Citizenship Beyond Nationality: Immigrants' Right to Vote Across the World 9780812296068

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Citizenship Beyond Nationality

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DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM Rogers M. Smith and Mary L. Dudziak, Series Editors

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Citizenship Beyond Nationality Immigrants’ Right to Vote Across the World

Luicy Pedroza

U N I V E R S I T Y O F P E N N S Y LVA N I A P R E S S PHIL ADELPHIA

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Copyright  2019 University of Pennsylvania Press All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher. Published by University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112 www.upenn.edu/pennpress Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 A Cataloging-in-Publication record is available from the Library of Congress ISBN 978-0-8122-5097-8

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CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations vii Preface and Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 1

PART I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ENFRANCHISEMENT OF MIGRANT RESIDENTS ACROSS THE GLOBE

Chapter 1. Citizenship, Nationality, and Voting Rights 21 Chapter 2. Broad Comparisons: Denizen Enfranchisement Across Countries 54

PART II. PROCESSES OF DENIZEN ENFRANCHISEMENT

Chapter 3. The Differentiated Enfranchisement of Denizens in Portugal 87 Chapter 4. The “Failed” Denizen Enfranchisement in Germany 112

PART III. COMPARING AND THEORIZING

Chapter 5. The Steps of Denizen Enfranchisement Processes 151 Chapter 6. A Process Approach to Denizen Enfranchisement in Further Cases 168 Chapter 7. Beyond Denizen Enfranchisement: Citizenship Change and Migration Policy 187

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vi Contents

Appendix 209 Notes 245 References 273 Index 305

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACIME AL Brem. GBl. BVerfG Drs CDA CDS-PP CDU COCAI CPLP CSU DAR DVU ECJ EU FDP FRG GDR PALOP PCP

Alto-Comissariado para a Imigrac¸a˜o e Minorias E´tnicas: High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities Alternative Liste: Alternative List Bremisches Gesetzblatt: Official Gazette of the state of Bremen. Bundesverfassungsgericht: Federal Constitutional Court Drucksache: “printed material” of a German parliament Christen Democratisch Appe`l: Christian Democratic Appeal Centro Democra´tico e Social—Partido Popular: Democratic Social Centre—People’s Party Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands: Christian Democratic Union Conselho Consultivo para os Assuntos da Imigrac¸a˜o: Immigration Affairs Consultative Council Comunidade dos Paı´ses de Lı´ngua Portuguesa: Community of Portuguese language speaking countries Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern: Christian Social Union in Bavaria Dia´rio da Assambleia da Repu´blica: Official Portuguese Parliament Gazette Deutsche Volksunion: German People’s Union European Court of Justice European Union Freie Demokratische Partei: Free Democratic Party Federal Republic of Germany German Democratic Republic Paı´ses Africanos de Lı´ngua Oficial Portuguesa: African Countries of Portuguese as Official Language Partido Comunista Portugueˆs: Portuguese Communist Party

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viii Abbreviations

PDS PlPt PPD PRD PS PSD PSN PvdA REP SPD SSW VVD

Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus: Party of Democratic Socialism Plenarprotokoll: stenographic version of a parliamentary debate in Germany Partido Popular Democra´tico: People’s Democratic Party Partido de la Revolucio´n Democra´tica: Party of the Democratic Revolution Partido Socialista: Socialist Party Partido Social Demo´crata: Social Democratic Party Partido da Solidariedade Nacional: National Solidarity Party Partij van de Arbeid: Labour Party Die Republikaner: The Republicans Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands: Social Democratic Party of Germany Su¨dschleswigscher Wa¨hlerverband: South Schleswig Voter Federation Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie: People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

CITIZENSHIP IS A bouquet of ideals that individuals and collectives hold

dear. This ranges from the abstract, yet evocative, idea of an individual “right to have rights” (proposed by Hannah Arendt) to the mere possession of identity and travel documents that attest citizenship in international law. In between, the important collective attributes of citizenship include the recognition of a membership as an equal in a political community, as well as the duties derived from it, but also the dignity implied in that social and legal recognition of being recognized as an equal member of a community. Citizenship matters in all of these aspects: from the deepest identity conceptions, such as the self-understanding of persons as political animals, to the objective and mundane, such as the possession of a passport. People who doubt this may renounce their passport and try moving across borders. In all likelihood, their very movement will have to change as they try to avoid authorities, and the treatment they receive and their chances of finding a place to live and a job will be very different. In today’s world, without documents that attest citizenship understood as nationality, a person might be seen as unworthy by authorities responsible for sorting out the rights to cross, enter, and reside in spaces under their jurisdiction, and all dignity of persons as equal is stripped as they are placed in residual legal categories left to those not possessing documents. Even if a person has a passport attesting to her or his nationality, that person may find, after moving to a jurisdiction other than the one corresponding to the authority that issued the passport, his or her contributions, stakes, interests, and social involvement in that place will be worthy of recognition as a co-citizen in some aspects, but not in others, unless she or he is capable of, and ready to, begin the process of becoming a citizen by taking up nationality of that place. The word for this is naturalization, and it already suggests that the change is supposed to reach the very core of who a person is. If a person is lucky,

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he or she may end up in a polity that tolerates keeping his or her original nationality so that the links to the place of origin are not severed at naturalization. Why should citizenship be understood as depending on the affiliation to polities on the scale of nation-states rather than on other conceptions of membership? Why has citizenship (that bouquet of ideals) been boiled down to nationality? What is the relationship between these two concepts historically? What is their relation in legal practice today across the world? What are the chances to overcome it? This book answers these questions while telling the story of the changes in citizenship from the perspective of participation rights, a subject that has fascinated me since I studied the civic education efforts of the Mexican state to create a “democratic culture” during key years of democratization. It puzzled me that something that looked like indoctrination could be justified in a democracy; that for pluralism to flourish, a particular culture that appreciates pluralism needs to be nurtured. As it turns out, liberal democracies do not leave civic commitment to individual discovery in a laissez faire environment. Democracies—especially new ones—seem to require citizens to have the proper expectations about space for diversity and disagreement. Then I became a migrant myself. Thanks to an academic exchange scholarship, I spent a year at Yale University in the United States and was repeatedly confronted with incredulous looks as people contrasted my national origin to that academic affiliation. Still, in all my frequent encounters with other Mexican migrants, I experienced nothing but kindness. Despite our very different life circumstances, they offered me solidarity. Clearly, nationality can unite people, but to which degree should national belonging be the reason to have a say in a community? Living in Germany has relieved me of the stress of belonging to the main immigrant group in a receiving country (as was the case as a Mexican in the United States), but I quickly found that Turkish immigrants and their German-born descendants endure similar strains here. Just nineteen years ago, they were almost absolutely impeded from becoming German nationals, even those who had been born here and knew no other country than Germany. For decades, migrants in Germany had to swim against the current and integrate into a polity that had consistently denied being a country of immigration. Changes occurred slowly in Germany as it began to develop a welcoming culture and accept more diversity in society until

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authorities finally conceded that this is a country of immigration. Barely settled in public conscience, this disposition already faces enormous challenges. As I write these lines, the federal government’s policy to accept refugees from the Middle East has practically stopped after nearly a million arrivals in 2015. Asylum law has been compromised and the rapid rise of a right-wing populist party puts pressure on governing parties to restrict basic rights, such as family reunification. Still, over the long run, Germany has facilitated naturalization for resident immigrants—not without some steps backward—through compromises that took place in the middle of the political spectrum. Likewise, today’s debates on Willkommenskultur (welcoming culture) toward refugees are not spontaneous: they are a precious good that has taken much effort from many actors and much time to develop. An early draft of this work was recognized by the German Association of Political Science (DVPW)’s Section on Migration Politics/Policy in 2014, and by the American Political Science Association’s Migration and Citizenship Section. I owe my deepest gratitude to the selection committees in both associations and to the people who helped me in the early stages of research and writing, especially to Rainer Baumann and Rainer Baubo¨ck for sharing with me their expertise and dedication. I am especially honored that my research was distinguished with an award carrying Dietrich Thra¨nhardt’s name; he is not only a giant in migration studies but also a pioneer who, in four decades, has never ceased to fight for the enfranchisement of noncitizen resident migrants, the very topic of this book. His professional trajectory demonstrates that scientific rigor and brilliance can go hand in hand with convictions and humbleness. When I feel discouraged, I only have to remind myself of his example to regain motivation. I want to thank some institutions or, more precisely, the people behind those institutions for their support of my research: the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS), the international network of researchers DesiguALdades.net, and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies. My thanks also go to the Central European University, where I have done most of my teaching, and where I have learned much from my students and colleagues. Thilo Bodenstein, Nick Sitter, and Matteo Fumagalli gave me the chance to become their peer in that community. My gratitude also goes to people who have inspired, read, and commented on my work: Uwe Hunger, Viola Zentai, Kristina Hahn, Petra Kovacs, Jolanda van der Noll, Bert Hoffmann, Hannes Mosler, Matthias Wingens, Leticia

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Caldero´n, Alexandra De´lano, Roswitha Pioch, and Stefan Rother. My warmest thanks to Lily Palladino and Peter Agree for their patience and guidance as editors at the University of Pennsylvania Press. For their moral support and guidance in difficult times as I neared the end of this book project, I am grateful to six bright, inspiring, generous women: Erin K. Jenne, Onawa P. Lacewell, Beth Coffey, Jasmin Lorch, Elizabeth Cohen, and Mariana Llanos. For their unconditional love in the distance, I am grateful to my parents, Rosalba and Julio; my sisters, Frinee and Julianne; and my friends Cristal, David, Dionisio, Jackie, Julieta, Lili, Ofayra, Olmo, and Vanessa. Thanks to Achim, for unsparingly giving me reassurance through the years I worked on this book and even the occasional push to finish it. I try to apply an interdisciplinary social scientific perspective to my research and my writing but, admittedly, I use more often the specific lens of a political scientist, which led me to focus on forums where the main actors debating the enfranchisement of resident immigrants were political elites. I also sought to apply, and partly to develop, tools of analysis that are as transparent as possible to portray and interpret those debates. Still, the impetus for writing this book cannot be substantively disentangled from the efforts made by people who fight on the ground for migrants’ participation rights beyond academia. Every day, many people around the world continue to fight for this. It is not only migrants who devote their scant free time to the battle for citizen rights; in a spirit of empathy, many native citizens are at the forefront of these movements. The collective enthusiasm of both nationals and nonnationals to fight for citizen rights for nonnationals activates the best there is within citizenship as a concept and practice—much more than any passport will ever do, and much more than nationality, which is mostly an arbitrary attribution of membership in a nation that determines our chances to move and to have rights depending on where we are born and to whom. The common actions of nationals and nonnationals make it worthwhile to preserve citizenship as an institution, despite all its legalistic traps. A few persons, especially in the lingering German case, have been doing this for almost forty years, serving continuously or intermittently as scholars or citizens, or both. Their zeal may have flowed and ebbed with the tides of politics. At times, they were disheartened by decisions that seemed to condemn the cause to failure. But over the long run, many stood their ground and adapted their efforts. By doing that, they made a difference for German politics and academia.

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For many persons fighting for denizen enfranchisement today, it is not clear how old this fight is. They follow a path opened by other highly committed people in the past. This book shows the significance of old and new efforts and how they are connected over time and space. I dedicate it, with all my admiration, to those who have fought for enfranchisement as well as to those who have joined this fight recently and keep fighting for it today. This book illustrates the success of their perseverance, and it looks for the clues to understand the—hopefully, temporary—setbacks and help clear the obstacles ahead. These persons inspired me to write a book that would be able to locate their efforts within a big picture in the hope that more people will know, and join in.

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Introduction

THE STORIES PEOPLE tell themselves about how immigrants can partici-

pate in their political community have the potential to change citizenship. This is a central tenet of this book. When debating the extension of voting rights to resident immigrants, parliamentarians consider the right to exercise citizenship before acquiring nationality from different normative perspectives and elaborate justifications to defend it or reject it based on them. These issues matter to immigrants because having a passport (or having passports of different countries) or not opens or closes doors to mobility, security, and the enjoyment of a wide range of rights. However, these issues are important not only to migrants. Another central tenet of this book is that the beneficiaries of debates on denizen enfranchisement are not only the potentially enfranchised persons but also the receiving societies who thereby dare to discuss their principles of admission in the polity and weigh them, for instance, against the importance of self-rule and democratic representation. The idea here is relatively simple: When debates arise on giving the right to vote to immigrants who are coresidents, yet not conationals, it is for societies at large—not only for the migrant residents targeted by the reform—that an understanding of citizenship is recast under a new light. This book shows the possibilities harbored by the language of citizenship in those debates. It shows how citizenship is constructed sociopolitically and how it can transcend nationhood. For the sake of brevity, I use the term “denizens” to refer to nonnaturalized resident immigrants. Denizens are people who, by virtue of their immigration to a polity and sustained presence in it, tend to spark reflections on political incorporation and the expansion of citizenship, either through the franchise or through naturalization. I am not the first to use this curious term, denizen. Thomas Hammar (1990), a pioneer of the analysis of enfranchisement processes, rescued it from a forgotten academic

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use to refer to settled immigrants who live in receiving societies almost indistinguishably from citizens—paying taxes, attending schools and churches, receiving social transfers, and even serving in the military—but who lack the formal citizenship-as-nationality status that would give them formal and full electoral rights. Rainer Baubo¨ck redefined it as “a status of residential quasi-citizenship combined with external formal citizenship” (2007). I use “denizenship” precisely in that sense, as an analytical category comprising migrants who usually remain full formal citizens of their country of origin, but who are legally settled in another society where they generally enjoy social and civil rights, yet only limited participation rights, as they have not naturalized there.1 My aim is to understand how societies justify giving or denying them political rights to participate in official channels of electoral representation. A normative concern motivated me to study denizen enfranchisement and its relation to migration and citizenship: It is the idea that being born in one place (somewhere and to someone with a passport) is an accident of life. An accident, meaning it is independent of personal talent, achievement, and moral worth. Why should an accident determine the stakes that people have in a community and justify their having a say in it? Why should it trump life circumstances that push people to migrate and the commitments that migrants develop—of their choosing or not—in one or more political communities? The normative concern I just described is rooted in the old cosmopolitan belief that humans are equal in moral worth and dignity. In its more contemporary variants, it stems from the belief that people are equal in their right to pursue liberty and a good life, and that this right is paramount to the right of nations to decide who belongs or of states to decide whom to admit. From these premises, it follows that the rights of all noncitizens should be defended in a comprehensive cosmopolitan argument, of the kind advanced by Joseph Carens (2002, 2005). Legal scholar Emily Carasco cites a view expressed in the Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia case in Canada, which made clear what the problem is for all noncitizens: “Noncitizens are lacking in political power and as such vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and their right to equal concern and respect violated. They are among those groups in society whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in attending” (Carasco 2012: 1). Certainly, from the point of view of advancing the rights of migrants, it makes sense to highlight that the problem of lacking representation is common to

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all immigrants, be they resident or temporary, documented or not. I would argue—and have argued elsewhere (Pedroza 2014b)—that we should discuss the mobility and participation rights of all migrants so that they are not prevented from having voice and from voting in the places where they live due to the circumstances of their arrival or to status issues. However, I see a key analytic reason to delineate long-term resident migrants as a subgroup within all noncitizen immigrants. Because they already enjoy rights previously given only to citizens, the presence of denizens poses a particular challenge to the boundaries of membership. It is intriguing how polities are granting them not only civil and social rights, but also those rights quintessentially understood as a privilege of “full” national citizens: voting rights. A caveat is in line here. Denizenship is not a category in administrative reality or much less a formal legal category that distinguishes migrants in international law. Political and sociological theory uses the category “denizen” as an analytical tool. Consequently, there is no solid social group that enjoys the same rights across receiving countries identifiable as denizens. Even within a country, several differentiations may apply that effectively reduce or enlarge the array of civil and social rights that denizens enjoy, depending on their country of origin, employment status, and so forth. Thus, denizens are a variable portion of the population that is defined in different ways across countries when those countries extend the franchise to foreigners. It is a matter of empirical research to find out how long a residence (which may range from a few months to fifteen years) makes foreigners eligible for gaining (which) participation rights. It makes sense to refer to denizenship an analytical category, even with variations across countries, because in most democratic countries there are nonnaturalized immigrants whose sustained presence without any political power poses questions related to membership and participation rights. In this regard, the analytic use of the category refers to a substantive reality that is common across cases (the challenge that it poses to democratic self-rule), but which remains subject to a precise definition in each case. The category also allows us to highlight the progressive character of enfranchisement as we see how denizens are defined and redefined by polities in a way such that boundaries formerly thought to be hard and set in heritage are trespassed when citizen rights are removed from the strict mold of nationality. Fundamental questions related to migration, democratic participation, and global justice motivate me, but those are too big to be answered at

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once and too big for one researcher alone to answer. The aim of this book is to accomplish a more modest, theoretical, and empirical undertaking regarding questions that are big enough: How much exclusion can liberal democracies tolerate within their territorial boundaries without losing congruence with their principles? What kind of citizenship does denizen enfranchisement delineate? Does denizen enfranchisement make nationality less dominant an understanding of citizenship? How, under overwhelming rules of birthright acquisition of citizenship, does denizen enfranchisement redefine the need to be from a polity to participate in the self-government of a polity? Are these debates a sign that self-governing peoples are reconceiving themselves through more inclusive understandings of membership and participation rights? More precisely, my aim is to inform debates of social science students and public policy practitioners by focusing on an even smaller set of interrelated questions: To what extent can we say that denizen enfranchisement constitutes a global phenomenon? Under which conditions do these processes expressly address a democratic deficit? Which other reasons are used and when are they used? Do the enfranchisement processes present an alternative to overcoming the requirement that the electing people—the demos—be composed of nationals? I am not the discoverer of these fascinating queries. There is fortunately a stock of literature that has considered them and proposed plausible explanations. The main two bodies of literature are situated in the field of political sociology. One proposes that denizen enfranchisement is an example of emerging post-national trends by which human, individual rights are separating from those of the nation-state and instead are becoming rights based on personhood: The exact mechanisms hypothesized to power this trend differ mainly among those who believe it is international/transnational norm diffusion in the form of discourses (Soysal 1998, 2007) or a slow-paced but growing agreement in international law (Jacobson 1996; Spiro 2010) or bottom-up convergence (Hansen and Weil 2001b; Joppke 2001). The other body of literature can be traced back to versions of historical institutionalism that explain the adoption or nonadoption of denizen enfranchisement (like other immigrant policies) as a result of citizenship traditions or “self-understandings of citizenship,” which are assumed to approximate ideal types but actually differ in their formal legal definitions of citizenship from nation to nation (Brubaker 1989, 1990; Hollifield 1992, 2010).

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There are good reasons to explore further, though, and this book aims to do that. Confronting the actuality and vagueness of the transnational/ post-national rights hypotheses, convergence about denizen enfranchisement is far from clear. Confronting the stillness of historical institutionalist hypotheses, denizen enfranchisement reforms have succeeded in countries of allegedly conservative citizenship traditions. Balancing these two hypotheses might help to explain denizen enfranchisement (cf. Earnest 2005), yet the mere statement that both transnational influences and traditions of citizenship seem to be at work does not get us very far in understanding why some democracies introduce it and others do not and why denizen enfranchisement reforms differ so much. This puzzle invites us to examine cases that contradict or remain outside the explanations that these theories provide and to look for an approach that corrects or supplements them where they are still lacking. Joining a strand of literature focused on the politics of citizenship, I explore and compare denizen enfranchisement processes by looking at how debates unfold within democracies. I look in depth at cases that deviate from the expectations of historical institutionalism and post-national convergence theories. The guide in this exploration is my hunch that aside from being shaped by grand historical (national or post-national) processes of normative change, citizenship is ultimately a matter of dynamics in politics and policy. I adopt a wide comparative lens, but also a deeper, more detailed look into how denizen enfranchisement reforms occur in order to understand why and in what ways they differ.

The Outlook: Comparative, Contextual, and Interpretive Interesting social problems tend also to be complex. The lens through which I study denizen enfranchisement reduces the complexity around such a process but, in doing so, remains bound to some blind spots. This does not mean that complex phenomena should not be studied; rather, it means that we must remain conscious of how ways of studying these phenomena simplify and reduce our scope of vision. In this book, I still try to accommodate a fair amount of complexity. I compare the political discourses put forward in different processes of denizen enfranchisement for us to understand them in general, but also to remain more sensitive to the complexity of their context than what other explanations have allowed so

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far. As developed by Charles Tilly (2001), the idea of a process-based account is that researchers explain episodes, or major differences between them, by seeking mechanisms of relatively general scope within those episodes. The lens I chose is a process account to study how citizenship understandings shape institutions, identities, and social meanings. My search for mechanisms at the heart of enfranchisement processes proceeds with a comparative, contextual, and interpretive methodological approach, which stems from three assumptions rooted in social constructivism and political pluralism. First, there is no “automatic detection” of a democratic deficit in democracies, despite their commitment to democratic principles—thus, much of the destiny of denizen enfranchisement reforms may depend already on who the actors that propose denizen enfranchisement are and how they frame it. Second, because elections constitute the form of participation par excellence in democracies, enfranchisement debates tend to be controversial for politicians because they mean giving denizens entry into and currency in a political market that thus far was exclusively composed of nationals—the electorate that brought them to power. Third, enfranchisement debates exist within a certain institutional context that frames the terms and the reach of political discourse. We need to consider political agency, historicity, and the institutional order to make sense of the terms, categories, and framing of political debates. Denizen enfranchisement results from decision-making processes in which multiple interpretations of the social world can be heard and are likely to contend with each other. These interpretations are certainly connected to, but also are more than, national traditions of citizenship simply applied to a new challenge (in this case, the formal political incorporation of immigrants) and are more than the embrace (or contagion) of emerging norms that transcend borders. A look at the political processes that unfold once a proposal of denizen enfranchisement is made shows that different institutional settings and framing over time within those settings shape the different paths of denizen enfranchisement across countries. It is especially the translation of justifications (a cognitive-relational mechanism, as Charles Tilly would say) taken from domestic civil society and/or from international cases into arguments for or against denizen enfranchisement, and not necessarily cultures or traditions of citizenship, which play a decisive role in the success or failure of denizen enfranchisement reforms. I will argue further that these arguments cast a long shadow even in political processes of enfranchisement that compromise reforms in the short term.

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A reframing or change in the relation between argumentative elements in a debate can define the success and the form of denizen enfranchisement. In that sense, this book contrasts how the stories that people (societies) tell themselves about who they are can be possibly extended to include more people (migrants) across institutional environments.

Methods In every polity, extensions of the right to vote to a new group require serious inward normative reflections. The central and most delicate reflection relates to who is allowed to participate in self-government: the demos. Sociological sensibility, political analysis, and case expertise are necessary to capture those reflections within and across enfranchisement processes. Comparative exercises are the backbone of this book, so I use methods appropriate to follow the three steps of comparative analysis identified by Wilson (2002): First, I show the varied forms that the phenomenon of denizen enfranchisement has taken in the world; second, I examine the patterns of variation that exist; and, finally, I study institutions and political processes in different settings to discover similarities and differences across patterns. I believe that the expertise needed to conduct a general study on this topic can best be accomplished by juxtaposing interdisciplinary lenses. Efforts to apply theoretical insights from sociology and political science to the scant empirical research on noncitizen enfranchisement have produced excellent case research, but the existing studies are limited in their ability to connect cases across time and space. According to Adam Przeworski, there is a trade-off between the novelty of a topic and methodological sophistication (1987: 31). But this may also mean a chance: For relatively new topics, we might open paths by trying method combinations. Here I combine various qualitative comparisons in a sequential design to be able to make the most of the data in a rigorous manner and reach middle-range generalizations. This design allows for theory development because it first clarifies the whole population. Then, by means of a simple configurational analysis of that universe of cases (not by the Millian methods of similarity or difference), I select two deviant cases before embarking on their in-depth qualitative study. The configurational analysis made first lets us keep a view of the larger types of cases (configurations) to which each of the case studies

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can later be compared. Finally, a wider comparative exercise measures the explanatory capacity of the insights gained through the in-depth studies against explanations that exist for other types of denizen enfranchisement that have already been well studied (universal denizen enfranchisement). Thus, the “case studies” are but one among various comparative exercises made cumulatively throughout the book. The book builds on a data set I constructed for the universe of cases of noncitizen enfranchisement, as defined by reform processes that reached parliaments. This leads me to consider fifty-two democracies (including, for the first time, cases from Latin America and Asia that had not been considered in previous systematization efforts). I then define a smaller set of relevant cases (including positive and negative cases to correct a bias in the literature) according to some scope conditions, and then I analyze the variations in denizen enfranchisement using qualitative comparative analysis, which is a type of analysis of logical elimination based on Boolean algebra. The purpose of this is to facilitate an empirically-informed selection of denizen enfranchisement cases while keeping a rich cross-case scenario of types of processes in the background before embarking on the indepth qualitative case research, and thus tackle a research lacuna detected in cross-case research on the topic (Caramani and Grotz 2015). On that basis, I study enfranchisement processes in two cases (Portugal and Germany), which display conditions similar to other cases (to which findings can be generalized in a middle range), yet they remain puzzling for the relevant literature. The two cases show why processes of enfranchisement may ultimately fail after long and profound discussions and why they take very peculiar forms. I study them with a toolkit of process-tracing, qualitative coding of parliamentary debates, and interpretive techniques. The qualitative comparative analysis allows me to treat apparently negative cases, such as Germany, as having a greater variation of outcomes. After that, I again undertake a comparison, assembling the findings of the two cases as building blocks of a middle-range theoretical approach that allows us to grasp change within citizenship regimes by looking at the processes of reinterpretation in politics that denizen enfranchisement triggers.

The Organization of the Book The book is organized into three parts. Part I deals with the significance of denizen enfranchisement in the world. Chapter 1 presents the normative,

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theoretical, and practical relevance of denizen enfranchisement for different theories of citizenship, weighing the analytical strengths and weaknesses in the literatures and indicating the enduring contradictions and puzzles. I argue that there are three strands of literature, all with plausible insights of why denizen enfranchisement has appeared, at different levels of analysis. Without denying their power to explain parts of the phenomenon on those different levels, I show that these accounts are unable to explain the variety of denizen enfranchisement reforms. This inability is connected to inertia in citizenship research that leaves the study of denizen enfranchisement in the shadows of the study of the changes of naturalization (the “traditional” way through which non-citizens acquire the right to vote). I make a case for finding a research approach that is better able to connect the valid partial insights they offer: Instead of attempting to explain outcomes through entrenched path dependencies or remote independent variables, I focus on the process itself, through which proposals for noncitizen enfranchisement are introduced, debated, decided, or reintroduced. Also, in Chapter 1, I present in greater detail the methodology I rely on: data collection, techniques of analysis, and the limitations of those techniques. Chapter 2 substantiates the theoretical claims made in Chapter 1 with empirical evidence and lays the groundwork for the development of a different approach. It first shows where and to what degree denizen enfranchisement has happened. By defining the universe of cases of denizen enfranchisement and looking at its variations, this chapter shows that many democracies tolerate a great deal of exclusion without even discussing denizen enfranchisement—in other words, that there is no necessary diagnosis of a democratic deficit simply because a democracy has a high proportion of denizens. Through a configurational analysis of different kinds of enfranchisement and their different outcomes, this chapter further corroborates the critique that knowing the naturalization regime of a polity for denizens does not suffice to predict how that polity decides on denizen enfranchisement. This analysis leads me to select two cases, Germany and Portugal, for their promise to yield important insights about types of cases that thus far remain unexplained yet are relevant: protracted denizen enfranchisement processes and reforms based on reciprocity and cultural affinity, respectively. Chapter 2 introduces the basis for the general argument of the book: Though important, traditions of citizenship (usually established in the principles of nationality and naturalization laws) follow contemporary political

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struggles only inasmuch as different political actors frame their own heterogeneous agendas in their (allegedly traditional) terms. I propose this idea after showing that noncitizen enfranchisement reforms do not conform to a coherent pattern set by naturalization rules but instead fill all possible combinations with different traditions of citizenship. This descriptive analysis begs the question: If traditions of citizenship (as indicated by access to nationality rules) do not explain policy-making in such a delicate area as the right to vote, what does? Part II answers that. Having established that the relationship between traditions of citizenship and enfranchisement reforms is nonexhaustive, Part II shows the leverage of a process analysis of noncitizen enfranchisement. This perspective makes sense because of the very nature of enfranchisement reforms as decision-making processes: they are justified, decided, and designed along debates that stir controversies between political parties. Since it is generally unclear how the potentially enfranchised voters will participate, both the ultimate success of these processes and the characteristics imprinted on the franchise depend very much on the proposal and terms on which it is formulated, but they also depend on the breadth and depth of the arguments that enter the parliamentary field throughout the agenda and legislative negotiation. Neither is the course of enfranchisement debates simply traceable to traditions, nor are its political conditions “readable” backward from the outcome. Part II develops the rest of the argument in this book: Momentous renegotiations of definitions of citizenship may take place through these reform processes even if those reforms fail. A serious, systematic look at the arguments and negotiations exposed in debates shows the dynamism in the positions of different political parties on the issue—which are evident when some terms are dropped, when a new dimension is introduced, or when arguments are reframed. Institutional contexts provide incentives to decision-makers to interpret the problem, but the results ultimately depend on how that problem is construed. Chapter 3 presents the process of denizen enfranchisement in Portugal, which unfolded slowly through successive reforms, gradually gaining support in the legislative arena, but which nevertheless ended in a reform that greatly restricted the number of denizens potentially benefited by the franchise, for it was anchored to strict reciprocity and to the positive discrimination of nationals of countries that have Portuguese as an official language. Through synchronic and diachronic within-case comparisons,

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this chapter demonstrates that denizen enfranchisement gathered consensual support thanks to a very limited and symbolic framing of the reform. Even though it was part of a major turn in migration policies, the enfranchisement of denizens did not make room for a discussion about the situation of migrants or about the restrictive naturalization regime (as the literature on traditions of citizenship would expect); on the contrary, the silencing of these issues helped to pass the reform. In Portugal, denizen enfranchisement has been part of a reassessment of citizenship that does not collide with the validation of citizenship-as-nationality, but reaffirms it. It reveals a consensual top-down understanding of citizenship that admits that different groups have a claim to representation in different levels of the polity, depending on their national belonging to nation-states with which Portugal has a special relation. Chapter 4 presents and compares debates on denizen enfranchisement beyond a span of thirty years, and at different levels of a polity, in a case that has been considered most likely to reject denizen enfranchisement and has been used often to confirm the hypothesized cultural determinants of the historical-institutionalist literature on traditions of citizenship: Germany. The study of this case corrects the tendency to explain successful reforms by looking only at those successful reforms. What is more, the evidence from this very complex case demystifies common characterizations of Germany as the prototype of a rigid, conservative, ethno-nationalist understanding of citizenship (Brubaker 1989; Mu¨nch, 2001; Safran, 1997). There were, in fact, four enfranchisement processes in Germany (and many more proposals in fourteen of its La¨nder, the states that constitute the German Federal Republic), some of which culminated in successful legislative bills. Again, through synchronic and diachronic comparisons, I show that a long and deep discussion process in political society can leave footprints beyond the passing of laws and can change the terms of political discussion, which may lead to a full reappraisal of institutions—even of cultural ones, which are assumed to be quite resilient to change. Four months before Schleswig-Holstein could implement its enfranchisement reform, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled it nil. However, the German debates on denizen enfranchisement go on and already have accomplished something significant: Through a multifold process by which institutions and groups selected, adopted, and shaped justifications for and against the reform, they have provided new referents for citizenship that have become part of a wider political discourse.

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Part III probes the potential to generalize this argument by weaving all methodological, empirical, and theoretical threads together into a middlerange theory that applies to a wider range of polities that have decided, or are on the verge of deciding, whether to enfranchise their resident migrants, and, if so, how. Chapter 5 tackles a systematic comparison of the two cases studied in depth, pondering the decisive similarities and differences. Both cases show that parties fight to define what is to be taken from societal debates into politics depending on their own interest, but such interest is as related to vote calculations as it is to symbolic politics. Symbolic politics sometimes allows parties to transcend narrow arguments, as denizen enfranchisement debates can be an opportunity to negotiate larger issues of citizenship or even loftier goals, such as cooperation between states to construct new transnational communities. Although different institutional contexts certainly prefigure different complexity for each process, what is decisive for the course of an enfranchisement process is the breadth and depth of political arguments, the interplay of parties along the political spectrum, and the stakes of incumbent governments in pushing forward the reform. These are the constitutive mechanisms of a middle-range approach that can better integrate domestic and international influences, yet are more sensitive to politics. Chapter 5 also highlights what this approach contributes to the literature: In contrast to grand theories that focus on showing continuities, ignoring the changes, or offering partial snapshots of convergence ignoring diverging gaps, it allows us to grasp stepwise normative change in different contexts. Chapter 6 assesses the limitations of my approach compared with previous accounts of cases of the well-researched type of universal denizen enfranchisement. The aim of this comparative exercise is not only to demonstrate explanatory leverage but also to illustrate how the approach can be used on cases different from those on which it was developed. It also returns to the configurations found in Chapter 2 to assess lessons learned for a larger universe of cases. Finally, Chapter 7 connects those lessons learned with the questions that motivated this book, particularly whether denizen enfranchisement holds a promise to reinvigorate citizenship with principles that leave nationality behind, or rather re-substantiates it and whether and how it connects to larger debates on citizenship and migration. I argue that if citizenship is true to both its liberal and republican aspirations (which are the very historical-philosophical roots of Western understandings of citizenship),

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then the challenges of substantial immigration in democracies commend a normatively coherent policy that combines open, easy rules of naturalization with denizen enfranchisement. That policy prescription offers denizens a path to democratic inclusion in the polity through the practice of citizenship, and even if denizens reject naturalization despite easy rules (which they may, for a variety of reasons) it gives receiving democratic societies a dynamic mechanism to ensure their political community is up to date in matching its reality with its principles. In turn, the practice of citizenship with its quintessential political rights—even if only at the local level—may develop in denizens an attachment to the receiving polity, which emphasizes what they have in common with national citizens. Already the combination respects their liberty to choose to belong or not. The democratic potential of these otherwise rather quiet enfranchisement reforms should not be underestimated. Debates on denizen enfranchisement are essentially redefinitions of the boundaries of political membership. As such, they create dissonance in political discourse and carry a force that pushes for further debates beyond the already successful ones and also within cases where, so far, the reforms have been too limited. My account of enfranchisement processes not only shows empirically how incremental change in citizenship understandings occurs but forcefully argues that, since at any moment citizenship understandings are plural and not singular in a democratic polity, such a polity should preserve its democratic foundation in the face of challenges posed by the presence of immigrant populations by making its immigrant and citizenship policies coherent with each other under principles of liberty and equality.

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A GOVERNMENT OF the people, by the people, and for the people is a

dream dear to our time. But who are the people who can strive for that dream? Who are those summoned to set up a self-governing polity? According to political scientist Robert Dahl, the questions on the constitution of the demos and the delimitation of the realm where democratic principles apply pose some of the hardest dilemmas for democratic theory (1970: 60). The idea that people identify themselves as members of spatially divided states and that, as members, they exclusively take part in the exchange of certain rights and duties with their respective state is an idea historically bound to the era of the nation-state. It contains at least three dimensions: political identity, formal membership, and a contractual relation with the state, from which rights and obligations derive. Citizenship is the conceptual-legal intersection where these dimensions meet. However, both as practice and as concept, citizenship has a much older ancestry than its reduction to membership in, “ideal” contract with, and identity documents from the nation-state. Citizenship has a classic lineage. Since ancient Athens, citizenship’s meaning has changed uncountable times, shrinking in some dimensions and erupting into new ones. Despite (or rather because of) this volatility and multidimensionality, it has stuck to our moral and political vocabulary. And yet, something about it has endured throughout time: Citizenship enjoys the prestige of the most desired of conditions in a polity, the highest fulfillment of democratic aspirations. Citizenship has been invoked simultaneously to convey democratic belonging (equal rights for all) and an inclusion premised on the concept of a bounded community (for all members only). It has been most universally proclaimed and practiced in this guise in the Western world for the last two centuries, along with the promotion of the idea that states (also beyond the West) should ideally correspond to nations and treat their inhabitants as their national citizens, granting them formal participation and representation rights in the polity.1 In that case, why would democracies extend the quintessential and utmost classic right of citizens, the right to vote, to persons who are not formal members of the polity, in other words, not nationals? This book showcases real debates in democracies around the world that dwell on that question and, at the same time, shows a more abstract and

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deeper transformation in citizenship brought by debating the extension of voting rights2 to denizens:3 its expansion beyond nationality or before the acquisition of nationality. The importance of this transformation of citizenship surpasses by far the academic discussions on the genealogy of citizenship as a concept. It touches on debates that have occurred and keep occurring beyond ivory towers, from town halls to the forums of supranational institutions. These debates would presumably occur in democracies where the extended presence of immigrants raises normative and political dilemmas regarding the borders of formal inclusion and exclusion in politics. Why? Because denizens live and work in the social, cultural, and economic subsystems of society, pay taxes, and obey the laws approved by councils and legislatures just like citizens, since these laws apply to all residents. Precisely because they are already participants in so many of the subsystems of the receiving society to the same extent as citizens are, denizens’ lack of access to formal channels of political participation stands at odds with basic principles of democratic theory. This is true in those principles’ various formulations of affectedness, self-rule, and inclusion: What concerns all, should be approved by all; no taxation without representation; no person should be subject to political decisions for long periods of time without being able to influence them in a formal way. Recent reformulations of these principles by contemporary political theorists also point to a legitimacy and representation deficit in democracies with denizens. For Robert Dahl, it is clear that, for a democracy to be worthy of the name, the demos should include all adult members of an association except transients and persons proved to be mentally defective, and, within that demos, all citizens should have the right to equal and effective participation, from agenda control to voting (1992). From a deliberative perspective, Ju¨rgen Habermas holds that norms can only claim to be valid if they meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse (1992). To Michael Walzer, the rule of citizens over noncitizens constitutes a form of tyranny because it violates the principle of political justice that “the processes of self-determination through which a democratic state shapes its internal life must be open, and equally so, to all those men and women who live within its territory, work in the local economy, and are subject to local law” (1997: 63). More generally, Joseph Carens has advanced the claim that residence, not citizenship, should be the criterion for deciding who is granted electoral rights following the basic rule that

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“the longer one stays, the stronger one’s moral claims” (2002: 108). More recent contributors to this debate go as far as to maintain that noncitizen voting is not only compatible but required by principles of democratic legitimacy (Lo´pez-Guerra 2014; Munro 2008; Song 2009) and that denizen exclusion from participation on grounds of lacking nationality is the phenomenon that makes apparent the mutually exclusive logic of citizenship and nationalism (Helbling 2009). Following this debate in political theory, we could expect that the contemporary enfranchisement of denizens in many polities around the world would aim to solve the democratic deficit in democracies where migrants are a significant part of the population and have otherwise no say in politics. If this is true, denizen enfranchisement would redefine citizenship in several senses: by changing the exclusivity of the contract of democratic representation between state and citizen, by redefining the amount to which its formal participation requires a sharing of a formal legal identity and, ultimately, by redefining the people. Thus, the phenomenon of denizen enfranchisement implies a reassessment of a classic ideal of political thinking that has characterized democratic citizenship throughout time: the ideal of the self-governing people. Certainly, the exercise of voting rights by nonnationals is anything but an absolute innovation: In the past, several Western polities (especially in the Americas) allowed foreign residents to vote. This applied during episodes when other qualifications were more relevant than nationality: religion, property, socially recognized neighborhood, familial status, race, gender, literacy. Only as nation-state borders consolidated, and national identities became politicians’ and political thinkers’ obsession did the qualification of being a national become the core of the citizenship status. By definition, any reform to extend voting rights results from processes that redefine a constituency. The contemporary extensions of voting rights to nonnationals through electoral reforms across democracies are fascinating phenomena because they suggest that, just as denizen enfranchisement was possible in the past thanks to the preeminence of other criteria, these recent redefinitions of the electorate are changing something fundamental at the core of our understanding of citizenship. To illustrate this, let us come back to a classic: T. H. Marshall’s Citizenship and Social Class (1950). This book was the starting point of a vast literature on citizenship developed to supplement Marshall’s account of the development of citizenship rights in England (Somers 1994) with examples

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of historical processes that accounted for not one single path to citizenship but a variety of paths to citizenship (Engelen 2003). Others added different categories of rights to his tripartite definition of citizenship as a status that confers a bundle of civil, political, and social rights (Marshall and Bottomore 1992) and countered that some of these had already transcended national borders in the post–World War II world. Marshall’s book has been a reference point for studies that demonstrated that citizenship is defined and understood differently depending on the context. Still, a common denominator of those studies was to define citizenship generally as a legal relation of individuals with a specific nation-state, commonly determined by requisites that imprint on it a taint of culture, in the form of legaladministrative principles and traditions and, of course, language. In this sense, citizenship was referred to as a status susceptible to being enhanced with other rights beyond the strictly political (i.e., cultural rights, economic rights), yet which allowed individuals to be multinational at most. Since the 1990s however, citizenship has been reappraised as a human right that transcends national compounds, relocating the relation of rights and duties of the individual to ever higher domains. Thus, to some (Soysal 1998; Jacobson 1996), citizenship emancipates from national ideologies of assimilation and distinction by origin and adopts instead a post-national character, embodied in supranational, subnational, or transnational institutions and relations. Yet, Marshall’s account of citizenship still remains relevant for all these old and new accounts in the sense that it conceived of citizenship generally as comprising various parts that adapt differently to dynamic forces in history. Perhaps the only constant in the history of the classic citizenship until today is that it contains both a promise of equality of political power among citizens and a marker of who may enjoy it. It still preserves the quality of a marker in a time when people move more than ever and are able to retain links to polities and extend links to others. In lay use, citizenship keeps being identified (or confused) with nationality. Yet, the extension of franchise to denizens questions nationality as requisite to exercising the most crucial of all citizen rights: the right vote and to seek political equality within a democracy. The conceptual and historical scenario I have sketched to start this study of denizen enfranchisement begs two rather abstract questions: First, can citizenship still be thought of as a status conferring a bundle of rights and duties upon exclusive membership? And, second, how are those rights

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redistributed according to different categories of people that are equally subject to the state authority in a territory? It also begs a more practical and important question for the lives of millions of migrants around the world: How do democracies address the dilemmas of political inclusion and membership in relation to the presence of migrants who are not just newcomers or passengers but who already belong to the community as residents? Normative democratic theory would suggest that this question is especially urgent in polities where resident migrants constitute sizeable proportions of the population simply because questions of justice, stability, good government, and governance concern both the denizen and the national citizens in the receiving population. Part I of this book shows that reality, however, is different, and pushes us to readjust our questions and to look for better answers. As we shall see, these questions have not always been raised in such polities and are not necessarily limited to those polities: Polities that are very far from classic immigrant-receiving profiles have also dared to take a serious look at their principles of formal admission and inclusion as they relate to migrants. In the last five decades, more than fifty democratic polities (from municipalities to national governments) have formally discussed in their parliaments whether to extend voting rights to denizens. More than thirty-five of them decided to do so at different levels of the polity (vote at the local, regional, or national) and according to different levels of conditionality. If we consider that democracies of very different institutional and migration profiles make up this heterogeneous trend, it is evident that denizen enfranchisement does not obey a single cause and that there is no single normative recipe for inclusion. The more important, and interesting, empirical questions to ask are: What determines that these issues are addressed only in some democracies and not in others, despite sharing similar challenges? And, when can we expect that these issues will be addressed and that a reform will be successful?

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CHAPTER 1

Citizenship, Nationality, and Voting Rights

A weakening of the precise, nationality, meaning of the word “citizenship” has come about, again especially in Europe, by the extension of civic rights beyond the established framework. —Derek Heater (1990: 213)

Why Focus on Citizenship? Charles Tilly (1996) defined citizenship as a political and legal institution that bundles together the formal relation between a person and a state, giving each part enforceable rights and obligations by virtue of the person’s membership in that political community.1 This brief—and admittedly instrumental—definition is useful at this point to take a clear stance toward citizenship’s deep, more-than-rhetorical fuzziness. The biggest challenge in dealing with citizenship is not only that it admits multiple and sometimes wildly divergent definitions, but also that it is very often characterized in ways that blend “what is” with “what ought to be.”2 As a normative concept, it always contains both a promise of inclusion and a marker of the exclusive boundaries of the political community. To complicate matters further, both the boundaries of the political community and inclusion are contested concepts. Yet despite multiple and contested definitions, citizenship is by no means indeterminate. It has a scope of meaning, as common topics organize citizenship discourse and literature on it. Three topics are especially prominent in the history of political thought and political practices: (1) citizenship as a political principle of democracy that involves participation

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in deliberation and decision-making by political equals in a body politic; (2) citizenship as a status of legal personhood that carries a set of specified rights among which the ability to claim a state’s protection is prominent; and (3) citizenship as a form of membership that affords a social status and a pole of identification that can become rather thick and able to generate solidarity, civic virtue, and engagement. In the literature on citizenship, this perception of citizenship as a tripartite entity—a status, a bundle of rights and duties, and an identity—is a common denominator. According to Linda Bosniak (2006), however, the most visible line organizing the literature on citizenship is the dividing line between those who see citizenship as a universalist project and those who see it as an exclusionary one. The history of such a polyvalent concept as citizenship is necessarily multifaceted. It is the history of its identity, both normative and legal components, and of the conflicting paradigms that coexist uneasily as its definers. Looking to classical definitions, nothing short of a revolution in political thought and political practice stands between Greek and Roman citizenship.3 Later on, the French Revolution, freeing individuals of feudal and other traditional ties to make them lawful subjects of their own destiny, properly gave substance to citizenship rights. Under the 1793 constitution, the demos was defined as everyone over twenty-one years of age, born and resident in France, but adult foreigners domiciled in France for at least one year also enjoyed the rights of French citizens, provided that they were able to support themselves or had other signs of a “right-minded” citoyen, such as having married a Frenchwoman, adopted a child, or looked after an elderly person (Hirsch Ballin 2014: 9). Very soon afterward, the emergence and growth of European nationalities led the understanding of citizenship as the possession and exercise of substantial political rights of participation in government to join an understanding of citizenship as exclusive membership that distributes rights and obligations with regard to nations (Maas 1999). A period started in which nation-states claimed the exclusive attribution of the political membership of individuals, backed by the principle of self-determination of peoples, and implemented by international institutions that promoted cooperation to avoid double citizenship—considered a threat to sovereignty and world peace. Some revolutionary steps stand between that practice of avoidance, still prevalent until the 1980s, and today’s wide acceptance of multiple nationality (Bosniak 2001; Spiro 2010). In the view of Elizabeth Cohen, every historical synthesis of the overlapping, but often conflictual, components of citizenship entails political

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choices and trade-offs that tend to be forgotten once a conception becomes hegemonic (2009). Still, some guises of citizenship over the last two thousand years have proved lasting. The codification of membership rules made possible a direct form of state membership that replaced mediated, informal, and indirect forms of membership. Later, the identification of membership with citizenship as a legal category that could define individuals as equals was another breakthrough of classic Roman citizenship, even if this was restricted to only a few and gradated for all others. In the last thousand years, the increasing demands of administration (and taxation) of world commercial cities, followed by the strengthening of the state as a taxing and warring unit, were concomitant to the bureaucratic institutionalization and legitimization of a certain theory and practice of citizenship as a uniform status (see Holston 2008). Later, citizenship became synonymous with nationality when, as Hannah Arendt (1951) put it, the state transformed from being an instrument of the law to being an instrument of the nation. This meant that only people of the same national origin—however this was defined— could enjoy the protection and all the rights under state institutions. It also meant that persons of different nationalities could be placed under an altogether different legal category that allowed the state to restrict whatever claim those people could make on the state until they were completely assimilated and divorced from their countries of origin and thus “naturalized” as nationals.4 On a more abstract level, this meant that the aspirations to universality of citizenship came to be subsumed against national definitions of citizenship, whether defined by racial, ethnic, or even religious markers (Isin and Turner 2007: 11–12). Over the last two hundred years, this understanding coexisted with struggles regarding the national identity of the state, especially by groups that were ostensibly of the state but remained out of the definition of the nation. Citizenship is connected to all these broad, significant struggles. This is why it is worth understanding the contemporary changes to the aspirations and principles contained in it. While its historical developments may be subject to variable construal, one core understanding of citizenship remains constant and prevalent in all accounts: Citizenship refers to the prized right to belong to, and to have a say in an organized community. As Arendt proposed, throughout history, it has come to constitute the “right to have rights,” the right to be judged for one’s actions and opinions ([1951] 2004: 177). In the last four centuries,

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sovereign states established themselves as the units that grant the right to be a member, and thus to belong to a community in which one’s right to have rights is to be protected. During this peak period of the sovereign state system, it was clear that electoral rights were the quintessential rights ascribed to members of a nation-state. But much earlier, the republican tradition dating back to Aristotle understood citizenship to be essentially a status of full membership in a self-governing polity, the central privilege of which was the possibility of participating either through voting for representatives or running as candidates for public office. Today, democratic states have come to grant more and more civil rights to any person by virtue of being human and socioeconomic rights by virtue of being workers, contributors, or even residents. Has our time added anything new to citizenship?

The Challenges of Migration and Globalization to Citizenship The working definition of citizenship I have offered highlights two of its central components over time: political rights (especially voting rights) and formal membership.5 To study the contemporary changes in citizenship, I look at the relationship between those components. So far, I have argued that while voting rights have been the highest and most constant privilege of citizenship, views of membership and its relationship to citizenship have changed over time. But we have not yet arrived at a reflection on the current state of affairs. It is clear that, in a world of heightened mobility and migration, questions about the just allocation of rights and duties in a democratic polity transcend borders easily. In the same manner, this book weighs whether and how the power of voting-rights claims, which are the core of citizenship, may redefine the principles of membership within a polity and across polities, transcending a view of citizenship that has prevailed for more than a century. Migration has been an issue for citizenship since states acquired the primary responsibility for regulating territorial borders, managing the status under which the persons who want to enter may do so, conferring citizenship rights, and deciding on the legitimacy of claims to membership in the political community. Yet, Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson consider that globalization has added a substantially greater challenge for the state:

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Globalization breaks the territorial principle, the nexus between power and place. [It] destabilizes traditional ways of balancing the contradictions that have always beset the nation-state model: the contradiction between the inclusion and exclusion of various groups, between the rights and obligations of citizenship, and— most important—between political belonging as a citizen and political belonging as a national. (2000: 6–7) Statistics support their view. In 1910, 33 million migrants lived in countries other than their own; by the year 2000, that number had reached 175 million. More than half of this migration occurred in the three last decades of the twentieth century. According to UN estimates of 2013, over 231 million people compose the actual world migrant stock (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2013). Even though that number of persons amounts to a mere 3.1 percent of the world’s population, more than half of them live in the world’s most developed regions (North America, with the exception of Mexico; Europe; Australia; New Zealand; and Japan). Most of these migrants are categorized as “economic migrants.”6 Does the movement of people across the territories of bounded political communities and the higher connection of migrants in the places they reside in and the places they come from constitute a challenge to a state’s constitution or sovereignty? They do not. Empires and colonialism already promoted instances of transnationalism in a period of nation-state consolidation across regions. On the other, although borders (physical and conceptual) tend to be a feature of the divisions and hierarchies that constitute contemporary political communities, they have been always been contested, stretched, permeated, or breached, and, in any case, affected by the crossing or entering of nonmembers. The changing geography of borders and reordering of territories under different kinds of rule have also prompted redefinitions of citizenship. A territorial aspect of political membership is found in the very word citizen, which means originally the one who enjoys both the freedom and the privileges of a city, implying there is a delimited space where social life and social power are subject to specific rules. In the contemporary world, the redefinition at stake relates to this dual meaning. What is being redefined is specifically the prevailing understanding in the last three centuries that states take for themselves not only the authority to

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grant the status of citizen under international law, but also the association of that status to the very idea of a political community. Far from simply being born in 1648, the modern sovereign state has evolved over a long time, yet the Peace of Westphalia marked an inflection point for the possibility of multiple memberships in polities of different levels, or under different kinds of political rule, toward one in which increasingly quarrelsome interaction between states would demand a clearer delineation of their members and exclusive territoriality. For a long time, the assumption that political communities must match state borders and be exclusive was carved in the minds of political leaders and followers alike, legitimized in several instruments of international law.7 Under the neutral guise of nationality, but often serving ideologies of nationalism or economic systems, it took a toll on human lives and even now it is only slowly loosening its grip on political rhetoric. In lay language and in most academic use, nationality and citizenship are used as synonyms, even if it is clear that, at least implicitly, the notion of citizenship has kept a wider field of meaning than has nationality. This is palpable in the extra requirements that are asked of nationals in order to exercise the rights of citizenship (e.g., majority of age, freedom from criminal offenses), but also in the overlap that citizenship allows in different communities (i.e., one can be a citizen of a federation, a state, and a locality), as opposed to the unique belonging of nationality to nation-states.8 Again, within a process of a long duration, it is precisely this assumption of exclusive membership that is becoming unsustainable in practice and creating normative dilemmas, the most fascinating of which relates to citizenship. This is because, in today’s world, there is so much more at stake in defining citizenship than only a legal status that specifies membership: For better or for worse, contemporary citizenship represents an ideal of a certain kind of rule and social order among the people. Today the challenge that migration poses for citizenship lies in redefining the people who are eligible for self-rule. Democratic states commit to honor norms of democratic rule: fair and equal representation to those ruled; no taxation without representation; fit to fight, apt to vote. Yet, in many democratic states, these principles stand at odds with a reality of high proportions of immigration. After all, it is the developed, democratic world where more than 60 percent of the total migration flux has gone in the last decades.9 A democratic deficit arises, especially over time, when flow transforms into a stable population and

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when immigrants become residents and contribute to and participate in society as citizens do, yet they remain a separate subclass of people who lack the right to participate in the political system. Such a situation is not only incompatible with modern democratic norms but also potentially dangerous to the social cohesion of states. Democratic polities with a high proportion of resident migrants must offer a way to incorporate them into formal channels of decision-making—either turning them into citizens within a reasonable period intended for their familiarization with political matters, or otherwise. The dilemmas that this book deals with have to do with the issue of how to incorporate them: through nationality (i.e., easing access to naturalization or even imposing automatic naturalization, as Rubio-Marı´n [2000] proposed) or through extending citizenship to them within a different scheme than nationality. The fact that today individuals can move more easily than ever and, just as easily, maintain ties with their origin societies and extend ties to new ones challenges the understanding of citizenship as nationality. Ernst Hirsch Ballin calls it the Janus-faced nature of citizenship (2014: 7) and legal scholar Linda Bosniak helps us see the two faces by reminding us that the simultaneous universalist and exclusionary commitments of citizenship could only cohere when each one operated in a different jurisdictional domain: universalism within the political community; exclusion, at its edges (2006: 4). Well, the problem today is that the outer edge does not clearly separate inside from outside: Noncitizen immigrants claim rights that belong to citizenship, while still being outsiders in the sense of being nonnationals.10 And there is, of course, the other side. A more mobile and interconnected world pushes forward the uncoupling among territoriality, state sovereignty, and citizenship, creating emigrant groups with varying citizen rights in origin and destination countries. As this process evolves, emigrant identities develop into diasporic ones, some states of origin reach out to their emigrants, extending rights and regulating the transmission of membership, while others grapple with the regulation of membership and rights for those who come in. Several states assume both roles and therefore redefine citizenship for both emigrants and immigrants. In a nutshell, when the three dimensions of citizenship—identity, rights, and membership—cease to meet, normative and policy dilemmas arise for democratic states as they face the challenges of migrant integration. This book deals in particular with how democratic polities respond to two challenges to citizenship posed by the sustained presence of immigrants.

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The first challenge is to citizenship as membership in the polity. A change in naturalization rules is often a solution to adjust citizenship as status (the formal nation-state membership definition) and the rules of access to it to migration. Should we expect that, in the light of heightened migration and globalization, states reassert their control by changing the procedures to become a national? This is what a broad corpus of empirical research seems to expect when assessing whether the changes to naturalization rules across countries constitute a trend and whether this trend is of a restrictive or an opening kind. Migration questions often affect the reshaping of citizenship-acquisition rules because full membership in a state acquired through naturalization would entitle the new citizens to security over the full package of citizen rights in a polity, though we should not fool ourselves to think that access to citizenship forever erases the immigration past or even precludes disenfranchisement.11 Changes in the rules of access to nationality across countries in the past years attest to the continuing relevance of citizenship as a marker and the prevalence of the nationalcitizenship status as a privileged key to other rights. Yet states do not easily change naturalization rules, and changing the rules to allow access to full membership is often the subject of intense contestation. The very discussions of rules and defining criteria to formally belong to a nation-state often reveal concerns about the stability of the polity and are even connected to concerns about the distribution of access to socioeconomic, cultural, and political rights in a society. A key argument of this book is that momentous redefinitions of citizenship take place in those very discussions. The second challenge is to citizenship as a bundle of rights and duties. The rights and duties of citizenship seem to disaggregate in a manner such that some are now enjoyable even when disconnected from the status of citizenship. The idea of a status that exclusively confers formal capacities and immunities in a country has increasingly been diluted through the recognition of human, civil, and most social rights in democratic countries. This major break with the past has been observed by philosophers and confirmed by empirical sociologists who focus mostly on the rights migrants enjoy in Europe. For some authors, this development can be interpreted as a change in the exclusionary character of citizenship and as the emergence of forms of “partial” or “post-national” membership (Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1998, 2003). Especially after World War II, many of citizenship’s attributes became rights that could be claimed in any liberal democratic state by mere presence (see Bader 1995,

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1997; Gutmann, 1999)—except the right to vote. Electoral rights remain generally understood to be the exclusive domain of the political community: of formal members. Regardless of whether they are post-national, there is evidence of some disaggregation of citizenship in the increase of quasi-citizen or “partial citizen” statuses (Benhabib 2003, 2007) across the globe. This book examines that evidence. The enfranchisement of denizens seems like a puzzling new response to these two challenges. As stated in the Introduction, I use the term “denizenship” as an analytical category,12 which is relevant because it helps to critically inquire if the exclusive borders of citizenship status are making space for a more broadly-conceived citizenship. While a process of naturalization (even a facilitated one) reaffirms an understanding of citizenship-as-nationality (the very name of the term implies a “changing of nature”), denizen enfranchisement proposes something quite different as a potential solution to a democratic deficit provoked by the presence of significant numbers of politically unrepresented denizens. It proposes that the factual integration, belonging, and contributions that derive from residence can suffice to acquire quintessential citizen rights. Finally, even though citizenship as identity is not the focus of this book,13 conceptions of citizenship as identity are often implied in the political debates under study here. To some participants in these debates, the enfranchisement of denizens disentangles membership from identity, affecting how individuals act and conceive of themselves as members of a community.

A Puzzling New—and Different—Response to the Similar Challenges The substantive standards for admission and exclusion of foreigners and the status and treatment of foreigners who live in the nation-state without citizenship have been, until recently, the realm of study for migration specialists, mostly legal scholars. Fortunately, in the last few years, political theorists and empirical social scientists have also started to devote attention to the ways in which institutions and norms of citizenship determine the boundaries of the polity and the distribution of rights and duties within them. Linda Bosniak has condemned the “habit of dichotomous inside/ outside thinking that disables theorists from seeing, among other things,

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that the global is not merely situated ‘out there’ but also located increasingly within national borders” (2006: 7). She laments that we normatively take for granted that citizenship is metaphysically bounded to the nationstate, thereby restricting discussions about the scope of solidarity and justice claims to this “given.” Studying concrete relations of distributive justice in a political community in Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer also proposed that we should ultimately ask how a community is established and maintained in the first place. Joseph Carens, Barry Hindess, Rainer Baubo¨ck, Seyla Benhabib, and Veit Bader, among other political theorists, have duly responded to the normative challenge of reflecting on these boundary issues. Their reflections provide a normative frame to the empirical analysis of the extension of voting rights to denizens which still requires thorough examination because our knowledge of it is still composed of chunks of literature that so far have been scattered and hard to compare. What do we know already about the history of the extension of voting rights throughout the world? We know that it has not always followed a linear, irreversible route in which categories that are rendered irrelevant as disqualifiers of the electoral capacity can be forever thrown away (e.g., property, religion, gender, race). There are infamous examples in history of some of these categories returning after being formally discarded. Likewise, we have reasons to remain skeptical that the relation between voting rights and nationality is on a sure, predictable path of dissociation. We know that, until the early twentieth century, nationality was less relevant than criteria like property or race to exercise voting rights in the United States, although it was never totally irrelevant—a presumption of the will to become an American citizen was still a requisite (see Neuman 1992). Yet the debates on the enfranchisement of denizens in more than fifty polities across the globe question the necessity of nationality as a requisite for exercising voting rights. These enfranchisement reforms work at different levels of the democratic polity. In fact, Arrighi and Baubo¨ck (2017) have argued on the basis of comparative evidence for thirty-one European and twenty-two American cases that the expansions of the demos through enfranchisement follow mostly a level-specific pattern; while the emigrants’ voting rights have expanded for national-level elections, immigrant residents’ voting rights have mostly expanded for the local level. The keyword here is mostly, because there are important deviations, as we will see. In addition, these enfranchisements display different degrees of conditionality to exercise voting rights and many of the enfranchisement processes in parliaments failed.

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In the best-known national-level failed case, Germany, two La¨nder enfranchised denizens but were later forbidden to put them into practice by the Federal Constitutional Court (henceforth BVerfG, after its name in German: Bundesverfassungsgericht). Other countries, provinces, or municipalities have discussed it but found no majorities to support it.14 Democratic polities such as Costa Rica, France, and Italy, as well as subnational polities such as Toronto, San Francisco, New York, and California, among others, have discussed it since the early 2010s. The reasons given to make sense of these reforms are often postcolonial relations, cultural similarities, legal reciprocity, and integration. One, however, takes us right back to the liberal-democratic dilemmas posed by migration: Democracies with a high proportion of denizen population redelineate membership while somehow responding to demands of representation and civic equality that are formulated by and with regard to resident immigrants. Since the 1990s, the silent but growing wave of denizen enfranchisement across democracies to vote in the communities where they live after a certain period seems to change the key criterion to acquire voting rights from nationality to residence. The fact that voting rights may be extended on the basis of a certain length of legal residence and not through naturalization is an empirical and normative puzzle: Why not facilitate the access of immigrants to naturalization instead, opening the way to full status citizenship with all core political rights attached to it? Let us see what the expert literature says about this puzzle.

