it says. [MS:] We believe that each man has his Holy Ghost, that is, the best part of himself inspired by God. But whether it is I who speak, or whether it is God speaking to me, I do not know. We call upon our fellow creatures to study this subject. That prayer, as asking, will entirely cease, we are certain. If we give up asking, confessing our sins and formal praising, will it be said, what remains to be expressed to God? Surely, infinite are the sympathies, infinite the thoughts and feelings, of man towards the Perfect Spirit, with whom he desires to be one.

23 Heb 7:25, ‘‘he ever liveth to make intercession for them.’’ 24 Possibly a paraphrase of 1 Sam 3:9.

We want communion with a divine brother.

Does God want ‘‘intercession’’ from the Son?

How can man receive an answer from the Eternal?

Do we ever hear God speak?

If prayer is not asking, what is it?

296 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought What is ‘‘Intercession?’’ [JA:] If, though I have much to say to God, He has nothing to say to me, what does it profit me?

What is the ground for this belief ?

[MS:] The Perfect exists in three relations to other existence. 1. As the Creator of all other existence, of its purpose and of the means of fulfilling its purpose. This is the Father. 2. As partaken in these other modes of existence. This is the Son. 3. As manifested to these other modes of existence. This is the Holy Ghost. [JA:] What reason, it will be asked, is there for a belief so fanciful? We revert to what we have formerly said. {Omitted JA: You have laid aside the ‘‘It is written’’ and have no right to speak of a Trinity, the belief which comes to us from holy writ. f141} [MS:] Grant a perfect being, as inferred from what is, what has been, and what may thence be deduced is to come, and it follows that, if the two former of these relations be denied, the perfection we have asserted is denied. The Being would not be perfectly benevolent who, being omnipotent, did not will other modes of existence, with the purpose of producing happiness. The Being would not be perfectly wise who did not will the means to exist for fulfilling his purpose. Neither would the Being be perfect who did not cause others to partake in that which constitutes well-being. We find that that which constitutes well-being of the highest kind is the exercise of goodness, wisdom, power, those attributes which we have ascribed to God as existing in perfection in Him. These being the essentials of the highest mode of well-being, God would not be perfect unless He caused other beings to partake in them. To say, then, that God is perfect is to say that He exists in those two relations, which relations have perhaps been felt when He has been spoken of as the Father and the Son. The third relation seems to consist in our consciousness of the existence of these attributes, in the communication which, if we seek it, these attributes hold with us. Ask of perfect wisdom, you will have an answer above and beyond yourself. Speak, articulately or inarticulately, to per fect goodness and love, such existence hears you, answers you, through the exercise of your own nature, it is tr ue, but it is not your own nature which answers you, but a higher. It is not the mere fact of using words which brings this answer. Many, many are the words spoken to this Holy Spirit which receive no response. Time has already disclosed conditions which, if kept,

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allow a communication between the holy spirit of God and the holy spirit in man. It used to be thought that God spoke occasionally to individuals, with no other condition than that it was His arbitrary will so occasionally to speak—that He called man out of his sleep with no reference to any particular state in man, the consequence of which would be always communication of the divine in man with God. But experience shows that there are times when man may ask this communication, but cannot have it, because the conditions for having it have not been kept. He has strayed after false gods. But let him have patience to find out and to keep these conditions, and wisdom and love and goodness, which he will feel above his own, will dwell with him; he may interpret their words. [MS:] Evidence for this may be found in experience. We believe, from experience, that man is capable of living always, as it were, in a state of reference to that higher Being—that, as the world’s ways improve, far as we are from it now, man’s intercourse with man will be regulated so as to help this higher intercourse, to keep it unbroken, whereas now it is almost impossible not to break it as soon as man is with his kind. Deep souls who wanted it fled to wildernesses, to monasteries, and as always happens, others who did not comprehend them imitated them, and fleeing from the world became a fashion, although it is hard to understand what it means, since the world is what we have to mould, not to fly from.

[JA:] Where is the proof ?

What is ‘‘flying from the world’’?

Mysticism and Methodism Ever ything which is only a part is dull or false. It is only as part of a whole that anything can be interesting. As part of a whole, even the most trifling events of every day are interesting. It is said that mysticism is mistaken in urging man to isolate himself with God and devote himself exclusively to his Creator; whereas man’s natural inclination, implanted in him by God, urges him to devote himself to his fellow man, urges all mankind mutually to unite in benevolent ties. But those who say this do not see that the first motive for mankind to unite is devotion to God, that devotion to God is the spring of love to man, makes it necessary, is the same thing. One with God, one with man. The novel—what a false idea it is—brings two people through ‘‘no end’’ of troubles, to make them at last—what? exclusive for one

Partial tr uth of Mysticism.

One with God, one with man.

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Partial tr uth of Methodism.

another—caring alone for one another—‘‘wrapped up,’’ as it is called, in each other—an abyss of binary selfishness. The Methodists, again, have tried for intercourse with God by exciting discourse, by imparting their ‘‘experiences,’’ and have sometimes mistaken the workings of overexcited nerves for the still small voice of God.25 Would that our intercourse with each other could be such as that to be together were a means of being more, not less, in the presence of God! Would that we felt that awful, though loving presence, so as not (while we profess to be especially seeking it) to be repeating words without feeling, to be telling lies with such indifference that we are not conscious of them. We passed the church yesterday morning, which was Sunday, on our way to visit a sick person. The people were all in church, saying that they had done everything that was wrong, and nothing that was right, and that they meant to do quite differently in future. As we came back, they were just going into church again to say the same thing. It was to be hoped for the sake of their sincerity that they had done something wrong between this and then, otherwise they would be telling a lie. But how dare we say this? We said it last Sunday; have we led an entirely different life since then? And what expectation have we that we shall do so next week? What prospect have we? Have we taken any means? Have we any hopes? Do we ‘‘find God’’ at Church? We say that we wish to conform ourselves to the pattern of Christ. The Roman Catholics, some of them, do act somewhat after his pattern. They go about doing good,26 they beg about without shoes— but what do we do? The most we do is to confess every Sunday that we are not like it. There have been holy souls who, in silence like the Quaker, in excitement like the Wesleyan, in form like the Anglican, have sought and found this presence, but the imitators of such often find it not, yet are not aware that it is not there. They go to church or to chapel because it is a ‘‘duty,’’ and feel no want in not having seen God there. They did not expect His presence—they are not disappointed at not finding Him, because they did not expect He would be there.

25 An allusion to 1 Kings 19:12. 26 An allusion to Acts 10:38.

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Editor: This next section, printed from Add Mss 45838 ff148-84, is from the English novel form. For the printing the identifying characters (Portia, Columba and Fulgentia) were stroked out and thirdperson forms substituted, for example, ‘‘I used to think, Portia, what is the good of my theories’’ became ‘‘Many think, what is the good of theories’’ (f156) and was further changed to ‘‘Some ask what is the good’’ in the printed version. ‘‘ ‘Or God makes the family,’ Portia, you say’’ (f171) became ‘‘God makes the family.’’ So it is often said. Personal asides and casual chatter are simply dropped; virtually ever ything was slightly rewritten. To give an idea of the extent of the changes Nightingale made, we reincorporate some of the dropped passages (those that can be made sense of in the context). The three major characters in the discussion are Portia, the moderate daughter, who was more enamoured of the Church of England; Columba, the youngest, who becomes a Roman Catholic nun; and Fulgentia, whose views seem closest to Nightingale’s own. The deep disappointment Nightingale felt in the failure of the Church of England to provide meaningful work for women comes through strongly in this writing. To make her point even more forcefully, Columba’s conversion was promptly followed by her becoming a Sister of Charity, a practical order that trained women to work as teachers and nurses, and one Nightingale knew from Paris. 3.1 {Omitted: ‘‘Portia, I don’t think there has ever been less religion in the world than at this moment.’’ 48383 f148} Never, perhaps, has there been less religion in the world than at this moment, except at the advent of Christ, when, probably, there was scarcely any religion. That of the Jews had become a mere form; there had not been a ‘‘prophet’’ for 300 years; in the Greek religion no educated man believed; Aeschylus and Socrates and Plato27 were dead, and Plato was, indeed, the last of their ‘‘prophets,’’ so that it was more than 300 years since the Greeks had had any tr ue religion. The Romans had none; the Egyptian was long since extinct. Where Christ and his apostles went, therefore, there appears to have been hardly any religion left.

Has there ever been, in the histor y of the world, less religion than now?

27 Aeschylus (525-456 bce), Greek tragic poet; Socrates (469-399 bce), teacher, and his pupil Plato (427-347 bce), idealist philosopher.

300 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought And is not this again not the case now? There is so little religion now that we do not even feel the want of it; we need a Saviour now as much as they did then. What Religion is there now?

Had we acted in science as in religion, what would have been the result?

Nations do not always improve: sometimes they degenerate.

This morning I read to my dear grandmother the Psalms for the day, as usual; I sang ‘‘unto the Lord a new song,’’28 I sang ‘‘praises unto his name’’; ‘‘For why?’’ as the Psalmist very properly asks, why, indeed? Because the Lord had killed all the young Egyptians, both human beings and animals, because he had favoured the Israelites and proscribed everyone else. So do we think now, viz., that He ‘‘hath set apart’’ the English for Himself, and favoured them to the detriment of every other nation. And, really, that such things should be ‘‘sung and said’’ by educated men in every church in England ‘‘throughout the year’’! Two hundred years hence what will be thought of us? that we ought to have been in a lunatic asylum, but people in lunatic asylums are more sensible. Is it as extraordinar y that a man should think himself a teapot as that we should think God like this? like what a small and half-savage tribe thought Him 3000 years ago. Suppose that we had done with steam as we have done with morals, that is, asserted that ‘‘ever ything has been discovered, nothing more is to be done, you have only to believe’’; should we have had any railroads, any steamboats, any manufactures? Yet within the last thirty years how astounding has been the advance! We may indeed say, what will be thought of us 200 years hence? But what England will think of herself 200 years hence depends upon whether there arise discoverers or not. A nation does not always necessarily improve; it sometimes comes to an end. We may, perhaps, say, there has never been less of religion than there is now; but 200 years hence there may be less. The Roman Empire, when there ceased to be religion, ceased to be; may not England too? A large number of us believe in nothing; or, by a caricature, a painter makes himself a Roman Catholic, in order that he may believe and be able to be an artist. What the most conscientious among our working men seem to be doing now is renouncing religious error, not announcing reli-

28 Ps 96:1.

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gious truth; they seem not to be seeking after light, but giving up darkness. If religion is lost, what is to become of England? unless One comes to raise up another religion. It is not ‘‘profane’’ to say these things. By some it is thought a kind of tribute and homage paid to God to laugh at Bacchus and Jupiter and the gods of antiquity, and to wonder ‘‘how people could believe such things.’’ Such could not bear to laugh at anything connected with our worship and with our God; to do so seems to them to be blaspheming—like Voltaire. But the perfect God is so unlike that of the Protestants and Roman Catholics, He is such an entirely different being that we too may almost feel as if we were doing Him good service when we laugh at ‘‘their gods.’’ At all events, there is such an absolute separation between them, such an opposition of natures, that we are no more laughing at Him, Him the infinite wisdom, the perfect love, than when we speak of Jupiter and Juno, or the Egyptians cats. There are three ways of reading the Bible: first, ‘‘I dare not doubt a word Christ says to be absolutely true and inspired. Do not prove to me that it is not so, for if you do I have lost my Christ.’’ And yet there are things which nobody does really believe. Suppose I were to say, ‘‘consider the laurel of the garden, how it grows! It toils not, neither does it spin.29 Do you do like the laurel, and you will have food and clothing too.’’ People answer, Christ did not mean that, he meant something else. Yet such is the vagueness of men that this is preached one day in the seven, and the other six days the board of guardians preaches something quite different.

Not profanity but reverence often inspires men now to laugh at the God of the churches.

Three ways of reading the Bible.

What is Idolatry? The people look and see, and they see that practically the guardians are right, and that Christ was wrong, and some are frightened and say, ‘‘I have lost my Christ,’’ and others are hardened and say, ‘‘I don’t want your Christ.’’ These are two alternatives, equally unsatisfactor y, but if we put in juxtaposition with this ‘‘the kingdom of Heaven is within,’’30 or some other of the truly divine things

29 A paraphrase of Matt 6:28. JSM: To all appearances Christ meant it only for his own immediate followers. 30 Luke 17:21.

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What is idolatr y?

which Christ has said, and feel that after all there was no one like him, none who knew so much truth as he did, none who lived as he lived, then we are neither hardened not frightened; we do not lose the truth, and we have not to lie to ourselves about the untruth; we can truly say, never man spake as he spake.31 Many who do not believe Christ miraculously inspired do not become hardened about him; they love him more than ever they did; they admire his life and character more than those do who think him God. But many men who never read the Bible, because their common sense resists such things as ‘‘Take nothing for your journey, neither scrip, nor staff, neither bread, nor money, nor even two coats’’; and ‘‘Shake off the dust against any who do not receive you,’’32 things which belong to the times of the Essene communities, but not to these, and which do not even sound perfectly just and good, as belonging to those times, men who cannot bear to read these things, will yet be shocked at not thinking Christ divine. Divine? We too think him divine as all men are divine, but not the only divine One. As he said himself, ‘‘those are Gods or the sons of God to whom the word of God comes.’’33 {Omitted: Oh! Portia, f151} People preach sermons now not because they have anything to say, but because there is a sermon to be preached. They sit down to write it on Saturday night, not because the spirit stirs them to say something which they must preach to all who will hear, but because custom compels them to preach a sermon, for which they must make something to say. Some, it is true, find God in church. Yes, but whom do they find there? Not the spirit of goodness and wisdom, but a being whose merit it is that he does not wish to kill what he has made, etc. Is not this ‘‘idolatr y’’? Idolatry is worshipping something which is not, which has no existence. Whether that something be a calf or an untrue idea, is it not the same? The poor at that Methodist meeting have been nearer in feeling to God for having been to that meeting. But again I ask myself, nearer to whom? To God? The being they fancy is surely not God, and if it is not God they are ‘‘idolaters,’’ just as much as those who worship a cat. Still they have

31 A paraphrase of John 7:46. 32 A paraphrase of Matt 10:14. 33 A paraphrase of John 10:34-35.

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been nearer to some good being, whether it is Christ who came to save them from God, or whoever it is. Surely it is strange that we should come to God every morning to say to Him that He is so good, so merciful, so compassionate. If a child were to do so ever y morning to its mother, would she not say, ‘‘My dear child, don’t be troublesome?’’ And if it were to go on saying, ‘‘Oh, mother, do be kind to brother, do be kind to sister, do be kind to baby,’’ would she not say, ‘‘My dear child, don’t be impertinent?’’ {Omitted: Do you think it would make any difference at all in the parish if the church and the vicar were to disappear altogether, swept away by the deluge? ‘‘You ask me, Fulgentia, if I think that the sudden sweeping away of the parish church would make any difference in the parish? Yes, I do. There is something in thinking it a duty to go to church. f152} Always respect the Sense of Duty 3.2 But let us respect the feeling of duty, even where it exists with a mistaken unreal understanding of what is true and right. Let us be careful not to destroy it, without attempting to substitute as its object something nearer the truth. It were better to believe that one ought to go out every morning, wet or dry, hot or cold, regularly at five o’clock, whatever the difficulty were, and make a bow to that gate, than to think that there is nothing one ought to do. Provided only that there is none of that feeling of pride in doing what one believes ought to be done, which poisons any discharge of duty, turns reverence, one of our highest capabilities of feeling, into selfishness, the lowest.

Sense of duty.

3.3 What is the craving after sympathy which we feel but the craving after God? A part cannot apprehend the whole. How can we receive God? How can we receive the sympathy of the all, or understand it, if it were given us? We must receive it from parts like ourselves, from the fragments of God who are our fellow creatures. The craving for sympathy which there exists between two who are to form one indivisible and perfect whole is, in most cases, between man and woman, in some between man and God. This the Roman Catholics have understood and expressed under the simile, Christ the bride-

Our craving after sympathy is the craving after God.

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Can one man or one woman be more interesting to us than mankind?

groom, the nun married to him, the monk married to the church, or as St Francis to poverty, or as St Ignatius [of] Loyola to the divine mistress of his thoughts, the Virgin. This sort of tie between man and God seems alone able to fill the want of the other, the permanent exclusive tie between the one man and the one woman. It seems unnatural that one man should be more interesting than God and mankind. It is unnatural, and the most selfish of all ties, if the tie is to be, as Milton has put it, ‘‘He, thy God, thou mine,’’34 if they are to ser ve and divinify one another, then one can quite conceive the Muhammadan profligacy, which says that a man must have many women in order to sympathize with different parts of his nature. But if the two come together to serve mankind and second God more per fectly together than they could do separately, supplying each the deficiencies in the other’s nature, so as to make one perfect whole, being one with each other in order to be one with God, then it is a true and a glorious tie, and we can understand why it must be always one, permanent, exclusive and indivisible, in order to fulfill its purpose. 3.4 Influence of Circumstances

What the influence of circumstances is intended to be.

We cannot be good in all circumstances. God does not intend it; and this, instead of making us do nothing, is the greatest spur we can have to exertion. If God does not intend us to be right under such and such circumstances, we must alter them. It is very seldom, it will be said, that we can alter them for ourselves; mankind must alter them for us. But we shall not lie down and say, ‘‘God did not intend me to be good now, I must be bad,’’ but ‘‘what circumstances can I bring forward to make me good?’’ God is always definite. An evil is always an evil, and a good a good. It is not by thinking that we can be good under all circumstances that we neutralize the evil of any particular circumstance, the effect of which must always be the same, and no other, but by bringing forward circumstances which will have a good effect, which, again, will always be the same, perfectly defined and invariable. It is like Dalton’s discover y in chemistry that there are pre-

34 John Milton, Paradise Lost Book 4.

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cise quantities in every atom.35 So the qualities are precise in the ef fect of every circumstance, and are never any other. To think that we can be good under any circumstances is like thinking that we may be healthy when we are living over a sewer. If a person has to go to an unhealthy climate, he does not say, ‘‘I can be well if I choose under any climate,’’ but he takes means, as far as he can, to arrange other healthy circumstances. If the heat is intense, he takes care to have exercise in the early morning; if the dews are hurtful, he takes care not to be out just at sunset, for there may be circumstances under which it is right for a man to go to an unhealthy climate. So there may be circumstances under which a man cannot be good, and yet which he cannot, at present, rightly alter. In that case it is not by saying, ‘‘I can be good, if I only will, under any circumstances,’’ that he will maintain himself so, but by supplying, as much as in him lies, circumstances which will make him so. Here, again, comes in that fatal mistake about the will. The boy William is good and happy in some occupation for which he has a vocation, that is, to which God calls him. If it is right for the convenience of parents or for the conventional code that he should adopt some other occupation, parents seldom hesitate to say, ‘‘This is not the thing for you, go and be good and happy in the law, or the church, or at college,’’ and they would not doubt but that it was in his power to say, ‘‘I will go and be good and happy in the law, or in the church, or at college.’’ To say it is, indeed, in his power, and if he is amiable and feeling he will probably try to say it, but to be it may not be in his power, and this is just the practical mistake which shows the want of a true conception about the will. It is taken for granted that there is this uncomprehended something, called will, which what we call William can command, what we call will will obey, without our understanding what man is, what the man William is, what the will is, and thus among wellintentioned people half the mischief in life arises. What a dangerous immoral doctrine, people say, that we are in the hands of circumstances. No, we are in the hands of God. ‘‘I can be good if I will,’’ is the road to despair, for a person says, ‘‘I will be good when I go back to such and such circum-

35 John Dalton (1766-1844), pioneer of atomic theory.

What is this uncomprehended something called will?

The road to despair.

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’’You may pray for rain, but it’s no use, while the wind is in that quarter.’’

stances, I resolve to be good; I know I can if I will.’’ He ‘‘wearies Heaven with prayer’’; he fails and fails; he thinks the fault lies in his will, and he sinks lower and lower till he gives himself up as lost. The parish clerk who said, ‘‘You may pray for rain, but it’s no use while the wind is in that quarter,’’ spoke according to experience and obser vation. In the same way we may pray for selfforgetfulness, but ‘‘it’s no use’’ while the wind is blowing from the quarter of luxury and idleness. We may pray for humility, but ‘‘it’s no use’’ while there is no wind of sufficient strength to blow our thoughts away from ourselves. Am I the Test of a healthy State?

What is the universal rule of action? Not, what circumstances improve us? but ‘‘I like this, why don’t you?’’

How many have struggled against a sin of vanity, and prayed and prayed and gone through years of self-mortification and self-inflicted tortures, and wondered why God was so far off and whether ‘‘His arm was shortened that He could not save,’’ and why He was so deaf that He would not hear, and have been brought to the very verge of despair: ‘‘the sorrows of death compass me, and the pains of hell gat hold upon me,’’36 whereas if they had lived a life which had afforded them one interest so strong as to make them forget themselves, they would have forgotten their own puny reputation from the mere force of another interest. In the same way with pride. The desire to be something, to do something, is implanted in us. Everybody ought to command. No one’s faculties are fully called out till they do command. There is nothing so invigorating, so inspiring, so regenerating. Everybody ought to obey. How delightful it is to obey someone who really knows what he is about and can teach you to learn, when one really feels that one is learning something. But let children speak and say how much they have learnt from their masters and their lessons. Ever ybody ought then to command and to obey, and then we should hear no more of pride and thinking much of oneself, for pride is the perversion of that desire of action which would then have found its proper exercise. It is asked, what circumstances make us good? These are dif ferent for different idiosyncrasies, just as different climates suit dif-

36 A paraphrase of Isa 50:2.

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ferent people. But ‘‘I like it, why don’t you?’’ is now the tacit feeling of everyone, as if he were the test of a healthy state. It is said that ‘‘grace is the gift of God,’’ that we cannot calculate, if the same circumstances do recur, that they will produce the same effect. If this means that, with the same circumstances and the organization in the same state, we are not to expect the same mood or state of mind, that that mood is dependent, not on laws in which is no ‘‘variableness, neither shadow of turning,’’37 but on an arbitrary state in the mind of another which we cannot calculate upon nor foresee, and over which we can have no control, that we can only expect this mood as a free gift; would not this interfere with our action, as would a doubt, whether, if I go today through Whitehall, as I did yesterday, I shall find the Admiralty where it was yesterday? God does not leave our highest moods at the mercy of chance, so that we cannot reproduce or calculate upon them. But the same state of mind never does recur, it is said. Choose, not submit to, Circumstances No, but exactly the same circumstances never do recur, but if they did it would. The whole state of the universe at this moment is the consequence of the whole state of the universe at every past moment, both as regards its spiritual and its physical laws. God does not will ‘‘on Monday it shall rain, on Tuesday the wind shall be east,’’ or ‘‘the spring of 1852 shall have three months’ drought,’’ by an arbitrary decree. The drought of 1852 is the consequence of His meteorological and other laws which have ruled since eternity, not, as in those noble words, ‘‘As it was in the beginning, is now and ever shall be, world without end,’’ but As it was without beginning, is now and ever shall be. And we, if we knew all these laws which have been without beginning, could have prophesied that in 1852 there would be three months of east wind. So God does not will on Monday A shall be in a ‘‘state of grace,’’ on Tuesday B shall be in a ‘‘state of grace.’’ It would not be omnipotence, benevolence and wisdom, which could will in this way. Our wisdom is relative, because dependent upon external circumstances, which we cannot at present prophesy. We

37 Jas 1:17.

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Object of life should be not to keep right under all circumstances, but to find out what circumstances only we can keep right.

say, tomorrow I will water the garden, because we do not know whether it will rain, but ours is an ignorant will, an ignorant wisdom, at best. Some ask what is the good of theories and principles, since they cannot keep us right except in certain circumstances? They are to point out that only certain circumstances are favourable to goodness. No knowledge of science will enable man to breathe in gas which God has made destructive to human life, or to live permanently under water. But science reveals the safety lamp to warn him of his danger, the means of taking respirable air with him in a diving bell. And so, morally, man may have safety lamps, and contrive for himself air to prevent suffocation for a time in unfavourable circumstances. But let us not blame a principle for not making us well and contented to abide as, in truth, it is not well that we should abide. The diving bell simile is an exact one. We must not attempt to live on the past or the present, as presented to us by circumstances (without ‘‘special interference’’ for a purpose by ourselves). We must each day try with purpose to collect what good air we can, and put it into the diving bell, in which we go under the stifling and oppressive waters of life, as it is now, to fish up what pearls we can find. Perhaps some say, I would with all my heart seek those pearls, but not in these muddy waters where I can find so few. My brethren of mankind (unconsciously to themselves) have forced me into these waters; or, rather, I accepted this fishery thinking it of high promise. But my brethren of the past arranged the means and inducements of life as it is. May saviours come to reveal the higher means and inducements ever existing in God’s laws to a higher life! In trust that so it will be, I will try not to sink in these waters, but to preser ve life for a blessed day of working with God, a day in which I may learn how so to work, a day in which I may see those whom I love attracted so to work also. God is always definite Now, when we read Dalton’s discover y that all is by weight and measure, that the proportions in which bodies combine follow a numerical law, as, for instance, carbon expressed by 6 unites with oxygen expressed by 8, and forms carbonic oxide—it will otherwise unite only with oxygen expressed by 16, and form carbonic acid, etc.; when we discover such and similar laws, does it not seem that there must

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be a spirit of wisdom? God is so accurate, so definite; He knows exactly how long we shall go on in a given way, just as He knows how much of the oxygen will combine with carbon, hydrogen, etc. The other road leads to despair, as we have said. There is no cause for wonder that people came to saying, ‘‘I can do nothing of myself, Christ must do it for me’’; they found they could not control that uncomprehended something called will. They said, ‘‘I cannot will what is right’’; they did not say, ‘‘I must discover the laws which cause me to will right, must bring about the circumstances which produce in me a right will.’’ They said, ‘‘Christ must will for me, I cannot save myself, Christ must do it.’’ God, in truth, must do it. Union with His laws, which we have to discover, is what we have to look to. If one could but help people to learn by experience—what they have to become and what their means are, what life is, what the nature of God is, what the destination of man! {Omitted: The impression of a past fruitful time, the gain of it is ingrained and digested into one and benefits the present, but the sentiment of interest and enjoyment which one has had is as being reminded when one is thirsting of a pure spring enjoyed on a past day. However, there seems this good in the food of the higher part of the nature that it nourishes for all the future, whereas the best of bread nourishes but for an appointed short season. It often happens that one who has the capacity for high things sinks perhaps, more when deprived of them, when sent into a land of famine, than one who is not used to good food. f157}

How the doctrine of vicarious salvation arose.

3.5 These doctrines are, after all, what the greater part of educated men believe. {Omitted: I don’t know, Fulgentia, why you don’t try to propagate your doctrines. . . . Why don’t you try conversation, if you want to do good? It was said that Sir James Mackintosh did more good by his conversation than by anything.38 f158} But educated men consider them as a matter of curiosity, as an amusement to be derived from a subject of speculation in their libraries. They do not mean to do anything different—to alter anything by reason of such opinions. Religious opinions are to them a

38 Sir James Mackintosh (1765-1832), Scottish author and mp.

Why belief leads so little to practice.

310 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought pure matter of curiosity and speculation. They do not even care about them enough to teach them to their own children. On the contrar y, they rather wish their wives and children to belong to the existing religion; they think it a good thing that their families should go to church; they would like their wives to be ‘‘in society,’’ their daughters to marry well, their sons to get on in the world, all of which objects would be rather hindered by their being ‘‘heretics,’’ because the husbands of the daughters, again, will like their wives to go to church, and the sons will not be able to become bishops, or to do anything which requires the signing of the thirty-nine articles.39 The father would rather, therefore, that the children were not of his opinions, so he says nothing about them. He may, perhaps, write a liberal review, or a philosophic book, but further than this he would not go on any account. If he has such opinions, therefore, he always keeps them to himself and a few select old friends. ‘‘It would distress my wife.’’ ‘‘You cannot trust women with such opinions.’’ ‘‘It would make a revolution.’’ ‘‘England is the country of compromise,’’ etc. If Christ had said, ‘‘But suppose we should shake the Pharisees! Think if we were to pull down the Sanhedrim!’’40 we might have been Jews and Gentiles still. If he had said, ‘‘we had better not shake a stone in the edifice, for fear the whole should totter,’’ we might still be sacrificing in the Temple of Jehovah or in that of Jupiter, for the world never seems to make much progress, except by saviours. {Omitted: But, when one thinks that clever educated men go year after year to church to listen—or not to listen—to such stories as those of Balaam, Adam and Ahab, and to say such things as that ‘‘God does not desire the death of a sinner,’’41 there really seems to be not much difference between those who are in and those who are out of a lunatic asylum. What is going to church? You say, first of all, that you have done ever ything wrong and that you mean to do something entirely dif-

39 Clerical appointments in the Church of England then required the priest to sign his agreement to the Thirty-nine Articles, which set out basic doctrines of the church. 40 The highest court in Jer usalem. 41 The absolution given by the priest after confession after morning and evening prayer, states that God ‘‘desireth not the death of a sinner,’’ Book of Common Prayer.

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ferent, but it is very clear you do not, or you would not intend, absolutely intend, to come back and say the same thing next Sunday, putting a premium upon saying what you do not mean. You say the Lord’s Prayer two or three times. You then (very impertinently pray) for a few people, whom you think God, which the church says and make superstition ‘‘lovely and of good report.’’ Just as a very ‘‘amiable’’ family is a positive evil—an ‘‘amiable family’’ generally meaning one without any strong idiosyncrasies or character of any kind, and tending therefore to perpetuate a slavery by making it tolerable. ff158-59} 3.6 Unity in Variety What varying lives and characters pass in the course of fifty years before many of us! One impression often becomes thereby weakened by another. But a conception of variety in unity, and a realization of it in life, would cause all true impressions, however various, to strengthen each other. The child lives through variety, without any unity, and many a man is a child, but a thread of unity ought to run through each varying phase of life. Without this there can be no strength, for it is reference to the one per fect purpose, and confidence in the realization of it, which give strength. Without this there can be no connection, as life passes with its constant variety, and without connection, there can be no consistency. There is nothing to be consistent with. But, while ever striving to keep up one uniform thought, feeling, purpose, at one with the divine thought, feeling, purpose, it is well to yield with a certain elasticity to varieties in life. The man, it is often said, who could thus carry one thought, feeling, purpose, through all possible varieties of human life, would be righteous in all circumstances—circumstances would not affect him. This is a misapprehension of the divine course of human duty and destination. Circumstances (in accordance with the divine thought) are to regulate and modify human being. Man has capability to learn how circumstances regulate and modify human nature, to learn what circumstances develop and exercise human nature aright. By the united efforts of mankind, in accordance with God’s ever-present, ever-efficient law, to bring about such circumstances is man’s work. The capability for this is man’s power.

How to attain unity in variety.

312 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought But do we not see, it will be said, the truly great and good become greater and better in adverse circumstances? It is most important, it is indeed essential, to discern what are adverse circumstances. In the first place, adverse to what do we mean? Those circumstances are really adverse to man which impede in him the development and the exercise of the divine nature. It is said ‘‘such a man is in good circumstances,’’ ‘‘is in easy circumstances.’’ When we hear this, we know that it conventionally means, such a man has abundance of money. ‘‘He has ample means,’’ signifies that he has an ample supply of money. But, whether the possession of money is equivalent to ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘easy’’ circumstances, or to ‘‘ample means’’ for attainment of the real object of life, opens up other questions, general and individual. What are ‘‘easy Circumstances?’’ Curious instance of our non-belief in what we think we believe. ‘‘Easy circumstances.’’ ‘‘Ample means.’’

‘‘It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven,’’42 says the wisest and best of our instructors. Curious how many hear his words read as indisputable authority, yet habitually speak of riches as ‘‘easy circumstances.’’ How little must we think of what we hear and accept as truth or of what we say! But there are those who are rich within, whether, externally, they are rich or poor. Riches or poverty do not inevitably stand for favourable or unfavourable circumstances as regards the development and exercise of the divine in man. What circumstances will develop it, what will strengthen it, what will afford it satisfaction— this is the problem for the united efforts of man to solve, these are the circumstances for the united efforts of man to strive to effect. But no considerable portion of mankind have, as yet, had this problem distinctly before them, and there is little union in trying to discover it, or to realize it in life and work. To get ‘‘money,’’ or to use it as other people who have as much money usually do—this occupies much of human life, employs much of human effort—some bestow their surplus of time and thought on divine objects and purposes. But there is not the unity which should make the whole of the object of the whole of mankind a search after the divine. This object would, no doubt, remain, in part, work for

42 Matt 19:24.

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money. Money may facilitate the entrance into the ‘‘kingdom of heaven.’’ Whether it will or not depends upon whether it becomes ‘‘ample means’’ to exercise a righteous nature. But, it will be asked, will man never attain a state in which it will be impossible for circumstances to stifle the divine light in him? If such a state can be attained, it will be through the attainment of wisdom by which to change unfavourable into favourable circumstances. Upon an active, good and strong nature unfavourable circumstances tell with more intensity than upon feeble ones; the activity of the nature increases the evil in the circumstances. But the good and strong have more power to modify or to change the circumstances; it is not passive endurance, but such change or modification which helps the good through evil circumstances. (Arguelles,43 alone, in the dark, in prison, felt himself in danger of going mad; a feebler spirit, a less living soul, would have been in less danger. But he modified the circumstances; he did not attempt passively to endure them. With the end of a cigar he wrote on his prison walls such passages from books as he could recollect; when light was brought with his food, he read them, and thus he kept himself sane for better days.) 3.7 {Omitted: Dear father, now f164} Is it possible for people now to ‘‘think seriously’’ of anything? Think of the importance of a day! Roman Catholicism teaches that in the mass the great sacrifice of Jesus Christ is renewed every day, and every day He is solemnly enshrined on earth. So, when morning breaks, that solemn portion of eternity called a day is every day renewed. But do what are called the ‘‘upper classes’’ begin it again in that frame of mind, preparing for their work, keeping up the spirit necessary for that solemn day’s work? We get up and hurry through our dressing, saying our prayer first by our bedsides (at least some do, some do not) (‘‘saying our prayers,’’ what an expression! How much it tells! Were I urging one of the ministers to grant some benefit to the army, would it be called ‘‘saying a prayer’’?) ; we then sit down to breakfast and talk of this thing and that thing, and a thousand other things, till our

Can what are called the ‘‘upper classes’’ think ‘‘seriously’’ of life?

43 Augustin Arguelles (1755-1844), main writer of the Spanish constitutions of 1812 and 1837, was imprisoned and then fled the country for England in 1823. He became head of the Spanish government on his return.

314 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought minds are all dribbled away. Are our minds then pitched to the tune necessary to begin our work? But it is ten to one that we don’t begin it then; we sit about for a few hours longer, reading the paper, writing a letter, talking to our friends, paying a visit, doing a little bit of accounts, reading a light book, till we are all broken up for the day into little fragments. Seriousness of Life Do we look ‘‘seriously’’ at what is so serious a thing, viz., a day?

Should we not, by some time of communion with God (the manner to be arranged as mankind shall hereafter appoint) try to rise each morning to a point of view whence we may see and feel the day before us as truly as possible, may estimate its importance, whether it is to be passed in doing or suffering? Thus may we hope to be in that spirit which is fittest to do that small work which awaits us, to prepare for that larger and higher work whenever it comes, which, as we believe in the Spirit of Perfection, so we must believe is in His purpose for all, which therefore may be prophesied undoubtingly, however distant the time, will come. To try, then, now for the spirit in which to meet the small things before us, to wait for the larger ones, surely expected, must be our matins. May this day be passed in such union with Him that we may draw out such nourishment as may be found, may gather it in, in any way possible, for a future day! But instead of winding up the watch for its work, beginning the day with a solemn dedication to God in some way, and taking every means to fit ourselves for our work, we seem to take every means to unfit ourselves. There is as great a difference between people who have been sitting all the morning, as young ladies usually sit, in the drawing room with friends, and those who have been at real work on things suitable to them, as there is between people who have been shut up for ten or eleven hours in a close room without food, and those who have had their exercise and their usual meals. Yet nobody seems to notice this; everybody is aware of the latter, but very few of the former; and till this is noticed parents will make no difference. If a parent were to say, No, you must not eat your dinner, or you must take no exercise because I cannot spare you, you must stay and read to me, and only eat at odd times, the whole world would be amazed at the selfishness of such a parent. Yet the moral starvation which parents inflict is just as great, but this is not noticed, neither by parent

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nor child, and it is better for a girl to do what her parents tell her than for her to be doing the same thing by herself, for there may be some exercise of her social, her affectionate nature in the first case, instead of no exercise at all, as in the last, of any part of her nature. In what is called the ‘‘higher class,’’ it is all laid down what we are to think; there is no exercise of the nature. People are said to lose their reason when they become insane, but they may lose their reason just as much by never exercising that part of their nature, and there are quite as many who have lost their reason out of as in a lunatic asylum. 3.8 Woman’s Choice What a choice it is before a woman! It is notorious how few are her acquaintances among men; a few out of the few are likely to give her the opportunity of marriage, and how slight is the acquaintance which she has with them! If, then, among these few, to those who like her, she says, ‘‘I know you so little that I cannot make up my mind to marry you,’’ she will but express a very common situation. The anxiety of mothers to marry their daughters is a current joke. When daughters are grown up, mothers do not know what to do with them; they are aware that the daughters have not what is called a ‘‘sphere’’ at home, are not satisfied, and the mothers think therefore, naturally enough, a great deal about the marriage of their daughters, perhaps hardly consciously to themselves. Therefore, the usual talk about children staying at home to take care of their parents means nothing. Now, if the daughter does not marry, what is her alternative? She is penniless, unless in exceptional cases where she may have had something left her; she must remain at home, it is said, to take care of her parents. It is the hardest slavery, either to take the chance of a man whom she knows so little, or to vegetate at home, her life consumed by ennui [boredom] as by a cancer. What does she take to? In the absence of other spheres of action she very often takes to governessing her parents. Where she is fond of her home, this is generally the case; an active spirit doing nothing must find something to do, and this is the nearest thing at hand. People who have nothing to do generally take to playing the policeman over their relations; if too gentle or too indolent for this kind of action, ennui consumes their lives. We do the best we can to train

What is the choice of life before a woman?

316 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought our women to an idle, superficial life; we teach them music and drawing, languages, and poor peopling, ‘‘resources,’’ as they are called, and we hope that if they don’t marry, they will at least be quiet. 3.9 What is the duty of children towards their parents?

It will be said that this doctrine sets the father against the son, and the mother against the daughter, and there will be five in one house divided, three against two and two against three. {Omitted: Yes, Father, she said, If I were to lock them all up together in the same room, certainly there would be nothing but their tails left. f168} Granted, if we were to lock them all up together in the same room. But this is just what we want not to do. We want to send them forth. But the children often don’t want to be sent forth; they have nothing which they want to do; they are like canary birds which you let go, and they come back again. We don’t want to force them out. But, if they are not canar y birds and want to go, we would let them out. If they are quite satisfied, let them stay, by all means. But, in general, they are not satisfied at home, and yet have nothing they want to do abroad. But do children owe their parents no duty, no love or gratitude for all that they have done for them? Certainly they do, but what is duty? Not to sacrifice but to improve life. Love and gratitude? Certainly. But they can’t be grateful to people for making slaves of them. They acknowledge the kind intentions of parents with all their hearts. They are grateful in two ways, for what parents have done which is kind, and for what they intended to do which was kind. But gratitude is a sense of kindness, and they can’t love and be grateful to people for enslaving and injuring them. Type for Social Intercourse

What is the type before us in our intercourse with our families?

But is there to be no forbearance, no respect, no mutual self-denial? Is every member of a family to think only of improving, or developing himself, without any regard to the duty of yielding to one another’s desires, or even caprices? There should always be a whole in our dealings with everybody, that is, we should always see the whole of our intercourse, or a type of it, before us. If, for instance, I were to see before me the whole of my intercourse with my child, or friend, not merely what I should like to give her today, I should not let her go on interrupting me ever y half hour; there would be no type in that, but I should settle

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with myself what amount of time and forbearance I ought to give her. I should not sit today two hours after dinner listening to her, thinking, ‘‘Today it would not be kind to go away,’’ but I should consider her whole life and my whole life, and the type of each, and how much we ought to give to one another. And I should not allow these things to be determined by accident, by momentary impulse, vibrating like a pendulum, between resentment and remorse, resentment at having so much exacted from one, remorse at not giving so much as is expected of one. A woman who accomplished one of the greatest works which has ever been accomplished, either by man or woman, mentions that she had had the plan of it three years in her head before she did anything. Why? because she had no type of what her intercourse should be with her own family, nor had they, and she allowed them to monopolize all her time, the time for doing the thing to which God had called her, and thought it was ill-natured to go away after breakfast or after dinner. Some day such a family will say to her, ‘‘How could you? You saw, and we did not see, and you let us. How could you suffer us to do it?’’ A friend of mine had a crooked finger, because when she was a child, she would not let her nurse take off the rag when it was hurt to dress it, and the nurse allowed it. Might she not say, ‘‘I was a child and did not know; how could the nurse let me?’’ How could she indeed? And what is a deformed or crippled finger compared with a deformed or crippled life? Is it well to go on without a type, leaving it to the accident of the moment to decide? Thus is frittered away our life. When we think of the lives around us, squandered by the fancies of children who know not what they do, we cannot but see strongly the danger of having no type. For, if you were to ask people seriously, ‘‘Do you intend your life to be spent in this way?’’ they would say, ‘‘Oh! no, it is only for today; it would be thought unkind not to give way today.’’ The audacity of people in forming an opinion, and not only forming but urging one, merely ‘‘because it is my opinion,’’ is curious. It is because they have no type before them. When they give unhesitatingly their opinion that such and such should be done, that A should go to college, for instance, B study the law, it is because they are thinking, ‘‘What will people say? They will say what a bad thing that he should not go!’’ not because they have any clear type in their minds of what A will be when he leaves college, or how the study of the law will suit B.

318 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Family intercourse 3.10 What is the ‘‘family’’?

What is right in ‘‘giving up one’s own way’’?

In ‘‘forbearance.’’

What is the right of parents to the services of daughters?

‘‘God makes the family’’ {Omitted: Portia, you say f171}. So it is often said. Perhaps it is just the contrary. God makes attractions and the principle of the family is not to go by attractions. There may be one tyrant in the family, and the tyrant may go by attraction, but the others do not. In an amiable family, the common course of things is for everyone to give up just enough to prevent such collision as would make it intolerable. But is it not good for the character to give up its own way? Does not God intend all our peculiarities to be softened, our selfishness subdued in this way? {Omitted: said Columba, my youngest daughter f171} is often asked. The question is a very simple one. Are we intended to go by attraction or by repulsion? Are we to put on a strait waistcoat? Good people make themselves resigned to a family. They do not kick nor str uggle, and unquestionably this is much better than mere impatience of it. But it is as if we were to say, There are plenty of things in that room for one to do, plenty of people whom I could help and whom I could work with, but it is good for me to deny myself; I will put on a strait waistcoat and I will be resigned to it; I will sit quiet and not complain nor resist. Then, is there no truth at all in the universal opinion of good and earnest Christians, that it is right for us to practise self-denial and forbearance, to give up our own way and have our sharp corners rubbed off by a little contradiction? will be said. It is good for us to walk about and exercise all the muscles which are in our body. But to graze our elbows and our shins, rub the skin off our knuckles, how can that ever be anything but an evil? God means us to do what we like, first learning to like the right. ‘‘For joy that a man is born into the world,’’ Christ says.44 And that is a subject of joy. But a woman must be born into the family. If she were born into the world, it would be joy too. But what joy is there in her being born into the smallest of all possible spheres, which will exercise perhaps no single one of her faculties? {Omitted: ‘‘Well, I think you are right, Fulgentia,’’ said Portia, though f172} Ever yone will say this is preaching doctrine subversive

44 John 16:21.

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of all morality. But what right have a man and woman to absorb all the powers of four or five daughters? The right is all the other way. If I have brought them into the world, they have the right to expect that their powers shall be exercised, their lives made worth having, opportunity given them for developing all their faculties. I brought them into the world without consulting them; they had no choice in it, and I ought to have thought of this, whether I was able to give them all this, before I did so. ‘‘The mother that bore you’’ is often mentioned as such a subject of gratitude, as if life were such a boon that the mere circumstance of my having given you life entails slaver y upon you. But whether it is a boon or not depends upon whether parents can make it so for children. ‘‘Bore you’’ to what? To take care of me? By the beautiful arrangement of Providence that the good of one shall tend to the good of all, and vice versa, that one cannot be injured without injuring the whole, the parents are injured as well as the children by this absorbing of their services. Family Co-operation And how often is there unsuitableness in the characters of the members of the same family. Look round among the families you know, and see how many you know in which they do not think there is something very peculiar in them. ‘‘We do not go on well, but,’’ etc.; ‘‘I should not like it to be mentioned, but,’’ etc., ‘‘there is something ‘ver y peculiar’ about that child,’’ ‘‘such an unusual reser ve,’’ or, ‘‘I know there is a ‘peculiar’ deficiency in myself.’’ Do you know one family where the mother has what may truly be called a beautiful relation with the daughter? One which you would call a very happy family, except the ‘‘happy family’’ in the cage which travels about? ‘‘If I had but children like so and so,’’ we hear constantly said in private, ‘‘but mine are so ‘ver y peculiar.’ ’’ ‘‘Robbed and murdered’’ we read in the newspapers. The crime is horrible. But there are people being robbed and murdered continually before our eyes and no man sees it. ‘‘Robbed’’ of all their time, if robbing means taking away that which you do not wish to part with, slowly ‘‘murdered’’ by their families. There is scarcely anyone who cannot, in his own experience, remember some instance where some amiable person has been slowly put to death at home, aye and at an estimable and virtuous home. With regard to time, however, it is often said that if people made the most of their odd moments, they would have not much to com-

What family cordially cooperates within itself ?

Are ‘‘families’’ to take up all the time of their own members, excepting ‘‘odd times’’?

320 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought plain of, but they waste their spare quarters of an hour so grievously. The maxim of doing things at ‘‘odd moments’’ is a most dangerous one. Would not a painter spoil his picture by working at it ‘‘at odd moments?’’ If it be a picture worth painting at all, and if he be a man of genius, he must have the whole of his picture in his head every time he touches it, and this requires great concentration, and this concentration cannot be obtained at ‘‘odd moments,’’ and if he works without it he will spoil his work. Can we fancy Michelangelo running up and putting on a touch to his Sistine ceiling at ‘‘odd moments’’? If he did he would have to take it out again. But the value of fresco is that this cannot be done, and that is one reason probably why great masters preferred fresco and said that oils were only fit ‘‘for children and dogs.’’ The very gist of fresco painting is that it should be all painted in at once from one master idea, not niggled and dawdled at. The Chancellor Oxenstiern45 is recorded {Omitted: in all little good books and odd corners of moral newspapers . . . said Columba f174} to have written a folio volume during the ten minutes his wife kept him waiting for dinner every day. It was not worth his writing, then, nor our reading. Everything that has ever been done at ‘‘odd moments’’ had better never have been done; even a letter, written in a ‘‘spare quarter of an hour’’ had better not have been written. Can any work requiring thought be done at ‘‘odd times’’? Perhaps the mere writing what has been carefully thought out in the watches of the night—yet hardly even that, to do any good. Then are we to do nothing with our odd times? Are we to waste the spare moments which make up the greater portion of a woman’s life? If you are to do anything, you must do it then, is again said. Odd Moments When people give this advice, it sounds as if they said, ‘‘Don’t take any regular meals. But be very careful of your spare moments for eating. Be always ready to run into the kitchen and snatch a slice of bread and butter at odd times. But never sit down to your dinner, you can’t, you know.’’ We know what can be done at odd times, a little worsted work, acquiring a language, copying something, putting

45 Axel Gustafsson Oxenstiern (1583-1654), regent for Queen Christina of Sweden.

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the room to rights, mending a hole in your glove. What else is there? I don’t know. Nothing requiring original thought: nothing, it is evident, which requires a form, a completeness, a beginning and an end, a whole, which cannot be left off ‘‘at any time’’ without injur y to it, which is not ‘‘mere copying,’’ in short. When Beethoven46 wrote a bar, he must have had the phrase, the movement, the quick time which was to succeed, the slow movement which came before—the whole piece, in short, in his thought. And could he write a bar now, a bar then, at an ‘‘odd moment’’? This is what we call being a ‘‘dilettante,’’ when a man does work in that way, and most of the works of dilettanti had better not have been. Women are almost always dilettanti, and have women ever produced any original work, any, with a ver y few exceptions, which the world would not be as well without? Many, indeed, are the stories told of great men mastering a whole science in their spare moments. There are, no doubt, some minds which can work, and some employments which can be taken up at odd times—where it is acquiring which is to be done. But if there is no digesting done, or if there is no time for digesting afterwards, the acquiring perhaps is not of much benefit. Or a mind may become so possessed with a subject that it can work at it at all moments, but then the moments cease to be ‘‘odd.’’ The greatest genius which cannot and ought not to work without seeing the whole of its subject before its eyes, the most important subjects of thought which require this, these cannot be referred to ‘‘odd moments.’’ People get out of the difficulty by not having any subjects of thought which require to be pursued at other than ‘‘odd times.’’ {Omitted: ‘‘But I don’t see how it can ever be otherwise. You must make the best of it.’’ ff176-77} How, in a family, where the one has to wait for the other—where, if they have an amiability, the employments of everyone are constantly called upon to give way—how can the members, excepting those who have professions, ever have anything but ‘‘spare moments’’? How, indeed? we constantly hear it said, ‘‘So and so has given up all her music since she married, or her drawing—what a pity, such a first-rate artist as she was!’’ A married woman cannot follow up anything which requires exercise, and if, even for such second-rate

46 Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827), composer.

322 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought things as these, people cannot command the time necessary, how will they do for subjects of thought ? And we are slower still to apprehend that we must not rob you of the state of mind with which to think, than of the time in which to think. If visitors come in, the lady of the house often complains that she will not have time to do this or that, she does not complain that she will not be in a state of mind when they go to do it, if it is something important and requiring thought. She settles that by not having anything important to think about. {Omitted: ‘‘Ah! Fulgentia, you can think, I cannot.’’ f177} Employment at ‘‘Odd Times’’ Half the people in the world have, indeed, no power of thinking. ‘‘What does it matter to give me time for that which I cannot do?’’ is often said. But ‘‘half the world cannot think,’’ because they have never tried. How is it possible? People get up in the morning and come down to breakfast, can they think then? After that, they read the newspapers or write letters, or sit in a room reading a book, where ever ybody is reading bits out of their own book aloud, or talking, till luncheon. Then they ride or drive, then they read a book or write letters till dinner. Then they spend the evening together till bedtime. This is interspersed, for women, with housekeeping and visiting the poor people, for men, with House of Commons, managing their estates, the bench and the board. Now, how are you to think? When are you to think? Not sitting with your feet on the fender, that is only dreaming. Few, except Descartes, ever thought without a pen in their hands. A mother will say to her daughter, ‘‘Now, my dear, all the people are gone, you have all the afternoon to yourself, you can go up and employ yourself in your own room.’’ But is she in a state to think? Is not her power of attention all frittered away? If she has breakfasted in a crowd, if she has been standing about for two or three hours after wards, not knowing whether she might go away or not, how is her mind in any condition to think after that time? Sir Walter Scott47 even did not write his novels in that way. But we are not all Sir Walter Scotts, nor Michelangelos, nor Beethovens. On the contrary, such geniuses only come once in a thousand years.

47 Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832), novelist.

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How do we know that? We are often struck by the richness of organizations at seventeen or eighteen, and how they go off afterwards. We are oftener surprised by the power than by the poverty of young characters. In many families there is one with a great dramatic talent, another with a genius for music, and a third with one equally remarkable for the pencil, a fourth writes like Coleridge.48 Yet we know perfectly well that these will be neither Michelangelos, nor Beethovens, nor Mrs Siddonses,49 nor Miltons. Why? A lady friend {my mother f178} of mine and Michelangelo both had a turn for architecture. Michelangelo studied it. My friend never did. All she did was pure genius. To compare her to Michelangelo, of course, does not come into our head for a moment. How could she be compared, indeed? The one had no possibility given her, the other had. But people never think of this. They think nothing of being in a state of mind to think a great thought, to do a great work. They will fritter away all their power, and then think they have enough to do anything they want to do with it. They will let others play with them all the morning, and then think, ‘‘I shall have the afternoon to myself.’’ You may do your accounts, or you may play with the children, or you may read an idle book, but do anything important which requires thought you cannot. And therefore the best way is to give up all subjects of thought, and that is what people do. Reading aloud Many say there is not the absolute want of steady application in a family here mentioned, because there is ‘‘reading aloud’’ almost always going on. But don’t you feel, when you are being read to, as if a pailful of water were being poured down your throat, which, but that it comes up again just as it goes down, would suffocate you? Very few swallow it at all; fewer still digest it. Many people like to read aloud, but how many can bear being read to without going to sleep? Yet ever ybody can’t be reading aloud. Women like something to tickle their ears and save them the trouble of thinking while they have needlework in their hands. They like to be spared the ennui of doing nothing, without the labour of doing something.

48 Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1722-1834), poet and essayist. 49 Famous actress Sarah Kemble Siddons (1755-1831).

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Why does not improved character follow improved experience in the lives of adults?

Those who have a great power of receiving impressions, a ready perception, thus like to be read to, but a reflective person does not because there is no time nor opportunity given for reflection, and therefore he ceases to attend. I remember hearing Lord Jeffrey50 say, only the year before his death, that he hated being read to. He always read to himself, at eighty years of age. In a family the common practice is for one to read aloud and for the others, of course, to listen, or—not to listen. What does it signify in the latter case whether I am there or not? Generally, I am not there, though my body is, for the others would be very much vexed, of course, and think it ver y unsocial if my body were not, even though it be asleep. {Omitted: A family is a strait waistcoat. f180} One person can do nothing after eight p.m., but goes to sleep. Another can do nothing before 10 a.m. But both unfortunates are obliged to be present in the body at whatever is going on, although they are not there. We shall think it curious, looking back, in a future state to see that we have condemned people to do nothing, and called it a duty, a self-denial, a social virtue. This, perhaps, may be one reason why grown-up people seldom improve. We ought to improve, of course, every year, as long as we are capable of gaining any experience, and the more experience the more improvement. Young people, during the time of their education, do improve. But it is set down for granted that old people are not to improve. Does anyone ever say, ‘‘Do you think Mrs - is improved since last year?’’ Nobody ever thinks of such a thing, unless, indeed, there is exercise of some faculty.51 For instance, it is said, ‘‘Pauline Viardot is much improved since last season; she shows marks of careful study’’; and this after she has arrived at mature age. Or, ‘‘George Sand’s style and ideas have undergone a complete regeneration since she began writing.’’52 Or, ‘‘Sir Robert Peel’s53 powers as an orator are sensibly greater than last session.’’ Raphael,54 it is well known, changed his manner, and most, or all

50 51 52 53 54

Lord Francis Jeffrey (1773-1850), Scottish writer, lord advocate and mp. JSM: Special and rare. Pauline Viardot (1821-1910), opera singer; George Sand (1804-76), novelist. Robert Peel (1788-1850), Conservative prime minister. Raphael (1483-1520), Italian Renaissance painter.

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but the pre-Raphaelites, would say for the better. Schiller made the most tangible progress, so that Goëthe55 said of him, ‘‘If you met him after the lapse of a week you did not know him again.’’ Is it not evident, then, if exercise goes on in mature age, as it does in childhood, that progress will be made in the same way? Nay, probably even faster, as the vantage ground of experience becomes greater. But people have no type before them, neither nations nor individuals. Degeneration of Individuals We say vaguely that ‘‘times improve,’’ whereas sometimes it is evident that they do not improve, as in the Roman Empire, as in Spain, where they degenerated. In England it is always taken for granted that we are making progress. Then comes some statist and says there is more crime, more disease, more madness than formerly. Macaulay says the contrary, and shows that food is cheaper, that the ‘‘condition of the working classes’’ is more comfortable, education and literature more diffused, etc. No one seems to know which is the case. Both these statements may be true, and are not inconsistent. How can nations improve, however, if they have no type before them? It is perhaps incorrect to say that they have no type. England has the type of making money. In commerce, in trade, in many manufactures, in railroads, in mercantile speculations, she is far beyond all the rest of the world, and (which is having a type), she seems to make money for making money’s sake. A Cabinet minister of the highest moral worth subscribes to Hudson’s testimonial.56 When Hudson lost his character without losing all his money, he was still ‘‘received.’’ A man left nine or ten thousand a year to a boy of nine years old whom he knew nothing of, to his only sister with whom he had lived in the most affectionate intercourse all his life, a small annuity (and this was prompted by his attorney), to his niece nothing, and all for the sake of keeping a large fortune together after his death, which he had spent his life amassing.57 Lately a most distinguished

What type have nations or individuals before them?

What is the type of England?

55 Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805), German poet and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), Enlightenment writer. JSM noted the typo: Goëthe should be Goethe. 56 George Hudson (1800-71), corrupt mayor of York; for a memorial fund being raised for him see the Times 10 December 1853:8. 57 The stor y of Peter Nightingale, who left his money to Nightingale’s father, a great nephew, rather than to closer women relatives.

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What is the type of France?

and respectable man left his whole enormous fortune to a young nobleman, known to him and to all the world as a profligate, and deeply in debt, so that the fortune was tied up till these debts were paid, while he left to some of his best friends nothing. Such things as these could perhaps happen only in England, where money, for its own sake and not for that which money procures, seems to be valuable. Perhaps the type of France is a type of art in ever ything that concerns the eye and the ear. Some women furnish their apartments to suit their complexions. The barricades were a study for the painter. No Frenchwoman is ill-dressed, no Frenchman or woman does not know how to talk. You have only to enter their gay capital, smiling and beautiful, like a gem, to see the difference of its type from that of ours. You had only to go in to the Great Exhibition of 1851 and see their counters, arranged with an artist’s eye, even to the papeterie, so as to be perfect studies, and then look at the beautiful English silks, set up upon a thing like the ornamental paper of an inn fireplace, in order to see the difference of the two nations. Then the cleverness of their talk, by which their wits become sharper every hour—the point of everything they say and write. You see at once that their type is to elaborate ideas into conversation, but no one would say that this is an English aim, and therefore the sooner, perhaps, they give up a mere attempt to imitate their neighbours over the water, the better. (In a review by one who knows both French and English society thoroughly, it is said, speaking of Paris: The sociability, the love of conversing, is an absolute necessity. We know men who had rather live in extreme poverty in Paris than go away for a comfortable income, not from any love of its localities, but they are afraid of being ennuyéd for want of the conversation they find in every salon. Why does a man in London prefer his club to a drawing room, where a lady presides? And why do men in Germany never go to one but by special invitation, with a supper to make it bearable? They are as fond of their homes as the French, but they have less need of companionship in their wives. But whatever is the cause, the effect is certain, and in consequence of this preference for their society, the middleaged and the old ladies have the same relative value, according to their intellectual merit, that men have. We never heard anybody in France call a man an ‘‘old woman’’ because he was a fool of a particularly twaddling kind. Old women are thought quite as

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capable of wisdom as old men, and in fact they have more influence. In England a woman’s beauty and her virtues are what every man thinks of as the charm of his house. He talks with rapture of the woman who will nurse him and pour out his tea. In France you do not hear much about a woman’s coffee. ‘‘Est-elle aimable?’’ [is she likable?] Aimable does not mean a virtue, but an agrément [pleasantness]. ‘‘A-t-elle de l’esprit?’’ [has she a good head?] is the second question, if not the first, that every man asks. It does not mean anything wonderful: it means, ‘‘Has she the quick perception that seizes what is said, and returns change for your thoughts?’’

Types of London and Paris The French elaborate their thoughts into words, the English into work. The word is good and so is the act, but can the two nations ever interchange? A copy is seldom worth having. Perhaps no nation or individual has a tangible type before them now. All they do is to imitate. When the Greeks believed in their gods, there came forth an Apollo Belvidere, a Ludovisi Juno.58 Now we no longer believe in them, but we still imitate them. And there come forth Titian’s Venuses and Canova’s Perseus.59 When the Italians believed in the Virgin Mar y, see what holy families Raphael and Guercino and Guido60 produced, and the same Titian, whose Venus is an earthly profligate, paints a virgin fit for the skies. We still go on painting the holy family, though we have ceased to believe in it. And what holy families! Could we not advance to paint a new holy family, the holy family of mankind? If we were inspired by that, as the Greeks and Italians were by their gods and goddesses, a new era of art would come in. But go into Mr Vernon’s galler y61 and see horses and cows and game, and cottages and dogs, and little boys grinning and ladies on horseback, all very beautiful in their way, but no holy families, nothing of what in the future might be—of the ideal—of the type which God intends mankind to reach, and poets and artists, who are our prophets, to set forth.

When a nation or an art ceases to have a type, and begins to imitate, it begins to degenerate.

58 Works of art seen in Rome 1847-48, in European Travels (7:112 and 242). 59 Painters Titian (c1490-1576) and Antonio Canova (1757-1822). 60 Guercino (1591-1666), Bolognese school; Guido Reni (1575-1642), perhaps Nightingale’s favourite artist after Michelangelo; all discussed in European Travels. 61 The art collector Robert Vernon gave a magnificent collection of British art to the National Gallery, displayed in a gallery named after him.

328 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Moral Evidence 4.1 What is moral evidence? Is there a science of moral evidence?

Is it presumption to assert what God will and will not do?

Is there, or not, a science of moral evidence? This is what we want to know. Faith is a belief in the unseen, and people make a merit of it, whereas it is no merit at all; it is what we cannot help. But what do we mean by a science of moral proof ? I believe that, if Dr Arnold could, by placing a boy at the top of the class, ingratiate himself with a certain family, though he could do so without detection, he would not do it. I believe this with as great certainty as that the sun will rise tomorrow. There is no difference in the conviction with which I assert these two things. And is not this faith, conviction or certainty about the unseen? I believe it because I cannot help it. May we not attain to the same certainty about God? May we not feel, for instance, the same certainty that He will not blot us out of existence tomorrow, as we feel that the sun will rise tomorrow? a certainty drawn from our knowledge of His nature, as the former certainty was drawn from knowledge of Dr Arnold’s nature. To some minds this would carry no certainty at all. A distinguished dignitary of the Church of England was heard to say, speaking of his own near connection who had become a Roman Catholic, ‘‘it would not have happened if he had been made a bishop.’’ Now his intimate knowledge of that man, during many years, of his undoubted disinterestedness, single-mindedness, earnestness and purity of aim, carried no conviction at all to the dignitary’s mind. He believed that he would do as he probably would have done himself. It appears, therefore, that the mind to which moral proof brings certainty must be in a particular state. Neither, however, can you demonstrate mathematical truth to a mind wholly ignorant of or untrained to it. And in the same way as the dignitary was incapable of receiving any moral proof about his friend’s character, may a mind be incapable of receiving any moral proof about God’s character. If it is said, what presumption in us to say what God will and will not do, I answer, on the contrary, it appears as if all His purpose were to train us to such a knowledge of His nature, that we shall know what He will do. What a gospel there is to be revealed! The gospel of His nature. The nun sees her God in the Loretto miracle.62 She

62 According to the miracle, the house where Jesus lived in Nazareth was physically transported to Loretto, in Italy, where it is a place of pilgrimage.

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would fain believe it that she may find Him there. But we should lose our God if that miracle were to be proved to us, if we could fancy it by possibility true. We should not find Him in that, or in making wine,63 or in any of the miracles of the first century. People, however, do accept moral proof so far as to say God is good; therefore, He would not have left the world without a revelation. Therefore, there was a revelation. But He did leave the world without a revelation, and He leaves numbers of tribes and nations to this day without revelation. ‘‘Oh, then,’’ they say, ‘‘He makes allowances.’’

Moral evidence is used so far as to support the theor y of revelation.

Laws, not Phenomena, Evidence of Character {Omitted: ‘‘What a weary life God must have of it!’’ f187} What an existence is ascribed to God! Always weighing and balancing our sins against our disadvantages, or listening to Christ, who is always asking Him to do what He would not do without such asking! Who would wish to have such a God? It is not every mind, however, to which the discovery of the laws of nature reveals anything of the nature of God. To one it reveals that he will get paid for his discovery; to another, that he will have fame; to a third, that he will rise in society. Many of our scientific men receive no revelation about God from their discoveries. Like our bishop, their intimacy with such a character has made no revelation at all. Again, not phenomena, but laws, are the only evidence of character. We cannot estimate a man’s character from any action which he per forms, but only from the principles which govern his whole conduct. So with God. We see a waving field of wheat and we say, what a good God! We see floods and earthquakes, and we often imply, though nobody says, what a cruel God to drown and burn all these people! But it is from the law alone that we can detect His character. Perhaps we may find that God can be said never to do anything except actuated by the spirit of goodness, that His wisdom, His activity, are directed by His love. As St John says, God is Love.64 Has He no love of beauty, independent of His benevolence? in the little mosses which grow upon the Alps where no foot treads, in the cr ystals which strew the deserts where no man can dwell, do we detect no pure love of beauty?

63 An allusion to John 2:7-10. 64 1 John 4:8.

Not phenomena, but laws or principles, the only evidence of character, whether God’s or man’s.

What may we assert concerning God’s character?

330 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Does genius, without benevolence, make happiness, whether God’s or man’s?

Is intellectual power, without love, higher than brute force?

There may be beings to enjoy them. It seems to tend to this, that all that God does is the fruit of love. And if it be so, and man’s happiness be of the same nature as God’s, as we say it must, the only happiness of man which can be worth calling happiness must be working in the spirit of benevolence. Nothing of which feeling is not the origin and the end will be happiness. But is not the spirit of invention, even if not set going by feeling, by love, satisfactory? Was not the inventor of the railroad, of the steam engine, the discoverer of the law of attraction, happy? Not unless there was benevolence with it. It was not happiness, because not God’s happiness. Does He ever do anything except with the aim of benevolence? If not, neither must we. But often the spirit of invention is only for itself; genius spends itself for the love of fame only, or the pleasure of the discovery, or that of ‘‘getting on.’’ What is the meaning of ‘‘all is vanity and vexation of spirit,’’65 a meaning realized and felt as true by so many, if not this that, where is only what is called vocation—nothing of benevolence or of veneration in it—it always comes to be felt unsatisfactory? Comte says that there will come a time when intellectual power will be acknowledged to be no higher in itself than brute force. Both must be actuated, he says, by love. There was a time when physical strength was respected. Then intellect took its place. But in reality intellect, Comte says, is not more worthy of veneration than strength, unless inspired by feeling. Intellect, not Source of Happiness Scientific men are frequently absorbed by their science, and seldom think of pursuing it from love or benevolence. And the artist, the musician, how few think of anything but their art or of what it will bring them! All these men are in the possession of a kingdom only, not of the universe. It is only the universe coming into their schemes which will raise high their art or their science. We hear of Newton forgetting to eat his dinner, and becoming imbecile during part of his life; we hear of Schiller and other poets becoming so much interested in their subjects that they will take stimulants and walk up and down their rooms all night, and they die

65 Eccl 2:11.

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at thirty-seven. We see this on the one hand, and on the other men like the type idealized in Faust,66 giving up their pursuits in disgust. If an astronomer is solely intent upon discovering the law of gravitation, it seems to be little better than discovering a trick. You cannot think why those planets move about in the way they do. You find out the law of attraction. Is there anything higher here than finding out a very clever trick at cards? It is only veneration, devotion, benevolence, which elevate the discovery. Yet the discoverer must not be moralizing about schemes of benevolence while discovering laws; his attention would be divided between moral philosophy and astronomy; he must not be saying, ‘‘I must be benevolent, whom is this to please?’’ He must be absorbed in his pursuit, as it is justly called. Yet the spirit of devotion and benevolence must be at the bottom of it. He must be out of himself, yet within call. If not, if he is pursuing his vocation only, he comes to ‘‘all is vanity and vexation of spirit,’’67 there is nothing of the universe in his kingdom. If, on the other hand, he does not consult his vocation, but thinks ‘‘keeping school will be more useful than engineering, I will teach,’’ without any vocation for it, then it will end in schools being undertaken and badly done, and a great deal of doing good attempted, and nothing but harm done, as we see every day. There must be both: first, a spirit of benevolence and veneration at the bottom of everything, a reference to it in everything; second, a pursuing and acting it out according to the individual vocation. A surgeon must be so absorbed in the operation he is performing that he does not hear the cries of pain, and yet not so taken up with that patient that he neglects another. A man of science must not be interrupting his calculations to call up his benevolence, and yet a spirit of benevolence must animate the whole; that is, we must be wise and we must be good, wise in doing good according to our vocation, good in following our vocation with a view to God’s purpose, which is benevolence, a purpose always connected with the universe.

66 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Faust, a Tragedy. 67 Eccl 1:14.

Yet the discoverer must be absorbed in his pursuit.

332 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 4.2 Church of England In what is the Church of England a help?

Will the Church of England help religion to advance?

‘‘The Church of England is a good human help,’’ it is said. What does she offer as help? She has certain prayers taken from the Roman Catholic, which, if you find that they suit your feeling too, you may go and hear every Sunday; twice, if you like; in some places every day; and you may hear the Bible read, which some say you can do just as well at home; and you may hear a sermon preached by the best educated in the land, educated in classical literature, Aristophanes and Cicero,68 and such theological learning as we can give. Few men attend to the sermon, but they may criticize it. Farther, you may be married, that is, have a form of words pronounced over you, which makes your marriage the law of the land; and you may be buried, or the feelings of your friends gratified by having certain words read over you, and when you are ill you may send for the clergyman to read a service by you; and you may receive the sacrament once a month; and your children may be baptized. {Omitted: Christened, married and buried. f192} This is the help the church offers, which we may take if we like it. {Omitted: I should call it a hindrance. f192} But the Church of England may make discoveries, may make progress, it is said. The Roman Catholic Church cannot. The Church of England is no training for a discoverer in religious truth; we might as well say that a mathematician is prepared to enter upon farming as that a man trained in Latin and Greek and theological learning is prepared to find out truth in religion. When we walk through the new House of Commons, those rooms do not look like the rooms of an assemblage of men straining to find out truth for a great country, political truth, or the good of a nation. Nor does the church look like an assemblage of men fitted to find out religious truth. If it is asked, ‘‘Are we capable of finding out truth?’’ it may be answered that what we might be is indicated by moments. We are surprised to find the depths of feeling we are capable of. If life were organized so as to produce constantly what we are now conscious of at moments, ‘‘eye hath not seen,’’69 that which man might do. And,

68 Aristophanes (c448-c385 bce), Greek comic poet and playwright; Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 bce), Roman politician and historian. 69 An allusion to Isa 64:4.

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instead of talking about man being ‘‘desperately wicked,’’ we should say, as we sometimes do say of great heroes, we did not know of what man was capable. Instead of that hideous hopeless repetition ever y day for years of ‘‘there is no health in us,’’70 we should be living with a purpose, a purpose of moral improvement, which would be constantly realized till we were ‘‘per fect, even as God is perfect.’’71 What a difference there is between those thus living with a purpose and those who live with no purpose at all! These take up a book, but not with any particular object to further. They have no purpose but amusement. Our religion is too exclamatory to be a religion. All our prayers begin with ‘‘O Lord,’’ as if we were trying to excite in ourselves a feeling which we have not.

Exclamator y religion.

4.3 Want of Reality in this Generation We may see reasons for a less impressive character in this generation than among those whom we knew and heard of in the last. Religion is less real and less fervent. Prejudices are less deeply rooted, but so are attachments. Far indeed should we be from wishing to bring back the past, but oh! that we might feel the deep importance of the present! The senses, the taste, are now cultivated. Competition is keen. Novelties abound. A smattering of knowledge becomes common. Good people are trying to make it universal. But strive after the knowledge of the intimate nature of God and man, and let all other knowledge, all other acquirement, be pursued with a sense of man’s nature and destination! Who thinks of one or the other now in what he does or learns? ‘‘Thy kingdom come.’’72 If we seek Christ’s most abiding, his uppermost thought, it was this. And what did Christ understand by ‘‘Thy kingdom’’? He explains in those memorable words, ‘‘the kingdom of God is within you.’’73 There are no more satisfactor y

Causes of the want of reality obser ved in this generation.

70 From the confession in morning and evening prayer, Book of Common Prayer. 71 A paraphrase of Matt 5:48; Nightingale wrote a sermon on this theme, in Spiritual Journe y (2:335-43). 72 From the Lord’s Prayer, Matt 6:10. 73 Luke 17:21.

334 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought words of His. How much is contained in them! Earth may be heaven. But man is of the earth now, and there are so many good and pleasant things now rife in life that man is particularly liable to forget how great he might be—to be satisfied with being an amused and amusing child. Let him arouse himself to a consciousness of the divine within him, as pleasant and cheerful days pass among those around him. It was to the poor the gospel was preached.74 And, if another Christ came to draw fresh supplies from the well of tr uth which fails not he would still speak to the poor. Truth is a speculation among the rich. Among the poor, there might be a few who would listen and care to find more truth in life than it now manifests. We must be patient, but never failing in fervour for God’s work, ready to work and, which is much harder, ready to wait. Then may some seed be sown in this world, and we may be learning for other spheres, when we cannot learn for this. 4.4 The God of Law the ‘‘Most High.’’

Does it console the miserable to know that their misery is the consequence of Law ?

It is said that Christ is God. But there is wanted a higher God than Christ, a higher God than even Christ’s God. Certainly Christ believed that he could work miracles. Can we believe that such would be a God whom we can feel veneration for, whom we can trust in? The God of law is surely a much higher God than this. The God who works miracles is not the highest. We want the Most High. God’s plan is to teach all by invariableness. See how opposed this is to miracles, which teach by variableness! And how are we ever to learn when we cannot be sure of what is coming? When Christ says, ‘‘faith shall remove mountains,’’75 he appears to think that if you can but believe it, God will break a law. For to remove a mountain in the way He implies would be to break a law. No doubt the expression was used merely as a strong and startling one. But he would not be a wise man who would wish to break a law of God. He would be the wise man who believes that God will never break His laws, not that, if he believes that God will, He will. Certainly Christ’s was not the God of law. But some think that the theory of omnipotent and implacable law is not more satisfactor y than that of benevolent caprice, the recognized form of Deity. They think this a miserable world. If they are

74 An allusion to Matt 11:5. 75 A paraphrase of Matt 17:20.

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to be miserable, it does not signify to them whether they are miserable in consequence of such misery being the law, or whether they are miserable in consequence of such misery being the caprice of the Superior Being. On the contrary, they would rather it were caprice, because then there might be some hope that the caprice might change, whereas, if it were the law, there would be no hope. ‘‘Eternal Life’’—‘‘to know’’ God’s Character But it makes some difference what the Being is from whom emanates the law. If the law emanates from Juggernaut, certainly we would rather have caprice. But, if the law springs from wisdom and goodness, had we not rather have invariable law? If it is wisdom and goodness that I and all the world should work out perfection, and that perfection cannot be worked out without ignorance and mistake and misery, does it not then make a difference to us whether we are governed by law or caprice? Is it not of the very highest importance to find out God’s character? (‘‘Theology’’ is said by Pattison to be ‘‘(1) The speculative habit which transports the mind into another world; (2) An ethical principle regulative of our conduct in this world.’’77 Is not theology rather the knowledge of God’s character? Is it not a curious thing to leave out all mention of God in that which is, if anything, nothing but the science of God, and to call such science a ‘‘speculative habit’’? One might as well call the study of astronomy a ‘‘speculative habit.’’ God, whom perhaps we may call the only reality, is the subject, of all others, which we shake all belief in, as a reality, by this kind of speaking.) Is not God’s character our only dependence for a future state? We seem to think that a ver y poor dependence. But if we could make out God’s character from the things we see, should we not be able to make out the things we do not see from God’s character? I do not feel the slightest doubt from knowing your character that you will not commit a murder. Cannot I feel the same certainty about God? What is the difference between His and your committing a murder? and what is killing one of us but committing a murder? Does the fact of being possessed of Omnipotence justify it? And why should we suspect Him of it?

Knowledge of God’s character our only dependence. ‘‘To know’’ God is ‘‘eternal life.’’76

76 A paraphrase of John 17:3. 77 A paraphrase of Mark Pattison in ‘‘Tendencies of Religious Thought in England, 1688-1750,’’ in Essays and Review 264.

336 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought One cause for ever ything— God’s character.

If we could but get it into our heads that to be accordant with truth and wisdom is the only reason for anything, the only reason why bodies fall through the air in a given time, the only reason why fluids press equally in all directions, the only reason why gravitation is, why Dalton’s law is; if we could see this, we should see it to be the only reason why eternal life is, viz., that it is accordant with truth and wisdom, and we should not ask how it can be, nor why it should be that, when the material frame is gone, the spiritual identity should remain. Is it less incomprehensible how the human being can be at all? The conclusion of the whole matter is to recognize one cause, and that an omnipotent righteous will. A certain state of the optic ner ve causes sight, it is frequently said. A certain state of the optic ner ve invariably co-exists with sight, because such a co-existence is the will of the Omnipotent, these co-existences being the means for mankind to attain the knowledge which is power. But there is only one cause. Some philosophers, finding the word ‘‘cause’’ frequently misused, say there is no cause. Do the phenomena of the universe with which we are acquainted justify this assertion? By cause we mean that which effects some mode of existence which was not. 4.5 Find out your ‘‘Calling’’

To be content with the position God has placed us in is a fatal mistake.

It is a radical mistake fatal to all progress to say that we are to remain in the position ‘‘in which God has placed us.’’ The very object of all the teaching which we have from God is that we may find out the ‘‘calling’’ to which we are called. He leaves us to find it out. If He were to rub out the wrong figure in the sum and put in the right one Himself, would that be exercising our faculties at all as it does to make us do it ourselves? There is no idea now of organizing a life to act out our religion. We are to get on as well as we can in our life with our religion. What can we expect, then, other than what we do? It would be truer to say at once, ‘‘I know that I shall do so all my life, but if you like I will come once a week, and say that I will not.’’ We think so much more about having done wrong than about doing right. We talk so much more about what we have done, and our ‘‘desperate wickedness’’ than about doing otherwise. To ask God’s pardon is the main part of our religion, perhaps all the religion we have.

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Now, if we think that the very kernel of God’s plan is that we should make mistakes, asking pardon for them, instead of learning our lesson (His lesson) from them, does indeed seem counteracting His plan, and mistaking goodness for badness. What a difference it would make in our feelings towards each other if we could but get into our heads that this is God’s purpose. God’s plan is that we should make mistakes, that the consequences should be definite and invariable; then comes some Saviour, Christ or another, not one Saviour but many a one, who learns for all the world by the consequences of those errors, and ‘‘saves’’ us from them. Instead of saying to ourselves, as we have so often done, ‘‘we will begin next Sunday, and never do wrong anymore,’’ we ought to say, ‘‘I know that I shall do wrong; there will be (not one ‘‘fall’’ visited upon all mankind, but) many falls. I know that I must make mistakes. It is part of God’s plan. I will (not ask pardon for them but) take them in conformity with God’s purpose, and strive to learn His purpose. The consequence of my falls, indeed, will be upon the human race till a Saviour comes. May we all be Saviours in some way to humanity! I yearn to be and to do right, but before I knew what I was about in existence, the time was passed when I might have cultivated, have exercised capabilities which I now no longer possess. Inefficiencies, ignorance of the way I should pursue, habit, all render powerless the wish I have to will aright. What shall I do? I live on, strengthening much that I know to be wrong, though I desire above all the right, though the only times on which I look back with any pleasure are those when circumstances did help me to true and right feeling. I care for nothing that is called amusement. Ambition, as it is called, the externals of the world, have not a charm left for me. But incapacity blights me. Not a day passes, not an hour, in which I do not feel myself mistaken, in the wrong, either in thought, in feeling, or in doing. How shall I find help? What is God’s Plan for us? At all events I am convinced that to beat down my already depressed spirits, to thicken the cloud of darkness by self-reproach for that which arises from the laws of God, would be untrue. I can point out to myself many helps and consolations. I can assure myself that all shall be well, but I do not ask to live upon such assurance. No, existence is made up of presents, and each present is to be

What is God’s plan for us? How can we co-operate with that plan?

338 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought cared for. To live on the future (or on contemplation of any kind) is obviously not intended to be sufficient to man. In an imperfect state of things, in a life modified by no comprehensive view of what they are, and what they might be, who are to live it, it is difficult to exercise the nature aright. But from day to day I can see, helped by my own experience, means by which I may improve my course. And let me not think that there can be anything selfish or wrong in striving for the healthy nature of a human being, because that being is myself. The only question is, will my thought and care improve that being really? If it will, so I may help, or prepare to help, mankind. If I can really help myself or any human being to be better, so I undoubtedly am working with God and for man. I wish to avoid any course of thought, any talk, which is deteriorating, but I have not the capability to lead, to elevate myself or others; life takes its poor course; with a sorrowful heart I follow, unable to lead. I never will offer to myself the false doctrine that I may be good and happy in any circumstances, if I will. Since God intends man to modify life into one righteous course, dissatisfaction with any other course is His admonition, teaching me that this is not it. Let me be thankful, at all events, that I am not dead or paralyzed, so that this voice does not reach me. But helps I can have. I can look into the detail of my life, I can try for wisdom to steer through it aright, when I can. I will not flatter myself that I can enter upon an unbroken course of life, that I can say, ‘‘I have been always wrong, pardon me, O Lord, because I am conscious of it, and confess it. Now I will tr y never to be wrong again.’’ I accept God’s will that mankind, and I, as one of mankind, am to learn—to work my way. Let me awaken to see the nobility of such an existence, to see it in my own feebleness and ignorance, and in that from which I suffer, in others. Let me look how not to deteriorate, look even to the less rather than to the greater deterioration. If I cannot avoid what I feel deteriorating, there is a feeling with which this may be borne, which is elevating. The general run of moral books and of sermons are full of precepts which come home to nobody. How few can say practically that they have been better in consequence of them. To hear or read them is thought right in itself, but who says that they have helped him to be, to live better? Yet how one may help another, when a true life shall become the object of mankind. I heard yesterday a concert of instr umental music; how perfectly one fell in with another, what harmony! Such harmony will there be in

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life when man strives to find out what it ought to be, to make it such, to help man by means of man, each to take his part so as to harmonize with each other, engaged in the performance of the same piece. What is the World’s Plan? When I feel low and poor and miserable in a drawing-room life, where I can do nothing, is not that His word to me, saying, ‘‘Now you see that in this life human nature is not exercised to anything like the degree which it is capable of. You feel very uncomfortable; therefore change it as soon as you can; pick up everything you can from it while you are in it, but find out the life, as soon as you can, which does call out all the goodness and wisdom of which human nature is capable.’’ Can He speak plainer than He does? Could it, if He spoke in words, be more clearly His voice to me? {Omitted: Columba and Portia read the Life of St Teresa together. They read Manning’s Lectures on the Grounds of Faith.78 They read all kinds of Catholic theology, in ever y tongue. I used to hear their strange conversations. I never disturbed them, for it was no use. I felt it. I record these now, partly from a melancholy pleasure in their cleverness, partly to record for the benefit of posterity their downward course.’’ f204} But there is nothing about God in the lives we lead; we are to do what is usual. The visits we have to make, the people we are to ask to dinner, that which is ‘‘usual,’’ determines all these things. We never ask, what is the nature of God? and what His purpose for man? What is the nature of man, and what his destination? Or, if we do, we have only a Sunday answer. It is surprising that what God is is a question which interests no one. They take, without inquiry, what is set down in a book. Dr Arnold was right in taking a country curacy,79 and letting inquiry alone when his mind was disturbed. Those who take the miraculous view, and think that God has given a revelation to the world, must think that, if He has given one, He has adapted it to the normal state of that world; therefore, if anyone doubts it, it must be owing

What is the world’s plan? To do what is ‘‘usual.’’

The consistent course for those who believe in revelation is to abstain from inquir y, but only for those.

78 Henr y Edward Manning, Grounds of Faith: Four Lectures Delivered in St George’s Church, Southwark, 1852. 79 Dr Arnold was a tutor and informal curate in Laleham, 1819 to 1828, when he worked out his ideas on reform of the Church of England, the conception of a truly national church and education.

340 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought to some defect in his own nature. What he has to do, then, is (not to inquire, but) to improve his own nature that he may be able to accept God’s revelation. We have long since done with the miraculous view. We think God has entrusted it to the exercise of our own faculties to make the revelation. But, for those who hold such a view, Dr Arnold’s course was the only wise one, viz., to lay aside inquiry, adopt an active life, and tr y to improve his being. 4.6 ‘‘God could not have left His children without a revelation.’’

Four theories concerning revelation.

People constantly say, would God have left us without a revelation of Himself? Would He have left such an important question as religion to the unassisted reason of His creatures? All that we can say is, He has done it. But it is said people might believe Christianity if they liked it. Could those who lived before Christianity, could those now living, who have never heard of Christianity, believe in it, if they liked it? It is said, this is a mystery. Then He has done it. People allow that there are ‘‘doctrines upon which eternal life depends, and yet of these not a whisper was heard on earth until there came a revelation’’ 4000 years after the world began. They do not see what a God they have made when they say this; they do not see how they have been insulting Him. We who say that revelation has to be worked out by the exercise of man’s faculties can readily believe (and thank God for it) that 4000 years and much more might pass before the revelation came. We can reverence and esteem God for it. We can even be in a ‘‘rapture’’ like St Teresa,80 in contemplating the perfection of the scheme. But if the revelation was to be given by God, as these men say, why not give it sooner? What reason could He have? {Omitted: ‘‘Then you believe in no revelation,’’ said Columba. f206} There have been three parties—those who have said that there was a revelation through the book; those who have said that there was a revelation through the church, or through the book and the church; and those who have said that there was no revelation at all. Now we say that there is a revelation to everyone, through the exercise of his own nature—that God is always revealing Himself.

80 For Nightingale’s comments on St Teresa see Mysticism and Eastern Religions (4:66-70).

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God always revealing Himself Then how come men to believe in so many other revelations? The church is necessary to maintain those beliefs, in the atonement, the incarnation, the sacraments, etc., which were the natural growth of minds in the times in which they sprung up, but which, in these times, in which they are not the ‘‘intuitive effluence’’ of our natures, could not be maintained without a church. The Anglican Church has not authority enough to do this, and therefore she maintains them but very imper fectly. The Roman Catholic Church alone can do it. As she says herself, she is the only church who can. Is there any consistency in this age in any church but the Catholic? There can be no religion in arguing that you should stay in the church into which you were born. The struggle now going on between the Roman Catholic and Protestant appears to be not at all a matter of religion. We hear the argument daily used by the Arnold school (the names of which we reverence beyond most, the principles of which we are hardly able to understand), that men ought to stay in the church into which they are born. There is no religion in this; there is something else, there is conscientiousness, there is reverence, but there is no religion if religion be our tie to God. Surely the God who orders the Roman Catholic Church must be a very different God from the God who orders the Protestant Church, still more different from Him who orders the church of the future. If you believe that He does the things which the Roman Catholics say that he does, how can you stay worshipping Him in another church which says He does not? There can be no religion, at least in doing so, though plenty of something else, love of kindred, regard to duty, etc. And, indeed, can you go into an Anglican church and think there is any devotion? You see no prostration of spirit, no intensity of feeling, as among the Roman Catholics; you see people very nicely dressed; you see great care to come in good time; you see a feeling of having accomplished a duty when it is over. {Omitted: No, Columba, I think you are right. If you must belong to a church, I would belong to the Roman Catholic Church. f208} No one can call the Church of England the church of the apostles. The Catholics may say that their church is the church of the apostles, but we do not call our church the church of the apostles, except in the creed. We know that it is the church of Henry VIII,81

How come men to believe in other doctrines? God is always revealing Himself.

Argument that ‘‘we ought to stay in the church into which we are born’’ leads directly to having no religion at all.

Church of Rome overbusy. Hence Church of England too idle.

81 Henry VIII (1491-1547) founded the Church of England when the pope would not grant him a divorce.

342 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought not of the apostles. And what a church it is! The best thing that we can say of a clergyman in these days is that he does not interfere—‘‘a ver y good man, he never interferes’’—that is, he may interfere with the poor people, he may go and say, ‘‘I did not see you at church last Sunday, how was that? I think you might have managed to walk so far.’’ But he must not say such a thing to the ‘‘upper classes.’’ That would be ‘‘inter ference.’’ No Church intent upon seeking Revelation

If we are to seek revelation through our own faculties, why has no church dedicated itself to this search?

Whatever help past religions have given us, tr ue religion would give us more of.

The Church of England is expected to be an overidle mother, who lets her children entirely alone, because those made her who had found the Church of Rome an overbusy mother. She imprisoned us; she read our letters; she penetrated our thoughts; she regulated what we were to do ever y hour; she asked us what we had been doing and thinking; she burnt us if we had been thinking wrong. We found her an overactive mother, and we made the Church of England, which does not ‘‘inter fere’’ with her children at all. But, if mankind can find out God by the exercise of their own faculties, how does it happen that we have not long since found Him out, that we have not long since a church dedicated to that search? Hitherto all the efforts which have been made in religion since Christ’s time have been either to cut off error, or to believe what you say you believe. The Catholics say, ‘‘Christ says, be poor like me, leave your family for my sake,82 we are going to do it.’’ And the religious orders are the consequence. The Evangelical party says, ‘‘You tell us that Christ died on the cross for us; this really makes a great impression upon us; we cannot go and laugh and dance as if He were not dead.’’ These are the efforts which have been made to act out what was believed. Luther83 and the Reformers were the men who cut off some monstrous errors. Protestants they rightly called themselves, for to protest was all their business, and there is nothing very high or noble in protesting. To search for truth has yet to be brought for ward as an object. {Omitted: But, Portia, it seems to me that you are always protesting. What else do you do but protest? you protest against every single doctrine of Christianity and religion. f210} Ever ything that we have now in religion we should then have more of. You want to believe that Christ ‘‘died’’ once for you. We

82 A paraphrase of Mark 10:29. 83 Martin Luther (1483-1546), leader of the Protestant Reformation.

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believe that God is always dying for us. You want to believe that we ‘‘do nothing of ourselves.’’ We believe that God is in all of us, that we are, in fact, His activity. You want to believe in ‘‘free will.’’ We believe that God’s whole purpose is that man should learn (of himself) to be God. You want to believe in a future state; we would teach really to believe in one, not a future state which is to be given us, but a future state which we are to create. The mistake of all religions seems to have been, ‘‘Let us renounce this world and all its vanities, and look forward to a better.’’ We say, too, ‘‘Let us renounce this world,’’ but ‘‘let us create a better, let us show an example of a better.’’ There is no fault to be found with this ear th; we have no reason to suppose that there is a better earth anywhere else; we have no reason to suppose that there is a ‘‘better world,’’ unless we have created it; it will not be given us; let us then begin without delay to make one. Again, you think Christ was ‘‘inspired,’’ we don’t well know how; we believe all men to be inspired, to have God dwelling in them. All, excepting the atonement, we shall have. Suffering instead of a person seems to be without meaning. {Omitted: ‘‘With all that,’’ said Columba, ‘‘I think, if I were you, Portia, I should have no religion at all.’’ f211} Without the belief in miracles, in prayer, in a man-God, it is said, we can never have that fervent conviction which Saint Teresa had. Remember these words, ‘‘Lo, it is I, be not afraid.’’84 Some great artist should paint a series of pictures where man is passing through sorrow, and God says, ‘‘It is I, be not afraid,’’ where he is passing through sin—even through sin—yes, most through sin, and God says, ‘‘It is I, be not afraid.’’ God is so much more there than ‘‘walking on the sea,’’ which is, after all, very paltr y. Raphael paints Him per forming the miracle of the fish, and makes him so divine that we lose sight of the absurd nature of the miracle.85 But, if he had painted him saying to man in a state of sin and degradation, ‘‘It is I, be not afraid,’’ how much more divine! Belief in a Perfect God Saint Teresa was in a ‘‘rapture,’’ but we might be in a much greater rapture than hers. We have so much more to give us ‘‘rapture.’’ For what made her in a ‘‘rapture’’? Because Christ had appeared to her

84 Matt 14:27. 85 Raphael’s painting, ‘‘The Miraculous Draught of Fishes.’’

Saviours do ‘‘not come to destroy, but to fulfill.’’

Is belief in prayer and miracles essential to a fervent belief in God?

We do not really believe in a Per fect God, other wise we should be in a continual ‘‘rapture.’’

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No evidence could convince us of miracles, if we really believed in a Perfect God.

Roman Catholic aptitude for organization sustains belief in Roman Catholicism.

Evidence of ‘‘eyewitnesses’’ to miracles really of no value.

with a crown upon His head, and had told her that He would keep one door of her monastery and His Mother the other. And what was her monastery for, and the life she intended to live? To live at other people’s expense and pray all day. If she could be in a ‘‘rapture’’ about such things, it shows the power of loving in her nature. And we who have so much more to love, shall we not be in a much higher ‘‘rapture’’? We who see our God always, not with a crown upon His head occasionally, but always acting out the perfect law of love and wisdom in everything? Saint Teresa did not know whether her ‘‘raptures’’ were from God or the devil. It was a misery to her all through her life that she never could be quite certain of this. But we shall be quite certain that our ‘‘raptures’’ come from God. Because what we have to do is the searching out and finding what is consistent with perfect love and goodness. And this consistency will be the cause of our raptures. And therefore we shall have no doubt that they are not ‘‘the devil.’’ Saint Teresa was never sure. Did we really believe in God, i.e., in a perfect Being, whose scheme was that of perfection for all His creatures, should we not be in a continual ‘‘rapture’’? What evidence we have for miracles! is often said. But no evidence could convince us of them. You wish to believe in them, because you think you find your God there. We should lose our God, if we were to find Him performing miracles. That is the difference. But the Roman Catholics have not lost their God. They are, perhaps, the only people who have found Him, who are one with Him. The Roman Catholics, it is true, believe in such a God that we should find it impossible to love Him if we did believe in Him. But, then, they have an organization ready for their truly religious people to step into—to act out the irreligion. They have a life. Like them, it would become impossible and disgusting for us to do anything which was not one with Him, if we organized a life, of which unity with Him was the purpose and end. When all mankind shall have one purpose, then will there be real unity. And what a world that will be! all pursuing the same purpose, though with different means. Value of testimony—what? People make a point of having the evidence of eyewitnesses to a miracle. But here we have the evidence of St Teresa that she saw two little devils round a priest’s neck. We have the evidence of St

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Paul that he saw a light in the sky, and heard a voice.86 We are as certain of their honesty; we are as certain that they believed it when they said they saw the devils and the light as I am that I believe it when I say I see an inkstand on the table. There is no more ground for suspecting imposture in the case of St Paul than in that of St Teresa, but that the devils were not there, and that the voice was not there, we are equally certain. Therefore, what is the ‘‘evidence’’ of an ‘‘eyewitness?’’ Wherever miracles have been believed, they have been seen. We feel as sure that St Teresa believed she saw the miracle as that she did not see it. There is no difference in our certainty. Note. Baden Powell truly says, Testimony is but ‘‘as a second-hand assurance, a blind guide that can avail nothing against reason.’’87 We agree also with Pattison that ‘‘evidences do not constitute theology.’’ We cannot, however, agree with him as to what is ‘‘theology.’’88 {Omitted: I come now to the great sorrow of my life. My third daughter, my little Columba, the fairest jewel, the morning star of my old age, the gentle dove who nestled in my bosom (I have hardly mentioned her as yet, I thought her a mere child in her father’s arms) she became, at seventeen, a Roman Catholic, and, far worse, a nun. I seem doomed to disappointment. I, the most commonplace of mortals, addicted to common sense above all things, was obliged to ‘‘put up’’ with every phase and every possible show of folly and eccentricity in my children. The first inkling I had of this misfortune was a vehement attack from Columba, the sweetest child, as I have said, who ever shrank from contest and dispute, upon the poor old church. f215} 5.1 The Church of England has for men bishoprics, archbishoprics and a little work (good men make a great deal for themselves). She has for women—what? Most have no taste for theological discoveries. They would give her their heads, their hearts, their hands. She will not have them. She does not know what to do with them. ‘‘You may go to the Sunday School, if you like it,’’ she says. But she gives no

What does the Church of England do for us?

86 Paul’s vision on the road to Damascus, in Acts 9:3-6. 87 Baden Powell, ‘‘On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity,’’ in Essays and Reviews 141. 88 Mark Pattison, ‘‘Tendencies of Religious Thought in England, 1688-1750,’’ in Essays and Reviews 264.

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Curious merit, that of ‘‘toleration.’’

‘‘Atonement’’ at one time aroused much feeling.

training even for that. She gives neither work to do for her, nor education to do it, if she had it to give. Many women would willingly give her their life’s work. Luther gave us ‘‘faith,’’ justification by faith, as he calls it; and the Church of Rome gives us ‘‘works.’’ But the Church of England gives us neither faith nor works. She tells us neither what to believe nor what to do. No, it is said, she has wisely refrained from telling us what to believe. She does not wish to make slaves of our intellects, but to let each man judge for himself. We do not wish to believe all the dogmatic absurdities of Christian churches, to have an Inquisition forcing us to believe. Does any educated man, now, really believe in the incarnation? There has been, perhaps, more of feeling excited by the incarnation than by anything else. People were tired of hearing about the beauties of nature, and God’s skill in contrivance, and about their ‘‘creation, preser vation,’’ etc. But the idea of a God dying for their sins awakened much of feeling for religion. What does the Church of England do for us?

So did the theor y of prayer.

{Omitted: ‘‘Yes,’’ said Portia, f216} People must make a God till they can find one. It has always happened that some have made such a God as could be imagined by them, and others have taken Him from them. Few have looked about to find the true God. Indeed, it is hardly likely that they should. If we are to make a God for savages, or for men living in a false state of refinement, this is not finding God as He is. ‘‘What is religion without prayer?’’ says Gerbet89 {Omitted: said Columba f217.} Rather, what is prayer? Mrs S., when she lost her daughter, said, ‘‘I prayed that she might die without pain, and my prayer was heard.’’ Think of a sweet gentle innocent creature whom you would not have hurt for the world, and that God should have given her pain! and for no reason!! Because He desisted when the mother asked Him. It can only be (on this view) because the mothers do not ask Him to desist that He gives the children pain. And this is the God made by our theory of prayer. Well may it be said that we are idolaters, and have not found the true God. It is said that the Protestant religion gives no discipline to the character, no feeling of duty.

89 Philippe Olympe Gerbet, bishop of Perpignan.

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There are these three phases of character: selfish indulgence, necessity of duty and accordance with right. We have got out of the second phase (duty), and we have not got into the third phase (right). Therefore we have fallen back into selfish indulgence. Formerly, there was much more of conscientiousness. It was all laid down what we were to do, and we did it. People did not think of what they liked, but of what they ought to do. Now duty is so difficult, it is so little known what it is, that we only think of what we like. We have not come to ‘‘accordance with right.’’ ‘‘Right’’ {Omitted: said Columba f218} is the voice of God. It is natural that people should say, ‘‘I can’t hear what He says, I can’t hear distinctly. I want a man to speak to me and tell me plainly what He says and what I am to do, a man or a church.’’ In the Catholic orders, it is the superior who speaks with the voice of God. But the Protestants are between heaven and earth. They have neither an earthly superior nor a heavenly one. They doubt whether God speaks, unless indeed they open the Bible and find some text which tells them. But then they find contradictory things. They will not allow a man to speak as from God, which they call interference with religious liberty. But we might have the same certainty about God’s purpose which the Roman Catholics have. Only we must have it through the exercise of our own nature. Sometimes indeed His voice whispers, and sometimes it does not speak plain. But can we wish to hear it, except through the exercise of our own and others’ nature? If God did tell us things, a little detail here and a little detail there, what a confusion it would be! Supposing we were to ask Him how to make the steam engine, and He were thus to tell us! Two inquiring spirits among the operative class (a man and a woman) have at different times told me that they had asked Him to tell them if He was, and when He did not, they concluded that either He was not, or that He did not care to have it known to us. This is as if Galileo were to ask Him to tell us if the sun stood still in the centre,90 and to conclude, if He did not, that either it was not so, or that He did not care to have it known. These earnest spirits

Three phases of character— self-indulgence, duty, right.

90 Galileo (1564-1642) defended Copernicus’s sun-centred theory of the universe against the Aristotelian earth-centred theory favoured by the Roman Catholic Church.

348 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought were exactly in the position of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, expecting a voice from heaven.91 No Relation in Man’s Life to God’s Purpose What is the theor y of prayer?

It is indeed said, what is religion without prayer? But is it not impiety to ask anything from Him who is always giving, who regulates ever ything by wisdom, righteousness, goodness—who is goodness? When we can hear His voice plain, we shall hear Him saying, ‘‘Do not regret anything that is past. It is all right. I did it. Do not be anxious about anything to come. It is all under my laws, in accordance with my nature.’’ We should have perfect trust. But we should doubt that He exists, it is said, if we did not recognize Him in revelation, in answers to prayer. Can we ever doubt that He exists? It seems ingratitude to do so (as if we were to doubt the goodness of the kindest friend), after such proofs as we have had of His goodness. {Omitted: I heard Columba explaining one day to Portia her reasons for becoming a Sister of Charity. f220} 5.2

Is life organized with any relation to God?

Can life be rightly organized on any other principle than the purpose of the Author of life?

There appears to be now no relation to God in anything we do, no reference to Him in any of our modes of life. Among the rich the reference is to how much of material enjoyment they can crowd in, among the poor how not to starve. A young lady takes a ride. Think what that involves! There is she exalted on a horse, looking about her, and a man, a noble thing like a man, who ought to have the objects and pursuits of a man, employed—in what? in riding behind her. Is there any reference to God in this? But, it is said, people must be young, must have some pleasure and amusement. Does not God intend His children to be happy? It is not surprising in people who live merely to amuse themselves, in young people, who enjoy what they do so much that they can think of nothing else. But there are many who really think of nothing but their duty, who look to duty from morning to night. When these write down in their visiting books whom they have to visit, is there any reference to God in it? How can life be organized on any other principle than the nature of the Author of life, the purpose of the Author of life? How can we

91 Edward Herbert (1583-1648), 1st Lord Herbert of Cherbury, deist author.

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tell what life should be without this? Life, to be well organized, to be worth having, must be in harmony with His purpose, whatever that is. But who thinks of this? The principle upon which it is organized among the rich is how high they can live in the conventional mode to which their fortune entitles them; the principle among the poor is how they can live at all. In furnishing our rooms, in choosing our dress, our dinner, in laying out our occupations, is there any reference to God’s purpose, to God’s nature? Is not the only reference how much of enjoyment we can provide? We have laughed at people coming back every Sunday to say the same thing. But they must say the same thing. There are the shopmen behind the counter; they go to church, and, if there is a ‘‘faithful’’ preacher, he tells them to have God in all their thoughts, to ‘‘do everything to His glory,’’ etc. Then they go back to their gowns and silks and laces. How can God be never out of their thoughts? How can He ever be in their thoughts? The natural thing for them is to come back the next Sunday and say, ‘‘We have forgotten God, the Author of all our benefits, all the week; we have forgotten all you told us, and we are miserable sinners.’’92 We have actually made it into a form of prayer, but, if it were not, it is the natural thing to say.

If life is not organized according to such principle, people must come back every Sunday to say the same things.

But we must live If you were preaching to the New Zealanders, and preached to them to ‘‘live to the Lord and not unto men,’’ to ‘‘do all to the glory of God,’’ and then sent them back to all their old way of life, you might prophesy that they would come back next week, and if they were honest they would say, ‘‘We have done all that we ought not to have done, and there is no health in us’’; and if they were to go back week after week, you would prophesy that week after week they would want to say the same thing, and you would make it into a ‘‘form’’ of confession. We preach to the lawyers to love God, and the lawyers go back to their way of life, and how can they have God in all their thoughts? We preach to the tradesmen to love their neighbours as themselves. But the tradesmen must buy in the cheapest market, and prevent their neighbours, by concealment, from buying there too, and they

92 ‘‘Miserable offenders’’ in the confession in morning and evening prayer, Book of Common Prayer.

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Religious reformers have seldom undertaken the reformation of the organization of life.

Fashion directs the organization of life.

must sell in the dearest market. And how can they love their neighbours as themselves? But we must live! We have two things to do: (1) we must live; (2) we must be in accordance with God. If we are in accordance with God, it seems we cannot live, and if we live we cannot be in accordance with God. Is that it? None of the great reformers have ever taken the way of life into account. Wesley—how much in earnest he was!—he preached and people were glad to hear. But did he say to the people, ‘‘Now while you are washing can you be in accordance with God?’’ There must be washing and ironing and building; the earth must be cultivated; we must have food and drink and shelter. How can these occupations be organized so as to be in accordance with God’s purpose instead of separating us from it? Now we have not an idea of being in accordance with God’s purpose. We put a great deal of food upon the table, but there is no thought of its being wholesome; there is no calculation of what will give us most strength and vigour to do God’s work. On the contrary, if we send for a physician we know that he will put us on a ‘‘regimen,’’ and give us something quite different. The same as to dress; there is no thought of God’s purpose. The same as to occupation. Fashion directs us, i.e., that which is conventional in our order. Conventional life consists in this, in saying ‘‘I am so sorry,’’ ‘‘I hope you are coming,’’ when we are not ‘‘sorry’’ and we do not ‘‘hope,’’ in saying the proper thing without feeling it. This is the first step in conventional life. The next step is when we actually do not know whether we feel it or not. And the last is when we have said what is ‘‘proper’’ till we do not know that we do not feel it—when we really think we feel a thing, because we have said it. Fashion directs Organization of Life Shall we ever lead a life where we shall really sympathize with those with whom we live, and live with those we sympathize with, where we shall not speak these ‘‘idle words,’’ but say that which we mean, and mean that which we say? The Roman Catholics {Omitted: said Columba f224} have had some idea of being always in accordance with God; they have made a few feeble attempts; they told Mme de Longueville to wear a hair shirt under her ball gown, and to keep up the thought of God by an

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abrasion on her skin.93 They tell the washerwoman to repeat, while she is washing, so many aves and so many paters, and to say her rosar y. They have organized convents where the way of life is meant to bring the person into constant harmony with God’s purpose. But we, what organization have we for the purpose? How is it possible to hold a conversation with God when we are holding such a ver y different conversation with men? It is very natural to have recourse to penance and fasting as a manifestation to oneself that one is living for God’s sake, after one has been eating for one’s own sake without any reference to Him. {Omitted: ‘‘Well,’’ said Portia, ‘‘I think f225} A true scheme for mankind would differ from all others in regard to this, that we should organize a life by which it would be possible to live in harmony with God’s purpose. But now if we have been with Him in our ‘‘closet,’’ we cease to be with Him as soon as we are at our work or with man, instead of being more with him when at our work, because it is His work, and it is more in accordance with His purpose to work than to meditate. But there is now no purpose of this kind, and there never has been any purpose of this kind in any of the organizations or religions of nations. We have it set down in our minds that nations are to rise and fall; we make a little vague talk about ‘‘civilization’’ and ‘‘luxur y,’’ but it is not set down in our minds that a nation living in disregard of God’s purpose, when it comes to civilization and the enjoyments of civilization, must fall into selfish indulgence, thence into luxury, thence into decline and ruin. ‘‘What shall I do to be saved?’’ they said to Christ. {Omitted: here put in Columba. f225} And Christ said, ‘‘Sell all that thou hast and give to the poor, and follow me,’’94 part of which answer we think must have been a mistake. ‘‘What shall I do to be saved?’’ they said to Paul. ‘‘Repent and believe on the Lord Jesus Christ,’’ he said.95 Now, if we were to say,

‘‘What shall I do to be saved?’’

93 Anne Geneviève de Bourbon (1619-79), princess of royal blood, later the duchesse de Longueville, heroine of the Fronde and supporter of PortRoyal, cited in James Fitzjames Stephen, ‘‘The Port-Royalists,’’ Edinburgh Review 73,148 ( July 1841):346. 94 A paraphrase of Matt 19:21. 95 Acts 16:30.

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Has this question ever been answered?

‘‘What shall I do to be saved,’’ you must answer, ‘‘I really can’t exactly tell you.’’ Mankind must discover the organization by which mankind can live in harmony with God’s purpose. {Omitted: ‘‘But what did Socrates tell the people to do?’’ f226} Socrates does not seem to have suggested any way of living in sympathy with the truth which he so much prized. He made Plato and Plato made the Academy, and Plato is said to have ‘‘left his impress on the world.’’ Plato’s Republic 96 was apparently his ideal of an organization which would have enabled the world to live in accordance with his truth. In Christ’s days preaching was the great thing, and he said, ‘‘Follow me.’’97 He formed a school to do as He did, to follow Him and preach. And then came the persecutions, and his followers were obliged to live in catacombs, and then came the conversion of the emperor and splendour, and the church began. But there seems to have been no organization of circumstances to enable men to live as it was preached to them that they should live. God has only His one day now It is said that the church is an organization to tell us how we should live—how we should serve God. But is it? God has His day to Himself. We are told to go to church twice a day, which we can’t do; we are, at all events, told to go to church twice on Sunday; we go perhaps once, and the rest of the week our occupations have no reference to Him. A little prayer is said to Him, morning and night. There are, doubtless, very good people, and very religious people, who make a great point of going to church and being sorry for their sins, but is there any relation between their religion and their life? God and Sunday are a thing apart. {Omitted: ‘‘No, I can’t but say that I agree with Columba.’’ ‘‘You will ruin her,’’ whispered I. ‘‘I was in hopes you would have kept her straight. But you are enough to make her a Catholic.’’ f227} 5.3

Have we discovered what is our duty now?

Duty is so difficult now {Omitted: said poor Columba to me one day f229}; formerly it was quite certain what there was to be done. People were to go to church and teach their children the catechism

96 For Nightingale’s extensive comments on Plato’s Republic see Society and Politics (5:587-614). 97 Matt 4:19.

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and the creed, and give away flannel petticoats and broth, which was called ‘‘doing good’’; there was no doubt about it. But now it is tr uly said of many a woman, ‘‘she has been trying all her life to do a little good, and has done a great deal of harm.’’ People know that giving away is not doing good, and they don’t yet know what to do in its place; even such a school as King’s Somborne98 is not doing unmixed good. No more do people know what to teach their children; even the atheists among the operatives cannot bear teaching them that there is no God, and yet they do not know what God to teach them. A religious woman used to attend ‘‘Divine Service’’ on Sundays and say her prayers; that was her religion. Her goodness was to be careful of the poor, and to do little kind things by everybody, and further to make society for her children; about all these things there was no doubt, but now? {Omitted: I felt so hopeless of convincing her and bringing her to common sense that I did not say much, and she went on to speak to Portia again about prayer—how she could have a religion without prayer. ‘‘Are you not afraid,’’ . . . but Portia, more dauntless than I, probably because she was more convinced, answered, ‘‘Am I afraid of destroying spiritual feeling?’’ ff239-30} Good people often say that they are afraid of all these new-fangled doctrines destroying spiritual feeling, cutting off communication with God. But what have they now? What communication have men, have gentlemen, with God? They go to church because their wives make them, and criticize the sermon a great deal, and they have prayers with the servants in the morning, because their wives wish it, but no one ever thinks of this religion as a religion for men, but as one for women and children. Has the House of Commons much communication with God? It reads its prayers every day, it is tr ue. It is said that we could have no comfort in our religion if we did not think our prayers were heard and answered. Surely that is the most uncomfor table part of it. You say your prayers and you don’t know whether God has heard you or not, whether He will answer you or not, nor why He has heard you, nor how to bring Him to answer you. Some few feel, from the sensation of comfort and satisfaction in themselves, that He has answered them; other few are

Has the House of Commons much communication with God?

Do those who say they ‘‘believe in prayer’’ really look for an answer?

98 The rector of this (Hampshire) school, Richard Dawes (1793-1867), was a family friend and supporter of Nightingale.

354 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought miserable because no such feeling in themselves gives them a conviction that He has heard them. The greater part go their way, having ‘‘done their duty’’ in ‘‘saying their prayers,’’ and never look for any result at all. {Omitted: ‘‘But you say that there never is any reason that He never does answer us.’’ ‘‘I believe that God is always speaking to us. f231} God always speaking to us Is not God always speaking to us?

God is always speaking to us, expressing something to us, if intention and means taken make up expression, He always intends to say something to us. Then why do we not always hear? See what different words the same thing says to different natures. A storm says nothing to the boorish farmer but ‘‘it will lay the crops’’; it says to the poet something sublime; to the religious man it speaks of the power of God. Is it wonderful, then, that we should hear different things, and sometimes not hear God plain, according to the different exercise of our natures? The morning air speaks to some people of work to be done, to others of coming amusement, to others of God’s returning goodness. Along the wires of the electric telegraph are flying words by which nations are governed, by which commerce is carried on, yet to us they remain only wires, but those to whom the message comes understand and act. 5.4

What does the ‘‘effect of miracles’’ show but the debased state of the minds on which they have such effect.

{Omitted: Columba had been discovering one day about the Rimini miracle. We had been to Rimini a few months before and I confess I was myself struck with the beauty of the picture. f232} Much attention has been excited, both in devotion and derision, by the Rimini miracle.99 The beauty of the picture which people call the ‘‘winking madonna,’’ and which was forty years in that small church unobser ved, is striking; the expression of purity, holiness, devotion and melancholy in those upturned eyes exceeds that of any madonna, excepting, perhaps, the Dresden Raphael.100

99 Pius IX issued a decree authorizing clergy at Rimini to ornament the head of the ‘‘winking madonna’’ with a gold crown. 100 Nightingale was much moved by seeing Raphael’s ‘‘Sistine Madonna’’ in Dresden; see European Travels (7:454-55).

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But the decaying faith of the town has revived; the besetting sin, swearing, has disappeared, and many conversions have taken place. ‘‘It may be the effect of colour’’ has been said, but is it not equally God’s way of calling and awakening souls that He, after a lapse of forty years, should cause the effect to be seen with such results? Must we not look with deep reverence on the instrument through which He has worked such a change? The most striking part of this story is the state of the people which it shows. The picture had been there forty years and had remained unnoticed; the ‘‘purity, holiness and devotion’’ said nothing to them; the beauty of virtue had no effect. This did not appear to them to be God speaking to them, but it is most affecting how ready they were to listen directly, as soon as they thought that they received God’s communication in His ‘‘winking’’ at them. They did not see God in the expression of ‘‘purity and holiness,’’ but they saw Him when the picture shut its eyes. God, acting by a law of goodness and righteousness which never fails, is really more worthy of reverence than God ‘‘winking’’ at us occasionally, or turning water into wine or into blood, or anything else. It is a most curious fact that a picture making faces should have cured swearing, and a most touching one that the swearers should have been so willing to listen as soon as they could hear. But that which it tells most loudly is that this people must be raised and educated till they can hear God’s voice in His law of perfect righteousness, hear it in ever ything—that ‘‘still small voice,’’101 rather than hear it only in a ‘‘tour de force.’’ It is a ver y remarkable thing that people should be converted by seeing a picture move. What is the connection? Effect of Miracles And is not every answer to prayer a departure from what God would have done otherwise—a departure from His law? Protestants have done here what they have done in everything else, left principles as they were, and only taken away something of which the absurdity has struck them. The whole church service is one appeal for a miracle. It is not really more absurd to expect God to carry about houses in the night, as he is said to have done at Loretto, than to ask Him to cure a sick man.

101 1 Kings 19:12.

Protestants half cut off some absurdities, but left the principle of miracles where it was.

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The Roman Catholic places the Virgin first; the ‘‘Evangelical’’ places Christ first. Neither has any idea of God acting by law, law which never needs to be remedied by miracle.

‘‘My father began to grow better from the moment he was prayed for in church,’’ a lady said to me the other day; this is concluding that a miracle has taken place just as much as those did who believed in the ‘‘winking madonna.’’ The Protestants have left the principle just where it was, the principle of expecting miracles. The whole theory of prayer is to expect a miracle; they have only struck out something here and there which they thought the extreme of absurdity. God acting by law, the law of goodness, the law which never needs to be remedied by a miracle, this was just as much out of their thoughts as out of the thoughts of the Roman Catholics. {Omitted: But I should like, dear Portia, to go over with you the evidence of some of them to miracles. I wonder if any Protestant philosopher has ever written upon it—has ever overthrown the ‘‘Catholic testimonies.’’ f234} We do not want evidence to miracles, ‘‘Catholic testimonies’’ to their ‘‘tr uth.’’ Many wish to be able to believe in the miracle of Loretto, to find that it is tr ue. Now we should above all things dread to be convinced of that, or of any miracle, if any evidence could convince us, because we could not reverence a God who broke His own law, who carried about houses in the night in opposition to His law (which we know is founded on the plans of perfect goodness, is goodness, in fact), the law that ‘‘houses shall stand and not fly.’’ Do we see God more in the breach or in the observance of His law? Surely the one God is more worthy of reverence than the other. What is there wonder ful, it is said, in God working a moral change by means of a special interposition? He did so in the first centur y, why should He not in the nineteenth? People think that they hear God’s voice in a miracle now and then; they don’t think they hear it in the daily and everlasting expression of His goodness, in the beauty of holiness, in His laws, which are never broken; this is ver y remarkable. But this tells equally against all miracles. Indeed it does. {Omitted: How is it these are the things which you object to in the Catholic religion, dear Portia, and not the prevailing misconceptions that the Catholics place the Blessed Virgin first?’’ f236} The madonna of the Romanists is first in one sense. Her gentleness, her goodness, is first in their minds. Just as among the Evangelical sect, Jesus Christ is first. If you were to say to them, ‘‘You worship Christ much more than God,’’ they would say, ‘‘Oh! no, we don’t.’’ But they think of Christ as saving them a great deal more

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than they do of God. {Omitted: Christ as our intercessor—the Blessed Virgin as interceding too for us. This is how we think of them. But what an idea does intercession present of God! That God should not give us what we ought to have (in order to fulfill His plan for our perfection) of His own goodness, but only because Christ asks Him, and that Christ should have no better way of spending His time than in asking, or God than in listening. What a Being it supposes Him to be! Why He had better not, they had better not exist at all, than exist in that way! f236} But, on the whole, it is said, there is more religion in Italy than in England, more feeling produced by these beliefs in miracles, in intercession, in saint worship and the like, than here. Law never needs to be remedied by Miracle This is true. Why is it that we meet with this power of reverence in Italy only? There is something of the spirit of fear in it, the fear of hell, the hope of gaining a reward. But doubtless there is a great deal of the true spirit of veneration also. Only, what is it that we venerate? A God who breaks his own law or who keeps it? Should we expect to find God keeping His law or breaking it, His law which He had made in the spirit of perfect goodness? This theory would do away with some of our most common forms of thought and of expression. For instance, whenever an accident happens, we hear, ‘‘Thank God, we were not more hurt! A.’s face only was scratched.’’ {Omitted: ‘‘And you do not say, ‘Why, Lord, did you scratch Fulgentia’s face?’ ’’ . . . ‘‘But, Portia, was it not for Fulgentia’s good that her face was scratched?’’ f237} And we do not say, ‘‘Why, Lord, did you scratch A’s face?’’ We say it was for A’s good that his face was scratched. It was for his good that those laws were through which his face was scratched. He would not have been so well off if those laws had not been. But another person has the good of those laws, and has not a face scratched. Was there any par ticular good accruing to A. from having his face scratched? Yes. But it is alarming to think how completely we are destitute of the first principles of knowledge with regard to God’s nature and His plans with men, His manner of acting. As, till Bacon’s time, people were ignorant of the first principle of philosophy, so we want a Bacon for the science of God. The crane on Cologne cathedral stands there a monument of man’s ignorance of the ways of

Alarming ignorance shown by some common forms of expression.

358 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought God. It was taken down, and there was a thunderstorm. They thought God was offended and put it up again. But, it is said, it is only the most ignorant who have so absurd a superstition as this. (Note: Benjamin Constant puts these words in the mouth of a shipwrecked mariner, ‘‘Grand Dieu, je ne suis pas assez indiscret pour vous prier de nous sauver tous. Sauvez-moi tout seul.’’) [Great God, I am not pushy enough to ask you to save us all. Save me alone.] Is it a whit more absurd than the expecting an ‘‘answer to prayer,’’ which is expecting that God will alter his laws, His good laws, in conformity with our advice—and this when all is as certain as an eclipse? If we prayed that the eclipse set down in our almanacs should not take place, would this be more absurd than praying that one of God’s moral laws should be altered? Is the crane at Cologne a whit more absurd than the theory of forgiveness and absolution? At a water-cure establishment {at Umberslade f238} some of the patients were found eating cake and drinking wine in their rooms. This immediately strikes us as foolish, as hindering their own cure; what were they there for? But the doctor was there to give them ‘‘absolution.’’ It is just like the theory of forgiveness. ‘‘Thank God, we were not more hurt,’’ is not really a lesser ignorance of God’s ways than the crane at Cologne. 5.5 What does the Church of Rome do for us as to practice?

We find two things in the Roman Catholic orders which we find nowhere else. What does the Church of Rome do for us?

In its religious orders.

One is an attempt to organize life so as to enable men to act out their belief, and the other is a carrying out of what Christ and the apostles say, really, as a mode of life. Our church says that we are to follow the words of Christ, but does not attend to them. They (the Roman Catholic orders) organize their life according to their belief. They say, attend to the words of Christ, and they do it; they sell all and give to the poor,102 and arrange their lives with services, etc., so as to have God always in their thoughts. We make no exertion to conform our lives to the words of Christ.

102 An allusion to Matt 19:21.

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{Omitted: As far as I know, the Catholic orders are the only system which has ever organized the life to correspond with the belief. They have really followed out the words of Christ and the apostles literally. ‘‘I agree.’’ Then they make the purification of their consciences their business. ‘‘Yes, but I don’t think that the ‘purification of our conscience’ is best done by self-examination as the Catholics do, but by doing the work of God.’’ The orders do that, too, by a life of self-denial rather than a life in the midst of riches and pleasures. ff240-241} The Catholics recommend ‘‘a life of self-denial.’’ But this ought to be really a life of self-indulgence. ‘‘Let him deny himself’’103 should be to indulge himself, his better self, more than by leading a life ‘‘in the midst of riches and pleasures.’’ There are ‘‘pleasures’’ and ‘‘pleasures.’’ It should be a greater pleasure to do the work of God than to have the ‘‘riches of this life,’’ and it should be ‘‘denying’’ yourself, your real self, to live in these, in preference to going wherever He calls you. It should be your own will (not a denial of your own will) to be in accordance with His. The Catholics wish you to have no will, no preference with regard to health or sickness, or any other thing, but to have a perfect indifference to all things which are sent you by God. With regard to health or sickness, these are not ‘‘sent’’ to try us, but are the results of keeping, or not keeping, the laws of God, and, therefore, it would be ‘‘conformable to the will of God’’ to keep His laws, so that you would have health. The member of a religious order makes his own ‘‘sanctification’’ his aim. But that is best accomplished by doing the work of God, not by making it ‘‘an aim.’’ The object of the Catholic is, by clearing away our love of praise and our self-love, and substituting for them an actual love of contempt and pleasure in self-mortification, to release us from the slavery (in which Christ finds us), slavery to a little comfort, to a little praise, and set us free to serve Him in any way to which He shall call us. The three things which prevent us from thinking of ourselves are interest in the work we are doing, devotion to God, or devotion to our neighbour. And any one of these three things would prevent us from taking pleasure in praise. This would be a healthier and more

103 Mark 8:34.

As to selfdenial.