Observations and Omissions Regarding Denizen Enfranchisement and Its Alternatives Although denizen enfranchisement appeared first in the Western world around the 1970s, the attention it has garnered is minimal compared to the attention devoted to changes of naturalization rules across countries. It is easy to imagine the reasons for this. First, if we agree that there are certain paradigms and inertias in academia, it is likely that naturalization is more easily identified within the tradition of classics like Marshall’s Citizenship and Social Class that focus on the development of citizenship—conceived as a bundle of rights and duties tied to a national context.15 Second, for many, naturalization is normatively more in accordance with the generalized concept of democratic citizenship as membership in the nation-state,

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for it serves the egalitarian ideal of a single status of membership in a more “secure manner” (i.e., in contrast to a proliferation of quasi-citizenship statuses in a polity) given that (1) key political rights at national levels remain attached to it; (2) the rights of citizens are generally more secure than the rights of noncitizens in the sense that they cannot be easily revoked; and (3) citizenship-as-nationality is reputed to have symbolic importance as a mark of full membership in a political community and as a way to encourage a sense of identity, solidarity, and loyalty to the state. This normative concern is significant because despite getting some important political rights, denizens seldom have all political rights (i.e., the right to run for office, the right to vote in national elections) and are exposed to a higher risk of losing these rights with changes in migration and immigration policy. In addition, without nationality, denizens still lack the rights attached to the passport, such as the right to return and the right to claim the diplomatic protection of the state.16 For these reasons, for many of my interlocutors over the last years, denizen enfranchisement is but a symbolic measure that works at too low a level (mostly local elections) to be of importance. They worry that denizen enfranchisement is nothing but a measure to “make as if” denizens were included, while only handing out the crumbs of participation in the political system. I would understand and sympathize with such concern. However, to me this reveals how little the general public is acquainted with the phenomenon and its significance (and substantiates my need to write this book). I can show precisely that enfranchisement processes, even at the level of symbolic politics, can be relevant so that even a negative outcome in the short term can be an opportunity to contest ideas about political membership and achieve compromises that affect larger citizenship policy. Also, in a more normative spirit, I argue that enfranchisement processes carry an empowering force for democracies that confront challenges of immigrant integration, binding together native citizens and immigrant denizens in a common quest which reinvigorates liberal and republican elements of citizenship. This, in turn, is of great importance to create solidarity and foster a pluralistic identity in democratic societies. The extension of voting rights to denizens begun to draw more attention as a subject of study from the 1990s onward. Christian Joppke had observed a “liberal convergence trend” (2007: 38) across countries in the reforms to naturalization rules that seemed to move away from notions connected with particular ethnicities and closer to notions connected to a

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general liberal right to choose a belonging.17 It had been hoped that this trend would solve the representation deficit in democracies with high proportions of denizens, as immigrants would be integrated through generous naturalization rules and procedures. However, this trend stopped (Joppke 2008). Besides, naturalization rates had not increased substantially in the countries that had facilitated their naturalization rules, which made clear that the mere facilitation of naturalization would not automatically solve the democratic deficit provoked by unrepresented foreign long-term residents in a polity (Shanahan 1997). And yet, the attention that denizen enfranchisement started to receive came not only from the deceived expectations related to the potential of naturalization: The research agenda received an important “reality push” when, in 1985, the Netherlands followed the Nordic countries in extending local enfranchisement to denizens. The phenomenon ceased to be just a sign of Scandinavian idiosyncrasy, the exoticism of two remote South American countries—Uruguay and Chile—and a few Swiss cantons. To this day, though, and despite the greater attention, the contours of denizen enfranchisement remain blurry; the light thrown at it is still only a refraction of the spotlight fixed on changes of naturalization regimes—the “traditional” route of inclusion of foreigners to citizenship status. So far, the literature on the enfranchisement of denizens has provided good classifications of the types of extension of voting rights across countries (Groenendijk 2008; Waldrauch 2005), but there have been few elaborate explanations on why extensions of voting rights differ among countries that are subject to the same pressures (with some exceptions, such as Earnest 2002; Baubo¨ck 2005). The most recurrent hypotheses advanced so far have been based on a historical institutionalist perspective on naturalization (Brubaker 1989; Earnest 2003, 2005), with the same approach to explain change—and the same temptation to circularity. These theories could provocatively be also termed “nationalist” for their overwhelming focus on the nation-state as the relevant political unit. Focusing on traditions of citizenship as causes, studies conducted with this theoretical background are able to say that countries arrive at different enfranchisement rules because they are historically different. Yet they have difficulty explaining the sometimes quick and radical redefinitions of citizenship brought by either citizenship acquisition reforms or the enfranchisement of denizens. The most prominent theoretical contender is the post-nationalist literature, which takes the aforementioned influence of cosmopolitan norms and

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processes and the transnational organization of the interests of migrants as an explanation for the changes in a state’s treatment of resident immigrants, including enfranchisement. Jamin Raskin, for example, advanced the hypothesis that “evolving international norms of community based democracy and human rights” explain resident alien voting rights in several American municipalities as a local response to transnational processes and emerging global norms that redefine citizenship as a “polity of presence” rather than as polity of membership (1993). Yasemin Soysal (1998, 2003) and David Jacobson (1996) have argued that the two major components of citizenship, a shared national identity and access to rights, are increasingly being separated as rights are legitimized at the international or supranational level in increasingly abstract terms like “personhood.”18 While convincing in explaining the time and geography of denizen enfranchisement across the globe, this literature has failed to capture and account for the variance in denizen political rights across countries. In particular, the postnational hypotheses cannot explain the stratification of rights observable in so many polities where denizen enfranchisement is not universal, but covers different groups of migrants with different rights depending on their nationality. All of this makes obvious that democracies that have the same democratic challenge in common have not (yet) converged on a common model to solve it. If there is anything like a trend in denizen enfranchisement, this appears to be patchy: States under the same transnational/postnational influences and systemic factors adopt quite different enfranchising policies. Plausible at the most general level, these two grand theories have shed light on the same phenomenon on different levels and using different methods, from case studies to large-n statistical analyses. At times, the selection of cases seemed biased to verify the theory. In all cases, the theories lie far from the actual policies, unable to capture with covariance how the historical or transnational influences theorized actually play a role, they fall short of explaining how conditions and outcomes relate to each other and why there are so many qualitative variations of denizen enfranchisement across democracies facing similar dilemmas. By these variations, I mean the subnational enfranchisement at elections of different levels of government and the qualitative variations of enfranchisement policies regarding discriminatory and reciprocity clauses, restrictions of denizen voting rights to certain groups of denizens only, or the kind of electoral rights granted (i.e., the right to vote but not to run for office). Moreover, these studies have focused

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on the cases already researched to exhaustion by the naturalization literature, without touching on the more complex, under-researched ones that would show that the evolution of national institutions does not fully explain why some municipalities enfranchise denizens while others radically refuse to do so, as happens in Switzerland, as well as in Argentina, where an ample scale exists between extension of voting rights to no voting rights for denizens across the states of the federation (Modolo 2014). Judging generalized trust to be a powerful factor for noncitizen enfranchisement, Florian Justwan has recently asserted that it is likely that frequent debates will not produce any substantial policy changes. Instead of searching for further explanations for those stuck cases, however, he recommends focusing again on legal traditions of nationality acquisition, a factor that has no causal power in his own analysis (2015: 379). In sum, these theories owe us an explanation for the variations among denizen enfranchisement reforms and an account of how it is that the large-scale social processes theorized as causes work. A third strand of literature has often been subsumed under the historical-institutionalist theories because of its focus on domestic institutions, but it may be distinguished because of its emphasis in the role of some of them, especially for their composition—for example, on the proactive liberal role of courts versus conservative legislatures (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001; Joppke and Morawska 2003, 2005a; Weil, 2001). Authors in this “liberal institutionalist” strand of literature partly rebuke the historical institutionalist arguments that attribute differences among the regimes of citizenship of states to expressions of particular national characters. Christian Joppke has led the way in emphasizing that domestic institutions and constitutions rather than international instruments of human rights are the foundation for any trend observable in citizenship regimes (2011; Joppke and Moravska 2003). Patrick Weil (2001) aimed to identify the combination of factors that would push for more liberal regimes of admission to citizenship: the influence of democratic values, the stabilization of borders, and a shared experience with immigration. I, too, write this book in the hope of refuting the easy versions of historical institutionalism which often end in self-confirmatory accounts but do not help to explain what made denizen enfranchisement possible and why denizen enfranchisement reforms differ so much across countries. However, it is not fair to build a straw man out of historical institutionalism; it is clear that path dependencies in the institutions of different states

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What grand theories say so far

Post-national citizenship theories: “Democracies extend rights on the basis of human rights” Cannot explain variations in denizen voting reforms.

Historical institutionalism: “Each democracy follows the evolution of its national institutions, and its citizenship self-understanding is resilient” Cannot explain enfranchising trend across democracies and the rapid change it involved in countries of conservative citizenship traditions.

What a middlerange theory might add

Institutionalism / democratic liberalism: “National institutions and transnational norms do affect enfranchisement in each democracy but are amenable to change throughout politics” Has led to case studies of limited comparability and generalizability.

Figure 1. Theories and explanations of denizen enfranchisement.

open or close some options in politics when particular political communities confront the problem of integrating migrants. This assumption is foundational for the studies that have documented that discourses of citizenship differ from state to state and from society to society (Brubaker 1989). I, too, work with this assumption in this book. The problem with some uses of historical institutionalism is the overly simplified and rigid versions of citizenship they have depicted under “national models” or “traditions” (for two balanced critiques see Schuman 2002; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012). In this book I show the dynamism in citizenship traditions: through studying enfranchisement processes, I want to show how those traditions change. The grand theories sketched so far lack comparative breadth and explanatory depth, as well as an outlook that is able to incorporate the variation present in the universe of denizen-enfranchising democracies. I believe that they approach this issue defectively because they misunderstand its nature. If we look at the history of citizenship policies, we will learn something about the discursive field available to make proposals and the path dependencies that constrain and frame the possible reforms. It seems plausible that postnational norms frame the incorporation of rights based on personhood through domestic law, and that this fits with the expansion of denizen

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enfranchisement across the Western world in the last forty years. But if we ignore the dynamics of contemporary politics, in particular of political-legislative processes within polities, we are still at pains to explain the various kinds of decisions reached: Where do the decision-makers draw from when they argue for or against a particular way to include migrants in the polity? In general, institutions matter because laws, customs, and established practices play a powerful role in shaping the behavior of individuals. Rigorously done, a study based on historical institutionalist foundations would demand that we study not only historically-developed constraints but also actors as interpretive and choice-making agents that operate within them. In this regard, sociological institutionalism is stronger, asking us to look at actors that shape their interactions following their interests but also constrained by an institutional environment by using frames of reference and normative orientations that resonate in such environments (Bell 2002: 371). My own perspective is close to this sociological institutionalist line of thought and to recent attempts to develop a discursive strand within it (see Schmidt 2008). Discursive institutionalism takes discourse as a generic term encompassing the substantial content of ideas and the interactive processes by which they are conveyed: text and context (meaning where, how, why, and when something is said). In my view, the inconclusiveness of current research on variation across democracies that have enfranchised denizens is a result of jumping too early to the why and disregarding other equally relevant foundational questions: What and how must first cement any account of possible relevant causes at play. After all, the extension of rights to denizens was an anomaly when it first happened and it would be important to say what this option meant in the first place (which explicit aim it had) and how such innovation was proposed, negotiated, and passed. Are enfranchisements not usually the results of painstaking political processes? My hunch has been initially yes, and I have followed this hunch with more interest the more I learned about the particular universe of cases I am addressing. In democracies with high proportions of noncitizen immigrants, proposals to include them in the electorate are likely to generate anxieties about their electoral and social preferences. The “processes” by which this option is explored and negotiated should be studied to better understand why voting rights were extended to denizens in some democracies and not in others, despite common challenges; why there are different kinds of enfranchisement; how voting rights were pushed through; and, more fundamentally, how was it even

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possible that extending voting rights became an option besides the traditional way of incorporating migrants—through naturalization. These puzzling questions have been largely overlooked in the literature. The outstanding exception is the work of Dirk Jacobs, who states that “it is essential to analyze political and discursive dimensions of the policy process in their own right, before falling back on all-encompassing explanations” (1998: 352). He showed that looking at the evolution of the decade-long and formidably complex parliamentary process that preceded enfranchisement of denizens in the Netherlands could better explain its characteristics and timing than could the until-then predominant explanation that supported the idea of “tolerance and communitarian inclusion” as a remote historical cause. Although preceded by another similar effort for the case of the Netherlands, Jacobs did not attempt to generalize.19 This book takes a small but significant step forward toward a middle-range theory; that is, a theory that can be applied to many cases—and so is able to characterize a phenomenon at large—but that allows for adjustments for context. The engaging part is less the theory itself than the path it opens for understanding how citizenship changes through denizen enfranchisement.

Toward a Larger Picture The Questions That Matter for Liberal Democracies with Resident Migrants

I have argued thus far that both the right to vote and the exercise of voting rights are so inextricably linked to the core of definitions and practices of citizenship that their sheer decoupling, even at the local level, from nationality constitutes a significant change for what citizenship has meant in the last two hundred years. But is it naı¨ve to focus on the openness of political rights for migrants instead of the more “practical” and “urgent” socioeconomic rights, or the more diffuse but “substantive” notions such as identity? I have been asked this question many times and it generally comes from activists working very hard in the fight for the respect of the most basic rights (human and labor rights) of migrants, who deem my focus on political rights naı¨ve because they see voting rights as too ambitious a goal, or from colleagues in academia who think that these extensions of rights are symbolic and do not represent “deep” change processes.

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My answer is no. It is obvious that most migrants who get involved in demanding participation rights have their survival priorities satisfied.20 Yet, studying how democracies confront the normative dilemmas that arise when they have a high proportion of denizens is not important only because of the subjective evaluation migrants themselves make of their needs or because of how native citizens evaluate the urgency or profundity of migrants’ needs.21 These discussions are important because they tell a story about the terms of inclusion in the governing people as a whole, a story that is relevant for the all persons that care about the quality of a democratic polity that has immigrants. Struggles for the political representation of denizens—be they elitist or popular, championed by migrants or by citizens—illustrate the redefinitions of citizenship that emerge when a significant part of otherwise functional and contributing subjects are excluded from channels of political decision-making, independent from whether they figure as a priority. Whether political rights in these discussions are limited to electoral rights or instead reach out to profound issues of inclusion is something that must be researched and cannot be discarded by deeming the issue legalistic or symbolic. Political rights back political personhood in a polity, so they are clearly not superficial, and empirical research shows that individuals may not value the vote, but they still value having the right to vote (Conley and Termini 2001).22 In fact, in countries with a defective rule of law, voting rights are bought by immigrants by way of fraudulently acquired documents (Sadiq 2009). For many receiving polities, opening the possibility of enfranchising denizens might make sense because the alternative (naturalization) seems not to work: Even if it is relatively easy to acquire, there are important subjective reasons why immigrants would rather not acquire the nationality of the country of reception but would still value having voting rights there. And there are valid reasons why countries of reception might prefer extending the franchise to immigrants before having a disfranchised population of subjects. However, rather than a priori establish why both immigrants and the country of reception would be more willing to accept denizen franchise than a path to status citizenship through naturalization, the question this book researches is how the relationship between denizen franchise and citizenship is construed across democracies in a time of tension for citizenship as a multidimensional concept. The current one is a period in which nationality still is the status that gives a guarantee over the whole

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set of citizenship privileges, and this is why it makes sense that citizenship is generally understood to mean nationality. However, it is also a period in which more groups demand citizenship to be restored in its meaning of being primarily about a democratic practice or constituting a people from the bottom upward—rather than by the nation-state alone. As noted above, the view as to whether citizenship is inherently exclusive—and if it is, in what way—divides the whole normative literature. On the one side, many believe that the connection of citizenship to democracy makes necessary some kind of exclusion because democracy requires a “we” to which individual citizens feel they belong, in whose deliberations they have a voice, and toward which they can feel a sense of shared fate and solidarity (Arendt [1951]2004; Habermas 1992; Miller 2005; Walzer 1997). The rationale is simple:23 Political exclusion of some is an instance of constitutive boundary maintenance that is necessary for the preservation of a community within which the struggles against social exclusion and inequality can take place. If “we” cannot include all, a demarcation is necessary. Yet, even if we agreed on this, the principles upon which such exclusion is maintained are the subject of normative debate. Today, some authors question the legitimacy of the very demarcation. Barry Hindess proposed that this view of citizenship constitutes a conspiracy to the extent that it provides the system of modern territorial states with reasons for discriminating against noncitizens who cross, or live within, their borders because it is assumed that citizens of a country should make their citizenship claims there, first and foremost. This critique holds even for the thinner, cosmopolitan citizenship described by Soysal and Jacobson: To celebrate that more and more societies become formally “democratic” states where citizens enjoy the same rights and duties as equals is to forget the crude reality that the rights and duties that citizens of El Salvador enjoy with regard to their state cannot remotely be equated with those that citizens of Costa Rica hold. The mobility of persons remains formally much more restricted given the increased mobility of goods and services in the world, and the stronger and richer a state, the more it invests into controlling borders. Likewise, in the view of Bryan Turner, contemporary sociology has failed to note the strategies of “enclavement” (2006: 295), the rise in global security concerns and regulations, the stated aim or justification of which is to protect residential populations against the perceived economic and security risks of mobile populations. In Turner’s view, we can expect that denizen voting and other semi-citizenship arrangements

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will be seen with distrust, for they challenge the hegemonic model of exclusionary political membership that requires compliance with stringent criteria and going through a selective and slow assimilation process (2007: 290). Especially after 9/11, the “threatened majorities” of advanced liberal democracies justified stronger controls of mobility, fearing that their liberal laws might be protecting potentially criminal strangers—or unemployable people.24 These debates bring to light the global justice dimension behind immigration, and immigrants’ access to citizenship. Renowned economist Branko Milanovic´ argues that, at the global level, 85 percent of inequality between individuals in the world can be traced to differences between mean country incomes and only 15 percent to social class. In other words, the most important world social divide is not between the worker and the bourgeoisie class but between people who have been born in one country or another. And since citizenship-as-nationality is mostly acquired as a birthright related to place or ancestry, it is the citizenship status that people are born into which defines more strongly than any other attribute their different chances in this world with regard to one another (see Shachar 2009). Thus, today there is a global agenda for a cosmopolitan right to move to relieve these inequalities of birth because from this perspective, the right of people to move is also a right to emancipate from circumstances that condemn them to poverty and for which they are not to blame—political theorists would label me a “luck egalitarian” for this reasoning. There is a counterpart to this perspective that focuses not so much on the right of individuals to move, but on the duty of countries to play a role in attenuating these injustices. It contends that people should also have the right not to have to migrate to remedy injustices; that is, the right not to be forced by circumstances to move in order to have a decent life. Voices of this kind demand redistribution (or retribution for past injustices, often anchored in colonial relations) from the “North” to the “South” (Blatter 2011; Hindess 2019; Delgado Wise and Ma´rquez Covarrubias 2012). While less normatively coherent with liberal cosmopolitanism, this view may be more practicable in the current international system. Leaving the normative and entering the empirical terrain, many scholars have studied how migration concerns of states have crept into areas of citizenship policy.25 The diagnostics of what denizen enfranchisement does to citizenship vary and, until further comparative research is done beyond

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a few famous cases, the evidence they disclose has largely depended on the theory they use. So far, the relevant literature has overlooked the significance of the slow and silent decoupling of voting rights from citizenship as a status and, probably, as an identity, which is a phenomenon that shakes the foundations of citizenship as an intersection of its core dimensions: identity, status, bundle of rights, practices. The thorough, exhaustive redefinitions of citizenship that have occurred in many liberal democracies as they have enfranchised resident migrants have passed unnoticed in citizenship studies, with few remarkable exceptions (e.g., Baubo¨ck, Waldrauch, Howard, Joppke, Escobar, and Jacobs). In this book, I stand on the shoulders of these authors to find out how normative commitments are dealt with across polities that confront a similar challenge. To do that, I propose to empirically explore a phenomenon that so far has been only reflected on in the shadows of the spotlight of discussions of citizenship-as-nationality. Thus, these questions lead my exploration: Why, despite common normative commitments and challenges confronting migration, have democracies arrived at such qualitatively different solutions to solve the democratic deficit created by denizenship? Why is denizen enfranchisement a trend moving forward across countries, yet so heterogeneous? How does denizen enfranchisement change citizenship? The answers to these questions demand a comparative analysis of how denizen enfranchisement is promoted and negotiated, and with regard to which conceptions of citizenship. Toward a Middle-Range Explanation

My goal in this book is to construct an empirically-grounded middle-range account that helps to understand the specificity and diversity of enfranchisement. Middle-range accounts are situated between laws and descriptions (Abbott 2010: 74). Mine will be too complex to predict outcomes, yet capable of showing “internal patterns” in denizen enfranchisement processes. In this section, I delineate the approach necessary to develop it: a process approach. I have claimed that the literature on denizen enfranchisement overwhelmingly focuses on naturalization, instead of clarifying the phenomenon of denizen enfranchisement itself. This is understandable since for policy makers and for individual migrants alike, access to citizenship through naturalization and denizen voting are related. Still, in theory, it is possible that there are different combinations of institutional regimes and

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ideological instances on that relationship. Whether there are patterns and regularities in that relationship is something that should be empirically researched, not just assumed away. The questions posed in this book are real questions, that is to say, meaningful and open to research. Seeking answers to them via a process perspective makes sense in method and content. It makes sense content-wise because decisions are usually arrived at in democracies through formal legislative processes that include much discussion and are not simply deduced from existing laws and traditions or simply aggregated as voting preferences, even if it might make sense—and a nice story—to say that existing laws, traditions, and voting preferences matter in negotiations. Any enfranchisement discussion in history has involved tough discussions about the legitimacy of conditions that are to signal who gets to enjoy the right to participate in political matters. Enfranchisement reforms have historically been the result of long political discussions in which a wide range of political (governmental and nongovernmental) actors advanced carefully crafted arguments. A process perspective makes sense method-wise because, by looking at decision-making processes, we can get close to the mediating variables between large institutional structures and actual decisions (i.e., variables that make countries with similar dilemmas differ regarding their portrayal of citizenship, or that make countries under the same transnational influences incorporate such influences differently into domestic politics). Contrary to the assumption that there is a static and predictable relationship among citizenship, naturalization, and enfranchisement, a process perspective allows us to be open to a variety of possible realizations of denizen voting rights within different conceptions of citizenship. The relationship between the enfranchisement of denizens and citizenship traditions probably depends on how the political actors in a state construe the meaning of the social and political contract behind citizenship; that is, of its use, its value, and the exclusivity it demands. This “construal” should be the object of empirical research, not presumed to be the natural result of historical, national, or transnational structures. Why? Because such a construal is based on arguments crafted and negotiated in live politics. Though we can assume that the arguments for or against denizen enfranchisement play out within the discursive space of a tradition and within the confines of some institutions, arguments are crafted, debated, interpreted, and contested within the context of live politics. Methodologically, I will argue that the complexity of denizen enfranchisement requires a lens different from

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the theoretical lenses used so far: a lens that allows us to discern processes and their main components. Reasons to Develop a Process Perspective One: A Multiplicity of Arguments Justifies Different Kinds of Denizen Enfranchisement

Many variations define denizen enfranchisement empirically. It might be extended by a national/federal authority or by a subnational parliament; a franchise extended by a national/federal congress may be then applicable in regional or national elections or in local elections only. Moreover, the franchise can be extended on the basis of length of residence and perhaps employment status, but, in many cases, it is extended on the basis of reciprocity—for example, country A reciprocates to country B for extending voting rights that de jure or de facto benefited mainly citizens of country A living in country B—or on the basis of cultural or colonial ties to only some subgroups of migrant residents. Such “differentiating” clauses that favor some migrants over others introduce a rationale for enfranchising reforms that qualifies or even subordinates the rationale of solving a democratic deficit and is potentially at odds with the observation of the declining importance of nationality norms. Finally, the enlarged franchise rights might include passive and/or active voting rights (the right to run for office and the right to vote); and any of these rights may be conditional on requirements like special registration. The mere existence of all these variations should make us wary of hypothesizing a determinate relation between naturalization rules and extensions of voting rights that explains why enfranchisement of noncitizens happens. However, the relevant literature not only has assumed that a relationship exists but has judged it stable and determinate enough to explain denizen enfranchisement and do away with the task of exploring it further. Even the historical-institutionalist explanations that have come closest to looking at processes of enfranchisement derive postures and policy prescriptions regarding enfranchisement from alleged “traditions of citizenship” and the decisions made on the issue have been considered at the same time revelatory and confirmatory of the “dominant” tradition in a country. The vocabulary to describe the different traditions of citizenship is usually drawn from two schools of political theory that are placed at the

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extremes of a continuum for their distinct views on the dilemma of nationality versus representation. The one, liberal cosmopolitanism / transnational pluralism, demands for migrants the extension of voting rights and celebrates divorcing citizenship from nationality and stripping it from its old sacred character of membership. The other, communitarianism, demands from migrants naturalization conditioned upon assimilation, if they want to stay, and leaves little room to legitimize denizen enfranchisement. This linear, continual view has provided unreliable guidance in the effort to determine the positions regarding changes to naturalization laws in politics (e.g., from jus sanguinis to jus soli), yet it has been prolonged in the study of denizen enfranchisement with the disappointing effect of flattening the possibilities of analysis. Why? Because its hypotheses conflate the normative level of precepts and evaluations in theory with the practical level of laws and policies and their discussion, giving the erratic impression that naturalization and enfranchisement stand in either a “negative” or a “consistent” relation that explains a priori the dilemmas of denizenship, and potentially solves them. In the “negative” assumption, whatever political positions exist, enfranchisement appears only in cases where the naturalization regime includes very difficult-to-meet and strict conditions and is unlikely to be changed. For example, it is supposed that if naturalization is easy in country Z, then Z is “liberal” and there is no need for extending voting rights, while if naturalization is restrictive in country Y, then Y is “communitarian,” and there is a need for extending voting rights. In the “consistent” assumption, the two issues are connected through coherence in policy so that if naturalization is relatively easy, it reveals an open—or “liberal”26 —tradition, which thus commends the extension of voting rights, while if it is relatively difficult, it reveals a conservative tradition, in which case only a path to inclusion through naturalization, if anything, is more plausible than extending voting rights. It is easy to see that these different assumptions lead to contrary hypotheses. Despite that, both share a more fundamental assumption: that knowing differences in naturalization policy suffices to know variations in enfranchisement policies. This assumption is implausible: Denizen enfranchisement is not an alternative to naturalization, even if the literature insists on portraying the former precisely by its relation to the latter. The fact that there is a relationship between naturalization rules and enfranchisement as policy does not allow us to take for granted a certain direction in that relationship. The idea that ease of naturalization and denizen

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Table 1. The ambiguous link between naturalization ease and enfranchisement: Selected cases Enfranchised denizens

Not enfranchised denizens

Relatively easy naturalization rules

Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Netherlands,1 Iceland, Belize

(Canada), France, Australia, (United States)2

Relatively difficult naturalization rules

Denmark, Slovenia, Spain, Norway, Luxembourg, Estonia, (Switzerland)3

Greece, (Germany), (Austria),4 Latvia, Costa Rica

Note: Cases in parentheses indicate subnational reforms. Based on own data set. 1. When denizens were enfranchised at the local level, the acquisition of nationality in the Netherlands was still regulated by the Netherlands Nationality Law published on January 1, 1985. 2. Some cities (Chicago; New York; Washington, D.C.) or counties (in Maryland: Takoma Park and Chevy Chase; in Georgia: Barnesville; in Kentucky: Somerset) allow denizens to participate in local councils and on school boards. 3. Neuchaˆtel, Jura, Appenzell-Außerrhoden, Fribourg, Grisons, Waadt. 4. Austria and Germany could fall into two cells: laws to enfranchise denizens were passed at subnational levels (in Austria: Vienna; in Germany: Hamburg, Bremen, Schleswig-Holstein, and Berlin), but they were later ruled unconstitutional.

enfranchisement tend to stand in a certain inverse relationship is not always wrong, but it is erratic and whimsical, if applied across cases. Table 1 provides a demonstration of this. Assuming that naturalization and denizen enfranchisement are roughly equal alternatives implies that the latter is an option that readily presents itself as practical, or even necessary, in some circumstances (depending on the theory of a nationality tradition) and can be expected to be implemented as a result of a previous normative stance. As Table 1 shows, this assumption leads to contradictory conclusions regarding why polities decide on denizen enfranchisement: It not only appears where naturalization is difficult (because there is “need for it”) or where it is easy (“because it is coherent with a citizenship tradition”); there are all combinations. Denizen enfranchisement might be construed in relation to naturalization rules, but also independently of them, as a policy needing no logical precedent of normative stance with regard to nationality.

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In my view, each cell displays a different policy, belonging to potentially different areas (citizenship policy and migration policy). Thus, even if they may be integrated in a larger aim, they might as well be instruments for different ends. For the purpose of developing a strategy to research and understand denizen enfranchisement better, this means that the policy story that naturalization and denizen franchise build together in regard to citizenship cannot be told from looking at one end only. What is more, a variety of ideological instances can be derived from each of the four combinations displayed in the table. Let us take the first column, which contains cases where extending the franchise to denizens has been discussed and passed. In those cases, denizen enfranchisement could have been portrayed as an alternative to citizenship—a concession to the democratic demands of representation and to cosmopolitan principles that accord equal dignity to all persons who contribute to a community and are affected by its decisions, and thereby leaves little reason to stick to naturalization as requisite for political rights. But just as well, it could have been portrayed as a pathway to citizenship: an integrating step that leads to naturalization—that is, a way of inviting migrants to step onto the path of integration in the hope that they will finally naturalize.27 Some studies have documented that these views exist in discussions over enfranchisement and suggest that the same party can hold them at different points in time (Jacobs 1998; Waldrauch 2005). Even more puzzling, from the perspective of citizenship change, is that these two positions can be held in a positive or negative light, depending on the ideological perspective. For example, those who think of denizen enfranchisement as an alternative to citizenship may not only be the cosmopolitans: Others might see it as an alternative to citizenship-as-nationality and disapprove of it precisely because of that. If cosmopolitans celebrate the decline of citizenship-as-nationality, many others in a broad spectrum, although still well placed in liberalism, worry that as long as the national-citizen status still secures citizen rights better than other options, naturalization, rather than “minor” concessions, should be encouraged.28 A step further toward conservatism, communitarians and nationalists believe citizenship will lose its value if the key political right (voting) is divorced from citizenship-as-nationality. In the same way, for those who think of denizen enfranchisement as a pathway to citizenship, it reaffirms the value of citizenship in that it tries to make citizenship the “final prize” of a process of socialization into the political community, which may be seen as good (for a very broad spectrum ranging from liberals

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to communitarians) or bad (for those who think exercising a political voice in the community, even if local, requires first a guarantee of loyalty that can only be proven through naturalization or citizenship acquired at birth). Thus, there is a myriad of discursive possibilities from any given combination between naturalization and extension of voting rights to respond to the dilemmas of denizenship, depending on the principles prioritized. The study of denizen enfranchisement offers normative political theory a scenario in which all answers to the question “What is citizenship?” in our universe of cases (democracies with a significant proportion of denizens) can play out. If we are ready to grant that the relationship between extensions of voting rights to denizens and rules of naturalization is more complex than what it may seem at first sight, we can reasonably expect that the relationship between extensions of voting rights to denizens and citizenship change is at least as complex. Both are contingent on the articulation of different moral arguments that cannot be deduced straightforwardly from grand theories or from one single normative continuum. A careful and nuanced analysis of the variety of possible arguments for and against enfranchisement of denizens from a purely theoretical perspective (as done in the previous paragraphs) plus the myriad arguments that have been documented to exist in real public debates in empirical studies further support the claim that we cannot infer the understanding of citizenship that prevails in each country from simply looking at naturalization policies or enfranchisement decisions (see Jacobs 1998; Waldrauch 2005). Before we explore the arguments played out in each enfranchisement debate, we cannot say what they stand for concerning citizenship: We must look at how their relationship is construed in each case investigating the debates involved in the enfranchisement processes. The process lens I propose to use will help us separate arguments on the right to vote from arguments on nationality and on citizenship as three different issues. It will also help us identify and focus on competing criteria to exercise what previously were exclusive citizen rights attributed only upon naturalization. And, importantly, it will also show other issues that may possibly have a stake, besides those that we deduced so far from theory. When it comes to citizenship, it is wise to remain open to see it appear in new guises. In history, many political changes have been forged in the language of citizenship. This flexibility within the concept of citizenship is key for its extraordinary survival. For example, when suffrage is extended only to

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some, we may ask ourselves why this is the case. The fact that an enfranchising reform favors only some migrants and not all suggests the creation of a hierarchy of citizenship (Fukumoto 2004). Also, to be able to understand what reciprocity and preferential rules address, we need to go beyond the theoretically rich, yet empirically narrow, relationship between denizen enfranchisement and naturalization, and instead track arguments about an array of other issues that might justify such selections. These may be as varied as the composition of the resident migrant population, the rules of the legislative process needed to pass a reform, the kind of political system in place, the mobilization of popular or elite interests, international pressure or interest to belong to a regional bloc, and, of course, party politics. Two: Liberal Democracies Interpret the Challenges Posed by Denizenship

Can we assume that most democracies pay lip service to a dilemma of principles when a large population within their territory is excluded from exercising the quintessential political right in a democracy? Perhaps, but beyond recognizing the dilemma, the mere fact of having high proportions of denizens will not necessarily lead democracies to consider enfranchisement of denizens, let alone pass a reform to this effect. Different citizenship rights in the population of a democratic state are not a historical rarity. As Walzer wrote, “the rule of citizens over non-citizens is probably the most common form of tyranny in human history” (1997: 62). The particularity of democratic regimes is not that they cannot sustain differentiated citizenship, but that usually they have to justify it. As it turns out, democracies have often found ways to justify the exclusion of foreigners from the vote on economic, political, social, religious, and ethnic grounds. More important, as Carens reminds us, liberal democratic states vary in the ways they read and institutionalize norms of democracy, justice, freedom, and human rights (2005: 29). The fact that, in any given polity, citizenship can only be legally negotiated by those who are already citizens—and by their representatives—often leads to the conclusion that they are free to decide the principles and conditions of inclusion in their political communities on the basis of whatever their own understandings of what their political community constitutes and demands. Usually this point of view favors conservative and circular explanations of policy outcomes based on the rather simplistic idea that only those proposals that could be popular can be proposed, and that therefore whatever reform is passed tells us what the “traditional” principles of

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exclusion and inclusion are. Self-confirmatory arguments creep in again in this one-dimensional view of political decision-making in democracies. Nevertheless, a quick comparative look at contemporary cases corrects (and complicates) the picture: In Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, judicial courts, groups of intellectuals, and legislators have proposed enfranchisement measures so innovative in the light of their traditions that they should rule out ex post facto inferences of their traditions. As Hayduk (2006) and Raskin (1994) have shown in their rich historical accounts of past episodes of noncitizen franchise, the agents of denizen enfranchisement probably lie in society, in live politics, just as much as, or maybe to a greater degree, than in “traditions.” Furthermore, even the most rigid traditions are amendable.29 Even if it is plausible to say that enfranchisement is needed to solve the democratic deficit provoked by unrepresented noncitizen residents in a state, some migrant-receiving states and societies may place less emphasis on liberal commitments than on others. Rules for accession to the EU, the need to deepen the integration of an alliance of countries, and the wish to maintain former colonial links or party politics may be stronger incentives to advance progressive politics of inclusion compared to migrants in general, or some subgroup. Liberal and democratic principles signal what liberal democracies should do and surely set some limits on our expectations of what they can do, but what democracies actually do is something bargained. In short, democratic governments do not just detect objective problems and apply straightforward solutions, they create issues and seek legitimate ways of solving them, regardless of whether there is a need for it. The agenda-setting literature in political science reminds us that for any given issue there is not just one conflict line in politics (or maybe two or three that coexist with one another) but rather many potential conflicts, some of which fail to come to the fore and others that compete with one another to gain attention (Baumgartner 2009; Baumgartner and GreenPedersen 2006). In Schattschneider’s terms, the key dynamic is not simply the alignment of forces on one side or the other of a dividing line but rather “the conflict of conflicts” itself: the different divisions pushing against one another to get into, and dominate, the agenda (1975). This literature offers helpful insights as to how these reforms are passed and why they are stopped in some cases (see also Hansen and Koehler 2005). Denizen enfranchisement presents a difficult case for political reforms, since these rarely get any popular support from citizens and very rarely are pushed forward by denizens themselves. Thanks to a few excellent case

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studies on Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium (which I review in detail in Chapter 5) we know that the debates that led to enfranchisement do not derive from society-wide movements (such as in the UK for women enfranchisement) but are mostly restricted to elites or small groups of experts. Denizen enfranchisement differs in this regard from other enfranchisements in history that involved social movements, such as the enfranchisement of workers in the nineteenth century, and of women and some citizen minorities in the twentieth (King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005). This different trajectory also suggests we look at the processes of discussion that led to denizen enfranchisement. Related to the multiplicity of arguments that can justify denizen enfranchisement, a particularly important normative item when denizen franchise is proposed and fought over is the value that is attributed to naturalization. How do policy makers and other stakeholders perceive and interpret the relation between naturalization and denizen enfranchisement as policy options? Do they conceive of them as complements to one another, or as alternatives? Do they envision them as equivalent options to solve the democratic deficit? For both conservatives and liberals, there seem to be good reasons why naturalization—the full acquisition of citizenship as a legal status supporting membership—is preferable to just extending voting rights to resident migrants. For some, denizen enfranchisement gives too much, devalues national citizenship, and poses loyalty risks. For them, the issue is often that denizens simply do not deserve voting rights until they prove that they deserve citizenship. For others, denizen enfranchisement may be too little because it does not provide denizens with the full package of citizenship: the bundle of political, social, economic, and cultural rights, and a guarantee of those rights. Admittedly, denizens enjoy human and civil rights, and some sociopolitical rights, like the right of association and sometimes even the right to join a political party, but these are shakier than the rights of citizens because they can be more easily taken away with a change of government that would radically change immigrant policy (although I think this only could happen in a regime with very brittle democratic credentials, where citizens could be disenfranchised, too). Still, for many liberals, the fact that the status of citizenship better guarantees citizen rights is a reason to prefer naturalization. There is a further political and normative argument to favor naturalization over enfranchisement that directly connects the status of citizenship to

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issues of belonging and recognition: By becoming full citizens, denizens are better equipped to demand that the political system address the differences that may lead to the segregation and marginalization of migrants. Beyond the exercise of voting rights and the security over them, this argument emphasizes that the status of citizenship as a status of membership is a mark of full civic equality.30 As should be obvious by now, citizenship is a concept open to contested meanings. Like sovereignty or democracy, citizenship is one of those concepts that “act in the world” (Bartelson 1995) and serve as proxies of big normative changes in history. It is in flux despite the general impression that it has remained roughly fixed to the nation-state over the last two centuries. For all these reasons, a process analysis that is attentive to political interpretations is appropriate. The crux of the matter is that, although the dilemmas of denizenship concern both current full citizens and denizens, they are decided by the former and their representatives alone. Denizens remain contributors of taxes and subject to the law as well as to all government decisions, but their interests can be sidelined or disregarded completely because they do not count in the constituency of politicians.31 On the side of politicians, this leads to different constellations of interests for and against enlarging the electorate to include resident immigrants, and to zealous debates about the multilayered concept of citizenship. This is why the study of processes of enfranchisement—how it is debated and negotiated—showcases how voting rights are appraised in relation to citizenship as a whole. Now that we have set the theoretical landscape, it’s time to begin the journey. Our task in the following chapters will be to find out why, against all the arguments that seem to favor a solution that focuses on naturalization as a formal gate to the political community, denizen enfranchisement has appeared in so many democracies around the world showing different qualitative specifications. A first step will be to take this test of the indeterminacy between naturalization rules and enfranchisement a step further. Next, we will compare processes of enfranchisement, looking at the argumentation and decision-making processes surrounding them, to discover a clearer, more detailed picture of variations in enfranchisement reforms. We need to do some mapping first, identifying the universe of cases, and to get a compass—that is, a strategy to select some cases and a set of questions that are comparable in a structured, focused manner

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(George 1979). Chapter 2 will expand our field of vision of denizen enfranchisement reforms as they are, landscaping how they vary between democracies that confront the dilemma of denizenship. It will also serve as a comparative background to select the cases for in-depth study, and it will be a map to guide us through the process and remind us what each case stands for.

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CHAPTER 2

Broad Comparisons: Denizen Enfranchisement Across Countries

What Do We Already Know about Denizen Enfranchisement and What Should We Learn About It? The form of participation par excellence in democracies—voting and standing as candidate—has been traditionally an exclusive privilege of citizens and it remains so in most of the world. Yet more and more countries have extended voting rights to noncitizens. Why do denizen enfranchisement reforms vary so much among democracies that confront the same normative dilemma with regard to the inclusion of settled immigrant populations? The following pages constitute the first steps in the quest for an explanation. First, I demarcate the phenomenon of denizen enfranchisement at large, and then I examine its patterns comparatively and show, now from an empirical angle, why we should study it from a process perspective.

The Big Picture of Denizen Enfranchisement Figure 2 presents the occurrence of formal debates on denizen enfranchisement (those that took place in parliaments), including failed attempts, in the world. It includes democratic and non-democratic polities of different levels, as well as countries with high or low proportions of immigrant population.1 There have been ninety-four such debates in sixty-one countries from 1945 until 2015. Figure 2 also displays the most important varieties of denizen enfranchisement, divided by thin pointed vertical lines, away

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Figure 2. Debates and different levels of denizen enfranchisement across countries, 1945–2015. Own elaboration based on author’s data set on debates on foreign residents’ enfranchisement 1945 to 2015 in all countries, see Appendix. For EU countries after 1993, this refers to “third-country nationals.”

56 Chapter 2

from the timeline in the center: (1) the countries that are known to have discussed it or are discussing it since the marked year but where a proposal has not passed (or become policy) appear just above the timeline, (2) polities that held parliamentary debates on denizen enfranchisement but where a reform process did not materialize; (3) polities that enfranchised only some migrants (e.g., from some countries only, be it on reciprocity grounds or because only denizens of certain nationalities were enfranchised) at the local level; (4) polities that enfranchised some denizens at the regional level; (5) polities that enfranchised all denizens (universal enfranchisement) at the local level, and (6) polities that enfranchised all denizens at the national level. Figuring out why these variations exist in our universe of cases (from now on, the cases that are above the timeline) constitutes the greatest challenge of this book. Where have denizens acquired the right to vote? The answer requires several distinctions. Today, only five nation-states in the world—Uruguay, New Zealand, Chile, Malawi and Ecuador—have granted full political rights to all denizens at all levels. Clearly, these reforms are exceptional; the rest limited enfranchisement at the local level or to a group of denizens, or both. Usually proposals to extend voting rights to denizens at the national level are put aside with arguments that the political competence, and loyalty of foreign residents are not to be trusted to vote at that level, or that they might lack the supposed long term commitment that national citizens are supposed to have. Something similar occurs with the restriction of the denizen franchise to a group of denizens, usually a group that is construed as closer culturally or historically to the native majority. In particular, the enfranchisement of co-ethnics and based on reciprocity2 has restricted denizen enfranchisement to a subset of the denizen population in many countries. From a normative standpoint, consequentialist readings that prioritize democratic governance can justify such restricted reforms as long as they are explicitly conceived as part of a stepwise process, the goal of which is universal enfranchisement.3 A temporary restriction to the presumably “better-known” denizens might be needed to preserve and construct trust in a polity, especially since a rapid and sudden extension of the franchise to all denizens may threaten public trust and order in polities where the proportion of denizens is high and where their social integration cannot be taken for granted. Even if cultural identity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a successful construction of a community, and if some communities might be bound together by constitutional values

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more than cultural commonalities such as shared language, religion, or ethnicity, it is plausible to think that such communalities facilitate the encounter with migrants and, in turn, their understanding of the resident country’s society and political system. Moreover, these commonalities are often a shortcut to establish trust. In a recent study, Justwan asserts that “for members of the host society, extending voting rights to noncitizens means granting members of an ‘out-group’ direct influence on their own lives [which] requires a ‘leap of faith’ that is only possible at higher levels of generalized trust” (2015: 373). In reality, it is very likely that the perception that a culture is shared with the potentially enfranchised may demobilize the fear that the migrants’ votes would radically change the status quo, as it can be assumed that the chances are higher that the enfranchised will approximate the preferences of the native population. This was the case in Portugal, where proponents warned that a stepwise procedure was the best means to accomplish universal enfranchisement of denizens in the long term. In fact, they argued that the process had properly begun decades earlier when Brazilians, and then European citizens, were successively enfranchised. In Belgium, too, EU citizens were enfranchised, sealing an explicit compromise between parties to make legal room for universal denizen enfranchisement after a certain period. Stepwise enfranchisement, often beginning with some groups that are perceived to be closer (in different senses), is thus not only a choice to protect stability and gradually develop trust in the new, larger electorate,4 which usually is in the interest of majority parties, but also to prevent backlashes against the reform, which is in the interest of proposing, even if minor, parties. Denizen Enfranchisement in Relevant and Nonrelevant Cases

The first step in surveying the variety of denizen enfranchisement cases across space and time requires defining what counts as a case. This step is crucial in any effort of theory development for a new phenomenon because it delineates the extent to which research findings on any particular case can be projected onto others. I follow James Mahoney and Gary Goertz’s “possibility principle” (2004), according to which, drawing the boundary between relevant and irrelevant cases is more important than drawing the boundary between negative (cases where the phenomenon of interest does not occur, despite the conditions hypothesized to be relevant) and positive

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cases (cases where it does). Figure 2 shows all the positive cases, both relevant and irrelevant, to illustrate the breadth of denizen enfranchisement in the world; according to the possibility principle, however, the universe of relevant cases is defined by the research interest, which in this book is to explore the dilemmas created by denizenship in liberal democracies and their solutions compared to traditional reforms of access to nationality.5 Thus, the relevant cases are also those in which denizen enfranchisement at least has the chance to come up in a formal parliamentary discussion—that is, where democratic governments are in place—and where potential addressees for enfranchisement—such as migrants—exist.6 I call these scope conditions.7 Although the number of democracies that have discussed the extension of voting rights tops ninety, the scope conditions reduce my universe of cases to sixty-three democracies with high proportions of resident migrants. Taking regime and migrant population as scope conditions means that the results of my study cannot be generalized to the universe of ninety-four countries (and, if we consider the subnational level as polities, as well, a number that is well over one hundred) that have enfranchised immigrants. There are countries of dubious democratic credentials and also countries that have negative migration rates that have done so (mainly in Africa, the Caribbean, Latin America, and Asia).8 This delimitation allows us to develop an account that addresses exactly why denizen enfranchisement succeeds or fails in cases that share the same normative commitments on the one hand, and pressing circumstances, on the other. Thus, the placement of the timeline in the center of Figure 2 serves a purpose: While I present a visualization of the phenomenon in the world, the timeline makes a clear division of the cases that interest me. On the left side of it are the relevant cases, which are heavily concentrated between 1975 and 2005. On the right side of it, there is a concentration of cases between 1990 and 2005. Before moving on to the relevant cases, let us look briefly at the cases on the right. From all the polities that have discussed and/or passed denizenenfranchising reforms in the Western world, fifty-two (55 percent) correspond to democracies with high proportions of denizens. It is not easy to draw insights from the remaining 45 percent on the right side, but with almost no relevant population to benefit from enfranchisement, we can hypothesize that they have introduced it mostly as a symbolic measure with different possible purposes. In some of these countries, denizen enfranchisement may be connected to enfranchising reforms in other countries

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with a common cultural heritage or former colonial ties, either through the legal mechanism of legal reciprocity or through a political one, such as giving a response to (or providing stimulus for) reforms that will benefit their own emigrant population resident in those countries. I will illustrate that the legal mechanism was at work in Portugal, the response to a previous reform in a colonial metropolis was at work in Cape Verde, and, as I will illustrate in Chapter 6, the expected reciprocity was present in the Republic of Korea. A similar logic applied in five Latin American countries that enfranchised denizens after Spain enfranchised denizens exclusively on the basis of reciprocity agreements (not in Uruguay, which, as a world pioneer, enfranchised denizens since 1952). The remaining number in (and biggest proportion of) the cases shown on the right side of the timeline is constituted by very small countries that belong to the Commonwealth of Nations and that responded to the reciprocity-based denizen enfranchisement introduced in the United Kingdom: Most of them restricted this electoral reform to citizens of the Commonwealth and Ireland, and, even then, to local-level elections. If we now look at the enfranchisement of all resident immigrants (universal enfranchisement) at the local level in countries on the right side of the timeline, it may have served as a token of willingness to follow the dictates of regional integration, and therefore to boost the chances of aspiring countries to be accepted in the region. In an effort to outperform EU accession demands, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, and Bulgaria extended local voting rights not only to EU citizens but also to all resident migrants after a certain period of legal residence and with different additional conditions. Far from being detrimental to the conclusions that can be drawn from the study of relevant cases, differentiating relevant from irrelevant cases (merely for the purpose of this study) helps us to focus the research question and separate it from the more general question of why denizen enfranchisement happens, which, in all likelihood, would lead us to a heap of possible explanations suggested above for all the cases on the right side of Figure 2.9 This figure is the only one in the book that relaxes the scope conditions and includes non-democracies and countries with low (or even negative) proportions of immigrants that have enfranchised denizens. It is important to present the breadth of the phenomenon of denizen enfranchisement in the world, but from now onward we will focus on the relevant cases only.

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The Relevant Cases

One observation to make about the polities on the right side of Figure 2 is that the Nordic countries appear to be following each other over time. Sweden was the pioneer. Its neighbors followed later, moving stepwise to universal denizen enfranchisement, after testing for a couple of years a franchise restricted to Nordic resident immigrants only. We also see that Canada and the United States seem to be “on the move” since the 2000s, discussing enfranchisement in subnational polities time and again. In the United States, the discussion has appeared not at the national level, but only in a few cities with a high proportion of migrants and in the northeastern states. In the District of Columbia, where one in eight residents is foreign, the city council once again debated in 2017 letting permanent residents vote in elections for mayor, city council, attorney general, and State Board of Education members (Bennett 2017). Puerto Rico’s governor attempted in 2015 to propose a similar bill to allow noncitizen residents to vote in island-wide elections, which would be important for hundreds of thousands of Dominicans who are estimated to live there (Lee 2015). Chicago, San Francisco, and New York City (NYC) have had debates about enfranchisement since 2005, with NYC being the latest and having had the most attempts so far to allow noncitizens resident for at least six months to vote. The issue keeps arising locally, and it is most aptly brought forward by representatives who experience the frustration of many denizens for being excluded from voting even for decisions on the most basic local services, and see this linked to the need to counter a general civic disengagement in their communities. The council member who proposed it last in NYC, Daniel Dromm, represents a district where noncitizens make up half of the population. He argues that “[it] would make communities like mine more important to city-wide and state officials. We can’t ignore them if they can vote” (cited in Tharoor 2015). Third, and closely connected to the previous observations, it seems that enfranchisement decisions get to be reappraised if they are not successful at the first reform attempt—that is, the issue can be reopened or enlarged after a restrictive or negative decision. Belgium had at least two failed attempts at a reform before it succeeded in 2004. In France, Italy, Austria, and Germany, there have been various attempts at different levels. In France, it has been repeatedly discussed, but it failed in the Senate, the approval of which is needed for constitutional reform. Senators have voted against it on the grounds that the five years of residence condition in the

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defeated bills is the same residence period required to apply for naturalization, so it is preferable that denizens acquire voting rights through that path. In Luxembourg, where all denizens can already vote in local-level elections (since 2003), citizens decided in June 2015 through a referendum that the foreigners who have resided for over ten years in the country and who have voted at least once in municipal elections (these were the conditions under which they would have been enfranchised) cannot vote in legislative elections at the national level. The proposal had been made by the prime minister in terms of updating the demos to meet the political and social life of a country where 46 percent of the resident population is foreign. Business leaders and the liberal party in government had supported it, while conservatives now in the opposition, notably today’s European Commission’s president, Jean-Claude Juncker, rejected it—together with 80 percent of Luxembourg’s citizens. Fourth, and following the same line of the previous observations, Figure 2 suggests that reforms that focus on one subset of denizens are unsustainable over time. Indeed, Nordic countries, Ireland, the Netherlands, and New Zealand illustrate the successive opening of the franchise from reciprocity or from the focus on one group of migrants (again, regularly groups with which a strong cultural, geographical, or former colonial relationship exists) to denizens of any nationality. The case of Portugal is particularly telling: More than four reforms from 1971 until 1997 moved it along the continuum of denizen enfranchisement based on reciprocity and addressing some groups only, with each reform enlarging the number of people covered by that notion bit by bit. In Portugal as much as in Spain,10 there is a debate among the interested public on whether it makes sense to retain the reciprocity rule. Regions Propelling Denizen Enfranchisement: Europe at the Forefront?

Although it is tempting to infer from a transnational similarity of public policy that a transnational explanation must be at work, this might be methodologically misleading. Still, the postnationalist literature may have a point when it highlights how noncitizen voting—a highly innovative policy—has appeared in the last forty years in particular regions. Looking for broad similarities in our universe of relevant cases, it is easy to grasp that, within the Western world, enfranchisement of denizens is clearly preeminent in Europe, precisely where a subset of resident immigrants, EU nationals, can vote in

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municipal and European Parliament (EP) elections wherever they live within the EU.11 However, these voting rights are out of reach for millions of migrants coming from non-European countries, the so-called thirdcountry nationals, who are enfranchised in only seventeen countries in the EU. Although the EP has advocated voting rights at the local level for all foreign residents and the facilitation of dual nationality since 1996 (Geyer 2007: 3),12 the hope that these rights would be established as norms in the integration process to the degree that voting rights for third-country nationals would become a reality that should apply in all countries of the EU has not been realized (Benhabib 1999: 716). On the contrary, the approach to third-country nationals remains deeply politicized and zealously guarded by EU member countries as a “last bastion of sovereignty” (Lavenex 2006). In its 2003 Communication on immigration, integration, and employment, the EP again proposed the extension of local voting rights to third-country nationals within the framework of an inclusive “civic citizenship.” Later, the European Commission’s “Handbook on Integration for Policy Makers and Practitioners” advocated political rights for all residents, at least at the local level (Geyer 2007: 4–6). In 2007, the European Economic and Social Committee stated that “citizenship rights and the right to vote in municipal elections must be guaranteed for third-country nationals who are stable long-term residents.”13 Since these soft law instruments in place have had little effect so far, the EU tries to support harmonization of political rights for immigrants across the member countries and raise awareness of the need to democratically include immigrants by supporting local civil society initiatives that attempt to change the consciousness of citizens especially in the immigrant-strong countries that are lagging behind: Germany, France, Italy, and even the United Kingdom, where enfranchisement has only reached Commonwealth citizens.14 Latin America is the next region where most cases concentrate, mostly in South America. 15 In fact, the eleven cases there exhaust the whole spectrum of variation that characterizes noncitizen enfranchisement in the world. Despite such variation, there is something notable about denizen enfranchisement in that region: As compared to the noncitizenenfranchising reforms in the world, half of which restrict voting rights to only a subgroup of migrants, in South America, enfranchisement reforms are universal, with only one country (Brazil) anchoring noncitizen franchise to a strict reciprocity principle. More interesting, the oldest cases of noncitizen enfranchisement by a national authority in the world are in this

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region: Chile (1925) and Uruguay (1952). In Uruguay, the constitution not only recognized the right of foreign residents to vote but also the right for them to be elected to regional parliaments (although the residence requirement is also the highest in the world at fifteen years). Furthermore, in Latin America, most of the existing several subregional projects, from the ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra Ame´rica [Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America]) to Mercosur (Mercado Comu´n del Sur [Common South Market]) include initiatives to create some form of a common political citizenship (e.g., Declaracio´n de Brasilia hacia una ciudadanı´a sudamericana [Brasilia Declaration Toward a South-American Citizenship] or the Parlamento Andino [Andean Parliament]) on top of the establishment of free movement across four countries of Central America through the CA-4 agreement, composed of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (Convenio Centroamericano de libre movilidad [Central America-4 Free Mobility Agreement]) and even of the right of residence anywhere within the space of Mercosur for nationals of Mercosur countries (for important differences with regard to EU citizenship and residence, see the work of Brumat 2015). However, none of these approximations to a regional citizenship has claimed explicitly the goal of extending voting rights in the receiving polity to resident immigrants. So far, each country that has enfranchised immigrants in South America appears to have done so driven by domestic forces. The populations of immigrants in Latin America are low, which suggests that these reforms could have come from democratizing periods and from searching coherence with citizenship and franchise policies designed for their emigrants, which are even more common in that region (see Pedroza, Palop, and Hoffmann 2016). With an insignificant population to benefit from the reform, even attempts at a broadly-conceived reciprocity might have been at play in the denizen enfranchisement reforms in this region, namely the willingness to join a general trend that will put pressure toward similar reforms in all countries, especially if their emigrants are likely to benefit as residents in countries that enfranchise all immigrant residents. Other regions of the world have few positive cases. In Asia, so far only one country, South Korea, has enfranchised denizens. In 2005, noncitizen foreign residents were granted voting rights at local and regional levels (chibangso˘n’go˘).16 The South Korean case is not only astonishing within the context of the rest of the cases in the world, but because its nationality regime made it an unlikely champion of this cause. Like Germany, Austria,

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and Japan, South Korea has been typically characterized as having an ethnonationalist understanding of citizenship (Brubaker 2011; Shin 2005, 2006; Shin, Freda, and Yi 1999), and it barely had a population of migrants to address: the proportion of migrants has not surpassed 2.7 percent even at its recent peak (UN 2017). Without explicitly anchoring the reform on reciprocity, the requirements that were imprinted onto the denizen franchise keep a nominally generous enfranchisement applicable to just a few thousand selected migrants: those over nineteen years of age, registered as residents for over three years in South Korea, and in possession of a special visa (F-5).17 If we look at the supranational level, for supporting evidence of international diffusion of denizen enfranchisement, it seems that international treaties are ambiguous and feeble in terms of formal obligations and enforceable rules when it comes to determining how to integrate immigrants politically: While the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (signed in 1966; in force since 1976) has 172 parties, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (signed in 1990, in force since 2003), which should reinforce the nondiscrimination of migrants, has only fifty-three parties as of 2018—mostly countries in the “global South.” The conventions that are closest to explicitly stating that migrants should have political rights in the countries of residence are the Council of Europe Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level, which entered into force in 1997 and includes local franchise for all foreign nationals after five years of residence but has been ratified by only five states. Recommendation 1500 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed in 2001, and the Additional Protocol to the European Charter of Local Self-Government on the right to participate in the affairs of a local authority, has been ratified by only eight member states as of 2017. Still, at the level of discourse, these international instruments have an effect through “setting norms, framing discourses, engineering legal categories and legitimating models . . . They define goals and levels of competences and compel nation states to achieve certain standards” (Soysal, 2007: 149). Also, as Baubo¨ck (2005) contends, these endorsements by increasing numbers of international bodies demonstrate that the practice of extending voting rights to noncitizens can no longer be regarded as an irregularity at odds with the international community’s concept of citizenship. Again in 2015, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed Resolution 2043, stating that “unless the migrants and local residents

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of all backgrounds are given the right to vote, at least in local elections, the process of integration will remain incomplete,” and recommended a maximum period of residence of five years as a standard requirement to get passive and active local voting rights (para. 2, and 9.1.2).

Configurations of Denizen Franchise and Access to Citizenship-as-Nationality With a definite universe of cases, the next step is to order the cases within it. We will start with the obvious: All debates to enfranchise denizens in democracies begin as proposals, but the literature so far seems to assume that all these proposals necessarily begin by posing the issue of voting rights—passive or active, at any level—in relation to the acquisition of nationality. In case studies, some assumptions are made to explain why, depending on the legal rules for ordinary naturalization, enfranchisement succeeds or does not succeed. It is now time to examine whether these assumptions make sense, and the best way to do this is to analyze them within a comparative framework, yet close enough to the cases.18 A simple crisp sets qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) serves this purpose in three ways (Ragin 2000: 14): First, it presents all the relevant cases parsimoniously to assess the necessity and sufficiency of conditions presumed by the literature to be decisive in leading to an outcome; second, it assesses the relationship between naturalization rules and stages and types of denizen enfranchisement; and third, it shows how decisive one combination is among the possible combinations that lead to an outcome. This analysis helps to order the universe of cases according to variables derived from theoretical insights and from their empirical combinations. Here in particular, it will give us basic classifications of the ease of ordinary naturalization procedures and the existence of a preferential naturalization path for some migrants,19 as well as a fundamental understanding of the different stages and types that differentiate denizen enfranchisement processes (the unit of analysis here).20 I will propose that we conceive of denizen enfranchisement processes as composed by levels of reform success (debated, passed, implemented), and that we differentiate whether it is universal in how it benefits immigrant residents or if it only benefits a subset of migrants. The use of QCA here is simple,

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but important to reveal the configurations of main conditions in our universe of (relevant) cases, as well as to select cases in a way that allows us to track what each case shares with others; in other words, it helps us understand what typical cases may look like in order to, thereafter, engage in exploratory research to address the deviant cases which existing theories struggle to explain. The technical details of the coding involved and more complex and detailed analyses can be found in the Appendix (Tables A.1, A.4, and A.5). Here, Table 2 presents the findings in a concise form.21 Table 2 deals with a first necessary step of denizen enfranchisement: parliamentary debates on it, in different levels. It shows something that is perhaps obvious, but that has not been dealt with systematically before: Debates at the subnational level occur only in federal countries with varying degrees of subnational competence to develop autonomous electoral laws and policies22 contesting the uniformity of the electorate within one territorial-national unit. Canada, Germany, and Austria may appear in more than one cell because they include either reforms of one kind that are in place in some subnational units, with a reform of another kind being discussed in other subnational units, as in Canada, or differing outcomes of national and subnational debates, as in Austria and Germany. In Canada, electoral rights for some groups of migrants (British subjects) exist in Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan. In turn, Toronto has repeatedly held debates on enfranchising all its foreign residents (see Triadafilopoulos 2010). In Germany, some subnational debates succeeded and others did not—some were grounded in reciprocity, while others were universal; in addition, there are national debates that so far have failed. In Austria, Vienna held a debate and passed an enfranchising reform in 2004 only to see it vetoed later by the Constitutional Court. The Relationship Between Naturalization and Voting Rights

Table 2 addresses the assumptions of the literature discussed earlier between naturalization ease and denizen enfranchisement and shows that if we leave the terrain of case studies and see the combinations of denizen enfranchisement in a wider comparative perspective, there is no clear relation between the two. Any attempt to construct types from those combinations is frustrated by the fact that there is no single straightforward solution among the outcomes analyzed (different stages of denizen enfranchisement, from a debate, to a passed reform, and different types of denizen franchise: universal or restricted to a particular group of resident immigrants) because

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Table 2. csQCA Truth Table Types of cases

Easy ordinary naturalization for all

National NLD, BEL, debates/reforms FRA, IRL, UX

Subnational reforms

USA, CAN, ARG

Contradictory Debated outcome enfranchisement formally Yes No N  33 NLD, PAN. BEL, LUX, FRA, IRE, USA, CAN, ARG

Contradictory Passed an outcome enfranchisement reform Yes No NLD, FRA BEL, IRL, LUX, CAN, PAN, USA, ARG Debate/reform was on universal enfranchisement (no group differentiations made)

Yes NLD, BEL, IRL, LUX, ARG, FRA, USA, CAN

Difficult ordinary naturalization for all FIN, ITA, EST, LVA, LTU, SVK, SVN, VEN, SMR, HUN

Difficult Easy naturalization, naturalization, but easier for but easier for some groups some groups CRI, ESP, NOR, DNK, DEU

SWE, NZL, POR, GBR, BLZ

CHE, AUT Contradictory outcome Yes FIN, ITA, EST, LTU, SVK, SVN, ISL, VEN, HUN, CHE

No LVA, AUT.

Contradictory outcome Yes FIN, EST, HUN, LTU, SLV, SLK, ISL, VEN, CHE

No AUT, ITA, LTV

Yes FIN, ISL, SLK, SLV, ITA, EST, LTU, VEN, HUN, CHE

Solution

AUS Contradictory outcome Yes ESP, NOR, DNK

No CR, Ger, Ger.

Yes SWE, NZL, POR, GBR, BLZ, AUS

Contradictory outcome Yes DNK, ESP, NOR, DEU

No DEU

Yes SWE, NZL, POR, GBR, BLZ, AUS

Contradictory Contradictory outcome outcome Yes No DNK, DEU NOR, ESP, DEU

Yes SWE, NZL

No POR, GBR, BEL, AUS

Debates occur in countries with easy naturalization, but easier for some.

Reforms pass in cases of easy naturalization, but easier for some.

Universal franchise is discussed where naturalization is easy for all.

Note: Country abbreviations correspond to the three-letter codes of the United Nations; I use italics to highlight that the case is a subnational polity within that countries which debated or passed an enfranchisement reform.

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for each solution, there is at least one case that contradicts others within the same combination of conditions including whether there is an easier naturalization for some groups of migrants. There are ways to solve such “problems in the data” in QCA, but they all involve taking arbitrary decisions that force an outcome that did not really occur, or they exclude the cases that contradict the majority. There is already a degree of simplification in csQCA (i.e., dichotomization)23 for the sake of cross-case comparison, so instead of forcing reality into neat results, it is better to take it as it is—complex—and interpret rigorously what “the problem with the data” actually means in terms of the theoretical expectations. Here, the fact that contradictions plague the analysis suggests that naturalization rules are only a partial component in the comparative story of denizen enfranchisement, the role of which has to be assessed in more detail. The exercise with QCA serves us further in that it simplifies the task of constructing a property space to locate relevant cases in their actual combinations across countries.24 In qualitative research, a property space shows cases’ relation to each other: It reveals which different combinations have the same outcome (equifinality), and which same combinations of conditions have had different outcomes (multifinality). This, in turn, allows us to single out cases that are especially important to study in order to develop or correct a theory (which makes sense here rather than only focusing on the relations of sufficiency to the outcome) (see Bennett and Elman 2006a: 465). Figure 3 illustrates the property space by dividing the population of countries analyzed into four concentric circles according to the stages and kinds of denizen enfranchisement and their qualities. Figure 3 only reveals a snapshot of combinations, not a process. Dynamics can be suggested only in this graph. This is clear in the double mention of Germany, which refers to two points in time: some subnational debates successfully passed legislation that enfranchised noncitizen residents first, and a later federal judicial instance deciding on top of the subnational polities just before the first of those reforms could be implemented in a local election. Process-tracing with focused comparisons is what we need next to solve the puzzles of contradictory combinations (Hall 2006: 385), to provide an analysis of the stages of denizen enfranchisement (important to understand its sequences and interactions), and overall, to correct the lack of “dynamics” of this diagram. Enfranchisement seems like a process that can get stuck, have setbacks and, as we have seen earlier, that can successively enlarge its scope. Is enfranchisement a process that cannot be stopped after a certain juncture

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Easy naturalization rules

Difficult naturalization rules

Italy, Estonia Latvia, San Marino

Panama

No preferential naturalization rules

Canada Austria

Lithuania, Finland, Hungary, Venezuela, Slovakia, Iceland, Slovenia, Switzerland Denmark, Spain, Norway, Iceland

France

Portugal, UK, N. Zealand, Belize Australia

Preferential naturalization for some

Germany

Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Belize, Argentina, USA

Germany Costa Rica

Figure 3. Property space. The figure contains a large sample of democracies that have discussed denizen franchise, and a few that, though relevant, have not (the latter outside the circles) according to their naturalization rules. The biggest and lightest circle contains all cases of discussion, leaving out cases of nondiscussion. The next smaller circle contains cases of discussion where the enfranchisement reform succeeded or failed. The next smaller circle contains passed reforms, which were later aborted (excluding cases where enfranchisement discussions failed). The last, darkest, circle contains cases where enfranchisement succeeded and has been implemented. Within the circles a qualitative distinction is made: whether it was a national or a subnational reform (the latter appear in italics).

is reached? This question invites us to make a brief digression to reflect on enfranchisement and disenfranchisement. Disenfranchisement is rare in democracies; however, episodes of disenfranchisement have accompanied democracies since their origins. Hirsch Ballin has noted that the rights granted in 1789 in many European states,

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following the French example, were partially rescinded in 1814–1815 upon the restoration of European monarchies. But the genie was out of the bottle: A full return to the old feudal system was inconceivable and, in 1848, revolutionary movements in large parts of Europe enshrined fundamental rights more firmly in the constitutions (2014: 10). In the universe of cases, as well as in the analyses, Australia appears as a polity where reforms have only happened at the subnational level. This is actually the result of a disenfranchisement process. Before 1981, British subjects could vote at the local level anywhere in Australia. Eligibility to enroll and vote was based on a combination of British subject status and a minimum Australian residence qualification of six months. Today this is not possible, yet there are some British subjects living permanently in Australia, who are not Australian citizens, who are eligible to vote in federal elections and referendums: those registered in a federal electoral division before 1984. This is because when the parliament at federal and the state levels passed legislative reforms requiring Australian citizenship to have the right to vote, it was considered unfair to disenfranchise British subjects who were already enrolled and entitled to vote. Consequently, those who were already enrolled at the date of transition were able to retain their franchise. In addition, some states retained some very local forms of noncitizen resident franchise with special requisites of ownership in the locality. Even when democracies experience disenfranchisements as consequence of nondemocratic takeovers or state takeover of their former sovereignty, some restricted forms of noncitizen franchise may survive, as the cases of Hong Kong and Macau illustrate. While Hong Kong was under British control, for example, noncitizen permanent residents had passive and active electoral rights. With devolution to China, Hong Kong became a special administrative region and fought to preserve its electoral governance regulations, including the provision that “permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have the right to vote and the right to stand for election in accordance with law” (Art. 26 of the Hong Kong Basic Law). Ji Pengfei (chairman of the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China) fiercely defended this through the negotiations of the devolution, saying that it provided “multi-level protection for Hong Kong residents’ rights and freedoms.”25 Disenfranchisement is perhaps much more dangerous when it is powered from within. In Myanmar, until recently, the Rohingya26 and other

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stateless minority populations—such as Myanmar-born ethnic Chinese and Indians—had ID cards that allowed them to vote on two occasions. Allegedly, the ruling government—a military junta—has given and rescinded these ID cards and voting rights at will over the last three decades. In 2015, disenfranchisement became definitive, powered by protests of nationalist Buddhist monks across the country, with successive decisions by the Burmese Parliament and the president, to rescind those cards that had allowed noncitizens to vote and give them cards of a different color (Pedroza 2015). The most infamous episode of disenfranchisement, how Germany in the 1930s rescinded the citizen rights of its Jewish citizens one step at a time until it stripped them of the very status of citizenship, needs only a passing mention to understand that the downward slope from disenfranchisement to horrific crimes against former citizens can be steep. The relationship between regime type and enfranchisement/disenfranchisement is not always so clear, however. The United States constitutes the best-known case of disenfranchisement of noncitizen residents in a democracy. It suggests that political interests represented through democratic processes are not safeguarded from stark swings if values and norms of majorities express a discontent with the vote of a particular group, even in the face of generous jus soli access to citizenship, and inclusive citizenship traditions. In forty states and federal territories, residents who were not citizens could vote in local, state, and sometimes federal elections from the founding of the republic until a wave of anti-immigrant protests changed this in the 1920s (Hayduk 2006; Schuck 1989). Still, the disenfranchisement of denizens was not a single, sudden decision but a stepwise rollback, with no locks that would prevent a re-enfranchisement: The U.S. Constitution does not require citizenship in order to vote; this decision is left to the states, which is why several counties in Illinois and Maryland allow noncitizens to vote in school-board elections and for local councils, and why several other local councils are discussing denizen enfranchisement today. Coming back to our cross-case quest to understand why and how denizen enfranchisement appears, it seems that assumptions about its being a function of naturalization ease, which were supported so far by looking at only some cases of this phenomenon, are simply implausible when one takes a wide comparative perspective. A change toward less simplifying assumptions is commendable because there is potentially a variety of norms that intervene in decisions regarding denizen franchise in liberal democracies, in addition to what is supposed to be the political elite or the majority

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or the constitutional expert’s opinion on its relation to naturalization. Although there is a relationship in discourse and in practice between naturalization regimes and denizen enfranchisement, it is a complex one. The configurational exercise with minimal conditions conducted here confirms what I advanced theoretically in Chapter 1: We must look beyond naturalization rules. In fact, all empirical observations—case and comparative—in this chapter signal the importance of researching the process behind denizen enfranchisements: Is it such a resilient issue that even the failure of proposals in national debates or the restrictive victories get to be reassessed and survive in political discussions? Is the passing of a reform that favors one group only a partial concession to generate public trust in a path set to universal enfranchisement? The claim to pay attention to processes involves developing an understanding of the working of political systems and of what is required to bring forward reforms like this, depending on the requirements that the system itself imposes for a successful reform, on how ingrained it is in definitions of who the people are in constitutional texts, on whether a constitutional reform is needed, and so on. As the U.S. example shows, disenfranchisement of noncitizens can occur in a democracy if the political scenario shifts strongly toward nationalism. But the issue can reawaken. Either way, such reversals are possible, but in a democracy they require careful justification. Making enfranchisement possible usually requires substantial changes to the organization of elections: from distinguishing between citizen voters and noncitizen voters as to allow enfranchisement of the latter only for some levels, separating elections that were previously held concurrently, possibly creating a new ballot and different voting IDs, designing new verification mechanisms at the polls, to training bureaucrats and poll officers on how to identify and register the potential new pool of voters. Especially in federal countries, a denizen enfranchisement reform even for local elections may require a clarification of electoral reform competencies in the federal pact. In this light, the repeated debates and stepwise reforms in many polities (states and subnational) shown in Figure 2 should not come as a surprise: Several steps need to be taken in a single polity before achieving a successful denizen enfranchisement reform. In short, denizen enfranchisement very likely poses a scenario where the question “What is citizenship?” can receive widely different answers and the naturalization regime is likely to be of weight in considering denizen

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enfranchisement, but it is unlikely to constitute the whole story of why some countries decide for it or not. Altogether, the analyses carried out call for a better explanation of how conditions and outcome in enfranchisement processes relate to each other. A process analysis can help us elaborate on that and clarify whether what we are missing is the sequencing of conditions (which also means timing) or altogether different conditions (as suggested by the non-sufficiency of the minimal conditions of naturalization rules to explain it). Evidently, we have paths to discover, but we must first choose a point of departure. Agreeing with Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman that both the ontology and the choice of method to study phenomena in social science are affected by our own beliefs about “how the social world is made and how it operates” (2006a: 456) I want to acknowledge how classics of social constructivism (Berger and Luckmann 1991) inspire my process approach.

Developing a Process Account: Assumptions, Purpose, and Method Assumptions for a Process Perspective

Process accounts rely on general assumptions about the world, be they highly theoretical (nomothetic laws) or pre-theoretical (common-sense assumptions of how the world works) (Gerring 2009, 181). My assumptions stand in between, on the basis of the theoretical and empirical comparative work I have presented so far. The first assumption is that issues of citizenship are a matter of politics and policy, resulting from decision-making developments where multiple interpretations of the social world are heard, which are more than deductions from national traditions simply applied to problems, and more than the embrace (or contagion) of emerging norms that transcend borders. The issue of how democracies understand the rights connected to residency and how, in contrast, they define “belonging” to the political community must be a key question to understand how denizen enfranchisement has appeared as an option with regard to naturalization. The second is that, for elected politicians, enfranchisement debates tend to be hard to raise and controversial, even if franchise is limited to the local level, because enfranchisement entails giving denizens entry and currency in a “political market” that elected them, so far exclusively composed of

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nationals. Whether we want to conceive of elections as a market or not, they constitute the ultimate form of participation in democracies, and thus carry value in terms of citizenship practice: Enfranchisement entails making such a practice less of a privilege reserved to nationals. To begin with, depending on the perceived allegiances of the immigrant population, some parties will welcome this new potential electorate, while others will prefer to keep the electorate restricted to their existing citizen clientele. Thus, even enfranchisement proposals may bring anxieties for voters (citizens) and elected politicians alike. The third assumption is that enfranchisement debates exist within certain institutional confines that limit the terms available in political discourse to redefine who is subject to certain rights and entitlements in a polity. This comes very close to discursive approaches—for example, Schmidt (2008)—that consider that agency, institutional order, and historicity while making sense of terms, categories, and framing in politics and policies. These assumptions serve as standards of validity for my process account: If the latter is valid, evidence should not contradict the former. Assumptions are not hypotheses, but rather common-sense statements we take for granted in order to develop hypotheses on causal links and micromechanisms that are still unknowns and are interesting to investigate. Following the first assumption, I pay close attention to how denizen enfranchisement is defined—especially in its relation to traditions of naturalization and residence—and where the proposal comes from. In line with the second, I will focus on how parties position themselves regarding the issue and, consequently, which negotiations and compromises are needed to pass a reform. In line with the third, I will consider nationality laws, migration policies, and trajectories of political parties as the larger institutional context from which actors draw their discursive resources. My next step is to dig deeper into some of these processes. In Chapter 1, I discarded explanations that did not work even for a small selection of well-studied cases. In this chapter, I added complexity by glancing at the whole universe of cases, discovering the different stages and kinds of outcomes in enfranchisement processes. We are now set to compare and examine cases more meticulously, not for the sake of just adding another level of comparison (see Przeworski 1987), but to understand why reforms take such different outcomes in democracies with similar normative dilemmas and commitments.

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A Contextual, Interpretive, Comparative Method

Case-study accounts usually present causes not as competitors but as raw ingredients that combine into a narrative that explains the outcomes under study. Knowing that their primary objective is not to test theories so much as to elaborate them (Bennett 2004; Bennett and Elman 2006b; Gerring 2009), I want to develop two case studies from a selection informed by the broad comparisons performed in this chapter. By specifying what makes them special and what they share with other cases in the larger categories where they were chosen from, we will be able to relate them to those categories (George 1979).27 My aim after the case studies is to assemble a focused comparison to see how denizen enfranchisement processes operate across cases (Checkel 2005; George and Bennett 2005; Hall 2006). I have argued that denizen enfranchisement is a relevant phenomenon not only because of the number of countries that have discussed, passed, and implemented it, but for what it implies for ideas on citizenship. My larger claim is that denizen enfranchisement is not simply deduced from “national traditions” or drawn from transnational trends but is a policy that responds to political dynamics, which is why we need to look at the processes behind these reforms. Both transnational influences and national traditions are subject to the interpretation of policy makers in prescribing a certain course of action or not, but contextual politics and policy (i.e., migration control, left-right party politics, ethnic and historical cleavages) play a similar, if not larger, role in those decisions. The command that follows in order to include such factors is not only to change levels or units of analysis, but also to change the analytical lens. A Process Theoretical Argument

Imre Lakatos (1970) famously recommended that a theory with strong deductive power not be rejected simply because it is inconsistent with recent observations. Instead, the adequacy of the observations must be weighed against the plausibility of the theory. In my view, both the historical-institutionalist and post-nationalist hypotheses are too vague to be tested at all. Yet, for all the simplifying guises in which it has appeared in citizenship research when authors identify “idioms of nationhood” or “citizenship traditions,” historical institutionalism deserves credit for its theoretical power. Institutions are the products of past political struggles over how the game of politics is to be

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played and by whom. They constrain not only what individuals do, but also what they think is possible to do. Since denizen enfranchisement implies the obliteration of the utmost privilege of national citizens as members of a polity in order to include new voters, one can expect clear positioning from political actors on the very possibility of such reform. Their positions are likely to follow forms of organization that work in the interest of past winners (or, at least, players) and tend to be resilient to change. We can capture those positions by looking at the influence of existing path dependencies in laws (as done predominantly in the literature), as well as in a discursive form, as rhetorical resources and references that could be drawn from “conceptions of citizenship,” trajectories of immigrant policies, and so on. However, to guide ourselves by the analysis of political rhetoric alone could be misleading, as similar rhetorical goals may be supported by quite different means depending on the party pushing for change (see Hansen and Koehler 2005). Although I am particularly interested in the arguments put forward during a decision-making process, it is imperative to observe the policy-formation process itself with its institutions, interactions, and contingencies. As Isaiah Berlin wrote long ago, “political words and notions and acts are not intelligible save in the context of the issues that divide the men who use them” (1969: 121). The post-national hypotheses would seem to be supported by the growth of denizen enfranchisement across the world. Yet, concentrations of cases of enfranchisement in the last thirty years and in some regions of the world are offset by a great heterogeneity in reform success and types of reforms. As the literature on policy convergence and policy diffusion makes clear, it is not enough to say that comparable conditions produce comparable problems, which produce comparable policies: Often, policies adopted by different governments do not fit into the same conceptual categories (Przeworski 1987). To be fair, for Yasemin Soysal, the strongest proponent of the post-national hypothesis, the spread of post-national rights is mediated and enforced by political actors with cross-level agendas and activities, not a monocausal, uniform process. Still, she did not propose a mechanism showing how such mediation and enforcement happen. Rather than counterposing the national and the global levels to “test” these hypotheses, as has been done by some researchers, I think it we can learn more about the phenomenon, and also contribute to their theories if we illuminate the complexity between the multiple levels and interactions of citizenship politics in enfranchisement reforms. A process perspective

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should illuminate to what extent justifications grounded in traditions of citizenship or in international influences are brought into debates on denizen enfranchisement and how that occurs. Theoretical insights from policy studies and discourse analysis will be instrumental in doing so. The former, because we have seen that, despite similar challenges and some similar policy conditions, debates on enfranchisement flare up in some states but not in others. The latter, because it can show how different actors interpret proposals to enfranchise denizens and compare how the arguments of what citizenship means, and its relation to nationality and voting rights, have been advanced in cases where denizen enfranchisement has been discussed and why, despite similar normative commitments and similar migration challenges, democracies respond differently. Thus, within the context of this book, to theorize that process matters amounts to saying that we can find similar scope conditions in several cases and yet that there is a contingent interplay of actors and arguments in an institutional context and time, delimiting the possibility for a reform in a polity. The theoretical level I aim for is a middle-range, because my process account requires adaptation to specific circumstances: I am saying that to understand how denizen enfranchisement is defined as a political issue, the range of arguments about it need to be explored within their context. With regard to historical-institutionalism and post-nationalism, my process account can take two different positions. It may be a mediating explanation of how national traditions, post-national norms, and domestic institutions play a role in defining certain policies and explain both their timing and the variations in quality and level. However, it can also be seen as a third explanatory account that claims preeminence of process over institutions and post-national norms: While institutions are the containers in which politics takes place, the analysis of institutions is not the analysis of process, but only one prerequisite for a meaningful interpretation of how processes differ as determined by arguments and justifications exposed. These are drawn from an institutional context, but also malleable by the interaction of actors and the adoption of new interpretations. If we agree with Schattschneider’s idea that politics is the mobilization of bias, then structural, historical, and institutional confines are important because they support some biases over others. However, these confines are contested, moved, and shaken by politics: Skilled political agents not only build on historical features, they can also restructure them. With regard to

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post-national norms, we have yet to explain how they are translated into different policies by political actors. I strive to develop an account of what is common to different decisionmaking processes and how the choices offered as justifications for enfranchisement make a difference. In this kind of account, the answer to a how question is also an answer to a why. Institutions and Discourses

Since time and context are essential for explorations of processes, my case analyses will include diachronic and synchronic comparisons, and I will use a political discourse analysis toolkit (see Yanow 2006; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Fischer 2003) for the analysis of the cases. This is because a process perspective on denizen enfranchisement requires that we reconstruct how different outcomes came about, and because I aim to narrate cases of enfranchisement as an articulation not only of events, but of arguments, likely to be delineated by their institutional contexts.28 Thus, in the case studies I will observe the following: • The formal rules of the denizen enfranchisement process: These include the balance between different branches of government (presidential, parliamentarian), the vertical distribution of authority between central government and lower levels (unitary or federal), limitations on government authority (e.g., judicial review is often essential, especially where constitutional doctrines regulate citizenship and voting, as in Austria or Germany).29 Are constitutional reforms, consensus, or just a simple majority needed? • The constellation of domestic political actors and their mobilization to spark, accompany, and review the authoritative decision-making process of denizen enfranchisement:30 These include civil society organizations, government and opposition, coalitions, political parties, courts, and administrators. Analyzing the interaction between various types of actors and their arguments along the political process is the key to the reform/policy formation process itself. • General institutional context on migration and access of migrants to nationality: This is relevant because this context is likely to be a reference for arguments. How are migrants treated and referred to? Can they become nationals? Are links made between voting rights for noncitizen residents (immigrants) and for nonresident citizens (emigrants)?

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As to migration “facts,” their relevance as context for a decision depends on what they are meant to signify by relevant actors. As Fischer says, the meaning of facts, events, and issues is what the political struggle is first and foremost about (2003: 61). In order to study the dynamics of a debate, though, we need not dive into politician’s heads in search of their intentions or values.31 It is enough—and far more important—to study how they defend and promote denizen enfranchisement. Sharing deep values of societal insights is not necessary for defending or promoting them: What matters is their orchestration and coordination in arguments that are exposed in debates and the overall political process. To observe this, I use the concept of policy framing. Framing refers to the structuring of perception by focusing on particular elements of the world—that is, a particular frame is used by a politician or a political faction to reveal a standpoint on an issue. An analysis of framing involves looking for patterns in the way political actors put forward particular views on specific issues and how contending frames hamper communication between policy-relevant groups (see Schmidt 2008; Hajer 2005). A tenet of discourse analysis (as a host of different theoretical and metatheoretical perspectives on the social world) is that “language is performative”—that is, language is action, for it not only serves to describe and interpret, but also to constitute social reality—and that all actions, objects, and practices are socially meaningful and shaped by the social and political struggles in specific contexts (Fischer 2003: 74). Beyond this common denominator, discourse analysts part ways in a plethora of philosophical approaches, methods, and levels of analysis. In studying and comparing enfranchisement processes, I am interested in the competing ways of portraying denizen enfranchisement as it relates to citizenship, which I introduced as a multidimensional concept, the dimensions of which only become more tangible when we see what meaning is ascribed to it. As Albert O. Hirschman implied in The Rhetoric of Reaction (2004), the choice between “reactionary” and “progressive” arguments in the history of the rights of citizenship has been first, last, and always ideological. To correct the vagueness to which the literature on denizen enfranchisement has been prone in its observations,32 we need a set of criteria according to which we will observe political discourse on denizen enfranchisement. I focus on denizen enfranchisement across democratic polities because the legitimacy and representation deficit that should be expected to arise by high proportions of denizens originates in a democratic norm, but it is clear

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to me that those who handle, consider, deliberate, and ultimately decide on proposals on denizen enfranchisement are political groups and elites who represent the electing citizens, not the broad unmediated electorate. Thus, I can delineate the sites to observe the arguments made by agents that I assume have a stake regarding denizen enfranchisement: parliamentary debates—essentially, political discourse within the confines of the formal deliberative forum in representative democracies. Although the formal purpose of a parliament is to pass laws, parliamentary debates serve also the purpose of opening up spaces for authoritative reinterpretations and many debates occur in parliaments that have primarily a declarative or even merely expressive purpose. My unit of observation is an argument, not a word.33 Analyzing full arguments allows us to observe whether denizen enfranchisement debates mediate other purposes or are reform aims in themselves, to observe the references they introduce in their justifications for or against reform, as well as their correspondence to what theories on idioms of nationhood or post-national norms suggest. To a considerable extent, I approach discourse analysis the way interpretive policy analysts do: by considering that decision-making processes include the ideas which inform policy conception, the discourse, and work that go into providing the formulation of policy proposals, their negotiation, and their translation into practice (Dierkes 1987; Yanow 2006). However, in contrast to common practice among interpretive policy analysts, I take into account actors and institutional structures in order to understand how selections take place among all existing arguments regarding denizen enfranchisement (Hajer and Laws 2006; Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams 1983).

Case Selection In this chapter, I have demarcated the universe of cases of denizen enfranchisement with its most relevant variations, ordered it according to different empirical outcomes and different theoretically-derived conditions, and have shown that these alone are insufficient to say anything conclusive about its possible outcomes. Building on this, I have proposed more adequate assumptions and scope conditions to study the phenomenon. The next step is to select cases for deeper study. With my process approach, I want to enlighten plausible causal links that may explain variation in denizen enfranchisement processes, but to reach that goal, I need

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to be able to compare the cases chosen, controlling initial conditions and observing the steps that lead those conditions into trajectories. The challenge is that, generally, the “how” of each case is something that researchers construct in their heads and it is difficult to keep track of similarities and differences across cases. Because of this, I select only two cases, but I have the scope conditions in the background (Figure 3): Knowing the categories that they come from allows us to maximize the evidence we gain to contribute to the theories I address and further develop my own.34 I follow a strategy of choosing deviant cases from puzzling combinations to maximize variation in the property space in relation to citizenship traditions and enfranchisement processes. In the literature, there are some well-researched, seemingly representative cases of one type of enfranchisement: universal enfranchisement. A goal of my research is to shed light on the insufficiently explained kinds of cases. Yet, precisely because we would still want to later compare my account to the existing ones, it is important to also take a well-researched case. To the extent that historical-institutionalist theories about selfdefinitions of citizenship can be put into hypotheses amenable to test in case studies, denizen enfranchisement in Germany could be taken not only as deviant, but also as a crucial case, one “that closely fits the theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed” (Eckstein 1975: 118). The German case covers a formidable number of variations of outcome in our property space (Figure 2). For one, it is a negative case in terms of denizen enfranchisement implementation but not of discussion or even of a passed reform. Indeed, Germany is a very problematic case for historicalinstitutionalist theories because, according to its legal traditions, it is a most likely case to reject denizen enfranchisement (Earnest 2006), yet if we look at different levels of the polity (also the federal), we will discover that the issue has not been put down in over three decades. Still, the advantages of choosing the German denizen enfranchisement process go far beyond measuring the explanatory power of historical institutionalism: Because of its federal structure, an analysis of Germany requires looking not only at one national (federal) enfranchisement debate, but at several debates in many La¨nder, some of which became successful reforms with different characteristics. The case became “negative” only after the German Constitutional Court forbade their implementation, ruling them unconstitutional. This particular deviant case can help us refine the causal mechanisms and

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paths that affect more than one type of case and possibly even all instances of a phenomenon (Gerring 2007). Although no case study can disprove a vague theory, a (deductively chosen) deviant case can bring into question the self-confirmatory manner in which historical institutionalism is often interpreted onto cases. It can also lead to new conceptualizations. Still, for all its specificity, it is important to highlight that the German case is not unique or idiosyncratic. On the contrary, over time it has moved in the property space, across kinds of cases: of successful passing of laws that lack implementation; of negative cases; of subnational reforms; of universal and particularistic enfranchisement. The second case I have selected is that of Portugal, a case that deviates from all others for its many distinctions regarding differentiations of migrants: Enfranchisement is not only based on strict reciprocity, but also on the preferential treatment for some migrants creating as many as five electorates. However, Portugal also stands for a population of the lessresearched types of cases of particular denizen enfranchisement (with either difficult or easy naturalization): Preferential characteristics were once common to the Nordic countries to distinguish several electorates, each with different voting rights, including denizens, and reciprocity still characterizes denizen enfranchisement in Spain and the Commonwealth countries. These are important cases to explore substantively for reasons beyond their methodological use in helping us clarify what still begs explanation in the comparative literature on denizen enfranchisement and citizenship. First, both beg a detailed account of their outstanding positions on immigrant integration. Within the specific literature that I review, these two cases are relevant because they provide prototypes of an “ethnocentric” (Germany) and a relatively open, yet highly selective (Portugal) citizenship tradition and practice that would not lead us to expect the relatively open policies they have today with regard to immigrants. Despite their very particular enfranchisement processes and outcomes, both cases are puzzling in a substantive sense: with regard to the mounting immigrant integration challenges that so many democracies face as of 2018, these two countries have proved to be, to this day, the most successful and open democratic polities in admitting refugees (Germany) and in implementing immigrant integration policies (Portugal). Independent of their relevance as cases for the particular theoretical arguments I advance in this book, the contemporary positions of these two countries in that larger sense makes them crucial for anyone interested in immigrant integration policies, outputs, and outcomes.

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Data Collection and Methods of Analysis Some will doubt that parliamentary debates can be taken as proxies for decision-making processes, since many issues are decided in advance (outside of parliaments) or behind closed doors. Indeed, parliamentary discourse has received less attention than the amount of public attention and the kind of media discourse (e.g., how migration is presented and what arguments are put forward) to explain how legislation evolves from initial proposals until final acceptance (Bauder 2008). However, Dirk Jacobs has exceptionally illustrated how parliamentary debates develop with an internal logic of argumentation, and my study of debates is inspired by his remarkable comparative work. There are strong reasons to focus on parliaments. Parliaments have different weights and roles depending on the political system, but three functions are common to all. First, in a democracy, parliamentary debates are legitimating venues for encounters that serve each party to justify a stance towards an issue decision before the public.35 Second, parliamentary debates are a source of public information about politics that contributes to the socialization of citizens—and to elites in particular. As John Stuart Mill put it: “I know not how a representative assembly can more usefully employ itself than in talk, when the subject of talk is the great public interest of the country, and every sentence of it represents the opinion either of some important body of persons in the nation, or of an individual in whom such bodies have reposed their confidence” (Mill 1985: 105). Third, parliamentary debates are the venues par excellence for the aggregation of political preferences as represented by directly-elected representatives and the parties that they belong to. Because of this, they are the organs of authoritative deliberation and legislation on policies that come before them. Even if political decisions are finally made through deliberations outside parliaments, it is often due to the invitation of deliberations that began in them. All in all, the formalities of a legislative process allow parliamentarians to change their speeches, react to each other, reformulate proposals, and demand time between decisions during which they reorganize, renegotiate, or even mobilize their constituencies by taking the issues being debated closer to the public eye and to the streets—that is, to steer a discussion indoors by threatening action or acting outside the parliamentary room. Moreover, letting the parliamentary debates be my proxy for the political process makes sense because the topic I study directly concerns the

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representation of “the people” by the legislative power. In contrast to many other issues concerning immigrant integration, when it comes to the enfranchisement cause, most other political actions occurring outside parliament have the final goal of influencing decision-making in parliament. Parliamentary debates are a particular kind of text to be analyzed. Speeches in parliament are recorded, so the memory of parliaments is exact. Now, my data consists primarily, though not exclusively, of the parliamentary debates on denizen enfranchisement (debates, communications, committee requests, and committee responses to proposals). Since decisions are prefaced by lengthy periods of establishing what does and what does not need to be decided upon, and what the parameters of any decision might be, I also include primary and secondary sources that have been quoted in the debates or that attempted to start or influence them, as well as legislative proposals and debates related to denizen enfranchisement. To collect these texts I asked myself, “to what debate and parliamentary process does denizen enfranchisement belong?” I collected the data doing archival work in the parliamentary archives of the Assembleia da Repu´blica in Lisbon and the Internet databases of the Parlamentsspiegel and the Bundestag, as well as sixteen different La¨nder archives in Germany. The investigation of these texts consists of a study of the arguments and counterarguments about denizen enfranchisement and citizenship and their later analysis and comparison with a discourseanalytical toolkit.36 Specifically, I looked for the answers to the question “Why introduce denizen enfranchisement?” I read, coded, and reread texts following the way a debate usually goes: with full sentences, which build up arguments of variable length and react to each other. My focus on framing involves understanding how actors make sense of a problem and what should be done about it. While frames are “particular ways of making meaning out of complex situations by directing attention toward some elements while simultaneously diverting attention from others” (Yanow 2009: 11), framing highlights agency and a dynamic analysis over time (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006), which I considered in my coding by also coding the different actors (see the code tree in Figure A.4 in the Appendix).

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WE HAVE NOW surveyed what we know about denizen enfranchisement

and made clear that serious gaps in our knowledge about it can be attributed to misleading assumptions, which I have suggested to correct. Besides more appropriate assumptions, I have suggested a different methodology, which sees denizen enfranchisement as a process of social construction and is sensitive to its political context. In developing this explanatory approach—which may stand either as a mediating or an alternative to the historical-institutionalist and post-nationalist ones—I am motivated to find “the subtle interactions between political culture and public policy predispositions” as Heidenheimer, Hecho, and Adams (1983: 5) put it. To do that, yet avoid reaching an approach according to which each case is unique, I have a strategy. The first part of that strategy is the comparative analysis of denizen enfranchisement processes in Portugal and Germany in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. The chapters follow the same approach: tracing the framing of enfranchisement through political processes delimited by their institutional contexts, and including proposals that failed or ended up stranded in legislative limbo. This solves the confusion about many possible relevant factors—often a result of bias in analyzing successful reforms only (see Hall 2003). Yet, I apply the approach somewhat differently because one is a unitary and the other is federal state, with the latter demanding attention to horizontal and multilevel dynamics in the framing of conceptions of citizenship (see Maas 2017, 2013). The second part of my strategy, after the case studies and within-case comparisons, is to situate the findings of Part II in a broader comparative context in Part III, relying on the work done in Part I.

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CHAPTER 3

The Differentiated Enfranchisement of Denizens in Portugal

THE PORTUGUESE CASE deviates from all other cases of denizen enfran-

chisement in that it only gave voting rights to selected groups of resident immigrants, differentiating them from one another, first, based on strict reciprocity, and, second, favoring particular groups of nationalities. Similar conditions once characterized extensions of voting rights to denizens in the Nordic countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but these conditions have been removed. Actually, when, in 1996, the Portuguese parliament decided to apply preferential conditions based on nationality to the extension of the franchise to denizens, the Nordic countries already had moved on to universal denizen franchise. Also, by then the Netherlands, New Zealand, Guyana, Barbados, Malawi, Burkina Faso (and several municipalities in the United States, as well as several Swiss cantons), had passed enfranchisement reforms favoring all denizens without any distinction of nationality or limitation to a subgroup. Today, Portugal shares the reciprocity focus with Spain. With Commonwealth countries it shares both reciprocity and a preferential treatment of some denizens according to their nationality. In this regard, though, the Portuguese enfranchisement is extreme, having gone as far as to differentiate four populations with different voting rights and different conditions to exercise them: (1) European citizens, (2) Lusophone-country nationals, (3) Brazilians who possess special equality status, and (4) other foreigners.1 According to Marı´a Ioannis Baganha and Constanc¸a Urbano de Sousa, the enfranchisement of denizens in Portugal marked a “movement towards a concept of citizenship disengaged from nationality [and which] goes beyond the special status of Brazilians or the inherent status of EU citizens”

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(2006: 436). Theirs is a balanced and uniquely expert assessment of nationality, citizenship, and voting-rights regulations in Portugal within an already rich scholarship on foreigners’ political participation and immigrant integration in Portugal (Fonseca, Caldeira, and Esteves 2002; Sardinha 2007). That quote, however, suggests an overstretched claim by Baganha and Urbano de Sousa in the direction of interpreting the Portuguese denizen enfranchisement as part of a potentially post-national trend. There is no disengagement from nationality in Portugal when that polity gives differently-privileged access to franchise to groups on the base of shared legal or cultural affinities, if it defines those groups by their national membership! As I have clarified, Portuguese legislators chose this exact form of enfranchisement over the form that was already “best practice” by then: universal enfranchisement. By tracing how enfranchisement debates unfolded, from a broad framing toward a very particular that made consensus possible, this chapter shows why. The process of denizen enfranchisement in Portugal started as early as 1971, with the signature of a quasi-citizenship agreement between Brazil and Portugal; passed through the inclusion of prospective consent in the constitution of 1976 for enfranchising Lusophone-country citizens at the local level on the condition of reciprocity; and, later, passed to constitutional reforms that enlarged this consent to other foreigners (i.e., not only Lusophone) under the condition of reciprocity (1989) and to European citizens (1992). Ordinary legislation in 1996 finally made this whole process applicable, giving voting rights with qualitative differences (passive/active, with different residence requirements) for the four distinct groups of voters. To understand that long process, I will analyze data consisting of parliamentary debates (accessed through the archives of the Assembleia da Repu´blica, hereafter referred to as parliament), government and party programs, and journalistic articles on parliamentary discussions.2 In Chapter 2, I provided reasons for taking parliamentary debates as a proxy for the process of denizen enfranchisement in democracies. On top of those, in parliamentarian or semi-parliamentarian systems, such as those in Portugal, parliaments are not only unavoidable venues of authoritative decision-making, but also have exclusive competence on issues of citizen rights and nationality law. Not even the Constitutional Court is a veto player over the parliament: It stands below the president, who in turn stands below the parliament.3 In the Portuguese parliament, communication is characterized

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by speeches that are rich in rhetoric. Beneath a solemn, sometimes pompous style of address, statements can be spontaneous and sarcastic. The president of the parliament, elected from among the leaders of the party-based parliamentary blocs, organizes the debate and often pushes quarreling deputies into trading speech time with one another: Thus, bloc/party statements originally prepared as speeches transform into dialogues. Not only are parliamentary debates accurately recorded in Portugal, as happens formally in so many democracies, but deputies display their command over the parliamentary process by making precise references to previous interventions. This means that if initial frames in a debate change, it is not because they are forgotten, but because they are discarded. The specific political-legislative process I analyze changed the local authority laws to give voting rights to resident migrants who are EU citizens, Lusophone-country citizens in conditions of reciprocity, and any other resident migrant citizen of a country with which there is legal reciprocity. My analysis of the political process is not limited to the change from initial proposals to final decisions in the issue of denizen enfranchisement alone: Rather, it has a wider scope than the enfranchisement debates. Knowing that, in the absence of empirical or counterfactual comparisons, framing analyses are prone to self-confirmatory, functionalist bias (Campbell 2000), in this chapter, I not only include the institutional factors presented in Chapter 2 (political system features, migration profile, naturalization rules) but, to test framing mechanisms, I also consider parallel relevant debates in the political context, observing the justifications provided within the context of their success or failure. I proceed in three steps. First, I present a sketch of basic institutional features of the Portuguese democracy. Second, I introduce the migration profile of post-revolutionary Portugal and review its nationality laws. These two steps present the context that is analytically relevant: To maintain a dialogue with the most relevant hypotheses, these sections consider the main factors that post-national and historical-institutionalist hypotheses put forward to explain processes of enfranchisement. Third, I analyze the enfranchisement process and debates in Portugal, demonstrating how frames were constructed, tested, and transformed to fit prevailing normative frameworks in policy debates. This includes diachronic and synchronic comparisons with previous, concurrent and later-relevant debates in Portugal. These withincase comparisons explain the timing of denizen enfranchisement, as well as the specificity of its framing as key for the reform’s success.

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Institutional Framework in the New Portuguese Democracy The Carnation Revolution of 1974 and the quick decolonization that accompanied it left important institutional birthmarks on the political system, migration patterns, and identity of Portugal as a democratic European state. The Portuguese democracy is the offspring not only of democratic ideals but also of a military-led revolution. In 1976, the drafting of a constitution demanded compromises to gather the support of all de facto postrevolutionary forces to set up a democratic regime. In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, more than fifty political parties emerged, but only some would endure. The Partido Socialista (PS; which, relative to European party families, figures as a social democratic party), the Partido Social Demo´crata (PSD; which can in turn be considered center-right), and the Centro Democra´tico Social / Partido Popular (CDS/PP, which can be considered the right wing) supported a parliamentary form of government. The Partido Comunista Portugueˆs (PCP, communist party) and its allies pushed for socialist content in the constitution. Building on tough compromises with the army, these parties were able to safeguard a democratic regime with basic rights and liberties (Constituic¸a˜o . . . , Art. 288).4 Later, both consensual politics among political parties and a moderate attitude among voters made it possible to gradually remove military players from the political system (Costa Lobo 2007: 8–9). This had effects beyond the transition: Political debating became moderate, preventing parties’ politicization of even such issues as immigration. As to the form of the state, postrevolutionary Portugal remained unitary, with local authorities functionally inaugurated with the first local elections in 1977.5 Migration and Access to Citizenship Policies in Portugal Before Enfranchisement

In the migration trajectory of Portugal, the Carnation Revolution of 1974 is also a turning point. Emigration had been significant throughout the twentieth century6 and had been reinforced by the colonial wars in the 1960s.7 From 1961 until 1974, approximately 1.3 million Portuguese emigrated from the mainland. From the Revolution onward though, emigration decreased and emigrants started to return (especially in the 1990s): Portuguese living in the former colonies were repatriated, and immigration flows increased (Peixoto 2000). In 1990, about 110,000 foreigners resided in Portugal with residence permits. Although precise estimates do not exist

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regarding the undocumented immigrant population, a proxy to their number is the number of applications in the first regularization program of 1992–1993: 80,000 (Levinson 2005). Still, for a long time after the migration profile of Portugal had changed, net immigration did not interest politicians: Experts agree that until the mid-1990s immigration and immigrants were not a topic of political debate. The immigrant groups most mentioned in the media were Eastern Europeans, immigrants from Lusophone countries, and “gypsies” (Costa Lobo 2007). Instead, concerns over migration issues were linked to emigrants, strengthened by the new idea that post-imperial Portugal would have a hard time surviving as a small European country with a third of its people spread across the globe (Lloyd-Jones 2001: 2–4). The goal that an enfranchising reform was supposed to fulfill can hardly be analyzed by interpreting laws without a look at the existing migration policies back then. According to Baganha (1998), Portuguese migration has changed the country’s landscape as much as its way of life and its people’s mentality. Thus, it is important to have an idea of the discussions and policies on emigration and immigration that preceded denizen enfranchisement. Between 1975 and 1980, immigration grew at an annual rate of 13 percent and was characterized by (a) flows from European countries and from African countries with Portuguese as their official language (officially called PALOP after “Paı´ses Africanos de Lı´ngua Oficial Portuguesa”; hereafter, PALOP), which until 1974 had been considered “inter-regional migration” and therefore excluded from statistics on foreigners; (b) a countercurrent of Brazilian migration; and (c) Asian immigration directed to small businesses, mainly from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh (Malheiros 2009; Pires 2003). Portugal’s increasing demand for labor during the 1980s contributed to an increase of 230 percent in the legally resident foreign population. Since the late 1990s, migration from Eastern Europe (Ukraine,8 Moldova, Russia, and Romania) increased vastly, relative to migration from PALOP countries.9 Table 3 displays the percentage of foreigners by country or region of origin over the total foreign residents with legal residence in Portugal. The development was similar to the German “guest-worker” (Gastarbeiter) experience in the sense that the settlement of migrants occurred in a political-legal context that was intended to deter it (Pires 2003: 151), leading to negative consequences. However, the situation was quite different for Brazilian migrants, who profited from the common language and cultural

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Table 3. Percentage of foreigners by country or region of origin over the total foreign residents with legal residence in Portugal Area of origin

1981

1991

2001

Europe

30.2

29

30

Africa PALOP countries

45.7 45.1

41.9 40.2

47.3 44.7

1.9

3.9

4.3

21.2 8.0

24.5 11.1

18.2 10.8

Asia Americas Brazil

references that facilitated their social integration, and on top of this had a semi-citizenship status to benefit from, thanks to the 1971 Convention on Equal Rights and Obligations between Portuguese and Brazilians, a clear advantage over other Lusophone migrants. Thus far, that convention had mostly benefited the large community of Portuguese in Brazil (Peixoto 2004). Connected to this, an immediate migration challenge of postrevolutionary Portugal was the prospective return of Portuguese living in the former colonies: the retornados. Decolonization, as well as military and political instability in PALOP countries, pushed nearly half a million people to Portugal, most of whom entered as retornados, even if half of them had never touched the Iberian Peninsula before. Recalling this exodus is central for two reasons: First, nationality laws were radically changed in order to address retornados (Reiter 2008); second, retornados were the reason the drafters of the 1976 constitution potentially extended to citizens of Lusophone countries the quasi-citizenship status of Brazilians. This quasicitizenship status made it easier for Brazilians to see Portugal as a destination in the 1980s, when dictatorship ended in the latter, and the socioeconomic situation worsened in the former. The development of legislation to regulate migration indicates how late Portugal started considering immigration an issue. Immigration policy had been characterized by thin regulation that favored a minimal control of flows, but the Schengen Agreement, in 1992, forced Portugal to tighten entry controls. Until then, historical ties to PALOP countries and Brazil had made Portugal a privileged port of entry and stay for their emigrants. Thus,

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Portugal found itself in the double bind of complying with EU regulations while trying to preserve its ties to Lusophone countries (Teixeira and Albuquerque 2005; Jero´nimo 2008). After 1995, immigration gained relevance in both the legislative and executive branches of government.10 A specific agency, the Alto-Comissa´rio para a Imigrac¸a˜o e Minorias E´tnicas (ACIME) was created to manage a wide range of activities related to immigrant integration at all levels of government and provide support to immigrants on housing, employment, education, and health (Decreto-Lei N 3-A, January 26, 1996). This was the starting point of a more positive—in the legal sense—phase of public policies addressing immigrant inclusion: It included two extraordinary regularization programs, housing programs, a guaranteed social income also for poor foreign households, and a loosening of the laws regulating foreign work. ACIME became the political mediator between the government and immigrant associations, which, in turn, served as mediators between public administration offices and migrants. The stepwise change from previous migration (non-)policy is already palpable in the exposition of motives for the first extraordinary regularization law, from October 1992, which still presented migration as a threatening, undesirable phenomenon, the “waves” of which needed to be prevented (Law 1/ 92, March 9, 1992). This contrasts highly with the civil rights language of Law 17/96, which, four years later, allowed for the second regularization. Also, in 1995, for the first time, a government program included a separate section for migration and specific migration directives within chapters of internal administration and social policy. Chapter IV, of social policy, read: “In our case, migrants predominantly come from PALOP countries, relative to which migrants are the main link of the political relation of the Portuguese State, marked by friendship and cooperation” (Programa do XIII Governo Constitucional, 1995, Chapter IV). This quote illustrates how the overhaul in migration policy change during the government of the PS (1995–2002) was concomitant to a reaffirmation of a special treatment of Lusophone migrants. In sum, if we read the law that enfranchised denizens in Portugal (Law 50/96) within the immigration history of Portugal, it seems part of a bigger turn toward policymaking for immigrants that reached well into the realm of integration, instead of the mere regulation of entry.11 Over time, immigration policies further simplified visa categories, strengthened family reunification (including one of the broadest definitions of family in

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Europe), and allowed for ordinary processes of regularization for irregular migrants and their children. It is sensible to ask what the role of migrants in this policy reorientation process was. With regard to migrant mobilization, however, experts agree that this was modest until the mid-1990s and became present in Portuguese political life as a result of top-down initiatives coming from the government and political parties (particularly the PS), which took a co-opting initiating approach to institutionalize immigrant participation into formal channels of representation early on (Machado and Matı´as 1992: 34). It seems that, by the end of the 1980s, only few migrant organizations existed, challenged in their very existence by the irregularity of status that affected thousands of immigrants, social exclusion, and growing multiethnic tension. Then, the government-initiated campaign of legalization was the start of a long process to institutionalize dialogue with migrant organizations and find interlocutors. Fernando Ka´, president of the Guinean Association for Migrant Solidarity since 1982 and one of the earliest and most outspoken leaders of migrant organizations, was invited by the Socialist Party to run for a deputy seat and entered parliament in 1991 with the unofficial mandate to speak for immigrant associations. Being a Portuguese national, he had no problem running for such a post. He was succeeded by Celeste Correia in 1995, former president of the Cape Verdean Association, which represented the most active of all migrant communities in Portuguese politics until then. Without formally assigning a special representation seat in the parliament for immigrants, the PS governments were giving some vocal immigrants substantial representation and illustrating what they considered a workable approach of cooperation in order for immigrants to be heard and considered in the long term. From 1990 until 1995, there was an eightfold increase in the number of migrant associations (Sardinha 2010: 24). When the newly elected government in 1995 set the stage for a broad integration policy, migrant associations were able to gain visibility on that stage, flourish, and mature together, and this goes far beyond the creation of interlocutor bodies such as ACIME. A key moment of associations’ disengagement from the state came, paradoxically, out two state outputs: the creation of COCAI in 1998 and Law 115/99 in 1999, which paved the way for the juridical recognition of migrant organizations as independent from the state. The story of migrant collective action in Portugal is thus not the story of a fully top-down process but an iterative process that started with the early detection of migrant groups as a potential constituency by a

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majority party and several steps toward the institutionalization of their representation, through steps of co-optation, but also accompanied by and contributing to the independent strengthening of associations. With regard to access to citizenship-as-nationality, despite the continuous growth of immigration in Portugal since 1985, this was restrictive. With a brief look into the history of naturalization laws, it is not surprising that, for a long time, the percentage of foreigners that acquired Portuguese nationality never surpassed 1.5 percent of the total foreign population legally residing in Portugal. Since the promulgation of the Civil Code of 1867, the regime of nationality in Portugal had been based on jus soli. Under Salazar’s dictatorship, the nationality law of 1959 (Law 2098/59) upheld jus soli and stipulated that those who had been born in the colonies before their independence had the right to preserve Portuguese nationality for life. However, after 1974, the fear of immigration as a consequence of decolonization and civil war in the former colonies prompted Portuguese politicians to legislate so as to prevent that immigration yet let the European population “come back.”12 In the short term, Decree-Law 308-A of 1975 introduced the loss of nationality. Later, Nationality Law 37/81 eased the repatriation of the white population while hardening entrance for black Africans by allowing the preservation of Portuguese nationality through jus sanguinis—thereby breaking with its jus soli tradition. The ensuing lack of access to nationality for a growing number of children of African ancestry born in Portugal did not stir legislators to action. According to Weil (2001), after experiencing an initial phase of migration, European governments began to recognize over time that the norms and values of a democracy are incompatible with too restrictive nationality laws. However, Baganha and de Sousa show that the original version of the Nationality Act of 1981, the new wording of 1994, and the later minor changes of 2004 regarding who should be Portuguese had broad support among the main political actors and were not the subject of heated debates or political divisions (2006: 450).13 Still, the usual historical institutionalist reading of traditions of citizenship, centered only on successful legislative acts, tends to overlook the significance of failed attempts by the opposition to change the Nationality Law. In 2004, the Communist Party (PCP) group in parliament attempted to alter it through Law Project 510/IX, which would remove (1) the requirement that residents prove their means of living to be naturalized, (2) the requirement that applicants prove their “effective connection to the national community,” and (3) the authorities’

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arbitrariness, by making naturalization a right once the requisites were met. After a first discussion, the initiative expired after months of not being taken up in plenum. In general, the law proposals made by the majority center-right government to amend the 1994 Nationality Law and a bill presented by the PS were approved by large majorities in the parliament, while the projects presented by left parties and the Greens, aiming at more profound changes to the law, were rejected, until finally, Law 2/2006—again, a PCP proposal—introduced changes to the Nationality Law 37/81 in precisely the same lines that the party had been proposing for years: Jus soli nationality was reintroduced and discretionary decisions were limited. Notably, country-of-origin differentiations ceased to exist for the naturalization of legal residents in Portugal: A period of six years of residence is now required from any applicant. Today, Portugal is widely recognized as having the most accessible nationality laws in Europe, and it enjoys the highest naturalization rates in the EU. Figure 4 illustrates the major legislative changes mentioned.14 The progression in time of migration policy and nationality laws suggests that policies on these issues developed through the search for a framework to accommodate the close relation that post-revolutionary Portugal aimed to keep with its longstanding diaspora, estimated to consist of roughly 4.3 million persons who, thanks to two decades of jus sanguinis naturalization law and double nationality, remained citizens. It is crucial to note here that the emigrant population is almost ten times bigger than the foreign or foreign-ancestry population living in Portugal:15 Those proportions and their electoral weight would be felt in the denizen enfranchisement process. The Political Process of Denizen Enfranchisement

The Constitution of 1976 established the principle of nondiscrimination and equalization of rights among nationals and foreigners:16 In Portugal, legally resident foreigners have a right to health care, education, social security, and access to judicial courts, but they have no political rights. Yet, the constitution made room for a potential extension of voting rights to Lusophone citizens at the local level on the basis of reciprocity. Ever since, the possibility of positive discrimination of foreigners from Lusophone countries to exercise rights reserved for Portuguese citizens was admitted: “By means of international convention and in conditions of reciprocity, the rights not conferred to foreigners, except for organs of sovereignty, service in the armed forces and diplomatic career can be attributed to the citizens

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Differentiated Enfranchisement of Denizens in Portugal 1971 1975 1980 -

97

Signature of quasi-citizenship rights convention with Brazil

Constitution makes room for denizen enfranchisement legislation

Nationality Act 37/81 makes jus sanguinis dominate over jus soli but tolerates dual nationality

(1982…1988) 1990 1995 2000 2005 -

Constitutional revision allows reciprocity-based denizen enfranchisement Constitutional reform potentially enfranchises non-PALOP denizens PS proposal 3/VI to enfranchise all denizens fails under a PSD government Nationality Act 25/94 further restricts jus soli acquisition of nationality New PS government PS proposal 37/VII to enfranchise denizens (Lusophone plus reciprocity) becomes Law 50/96 Constitutional reform extends external voting rights (PSD proposal) Law 13/99 facilitates denizen registration, after similar PCP proposal failed

New CDS-PP coalition government Reform to Nationality Act (PS proposal), after similar PCP proposal failed New PSD-PP coalition/ New PS government Reform to Nationality Law 2/2006

Figure 4. Major legislative changes on naturalization and denizen franchise in Portugal.

of Lusophone countries” (Art. 16). This legal provision made Portugal a potential world pioneer, as it was introduced in the constitution before Denmark, Norway, and Finland, and later the Netherlands, enfranchised denizens in local elections with a residence requirement only. Still, the necessity of enacting secondary legislation to make that provision apply meant that it took twenty years to enfranchise denizens, with Law 50/96. By then, however, the Nordic countries had eliminated the reciprocity clause and had opened franchise to all denizens. Portugal remained unmoved by these developments in the European neighborhood and kept to the path that the Constitution of 1976 had started, following it in the

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1989 and 1992 reforms. Law 50/96 enfranchised Lusophone-country and European-member citizens, as well as other citizens whose country of origin gave voting rights to Portuguese (albeit with longer waiting periods). This legislation, outdated if compared to the Nordic cases, and restrictive if compared to the Dutch, was praised within the parliament as innovative and generous when, in fact, it was giving little and expecting a lot in return. To understand how this happened, let us review the closer institutional features of parliament that may explain legislative idleness until 1996. The Portuguese parliament is composed of 230 deputies elected by direct, universal suffrage by eligible citizens both in Portugal and, since 1976, abroad. Legislation is initiated through law projects (by deputies, parliamentary blocs, or citizens) or law proposals (by the government). Strong party discipline demands that deputies vote in line with their party and submit their bills through their parliamentary groups, who set the agenda (Opello 1986). In the light of the special quasi-citizenship status enjoyed by Brazilians since 1971, the prospect of extending voting rights to Lusophone-country denizens discretely mixed privileged Brazilians in a larger category of persons that “needed to be” addressed: former colonials. Initiated by a Socialist Party (PS) majority in 1976, throughout the next twenty years, denizen enfranchisement was always a Socialist project. The constitutional reform of 1992, which opened the franchise a little further to other foreigners who were not citizens of Lusophone countries, was a PS proposal (DAR II 8/VI/ 2; 15.10.1992: 131–146). It also pushed forward the creation of the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries (Comunidade dos Paı´ses de Lı´ngua Portuguesa, CPLP)17 and the Council of Portuguese Communities which, together with denizen enfranchisement, became goals of the PS government program in 1995. The PS had returned to power with a government composed, for the first time in the history of postrevolutionary Portugal, of one party—that is, both the president, Jorge Sampaio, and the prime minister, Anto´nio Guterres, were PS members. The PS fell only four seats short of an absolute majority in parliament: Socialists could almost govern by themselves.18 By sanctioning a favorable regime for Lusophone-country citizens in Portugal, based on reciprocity, they were reinforcing a foreign policy principle they had helped imprint into the constitution. I will now tackle the debates on denizen enfranchisement in Portugal. With diachronic and synchronic comparisons, I will compare the proposal

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that succeeded with those that had failed and with related pieces of legislation and government policy. First, however, I compare the government programs, which is important for the case of Portugal, where enfranchisement was a national-level reform, because those programs contain all major policy goals of new governments, and their parliamentary approval serves as a vote of confidence. I want to find out what was the place of denizen enfranchisement in them. Then I will compare different stages of the debate on denizen enfranchisement to observe framing, reframing, political realignments around the topic, and the tone—especially on matters that I expect to be controversial. I will also review related legislation in order to observe how contested other issues connected to electoral franchise had been framed, in comparison. Denizen Enfranchisement as a Goal or a Problem in Government Programs

Government programs contain the main political orientations for all fields of government activity of newly-elected governments and are presented to the parliament and president for approval within ten days of a new government’s nomination. The law that effectively enfranchised resident migrants in Portugal (Law 50/96) entered parliament as law proposal 37/VII, to alter two secondary laws on May 28, 1996.19 It was already present in the government’s program, as a measure to improve participative mechanisms in political life (Program of XIII Government, 12), along with a list of measures to “combat social exclusion and uphold citizen rights.” Migration was described as part of what the XIII government considered “challenges”: “The presence of immigrants and ethnic and cultural minorities has come to constitute a challenge of growing complexity for the solidarity of European societies. In our case, immigrants come mainly from countries of official Portuguese language, towards which migrants are the fundamental thread for cooperation and friendship relations” (106). The XIII government program connected denizen voting rights for European citizens with the fulfillment of European commitments “conferring priority to the integration of foreigners already resident in the national territory” (14). It stated also that a foreign-policy goal was to “[create] a Community of Countries of Portuguese Language with African countries and Brazil,”, with the purpose of “the affirmation of Portugal in the world [which] requires the reinforcement of cultural links between all Portuguese speakers” (28).