As to ‘‘sanctification.’’

As to selfmortification.

360 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought real state of mind than ‘‘loving contempt,’’ as the Catholic has it. We should not think about contempt in this case. And this is more in accordance with the thought of God than to ‘‘love contempt.’’ Christ says, it is true, ‘‘if any man hate not his own life, etc., he cannot be my disciple,’’ and ‘‘blessed are ye when men shall revile you, etc.’’104 It is a much easier thing for some of us to hate our lives than to love them. Yet it is more the thought of God (and what is the thought of God should be the question in everything) that we should love our lives than that we should ‘‘hate them.’’ The Catholics say that we should prefer the lowest office, and this rests upon what Christ said, ‘‘to take the lowest place.’’105 Roman Catholic ‘‘Orders’’

As to ‘‘indifference.’’

As to suffering for the love of God.

We shall fill that office best for which God has fitted us, and for which we feel the most attraction. The direction of the divine will is shown by the fitness we discover for an office, not by our dislike to it. A duty will not be laborious and painful to our nature which we can do well. And this fitness is what we should look out for, more than for the ‘‘lowest office.’’ ‘‘Entire indifference’’ as to all the goods and evils of this life is what the religious orders strive to attain, so that, as they express it, a man ‘‘is as if he were a dead body, which may be carried about and turned on every side, and which bears all manner of usage,’’ and ‘‘lets himself be moved and governed by divine providence.’’ ‘‘To be indifferent to all the goods and evils of this life’’ depends upon what we think goods and evils. To a well-constituted, welldeveloped nature, the ‘‘riches and pleasures of this life’’ are not goods, and its inclination is not against what are called ‘‘evils.’’ It is very evident that Christ did mean everybody who believed in Him to renounce all that they had in property. We say (in the catechism) that we renounce the pomps and vanities of this world. But who ever thinks of those words again? What earthly difference do they make to us? Does anyone ever think of renouncing anything (pomps, or vanities, or anything else), because they have said those words? Have these any meaning at all to us? And could we suffer for our God as the Catholics do for theirs? We could suffer more for our God than they for theirs, because He

104 A paraphrase of Luke 14:26 and Matt 5:11. 105 A paraphrase of Luke 14:10.

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is more worthy of being ‘‘suf fered for.’’ But we do not think He wants us. He wants us so much that He does nothing without us—all through us. With regard to suffering there is the utmost difference between suffering heartily for, acquiescing cordially with, God, and doing a thing merely because I cannot help it. If I get up in the morning because if I don’t I shall be late and people will notice it, or if I get up in order to be in harmony with God’s purpose, to do His work, makes all the difference possible. If when I go to have a tooth out, and the instrument is in my mouth, I think ‘‘it is God,’’—if I take the initiative as it were, and go forth to acquiesce cordially in His plan, not submit, or if I do it merely because I must submit, and it cannot be otherwise, makes all the difference possible. It is not obedience that God wants. It is to be one with Him, one with Him in purpose, action, everything. Now if there is a God who likes human beings to suffer—can we conceive suffering for Him with any zest? But our God—we know that His purpose can only be obtained through our suffering—that He suffers with us. Can we not suffer for Him, as well as or far better than the Roman Catholics suffer for their God, who, they think, likes their suffering for its own sake? Hardly anybody knows Him. Can we not suffer to make Him known? The Catholics say that we can only ‘‘know Him, know His will, through a superior.’’ Great things done by Obedience How man does always want a leader, whom he can venerate, and follow, and trust in, and love and act with entirely! How it elevates him when he finds such a one—elevates the led perhaps as much it does the leader—how it inspires man to obey that leader entirely. Now that leader can only be God, a God who may be trusted in and obeyed entirely. To obey and to command, man must do both. He may be a leader to other men in individual things, and his leader in all must be God. Men will be so ‘‘shocked’’ at what we say of God that they will have neither Him nor us for a ‘‘leader.’’ But it is for us to be shocked, not for others to be shocked at us, shocked that men can believe a God to be good who organizes ‘‘everlasting punishment,’’ who requires to be ‘‘interceded with’’ by Jesus Christ to do that which is good. This would be a malevolent, not a benevolent,

As to ‘‘obedience.’’

362 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Being, as men would find if they would examine. But they don’t examine; they only examine the grounds of the authority upon which they believe; they never examine their belief itself. But let us examine the God whom we love, and the more we examine, the more we shall find Him perfectly venerable and worthy to be tr usted in, and the more we shall suffer for Him willingly to carry out His purposes. We don’t object to the theory which generally shocks Protestants, of perfect obedience to a superior, of looking upon the will of the superior as the expression of the divine will and providence, of seeing God in the person of the superior. All great things have been done by obedience. In a shipwreck what wonderful feats have been accomplished by obedience to the commander! Had every man thought that he knew best, he might have saved two or three, but the same result would not have been brought about. St Peter’s was built by all (masons, workmen and labourers), all working in obedience to the one master plan of Michelangelo. Had each mason thought he knew a better plan, St Peter’s would never have been built. At the philharmonic concerts the effect is produced by two or three hundred men, all acting in per fect obedience to the baton of the conductor. One may think that the time should be taken a little slower, another a little faster, but the effect is produced by entire ‘‘obedience.’’ The religious orders say that ‘‘obedience is the very source from whence the whole religious life takes its spring,’’ ‘‘a blind obedience,’’ ‘‘putting aside our own will and judgment,’’ that so every command of the superior may be fulfilled, as though it were the command of God himself; and ‘‘at the voice of the superior, as if our Lord himself had spoken, all must be quick to do his bidding.’’ In one particular thing this perfect obedience must be and ought to be in order to produce any great result. In nursing, if you put yourself under the direction of a superior, that superior must have perfect obedience yielded, and I should think that I was obeying God in that superior, because I should think it was wise to give that perfect obedience, and therefore I was obeying the spirit of wisdom, which is God. But it is different in giving up one’s whole being. It is not the thought of God that anyone should give up his whole being to the direction of a superior, only that he should yield per fect obedience in any department where a great work is to be per formed, and where, though he may sometimes know better him-

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self, he recognizes it as wise that there should be one directing mind in order that it may be ‘‘one work.’’ Obedience to Man ‘‘Obedience to man,’’ according to the Catholics, ‘‘is obedience to God, for whose sake they render obedience to man,’’ ‘‘adapting their will and judgment altogether to that of their superior,’’ in order thereby ‘‘better to obey the will of God.’’ Obedience to man is more intelligible than obedience to God. Obedience to God is not natural, because we know that what God wishes is always good, better than anything else, the best of all for us, and therefore it must be perfect oneness with God—perfect and entire conformity or nothing, if we think at all. Obedience to God has, therefore, no meaning, but obedience to man is a true word. Man is not always wise; sometimes he makes mistakes. God cannot make mistakes. With Him I must be always one. With man I cannot always accord with his opinions and desires, but I can see that on the whole it is best to obey, to obey one leader, just as soldiers obey one commander; otherwise no battle ever could be fought. So if we were really soldiers of God, in order to accomplish any great campaign in His service we should obey a man, a leader, even though we sometimes felt that we knew better than he. None of the practices (we are not speaking of the doctrines) of the Catholic orders, but are founded on some words of Christ. ‘‘But Christ did not mean that, He meant something else,’’ say the Protestants. If they who profess to found everything on the Bible reject some things, why may not others be rejected? If an inhabitant of Arabia were to set himself to meditate on what would be the life which would grow out of Christ’s words, were they all of them carried out to the full, would it not be a life very much like that of the best Catholic working orders? Even the begging orders are really a following-up of Christ’s words. {Omitted: And the contemplative orders? What nonsense are the words we say! f249} How unmeaning are our prayers! We pray to ‘‘have God in all our thoughts’’; we know that we shall go downstairs next minute and talk about our neighbours, and our clothes, and our amusements, and that it is physically impossible to keep God in our thoughts there. He will not stay there, and therefore it comes to this, that we shall be always ‘‘sinning and repenting,’’ always dissatisfied with ourselves, without any plan for anything different. The contemplative orders, though they hardly take the right means, arise naturally. They are an attempt,

Are not the Roman Catholic ‘‘orders’’ a literal carrying out of the words of Christ?

What is the theor y of the Roman Catholic ‘‘contemplative orders?’’

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As to selfabasement.

whether we ‘‘eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, to do all to His glor y,’’106 to keep, like the vestal of old, the holy fire ‘‘always burning.’’ The question is what the goods of this world are which we are to ‘‘despise.’’ The ‘‘goods of this world’’ are to be one with God, and these goods we are not to ‘‘despise.’’ As to ‘‘self-abasement,’’ there is something better and truer than abasement. Abasement is to be induced by the exercise of our nature in crushing ourselves, but the exercise of our nature upon worthy objects out of ourselves would have the same effect in taking us out of ourselves, in causing us to forget ourselves, which the direct exercise of ‘‘abasing’’ self has, and in a far healthier and truer manner. There is something better than ‘‘compunction.’’ Compunction exhausts the nature. Oneness with God, resignation to sin and to His laws, raises it. Resignation to Sin

Ought there to be ‘‘resignation’’ to sin?

Where are we to find a ‘‘superior’’?

Christ’s war upon the family.

What is sin? It is imperfection of nature and ignorance of truth. Then, instead of saying, ‘‘defiled by sin,’’ we should say, ignorant of a truth, whether of feeling or of intellect, and be resigned for the present to our ignorance, sure that it will not last. Now all theology consists in raising God and depressing ourselves. The most we come to is, ‘‘He is so good, and I am so bad.’’ We ought to come to ‘‘I am bad because He is good,’’ i.e., His good laws have made me what I am; His laws will help me through to perfection. Why make such an immense distance between me and God? Homage is not the thing He wants; unity, not homage, is ‘‘His thought.’’ ‘‘The childhood which Christ says shall enter heaven,107 points to the reverence with which little children look upon a superior.’’ But we so seldom find a superior. Man does so little for us. Our superior then must be God, and we must work for and with Him, as little children follow and work with their ‘‘superior.’’ If Christ’s words are fully acted out, the Catholic orders result. Protestants say they abide by the Bible. But they do no such thing. ‘‘Sell all thou hast and give to the poor.’’108 The Catholics do this. Christ’s whole life almost was a war upon the family; so is the Catholic nun’s. ‘‘Call no man your father, etc.’’ But Protestants take some words of Christ, and not others. The Quakers will not call any

106 A paraphrase of 1 Cor 10:31. 107 An allusion to Mark 10:14. 108 A paraphrase of Matt 19:21.

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man ‘‘Master,’’ nor say Mr - - (but they will say ‘‘Lord’’ - -). But no one ever takes up that remarkable saying, ‘‘Call no man your father upon earth,’’109 holding God in place of your ‘‘father.’’ {Omitted: It is most curious that, at this moment, there is possibly not in all England one heart which is warm and satisfied and joyful in the filial or maternal relation. This is, however, by the bye. ‘‘You, Portia, who feel so deeply the unsatisfactoriness of the family, as it is now, are not likely to quarrel with the celibacy of the Catholic clergy.’’ ‘‘There may be other reasons, dear Columba, against it.’’ f253} As family is now, it does seem necessary that, if men are to be set apart for the study of religion, they should be unmarried, because family engrosses a whole man. {Omitted: ‘‘It is so evident, too, that Christ discouraged the family life.’’ ‘‘Yes, even to the degree of saying that we were to ‘hate our father and mother, etc., for His sake,’ which, of course, I conceive to have been a mistake.’’ ‘‘A propos, though this is quite beside the mark, I wonder, Portia, what truth there is in calling a man Lord - -. Lord means master, one in authority. Is there any true foundation in a man being hereditarily ‘master,’ over those who may be far superior to himself, and who may be really his master, but who are to be nominally and hereditarily inferior to him? Is there any truth in a man, such a great and noble thing as a man (the duke of Wellington, for instance) finding any pleasure in hearing himself called ‘Lord’?’’ ‘‘You little republican! I thought we were discussing the religious orders.’’ ‘‘So we are. And I want to ask you, if so you then see no tr uth in ‘renouncing the world,’ in ‘self-renunciation,’ in ‘despising praise’?’’ ‘‘I don’t quite understand what the Catholics mean—nor indeed what our catechism means by. . . . ’’ ff253-254} ‘‘Renouncing the world’’ would mean renouncing the great majority of mankind, of our fellow men. Now mankind (or the world) is what we have to work upon. That we ought to seek the offices which we dislike most has no truth in it. Those who have an attraction, a fitness (and these are many) for cooking and sweeping, ought to be sent to do it, not those who have a dislike to it. To ‘‘forget themselves and to despise the praises of men,’’ the Catholics say. But the way to ‘‘forget yourself ’’ (which is certainly of the first importance) is to be so much interested in some object out

109 Matt 23:9.

What does ‘‘renouncing the world’’ mean?

366 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought of yourself that you can’t remember yourself. If you are fully occupied, all your faculties in full and interesting exercise, you won’t think about the praise of men. It may be said that Napoleon thought about the praise of men, and yet his faculties were all in full and interesting exercise. No. It must be full exercise for the work of God and mankind. To wish for reproach and contempt is an unnatural state, but not to think about it, a natural and healthy one. Reproach, it is said, is the ‘‘liver y’’ which Christ’s ser vants wear. No ‘‘special’’ but universal Providence And we put on purple for our bishops’ servants’ livery, that is, the ‘‘liver y of Christ’’ with us. In ‘‘mortifying’’ ourselves to gain blessedness, in ‘‘humbling ourselves that we may be exalted’’110 (though this is certainly founded on the words of Christ) there is a good deal of the spirit of doing things for the sake of reward, and this, of course, is untrue and unhealthy. {Omitted: Columba: ‘‘But don’t you think there are many useful rules among the R. Catholic orders?’’ Portia: ‘‘Most useful. For instance in England. . . . f255} It is a most useful rule, that of the religious orders, which forbids all gossip, whether by pen or word. (One of the strongest minds and best organizers I have known told me that she had given up working in the ‘‘West End’’ of London, because this talk invariably took up two-three hours of everyday talk out of which nothing came— and had transferred her work elsewhere.) In England, one’s time is taken up by letter writing to one’s friends and kindred. {Omitted: Columba: ‘‘But you don’t agree with them about humility.’’ f255} The Catholic orders do get rid of their self-love and attain humility by dint of a very active, useful and interesting life, and they think they attain it by ‘‘self-examination,’’ ‘‘compunction’’ and direct onsets upon themselves. The thing is to gain a virtue, not to root out a fault, nor to ‘‘root out’’ themselves, as they call it. And this they do, but not in the way they think. Also the rooting out of individualism is not in the thought of God. They say that they are leaving the ‘‘pleasures of the world’’ when they are ser ving the sick. Now, they are finding the ‘‘pleasures of the world.’’

110 A paraphrase of Matt 23:12.

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What do people do, how can they live, who think that most of our affairs are conducted by mankind, but that Providence interferes a little here and there to save them? The words, ‘‘Thank God, we were not more hurt,’’ imply this. We have also a vague kind of belief that ‘‘all is for the best,’’ we don’t exactly know why. But we should prove and make real this belief by showing that every, the smallest, thing happens by ‘‘interposition’’ of Providence, that to wish one had done otherwise is downright impiety, for to wish anything different is to wish that the whole universe shall not be so happy as it is to be; and even if I have wrecked my whole life and usefulness by some mistake or fault of my own, still this is true. If we could believe this, we should thank God for ever ything, for being so much hurt, or for not being more hurt; we should believe that everything happens by His laws. This is not saying that nothing is to be otherwise for the future, for His laws are for the very purpose of enabling us to learn to do other wise. It certainly is very remarkable how Christ always spoke as if everything came from God. But now the prevailing theology is that God interferes now and then to do some little particular thing. And the rest? Nobody knows who does the rest. ‘‘Man does as he wills,’’ is the prevailing opinion. Foundation for belief, it is said, unless you lay claim to a particular inspiration, must be the ‘‘individual’’ or the ‘‘collective’’ reason, i.e., the reason of each man for himself, or the accumulated reason of Christians taken together. Now, it is said, we can hardly have such an unbounded confidence in our own reason as to substitute it for the ‘‘collective’’ reason of ‘‘the many.’’ That Numbers believe is not Testimony But, if the collective reason be collective error, then we only get an accumulation of errors from mankind, instead of an accumulation of truth. If the life of mankind is so organized as to make a collection of idiots, or a collection of Voltaires, then accumulated reason does not give accumulated truth, but accumulated error. If, on the other hand, there are laws to secure a right constitution for man, and his life may be so organized as to improve that constitution, then you may expect ‘‘right reason’’ from such constitutions, and from a collection of such men would come collective truth. But no one seems to think of this. No one seems to think of a right constitution as necessary by which to come at ‘‘tr uth.’’

How could we endure life, if we did not believe that God manages ever ything?

What does the Church of Rome do for us, as to belief?

368 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

The belief of many, merely because many, adds no weight to testimony— is no evidence for truth.

This is the reason why we go to the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church declares that it founds its faith not upon private judgment, but upon that which was believed ‘‘at all times, everywhere, and by all men.’’111 The ‘‘historical tradition of the church is the intellectual agreement of the saints of God, the illuminated reason of those that believe.’’ ‘‘The church in councils is the judge which declares the tradition of the faith.’’ There is a vagueness here even in the Catholic Church. Does the Catholic Church in councils judge by the exercise of its own faculties? Is it men coming together to judge by making the utmost use they can of their own understandings? This is a comprehensible principle. Or does it come together because God will so tell them by His spirit what to believe? If so, why will He not tell one by himself as well as all in council? Why must they meet? Because the ‘‘promise,’’ it is said, is only to the church, not to each one by himself. What is believed ‘‘semper et ubique et ab omnibus’’ [always and everywhere and by everyone] is not, however, what is pressed upon us by the church; it is what is believed by the pope and the cardinals and the priests, a number of men set apart to receive the ‘‘spirit.’’ {Omitted: ‘‘But, Portia, the presumption of setting yourself against the belief of the world! If you are right, you had better leave people in their faith and not disturb it. And if you are wrong, why Heaven help you!’’ f259} People say often, ‘‘How can you set yourself against the belief of the world?’’ But why do most of us believe? Because St Paul believed, not from any real living belief in ourselves. It is no testimony to the truth of astronomy that a number of us believe what Copernicus112 and Galileo have discovered. We have not examined. We only believe because they believed. This is no testimony at all. The testimony is when people believe in consequence of the working of their own faculties. It is often said, ‘‘Why, all the world believes this.’’ But if ‘‘all the world’’ believes it only because St Paul believed it, or Aristotle believed it, their belief adds no weight to the testimony of St Paul or of Aristotle, which remains what it was before. It is reasoning in a circle. Why do you believe what Aristotle believed? Because all the world believes it. And why does all the

111 Vincent of Lérins, Commonitorium II.4-III.8. 112 Nicolas Copernicus (1473-1543), astronomer.

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world believe it? Because Aristotle believed it. So the belief of a number, by reason only of its being a number, adds nothing to the weight of a testimony. Was Galileo’s certainty strengthened by the after-belief of many? Did he feel at all less certain that the sun did not move before others believed in it, or more certain after they did? Did this add anything to his conviction? And is there not moral evidence as strong as Galileo’s evidence? There was a time why one man alone believed that the earth moves around the sun. The assent of numbers added nothing to his certainty: their dissent took nothing from it. Will it not be so with religious certainties? 5.6 What is the End of Society? ‘‘The end of the society,’’ as the rule of a certain Roman Catholic order states, ‘‘is to promote the sanctification of its members, and to exercise every work of charity, especially those which regard our neighbour’s eternal welfare.’’ Is the end of ‘‘society’’ with us to ‘‘promote the sanctification of its members, and to exercise every work of charity, especially those which regard our neighbour’s eternal welfare?’’ When we have a party, what is ‘‘the end’’? ‘‘The end’’ is to be amused and to be comfortable, and to avoid doing anything which is unusual or inappropriate—having a bad dinner, for instance, or no fish; this would be most inappropriate. If there were any ‘‘end’’ in society, such as the ‘‘r ule’’ mentions, we should, when the party was over, examine in order to see if we had made progress in the purpose of which the express type was in our minds as the ‘‘end’’ of that party. But why do we have ‘‘society’’? There is an idea set down in people’s minds, just as it is set down that one is to have one’s breakfast, that it is a right thing to have a ‘‘good acquaintance’’; that to have ‘‘good, clever, agreeable’’ people in one’s house is ‘‘improving.’’ But the ‘‘end’’ of ‘‘society’’ is not ‘‘the sanctification of its members,’’ especially not that ‘‘which regards their eternal welfare.’’That is a thing apart—that is to be done on Sundays by going to church— some kneel down every night and confess their sins in order to do it. But the organization of society has nothing to do with that. It is for something quite different. For ‘‘good, clever, agreeable’’ people to meet together in a party to do the work of God—the words are absurd!

What is the end of ‘‘society’’?

370 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought What do they meet together for? You may gain some information, if you like it, but not for any express purpose. If one of the party is known to have a particular object, you would never think of taking him aside for an hour and saying, ‘‘Would you give me all the details of the management of Pentonville?’’ or ‘‘Would you tell me exactly how you organized your school?’’ That would be called ‘‘shop,’’ or ‘‘spoiling the party,’’ or, if you did so, it would be felt to require an apology. Now, if the improvement of its members were the end of society, would it require any apology? But if a man is famous for having successfully studied some special subject, you may allude to it, but you must not ‘‘tire the rest of the company’’ by dwelling upon it. But why do not ‘‘good, clever, agreeable’’ people meeting together promote each other’s ‘‘welfare’’ without making it a stiff and formal rule? Because they meet for no object—for no express purpose. Even if they do talk together upon interesting subjects, it is not with the intention of doing anything—it is with no ‘‘end.’’ A ver y ‘‘good, agreeable’’ man, who keeps a magnificent and most entertaining house for the reception of his friends, said, ‘‘I like to be a suburban; then my friends come to see me from London, and don’t stay long enough for them to get tired of me, nor for me to get tired of them.’’ If people had an object together, if they met for a purpose, if they met out of some sympathy for each other, this could not be the case. But saying this very thing proves that it is not so—that they meet for no particular object but amusement; otherwise, the longer they were together, the more they would be interested, not the less. Daily Deterioration or Improvement

Selfexamination.

But improvement forms no part in the business of society; we go to be amused, not to further our objects. And yet we say that we ‘‘strive day by day after righteousness.’’ Do we, day by day, improve in it? Do Mr and Mrs - - improve every day? Perhaps we should rather say that each person deteriorates a little day by day. The having to be interested about so many things which have no interest—the having no express type for the day, or, if you have one, the not knowing whether you are realizing it or not; these things produce necessarily, as appears, a slight deterioration daily. In the present state of things, to ‘‘examine yourself’’ ever y day is not wise. Because so much of our life is, and must be, now spent in

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waiting, that the effect would be depressing and discouraging if, ever y evening, you were to be obliged to say, ‘‘I have come no farther.’’ God takes long to teach us our lessons. But every month and ever y year to examine whether we have advanced in the purpose for which we live is simply the indispensable and natural consequence of that purpose. But would it not be better, it is said, to do this every day? Bad habits grow so fast. If we were leading a very active life, as the Roman Catholic orders do—if we were physicians or men of business, then we might do as Ignatius [of] Loyola tells us, and ‘‘examine ourselves twice a day,’’ with great profit, but not in the life we at present lead. It is no use talking of salvation, unless you ask ‘‘What shall I do to be saved?’’113 What feeling does the ‘‘blood of Christ’’ excite now among educated men? Are the historians, the men of science, the statesmen and legislators of the present day much influenced by the ‘‘blood of Christ’’? What expectation have you that in one year—that in five years from this time—you will have made progress towards perfection—that you will no longer be obliged to say that you have done nothing that is right, and all that is wrong? Have you any prospect of being no more compelled to say this? If not, would it not be possible to organize a life which will put you into circumstances in which you may expect, at the end of five years or ten years, to have made some step towards per fection? ‘‘Be ye perfect,’’114 Christ says, but who thinks of it?

Salvation.

If we have no expectation that, as it is, we ever shall be better than we are now, should we not try a different kind of life?

Stationariness Stationariness is the very essence of the Church of England, for she sets it down as a principle that we are to make no progress. Suppose those services, as no doubt she intends, were to last for 500 years (she intends them to last as long as the world lasts), then she expects that 500 years hence men are to be as sinful as they are now. Indeed she sets it down as a dogma. {Omitted: ‘‘But is it not so, Portia? Is not the heart of man’s ‘depravity’ wicked? Can we expect life to be ever much better than it is?’’ f266} ‘‘Lord, what is man that thou art mindful of him?’’115 113 A paraphrase of Acts 16:30. 114 A paraphrase of Matt 5:48. 115 A paraphrase of Ps 8:4.

Can we expect life to be ever much better than it is?

372 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

What is the Established Church for?

Man is what God has made him. But, when we make mistakes, we pray and we beg God to ‘‘forgive’’ us, and say that it is a ‘‘myster y,’’ and think about the atonement. We do not see that our mistakes are part of God’s plan, and no ‘‘myster y’’ at all. It is so strange that life should be the only thing which we begin without having a type in our minds of what we mean it to be. We don’t even build a house without seeing exactly before us that which we intend it should be when it is finished. We don’t begin a drawing without knowing exactly what we mean to make of it, and life, which one would think the most important, is the only thing which people begin without any type or purpose at all before them. And the church is made rather to prevent our having any. Because the church is there for us to obtain forgiveness for our sins, and praise God and pray to Him, and nobody thinks therefore of organizing a life which shall raise us so that we shall not sin any more. We live to make money for our families; that is the only definite type. Those who have not this live to amuse themselves. We don’t live to do the work of God. Going to church is to do that. And now, while life is organized so as to quench very much any religious feeling or belief, or, at least, not at all in reference to it, we say that the ‘‘heart of man is desperately wicked.’’116 Poor ‘‘man’’! But some do try, while leading the usual life, to introduce their religious belief into every part of it. Evangelicalism does this, and Puseyism. The daily services do, no doubt, introduce God into their lives, but none, excepting the Moravians and the religious orders, have organized life upon the model of their religious belief—have set as its purpose to do the work of God and of the world. But what is all this immense body, this organization, which we call the Established Church? The Church of England—not the church of the apostles—and what a real Church of England it is—so like John Bull, so businesslike, so brief and terse. ‘‘Have you done all that is wrong? Well, then, say you are sor ry, and we will absolve you; we have no time to hear what for,’’ like a matter of business, instead of all the trouble which the Church of Rome gives about sins, about being sorry for them, and saying them over one by one, and instead of ascertaining whether you are sorry before you are absolved.

116 A paraphrase of Jer 17:9.

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John Bull and his Church John Bull will have plenty for his money. He will have his services long, till he is quite tired, that he may have his money’s worth, like his concerts, plenty in them, no cheating, till he goes home yawning. So he has his confession, ‘‘lumping’’ all his sins together, and then his absolution, and then his praise, and then his litany, asking for every imaginable thing, and ending with asking God for ‘‘mercy on all men,’’ lest he should have left out anything, till there does not remain to God the smallest choice or judgment, and then his sermon—a long one—three services in one, that he may not have put on his best clothes nor paid all his tithes for nothing. But our indifference to what we have said and asked for is really extraordinar y. That we really should not know nor care whether all those prayers which we have made will be answered or not! That we should not think—what a God this must be who does these things only because we suggest them to him! It shows such a want of care about religion that we should never look to see the result of these prayers (for we are always surprised when they are answered). We have done our duty in praying for people—that is enough. We cannot stay to see whether they ‘‘get anything by it.’’ When one sees a spire or a church tower, one asks oneself, ‘‘how got it there?’’ did the spirit of devotion place it there? Was it not rather the spirit of order, of propriety, of duty ? If religion is that which bears fruit in the life, is there any religion now? Should we be in any way different from what we are now if we had no religion? Religion is that which makes us go to church, which makes us say grace, etc., but does religion make any difference in our lives; if it were all swept off tomorrow, would there be any difference in us? Religion is a feeling towards a good being. We have believed that power gave rights, and we have worshipped a being with power, but not with goodness. Should we call fear of a devil a religion? Can we call Calvin’s a religion? A God who, for no other reason than His own ‘‘good pleasure,’’ predooms some beings to happiness for eternity, and some to misery for eternity, or a God who destroys some of His children for the benefit of others. It is the common mistake that might makes right. The clay must not say to the potter, ‘‘why didst thou make me so?’’ But the conscious intelligence may and ought to question its Maker’s ways, and say if they are according to right. Because He is more power ful than

Religion must be a feeling towards goodness.

374 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

The ‘‘potter’’ is goodness and wisdom. The ‘‘clay’’ is to examine whether it is made according to goodness and wisdom.

Do practical men believe that man is to make progress? Belief in a future state depends upon the ‘‘clay’’ questioning the ‘‘potter’s’’ ways; upon understanding the nature of God, and not supposing that might makes right.

we are, is that a reason why He should do according to His fancy? It is an old confusion between might and right. At first some power greater than human was all that was recognized, then almighty power, and it was thought that that power gave the powerful the right to do anything he pleased, and that the clay, the vessel, must not question it. ‘‘Shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it, what makest thou?’’117 It was not perceived that He has the power, and could not have other than the will, to do everything which is according to wisdom and goodness, He being goodness and wisdom himself. We are to understand the nature of God, and we can make no progress without such understanding. The whole doctrine of a future state depends upon it, and all our capability of perfection. It is hardly an acknowledged principle that mankind is to make progress. In politics, in the church, is it their principle? Is it the principle of the statesman at the head of affairs? His principle is to keep in office, to keep the party in good humour, etc. But we cannot doubt that it is God’s thought that man shall progress towards perfection. And what means has God given us to accomplish His thought? God has given Himself and His laws. The old belief was that a God was a being a little more power ful than ourselves; does this authorize Him to commit murder and robber y? Does the possession of any degree of power, of almighty power, justify a being in killing and stealing? If God lets us die, this is murder. The ‘‘Clay’’ and the ‘‘Potter’’ If my experience benefits a whole generation to come, may we not be content that they should have my experience, without my being perpetuated in life? This would be robber y, stealing my experience in order to benefit mankind. If you rob in order to give to others, it is not the less stealing. If God kills a being whom He has called into life, it is worse, too, than murder, it is infanticide. And what should we think of a parent killing one of his children for the sake of the rest? But we do die. We never die. What a waste it would be if any one of us were to die! And God never wastes. Here is a human being with all this depth of thought and feeling, which he can never work out here,

117 Isa 45:9.

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never even communicate to anybody else, with all these plans, these riches of affection, this ripening wisdom, all crushed out at once, and God is the spectator of all this play-acting. He is the only one to profit by it. We are to have no good of all this, which we have been acting, merely as a drama for His benefit. How unlike God! We are not to see the perfecting of the world. He is to watch us per fecting things for His amusement. But is He to take care to provide an eternity for every poor creature which any man and woman who choose to come together bring upon His hands? This is the question the materialists ask. And we answer, yes, He is, if you acknowledge that it is by His laws that these men and women come together, and that these poor creatures come into the world. If we admit these four things, viz., that (1) human will is regulated by law; that (2) there is a per fect Being; that (3) a perfect Being could not will one to suffer for the good of the rest; that (4) by His law there must be human existences not worth having, it would seem that a future state follows. But there is absolute childish ignorance about all these subjects. We have not yet determined whether will is regulated by law, like other things, or whether it regulates itself and is without law. In all other subjects we are advancing rapidly. In moral philosophy alone, the most important of all, we are like children. Nay, worse, we are like those judges who shut up Galileo for saying that the earth moved.118 If we could but admit this one truth, that will is regulated by law, what a difference it would make in our feelings towards each other, what a difference it would make in criminal jurisprudence! Serjeant Adams119 would be no more giving his ‘‘two months’’ to juvenile criminals. Ragged schools would take the place of jails. Punishment would be done away with, and means would be taken for reformation.120

118 Galileo, condemned by the Inquisition for the theory that the earth revolved around the sun, held nonetheless, ‘‘but still it moves.’’ 119 Serjeant Adams (c1786-1856), judge, advocate of reformation over punishment for youth. 120 JSM: Non constat [it is not certain]. The suffering of one from others may be a necessary means of the progression of the race, like the suffering of one from inanimate nature.

376 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Belief in Perfection is Belief in a Future State

Those who do not believe in man’s capability for perfection cannot really believe in a future state.

Ought there to be physicians for the soul?

We have a vague idea that we please God by abusing ourselves.

It is said that everybody believes in a future state, whether proved or not. But how few can be said to realize belief in a future state! An old lady, the most affectionate of human beings, speaks of her sister, whom she lost fifty-eight years ago, with the same emotion as if it were an hour ago, though, according to her creed, she ought to believe that she will see her again in a year or two. If it were discovered that this sister had not died, that she were now alive, my old friend would rise from her paralytic bed and walk to meet her, if she thought that she were really going to see her in this world! Hardly anything can be less believed in than a future state. What a blessing it would be if we could believe in ‘‘eternal life’’! But this belief depends upon our belief in a capability of progress and perfection. And who believes this? Religious orders may really ‘‘per form ever y day better and better the duties of their state.’’ But do we? Do we ever think of anything else but confessing that we do not? Have we any type before us at all in performing them? The main idea, it is said, in most people’s lives is that of duty. Most of us go into society because we think it right. But have we any type or purpose when there? To make it a service to God, to make it in conformity with God? Supposing I were to announce today at dinner that the ‘‘end of society’’ is to ‘‘promote the spiritual advancement of the brotherhood,’’ how people would wonder, and none more so than the clergyman! It is said that God is everywhere. But He is not in society, or at least, if He is, we can’t find Him there. But does the clergyman do nothing for our ‘‘spiritual advancement?’’ As there are physicians for the body, so probably will there always be physicians for the soul. The Roman Catholic priest does make some attempt at regulating the life of his patients. But the Anglican clergyman, he makes no effort to alter or improve the organization of life. He has to preach the atonement for sin, not any systematic arrangement for our sinning no more. On the contrary, he has to represent the committing of sins as the normal state. He offers no hope that it ever will be otherwise. He has not to think of any organizing of life so that life shall put us in the way of perfection. He has to confess the sins for us when they are done, in a form showing how little we expect a change. But does not Christ praise the man who said, ‘‘God be merciful to me a sinner?’’121 121 Luke 18:13.

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Almost all our practices are, no doubt, based upon words of Christ. He says that that man went home ‘‘justified’’; and no doubt we think that by saying, ‘‘Lord have mercy upon us,’’ so many times, we shall be ‘‘justified,’’ that we have done something to justify us, to please God, to find favour with Him. But is praying for the love of God the way to attain it? {Omitted: ‘‘Not to find favour with him, but to obtain the love of God in ourselves.’’ f275} ‘‘If two of you shall agree’’ in prayer, ‘‘it shall be done for them.’’122 What remarkable words those are! How strange that Protestants should never have laid hold of that text. Catholics have their novenas and their praying orders, but Protestants act as if they believed it not. Ought we not to be miserable if we were to think that any poor friend’s suffering had been a dispensation, as it is called, of Providence, from which we could, by praying, have saved him? The Catholics, who follow everything logically out to its extreme, have whole societies who spend their lives on their knees, and indeed how unkind it does seem, if you can save a person by praying, not to be constantly doing it, how unkind it seems ever to be doing anything else! Belief in Miracles—what is it? But it cannot be right and wise that he should recover, for then God would do it without our asking for it. If it is right and wise that he should be spared this suffering, will not Wisdom and Righteousness do it, and not wait for us to tell Him? {Omitted: I do think it is so curious that people should have common sense about ordering a gown and should not have common sense about such great subjects! They pray and they don’t inquire whether they will be answered or not. Miss S. says to me that her father was prayed for at church, and that he was a little better— all the time he was being ‘‘prayed for.’’ The poor old man became worse again immediately afterwards and died all the same. Now that is such a way for God to do His affairs! If it were wise and right that the old man should be better, what a thing to make it depend upon their prayers! They say that a religion without miracles must be dull and I can conceive that Saint Teresa’s belief in miracles certainly made her

122 Matt 18:19.

If we can save people by praying, what must we think of ourselves if we do not pray?

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Would there be any actual loss to religion in taking away the belief in ‘‘miracles’’?

happy. It has a cheerful effect to have a miracle worked every week and to be expecting a miracle, like Miss S., every day—only that it makes God look like a juggler. But those old miracles, I do not believe that they have any effect now at all. Is anybody or has anybody ever been in the least surprised by them? And yet a miracle, one would think, ought to be surprising. Does not this show that they do not believe them? Does the House of Commons believe that Christ made water into wine, or that he raised Lazarus? It thinks it does and yet it ought to be surprised that a dead man rose up. Do you think this has any effect upon them as a surprising instance of God’s power? ff276-77} People are terrified at the idea of a religion without miracles, and belief in miracles certainly makes some happy. It has a cheerful effect to be expecting an interposition, like Miss S., every day, but what a lowering of the conception of God! And those old miracles, have they any effect now at all? Is anybody, or has anybody ever been, in the least surprised by them? And yet a miracle ought to be surprising. Does not this show that people do not believe them? Would it be any loss to religion to be without miracles if people are not now in the least surprised or impressed when they hear them read in church, nor can ever remember a time when they were surprised or impressed? And yet there must have been a first time when they heard them, but have they the least effect upon them any way? Then, would there be any loss if they were taken away? Surely the invariableness and goodness of God’s law is much more sublime and awful than asking for a thing, and not knowing whether you will have it or not, but thinking that God will perhaps be directed by you. In all physical things God’s law is invariable. We know that if we eat nightshade we shall perish. We take means that our children shall not eat nightshade; we dig it out of our gardens. We don’t pray that it may not take effect. We know that certain organizations in certain circumstances will become criminal. The law is invariable. Why do we not take means as in the former case? Why do we, instead of this, think that God will alter his righteous law, his invariable law, by the invariableness only of which we can learn, for our prayer? To think that, in 15,000 churches this morning, people are hearing about Balaam,123 and to think that learned men and good men 123 Num 22, in morning prayer the third Sunday after Easter.

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can consider so little as that they can go to church to praise God and tell him that that is goodness which would be badness if it were at all, and that that is wisdom which is folly! They say that when a man has committed a murder, though the consequences of that murder remain the same and must remain the same in him by the laws of God, yet if he will but believe in a Saviour’s ‘‘blood’’ he is free from them. And then they praise God for his wonderful works! It is like irony! {Omitted: ‘‘Oh! Portia, how you will shock people!’’ f278} Few really believe the things which the majority will be shocked at you for saying you don’t believe. Few really and practically believe, of those who think they do, the miracles, the atonement, or any of the things which they would be most shocked at your disbelieving. {Omitted: On the contrary, we believe many things which they don’t believe, an eternal life—the goodness of God—though they say they do. ‘‘Well, Portia, on the whole I think you think that the Catholic orders are the only means to ‘turn away from evil’ on our road to per fection, and to ‘cleanse the soul from iniquity.’ ’’ ff278-79}

People are shocked if you say what they believe, but don’t say.

5.7 Not ‘‘turning away from evil,’’ but pursuing good is the means for good; ‘‘cleansing the soul from iniquity’’ does not answer, but rather taking every means to feel and think and do what is good. If we are thinking of ‘‘self-mortification,’’ we are thinking of ourselves, whom we had better forget; it is in itself a kind of self-seeking, and the end is much better attained by going out of ourselves than by trampling upon ourselves. What is ‘‘my own Interest’’? Luxur y, indeed, enslaves the soul, and renders it unfit for charity. All history is an example to us how nations decline when seated in their easy chairs. Soft chairs and luxuries are an impediment to love and charity, but if we were to put such nations upon hard chairs, would they do anything for the world? There is so little of the ‘‘spirit of understanding’’ now. ‘‘One great duty which we owe to God is faith in his providence, which is made known to us by external circumstances, well considered by the light of reason and divine grace,’’124 say the Roman Catholics.

124 From the Rules of the Society of Charity.

Prevalent mistakes in religious practice.

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Object to attain: that God’s law and our own inclination may become the same.

We do not owe it as a duty to God to have faith in His providence, but if we rightly understood His providence as it is ‘‘made known to us by external circumstances, considered by the light of reason’’ and of feeling, we must have, we cannot but have faith in it. ‘‘I know in whom I have believed’’125 are pregnant words, but how few do ‘‘know’’! To ‘‘do things considerately’’; how few ever do anything with consideration! And yet the least thing would be better done if done with consideration. ‘‘Doing all things with consideration and disregarding all human feelings and inclinations’’ is the Catholic precept. It is not disregarding our natural feelings and inclinations, but endeavouring that our nature shall be such that our natural feelings will be those which we can follow, that is the wise course. The Roman Catholic says that I am ‘‘not to seek my own interest, but to be intent solely upon the work of God and upon the benefit of my neighbour.’’ It should be my own interest, the greatest interest I have, to do the work of God and the world; ‘‘to benefit my brethren’’ would then be to ‘‘seek my own interest.’’ The law of love and that of our own feelings and inclinations may be the same. How many laws have now become the strongest impulse of our own feelings which were formerly not even acknowledged to be laws. Take a glaring instance. In some of the most civilized nations of antiquity, the marriage of a brother and sister was not only tolerated, but was almost enjoined, as in the case of the Ptolemies.126 Experience proved such marriages to be fatal to a race; they are now illegal, and what is more, the strongest feelings which exist in our nature are enlisted against them; they are become not illegitimate, but simply impossible, a crime we may not even think of. All moral laws should be thus unmistakably supported by our warmest impulses, as this physical law is by our (instinct, we should say, were it not that we see, by history, it is not instinct but) experience; here we say, it is not duty, it is nature, such a crime is unnatural; we do not say ‘‘disregard your natural feelings and inclinations.’’ So it should be our object to create in ourselves such a nature that the seeking our selfish interest would be unnatural, and that the not doing God’s work would be ‘‘disregarding our natural feelings and inclinations.’’

125 2 Tim 1:12. 126 Cleopatra, daughter of Ptolemy XII, married her brother, Ptolemy XIII.

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Is Man a selfish Animal? The mistake is in considering man a selfish animal. If we mean by ‘‘selfish,’’ one constituted by God to follow His highest satisfaction, man is a selfish animal, but well constituted and well developed, man is a generous, a devoted animal, devoted to God and mankind, and devotion to God and mankind is his highest satisfaction, his greatest selfishness. The Roman Catholics talk about ‘‘abnegation of will.’’ Abnegation of will is the exercise of the highest will, the will, that is, of the highest part of us. ‘‘Mortification’’ is not the highest pursuit of the soul; to ‘‘mortify ourselves’’ is to think of ourselves. To do the work of God and mankind is the highest work, and we could trust ourselves more if we could do this work, enjoying the feast which God has carefully prepared for us, yet able to leave it instantly for His work, than if we make ourselves uncomfortable for fear we should not be able to leave our comforts. It is the rule of the Catholic orders ‘‘to seek zealously greater denial of self in all things, and as much as possible continual mortification,’’ and it gives them far greater liberty of spirit and much more freedom to serve God. It sets them free from all those little recherches which perplex and enslave us. But it is not a very high pursuit to make oneself uncomfortable, though it is a higher pursuit, certainly, than making oneself comfortable. But we may embrace and welcome what comes in the way of making us uncomfortable, instead of shrinking from it—as wishing to be one with God, and this without putting ourselves in the way of it. Oneness with God, benevolence towards man, and interest in the exercise of one’s faculties, ought to be the ‘‘end of society,’’ and if they were so, we should take with thankfulness the comfort, and with thankfulness the discomfort, as being one with God. The Roman Catholics always take the bull by the horns; they say, for fear that I should not be able to leave my comforts, I will make myself always uncomfortable; for fear I should prefer anything to God’s work, I will prefer to have nothing. But we are in a higher state if we leave, for instance, our warm bed or our good dinner at God’s call for something which would be higher gratification, something for God or for man, than if we make our bed cold or no bed at all, and our dinner distasteful or no dinner at all, for fear we should not be able to leave them at such a call.

382 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought The ‘‘Old Man’’ and the New One

If we lived a life to call out our good, if we heard ‘‘discourse only tending to good,’’ we should have no occasion to ‘‘bur y’’ the ‘‘old man.’’ He would become a new one.

Tr uth in the theor y of ‘‘per fect obedience.’’

It will not be found necessary to ‘‘bur y’’ the ‘‘old man.’’ A new man would spring up directly in a life organized to call out the religious feeling, instead of being organized to depress it—amidst intercourse, which called out our good, instead of our bad. But what discourse ‘‘tends to good’’ now? If we ‘‘gave ear’’ to such only, to what discourse should we give ear? To ‘‘live apart’’ from men is now perhaps wise, because there is so little to be gained from men, but if we were all in progress towards perfection, we should gain by living together. In order to make this possible, the Catholic orders lay down certain rules. They are ‘‘to keep nothing hidden from their superior,’’ and to be glad when their defects are told by others to the superior. They are to feel an ‘‘equal love for all men,’’ to give up their own opinion and judgment for that of another, to wish to be accounted fools, to esteem every man superior to themselves.127 They are to strive that ‘‘holy obedience’’ may be perfect in all its parts, in the outward action, in the will and in the understanding. They are ‘‘to hate the things which the world loves and cherishes, to cultivate the spirit of mortification, to choose always the poorest and worst things of the house.’’ If we did not look upon fault as blame, if we really wished to do the work of God, and to improve in order to do it, if our master, or leader, or superior were really our spiritual physician, we too should wish our fault to be told to him (just as we are, when ill, grateful to anyone who will explain our symptoms to our doctor), not for the sake of ‘‘mortifying’’ ourself, but for the sake of true improvement. There is a necessity for perfect ‘‘obedience’’ in great works and in learning individual things. But the whole being is not to be given up. For there is no one who has the power to conduct the whole being. God the ‘‘Superior General.’’ For each great work and department, a human ‘‘superior,’’ under whose guidance we place ourselves, and in whom we really recognize the voice of God, because, if we were to listen to His voice in ever ything that He says, we could not hear. He is speaking in everything all day long. We cannot, each of us, listen to all. Each had better listen in his or her peculiar department, and communicate to the others. Then we should be

127 A paraphrase of Phil 2:3.

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tr uly said to be listening to the voice of God, when listening to these. This is not rendering up the whole being to anyone. It is each man hearing the voice of God as well as he can in one thing for the rest. Each is the superior in one thing. We cannot be supposed to listen to the voice of God in astronomy, in chemistr y, in theology, in natural history. In all these things there must be leaders for each. Obedience forces the mind (which is a great help), from ‘‘Shall I do this little thing or that?’’ And for the superior to be freed from the consideration, ‘‘Shall I be obeyed or not?’’ is necessar y. Without these things no great work can be done. ‘‘Let us do instantly whatever we have to do, without even staying to finish the letter we are making,’’ the Roman Catholics say, ‘‘For it is the voice of God that calls.’’ It is the spirit of order, or punctuality, or duty, and that is the spirit of God. But it is not the thought of God that we should be like a ‘‘dead body,’’ surrendering up the whole being to the superior. We cannot ‘‘feel an equal love for all men.’’ Our interest for them must be in proportion to how much we know them. How can you ‘‘give up your own opinion for that of another?’’ It is yours. It is like saying that you can become another person—that you can see that blue is green. To ‘‘esteem everyone superior to ourselves’’ would, if pushed to its ultimate practical consequences, become folly and untruth. Then would a Galileo be seen giving up his opinion to any ignoramus. To ‘‘wish to be accounted a fool’’128 when you are not a fool, is to wish that someone should make a mistake, an error in judgment.

No truth in the theor y of rendering up the whole being to anyone.

Nor in feeling ‘‘equal love for all.’’ Nor in giving up one’s own opinion.

Nor in esteeming everyone better than oneself.

As to ‘‘Renouncing the World’’ There may be a pride even in humility, a self-seeking in suffering ‘‘abjection’’ (all pride is the effect of a narrowness of view), and therefore it is far safer not to be thinking of ourselves than to be seeking for ‘‘mortification.’’ Besides, it is ungrateful to God, when He is seeking to give you pleasure, always to take the worst—not that someone else may have the best, but only for the sake of mortifying yourself, and, especially, if you do this for the sake of having the best in another world.

128 Thomas à Kempis, ‘‘Be content to be accounted a fool for Christ,’’ in Imitation of Christ I.17.

384 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Nor in ‘‘renouncing worldly enjoyment.’’ Nor in ‘‘hating’’ anything. Nor in loving ‘‘poverty.’’

What is the tr uth as to the ‘‘family’’? Are we to ‘‘hate’’ it or to sacrifice to it?

To ‘‘renounce worldly enjoyment’’129 implies a mistake. It should be our enjoyment to do the world’s work. It does not improve us to ‘‘hate’’ anything. One might easily excite oneself to hate all these luxuries. But it does us no good. The Catholics say that ‘‘through love of Christ’s poverty the religious man should be glad when he has the poorest and worst things.’’130 {Omitted: ‘‘We must think that Christ made a mistake in recommending poverty. f287} Surely it is a mistake to recommend poverty. Surely it is a higher pursuit to have property, in order that we may devote it to Him and do His work with it. {Omitted: ‘‘I never know, Portia, what you think of Christ. I could not speak of Him as you do.’’ f287} Christ was the most spiritual being who has ever lived. But surely he made mistakes. He is generally considered either as God or as an impostor. Now, much progress cannot be made unless we admit that he made mistakes, and we, Protestants, who profess to be the upholders of the Bible, do admit it practically, though we assert theoretically that He was plenarily inspired, a man-God. What do boards of guardians make, for instance, of this his counsel of ‘‘poverty’’? Those who do not admit His wonderful spirituality cannot make much progress either. He was not a reasoner, certainly. For sometimes he speaks of leaving father and mother and lands as a sacrifice, and offers compensation elsewhere, and sometimes he tells us to hate them, and then it cannot be a sacrifice. He certainly was so indignant with the lukewarm spirit of the times, which was always making excuses, that he spoke in very strong words, ‘‘Let the dead bury their dead,’’ ‘‘Hate your father and your mother,’’ ‘‘Who is my mother and my brethren?’’131 The truth of the matter is probably that the attraction between husband and wife, and between all other friends, should be this, that those two can do the work of God better together than apart, and then there would be no occasion to ‘‘leave them for His name’s sake,’’132 but the contrary. When you have taken a wife, and under-

129 Thomas à Kempis, ‘‘Renounce desire and you shall find peace,’’ in Imitation of Christ III.32. 130 Ignatius of Loyola, General Examen, in The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, trans. and ed. G.E. Ganss, 100 (chap 4, no. 28). 131 Matt 8:22 and 12:48. 132 An allusion to Mark 10:29.

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taken the responsibility of children, without any such attraction, certainly there is no right in leaving them. With regard to leaving brothers and sisters and father and mother, you have undertaken no charge with regard to them, and these should be left anyhow for God’s work. Christ spoke ‘‘with authority,’’133 it is said. ‘‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.’’ ‘‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.’’134 But the command does not elicit the feeling. We do not say, Thou shalt love thy husband, or thy dearest friend. The thing is to show God to be such a Being as one can love, as one must love. Christ’s God was not such. What a gospel there is to proclaim, the ‘‘good news’’ of a perfect Being. This is a gospel, and one which has never yet been preached.

It is no use to command us to love God; to show us that He is loveable is the way to make us love Him.

Real Gratitude to God It is said that we make God, make Him after our own image.135 But surely we can trace the existence of a spirit of benevolence, of wisdom and goodness, not ourselves. We can go further and show that all would be as it is, if there were a spirit of perfect goodness and wisdom, and would not this be evidence that such a spirit is? There are depths of intense bliss, yet unknown, in the perfect tr ust and reverence, the untold happiness which to live consciously in the presence of such a Being must be. St Paul felt it. He says that ‘‘eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him.’’136 And yet his God was far inferior to our God. Luther left his God just as he found Him. He only swept away some absurdities. All he did was negative. But think what, if we did realize what He is (not all that He is, for truly is it said that He is incomprehensible), but if we did realize Him, not through special providences, but through all His providences—think what it would be to live in His presence, devoted to Him! Think what the gratitude would be! Now we have such strange gratitude. We are grateful to Him for having broken one arm and not two, but if we could be grateful to Him for His laws, those

133 134 135 136

A paraphrase of Matt 7:29. A paraphrase of Luke 10:27. The basic claim, by Comte and others, of the sociology of religion. 1 Cor 2:9, quoting from Isa 64:4.

Is it we who make God?

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Why is God silent?

Will the belief in law be strong enough to make us martyrs for our belief ?

essences of perfect goodness and wisdom, what gratitude that would be! There are three phases of theology: the miraculous, the supernatural and the ‘‘positive’’ theology. At first it is quite natural (in an infant state) that infants should think God works by miracles, and should see Him in miracles and not in law; then that they should see Him in special providences, which is really almost the same as the first; that is the supernatural theology; lastly, we see Him in law. But law is still a theology, and the finest. We love that which is loveable, and surely we must love the God of the perfect laws. But how silent God is! Through all this difficulty and suffering, when just to hear His voice would inspirit us to do anything, He remains silent. That silence is so speaking. We could not resist the temptation which, humanly speaking, to so loving a Father it must be to speak. But He does. Because, if He speaks at all, He must speak always, and then we should be machines. We must be either interfered with occasionally, or passive recipients of perfection, which, if we could see it, we should feel to be a contradiction. This belief will make no martyrs, it is said. There are none now. And this belief in the God of ‘‘law’’ will make none. In former days, the Christians thought that they had nothing to do but testify to God. It did not matter whether their truth were received or not. If it were not, they would still be martyrs, and would go straight to God. It did not matter that their persecutors would be then in the farthest possible state from receiving the tr uth, in the very opposite of the state in which they wished them to be, when proclaiming that truth. But we have now no truth which we are sure of, which we wish to proclaim, which we feel anything at all about. It is therefore no wonder that we have not the zeal of the martyrs. Will the Belief in Law make Martyrs? But, having a truth, we may have a wisdom in choosing how and when to speak, which they had not, because they were thinking of a crown for themselves. Let us, with more wisdom, have the same or a higher zeal. Their way was easy compared to ours. For Christ had to prepare men for death, not life, and his followers had to bear their testimony, and if they were made martyrs, so much the better.

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‘‘What zeal does he experience for the attainment of perfection?’’ is one of the questions the Catholic orders ask.137 And were that question asked of anybody here, could it be said that they feel any? The Catholics say that ‘‘ever ything is to be preser ved for the honour of our Lord alone, and therefore held sacred, that nothing be wasted; thus all actions, even the most common and trifling, will be sanctified.’’ We cannot say to our servants, ‘‘This is God’s, you must not waste it,’’ but ‘‘this is mine, you must not waste it,’’ and that makes the difference. ‘‘ ‘Not to be curious about trifles’ is another rule.’’ But, in ‘‘society,’’ what else is there but trifles? The religious orders insist upon the intention, that every action may be done to God, through the best and purest motive. We ought always to know the moment our intention is wrong. It is possible to know directly whether one’s intention is with God or not, just as one is conscious that one is cold, even though one should not be able to alter it directly. {Omitted: ‘‘We are the activity of God. I believe that is His thought. He can do nothing but by us.’’ ‘‘But He does not want us.’’ ‘‘He wants us so much that He can do nothing without us, and we are to work out His thought.’’ f292}

Do men feel any zeal now for the attainment of per fection?

5.8 {Omitted: ‘‘I cannot understand,’’ said Fulgentia one day, I cannot understand, Portia, the revival of Roman Catholicism in England. They say that one half the Roman Catholics at this moment in England are converts.’’ f293} Wesley was the first man who brought about the renewal of Roman Catholicism in England, for he first shook the Church of England. People had never thought of inquiring before. The Church of England said, ‘‘don’t use your own judgment,’’ and she remained unquestioned, but then people began to see that in the church some maintained the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, and some did not. Among the Wesleyans, some held Calvinism, and some did not, and they began to look about for what they were to believe. Only

Why have the Roman Catholics doubled their numbers of late in England?

Wesley and the Church of England.

137 Ignatius of Loyola, General Examen, in Constitutions, trans and ed. Ganss, chap 4, no. 44.

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Dr Arnold and Puseyism.

Luther and the Church of Rome.

one church could offer them ‘‘one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God.’’ The Church of England now said, ‘‘use your own judgment, but only so far as to see that the Church of Rome is wrong.’’ She said, ‘‘look to the Bible’’; people looked to the Bible; and this once admitted, authority once admitted, the Church of Rome must follow. Again, the Church of England says, ‘‘Don’t use your own judgment, or at least you will be damned if you do’’ (vide [see] Athanasian creed).138 Dr Arnold led the way to Puseyism;139 he urged an earnest religion— an earnest religion on authority—and Puseyism naturally followed. So Wesley strengthened the hands of the church; he diminished their numbers, but moralized their lives, and thus the church was really strengthened. So Luther moralized the Church of Rome. We often do what we don’t intend, while at the same time doing what we do intend. Dr Arnold urged earnestness in religion, without saying, ‘‘think for yourselves,’’ and by his influence he produced a great feeling in religion, but then his pupils began to want authority. If ‘‘to believe’’ was of great importance to them, they wanted to know what they should believe. The Church of England did not tell them, or, at least, it told them different and contradictory things, and they had recourse to a stricter authority. In the same way, the moralization of the Church of England led to the Church of Rome. {Omitted: ‘‘But Portia, you must use your judgment to enter the church of Rome.’’ f294} Persecution and Disabilities

What persecution is favourable and what unfavourable to development?

It is said that the persecution of the Catholics led to their increase. There is no law which makes persecution favourable to development. A persecution which weakens or paralyzes the organization or a slow system of disabilities, as the privation of education and privileges—such persecution tends to destroy. The Emancipation Act140 gave an immense impulse to Roman Catholicism in England,

138 The Athanasian creed states that unless one keeps the ‘‘whole and undefiled’’ faith, with numerous specifics listed, ‘‘he will perish eternally,’’ in the Book of Common Prayer. 139 The high church movement within the Church of England. 140 The Catholic Emancipation Act, 1829, permitted Roman Catholics to be sworn in as members of Parliament and thus become eligible for most official positions.

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just as its worst enemies said it would. But any persecution which tends to make a thing conspicuous, to attract attention of any kind to bring it forward, and which does not tend to enfeeble—such as the persecution of the early Christians—the murders, tortures, blood, which made their faith notable, which made people ask, what is this which enables them to bear so much? Such persecution gives to the persecuted power, it is true. {Omitted: But, in England, since the Catholic Emancipation Act, converts have increased. f293} Roman Catholics say, the church shall think for me. ‘‘I can’t understand, but I will believe, because the church tells me so.’’ Protestants protest—that is the meaning of the word—they protest against anyone thinking for them, but they don’t think for themselves. They say, ‘‘I am far too busy to think out these things for myself, but you shall not think for me.’’ They like to be told what to think; in fact they pay many thousands a year to fifteen thousand people to do this. They say, ‘‘Our teachers shall all think so and so. They shall tell us so and so; whether we believe it or not is our affair. We ‘protest’ against being made to believe it.’’ They don’t read the 39 Articles, not, at least, unless there is something to be got by them. Some read them because they don’t believe them, but are they read by those who call themselves Church of England? They say ‘‘our teachers shall believe the 39 Articles,’’ but they don’t believe them themselves. The heap of reviews on an English table is exactly the Protestant spirit. Reading a review is being told what we are to think; we are not bound to think it. This is just what we do with our religion. We go to church; the clergyman is to tell us what we are to think; we go armed to criticize what he says, what he thinks, what the service is like. We must be told what the church thinks, but we will not be obliged to think it. It is all a contradiction and a mystification, whereas the Roman Catholic never thinks of criticizing; he says, ‘‘I can’t understand, but I can believe, ‘credo, quia impossibile est [I believe, because it is impossible].’ ’’141 As long as the Church of England enforced herself by penalties and laws, by hanging people who did not belong to her and punishing those who did not come to church, she did very well, but when she became moral, when she said, No, I don’t think it right to com-

141 Tertullian, De Carne Christi.

Protestants choose to be ‘‘thought for’’ as much as Roman Catholics. They only don’t choose to believe.

Review-reading an instance of this.

How came the ‘‘Church of England’’ to be believed in at all?

390 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought pel and punish—when she rested her claim not on her authority, but on her morality, then she lost ground. Wesley’s secession made people think she was not infallible, and then they looked about them, and found that there were contradictions in her teaching. ‘‘Forgiveness’’ a Step beyond Revenge What is meant by forgiveness towards one another?

Is not forgiveness a right state of mind, and therefore a logical one, whether in God or man?

What is meant by ‘‘forgiveness’’ in God?

Look at the doctrines which she teaches—forgiveness of sins, for instance. {Omitted: ‘‘Really, if you were to say to me, Abracadabra, I should have as little an idea of what was meant as when you say the word ‘forgiveness.’ ’’ f296} What is meant when you say the word ‘‘forgiveness’’? People forgive, but how do they do it? Probably they think of something else. If a man knocks me down, and if I feel that he is the greatest sufferer, because he is further from the way of right or happiness by the act of knocking down than I by the fact of being knocked down, and if I feel that by the laws of the universe he could not have done other wise than he did, I cannot forgive, but feel no resentment, for he could not have done otherwise. But if I am told that I am to forgive another because God forgives me, what have I to do? I must think that that man has been very wrong, but then I have been very wrong, too, against God, and He has forgiven me, and if I don’t forgive this man, perhaps another time God will not forgive me. What does that mean? It means that I think of something else, of God’s wrath and my sins against Him, and so I forget what has been done against me. Can any other meaning be attached to the theory of forgiveness? {Omitted: ‘‘But surely, forgiveness is a right state of mind and therefore a logical one, both in God and man.’’ f297} Forgiveness is certainly a step beyond revenge. In the first state of society, it was considered right to revenge our injuries; in the next state, it was considered right to forgive them, though how this is done we do not know. Still, this is a step in advance. This is already a ‘‘future state’’ to the first. In the next ‘‘future state’’ it will be considered that there is nothing to forgive, and that will be a doctrine as much higher and truer than this of forgiveness, as this of forgiveness is higher than that of revenge, but the philosophy of the will must be first understood. With regard to forgiveness in the Creator, the theory is no more intelligible. ‘‘God cannot forgive’’ is true, and it is curious how people lay hold of a little bit of a truth. God cannot forgive; His laws have assigned consequents entirely definite to every antecedent. Do we

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pray that he will prevent oxygen from uniting with hydrogen in the proportion of eight to one to form water? Neither can we pray that he will alter the laws of perfect goodness and wisdom with regard to spiritual things. He would not be perfect goodness and wisdom if He did. But the theory of forgiveness, as the Anglican Church holds it, is, besides, a confused one. What sign have we that we are forgiven? How do we know when we are forgiven? The Roman Catholic is more sensible, who takes his beads and says so many paternosters for every sin as his confessor orders. ‘‘We don’t know how to pray,’’ he says, ‘‘therefore we take our Saviour’s form of prayer, which is much better than anything we can say, and we take each sin in succession and say, ‘Forgive us our trespasses, etc.,’ and then say ‘that sin is forgiven,’ now on to the next.’’ Is not this the theory of the rosar y when used ‘‘in union with’’ our Saviour’s sufferings? The Roman Catholic does think of his sins enough to tell them each and individually to a priest, who is the intermediar y, and who tells him whether he is sorry enough, and, if he is, gives him absolution, though what takes place when we are absolved we do not know. But Protestants have such a ‘‘slovenly unhandsome’’ way of doing the business. We will not even take the trouble of enumerating our sins, but we say, in order to save ourselves that trouble, ‘‘We have done those things which we ought not to have done,’’ in order to include everything, and then ‘‘bang comes the absolution,’’ without more ado. But what takes place when we are forgiven? Is it a change in God or in man? What is it? We know no more than if you were speaking Chinese. Forgiveness a Mistaken Idea ‘‘Taking a clergyman’s duty,’’ the very words are significant, it is a duty to pray to God, and when the clergyman wants to do something else, he gets somebody to ‘‘take his duty.’’ We do it in the most lazy way we can. We get one man to say it all for us (while we sit by), to say that we have done everything wrong. The doctrine of forgiveness, though an advance upon that of revenge, is still, therefore, the great mistake with regard to God’s character, the character of the Perfect, of perfect wisdom and goodness. The parable of the two debtors says, to him ‘‘who sins against me most I shall have to forgive most, and he will love me most.’’142 This

142 An allusion to Luke 7:41-43.

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Christ’s character.

His sayings.

is the substance of it. ‘‘Can this man have power to forgive sins?’’143 the Jews once asked. Here they were right. But they did not go farther and ask, can God have power to forgive sins? What does forgiveness mean? and if it means anything, is it not a contradiction? In the case of the blind man, they asked, ‘‘Who did sin, this man or his parents?’’ and Christ did not say, blindness is not the consequence of sin at all, but of some physical law. He said, ‘‘That the works of God should be made manifest.’’144 He was so filled with the idea of impressing the people with the power of God, that he really seemed to imply that the man had been made blind on purpose. Or, rather, he did not turn his attention to these subjects at all; his feeling was per fect and he came to save from ill feeling, not from bad moral philosophy, and when a man feels very intensely on one subject, it is not rare that he should overlook another. Christ certainly did believe that sin was visited with ill health, and that, if the sin were forgiven, the ill health would be removed. In the case of the man with the palsy, he implied, ‘‘If I say, thy sins be forgiven thee, or say, arise and walk, what does it matter?’’145 In either case the man would be cured. But what a character his was! When he talks about the baptism and the fire he has to go through, how expressive those words are! A baptism of fire he might well have called it. Every person must be baptized with fire who would do anything which is not usually done in the conventional walk of his life, which is not provided for in the ordinar y course of things. Every person must have a baptism of fire who is not satisfied with the world as it is, and who would fain help it out of its rut. ‘‘And how am I straitened till it be accomplished!’’146 But there are many things he said, which are ver y beautiful, and yet are not true. When they brought the woman taken in adultery before him, and he turned aside and wrote in an absent mood on the ground, and then said, ‘‘he that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her,’’147 that beautiful tender spirit felt truly. But still there is a right and a wrong about adultery. This would be putting an end to all law and justice. If no one is to execute the law unless he be perfectly pure himself, the lord chief justice and the

143 144 145 146 147

A paraphrase of Matt 9:6. John 9:2-3. A paraphrase of Mark 2:9-10. Luke 12:50. John 8:7.

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chief baron must vacate their seats on the bench, and the police be disbanded, and the criminal jurisprudence of a country come to an end. And when he implied that we should take no more thought than the lilies of the field, is that absolute truth?148 And what he tells the Samaritan woman of the ‘‘living water’’ is ver y beautiful, but when she does not understand, he seems to make no effort to explain to her.149 He was so filled and absorbed with his own thought that he seems to have spoken absently, and hardly to have cared whether she understood or not. He even sometimes says, ‘‘That seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing they may hear and not understand.’’150 Might not the people have said, if you are to teach us, would it not be better to speak so that we can understand? What a point he seems to have made about faith, believing that we can do a thing! ‘‘Faith can remove mountains.’’151 Now, it is ver y tr ue that very often we do not believe we can do a thing, which, if we did believe it, we could do. But we may believe we can do a thing which we can’t. A great many, from ignorance of the laws of God, have done so. Believing does not make us able to do it, does not make the law of God by which to do it. He seems to have known the first fact, and to have confused the second with it. Christ has been vulgarized by us But what have we made of Christ in these vulgar times? We have daubed him all over with bright colours, so that we can hardly see through to the original beautiful form underneath. The churches have made him a God, and said, What! do you think you are like Christ? while they are preaching to you to imitate him. The Unitarians have made him into a perfect man, preaching that of which you see a great deal is not true. If we could but show him in his original form! The idea of a divine being dying to save you from another being does excite some feeling, but to tell you to listen to preaching which is perfect, and which you see is imperfect, and the whole of

148 149 150 151

An allusion to Matt 6:28. An allusion to the woman at the well in John 4:7-30. A paraphrase of Matt 13:14. A paraphrase of 1 Cor 13:2.

What have we made of Christ?

What has Trinitarianism, what has Unitarianism made of him?

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Strange imaginations about God.

Have moral and physical laws no connection?

which you cannot believe, excites no feeling at all. If he is to be merely a teacher or merely a God, he is nothing. We have such a strange idea of our God. ‘‘If we don’t forgive, perhaps He will punish us more.’’ A mother who lost her little boy said ‘‘she must be resigned, or a worse thing might be sent.’’ If we believe that God puts in His hand now and then, we may believe that He says, ‘‘Another lesson must be yours, if you don’t learn the first.’’ But it is worse, it is like a great boy who says to a little one, ‘‘I will hit you harder if you cry.’’ No wonder we love Christ for having come to save us from Him. But have moral and physical laws no connection with each other? It is all planned from the beginning to bring imperfection to perfection. Unless the perfect one wished to make the imperfect perfect, there would be a contradiction; and, therefore, it may be asserted with certainty, that, if there is a spirit of perfection, this is His plan. There is no ‘‘if’’ in God’s World

How do we know there is a spirit of per fection?

Is there any tr uth in vicarious suffering?

There is no such thing as ‘‘if’’ in histor y.

But how do we know there is a spirit of perfection? We see signs that there is. We do not assert it. It is evident that, in some stages of our development, it is impossible for man to conceive even of a spirit of perfection. The more he advances, the more he finds reason to believe that there is. But we assert that, if there is a spirit of perfection, it is a contradiction to say that such was not his plan. There is some rough truth in the superstition, A. died for the good of B., A. was drowned in order to teach B. sympathy. For, it is all a vast scheme for bringing the imperfect to perfection. But it is implied, if B. had had more sympathy, the water would not have risen and drowned A. Now we cannot say, if B. had had more sympathy—for nothing could have been otherwise than it is. If B. had been different, all the laws of God would have been different, and the imperfect would not have been progressing to perfection. God knew perfectly well that B. would not sympathize any more for A.’s death. He did not require to be told of this. He was not trying experiments. It was all in his scheme. To write history with ‘‘ifs’’ is unmeaning nonsense. (A historical writer in French actually sets forth a different course which God might have taken in history, ‘‘if ’’ the Elector of Saxony had but been different.152)

152 Augustus II (1670-1733), elector of Saxony, became a Roman Catholic to improve his chances of becoming king of Poland, but the Saxons resented it.

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Then why do we not sit still and do nothing? The laws of God visit us with consequences till we do something. We may try the experiment; we may sit still, if we like; but, while we do so, God’s laws will never cease molesting us. His laws have provided that it shall be impossible to us—that our nature is such, our desires, energies, inclinations such, that we can’t continue to do nothing. To say, if ‘‘A. had been different, if B. had had more judgment, and C. had had more feeling, how easy it would have been!’’ To wish that it had been otherwise is to wish that the imperfect should not be on its way to perfection—is, in fact, pure nonsense. In many cases we can see that it has all been ‘‘for the best,’’ but even when we cannot, to say, ‘‘if it had but been otherwise,’’ is using words without meaning. With regard to ‘‘special providences,’’ if there were any, there would be no universal general providence. Each particular thing is, indeed, brought about by Providence, in accordance with His law, as a part of the whole. If, when I come to London and go into Oxford Street, I find Mrs C. at home, God had it before His thought that I should carry out some purpose through her means. God took me there. God always has before Him in His thought what the whole plan is, and the purposed results. Now, nobody reasons; there is good feeling and good conscience, but it is reasoning power which is most wanting in the world. The church does not reason; society reasons still less. How worse than useless it is talking to anyone about religion! Can we expect anything else with the existing code of society—when people go on paying morning visits to each other, although they know that both sides will be glad if they are not at home?

We cannot sit still and do nothing, if we would.

To say ‘‘if ’’ anything had been other wise, is pure nonsense.

If there were ‘‘special providences,’’ there would be no universal providence.

Common sense is what is most wanted now.

Tr uth of Feeling The Bs said they left London that nobody might say any more, ‘‘There now, we have done the Bs,’’ when they had been invited to a dinner, to a dinner, too, to which they did not wish to go. Much is said now about the tolerance of society. We may have, it is true, any opinions we like about Gothic architecture and Italian pictures, because that is only amusing; it involves no change. We are not likely to be pulling down York Minster in consequence. But if we have any opinions which require a change in society or in any-

Are people allowed to have what opinions they like?

396 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought thing else, even if seen to be true, ‘‘it won’t do.’’ You must only have fancy opinions, not working opinions. 5.9 Tr uth of feeling much more important than tr uth of words, and much less thought of.

We are such martinets about the truth of our words. We seldom think about having true feelings, which is of much more consequence. If I think of a person differently today from what I did yesterday, especially if it is on account of some act, and more especially of some act towards myself, while all the while his character is the same, I have an untrue feeling. But nobody thinks whether their feelings are untrue or not, yet if they are, it matters very little whether their words are true or not. Now, it is ver y possible that a person may be in a very high and noble mood of feeling while acting very unreasonably. It is proved to be perfectly possible for feeling to be quite independent of reason. If then I suffer from his unreasonable conduct, and do not take into account the whole of his character, but feel to him on account of his unreasonableness only, I am in a state of untrue feeling towards him. The first step is to reason well ourselves, then we become discontented with others for not doing so too. The next step is to be satisfied that others should not be able to reason, to see that it cannot be otherwise, that we must not expect it any more than that everybody should have seven-leagued boots like Peter Schlemiel;153 they will see it some day in a ‘‘future state’’; and it is true that they are not to blame; it was not their fault; it was God’s fault, or rather it was His wisdom; they could not help it, they could not do otherwise. There will be no sorrow for the past in a ‘‘future state,’’ then ever ybody will see that to blame themselves is as untrue as to blame others. If the laws of God had been different, which made them what they were, imperfection would not have been on the way to per fection. Then all that energy which is expended now on remorse and wishing ‘‘it had been otherwise,’’ and blame of others, will be turned to considering our position as it is, as we should consider it if it were another’s, and to making the most we can out of it.

153 Adelbert von Cahmisso, Peter Schlemiel: The Man Who Sold His Shadow; to make amends for selling his shadow for wealth, this character used his seven-league boots to leap around the world observing nature.

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‘‘Love your enemies’’154 appears to be unmeaning; we cannot love a person for injuring us and making us unhappy. We love that which is loveable, but we can love that in them which is good intention; we can love the absolute good in them which they show to others; we can feel truly, in short, to them. {Omitted: It is so very important to know what we don’t believe and what we do. So few people know what they believe—they think they believe and yet we see how different would be their conduct if they did believe the things which they think they do. For instance, people would be indignant and distressed if you were to say that they did not believe in a future state—and yet they don’t, because you see how differently they would act if they did. f306} 5.10 To your own Self be true How vague we are in what we believe and say! We think we believe and don’t; we think we don’t believe and do, till something comes to reveal to us, all at once, that we did not believe what we have said we believed all our lives. I am afraid to say that I believe in a God, though I have a consciousness that I do, and though I feel as much hurt at the doubt as if you were to say, ‘‘I, whom you have known so many years, whom you have loved and sympathized with so much, who have done so much for you, and now you don’t believe in my existence.’’ I feel the same pain at the question as to whether I believe in God’s existence. And yet I think that if I did believe in it as I do in yours, and if I had a comprehensive view of His whole character as I think I believe him to be, I should be in a continual ‘‘rapture,’’ much greater than St Teresa’s, because my God is so much more worthy of exciting ‘‘rapture’’ than hers was. But how seldom it is that we have a comprehensive view of the whole character, even of one another! Do we not generally judge each other by the accidental behaviour, and the behaviour to ourselves, of each moment? God only always thinks of us the same, and as we are. Most of us do not even make an attempt to do so. For instance, although I know that you are kind and affectionate, yet a word, a look, and that generally to myself, will alter my impression

154 Matt 5:44. 155 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, scene 3.

‘‘To your own self be true’’155 in knowing what you believe. Of God.

Of one another.

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Of the real existence of God and of one another. Of the whole being of God and of one another.

of your character, although if anyone were to ask me if you were changed, I should certainly say that you were not. Almost everybody’s feeling judges unconsciously by the moment. When I see a person cross and unreasonable, I feel differently to what I do when I see him all that is generous and affectionate, though I know that there is no real difference in his character. Therefore we may say (of each other as well as of God) that we do not always believe in his real existence; we have not always a comprehensive view either of God’s character or of each other’s. Unless we can see all the present, and all the past, and all the future, indeed, how can we? We see only a strip. We may therefore perceive that, occasionally, we don’t believe in one another’s whole existence more truly than we do in God’s, for our opinions of another alter, even where confessedly there is no alteration in the character. We do not profess to have made any new discovery. Yet there are ver y few of us who try always to have the same and a true view of one another’s real characters, uninfluenced by their passing conduct to ourselves. Most of us hardly profess not to be acted upon by the moment. And we make no struggle against this kaleidoscope habit of mind. 5.11

Super ficial and vague opinions given in conversation.

The opinions given in conversation on people’s lives and characters, concerning which we ourselves have had experience, the opinions given in conversation on subjects on which we ourselves have worked, seem to us, as we should expect our own to seem to others, if we gave our opinion on draining or fencing, on the management of horses or cattle. Vagueness of Opinion We hear much of the benefits of conversation and reading to quicken mankind. It is true that there is more intelligence among social than among solitary workmen. If people were conscious where they are ignorant, if they proposed queries to themselves and others, till they had good ground for making assertions, social life might quicken truth more than error. At present it seems as often to quicken the latter as the former. All goes vaguely, sometimes according to our individual inclinations, as idiosyncratic, but, in the main, according to our inclination to follow the fashion established. Fashion of dress, fashion of life, etc., spring from we know

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not whom, but it is easier to follow them than to look for an absolute truth and right. We go to Sheffield one year; we hear of extreme distress, ‘‘trade so bad.’’ We go another year; we hear of great prosperity, ‘‘trade so good.’’ What is the difference? In the one case we find Chartism, discover y of plots, instruments of maiming and wounding, etc. In the other case we find drinking and dress. Of course there are good exceptions but these are, in each case, signs of the times. If there were but a type of life, after which man was working, we might improve out of each variation of the circumstances which we should be trying to direct, so as to forward the realization of that type. Ireland is emptying itself into America. There is some good in this, but what a vague uncertain prospect of good, unless the Irish, whether in Ireland or America, have some type to work after, are endeavouring to modify circumstances to a right purpose. It is God’s purpose that man shall modify life and circumstances so that the outer world shall help the inner being to be one with God. Is man intent upon thus modifying circumstances? Till he is, trade may rise or fall, mines of gold lie hidden beneath the ground or millions lie scattered on its surface, there will be changes, without real progress, to mankind. According to laws, not fathomed by us, nations will rise and fall. We shall vaguely ask the question, ‘‘Is England come to its culminating point?’’ as if there were a law that each nation was to rise and fall—not in accordance with any specific laws, but merely because the law was rise and decline. The religion of mankind is without, outside of them, making them discontented with themselves and their lives, whenever they think of it, but not helping them to improve their lives by themselves, themselves by their lives. ‘‘When I hear the sermons telling me to be good,’’ said a sensible cook, ‘‘I think I will, but I am just the same when I get into the kitchen.’’ To this purport at least spoke that observant personage. The only remedy for sins which we know we shall commit, which we pledge ourselves to commit, which, if we knew more than we do of God’s laws, we should know it would be impossible for us not to commit in these lives, is absolution. How naturally arose these paradoxical remedies of the atonement of blood, of intercession, of forgiveness of sins, when man feared a higher Power, so clearly discernible in existence—found himself always sinning—but never thought of the simple device of

Vagueness of type in life.

Vagueness of historical philosophy.

Vagueness of object in religion.

400 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought tr ying whether life might be modified so that he would not sin! When his body is sick he goes—not to a priest to forgive him—but a doctor to try to cure him. He himself tries change of air, of food. Vagueness of Life Vagueness concerning the will.

The mistakes concerning the will of God and of man cause this confusion. Till the will is recognized to spring from the whole nature, which nature is recognized to be modifiable by circumstances which man can modify, there is no essential improvement to be hoped for mankind. Oh, mankind, ‘‘Grand-Être’’ indeed, how little dost thou know thy power, how little conceive what thou mightest realize! Oh, God in the flesh, rouse thyself from thine inanities, know thyself, unite thyself as one with all-comprehending thought, accept thy high office to work out, to manifest that thought, phase after phase, now and forever! Thou also shalt rise, each and all, to the allcomprehensive glance and will for thine eternal course, and then work on in its realization, but not till thou dost include in thy present existence a conception of its nature and object! 5.12

Untr ue feelings which generally prevail.

How can society go well if its principles are wrong at the core? if it is believed, if the feeling is that the self-indulgent man is ‘‘receiving his good things here,’’ when the truth is that he is in a state of privation, if it is believed that the wrong which is in characters might be changed by what is called ‘‘an act of the will’’ (these being words without meaning, and a change of influences being necessary to effect a change of will); if it is believed that a man who feels and does what is wrong is in himself guilty because he feels and does wrong, whereas he might, if he would, feel and do right, when, in reality, he is the greatest of sufferers through God’s righteous law? Evil feeling, evil nature, is in itself the worst of evil, and, in addition to being so, it has no compassion from mankind, as physical suffering has. It has condemnation, and for the most part no pity, no means taken to improve it, or, if means are taken, the subject has been so imperfectly studied that they are generally inefficient. Some benevolent and conscientious men say, ‘‘Make a prison for criminals as wretched as possible, in order to deter them from committing acts which will bring them back to it.’’ But they make these criminals in themselves no better, and what are they to do with themselves in their wickedness? Is this true or not?

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At all events, let us try to feel, as we believe to be consistent with tr uth, in regard to our own faults and those of others. And something of the sharpness of the sting is taken out by such a view, in suffering from our own incapability, in suffering from seeing the sense of our incapability in those around us, which has so often depressed us, lowered us in our own eyes. We can, then, in some degree, acknowledge our own incapability to ourselves, yet be conscious that it arises out of God’s righteous laws, that we have no reason to be ashamed of it, that God will respect us for bearing, in a true spirit, with the privations to which it subjects us, that we have His sympathy, that the evil which we bring to others from our incapability arises also from His righteous law, that all will unfold to good, that we may stand upright before God, while endeavouring truly to appreciate our own failings. And we may think of the failings of others also without bitterness, may trace them to our own without sinking of heart, may recognize the hidden mines of goodness in others and in ourselves, prevented though they be from outward manifestation. Thus may we do justice to others, to ourselves, and to the source of all that is.

A true and comprehensive view of the nature and purpose of God essential alike to give us any tr uth of purpose and to support us under a sense of incapability.

No Remodelling of Life ‘‘A wounded spirit who shall bear?’’156 And for such wounds the only healing is a true and comprehensive view of the nature and purpose of Him who calls us into being, i.e., trust (not in books nor in words, called faith, though meaning often we know not what, but) trust in the nature of all that exists, which is revealed to us by the revelation of the nature of the universal source of being, which is revealed by the activity of our own nature. 5.13 How is it likely that social or individual life can be well carried on with so little knowledge or feeling as we have of human nature, or of the nature from whose will spring the laws in consequence of which we are, in consequence of which we are exactly what we are, and by a certain mode of keeping which we might attain the happiness of mankind (it being in the power of mankind to learn what is this mode, to attain, to desire and relish this mode, to attain to keep this mode).

156 Prov 18:14.

Instead of seeking for this true and comprehensive view of God’s nature and purpose in order to fashion our social life, we take for granted that our ways of life are right, are eternal. We only seek to modify particulars.

402 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Mankind, meanwhile, are regulating themselves by a mode of life liked or approved by a few, and for this let us not blame mankind. It is not in the nature and constitution of mankind that each man shall think out for himself what ought to be the organization, the regularly established circumstances of life, any more than that each should think out for himself the truths of religion. All are not adapted for such thinking, for such searching into truth, any more than all are adapted to search into any other peculiar line of truth. The nature of these truths is, however, by far the most important of all, and concerns every mode of truth, more intimately, more fundamentally than any other. Yet these truths are least inquired into. There is no regular, earnest study of them going on among mankind, as there is of other sciences. As to the nature of God, it is taken for granted that what we can know of it we know from the Bible or the church. Thus we hear read chapters of the wars of Agag, etc.,157 to teach us the nature of God, though we do indeed hear also from the Bible conceptions of the nature of God, which are absolute truth. Yet even these are presented to us confusedly and mixed up with what is not true, and the true and untrue are repeated till interest ceases. God’s Purpose should be the Type of Life Men have it in their power to regulate circumstances. Circumstances regulate that which, within certain limits established by the laws of God, the constitution of man and the development of that constitution shall be. But how little do men go to the foundation for their circumstances, how little do they inquire what circumstances will call forth the character adapted to fulfill the type of mankind in the purpose of God, the type of greatest well-being! They exercise some power over circumstances certainly, but what are their objects when they exercise this power? To live as the highest class, to which the money they possess enables them to belong, live; they exercise the power of choosing one school or another, one governess or another, one profession or another. But it seems taken for granted that these modes of life are right, are eternal; no inquiry is made whether they are in harmony with God’s nature and man’s nature; some aims at improvement go on, indeed, but nothing fundamental.

157 See 1 Sam 15.

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Drawing is now taught from the cast instead of from copies, and women draw infinitely better than they used to do in consequence. But no inquiry is made into the real object of drawing, how the exercise of it shall affect the character and life, so as to render these in harmony with the nature and purpose of God, and enable them to fulfill the work of man. {Omitted: Fulgentia: ‘‘I am going,’’ she said to Portia, in one of her last letters, ‘‘to ask a question of the Church of England, which she will not answer. If she is silent, if she does not answer, I shall go elsewhere, not to the Roman Catholic Church, as people think, but to the infidels and atheists, as they are called. From the time of Christ down to that of Wesley, all successful religions have begun with the very poor, with the ‘refuse’ of ‘society.’ I do not believe that it is possible to engraft what we wish to do upon Protestantism. I think that Protestantism does not admit of it. f317} 5.14 Catholicism makes the love to Christ, or as we should call it, love to God and to our fellow man, the first; Protestantism makes love to our own belongings, to our family, the first: ‘‘Charity begins at home,’’ ‘‘Take care of your own people, and if everybody does this, ever ybody will be well cared for,’’ are its favourite proverbs. Your own home is to be your first object, not devotion to God and your neighbour. But, we are told, devotion to your home is devotion to your God; family love is to ‘‘love your neighbour.’’ Family love is generally but a multiplied form of selfishness. Magnificent exceptions there are, it is true, but what a man wants is that his wife shall be ‘‘his,’’ not that she shall be God’s. A woman’s selfishness, if she have twelve children, is commonly but a twelvefold selfishness for them. And the family tie would be so much better and finer if it were not so narrow. If there were an independent occupation for each, how much sweeter the return, how much closer the tie! Again, how often in a family in the ‘‘higher class’’ of life (there being in it more than one unmarried daughter) there is one invalid, ‘‘my invalid daughter.’’ Does not this point out something very wrong in the family? And the medical man almost always says, ‘‘if she had been a boy at school, this would not have happened.’’ Protestants, in their horror of Catholics, have ‘‘in emptying the tub emptied out the child’’ with it. With their well-grounded detes-

What comes of Protestant idolatr y of ‘‘the family.’’

404 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought tation of Romanist forms of charity, they have emptied out the spirit of charity too. To the woman, Protestantism offers nothing but marriage; she may leave home to marry, but for nothing else; she may marry, however selfishly, and have the blessing and the good word of all her family. If she do anything else, she will have—what? she will be called ‘‘unnatural,’’ her character will be suspected, she will be supposed to be ‘‘crossed in love,’’ ‘‘unhappy in her own family,’’ a ‘‘bad temper’’; to justify herself she must take a husband. Editor: The next section begins in the third person, then returns shortly to the English family dialogue form. Add Mss 45839 ff1-232. Unfair Treatment of Religion 6.1

Unfair treatment of religion.

What is the meaning of the word?

{Omitted: ‘‘If any man will do His will he shall know of the doctrine.’’ John 7:17 f1} No science has been so unfairly treated as religion. From the awe which it has inspired, it has never been allowed to be on the same footing as any other part of our knowledge. Emotion, imagination and self-interest have been its main sources. Up to a certain period in the development of mankind, it is well that it should be so. It is well that emotion and imagination should keep up in man a sense of a higher power than his own, before he is able to reason upon it. But is there, or is there not, what may be called a science of religion, as of other subjects of our knowledge? What is the meaning of the word ‘‘religion’’? Is it not the tie, the binding,158 or connection between the Perfect and the imperfect, the eternal and the temporal, the infinite and the finite, the universal and the individual? Here, as in many instances, the derivation of the word shows its import, such as suits with our meaning, though scarcely does that meaning seem to have been attached to it, when originally so derived. Religion includes a knowledge of the universal and particular, the general and individual, the perfect and imperfect natures which are within our ken, as well as a knowledge of the connection between

158 One Latin derivation of religion is the word to bind, religare.

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them. Indeed, it is obvious that this connection can only be correctly appreciated in proportion as we understand the natures so connected. The primary fact in religion seems to be the existence of an Omnipotent spirit of love and wisdom—the primar y fact, because it is the explanation of every other. This gives us four words to explain, each of which is open to great misconception, and has been greatly misconceived, viz., omnipotent, spirit, love, wisdom. By omnipotence we understand a power which effects whatever would not contradict its own nature and will. By a spirit we understand a living thought, feeling and purpose residing in a conscious being. By love we understand the feeling which seeks for its satisfaction the greatest degree and the best kind of well-being in other than itself. By wisdom we understand the thought by which this satisfaction is obtained. But, first, is religion a subject to be logically treated, or is there any truth in the feeling of deprecating, as irreverent, the sifting of what is true, as to religious belief, by the aid of the science of logic? If religion is to depend upon evidence, not upon intuition or consciousness, a more comprehensive evidence is required than is necessar y for any other subject. More faculties must be exercised for this purpose than are required in seeking after truth on any other subject. If a man is seeking truth in physical astronomy, the perceptive faculties alone will enable him to draw his inferences. But he will not know thus all that is to be known about astronomy, or the most important part of what is to be known about astronomy, for that most important part is its relation with religion. What is Religion considered to be? If a man is seeking evidence concerning a nature which is love, his evidence must partly depend on his own nature being in some degree love; and, inasfar only as it is love, can he judge of love in another being. A London lady, speaking of a cousin who, on returning from the East, had remained some weeks in a foreign institution for training deaconesses, said, ‘‘It is rumoured in London that Miss - - remained on the Continent for the purpose of recovering her complexion before her return to England.’’ Thirty years’ acquaintance with that cousin had not enabled her to draw any inference with regard to

What the primar y fact in religion.

Is religion a subject for logical treatment?

What has religion generally been considered to be? What are the foundations of that which it has generally been considered to be?

406 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought her nature. This is a homely instance of our meaning with regard to the study of the nature of God. Is it an intuition, when a child feels a consciousness of love in another being, and gives love in return? Certainly, such a sentiment or emotion exists in a human being prior to any reasoning upon it. But, love to God does not exist as an ‘‘intuition.’’ At an early age, awe, admiration or fear may exist intuitively in a human being towards a superhuman power, manifesting itself in nature or the events of life. But love or trust towards this superhuman power can have no true or firm foundation, except from inference. The nature and purpose of God is a subject immediately connected, bound up with every subject of possible human inquiry. Tr uly, therefore, may we express by the word ‘‘religion’’ inquiries concerning the nature and purpose of God. All that comes by intuition (of that which is true in religion) is an emotion or sentiment of awe or admiration. Reasoning will reveal the existence of a spirit of love and wisdom to a loving and wise spirit, but cannot do so to any other mode of being. Consequently, the evidence for religion requires the exercise of parts of man’s nature, which are not necessarily exercised upon evidence for mere physical facts. The confusion in which men are as to the nature and true sources of a real belief in religion greatly impedes its existence. Few, even of thinking and feeling men, have any true estimation of the present state of religious belief and religious feeling among mankind. Numbers are thinking they believe what they do not believe. Numbers have feelings towards beings of their own imaginations, or taught to them from the imaginations of other men. This deplorable ignorance on the subject, which is connected with ever y possible interest and question which can present itself to man’s heart or mind, will remain till mankind are aware of it, till they know and feel how to make some advance towards removing it. We say, advance towards removing it. No man—no number of men living in any age—can remove it. All men, through all ages of human existence, must unite to learn and to feel more and more (and yet not fully comprehend or appreciate) that universal Spirit. To learn and to feel Him perfectly requires perfection. Man and mankind are essentially imper fect, but they are to be workers towards perfection—towards that which, in the view of the All-comprehending, is the only true per fection—that which has been attained by exercise.

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What is Religion? Let the question now before us be, What is religion, and what the grounds of belief in it? Religion is the tie between the Perfect and the imperfect. By the Perfect, we mean His perfectly right thought, feeling and purpose. Concerning right, we can only say this, it is that thought, feeling and purpose which produce, in the course of eternity, the most happy being possible, without involving the supposition of any contradiction. The primary fact in religion is the existence of an omnipotent spirit of goodness and wisdom, whence spring all other modes of existence and all connections between them. Our evidence for this existence is the consciousness and the experience in man of goodness and wisdom in himself and his kind—the discerning certain phenomena of the same nature as those which spring from human thought and feeling—from purpose to promote human welfare, but which do not spring from human nature—which would spring from human nature, if it had the power to call into existence such phenomena—the inference that other thought and feeling, more power ful for effecting its purpose than man’s, calls these phenomena into existence. Thought, feeling, purpose for other welfare than that of the individual who thinks, feels and purposes, we recognize as benevolence (or wish for the well-being of others). The pursuing a right end by the means adapted to attain it, we call wisdom. The existence, then, of a spirit of wisdom and benevolence may be inferred in this way—we trace the operation of a benevolent and wise will by the existence of the same kind of effects as spring from a benevolent and wise will in man, by effects which the benevolent and wise man would produce if he could. The aim of the benevolent and wise man will be to help his fellow men, by the improvement and exercise of their natures, to attain well-being. Experience proves well-being to be attainable only in this way. Thought, feeling, reflection, experience, agree that in no other way, without some contradiction, can well-being exist. In this way, obser vation and experience will show ever-increasing evidence that a power superior to man’s is ever promoting man’s welfare. Looking into the nature of human existence, questions arise as to the source or sources of the phenomena which we discern, some tending apparently to man’s welfare, others to his suffering. Hence

What is religion? What the foundations of it?

What observation and experience show.

408 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought have arisen the questions, do these phenomena spring from a variety of wills? from one benevolent and one malevolent will? from no will at all? or from one will? Inference, arising out of conscious experience, may be found tending to prove that (in proportion as we improve in being and increase in knowledge) we shall discern that present evil and suffering, as well as present good and enjoyment, essentially spring from one source, the omnipotent spirit of benevolence and wisdom, which is thus effecting human welfare, human progress towards the divine, through the improvement and exercise of the capabilities of mankind, these capabilities and this exercise arising from what we may designate divine laws, that is, from certain invariable co-existences and successions springing from the omnipotent spirit of benevolence and wisdom, who would have no existence, were anything other than it is, has been and is to be. In accordance with his righteous thought, there is a way in which every law is susceptible of being kept, which will ensure human welfare, i.e., human advance towards the divine. Human nature is, through law, constituted capable of discerning these laws, how they ought to be kept, how to incline human will to keep them. What Problem is set us by God? Problem set us by God

To attain this is the problem which the omnipotent spirit of benevolence and wisdom sets before humanity, supplying humanity with the means by which to attain it. God’s law is absolutely definite. One of its purposes seems to be to educate a divine capability into a divine existence, by the exercise of the capability of the individual and the race. Does not this purpose come home to our conviction as worthy of, consistent with, the divine nature? The definiteness of the means by which this is effected is complete and entire. If our comprehension could penetrate through the whole, we should be conscious that not the bending of a leaf this way or that—not the resting of a grain of sand in one place and not in another, is without a purpose, as part of the whole. All is connected with all so intimately, that the most minute difference in any part would alter the whole. In some minds there is a sort of struggle against this definiteness, as if it implied some necessity, i.e., some yielding to need. But that would be to imply that it were to be wished that something had been otherwise, whereas of nothing can it be truly wished that it had been otherwise, for all has accorded with right.

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The two great objects of a wise benevolence are secured, first, that man works for himself and his kind—he is not worked for, he being in a state of passivity, but he lives in the midst of the means and inducements which make him or which will make him active. Second, that it is the eternal, the omnipotent spirit of righteousness, who is the spring of the means and inducements which will assuredly set in movement the springs of active will in each human being, so that he attain unto righteousness and knowledge. No satisfaction could there have been in beings moved like machines—none could there have been in ignorant and finite man being left without full guidance. All the suffering, all the privation in human existence, is because it is the education of mankind which is going on, so that his will shall attain to be right, not that he shall be driven at the will of another, his own being passive.

Two great objects of a wise benevolence.

Editor: The English family dialogue form resumes here. 6.2 {Omitted: What is this age, father? In a sister country you tell me. . . . f11} What is this age? In a sister country it is said to be the age of atheism and despair. In ours, is it not a time of indifference and unbelief ? We do not believe in a type of perfection into which each man is to be developed, we do not believe in social progress, we do not believe in religious progress, we do not believe in God. {Omitted: Least of all do we believe in women. I don’t myself. Men dare not express their beliefs or their unbeliefs, if they have any, to their wives—parents keep their daughters in subjection lest they should ‘‘become like men.’’ ff11-12} Our political progress is the only thing which we do believe in, but as to any development of our church, any improvement in society which shall modify the two great extremes of luxury and poverty, we do not so much as imagine it. In the last 300 years much has been gained politically, but what has been done for religion? We have retrenched a good deal, but we have put nothing in the place of it. It has been all denying and no constructing. {Omitted: The Roman Catholic Church loved the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mar y and the saints. The Protestant Church does not love the Virgin Mar y and the saints and I don’t see that they love God and Jesus Christ and the Holy Ghost

This age has not belief in any but political progress.

410 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought the better for it. The Unitarians cut off the Son and the Holy Ghost and they don’t love God the better either, I believe. It is all negation and no compensation. You may be sure I did not let this nonsense pass. I wrote her a long letter about the benefits of the Reformation, which everybody knows, and the corruptions of the Roman Catholic religion, and I asked her whether she thought she could give us a new religion to replace the Church of England. f12} 6.3 What are ‘‘Christians’’? Does ‘‘a Christian’’ mean ‘‘a follower of Christ’’?

We call ourselves Christians. If the word mean ‘‘followers of Christ,’’ there appears to be scarcely anything in England now which bears any resemblance to Christ, which would not surprise Him as something He had never thought of. Call us something else—do not call us Christians. {Omitted: It appears to me to be a mistake to call the bishop of London a Christian. Because we are ver y sure that he is not what Christ intended, which is, no doubt, being a Christian. You may be one in the spirit or in the letter. The bishop of London might be so in the spirit, without being so in the letter. Christ might not have fixed the colour of his liveries that it should be purple, and yet he might be a Christian in the spirit. But do you think there is anything like Christ in Christianity? If there is not, let us not call it Christianity; let us call it something else. ff13-14} The Roman Catholic orders, indeed, do follow, word for word, what Christ said and did; thus far, therefore, either the Roman Catholic orders are Christians and are right, or Christ was in some things mistaken. Who can wonder that this world is such a poor world as it is? that it does not seem, certainly at present, worth the creating? that Europe, Asia, Africa and America should be so miserable a contemplation? when nobody is interested in the one vital interest which runs through all other interests, and nobody is set free to pursue it. Here and there a man thinks a little for his amusement in his librar y; others do not think at all; they believe that they are to take their thoughts out of a book or a church. Is the worship of the goddess of wisdom by the ancients more unreasonable than the worship of the God of the nineteenth centur y? We should not have liked, it is true, many things which that goddess of wisdom did, but a really wise God, what a grand conception!

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The Greeks and Romans divided the evil among all their Gods; the Persians heaped it all upon Arimanes [Ahriman]159—their mode of purifying the one good spirit. The motive of all religions is to account for what men saw. The Greeks seem hardly to have cared to suppose their Gods perfect. It is not to be supposed that they could have called the things good which their Gods did. They were simply the explanations, after the Greek fashion, of the phenomena believed to be observed. But, since that time, in all so-called Christian religions, the God has been supposed to be a perfect man. Historically it might be shown that the perfection in fashion at the time was imputed to God. I was much struck by the terror of death, felt by a sweet young girl of fifteen years of age, the daughter of an Unitarian, in her last illness. ‘‘Save me, Papa, pray for me that I may not die.’’ The ignorance in which the unorthodox leave their children is very lamentable; perhaps, as things are, they can hardly do otherwise. Religious instruction by the orthodox is given under authority. The Bible, the catechism or priestly instruction is all supposed to rest, not on discovery by human capability, but on more or less miraculous light. Those who do not believe in this miraculous light either think too little on the subject to teach, or they fear to teach what they are not sure of, or to disgust with what they know not how to teach. May we not look to see the possibility of a religious society, the religion of which shall not profess to be other than the discoveries of mankind through the nature God has given to man, and through the teachings of God in His universe to that nature? The principles of the Roman Catholic orders might, with modifications, be adopted, viz.:

Want of religious education among the ‘‘unorthodox.’’

Three principles of a Religious Society 1. In religion being the foundation and spring of the life. 2. In unity of religious belief among those associated. 3. In regular instruction in the principles of this belief. {Omitted: But in an order/society such as I would endeavour to conceive, I think I should imitate the Roman Catholic orders in giving regular instruction. f15}

159 In Zoroastrianism.

What the religious education which should be given.

412 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought In respect of youth, would there not, at an age when death can be conceived of so as to terrify, be capability so far to conceive of the ruling spirit of the universe as not to fear death? Grown-up people show such a stiffness in their ideas and prepossessions that it is easier to deal with fifteen years than with fifty, or even than with thirty or forty years. One says: ‘‘I believe all you say to be true,’’ yet continues to manifest a fear of death and of punishment for the sins and omissions of this life. Another stops short with, ‘‘I must have a God who,’’ etc. Such religious instruction to children would be inexpressibly facilitated by the life being a constant exemplification or manifestation of what was taught. Could I teach my children what I think of God’s nature and purposes, of man’s nature, duty, destination, and then live after the fashion of conventional life, and turn them back from my lesson on religion to the same life? This may be done consistently by those who can call this life the ‘‘state to which it has pleased God to call’’ them—who can bid their children pray, at morning and evening prayers, to be forgiven for having done nothing and omitted everything, but we, who think we ought to strive to fashion our circumstances so as to enable us, in accordance with the divine law, to do what is right, and not to omit what God calls us to do, how can we teach what we believe, and then send them back, as well as ourselves, when the lesson is done, to a life of which we know that, in accordance with God’s law, the effect will be to make it impossible to live and to be in the spirit of that lesson? 6.4 There will be no heaven unless we make it.

What is the religion that people have now? If they do wrong, they say, Let us pray—pray for pardon and peace. If they have ‘‘trials,’’ as they call them, they say, Let us bear them patiently: in another world it will all come right. If they are well-meaning and conscientious, and they make mistakes, or fail, or are hindered by external circumstances, they say, God takes the will for the deed: in heaven we shall see our hopes fulfilled; not, there will be no heaven for me, nor for anyone else, unless we make it—with wisdom for carrying out our thoughts into realities. Good thoughts don’t make a heaven, anymore than they make a garden. But we say, God is to do it for us, not we. We? What are we to do? We are to pray and to mean well, to take care that our hearts be right.

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No Heaven unless we make it ‘‘God will reward a sincere wish to do right.’’ God will do no such thing: it is not His plan. He does not treat men like children: mankind is to create mankind. We are to learn, first, what is heaven, and, secondly, how to make it. We are to ascertain what is right, and then how to perform it. {Omitted: In her days of discouragemente she wrote to me then. And how one (I had told her that I could not understand how, with her views, with her certainty that all. . . . f18} 6.5 Why, with our certainty that all, through God’s laws, will come at last to perfection, are we not happy? Is the man happy who dreams only of California, and goes up and down, finding no way nor means of getting there? I see, or believe I see, in a better future a relief from present poverty, but how am I to make my way into the new era, religious and social, which is coming? I have not strength to create it. I have not resignation to wait for it. Many a man takes refuge with one loving heart, and so contrives to live till the time when the world will have brought in a new era of itself. In this way he survives the present storm, and thus he learns, it is tr ue, the soundings, most effectually, by the way his vessel has str uck, but she will be too much damaged for a successful voyage.

Certainty of ultimate perfection not intended to produce present peace of mind.

6.6 In this age, atheism and indifference are man and wife. In former times, atheism used to be the father of despair. But now people live without God in the world, and don’t so much as know that He is not there: they are not aware of his absence. Formerly, the terror and the anguish of the sceptic testified to what he had lost, and were the truest witnesses to God and to his own religiousness. Now, the indifferentist is called the religious man, and the religious man is the heretic. How do you know a religious man now? By his going to church. And going to church is considered as a duty, that is, as something due— to whom? to God: something you have done for Him; He is flattered by your going to church. But it is not always done as a compliment to Him; sometimes it is done as a compliment to our fellow creatures. Mrs A. is deaf and cannot hear the service, but she always goes to church for the sake of ‘‘example.’’ A great many ladies never

In this age, atheism the father not of despair but of indifference.

Going to church the fr uit of irreligion now as often as of religion.

414 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought miss going where they are known, for this purpose, but if they are where they are not known, they do not go. What a poor compliment it is to God to go, not because you have something you want to say to Him, but ‘‘because Mrs A. goes.’’ In a countr y church, if there is a wedding of any consequence, the church is always sure to be full the first Sunday the bride appears, in order to see her. ‘‘To see the bride,’’ is a ver y innocent amusement, but is religion come to that pass in this country that people go to a place where they say they expect to meet God, to ‘‘see the bride’’? In more civilized society, a woman scarcely ever leaves a breakfast table to put on her bonnet for church, without hearing a joke among the men and the inquiry, ‘‘Shall you go this morning?’’ ‘‘No, I don’t like the litany. Shall you?’’ ‘‘Yes, I shall; I don’t like shocking our hostess.’’ And when you meet at luncheon, ‘‘Have you fulfilled your ecclesiastical duties? Oh! shocking; don’t you consider it a duty? I did not know you were so bad.’’ Or, ‘‘I counted forty-six people asleep this morning.’’ And when one thinks that there are fifteen thousand sermons to be preached this morning, and more than fifteen thousand breakfast tables where similar jokes are making—and this is called a church, and this religion! 6.7 Is the World dead? Is the world dead?

{Omitted: ‘‘I think the world is dead.’’ f21} The world seems to be dead. There is a fable by Leopardi,160 where Hercules visits Atlas, and offers to relieve him of the world for a time while he takes a holiday, and Atlas imparts to him his uneasiness lest the world should be dead. There used, he says, to be a constant buzz and murmur in it, but now it is all quiet; there used to be a great pulse beating in it, but now it is quite still. He says that he had even made preparations for the funeral and composed his elegy, fearing that the corpse would smell, but he has not perceived it yet, and is afraid of burying a still living body. I partake the uneasiness of Atlas, and think this must be the case now. Look at what is passing on the world. Look at France submitting to such a yoke. And what do we discuss? Not the chances or means

160 Giacomo Leopardi, ‘‘The Dialogue of Hercules and Atlas,’’ in The Moral Essays, Operette Morali vol. 1.

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of recover y for the wretched French from this horrible disease, but— the personal character of Louis-Napoléon, as if the ‘‘coup d’état’’161 were a play or a work of art. We dispute whether he is a fanatic or a rascal, whether he is a well-intentioned man using bad means, or a bad man using good means. Look at Switzerland! What a noble little people they used to be, {Omitted: kicking and f21} str uggling, on the tops of their mountains, for their independence, keeping all the world at bay, and only fourteen years ago (this is written in 1852) how gallantly they armed their little fortifications and dragged out their cannon, and were ready to have their {little f21} watches smashed for this very man,162 who is dictating to them now. And now look, at his first word they give up their privilege of affording hospitality—they agree to everything he commands. Look again at Austria. Schwarzenberg dies, and in this country, in the land of political freedom, as it calls itself, there appears the next morning on 40,000 breakfast tables a leading article in a newspaper, speaking with admiration of Schwarzenberg’s talents, and saying that his country will remember him ‘‘with gratitude but not with love.’’163 (It may be said, we should speak with generosity of a fallen foe. Is there no absolute right and wrong, but are we only to consider Schwarzenberg as a foe to us, not as a sinner in the abstract?) For Schwarzenberg read Rush164 or Mrs Manning—and speak with admiration of Rush’s talents. Yet Rush committed only three murders, where Schwarzenberg committed 3000. It is often said, what does it signify what the opinion of the writer of a leading article is? he is but one man. But the Times writes what will be read, and it is therefore a fair standard of the opinion of this country. The days of martyrdom cannot return. We do not wish that they should; when all that a man needed to do was to ‘‘pour out’’ the tr uth which was in him, without caring what became of it, nor whether it were said in such a manner that anyone could accept it.

161 The ‘‘coup’’ was Louis-Napoléon dissolving the Assembly in December 1851, seizing power himself. 162 Louis-Philippe, then king of France, demanded that Louis-Napoléon, then living in exile in Switzerland, be turned over to the French. The Nightingales in Switzerland at the time saw the preparations for war and left; see European Travels (7:32-33). 163 In a flattering account of the life of Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg (1800-52), Austrian prime minister, Times 7 April 1852:4. 164 James Bloomfield Rush, multiple murderer, executed in 1849.

416 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Those days cannot come back, and we should not wish them back. Still, there was a nobler element then in the character than silence, and now that people are silent (in the midst of so much speech), silent about the convictions which are deepest and strongest in them, we must find some other expression which shall be as true and afford as strong a nourishment to the character as martyrdom formerly did. 6.8 Law of God against Repetition Law of God against repetition. Caste deteriorates. Infinite variety of temperament in each family.

The prison which is called a family, will its rules ever be relaxed, its doors ever be opened? What is it, especially to the woman? The man may escape, and does. The cases where a child inherits its parents’ tastes are so rare that it has passed almost into a proverb. The son of a celebrated man is never a celebrated man. The two Herschels,165 the two Mills,166 are mentioned as memorable exceptions. A son scarcely ever adopts his father’s profession, except when compelled, as in the case of caste, and in the countries where caste prevails, the race deteriorates. How often a parent is heard to say, ‘‘All that I have done will go to rack and ruin when I am gone. I have none to come after me who will keep it up!’’ It is said that the chances are 200 to 1, where a man’s immediate descendants consist of three children and three grandchildren, against there being found one among these six who inherits his tastes and pursuits. The law of God, it seems, is against repetition. Whatever the family, whatever the similarity of education, circumstances, etc., repetition is never seen. And is this extraordinar y? In chemistry, the mixture of two substances constitutes an entirely new substance, of which neither the colour nor any of the properties can be predicated167 from a knowledge merely of the colour or any of the properties of the two original substances. So, in the family, though there can be traced, it is true, the family character, the family likeness, yet the children are all strikingly unlike each parent, strikingly unlike each other. Here the analogy with chemistry appears to cease, for the product of two chemical substances is always the same, under the same circumstances.

165 Astronomers Sir William Herschel (1738-1822) and his son, Sir John Frederick William Herschel (1792-1871). 166 The historian James Mill (1773-1836) and his son, J.S. Mill. 167 JSM notes a typo: predicted.

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{Omitted: But, taking into account the probability of an anterior existence, also that there are such. . . . f24} But, such are the minute differences of circumstances which we never estimate, that the analogy may still remain, and, as it is said that there are no two leaves alike upon the same tree, so, and much more, there never were created two human beings alike. Now, what do we do with these unlikenesses? The family strives to make them all do the same thing. If one of the family, as often happens, is superior to the rest, the rest, and especially the heads of the family, seem to want this one to be one with them, as we try to be one with God; he is to devote all his talent and genius to forward their ideas, not to have any new ones, to put their opinions, their thoughts and feelings into a better dress, a more striking light, not to discover any new light, and, above all, he is not to find any untruth in their ideas, or think he has any new tr uth, ‘‘for there is no such thing’’! To help Others by being Oneself To help others by living—by being oneself, is not this the true meaning of sympathy, the true benefit of companionship? But, in general, we have to live by not being ourselves. And what a fatiguing way of life it is! When we are not afraid of being ourselves, when we suit the people we are with, when what we say and feel does not shock them or annoy them or frighten them, life is easy, life is improving, we make progress. Now, how often does this happen in one’s own family, where one can rarely speak without implying blame of something, without knocking against someone’s prejudices? And can it be otherwise when people are chained up together for life, so close in the same cage? It is often said that you are less known by your own family than by anyone else. Is it wonderful? There is much of which you can never venture to speak. ‘‘The extraordinar y reserve, which he (or she) maintained with his (or her) own family’’ are words so common that everyone has heard them, and yet they are always uttered as if it were a solitar y, or, as it is put, an extraordinary fact. ‘‘He is so much more agreeable out of his own family,’’ is another common remark. And how often you see ‘‘his’’ countenance fall when he is speaking to one of his own kin! As long as the iron chain is drawn tight round the family, fettering those together who are not joined to one another by any sympathy or common pursuit, it must be so. It is often disputed what kinds of character like society. It is probable that those like it who can say aloud the things which they would think to themselves,

Tr uly true sympathy—to help others by being oneself.

418 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought if they were alone. But how few can do this at home! There is no tyranny like that of the family, for it extends over the thoughts. 6.9 Blasphemy of religious men.

What blasphemy has there ever been worse than the blasphemy of the religious man of the present day? He tells us that God is angry, that He seeks His own glory, that He is revengeful, sometimes, as a climax of panegyric, that He does not wish for the ‘‘death of a sinner.’’ Could anyone ever think He did? Do we take Him for a murderer? Him—the Creator? Suppose you were to say of me that I do not desire the death of my child, but rather that she should turn from her wickedness and live—and expect that I should be admired for it! {Omitted: I am sure it would have done me much more good had I lived. . . . f26} It must have done much more good, in the days of the pantheistic Greeks, to have gone down in the beautiful summer mornings to the river’s brink, and thought of its benevolence and its beauty, and how much good it had done on its way, than it does now to go to church, and say the very same prayers over and over again to the Being whom we worship. ‘‘Grant all this for the sake of Jesus Christ our Lord.’’ What a being not to grant it because it is right, if it is right to grant it, or because He loves us, but for ‘‘the sake of Jesus Christ’’! We cannot think such a Being good, though we tell Him that He is so. ‘‘Have compassion upon thy children.’’ Is it possible that we can love such a Being? one who cannot, or will not, take care of His own children, unless He is begged and prayed. We love Jesus Christ for saving us from Him. {Omitted: It is all so poor. When there happens an accident on the railway, I am to thank God for having saved me, and not to say, ‘‘Why, there is poor Mrs - -’s son. You said if she prayed to you, you would keep him safe and now you have broken his arm.’’ No, I am to thank God for having taken care of me and not him in this accident—instead of thanking Him that he keeps the eternal laws inviolate—which His goodness and wisdom have planned. f27} 6.10 Saviours from moral Error needed

Is the time for individual Saviours past?

{Omitted: She had been writing to me some of her imaginative nonsense about [the] Saviour, to which I answered, ‘‘I differ with you in the anticipation.’’ f28}

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It is often said that the time is past for individual saviours (male or female), that the rough machinery of many hands and many minds must now work out the slow results of regeneration, that the most enlightened despotism of mind or body (emperor or philosopher) will have a poor chance, even when Europe has burst her chains—that we have passed the days of enthusiastic saviours—we must be of the mob, that a J.S. Mill cannot ensure us of a single tr uth in political economy—that no two men agree upon whether ownership or partnership is to form the remedy for the labourer’s miser y—that neither a Pitt nor a Fox168 could settle the best extent of the future suffrage, not the best scheme of education—that no future president could settle the slavery question in America—that single hands are non-co-operative, and when they have done their work, there comes a collapse. Nevertheless the world cannot be saved, except through saviours, at present. A saviour means one who saves from error. But we do not think it worthwhile to dignify with this appellation one who saves from merely intellectual or scientific error, and therefore it means one who saves from moral error. It has been generally thought that Christ saved from all moral error, and that we have nothing to do but make ‘‘faith,’’ as it is called, in Him, ‘‘effectual to bring down our pride, subdue our selfishness, restrain our tongues,’’ etc. Men do not see that pride is only the perversion of the natural desire (implanted by God in us) to be and to feel of importance. Ever y human being is of importance, and ought to be employed in a way to make him feel himself so. The ‘‘bringing down’’ this feeling has been the origin of some of the most cruel perversions to which the poor human being has been made subject. But man does not know, first, what is pride, nor, secondly, how to save himself from it, and therefore he prays to God to make the faith of Christ do it, and then to give him his ‘‘great and final reward.’’ He does not see that God will not give it him, because it is not consistent with infinite goodness and wisdom to give him anything, but that he must work it out for himself and for mankind, not in the shape of a ‘‘reward,’’ but of a state of well-being. Now what are the saviours to do? Not to do anything instead of man. Still it is not intended that every man shall learn all the laws

On the contrar y, Mankind cannot do without Saviours from intellectual error. How much less without Saviours from moral error!

Saviours not to do anything instead of man.

168 Progressive politicians William Pitt the younger (1759-1806) and Charles James Fox (1749-1806), both supporters of the anti-slavery movement.

420 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought of God for himself. In astronomy, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler,169 Newton, Laplace, Herschel, and a long line of saviours, we may call them, if we will, discoverers they are more generally called, have saved the race from intellectual error, by finding out several of the laws of God. We do not say, ‘‘don’t look at what these men have done—they may be despots, enlightened despots of the mind—you must learn all the laws of God yourself from the beginning.’’ In the same way, there may be, there must be, saviours from social, from moral error. Most people have not learnt any lesson from life at all—suffer as they may, they learn nothing, they would alter nothing—if they began life over again they would live exactly the same life as before. {Omitted: My dear grandmother and aunt (one of whom said to me, ‘‘I have suffered everything’’) they have learned nothing from life. f30} When they begin the new life in another world, they would do exactly the same thing, and they must, till somebody comes to help them. And not only individuals, but nations learn nothing. Austria, four hundred years ago in Switzerland, was doing exactly the same thing which she is doing now in Hungary. She has learnt nothing. A man once said to me, ‘‘Oh! if I were to begin again, how different I would be.’’ But we very rarely hear this; on the contrary, we ver y often hear people say, ‘‘I would have every moment of my life over again,’’ and they think it pretty and grateful to God to say so. For such there can be no heaven; in fact it will not be there for them to have till saviours come to help them. This is ‘‘eternal death.’’ {Omitted: This is the eternal death of which the scriptures speak. f31} We sometimes hear of men ‘‘having given a colour to their age.’’ Now, if the colour is a right colour, those men are saviours. People think that the world is in the mud, and that it must stay there. We think it is in the mud too, but we are sure it is not to remain there. 6.11 Love of Nature Love of nature a lazy love.

We are often told to find our solace in nature. To those who remain always children and to those who are still children, with whom the poetr y of life is everything, nature may be all-in-all. But those who have attained the weariness and discouragement of middle life, of

169 Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), astronomer.

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efforts which have been made and have failed, such require not so much the beauty as the wisdom of life, not art, but knowledge and strength. The intellect, left inactive, its powers without an aim; the heart, left empty, its ennui without an employment; the moral activity, left objectless, its appetite without food, gnaw themselves, and the spectacle of life and beauty only excites and increases their tor ments. The worst of inactivity is that it does not, with the faculties anymore than with the limbs, lead always to activity through suffering. Though we detest the sofa which has become necessary to us, yet we dread the exertion which would save us, and of which we are perhaps become really incapable. Suffering sometimes extinguishes us, sometimes partially paralyzes us, sometimes enfeebles us, sometimes, indeed, it enriches us, as nothing else can, but, in the first case, what can save us but a saviour? Only where suffering exercises our faculties, does it enrich us. Pity a man because he knows too much of life to be happy? Pity those whose ignorance must one day be torn asunder like a curtain, and passing through an age of misery, must be transmuted into pure wisdom before they can be happy! Many long intensely to die, to go to another world, which could not be a worse and might be a better than this. But is there any better world there to go into? Has mankind yet made a better world ready? We are sure that it will not be there till mankind has ‘‘gone to prepare a place for’’ us.170 Have we any reason to suppose that any other world is forwarder than this? {Omitted: Perhaps I had better, after all, stay where I am. f32} The ‘‘kingdom of heaven is within,’’171 indeed, but it must also create one without, because we are intended to act upon our circumstances. We must beware, both of thinking that we can maintain that ‘‘kingdom of heaven within’’ under all circumstances, because there are circumstances under which the human being cannot be good, and also of thinking that the kingdom of heaven without will produce that within. {Omitted: My daughter and I were walking together. The high south wind was hurrying by—the sun shining bright and hot in the cloudy heavens. But the air was filled with a fog of dust carried

170 A paraphrase of John 14:2. 171 A paraphrase of Luke 17:21.

Weariness of inactivity not a stimulus to activity.

Suffering only enriches where it exercises.

Is there a ‘‘better world’’ yet ready to go to?

’’Kingdom of heaven’’ is ‘‘within,’’ but it must create one without.

422 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought before the gale, which blew ceaselessly, fiercely, like a destiny never wear y of suffering—so at least said my poor foolish girl. The dust formed into whirlwinds and whitened all the fresh grass and the yellow spring buds which were coming out. ‘‘So it is with my life,’’ she said. ‘‘The wind has blown down all my supports and hopes and plans. The dust has dried them up. But the sun is still shining high in the heavens and the fresh wind is still blowing.’’ f33} 6.12 Christ’s ‘‘Temptation’’ the Experience of us all Christ’s ‘‘temptation’’ the experience of us all.

Christ’s temptation is the epitome of all life, as it was, no doubt, the epitome of his own, which he told to his disciples in that form. A sensitive, noble spirit could perhaps hardly bear to speak of it in any other form. Do not we live for ‘‘forty days,’’ often for as many years, in the wilderness,172 seeking bread and finding none? Have we not lived these many years trying to find bread in society, in the literary dawdling of a civilized life, in the charitable trifling of a benevolent life, in the selfish elegance of an artistic life? Have we not, in these deserts, these long, long weary years, tried to pick up food, and at last, craving and despairing of anything better, have we not eaten that which was not bread, applause and sympathy for that which is not good, the vulgar distinction of social praise, the temporary forgetfulness of excitement? Christ was never satisfied with anything short of the highest. He resisted the temptation, which presses so sore on weaker minds, of making stones into bread. Then comes the temptation to make the great leap, inconsiderately to disengage ourselves thoroughly and entirely from this life of starvation. With some this temptation comes first, with others later, as St Luke has it. But in all, it comes from a religious impulse, as it was from a ‘‘pinnacle of the temple’’ that Christ was tempted to throw himself down.173 And it is in ‘‘the city,’’ not of solitude, that such resolutions are bred, from the monotonous {trifling f33} super ficialities of commonplace intercourse. {Omitted: Three times I have tried to take the great leap: once, fourteen years ago, when I waited, longed for a man’s education at college, and thought of disguising myself and going to Cambridge;

172 A reference to Jesus in the wilderness in Matt 4:1-11. 173 Luke 4:1-13.

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once, seven years ago, when I endeavoured to enter a hospital, to learn my profession there, in order afterwards to teach it a better way; and once, having failed, with all my plans annihilated and all my hopes blighted, I resolved to try marriage with a good man. f34} Women sometimes try to take the great leap; they long for a man’s education at college, and sometimes even think of disguising themselves and going to Cambridge. They endeavour to enter institutions, to learn a charitable profession, in order afterwards to teach it in a better way, or when all other ‘‘trades’’ fail, they try marriage with a good man, who loves perhaps his wife, but who initiates her into the regular life of the world. {Omitted: ‘‘And why did you not take one of these leaps, my child?’’ I said. ‘‘The first I myself had not courage for. The second you, of course, would not suffer—and I gave it up! It cost me my life.’’ f35} Disappointment often costs the woman her life—if by life is meant all spirit, energy, vitality—while the vocation, if gratified, as often becomes the angel’s hand to bear her up, that she shall not dash her foot against the stones.174 {Omitted: The uncertain was so strong in me, I had thought of it ever since I was six years old—I might have been the Howard of hospitals, which I mention, not, I think, from any puerile vanity now but merely because I believe, in that case, while the vocation would, if gratified, become the angels’ wings to bear me up and I should not have dashed my foot upon the stone. Oh if I had done it, what a different creature I should have been. But you could not tell that. I do not blame. ‘‘Oh’’ said I, ‘‘how I wish you had some sensible man to talk to you, whom you would listen to, who would convince you of the folly of these ideas. You talk of Howard. What good did Howard do? Did not the prisons remain in the same state as they were for nearly a century after all his effort?’’ To this she made no answer and we walked a long time in silence, by the side of a little stream, which ran over its rocky bed, in the midst of the high, uncultivated, barren moorlands. At last we came to the rock where, leaping over a fall of three hundred feet, it fell with a tremendous noise into the boiling black, bottomless chasm below. But drifting on the air was the spray sprinkled with a

174 An allusion to Matt 4:6, quoting Ps 91:12.

424 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought thousand bright rainbows. ‘‘Yes’’ she said, ‘‘how like is the course of that little stream to ours.’’ ff35-36} If parents would let their daughters follow their vocations, when they have any, what different creatures they would be! The ‘‘devil’’ shows us the glory of the ‘‘kingdoms of the world,’’175 sometimes in the shape of the vanity of colloquial or literary or social distinctions, of reigning by the intellect or by the word, or by love; oftenest, to the woman, in that power over a heart. It comes in the desert, is most seductive to those who live out of the common vanities of life, and it comes, with overpowering force, upon those who have long wanted for bread, and found nothing but stones.176 Christ resisted the vanitous devil, but how few do, when weary, faint and wounded, having prayed every day for their ‘‘daily bread,’’ and found none; they see how almost any amount of reputation is to be made by cleverness and none by wisdom, and yield to the temptation! {Omitted: In the evening we were at church, for it was Easter Day. ‘‘I like going to church at night, when it is lighted up,’’ she said, ‘‘for the lights remind me of the times when they worshipped in catacombs.’’ f36} 6.13 ‘‘Revelation’’ progresses with the Times When man was living barbarously, the only revelation there could be of God was one of mercy. It was the only goodness man could comprehend.

Going to church at night, when it is lighted up, reminds one of the times when they worshipped in catacombs and in dens and caves of the earth—they, of whom the world was not worthy, as St Paul says;177 one would rather say, of whom the world was so in need as saviours. It reminds one of the first churches—caves in the third storey below the earth, in the catacombs at Rome, where, renouncing the beautiful light of the sun, they lived—a greater sacrifice than to die.178 It was necessary {she said f38}, when man was still in the savage state of war, revenge and barbarous life, that the Holy Ghost, the manifestation of the Father, should make itself forgiveness, mercy— on His part atonement, on ours humility, imploring prayer, hope. We could not apprehend the Father in any other way, then. The

175 176 177 178

An allusion to Luke 4:5. An allusion to Matt 7:9. An allusion to Heb 11:38. Nightingale’s visits to the catacombs in Rome are described in European Travels (7:215-16 and 269-73).

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Father is at all times making Himself the Son, God becoming man, to enlighten us. But how can we understand the Word, unless it is a Word that we can hear? How can the Father speak to us? We should not comprehend. He must speak through the Holy Ghost. Therefore, at that time, it was necessary to speak of ‘‘descending’’ to us, to our weakness and unworthiness, of hope and peace offered to the sinner through a sacrifice; with all the poetry and love of the Christian {mythology f38} epic. The Greek mythology was the deification of the powers or laws of nature; the Christian mythology was the deification of spiritual laws or ways by which communication exists between God and a half-savage, half-corrupted man (‘‘I am the way,’’179 Christ says)—a man who fancies to himself God offended with His own creation, and taking His revenge upon it. If Christ were obliged now to speak to the judges, magistrates and staff of our criminal courts, where He heard the word ‘‘punishment’’ used, must He not speak of the mercy of God to those whom He sees condemning criminals, in perfect good faith, to places where they must lose every ray of humanity still shining within them? For is not mercy the only goodness which society can apprehend, while we still conceive the idea of punishment, still have the word at all, instead of reformation? A Christ must speak of the forgiveness of God: society can conceive of nothing else. {Omitted: ‘‘But we can’t reform others and God can,’’ I said. f39} Can God only punish—not reform? Those who don’t believe in reformation, in Sir Joshua Jebb, in Lord Shaftesbur y,180 and the ragged schools, have attributed the same impotence to God. He can only hang them, and put chains on their legs, as we do. ‘‘The court feels bound to pass a severe sentence,’’ what does that mean? and the criminal ‘‘is imprisoned for eighteen calendar months,’’ what is that for? merely to keep him out of mischief for that time? or to deter others by terror? or to reform him? (Serjeant Adams, at the Middlesex Sessions, complained that always the same criminals came before him, again and again, most of them young boys.) We know that the second of these objects is not attained,

When man’s law is punishment and not reformation, the only revelation there could be of God’s law is eternal damnation.

179 An allusion to John 14:6. 180 The 7th earl of Shaftesbury (1801-85), friend, supporter of many philanthropic causes, especially of ragged schools and the humane treatment of the insane.

426 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought and the third is not even aimed at. Would it not be better to let him out? But no, ‘‘the court feels bound to pass a severe sentence,’’ and God feels bound to give the sentence ‘‘of everlasting chains under darkness.’’ Can He too only punish, instead of reforming? The idea of eternal damnation had its origin amid a society which exercised punishment, and as soon as mankind sees that there is no such word, that reformation is the only word, eternal punishment will disappear out of our religion: everlasting damnation and capital punishment will go out together. {Omitted: The first of May we were at a ball, up and down the splendid marble staircase, brilliant with lights, the air heavy with the scent of the perfume of hothouse flowers, passed pale, sad, fair figures, floating in light draperies and crowned with wreaths. The buzz, the warm and loaded atmosphere, the music, the pomp of dress and luxury, the beautiful figures moving about contrasted strangely with the grave, melancholy countenances of the dancers. Here and there, a girl quite young, pleased with the light and flowers and motion, the atmosphere of riche—or a vulgar matron, triumphant in her success in ‘‘getting on’’ in society, appeared to enjoy themselves really. Fulgentia, white as the pearl which glistened in her dark hair, looked that night like Correggio’s Magdalen.181 As she stood for one moment at the door of the London palace, the resemblance str uck me particularly. Like that picture, there was nothing but the dark background behind her, typifying the darkness of the past. She had gone through nothing but darkness—the sharp stones of the courtyard were in front—for there was nothing before her but a hard, sharp, struggling life. The light was upon her face and she looked straightforward far out into the night, as upon a distant point, on which all her faculties were concentrated, in which all her thoughts were absorbed. The future was everything to her. She had no other thought or hope. I noticed the peculiar expression of her countenance as she stepped into the carriage and asked her why she did not like society. She pressed my arm and said ff40-41}

181 Allegros Antonio Correggio (1489?-1534); Nightingale left her print of this painting to cousins. See Life and Family (1:855).

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6.14 What has ‘‘society’’ done for us? What is the mission of society? of mankind? to civilize and educate us. How does it fulfill this mission? What does it do for ‘‘fallen women’’? {‘‘women on the street’’ f41}. Those who have committed indictable crime, it takes possession of, and ordinarily condemns to a place where they must lose all hope as well as all desire of reformation. One would have thought that society, which had done so badly for them in their childhood, would now have wished to remodel them. Not at all. That is not the question. To punish them is all that is wanted. They must go where the poisoner becomes corrupted and the forger loses all feeling, divine and human. They must be punished by being deprived of all lingering claims to being thought human creatures and our sisters. ‘‘From him that hath little shall be taken away even that which he hath.’’182 But if indictable crime has not been committed, what does society do? What protection does she give those wretched women? What constraint does she put upon those men who make them what they are? Does she even turn a shy look upon them? Not at all. On the contrary, she throws open her doors wide to them, vicious as they are, and like the beggars, whom she puts in prison, while she praises those who give to them (curious anomaly!), so she says to the woman, ‘‘Get out of my path.’’ While to him without whom the woman would not have been vicious, she offers her drawing rooms and her high-bred daughters. Society takes pleasure in stimulating passion in every kind of way, by early excess in wine, late hours, schoolboy conversation and classical books, etc., and then says, ‘‘you must not gratify this in a legitimate way, under pain of exciting our censure—the illegitimate satisfaction is the only one we allow.’’ And then she gives these satisfactions, ‘‘like lilies, with full hands,’’ and allows no difficulty to remain unremoved. But, if a criminal is great, if, by some political trade, he has, like Schwarzenberg, made himself useful to the designs of a government, of a sovereign, then he does not go to prison or to Norfolk Island at all; on the contrary, the Times writes of him that he will be remembered with gratitude, if not with love. Society punishes a Rush and protects a Schwarzenberg. And we who are not ‘‘fallen women,’’ we talk about mankind creating mankind—what has mankind done for us? It has created wants

182 Matt 13:12.

What does ‘‘society’’ do for us? For ‘‘fallen women?’’

For ‘‘young ladies?’’

428 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought which not only it does not afford us the opportunity of satisfying, but which it compels us to disguise and deny. It affords us neither interest, nor affections, nor employment. Society neither finds us with work, if we are too weak to find it for ourselves, nor with training to perform it, if we have found it—nor does it so much as suffer us to follow a vocation of our own, not even if there be one too strong within us to perish for lack of nourishment. It has made rich and poor, without teaching the rich to use their riches, nor the poor their poverty. {Omitted: It never ‘‘found’’ me with work, when I was too weak to find it for myself, nor with training to perform it, if I had found it for myself. It refused me a vocation, because society does not suffer one in females of my class. f42} It says, if anyone dies of hunger, ‘‘you must not starve—so and so shall be punished if you do,’’ or ‘‘you shall be provided for at the expense of society.’’ But it never says, ‘‘you shall not starve spiritually—you must not want the bread of life—so and so shall be punished if you do, if you lack the satisfactions which are as necessar y to the faculties and feelings as food is to the physical wants.’’ {Omitted: And how are we to know, I said, what satisfactions are necessar y, what bread is healthful? ‘‘Ah! how?’’ she said, sinking into silence. f43} 6.15 Never fritter away your Will What does ‘‘society’’ do with its members who can work?

If we lived in a race which knew how to employ our strength instead of frittering it and repressing it, how different it would be! But now, when it finds one of its members with a great power of work, it is disagreeably surprised, it does not know what to do with him, he is something extra and troublesome, which it had rather were not there. The will is not intended to be frittered away in little decisions about every moment. It is meant to have a great type before it— means and inducements for attaining that type—every day to receive some knowledge or training towards realizing it, every day to apply and test that knowledge by actual work. Repose, which is the employment of all our powers (of mind and heart) is found thus and only thus—thus it may be found in an external hell. This is God’s repose—other wise how could He be happy in the midst of all this wretchedness? There is always something repulsive in the thought of God’s existence as solitary enjoyment, while his children

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are suffering all this—as if there were something selfish in it. But in His goodness and wisdom He finds His peace. But, without a type before one of what human nature may become, how can anyone work? There is a kind of vague belief that mankind goes on improving—that every generation is farther on than the last. There is, existing at the same time with the other, a vague belief that it is a kind of law that nations shall rise to a certain point and then fall, without any particular reason but that it is a law— and people point to the Assyrians, the Egyptians and others whose name is legion183—and some say that England is come to that point, and must now decline. It is very true that nations have risen and are now fallen, but not because there is a law that so it shall be. Do we know yet what the type of England ought to be? Has anyone a type before them in what they do? Do we think Lord Derby,184 or any English prime minister, has a type of what are the nature and destination of mankind or of England in his head? The words are absurd. Lord Derby thinks of ‘‘staying in’’ a certain time, of not becoming unpopular with the country, of not doing any serious harm. Is there any Type in Politics? When a young lady takes a poor child out of the village and thinks she will teach it, has she any type before her of what ought to be done, of what it ought to be by a certain time? She thinks, as the phrase is, that it is better than ‘‘doing nothing’’ for the poor child, that some good will come of it, she does not quite know what, either for her or for it. She has no type. And it does not appear at all certain that mankind is always making progress. Sometimes they are going forward, sometimes they are going back. It is very evident that Asia has been making retrogression, excepting the Chinese, who have probably remained stationar y, perhaps the only people which has done so. Parts of Europe have been making retrogression, Greece, Italy, Spain—England and Germany have been perhaps advancing. {Omitted: ‘‘Do not go off into your types and politics,’’ I said, ‘‘you bewilder yourself with these things. ‘‘Politics cannot be carried on, it is said, in this, with that wild womanish way, with types

183 An allusion to Mark 5:9. 184 The 14th earl of Derby (1799-1869), Conservative prime minister.

Can politics be car ried on with a type? Or must they be without farther view than present exigency of time and countr y, or than what can or cannot be done now?

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’’Ladies’ ’’ life spent in passtime, men’s in business.

When it is not ridiculous for men to do needlework.

and theories and so forth. They must be carried on by practical men, with a view to the exigencies of the time and country and to what can be done and not done.’’ ‘‘I acknowledge, I acknowledge,’’ she cried, ‘‘all that you say about women, and much, more more.’’ ff46-47} Women’s life is spent in pastime, men’s in business. Women’s business is supposed to be to find something to ‘‘pass’’ the ‘‘time.’’ If young ladies are seen sitting round the table doing worsted-work, they are supposed to be appropriately and rightly employed, especially if one is reading aloud. But if men were to be discovered sitting round the table doing worsted-work, or even in the evening talking over the fire doing crochet, how women would laugh! The reason is that men are supposed to be doing their business in the morning, and in the evening, when their business is done, to be talking about something important enough to prevent their being able to do fancywork at the same time. But women have never anything to say so important as that they should not be looking at their pattern. When tailors and shoemakers are at their own work we do not laugh, because they are doing their business, and tailors and shoemakers are generally reckoned among the most intelligent part of the community. It is only the regarding anything as a mere ‘‘passtime’’ that strikes us as so ridiculous in a full-grown man, and why is it not so in a woman? Without the right cultivation and employment of all the powers (and where do we see the woman with half her powers employed?) there can be no repose, and with it, as we have said, repose may be found in a hell, in a hospital of wounds and pain, and operations and death, and remorse and tears and despair. The effer vescence of energy, which there is in ever y young being not diseased in mind or body, which struggles to find its satisfaction in the excitement of society, of imagination, of the vulgar conflicts of social life, will seek its true occupation, at last, in the anguish of real life. {Omitted: I have felt with despair, before I came to pass the hell of despair. What was easy, what I could have had, what would have kept me alive till came a better day, what would have been sanctioned by all the wiles and sympathies, human and divine, around me. Marriage, that I refused. Oh! afterwards, how bitterly I was made to repent it! But I could not make up my mind at the time I refused it, call back all the many coloured and sweet singing birds,

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which I had sent out, on the faith of accomplishing some day a great destiny, into many parts of the world of thoughts, recall them to fold their drooping wings forever in my life. f48} Many a woman cannot resign herself to lead the life she has seen ever y woman about her lead—of composing parties, laying out the grounds, reading the newspapers, superintending children whom she cannot manage, servants whom she cannot influence, schools which she knows nothing about, and seeing them all fail, and this unsustained by any real deep sympathy with her husband, good though he may be. He is thinking of other things; he does not cause her to partake his ideas and plans, except indeed his desire to have such and such a person at the house, such and such a disposition of the furniture or the garden. {Omitted: I had no faith in myself that I could lead a better married life than this, though I really loved. I hoped, I wished, I prayed for a better destiny. I could not give up this trust. Oh God! what despair I have since felt in having given up what I might have had, woman’s natural strength and solace, and with attaining nothing else. How I did labour for a profession. How I did struggle. f49}

Women loathe the life of pastime.

Craving of Women for real Work Such a woman longs for a profession—str uggles to open to women the paths of the school, the hospital, the penitentiary, the care of the young, the sick, the bad—not as an amusement, to fill up odd times, to fancy they have done something when they have done nothing, to make a sham of visiting—but, systematically, as a reality, an occupation, a ‘‘profession.’’ {Omitted: But as the Roman Catholic Church (whose name I hardly venture to pronounce in your presence). . . . And how much good does your R. Catholic Church do, I asked, with its systematic encouragement of beggars, its making the people dependent, its hideous demoralizing influence, in the giving away of alms? ‘‘That is the harm it does, not the good,’’ she answered. ‘‘I was afraid to bring up her name, because of all this harm. But I am convinced that the hold she has upon female minds, especially at this time, is from the vocations, the real work which she opens to them. What does our church do for us? As for me, I can say what has she ever done for me?’’ You are always throwing stones at the church, I said. And what would you, I should like to know, if we were to do away with the church tomorrow? ff49-50}

They long for business.

432 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Hold of the Roman Catholic Church upon women’s minds is the real work she opens for them.

For such women, what does the Church of England do? But what should we have better, if we were to do away with the church tomor row? We may well ask this question. Much mischief has arisen from its not having been asked long and considerately before ever y change has been made. But how can we answer it, solitary beings as we are? Numbers of men must consult together and discover their wants and how to supply them, doing nothing hastily, for from these hasty destr uctions small good has ever arisen. In fact, the day of destruction is over. We must now build up. But to build up without much consideration is as unwise as to pull down without any. Luther saw the mischief of ‘‘indulgences,’’ and he, by the most colossal effort of the human intellect, set aside the idea of an authority which had never before been doubted. But, instead of one authority, he set up another. Instead of a church he gave us a book. Then his mind was incompetent to look what was to be done next. And the Protestant Church is, perhaps, little improvement on the Roman Catholic. In some respects it may be a deterioration, inasmuch as it expects to excite the same feelings while it has lopped off half the means. Yet we should not say that Luther had better have left the indulgences alone. Brutus killed Caesar, but he had not thought what was to come next, and there followed a worse than Caesar.185 In the same way, the French knew very well that Louis-Philippe’s government was an evil, and they overturned him without more ado, but they had not thought about what was to come in his place, and a worse than Louis-Philippe is here.186 This is not saying that Louis-Philippe was not an evil, and that they had better have left him alone, but that they had better have considered what they were about to place in his stead. We quite agree with those who ask, if we were to do away with the church tomorrow, what should we have in its place? Mankind must consider—those of mankind who want something more than the church as she is. To take her away from those who are satisfied with her would be cruel.

185 Brutus (c85-42 bce), leader of the assassins of Julius Caesar (100-44 bce), who was succeeded by Augustus Caesar (63 bce-14 ce), first Roman emperor. 186 Louis-Napoléon, among other things, instigated the Crimean War; in 1870 he declared war on Prussia, was defeated and forced into exile on losing in 1871.

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And about everything else, people do consider and lay their heads together. Mr Hunt, of Herne Bay, writes to all the medical men in this kingdom to ask what has been their experience about the effects of arsenic as a medicine, and out of the experience of many men he deduces a result. People will do this about a medicine for the body, but they will not do it when it is only for the soul. They will do it to ascertain a fact, and when a fact has been ascertained, and people are interested in procuring means to apply that fact to their advantage, how they will work! Look at the Anti-Corn Law League,187 at the thousands of pounds which were subscribed in a few days when Lord Derby’s administration appeared to threaten the return of protection! But we are so little interested about religion, we are so little sure of our facts concerning it, that we never go to the same trouble nor exertion for its sake. {Omitted: We broke up the conversation, for she had to dress to go to a marriage, where she was bridesmaid. For description, see Sir Charles Grandison.188 f52}

Mankind will consider together about finding out a medicine, but not about finding out a church.

6.16 What God ‘‘thinks’’ the one question What a dangerous and hairbreadth speculation it is to bring up children on the plan of doing a thing because ‘‘you like it,’’ because ‘‘it pleases you.’’ What does it signify whether I like it? What God likes is the question, not what He likes by an arbitrary fancy, as we often imagine, but what His laws, His eternal immutable laws, the expressions of perfect goodness and perfect wisdom, are for or against. Let, then, the question be not what Mr A. or Mrs B. thinks, but what God thinks. Relations intermarry, or persons with scrofula or insanity in their families. In the whole family the question immediately arises, ‘‘does E. {Elizabeth} like it?’’ ‘‘I don’t think S. {Sabina} does.’’ ‘‘J. {John f53} I am sure does. He has quite got over all his prejudices against it.’’ ‘‘And A., she was always inclined to it.’’ The question never once presents itself to the minds of either bridegroom or bride, or any of those in authority over them, does

The one question in everything is, not what ‘‘I’’ think, but what God ‘‘thinks.’’

187 The Corn Law League advocated free trade, which required the repeal of the protectionist Corn Law; rural landowners profited by protection, by making urban consumers, especially the large working class, pay high prices for their bread. 188 Presumably Samuel Richardson’s novel, Sir Charles Grandison.

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Nobody asks what God ‘‘thinks’’ in the affairs of common life, such as marriage, politics, etc.

God like it? Is there a law of His or is there not which favours marriage between blood relations? or between persons with hereditar y disease in the family? People do not for these purposes investigate physiological laws, consult statistics, or make out what they can from the experience of those who have experience. They consult fancies. {Omitted: Last year I was bridesmaid at a marriage where there was not enough to live upon. f53} Again, when a poor marriage is decided upon, neither bride nor bridegroom make the smallest calculation how much bread, how much butter, how much house is to be had for £600 a year. They say they will be guided by the wishes of their parents. Which of us has not heard that dutiful speech? Then, afterwards, they grow tired of being guided by the wishes of their parents, and quite amiably and respectfully ‘‘think’ they can marry, still without making the least calculation. The parents ‘‘think’’ they could not, and disapprove. The poor girl grows thin and pale. ‘‘Now, don’t you approve?’’ she says, or, if she does not say, she feels, and at last they are fain not to ‘‘disapprove.’’ The thoughts of children are seldom directed upon the question before them, but upon questioning the judgment of their parents, and this is not entirely their own fault. It arises from the views of authority and of their responsibility, taken by parents. They assume a responsibility they cannot have. ‘‘I will wait two years for your satisfaction,’’ says the young lady. It is exactly as if she had said, ‘‘I do not know whether it is safe for me to go into that river or not, I have not examined the point, how deep nor how rapid it is. I don’t know whether I shall sink or swim, but I will wait two years.’’ What for? ‘‘for my mother’s satisfaction, before I jump in.’’ Is not this a true experience of what passes between parents and children in most families? {Omitted: I remember when I was younger than I am now, when I used to teach at our Sunday school and felt that it was all a sham and that I was pretending. . . . I remember begging and praying to be allowed to go to some place for a few months to learn to teach, my mother always answering. . . . f54} A young lady teaches at a Sunday school and feels that it is all a sham and that she is pretending to do that which she is not really doing. She begs to be allowed to go to some place for a few months to learn to teach, and the mother answers, ‘‘You teach quite well

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enough to please me.’’ The girl has a vague idea it is not all right, but knows not what to answer. Mistake implied in the word ‘‘Indulgence’’ {Omitted: How I hate} What a mistake that word ‘‘indulgent,’’ as applied either to God or man, implies! If ‘‘indulgent’’ means doing what love prompts and wisdom teaches to be right, God always is indulgent, and parents out to be so. But if ‘‘indulgent’’ means giving something which may be a little hurtful, because you love so much, that is not true love, and God never is indulgent and man ought not to be. {Omitted: In looking over her old letters, I find a few more relating to this time of her life. I was amused with some of her speculations, interested in others, but merely as speculations. To endeavour to carry out such things into shape and form in actual life is simply absurd. The world must wag on as it pleases, and the thing we have to do is to make the best of it. The vehemence with which she urged some of her opinions sometimes annoyed me, but I never had the least idea that she would step out of her position, forsake her duties and do what she did. Her sister, who married and married ver y well and satisfactorily, as I have said, partook some of her strange notions, and, I always thought, supported her in them, though marriage had considerably modified her, as it always does, and taught her to recognize the wisdom of many conventionalities which she had formerly rebelled against. I was proud of both of them, though they frightened me when I was anxious and made me laugh when I was merry. But here is a letter, which I found among Fulgentia’s, from her married sister, relating to her five children. I hope they did not see it. ‘‘Honour thy father and thy mother.’’ But we honour that which is honorable—I cannot teach them this, Fulgentia. In this commandment there are three fallacies: ‘‘that thy days may be long in the land’’—there is no connection between duty to parents and to be rewarded with a ‘‘long life,’’ ‘‘which the Lord thy God giveth thee.’’ The Lord did not give it them. They took it from the Canaanites by fraud and force. What shall I do with these girls of mine? Fulgentia? ff55-56}

436 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 6.17 What is a right part for a mother to act towards her daughter now?

Do parents ever think their own children ‘‘of age’’?

What are we to do with girls? It is vaguely taken for granted by women that it is to be their first object to please and obey their parents till they are married. But the times are totally changed since those patriarchal days. Man (and woman too) has a soul to unfold, a part to play in God’s great world. Marriage is supposed to exercise a magical effect upon the judgment—for a married woman of eighteen has more independence, and is thought better able to act for herself than a single one of thirty-six. But it is not to be the first object for a man ‘‘born into the world,’’ nor for a woman either, when he or she is of age, to please the parents. There is a higher object than this for the being which is to be one with God. It is true the child must obey and ought to obey implicitly. The question is, then, when the child becomes of age. If this were left to the parents’ discretion, they would, perhaps, with the best and purest intentions, declare that their children were never of age. Parents seldom think that their children are grown up, and the children who have made most advance, and are before their generation, will always be those whom conscientious parents are most tempted to restrain as ‘‘geniuses unfit to judge for themselves in the common affairs of life,’’ because, naturally enough, they cannot understand them. We see parents building up obstacles in the way of their children as zealously as if it were their sole vocation! It is almost invariable that, when one of a family is decidedly in advance of all the others, he or she is tyrannized over by the rest, and declared ‘‘quite incapable of doing anything reasonable.’’ A man runs away from this—a woman cannot. The one who ought to be at the top of the ladder is always at the bottom. It is not only against those esteemed physically insane that commissions of lunacy are taken out. Others have been kept unjustly in confinement by their well-intentioned relations, as unfit to be trusted with liberty. In fact, in almost every family, one sees a keeper, or two or three keepers, and a lunatic. Happy for the poor lunatics if there are two of them in one family! They may combine. Those natures which have the strongest affections, and therefore cannot bear not to please the others, not to be in the same key with the others, follow where they ought to lead. {Omitted: The youngest of my girls, Mary, has by far the richest nature of the whole family. She is always at the bottom of the ladder. In fact, it must be so. Those natures which have the strongest

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affections, and therefore cannot bear not to please the others, follow where they ought to lead. f57} It must not be left to parents’ discretion to declare when a child is able to act for himself. The law has not left it at the discretion of parents and guardians to decide when a man becomes of age. If it had, he never would have become of age. It has fixed this age at twenty-one. It has not said twenty or twenty-five, but advisedly, taking into consideration the experience of mankind, it has fixed upon twenty-one. Guardians are not left to say when a young man shall come into the possession of his property. If they were, some, selfinterested, would like to keep him out of it for their own sakes; others, well-intentioned and conscientious, would think he was still a child and not fit to manage it. But the law says twenty-one. When the child becomes ‘‘of age’’ Who is to decide when a young woman shall come into possession of herself? Not the parents, certainly. A woman of twenty-one ought to consider herself of age, as regards her own conduct. It may be too early for some, too late for others. The real age of regeneration varies, when the child, generated by the parents at the age of zero, is regenerated by reason and education. But in spite of the mistakes which will follow, it would be better for children if they no longer considered themselves under tutelage after twenty-one. The connection between parents and children, in its present state of transition, is a miserable one, yet we would not have it back to its old state, if we could. In former days, children called their parents ‘‘Sir’’ and ‘‘Madam’’; in the present days, they call them, at least one of them, ‘‘Governor’’ or ‘‘Relieving Officer’’; in former times, they did not sit down in their parents’ presence; in these, mothers wait upon their daughters, and are vexed at once that the daughters do not do it for themselves, and that they are not grateful to them for doing it. In the last century, proposals of marriage for the children were made to the parents, the parents accepted or refused, often without the knowledge, generally without the consent of the children; in this, a man asks the woman herself, without the previous knowledge {Omitted: (as happened the other day with my oldest daughter)} and sometimes even in the absence of the parents. In the last century, the relation was therefore a much more definite and easy one. Implicit obedience was exacted and given; submission, not love, was demanded; silence, not gratitude, expected.

When does the child become ‘‘of age’’?

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Mothers still assume the responsibility without the rights to support it.

Then it might truly be said that the responsibility rested with the parents, for they undertook, and were understood to act, in the stead and without the co-operation of their children. But now with whom rests the responsibility? The parents assume that they have it, but without any longer the rights to support it. Many a mother of this day would speak (if her feelings were put into words) thus: ‘‘My mother did not think of what her daughter thought; her daughter had no business to think, she thought in her stead. I allow my daughter to think, but I expect that she shall always think like me. That is the least she can do, in common gratitude, in return for all that I have done for her. I don’t desire her to obey—no such tyranny can exist in the nineteenth century, but she is always to act as I should do. I don’t wish her to submit, but I wish her to be what I wish to be with God, one with me. I don’t command her to be silent, but I expect that her opinion shall always be the same as mine. I am excessively indulgent, that is, I take immense pains (my mother took no pains of the sort) to make her happy, in my way; to please her, according to my taste; to do what she ought to like, not what she does like; to arrange what I think is good for her, not what interests her—and she is not grateful.’’ In these days, it can no longer be, ‘‘Do unto others as you would be done by,’’189 but ‘‘Do unto others as they would be done by.’’ In the vagueness of all things which belongs to this transition-time, the relation between parents and children is as difficult to find as your way in a London fog. The parents take responsibilities which they cannot perform; the children feel that they are not performed. The parents feel that they are going through a great deal for their children, the children that gratitude is exacted from them for that which does not make them happy. Both sides suffer equally from disappointment, and both are alike to be pitied. The mothers are disappointed that they are not loved, the daughters that they feel no attraction towards the parents, for we can only love that which is loveable to us. An uncomfortable age! The last one was better. But no, it was not. We could not go back to that if we would, and we would not if we could. Still we know our daughters wish that they were married, as we did, in order that they may exercise at least some of their faculties and attractions. And no wonder, that is the

189 A paraphrase of the ‘‘golden rule.’’

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reason why we married, and they will have to run the same chance with their children. See what is expected of the poor unfortunate mother, that she should be able to respond to all the wants and tastes of all her daughters, the parts which twenty people could not play must all be acted by her; she must be a poet with one, a woman of business with another, an artist with a third, a thinker with a fourth, in order to develop the capabilities of each; and why? because they are shut up in a family, without free scope to find and exercise their natural inclinations and powers. Yet daughters are now their mothers’ slaves, just as much as before; they are considered their parents’ property; they are to have no other pursuit, nor power, nor independent life, unless they marry; they are to be entirely dependent upon their parents—white slaves in the family, from which marriage alone can emancipate them. Mothers acknowledge this, even while feeling that they are the daughters’ slaves too. What we have to do is so vague that we are obliged often to keep our responsibilities, while we have lost the privileges to which they appertained, and which alone could enable us to perform them. {Omitted: In answer to this epistle, Fulgentia wrote as follows: ‘‘Let me see. . . . ’’ f62} 6.18 Shall we not all allow that everyone ought to have exercise for all his faculties, and that everyone ought to come freely into contact with all others? But how is it? We begin by teaching something to our boys which we acknowledge, if it is to be learnt, will leave time for nothing else. Dr Arnold wished to introduce German into Rugby, but he soon found, if the boys were to learn Latin and Greek, they had no time for German or anything else. We teach languages and histor y. Histor y consists of facts, which can be made no use of by the boy, because he has not yet sufficient experience of life to understand them; they may lie fallow, it is true, till he has. And yet there is not one of us but admits at once that all the faculties ought to have exercise and food.

Ever yone ought to have exercise for all his faculties.

Mix freely with all—exercise all your Faculties As to mixing freely with all others, we mix (at least our women do) with the narrowest of all possible circles, a family, where the chances

Ever yone ought to mix freely with all others.

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Community in work.

Tendency of the present day to separation into assemblies of the same. Schools a large assembly, but ‘‘family’’ too, only a small assemblage of the same.

are almost nothing that we shall find two persons who will have one idea or mode of action in common. For the law of God is against repetition. In so narrow a limit, you can scarcely find room for the exercise of one of your faculties, for everybody must do the same thing. It is well known what difficulties a genius produces in a family. We had much rather have a commonplace person. Monasteries, according to their original plan, were a much larger circle than the family. For there people did meet for a common object: those who had a vocation for work went into a house which supplied their kind of work, for contemplation, into a house of contemplation. Afterwards they degenerated into places of idleness and vice. But, in their original idea, they were places where people who liked to work for the same object met to do so, and the enormous rate at which they multiplied showed how they responded to a want in human nature. Each was employed according to his or her vocation; there was work for all, but there is no such possibility in the family. There ever yone must be employed within the narrowest of all limits on the occupations least susceptible of any expansion—tied together, with rarely any common pursuit or interest, by the closest of all possible chains, and without a possibility of getting out, except by marriage. Fathers are much to be pitied who, without any attraction for their daughters, are condemned to pass their lives with them in the narrowest of prisons, and cannot by any means escape from them. Many, who would never confess it even to themselves, have a dread of being left alone with some other member of the family. I once knew a father—the best of fathers—who begged that he and his son might never be left in the house without some third person. There is a constraint, an embarrassment, which is the more painful the more excellent the person. Yet what can be more natural, nay unavoidable, in such a prison as the family? Open wide its doors {Omitted: Portia}, not only to your sons, but to your daughters also. Let them all have free scope and exercise, and room for all their faculties. 6.19 One of our most distinguished ethical philosophers says that he fears the present tendency to separation into assemblies of the same. ‘‘We find,’’ he says, ‘‘the sick together in hospitals, the blind, the insane also. We find boys together in schools, young men in col-

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leges, etc., whereas the family,’’ he adds, ‘‘which is Nature’s work, presents variety—old, young, male, female.’’ We entirely agree in the objection to that to which he objects. But if, by a family, he means the father, mother and the children born to them, the evil is not thereby remedied, and it is plain that if it is desirable to bring together variety, such a family as this is by the ver y word pronounced against. ‘‘Family’’ a small Assemblage of the same Such a family presents one man, one woman, the number of children uncertain, is generally said, but that word is inapplicable. Obser vation is indicating laws which regulate it. The tendency is to decrease in number, up to a certain point, with full exercise of faculty and sufficient supply of food. But take the family as it is now. Perhaps there is one boy, three girls, perhaps there are two girls; perhaps, four boys, four girls, or say one boy, one girl. What that we can call companionship in life and work springs from this? The father and mother have had an education from life and circumstances different from the children. The father, where he is earning his bread, necessarily spends his time apart from the mother and children. What sympathy in life and work is there, in general, between parents and children, however good and affectionate each may be! Then, as to the children, does it not come, in the family, to this, that the boys go forth to the work, the girls are left at home together? A small assemblage of the same is presented by the family in the girls. This is all the difference (if we come to the consideration of parents and children in family life) between the family and the assemblies of schools and colleges. We agree so much with the principle laid down by this ethical philosopher that we should wish for a different organization of life and society. We are not satisfied to see father, mother and children living and working together. This was on our lips to say, but, in fact, we never do see it. We see father, mother and girls living in the same house, and boys occasionally visiting them. We want to see all ages and both sexes really living and working for each other, each contributing what the other has not to the great existence, humanity. We never have to root out feelings or opinions. We have to make them more comprehensive. We want a family which will really live and work together in sympathy, and efficiently. Whoever has that in parents or children, let him work on; it is well with him. But if he

Break no ties. Enlarge and strengthen them.

442 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought have it not, however dear and good his parents or children, his brothers or his sisters, or if he see others wanting it, let him, in all love, look whether God did not intend mankind to use their means to obtain sympathy and efficient work and help among the varieties of age, sex and character in the world. God knows we want to break no tie. We want to strengthen and enlarge ties. 7.1 Theor y of Daughters Theor y of daughters.

{Omitted: Well, dear father, you. . . . f67} It is acknowledged that daughters are brought into the world without the possibility of asking their own consent. It is acknowledged that they have then but two alternatives. There seems to be no doubt that marrying a man of high and good purpose, and following out that purpose with him, is the happiest, but the mother must say to the daughter, ‘‘I cannot ensure your meeting such,’’ and the daughter cannot go out seeking them for herself. The parents must show them to her. ‘‘If I can show you one such it will be a great deal; if I can show you two or three such, it will be an extraordinar y thing indeed; and out of those whom I can show you, it does not follow that all will want to marry you or you them.’’ How many, then, are the chances against the woman embracing this alternative! The other is, as we have said, to adopt the way of life which her parents have adopted for themselves from necessity or inclination, necessarily without any regard to her vocation, or capabilities for it, before she was born. And why do the parents wish this? Not selfishly. There is really no selfishness in it, for it would rejoice them, as we have said, beyond anything, if the daughter could marry as they like. It is because they are afraid of what the world will say, of how they will judge a daughter who should leave her ‘‘duty to her parents’’ and ‘‘fly to other duties,’’ who should forsake her ‘‘home sphere’’ for ‘‘strange fancies.’’ To the world, then, I appeal. Is this right or is it wrong? Men are so well aware of the fact that it is very important that a woman should marry—that she is anxious to try whether she cannot find more of interest away from home—that they take for granted, if they have means, that a woman will be too glad to accept them. ‘‘Yes,’’ we ought to be able to say, ‘‘it is ver y important that a woman should marry, but not that she should marry you. She has a

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vocation. She will not marry, unless she finds a man with whom she can unite in high and holy purpose to serve mankind.’’ Else how unnatural that one man should be more interesting to her than God and mankind! Now, in the ordinar y course of an ordinar y woman’s life, she is asking people to marry her all day long. Men only ask once and occasionally. It is true that, when a man asks, he must take his answer; if it is in the affirmative, he must stand by it; but a woman may ask, and if she gets her answer, she may draw back (which a man cannot do), and say, I meant nothing by it. There are three things on which marriage is generally founded: a good opinion of a person, a desire to love and be loved, and a wish to escape dissatisfaction at home. Any real attraction is difficult, because there is so little choice, for there must be similarity of means and age. There must be acquaintance. What is Love in Marriage? Will it be said, we do not take love into the account? We hardly ever saw it, and therefore cannot well tell what it is. We have seen women asking men to marry them, as we have said, all day long, and men asking women occasionally once. If that is called love? We have seen married people consulting together about whom they shall ask to dinner, or how they shall lay out the grounds. If that is called love? What, then, do we call love? The highest, the only true love, is when two persons, a man and a woman who have an attraction for one another, unite together in some true purpose for mankind and God. But it is said, and said truly, that few people are capable of such a purpose. And are such capable of love? We have seen women ‘‘in love,’’ as it is called, and men too. We never felt, ‘‘Now that is love.’’ Mr and Mrs - - unite together to keep up a political ‘‘party,’’ and that is really more like love than most mar riages, though it is only for party politics. {Omitted: Portia and Fulgentia were driving together in Hyde Park. ‘‘Well, said Fulgentia, what did my father say?’’ Portia showed her his letters. ‘‘And is he not right,’’ said Fulgentia, ‘‘do we owe our parents duty?’’ f69}

If you call that love?

What, then, do we call love?

7.2 How is duty to be shown to parents? By destroying one’s self ? They say they want you to stay at home to take care of them. The whole

Do we not owe duty to our parents?

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Ought not parents to have the services of their children in return for all they have done for them?

Have not daughters their time and their faculties?

Daughters can marry, if they like it.

The young woman is preached to all her life to take Christ for her pattern.

We have not Christ’s objects to fill our souls. ‘‘We cannot be like Christ.’’

thing is a falsity! They don’t want you to stay to take care of them; they don’t want you to stay for their sakes, but for your own sake, for fear the world should think evil of you. That is the first falsity. And you can’t benefit them by cramping yourself any more than a slave can benefit his master. That is the second falsity. An injur y to any one person is an injury to all the world. That parents should fancy that they can be benefited, or that anybody else can be, just by the cramping of the daughters! The parents don’t want the services of the daughter, but they are obliged to pretend to do so, for fear of something unfavourable being said of her by the world—out of kindness to her, therefore, and for her sake. The parents are really as much to be pitied as the daughters. {Omitted: ‘‘But our time and our faculties at least we have.’’ ‘‘My dear, children. . . . f70} Daughters can do nothing but what their parents approve. They may, it is true, play at one hour and draw at another, as they choose, but they must come down to the company which the parents have invited. They cannot make even of their drawing a pursuit, for fear of appearing singular, of not performing what are called the ‘‘social duties.’’ They can only have a choice among those people whom their parents like, and who like their parents well enough to come to their house, and among those few, if one suits you, well, if not, not so well. Christ did not marry; He was so devoted to God and mankind that he appears not to have wished for marriage. We profess, but it is only a profession, to take Him for an example. {Omitted: The young woman is preached to all her life to take Him for her pattern. Now he was so devoted to God and mankind that he appears not to have wished for marriage. And then she is told, ‘‘Oh! you would be like Christ, would you?’’ ‘‘I cannot be like Christ I am sure,’’ said Fulgentia with a deep sigh, ‘‘I have not his objects to fill my soul.’’ f71} Yet no one out of the Roman Catholic Church recognizes Christ as an example in this particular. Even the idea of marriage, in connection with Him, offends, from the confusion of His divine and human nature. There are two alternatives, either of which might be a happy one, a good marriage or this devotion to God and mankind. But we say, she shall not be devoted to God and mankind, she shall be devoted to doing what her parents do, whether it suit her or not.

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Mar riage ‘‘all a Woman’s life,’’ Why? What parents ought to do is not to approve what their children do, but to approve that their children should do what they think right, to bring them up till they are ‘‘of age,’’ so as that they shall have power to judge what they shall think right, and then, when they shall have come into possession of themselves, cordially to acquiesce that they should do what they, not their parents, judge good, but parents never think children ‘‘of age’’ till the children think like them. They want the daughter to have her own peculiar genius, in order to think their thoughts, to advocate their opinions, and say what they think right. Children cannot give love and duty for binding them down, for cr ushing their heart. They may recognize the good intention. We never see children in the street without thinking, ‘‘why did you come into the world?’’ because it was convenient or agreeable to Mr and Mrs - - to mar ry, or because it satisfied the passions of B. and C. to come together, for no other reason. How is it, it is sometimes asked, that women of the upper class have nothing to do, even if they are set free—that they never desire nor look forward to anything but marriage? Very few people live such an impoverishing and confusing and weakening life as the women of the richer classes. What is it? They have made up their minds to live in public, never to have any time to themselves. If one of a higher stamp joins them, she will not help them, but they will all go to the bottom together. Their brains all become muddled in company. They will go on impoverishing and getting worse to the end of their lives, and she will too. {Omitted: ‘‘But I don’t know what you mean by our impoverishing and confusing life.’’ f72} It is the most confusing life. They have all cultivated general literature. Everybody is reading aloud half a page out of her own book. The mother has a sort of pride in her daughters being literary ladies, in their having five books lying upon the breakfast table at once, and quoting from a heap of authors. She says, with a sort of half pride, half regret that there is not more done, ‘‘You know they are literar y.’’ {Omitted: ‘‘And I, do you know, Portia, I was such a fool that I thought there was something peculiar in me and that I ought to break up my mind too, in order to enjoy it and take part in it?’’ ‘‘You ask me why it is a confusing life.’’ f73} You cannot bring forward an opinion without exciting a storm of words. You have made up your minds to live always in this whirlwind. What can be so confusing?

Is not doing what our parents approve devoting ourselves to God?

Surely we do owe our parents that love and duty.

Women look for nothing but mar riage.

Why is woman’s life impoverishing and confusing?

She thinks it something ‘‘peculiar’’ in herself, if she cannot enjoy and take part in this life too. She thinks she ought to break up her own mind to do so.

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Children can’t be independent of their parents.

We pity the mothers quite as much as the daughters. The impossible is demanded from a mother. She is expected to undertake all, to sympathize with and understand all her children, among whom are the most dissimilar characters, the most unlike her own. Yet, by our method of imprisoning in families, she is to supply all these different kinds of characters and wants with sympathy, instr uction and help. It is like having no division of labour. The end is, a mother does nothing well, only interferes with everything, looks for the faults in those she deputes, and painfully feels, if she sees the faults, that she knows not how to prevent them. Let a mother, when her daughters grow up, tell them the truth, as to independence of time, faculties, money, which women ought to have at twenty-one, allowing that age to be too young—but considering a too young fixed time better than an unfixed time to be regulated by the opinion of each individual parent. But, if a daughter wishes to do something flagrantly imprudent, to marry upon nothing, for instance, is she to be free to do it after twenty-one? The parent has then to say, ‘‘You are free to do so, but I am not free to take a part. I cannot receive your meetings. You may correspond and meet elsewhere, if you have other friends who approve that course. That which would be spent upon you at home I lay by from the moment you cease to spend it at home. I cannot, in duty to the others, give it into your hands. I keep it, because experience shows that you are undertaking what will probably require more than your share of that common fund, of which, in the present state of things, I am the guardian.’’ Greater liberty than this could not be, because that could not be called liberty which would trench on the rights of others. Women ought to be free to follow any pursuit, or to marry, irrespective of parents’ opinions, so long as they can show, on experience, probability that they will not trench on the shares of others, money for the others standing for means, in like manner, to follow their wishes. If they do not wish to spend their share of means like the rest of the family, they ought to have that share for their own purposes. This liberty is alike at all ages after twenty-one, never less, but never more, while the parent lives as guardian of the means of all, because at no age must the rights of any be trenched upon.

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7.3 ‘‘We find no sympathy’’ {Omitted: ‘‘Dear Fulgentia, you say that you have no sympathy. . . . f75} In thinking over life as it is now, practically, it is ver y desirable to understand, to feel truly as to our possibility of sympathizing with each other. Sympathy must and ought to be a want to man, since the essential nature of mankind is to be one. We should not wish, even if without it, not to feel the want of it; the evil is that people throw themselves into the outward, so that they do not feel the want of it. Very few people, for instance, can sympathize with each other in any pursuit or thought of any importance. {Omitted: I am sure that you wished for my sympathy in your ennui, in your politics—you used to try to incense me. . . . f75} If there have not been the means to learn, if one knows nothing on a subject, to pretend or to try to sympathize is more balking than to give it up. If people do not give you thought for thought, receive yours, digest it and give it back with the impression of their own character upon it, then give you one for you to do likewise, it is best to know what one is about, and not to attempt more than kindly, cheer ful, outward intercourse, or occasionally each giving information to the other which the other has some pleasure in receiving, though not able to make much of it. This is well as far as it goes, and it is better not to fancy it can be more. {Omitted: Poor little Mary is so sympathizing, she likes to think she does understand when she does not sometimes, because she has such keen sympathy and want of sympathy. f76} Let us think of the sympathy we don’t have, as merely absence of sympathy, not fault in others (who often would gladly sympathize if they could), nor fault in ourselves (who also gladly would if we could).

We say ‘‘we have no sympathy.’’

Members of families wish for each other’s sympathy in politics, music, etc.

How many are in Solitar y Confinement? Solitar y confinement! Should we be afraid of it? It is solitar y confinement. What are we all in but solitary confinement? To be alone is nothing, but to be without a sympathy in a crowd, this is to be confined in solitude. Some of the most painful suffering in women of the richer class arises from not understanding that sympathy cannot be willed, cannot be given at will, nor attraction felt at will. The want of sympathy is painful enough, without the aggravation of blame to oneself or

Women have so much sympathy and want of sympathy that they like to hear what they don’t understand half of— to fancy that they do understand.

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Is there no alternative for those without sympathy, who do not take refuge in the outward, but to suffer?

others. Some find amusement in the outward, do not suffer inwardly, because the attention is turned elsewhere. When this is not the case, and there is this want of sympathy, of attraction, given and returned, must it not be a feeling of starvation? Sympathy being one of the essentials of the human spirit, must not the human spirit be famishing without it, as the human body without food? No, we can feel what is to be called happiness, without attraction or sympathy, in certain exercises of the nature, where God has had a part. {Omitted: If it is really true, I would not shut my eyes to the fact, if it be really true, that there is no alternative but to suffer, for those who are not outward, or who have not sympathy and attraction. f77} In certain diseases there is no remedy known for acute and constant suffering, and it is right that it should be so, in order to bring about circumstances in which the causes of such suffering shall be removed, in which man shall attain a right physical state. Disappointment always springs from want of wisdom. Let us not, in a cowardly spirit, shrink from the pain of disappointment, but let us seek the wisdom which will prevent disappointment. It may often be that it is not in our present possibility to prophesy aright, but when this is so, we would wish for the consciousness of its being so, which prevents disappointment. It may be wise to try that which will fail, but not wise to feel disappointment in failure. Hardly any class suffers more from want of sympathy than married women, even those who are loving and loved. In some sorts of attraction the woman does not want sympathy; she only needs to satisfy the want of ‘‘his’’ presence, the want to supply his interest, or amusement, or comfort, to feel what he is feeling, and fulfill his consequent desires. But this is by no means the highest, certainly not the most improving kind of married love. To work at one or more objects interesting in the view of God, important in God’s purposes for man, to work with one or more between whom there is a mutual attraction, and who are mutually interested in these objects, not only for each other’s sakes, but from their own natures and for God’s sake and man’s sake, this only is human happiness. Who has it? While unhappy, we can do comparatively so little. Let us look carefully to experience to make out whether there is to be nothing which can be called happiness, while this is impossible. The want of all this ought to be recognized as a want, but it is not essential

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poverty, miser y; such a state admits of partial riches, of partial happiness, even with a sense of want and suffering. Oneness with God, kindness, sympathy (even if not mutual) with the feelings of others, and such exercise of the faculties as life affords, together with attention to the idiosyncrasies of our own natures will, in many cases, prevent the suffering which paralyzes and impoverishes, will turn suffering into a species of happiness, which is the only right way to suffer. We must not desire to be unconscious of it. To faint away, or to be paralyzed, or to have the attention so turned away as not to be conscious of the truth, are not desirable modes of escaping sense of suffering. Yet neither is it desirable that a phase of life and experience should pass unattuned to all possible enjoyment of right kind which circumstances admit of, for this enjoyment is in accordance with God’s pleasure. Will it not answer our purpose of stirring us to seek, if we are conscious of greater happiness to mankind from a supply of what is wanting, without actual suffering in the want? It has long been a practical question whether we can be happy without sympathy, whether it would be well to be without the inward cry for it. If that inward cry has made us conscious of the want, it will be well for us to find happiness in oneness with God, and striving to do one’s part (even if a little one, though ever striving after a greater one). Need we be impelled by suffering? May not the bliss of God and wisdom and righteousness attract us onwards and upwards? We cannot live on suffering and poverty. We often tr y. We must find peace and joy if we are to be or to do anything. There are so few means of learning to do anything well, people’s attention is so little directed to good objects, is so spent on many small objects, and we are so little thrown upon the variety of mankind for associates, that even the want of sympathy in good work, one of the essentials of well-being, is little recognized. The other essential of well-being is oneness with God, but of this, too, few have the consciousness. Love God, and love thy neighbour. How Christ resumed the whole science of man’s well-being in those two sentences!190

190 A paraphrase of Luke 10:27.

450 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 7.4 Mothers’ Power like the Church of England’s Why are mothers like the Church of England? Because their power declines as it becomes moral.

The ‘‘mother at home.’’

The ‘‘daughter at home.’’

Why are mothers so much to be pitied? The Church of England is not the only power which declines as it becomes moral. Parental power declines, in proportion as a door is opened to opinion. Neither the Church of England nor the parent having any real foundation for power, they lose it as soon as it is questioned. But the parent, like the church, must allow for varieties of character, whilst he retains his absolute authority; otherwise he too will turn out John Wesley, instead of being strengthened by his earnestness and zeal. ‘‘The mother at home!’’ There is no desert for the heart so oppressive as that of the ‘‘mother at home’’ in England in the nineteenth century, at least as some of the deserts which she has to pass through. Perhaps that of the ‘‘daughter at home’’ is sometimes as much so. Many have passed through both, with excellent parents and excellent children. In both, we long to love and be loved, to sympathize and be sympathized with. In both as to participation of the thoughts and feelings most interesting, it is no exaggeration to say that we should not have been more alone in any African desert. There is (in both) the appearance of food which disappears whenever you stretch out your hand to take it. Imperfection only seen by seeing the Imperfect in a good Form

What is satisfactor y in a good ‘‘family.’’

To excite us to remedy evils, we must see things in a bad form; to show their imperfection we must see them in a comparatively good form. (The same principle holds exactly with regard to religious orders. It is only by seeing a perfect ‘‘superior’’ of such an order that its essential defects are made visible. I speak from experience.) When we see a bad school, we think a good one would supply man’s education. When we see a perfect one, like Mr Brooks’s in John Street, we most strongly feel that it cannot. When we see a family with obvious deficiencies as a family, we feel that a well-regulated family might afford satisfaction. {Omitted: I come back to my own, thinking as to my two girls, how much there is supposing. . . . f81} Taking for granted that what girls in the richer class are supposed to aim at is the right thing, how much there is which is satisfactor y! They are indefatigable at their music, drawing, reading; they really like one another, companionize each other in their read-

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ing. They have all possible liberty. Their father is generally an affectionate and enlivening element to them; they are good and wellintentioned. Yet what poor work it is for human life! The mother has hardly an interest in common with them. Though they mean and feel so rightly to each other, they can do scarcely anything for each other. Yet there is so much of good in their lives that they will never know what its wants are; they will feel ‘‘ennuyées’’ [bored], will look to loves and friendships and to outward things for relief, often in vain. If a real attachment and a good one comes, they will embark in the same sort of family life, enter upon its evils and deficiencies, will live over again (unless they be some rare exception) the old story of thinking their children, their difficulties ‘‘peculiar.’’ When will be revealed (by suffering falling upon a nature capable of distinguishing whence it comes, and a remedy for it), when will be revealed a glimpse of human nature’s wants? We see no tendency to such a revelation. If it is to be that I leave this world, seeing nothing done as to these objects, I hope I shall be able to die trusting and remembering that there is eternity for God’s work. But looking to probabilities as they can be estimated, if nothing is done now, all seems as though there were no other salvation in sight. Neither do we see any tendency towards a revelation to thinkers upon religion. Some blind clergy and Methodists will preach what will go against their reason. This is the only influence at work directed to them. To return, however, to the question of sympathy. Mothers, though living among the good and feeling, may be like John the Baptist living in the desert as to absence of sympathy. In return they give none, for it is true that they generally know and care nothing about their children’s objects. This the children must feel a want. Some mothers have learnt not to blame their absence of sympathy, but daughters cannot have learnt not to feel the mother’s absence of sympathy to be a deficiency which they have to complain of or regret. {Omitted: I suffer very much less, however, for seeing these things more truly. I am not disappointed, reproachful to myself for them. I pursue my own thoughts, do not strive to pull open their hearts, take what I meet with on the surface, and thus I can love them better and do for them the trifles in my power. When I say I don’t know nor care about their pursuits, how gladly would I know and then I should care, but it is impossible for me to know. f82}

Mothers would suffer much less for seeing more truly—for not reproaching themselves or their children—not being ‘‘disappointed’’—not striving to pull open their children’s hearts— pursuing their own objects— meeting what they can of their children’s— loving them better—doing what they can for them. Gladly would they care for their children’s pursuits. But they must know in order to care.

452 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Mothers have longed to know about machinery and natural histor y in order to sympathize with their sons, but they can’t, and without knowledge they can’t care for these subjects, much as they care for the sons. They can’t care at least with such a sympathy as the sons ought to like to accept. But oh! the wretchedness of these family parties—of this do-nothing life! Try to keep your head above water for the possibility that you may bring some light to the weary sufferers who know not why they suffer. {Omitted: I must bear to the end, and am not likely to be able to help others, but only, while suffering myself, to cause the suffering of others, as I always have done and probably always shall do in this world. f83} Those who can only bear to the end may believe that all is well, that not one moment of sorrow is felt, which is not essential to the per fect whole, that even these helpless hands and this weary heart are working indirectly at that whole. And this is comfort. 7.5 You must know in order to care A new question has arisen about the relation of parent and child.

{Omitted: ‘‘You say, Fulgentia, that this question about. . . . f83} Why is there all this new question about the relation between parents and children now? The question concerning our relation to God and our relation to our parents arises naturally, or rather necessarily, in these times. Hitherto (at least in principle, if not in practice), the nature of both relations has been taken for granted, though somewhat vaguely. In both cases power above our own was recognized and acknowledged. In mankind’s earlier ignorant state, questions are not searched into by all or by many. A few who think more closely, or feel more strongly than the general run, are listened to as oracles. ‘‘Fear God,’’ ‘‘honour your parents,’’ were acknowledged precepts, and largely governed practical life. Those who did not conform to them dissented, not because they had thought out something else which they felt more true, but because they were self-confident or self-indulgent. In savage life, and for many steps beyond, the perceptions are the part of the nature most cultivated and exercised. When the perceptions are much exercised, general laws not understood, and the intellect little cultivated, fear of a higher power naturally arises. The next step to this is that intellect becomes cultivated by the few, while the many are ‘‘hewers of wood and drawers of water.’’191 191 Josh 9:21.

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These few see the folly of the fears of the multitude, and some become unbelievers. But a higher power manifests itself to the learned as well as to the unlearned. Human nature is adapted to venerate, and though some scoff, many acknowledge, and the religion of the cultivated undergoes various phases. No other religion, perhaps, ever died out so entirely as the Greek and Roman Pantheon. In Asia, and to a degree in Africa (?) (though we know, perhaps, too little about Africa to judge), the old religions either remain, as the Buddhist and the Chinese still do, or modify the present, either there or elsewhere, as does the Egyptian, at least to a much greater degree than do now the Greek or Roman or the religions of the north. These religions, we may say, expired; they left traces of themselves, in ceremonies and practices adopted from them by the Christians; the abstractions, virtue, goodness, etc., come from the Epicurean and the Stoic philosophers more than from the Christian; the worship of the Virgin, of a female divinity, by the Roman Catholic, owes its origin, perhaps, to the worship of Diana. All this may be granted. But still nothing of the character of the heathen deities appears in the Christian objects of veneration, neither in the Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost, the Virgin Mar y, nor the saints. The Father was the God of the Jews receiving Europe into His jurisdiction. The essence of the religion of Moses was to deny more than their one God (at first, because, though others were acknowledged to exist, He was a jealous God, and where He was acknowledged, would admit no other). {Omitted: The Christian Moses, again, borrowed his God from the Egyptians. f85} Questions as to Religion and the ‘‘Family’’ inseparable The Christians, therefore, in adopting the Jewish religion adopted this principle, so strongly laid down by their first teachers among the Jews. But it had been necessary to force their doctrine upon the Jews. It did not satisfy the nature of men, in general, though it elevated a few, as it seemed, supernaturally, who were of high nature. Europe would not have accepted it. But Christ, deified under a character of love and self-sacrifice, the Virgin Mar y with all her loveliness and tenderness, the saints with their heroism, the doctrine of the atonement, so consolatory to man, who felt his weakness, his sin, his danger; these doctrines, containing so much of tr uth and beauty, so much to engage the heart and imagination,

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The two questions concerning the relation to God and the relation to the parent are one. You cannot separate the inquir y about religion and about the ‘‘family.’’

took a strong hold on the thoughts and feelings. And so long as power, not to be questioned or criticized, was acknowledged in heaven and at the head of the family, these doctrines remained in force. People are hardly aware of the very great importance of the present phase of religious and domestic life, of the change going on, of the want of a Saviour, for this hour of peculiar trial. When religion expired in Greece and Rome, the Saviour, who appeared in Judaea, spread his influence to raise it from the dead. These two questions of religion and family are so intimately connected that to ask concerning the higher power or powers acknowledged in heaven and on earth is one. There has been an actual veneration for power, and readiness to acknowledge it, in mankind, without inquiry whether it consisted in the righteousness, the truth, the goodness, the wisdom, which are the essentials of all permanent power. No reason is felt now for venerating or yielding to the powers which formerly influenced men’s minds, from a sense of fear or duty. The changes, which we now must bring about, are the substitution for authority, which cannot be replaced in heaven or in the family, of sense of truth and right, of accordance with right. No longer can it be duty submitted to, but right accorded with, which must be the spirit of mankind. And an awful phase it is, while the former is a waning influence, and the latter can scarcely yet be said to be a waxing one. Man used to throw himself under the wheels of the divinity’s car. Now, He’ll not lose a cup of drink for thee: Bid him but temper his excess; Not he: he knows where he can better be, As he will swear, Than to serve thee in fear.192

God surrounds us. His law is ever at work, bringing about the right, so all will be well. Without this conviction the present would be fearful, for, in the errors which are dying out, it is difficult to distinguish the germs of truth which are growing up. Truth, in our relations both with God and with man, must come in this substitu-

192 George Herbert, ‘‘Miserie’’ 8-11.

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tion of accordance of the whole nature with right for authority, vaguely acknowledged from fear or duty. Let us do justice to these passing influences, to their good effects, imperfect and erroneous as they were. They were better than the phase which is now, though this phase will lead to better than they. Oh! that we could help ourselves and each other out of the present selfish, cold, self-satisfied views, poor and narrow, while supposed to be new and improved lights! 7.6 Mistakes in what is common to Divine and human Nature Mistakes with regard to the relation of God to man, and of parent to child, arise from mistaken ideas concerning those attributes which are common to divine and human nature. Power, as we have said, is the attribute most universally recognized, both in the divine and the human author of being. In the earlier ages of civilization it is acknowledged that might is right, and the ideas of the parental relation, both divine and human, are much modified by this acknowledgment. Now, when we say accordance with right, we do not mean the right of might; right has come to have quite a different meaning; right probably comes from rego, I govern, but governing by the right of governing, and governing by the principle of right, no longer mean the same thing. We are tending to the discovery that all permanent power arises out of wisdom. Thus the nature of the Supreme, the source and spring of all other natures, seems to determine. Under the idea that might was right, men worshipped deities in whom was no goodness, consequently no wisdom. They yielded to a master (whether the king, the master of a nation, or the father, the master of a family), whatever his character, unless he were weak, and thus forfeited his characteristic of power. But now it is coming into view, though indistinctly and unconsciously, that the divine and human parent must excite in us the consciousness of love, goodness, wisdom, righteousness; then we shall love and revere, trust and sympathize. But if the human as well as the divine parent is not in the state of being to call forth these sentiments, and if the child is not in the state to admit of them, there will be no relation between the divine or the human parent and the child, except the latter yielding when he cannot help it. This beginning to be recognized causes the uneasiness of the present phase of domestic life, especially in this country and in the

Mistakes in religion and the family arise from mistakes concerning what is common to divine and human nature.

456 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought richer class, and when we look into it we are not surprised that it is thus uneasy. While God’s power was acknowledged to be in itself an object of reverence, and duty to be owed to his power, a family united in worship to him. While they had more practical work to do, there was less time and occasion for the present uneasiness in families of the class whose practical work is now done for them. And while the right of the parents to direct was acknowledged without examination, whether they directed wisely or not, there was merit in submission and wrong in resistance. And that was a more peaceful, a more unselfish, a more conscientious phase than this, though this will develop into a phase much more so than that. Difficulties of the ‘‘Mother at Home’’ Difficulties of the ‘‘mother at home.’’

But now the parent is getting more and more into an anomalous and difficult position; more and more does any relation between his child and himself depend upon the love and wisdom with which he fulfills it. As civilization and luxury advance, he undertakes more and more for such wisdom as he may have; he, or rather she (for these difficulties chiefly concern the mother, the father escaping them, as his employments of work or of amusement lie chiefly out of the house) she, then, is to direct the servants, who are to provide conveniences and luxuries not thought of formerly. She has never learnt and does not know how, but she must take care to provide them. She must superintend the nurse and the governess of her children, though she knows nothing and has learnt nothing of the nurse’s work. And the governess, whose time, if she prepared herself to be a governess, was spent in a poor little backroom out of sight of humankind, excepting of her masters of music, singing, drawing or languages (or as many of these as time and money would allow), what is she to do? She must direct the characters of her pupils. How is she fit for it? If she were not expressly preparing in youth for it, she comes out of difficulties perhaps little suited to prepare her for this work. Over her, so little prepared, the mother, so little prepared, is to preside. Over the society, the duties to the rich, the duties to the poor, the poor mother is to preside, and, naturally, she presides so imperfectly over some, if not all of these duties, that the daughters soon begin to criticize. In youthful spirits, knowing little of difficulties—in the ‘‘irresponsibility of opposition,’’ they do this. She is one—they more than one, banded

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together in this criticism and opposition. The more in her maternal affection or conscientiousness or in her ambition that they should excel she has striven for them, the more capable they will be to criticize. And here, without blameable intention, either in parent or child, is where we are now, in families in easy circumstances. Much power still remains with mothers if they like or think it right to exert it. Whether they do or do not, their position is anomalous and unsatisfactor y. {Omitted: Fulgentia, you have heard from your poor Aunt Cassandra something of the difficulties of a ‘‘Daughter at Home.’’ I have told you now something. . . . f90} We have heard something of the difficulties of a ‘‘daughter at home,’’ these are the difficulties of a ‘‘mother at home.’’ 7.7 What was the original meaning of authority? Does it mean the tie between the Author and those of whom He was the Author? The Author has power over what He has created—God over the universe—man over the family—and might, as we have said, was right, in early days. Was this the pedigree of ‘‘authority’’? But reflection brings to view that might is not right. Is there any permanent power, any real power except what arises out of wisdom, truth, goodness, as we said? The tie comes into view that the Author shall make the existence he has created a blessing to the created. The more man’s nature is rightly exercised and developed (i.e., improved from imperfection towards perfection, from ignorance towards truth), the more will he appreciate the right and good, love the loveable, sympathize with the right in respect of the wrong. His real ties to his parents and to his children will be stronger and stronger. His ties to the Author of the universe will be stronger and stronger. More and more, in proportion to his own improvement, will he love, venerate, trust, sympathize and work consistently with such feelings. Meaning of ‘‘Authority’’ But this applies, it will be said, to his relation with all men, with whom circumstances throw him into relation. What ought there to be peculiar between parent and child? is our question. Undoubtedly the parent has power over the child. At his call comes into the world an utterly helpless being, who, without some care from him,

Meaning of ‘‘authority.’’

458 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought would soon cease to be a human being (though that which is will never cease to be in some mode; nothing that exists ever ceases to be, i.e., to lead to some other modification of being). Immense might be the power of the parent over the child for good, if he had wisdom. However, in proportion as the parent has wisdom, goodness, righteousness, love, and as these develop the same attributes in the child, will the tie be strong. The parent having peculiar power over the child will, in the exercise of these attributes, call forth the love, the respect, the trust, the sympathy of the child, more than others who have not that peculiar power and influence. It is certain that there are to be families, i.e., there are to be parents and children, brothers and sisters and cousins. One remark we can at once make with regard to these relationships, that the relation of marriage is, by God’s law, not to take place between brothers and sisters and cousins. The tendency of this law is separation. Marriage thus breaks up families, separates parents and children and sisters. Brothers go out into the world, and in general are separated, whether married or not. There is felt something almost unbecoming in a son living at home after he grows up; he sometimes leaves home and lives elsewhere, for no other reason scarcely. God’s laws seem to point to dispersion of families. Man accords, with regard to marriage, so much as often to seek or agree to marriages which are undesirable—accords with regard to the desirableness of sons going out to work in the world, to daughters doing so, who have to maintain themselves. But daughters, who are not obliged to maintain themselves, must not do so; they may not leave the paternal roof except to marry. To try to find out whether this is right, let us go back to the nature of the relation between parents and children. It begins with that great point which we have already mentioned. The parents call the child into existence. Let them take care that they can prophesy that the existence to which they summon him will, in probability, be one in the direct road to being wor th having. All existence is essentially worth having. God takes care of that. But one of the means by which He takes care of this is by man seeking the right, by presenting means and inducements to man to seek the right. Till man has an appetite for the right, he is under liability to suffering and privation; till he has attained how to find the right, he is under liability to suffering and privation, which are among the teachers of mankind. .

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The parents, then, have to try to be able to prophesy that the being whom they summon to human existence shall find human existence worth having. This principle is, to a degree, acknowledged and generally acted upon in the educated classes. The class in which women are able to live without working for a livelihood takes it for granted, however, that ‘‘to be wor th having’’ means, ‘‘to live without working for a livelihood in the way which well-disposed parents have fixed upon.’’ Responsibility of Parents’, not Children’s, Tie So far we have come, then, that the tie springs from the parents, who, if they are in a right state, will feel a repulsion, not an attraction, to summoning this human existence, unless they can prophesy a probability that it will be worth having. Before we inquire what the being ‘‘worth having’’ means, let us inquire what will be the tie of children to parents, and what its nature. Parents have a greater field of influence than others. They ought to provide life, and what is desirable in life, till the child can provide for himself. Money answers to means for all that is desirable. Without means for food, clothing, shelter, sleep, man cannot develop and exercise his faculties for perceiving, thinking and feeling. Money, or something equivalent, is essential as a mode to enable man to work with man in such development and exercise. Does, then, a parent’s power, his means for influence, lie in money? and ought it to be exercised only till the child can earn money for himself? Partly, but not entirely, his influence, is in money. In theor y, the parent has wisdom and goodness beyond the child. If he has not, he ought not to be a parent. In proportion as a parent has wisdom and goodness to fulfill the part he has undertaken, he will, naturally and essentially, have the affection, the respect of his children. But, if circumstances are such that present wisdom and goodness cannot exist in the relation of parent and child, the parent must not expect respect and love. For instance, suppose a parent, in ignorance, undertakes the relation of a parent, and is not conscious that, not having learnt, he cannot teach or superintend the teaching of a variety of things necessary to well-being for his child. If he finds that the arrangements of society, and the wants in himself, or rather herself (for all this applies much more to the mother), of which she was not conscious, impede the well-being of the child, let her see this truth, viz., that it is not possi-

460 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought ble for the child to love and revere her, though she be good, and would gladly do anything possible to her, in the way of active work or passive self-sacrifice, and endurance for her child. Let her find comfort in accordance with her God, in the lesson she has learnt. There is still a possibility of wisdom and righteousness for her, relative to her circumstances, though perhaps not one which will engage the affection of her children. What has been said is true in reference to most families of the upper class now, though, of course, it varies with individuals. If it appears that mothers cannot teach, nor superintend the teaching of, nor regulate life for, their unmarried daughters, let us look what should be the fate of these. As things are now, at all events, they cannot go out alone into the world as men can. This brings us to the difference between men and women, which would lead us too far. But thus far we may safely say, that the difference is physical, that the woman, in consequence of this, required help and protection from the man, hence the difference has resulted. But man is not to work for woman, merely as a personal defender— one man for one woman, or one man for a family. This was so in earlier times, but cultivation of the whole nature is to do the work which then was for the strong arm. It is the remains of uncultivation, of want of good exercise, in consequence of which woman cannot go about freely, where man’s arm is not known to be ready to defend her. Mother’s part the most difficult Any way in which the daughter can be helped to facility in doing well that, or those things which she has a natural attraction to do, will lead her to happiness, provided, however, that her whole nature be so cultivated and exercised that what she does, she does in sympathy with God and man, or, at all events, in sympathy with God and for man. If she has this, she may live for the present without sympathy with man (though this is sure to come in the course of existence; the other is food to live, this may be waited for). But is it possible to provide the circumstances, the exercise of the nature for a daughter, which will do this? We know not, we can only say, without this the essential of well-being is wanted. We would tend to this as much as possible, if unable to realize it. There are institutions which would seem direct means for the practical part of such an object; they should be accompanied with an endeavour to

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engage the whole of man’s nature in a recognition of the God who calls upon us to accord and to work with Him. By appealing to the reason, to the feelings, to the conscience, by practical work in accordance with the appeal, we would, if we could, strive to make the daughter ‘‘one with man and with God.’’ 7.8 Why should anyone be shocked at this? What we have said amounts only to this, that unmarried women should have every facility given them by parents to spend their time and faculties upon any exercise of their nature for which it has an attraction, which can be pursued in harmony with God, which can answer, in short, any good purpose. To know how to do well anything which has, or which leads to a good purpose for man, will be security for an existence worth having. To facilitate such an existence, then, should be the object of a parent. Many difficulties arise in the consideration of this question. What is good purpose for man? will be one of these questions, one where the parent and child will be apt to differ. The parents have the child’s education in their hands before the child can form any opinion for himself. Educations may be comparatively better or worse, but no means exist now for a good one. Let us consider children in the upper class of life. What is their education?

Why should you be ‘‘shocked’’?

Children in the Nursery Ennuyés in the nursery, obliged to remain without any object but the amusement of the moment, as far as they can find it in their poor little selves, obliged to remain (a very limited number of children) always together, whether suited or not in character—who is their guardian and directress? Is it someone who has studied human nature to whom is given this most interesting and important charge? Has she an attraction for this employment? Is she wise and experienced in it? Have her heart and conscience sought it? No, it is a couple of nursery maids (making and mending the lady’s or the children’s clothes) who sit there to prevent the children hurting their bodies. They are to jump up if a child is in danger of falling or burning itself, or otherwise doing itself or its companion bodily harm. But if, with nothing to do, with perhaps unsuitable dispositions, these poor children quarrel and mar their dispositions, the two nursery maids had generally better sit still, for

Children in the nurser y.

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Children in the schoolroom.

in such circumstances the children must be cross and tease one another. Inter ference on the parts of the nursery maids would only do harm, they had better mind their work, in extreme cases only calling out, ‘‘Master Johnnie, don’t teaze Miss Eliza so.’’ These innocent helpless victims to ignorance, they could love, they could work, and how happy they might be, not in an infant school, with faculties stretched all alike, or nearly so, and for no object for which they themselves have shown an attraction, though this may be better than the nursery. In the nursery nothing was taught, but afterwards comes the time for lessons, which lasts till children are said to be ‘‘grown up.’’ What do they learn? What have they learnt when they are grown up?—when regenerated they should enter into possession of the conscious direction of a human being (till then more or less directed by others with more or less of conscious participation on the child’s own part). When they enter into this vast possession, what have they learnt of God’s laws, of the nature of God, of the nature of man, of his destination? Have they learnt to do any one thing well, with a comprehensive understanding of its nature, of its purpose? They know a good deal of history—but is it the philosophy of history? of languages—but is it the philosophy of language? they can play and sing—but does their music elevate either themselves or others, or send them forth to good things? While direct teaching and the indirect teaching of circumstances is what it is, it seems of little use to speculate on what ought to be the vocations of women. Generally speaking, they have no vocation, no desire after anything; they read and play, and draw and talk, and are religious, and go to see sights, and go to church, and to hear music; they are dissatisfied, but they seek nothing better, and have no desire to seek anything better. We are inquiring into the nature of the relation between parents and daughter, but while education or the want of it, i.e., of real education, so fetters the nature, how can we judge of this relation, of what it should be? It seems that the part of the parent is to make worth having the existence which he is the means of beginning, and that a human existence worth having means one in which the person knows how to do well something which he has an inclination to do, which is in harmony with God’s purpose of man’s well-being. But literature, music and drawing, and fine needlework, do not answer this defini-

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tion, nor visiting, nor sightseeing, nor parish or school business, as usually done. Any of these objects might be pursued so as to make a life valuable to one who has an attraction for them, but not as they are super ficially taught, not if so many of them are pursued that none can be done thoroughly, not if they are pursued for the purpose of mere selfish amusement—a resource, as it is called. But what can the Parents do? But what can the parents do? How can they help this? The means of teaching better do not exist. Many parents would eagerly grasp at them if they did. He who would be a saviour to mankind must offer these means for instruction and for living a true life. And when children are ‘‘grown up’’ with their wings clipped, their ideas, their instruction, the examples before them, all leading into the same path—is it likely that they should look out for any other? even if discontented in this? This is not satisfactory to them, but any other would be still greater dissatisfaction. If here and there one among parents is found who wishes something different, his children and society are against him. If here and there among children is found one who wishes to work at what he or she likes, and to learn how to do it, though in the sight of God it be an unobjectionable or valuable employment, society and generally the parents are in opposition to the child. And what else can be expected of the parents, brought up as they were? Another state of things quite as common as that of parents refusing to sanction the ‘‘vocations’’ of their children—I had almost said more common, because fixed and defined vocations are comparatively rare in the present phase of life, is this: Some young people have such determined sociability that they will contract friendship or marriage with anyone, however inferior in moral or mental quality to themselves, rather than with none. There are young men who will marry any woman who chooses to marry them. Now, the best woman is certainly not she who chooses to marry a man, and therefore such a marriage is sure to present a wife far inferior in moral quality to the husband. There are young girls who will look forward ever y week of their lives to seeing some friend who as regularly disappoints their moral sense, yet having no other friend they periodically hope and expect anew, and anew are disappointed. They marry in the same way. For such characters

What can parents do?

Another phase of ‘‘the family’’.

464 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought there is nothing but showing them a choice in variety, in order to save them from such deceptions. There are ‘‘vocations,’’ if you choose to call them so, for sociability, friendship, and love and marriage, just as much as there are ‘‘vocations’’ for science, art and administration. Both kinds are often equally disregarded by the best parents. A mother incapacitated by ill health, overwork, or a retiring disposition, maintains almost a solitude in the home. Sons who are in business or a profession are often just as much dependent as the daughters, upon whom they see at home, for whom they shall marry. It is impossible to say, the mother ought to ‘‘take a house in London,’’ to go to ‘‘parties,’’ to ‘‘make society,’’ for which she has such a distaste, and which is, without doubt, in itself so unsatisfactory, in order to enable her children to have friends and to marry. What does God ‘‘think?’’ Yet not the less true is it that her children are cut off from satisfactor y loves and friendships by her way of life, which virtually determines theirs, just as much as if they were forced into convents. What is natural to her they must adopt, however unnatural to them. The children’s ‘‘vocations’’ are as much baulked in the one case for marriage, as in the other for employment. I know not which is the more unsatisfactor y aspect of the family, for the better mother is generally the one we have now described, and to see the imperfection of a mother’s relation, we must, as we have said, see her in a good form. But no mother, however good, considers her children as anything else but her property. If she would have permitted their ‘‘vocations,’’ and they have none, she says, how she is disappointed. If, on the other hand, they have ‘‘vocations,’’ and she will not sanction them, she says, what can they want more than she has given them to make them happy? The mother’s feeling is, more or less, always a selfish one; she refers everything back to herself. The child is her thing. It is often said, we do not know what a wife’s and mother’s feelings are. I say they do not know what ours are. They do not know what it is to give one’s life’s work for man, and never to look for a return of affection, nor even to wish that one’s labours should be acknowledged by those they were for. To return. The good Roman Catholic ‘‘director of conscience’’ is much more awake to the fact of what he terms ‘‘a vocation for the world’’ (which ‘‘world’’ does not mean that which is worldly) than

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we are, and he takes care neither to thwart nor to neglect it, nor to leave it unguided. There are different ways of finding fault, both with oneself and with other people. To see the truth must be desirable, but we know that, whatever is—evil as well as good—is through God’s laws. Most inconsistent with such a belief would it be, while disapproving, to condemn, to feel harshly towards those who, in ignorance, wander in the dark, though the sun is in the sky, who take sickly food, leading to numberless diseases, though the food is within reach which would supply the joy of health. If all this evil were not, God would not be the object of our love, our trust, our veneration. His nature, His will which springs from His nature, His law, which springs from His will, would not be, as they are, perfect—per fect in willing that mankind shall attain excellence of nature and consciousness of truth by exercise, His law furnishing the means and inducements. Let us rejoice and bless God, with our eyes open to the evils around and within us. All we suffer, and see suffered, all the melancholy privations we feel and see, are voices telling us these things.

To see the tr uth—always desirable.

7.9 Concerning the relation of parents and children, it seems impossible to say anything comprehensively true which refers to general arrangements of society, founded upon such a narrow view. The only comprehensive view of what the various relations of life ought to be, in order to effect the well-being of mankind, must come from comprehending the nature and purpose of the will, whose manifestation is the universe. What is God’s View of Parent’s and Child’s Relation? What, in His view, is the well-being of mankind? How, in His view, can it be effected? When men and women set about a mode of life, or relations in life, do they refer to these questions? In the ‘‘lower classes,’’ the men and women seek a livelihood if single; if united the objects are, for the man, a wife to help and make his house comfortable, for the woman a homestead, at the cost of having children, whom they must maintain till these can maintain themselves. Some vague hopes and fears of religion, some affectionate feelings to each other, are intermingled. But, to these poor people, can there be any type of life which they are aiming to fulfill?

To determine the right relation between parents and children, we must go home to—what is God’s view?

466 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought The ‘‘higher classes’’ are as little pursuing any type, as little inquiring after the purposes of God in human life and society. To live in as high a degree of the conventional life, in which his purse and his circumstances place him, as that purse and those circumstances will permit, is taken for granted as the object of a man in the higher classes. He varies it in some slight particulars but, in the main, conventionality lays down his life, spends his time and his money for him. Religion and the affections and benevolence have a part, but conventionality, we might almost say, settles what this part is to be in his life. In whatever science it is, if we start from a fundamental law, progress is made. It took six thousand years to discover the law of gravitation,193 but to what discoveries has it not led? The source for the organization of social life is knowledge of the nature of God, which leads to knowledge of His purpose. And where is this knowledge to be sought? In the Bible? In the church? In the fathers? In the history of material phenomena and of consciousness, which will reveal to us the nature of God and His purpose, which purpose it is for us practically to realize. But we must have some general idea of what we are attempting to realize. The ants on an anthill look to us as if running to and fro with no purpose, but each has his purpose ingrained into him by instinct. We are, as to man’s view, moving about with the will of the moment, it may be with purpose for the day or something more, but with no purpose springing from a principle, that principle springing from eternal universal truth. To the view of God, indeed, there is purpose in all man’s movements, as much as in the movements of every ant on an anthill. For the movements which are ignorant and purposeless in man are organized by His law to lead to knowledge of truth and to right purpose. The question, what is the relation between parents and daughters? must lead us very deep. It is easily answered thus far. The parents summon the daughter into existence. It is their part, as we have often said, to facilitate to the daughter whatever will make her existence most worth having, in the view of God, for this must be most really worth having. But this is saying little in general cases, for daughters brought up in conventional life

193 Using Ussher’s 4004 bce as the date of the origin of the world.

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seldom wish for anything else. A few of peculiar nature, or peculiar circumstances, mothers or daughters, are urged, either by suffering from the trammels of conventional life, or by feeling the want of opportunity to learn what they would do, if they could, to wish for something springing from a truer foundation than conventional life. For what purpose do we learn? It is for these sufferers to lead the way, if they can. It is not necessar y for all to suffer. Some through suffering must find out truth, but, when found, its loveliness will attract others. If life, springing from the true principle, from knowledge and consciousness of God’s purpose, were presented in practical existence, it would be so congenial to human nature that it would attract those who are feeling dissatisfied, though they know not why, and thus truth in life, in the organization of society, would advance. On that foundation only can it make any real or important advance. In vain do fathers and mothers suffer and complain of their children, in vain do children complain of their parents, masters of servants, ser vants of masters, husbands and wives of their unsuitable wives and husbands; all these disappointments and sufferings in the relations of society must continue till society springs from a true foundation, the nature of God, till it pursues a true type, which the comprehending and feeling the nature of God will reveal. The partial improvements which are made now cause the evil to be more felt which lies at the core. More teaching (we will not say, better education) is given to the working classes, but they have no fundamental principle opened to their view. They can read and write and understand grammar and astronomy and political economy. This last does give some principle as to the nature of life, but not a sufficiently comprehensive one, not a divine one. All this makes them ambitious to rise, as they think. But where? What is rising? Perhaps there was more conscientiousness, less selfishness before, except where sensuality got hold of a man. There is now less drinking, more ambition to rise (as rising is understood) in society, than formerly. In the ‘‘upper classes,’’ people are infinitely better taught various things. But the better things are taught in detail, without a principle being understood or felt. For what purpose are the y learnt? The schools of design? The teachers dwell much on the progress of the women especially. They have greater aptitude. It was expected that, though they began better, they would fail somewhere in their

468 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought course when compared with men. Teachers do not admit this. They think from their experience that all can learn if well taught, though of course with decided differences of degree in aptitude for learning. Most decided is the progress in the means of teaching drawing to women. Here is an improvement which cannot be doubted, viz., the drawing from models and from nature (not from copies), of which mode of instruction, 100 years ago, there was not, perhaps, an instance for women, and which is now to be found organized in almost every large town in England. What does this portend? It might lead to the spiritual. But, at present, it has not, in general, any connection with it. Such improvement is but urging on an evil crisis, resulting from the want of a principle, an evil less felt while people had less capability. Mankind must think to find what God ‘‘thinks’’

God means mankind to be improved by improving organizations and circumstances.

What God ‘‘thinks’’ must determine what we think. But all mankind must think to find out what God thinks.

We have been sick at heart with our own faults and those of our friends. We feel more and more how such faults are the natural growth of the soil. Modify it, its productions will vary—will be better or worse, according to the soil whence they spring. Thus God gives power to man. It is curious to consider each man’s possibility at any given moment. He has certain physical possibilities. A certain weight (not an atom more) he could lift. With a certain degree of speed (not the unimaginable part of a degree more) he could run. As definite are his possibilities of thought, of feeling. What do these last depend upon? It signifies little whether we say, ‘‘brain,’’ ‘‘ner ves,’’ or ‘‘we do not know.’’ If it is brain and nerves, still we do not know. Because we know something about muscles, etc., in the physical frame, still we know not how these bring about the effects which are brought about. The only real answer to the question, ‘‘On what depend each human being’s possibilities of every kind at any given moment?’’ is ‘‘the laws of perfect wisdom, goodness and righteousness.’’ {Omitted: This is only a parenthesis, however. I meant to say that God means us to improve mankind by improving organization and circumstances. f105} To return. A true understanding {consciousness} of the nature of God and man, of our relations to God and to our fellow creatures, depends upon, requires the right exercise of the whole nature of all mankind. We can only have such right exercise by a right organiza-

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tion of society, by mankind arranging circumstances so that they will have employment, work, suited to their natures, suited to call forth their natures into right exercise. But, through the wisdom of God, man has all this to find out for himself, with such help as the laws of God supply, which is all that it is possible for the God who is wisdom to do for us. These objects, which we have to find out, mutually help each other. To understand the nature and purpose of God will assist us rightly to organize society and to arrange its work; to understand the nature of man will also help us in organizing his social arrangements and his work. On the other hand, in proportion as man’s social arrangements and his work are right, God’s nature and his own will be more and more revealed to him, better comprehended, more truly felt by him. We must work on, recollecting that we must see and know imperfectly God’s and man’s nature, while our social arrangements are imper fect—that our social arrangements must be imper fect, while we know God and man imperfectly. Hence we must be careful not to dogmatize, remembering that the light by which we work is imperfect, though more and more is attainable, whenever we work for it in a right direction. How great is Thy wisdom who keepest silence,194 excepting in the never-silent voice of law, and excepting in those voices, those human voices, inspired by Thee, in accordance with law! If we complain of want of companionship, the want is only temporary, and, like all other wants, may be supplied by our own work. As, in the course of eternity, we improve ourselves and our fellow creatures, God will more and more dwell in us and in them, will speak to each through others, for no two are alike. Each, therefore, will be able to give and receive, to give to others some light from God which others have not, to receive from others some light from God which he has not. We must know God’s Thought, to improve Man’s Thought We are to have the voice of the One Perfect, ever the same, the varied voices of all mankind, but for both we are to work. Both will be heard only in proportion as man works and, in proportion as man works aright, one and the same God will be recognized by all, for tr uth is one.

194 A paraphrase of Sir 20:5.

We can only know God’s and man’s nature by improving our social arrangements. We can only improve our social ar rangements by knowing God’s and man’s nature.

470 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Indifference of these times makes our difficulty.

While our God is taken from the Bible, a collection of books written by different people—from the church, composed of different natures, living in various circumstances, the notions of religion must var y. The old Muhammedans, perhaps, varied little, for they went by one book, written by one person. When we go by the revelation God makes of himself, we may differ, indeed, as astronomers differ, while reading by imperfect light the book of God in the heavens. But more and more of indisputable truth will be revealed. In religion, which comprehends all truth, as in the various kinds of truth which compose religion, there must be teachers and leaders. Every man will not go to the fountainhead to work out his own religion. It will not suit all natures to do so. No man can feel for another, or think for another vicariously, but one must supply for another that which will call forth thought and feeling. How carefully, how earnestly, then, should those work who have the nature which disposes them to work out what religion is! These are difficult times, certainly, in which to work at spreading a truer revelation of religion than exists, and at improving the organization of society, for there is no loud or general call for either. There is an inclination to go back to the old forms of religion in Roman Catholicism, or to stick to the ease and well-doing of the English church, and to keep up protection by articles; or, because to some the error of these two courses is evident, to throw off all religion. It is true that speculation is going on, as lists of books show, but not with much earnestness, as if life and hope depended on it. With some exceptions, it is more as an intellectual interest. And the same of social arrangements. There is much discontent, though no definite demand for a better thing, which is looked upon as impossible. The improvement of religion and society must go together. There can be no high tone and object in society, except from a true understanding, a true feeling of Him who brought man into life, of what His object is, His law for effecting His object. Nor, while we live poorly, can we comprehend the nature and purpose of the Highest, nor our own. To offer, whether by words or work, help which is not sought, is difficult. Each family, or, at any rate, most families, suffer more or less, but not enough to make something else than the life which they live, sought for; besides, most find relief and pleasure in the

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outward. But a mother’s situation now requires the impossible. Before she was a mother she had no means of learning how to fulfill its requirements, and, if there were means, to learn or practise all would be impossible. What is she to do? Her best plan would be to have a pursuit of her own, with her family, if any of them like it, without them, if they don’t or can’t do it, like Mrs Fry or Mrs Chisholm.195 But then what a cry the world makes! {Omitted: And the little Frys? One did not quite see why they were called into the world by Mrs Fry. f108} 7.10 God’s Nature Foundation for all social Organization {Omitted: ‘‘You say, Fulgentia, that I am so indefinite, and I feel it myself. f109} All this is indefinite. For no question can be studied comprehensively without embracing other studies with which, in the nature of things, it is interlaced. The nature of God is at the foundation of every subject. None can be rightly appreciated, none rightly applied in practice, unless the understanding and feeling of the nature of God is at the foundation of the study and practice of it. But we must study the nature of God in other natures, in which He has manifested and revealed His own. Thus, our ignorance, our want of feeling of the nature of God, checks our improvement in social organization, makes our social habits wanting in a principle, in a foundation. What fundamental principle can there be but a reference to the nature of Him whose nature constitutes what well-being is, to the law of Him, through a cer tain manner of keeping whose law alone well-being can be? By a certain manner, we do not mean an arbitrary manner; we mean the manner which is in accordance with wisdom and right. As certainly as from the invariable law of gravitation, if kept by a man in one way, he is dashed down a precipice, if kept by him in another way, he stands in well-being firmly on the earth, so certainly is his wellbeing regulated with respect to every part of his being by the mode in which he keeps those laws, which not to keep is not in his power. The relation between parents and daughters, its nature, and how practically it should be worked out—how is this to be referred to

195 Caroline Chisholm (1808-77), ‘‘the emigrants’ friend.’’

We cannot help being indefinite till we know God’s nature. We cannot know God’s nature till we know mankind’s.

472 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

We can only organize society by knowing God’s and man’s nature. We can only know God’s and man’s nature by a better organization of society.

the nature of God? How are we to find answers to the questions, ‘‘What is this relation in principle, in theory,’’ and ‘‘How is it practically to be worked out in life’’ from a study of the nature of God? A mother was heard to say, when it was a question whether one of her daughters should go to a distance for the sake of prosecuting a work upon which she was intent, ‘‘It cannot be, because it entails the other staying at home, if I am not to be left alone.’’ If she is not to be left alone? If the purpose of God in bringing female children into the world is that one woman shall not be left alone, then she was right in saying this, and this way of thinking was just and correct. But since then she has widely altered her views as to the purpose of God in causing that a woman ‘‘be born into the world.’’196 Granted, that we discover, from obser vation and from experience, that, whatever is, is according to invariable law, that this law bears the impress of an invariable will, this will the impress of an invariable nature; granted, that we trace this nature to be benevolence, love, wisdom, righteousness, we have then to inquire, not merely ‘‘what do people say and do?’’ or ‘‘what do books say?’’ but how far is what people say and do, what books say, consistent with the purpose of benevolence, which wills well-being to the sentient part of the universe, which wills that the non-sentient part of the universe should be adapted by the sentient to its well-being? and what, that has not been said by people or books, may yet be consistent with that will ? Better social Organization necessary to know God’s nature Man must, then, come to observation and experience, to reveal to him what this relation between parents and daughters should be, in order to be thus consistent. What are the laws of human nature? In accordance with what mode of keeping them is human nature’s well-being? Obser vation and experience will reveal to him that the exercise of the faculties of the human being in cer tain modes constitutes happiness; he will discover how the benevolence of God works through and by human nature (thus giving human nature the happiness of such work), yet leaves it to human nature to discover what the work is to be, and how to do it. Otherwise there would not be the exer-

196 An allusion to John 16:21.

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cise which, in the view of wisdom, constitutes happiness. Thus he would see the parents constituted guardians, that the daughter shall have the organization, the development, the education, the opportunity, to exercise her faculties aright, i.e., according to the nature of the human being and of her own individual idiosyncrasy. Thus, in general, would be revealed the relation of the parent to the child. As to the relation of the child to the parent, it would be the natural flow of sympathy, affection, gratitude, respect, appreciation for the parent for the right exercise of that guardianship. This mutual relation would not involve that the parent and child should live together, work together, or that they should not. This would be according to their characters, their circumstances, according to whether or not they mutually found the best exercise for their faculties, the best purpose for their faculties, in living and working together. Neither would wish it, if it were not so. Both would wish it if it were. But the love, the reverence, the gratitude would exist from the child to the parent, whether they lived and worked together or not. The child’s wish to promote the happiness of the parent would be one of the wants, the appetites of his life, but he would know that he could not promote the parent’s happiness except by right and appropriate exercise of his own nature, for a purpose in sympathy with God’s nature. The nature of God involves that this guardianship shall belong to the parent, that the response to it shall belong to the child. Does not my son at this moment make me much happier than if he and I tried to live and work together? Does not he love and respect me more than would be the case if we tried to do so? This is admitted in the case of sons, but not of daughters. It is almost a proverb that sons and mothers ‘‘get on the best together.’’ But as things are now, few daughters will wish not to live with their parents, in order to have the saving of trouble, of effort, of responsibility, which prevents certain dissatisfactions, if it does not give satisfaction. And the difficulties for a woman to exercise her faculties up to the best of her possibility, and for her best purpose, are great, even if both parents and daughter desire that she should do so, while society is regulated by conventionality, not by reference to the nature and purpose of God. If mankind were set upon organizing society by such reference, modes of life would be almost entirely different from what they are now. As to the present, all that the parent can do is to give all possible facility to the daughter to learn, if she is inclined, some mode of

474 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought exercise of her faculties, which will be in harmony with God’s purposes, and which will be in harmony with her own individual idiosyncrasies (by which God marks His purposes), and afterwards to facilitate as far as possible her practically using what she has learnt. What a Daughter and Mother says What one who has been a daughter and a mother says.

‘‘I have been a daughter living with parents whom eternally I shall love with tenderest affection, whom I shall honour with sincerest respect; they were unselfish, conscientious, religious, had excellent abilities, most affectionate hearts. I was by nature conscientious, religious, affectionate; both they and I had active spirits for work, loving spirits towards God and man to lead us to work aright. How was it that we made each other unhappy? Will it be permitted to us again to come again together, and to prove our love? To make them happy was the ideal of my childhood, as to have a good influence on my children to make them happy, to love and be loved by them, was the ideal of my womanhood. I can do little for them, I can be little to them. They can but little love me. I would work, I would love, but I must live in solitary confinement with every appearance of social life and liberty around me. I say all this in love to all, especially to my dear and good parents, and husband, and children.’’ Is this a fiction? Is it an unknown case? Is it a solitary case? or has it been said by hundreds and felt by thousands of good women in this generation? Few indeed will be able to say or to feel what follows, though it is the truth. ‘‘God is the source of my suffering, and I bless Him for it— I know it is all right—I will try to learn my lesson.’’ 7.11

How shall we give to each a ‘‘family’’?

We want to give that which the family promises to give and does not. We want to extend the family, not annihilate it. We want ‘‘not to destroy, but to fulfill’’ the hopes it holds out—to supply the sympathy, the love, the fellow feeling, the tenderness which it offers to supply and does not. Where is there such rudeness as in a family? Everywhere but in our own family our feelings are regarded. Now, we want to make a family where there shall be companionship in work, mutual attraction, love and tenderness; we want to make God’s family. We would not take away anything, we would enlarge and multiply. But where

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is there such absence of tenderness, such constant contention as in a family? And the oddest part of the thing is that everybody thinks it peculiar to themselves. No, certainly, family does not answer its purpose (nor is it likely it should among five or six); we want to make it do so. The law of God seems to be to scatter: ‘‘go forth and conquer the earth and possess it,’’197 He says. Marriage does this, sons do this. The only exception to this rule seems to be the unmarried daughters. They must stay at home—because in a half-savage state of society it is taken for granted that men have injurious feelings towards women, therefore women must remain at home till they are married for the sake of protection, or till society is in such a state that they do not want protection. The only exception to this rule is when they are obliged to earn their own livelihood; then, when they have something to do, they are allowed to go forth; that is supposed to be a protection. But the Exodus should always follow the Genesis. Generated by the parents, they should, when they are supposed to be regenerated, go forth, but unfortunately then comes the Leviticus, a number of rules and laws must be laid down, because they always misbehave when they have gone forth. We don’t wish to force them out of the family, we only wish them to be where all their faculties will be best exercised, wherever that is. Surely it cannot be denied that these two things are necessar y, viz., that we should come into free communication with mankind, so as to give us room for our sympathies to find a response, and that we should have all our powers called into the highest exercise. If these two things were, there would be happiness, because then we could find work and sympathies for ourselves. {Omitted: But, Portia, father said to me one day, ‘‘I brought the children into. . . . f115} 7.12 Theor y of Daughters again Daughters come into the world without their own consent. The law gives them nothing. God gives them their time and faculties. May they not have these? And if the life, which their parents and the other members of their family lead, does not interest them, does

197 A paraphrase of Gen 8:16.

Theor y of daughters again.

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Does marriage give a woman independence? More than single life.

not exercise those faculties and employ satisfactorily that time, may they not use them elsewhere than at home, or would they be wrong if they sought to earn their own livelihood by them? It does seem unjust that, whereas, if they were to marry, their fortune might consist of thousands, they are not to have a farthing (because they don’t see anybody who tempts them to marry) till their father dies. The days of our years are threescore years and ten198—and if, by reason of strength, they be fourscore years or fourscore and ten, the daughters may be fifty or sixty years of age when the parents die. And is it not hard, because the customs of conventional society forbid their earning their bread with their own faculties and time, without losing their caste, and because they may not see anybody whom they like well enough to induce them to earn their bread by marriage, that therefore they should have nothing, no kind of independence till their parents’ death? Is this not a premium upon thoughtless marriage? {Omitted: You gave me a thousand a year when I married—you give Fulgentia nothing. ‘‘My dear,’’ I said, ‘‘don’t flatter yourself. Marriage does not give people independence. You must know that yourself. I might give you a hundred thousand at your marriage, but the law gives it to your husband. ff 115-16} It will be said that marriage does not give the woman independence. Thousands may be given her at her marriage, but the law gives it to the husband, she will not have half a crown of it; a married woman does not exist in the eyes of the law; she cannot sue or be sued; her husband gives her a cheque when he thinks right, or rather not when he thinks right; he never thinks it right, but when she bothers him. This is true, still has a married woman the command of money more or less than a ‘‘daughter at home’’? The law may be against married women, still they have ver y much of the disposal of their husbands’ incomes, and daughters have not, of course, of their fathers’, during their mothers’ lifetime. {Omitted: ‘‘Well then, let Fulgentia go and earn her own bread, if she will, self-willed girl! I shall not prevent her But she may depend upon it, I shall leave her nothing.’’ ‘‘No I am not prepared to say that she ought not. . . . f116}

198 An allusion to Ps 90:10.

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Daughters must follow Parents’ Mode of Life A daughter at home cannot even tacitly disapprove her parents’ life, by not joining in it, for if they disapprove her way of life, they will probably wish to discourage it in every way, even by disinheritance. Now she ought not to give up her share of what her father will distribute among his children, when he no longer wants it himself, viz., at his death, and, if he believes her wrong, he will probably think it right not to leave her anything. But, if she is not wrong, that will not be fair, and she is not justified in being willing to give up whatever share he would otherwise have given her. Therefore should not parents ask themselves, ‘‘are the following facts true or untr ue?’’ We have adopted the mode of life which suits ourselves, before our daughters exist, or before they are capable of having a preference one way or another. Perhaps this mode of life gives no interest to them, or perhaps all but one would choose it by preference, that one alone cannot. Are we to alter our mode of life to suit that one or any one of our children? Certainly not. Are any or all of our daughters to be condemned to our mode of life which may exercise none of their faculties, and to be entirely dependent as long as we live, which may be till they are fifty or sixty years of age? Whatever parents intend to give their daughters if they marry, why should not they have when they come of age, deducting from it the cost of their maintenance at home, if they choose to remain at home? {Omitted: ‘‘You will find it very inconvenient my dear, I can tell you, to pay that ready money from the common stock to a parcel of foolish girls coming to the age of reason or of unreason.’’ ‘‘It seems to me that I should like to live. . . . f117 } But parents live in such a way that they must say, ‘‘We can spend £300 a year on a house in town, but we can’t give anything like that to our daughters; it would be very inconvenient.’’ Yet perhaps for one of them the life in London has no interest. Is she to have nothing because she cannot like what the others like? The ordinar y course of things is this. The parents provide a common home; if the children like what is there—well—if not, they have no resource. It often happens that one daughter, who chances to have the same tastes as her mother, may spend anything, because it falls in with the spirit of the family, and another, who has a somewhat differing turn of mind, nothing. Her life may be full of interests, but if she have not those which her mother and sisters have, she must have none. {Omitted: ‘‘Well, my dear, I hope you will carry

A daughter cannot even rightly displease her father because she may, without power of earning her own livelihood, find herself left without any.

It would be ver y inconvenient to pay ready money from the common stock to all foolish daughters coming ‘‘of age.’’ ‘‘House in London’’ is for them, more than for anyone else.

478 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought out your own notions with your own children. But I can assure you. . . . f118} It is said, first, that it is much better for a family to bear and forbear among themselves, and if one is a little different from the rest, the lesson of self-denial is the best exercise which can be given her, better than £300 a year. Can anybody follow his own fancies in this world? Secondly, that not only the daughters will be all the worse for the money given them, but everybody else too; they will build almshouses perhaps, or something worse. And thirdly, that the scheme is an impossible one to carry out, for any income, however large, would be broken up in this manner. Yet if a daughter wished to build an almshouse with her share,199 more shame for the parents not to have taught her better political economy, but they would have no more right to prevent her than if she were a married woman, so long as she did not trespass upon her sisters’ right. If indeed one should have an object, which was so heartily recognized by all, that all should wish that a large sum should be given to it, that again would be quite fair. But otherwise, each must keep within her own share. {Omitted: ‘‘But how many women, my dear, have an object at all, do you think? Not three in a hundred.’’ ‘‘Ah, my dear father, I was afraid all along that you were coming to that.’’ f119} Wise Virgins 200—where are they? Christ told of wise and of foolish virgins. How can a ‘‘virgin’’ be wise in a foolish life? She must be foolish. A wise ‘‘virgin’’ would make another life.

But the real difficulty is this: there are not three women in a hundred who have any object. Women are like the slaves; they do not wish for their liberty, and they would not know what to do with it if they had it. They are ver y uncomfortable, and they don’t know why, and think that they would like to marry. Few, if they were set free tomorrow, would know what to do with themselves. One might be an artist, for which she has all the powers; another a moral philosopher, a third a Sister of Charity. But as to most, if they had their time and their faculties, what could they do with them? First give them their faculties for, at present, how many women are taught well enough to do anything?

199 Probably a reference to Amalie Sieveking (1794-1859), whom Nightingale met in Hamburg, who used her inherited fortune to found several charitable institutions. See European Travels (7:473-74). 200 In Matt 25:1-10.

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But how is a parent to make an unmarried daughter independent? The duke of - - 201 gave his daughters £10,000 when they married, that is £300 a year; they probably each cost him very nearly that at home. Deducting their dress and maintenance, what would they have had left, even if he had given his single daughters the same as his married ones? Another rich man gave his daughter £5000 when she married, that is £150 a year. If he had given her this when she came of age, there would have been nothing left, after deducting £100 a year, which he did give her for her dress, and what she cost at home. Most girls actually cost their parents as much at home as they do when they marry. But is it not extraordinar y that parents should like to live in such a way that daughters must marry, or wait till their death, in order to carry out any of their plans which require money, or to be independent at all? Daughters cannot, however, claim the money. But their time and their faculties they ought to claim. What objection can there be, in the minds of good parents (the only case we are now considering), to their having these? But they would not know what to do with them, when they had them. If parents did not make their claim upon the whole time of their daughter, to dictate how it should be spent, in entertaining the company, sitting in the drawing room, driving out, reading aloud, cultivating accomplishments, visiting the poor people, what would she be doing? Her drawing, her music, her intellectual work, her interests (not very deep) in the people around her, her flirting, her reading to herself, and her outward things. She had better fritter herself away, as ‘‘the law directs’’ (that is, the parents) than as she herself directs. There is less of the selfish element in it. {Omitted: ‘‘But what is the truth,’’ I asked, ‘‘with regard to its being the duty of parents to dictate or to judge as to the object which should engage the time and capability of an unmarried woman of mature age?’’ To this question she made no answer. The conversation took place at a crowded party, ball—I think it was in a London palace. And at this moment her husband came up to take her away, or to introduce somebody to her, I forget which. And she could not answer. But I suppose she thought about it all night—poor Portia! For the next day I received this long note from her by the penny post. f121}

201 Identified as the duke of Sutherland in Add Mss 45839 f120.

480 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought What is the parents’ claim to dictate or to judge as to the objects which should engage the time and capability of an unmarried daughter of mature age?

Let us look at the relation of parents and child. When people marry, they summon human beings from the unseen world into existence—no power existing in the hands of the latter to accept or refuse it—consequently no stronger bond of responsibility (to make that existence a good to the child as far as lies in the parent’s power) can be imagined than that between the parent and his conscience, his feeling, his sense of what is reasonable. God and Mankind the ground for Single Life

God and mankind must be the ground for marriage, as they often are the ground for single life.

Now it is taken for granted that an unmarried daughter, when grown up, is wrong not to devote her time, her capability, to the life, the circumstances, arranged by her parents before she was born, or while she was still helpless and incapable of forming a wish. To marry, or to devote herself to these circumstances, are the only alternatives in which she can enjoy the approbation of her parents. Parents, in general, are sincerely and earnestly desirous of the happiness of their children. If a marriage which they think for the good of their child offers, they rejoice; they would be shocked at the idea of refusing it in order that their daughter’s society or work might not be lost to them. But with anxious interest for their daughter, they refuse her pursuing any path of life except that laid out by them (if she does not marry), because they fear for her the condemnation of the world, which takes for granted that to follow her parents’ path of life is to do ‘‘her duty in that state of life unto which it hath pleased God to call her,’’ for ‘‘God’’ substituting ‘‘Mr and Mrs - -.’’ The parents plead with her, indeed, the hardship of her not giving them her society, her co-operation in carrying on, in the way they approve, the details of the life they have established. They are disappointed, complain that she is discontented, if she does not enjoy this life. Let us look at these two alternatives, marrying and living a life, the details and interests of which are regulated by her family. God has instituted marriage, but apparently as matter of choice. It is not to be concluded that every human being will feel the desire to marry. He whom we love and revere above all mankind, whom we call our example, lived to mature life without marrying, and does not appear to have desired it. God and mankind so filled his soul that he appears not to have wanted more particular and individual interest. To the generality of mankind, however, it will not be doubted that married life will and ought to have most of interest

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and enjoyment, provided it be a marriage of attraction, of suitableness on both sides. But, for a woman of high nature, for one who has sought to make an example of Christ, in devotion to God and mankind, what will be the opportunities of marrying, with suitableness of purpose in life, with attraction to pursue that purpose together? Whom will she see? Those whom her parents like and who like them sufficiently to visit in their family. How will she see them? Not at work, where his and her capabilities are drawn forth and attractions manifested. Men and women (unmarried) meet only in idleness, in the present age. Where will she see them? Under her parents’ and companions’ eye, where the eager game of marriage is played, where, in the thoughts of many, it is uppermost, as she knows, and where there is no work interesting enough to divert their thoughts from it. Let us now suppose the other case of a woman living with her parents and brothers and sisters. It is not, a priori, to be calculated upon that their tastes and interests will coincide, like the triangles of Euclid’s fourth proposition,202 and for this reason, that the law of God in the characters of mankind appears to be variety, not repetition. {Omitted: I have heard it conjectured that, if you take three children and three grandchildren in the same family, it is 200 to 1 that you will not find one of the same character as the parents. One would think it easy to make out whether this be so or not. The materials for the inquiry are always before us. It is almost a proverb that the son never adopts his father’s profession. But, however this may be, we may set down that God’s law is variety, not repetition. ff 123-24} God and Mankind the ground for Marriage There is, therefore, the strongest reason why a family cannot develop itself to perfection within the walls of one home. With sons it is thought out of the question. Three or four living at home all day is a state of things never seen, never desired. Each must follow a career of activity out of home. But what an alternative it is for a woman! The ordinar y expectation, the eager desire of most mothers, is that the daughters should find other homes by marrying. This desire may be suppressed and concealed by the mother, perhaps

202 Elements of Euclid, c300 bce.

482 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought even from herself {Omitted: (I speak from my own experience) f124}, but there is no excitement so strong to a woman as that of marrying her daughters, except that of marrying herself. {Omitted: ‘‘Ah! Those are your worldly and ambitious mothers.’’ f124} And this, whether she be a good and affectionate or a worldly and ambitious mother, is a mother’s first interest {it was mine f124}. In the former case she generally feels the insufficiency of home to satisfy the yearnings of the young nature, for which she has perhaps unthinkingly undertaken to find food other than the daily meals; in the latter case she desires it, because it is the only field where she can exercise the talents and desires which a statesman exercises in the House of Commons, a lawyer at the bar. But how very few are the opportunities which a woman has for seeing any variety of character, or for knowing intimately the characters she does see in mankind! This is so completely acknowledged that it would be wearisome to dwell on it. May we not then take into consideration the case of a woman living at home with her family who does not wish to marry any of the few with whom she has a superficial acquaintance? Is this likely to be such a very extraordinar y case? Now the father and mother formed their habits and modes of life, as we have said, before she had a character and inclinations at all of her own, without any reference, therefore, of course to her. Sisters differ notoriously in character from each other. Take any family. If the question were asked (and answered with sincerity) would, in most cases, any one sister like the idea of living with all the rest? Would not the answer to such a question be, in general, an acknowledgment that it was well such and such a one married, they ‘‘could not have lived together?’’ But, perhaps, one or two or three remain, and of these one or two or all may be of character not disposed to adopt the life chosen by the parents to suit their own characters; may be of character finding little sympathy from any inmate of the home (not from anything wrong in any of the party but), because of God’s law of variety. Is man to make a counter law and say, they shall all be confined to the same pursuits, the same society? Why? Because it will be cruel to leave the parents; those very parents who would rejoice, probably, beyond anything that rejoices them, in a marriage which pleased them, for this daughter who must not leave them. Did they bring her into the world to be their bounden slave as long as they live unless they can be gratified by a marriage to their taste?

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{Omitted: ‘‘Well, my dear child,’’ I answered, ‘‘I have listened to your sermon, I have read patiently, for which I hope you give me credit. I suppose it is all aimed at Fulgentia and that it means I ought to give her a separate ‘establishment.’ Now I want to know what she has not got that she can possibly desire. She may order anything she likes, she has the command of her money, time, influence.’’ ‘‘I was not thinking only of her, dear father,’’ but of my own children alone. I will speak of Fulgentia first.’’ f126} Take any ‘‘daughter at home’’ of the richer classes. She has her food and her lodging and £100 a year. What else? There is a great deal of money spent on a carriage, but suppose she never wishes to get into it. There is money spent on a cook and giving dinners, but, perhaps, she never wants to eat them or to see the people who eat them. What has she out of the fortune but dress and food? {Omitted: How intensely is I am now feeling man’s ignorance of what happiness is! How ignorant I have myself been of it. f126}

Can a father give his unmarried daughter a separate ‘‘establishment’’? What has she not got that she can possibly desire?

Man’s Ignorance of Happiness How intense is man’s ignorance of what happiness is! How earnestly people seek the circumstances which will make impossible for them that for which the type of human nature essentially hungers and thirsts! {Omitted: I know now distinctly what I should seek for in life, if the search were before me. But it is so no longer. f126} And how eagerly are stones sought for bread!203 This arises much, because people really do not know what God’s happiness is, and what man’s capability of happiness is. Perhaps multitudes of really good people go through this life without experiencing it. Indeed, those who do feel it are exceptions. Enjoyment is felt by very many, and this prevents the want of happiness from being felt. Man becomes satisfied, ceases to be dissatisfied, without his natural food. He takes stones for bread. Some cease to be dissatisfied by smoking and drinking. Perhaps this can hardly be called satisfaction to those who are most eager for it. Some find satisfaction in the outward, satisfy one part of their nature so that the other is stifled and no longer cries for or even wants food. To cry for food which one wants is grievous. To cry for food, not knowing what food one wants, is still more so. Not to want the food which the type of human nature

203 An allusion to Matt 7:9.

What else can she want than such a situation as hers to make her happy?

Most people learn, if ever, what they should seek for in life—at a time when the search is no longer before them.

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What do we want for women? Do we doom all women, too ‘‘highflown’’ in their ideas to fall in love in the commonplace way, to single life? If we condemn marriages made in the ordinar y way, what marriages would we have?

would want, if without it, is more so still. Yet this last is the state of by far the larger proportion of mankind, including the ‘‘easy’’ classes, as we may perhaps truly call them. This, indeed, is the state which people seek and approve for themselves and others. And what a hopeless state—till some Saviour strikes a chord which reveals to man what is his proper food by giving him a taste of it, or a consciousness of what that taste would be, for, by God’s law, it is the appetite which is to lead to food, to determine what food. If, then, the appetite does not exist, or if it exists for that only which is not sustaining food to man’s nature, how is man ever to become the realization of his type, except through such a Saviour? Nothing in this age is tending to reveal (unless to cases of exception which one never can tell how to calculate upon, which sometimes indeed are pressed into being, squeezed into shape, by opposition of a particular nature to the general tendency), nothing, even in the best tendencies of the age, reveals what man’s proper food is. {Omitted: To this enigmatical epistle, I answered, beseeching her to come to terms, and to explain to me in good plain, Queen’s English, suited to a plain man like me, what she wanted for women— whether she doomed all women to single life who were too highflown in their ideas to fall in love in the commonplace way—what mar riages she would have, as she so very much condemned those made by ordinar y mortals in the ordinar y way. To this she answered. . . . f128} Probably, in the course of eternity, for each man, for each woman, there is a union, an exactly adapted one. Many will be formed which will not be the exactly adapted one. Man wants variety. Man wants concentration. By this union will the latter be secured, then for the former he may go forth into the universe. He wants one fixed companionship and he wants varying companionships. Thus will he have both. Except we be as the Father, ‘‘we shall have this treasure in earthly vessels.’’204 Two will form one in every instance, sooner or later. Mar riage in theory In cases in general, the excitement between the two is partly the pleasure of being an object of interest, the hope of affection (that

204 A paraphrase of 2 Cor 4:7, where ‘‘earthen.’’

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can scarcely be called affection which exists with so slight an acquaintance, as in many cases, or after long acquaintance, as in many others, where they remain indifferent for years, then, qualities being just the same, all at once they become devoted to each other). Partly it is the common interest, between them, of the new eventful life in prospect. What real love is we are almost unable to say. Can it be God’s plan of bringing about that man shall have intimate companionship, as well as infinite variety, secured in the course of existence? That these two, when the right two are united, shall throw themselves fearlessly into the universe and do its work, secure of companionship and sympathy in one instance, consequently (though ready and glad to take it, when it comes in any other form), not shrinking from any temporary absence from it? But how few ‘‘twos’’ gain together that which prepares them to do the world’s work! The spirit is exclusive which brings them together; it is understood that there is to be no third. In proportion as the interests and objects of affection are exclusive, it will not last on into eternity. When two are bringing different qualities, or partly the same, to bear upon a common object, and that God’s object—ought it not to be this which suggests the question, shall we physically, mentally, affectionately, spiritually be one? When two meet each other at work upon an object interesting to both, should not this be their introduction to love? Perhaps it will be said that the drawing room in which they meet is life interesting to both. But God is not often there. And He should have a part in that which attracts them to each other. God’s purpose, as to the man and woman, is to effect a union of two spirits closer than with the rest—eventually each one probably is to have a real mate. The different work to be done, in physical human existence, requires a physical difference, it is clear. It would not be well that every human being should perform the physical part of a mother. There are spiritual, affectional, mental and physical attractions. It is plain that great and even good men have had physical attractions to little and not good women. In some minds exists an attraction to great talent, without the feelings being affected. To some the affections (no other part) are attracted. All these attractions should meet in the two who are to be peculiarly united, but it is daily experience that it is not so. If it were, and if, though there were differences in character, there was interest for the same work, and that

Mar riage in theor y.

486 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought good work, then would there be a real independence for these two. They would together devote themselves to God and man, to the universe. This would secure them all sympathies, in the course of eternity. But they would, at each particular present, be independent in having each other’s sympathy, trusting for every other. {Omitted: The next day I had from her the following letter, ‘‘The present education of a woman makes everything impossible but marriage—where she can go with her cut wings, or where she must cut them, if, by chance, she have not had it done.’’ f130} Mar riage in practice Mar riage in practice.

A married woman’s life consists in superintending what she does not know how to do. (1) She goes into the kitchen and orders the dinner, and tells the cook that it was very bad the day before, but she does not know how to tell her the way to do it right. (2) She goes into the larder and storeroom. She does not know how much the servants ought to use. She is certain there is waste somewhere, but she does not know where, nor how to correct it. But she does her best. She tries to say authoritatively that ‘‘she will not have it,’’ and to convince the family that she knows that something wrong is going on. (3) She goes into the nursery, knowing nothing about young children, where she has a nurse with whom she is much out of sorts, because the nurse actually does not like ‘‘mistress to come into the nursery when the baby cries.’’ Her life is spent in imposing upon the servants, in making them believe that she knows how to do things which she has to scold them for doing badly. (4) She goes into the schoolroom, because she thinks it right to see ‘‘how the children are going on with the governess.’’ And something different is done because she is in the room, in order that they may never look as if they were doing nothing. (5) She ‘‘looks in’’ at the poor school, because ‘‘they want looking after,’’ and the master ‘‘requires a little stir now and then.’’ But the master knows, privately in himself, that he knows more than she does about a school. (6) She goes into the village to visit the poor people. And what is visiting the poor? Ver y like visiting the rich. {Omitted: We hope that something will turn up to say and. . . . f130} We ask them how many children they have and whether they go to school, and so on. We don’t go for any purpose, but as we sit in the drawing room, merely for the chance, not because we want to say something which they want to hear, or, vice versa, because they want to say something which we

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want to hear, but for the chance of something turning up to say. That is part of the lady’s business, to tell the poor people that they are wasteful, that they don’t make as much out of 12s a week as they might, in order to be comfortable, which is very true, but she cannot tell them how to make the most of 12s a week; she does not know. A young married lady asked the advice of a very intelligent woman, a great many years older, as to housekeeping, and she said, ‘‘My dear, when I married, the first thing after we settled down at home was my cook coming to ask me how I liked to have the pig cut up—I hardly knew that pork was pig—but I said, cut it up your own way first, and if I don’t like it, I will tell you my way.’’ This was thought so clever (and she was a very clever woman) the mistress taking in the servants in this way. Probably it matters little whether the lady’s pig is cut up in one way or another. But it matters very much whether her time is cut up in one way or another. This is the way her life is passed. The business of a superior is to tell others to do what she does not know how to do herself. How different it would be if she felt a confidence in herself that she knew what was to be done and how to do it, and to do it well! How different would be her whole life and happiness. But now, it is all disappointment if she is wise; ungrounded security if she is foolish. And so she spends her days {life f132}. {Omitted: I was in despair. I had taken Columba to stay at her sister’s house, hoping that Portia would have more influence with her than I had, and would prevent this mad scheme of becoming a Catholic. And now they held long disquisitions together upon the comparative merits of the Roman Catholic and Moravian systems and went into the minutiae of the religious orders. I entreated Portia to take the matter seriously. Columba was a person who pursued ever ything to extremities and I begged her to do her best to keep the girl in the church in which she was born. f133}

Superintendence consists in telling others to do what you do not know how to do yourself.

Am I to stay where I was born? 8.1 It is often said that we are to stay in the religion in which we were born, to ‘‘abide in the calling wherein we are called.’’205 {Omitted:

205 A paraphrase of 1 Cor 7:20.

Are we to stay in the ‘‘church into which we were born’’?

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Unity and infallibility.