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Comparing the programs of the XII and XIII confirms that the initiative to enfranchise denizens was truly a PS project. In fact, the program of the previous PSD-led XII government (1991–1995) lacked a single mention of the word migrant (DAR I, No. 4/VI/1, 11.11.1991: 33–43).20 Instead, the only related topic raised had been the Portuguese abroad: the “need to correct the unjust lack of participation of emigrants in presidential elections” (39). Framing of the Denizen Enfranchisement Proposal and Its Legislative Process

Proposal 37/VII, which would become Law 50/96 that enfranchised denizens, included a mix of justifications that referred to domestic, international, and supranational levels, as well as a potentially post-national development of voting rights. In its preamble, it was justified referring, first, to the constitutional provision that made room for it; second, to the Directive of the European Council 94/80/CE,21 which established rules for the exercise of voting rights and eligibility at the local level for EU citizen residents in a state from where they are not nationals; and, third, to the “significant immigrant communities coming from countries of Portuguese language, which reside in Portugal for a long time already, and that honoring the special character of the historical and affective links that unite us to them, should have access to the rights of political participation at the local level” (DAR II A No. 45/VII/1, 31.05.1996: 862—my italics). Yet a statement that approximates a post-national frame closed the proposal: “[This proposal] echoes the generalized understanding that the right to vote in local authority elections will eventually need to be a vote of all residents, and not only of the nationals” (862—my italics). The proponents branded the aimed reform “mandatory,” but they also praised it for “stimulating” Lusophone or “third countries where Portuguese reside” to introduce “constitutional and legislative reforms that allow Portuguese there to exercise electoral rights there in a reciprocal attitude of openness” (DAR II A No. 45/VII/1, 31.05.1996: 862). In the next step of the legislative process, the Commission of Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Liberties and Guarantees prepared an opinion. It downgraded the government’s role in the proposal by stating that it was “nothing but the fulfilment, at the level of ordinary law, of the possibility conferred by Art. 15, n. 4 of the Constitution” (DAR II, A No. 57/VII/1 13.07.1996: 1350). This is no surprise given that the commission’s makeup

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usually mirrors the parliament’s composition. Warning that four different electorates would “alter qualitatively the electoral census,” the commission nevertheless passed it to discussion in plenum, considering that, from the technical point of view, the road was paved by electoral reforms which had been approved for European Parliament elections. Indeed, in order to secure quick passage through the Commission, the proposal had been drafted following the technical pattern used for two years for changing local electoral laws to allow European Parliament elections. Once in plenum, the debate on the proposal opened with an introduction by Minister of Internal Affairs Alberto Costa, an impassioned speech that sought to rally support from all deputies. He emphasized the socialist ownership of the proposal “from the start” and its coherence with “recent government measures regarding immigration.” The minister framed the proposal as introducing “a new concept of civic modernization” which would allow Portugal to catch up with modern countries (DAR I No. 86/ VII/1, 26.06.1996: 17). “To modernize civic participation, valuing residence as a title for participation, going beyond the classic title of nationality” was the only mention made in the whole legislative process of a potential disconnection between voting rights and nationality. After this argument for a new model of civic participation that would overcome nationality, the introduction of the condition of reciprocity seemed somewhat odd: “A vast number of countries in Europe, out of Europe; in Africa, in Latin America and even in Asia confer the right to elect and be elected in local elections to foreign residents; in some, only conditioned reciprocity. We understand that it would be correct and that it would promote the possibilities of Portuguese candidates and Portuguese electors in those countries if we took a step in this direction, observing the condition of reciprocity” (DAR I No. 86/VII/1, 26.06.1996). Remarkably, despite noting that there are countries where denizen franchise is universal, the minister justified the preferential access to voting rights for migrants of some nationalities by linking it to a “new idea of Portugal”: “a self-confident, competitive Portugal, a Portugal capable of welcoming and including, composed by Portuguese capable of affirming, projecting and including themselves in the very exterior of Portugal” (DAR I No. 86/VII/1, 26.06.1996—my italics). Closing his speech, Minister Costa reminded the deputies that he was making the case for unanimity: “The government is at your disposal to accept all technical or political polishing [. . .]. What is at stake is not the approval of this piece [but] that all of us

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take this step together, each of us sharing this modern vision of Portugal” (18). Indeed, the law would be approved by unanimous vote of all parliamentary groups (DAR I Se´rie No. 96/VII/1, 13.07.1996): Before that, however, there was some “technical and political polishing” after Costa’s intervention. First, the PCP speaker was the only one to question the privileging of Lusophone from other citizens, but Costa replied almost tautologically: We wanted to distinguish two segments of the new electorate because we are conscious that the reasons to contemplate a Venezuelan, a Peruvian or Israeli should not be confused with the reasons to elect a Cape Verdean, a Brazilian, a Mozambican, or a Sa˜otomese. For the Government, those two realities have different historical foundations and, in the future, may come to have different juridical regimes regarding many matters that are in development. We are not speaking about a community that involves these countries which, already today, give us rights which we want to use, offering, as counterpart, other rights [referring to the 1971 Convention with Brazil], but we want to prepare judicial mechanisms for possible developments [referring to the creation of the CPLP]. (DAR I se´rie No. 86: 18—my italics) Without naming universal enfranchisement, Maria Celeste Correia, deputy of the PS, pointed to the “great heterogeneity at the European level” regarding the concession of voting rights to foreign residents, and she went on to make the second and last mention in the debate of the urgency of the proposal from the point of view of immigrants (DAR I No. 86/VII/1, 26.06.1996: 19), in general, in a debate which otherwise focused urgency of the extension of voting rights to immigrants for emigrants’ sake. However, the reference she made was limited to a communication approved in a conference of European ministers, which days earlier had suggested the “need for measures which allow active participation of immigrants in decision-making processes.” Remarkably, in that regard, she minimized the proposal’s reach: “As is evident in the numbers, the proposal will benefit mainly the citizens of Lusophone countries and the European Union. Besides, it is important to remember that until December 31, 1995, Portugal had 169,316 foreign legal residents. For them to benefit from this law, it is demanded that their countries recognize this right to their Portuguese

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resident immigrants. Reciprocity, characteristic of our Constitutional regime, is a form of instituting these rights for our emigrants in any country of the world” (20). Correia appropriated time and again the cause as one long fought for by the PS, pointing out that it was part of a strategy that included initiatives coherent with “the best Portuguese heritage” and “strategic for the future of bilateral and multilateral relations” (20—my italics). Next, Deputy Joa˜o Nuno Calva˜o da Silva, from the biggest opposition party (PSD), objected to incompatibilities in the law that may give thirdcountry nationals more advantages relative to Portuguese citizens. While emphasizing why, for the PSD, the Portuguese emigrants deserved the best possible treatment, da Silva stressed a remarkably anti-post-nationalist argument: “With a spirit of promoting common citizenship in a time of globalization there are temptations to dilute the real and only nationality, which is the nationality that each, by jus soli or jus sanguinis, acquired” (DAR I No. 86/VII/1, 26.06.1996: 21—my italics). Here the PSD was supporting the view of nationality it had upheld while in power, a view accommodating toward emigrants’ rights but restrictive toward those of immigrants. The PSD speaker further circumscribed the idea that “there is one fatherland and only one nation but that there can be many citizenships” to Europe (20). Next, the speaker of the bloc furthest to the right in parliament, the CDS/PP, applauded linking the proposal to the creation of the CPLP, considering that there are “laws beyond humanitarianism that we must apply first of all with those who have made a journey of centuries with us, who use our language and who want to keep on using it” and that “all are equal but some are always more equal” (DAR I No. 86/VII/1, 26.06.1996: 22—my italics). Yet, he demanded that the reciprocity clause be applied also to Lusophone-country citizens and not only to other citizens. At the other extreme of the political spectrum, the PCP recognized the ample consensus on the issue and expressed the sole concern of “securing strict observation of the reciprocity principle.” Thus, the PCP was in line with the right-wing party at the other extreme. The PCP explicitly agreed to connect denizen voting rights with the ultimate goal of allowing Portuguese citizens abroad conditions to participate in local elections” (DAR I No. 86/ VII/1, 26.06.1996: 23). Last, the speaker for the Greens emphasized their ownership of initiatives to “give electoral capacity to foreigners.” Applauding the focus on Lusophone citizens too as “the communities of migrants that share with us a special historical, linguistic and cultural affinity,” the

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Greens were the only parliamentary group to express reserve regarding reciprocity, for limiting the scope of enfranchisement (24—my italics). In response to the interventions, Minister Costa addressed the concern of the PCP by stating a somewhat obscure differentiation of reciprocity concepts that merits quotation: [Reciprocity] is a topic that unifies us, but there are many ways of treating it: one is a symmetrical and retributive manner of the kind do ut des, a logic in which one only gives what has been, simultaneously, given by the counterpart. In another logic of increase, something can be offered that is not yet offered by the other part and that will gain increased stimulus, authority and legitimacy that will contribute to its being promoted by the part that advances immediately with its own offer, in this case, a civic offer. The Government does not shy away from the idea of a stimulating, incremental reciprocity. [It adds] authority to positions we want to defend in the future, in the sense of eliminating restrictions in other countries. (DAR I No. 86/ VII/1, 26.06.1996: 24—my italics) If there is one clear point in this statement, it is that the government was framing the proposal as based on expected reciprocity, rather than on concrete existing agreements. A further commission entered minimal changes to the proposal, which was then voted unanimously, becoming Law 50/96 on August 3, 1996 (DAR II, Se´rie A, No. 59/VII/1 03.08.1996: 1430–1436). As it is clear from the quotes provided, no big ideological divides emerged during its debate. All parties tried to appropriate it as far as possible, all agreed on privileging the Lusophones and only varied in the superposition or complementarity of the condition of reciprocity with regard to that privileged group. How did the proposal gather such a consensus across parties in a debate relating to the polemic issue of enlarging the electorate? Are we right to conclude that a majority of parliamentary votes behind it was all such a proposal needed to get passed? No. A debate occurring just one year after the approval of law proposal 37/VII suggests that reforms about the electorate needed, first, to be negotiated in such a way that would secure the status quo and, second, to be framed in such a way that would pitch to emigrants. Already within the context of the discussions of the constitutional reform of 1997, the PSD

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proposed extending voting rights for presidential elections to Portuguese citizens residing abroad, which meant changing Article 124 of the constitution. The justification for it was practically identical to the proposal that had enfranchised denizens a year earlier: “A little country like ours has to base its strategy on three pillars: active participation in the European Union, defense of the Lusophone ideal, and affirmation of the Portuguese communities (DAR I, No. 100/VII/2, 24.07.1997: 5). The debate stalled in a fight for appropriating the cause of giving electoral rights to emigrants and having fought most consistently for it over time.22 Deputies of the PCP fiercely opposed the reform on the grounds that “the [PSD’s] real objective has never been the rights of emigrants but exploiting the objectively different conditions under which the electoral process is realized abroad” (9). Experts on migration policy in Portugal have observed that Portuguese attitudes toward immigrants are partly influenced by the country’s own extensive historical experience with emigration. Yet this debate over external enfranchisement of Portuguese emigrants, which occurred in the very same legislature, shows a stark contrast to the denizen enfranchisement debate. Regarding immigrants’ enfranchisement, positions converged in such a technical arrangement that it did not represent a danger to any single party: The technical hurdles and restrictiveness posed no danger of altering substantially the electoral support between parties. In contrast, raising the possibility of altering the party balance through a substantially large new electorate, as with emigrants’ enfranchisement, caused heated debates. Even the topic of the “effective link” between emigrants and Portugal, usually a taboo in political discourse, came up in these debates. In the view of the PCP, the danger was the very “possibility that a President of the Republic is imposed from abroad and against the will of Portuguese citizens residing in Portugal who in the end are those who suffer the consequences of good or bad exercise of power” (DAR I, No. 100/VII/2, 24.07.1997: 11). The speaker of the CDS-PP estimated that “if all nationals voted, one in every three voters would be out of the territory. Because of that, they should have an effective link to the Portuguese community” (16). In response, the PSD questioned the legitimacy of calling the Portuguese living abroad emigrants: “It is insulting to consider them different from the Portuguese living in Portugal” (31—my italics). Another example of the confrontational character of related debates is the seemingly modest law project 594/VII submitted by the PCP in 1999, discussed as part of a broader revision of electoral laws, which aimed at

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eliminating bureaucratic hurdles for the register of foreign voters in the electoral roll (DAR Se´rie I, No. 25/VII/3, 14.01.1999: 31), which did not succeed. Furthermore, shortly before the discussion and passing of Law 50/ 96 in the very same legislature, law project 47/VII, authored by the PSD, aimed at regulating the exercise of the vote by Portuguese abroad, allowing them to vote in embassies and consulates and not only by post, was strongly rejected in the plenary discussion by the PCP with the argument that it was a PSD charade to get through bureaucratic means what it had lost on the polls, by manipulating the consular network. Otherwise, PCP deputies argued, it could not be explained how, in ten years of government with overwhelming majorities, the PSD had shown no interest in such a reform (DAR I, No. 31/VII/1, 25.01.1996: 874–894). The CDS-PP supported the reform mildly but not without expressing a similar distrust. The Greens stated that the PSD tried to make of emigrants “a flag.” The failure of the project shows how vital electoral rules are for minority parties: With potential millions of Portuguese abroad, even seeming technicalities led to heated debates, as they could turn the tables. To observe the effect of framing and negotiation in the Portuguese enfranchisement, the most telling contrast with another debate is that between the debate of the successful denizen enfranchisement law proposal 37/VII (later Law 50/96) and the very similar law project 3/VI initiated four years earlier by the PS, in opposition, with the PSD in government. After fierce initial debates in plenum and commission reports (DAR II A, No. 1/ VI/1, 12.11.1991: 4–5), this project was stranded in the legislature. At first sight, the frame and arguments between this failed attempt and the successful one diverge only slightly. Both mentioned general advantages of linking residents to the areas where they live (the extensions of the franchise to immigrant residents in other European countries) and urged Portugal to take its place among pioneer denizen-enfranchising nations. Both noted that the constitutional revision of 1989 had allowed foreigners (in general) to participate at the local level on condition of reciprocity and both suggested expected reciprocity gains for Portuguese emigrants (DAR I, No. 100/VII/2, 24.07.1997: 5). Substantially, however, the debate on proposal 3/ VI had been framed from the perspective of immigration and it was debated together with proposals for the improvement of housing conditions for migrants and an extraordinary regularization of undocumented immigrants. The PS emphasized a general immigration frame for all: “The three projects are linked in an integral policy” (DAR I, No. 21/VI/1, 15.01.1992:

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507). This proposal was deemed “careless” by the CDS, while the PSD criticized it as “too permissive” and potentially “hasty and unnecessary” if the European integration process were to build a regime for denizens (523). Evaluating that proposal, the commission’s report had expressed a tone of self-contentment with the status quo, noting that just as voting rights for foreigners in local elections had been extended in a “significant number of European countries,” there also were “many countries with a big number of resident migrants in their territory” that did not concede such a possibility. Curiously, the report situated Portugal in the first group, having already done its part with the formal extension of voting rights to Brazilian citizens, and recalling that the constitution conceded electoral capacity to other foreigners in local elections in conditions of reciprocity, even if it was only “a possibility that left freedom to the legislator to choose the moment to approve legislation on this matter” (Luis Sa´, DAR II A, No. 12/VI/1, 15.01.1992: 263–264). The commission’s report was approved by PS and PCP members only. The PSD abstained, criticizing the PS for revealing concern in defending rights of foreigners in Portugal while lacking “the decency to give foreigners abroad the right to vote for the president” (515). The PS responded that external voting rights would have to be discussed in the next legislature, suggesting a tit-for-tat between parties. So what did the successful denizen enfranchisement law proposal 37/ VII 1996 have that the failed law project 3/VI did not? First, it had a frame fixated on emigrants, not on immigrants. In blatant contrast to the repeated mention of emigrants, the only two mentions of immigrants in 1996 were brief and shallow. At first, it may seem that Portuguese legislators ignored immigrant issues, but on a closer reading the absence of the topic suggests conscious silencing. We have observed that the XIIIth government was actively developing immigrant policies at the time, yet the enfranchisement debate included no mention of immigrants’ representation or participation needs. The closest idea was framed abstractly and for the benefit of Portugal, not of the potentially-enfranchised resident immigrants, as an urgent “civic modernization” so that Portugal could find its place in Europe and the world. Another piece of evidence suggesting conscious silencing on the issue and a strategic framing is that just one year earlier, reforms to nationality laws had repeatedly referred to immigrants.23 Second, the specificity regarding groups in the electorate differently favored by the proposal 37/VII highlighted two symbolically relevant categories of people—“the Lusophones” (a euphemism for former colonial

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subjects) and the “Portuguese abroad”—who were vital for some political projects widely supported across parties. The diffuse emphasis on the advantages of denizen enfranchisement for emigrants, and the forceful anchor on reciprocity framed the 37/VII proposal in a nonthreatening way: All parties could pay lip service to a reform that rhetorically benefited emigrants in their residence countries without changing much at home. Had the Portuguese parliamentarians enfranchised all immigrants with the same standard residence conditions after the reforms that lifted reciprocity or particularistic clauses of denizen enfranchisement in several Nordic countries, that wave of reforms could have contributed to establishing universal enfranchisement as a general trend. But thinking first and foremost about their emigrant population, Portuguese deputies deliberately chose the offbeat path and were rather ready to disaggregate the pool of denizen voters into four groups, forcefully anchoring the eligibility of all in reciprocity. This allowed them to frame the proposal as a strategic promotion of voting rights for Portuguese emigrants in their countries of residence. The disaggregation was largely symbolic: The privilege for Lusophone denizens ultimately consisted of a shorter residence requirement by one year. Without it, the reform would have mainly benefited Lusophone-country citizens because they constituted two-thirds of all eligible (i.e., regular) migrants and because the reciprocity clause excluded most other denizens. As for the political projects, all parties supported the PS’s impulse of the CPLP to crown the special treatment of Lusophone-country citizens and wanted to be associated with “the contemporary affirmation of Portugal” and the quest for a democratically legitimate role for Portugal in relation to those countries after empire. Finally, it is true that law proposal 37/VII entered parliament as a law proposal drafted by a mono-party government, while the previous, failed, project had been a law project brought by the opposition. Yet, the enfranchisement of denizens was a process slowly pushed forward through several legislatures, a process aided the moderate style of political debating in the parliament—not a once-and-for-all measure supported by wide sectors of society or influential groups. It was never a PS campaign topic but rather a moot point in their agenda. That the issue did not move forward for twenty years unless by PS initiative helps to show the lack of popular interest behind it, and the very fact that it became a topic only when the PS became a government in 1996 and was addressing also migration policy and nationality laws confirms this. By then, however, the party had found a powerful

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way to frame it to gather unanimous approval for denizen enfranchisement.24 Further Revisions of Denizen Enfranchisement

Currently, the legal framework that defines migrant participation rights still caters to Portuguese emigrants despite lapses of attention to immigration issues during PS governments. The 350,000 registered denizens correspond to approximately 3.5 percent of the population, excluding foreign born who naturalized (IOM 2007: 27). Reciprocity has kept the universe of foreign voters in Portugal reduced and fragmented. The most recent official list of denizens for which passive electoral capacity is recognized can be found in Declaration 253 from July 23, 2009: all member states of the EU, Brazil, Cape Verde, Peru, and Uruguay for local elections. Regarding active electoral capacity, in addition to those already mentioned, are Argentina, Chile, Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Peru, and Venezuela. To this day, the reciprocity clause did not produce any remarkable results regarding expected reciprocity (only Venezuela was added), at least not in the countries where most Portuguese emigrants reside: France, Canada, Germany, and the United States. With regard to historical-institutionalist and post-national hypotheses, it is clear that the persistence of reciprocity in Portugal shows traditions playing a role. However, the relevant traditions need not be linked to abstract notions of citizenship or nationality. In this case, it was legal reciprocity that played a role, and (the crisis of) an imperial tradition of unequal citizenship. Still, any tradition can change. Diverse voices have called to abolish the reciprocity clause and move toward universal extension of voting rights.25 The PS has declared that the differentiations among denizens have been irrelevant and should be avoided. Under a comparable lens, the Portuguese case suggests that novel citizenship practices such as denizen enfranchisement can be more clearly understood by looking into the processes of reinterpretation in the arguments used to frame it than to transnational/post-national trends or nationality traditions as remote causes. To begin with, Portugal’s immigration policy does not fit dominant approaches to migration policy, which take for granted a generalized public opposition versus a more favorable view from economic and political elites (Freeman 1995). In contrast, it has set a model of immigrant-friendly policies rather consensually—a result of institutions that mediate pressures from immigrant groups and enable a “whole of government approach” to immigration and also choices made by

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agents (politicians, bureaucrats, civil society) to forge consensus and seek inclusion. This consensual style is also part of the legacy of a peaceful democratic transition from a revolution and decolonization process that led to reappraise the Portuguese diaspora. These are other “traditional” and institutional filters through which politicians have interpreted challenges posed by immigration.

Conclusion: The Preeminence of the Emigration Discourse The peculiar Portuguese enfranchisement of denizens has been shaped by the framing of different actors of the “relevant issues” and the categories of people to be addressed by it over time until a resonant proposal could fit within the political and institutional context. It illustrates the importance of framing when weighing international trends against national institutions and self-understandings of citizenship. As framing experts contend (Baumgartner 2009), framing allows building political resources over time through debates that test legitimizing, unifying frames. The ultimate success of framing efforts became clear not only in the passing of the reform (for which the majority in parliament was easy to secure) but also in the attempts of all parties to appropriate the issue, and in the surprisingly close positions across parties that were markedly opposed on very similar issues. However, a reform in 1997 granting voting rights of Portuguese emigrants for presidential elections and national referenda reveals that the PS and PSD agreement was central to such consensual development. Yet the absence of two topics—migration and its relation to nationality laws—reinforces the impression that the success of denizen enfranchisement in Portugal rested more on framing through a long process with plenty of feedback than on just the support from a single-party government and a tit-for-tat deal. The absence of these topics is surprising in the light of the comparative literature on denizen enfranchisement and, empirically, given that the enfranchising reform took place during a period of a major turn in government-initiated immigration policies. Although organized immigrants played a minor role in enfranchisement debates, all these initiatives strengthened their voice in the parliament through the recognition of the right to vote and beyond. Lobby activities by migrant organizations only increased in the second half of the 1990s (Sardinha 2010). Even though

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academics in Portugal have ex post facto considered denizen enfranchisement to imply “a substitution of the nationality criterion by the residence criterion” (Abreu da Silva Costa 2000: 211), no trade-off was ever considered to exist between the denizen franchise and naturalization in the debates, even though the PS was both crucial in easing naturalization and the main impulse for denizen enfranchisement. The frame of expected reciprocity for the emigrants’ benefit was superposed to the exaltation of the links among Lusophones. As strange as it sounds, framing a reform designed to enfranchise immigrants by talking about emigrants makes sense in a country where the diaspora outnumbers by a factor of ten the number of foreign residents (Malheiros 2002), who come mostly also from former colonies. Context and institutions matter to understand this. In a period of fine-tuning of democratic institutions and re-forging of international ties, such framing combined the promises of strategic alliances among parties to woo voters and of international alliances for a new postimperial Portugal. The astonishing unified stance across the political spectrum in a topic so prone to generate controversy elsewhere reveals to students of comparative politics how difficult it is to disentangle politicalstrategic rationales from cultural and symbolic rationales when it comes to comparing responses to what may seem like objectively similar challenges. The relatively harmonious passing of this law, however, coincides with a general legal framework that promotes immigrant inclusion in Portuguese society. Despite its restricted scope and strange framing, the reform led electoral participation of eligible third-country nationals to double from 1997 to 2007, even though this remains a fraction of those who would be eligible (Rodrigues et al. 2013).

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CHAPTER 4

The “Failed” Denizen Enfranchisement in Germany

Who are the people? This is the question. —Josef Isensee, constitutional lawyer and federal government consultant introducing his case against denizen enfranchisement Not “who are the people,” but “are only the people (as the German version of the nation) entitled to vote locally?” should be seen as the central issue of the alien suffrage debate. —Christian Joppke (2001: 40)

A CONTROVERSIAL PIECE of artwork in one of the inner yards of the

German federal parliament (Bundestag) is now covered by greenery because, at its inauguration, parliamentarians threw soil from their constituencies into the box that frames it and that soil contained seeds that, after eighteen years, have grown into a serendipity garden that is ever-changing. The artwork is named after the two large neon words at its center: DER ¨ LKERUNG (To the Population). With it, artist Hans Haacke motivates BEVO a comparison to the text that stands on the frontispiece dedicating the parliament to the German people: “Dem deutschen Volke.” Because of this, ¨ LKERUNG led to a heated debate in the the commissioning of DER BEVO parliament: While some parliamentarians understood that the artist wanted them to put the two texts into a dialogue, others understood it as being aimed at denying Germans their right to see themselves as the sole addressees of legislative work; others yet understood it as a symbol of the recent

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Table 4. Percentage of foreign residents, by region of origin, resident in Germany since 1981

Area of origin All

1981 (Federal Republic of Germany; German Democratic Republic)

1991

2001

7.5; 0.1

7.5

8.8

2011 9

Europe

56 (of which EU nationals are 41%)

Asia

36.8 (of which 23% are Turkish nationals)

Americas

2.8

Africa

3.6

Oceania

0.1

nationality reform that finally introduced jus soli for naturalization procedures (Drs 14/2867, 05.04.2000: 9034–48). Each party had defenders and opponents of the art project speak in the plenum. For the artist, DER ¨ LKERUNG aims to express the changed and changing nature of conBEVO temporary German society as well as the fact that the German constitution recognizes equality of all persons and not only among the German people, however defined (see Figure 5 on page 147) (Haacke 1999). In the end, the art project was saved by two votes (260 to 258 votes), showing how even the symbolic definition of who is the governing people is bound to raise controversy in the German parliament. As of 2016, Germany had a disfranchised foreign resident population of 6 percent (i.e., excluding the resident European citizens who are of eligible age to hold citizen rights and can vote in local and EP elections) (Eurostat 2017). Table 4 shows the distribution of foreign residents in Germany since 1981, by region of origin.1 Despite this substantive relevance, Germany is unlikely to be the standard choice of a case to study denizen enfranchisement: The reforms introduced there to extend voting rights to denizens in 1989 were abrogated by the Constitutional Court (hereafter BVerfG) shortly thereafter. That ruling made Germany the quintessential failed case in the literature (Earnest 2003; Groenendijk 2008).

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Still, for the purposes of this book, Germany is precisely what Mahoney and Goertz (2004), and Geddes (2010) defined as a relevant negative case. The possibilities of denizen enfranchisement in Germany have been well studied in German scholarship, especially from a legal perspective. The case has also been considered in comparative studies (Brubaker 1998; Hansen and Koehler 2005; Joppke 2001, 1999; Rubio-Marı´n 2000; Weil 2003). However, none of these has covered the span of time that these debates have lasted. Most of them stopped at the BVerfG ruling, as if no other parliamentary proposals had been made later. But they were. This chapter portrays how the arguments have changed in a debate that is still alive nearly four decades after it began. As its predecessor, the backbone of this chapter is a series of comparisons. Due to its federal structure, this is a case that invites within-case comparisons among its subunits, each showing a different type of enfranchisement and embedded in a larger federal process. Germany allows us to see how while framing in a local political context matter in relation to the national context, and how transnational influences are appraised in polities of different levels. I will first present the political-institutional context surrounding the first proposals in West Germany in the late 1970s. Second, I will develop the German case(s) following debates on denizen enfranchisement in the four La¨nder where they took off, the debates at the federal level, and the BVerfG’s ruling that struck down denizen enfranchisement. Finally, I will review how the BVerfG ruling has been appraised in later proposals. Before doing anything, however, I will present some methodological caveats, since—in contrast to the case of Portugal for which the data on national debates was manageable—the sheer number of relevant texts at all levels in Germany made it imperative to develop a different method to manage and systematize the data.

Data and Their Systematization As with the Portuguese case, this chapter aims to discover the issues at stake in denizen enfranchisement and how they entered, left, or changed along the debates of the discussion, to understand which factors led to the ultimate success or failure of the reform process. The unit of analysis is the same: the argument. Analyzing arguments without the help of technology

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was possible for the Portuguese case, which included about 150 pages. Yet, the empirical material for the German case(s) consisted of 190 parliamentary documents (Figure A.2 in the Appendix), ranging from one to seventy pages each, from the federal (Bundestag, Bundesrat, and BVerfG) level and from fifteen of the La¨nder.2 In the Appendix, Figure A.3 presents the proposals on denizen enfranchisement analyzed, ordering them by La¨nder or the federal level and by the stage of the political process they reached (debated in parliament or not), and party, showing the long span of German debates on denizen enfranchisement at all levels. Following the procedure as for the case of Portugal, I confronted the data with the same key question: How is denizen enfranchisement conceived of, when, and by whom? The length and number of responses made it necessary to order arguments into codes with the help of a computerbased program, according to their content (what is said), their form/tone (how it is said), and the stage of the debate they alluded to or came from.3 This led to a code system (see Figure A.4 in the Appendix) I developed by carefully reading and rereading fifteen documents, not from a predesigned category system.4 I later ordered and adjusted the code system for other debates, remaining open to new codes and arguments. Upon reading all documents, I assigned text segments that constitute argument units to the codes. After indexing all the documents, I analyzed all passages, ordering them in subcodes (Kelle and Kluge 1999: 57). I did not use automatic coding or word frequencies, as is done in quantitative content analyses. Coding served only to order and systematize data, the analysis meant thoroughly reading the documents and reconstructing a narrative that unfolds exactly as debates unfolded—that is, not abstracting them from their time or context.

The Institutional Context of the First Denizen Enfranchisement Proposals in West Germany It is not difficult to understand why Germany served for such a long time as the prototype of an “ethno-cultural and differentialist” (Brubaker 1990: 379) or a “restrictive, nationalist, linguistic—and blood-based” understanding of citizenship (Palmovski 2008: 547). Its naturalization rates were the lowest in Europe when the debates started and unfolded—under 0.5 percent of those eligible until 1980, less than 1 percent on average from 1980

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until 1990 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012: 15).5 Although immigration had been growing continuously by hundreds of thousands since its first labor recruitment program with Italy in 1955,6 Germany did not have any migration integration policy until the 1990s. By 1970, the foreign population in Germany was close to 3 million,7 yet the political elite did not recognize immigration as a reality in German society: Migrants were considered “guest-workers,” expected to eventually “go home.”8 Initially, that expectation was emphasized by the barrack-style housing provided to guest workers and a lack of pathways to residence permits for migrants with different statuses. Only after 1978 were migrants able to request long-term or unrestricted residence entitlements upon proving language competence and a “high degree of socioeconomic integration.” In contrast to the guest workers, two privileged categories of immigrants were not even considered such: the Aussiedler, persons of German ancestry living in Eastern Europe who had been born as Germans east of the current border with Poland and who stayed there after 1945; and the Vertriebene, a population displaced from the German territories within the borders of the Empire (Thra¨nhardt 2002).9 Article 116 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter FRG) entitled both categories to claim nationality, and thus voting rights at all levels, immediately. They were the target of special integration programs, as it was presumed that they would remain in Germany, yet were allowed to keep double nationality under the assumption that their loyalty was undivided since they were “Germans” (Anil 2005: 457). Between the 1960s and 1990s, they arrived in the hundreds of thousands, making up 3 million of today’s German citizen population, generally courted by conservative parties. For the rest of the immigrants, access to citizenship was regulated first by the Foreigners’ Law (Ausla¨ndergesetz) introduced in 1965 to regulate their work and residence and later by the Naturalization Guidelines (Einbu¨rgerungsrichtlinien) passed in 1977 under a social democratic government. Both laws openly discouraged naturalization: “The FRG is not a country of immigration, it does not strive to increase the number of German citizens through naturalization . . . the personal desires and economic interests of the applicant are not decisive” (Einbu¨rgerungsrichtlinien des BMI, Dec. 1977, 2.2–2.3). In this context, and roughly a hundred years after German unification wiped away some scattered foreign resident voting practices,10 Christian associations (Protestant and Catholic) in Hamburg and Bremen made the

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first calls to enfranchise foreign residents. The first formal sociopolitical actors to respond to those calls in the early 1970s were trade unions and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).11 The preparatory work toward a formal law proposal took place in conference panels organized to discuss the feasibility of enfranchise denizens at La¨nder-level without a federal constitutional reform that clarified Article 28 of the Constitution, which loosely defined the electorate as the people (Volksbegriff). Although the legal intricacies of this discussion need not be dealt with here (not least because the legal experts cited above occupy themselves fully with them),12 it is necessary to explain briefly the controversy around the concept of “people,” for it has been central to debates on denizen enfranchisement in Germany. The concept is treated ambiguously in the German constitution (or Basic Law) and across levels of government: Different sections of the constitution equate people to German nationals, but other references can be in fact equated with “citizens” as “residents” or even “persons.” This is why its interpretation became crucial, especially in Article 20, paragraph 2, which states that “(2) all state-authority emanates from the people. It will be exercised by the people (vom Volke aus) through elections,” but Article 28 which specifies that “in the La¨nder, districts and communes the people (Volk) must have a representation that emanates from general, free, equal and secret elections.” Experts and politicians of different political orientations understand a different relation between these constitutional articles. Conservatives state until today that “the people” is the Volk as defined in Article 116 of the Basic Law: “Germans in the constitutional sense are, unless other legislation applies, those who possess the German nationality/citizenship (Staatsangeho¨rigkeit) or refugees or displaced persons of German nationality or as their spouse or descendant have been included in the territory of the German Empire as it was on December 31, 1937.” Proponents of denizen enfranchisement, however, have argued over time that the spirit of the Basic Law was not to restrict the idea of people to the German nationals and, that the standard for the definition of Volk in Article 28 is the democratic principle of self-determination, which also applies to long-term foreign residents at the communal level, considering that structurally (in function and legal nature) communes are different from the state and the federation (Wiegl 1992: 32). A proposal to enfranchise denizens entered politics when, in 1978, the federal government’s Commissioner on Foreigner Issues delivered a memorandum—the so-called Kuhn-Memorandum13—which recommended

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developing a coherent integration policy based on the final acknowledgment that Germany had become a country of immigration. Concretely, it also advised both to facilitate access to citizenship for people born and raised in Germany and to introduce communal voting rights after long residence periods. In the 1980s, conferences and publications on denizen enfranchisement mushroomed; the topic had gained momentum after Sweden’s national reform to enfranchise denizens at the local level. Legal scholars exposed their views on the feasibility of a reform at the La¨nder level: after initial skepticism, by the mid-1980s more experts believed the reform could pass with a “progressive interpretation of the Constitution.”14 The Evangelical Church assumed a prominent role as convener of supporters, especially academics from Germany and neighboring countries where the issue also was being discussed (e.g., the Netherlands). The recommendations emanating from these discussions showed ambiguity regarding the necessity of a constitutional reform but unanimously rejected that consultative councils without decision-making power could be an alternative to the vote and suggested that the debate on denizen enfranchisement be framed as an issue in the interest of Germans first (Franz 1981: 45). Given the early involvement of trade unions, it is not surprising that the first party to take issue with denizen enfranchisement was the Social Democratic Party. For decades, the story of federal governments in Germany has been the succession of coalitions between either the SPD or the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) (with its Bavarian sibling party, the Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern [CSU]), which together occupy the center of the political spectrum and have, until recently, amassed up to threequarters of the votes. These two parties are firmly rooted in a party system, which only after the 1980s can be said to consist of four to five parties. Since 1991, the main other parties in parliament have been the liberal democrats of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Greens (Bu¨ndnis 90 or AL), and the PDS (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus; later Linke or the Left). In the political spectrum, these parties occupy the following positions from left to right: PDS/Linke, Gru¨ne/Bu¨ndnis 90, SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU (Saalfeld 2002: 108–113). As we will see, there have been parties successfully elected to La¨nder parliaments, especially in the right end of the spectrum (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands [NPD]; die Republikaner; die Deutsche Volksunion [DVU]; and, in 2017, the Alternative fu¨r Deutschland [AfD], which reached the Bundestag with 12.6 percent of the votes).

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Data on the expected voting preferences of foreigners, if they were given the vote, are far from straightforward: Over time, estimations have been conducted by polling institutes using different methods and geographic selections.15 Yet, the assumption has largely been that most would vote for left-wing parties.16

Four Legislative Processes, Two Passed Reforms, One Court Ruling, and Copious Debates Despite sharing a legal background, political and historical references, the enfranchisement processes, and debates in Hamburg, Bremen, SchleswigHolstein, and West Berlin followed different paths. In Hamburg, the pioneer state in Germany, the debate on denizen enfranchisement took long to take off, preceded by long negotiations between parties and intricate expert hearings which set the terms and questions to be discussed in that debate, and in the other La¨nder, too. In Bremen, the debate had been prepared for awhile in the arena of civil society, while legislation had quietly moved forward through minor laws, only gaining a relevant political dimension as the reform in Hamburg was under way, and as an extreme right-wing party entered parliament, leading to a stalled reform process and a debate that degenerated quickly into protracted political fights. In Schleswig-Holstein, the proposal followed the reform process in Hamburg with a high degree of consensus, as it echoed what was perceived as a longtime, legitimate request in that particular state to enfranchise a legally recognized nonmigrant, yet foreign resident minority: the Danes. The reform passed more swiftly there than anywhere else in Germany. Finally, West Berlin had a controversial reform process that tried different legal paths and frames, even after the BVerfG had suspended the implementation of the successful Schleswig-Holstein reform and was known to be preparing a final ruling on the constitutionality of local denizen enfranchisement reforms altogether. These four cases are not random in Germany: Three of them—Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg—stand out in terms of their high proportions of foreign residents, topping 15 percent (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017: 15); and in terms of their basic political structures—as they are densely populated city-states (Stadtstaaten), with unique government structures. By the time the debates started, Berlin was still a divided city, with particular

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administrative laws. The “odd-case,” because of its “normal” (Fla¨chenstaat) structure within Germany, was Schleswig-Holstein, but then again it was exceptional in having a legally recognized foreign minority.17

The Enfranchisement Reform in Hamburg As early as 1980, the government of Hamburg stated in a parliamentary communication that it would strive to allow long-time foreign residents to vote in local elections (Drs 9/2431), but a debate did not take off until 1988. Meanwhile, the Green party made four proposals, starting with one that required a very short residence (three months), and finally proposing three years as a compromise so that the SPD and the FDP would agree to discuss it. Nevertheless, this did not happen, and, in turn, those parties appropriated the topic for their coalition agreement toward the new legislative period. The CDU argued from the start that denizen enfranchisement was not needed, since denizens were apparently not interested in political participation as they were not exercising their right of consultation at the local level. Replying that a counseling voice could not be compared to a vote, the SPD-FDP Hamburg government prepared a programmatic document referring to the Kuhn Memorandum: Denizen enfranchisement for foreigners of more than eight years of residence would be a solution to a democratic deficit given difficult naturalization procedures. It is important to note that the government recognized it was unrealistic to expect clearing all doubts about denizen enfranchisement being constitutionally feasible,18 and advised restricting the discussion to voting at the communal level, arguing that the democratic deficit was stronger there. In its proposed “Law to introduce voting rights for foreigners at the municipal assemblies” (Bezirksversammlungen, hereafter BV)19 (Drs 13/ 1680), which joined a similar proposal 13/2245 by the Greens, the government quoted judicial experts and academics who were ready to argue that, in order to keep harmony with the highest democratic principles ingrained in the constitution, the concept of people (Volksbegriff) allowed an extensive “sociological” interpretation. It needed to be adjusted because society had changed through immigration without there being any legal consequences in naturalization rules: “The core of the community-of-life-andfate on German soil comprises Germans, but its edges can be extended.” In

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turn, the CDU set a narrow space for negotiation from the very start, conveying the message that the CDU would not hesitate to turn to the courts if proponents would not compromise. In November 1988, the party factions agreed to postpone the debate until the committees consulted (“Law” and “Situation of Foreigners”) submitted their recommendations.20 In turn, those committees organized hearings with academic experts proposed by each party faction.21 These hearings merit attention because they delineated arguments that would be quoted time and again in debates beyond Hamburg. Each expert received a questionnaire that had to be answered and sent back before the hearing. These questionnaires centered on whether foreigners could be included in the constitutional understanding of Volk; whether European Economic Community citizens should constitute another electorate; whether, in view of practices in other countries, a reciprocity clause should be included; whether the BV could be equated to communes; and, finally, whether eight years was an appropriate residence requirement (Drs 13/3115). Also, it introduced a new way of understanding constitutionality: “Is it compatible with our constitutional understanding of democracy that a sizeable part of the population is subject to the authority of the FRG as much as German citizens yet is excluded from democratic participation—as subjects on probation?” Some experts minimized the consequences of a democratic deficit, providing examples that ridiculed the urgency of the proposal. Conversely, others supported it as part of a “larger debate, ongoing for 15–20 years.” Only one expert convoked by the SPD minimized the danger posed by the proposal by pointing out that voting rights limited to the BV were so unimportant that letting foreigners vote in them would have practically no effect on bodies conveying sovereignty. This discursive strategy is not trivial: In Portugal, a technical framing that limited the reform’s impact enabled the commitment of parties that had previously opposed. Yet, in the case of Hamburg, the argument was turned around when the same speaker stated it would be “sad to focus the justification on that” and demanded to push the debate deeper into a discussion on whether a nation-state population (Staatsvolk) may rule over a population of “subordinates” (Untertanenvolk) in a democracy (Drs 13/3115, para.162). With only one exception,22 the experts backed the political stance of the party that had convoked them, taking feasibility as a dividing line: whether legislators in La¨nder could legally (re)define what Volk was and enfranchise denizens without hurting principles of equivalence and homogeneity of elections and electoral rights

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across the federation. Experts called by the CDU declared that the proposal was unconstitutional and added that the integration of foreigners would be threatened by giving them voting rights, because they would have fewer incentives to naturalize—although the questionnaire had mentioned neither “integration” nor “naturalization.” Furthermore, they argued that it sufficed that long-time residents were protected by German rule of law. Here they raised two connected arguments that would prove resilient in all their interventions in denizen enfranchisement processes in Germany: (1) that, due to their foreign nationality, foreigners had “exit options” vis-a`-vis citizens, and (2) that they did not belong to the “community of fate” unless they naturalized and gave up their previous citizenship. Thus, for them, naturalization was both the only way to prove integration and the only legitimate way to acquire citizen rights, stating time and again that the scope of legislators did not allow for “weakening nationality [which] constitutes the upper and lower frontier of citizen rights” (Drs 13/3115, para. 502). Some went as far as to affirm that migration only occurred when the incoming persons had the intention to naturalize.23 They extrapolated from low naturalization rates that resident immigrants had no intention to naturalize. Finally, conservative experts ridiculed examples given of countries in the world that had enfranchised denizens: The argument of “democratic consistency” seemed ridiculous to them, as “no people had been ever constituted themselves originally according to democratic principles,” implying that although extending voting rights would be more democratic, denying them was not undemocratic. They also justified keeping the Volksbegriff “unchanged” by naming “powerful States of the world” (e.g. the United States) that had not enfranchised denizens (paras. 162–184). However, experts convoked by the SPD ensured that the legislators could interpret the Volksbegriff to overcome nationality and portrayed denizen voting rights as either (a) a pathway, not an alternative to naturalization, or (b) an alternative to naturalization, justified by the lack of a majority at the federal level to facilitate naturalization (paras.168–169). The arguments from experts and the committee’s recommendations laid the groundwork for the rawer parliamentary debate that would follow, starting February 1, 1989.24 Only among parliamentarians, the terms of the debate turned simpler: arguments about the Volksbegriff, predominant in the expert hearings, almost disappeared. Yet, the prominent argument of Hamburg becoming a pioneer of denizen voting rights in Germany emerged,25 as it was known

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that governments in North Rhine-Westfalia and Bremen were considering enfranchising denizens locally and the European Commission was drafting a directive on local level voting rights for European residents (Drs 13/3160, para. 13). The CDU made its position clear from the start: There was no democratic deficit to address because the addresses of the reform were conceived by them as “guests” (even if invited and legal) who already had social and civil rights (para. 941). For the CDU, denizen voters could always escape the consequences of their decisions by returning to their countries of origin (an argument they also use against double nationality). Therefore, denizen voting rights could neither be considered a pathway or first step nor be accepted as an alternative to citizenship (PlPt 13/45, para. 136). Moreover, the CDU expressed that the proposal was dangerous as it could mislead foreigners’ expectations and harm both the prestige of Hamburg, and democracy, by creating different classes of electorates with unequal burdens of responsibility. Having seen their own proposals rejected four times only to see them appropriated by the SPD and FDP, the Greens participated in the debate with little responsibility for its fate, antagonizing all other parties and arguing simply that something “had to be done” after the far rightwing Republikaner (hereafter REP), had gotten 7.5 percent of votes in Berlin, and to which they likened the CDU position.26 Finally, the SPD focused on diverting attacks: For instance, raising the inconsistency of the CDU stance in relation to the Aussiedler, from whom it did not seem to require proof of integration before awarding full citizen rights (para. 999). The FDP stated its support without openly committing and placed itself somewhere between the SPD and the CDU, granting that their support came from a coalition agreement: “The FDP supposes that the foreign co-citizens that live for long here occupy themselves with politics in their commune because they are directly affected by it, and therefore have a great interest in political participation” (para. 306—my italics). The party’s position on the issue reached most clarity when Ingo von Munch, who led the FDP to a coalition with the SPD and was second mayor of Hamburg, took the floor, with a speech conveying the impression of objectively weighing the two sides: This parliament stands before one of its most important political decisions: a question that we have been confronted with for many years and that goes beyond Hamburg. It may mean that Hamburg

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becomes a pilot, the first federal state that gives voting rights to foreign citizens. It may also mean that the contrary opinion establishes and that the door is closed once and for all [para. 694] . . . The issue is contested, but while the voices supporting it from the judicial perspective were very few at the beginning, they were clearly the majority in the hearings [para. 737]. By the end of the first debate, the SPD’s proposal 13/1680 was approved with sixty-eight votes in favor and forty-seven against. The law could have been approved the same day had the CDU not objected to an immediate second reading. Two weeks later, the CDU opened the debate reframing it as one about integration: “Granting voting rights presumes successful integration, because participating in decisions that may have life-long effects requires full consciousness that the matters decided affect a society where one belongs and wants to remain.” The SPD responded by accepting that communal level voting would be a concrete step toward integration, thus moving away from its original argument that denizens were already integrated. The law passed in its second reading on February 20, 1989, with sixtysix versus forty-five votes, giving active voting rights to foreigners of all nationalities in the BV after eight years of residence. Hamburg was enfranchising more than 150,000 persons. There are three crucial issues that divided parties in this debate and set the terms for coming debates. The first issue is the political assessment of whether denizens were integrated already. The Greens’ position was that they were, thus enfranchisement was required as a matter of democratic consistency and equality. The CDU was equally consistent, denying they were and furthermore arguing that their enfranchisement would have perverse effects on integration, as denizens would make even fewer efforts to integrate. The SPD and the FDP changed their views along the debate.27 The second issue was whether there was a need to extend voting rights, in view of the absence of popular demand. For critical voices from the left and right, the contrast with past enfranchisement movements was obvious, but it was interpreted differently: For some Green parliamentarians, the process was not legitimated by a process where migrants could be promoters of their own rights; for the CDU, it was illegitimate because it ignored the will of the German population which, for them, was clearly against denizen enfranchisement.28 The SPD and the FDP hinted at the conditions

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of fear and marginalization of the foreign population as an explanation, but thereby they were echoing CDU frames that portrayed denizens as “needy.” The third issue was the very categorization of the potential constituency: denizens were referred to differently by each party: The SPD rejected the term “guests” (para. 872), using instead terms neutral to origin, such as “persons,” “neighbors,” “co-citizens” (Mitburger), and “workers” (Arbeitnehmer);29 the CDU used consistently “guests” or “foreigners” (never “migrants”); the Greens rejected any categorization other than “co-citizen.” As we will see later in this chapter, the debate on denizen enfranchisement in Hamburg did not end with the passing of this reform. It restarted on April 25, 1990, when the parliament hosted a long discussion over the anticipated revocation of denizen voting rights, shortly after the BVerfG preliminary decided to suspend the Schleswig-Holstein enfranchisement, which had also recently been passed.

Bremen: The Longest Quest for Denizen Voting Rights Bremen had been quietly approaching denizen enfranchisement at a lowerthan- communal level since 1985, when the “law to change the local laws on neighborhood councils in the territory of the city of Bremen” (Ortgesetz ¨ nderungsgesetz 1985: 236) gave foreigners legally resident in BremGBl.-A Bremen for more than five years the right to be elected to those councils (Beira¨te).30 Because these were primarily councils with no authoritative decision-making power (they had fewer competencies and autonomy than the Hamburg BV), jurists concluded that the law was constitutional (Weigl 1992: 83). This law was in force before Bremen passed the “Beiratsgesetz” of June 20, 1989, which extended the Beira¨te competencies, strengthening their election process and thus broadening foreigners’ participation rights to active and passive voting rights (Brem. GBl: 236). That debate is the one that properly extended voting rights to foreigners at the communal level in Bremen. Yet the previous, if modest, 1985 Ortgesetz law, reveals that Bremen is the discrete pioneer of denizen enfranchisement in Germany and certainly the polity that remains the longest-running and most consistently at the forefront of that quest, with the latest, most serious enfranchisement attempt in 2013–2014. The quietly advantaged legal position of Bremen is concomitant to a wide, active societal debate in the 1980s. The Bremer SPD had led meetings

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with supporting associations for at least two years to develop a programmatic guide on how to frame the proposal both as an issue of democratic coherence and a strategy for integration through participation. The resulting publications suggested drawing lessons from the experiences of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, and arguing for the spirit of commitment to democracy in the constitution—what in the Hamburg debate had been referred to as “sociological reading of the Volksbegriff.” These papers anticipated possible arguments against the proposal, preparing proponents to be ready to counter them,31 and they suggested that anyone against enfranchising foreign co-citizens “on judicial grounds” should be suspected of being against it fundamentally. The first formal initiative came from the Greens in February 1987, addressing foreign residents who lived for over three months in Bremen and more than three years in Germany to vote for the Bu¨rgerschaft (the parliament of both city and state level in Bremen) (Drs 11/853, para. 1). From the first reading, this debate was emotionally charged. The Greens presented it as “a signal of the readiness to move to a multicultural society” and portrayed individuals among the addressees, not as an abstract, passive whole: Kadri has worked twenty years for Vulkan. His children grew up here. He collaborates with Turkish and German workers every day, but he may not vote. Ali is a social worker in Walle, leads social counselors there, helps many of his co-nationals and speaks German as perfectly as he speaks Turkish, but may not vote. Gu¨len is a member of the umbrella association of foreigners in Bremen. She may not vote. Gu¨lbahar is a young Turkish woman who feels realized in biculturalism. She may not vote. When we hear about the 4.5 million foreigners in the FRG an anonymous mass comes to mind, but they are individual persons and destinies; many of them embittered, deceived and annoyed about the injustice they have to endure. This two-class system in our society does not correspond to a democracy. I know that the CDU will entrench behind judicial opinions, that they will use the concepts of people and nation in the Basic Law. These are but mock battles to mask their political position. (PlPt 11/ 76, paras. 41–46)

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Avoiding the ambiguities shown by the SPD in Hamburg, the Bremen SPD clarified its stance toward integration: “political integration is a precondition for social integration.” Yet, the Bremen SPD deemed the Greens’ proposal naı¨ve and proposed another path: How one defines the playing field politically is key in any parliamentary debate. To demand something without thinking how it could be realized does not work. It is naı¨ve and ignorant of the political reality and a decisive tactical mistake to regard dominant constitutional interpretations as nonsense. These interpretations mirror factual political balances. By starting too early, one may lose the chance to change anything, because these balances have the power to reproduce the legal state of things that we want to see changed. What the Greens are doing here is unprecedented and irresponsible; no other faction has proposed La¨nder-level voting rights. . . . There are risks that one cannot avoid unless by convincing others through a long discussion process . . . We salute your proposal as a contribution to discuss this in parliament so that we get closer to widening the opportunities of foreigners to participate politically, but we suggest that, since the legislative period is coming to an end, despite its formal expiry we turn the proposal to an internal committee which can suggest how to go about it in the next period. (paras. 114–117). A far-right party in the Bremen parliament, the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), echoed the CDU’s rejection of the Green proposal and also of the alternative SPD proposal (para. 195). However, the Greens’ response to the SPD suggestion showed that not even the Greens believed their proposal had a chance, accepting that their intention had been to generate an “open social discussion beyond parliament.” The government asked to moderate emotions in the debate and to support the procedure proposed by the SPD (paras. 258–260). Since the SPD faction alone sufficed to pass the SPD option, all other parties took action while the proposal was in the committee: The DVU introduced a motion to affirm that denizen voting rights were unconstitutional and against the will of Germans (Drs 12/289 and PlPt 12/27, para. 88); the Greens introduced motions to assert “solidarity with foreigners” (Drs 12/509 and Drs 12/452) and the CDU made a statement that would hold true for their stance throughout the debates at all

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levels: “The FRG is no country of immigration. Naturalization should be at the end of the integration process of long-time resident foreigners. The requisites for it can be facilitated by reducing the residence period or the fees, but foreigners must decide whether they want to be German or preserve their nationality. Any foreigner who wants to vote in Germany must become German. Voting rights for foreigners at any level will be rejected” (Drs 12/516, paras. 44–57). In the end, the Greens’ proposal was rejected, while the proposal by the SPD passed—with the SPD and Greens votes (the FDP abstained and the CDU voted against). The Bremen debate had been long anticipated, with a script practically prepared by civil society, only waiting for political actors to take it on stage. Yet when that finally happened, Hamburg, not Bremen, was in the spotlight, even if the reach of the proposed denizen franchise was more ambitious in Bremen. However, in Bremen, parties showed little responsibility for the success of the proposal; the SPD, with a comfortable majority to pass laws, was better articulated to defend it but showed that a government with a parliamentary majority sympathetic to it was not enough to pass it. Pressed from left and right, the CDU took a clearer stance toward it, making clear that by integration the CDU meant assimilation: “Assimilation and integration cannot succeed when foreigners want to keep their national and cultural identity as intact as possible here. The order must be: integration–citizenship–voting rights” (para. 329).

Schleswig-Holstein: A Compromise on Reciprocity The first proposals to extend voting rights to denizens in SchleswigHolstein date back to the foundation of the Su¨dschleswigscher Wa¨hlerverband (SSW), a party representing the Danish minority, avowed follower of sociopolitical developments in Scandinavia. Exempted from the 5 percent representation hurdle on minority grounds, the SSW has had a single seat in parliament since 1947. This seat was occupied from 1971 to 1996 by Karl-Otto Meyer. With this faction size he needed to convince other parties in order to get his proposals to be discussed. Expectably, the successful reform to enfranchise denizens in Schleswig-Holstein would ultimately follow the lines of reforms in Scandinavian countries, which, by the mid1980s, were still based on reciprocity. Yet the original proposal was aimed at universal denizen enfranchisement. As the debate went on and to get the

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reform passed, the SSW and SPD compromised on universality, raised the residence requirement from three to five years, and postponed the date of implementation from November 1989 to March 1990. Beyond reciprocity, the Schleswig-Holstein debate was distinct from other German debates on denizen enfranchisement for its relatively short length and its consistently moderate tone following an initial agreement to depoliticize the issue across all parties. In Schleswig-Holstein, a sizeable population of Danes was excluded from political participation, while Germans could vote and be elected in neighboring Denmark. This contrast made arguments about democratic consistency and the international comparisons more urgent there than anywhere else. After decades of SSW attempts, in June 1988, the head of the government of Schleswig-Holstein, Bjo¨rn Engholm (SPD), made the case for reform in his inauguration speech, arguing that the law could not wait longer: “We know that the SPD holds different opinions in Hesse, Bremen and North Rhine-Westfalia, as government or opposition. Some suggest we wait until acceptance is gained. . . . Such an attitude is not involved enough; we could wait eternally. The SSW will again make a proposal to introduce voting rights on the basis of reciprocity as a first step. We can then discuss positions and study its constitutionality” (PlPt 12/2, para. 258). The SSW introduced simultaneously two law projects: one to enfranchise denizens at the local level after three years of residence (Drs 12/72, para. 8) and another to push the government of Schleswig-Holstein to raise support in the Bundesrat (Drs 12/73). A week later, the SPD proposed universal enfranchisement with a longer residence requirement (Drs 12/ 74), labeling it “politically necessary and judicially possible” (para. 16). When the debate took off, the SPD presented it as an issue of democratic consistency (PlPt 12/9, para. 24) and a supplement to naturalization when double nationality is impossible (para. 27). More important, it emphasized positive effects for German society: “This law will facilitate the acceptance of foreigners as co-citizens because, as a voting group, they won’t be degraded in political fights. Xenophobic campaigns, which threaten not only foreigners, but all of us and our democracy as a whole, will lose ground” (para. 31). Although a contrast with neighboring Denmark was hard to avoid, the CDU still argued that the “valid international comparison” should be made to “the majority of nations” (para. 112). The SPD’s zeal in defending the proposal from the CDU’s arguments provoked a surprised reaction from

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the SSW, which denied the SPD any ownership of the proposal (paras. 69 and 266) and pledged to proceed with reciprocity first, in order to secure that at least the Danes would be included in the 1990 elections: “We would at least advance one step towards voting rights for all: In the coming years, communal rights for EC citizens, and finally for all, independently of origin. But, to get there, we need to gain majorities” (para. 74). Agreeing with the SSW that the reform had to be passed soon, the SPD pressed to send it to committees, warning other parties that the topic should be kept in low profile, “away from emotion-stirring campaigns” (paras. 236–240). The SSW had no choice but to accept the procedure proposed by the SPD, rescuing a frame of historical justice: Some say that the SSW wants to win Danish votes in the next elections, but we do not need them. In this area Danes are not immigrants, but people whose ancestors lived here, opting for Denmark when Prussia obliged them to. They preserved that citizenship, just as in 1920 there were people in Nord-Schleswig who preserved German nationality. Some of these persons rooted here are 85 years old and have never voted! Aussiedler, whose ancestors have lived for 300, 400, 500 years in Russia or Romania, and cannot even speak German, can vote. I have no personal problem with that, but how do I explain it to the Danish minority? (para. 273) Surprisingly, after this intervention the CDU stated it would not vote as it had in 1979 and 1985, suggesting a positive vote “so far as the constitution permits” (para. 312). The CDU later clarified that it meant enfranchising EC citizens only: “The time when the Turks, Tamils, Indians, and what not get voting rights at the communal level is not now” (para. 356). The two SSW proposals and the SPD proposal passed to a committee which held four sessions on it, raising consultations with communal associations and finally recommending the acceptance of the SSW proposal 12/ 72 to be applied in the local elections of March 1990 (Drs 12/194, paras. 4 and 35). By this time, the Federal Minister of Justice, Hans Engelhard (FDP), had declared that voting rights were unconstitutional, discrediting the ongoing processes in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, as well as the Minister of Interior, Friedrich Zimmermann,32 who had just characterized them as an assault on the constitution.

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The debate reopened in plenum with a corrected version of the proposal that anchored enfranchisement to reciprocity and increased the residence requirement. Its voting was conditional on the withdrawal of the SSW’s original proposal. The CDU decried the time pressure to pass a reform before elections (PlPt 12/17) and at this point, not earlier, it rescued arguments against denizen voting rights heard in Hamburg before, regarding the harm that would be done to foreigners’ integration and expectations, once the BVerfG declared it nil. In Schleswig-Holstein, however, the SPD had a clear stance regarding the order between naturalization and voting rights than in Hamburg and demanded consistency from the CDU: “Those who hold that naturalization is the only path should commit to encourage massive naturalizations” (para. 298). The SPD portrayed denizen enfranchisement as inevitable in Schleswig-Holstein so that parties should avoid arguments exposed in Hamburg. Yet, as in Hamburg, the SPD also minimized the reform’s political effects: With this reform, we can collect experiences and the population will discover that it will not trigger the terrible consequences feared. In Denmark and Sweden, foreign voters have not formed new parties, but vote for established ones. We have raised the required residence period to make clear our political will to compromise. We agree to the SSW proposal not because we think it would be politically or judicially less awkward to enfranchise blonde North-Europeans first and then, later, who knows when, the Turks. If this phrasing sounds odd, recall the CDU’s intervention earlier when they distinguished Europeans from “Turks, Tamils, Indians, and what not.” [If you, the CDU, are] ready to support communal voting rights for EC citizens you will have to justify why you reject this one. . . . You argue that it does not serve integration, but xenophobia. Xenophobia will surely not be the consequence of extending voting rights, yet it can be the consequence of abusing the topic. (PlPt 12/17, paras. 113, 199) The CDU replied matter-of-factly that it would see that its federal faction requested norm control (para. 214). By this moment, it was clear that the reform would face judicial obstacles, but the parties in favor were ready to try its frontiers: “Judicial arguments perpetuate inaction. In 1975 there was

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the first proposal on this; in 1976 and 1985, resolutions, but nothing followed because this parliament’s majority entrenched behind judicial arguments” (para. 340). Proposal 12/194 passed with SPD and SSW votes. The law (Gesetz zur ¨ nderung des Gemeinde-und Kreiswahlgesetzes) was published on February A 21, 1989; one day after the Hamburg parliament passed its enfranchising reform. With it, Schleswig-Holstein was enfranchising more than 5,500 Danish, Irish, Norwegian, Dutch, Swedish, and Swiss residents. The CDU had a more moderate voice than in previous debates, granting that the issue depended on political and not only on judicial arguments, even if toward the end it closed its gap with the otherwise solid CDU position across La¨nder. The “better argument” of Schleswig-Holstein may explain the committed stance of the SPD supporting the democratic consistency argument as a matter of justice, which had not come up either in Hamburg or Bremen. It may also explain the more responsible behavior of all parties and the moderate rhetoric. Interestingly, parties in favor avoided the term “migrants” and the SSW explicitly rejected debating migration. But something important was different regarding the political spectrum. Instead of extremist parties, a recognized, small minority party could attest to the length of its support for the issue and was ready to compromise in order to get it passed: Less would be more, as long as it covered the Danes.

West Berlin: Debating to Send a Signal At the time the enfranchisement debates started in Germany, Berlin was still a city divided by a wall, with administration laws that made any electoral change even thornier there than in the city-states of Bremen or Hamburg, which make the attempts to enfranchise denizens seem like a long story of trial and error. However, this case shows also the importance of periodization when we compare episodes of an apparently similar phenomenon: Debates in West Berlin went on even after the BVerfG ordered the suspension of implementation of the Schleswig-Holstein reform. They went on to “send a signal”—an argument perhaps nowhere so urgent than there, where the Republikaner had reached parliament. Denizen enfranchisement had been raised first by the Alternative List (AL)—a coalition of Green parties—in 1985, in an “inquiry about immigration policy in Berlin” (PlPt 10/19), on the thirtieth anniversary of the

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first guest-worker contract with Italy (Drs 10/488 and 10/489). Soon after, the coalition government of the SPD-AL agreed to address it, but a formal proposal to enfranchise foreign residents in the Bezirksverordnetenversammlungen (BVV)33 materialized only in 1987 (Drs 10/1667, by the SPD; Drs 10/1668, by the AL), presented as part of “a wide and rapidly growing international trend” (PlPt 10/58, para. 43), an argument that was quickly contested by the CDU in the same ridiculing tone it applied in other La¨nder. On April 29, 1988, the SPD introduced a proposal to change the Berlin constitution, including denizen franchise in the catalog of fundamental rights (Drs 10/2183, para. 80). However, the confidence expressed by the SPD in the written proposal disappeared when the plenary debate opened on May 5, 1988: “We know well that the extension of voting rights to foreign residents does not have a chance, and not because of judicial reasons” (PlPt 10/74, para. 53). This provoked a clash with the AL, which asked why the SPD doubted that a procedure that they were negotiating in Hamburg would be correct in Berlin (para. 114). A year passed before the second reading, without any change in positions. The CDU held firm in its arguments of unconstitutionality and the primacy of naturalization but articulated them more clearly than elsewhere: “If resident foreigners get voting rights they will want to found their own parties. It is very natural because the foreigners naturally cannot integrate in the German parties. This will have an impact on this city and state. I would not like a Berlin or a FRG whose political image is affected by foreign parties” (PlPt 10/84, para. 70—my italics). Supporters (AL and SPD) continued to defend voting rights but away from the focus on naturalization, yet still echoing it: “We strongly support the facilitation of naturalization, but that is not the only way of opening political participation” (para. 140). The Berliner FDP rejected it arguing there was “nil interest.” The Internal, Security and Order Affairs Committee recommended rejecting the proposals on grounds of possible unconstitutionality (Drs 10/2525; Drs 10/2526). On October 12, 1989, when the BVerfG rushed to produce a provisional commentary on the Schleswig-Holstein reform (einstweilige Anordnung), ordering its suspension for the upcoming local elections in March, it argued pragmatically that the damage that would occur if the reform were applied only to be later found unconstitutional would be worse than the damage of not applying it. The official communication stated that “with its preliminary judgment the BVerfG has not made a decision whether communal

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voting rights for foreigners are in line with the Basic Law. The judgment does not allow inferring the result of the process” (BVerfG Nr. 42/899). Still, it signaled a serious questioning of the enfranchisement reforms, and yet the Greens/AL and the SPD would make made three more proposals in Berlin (Drs 11/370; Drs 11/395; Drs 11/982), justifying them on the civic principle of “same obligations, same rights.” As in Bremen, the presence of an extreme right party had a centrifugal effect on the way parties traditionally in the center debated: the REP saw itself as the only unambiguous opponent of the proposal. In contrast to the CDU, the REP recognized that immigration had occurred but deplored it, portraying foreigners more negatively than any other party had dared: Our government and politicians negotiated undemocratically when they let millions of foreigners from remote corners of the world into our country, without asking Germans if they agreed. Shockingly, in some districts one has no longer the feeling of being in Central Europe. In some schools German children are the minority. The governments did not have the right to attack the population structure like that; they are administrators and trustees of our land and not its absolute rulers. They broke their oath to protect the selfdetermination right of the German people. [PlPt 10/84, para. 244] . . . Next to many diligent foreigners that we value as guests, the mass of millions of foreigners includes hundreds of thousands of cheaters, criminals, and political extremists. Drug trade and band criminality have risen by leaps with foreigners. (para. 247) The REP introduced a whole new dimension into the debate by postulating Germany’s right to keep closed and suggesting that the “real motives” of the proposal were pure political calculation: “For us the extension of voting rights to foreigners means the political silencing of Germans. [para. 270] . . . The goal for us should be to reduce the number of foreigners in this city, because, with a proportion of 13%, our accepting capacity is exhausted. If you think that also criminal asylum seekers and drug dealers must remain here and even get voting rights, that is your problem. We can only assure you that most of the population thinks differently” (para. 392). After the interventions by the CDU and REP, the Greens/AL defended the proposal in an increasingly resigned tone but recalled the societal support it had in Berlin: “This is not a world-shocking measure, but it’s more important than

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most of the laws that we pass in this parliament for the daily lives of people. The campaign to enfranchise denizens started here in the March 1979 election, when many foreigners stood by the polls with their mouths taped shut. This action has been repeated four times in total and has been a quiet, moving protest. This parliament has now the chance to address that” (para. 327). Finally, the CDU recalled the SPD’s former failed proposals to change the Berlin constitution, suggesting that the SPD was unsure about how to enfranchise denizens, and threatened with collecting firms against the reform (para. 149). The SPD replied framing the proposal as a signal “to express that people who live here for a long time, who have helped our economy to recover and came on our request, are not only subjects. The extension of voting rights has a stronger political meaning than its mere content” (para. 231). After different committees prepared recommendations, the second reading and voting on August 30, 1990 (Drs 11/982), led to a vote of seventy-one in favor and fifty-eight against (PlPt 11/39). Although the proposal had been formally passed, a third reading had to be scheduled because of formal inconsistencies. The Greens/AL faction apologized for the error (a detail on the voting age), but the CDU seized the chance to condemn the law, now echoing the REP’s arguments: “[Your] multicultural policy means accepting unlimited immigration, allowing the misuse of asylum rights, keeping criminal foreigners and extending voting rights to foreigners” (PlPt 11/42, para. 2181). In turn, the REP accused the CDU of stealing its arguments, and gave a dim forecast regarding the political consequences of denizen enfranchisement: Promote the emergence of radical parties from these foreigners’ origin countries: Italian neo-fascists, Greek and Turkish communists, and the worse: radical Islamist groups. What will Mrs. [Renate] Ku¨ nast and other AL parliamentarians say when all women in the public must walk five steps behind their men and use veils? You will remember the nice hours spent with a liberal and forward-looking party as the Republikaner. This proposal’s real background has nothing to do with foreigners, who do not take voting rights seriously. You lost trust among German voters so you want new ones. That is just as bad as if one tried to take

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voting rights from a part of the electorate. (PlPt 11/42, para. 2182) Finally, a single parliamentarian representing the FDP accused the SPD of bending to the wishes of AL to honor a coalition agreement. The SPD rejected this attempt to antagonize coalition parties, reminding the FDP that this had long been their issue. Against critiques that the reform was untimely, the SPD argued that, on the contrary, it would be a “welcome sign for East-Berlin.” The proposal finally passed with seventy-two to fiftyseven votes (PlPt 11/42), twelve days before the BVerfG declared the Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg reforms unconstitutional. The CDU and REP quickly made motions in Berlin (Drs 11/1332 and Drs 11/1350) to reassess the failure of the SPD and AL, but these, as the reform itself, got lost in the reunification negotiations.34 In this last debate before the BVerfG’s ruling, the SPD was better prepared to elaborate on why voting rights were an integration instrument, yet it still framed it time and again as a political “signal.” While the AL behaved responsibly compared to the Greens in Bremen and Hamburg, the presence of a far-right party pushed the rather consistent CDU to a more radical rhetoric, even if there was a recognizable gap between its arguments and the REP’s. After reviewing the four La¨nder processes that took debates on denizen enfranchisement furthest in Germany, it is clear that the justifications in them not only varied in number, tone, and order but also alluded in each case to different local historical and contemporary contexts.35 The 1990 BVerfG ruling made clear what applied to them all: La¨nder could only enfranchise denizens after a federal constitutional reform, which requires a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag and Bundesrat. Let us briefly address the ruling.

The Constitutional Court (BVerfG) Ruling Germany has one of the strongest constitutional reviews in the world: The BVerfG intervenes substantially on national and state policy-making, rejecting 5 percent of all legislation on constitutional grounds (Lijphart 1999). New legislation may be challenged by parliamentarians even before it takes effect, in a process called “abstract” judicial review. Without digressing into the legal details of the ruling that struck down the denizen enfranchisement

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reforms, some arguments it avowed require attention because they can be traced back to the Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein processes. After its preliminary decision to suspend the implementation of the Schleswig-Holstein reform, the BVerfG’s first decision addressed SchleswigHolstein only.36 The reform had been brought to its attention by 224 federal parliamentarians (the complete CDU and CSU Bundestag factions), represented by Josef Isensee and the Bavarian government (BVerfG 83, 37; para. 21). The plaintiffs urged a prompt decision since “Hamburg and SchleswigHolstein were only testing for the real action.” As we have seen, Berlin and Bremen were indeed at work. The BVerfG decided on October 31, 1990 (BVerfG 83, 37), on the grounds of constitutionality, subsidiarity, institutional guarantees of the German citizenship, and equality, that the Schleswig-Holstein law was incompatible with Article 28, para. 1, phrase 2, of the Basic Law and thus void (Bundesgesetzblatt I, November 15, 1990). Explaining this decision, the court stated, however, that a reform of Article 79 of the Basic Law to introduce voting rights for European citizens would not necessarily be void, too. As we will see later in this chapter, the reforms to introduce voting rights for EU citizens occurred in 1992 without much noise. In a second part of the ruling, the BVerfG addressed Hamburg (BVerfG 83, 60). Notably, four weeks after reunification, the BVerfG recognized the democratic concerns exposed in the reforms, lauding the aim of a law addressed to enfranchise millions of persons locked out of elections. Yet, it discredited the “sociological view” of the Volksbegriff proposed in Hamburg and prescribed a path: “It is not correct to say that, due to the increasing proportion of foreigners in the total population, the Volksbegriff has changed meaning. Indeed, it speaks for the democratic idea that congruence between the owners of democratic political rights and the receivers of authority must be reached over time. However, . . . under the constitutional conditions the only option left is to change the nationality law.” The BVerfG highlighted that legislators could change the conformation of the people: “The constitution gives the legislator freedom to decide on the rules for the acquisition and loss of nationality and the criteria through which membership to the state is defined.” After the ruling, the justifications for denizen enfranchisement reassembled around democratic consistency.

The Denizen Enfranchisement Cause After the Court Ruling As expected, after the BVerfG ruling the overwhelming opinion in academia was busy confirming it (see Weigl 1992: 81; Isensee and Schmidt-Jortzig

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1993: 51–55) and formal legislative proposals disappeared. But just for a while; a battle started to set the records right, pass blame, and save face, mostly in the parliaments of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, where the defeat was heaviest. From that early point after the BVerfG’s ruling, proponents of denizen enfranchisement argued that the BVerfG had recognized that the democratic deficit concerns expressed by the reforms were rightly founded. The BVerfG’s recognition of this indeed obliged the CDU to accept that a change in naturalization laws was needed, despite its efforts throughout the debates to argue that, if there was a democratic deficit at all, it was because of the lack of interest of denizens to naturalize. After the BVerfG ruling, the CDU faction in Hamburg demanded a parliamentary debate (PlPt 13/89), in which it blamed the government for the defeat: “The ruling is a heavy defeat for the Senate but also for its two mayors, who threw their political and judicial weight, their competence and authority on this law. The BVerfG weighed and found them too light [para. 158] . . . your politics fed the expectations of foreigners, only to deceive them” (para. 163). The SPD accepted the defeat but thanked those who had fought for the “right political way”: “Germans and non-Germans in the SPD, in other governments and also other parties—should be reassured that the path is right, it only became longer. The next step is to open the debate [on naturalization] at the federal level” (paras. 283, 307). The Greens, however, deplored the ruling: Let us think of who has won and who has lost. The 4.5 million foreigners who have lived here for over 20 years and have been told that they are here no more than taxpayers and workers: They lost. The idea of the conservative national-state that citizens must have German ancestry, a constitutional understanding from the last century: That won. The reunified German people looks upon millions of subjects that have to obey, but have no say. The insurmountable abyss between the national people and the foreign subjects within the framework of our constitutional law is legitimized by lawyers . . . A positive ending to this debate would be to discuss how we can correct the concept of the nation-state according to which citizens of the state are only those with German blood. That is the crux of this constitutional debate, the issue that you all refused to address. I hope that the SPD draws practical consequences like a massive

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campaign for naturalization with the possibility of double nationality. (paras. 358, 457) The Schleswig-Holstein the CDU accused the SPD of having attempted a political process “to tailor its own electorate” (PlPt 12/61, para. 63) and having emotionalized the topic, pushing the CDU into a xenophobic corner:37 “Whoever [does this] damages the political culture of this country beyond repair, like broken porcelain. You pursued an adventurous process, heaping documents to committees at once” (para. 279). In turn, SPD accused the CDU of hypocrisy, for defending naturalization as the crown path of integration, while opposing its facilitation, and confirmed its conviction that the cause was right and that voting rights for foreigners had to be introduced independent of reforms to naturalization (para. 126). Moreover, the SPD dared contest the BVerfG rationale: “What is permitted in six other old European democracies, sometimes without the need to engrave it in constitutions, is not constitutional in a modern democracy as Germany” (PlPt 12/61, para. 429). Concluding that “Not the goal was contested, but the path” (paras. 145, 163), the SPD introduced its own proposal to discuss the consequences of the BVerfG ruling (Drs 12/1143) exhorting the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, and the federal government to change the Basic Law “after the BVerfG precluded the democratic progress of constitutional interpretations.”38 Beyond these different battles to set the records straight, the “failed” denizen enfranchisement reforms became a reference on a myriad of debates on migrant integration.39 Federal Attempts

The Green party led federal attempts to enfranchise denizens even as debates were ongoing in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein. In May 1989, it addressed the Bundestag with a proposal to introduce local voting rights for foreign residents living in Germany more than five years (Drs 11/4462). The justification followed closely the lines that the Greens had used in La¨nder debates, alluding first and foremost to the democratic deficit of representation with a population of 4.5 million foreigners in 1989, 85 percent of whom had lived more than five years in Germany. Second, it emphasized it would contribute toward reducing material inequalities between foreigners. It also highlighted that voting rights should be seen as independent from naturalization. The proposal was never debated.

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Only half a year after the BVerfG ruling, the Berliner PDS made an attempt to start a federal debate on denizen enfranchisement (Drs 12/403, June 1991) with a “federal initiative to redefine the concept of citizenship in the Basic Law,” which was blocked in the revising committee (Drs 12/ 1496). In the following three years, Hamburg made a timid proposal in the Bundesrat (Drs 69/92), the PDS/Linke made proposals (12/5128 and 12/ 5131) in the Bundestag, which were replicated a legislature later (Drs 13/ 3519, Drs 13/3520, and Drs 13/3521) without consequence. By then, both the PDS and Greens had adopted the SPD’s reframing of the BVerfG’s ruling. Also, proposals to introduce voting rights for European citizens were being passed unanimously (Drs 12/5651; PlPt 12/86).40 In August 1997 (Drs 13/1924), the PDS made a proposal to the Bundesrat for a federal initiative to change Article 28, jointly presented by Hessen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Saarland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Brandenburg, Niedersachsen, and Schleswig-Holstein (Bundesrat Drs 515/97). The Bundesrat acknowledged its justification: “The La¨nder should be able to address the inequality created between EU foreigners and third-country nationals” (Bundesrat Drs 515/97 and 13/9338). With this statement in hand, the Greens hoped to start a debate in the Bundestag on voting rights for all residents at the municipal/district level in 1998, when they entered a federal coalition government with the SPD. However, this was impossible after a petition campaign started by Wolfgang Schau¨ble, then head of the CDU, gathered more than five million signatures against double nationality within the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections in Hessen, which led to the triumph of the CDU and changed the federal distribution of powers in the Bundesrat.41 Rheinland-Pfalz, Brandenburg, and Schleswig-Holstein restarted the initiative to change Article 28 (Bundesrat Drs 45/99) in 1999, but their efforts were overshadowed by the discussions to reform the Nationality Law. In that year, the acquisition of German nationality was considerably facilitated through the introduction of jus soli and the reduction of the residence requirement from fifteen to eight years, although it included a new language requirement and an oath of loyalty (Hailbronner 2006). Although the hard naturalization rules were never the main justification of any proposal to enfranchise resident migrants in Germany, the facilitation of naturalization made the “necessity” arguments disappear for a while. Yet, the promulgation of the new Nationality Law—a watered-down version of the original SPD-Greens proposal—only quieted the cause until

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2007, when Rheinland-Pfalz (with Berlin, Saarland, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern supporting the proposal) addressed the Bundesrat again on the issue (Bundesrat Drs 623/07), referring back to the acknowledgment of the Bundesrat ten years earlier. The Linke and the Greens addressed the Bundestag on the issue, too, with a proposal based on their old justifications, but adding the “BVerfG’s recognition of the democratic spirit of denizen enfranchisement” (Drs 16/5904, para. 7). In 2008, again, the Greens and Linke made proposals (Drs 13/2006, Drs 13/2017) referring to one another as partners in the cause, together with unions, churches, and migrant organizations. In 2009, the Greens of Bavaria asked their government to speak up before the Bundesrat and the federal government for the introduction of voting rights for third-country nationals at the communal level, adding a reference to new countries in the EU, which did so (Lithuania and Slovakia), and to the European parliament’s recommendation to follow suit. In 2009, the Linke warned the government to be ready, in view of the decreasing rates of naturalization, to change the constitution in order to allow communal voting rights for third-country nationals.42 The federal government rejected any such perspective, arguing that it had already addressed the democratic deficit by changing naturalization in 2000 and that further changes needed a cross-party consensus in both chambers that was not foreseeable (Drs 16/13558). Still, after eighteen years of ignored proposals from parties in the opposition, a debate on denizen voting rights did take off at the federal level in May 2009. Before the first reading, a committee of eighteen parliamentarians called for expert consultations and longtime academic supporters of denizen enfranchisement such as Klaus Sieveking, Dietrich Thra¨nhardt, and Ulrich Preuß considered that the proposed law was feasible, since objections posed in the past were no longer valid (A-Drs 16(4)459). This time, the Linke and the Greens (Drs 16/6628 and 16/13165) framed enfranchisement as an alternative not to the rules of naturalization but as a necessity given the “massive decrease of naturalizations.” The 2005 coalition agreement had committed the CDU to conduct hearings on the issue,43 yet the CDU upheld its view of voting rights as the final prize for a successful integration, the greatest privilege of democracy which can be enjoyed “only by those who naturalize after avowing to our country and value structure” (PlPt 16/224, para. 135). The Greens proposed that denizen enfranchisement delineated a more comprehensive approach to integration: “In contrast to the CDU, for us, integration is more than

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language promotion; it means equal participation for people that have found their home here. Voting rights promote identification with our community and thus integration. [For some, integration] is achieved at the end of a long process that culminates with naturalization, but some will like to keep their nationality, for whatever reasons, even if they plan to stay here the rest of their lives. They should still be able to participate in their local community” (para. 269). In that first federal debate, the SPD reappropriated the cause (“This debate was a Social-democratic one before the Greens or the Linke existed”) but rejected the proposal on practical grounds: “We have a coalition party, who, despite long negotiations, has not agreed with us on this matter.” The Linke complained that the SPD had not proposed it while in government with the Greens, to which the SPD replied by deviating attention to the future: “After the next Bundestag elections we will get a majority to push this forward and the FDP will collaborate” (para. 238). Both proposals (Drs 16/6628 and 16/13033) were rejected. In March 2010, the Linke (Drs 17/1146) made another proposal, bringing back the argument of necessity “since naturalization was not really facilitated,” and accused the Bundestag of having belittled the promotion of democratic culture “when a majority with the votes from the SPD, CDU/ CSU and FDP decided to exclude 4 million persons from the vote” defeating the proposal months earlier. By then, the federal government had changed and the SPD, now in opposition, also backed a reform of Article 28 (Drs 17/1047): “It was unfortunate that last year, after a reading in the parliament, we could not vote for it because of our coalition agreement. Today we discuss a proposal that emanates from our tradition, identical to the proposal passed by the Bundesrat in 1997, identical to the Greens’ proposal, and quite similar to the proposals made by the Linke, at least in their justifications.” After all the opposition/left-wing parties made a common proposal in 2009 (Drs 17/1146 and 17/1150), the Bundestag debated denizen franchise again on March 25, 2010. The Linke accused the SPD of opportunism: “Ten months ago you voted against communal voting rights for foreigners, but now, shortly before elections in Nordrhein-Westfalen, you rediscover your passion for migrants’ rights. In 11 years of government you did not do anything on this matter” (PlPt 17/34, paras. 124–129). The FDP argued that “facts that support the idea that there is no great need for enfranchisement,” without quoting any source (para. 218). The proposals stranded in the committees. The issue did not disappear; however, it came

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back as a resource to ridicule the government’s avowed commitment to migration concerns (Drs 17/1660, para. 39; Drs 17/1881, para. 83). The federal debates held in 2009 and 2010 stressed the shaky support of the SPD, which supported denizen enfranchisement in opposition or when La¨nder-relevant elections were ahead, but easily let it fall while in government. The SPD had also approved a watered-down version of its own naturalization reform proposal in 2000 without ever discussing its relation to denizen voting rights, only to see the naturalization procedures get stricter as CDU governments introduced an integration course and test requirements that made naturalization rates fall steeply. The Greens and Linke made motions and proposals in the Bundestag in 2011 (Drs 17/5896; Drs 17/7266), and there were further local proposals that did not develop into debates in Berlin (Drs 16/3860 and 17/0043), Bavaria (Drs 16/6123), and Nordrhein-Westfalen (Drs 16/3244) by Greens in the first two, and the Pirate party in the third. Since the SPD has been back in government as coalition partner of the CDU, a federal debate on denizen enfranchisement was held in 2013, sparked by proposals by the Greens (Drs 17/1150) and the Linke (Drs 17/ 1146). But the CDU/CSU voted against and the SPD abstained (PlPt 17/ 222), even though it hat still defended it before entering the coalition. In the last two decades, there have been many proposals to enfranchise denizens at all levels in Germany, all of which have reinterpreted the BVerfG as avowing the goal of finding democratic representation of resident immigrants. Bremen has been involved in these efforts longer than any other state and also deeper because of its city-state structure and its unique local councils (Beira¨te), which mix characteristics of selfgovernment and self-administration, offering a more urgent (and feasible) case of democratic self-government. In 2014 a parliamentarian majority (SPD and Greens) in Bremen decided to debate a proposal to give resident immigrants voting rights for local council elections. A committee began hearings with experts who had been among the very first supporters in civil society and academia for denizen enfranchisement more than twenty years earlier. They were joined by a new generation of representatives of new local councils (e.g., Bremer Rat fu¨r Integration) and ambassadors of countries where denizen voting rights exist (e.g., Luxembourg). The first voting gathered a majority in the parliament (Drs 18/731), but to demonstrate that this was a cautious attempt, the parliament sought an authoritative judicial backing before moving on to the necessary second reading and

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voting, thus requesting that the Bremen Constitutional Court (Bremer Staatsgerichthof) do a “preventive norm control” regarding the proposal’s compatibility with the federal and Bremen constitutions. According to SPD parliamentarian Bjo¨rn Scho¨pe, this was “not an attempt to change the Basic Law—you all know that these attempts have failed repeatedly due to lacking majorities—but an endeavor to raise an interpretation fit to our time, to give the Courts the chance to prove their own judgments self-critically . . . Each limitation to voting rights has a time; when social relations change, electoral rights must adapt” (PlPT 18/34: 2279). Two months later, the Bremen State Court ruled—with an opposing opinion by judge Ute Sacksofsky—that the reasons exposed back in 1990 and 1991 by both the Bremen court and the BVerfG were still valid and that parliamentarians in the La¨nder may not apply different definitions of the electing people. The appraisal of this judgment was somber (Bremen Parliament, PlPt 18/70) as this recent failure made clear that the only path left open remains a constitutional reform, which requires a two-thirds vote in the Bundestag. However, support has kept growing in the Bundesrat, revealing that more states would welcome a reform that gives La¨nder the chance to be able to legislate on it (Niedersachsen: Drs 17/3119, Drs 17/ 2885; Schleswig-Holstein: Drs 18/729, Drs 18/748). Recent proposals to reform Article 28 of the federal constitution (on the self-government at the communal level) were made by the Greens and Linke (Drs 18/2088 and Drs 18/3169 of 2014), recovering arguments from federal and from subnational debates, as well as from the recently-failed Bremen attempt. The CDU has not moved an inch from its position of over three decades, arguing that if voting rights ceased to be an exclusive privilege of national citizens “there would be absolutely no other reason for foreigners to bother getting German nationality” (PlPt 16/120: 12544).

Lessons from a Lingering Process The literature on the German case of denizen enfranchisement has been quick to call it failed due to lacking majorities and the BVerfG ruling against it. But the debates on denizen enfranchisement in Germany are alive. That they did not end with the BVerfG’s ruling is obvious in the reappraisal of that very ruling by proposing parties. Also, over time, arguments about its

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urgency have gained clout, uniting parties against the CDU as responsible for the cumulative period the issue has stalled. The long, tortured trajectory of debates on denizen enfranchisement in Germany explains what citizenship scholars have from a historicalinstitutionalist perspective been so troubled to explain by just looking at the sudden changes in nationality laws: If there ever was anything like a consensus about the “self-understanding of citizenship” in Germany, no such thing has existed in the last three decades. To the contrary, principles of nationality have been deeply questioned in Germany. Ethno-nationalism or, in this case, the interpretation of citizenship as being a privilege of German citizens only, is not a monolithic cultural institution or even mildly accepted as a reference for consensus, but a highly contested political view. A conservative party in the middle of the political spectrum opposes any dissociation of citizenship from nationality, blocking all attempts of enfranchisement at different levels, for over thirty years. It is not German society or Germany’s political system as a whole who are ethno-nationalist. Denizen enfranchisement reform attempts existed nearly everywhere in the federation, with three parties alternately making proposals, leading to legislative processes, some of which concluded in reforms. The frames taken by proposing parties were never able to derange the arguments of the CDU in the legislative processes that took off: The CDU has moved its position only to the right whenever a radical right-wing party has been present in a parliament. The CDU set the playing field in the terms it wanted, by delineating naturalization with no toleration of double nationality as the only admissible proof of full integration and the only path for immigrants to acquire voting rights at any level. Proposing parties reacted bleakly. They reduced the initially diverse arguments for the reform to only a few arguments, insisting on the weakest (e.g., “sending a signal,” “being a pioneer”), and were unable to introduce new frames as debates unfolded. Instead of adopting other arguments from among the flurry of justifications provided by academic and civil society actors and from debates in other La¨nder (for instance, that denizen enfranchisement is in the interest of Germans to strengthen representation and participation in German democracy!), proponents and defenders of denizen enfranchisement played along the CDU frames, getting entangled in assessments of factual integration, a topic that is highly divisive in Germany. The only battle they won with that framing was to reach a mild compromise with the CDU on a reform to facilitate naturalization and double nationality in certain circumstances, since the

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CDU frames could be used to portray denizen enfranchisement as an immigrant political incorporation alternative given difficult naturalization rules and the prohibition of double nationality. While majorities or coalition agreements have been necessary to start debates on denizen enfranchisement, a majority has not been sufficient for its approval. The plausibility of proposals varied according to the circumstances in each of the La¨nder, but this finding emerges only if we look at the connection between the many legislative debates related to it. The court’s ruling halted the process for a while; however, far from dooming it, it legitimized the goal of seeking democratic representation of denizens merely precluding the path of subnational reforms under the current constitution. Comparing the La¨nder debates along the wider process also reveals that there was nothing obvious about the court’s ruling: Parties and experts on the left and right showed uncertainty until days before it fell. The bias in the literature to study only successful processes has made us content with keeping the obvious and overlooking the important debates in lengthy legislative processes that led to no decision or no implementation. Supporting majorities for denizen enfranchisement have been rare, as its discussion or nondiscussion would not bring down a government. While the perspective of gaining a wider constituency was attractive for left parties, it was not a priority and seldom an issue so urgent that they needed to seek compromises. This explains the lightness with which the FDP addressed its success or failure, the opportunistic stances of the SPD (especially after 1989), the consistent but uncompromising stance of the Greens, who used maximalist frames, and the resilient stance of the CDU to address it politically. With hindsight, it is tempting to conclude that denizen enfranchisement never had a chance because of a prevailing understanding of citizenship, but there was no such understanding. The CDU might claim to represent a (diminishing) popular position in the middle of German society, but it is due to other institutional systemic factors that the proponents have not been able to push the reform through (coalition dynamics and conservative judges), and also to tactical preferences of proponents to support migrant inclusion through other means, such as naturalization. Still, the German case(s) show that understandings of citizenship do not always fit to party positions, even less to a coherent ideology beyond reform or rejection (Hirschman, 2004). Parties locate themselves relative to others’ positions, reacting to imperatives of argumentation and to context: Whenever a far-right party participated, the CDU went farther right and the parties on the left became

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¨ LKERUNG Figure 5. Inauguration of the participatory art project DER BEVO (To the Population) by Hans Haacke in the northern open-air courtyard of the Reichstag building (seat of Bundestag, German parliament) with parliamentarians stepping on it to throw soil collected from their election districts in Germany. The current state of the artwork can be seen anytime at: http:// derbevoelkerung.de/en/. Photograph by Jens Liebchen printed with the permission of DBT/Jens Liebchen and with the artist’s permission.

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louder. As of 2018, this dangerous political dynamic is again politicizing migration topics to the detriment not only of immigrant integration, but also of many other relevant topics for German society that require urgent attention, but which are displaced from political debate for the sake of debating immigration, even though immigration has dramatically decreased and is under control. Most important of all, however, and connected to the dynamics of political debating, the German case/cases suggest that enfranchisement debates are worthy in themselves. When the societal discussion on denizen enfranchisement began, immigration was denied as a reality in Germany. From the Kuhn Memorandum onward, through a span of almost forty years, the debates on denizen enfranchisement have hosted different terms to discuss migration and integration and different forms to categorize migrants. The cumulative pressure of new terms and categorizations and the fight to establish a new reality have brought the CDU, with Chancellor Angela Merkel at its head, to surprising policies. Even before the events of the “summer of 2015,” the CDU claimed for the first time ownership of the topic of immigration, linking it positively to issues on which it commands trust for its voters, such as security and economic policies (Schmidtke 2015), and proposing to debate a general immigration law. Through this long process the debate has developed well beyond the point at which most references to the “German failed reforms” stop in the literature: Even the Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein reforms came to be reappraised as “successful” legislative processes! Today, the strongest new justification that proponents of denizen enfranchisement use is the need to end the unequal treatment from the perspective of the equivalent contribution of all immigrants to German society, given that only EU nationals have local voting rights. Today, the cause is alive because German and non-German residents volunteer to work hand in hand to fight for the voting rights of the latter as much as they try to defend the advances that nationality law experienced since the reform of 2000—especially with regard to the toleration of dual nationality for second-generation migrants born in Germany—which are at risk of being backpedaled due to the heightened discussions on the transnational political activities of the Turkish state and the loyalty of dual nationals (Fick 2016; Thra¨nhardt 2017).

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THIS BOOK FOLLOWS Rogers Smith’s suggestion that contemporary

political science should prioritize studies of the political processes through which senses of political membership, allegiance, and identity are formed and transformed. In the comparative journey I have embarked on, the methods I chose allowed me to trace arguments along the political process with different institutional contexts to discover what explains variations in denizen enfranchisement reforms and what they represent for contemporary understandings of citizenship. The comparative exercises in the chapters that follow are further inspired by Smith’s admonition that, even in our contextual and interpretive depictions, we must aim to conform to a logic of rigorous scientific inquiry, beyond “thickly descriptive case studies or narrative accounts of unique historical trajectories” (2004: 59). Thus, Chapter 5 fulfills the task of systematically comparing the lessons from Chapters 3 and 4 to develop an explanation on what makes a difference; Chapter 6 applies that explanation to other cases of the type of enfranchisement reform that has been best researched: universal denizen enfranchisement (e.g., in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden), and some sui generis cases in Asia and Latin America. With that last comparative exercise, I will try to overcome the blind spots associated with small-n studies, and test how much my own middle-range explanation can help us understand the variations of denizen enfranchisement. Finally, Chapter 7 confronts my explanatory account with the question that inspired this book: What does denizen enfranchisement imply for our understanding of citizenship?

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CHAPTER 5

The Steps of Denizen Enfranchisement Processes

Every regime lives on a body of dogma, self-justification and propaganda about itself. In the United States this body of dogma centers on democracy. The hero of the system is the voter. . . . Yet, the struggle for the vote was almost bloodless, almost completely peaceful, and astonishingly easy. The bulk of the newly enfranchised won battles they never fought. It is hard for Americans to believe how easy it was because their hopelessly romantic view of the history of democracy attributes a revolutionary significance to the extension of the right to vote. —Schattschneider (1975: 97–98)

A Systematic Comparison of the German and Portuguese Enfranchisement Processes This chapter compares systematically the diverse cases of Germany and Portugal, starting with concrete characteristics and moving on gradually to comparisons of their different process paths, making partial analogies along the way (Tilly 2001: 25), and finally projecting these onto analytical components of a middle-range theory that can be tried for other cases.1 The political process and discourse in the two cases of denizen enfranchisement reforms obviously differed in their legal conditions and ultimate success in becoming law, but they also differed in the following respects: the number and kind of attempts before a debate began, the length of the formal political debates once the debates started, the depth of those debates, the range of party-ideological differences exposed in them, and the stated goals

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enfranchisement would serve. Across these two countries, processes mattered in ways largely defined already by different initial circumstances. By saying that process mattered, though, I mean to highlight that the dynamics linked to framing, temporality, and contingency made the cases part ways. The debates in the two countries had different depth and breadth, as well as room for different voices. In Germany, the topic has been raised in almost every state and has consolidated some of its justifications, while avoiding others, in consecutive attempts: Political positions swung over time along the range of the party-ideological spectrum, between and even within parties. Also, denizen enfranchisement has been framed in parliament as a deeply normative issue that would benefit primarily immigrants. Its chances were better there where the extremes of the political party spectrum did not participate and discussions were moderate.2 In Portugal, the failure of an initial ambitious proposal led to a reframing of the topic down to a handful of justifications that left little controversy between and within parties. Seeing that the immigration framework had the potential to polarize rather than to rally parties to the cause, proponents framed the proposal self-centeredly with Portugal and the Portuguese emigrants as the main beneficiaries, using the legal tradition of reciprocity to give plausibility to this framing. Denizen enfranchisement processes differed in length and they were directly connected to the depth, breadth, and participation of different actors. In Germany, the debates have stretched over three decades, without reaching a passed, applicable law until today; in Portugal, a few years sufficed to extend a different franchise to different groups on the basis of reciprocity and cultural affinities. Yet, the debate was revived in Portugal ten years later, with proposals to make enfranchisement universal for all denizens, suggesting that the 1996 reform was perhaps only a step in a larger process. A quietly-passed reform of the Portuguese nationality laws in 2005 already eliminated privileges for Lusophone citizens and facilitated naturalization for second- and third-generation migrants, suggesting that preferential rules may lose legitimacy.3 As for Germany, I agree with S. Green that, in the absence of a federal consensus, the ruling of the BVerfG “illustrated its formidable ability to limit the range of options available to policy makers, [ruling out] the possibility of bottom-up pressure for change” (2004: 56), despite mobilization of civil society for denizen enfranchisement. With a longer-term view, Benhabib duly observed that the ideas introduced in the debates have widely disseminated into political discourse through what she calls “democratic iterations,” which may be credited for

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the change of naturalization rules in 1999 (2004: 207).4 However, with the exception of Shaw (2007: 295), most authors who wrote on the German case (also Green) ignore that the enfranchisement cause remains alive. It is easy to recognize that basic institutions of the state of these two democracies (i.e., balance between branches of power) required different formal steps of a political process and thus prefigured a different degree of complexity from the beginning. First, state structure: The federal system of Germany allows a limited scope for change as majorities at several levels have to be secured to implement a fundamental change in constitutional laws, and a number of veto players remain besides and above state parliaments. In Portugal, the parliament is the sovereign of a centralized unitary state, so, even if enfranchisement required a constitutional reform and thus a qualified majority, a single successful parliamentary debate was enough. Second, legal institutions: in Germany an intricate legal discussion preceded debates, letting the debate stand on a ground of ambiguity and confusion among legal scholars regarding the constitutionality of denizen enfranchisement without a constitutional reform. When the debates began on a conceptual controversy (i.e., on the Volksbegriff), supporters of denizen enfranchisement had to bet that no constitutional change was needed. However, even among supporters, there was insecurity about the formal and judicial requisites to accomplish the reform, as much as they tried to portray it as a political decision. In contrast, in Portugal, previous changes made to local electoral laws to allow Brazilians—and later European citizens—to vote paved the way in the technical-legal sense for enfranchising denizens. At the level of contextual policies, important similarities show how “traditions,” as generally appraised in the literature, do not explain anything if we ignore how they are articulated to be relevant. Both countries had hard naturalization rules and strong ethnicity-based repatriation policies at the start of denizen enfranchisement debates, but these factors were appraised differently in their respective debates. In Portugal, there was a change from a predominantly jus soli-based regime to a predominantly jus sanguinis regime marked by the political circumstances of the Revolution and decolonialization, which demanded addressing the Lusophone former colonial citizens. In Germany, there was no change when most debates started (1987–1989) regarding the restrictiveness and exclusiveness of access to a citizenship based mostly on jus sanguinis.

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Repatriation policies were similar toward people who allegedly had ethnicity or culture in common. In Portugal, the relevant category was “retornados,” while in Germany there were several: Vertriebene or Heimatvertriebene, for those expelled from Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, or ¨ bersiedler, for those who fled East Germany; and the most genRomania; U eral one, Aussiedler, for those coming from Eastern Europe. In both Germany and Portugal, the repatriated populations received ample support to integrate in jobs, find housing, obtain economic transfers, get help with administration, and so on, and were courted by parties on the Right and distrusted by those on the Left. Their appraisal as a privileged group of migrants compared to the lack of representation of denizens was controversial in both cases, though in different times: In Portugal, late decolonialization meant that repatriation was strongly concentrated in time, occurring during an economic crisis, while in Germany repatriation happened slowly over a long period of growth, creating controversies only toward the end of the 1980s, after reunification. Regarding migration dynamics, both countries had experienced significant immigration and policies that discouraged permanent settlement before enfranchisement debates began. In Germany, this was only contested by the Left, whereas, in Portugal, there was not even an open debate on the matter but a general agreement that Portugal was a “country of emigration.” The large Portuguese diaspora was the main referent for migration policy in Portugal: Immigration was, in turn, seen from a colonial lens, as requiring special “duties” toward former citizens. Germany had no parallel to this. The German political system is strongly tilted toward the need for consensus, secured by veto players from drastic changes and adventurous constitutional redefinitions. This ought not to be mistaken for a monolithic culture based on an ethno-nationalist understanding of the people. However, that very context required a more comprehensive reappraisal of citizenship than in Portugal. Because of the federal structure and the legal ambiguity regarding the feasibility of state-level reforms, debates proliferate across subnational polities slowly building bottom-up pressure for consensus, in contrast to the more definite national Portuguese reform, built on a compromise that even admitted the creation of different classes of voters. Still, in all its complexity and length, the process in Germany has aimed at a deeper disentanglement of criteria to assert nationhood from principles of democracy. In this sense, the “failed” debates here have become more

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enduring references of political discourse regarding citizenship than the effective and uncontroversial enfranchising reform in Portugal. In sum, structures in the legal and political system, migration, and naturalization policies all combined into setting contexts that provided the parliamentary processes with different resources from the start. In both cases, purely accidental events along the processes had minimal effect, yet contingencies were important in defining different causal paths. In Germany, the enfranchisement debates served as the field to contest the denial of immigration in political discourse. In Portugal, controversial proposals on denizen enfranchisement failed which had been framed as part of a wider turn in migration policy (which they were) at a time when immigration was becoming a topic of public concern. In contrast, the successful enfranchisement made no reference to resident migrants in Portugal as addressees, but it did refer to Portugal and its emigrants. This framing was accepted by majority parties and not seriously questioned by smaller ones. In contrast, even the categorization of beneficiaries was hotly contested in Germany and the debates could not (or aimed not to) get rid of the immigrant integration frame. The framing of naturalization as an option for inclusion in these debates was also very different: In Germany, the debate on denizen voting rights was inextricably linked to naturalization, with diverging opinions regarding how hard (and exclusive) naturalization rules were at the time and ought to be. In the eyes of some proponents, difficult naturalization rules made it imperative to enfranchise denizens to give representation and participation to denizens; for other proponents, however, these were issues of a different nature that should not be linked. This means that even proponents were divided regarding how denizen franchise stood as a policy with regard to naturalization. They shunned speaking about it because there was an unsolved normative dilemma. In turn, opponents exploited this division with two tactics: (1) by affirming that they themselves were convinced that naturalization was the only road to voting rights, which were an exclusive right of national citizens; and (2) by deviating the debates to a discussion on immigrant integration, a topic that also divided proponents. However, after the BVerfG’s ruling on the unconstitutionality of the Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein reforms and the facilitation of naturalization through the reform of the Nationality Law in 1999–2000, proponents of denizen enfranchisement have become more resolute in their view that denizen enfranchisement is a complement to naturalization, needed even if rules

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are now easier. In Portugal, no interplay between naturalization rules and denizen enfranchisement was ever mentioned in debates, not even when the former configured an unjust hereditary citizenship. Considering all these differences and similarities, I see three as decisive for the legislative success of denizen enfranchisement in Portugal and for its failure in Germany: 1. The agreement from center parties to push it forward. In Germany, the Christian democrats and the social democrats occupy the political center and hold the biggest proportions in parliament. The lack of commitment from the latter to convince the former to let the reform pass, if not to support it, and its own vacillating position across states and levels of government and over time, suggest an opportunistic use of the topic by the SPD. It echoes evidence from other countries where political parties favored electoral reforms when in opposition but lost their zeal when in government (LeDuc 2011). Following Jo Shaw’s admonition, debates about electoral rights cannot be seen simply in terms of general success, since successful attempts by mobilizing groups to bring about a change in the law may fail but sow seeds for wider claims; and successful reforms may be too restricted to elites to be meaningful (2007: 196). Still, regarding the German case in particular, I disagree with Shaw’s view that the debate was “instrumental at the political level rather than concerned with the niceties of political theory” (2007: 55). It may have been instrumental politically by linking it to facilitating naturalization, but that was because of its normative depth. 2. Moderation. Beyond the variations in the “objective” plausibility of the democratic deficit argument across German La¨nder, the debate was overall deeper and its tone more controversial in Germany than in Portugal. The German debates mixed many deeply contested issues simultaneously: from the pragmatic (as the very feasibility of the reform) to the abstract-normative (as differing views on citizens as free individuals or subjects tied to their national identities). Between these levels, other contested issues were: the “valid” international comparisons, the “right” relation of voting rights to naturalization and integration, the “true” situation of foreigners in society, and the “expected effects” of the reform on (a) xenophobic discourse, (b) the foreign population, (c) the German population, and

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(d) the image of the reforming La¨nder. In Portugal, the issues at stake were restricted to a handful of references in all attempts, shifting and eliminating some over time. The within-case comparisons of political arguments across German La¨nder suggest that streamlined discussions where parties agreed on “how to negotiate” improved the chances of proposals. Connected to this, but not as a sufficient condition, the debate was more moderate where the extreme right parties were absent. This echoes research correlating the salience of migration in public debates to the strength of the far right-wing parties (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Davis and Deole 2015). 3. A frame that avoided the topic of immigration. The salience of the topic of immigrant integration in the German debates hindered the possibility of reaching cross-party compromises. In a context where a fundamental political force rejected the very idea that immigration had taken place, the demands by some parties to enfranchise denizens as to “do justice” and “pay is owed” to immigrants were extreme—those parties used such frames knowing that their demands stood no chance and still did not change them. In Portugal, by contrast, centrist parties compromised on a framing that minimized the potential political impact of the reform. At a subnational level, something similar occurred in Germany: the reform was smoother where immigration could be put aside, as in SchleswigHolstein. In Germany, however, a “selfish” framing as in Portugal was impossible because the CDU brought immigration to the debate every time. 5 When processes began, these three factors conjoined. At this point, it is important to remember that, in Germany, the arguments to justify denizen enfranchisement had been prepared for a long time in the realm of political society: Associations and intellectuals had long called for a moderate framing that should highlight denizen enfranchisement as a concern of Germans as a receiving democratic society—that is neither as a handout nor even as a compensation to immigrants. However, when parties took the issue to the parliamentary arena, that previous work got lost in controversial issues. These conclusions from a positive and a negative case resonate with some questions raised by Elmer Eric Schattschneider in his classic study of politics, The Semisovereign People (1975): Why, out of all potential issues,

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are only some selected into politics while others are not? Selecting issues tells a lot about the battles that are important to be won. In the German case, proposing parties left so much room for issues to be raised that, over time, debates on enfranchisement became debates about immigrant integration at large. When both the integration of migrants and naturalization were raised, the possibilities of consensus regarding enfranchisement faded away. These issues opened too much room for dissent even among supporters. In contrast, Portuguese legislators were successful in framing denizen enfranchisement in a way that displaced controversial topics. This required framing strategies that took into account issues that set parallel lines across parties, such as appropriating a measure to symbolically pay back a historical debt to former colonial subjects or gaining international recognition from passing the reform. It is important to note that, in order to agree on that framing, the parties had to first agree on a tit-for-tat offer to center conservatives: let denizen franchise pass now in exchange for discussing emigrant voting rights later.

A Layout of Mechanisms I have used the adjective “symbolic” to describe enfranchisement debates in Germany and Portugal with two different meanings: The “symbolic” I used to describe Portugal denoted critically that the reforms benefited few migrants and little, as opposed to a “consequential,” reform. The “symbolic” I used to describe the German case(s) denoted the uncommitted stance that supporting parties displayed. In both cases, I was alluding to the fact that the debates seem to have stood for something else. Yet these debates did take precious political resources in the form of lengthy parliamentary actions, especially in Germany. Coming back to Schattschneider’s questions: What was the battle about? Who expected to win from it? A symbol is the smallest unit of significance for something else, which is bigger and is alluded to but is not there. If the drive for the discussion of enfranchising reforms is symbolic, what was the symbol deployed for? Let us review what framing and result, together (instead of seeing one causing the other), meant over time in both cases. In Portugal, the framing of the successful, if restricted, enfranchisement reform did not lead to a great improvement of the situation for all denizens, but, paradoxically, the process as a whole, being part of a larger set of

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migrant inclusion policies such as the recognition and support of migrants’ own organization, contributed to reducing the stigmatization of migrants as needy recipients of help from the receiving society and to their emancipation as political actors. Admittedly, one of the most telling similarities between the two cases analyzed was that denizens were not among its protagonists. In contrast to other enfranchisement movements in history, it is not the to-be-enfranchised who mobilized but rather the so-called self-appointed advocates: native citizens who embraced the cause to enfranchise another group. For this reason, it was relevant to see how denizens were portrayed and categorized—if at all! According to Koopmans et al., there is evidence that this form of political “altruistic” activism is identity-oriented to defend a specific understanding of nationhood: that of an open, accessible nation following an enlightened and liberal traditional understanding of equality between individuals or a community understanding of equality between groups (2008: 230).6 In this sense, denizen enfranchisement in Portugal was inexpensive and yet empowering—in the sense of Schattschneider’s quote in the epigraph to this chapter. Initially it gave more rights to some denizens without requiring their direct involvement in the battle and has returned to the political agenda in discussions to become applicable for all. However, the German debates have shown the width and heterogeneity of the self-understanding of citizenship in Germany. This contrasts with portrayals of its citizenship tradition in a literature that has assumed consensus. My findings contradict the idea that there is anything homogeneous or stable that can be termed “national idiom” of citizenship in Germany. It seems that the BVerfG ruling has been interpreted differently by academics than by parliamentarians: The former took it as more definitive than the latter has ever considered it to be. Together with the aforementioned recent proposals in Portugal to enfranchise all denizens, the contested nature of the BVerfG ruling in Germany until 2015 reminds me of Tilly’s words about the urgency of justifying what we social scientists select to be our “episodes”—that is, taking chunks of time out of history as if their limits were obvious. Still, the negative case of Germany begs the question: Why were proposals made without a prospect of winning? Academic partisans of social/rational-choice theories could give two answers: (1) because of the promised votes from the potential migrant community and (2) because it may be a political item the discussion of which pleases a constituency (e.g., left-wing voters). As I have not attempted to

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unveil “real intentions” or beliefs, I cannot discard any of them. These hypotheses draw us into the terrain of perceptions and calculations of gains which we cannot derive from, much less equate to the political arguments traced here that justify rejection of denizen enfranchisement.7 Nevertheless, I did observe arguments that suggest these kinds of rationale (I coded them under “accusations of political use”): Some parties used denizen enfranchisement to profile themselves in the eyes of their electorate. Even the CDU found a way to profit from discussing it, being able to position itself as borrowing topics from the far right, yet with more moderate frames, in a time when its popular support was being challenged by new far-right parties. And yet, the debates enjoyed too little press for profiling to be credible as the main reason to hold them. Rather, the two cases confirm hypotheses that have been suggested to understand electoral reforms in general, namely that, in the absence of great pressure, government elites have few incentives to change laws by which they have been elected. Thus, the question compels us to think of another sense in which debating denizen enfranchisement serves a purpose. A serious debate on the normative issues surrounding denizen enfranchisement may serve as the arena to question ideas on nationhood and membership that cement an exclusive access to citizenship. In its normative and practical justifications, the broad, profound, lengthy German process of debating denizen enfranchisement has offered opportunities to hold discussions on the principles upon which citizen rights should be conferred. Some authors agree that the most striking feature about postwar immigration policy in Germany has been the repression of nationalism, yet they still maintain that the German selfconception of citizenship was markedly closed and ethno-nationalistic compared to that of other countries,8 even when considered to be part of a cross-national liberal convergence trend that included de facto, if not de jure, expansionist immigration policies (Joppke 2001). If we look at denizen enfranchisement debates, however, both political discourse and compromise changed: Even the BVerfG ruling was reappraised to demand that conservatives accept reforming nationality law. Until today, the negative outcome of the denizen enfranchisement process keeps serving the Left and Greens to protest against reforms that have again made access to nationality harder and more exclusive. Also, the two cases show how debating enfranchisement serve parties to develop tit-for-tat strategies on issues related to different aspects of migration policy from which they expect different concrete rewards. Just as it is

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clear that reform processes on the redefinition of the electorate are affected by the expectations of electoral gain of parties, parties might have normative aims that we cannot discard as intangibles. When we look beyond the legislative outcome of a debate and compare the arguments that took processes on different paths, it becomes obvious that a debate is not only a necessary means to pass a law, but also may be an end in and of itself, especially in settings that require piecemeal formation of compromises. Experts of political symbolism have proposed that debates fulfill a political function even if a decision fails to materialize: They offer opportunities for interested politicians to build cooperation (Edelman 1985: 46). Serious discussions signal readiness to negotiate norms in the interest of future political viability and social adjustment. This might explain why, in Germany, the Greens stuck to migration and integration topics and why the social democrats failed to follow the well-prepared and much-repeated recommendations of civil society associations to frame the issue as being in the interest of the German society first. True die-hard advocates of an enfranchisement reform would have recognized that alternative framings were tolerable to achieve the end. But what proposing parties advocated was the discussion on political membership itself and recognition for immigrants as citizens. Debates on enfranchisement opened to reinterpretation ideas inextricably linked to the construction of “the people.”

The Interplay of Strategy, Framing, and Institutional Context If we look at the enfranchisement debate in Germany as determined neither by its failure nor by any reputed enduring characteristics of the German conception of nationhood (cf. Uhlitz 1986), and if we restore the contingency that political processes have in democracies, it is easier to understand the mechanisms that made it kick off, as well as the circumstances of partial successes. Already the start of the debates in Germany revealed that the supposedly ethnicity-based understanding of citizenship was not shared by all political actors (if it ever was). Conservatives rejected a discussion whenever they governed, but they were forced to debate when in opposition. When compelled to debate it at the federal level, they tried to restore orthodoxy, insisting that the constitution linked nationhood to democracy, but

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proponents repeatedly disputed that. With their uncommitted stance, the SPD aimed to soothe both sides (cf. Fischer 2003: 63). Interpretive approaches demonstrate the insufficiency of electoral arithmetic—shares of votes and party seats—as an endpoint to our understanding of the selections made in politics.9 We need, at least, to distinguish the “messier” feedback effects that electoral arithmetic implies: not only seat maximization by the expected number of votes from the newly enfranchised but also seats gained by the sympathy of joining a cause held dear by existing constituents, even if the cause does not formally move forward. As Wedeen wrote, “Rhetoric not only exemplifies, but produces political support” (2004: 284). Does this mean that the parliamentary processes—with their debates and specialized committees, their framings and re-framings, and the judicial processes that they prompted—were nothing but a theatrical display of roles or that agents were intentionally carrying out a grand quest of normative change? No. My process-tracing of the German case with synchronic comparisons shows that uncertainty about the outcomes was real: In the absence of good chances for success, however, agents directed the discussions to issue areas where commitments were needed and could be used in related proposals (i.e., to facilitate naturalization). While the proponents of maximalist proposals made expressive offerings to their constituencies, the proponents behind most proposals did aim to accomplish something concrete:10 When opening new controversial dimensions, they picked issues worth discussing to generate majorities and tried to commit higher-level institutions, such as courts. In Portugal, the conscious framing facilitated consensus but entailed an enfranchisement that reduced the risk of adding too many voters to the electorate. Here it is helpful to recall the concepts of heresthetics and rhetorics, as used by William Riker, because they show what groups do when combining strategy and interpretation in politics.11 Analyzing political rhetoric, Riker (1996: 255) looked at which themes were raised, how they were portrayed, and at strategies of dominance (emphasizing themes on which one has little oppositions) or dispersion (avoiding themes on which the other side has a strong argument). I have not attempted to “find out” the dominant discourse in a debate. Instead, I have looked for a sense of the possibilities on which the actors drew (see Jackson 2006: 272) and observed how they selected and reformed arguments from among all initial ones or added new ones. Yet, as Riker warned, it is hard to determine if interpretation is

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subordinate to strategy or the other way around:12 Strategic and argumentative steps seem inseparable. An interpretive and contextual approach allows bridging between purely actor-centered approaches and structural excessiveness of some discursive approaches (Keller 2005). It also helps to delineate accurately the sites where these processes develop and the agents that may, can, and do have a say in it. This is important in order to free ourselves as researchers of the handy but tricky assumptions that generalize from decisions that result from debates of a few as if they were decisions made by collectives as big as “nations” or “societies.” This, I think, is a much needed corrective in the comparative literature on citizenship.

A Middle-Range Theory on Framing in Enfranchisement Processes For political scientists, the study of any electoral reform must take into account the institutional preconditions that allow or preclude it, as well as the actors that have a direct stake and say in it, formally and informally. Yet, in standard analyses of electoral reforms, the focus on analysis is reduced to an elite-level game between rival partisan interests. The standard explanation by rational choice institutionalist accounts of electoral reforms is that parties will take a stand in relation to the enlargement of the electorate, depending on the kinds and degrees of their political participation in debates and the political preferences they attribute to the potential new voters (Benoit 2007; Boix 1999; Colomer 2004; Cox 1997; LeDuc 2011; North 1988). It makes sense. However, in reforms that may enlarge the electorate, information about the preferences of the potential voters is rarely well-known and thus these accounts are seldom able to explain when and how reforms are raised in the policy agenda (Norris 2010). We have learned so far that even in democracies with big proportions of denizens, an argument about a democratic deficit is not self-evident. When it arises, it is one among many and might disappear from debates quite early. Yet, despite outcome variations, denizen enfranchisements have some common patterns as social-construction processes. Discerning those patterns gets complicated when interests are not simply calculated in terms of likely policy outcomes, office-seeking, and personal gain, but in more complex ways, such as seeking the support of the

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voters already in the electorate who sympathize/antagonize with enfranchisement, or when parties may trade electoral advantage in the short term for other goals in the long term. Denizen enfranchisement reforms are a particularly controversial kind of electoral reform for their capacity to destabilize the status quo: What is at stake is the definition of the demos (the electing citizens), principles of representation, and related electoral districts. Thus, what Pippa Norris noted for electoral reforms in general applies all the more for denizen enfranchisement: To assume that parties in legislatures act in isolation from broader political processes and from the societal context is “dangerously naı¨ve” (2010: 15). Denizen enfranchisement is a hard case of electoral reforms because it is rarely supported by the majority of citizens or openly pushed forward by the potential voters themselves. This is why, in order to discover the reason it is debated at all, it is necessary to trace where the proposals came from. These reforms are best understood through an approach that leaves open the study of actors, discourses, including new ones that go beyond those predefined by our theoretical lenses (i.e. the “traditions” of citizenship or conditions for naturalization) and then follows the construction of reform through the political processes required in each case, including failed attempts. Clearly, as experts of political discourse analysis and experts of agendasetting and heresthetics know, processes of construction and framing of reality through political justifications, persuasions, and negotiations allow some interests to be formulated and others to be disposed of (see Rose and Miller 1992: 175). But more than that, we can say that framing is crucial not because it manages to truly convince others, as in changing their values or ideas, but because it can make others commit to a path of argumentation. This take might be too agent-based for interpretive analysts and too interpretive for positivist political scientists: It is one that accepts that discourses are a specific way of “signifying experience from a particular perspective” (Fairclough 1993: 135) yet leaves room for agents with particular relational resources in their context of political struggles and surrounding institutions. The portrayal of denizen enfranchisement in the political arenas of deliberation is fundamental to understanding how debates evolve, and the way debates evolve is fundamental to their outcome as a reform. Ontologically and epistemologically, such an explanation does not get along with a straightforward language of variables, which assumes constantly relevant

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variables, variables that stand next to each other in the same analytical level, or the effects of which are fundamentally independent. Thus, as I try to delineate next how patterns combine and lead to different paths in enfranchisement processes, my aim is not to extrapolate independent variables but rather process steps that need to be adapted to different institutional contexts. Institutional context is thus step 0, predetermining who has a say before a proposal is even raised in a society. Political institutions provide resources and rules—ideal, material, linguistic, legal—to channel new demands. On this basis, actors plan how to make a proposal and push it forward. Step 1 determines much of the process that a reform attempt will follow: The proposals which individuals or groups in political society formulate. Political actors with the capacity to make an authoritative proposal recognize the issue, define it, and propose ways to address it. The social construction of the issue at this stage requires referring to well-established cognitive and relational categories or constructing new ones with regard to the addressees. The crucial question to compare in this step is how denizen enfranchisement is formulated and by whom. Step 2 is the translation of the topic into formal political proposals. Which issues are taken into parliament is an empirical question of great value because only a limited number of political issues can be plausibly addressed in a parliamentary period. By calling it “translation” I highlight that the issue as it was raised in political society is changed into what can be raised in the political/parliamentary agenda in the light of the prevailing political context. The crucial questions are: Who appropriates the cause and with which justifications? And how are others convinced to discuss the issue? Step 3 contains the proper parliamentary debate with its consultations, hearings, debates, negotiations, committees, and times. Even if proponents and opponents can be clearly differentiated, it is not plausible to assume that their positions remain the same. Arguments and positions may shift, so it is crucial to look at how the actors that first made arguments in favor and against rearrange them throughout the process. Objections or alternatives put forward by opponents can give clues to proponents on how to reframe denizen enfranchisement so that majorities can be gained for it. Framing—as a gerund—is what actors do to filter available information into and out of the discussion, selecting and redirecting it to certain themes. For comparative research, it is worth keeping in mind that, through their

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166 Chapter 5 Institutions (legal, linguistic, political) preconfigure the debate Transnational/international pressure Domestic societal mobilization,

parties translate

arguments are chosen,

issue to parliament

tried, discarded, reframed

Elite/intellectual concerns groups mobilize aiming to influence debates

Figure 6. Stages of a denizen enfranchisement process.

frames, political actors (parties and others) give debates varying breadth and depth. Across cases, we can compare which are the initial justifications, which remain, and which collapse. The interplay of coalition-building and rhetoric must be always related to the immediate and larger institutional environment because, over time, that changes too and may affect what occurs in the parliamentary process. This adds complexity to a process that in and of itself must be compared in its regulatory scheme (for example, the number of plenum readings and votes needed to pass a law, the formal steps of the legislative process itself, etc.). Developments through these stages answer why in some cases enfranchisement has been a deeper political struggle than in others. In Portugal, a proposal “made from above” and with antecedents mainly in the legal sphere of international treaties was the starting point for a rather technical debate, which led to a successful reform that enfranchised denizens on the basis of national origin and anchored in reciprocity. That reform hardly changed Portuguese definitions of citizenship: It merely widened the space for (some) foreigners’ political participation in a legal frame that clearly admitted such reform. In Germany, a wide, but subtle, societal debate garnered the support of the SPD early on, but that party needed years to raise it in a parliament. When it finally managed to do that in Hamburg, other parties sympathetic to the cause emulated debates in other La¨nder, multiplying the debates for a broader reappraisal of citizenship than in Portugal. Finally, the cases studied reveal that time has an effect on the mechanisms that make processes unfold in one way or another. Timing—as the precise moment in which things come together—offers different references for the start and development of a debate. In Portugal, it was the end of the

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dictatorship, colonialism, and empire—a time of high democratic hopes. In Germany, it was the demise of the GDR, reunification, and the arrival of the Republikaner to the Berlin parliament13 —a high time to reappraise the German conception of citizenship. Besides timing, temporality—as sequences and duration—matters. Abbott (2010: 255) advised researchers to be self-critical of the episodes we select for study and reflect on the accumulation of time for something to happen and the order in which events occur, both of which may lead to different causal trajectories. This is why longitudinal comparisons are essential to assess how processes differ across cases. So far, taking the BVerfG ruling as the end of the German enfranchisement process has suited well the narratives on German ethnocultural understanding of citizenship but has also hid the feedback loop that the very ruling prompted (i.e. the refinement of arguments that came later) on debates at all levels until today.

Conclusion In this chapter, I systematically compared the case findings and explained why understandings of citizenship substantiating different philosophies on denizen voting are not uniformly developed according to “tradition,” but political creations. Such understandings are raised by actors with interests defined within an institutional context—cultural, linguistic, political, and legal—indeed, but ultimately the opportunities to debate and pass denizen enfranchisement demand political action. A key to successful outcomes is the unambiguous support of proponents, particularly through flexible framing strategies that echo issues on which opponents must agree.

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CHAPTER 6

A Process Approach to Denizen Enfranchisement in Further Cases

Evidence from Cases of Universal Denizen Enfranchisement Chapter 5 developed a middle-range approach for denizen enfranchisement processes from comparing two diverse cases that, though unexplained by the literature, are not unique. Since a typological design led to their choosing (Chapter 2), we can see that the Portuguese enfranchisement of Lusophone denizens and denizens coming from countries where Portuguese were enfranchised, is similar to denizen enfranchisement outcomes in Spain and the Commonwealth countries, as well as to past stages of denizen enfranchisement in Nordic countries. In turn, Germany, though a negative case, had different outcomes at the subnational level, which can be compared to subnational reforms attempts in federal countries, such as Austria. This chapter tries the explanatory approach developed in Chapter 5 on cases other than those used so far to develop it, and which belong to a type that has been well researched in the literature: universal denizen enfranchisement. I will look at cases researched by Dirk Jacobs (Netherlands and Belgium); by David Earnest (Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium); and, finally, by Tomas Hammar (Sweden). I will add further insights on recent cases of enfranchisement in other regions of the world. The reconstruction of parliamentary debates made by Jacobs for the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands has been archetypal for my research. He illuminated enfranchisement processes with a heuristic tool that reveals the proximity of political discourses to positions on a two-dimensional space, derived from theory and initial observations. Jacobs’s account

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focused on apprehending the frames more than the framing in his empirical observations: He identified how positions of parties applied to a discourse matrix derived from theory and initial observations. My framing approach focuses instead on the dynamics. I did not make theoretical expectations about discourses but was open (from beginning to end) to any possible arguments that could be raised, following then how arguments changed along the process. Jacobs’s unparalleled contribution, which I uphold, is to highlight the plurality of discourses: He disproved narratives that attributed the generous Dutch enfranchisement of denizens to a “tradition of tolerance and multiculturalism” (Earnest 2003; Stuurman 2004), finding no evidence of a single cultural idiom, discourse, or ideology that translated into a policy outcome. Because he ceased to look for a single “national” ideology guiding debates, he was able to throw light on the struggles between different ideologies, and show that policy changes do not have to be the result of a genuine compromise on the argumentative level or the dominance of one specific type of reasoning but can just as easily be the result of ad hoc discourse coalitions.1 The gap between my approach and David Earnest’s is bigger. Studying the same phenomenon, Earnest laid more emphasis on the “traditions of citizenship” scholarship, which tends to pair historical events with a “final” decision (political or legal), explaining the decision as a result of a historical-institutional trajectory. For Earnest, one can best explain differences in voting rights in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium as a result of their different historical understandings of citizenship (2005: 4). In this view, each case is unique. For instance, Dutch citizenship is unique in combining French republican liberalism, Protestant religious toleration, and colonial multiculturalism. In Earnest’s narrative, the migration reality described by him as problematic is also assumed to be defined as such by the political actors which then seem to solve it (i.e., with a passed reform) in a consensus derived from their national way of understanding citizenship. According to him, denizen enfranchisement in the Netherlands was a “a consensual process across the spectrum of Dutch political parties” to solve the growing inequality between citizens and noncitizens (mainly from former Dutch colonies) primarily in Rotterdam and Amsterdam, the cities where enfranchisement was first proposed.2 In contrast, Jacobs’s account on the same case reveals that such consensus was constructed gradually from among a plurality of “idioms of nationhood.” The process that in 1985 led to the enfranchisement of denizens at

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the local level who had lived in the country for at least five years was a time-consuming process that required a constitutional reform. From a greater societal perspective, its success was part of a broader incorporation policy to improve the social status of ethnic minorities in the Dutch society, and it took time to gather political clout in circumstances of rising xenophobia and contextual shocks (see also Jero´nimo and Vink 2011: 124–125). From Jacobs’s narrative, we learn that, in the Netherlands, the first calls to enfranchise denizens came from a small academic debate that originated in law journals, with some scholars claiming that all Dutch citizens living abroad should get voting rights, which in turn led to a broader academic discussion that put forward the prominence of the principle of residence in citizenship. After this, the center-right government appointed a group of lawyers to propose how to modernize electoral laws. This group, the CalsDonner Committee, concluded that the enfranchisement of foreign residents in the Netherlands was an urgent matter. As to the popular mobilization, Jacobs found no evidence of pressure from a denizen suffragist movement but only from Dutch citizens active in antiracism movements. Social-democrats rescued the Cals-Donner Committee’s recommendations and included them in the debates about migrant workers in the 1970s. Jacobs speculates that their reasons for adopting those recommendations may have been the expectation to win new votes (although proportions of denizens were hardly an automatic stimulus for parties), as well as an ideology of international solidarity among the working class (1998: 361). However, the center-left government promised to consider the issue during the constitutional revision and the Home Office, led by a Christian Democrat, proposed a constitutional amendment in August 1976 to allow enfranchising denizens at the municipal level. As in Portugal (and in contrast to Germany), it was taken for granted that higher-level voting rights were bound to state citizenship, so a discussion on general principles of membership did not flare up. Yet, the amendment would not itself grant voting rights, nor would it force an alteration of electoral laws: It would merely make a future adaptation of electoral laws for denizen enfranchisement possible. The initial proposal was phrased carefully, and debates developed quietly, so as not to awaken dissent. Jacobs’s rich and detailed account is close to his normatively-derived positions about denizen enfranchisement, but leaves the reader wondering about how it is that discourses “coalesce.” The stepwise analytical approach

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I propose points to the agency in political discourse dynamics: In the Netherlands, leftist proponents avoided a migration frame and parliamentarians favored what I have termed a “selfish” perspective. Voting rights were not presented as rights that foreign residents should have necessarily but as being in the community’s interest in order to take denizens into account. Jacobs affirms that these arguments did not suffice to win the support of the Christian democrats and right-wing liberals for a constitutional reform, who stuck to assimilationist-exclusionary discourse and used migration frames (as did conservatives in Germany). What did it, then? To explain how discourses converge, Jacobs highlights the broad normative spirit of arguments, assuming that if discourses share at least one normative dimension they can potentially join in one storyline. According to him, progress was stimulated by a secret agreement among all parties not to fight too overtly in order to avoid stimulating the popularity of extreme right-wing parties. Yet, the decisive turning point came when the center-right entered the government in 1978 and started to use an “assimilationist inclusionary discourse,” closer to the Left’s discourse. In the end, the turnaround came from a shock: the Moluccan youth terrorist attacks of 1977 and 1978. Enfranchising denizens at the local level provided a solution that all parties could embrace as a policy for ethnic minorities to partially pay the historical debt of the Dutch toward the Moluccan community. Each group could stress its own reasons to favor it but with arguments vague enough to agree.3 The bill passed with a broad majority that included three major parties—right-wing liberals (VVD), Christian democrats (CDA), and social democrats (PvdA)—but not without internal divisions. Jacobs notes the importance of the institutional setting, but he does not include it in his analytic account. However, it seems crucial that, in contrast to most other countries, in the Netherlands, bills do not automatically die after dissolution of the parliament, so the proposal to enfranchise denizens survived government changes. It is because of this that the center-right had to address it. In 1979 and 1980, the bill was discussed in the Second and First Chambers. Meanwhile, Jacobs notes, it was quietly but constantly lobbied for by the largest trade unions and self-appointed advocate organizations.4 A report by an academic advisory committee on ethnic minorities also urged parliamentarians to stimulate a tolerant, multicultural society. Small confessional parties contested the bill on the grounds that it would hinder integration, but the social democrats, left-wing liberals, and leftist

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parties supported it as a human rights issue and even as a moral obligation. Crucially, the right-wing liberals decided finally to support it in exchange for national voting rights for Dutch citizens abroad. All these conditions and actors point to strategic tit-for-tat negotiations and create noise in Jacobs’s neatly defined discourse matrix. In Earnest’s account, however, the rich story offered by Jacobs collapses into a couple of sentences. Observing denizen enfranchisement from the snapshot of its passing only, Earnest defines it as an elite-led process with broad support confirming Dutch norms of political consensus and the Dutch communitarian-liberal model of citizenship.5 Earnest’s account of the German case, by the way, is identical in perspective, and was selected by him for showing “what a contrary understanding of citizenship entails.” Without digging into debates, Earnest finds that Germany’s experiment reflected “both persistent ethno-cultural conceptions of the political community and the variation incubated by a federal system with disinterested executive leadership at the national level” (2005: 22). Belgium is another case of universal denizen enfranchisement studied by both Earnest and Jacobs, which helps to show more crisply the differences in their explanatory accounts (partly because of their choice of episodes for analysis). Before Belgium enfranchised its denizens at the municipal level, Earnest (2003) had attributed its failure to do so to its “intolerant political culture,” distrustful of other communities and limited to rigid pillarization. He saw the long-reaching hand of history determine the fate of denizen enfranchisement through socioeconomic, political, and linguistic divisions between Flemish and Walloon cross-cutting policy issues. There—but not in the Netherlands, where it also took more than a decade to reach a majority to pass it—Earnest identifies a long, protracted debate and political conflict. Yet when Belgian parliamentarians enfranchised denizens in 2004, Earnest corrected his previous account, recurring to a remote cause: the influence of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which had already enabled EU nationals to vote in local elections, next to which the enfranchisement of non-EU resident aliens “seemed a relatively modest extension of the franchise.” He also hypothesized that the examples set by nearby nation-states (the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, and Finland) may have exerted pressure. Without looking any closer at the process that led to this decision, Earnest concluded that “Belgium’s enfranchisement of resident aliens may reflect international factors that transnationalist scholars emphasize rather than domestic ones” (2005: 26).