She said, doubtingly, ‘‘Think what a bar to progress, if you are always to stay where you are born. Then the Muhammadan, the Jew are to stay where they are born?’’ I pointed out to her the arguments in the epistles for ‘‘abiding in the calling wherein we are called,’’ and said (which of course requires no proof ) that there is a far wider difference between other religions and Christianity than between the religions of Christianity and that the arguments for leaving the former do not apply to changing about in the latter. f133} Were we in geography or astronomy to take one book as our final rule, our ultimate appeal, the same thing would happen inevitably as has happened in religion. Some things in it we should absolutely ignore, as when we ignore that Solomon said, ‘‘Man is like the beasts that perish,’’206 and of other things we should say, ‘‘he did not mean that—he meant something else,’’ as when Christ says, ‘‘Hate your father and mother, sell all and follow me.’’207 No one would cry out so much as the bibliolaters—‘‘what a shame!’’ if we were to do it, but they say ‘‘he did not mean it.’’ Could we go on with such a system in geography or astronomy? {Omitted: I pointed out to her the absurdity of the Roman Catholic claim to unity and infallibility—the difficulties which beset all churches, but her most of all. f134} As much as the Roman Catholics can believe that there will be unity and infallibility,208 so do we. How can the preachers of toleration of the present day say, ‘‘take the religion which suits you best,’’ any more than ‘‘it may suit your mind better to believe that the sun moves round the earth, if so, take the belief which you find best for you’’? There may be a mind which, from want of imagination, want of cultivation, cannot be made to apprehend that the earth is not an immoveable body, but one flying through space; and it is true, therefore, to say ‘‘there are minds which must believe that the earth is stationary till they are more cultivated.’’ But unity in religion there must be one day, as surely as there is unity in astronomy. There is objective truth and untruth in religion as in astronomy, and the well-constituted mind, by the exercise of its own powers, must and will come to this unity of truth.

206 Ps 49:12. 207 Luke 14:26 and Matt 19:21. 208 Papal infallibility as a doctrine was not proclaimed until 1870.

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What is the Meaning of ‘‘Private Judgment’’? It is a mistake to refer us to ‘‘private judgment’’209—those words are dangerous because they seem to imply that one person may judge one way and another another, according to their ‘‘private’’ views of things, according as it ‘‘suits their own minds,’’ as the phrase is, whereas it is the truth, as it were, which judges for us. The principle of ‘‘private judgment’’ ought to mean (if it means anything) that we are to search earnestly with all our mights for the truth, and that that is to judge, not that we are to judge. The principle cannot be too strongly laid down that there cannot be two truths, any more than two Gods. There can be but one truth; it cannot vary to suit the minds of each. There is but one truth and we have to find it. The Roman Catholics say, truly, there is but one truth. But some say that we are to find it in the Bible—some that we are to find it in the Bible and church together. Comparing the churches, some say that we are to find it in the Roman Catholic Church, others that we are to find it in the Church of England, and some that we are to find it in the Roman Catholic Church or in the Church of England— they are not quite sure which. But we don’t want to ask the church. We want to ask God. But God tells different people different things. So it was in astronomy. God has told Sir John Herschel a great many things which He did not tell Galileo, which it was not in Galileo’s possibility to receive. Do we complain of this? We do not say that each is to take the system of astronomy which best suits his own mind. Are we not to strive to find out the truth in religion as we have been striving to find it out in astronomy? There is but one truth. Most dangerous is it to allow the belief that there may be two— that it is as our ‘‘private judgment’’ judges best. God judges for us, and His truth it is which we have to find out. ‘‘Private judgment’’ is not the question. It is God’s ‘‘judgment.’’ {Omitted: ‘‘Well,’’ said I, ‘‘with all your religious theories, you would be the most intolerant of all the inquisitions which have yet been set up on this unlucky earth.’’ f136} There is a truth, and we must find it out. ‘‘It is the truth for you’’—we don’t say this in medical science—we don’t say ‘‘only believe, believe sincerely, and it does not signify what you believe— be but conscientious in your belief, that will do.’’ Religion is the only thing which is of so little importance that we can say this. In medical

209 See Nightingale’s essay on this in Theology (3:162-66).

Do we ‘‘do away’’ with ‘‘private judgment’’?

Is this setting up an ‘‘Inquisition’’ and the rule of intolerance?

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How are we to know when we have found this tr uth which each man is to search after?

One religion has a more healthy influence upon one person— another upon another.

Do we find ‘‘certainty’’ in the Roman Catholic Church?

science, we say ‘‘it is a matter of the utmost importance to health that you should discover the truth—search for it, then, with all your might; if you don’t find it, there may be fatal consequences.’’ But in theological science, and theological science only, we do not say, ‘‘you must bend your whole faculties to discover and earnestly search out the truth.’’ No, ‘‘tolerance’’ says, ‘‘if it be only your conscientious opinion, and if it suit the nature of your own mind, that will do.’’ ‘‘But what test have we, if each man is to depend upon his own faculties?’’ it is said. In sanitary {medical f136} science there is a test to make the body healthy. But this test does not exist for theological physicians, viz., to make the soul healthy. On the contrary. They are to say that the soul never can be healthy. It is as if the sanitarian were to say, ‘‘You were born in such a state of disease that I can do nothing for you in this world. There is no hope of your ever being well. You will never get better here. Do not, therefore, expect it or strive for it. But I have to announce to you that, by some method which you cannot understand, by the death of a God a long time ago, you will be quite well in a state which comes after the time when you will be dead in this. Only believe this and you will be quite well then; here you never can be.’’ {Omitted: ‘‘Surely, however, using your own test, you see that one religion has a more healthy influence upon one person than another, upon a person.’’ f137} The essentials of religion are love and veneration and trust and duty. It may be that some will have less of these essentials of religion while believing one form of religion than another. Yet it will not do to say that ‘‘that religion is true for them.’’ There is one truth, which is God’s truth, and we have to find it out and to educate mankind to be capable of receiving it. But ‘‘tolerance’’ says ‘‘any religion will do which you yourself think a good thing.’’ Is it for me with my foolish thought to say what is a good religion? It is God’s thought which I am to seek for. ‘‘But that is the truth for you and this is the tr uth for me,’’ it is said. ‘‘If he only follows his private judgment, it is the truth for him.’’ It is not for him with his ‘‘private judgment’’ to make a truth; he has to find out what is God’s truth. There is but one truth, which all have to find out; there are not as many truths as there are private judgments and individual minds. This, it is said, is to go back to the Roman Catholic Church, to ‘‘turn back again to the only foundations of certainty, and lay once more’’ in her ‘‘the basis of your faith.’’

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Unity and Infallibility Rather it is to go on ‘‘to the foundation of certainty, and to lay’’ at last ‘‘the basis of faith’’ which must be our object. It did seem no wonder, when men asked whether poor little babes were damned or not, and the Church of England said ‘‘it was an open question,’’ ‘‘it did not signify, you might believe one way or another, as you chose,’’ it did seem no wonder that she thus sent so many earnest men, who thought that it did signify, into the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholics say that the Church of England ‘‘prevaricated in her answer.’’ She did not ‘‘prevaricate.’’ She said, ‘‘she did not know; it did not signify!’’ The Roman Catholics say, ‘‘ask Gregor y what he would have said.’’210 But we don’t want to ask Gregor y; we want to ask God. Not through revelation do we find definite truth. Can there be anything less definite than what is called ‘‘revelation’’? or less definite than the doctrine which is to be found in it? It is not there that we can find certainty. There are three ways as to religious truth. One is as if we said in physiological science, ‘‘You may think for yourself, believe conscientiously, believe that such a system of medicine is right, that boiling oil will cure gunshot wounds, that calomel will cure indigestion, and then (it does not signify) you are safe.’’ Another way is to say ‘‘there is a truth’’ and ‘‘you will be damned if you don’t believe it.’’ We do not say this, but ‘‘there is a truth and you will find it out in time,’’ and it is of the very greatest importance to health that we should find it out. But people now pique themselves upon not being startled at anything. They like to talk among one another. They make a merit of it that they ‘‘wish to have other people’s views.’’ They treat truth as an exercise of the intellect, not as something of the utmost importance, which is to be strained after and bought with our brow’s sweat and our heart’s blood. They like to ‘‘hear people’s arguments,’’ they say. It is a titillation of the intellect, which is agreeable, not a matter of life and death. Good men, learned men, senators and men of action discuss together free will, necessity, the origin of evil, God’s purpose, the most momentous questions of man’s destiny, and as

Can we find definite truth in ‘‘revelation’’?

’’You may think what you like,’’ say the ‘‘private judgment’’ men—not ‘‘there is a tr uth to be found and you must apply your whole soul and mind to find it, and great will be the harm to you and yours if you don’t find it.’’ They say, ‘‘if you can only believe conscientiously, you are safe, you may think for yourself.’’

210 Probably Pope Gregor y I (c540-604), called ‘‘Gregor y the great,’’ doctor of the church.

492 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought they part to dress for dinner say, laughing, ‘‘You know who reasoned high: Of providence, foreknowledge, will and fate, And found no end, in wandering mazes lost,211

How unity is alone to be attained.

And infallibility.

and run off. It is a mere matter of intellectual amusement, this search into man’s nature and God’s nature. It would not have been so had it been a search into man’s muscles and arteries. ‘‘Unity’’ can only be attained through man exercising his faculties, not in this way, but in the way in which Archimedes212 and Newton and so many others set to work upon their sciences. Infallibility can only be attained in the same way. Each (by exerting his own faculties) will learn of God, who is infallible, the truth. The truth is discoverable, if we will bring our faculties to it as to any other truth. Is it not as infallibly true that a man must not have three or four wives, or that I am not to go into Mrs M.’s room and take a £5 note, if I can find one, as that the earth moves round the sun? Does not all educated England believe the one as ‘‘infallibly’’ as the other? Polygamy and theft are wrong as ‘‘infallibly’’ as it is untr ue that the earth is stationary. Yet the Muhammadan does not believe the first, not did the Lacedemonian the second. These are discoveries as to the nature of man. These lead directly to discoveries as to the nature of God, which discoveries, when man applies his faculties to make such, instead of pinning them to a book, will be as remarkable as have been his discoveries in every other line. So, with the exercise of man’s faculties, there will be ‘‘unity.’’ Is Unity at hand?

Is unity at hand?

Suppose that, in nautical matters, we were to say ‘‘I think so. You think otherwise. It would be very illiberal of me not to think that you may be right and I be right too. It is better that men should be of different opinions—let each man have his own. Let each take the opinion which suits his own mind and tolerate the other’s.’’ Were this said in nautical matters, or were naval men to refer to a chart made in 1300, what would be the consequence? Yet thus it is in religious matters. There are two ways. The Roman Catholics say ‘‘there must be unity,’’ and they are right, for the want of unity results from

211 John Milton, Paradise Lost Book 2, 459-61. 212 Archimedes (c287-212 bce), astronomer and inventor.

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some minds not having yet received the truth, not from there being no absolute truth. But they say ‘‘there must be a church to maintain this unity and to interpret that book.’’ The other way is to say ‘‘the more sects the better. Difference in religious opinions is good. Let me believe what I like and do you believe what you like.’’ This is called liberality or toleration. Religion is treated quite differently from anything else. We do not appoint a church or assembly in nautical matters, which is to be infallible. But men search and discover. The principle of searching is still unacknowledged in religious things. And as to the other way, it is simply saying that there is no ‘‘tr uth.’’ It is often wondered at that anyone can be taken in by the claim to infallibility of the Church of Rome. But there is so much in saying that you are infallible. Faith can remove mountains. Faith in yourself does remove mountains. Those who speak with a tone of authority, mothers, doctors, are more than half believed for doing so. We cannot have this belief in the Church of England, because, if we were to go to her and say ‘‘You are infallible,’’ she would answer, ‘‘No I am not’’; while, if we go to the Roman Catholic Church and say, ‘‘Mother, teach me, you are infallible,’’ she answers, ‘‘Yes, my child, I am.’’ {Omitted: ‘‘Well, Portia, I do hope you will do your best to keep this poor misguided child in the church in which she was born.’’ ff143-44} The principle of not leaving a church because you were born in it is unintelligible. Error is error whether you were born in it or not. The argument is, A church is a desirable thing. All churches have defects, Therefore remain in the church in which you were born, And do not bring pain upon your family. All churches are beset with difficulties. So is the Roman Catholic Church—you do not say, ‘‘difficulties more vital than the rest,’’ but ‘‘such as no one can overlook.’’ Is it not fair to conclude that you consider those of the Anglican Church as equal? {Omitted: I have often heard you say that you would not have left the Catholic Church, if you had been born in her.’’ ‘‘Well,’’ said I, impatiently, ‘‘I wonder that you do not become a Catholic yourself, Portia.’’ f144} But most of all do we not want our God? Is he not our first want? The Roman Catholic’s God is not ours. To live very closely with those who are all worshipping very fer vently one God, while we are thinking about another, and that other not at all like theirs, is very

Why people are ‘‘taken in’’ by the claim to infallibility of the Church of Rome.

Would you not have left the Roman Catholic Church, although ‘‘born’’ in it, if convinced of its error? Argument used by those who would stay in the Church of England, because ‘‘born’’ in it.

Solemn question: Do we not want our God most of all?

494 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought painful. To have sympathy with our God, to be able to esteem Him is surely the first thing. And with the God who carries about houses in the night and opens and shuts a picture’s eyes, we can have no sympathy. To live with those who are worshipping not at all fervently another God, still less like ours, because He is so far off and we are so ver y indifferent about him, is more painful still. The God of any church now existing is a different God from ours. 8.2 Is Truth absolute, or only what Man troweth? Is truth what man troweth?

There is great interest in tracing the derivation of words. It is a means of tracing man’s thought. It is interesting to think concerning each word that there was a time when it had never been used, to ask the question of what thought, emotion or sensation was it the consequence, when it first passed the lips of man. The word tr uth appears to have been derived from troweth—that which a man believes was trowth or truth. And here we see into a common error of mankind. Often man does not look for the absolute what is, but satisfies himself with that which he ‘‘troweth.’’ Nay, many go so far as to assert that there is a different truth for different natures. If we mean by truth that which is, we mean a definite mode of existence not subject to be changed by the view which different men take of it. But, among the different views which men take of religion, is one, then, only true? All are imper fect; none without some true belief, if, by true belief, we mean belief of that which is. The conception, the comprehension, of the Infinite and Perfect which the finite and imper fect struggles for must always be, like himself, finite and imperfect, but, like himself, it may be ever advancing and improving. It has been said that man makes his God. He does so in an obnoxious sense, if he supposes that he conceives and comprehends the whole truth concerning God in his creed, be it what it may. He who fashions a figure of wood, and then bows down to it, is called an idolator. We are shocked that, by his limited faculties, he has limited the conception of the superhuman power. When man limits his conception of the superhuman power by any form of words he makes the same sort of mistake as the man who fashions an idol with his own hand. Let us ever remember that our conception, our comprehension, our feeling of God, must be ever imperfect, yet should be ever advancing.

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We do not make God: we find Him We must not make God: we must find Him and feel Him more and more. ‘‘He that loveth not knoweth not God.’’213 How imperfect our love, how imperfect our wisdom, to fulfill the purpose even of such love as we feel! In proportion as we partake the attributes of God, shall we know Him better. Love and knowledge must unite. He who feels and comprehends, by his feeling, God’s love, will know God better and better as he penetrates into His wisdom, as revealed and revealing itself in the everlasting tale of the universe. The nature and history of the material, the intellectual, the spiritual will all be to him, as he learns them, revelations of God. Love, without knowledge, will form a poor conception of God; knowledge without love will form none at all. Seeking truth as that which is, we can never believe a contradiction. That which is never is not also. We recognize that a supreme benevolent and wise Will is and has been. Nothing, therefore, can be (or have been) co-existent with this Will which would be contradictor y to it. As far as we can penetrate into what is a wise benevolence, what the thought, the sentiment, the purpose consistent with it, we may interpret the past and present, we may read the future. These are the auguries, the prophecies open to all mankind. {Omitted: I ask myself the question what, after the experience of my best moments, my conception is, or rather my grasp after a conception, an imagination, of the best and greatest happiness that is— the truest happiness, the happiness which would satisfy the Spirit of all that is good and wise, true and righteous, lovely and beautiful in the abstract. f147} 8.3 We must put out of our heads the word ‘‘law’’ as applied to Moses’ law. God has not said, ‘‘Thou shalt not kill,’’214 because people do kill—while God’s law is never broken. Think what it would be, if God’s world were, as it is often represented, a continual breaking of His laws, and being punished for it! The world would be out of joint indeed. But it is not so: His moral and His physical law stand on exactly the same basis, neither is ever broken; bodies do not fall

213 1 John 4:8. 214 Exod 20:13.

The God of the per fect laws.

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More truth in belief in miracles, as formerly held, than in assertion of law, as now made.

There is an intermediate time of belief, not in miracles, but in prayer.

upwards; and his moral law which says, ‘‘if you kill, certain consequences will follow, and if certain circumstances take place, you will kill,’’ is always kept. ‘‘Thou shalt not kill,’’ was Moses’, not God’s, thought. God’s thought is, if a certain phase of education exists, there will be ninety-five murders in the year in such a population, and that thought is always accomplished. Accordingly, we see {Omitted: an average of 999 murders annually in Great Britain. f148} ninety-five murders in the year 1859 in England and Wales.215 {Omitted: This was said to me one day by Portia when I was questioning her about her ‘‘three phases’’ and her God of the Perfect Laws and what she meant by laws. ‘‘If you observe,’’ she said, ‘‘you will see that. . . . f148} Generally, as the belief in miracles decreases, God dies out. At first, as is very natural, while the laws of God are little, or not at all, understood, people are expecting and finding miracles every day, and see God in them. The saints lived in a perpetual expectation of a miracle; they speak to God: He hears and answers and the state of such persons is truer than the state of the asserters of law is now. Tr ust in the God who will work a miracle in answer to their prayers, veneration for the God who works the miracle, thankfulness, love to Him for having worked one (though we may feel we could not love a God who did work miracles), are truer feelings, juster appreciations of Him, than the appreciation given by the ‘‘positive’’ school of the present day. Alas! that, as the belief in miracles dies out, God dies out also. There is, or rather there was, a time when, without believing in miracles, people yet had strong faith in prayer and in God. This is the ‘‘supernatural’’ phase, when people prayed, and believed that an alteration took place in God in consequence and that something different was done from what would have been done if they had not prayed, and thought it very good of God, and were grateful to Him, and loved Him. Wesley and Fénelon were types of this time, but do the farmers now go to church, and pray for rain, and say, ‘‘This morning the crops looked very bad, and I was very low, but we prayed for rain today, and tomorrow they will look better?’’

215 The manuscript had ‘‘Great Britain,’’ corrected to England and Wales.

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Belief in Prayer is gone, in Law is not yet come Does Montalembert look to see whether Louis-Napoléon216 has made any alteration because they prayed for him—whether he has become more virtuous since last Sunday? No, people go on saying the same prayers, because they are there in a ‘‘form,’’ but they don’t even look to see whether any change has come in consequence; they don’t expect it. The God of prayer has also died out, and the far higher God of law is not yet come. {Omitted: I could not help recurring here to the idea ever present to my mind, and I begged Portia, since she was so far removed from Roman Catholicism herself, to exert her influence to keep Columba out of it or at least not to exert her influence to urge her into it. ‘‘I may be very clever,’’ she answered, half laughing, ‘‘but if a person has no stability in their belief beyond my not exerting my influence, I do not see what is to be done. I cannot fancy, I mean, your belief depending upon a person. And as to my dear Columba, you may keep your body in one room or another. But how can you keep your heart in one church or another? f150} How can you keep it from following your convictions? Almost all that can be said against the evils of the Roman Catholic Church applies equally to those of the Anglican—while there are hardly any of the advantages in the Anglican which there are in the Roman Catholic Church, if you are to have one of the existing churches at all. Almost everything that could be said against miracles at Loretto holds equally against the miracles of Christ. Sir James Stephen sees this and says (in his review on Port-Royal in the Edinburgh), finishing his climax with a sentiment, without giving any reason, ‘‘rather let my right hand forget her cunning than that I should say anything against the miracles of our Lord.217 The devil did the miracles of the nineteenth century, if there were any. Christ did those of the first.’’ ‘‘Why?’’ ‘‘Because I believe it.’’ I might as well say, I believe the devil did the miracles of the first century (the Jews did say so, who saw them) but those of the nineteenth are of God. {Omitted: Stripped of its sentiment, is not this the substance of what Stephen says? f151}

The God of prayer is gone, the God of law not yet come.

If miracles are, there is not much to choose between the churches.

216 It is ‘‘anyone’’ looking to see if George IV made any alteration in Add Mss 45839 f150. C.R.F. Montalembert (1810-70), liberal Catholic. 217 James Fitzjames Stephen, ‘‘The Port-Royalists,’’ Edinburgh Review 73,148 ( July 1841):340-41.

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No spirituality in simply disbelieving miracles and going no farther.

‘‘Wherever miracles have been believed, we know that miracles have been.’’ {Omitted: ‘‘And this is the doctrine that you are going to teach your own children.’’ f151} But there is no spirituality in disbelieving the miracles. There is nothing very inspiring nor particularly tending to morality or progress in disproving them, if that were all. The feeling of the Church of England is very intelligible. Many know that they are in a state of ‘‘twilight faith.’’ But what can they do? If they step out of it, they step into a state of darkness. They have not admitted the principle, ‘‘search,’’ and it is like stepping out of a rickety house into the blank cold darkness of unbelief. 8.4

Men can have no God now and not know it themselves.

Have we any God now?

It is so easy now, men can have no religion and not know it themselves, because it is all laid down for them what they are to think and what they are to say; their services are not with them a matter of feeling. The dean of {Hereford} and the bishop of {Sodor and Man f153},218 while labouring so intensely in the cause of humanity, have they any religion? And yet they don’t know themselves that they have none, when saying their services. They never think of asking, because they have no doubt they have. {Omitted: ‘‘I agree with you, Columba. . . . f153} People have no God now. A few speculate as an amusement to the intellect, but most have a diluted religion of the kind of St Teresa’s. They use the prayers she did, but without expecting the answer she did. They pray for rain, but they look at the barometer and ask which way the wind is. What can you expect of a religion which uses the forms without awaiting the result? They pray indeed, but they don’t know whether they shall have it or not. If they have, they are rather surprised; if they have it not, they say it was not wise to give it them. But our God always does what is wise, whether we suggest it to Him or no. St Teresa was so much better than her God. Have we any God now? But how comes it that we don’t love this wise God and that St Teresa did love hers?

218 Both progressive clergymen: Richard Dawes, dean of Hereford and an educator; Walter Augustus Shirley (1797-1847), bishop of Sodor and Man.

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We open a book of science, and we read of a God all order and beauty and goodness, and He excites no feeling. We open the life of St Teresa, and we find a God all injustice and disorder, and we find her in a rapture about Him. The God of law is always speaking to us—always saying what is wise and good. The God of St Teresa speaks to her sometimes, and says something which is often foolish and not good. Curious indeed, that, while the God of science never appears to have excited any feeling, the other God has excited so much! May we not hope that the day is coming when we shall feel as much, yea, a great deal more, for our God than she did for hers. The Protestants, it is said, do not feel so much for their purer God as the Catholics do for their unjust one. But we can hardly call the Protestant God a God at all. What does He stimulate us to do? What does He require of us but to go to church once a week? We cannot say, ‘‘Why are the Protestants not better than the Catholics, their God being so much less absurd?’’ We can only say, the Protestants have hardly any God at all. They were so occupied with the absurdities of the Roman Catholic God that, as often happens, they did not perceive that they had left themselves no God at all. For the last 300 years, the work of religion has been a work of destruction. And when will it come to be a work of edification? Even now we hear ‘‘the voice of one crying in the crowd, ‘Prepare ye the way of the Lord.’ ’’219 We do not wonder at the rejection of monotheism on account of its dullness. The Jewish religion and the Unitarian are the dullest of all. They are pure monotheism. The Catholics, with their angels, and devils, and saints, and Virgin, and the Holy Ghost, and the Son, do make religion more exciting. But God in his solitary existence, enjoying while we are suffering, is the most cheerless religion—would be revolting, if we really believed what we think we believe. No wonder we turn from him with indifference and then complain of our hard hearts. But all that the Catholics have we shall have in our religion. Angels and saints we shall have as soon as we have made them. Every man is not intended to be superior in everything. But let him organize a right life and men superior to himself in different things (or ‘‘angels’’) will spring up. And mankind, not only Christ, will be the Son. A

219 Matt 3:3.

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Incarnation – Trinity – Atonement—all abortions of comprehension of some part of God’s plan.

great sacrifice has been made for us; God is suffering for us—not enjoying Himself by Himself. Our religion will have everything. The Incarnation – the Trinity – the atonement seem to be abortions of a comprehension of God’s plan. The Incarnation? We do not see that God is incarnate in ever y man. We think He was only incarnate in one. We make the Trinity of God, Christ and the Holy Ghost—instead of making it God and man, and such manifestation of God as man is able to comprehend. What God has been supposed to say, not worth saying The atonement? Man had a dim perception of God passing through sin and suffering for man and in man, and also of sacrifice and compensation—though it seems a curious sort of compensation that His Son should suffer and die because we have offended Him—the whole scheme of grace and redemption appears to be an elaboration of error founded upon some truth. And yet this is believed, and the simple scheme of God’s providence men are scandalized at; it is indeed necessary to have a church to keep up all this. ‘‘How glad we should be, if God did speak to us, as St Teresa thought He did,’’ is often said. But there is hardly anything which it has ever been supposed that God did say, than which we could not have said something better ourselves. (A recent Protestant religious work, written with no small fer vour and eloquence, and extensively read by Roman Catholics as well as Protestants, after justly condemning the idea of heaven composed of circular glories of angels’ heads melting away one behind the other, as in the old pictures, informs us that the true conception of heaven has been revealed, and is to be found, in what? in the account of Christ’s days on earth between his resurrection and ascension. It dwells with rapture—and desires us to do so too— upon his words, ‘‘Children, have ye any meat?’’220 and tells us to find in them the ground of our rejoicing faith in an individual eternal life. Surely there is no eccentricity in Comte’s religion more strange than this! It seems to us like the old woman who found her joy at church in hearing that comfortable word, Mesopotamia.) What St Teresa says, what Moses says—the ten commandments— are they not full of mistakes? ‘‘I am He that brought thee out of the

220 John 21:5.

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land of Egypt.’’221 He was taking care of the Egyptians as much as of the Hebrews. ‘‘I the Lord am a jealous God.’’222 The iniquity of the fathers is indeed visited upon the children, but not because God is ‘‘jealous.’’ The fifth commandment223 contains three mistakes, first, we can only honour that which is honourable; secondly, filial piety has nothing to do with living to old age; thirdly, the Lord did not give them that land (in the sense in which Moses said it), they took it. As to ‘‘Thou shalt not kill,’’ ‘‘Thou shalt not steal,’’ we did not require a voice from God to tell us that it was better not to kill and steal. Christ does not say that God spoke. It shows his great wisdom. But, in the few times when God is said to have spoken in the New Testament, it does not appear that He said anything very inspiring. He said, ‘‘This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased, hear ye Him.’’224 When He speaks to Paul, and says, ‘‘I am Jesus whom thou persecutest,’’225 we feel sure that that is not what He would have said. All religions have been hitherto founded on miracle—on the breaking of law. The present is an attempt to preach religion founded on ‘‘law,’’ to make God’s law His gospel—His ‘‘good news’’ to man. Had it not been for the miracles and resurrection of Christ, would the Christian religion have been founded? Would the Muhammadan religion have been founded without the miracles of Muhammad? Would the pure, devoted and beautiful life of Christ, His doctrines and teaching have laid the cornerstone for Christian religion without His resurrection? First Attempt to found Religion upon Law No, this is the first attempt to found a religion upon ‘‘law.’’ The Christian doctrines would never have founded the Christian religion. It is true there is much in the Christian religion which has nothing to do with Christ. The atonement, the incarnation, these He never preached—nor ecclesiastical pomp, nor the fabric of the hierarchy. Nothing, in the vagueness of people, strikes one so much as their raving against the Catholic superstitions, and not seeing that, if the

221 222 223 224 225

A paraphrase of Exod 20:2. A paraphrase of Exod 20:5. Exod 20:12. Matt 3:17. Acts 9:5.

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What can Roman Catholics find to think about in long meditations, for weeks, for years, upon the few hours of Christ’s passion?

What do we mean by God suffering?

Roman Catholic scheme a fine one.

words of Christ were exactly followed out, the Catholic orders will result—the parting with all they have—the leaving father and mother— all excepting their mortifications—those He never preached. The orthodox took hold of a great truth when they got hold of the incarnation—but they confined it to one—they did not extend it to all. They dwell so much on the passion of Christ, which He suffered for us for a few hours, and they think nothing of the passion of God for eternity—which He suffers for our sakes since the world began. Books upon books have been written upon that day’s suffering, till the most fanciful schemes have been built upon it, as might be expected, in order to supply materials for thought. {Omitted: Still I cannot think what they can find to think about in those long meditations which the Catholics make for years, for centuries, upon those few hours. f158} If they would think upon the plan of God, the sufferings of God from eternity, what materials for thought are there not there! What truths might not be discovered! what mines are there not to be worked! The gospel of a perfect God. What a gospel might be preached! {Omitted: But they go off upon preaching the necessity of baptism and those doctrines, one would think, must be very dry. f159} The ‘‘evangelicals’’ so often complain of their hard hearts (Wesley’s whole tone is of nothing else); they say they cannot love God. Is it any wonder? How can they love the Being whom they imagine? They work themselves up by excitement into a kind of spasm of interest about Him, but they must find their hearts hard in a religion so essentially cold. It seems to be inconsistent with love and wisdom to leave the work and the suffering to any but itself, therefore God works for us in us. The true feeling of God in us, which led to the belief of one incarnation, ought to be extended to the incarnation of God in all of us. The Roman Catholic idea is not nearly so fine as God’s thought. But it is the next fine idea to it. If God had not done what He has done, He would have done what the Roman Catholics say He has, that is, if He had not made truth discoverable by the exercise of man’s faculties, He would have told it to man in one continuous line of communication and revelation, as the Roman Catholic Church says He has to her. It is curious, however, that the whole cumbrous fabric of contradictions—contradictions to love and wisdom— should be thought right and orthodox, when compared with the simplicity of God’s scheme, at which people are ‘‘shocked.’’ On the

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doctrine of sin, as held by the church, necessarily follows the atonement. Unless you say, ‘‘man sins by God’s law, and his sin (or ignorance) is to be removed by the increasing knowledge of mankind, which is to be gained by the exercise of their own faculties,’’ you will say, ‘‘I sin—I cannot help it—I must have an atonement to save me. Else I am lost.’’ For your very theology teaches you that you must never hope to avoid sinning in this world. People are ‘‘shocked’’ at God’s plan The Roman Catholics say, ‘‘we are so bad, and yet He loves us,’’ and that melts Saint Teresa and Father Gentili226 into raptures of gratitude and love. We say, ‘‘we are so bad, and He is helping us to be good.’’ He does not love us while we are bad—that is a contradiction. He can love only what is loveable. But His law of goodness is always working out our good. {Omitted: ‘‘Portia, I do not quite understand what you mean when you say that we cannot love our God.’’ What a God that must be who likes to hear it said to Him every day, and said in a ‘‘form’’ too, that He is good (when He knows too that we don’t believe it, and only say it because we think Him a ‘‘jealous’’ God, jealous of His own ‘‘glor y’’), who likes to hear the praises of His own glory sung, who likes to be to us as if there were no one else in the world but Him, as St Teresa tells us! To say every morning to Him the very same words ‘‘I love you, I love you,’’ which would be obnoxious to any human being, how very absurd it does seem, how very sure one feels that those who can say it do not feel it! ff160-61} Mankind have thought a great deal about doing the will of God, but have not thought what God is and what His will will be—what He will like—when they try to do it. And now people think less of what will be the will of God than of what will gain the sympathy of men. Now, too, in times when what God likes, and what men will sympathize with, are so ver y different—when, in truth, what God and man will sympathize with is hardly ever the same thing—this is dangerous indeed.

We cannot love the God who ‘‘likes to be to us as if there were no one else in the world but Him.’’ Those who can say it do not feel it.

226 Aloysius Gentili (1801-48), Catholic priest who converted many British and Irish.

504 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 8.5 Vice. Is this Thy work, O Lord?

If we knew what vice is, if we could conceive of the depth of its horrors, we should conceive that the pure, the loving God, could not, consistently with His nature, will the law whence it should spring, Himself calmly contemplating and administering to others the suffering which is eventually to bring about the metamorphosis from vice to virtue. It is in the dens of vice that we most earnestly feel, ‘‘is this Thy work, O Lord?’’ Yet all is His work. He ‘‘Himself took our infirmities.’’227 He wills that divine love shall make the great attainment— the attainment of ever-increasing good, through successive phases of existence, by the exercise of the divine attributes. The perfect thought, the perfect feeling of love, shall become more and more legible as man learns to read and interpret the universe, its manifestation. But perfect thought—perfect feeling of love—can never be consistent with an eternal law, calling forth the work and the suffering of others, with an eternal contemplation of this work. Thought and feeling will the eternal work, assure its success, go forth to do it, are ever transmuting the intention into the reality. Life and work must be successive. They will occupy the ages which have no end. And what evidence is there for all this? That this only is consistent with the revealed character of God. God, it is said, is ‘‘of purer eyes than to behold iniquity.’’228 Yet, through His law, is man called upon, not only to behold it, but—oh, the depth of misery, little conceived by those who live, who play on the surface of the world! to live and be it. We who have been called upon to walk through varying scenes of life, to see the pure and the noble, to see the debased, can tell that mankind, in general, little conceive the misery of iniquity, but still less the heaven within a man’s nature, from which he is in banishment, because his capabilities are not exercised. Mankind must unite to organize life, so as to exercise these capabilities. Meantime, the divine nature ‘‘descends into hell.’’

227 Matt 8:17. 228 An allusion to Hab 1:13.

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‘‘He descended into Hell’’ 229 Does it? it is asked. Oh! does it not? Is this any strange thing to say, for does not that capability for love and goodness exist dormant in many, when the sign of it is not to be seen? We have known natures showing love and kindness which could scarcely be exceeded in intensity, but life did not exercise these natures aright, and from the spirit of love proceeded that which was not of it—that which was entirely in opposition to it. Oh! that we could reach the heart, the consciousness of mankind, that we could arouse them to look at what they are, at what they might be! Eager they are in pursuit, but what are they pursuing? What can we know of the Being we call God, but from the manifestation of His nature—His attributes? Look for His thought, His feeling, His purpose, in a word, His spirit within you, without you, behind you, before you. It is indeed omnipresent. Work your true work and you will find His presence in yourself, i.e., the presence of those attributes, those qualities, that spirit, which is all we know of God. If we recognize this spirit without us in the rule of the universe—if we recognize this spirit within us, whenever man is well at work, may we not say ‘‘He is in us, and we in Him?’’ We shall find this no vain or fanciful theory. If we seek Him by tr ue work, true life, we shall find Him (i.e., His attributes, which are all we know of Him) within us, limited indeed, as is right, till our life and work shall attain for us higher regions of being, i.e., greater love, greater wisdom, greater power. Well it is that power is so limited, while love and wisdom are so feeble. Blessed are the limits of humanity, till it has advanced to greater purity and truth! Peculiar power, whether arising from nature or from circumstances, is seldom now a good for the individual or for mankind. And let all this be tested by the realities of life, striving to look at these comprehensively, in relation to all being and all successions of being. Thus only can we, in any degree, see as God sees, which is ‘‘tr uth.’’

‘‘He descended into Hell.’’

229 From the Apostles’ creed, said in evening prayer, Book of Common Prayer.

506 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 8.6 Why is Sunday kept?

‘‘Tomorrow is Sunday!’’ and what a curious thought that tomorrow, in all the length and breadth of Christendom, people will put on their best clothes and be in time for church, and think that they have performed a duty by going to church, and hardly anybody will really feel anything whatever, when there. And what is the cause of its being Sunday tomorrow all over the Christian world? Why is Sunday kept? From the feeling of a Superior Being. But why does that make people put on their best clothes? Out of a feeling of respect to Him. But we appear to think this Superior Being more particular about the fashions than about the arts, for there is such singing in the church as you would not suffer for a moment in your drawing room. Such reading aloud there is as you would not allow in your own family; nowhere is such reading as the clerk’s ever heard, except in church. ‘‘Let us sing to the honour and glory of God,’’ and then such music follows as is certainly not to the honour and glor y of the singers. Then, although the people are dressed in their best, the church is not: it is generally so uncomfortable, ugly and bare a place that you would not go into it if it were not the house of God. God’s house is much dirtier and shabbier than anybody else’s house. We feel so strongly the necessity of a Sabbath—a day of rest— a day peculiarly devoted to religious thought and feeling, and to their expression by God’s children gathered together, that surely, whatever external aid is called in from art, as music, architecture, etc., should be of the best. We think God inferior to man in business

We think men much superior to God. We think God incapable of carrying on the business of a great nation.

But we think so little about God at all. Most people think men much superior to God; they do not say so, they do not admit this to themselves, but it is really so: God has no interest in their thoughts; what He will think has no interest for them. They attach great weight to some men’s opinions: what the dean of St Paul’s or Mr Gladstone230 says, makes a great impression on them: they think ‘‘what a clever man that is; what did he say upon that question? I shall meet him tomorrow; I will ask him what he thinks of this.’’ But God makes no

230 Henry Hart Milman (1791-1868), family friend and supporter of Nightingale; W.E. Gladstone (1809-98), mp, later prime minister four times.

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impression on them; they attach no weight to His opinion, to what He would say. How can we expect any progress to be made? The theologians preach to us to despise riches; the political economists preach to us to amass riches, and nobody asks, ‘‘What is well-being? what does God think well-being to be?’’ If you were to ask it of anybody, they would think, ‘‘That is a stupid question: we must mind our own work and not be theorizing.’’ And the main question of all, ‘‘Is well-being riches or poverty? if it is neither, what is it?’’ is put aside as a question which does not concern us: ‘‘Do what you have to do, and do not perplex yourself with abstract inquiry’’ is the answer. {Omitted: ‘‘But would not your religion make us happy, if it were true, Portia?’’ f166} The religion which we preach dictates a right life, and it cannot, therefore, be expected to produce well-being or happiness till there is a right life. We are not surprised at not being happy: how can one expect it? how can one expect of God that He should wish one to be happy? Our unhappiness is His voice, telling us to make a right life. To say that we wonder that our religion does not make us happy is to say that, if we have a true religion, we ought to be able to do without food or without exercise. God intends that our faculties should all be in right exercise, that we should have no happiness without this, and our religion is to teach us to look out how to do this, not to enable us to do without it. We may appeal to experience to prove that persons of a religious feeling, continuing in the present mode of life, can do nothing else but sin and repent. Unless you make a life which shall be the manifestation of your religion, it does not much signify what you believe. Organize then your life to act out your religion. To point out the evils of the family, to say anything against the family, is useless and hurtful, but you will find, in organizing your life, that family is too narrow a basis to build it upon, and that Christ was right—that, if you will do His work, you must do as He says—and that it was a proof of His wisdom and His strength, when you take into account the tender nature He was of (as He shows it by His conduct to His mother on the cross231 {Omitted: (from that and so many other instances you cannot doubt the tenderness of his nature) that it was

231 When Jesus gave his mother to John’s care, John 19:26.

Ought not our religion, if tr ue, to make us happy?

It is indifferent what you believe, if you do not act out your belief.

508 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought a proof too of His wisdom and His strength when f167} that He said, ‘‘Who are my mother and my brethren?’’232 Do not protest against a bad Life—show a better

Fourierism considers attraction alone: Roman Catholicism God’s end alone. We consider neither. We ought to consider both: the first as the means, the second as the end of all we do.

Merely to protest against ordinar y family life is of no use at all, will only shock people: you must show a better life. We would not destroy the family, but make it larger. We would not prevent people from having the ties of blood, but we would secure all that the family promises by enlarging it. The family is for love, sympathy, protection, support, for the opportunity of exercising and enjoying all these. We wish to secure sympathizers, protectors, helpers. But now, if a mother feels a particular attachment for one of her children, she must not allow it, for this would produce distress to all the rest. If one of the sons has a great feeling for one of his sisters, it will produce nothing but unhappiness and heartburnings. Whereas, if the family were much larger, if it were God’s family, there would be room for indulging all these sympathies—because the others would have sympathies too with others. But now you must not enjoy these, for the others have none to supply to them the want of yours. Ever ything is arranged contrar y to attraction now. The family, the school, the university, there is no attraction in any of these. It is true that young men do like Cambridge, that boys like Eton, but it is generally in the inverse ratio of the purposes for which they are there. School and college are not liked for what they are intended for—for learning and education—they are liked for boating and cricket—for amusement. It is not the education which people like; on the contrary, they are built upon the opposite principle: it is laid down as a principle that boys cannot like their ‘‘education,’’ that they must be coerced, that they must be flogged. For people to follow their attraction is rarely or never thought of: one boy wishes to go to sea—he must go into the church because there is a ‘‘living’’ in the family. As to the family, the principle laid down is to bear with each other; to repent of your sins and bear with your sufferings is the theor y of life; changing any organization is never thought of in order to seek another which shall cause you to commit no more

232 A paraphrase of Matt 12:48.

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sins, which shall remove the sufferings: we never try to alter the organization of life; attraction does not come at all into our theory of life. This is not Fourierism233 {Omitted: You are a Fourierist in everything but his matrimonial schemes.’’ f168} The Fourierists and the Roman Catholic orders are alike in wanting in a main point. The Roman Catholic orders have the right end, viz., that to work out God’s purpose is all we have to do. But they have mistaken the means; they think the purpose of God is to be forwarded by our being ‘‘like dead bodies,’’ by our ‘‘preferring the office we dislike most,’’ by our ‘‘disregarding natural inclinations and friendships especially.’’ The Fourierists have got hold of the right means, viz., that we should follow our attractions; that education should be the discovering of these attractions, not the counteraction of them, that we should take the friends we like best, the occupations which our natural inclinations discover us to be fittest for. But they have mistaken the means for the end; they have no end, no purpose but to follow their attractions. Now, our end must be oneness with God in all we do; His purpose must be ours in life; if we have not this ‘‘end,’’ this high aim, the following our vocations becomes mere caprice. Is God in our Social Life? Should we have fasting in our life? We are God’s activity. And the principle of fasting or of eating ought to be to keep our bodies in such a state that they shall be the activity of God. Should we, like the evangelical, object to balls and society? He does not object to balls and society, because it separates him from God, but because he conceives it to be in some way displeasing to Him. If he thought much about being separated from God, he would object to the drawing room equally or to church. For God is often no more in church than He is in a ballroom. We often feel His presence no more in the one than in the other. {Omitted: ‘‘But don’t we think of God in the drawing room?’’ f170} It seems to be supposed that God has nothing to do with social life—that it would be impious to think that He cares anything as to

Ought we to fast?

To have balls and society?

Is God in the drawing room?

233 The movement formed on the theory of attraction of Charles Fourier (17721837). Fourier denounced conventional marriage and the nuclear family for a larger community, a phalanster y, and a new ‘‘amorous order.’’

510 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

What is ‘‘submitting to God’s will?’’

what carriages we have—as to whom we ask to dinner. He has nothing to do but to punish us in some quite other state of being. The flogging of a boy at school is reasonable compared with this; he is flogged immediately, there are some faint hopes that he may learn his next lesson the better for having been flogged. But we are flogged long, long afterwards; we don’t know whether we shall be flogged or not, and we are flogged when it can do us no good—for all opportunity of amendment, we are expressly told, is past. It is not therefore for the purpose of making us learn our lesson, for there is no longer any lesson to be learnt. {Omitted: ‘‘No, we do not believe that God has any intentions about our social life.’’ ‘‘But surely submitting to God’s will is a thing practised by us in our social life.’’ f170} ‘‘Submitting to God’s will’’ is a phrase we cannot understand. It is as if you looked upon God as something apart, without, independent of all principle, to whom you have only to submit. But if, for ‘‘God,’’ we read ‘‘the spirit of perfect love and wisdom,’’ how can we talk about submitting to perfect love, directed by wisdom? We accord with it; we don’t submit. It is often said, ‘‘So-and-so is so good, she submits entirely to God’’ as a merit. Insofar as she is good, she is part of the divine goodness, accordant with it, willing the same things, omnipotent inasfar as she wills the same things. Is it not a mistake to call this submission? It is oneness. Christ’s will was God’s will—the will of love. I would try to teach a child—not to ‘‘submit’’ to God, nor to pray that anything should be otherwise—but to second Him. I would try to inspire it with the idea that it, the child, can second God! ‘‘The happiness of private life,’’ it is often said, ‘‘consists in giving up our wills mutually.’’ But, if private life were enlarged, so as to allow more room for the possibility of attraction, there would be those together who would have the same will. ‘‘It is the divine will that we should be made perfect by suffering.’’234 But, if we could look into the divine thought, we should not see there, ‘‘Suffering shall be the instrument of progress to human nature,’’ or ‘‘so much suffering shall be sent to make them perfect,’’ but ‘‘human nature shall attain perfection by their own efforts, and, in discovering the means, by their own efforts, there

234 An allusion to 1 Pet 5:10.

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will be suffering,’’ not ‘‘suffering is the means to progress,’’ for enjoyment is often the means. {Omitted: ‘‘They say that butchers become so hardened that it is said to be a bad trade, because it destroys the better feelings. In the same way, Magendie,235 groping among the entrails of living animals, must have had all his own feelings destroyed—must have been the death of all his own better life. So I think of God. If He has and if He has not the plan in view for His creation, which reconciles all evil—the plan of eternity for each—of perfect happiness for each, He does seem to me like a butcher. f172} Is God becoming hardened to evil? Think what a spectacle the world is now, what it must be to Him. {Omitted: There He has been, through his life, with His hands in the heart of my poor Aunt Cassandra all through her life. f172} If we are not on our way to anything, if we have now simply to die! Is it not doing an immense injustice to the spirit of love and wisdom to think that He has called us here—for what? to play our parts on a theatre, of which He is sole spectator? {Omitted: ‘‘You won’t let Him do anything,’’ I could not help chiming in here, though I had been sitting all the time with my newspaper, a passive audience to their dispute. ‘‘You are like the people in the litany who say, ‘Don’t go there, oh! don’t do this, oh! don’t do that.’ So you say, ‘He must not do this, He must not do that,’ till you leave Him nothing which He may do.’’ ‘‘No,’’ said Portia, we don’t. . . . ff 172-73} We don’t say of God, ‘‘He must not,’’ but we are sure ‘‘He will not.’’ It would be misunderstanding Him to suppose He would. {Omitted: ‘‘But with all this evil in the world,’’ said I, ‘‘which you cannot explain, how can you say what He will do and what He will not?’’ f173} In speaking of the evil which is in the world, people say, ‘‘There are signs of there being a good God. It is very difficult to understand how He permits all this evil—whether there is a devil who causes it? or whether it is altogether a mystery which we cannot comprehend?’’ (It is now known that storms are subject to laws so invariable as that their coming can be exactly foreseen. If people

235 François Magendie (1783-1855), leading French vivisectionist.

Is God, if He is as represented, becoming hardened to evil?

We are accused of leaving God nothing that He may do. But it is not, He must not, but He will not. How can we say what He will do and what He will not?

512 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

People go on without any view of what the nature of man requires.

will look at these meteorological signs, the Royal Charter 236 need not be lost. Do we say, how could God permit such a dreadful calamity as the loss of all hands on board? the devil must have done it. No. We say, Study the signs of approaching gales, and you will not be lost. Is it not the same with moral evil, the laws of which are just as calculable?) One of these two things they say about evil, and then they say, ‘‘Man fell, and, since that, it is no use his hoping to be good, he must be bad; it must be sinning and repenting’’ (they even write it down and put it into a prayer, which is to last forever) ‘‘and somebody else must manage the whole matter for us, somebody must die for us, and that must save us in the next world, nothing can save us in this.’’ {Omitted: (God must kill His Son to satisfy His justice as the children are sacrificed to Moloch.237) f173} They say this about evil; they don’t try any organization of life which shall enable them to leave off sinning, enable them to act according to the purpose of God. If they are to go on always saying what is written down for them to say, of course it is no use. They don’t say, ‘‘Let us see whether there are not any of these evils out of which it is in man’s power to help mankind.’’ This has never been tried, not, at least, after any type. At first, in the world’s histor y, ever ybody tried to get as much as they could, and there were quarrels about wells and so forth; everybody was on the offensive and the defensive; then came governments, and then a great organization to preach the atonement and put into form people’s confession of their sins, while they live as they can—but never any type of living by what it was the purpose of God that our life should be, by any understanding of the nature of God and the nature of man. That is the last thing that comes into people’s lives. {Omitted: They are to go on sinning and repenting and somebody else is to manage the matter for them— they go on without any view of what the nature of man requires. f174} One would have thought that life was the most important thing of all, that men would have said in the first place, ‘‘what is the nature of God, and what is the nature of man? What is the purpose of God as to the life we should lead?’’ But no, nobody thinks of this. It was not so about the organization of war. But that we must not be surprised at. The physical must come first. In war, ever ything is

236 A shipwreck off the coast of Wales on 25 October 1859, with enormous loss of life. 237 A Canaanite deity.

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exactly adapted for its end, and the end is carried, for exact obedience is rendered. But, even in politics, the very business of the opposition is to harass and oppose the ministers and prevent them car rying their measures. And we call it our ‘‘glorious constitution.’’ Is God inadequate to the business of Politics? For any great end there must be perfect obedience, and perfect obedience rendered knowingly and consciously to an imperfect leader (not smuggled in, but freely rendered as being, on the whole, what is best), for the leader must always be imperfect, while man is imperfect. {Omitted: ‘‘Lord, what is man?’’ ‘‘Why, man is what God has made him.’’ But, when we make mistakes, we pray, and we beg God to forgive us, and say it is a mystery, and think about the atonement—we do not see that our mistakes are part of God’s plan and no mystery at all. Whether, if there had not been the Church of England for these people, to make them satisfied with going to church once a week, whether they would have thought more about religion? I do not know. The Anglican Church does not even call itself the Church of Christ—it calls itself the Church of England. ‘‘Why, you who are such a great materialist,’’ said I, ‘‘must trace all these things to the English material.’’ ‘‘Perhaps,’’ said she, ‘‘then it is the spiritual which generates the material, not vice versa, as some think, the material, and material only, which generates the spiritual, and all the spiritual.’’ f175} A theocracy! what a sublime idea the theocracy of the Jews was! to be governed not by kings and presidents but by God! When Cabinet ministers will be selected for the purpose of discovering and carrying out the purposes of God in politics, for executing the laws of God, what a change it will be! Now, though we do not say so, we evidently believe Him quite inadequate to carrying on the business of a great nation; a nation would fall to pieces if its business were done according to His will; and no wonder, it certainly would, if done according to what we conceive now to be His will, to what we are told is His purpose. No wonder we exclude Him from our Cabinet and our politics. Well may people ridicule or be indignant at the idea of a religious government when religion is so little comprehended or so little felt! The government of the Jews was called a theocracy, but what a God was theirs! Let him not be called a God (or spirit of Good) till we lose our sense of the meaning of words. What a fine

Is this doing away with liberty?

Theor y of a Theocracy.

Practice of a Theocracy.

514 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought idea, still, was that of Moses, viz., of a theocracy, of God governing by high priests receiving His oracles! If only they would receive them ‘‘through all the powers irradiated,’’ so ‘‘purge and disperse all mist,’’ so ‘‘tell of things invisible to mortal sight!’’238 8.7 Religious government.

On the subject of the government of one and the government of a council, experiments have been made through all the history of man with which we are acquainted. But they have been made, generally, without any true view of his nature or of the purpose of his being. How, indeed, can the purpose of his being be comprehended without a true comprehension of the nature of the will whence man’s being springs? How little, in the various attempts at government by one, or by council, has any correct or comprehensive view of man’s nature or destination been sought, as a clue to direct such attempts! In the earliest histories which we possess of man, the many, in order to live at all, or to live without intolerable physical discomfort, appear to have found it necessary to put themselves under the direction of someone, the strongest or the most able (in some way), to contend with their common difficulties. But such government had reference to a very small part only of man’s nature and wants. Religious Government—in Theory Quer y, is it not a religious governor, in the true and comprehensive sense of the word, to which past and present experiments are leading? Is it not such a religious government which is really in accordance with God’s purpose and man’s nature? And to whatever is in accordance with God’s purpose and man’s nature, we may be sure that the past and the present are leading. There have been, indeed, various attempts in theory, various attempts in practice at a religious government. There have been essential defects in such theories and such practical experiments from the essential misunderstanding of the purpose of God and the nature of man which has attended them. The pope, the Roman Catholic superiors, are instances of such experiments in modern histor y, and, among Protestants, the sovereign of England as so-called head of the church, Pastor

238 From the last lines of Milton’s Paradise Lost, Book 3.

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Fliedner,239 as head of a Protestant institution. Among these, Roman Catholic superiors alone (except Fliedner, who is an individual instance, representing no class), have governed in many instances, though by no means invariably, with a religious intention. Religion, in the sense in which we understand it, has had little to do with the government of the heads of the Roman Catholic Church, or of the Church of England. Quer y, may it not be gathered from the study of the purpose of God and the nature of man that ‘‘it is written’’ that mankind will form itself into communities, with an elected chief, who will be high priest, or physician and leader in regard to the spiritual, the intellectual and the physical natures which are under his superintendence—the whole community being educated with a view to comprehending such truth as is known, and to seeking unknown tr uth concerning God and man—the whole community therefore at mature age capacitated to choose their leader—the leader’s length of rule being fixed with a view to make it long enough to give fair trial to his thought, so as to make it experience for mankind, but not long enough to injure materially through the mistakes to which he will be liable? He will not himself be the only practical high priest, intellectual schoolmaster and physician, but the head of those who are such. Religious life and work require the healthy state and devotion of the spiritual, the affectional, the intellectual and the physical nature. Each community of men should modify itself, and choose its chief leader and all subordinate leaders with a view to rendering its life and its work in accordance with the Spirit whence springs life. We should aim at implicit obedience to leadership, together with scope for individual exercise of idiosyncrasy—this is a difficult problem. The Perfect Spirit alone accomplishes it perfectly. His one law of truth and right effects from every living being a perfect obedience. Yet each shall attain through it to the free exercise of his idiosyncrasy. To fill up the practical detail of how such implicit obedience to government and such free exercise of idiosyncrasy are to be attained in human government is a problem which ages must gradually solve. Certain it is that it must be the object of the human as well as the divine Governor in attaining implicit obedience to

Theor y of religious government.

239 Theodor Fliedner (1800-64), founder of the Kaiserswerth Deaconess Institution.

516 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought attain freedom for individual idiosyncrasy. Hitherto, generally speaking, individual obedience checks freedom of idiosyncrasy. But this is a remediable defect in the Governor and the governed, not one existing in the constitution of human nature. Religious Government—in Practice Practice of religious government.

In practice, all religious orders, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, fail in this. Each generally consists of one powerful mind at the head, and a great many childish minds under him (or her). If by chance another powerful mind creeps in among the subordinates, it throws all into confusion, it is called and is troublesome, and it ends by being expelled, expelling, or becoming stupified. In practice, no religious order succeeds in not doing more harm than good, unless it is in close and constant collision with secular and independent powers—unless it is continually and forcibly brought into contact with public opinion—which must be trusted, now, as being, on an average, a higher standard than individual opinion. The A.s will keep the B.s more in order than they will keep themselves, and vice versa. In these days, whoever and whatever is not brought perpetually under the influence of public opinion deteriorates or is lost. In practice, religious orders never make progress. Great minds found them; little minds spring out of them. There is scarcely a historical instance of a discoverer, an inventor, a genius or a benefactor of mankind being produced by a religious order after it is once compact and established. This is easily accounted for. There exists a certain personality, a want of interest in mankind in general, in the efforts of others, a narrowness which leads the superior, who is (in theor y and in reality) the moving spring, to think that his (still more her) own way is the only one for the world’s salvation, that whatever does not spring from the same centre of thought is ruinous, and therefore to be discouraged; that the world, in fact, consists of himself (or herself), his (or her) community, and the poor immediately under their charge. There exists an impatience of interference (all other work being called by them ‘‘inter ference’’ with their own). This makes the usefulness of ‘‘orders’’ per se so narrow as to be nearly nugatory. I speak from experience. But the remark applies solely to those ‘‘orders’’ and ‘‘societies’’ which are not in constant official and essential contact with secular institutions. I speak quite as much of Protestant as of Roman Catholic ‘‘societies.’’ The travel-

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ling ‘‘Sisters of Charity’’ are perhaps the least stereotyped, the most exempt from this exclusiveness, which, where it exists, destroys all progress. The true ‘‘papacy,’’ the real doctrine of ‘‘infallibility,’’ exists in its completeness only in the self-constituted unchecked head of an ‘‘order,’’ ‘‘society,’’ parish, congregation, or doctrine. Yet, while anxious to avoid the evils which experience has shown to arise in religious orders, we yet believe that associations with the object of discovering truth concerning the nature and will of God, the duty and nature of man—how to regulate life in accordance with such truth—are the probable, the natural means for causing mankind to advance in true belief, in true life. If two or three, or if one only, finds contradictions to the truth within him in the taught beliefs and in the ordinar y lives of mankind, we would say to the few or the one, ‘‘Try to gain some few who would fervently wish to live as one with God.’’ But, if this is to be our endeavour, we must strive to know, and to declare to those few, the Being with whom we seek to be one. And here we may well imitate the best of the Roman Catholic orders, while on our guard against the evil incident to them. As with them, a fer vently felt religion must be our bond. And, like the Roman Catholic orders, those who unite to seek a life springing from religion must unite in the reception of the same truth. We seek not to burn those who praise and worship, in God, what they would despise in man. We sympathize with parts of most religions. But if we unite together with a few to strive to live a life dictated by the Spirit of God, we must agree as to what the Spirit is. If one thinks it right to pray continually for forgiveness of sins, while another feels those sins to have been the cross which man bears for mankind, and that it is truth magnanimously to bear the cross of our past sins, while striving by God’s means to emancipate ourselves and others from the burden of that cross—can these two be harmoniously, in life and feeling, one with God?

Of ‘‘Societies’’ as means of religious progress.

8.8 Discussion not desirable in Religion One great advantage of the Roman Catholic teaching of religion (an advantage, at least, in one sense) is that there is no discussion. We should object to religious instruction in the way of discussion. (It will be said that fear of discussion arises from a want of ‘‘combativeness’’ or ‘‘destructiveness,’’ as it is called. Destructiveness, selfesteem, hope, love of life, etc., all of which intimate a wrong state,

Discussion, as mere discussion, not desirable in religion.

518 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought show, whenever they appear in a head, an overplus of some quality. A certain degree of depression in one portion of the skull makes manifest that a man cannot estimate himself sufficiently well. This is tr uly called a want of self-esteem, i.e., it manifests a want of tr ue estimation. The exact state of true estimation would not be appropriately called self-esteem, for if you think well of your doings, because you have discernible an organ of self-estimation, you think on no tr ue foundation. You may be right, or you may be wrong, when you go on your course fearlessly, because you have an organ of selfesteem. From a deficiency in that portion of the brain you may be discouraged without reason. It is natural to have called this the organ of self-esteem, since it manifests itself clearly then only when that state of the brain would be attended with the effect of thinking well of your work, even without good reason, unless modified by some other portion of the brain. Perhaps all that we can say is a certain appearance of the skull exists with a character which appreciates itself too highly, a certain other that appreciates too low— unless modified by other organs. There is a state which, if not impeded by other portions of the organization, is accompanied by a character which thinks tr uly of itself and its work.) One is chosen as the teacher, and he or she is to be listened to. Not that the hearers are to suppress their own doubts. They might perhaps give them in writing to the teacher, and the teacher might give, also in writing, or, in his address, such answer to them as he could. Nor would it be objectionable to associate, without exact accordance of opinion, but the person at the head of the ‘‘society’’ or institution should say, ‘‘I mean for myself, and for any wishing to associate with me, to live as closely as possible in accordance with my religious belief. Anyone who finds my belief that which does not accord with his or her views of right to live with, or according to, is entirely at liberty to leave me any day.’’ Unless he has such reason to give, no such association should be made for less than a year, because frequent changes would impede the effecting any valuable work of life. {Omitted: My present impression is even to forbid religious discipline in the society. f182} Private study, as much as the work of life permitted—receiving instr uction from the teachers, and suggesting, in writing, any difficulties, would be best, in writing, because that would be a test that consideration had been given to them, that it was not loose exclamation from emotion, or crude thoughts merely, disturbing both to

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the pupil and the teacher. Perhaps, in writing too, if desired, the society might offer to each other on a fixed day any of their questions for solution. In a religion, which each man is to learn from his God by the capabilities God has given to mankind, there are, of course, many considerations to be taken into view, in which we can have no guidance from the Roman Catholic orders. Looking to any probable means of efficiently introducing new views of religion to be the spring and foundation of the mode of human life, something after the manner of Roman Catholic orders appears the most feasible, perhaps the only means. 8.9 What would be the true connection of Mankind? Machiner y, which is, at present, mainly an assistance for effecting material wishes, will become, by facilitating communication over the globe, the grand and noble means towards a truer connection of mankind. While it is impossible, at present, for individuals to effect such a connection, a more limited and modified connection, that of a ‘‘society,’’ may be possible. Imagination may strive to picture what, even with our power of comprehending the nature of wisdom and love, we may prophesy, will one day be. Isaiah, prophesying that there will be peace, says that ‘‘the wolf shall dwell with the lamb.’’240 A much higher peace than this will be. It would not be accordant with wisdom that the wolf should so alter his nature; he will cease to exist, as unfitted for that state of progress. Mankind, with the various characteristics which, in accordance with God’s law, are impressed by climate, by races, rightly blended, will join in one common purpose, or aim at one common purpose, with God. We may well see, then, that a ‘‘society’’ must be very limited in its capabilities. But a little leaven (is it not said?) shall leaven the whole lump.241 And to begin in small that which ought to be universal may be the dawn of the sun of righteousness. We find individuals eagerly pursuing one object or work disgusted with another. To the wellborn and well-developed no subject proper for man’s interest would be without interest to each. Nay,

240 Isa 11:6. 241 An allusion to Gal 5:9.

What would be the true connection of Mankind?

520 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought man must always be wanting in divine comprehensiveness, in proportion to that part of the divine thought of which he has no knowledge or feeling. It is certain, however, that in a ‘‘society’’ the subjects of study and the objects of work must be greatly limited. And a wise limitation must be most carefully sought. Limitations of social relations, limitations of liberty to follow idiosyncratic tendencies, limitations of study, limitations of employment, must be most carefully considered. Perpetual mistakes are made, on the one hand, by not seeking a general principle, on the other, by not wisely modifying it. Never remain ignorant of a principle because it cannot be acted out, because ‘‘the hour and the man’’ require its modification. It is a principle (if by principle we mean a universal truth, which may be asserted without limitation) that knowledge of each separate kind is capable of advancing man to comprehension of and oneness with the perfect one, that ignorance of any one subject increases the separation of the imperfect from the perfect. Yet it is ver y certain that any religious ‘‘society’’ of today must systematically limit, but not without intense consideration, the studies, employments and social relations of its members. Mere obedience to rule no true connection I would repeat that all experience shows that ‘‘societies,’’ unless held in check by the curb of public opinion, do not make progress—they make coteries. They do not advance, they become stereotyped. Their ‘‘tone’’ belongs to centuries back—nay, even to times in the Old Testament. In these days public opinion is before them. I have for many years been trying to find out how this could be, since public opinion is made up of individual opinions. I think it is because we are much more rigid in making you mind your business than in minding our own. Public opinion is good for this. The remark is not a high-minded one, but it is true. It is incontrovertible, that to give to ‘‘societies’’ a prospect of real usefulness, public opinion should always be ‘‘blowing a gale’’ through them. It is further remarkable how generally the heads of ‘‘societies,’’ almost always themselves distinguished, have hitherto failed in producing great minds under them, how frequently, indeed, they have been unable to tolerate them. It is a great mistake, too, to form the life either of a ‘‘society’’ or an individual upon such a basis as this, viz., to ‘‘follow out God’s thought’’ in an imaginar y scheme of perfection for ‘‘each hour of

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the day,’’ or in an ideal community upon an ideal basis of ‘‘developing oneself,’’ ‘‘according to God’s laws.’’ This is not God’s thought. God’s thought, as far as we can interpret it, is (in the present state of His world, at least) that we should ‘‘follow out’’ some one or more things which appear most urgent in this world’s work, and for which we have capacity, at the expense of many other things which would perhaps further more our own individual ‘‘development,’’ and which, in one sense, must appear to be His thought, such as physical health, intellectual progress, etc. The union of several in such a work, whether you call them by the name ‘‘society,’’ or not, is no doubt essential. Scarcely anything can be done by an individual alone. But to unite, in order to ‘‘make a life for yourselves’’ (the young-lady phrase of the present day), is not God’s thought. What may be when His world is better off is another question. In all things, however, be not satisfied with thinking, do: by doing, and accurately observing at once, experience is gained. By thinking only, ideal theories are gained, brought to the test of no experience, and generally far astray. ‘‘Don’t think, but try,’’ said old John Hunter, ‘‘be patient, be accurate.’’242 8.10 The idea, prevalent in all ages, of a priesthood, directs one’s thoughts to the subject, which requires immense thought and practical experiment, how far the many are to be ruled by the few. Past experiment has been mainly founded upon selfish views. We would wish, now, to experimentalize with religious and benevolent views. All should be fitted to choose their chiefs, but chiefs there should probably be, with undisputed authority in various domains, those who obey being at liberty to change their chosen chiefs, not arbitrarily at any time, but at intervals which should allow a fair opportunity to the chosen chief to effect what he has undertaken.

Idea of a priesthood.

8.11 God’s thought our only real study Let the Almighty’s thought, His purpose, be our daily study, so that ours may accord with it. Instead of ever-reiterated prayers for what will be if it is right, will not be if it would be wrong, whether man

242 Dr John Hunter (1728-93), pioneer of scientific surger y.

God’s thought to be our daily study.

522 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought prays or not—instead of reiterated confessions of errors and regrets for errors, from committing which again we take no means to prevent ourselves—let us take to a daily study of God’s holy nature and will, to a daily devoting of ourselves to execute the work which He has given us natures capable of executing. Fellow workers, let us be in one spirit, under one head, the truthful, the righteous, the wise, the benevolent Spirit of the Universe. He speaketh not to us, indeed, by words which reach the ear, by writings which reach the eye. His scripture is the past, the present, the future of the universe, addressed to natures to whom He has given to partake of His own divine qualities. We too can love, we may learn how to love wisely. Wisdom! of attributes only not the highest! but whose existence essentially depends on there being one above, i.e., love, for its essence is the pursuit of right means for a right end. 8.12 Disappointment.

Great men who have left behind them discoveries which have benefited the world might have prophesied that they would be ‘‘rejected’’ and ‘‘despised’’243 and not have died of disappointment. They would not be disappointed, because they would know it must be so. While the majority of mankind is ignorant they must misunderstand, and they must persecute that which is beyond their understanding. Let not great men bring forward that which must be rejected by all mankind, because that would be unwise, that would be retarding truth. But let them consider, when they have made a discovery, ‘‘will this bring me honour and appreciation from the world, or simply opposition and contempt?’’ Each return has been reaped by the world’s benefactors. The duke of Wellington, Turner, Dickens, Mrs Stowe,244 how they have been appreciated! If great men find that they may perhaps make a few disciples, but that they will be ‘‘despised’’ and ‘‘rejected’’ by the rest of mankind, let them prepare themselves for it, if they choose to prosecute their undertaking, and not die of disappointment when it comes. If I could leave behind me that which should benefit the whole world, how little could I die of disappointment! I would say to myself, when the rejection came, ‘‘This is what I expected,’’ and I would not die but live.

243 An allusion to Isa 53:3. 244 Charles Dickens (1812-70), novelist; J.M.W. Turner (1775-1851), landscape painter; Harriet Beecher Stowe (1811-96), author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin.

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8.13 Moral Evidence Experience and moral proof must go together. When David said that he had never seen the ‘‘righteous begging their bread,’’245 he went by moral proof ; he thought that it ought to be so, and that therefore it was so. The world was not yet old enough. He had not experience enough to see that it was not so. And a juster view of God’s character would also have shown him that it was not likely to be so. But it is quite natural that, in the early ages, it should have been thought that it was not likely that God should suffer ‘‘the righteous’’ to want for bread. Again, ‘‘Did this man sin or his parents?’’246 implying a belief that this man was likely to be sick because he or his parents had been wicked—this again is moral evidence. They thought it would be so. And here again there is a defect both of moral evidence and of experience, i.e., it would neither be wise and good if it were so, nor is it so. Not but that ill health is ver y often the consequence of sin, either in a man or in his progenitors, but it is also the consequence of ignorance of the physical laws as well as of the moral laws. It is not a visitation for the infraction of a moral law. It is the consequence of a physical law, which physical law may indeed have been brought into action by moral guilt. The ‘‘ought to be’’ would tell us what ‘‘will be,’’ did we always know it perfectly. It would reveal to us the whole future. But our knowledge of the character of God must, as yet, be too limited to enable us, without experience, to say what ought to be. The early belief in miracles is right and natural. If a man had repeatedly observed that the seeing three black crows preceded a death, it would be an exercise of right reason for him to conclude that it was always so, that it was a law, and nothing but experience could undeceive him. In many cases moral evidence could do nothing for him. For there is nothing in itself more improbable, more miraculous, in supposing that when a man reaches a certain pitch of moral goodness he is able to cure sick men, than that the marriage of two people should precede the birth of a human being. It does, indeed, seem discordant with the nature of God that the

245 A paraphrase of Ps 37:25. 246 A paraphrase of John 9:2.

Experience and moral proof must go together.

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Of all evidence, moral evidence the finest.

touch of a king should be able to cure erysipelas,247 because what is a king? When the belief in the ‘‘divinity’’ which ‘‘doth hedge a king’’248 had gone off, we saw that he is neither wiser nor better than other men. And moral evidence is therefore against the fable of the king’s evil. But nothing but experience could teach us that some miracles are miracles and not laws, and therefore are not, and that other miracles are laws. For the generation of a human being would appear a miracle were it not a law, that is, had it happened but once instead of happening always, whenever certain circumstances precede or co-exist. But how much finer is moral evidence than any other! If we can predict what a person will say and do—if we can be sure of what he must have said and done, how much better it is than any letter he may write, about which there may be always quarrelling and mistake, especially such a letter as God is said to have written! {Omitted: The last letter I can find of Portia’s to my poor Columba is this. It is dated 28th March 1853 [Easter Monday]. ‘‘You may be sure that the question of a person joining the Roman Catholic Church without believing in her authority to dictate belief is one which has often occupied me, without my venturing however to proceed further than to query. It appears to me that the R.C. Church stands on a different ground from any other in this respect. She claims openly and decidedly to dictate belief, and would not, I suppose, knowingly accept a convert, excepting on the convert’s acceptation that she had a right to do so. . . . There appears to me a doubt in theory and in practice—a fear whether I should not be losing weight in bringing forward other opinions through having been believed to have adopted those of the Roman Catholic Church, even if afterwards leaving her. These, as I have said, are but queries. I shall believe in your inward truth, whatever course you take, Columba.’’ It was too late. On Lady Day [25 March] my poor Columba had already joined the Roman Catholic Church. f194}

247 The superstition that the king’s touch could cure leprosy, or skin disease more generally; erysipelas then was a common skin disease. 248 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 4, scene 5.

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8.14 Difference in Theory and Practice The question of the possibility of a person joining or remaining in a church without believing in her authority to dictate belief is very important. It appears that the Roman Catholic Church stands on a different ground from any other in this respect. She claims openly and decidedly to dictate belief, and would not knowingly accept a convert excepting on that convert’s acceptation that she had a right to do so. What is it to belong to the Church of England? At some places, if you go once on Sunday to church—at others, if you take the sacrament—you are admitted to her privileges, which, to a woman, seem to amount to the not being objected to on account of religion in conventional society, to a man, of not being ineligible to certain employments. No scruple need be felt about thus occasionally appearing to belong to the Church of England. But it wants a great deal more consideration to remain or to become a member of a church who would give me and all to understand, not merely in a form of words, but in her life and organization, that, if I become a member of that church, I am supposed by her and by mankind to receive my belief from that church. Though this, in fact, applies both to converts and to those born in the church, in feeling it applies more to the former. We have said, in speaking of the family, that we want not to root out feelings and opinions, we want to make them more comprehensive. So of every thought, feeling, institution that has been sacred to the human mind—we want not to give it up, to abandon it, but to make it more comprehensive, more adapted to the needs of today, to the fulfillment of the progressive wants of mankind. Above all would we say this of a church—understanding by that term a religious assembly seeking truth from God, seeking true thought and feeling, true will and life—an assembly in which the few whom the many feel to be superior to themselves in the capability for so doing, shall communicate knowledge and shall direct life. Editor: In the printed version this next section seems to continue in form from the previous material, but in fact there is an abr upt break. From this point on, Nightingale has left her attempt at a novel and has moved on to sermons, the biblical texts appearing at the head as for a sermon. Three of the sermons are numbered in the manuscript (IV, VI and VIII), but not in the printed version.

Difference, both in theory and in practice, in professing oneself as belonging to the Roman Catholic or to the Anglican Church.

Tr ue object for a true Church.

526 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Two other sermons, also apparent drafts, have biblical texts at the start, but no number, while the last has neither. Several of the texts cor respond with texts used in Nightingale’s later draft sermons, but the contents are quite different.249 Of course none of the ‘‘sermons’’ was ever given in a church service. Nightingale’s editing was quite minor in this section of work: ‘‘you’’ is often changed to ‘‘we’’ (Add Mss 45839 ff198-232). 9.1 Groundwork of Belief ‘‘Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief.’’

{Omitted: Sermon IV, ’’Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief.’’250 f198} What is the groundwork of belief? Many will exclaim, as if a religious belief were nothing, unless it were undoubting. To doubt is by many sincere religionists considered to sin. And, if indeed God had taken means to declare to us His nature and His purpose, so that only by willful blindness we could doubt, to doubt would be to sin. That this is not the case is evident from the variety of opinions among those who have sincerely entertained their belief. In this most important subject, this subject which is at the foundation of ever y other, which is of a nature to influence every part of our being, of our life, of our work, we are to work out the truth for ourselves and for each other. If we were united in this search, if we would try to live and to be, so as to come to the search in a pure and elevated spirit, what truth might dawn upon our hearts and our minds to bless us all! The groundwork of belief, then, is this. With such capabilities as we have of heart and mind, with such glimpses of knowledge as we have gathered, looking forth upon the universe and all that it manifests, physical, intellectual, spiritual, we discern indications which are not referable to man, nor to any of the material beings which surround us, of benevolence, of a benevolent spirit. The more we learn of the various sciences which embody the laws of the universe, and the more we understand their mutual relations tending to man’s well-being, the more our affectional nature and our intellect trace a thought, a feeling, a purpose for well-being, for comfort, for enjoyment in various modes of being. This cannot be denied.

249 See Spiritual Journe y (2:325-51). 250 Mark 9:24.

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At the same time, it is certain that while we perceive that there are arrangements by which, in a healthy state of body, there is comfort, there is liability to derangement which causes suffering, and so throughout. The laws which exist, if kept in a certain manner by all mankind, would secure well-being, enjoyment. But it is an impossibility that all mankind should so keep them. What, then, shall we say when we look for consistency in the character—the purpose—of the ruling spirit? Great power, great benevolence, great adaptation of means to the ends of benevolence we trace, and the more we learn the more we trace. But we find that the inevitable ignorance of man stands between him and the enjoyment he is capable of, besides frequently causing intense suffering. May we not thus interpret this difficulty? Experience shows us that mankind are capable of making perpetual advances from ignorance to knowledge, are capable of learning how to keep law aright (i.e., so as to effect human well-being). Sometimes, even before they are conscious of the law, they have learnt practically how to keep it aright. May we not interpret, then, God’s thought to be this, viz., that mankind shall learn this law and how to keep it, that suffering and impediment to enjoyment for which humanity has capability arise from ignorance removable by humanity’s efforts? One of the lessons of experience is that we cannot afford real help or benefit to others in any way, except by that which brings into activity some part of their being, or prepares for its activity. Is not this a hint to us that it may be consistent with a perfect benevolence and wisdom to benefit us by calling our natures into activity? The cry of suffering man will be, sooner or later, man’s benediction. The blissful spirit will also bless, for it will excite man to communicate, to lead on others to enjoy a being like its own. ‘‘Help thou mine Unbelief’’ On this groundwork of observation, reflection, and experience, do we found our belief that God is good. But, granting that for many individuals it is by experience proved that they attain goodness and knowledge, still we seek for consistency with regard to those who have suffered much, enjoyed little, to whom it cannot be said that existence is a boon. Consistency of purpose and of practice cannot be found but in the belief of a continued existence, in the course of which all being

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Divine nature is ever y human being.

capable of improvement and well-being shall attain it. Is it unreasonable to argue from what we know of a character and purpose to what we do not know? Do we not thus infer a future with regard to human character? The argument which we have for a continued existence, is it not ‘‘positive’’? this argument being the expectation that the spirit of the future will be consistent with the spirit of the past and present. The argument against a continued existence, what is it? That to our physical nature there is no evidence of it. Our religious creed consists in this—belief in an omnipotent eternal spirit of love, wisdom, righteousness, manifesting itself by calling into existence, by definite laws, beings capable of the happiness of love, wisdom, righteousness, capable of advancing themselves and each other in divine nature—living in a universe in which, by definite law, the means and inducement are afforded which insure their advance through their own activity to humanity’s blessedness. Observation, reflection, experience are that which furnishes the evidence. We cling to the idea of continued existence, not from any personal anxiety for existence, which we should be ready enough to give up, but because, without the idea of continuity of existence to human beings, there is no consistency between one part of Providence’s ways and another, whereas, supposing continuity of existence, with the same purpose of educating divine capability into divine being, a purpose rises to view which turns all suffering into part of a wise and benevolent course to unite man with mankind, mankind with God. Can we deny this, that every human being born into the world with the ordinar y human faculties has capabilities for a divine nature? Is not this our experience? Where sin and selfishness prevail, can we not trace the maltreatment of the nature whence they have spr ung? Let us strive to look into the object of human existence, let us not be intent alone on an individual temporary object. We shall best pursue each individual temporary object by seeing its relations to all existence, to eternity. To educate human capability into divine nature by the exercise of its own powers is the object of divine law. There is one invariable law with regard to each different mode of existence—there is one right way of keeping that law in each particular instance. To know the law, to know how to keep it aright, to attain the will to keep it aright—this is the object of human life.

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Had the past been different, it had been less well for all Fear not, ye who would sincerely and earnestly devote yourselves to this object. There is around you a spirit guarding you from all permanent evil, even in your mistakes. Even these mistakes shall be turned to good for you and for all. It is a part of His righteous and benevolent purpose that we discover for ourselves His will and His way, and how to incline our hearts to keep them. Mistakes we must make in our endeavours to fulfill this purpose. He knows our ignorance. In righteousness and love and wisdom He has left us ignorant. We may trust Him that all our mistakes even are turned to good. We may always look to the past and say with confidence, ‘‘had the past been different, it had been less well for all.’’ It is a sort of impiety to the Great Spirit, a want of accordance with His will and way, to lament over our mistakes, since they arise from the nature and the circumstances which He has appointed. Let us not shrink from being conscious of them, in order that we may learn experience, but let us trust all to Him who will turn them to good. Let us look onward to our next step. If we are in spirit set to be and to do our best in the present and future, we need not fear that we shall become indifferent, because we do not goad ourselves by dwelling on past mistakes. There are much truer and higher incentives to a right present than dwelling on anything wrong in the past. Let us try that the spirit of our feelings to others be the same as to their mistakes; let us especially look upon them all as temporary. Let us endeavour that our spirit to them be in relation with the best we know of their characters, for this is the permanent in them, this is the divine, which sooner or later will strengthen and develop, while the rest is temporary and will die away. A consciousness that anything wrong or deficient is, in them, an inevitable evil, that it must be to them suffering or privation, an endeavour to set our temper and feelings in relation with what is best in them, let this be our frame of mind with regard to all whom we associate with. If we feel otherwise to them, we cannot, indeed, consistently comfort ourselves, find peace ourselves in our mistakes by views which must be universally applied to have any tr uth or help in them. Oh, the sharpness of the pang of consciousness of one’s own mistake! The heaviness of the cloud under which we begin the day which breaks upon us with the feeling that a lasting good has been lost, a lasting evil entailed by a mistake now irremediable!

Miser y of looking back upon our own mistakes.

530 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought There is soothing for the pang, the sun may break through the cloud, if we will open our hearts to the truths which are always in existence, always within the capability of man’s understanding. The will of perfect benevolence, of perfect wisdom—how can one conceive it consistently to manifest itself, except in the law which secures to eternal natures that which is well-being in the view of per fect wisdom, perfect righteousness, yet secures it by the work, the life, the exercise of each individual for his own individuality, and of each for all? The operation of such law is to be traced through all existence. Divine Nature in Man Fear not, all is safe; our mistakes lead us through a winding road to the blessedness for all being, which could not otherwise be without supposing contradictions to that divine nature in whom may rest our trust and our peace. When we are conscious of past mistake, whether it arose from ignorance of the right, or whether we had knowledge which might have directed us, but had not will, let us set ourselves at once with all vigour to the life, the work of the present. Let us look upon the past as not almost but altogether springing from the righteous law of God. Let us accept the suffering of our mistake, accept our present work. Let trust in the redeeming power of God’s law invigorate us. Let us not spare ourselves the full consciousness of our mistake, let us look at our error as far as it may help us to truth. Let us strengthen our consciousness that there is no good but in the tr ue and the right. Let us work on, even through our own faults and mistakes, with a noble striving for accordance with God’s universal work. Away with regrets which have no true foundation, empty your heart of them! Work out the page of today with good will, even though the mistake of yesterday may have complicated it. That very mistake shall lead to a brighter page than could have been, but that God, while his everlasting law of right secures us from all lasting evil, and assures us of all lasting good, gives to us to work the divine out of the human, to transmute ignorance into knowledge and feeling of truth. But shall we have motive to avoid error, if we cease to suffer the pangs of regret and remorse? There is a higher, better, truer help than those pangs—you will never rise high goaded by them. Strive to awaken the divine spirit

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of love in yourself, to awaken it in doing your present work, however you may have erred in the past—this will help you far better than dwelling on your own mistakes. There is nothing elevating or animating in the dissection of them. Essentially, in their very nature, they bring suffering or privation. Bear it in a true spirit and work on. Turn your mistakes to as much account as you can for the gaining of experience, but above all work on, yield not to paralyzing, depressing retrospection. God gives us the noble privilege of working out His work. He does not work for us. He gives us the means to find the way we should go. An eternal course is before us. Miser y of looking back Better indeed to suffer the pangs of regret than to be indifferent, but in proportion as we are conscious that we are throwing our earnestness into the present, we may dismiss regret for past mistakes. In proportion as we are striving for the path of righteousness, we may cease to look back on our false steps, except for experience to avoid them in future. And, even for that purpose, we must be careful not to weaken ourselves by feelings of despondence and depression and regret, when intending only to learn experience. Much of the power for work will depend on the mood in which we work. We must consult nature and experience as to how best we can animate and elevate the spirit in which we live. We shall seldom find the spirit for doing our best in the present by dissecting our past mistakes. When we talk of the great realities of the universe, high wishes rise within us; we would strive to make our life divine. But, when we enter the petty details and purposes of our life, that divine spirit is aggrieved and sinks within us. To begin with, some few must unite in endeavouring to make life and work one with the divine thought and purpose, and by degrees humanity may become the working out of God’s thought, which is its destination. At present it is indeed difficult to carry a true spirit into the details of life, such as life is. But we must strive to modify our life, as best we may, so as to keep alive the spirit of God within us. Father, we yearn for truth, goodness, wisdom! Oh, for a guide! How earnestly we desire the right path, yet scarcely a step can we make in which we do not afterwards perceive some mistake. But patience! We trust in the spirit of the universe. We listen to the tale which eternity is telling. We strive to interpret it aright. We

532 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought find that truth, goodness and wisdom are regulating the universe aright with relation to eternity. We find that there is neither right nor tr uth in the feeling of reproach to ourselves nor to others—that such feeling becomes a very rebellion against the divine thought, when we gain any comprehension of it. But are we to feel nothing at the folly, the darkness, which we are conscious of in ourselves, the worse than folly and darkness which the history of man, past and present, brings before us? If so, whence will spring the motive to try for better things? If we attain to estimating truly light and darkness, wisdom and folly, good and evil, the spur will not be wanting, because we do not blame those who, through the laws of the Omnipotent, are undergoing the privations, the sufferings of the race who, in darkness, must work for light. If we attain to a consciousness of what happiness is, how far from it are all who are not in harmony with God’s law for human welfare—how inevitable has been the past—what are the possibilities of the future, we shall waste ourselves in no regrets or reproaches—each will try to make himself one of God’s missionaries, to turn darkness into light, folly into wisdom, selfishness into love. What philosopher’s stone that was ever dreamt of could be compared to such a discovery—yet this is within human grasp! Tr uth, truth! let us not rest satisfied without at least striving to know when we are, in our thought and our feeling, aliens to it, or dead to its force and depth. We may not be able, at once, to help feelings most untrue towards those among whom we live. It may be impossible to us to bring home to ourselves a consciousness that, through God’s law, we and they are still in ignorance and imperfection—to estimate the degree of distance to which this throws us from divine harmony and joy. But let us not pass on without the acknowledgment of our reason to such truth as it can assent to, and let us be ever striving that our feeling and our life shall become accordant with that to which our reason has assented. When we say, let us not reproach ourselves and others, how far is this from saying let us keep ourselves unconscious of our and their wrongs against the divine nature! Let us be more and more conscious of all that is wrong, of the right which is in human possibility. Let us be more and more conscious of the privations consequent upon such wrong, of the blessed possibilities of man through human attainment. As we live through the day, let us ask ourselves, ‘‘is this truth of spirit?’’ endeavouring with a divine ken to watch our human nature—to watch it,

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not for self-reproach, but as a spring to divinize humanity—to watch that our consciousness of what is wrong in others, while becoming more and more clear and true, may become more and more accompanied with the consciousness that, in that wrong, we behold the effect of the law of right, that, by that wrong, they, in whom it exists, are inevitably separated from divine peace and joy. Fear not But how can I dare to look forward? To look back upon my life is to look back upon a tissue of mistakes. Father, thy poor child comes to thee penetrated with the feeling of its ignorance! ‘‘Fear not.’’ This ignorance points to one of the main elements of the Divine thought and purpose. In looking truly at human ignorance I read His mind. Had He guided my course with a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night,251 the problem of existence (in the tr ue solution of which, by the exercise of human capability, lies human well-being) could not have been solved aright. Yet am I never left alone in the struggle of ignorance. I am always in presence of the Father, whose law is security that His problem will be solved. But what is the problem of life? Is it not how to change imperfect knowledge into comprehension of truth, how to change imperfect nature (or mode of being) into that which is perfect, and how to live and act the truth which is thought and felt? And what assistance does God give in this work which He commits to man? He assists in two ways. He gives Himself and His laws, in consequence of which the end is sure to be attained. He ‘‘Himself took our infirmities.’’252 It is the belief common to all professing Christians (except one very small sect, to whom the rest frequently deny the name) that Christ—even when on the cross, and feeling Himself ‘‘forsaken’’253 of the Father—partook His nature and spirit which were incarnate in Him. And yet does it strike us as essentially contrar y to truth, if we say that we believe the nature of God to be incarnate in all men, as it was in Christ? But is not this a fanciful notion, grounded on no more evidence than what we have heard at church as to what God feels and will do, as to what the devil is doing, the only source of such belief being

251 An allusion to Neh 9:12. 252 Matt 8:17. 253 An allusion to Mark 15:34.

How dare I to look forward?

534 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought that the Rev Mr A., who is preaching, thinks such feeling and conduct accordant with his conception of the character of God and the devil? How dare I to look forward? There is, we agree, the same kind of foundation for our belief and that which the Rev Mr A. holds. Each believes in accordance with his conception of the character of God. And how are we to know which belief is true? By the same means by which all truth is to be attained, by taking the means which exist, if human capability is exercised aright, to attain a true conception of the character of God. The foundation for our belief that the divine nature is incarnate in, or exists connected with, human nature, is that to disbelieve this appears essentially contradictory to what we acknowledge as truth. Belief in the divine presence in man is an inference from belief in the omnipotence, benevolence and wisdom of God. What would be essentially the will of omnipotent benevolence? (by ‘‘essentially’’ meaning that which does not imply contradiction to omnipotence or benevolence). Undoubtedly happiness, well-being, welfare to other being. And what is happiness, what is well-being, welfare? Let us look into the natures we have known in life or on record, let us look into our own individual experience, to answer this question. Looking into experience, does it not accord with our consciousness that a harmonious exercise of the various powers within us for the purpose of constituting and in the way which will constitute the general well-being is our greatest happiness? If we can attain a comprehension of well-being in the abstract, this will help us to a conception of the nature of God’s existence. But may we not be in dangerous error in forming our conception of the nature of God’s existence by that which appears to man to be well-being? If each man, in his present state, imagined the satisfaction of his present inclination to be the mode of God’s existence, these would be ‘‘vain imaginations.’’ Such imaginations have had much part in human conceptions of the superhuman power which is recognized. Vengeance and a mistaken idea of justice have been attributed to God, and He has been, and is, represented as pursuing a course which would constitute Him a spirit of evil, not of good.

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But we are not to look alone at human inclinations to assist us in conceiving the satisfactions of the Power above us. We are to endeavour to read the ‘‘how’’ and the ‘‘why’’ of the universe. We shall then trace the ‘‘why’’ to be the satisfaction of the highest inclinations of which humanity is capable—enjoyment of the well-being of others. Then come inquiries into that which constitutes well-being, in order to help us to conceive the mode of existence of the Being who is always pursuing it. Our experience represents well-being to be essentially progressive. Much has been said in prose and in verse of the dissatisfied nature of man, how he never is satisfied with an object attained, but must have ever more and more. But an eternal development is essential to good in the abstract, to divine as well as to human good. It is obvious that, through the whole range of being in its various modes, every present differs from every past, and it will become obvious to the wise interpreter of existence (of its how and its why), that this ceaseless difference is all development, is all a rendering into successive being of the eternal, unchangeable thought, feeling, purpose of the one Supreme. What is Happiness, Welfare? But since unceasing change of present from past is essential to our well-being, how shall we conceive of the Being who consists in one eternal unchanging thought and feeling? The more we improve, the more will our thought and feeling become one and unchangeable. The variety consists in rendering this thought and feeling into other existence than that from which they spring. The perfect thought, the perfect feeling, lead to their own manifestation. God’s thought and feeling is the Father, its manifestation is the Son. For the Son, the Father ensures that which our experience may enable us to say constitutes well-being—individual exercise, communicating and receiving—attainment carried on under a law which ensures success. Whoever can so far read the will of God as to attain a present well-being, and an assurance of the law which is securing well-being to all that is, has arrived at a oneness with God. But is there not selfishness in that search after present wellbeing? No, because, by the benevolent and wise constitution of all that is, individual well-being promotes general well-being. When we

536 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought are selfish in pursuing our own well-being, it is because we do not understand in what it consists. Ourself is our own instrument for pursuing God’s work. If we let that instrument deteriorate, its work deteriorates. But, when we say that the Perfect nature, by His own will, exists limited as the Son, has not the Perfect caused thus His own nature to deteriorate? Is that a perfect being, which has existed only as thought and feeling? Do we recognize it as such according to our experience and consciousness? The Perfect One does not cause Himself to deteriorate. He renders thought and feeling into other being— hence perfect being. If there exists an omnipotent spirit of benevolence, and there does not exist absolute well-being for the capabilities which he has called forth to enjoy it, there must exist provision for it. It is not essentially a contradiction to the existence of a perfectly wise and omnipotent benevolence that, in the past and the present, evil and suffering have existed and do exist, for it may be a contradiction, an absurdity, to talk of the greatest possible happiness as existing ever in the present for all existence throughout eternity. We recognize God as the spirit of what is. We have to interpret the purport, the spirit of what is in eternity. We look not for a will that what is shall, at the same time, not be. That would not be the will of the spirit of truth. Without a contradiction, without supposing that to be which is not—the greatest happiness which is in possibility will not be always in existence—but the provision for it will always be in existence, if an omnipotent benevolence exists, and any tr ue interpreter of the past and present will discover the invariable eternal existence, in every present, of provision for the greatest, truest well-being for all that is. What is Man to do? A harmonious exercise of the various powers within us for the purpose of constituting (and in the way which will constitute) the general well-being is our greatest happiness. Intermingled it must be with intervals of individual contemplation. But, by our experience, we come to the conclusion that contemplation alone will not be the satisfaction of any wise and good being. But how may we venture to speculate upon the satisfactions of a being of a nature differing from man?

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All that it is possible for us to trace of a superhuman spirit is not different, but the same as what is best in humanity, differing only in degree, and in absence of the ignorance and imperfection essential to humanity. Suppose a man able to give laws to a community such as would ensure its well-being, would you think it satisfactory to that man to spend the rest of his existence in contemplating that community—even though, if he interfered with the effect of his own law, he might do mischief? It is always a proof of imperfection when particular inter ference or modification of details is required. As human laws for communities or for individuals improve, they will require the less interference or modification. Life is now full of uncertainty. We cannot calculate our circumstances, we cannot calculate upon their effect on ourselves, upon their effect on others. The human ruler cannot say beyond a certain very limited point, ‘‘such circumstances shall arise—you shall be and do thus.’’ But the degree in which man, as ruler, will be able to say this, will increase with the improvement of mankind. The glance of God sees through all the being which His law calls forth into existence in the eternal succession of present to past. From experience it may be gathered that perfect wisdom wills a perfect law for all being, from experience that that is the best rule for all being. Does it, then, only remain to the perfect Ruler of the universe to contemplate the law which is His will, to pass eternity in that contemplation? From human experience we may gather that such contemplative existence would not be satisfaction to the best attributes of humanity, still less to those attributes existing without humanity’s limits. What, then, is the nature of the Divine satisfaction, if, consistently with His nature, it is neither to contemplate the working of His law, nor to take part in the work which, for the good of others, He leaves to others uninterfered with? Will it be considered contradictory to His nature if we say that we believe Him to incarnate Himself in all men? All that we can estimate of God is love and wisdom. These qualities, or attributes, we know by experience. These attributes we may recognize in the law which regulates all being. The more we attain to comprehending and feeling the nature of this law, the greater we find that love and wisdom to be. We can also discern that it is love and wisdom alone which can keep that law aright. Man may keep law aright partially, i.e., so as partially to promote well-being, but

538 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought law can be really kept aright by the spirit of love and wisdom alone. It is the spirit of love and wisdom which wills the law of all existence. It is the spirit of love and wisdom which alone keeps aright the law of love and wisdom. These are the only attributes of God which man is able to comprehend. To define, to comprehend that nature, which we recognize as effecting that which is, is beyond our power, but we can recognize in it love and wisdom, because we may have, in some degree, experience of what a wise love is, in ourselves and each other. The very want of it, from which we suffer in ourselves and each other, teaches us what a wise love is, and this wise love, sometimes partially recognized, sometimes feelingly wanted in ourselves, we recognize as existing not in ourselves. And this is our comprehension of God. What does God do?

What is ‘‘right’’?

The idea of the divinity within has pervaded various conceptions of religion. That nature which we mean when we speak of the divinity not in man, that nature we also recognize in man. This seems all that we can say of the divinity within. Righteousness, goodness, tr uth, ascribed as attributes to God and man, are words very vaguely used. All we can comprehend of righteousness is what will here be explained of our comprehension of right. With regard then to right, to ought, to goodness (or godness), all that we can practically know of it is that it is that which causes wellbeing to man. But is not this putting right at low estimation? That depends on what is well-being to man. We mean well-being to mankind for eternity. What is right and what is wrong may be tried by this test. No thought, no feeling, no purpose is wrong which is not contrary to this. No thought, no feeling, no purpose is right which is contrary to it. Many mistakes, which penetrate into the very core of our lives and feelings, arise from erroneous or contracted views of what is human well-being. If all that satisfies the seeking of man after his greatest satisfaction could be tried, that would be right which affords man the greatest satisfaction. It has been supposed that inspired books or persons tell us what is right. The Roman Catholic, hearing that Christ says, ‘‘Sell that thou hast and give to the poor,’’254 sometimes thinks these words sufficient to

254 Matt 19:21.

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direct him to give alms, even though experience prove that alms do mischief. Whatever by experience shall be proved to be really promotive of the well-being of mankind, that is right, that is a test to be trusted. This will not be low estimation of right, if we put at a true estimation what is well-being to mankind. When we speak of a man who seeks the highest satisfactions of which human nature is capable, we are not speaking of a selfish man, for the highest satisfactions of which human nature is capable, are not selfish. When we say that is a right purpose which tends to the well-being of mankind, we are not lowering the nature of right; for that which causes the thought, the feeling, the purpose of man to approximate to unity with the thought, feeling, and purpose of the Perfect is that which tends to the greatest well-being of mankind. Right is what makes happy in Eternity To say, on any occasion, that we know not what is for the well-being of man is to say that we know not what is right. To say that we know not what is right is to say that we know not what is for the well-being of mankind. It may be that of the essential, ultimate nature of right, man is unable to judge. Practically, that thought, that feeling, that activity, that mode of being, in short, which gives the greatest consciousness of happiness to the being capable of a consciousness of past, present, future, is the mode of being to be desired, and this is all we know or can know about right. One of the elements of well-being to any mode of existence capable of consciousness of past, present and future is an assured conviction that the past, present and future of all being are determined by a righteous, benevolent, wise law. The satisfaction of loving, venerating, trusting in perfection depends on this; and this greatest satisfaction to any imperfect nature is not possible without believing in an eternity for each being capable of comprehending past, present and future. With regard to a continuation of this existence, it is not, as respects ourselves or our friends, any eagerness for the enjoyment of life, any repugnance to the idea, as respects ourselves or them, of ceasing to exist, but a desire to be convinced that there is a continued existence for each identity, because such a conviction alone accords with our idea of what is right in the supreme will.

540 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Through eternity, that which in the thought and feeling of the Per fect effects well-being for an eternity to each mode of being springing from His will, this would be the will of love and wisdom. This would be right in the Being whose will calls forth existence. We feel more satisfaction in saying that that which is right involves wellbeing than in saying that that which effects well-being is right. Undoubtedly they are one. But what is right? This sort of confusion arises from not taking into account that right is that which promotes well-being in the eternal being. That which promotes well-being in any one eternal being will promote it in ever y eternal being. There will, therefore, be no selfish or unjust principle in the idea that what makes happy is right. And here we come to a kind of evidence that immortality is to be the portion of every mode of being capable of a consciousness of present, past and future. For if, practically, that which is right is adapted to make happy a mode of being adapted to a never-ending future, if we can trace a law and a will adapted to the satisfaction of the nature of beings who are immortal, but not adapted to the satisfaction of beings of finite duration, this is evidence for the immortal nature of all beings capable of a consciousness of present, past and future. Do we still feel an inclination to think that being happy arises from what we call being right, not that being right arises from being happy? Do we still feel dissatisfaction in saying that that which makes happy is right—satisfaction in saying that that which is right makes happy? Can we define ‘‘Right’’? To give a definition of right is, perhaps, not in our power, but practically we can still say that that is right which tends to the well-being of an immortal nature. And the more we study the law and will which may be discerned to regulate all existence, the more we shall find it adapted to the well-being of immortal existence. All that we can comprehend of righteousness is, then, this comprehension of right. Goodness is godness—godness is goodness. We can say no other of goodness than of right or righteousness. Truth is that which is: that which is springs from the will of omnipotent love and wisdom. A finite being can comprehend truth, or that which is, only imperfectly, for whatever is, is connected with all else that is, and with all that has been in the past, and that will be in the future. We may be perpetually advancing in the estimation of what

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is, but no finite or imperfect being can fully estimate it. Neither can the intellect alone attain truth; feeling must join with the intellect to estimate aright what is. Many feel a positive conviction of a truth when they are far from any comprehension of it, they have the assurance of the senses, or of the intellect, or of the feeling, perhaps; and, having this assurance, and not being conscious that other than this is necessary for the estimation of truth, they have an undoubting belief. The imperfect can never attain the fullness of truth. Truth is that which is, and none can comprehend that which is without the comprehension of what has been and is to be, for whatever is, even to the most minute and apparently insignificant mode of being, is in connection with all that is and with all that has been. If all that has been had not been, nothing that is would be as it is. No one, therefore, can fully comprehend anything that is, except the Being to whom all is ‘‘one eternal now,’’255 without past or future. But the being who is capable of an increasing comprehension of past, present and future, and the connection between them, may be forever advancing in comprehension of truth. If it be that to One alone the fullness of truth will ever be comprehensible, is not the best which the Omnipotent can bestow, (1) a nature to which He furnishes the capability to be ever advancing towards that fullness of truth; (2) means and inducement to advance towards it—His law being such as to ensure the attainment of such a degree of truth as constitutes well-being, even if the fullness of tr uth be for One alone? Happy, at all events, is the destiny of mankind—infinite the benevolence and the wisdom which wills that destiny. We have had but slight glimpses of the sunshine of joy which is man’s destination, yet enough to reveal its nature. The happiness of attaining is, as yet, imperfectly estimated, because the objects which a man attains are low and incomprehensive. If he works from attraction for the object of his work, it is well, but if he has the highest and the most comprehensive object for his work, how will its interest be increased! There is a want of elevation, of comprehension in almost all the objects for which men work. Co-operation in one true work, with

255 Abraham Cowley, ‘‘Davideis’’ 1:362.

542 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought various idiosyncrasies, would admit of sources of happiness little understood—would call forth a constant giving and receiving of help and sympathy between those of our kind. Is right what makes happy, or the Converse? But we want the help and sympathy of One Higher than ourselves. We want to love, to venerate, with all the power within us: we want to trust in the love, the sympathy, the help of a power and a wisdom which have not the limits we feel within and around us. We are glad to work, glad to suffer, in order to attain a true thought, a true feeling, a true life for ourselves and others, but we want to be assured that we shall attain it; we want to be sure that we shall find the means, if we will seek them. All these wants shall be supplied by the omnipotent spirit of love and wisdom, whom, if we seek, we shall find, ever present with us, the Holy Ghost indeed, the Comforter,256 the God of our salvation from the evils of ignorance, which is the tr ue source of all our sufferings and privations: He will save us by teaching us how to work for ourselves and each other. It is essential to man to seek the satisfaction of his nature: but who now seeks true satisfactions?—who feels or understands what are true satisfactions? With a varied idiosyncrasy in every human being, there might be the ‘‘unity of the spirit’’ of God and of man. 9.2 ‘‘We love Him, because He first loved us.’’ 1 John 4:19 [Sermon VI] ‘‘We love Him, because He first loved us.’’

{Omitted: ‘‘The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb.’’ Isa 40:6 f226} There is only one true ground on which to look for that love which is wanted to satisfy the divine nature in God or man. Be that which is true, good, wise, loving. Owe any love which you may receive to the appreciation, to the feeling called forth by truth, goodness, wisdom, love. If you owe affection to any other source, it is sure to turn into a scourge in one way or other, at one time or other. To be loved is a natural want, but if you cannot be that which is truly loveable, even though you recognize what that is—if you cannot be where that is which will appreciate what there is in you of loveable, with a great magnanimity wait God’s time. Man cannot

256 An allusion to John 14:26.

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wait for physical food beyond a certain time without ceasing to exist as a being of this world. It may be that, without food, his affections will become entirely imperceptible to others, unknown to himself. But they cannot perish. Nothing indeed perishes. The physical framework of man changes into other modifications of material being. But it is ever matter, ever accordant with the laws of matter. We have no experience of any material existence which has ever ceased to be accordant with those laws which regulate what we mean by matter. As to other modes of being not less real—such as thought and feeling—they also are imperishable. We recognize them as manifested (not modified by matter) in one individuality; we recognize them (modified by matter) in many individualities forming one connected race, each individuality being influential on every other. Nourish yourself with love of truth, goodness, righteousness, with reverence and admiration for wisdom, beauty, order, wherever such attributes are made manifest. When love to you springs from them, receive it, welcome it as your natural food, but the only legitimate trying for it is by being that which is fitted to attain it from the divine. You are in an attitude of unnatural screw if you strive otherwise for it. Be wise as regards God, and you will secure right relations as regards man, as far as depends on yourself. But I must vary according to the characters I am with, be grave or gay, for instance, as suits my companionship, you say. A real view of what is and a feeling consistent with it would cause a constant flow of cheerfulness, arising from a spring too deep for variations, provided the present is healthful to the nature. But as it is God’s will for man that he discover and attain the circumstances, the organization of life, which are calculated to call forth and exercise the divine in him—in circumstances not so calculated, it will not be well with him. 9.3 It is all One Will ‘‘God is Love.’’ 1 John 4:16 {Omitted: Sermon VIII. f228} It is all one one unvarying principle from which spring ever-var ying manifestations. The one invariable principle is indeed the spring of other invariable principles adapted to various modes of being. All, however, there is reason to believe, will prove traceable to one will—

It is all one Will.

544 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought the will for the greatest {possible} degree and the highest kind of well-being (in the course of eternity) which are possible without admitting of any contradictory volitions in the mode of effecting it. From perfect wisdom and benevolence springs the will for the various invariable {unconditional} co-existences and successions which are found to exist, the knowledge of which is attainable by man, and from this knowledge, which must spring from the exercise of his own nature, comes his power—his power to create, to develop, to modify. Nothing is destructible. 9.4 God’s will the only cause for all that exists.

There can be no cause for anything which exists but that it is the will of the spirit of the universal, the righteous, the wise, the good. This spirit wills the same co-existences, the same successions through eternity. This we call law. Hence springs infinite variety. Hence springs development, evolution. There is nothing dull in the operation of invariable law. The universe varies throughout, in every part, in each present from every past. The Almighty never repeats Himself in His wonderful work. Yet His law, whence it springs, never varies. The thought, the feeling whence all springs are ever the same, the activity, His manifestation, ever varying. Is it dull to trust and love? Yet whom can we trust and love like Him, whose thought never varies, because it is always the thought of perfect love, perfect wisdom? Is it dull to work with certainty of success for every righteous wish, for those we love as well as for our poor selves? Yet what nature shall inspire such certainty as the one whose wisdom is such that in Him ‘‘is no variableness nor shadow of turning?’’257 9.5

‘‘Prepare ye the way of the Lord!’’

Oh! that again someone would cry, in a voice that might reach the human heart, ‘‘Prepare ye the way of the Lord!’’258 ‘‘Woe unto Jerusalem’’259 is a cry some read with a kind of religious feeling. We condemn those sinful Jews who crucified the tabernacle of that bright spirit. We have a sort of satisfaction in condemning them, as if thereby we were manifesting in ourselves a religious spirit, but suppose one says, Woe to London! Suppose one

257 Jas 1:17. 258 Matt 3:3, quoting Isa 40:3. 259 Jer 13:27.

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says, How much worse not to strive to save thousands from a crucified spirit than to crucify one body, thereby transferring that lofty spirit to some other reign of God’s universe! Woe indeed to those who did it; their state must entail woe. But what is not entailed to multitudes by present modes of life, general even among those accounted the first of the land! What, then, to do? 9.6 Go forth from these Principles Keeping to these principles—when the ‘‘hour and the man’’ come, fear not to declare them and to strive to live and act them, but look to do it wisely, or the time when such truth shall be acknowledged and shall bless mankind is made more distant. But is this time of materialism, of comfort and luxury seeking, of conventionality, a time in which the apostle of such truth may hope that any will join him? Yes, thought and feeling are (and will be more and more) afloat, especially among women. Within half a centur y most decided is the change of the relations of women in society. {Omitted: I heard the other day a brother and sister reading the passage of Eve’s expression of her feelings of submissive devotedness to Adam in. . . . f231} Milton’s expression of Eve’s submissive devotedness to Adam is read with far different feelings from what it was thirty years ago. {Omitted: They both agreed afterwards, talking over the subject. . . . f231} What a general change there is in feeling! Families are no longer monarchies. Household occupations are withdrawn from the middle classes. Yet, at the same time, servants educated in the best schools decline to scour. There is higher and higher mental cultivation and cultivation of the arts. Music and singing and drawing, passable thirty years ago, would not be produced now. But there is more discontent as well as more speculation. It is the time for a few among the speculative and discontented to listen to more enlarged views of religion and to a life consistent with these. The word ‘‘matter’’ invariably implies limit. The study of matter is the study of various kinds and degrees of limit, and of the development of these towards the unlimited. See the wisdom and benevolence of the Spirit of the Universe. In and through matter arise enjoyments which, without a contradiction, could not be, except with such a mode of existence. Some enjoyments are impossible except to the material, and these are both in themselves good, and

Go forth from these principles.

546 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought also enhance the excellence of the spiritual being, towards which all is tending. The feeling of vigour after a cold bath is a thing with which we should be sorry to part with out of existence, and for which we thank God. This brings to our consciousness in a small matter that which we expect will prove true throughout, viz., that suffering is always to intermingle, to co-exist with enjoyment. We have not this delicious feeling of vigour, except after such a shock of cold as to make us shudder.260 Another truth seems to be that a wise care of the physical frame will not at all preclude great occasional efforts. An habitual care of the machine for the purpose of effecting its high end will enable, not prevent, its occasionally bearing great stretches, without lasting diminution of power. The ‘‘Son’’ essential to the Father’s Wor th And, when, having passed through the various limitations of matter, the limited merges, according to the thought of the All-wise, into that which is without limit, the unlimited thereby possesses an existence, the value of which could not otherwise have had the excellence which it possesses. For without a contradiction, thought, which has not been lived, realized, worked, exercised, cannot be, in worth, what life, reality, work, and exercise effect. And thus the Father and the Son are one,261 essential to each other’s worth, essential to that excellence which even man thirsts to recognize in existence. Bravely then, oh man, accord with thy high calling! Be already one, in spirit, with the Unlimited to which thou art advancing. Do the hills, the woods, the tufts of heath, the active ants make the spirit of man to sing with joy? What shall it be, as limits, through work, extend themselves, and worlds and firmaments, and finally the universe, with its existence of past, present and future, rises to our consciousness?

260 Nightingale, as others of her family, did water cures, described in European Travels (7:675-80). 261 An allusion to John 10:30.

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Cassandra Editor: Cassandra, the most-well-known part of Suggestions for Thought, is also the most altered of the drafts to reach print. As described in the Introduction above, there is a substantial draft of its early novel form, without the name ‘‘Cassandra’’ ever appearing in it. Rather, the characters were Nofariari, the unfortunate heroine with a Cassandra-like role, prophetess of doom, here not of the fall of Troy but of the plight of educated and intellectual women. The name of her brother, Fariseo, might imply ‘‘Pharisee,’’ although his portrayal is quite sympathetic. Certainly he represents the position of a conventional family which cannot understand what the thwarted young woman has to complain about. As for other parts of the Suggestions for Thought manuscript, Nightingale struck out the names of the characters and much of the dialogue, and rewrote passages in the third person. Both versions are printed here, side by side, to make it possible for readers to compare them. The inside columns give the original, novel, draft, the outside the final printed form, complete with sidebars. The identifying footnotes largely pertain to both and are given only once. Passages only in the manuscript version or substantially reworded indicated with { }. Passages reworded for person or minor editing are not indicated.

[manuscript] Source: Add Mss 45839 ff236-88 ‘‘The voice of one crying in the ‘crowd,’ ‘Prepare ye the way of the Lord.’ ’’ {The night was mild and dark and cloudy. Nofariari was walking to and fro before the beautiful façade of a Palladian palace. All was still. Not one light through the windows betrayed the existence of any life stirring within. ‘‘I, I alone am,’’ she said.} One often comes to be wandering alone in the bitterness of life without. {(She went down where, on the glassy dark pond the long shadows of the girdle of pines whose tops seemed to touch heaven were lying. The swans were sleeping in their little islands. Even the Muscovy ducks were not yet awake. But she had suffered so much that she had outlived even the desire to die.)} ‘‘For such a one, all must be gone through,’’ she said, ‘‘why not this side the grave as well as the other?’’ Perhaps, if prematurely we dismiss ourselves from this world, all may even have to be suffered through again— the premature birth may not contribute to the

[printed] Suggestions for Thought 2:374-411

1 ‘‘The voice of one crying in the’’ crowd, ‘‘Prepare ye the way of the Lord.’’ One often comes to be thus wandering alone in the bitterness of life without. It might be that such a one might be tempted to seek an escape in hope of a more congenial sphere. Yet, perhaps, if prematurely we dismiss ourselves from this world, all may even have to be suffered through again—the premature birth may not contribute to the production of another being, which must be begun again from the beginning.

The night-walk of one prematurely awake.

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Sleeping ignorance.

Such a one longs to replunge into the happy unconscious sleep of the rest of the race! they slumber in one another’s arms—they are not yet awake. To them evil and suffering are not, for they are not conscious of evil. While one alone, awake and prematurely alive to it, must wander out in silence and solitude—such a one has awakened too early, has risen up too soon, has rejected the companionship of the race, unlinked to any human being. Such a one sees the evil they do not see, and yet has no power to discover the remedy for it.

The eternal patience of God.

Why have women passion, intellect, moral activity—these three— and a place in society where no one of the three can be exercised? Men say that God punishes for complaining. No, but men are angr y with misery. They are irritated with women for not being happy. They take it as a personal offence. To God alone may women complain, without insulting Him! Women live a ‘‘fancy’’ Life.

And women, who are afraid, while in words they acknowledge that God’s work is good, to say,

production of another being, which must be begun again from the beginning.’’ {She resumed her walk on the terrace by the struggling light of the moon, which at this moment shone out from between the clouds. The sharp cornice of the Venetian palace building stood out clear against it in the clear pale blue of the morning dawn. Would, she said, that I could replunge myself in} the happy unconscious sleep of all my race! They slumber in one another’s arms—they are not yet awake. To them evil and suffering are not, for they are not conscious of it. While I alone, awake and prematurely alive to it, must wander out in silence and solitude. I have awakened too early. I have rejected the companionship of my race. I am unmarried to any human being. I see the evil they do not see, yet I have no power to discover the remedy for it. {Would that I were back again warm and innocent in sleeping ignorance, but not alone! She re-entered the palace and reached her balcony, where she threw herself down on its cold pavement, resting her forehead on the stone balustrade and her long hair, of the golden tint which the Venetian painter delight to honour, bound with gems, radiant gems, which sparkle in the moonlight, fell upon her bare arm onto rough stone. But hardly for a moment could her energetic nature acquiesce in this humiliated despairing posture. She started up like the dying lioness who fronts her hunters, and, standing at bay, as it were, she bared her forehead to the night breeze, and stretching out her arms she cried: ‘‘God, to Thee alone can I say all— God, hear me.} Why didst Thou create us with passion, intellect, moral activity—these three—and place us in a state of society where no one of the three can be exercised. {God, to none else can I make my complaint, without being rebuked for complaining, scoured for suffering! There are men who say that Thou too dost punish for complaining. I do not believe it. No, but men are angr y with misery. They are irritated with us for not being happy. They take it as a personal offence. To Thee, to Thee alone may we complain, without insulting Thee. Oh Eternal Patience of God! Him! God, how passionate hast Thou created us!} The women who are afraid to own that God’s work is good and wish to say, Thy will be not done (declaring another order of soci-

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 549 ety from that which Thou hast made) go about maudling to each other and teaching to their daughters that ‘‘women have no passions.’’ In the conventional society, which men have made for women, and women have accepted, they must have none, they must act the farce of hypocrisy, the lie that they are without passion, and therefore what else can they say to their daughters, without giving the lie to themselves?

‘‘Oh, miserable suffering, sad female humanity!’’ And what are these feelings which you are taught to consider as disgraceful, to deny to yourselves? Let us see what form do the Chinese feet assume when denied their proper development. Speak, young maidens of the ‘‘higher-toned’’ classes, ye who never commit a false step, whose justly earned reputations were never sullied even by the stain which the fruit of the mere ‘‘knowledge of good and evil’’ leaves behind, were to speak, ye say, what are your thoughts employed upon and your thoughts, which alone are free, what would they say? {And, moved by the spell of the enchantress there appeared the phantoms, the lar vae of the most beautiful race of the world, the maidens of the rank whose white hands have never been made hard by toil. Graceful and lovely, pure and ethereal they floated by and their thoughts and fancies took shape and form at the word of the Magician. With each maiden there was a phantom. One! There were two, three, twenties, hundreds ever varying, ever changing, but never was she alone.} With the phantom companion of her fancy they talked (not love, she was too innocent, too pure, too full of genius and imagination and high-toned feeling for that—but she talked in fancy of that which interested her most, they sought a companion for their ever y thought. The companion she found, not in reality, she sought in fancy, or if not that, if not absorbed in endless conversation,

262 Gen 2:9.

Thy will be not done (declaring another order of society from that which He has made), go about maudling to each other and teaching to their daughters that ‘‘women have no passions.’’ In the conventional society, which men have made for women and women have accepted, they must have none, they must act the farce of hypocrisy, the lie that they are without passion—and therefore what else can they say to their daughters, without giving the lie to themselves? ‘‘Suffering, sad’’ female ‘‘humanity’’! What are these feelings which they are taught to consider as disgraceful, to deny to themselves? What form do the Chinese feet assume when denied their proper development? If the young girls of the ‘‘higher classes,’’ who never commit a false step, whose justly earned reputations were never sullied even by the stain which the fruit of mere ‘‘knowledge of good and evil’’262 leaves behind, were to speak, and say what are their thoughts employed upon, their thoughts, which alone are free, what would they say?

That, with the phantom companion of their fancy, they talk (not love, they are too innocent, too pure, too full of genius and imagination for that, but) they talk, in fancy, of that which interests them most; they seek a companion for their every thought; the

English women (of the richer class) live in fancy in a constant ideal inter view.

550 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought companion they find not in reality they seek in fancy; or, if not that, if not absorbed in endless conversations, they see themselves engaged with him in stirring events, circumstances which call out the interest wanting to them. Yes, fathers, mothers, you who see your daughter proudly rejecting all semblance of flirtation, primly engaged in the duties of the breakfast table, you little think how her fancy compensates itself by endless interviews and sympathies (sympathies either for ideas or events) with the fancy’s companion of the hour! And you say, ‘‘She is not susceptible. Women have no passion.’’ Mothers, who cradle yourselves in visions about the domestic hearth, how many of your sons and daughters are there, do you think, while sitting round under your complacent maternal eye? Were you there yourself during your own (now-forgotten) girlhood? What are the thoughts of these young girls while one is singing Schubert,263 another is reading the Review, and a third is busy embroidering? Is not one fancying herself the nurse of some new friend in sickness, another engaging in romantic dangers with him, such as call out the character and afford more food for sympathy than the monotonous events of domestic society, another undergoing unheard-of trials under the obser vation of someone whom she has chosen as the companion of her dream? another having a loving and loved companion in the life she is living, which many do not want to change?

she saw herself engaged with him in stirring events, circumstances which call out the interest wanting to them. Yes, fathers, mothers, you who see your daughters proudly rejecting all semblance of flirtation, primly engaged in the duties of the breakfast table, you little think how her fancy compensates itself by endless interviews and sympathies (sympathies either for ideas or events) with the fancy’s companion of the hour! And you say, ‘‘she is not susceptible—women have no passions!’’ Ah! mothers, who cradle yourselves in visions about the domestic hearth, how many of your sons and daughters are there, do you think, while sitting around under your maternal complacent eyes? Were you there yourself during your own (now-forgotten) girlhood?

Tell your thoughts for once, maidens, while one is singing that divine music, another is reading the review, and another is doing crochet, busily embroidering? Where are your thoughts? Is not one fancying herself the nurse of some new friend in sickness, another engaging in romantic dangers with him, such as call out the character and afford more food for sympathy than the monotonous events of domestic society, another undergoing unheard-of trials under the observation of someone whom she has chosen as the companion of her dream? Another having a loving and loved companion in the life she is living, which many do not want to change?

263 Franz Schubert (1797-1828), Austrian composer.

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 551 And is not all this most natural, inevitable? Are they, who are too much ashamed of it to confess it even to themselves to be blamed for that which cannot be other wise, the causes of which stare one in the face, if one’s eyes were not closed. {‘‘Alas!’’ oh cried poor Nofariari, ‘‘how I have struggled against it as a snare! How I have martyrized myself, put myself to the torture!} No Trappist ascetic has done so wretched a fast, more in the body than I have done in the soul! Oh! how well I can understand the discipline of the Thebaïd, the lifelong agonies which those strong moral Mohicans put themselves through!

And is not all this most natural, inevitable? Are they, who are too much ashamed of it to confess it even to themselves, to be blamed for that which cannot be otherwise, the causes of which stare one in the face, if one’s eyes were not closed? Many struggle against this as a ‘‘snare.’’ No Trappist ascetic watches or fasts more in the body than these do in the soul! They understand the discipline of the Thebaïd—the lifelong agonies to which those strong moral Mohicans subjected themselves. Cassandra shows the young Girl dreaming at Home.

How cordially I could do the same if I believed in the effect of such to escape the worse torture of sin. But I know that the laws of God for moral well-being are not to be obeyed thus. How I have fasted mentally, scourged myself morally, used the intellectual hair shirt in order to subdue that perpetual daydreaming which I knew to be so dangerous!

I have resolved this day month I will be free from it! Twice a day, with prayer and written record of the times which I have indulged in it, I have endeavoured to combat it. Never, never, with the slightest success. {Then I thought, ‘‘through vanity it comes— through vanity it must be conquered. And I selected a person to whom to make my confession, the confession of my whole life of dreaming. I remember the day. It was like a day of crucifixion to me. It was like death. As each confession came out I feared I should not have strength to make the next confession, to drive the next nail. But I did. I went through the whole. And when it came to piercing the side, I did it too. For a fortnight it delivered me. Then all was as bad as ever.} By mortifying vanity I had done myself no good. {I did not see that it was the want of interest in my life which produced it, that by filling up that want of interest in my life I could alone remedy it. And had I even seen this. How could I make the difference? How could I obtain the interest which society declared she did not want and I could not want? But now it

How cordially they could do the same, in order to escape the worse torture of wandering ‘‘vain imaginations.’’ But the laws of God for moral well-being are not thus to be obeyed. We fast mentally, scourge ourselves morally, use the intellectual hair shirt, in order to subdue that perpetual daydreaming, which is so dangerous! We resolve ‘‘this day month I will be free from it’’; twice a day with prayer and written record of the times when we have indulged in it, we endeavour to combat it. Never, with the slightest success. By mortifying vanity we do ourselves no good. It is the want of interest in our life which produces it, by filling up that want of interest in our life we can alone remedy it. And, did we even see this, how can we make the difference? How obtain the interest which society declares she does not want, and we cannot want?

Conscientious girls suppose that this daydreaming comes through vanity, and try to subdue it by mortifying their vanity.

552 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Ferment of years of inaction. Yet this, too, is God’s voice.