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Jacobs’s study of the Belgian case took into account traditions of migrant incorporation as well but focused on how they were brought into debates together with an array of other issues. His account shows that, after failures to introduce the issue on the parliamentary agenda, Belgian trade unions, migrants, and antiracism associations launched a suffragist struggle in 1976, demanding the improvement of migrants’ legal position. They lobbied individual center- and left-wing politicians to take the issue to the parliament, but due to political instability the issue could not be tackled quickly and the left-wing government supporting it was replaced by a rightwing government in 1981. Again applying his discourse matrix, Jacobs observed how francophone right-wing liberals “turned from an implicit assimilationist exclusionary discourse to explicit anti-immigration discourses,” hoping to attract votes in competition with extreme right-wing parties and a militant francophone party in Brussels. Most politicians from traditional left-wing parties withdrew their support in fear of a growing electoral appeal of the extreme right. Only ecologists kept firm behind the cause. In 1985, trade unions and migrant associations reinstalled their suffragist movement, naming it Objective 88 (for the elections of 1988). Still, given the increasing success of the extreme right’s consolidation on the national level, any parliamentary reference to the enfranchisement of foreign residents had become taboo. Jacobs highlights that, in contrast to the Netherlands, Belgium had, as yet, no national parliamentarians of migrant descent. Antiracism movements kept negotiating with trade unions and with the center-left government in the 1990s, getting nowhere. Individuals from different migrant associations created the Comite´ voor Algemeen Stemrecht exclusively for migrant members, to counter the argument that denizens were not interested and that the topic was proposed by native extremeleftist agitators. Despite this societal mobilization, the center-left parties did not reopen the debate. Jacobs shows how major political parties worked gradually on a compromise on the constitutional reform to grant EU citizens local voting rights toward 1998. Finally, in 1999, EU citizens were enfranchised, but other nonnationals were only enfranchised five years later. Jacobs attributes this to the position change of the francophone rightwing liberals from opponents to champions of the cause.6 Further studying the migration circumstances of Belgium along those years reveals the conflicts of interest behind denizen enfranchisement. Much like other European countries that had received thousands of migrants through guest-worker programs in the postwar period, Belgian

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governments began to develop policies to foster the inclusion of migrants in society only in the late 1980s. Marco Martiniello and Andrea Rea (2003) suggest that the parliament was a protagonist of a slow and quiet but steady policy of development in this area, passing laws unanimously in the early 1980s to curb racism and give migrants a secure residence status, but rejecting denizen enfranchisement. Right-wing parties were hindering any compromise by politicizing immigration topics. Laws passed in this time attest to the political struggles: Some were encouraging immigrants to go back to their home countries, others encouraging integration. A new Nationality Code in 2000 simplified naturalization and established jus soli for children born in Belgium to foreign parents also born in Belgium. Yet, the naturalization still required individuals to demonstrate a “desire to integrate,” leaving authorities room for arbitrariness in assessing such desire. Thus, the institutional and migration policy context suggests conditions for the “long, protracted debate” in Belgium had less to do with a tradition of ethnolinguistic division than with contrary demands of mobilized constituencies on the political system. Back to Earnest, it seems plausible to suppose that in each case, the terms of debate reflected histories of unique political and social development, but the historical-institutionalist scholarly tradition requires that we at least strive to define how these histories find expression through particular institutions and discourses. By constructing different, and actually “unique,” models of community and citizenship for each case (the ethnolinguistic German, the pluralist and tolerant Dutch, the consociational Belgian, and so on), Earnest assumes that citizens and political elites debate voting rights for noncitizens through the prism of these understandings, without saying how these traditions direct change (to pass a reform). For him, Germany’s abortive experiment with noncitizen voting rights failed because the BVerfG interpreted the franchise as a collective rather than an individual right, and Belgian proposals floundered because they directly challenged the constitutional definition of Belgium as a community of distinctive cultural and linguistic groups until, suddenly, they did not flounder anymore in 2004 as a result of “changing historical circumstances at the turn of the millennium.”7 Admittedly, traditions might be more important in some cases than in others, but it should be possible to explain how they work. Otherwise, one remains perplexed given their sudden deactivation when denizen enfranchisement is adopted in cases in which it was supposed to be doomed.

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Historical traditions are important, but it is the researcher’s task to identify their reflection in the institutional context. Germany’s opposition to enfranchising denizens is strongly determined by its institutions, especially the democratic safeguards and veto players for substantial normative changes, which require almost consensual decisions to be reached in both levels and branches of government.8 Discursive path dependencies are observable as well: Debates fall easily into migration and integration controversies because this allows parties on the Right to use far-right frames without being overtly racist. Portugal had a political-institutional setting more permeable to change: In addition, the timing of its debates, after decolonization, and requiring a new identity as a small post-imperial democracy in a growing EU made it easier to agree on a few “traditional” referents that remained stable (e.g., reciprocity as a legal principle). In the accounts I offered for Portugal and Germany, I clarified why the “prism of citizenship understandings” is insufficient to explain the outcomes and why it does not suffice to superimpose it on politics. It might make sense to understand a decision ex post facto, but it does not bring us further in understanding how it came to be. Also, traditions of citizenship are multifaceted and do not infuse political actors and their arguments homogeneously through a process. They are interpreted within specific times and political contexts, framed and reframed in the light of strategies (instrumentalized) as processes develop. My intention here is not to make a straw puppet out of Earnest’s account,9 much less of historical-institutionalist approaches to citizenship. However, I second Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski in the call that historicalinstitutionalist approaches ought to be sensitive to contingency, and conjuncture (2008: 245). Despite being structural, they should consider the immediate context of each period addressed and the political struggles involved. This is why I think that middle-range accounts are able to allow postnational or historical-institutionalist accounts maintain their emphasis on structural patterns (be they domestic or supranational) yet connect them with the contextual and internal dynamics of cases. The Portuguese case, for instance, illustrates how rhetoric filters and construes international influences at the domestic level. The main difference between my approach and Jacobs’s is in turn one of emphasis on the static/dynamic divide. In my work, I have expanded his original analysis to cases that begged explanation and I have aimed to elaborate an explanation of the mechanisms at work in framing.

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I have left apart the comparison to Sweden, the pioneer case of universal denizen enfranchisement par excellence, studied by Tomas Hammar, because it is the one that best allows signaling what is new in my account. With a rigorous historical-institutionalist perspective, Hammar researched the Swedish case, surveying numerous relevant factors. From a thorough analysis that ranged from factors related to geography, international relations, education and cultural policies to economic development, but also categorizations in migration policy, he concluded that four factors were decisive. First, the acceptance of Swedes that immigration was a fact, which was already reflected in the existence of institutions for immigrant incorporation. Sweden had received migrants from Finland since the 1920s, with an increased flow of refugees from neighboring countries after World War II, and a substantial flow of migrants from Southern Europe after 1956 to satisfy the needs of its booming industry. In 1983, 5 percent of the population in Sweden was foreign born. However, in contrast to similarly “new” immigration countries in Europe, Sweden was more ready to create institutions to incorporate this population, putting in place an Immigration Board already in 1969. Second, the stable political system based on consensus, which demands long, “boring and bureaucratic” work from politicians. Third, the importance of the sustainability of the welfare state in Swedish society, which led trade unions to argue early on that migrants who were able to live and work as equals to Swedish citizens (1991: 25) should have concomitant chances of representation. Fourth, and last, an anti-populist elite consensus to let administrations decide on migration policy issues (1985: 277–287). Without claiming a discursive perspective, Hammar studied who had a say on denizen enfranchisement and how. He observed the characteristics of the parliamentary field in Sweden and found that some of the topics introduced strained debates, while other topics were absent even though one would expect them to be at the center of debates. In Sweden, migrants and their associations, and even parties, played a relatively small role in pushing the issue forward (which is not so surprising for a party system which until 1976 was dominated by one party). The main spokespersons for denizen enfranchisement were politicians and experts—“other people did not bother too much” (Hammar 1990: 176). In 1973, the Council for Immigration Issues and the Minister for Immigration Issues commissioned academics to research immigrant incorporation policies. The result of that research was the recommendation to enfranchise denizens at the local level. Two years later, the proposal passed by a unanimous vote in

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parliament (1985, 45). From his account for Sweden, Hammar generalizes three factors determine the chances of denizen enfranchisement across countries: the acceptance of immigration as a fact, the proportions of denizens in a country, and the possibility of approving enfranchisement without a constitutional reform. Yet, in 1985 the Netherlands passed its denizen enfranchising reform with values that were far from optimal for all those factors. Although Hammar’s account is convincing regarding the readiness of political elites to leave immigrant incorporation to experts, in my view, the institutional and contextual factors he mentions may have made the reform easier, yet what made the difference in the type of franchise and its success was the dynamic framing of the proposal to make it a “boring, technical” issue. Hammar himself observes that in Sweden denizen voting rights pushed the lines of what was possible short of a constitutional reform. The parliament rejected the first proposals (1990: 170, 175); only the restriction of the franchise to the local level (in anticipation of controversies), got the unanimous support of the parliament in 1975.

Cases of Universal Denizen Enfranchisement Beyond European Scholarship As seen in Chapter 1, political studies on denizen enfranchisement have ranged from broad historical monographs that, in the tradition of Tocqueville, characterize it as a democratizing wave enlarging the demos (Przeworski 2009; Romanelli 1998), to narrower institutionalist studies that reduce it to an outcome of particular national traditions of citizenship (Brubaker 1998). Meanwhile, grand sociological theories characterize it as a subphenomenon of a larger reconfiguration of citizenship toward postnational forms, through either top-down (Jacobson 1996) or bottom-up mechanisms (Soysal 2007), or even see it as an aspect of a grand phenomenon of migrant transnationalism, which causes political communities to overlap (Baubo¨ck 2003; Faist 2001). Sociological theories that work at a middle-range level of abstraction focus on the interplay between institutions and politics across levels, drawing most of their evidence from the domestic one (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002; Joppke 2007). Yet, few of these theories have been developed with a broadly comparative view, and even fewer have taken into account cases beyond a familiar sample of Western polities. In my attempt to

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develop a middle-range theory of denizen enfranchisement, I can illustrate its adaptability by taking a brief look at other cases of universal denizen enfranchisement in Asia and Latin America, even for cases that are strictly beyond the scope conditions (liberal democracies with high proportions of denizens). South Korea is the only country in Asia that has enfranchised resident migrants, making (apparently) no selection among them (e.g., in my own definition, as well as in standard definitions, it would fall on the universal denizen enfranchisement type). Currently, however, the eligibility conditions to exercise the denizen franchise (active and passive voting rights) in South Korea are so restrictive that it only applies to a tiny portion of denizens: those possessing a permanent residence visa. That visa is difficult to get for most immigrants, who are originally admitted with work or trainee visas, since the maximum residence period of these visas is just below the five years needed to obtain a permanent residence visa. Still, the South Korean enfranchisement has already raised interest among comparative-politics scholars, most prominently Konrad Kalicki (2009) and S. H. Chung (2010). Both authors refer to the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, particularly to traditions of citizenship as frameworks for their study. Moreover, both create narratives that portray a sense of coherence in the process of enfranchisement regarding what was perceived as the right course of action. Puzzlingly, however, each concludes that an opposite tradition was key: While Kalicki found that the enfranchisement delineated a new, distinctive less ethnocentric and more civic understanding of citizenship in South Korea than usually portrayed (see Shin 2006), Chung found that it was precisely an ethno-nationalist approach explained the success of the reform. In a study I conducted with Hannes Mosler (Mosler and Pedroza 2016) using my process approach, we showed that a framing that highlighted the special historical and cultural relation between former colonial countries and the aim of reciprocity explains the South Korean case more satisfactorily than the explanations so far. Yet, we also found that in the South Korean enfranchisement the reciprocity frame was applied differently than it was between Iberian and Latin American countries. South Korean decision-makers tried an expected reciprocity framing strategy without actually anchoring denizen franchise on reciprocity: legislators argued that, by acting first, South Korea would be able to formulate legitimate claims on other countries. The background of this intricate framing is a delicate postcolonial relationship between Japan and South Korea—former colonizer and colonized.

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South Korean parliamentarians and civil society were closely involved in the debates and they collaborated in the aim of inducing the enfranchisement of an important denizen population of Korean ancestry in Japan which remains disfranchised for over three generations, after being abducted from Korea during Japan’s colonial expansion. Compared to other colonial dyads, such as Great Britain and the Commonwealth of Nations or Spain and some Latin American countries, where former colonizers enfranchised denizens first and then former colonies reacted with similar reforms, in South Korea, it was the former colony that acted first. The political institutional context in South Korea facilitated consensus and a swift process. To begin with, both the constitutional design in South Korea that explicitly differentiates between citizens and residents, and the relative centralization of government (despite attempts to deconcentrate and decentralize it at the turn of the century) made such reform feasible through ordinary legislation, but also the low institutionalization of the party system, which hampers the identification of specific parties with clear political programs. In contrast to most other cases of enfranchisement where a clear divide existed between parties on the basis of their established ideological identities, and where this can be checked for its coincidence with positions regarding denizen enfranchisement and how they change with different framings, in South Korea, debates were rather uncontroversial as parties did not appropriate clear positions. And yet, the South Korean enfranchisement of denizens is obviously more than a tale of dysfunctional party dynamics: Parties still addressed this highly symbolic issue (considering the few actual votes at stake and lofty aim) because various civil society organizations pressed politicians to do that, despite their change from party to party. Organized civil groups of migrant-rights advocates in South Korea and Japan recommended using a framing that highlighted the benefits for South Korea. This case illustrates how the process approach I propose, linking agents and institutions through interpretive and relational mechanisms of social construction, works for a strikingly different institutional context. In Latin America, Uruguay and Argentina are good examples to show the reach and the limits of my process approach with regard to other explanations. Both countries share a common history of immigration: Early in their independent lives, they developed policies to stimulate immigration, resulting in high inflows from Europe (mainly Spain and Italy) arriving at

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their ports to populate vast territories, lured by the promise of free land. Both Argentina and Uruguay have citizenship regimes that distinguish citizenship from nationality: Citizenship follows residence. The striking similarities between these two countries delineate a deviant regime from the rest of the continent which I have called “rı´oplatense” (as both countries border the River Plate) (Pedroza and Palop-Garcı´a 2017). In turn, this regime helps us to see the limits of cultural and historical explanations of traditions of citizenship to explain decisions on denizen enfranchisement if other institutional factors and political context are overlooked. With regard to denizen voting rights, Uruguay recognized them for all foreign residents after fifteen years as early as the 1925 through Elections Law n. 7.812, which was upheld in Uruguay’s latest constitution, the Constitution of 1967 (Art. 78). Even the first (1830) Uruguayan constitution established that foreigners would be legal citizens if they fulfilled a requirement of residence, depending on the other conditions as well (all of which attested to some kind of commitment in the country: from family ties to employment), making any process of naturalization superfluous—naturalization, in fact, does not exist in Uruguay with that name. Argentina, however, and despite its most similar citizenship regime, has no national enfranchisement of denizens to date, but is one of the few countries in the world where denizens have been enfranchised by subnational polities. As such, it reveals possibilities theoretically open for cases that are negative in federal systems such as Germany. In twenty-two of the twenty-three Argentinean provinces, immigrant residents can vote at the local level and, in four of them, they can vote for legislative and executive regional positions. The requirements vary considerably across provinces in residence length (from one year to ten), age thresholds (eighteen to twenty-one), and additional ones (Emmerich 2011: 12). Electoral federalism, which is also found in Mexico, makes this possible. However, the political context and migration could not be more different between Mexico and Argentina: Mexico’s proportion of immigrant residents is less than 1 percent, but has high numbers of transit migrants who aim to migrate northward, like millions of Mexicans (10 percent of the national population) have done. Mexico has applied a migration policy completely determined by this historical emigration and by the pressure from the United States to apply its immigration and border security policies further to the south to stop migrants hailing from Central and South America to even enter Mexico. Despite having passed a very progressive immigration law in 2011, Mexico displays divergent discourses and

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policies for emigrants and immigrants, demanding respect for its emigrants while failing to guarantee the most basic human rights for migrants crossing its territory. Advocates of denizen enfranchisement in Mexico thus use frames that emphasize the need for coherence in migration policy, rather than to solve a democratic deficit. Academics and activists have organized symbolic elections for foreign residents in the 2012 and 2018 elections in Mexico City and lobbied candidates from left-wing parties to back local denizen enfranchisement. Until now, however, and despite the city government’s many passed laws in a progressive agenda, no debate has taken place on it. Can we learn something concrete about how enfranchisement reforms succeed after having considered these different cases of universal enfranchisement processes?

Lessons Learned from Comparisons Across Types of Enfranchisement Reforms The basic political constellations that a successful reform requires are rather obvious: a coordinated political stance among key proponent actors in an environment of few legal veto players. This usually takes the form of a supporting majority in the legislative body with strong support from executives, be it personal or institutional (e.g. from consultative councils within the executive branch). Also, the clearer it is that such reform can pass through normal legislation—without constitutional reforms or the consent of veto players—the easier it is to pass them. Regarding political parties, it is true that denizen enfranchisement has been everywhere (at least initially) a proposal taken to the formal political arena by political parties or governments rather on the left of the political spectrum. However, both the empirical work of this book and the existing research on universal denizen enfranchisement cases confirm that this is not a sufficient condition and that these parties cannot be trusted to have a unified, stable position, even if they express expectations of gains from a new electorate.10 It is clear that reforms have better chances when backed by civil society organizations and intellectual elites but in a controlled mobilization of supportive actors, rather than in a society-wide debate. Denizens themselves are seldom protagonists or even prominent mobilizers of successful reforms. In fact, there are very few cases where migrants’ mobilization led to a successful reform:

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In Belgium, it only helped the cause when the frame changed from immigrant integration to nondiscrimination. In South Korea, the ethnic Chinese residents did mobilize after the debates begun, but in forums where they lobbied specific parliamentarians without raising the attention of the general public. In Sweden, the Netherlands, and Portugal, the lack of organized public opinion actually facilitated the passing of denizen enfranchisement. In Germany, public mobilization has been an intermittent reality, and often a threat made by opponents of denizen enfranchisement to stop it. Yet my question was not only why denizen enfranchisement succeeds or does not, but also why it has such different outcomes. This takes us back to the terrain of social construction. In all cases compared, the passing of denizen enfranchisement involved a slow and painstaking diagnostic that usually arises only after problems with the migrant population are entrenched. It is fundamental to understand that democratic polities do not just “see” and diagnose needs. Usually a good deal of social cohesion has been undermined by the time some societal and political actors demand to integrate migrants politically, and these mobilized actors are seldom migrants, which leaves the cause in the hands of native citizen advocates who have to justify why they propose to change the present electorate and, oftentimes, why they do not fight for the “usual way” of giving full citizenship to immigrants, naturalization. Elaborating these justifications can divide proponents. Thus, the success of proponents to gather support to even start debates on denizen enfranchisement is a necessary but insufficient first step. The second one, taking the issue to the arena of political society, requires a lot more work. Hammar was a pioneer in showing how, despite information on migrants’ potential political preferences, parties were uninterested in denizen enfranchisement, partly because they could not calculate if ignoring them was worse than angering their native constituencies by taking on the issue (1980: 281).11 This is why the consistent, unambiguous support of centrist parties for the cause, from the start and throughout the political process is a key to different outcomes. And such support is no easy feat because supporting parties must be ready to reframe enfranchisement in ways that neutralize sceptics and opponents, and attract more supporters. Failure to do so is illustrated by the SPD in the German debates, the ambiguous stance of which was largely dealt with in Chapter 4. Similarly, the most recent local denizen enfranchisement attempt in France (considering that the first was a proposal by President Franc¸ois Mitterand in the early

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1980s) became an unfulfilled promise in President Franc¸ois Hollande’s government agenda, due to divided views within his party. While some Socialist leaders, such as Jean-Christophe Cambade´lis, supported it as a measure that would strengthen the democratic republic, Prime Minister Manuel Valls argued that it would only focus attention on immigrants to their disadvantage under the current politicization of refugee and migration issues by the far-right Front Nationale, and would most likely be defeated in a Senate tilted toward the Right.12 With party support being a necessary but insufficient condition, we can observe that denizen enfranchisement has passed there where it was restricted to a few justifications on which all could agree, particularly where categories of beneficiaries and the grounds on which the franchise is extended were generally accepted. More tellingly, successful reforms have almost always involved the framing of denizen enfranchisement away from being an “immigrant problem” that benefits, by definition, an unrepresented group in society, into an issue that affects and benefits the whole society. Democracy has no self-perfecting device. To work within the complex realities created by immigration, it must be purposefully adjusted and updated. In this regard, when supporting majorities are not at hand (and they seldom are, so that the political constellation is hardly ever favorable from the start), framing becomes fundamental to divert debates from controversial issues and streamline them toward potential gains for the receiving society. The most supportive framing for denizen enfranchisement involves contouring debates along a few arguments that oblige conservative actors to agree or that offer them a tit-for-tat. Referents for such framing may be historical or may come from the contemporary context. Gauging my theoretical approach to compare cases against earlier ones, a further conclusion is that some readings of William Rogers Brubaker’s influential book Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany on the traditions of citizenship in those countries are responsible for a great deal of reification of citizenship traditions in academic discourse.13 In the best cases, those that closely follow Brubaker’s analyses, including his methodology, document these traditions tracing “crucial moments” of nation- and state-building when basic documents were drafted and institutions were shaped which created path dependencies thereafter.14 In other cases, however, authors leave the burden of proof to Brubaker’s authority, simply referencing him to “apply” his argument to particular outcomes (Weiss

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2002). In such a guise, “historical institutionalism” is little more than a label. Yet articles stamped with it do a lot to confirm the defective impression that traditions of citizenship are impervious to change and the reason why some states are more ready to reassess specific citizenship practices than others. My account is no disproof of historical institutionalism: It is but a more pluralistic and more contextual take on it. Much in the spirit that Lakatos conceived of progressive research programs, I trust that, by incorporating evidence from cases that were unexplained by it, we can correct and supplement it. A last example of a denizen enfranchisement reform can illustrate this. One of the most progressive denizen enfranchisement reforms occurred in New Zealand over forty years ago. Since 1975, denizens may vote in national-level elections if they have lived in the country for two years. In a country with more than 25 percent of foreign residents, this is not trivial. Over the years, half of the denizens in New Zealand have come from countries with plenty of commonalities (Australia and other Commonwealth countries) but increasingly also from Asia. Yet, New Zealand experts think that the separation of voting rights from issues of nationality and formal membership is completely uncontroversial.15 Judging from New Zealanders’ national experience, diversity is part of their identity, a positive feature they can be proud of, and also a tool to generate a positive image internationally. Historical institutionalists see here a link to the Commonwealth tradition of allowing voting generally by other Commonwealth citizens. But this relegates the New Zealand enfranchisement to a relic of colonial rules, robbing it of its strong progressive politics, and missing that New Zealand has enfranchised all denizens, and not only Commonwealth migrants. Uruguay and Chile, which share the same type of universal enfranchisement even for national-level elections, show as well that such a particular colonial past is not a must. Thus, ostensibly and beyond nit-picky issues of rigorous application of research methods, historical-institutionalist explanations tilt strongly toward conservatism, even when trying to explain progressive and forward-looking policy paths. It is a birthmark of that analytical approach that contemporary politics and reinterpretations of political understandings are overshadowed by the focus on the past. While it is a proper approach for many research questions related to citizenship and, in any case, always a reasonable starting point, if we look to explain contemporary politics, citizenship traditions are only one among various possible influences on how agents shape arguments for and against a particular reform proposal.

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My middle-range, process-based account has been distilled from various consecutive comparisons. It may fall short of parsimony in explaining neat cultural patterns along a typology that lead to different outcomes, but its aim is different: Its goal is to cultivate the idea that conceptions of citizenship are embodied in institutions and, as such, determine different degrees of complexity to achieve reforms, yet they remain open to political reinterpretation and negotiation. This process-based approach is based on findings that come from different comparative exercises: It germinated from the findings in Chapter 2 that show the indeterminacy of the relationship between naturalization policy and denizen enfranchisement; grew through the study of two diverse, unexplained cases; and matured into a middle-range theory with the confrontation of other explanations and further evidence on cases of universal franchise.

Conclusion Not long ago, New York City parents, regardless of their immigration status, were allowed to vote in community school-board elections. In the wake of this very limited enfranchisement, a poll found that U.S. citizens with democratic sympathies would support, by a thin majority, giving the right to vote to immigrants if they pay taxes and have resided in the United States.16 Even though we know that denizen enfranchisement would not be completely new in the history of the United States (as Raskin 1993 and Hayduk 2006 have shown), watchdog organizations (e.g., DCWatch) warn that groups who fought to get the right to vote while already being citizens (ethnic minorities) might be resentful of denizen enfranchisement. This reveals not only the many inequalities that are highlighted through the right to vote as a privilege of citizenship, but also the magnitude of sociocultural acceptance required to open broad debates on it (Bullard 2015), even in democracies widely reputed to have a “civic” tradition of citizenship, as in the United States. The conclusions of this comparative chapter on the most crucial conditions of successful denizen enfranchisement reforms— streamlined debates in parliaments—might come across as a cynical finding for democratic regimes but are in fact supported by the history of even bigger revolutions in social values. Through the decision-making process of an issue as fundamental to our understanding of democracy as the enlargement of the electorate, rhetoric

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is extremely important, as serious risks are associated with a polarization of positions that reach the general public with messages of fear. Christian Joppke has been right in delineating an anticlimactic, anti-romantic path of extensions of rights to immigrants, as being “not the popular drama of social movements confronting the state or political entrepreneurs competing for votes, but the quiet and largely unnoticed processing of the legal system, which often conflicts with the restriction-mindedness of popularly elected governments” (1999b: 3). And yet, another German sociologist and social philosopher, Hans Joas, allows recovering some of the romance of enfranchisement in his beautiful portrayal of the history of human rights, a much bigger revolution of values. For him, the adoption of human rights by populations as something subjectively self-evident and emotionally intense was the result of continued support by institutions and society, and of their vigorous defense. This can only be adequately described as a complex transformation in which a “tradition” had to be in fact articulated, legally codified, to be later assimilated into practices of everyday life (Joas 2013). To see how both Joppke and Joas can be right, we can recall Hammar’s mention in passing that a poll conducted shortly before the debates on denizen enfranchisement began in Sweden had revealed that a majority of Swedes opposed such a reform; however, when the same poll was repeated a few years later (that is, when the passed reform had made Sweden a pioneer of denizen enfranchisement in Europe), most respondents embraced it. After an elite-led process that dealt with denizen voting rights in a frame of inclusion and equality, enfranchisement became appropriated by the wider society. After so many comparative exercises, this is the story I can conclude with: Denizen enfranchisement processes have the power to reconfigure self-understandings of citizenship by hosting arguments that can eventually gain the commitment of others and create consensus for understandings of democratic rights broader than those rooted in national membership.17

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Beyond Denizen Enfranchisement: Citizenship Change and Migration Policy

The case of alien suffrage is typically supported by versions of liberalism premised on equality and autonomy with a splash of cosmopolitanism (i.e. the putative international right to democracy) and the desire to bring voting rights to a continuum of inclusion rather than confine them to the dichotomies of membership (i.e. yes/no, in/out). —Jo Shaw (2003)

THIS BOOK HAS explored the various paths to denizen enfranchisement.

It began by defining it and surveying its variations. I showed there is a growing trend across democracies to start denizen enfranchisement processes, a trend I qualified by showing that the outcomes of those processes differ, depending on the level of reforms, the population of denizens covered by them, and the conditions of residence to the get the franchise. Letting variables vary as much as they possibly can within the possibilities of case-study research, I chose cases for in-depth study that would allow me to elaborate the explanations offered so far for why denizen enfranchisement varies. The varieties of denizen enfranchisement make it difficult to assert that it represents a general trend toward post-national or de-nationalized citizenship. In all cases, it is still too weak to call into question national membership as the prerequisite for the formal status of citizenship that confers completeness and security over all citizen rights. Also, the realm of application of denizen voting rights remains overwhelmingly limited to the local

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level, while the nation-state remains the repository of welfare and public health, education, and social distribution—where it assumes these functions, even if some of them get to be customized and administered at subnational levels in federal states. Still, in support of the post-nationalist hypotheses, it is clear that the sheer growth of cases of denizen enfranchisement around the world suggests that participatory rights are increasingly being discussed as an essential aspect of human personhood. The two diverse cases with different outcomes studied in depth in this book provide evidence that emerging post-national norms are indeed part of those discussions.1 This is important since hypotheses on the influence of postnational norms are sometimes unfairly disconfirmed by negative cases or variations of denizen franchise reforms in democracies that supposedly should be bound to the same principles (Faist 2001).2 I say unfairly because this book shows that the recognition of participatory rights of resident immigrants is neither explicit nor consensual. If we approach theorizing with sensitivity to political contexts, we can observe that some postnational arguments were part of those contexts, even if they were not the only frame (see also the very nuanced critique of post-nationalism by Bosniak 2000). The analytical proposal I make works at a different level than the grand theories offered so far to explain denizen enfranchisement (theories on post-national influences or national traditions of citizenship), but it builds on a reassessment of their limits with the aim of specifying them further, so that their explanations gain in depth and quality. Chapter 1 shows that basic assumptions of these theories are not coherent with an ample view of the phenomenon. Through broad comparative exercises, Chapter 2 arrives at two more specific findings: First, that there is ample variation in the kinds of denizen enfranchisement and in the stages that enfranchisement attempts have reached; and second, that the relation between naturalization and denizen franchise is non-unidirectional and nonexhaustive. Chapters 3 and 4 unveil different scenarios in which the enfranchisement outcome begged explanation: Portugal and Germany. A liberal democracy is not necessarily homogeneous within a national boundary and not necessarily stable in its citizenship regime, traditions, and practices: The whole range of justifications for inclusion or exclusion in a democracy must be studied to accurately comprehend its citizenship “understanding.” To Cristina Rodrı´guez, the very limitations of denizen franchise worldwide serve to “measure whether a society lives up to its

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democratic aspirations as well as to understand how democratic societies construct their polities” (2010: 35). However, this means to make an assessment of democratic quality, again, reading backward from an outcome. In this book I have argued that we should be wary of such readings. I find that without a fuller view of political debates behind outcomes we still have a poor measure of such understandings of citizenship. This is why I prefer to side with Joseph Carens in that “every liberal democracy is inevitably culturally specific because of the particular way in which it is a liberal democracy” (2000: 11). My interpretive approach extends the compelling findings of the postnational account, too. In general, my empirical work supports Soysal’s references to discourses as mechanisms of change to extend rights for noncitizens. However, in contrast to Soysal, I do not find that “debates invariably center on the universal/humanistic versus national/particularistic controversy” (2007: 154—my italics). Debates in Portugal avoided those controversies. A reputed voice in migration studies, Virginie Guiraudon, has said that domestic institutional sources, not international or post-national influences, are relevant in extending rights (2007). Yet, to be fair, it is hard to see how domestic institutional forces would not be more relevant than international and post-national ones when it is necessary that the domestic level adopts (and adapts) higher-level discourses to a national context. Analytically, the issue becomes one of empirical observation, and of immediate or remote causes. Furthermore, Guiraudon has argued that negotiations that extend rights to immigrants tend to be closed, but I focused on parliamentary debates, which constitute an arena of politics the purpose of which is precisely to provide public justification for politicians’ positions vis-a`-vis policies and prospective laws. Looking at these, I found that it does make a difference in the long-term effects of political discourse whether the debate is framed broadly and deeply, as in Germany, or is restricted and superficial, as in Portugal. This, in turn, also has an effect on the outcomes. In Germany, the terms of the debate on denizen enfranchisement were so fundamental that they frustrated such reform, but authoritatively grounded the need for a reform of naturalization laws. Among the processes that get into deep controversies, the political-legal success of universal denizen enfranchisement is less likely. I have termed some enfranchisement debates “symbolic” after finding out that their impact was modest in terms of reach of rights and of people covered by the passed law. This reflects a concern that denizen enfranchisement debates

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are, at times, used as a flag for changing something else without a real prospect of achieving an enfranchisement reform in the short term. Symbolic framing determines the scope of a debate regarding many issues of public policy, not only enfranchisement. But it does not mean that a political debate is a sham (cf. Freeman 1995). In enfranchisement debates generally, historical research has shown that the most important reforms of the recent past were possible thanks to a selfish framing by the political elite. In turn, a deeper debate may have a more consequential effect on the understanding of citizenship, even if, in the short term, it leads to the rejection of denizen enfranchisement or to its restriction. This finding should be interpreted with caution: A deeper, wider debate does not mean an open (i.e., public) debate. I also used “symbolic” to signal the more normative concern I have that some enfranchisement debates remain within the realm of the political elite. Guiraudon (2007) notes poignantly that denizen enfranchisement seems counterintuitive compared to previous enfranchisement trends in its “lack of open mobilization.” Although this is true, the framing of denizen enfranchisement in the formal political decision-making process is not all that different from the great enfranchisements of people of the lower classes and women in nineteenth- and twentieth-century England: The success of negotiations to achieve those much larger enfranchisements was possible in great part thanks to justifications that portrayed those reforms as desirable to enhance the political system’s efficiency, saying nothing about how they would improve the lives of the disenfranchised (Lizzeri and Persico 2004: 746). In Germany, the debate originated in civil society groups with experts on the situation of immigrants: intellectuals, academics, religious authorities, and trade unions. When parties adopted denizen enfranchisement as a formal proposal, they agreed not to politicize it—indeed, the most delicate moments of the parliamentary discussion involved threats to “take it to the streets.” Portugal also shows an agreement on nonpoliticization. These findings support the verdict by Joppke (2001) and Howard (2007) that liberalizing moves in migration policy have better chances when kept in low profile. In each case, similar framing mechanisms of denizen enfranchisement belonged, nevertheless, to political processes of different breadth and length. My middle-range account extends grand theories in that it looks beyond outcomes toward decision-making processes and the political discourses exposed in them. This is important not only because it is by looking at

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processes that we can understand how innovative decisions were arrived at—and very likely which conditions allowed such decisions to be taken, thus why they were arrived at—but also because debates have important political effects by themselves. Debates, too, constitute political action, sometimes channeling decisions to other areas that are more fundamental or advancing compromises toward a meaningful decision over time, and overall changing political discourse. So far, the literature has drawn positions in favor of and against denizen voting rights from both easy and hard naturalization rules, as if these could be straightforwardly derived from legal traditions. This book demonstrates that the interpretation of the relationship between naturalization and voting rights should be researched empirically rather than assumed: Even nation-states that share a dilemma of immigrant incorporation due to high proportions of immigrants and their commitment to democracy vary in the way they incorporate migrants politically because such commitment is interpreted in relation to other norms as well. Among those norms, the hardness of rules of naturalization in each country usually figures in the discussions about denizen voting rights, but it does not determine a decision on these rights in one way or another. Moreover, this book shows that decisions on denizen enfranchisement are part of wider political processes where usually more is at stake than an enlargement of the electorate and the political consequences it would have. In fact, deep reassessments of citizenship may occur in debates that fail to become decisions or that become awkward decisions under circumstances of political compromise. Debates on denizen enfranchisement already constitute meaningful political action. More important, this book shows that the ways in which actors portray denizen enfranchisement—how they project the reasons for it, its potential and its effects—is fundamental to its course in the formal political process. Puzzling cases of denizen enfranchisement based on reciprocity and/or that focus on a specific denizen group are the outcome of hard political compromises (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) that might be partial steps in a longer process. This finding echoes studies on larger political arrangements in multilevel polities that demonstrate how norms of reciprocity play an important role in constructing mutual accommodation and solidarity between contentious agents (Lluch 2014). Still, in Germany and Portugal, the decisions taken regarding denizen enfranchisement (one negative, the other with preferential treatment for some groups) have been reappraised. This echoes a general pattern that was already discernible in the broad comparisons (Chapter 2): The vote is a marker of civic equality, so particularistic forms of denizen

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enfranchisement are hard to sustain over time. Restricting the franchise to people considered politically, ethnically, or culturally similar reproduces the logic that ethnicity (or nationality) is what counts, not personhood or residence or interests or social bonds at the local level. The Nordic countries’ experience with denizen enfranchisement suggests that in democracies, extensions of the vote to a new category of people on grounds that seem incompatible with civic equality create dissonance and give impetus to further discussions. A process-based account shows precisely how framing (as a cognitive-relational mechanism) works: Every time denizen enfranchisement was proposed again in Germany, proponents could get a more serious commitment from the opponents to change nationality. Debating controversial issues of migration and belonging made agreement on denizen enfranchisement difficult immediately but opened a larger set of policy issues from which no party could abstain later. In Portugal, the more restricted debate did not provide any reason to question principles of membership, but recently the original advocates of enfranchisement have expressed demands to remove the reciprocity requirement. Without attributing a progressive teleological nature to these particular case findings, they do suggest that we must be aware of feedback loops in enfranchisement processes. It seems that, in some cases, changing the boundaries of the electorate (either because of lacking political majorities or because of the need to overcome veto points) might require constructing an ample consensus. Initially, restrictive decisions on enfranchisement can become a reference point for partial agreements in a long process that requires building both trust and momentum. The middle-range approach I put forward can be adjusted to context, works with varying conditions and outcomes, and can be thus applied to a broad range of cases beyond Germany and Portugal. It signals how institutions matter and how historical effects accumulate, overcoming assumptions of some historical-institutionalist hypotheses that attribute both change and lack of change to culture. Framing strategies which neutralize contentious or polarizing issues play a crucial role in the success of denizen enfranchisement processes. The frames are particular to each case (i.e., path-dependencies, traditions), but their role in a debate has less to do with alleged cross-state cultural differences than with the actual framing by political actors, deploying such references to fit the conditions and resources set by the political-institutional context (Chapter 5). I arrived at this approach combining deductive and inductive insights, relying on

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Charles Tilly and Andrew Abbott. With cases other than those used to develop my account, I showed how a strong requirement to observe processes can both incorporate the evidence from comparative-case exercises (Chapter 6) and explain them better. A process approach helps us avoid the biases which so far overlooked momentous changes in the language of citizenship by arbitrarily setting a beginning and an end to denizen enfranchisement episodes under study, which in reality may not have ended. What we deem to be the “result” of a denizen enfranchisement process makes a difference because the varying complexity of political systems may require different amounts of time for the same process to advance, take detours, and make loops to reach a similar goal. Furthermore, even with short-term failures and restrictive reforms, where debates run wide and deep, the change is observable. Thus, the particular outcomes studied in this book are (and hopefully remain) open to political change.

How Debates on Enfranchisement Change Citizenship Enfranchisement debates both indicate and provoke citizenship change as they challenge the very distinction between citizen and noncitizen. This challenge is sometimes powered horizontally by nation-states that aim to establish closer bonds across polities, trespassing the clear in-and-out logic of membership with stratifications of it, or introducing reciprocity; sometimes it is powered top-down, by elites; and sometimes, if rarely, it is powered from below, by the already citizens or by (or with) denizens. In the pioneer cases of denizen enfranchisement, citizens promoted the inclusion of denizens in society and their acquisition of rights so as to protect themselves from the negative effects of competition in labor markets. Certainly, the very blending of the languages of citizenship and human rights has served social movements to demand citizen rights for migrants more amply than the mere promotion of political-electoral rights for denizens. Also, the growing activism of noncitizen migrants and citizens together speaks to wider issues that reflect solidaristic conceptions of what it means to be a citizen, as they challenge the borders of political communities, or their coincidence with nationality, and because such joint action by both citizens and denizens helps enacting migrants as political actors, regardless of their formal status. This is the sense in which the critical citizenship literature

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speaks of “acts of citizenship” or “citizenship from below” (Balibar 2012, 2015; Isin 2008, 2012; Isin and Turner 2007; Rugiel 2010) and challenges the binary of citizen/noncitizen. While I work with that binary, I am aware of its semantic problems when they flatten the myriad of possible citizenship experiences under a difference in status. As a political scientist, I share with the critical citizenship-studies a discomfort when I see citizenship reduced to nationality. In contrast to that critical literature though, I see a fundamental difference between citizenship and nationality: For me, while the membership-status dimension of citizenship can be properly identified with the national/nonnational divide, while citizenship as a whole should have the space it deserves as a much wider repertoire of meanings and practices related to civic life, only some of which are related to participation in the nation-state. Along with critical perspectives of citizenship, I propose that denizen enfranchisement processes can also be linked to a global justice concern. Many authors have criticized both the ideals and the practices of citizenship that sanction and freeze global inequalities (Baubo¨ck 2011; Hindess 1998; Isin and Turner 2007; Kostakopoulou 2008; Shachar 2007, 2009; Boatca 2011). This critique often translates into policy as support for and sympathy with the individual efforts of people to redefine their citizenship by migrating to where it comes closer to reality: the cosmopolitan right of individuals to migrate. However, it also translates into sympathy for debates and arrangements that allow the pursuit of greater equality among nation-states, as a more reachable solution in the international sphere. For instance, seeing political participation rights of migrants from a transnational perspective, Blatter (2011) concludes that granting them to immigrants in affluent countries is a way to redress the negative effects of asymmetric relations. For policy, this implied that, in addition to allowing immigration for humanitarian and self-centered economic reasons, affluent countries should consider accepting immigrants from poorer countries for normative (e.g., redistributive) reasons. Let us reflect for a moment on what the change of focus in the unit of analysis from the individual cosmopolitan to the state-centric global justice perspective implies. The identification of citizenship with nationality has far-reaching implications. Despite being heir to a tradition of thought that premises equality, citizenship today is not an equalizing device that allows us to take for granted a relationship of stable rights and duties between individuals even within the realm of nation-states, much less across states.

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This is because citizenship does not bring the same kind of relationship between individual and state across countries in the world: In different nation-states, citizenship contains more rights and obligations than in others and, obviously, not all states can serve their obligations equally, and there is no world authority to guarantee that they do. Indeed, a big deception of confusing citizenship with nationality is that this obscures the crude inequality behind nationalities that exists under the name of citizenship, which is a reputable institution related to self-government, and not merely a document that identifies membership to nation-states and opens doors to international mobility. While it is obvious that all passports attest to some sort of national belonging, not all passports are equal: The possession of some passports gives their holders power in terms of the life chances they afford by the very means of mobility and residence rights. There is academic research (Mau et al. 2015) measuring just this, as well as companies indexing data on this and processing second passports for wealthy persons who might try to flee their own countries for tax- or law-evasion reasons. Therefore, equating nationality to citizenship is incorrect, even in the (otherwise admirable) critical readings of it (Hindess 1998). Moreover, as Cohen (2009) has demonstrated, citizenship is not even equal within one nation-state: The fiction of a uniform citizenship-as-nationality conceals its many contemporary forms of discrimination, only some of which are related to migration. And then, forms of discrimination related to migration not only relate to immigrants, but also to emigrants: These forms are palpable when nationals of the same country emigrate and get a different legal treatment from their country of origin, depending on the origin of their nationality (by naturalization or by birthright), and the exclusivity of their belonging (Pedroza and Palop-Garcı´a 2017). Moreover, several forms of exclusion of some nationals from citizenship rights have less to do with migration than with colonialism and empire (Alexander 2012). The need to update the “citizenship myth” to democratic ideals of today in light of global inequalities was observed by Michael Ignatieff (1995) more than two decades ago, and holds truer today, with the challenges of forced migration due to violence and environmental events, as well as economic causes that might have been provoked by wealthier countries. If we look at the larger scheme of things, we are well advised to reinvigorate citizenship with a substance that is up to global responsibilities. Even if for the time being this still means that we strengthen citizenship as compartmentalized within nation-states, we can still imbue it with more inclusive principles.

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I mean to emphasize that, when analyzing democratic challenges posed by migration within nation-states, we should not shy away from connecting them to issues of democratic governance of migration across states. The right to move, to enter, to have rights upon different kinds of entry and as resident is unequally distributed in the world. Migration policies produce a global stratification of the right to move, and this extends from admission policies to immigrant integration and inclusion policies which cover the political rights studied in this book, as well as the right to employment, to social security benefits, to health insurance, and to schooling. Although access to nationality has been used as the crown jewel of immigrant integration policies and despite the facilitation of naturalization in many countries, we know that naturalization rates remain low because matters of identity, plans of return, and fears of rejection keep denizens from naturalizing. Thus, if we reduce all the different dimensions of access to rights to nationality, we make those rights (many of which are the core of citizenship) subservient to hierarchies by which migration policies discriminate among people (even from the same country). But citizenship can and should be more than that. In a liberal society, citizenship should recognize the capacity of individuals to choose their ends (Kakabadse, Kakabadse, and Kalu 2009: 11). Such a principle is best honored by not imposing naturalization as a precondition for enjoying recognition of equal worth and dignity as individuals in daily life where they reside.3 The recognition of citizen rights, responsibilities, and commitments that comes with the local denizen franchise is just an aspect of that. Combined with easy naturalization, this allows denizens themselves to decide on their personal commitment to the larger polity without giving up their de facto belonging in the local level. This is important for the quality and self-definition of citizenship of the receiving polity, just as it is important for the immigrant residents themselves. Studying citizenship in diverse societies, Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (2000) warn that those who feel excluded from a political project will have a harder time making the compromises usually justified for the sake of a common good and a common goal in democratic societies. In 2018, this can be easily applied not to denizens, but to national citizens who vote increasingly for radical right-wing parties across Europe out of anxiety of being excluded themselves from societies that they see visibly changing due to the reception of immigrants. Thus, I cannot emphasize enough how important it is to

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make the extension of rights to immigrants an issue that is in the interest of receiving societies. The local denizen franchise might indeed bring additional rewards for both migrants and nonmigrants. Granting the right to vote in a political community might be seen as an act of recognition and thereby likely contribute to the development of mutual respect (Taylor 1994: 37), but already the discussion of denizen franchise recognizes denizens in a way that can helps break vicious circles of marginalization in a political system (cf. ReedDanahay and Brettell 2008: 163; Zincone and Caponio, 2004). For denizens, long-term exclusion from decision-making may lead to lasting political passivity—if not outright frustration—of denizens. Even those who were used to voting in the past may lose their participatory capacity so that, by the time they can comply with naturalization criteria, their civic idleness may have become a habit. In addition, immigrants who are denied full membership (due to hard naturalization rules), and who are also disfranchised, are more vulnerable to being treated in ways in which the majority does not treat its own members (Kymliycka and Norman 2015: 49). Enfranchisement might inspire trust and a sense of worth defined by Smith as sufficient to build, together with native citizens, stories of peoplehood, with a chance that these grow from commonality rather than from exclusive constitutive myths (2001: 78). The virtue of denizen enfranchisement processes is that they open an alternative path to citizenship conceived as either beyond or before nationality. Denizen enfranchisement thus presents an imperfect but meaningful way to restore some of the best liberal and republican components of citizenship (Pedroza 2014b). The recurrent update of the electorate, so that every adult who resides and contributes to the polity can be counted as a voter regardless of origin after a certain period of residence, brings in much more value for citizenship than understanding it only as nationality. Denizen enfranchisement allows citizenship to emancipate from nationality at least to a degree, by letting polities update themselves to a better democratic practice while coming to terms with the fact that, in today’s world, people maintain plural attachments and should be free to choose their allegiances. I say only to a degree because cosmopolitanism of a universal citizenship kind that gives individuals the same participation rights everywhere is far from practicable in a world that seems to be in the course of closing its demoi within walls again. And still, in the same year as Brexit

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and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, Ecuador passed a Law of Human Mobility that recognized the same political participation rights for emigrants as for immigrants under an understanding of mobility as a human right, both as part of a concept of “universal citizenship.” It is possible to re-signify citizenship.

The Policy Choices for Contemporary Democracies with Regard to Denizens At this point, it is worthwhile reiterating an important caveat regarding this book: Its purpose has been to explain salient features of those denizen enfranchisement episodes in liberal democracies that theoretically face a democratic deficit because of a high proportion of immigrant resident population. Following my wish to find a more satisfying explanation for the varieties of denizen franchise, I compared the processes in which denizen enfranchisement is debated. But I did not explore the empirical or normative consequences of denizen enfranchisement. My decision to focus enfranchisement processes and their output, not their outcomes, can be extended toward a normative position (see endnote 37 in Chaper 1 and Baubo¨ck 2008): Denizen franchise is a worthy policy and debates on it already matter to re-signify citizenship. Giving a policy recommendation is a different matter, however. From all the cases studied, to me, the commendable policy in democracies with high proportions of denizens is to combine universal denizen enfranchisement and easy naturalization rules, with tolerance for dual nationality. This policy redefines the worth of citizenship as the chance for political participation and the possibility to autonomously decide to participate and to join the larger political community, delineating a pathway to citizenship (either through the exercise of voting rights or through naturalization) that is distinctively grounded in liberal and republican principles. The denizen franchise substantiates a different model of citizenship than nationality but does not contradict it: If combined with open naturalization procedures, it provides a republican mechanism that revalues practices of citizenship, while respecting the liberty to choose affiliations, without imposing the adoption of a community view as a requirement.

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Practices to exercise citizenship in some Asian countries by using either fake or fraudulently-acquired documents to access the franchise illustrate that voting rights do matter to migrants, and that where state control is ineffective, migrants can acquire electoral capacities without a previous sovereign political decision (Sadiq 2009: 140). Such practices lead de facto to participation of a broader electorate, but they weaken the legitimacy of the franchise, since migrants “buy” their political voice and influence. With formal denizen enfranchisement processes, it is not only the vote, but also the recognition of the right to vote that matters. And yet, wealthier states with more capacity to enforce laws should not think that their democratic citizenship is without challenges: They are acutely affected by the marketization of citizenship-as-nationality described above. Thus, contemporary challenges to equal citizenship—or, otherwise stated, the problems derived from the hierarchical treatment of people within a democratic polity in wealthy or poor societies—are deeply interwoven with global phenomena. Denizen enfranchisement can correct some aspects of global inequalities, but the expectations related to its potential reach must be kept realistic. Comparisons help to do that. The denizen franchise might correct democratic deficits of representation between denizens and native citizens, but it cannot possibly solve the myriad of problems associated with legitimacy deficits of representation in societies with high migration. Such problems are, just as well, related to the fit of electoral formulas, lacking representation of political cleavages, wider socioeconomic inequalities, and political disaffectedness. Caution is advised also in inferring a revolution in citizenship from the growing trend of denizen enfranchisement across countries. As long as the nation-state with its exclusive migration and citizenship policies remains in control, we cannot declare it an unstoppable, decisive trend. While the spread suggests that emulation and competition mechanisms of diffusion might be at work in the current growing trend of denizen enfranchisement, everywhere, each process has been defined in its start, development, and conclusion by domestic constellations of institutions and actors. Rodrı´guez has declared it to be “marginal as a feature of the contemporary nationstate” (2010) because of the overwhelming restriction of the franchise to the local level. However, we should not underestimate it either: It is true that, being restricted to the local level, denizen enfranchisement will not challenge the granting of citizenship at the national level or reorder how

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membership is assigned in the current international system through nationality. It is also true that no local voting right can substitute for national elections in the interest they raise among voters and how they empower decision makers to change higher-level laws and redirect policies in comprehensive ways. Yet, where it exists, it is central to the reconfiguration of content of citizenship in a polity: The denizen franchise strengthens residence as the basis for solidarity and civic equality. Because of that, it reawakens important features of citizenship and of its tradition in Western political thought. Extending the franchise to noncitizen residents is justified by liberal and democratic concerns, and it also offers a potential to reach toward republican ideals, even if, for these, voting and the right to vote is but a partial, minor part of civic life. According to Miller, liberal and republican conceptions tend to converge substantially in societies with a high degree of pluralism (2005: 59); and pluralism is precisely the main added value of a local demos where denizens have the franchise. By dissociating the practice of citizenship at the local level from the national status, the franchise can awaken a civic attachment of denizens to a polity in a form that accepts multiple forms of belonging, respects diversity, and fulfills the commitment to equality that is expressed in the language of citizenship. Citizenship rights may foster a sense of community that makes it more appealing, over time, to also naturalize. More important, however, opening access to democratic participation at the local level partly reverses the domination of citizens over noncitizens and echoes the republican liberty of the ancients (Berlin 1969; Constant 1997) in the sense that there is virtue in being able to participate and liberty is conceived as self-mastery. The basis on which the equal right to decide is recognized is common residence: sharing with others all that is common and present in daily life. It is not the Aristotelian republicanism for which participation is the highest good, likely to be appreciated only by those who can afford the leisure to get involved. It is but a liberal policy that gives denizens freedom to decide whether and how to get involved. Their engagement remains chosen, but the paths are open for it, and their right to have a say is recognized by virtue of their attachment and stakes as residents, rather than by the value attributed to an identity or a community and its imposition. Baubo¨ck has most seriously addressed the local polity as a community of a particular character (2004) allowing for residence-based citizenship within a larger democratic polity (2018). Still, similar to Walzer (1997: 60), he favors that

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migrants be set on the road to full citizenship. Baubo¨ck’s concern is not only with democratic governance but also with the stability of the demos and its boundaries (2015: 826).4 The risks for instability could come from two sources: ambiguity regarding who has the franchise, which endangers democratic representation and accountability, and different sources of solidarity and collective identity for temporary and sedentary residents, which may appeal to different kinds of commitment for citizens. The reforms studied in this book, however, are not ambiguous: They clearly demarcate who has the right to vote with specific criteria, even in cases where denizens may vote in national elections. What remains open to political debate, then, is the legitimacy of residence criteria to acquire the vote and the time of residence required (Cohen 2015 and 2018 deal with the political economy of immigrant time at length). Communitarians, as many conservative politicians in the cases studied here, oppose denizen franchise because they fear that extending rights that were previously a privilege of citizens (i.e., the vote) it cheapens national citizenship and weakens the incentives of denizens to naturalize (Schuck 1989). Valuing citizenship by how hard it is to get and how much of a privilege it represents, they demand that denizens prove their will to integrate. Yet, this debate is mostly symbolic, as the most instrumental privileges associated with citizenship—security of rights, right to return, passport—are not really touched by denizen franchise, but come after the acquisition of permanent residence status or naturalization.5 As long as open, accessible rules for naturalization exist, including the tolerance for double and multiple nationalities, local denizen voting rights can not only coexist with national citizenship but provide it with legitimacy.6 In my view, such a combination lets denizens decide freely about their national belonging, while the local polity retains legitimacy and imbues citizenship with a civic base that makes franchise the best promotion for full citizenship, should denizens decide to seek it. It is important to highlight that naturalization often implies a strong personal decision and that a main factor that contributes to facilitating it is a policy of dual or multiple citizenship toleration in both receiving and sending countries.7 This point has strongly been put forward by Spiro (2010), who proposed that dual nationality should be considered a human right, as exclusive nationalities burden the exercise of political rights by raising the costs of naturalization. Beyond normative arguments, empirical research supports the policy combination I advocate. Huddleston and Vink (2015) have shown that, for twenty-nine European states, extending membership and extending participation rights are

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generally complementary actions, which does not invalidate the view of many conservatives that they are alternatives, but does show that the alternative thesis finds little support in Europe: “There is no trade-off between facilitating naturalization and political participation policies for foreigners . . . Inclusive naturalization policies positively affect naturalisation rates among immigrants” (2015: 14). Recent research has also shown that countries with the most comprehensive and immigrant-friendly integration policies also have the lowest political engagement gaps between foreigners and citizens (Helbling et al. 2016). This supports other empirical studies that have demonstrated a “substantial benefit” for immigrants of easier naturalization procedures (Steinhardt 2008), for several reasons, but mostly for the unrestricted access to the labor market (especially in the public sector), better employability in better jobs with higher wages,8 and a safer inclusion in social safety networks in general (Aptekar 2015; Bratsberg et al. 2002). In sum, should immigrants develop an interest in becoming nationals, and not just local citizens, the path to do that should be open. I envision denizen voting rights as a path to citizenship that collides the least with the room for freedom and choice of denizens regarding their identity and belonging, while it offers coherence with democratic principles in a world characterized more and more by plural attachments, but where the toleration of these cannot yet be taken for granted. The reason to favor this policy combination is, again, to find an applicable scheme in which democratic inclusion and representation cohere with reality. The division of our globe into nation-states with territorial boundaries and controls over the movement of persons has made nationality the international organizing norm for membership and belonging. The increasing recognition of dual nationality (Vink et al. 2015) might be changing its exclusive character, but there is no foreseeable change in the privileged role states give to birthright national citizens over others. That role is the standard against which nationality and citizenship are granted to “others” along gradations of loyalty and membership (Pedroza and Palop-Garcı´a 2017). Moreover, national suffrage remains mostly tied to nationality and thus remains a further incentive to keep naturalization an option for denizens. I therefore support scholars who see easy naturalization rules and procedures as a partial but necessary component of sound inclusion policies. Still, denizen enfranchisement should not be taken for a cheap measure to pacify demands for “full, formal” citizenship, or a crumb of what is too precious to be given away to denizens: It reinvigorates citizenship from

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below because citizenship acquires more value the more autonomously and freely-chosen participation is.9 It also recognizes denizens’ autonomy to decide how to belong. Even if denizen voting rights are limited to the local level, the receiving polity gains substantially as well: the immigrant voting rights reduce gaps between citizens and immigrant residents at the level where pluralism challenges coexistence in local daily life. Obviously, not all important gaps can be remedied there. Denizen enfranchisement is not more, and not less, than a call to re-signify citizenship by emphasizing the commonalities, instead of the differences, that unite people sharing residence in one place and claims to participate there.10 At its best, denizen enfranchisement can help to integrate migrant residents if it is part of a wider set of policies that seeks to improve the chances that denizens participate in all subsystems of society—not only the political—on an equal basis with citizens (see Young 1998). Even a successful denizen enfranchisement reform cannot be the end of a project of political participation. It is only the beginning. Achieving substantial political incorporation requires many measures, such as ensuring language proficiency, an equal footing in the labor market, and the respect of equal civil obligations. Civic education must follow to promote participation. Moreover, many “softer issues” (i.e., institutionalized racism) have the power to define personal experiences of inclusion or exclusion in the larger subsystems of society and require horizontal policies to be solved. In the absence of this larger set of policies, political integration through the franchise may miss the target (see Bloemraad 2006; Hirsch Ballin 2014). This last point hints at one of the core empirical findings of this book: Enfranchisement has better chances in places where the polity is ready to redefine broadly its terms of inclusion. Challenges associated with migrant integration cannot be solved by reducing them to being related to immigrants only. Receiving societies are constitutive parts of migration systems that reflect political, economic, and historical connections of international and sometimes global scope. The successful integration of migrants in a society concerns everyone in a society, and the kind of inclusion a society favors mirrors its very norms, goals, and values. As receiving societies, the citizenship we offer migrants is also the citizenship we strive for ourselves. If we relegate migrants to subjects and observers with no voice, or if we only pick a few among them to have a voice with no hope for the others of ever getting one, then we might for a while rest in the privileged seat of deciding who gets what kind of voice, but at the cost of establishing a

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discriminatory citizenship regime that one day might turn its nasty back on us. Citizenship is a political institution which is shaped by practice: deliberation and contention within the limits of respect for the rights of others to dissent. If citizenship is to be based on liberty and equal respect, it must be routinely reassessed as societies change. These principles may crumble if democratic legitimacy is taken for granted: If overlooked, gaps of representation and participation can freeze and hide unequal distributions of power. Blatter (2011) eloquently suggested that contesting the boundaries of the demos is a sign that democracies are becoming more reflexive. This book has shown how: Denizen enfranchisement debates demonstrate that representatives of the people in democracies engage in critical selfreflection. The challenge posed by denizenship merely offers a mirror for societies to confront themselves, but it is up to them to address it. As Ernst Hirsch Ballin beautifully wrote, “Citizenship is human dignity in constitutional terms. Migration not only confronts people with the diversity of their fellow citizen identities but sets everyone the task of accepting diversity as a characteristic of citizenship itself, with its associated rights—a citizenship that is appropriate to everyone’s life situation where he or she is at home, which can change during the course of a person’s life” (2014: 145). Here it is crucial to recognize and remind ourselves that exclusion on grounds of nationality begins well before people become denizens: It begins before migrants arrive and settle, with border controls and immigration policies requiring proof of socioeconomic means and passports to extend legal access to territory and residence permits. In an argument that involves not only the right to vote as a resident but also the right to immigrate, Arash Abizadeh has posited that the demos of democratic theory is, in principle, unbound, which means that boundary controls (borders and also the franchise) must be democratically justified to foreigners as much as to citizens, in political institutions in which both can participate (2008). Within that larger context, we are best advised to admit that the denizen franchise has limits as a democratic mechanism for reinvigorating citizenship in today’s world: It affirms residence as a criterion for inclusion in the demos merely for those who have been already admitted. This means that, in fact, the challenges of inclusion posed by immigrant residents are much larger than their enfranchisement: They relate to the reassessment of what citizenship requires to honor a commitment to self-government in a democratic polity, instead of being reduced to a membership defined by nationality or

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criteria which are even more exclusive (i.e., ethnic or economic). I am speaking about reassessments of all the policies that regulate inclusion through the different stages of immigration, residence, and access to nationality. This is a much bigger challenge than the challenge of denizenship to participation and representation in a democracy, but it is very important, since, in the end, those policies and their links to each other determine how the people conceive of and constitute themselves in the face of migration. Even if for the time being reconceiving citizenship still means that we strengthen it as compartmentalized within nation-states, we can still gradually imbue it with more inclusive principles. Societies that debate denizen enfranchisement and address the challenges posed by discriminatory migration policies (from the regulation of entry to selections regarding the right to reside) are, in fact, increasing the emancipatory potential of citizen rights to be conceived universally.