What are novels? What is the secret of the charm of ever y romance that ever was written? The first thing in a good novel is to place the persons together in circumstances which naturally call out the high feelings and thoughts of the character which afford food for sympathy between them on these points—romantic events they are called. The second is that the heroine has generally no family ties (almost invariably no mother) or, if she has, these do not interfere with her entire independence. These two things constitute the main charm of reading novels. Now, inasfar as these are good and not spurious interests, let us see what we have to correspond with them in real life. Can high sympathies be fed upon the opera, the exhibitions, the gossip of the House of Commons and the political caricature? If, together, man and woman approach any of the high questions of social, political or religious life, they are said (and justly—under our present disqualifications) to be going ‘‘too far.’’ That such things can be! ‘‘Is it Thou, Lord?’’ And He said, ‘‘It is I.’’264 Let our hearts be still.

264 Matt 14:27.

seems to me that no one cares about sin, no one feels it, no one thinks it a matter of much importance.} What are novels? What is the secret of the charm of every romance that ever was written? The first thing that you observe in a novel is that the persons are placed together in circumstances which naturally call out the high feelings and thought of the characters, which afford food for sympathy between them on these points, ‘‘romantic events’’ they are called. The second is that the heroine has generally no family ties, but (almost invariably no mother) or, if she has, these do not interfere with her entire independence.

These two things constitute the main charm of reading novels. Now, inasfar as these are good and not spurious interests, let us see what we have to correspond with them in real life. Can the high sympathies be fed on the opera, the exhibitions, the gossip in the House of Commons and the political character in Punch? If, together, man and woman approach any of the high questions of social, political or religious life, they are said, and justly, to be going ‘‘too far’’! God that such things can be! {And again she threw herself down in the extremity of her suffering. It seemed a little thing to awaken such anguish. But it was the fermenting of a life of inaction and solitude. Again she raised herself up and looked abroad. The moon was shining brightly. A heavy shower of rain, which had just fallen (upon her all unconscious head) had moistened the pavement of the noble terrace. The moon was reflected from the moisture below —doubling the light above her head and beneath her feet there was a flood of radiance. The swollen river at the bottom of the valley rushed and roared from afar. The distant circle of mountains gave liberty to the thought which is fettered by a circumscribed horizon. She fixed her eyes upon the splendid moonlit expanse beneath her, when suddenly there came that darkening of the world, which we have all observed on a night when fleecy

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 553 clouds veil unexpectedly the face of the moon and which is like the wings of the Almighty— overshadowing suddenly the world, as in that inspired representation of Him in Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel. She felt the overshadowing wings above her, which had darkened her lower world and she said, ‘‘Is it Thou, Lord?’’ And He said, ‘‘It is I’’ and her heart was still.} (Let our hearts be still.)

2

Yet I would spare no pang. Would wish no torture less. The more that anguish racks The earlier it will bless.

{Nofariari and Fariseo sat talking together in the shadow of the cypress tree by the side of a fountain which shot up its single solitar y spire towards heaven. The heat was intense. They had agreed to spend there together the hours when every man is idle. Little fountains played all around them in the beautiful Italian garden. The white blossoms and shining greens of the orange trees glistened among the cypresses. ‘‘But why, my sister,’’ said Fariseo, ‘‘have you quarrelled with the world? Enjoy it as I do and do not complain of it.’’ Nofariari was speechless. What could she say? A crowd of thoughts rushed into her mind at this moment.} ‘‘Oh! Give me, give me back my suffering,’’ she cried to heaven in her heart, ‘‘suffering rather than indifferentism! For out of nothing comes nothing. But out of suffering may come the cure. Better pain than paralysis! A hundred struggles and drown in the breakers. One discovers the new world. But rather ten times rather die in the surf heralding the way to that new world than stand idly on the other shore!’’ {Fariseo scarcely remarked her silence.} ‘‘You have ever ything to make a woman happy,’’ he said, ‘‘why are you so cast down?’’ {‘‘I cannot answer the question, it is too long.} Passion, intellect, moral activity, these three have never been satisfied in me. In this cold and oppressive conventional atmosphere they cannot be satisfied. To go farther would be to enter into the whole histor y of society, of the present state of civilization.’’ {‘‘But let us do so. We have nothing else to do this hot noon,’’ said Fariseo. ‘‘Only be as short as you can.’’

Yet I would spare no pang, Would wish no torture less, The more the anguish racks, The earlier it will bless.265

Should we quarrel with the world? should we not rather try to enjoy it?

Give us back our suffering, we cr y to heaven in our hearts—suffering rather than indifferentism, for out of nothing comes nothing. But out of suffering may come the cure. Better have pain than paralysis! A hundred struggle and drown in the breakers. One discovers the new world. But rather, ten times rather, die in the surf, heralding the way to that new world, than stand idly on the shore! Passion, intellect, moral activity— these three have never been satisfied in woman. In this cold and oppressive conventional atmosphere, they cannot be satisfied. To say more on this subject would be to enter into the whole history of society, of the present state of civilization.

265 Emily Brontë, ‘‘The Prisoner,’’ stanza 14.

’’You have ever ything to make a woman happy.’’ Why do you complain?

554 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Look at the lizard. ‘‘It is not hot,’’ he says, ‘‘I like it. The atmosphere which enervates you is life to me.’’ The state of society which some complain of makes others happy. Why should these complain to those? The y do not suffer. The y would not understand it, any more than that lizard would comprehend the sufferings of a Shetland sheep.

Shall we ‘‘quarrel with the World’’?

The story of a girl’s life.

The progressive world is necessarily divided into two classes— those who take the best of what there is and enjoy it—those who wish for something better and try to create it. Without these two classes the world would be badly off. They are the very conditions of progress, both the one and the other. Were there none who were discontented with what they have, the world would never reach anything better. And, through the other class, which is constantly taking the best of what the first is creating for them, a balance is secured, and that which is conquered is held fast. But with neither class must we quarrel for not possessing the privileges of the other. The laws of the nature of each make it impossible. Is discontent a privilege? Yes, it is a privilege to suffer for your race—a privilege not reser ved to the Redeemer and the martyrs alone, but one enjoyed by numbers in every age. The commonplace life of thousands, and in that is its only inter-

This morning Nofariari was so discouraged she did not wish even for the power of expression.} ‘‘Look, brother,’’ she said. ‘‘At that lizard. It is not hot.’’ he says. ‘‘I like it. The atmosphere which enervates you is life to me.’’ The state of society which I complain of makes you happy. Why should I complain to you? You do not suffer. You would not understand it any more than that lizard would comprehend the sufferings of a Shetland sheep.’’ {‘‘Never mind,’’ said Fariseo, ‘‘tr y and I will do my best.’’ It was not pride, unless pride is the fear of not finding sympathy. It was the reluctance of wounded feeling which kept Nofariari silent. ‘‘Speak,’’ said Fariseo, ‘‘I am ready. With all the gifts which heaven has bestowed on your ingratitude, I cannot understand your suffering. I want to understand it.’’ ‘‘Must I enter into all the history of my life?’’ said Nofariari. ‘‘Cui bono? [to what good?] I do not quarrel with you, as you often accuse me of doing.} The progressive world is necessarily divided into two classes—those who take the best of what there is and enjoy it—those who wish for something better and try to create it. Without both the one and the other the world would be badly off. They are the very conditions of progress, both the one and the other. Were there none who were discontented with what they have, the world would never reach anything better. And through the other class, which is constantly taking the best of what the first is creating for them, a balance is secured, and that which is conquered is held fast. But with neither class must we quarrel for not possessing the privileges of the other. The laws of the nature of each make it impossible. {‘‘Then you do esteem discontent a privilege,’’ said Fariseo, with a smile which chilled poor Nofariari’s blood.} ‘‘Yes, it is a privilege to suffer for your race—a privilege not reser ved alone to the Redeemer and the martyrs, but one enjoyed by members in ever y age. {But if you will hear what I have been doing, listen, it is a vulgar commonplace life enough.}

And in that is its only interest, its only merit as a history, viz., that it is the type of

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 555 vulgar sufferings—the story of one who has not the courage to resist nor to submit to the civilization of her time. Poetr y and imagination began life in me, as they do in most, I remember, when I was a child falling on my knees on the gravel walk at the sight of a pink hawthorn in full flower, to praise God for it. Then came intellect. It wished to satisfy the wants which my intellect created for me. But there is a physical, not moral, impossibility of supplying the wants of the intellect in the state of civilization at which we have arrived. The stimulus, the training, the time are, all three, wanting to us—or, in other words, the means and inducement are not there.

Look at the poor lives which we lead. It is a wonder to us that we are so good as we are, not that we are so bad. In looking around me, I am struck with the power of the organizations about me, not with their want of it. Now and then, it is true, I am conscious that I am in the presence of an inferior organization, but, in general, just the contrary. Your sister-in-law, Mrs A., has the imagination, the poetr y of a Murillo and a sufficient power of execution to show that she might have had a great deal more—why is she not a Murillo? From a physical difficulty, not a mental one— If she has a knife and fork in her hands during three hours of the day, she cannot have a pencil or brush. Dinner is the great sacred ceremony of this day, the great sacrament. To be absent from dinner is equivalent to being at the point of death. Nothing else will excuse us from it. Bodily incapacity is the only apology valid. If she has a pen and ink in her hands during other three hours, writing answers for the Penny Post, again she cannot have her pencil and so ad infinitum through life. People have no type before them in their lives—neither fathers and mothers—nor the

est—its only merit as a history, viz., that it is the type of common sufferings—the stor y of one who has not the courage to resist nor to submit to the civilization of her time—is this. Poetr y and imagination begin life. A child will fall on its knees on the gravel walk at the sight of a pink hawthorn in full flower, when it is by itself, to praise God for it. Then comes intellect. It wishes to satisfy the wants which intellect creates for it. But there is a physical, not moral, impossibility of supplying the wants of the intellect in the state of civilization at which we have arrived. The stimulus, the training, the time, are all three wanting to us; or, in other words, the means and inducements are not there. Look at the poor lives which we lead. It is a wonder that we are so good as we are, not that we are so bad. In looking round we are struck with the power of the organizations we see, not with their want of power. Now and then, it is true, we are conscious that there is an inferior organization, but, in general, just the contrary. Mrs A. has the imagination, the poetry of a Murillo,266 and has sufficient power of execution to show that she might have had a great deal more. Why is she not a Murillo? From a material difficulty, not a mental one. If she has a knife and fork in her hands during three hours of the day, she cannot have a pencil or br ush. Dinner is the great sacred ceremony of this day, the great sacrament. To be absent from dinner is equivalent to being ill.

266 Bartolomé Esteban Murillo (1618-82), artist.

556 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Nothing else will excuse us from it. Bodily incapacity is the only apology valid. If she has a pen and ink in her hands during other three hours, writing answers for the penny post; again, she cannot have her pencil, and so ad infinitum through life. People have no type before them in their lives, neither fathers and mothers nor the children themselves. They look at things in detail. They say, ‘‘It is very desirable that A., my daughter, should go to such a party, should know such a lady, should sit by such a person.’’ It is tr ue. But what standard have they before them? of the nature and destination of man? The very words are rejected as pedantic. But might they not, at least, have a type in their minds that such a one might be a discoverer through her intellect, such another through her art, a third through her moral power?

children themselves. They look at things in detail. they say, ‘‘It is very desirable that A, my daughter, should go to such a party, should have such a lady, should sit by such a person.’’ But what standard have they before them? of the nature of destr uction of man? The very words are rejected as pedantic. But might they not, at least, have a type in their minds that such a one might be a discoverer through her intellect, such another through her art, such through her moral power?

Cassandra tells the Story of a Girl’s Life.

Women often try one branch of intellect after another in their youth, e.g., mathematics. But that, least of all, is compatible with the life of ‘‘society.’’ It is impossible to follow up anything systematically. Women often long to enter some man’s profession where they would find direction, competition (or rather opportunity of measuring the intellect with others) and, above all, time. In those wise institutions, mixed as they are with many follies, which will last as long as the human race lasts, because they are adapted to the wants of the human race; those institutions which we call monasteries, and which, embracing much that is contrary to the laws of nature, are yet better adapted to the union of the life of action and that

I tried one branch of intellect after another in my youth. I tried, e.g., mathematics. But that, least of all, is compatible with the life of our ‘‘society.’’ It is impossible to follow up anything systematically. I thought seriously at one time of running away and putting on men’s clothes and entering myself into college where I should have found direction, competition (or rather the opportunity of measuring the intellect with others), and above all, time.

In those wise Institutions, mixed as they are with many follies, which will last as long as the human race lasts, because they are adapted to the wants of the human race— those institutions which we call monasteries and which, embracing much that is contrary to the laws of nature, are yet better adapted to the union of the life of action and that of thought than any other mode of life with which we are acquainted—in many such, 41⁄2 hours, at least, are daily set aside for

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 557 thought. Rules are given for thought, training and opportunity afforded. Among us, there is no time appointed for this purpose and the difficulty is that, in our social life, we must be always doubtful whether we ought not to be with somebody else, or be doing something else.

Are men better off than women in this? {But do you fancy, said Fariseo, that men are so much better off than women?} ‘‘It happened to me, calling twice upon a friend in London, to see both times her son in the drawing room, it struck me odd to find a young man sitting idling in his mother’s drawing room in the morning. For men, who are seen much in those haunts, there is no end of the epithets we have: ‘‘knight of the carpet,’’ ‘‘drawing-room heroes,’’ ‘‘ladies men,’’ beneath our contempt. But suppose we were to see a number of men in the morning sitting round a table in the drawing room, looking at prints, doing worsted work and reading little books, how we should laugh! I knew a man once, an honourable, a member of the House of Commons, who did a great deal of worsted work. Of another man a friend said to me once, ‘‘His only fault is that he is too good—he drives out with his mother every day in the carriage and if he is asked anywhere, he answers that he must dine with his mother, but, if she can spare him, he will come in to tea, and he does not come.’’

Now why is it more ridiculous for a man than for a woman to do worsted work and drive out every day with his wife? Why should we laugh, if we were to see a parcel of men sitting round a drawing-room table in the morning, and think it all right if they were women? Have women confessedly nothing to do? is man’s time essentially more valuable than woman’s? or is the difference between

of thought than any other mode of life with which we are acquainted; in many such, four and a half hours, at least, are daily set aside for thought; rules are given for thought, training and opportunity afforded. Among us, there is no time appointed for this purpose, and the difficulty is that, in our social life, we must be always doubtful whether we ought not to be with somebody else or be doing something else. Are men better off than women in this? If one calls upon a friend in London and sees her son in the drawing room, it strikes one as odd to find a young man sitting idling in his mother’s drawing room in the morning. For men, who are seen much in those haunts, there is no end of the epithets we have: ‘‘knights of the carpet,’’ ‘‘drawing-room heroes,’’ ‘‘ladies’ men.’’ But suppose we were to see a number of men in the morning sitting round a table in the drawing room, looking at prints, doing worsted work, and reading little books, how we should laugh! A member of the House of Commons was once known to do worsted work. Of another man was said, ‘‘His only fault is that he is too good; he drives out with his mother every day in the carriage, and if he is asked anywhere he answers that he must dine with his mother, but if she can spare him, he will come in to tea, and he does not come.’’ Now, why is it more ridiculous for a man than for a woman to do worsted work and drive out every day in the carriage? Why should we laugh if we were to see a parcel of men sitting round a drawingroom table in the morning, and think it all right if they were wom-

558 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought en? Is man’s time more valuable than woman’s, or is the difference between man and woman this, that woman has confessedly nothing to do? Women are never supposed to have any occupation of sufficient importance not to be interrupted, except ‘‘suckling their fools,’’267 and women themselves have accepted this, have written books to support it, and have trained themselves so as to consider whatever they do as not of such value to the world or to others, but that they can throw it up at the first ‘‘claim of social life.’’ They have accustomed themselves to consider intellectual occupation as a merely selfish amusement, which it is their ‘‘duty’’ to give up for every trifler more selfish than themselves.

man and woman this that woman has confessedly nothing to do?

Women are never supposed to have any occupation of sufficient importance not to be interrupted—except ‘‘suckling their fools.’’ And the next curious part of it is that women themselves have supported this—have written books to support it—and have trained themselves so as to consider nothing that whatever they do as not of sufficient value to the world or to others, but that they can throw it up at the first ‘‘claim of social life.’’ They have accustomed themselves to consider intellectual occupation as a merely selfish amusement, which it is their ‘‘duty’’ to give up for every trifler more selfish than themselves.

Society frittering away its Intellects.

A young man (who was afterwards useful and known in his day and generation) when busy reading and sent for by his proud mother to shine in some morning visit, came, but after it was over he said, ‘‘Now, remember, this is not to happen again. I came that you might not think me sulky, but I shall not come again.’’ But for a young woman to send such a message to her mother and sisters, how impertinent it would be! A woman of great administrative powers said that she never undertook anything which she ‘‘could not throw by at once, if necessar y.’’ How do we explain then the many cases of women who have distinguished themselves in clas-

267 Shakespeare, Othello.

A young man, (who was afterwards useful and known in his day and generation) when busy reading and sent for by his proud mother, and sister, to shine in some social occasion, came, but, after it was over, he said, ‘‘now remember—this is not to happen again—I came that you might not think me sulky—but I shall not come again.’’ But for a young women to send such a message to her mother and sisters think how impossible it would be! A woman of great administrative power told me once that she never undertook anything which ‘‘she could not throw by at once, if necessary.’’

‘‘But how do you explain then,’’ {said I (if I am Fariseo)} ‘‘the innumerable cases of women who have distinguished themselves in classics, mathematics, even in politics?’’

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‘‘Widowhood, ill health, or want of bread, these three explanations—or excuses—are supposed to justify a woman in taking up an occupation. In some cases, no doubt, an indomitable force of character will suffice without any of these three, but such are rare.

But see how society fritters away the intellects of those committed to her charge! It is said that society is necessary to sharpen the intellect. But what do we seek society for? It does sharpen the intellect, because it is a kind of tour de force to say something at a pinch—unprepared and uninterested with any subject to improvise something under difficulties. But what ‘‘go we out for to seek?’’ To take the chance of someone having something to say which we want to hear—or of our finding something to say which they want to hear? You have a little to say, but not much. You often make a stipulation with someone else, ‘‘Come in ten minutes, for I am sure I shall not be able to find enough to spin out longer than that.’’ You are not to talk of anything very interesting for the essence of society is to prevent any long conversations and all tête-à-têtes.

‘‘Glissez, n’appuyez pas’’ is its very motto. The praise of a good ‘‘maîtresse de salon’’ consists in this that she allows no one person to be too much absorbed in, or too long about, a conversation—she always recalls them to their ‘‘duty.’’ People do not go into society, because the company of their fellow creatures for what would seem a very sufficient reason, namely, that they have something to say to them, or something that they want to hear from them, but in the vague hope that they may find something to say.

268 A paraphrase of Matt 11:8.

sics, mathematics, even in politics? Widowhood, ill health, or want of bread, these three explanations or excuses are supposed to justify a woman in taking up an occupation. In some cases, no doubt, an indomitable force of character will suffice without any of these three, but such are rare. But see how society fritters ways the intellects of those committed to her charge! It is said that society is necessary to sharpen the intellect. But what do we seek society for? It does sharpen the intellect, because it is a kind of tour de force to say something at a pinch, unprepared and uninterested with any subject, to improvise something under difficulties. But what ‘‘go we out for to seek?’’268 To take the chance of someone having something to say which we want to hear? or of our finding something to say which the y want to hear? You have a little to say, but not much. You often make a stipulation with someone else, ‘‘Come in ten minutes, for I shall not be able to find enough to spin out longer than that.’’ You are not to talk of anything very interesting, for the essence of society is to prevent any long conversations and all tête-â-têtes. ‘‘Glissez, n’appuyez pas’’ is its ver y motto. The praise of a good ‘‘maîtresse de maison’’ consists in this, that she allows no one person to be too much absorbed in, or too long about, a conversation. She always recalls them to their ‘‘duty.’’ People do not go into the company of their fellow creatures for what would seem a very sufficient

560 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Should we not learn to be able to work, as schoolboys do, in a room full of people?

reason, namely, that they have something to say to them, or something that they want to hear from them; but in the vague hope that they may find something to say. Then as to solitary opportunities. Women never have half an hour in all their lives (excepting before or after anybody is up in the house) that they can call their own, without fear of offending or of hurting someone. Why do people sit up so late, or, more rarely, get up so early? Not because the day is not long enough, but because they have ‘‘no time in the day to themselves.’’ If we do attempt to do anything in company, what is the system of literar y exercise which we pursue? Ever ybody reads aloud out of their own book or newspaper—or, ever y five minutes, something is said. And what is it to be ‘‘read aloud to’’? The most miserable exercise of the human intellect. Or, rather, is it any exercise at all? It is like lying on one’s back, with one’s hands tied and having liquid poured down one’s throat. Worse than that, because suffocation would immediately ensue and put a stop to this operation. But no suffocation would stop the other.

Then as to solitary opportunities. I never had an hour in all my life (excepting before anybody was up in the house) that I could call my own without fear of offending or of hurting someone. Why do people sit up so late or, more rarely, get up so early? Not because the day is not long enough, but because they have ‘‘no time for themselves.’’ {‘‘But can’t you do anything when anybody else is in the room?’’ he said. ‘‘If not the best advice I can give you is to learn as soon as possible—schoolboys do.’’} And, if I do attempt to do anything in social or domestic company, what is the system of literary exercise which we purchase? Ever ybody reads aloud out of their own book or newspaper, or ever y five minutes something is said. And what is it to be ‘‘read aloud to’’? The most miserable exercise of the human intellect—or, rather, is it any exercise at all? To me it is like lying on my back, with my hands tied, and having food poured down my throat—worse than that, because suffocation would immediately ensue and prevent that operation. But no suffocation would stop the other.

Cassandra shows a Girl in ‘‘Society.’’

So much for the satisfaction of the intellect. Yet for a married woman in society, it is even worse. A mar ried woman was heard to wish that she could break a limb that she might have a little time to herself. Many take advantage of the fear of ‘‘infection’’ to do the same. It is a thing so accepted among women that they have nothing to do, that one woman has not the least scruple in saying to another, ‘‘I will come and spend the morn-

So much for the satisfaction of the intellect. Yet for a married woman in society, it is even worse. I once heard a mar ried woman wish that she could break a limb that she might have a little time to herself. I am sure I have often wished to take advantage of the fear of ‘‘infection’’ to do the same.

It is a thing so set down among women that they have nothing to do that a woman has not the least scruple of saying, ‘‘I will come and spend the morning with you,’’ and you would be thought quite surly and absurd if you were to refuse it. Nay, it is thought a

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 561 mark of amiability and affection, if you are ‘‘on such terms’’ that you can ‘‘come in’’ ‘‘any morning you please.’’

The last time I was in the country, in the next country house, if there was a large party of young people, ‘‘You will spend the morning with us,’’ they said to the neighbours, ‘‘we will drive together in the afternoons,’’ ‘‘we will walk together,’’ ‘‘tomorrow we will make an expedition’’ and we will spend the evening together.’’ And this was thought friendly and pretty and they went away at the end of some weeks without the smallest idea that they had not been perfectly acceptable, and thinking that their time had been spent in a very pleasant manner, and that ‘‘we had seen each other every day.’’ So women play through life. Yet time is, I suppose, the most valuable of all things. If they had come every morning and afternoon and robbed me of half a crown, I should have had redress from the police. But it is laid down, among us, that our time is of no value. If you offer a morning visit to a professional man, and say, ‘‘I will just stay an hour with you, if you will allow me, till so and so comes back to fetch me,’’ it costs him a guinea and therefore he has a right to complain. But women have no right, because it is ‘‘only their time.’’ {‘‘Well, but do you mean to say that you can’t resist?’’ said Fariseo.}

‘‘Women have no means given them, whereby they can resist the ‘claims of social life,’ as they are called,’’ she answered. ‘‘They are taught from their infancy upwards that it is wrong, ill-tempered and a misunderstanding of ‘‘Women’s Mission’’ (with a great M), if they do not allow themselves, willingly, to be interrupted at all hours. If a woman has once justified a claim to be treated as a man by some work of science or art or literature, which she can show as the ‘‘fr uit of her leisure,’’ then she will be considered justified in having leisure (hardly perhaps even then). But, if not, not. If she has nothing to show, she must resign herself to her fate.’’ {Nofariari was silent and so was I, her brother, for in truth he knew not what to say.

ing with you.’’ And you would be thought quite surly and absurd if you were to refuse it on the plea of occupation. Nay, it is thought a mark of amiability and affection, if you are ‘‘on such terms’’ that you can ‘‘come in’’ ‘‘any morning you please.’’ In a country house, if there is a large party of young people, ‘‘You will spend the morning with us,’’ they say to the neighbours, ‘‘we will drive together in the afternoon,’’ ‘‘tomorrow we will make an expedition, and we will spend the evening together.’’ And this is thought friendly and spending time in a pleasant manner. So women play through life. Yet time is the most valuable of all things. If they had come every morning and afternoon and robbed us of half a crown we should have had redress from the police. But it is laid down, that our time is of no value. If you offer a morning visit to a professional man, and say, ‘‘I will just stay an hour with you, if you will allow me, till so and so comes back to fetch me,’’ it costs him the earnings of an hour, and therefore he has a right to complain. But women have no right, because it is ‘‘only their time.’’ Women have no means given them whereby they can resist the ‘‘claims of social life.’’ They are taught from their infancy upwards that it is wrong, ill-tempered and a misunderstanding of ‘‘women’s mission’’ (with a great M) if they do not allow themselves willingly to be interrupted at all hours. If a woman has once put in a claim to be treated as a man by some work of science or art or literature, which she can show as the ‘‘fr uit of her leisure,’’ then she will be considered justified in having leisure

Women think themselves acceptable if they come to ‘‘see one another ever y day.’’

Can we not resist?

562 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought (hardly, perhaps, even then). But if not, not. If she has nothing to show, she must resign herself to her fate.

They sat looking at the fountain and its beautiful solitary spire of water. At last she said in a low voice: ‘‘See how it strives and strives and strives towards heaven. It cannot reach it. It is shedding tears of grief and of disappointment. And now it makes another and another spring. Alas! it has chains about its wings and about its feet. And it falls, falls, falls heavily to the ground and is lost upon the earth. And that which escapes is scattered among the clouds and before the wind and never finds its way again.} {See, it struggles up towards heaven again. And this time it will succeed. Behold it scales Infinity. It is rising higher and higher. That mighty heart will climb to heaven. Now it has conquered Earth. it is out of the sphere of its attraction. Oh! it is rising now! It has ascended upon high. It is leading Gravitation captive. The earth cannot reach it to pull it down again. Shoot up, brave spirit, brave spirit, soar higher! Thou hast mastered matter. Be of good cheer, thou hast overcome the world?} {Alas! the wind has carried away large fragments of its column. It has made wide gaps in its shaft. Will it fall? Will it fall? It has no support and it has but a cloud to cling to. No, it does not fall. Brave spirit, it soars higher and higher. Oh! living soul, oh unconquerable heart! Though it has lost its foundation, by its own impulse it has struggled on. Alas! where is it now? Its impulse is exhausted, its strength is at an end, its life is blasted, its struggle done, its hope destroyed. And it falls lifeless on the grass. It, which had so lately been striving to Heaven—for it is dead. And is there no comfort? Were all its str uggles vain? Did that noble heart seek Heaven in vain?} {The ungrateful ground has been fertilized by it. It struggled to the skies and it watered a weed. It thought to scale Infinity and it made verdant a blade of grass. And Nofariari positively shed tears. Her companion had never seen her cry for herself. And now she was actually in tears for the fountain. Seeking to assure her and calm her, he drew her attention to the other little sparking fountains which were playing in the sun. And though he was nothing of a mysticist himself he made shift to improve a ‘‘ballata’’ for her benefit—to show her that her sick fancies were not those of all the world.} {‘‘See how the infant founts spring and gambol and dance in the sunbeams! There is one! He is shooting with his tiny arrow at the

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 563 sun. He stands, the mimic Apollo, erect and fearless, and laughing sends the missile at the mark—and when the harmless arrow falls playful at his foot he runs, with joyous laughter, back, and hides her merry face in his mother fountain, while he tells her how the sun held out his noble hand to catch the infant spear and could not.} {See, there is a brother plashing in the bright waters below. He spreads out his little arms and feet in exulting sport—he thinks he is swimming. And another stands by the edge already reached and cries, Thou canst not come so far. And here are young spirits in merry multitude, playing shuttlecock with drops of water. Two, tired with the long summer’s holiday, have laid their dimpled cheeks on one another and are dreaming of the rich mar vels in the upper air. What flushes his cheek like a bright rose leaf in sleep? He sees a snowy cloud tinged with pomegranate and thinks how wonderful it must all be up there. Shall he not fly thither and see those dazzling white and purple walls? He climbs with his tiny foot upon his companion to help him a step higher—and his rosy wing pinions are all too small to carry up the aspiring fount, till a bright sunbeam leaves his ethereal home and shoots down with outstretched helping hand. And he catches the kindly ray and reaches the topmost spring by that sweet brother’s arm. There, pouring his joyous soul in song, he waves his little lance on high. Glad morning vision of light and merry life as brothers! Not long does he remain there, but eager to rejoin his Mother Earth, down he springs—and his sister fount welcomes him back with her glad eyes. In loving triumph she holds up her water y mirror, while he, the daring little soarer, successful Icarus, admires his scatheless wings.} {And now they all unite in merry ring, to gather the sunny drops which fall from on high—one, more eager than the rest, darts from the circle to collect a heap in his infant lap. But see, ’tis but to throw again the sparkling fruits among his brothers! And here a fair y sister spirit riding in a little boat, while a stout young fount pushes behind with exulting voice—and two brother springs harness themselves in front with wreaths of childhood’s own heavenly colour, blue chains of forget-me-not. And lo! one solemnly teaching a fraternal fount the principles of the circle on the water y surface—and while his circle spreads and spreads and escapes beyond his little com-

[no printed text]

564 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought [no printed text]

passes and vanishes out of the reach of his eyes, the other laughs with joyous glee—and tr ying to stop the runaway, tumbles headlong into the circle’s midst, scattering all the glittering fragments into water. And see (oh wonder of wonders!) the little Archimedes stands amazed! the solid walls of his marble home are broken into a thousand glistening jewels, wavy lines, sparkling gems of light, while the commotion lasts which the little diver has made in the reflecting mirror.} {And fresh sport succeeds, as they dance round their king—their smiles light up the ver y sky. Blest spirits! glad, sunny fairies ever y one! But their king, the boldest, the loveliest of them all! Joy to thee, glorious Child—for lo! the bird of Jove, the noble eagle, floating, descending, not swooping from the skies, paternal in his might, fondly raises the little Ganymede clinging round his neck and looking confidingly in his face and bears him to the feet of Jove, where Innocence and Power have kissed one another, and are forever hand in hand.’’} {Nofariari sat alone, in her pale cold arid life. She sat looking at the falling snow which came down silently, silently, ever slowly and silently falling, till it had covered up all her spring flowers, all her evergreens. And there was nothing but one drear y expanse of untrodden white. The air was full of snow and fog, so that a few yards off even that white sheet was lost in a wall of dirty mist. She thought of the consolations which she had so lately received—the advice to ‘‘come to a compromise with society,’’ to ‘‘let society have its share and take the other herself,’’ not ‘‘to quarrel with the world,’’ to ‘‘take things as they were,’’ etc. And she felt that it was like telling the bush ‘‘not to quarrel’’ with the heavy load which overpowered it and crushed it down, that it was like telling the snowdrop to ‘‘make a compromise’’ with the superincumbent weight.} {‘‘My life is like that snow-oppressed landscape,’’ she said. ‘‘There is nothing to be seen but snow and mist on all sides. They say God intended it. Did God intend that waste of snow to press down all life and green spring beneath it. Yes, I suppose He did, but only for a time. ‘‘You must look at life cheerfully,’’ they say. Say to a wretch writhing on his bed in horrible spasms, ‘‘God intended it, you must take life cheerfully.’’} ‘‘Well, but you are at ease now,’’ they say, ‘‘Such and such a grievance is not here.

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3 ‘‘I like riding about this beautiful place, why don’t you?’’ I like walking about a garden, why don’t you? is the common comfort. As if I were a child, whose spirits rise during a fortnight’s holidays, who think that they will last forever and who look neither backwards nor forwards. {‘‘Oh! Pale and cold existence of a broken heart!’’ I heard her saying. ‘‘And why art thou broken,’’ I asked, ‘‘thou that hast everything that earth can give?’’ ‘‘I everything!’’ she said, ‘‘I who have now nothing I can desire and nothing I can rejoice in on this earth.’’ ‘‘How can that be?’’ I said. ‘‘Do you wish to know? Listen and you will see.} Society has triumphed over me. The wish to regenerate the world with my institutions, with my moral philosophy, with my love. Now I am satisfied to live from breakfast till dinner, from dinner till tea, with a little worsted work, and to look forward to nothing but my bed.

‘‘I like riding about this beautiful place, why don’t you? I like walking about the garden, why don’t you?’’ is the common expostulation—as if we were children, whose spirits rise during a fortnight’s holidays, who think that they will last forever—and look neither backwards nor forwards.

Society triumphs over many. They wish to regenerate the world with their institutions, with their moral philosophy, with their love. Then they sink to living from breakfast till dinner, from dinner till tea, with a little worsted work, and to looking forward to nothing but bed. Cassandra shows the Woman’s Intellectual Life.

Oh! When shall I see a life full of steady enthusiasm, walking straight to its aim, flying home as that bird is now, against the wind— with the calmness and the confidence of one who knows the laws of God and can apply them? {When shall I see it?}

And what do I see? I see great and fine organizations deteriorating. I see girls and boys of seventeen before whose noble ambitions, heroic dreams and rich endowments I bow my head, as before God incarnate in the flesh. But before they are thirty they are withered, paralyzed, extinguished. ‘‘Oh! I have forgotten all my visions,’’ they say themselves.

The ‘‘dreams of youth’’ have become a proverb. That organizations, early rich, fall far short of their promise has been repeated to satiety. But is it extraordinar y that it should be so? For do we ever utilize this heroism? Look how it lives upon itself and per-

When shall we see a life full of steady enthusiasm, walking straight to its aim, flying home, as that bird is now, against the wind—with the calmness and the confidence of one who knows the laws of God and can apply them? What do we see? We see great and fine organizations deteriorating. We see girls and boys of seventeen, before whose noble ambitions, heroic dreams and rich endowments we bow our heads, as before God incarnate in the flesh. But, ere they are thirty, they are withered, paralyzed, extinguished. ‘‘We have forgotten our visions,’’ they say themselves. The ‘‘dreams of youth’’ have become a proverb. That organizations, early rich, fall far short of their promise has been repeated to satiety. But is it extraordinar y that it should be so? For do we ev-

‘‘God intended it.’’ ‘‘Take life easy.’’ ‘‘What have you to make you uneasy now?’’

566 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Women strive to live by intellect.

er utilize this heroism? Look how it lives upon itself and perishes for lack of food. We do not know what to do with it. We had rather that it should not be there. Often we laugh at it. Always we find it troublesome. Look at the poverty of our life! Can we expect anything else but poor creatures to come out of it? Did Michelangelo’s genius fail, did Pascal’s die in its bud, did Sir Isaac Newton become a commonplace sort of man? In two of these cases the knife wore out the sheath. But the knife itself did not become rusty till the body was dead or infirm. Why cannot we make use of the noble rising heroisms of our own day, instead of leaving them to rust? They have nothing to do. Are they to be employed in sitting in the drawing room, saying words which may as well not be said, which could be said as well if the y were not there? Women often strive to live by intellect. The clear, brilliant, sharp radiance of intellect’s moonlight rising upon such an expanse of snow is drear y, it is tr ue, but some love its solemn desolation, its silence, its solitude— if they are but allowed to live in it, if they are not perpetually baulked and disappointed. But a woman cannot live in the light of intellect. Society forbids it. Those conventional frivolities, which are called her ‘‘duties,’’ forbid it. Her ‘‘domestic duties,’’ highsounding words, which, for the most part, are but bad habits (which she has not the courage to enfranchise herself from, the strength to break through) forbid it. What are these duties (or bad habits)? Answering a multitude of letters which lead to

ishes for lack of food. We do not know what to do with it. We had rather that it should not be there. Often we laugh at it. Always we find it troublesome. Look at the poorness of our life! Can we expect anything else but poor creatures to come out of it? Did Michelangelo’s genius fail, did Pascal’s die in its bud, did Sir Isaac Newton become a commonplace sort of man? Yes. In two of these cases the knife wore out the sheath. But the knife itself did not become rusty, till the body was dead or infirm. Why cannot we make use of these noble rising heroisms of our own day, instead of leaving them to rust? They have nothing to do. Are they to be employed in sitting in the drawing room, saying words which may as well not be said, which they could say as well if they were not there? {Oh love! Oh intellect! Oh activity! ye sun and moon and stars of human existence! Are ye all so departed from my sky?}

Women often strive to live by intellect. {For seven years I lived in the light of the moon. She was pale, it is true.} The clear, brilliant sharp radiance of intellect’s moonlight rising upon the expanse of snow was drear y, it is true. But I loved its solemn desolation, its silence, its solitude—if I had been allowed to live in it, if I had not perpetually been baulked and disappointed. But a woman cannot live in the light of intellect. Society forbids it. Those conventional frivolities which are called her ‘‘duties’’ forbid it. Her ‘‘domestic duties,’’ high-sounding words, which, for the most part, are but bad habits (which she has not the courage to enfranchise herself from, the strength to break through) forbid it. What are these duties (or bad habits)? Answering a multitude of letters, which lead to nothing, from her so-called friends—keeping herself up to the level of the world that she may furnish her quota of amusement at the breakfast table—driving out her company in the carriage. And all these things are exacted from her by her family which, if she is good and affectionate, will have more influence with her than the world.

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What wonder if, wearied out, sick at heart with hope deferred, the springs of will broken, not seeing clearly where her duty lies, she abandons intellect as a vocation and takes it only, as we use the moon, by glimpses through her tight-closed window shutters?

The family? It is too narrow a field for the development of an immortal spirit, be that spirit male or female. The chances are a million to one that, in that minute sphere, the task, for which that immortal spirit is destined by the qualities and the gifts which its Creator has placed within it, should be found.

nothing, from her so-called friends—keeping herself up to the level of the world that she may furnish her quota of amusement at the breakfast table, driving out her company in the carriage. And all these things are exacted from her by her family which, if she is good and affectionate, will have more influence with her than the world. What wonder if, wearied out, sick at heart, with hope deferred, the springs of will broken, not seeing clearly where her duty lies, she abandons intellect as a vocation and takes it only, as we use the moon, by glimpses through her tight-closed window shutters? The family? It is too narrow a field for the development of an immortal spirit, be that spirit male or female. The chances are a thousand to one that, in that small sphere, the task for which that immortal spirit is destined by the qualities and the gifts which its Creator has placed within it, will not be found. The Family uses its Members for itself.

The family uses people, not for what they are, nor for what they are intended to be, but for what it wants them for—for its own uses. It thinks of them not as what God has made them, but as the something which it has arranged that they shall be. If it wants someone to sit in the drawing room, that someone is to be supplied by a member of the family—though that member may be destined for science or for education or for active superintendence by God, i.e., by the gifts within. This system dooms some minds to incurable infancy, others to silent misery.

And family boasts that it has performed its mission well, inasfar as it has enabled the

The family uses people, not for what they are, nor for what they are intended to be, but for what it wants them for—for its own uses. It thinks of them not as what God has made them, but as the something which it has arranged that they shall be. If it wants someone to sit in the drawing room, that someone is to be supplied by the family, though that member may be destined for science, or for education, or for active superintendence by God, i.e., by the gifts within. This system dooms some minds to incurable infancy, others to silent misery. And family boasts that it has per formed its mission well, inasfar

568 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought as it has enabled the individual to say, ‘‘I have no peculiar work, nothing but what the moment brings me, nothing that I cannot throw up at once at anybody’s claim,’’ inasfar, that is, as it has destroyed the individual life. And the individual thinks that a great victor y has been accomplished, when, at last, she is able to say that she has ‘‘no personal desires or plans.’’ What is this but throwing the gifts of God aside as worthless, and substituting for them those of the world? Mar riage is the only chance (and it is but a chance) offered to women for escape from this death, and how eagerly and how ignorantly it is embraced! At present we live to impede each other’s satisfactions: competition, domestic life, society, what is it all but this? We go somewhere where we are not wanted and where we don’t want to go. What else is conventional life? Passivity when we want to be active. So many hours spent every day in passively doing what conventional life tells us, when we would so gladly be at work. And is it a wonder that all individual life is extinguished?

Women strive to live by moral practical activity.

Women dream of a great sphere of steady, not sketchy benevolence, of moral activity, for which they would fain be trained and fitted, instead of working in the dark, neither knowing nor registering whither their steps lead, whether farther from or nearer to the aim. For how do people exercise their moral activity now? We visit, we teach, we talk, among ‘‘the

individual to say, ‘‘I have no peculiar work, nothing but what the moment brings me, nothing that I cannot throw up at once at anybody’s claim,’’ inasfar, that is, as it has destroyed the individual life. And the individual thinks that a great victory has been accomplished when, at last, she is able to say that she has ‘‘no personal desires or plans.’’ What is this but throwing the gifts of God aside as worthless, and substituting for them those of the world?

Marriage is the only chance (and it is but a chance) offered to women for escape from this death, and oh! how eagerly and how ignorantly it is embraced! At present, we live to impede each other’s satisfactions. Competition, domestic life, society, what is it all but that? We go somewhere where we are not wanted and where we don’t want to go. What else is conventional life? Passivity when we want to be active. So many hours spent every day in passivity doing what conventional life tells us—when we would so gladly be at work. And is it a wonder that all individual life is extinguished? {I lived seven years by the wan lights of conventional society, striving to see the moonlight of intellect. She does not warm— she is cold and drear y, with sharp harsh lights and blackest shadows, but oh! she is fair and brilliant compared with the glare of the candles. At the end of that time I gave up the point, or rather the point gave up me. And I began to dream of other lights.} I dreamt of a great sphere of steady, not sketchy benevolence, of moral activity, for which I should be trained and fitted, instead of working in the dark—not knowing and not registering whither my steps led me, whether farther from or nearer to my aim. For how do people exercise their moral activity now? We visit, we teach, we talk, among ‘‘the poor.’’ We are told ‘‘don’t look for the fruits, cast thy bread upon the waters, for thou shalt find it after many days.’’ I say too, ‘‘don’t look,’’ for you won’t see, you will not find it and then you would strike work.

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Oh! how different would be the heart for the work, and how different would be the success! if we learnt our work as a serious study and followed it out steadily as a profession. Were the physician to set to work at his trade, as the philanthropist at his, how many bodies would he not spoil before he cured one?

{Oh! true, I had forgotten.} We set the treatment of bodies so high above the treatment of souls that the physician occupies a higher place in society than the schoolmaster. The governess is to have every one of God’s gifts—she is to do that which the mother herself is incapable of doing—but our son must not degrade himself by marrying the governess, nor our daughter the tutor, though she might marry the medical man.

poor’’; we are told, ‘‘don’t look for the fruits, cast thy bread upon the waters, for thou shalt find it after many days.’’269 Certainly ‘‘don’t look,’’ for you won’t see. You will not ‘‘find it,’’ and then you would ‘‘strike work.’’ How different would be the heart for the work, and how different would be the success, if we learnt our work as a serious study, and followed it out steadily as a profession! Were the physician to set to work at his trade, as the philanthropist does at his, how many bodies would he not spoil before he cured one! We set the treatment of bodies so high above the treatment of souls that the physician occupies a higher place in society than the schoolmaster. The governess is to have every one of God’s gifts; she is to do that which the mother herself is incapable of doing; but our son must not degrade himself by marrying the governess, nor our daughter the tutor, though she might marry the medical man. Cassandra shows the Woman’s practical Activity.

But my medical man does do something for me, you say, my tutor has done nothing. This is true, that is the real reason. And what a condemnation of the state of mental science it is here! Low as is physical science, that of the mind is still lower.

Well, I dreamed for an education (it was but a dream) to teach me to teach, to teach me the laws of the human mind and how to apply them and knowing how imperfect, in the present state of the world, such an edu-

269 Eccl 11:1.

But my medical man does do something for me, it is said, my tutor has done nothing. This is true, this is the real reason. And what a condemnation of the state of mental science it is! Low as is physical science, that of the mind is still lower. Women long for an education to teach them to teach, to teach them the laws of the human mind and how to apply them—and knowing how imperfect, in the

570 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Dreams, struggles and disappointments.

present state of the world, such an education must be, they long for experience, not patchwork experience, but experience followed up and systematized, to enable them to know what they are about and where they are ‘‘casting their bread’’ and whether it is ‘‘bread’’ or a stone.270 How should we learn a language if we were to give to it an hour a week? A fortnight’s steady application would make more way in it than a year of such patchwork. A ‘‘lady’’ can hardly go to ‘‘her school’’ two days running. She cannot leave the breakfast table—or she must be fulfilling some little frivolous ‘‘duty,’’ which others ought not to exact, or which might just as well be done some other time. Dreaming always—never accomplishing, thus women live— too much ashamed of their dreams, which they think ‘‘romantic,’’ to tell them where they will be laughed at, even if not considered wrong. With greater strength of purpose they might accomplish something. But if they were strong, all of them, they would not need to have their story told, for all the world would read it in the mission they have fulfilled. It is for commonplace, everyday characters that we tell our tale—because it is the sample of hundreds of lives (or rather deaths) of persons who cannot fight with society, or who, unsupported by the sympathies about them, give up their own destiny as not worth the fierce and continued struggle necessary

270 An allusion to Matt 7:9.

cation must be, I dreamed of experience, not patchwork experience, but experience followed up systematically to enable me to know what I was about and where I was ‘‘casting my bread’’ and whether it was ‘‘bread’’ that I was ‘‘casting’’ or a stone. {But vain, vain, were all my dreams—killing my disappointments—heart sickening my struggles.}

How should you learn a language, if you give to it an hour a week? A fortnight’s steady application would make more way in it than a year of such patchwork. So was it with all my plans. A ‘‘lady’’ can hardly go to ‘‘her school’’ two days running. She cannot leave the breakfast table, or she must be fulfilling some little frivolous ‘‘duty,’’ which others ought not to exact, or which might just as well be done some other time. {Thus I lived for other seven years,} dreaming always— never accomplishing, too much ashamed of my dreams, which I thought were too ‘‘romantic’’ to tell them where I knew they would be laughed at, if not considered wrong. {So I lived till my heart was broken. I am now an old woman at thirty.}

I do not say that, with greater strength of purpose I could not have accomplished something. But if I had been a hero, I should not need to tell my story, for then all the world would have read it in the mission I should have fulfilled. It is because I am a commonplace, everyday character that I tell my tale, because it is the sample of hundreds of lives (or rather deaths) of persons who cannot fight with society, or who, unsupported by the sympathies about them, give up their own destiny as not worth the fierce and continued struggle necessary to accomplish it. One str uggle they could make and be free (and, in the Church of Rome, many, many, unallured by any other motive, make this one struggle to enter a convent), but the perpetual series of petty spars, with doubts and discouragements between, and doubts

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 571 as to whether you are right, these wear out the very life necessary to make them. {So I lived then, for seven years. And, at the end of that time, I was dead. My pole star was still in the sky—for it could not set. But my eyes were too dim to see it. I lost my way and perished.}

If a man were to follow up his profession or occupation at odd times, how would he do it? Would he become skillful in that profession? It is acknowledged by women themselves that they are inferior in every occupation to men. Is it wonderful? They do ever ything at odd times. And, if a woman’s music and drawing are only used by her as an amusement (a pass time, as it is called), is it wonderful that she tires of them, that she becomes disgusted with them? {During all these fourteen years, I had been waiting for my sun to rise—the sun of a per fect human sympathy—the Sun of Passion, as it is called, not consciously looking out for it—our pride and our ignorance are alike too great for that—but unconsciously shadowing it in idea.} In every dream of the life of intelligence or that of activity, {I was accompanied by a phantom, the phantom of sympathy, nay war ming me, guiding me, lighting me. It was only an idea—it never reached, even in my own mind, reality. I sacrificed marriage because I must have sacrificed all other life had I accepted that. That man and woman have an equality of duty and right is accepted by woman even less than by man. Behind his destiny woman must annihilate herself. I felt that I knew that.} I must be only his complement. A woman dedicates herself to the vocation of her husband. She fills up and perfor ms the subordinate parts in it. But, if she has any destiny, any vocation of her own, she must renounce it in nine cases out of ten. Some few, like Mrs Somerville, Mrs Chisholm, Mrs Fry, have not done so. But these are exceptions. The fact is that woman has so seldom any vocation of her own that it does not signify. She has none to renounce. A man gains everything by marriage. He gains a ‘‘helpmate.’’ But a woman does not.

to accomplish it. One str uggle they could make and be free (and, in the Church of Rome, many, many, unallured by any other motive, make this one struggle to enter a convent), but the perpetual series of petty spars, with discouragements between, and doubts as to whether they are right—these wear out the very life necessary to make them. If a man were to follow up his profession or occupation at odd times, how would he do it? Would he become skillful in that profession? It is acknowledged by women themselves that they are inferior in every occupation to men. Is it wonderful? The y do ever ything at ‘‘odd times.’’ And if a woman’s music and drawing are only used by her as an amusement (a passtime, as it is called), is it wonderful that she tires of them, that she becomes disgusted with them?

In every dream of the life of intelligence or that of activity women are accompanied by a phantom—the phantom of sympathy, guiding, lighting the way—even if they do not marry. Some few sacrifice marriage, because they must sacrifice all other life if they accept that. That man and woman have an equality of duties and rights is accepted by woman even less than by man. Behind his destiny woman must annihilate herself, must be only his complement. A woman dedicates herself to the vocation of her husband; she fills up and performs the subordinate parts in it. But if she has any destiny, any vocation of her own, she must renounce it, in nine cases out of ten. Some few, like Mrs

Women are practically dead before they are physically dead.

Women are unconsciously always waiting for love and marriage—for a per fect human sympathy.

572 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Somer ville,271 Mrs Chisholm, Mrs Fr y, have not done so, but these are exceptions. The fact is that woman has so seldom any vocation of her own, that it does not much signify; she has none to renounce. A man gains everything by marriage: he gains a ‘‘helpmate,’’ but a woman does not.

{I felt that I must choose either to hold myself ready to sacrifice, if called upon, feelings, religions, social, political (but when these were all gone, there would not be that much of me left) or I must sacrifice love and marriage. I preferred the latter. And now I have lost all—the prize and the penalty the crown I ran for and the wayside happiness I despised. And I am dead.} {I dared presumptuously to measure my strength, and it has been found wanting. I have fallen so low that I now regret even the conventional importance of marriage. The glor y has departed. The life is gone out of me. I now only recognize my existence but by suffering. Otherwise I should believe that I was dead. I cannot even remember the motives which caused me to overstep the easy landing place of marriage. I have lost even the memory of my former self. Once only did I recover the sentiment of my vocation, the recollection of former springs of action. Those dreams of a human sympathy had pursued me day and night, tortured and driven me to within a hair’s breadth of losing all consciousness of actual existence. I now think that I should have done better to satisfy them at any price. But it was now too late.}

Practical Activity necessary for Life. Women revived by practical reality.

But if ever women come into contact with sickness and crime, and poverty in masses, how the practical reality of life revives them! They are exhausted, like those who live on opium or on novels, all their lives—exhausted with feelings which lead to no action. If they see and enter into a continuous line of action, with a full and interesting life, with training constantly kept up to the occupation, occupation constantly testing the training—it is the beau-idéal of practical, not theoretical, education—they are retempered, their life is filled, they have found their work, and the means to do it.

{When all was lost, I was called for three months (it was the only romantic incident of my life) to see and nurse sickness and crime and poverty in masses, how the practical reality of life revived me. I was exhausted like a man who has lived on opium or on novels all his life, exhausted with feelings which lead to no action.} If they see and enter into a continuous line of action with a full and interesting life, with training constantly kept up to the occupation, occupation constantly testing the training, It is the beau ideal of practical, not theoretical education. I was retempered, my destiny accomplished, my life is filled, my intellect and acting satisfied. I had found my work and the means to do it.

271 Mary Somer ville (1780-1872), mathematician and astronomer, after whom Somer ville College, Oxford was named.

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 573 I remember when I was young I used often to think that an actress’s life might be a ver y happy one, not for the sake of the admiration, not for the sake of the fame. I did not think of that. But because in the morning she studies, in the evening she embodies those studies. She has the means of testing them by practice, of correcting them by incarnation and of resuming her studies in the morning to improve the weak parts, remedy the failures and in the evening try the corrections again. In this way, I thought, there was not end to the progress which might be made. {‘‘But why, why,’’ said I at last ‘‘can’t you be satisfied with this life, which so many love and enjoy? I never wanted five minutes’ solitude, I never wanted a profession, why do you?’’ ‘‘And I (a pause) to stop this little breath and with it all this load of misery, how often have I been tempted to do it?’’ ‘‘And why don’t you? What has held you back?’’} Many are only deterred from suicide because it is more than anything else saying to god, ‘‘I won’t, I won’t do as Thou wouldst have me.’’ and because it is ‘‘no use.’’ {‘‘Well, but tell me, tell me the cause of this misery. I can’t understand it. You have told me a great deal, and yet I can only say, Is that all?’’ To have food for my head, no food for my heart, no food for my activity. And you call that not enough? Oh!} If we have no food for the body how we do cry out, how all the world hears of it, how all the newspapers talk of it with a paragraph headed in great capital letters, Death from Starvation! But suppose I were to put a paragraph in the Times, Death of the Head from Starvation or Death of Moral Activity from Starvation, how people would stare, how they would laugh and wonder! One would think we had no heads or hearts, by the total indifference of the public towards them. Our bodies are the only things of the least consequence. {‘‘Well, but just tell me what you complain of,’’ said I, ‘‘I am sure I don’t know. Still I cannot see.’’} I have nothing to do which raises me— no food which agrees with me. I can never pursue any object for a single two hours! for I can never command any regular leisure or solitude’’ and in social or domestic life, one is bound, under pain of being thought sulky, to make a remark or to speak every two minutes.’’ {‘‘But cannot you do anything with anybody in the room? If not, the best advice I can give you is to learn as soon as possible—

Women, when they are young, sometimes think that an actress’s life is a happy one—not for the sake of the admiration, not for the sake of the fame; but because in the morning she studies, in the evening she embodies those studies: she has the means of testing and correcting them by practice, and of resuming her studies in the morning to improve the weak parts, remedy the failures and in the evening try the corrections again. It is, indeed, true that, even after middle age, with such exercise of faculty, there is no end to the progress which may be made.

Some are only deterred from suicide because it is in the most distinct manner to say to God: ‘‘I will not, I will not do as Thou wouldst have me,’’ and because it is ‘‘no use.’’ To have no food for our heads, no food for our hearts, no food for our activity, is that nothing? If we have no food for the body, how we do cry out, how all the world hears of it, how all the newspapers talk of it, with a paragraph headed in great capital letters, Death from starvation! But suppose one were to put a paragraph in the Times, Death of Thought from Star vation, or Death of Moral Activity from Starvation, how people would stare, how they would laugh and wonder! One would think we had no heads nor hearts by the total indifference of the public towards them. Our bodies are the only things of any consequence. We have nothing to do which raises us, no food which agrees with us. We can never pursue any object for a single two hours, for we can never command any regu-

‘‘Is that all you have to complain of?’’

574 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought lar leisure or solitude, and in social or domestic life one is bound, under pain of being thought sulky, to make a remark every two minutes. Men are on the side of society; they blow hot and cold; they say, ‘‘Why can’t you employ yourself in society?’’ and then, ‘‘Why don’t you talk in society?’’ I can pursue a connected conversation, or I can be silent; but to drop a remark, as it is called, every two minutes, how wearisome it is! It is impossible to pursue the current of one’s own thoughts, because one must keep oneself ever on the alert ‘‘to say something,’’ and it is impossible to say what one is thinking, because the essence of a remark is not to be a thought, but an impression. With what labour women have toiled to break down all individual and independent life, in order to fit themselves for this social and domestic existence, thinking it right! And when they have killed themselves to do it, they have awakened (too late) to think it wrong.

schoolboys do.’’ ‘‘Yes, to be sure, one might as well be alone if one is to sit mute.’’}

‘‘You see, you men are on the side of society. You blow hot and cold, you say, ‘‘why can’t you employ yourself in society?’’ and then, ‘‘why don’t you talk in society?’’ I can pursue a connected conversation, or I can be silent—but to drop a remark, as it is called, ever y two minutes, how wearisome it is! It is impossible to pursue the current of one’s own thoughts because one must keep oneself ever on the alert ‘‘to say something’’ and it is impossible to say what one is thinking, because the essence of a remark is not to be a thought, but an impression. With what labour I have laboured to break down all individual and independent life in order to fit myself for this social and domestic existence, thinking it right. And now I have killed myself to do it. I have awakened (too late) to think it wrong.

Is this all Cassandra has to complain of?

For, later in life, women could not make use of leisure and solitude if they had it! Like the Chinese woman who could not make use of her feet if she were brought into European life. Some have an attention like a battering ram, which, slowly brought to bear, can work upon a subject for any length of time. They can work ten hours just as well as two upon the same thing. But this age would have men like the musket, which you can load so fast that nothing but its heating in the process puts any limit to the number and frequency of times of firing, and at as many different objects as you please.

For now in life women could not make use of leisure and solitude, if I had it! Like the Chinese woman who could not make use of her feet, if she were brought into European life.

I was born with an attention like a battering ram which, slowly brought to bear, could work upon a subject for any length of time. I could work ten hours as well as two upon the same thing. But this age would have men like the musket which you can load so fast that nothing but its taking fire puts any limit to the number and frequency of times of firing and at as many different objects as you please.

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 575 Now I, later in life, cannot use my battering ram. My attention, like society’s, goes off in a thousand different directions . . . by the time it is fixed, the leisure is gone. I become incapable of consecutive or strenuous work.

What I suffered from the want of such work no one can tell. Even physically. The accumulation of nervous energy, which had had nothing to do during the day, made me feel every night, when I went to bed, as if I were going mad. And I was obliged to lie long in bed in the morning to let it evaporate and keep it down.

Now I am suffering at once of disgust of the one and incapacity for the other, from loathing of conventional idleness and powerlessness to do work when I have got it. ‘‘Now go, you have several hours,’’ say people, ‘‘you have all the afternoon to yourself.’’ Yes, when I am all frittered away, I am to begin to work—when I am broken up into little bits, I am to hew away. {Oh! Call me no more Nofariari, call me Cassandra. For I have preached and prophesied in vain. I have gone about crying all these many years. Woe to the people! And no one has listened or believed. And now I cr y, Woe to myself! For upon me the destruction has come. Oh world! Oh life! Oh time! On whose last steps I climb Trembling at that where I had stood before When all return to the glory of your prime? No more. Oh never more!}

{‘‘Yes,’’ she said to me one day, ‘‘I feel that my youth is gone. I used to laugh at the poets’ sunny description of youth and say that I had never felt anything like that. But now I see the great difference between youth and middle age. Before I suffered but I always thought that I should carry out my schemes. I lived but for that. I lived upon desire, upon the dream of my hopes fulfilled. Now I see that I never shall fulfill them. I

So, later in life, people cannot use their battering ram. Their attention, like society’s, goes off in a thousand different directions. They are an hour before they can fix it, and by the time it is fixed, the leisure is gone. They become incapable of consecutive or strenuous work. What these suffer—even physically—from the want of such work no one can tell. The accumulation of nervous energy, which has had nothing to do during the day, makes them feel every night, when they go to bed, as if they were going mad, and they are obliged to lie long in bed in the morning to let it evaporate and keep it down. At last they suffer at once from disgust of the one and incapacity for the other—from loathing of conventional idleness and powerlessness to do work when they have it. ‘‘Now go, you have several hours,’’ say people, ‘‘you have all the afternoon to yourself.’’ When they are all frittered away, they are to begin to work. When they are broken up into little bits, they are to hew away.

576 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

4 Poets sing of youth. It is tr ue, youth has the sap to dream—it always thinks it will carry out its schemes. Middle age does not.

Moral activity? There is scarcely such a thing possible! Everything is sketchy. The world does nothing but sketch. One Lady Bountiful sketches a school, but it never comes to a finished study; she can hardly work at it two weeks consecutively. Here and there a solitar y individual, it is true, makes a really careful study—as Mrs Chisholm of emigration—as Miss Carpenter of reformatory discipline.273 But, in general, a ‘‘lady’’ has too many sketches on hand. She has a sketch of society, a sketch of her children’s education, sketches of her ‘‘charities,’’ sketches of her reading. She is like a painter who should have five pictures in his studio at once, and giving now a stroke to one, and now a stroke to another, till he had made the whole round, should continue this routine to the end. All life is sketchy—the poet’s verse (compare Tennyson, Milnes and Mrs Browning with Milton or even Byron:274 it is not the difference of genius which strikes one so much as the unfinished state of these modern sketches compared with the studies of the old masters), the artist’s picture, the author’s composition—all are rough, imperfect, incomplete, even as works of art.

have lost the vigour to hope, the zest to desire, the sap to dream. I have come even to regret the enjoyment which I thought unworthy of me to pick up as I went by.} Moral activity? why there is not such a thing possible! Everything is sketchy. The world does nothing but sketch. One Lady Bountiful sketches a school—but it never comes to a finished study—she can hardly work at it two weeks consecutively. Here and there a solitar y individual, it is true, makes a really careful study—as Mrs Chisholm of emigration, {as Mrs Dawes272 of a school education,} as Mrs Fry of prisons, Miss Carpenter of reformatory discipline. But, in general, a ‘‘lady’’ has too many sketches on hand—she has a sketch of society—a sketch of her children’s education—sketches of her ‘‘charities,’’ sketches of reading. She is like a painter who should have five pictures in his ‘‘studio’’ at once, and giving now a stroke to one, and then a stroke to another—till he had made the whole round should continue this routine to the end. {How would he paint, do you think?}

Alas! all life is sketchy—the poet’s verse (compare Tennyson, Milnes and Mrs Browning with Milton or even Byron—it is not the difference of genius which strikes you so much as the unfinished state of these modern sketches, compared with the studies of the old masters). The artist’s picture—the author’s composition—all are rough, imperfect, incomplete, even as works of art?

272 Mary Helen Dawes, wife of Richard Dawes, founder of a school, King’s Somborne, Hampshire. 273 Mary Carpenter (1807-77), social reformer. 274 English contemporar y poets: Nightingale’s friend Milnes; Alfred Tennyson (1809-92); Elizabeth Barrett Browning (1806-1861); Lord Byron (1788-1824).

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 577 And how can it be otherwise? A ‘‘leader’’ out of a newspaper, an article out of a review, five books read aloud in the course of an evening, such is our literature. What mind can stand three leading articles every morning as its food? {Alas! for moral activity!}

And how can it be otherwise? A ‘‘leader’’ out of a newspaper, an article out of a review, five books read aloud in the course of an evening, such is our literature. What mind can stand three leading articles ever y morning as its food?

When shall we see a woman making a study of what she does? Married women cannot, for a man would think, if his woman undertook any great work, with the intention of carrying it out, of making anything but a sham of it, that she would ‘‘suckle his fools’’ and ‘‘chronicle his small beer’’ less well for it, that he would not have so good a dinner but that she would destroy, as it is called, his domestic life. {And I, who dreamed of institutions to show women their work and to train them how to do it, to give them an object and to incline their wills to follow it. I, in whom thought of this kind put aside the thought of marriage, who sacrificed my individual future for great hopes, glimpses of a great general future, I have fallen so low that I can look back with a sigh even after the conventional dying of a married woman, the vulgar incident of the pomp and circumstance of marriage and say with a sigh, ‘‘Such might have been mine, if I had chosen.’’ Yes, I thought that I could despise passion.} I thought the intercourse of man and woman, how frivolous, how unworthy it is! Can you call that the true vocation of woman, her high career? I look round at the marriages which I know and I said, ‘‘the true marriage, that noble union by which a man and a woman become together the one perfect being, probably does not exist at present upon earth.’’

When shall we see a woman making a study of what she does? Married women cannot, for a man would think, if his wife undertook any great work with the intention of carrying it out, of making anything but a sham of it—that she would ‘‘suckle his fools and chronicle his small beer’’ less well for it—that he would not have so good a dinner—that she would destroy, as it is called, his domestic life.

Cassandra preaches on Marriage.

I am not surprised that husbands and wives seem so little part of one another. I am surprised that there is so much love as there is. For I see there is no food for it. I don’t know what does it live upon, what nourishes it? Husbands and wives never seem to have anything to say to one another. What do they talk about? Not about any of the great religious, social, political questions and feelings. They talk about who shall come to dinner,

The intercourse of man and woman—how frivolous, how unworthy it is! Can we call that the tr ue vocation of woman—her high career? Look round at the mar riages which you know. The tr ue mar riage—that noble union by which a man and woman become together the one perfect being—probably does not exist at present upon earth. It is not surprising that husbands and wives seem so little part of one another. It is surprising that there is so much love as there is. For there is no food for it. What does it live upon—what nourishes it? Husbands and wives never seem to have anything to say to one another. What do they

Women sometimes put aside an individual future for themselves for the sake of opening a general future for their sex; then, disappointed, sink down into regretting the conventional dignity of married life.

578 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought talk about? Not about any great religious, social, political questions or feelings. They talk about who shall come to dinner, who is to live in this lodge and who in that, about the improvement of the place, or when they shall go to London. If there are children, they form a common subject of some nourishment. But, even then, the case is oftenest thus, the husband is to think of how they are to get on in life, the wife of bringing them up at home. But any real communion between husband and wife—any descending into the depths of their being, and drawing out thence what they find and comparing it— do we ever dream of such a thing? Yes, we may dream of it during the season of ‘‘passion,’’ but we shall not find it afterwards. We even expect it to go off, and lay our account that it will. If the husband has, by chance, gone into the depths of his being, and found anything there unorthodox, he, oftenest, conceals it carefully from his wife; he is afraid of ‘‘unsettling her opinions.’’ What is the mystery of passion, spiritually speaking? For there is a passion of the Spirit. Blind passion, as it has most truly been called, seems to come on in man without his exactly knowing why, without his at all knowing why for this person rather than for that, and (whether it has been satisfied or unsatisfied) to go off again after a while, as it came, also without his knowing why. The woman’s passion is generally more lasting. It is possible that this difference may be because there is really more in man than in woman. There is nothing in her for him to

who is to live in this lodge and who in that— about the improvement of the place or when they shall go to London. If there are children, they form a common subject of some nourishment. But, even then, the case is oftenest thus—the husband is to think of how they are to ‘‘get on’’ in life, the wife of bringing them up at home.

But any real communion between husband and wife—any descending into the depths of their being and drawing out thence what they find there and comparing it, do we ever dream of such a thing? Yes, we may dream of it during the season of ‘‘passion,’’ but we shall not find it afterwards. We even expect it to go off, and lay our account that it will. If the husband has, by chance, gone into the depths of his being and found anything there unorthodox, he, oftenest, conceals it carefully from his wife, he is afraid of ‘‘unsettling her opinions,’’ {of ‘‘shocking her feelings.’’}

What is the mystery of passion, spiritually speaking? For there is a passion of the spirit. Blind passion, as it has most truly been called. It seems to come on, in man without his exactly knowing why, without his at all knowing why for this person rather than for that, and (whether it has been satisfied or unsatisfied) to go off again after a while, as it came, also without his knowing why.

The woman’s passion is generally more lasting. It is possible that this difference may be because there is really more in man than in woman. There is nothing in her for him to have this intimate communion with. He cannot impart to her his religious beliefs, if he have any, because she would be

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 579 ‘‘shocked.’’ Religious men are and must be heretical now—for we must not pray except in a ‘‘form of words, made beforehand—or think of God but in a prearranged idea.

have this intimate communion with. He cannot impart to her his religious beliefs, if he have any, because she would be ‘‘shocked.’’ Religious men are and must be heretics now—for we must not pray, except in a ‘‘form’’ of words, made beforehand—or think of God but with a prearranged idea. How is Marriage now brought about?

With the man’s political ideas, if they extend beyond the merest party politics, she has no sympathy. His social ideas, if they are ‘‘advanced,’’ she will probably denounce without knowing why, as savouring of ‘‘socialism’’ (a convenient word, which covers a multitude of new ideas and offences) and feel that they will lead to a ‘‘community of women.’’ For woman is ‘‘born a Tor y’’ as has been often said. Woman has nothing but her affections and these at once make her more loving and less loved.

But is it surprising that there should be so little real marriage, when we think what the process is which leads to marriage? Under the eyes of an always present mother and sisters (of whom even the most refined and intellectual cannot refrain from a jest on the subject, and {(the mother at least,} who thinks it their duty to be anxious to watch every germ and bud of it) the acquaintance begins. It is fed upon what? the gossip of art, musical and pictorial, the party politics of the day, the chit-chat of society, and people marry, or sometimes they don’t marry, discouraged by the impossibility of knowing any more of one another than this will furnish.

They prefer to marry in thought, to hold imaginar y conversations with one another in idea, rather than, on such a flimsy pretext of communion, to take the chance (cer tainty it

With the man’s political ideas, if they extend beyond the merest party politics, she has no sympathy. His social ideas, if they are ‘‘advanced,’’ she will probably denounce without knowing why, as savouring of ‘‘socialism’’ (a convenient word, which covers a multitude of new ideas and offences). For woman is ‘‘by birth a Tor y,’’ has been often said—by education a ‘‘Tor y,’’ we mean. Woman has nothing but her affections, and this makes her at once more loving and less loved. But is it surprising that there should be so little real marriage, when we think what the process is which leads to marriage? Under the eyes of an always present mother and sisters (of whom even the most refined and intellectual cannot abstain from a jest upon the subject, who think it their duty to be anxious, to watch ever y germ and bud of it) the acquaintance begins. It is fed—upon what? the gossip of art, musical and pictorial, the party politics of the day, the chit-chat of society, and people marry or sometimes they don’t marry, discouraged by the impossibility of knowing any more of one another than this will furnish. They prefer to marry in thought, to hold imaginary conversations with one another in idea, rather than, on such a flimsy pre-

580 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought text of communion, to take the chance (cer tainty it cannot be) of having more to say to one another in marriage. Men and women meet now to be idle. Is it extraordinar y that they do not know each other, and that, in their mutual ignorance, they form no surer friendships? Did they meet to do something together, then indeed they might form some real tie. But, as it is, the y are not there, it is only a mask which is there—a mouthpiece of readymade sentences about the ‘‘topics of the day,’’ and then people rail against men for choosing a woman ‘‘for her face.’’ Why, what else do they see? It is very well to say ‘‘be prudent, be careful, try to know each other.’’ But how are you to know each other? Unless a woman has lost all pride, how is it possible for her, under the eyes of all her family, to indulge in long exclusive conversations with a man? ‘‘Such a thing’’ must not take place till after her ‘‘engagement.’’ And how is she to make an engagement, if ‘‘such a thing’’ has not taken place? Besides, young women at home have so little to occupy and to interest them—they have so little reason for not quitting their home that a young and independent man cannot look at a girl without giving rise to ‘‘expectations,’’ if not on her own part, on that of her family. Happy he, if he is not said to have been ‘‘trifling with her feelings,’’ or ‘‘disappointing her hopes’’! Under these circumstances, how can a man who has any pride or principle become acquainted with a woman in such a manner as to justify them in marrying?

cannot be) of having more to say to one another in marriage.

Men and women meet now to be idle—is it extraordinar y that they do not know each other, and so in their mutual ignorance, they form no surer friendships? Did they meet to do something together, then indeed they might form some real tie. But, as it is, the y are not there, it is only a mask, which is there, a talker, a mouthpiece of ready-made sentences about the ‘‘topics of the day,’’ which you see. And then people rail against men for choosing a woman ‘‘for her face.’’ Why, what else do they see?

It is very well to say ‘‘be prudent, be careful, try to know each other.’’ But how are you to know each other? Unless a woman has lost all pride, unless she has the impudence of that which we must not name, how is it possible for her, under the eyes of all her family, to indulge in long exclusive conversations with a man? Such a thing must not take place till after her ‘‘engagement.’’ And how is she to make an engagement, if such a thing has not taken place?

Besides, young women at home have so little to occupy and to interest them—they have so little reason for not quitting their home that a young and independent man cannot look at a girl, without giving rise to ‘‘expectations,’’ if not on her own part, on that of her people. Happy he, if he is not said to have been ‘‘trifling with her feelings,’’ or ‘‘disappointing her hopes’’! Under these circumstances, how can a man, who has any pride or any principle, become acquainted with a woman in such a manner as to justify them in marrying?’’ {‘‘Yet people do marry,’’ said I, ‘‘Yes, people have married,’’ said I, ‘‘and we do see them marrying even now.’’}

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 581 Yet People do marry. There are four ways in which people marry. First, accident or relationship has thrown them together in their childhood and acquaintance has grown naturally and unconsciously. Accordingly, in novels, it is generally cousins who marry. And I confess that now it seems to me the only natural thing—the only possible way of making an intimacy. And yet, we know that intermarriage between relations is in direct contravention of the laws of nature for the well-being of the race—vide [see] the Quakers, the Spanish grandees, the royal races, the secluded valleys of mountainous countries where madness, degeneration of race, defective organization and Cretinism flourish and multiply. {The laws of nature have said, ‘‘Marry your cousin, be happy, and cause the race to degenerate.’’ ‘‘And have they said, Marry a foreigner and be miserable and improve the race?’’ Something like it, I believe, or pretty nearly so.} The second way and by far the most general, in which people marry, is this: A woman, thoroughly uninterested at home, and having formed a slight acquaintance with some accidental person, accepts him, if he ‘‘falls in love’’ with her, as it is technically called, and takes the chance. Hence the vulgar expression of marriage being a lottery, which it most truly is—for, that the right two should come together has as many chances against it as there are blanks in a lottery.

The third way is that some person is found sufficiently independent, sufficiently careless of the opinions of others, or sufficiently without modesty to speculate thus, ‘‘It is worthwhile that I should become acquainted with so and so. I do not care what his or her opinion of me is, if, after having become acquainted, to do which can bear no other

There are four ways in which people marry. First, accident or relationship has thrown them together in their childhood, and acquaintance has grown up naturally and unconsciously. Accordingly, in novels, it is generally cousins who marry, and now it seems the only natural thing—the only possible way of making an intimacy. And yet, we know that intermarriage between relations is in direct contravention of the laws of nature for the well-being of the race; witness the Quakers, the Spanish grandees, the royal races, the secluded valleys of mountainous countries, where madness, degeneration of race, defective organization and cretinism flourish and multiply.275 The second way, and by far the most general, in which people mar ry, is this. A woman, thoroughly uninterested at home, and having formed a slight acquaintance with some accidental person, accepts him if he ‘‘falls in love’’ with her, as it is technically called, and takes the chance. Hence the vulgar expression of marriage being a lottery, which it most truly is, for that the right two should come together has as many chances against it as there are blanks in any lottery. The third way is, that some person is found sufficiently independent, sufficiently careless of the opinions of others, or sufficiently without modesty to speculate thus: ‘‘It is worthwhile that I should become acquainted with

Yet people have mar ried and do mar ry.

275 Nightingale comment on L.A.J. Quetelet’s Physique sociale, in Society and Politics (5:33).

582 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought so and so. I do not care what his or her opinion of me is, if, after having become acquainted, to do which can bear no other construction in people’s eyes than a desire of marriage, I retreat.’’ But there is this to be said, that it is doubtful whether under this unnatural tension, which, to all susceptible characters such a disregard of the opinions which they care for must be, a healthy or a natural feeling can grow up. And now they are married— that is to say, two people have received the licence of a man in a white surplice. But they are no more man and wife for that than Louis XIV and the Infanta of Spain, married by proxy,276 were man and wife. The woman who has sold herself for an establishment, in what is she superior to those we may not name?

Lastly, in a few rare, very rare, cases, such as circumstances, always provided in novels, but seldom to be met with in real life, present—whether the accident of parents’ neglect, or of parents’ unusual skill and wisdom, or of having no parents at all, which is generally the case in novels—or mar rying out of a person’s rank of life, by which the usual restraints

constr uction in people’s eyes than a desire of marriage, I retreat. {I do not care what others think of me.} It is worthwhile.’’ But there is this to be said that it is doubtful whether, under this unnatural tension which, to all susceptible characters, such a disregard of the opinions which they care for, must be—a healthy or a natural feeling can grow up.

And now they are married, that is to say, two people have received the licence of a man in a white surplice. But they are no more man and wife for that than Louis XIV and the Infanta of Spain, married by proxy, were man and wife. {The woman is as often a prostitute as a wife. She prostitutes herself if she has sold her person for an establishment, as much as if she had sold it in the streets. She prostitutes herself, if, knowing so little of her husband as she does, she begins, immediately, without further acquaintance, to allow him the rights of a husband over her person. She prostitutes herself later if, against her own desire, she allows herself to be made the blind instrument of producing involuntar y children. It will be said—and truly— that, when she marries, her husband understands all these privileges as granted and that she would drive him mad and deceive his understood expectation, if she did not grant them. But how is she to ascertain her husband’s opinion on these points before marriage?} Lastly, in a few rare, very rare cases, such as circumstances, always provided in novels, but seldom to be met with in real life, present, or whether the accident of parents’ neglect, or of parents at all, which is again generally the case in novels, or marrying out of the person’s rank of life, by which the usual restraints are removed, and there is room and play left for attraction, or extraordinar y events, isolation, misfortunes, which I am sure that many wish for, even though their imaginations be not tainted by romance

276 Louis XIV and Maria Theresa, the Infanta of Spain, were married as children by proxy; they met for the first time at their (real) wedding in 1660.

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 583 reading—such alternatives as these give food and space for the development of character and mutual sympathies.

But a girl, if she has any pride, is so ashamed of having something she wishes to say out of the hearing of her own family, she thinks it must be something so very wrong that it is ten to one, if she have the opportunity of saying it, that she will not.

are removed, and there is room and play left for attraction—or extraordinar y events, isolation, misfortunes, which many wish for, even though their imaginations be not tainted by romance reading; such alternatives as these give food and space for the development of character and mutual sympathies. But a girl, if she has any pride, is so ashamed of having anything she wishes to say out of the hearing of her own family, she thinks it must be something so very wrong, that it is ten to one, if she have the opportunity of saying it, that she will not. Cassandra tells the Story of Mar riage.

And yet, she is spending her life, perhaps, in dreaming of accidental means of unrestrained communion. And then it is thought {chastely} pretty to say that ‘‘women have no passion.’’ If passion is excitement in the daily social intercourse with men, I am sure that women think about marriage much more than men do—it is the only event of their lives. It ought to be a sacred event, but surely not the only event of a woman’s life, as it is now—when many women spend their lives in asking men to marry them, in a refined way. Yet it is true, I believe, that women are seldom in love. How can they be?

Oh! how cruel are the revulsions which high-minded women suffer! {I remember, on the ruins of Palmyra, amid the wrecks of worlds and palaces and temples, thinking of one I had loved, in connection with great deeds, noble thoughts, devoted feelings. She saw him again. It was at one of those crowded parties of civilization which we call society. His words were, ‘‘The bar tonight is like a manufactor y. Yet that man loved me still. And now, I have soon done with this world. The life of it has departed from me.’’}

And yet she is spending her life, perhaps, in dreaming of accidental means of unrestrained communion. And then it is thought pretty to say that ‘‘Women have no passion.’’ If passion is excitement in the daily social intercourse with men, women think about marriage much more than men do: it is the only event of their lives. It ought to be a sacred event, but surely not the only event of a woman’s life, as it is now. Many women spend their lives in asking men to marry them, in a refined way. Yet it is true that women are seldom in love. How can they be? How cruel are the revulsions which high-minded women suffer! There was one who loved, in connection with great deeds, noble thoughts, devoted feelings. They met after an interval. It was at one of those crowded parties of civilization which we call society. His only careless passing remark was, ‘‘The buzz tonight is like a manufactor y.’’ Yet he loved her.

584 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 5 Women’s inward development and outward activity do not keep parallel now.

Why do not all women feel this?

‘‘L’enthousiasme et la faiblesse d’un temps où l’intelligence monte très haut, entrainée par l’imagination, et tombe très bas, écrasée par une réalité, sans poésie et sans grandeur.’’277 Women dream till they have no longer the strength to dream, those dreams against which they so struggle, so honestly, vigorously and conscientiously, and so in vain, yet which are their life, without which they could not have lived; those dreams go at last. All their plans and visions seem vanished, and they know not where; gone, and they cannot recall them. They do not even remember them. And they are left without the food either of reality or of hope. Later in life, they neither desire nor dream, neither of activity, nor of love, nor of intellect. The last often survives the longest. They wish, if their experiences would benefit anybody, to give them to someone. But they never find an hour free in which to collect their thoughts, and so discouragement becomes ever deeper and deeper, and they less and less capable of undertaking anything. It seems as if the female spirit of the world were mourning everlastingly over blessings, not lost, but which she has never had, and which, in her discouragement, she feels that she never will have, they are so far off. The more complete a woman’s organization, the more she will feel it, till at last there shall arise a woman, who will resume, in her

L’enthousiasme and la faiblesse d’un temps où l’intelligence monte très haut, entraînéé par l’imagination, et tombe très bas, écraséé par une réalité, sans poésie and sans grandeur.

And now I dream till [I] have no longer the strength to dream, those dreams, against which I did so struggle, so honestly, vigorously and conscientiously and so in vain, which I did so curse in [my] time, and which I now know were my life, without which I could not have lived. Those dreams are gone at last— all my plans and visions seem vanished, and I know not where—gone and I cannot recall them. I do not even remember them, and I am left without the food either of reality or of hope.

Later in life, I neither desire nor dream now, neither of activity, nor of love, nor of intellect. Yes the last often has survived the longest. I should like, if my experiences would benefit anybody, to give them to someone. But I never find an hour free in which to collect my thoughts, and so discouragement becomes ever deeper and deeper—and I less and less capable of undertaking anything. {Oh! miserable fate of the woman!}

It seems to me, {when I hear that eternal wind sighing and lamenting I know not where} as if it were the female spirit of the world were mourning everlastingly over blessings—not lost, but which she has never had—and which, in her discouragement, she feels that she never will have, they are so far off. ‘‘But why do not other women feel this?’’ ‘‘The more complete her organization, the more she will feel it—till at last there will come arise a woman, who will resume, in her own person, all the sufferings of her race—and that woman will be the Saviour of her race.

277 George Sand, Les années d’enfance et de jeunesse, chap 1.

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 585 Jesus Christ raised us above the condition of mere slaves, mere ministers to the passions of the man, raised up them by His sympathy, to be ministers of God. He gave them ‘‘moral activity.’’ But the age, the world, humanity must give us the means to exercise this moral activity, must give us intellectual cultivation, spheres of action.

There is perhaps no century where the woman shows so meanly as in this, because her education seems entirely to have parted company with her vocation. I mean that there is no longer unity between the woman as inwardly developed, and she, as outwardly manifested.

own soul, all the sufferings of her race, and that woman will be the Saviour of her race. Jesus Christ raised women above the condition of mere slaves, mere ministers to the passions of the man, raised them by his sympathy to be ministers of God. He gave them moral activity. But the age, the world, humanity, must give them the means to exercise this moral activity, must give them intellectual cultivation, spheres of action. There is perhaps no century where the woman shows so meanly as in this. (At almost every period of social life, we find, as it were, two undercurrents running different ways. There is the noble woman who dreams the following out her useful vocation, but there is also the selfish dreamer now, who is ever turning to something new, regardless of the expectations she has voluntarily excited, who is ever talking about ‘‘making a life for herself,’’ heedless that she is spoiling another life, undertaken, perhaps, at her own bidding. This is the ugly reverse of the medal.) Because her education seems entirely to have parted company with her vocation, there is no longer unity between the woman as inwardly developed, and as outwardly manifested. Education and Practice have parted company.

In the last century, it was not so. In the succeeding one, let us hope that it will no longer be so. But now she is like the Archangel Michael as he stands upon Sant’Angelo at Rome. She has an immense provision of wings, which seem as if they would bear her over earth and heaven, but

In the last century it was not so. In the succeeding one let us hope that it will no longer be so. But now she is like the Archangel Michael as he stands upon Saint Angelo at Rome.278

278 The statue at the top of St Peter’s Basilica, Rome; Nightingale was so moved at the scene she exclaimed ‘‘Sancte Michael Angele, ora pro nobis [St Michelangelo, pray for us], in European Travels (7:278).

586 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought She has an immense provision of wings, which seem as if they would bear her over earth and heaven, but when she tries to use them she is petrified into stone; her feet are grown into the earth, chained to the bronze pedestal. Nothing can well be imagined more painful than the present position of woman, unless, on the one hand, she renounces all outward activity and keeps herself within the magic sphere, the bubble of her dreams, or, on the other, surrendering all aspiration, she gives herself to her real life, soul and body. For those to whom it is possible, the latter is best, for out of activity may come thought, out of mere aspiration can come nothing. But now—when the young imagination is so high and so developed, and reality is so narrow and conventional—there is no more parallelism between life in the thought and life in the actual than between the corpse, which lies motionless in its narrow bed, and the spirit, which, in our imagination, is at large among the stars.

when she tries to use them, lo! she is petrified into stone, her feet are grown into the earth, chained to the bronze pedestal.

Nothing can well be imagined more painful than the present position of woman, unless, on the one hand, she renounces all outward activity and keeps herself within the magic sphere, the bubble of her dreams—or, on the other, surrendering all aspiration, she gives herself to her real life—soul and body. For those to whom it is possible, {I recommend the latter.} For out of activity may come thought. Out of mere aspiration can come nothing.

But now, when the young imagination is so high and so developed—and reality is so narrow and conventional—there is no more parallelism between life in the thought and life in the actual than between the corpse, which lies motionless in its narrow bed, and the spirit, which, in our imagination, is at large among the stars.

Cassandra tells a married woman’s life.

The ideal life is passed in noble schemes of good consecutively followed up, of devotion to a great object, of sympathy given and received for high ideas and generous feelings. The actual life is passed in sympathy given and received for a dinner, a party, a piece of furniture, a house built or a garden laid out well, in devotion to your guests (a too real devotion, for it implies that of all your time) in schemes of schooling for the poor, which you follow up perhaps in an odd quarter of an hour, between luncheon and driving out in the carriage—

The ideal life is passed in noble schemes of good consecutively followed up of devotion to a great object of sympathy given and received for high ideas and generous feelings. The actual life is passed in sympathy given and received for a dinner, a party, a piece of furniture, a house built or a garden laid out well, in devotion to your guests (a too real devotion, for it implies that sacrifice of all your time), in schemes of schooling for the poor, which you follow up perhaps in an odd quarter of an hour, between luncheon and driving out in the carriage—broth and dripping are included in the plan—and the rest of your time goes in ordering the dinner, hunting for a governess for your children, and sending pheasants and apples to your poorer relations. Is there anything in

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 587 this life which can be called an Incarnation of the ideal life within? Is it a wonder that the {unfortunate} woman should prefer to keep them entirely separate? not to take the bloom off her ideal by mixing it up with her actual—not to make her actual still more unpalatable by trying to inform it with her ideal? And then she is blamed, and her own sex unites against her, for not being content with the ‘‘day of small things.’’ She is told that ‘‘trifles make the sum of human things,’’ They do indeed. She is contemptuously asked, ‘‘would she abolish domestic life?’’ Men are afraid that their dinners will not be so comfortable, that their wives will make themselves so good women that they will make themselves distasteful to men—they write books (and very wisely) to teach themselves to dramatize ‘‘little things,’’ to persuade themselves that ‘‘domestic life is their sphere,’’ to idealize the ‘‘sacred hearth.’’ Sacred it is indeed, virgin from the touch of their sons almost as soon as they are out of childhood. (From its dullness and its tyrannous trifling these recoil) virgin from the grasp of their daughters’ affections, upon which it has so light a hold that they seize the first opportunity of marriage—their only chance of emancipation—the ‘‘sacred hearth,’’ sacred to their husbands’ sleep, their sons’ absence in the body and their daughters in mind.

Oh! mothers, who talk about this hearth, how much do you know of your sons’ real

broth and dripping are included in the plan—and the rest of your time goes in ordering the dinner, hunting for a governess for your children, and sending pheasants and apples to your poorer relations. Is there anything in this life which can be called an incarnation of the ideal life within? Is it a wonder that the unhappy woman should prefer to keep them entirely separate? not to take the bloom off her ideal by mixing it up with her actual, not to make her actual still more unpalatable by trying to inform it with her ideal? And then she is blamed, and her own sex unites against her, for not being content with the ‘‘day of small things.’’ She is told that ‘‘trifles make the sum of human beings;’’ they do indeed. She is contemptuously asked, ‘‘Would she abolish domestic life?’’ Men are afraid that their houses will not be so comfortable, that their wives will make themselves ‘‘remarkable,’’ women, that they will make themselves distasteful to men; they write books (and very wisely) to teach themselves to dramatize ‘‘little things,’’ to persuade themselves that ‘‘domestic life is their sphere’’ and to idealize the ‘‘sacred hearth.’’ Sacred it is indeed. Sacred from the touch of their sons almost as soon as they are out of childhood—from its dullness and its tyrannous trifling these recoil. Sacred from the grasp of their daughters’ affections, upon which it has so light a hold that they seize the first opportunity of marriage, their only chance of emancipation. The ‘‘sacred hearth,’’ sacred to their husband’s sleep, their sons’ absence in the body and their daughters in mind. Oh! mothers, who talk about this hearth, how much do you

588 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought know of your sons’ real life, how much of your daughters’ imaginar y one? Awake, ye women, all ye that sleep, awake! If this domestic life were so ver y good, would your young men wander away from it, your maidens think of something else? The time is come when women must do something more than the ‘‘domestic hearth,’’ which means nursing the infants, keeping a pretty house, having a good dinner and an entertaining party. You say, ‘‘It is true, our young men see visions, and our maidens dream dreams,279 but what of? Does not the woman intend to mar ry, and have over again what she has at home? and the man ultimately too?’’ Yes, but not the same; she will have the same, that is, if circumstances are not altered to prevent it, but her idéal is very different, though that idéal and the reality will never come together to mould each other. And it is not only the unmarried woman who dreams. The married woman also holds long imaginary conversations but too often.

life, how much of your daughters’ imaginary one? Awake, ye women, all ye that sleep. awake. If this domestic life were so ver y good, would your young men wander away from it, your maidens think of something else? The time is come when women must do something more than the ‘‘domestic hearth,’’ which means nursing the infants, keeping a pretty house, having a good dinner and an entertaining party.

You say, ‘‘it is true, our young men see visions and our maidens dream dreams, but what of? Does not the woman intend to marry and have over again what she has at home? and the man ultimately too?’’ Yes, but not the same—she will have the same—that is, if circumstances are not altered to prevent it, but her ideal is very different—though that ideal will never come and that reality will never come together to mould each other.

6 Would it not be better if we left off complaining of the world?

We live in the world, it is said, and must walk in its ways.

Was Christ called a complainer against the world? Yet all these

{‘‘Well,’’ said I, ‘‘We are now giving in to the world. We live in the world, it is said, and walk in its ways and if you would cease quarrelling with it and would open your eyes to its joys, which you don’t seem inclined to do, I think you might make yourself very tolerably happy.’’} {This was a cruel speech, I admit, to such deep discouragement, such old griefs as hers. But it was my true impression, and good advice too. She answered me never a word but, in the course of the evening, she said,} ‘‘I wonder whether Christ was called a complainer against the world? Yet all these

279 An allusion to Joel 2:28, quoted in Acts 2:17.

Suggestions for Thought Volume 2 / 589 great teachers and preachers must have had a most deep and ingrained sense, a continual gnawing feeling of the miseries and wrongs of the world. Otherwise they would not have been impelled to devote life and death to redress them. Christ, Socrates, Howard, they must have had no ear for the joys, compared to that which they had for the sorrows of the world.’’

{‘‘Ah! but,’’ I said, ’’they acted however and we complain.’’ ‘‘Yes,’’ she cried, ‘‘I suppose that is the difference.} The great reformers of the world turn into the great misanthropists, if circumstances or organizations do not permit them to act. Christ, if He had been a woman, might have been nothing but a great complainer. Peace be with the misanthropists. They have made a step in progress. The next will make them great philanthropists.—They are divided but by a line.

The next Christ will perhaps be a female Christ, {I believe. But I do not see one woman who looks like a female Christ? I don’t see anyone who looks, in the least, like her Precursor even. If I could see one, I would be like ‘‘the messenger before’’ her ‘‘face,’’ to go before her and prepare the hearts and minds for her.} {‘‘Now I don’t wonder,’’ said I, ‘‘at your being unhappy. If you have that insane ambition to be a Christ or a John the Baptist! Do you know that to this will be answered that half the inmates of Bedlam begin in that way. They are divided but by a line. ‘‘Yes,’’ she said, ‘‘that is just like you.’’}

great teachers and preachers must have had a most deep and ingrained sense, a continual gnawing feeling of the miseries and wrongs of the world. Otherwise they would not have been impelled to devote life and death to redress them. Christ, Socrates, Howard, they must have had no ear for the joys, compared to that which they had for the sorrows of the world. They acted, however, and we complain. The great reformers of the world turn into the great misanthropists, if circumstances or organization do not permit them to act. Christ, if He had been a woman, might have been nothing but a great complainer. Peace be with the misanthropists! They have made a step in progress; the next will make them great philanthropists; they are divided but by a line. The next Christ will perhaps be a female Christ. But do we see one woman who looks like a female Christ? or even like ‘‘the messenger before’’ her ‘‘face,’’ to go before her and prepare the hearts and minds for her?280 To this will be answered that half the inmates of Bedlam281 begin in this way, by fancying that they are ‘‘the Christ.’’ (It is quite true that insanity, sensuality and monstrous fraud have constantly assumed to be ‘‘the Christ,’’ vide the Agapemone, and the Mormons. ‘‘Believing’’ a man of the name of Prince ‘‘to be the tabernacle of God on earth,’’ poor deluded women transfer to him all their

280 An allusion to Mal 3:1, quoted in Mark 1:2. 281 Bethlehem Hospital, for the insane.

The y acted and we complain.

We are told to be ‘‘like Christ.’’ But if we try, we are called insane.

590 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought stock in the Three Percents.282 We hear of the Mormons, etc., being the ‘‘recipients and mouthpieces of God’s Spirit.’’ They profess to be ‘‘incarnations of the Deity,’’ ‘‘witnesses of the Almighty, solely knowing God’s will, and being the medium of communicating it to man,’’ and so forth. It does not appear to us that this blasphemy is ver y dangerous to the cause of true religion in general, any more than forger y is very dangerous to commerce in general. It is the universal dishonesty in religion, as in trade, which is really dangerous.) We are told to ‘‘imitate Christ.’’ Do we?

People talk about imitating Christ, and imitate Him in the little trifling formal things, such as washing the feet, saying his prayer, and so on, but if anyone attempts the real imitation of Him, there are no bounds to the outcry which the presumption of that person is condemned. For instance, Christ was saying something to the people one day which interested Him very much, and interested them very much, and Mary and his brothers came in the middle of it and wanted to inter rupt Him,283 and take Him home to dinner, ver y likely (how natural that story is! does it not speak more home than any historic evidences of the gospel’s reality?), and He, instead of being angry with their interruption of Him in such an important work for some trifling thing, answers, ‘‘Who is my

You talk about imitating Christ and you imitate Him in the little trifling formal things, such as washing the feet, saying prayer and so on. But if anyone attempts the real imitation of Him there are no bounds to the outcr y with which the presumption of that person is condemned. {‘‘Presumption, indeed! It is mad pride, downright insanity!’’}

For instance, Christ was saying something to the people one day, which interested Him ver y much and interested them very much. And Mary and his brothers came in the middle of it and wanted to interrupt him, to take him home to dinner very likely (how natural that story is! Does it not speak more home than any historic evidences ‘‘of the gospels’’ reality and he, instead of being angry with their interruption of Him in such an important work for some trifling thing, answers, ‘‘Who is my mother? and who are my brethren? Whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother and sister and mother.’’ But, if we were to say that, we should be accused of ‘‘destroying the family tie,’’ of diminishing the obligation of the ‘‘home duties.’’

282 An English sect led by Henry James Prince, in which women adherents were married to members and their fortunes thus acquired; the family of Louisa Nottidge (1802-58) had her put into an asylum and sued for the return of the money. 283 An allusion to Matt 12:46.

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He might well say ‘‘Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.’’ His words will never pass away. Only think if he had said, ‘‘Tell them that I am engaged at this moment in something very important, that the instruction of the multitude ought to go before any personal ties, that I will remember to come when I have done,’’ no one would have been impressed by His words. But how striking is that, ‘‘Behold my mother and my brethren!’’ {Before I go on, I had better tell who ‘‘I’’ am. My name is Fariseo. I am one of those who are called the Cynics of the age, who openly confess their own selfishness, admit the want of the times, and preach that we should bear with those making this confession, not with sorrow of heart nor well-trained resignation, but without shame and without difficulty as, on the whole, the best state of mind. I am the brother of poor Nofariari and I tell her story as she told it me, one day when I blamed her for not finding her happiness in life as I and her contemporaries have done, and she answered that I did not know whether her life had been such that she could either find happiness in it or alter it. I made some few notes of our conversation, for it occurred a short time only before her death. My poor sister! She died at thirty, wearied of life, in which she could do nothing, and having ceased to live the intellectual life long before she was deserted by the physical life. I saw her on her deathbed and giving way to the tears and exclamations natural on such occasions was answered by her.} The dying woman to her mourners. ‘‘Oh!’’ If you knew how gladly I leave this life, how much more courage I feel to take the chance of another than of anything I see before me in this, you would put on your wedding clothes instead of mourning for

284 Matt 12:48 and 50. 285 Matt 5:18.

mother? and who are my brethren? Whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother and sister and mother.’’284 But if we were to say that, we should be accused of ‘‘destroying the family tie’’ of diminishing the obligation of the home duties.’’ He might well say, ‘‘Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.’’285 His words will never pass away. If He had said, ‘‘Tell them that I am engaged at this moment in something very important, that the instr uction of the multitude ought to go before any personal ties, that I will remember to come when I have done,’’ no one would have been impressed by His words, but how striking is that, ‘‘Behold my mother and my brethren!’’

7 The dying woman to her mourners: ‘‘Oh! if you knew how gladly I leave this life, how much more courage I feel to take the chance of another, than of anything I see

Cassandra, who can neither find happiness in life, nor alter it, dies.

592 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought before me in this, you would put on your wedding clothes instead of mourning for me!’’ ‘‘But,’’ they say, ‘‘so much talent! so many gifts! such good which you might have done!’’ ‘‘The world will be put back some little time by my death,’’ she says; ‘‘you see I estimate my powers at least as highly as you can, but it is by the death which has taken place some years ago in me, not by the death which is about to take place now.’’ And so is the world put back by the death of ever yone who has to sacrifice the development of his or her peculiar gifts (which were meant, not for selfish gratification, but for the improvement of that world) to conventionality. ‘‘My people were like children playing on the shore of the eighteenth century. I was their hobbyhorse, their plaything, and they drove me to and fro, dear souls! never weary of the play themselves, till I, who had grown to woman’s estate and to the ideas of the nineteenth century, lay down exhausted, my mind closed to hope, my heart to strength.’’

me!’’ {‘‘But,’’ I said, ‘‘so much talent! so many gifts! such good which you might have done!}

‘‘The world will be put back some little time by my death,’’ she said, ‘‘you see I estimate my powers at least as highly as you can, but it is by the death which has taken place some years ago in me, not by the death which is about to take place now. And so is the world put back by the death of everyone who has to sacrifice the development of his or her own peculiar gifts to conventionality! (which were meant, not for selfish gratification, but for the improvement of that world).

My people were like children playing on the shore of the eighteenth century. I was their hobbyhorse, their plaything. And they drove me to and fro dear soul! never weary of the play themselves, till I, who had grown to woman’s estate and to the ideas of the nineteenth century, lay down exhausted, my mind closed to hope, my heart to strength {and all was still and dark and drear y.’’ She lay for some time silent. Then starting up and standing upright, for the first time for many months, she stretched out her arms and cried:}

Cassandra dies

‘‘Free-free—oh! divine freedom, art thou come at last? Welcome, beautiful death!’’ Let neither name nor date be placed on her grave, still less the expression of regret or of admiration, but simply the words, ‘‘I believe in God.’’

‘‘Free, free, oh! divine freedom, art thou come at last? Welcome, beautiful death!’’ {She fell forward on her face. She was dead. One of her last requests had been that} neither name nor date should be placed on her grave. Still less the expression of regret or of admiration, but simply the words, ‘‘I believe in God.’’

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o manuscript material has been found that corresponds with this printed text. However, there seems to be an earlier, but undated, printed version, on half pages, that contains some material not incorporated into the final volume 3 of Suggestions for Thought. This untitled sixty-five-page text begins with a dedication. Other material from it has been spliced into the regular text and so indicated. As for other Nightingale books, the first version often had copious and lengthy footnotes, which were incorporated into the regular text in a later edition. Here what were footnotes, some several pages long, have been brought into the main text, in parentheses. As before, the running heads have been inserted where it seemed most appropriate.

Source: Suggestions for Thought, 3:1-126, and British Library Cup.1247, p 48 [short version]

Dedication to the Artizans of England Fellow Searchers[Short Version] 1. There are many who say that they will do what little good they can here without looking further to a future or a God. 2. There are others who say that a future which will set right all they could not do here is all they have to look to. Of the first I say: I reverence their devotion. But I think that they can only feel thus by looking so little ahead that, in ‘‘doing,’’ they will make mistakes—such that ‘‘the little good’’ they could do will be not good at all, and that, in order to do even ‘‘this little good’’ wisely, they must ‘‘look further,’’ and, if they look, they will see a future and a God. To the second I say: The value of a future, if there is one, must depend entirely on the character of the Power which makes the plan for man. / 593

594 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Upon these two grounds the following inquiry is undertaken. It is an inquiry into the plan upon which mankind is created, or, in other words, into the character of the Power who planned it. Note: J. Stuart Mill’s Logic—especially as regards ‘‘law,’’ ‘‘free will’’ and ‘‘necessity’’—has suggested much of the foundation on which the argument rests, though whether he would acknowledge the superstr ucture, I am quite ignorant. Summar y [Volume 3 Begins] Suppose a man intensely desirous to be assured that human existence is in accordance with moral right. He finds this desire to be, not an individual caprice, but a want indicated by the laws of his constitution to be appropriate to his nature. Yet a study of the actual history of human existence, a recognition of the suffering, the moral wrong which it exhibits, show it to be in the past and the present utterly at variance with this desire, since the history of human existence is what it is in accordance with law, and it was not, therefore, in human possibility that such history should have been other than it has been. Here, then, consequently on the universality of law, so long as man contemplates its temporary and immediate results unexplained, he is face to face with a difficulty. To this we are endeavouring to offer a solution. The solution we find in the character and tendency of law, which are such as to induce us to refer its existence to will and power in a righteous nature, and hence to infer human existence to be in connection with a future by which connection the desire for moral right is satisfied. The mode of operation of law, from which this character and tendency are deduced, is, that thereby are supplied means and inducement through which the imperfect moral nature will ultimately perfectionize itself and its kind. We propose to elucidate these propositions by a consideration of the subjects ‘‘law’’ and ‘‘moral right,’’ as connected with the conditions of human existence. Chapter 1 Law Meaning attached to word ‘‘Law.’’

‘‘Law is, etymologically, that which is laid down, and is used in the most appropriate sense, to signify some general injunction, command or regulation, addressed to certain persons who are called upon to conform to it. It is in this sense, that we speak of ‘the law of

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Moses,’ ‘The law of the Lord,’ etc. It is also used in a transferred sense to denote the statement of some general fact, the several individual instances of which exhibit a conformity to that statement, analogous to the conduct of persons in respect to a law which they obey. It is in this sense that we speak of ‘the laws of nature,’ when we say that ‘a seed in vegetating directs the radicle downwards, and the plumule upwards, in compliance with a law of nature,’ we only mean that such is universally the fact, and so in other cases. It is evident, therefore, that in this sense the conformity of individual cases to the general rule is that which constitutes a law of nature. If water should henceforth never become solid at any temperature, then the freezing of water would no longer be a law of nature; whereas, in the other sense, a law is not less a law from the conformity or nonconformity of individuals to it. If an act of our legislature were to be disobeyed and utterly disregarded by everyone, it would not on that account be the less a law’’ (Whately’s Logic 1). Meaning of Word ‘‘Law’’ The word ‘‘law’’ when it is used to express some regulation of man, includes the idea of will or intention that, when this is, that shall be. ‘‘The expression Law of Nature is generally used by scientific men, with a sort of tacit reference to the original sense of the word law, viz., the expression of the will of a Superior, the Superior in this instance being the Ruler of the Universe’’ (Mill’s Logic 2). There are thinkers, however, who do not admit that evidence is within our reach, for referring to any will the uniformities observable in nature, which are designated laws of nature. By such thinkers the expression (laws of nature) is only used to express uniformities which experience shows may be expected with as much certainty as if there were evidence that these result from will, existing with power competent to realize such will. By such thinkers the word ‘‘law,’’ in the phrase ‘‘laws of nature,’’ is not used correctly, unless in a figurative sense, nature being figuratively represented as an entity ordaining laws.

1 Richard Whately, Elements of Logic, Containing the Substance of the Article in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana 327; Whately actually wrote the ‘‘law of the land.’’ 2 Mill, System of Logic 7:316-17. The full title of the work is instructive: A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation.

596 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought The groundwork of our argument is that observation and experience afford evidence that law is manifested in the beginning, the constitution, the history and the tendency of all modes of being that have a beginning. The manifestation of law in certain instances is now admitted, but difference of opinion exists as to its universality and invariability. By many the phenomena of volition are not admitted to manifest the operation—by many deviations from law are considered to be effected by miraculous interposition. That there exist observed uniformities in many modes of existence is acknowledged by all thinking minds. This, being interpreted, signifies that there are certain definite modes of existence which are invariably attended by certain other definite modes of existence—that the former never exist without the latter, the latter never exist without the former. Such observed uniformities are called laws, and there are thinking minds—now numerous enough to constitute a class—who say that to notice such observed uniformities is all that man is capable of—that he has no sufficient evidence for tracing that they arise from a will. By will, as recognized by our own consciousness, we mean wish, purpose, existing with the conviction of being able to effect the wish and purpose in question. Now, suppose that the more we learn concerning the modes of existence which are and have been, and concerning the future modes of existence—towards which are tending what is and has been—the more we find reason to believe that, if there existed a will, perfect in righteousness, in goodness, in love, in wisdom, and omnipotent to fulfill itself, the will of such a Being would be: 1. The invariable accompaniment of certain modes of existence, determined by Him, by certain other modes of existence, determined by Him. 2. That one mode of existence should be beings adapted to find their satisfaction in will the same as the Perfect Will. 3. That beings of this mode are capable of recognizing what modes of existence involve, or are certain to be accompanied by, what other modes of existence, and that they thus possess the power of bringing into existence, through the exercise of the powers of their nature, that which is satisfactory to their nature and to the nature of the Perfect.

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Scheme harmonious with a Perfect Will Suppose, further, that we arrive at the conviction that such a scheme alone would be harmonious with a Perfect Will, and that, the more we learn the essential nature of ever y different mode of being which exists, the more evidence we find that such a scheme actually exists, will it not, in such a case, be justifiable to trace these, undoubtedly to be observed, uniformities to the existence of a will? The recognition of truth is much impeded by vagueness in the words with which we seek to convey what we conceive to be true. The question, whether the uniformities observed may be traced to will, or whether all we can say about them is to affirm their existence, is confused by the designation laws, applied to these uniformities. The word law is used also to designate some rule laid down by human will, and it is doubtful whether those who use the word law, with no conscious reference to will, have not an unconscious reference. It would seem best that law should be used to signify will, that a definite mode of being should invariably be simultaneous with certain definite (and invariably the same) circumstances, without any fresh exertion of will to occasion this uniformity. If a Supreme Will is understood as the spring of what are called the laws of nature, the word law appears per fectly appropriate. But, if observed uniformities are spoken of— not attributed to any will—the use of the word law is objectionable. It is always dangerous to clearness to use a word sometimes according to its etymology, connected with which there are likely to be old and strong associations, and sometimes in a quite opposite sense. By a law of God, we mean that it is a volition of God—that there is, and shall be, a constant relation of succession or co-existence with regard to certain modes of being, such as that, co-existent with certain other modes of existence, it shall always be that particles press equally in all directions—thus constituting one mode of being which we denominate a fluid. Our experience is that such laws are invariable, never broken. ‘‘Thou shalt do no murder’’3 is sometimes called a law of God written in the heart of man, or pronounced by God through Moses. But this cannot be said to be ‘‘laid down’’—to be a volition of God. It is broken many times in every year in the nineteenth century in England and Wales. To call it a volition of God would be to say that God’s will is not always done.

3 Matt 19:18.

598 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought A law may be kept in various modes or manners. The law of gravitation is kept whether a man falls down a precipice or stands upon the earth. But one mode of keeping God’s law is salutary, another pernicious to man’s temporar y well-being. (We say temporar y, for the whole of the laws of God is such that temporary evil only is possible. The whole of the laws of God is such that they are self-rectifying, with regard to their effect upon man’s well-being.) Can ‘‘Thou shalt do no murder’’ be denominated a law of God? We must carefully distinguish what are the modes of existence which are law, i.e., which are, because it is the will of God that such a mode of existence shall be. It is one of the laws of motion that action and reaction are equal to one another, and in contrary directions. The invariable co-existence here is movement communicated by force, and action and reaction equal and in contrary directions. Will it be said that, if all be thus law, man is really directed by God—not by himself—as much as if, each time he lifts his hand, it were by Divine will? 1. In some respects, every human being is like every other. In these respects, every human being will be definitely so and so, in such and such definite circumstances. 2. The nature of ever y human being, though like that of every other in some respects, differs from that of every other in other respects, but each will vary in a definite way, according to the circumstances it is in. Each nature is different in every present from what it was in any past. But it always has a relation to what it was in ever y past. What power rests in Man? What power then rests in man, making his being different from what it would be if God directed by an act of will his every movement? This difference: man is capable of finding out what state and what circumstances will be simultaneous. And thus, within certain limits, he may determine his state. Now every present influences the character as an individuality. May we believe that each character is, and will remain, an individuality through eternity? Or must we suppose that the individuality goes on till, by progress, worked out by exercise, all knowledge is attained—till God’s thought, which is the revelation of knowledge, present, past and future, is attained, and then His being is shared,

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His purpose is shared, viz., that of turning a fresh phase of purpose into life, exercise, work? But, then, will this bring to an end individual affections? Not necessarily, for the Perfect thus contains in His nature all the individual affections which ever were, matured by life and work, in one. And this one, in again individualizing, according to the laws of righteousness and benevolence, contains in its nature those same individuals which may again meet as individuals, again merge into perfection—per fection of thought and feeling, now and forever, but such thought and feeling ever anew worked out in successive phases of life. It is a question whether, in the estimation of Perfect Wisdom, Love and Goodness, any mode of existence can be worth having in which each present is unconnected with a future, each part with a whole? If so, it would be inconsistent with the Omnipotent to will such existence. A temporary individual existence would seem a constant battling with disappointment, both to the individual and to others. A well-disposed mind, which has right affections to God and man, has only ignorance to contend with. But this contention is invigorating. Who shall complain of it? What more animating prospect can man desire than this—that man shall work in unison and sympathy with his kind, with certainty of success, because God’s nature and God’s laws insure it to him? But success in what? What are we living for? Is it not for happiness in its largest, widest, highest sense? And does not happiness in such sense mean the union of God and man in one common thought, feeling, purpose? Union of God and Man The perfect is constituted of the imperfect, which has lived and worked its way to perfection. Do we not interpret the unknown by the known? Do we not know thus much of the Almighty Presence— that we may pronounce that Presence to be Almighty Righteousness, Love, Wisdom? One Spirit of the Universe connects worlds with worlds, and the spiritual and intellectual individualities which inhabit them with each other. He lives to communicate His power, His wisdom, His love, for the essence of well-being is the power of wisdom and love. ‘‘Thou wilt receive the kingdom of heaven.’’ ‘‘Thou wilt be a companion of God.’’

600 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought For thou art become God, for, whatever sufferings thou hast endured as being a man, these things God hath given thee because thou art a man, and whatsoever things befit Deity God has promised to bestow when thou hast become divine, having been born into immortality through the knowledge of the God which made thee,’’ says Hippolytus.4

How law is manifested in the beginning of all modes of being which have a beginning.

We have vague ideas of the perfection of which we talk. Does that come home to our experience as perfection, which is aught but thought and feeling, manifested in work? The perfect work is imperfection perfecting itself. ‘‘Le perfectionnement suppose d’abord l’imper fection [per fectionment supposes first imperfection],’’ says Comte. ‘‘Le progrès est le développement graduel de l’ordre [progress is the gradual development of order].’’5 May we not already read that the order of the ages is eternal progress? There was a time when it was impossible that man should interpret thus. If experience should prove that man may attain (the individual and the kind) more and more of the divine nature—that the thought, the feeling, the purpose of humanity may become one— one with itself—one with that other thought and feeling and purpose which are distinguishable, but not in man; if, as man improves in his nature and his knowledge he more and more recognizes goodness and wisdom at work in the universe; if he more and more recognizes the nature of wisdom and goodness to be such that it would not will progress to be through successive individuals, each quenched after contributing its work and experience; if he recognizes one spring, one cause for all the uniform laws whence spring the varying phenomena of the universe, viz., the Omnipotent Spirit of a Wise Love, thus, by the discernment of these truths, may it be verified whether these things we have spoken of are truth. If they are, could the heart of man desire other for its help, its abiding satisfaction, than to be thus ever surrounded with the Spirit of Wisdom and Love, in which is all power? 1. The uniformities in nature, which are called ‘‘laws of nature,’’ consist in uniform relations of simultaneity and succession, in which one mode of being is observed to exist to another. In respect to every mode of being which has a beginning, the beginning is uniformly preceded by and simultaneous with certain conditions,

4 Hippolytus of Rome, third-centur y ce church father, in The Refutation of All Heresies, Book 10. 5 Comte, Système de politique positive 2:41.

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without which it is true to say of each existing mode of being which has had a beginning that it would not have begun, while, if ever or whenever these conditions recur, the same mode of being will again begin to be. Law manifested in Beginning and in Constitution Whether to such uniformities appertains the character of law depends on whether human observation and experience, to which alone we can refer, afford ground for believing its invariability to justify either the inference that it is the result of will, existing with power to realize that will, or that its invariability is as it would be if it were the result of will existing with power to realize that will. In the proposition that law is manifested in the beginning of all modes of being which have a beginning, we express our belief of such uniformity. 2. By the nature or constitution of a mode of being, we mean something in which individuals uniformly resemble each other so as to admit of being classed together, or we mean definite states uniformly simultaneous with or successive to definite antecedent or coexisting circumstances in beings of the same class or in an individual. ‘‘It is the nature of fluids to press equally in all directions.’’6 ‘‘Such is the constitution of the human frame that in the polar regions food of an oily nature is nourishing and palatable, which at the equator would be repugnant and unwholesome.’’ While in some particulars there is a resemblance between individuals in regard to which they may be classed, in other particulars individuals differ from each other, each from every other, but, alike in those particulars in which they resemble each other and in those in which they differ, law is manifested, i.e., a uniform state of things exists simultaneously with and successively to uniform conditions. Thus, in regard to the physical nature of man, certain conditions are essential to human life, others to the healthy existence of a human being; while, in other particulars, individuals vary as to those which are essential or conducive to health. But uniform relation is observable in all states in which human nature exists. In like manner as to those states of consciousness which we call states of mind, they exist and differ relatively to uniform condi-

How law is manifested in the nature or constitution of all modes of being which have a beginning

6 Pascal’s law on the equilibrium of fluids, that the pressure of fluids is transmitted equally to all distances and in all directions.

602 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought tions. In regard to the body, we recognize states differing from each other in a uniform manner, which we distinguish as healthy or unhealthy. In regard to the mind, we recognize states of mind differing from each other in a uniform manner, which we distinguish as morally right or morally wrong. We have the phrase, mens sana in corpore sano [a healthy mind in a healthy body], which we understand to mean, a state of mind morally right existing in a body physically healthy. Those states of consciousness which we call mind, or states of mind, may be distinguished as sensations, thoughts, emotions or volitions. Of these states of mind, thoughts, emotions and volitions may be characterized as right or as wrong. The uniformities and the differences which exist in human minds as in human bodies manifest law, for those differences exist relatively to uniform conditions. In regard to the body, they exist relatively to physical organization and to circumstances which affect it. In regard to the mind, they exist relatively to the physical organization and to circumstances which otherwise definitely and uniformly affect the state of mind. Law manifested in Tendency and in History Law manifested in the tendency of all modes of being which have a beginning.

Law manifested in the histor y of all modes of being which have a beginning

3. The histor y of every mode of being which has a beginning is in accordance with law, i.e., from that time present in which a mode of being begins to be, in each successive time present some change takes place, all such change being relative to a definite nature or constitution in the being in which it takes place, as well as to its circumstances of simultaneity and succession to other modes of being. No history of the past could therefore have been changed or prevented except by a power competent to alter the law from which such effects resulted. 4. All modes of being which have a beginning are throughout existence tending to some definite state or mode of being, i.e., the present is a definite preparation for a definite future. As far as our experience extends, no material existence comes to an end; in each, change is always taking place, and change in a definite direction. [Short Version Resumes pp 8-11] (3) Uniformities are obser vable in regard to the constitution of man—such as afford evidence of law referable to the will and power of a moral nature, the consciousness in whom appears to be the absolute conception of moral right, in which law are to be found

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means of attaining such approximation to that conception, and such realization of it as are within the possibility of man. (4) The constitution of man, in one sense, expresses the conditions essential to constitute a man. There have been, in the case of each individual, certain antecedents and present conditions, successively to and co-existent with which, if such recurred precisely, such individual existence would recur. But the antecedent and present conditions of the past never precisely recur. Resemblances only recur sufficient to afford evidence that the result of precise recurrence would be precisely uniform. Each individual human being has not only the constitution of man, but an idiosyncratic constitution susceptible of being affected in a definite manner by definite antecedents and co-existences. There are definite possibilities as to what the human constitution might be, definite possibilities as to what each idiosyncratic constitution might be, i.e., definite certainties as to what the human constitution and each idiosyncratic constitution would be under certain conditions. (5) On the supposition that the constitution and history of human nature accord with law, to what extent would it be in the possibility of human nature and of myself individually to render human existence accordant with those desires for humanity to which the constitution of human nature is adapted? and what would be the means by which this possibility might be realized? 1. As to knowledge of the results of law in regard to those states of human nature and human life which it is wished to produce. 2. As to will to effect results which such knowledge reveals to be the appropriate means. In proportion to the extent of such knowledge, and in proportion to the force and continuity of such will in mankind at large, would be progress in the objects proposed. Ignorance and opposition in a portion will lessen the power of another portion or of an individual. But success, individually or collectively, will be relative to these conditions. IV. It is usual to include in the word ‘‘nature’’ all modes of being which exist irrespectively of the exercise of human mind in bringing them into existence.

Nature

604 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 2 Universality of law

Propositions Extended

Proposition 1. That law is manifested in the beginning, in the nature or constitution, in the history, and in the tendency and destination of all modes of being which have a beginning. If this is granted, then it must be granted: (a) That the constitution and history of human nature are as they are in accordance with law. (b) That no power not competent to annul or alter that law could have rendered that constitution and history other than it is. Proposition 2. That the constitution of human nature is, in accordance with law, adapted to certain desires and aims, which are called morally right. But the history of human nature is, in accordance with law, a histor y of that which is morally wrong. It is the history of a nature in which sometimes man has been altogether unconscious of the desire for right, to which his constitution is adapted. Sometimes the desire has been in him but too weak to determine his will; sometimes his ignorance of how to carry it out has negatived or even produced a contrary effect to what he desired; and sometimes unavoidable obstacles have prevented the fulfillment of his desire for right. Proposition 3. That the plan of human history is thus apparently at discord with the plan of human nature, unless there is evidence for belief in such a future, as that human history, when considered in connection with it, will be found to be in the course of fulfilling these human desires for right: in other words, unless there is evidence (1) that human existence is a par t of the results of law, in accordance with which those desires are in process of being realized, and (2) that, in the nature, the consequences and the tendencies of law, as manifested in the constitution and history of beings who have a beginning, there are means of realizing those desires to an extent as yet imperfect, but to which no essential limit can be laid down, except that of time. Suppose a person who, as it has been expressed, ‘‘hungers and thirsts after righteousness,’’7 to be considering the actual history, past and present, of human nature, and the possibilities of human nature, with a desire that, to the extent of human possibility, ‘‘righteousness,’’ goodness, should be realized in human existence.

7 Matt 5:6.

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Such a one would seek for evidence (1) that the beginning, the nature of constitution and the histor y of human existence, are a manifestation of law; (2) that a definite future to which each human being is tending is a manifestation of law; (3) that it is in accordance with such law that feelings, desires, objects of pursuit, actions of which the character is morally right, are alone appropriate to or befitting a nature so constituted; (4) that all others arise from defect of organization or development, from ignorance or from influences unfavourable to a nature so constituted; (5) that the constitution and histor y of human nature accord with law in such a sense that no power not competent to annul or alter that law could have rendered that constitution and history other than they are. Any person ‘‘hungering and thirsting after righteousness,’’ and admitting these five propositions to be true, would, in proportion to the force of his desire for the morally right in human nature and human life—in proportion as he not only knows, but realizes to his conception the actual history, past and present, of human nature feel repugnance to the conditions of human existence, unless he can discover ground of belief that human existence is in connection with such a future as that he can satisfactorily interpret it by means of that future. [Volume 3 Resumes] If, then, law be manifested in the beginning, in the nature or constitution, in the history and in the tendency and destination of all modes of being which have a beginning, it follows of course (a) that the constitution and history of human nature are as they are in accordance with law, and (b) that no power not competent to annul or alter that law could have rendered that constitution and history other than it is.

What is the conclusion? Universality of Law

Chapter 2 Moral Right We have said that the desire to find human existence in accordance with moral right is a want appropriate to our nature. With regard to the states of mind which we distinguish as thoughts, emotions and volitions, and with regard to actions or other external manifestations of them, a consciousness exists in some minds, which is expressed when those states of mind, or their manifestations, are characterized as morally right or morally wrong. This consciousness, existing with a feeling of satisfaction in the right, of dissatisfaction in the wrong, is designated moral feeling. This appears to be the essen-

Right—what is it?

606 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought tially appropriate, what we may call the healthy state of the human mind. Morality, which lies at the foundation of all science, is not accepted as a science. On this subject we are, generally speaking, permitted only to accept the guidance of vague individual feeling, or of supposed revelation. How could men advance as they have done in chemistr y, geology, botany, etc., if they were to treat these studies in the same way? But nobody cares about morality as a science, that is, the science of morality in the mind of God—the consciousness of God. (It is said that in any recent list of German and English publications, it will be seen that religious or theological works always exceed all others in number and importance. If this is true, does it not show how very vague and unpractical these ‘‘publications’’ must be? For of what subject have we so little knowledge—that is, belief founded on evidence—as of religion? And such is the effect, or non-effect of these ‘‘publications’’ that churches go on preaching contradictions to God’s law; men’s lives are organized, habituated, taught to be contrary to God’s law. These ‘‘publications’’ are generally either repetitions of orthodox doctrines, read by those who already believe them, or speculations read for amusement, not in serious search for truth.) Moral Right If we have to speak of the mind of God, we can find no other word than ‘‘consciousness’’ available. ‘‘The mind of God,’’ ‘‘the feeling,’’ ‘‘the thought of God,’’ are inapplicable expressions. ‘‘Consciousness’’ expresses the state or kind or manner of feeling in God and in man. J. Stuart Mill has pointed out that the word feeling has this difficulty: that, though, in the language of philosophy, it is an equivalent expression with ‘‘a state of consciousness,’’8 yet it is often applied more peculiarly to the sensitive or emotional phases of our nature. If you ask what my consciousness is at any particular moment, I can only say that it is the sensations, thoughts, emotions or volitions which exist in me at that moment, and I express that which is so compounded in me by the word consciousness. Morality, because of its practical importance, has been treated differently from every other subject. People could not wait to learn

8 A System of Logic 7:51.

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from experience a theory of right and wrong—knowledge of the power that rules them, and how to gain His help. In the infancy of human nature and human experience, people rushed to conclusions—they did not obser ve whether God gave help because they prayed or sacrificed, in order to try some other way if they were still ill and unfortunate, although they prayed. The sciences of physiology, of political economy, etc., slowly indeed, but still actually—did go on to be studied. But it was and is left in the vague how much we owe to acting upon the laws of those and other sciences—how much to our prayer or to God’s merciful interference. This is but a type of the multitudes who recognize science and prayer—of the infantine ignorance betrayed in all modes of public worship—consequently of popular belief. How many are there of such kinds of worship in which we do not find thorough ignorance or misinterpretation of God? There are occasions on which the man of moral feeling will be conscious of ignorance or uncertainty as to what is right, will desire to refer to some other consciousness or knowledge than his own for enlightenment—sometimes to be found in other human minds. But sometimes the limits and ignorance common to human nature suggest to us a desire to know, if we may—inasfar as we may—what would be the consciousness of right in a nature having in moral right the kind of satisfaction which exists in the conscientious human mind, but without its limits of nature and knowledge. How may man attain or approximate, to the extent of his power, to a true conception of moral right—that is to say, to such a conception or consciousness as would exist in a moral nature which had not man’s limits of nature and knowledge and how realize in human nature and human life, as far as is possible to him, his best conception of right? These seem questions appropriate to the moral nature of man. Law the Promoter of Right The man who believes he knows the right and who reverences the right—who is dissatisfied with the wrong—is yet sometimes wanting in will to pursue the one, to avoid the other, though even suffering under the consciousness of wanting it. Sometimes, where the knowledge and will exist, which would, were it possible, realize the right, there is a painful recognition of want of power to realize it. The man of moral feeling, seeking to satisfy it, finds in himself a limited conception of what is right, of what constitutes right—finds in

608 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought himself deficiency of knowledge, of will, of power, to realize such conception as he has. Means to enlarge, to improve that conception—to attain to an indefinite extent advance in knowledge, will, power to realize his best conception—means thus to fulfill human possibility towards rendering human existence satisfactory to a moral nature, we believe to exist for mankind through those uniformities in nature designated laws. (If we found in law a Bonapartist spirit, though with irresistible might, we should not care to listen to the questions it bids us ask, nor to the answers it promises. We must start from the thirst after right in our own nature, and, finding that law satisfies it, we ask of law our questions, and listen for its answers.) Those laws (as already said) we find, in their actual results, to be such that it is not in human possibility to render man’s existence here other than unsatisfactory to a moral nature, but that in their character and tendency they afford evidence of the existence of power of a moral nature such as to entitle us to infer human existence to be in connection with a future, in which connection it is satisfactor y to a moral nature. Summar y On Law—Chapter 1 Propositions [Short Version B-2] Universality of law

1. That the phenomena of all Nature, universally and invariably, accord with law. 2. That, in accordance with law, the constitution of human nature is adapted to certain desires and aims. 3. That on a human mind in which such desires and aims exist, and which admits the universal and invariable accordance of phenomena with law, the following questions will press with a force in proportion to the force of those desires, and in proportion as the actual history of human nature is known and conceived of by that mind. (For it will see that, whereas human aims are right, human histor y is wrong.) These questions will be: (1) To what extent and by what means is man individually, and mankind collectively, able to fulfill those desires to which, in accordance with law, the constitution of human nature is adapted? (2) Is there evidence that the law with which the constitution of human nature accords is derived from such a will or power as that, by means of this law, those desires to which the constitution of human nature is adapted, will be fulfilled in all things in which

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mankind is obviously unable to do so? (For instance, mankind cannot undo past history, yet sees that all that history is wrong. Is there such a plan—such an order of things—as that this past history will not have been for a mere spectacle to its Creator, but to bring each and all to righteousness?) Let me extend a little more these three propositions. But first let me define some common expressions used in regard to law. [Volume 3 Resumes] To clear up the question touching a ‘‘moral sense,’’ to make inquir y after a God, after the tie we call religion (‘‘religo’’) to keep clear of selfish or intellectual questions on religious subjects, and always to pursue them in connection with moral right, are the objects we wish to keep in view. Righteousness is our God, if we can but find Him. Show us ever so many undeniable miracles, we will have no other God. But then what is right? how are we to know it when we see it? When we say righteousness is our God, we know, that is, we feel sure, that certain feelings and qualities are right—benevolence, justice, sympathy, etc. Why do we say so? Some (Sedgwick and his school9) say that ‘‘intuition’’ teaches it. Some (Mill and his school) say that experience of what is man’s well-being teaches it. But why do we want happiness for others, why not enjoy their tortures, as some do? It ends in this—a Power there is, whose feeling is what we call benevolence, justice, sympathy (so we learn from law), and this Power wills that it shall be brought about that we shall feel so. We do not attempt to define right, because we cannot. We have no evidence to tell us how to define right, but we can describe right. We find reason to believe that this Power feels, thinks, purposes, destines (not sometimes this, sometimes that, but) something definite, and this we call or name right. We describe right, then, as the consciousness of a being we call God, revealed by law. Is Right right because God wills it so? We describe right as that in which man partakes this consciousness. To be benevolent (willing the ‘‘well’’ to others) is right. Other wise expressed, it is God’s consciousness, and what God wills to become man’s consciousness. But is right right because God wills it so?

9 Probably a reference to Adam Sedgwick, A Discourse on the Studies of the University, 1834.

610 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Might this Power have made it right to take pleasure in the pain of others? No, not this Power, not power of this nature. ‘‘Right expresses what the Gods are.’’ But what is benevolent? Here come in large modifications with regard to all time, all being, all knowledge of truth. What is right in regard to one consideration is not always right in regard to another. It is right to attend to the laws of health, moral and physical, yet right in some cases to go to a physical or a moral Cayenne.10 Right is modifiable relatively to all time, all being, all knowledge of truth. It can be therefore absolutely the consciousness only of One, the source of all being of the history of all being through time, through eternity, whose consciousness is what we call truth, or rather what we call truth is His consciousness. The exercise of all the capabilities (not which every man has, but) which are appropriate in God’s consciousness to human nature, is right in one sense; it may be the right to leave some unexercised, to overexercise some relatively to others, temporarily even to crush ourselves, to crush others. Here comes in the word ought. How ought we to proceed, how may the relative ‘‘best’’ be in harmony with the absolute, in the march of time as a part of eternity, of parts in relation to the whole? Is it a ‘‘moral sense’’ which is to show us this, or a ‘‘religious sense’’ or conscience? Is it not feeling compounded of the various rights? Must not all our faculties unite to settle how they all must be modified into the right? Whatever is, properly speaking, natural to us is right. ‘‘Follow nature’’ would be right, but for these compounds of what is natural to us. It is natural to eat when we are hungr y, therefore right, unless there is another right which modifies, in other words, something to say ‘‘don’t eat though you are hungr y’’; and conscience or the moral sense or the intuition, is this struggling, perplexed perception or consciousness of the various rights, making the right. ‘‘Follow nature,’’ if the time comes when all men are following human nature, will probably be a simple straightforward road. Now, to those of true and large views, who must (mainly) be struggling alone and against the stream, to ‘‘follow nature’’ in the highest sense must be a battle, and, ignorant as we are, a battle in the dark. All words or phrases which recognize goodness, actual or possible, in human nature, show a true feeling of it. ‘‘To follow nature’’

10 A French penal colony.

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is one of these: ‘‘humane,’’ ‘‘humanity,’’ are others. It was necessary to create a devil wherever we gave up this recognition. We would then keep or give up the phrase ‘‘moral sense,’’ according as it is or is not used to express this endeavour to recognize what we can of the right, by reference to God’s nature, to what our nature is to become, to various being, various truth, in time, as a part of eternity. Propositions concerning Moral Right 1. We have then with regard to certain states of mind and manifestations of states of mind by action or otherwise, a consciousness, which we express by calling them right. 2. We are conscious of a peculiar distinction between these and certain other states and manifestations of states of mind, which we designate as wrong. 3. We have certain desires which accord with those feelings of right, distinct from other desires actually found in, or possible to, the human mind. 4. Man is so constituted that what he desires to a certain degree, he pursues, if he sees no impossibility of satisfying that desire; thus, one ‘‘hungering and thirsting after righteousness,’’11 will seek to satisfy that desire. (a) He desires to be and to do what is right. (b) He desires that others should be and do what is right ( Jowett). (c) He desires to know that the conditions of human existence are satisfactor y to the consciousness he expresses by the word right. (Although many have sought to be and to do what is right themselves, few have yet sought to find out whether the Superior Power they acknowledge is and does what is right—whether the conditions He has laid down for their own existence (and which they are aware they cannot break through) are what it is right for Superior Power to lay down. No, though it is true that, even ‘‘in the books of Job and Ecclesiastes, the human spirit begins to strive with God, and to ask, not only ‘How can man be just before God?’ but also ‘How can God be justified to man?’ ’’ Men have generally been content, either confusedly and dimly, to take for granted, like Oriental slaves, that power is right, or to take the word of certain societies, called

11 A paraphrase of Matt 5:6.

612 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought churches and certain books, called sacred and inspired, that qualities attributed to the Superior Power, and which certainly in inferior powers would be wrong, are in Him right. And it has even been set down as blasphemy, presumption or irreligion to make this inquir y at all. Were there any truth in what is called accountability, as between an infinitely perfect Creator and His creature, we should certainly have as much right to call our Creator ‘‘to account’’ as He would have to call us—more, indeed, because He has created us, and therefore, if a perfectly moral being, assumed a responsibility— according to all moral ideas—towards us; we have not created Him. But the truth is, that the relation between a perfect Creator, creating and training His creatures to perfection, i.e., to be one with His creatures and ultimately with Himself—is one of far higher character than mere ‘‘accountability,’’ which always presupposes the servant obeying, not the friend co-operating—alike in intention, although not in power.) (d) He desires to know what he can of the nature of right. 5. There exists a being whose consciousness is that which man desires in himself and others, when he distinguishes it from other states, actual or possible, by calling it right. 6. In this Being exists the will that all human existence shall be the progress to, or the preparation for, progress (in each and in all) to the state of consciousness existing in Himself. [Short Version: We name this Being God.] [Volume 3 Resumes] 7. Every other mode of existence manifests change; in every other mode of existence the present is a change from past. 8. These changes manifest uniformities of simultaneity and succession, in which relations one mode of changing being exists to another. 9. These uniformities manifest a supreme will exercising itself as law, as that word has been defined. These uniformities, then, we call ‘‘laws,’’ the will to which we trace them we call ‘‘God.’’ 10. Each var ying mode of existence manifests unvarying law, of which God’s will is the origin—in what it has been, what it is, what it is tending to be. 11. In accordance with God’s law, human consciousness is tending to become what God’s consciousness is—to become one with

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the consciousness of God. For this proposition, on the truth of which experience must decide, we think we find sufficient evidence in the character and tendency of law. 12. Right expresses the consciousness of a Being whose existence and what we can learn of His nature and consciousness are to be learnt through law, with which all other being accords. Right expresses the consciousness to which, in accordance with and by means of law, human nature is advancing, or for advance towards which it is preparator y. 13. The human mind which desires right in itself and its kind may find in God’s laws means to realize this desire to the extent to which it is possible. 14. The human mind, which desires that human existence shall be the realization of a true conception of right may find satisfaction in the revelation to be discovered in God’s laws, viz., that human existence is the realization of a portion of that conception to be fulfilled here and hereafter, which as a whole is the absolute perfect right. [Short Version pp 12-13] The human mind which desires that human existence shall be the realization of a conception of right. . . . 3 ‘‘The vessels of Pompeii all speak one language—look out for steam.’’ The human mind, struggling for assistance in moving from one place to another, was unconsciously pursuing the course leading to the discovery of the use which might be made of steam for this purpose. The human mind is constituted to pursue its satisfaction. Some minds feel satisfaction of one kind, some of another. But there are kinds of satisfaction which, in accordance with law, human nature is tending to desire and to realize which are, in kind, the same as the satisfaction of the nature whose existence and what we can learn of His nature are revealed in law. . . . If we could know and understand the history of human nature, we should see in that history how, through joy and sorrow, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, efforts to avoid the one and obtain the other, man is tending to desire and to obtain cer tain satisfactions. If we could know and understand the history of human nature, we should see in that history advance towards, or preparation for

614 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought advance towards, the desire and attainment of those satisfactions, in accordance with and by means of law. . . . For it we feel approbation—a certain kind of satisfaction; we desire to realize, to see realized in human nature and human life, our conception of moral right. We feel repugnance to what we conceive to be morally wrong—a desire that it should not be. How is mankind to find what is right?

[Volume 3 Resumes] But how shall the human mind, desiring right, obtain satisfaction that its conception of right is true, or, in other words, is what it would be in a nature without the limits of which the human mind is conscious in itself, limits of nature or capability, limits of knowledge? how assure itself of truth, as far as it goes? how advance towards a more enlarged conception, even if still imperfect? Let us look, first, to the human mind, to its varieties of consciousness, of belief, such as we have experienced or believed to exist in other minds. Has a human mind ever arrived at maturity without some feeling of satisfaction in something conceived of as right? dissatisfaction in something conceived of as wrong? We see variations in the force of such desire, and in what is conceived to be right. These variations, however, are not unconnected. They are relative. They differ relatively to organization, to development, to knowledge of various kinds, to circumstances which affect the mind as to its organization, its development, its exercise. Inevitably, each individual must finally appeal to his own mind in regard to what is right—he must ask of himself what does he conceive to be right? How is Man to find the Right? He may compare the consciousness of his own mind at different times. He may compare his consciousness with that of other minds. He may modify—alter, it may be—his own conception of right. But to the consciousness, the conception of his own mind he must appeal, yet with a consciousness of the limits of that mind, in nature and in knowledge. And hence comes a desire to know whether this consciousness—this conception—is what it would be in a mind without those limits. (Modification and limit are the words which signify the difference between the perfect and the imperfect. Wisdom for man consists in adopting, among limits and modifications, possible in themselves, those which are wise. Emerson has an essay on compensation. But it seems more comprehensive to consider the subject in reference to

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modifications and limits, since these consist with the idea that they are to cease with attainment by exercise. That they are to do so through the purpose of the Ruler of the Universe is ascertainable tr uth. That life ought to be manifestation of belief, no one would deny who does not deny either the existence or the importance of religion. On the other hand, no one could affirm that the modes of life, now general in any rank or class, are consistent with the religious belief of those living in that rank or class. If the Bible is held the rule of life in theory, it would be easy to prove that, in practice, it does not constitute that rule, since it is impossible to expect that, by addressing society at large, one could remodel society so as to make it the manifestation of religious belief, to those who acknowledge that life ought to be such it would seem no wild scheme, but attempting the only possible means to effect what it is acknowledged ought to be—to try an organization on this principle. Practically, to study a wise organization is to study the wise limits and modifications for society. Mankind can scarcely be considered a whole as yet. It is disjointed; there is no connection except one for gain, and convenience, and luxury, in most of the ties where a certain mode of association is supposed to exist. And among numbers there is no connection at all, except that which the laws of God effect, irrespective of man’s will. If the poor idiot, the frantic madman, who have no conception of what mankind is, or that they belong to it, did not exist, the universe would be different from what it is. In that sense, then, there is connection. But man should be conscious of a connection with mankind, should determine what it shall be.) Hence the inquiry whether any means exist for answering this question. We desire to know whether what is accords with what we should feel to be right, if we had not those limits which we recognize in ourselves; by what is meaning not the present only, but the ‘‘eternal now’’ of present, past and future.12 Hence the desire for superhuman light and guidance as to what man ought to be, to feel, to do. The word ought concentrates the prominent feeling which he is constituted to have or to want, and which impels this desire for assistance from a higher nature. The sacred books, the teaching of

12 Abraham Cowley, ‘‘Davideis’’ 1:362.

616 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought various kinds—professing to be, believed (often by teacher and learner) to be, light from above—show this want felt in every age. Is this age to show such want a folly, or to show that it must exist in vain? or is it to discover means for fulfilling this want satisfactory to the whole of our nature, to the whole of human experience? Can it thus reconcile (at-one) what is right? Can it reveal superhuman consciousness, as what we are feeling for, even though in the dark, in our attempt to answer, What is right?—or can it give gleams of light and promise more and more to be earned by joint human effort? Law the Conception of Right in the Mind of God In what has been and is held forth as superhuman teaching we recognize much that comes home to us as true and right, yet recognize imper fection alike in the knowledge of what is and the conception of what is right. Therefore, we cannot accept such teaching. We look to law; we inquire whether we can discover in the results of law, considered in connection with the tendencies of law, manifestations of consciousness—of conception of right—with which we can feel oneness, unity. By the consideration of this law, once finding ground to believe that it manifests absolutely and without limit that conception which we attempt to express by the word right, can we enlarge, uplift our conception of right, in learning, reflecting upon, comparing the results and tendencies of law? In its source can we find the Nature which has constituted human nature, has regulated human nature, to seek for, to ‘‘hunger and thirst’’ for, and progressively to attain to oneness with the consciousness of that Nature, which consciousness, there eternally existing—by other natures eternally sought, pursued, progressively attained—we characterize by the word right? Sacred be that word, sacred the law which reveals to us its proper signification. Proof is a word which hardly belongs to human experience. What can a being prove who cannot prove that his consciousness is correct, since other minds have had consciousness as strong as his, which he recognizes as false? But evidence strong enough to act upon, to regulate feeling and action, is within man’s reach—evidence in which man may confirm man, in which God will, in His love, confirm man—evidence increasing in strength progressively, as man fulfills his possible progress.

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4 [Short Version pp 16-18] 1. In human beings, then of certain organization, and existing under certain circumstances, feeling of the nature designated as moral feeling uniformly exists. In some minds the feeling exists to a degree which has been expressed as ‘‘hunger and thirst after righteousness.’’ To such minds (1) certain questions will urgently arise, (2) certain answers to those questions alone will afford satisfaction, and certain evidence on which those answers can be founded will be earnestly sought for. Desire to be and do right—desire that the human kind should be and do right—painful recognition of mankind’s ignorance, error, suffering, and of its capability of being better than it is—repugnance at moral wrong done and suffered—these impel the mind ‘‘hungering and thirsting after righteousness’’ to ask the questions. (Vide questions (1) and (2) p 1.) 1. What means are within its power to attain and to realize to the extent of its possibility a true conception of the right? 2. What means are there by which mankind might attain and realize a true conception of moral right, to the extent of their possibility? Farther, the consideration of human existence—of the constitution and history of man—when viewed in connection with law (with which we have accepted as a postulate that the constitution and histor y of man are in accordance), leads the mind ‘‘hungering and thirsting after righteousness’’ to the following convictions: (1) That in man there is no power to render man’s existence satisfactory to a moral nature, if such existence be considered by itself, without reference to any future in connection with it. (2) That such existence could alone, through connection with a future, which man is powerless to effect, be satisfactory to a moral nature. And these convictions will lead to question: 3. Whether there may not be discovered sufficient reason to believe that a power and will exist which can and will render human existence satisfactory to a moral nature? Moral feeling farther asks, in relation to questions 1 and 2, a practical answer to such inquiries as these: (1) How may the desire for right be attained or strengthened in the human mind? (2) Where it exists, how may man attain a true conception of what right is?

Question 2.

Question 3.

618 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought

Answers to question 3.

How is a true conception of right to be attained?

(3) How realize the right in what he is and does? And, in reference to such questions, will be asked: (4) What tr uth do we possess, what truth can we attain, concerning moral right? How shall a man assure himself that his conception is a true conception of right? He is conscious of ignorance, of uncertainty, of change in his own mind. He perceives the same in other minds, and that human minds frequently differ from each other in their conception of right. That the human mind has felt the want of guidance on this subject is shown by its history—by what it has accepted as guidance. The guides accepted have been: intuition; supernatural communication; ‘‘greatest happiness’’ etc., principle, etc. 2. The answers to the above questions, which afford satisfaction to the ‘‘hungerers and thirsters after righteousness’’ are (1) That law, with which the constitution and history of all modes of being subject to change accord, is to be referred to a moral nature. Because the character of that law, as manifested in its results and tendencies accords with the moral feeling in their own minds. (2) The manifestations of law are such as to indicate that the nature, to which it is to be refereed, is without the limits of nature and knowledge, of which we are conscious in human nature. (We will call this Unlimited Being by the name of God. The conception here entertained is, however, different from those which it has been used to express. We use it to express the Being to whom we conceive that law is to be attributed, not supposing ourselves to know or to be capable of knowing more of His nature than we can learn from law. When we say here ‘‘the will of God,’’ the ‘‘thought of God,’’ such expressions are no doubt incorrect. Will, thought, as we know them in the human mind, are the states of mind of a limited nature. And we can trace no limits in the nature manifested to us in law. We, therefore, use these expressions for want of better ones.) [Volume 3 Resumes] The minds ‘‘hungering and thirsting after righteousness’’13 inquire, as we have said, for the means of attaining or approximating to a true conception of right. Their inquiry thus finds satisfaction:—God

13 An allusion to Matt 5:6.

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wills law to be such that, in accordance with it, the history of human nature is the history of progress, or preparation for progress, towards feelings and manifestations of feeling of that nature which we distinguish as moral, as right, or righteous. God’s law is such that the history of man is tending to bring about such feelings in human nature, tending often indirectly, but through crime, ignorance, error, suffering, still tending to this, viz., that human nature shall attain to a certain constitution in which will exist certain desires, feelings, and which will manifest themselves externally in a certain manner. This is satisfaction to the Divine mind—and that mind we conceive to be the absolute right—to cause the limited and the imperfect to approximate to the Infinite and Perfect by means of law. Right we understand to be a mode of characterizing the Divine mind, our insight into which, as far as we can have any insight, consists in referring to the moral consciousness in our own minds as well as to the consciousness revealed to us in law. We are not supposing right to be right because God wills it so. (Plato, ‘‘the highest exponent of Grecian ethics,’’ teaches, ‘‘the good is not the good because the Gods love it, but the Gods love it because it is good.’’14) Man tending by Law to same Conception as God We are supposing Right to express (1) the actual state of consciousness existing in the divine mind; (2) the state of mental consciousness to which, through inducement and means afforded by law, man is tending, not by absolute exercise of the divine will on our state of consciousness, but by exercise of the capabilities of our nature in accordance with God’s law—such capabilities being exercised individually and by mankind for the individual and for mankind. Through law, then, is revealed a true conception of right, i.e., a conception of right satisfactory to a nature recognized as moral through our own moral nature, but without the limits of our own nature. In law are found the means by which man may advance and approximate towards that absolute and perfect moral nature. 1. Reference to one’s own consciousness essential in estimating what is right and what is wrong. I cannot feel a state of mind or an action, or

14 In the dialogue ‘‘Euthyphro,’’ Socrates asks if a thing is good ‘‘because God desires it—or does God desire a thing because it is good?’’

620 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought other manifestation of a state of mind, to be right or wrong, except as an exercise of my own mind. I may be sensible of the limits to my nature, my capability, my knowledge, and desire enlightenment from a nature without those limits. But it must be through the exercise of my own mind that I can accept a source of enlightenment which I can only feel trustworthy because I recognize therein some harmony with my own feeling of right, yet without the limits I find in myself. 2. Er rors observable in what have been human estimates of moral right. A tendency has existed, and does exist, to confuse right with might. Gods and men have been estimated as right in following their inclinations, merely because they had the power to do so. (A councillor of Philip II says to him, ‘‘Senor, reconnaissez la suprématie de Dieu sur la terre comme dans le ciel, afin que Dieu ne se fatigue pas des monarchies, genre de gouvernement très doux, si l’on en use avec modération.’’ ‘‘Le Dieu du ciel est trop jaloux pour souffrir un compagnon dans une chose quelconque: il est outré de tout abus du pouvoir humain. Si Dieu se lasse des monarchies, il donnera au monde (politique) une autre forme.’’ A. Perez.15 Is not this the theory of the divine right of might, as in the king, so in the God?—as is man, so is God. Is not this the explanation of why the most frightful exercises of might have often excited no feeling of wrong, not even in the present day? King Bomba of Naples16 dies, and his son follows in his steps, without apparently any other idea of God or of the right of kings but that of Philip the Second.) ‘‘Nay, but, oh man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?’’ says St Paul.17 Pope’s vindication of ‘‘the ways of God to man’’ rests mainly on the power of God to place man where he is, and on the dogmatic assertion that ‘‘whatever is, is right.’’18 Man has bowed to power in Gods and men, partly in fear, partly, perhaps, with a sense of admiration. But where moral feeling forms the estimate, might has to do with right only in increasing the claims on

15 Antonio Perez, cited in La genèse du 19ème siècle, chap 8; Philip II of Spain (1527-98), absolutists, son of the holy Roman emperor Charles V. 16 Ferdinand II (1810-59), king of the Two Sicilies, named ‘‘Bomba’’ for bombarding Sicilian cities during the independence uprisings. 17 Rom 9:20. 18 Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, epistle 4, line 145.

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the former, which, in the moral estimate, the latter establishes. We cannot feel that ‘‘whatever is, is right,’’ because it is dogmatically asserted. The moral nature will desire above every other desire to gain assurance of the existence of power in a moral nature, through which ‘‘whatever is, is right.’’ 3. Where shall we look for a consciousness of right with which we can feel in harmony, yet which we can reasonably believe to be not limited and imperfect, like that of human nature? This is discoverable through law, with which all other being accords—which law is to be referred to the Absolute and Perfect Moral Nature, from whom, through the law which reveals His existence and all that we can comprehend of His nature, we may attain the enlightenment possible to us concerning the right. Evidence to be sought that ‘‘whatever is, is right’’ 4. Concerning the evidence for this belief, the evidence of the manifestation of law, evidence that such law is in accordance with the will of a moral nature—of a nature without human imperfection or human limit of knowledge. In all modes of being susceptible of change—whether material existences or states of mind known to us only by consciousness— wherever the present state is in some manner a change from the past—in all such change that sort of definiteness and uniformity is obser vable which we express by the word law. If this is, or whenever this is, defined consequences shall ensue. There are thinkers who maintain that, granting that such change as we refer to takes place as uniformly and as definitely as if it were laid down by will, man is not in a position to pronounce it law, because he cannot prove it such. (Strange that the present materialist school sets the belief in law as contrar y to the belief in a Benevolent and Righteous Spirit, the Cause and Ruler of the Universe, when it may be shown that it would be contrary to benevolence and righteousness to influence other wise than by law! If by God we mean a Wise and Benevolent Spirit, the thought and will of that Spirit would be law. We find that that exists which would exist if such a Spirit existed. Why are we to disbelieve it? It is bad inference when we perceive the same causes (to use the popular word) accomplishing the same phenomena, in the one instance more efficiently, in the other less—as, for example, the eye and an optical instrument—to say, in the latter case the

622 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought effective instr ument springs from an intelligent will, in the former we can know nothing of the matter. We never suppose phenomena to be effected by that which is what, alone, we see in man—by the hand, the eye or the brain. Sight is consciousness of the presence of an object, and of some particulars, positive and relative, concerning it. Why this consciousness is connected with an eye we know not at all, unless a more comprehensive understanding of all existence shall convince us that we may call it the will of a Superhuman Being that the connection shall exist. The same of the brain, as connected with thought. For cause may we not read will? Order, when observable in what human nature is competent to effect, being always traced to will, may we not logically infer that order, which man is incapable to effect, but would, if he could, is traceable to a will more power ful than his? The materialists speak of ‘‘the exterior world as being more power ful than man.’’ It seems strange to use this language, and a most narrow and ill-conceived view of what exists, since man can become omnipotent, i.e., powerful to effect all he wills, powerful to make it his wish that the thought of the Perfect be realized. ‘‘And feel myself omnipotent in Thee.’’19 He can modify the effect of all laws on mankind, whereas all objective laws bear in their nature no power to modify themselves or each other—they are passive, unconscious, objective effects of a subjective will. Man finds, indeed, an order dominant over him which is irresistible. He would try in vain to make summer succeed to winter without spring, in our climate, or manhood to infancy, without youth. To study this order, to accord himself rightly with it, i.e., so as to effect the greatest satisfaction to the divine attributes in man in the course of eternity—this is his work.) And it is held by this class of thinkers that it is futile for man to undertake a search for truth, which he has not means, and cannot anticipate that man ever will have means, to prove or verify. Inquire for Evidence, not for Proof From this view we differ on this ground, viz., that it may be shown that mankind will attain much more truth by seeking evidence on which to build belief than by accepting only proof, or, rather, what

19 Anna Laetitia Barbauld, ‘‘On the Deity,’’ second stanza.

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is called proof (for to limited nature and knowledge we believe proof to be impossible). A great part of the feelings and convictions on which we act are not susceptible of proof, and it is never doubted that we are right in acting on evidence such as we can gain. Our conviction on evidence is often of such force that it would not seem possible to increase it. Mere uniformity of conditions would not, however, be convincing evidence that it was of the nature of law. It is because such uniformity not only is consistent with a moral nature, but is the only course which would not be inconsistent with power existing in a moral nature, that these uniformities appear to us to be laws or results of law—the will of a moral nature. They are also such as manifest will in a nature without the limits of constitution and knowledge which we recognize in ourselves. In all inquiry for evidence we have to keep in view a fair appeal to our own minds. We have the consciousness, the experience, that the human mind is susceptible of evidence, capable of receiving evidence, capable of progress in capability and knowledge for estimating evidence. But, also, we have to keep in view its limited and imper fect nature. It will sometimes occur that our understandings recognize evidence which we are unable to feel true, also, that we feel tr ue what our understandings doubt or contradict. And sometimes we are conscious of incapability or ignorance which disables us from estimating evidence. 5. Inducement to inquiry. The popular beliefs—or rather the popular acceptation, without inquiry or consideration, of what have been, or are, the real beliefs of a few—set aside, more or less, all questions such as the above. But there is no real consistency in the grounds of belief, except in the Roman Catholic principle of authority, or in the one now urged, viz., a reference to our own minds as capable in a degree of discovering and appreciating evidence. That our own natures are incapable of ‘‘private judgment’’—that is, incapable of unassisted appreciation of truth—is certain. The Roman Catholic, inasfar as he is consistent, holds that human nature is incapable of discovering or estimating evidence as to any nature above its own, and counsels men to accept as knowledge and true direction what certain men tell them comes from a true source. All miracles—all, so-called superhuman communications—bear on the face of them doubt—not because such could not have been, but because none satisfy the craving of a moral nature to believe

624 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought that what is ought to be—in other words, that what is, is satisfactory to a moral nature. And thus, unable in these questions to find satisfaction in those beliefs, we have to seek it elsewhere. Unless we can find it, human existence is repugnant to our moral nature, since whatever has been, it has not been in human possibility to have rendered other than it has been. Equally have the constitution of human nature and its appropriate satisfaction been determined for us—yet the activity, interests, affections appropriate to that constitution are dormant, or, if existing, they exist to struggle and suffer. And as far as human experience goes, a nature fitted for progress to which we can trace no limits, must sink into nothingness, without realization of its proper wants—sometimes without feeling them. Hence our desire for evidence that this existence is a beginning of, or a preparation for, such realization. What Questions may we hope to solve? 6. Scope of inquiry. ‘‘The one object of Locke’s speculations was to ascertain the limits of our knowledge—what questions we may hope to solve, what are beyond our reach.’’ Of his own Essay, he says that it is an endeavour to ‘‘prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with exceeding its comprehension—to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether, and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities.’’20 This most important lesson has, to a certain extent, led our age into another error in avoidance of this, as frequently occurs. Wiser than former generations in abstaining from futile speculation, some powerful minds show a determination to seek no truth except what is supposed to admit of proof. We conceive that the limit to our inquiry should be those subjects on which we can hope progressively to receive evidence. The limitation to proof, in the sense of what is commonly considered proof, would, we conceive, deprive us of important means of progress and approximation towards a higher nature—of more tr ue and comprehensive understanding of such evidence as exists, that what is accords with what ought to be. The subject to which we would invite inquiry (on which we have not professed to do more than offer ‘‘suggestions’’) is the satisfac-

20 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 1:28.

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tion of our moral consciousness, admitting the limits of our nature and knowledge, and seeking light from a nature without those limits—revealed in the uniformities which manifest the character of moral law—on the following questions: (1) What are the means within human reach by which man, individually and collectively, may fulfill the desires to which the human constitution is adapted?—in other words, may be and do right? (2) How may man obtain such light as is within his reach as to whether human existence is satisfactory to a moral nature in those respects in which it is not in human possibility to render it so? in other words, how obtain evidence that whatever is, is right? It may be said that it is reasoning in a circle to attribute the uniformities in question to a moral nature, because in them we find some satisfaction to our own moral nature and then to seek to enlighten our own moral nature by means of them. Yet thus we obtain our best glimpses of truth, our best conceptions of right, our best means of realizing it. And these being our objects, is not this the appropriate course? Chapter 3 Law, the means by which human nature may fulfill the desires to which by law it is adapted—i.e., may be and do right. 1. There is but one possibility to God or man as to the future— law being what it is, and the past and present what it is. To use the expression that there can be but one possibility to God in the future may sound like saying that God might will to make the future other than it will be, but is restrained by some necessity. Such is no meaning of ours. Our meaning is, that, with the spirit of perfect righteousness and wisdom existing with power to fulfill the conception of perfect righteousness, one future only can be consistent. Human capability is limited; our time of existence is limited. Our desires concern other beings over whom we have not power. The fulfillment of our desires would require knowledge, in which we are deficient, and also will, present and future, in ourselves, not always at our command. Human power to realize the right will depend upon the knowledge of what is right in mankind—in man collectively considered. Look at man individually. As well might he expect to change the nature and course of every star as to direct, according to his desire, the nature and course, the constitution and history, of man. But

Human possibility for fulfilling the appropriate desires of human nature limited. How limited. Human possibility, though limited, admits of indefinite or unlimited progress. Conditions of such progress.

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Of past or present fulfillment of desires appropriate to human nature.

consider man collectively and in successive time—no limit can be affixed to the progress which mankind may make in bringing the constitution and history of man to accord with human will, if human will is for the right—to the progress that will be made in proportion as collective human will is for the right. In times past, in time present, is there advance towards such fulfillment? There is advance in the view of God—there is progress towards progress. (All that God says to us has reference to an eternity in the progress of which its truth will be made manifest. We, who see in part only,21 are afraid of what we say to one another. We are afraid of giving temporary pain, losing sight of eternity, or sometimes, like the Franciscans, we are so afraid of eternal pain that we martyrize ourselves in ‘‘time,’’ and profess to despise ‘‘temporal things.’’ Both are wrong. Nothing is true but as a whole. Why is one part of God’s eternity to be despised rather than another? How carelessly we speak of God’s dealings with us! In fact, every time we say that anything is ‘‘unfortunate,’’ we are blaming Him. It is like a timid woman sitting by the side of a perfect driver, and trying to pull the reins out of his hand.) Human follies—horrors repulsive to our true nature, though not identically repeated—may be said to have succeeded each other throughout human history. (Hitherto most political revolutions have been conducted without any principle whatever: they send away a weak man, they take back a bad man—see Charles I and Charles II, Louis XVI and Bonaparte, Louis-Philippe and LouisNapoléon,22 etc. It is the almost universal rule of political revolutions, if rule it can be called.) That it is so is but consistent with the state of human knowledge, human will, relatively to moral right. Wonder ful is man’s advance in some directions. His mind has reached the stars to satisfy its thirst to know; he has traversed the earth, he has penetrated its depths, to

21 An allusion to 1 Cor 13:9. 22 Charles I of England (1600-49) made war on his people, was tried and executed, while his son Charles II (1630-85), who became king on the restoration, was a patron of the arts and a philanderer; Louis XVI was guillotined during the French Revolution, while Napoleon was made emperor and conquered most of Europe; Louis-Philippe was forced out of France in the uprisings of 1848, while Louis-Napoléon, his successor, started both the Crimean and Franco-Prussian Wars.

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supply his wants, but he has not learnt his alphabet as to the nature of moral right—the conditions on which it may be realized in human nature and human life. In proportion as mankind desire their appropriate spiritual food—‘‘hunger and thirst’’ for it—learn and keep God’s laws in a way which will obtain it, will be the realization of the desires proper to human nature. Principles observable in God’s Rule Infinite progress, then, towards the realization of our true desires we conceive to be in human possibility, such progress corresponding in degree with the keeping of definite conditions. These conditions are will and knowledge, through which power for such progress may be attained. There are principles to be observed throughout God’s rule essential to be kept in view if we would interpret it aright. 1. God’s help is given to an active—never to a passive—recipient. 2. Whatever help is received by the imperfect from the Perfect, by the limited from the Infinite, by the ignorant from the Omniscient, is through inducement and means to the former to improve and exercise capability appropriately. Great has been the confusion of the human mind on the subject of the will. From a just repugnance to the idea of human will operating as a machine under the direction of a higher power, some have shrunk from what has been called necessity, and have adopted the idea that human will depends on human will, to determine which power as to his own will exists in each individual, irrespective of means. Others, impressed with the stupendous power of the world’s Ruler, have prostrated their will in awe of such power, and accepted the idea of predestination—the idea that man’s will is directly determined by a Higher Power. In each case we believe some moral feelings—some desire that what is and what ought to be should be one—has been at work. Such at one-ment—to find evidence for which, to assist man in taking his part in which, is our present endeavour—we conceive is to be found in the conception that human will accords with law. Let us consider, in inquiring whether will accords with law, what we know of the nature and mode of operation of that state of mind which we call will.

Possible progress infinite as to degree. Progress conditional. What the essential conditions. Principles obser vable in God’s rule.

Various beliefs concerning the Will. Necessity. Predestination. Absolute Free Will.

Moral feeling concerned in such belief.

Mode of operation of the will.

628 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Explanation of evidence that will accord with law. What constitutes will. Its relation to constitution and circumstances shown by observation. What is implied in maintaining that will accords with law.

Difficulties in tracing the relation of will to law in the constitution and circumstances. Relation between constitution and circumstances and sensations, thoughts and emotions, uniform. Relations between those states of mind and volitions uniform.

Human nature is the subject of various pains and pleasures, satisfactions and dissatisfactions, physical, intellectual and emotional, from the positive or comparative force of which arise inclinations. Inclination of such kind and degree as realizes, or attempts to realize itself, we call will. What a man’s inclinations, what his volitions will be, we believe that experience, with observation, may show to depend on constitution and on circumstances affecting each constitution in a definite manner. If it could be shown that, given a certain constitution and certain circumstances, the same state of will would recur, this would be all we mean in saying that the various states of will, actual or possible, manifest law. The constitution of human nature, varying as well as uniform in each individual, is a complicated subject—very imperfectly known to us. Equally complicated and imperfectly known are human circumstances, including therein all states or changes of being which affect a man’s state. We believe, however, that observation will afford sufficient evidence—evidence strengthening with observation—of the relation between sensations, thoughts and emotions, and constitution and circumstances. From those states of mind proceed volitions. Those states of mind have a uniform relation to constitution and circumstances, to those states of mind volitions have a uniform relation. Man’s Will accords with Law

Instance of such uniform relation.

Such relation maintained to exist, to the extent of justifying the proposition that will accord with law, on the evidence of obser vation.

In God’s law, then, we discover means for rendering human will, whether our own individually or that of others, right. In proportion as we discover the conditions of constitution and of circumstances with which a right state of mind will exist, and realize those conditions, human will will be right. One who wished to rise in the morning before a certain hour, but mistrusted her will to do so when the time should come, used to place her watch on the ground, where a ser vant who came into the room regularly at this hour would certainly tread upon it if left there. With this assistance to will in the morning what she wished at night, she felt assured she should do so. This is an instance, however simple, of correspondence which could be depended upon between circumstances and volition in that individual nature. As in this simple case, we believe that in the more complicated volitions uniform relation may be observed

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between will, constitution and circumstances to an extent to justify the proposition that will accords with law. Looking at the dangers to which man, in his imperfection and ignorance, is liable, we should feel discouraged for ourselves and those we love on the dark and difficult road through human life, but for the belief that, through His law, the source and rule of all, ‘‘God is over all.’’ They who believe that will is a ‘‘self-directing’’ power repeat those words, believing that they believe them, but if man’s will begins and ends with himself—is subject to no law which will secure his well-being (that is, his being right) in course of time—how can those words give comfort? We cannot but think that, if we realized to our minds the danger to all that the moral nature desires—of trusting for what is to happen, to what is called the ‘‘self-directing’’ will of man—we should feel that such an existence could not have been planned by a moral Being. Will it be said that, if we believe our will to be subject to law, we shall cease to make any effort to direct our own course—shall abandon ourselves to the action of that law? Such an idea can arise only from a misconception of God’s laws. Would a mother see her child fall into the fire without an effort to save it, because she believes, if he is burnt to death, it is ‘‘in accordance with God’s law?’’ Will a good man yield to temptation because both the temptation and the determination of his will accord with law? The affections, the desires which originate the will, accord with law. The belief that will accords with law would operate as an inducement, by means of law, to obtain the satisfaction of those affections and desires—not to contradict them. We ought never to accept as truth any proposition of which we are unable to accept both that it is and that it is right. Let us recollect the extent, the depth, of our ignorance. Let us never forget how ‘‘we see only in part.’’23 Let us remember, also, the limits of our nature, of our power of conceiving, of comprehending the Eternal Right right throughout all time, all being.

23 A paraphrase of 1 Cor 13:9.

Consistent with the moral nature to believe only what can be received both as tr ue and as right.

630 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought The real Trinity in Unity (Men have talked a great deal about Trinity in Unity, but they have but little tried that the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost shall be one, as far as there is any truth in those terms—that is, that God and man and the spirit of God in man shall really have but one purpose, one work.) Let us be willing to remain respectfully in doubt, yet hold fast to our reverence, our devotion to Right. Right is God, and God is Right. We will ever seek the great at-one-ment with Right, with God, in what we believe, in what we are, what we feel, what we do, but we will wait, rather than accept as true, or at least as the whole truth, what we cannot feel to be right—rather than accept as right what we cannot find to be true. Note. How can I find support in a religion which offers me no personal sympathy, which represents God as willing law, irrespective of me and mine? will be asked. He does not will law irrespective of me and those I love. If I could imagine the whole universe devoted to the purpose of my especial and greatest good, all would be as it is, for in no way could my especial good be promoted as it is thus. So I may also say of any individual whose well-being I desire. But God’s law would hold its course all the same if I, or those I love, did not exist, many will say. No, that is not a true representation, for my existence springs from His law is an essential part of His law being what it is. If I did not exist, His law would be other than it is—i.e., it would not be the per fect law of love and right which it is. But how do I know this? Am I not asserting what I cannot show to be true? It is true that it cannot be shown to all mankind. There are some convictions agreed in by all those of mankind whose natures have arrived at a certain degree of maturity, have received a certain degree of cultivation. But there has been so little internal cultivation—so few external means are taken to attain truth respecting the nature and purpose of God—that it is not surprising that what is here asserted does not carry general conviction. Perhaps no one can at all time feel the conviction. Perhaps mankind, in general, are not aware how little they know what are, and what are not, real convictions in themselves. Many faithfully believe that they believe that which they do not believe. Or, may we divide beliefs into living and dead ones? Or, how shall we call the difference of the feeling with which, when sepa-

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rated from one we dearly love, we hear that we are to meet him again in a few days on earth, and the feeling with which, when assured that we shall die in a few days, we expect to meet those whom we say we are assured of meeting? ‘‘Lord, I believe. Help Thou my unbelief.’’24 These words are ver y touching ones, and there was reality and truth in them, whoever spoke them. But God is always ready to ‘‘help our unbelief’’ in the same way in which all help is given by Him—by furnishing the means to help ourselves. If we exercise aright the being within us on the being without us—if we study ‘‘the mind of God clothed in the garment of events,’’ if we study His laws and their purport—this will be a means of helping our unbelief. God’s Plan for the Universe benefits every Individual It is true, indeed, that many have studied God’s laws in nature, but have remained without the conviction or feeling of a God. The improvement of our whole being is as necessary, in order to ‘‘help our unbelief,’’ as the lessening of our ignorance. Belief requires much more than a superficial inquiry in order to know either what we believe ourselves or what others believe, even though we may be told that belief in the most truthful spirit. I return to the question, how can it be shown that God’s plan for the universe is such that any individual human being is thereby benefited as much as if it were the object of Omnipotence to benefit that being alone? It is, indeed, a contradiction to talk of its being the object of the Per fect to benefit any one individual alone; that would not be perfect love and wisdom which could devote itself to one object. But each individual is the object of God’s special care, in the operation of every law which concerns the whole. Now, on what ground can this be asserted? Not dogmatically, but as conviction—conviction founded on the various evidences which lead to the conclusion that there exists a powerful spirit of love and wisdom (using the word spirit to express a living thought, feeling, purpose) that the more is known, the greater are the power, the love, the wisdom which come to light. Hence we come to the conviction that this power, this love, this wisdom, have no limits. We

24 Mark 9:24.

632 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought then question, what would be the will of an Omnipotent Spirit of Love and Wisdom? We answer the question as well as we may by our limited experience of the nature of love and wisdom. It is upon the answer to such questions that we found our belief. And thus I believe that God will ‘‘help our unbelief,’’ viz., by the means which He gives us, in and out of ourselves, to strengthen and purify our belief. Our creed may be felt a dull one by those who have been used to be kept alive by the belief of past miracles, and, in some sort, to look for present ones—since they expect their prayers for restoration of health, for rain or fair, to be answered. Mankind, however, are not now much kept alive by belief in miracles. St Teresa believed, with her whole soul, the miracles which she relates. But do the many congregations which listen on the appointed day to what was said by Balaam’s ass really believe that it spoke?25 Or, when the same congregation pray for fine weather or for rain, is there a real expectation that any effect from these prayers will result? Is there much vitality in the forms of prayer by law appointed? The religion of the Church of England is mainly now the religion of order, decency, respect. It is probably much better than none, but of how much more is not humanity capable! Religious ‘‘Farces’’ Religion now tells of an occasional miracle, meaning an occasional effect produced by the immediate will of God. We believe all successions, all co-existences, to be, in this sense, miraculous. We believe there is no reason, no cause for any succession, any co-existence other than the will of God. The beliefs of man have come from the assertions of individuals of their own feelings. The multitude has been led by those who felt fervently. These feelings have been stereotyped and have been held after all feeling had departed from the words and practices which once betokened feeling. ‘‘ ‘Pray, madam,’ said the prime minister (Sir Robert Walpole), ‘let this farce be played. The archbishop will act it very well. You may bid him be as short as you will. It will do the queen no hurt, no more than any good, and it will satisfy all the wise and good fools, who will call us all atheists if we don’t pretend to be as great fools as

25 Num 22:28.

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they are.’ ’’ (Lord Her vey’s Memoirs of George II.26) The ‘‘farce’’ alluded to was the coming of Archbishop Potter to pray with the dying queen. Now it is the ‘‘wise and good fools’’ themselves who make Walpole’s recommendation (and I appeal to every man of experience to say whether he has not oft-times heard it), thinking really to support religion by the playing of such ‘‘farces.’’ Is it not rather to destroy it? ‘‘Men,’’ says Humboldt, ‘‘are working in this moment at a fable convenue aiming in part at the impracticable, which they do not themselves believe!’’27 Is it not always ‘‘impracticable’’ to make others believe by any ‘‘farce’’ what has no root in ourselves? Religion, now, is outside of life. The creed of ‘‘law’’ would not be dull if it were lived. There is little to disbelieve in the popular religion. There is much to extend, in order to make comprehensive the germ of truth we find there. If we knew how, we should see each religion—even those which have burnt and killed their dissenters—on the road to unity—towards which each creed, capable of any hold on any part of humanity, has tended and prepared the way—and without every one of these, unity could not have been. 3.2 The accordance of Will with Law consistent with Moral Right, and the means by which Man may effect his accordance with Right The first step towards being and doing right is will—will to learn what is right, will to realize it. It often happens that a man desires the right, but cannot depend upon his own abiding will to pursue it. It may be that at present his desire is earnest, but he cannot feel assured that it will be so under some future circumstances which he foresees, or which may arise unforeseen. Moreover, to bring about righteousness on earth depends not on an individual will; the righteous man wishes to influence other wills aright.

Of willing right. Of the want of continuous will in a man’s own mind.

In other wills.

26 John Her vey, Memoirs of the Reign of George II, from His Accession to the Death of Queen Caroline 2:527. 27 Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), linguist; the reference seems to be to a puzzling problem discussed by linguists.

634 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought How experience may show whether will accords with law, and whether such accordance is right.

If experience gives evidence that, by the keeping of certain uniform conditions, man can ensure human will for the right, such experience will be evidence that human will accords with law. Such accordance, operating through the nature acted upon, reveals a righteous rule. Accordance of Will with Law is Right

Consideration of various beliefs concerning the will. Supposition that human will is the decree of a Higher Power. Supposition that there is a selfdetermining power in the will.

Supposition of accordance of will with law.

Means to obtain this power.

If what man wills were decreed by a Higher Power, irrespectively of the operation of his own nature, irrespectively of its possibility to will right, man could but submit, yet the conscientious mind could not recognize such rule to be right. Suppose a man’s will to depend on a self-determining power. It has been maintained that this is so to the extent that any man could, if he pleased, resolve any morning never to do wrong again, and keep his resolution by force of such self-determining power. Believing that experience contradicts such a supposition, we also consider it a most dangerous one, inasmuch as the tendency of such belief is to turn the mind from the possible, the necessary, the essential means, of attaining right will in man. Nor would it seem right, or analogous to anything we know, that one accustoming himself to do wrong for years should be as able by a single resolve to secure a righteous will as one who had been striving for the good for years. A man who has taken opium for months does not conceive that he could resolve to do away with all its consequences at once, and be tomorrow morning in the same state as if he had drunk nothing but pure water. Let us suppose that uniform relations exist between human will and the constitution and circumstances of the individual in whom it exists. On this supposition we have power to determine the will aright, if we use appropriate existing means. Man has power over unborn generations, over the will of his contemporaries, over his own will, if he uses the appropriate means. He has power to effect the constitution and the circumstances which affect the will. To explain how, by what means he may possess himself of this power, how exercise it aright, would include the whole compass of human knowledge, all available for this object. Sanitar y science is showing how we may affect the constitution of the living and of future lives. In one direction, sanitary science is understood to apply to the physical nature, but each part of man’s nature affects every other. Moreover, there is a sanitar y science

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essential to each of man’s faculties and functions. For each there is an appropriate state and operation—in other words a healthy state, and there is a science discoverable as to how, by what means to bring about that appropriate state. Let it be understood that we are not saying that a man of a certain constitution will inevitably will in a certain way. Not only have we the power to modify existing constitutions—we have power to regulate circumstances favourably to individual idiosyncratic constitutions (meaning by favourably so as to induce a right state of the nature—i.e., of the will). The source of will being sensation, thought, emotion, states of mind which vary with definite conditions—by bringing about the appropriate conditions, man may attain right will.

Of the power of man to modify will conditionally on certain means.

Mode of operation of the will.

To will Wrong should become impossible to Man What power will the righteous man desire in regard to the will? Is it the power to will either right or wrong? Will he not rather desire a state in which it will be in his nature to will right, in which to will wrong will be impossible to him? A mother who deserves the name does not contemplate a state of will as even possible in which it should be at her ‘‘choice’’ to mangle, ill-treat and starve her baby, or to nurse, love and tend it. It is impossible to her to will the first. It is in her nature to will only the second. To approximate to such a state, law affords man means—the means, namely, that he may learn by experience how to modify constitution and circumstances, how to adapt circumstances to constitution, so that the nature, the will, will be right. Practically, men are continually modifying circumstances to gain the will they desire in other men, though it may be that the right is not their object. God’s laws will reveal to man if he seeks such revelation—‘‘These are the desires and aims befitting man’s nature. Thus you may obtain for man to feel, to will, to realize them.’’ Law accords with the principle we have noted in God’s dealings with man. Law will help man, if he desires it, to help himself and others. And this, according to our conception of right, is the method in which perfect righteousness would help the imperfect towards perfection. This is ‘‘the method of nature.’’ Men fear to hear that so precise is law in its results that the number of murders which will be committed next year can be foretold

What power in regard to the will is to be desired.

How practically men move circumstances to act on the will. Revelations of law.

The operation of law.

Moral from the certainty of the results of law.

636 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought with approximation to accuracy. They think this is to say, ‘‘Law compels the commission of those murders.’’ Law says, ‘‘If certain circumstances now existing remain, those murders will be committed. Ye that would not have it so, strive to find out those circumstances, in order to alter them.’’ 3.3 Concerning the Practical Importance of the Question— Whether Will accords with Law? Of the opinion frequently held, that the mode of operation of the will is incomprehensible to man.

Practical importance of the question— whether will accords with law?

It is often said the nature or mode of operation of the will is beyond the human understanding. We believe that there are questions on that subject beyond our reach. But that uniform relations exist between volitions and sensations, thoughts and emotions, and between those states of mind and the constitution and circumstances of the individuals in whom they exist, appears evident from experience. If a certain state of mind produces a wrong will (whatever this thing, called the will, may be); if another certain state of mind produces a right will—surely it is of as much essential immediate vital practical importance to each and to every one of us to know (1) whether there are laws; (2) what these laws, if any, are (which bring about those distinctive states of mind)—as it is to know whether one kind of berry, when eaten, produces a healthy state of body, another causes sickness or death. Belladonna poisons the body; bread feeds it. The question whether there are poisons and foods constant in their operation, if it had not been answered centuries ago, would be of vital physical importance to us. The question what are poisons and what are foods is of vital physical importance. No one in a healthy, sane, state knowingly takes belladonna for food or bread for poison. Here constant laws are admitted to be in operation, and no one dreams of his ‘‘free will’’ being thereby limited or destroyed. No one says that, because he cannot feed himself with belladonna, nor poison himself with bread, therefore he is not a free agent. But the other question—the moral question—remains still in the uttermost confusion. Practical Importance of the Question Not only is it still a question whether there are any laws at all, constant in their operation, of which certain states of mind are the result—of which states of mind, again, a right or a wrong will is the result—not only are we almost entirely ignorant what these laws are,

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that is, what does poison the mind, what does feed it—but there is a per fect outcr y against even making the inquiry because it ‘‘implies a limit’’ to our ‘‘free will’’! In practice, people, in general, do, after a confused fashion, recognize and observe some laws of the kind, even those who, if the question were asked, would say they might, if they pleased, will tomorrow what they pleased, whatever they did today, and that to admit they cannot, would be the same thing as giving up their ‘‘free will.’’ [Short Version p 34:] A man who has to hear a difficult cause in court tomorrow does not fit himself for it by gambling tonight. He knows the effect to be just as constant as the physical effect of belladonna. But, if you were to ask him the question, ten to one but he would say he might, if he pleased, will tomorrow what he pleased, whatever he did today. A man does not row in a boat match without training himself for it. He knows quite well that on the morning of the boat match he cannot will all at once to be perfectly strong and able in body. And he fancies he could will all at once to be perfectly righteous in will, and that if he admits he cannot, it is the same thing as giving up his ‘‘free will’’!! [Volume 3 Resumes] In all ages, men have practically tried to influence their own wills. A night spent in fasting and prayer in the church is the prescribed preparation for ‘‘profession’’ in many religious orders. ‘‘Sterility of soul,’’ ‘‘aridity,’’ are the consequences we hear constantly lamented with remorse by real ardent votaries, as might be expected. So in former times persons have spent years, and even lives, in the ‘‘contemplative life,’’ doing nothing else. And if they have written books, their books have been full of confessions of ‘‘dr yness,’’ ‘‘ingratitude’’ and ‘‘want of feeling,’’ as might have been expected. The right means were not taken. But what is this but recognizing that there are laws which may be used to bring about states of mind? Observation has rarely, indeed, been used to hit upon the right ones. But the first of our propositions has been practically acknowledged. The second requires as much practical study as the ‘‘philosophy of nutrition,’’ and has hardly as yet received any.

638 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Of opinions held concerning the operation of the will.

Of ‘‘free will.’’

Of the term necessity.

Those who have entered into this subject have usually denominated themselves believers in ‘‘free will’’ or in ‘‘necessity.’’ We think both terms objectionable, even for the opinions they are intended to describe. We object to the character of free will being solely appropriated by the opinions it is used to express, which suppose will to be unregulated by law—not to exist in definite relation—to have no regulation, no origin, other than the determination of the mind in which it exists. It cannot be said that the will is not free because it accords with law. We understand absence of freedom to be impediment, through will and power in another nature, to a man following the inclinations of his own. Does the supposition that will accords with law imply that any external will prevents a man willing in accordance with his nature? By no means. No external will is supposed to decree that an individual nature shall be in a state from which some definite volition will follow. The supposition is that each volition consists with, is simultaneous with, or successive to, a definite state of the nature. Yet we should not use the phrase free will to express this conception, though, supposing it true, we consider the will free, in the accepted meaning of free. To say that the will is free would but give a part of an explanation of what we have to express. Nor does the term necessity express the state of the case. ‘‘Necessity’’ signifies ‘‘a yielding to need,’’ and implies that one might will other wise, if able to follow one’s own nature, but that one’s will is necessitated by another’s. Our Power arises from God’s Invariableness

Operation of law relatively to will.

Law not only leaves a man free to be and do right, if such is his nature—it ensures that, if he attains a certain state, he certainly will be and do right; it affords means to the nature which desires the right to improve—to approximate to right—means without which, indeed, the desire would remain a mere shifting desire, without becoming a constant will—means with which such improvement is certain to follow. The endeavour to learn what are laws, or results of laws, in our nature, and how to keep law aright, constitutes the means we refer to. Let us understand that our power arises from God’s invariableness. Granted that certain circumstances invariably involve one definite constitution of the human physical being, whence springs the

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whole capability of that being—granted that circumstances invariably affect definitely this being, so that all he is results from law—is this necessity? is this making him a machine? Is it not accordance with right? Is it not putting power into his hands? For he has capability to find out how to bring about right physical being—right circumstances in which to live. We hear of man ‘‘breaking God’s law.’’ This is not in human possibility; man may keep it in one way or another, to his weal or his woe, his health or disease, his strength or his weakness—to the improvement or the deterioration of his nature, body or mind, but he cannot break the law of the Eternal Omnipotent. Law is kept whether man places himself where, in accordance with law, he will fall down a precipice to his destruction or where, in accordance with law, he stands firm on safe ground. We have to inquire by which of possible ways of keeping law we shall bring about the result we seek.

Impossibility to man of breaking God’s law.

4 Of Principles commonly received in Religion and Morals which are untr ue, if the accordance of the Will with Law is true If it is true that will invariably accords with definite conditions—that a man’s possibility to will in a particular manner depends on whether the conditions essential to such a state of will are possible—that his power over will depends on whether he can and will bring about the essential conditions—it will follow that some of the principles commonly received in religion and morals are untr ue. 1. All men are supposed to be entrusted by God with certain duties, for the performance of which they are responsible, which they are to fulfill on pain of punishment, in hope of reward. Man comes into existence without choice or will of his own. In entering upon existence, he undertakes no duties—he begins life in accordance with a law which depends not on his will. On the constitution with which his life begins, its possessor has no power. If he has the will and the means, as his nature matures, he may modify that constitution, which, however, throughout his existence will definitely affect his life and nature.

Popular understanding of the religion of man to God in regard to duty. An erroneous understanding, since man’s will or choice has no part in the beginning of his existence. Nor in the constitution with which life begins.

Er rors concerning Man’s Will The circumstances of life during the time when he is unable to conceive or carry out any purpose powerfully affect his character.

Nor in the circumstances of early life.

640 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Result of law on the past of human will.

Conception attempted of what is right— obser vation of what is, to find whether to our minds they harmonize. Solitar y existence inconceivable as the will of Omnipotent Righteousness.

Whatever has been human will, it has not been in human possibility that it should have been otherwise, law being what it is. Upon these considerations, we hold the word responsibility as inapplicable to the relations of man with God. It is usual to ‘‘recoil with horror’’ from any conclusion of this kind, on account of its ‘‘immoral tendency.’’ In many instances, however, the ‘‘immoral tendency’’ lies the other way. If people think about it at all, they think that a ‘‘responsibility’’ may be cancelled by the person to whom they are responsible—that, by his indulgence, or his ‘‘making allowances,’’ they may be forgiven if they are found wanting—that it is, in fact, a contract from which the other ‘‘contracting party’’ may release them if he choose. In all great earthly undertakings we are obliged often to accept a sense of responsibility from our subordinates, for want of being able to inspire anything better. But how much rather would we not find in our fellow workers a sense of co-operation! How much safer for our purpose, then, fellow-feeling than ‘‘responsibility’’! 2. From observation of what is, from reference to what we can believe a conception consistent with Perfect Righteousness in regard to other being—let us inquire whether we can so interpret what is that it shall come home to our minds as what is right. We cannot conceive that Omnipotent Righteousness would find satisfaction in solitar y existence. What beings should we then conceive that God would create? Unless we admit that to will limited (though progressive) happiness is consistent with the spirit of Perfect Right, with the existence of prefect benevolence and wisdom, and of omnipotence to effect the will of perfect benevolence and wisdom, we come at once to a direct contradiction. We assert that no nature but that of God the Father can exist, and yet, if no other nature existed, He would not be God.28 For, granting that a perfect nature is essential to perfect happiness, then in God the Father alone exist the attributes essential to perfect happiness—namely, perfect goodness, power, oneness with all truth. And if you say that the being would not be perfect who willed limited happiness, then you assert that a Being would not be perfect who willed other nature than his own; in other words, that either there is no Perfect Being, or, being perfect, there is no other—that is, that

28 JSM: The contradiction is not fully made out. All that would follow is that One Being would not have the attribute of benevolence because there would be no one to exercise benevolence upon.

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only God can be consistently with God, and that, if God only is, God would not be. For that would not be perfect benevolence who willed only His own being—who, possessing omnipotence, did not will other nature than his own to which to communicate His happiness. And if we ask of our own minds what nature, what history of other being would be in harmony with, would be satisfactory to, Omnipotent Righteousness, it seems to us that it would be progress of imperfection and ignorance towards knowledge and perfection, such progress being cer tain, to such progress the Almighty and Perfect affording means and inducement to the imperfect, through which it is certain; such progress coming to pass through exercise of capability in those to whom means and inducement are afforded—exercise of capability to advance themselves and each other in such progress. Such a conception alone comes home to us, as what would be if Almighty Righteousness exists. Such a conception accords with law, as we recognize it. Such a conception we believe to be in course of realization, partly from observation of what is, partly from inference concerning what is. 3. Man’s conscious weakness, the terrible sufferings he has endured, which he has been powerless to prevent, the intensity of his desire for what he cannot obtain, his imperfect conception of moral right, have confused might and right. Power to do what he cannot do has been his God. The earliest and still recurring question of man concerning the Superhuman Power which he dimly recognizes seems mainly to have been how to obtain that this Power shall assist his desires, relieve his sufferings. He does not conceive of this Power as acting upon a principle, or according to a rule. He attempts to propitiate Him by offerings, by sacrifice, by glorification, by prayer, or, believing in the moral nature of God, he supposes human suffering the result of God’s displeasure for man’s sinfulness. He believes, for instance, that cholera may be removed by man’s repentance for sin, averted by his refraining from it. He has not recognized that to the virtuous or the vicious cholera is incident in certain states of body, under certain circumstances. (We say that ‘‘God has created all things for his own glory.’’29 Now if a man love his own glory, he must, at least, disguise it under

29 From the catechism.

What nature in other being— what history of other being— would be consistent with the existence of Per fect Righteousness?

Further consideration of popular interpretation of God’s character and dealings with man.

Means by which man seeks the help of superhuman power while not receiving law as God’s rule.

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Questions appropriate to the moral nature recognizing law as the method of superhuman power.

the veil of a decent pretext—a desire for the general or national good. Not so with God: He is supposed to be actuated entirely by the desire of his own glory. With Napoleon and Louis-Napoléon, we know that they do do everything to their own glory, but we say that they do it for the good of their people. Lord John Russell was even obliged to get up in the House of Commons and say that Louis-Napoléon acted out of good motives— i.e., out of a desire for the happiness of France—though nobody believes it—in order to save a war. The prime minister of England is obliged to tell a lie in Parliament, which he knows that they know that he knows is a lie, in order not to attribute even to LouisNapoléon what we attribute daily and unsparingly to God.)30 To the moral nature recognizing universal law, the question concerning Superhuman Power is—Does this law give evidence of a righteous nature as its origin? and how, consistently with the operation of such invariable law, may man obtain and fulfill righteous desire in man? He will not seek to possess himself of such desires, or to fulfill them, through assistance to be obtained by prayer and supplication. He has received the belief that his desires and their fulfillment depend on definite conditions, which his prayers will not alter. (We know that it does not signify whether all these prayers which are said are said or not: none are listening, whether God or man. It will not make the least difference anywhere: ‘‘nobody marks you,’’ there is nobody there to ‘‘mark.’’ But it is, by the law of the land, ‘‘established’’ that all these prayers should be said, for altering one word of them a man is subject to a penalty, amenable to law. The other day a clergyman, who did not like to pray for Jew and Roman Catholic mps, because he said they were ‘‘his enemies,’’ altered the ‘‘prayer for the high court of Parliament’’ so as to exclude these, as he thought, by a cunning device, and for this device, which makes him subject at assizes to the forfeiture of a year’s income, his bishop refused to censure him. This bishop is striking a blow at the church. In the Lord’s Prayer, beautiful as it is, there is hardly a word of exact truth. ‘‘Our Father which art in heaven.’’ If He is anywhere, He is ever ywhere—not more in heaven than on earth. ‘‘Thy will be

30 For the exchange between Lord John Russell and Viscount Palmerston, see Hansard, Parliamentar y Debates 3 Febr uary 1852:103-10.

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done in earth as it is in heaven.’’ We do not know whether there is any other place where His will is done more than in this, at present, and, in one sense, His will is always done. ‘‘Forgive us our trespasses,’’31 when the trespasser is His pioneer, cannot be true. Neither can ‘‘deliver us from evil,’’ when He made the evil by His laws on purpose to save us. The ‘‘God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob!’’32 We might as well say the God of George I, George II and George III. He is the God of all, and He is everywhere. But if prayer is done away with, does He never speak to us? In one sense He cannot speak to us. It would be the same as if I were to hold a discourse to the little cat. We cannot understand Him. If He were to explain His plans to us, could we understand Him any more than I should understand one who were to speak to me in Persian? In another sense, He is always speaking to us—saying to us what we can understand. We do not talk to one another of our feelings: we do not say perpetually, ‘‘How good you are!’’ ‘‘How much I love you!’’ At least, we cease to say this in proportion as we understand each other, as we really love and sympathize.33 God says nowhere but in the Bible, ‘‘I the Lord do these things.’’34 In proportion as we understand Him, we shall cease to require these declarations—we shall cease to think them beautiful. In proportion as we love Him, we shall not desire words from Him nor words to Him—we shall be one with Him, doing the same work, and work will be prayer.) Er rors concerning Prayer It is supposed that supplication for forgiveness will avert God’s displeasure when man has done wrong, and may save him from the consequences of sin which would otherwise befall him. It is supposed to be acceptable to God that we should humble ourselves before Him, in acknowledgment of our weakness, our ignorance, the right we have neglected, the wrong we have committed. Lest we should omit supplication for forgiveness for any error of omission

31 32 33 34

Matt 6:12. Exod 3:6. JSM: I do not agree in this. Isa 45:7.

Prayer for forgiveness—how inconsistent with belief in universal law.

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The word forgiveness without meaning, if law operates universally.

or commission, we are enjoined daily to confess that we have heretofore done everything wrong, nothing right. Without distinction, those who may be conscious of having earnestly striven after the right, those who may be conscious of having been indifferent to it, are, according to the popular religion, enjoined this daily confession, which would seem to express man’s moral state to be hopeless, yet he is also enjoined at the end of each confession to express to the Almighty his determination henceforward to live a new life,35 which cannot mean a life thus entirely wrong, although he is enjoined to acknowledge it for the whole of the future as for the whole of the past. How can such contradictory expressions, under any belief, be conceived of as satisfactory to the Spirit of Truth and Right? Belief in universal law leaves the word forgiveness without a meaning. If it is true that whatever man has thought or felt, all his inclinations, whatever has been his will, have arisen in accordance with law which it was not in his possibility to annul or to alter, it must be unmeaning to ask God to forgive a past which arose in accordance with His law, or man to forgive what was inevitable. Anger, indignation against the individual sinner, must be untrue feeling in whatever being it exists. Moral Right the Health of the Mind

Revelation concerning moral right in law.

Is the existence of moral evil consistent with Omnipotent Righteousness?

Does this mean that there is nothing to be said against indifference to moral wrong? that to God its continuance would be indifferent? Far from it. Such an idea only could be entertained from a misconception of the constitution of human nature, and of the nature of God, as both may be interpreted through God’s law. 4. Let us repeat, as fundamental to all that we would urge as tr uth in religion and morals, our belief that in God’s law we may find revealed that moral right is the health of the mind, the state which befits the nature, that moral wrong means simply deviation from the state to which the type of human nature in God’s thought is adapted. Is it asked how moral wrong can exist consistently with the existence of Almighty Righteousness? Is it not true that that would not be righteousness which by power decreed the will of others—

35 In the confession before holy communion, Book of Common Prayer.

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decreed in other beings an existence of will as though in a machine under His direction? The operation of God’s will in law appears to be that in human nature, through the operation of law there shall be such desire for, or satisfaction in, right—that is to say, for the state of being for which God fits man, or intends man to fit himself—that in successive time mankind will discover how to attain progress in right for mankind. Man will within certain limits become the creator of the human constitution, or, more properly speaking, will modify it for its proper objects—man will determine within certain limits the circumstances of human life—determine them with the purpose of progress in righteous existence for man. Thus the Almighty and Per fect affords assistance to the imperfect and ignorant. Does it not come home to the mind that the character of Almighty Righteousness would be wanting in any other course than this? It would not be consistent, according to our conception, that by the will and power of another being it should be determined for each man, ‘‘thus shalt thou feel, will, act during existence,’’ nor that the struggling being called into existence through another will should not, in the course of existence, receive help through which cer tainly existence shall be a boon to himself, shall be such as befits the nature he receives, or for which, according to his constitution, he is adapted—help through which he shall approximate to the nature which called him into existence, yet help to help himself, help to mankind to help one another. It appears that in God’s laws may be found the revelation that so it is—so it ought to be. Is it supposed that only the expectation of God’s anger, of God’s punishment, will deter human nature from sin? Those who so believe misconceive human nature as it may be, as through God’s law it will be. Existence of Evil consistent with a Perfect Ruler We hear much of a sense of sin. If we have really the sense of sin which befits our nature, it will revolt us. To the mind’s proper nature moral evil has no more charm than have the loathsome diseases to which the body is subject. Reverence and love for goodness and truth, sympathy and benevolence for our fellow creatures, the appropriate exercise of the functions of our nature—these are our proper element. Men are apt to suppose essential charms in wrong indulgences—to believe they necessarily tempt and attract us; that all we can do is to

Of the operation of God’s will for right in law.

The only conception not inconsistent with Almighty Power and Perfect Righteousness.

Tr ue conception of sin, and whether accepted to human nature.

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Nature of wrong inclinations. Redemption from sin.

Difficulty which is felt in interpreting the existence of evil consistently with the existence of Almighty Goodness and Wisdom.

What shall be man’s salvation from sin?

Popular belief concerning man’s sinful nature considered.

combat them; that we must struggle against them, because otherwise we shall incur God’s displeasure, since these are forbidden pleasures, for yielding to which He will punish us. Wrong inclinations are a false appetite in the nature. We must attain the healthy appetite. We must ‘‘work out our salvation’’36—salvation from ignorance, from physical and moral evils, from which, in accordance with God’s laws of wisdom and truth, we most suffer, which must deprive us of our proper life and being, till we can work from darkness to light. Thus shall we accomplish, by help of God in His laws, our redemption from sin. We hear much of the difficulty of reconciling the experience we have of the existence of evil with belief in the existence of an Omnipotent Ruler, per fect in goodness and wisdom. But if we can find evidence of the operation of law which is in course of leading human nature to moral feeling, and progress in righteousness—if, on the other hand, it comes home to our minds that to ordain by force of power, that the beings subject to that power should be incapable of deviation from moral right, would include contradiction to wisdom and truth—it appears to us that the moral nature may find its satisfaction as to divine rule and human destiny in law as the rule consistent with Almighty Power and with Perfect Wisdom and Goodness. Herein the weak and struggling nature may find help— help to work—man’s work, which is God’s work. Will it be asked to what have we to trust to save human nature from falling into sin, if we give up the fear of God’s anger if we sin? We have to trust to good feelings natural to man, which will cer tainly exist if we take the means to bring them into existence—means which would make it impossible to man to will wrong. It may be said, ‘‘Look at this man and that. Are good feelings natural to them? Are they not lost, as far as we can see, to good feeling?’’ If our physical nature is such that, fed and exercised in one way it would be strong, healthy, efficient to perform its functions; shall we, if it is fed in a different manner, say that man’s frame is by nature weak and sickly? We are often told that the heart of man is ‘‘desperately wicked, and deceitful above all things.’’37 Before accepting such doctrine,

36 Phil 2:12. 37 Jer 17:9.

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let us look to experience. Our feelings vary as they are exercised, as clearly, as certainly as the state of the physical nature varies with its food and exercise. If the thoughts and feelings which befit a man are called forth, a human being will be manly in the true sense of the word, but many hearts are turned from their natural manliness, and will be so while man’s life and circumstances do not afford to his nature its proper exercise. Life’s Work must be Done But what is to be done? Life’s work, such as it is, must be done. Much there is in the life of all classes—in the life of the artizan, in professional life, in family life, in all modes of life—gradually established by men’s wants, which inevitably makes our wills bad. Are men to be expected, or ought they to throw up these employments, and bring society into confusion by vague desire to make themselves good? No, but let us try to find what is the nature and law of our Ruler, what are the proper desires of our nature in accordance with that law. Let us try to communicate such light as we can gain by study of that law, and strive gradually to improve the circumstances of life—that is, to adapt them to man’s proper nature. In proportion as we can gain man’s belief in God’s law—in proportion as men’s hearts desire to keep it aright—the circumstances of life will help goodness, and goodness will modify the circumstances of life. Will it be said that it is presumption and conceit for a few individuals to think that they can discover the true nature of religion, and how it ought to be manifested in life? There is no fear of such presumption, for, according to the nature of things, no such conceptions would come into the mind of individuals till mankind had been long, long and laboriously at work. Comte profoundly teaches that the errors in man’s view of religion are essential paths to truth—they have been no wild vagaries, independent of law. Our heads and our hearts should estimate them with the respect and affection due to them. While we sift tr uth from falsehood in books held sacred which have come down to us, let us estimate the value of the truth—the truthfulness, in its position as to time and place, of the falsehood. How short-sighted, feeble and vain is he who fancies himself individually to have discovered anything! How disgusting is the narrow selfish folly of A, who

How to deal with life as it is, while wishing to change the wrong to right.

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Remorse not tr ue feeling if the existence of law be granted.

Human nature adapted to moral right as its health.

is contending in angry pages that he, and not B, made a certain discover y! Be assured it was neither A nor B—it was mankind, it was God in man. The perceptions or ideas in A’s mind could never have arisen had not a thinking and laborious race preceded him. When, therefore, you strive in the glorious work of endeavouring to read the revelation of the Great Spirit in time and space, fear not to be presumptuous in using the capabilities which that Spirit has bestowed for this very purpose; fear not that you are arrogating to yourself a power above other men. All science, all history and experience of human nature which the ages of man have laid before you are your means for discovery. 4.5. The belief in original sin is untenable, if law is found by experience to operate as we have interpreted it. If the existence of universal law be granted, then remorse is not a tr ue feeling—not a feeling of what really is, for remorse is blame to ourselves for the past. But if the origin of our will, and our will itself, were, as it has been, in accordance with law, there cannot, in tr uth, be blame to ourselves, personally, individually. A distinction should be made as clearly as possible between absence of blame in an individual to himself, where he is conscious that he has been wrong, and indifference to that wrong. Are we to be indifferent to Wrong?

How will is conditional.

Recognition of law in will does not lead to indifference to right.

To a healthy moral nature, having on an occasion erred, it would be as impossible to be indifferent to that error, though he should believe that it had not been in his possibility to avoid it, as it would be to one who should receive a bodily wound to be indifferent because ‘‘it was not his fault.’’ We object to saying that a man could not have willed otherwise than he did, because this sounds as if he would or might have willed other wise, but was under a necessity imposed by other and external power. We mean that the conditions on which will depends were such that, law being what it is, it was not possible that other will than that which did exist should exist. We are most anxious to show that such an understanding of law, as manifested in human will and act, does not lead to indifference to right or wrong, but the contrary. Law, which affixes certain conditions to willing right, establishes that the human mind is adapted, befitted to those conditions from which right will proceeds, to which conditions we believe evidence

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may be found that human history, however slowly, however circuitously, is certainly tending. (If it be asked, but does human nature make progress? it must be answered: In some human discoveries man has advanced, in others retrograded; there wants purport in all he is and does. Oh, for a moral and religious Bacon to give direction to all man’s purposes! Yet one advance has man made. What was the God of Love of the ancients? A sensualist, the embodiment of sensuality? ‘‘God is love.’’38 What an advance is there! Look at the pictures of the mother of the ancient God of Love! odious in her beauty!39 Look at the pictures of the Roman Catholic mother of God!—do not let us make such an absurd mistake as to say the Christian mother of God—what purity, what devotion! Here, indeed, is improvement, which cannot be doubted. But onward let us go. We talk of the God of Love, and what a mode of existence do we not attribute to Him! what satisfactions! what purposes! God is love, we truly assert, but let us go to the universe—search the present, the past and the future—learn and teach how it is that their awful voices confirm what we have asserted.) The portion of human existence during which right does not exist in feeling or action is, we may say, consequent on law being such that the nature and life shall become right, through exercise of man’s own will and faculties. Man shall not be made right without inter vention of human will and work. Probably, even if not clearly seen by us, there is contradiction in such a conception. Man will be the agent in human righteousness—by man it will be attained for man—God’s law leading him to wish and to work out the fulfillment of his true wants. For a man to give way to feelings of remorse—of blame for what it has not been in him to prevent—is not tr ue. To be conscious that wrong is wrong—to hold it in repugnance as all that we have to fear or avoid in our life and being—is tr ue.40 The more our state of being is human, manly, in the proper sense of those words, the greater will be our repugnance to what is morally wrong, till willfully to do wrong shall become an impossibility. The mind will accord with right, which is God’s thought or con-

Repugnance to wrong the dictate of our healthy nature.

38 1 John 4:8. 39 JSM: I do not agree in this as regards the Greek statues of Nimes. 40 JSM: But remorse is no more than ‘‘repugnance’’ to our former (or present) self because embodying wrong.

650 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought sciousness, or will thirst and long and strive to do so, not in fear of His anger, but in love of right—of God, the living consciousness of right. Indifference to wrong is in the moral nature as blindness, paralysis in the physical nature, and would not follow as the consequence of believing that right is our health and weal; that it is conditional—that, if ignorant—if unable, either from want of will, of knowledge, or of power, to keep those conditions—we fall into our greatest, our only essential, harm. Such a belief would lead to the pursuit of right, as including all man has to desire, to avoidance of wrong, as including all man has to avoid. Er rors concerning an Atonement Remorse practically enfeebling.

Popular belief of the atonement contradictor y to belief in universal law.

Our experience is that to dwell on the past error with feelings of remorse depresses the energy, all of which is wanted to pursue the right in future. Atonement for sin, by the suffering of One who has not sinned, is a popular feeling at variance with that interpretation of God’s thought, to which belief in universal law leads us. The main principle of God’s government thus interpreted is that man shall work out progress in knowledge and righteousness for humanity—shall suffer through his errors, not because God is angry, but because the spirit of Goodness and Wisdom we name God thus conducts us through our work to righteousness, which is our wellbeing. (The pioneer’s is the highest calling, and God calls the highest men to it. But the thieves and murderers who are also His calling, who are in some sense His pioneers! how much more difficult it is to understand that He can have called them to such far greater agonies! It is probably this which has given birth to the expression that He Himself descends into hell with them. He could not call them to go alone. St Vincent de Paul seems to have had an inkling of this tr uth when he summoned his missionaries to the galleys ‘‘to visit the Son of God suffering for our crimes, in the person of these men who suffer for their own disorderly life.’’41) Man shall not enjoy the high possibilities of his nature, except through the proper exercise of that nature; he is in a state of privation while he knows or seeks it not.

41 Nightingale cited this also in Notes from Devotional Authors of the Middle Ages, in Mysticism and Eastern Religions (4:47).

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The popular doctrine, on the contrary, is that man can do nothing for himself, yet that God’s anger against his sin is such that only by suffering consequent on that sin can He receive satisfaction, propitiation. Such is God’s condemnation of sin that all who have sinned must have suffered eternally for the satisfaction of God, but that One perfect in righteousness has in another manner offered satisfaction— propitiation for sin—has, in some way incomprehensible to us, made Himself guilty of all sin ever committed, or to be committed by man, and so suffered as to satisfy the Divine nature, and to save men from the sufferings which would otherwise follow from their sins, provided they believe in the sacrifice thus offered for them. Such belief, though directly contrary to the conception of the Divine nature and government which we believe to be revealed by law, yet generally accepted as it is, offers much to call forth reflection and impress the mind, even in those who differ from it. It shows the sense, the feeling concerning moral evil, which has existed in the human mind—the increased force of such feeling, since such atonement was conceived necessary and the belief in it accepted.

‘‘Man powerless to do right,’’ yet God condemns sin. ‘‘Man’s only salvation through the righteousness of another.’’

Reflections called forth by general acceptance of such doctrine.

Tr ue Feeling towards Moral Evil In endeavouring to show that moral, as physical, evil will arise or may be prevented according as laws affecting our moral nature are kept in one or another of possible ways, we are especially desirous to explain the different feeling towards physical and moral evil which befits the mind of man, which will exist in the mind of man, in that state which, in accordance with law, is the right, the healthy, the appropriate state, for we wish to raise our understanding of right to be that which is God’s consciousness—that to which, in accordance with law, human nature is, or is to become, adapted. By that nature moral evil would, indeed, be appreciated quite differently—treated quite differently from physical evil, yet we should seek deliverance from each in definite ways, taught by experience, by study of human nature and of God’s law manifested therein. As it is, physical evil calls forth compassion, which may prompt relief to the sufferer; moral evil calls forth condemnation, prompting deliverance to ourselves—temporary deliverance from evil, which perhaps we do not attempt to remove. A boy steals; we send him out of our way to a prison, from which we have reason to believe he will come forth more able and more willing to steal from the society he has had than when he went in.

Different feeling dictated by our nature to physical and moral evil.

Physical evil calls forth relief to the sufferer, moral evil, temporary relief to ourselves.

652 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Tr ue feeling towards moral evil.

Feeling though tr ue, not always possible to man.

Evil from thinking we believe what we do not believe.

Admitting that whatever a man’s nature, character, will, has been, it has not been possible, law being as it is, that it should have been otherwise, what is true feeling towards one guilty of wrong? Vengeance for wrongs has been held right in God and man. (It is said that we make God after our own image,42 and it is true that so we have done. In the times when revenge was reckoned a virtue, we called God revengeful—we attributed to Him vanity, change of purpose, jealousy, and all that we found in man—and we called it, with a little more power than man’s—‘‘God.’’ Histor y at each step shows that such qualities were admired in man at the time that they were attributed to God. It is true that we cannot attribute to God other qualities than those we find in man, because we are not conscious of any others. He may have other attributes, which we cannot appreciate. But it is not true that we need form God after our own image. Look and see what qualities you recognize, you actually find in God, which, indeed, you find in man also, and then form your god according to experience, and not according to your own ‘‘image.’’) Now, there is an indistinct feeling of a just resentment against wrong, yet that forgiveness is right. If it is fact that, however a man has sinned, though he might have done otherwise if he had willed, yet to will otherwise than he did was not possible, it cannot be that resentment, anger, indignation against the evildoer personally can be true. As to forgiveness, we really are unable to attach a meaning to the word. If the state of mind of the evildoer is changed—if he grieves over what he has done, and sins no more—our estimation of him must be different; if he is unchanged, it must be the same. No feeling contrary to a true estimation of fact can be right. But we shall do well to remember that we are flesh and blood. It is not always possible to us to feel to be true what we believe, recognize, acknowledge to be true, nor is it wise to urge on ourselves a state of feeling that the mind does not spontaneously accept. 4.6. Practically, ver y great, though unsuspected, evil often arises from persons thinking they feel or believe what really has not called forth in the mind real, genuine feeling or belief.

42 The contention of theorists like Comte.

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Evil of thinking we believe what we do not It is true that moral wrong is the greatest evil to our nature—i.e., brings it farthest from its appropriate, its essential, good, and it is true that to him who has been of an ‘‘evil spirit’’ it has not been possible to have been otherwise, and, therefore, it is true that the individual in whom exists an evil spirit, or state of mind, is in fact an object of compassion, not of blame, however much the evil is to be deprecated, however hard we labour to remedy it. But it is better to turn our minds from feelings which we know to be untrue, and into the right channels possible to us than to attempt to force feelings beyond our nature. If we would not be anxious about the future, it is better to occupy the mind in the present than to reason with ourselves against fear, because we believe all will be for the best. If we would not feel anger against the evildoer, we shall better avoid it by turning to other thoughts than by reasoning with ourselves about his not being able to do otherwise. We can never too forcibly remember that, because what has been in the past could not have been otherwise, it by no means follows that we are powerless over the present and future. If we can and if we will alter those specific conditions out of which past evil arose, it certainly will not recur. Our sense of moral evil cannot be too strong. Men are too indifferent, are callous to the existence, the nature and extent of moral evil; do not sufficiently recognize to what extent and by what means it is remediable; have not, as befits them, the ‘‘hunger and thirst for righteousness,’’43 or the world would be a different place. Men have organized life—fixed its ways and habits, with quite other aims than adapting this world for human nature, for what it may be, what it ought to be, what it ought to progress towards becoming. Though we should seek to gain all the knowledge we can of what is true—recognize truth as far as we can—our limited nature is incapable of feeling or conceiving much that it accepts as true, and it is well that we recognize a distinction between what we may learn to be truth in the consciousness of God and the feeling which befits our human nature. We accept as true that no beginning, no end, is traceable to change in phenomena never beginning, never ending, ever exhibiting change in the present from the past, yet eternity is a belief in us

43 Matt 5:6.

Best means to avoid untrue feeling.

Principle on which life is organized.

Difference in our power of recognizing tr uth and feeling it.

654 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought which we express in words, while we are incapable of conceiving it. Our power of conceiving what we know to be, or to have been, is imper fect. We can only imperfectly recall what has been our state of feeling in the past, or realize the consciousness in another mind. We are not to expect our feelings to correspond with our knowledge, but to be modified by our knowledge. It is not in us to feel as we suppose the Being to feel, to whose mind is present both how all that is arose in accordance with His law out of the past, and what it is leading to in the future. Knowledge of truth, of law, of God’s mode of government, will not paralyze or stifle our human joys and sorrows, but will ennoble our sufferings, make our joys wiser and more enduring. Is ‘‘Eternal Punishment’’ really believed in?

When we say we believe in eternal punishment, we know not what we say.

We shall not, because we are above resentment, and could find no satisfaction in revenge, be insensible to injury or submit to unjustice. We shall not, because we believe that all, whether sorrow or joy, is tending to human progress, cease to weep with those who weep. We shall regret nothing in the past, for we believe that only that law through which the actual past arose would be right and good for man. Yet one essential part of that past, of the benefit it is to be to us, is to teach us, to cry out to us to make the future different from the past. As well might we expect bodily pain not to distress us because we believe it the result of wise and beneficent law, in accordance with which it is temporary and a road to eternal good, as suppose that knowledge of truth will make us insensible to sorrow. It will but make us more keenly sensitive to human sorrows, privations and sins. As we better realize what man is, what man may be, our sympathies will be more keen, our efforts more earnest. We must sometimes know more than we can feel, and use words to express what we believe, though we do not feel it, to be fact, and it is well to keep in mind that, imperfect as is our knowledge, still more imper fect is our power of conception. If we had not used words without feeling or realizing what they meant, it would not have been in human nature to believe men doomed to eternal torments. Such sufferings as men talk about they could not conceive, and live or keep their senses. That a church which does not call itself inspired, of which Queen Victoria is the head, which embraces nearly all the cultivated men in the kingdom—that this church should say that it was

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an open question whether babes who died unbaptized were damned or not—that it did not signify—it might be so—men might believe one or the other, as they chose—is one of the most curious historical phenomena we know. It presupposes such an idea of God—that He should elect a babe from all eternity to everlasting damnation. The atonement does not give such an idea of Him. A man may dwell upon the justice of God, and then upon His goodness, in finding out this plan of saving us from hell, till he forgets the badness of plunging us into hell. But the doctrine of predestination, viz., that He chooses for all eternity a little child for hell—and the Church of England theory that she does not know—she may believe it or not, as she will—does seem unparallelled in the history of belief. Comte tells us to worship Lord Byron as a saint on the 27th day of the eighth month.44 As little could we worship the God we hear of at church, for we do not believe that Lord Byron would have condemned even his greatest enemy to eternal damnation, though we conceive him to have been one of the most sensual and selfish characters which have ever existed. We remain satisfied with Religious Farces That speech of the mystics: ‘‘God may plunge me into hell if He will; I shall not love Him the less,’’ is the most fatal and radical of mistakes. It is the same as saying, He is and He is not. Why do you love Him? Because He is loveable. You cannot do both, viz., He cannot be love, and loved by you, and not love and loved by you at the same time. If a tyrant choose to condemn me to death, I submit, because I cannot help it. But let me not say, ‘‘You murder me and my dearest friends, but I love you all the same.’’ Let us know what is loveable, and love it. Because, if we do not, if we lay it down as a principle that we are to love God, whatever He does, it will never occur to us, ‘‘Perhaps He did not do this. Let us examine and see if He did. It seems inconsistent with the many signs of goodness we see in Him.’’ But no, we remain satisfied with much that is false, because we mistake words that pass our lips for feelings in our hearts. ‘‘Whether ye eat or drink,’’ says St Paul ‘‘do all to the glory of God.’’45 Does

We mistake words which we say for real belief, hence the persistency of much that is false.

44 Listed in his Calendar of Saints, Auguste Comte, Système de politique positive 4:402-03. 45 1 Cor 10:31.

656 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought ‘‘good society’’ in England eat and drink ‘‘to the glory of God?’’ ‘‘Good society’’ in England acknowledges the Bible as inspired; a man is impeded in ‘‘society’’ if he is known to think otherwise. Yet, if one were to go to the highways of society, on its way to unwholesome and extravagant dinners, and speak forth these words, that one would be called a fanatic, and by the very men who would most strenuously oppose the admission into high offices of anyone who said that the Bible was not peculiarly inspired, and that we are not bound to fashion our belief by it. Such is our belief in this book which we profess to believe. This is the most singular of all such states of mind, when people abandon that which they do care for, for that which they do not care for. Few care for the Church of England, yet men are sometimes seen giving up a friend whom they like because he does not belong to a church to which they are indifferent. Opinions on religion do not now model life. The habits of life are stamped in strong and durable fashion. That certain individuals here and there differ from orthodox views makes little impression on modes of life. Except in religious orders, the Roman Catholic, the Puseyite, the Evangelical, the Jew, in the higher and middle of ranks live much after the same fashion, though in different coteries, and refraining more or less from each other’s society, but their habits do not differ materially or generally according to their religious views. If we study the varying manners of society (in our own countr y at least), we find them little influenced by religion. That which is called civilization in manners and habits, has it spr ung from religion? Convenience and luxury advance from year to year, but does religion prompt them? The manners of the time of Sir Charles Grandison are ver y different from the manners today.46 It would be amusing and interesting to spend a day among our ancestors of that date, but has religion influenced those changes? The Quakers speak and dress in certain formalisms, according to the directions of their religious ancestors. The Roman Catholics fast and attend to certain observances. But, generally speaking, is the way in which mankind employ themselves influenced by religion? Is their food, their dress, their conversation influenced by religion? daily or weekly, on bended knees, at certain

46 Presumably Samuel Richardson’s novel, Sir Charles Grandison, 1754.

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prescribed hours, to confess sins, little really felt or thought of— daily or weekly to offer praises and thanks to a Being little understood and little thought of—is not this the chief sign that religion exists at all in English society? In the time of Cromwell and among his followers,47 could we go back to spend a day with them, we should perhaps find a life really influenced by their views of religion, but where could we now track religion in life, generally speaking? Individuals will probably present themselves in each generation whose lives have sprung out of their religion, but not generations. Er rors as to ‘‘Afflictive Dispensations’’ 4.7. The popular doctrine represents God as inflicting punishment on offenders by misfortunes—not as the consequence uniformly following certain conditions, but as the consequence of God’s displeasure—which misfortunes we may hope that He will withdraw on our repentance and supplication. We lose a child by shipwreck, not because he imprudently went in a dangerous vessel, but because, consciously or unconsciously, his parents have done what is displeasing to God. Upon their expression of sorrow at having displeased Him, and supplication for His mercy, it may be that He will relent and not again afflict them. Thus the arbitrary earthly potentate proceeds and, as in man’s early history, he used his power, so it was supposed that the Superhuman Power to whom man is subject would exercise His power. Such proceeding is not rule or government, which implies will, that fixed consequences shall be uniform with definite conditions. Indeed, men act more and more as if they believe themselves living under such rule, but continue to address the Almighty as if He might change at their supplication. They pray for mercy, but mercy is inconsistent with Almighty Wisdom and Goodness, which will permit no evil or suffering, except as the temporary result of law, through the operation of which the evil shall be transformed into good by man’s will and work. Men seem to think it will be pleasing to God that they should be ashamed of their human nature—they do not express sorrow that, endowed with a nature which has divine possibilities, they remain

47 During the Puritan period, mid-seventeenth century.

Popular doctrine as to why misfortunes befall mankind.

Objections to such doctrine.

Self-abasement supposed pleasing to God.

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How neither pride nor humility are consistent with the tr ue comprehension of divine and human nature.

so poor; they prostrate themselves before the Source of all we are and all we might be, deploring their sinful nature, their impossibility to be or do anything that is right, except inasfar as God works in and for them, and this is supposed to be humility pleasing to God. A just and true appreciation of what we are and what we may become, of how God will help us if we take the appointed means to receive His help, what He will do for us and what we are to do for ourselves, is the state which is true to our nature, true to God’s nature. Pride is an aberration of mind, impossible except from misunderstanding of what we are, why we are, what we are to become. Self-satisfaction in humbling ourselves before God is misunderstanding as great in another direction. We can neither feel proud nor humble except from some misconception of God or of ourselves. If our state of mind is right, we shall press ever onward to be and to do in the infinite career before us. Such progress will be the want, the thirst, of our nature—not undertaken to satisfy pride, not calling forth pride. To God we shall refer what we are, what we shall become, our means of becoming what it is fitting we should be. There will be no place in us where pride can enter. While the infinite is beyond, how can we feel proud of any step towards it? Man is what God made him ‘‘What is man and the son of man,’’ says the Psalmist, ‘‘that Thou art mindful of him?’’48 Why, man is what God has made him. To call man ‘‘a worm’’49 has been often thought a religious sentiment. But is there any truth in likening him to whom God has given a power to create and to develop the divine qualities of His own nature to the ‘‘worm which creepeth,’’ unable to discern the Great Presence, the Great Will, unable to call into being anything but another equally incapable? ‘‘What,’’ indeed, ‘‘is man and the son of man?’’ It is said that through Christ God created the world. The power of creation is not limited to Christ. Within, it is true, certain limits, man may create, may create after his desire; he may create various modifications of all true and holy affections, spiritual natures, as also he may create various modifications of material nature. From himself alone, indeed, ‘‘springeth nothing,’’ and he who is proud

48 Ps 8:4. 49 An allusion to Ps 22:6.

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of his power is farther from the truth than the creeping worm, which can distinguish neither truth nor error. Yet humility and self-abasement seem no expression of the state of mind befitting the man who comprehends how and where God is leading him. Human nature will profoundly interest him as he appreciates its possibilities. Its poor and sorrowful realities will tell him of God’s law not yet felt or understood. He will not feel humbled in its hitherto inevitable results, or proud while he obeys the call of God in his nature to reveal and fulfill that law. Man’s str uggles for self-importance have a truth in them. (The feeling of each individual of his own importance is true, is real, but it shows itself in such queer ways. Some put wigs on their coachmen’s heads, and some on their own heads. It is honourable not to work, and the highest occupation of all, as one would think, viz., developing the human being, education—is loss of caste. But give the human being his real importance—give him his work, one with God’s work—and his fancied importance will disappear.) He tries to be of importance among a few; he is of importance through all time among all that lives. But he must become important through a place in God’s government which he shall win for himself. It suffices not that unconsciously, without will of his own, through God’s law, if he though the poorest, the most insignificant among men, were not, God’s righteous purpose for the universe would not be as it is. He fills an essential part therein. It will not be well with us till we are penetrated with the conception of God’s government of the world—with the conception of ourselves as the means through which it is in course of fulfilling God’s thought—till we contribute our conscious will, and work to it—are His willing servants, ministers, children—not His unconscious instruments. We must go through that state while in our natural childhood; as we advance to maturity, instead of renouncing an imaginary devil, we should seek the service of the living God. The popular religion teaches that ‘‘His ways are inscrutable’’50— ‘‘past finding out.’’ That people should be satisfied to take their belief upon the most important of all subjects, the subject which embraces every other, from a Book—for which, too, there is so little

Importance a man must have; importance a man ought to have.

Popular religion teaches that ‘‘God’s ways are inscr utable.’’

50 As in Isaiah 55:9, where the Lord says ‘‘for as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.’’

660 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought evidence, extrinsic or intrinsic, and knowing hardly anything even of what extrinsic evidence there is—that they should do this, instead of all mankind striving to find out truth for themselves, seems extraordinar y. Man’s Inefficiency not Incapacity

Law teaches that man may learn in proportion as he takes the means which exist for enlightenment. Man’s little progress attributable not to human incapability, but to want of will, knowledge, work in the right direction.

That they should sit down satisfied with saying that ‘‘evil is a myster y,’’ that ‘‘God’s ways are inscr utable,’’ appears no less extraordinar y when we consider that evil is only the essential ignorance of man’s beginning, and that God has constituted us expressly to discover all His thoughts. The limited nature cannot, indeed, understand Him ‘‘to perfection,’’ but more and more light penetrates our darkness when we seek where we shall certainly find it. The veil of the future shall be lifted up; the will of the All-Righteous revealed in past, present and future—revealed to us in proportion as we seek, as we work by those definite determinate means, which obser vation and experience will reveal to us. It has been said that we shall never get beyond the first class in the school of this life. A country makes some progress—then falls back; another advances some steps—then falls back. The evils of civilization—equally real, though of a different kind—succeed to those of barbarism, and have thrown back whole races of men into barbarism. There seems but little truth or wisdom in this conclusion; for, if there is a law which is to tell us what it is our proper nature to desire, how we are to obtain those desires, how fulfill them, how gain over the collective will of mankind, without which, such is that law they will not be fulfilled—if we remain ignorant or indifferent to that law—are we to pronounce that human nature cannot advance before this poor first class, the highest individuals in which are so low in power to call into existence the nature, to realize the life that is fitting and possible to man? If, indeed, in so many particulars we have misunderstood our own nature, and if the Nature which calls us into existence as one sort of being or another, according as His law is kept in one way or another—wills that we progress in or deteriorate from what is our proper nature, as we keep His law in one way or another—what wonder that the history of man is so full of folly and crime, so full of suffering, that, if we could realize what has been human suffer-

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ing during any twenty-four hours of that history, human reason would fail under such consciousness? Is it not time, then, to recognize our past ignorance of human nature, of the law which regulates it, of the nature to which our own nature may help us to ascribe it? Chapter 4.1 From the Character and Tendency of Law may be inferred that it is attributable to a Will through which Human Existence, considered as a portion of the results of that Will, is satisfactory to a Perfect Moral Nature, as well where Man has not the Possibility to render it so, as where he is the appointed means of rendering it so. Present desire in the mind to will aright may find help in law to render that will continuous, abiding in us, since from law we may learn the conditions on which right will depends, which conditions, if we can and will keep them, will make certain that our will shall be right. And, from law, we may learn conditions, which existing, other minds will certainly will right. But whatever will, knowledge and power individuals, or mankind collectively, may possess so as to be able to bring about, in course of time, that state of actual and progressive right which is appropriate to a nature so constituted, there will still remain a past of suffering and of sin, which it had not been in human possibility should have been otherwise before that will, knowledge and power were attained. Mankind have not had it, have it not, will not have it, for we know not how many ages, though we venture to predict that human history is the history of progress towards progress, if not actual progress in the nature and life appropriate to man. Yet a law, by which a single individual whose appropriate nature is moral should be called into existence without any possibility for that moral nature to develop itself would be a rule contrary to moral right. That Omnipotence should have willed or originated such a law would not make it right to our moral feeling. The sins and sufferings of the human race are imper fectly known, faintly conceived by us. But if we suppose a moral nature conscious of what has been felt, what has been consciously present to the human mind—to such a nature, recognizing law through which what has been was unavoidable to the sinner and the sufferer, human existence must be utterly repugnant, unless it leads the sinner and the sufferer in time to come to an existence true to human nature.

How law may help us to the right in the present and future. Man powerless in rendering past wrong accordant with right.

That is not morally a right rule which, in accordance with law, should render that impossible in history which is right in constitution.

662 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Since to lead the imperfect to perfection through law would be the only purpose we can conceive as existing in the Perfect One— since we find law in operation of a character and tendency to secure real, actual and progressive right, we infer that actual and progressive right will be realized in all so constituted that it is their appropriate nature.

Law, if operating to bring about moral progress in all men, would be the consistent rule of Almighty Goodness and Wisdom. We are thus led to infer that law will so operate in time to come that human existence is in connection with a future, in which, through law—the ever-present operation of the will of an Omnipotent and Perfect Moral nature—ever y being to whom moral progress is appropriate will attain a state of such progress. An alternative to such inference has been to refuse the proper character of law to those uniformities commonly so designated—that is, to refuse to attribute them to will. This alternative approves itself to some minds who refuse any belief which they do not consider proved. We have already said that we do not consider the human mind capable of attaining on these subjects what, strictly speaking, can be called proof. Evidence, which we have means to strengthen for or against a proposition, is our only means for attaining or approximating to truth. Progress in Right is God’s Will Granting the observed uniformities of co-existence and sequence to possess the character of law, attributable to will, we must either admit inconsistency in that will, or we must infer a future consistent with the character and tendency of law as manifested in the past and present. We find, resulting from that law, a nature so constituted that its appropriate state is actual and progressive moral right. But we learn that this state is to be attained by an active agent, not communicated to a passive recipient. In course of such attainment, sin and suffering result from this law. Sinners and sufferers are unconsciously making a path for others to attain their proper existence, while some, the excellent on earth, who hunger and thirst after righteousness, struggle for it through lives of suffering. A poor old woman, in her second childhood, is by her imbecility ‘‘bearing the cross’’ for all mankind; she is the pioneer, showing to mankind the consequences of such and such laws. So every deaf, every blind, man, every sinner, is ‘‘bearing the cross’’ for mankind. Not only Christ bears the cross, but all. And oh! what a heavy cross the thief and the murderer have to bear! God, indeed, ‘‘descends into hell’’51 with them. But, except on the inference that there is a future, both the sinner and he who is ready to suffer all

51 From the creed.

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things if he might only bring righteousness on earth sink into nothingness after their brief career. They have in different ways led the way to the day when man shall be what it befits his nature to be, but that career, too, will be short. The physical nature with which his mental being is connected is, as far as we can learn, indestructible—proceeds from one change to another. But that nature, capable of unlimited progress—that idiosyncrasy which never was before, never will be again, which seemed as if, in the universe of mind, it should have some place to fill, some course to pursue—is blotted out of existence. We have a law in operation which, if it may be interpreted as the means to bring about eternal moral progress, manifests righteousness as its source—a law which inasfar as our minds can grasp the subject, is the only manifestation of will which would be consistent with Almighty Righteousness. If we do admit law to be manifested in the constitution and histor y of man, but do not admit the inference of a connection of that histor y with a future in which results appropriate to that constitution will be realized, we find a law inconsistent in character—contradictor y alike to righteous or unrighteous nature as its source. Bishop Stanley,52 on being asked whether he did not see a difficulty in some part of his creed, answered by another question, ‘‘Does it not make you happier to believe’’ so and so? implying, if it does, why question?

Individual opinion not the criterion of truth.

Criterion for Belief Certainly, whatever belief would make us happier, by conveying the assurance that mankind are under a righteous rule, we should inquire into, seek evidence for, but not stop short—not rest satisfied with believing whatever it makes us—us as we are—is, ignorant, imperfect, various, varying from our own selves, happier to believe. The belief which we can accept must be consistent with the character and tendency of law recognized in the past and present, and it must not contradict any of the known results of law. Here is a criterion by which to judge—a rule by which to constr uct our belief. For instance, the belief accepted by certain minds that the majority, or a certain number, of the human race are to be eternally tor-

52 Edward Stanley (1770-1849), bishop of Norwich and a family friend.

Criterion for belief.

Application to prevailing creed.

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Ignorance of the nature of mind too great to justify our asserting, contrar y to other evidence, that it can only exist in its present relations to body. Argument from law traceable in these relations.

Further evidence independent of relations of mind and body to be expected in future time.

tured is revolting to other minds. Not on that account let them reject this belief. But because, from the will of a Perfect Being that mankind, through sin and suffering, should progress towards perfection, the result—eternal torture—could not by possibility proceed. Again, that imperfectly known subject of law, the connection of mind and body, is considered by some as an obstacle to the belief in a future life. Non-confirmative of the belief in a future life it may be in the present state of our knowledge, but not contradictory. Let us here apply our criterion. Concerning what we call ‘‘mind,’’ all we are aware of is a certain thread of consciousness—a series of feelings—that is, of sensations, thoughts, emotions and volitions, more or less numerous and complicated. There is a something which I call myself, or, by another form of expression, my mind. But what this being is, although it is myself, I have no knowledge, further than the series of its states of consciousness. (Mill’s Logic.53) Concerning the relation of mind and body, we know that it exists in such sort that the state of mind varies uniformly with the state of body, and herein we trace law—the law which does, by its character and tendency in this and its other manifestations, lead us to attribute the government of the world to a Perfect Will and Power. If, then, from other evidence, we are led to expect the continuation of the identity of individuals after the present relations of mind and body are at an end, no difficulty in conceiving the mode of that continuation to which, in our ignorance, we are subject, can be a bar to our belief. The more, in ages to come, mankind shall become convinced, by the evil actually remedied by man, of human possibility to remedy all evil—of human possibility to progress in righteousness and knowledge by progress actually made—the more the experience how each existing character can help the human family as no other can—the stronger will become the conviction that each individuality is intended to help God’s family in the universe after, as well as during, his present phase of being. Hence, without increased means of conceiving the mode of existence after death, human belief in it may be strengthened.

53 A paraphrase from A System of Logic 7:71.

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The ceaseless change which goes on through all existence except One, whose will directs it, is all development—all the fulfilling of purpose. Time, in one sense, is as nothing to the eternal One. He will realize the full, the perfect, development which is His thought, though it require ages beyond the grasp of our minds to conceive. Yet not a portion of time so short as to be inconceivable to us is lost or wasted in carrying out His purpose. Not one instant does any state of sinfulness or sorrow continue which is not its development into righteousness by the only road, through the only progress, which are per fect righteousness, viz., through the will, the work of God’s ser vants, His children. All sin, sorrow, ignorance, is to be set to the account of their attaining the will and the way which leads to righteousness, to progress in righteousness, for there is nothing final in the universe of mind or of matter—all is tendency, growth.

All change is development of one unchanging thought.

Man ‘‘to run on better Errands by and bye’’ ‘‘Read alternately, for example, in natural and in civil history, a treatise of astronomy, with a volume of French mémoires pour servir. When we have spent our wonder in computing this wasteful hospitality with which boon Nature turns off new firmaments without end into her wide common, as fast as the madrepores make coral— suns and planets hospitable to souls—and then shorten the sight to look into this court of Louis Quatorze, and see the game that is played there—duke and marshal, abbé and madame—a gambling table, where each is laying traps for the other, where the end is ever by some lie or fetch to outwit your rival and ruin him with this solemn fop in wig and stars—the king—one can hardly help asking if this planet is a fair specimen of the so generous astronomy, and, if so, whether the experiment has not failed, and whether it is worthwhile to glut the innocent space with so poor an article. I think we feel not much otherwise if, instead of beholding foolish nations, we take the great and wise men, the eminent souls, and narrowly inspect their biography. None of them, seen by himself, and his performance compared with his promise or idea, will justify the cost of that enormous apparatus of means by which this spotted and defective person was at last procured. To questions of this sort, Nature replies, ‘‘I grow, I grow.’’ All is nascent, infant. When we are dizzied with the arithmetic of the savant toiling to compute the length of her line, the return of her curve, we are steadied by the perception that a great deal is doing, that all seems just begun—remote aims are in active accomplishment.

Emerson’s view that man, however purposeless his life here, is ‘‘to run on better er rands by-andbye.’’

666 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought We can point nowhere to anything final, but tendency appears on all hands: planet, system, constellation, total nature, is growing like a field of maize in July, is becoming somewhat else, is in rapid metamorphosis. The embryo does not more strive to be man than yonder burr of light we call a nebula tends to be a ring, a comet, a globe and parent of new stars. Why should not, then, these messieurs of Versailles strut and plot for tabourets [high stools] for a season, without prejudice to their faculty to run on better errands by and by?54

Each atom of the material universe, at each instant of time, is in an appointed place. The seeds that are scattered, of which small part germinate, yet all fulfill a purpose. If a single leaf that falls in the autumn, a single seed scattered in the summer, a drop of rain falling into the ocean, had not been where it was, the universe of mind and matter, ever working into and through each other, would not be the fulfilling of the Perfect Thought. In like manner is each sensation, thought, emotion, volition, in the universe of mind, existing as it did, when it did, an essential part of the perfect and eternal development. The highest Work is not Happiness Moral right, not happiness, to be kept in view as the object we seek to find fulfilled in human existence.

‘‘Either the possibility or the benevolence must be limited, if happiness be not complete, continuous, infinite.’’ (Miss Martineau and Mr Atkinson.55) Is happiness complete, continuous, infinite, consistent with man’s highest wants? If not, present human happiness cannot be said to be the test of Omnipotence and Benevolence. As things are, the man who undertakes the highest work of man— that which most tends to assist the progress of mankind—the struggle with the greatest moral evils—so far from being the happiest of men, has to give up the expectation of happiness. He is on the direct road leading to the highest happiness for himself and his kind, but in the meantime the many are against him, or indifferent

54 ‘‘The Method of Nature,’’ Oration delivered before the Society of the Adelphi in Water ville College, Maine, 11 August 1841, in Richard Poirier, ed., Ralph Waldo Emerson 57. 55 Henry G. Atkinson and Harriet Martineau jointly published a series of letters to each other, Letters on the Laws of Man’s Nature and Development, but no such passage appears in it.

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to his work. Single-handed, or with little of sympathy, he holds his course. Tr ue, he is fulfilling, as far as he may, the highest demands of his moral nature, but other wants in his nature remain unsatisfied. Sympathy, affection, much that rightfully affords satisfaction, he gives up: in him the highest craving is fed, not satisfied; other cravings are not the less felt. (In vain we try to bend Nature to find nourishment in food not really adapted to her. Stones cannot be bread. It was the devil, not God, who proposed to make them such.56 When we hear of persons ‘‘behaving well,’’ or finding happiness in difficult circumstances, we shall find that something nourishing to the divine characterizes those circumstances, if those persons really ‘‘behave well,’’ really find happiness. You may—in circumstances, generally speaking, unfavourable—frequently by skill and wisdom, so modify them as to find crumbs of bread with which to nourish yourself, and, for a time, an elevated mood of mind will keep one up, even in the midst of vice or trifling—nay, even, for a time, the pure in heart and the lofty may feel stimulated to right by the view of what is unworthy. But let no one think he can keep his moral health in a life which has no nourishment for his moral being, which is calculated only to infect or to cause deterioration. God wills not that man should live in marshes and swamps.57 He wills the work of man’s head and hand to turn them into healthy ground. One sees almost everybody erring as to habitual practices which concern bodily health, including the healthy state of the cerebral organs and conventional modes of life which cannot be abandoned without a man’s ceasing, in a great measure, to be a member of society, have no view to health, and are perpetually at variance with it. Who thinks of health in conventional hours, diet, dress? Yet, if mankind were one united whole, aiming to live for its true purpose, attention to habits and practices important to health would surely become an acknowledged social duty, in order to enable mankind to perform its true part in the universe. The conception of the Son, in the modern school of materialism, is very fine, though radically impoverished by their non-conception of the Father. The Son becomes a noble, but pathetic being, working immensely for a tem-

56 In Matt 4:3. 57 Nightingale noted from Quetelet that a high proportion of ‘‘idiots’’ bred in ‘‘dark unaired’’ valleys (Society and Politics 5:33).

668 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought porar y, and consequently essentially worthless good to his kind— forced into life by, and subject during a short individual course to, an immutable necessity.) Grant that the satisfaction of the thirst for right is the appropriate end and aim of human nature—grant that its highest satisfaction is inconsistent with happiness in this world—it is no bar to belief in Omnipotent Benevolence, that human happiness is not complete, continuous, infinite. Benevolence is to seek not always the present happiness, but the lasting well-being of others. The essential well-being of human nature is moral well-being. If, indeed, the constitution of things were such that the satisfaction of man’s highest wants involved loss of happiness forever to one human being, we could not believe in Omnipotent Benevolence. So it ought not to be, so it is not. Mankind seeking Happiness would not find it The sufferings of those who work for righteousness’ sake will become less as more unite in the work and as evil disappears, and man’s work becomes not contention with wrong, but advance in right, more and more of happiness will attend the satisfaction of man’s highest wants. For those whose sufferings have been the bridge by which others passed to a better life, the inference of the life to come, already urged, gives promise of happiness, without which belief in Omnipotent Benevolence could not be maintained. No man seeking his own happiness as an end will find it. Mankind collectively, seeking happiness for mankind, would not find it. Such is not the constitution of man. But, in proportion as men individually and collectively seek and find the right, happiness unsought will result. It is not proper to all to engage in the struggle with the greatest moral evils. As various as are human wants, as various as the characters, the idiosyncrasies of body and mind, and the peculiarities of circumstances, so various are the means by which each may render service if he will. Ever y art, science, trade, every needful occupation may forward the true purpose of human existence. We are not more str uck with the greatness exceeding conception than with the minute workings of God’s law. The successive changes which, through eternity, will take place in the globes, whose vastness we cannot imagine, are not more the workings of God’s will, the subject of His law, than is the course of the intangible, inconceivable atom.

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So in the moral world, the greatest and smallest are alike elements of value. Both are necessar y. Whoever looks out for the work which he can and ought to do, and does it as well as he can— whether it be to govern a kingdom or to scour a floor—is in the right road. Let him feel no discontent if, comparatively, his work seem small. No comparison can render worthless what ought to be done, and promotion in God’s ser vice, in one world or another, will be the lot of all who do well the duty of their present grade. Will it be asked—would not an Omnipotent Benevolence have ruled so as to bring about good without evil, happiness to all—in the end, without suffering on the road to it? A Perfect Being cannot contradict himself—cannot will that what is to be is at the same time not to be. If ignorance and imperfection are to obtain per fection—not to be made per fect—Omnipotent Benevolence itself cannot will that no nature shall exist which is not perfect in wisdom and goodness. ‘‘A Per fect Being will not be at variance with Himself; He cannot, because He will not do that which will be inconsistent.’’ ‘‘Look, what I will not, that I cannot do.’’ (Mackay’s Progress of the Intellect.) Note. It is one of the distinctive attributes of man that he is capable of improving his own nature. But, alas! methinks he has less improved his own nature than he has improved natures which can be serviceable to his material wants. We hear discussions on the improvements in animals, improvements which cannot be doubted. But is the human being improved? Some races are so far above other races that we cannot doubt man’s capability for improvement. But is there any race or any individual in this century (what century shall we call it since man began to inhabit this earth?) decidedly above any former race or individual? So long as we know not the nature or purpose in consequence of which we live—so long as we are satisfied to accept as our source of knowledge of that nature a collection of books contradicting each other, representing God as sometimes one with goodness and wisdom, sometimes the most inexorable of tyrants—so long man will make no real and steady advance in the improvement of his nature, the fulfillment of its destination. Editor: For the last section there is neither an extant manuscript nor any correspondence with the printed short version.

670 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 4.2 Is Man powerless to will? ‘‘For what I would, that do I not, but what I hate, that do I.’’

Distinction between ‘‘yielding to need’’ and ‘‘accordance with right.’’

By taking into consideration the physical being, and the circumstances which influence it, we have, as far as we know, all the springs which determine human nature; in other words, if we could know the laws, or invariable uniformities, of physical being, and of the manner in which it is influenced by its circumstances or sur rounding being, we should be able to tell exactly what any individual being would be or do when we know what his physical being and his circumstances are. But is not this saying that man is powerless to will? May not St Paul, indeed, say, what I will, that I cannot do?58 Whether it was in the power of any individual, on any particular occasion, to do what he willed is another question. But the power which man may attain to will arises from this very regularity, from the unfailing certainty that human nature will be, with the utmost definiteness, in accordance with the laws of that nature. But how can this give power? It is more like an inexorable ‘‘necessity.’’ We cannot too carefully and definitely distinguish between the phrases yielding to need and accordance with right. If we have some definite desire concerning the nature, the disposition, the character of a human being, whether it be ourselves or another—what are our means of effecting that desire, except a dependence on some known invariable uniformities? If Turner wished to paint a landscape, but was uncertain of the colour which will be produced today by that which yesterday produced green, how could he proceed at all? It is not law, but our ignorance of law, of the mode of keeping it, of the mode of attaining the desire to keep it, which prevents our having the divine nature to will, and to effect the will, for the welfare of all eternal being. We are shocked at the thought of Omnipotence being by possibility attributable to more than One, and there is truth in this feeling. It is attributable to one nature (or mode of being) only: to certain attributes or qualities—wisdom, goodness—to the nature discernible always in God, sometimes in man. If a man knows that, given certain uniformities, certain human capabilities will assuredly exist; given certain uniformities, a certain

58 Rom 7:15.

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mood of human nature; given certain uniformities, a certain state of human will; then, inasfar as it is in his power to effect those uniformities, is he not powerful to effect human capability, human mood, human will? Law not Necessity I desire that my will shall be this and not that, and that what I will, that I shall be able to do. Must I not observe, then, with all care, the uniformities of human nature, those common to every human nature, and those which apply to that one idiosyncrasy alone which in each human being differs from every other which is, ever was, or will be? But each present differs from every past, each human being from every other. How shall man attain, then, his experience? Law varies not with these variations, which are, indeed, its manifestations. In proportion as we comprehend law, we shall know what will be succession to present being in certain circumstances, and experience is perpetually showing us how man may advance in knowledge of law. But granted that defects in individuals have arisen from a mode of operation of law, which might have been different, had some individual human will been different; still (alas! for the sufferer, the criminal, the madman, the idiot) is it consolation for him that, such as he is, he is through law? Yes, that word bears in it all consolation, for all law is remedial in eternity. But mark, even in the temporary existence of this world, how remedial is law even for the moral criminal, the insane and the idiot. An eminent educationist said, ‘‘I care not how bad the boy who comes into my school; he soon ameliorates when he falls into good work and good companionship.’’ Dr Conolly59 says that, taken in time and treated wisely (i.e., in accordance with the laws of human welfare), the incurably insane would decrease in number, and ultimately no incurables need remain. Half the cretinism which comes under treatment in right time yields to right treatment. If, then, law is effective for the welfare of all eternal being, if man’s being, except its physical limit, is eternal, is law the same as necessity, since necessity means yielding to need, and the very expression, ‘‘yielding to need,’’ implies an unwilling submission to

59 John Conolly (1794-1866), pioneer of humane treatment of the insane.

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Has man yet learnt in what consists his well-being, or how to attain it?