Closing Words Benhabib (2003) claims that the “fundamental paradox in democratic citizenship” is that democracies act in the name of universal rights but circumscribe their application to a particular civic community. Most liberal theorists agree that a liberal state should not function as a private club but rather allow a public dialogue that recognizes each person as a free, rational being of equal moral worth to others. Yet, in the case of extending voting rights it is those in power (electors and elected) who redraw the borders of the electorate. According to Schattschneider (1975), they decide what the game is about and who can play. From classical times, the equality granted by citizenship has been something reserved for a few who fulfill the qualifications required in each era until a major normative change turns them dispensable (Pocock 1995: 31). This is a progressive reading of democracy as an ever-expanding process powered “from within” through the gradual enlargement of the franchise. Yet, a few fatal disenfranchisements in the twentieth century (in what we today consider to be perfectly functional democracies) remind us that this path toward greater numbers of people and fewer distinctions is not only stepwise and inconstant, but reversible. At each point in history (in the Western world), the arguments to extend suffrage have focused on invalidating categories used to qualify self-determination or self-emancipation:

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freedom from masters, judgment abilities, property, gender, age, religion, skin color (see Pocock 1995: 40ff.; Romanelli 1998: 15; Fukumoto 2004: 4). Today, arguments against denizen enfranchisement replicate some arguments heard not so long ago against women’s enfranchisement: The potential electorate is portrayed as having “no interest,” or their capacity for emancipating from previous “primordial” loyalties is doubted. As Tocqueville suggested, such reasons may lose their common-sense value if the criteria upon which they stand are questioned—in this case, that allegiances are necessarily singular. Such monumental societal questioning is underway in several democracies. Understandings of citizenship are amenable to democratic iterations as Benhabib (2004) proposed, but, at any point in time, different understandings of citizenship legitimately coexist. Debating them is quintessential for pluralism in a democracy. This book was motivated by questions that required a comparative investigation into how citizenship is debated and constructed around different types of principled justifications regarding the inclusion or exclusion of denizens. Given our limited knowledge of the phenomenon in question, such investigation called for a comparative, explorative path. Toward the end of this path, I proposed a theory in which framing, the way in which extensions of voting rights are discussed, is a key factor to understanding why some reforms succeed and others fail, and why reforms vary. More important, it is a theory that invites us to observe closely how the terms used in political struggles through long, contentious processes constitute citizenship regimes. Traditions of citizenship are important in each enfranchisement process: They explain why some institutional path dependencies exist, as expressed in legal principles, special relations, and a particular language. However, in debates on enfranchisement, political agents use those path-dependent institutional resources just as they include new terms in their current political context. In order not to be fooled by partial outcomes of phenomena that involve rather long-term processes, we need to selfreflect as researchers on our arbitrary delineation of episodes under study. A lens like this, so focused on processes of normative reappraisal, can make one dizzy. Historians and historiographers are used to seeing through a similar lens how reforms that today seem to have been absolutely innovative did in fact preserve much of the preceding stages. Yet, for political scientists, more attracted to stills, such a lens creates a discomforting sensation, making political phenomena seem like clouds moved by strong winds.

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However, to be clear, I have not dealt with a cloud that might disappear at any moment: citizenship has anchors in traditions, yet it is bent by reinterpretation. My argument implies that truly democratic citizenship traditions are not set in stone but require reassessments to adapt to pluralism and to new social configurations within the boundaries of democratic discourse. In many countries, immigrants remain excluded from political participation and no attempts are made to close the gap between the democratic representation commitments and the flagrant realities of marginalization of noncitizens. Even worse, in several countries, this gap widens every year for a growing population: people who lack a path to naturalization because of their particular precarious legal migration status or because they do not possess valid migration papers or any documentation. Democratic polities that aspire to be worthy of that name must revisit their immigrant policies toward people in their territories who are contributing, participating residents and must consider to which extent they are included in their normative commitments to democratic citizenship. Even though debates on denizen enfranchisement are limited in their potential as inclusion policy, when they spark and flare in democracies, citizenship is shaken. What is more, this book has shown that these debates tend to be resilient and move on. Their force can still be stopped or reversed but not without compromising democratic institutions. The force of enfranchisement debates is potentiated and reiterated by other democratic principles. This is why it matters to know the process by which that force builds up. Wherever denizen enfranchisement processes arise, they make visible a dissonance in the way a democracy understands its principles of inclusion. This dissonance conveys the same message, whether denizen enfranchisement is discussed only, passed, implemented, intentionally traded for other policies, or even struck down. The message sounds a lot like Tocqueville (2003 [1889]: 43): “The further electoral rights are extended, the greater is the need of extending them; for after each concession the strength of the democracy increases, and its demands increase with its strength.”

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APPENDIX

TO SURVEY THE universe of cases of denizen enfranchisement in the

world, I collected data from primary and secondary sources. Then, to differentiate the cases that were relevant for my research question, I used two scope conditions—proportion of migrants and democracy—which I have summarized in Table A.1. In the larger data set I constructed, I collected information on a variety of denizen franchise provisions: local/regional or national level, benefiting all versus benefiting a particular group only, and stages of enfranchisement. These were the outcomes that I analyzed in this book. As to the conditions considered, I followed the literature and collected information on a variety of naturalization provisions: ordinary citizenship acquisition after how many years of residence, existence of preferential versus discriminatory clauses for some groups (excluding spousal transfer), legal stance toward immigrant double nationality. On the denizen enfranchisement reforms, I collected data on their level, registering the province (if enfranchising reform was subnational), whether the reforms included passive and/or active voting rights, year of reform, type of state, and requisites to exercise the franchise.1

Data Set The first step in this Appendix is to present the raw data on which all the broad comparative analyses of this book are based (Table A.2).

Crisp-Sets Qualitative Comparative Analysis Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) combines inductive and deductive exercises that serve to find relevant categories and create typologies.

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Table A.1 Scope conditions for the selection of relevant cases

Conditions

1. Proportion of migrants is relevant when the proportion of foreign population in a country is higher than 3%, according to the UN population database (United Nations 2013). These are nonnaturalized migrants (i.e., those counted as foreigners and not as foreign-born, who might have naturalized already). 2. Democracy is relevant when two different indices (Polity IV and Freedom House subdivided in two years of measurement 1998 and 2006) both classify the country as a democratic regime (Center for Systemic Peace 2018; Freedom House 2018).

Relevant cases for this study (negative and positive)  24

Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Norway, Greece, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia, United States, Belize, Denmark, Costa Rica, Germany, Spain, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom.

The core of QCA is qualitative: it requires a careful collection of data and a subsequent categorization of occurrences of conditions and outcomes. To simply point out that “conditions” is the QCA name for “independent variables” would be misleading; configurational approaches claim a different language because, in contrast to regression techniques, their aim is not to find the effect of single, particular causes but to accommodate causal complexity (conjunctural and asymmetric causation; multifinality and equifinality). This means that the social world does not neatly present independent variables where timeless causal regularities operate, but, on the contrary, that the effect of certain conditions varies when combined differently with other conditions (see Linz 2007; Hall 2003). Qualitative Comparative Analysis balances within-case with cross-case analysis, since each case is seen as an intersection of conditions, but cases are still comparable with each other as configurations of those conditions. Still, for all its advantages, QCA obliges the researcher to make difficult decisions in the process of selecting conditions to be included in the analysis. Crisp-sets QCA (csQCA) requires dichotomization of conditions and outcomes. A good practice applying this method is to make the coding precise and transparent. For this study, a rigorous procedure has the added value of allowing us to assess problematic assumptions that the literature

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Yes

Sweden

a. No b. Yes

a. No b. Yes

Norway

Finland

Denmark

Yes

Austria

Country

Were all denizens benefited by reform?

Table A.2. Data set

Granted

Granted

a. No b. Yes

Discussed, passed, later aborted by Constitutional Court

Local

Local: municipal and county council

Granted

Local: municipal assembly, county council

Local

Levels of polity Stage of denizen denizen franchise franchise covers

Local: municipal and county council

Vienna

Province (if subnational reform)

a. 1981 b. 1991

a. 1978 b. 1983

a. 1977 b. 1981

1975

2002

Year of reform

2 years

3 years

3 years

3 years

5 years

Requisites required to vote

Eligible after 5 continuous years; long and expensive procedure; language checks, income and criminality tests.

Nordic citizens wait 2 years; refugees and stateless, 3; all others, 7. Jus soli for children of migrants or of one migrant parent. Applications can be refused.

9 years, but only 2 for Nordic citizens, children born there face extra conditions, expensive language and citizenship tests, stringent tests of income.

Spouses can apply after 3 years or fewer, Nordic citizens after 2 years, others after 5. No automatic jus soli at birth. Conditions for acquisition are favorable.

Eligible after 10 years, state can refuse on many grounds, conditions are difficult to meet; must renounce original nationality.

Conditions of ordinary access to nationality

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Yes

Switzer-land Yes

Netherlands

Country

Were all denizens benefited by reform?

Canton Communal Communal Communal

Permitted

Granted

Permitted

Canton

Local

Granted

Granted

Granted

Local: municipal council

Levels of polity Stage of denizen denizen franchise franchise covers

Table A.2. Data set (continued)

Grisons (Graubu¨nden)

Fribourg

ApenzellAußerrhoden

Jura

Neuchaˆtel

Province (if subnational reform)

2004

2002

2002

1978

Communal level: 1849; cantonal: 2000

1985

Year of reform

Residence permit

Residence permit

Residence permit

Residence permit

Residence permit (5–10 years)

Requisites required to vote

Eligibility after 12 years, years between 10 and 20 of age count double, spouses and registered partners wait less, cantons rarely provide guides for integration and language tests, other conditions include an undefined good character clause and a long procedure.

Same conditions as long-term residents, but not restricted to those who can prove enough income. Spouses are eligible sooner.

Conditions of ordinary access to nationality

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United States

Australia

New Zealand

Yes

No (British citizens enrolled before 1984 only)

Yes

Local council: city, district, region, national

Communal

Granted

Takoma Park, Maryland Chicago NYC

School boards only School boards only School boards only

Washington, D.C.

Barnesville, Chevy Chase, Somerset, Takoma Park, Maryland

Local council

1975

2004

2004

1988

1991

1992 and after

Municipalities 1981 in (a) all states and territories, (b) S. Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, (c) S. Australia

Waadt (Vaud)

Local council and school boards

Local: local Granted; the reform in fact council, mayor disenfranchised British citizens from 1984 onward

Granted

Granted

1 month

1 year

Residence permit

5 years, permanent resident status, spouses only 3 years married and at least 11/2 years in the U.S, language test, knowledge of U.S. history and government. Good moral character and attachment to the U.S. Constitution.

4 years, language test, oath.

5 years, language test, good character, income test.

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Discussed in 2000; defeated by Senate in 2004; discussed again and rejected in parliament in 2010

Granted

France

Belgium

Discussed, defeated; included in the 1998 Immigration Act, but amendment needed was not adopted. Still defended in Torino, Emilia Romagna, and Tuscany

Yes

Country Local: gemeinde and gemeinderat

Levels of polity Stage of denizen denizen franchise franchise covers

Italy

Were all denizens benefited by reform?

Table A.2. Data set (continued) Province (if subnational reform)

1981, 2000, 2010

2004

Year of reform 5 years

Requisites required to vote

Eligible after 5 years of legal residence, French graduates after 2 years, children are French at birth, procedure is clear, language and integration test exists.

First generation can apply after 10 years, but spouses are eligible after 6 months residence or 3 in marriage without residence.

3 years residence but arbitrary process with no right of appeal. Citizenship can be taken if failure to fulfill citizen duties; dual nationality exists.

Conditions of ordinary access to nationality

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Passed, but aborted

No

Yes

Luxembourg

Granted

a. Yes, at Granted local level b. Only UK citizens for local and national

Discussed

Discussed

Passed, but aborted

Yes

Discussed, granted in four La¨nder, but aborted by Constitutional Court; again in discussion since 2008

Ireland

Germany

Hamburg

Local: municipal council

a. local: county, All urban district, county borough, town b. Also Da´´ıl (the lower house of parliament) elections for UK citizens.

West Berlin

Bremen

Local: gemeinde SchleswigHolstein

Local: Bezirksversammlung

2003

a. 1963 b. 1984 through Ninth Amendment of Constitution, (since 2008 there are further plans to let EU migrants vote for Da´il)

1988–1989

1987–1989

1987–1989

1986–1989

Ruled void in 1990

5 years, residence permit, enrollment

a. Residence of six months b. residence permit

5 years

5 years

10 years, 5 of which noninterrupted, additional requirements for children, simple language oral test.

Lengthy procedure with many conditions, 5 of 9 years preceding application, discretionary system checks for good character and income.

8 years of residence; children must fulfill additional requirements, language test, integration test, and criminal records check, proof of sufficient income needed and can still be rejected.

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Were all denizens benefited by reform?

No

Country

Portugal

Granted

a. Local, regional: municipal council b. national parliament c. presidential elections

Levels of polity Stage of denizen denizen franchise franchise covers

Table A.2. Data set (continued) Province (if subnational reform) 1971: a  b  c for Brazilians who hold “status of equality,” residents after 5 years; 1986: for Brazilians (a) after 2 years (b) after 3 years; 1996: (a) Lusophone foreign residents of more than 2 years, anchored in reciprocity, and other foreign residents on conditions of reciprocity after 3 years of residence

Year of reform 2, 3, or 5 years, depending on country of origin

Requisites required to vote

10 years; 6 for Lusophone citizens. Language test with guide, migrants who have committed a punishable crime within 3 years are rejected, and applications can be rejected for failure to prove a link to the National Community. Since April 2006, a new law gives jus soli for children of Portuguese descent who were in Portugal.

Conditions of ordinary access to nationality

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Granted

Yes

Yes

Hungary

Granted

Granted

No: only Granted UK, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus citizens in all elections

No

Estonia

United Kingdom

Spain

Local: municipality, county

Local: city, rural municipality

Local (various) and national; European citizens only in local (various)

Local: ayuntamiento

1990

1993

England: 1972 parish, county, district council; London: borough, common council; Wales: community, county, borough, district council; Scotland: regional, district council

1990

Spouses of nationals, refugees, or migrants from some Latin American countries wait less than the general 10 years. Children of migrants born in Spain can apply without further conditions, but they are not automatically Spanish at birth.

Immigration or settlement permit.

5 years; long-term residence status

8 years; income check; language, history, and literature test; study guide is online. Children must fulfill additional requirements.

8 years, advanced language test and expensive citizenship test with written questions and legalistic language, income check.

Legal permit 5 years, spouses and partners 3, multiple-choice standardized tests on English, political and civil rights, study guide provided but high failure rate.

5 years, reciprocity treaty exists with country of origin.

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No

Yes

Country

Latvia

Lithuania

3 years

Only longterm residents

10 years, long, complicated procedure.

10 years, long-term residents must wait another 5 years to be eligible; children must also wait unless they were born after independence; spouses must wait 5 years to become long-term residents and another 5 years to naturalize.

Conditions of ordinary access to nationality

Granted

Local: municipality

a. 1986 b. 2002

2002

a. 3 years b. 5 years

Permanent residence

10 years, facilitated procedure for students, stateless, and alumni; language test.

7 years, (3 in case of spouses and 5 in case of Nordic citizens).

Yes

Local: municipality

Iceland

Granted

5 years as long-term resident visa holder (at least 10 years residence), basic language test, but wide discretion and no right of appeal.

Yes

Bulgaria

Slovenia

5 years as resident, language test, insecure rights as naturalized citizen.

2002

2002; in effect: 2004

2000

Year of reform

Requisites required to vote

Slovakia

Local: municipality

Local

Province (if subnational reform)

5 years as permanent resident (at least 10 years), children must meet various requirements, income check.

Granted

Granted

Discussed

Levels of polity Stage of denizen denizen franchise franchise covers

Poland

Yes

Were all denizens benefited by reform?

Table A.2. Data set (continued)

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Yes

Paraguay

Costa Rica

Yes

Uruguay

Yes

Granted

Granted

Local

National

a. Granted Municipal and b. Implemented district

a. Granted National b. Implemented

Chile

Colombia

Discussed, failed

Yes

No: only British citizens

Japan

Canada Only in Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia; under discussion in Ontario since 2007

1952

Permanent residence

15 years

7 years residence, 5 for iberoamericans, spouses 2, language test, good conduct, employment proof, test of history and “country values,” oath of allegiance.

Property, employment, good conduct, 3 years with family in Uruguay, 5 years without family.

Permanent resident status  5 years, income, language, history, and geography tests.

5 years, No crimes, permanent resident status, certificate of employment certificate. residence

5–10 years, income, proficiency of language, very long and discretionary procedure.

Legislation 3 years, language test, and test on has changed citizenship rights, history, politics and several times geography (with study guide). in the federal states

a. 1991 5 years b. not yet; last attempt to pass needed secondary law was 2006

a. 1980 b. 2005

2000

2007, 2010

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Venezuela

Yes

No: Portuguese only

Brazil

Granted

Granted

Granted

No: strict reciprocity applies

Bolivia

Local and regional

a. Local b. national parliament

Local

a. Local level: all residents b. national level

Granted

Local

No: only Commonwealth citizens

Granted

Belize

Argentina

Passed but Local repelled by Supreme Court of Appeal

Yes

Country

Levels of polity Stage of denizen denizen franchise franchise covers

Greece

Were all denizens benefited by reform?

Table A.2. Data set (continued)

Buenos Aires and other regions

Province (if subnational reform)

1983, 1999

a. 1971 b. 2002

1994, 1999

1981

2010–2011

1996

Year of reform

2 years residence, employment, Spanish, test of geography, and history, politics.

Conditions of ordinary access to nationality

10 years

3 years

5 years and registration

Employment, residency, discretionary procedure with time limits.

For Portuguese speakers, 1 year and good moral character; for all others, 15 years (permanent residence), ability to read and write Portuguese, trips in between must not exceed 18 months, health proof, penal antecedents proof.

Jus soli before 1981, also jus sanguinis, 5 years residence, registration.

5 years and 10 years, easier for spouses but depends long-term or on having children; fees are very high permanent (1,500 euros). residence status

3 years

Requisites required to vote

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No: strict reciprocity and to Lusophone citizens

Yes

No: only Commonwealth citizens

Cape Verde

Malawi

Mauritius

Barbados

Granted

Granted

Local and parliamentary elections

a. Regional b. local

Local

Local, national

Local

Granted

Granted

Local

Granted

Yes, but with Granted different conditions: (a) only Commonwealth and Irish citizens (b) all others

Antigua and No: (a) Barbuda Commonwealth citizens; (b) others

Yes

Burkina Faso

a. 3 years legal residence b. all others 7 years a. 3 years b. 7 years

1990

2 years

7 years

Citizens of Lusophone countries

10 years, employment, taxes paid

2001

1968

1993

1992, 1997

1993

5-year residence in the 7 years prior to application, sponsorship by citizens, good conduct proof, oath of allegiance.

5-year residence in the 7 years prior to application, sponsorship by citizens, good conduct proof, oath of allegiance.

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No: only Granted Commonwealth and Irish citizens

Jamaica

Granted

No: only Commonwealth citizens

Guyana

Granted (active)

No: only Granted Commonwealth and Irish citizens

All

Ecuador

Local, parliament

Local, parliament

Parliamentary elections

Local, national

Local

Levels of polity Stage of denizen denizen franchise franchise covers

Grenada

No: only Commonwealth citizens

Dominica

Country

Were all denizens benefited by reform?

Table A.2. Data set (continued) Province (if subnational reform)

1962

1996

2008

2007

Year of reform

1 year, election register

1 year

1 year

5 years, election register

1 year, election register

Requisites required to vote

3-year residence, ability to speak and write Spanish, general knowledge of history and geography of Ecuador, and its Constitution.

7-year residence, high fees and difficult process (economic citizenship also exists to waive residence requirement).

Conditions of ordinary access to nationality

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No: Passed, but anchored in legislation reciprocity needed for application pending

2001

Residence permit

Notes: Own elaboration, based on the following sources: On Switzerland: http://www.about.ch/cantons/index.html, retrieved April 30, 2008. On New Zealand and Australia: (1) http://www.teara.govt.nz/Places/Auckland/Auckland/5/en, (2) http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/02key.htm and http://www.aec.gov.au/Enrolling_to_vote/ British_subjects.htm, retrieved November 2011. On Europe: (1) MIPEX.eu, retrieved July 2008, (2) http://suffrage-universel.be/vo/etrangers.htm, (3) http:// www.immigrantvoting.org, retrieved April 2008, (4) Waldrauch 2005, (5) Baubo¨ck 2005, (6) Ko-Ching R. Tung, “Voting Rights for Alien Residents: Who Wants It?” International Migration Review 19(3): Special Issue: Civil Rights and the Sociopolitical Participation of Migrants (Autumn 1985), 451–467. On Ireland: http:// www.irishstatutebook.ie/1992/en/act/pub/0023/sec0006.html; nssec6, retrieved February 27, 2012. On Bulgaria: https://web.archive.org/web/20110605033300/http:// www.government.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s001&p0159&n000007&g. On the United States: (1) http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/ display.cfm?ID265, (2) http://www.hooyou.com/naturalization/requirements.html, retrieved August 13, 2008. On Latin America: (1) http://pdba.georgetown.edu/comp/ elecciones/Sufragio/derecho.html, retrieved August 13, 2011. My own research on Uruguay (http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/constituciones/const004.htm), Chile Constitucio´n de la Repu´blica de Chile, Art. 14 and Ley 20568, Diario Oficial 31.01.2012 (https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma1035420; https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/ Constitucion_Chile.pdf, retrieved June 2013), Costa Rica (http://www.constitution.org/cons/costaric.htm, retrieved June 2008), Colombia: Ley 1070 de 2006, Diario Oficial No. 46.346 de 31 de julio de 2996 http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley_1070_2006.html, Paraguay (http://pdba.georgetown.edu/constitutions/paraguay/ para1992.html, retrieved in April 2008), Ecuador: Constitucio´n de la Repu´blica del Ecuador, 2008, Ley Orga´nica Electoral de Abril de 2009, and Ley de Naturalizacio´n No. 276, de Abril de 1976; Panama´ (https://www.tribunal-electoral.gob.pa/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Codigo-electoral-de-Panama.pdf, retrieved May 2008), Venezuela (http://www.analitica.com/bitblio/anc/constitucion1999.asp, retrieved April 2008), Colombia (http://pdba.georgetown.edu/constitutions/colombia/col91.html, retrieved May 2008), and Argentina (https://padronelectoral.org/voto-de-extranjeros-residentes, retrieved May 2018). On the Caribbean: Earnest (2002) and my own research on Belize (http://pdba.georgetown.edu/constitutions/Belize/belize81.html); Guyana (http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Guyana/guyana.html; and Antigua & Barbuda, The Representation of the People Act, 1975(http://laws.gov.ag/acts/chapters/cap-379.pdf). For Burkina Faso: http://presidence.bf/code-electoral.php?sid23, retrieved November 2011. On Mauritius: The Constitution of Mauritius: http://electoral.govmu.org/English/Registration/Documents/CONSTITUTION%20of%20Mauritius.pdf, retrieved November 2017.

Czech Republic

224 Appendix

on denizen enfranchisement has worked with as a first step toward correcting the theory to better fit the complexity of this phenomenon. For this analysis, the sample equals the universe of relevant cases. The coding rules for the conditions and outcomes analyzed are summarized in Table A.3. Because the main relation I initially want to explain is that between naturalization and enfranchisement of denizens, naturalization ease is the basic condition I include in the analysis (coding easy naturalization as “A” and difficult naturalization as “a”) as a proxy for the conservatism of conceptions of citizenship: the easier it is to become a citizen, the more open a conception of citizenship is. Table A.4 schematizes this coding.2 The second condition I include refers to the existence of naturalization rules that differentiate or favor particular immigrant groups—for any reason, including former colonial relations, shared cultural heritage, legal reciprocity, or resettlement (coding the absence of these rules as “B” and the presence of this rules as “b”). It is important to control these differentiating or preferential clauses because they all suggest a rationale of reform which was not based only on the democratic legitimacy argument. As to the outcome of interest, there are different stages of the enfranchising reform that deserve to be distinguished because of their significance regarding different political processes. Differentiating between stages is important because in many countries enfranchisement has been discussed at the level of parliament, without leading to a decision (discussed, “D”; not discussed, “d”). Of course, the most clear-cut outcome would be whether the reform passed—which is obviously a subset of D—or failed as a parliamentary bill (successful reform, “E”; unsuccessful reform, “e”). A third—subtler—distinction among reforms that were passed is between reforms actually implemented or those that were not (implemented, “G”; not implemented, “g”), for there are cases in which, despite substantial constitutional changes, some instrumental regulation is needed to put it in practice.3 Beyond the stages, the outcomes differ most importantly in kinds regarding the governmental authority conceding these rights, the scope of voting rights granted, and the degree of selectivity involved in their allocation. Franchise might be extended by a national/federal authority or by a subnational congress; a franchise extended by a national/federal congress may be then applicable at local elections only or at higher levels like regional or national elections as well; franchise may be extended on the

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Table A.3. Conditions and outcomes for configurational analysis Presence

Absence

Discussed enfranchising reform?

1 when this discussion reached a parliament (local or national)

0 when there are no records of a discussion on this issue reaching parliament

Did the discussed reform pass the legislative process?

1 when it did.

0 when it did not.

Has the passed reform been implemented?

1 when it has.

0 when it has not.

Were denizen enfranchisement proposals directed to all or to some denizens only?

1 when enfranchisement reform or debates were universal, applying to all resident migrants without distinction of nationality or language or reciprocity. This may apply to debates (also failed ones) or passed reforms.

0 when enfranchisement favored a group of denizens only.

Are naturalization procedures easy?

1 when the length of residence required to become eligible for citizenship (in cases where preferential rules exist, I look at the rules for those not included in the preferential groups) is equal to or less than 5 years. Taking this proxy makes sense practically and theoretically because it is a relevant requisite almost everywhere. From looking at the general variation in my data set I consider that a requirement of up to 5 years is regular and anything equal to 5 years or less than that is easy.

0 when the length of residence required is longer than 5 years. In a case of a requirement of 5 years of residence (the cut-point) but more than one additional difficult-to-meet condition—such as a requirement of high income, health insurance, and employment; mandatory courses or tests of language/ integration that are reportedly very difficult, for which guides are not available or are too costly—the code is 0.

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226 Appendix

Table A.3. Conditions and outcomes for configurational analysis (continued)

Are there naturalization rules that differentiate or favor particular immigrant groups?

Presence

Absence

1 when there are.

0 when there are not.

Table A.4. Cross-tabulation of relevant cases with ease of naturalization and denizen enfranchisement debates Difficult naturalization

Easy naturalization

Debate

9

12

No debate

3

0

basis of residence, as well as on reciprocity or on cultural or colonial ties. Last, franchise might include also the right to be a candidate or not and any of these rights might be conditioned upon the fulfillment of special requirements. Most of these were included in the csQCA; however, the insights about the level of the process of enfranchisement were difficult to interpret because of different federal attributions and the insights about candidacy rights (passive voting rights) were linked in several cases to other conditions, so I do not report them here. Table A.5 presents the coded information for a large sample of cases. The conditions were: easy naturalization for some (E), easy naturalization for all (A). I worked with different sets of cases corresponding to different outcomes: discussion (D: N  33); passed enfranchisement, and whether the passed reform was preferential or universal (P, U: N  25, 23). Some descriptive statistics of this universe of relevant cases are worth reporting: of the 24 cases, 20 cases discussed them. Of these, 80 percent passed a reform to introduce them. Of these, 87 percent implemented the reform, and in 82 percent the franchise reaches the local level only. Of the successful legislative processes of denizen enfranchisement, only 25 percent were subnational—that is, passed by a subnational authority.

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Table A.5. Coded conditions and outcomes for a sample of cases from Figure 3 (page 69)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Country

E

A

D

P

U

Austria Sweden Denmark Norway Finland Netherlands Switzerland New Zealand Australia United States Belgium Italy France Germany Ireland Luxembourg Portugal Spain United Kingdom Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Slovakia Slovenia Iceland Canada Costa Rica Venezuela Argentina Panama San Marino Belize

0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1

1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 subnational 0 1 1 0 0 1

0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 subnational 1 subnational 1 0 0 0\1 subnational 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 NA 1 1 1 1 0 NA 1 1 NA NA 1

1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0\1 subnational 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 NA 1 1 1 1 1 NA 1 1 NA NA 0

Notes: E  easy naturalization for some; A  easy naturalization for all; D  discussion (N  33); P  preferential passed reform (N  25); U  universal passed reform (N  23).

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228 Appendix

Table A.6 shows a detailed truth table with the combinations of the minimal conditions required for different outcomes of a smaller sample of relevant cases. To interpret these data, it is crucial to remember that QCA logic requires us to consider bundles of conditions as configurations and that solutions express co-occurrence, not causality. A contradiction in a truth-table cell indicates that the cases included in a combination have different outcomes; it suggests that the causal conditions analyzed cannot account for this outcome. In theory, a row that includes contradictory combinations cannot be solved, but QCA experts get around the problem of contradictory combinations in several ways, all of which come with tradeoffs regarding the number of cases for which a statement is valid or regarding the validity of the statement. The most conservative strategy to force a logical solution is to ignore the cases that create the contradiction, if they are a minority of cases, to see at least whether a majority of cases in one combination leads us to interpretable results. I solved contradictions this way when one-fifth or fewer of the cases in a combination had a different value and qualified the solution with two measures of fit: consistency and coverage. Consistency (abbreviated as cons. in the Table) expresses to which extent the solution is consistent with the statement that the conditions are sufficient for the outcome. Solution-coverage (abbreviated as cov. in the Table) tells how many cases of the outcome are covered by all paths together, raw-coverage tells how many cases are covered by a given path that possibly overlaps with others, and unique-coverage tells how many cases are uniquely covered by one path (see Table A.6). From all solutions, the most robust one refers to the relationship between naturalization rules and discussion of denizen enfranchisement as a law proposal: discussions arise mostly in cases of relatively easy naturalization rules. This contradicts the idea that countries of “open” citizenship regimes do not enfranchise denizens (i.e., because they “do not need to”). However, this statement applies to only 57 percent of the relevant cases, among which are Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, the United States, Belize, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Easy naturalization rules constitute part of the story for more than half of the cases. However, for the remaining cases there are alternative paths to discussing denizen enfranchisement. The next most plausible result is that 85 percent of the cases that were implemented either have easy naturalization regimes or naturalization rules that are equal for all, or they have both. This result is consistent. Stalled,

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Type 3 Difficult naturalization but easier for some ab

Type 4 Easy naturalization but easier for some Ab

Yes (1)

Contradictory

Contradictory

Contradictory

Passed denizen enfranchisement reforms in a political process?

Yes (1)

Contradictory

Yes (1)

Yes (1)

Denmark, Costa Portugal, Sweden, Belgium, France, Austria, Estonia, Rica, Germany, United Kingdom Netherlands, Canada, Latvia, Switzerland Spain, Iceland Luxembourg, Norway, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia, United States, Greece Belize

Type 2 Easy naturalization for all AB

Discussed denizen enfranchisement as formal political proposal?

Cases

Types

Type 1 Difficult naturalization for all aB

Table A.6. Detailed csQCA Truth Table with solutions

ab a (cons. 0.88; cov. 0.50) b (cons. 1 cov. 0.18) sol. cons.: 0.68 sol. cov.: 0.92

A (cons. 1; cov. 0.57)

Solution

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Contradictory

Yes (1)

Yes (1)

Contradictory

Contradictory

Yes (1)

Type 2 Easy naturalization for all AB

Note: sol.  solution; cons.  consistency; cov.  coverage; uni.  universal.

Are denizen voting rights national (as opposed to local voting rights)?

Is denizen franchise potentially open to all denizens (i.e., not focused on only some migrants)?

Implemented the reform (as opposed to dormant reforms)?

Types

Type 1 Difficult naturalization for all aB

Table A.6. Detailed csQCA Truth Table with solutions (continued)

Contradictory

Contradictory

Contradictory

Type 3 Difficult naturalization but easier for some ab

Contradictory

Contradictory

Yes (1)

Type 4 Easy naturalization but easier for some Ab

ab sol. cons.: 0.40 sol. cov.: 0.66

aB sol. cons.: 1 sol. cov. 0.30

A (raw cov. 0.57, uni. cov. 0.21)  B (raw 0.64; uni. cov. 0.28) sol. cons.: 1 sol. cov.: 0.85

Solution

Appendix 231

dormant, or aborted enfranchisement reforms fall mainly within the universally difficult naturalization type. This suggests that enfranchisement might have been a matter of gaining political votes without the perspective that it is possible to apply it. However, to pass a reform, significant resources have to be invested and there is a potential loss of prestige in failing to apply legislation already passed. In any case, the answers to this puzzling result can only be investigated by looking at what happened in a political process among the proposal, decision-making process, and lack of implementation.4 The next most reliable result is that 30 percent of the cases of universal denizen enfranchisement correspond to cases of difficult naturalization for all, type 1, but such a percentage already raises more questions than it answers. It means that there are plenty of cases of easy and/or particularistic naturalization, which also reach reforms that benefit all denizens.5

Information on the Portuguese Case Table A.7 contains a time line of relevant passed legislation on migration and nationality issues in Portugal. Table A.8 presents the distribution of seats in the Portuguese parliament in the period studied. Figure A.1 complements this information, indicating the position of party factions regarding law projects and proposals mentioned, including their size in the Portuguese parliament. Finally, Table A.9 schematically presents the steps of the analysis for the case of Portugal, considering the governments in turn, the legislative proposals related to denizen enfranchisement and nationality, and the frames used for each and their contexts.

Information on the German Case Figure A.2 shows the number of documents analyzed for the German case according to their kind and their origin in different levels of government/ La¨nder. Figure A.3 shows the dispersion of proposals of denizen enfranchisement in Germany along time and across La¨nder—and at the federal level

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Table A.7. Relevant legislation on migration and nationality issues in Portugal Law-Decree 126/72, 1972

Creates legal conditions to apply the international Convention of Equality of Rights and Duties between Portuguese and Brazilians, signed in 1971

Decree-Law 308-A, 1975

Addresses the loss of nationality

Constitution of 1976

Makes room for the possibility of extending voting rights to Lusophone-country citizens on the basis of reciprocity, thereby potentially extending the quasi-citizenship status of Brazilians to Lusophone migrants

Law 37/81 of 3 October 1981

Law of the Portuguese nationality

Decree-Law 322/82 of 12 August 1982

Regulates the Law of Nationality

Constitutional revision of 1989

Extends the universe of migrant populations covered by potential enfranchisement to all denizens on the basis of reciprocity in Article 15

Decree-Law 212/92 of 12 October 1992

Institutes the first regularization of illegal immigrants

Constitutional revision of 1992

Adapts Article 15 to the European commitments on voting rights for European citizens in other European countries

Decree-Law 59/93 of 3 March 1993

Creates a new entrance, stay, exit, and expel regime of foreigners

Dispatch of the State Secretaries of Social Security and Employment and Professional Training 1993

Aims at the insertion into the job market of the less fortunate groups, including immigrants

Resolution of the Council of Ministers 38/93 of 15 May 1993

Approves a program of intervention that seeks the social and professional integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities

Law 70/93 of 29 September 1993

Reformulates and regulates the law of asylum and shelter

Law 25/94 of 19 August and Decree-Law 253/94 of 20 October 1994

Juridical dispositions that reformulate and regulate the attainment of Portuguese nationality

Law 3-A/96 of 25 January 1996

Creates the post of High Commissioner for the Immigration and Ethnic Minorities

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Table A.7. Relevant legislation on migration and nationality issues in Portugal (continued) Law 17/96 of 24 May 1996

Institutes a new process of extraordinary regularization of the situation of the illegal immigrants

Lei 19-A/96, 26 June 1996

Creates a minimum wage to which all residents have access independent of nationality

Law proposal 37/VII, which became Law 50/96 of 4 September 1996

Alters two electoral laws in order to allow the right to vote and eligibility to the local authorities, on conditions of reciprocity, to resident foreigners, with different conditions according to their nationality of origin

Decree-Law 37/97 of 31 January 1997

Alters the regulation on the Law of Nationality

Decreto-Lei 39/98 of 26 February 1998

Creates the Conselho Consultivo para os Assuntos da Imigraca˜o (Consultative Council for Immigration Issues)

Law 20/98 of 12 May 1998

Lifts quotas on work permits for foreigners

Decree-Law 244/98 of 3 August 1998

Regulates the entrance, stay, exit, and dismissal regime of foreigners in the national territory. Despite maintaining an administrativebureaucratic logic, it inverts the restrictive sense of previous policy: instead of 20 years, only 10 years of residence were required to obtain permanent residence and make family unification a right (revokes Decree-Law number 59/93)

Law 13/99 1999

Facilitates bureaucratic procedures to encourage migrants to register to vote

Law 115/99 of 3 August 1999

Establishes the legal regime of the associations representing the immigrants and their descendants, foreseeing the recognition of their relevance, as well as their right to technical and financial support from the state to the development of their activities and also the right to benefit from free broadcasting time in the public services of radio and television

Proposal Decree 37/VIII of 26 July 2000

Allows the government to alter the legal regime that regulates the entrance, stay, exit, and dismissal of foreigners in the national territory

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Table A.7. Relevant legislation on migration and nationality issues in Portugal (continued) Decree-Law 4/2001 of 10 January 2001

Alters the Decree-Law 244/1998, of August 8, which regulates the conditions of entrance, stay, exit, and dismissal of foreign citizens in the national territory and creates the title of authorization of residence

Resolution of the Council of Ministers 14/2001, od 14 February 2001

Clears legal contradictions which had been used to deny foreigners access to health care; creates an interministerial commission for migration policy

Regulation Decree 9/2001 of 31 May 2001

Regulates the entrance, stay, exit, and dismissal of foreign citizens in the national territory

Organic Law 2/2006 of 17 April 2006

Again reinforces the principle of jus soli in Nationality Law

Table A.8. Party seats in the Portuguese parliament, main parties, 1975–2009

1975 1976 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2005 2009

PCP

PS

PPD

30 40 39 44 38 31 17 15 17 12 14 15

116 107 63 101 57 60 72 112 115 96 121 97

81 73

PSD

PRD

74 75 88

45 7

148 135 88 81 105 75 81

CDS 16 42 46 30 22 4 5 15 15 14 12 21

PSN

BE

Total

2 3 8 16

250 250 250 250 250 250 230 230 230 230 230 230

1

Source: Histo´rico de Resultados, Portal do Eleitor, http://eleicoes.cne.pt/raster/ index.cfm?dia05&mes10&ano1980&eleicaoar, accessed November 2009. Note: PCP  Partido Comunista Portugueˆs; PS  Partido Socialista; PPD  Partido Popular Democra´tico; PSD  Partido Social Democrata; PRD  Partido Renovador Democra´tico; CDS  Centro Democra´tico e Social; PSN  Partido da Solidariedade Nacional; BE  Bloco de Esquerda.

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Appendix 235 In favor

Against

1992: enfranchisement project 3/VI

CDS - PP PSD

1996: enfranchisement proposal 37/VII

PSN

1996: project to facilitate external voting 47/VII

PEV

1997: constitutional reform to allow citizens abroad to vote for president 1999: law project 594/VII to facilitate denizen voting technically

PCP PS

Figure A.1. Positions of party factions regarding the law projects and proposals mentioned, indicating their relative proportion of seats in the Portuguese parliament. CDS-PP  Centro Democra´tico e Social – Partido Popular; PSD  Partido Social Democrata; PSN  Partido da Solidariedade Nacional; PEV  Partido Ecologista “Os Verdes”; PCP  Partido Comunista Portugueˆs; PS  Partido Socialista.

(Bundestag and Bundesrat together)—marking which party, or government, authored them. It also shows the proposals that were discussed in the parliament plenum—whether stranded or decided upon—with hyphens, dashes, or white diamonds. The black hyphen indicates proposals initiated by a La¨nder government to its corresponding parliament. Dashes indicate proposals made by a La¨nder government to a federal organ (e.g., to the Bundesrat). The white diamonds indicate federal government proposals in the Bundestag. The abbreviations are as follows: Fed: federation (contains both Bundesrat and Bundestag); ST: Sachsen-Anhalt; SN: Sachsen; SL: Saarland; SH: Schleswig-Holstein; RP: Rheinland-Pfalz; NW: NordrheinWestfalen; NI: Niedersachsen; MV: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; HH: Hamburg; HE: Hessen; HB: Bremen; BY: Bayern; BW: Baden-Wu¨rttemberg; and BE: Berlin. Figure A.4 shows the code tree for the arguments in the German debates, produced with the program MAXQDA. Table A.10 shows the absolute numbers of foreign residents in Germany’s biggest cities and their proportion in the population in 1982 and 2008. Given that cities cannot—in any interpretation—hope to enfranchise denizens at their level of government, it is useful to complement this information with data on proportions of denizens in La¨nder. Table A.11 shows which La¨nder had over 5 percent of foreigners in their populations as of

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Table A.9. Steps of the analysis of the Portuguese case

Step 1 Comparing government programs

What?

When?

How?

Context

Government programs of XII (led by PSD, 1991–1995)

1991

XII government made no mention of immigration.

XII government holds majority in parliament, under a PS president.

1995

XIII government portrays immigration as an issue of social exclusion, citizenship rights, and Europeanwide challenge to solidarity.

and XIII (led by PS, 1995–1999).

XIII government is led by PS in both organs. Migration policy becomes prominent.

Step 2 Comparing different stages of the debate of enfranchising law 50/96

Law proposal 37/ VII framed as an issue of expected reciprocity, overcompliance with EU commitments by creating four universes of voters.

1995– 1996

Consensual tone; all parties want to appropriate it.

Discussed after the creation of CPLP, ACIME, and Council of Portuguese Communities. Silences migration, highlights emigrants and Lusophone aspiration.

Step 3 Comparing related legislation

Law project 47/ VII by PSD (failed).

1996

Aimed to allow emigrants to vote at embassies. Greens and PCP reject fiercely. Opponents question emigrants’ link to community. PSD says Portuguese abroad are not emigrants. PSD and CDS-PP deem it “too permissive.”

Distrust of PSD; pushing external voting only while being opposition. Distrust that PSD aims to manipulate external vote to get what it lost in the polls.

Constitutional revision of Art. 124 to let emigrants vote in presidential elections (failed). Law project 594/ VII by PCP to facilitate voting registry for foreign residents (passed).

1997

1999

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Mild support within a government favorable to migration policy.

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Appendix 237

Table A.9. Steps of the analysis of the Portuguese case (continued)

Step 4 Comparing to its failed predecessor

What?

When?

How?

Context

Law project 3/VI by PS (voting rights at local level to Lusophone and EU citizens on condition of reciprocity (stranded).

1991

Debated as immigration issue together with other immigration laws proposed by PS.

PSD argued against it on grounds of futility but suggested future tit-for-tat in exchange for supporting external voting rights.

December 2008. The data in the table are based on information from Statistisches Bundesamt. Table A.12, created and published by Liegmann (1990: 26), compiles public opinion polls between 1988 and 1989—at the start of the debates at the subnational level in Germany—that asked respondents their opinions on the extension of voting rights at the communal level. As introduced in Chapter 4, Text Portrait is a visual tool of MAXQDA that helps to visualize the location and occurrence of coded segments of a text as a “portrait”: each code has a color (here turned to grayscale) and each square in the picture presents an equal portion of the text. Since the unit of analysis was the argument, the length of coded segments varies from a single phrase to a few paragraphs. I show these illustrations here for transparency, with the aim of providing an example of what a coded debate looked like. The text portraits clearly show how arguments reduced from having many different possible framings to having just a few. A more detailed description of the portraits can be found below each. Table A.13 presents the most complex of all the debates, that of Hamburg, with the expert hearing on the left side, the first debate in the middle, and the second debate (which led to voting) on the right side. Finally, Figure A.5 illustrates parties’ positions along two main dimensions: the assessment of how well migrants were integrated and the general support for denizen enfranchisement along the debate. The bubble size stands for the party faction size (number of seats in the legislature). The location of the bubbles in the dimensional space represents my qualitative assessment of the support of each faction for denizen enfranchisement

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238 Appendix

180 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

36 20 22 25

21

42

10 6 11

Federal proposals Schleswig-Holstein

17

45

Hamburg 4 6 6 8 13

Tot

43

al n

Parl

umb

er o

iam

f do

Parl

enta

cum

ents

9 3 10 3 10

iam

ry p

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sals

lyze

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ry d

(law

d

Pas

sed

arlia

eba

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tes

proj

Berlin

2 1 2 3

Oth

enta

ropo

Bremen

ects

/pro

tary

Other Länder proposals laws

doc

& co

urt d

s (in

pos

ecis

quir

ies,

als)

com

ions

mitt

ee r epo

rts)

Figure A.2. Number and kind of documents analyzed for the German case. Fed  Federation (contains proposals in Bundesrat or Bundestag); ST  Sachsen-Anhalt; SN  Sachsen; SL  Saarland; SH  Schleswig-Holstein; RP  Rheinland-Pfalz; NW  Nordrhein-Westfalen; NI  Niedersachsen; MV  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; HH  Hamburg; HE  Hessen; HB  Bremen; BY  Bayern, BW  Baden-Wu¨rttemberg; BE  Berlin.

along the debates relative to each other, with the dotted vertical in the middle representing an ambiguous position (i.e., anything to its left represents support for it and anything to its right, rejection). A change of positions along the debate is shown by the bubbles marked with the legends t1 (initial position) and t2 (final position).

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Figure A.3. Proposals in German La¨nder and Federation along time, by proponent. Fed  Federation (contains Bundesrat or Bundestag); ST  Sachsen-Anhalt; SN  Sachsen; SL  Saarland; SH  Schleswig-Holstein; RP  Rhineland-Pfalz; NW  Nordrhein-Westfalen; NI  Niedersachsen; MV  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; HH  Hamburg; HE  Hessen; HB  Bremen; BY  Bayern; BW  Baden-Wu¨rttemberg; BE  Berlin; BB  Brandenburg (no proposal has existed in Thuringia).

Figure A.4. Disaggregated code tree used for German debates.

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Table A.10. Foreign residents in the biggest German cities: 1982 and 2008 Absolute 1982

Proportion 1982

Absolute 2008

Proportion 2008

West Berlin

234,700

12.5

433,000 (unified Berlin)

12.8

Munich

222,600

17.3

272,600

22.8

Hamburg

172,600

10.6

261,900

15.4

Cologne

147,500

15.2

189,700

19.7

Frankfurt

146,400

23.5

155,500

24.1

Stuttgart

105,500

18.3

142,700

24.5

Source: S¸en und Jahn (1985: 19) for 1982; Genesis database on Ausla¨nder: Kreise for 2008.

Table A.11. La¨nder that had over 5 percent of foreigners in their populations as of December 2008 Land

Absolute number of foreigners

Percentage of the La¨nder’s population

480,555 248,973 84,537 1,269,337 681,486 1,906,081 1,180,035 86,538 315,345 533,411 149,395

14 13.8 12.3 11.8 11.1 10.5 9.4 8.3 7.7 6.6 5.2

Berlin Hamburg Bremen Baden-Wurttemberg Hessen Nordrhein-Westfalen Bayern Saarland Rheinland-Pfalz Niedersachsen Schleswig-Holstein

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Fachserie 1, Reihe 2, Bevo¨lkerung und Erwerbsta¨tigkeit. Ausla¨ndische Bevo¨lkerung. Ergebnisse des Ausla¨nderzentralregisters. Ausla¨ndische Bevo¨lkerung 2008 nach La¨nder, Wiesbaden 2009, p. 25.

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Table A.12. Public opinion polls on denizen enfranchisement at the communal level, 1988–1989 Date

Polling institute

Question

For

September IPOS 21, 1988

Should voting rights remain tied to nationality?

80%

February 4, Wickert 1989

Extending voting rights to foreigners in Hamburg: For entire Hamburg population 24.2% For Hamburg citizens 31.1%

Against Undecided NA

NA

69.9% 59.7%

5.9% 9.2%

January 21, Forschungsgruppe Communal voting rights for 1989 Wahlen Mannheim foreigners?

34%

64%

2%

June 1989

39%

48%

13%

Institute fu¨r Demoskopie Allensbach

Communal voting rights for foreigners?

Source: Liegmann 1990, p. 26.

Table A.13. Text portraits from the Hamburg debates on denizen enfranchisement

The most salient feature of this first portrait, which corresponds to the hearings with experts, is the sheer variety of arguments.

(PlPt 13/45) Relative to the previous portrait, this portrait of the first debate shows less diversity of arguments.

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(PlPt 13/46) In the second hearing, the arguments have been reduced to a few.

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Assessment of migrants’ integration Not integrated at all to very integrated

Party positions in the Hamburg debate over time: two dimensions (political support and assessment of migrants’ integration), with size of faction in parliament

NS

EE

GR

SPD

SPD

2

T DP

F

T1

1

PT

FD

T2

U

CD

Political support of denizen voting rights Strong support to outright rejection

Assessment of migrants’ integration Not integrated at all to very integrated

Party positions in the Schleswig-Holstein debate over time Two dimensions and size of faction in parliament SSW SPD

T2

CDU

T1

CDU

T2

Political support of denizen voting rights Strong support to outright rejection

Figure A.5. Party positions through the subnational processes in Germany.

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Party positions in the Bremen debate over time Two dimensions and size of faction in parliament NS

EE

Assessment of migrants’ integration Not integrated at all to very integrated

GR

SPD

t2 SP

D P

FD

CDU

DVU

Political support of denizen voting rights Strong support to outright rejection

GR EE AL NS/

2 DT

1

DT

RE P

CD

U

U

T2

T1

FD P

SP

SP

CD

Assessment of migrants’ integration Not integrated at all to very integrated

Party positions in the West Berlin debate P1Pt 11/42 Two dimensions and faction size in parliament*

Support for denizen voting rights Strong support to outright rejection *in the January 1989 elections the FDP lost its seats in parlament and the REP entered for the first time.

Figure A.5. Party positions through the subnational processes in Germany (continued).

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NOTES

Introduction 1. Because a good part of this book is devoted to two European cases, it makes sense to clarify that, for any case analyzed here that is in the European Union (EU), I focus on a subset of the denizen population: those who are legally termed “third-country nationals,” thus leaving out the denizens from EU countries. EU national citizens are also resident immigrants who have not naturalized in their countries of residence but already have voting rights at the local level in their places of residence anywhere in the EU, and for elections to the European Parliament. This book has an international comparative scope, however, so I refrain from overusing the term “third-country national” to allow readers to reflect about crosscountry and cross-regional differences for other contexts, where this differentiation of a regional citizenship has less relevance than other differentiations.

Part I 1. I am alluding here to Barry Hindess’s (1998) persuasive interpretation of citizenship as an institution that has allowed powerful states to “divide and rule.” 2. Voting rights have a precise scope of entitlements: the right to vote (active voting rights) or to stand as a candidate (passive voting rights). When I write “full voting rights,” I refer to both, while “voting rights” alone shall be understood in the more general sense. When I refer to specific active or passive voting rights, I make that explicit. More frequently, I refer to the level of voting rights, by which I mean whether voting rights are to be exercised in local or higher, such as regional or national, elections. 3. I am aware that some have infused the term “denizen” with a substantive meaning, for example, to denote a category of persons of foreign descent who are rejected from belonging to national citizenship (Rosbrook-Thompson 2015). As I stated earlier, I do not wish to suggest that denizenship is a legally, empirically recognized status that can be assumed to include the same set of rights across polities, but I would even less subscribe to a pejorative interpretation of it. In the most basic sense, I reiterate here that by either “resident migrant” or “denizen” I simply refer to a resident in a polity without the national citizenship status of that polity.

Chapter 1 1. State membership is understood today primarily as nationality. The ways of gaining citizenship-as-nationality tend to be embodied in the legal principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis. According to jus soli, citizenship-as-nationality is awarded to people born in a territory.

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246 Notes to Pages 21–24 According to jus sanguinis, it is awarded to children born of member parents. Citizenship regimes tend to rely on a combination of one of those principles, qualifying or conditioning the degree to which each is applicable with other criteria (e.g., residence, declaration, parental residence, parental nationality). These combinations have the potential to determine the acquisition of the legal status of citizenship and how people are supposed to acquire a formal link to the political community. For this reason, it is common practice to compare citizenship regimes (i.e., how open or restrictive, inclusive or exclusive, or even how “liberal” they are) by analyzing the combination of jus soli and jus sanguinis and the degree to which these are qualified by further requisites in constitutions and nationality laws (e.g. Weiss 2002). 2. For the “German concept of citizenship,” Ulrich Preuß (2004) counted seven substantially different concepts! 3. In the medieval world, different territorial units had several gradations of membership, each with different sets of rights and privileges: In general, the more active (and propertied) persons were in the community, the more recognition they acquired, and the closer they moved to full citizenship (Roma´n 2010: 34ff.). Some “free” cities were primarily defensive units where the economy was based in guilds, restricting citizens’ interest in admitting too many participants (Weber, repr. in 1998: 45–49). The modern state subsumed those cities to larger aggregates and citizens came to be seen not only as current householders and contributors to the local well-being of the community but also as potential soldiers so that oaths of exclusive loyalty and a congruity of nationality and citizenship became crucial characteristics of the practice and understanding of citizenship. 4. To conceive of different possible models of citizenship beyond nationality, it is insightful to note what happens in places where the appropriation never took full hold. In most Latin American countries, a distinction between citizenship and nationality remains rooted in the need for those countries after independence to create nationals rapidly through generous jus soli and easy naturalization upon the people’s renunciation of their previous nationality and also to encourage immigration to largely uninhabited areas, in a competitive context. This was, in fact, common also to the settler policies in the early United States, where statescale and city-scale citizenship prevailed as a local level measure to attract immigration, until a wave of nativism took hold in the early 1900s (with a peak during and after World War I), which did much to cement the identification of citizenship with nationality (Varsanyi 2005). As Varsanyi rightly notes, citizenship is an institution with malleable boundaries. The young Latin American nations enlarged the franchise to a very wide population at once, yet anchored the effective exercise of citizen rights to a tradition of local social recognition as neighbor (Pedroza 2014a). Today, in most countries, the difference is only felt for emigrants, who may lose citizenship—but not nationality—upon taking another nationality or being absent for long. This is stronger in Argentina and Uruguay—states that bind citizenship to residence— even if nationality follows the usual mix of jus soli and jus sanguinis. These states delineate who the national members are and, in turn, who the citizens are. Citizens are considered not only a subset of nationals, but also must be residents of the state, and there is a path to citizenship through (very long) residence in Uruguay, though not to nationality. 5. An objection to this definition of citizenship could be that a whole array of discussions associated with citizenship is left aside, most notably those that conceive of it as an identity. Such discussions are articulated in political theory by communitarians, for whom citizenship is a common project that helps to engender solidarity among the members of a society, but

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Notes to Pages 24–28 247 they are also prominent among anthropologists, who study practices and subjective understandings of citizenship. The definition I offer here also leaves in the shadow other important political rights and forms of political participation that do not find expression through the rights to vote and to run for office. I think, however, that this definition allows for a rigorous understanding of the processes of denizen enfranchisement that may provide a strong base on which to make informed criticisms of reductionist understandings of citizenship later. The large methodological approach to citizenship—explained in Chapter 2—allows for a plural, rich understanding. 6. World Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision Population Database, accessed on March 12, 2008, http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel3. 7. The rejection of dual nationality was formalized from the Bancroft treaties of the late 1800s, through the League of Nations’s 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws to the Council of Europe’s 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality. 8. Unlike nationality, citizenship can be a relationship between the individual and municipality or city (as in the medieval ones, where it meant freedom), a state, or even a supranational or multinational political unit. 9. International law distinguishes between political and economic migration by assigning categories to individuals who are seeking to cross borders to escape political persecution or violent conflict, as opposed to those who cross borders in search of economic opportunities. In this work I focus on the latter, and specifically on legal economic migrants. That is, I do not focus on “refugees,” those who have a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social or political group; nor do I focus on so-called irregular migrants, who make up 30 to 50 percent of all migration to Western industrialized countries. I also focus on settled immigrants rather than on “temporary migration” (“guest workers,” seasonal workers, and students). The line distinguishing settled “immigrants” from people claiming democratic rights after not too lengthy periods of residence is very fine, but that line is very clear regarding the millions of people crossing borders for purposes of travel. 10. This is why I insist elsewhere that citizenship scholars must be more sensitive to consider the legal traditions beyond the Anglo-Saxon and European ones, as in some regions there has been no conflation of the terms “citizenship” and “nationality,” but a prevalent differentiation (the former being usually a subset of the latter). This occurs in most Latin American countries (Pedroza and Palop-Garcı´a 2017). 11. In contemporary Germany, immigrants who have naturalized cease to be foreigners, but they enter a new status that they will pass on to their grandchildren: Germans with migration background. This categorization is supposed to make immigrants more visible in society for the purpose of tracking their place in societal outcomes and therefore designing better long-term integration policies. The other side of the story is that it only confers upon immigrants a belonging with adjectives, even if they naturalize, for as long as they live and beyond. That a separation of this kind can have brutal consequences for the upcoming generations is today crudely demonstrated by the debates around the disenfranchisement and even the deportations of descendants of the “Windrush generation,” Caribbean immigrants who were invited to the United Kingdom to reconstruct and enhance the labor supply in the country after World War II and, as Commonwealth citizens, were granted a residence permit

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248 Notes to Pages 28–31 in the United Kingdom. This changed in 1973, when the residence rights were abrogated but the presence of those who were already in the country was tolerated. After 2014, employers, state health service employees, and landlords were obliged to remit information on the legal status of their clients and employees. As of 2018, Theresa May is the prime minister, but already as home secretary she sought to implement policies that would create a “hostile environment” for immigrants and immigration. Her successor in the post of home secretary, Amber Rudd, continued this line, seeking to increase the number of deportations as a primary goal: persons who cannot prove to have a legal residence status were considered illegal, denied public services, and asked to leave the country, including Commonwealth citizens, those from the Caribbean, and also the Windrush generation (Gentleman 2018; Prentis 2018; Sta¨uber 2018; Shirbon 2018; Walker and Gentleman 2018). 12. This use of the category throughout this book is far from the pejorative use of “denizen” in critical citizenship studies to highlight the relations of domination over migrants (see Part I, note 3). I generally sympathize with the gist of that literature in its denunciation of global systems of production and environmental degradation that create a “precariat” in which migrant workers share similar insecurities with “failed” citizens, such as criminals, unemployed workers, or people relying on welfare within nation-states (Standing 2015: 86– 87). I also sympathize with Hindess’s (1998, 2000) critique of citizenship as a trap that promises equality among citizens by serving richer countries to reject immigrants by recommending that they use their citizenship in their countries of origin. Hindess’s critique is urgent in a context in which renowned economists make casual inroads into the highly politicized debates on migration policy with prescriptive tones, supporting precisely such view of citizenship to keep immigrants out. However, I believe this critical literature has failed to recognize that the identification of citizenship with nationality is itself a means by which citizenship has been instrumentalized in those ways. As I elaborate in Chapter 7, I see denizen enfranchisement as harboring the promise of wider participation rights, as it carries the potential for progressive emancipation of citizenship from narrow nationality. These processes provide opportunities for potential alliances between foreigners falling in the margins of residence requisites and outsiders deprived of full social, political, and economic rights to struggle together in more ample practices of citizenship. 13. Identity as thick, collective self-understanding poses a problem that is further away from the focus of this book, but I remain open to arguments that refer to how a “selfconception of citizenship” in a polity may determine the way to address the dilemmas of denizenship. Yet, as I will later expose, it is unlikely that such “self-understandings” are (a), homogeneous and (b), termed in a language that can neatly essentially differentiate denizens from citizens. 14. Bear in mind that, in the cases of EU member states, I refer to the voting rights acquired by so-called third-country nationals, that is, not to the voting rights acquired in European states by citizens of other European states. 15. After Marshall’s book, a vast literature supplemented and confronted his work not only with other examples of historical processes that accounted for a variety of paths to citizenship but also with agendas of gender, migration, and multiculturalism. The common denominator of that vast literature is the historical institutionalist approach that explains variation in citizenship mainly as a result of inherited traditions of nation-building, or the “self-definition of the demos” particular to each country, or of factors within the state (see

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Notes to Pages 31–39 249 Turner 2000; Brubaker 1990). From the perspective of the citizen rights gained by resident immigrants, however, the development of citizenship rights as Marshall described it fits as long as we observe the group of core citizens. In the case of guest workers, the acquisition of rights reversed the Marshallian sequence: Economic and social rights were the first rights to be fully granted to migrant workers in European host countries. Political rights became part of the agenda much later (see Soysal 1998). 16. Although this might sound like a minor issue, it is not; the practices of investor citizenship and the “citizenship-for-sale” programs of several countries (see Shachar 2006; Boatca 2011; Dzankic 2012; Ong 2006) show that those rights attached to the passport, devoid of the democratic connection signaled by residence, are indeed important and offered by more and more states as a commodity. 17. By “liberalization trend,” Joppke referred to the increasing difficulty of liberal democracies to legitimize the imposition of a substantive identity as a precondition for acquiring citizenship (2010). This is notably different from the recent attempts across democratic governments to load citizenship with new meaning through civic integration tests and courses (cf. Wallace 2010), which he identifies as the stopping mechanism to the liberalization trend. 18. Joppke has noted that Soysal has been too quick in reading tangible results from the symbolic promise of these instruments and has not been sufficiently attentive to the institutional contexts that the effective enforcement of rights requires. For example, the extensions of social rights to noncitizens have mostly occurred in the case of contribution-based benefits, such as unemployment compensation and pensions. 19. See Rath (1983). Until now, and to the best of my knowledge, there has been no comparative study that attempts to account for how processes of enfranchisement of denizens differ across time and place. It is worth mentioning, though, David Earnest’s great effort to reconcile qualitative and quantitative methodologies in explaining variation across countries in their incorporation of denizens and to explore the influence of not one but all three of these theories and other hypotheses he derived from strands of literature less related to the topic but nonetheless thought-provoking, such as the influence of neighboring countries or the influence of the EU. Earnest dispatched interesting partial results, which pointed to contrary outcomes, to conclude that the insignificance of the “national” hypothesis he had tested pointed to the influence of untested “post-national” factors. In a later study, he refuted his own findings by following the majority of writers that attribute most effect on variation between enfranchisement to national traditions (see Earnest, 2002, 2003, 2005). 20. A common approach of conservative parties to proposals of denizen enfranchisement in parliamentary debates is to undervalue the vote as something important to migrants and disregard their use of the vote, or to argue that the vote must be relegated to a later point in time after more fundamental needs of migrants are adequately provided for. Such an approach ignores that enfranchisement carries recognition as a fundamental part of debates. Voting is the only massive, universal form of political participation that, independent of formulas to aggregate votes, assigns a voice to each person in the electing people, the demos. The relevance of the normative argument for denizens’ participation in local life should not be affected by arguments about their actual participation, much less the interest or subjective value that individuals or groups later assign to voting, as these have nothing to do with the normative principles, requirements, and justifications that substantiate recognizing them as having a stake in the well-being of the political community. That subjective interest and

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250 Notes to Pages 39–47 participation rates in national politics are higher than in local politics is true for full, formal citizens, as well (see Lister and Pia 2008: 88) but is no reason to disfranchise them. 21. Treating denizens in the aggregate leaves open the question of in which respects they can be said to constitute a unitary social group in the conventional sense. There are crucial gender, ethnic, national, and class distinctions that differentiate them. In this book, I take the license to highlight instead what the resident immigrants share because this is what interests me analytically and normatively: Their lack of formal citizenship has rendered them politically disenfranchised and vulnerable to migration policies to which national citizens are not. 22. A radical solution for the sake of achieving fair results through suffrage in a polity, though unimaginable in practice, is Lo´pez-Guerra’s “critical suffrage doctrine.” The proposal amounts to eliminating universal suffrage in favor of a lottery to achieve first a representative sample of the population and then to well inform the sample of voters before the election. In making the general case for that mechanism, he argues that franchise is not a basic right, but a matter of institutional design to achieve fair results, and he makes an interesting contribution regarding the groups that would be eligible to participate in the lottery: Resident immigrants would be eligible for him because he deems citizenship not important as such, nor morally required (2014: 84). To me, his otherwise intelligent proposal from the point of view of fair outcomes errs in reducing citizenship to nationality and in overlooking other evaluations of the right to vote (for instance, as proof of equal recognition). 23. In the sovereignty-based understandings of citizenship (e.g., Carl Schmitt) exclusion is justified on ontological grounds with the argument that the very concept of citizenship implies by necessity some kind of exclusion to define a “demos.” As brilliantly pointed out by Ewald Engelen (2003), even the Marshallian account of citizenship development presupposes a unitary concept of sovereignty that proclaims states to have an absolute right to rule within the territory that constitutes their statehood and a thick notion of solidarity among a group of individuals. This has been criticized on moral and practical grounds by Carens (2000) and Schotel (2006). 24. The question of whether we should read the proliferation of denizenship as democratic has been critically explored by Aihwa Ong, who has noted that states drop the divide between citizens and foreigners in favor of pursuing market-oriented goals (2006: 499). 25. Many authors have empirically observed the opposite of what Turner predicted: There has been a wide convergence trend that, despite back-and-forth adjustments, can be considered a liberalizing trend around a relatively permissive combination of birthright (jus soli) and descent-based (jus sanguinis) citizenship-acquisition rules (see Weil 2001; Joppke 2003, 2007) and a relaxation of rules restricting double/plural nationality (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001; Pedroza 2015). Joppke, in particular, has noted that 9/11 may have indeed changed the outlook of democratic states toward migrants, but this change remains within the liberal spectrum of political positions. 26. Dumbrava (2010) has made the point that not all movements toward inclusion or openness in nationality reforms point in a liberal direction. 27. The history of local suffrage in the United States is fairly complex and also well documented. See, among others, Neuman (1992, 1996), Raskin (1993), Smith (1997), and Hayduk (2006). 28. A usual critique of denizen voting rights is that they devalue citizenship and make solidarity more difficult (Schuck 1989). Baubo¨ck (2003) has grouped the “devaluation” arguments as belonging to three theories. First, for a cost-theory of citizenship, citizenship is

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Notes to Pages 47–52 251 worthy only if it is difficult to acquire (e.g., through fees, long waiting periods, and/or difficult-to-meet conditions). Second, citizenship is of value only if it is good for many purposes: In this view, denizen enfranchisement devalues citizenship if denizens do not have strong incentives to go through the naturalization process in order to acquire the very few rights that distinguish them from citizens. Derived from this view, political rights—and perhaps others—must be reserved for full citizens only. Third, the value of citizenship lies in the recognition it accords to persons as members of a democratic community; in contrast to the previous views, there is an intrinsic and not only an instrumental value to it. In this view, the value of citizenship grows as its costs and usability decline. Baubo¨ck favors a view according to which the extension of rights alleviates the discriminatory/instrumental pressure on the denizen and lets him or her decide to become a citizen out of will, not constraint. 29. In this regard, I fully agree with Seyla Benhabib’s proposal that even supposedly fundamental principles of inclusion and exclusion are the subject of radical reinterpretation within a few years, in what she has called processes of “jurisgenerative” politics (2004). 30. This is, however, not necessarily true in reality: The formal acquisition of citizenshipas-nationality does not always imply voting rights. Today, the delay in getting voting rights after naturalization in some countries—for example, in fully democratic Costa Rica—and the feebler citizen rights of naturalized citizens across several countries in Latin America (more vulnerable to suspension or cancellation if naturalized citizens cease to reside in the country, for example) also suggests that citizenship as status does not necessarily erase the past (Hoyo 2015; Pedroza and Palop-Garcı´a 2017). That not all national citizens under a state are equal to each other, as the contrasting status of American citizens born in the United States versus those born in Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands demonstrates. This could be a reflection of concerns regarding the loyalty of naturalized persons in the present times of easier migration, as much as legacies of colonial practices. Ongoing research by Jaime Lluch on asymmetric citizenship in empires shows that there were voting rights without citizenship in French Algeria around 1871, a time when a 10 percent resident European-settler minority ruled over Algeria and made citizenship almost unattainable for native Algerians, making assimilation a necessity (2014). When acquiring nationality was made possible in 1919, it came without voting rights, as these were restricted until 1958. 31. Some empirical studies available on the “effects” of denizen enfranchisement in two of the oldest cases—Sweden and the Netherlands—show that denizens vote in fewer numbers than do citizens (Rath 1990: 143). This has led some to affirm that denizen enfranchisement raises expectations that are hard to meet and may lead to a more serious marginalization of migrants if politicians can argue that they are responsive to a pool of voters that includes migrants but, in fact, they ignore them because they know they do not vote. However, this fear overstates the risks posed by a relatively lower turnout at the polls, which should be no surprise since, compared to citizens, denizens are challenged to familiarize themselves with the receiving political system, though they usually belong to social strata that have less time available to invest in following politics. As Hammar (2009) and Munro (2008) hypothesize, their low participation may be explained by the overrepresentation of people of low socioeconomic status, who often show lower interest in and unfamiliarity with the political system than people in the middle and higher classes. However, it might be a consequence of low saliency of debates for them. A study of turnout rates among several migrant and naturalized groups in France showed that non-European–origin migrants have lower turnout rates than

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252 Notes to Pages 52–58 French metropolitans not because of lack of interest or ethnic differences but because of neighborhood effects (Maxwell 2010). Some evidence suggests that their political interest develops over time. In the first elections after enfranchisement, denizens participate less than nationals and the number of foreigners elected is small, but both numbers increase with the number of elections after enfranchisement getting closer to rates of participation of the population in general (Abreu da Silva Costa 2000: 209).