What does ‘‘natural’’ mean?

the inevitable? But how shall we be unwilling that that should be which effects the welfare we desire, if we comprehend that thus it is? In that case we accord, we do not yield. To be well is the purpose of all being. Well-being is the purpose of the Will whence springs every modification of existence. Yet mankind in general are ignorant as to what constitute human well-being. Strange that human existence has continued thousands of years, yet man has not yet learnt in what consists his well-being, still less how it can be attained! This, however, when we shall be able to interpret the whole of God’s thought, will appear perfectly natural. The true application of the word natural is according with the one nature which regulates all—the nature of wisdom and goodness. And how is it accordant with the nature of the omnipotent wisdom and goodness which we attribute to God, that man should live for thousands of years ignorant of, or mistaking, the real object of his existence? Yesterday I watched an anthill, a moving mass of life it was. Countless creatures in motion, I could not perceive why, but each had its right purpose. Next day I returned. By their labours they had provided themselves a shelter; not an ant was to be seen, though, on the least disturbance of their heap, it appeared that the multitudes were there. If we look to human life and work in order to interpret the purpose of human existence, shall we find it thus tr uly understood, thus rightly pursued, thus realized by one aim common to many? What is natural? Yet this is natural, accordant with perfect right, no subject for melancholy, for reproach to man, no cause for calling God’s ways ‘‘mysterious,’’ for it is explicable. Instinct is inherent in certain natures, and requires no previous exercise to prepare its wisdom for any present work. In certain other natures, the capability for wisdom and goodness is inherent, but requires the education of exercise in order to make, out of capability for a certain mode of being, the real existence to be desired of that mode of being. Favourable circumstances call forth in all animal life, except human life, active enjoyment from the instinctive exercise of faculties, no education, no preparation, being necessary. No mistakes are made; consequent sufferings arise; no experience is gained; no consequent progress ensues to the individual or the race. Favourable circumstances call forth, in man, the exercise of divine attributes, i.e.,

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of those attributes which we trace in a superhuman nature, and in the exercise of which human happiness essentially consists. But, if this is the essential element of human happiness, would it not have been consistent with divine benevolence and wisdom to have made this known to humanity, rather than to have established an order of things in which there is such suffering, such contention with ignorance, as is presented to us in the history of mankind? This question is natural to the immature conception only of realities and possibilities—one which can be answered as far only as we can reach towards understanding the perfect thought, feeling, purpose—the divine nature. Truth contradicts not itself. That which should contradict itself would not be truth. To this we easily assent, but a comprehension of the bearings of this assent will be a revelation of why the spiritual and material universe is as it is. The true nature of per fection is thought and feeling, the verification of which has been manifested, and is manifesting itself in act. Is that a per fect being which has not by work manifested its perfection? Er rors of Modern Materialism We perceive a thoroughly wrong tack in the materialist of the modern school. He is always setting himself against the ordinar y vague understanding of what is called ‘‘providential’’ government. But he seems to suppose that all that man can do is to make up for certain defects in the positive order of things. He does indeed admit that there are ‘‘natural relations of succession and similitude,’’ but he says that the ‘‘aptitude of the external order to submit to human inter vention is the necessary combination of its imperfection.’’ The idea which we ought to grasp, though at present we see it confusedly, is that the ‘‘exterior order’’ cannot be said to ‘‘submit to man’s inter vention’’ through its ‘‘imper fection,’’ but that man’s intervention is all a part of order and law. There never will be any just comprehension of the whole, except in proportion as we attain the thought and feeling of the will which calls the whole into existence. The materialist, appreciating the folly of those who look to the inter vention of an occasional will in events, turns to an immutable external order without any will, in order to explain the immutability of law and order which he discovers. But we cannot conceive how he understands human intervention when he speaks of it as ‘‘submitted to’’ by external order, and ‘‘combined’’ with the imperfection of the external universe.

Materialist school, while justly rejecting the intervention of an occasional ‘‘providential’’ will in events, excepts an ‘‘immutable order without any providential’’ will.

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Distinction between ‘‘essential’’ and ‘‘necessar y.’’

Hope of progress from tendency to advance without limit.

We believe man to exist for two special purposes (1), the essential effect of perfect benevolence, which wills other well-being than its own, and which, essentially, could not exist as well-being without other well-being than its own; (2) the essential will of the One Perfect that righteousness shall be realized for all, worked out by all. The attributes of perfection would not be complete while existing merely as thought and feeling; that thought and feeling must have worked itself into reality, into real being. Unless realized by work, it might be perfect thought and feeling, but not perfect being. And thus does human being, and probably other modes of being, in which perfect thought and feeling are limited by physical relations, realize the satisfactions essential to perfection, viz., the satisfactions of the existence of well-being in other than itself, and the realization in life of thought and feeling. We use the word essential as distinct from the word necessar y, always adopted by the materialist, which means, both etymologically and in accordance with the sense in which it is used, yielding to need, whereas when we describe an attribute as essential, we mean that, in its absence, the existence to which it is attributed would not be what it is. The thought which we strive to grasp is that human intervention, human thought, feeling, work, are all in accordance with a law of right—not here and there a little intervention permitted by the imper fection of the external order (the immutable ‘‘necessity’’ of the materialist), but a part of the whole, which, to be perfect as a whole, requires that perfection shall exist attained and realized by keeping of law, as well as that it shall exist as thought and feeling willing law. This perfect thought exists as law, manifests itself through the keeping of law, and exists attained by keeping of law. Wherever we find some tendency to advance, without any distinct limit to such advance, we may hope for further steps—for further progress in penetrating into the thought and purpose of the Supreme. But is it not extraordinar y, if there is a God, that He has left it impossible for human beings fully to estimate His nature, and possible even to doubt of His existence? This does not appear to us contrar y to what we should expect, supposing that by God we mean a spirit of love and wisdom.

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Three Elements in Man’s Progress It is evident that three elements enter into man’s means of progress: (1) his individual work or exercise; (2) the work or exercise of his fellow creatures; (3) circumstances which have not any connection with his own will or the will of his fellow creatures. These two last means help him only by being means to call his own being into exercise. A human being is so constituted that he cannot be helped, except by having his own being called into exercise. The one law, the one eternal invariable co-existence, from which is derived every co-existence and succession which we call law, this one co-existence is right and the will of God. We have said what is all that we can comprehend of right. We will now only say we are not to consider God’s wisdom and goodness as shown in events, but in the laws whence they spring. Is the existence of constant relations of sequence and co-existence evidence of a will whence these relations spring? If it can be brought home to man’s conviction that it is, then is there evidence to man of a will directing all things? For there is evidence of the invariableness of certain relations of sequence and co-existence. If the more man knows of these relations and of the effects which they are calculated to produce, if the more his nature is improved and the more he (not only knows but) exercises the whole of his nature in appreciating these relations and their effects, the more he becomes convinced that, if there did exist a will benevolent, righteous and wise, such relations exactly would be the will of righteousness, benevolence, wisdom; this would be evidence which would come home to every well-constituted and well-exercised mind. Granting that there is proof of the existence of such a will, we may, to a certain extent, know what would be its determinations. We know, in certain cases, what will be the determinations of certain characters, without having been informed of them by words written or spoken. Is it not evident that it is the spirit of God within man which undergoes suffering and privation? For what do we know of the spirit of God but that it is a spirit of righteousness, wisdom, goodness, love, benevolence, as manifested in the laws of existence? And what is all suffering and privation but a counteraction of, a contradiction to, a limiting of these attributes? Perhaps it may be susceptible of evidence that there is no existence which can be called human in which these attributes do not exist. If we can trace as existing in man, limited only in degree, all

676 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought that we know or can know of God, is it not evident that man is God ‘‘manifest in the flesh’’?60 Perhaps, if man becomes wise enough, he may call out, by the organization of life and by education, whatever there may be of such attributes in every human being, and certainly it cannot now be denied that the tendency is to prove the existence of such attributes, wherever human nature exists. They are revealed where not suspected to exist, by some wiser treatment than had before been adopted, to the surprise sometimes of the individuals themselves in whom they are revealed, as well as of others. In cases of idiocy and madness even, the tendency is to show the existence of such attributes. While admitting this, may we not admit that our senses, our reason and our feelings give evidence of the existence of a spirit of wisdom, goodness, love, benevolence, righteousness? Our senses, reason and feelings give such evidence, not from merely taking cognizance of what is or has been, but from tracing out the laws of what has been and is, which will, in proportion as we can know and understand them, reveal what is to be, and show it to be what could alone arise from a spirit of goodness, wisdom, love, benevolence, righteousness—an arrangement of order and progress, such that none other could be satisfactory to such a nature. If it can come home to our consciousness that the arrangement is such that, if from any will, it could only be from such a will—that, if there were a spirit of per fection, such an arrangement only could be satisfactory to Him, may we not be satisfied to attribute the laws of existence to such a will? 4.3 We must make the ‘‘Saints’’ Why the Roman Catholic turns to the saints for sympathy.

The loving, conscientious, fervent Roman Catholic turns from the selfish and worldly beings around him to hold converse with the saints of Heaven. He thinks or he feels that they speak to him. It is himself who says what he thinks or feels that they say. But let mankind work aright, and saints will indeed people the earth. One man will not then work out of his own being unconsciously that which be supposes saints to say to him. Living, breathing fellow creatures, earnest as the saints of old time, but with wisdom gathered from their predecessors, and developed into new and higher phases of tr uth, will indeed hold converse with him.

60 1 Tim 3:16.

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Those great hearts whose earnestness, whose devotion to truth and love is, perhaps, not to be exceeded by God or man in intensity, are working towards a truer comprehension of the God whom they loved, and of His work. Each mode of being develops in itself, and also influences on the mode of development of other being. The thought and feeling which, by God’s law, has been individualized, goes on in its individuality till life and work have realized, have manifested the phase which the all-comprehensive thought sees to be the right succession of events. Thought, feeling, purpose, are thus verified in life and activity. By degrees, through life and work, are opened the counsels of eternity to the being who lives and works, till he becomes one in love, one in wisdom, one in comprehension, with the eternal. Is this fanciful? Does not our own little experience point in this direction? And when that blessed oneness is attained, its object will be ever fresh realization in life and activity of thought and feeling. To do and to suffer in order to realize true thought and feeling in life—to extend and diversify modes of happiness, will ever remain the will of the One who lives as the perfect purpose, as being the imperfect fulfillment, developing by work in time (or succession of events) to a per fect fulfillment of ever fresh phases of life worked out of thought. Thought, feeling, purpose, are one and the same at every present in the Perfect One. In them is no development. This is our joy that they are ever perfect. But the life into which they are transfused is development, succession. Let that perfection give us faith and patience to go on our imperfect way till the very life become perfect. The Roman Catholic loved and worked for a God who was very imper fect. The earnest Roman Catholic peoples the world with saints from heaven, with whom he thinks himself sometimes allowed to hold communion in this world, and whom he longs to join in another. To despise and hate the world, to think it his best fate to lose his life as a martyr, is indeed consonant with the words, may we not say, with the spirit, of Christ? Did he not seek martyrdom? and he said, ‘‘He who loses his life shall save it.’’61 Yet the truth is that this life is part of a whole of the same nature, and that we are not fit for the next scene if we wish prematurely to hurry over this. Some thinking minds, conscious of the unpractical

61 A paraphrase of Matt 10:39.

How man may make saints who shall sympathize with him.

What is the will of the perfect Per fect?

In what way should the view of a future life influence this life?

678 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought tendency of ‘‘despising’’ and ‘‘hating’’ the present life, have condemned all thoughts of a future life as practically mischievous. Perhaps increased knowledge of the nature of God may reveal to us that each present mode of being is part of a development from a past without beginning, towards a future without end; all, except the one eternal Spirit, whose thought, whose feeling, whose purpose, whose will, comprehends every other mode of being. Individualism Does that which is individual always remain individual?

Will there be development or succession?

Can development take place by succession?

The subject of individualism, if better understood, would throw great light upon this. Does that which is individual in thought and feeling always remain individual? or does it remain individual till, through progress attained it merges in the one all-comprehensive nature, carrying to it its phase of thought and feeling, made concrete in life, manifested in activity, in work? Was there never a time when the spirit of love, of wisdom, of truth, of righteousness, did not exist? What is time? All that we know of it is succession of events. And is there any reason within or without us for supposing that this spirit in any succession of events did not exist? If in any succession of events will not exist? And if the thought, the sentiment of right, and love, and wisdom is eternal, will not its manifestation in life, in activity, be eternal? And will this manifestation be an eternal development or an eternal succession? Development carries the past into the future; succession begins where the past has left off. The smallest seed which develops into a plant carries on into that plant the nature of ever y seed which preceded it. The elective king or ruler takes up circumstances where his predecessor laid them down. In him is not development. The thought, the feeling, the character of man, is by far the most interesting mode of existence of which we have any knowledge or conception, except the thought, the feeling, the character of God. Development from one individual thought, feeling, character to another, cannot take place by succession, by one character taking up circumstances where another left them. Hence, perceiving development to be God’s mode of proceeding, we are led to expect development from one state of character into another. Is it asked, how is it if the all-comprehensive thought and feeling is perfect, that its manifestation in life is imperfect? That manifesta-

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tion can only be perfect, if we may so express it, by being imperfect. That manifestation, to be perfect, to be in harmony, that is, with a per fect thought and feeling, must admit of development through exercise. ‘‘My Father worketh and I work.’’62 These words are of extraordinar y significance. Were it other wise, it would be unsatisfactor y to our conception of what is right. If the Father were in activity, leaving the Son passive, would that be in accordance with the spirit of wisdom and benevolence? for does experience show any passive happiness? Are thought and feeling not transmuted into and manifested in work, ever happiness for any abiding state? Is God a mere Spectator now? On the other hand, shall ignorant imperfect beings, who have faint glimpses of the past, fainter glimpses of the future, be left to jostle among each other on the vast ocean of life, while the Being, according to whose will the past and future alike exist, remains a spectator, contemplating and feeling? The omnipresent spirit of right, of love, of wisdom, is not absent where man is present. As Holy Ghost, Holy Spirit, Comforter, He is recognized whenever, perhaps, what can truly be called religion has existed. He is, as even our imperfect wisdom might expect, more or less pure, comprehensive, elevated, as the perfect law is rightly kept. Is this any vague fancy? Does not experience prove it? He works, He suffers, just so, just so much, as to leave to man the good, the happiness of attainment, of exercise, of communicating to man, of receiving from man. The spirit of truth, of love, of wisdom, has no beginning, has no end. Within or without us, is there that which tells us it has? Within and without us, as we improve in nature, as we improve in knowledge, is there not that which tells us that it has not? Its thought, its feeling, are one and the same forever. Its manifestation varies in each present through eternity, but its manifestation, though thus varying, is yet ever the same. It is ever development. It is order, progress. It is development with a purpose definite beyond our power of conception, definite in means, definite in accomplishment. Look not, then, upon any mode of existence, as beginning and ending, as the senses may suggest. Above all, think not so of the highest mode of being with which we are acquainted, the thought,

62 John 5:17.

Is God merely a spectator, while man is struggling? Is God the Perfect absent where man the imperfect is present?

Does any mode of existence begin and end, as the senses suggest?

680 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought the feeling, the character of man. His individuality is marked. It will not cease; it will not merge so as no longer to be distinguishable in the thought and purpose of God. But how can it be continued? Is it in accordance with the nature, the thought, the feeling, the purpose, the character, in short, of God, that it should be continued? If it is, let us remember that an omnipotent spirit of right is revealed to us, omnipotent to effect whatever it is not inconsistent with the spirit of right to will. By degrees, by the Son’s work, shall the nature of the Father’s work be revealed to him. Thus shall he learn what is possible, what is impossible. Thus shall he read the past, thus shall he read the future. Eternal life is ever manifesting eternal thought and purpose. Eternal development is ever adding or preparing fresh riches for the Father and the Son. Same Identity or successive Identities? The laws of physical existence all teach that death is the end of man. But is there no revelation from moral evidence?

Two questions with regard to a future state.

Dr Priestley came to the conclusion that the laws of material existence would prove that man ceases to exist at death but for revelation, in which he was so firm a believer, that his confidence in a future life appears to have been as strong as his consciousness of a present one.63 We believe with him that the laws of physical existence all teach that death is the end of human existence, but the revelation which proves the contrary is not made by God through miraculously inspired teachers; it is a revelation made by the various capabilities of observing and reflecting, of thinking and feeling, which God has given to mankind. This is the revelation of moral evidence. Granted that there exists an omnipotent goodness and wisdom, the only questions which remain with reference to a future state would be whether happiness is most promoted by the continuation of the same identity, or by successive identities, and whether it would be right that one identity should be forced into a life, to itself an evil, for the sake of leading to a state of things in which life should be a good. As to the first question, all existences which comprehend thought and feeling, without knowledge of the past, the present and the future, are imper fect in happiness. Perfect satisfaction can arise

63 Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), chemist and Unitarian minister.

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only from the comprehension of all present, past and future existence. It would be inconsistent with the nature of omnipotent love to be satisfied with imperfect happiness in natures adapted to perfect happiness. It will be the will, then, of omnipotent love to enable every such nature to attain perfection for itself and others. And this can be only by progressive attainment. As to the second question, there is a vague idea in some minds that the small may rightly be sacrificed for the large, that some individuals may be a sacrifice to the happiness of a future generation. But such a sacrifice is inconsistent with love, wisdom and power. The only reason for which it could be imagined, indeed, would be that a greater good would be gained by the many than would be possible without the sacrifice of the few. But how could it be consistent with Omnipotence to make this sacrifice? There is nothing contrar y to omnipotent love and wisdom in suffering which brings a good to the sufferer, not otherwise to be attained without a contradiction. As to benefit to some from the evil of others, it will be found that all being is connected, so that every evil which is or has been, affecting any conscious being, will lessen good to every other, unless the cause of that evil shall be removed. But it may be said, it is thus that the sacrifice of one is beneficial to others, who are stimulated to remove the cause of the evil. May the Individual be sacrificed for the Generation? But the sufferer? Who takes thought for him, when, for the sake of others, the cause of the suffering is removed? Is the only answer to this question, there exists an omnipotent spirit of love and wisdom? Is it not the continuity of individual existence which alone can make existence worth having? The stars we see, and those which science reveals, but which even imagination cannot grasp—are we to suppose this fabric (immense in its magnificence beyond our powers of conception) made to be peopled by beings possessing the divine attributes, but existing for only a longer or shorter period, and ending by being, each in turn, exterminated by the will of their wise and benevolent Father? Why? In order that generations may gain degrees of wisdom and goodness from those which are passed, each itself passing away in its turn to be no more? If this were so, it would seem of little consequence whether the universe exists or were blotted out. How different its value if we

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‘‘My Father worketh and I work.’’64

look on these numberless worlds as abodes for the imperfect, in which they attain perfection. The telescope shows much to the physical sense. Can moral evidence show nothing to the moral sense? A Being the nature of whom is the cause of past, present and future, as one whole—this is one individual being of whom we have evidence. We have evidence that this being is the omnipotent spirit of love and wisdom. The recognition of this Being is the assurance, whatever the present may be, of well-being to all that is, through His will, in that ‘‘eternal now,’’ which is ever present to His thought. And what is well-being to the nature which thinks and feels? Is it the eternal unchanging will and contemplation of the effect of will in the Almighty? This alone would not satisfy the spirit of love. There is no existence so essentially valuable as that in which perfection is attained by life and work. But perfection cannot be attained by a finite and imperfect being, unless the all-wise, the comprehensive thought, which possesses past, present and future, wills the law by which the imperfect learns and attains. In one sense we may say that there is no perfection, for perfect thought, per fect feeling, are not perfection till manifested in activity. Thought, sentiment, activity in life dictated by thought and sentiment, these form the perfect will. But activity is development, succession of events; it is never-ending. Through fresh and fresh phases of activity, of life, the eternal purpose is being manifested. There is ever development of God’s eternal purpose; there is ever attainment or preparation for attainment by work. The most desirable circumstances which any being could be in would be circumstances willed by perfect goodness, wisdom, by Omnipotence, for the purpose of furnishing to that being means and inducement to attain perfection. Per fection attained by work, by communicating and receiving, this is the best possibility to any being. The Almighty himself would not conceive His existence righteous or satisfactory if it were confined to willing, to contemplating, to feeling. ‘‘My Father worketh and I work.’’ And by this work is all conscious being forever being enriched, or preparing for enrichment.

64 John 5:17.

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‘‘My Father worketh and I work’’ Is not this the true support, if we can really feel and believe that ourselves, and all we love and care for, are really, by Almighty love and wisdom, secure of attaining God’s truth, and love, and wisdom, and righteousness! on what a ‘‘rock of ages’’65 shall we, indeed, found our church, if we can believe this! What courage may not this inspire, even in the weary days of ignorance and error! Without the belief in a continued identity there is really no belief in a wise and good superintendence. What is the aspect of present life, and the history of past life, without this belief? Estimate it, as you would do, if not overawed by the idea that is God’s work. Fear not to estimate God’s work with such power as you have, for so only can you use the means He has given you to comprehend His nature and your own nature and destination. We see beings forced into existence with no choice of their own, forced into an existence which most certainly they would not choose, if they had a choice. What battlefield is to be compared to the sufferings scattered over this world in one hour’s course? sufferings, too, generally unsoothed by any comprehension of why they exist! If there were not a sacred halo round Him, what should we say of the Being who could cause such sufferings for no ulterior benefit to the sufferer, but for future temporar y benefit to some future being, who, benefiting by the experience of past ages, makes fewer mistakes? But, in proportion as the favoured being possesses an existence valuable to himself and others, in such proportion is the inconsistency of quenching his being too. Can the calm speculator talk of life as a ‘‘mixture of good and evil,’’ the ‘‘good preponderating’’? Let us well anatomize human life, before we pronounce this sentence on mankind at large. And if it cannot be truly said, then all suffering, unsatisfactor y lives must surely point to a future for those identities in the will of the gracious spirit of love. Otherwise, the Omnipotent may, indeed, be said to have His hands ‘‘bathed in blood’’ for ages. But the physical laws make it incomprehensible, it is said. Once grant that right is omnipotent, this difficulty ceases. And what is there to account for any co-existences, except the omnipotent will? Is it asked what beings will live after this life ceases? Every mode of being which admits of thought and feeling, for such modes of

65 Reference to a popular hymn of the same name.

684 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought being require eternity for their development. No thought, no feeling, can have attained perfection, can have acted and lived perfection, in any limited period. Each individual thinking, feeling, being, by the law of the Perfect, works upward, directly or indirectly— attains to the perfect thought and feeling which comprehends all, which feels and wills all truth—and then again sets forth to work, and live, and manifest, and realize fresh phases of being, guided by the law of the all-comprehensive spirit. Well-being consists in attainment by right exercise of true thought, feeling and activity, of sympathy with and for one’s kind, of communication to and from one’s kind, of an entire trust in and love and veneration for, a supreme being, whose will is believed to spring from a nature of per fect love, righteousness and wisdom, whose will is law, and whose will being law insures that all shall be well for the existences which spring from it. It is not, indeed, for man to estimate the divine nature, but there are certain attributes of a superior power which manifest themselves in existence and in its laws. Of His attributes of love and wisdom we have, in a degree, experience and consciousness—and by reflecting on the nature of love and wisdom, we may realize to ourselves in some degree what will be His will. Is it possible that it will be satisfaction to Him to exist as contemplating, estimating, loving the activity which His law calls forth, but without working Himself? Yet how, without a contradiction, can we attribute activity, work, to the will which is law to the universe? The well-being of all is His will, but this well-being consists in attaining by exercise for which His law is the means and inducement. Activity in the Being, whose will is the law of the universe, would mar His own purpose, the well-being of mankind. Yet, on the other hand, that perfect nature, can it find satisfaction without work? How shall we solve this contradiction? since it would seem inconsistent with the perfect nature either to work or not to work? Is there anything inconsistent, contradictory, in supposing this per fect spirit to will law, to will also to be the keeper of law in act, to will to Himself the satisfaction of well-being to others through His work and their work? ‘‘My Father worketh and I work.’’66 Would not this be the great union, the great at-one-ment of the Father and the

66 John 5:17.

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Son? And if we reflect on the nature of love and wisdom and righteousness, is it absurd, or is it harmonious and consistent with such attributes, to suppose that will to be at the same time superintending law of right? and the keeping of that law, attained by work? With what patient endurance, with what hearty work we may go forth, if we believe that there is a will whose law secures all we can tr uly desire for ourselves and others, when it has been worked for aright. This will cause no slothful trust in another, for to work and to work aright is essential to each individual’s success. It will give the spirit of freedom from fear in the certainty of success, if the object is pursued with a patient and earnest spirit, to which, by God’s laws, it is in time insured that the right road will be found. ‘‘Per fect love’’ will ‘‘cast out fear.’’67 To talk of perfection without supposing it attained by the Being to whom it is attributed is a contradiction. To talk of perfection as the source of work and suffering, yet not working and suffering, is a contradiction. The deep truths contained in those books, which, united, are called The Book, may well entitle it to such distinction. As religious and moral truth become revealed to us, we shall generally, perhaps, find some expression in the Bible, showing that some writer in it had a glimpse of that truth. The spirit of righteousness, love and wisdom is the abiding source of eternal law. The spirit of righteousness, love and wisdom wills itself incarnated, modified by its own laws. Thus ‘‘it is finished,’’68 fulfilled. Thus are the purposes essential to the spirit of righteousness, love and wisdom accomplished. Thus does that spirit realize well-being to other being than its own individuality, by becoming itself the subject of its own law, while incarnating itself in varied being. Thus does the Father work in the Son. Thus does the Son work till he becomes one with the Father. Thus ‘‘does the Father work and I work.’’

Glimpses of almost all truth in the Bible.

Does God ‘‘divide’’ Himself? ‘‘Do you, then, mean to say,’’ may be asked, ‘‘that God, as it were, divides himself ? that He exists as a perfect nature, willing law, that also He exists as an imperfect nature in other modes of being? Is not this absurd?’’

67 1 John 4:18. 68 John 19:30.

Does God, then, ‘‘divide’’ Himself ?

686 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought In answering this, we must ask another question. What do we mean by ‘‘God’’? All we can say is that we recognize a power superior to our own, that we recognize this power as exercised by a wise and good will. When you speak of God ‘‘dividing Himself,’’ are not you, in using the word ‘‘dividing,’’ referring to a material nature? I do recognize in existence the omnipotence of wisdom and goodness, or, rather, I recognize tendencies towards proving wisdom and goodness omnipotent. To man it is given in some degree to estimate the nature of wisdom and goodness. We can say, we are sure this or that would not be the will of wisdom and goodness; as we take the means we have in order to become wiser and better, we can more and more estimate what would be the will of wisdom and goodness. We can assuredly estimate that goodness would will happiness. We can estimate what happiness, what well-being, is. And can it be denied that this is well-being, to attain by exercise all that, in the thought of wisdom and goodness, is worthy to be attained— to receive from and communicate to our kind—and to pursue our course with the assurance that a superintending power is educating us for the happiness of each and of all? We may trace that this education is really going on. Our power of estimating the nature of wisdom and goodness is also capable of revealing to us that the perfect nature wills a perfect law of invariable co-existences and successions, which is His education of those beings whom He has so constituted, that essentially they seek their greatest satisfactions. Let it not be supposed that this is an education to selfishness, for their satisfactions, like His own, He has constituted to be love and wisdom. Again, man’s capability of estimating love and wisdom will reveal to him that the perfect thought, the perfect sentiment, would will no other interference with any mode of existence, not itself, except law, because this will would best promote the greatest degree, the highest kind of happiness. Yet we may also distinguish that that existence would not satisfy a per fect love and wisdom which was without other activity than will for the activity of other beings. And does not this reveal that God incarnates Himself, i.e., the attributes which constitute all that we know of God, wherever we find them? He wills the laws of physical existence. Are not they the limits to His nature? By knowing and keeping aright the laws which affect this material existence, does not experience prove that the divine nature, at all events, a nature

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corresponding to the divine, increases in power? And is it not thus revealed that God is really keeping as well as willing the law of love and wisdom, thus satisfying the desire essential to His nature for the happiness of other being than His own? For each being in whom he thus incarnates Himself, has an identity of its own, and this identity, through His law, is directly or indirectly ever progressing till it has by exercise, by life, realized into activity His thought and sentiment. Law of the Father, activity of the Son Thus shall eternity be ever enriching eternity with fresh realizations, in successive activity, of the thought and the sentiment of which we may say, Nothing is there to come and nothing past, But one eternal now doth ever last.69

It is said that we take for granted manifestations as proving, without other revelation, the existence of the perfect law, of a per fect nature, but, it will be asked, how do we trace this perfect law in a world where exists so much evil and suffering, so little, if any, divine happiness? We admit that we discern tendencies, evidence only, not proof, verification. But are these tendencies, this evidence to be therefore disregarded when they lead us to the conclusion that the process of verification extends over eternity? Mankind are, after these thousands (we know not how many) of years of existence, still in dark ignorance of the nature of the being who calls man into existence, of man’s nature, of man’s true destination, of God’s laws which are to be kept in that one definite way which is right, in order to secure well-being. But the all-comprehensive, all-superintending power waits while all is accomplishing itself through the law of the Father, the activity of the Son. Man has attained much, but as yet man knows not God; man knows not man; man knows not his real satisfaction, though it be essential to him to seek it; man, while unconscious of the depth of his ignorance, is alike unconscious of the height of his capability.

69 Abraham Cowley, ‘‘Davideis’’ 1:361-62.

Can we discern evidence or only tendencies which indicate evidence for what we have said?

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Related Texts

T

here are many surviving manuscript pages that were not included in the printed Suggestions for Thought. They are all undated, and it is not at all apparent if they were written at the same time as the texts that were printed, and why they were not included. One short passage (the second item below) provides a succinct statement of a major point (perhaps too succinct?). The material might have been, or some of it, later drafts, written in response to the demand for a shorter, more accessible, version of Suggestions for Thought. Her friend Benjamin Jowett, in particular, had urged Nightingale to write brief essays or even tracts. Following these shorter texts is the full exchange between Nightingale and John Sutherland, only short excerpts of which were given above in the printed Suggestions for Thought. Source: Draft essay, Add Mss 45837 ff1-10

Political economists are generally men of very logical minds who set out upon a wrong premise, reason clearly and well, and are much pleased at their conclusion. But what is their premise? That virtue must be rewarded and vice punished. But is this God’s thought? They think of vice as a very pleasant thing, but subject to an (almost arbitrar y) interdiction of God, and for which we must be hanged and punished, a thing not in itself an evil, but for which God harms us or does something to us. But is not God’s thought that virtue and happiness are synonymous, one and the same thing. Virtue is happiness, that vice is misery. And that the honest (unprovided for) are in themselves happier than the dishonest (provided for). Political economy is a very nar row view of things, but arising, as Puseyism did, naturally out of and to counteract Germanism, out of the new views of prison discipline and punishment. But carry it to its lengths, the letting evil alone to work out its own experience, and see what it will come to. Will the bad man become better, the bad man’s / 689

690 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought offspring become reformed? The drunken man’s child becomes a sot, a thief, and society ends by shutting him up for its own protection. There seems no chance for them in this way. Yes, lest you say the honest man is encouraged, but he ought not to be. For the reformation of every bad man is an advantage, the deterioration a disadvantage to all society. In himself the honest man is injured by the others. What we want is to educate all the rich to lay aside the doctrine of reward and punishment, the poor honest man to feel that the reformation of the dishonest is an advantage to society and therefore to him, and all to feel that virtue is itself the good, vice is itself the evil. What you want is not the reformation of that particular ragged school but the amelioration of society, and how is that to be effected? Not by having the wicked to propagate himself. For is there not more hope of the wicked child becoming instrumental in reforming the father? You send him back home on a vantage ground where the example of the father can be of use to him, than if you leave both to rot. What can you expect? Then as to the principle of not educating or reforming vice, for fear of discouraging the virtuous, carry it to its extreme. The thief has a child, which becomes a thief and is shut up. There it is not to be educated because the honest man can’t afford a similar education. Is it to have a clean healthy home and sufficient food? The parents are to pay for it, says the economist. But if he drinks away all his money, is it to star ve? Yes, then you are to give it nothing but confinement. But if the honest man could see that the rogue’s disease is worse than his? that, of the starving and the hungry, the starving are to be attended to first. But shan’t you make the honest man envious of the dishonest? No, because you don’t exempt the dishonest from the consequences of his evil. You can’t if you would. He has an ulcer, which you must put under process of cure, but he must suffer from the disease. But if the political economists are right, Howard’s whole system is wrong—the prisoners ought to have been left to suffer everything. In the cholera, too, the poor are much better off than the rich, because the poor get their houses whitewashed and plyed upon, by law. Oh but you say, it is infectious and would spread. Well, is not vice infectious? Then it seems to me that men would become bad under the noninter ference system [more] than under the other. Taking for granted that some of the honest will become dishonest for the sake of the

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maintenance, you will not more (the offspring of the dishonest) become so if let alone. The argument of the political economist applies to all workhouse schools of course. Child has made itself sick and is like to die. Do you neglect it for fear of making another child desirous to overeat itself, to get the attention? Granted you do, but the child is like to die. The wicked are like to do still more than die. This very question was asked of Christ, and he said, they that are whole need not, etc. God does not play such tricks with us. If we are in a healthy state, we are not created such that we can’t tell but that green is blue and blue is green, that we can’t tell what is good and what is bad, what is a good God and what is a bad God. If we are told God does not mean you to perceive and reason, He has given you a book to read out concerning Himself, I can understand that. But I read the book and find it differing with itself. I can only use the faculties which God has given me and say, this is good in a man, this infinite and perfect would be in a God. I don’t know that we have anything else to go by. Hume an example of the logical mind going wrong; no one ever reasoned more clearly and more per fectly, but he set out from imperfect premises, leaving feeling entirely out of the argument (I do not mean that he was an unfeeling man) and I suppose no one has ever gone more wrong. St Ignatius made the mistake of thinking that each particular circumstance was a particular volition of God, then we have no right to alter it. The laws of which we come to that position were the will of God, that we should be murdered, e.g., and we have no cause therefore to be angr y with the murderer. He murdered us in the process to perfect happiness. He murdered us on his way to something else. God is not sorry. He sees him at this moment in his perfect state. This does not mean that the murderer is not to be sorry for what he has done, or that you are not to try to alter it. If it were by a particular volition of God that it came about, you ought not to try to alter it. That is the difference, but it came about in consequence of His laws. And you do not cease to suffer from toothache or to try to relieve it. So the murderer must suffer and you refor m him, i.e., put yourself in connection with the laws of God in regard to him. It may not be consonant with the law of God that you should alter him (St Ignatius again). You have to find out the laws of God and put yourself in connection with them.

692 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Are there not spiritual laws as well as physical? But the former are not only not sought for but not acknowledged. You are told to cast your bread, etc., to teach and spread and help, not looking for the effect, but to hope. The minister complains of the hardness of the hearts, but hopes some seed is sown, some shaft has struck. It would be wrong to do more than trust. But if we were to examine and find out the law of what has struck, we should no more say anything which was at random (as we do now, hoping that by accident something will come in connection with a spiritual law and act). If by degrees we knew all the spiritual laws, we should be able always to speak and teach to effect, i.e., in conformity with the laws of God. That fatal word ‘‘faith,’’ which we have construed to mean walking blindfold among the laws of God, shutting our eyes to them so that we literally speak of ‘‘blind trust,’’ really means finding out a law of God and trusting to it. You do not build a steam engine in this manner, trusting that some engine will come out by accident. Why do you build a human character in this manner? It is true that many act according to the spiritual laws of God without knowing it and we call these geniuses in education, but all might find them out and apply them more or less skillfully. It is true also that all characters are different and therefore you may say how can there be spiritual laws invariable concerning them, which you may lay hold of ? But you make six pianofortes by the same law or laws, and they turn out all different, so with the human character. You don’t want to form it. You only want to teach it to form itself. Till education has become the first profession instead of the last, but now the physician is literally put before the schoolmaster—he is of a higher caste. Though it is sometimes good to ‘‘commune with God and be still’’ to hold such intercourse as we can through our own being only, there is no employment, no enjoyment, which is not increased by companionship. You must pay such attention to the cries of nature. All cries mean something. You do not excite a person’s interest in the everyday circumstances of life. You dream of circumstances where you will excite their interest. It is a natural cry that, of sharing an interest, of seeking companionship for each of the purposes and thoughts of life. If it cannot be satisfied it becomes perverted. Do not be angry with yourself, it will be satisfied in eternity. The Gloria I like so much: the Father, i.e., God, the Son, i.e., man and the Holy Ghost, i.e., God in man, and the as it was, is now, etc., I like so much.

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I think there is such truth in the Puseyite attention to little things, in the ejaculation, etc. Because a man when he is sinning is not in a state to maintain himself in a high state of mind, it is only by attention to little things, if at all, that he is to be recalled. A drunken man cannot be told to keep up a high state of feeling, to put a flower in water, any little trifle to divert his attention at the moment, which he can do, is the only thing, and aiming too high I take it to be our bane, because then we fall too low. If a person suffering from ennui aims at too sublime occupations which she cannot do, she will end with taking a puff out of the closet, or thinking of her dress, but if she finds out what she can do easily, she does it. Rules are so valuable because they prevent you from thinking about forbidden things. If you wish for a dainty dish and yield, you are the worse for it. If you wish for it and resist, you are still the worse for the thought, but a rule prevents you from thinking about it. I have such a value for little things. The greatest things of life are accomplished by them. A pencil in the pocket to write down a question or a thought at the time, because a thought is an inspiration of God and should not be lost. The mere getting up an hour earlier may make ‘‘a sot a prince’’ all day, and without it he may stay a sot. The getting up at 9 instead of 8 may prevent a man from being a reasoner. The prayer, Keep us from vain imaginings, I like in one sense. It is tr ue that we only can keep ourselves from vain imaginings and that only by putting ourselves in accordance with the laws of God, but the uttering the prayer is an obeying a law of God, a thinking of something else. Ought we to regret anything? Surely, if we have decided what is best to do, i.e., what is the only thing to do, to say we are sorry for the consequences, sorry we cannot do the other, is absurd. It is as absurd to be sorry that you cannot see Mme Mohl if you have missed her by one hour by deciding that it is right to go, as it is to say that you are sor ry you cannot see the bishop of Norwich who is in the other world. You must have no regrets. Everything is done by the laws of God. With regard to the spiritual laws, you admit that inspiration which has written ‘‘the book,’’ in ever y age, is received by men not exempted from the common laws of mankind, not endowed with separate organizations. The question is to find out the laws by which they received it (probably unknown to themselves) that we may receive it, not uncertainly and accidentally but knowingly, may put ourselves and others under the influence of those laws.

694 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Does a law benefit each person individually as well as the whole? Yes, because the happiness which each person may and will reach could not exist at all if it were not for those laws. Each individual obtains a higher happiness, i.e., God’s happiness under those laws and in consequence of that plan than he could under any other. The Roman Catholics had got hold of a higher truth than we when they made physicians of the soul and confession to them of our soul maladies and gave them an education for the employment, training them in the knowledge of character and of spiritual laws. But the physicians did their work so badly that men said, we will have none of them. But not the less do they feel the want of them. But we have put the spiritual teachers, the schoolmasters, beneath even the physical teachers, the physicians. The evangelicals say, Don’t look at the effect of what you are doing, and they say true, for if you did, you’d leave off. They say, Have faith, go on, trust that something will sow a seed. Yes, but that something succeeds by some spiritual law. Find out that law, find out the other laws, and all will succeed, or rather you will do nothing that won’t have an effect. They say, don’t look, you won’t see. No, you say, because it is not there, and therefore, you do right not to look or you’d leave off. I can’t believe that God would leave our highest moods and highest happiness to come by accident, to come without our call, and so that we cannot recall them. He must have made spiritual laws as well as physical. Indeed, we acknowledge them. We say, if we put ourselves under such and such circumstances, we cannot trust our imaginations, if we listen to such and such conversation we spoil our affections, if we read such and such books, we cultivate them. Isaiah was Isaiah because, with such an organization and under such circumstances, such effects took place. You say oh there cannot be spiritual laws because no two men are alike. But that is just what proves a law, because no two men are under exactly the same circumstances. There never can be another Shakespeare. The evangelical goes out and reads the Bible and gives tracts to the poor and the drunken, and does not look what takes effect and what does not. Many acknowledge that ‘‘God orders all things for the best.’’ Many pray every day ‘‘Thy will be done.’’ If a great calamity come, they will really struggle to feel as well as say this. But it is often forgotten that it was not said, ‘‘God orders all great concerns for the best, but small matters are not his care, nor Thy will be done in all great things; we

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wish ours to be done in smaller things. God directs the stars on their course. In a storm or a whirlwind we feel He is there, we recognize His presence with awe. But when we cannot take a walk we wished to take because it rains, when somebody does not come that we wanted or somebody comes we did not want, or our dress is stained, or a glass is broken, it would be thought ridiculous and bordering on profane to connect thoughts of God and religion with such concerns. Yet there is one Will in consequence of which every change in the Universe which makes the present moment different from the past takes place. The rain drops from the clouds, the glass from the table by consequence of the same law, without which the earth would not travel round the sun. All these are effects arising from its being the will of God that this law should be at the moment they take place. Let us look into what passes within us in regard to the smaller circumstances of life which are troublesome or disagreeable. Some such are attributable to no person but to what is called the course of events— some to ourselves, some to other people. If to ourselves it would be felt an undesirable indifference not to be somewhat vexed and provoked with ourselves. If to others, if we are only a little vexed and angr y at a little provocation, it is considered natural. In proportion to what is called our easiness of temper and good nature we shall sooner or later forgive and forget. If we were not at all vexed or angry, we should be thought too easy, stupid perhaps. All is vague, it is not of consequence enough to think about—it would be tiresome and pragmatical and ridiculous to think about such feelings. They pass off when others take their place as in children. In God’s thought in God’s ways there is no vagueness—there is no difference in His attention to what we call great and to what we call small. There is no great or small in His view, because one law, one purpose, attaches to all in accordance with which the whole is ruled. Man should aim so to rule his spirit that there shall be no difference in the thought, the feeling with which he receives events because they are comparatively great or small. Whenever an individual would bring about or prevent somewhat if he could, if such prevention or effect is certainly beyond his power, he cannot indulge a wish or a regret concerning it consistently with his acknowledgment God orders all things or his prayer, Thy will be done. It may be answered, This may be admitted, where it is clear to the mind that the small annoyance comes from God but it is very certain that any of our lesser vexations come from ourselves or other people.

696 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Whatever comes from ourselves or other people comes from some law of God in regard to human nature. Let us be very careful to distinguish between the idea of a separate distinct volition of God, and a law of God. Suppose a glass broken, I do not mean that there preceded it a volition of God, this glass shall be broken, I mean that the breaking of the glass arose from a variety of laws or volitions of God that certain consequences should invariably attend certain preceding circumstances. What all the laws connected with any event perhaps no man can tell. However comparatively of small import the event itself—on the laws which induce it depends the whole framework of the Universe—the whole Providence of God. With such an event as the breaking of a glass at a particular time by a particular person will be connected a variety of physical laws in regard to the glass broken, of physical and other laws concerning human nature in regard to the person who breaks. It may be that laws of chemistry, of natural philosophy, of geology, that laws which regulate the intellectual and spiritual nature of man, may have united in the production of that event which could not have taken place without them. What is truth? Truth is the thought, the feeling of God. The truth concerning any subject is the view God takes of it. You say that absolute prevision fetters the will—I know, ever ybody says it and it’s ver y odd, for an old fellow of my time of life, I can’t see it. There are Quetelet’s tables—he computes that so many third marriages will take place in one year—that so many people will die at 4 o’clock, and supposing the computation correct, he foretells, we may say, these things. But does he therefore limit our free will? Yes, if he foretold this unerringly he would. No, but he does not foretell who shall die and who shall steal and who shall marry? Why I can foretell as well as possible of the children of the school—this girl will turn out ill, that will - -. Do I therefore make them do so? In judging of each other, if I see my mother go by the window in best gown, I know she’s going to call on Mrs Thingumbob and that she’s not going to garden. She would even be annoyed if I were to suppose such a thing. She would say You extravagant child, do you suppose I’m going to make a dog of my best gown? Do I make her go and pay that visit? The nearer we approach to perfect knowledge of one another’s character the more accurately can we predict. But is there any coercive force in that prediction?

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The Euclid of metaphysics: Postulates: 1. Let it be granted that there is a God. 2. That God is eternal. 3. That God is perfect. Axioms: 1. A part cannot conceive of the whole. Definitions: Perfection: Proposition 1: The human mind is incapable of conceiving a beginning to creation. The finite mind cannot conceive a beginning to creation, for, it could come to the limits of the whole it could conceive the whole, the part the whole, which is absurd. Therefore the human mind is incapable of conceiving how creation began. Proposition 2: The human mind is incapable of conceiving eternity. Source: Draft essay, Add Mss 45837 ff20-21

The mysticists and the rationalists alike acknowledge an organization through which man must think, feel, will—by means of which man has mind. They are alike in recognizing God as the author of this organization. Both sects are therefore believers alike in a Creator and Governor. The difference is that the mysticists believe that God speaks through the organization which He has created, that He is its Holy Ghost. The rationalists believe that this organization, in accordance with the laws which He has given it, generates or secretes its own Holy Ghost. I should be tempted to think that, if we came to close definitions, there is ver y little real distinction. What is the difference between God and His laws? His laws are, after all, only His thoughts—the expression of His thoughts. If we could be sure of, first, always thinking the same thing, and, second, accomplishing our thought, our thoughts would be laws. Law is nothing but invariable thought in a Being where thought and action is the same thing. But we have got into our heads that law is some mysterious chain which God creates and then leaves—machinery (like the watch, which the maker manufactures and then sends to a distance out of his own hands). If, however, it is correct to define law as but the unvarying thought of God, what is the real distinction between the mysticism which says

698 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought God communicates/speaks Himself through the organization which He has created, and the rationalism which says the organization which God has created speaks by means of accordance with His thoughts (or laws). I can make no distinction between God and His thoughts. Or, putting it into an algebraical formula, Organization x God = man’s mind Organization x Law = man’s mind But Law = God’s thought or God.

Original Exchange between Nightingale and Sutherland Editor: Much of the material in this rambunctious exchange, albeit drastically edited, was incorporated into the printed text above, with identifying information. Identifying information is provided here only for the few names that were not so included. The corresponding page numbers are indicated, to permit comparison with the edited text and reference to the relevant footnotes. Note that each sometimes broke into the other’s statement mid-sentence. The code FN recap: indicates Nightingale’s restatement of material initially written by Sutherland. Source: Exchange between Florence Nightingale and John Sutherland on Man’s Will and God’s Law, Add Mss 45838 ff1-92

FN: ‘‘Free will ’’ and ‘‘necessity’’: words which have perplexed the human

race, because they are mere ‘‘ words.’’ JS: On the contrary, ‘‘free will’’ has a very definite meaning: [211]

1. The absolute freedom of willing is matter of experience. 2. The freedom of doing, which is quite another matter, is bounded by external conditions or by internal considerations. 1. and 2. are often confounded, and have a mark of the obscurity which surrounds the controversy. Without the freedom of willing, there could be no responsibility, no choice, no obedience. Of course, the absolute freedom adverted to exists within the limit of one’s sphere of being only, and cannot extend beyond it. FN: It is constantly said that ‘‘necessity’’ and ‘‘freedom of the will’’ are subjects beyond human comprehension. Milton once clinched the nail. And now it has been repeated ‘‘usque ad nauseam’’ by the idle, the cowardly and the silly, who are miscalled ‘‘the world.’’ I believe the words ‘‘free will’’ and ‘‘necessity’’ to be words without meaning and therefore I do not intend to use them, especially as

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some are frightened when you touch these words, and feel they have lost their God, and others are hardened, and say they don’t want your God. I would wish to consider the following question concerning human will, without touching these dangerous words. Does human will accord with definite and invariable Laws? Do human volitions, in other words, manifest such laws? Or can human will be called a self-determining power, irrespective of any traceable law? JS: The use of the word ‘‘law’’ here requires careful definition. The

idea of law was drawn first from social relations, and then when science arose the social idea was carried naturally into the material world. We talk of ‘‘the common law’’ and of ‘‘the law of gravitation.’’ Now in neither of these senses is volition under law at all. The very faculty is the opposite of law in that sense. Volition acts within bounds or limits, and there is a certain similarity in its manifestations in all men as beings of the same order. In this sense alone is there a law. Except in this sense human volition is a selfdetermining power. It is above all law that can be conceived, and of its own free choice alone can it subject its own action to law. One of its grandest powers is the power of submission to law, but that very power shows its superiority to law. FN: This is a question which bears directly on the moral government

of mankind. And, in considering it, I must allude to this, viz., that it has frequently been admitted that the human will does bear traces of being in accordance with definite and invariable laws, but that most writers, among others, Kant and Fichte, have recoiled from the admission and said that it was so contrary to right that, although it appeared in accordance with fact, it could not really be so. [211] JS: The only traces of action according to law prevented by volition is in the similarity of its manifestations in different individuals of the race already referred to, and whatever the idealist school may say, it is simply a mistake to say that ‘‘similarity’’ is law or anything like law. FN: I would therefore begin the inquiry with the two following ques-

tions: 1. What can we learn with regard to this from actual observation and experience? 2. What would be most satisfactory, with regard to this, to what we feel to be morally right? In other words, what is? what ought to be? (If it is said, ‘‘we can learn nothing with regard to these things from human observation or with human powers of mind, we must have

700 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought recourse to superhuman communications,’’ I have nothing more to say.) JS: I never heard this said. I don’t know who would say it. FN: I think that, by human observation and inquiry, we arrive at the

hypothesis of an omnipotent and righteous Being, that by what are called ‘‘superhuman’’ communications we arrive at what is called a ‘‘certainty’’ of a capricious and unrighteous Being. JS: You assume this. Although it may be granted at the outset that,

inasmuch as there is an evident adaptation, amidst disharmonies, between man and the world, and inasmuch as in all ages the idea of God in some sense has arisen in the human mind, that the induction is a simple one, namely, that the universe and man came from the same being. As to the character of that being, however so conceived, if it is simply matter of experience that early nations and men have differed more than they have ever differed about any other subject. There is perhaps no one moral attribute of the Supreme Being that is found in all religious systems or notions of merely human origin. The idea of God is universal as far as we know. The idea of the character of God varies with every changing notion of humanity. FN: But, if it is desired to pursue the inquiry upon human observa-

tion and experience, JS: This is simply an error. It is surely possible for God to reveal Him-

self to the creatures He has made. If He has so revealed himself the revelation must be a correct one. ‘‘He cannot deny himself.’’ The only question is how He revealed Himself. FN: I ask (1) does human will accord with definite laws, JS: Only in the sense already stated. FN: or may it be called self-determining, without dependence on law? JS: Yes. Third hand: The question does not seem to me to ‘‘grant’’ anything. If

men have differed about what ought to be, it does not follow that no satisfactor y answer will ever be found for the question, still less that we should not try to find one. FN: How would the government of the superhuman Power, on which

man depends, appear to be a right one to human comprehension? JS: This is the question of all ages and times. What ought to be? would

never have been asked if the fundamental conception of God’s character and of moral government had not varied in every individual

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man by light of nature. The very question grants the whole case, namely, that there is a striking discrepance between what various men think there ‘‘ought to be’’ and what the same men think ‘‘there is.’’ FN: Here I must make another diversion. Human will is not, as it

often appears to be thought, a separate force. JS: It is a separate independent faculty. Third hand: I should like to know what are the respondent’s views

about the ‘‘faculty of electricity,’’ divested of its manifestations and the apparatus in which it is produced. FN: It is the result of a man’s thoughts, feelings, wishes. The man’s

thoughts, feelings, wishes are the result of organization and circumstances. JS: No it is not! Its manifestations are bounded in the way you mention. Its results are governed, but not always, by ‘‘thoughts, feelings, wishes and the result of organization.’’ The faculty itself never. By training you may give it a direction, as you can everything else including even the law of gravitation. But the faculty like the law remain the same. FN: Given the hypothesis of an omnipotent and righteous Being such

could not create other perfect beings, neither could He create imperfect beings, without a cer tainty of their arriving at perfection. How can they arrive at perfection except through His laws? JS: I simply reply that a perfectly righteous and omnipotent Being has

created other beings with certain faculties. That these beings in all ages have recognized their responsibility in some sense. That one of these faculties is freedom of will, and that if there be a such a cer tainty the will must will per fection, other wise it is unattainable. This is in human experience, God’s law in the matter of perfection. FN: When I say, ‘‘could not,’’ I mean, it would not be in accordance with

the nature of an omnipotent and righteous Being. [213] JS: ‘‘Who can by searching find out God? [Job 11:7] Who can discover the Almighty to perfection’’? The problem is a mightier one than you contemplate. You contemplate animated stones. God contemplates something infinitely higher. Up to this point you desiderate a human being with certain faculties subordinated to certain laws, which you consider the best, and having so conceived of your ‘‘man’’ you charge the Almighty with the duty of finishing a work He has left unfinished. There may be a world where such a process is to go on, but it is certainly not this world, except in the case of the lower animals, who are per fect in their kind. You forget man’s absolute responsibility which is his.

702 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought FN: To return. When we say that we trace laws in the phenomena of

nature, we mean either that we trace uniformities so invariable that they may be considered as the laws of a Power which wills this invariableness, or that such uniformities are as invariable as they would be, if attributable to a Will and a Power which render them so. JS: In abjuring the pope, here we as a matter of mental necessity had to take refuge in another pope with a wig instead of a tiara. I sometimes think that we have either done so or are rapidly doing so. Witness ‘‘Combe’s Constitution.’’ The so-called ‘‘philosophie positive,’’ ‘‘Miss Martineau’’ and ‘‘Mr Atkinson’’ save the mark! FN: With respect to human volitions, it can only be said that, the

more widely and the more closely we observe, the more we shall find them to be examples of such uniformities as we call law. JS: This is the same proposition restated; it confounds the manifesta-

tions of will with the faculty. [212] FN: The phenomena of the will are so complicated that, without such

wide and close observation, it is impossible, with it it is difficult to trace in them those relations of simultaneity and succession (or, in other words, those uniformities) which we call laws. JS: It is not so difficult to arrive at the psychology of the matter. There are, or, rather, alas! there were spiritual laws or, better and truer, a spiritual economy (for the term law is cold, frigid and irrational). This economy is the reminiscence of humanity, of the time when the Father dwelt in His house. But we wo u l d not. FN: Volitions originate in (and exist in uniform relations with) sensa-

tions and thoughts. Sensations, thoughts and volitions originate in (and exist in uniform relations with) organization and circumstances. For the truth of this, we can only refer to observations and experience. Third hand: What does it signify whose argument it is? JS: This is Combe’s argument stated in another form, but it arises

solely from want of analysis, and confounds manifestations with faculty. Experience teaches us that the will is absolutely free. Experience teaches us that its external manifestations are conditioned, and that not even so constantly as to give the idea of ‘‘law.’’ FN: If we consider phenomena only, they tell sometimes one way, some-

times another. But if we consider the character and tendency of law, we arrive at some hypothesis regarding a perfect Being. Given as an hypothesis a Being omnipotent and perfectly righteous, the existence of other beings would follow.

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JS: This is simply a hypothesis founded on a hypothesis. Creation did not so originate, otherwise the Creator has no free will and was subject to ‘‘destiny.’’ [213] Whence comes conscience? From God. Is it or is it not a fact that the entire human race, as a race, has sent up its prayers and groans and bloody sacrifices for ‘‘mercy’’ and its petitions for favour, ‘‘grace,’’ to Heaven ever since the world began? Why so? Conscience. Your perfectly righteous Being, who could not be ‘‘merciful’’ or ‘‘gracious,’’ has laid on all His creatures an instinct requiring both mercy and grace. FN: A per fect God must create. For a Being would not be omnipotent

and righteous unless His existence became the source of other being, of other righteous beings (on the same reasoning) but not of other beings righteous through the direct will of the Omnipotent, because the Being would not be perfect in righteousness who thus operated on other beings. JS: God, in creating, must have created other beings in one of two antitheses: (1) righteous, that is, cognizant of and obeying every condition in which the welfare of the universal creation depends, and for this the gift of free will is absolutely necessary, or (2) unrighteous, that is disobedient to the conditions, which is absurd. The most absurd of all hypotheses is that a being, unrighteous, was created capable by some absolutely unknown and inconceivable process of arriving at the per fection of the Creator or that by a perfect creation. Suppose the following: ‘‘God created Abel a righteous man and Cain a righteous man, not in the sense of absolute righteousness, but that both might arrive at perfection, and Cain was displeased with Abel and murdered him’’ [Gen 4]. FN: (And here I must remark that there can be no ‘‘grace,’’ there can

be no such word as mercy with a perfectly righteous being.) JS: This is simply a hypothesis ‘‘philosophically’’ without any basis in philosophy. While it is contradicted by the entire feelings of humanity. FN: Other beings, perfectly righteous, the existence of other beings

would follow. For a being would not be omnipotent and righteous unless His existence became the source (1) of other being, (2) of other righteous beings (on the same reasoning), (3) but not of other beings righteous through the direct will of the Omnipotent, because the Being would not be perfect in righteousness who thus operated on other beings, (4) of being therefore righteous through advance

704 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought from limited and imperfect natures towards perfection, by exercise of the faculties of those natures individually and collectively. JS: The fallacy of the word ‘‘law’’ runs through the whole argument. The sooner we get our philosophy out of the ‘‘courts’’ the better. FN: The inducement and the means to such exercise being afforded by the laws

of the omnipotent and righteous Being. JS: It is a fact however that in human souls there is a progress, which must either arise from the use of faculty implanted once and for all, which again implies the exercise of free will, which you are destined to deny, or it must be the result of the same free will operating in the appropriation to the life of the soul, of certain supplies of spiritual sustenance (‘‘Give us this day our daily bread’’ [Matt 6:11]) given by the soul’s Lord and Creator, which is ‘‘grace.’’ It is per fectly consistent, nay more it is necessar y, that the soul should receive what it requires when it requires it from its Father. Other wise it would be independent of its source, which is impossible. Why should the soul be the only exception in the universe to dependence on its Creator and Upholder? FN: This is the only thing possible on the hypothesis of the existence

of a Being omnipotent and righteous. If we are asked our ground for such a hypothesis, it is this: that the character and tendency of the laws manifested in the history of human nature becomes consistent only with, becomes inconsistent only without, such a hypothesis. That human volitions shall accord with (be subject to) definite laws follows on the hypothesis. JS: This again is simply a hypothesis founded on a hypothesis. There

is another hypothesis which runs through all the ancient mythologies, namely, that of a ‘‘golden age,’’ which has the authority of infinitely greater adaptation and acceptance than this one. And there is another that is not a hypothesis: the cross, and what led to it, is the only key which opens the mystery of obedience and free will. FN: The object to be obtained by such laws with regard to the human

will is that the will shall be right, or rather that the nature and the knowledge shall be such that the will must be right. JS: This again is all wrong. It supposes in the will a necessar y righteous-

ness which would be opposed to the very [Third hand: respondent’s] idea of will at all, acting righteously or unrighteously being simply manifestations of free will, and not free will, while it further gives to ‘‘knowledge’’ a master y over the will,

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thereby depriving it of its freedom. It is simply the fact that ‘‘will’’ presupposes freedom or it is not ‘‘will’’ but something else. FN: Not, as is often supposed, not, as is often expressed, that a man

shall be free to choose between right and wrong, but that such choice shall be impossible to, i.e., inconsistent with his nature, as it is with God’s. JS: Again I repeat, your creation would consist of a very low type. Cer-

tainly not of men. Man is a nobler creature than you appear to consider him. ‘‘Choice’’ and the power of ‘‘choice’’ was the Creator’s final finishing touch to man. Third hand: How does he know this? FN: Man’s power over his own will defined. Volition being in accord-

ance with law, a manifestation of law, all the power which can be rightly used or desired by a man over human will, whether his own or another’s, is given to him, namely, the power to take means to render human will right, means cer tain when known and the knowledge of which is attainable to human nature. JS: The tenor of the principles in this paper is pantheism, making men a mere fragment of a whole, and depriving him of his individualism and responsibility, and it has all arisen from that supreme fallacy of modern times, substituting ‘‘law’’ for ‘‘necessity,’’ which used to be the fallacy formerly. [234] Always the same fallacy of late years. ‘‘Law’’ has been gradually rising into ‘‘God.’’ We will not surrender our freedom! Whenever it is impossible to do wrong, there is no longer ‘‘man’’ but some other being. Man rises to be partaker of the divine nature when he of his own free will surrenders his will to God’s will, and in doing so he remains man, but becomes a son of God by losing his free will. [214] Third hand: in order to learn, not in order to be childish. JS: Ah! There’s the rub! ‘‘Ye shall be as Gods knowing good and evil’’

said the tempter [Gen 3:5]. How to have such knowledge and to choose the good required quite another teacher, and he has told us that, unless we become as ‘‘little children’’ [Matt 18:3], we cannot do it. It is when we voluntarily surrender the will, not when we acquire knowledge, that we again enter the Father’s economy. But as all definite acts of the will depend on motives, what is our motive? What can make us give up our freedom with the certainty of a higher freedom. Third hand: Do we give it up? JS: There is but one thing and that is love, which is above all philosophy, for it is of the soul, while philosophy is only of the reason. It is

706 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought when we love Him, because He first loved us that we learn once and forever how to wed our free will to God’s will so that they become one, and from that moment all contradictions are solved forevermore. It required Gethsemane and Calvary to do this. FN: I simply reply that a perfectly righteous and omnipotent Being

has created other beings with certain faculties. That these beings in all ages have so recognized their responsibility in some sense. That one of these faculties is freedom of will, and that if there be such a certainty, the will must will per fection; other wise it is unattainable. This is in human experience, God’s law in the matter of perfection. JS: ‘‘Who can by searching find out God? [Job 11:7] Who can dis-

cover the Almighty to perfection?’’ The problem is a mightier one than you contemplate. You contemplate animated stones. God contemplates something infinitely higher. Up to this point you desiderate a human being with certain faculties subordinated to certain laws which you consider the best, and having so conceived of your ‘‘man’’ you charge the Almighty with the duty of finishing a work He has left unfinished. There may be a world where such a process is to go on, but it is certainly not this world, except in the case of the lower animals, who are per fect in their kind. You forget man’s absolute responsibility which is his. FN: When I say ‘‘could not’’ I mean it would not be in accordance to the

nature of an omnipotent, therefore righteous, Being. When we say that we trace laws in the phenomena of nature, we mean either that we trace uniformities so invariable that they may be considered as the laws of a Power which wills this invariableness, or that such uniformities are as invariable as they would be if attributable to a will and a Power which renders them so. Dr Sutherland’s Objections: ‘‘Freedom of willing is matter of experience.’’ Answers: It is so, in this sense. It never happens that what we should will, if not prevented by a superior power, we are prevented by such power from willing. When we say we are free to act as we please, we mean no power above our own prevents our acting as we should act, if we were not subjected to such superior power. [214] JS: I would still keep in view the distinction between simple ‘‘volition’’ and ‘‘acting.’’ The former is the result of a power implanted in man, necessar y to complete the man, without which he would not be man but something else. Descartes says ‘‘Cogito, ergo sum [I think, there-

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fore I am].’’1 Descartes should have gone a step further and said ‘‘volo ergo sum [I will, therefore I am].’’ The highest manifestation of ‘‘volition’’ is in thought. The proper definition of man is ‘‘a being who wills.’’ FN: In this sense, we may say that we have ‘‘freedom’’ to will as we

please, i.e., no power above our own operates to prevent us from willing as we please, or, in other words, willing according to the state of our nature (when we will). JS: I agree to this except to the last clause. ‘‘Acting’’ on ‘‘will’’ is founded (among other things) by our state when we will, but ‘‘volition’’ is not so bounded. [215] FN: But where is there any contradiction in this to the proposition

that a volition is a phenomenon which accords with definite laws or, in other words, that, given a certain state of being and certain circumstances, the same volition will invariably co-exist or succeed? JS: No! Because the proposition as thus stated subordinates volition to circumstances and introduces the idea of ‘‘necessity.’’ ‘‘I was in such circumstances and therefore it was ‘necessary’ for me to will so and so.’’ I have heard this very frankly stated to excuse crime, and if it were true it would afford sufficient excuse. FN: If the word ‘‘law’’ gives offence, I would gladly change it; shall I

say plan? JS: I only object to the word law in such discussion because it really means nothing. It is a stilt to help on the lame intellect and is of no further use. The evil of it is that we are so apt to make it a ‘‘leg,’’ and worse to make it a God, or worse still to subject God to our law, or what we think a law. FN: But it is impossible to me even to conceive of the perfect Being,

‘‘in whom is no invariableness neither shadow of turning’’ [Jas 1:17] without conceiving of law, in His moral government, in the sense in which that word differs from decree. No other term will express my sense of this invariableness and perfection of His moral government, His plan, His theodikè, call it what you will. JS: I entirely concur in this but it is a separate proposition, and ‘‘law’’ is used in another sense here. If there be one idea more than [an] other which we attach to perfect Divine nature it is absolute ‘‘unchangeableness.’’ But the moral government of God is not therefore ‘‘necessi-

1 René Descartes, Discourse on Method, 1637.

708 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought tarian.’’ It is the result of supreme intelligence acting in accordance with its own perfect nature, and yet perfectly free. In our weakness we say God acts (appears to act) (or can only act) on fixed laws. God is above all law. He is perfect and therefore above all law. We may certainly use the word law in a human sense to express this as a formula, but for no other purpose whatever. It is worth nothing else in such a discussion. The instant we admit the idea as a fact, then away goes freedom from the universe and there is left fate in its stead; we ought never to forget this. FN: ‘‘Without the freedom of willing, there could be no responsibility,

no choice, no obedience.’’ JS: It would be a sufficient answer to this that the human race in all ages and states of advancement has acknowledged its ‘‘responsibility’’ to its Creator, its power of ‘‘choice’’ and its power of ‘‘obedience.’’ FN: Answer. 1. ‘‘Responsibility.’’ I have never been able to see how the

word ‘‘responsibility’’ applies at all to the relation between man and the source of his being, the ruler of his destiny. Responsibility,’’ ‘‘choice,’’ ‘‘obedience,’’ are all secondar y conditions. Responsibility does exist between two beings, of whom one accepts from the other certain conditions. JS: Responsibility can occur in other ways. Suppose the case of a child

and parent. Neither one nor other offers or accepts responsibility. It nevertheless exists between them, and is acknowledged by both. This is matter of experience. The child can sever itself from its parent and in so doing renders up ‘‘responsibility.’’ This is what is called ‘‘majority.’’ FN: Something being committed by one to another on the mutual

understanding that the latter accepts conditions, upon the breaking of which follows some penalty or blame. JS: This is only one phase of it. FN: E.g., I give to my linen storekeeper the charge of certain articles

of linen. [215] JS: And this. FN: She accepts the ‘‘responsibility,’’ receiving an exact list of what is in

store. But no such engagement exists between man and his Creator. Man does not know what talents he has in store, what he is in charge of. God has not told him. On the contrary, by God’s plan he has to find this very thing out.

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JS: Man has two things to do, not one. He has to discover God’s will and to do it. His responsibility lies in these two things. His responsibility lies in doing his utmost in both. FN: If it be said that the Bible offers certain conditions with the assur-

ance that reward or punishment will follow, as they are kept or neglected, to such a decree the term ‘‘responsibility’’ does not apply. The human being comes into existence without choice of his own, without that acceptance of conditions which constitutes ‘‘responsibility.’’ JS: The Bible merely enunciates in this matter what God has already

done in the organization. He has been pleased to bestow on man. Man acknowledges the ‘‘responsibility’’ as already said. FN: Or if, as I interpret the thought of the Ruler of the Universe, man

is to attain the welfare of himself and his kind, i.e., man is to create mankind, dependently on his keeping aright laws manifested to him through phenomena; still the word ‘‘responsibility’’ does not apply, for there has been no acceptance of conditions. JS: Responsibility exists throughout God’s universe where so far as we know there has been no acceptance of terms. This is really nothing to the point. Because, first, we are here. Second, the infinite majority of us are convinced, against all reasoning to the contrary, that we are responsible to God. The inference is obvious that there is by an infinite probability an error in the reasoning. It is not for us, or the infinite minority of us, to say what we think God should have done, according to our manner of viewing things. FN: (Hence I infer that no righteous Being would, by His power, with-

out choice or conditions offered, call beings into existence, except on the certainty that their true welfare is to be to all such beings the result of such existence.) JS: I do not quite understand this. What is welfare? Is it simply earthly good? Then it is not worth supposed trouble. Is it everlasting good? Then it is in the highest degree doubtful what man can do in the matter. [Welfare is] quite true so far as God is concerned. But man can never be made happy by fate, necessity, nature, organization, call it what you will. It is possible to conceive of a being with passive happiness who could be happy in this way, but not man, whose happiness must be active. Be certain of this, that not an atom of misery shall exist in the spiritual world without man has willed it so. The real question is

710 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought why a being with ‘‘will’’ was created at all. What can we know? ‘‘We see through a glass darkly’’ [1 Cor 13:12]. Let us be humble. FN: ‘‘No choice, no obedience.’’ Men do choose, do obey. This is fact,

whether the will be a self-determining power or a manifestation of law. The question is whether a man’s ‘‘choice’’ or ‘‘obedience’’ proceed from a nature in which all the operations are manifestations of law, or in which one of these operations, viz., volition, is not a manifestation of law but the result of what is called a self-determining power. JS: This puts me in mind of an argument to show that morals were subject to ‘‘law’’ because a certain percentage of crime and murder and suicide are pretty clearly yielded every year by a given population. People used to argue this in mortality tables, but they don’t do so now. We now know that our ‘‘will’’ has to do with it. FN: Will it be said that a ‘‘choice’’ which originates in a mind, the operations of which manifest law, has the character of a piece of machiner y? I deny it. A machine operates without consciousness, while law stimulates man through his consciousness. In accordance with law, conscious natures are called into existence, educated to exercise appropriate to them, which is carried on by and within themselves. They are not machines acted upon unconsciously by external power. Suppose a child, educated by his parent, and that in a decision he makes, may be distinctly traced the effect of the education of that parent. Can it be said that, inasfar as the parent was the cause, the child was but as a machine in that choice? [216] JS: According to this a man’s acts are the result of his organization, or

in other words of God’s will. God is never the author of virtue and murder, of self-sacrifice and tyranny. It only removes the causation a step further off to introduce the idea of law. The law comes from God. The law leads to crime. Therefore, etc., where there is nothing but irresistible progress in one direction we may infer law, or in other words that it is God’s will. But where there is a paucity of progress in more directions than one there must be a determining power other than God’s will. What is it, law? No because God cannot be the author of two opposites (love and murder). Choice, then: it is the only alternative, in other words free will. Education as is well known acts not on the will at all, but it directs the will in using particular faculties or opportunities, and renders the use of these ‘‘by the will’’ easier in each successive occasion. It also gives data for the will to use. It may be safely stated that whenever the will has been attempted to be bent, the educator has failed and this is a common cause of failure.

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FN: Law which, in educating human beings to a future destiny, is the

origin of the decision a man makes, can no more be characterized as levelling man to a machine than can a parent who, in giving an education to his child, is traced as the cause of any decision made by that child. JS: The law here supposed decides one man to love his fellows, and another to destroy them. The law supposed makes man a machine. But the fact is there is no such law. The fact of one man hating and another loving rests on totally different grounds. The cases supposed do not admit of comparison. The parent cannot educate the ‘‘volition’’ of the child. The attempt is a common cause of rebellion in youth. FN: ‘‘Choice’’ (often a state of indecision) and ‘‘obedience’’ are indicative of imperfection, JS: On the contrary, the only conceivable perfection except passive

per fection consists in freedom absolute, used in consistence with the highest interests. And this act in perfection is the highest of which man can conceive. The earthly form of it is given by St Paul: ‘‘The spirit of power, and of love, and of a sound mind’’ [2 Tim 1:7]. FN: be yond which even imperfect man should strive to advance.

‘‘Choice’’ (where there has been doubt) and ‘‘obedience’’ are inferior, secondar y states of mind, inferior, that is, to a state of accordance with the perfect will, to be one with which is the highest state. JS: This is passivity and is morally a lower state than activity. Animals in

their paradise would be so. [217] FN: In fact, I cannot conceive of ‘‘obedience’’ at all, except as obedi-

ence to an imper fect Being. If the Being towards whom we are exercising obedience is perfect, and we are convinced He is perfect, it ceases to be obedience, it must become accordance. JS: This to me is quite unintelligible except I admit an industratum

[?] of thought based on ‘‘necessity’’ which I deny to be the foundation of the universe. In this passage which is quite logical from your premises I recognize the modern ‘‘idea of’’ law appearing in the older one of ‘‘necessity.’’ They are in fact the same idea as so used. FN: Even in the midst of the most severe paroxysms of pain, I have

felt this! JS: Quite so. But this does not follow from ‘‘necessity’’ of suffering

pain, but from the idea that it is ‘‘best,’’ and this very thing involves the exercise of free will, which we always exercise. Let us call it what we may.

712 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought FN: If the law is perfect which subjects me to this, let me not obe y, let

me second the perfect will, accord, agree with it. This is the perfect ‘‘love’’ of the ‘‘scriptures.’’ And towards the perfect there can be no obedience, but love, accordance. JS: To say I submit because it is a law of my being is one thing. To say

‘‘thy will be done’’ is quite another thing. The former proceeds on the theor y of an inexorable Law-Creator and law-created world. The latter, on the certainty (it is no theory as our own hearts tell us), of a loving, intelligent Creator, always doing the very best for us, although we cannot always see it. The ‘‘accordance’’ you desiderate is the highest conquest of free will. So high is it that it is one of the few things our Lord taught his disciples to pray for. To endure because it is inevitable and to accord because it is God’s will are the result of two entirely opposite philosophies. At the root of the one lies law, at the root of the other, free will. FN recap: ‘‘The use of the word law here requires careful definition.

The idea of law was drawn first from social relations. Then, when science arose, the social idea was carried naturally into the material world. We talk of the common law and of the law of gravitation. Now, in neither of these senses is volition under law at all. The very faculty is the opposite of law in that sense.’’ FN: I understand the word ‘‘law’’ to signify either a will that a defini-

tive state of things shall be always simultaneous with or successive to some other definitive state of things, whenever the latter occurs, or to signify such uniformity of co-existence or succession as, if not considered as attributable to will, yet is invariable as if it were the result of will, united with power to effect its realization. [217] JS: This does not apply to ‘‘volition’’ at all. A good musician has the ‘‘volition’’ to play on a bad instrument and does his best, but the result is very different on a good instrument, although the volition is the same in either case. FN: On this understanding of the meaning of the word ‘‘law,’’ I maintain that volitions accord with law, are manifestations of law, inasmuch as they are phenomena existing in uniform relations of simultaneity or succession to other phenomena. JS: This has never been shown at all and yet it is the whole question. It cannot be shown that volition as such follows any succession, acting, however, generally does. FN: Ever y volition is successive to or simultaneous with some phe-

nomenon or assemblage of phenomena; if this again exist, the same

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volition will be co-existent or successive. In other words, each volition exists in such relation of simultaneity or succession to some other phenomenon or assemblage of phenomena that, had this not existed, the volition would not have existed. JS: It has not, and cannot be proved! ‘‘Will’’ is free and above all mat-

ter and phenomena. It is lord and master in its sphere, and will subjugate matter and phenomena yet to the full bent of its original power, which is its only ‘‘law.’’ Other wise progress would be absolutely impossible and would be under the dominion of matter, which would be absurd. ‘‘Choose ye which ye will serve’’: matter or will [a paraphrase of Josh 24:15]. FN recap: ‘‘Volition acts within bounds or limits, and there is a certain similarity in its manifestations in all men as beings of the same order. In this sense alone is there a law. Except in this sense, human volition is a self-determining power.’’ FN: I refer to observation and experience to decide whether volition

does not manifest that uniformity which entitles us to designate it as according with law (defined as above) or whether volition only manifests law in a limited sense, exhibits only ‘‘a certain similarity in its manifestations in all men as beings of the same order, but is at the same time a self-determining power.’’ JS: So do I refer to experience. If the will ever follows in the same tract it is not because it is subject to law, but because it chooses to follow. And it chooses to follow because there is a motive, which motive in the ordinar y affairs of life is experience, but the volition acts, for all that, with entire freedom. [218] FN: ‘‘The only question’’ humanity has to ask, in reference to dependence on a higher Power, is, ‘‘Has He revealed himself?’’ To me the question appropriate to humanity seems to be: Is the law on which we find that human existence, human destiny, depend satisfactory or not to the wants appropriate to the human mind, consequently on that law? viz., the wants of a spirit of love, of sympathy, of justice, benevolence, conscientiousness, of a desire to learn the truths within our ken, JS: In other words to try to solve the insoluble problem of necessity by

our experience. FN: whatever else may be understood as the desire of a righteous

mind, i.e., the desire appropriate, through its laws, to healthy human nature.

714 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought JS: What is a healthy human mind? Why should we even have to distinguish a human mind as healthy? Here again comes in the idea of necessity. There is no such law discernible by us. If it is meant to ask, ‘‘is our experience of life in conformity with what one believes God’s moral government ought to be?’’ Then the reply must be that almost ever y human being will give a different answer. Unless we vary the question and ask, ‘‘ought we to submit to things as they are because God knows best,’’ and then the great majority would answer yes. FN: In the desire to ‘‘submit’’ without question to any higher Power

(be that power God or man) I see nothing which the highest Power (the Power of Right) should wish to constitute us for, constitute us, that is, to believe such ‘‘submission’’ to be the highest rectitude. This is ‘‘obedience,’’ not right. JS: The simple reply to all this, that God is omnipotent, we must

admit this while we admit that He is free. I believe that He has fitted our minds to learn His laws and understand their object. FN: Note: Job’s expression, ‘‘Though he slay me, yet will I trust in

him’’ [Job 13:15]. JS: Only those can use such an expression who have been tried. Those who have not been tried cannot. [221] FN: Isaiah’s question as to the right of the ‘‘clay’’ to ask of the ‘‘pot-

ter’’ anything about its creation [Isa 45:9], JS: Certainly absolutely, God has the power. FN: the Jesuit’s aspiration to be able to love God though he be thrown by Him into hell, JS: Such a question is not asked of us. The Jesuit asks it of himself. FN: appear to me all utter confusions as to the character of God,

echoes of the reverence for mere Power embodied in Eastern despotism, the very reverse of what I think the purpose of God in our creation. JS: Because you have made a deity submit to necessity. It is the same idea which lies at the root of all philosophic theism from the earliest dawn of philosophy, and leads to results you do not contemplate. FN: Power without right is not an object of reverence. And it would

be probably impossible to find in any savage superstition one more cr uel than that contained in Calvin’s own words. But indeed it would be difficult to call Calvin’s a religion at all, if religion is the tie to a good Being.

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‘‘God in predestinating from all eternity one part of mankind to everlasting happiness and another to endless misery was led to make this distinction by no other motive than his own good pleasure (note: ‘‘good pleasure’’! and free will’’). Of what devil could be said worse than this? JS: The whole of this is incorrect as regards Calvin. It is a partial state-

ment. And even if it were correct it does not touch Christianity and the Christian ideas of God. [219] FN: The abominable doctrine involved in that of baptismal regenera-

tion (viz., that God damns little babies come into the world without any choice of their own, and which certainly could not get themselves baptized) is another superstition about the nature of God unparallelled for its atrocity in any savage tribe. What human murderer could be compared to Him in crime, if this were so? JS: The truth should not be condemned on account of error. Besides you draw conclusions, logically enough I admit, from the error, which its supporters would deny. It is right to show that for it is no part of Christianity. FN: The wretched Church of England, one day some years ago, brought

to look this thing fairly in the face, and to say whether God did damn little babies or not answered: 1. It was an open question; 2. It did not signify; 3. People might believe one thing or the other (or both) as they liked. ‘‘Did not signify’’! whether God was the worst of tyrants and murderers or not. FN recap: ‘‘This is the question of all ages and times: what ought to be?’’ It has been so. And this is most important as showing, in all religious and moral questions, that to know and to bring to pass what appears the right to the human mind is one of its essential wants. ‘‘What ought to be? would never have been asked, if the fundamental conception of God’s character and moral government had not varied in every individual man by light of nature. The very question grants the whole case, viz., that there is a striking discrepance between what various men think there ‘‘ought to be,’’ and what the same men think ‘‘there is.’’ [220] JS: In the whole of your reply to me, there is a mixture of what I admit to be true and what is not as it appears to me tenable. There is no doubt in the first place that there is a religion of nature, a religion which

716 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought man works out for himself; at all events he considers that he has done so and is more or less satisfied with the result. Conscience lies at the root of the best form of it, but the form is infinitely varied according to the constitution of individual minds. Every centur y three thousand millions of people die and there is ever y probability that the religious ideas of this mighty host have varied more or less in every individual. Natural religion, therefore, in the sense of being a religio, is no religio at all, but apparently the wreck or remains of a religio which the human race once had. Just as the fossil collection in the British Museum is not a whole but only parts of a whole which once existed as a whole. This is to me the only conceivable explanation of the phenomenon. To suppose that God is in any sense the author of ideas of Himself and of His character so varied, so contradictory, so cruel, so immoral as these various ideas of a religion would indicate is to revive the old difficulty, whether there were not after all a number of contradictor y gods, which led to paganism, of which learning by the way there is a curious illustration in the last number of the Westminster [Review]. One thing is quite certain, and that is the only point we have to deal with, that up to the present moment the human mind, by its own power, has discerned no God’s government under which the entire human race is discovered to fit. As to Muhammad, everyone knows where he got his Koran [Qu’an]. It is one of the works (and there are many others in the world) of revelation, in the same sense as the ethnic idea of God is the wreck of a primal but lost religion. It is this same reminiscence which leads to all merely human attempts to disparage revelation and to discover a God and a God’s government. Theism has up to this present moment been as powerless for good as Muhammadanism, or any other merely human religion. The only question therefore, I repeat, is: has God revealed Himself? It is merely a question of fact, and like every question of fact it must be settled by evidence, and not by any preconception of what God ought to do or to say. FN: Now, if we look at phenomena, if we judge of single facts as

known to us from human experience, we shall indeed feel the discrepancy between what ‘‘is’’ and what ‘‘ought to be.’’ Man is forever contrar y to (or below) the best possibilities of his nature. We seek then a revelation to assist us to solve this difficulty. Some will answer we find it in the Bible, others in the Koran, others in other books supposed to be from superhuman sources. My disbelief in these as direct revela-

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tions, i.e., as being other than man’s noblest attempts (up to the present time) in the course of his development to understand God (in which attempts he has formed ‘‘God in his own image’’) is founded on the contradictions in these to universal law. This once admitted, what have been supposed to be revelations cease to appear so, because, on this admission, they fundamentally contradict both what ‘‘is’’ and what ‘‘ought to be.’’ FN recap: Human will ‘‘is a separate independent faculty.’’ [221] FN: What is a faculty? Is it synonymous with power? JS: Not necessarily. FN: For example, we say, man has the faculty of speech; does this not

mean that the power of speech exists in mankind? This faculty or power exists accordantly with or dependently on laws, i.e., it does or does not exist, and it exists in one mode or another, according as certain definite pre-existences or co-existences have been and are, or have not been and are not. JS: With regard to will, the faculty is willing, not doing. The power, if you will have the word, is that of willing freely and independently within the sphere of its being, but not necessarily of producing action, which is another thing. The power of willing is under no law in the sense in which you use the word. So I say, and I don’t believe a human being ever arrived at the conclusion that the will was found except by mixing up the ideas of willing and acting. FN: With respect to the faculty or power of will and how it is exer-

cised, we can only refer as before to obser vation and experience as to whether this faculty or power of willing differs from every other by not existing in, and being modified by, relations of simultaneity and succession with and to other phenomena, or whether, the more closely we observe, the more ground we find for believing that volitions do arise and vary connectedly, uniformly with sensations, thoughts, emotions, and that sensations, thoughts, emotions do arise and vary with organization and circumstances. JS: No! This idea, which leads logically to pantheism, and is in fact the

ground of that idea, has resulted as it appears to me from, first, want of courage in dealing with the freedom which God has given man. Second, and mainly, from want of analysis in confounding willing and acting. Willing has nothing to do whatever with sensations, thoughts, emotions. Acting has a great deal to do with them, and it has a great deal to do with organization.

718 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought FN: Men fear to look this experience in the face and to acknowledge

it, because they imagine that it is to acknowledge themselves powerless machines, or ‘‘animated stones.’’ JS: No, on the contrary, necessitarianism with its law-bound creator and law-bound will is afraid to look at God’s freedom and men’s freedom and to take the consequence of both, and it shelters itself behind an ‘‘eternal order of things’’ and so saves itself all further trouble. FN: The very reverse is the fact. Law is the means always at hand to

afford us power. Law is the inducement, if our minds are enlightened, our hearts true, to use the power aright. JS: This is a perfectly logical result, but it should be carried further. What say you to this: ‘‘Law compels me to diminish human suffering, which is great upon the earth, in the only way I can relieve it, namely, by taking away human life,’’ that is part of a creed. FN: If I believe that a certain state of will is right, if I wish for that

state of will which is right, [224] JS: This subverts by a stroke of the pen the distinction between ‘‘free will’’ and ‘‘necessity’’ and would do very well for the commencement of a chapter on the ethics of free will. FN: if I also believe that, in certain circumstances, upon which is con-

sequent a certain state (as to sensations, thoughts, emotions) human will becomes right, is not the course obvious to endeavour to bring about these circumstances for mankind? JS: And this is simply applying in practice the ethics of free will. But it utterly subverts the logical sequence from the position that will is under law. FN: What is all that we are doing for sanitary reform but this? We

know that crime, disease and death always go together. We know that to preach to a man to do right, and to send him back into a pigsty, where he cannot but do wrong, is nonsense. We set about improving his pigsty. What are all our attempts at education, Poor Law reform, municipal institutions, but one assertion of this belief? What has Louis-Napoléon’s whole course been, in his attempts to destroy these things, but another assertion of this belief in the converse sense? JS: Most certainly, but mortality tables and sanitary reform and physi-

cal morals, and the reformation of prisoners, all proceed on the basis of the philosophy of free will, which is the glorious liberty we got at the Reformation and which has made England what she is and a light on these subjects to all lands. Were your philosophical principles as

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laid down in the earlier part of this discussion true, every one of these reforms would have been impossible. For instance, I have found the real logical necessitarians everywhere opposed to these reforms, as they always must be. FN: The mode in which the will acts is subject for observation and

experience, from which we may collect evidence. Will it be said that obser vation and experience teach us that we can ‘‘will as we please’’? JS: One case is enough. If the will in any case can act independently of law, it can act independently of law. FN: Granted, in some cases. Truly and justly a certain previous exercise of our nature secures us the power to ‘‘will as we please,’’ while error or neglect deprives us of this power. If we desire to will right habitually, or to help others to do so, we must study so to live that we shall bring about such volitions. JS: Tr ue, but how? that is the whole question. FN: That is, we must so keep God’s laws that this will follow. JS: How do we know God’s laws unless He has revealed them? We

have certainly not discovered enough to guide us. FN: In proportion as humanity desires the right, pursues the right, in

accordance with law, human organization and circumstances will, by the power which law offers to man, be rendered such that human nature will progressively advance in what is right and true. JS: This again is begging the whole question. Law can never give

power. It presupposes power. FN: Can the imperfect have a greater scope to attain and exercise all

power which can be truly, rightly desired? FN recap: ‘‘A per fectly righteous and omnipotent Being has created

other beings with certain faculties.’’ [222] FN: On what ground is this asserted, unless on the admission of law of

such character and tendency as manifests a perfectly righteous and omnipotent Being? Do phenomena, on the separate facts of human life, enable us to assert it? JS: On the ground of everyday observation we know that our idea of what is right, and our knowledge of what we are by nature, are at direct antagonism. The Bible does solve the enigma in the only way our faculties tell us it can be solved. No other philosophy, no other socalled revelation does so, for they all rest on the basis of necessity, which contradicts our experience.

720 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Depend on it that there is no stronger proof of the decay of mental health among us than that afforded by our popular so-called philosophical writing which, in order to escape the clear utterances of scripture, dethrones a free Creator and sets up an inexorable fate in His stead. FN: Does the Bible or any other (so-called) revelation really present

to us a perfectly righteous and omnipotent Being? What ‘‘the Lord’’ is there said to have said and done, if we now heard it for the first time, could the true human heart, the mind enlightened even to our present possibility, hear it for the first time, could it accept such as any conception of the character of a perfectly righteous and omnipotent Being? Impossible. JS: Christians accept the character of Christ in the New Testament as the personal manifestation of God’s character. If you or anyone else can give us the absolute freedom we then have and at the same time give us a more per fect personal manifestation, pray give it to us. But until this is done, excuse us from declining the Trinity of the fates as God. When I meet with a tr ue human heart I will reply to the latter part of your question. It admits of a very satisfactor y reply otherwise. FN recap: Men ‘‘have, in all ages, recognized responsibility in some

sense.’’ FN: Does this prove that responsibility is the true term for the connec-

tion existing between humanity and a superhuman Power? Responsibility, in the received understanding of the word, implies conditions offered and accepted, implies ‘‘answering.’’ How can there be an answer when no question has been asked? How can there be responsibility ‘‘recognized’’ (in any tr ue ‘‘sense’’ at least), between man called into existence without a choice of his own, and the source of that existence? [222] JS: You cannot reason man out of his sense of what is commonly

called responsibility, namely, that somehow or other, some time or other, he must meet his Creator more nearly than at present, and answer for the use of all his faculties and opportunities. It is utterly useless to argue that this cannot be, because God has made it part of man’s nature, of which he is as certain as he is of anything. FN recap: ‘‘If there be certainty of perfection, the will must will per-

fection, otherwise it is unattainable.’’ Nem. Con. [nothing contrary]. Per fection must be the will of the imperfect, before it can be attained.

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‘‘It is surely possible for God to reveal Himself to the creature He has made.’’ FN: The word ‘‘God’’ has been used to express such various conceptions that there is a degree of vagueness in this proposition, which however I admit to be undeniable, since all these conceptions include the idea of superhuman Power. (Note. It would be the greatest gain religion has ever made, if, for a time, the word God, which suggests such various and irreverent associations (irreverent, that is, to a spirit seeking right) could be dropped. And the conception substituted of a perfect Being, called the Spirit of Right). JS: Even so! In such a philosophy as we have now arrived at it is highly necessar y to get quit of the word and ideas attached to it. One step further and your pitiless logic will have run itself out. If you have a ‘‘per fect Being’’ without free will, governed by law, and creatures without will, and under law, why not exchange the idea of your ‘‘per fect Being’’? Of what use is it? Martineau, Comte and Holyoake have arrived at this, by the sheer force of logic! FN recap: ‘‘If He has so revealed Himself, the revelation must be a cor-

rect one. He cannot deny Himself.’’ [223] FN: This depends, in order not to be either a truism or a nonsense,

upon what has been said before. If God has revealed Himself to our understandings as a Spirit of Truth, to such a nature it is undeniably impossible to contradict Himself. I find such a revelation in His laws. But I do not find any other harmonious or consistent revelation. JS: There can be no revelation of this kind except what is common to

the human race, and what the result of it is history and philosophy have pretty well told us. You assume individual ‘‘imperatives’’ so to speak. I assert that if you receive the teachings of revelation just as you would receive any of the teachings, there could be no contradiction. I assert simply that neither from your own experience, nor from the universe, can you know God’s laws. Before you assert this you ought to show what are laws sufficient to enable you to know God and God’s will, and then you must show that no other laws are necessar y to be known and that you knew the ‘‘necessar y.’’ FN recap: ‘‘The only question is, has He revealed Himself?’’ [218] FN: In what sense the only question? Another question, it appears to

me, man will be impelled to ask, and the force of desire with which he seeks for an answer will be exactly in proportion to the healthy devel-

722 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought opment of his nature, exactly in proportion to the advance in his knowledge of human nature, of human history, and exactly in proportion as he realizes in his conception the actual history (with the intensity of its horrors and the sublimity of its beauty) of human nature. (To be a historian, even a Macaulay, does not necessarily imply this. A mere hold on the memory of facts which have occurred by no means implies a realization in our consciousness of the consciousness of those to whom they occurred. Somebody has justly said that, if we could realize the misery, the crime, the lunacy, the pain, the suffering going on at this one moment of our existence, we should go mad.) The question then that we shall ask unceasingly, eagerly, earnestly, in proportion as we do realize human history will be: does there exist such a Power as causes man’s existence to be a road by which humanity shall attain to an existence of progressive righteousness, without limit short of per fection? The answers to all questions concerning human nature, human destiny, concerning the superhuman Power believed to be the Source and Ruler of Human Existence, will be modified, according as we believe or disbelieve that all the phenomena of nature are manifestations of law. (I include in the word ‘‘nature’’ all modes of existence which have a beginning and are subject to changes. Each of these modes is generally called a phenomenon.) I consider the beginning of and every change in each phenomenon to be a manifestation of law, in the sense above defined of the word ‘‘law.’’ In other words, the relations are such, in which phenomena exist to one another, that no one would have existed unless some other, existing previously or simultaneously, had so existed. And, as often as these definite phenomena again exist, again will arise the same co-existing or successive phenomena. Whether there is any exception to this rule experience must decide. Being convinced of its universality, I can only consider questions in accordance with its admission. [224] JS: Done into plain words this means that the present state of things was the best possible when it was framed, that we may rest assured it was the wisest because it is, and that we shall some time or other be convinced that it was the most benevolent and just. And that all this is the result of certain laws, which it is hypothetically supposed regulate the concerns of the universe. Now I am a great friend to examining with these laws or plans, provided we go no further than observe facts and classify these

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facts for the sake of convenience as we go on. The more we do this, the more will we know of God’s works, and the more will we learn of our own relations to the external universe and our power over it. But in the physical universe it would be simply absurd to predicate the unknown from the known, or to antedate as it were our discoveries. A man would be mad who would try to propel a steam engine through the air, although the time may arrive when we shall be able to do so. If this be true of the physical world, how much more is it true of the spiritual world? What do we really know of the spiritual world by our natural faculties? We suppose in philosophy that such and such things are the best. How do we know? We suppose humanity to be by nature progressive. Is it so? What experience have we of it? We are cer tain that sin and crime and sorrow sweep over the world unceasingly like a flood. It is horrible. It is abominable to contemplate. And yet more terrible still is the apparent contradiction that our own hearts tell us that our Creator is a merciful, holy, loving, perfect being. Is it possible that He can be the author of such obvious contradiction? It is not impossible, says philosophy, because in my opinion all must be for the best. It is impossible, says humanity, for I feel it cannot be. Come let us reason together, says philosophy, and I will convince you that your feelings are all wrong and that my reason can show you so. It is true I am not like your mechanical Philosopher [Aristotle], I cannot show you facts and discoveries, but I can give you reasons. ‘‘Reasons,’’ says humanity, ‘‘what have I to do with your reasons; have not I facts to deal with?’’ ‘‘Oh,’’ says philosophy, ‘‘your facts must be some part of the laws of the universe.’’ ‘‘How do you know?’’ says humanity. ‘‘I do not profess to know,’’ says philosophy, ‘‘but I can explain the whole matter in a satisfactory way.’’ ‘‘Can you,’’ says humanity, ‘‘give me back my lost child, my lost property, my lost wife, my lost eyesight, my lost health, my lost reason. Above all can you relieve me from the terror of my last account with God?’’ ‘‘No,’’ replies philosophy, ‘‘I cannot do any one of these things. I can perhaps show you that all are for the best and that you are wrong in supposing that God will account with you at last. It is in fact all part of a great plan which you and I will know more about afterwards.’’ This is really the state of the question. You try to discover something about God, either out of your own reason and understanding, or by analogy with nature, not one of which can tell you anything certain on the subject. And you mix up with these ideas so acquired certain other

724 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought ideas derived from the Bible, and so a God and a universe are created, and placed under law and from the creation so framed, which can never be the creation of anyone else, you argue against the revealed character of God in the scripture, and adjourn all the questions that humanity must have an answer to now into an indefinite futurity. FN: This view of humanity then follows: by the laws of man’s nature,

righteousness of nature and of life is his appropriate desire for himself and his kind. Yet, through the laws of which all phenomena are the manifestation, such an existence has been to many impossible. A nature and life of sin has been inevitable. JS: The whole plan of observation and induction is hollow. I should consider it simply madness to trust either life or soul to it, and so would everyone else, if they really were required to do so. But the fact is people don’t trust to what they profess. Reason cannot discern religious truth, for it deals solely with relations of facts. Understanding cannot discern religious truth, for it deals solely with facts. In what way are religious truths known? The answer is by the soul, but the soul lives only through God; it has no independent existence in the individual in the way that reason and understanding have. Yet the soul does not discover truth, it only receives, and religious truth comes direct from God or from nowhere. I mean by tr uth what man knows he may trust in. It is the highest kind of knowledge. (It is necessary to state that the idea I attach to religious truth here is not the philosophical idea, but the Christian idea. The philosophical religion, if there be such a thing, has nothing to do with the soul.) FN: Had it been thus to one only, the problem would have been the

same. And this is what I mean when I say that, in proportion as we realize the horrors of human history, the righteous mind will feel utter repugnance at such conditions of existence, unless there is ground for belief that (1) the law by which righteousness of nature and of life is made the appropriate desire of human nature and (2) the law by which it is to some impossible JS: There is no such law; it is simply an assumption. FN: are both the manifestations of a righteous Power, affording thus

the assurance (1) that sin is an evil remediable in time to come, JS: Sin is an evil remediable now or never. We know nothing by phi-

losophy of the life to come. FN: that (2) righteousness is to be attained through, if not during,

human existence.

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JS: Righteousness is to be obtained now or never, so far as our knowledge goes. In a matter of such inconceivable importance You require others to trust to inductions drawn from a philosophy which cannot deal with the questions at all. Why hold out delusive hopes? Why not say at once, here are such and such contradictory phenomena, who can solve them? And leave the question, or else take up the child nature, the first step in the solution of the problem, and go to Him who blessed the children, and say here are the contradictions, can you solve them? All the little children know that He has solved them. FN recap: ‘‘Who can by searching find out God? Who can discern the

Almighty to perfection? The problem is a mightier one than you contemplate.’’ [225] FN: Let us be equally careful neither to be fools who rush into sub-

jects in which evidence is unattainable, nor cowards throwing dust in our own eyes. If we ‘‘by searching’’ try to ‘‘find out’’ the nature of ‘‘God,’’ the beginning, the end, etc., we are fools. If we take for granted that we cannot learn or must not inquire, where evidence is within our reach, we are cowards. JS: Yes, wherever there is evidence go reverently. But put off the philosopher’s cloak. FN: The finite is utterly incapable of understanding the mode of being

of the Infinite, who reveals Himself by His laws as the Source and Ruler of our being. JS: It would be well to say where the laws are. I do not say there are no laws as mediatory expression of God’s will, but this is not the point. Of late years there has been an unusual talk about God’s laws, and this talk has got into both philosophy and religion. But it is nothing but talk. FN: But these laws, forever operating within and around us, seem to be expressly constituted in order to reveal to us the character, the thought, the plan, the will of man’s Creator and Ruler, as far as man is concerned. JS: This is simply an assumption. FN: It is consequent upon these laws that we have a consciousness of

right and wrong, in other words, that we have a consciousness concerning some thoughts, feelings, objects, pursuits expressed by calling them right, concerning others, by calling them wrong. JS: And this, the idea of right and wrong in man, is subject to as much variation as any other idea. I mean of course naturally. Man has the

726 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought faculty of knowing right and wrong but nothing more. The right of one generation is the wrong of another. Like other faculties it may err and does continually err. FN: It is consequent upon His laws that love, benevolence, justice, the

pursuit of truth and knowledge, have to our minds the character of right, JS: To your mind, not to Torquemada’s. He would have thought the highest love, benevolence, justice and truth counted in burning you for writing this paper. Only a week or two ago God’s justice was interpreted as meaning that the revolt in India was God’s revenge against Protestantism in England. Not a doubt that the men and the people whose sentiments he represents believe it. FN: that we include in right the attempt to realize, to the extent of our

power, these qualities in ourselves, and in others. Is not this practically admitted in our attempts to educate the ignorant, to reform the erring? JS: Don’t forget that these attempts came not of philosophy but of the

Christian faith. Let philosophy show its works and don’t let it boast itself in the works of others. Your basic principles, if rigidly followed out, would prevent action. FN: Are we presumptuous then (our minds being thus constituted by

the will of the Almighty) in our conviction that, to that Almighty, through whose teaching in His laws we reckon love and benevolence as essential to righteousness of character, it would be impossible to exist alone, while powerful to bring about goodness and happiness? JS: There is no presumption in any part of this except in the fundamental principle, that we know enough naturally to be able to predicate what God’s character and moral administration is. Which is certainly not the case. FN: Are we presumptuous in the conviction that (since He has so con-

stituted our natures that we feel, unless through defect or ignorance, that righteous existence is alone of real value) the Omnipotent will secure to our natures the realization of this righteous existence? It does not shock our sense of right, with regard to the rule, in conformity with which we find human nature exists, that sin and suffering are incident to it. [226] JS: It ceases to shock our sense only when we admit ‘‘necessity’’ as the law of the universe, which I deny absolutely. But the fact is most people don’t think on the subject at all.

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FN: For we find that to learn, to acquire truth and knowledge, to attain

righteousness (the means, through which we shall certainly arrive at it, being bestowed on our imperfection by the Perfect in Righteousness, the Almighty in Power) is the best which is possible for imperfect being. JS: This is all hypothesis without a shadow of proof. It is not in us natu-

rally at all. If man has any tendency in himself it is in declension. If he advances it is not of himself but of God acting against man’s proclivity. FN: (When I say ‘‘which is possible,’’ I do not imply necessity; I mean

that it must be without some contradiction or inconsistency, itself inconsistent with the Spirit of Truth.) JS: Yes, but you must accept one or other of the forms of the dilemma. Either necessity or free will. As it stands this proposition, when worked backwards, subverts all you have said on the subject. FN: If God’s plan for man is truth to be lear nt, right to be attained by

man for mankind, through the teaching of God’s law (as means and inducement), to such a plan sin and sorrow are essential, but remediable. JS: Your proposition is not ‘‘tr uth to be learnt’’; I agree with that. Yours is truth to be discovered by man’s natural powers, such that it shall teach him everything about God that it is necessary for him to know, and to ensure his salvation and everlasting life. That is your proposition. Men cannot do that. [226] FN: The character and tendency of these laws are educational. As

such, they show, as their source, righteous Power. Such a source assures us that the imperfect will attain to remedying each and all of our sins and our sorrows in the course of an existence, of which human life is but a part. JS: By all means discuss them and use them. Such discovery and use are the talents committed to us. Only don’t argue from this that man can by pursuing such a course discover all he requires to know and obtain. FN: Such a plan does not admit ‘‘responsibility.’’ JS: While at the same time it lands on the head of the Creator all the sin and sorrow and suffering that ever has been or ever will be to the end of time. It is so shaking to my sense of right and justice, that if I could really think you entertained it, it would be the greatest miracle I ever heard of. FN: These laws are not offered on conditions which we may accept or

refuse. We cannot refuse to be the subjects of His laws. Well for us we cannot! I for one should have refused, had I known what life was.

728 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought JS: Your idea of good and evil has landed you in Pyrrhonism. [226] FN: But perfect Love and Wisdom decide for the imperfect. It is well,

since our refusal could be but the refusal of ignorance. As we attain to the understanding of His plan, we shall accept it with all our hearts, though sin and sorrow may seem almost at times to overwhelm the fainting pilgrim walking in darkness and desolation. JS: Alas! alas! for all those countless myriads who have never known God’s plan, and for the myriads who will never know it. Better infinitely to accept Stoicism here and endless death hereafter. It is a shorter and less confusing creed, than to try to reconcile all these contradictions by philosophy. FN: But the Father never forsakes him (‘‘My God, my God, why hast

thou forsaken me?’’ [Ps 22:1, quoted by Jesus in Matt 27:46] is a mistaken cry). [227] JS: Little did I ever think that I should have met with a human hand who could have penned this. Pray God that in his mercy you may yet be compelled to utter the same cry. You will see more clearly then on some points than I fear you do now. FN: The Father conducts him surely to light, stirring up within him

the will to use his own powers to gain all for his kind (including himself ) which makes life of value. Though we be comparatively in darkness, it is in us to see that law alone, without making us machines (‘‘animated stones’’), can secure our attaining, by and through the exercise of our own natures, to become one with God. JS: Law mark! not God. God is dethroned, law is in His stead. Rewrite this and put God where you have put law and see how it will read. FN: When I say ‘‘can’’ I again explain that I mean no necessity. I mean ‘‘can’’ without contradiction, absurdity, inconsistency. JS: You cannot get off the horn. FN: ‘‘To God all things are possible’’ [Matt 19:26], viz., which are pos-

sible to God. To Him, the Spirit of Truth, contradiction or inconsistency is impossible. For He would thereby cease to be the Spirit of Truth, to be God. I should reverse Job and say, Because I know Thou canst not (will not) slay me, therefore I trust Thee [paraphrase of Job 15:13]. FN recap: ‘‘You desiderate a human being with certain faculties, subor-

dinated to certain laws, which you consider the best, and having so conceived of your man, you charge the Almighty with the duty of finishing a work He has left unfinished.’’ [227]

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FN: No desideratum of my own invention can affect the question, nor

indeed has entered my mind, excepting this: I ‘‘desiderate’’ to learn what is. I believe what is is right, not because I submit without question to superior Power, but because the healthiest promptings of the nature bestowed upon me yearn for right (to be realized in the existence of all my kind). I therefore search for a true interpretation of what is, determined to accept nothing as truth unless it comes home as the accordance of what is and what is right. Where I can see no such accordance, I remain respectfully in doubt, trusting to learn here and hereafter what shall remove all doubt. JS: I repeat that you have not found a man subservient to certain laws. You suppose you have found him that is all. I have found a man with free will. FN: I find a man ‘‘with certain faculties subordinated to certain

laws.’’ I do not invent him. The effects of these laws are such that (constituted as I am) I might admit their Author to be Almighty if he did not ‘‘finish His work.’’ I could not admit Him to be righteous (constituted as He has made me), if He did not ‘‘finish His work.’’ FN recap: ‘‘You charge the Almighty with the duty of finishing a work He has left unfinished.’’ [228] FN: This is a forced construction, that however taught by His law, I

interpret that it is His Will eternally to carry on this work. ‘‘Left unfinished’’: I believe that He never leaves it, but is carrying on in perfect wisdom, truth and love, the work of right which will never ‘‘finish.’’ JS: This again is a mere hypothesis on which you rest your own salvation and that of the human race. It is in part a religion, true you say to your nature, utterly untrue and hollow to mine. Our natures then are radically opposed on the most important of all questions. So far as I have studied the laws to which you have alluded they bear no such interpretation as you have put upon them. FN recap: ‘‘There may be a world where such a process is to go on, but

it is certainly not this world, except in the case of the lower animals, who are per fect in their kind.’’ FN: This world’s work is merely a part of the realization of God’s plan

(viz., the education of imperfection towards perfection), as shown by His laws. JS: This is true, but it follows from quite other premises than yours. It

does not follow from your premises.

730 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought FN: How indeed can the thoughts of the Infinite and Eternal be car-

ried out (or perfected) in the finite world? JS: A proper question but not germane to your position. FN: In infinity and eternity alone are we to advance towards perfec-

tion. FN recap: ‘‘Comte, Miss Martineau and Mr Atkinson save the mark!’’

[228] FN: Let not my friend give in to the common injustice of frivolously

supposing that one who believes with another on one point believes with that other on all points. With Comte I believe in the universality of law, but I entirely differ here, viz., that he thinks right to stop short when he has recognized law. (Miss Martineau and Mr Atkinson’s book is so weak, excepting in what they borrow from Comte, that I am really unable to say in what their propositions can be agreed with or in what differed from.) JS: Yes, but these people by narrow obser vation and by indulging in the idolum specus [idol of the cave, in Francis Bacon’s Great Instauration] have some of them denied God and others have placed law, of which they know nothing, as God. FN: Now, if I could get rid of the word law, I would and substitute for

it ‘‘a thought of God.’’ For this is all that it means to my mind. Comte sees law manifested throughout the phenomena of the universe and nothing more. I see ground for believing, as above said, that a law is nothing else than a thought of God. Without this staff, I cannot conceive how man dares bravely to walk through life’s difficult and dangerous paths. With it, I can conceive him thanking God even for his mistakes, from which he learns ‘‘right’’ for his kind. JS: You and I agree never now in the definition. God is perfectly free.

Freedom is the essential condition of spirit. God is infinitely perfect and you can depend on His perfectness. Observe very carefully what takes place under certain specific circumstances, and to the extent to which you can depend from experience, you may safely continue to depend. This is really all we ought to include under our idea of sequence. Law is a thing imposed. It saves us trouble if we can refer to the statute book, but in reality we cannot; we can only observe, and if we do so we shall find very little evidence of what we understand as law beyond the action of particles of matter on each other. God acts on a plan; we think we know His plan, but we don’t.

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FN: Except to the child or the animal, life can have no real peace

without this belief, viz., that the law of which the phenomena of the universe are a manifestation, is itself a manifestation of the existence of omnipotent Right. JS: You can have no peace in it from the instant the soul is awakened

out of its slumber. FN: All other peace can be only insensibility towards the sin and suf-

fering of our kind. FN recap: ‘‘There are or rather alas! there were spiritual laws or, better

and truer, a spiritual economy (for the term law is cold, frigid and ir rational). This economy is the reminiscence of humanity of the time when the Father dwelt in his house. But we would not.’’ FN: Let each speak for himself. I would that the Father should dwell in

His house, or, rather, I do not wish, I believe that He does dwell in every part of His house of the universe. And let me say that I deprecate the use of the evangelical jargon. It consists in saying that we are ver y bad, feeling all the while that we are ver y good for saying so. JS: This is a misunderstanding of the Christian religion altogether. FN recap: ‘‘The term law is irrational.’’ [232] FN: I should be glad to change it. I want a word to express the uni-

formity of the relations in which phenomena exist to one another in proportion to our knowledge of which relations we can foretell and influence the future. JS: Apply it to material phenomena and welcome, because we have made it out by observation, with the spiritual world it is different, we have there obser ved ver y little. Dr Sutherland’s Objections: ‘‘Whence comes conscience? From God.’’ [230] FN: Certainly, like every other faculty. But what does conscience mean? Is it not a consciousness with regard to some thoughts, feelings, actions, expressed by calling them wrong, with regard to others by calling them right, consequently upon which consciousness we desire the latter, avoid the former? But what is right or what is wrong? does conscience tell us this? In this matter, conscience has given entirely different verdicts to different ages and nations. Conscience told Calvin to allow that poor fool Servetus to be burnt. Conscience told the Egyptian Ptolemies to marry their sisters. Conscience told the old Romans to kill themselves. Conscience told the Jews to marry many wives and more concubines. Conscience told Abraham to marry his wife’s maid

732 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought and then to murder his own child. Many things now considered crimes, which we must not even mention, were at other periods or by other races considered duties or virtues. [230] JS: There is no need of answering this paper in detail because the arguments are the same as in the others. Your views, which rank you among the so-called positive religionists, and their views are based on principles which I deny, because the principles are hypothetical, and rest on no observed facts. Necessity is not a law of the universe. Man’s volition is absolutely free or he would not be man. There is no qualification of the term admissible. I hold free will in the sense of absolute independent volition. A power given by God to man to constitute him man. I have no doubt that God’s moral government is just and perfect, but we have never yet discerned how that government is conducted and most likely never will. I hold that the most obvious object of God’s dealings with man is that man, while retaining his will perfectly free, should in his very independence yield his will to God’s will, and not absorb it in God’s will. Holding these principles, the first three of which I hold to be proved and the last to be an obvious induction, I cannot for an instant admit your principles, the errors in which are obvious and easily traceable to your doctrine of necessity and your ideas of law. FN: Conscience tells many ‘‘to send up prayers and groans and bloody sacrifices for mercy and petitions for grace.’’ Conscience tells me the reverse, as long as I believe myself under the rule of a Being whose love, truth, justice, wisdom are inconsistent with the idea of ‘‘mercy,’’ and to whom ‘‘bloody sacrifices and petitions’’ would be but as the ignorance of His poor child, waiting for a better understanding of Him. I do not ‘‘petition for grace.’’ I ask for nothing. I rejoice always that His Will is law through infinity and eternity. Believing thus, I can thank God even for suffering and sorrow, even while struggling with the hardest suffering, my own ignorance and mistakes, past or present. JS: These ideas have been working in many minds for the last half centur y, and are to be traced in their present form to the revival or rather creation of physical science during the first French Revolution [of 1789]. Since that time matter has been in the ascendant and metaphysical science has been greatly neglected among us. The result of all on colleges and mechanics institutes has been that men’s thoughts and methods of reasoning have been directed into the channel of

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material induction, which is all very well and necessary with matter, but which leads only to error when transferred into the spiritual world. It is from this that first arose the modern necessitarian philosophy, judging in fact of spiritual things by the scale of atomic equivalents. And hence the idea of constructing a religion by subjecting God’s government and men’s relations to God to laws similar in their operation to the physical laws, and to perfect a man as you would perfect beer by ‘‘fermentation.’’ FN recap: ‘‘This is simply hypothesis.’’ ‘‘God has laid on all His crea-

tures an instinct requiring both mercy and grace.’’ FN: I have no such instinct, no more have many others, sincerely conscientious. Hence the desire for ‘‘mercy and grace’’ cannot be called an ‘‘instinct,’’ but the consequence of certain views, with regard to which it is desirable to consider whether there is, or is not, ground to believe them true. FN: Law, if it exist at all and whether it does or does not must stand on

evidence) is not ‘‘hypothesis’’ but fact. Its character and tendency are developing, and will be understood more and more as we improve in being and advance in knowledge. We can trace no beginning and no end to the thought of the Being who manifests Himself in law. Our glimpse at this eternal manifestation must be imperfect. But it is a revelation ever ready to unfold itself to our efforts to understand it. In this world, doubtless, it has the character of ‘‘hypothesis’’ to be verified hereafter. (So have many other things, upon which nevertheless we act.) JS: If new religions are to be accredited by miracles surely this ‘‘posi-

tive religion’’ has more miracles than any other ever had. Its miracles are miracles of reasoning. Matter is subject to laws deduced from obser vation. Ergo [therefore] spirit is subject to laws of which we have no obser vation. God appears to govern the material universe by defined laws, which we can in some sense arrive at. Ergo God governs the spiritual universe by laws we put hypothetically. And it is literally on this that Christianity is rejected. A stranger mutation of the perversity of that free will, which is denied, could hardly be adduced. You differ from others of these opinions in that you push your logic further, but you do not push it to its legitimate result which, incredible as it may appear, is hero worship and polytheism, but of a different aspect from the elder polytheism. FN recap: ‘‘God in creating must have created other beings in one of

two antitheses, (1) righteous, i.e., cognizant of and obeying every con-

734 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought dition on which the welfare of the universal creation depends, and for this the gift of free will is absolutely essential; or (2) unrighteous, i.e., disobedient to the conditions, which is absurd.’’ [231] FN: I see no evidence that man is created righteous or unrighteous,

nor any reason why he should be created in one state or the other. The baby enters the world neither in one state nor the other, unless the diabolical doctrine be adopted of ‘‘baptismal regeneration.’’ The baby becomes the one or the other, according as its thoughts, feelings, character, in short, are developed by its circumstances, acting on its organization. If we will, we can, to a certain degree, affect organization, and, when we cannot affect it, adapt circumstances favourably to it. And, if mankind at large attain to desiring the right, they will learn more and more to bring about this, viz., that both organization and circumstances shall ensure continual progress in righteousness, of being and of life. Can any evil be shown in human life not more or less remediable by power, wisdom and goodness attainable by man? Who shall say how far, then, all evil is not remediable? JS: In taking what may be called the active side, your reasoning passes

through pantheism and stops, push it further and you get hero worship. The human mind moves in all this in a circle. When man, left to himself, looked in the day and night orbs he said they were gods. When he settled in cities and his passions were lighted up he adored them. When he got an unexpected deliverance he adored his deliverer. And now after all these ages man, while admitting the supreme God has come round to the deification of the laws by which he considers the universe is governed, and he aspires to conform himself to God not on any positive knowledge of facts, but on an assumption that certain supposed laws, which he supposes he has discovered, are the will of God. FN recap: ‘‘It is necessary that the soul should receive what it requires from the Father, other wise it would be independent of its source, which is impossible. Why should the soul be the only exception in the universe to dependence on its Creator and upholder?’’ [232] FN: Am I conceiving of human nature as ‘‘independent of its source,’’

when I conceive of man’s entire being as a manifestation of the divine Thought and Will? (This is not a forced construction, but a misconstr uction of what I say.) It is the right wish of our nature not to be machines, ‘‘clay’’ in the hands of the ‘‘potter,’’ yet to attain (by His help given to our feebleness and ignorance) to be one with the Spirit of Love and Wisdom. For this

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end we are entirely ‘‘dependent’’ on His help. He gives it in the teaching of His law. We are (and we rejoice to be) entirely ‘‘dependent’’ on Him. JS: Hinduism was the ‘‘positivism’’ of 2000 years ago. Buddhism comes very near in some of its aspects to the present positivism. The present ‘‘positivism’’ ought to end in worship of man by man. The views in this paper are certain to gain a certain amount of circulation, as in fact they have already done. They will lead to inquiry on some unexamined points in philosophy and in theology, and then they will have served their time. Man will reassert his free will. And as soon as he recovers that he will be at no loss to discover what is true and what is untrue in the system. Like every other similarly constructed system, it is not all false. Much in it is true, not inherent, but derived from habits of thought engendered by Christianity, which you may rest assured will hold its own till the consummation of all things. Up to the present time we know nothing which harmonizes with the facts of our nature except Christianity. These views certainly do not. FN recap: ‘‘The golden age has the authority of infinitely greater

adaptation and acceptance than this hypothesis.’’ FN: I have yet to find any evidence that the ‘‘golden age’’ ever

existed, still more, any reason why it ever ought to have existed, or how (see Dr Sutherland) the ‘‘cross is the only key which opens the myster y of obedience and free will.’’ FN recap: ‘‘Knowledge a mastery over the will depriving it of its free-

dom.’’ FN: Does it deprive us of free will (in the sense above given to it), that

we certainly shall decide in some cases, according to our ‘‘knowledge’’? On the contrary. We are even indignant sometimes with others for supposing that we can decide otherwise than we do, having such or such a ‘‘knowledge.’’ ‘‘Could I decide,’’ we hear it said, ‘‘other wise, when I ‘knew’ so and so’’? ‘‘Could I, when I knew the soldiers were being murdered wholesale, decide otherwise than to give all I had to prevent it? FN recap: ‘‘Will presupposes freedom, or it is not will, but something

else.’’ FN: We must define will. Is it not inclination realizing itself, i.e., inclination of such a kind and degree and existing in such circumstances as that it will realize or attempt to realize itself in the present, or determine to realize, or to attempt to realize itself in the future? In other

736 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought words, will includes wish, intention and the belief that it can realize that intention. Such inclination or will is free in this sense: no power can prevent any inclination which a man would have (in the state in which he is at any particular time), if not prevented by any superior power. FN recap: ‘‘Choice and the power of choice was the Creator’s final fin-

ishing touch to man.’’ [233] FN: If ‘‘choice’’ means the unhesitating decision for right, as opposed

to wrong, the righteous man will choose. (I have said nothing at variance with this.) Will does not mean merely choice after doubt. Inclination realizing itself without doubt is still will, as much as or more so than where doubt has preceded or accompanied. FN recap: ‘‘Law has been represented as God.’’ FN: Not by me, but the reverse; I have in no sense represented law as

God, but as the thought of God. I think the error is where law is recognized as manifested in phenomena, but where a mind is not recognized as the Source, of which law is the manifestation only. All I know of law, from its character and tendency, is that it is the manifestation of an omnipotent Righteousness, expressed by the word God. FN recap: ‘‘The supreme fallacy of modern times, substituting law for necessity.’’ FN: I set out by avoiding the words ‘‘necessity’’ and ‘‘free will,’’ because

as now used they convey misconceptions. Do not recur to them without definition, therefore. The possibility exists for mankind to attain for mankind the power and the will to will right. Can we desire anything else? FN recap: ‘‘Whenever it is impossible to do wrong, there is no longer ‘man’ but some other being.’’ FN: Yet we know it to be impossible to some men to do wrong in some

ways. We know that A could not tell a lie, whatever the temptation, nor B take his neighbour’s property, nor C neglect a sick person committed to her charge, nor drink his wine, nor take away his pillow. Where, then, are we to place the limit of how far it may become impossible to man to commit any wrong? I do not assert that it will be ever impossible to human nature to do wrong in any possible human circumstances. I cannot see so far into the possibility of human progress as to assert or deny it. FN recap: ‘‘Always the same fallacy. Of late years law has been gradu-

ally rising into God. We will not surrender our freedom!’’

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FN: I have attempted to define the sense in which we ‘‘will as we please,’’

no higher power preventing, if it is in our nature to please. I have attempted to define how it is in human nature to attain to will as we please, if we attain to please, to will right. The question remains: is law a ‘‘fallacy’’? or does it exist? ‘‘We will not surrender our freedom!’’ is an exclamation which seems to arise from a misconception of the question, from a misunderstanding of the nature of the ‘‘freedom’’ possessed by man and of the power which man may attain, consistently with the existence of law, as manifested in all phenomena (in volitions as in other phenomena). Hence our power over our volitions, because hence our means to bring about certain volitions in our own minds or those of others. Whether law exists or not must be matter of evidence, and whether, if it exists, we may derive from it the power which will assist us to be and to live righteously. FN recap: ‘‘The tenor of the principles in this paper is pantheism.’’ FN: Pantheism attempts an explanation of the mode of being of God.

I express the belief that the mode of being of Him who is manifested by law, as the Source of law, is inconceivable by human nature. I maintain that phenomena (and laws manifested by phenomena) are open to human observation and are the subjects of human experience. These laws, in their effects as known through this experience of phenomena, are unsatisfactor y to the healthy, appropriate desires of man for mankind (healthy, that is, in accordance with law). Hence we are urged to inquire whether the character and tendency of these laws is such as to reveal a future, whether considered in connection with a future, their rule becomes satisfactory to man’s best desires for mankind. The more we study them, the more we find them adapted to educate the imperfect towards perfection, to afford that education which had we the power, we should give as the best boon to imperfection. Such character and tendency reveal them to be the manifestation of a righteous Power (i.e., reveal them to be consistent with righteous power) and, as far as we can see, reveal them as the only thought the realization of which would be consistent with omnipotent Righteousness. Consistent with the nature of omnipotent Righteousness is a sequel to human life, which shall be the continuation of an education of the imperfect towards the perfect, an education for each and for all, an education in which this world has been for some a beginning, for others a preparation only. [235] JS: In reading over what I have written I am afraid some expressions may appear harsh. I am apt to write rather too energetically. There is,

738 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought I fear, not the slightest chance of our agreeing. Your point of sight of these matters and my point of sight are totally different. For many years I have read and otherwise come in contact with almost all the new ideas on these subjects, but I have never been able to comprehend the state of mind out of which such ideas can have arisen. And the instant I get hold of these ideas they break up into a kind of mist and float away. The impression produced on me by them is that they are mental exhalations. Knowing, if ever I do know, how infinitesimally small is our knowledge, when I fear people raise systems of thought or belief on history on the barest suppositions (as it appears to me) I am sorry to say my charity fails miserably, especially when I am required to surrender what I know to be true in order to receive the new faith. I could never be a necessitarian. It is not in me. We have our necessitarians in science also and their doctrines I equally refuse. I love only that clear bright intelligence which, recognizing freedom and loyalty in all things, strives to combine them in all things. But to escape the contest by taking refuge in law or necessity or plan, or any other such idea, would be to me neither free nor loyal. It is just this in which Christianity is so immeasurably superior (merely as a philosophy) to all these systems, and which makes a descent from the New Testament into your John Chapman’s water ship like going from freedom into slavery. FN: Law Necessity Free Will. Direction the present theology is tak-

ing. Nature and tendency of law. Definition of freedom, free will. Distinction, or rather opposition, between law and necessity. Law the exposition of God and the only exposition. Mankind must create mankind, by means of God’s law. God’s law our means and inducement, in our progress from imperfection towards perfection. The character of religious literature in these days is truly alarming. For the last 300 years it has been purely destructive. And no one has thought of reconstr uction. Before that time the Roman Catholic loved God and Christ and the Holy Ghost, the Virgin Mar y and the saints. Then came the Protestant and he destroyed the Virgin Mar y and the saints. But he did not make God, Christ or the Holy Ghost more loved or loveable. Then came the Unitarian and destroyed Christ and the Holy Ghost. But he did not make God more loved or loveable. Now the conflict between Roman Catholic and Protestant is well nigh over. And no one reads ‘‘controversial’’ literature. The roarings of Cumming are listened to by an infinitesimally small sect. And the cardinal archbishop has taken to lecturing on art in Hanover Square Rooms!!

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JS: Allow me to make a passing remark on this decline of religion. I do not call it religion at all that has declined. The church has always contained all kinds of people and it is not surprising if certain formulas have ceased to carry weight. The real people are in no way influenced by such phenomena. FN: But what has taken its place? The alarming literature above

referred to, consisting either in a superficial defence of the doctrine of free will, urged by those as, e.g., Kant, Cousin, Rev James Martineau, who are terrified at an equally superficial glance at necessity or in a doctrine now rapidly becoming the only one thinking men will entertain, viz., that represented by Comte, Buckle, Mill and Quetelet. This consists in (directly or indirectly) establishing law (recognized as it is now becoming with unexampled completeness as obtaining in ever y department, physical, moral, intellectual of the universe). [235] JS: This statement is very doubtful. Necessity is one of the oldest of

theories and its prevalence marks decline of intellectual vigour and a surrender of free will rather than incur its consequences. The human mind revolts from it, in time, and reasserts its rights. It has done so hitherto and will do so again. To Buckle’s and Comte’s supposed discoveries I simply reply ‘‘dubito’’ [I doubt]. FN: But not in establishing law as the thought of God, rather in substi-

tuting it for Him in looking upon all farther research as being after a ‘‘barren theory.’’ These authors seem to consider law, which is only a formula, as an explanation, a first cause, for phenomena. R = ✓n. This is a formula. It explains nothing. No one would say that writing down R = ✓n ‘‘explains away’’ God in any department of His universe. Now no law which can be stated is anything more than this. JS: The objection to their whole procedure is that they employ most defective methods of observation and inquiry. That they classify supposed facts, and apply to their classifications the term law, which invests them with an apparent value of which they are destitute. FN: But what makes the superficial recognition of Quetelet’s truths so

dangerous is that they convey to the half-taught mind the delusion of necessity. Whereas, so far from really supporting necessitarianism, they in fact show how these very laws place in our hands the power which God deigns to give to man. For all that is His He designs to make ours, even His omnipotence. [236] JS: Ever ything of course depends on these laws having been discov-

ered, which they have not.

740 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought FN: The religion of Comte, of Buckle, etc., and even (and this is most

extraordinar y), of the puny reviewers who have dealt after their puny fashion with these great minds [239] JS: Great only in the petitio principii [begging the question]. In other things quite other than great. FN: is mere aspiration, ‘‘imagination,’’ nothing more. ‘‘In other words,

religion is a mere transitional form of thought.’’ JS: No one knows what religion is but its possessor. It is the ‘‘white

storm’’ of the Apocalypse. FN: Surely, it cannot be intended to say that absolute Truth depends

on what state man is in at any given moment. And, if not, what Comte calls the ‘‘theological, metaphysical and positive’’ stages of religion are only three forms of the ‘‘imagination.’’ ‘‘Free will in philosophy’’ I define to be an inherent faculty of spirit whereby it is capable of willing any order of sequences, whether such order is to begin to be, to cease to be, or to have its direction altered. ‘‘Free will in morals’’ I define to be an inherent faculty of the human mind, whereby it is capable of willing any order of moral sequences, or (so far as the physical capacities of men will permit) any order of physical sequences which it chooses to will. FN recap: ‘‘Generally that free will or liberty, as opposed to necessity, is

under no condition external to itself, to will or not to will, according as such external condition may require. That there is absolute freedom in short in the function or faculty of volition, while the ‘‘introduction’’ of the idea of necessary sequences in the functions of the will raises necessity into the rank of governing power in the spiritual kingdom, to which all freedom of activity in the highest as well as the lowest realm of spiritual existence must be subordinated. [240] FN: Before I define ‘‘free will’’ let me define ‘‘freedom,’’ ‘‘liberty.’’

Am I to understand these words to signify absence of impediment to any wish which might, by possibility, enter into the human mind? JS: Free will is just what the words express. It does not involve freedom of activity. Human freedom aims at pure external activity. Free will relates to the inner world alone, and through the inner to the outer world. FN: E.g., if a child were to wish to go to the moon, is it correct to say

that the impossibility of going to the moon is an absence of ‘‘freedom,’’ of ‘‘liber ty’’? Or does the word ‘‘freedom’’ not apply in this case—it being correct to say that human beings have not power to go to the

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moon. Or, in other words, that, to beings constituted as we are, it is impossible, while it is not correct to say that human beings have not the freedom to go to the moon. But take another instance. If Lord Derby were to have wished, fifty years ago, to cross the Atlantic by means of steam, the inability to do so, arising as it did from ignorance or uncultivated capability, it would not be correct to call want of ‘‘liber ty’’ but want of power. Power which an individual or a race does not possess at one period of existence may yet be attainable at another. JS: The illustrations here given as opposed to freedom do not touch

the question at all. They belong to quite another question, namely, the variance between volition and action, and its causes. These cases may be all true and a thousand million other similar cases may be tr ue, but they leave the question of free will just where it was. The limitations and their causes and consequences would form quite a separate inquiry. At the same time, it appears to me that all the modern discussions on the subject of law resolve themselves not into determining the law of the universe but into the law, if there be any, which regulates these limitations. They evade free will. The subject is highly important. It is partly philosophical, partly practical, partly physiological, but it is incapable of being applied in the manner in which the term law is applied. I formerly illustrated the whole subject by citing the case of a musician playing on a good or a bad instrument, as it refers to psychology. FN: But take another instance still. Suppose I had wished to plan the

dome of St Peter’s. Such impossibility, whether from incapability in the nature, or absence of development and cultivation, it is not correct to call want of ‘‘freedom’’ but want of power. Yet Michelangelo did it. To one individual is possible what is impossible to another. JS: Instead of discussing the causes of the difference or want of adap-

tion between will and power, in regard to which we have a large amount of knowledge, it is better to state the result as it affects our discussion. Suppose the universal human will were rightly directed. That is, suppose all mankind always willed to love and serve God and man, but yet did not do it on account of the same kind of limitations you instance, then it is quite clear that what we ought to do is to develop power. But it is a simple fact that the will itself is at fault in most of the observed cases, not the power simply. To bring the observed cases in morals parallel with those in physics which you have cited, the will must be right and free, and the power defective. But this is contrary to fact, observation and experience.

742 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought FN: Again, take a fourth instance. If I am ill and in consequence

unable to go to see my mother whom otherwise I should go to, this impossibility it is not correct to call want of ‘‘freedom,’’ but loss of power to go, though in common parlance, it may be called ‘‘being a prisoner.’’ An injur y to the brain from a fall is said to have deprived a man of the knowledge of three languages. As means were taken to promote his recover y, one after the other returned to his memory. This was not the recover y of his ‘‘liber ty’’ but of his power. Take a fifth instance. The fall of a burning house prevents all egress to a man in the basement. Such prevention is commonly called loss of liberty. But, if so-called, what definite meaning can be attached to the word liberty? If a man is prevented by a storm from joining his ship at sea, we do not call this want of liberty. Yet, if we use the word in the former cases, and not in the latter, what is the distinction? If I am prevented by the will of another from the possibility of realizing an inclination, this is distinctly want of liberty. And I do not see any definite meaning which can be attached to the word, unless by thus limiting its application. [237] JS: This illustration is of a somewhat different character. If you mean that simply the expressed will of another so influences you as to prevent the realization of an inclination, then such a result can only ensue from the action of your own will. I have the power of willing or of not willing, but volition so to speak precedes both acts, for both are acts. In my will I am sovereign or subject, just as I please. I must perform an act of abdication before I can obey another will. The more per fectly human nature is developed the more sensible will such acts of abdication become, and the reasons for them will be always higher and nobler; at present they are chiefly the result of moral deficiency or cowardice. If I felt as I ought, I should never follow any other will than my own, even in the most minute point, without feeling that it was right to surrender my will in the case. Almost all the cases of the kind you mention are simply indifference or acquiescence of the will, mostly unconsciously. FN: Such distinctions may be unimportant in common conversation,

but are so important in such an inquiry as this that, if we would advance one step beyond the mere everlasting persiflage, for I can call it nothing better, which prevails about ‘‘free will’’ and ‘‘necessity,’’ we must begin by such careful definition. Otherwise we shall learn nothing concerning the government of human nature by superhuman power.

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In the sense above defined of the word liber ty, freedom, man has absolute free will, i.e., no other will prevents his willing what is accordant with his nature. JS: This I consent to. FN: In other words, his will is not prevented by any other will from

being what it would be but for another will. JS: This I do not quite understand. It appears to me not to agree with the above. FN recap: ‘‘The more modern development of the idea of law in the

spiritual universe, so far as I can understand it, I take to be either that co-existent with the eternity of the divine or spiritual nature (as contradistinguished from matter) there have existed certain necessary sequences by which the divine nature found itself. ‘‘bound’’ (quer y: who has said this? not I certainly). [238] JS: You do not say this in so many words, but your exposition in more than one instance was based on the theory. FN recap: ‘‘and that in creating spiritual intelligences, it became neces-

sar y.’’ FN: (Again, who has said this? Quote.) JS: I cannot quote because I judged from the obvious consequences of the principles themselves. Mark! neither the first nor second definition of law is mine. Both are to me equally unintelligible. I have introduced two definitions of what I understand you to mean by law as applied to the government of the universe. The first involves philosophical necessity, involving both God and man in its mestes [Latin for sadness]. The second involves moral necessity, leaving God free, but binding man’s will in a certain predetermined chain of sequences. The latter is just as much opposed to what I believe to be the truth as established by experience as the former is to all our ideas of the divine nature. I understand you to reject the first and to hold to the second. At least some of the following passages would lead me to infer so, although there are others at variance with it. FN recap: ‘‘To create them in accordance with these necessary sequences.’’ FN: (This is the definition of necessity, certainly not of law, which pre-

supposes something laid down by the will of the Law-giver.) [241] FN recap: ‘‘Or that the divine nature by an act of its own will established a certain order of sequences, and left these to follow all their

744 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought evolutions forever, the divine nature by the condition of the problem having withdrawn itself from all connection with those sequences, and, so to speak, beholding their evolution apart and from a distance.’’ FN: Law is that which is laid down. JS: I object to this definition of law. In the present case the only possi-

ble definition is ‘‘a succession of sequences so numerous and invariable as to enable us to trust in their future invariableness.’’ Can we do this? This is as great a petitio principii as anything that Comte or Buckle ever wrote. My reply is simply ‘‘nego’’ [I refuse]. FN: There is ground to believe that there exist relations of simultane-

ity and succession between phenomena (including among phenomena the volitions of the human mind) which have the uniformity which would exist, if such relations were laid down by (or in other words were the regulations of) a Power able to effect such uniformity. (The ‘‘established order of sequences,’’ which is complained of as showing that the Power has ‘‘withdrawn’’ to a ‘‘distance’’ is the proof that He is always there, ‘‘in whom is no variableness neither shadow of turning’’ [Jas 1:17]). JS: Here there is a mixture of ideas. I agree at once that God governs all things on a fixed plan or economy, but I deny, for that very reason, evolution by what is called law. FN: Volitions are a manifestation of law, because, preceding (or co-

existing with) every volition, there exist (or have existed) phenomena, without the existence of which such volition would not have existed, but which, having existed in the same relation as to precedence or co-existence any number of times, those volitions would exist such number of times. JS: In other words volitions stand in the relation of effects to antecedent causes. Now there is only one definition of a cause. A cause is that which, if increased, diminished or suspended, increases, diminishes or suspends the presumed effect. This is not at all the case with volitions and motives. It is simply an observed fact, that the very same antecedents to volition affect different wills oppositely and the same will oppositely at different times. It is true that there is a general tenor, so to speak, in the manifestation of volition in every individual, but this arises from other causes besides your supposed law of sequences. FN: (Ever ybody knows and acknowledges this in practice. Everybody

who has had at all to put himself practically into moral training in

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order to manage his own will has tacitly acknowledged it. A ‘‘Sister of Charity’’ who had to go to South America to nurse the yellow fever told me that she took care to receive the invitation, not after she had been at ‘‘recreation’’ or in her laboratory, but after she had been at ‘‘meditation,’’ when she was sure to accept it. She did not attribute this to any supernatural ‘‘grace,’’ but to her having thus brought her will (by observing the relations of succession which are constant) into that conformity with the will of God which was essential to her performing such an act of ‘‘self-sacrifice.’’) [239] JS: This is quite true, but it in no sense bears out your supposition. It is no proof of anything other than that the will can be trained, which is a fact. That is to say that any class of motives, benevolent, malevolent, pure, impure, lofty, mean, can be used by this will to give it greater facility of action for a specific direction. I put this in the ordinar y language, but there are physiological reasons of the highest importance why the action of the will can be modified by men in this way. But will does it all, not God, nor law of sequence. The sequence follows on the action of the will. It does not precede the action. The nun’s practice is consistent with sound physiology and sound reason as well as religion, but it is no proof that the will is governed by law. Physiologically the nun’s act rendered the will’s act ver y much easier. But nature is teeming with similar illustrations. Only the will is always lord paramount. FN: These relations of simultaneity and succession are such as to jus-

tify us in actually considering them the regulations of a Power and Will of a nature which can be inferred from their character and tendency. JS: They would, were they constant, for they would partake of the

nature of law, but they are not constant except so far as they are willed to be so by the will, and if in the process the acts followed always in due sequence, then the will would be, as it ought to be, on its throne as law-giver. FN: If it is ‘‘laid down,’’ or determined by will, divine or human, that,

to a certain state of things, a certain state of things shall be successive, that with a certain state of things a certain state shall co-exist, such determination we call law, and the word expresses will, exercised in a different manner from that which is exercised by decree. JS: Here you have again changed your ground. I agree if you give the

power to the will. It then becomes independent and free and we can

746 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought then discuss the laws it enacts. But it escapes both from Comte and Buckle. But in any case the will as law-giver would be above law. FN: The chief of a savage tribe wills the death of a man for a theft,

although thefts are habitually committed without punishment. A mother has a child’s ears boxed for accidentally breaking a teacup by crawling over the tea table, although the child habitually crawls over the tea table without punishment. In either case this is a decree or order, but not a regulation or law. [239] JS: The whole of these cases touch of easy decision, . . . another question which we have settled that man’s will is free. But the decision would be very different if we decided man’s will not to be free. All depends on whether man can absolutely or cannot absolutely. If the former, human laws are justifiable, if the latter, they are unjustifiable. Anarchy in morals is the legitimate result of abdication of the will. FN: A determination that every man detected in the commission of a

theft shall be put to death, that a child every time it crawls about the tea table shall be put to bed would be a law. We do not therefore say that either of these individuals has been deprived of liber ty or that the governing power has ‘‘withdrawn to a distance.’’ On the contrary, law enforced is the means by which the governing Power induces those who live under it to govern themselves. If a man or a child knows that, by keeping a law in a particular manner, he or it is certain to obtain some object of his or its desire, the law furnishes an inducement to him or it so to keep it. JS: All human law presupposes freedom in men’s will. FN: In fact, vacillation (which is what we want to see in God, if, at least,

we hold the beggar’s doctrine towards Him is exactly what children arrived at maturity complain of having suffered from in their parents, viz., that their decrees were not to be depended upon. It by no means follows that law is necessarily an appeal to selfish feeling. Man, well-born, well-developed, well-bred, well-circumstanced, will not be a selfish being. JS: We are dealing not with the few, ver y few, exceptional cases, but

with the 1000 millions of human wills. FN: Such a man, discovering that there is a way of keeping law by

which he may promote the health and virtue of his fellow creatures is furnished by existing laws with inducement to keep them after that manner. And here I must refer to a common confusion about the word law. ‘‘Thou shalt not kill’’ is said to be God’s law. But this is not God’s law. For men do kill. But God’s law is never broken.

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Men do kill and if they could not kill, there would indeed be no ‘‘liberty.’’ This is Moses’ law, not God’s law. [240] JS: The exercise of liberty is either in obeying or disobeying. There is

no liberty otherwise. It is God’s will that men shall neither kill, steal nor commit adultery, but men do all these, ergo [therefore] they are not God’s laws at all!!! Practical communism realizes this beautifully. Propriété! c’est le vol [property is theft!]. Mariage! c’est une crime [mar riage is a crime]. Jalousie! c’est une folie [jealousy is folly]!! And yet the communists on such premises as you have here laid down are per fectly right. Abolish property, marriage and jealousy and you need no law at all of any kind!! Man can even break God’s physical laws. FN: Again, Quetelet says there is a law by which not only such a percent-

age of men shall kill in a year, but such a percentage out of this percentage shall use such a weapon, such a percentage shall use poison, etc. JS: Again, there is no such law. This is an entire misunderstanding of the whole statistical argument, and arises from omitting the conditions. Statistics are not intended for such purposes. FN: Either Moses or Quetelet must be wrong, or both. For one says,

Thou shalt not kill, in God’s law. And the other says, Thou shalt kill, in God’s law. JS: If Quetelet’s statistics proved what you say, they would simply show that wicked society necessitates remedy, nothing more. FN: The fact is, this last is Quetelet’s law, not God’s law. Again, it is

said that there is a law that, boys between the ages of fifteen and twenty, although they constitute only one tenth of the population, afford an amount of crime which constitutes no less than one fourth of the total crime committed in that population. But this is the statistician’s law, not God’s law. God’s law is that, given such organizations and such circumstances, given such a state of society, such a number of murderers will there be. And, further, such an amount of evil will be entailed on society, teaching it the truth about crime. JS: Again, there is no such law. It is an entire mistake and misuse of

words. Society makes laws, which very often it has usually no right to make, and boys break laws they do not understand. The statistical proportion of juvenile law breakers is determined more by the number of laws and the activity of the police than by the numbers of the population or its moral state. God’s law is that all men should do justly, love mercy and walk humbly with Him [paraphrase of Micah 6:8]. When society and the legislature do this there will be no juvenile delin-

748 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought quency. That is God’s law. The statistician’s law is the bitterest satire and condemnation not of the boys but of society. It proves God’s law inasfar as it shows the evil results of disobedience. FN: God’s law is that, given such a state of society and such of educa-

tion, such an amount of boy crime will take place. But what is this but to say that we must bring about another state of society or of education? If indeed we were to see a spotless and virtuous generation of youth growing out of our education and society, then indeed we should be at a loss to conclude anything else but that this God has ‘‘withdrawn Himself to a distance,’’ and has laid down no law at all. JS: This is all quite true, but society consists of individuals. It has no corporate moral existence. Every man must act for himself. God has given certain laws in morals, which have never been improved on, as has been acknowledged by every writer on morals. What he requires is that ever y man shall obey them individually, and He leaves the state as He well may to take care of itself. To treat society in such an argument, as if it were a big boy, is simply to blink the whole question of individual responsibility, and to expect society to do what the individuals composing it are not expected to do. God deals with men individually, not with society, in these matters, except that He has as a necessary consequence entailed social miser y on individual sin. FN: All natures (possessing certain conditions of being, which, if not

realized, their appropriate well-being will not be realized), if not omnipotent, not possessed of all knowledge, not perfect in wisdom and goodness, want assistance or guidance. [241] FN recap: Society must be improved through the individuals

which compose it. Individuals can never otherwise be improved through society. Hence God’s supreme wisdom in dealing with individuals. FN: The history of mankind shows that the want of such assistance

and guidance has led to the belief that it has been received by audible voices from an unseen world, by miraculously inspired teaching, by a cloud by day, a pillar of fire by night [Neh 9:12]. JS: I acknowledge the want individually. Apropos of these famous statistical laws, there are a definite number of fires in London year by year, and a definite loss of property and life. Are you prepared to use the statistical evidence in proof of God’s moral government of London, or does it not rather prove that there is an annual average of willful negligence? and no more?

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FN: But, as the mind has progressed, some find these teachings do

not contain intrinsic evidence of truth. They are but the teachings of men of like nature to ourselves, though in some way superior to those they taught. JS: I do think before you say the like of this you ought to state what

teachers are better than Christ and his apostles. I should like very much to know them. Will you give me their names? FN: Obser vation, extending throughout the phenomena of nature,

present and past, is presenting to us teachings of another kind, a governing power of another kind. JS: This is a mere chimera. It is however a very common petitio principii [begging the question]. The whole of it is to be proved. FN: A government is good in proportion as it offers means and induce-

ment to a man to realize for himself and for his kind a state of being appropriate, or befitting to human nature, that is to say, a state of being in harmony with (or adapted to) its present type, but ever progressing towards a higher type. What this higher type is we do not yet know definitely. JS: But even if it were proved, we have nothing to do with government in the argument of free will at all. A man is his own king and government. And the true teachers of mankind are those who teach him so. The human race exists. Societies and governments are all evanescent, sur face phenomena. They are here today and away tomorrow. We who live under them are bound to do all we can to alleviate their inequalities and miseries, but let us never forget that we have to do with immortal [?] beings as individuals. Civilization alas! exists for the very, ver y few. For the many it exists not, and perhaps never will. FN: But we do know by experience the capability of human nature for

indefinite improvement. JS: Non mille fois non!! [No, a thousand times no]. We hope, but we do not know. Experience is most adverse to this except in individuals. Society as such has improved little in 4000 historical years. FN: The character and tendency of law (as above defined), as mani-

fested throughout the phenomena of nature, are that it is shown to be a process for thus governing human nature. [241] JS: All unproved, at least in the sense I understand you to believe in law. FN: This law, not written for the eye, nor spoken to the ear, is obser v-

able in the history of human existence, as it passes before us.

750 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought JS: I believe firmly in God’s moral government of His creature, man,

but to be morally governed at all men must have free will. There are two independent parties: God and man, and God deals with man solely through his freedom. The law which God has given is the external law of moral freedom. Take it or leave it. There it is. Exercise your free will on it. Obey it and welcome. Disobey it and welcome. FN: Human existence becomes, within certain definite limits, one way

or another way of being, one or another organization, or constitution, according to, i.e., according with certain co-existences or pre-existences. What else do all crime tables, sanitary tables, statistical tables show us but this? JS: All these tables show simply the punishments which men in this life ever have reaped, and ever will reap because they chose to exercise their free will in being ignorant, selfish, unjust, covetous, haters, unclean. If the human race were, each individual of it, to exercise its will appositely, there would be no crime tables or statistics of preventible disease, or Comptes, etc. FN: What else do all the various organizations of the earth at different

periods, the Greek, the Roman, the Hindu, the Eskimos, show us but this? JS: They prove a moral government leaving men’s wills free. I believe

more than half the evil in all societies is the result of direct crime in the governors, that is, in breaking the moral laws of which they themselves are cognizant, and expecting the rest to obey them. FN: namely, that, if we possessed the knowledge of all facts and their

connections, certain facts would be recognized as having, in every instance, existed in such connection with these organizations as that, without those facts preceding or co-existing, those organizations would not have been, and were those facts precisely again to co-exist or pre-exist, those organizations precisely again would exist. The soil upon which a man has lived may be told by his appearance. The water the Guardsmen drank who dies by the Guadiana may be told by the record of their diseases. JS: There are those relations here refer red to, but they affect simply matter. They affect not will. I have already said that this is a separate inquir y involving actions not will. But it has nothing whatever to do with law. It is merely accidental. We cannot reason from it to moral freedom. FN: And, though we cannot yet prove, by actual experience, the whole of the case, prove, that is, that the above proposition obtains every-

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where and throughout, yet it is experience, and reasoning upon experience, which lead all thinking minds to believe that it is so, that it is tr ue universally as we know it to be true par tially. [242] Inclinations, of such kind and degree as induce the human being in whom they exist to realize, or to attempt to realize them, exist in every conscious human being. Such inclinations we designate as volitions. JS: No, not volitions. They belong to a class of phenomena which have never been sufficiently examined, but they are certainly not volitions. (Perhaps the best way would be if you will admit volitions to be perfectly free and independent, I will enter on the subject here mooted, namely, the conditions which limit the action of will. But it is necessary that the admission of freedom be absolute and unreser ved beforehand.) FN: What the volitions of each human being are is a manifestation of

law, i.e., given a certain constitution or organization, which is in itself a manifestation of law, JS: Not necessarily. In most cases it is simply an embodiment of con-

tingencies and hence comes not under law, the conditions and phenomena of which must always be immuable. FN: and given circumstances which affect that constitution or organi-

zation in a definite manner, there will exist definite volitions varying with (in uniform relation to), the organization and the circumstances. JS: This is not necessarily the case by any means. FN: Neither observation nor experience lead us to suppose that the

Power manifested in law ‘‘found itself bound by certain sequences.’’ See Dr Sutherland’s definition of law. To be so ‘‘bound’’ would be a state of things which we should call necessity. We see none of the characteristics of law in it. JS: You cannot escape necessity in the application of the term law you have here made. FN: Law is not necessitated on the Ruler of the universe, JS: Then this is not law but moral government. It is the just and infinitely wise procedure of a per fectly free Creator to His free creatures. FN: But is the eternal process of realizing the thought accordant with,

harmonious to, His nature, viz., the progressive advance of imperfection towards perfection by means and inducement afforded by His law in it. (Note. These means and inducements do not always act upon individuals, but upon the whole human race, which is, as the French term it,solidaire. For example, the murderer is not always induced by the evils of

752 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought murder to devote himself to improving murderers and to banishing murder from among mankind. But mankind is induced, sooner or later, to improve the state of society which produces murderers.) JS: Quer y with regard to the last sentence. Please define the state of society and the amount of population which composed it when Cain killed Abel? You can abolish murder, theft and adultery, the three cardinal human sins, only by one of two processes. Abolish property and marriage and separate the human race. In other words destroy society, or if this ab extra [by the outside] experiment should be impracticable (although the Communists would have it tried) then you must proceed ab intra [by the inside] through the soul and conscience of man, and teach him to obey these laws. FN: When our limited nature attempts to conceive of a Nature supe-

rior to our own, we conceive of a nature like our own in kind, having those attributes which we trace in His laws. ‘‘Only insofar as man is the image of God and can think like God, can he give the reason of anything that God has made.’’ This is true, yet, in attempting to interpret the thought of the Ruler of the universe through our own, we are not open to the sarcasm that ‘‘Man makes God.’’ We are to interpret, not invent. JS: Cer tainly! But this is the whole onus against Buckle, Comte, Mar-

tineau, etc., that they start with a preconception and range round it all manner of surmises and form a system. FN: And, if we find existing phenomena referable to laws, manifesting

thought, purpose, feeling, such as we are ourselves conscious of, though on a scale infinitely greater than our own as the infinity exceeds our sphere and as eternity exceeds our span of time on earth, we are justified in attributing such thought, purpose, feeling to a nature in kind resembling our own. JS: If it be unwise for men to measure themselves by themselves it is

surely not wise to measure God by themselves. FN: We learn from our own attempts at gover nment and at education

the advantage of law over decree. JS: Government is too often founded on what is quite a different principle from that on which education is founded. FN: An education which furnishes means and inducement to its pupils

to find their proper way along existence, by the appropriate exercise and improvement of their faculties, is the best boon an imperfect nature is capable of receiving.

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JS: I hardly know how to deal with you. There are passages such as this that are inconsistent altogether with certain other principles you lay down. I agree with this, nay more I believe it contains the whole tr uth as to the moral government of men, for it includes both faculty, matter and will. And it is thus the Creator appears to deal in His moral government. FN: A good education, a good government, proceed on this principle,

when man attempts to educate man. (Louis-Napoléon proceeds on the opposite principle and therefore he is not governing, but cutting the throat of France.) [243] JS: Louis-Napoléon is a dear friend of Comte’s and Buckle’s philosophy. FN: But man’s time, man’s knowledge, are limited. He must point out

His law, must enforce otherwise than by experience its being kept. The Ruler of the universe, in His wisdom, proceeds by law alone in His teachings to man. JS: All again confusion! God governs morally. He is not bound and has not bound Himself by any law of Wisdom [?] FN: The existence of this law which is to govern and educate man has

to be discovered by man. No voice reveals it. No finger points it out. Blindly and sadly man has wandered through his existence in ignorance of it. Blindly and sadly he suffers still, for it is little recognized, and how to keep it righteously has still to be learnt. JS: Do not think me wicked if I accept this as receipt in full. FN: But, if recognized, let us consider the means and inducements it

would offer to man to become individually and socially what it is right, healthy, appropriate to his nature to become. JS: If. FN: From law man may learn the conditions appropriate to individual

and social human life. JS: But there is no such law yet discovered. FN: From law he may learn how to desire, to cause to be desired,

these conditions, how to realize such desire. JS: But there is no such law yet discovered. FN: Granting organization and circumstances to be (by law), the con-

ditions which determine the nature of a human being, what power does not such an admission offer to humanity? JS: Take out the word law and put in the word will and it reads quite plain. It would give no power whatever. Knowledge is not power. Power

754 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought must exist before knowledge. Power simply uses knowledge, and gets more power ful. FN: For how great is not man’s power over organization? Unthinkingly

he has exercised hitherto this power. JS: What organization? It should be over matter. Over organization he

has little power, although he has some. FN: What is agriculture, chemistry, navigation, geography, all that art

or science puts into the power of man to render the earth healthy, to supply himself with appropriate food, etc., what is it all but means at hand to improve organization? What is all appropriate exercise of the nature, of the emotional, the intellectual, the physical nature, but means, directly or indirectly, to improve organization? JS: You cannot improve society except through the individuals which compose it. FN: And as to circumstances, what limits can we set to human possibil-

ity to discover and to realize the circumstances which will render human existence appropriate to human nature? JS: Improvement is simply a personal, individual matter. We are all bound to work at it for ourselves, and for others, to enable them to benefit by our experience, but they must improve themselves. FN: Distant as seems such a possibility, the character and tendency of law reveal that God’s law shall, in time, have furnished to mankind the inducement and the means to unite as one brotherhood in the aim to keep God’s laws aright, which is human nature’s real paradise. JS: State what the inducement is. Man has affections and passions, which all men must be taught to reverence. Man desires property, which no man must covet or steal. Man must be taught the sacredness of human life, which no man must destroy. Man must be taught reverence for God, whom none must blaspheme. Whatever one man desires and obtains justly for his own benefit, none must be jealous of. All must be truthful and abhor falsehood. Everyone must love God and his neighbours, in short. If this were all done, there would be heaven on earth. Now you must be able to show that men, by simply obser ving society and nature, will do all these things. Can you? FN: Yet there needs a future to human existence to satisfy the nature,

given by God to man, as to the law by which God governs man. In consequence of this law, vice and ignorance have degraded beings whose proper element is progress in righteousness. [244]

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In consequence of this law, all progress is cut short by death. The educational character and tendency of God’s law, which reveals to us what man may do for man on earth, reveals also the opportunities which the righteous Ruler, who is manifested in His law, will afford to all whose proper element He has made progress in righteousness, so that after death they shall continue (or attain) to make infinite progress therein. JS: The sum and substance of all this is that God created good and evil, sin and death, purity and impurity, murder and love, justice and injustice, all the opposites of heaven and hell, and centred them in man, whom He has left to struggle through this gulf for unknown cycles, in conformity with certain laws of process. FN: Law, in accordance with which righteousness is man’s proper ele-

ment and desire, law, in accordance with which the conception, the desire, the attainment of righteousness have been impossible to a portion of mankind, can be consistent on this hypothesis only, viz., that of a future in which progress shall be attainable for all, attained by all. JS: Now to say the truth I cannot understand it one bit. It is contrary to all I have observed of nature and nature’s laws. It is contrary to all I have read in history. It is contrar y to my experience. In philosophy it is strict necessitarianism. In morals it is strict necessitarianism. It charges God with injustice and denies men’s free will. It confounds good and evil, and if preached to the human race and believed would simply introduce anarchy in everything. Of course I would not charge you with these consequences, but I merely mean to say that I cannot conceive any other deduction from the theory than what I have stated. I hold it on the sure ground of experience that God leaves man to the guidance of himself. And yet governs him, leaving him free and responsible. For my man apparently differs from your man in being responsible, which yours is not, and I hold mine to be the nobler creature of the two. We all admit our responsibility and that simple admission subverts the whole ‘‘positive’’ hypothesis in all its forms. In fact it appears to me that the whole hypothesis has its origin in a supposed necessity to reduce into some practical shape the terrific phenomena presented by the moral world. It is an attempt to introduce a kind of moral law of gravitation. You have shown in objection. FN recap: ‘‘I cannot but feel that there is still some difference that

requires explanation in our definitions.’’ [245]

756 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought FN: It is essential to arriving at any tr uth that definitions should be definitions: i.e., defined. I therefore repeat my definition of law, and define my definition still more closely. FN recap: ‘‘The idea of law certainly involves the constancy of sequences without reference to the reasons of such constancy.’’ JS: This of course presupposes that the constancy refer red to has

been discovered. FN: The word law is used in two senses: (1) to signify any enactment,

proposed or carried out, that a certain defined state of things shall be simultaneous with (or successive to) some other defined state of things, whenever the former occurs; (2) to signify constant relations of simultaneity or succession between phenomena or events, such as would exist if that constancy were the result of will and of power to effect such will. JS: This definition is usually qualified in science by the expression, ‘‘It is an observed law,’’ or ‘‘it appears to be a law.’’ But the fundamental idea is that there is a ‘‘decree’’ of some sort, the operation of which we think we have discovered, although we may not know the nature of the decree, that is, the reasons why the sequences follow each other. FN: In this sense the word law is used, sometimes with reference to a

Ruler to whom constancy in those relations is attributed, sometimes merely to express the existence of those constant relations. JS: When the term law is used in this latter sense it is used so to speak in shor t. FN: In order to explain ‘‘the idea of law,’’ three ‘‘cases,’’ or senses in

which the word law is used are given: [245] 1. ‘‘God’s will is constant and unvarying, and in this sense it is God’s law’’ (sic). 2. Supposing ‘‘God to have directed once and forever an order of sequences and left’’ ‘‘that order to evolve itself, this would be law in another sense.’’ 3. ‘‘There is a tendency to generalizing and classifying in most minds, and we all invest our own classifications and generalizations with more or less of the attributes of constancy and say we have discovered such and such a law.’’ ‘‘The first two cases come within the range of philosophy. The last case is purely one of reasoning on obser vation’’ (sic). I do not find here the ‘‘explanation in our definitions’’ required. I respectfully ask for one.

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JS: God is omnipotent and can ‘‘decree,’’ He can surely exercise His own will in giving ‘‘law.’’ To suppose that there is no such power (I do not infer that you suppose so) is essential pantheism, which would combine in one personality God and creation, and merge will in necessar y evolution. FN: Taking the first case, ‘‘a constant and unvarying will’’ is not

another way of expressing ‘‘law.’’ Louis-Napoléon’s ‘‘constant and unvar ying will’’ to have spies throughout France is not ‘‘law.’’ It is tr ue that, conversationally, the word law is sometimes used to express will. Conversationally, it might be said that Louis-Napoléon’s will is ‘‘law.’’ But, if the word ‘‘law’’ is to have a definite meaning, so as to be of any avail in an inquiry after truth, I must either keep to the definition I have given, or ask to have given me some reason for attaching some other definite meaning to that word. To say ‘‘his will is law’’ generally describes a rule by decree, not by law. Taking the second case: neither does will ‘‘directing’’ ‘‘an order of sequences’’ express ‘‘law.’’ To will that certain events shall follow in a certain succession would still be a decree, not a law. The essential character of ‘‘law’’ is not that a prescribed series of phenomena will certainly exist, a prescribed series of events take place. JS: Tr ue from the position of observation merely, not true from the position of reflection. FN: The essential character of law is that, whenever certain definite phenom-

ena exist, certain other phenomena will be simultaneous with (or successive to) the former, in other words, that with (or to) a certain event another determinate event will be simultaneous (or successive). It is essential to keep this distinction in view. Without it, the whole bearing of this subject has been misinterpreted and distorted. (This will be shown farther on.) [246] JS: The proper term for this would rather be ‘‘obser ved order,’’ for it can only be known through observation of the presumed sequences. You and I would not differ however on the principle, which from all we have discussed appears to be the one which lies at the root of your idea. We should differ in its application to the subject of God’s government of the universe. Unless first it could be shown that a certain definite invariable order of sequences had been discovered. Second, that such invariable order was really God’s order and not men’s order. And there the matter rests at present. After we had got through these points 1 and 2 we should have to be satisfied that the order of sequences was purely accidental and not decreed by God beforehand,

758 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought other wise man would fall under the old bugbear ‘‘necessity.’’ If you would rest satisfied with realizing the No. 1 point simply, and not going further, you and I might possibly agree, but when you go further and say such and such an order of sequences represents the ‘‘plan’’ or ‘‘order’’ or ‘‘law’’ of God’s procedure, then I do not think I am exacting in saying ‘‘prove it,’’ especially as on its proof depends man’s nature, God’s nature and man’s destiny. FN: Taking the third case, although a ‘‘tendency to generalize and

classify’’ will accompany a tendency to search for truth, which is undiscoverable to any considerable extent without those operations, yet, of course, if men classify and generalize hastily and inaccurately, i.e., incor rectly ‘‘invest their classifications and generalizations’’ with ‘‘the attributes of constancy and say they ‘‘have discovered’’ a law without sufficient evidence, such ‘‘saying’’ can afford no instance of a ‘‘law.’’ And therefore this statement appears to me no definition, but a caution. On what constitutes sufficient evidence I shall say more hereafter. JS: Quite true, but the whole of our controversy turns upon this very point, namely, that certain sequences have been discovered, so unvarying that we are bound to assume them as first representing a law. Now the question really amounts to this: have these sequences been discovered or not? Second, if they have been discovered does it follow that they prove law or something quite other than law? Do they not prove disorder? FN: Note. I have only here to show the absurd self-contradiction and

most dangerous mistake of the Protestant words ‘‘private judgment.’’ This idea was, I believe, invented by Protestantism. It is absurd, because it is not private ‘‘judgment,’’ but God’s ‘‘judgment’’ we have to seek after. It is dangerous, because it weakens the idea of absolute tr uth as being the object we have to seek after and find. What should we say if a lecturer on astronomy were gravely to state, There is Ptolemy’s system and Copernicus’s system. Choose for yourselves, gentlemen; it is a matter of ‘‘private judgment’’? We should say, such a man deserves not to be in the chair but in Bedlam. It is not a matter of ‘‘private judgment’’ at all, but of absolute fact whether the sun moves round the earth or the earth moves round the sun, which we have to find out. Copernicus is not the ultimate and final discoverer of astronomical truth. But not the less is there to be discovered absolute astronomical truth. JS: You ver y properly fling at the vulgar idea of ‘‘private judgment,’’ which as regards religious truth (which I take as the highest kind of tr uth) has as you properly remark no existence. We cannot constitute

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ourselves judges of such truth. We can only judge of the evidence of such truth. The term was an unlucky one whoever invented it and its application in deciding on the nature of truth has led to all sorts of infidelities. FN: What did we say when the Anglican Church exposed herself to the

laughter of Europe, in the matter of the damnation of little babies, by gravely stating, ‘‘You may believe, gentlemen, the one or the other, or sometimes the one and sometimes the other, as you like. Use your ‘private judgment.’ ’’ JS: Pitch into them for they richly deserve it. FN: The Roman Catholic Church, who declares herself to be in the

possession of absolute and final truth, shows us the antipodes of this. It is hard to say which doctrine is the most dangerous. But, on the whole, I think both experience among the Protestant countries of Europe and deduction show that ‘‘private judgment,’’ by shaking the foundations of all truth, leads the most directly to absolute infidelity, that is, to considering that there is no final or absolute truth to be discovered in religion, as there is in all other sciences. But that it is a mere matter of ‘‘aspiration,’’ of ‘‘imagination,’’ of ‘‘private judgment,’’ in short. This is pure ‘‘Comte’’ism. JS: Truth absolute cannot be discovered by man. It is beyond his sphere

altogether. Religion from its nature does not admit of being discovered. You may wing your flight throughout the universe and you will not discover it. It is not to be observed. It ‘‘cometh not by observation’’ [Luke 17:20]. It is either in the heart or nowhere. ‘‘It is within you.’’ Straining the intellect after religion is useless, and can never get beyond opinion, and opinion is neither truth nor religion. It is neither a matter of ‘‘aspiration’’ nor of ‘‘imagination’’ nor of ‘‘private judgment.’’ We should never forget that, at the culminating period of the human intellect, a period compared with which we are in our dotage, ‘‘the world by wisdom knew not God,’’ and on this sacred and profane history are at one. FN: I repeat very distinctly that I am no disciple of Comte or Buckle. I

still believe them to be powerful minds, who have obtained an insight into certain important truths, perceived certain errors in the ordinar y beliefs of mankind. But they have stopped short of any true view of that thought of God which is in process of manifestation in human existence. The errors, of which they have become conscious in the minds of others, have subjected them themselves to prejudices of a

760 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought different kind. Comte and Buckle may afford help to others in the attainment of truth which they have not reached themselves. But to stop short where they have stopped short is to leave to be supposed such conditions of human existence as that they could produce nothing but utter repugnance in a righteous mind (Calvinism and indeed Roman Catholicism), JS: That may be, but neither Calvinism nor Roman Catholicism are necessarily Christianity. The species must not be taken for the genus. FN: the close ally of Calvinism now, have on the mind the same effect

as Comte and Buckle, viz., in representing the conditions of human existence such as would be impossible (because abhorrent) to the thought of a righteous Creator. JS: If you mean here that the problem of humanity as given in Chris-

tianity is abhor rent, etc., you ought to have shown how. I hold the very reverse and am prepared to sustain it. FN: If a law existed in any mind that a certain number of murders

should be committed every year, we may safely say such a mind is not good or wise. The idea of God, either under a ‘‘necessity’’ to make such a law, or making it of His own ‘‘free will,’’ is obviously a contradiction in itself, if by God we mean a Spirit of Wisdom and Goodness. No Being that could be called good would bring other beings into existence under such conditions as these, viz., of living under a law which compels men to be in such a state of mind as that they must commit murder. It is quite another thing to say that there is a Being, whose thought is the progress of imperfect natures towards perfection, such progress being worked out through the exercise of faculties existing and regulated in accordance with His law or plan, the consequence of such law or plan being that a number of men of a certain organization and in certain circumstances will have the inclination to commit murder. Such are the conditions of human nature in this country in the nineteenth century, viz., that a certain number of persons is so circumstanced that it is their will to commit murder. This is a fact. No one will deny it. JS: I read this passage as expressing your opinions. I agree as to your

doctrine of progress. I dissent entirely from the statement in next page that it is part of the same law of progress that a certain number of persons are to commit murder, and also to its being inferred from the fact that a certain number do commit murder. No man ever was or ever will be circumstanced so that his will must be to commit any act

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such as you mention. Circumstances affect will not at all. They have no such power except through the will acting primarily. If the will in a certain number of cases and under certain circumstances is found to will to commit murder, it certainly affords no reason for inferring that the circumstances were sovereign over the will. Murder has been planned and committed from kindness, as well as from revenge and malice or covetousness. If the judgment has not decided on the circumstances, and the will has not acted on the judgment there is no murder. You cannot admit any agency however trivial as necessarily influencing the will, apart from its own determination to commit murder, without introducing necessity. FN: To say that they are necessitated to commit murder would be, again,

a self-contradiction. For it is their determined will, the fulfillment of that strong inclination, without which no man ever committed murder. JS: Tr ue! But the inclination is a secondary phenomenon which has

been preceded by other phenomena. In the case supposed inclination has all the guilt of murder. FN: The practical result of such a belief as that above stated would

not be to induce us to cease the struggle to prevent or to reform sin, but the very reverse. The conviction that the existence of sin is decreed by a higher Power would indeed be ‘‘belief in necessity’’ or fatalism. JS: Tr ue! Yet I do not see how you can escape from this imputation. Inclination to commit murder must come either of man’s will or God’s will. You doubt the first. Or at all events you connect the inclination with certain external circumstances, which, through inclination and will, end in murder. This is simply necessity. FN: But, in proportion as a mind feels some horror at the idea of a

fellow creature murdered, and much more horror at the idea of the state of mind in which a man is who commits murder, such a mind will be urged to ask itself, Can I do anything to alter this state of things in England in the nineteenth century, consequent upon which this number of murders is committed? Can I, directly or indirectly, at once or in course of time, individually or with the help of others, raise the human mind to such a state as will prevent or lessen murder? JS: All Christians and all neo-philanthropists will join in doing the best they can to prevent murder, and to teach men what is right in order to prevent it. FN: We who are moralizing have no distinct impression of what the

previous life is of anyone who has committed murder.

762 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought JS: Oh! Yes we have. Most men who dare to fathom themselves can

understand the process. FN: Can we doubt that, if we had, if we understood the framework of

the human spirit, in other words, its organization, if we could trace the various influences affecting a man from his birth to the commission of such a crime, we should perceive when and how the inclination to commit it might have been prevented, the mind opened to better influences? JS: This can only be done by the will of the individual. The only con-

troversy is how best to do it so as to guide the individual will. FN: Such would be the practical power of this belief, when united

with any strong horror of sin, with any strong conviction of the power of man to raise man out of it, that such a belief would be an imperative call upon the human heart and understanding so to improve man’s circumstances as to ‘‘incline his heart to keep God’s law’’ aright. JS: One great reason of our want of success in all our efforts is the

‘‘sic volo sic jubeo’’ [I command what I will] philanthropy. ‘‘I know better than you follow me and you are safe.’’ The sinner answers, ‘‘I won’t,’’ and he is right. He won’t surrender his free will to another. Entire self-abnegation is the first step to recover our lost brothers and sisters. I know you agree in this. It recognizes them and sinks ourselves. FN: The arguments which most men bring against the capability of

man for such improvement have always appeared to me to tell in the opposite direction. JS: You are quite right. FN: Buckle says, ‘‘In India, slavery, abject, eternal slavery was the natu-

ral state of the great body of the people, the state to which they were doomed by physical laws utterly impossible to resist.’’ Granted, so long as circumstances rule man. JS: Circumstances do not rule men except by his own will. They are like other tyrants—they try to rule, but we must let them before they can rule. FN: But God’s laws will teach man to rule circumstances. While circum-

stances rule man, the majority in hot countries will be lazy slaves, JS: Quite true. FN: because food is plentiful, without labour. But let man rule circum-

stances and the abundance of food (without time and strength spent upon its cultivation) will set free that time and strength to be devoted

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to the cultivation of mental and spiritual food. Enough has been thought and felt and done in hot countries to prove that heat does not inevitably paralyze the exercise of the heart or mind. With regard to the horrors described in those pages, let us listen to them well. It is the eternal Voice: ‘‘Not so, my children, not so’’ I hear also repeated in ever y cholera, massacre, vice, degeneration. Man usually replies to it by prayer (if he replies at all), prayer for the removal of the evil. JS: ‘‘Ora et labora’’ [pray and work] is better. Why should men who do work not pray for health and strength to do more work? It is surely not inconsistent with reason since the whole human race prays in some shape. FN: And the eternal Voice answers again, Not so. Cease to spend your-

selves in vain. What is this buz of purposeless talk from thousands of reunions of such talent as might redeem mankind? JS: Do not forget that, amongst much useless ill-directed effort, there is much really practical good-producing effort. It is all our ceaseless duty to hold up the lamp to those who are in darkness, and to commit it to other hands when ours grow weary and old. If you must have a law I give you that one. But do not forget that those who most obey this law are those who pray most. This I know to be a law so far as my own experience of man has gone. FN: What is this rattle, ceaseless in your cities, yet purposeless for

man’s divine nature, when such a purpose waits to be fulfilled? Will you stand by or pursue these inane follies while man is being murdered or is murdering himself? Or, as inanely, will you betake yourselves to prayers for the salvation of man to Another, whose express plan it is that it shall be your own noble work? JS: We are not workers instead of God, but fellow workers with God. FN: The poisoned, the paralyzed nature cannot help itself. Man must

rise up and save. JS: Pray do not forget what experience we have in this matter. Who so ready to acknowledge humanity in all its greatness and sorrow? Who so ready to assist in mitigating its afflictions and teaching it better things than were those who shed human blood like water at the end of the last century? But these men did not pray; that is simply a fact. FN recap: ‘‘Can it be shown that a certain invariable order of sequences

has been discovered?’’ [246] FN: I would begin by defining this question: Is there ground for

believing in the existence of a certain invariable order manifesting

764 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought itself in every mode of existence which has a beginning and is subject to change? In other words, is there ground for believing that no beginning or change takes place without some co-existence or precedent (or assemblage of co-existences or precedents) which recurring, such beginning or change will again take place, which not occurring, no such beginning or change will ever take place? Practically, it is upon this hypothesis that every one of our actions is based, viz., that all phenomena (i.e., whatever begins and changes) exist in such definite relations to other phenomena co-existing with or preceding the beginning of, or whatever change takes place in, them. One specimen differs from another of any species of plant, in connection with some definite co-existing or preceding circumstance. And horticulturalists study these concomitants. So with diversities of animal life and character. And breeders of stock study these concomitants. The farmer, gardener, physician, sanitarian, teacher, governor, artist, artisan, what is their whole activity for but this? In order to bring about some beginning, some change, some continuance of what is, to find the means by observing co-existences and precedents, in other words, ‘‘laws of nature,’’ in other words, ‘‘observed orders’’ in nature. The phrase ‘‘laws of nature’’ is undefined and confused, unless ‘‘nature’’ expresses a conscious entity which lays down the ‘‘orders’’ we call ‘‘laws of nature.’’ By ‘‘nature’’ I understand the course of phenomena without beginning or end, but exhibiting ceaseless change, so that each present set of phenomena differs from what has been and what will be. [247] Resemblances and differences in phenomena alike show ‘‘order’’ in nature. A ship, a musical instrument, may be made to all appearance and according to measurement exactly to resemble another. But the exact qualities in one cannot be secured in another. The inference is not that co-existents and precedents being the same, results differ, but that circumstances so minute as to be imperceptible to us have differed and that, so exact is ‘‘order’’ in nature, no difference in co-existing or preceding phenomena can exist without difference in the result. Through such uniformity and variety, classification and generalization only become possible. Sensations, thoughts, emotions are to be classed as phenomena, i.e., they are modes of existence which begin and change. And each beginning and change are practically found to exist in relation to definite co-existences and precedents. Sensations, thoughts, emotions are

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the co-existents or precedents from which volitions result, and according to which they definitely vary, i.e., given certain sensations, thoughts, emotions, certain volitions invariably ensue. Given a certain volition, certain sensations, thoughts, emotions have existed, co-existent with or preceding it which, not having existed, neither would that volition have existed. JS: This is the whole case to be proved. The argument from analogy adduced above does not help the proof. All it can do is to lead the mind into a certain train of reflection, which may be true or not true. The laws of external nature are however very different from those of mind (law being used in the sense of succession of phenomena) and will is subject per se to no law. It is above all law and is in reality the maker of similarities or diversities. You have reproduced in the last paragraph the whole matter we have debated almost in the same words. That which you have defined, so to speak, in that paragraph I do not call will at all. Whatever it is, it is not will. The co-existence of sensations and volitions is no part of will. Will, as will, may certainly subordinate its functions to external conditions, but this can only be done by its own act. The principle is a cardinal one either way as it affects human destiny. As you have stated it in the preceding page, it is the philosophic basis of all systems by which man attempts to subordinate man, whether in politics or morals. Teach it undisguisedly and in time you may rear a race which will have abdicated its will. This is not only logically possible. But the voluntary abdication of the will is one cause of the great social evils which afflict the world. ‘‘Conformity to the world’’ is produced in this way. It is a voluntar y act, but not always a sensible act, for such an act must be preceded by mental or moral blindness, which is the result not of God’s law, but of man’s per verseness. Third person: The analogical part of the inquirer’s argument is well stated, but I think that the concluding paragraph requires working out more fully. It seems to me that the respondent does not go deep enough. Taking his case of the will subordinating its functions, etc., there still remains the question as to the ground for the will so acting. Might not something be made out in favour of law and order, from some such considerations as these? Will, in its widest possible acceptation, includes all phases from blind compulsive willfulness to intelligent, deliberate will. Any given phase is a compound of the impulsive (as it seems to me), the direct result of certain sensations, circum-

766 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought stances, etc., and (2) the rational the indirect result of them, refracted, collected and brought to a focus by the mind. This is perhaps too hastily put down, but the respondent’s view appears to me like Vishnu on the elephant, the elephant on the tortoise and the tortoise on nothing. FN recap: ‘‘The proper term for this (a definition of law) would be

‘obser ved order’ for it can be only known through observation of the presumed sequences.’’ [248] FN: I am quite willing to substitute ‘‘obser ved order’’ for the word

‘‘law.’’ FN recap: ‘‘You and I would not differ, however, as to the principle, which from all we have discussed, appears to be the one which lies at the root of your idea.’’ FN: I do not know what ‘‘principle’’ is here alluded to. JS: Neither do I. I have forgotten the manuscript. FN: The ‘‘root’’ of my ‘‘idea’’ is this: Man when he feels the desire

that human nature, human existence, human destination shall be satisfactor y to the moral sense (or the Spirit of Right) which is appropriate to healthy human nature, will desire to learn how to bring this about, as far as human possibility admits, but, feeling the limit of human possibility, he will yearn to discover ground for believing that there exists a superhuman Power of such a nature as to be an assurance that, in accordance with the will of such a Power, the conditions of human existence are satisfactor y to a perfect Spirit of Righteousness. My ground for so believing is the ‘‘obser ved order,’’ according to which it is discoverable that phenomena and events co-exist with or are successive to each other. I believe this ‘‘order’’ to be a manifestation of Power in a righteous nature, because such ‘‘order’’ affords means and inducements by which the imperfect can advance towards per fection, through the individual and social exercise of capabilities existing in the imperfect, fulfilling thus what is the appropriate desire of the moral sense of spirit of right in man. The first authority on law in the kingdom, the attorney general, says that the existence appropriate to healthy human nature (with £20,000 a year) is ‘‘to be fond of horses and racing, of good eating and good drinking and keeping a good table’’ (sic), in re Sir Henry Meux. JS: I may be wrong in the summary I am about to give of this, but it appears to me that what you mean to say is this:

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If we examine the world as it is with all its sins and sorrows, its horrors, its heroisms and its grandeurs, we may hope to discover that it is all created on a given plan and governed as well as created by a being of absolute perfection to a perfect end.’’

If this be your meaning, of course the evidence is everything. For my part I cannot see my way to admitting the proposition in the way it is here laid down either from observation, personal experience or history. All three show me that there are two sets of principles at work, one directly opposed to the other. One essentially good, the other essentially bad, and by no possible process of reasoning could I make them the produce of one mind, especially of an essentially good mind. If I understand your desire [?] aright, I should say it is utterly, hopelessly, unproductive. ‘‘Your ground for believing’’ in the spiritual order you think exists is nothing but an analogy, and as such is open to the final objection against all analogies, that they can prove nothing. But even in using the analogical form of reasoning there must be a certain correspondence between the things compared. Now no such correspondence exists between the laws of external nature and the obser ved spiritual laws of our own nature. Has not the want of correspondence been in all ages a matter of wonder and inquiry? The want of correspondence cannot be cloaked under any analogy. It is final and matter of simple fact. FN: Our opponent says ‘‘that he should differ as to the application of

the principle on which we agree unless 1. it could be shown that a certain definite invariable order of sequences has been discovered; 2. that such invariable order was really God’s order and not man’s order.’’ That the phenomena of nature exist in relations of simultaneity and succession to each other is universally now admitted. The only exception is supposed, by some, to be volition. This alone is said to originate in a ‘‘self-determining power’’ existing in the mind of man. [248] JS: Not ‘‘by some.’’ I know no philosophy that does not acknowledge human freedom. The so-called philosophies which deny it are not philosophies but simply talk about it. Emerson’s expression, ‘‘the omnipotence of the will,’’ inconsistent though it be as coming from him, is the very root and basis of all philosophy. FN: Others indeed suppose that here also exist constant relations of

simultaneity and succession. The existence of these relations, here, however, does not admit of the distinct proof which can be brought for ward in cases where the identical instances of simultaneity and succession can be pointed out and repeated.

768 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought JS: I shall here say a few words in reply to the following pages. Sin, crime and cholera (your illustrations) are God’s judgments on man’s willful perversity. (There is an awful, an infinitely more awful illustration given by Luther in one of his tracts, but which I cannot cite here). Luther’s argument, suffice it to say, is exhaustive and final. He never thought and no one who observes (as I contend) ought to think that these things are God’s work. God is omnipotent. He can slay them, but man is free and as long as man is free, he must submit himself to the consequences, good or bad, of his use of freedom. It hence follows that, although nothing can exist without God’s permission, yet man may bring any amount of evil on himself, or under God he may prevent it by the use of his faculties. But this is altogether a different thing from charging on a perfect Being, not only the authorship of imperfection, but the introduction of infinite abominations into His universe for a purpose. FN: Certain substances, being introduced into the system of certain

animals, they die. Certain external conditions existing, certain zymotic diseases follow. Till lately, such diseases were supposed to be an ‘‘inscr utable providence,’’ a ‘‘dispensation.’’ Such they are supposed to be still by the Horse Guards, by Lord Panmure and the Army Medical Service. [249] JS: You do not put this in its proper light. God, for instance, has not

decreed that the law of gravitation shall kill men. But he has decreed that, if men will throw themselves from the top of the monument, the law of gravitation will kill them. Is the law of gravitation therefore an evil? It is the same with the moral retribution here and hereafter. FN: In other words, such diseases were supposed to manifest a special

definite will of God that they should exist, just as now cases of moral evil are supposed to originate in the will of man. JS: Moral will does originate in the will of men or there is no moral evil. It cannot come from God, who is perfect and knows no evil. FN: Both these interpretations are errors equally dangerous, for this

reason, JS: Besides the cases you put are not parallel. FN: they prevent man from (or at least they fail to stimulate him to

the) taking means within his power to obviate physical disease or moral sin. JS: On the contrary, the idea that evil is part of God’s direct government of the world logically leads to fatalism and non-effort. And of

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this there is no doubt. The doctrine of the connection of evil with free will implies directly the power of coping with it. Man may reform himself, but who can resist God? FN: While Dr Andrew Smith was in power, it was ‘‘the gate to the king-

dom of the’’ Army Medical Department to say that yellow fever was an ‘‘inscr utable dispensation’’ and that nothing could be done to avert it. [249] JS: I leave it for you to point out, if all evil (and yellow fever is one) be part and parcel of God’s plan of the government of the world, without reference to man’s free will and power of coping with yellow fever, when Andrew Smith was to blame. He was on the contrary a true disciple of the philosophy which believes that the phenomena of spirit are governed by the same laws as the phenomena of matter. FN: Much wiser heads have believed that cholera was traceable to no

other origin than the direct will of superhuman Power that it should exist. And the means attempted to prevent it were prayer, which it was hoped would influence God’s will, or some changing of circumstances which were totally irrelevant to the case, i.e., the divine will as now proved to exist in respect to this disease. JS: The divine will, so far as we can see it with regard to the matter, is that if a man is of filthy and intemperate habits he will die of God’s angel, cholera, just as if he commit murder he will die of God’s minister, the hangman. Absolute human freedom is essential in either case, or both deaths are unjust. FN: This divine will is now shown by experience and observation to be

that, wherever certain physical conditions (such as want of draining, of cleanliness, etc.) exist, cholera will exist, that these physical conditions ceasing to exist, cholera will cease to exist. So, while men continue to believe in no other origin for crime but human will, those efficient means which might be taken to remove vice, like cholera, will not be taken. JS: Tr ue, but my point is that both crime and cholera are the result

not remotely (because we do not know remote causes) but approximate of human will. If all men were Christians there would, so far as we know of the evils, be neither cholera nor crime, for all men would have the spirit of power, love and soundmindness. FN: While the (so-called) evangelical believes that ‘‘the heart of man

is desperately wicked’’ [Jer 17:9] (mark the word, which signifies ‘‘hopelessly’’ wicked),

770 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought JS: The word desperately does not mean ‘‘hopelessly.’’ It means

‘‘determinately’’ and ‘‘willfully.’’ FN: that the ‘‘world’’ is ‘‘accursed,’’ that ‘‘many are called but few are

chosen,’’ [Matt 20:16] that those few are ‘‘saved’’ by the murder of one God by Another, [250] JS: I never heard of such a doctrine as this being held in any Christian

church. Some of the medieval Catholic theologies indulged in some such speculation, but it never was church doctrine. I know, however, what you mean to express. It is an old defunct objection, to which Christianity itself gave the reply long before the objection was made. The essence of the objection, so far as it concerns morals, goes to casting ridicule on almost every great deed that man has ever done on earth. FN: while the (so-called) Catholic believes that the ‘‘sacraments’’ are

the means of, not re/forming/creating the world, but opening the door of a place called ‘‘heaven,’’ which does not appear to be the earthmade heaven but a segregated pen, again set aside for a few. While these things are, what hope can we have for the removal of the cholera of sin? JS: Ear th can never be made heaven any more than matter can never be made spirit, nor the essence of men be made the essence of God. The ideas are antagonistic. It does not follow however that heaven may not be a state rather than a place, but whatever, or wherever it is, heaven can never be made out of earth. FN: Crime, disease and death, by God’s law, always go together. JS: Certainly! but the Bible first taught this to man, only he would not believe it till he saw it, just as he will not believe other things now till he sees them. Your proposition was stated more fully 3000 years ago than you state it now, but most remarkable it is that it is believed now by a very small part of educated men, and even by them only after experience. FN: Therefore, insensible but immense progress has been made

through Dr Farr’s branding of a certain class of diseases with the word ‘‘zymotic’’ (and its association of ‘‘preventible’’) towards the abolition of twin vices. But oh for a more direct acknowledgment of this and consequent effort! JS: So say I. Only your philosophy and mine would lead to two very different ways of dealing with the questions. But happily the two opposite sets of premises lead to somewhat similar results. People who

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won’t help us will not be made to do so by telling them it is man’s duty to do so and so, but there is no responsibility to God one way or other! Yet this latter is a legitimate result of your system. FN: Given the feeling of what vice really is, of what virtue really is,

together with the conviction that that vice will certainly prevail where certain organizations and certain circumstances co-exist, that virtue will as certainly prevail where certain other organizations and circumstances co-exist, then vice will cease and virtue take its place in proportion to the force of that feeling and that conviction. JS: This is partly true, partly not true, as you state it. ‘‘Organization’’

and ‘‘circumstances’’ which you allude to are precisely those things over which man has power through his will. They exist through his will acting in the course of ages. They are not God’s law. That is, man is not so created that these ‘‘organizations’’ and ‘‘circumstances’’ shall exist as part of his being. God has ordained however that if man will, think, speak and act in certain ways, such and such ‘‘organizations’’ and ‘‘circumstances’’ shall follow, from man’s free will. The conditions and circumstances are man’s creating. It was he who willed sin and in willing sin he rendered disease and death inevitable, God’s law being that if we ‘‘will’’ sin, that is, if we place our ([illeg] our ‘‘mind’’) ‘‘will’’ in opposition to His will these things shall follow. In other words He has created the world subject to certain conditions to be obser ved on the part of its reasonable tenant. We know that man has not observed these conditions. Of that there is no doubt. The question then renders itself into how to make him observe these conditions? That is the whole question of human progress, here and hereafter. Have we any reason to believe that the simple knowledge of the existence of these conditions will effect men’s deliverance? History tells us that for 3000 years man has had this knowledge and the result is what we see. FN: Given the conviction of this invariable co-existence of definite organ-

izations and circumstances, and definite vices and virtues, together with the conviction that human organization and human circumstances may be determined or modified by human will, or that, where organizations cannot be altered, circumstances may, then man will become what he is intended to be, viz., the creator, the modifier of human destiny, instead of being (what he was not intended to be) the creature ‘‘prostrate’’ at the foot of a priest, of ‘‘the cross,’’ of all those expedients, born of hopelessness, for smuggling a man selfishly into heaven, instead of setting him actively to regenerate the earth. [251]

772 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought JS: I must confess not to be able to understand this. It is not the ‘‘expedient of the’’ cross or of Christianity you hit at. What it is I don’t know. Christianity to me is altogether a different thing from what it appears to you. FN: Last night, a mob of people in the street was following for its

amusement a poor drunken woman who was violently resisting the policeman carrying her off. Lady - - in her carriage was saying to her daughter, ‘‘Don’t look that way to hear those curses, to see those revolting sights.’’ [251] JS: These are the maxims of the devil’s kingdom and are to me the

most irrefragable proofs of the existence of such a kingdom. How are you to deliver such people out of the devil’s kingdom? Philosophy gives you no remedy. Neither does experience of any ‘‘law’’ or ‘‘sequence.’’ FN: Is this the moral precept to be given to the (so-called) children of fortune? Oh no! Look and let your heart be wrung with the sense of human degradation, contrasting with the sense of human capacity for all that is right and good, not for all that is ‘‘desperately wicked.’’ Could such scenes exist, if the better educated felt that it lay in their power so to modify human circumstances as to prevent them? JS: I don’t understand your expression ‘‘better educated.’’ I know none such. You may remember that the later Platonists tried to establish a kind of moral aristocracy. It was part of their system, and so completely had it overrun thought in the East and West that it had ruined morals and wrapped man in Pharaseism everywhere. It was a per fectly logical result. You know also what Christ said on the subject. And here I think lies the radical difference between your philosophy and that of Christianity. You look for salvation through the efforts of a moral aristocracy upon society; now Christ, knowing that society depends wholly on individuals, gave it as an especial mark of His kingdom, whereby it was to be distinguished from all philosophies, that ‘‘to the poor the gospel was preached’’ [Matt 11:5]. The poor being in fact the mass. If the poor won’t hear Christ they will not hear the ‘‘better educated,’’ depend on that. In what I conceive as the grandest sense, education exists among the poorest, and they have much to teach to ‘‘better educated.’’ FN: Would the streets of London keep up their present sounds and

pursuit of amusement, if it were recognized that time and thought might be so spent as to prevent the wretched state of that woman and

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of thousands of women? If it were recognized that man has power to realize all that is right and good, not by prayer to another Being to do his work, not by a mysterious ‘‘self-determining’’ power through which he shall ‘‘will’’ to do it, but by taking God’s appointed means to incline his heart to will aright. JS: Precisely. If man has ever done this and ever can do it out of his own power, without prayer, which he has however abdicated by the terms of the proposition, then is salvation very near. But unfortunately man acting by himself has furnished us with no one example. ‘‘Man knows his duty. But he does it not.’’ The root of every thought, word or deed which is to raise any human being out of the social and spiritual death in which he is must come from without him. The ‘‘better educated’’ can’t give him any help, because it is essential to all such progress in action that man must believe before he acts, otherwise he would not act, and he won’t believe in the better educated if he won’t believe in Christ. FN recap: ‘‘We should differ as to the application of the principle which, from all we have discussed, appears to be the one which lies at the root of your idea. We should differ in its application to the subject of God’s government of the universe unless first it could be shown that a certain definite invariable order of sequences had been discovered, second, that such invariable order was really God’s order and not man’s order.’’ [251] FN: In considering these two questions, I must first define the nature of

the ‘‘order’’ which is discoverable. It is an ‘‘order’’ of relation. Phenomena exist in relations of simultaneity and succession with and to each other, i.e., a given phenomenon or assemblage of phenomena existing, some definite phenomenon or assemblage of phenomena will co-exist or follow, which never would have existed, except in those definite relations of simultaneity and succession with or to those definite phenomena, and which always will exist, should those conditions be repeated. As to the hypothesis that ‘‘order’’ is discoverable in the succession of phenomena and events, you who deny it appear to misconceive the nature of the ‘‘order’’ which I assert to exist. JS: I do not deny it. I deny your hypothetical origin of it, if it exists. Discover the order if possible, but for the moral purpose it is intended to serve it must rest on reasonable moral evidence, of which analogy (the evidence you have hitherto used) is the very weakest link. Our controversy will really begin when the order is discovered, viz., whether it be God’s, man’s or the devil’s order.

774 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought FN: It is not expressed by representing that each phenomenon in

which succeeds another is what it is by the will of superhuman Power and cannot, through human means, be otherwise. This is the proposition usually controver ted by you who disbelieve the existence of ‘‘order’’ in the succession of phenomena and events. This is the hypothesis which you persist in seeing therein. JS: Tr ue, it is so! and I will continue to controvert it because, without

directly stating it, your principle assumes the ‘‘obser ved order’’ which you say exists as God’s order. That although human effort may to a greater or less degree be involved in the order observed to exist, the order itself and man’s part in it are of God’s design in carrying on His plan from imperfection to perfection. Now on the contrary I merely say ‘‘Choose ye which ye will serve, if God be the Lord ser ve Him.’’ But in doing so the very idea of evil attacking in any sense by his own will to His moral government is a contradiction. If the Being who has planned this universe and men in it is really to be in any sense or degree charged with the evil in it, as being part of the plan, then that Being is not God but some other being. (This was held by certain early sects and logically from your ground.) I may be wrong in this conception of your doctrine. But if God be the Creator, our idea of God derived from our own intuitions tells us at once that the faintest shadow of evil cannot come from Him, wherever it many come from. To find such a being as would solve the difficulty we must make a concrete out of the Hindu mythology or find an origin for evil apart from God. FN: That each phenomenon which exists, each event which takes

place, and the ‘‘order’’ in which these succeed one another, is determined by one will is undoubtedly true. But such a proposition does not explain the nature of the ‘‘order’’ by which this will manifests itself to man, nor the effect of such will on human nature and human will, nor the results attributable to it on human history, past and present, nor the expectation to be derived from it as to human future. The proposition that each phenomenon or event which succeeds another is what it is by the will of superhuman Power, and cannot, by human means, be made otherwise, is fatalism, makes man’s existence a machine, and makes the man’s or machine’s existence represent the will of another only, in what it is and does. [252] JS: The only philosophy that can meet the difficulty must rest on facts. One, we see from God’s works that He is omnipotent in the highest sense in which we can conceive of omnipotence. Two, we see

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from the infinite variety of His works that He is free in the highest sense in which we can think of freedom. Three, we know from our own mental analysis that we are free, but that we can give up our freedom we know from sad experience. Philosophy must, if it can, bring together man’s freedom and God’s freedom. But to confound the two in one general hypothesis of progress or moral government is simply to leave the problem unsolved and to take refuge in a fallacy. FN: Alarm at such an interpretation of the ways of God with man dis-

inclines you from giving any fair or full consideration to a hypothesis which leads to quite the opposite interpretation. Therefore, in considering your two questions above, I must examine, one, whether the result of such ‘‘order’’ as is discoverable in the past or present, and of such anticipations in regard to the future as are derivable from it, would be satisfactory to the moral sense? Two, what is the nature of the evidence to be produced for the existence of an ‘‘order’’ of simultaneity and succession in which phenomena (i.e., all modes of being which begin and change), shall universally exist with regard to each other? [252] FN recap: ‘‘Neither Calvinism, nor Roman Catholicism are necessarily

Christianity. The species must not be taken for the genus.’’ [255] JS: It appears to me that the whole of this paper which follows has ver y little to do with the points of our previous controversy. The words you have placed at the top of this column were used by me simply to turn aside from Christianity certain objections you had raised against it through Roman Catholicism and Calvinism. I merely repeated Rousseau’s expression in another form. It is not my intention to discuss Christianity. We started to examine certain moral and philosophical questions regarding free will. All these objections, partly analogical, partly moral, against Christianity have been made and disposed of ver y long ago. Butler has finished up the analogical part once and forever. You can never repeat the analogical argument such as it is on the opposite side, without answering Butler, and all men agree, even opponents, that whatever the argument is worth, Butler has once and forever used it. He has shown to a demonstration that there is nothing in external nature with which we are acquainted that would lead us to believe that external nature and Christianity, with its peculiarities, did not come from the same hand, and there is an end of it. If you were ever to succeed in proving that Christianity, and the results of observation and experience in society, were at eternal variance, Butler’s argument

776 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought would remain intact. And you would have two analogies, each perfect and each opposed, which would reduce both to an absurdity, and so would go the whole argument from analogy, and all your ‘‘laws’’ and ‘‘orders’’ with it irretrievably. Insofar as the moral objections are concerned, they have been made 1800 years ago. They have attempted to show that Christianity is unreasonable, that it is partly true, that it is a compound of sublime truth and gross falsehood, that it is unjust, that it misrepresents the preconceived character of God. In fact there is no statement of the kind that has not been made. But in spite of all, we do know that the most reasonable of human beings have trusted it, that the most part have trusted it, that the most truth-loving have trusted it, that the greatest philosophers and theologians the world has ever known have trusted it, and that as a rule the great minds of all ages have made it their hope. This shows that it is open to not one of these objections. How have they arisen then? Simply because Christianity presents itself with certain conditions, which are precisely of the same nature as the conditions presented along with all other problems in God’s universe, and while man accepts the problems with the conditions he rejects Christianity with the conditions. It is his ‘‘will’’ simply, not his ‘‘reason,’’ which is in fault. FN: For humanity the fundamental questions, of which all others are

a part, or with which all others are connected, are the following: (1) Can human nature, its history and destination, be interpreted so as to be satisfactory to a righteous mind out of what man can learn of what is, what has been, what is to be? (2) What is possible to man to do towards rendering human existence satisfactory to a righteous mind? (3) Can man discover ground to believe that a Power exists of such a nature as to afford assurance that those conditions of human existence, which it is not possible to man to change, are satisfactor y to a righteous mind? We cannot answer these questions by merely examining into what there is of true or of false in Roman Catholicism or in Calvinism, or in any other professed form of belief which has arisen since the publication of the writings contained in the New Testament. I do not say since the publication of Christianity. For does not the way in which these writings have been rent and torn by disputants show how imperfectly the minds which lived after that time penetrated the thought with which they were written? The agonies endured at the stake, on the cross, in dungeons, in the homes of private life, do they not shriek, so to speak, the same tale?

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There is more of indifference now, there is less earnest belief, more concealment of unbelief. But is there a clearer and more unanimous conception of truth? Is it not the tendency of modern doctrine to say, with regard to religion, what with regard to any other subject would be felt to be monstrous and absurd, viz., ‘‘let every man have his own truth’’? Far be it from us to allow any man to construct a railroad from north to south as he pleases. But, in these (so-called) liberal days, we admire the tolerance what a word! which lets every man construct the road from earth to heaven as he pleases. (Query: what does this word mean?) JS: Right, what does it mean? There is only one way and that is Christ. There is no need of either asking or receiving tolerance at all. FN: Enough. The search after what is and what ought to be, the belief

that they are one, by which we wish to shape all inquiry, forbid us to have any faith in those ‘‘revelations’’ (said to have been addressed to humanity by superhuman Power) which in any way contradict our experience of what is, revolt our conception of what ought to be. JS: Why should this be? Both reason and analogy on the contrary show that we may consistently inquire and receive. It is surely equally one-sided to say in such an argument that revelation will teach us what we can only get from inquiry, or to say that the results of inquiry would render revelation unnecessary. Christ’s parable of the talents shows how the two processes are combined, namely, the human use of our talents and our responsibility for using them, the latter and supernatural element being in this case given by direct teaching, in other words revealed. FN: This same search after the true and the right directs us to the

eternal, ever-speaking voice of the Almighty and the righteous One speaking to us through His laws, and their mighty results to be seen in the past, the present and the future. [256] JS: Never forget in using these expressions that they take for granted that God speaks or reveals Himself through His laws, and that a revelation is presupposed as possible. Christianity agrees with this but denies, and very logically denies, that God reveals Himself solely through material laws. If it be possible for God to reveal Himself in material laws, it is equally possible for Him to reveal Himself personally or in any other way. The only question is whether He has revealed himself in any other way? Philosophy in its true sense has never denied the possibility. It is only our modern rationalism that has led to such an absurd-

778 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought ity. The question in fact is one of evidence, and the evidence for Christianity is so strong that even 1800 years after its appearance men are still trying to get quit of it. FN: Whether such laws really exist and whether (such as we suppose

them to be) they afford ground for belief in the existence of almighty and righteous Power, we have to examine to the utmost of our possibility. That eighteen centuries ago there lived one most pure, most earnest in love to God and man, we believe without doubt and with feelings of tender love and deep veneration. But most imperfectly do we know His thought, communicated only through the words and writings of others, eighteen centuries ago. [257] JS: You admit God to reveal Himself in a stone.2 You doubt whether

he has revealed Himself in a man! If you admit this you are bound to admit that Jesus was either what he said he was or the greatest imposter the world has seen. Or you must admit that men who wrote down such principles and died for them did not scruple to descend to the greatest falsehood. FN: And, if we did, it is the thought of his Father and our Father that

the knowledge of truth should progress. And it has progressed beyond that possible to him in his day. JS: Read over what Jesus says about the redemption of man and point

out what was true and what was false in that. The evil of such admissions as you have made above consists in this, that you select what you agree with and reject what you disagree with. It is kissing Christ and betraying him. The only fair moral practice is what he himself requires. ‘‘Either make the tree good and the fruit good or else make the tree corrupt and the fruit corrupt.’’ But it is an old way of dealing with Him. FN: Let us read the words we can trace to him, because they are the

words of love and wisdom consistent with his life and death. Let us read them with deep interest and rise up from them better prepared to love, to work, to suffer as he did. But, if we would speak the truth, deeper is the source of truth than those words, even the thought of his God and our God, to be studied now and forever in His Laws. And now, with regard to ‘‘Christianity,’’ what is ‘‘Christianity’’? Some tell us it is a doctrine; some say, no, it is not a doctrine, but a rule of practice. Then, what is this rule of practice?

2 In the ten commandments.

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JS: All objections grounded in the aspects of Christianity at any particular period have been long since silenced by Rousseau, who though no Christian, had the sagacity to show the hollowness of all of them. Christianity must be judged by its principles, not by the acts of its disciples. It professes to be light let in on darkness, or leaven put in meal. It is not to be judged by the darkness nor by the unleavened meal. It is a kingdom destined to subvert all Satan’s power and all human perverseness, and it will do it, and it is not ever to be judged by the wounds it receives in the contest. FN: It has been the rule of practice of twelve men who went about as

beggars, doing good. It has been the practice of men who lived alone in holes in the rocks, doing nothing, of men who lived in community, apart from everybody else, of bishops who drove about with servants in purple liveries behind their carriages, on £20,000 a year. But these cannot be all Christianity. Then, is it a doctrine? I look in books of sermons and I find it is ‘‘the doctrine of man’s sin and Christ’s atonement.’’ Now, this is something tangible (but perfectly incompatible with the other doctrine of there being no absolute truth). JS: There is one truth and that is Christ, who is the Way the Truth and the Life. That is enough for us. The absolute tr uth, which is the search of philosophy, not of Christianity, cannot be found by human reason, for it is beyond it. FN: Christianity then lays it down as an absolute truth that the scheme

of God is the creation of a vast number of beings, called into existence without any will of their own, the fate of the greater number of which is to be everlasting misery, of the lesser number eternal happiness, and this after a period of ‘‘trial’’ (quer y: ‘‘trial’’ of what?) of the average duration of, in Liverpool, seventeen years, in the healthier districts, double that time. (The only variation in this doctrine is a greater or less preponderance given by Calvinism to the ‘‘atonement,’’ by Roman Catholicism to a second period of uncertain duration (called Purgator y), before the everlasting happiness begins, and by other churches to different words, called ‘‘faith,’’ ‘‘works,’’ etc. This is a very positive proposition enunciated by Christianity. [258] JS: Christianity does no such thing. It tells men that, through their own willfulness, it is God’s law that they must perish, just as they perish from cholera or get hanged. There is not a human being to whom Christianity does not offer eternal life. It condemns none, but it tells them that there is a time at hand when they will condemn themselves.

780 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought It is the same process in the spiritual world which we see every day in the physical world. It offers them a way of life, if they will take it. And those who die die because they will not accept of life, just as we see people die every day to whom we preach sanitary science as their protection. The whole misery of men is summed up in one simple expression of our Teacher and Friend: ‘‘Ye will not come to me that ye may have life’’ [John 5:40]. As to church systems, creeds, catechisms, etc., they have nothing to do with the question, Christianity is not a system. If man has made it so, it is not to be blamed. FN: (Not by Christianity.) As positive is the proposition that God has

created a number of beings (called into existence by no will of their own), who are to be led by Him through infinite progress to perfection, which progress is however to be secured by mankind for mankind, in accordance with certain laws. Whichever of these two propositions be true, surely each implies as much a matter of fact as those two of the motion of the sun round the earth or the earth round the sun. JS: Both your propositions are in my opinion equally wide of the tr uth. The first proposition does not represent Christianity. The second, say what you will, must be classed as simple heathenism, and consequently as fatalism so far as human progression by will, is concerned. Your laws in such a proposition are my fates. FN: Now, if the first proposition be true, if there be a Being who has

done such a thing, nothing but the popular belief that Power is, in itself, to be worshipped, could induce men to worship such a Being, much less to love Him. If there be such a Being, the only feeling a right mind could have would be to submit, because it must submit (and here ‘‘submission’’ is the right word) but to protect, inasfar as possible, its fellow creatures from such a Creator. JS: Your idea, so far as I can understand it, is human freedom acting

on a certain plan and subject to certain preordained orders of succession, for they must be preordained otherwise the result would be uncertain. It is true you attempt to deny this inference, but I cannot let you escape from it. FN: Doubtless the words ‘‘submission,’’ ‘‘resignation,’’ etc., have

spr ung from such a belief as this. For ‘‘submission’’ to perfect Goodness is absurd. JS: In this Europe of ours the germ of Christian life is rooted too deeply to be injured by any philosophical discussions. There are many men, however, who do not like to face inquiries of this kind, because

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they have never examined themselves; when obliged to confront these questions they flee and take refuge in Puseyisms and especially in Roman Catholicism. Indeed arguments such as you have used are ver y frequently used by Roman Catholic preachers against human freedom in religious matters. They attempt to destroy belief by a philosophical attack on it and, knowing that the germ is still there, they offer the church as a refuge from the doubts they have raised. That is the only use of such arguments as this. So far as the inner Christian life is concerned, when one has to look at them from its platform it is like looking into the darkness, only one likes to look to see if there are any comets. One word more. Your proposition is that Christianity, being impotent for the salvation of man, we are to seek the means of his salvation by ascertaining from observation what are the sequences in the moral government of the universe, and having ascertained these sequences, we are to be guided by their teaching in saving the world. If I understand you aright, then: 1. The sequences have not yet been discovered; 2. They are to be discovered; 3. They are to be applied; 4. They are, being so applied, to save man. 5. What is to become of man in the meantime. And lastly, the whole thing would after all be an experiment and might fail, and what then? I must confess I would rather keep what I have got. What I have got I know; what you expect to get is utterly unknown. And I contend that your search is neither in conformity with what we know of ourselves nor of the laws of the moral government of the world. FN: To printer, please to page this as coming before (though in a dif-

ferent section) the part ‘‘Practical Deductions IX’’ sent yesterday, 14 January 1860. A short account of God’s dealings with the author.

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784 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Mulhauser, Frederick L., ed. The Correspondence of Arthur Hugh Clough. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon 1957. Newman, Francis William. A Histor y of the Hebrew Monarchy, from the Administration of Samuel to the Babylonish Captivity. London 1847. . The Soul: Her Sorrows and Aspirations, An Essay toward the Natural History of the Soul as the True Basis of Theology. London 1849. Poirier, Richard, ed. Ralph Waldo Emerson. New York: Oxford University Press 1991. Poovey, Mar y, ed. Florence Nightingale: Cassandra and Other Selections from Suggestions for Thought. New York: New York University Press 1993. Quetelet, L.A.J. Sur l’homme et le développement de ses facultés. Paris 1835. . A Treatise on Man, trans. R. Knox. Edinburgh 1842. . Lettres sur la théorie des probabilités. Brussels: Hayez 1846. Quinet, Edgar. Histoire de mes idées. Geneva: Slatkine Reprints 1989. Quinn, Vincent, and John Prest, eds. Dear Miss Nightingale: A Selection of Benjamin Jowett’s Letters to Florence Nightingale 1860-1893. Oxford: Clarendon 1987. Reid, T. Wemyss, ed. The Life, Letters, and Friendships of Richard Monckton Milnes, First Lord Houghton. 2 vols. London: Cassell 1890. Renan, Ernest. Vie de Jésus. Paris: Lévy Frères 1863. Sedgwick, Adam. A Discourse on the Studies of the University. Reprint, Leicester University Press 1969 [Cambridge: University Press 1833]. Smith, Thomas Southwood. The Philosophy of Health, or, An Exposition of the Physical and Mental Constitution of Man. 2 vols. London 1836-37. Stanley, Arthur Penrhyn. The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold. 2 vols in 1. Boston: Fields, Osgood 1870 [1844]. Stark, Myra, ed. Cassandra. Old Westbur y: Feminist Press 1979. Steuart, James. An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy. 3 vols. London: Routledge 1767. Thoemes reprint. Strachey, Ray. ‘‘The Cause’’: A Short Histor y of the Women’s Movement in Great Britain. London: C. Bell 1928. ‘‘Cassandra’’ 395-418. Thomas à Kempis. The Following of Christ in Four Books: A New Translation. London: Burns & Lambert 1851 [1441]. Whately, Richard. Elements of Logic, Containing the Substance of the Article in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. 8th ed. New York: Harper 1861 [1834]. Woodham-Smith, Cecil. Florence Nightingale 1820-1910. London: Constable 1986 [1950].

Index

S

pace limitations required some compromises in the index. It generally includes proper names, omitting those of acquaintances, employees and persons who appear briefly or are not readily identifiable. Items with identifying information are shown in italics. Persons known by more than one name are indexed under the name most frequently appearing in the text. Biblical references are indexed by book under ‘‘Bible.’’ Abbott, Jacob ix, xii, 3, 14-15, 57; comments in dialogue by JA: 60-81, 83-85, 87-88, 96-112, 117-31, 136-44, 146-53, 160-72, 175-77, 179, 272-97 Abraham 28, 62, 230n, 262, 643, 731 Adams, Serjeant 375 Aeschylus 299 agnostic/ism 3, 14, 17, 32, 42n Almighty (God) 131-32, 208, 225-28, 256, 276, 374, 544, 590, 599, 641, 644-46, 657, 662-63, 682-83, 701, 706, 725-29, 777-78 angel 423, 499-500, 769 Anglican (see also Church of England) 20, 98, 298, 341, 376, 493, 497, 513, 525, 759 Angreda, Marie d’ 91 Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius 103 Archimedesg492, 564 Arguelles, Augustin 313 Aristophanes 332 Aristotleg289, 347 n, 368, 723 Arnauld, Marie-Angélique 40 Arnold, Thomas 10, 140, 328, 339-41, 388, 439 artizan/artisan 1, 4, 11-12, 24, 26, 34-38, 44, 55, 59, 67-68, 82, 105, 247, 593, 647, 764

atheist/ism 1, 23, 25, 34, 63, 65-66, 98, 100-01, 353, 403, 409, 413, 632 Atkinson, Henry G. 17, 51, 228, 666, 702, 730 atone/ment 18, 73, 94, 96, 257-58, 268-69, 341, 343, 346, 372, 376, 379, 399, 424, 453, 500-01, 503, 512-13, 630, 650-51, 655, 779 Augustine, St 144 Augustus II (of Saxony) 394 Augustus Caesar 432 Bacon, Francis 85, 357, 649, 730 baptism/baptized xi, 11, 18, 219, 231, 262, 265, 332, 387-88, 392, 502, 655, 715, 734 Barbauld, Anna Laetitia 622n Beethoven, Ludwig van 323 Bell, Jacob 137 Benedict 16 Bernard of Clair vaux 102, 105 Bible/biblical (see also scripture, New Testament, Old Testament) 10, 15, 20, 45, 75-76, 92, 200, 216, 222, 289, 301-02, 332, 347, 363-64, 384, 388, 402, 411, 466, 470, 489, 525-26, 615, 643, 656, 685, 694, 709, 716, 719-20, 724, 770; Gen

/ 785

786 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 1:26-27 120, 220, 279; 2:9 549; 3:5 705; 4 703; 4:8 175; 8:16 475; 22 262; Exod 3:6 643; 17:11 81; 20:5 276; 20:13 495; 20:2 501; 20:12 501; 33:19 105; Num 22 378; 22:28 632; 1 Sam 3:9 188, 295; 15 402; 1 Kings 19:12 298, 355; Josh 8 262; 9:21 452; 10:12-13 146; 24:15 713; Neh 9:12 241, 533, 748; Job 11:7 105, 225, 701, 706; 13:15 219, 227, 714; 15:13 728; Ps 8:4 371, 658; 22:1 728; 22:6 658; 37:25 523; 49:12 488; 51:9 273; 78:20 108; 90:10 476; 91:12 423; 96:1 300; 139:6 119; Prov 18:14 401; Eccl 1:14 331; 2:11 330; 11:1 569; Isa 11:6 519; 40:3 544; 45:7 643; 45:9 138, 232, 374, 714; 50:2 306; 53:3 522; 55:9 659; 64:4 332, 385; Jer 13:27 544; 17:9 169, 372, 646, 769; Joel 2:28 588; Micah 6:8 747; Hab 1:13 504; Mal 3:1 589; Sir 20:5 469; Matt 3:3 499, 544; 3:17 501; 4:1-11 422; 4:3 667; 4:6 423; 4:19 352; 5:6 169, 604, 611, 618, 653; 5:11 360; 5:18 591; 5:44 397; 5:48 121, 371; 6:10 114, 333; 6:11 704; 6:12 643; 6:22 95; 6:28 301, 393; 7:7 184, 424; 7:9 483, 570; 7:29 385; 8:9 186; 8:17 504, 533; 8:22 384; 9:6 392; 10:14 302; 10:39 677; 11:5 334, 772; 11:8 559; 12:46 590; 12:48 384, 508, 591; 12:50 591; 13:12 427; 13:14 152, 180, 393; 14:27 343, 552; 16:19 66; 17:20 334; 18:3 71, 705; 18:18 66; 18:19 377; 18:20 90; 19:18 597; 19:21 351, 358, 364, 488, 538; 19:24 312; 19:26 142, 166, 227, 728; 20:16 250, 770; 23:9 365; 23:12 366; 25:1-10 478; 26:24 137; 26:39-42 166; 27:46 227, 728; 28:20 66; Mark 1:2 589; 2:9-10 392; 5:9 61, 91, 429; 8:34 359; 9:24 526, 631; 10:14 364; 10:29 342, 384; 15:34 533; Luke 4:1-13 422; 4:5 424; 7:41 391; 10:27 385, 449; 12:50 392; 14:10 360; 14:26 360, 488; 17:20 759; 17:21

301, 333, 421; 18:13 376; 23:43 171; John 2:7 329; 4:7-30 393; 4:23 85; 5:17 205, 679, 682, 684; 6:53 186; 7:17 96; 7:46 302; 8:7 392; 9:2 120, 523; 9:2-3 392; 10:30 114, 164, 546; 10:34-35 302; 14:2 421; 14:6 425; 14:8 153; 14:26 542; 16:21 318, 472; 17:3 335; 19:26 507; 19:30 685; 21:5 500; Acts 2:17 588; 9:3-6 345; 9:5 501; 10:38 298; 16:30 351, 371; 17:23 65; Rom 7:15 670; 9:23 219; 1 Cor 2:9 193, 274, 385; 7:20 487; 10:31 364, 655; 13:2 75, 143, 393; 13:9 626, 629; 13:12 132, 710; 2 Cor 4:7 65, 484; Gal 5:9 519; Phil 2:3 382; 2:12 259, 646; 3:14 129; 4:7 104; Col 3:23 187; 1 Tim 1:15 96; 3:16 676; 2 Tim 1:5 160; 1:7 711; 1:12 380; Heb 7:25 295; 11:38 424; 13:8 273; Jas 1:17 76, 169, 205, 215, 238, 260, 307, 544, 707, 744; 1:27 161; 1 Pet 3:15 275; 5:10 510; 1 John 3:2 166; 4:8 104, 273, 329, 495, 649; 4:16 543; 4:18 685; 4:19 542 Blainville, H.-M.D. de 208 Bonaparte. See Napoleon Brontë, Emily 553n, 564n Browning, Elizabeth Barrett 576 Br unel, I.K. 137 Br utus 432 Buckle, Henry Thomas 11, 159, 253, 739-40, 744, 752, 759-60, 762 Buddhism 453, 735 Bunsen, Christian von 33 Bunsen, Frances von 33, 53 Butler, Samuel 38, 775 Byron, Lord 576, 655 Calvin, John ix, 3, 14, 18, 57, 176, 219, 230, 278, 373, 714-15, 731; comments in dialogue by Calvin: 160-65 Calvinism 253, 255-56, 258, 387, 760, 775-76, 779 Canova, Antonio 327 Carpenter, Mar y 576 Carpenter, William Benjamin 49

Index / 787 Cassandra 3, 5-8, 22-23, 26, 43, 457, 511, 547-92 Chadwick, Edwin 33 Chalmers, Thomas 126 Chapman, John 738 Charles I 626 Charles II 626 Chisholm, Caroline 471, 571-72, 576 cholera 41, 49, 51, 249-50, 255, 293, 641, 690, 763, 768-70, 779 Christ (see also Jesus, Lord, Saviour, Son) 15, 18, 30, 38, 65-66, 75, 89, 92, 96-97, 135, 143, 156-57, 180-82, 186-87, 205, 235, 262, 264, 294-95, 298-303, 309-10, 313, 318, 329, 333-34, 337, 342-43, 351, 356-61, 363-65, 367, 371, 377-78, 384-86, 392-94, 403, 409-10, 418-19, 422, 424-25, 444, 449, 453, 481, 487-88, 499-502, 507, 533, 538, 585, 588-90, 658, 662, 677, 691, 720, 738, 749, 772-73, 777-79 Christian/ity 9-13, 15, 17, 27, 32-33, 73, 114-16, 135, 255-58, 261, 265, 267, 272, 318, 340, 342, 346, 367, 386, 389, 410-11, 425, 453, 488, 501, 506, 533, 649, 715, 720, 724, 726, 731, 733, 735, 738, 760-61, 769-70, 772, 775-81 Church of England (see also Anglican) xii, 1, 12-13, 20, 23-24, 220, 265, 299, 328, 332, 341-42, 345-46, 371-72, 387-89, 403, 410, 432, 450, 489, 491, 493, 498, 513, 515, 525, 632, 655-56, 715 Cicero, Marcus Tullius 332 Cleopatra 230, 380 Clough, Arthur Hugh ix, 33-37, 42, 48-49 Clough, Blanche 32n Coleridge, Samuel Taylor 323 Columba 7, 299, 318, 320, 339-41, 343, 345-54, 365-66, 487, 497-98, 524 Combe, George 9, 101, 213n 702 Comte, Auguste ix, 1, 11, 17, 44, 87-88, 100-01, 106, 146-47, 149, 151, 193-200, 203, 206, 208, 210,

228-29, 235-36, 243n, 253, 330, 500, 600, 632n, 647, 652n, 655, 721, 730, 739-40, 744, 746, 752-53, 759-60 Confalonieri, Frederico 292 Congreve, Richard 50 Conolly, John 671 Constant, Benjamin 358 Copernicus, Nicolas 347n, 368, 420 Cousin, Victor 235 Cowley, Abraham 541n, 615n, 687n Creator (God) xi, 9, 42, 52, 109, 116, 127, 162-64, 166, 169, 173, 216, 225, 232-33, 250, 253, 258, 296-97, 390, 418, 567, 609, 612, 697, 703-05, 708, 712, 720, 723, 725, 727, 734, 736, 751, 760, 774, 780 crime/criminal 13, 170-71, 174-76, 221, 224, 230, 240-41, 249-50, 254, 274, 284, 319, 325, 375, 378, 380, 393, 400, 425, 427, 572, 619, 650, 660, 671, 707, 710, 715, 718, 722-23, 732, 747-48, 750, 762, 768-70 Crimean War xi, 26, 33, 42, 51, 54, 249 n-50 n, 432 n, 626 n Cromwell, Richard 657 cross (Christ) 171, 251, 294, 342, 508, 517, 533, 662, 704, 771-72, 776 Cumming, John 235 Dalton, John 304-05, 308, 336 Daniel 187 Dar win, Charles 52n daughter/s (status, role of) 3, 6-8, 21-23, 51, 196, 310, 315-19, 322, 403, 409, 421, 427, 436-46, 450-51, 456-67, 471-83, 547, 549-50, 555, 569, 587-88 David 523 Dawes, Mary Helen 576 Dawes, Richard 353, 498 Derby, 14th earl of 237, 429, 741 Descartes, René 48, 70, 322, 707 determinism/ation 13-14, 17, 28, 49, 52, 142, 239, 246, 269, 624, 629, 660, 675, 743, 745, 757 devil 73, 128, 166, 177, 344-45, 373,

788 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought 424, 497, 499, 511-12, 533-34, 611, 659, 667, 715, 772-73 Diana 453 Dickens, Charles 160n, 522 disease 49, 117, 221, 249-50, 325, 415, 434, 490, 639, 690, 718, 750, 768-71 Egypt/ian xi, 5, 8, 13, 25, 62, 72, 230, 299-301, 429, 453, 501, 731 Eliot, George 23 Ellis, William 41, 101 Emerson, Ralph Waldo 51, 614, 665, 767 Epicurean 453 eternal/eternity 13, 19, 41, 65, 67, 70-77, 80, 83-84, 86, 90, 94-95, 99, 106, 108, 112, 118, 120, 123-25, 130-31, 134, 136, 142, 144, 147, 152-60, 169-71, 177-78, 180, 184-86, 189, 192, 197-98, 200-02, 205-07, 219, 228, 231, 238, 242-43, 254-58, 262, 264-65, 267, 269, 282, 294-95, 307, 313, 335-36, 340, 369, 373, 375-76, 379, 400-02, 404, 407, 409, 417-20, 425-26, 433, 451, 466, 469, 474, 484-86, 500, 502, 504, 511, 528-32, 536-40, 535-37, 540-41, 544, 548, 598, 600, 610-11, 615-16, 622, 626, 629, 639, 651, 653-55, 663, 665-66, 668, 670-71, 675, 677- 80, 682, 684-85, 687, 692, 697, 715, 718, 729-30, 732-33 743, 751-52, 762-63, 775, 777, 779 Euclid 481, 697 evangelical xii, 6, 14, 27, 29, 195, 230, 250, 290, 342, 356, 362, 372, 502, 509, 656, 694, 731, 769 family (general) 2-3, 6, 8, 18, 21-22, 51, 124, 276, 278, 280, 299, 310-11, 316-24, 327-28, 342, 364-65, 372, 384, 403-04, 416-18, 433-34, 436-37, 439-41, 446-47, 450-60, 463-64, 470-71, 474-82, 486, 493, 507-08, 525, 545, 547, 552, 567, 580, 583, 591, 647, 664 family (Nightingale) xi-xii, 14, 17, 23, 33, 43

Fariseo 3, 547, 553-54, 591 Farr, William 250 770 Father (God) xiii, 18, 64-65, 90, 99, 101, 107-08, 111, 114, 119-21, 125, 142, 153-54, 164, 166, 169, 182, 184, 189, 205, 227, 230, 232, 257, 260, 265, 294-96, 386, 409, 424-25, 453, 484, 531, 533, 535, 546, 591, 630, 640, 642, 667, 679-80, 682, 684-85, 687, 692, 702, 704-05, 728, 731, 734, 778 Fénelon, Bishop 281 Ferdinand II (‘‘Bomba’’) 620 Fichte, Immanuel Hermann 211, 699 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 211, 699 Fliedner, Theodore 515 forgive/ness 28, 89-90, 171, 264, 272-74, 358, 372, 390-92, 394, 399, 412, 424-25, 513, 517, 640, 643-44, 652, 695 Fourier, Charles 508-09 Fox, Charles James 419 Francis of Assisi 16, 97 free will 8, 13, 29, 40, 161-64, 170, 172-73, 175, 210-11, 219, 231-33, 235-37, 253, 267-68, 279, 283, 285, 343, 491, 594, 627, 636-38, 696, 698, 703-06, 710-11, 715, 718, 721, 727, 729, 732-43, 749-50, 755, 760, 762, 769, 771, 775 Fr y, Elizabeth 471, 571-72 Fulgentia 7-8, 299, 303, 309, 318, 322, 357, 387, 403, 426, 435, 439, 443-44, 452, 457, 471, 476, 483 Galileo 375, 420, 489 Galton, Francis 49 Gardiner, Samuel Rawson 53-54 Gentili, Aloysius 503 George IV 292 Gerbet, Philippe Olympe 346 Gibbon, Edward 71 Gladstone, W.E. 506 God, character of 19, 29-30, 41, 105, 126, 141, 143, 219-20, 222, 328-29, 335-36, 391, 398, 504, 523, 534, 593-94, 641, 645, 678, 700, 715, 720, 724, 726, 733, 776

Index / 789 God, law of xii, 9, 134, 161, 167-68, 170, 176, 202, 205, 207, 209-67, 274, 276-77, 279, 281, 285, 308, 334, 344, 355-56, 378, 380, 393, 395, 399, 408, 412-13, 416, 425, 434, 440, 458, 462, 465, 471, 475, 481-84, 495, 501, 503, 515, 519, 521, 530, 532-33, 538, 595, 597-99, 606, 612-13, 619, 627-31, 635, 639, 644-49, 651, 659, 668, 674, 677, 684-87, 691-93, 696, 698-781 God, mind of 9, 115, 272, 606, 616, 631 God (perfect) 1, 17-18, 24, 29, 50, 60-62, 64-65, 69-76, 83, 99, 101, 107-13, 124-25, 129-36, 140, 142, 147, 151-52, 154, 156-57, 162, 172, 178-86, 188-93, 197, 200-05, 207, 212-13, 215, 217, 222-23, 226, 228, 248, 258-59, 261, 271, 279, 293-96, 301, 304, 314, 323, 333, 343-44, 356-57, 362, 375, 385-86, 391-92, 394, 404, 407, 411, 433, 465, 468-69, 494-96, 502, 510, 515, 520, 527, 530, 533, 536-37, 539-40, 544, 596-99, 612-14, 619, 621-22, 625, 627, 630-31, 635, 640-41, 645-46, 651, 661-62, 664-66, 669, 673-74, 677-79, 682, 684-87, 691, 697, 702-03, 706-08, 711-12, 720-21, 723, 728-30, 732, 748, 766-68, 780 God, plan of 18, 29, 41, 49, 109, 111-12, 121-22, 151, 155, 210, 215-16, 225-26, 228, 276, 281, 293, 334, 337, 357, 361, 372, 394-95, 413, 485, 500, 502-03, 511, 513, 593-94, 604, 631, 694, 707-08, 723, 725, 727-30, 760, 763, 767, 769, 774, 780 God, will of 12-13, 82, 85, 90, 96, 110-11, 113-16, 119, 131-33, 140-42, 148, 154, 175-76, 184, 189, 191-92, 201, 209, 213, 225, 239, 245, 248-49, 252, 258, 276, 278, 291, 336, 338, 359, 363, 400, 503, 510, 517, 530, 534-35, 536, 540, 543-44, 590-91, 595-98, 612, 618, 621-22, 632, 640, 645, 660, 662, 664, 668,

674-75, 677, 683, 686, 691, 695, 703, 705, 709-10, 712, 721, 725-26, 732, 734, 743, 745, 747, 756, 761, 766, 768-69, 774 goddess 72, 327, 410 gods 60, 62, 69-70, 109-10, 135, 172, 297, 301-02, 327, 411, 489, 610, 619-20, 705, 716 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 12, 325, 331 n gospel 10, 261, 328, 334, 385, 501-02, 590, 772 Grand-Être 11, 101, 106-07, 199, 400 Greek (philosophy) 17, 70, 180, 241, 299, 327, 332, 411, 418, 425, 439, 453, 750 Greg, William Rathbone 160 Gregor y I 491 Guercino, Giovanni 327 Hamilton, William 31, 267-68 heathen (see also pagan) 261-62, 453 heaven 16, 66, 71, 96, 103, 112, 121, 125, 149, 165, 176-77, 182, 250-51, 256, 301, 306, 312-13, 334, 347-48, 364, 368, 412-13, 420-21, 454, 470, 500, 504, 553, 586, 591, 599, 642, 676-77, 703, 754-55, 770-71, 777 hell 19, 77, 103, 181, 219, 357, 428, 430, 504-05, 650, 655, 714, 755 Henr y VIII 341 Herbert, Edward (of Cherbury) 348 Herbert, Elizabeth 6 Herbert, George 454 n Herbert, Sidney 6, 26, 40 Herder, J.G. 10 Herschel, John Frederick William 416 Herschel, William 416, 426 Her vey, John 633 Hindu/ism 241, 735, 750, 774 Hippolytus of Rome 600 Holy Ghost/Spirit 19, 64-66, 97, 101, 107-08, 142, 235, 295-97, 409, 424-25, 453, 499-500, 542, 630, 679, 692, 697, 738 Holyoake, George Jacob 208, 721 Horsman, Edward 24 Howard, John 281, 423, 589, 690

790 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Howe, Julia Ward 23 Howe, Samuel Gridley 1, 23, 126 Hudson, George 325 Humboldt, Wilhelm von 633 Hume, David 2, 70, 691 Hunter, John 521 Ignatius of Loyola ix, 3, 14-17, 57, 304, 371, 691; comments in dialogue by St Ig: 95-99, 102-04, 109-12, 114-21 Incarnation 19, 70, 72, 96, 267, 341, 346, 500-02, 533-34, 537, 565, 590, 685-87 Jebb, Joshua 126, 425 Jeffrey, Francis 304, 325 Jesuit 14, 714 Jesus (see also Christ, Lord) 30, 56, 65, 313, 351, 356, 361, 409, 418, 501, 595, 728, 778 Jew/ish 9, 28, 103, 168, 265, 299, 310, 392, 453, 488, 497, 499, 513, 544, 642, 656, 731 Job 227, 611, 728 John the Baptist 451 Johnson, Samuel 60-61 Joshua 146, 262 Jowett, Benjamin ix, 8, 32-34, 37-43, 48-53, 611, 689 Julius Caesar 432 Kaiserswerth xi, 25, 515n Kant, Immanuel 235, 699, 739 Kepler, Johannes 420 Kingsley, Charles 11 Koran (Qur’an) 220 Laplace, Pierre-Simon 70, 100, 420 law, moral 9, 357, 380, 496, 523, 625, 750, 755 law, physical 47, 86, 120, 199, 201-04, 254, 307, 380, 392, 394, 495, 523, 683, 696, 733, 747, 762 Law, William 61 Law-giver 30, 46, 78, 238, 743, 745-46 Lawrence, Henry 147 Leopardi Giacomo 414 Locke, John 9, 24, 44, 624

Longueville, duchesse d’ 350 Lord ( Jesus, God; see also Christ, Providence, Saviour, Son) 65, 105, 187-89, 290, 295, 300, 333, 338, 349, 351, 357, 362, 385, 387-88, 418, 435, 497, 499, 501, 504, 544, 547, 552, 595, 643, 704, 712, 774 Louis XIV 582 Louis XVI 626 Louis-Napoléon 245, 272, 376, 415, 497, 626, 642, 719, 753, 757 Louis-Philippe 432, 626 Luther, Martin 18, 342 Macaulay, Thomas Babington 137, 223, 288, 325, 722 Mackay, Robert William 143-44, 669 Mackintosh, James 309 Magendie, François 511 Manning, Henry Edward 339 Mansel, Henry L. 31 Maria Theresa (Infanta) 582 marriage 3, 21-22, 45, 56, 130, 315, 332, 380, 404, 423, 430, 433-40, 443-45, 458, 463-64, 475-76, 480-86, 523, 568, 571-72, 577, 579-83, 587, 696, 747, 752 Martineau, Har riet ix, 3, 14, 17, 51, 57, 228, 666; comments in dialogue by HM: 109-10, 112, 119, 127, 136-41, 145, 147-49, 151, 153, 155 Martineau, James 78, 235 martyr 386, 415-16, 554, 626, 677 materialism/ist 17, 39, 48, 375, 513, 545, 621-22, 667, 673-74 McNeill, John ix, 26, 32, 34-36, 51, 53 metaphysical 31, 37-38, 49-50, 77, 81, 178, 236, 697, 732, 740 Methodist/ism 23-24, 30, 98, 106, 297-98, 302, 451 Michelangelo 82, 197, 237, 320, 322-23, 327, 362, 566, 585n, 741 Mill, Harriet Taylor 46 n Mill, James 416 Mill, John Stuart ix, xii, 4-5, 8, 27, 29, 31-34, 44-48, 57, 101, 235, 271, 419, 595, 606, 609, 664n, 739; comments

Index / 791 on Ms by Mill: 62n-64 n, 70 n, 78 n, 112 n, 116 n, 120 n, 122 n, 134 n, 155 n, 158 n, 164 n, 168 n, 173 n, 187 n, 189 n, 198 n, 200 n, 301 n, 324 n, 375 n, 640 n, 643 n, 649 n Milman, Henry Hart 506 Milnes, Amicia Henrietta 25 Milnes, Annabella Hungerford Crewe 25 Milnes, Florence Ellen 25 Milnes, Richard Monckton 11, 23, 576 Milton, John 492n, 514n, 576 Mirabeau 24 miracle/miraculous 19, 60, 84, 92-93, 123, 132, 143, 241, 260, 302, 328-29, 334, 339-40, 343-45, 354-57, 377-79, 386, 411, 496-99, 501, 523-24, 596, 609, 623, 632, 680, 727, 733, 748 Mohl, Julius ix, 43, 48, 54 Mohl, Mary Clarke 45-46, 56, 693 Montalembert, C.R.F. 497 Moore, Mary Clare 42 n moral government (of God) 53-54, 178, 210-11, 215, 220, 268, 699-700, 707, 714-15, 781 Moses 60, 62, 81, 180, 240, 289, 453, 495-96, 500-01, 514, 595, 597, 747 mother/s (status, role of) 21, 49, 119, 163, 315-16, 321-22, 384-85, 434-42, 445-46, 450-52, 456-60, 464, 467, 471-77, 481-82, 485, 488, 493, 502, 508, 550, 552, 555-58, 569, 579, 587, 591, 629, 635, 649, 746 Muhammad/an 30, 230, 488, 501 Murillo, Bartolomé Estaban 555 mystic/ism 69, 85, 142, 181, 203, 290, 297, 655, 697 Napoleon (Bonaparte) 123n, 170-71, 176-77, 186, 188, 608, 626 necessity (philosophical) 8, 17, 29, 38, 154, 173-79, 200, 211, 226-27, 233, 235-38, 242, 253-54, 263, 279, 281, 283, 285, 326, 491, 594, 627, 638-39, 648, 668, 670-71, 674, 698, 705, 707, 709, 711, 713-14, 718-19, 726-28, 732, 736, 738-40, 742-43, 751, 755, 758, 760-61

New Testament (see also Bible, scripture) 69, 256, 501, 720, 738, 776 Newman, Francis William 77-78, 100, 157, 159-60 Newman, John Henry 77n, 268 Newton, Isaac 48, 116, 167-68, 330, 420, 492, 566 Nightingale, Frances ix Nightingale, Parthenope (later Verney) ix, 43-44 Nightingale, W.E. ix, xi, 29-31, 48 Nofariari 3, 7, 23, 547, 553-54, 564, 575, 591 Nor wich, bishop of. See Edward Stanley nurse/nursing xi, xiii, 1, 19, 21, 36, 52-54, 163-64, 239, 317, 362, 456, 486, 550, 588, 635, 745 Oersted, Hans Christian 81, 201 Old Testament 69, 86, 520 orders (Roman Catholic) xi, 16, 20-21, 42, 91, 341-42, 347, 358-66, 371-72, 376-77, 379, 381-82, 387, 410-11, 450, 487, 502, 509, 516-17, 519, 637, 656 Owen, Robert 11, 101, 208 Oxenstiern, Axel Gustafsson 320 pagan/ism 89, 135, 716 Paine, Thomas 24 Paley, William 9 Palmerston, Viscount 642n Panmure, Lord 768 pantheism 39, 82, 121, 201, 234, 418, 705, 717, 734, 737, 757, 78 Parker, Theodore 160 Pascal, Blaise 566, 601 Pattison, Mark 335, 345 Paul (apostle) 60, 65, 116, 160n, 219, 343, 345, 351, 368, 385, 424, 501, 620, 655, 670, 711 Peel, Robert 325 Perez, Antonio 620 Phelan, Charlotte Elizabeth 91n Philip II (of Spain) 620 Pitt, William 419 Pius IX 354n

792 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Plato 299, 352, 619 poor/poverty 20, 59, 183, 188, 222, 287, 302, 304, 312, 316, 322, 326, 334, 342, 348-49, 351, 353, 358, 364, 375, 382, 384, 403, 409, 413, 428-29, 434, 449, 456, 465, 470, 479, 486-87, 491, 507, 516, 538, 566, 569, 570, 572, 586-87, 659, 662, 690, 694, 772 Poor Law 18, 222, 293, 718 Pope, Alexander 620n Portia 7-8, 299, 302, 318, 339, 342-43, 346, 348, 351, 353, 356-57, 365-66, 368, 371, 379, 384, 387-88, 403, 440, 443, 445, 475, 479, 487, 493, 496-97, 503, 507, 511, 524 positivism/ist ix, 11, 50, 193, 196-97, 200-01, 206, 236, 386, 496, 673, 702, 732-35, 740, 755 Potter, Archbishop 633 Powell, Baden 345 pray/prayer 18, 20, 28-30, 41, 52, 88, 92, 102, 104, 118, 131, 153, 167, 171, 179, 183-85, 187, 200, 230, 249, 251, 255, 267, 273, 287, 290-95, 306, 311, 313, 332-33, 343-44, 346, 348-49, 352-58, 363, 372-73, 377-78, 391, 411-12, 418, 424, 496-98, 510, 512-13, 517, 521, 551, 579, 590, 607, 632-33, 637, 641-43, 657, 693-95, 703, 712, 720, 728, 732, 763, 769, 773 predestine/ation 14, 160-62, 165, 177, 219, 627, 655, 715 Priestley, Joseph 680 Prince, Henry James 589-90 private judgment 43, 264-66, 368, 489-91, 623, 758-59 Protestant ix, xi, 3, 14, 18, 20, 25, 91, 235, 265, 301, 341-42, 346-47, 355-56, 362-64, 377, 384, 389, 391, 403-04, 409, 432, 499-500, 514-16, 738, 758-59 Providence (God’s) 71, 89, 112, 116, 144, 199, 249, 275, 280, 319, 360, 362, 366-67, 377, 379-80, 385-86, 395, 492, 500, 528, 696, 768 Ptolemy XII 380

Ptolemy XIII 230, 380 purgatory 19, 258, 779 Pusey, Edward Bouverie 102 Puseyite 102-03, 195, 372, 388, 656, 689, 693, 781 Quaker 91, 98, 298, 364, 581, 656 Quetelet, L.A.J. ix , xii, 167-68, 235-36, 240, 581, 667n, 696, 739, 747 Quinet, Edgar 33 Raphael 325, 343 n rational/ist/ism 27, 36, 53, 106, 166, 697-98, 766, 777 reason/ing (faculty) 1, 24, 36, 46, 67, 71, 79-80, 95, 97-98, 103, 106, 110, 112, 117-18, 121-22, 143, 149, 155, 176-77, 194-95, 199, 202, 213, 242, 245, 267-68, 274, 294, 315, 340, 345, 367-68, 379, 384, 395-96, 404, 406, 437, 451, 461, 477, 523, 532, 625, 653, 661, 676, 689, 691, 693, 703, 709, 720, 723-24, 732-34, 745, 750-51, 756, 767, 771, 773, 776-77, 779 Renan, Ernest 30 Reni, Guido 327 revelation 18, 60, 64-65, 77, 84, 86, 88-89, 92, 94, 98, 100-01, 106, 130, 132, 153, 180, 190, 195, 220, 222-23, 231, 256, 329, 339-42, 348, 401, 424-25, 451, 470, 491, 495, 502, 590, 606, 613, 635, 644-45, 648, 673, 680, 687, 700, 716-17, 719, 721, 733, 777 Richardson, Samuel 433n, 656n Roman Catholic xi, 1, 3, 7-8, 14, 20, 23-24, 28, 42, 63, 66, 69, 91, 97-98, 103, 181, 196, 230, 235, 241, 250, 253, 255-56, 258, 265, 268, 298-301, 303, 313, 328, 332, 339, 341-47, 350, 352, 356, 358-61, 363-69, 371, 376-77, 379-84, 387-89, 391, 403-04, 409-11, 431-32, 444, 453, 464, 470, 487-93, 497, 499-509, 514-17, 519, 524-25, 538, 623, 642, 649, 656, 676-77, 694, 738, 750, 759-60, 770, 775-76, 779, 781

Index / 793 Rousseau, J.J. 259n, 775, 779 Russell, Lord John 642n saint 11, 30, 102, 104, 235, 272, 357, 368, 409, 453, 496, 499, 655, 676-77, 738 salvation 18, 160-61, 171, 200, 255, 259, 261-62, 264, 309, 371, 451, 516, 542, 646, 651, 727, 729, 763, 772-73, 781 Sand, George 324, 584 n sanitar y law, reform, science 49-51, 221, 241, 254, 490, 634, 718, 750, 762, 780 saviour (Christ, see also Jesus, Lord, Son) 130, 182, 262, 294, 300, 337, 379, 391, 454 saviour (general) 105, 182, 300, 308, 310, 337, 343, 418-21, 424, 454, 463, 484, 585 Schiller, Friedrich von 325, 330 Schimmelpenninck, Mary Anne 91n Schubert, Franz 550 Schwabe, Julie 33 Schwarzenberg, Felix zu 427 science/scientific 10, 24, 27, 49, 69, 78, 85, 89, 91, 96, 100, 127, 170, 174, 178, 203, 217, 244, 259, 261, 289, 300, 308, 321, 328, 330-31, 335, 357, 371, 404-05, 419, 464, 466, 490-91, 499, 560, 567, 569, 606-07, 634-35, 648, 668, 681, 699, 712, 732, 738, 754, 756, 780 Scott, Walter 322 scripture (see also Bible, New Testament, Old Testament) 39, 144, 217, 287, 420, 522, 712, 720, 724 Sedgwick, Adam 609 Ser vetus, Michael 18, 176, 230, 278, 731 Shaftesbur y, 7th earl 425 Shakespeare, William 397n, 524n, 558 n, 694 Shelley, Percy Bysshe ix, 3, 14, 17, 57, 284 n; comments in dialogue by Shelley: 173, 175-78, 279, 281 Shirley, Walter Augustus 498 Siddons, Sarah Kemble 323 Sieveking, Amalie 478

sin, sinner 15-16, 66, 77, 96, 110, 114, 116-20, 128, 137, 155, 158-60, 169-72, 176-81, 189, 224-26, 229, 249-50, 254, 257, 272-78, 286, 294, 306, 310, 343, 349, 355, 363-64, 372, 374, 376, 391-92, 399-400, 415, 418, 425, 453, 500, 503, 507, 512, 523, 526, 528, 641, 643-48, 650-51, 661-62, 664-65, 693, 723-24, 726-28, 731, 748, 755, 761-62, 768, 770-71, 779 Smith, Andrew 249, 769 Smith, Mary Shore (‘‘Aunt Mai’’) ix, 12-13, 27, 37, 49, 210; comments in dialogue by MS: 60-80, 82-89, 95-122, 124-30, 132, 137-43, 146-55, 160-73, 176-78, 272-91, 293, 297 Smith, Samuel ix, 13, 28, 30, 32n, 37, 40, 49 Smith, Thomas Southwood 150 Smith, William Shore 15 Socrates 299, 352, 589, 619n Solon 197 Somer ville, Mar y 572 Son of God (see also Christ, Jesus, Lord, Saviour) 18-19, 39, 65, 90, 101, 107-08, 114, 128, 142-43, 154, 182, 261-62, 295-96, 409-10, 425, 453, 499-501, 512, 535-36, 546, 630, 650, 658, 667, 679-80, 685, 687, 692 soul 78, 91, 110, 122, 156-57, 160, 232, 313, 376, 379, 381, 433, 436, 444, 480, 490-91, 551, 585-86, 632, 637, 694, 704-05, 724, 731, 734, 752 South, Robert 61 Spinoza, Benedict 39 Stanley, Arthur Penrhyn 10n Stanley, Edward 663, 693 Stephen, James Fitzjames 497 Stoic 13, 48, 453, 728 Stowe, Harriet Beecher 522 suicide 128, 164, 167, 573, 710 Sutherland, John ix, 11, 26-29, 51, 56, 209-58, 698-780 Swedenborg, Emmanuel 97 Tennyson, Alfred 576 Teresa of Avila 50, 33-40, 339-40, 343-45, 377, 397, 498-500, 503, 632

794 / Florence Nightingale’s Suggestions for Thought Tertullian 389n theocracy 9-10, 513-14 Thomas à Kempis 383n-84 n Titian 327 Trinity/arian 64, 96, 267-68, 296, 393, 500, 630, 720 Tr uelove, Edward 11 Turner, J.M.W. 522, 670 Unitarian xii, 12-14, 17, 78, 96, 181, 235, 393, 410-11, 499, 680n, 738 Ussher, James 282n, 466n Vaux, Clotilde de 208 Verney, Margaret 53 Verney, Parthenope. See Nightingale Vernon, Robert 327 Viardot, Pauline 324 Victoria, Queen 292, 654 Vincent de Paul 102 Vincent of Lérins 368n Virgin Mary 91, 235, 304, 327, 356-57, 409, 453, 499, 738 Voltaire 1, 24, 71, 301, 367

Walpole, Robert 638 Watts, Isaac 61 Wellington, duke of 123, 147, 365, 522 Wesley, John 18, 61n, 104-05, 350, 387-88, 390, 403, 450, 496, 502 Wesleyan xii, 1, 23-24, 61n, 104n, 275, 298 Whately, Richard 10n, 595 Whewell, William 159-60 William IV 292 women (status, role of) xi-xii, 2-3, 5-6, 12, 18, 20-22, 25, 44-45, 52-53, 56, 62, 99, 251, 275, 299, 304, 310, 316, 321-23, 326, 345-46, 353, 375, 403, 409, 423, 427, 430-32, 436, 439, 443, 445-48, 459-62, 465, 467-68, 474-81, 484-85, 545, 548-50, 555-60, 566, 568-74, 577, 580, 583-89, 773 Young, Edward 144 n Zoroaster/Zoroastrian 69, 411n