Chapter 2 1. The unit of analysis is thus a parliamentary debate, which can occur in a national polity (in most cases in the world) but also can occur in a subnational polity (in cases in which subnational polities have the competence to regulate electoral rights, which is the case in non-unitary systems, such as federations or confederations). I exclude the EU from the analysis for two reasons: First, and most important, because it has not extended voting rights to denizens (which, in the EU, are called third-country nationals), but its debates on enfranchisement, directives, and regulations refer to its own member-state citizens, allowing them a measure of participation for “internal” mobility; and, second, because of its singularity, as it is the only region (or supranational unit) where voting rights for noncitizens of national states have been debated, which means there is no variation in the world. 2. Restricting denizen enfranchisement to reciprocity is harder to justify. According to Baubo¨ck, it is simply the wrong principle for allocating voting rights (2005: 685). Interestingly, Portugal’s immigration policy was praised in 2010 in a report by the International Organization for Migration as an integrated approach that produces successful policies and promotes harmony, making implicit references to the reciprocity clauses in the Portuguese migration policy. In Portugal, Spain, and the Nordic countries, reciprocity has a legacy based on a contractual tradition. In general, reciprocity seems to be a valid normative principle, meaning that what you give is what you get. As such, it is present between individuals and groups in all corners of the world, either part of customary law or backed by legal enforcement through contracts and treaties (Benhabib 2007: 27). What discomforts Baubo¨ck about reciprocity as a condition for political participation is that it trumps principles that are related more importantly to individual qualifications for participation in political life—that is, residence or stakeholding (2007). 3. Yet the criteria upon which groups are selected remain normatively questionable, being morally dissonant from a liberal democratic perspective, especially when it is clear that a restricted enfranchisement does not always contain a promise of larger or universal enfranchisement as the cases of Spain, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the European Union, among others, show. 4. Hammar (1991) provided an example of how quickly trust can be gained. Shortly before the Swedish decision on denizen enfranchisement, a public opinion poll showed that most Swedes were against denizen enfranchisement. New polls, taken after the decision, showed that the majority had changed: public opinion took pride in the unanimous decision of political parties. 5. Research design orthodoxy advises against a selection of cases based on the outcomes they display, since that is associated with bias and particularly with the inability to ensure findings that are valid, representative, and generalizable to a larger phenomenon. Yet, selecting on the outcome is valid in explorative qualitative research for the close examination of theory development, refinement, and correction (see Geddes 2010). To avoid inferring too much

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Notes to Pages 58–61 253 from too little, I use the possibility principle and develop a research design that includes deductive and inductive steps: (1) I order the cases of a clearly defined phenomenon: legislative debates toward denizen enfranchisement in liberal democracies with high immigration. (2) Within the defined universe of cases, I include a range of variation of country-level outcomes and I select and study cases that stand at different points of the outcome range. (3) To construct the case studies, I emphasize the integrity of the cases, their historical details, and the connections between different aspects of each case, as is the practice in case-study research, including within-case comparisons (several comparative observations within each). They are to be followed by a systematic comparison of their findings (Chapter 5) to distill general findings and then compare those findings to other relevant cases in the outcome range that have been well researched. 6. My delineation of the universe of cases follows three steps: (1) choose positive cases, (2) select negative cases from the remaining population according to the possibility principle, and (3) treat the union of the two sets as the population of interest to consider if they refer to varying degrees of the phenomenon (in this case: different stages of denizen enfranchisement). Cases that lack both the conditions and the outcomes of interest are irrelevant. In principle, this cut seems unjustifiably large because it leaves out cases in which denizen enfranchisement came about as a result of constitutional peculiarities, emigration projections, and reciprocity rules, which are all situations in extending the franchise to immigrants only becomes an issue with larger immigration (de facto or projected as a potential or hypothetical situation). However, before I cease to observe relevant cases, I will briefly look at other cases in which the two scope conditions are relaxed. Even later, one of the cases I will study in depth—Portugal—displays the changes from a denizen enfranchisement regime that developed from constitutional peculiarities and a reality of emigration, to a new context characterized by immigration and where successive enfranchisements enlarged the universe of people covered each time only marginally. Finally, in Chapters 5 and 6, the comparative argument will be complemented with the consideration of a case with low immigration rates. 7. These conditions are defined in more detail in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 8. Burkina Faso, Malawi, Guinea, Morocco, Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Paraguay, Guyana, and, in China, Macau and Hong Kong. 9. In qualitative research, a higher number of cases enriches the diversity of instances and promotes theoretical development and elaboration, but it may introduce unmanageable heterogeneity that risks diluting the clarity of insights deriving from research. I reduce the universe for a more rigorous applicability of my findings. 10. After 20 years of having passed a reform that enfranchised denizens at the local level on the condition that their countries of origin sign treaties of reciprocity on this matter, Spain finally in 2010 passed the complementary legislation needed to implement local denizen voting rights, and so resident migrants from fourteen countries with which Spain has signed reciprocity agreements voted for the first time in May 2011 (Ortega Gime´nez 2011). Also, over the last four years, I have followed in the news what seems to me a mounting pressure of leftist parties and more outspoken support of Spanish constitutional law experts to abolish the reciprocity clause (Gutie´rrez Calvo, Granda, and de Xime´nez Sandoval 2008). Interestingly, not because of its reciprocity rule for denizen voting, but because of a privileged citizenship acquisition procedure for Latin American denizens to whom a historical debt and cultural affinity are recognized—mainly with a shorter residence requirement and tolerance

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254 Notes to Pages 61–62 of dual nationality—Spain has been the subject of academic studies that conclude that the legal privileges of some migrant groups de jure might even be detrimental for them compared to other migrants (Cook-Martin and Viladrich 2009; cf. Bloemraad 2011: 279). 11. The first moves toward communal voting rights for European citizens occurred in 1974, when the European Council created a working group on the special rights of European citizens. From then onward, the EU parliament pressed the European Commission to pursue the issue, publishing brochures on it every year. In 1985, the Pietro Adonnino ad hoc Committee submitted a report to the Milan European Council recommending the introduction of voting rights at the local level. In November 1985, the European parliament asked the European Commission to make a concrete proposal, which materialized as a proposal in October 1989—Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Voting Rights for Community Nationals in Local Elections in Their Member State of Residence, presented by the European Commission pursuant to Article 149.2(d) of the EEC Treaty. COM (89) 524. The Maastricht Treaty included it, defining it as the core of Union citizenship. Finally, the European Directive 94/ 80/EG of December 19, 1994, clarified particularities of “the exercise of active and passive voting rights at the communal elections for EU citizens in a country of which they do not have the citizenship.” The enfranchisement of EU citizens at the municipal level in other EU member countries has not led to convergence on voting rights for third-country nationals, despite directives that call for granting them rights “as near as possible to those enjoyed by the EU citizens” (see Halleskov 2005). The EU does push denizen enfranchisement forward by financing conferences of civil society and academics that join forces to raise debates in countries that have not enfranchised denizens. The common frames are the disparities between countries that have enfranchised denizens and the “laggards,” as well as the arbitrariness of deemphasizing national belonging to develop a European citizenship but with the nationality distinction versus those born with the third-country nationality. One such example was the conference organized in June 2015 in Prato, Italy, to conclude “Let’s Participate,” an awareness campaign of civil society organizations across several laggard countries that over some years coordinated mock election exercises in which foreign residents participated symbolically, parallel to local elections. 12. European Parliament, Report on the Communication from the Commission on Immigration, Integration, and Employment, A5–0445/2003, 1.12.2003, Motion for a European Parliament Resolution, point 32. 13. Opinion on immigration in the EU and integration policies: cooperation between regional and local governments and civil society organizations, SOC/219, 13.9.2006, point 6.18. 14. Furthermore, in 2003, the European Commission stated that “naturalization is a strategy which can help to promote integration and which member states should consider when granting residence to immigrants and refugees” (EC, Communication on immigration, integration and employment, COM (2003) 336 final, 3.6.2003, 30). This constitutes a position on an issue that in certain member states is the dividing line between parties: naturalization as a means of integration, not as its end. 15. Negative cases regarding denizen enfranchisement are Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, and Suriname.

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Notes to Pages 63–66 255 16. This happened only a year after a Public Referendum Law had made room for their participation in plebiscites (chumint’up’yo), citizen petitions (chuminsosong), and recall elections (chuminsohwan). The legal basis for these participation rights is to be found in paragraphs 12 and 13, section 2 of the Law on Regional Self-administration and paragraph 3, section 2 of the Law on Recall Elections. 17. South Korean legislators found a way to technically restrict the enfranchisement of noncitizens to a few thousand and to exclude most resident migrants who may have resided in South Korea under schemes other than the F-5 visa (Mosler and Pedroza 2016). This is a permanent resident visa, generally reserved for some categories of ethnic migrants who have resided for a long period in South Korea (the ethnic Chinese) without becoming citizens, and otherwise attainable only for highly trained, economic migrants with a familial relation to a South Korean national. 18. Configurational analyses correct serious deficiencies of case studies by letting us know what each case represents. At the same time, they require case knowledge because the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) research questions do not inquire into net effects of variables across all cases, but rather into the contexts and kind of cases linked to outcomes in question. 19. Preferential citizenship access for co-ethnics through naturalization constitutes but one among many possible aspects of citizenship regulations that may be driven by ethnonational conceptions of state membership (Dumbrava 2015), but it is the most salient one. In this case, it refers to a privileged access to nationality through naturalization rules that waive the resident requirements partly or entirely by virtue of belonging to an ethno-national community beyond the territory, determined by ancestry and circumstances of birth. Controlling for this in addition to jus sanguinis is important in order to let go of the simplistic determination of more jus sanguinis–based rules as ethno-nationalist, and the more jus soli rules as civic or liberal. To acquire nationality by descent from a national does not mean to acquire it from a particular ethnicity. How much ethno-nationalist a citizenship regime is can only be considered in connection with many other citizenship regulations and particularly with the restrictions of access to citizenship to immigrants where jus soli is nonexistent and naturalization does not allow access (Vink and Baubo¨ck 2013). 20. In my recent work together with Pau Palop (2018) on the stages of emigrant enfranchisement across Latin American countries (to extend voting rights to citizens residing abroad) we study the legal mechanisms that explain delays in the stages of more general processes of enfranchisement. 21. Without Latvia, the solution would be even simpler: Debates on denizen enfranchisement are universal where naturalization rules are also equal for all (i.e., no preferential processes and rules exist for particular groups). It would make sense to exclude Latvia considering its sui generis context, even within the Baltic, where the geographic and historical context to pass denizen enfranchisement points to rationales of compliance with international pressure rather than arguments for democratic legitimacy arising from a self-diagnosis. Latvia is a negative case despite the very high proportion of denizens (19.7 percent third-country nationals; 19.5 percent foreign born, mostly Russians) and despite the huge pressure received from the EU to enfranchise denizens. To answer to EU pressure, Latvia created the infamous category of “non-citizen” (the closest there is in reality to the analytical category of denizenship),

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256 Notes to Pages 66–78 which grants all social and civil rights but no political electoral rights. Given the territorial concentration of Russian nationals in the capital, it is feared that even local voting rights would amount to giving them control of Latvian politics. Latvian governments have changed their nationality laws to incentivize the Russian population to naturalize—in contrast to Estonian governments, which, despite denizen franchise and changes that should “encourage” noncitizens to naturalize, stick to restrictive naturalization rules. 22. Since the elaboration of the database for this analysis, some countries have changed their laws. However, time constraints have obliged me to set a limit for collecting data on this research. The analysis in this chapter is based on data through 2015. 23. Dichotomous coding requires hard decisions, especially concerning cases that are borderline “easy” or “difficult.” The coding scheme and the coded cases are in the Table A.4 in the Appendix. 24. See a cross-tabulation of cases with naturalization ease (easy or not) and discussion of denizen franchise (discussed or not) in Table A.4 in the Appendix. 25. “Explanations on ‘The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)’ and Its Related Documents,” Address of Ji Pengfei to the Third Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on March 28, 1990, accessible through The Basic Law Website, www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/, accessed August 2015. 26. The Rohingya are a Muslim minority in predominantly Theravada-Buddhist Myanmar, who are treated as illegal migrants even though they have lived in Myanmar for generations. They are called “Bengalis” by authorities, since their own self-definition, Rohingya, is not recognized officially as either a minority group or a “race,” of which there is otherwise a clear number defined by the regime. The nationality law of Myanmar does not allow for the inclusion of the Rohingya in the polity, and there seems to be no desire to change this. In 2013, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar recommended an amendment of the Citizenship Act, but the government responded that it saw no reason to review this Act. Only an amendment of the current Myanmar citizenship law could improve the vulnerable status of the Rohingya, who currently reside in the Rakhine (Arakan) or in refugee camps in Bangladesh without citizenship. 27. Process tracing is sensitive to context, presuming that the sequence in which causes join one another may be important to the effects and that a cause does not necessarily have the same effect across all settings and thereby is fundamentally different from hypothetical deductive methods that rely on covariation (Kelle and Kluge 1999: 99). 28. According to Jeffrey Checkel (2005), process tracing is rightly placed to go beyond metatheoretical debates and toward empirical accounts embedded in interpretive-oriented analyses where both agents and structures matter. Process tracers are typically epistemologically plural: They aim to capture the interaction of agents and structures employing both positivist and postpositivist methodological lenses. 29. Judicial review describes the binding power of the courts to provide an authoritative interpretation of laws, including constitutional law, and to overturn executive or legislative actions that hold to be illegal or unconstitutional. In general, courts provide crucial limitations to government power to protect rights of citizens. They are supposed to correct the aberrations of democracy (see Tocqueville [1889] 2003: 287) 30. According to Tsebelis (2002), a veto player is an individual or a collective actor whose agreement is required for a change in policy. The potential for policy change varies inversely

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Notes to Pages 78–87 257 with the total number of veto players, their cohesiveness, and the ideological distance between them. Other factors are the duration of a government and the ideological difference between current and previous governments. See also O’Malley 2010; Hooghe and Deschouwer 2011. 31. For Apter (1958), a pioneer of political science, it was difficult to conceive of political decisions or policy without invoking the notion of choice, and it was difficult to deal with the theme of choice without coming to terms with the issue of norms and values. I do not think that one needs to divert to the difficult terrain of “values” or “ideas” to explain political decisions, when in democracies there are deliberative bodies whose purpose is to defend, argue, and justify decisions providing an immediate resource to analyze there. Yet, I do not take speech to be a proxy for ideas or values: I analyze speech as a final act. 32. For example, in one single paragraph, legal scholar Cristina Rodrı´guez (2010: 34) has alluded to democracies, nations, jurisdictions (in general), and societies as a site for enfranchisement. 33. Since I want to unveil the meanings and the use of particular arguments, I do not focus on word or metaphor analysis. I do observe terms, categories, and metaphors used during the debate, as the terms used to refer to newly-defined electorates are revealing of what is silenced and what is named when translating “transnational trends” or “national traditions” into policy. According to Maarten Hajer and David Laws, frames are neither entirely intentional nor tacit: They conceal as much as they reveal and they are powerful when they are empirically credible, consistent with experience, and ideationally central (2008: 256). This is why I neither freeze ideological positions and interests from different actors (i.e. separated from their arguments on denizen enfranchisement), nor do I assume a one-to-one match between ideological stances and endorsement of a policy. For the German case, I did try first to use word frequency analysis but found it to be useless without context. For instance, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) used the words democracy and equality as regularly as it did proponents of denizen enfranchisement, but with a different meaning (to emphasize equal duties and burdens, not rights). 34. A trade-off involved in methodological choices is generalization versus validity: While a most-similar design would be appropriate if my aim was to generalize, at the present level of theorizing on denizen enfranchisement I prefer to find a valid, rigorous way to develop theory (Strauss and Corbin 1991: 191). Textbook approaches to social sciences warn from selecting on the dependent variable. However, by exploring a wide range of variation across the property space and supplementing each case with systematic within-case comparisons, I focus on the anomalies for a theory, which can yield relevant findings (Rogowski 2004). 35. Of course, through party fractions or formal subunits, such as committees, there is a division of labor and specialization beyond the plenum as an arena of debate. 36. I keep clear of linguistic jargon (e.g., topoi) that makes references to schemes and models.

Chapter 3 1. Thanks to the 1971 Convention of Equality of Rights and Duties between Portuguese and Brazilians, Brazilians who reside legally in Portugal for more than five years can exercise political rights at local, regional, and legislative elections (not presidential) and may also run for office at the local level, so long as they are not forbidden to do so in Brazil (Law-Decree 126/72). To avoid situations of inequality, the exercise of these rights in Portugal means their suspension in Brazil. Lusophone-country nationals, in the terms of Article 15, n. 3 of the

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258 Notes to Pages 87–90 constitution may be conferred rights that are not conferred to other foreigners, so long as the attribution is made through international convention and based on reciprocity. Active electoral capacity in local authorities is conferred after two years of legal residence; passive electoral capacity is conferred after four years. All other foreigners only have active and passive electoral capacity for local authority elections, in conditions of reciprocity and so long as they live in national territory for more than three years, to vote; and more than five, to run for office. European citizens in conditions of reciprocity may vote and be elected as deputies for the European parliament. Thus, Article 15 of the constitution, on foreigners, stateless persons, European citizens reads: 1. Foreigners and stateless persons who reside in Portugal shall enjoy the same rights and be subject to the same duties as Portuguese citizens. 2. Political rights, the exercise of public offices not predominantly technical in nature, and the rights that this Constitution and the law reserve exclusively to Portuguese citizens shall be exempted from the provisions of the previous paragraph. 3. With the exceptions of appointment to the offices of President of the Republic, President of the Assembly of the Republic, Prime Minister and President of any of the supreme courts, and of service in the armed forces and the diplomatic corps, in accordance with the law and subject to reciprocity, such rights as are not otherwise granted to foreigners shall apply to citizens of Portuguese-speaking states who reside permanently in Portugal. 4. Subject to reciprocity, the law may grant foreigners who reside in Portugal the right to vote for and stand for election in local councils. 5. Subject to reciprocity, the law may also grant citizens of European Union Member States who reside in Portugal the right to vote for and stand for election as Members of the European Parliament. All quotations of the constitution are taken from the English version of the Portuguese constitution published on the site of the Assembleia da Repu´blica (www.parlamento.pt). All translations from Portuguese are mine, as are all emphases in quotations. It is important to note that the Constitutional Reform of 1992 had already made room for denizen enfranchisement: That is, it contemplated the possibility of enfranchising resident migrants on the basis of reciprocity, but for this to become applicable, an ordinary electoral law had to be passed by the parliament. 2. I consulted the archives of one of the most-read daily newspapers of national reach: Dia´rio de Noticias. 3. Cf. Constituic¸a˜o, Arts. 119, 169, and 278. Polls in 1978 and 1984 found that the Portuguese saw parliament as less important than the president, the prime minister, or the cabinet. Yet, after the first bumpy decade of democratic rule, the Portuguese came to value their parliament as the most important institution for the preservation of the political system (Leston-Bandeira 2002). 4. For the classification of party positions, I rely on Antonio Costa Pinto (1998). Initially, the radicalized environment of the revolution promotes party self-definitions that exaggerated their ideological distances to dissociate themselves from the Estado Novo, in which many party leaders had participated. Tellingly, the party most to the right chose to call itself Centro Democra´tico Social; center-right parties (PP and CDS) called themselves social-democratic, while the social-democratic, the Partido Socialista, presented itself as radical left.

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Notes to Pages 90–98 259 5. The local government is considered constitutive of democracy and citizenship in Portugal and consists of 308 municipalities elected by popular, secret, direct suffrage. They administer their own property and finances and have competencies over economic development, territorial order, provision of health care, culture, environment and sport, elementary schools, and social housing. Yet they have no lawmaking powers (Constituic¸a˜o . . . , Art. 239). Consulted on August 3, 2009, in www.forumcidadania.org/autarquias/local.htm. 6. The main destinations of Portuguese emigrants from 1950 until 1988 were France, Brazil, the United States, Germany, and Canada. The rest of the world received fewer emigrants than Brazil (SECP, Boletim Anual, 1988). 7. Over 150,000 troops deployed in Africa to fight colonial wars for this empire (by then, still including Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sa˜o Tome´ e Prı´ncipe) and devoured nearly half of Portugal’s gross national product (GNP). 8. Since the mid-1990s, Ukrainians have become the third-largest group of foreigners, immediately after Cape Verdeans and Brazilians. 9. Source: Servic¸o de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras 2001. 10. In 1998, the Immigration Affairs Consultative Council (Conselho Consultivo para os Assuntos da Imigrac¸a˜o, COCAI) was created as a consultative council to assist ACIME OIM 2007: 199). 11. This turn was all but permanent. After winning the elections in March 2002, the PSD formed a coalition with the CDS and announced in its government program (Programa do XV Governo Constitucional) a new migration policy that went back to the pre-1995 state of affairs, expelling migrants from the territory, restricting the concept of resident, and limiting entries per year. It is important to note, though, that even through restrictive phases a more favorable treatment of Lusophone migrants was maintained. 12. According to its drafter, Anto´nio Almeida Santos, the Portuguese “owed to this decree that the faculty of preserving Portuguese nationality by residents from the former colonies was conceived in terms sufficiently restrictive to prevent ourselves from being obliged to embrace who knows how many persons” (2006: 283). 13. The last reform to the Nationality Law (Organic Law 2/2006) strengthened jus soli and made it easier for migrants of second and third generation to naturalize, but jus sanguinis is still the dominant principle. 14. Furthermore, Table A.7 in the Appendix lists all the passed legislation on migration and nationality issues mentioned in this chapter. 15. The number of registered voters resident outside of Portugal in 1985 was 190,818. In 2006, they were 207,005 of 9,462,645 (Comissa˜o Nacional de Eleic¸o˜es, www.cne.pt, consulted in January 2010). 16. Article 7 states: “Portugal acknowledges the abolition of imperialism, colonialism and any other form of aggression, dominion and exploitation in the relations between peoples . . . Portugal keeps its privileged links of friendship and cooperation with Lusophone countries” (Constituic¸ao). 17. A Treaty of Friendship on equal rights was signed in 2000 to strengthen the LusoBrazilian citizenship status created by the 1971 Convention. Furthermore, the 2001 constitutional review reworded Article 15 (3) conferring broad citizenship rights on citizens of Lusophone states with permanent residence in Portugal, which are not conferred on other foreigners, as long as reciprocity is met—another privilege of CPLP membership.

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260 Notes to Pages 98–113 18. Table A.8 in the Appendix presents the number of parliament seats each party held. 19. These are the “Electoral Census Law” and the “Electoral Law of Local Autarchies.” 20. I follow the nomenclature used in the Portuguese parliament’s archive. DAR means Dia´rio da Assambleia da Repu´blica (Diaries of the Parliament) followed by the number of the series (I or II). The Arabic number refers to the catalog / the Roman number refers to the legislature / the last Arabic number refers to the session. The date is mostly redundant. The last number is the page number of the document. 21. European Council Directive 94/80/CE of December 19, 1994, would apply Article 8-B, 1 of the European Union Treaty. Consulted on eur-lex.europa.eu on August 12, 2009. 22. In January 1996, the PSD bloc had presented a law project with this objective, but it was not even discussed. External voting rights had been granted already in 1976 for legislative elections. Following Portugal’s entry into the European Community in 1986, external voting rights were granted for the national lists for the European parliament. In the constitutional revision of 1997, the PS and the PSD agreed to allow Portuguese citizens abroad to vote in presidential elections and for national referenda also. Marina Costa Lobo suggests that the PSD’s constant promotion of presidential voting rights for emigrants is no wonder given that, since 1976, the PSD had shown that it had a consistent majority of voters for legislative elections among external voters (2007: 83). 23. In the general public, the absence of immigration as a topic was generalized well into the 1990s. Intellectuals in Portugal were not as outspoken as in other countries regarding denizen enfranchisement. Until the 1990s, Portuguese emigrants and their communities abroad had been dominant as both an academic and a political issue. Not even in the media was migration but an intermittent topic dependent on certain events, such as political campaigns or incidents that attract media coverage and, where immigrants play a central role (Figueiredo 2005). Academic literature on migrant participation in Portugal can only be found in the 1990s (see the excellent bibliography compiled by Albuquerque, Ferreira, and Viegas 2000). Even migrants who rose to power did so through institutional channels opened and negotiated by political parties, mainly the PS. 24. In the Appendix, Table A.9 summarizes the four comparative steps of the analysis in a schematic form and Figure A.1 illustrates the position of party groups regarding the law projects and proposals mentioned in the analysis, indicating their size in the Portuguese parliament. 25. This proposal was made initially in 2007 by Deputy Feliciano Barreiras Duarte (of the PSD) in a meeting of the minister for presidential issues, Pedro Silva Pereira, with the Ethics Commission of the parliament. The PS government agreed to include this issue in the revision of 2009 and Pedro Pereira is reported to have said, “Today, the reciprocity clause is not an efficient instrument anymore. There are good motives to move forward in that realm in the next constitutional revision.” The Left bloc, through parliamentarian Luı´s Fazenda, is reported to have proposed going even further, to an extraordinary constitutional revision that would give “full political rights” to foreign residents in Portugal (Susete, December 13 2007; Lusa/fim, March 1, 2009).

Chapter 4 ¨ mter des Bun1. Own calculation on the basis of information provided by Statistische A ¨ mter des des und der La¨nder (2011: 23). Current data is available per La¨nder (Statistische A Bundes und der La¨nder 2018).

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Notes to Pages 115–117 261 2. To my knowledge, Thu¨ringen never made a proposal. Regarding the citation of documents, I use two abbreviations: Drs refers to Drucksache, which includes a range of parliamentary communications from proposals mostly, to inquiries to the government, and to committee reports. The abbreviation PlPt refers to Plenarprotokoll: stenographic versions of debates in plenum. The numbers that follow correspond to the official classification in the archival system of German parliaments: The first is the number of the legislature and the second is the bookkeeping folio. The abbreviation para.—used only in the in-text citations— refers to the number of the paragraph in a document. Paragraph numbers are not given in the original documents, but the reference to them is clear if the particular document is transformed with text recognition from an image file (as they are kept in online documentation systems) into a text file. The name of the state (La¨nder) is excluded to avoid redundancy. 3. I used MAXQDA, software for qualitative data analysis, 1989–2010, VERBI Software. Consult. Sozialforschung GmbH, Berlin-Marburg-Amo¨neburg, Germany. See Figure A.2 in the Appendix showing the number and type of documents analyzed. 4. In the Appendix, Figure A.4 shows the disaggregated code tree used to order arguments. 5. The numbers rose to an average of 3 percent between 1990 and 2000, but then declined to 1.7 percent for the next decade. Between 2010 and 2014, the average was 1.6 percent. These rates are calculated taking into account the population of foreigners within the whole group of foreigners of each nationality who meet the legal residence requirements for naturalization (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). With regard to undocumented migration, any estimation in Germany so far has been evaluated by expert Harald Lederer (1999) to be plagued with methodological problems. In 2004 Friedrich Heckmann (2004) estimated it to be below 100,000, having grown steeply between 1990 and 1994 and stabilized later. 6. Later bilateral agreements were made with Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia and Morocco in 1965, and Yugoslavia in 1968. 7. By 1985, it had risen to 5 million, and by 1994 to 7 million (Bundesamt fu¨r Migration und Flu¨chtlinge, Ausla¨nderzahlen 2009. Nu¨rnberg: 18). Before 1990, the data correspond to the Federal Republic of Germany, hereafter FRG. 8. “The FRG is not a country of immigration [but] a country in which foreigners reside for various lengths of time before they decide to return to their home country” (Vorschla¨ge der Bund-La¨nder-Kommission zur Fortentwicklung einer Umfassenden Konzeption der Ausla¨nder-bescha¨ftigungspolitik, February 1977, quoted in Katzenstein 1987). 9. In addition to the immediate entitlement to citizenship for Aussiedler and Vertriebene, the Basic Law contains a “restoration of citizenship” clause (Art. 116, para. 2) that applies to individuals who can prove that they or their ancestors were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds between 1933 and 1945. 10. Before 1824, nationality was not a requirement to exercise political rights, but rather property, tax payments, long-term settlement, or marriage with a native. The first codifications of rules for citizenship that required the quality of being German in order to exercise voting rights appeared in the 1830s (Niedermayer-Krauß 1989: 8–11). 11. For example, Caritas Germany since 1971, Diakonisches Werk der EKD and the Evangelischen Akademie Arnoldshain since 1981, Arbeiterwohlfart Konferenz and the Deutschergewekschaftsbund since 1986.

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262 Notes to Pages 117–120 12. See Birkenheimer 1976; Zuleeg 1981; Sievering and Dziuk 1981; Thra¨nhardt 1981; Franz 1981; Haug 1985; Kroes 1985; Lo¨wisch 1985; Secen 1985; Rittstieg 1988; NiedermayerKrauß 1989; Weigl 1992; Isensee and Schmidt-Jortzig 1993; Barley 1999; Hailbronner 2006; Green 2012. 13. “Stand und Weiterentwicklung der Integration der ausla¨ndischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”; Memorandum des Beauftragten der Bundesregierung Heinz Kuhn, Bonn, 1979. 14. Examples are Birkenheimer 1976; Go¨tze 1985; Lo¨wisch 1985; and Zuleeg 1981. Dietrich Thra¨nhardt (1981) wrote papers intended for the general public on the self-interested reasons why Germans should support extending the vote to foreigners: (1) more effective conflict resolution through formal means, democratic reforms, and self-government; (2) improvement of controls of all administration in all areas (though making differentiation more difficult); (3) strengthening of negotiation skills of citizens; (4) prevention of violent encounters and reduction of criminality; and (5) successful development of stability and equality. In later publications, he focused on the idea of solving the democratic deficit and preventing a society divided into two political classes. Other authors proposed models for societal action: panel discussions, signing lists, street festivals, and mock voting to combat the idea that they would create their parties (see Kroes 1985; Kempen 1989). In 1989, as debates were ongoing, opinions of jurists offered more options than either easing naturalization or extending voting rights, such as the possibility of a “small naturalization” that would endow denizens with the same rights, but of lower reach, or the possibility of a double naturalization with a latent and an active citizenship, disentangling nationality from the active exercise of citizen rights (Niedermayer-Krauß 1989: 231). Moreover, the fifty-third Lawyers Conference exhorted the La¨nder to push the idea that with the increasing length of stay on the German territory, foreigners came to share with German nationals a “legal fate” (Ausla¨nderrechtliche Abteilung des 53. Deutschen Juristentages 1980, Sitzungsbericht L: 289). The parliamentary debates collapsed all these justifications to only some interpretations. 15. In the Appendix, Table A.12 presents the results of public opinion polls conducted in 1988–1989 on the extension of voting rights at the communal level. 16. Experts on political participation of migrants in Germany have argued that this assumption is groundless when confronted with evidence based on rigorous samples of the migrant population (Wu¨st 2003). Most polls over time concurred that two-thirds of Turkish migrants preferred leftist parties (SPD, Greens, PDS), but samples that include migrants with other origins correct the aggregate picture. A working hypothesis so far is that, aside from foreigner and worker cleavages, a fair share of Turkish migrants are compatible with the values defended by the CDU. Until now, there is only evidence that in regions that have historically voted conservative the proportion of Turkish migrants is also higher than elsewhere in Germany, which is not the same thing. All in all, the most reliable proxy for voting preferences of migrants has been the voting behavior of the naturalized, which suggests that there would be very little difference regarding the voting patterns that applied to German citizens. However, when sorted by country of origin, naturalized citizens coming from the former Soviet Union and post-communist space (mainly Romania and Poland) would overwhelmingly vote for the CDU (Wu¨st 2009; Bauer 2008), which suggests why the CDU has have protected the privileged citizenship access for Aussiedler and Vertriebene. 17. See data on proportions of foreigners in the biggest German cities and La¨nder with the highest proportions of denizens in Tables A.10 and A.11 in the Appendix.

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Notes to Pages 120–126 263 18. There was legitimate uncertainty about this, as only in 1984 a ruling from the higher court of Lu¨neburg had referred to denizen enfranchisement as constitutional. 19. Bezirksversammlungen were created in 1949 and reformed in 1978 as councils for the popular representation and local administration for each of the seven districts of Hamburg. 20. The parliamentary process requires two readings for any law and three if a qualified majority is not obtained for constitutional reforms. If the law receives a majority after two readings, it is revised and published. The second reading should prevent rushed laws, give opportunities for consultations with organizations and authorities, and introduce changes. 21. For the SPD: Prof. Dr. Brun-Otto Bryde, Universita¨t Gießen; Prof. Dr. Helmut Rittstieg, Universita¨t Hamburg; and Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Schneider, Universita¨t Hannover. For the FDP: Hans Rau, Hamburg, and Prof. Dr. Hans Meyer, Universita¨t Frankfurt. For the CDU: Prof. Dr. Peter Badura, Universita¨t Mu¨nchen; Prof. Ulrich Karpen, Universita¨t Hamburg; and Prof. Hans-Ju¨rgen Papier, Universita¨t Bielefeld. For the Greens: Herr Michael Bo¨ttcher, Hamburg, and Dr. Fritz Franz, Coburg. 22. An expert called by the SPD denounced that party’s idleness out of fear of disapproval among its voters, despite having declared denizen enfranchisement a goal since its 1975 congress. 23. Bericht des Rechtsausschusses u¨ber die Drucksache 13/1680: Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Wahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder zu den Bezirksversammlungen Drs 13/3115 paras. 148, 453–458. 24. FDP and SPD committee members were as bold in recommending a discussion in plenum against the CDU’s will, as they were against Greens’ proposals to make enfranchisement less restrictive (Drs 13/3235). 25. This can be easily compared through the text portraits of hearings and the debates included in Table A.13 in the Appendix. Text portraits are MAXQDA-generated images that reflect the proportions of coded segments in every text, providing transparency for the reader to apprehend visually how a text was coded. 26. “What you are doing here is scho¨nhubern” (para. 197). The term was a play on words, alluding to “babbling around” and to a Republikaner leader, Franz Scho¨nhuber. 27. See Figure A.5 in the Appendix, illustrating parties’ positions in all subnational debates along two main dimensions: the assessment of how well migrants were integrated and the general support for denizen enfranchisement along the debate. 28. No poll was quoted by the CDU. The first polls on the issue were done as the Hamburg debate was ending (see Table A.12 in the Appendix). 29. The debate on the appropriate categories had already started in the academic and civil society debates that preceded the parliamentary ones. The term “co-citizens” was even older; it had been used in the Kuhn Memorandum but had been criticized by leftist parties for conveying the misleading message that denizens already had citizen rights, even if it signaled an egalitarian movement away from guest workers. 30. The twenty-two Bremen Beira¨te have a unique status in Germany, being an administrative council directly elected by the citizens. Over time, they took the function of cityneighborhood councils with some elements of political self-government. 31. These arguments were the following: (1) one may not separate voting rights from nationality; (2) those who want to vote, must first naturalize; (3) the FRG should only grant voting rights to foreigners on the basis of reciprocity and through bilateral treaties; (4) if

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264 Notes to Pages 126–136 Germany grants voting rights to foreigners, then it should be only for nationals of the EC; (5) those who get voting rights must comply with military service first; (6) foreigners can already influence politics sufficiently through parties, trade unions, and associations; (7) the special foreign councils in many La¨nder suffice; (8) most foreigners are not interested in voting rights; and (9) communal voting rights are second-class rights that do not lead to integration (Dittbrenner 1986). Indeed, all of these arguments would be heard in the debates. 32. Zimmermann (CSU) was well known for his crusades against immigration since the early 1980s, which he presented as “measures of integration.” Portraying foreigners as a threat, in 1988 he attempted to introduce a foreigners’ law with a view to prevent the “permanent immigration” (meaning settlement). This attempt was leaked to the press and a broad coalition of actors organized against it. This shows that the end of the 1980s was a high season to talk about denizen enfranchisement and shows why it was important symbolically. The atmosphere was so crisp that Zimmermann’s successor, W. Scha¨uble, could only pass a new foreigners law (the Act of Foreigners of 1990) under the motto of “pragmatism” and “deideologization” to keep the issue out of partisan politics (Joppke 1999b: 82–85). This law allowed foreigners who had resided lawfully in the FRG for fifteen years to apply for naturalization under easier criteria and limited official discretion over it. It also qualified the denial of double nationality, allowing it in conditions of hardship or unreasonable burden. 33. As in Hamburg, this is mostly an administrative council, but its members must have franchise. 34. It is a little-known fact that the Popular Chamber (Volkskammer) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) changed its electoral laws on March 6, 1989, to give passive and active voting rights to its less than 85,000 foreigners at the communal level who had lived in the territory of the GDR for more than six months, a surprisingly generous law, only comparable to Ireland’s. Curiously, this occurred shortly after the controversy over the SchleswigHolstein law unleashed in the FRG. It is likely that the purpose of the law was to portray a foreign-friendly society in the GDR, in contrast to a ridden FRG (see Barley 1999: 41). Despite their low proportion of foreigners, 112 were elected to communes in the last communal elections of the GDR, which would go down in history as the most discredited. Also, the BVerfG’s hearings on denizen franchise occurred on the eve of the fall of the Berlin wall. The law entered the reunification constitutional negotiations (Gemeinsame Verfassungkommision) as part of the GDR legal baggage (Art. 22) with a residence requirement higher than the original (two years), but it was hardly mentioned, and the CDU was quick to make its rejection clear, while the SPD, Greens, PDS/Linke favored it, with parts of the FDP. In the Bundesrat Bremen noted that it could be beneficial to include a clause for the city-states, but when Hamburg clarified that their structure was different, the Bremen group lost leverage. 35. The Greens made their first ambitious proposal for denizen enfranchisement in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in 1984 (Drs 9/256) justifying it with regard to local facts—for instance, as a response to “the shameful and humiliating treatment of foreigners in BadenWu¨rttemberg in foreigner and migration offices” (para. 56). In 1986 and 1987, the Greens in Hessen proposed to enfranchise denizens, also drawing on local facts and highlighting what the local German population would gain (Drs 11/6323, Drs 12/836). Also in 1987, the Greens proposed denizen enfranchisement in Niedersachsen as part of a bigger democratization reform in a historical perspective, deeming denizen enfranchisement necessary to prevent the reconstitution of a fourth class of citizens without voting rights but with tax contributions

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Notes to Pages 136–140 265 that existed in Prussia. By the time the BVerfG rejected the reforms in Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg, Nordrhein-Westfalen was just formulating a proposal to enfranchise denizens after three years of residence in terms that linked “no-taxation-without-representation” to a class problem, echoing arguments introduced by the Greens in Rheinland-Pfalz. In 1989, the Greens in Bavaria made a proposal based on the argument of democratic deficit wording it in a language that was almost compatible with that of the CDU. 36. At the same time, twenty-five CDU faction members of the Bremen parliament requested a norm control from the State Court of Bremen, which decided in favor of the applicants that the Beiratsgesetz was incompatible with the Basic Law (Staatsgerichtshof der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, Entscheidung vom 8. Juli 1991, St 2/91). Thus, the Bremen reform was not addressed by the BVerfG ruling because the BVerfG can “respond” to requests of constitutionality checks only if no state court, administrative, or federal authority has declared it unconstitutional already. 37. The SPD had referred to the CDU as having a “herrenmenschen” mentality, conveying the idea of a racist mentality. The term was used during the Nazi regime to describe a superior race. 38. Later, in the EU-citizen enfranchisement debate in Schleswig-Holstein (PlPt 13/100), the SPD and SSW expressed that EU voting rights demonstrated that foreign citizens voting in the communes did not distort popular will or curtail popular sovereignty. The SSW did indeed question the legitimacy of the ruling: “It is so difficult for me to understand that the BVerfG says it is possible if the EU says so . . . It is unintelligible that an American living 25 years here cannot vote at the local level, but a Greek can. I deplore this ruling.” In SchleswigHolstein, where parties were most eloquent recalling previous attempts to enfranchise denizens, the extreme right was loudest. In 1995, a new extreme right party active only in communal politics, the Deutsche Liga fu¨r Volk und Heimat (German League for People and Fatherland), rejected enfranchising Europeans, arguing that it was “another building block of Eurosocialists to wipe out nations and peoples” (para. 184), and the DVU made a proposal to stop it (Drs 13/3088), arguing that “foreigners may do whatever they please with the laws in their countries, but in Germany only Germans decide” (PlPt 13/106, para. 226). 39. Evidence of that is a written question the CDU made to the Hamburg Senate in November 1990 (Drs 13/7060), inquiring why the topic of denizen enfranchisement was in the syllabi of summer schools on political education for resident foreigners. The senate replied that foreigners would be informed about voting rights in other countries and about the controversy around them in Germany (Drs 13/7092). 40. The European Directive 94/80/EG of December 19, 1994, on “the exercise of active and passive voting rights at the communal elections for European Union citizens in a country of which they do not have the citizenship” required a constitutional reform of Article 28 of the Basic Law and of several state constitutions. Most of the La¨nder-proposals to adapt their electoral laws were so streamlined administratively as to make no room for discussing other possible electorates. However, everywhere that left parties or governments took the initiative there were statements suggesting that this particular enfranchisement of European citizens should be but a first step toward the enfranchisement of all resident migrants. Parliaments were thus reminded of the political silence that the non-European residents had to endure, and conservatives were reminded of how wrong they had been in declaring a change of Article 28 constitutionally impossible. In turn, conservatives only brought up the issue in order to

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266 Notes to Pages 140–152 limit enfranchisement reforms where they could have gone formally further, as in Bremen. This case deserves some attention because it shows how little the CDU’s animosity toward letting third-country nationals vote had to do with judicial conservatism. Because of its citystate structure, Bremen did not differentiate local and state votes, so the introduction of only communal voting rights for EU citizens brought a dilemma: either to change the Bremen constitution to separate levels or to let EU citizens vote simultaneously for the state (and not only city-) parliament, just as German voters. The former option was defended by the CDU; the latter by the Greens. The debates quickly turned controversial. The application of the EU directive was accepted, although it was inconsistent with the Bremen structure, and the parliament passed the two contradictory proposals of the Greens and of the CDU, obliging them to negotiate. They reached an agreement to reform the constitution, introducing a special voting procedure that would distinguish city and state voting, including EU citizens in the first only (Drs 14/400, para. 27). In that case, the “conservatives” in a constitutional sense were the Greens, who impeded the reform, twice arguing that constitutional changes were only possible through a two-thirds majority (PlPt 14/24), and escalated their accusations against the CDU to hold a third debate (PlPt 14/15, para. 59), in which they were labeled “constitutional purists” by the CDU. Finally, even after the proposal passed (PlPt 14/25, para. 168; Gesetzblatt der Freien Hansestadt Bremen 1996 16.10.1996, N. 46.), the Greens argued it was discriminatory (Drs 14/419, para. 6). 41. The new proportion of the CDU in the Bundesrat after Roland Koch’s victory in Hessen gave them veto power over the SPD-Green proposal. The SPD had no choice but to find the support of the FDP and exclude double nationality. The proposal was approved in May 1999 and became law on January 1, 2000 (see Green 2005; Hansen and Koehler 2005; Howard 2008). 42. By the end of 2007, the average “stay” of foreigners in Germany was 17.7 years: 35 percent of all foreigners had lived more than 20 years in Germany and over 70 percent had lived more than eight years, accumulating the required period to request naturalization, after the change of the 2000 Nationality Law (BSA Ausla¨nderzahlen 2009). 43. Gemeinsam fu¨r Deutschland mit Mut und Menschlichkeit. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 11.11.2005, 119.

Chapter 5 1. In a larger scheme of epistemology, one could call this procedure abductive rather than inductive, since it develops theoretical insights from the findings of deviant cases that had not been satisfactorily explained by previous theories. Abductive conclusions do not aim to explain everything in a class of phenomena but, rather, the so-far unexplained parts of it better than the others (see Kelle and Kluge 1999: 23). 2. This echoes Marc M. Howard’s (2006) finding that the chances of liberalization of citizenship rules are higher where no mobilization of public opinion, especially organized by far-right groups, occurs. 3. The new law makes no distinctions, and any immigrant is eligible to apply for citizenship after six years of legal residence. This benefited the more than 100,000 Ukrainian workers who now constitute the second-largest immigrant community in a country of 10.2 million, after the roughly 120,000 Brazilians. Grandchildren of immigrants will have a right to Portuguese citizenship if one of their parents was born in Portugal, and the children of immigrants will have the same right even if no parent was born in Portugal, as long as one of the parents

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Notes to Pages 152–162 267 has been a legal resident for at least five years. The governing Socialist Party and the opposition Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party voted in favor. Only the extremes abstained: The Left Bloc because it had pressed for more flexible legislation and the Social Democratic Centre because it wanted more restrictions. Ethnic Germans have also slowly and quietly lost privileges of access to nationality over the last twenty years. 4. Howard (2008) also considered the BVerfG’s ruling a factor that contributed to the liberalization of citizenship laws in Germany. 5. Greens often hinted at frames of local citizenship but discarded them out of fear that the reform would be struck down by the doctrine of homogeneity of the demos (which happened anyway). 6. Jacobs (1999) offered an interesting hypothesis to explain why ethnic mobilization is seldom the path. For him, it is obvious that, in countries with a diverse migrant population, a potential suffragist struggle of denizens has to bridge several ethnic identities. 7. While studying how different actors portrayed denizen enfranchisement, I was searching not for their deeply held beliefs or intentions but for what they said: justifications, arguments, and rhetoric. These could be just words to legitimize a decision already negotiated in advance, but in a parliamentary debate, a word is a deed that is recorded to be used later. In line with my interpretive assumptions, my aim was to identify the ways in which politicians employed and dismissed topics and their frames, and to see how arguments related to one another. 8. See Hollifield (1992) and Weil (2001). Ethno-nationalist conceptions of citizenship are typically contrasted to civic or liberal conceptions of citizenship (Calhoun 1997; Kalicki 2009; Koning 2011; Mouritsen 2013; Shafir 1998). However, this dichotomy has problems theoretically and empirically (civic conceptions of citizenship can be quite restrictive and exclusive toward groups not necessarily conceived as nationally different but still considered different within the nation due to religion or skin color, as the works by Rogers Smith and Michael Ignatieff show). If at all, some argue that these should be considered ideal types that serve as an orientation to locate regimes along a continuum, as nearly all citizenship regimes contain a mix of rules that could be associated with both, to different degrees (Helbling 2010; Dumbrava 2015). To trace the origins of this dichotomy, see Schulman (2002). 9. In the cases studied here, no political faction dominated parliament, but, whereas in Germany, the different parties seldom attempted to attune their discourses, in Portugal an accommodating frame developed quite rapidly in successive attempts to gather the support from all parties. From a similar perspective, Jacobs (1998) used the discourse coalition theory of Hajer (2003) according to which the importance of a discourse is assessed by looking at the way in which the political actors orchestrate and coordinate discursive elements into a coherent narrative. 10. Writing shortly before the judgment of the BVerfG, scholar Jan Rath had concluded that the successful enfranchisements in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein had been a process led by political, rather than judicial considerations (1990: 142). 11. Riker’s central preoccupation seems helpful here because he too looked at how groups won with the skilled use of persuasion and setting up a situation through agenda control, strategic voting, or the introduction of new dimensions so that others wanted to join them or felt forced by circumstances to join them. Especially in cases where a group had a clear majority, Riker found out that the most frequent tactic attempted was the manipulation of dimensions to distort the equilibrium of a discussion (1986: 150–151).

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268 Notes to Pages 163–175 12. This is a common dilemma to academics using process-tracing (Checkel 2005) and also Schimmelfennig’s (2001) “rhetorical action” in the international relations discipline. 13. In the early 1980s, foreigners were protected legally with extensive civil and social rights but disempowered politically against rising xenophobia. The CDU/CSU argued that if family reunification were to happen, it should do so in the origin country (which should ring bells to very recent discussions in Germany) (see Joppke 1999: 70–80).

Chapter 6 1. Similarly, Koopmans et al. developed a theory in which political rights are part of what determines “institutional opportunities” (their independent variable), but they did not ask how these political rights came to be. Their goal was to explain different mobilization opportunities by collective actors (migrants or natives acting on behalf of migrants) through “institutional and discursive opportunity structures” (2008: 19). 2. Earnest references Jan Rath (1990) to support his finding about a broad partisan coalition and elite consensus supporting enfranchisement. However, nothing in Rath’s nuanced account suggests that the consensus was expected given any Dutch tradition of citizenship. On the contrary, he points out that the construction of this consensus was complicated and time-consuming. Rath’s only mention of a traditional influence is a precedent of foreigners’ participation in the early nineteenth century (1990: 137). 3. This does not mean that discussions were smooth. There were disagreements regarding the residence period (with leftist parties arguing to eliminate it or strongly reduce it) and the reform was criticized as contradictory for aiming to increase emancipation and integration on the one hand but demanding de facto integration on the other. 4. Migrant associations were undecided about whether they wanted to focus on this or on other “more pressing issues” such as the socioeconomic situation of migrants. Jacobs notes that politicians of Moluccan descent in the Netherlands were speakers in the debate, but they did not explicitly exploit their descent as the source of a special “migrant perspective.” 5. Germany amounted to a crucial case for Howard, too, “a case that shows the importance of focusing on the politics of citizenship” (2009: 126). However, he too stopped his analysis at the BVerfG ruling, considering it a domestic factor adding pressure for citizenship liberalization. 6. Until the very end, however, the Vlaams Blok organized a petition and claimed to have collected 50,000 signatures that opposed the extension of voting rights to denizens. 7. Earnest’s narrative about the limitations posed by consociational arrangements to immigrant political incorporation is fair to a degree, but it is unconvincing as to how changes that seemed structurally so difficult became at once suddenly possible, if that arrangement did not change at its core. The internal Flemish-francophone conflict did stall the issue for a long time: Flemish politicians stressed the demand of guaranteed political representation for the Flemish in Brussels and denounced the pro-denizen enfranchisement position of the francophone right-wing liberals as a strategy to potentially increase their electorate and weaken the Flemish side. Yet, it is Jacobs’s account that demonstrates this. 8. Critics of German citizenship law affirm that a change can only legitimately result from a wide consensus. Yet such a consensus rarely, if ever, has existed in German history. In Germany local governments enfranchised aliens before elites are able to reach a national-level consensus; such consensus takes a long time to develop. As Nathans shows, “Just as the boundaries of the German nation and the form of the German state were the subject of intense

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Notes to Pages 175–188 269 and irreconcilable differences, so citizenship and naturalization policies were continuously disputed. In these senses, recent debates follow a long tradition” (2004: 269). 9. In all fairness, Earnest’s prime concern was to test the competing “nationalist” and “transnationalist” bodies of research on the conditions that lead denizen franchise to emerge, and he found the first to be strongest. In his latest piece on the topic (2015), he still argues that that enduring differences in national practices prevail even as the overall trend of liberalization progresses, but exposes a more balanced view, arguing that although global human rights and transnational advocacy create pressures on democracies to give non-citizens political rights, each democratic society refracts these pressures through cultural understandings of citizenship, political institutions and contestation among societal actors (2015). The perspective that Jacobs and I share emphasizes domestic factors from the start, observing international ones only inasmuch as they entered the terrain of argumentations. In relation to other accounts which emphasized domestic factors—either institutional-design (Aleinikoff 2001; Joppke 1999, 2001) or cultural traditions (Brubaker 1989; Mouritsen 2012)—my approach is closer to dynamic accounts that consider collective action (e.g. Freeman 2004; Money 1997) and political competition (Hammar 1990). 10. The literature on parties’ behavior vis-a`-vis electoral reforms echoes this (Blais and Shugart 2008; Hooghe and Deschouwer 2011). 11. Odmalm and Bale (2015) corroborated this recently, showing that immigrant issues impose ideological pulls in different directions within parties, so mainstream parties try to bypass these tensions by ignoring them. 12. Vinocur 2015; see also www.thelocal.fr, 2015. 13. German scholars Faist (2001: 14) and Joppke (2001: 24) made similar critiques of studies on citizenship for using “traditions of citizenship” hypotheses as explanatory shortcuts with no need of test or demonstration, especially for Germany. 14. Habermas (1992) and Gosewinkel (2009) also contributed to the narrative of a particularly German understanding of citizenship based on ethno-cultural descent, by documenting how historically and legally citizens were gradually reduced to nationals (Staatsbu¨rger to Staatsangeho¨riger), in an ever more exclusive relationship between individual and state. 15. See Bumb 2015, “New Zealand—A Model for Luxembourg Foreigner Voting Rights?” 16. See Brianna Lee, “Poll Finds Democratic Support for Allowing Undocumented Immigrants to Vote,” ibtimes.com, May 29, 2005; and Tharoor, Kanishk. “Non-Citizens in New York City Could Soon Be Given the Right to Vote.” The Guardian, April 2, 2015, sec. US news. http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/02/new-york-city-non-citizens -local-elections. 17. As Kratochwil (2006) suggested, analytical accounts are more interesting when they are able to fit detailed contextual investigations on the past and present, making space for what is relatively fixed as well as for that which is relatively flexible.

Chapter 7 1. For a review of the instruments of international law that support the extension of voting rights to immigrants, see Soysal (1994) and Shaw (2007: 64ff.). 2. There is disagreement as to what kind of evidence could contradict the post-national hypotheses. To some, it is the fact that some democracies seem to ignore the democratic deficit of representation posed by denizenship (i.e., the existence of negative cases), since one

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270 Notes to Pages 188–203 would expect post-national influences to be felt in all democracies. To others, it is the restriction of denizen rights to the local level, since the post-national view would lead one to expect changes especially at the national level. In my view, however, the latter is not valid: The postnational account offered by Soysal is not conditioned on the adoption by nation-states and it quotes controversies at different levels—also the local level—as an example of how rights become justified on personhood, not on rights specifically related to a nation-state. 3. While, in theory, inclusion through naturalization does not necessarily presuppose or promote homogeneity or exclusivity, in practice, it often does when it requires applicants to renounce other nationalities or to pass integration courses and exams. 4. Baubo¨ck calms anxieties about residence-based regimes being able to topple a national liberal order arguing that, even in contemporary democracies where the ratio of denizens to citizens is high, making territory and institutions as a sufficient source for a locally-based collective identity only happens at the substate level, “nested” within a higher-level birthrightbased regime. 5. Also, citizenship detached from a national level would not necessarily be more democratic. For a long period after Latin American states gained their independence, citizens were considered concrete individuals belonging to a local community rather than members of the abstract nation. Membership was assessed through the category of neighborhood: Voters had to be recognized face-to-face as vecinos (neighbors) with a stake in the community (see Herzog 2007: 165; Przeworski 2009: 8). This practice left ample room for arbitrariness and discrimination. A recent parallel is found in naturalization procedures in Swiss municipalities, some of which allowed natives to vote on decisions to naturalize individual candidates until recently (Argast 2009: 519; Helbling 2010: 797). 6. A case like Canada, where easy naturalization and toleration of double nationality exists, appears to make denizen voting rights superfluous. That policy combination certainly aids in making identification with the nation easier and more open, but the will to increase democratic legitimacy in a polity might exist nevertheless: Letting denizens practice citizenship in a place without being nationals of that place aims less to contribute to policies that support national identification as to policies that contribute to democratic participation and representation. 7. Klusmeyer and Aleinikoff noted that denizen voting rights can familiarize noncitizens with the political culture and imbue them with a sense of belonging that can make the decision to naturalize more attractive (2002: 43). However, in the absence of a general toleration of dual nationality, it would still be taxing to expect immigrants to naturalize, as it would mean imposing a requirement in order to get the recognition and right to representation that, in my view, denizens already legitimately owe for their contribution to a society. Decisions to naturalize also imply important decisions about investments, mobility plans, and identity. Considering the dual nationality prohibition from origin countries, years ago in the United Kingdom, Lord Goldsmith proposed a solution: to abolish the permanent legal residence status and to push denizens to acquire citizenship, while allowing for an exceptional “associate citizenship” for denizens from countries that do not allow dual nationality (2007: 78). 8. Studies by Bratsberg et al. (2002) and Mazzolari (2009) for the United States; DeVoretz and Pvnenko (2004) for Canada; and Bevelander and Veenman (2008) for the Netherlands, echo this. 9. Liberal authors have proposed different options. Extending an idea first proposed by Hammar (1994: 196), Rubio-Marı´n (1997) argued that naturalization should be automatically

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Notes to Pages 203–224 271 and unconditionally conferred accepting multiple nationalities after a certain residence period. In different works, Baubo¨ck has instead promoted an accessible, optional naturalization primarily premised on residence and tolerance of double or multiple nationality as the option that best preserves the expressive value of a voluntary commitment to the legal and political institutions of a state. For him, even if material stakes of full-citizenship status were minor, its moral, symbolic stakes are considerable. With him, I think that giving denizens political rights at the local level helps them acquire the experience and recognition that make naturalization the expression of a reflected commitment. Rubio-Marı´n objects, suggesting that as long as national voting rights are kept tied to national citizenship, the decision will be instrumental, not expressive (cf. Owen 2011: 3–5, 16). But Baubo¨ck’s alternative does not posit that the naturalization will be only expressive. Moreover, as I argue here, because of the legal guarantees of a national-citizen status, naturalization retains instrumental value regardless of the level of extension of voting rights. This is an empirical conclusion that has little to do with our ability to dig out the intentions of migrants in getting citizenship, and it holds as long as the world is divided by borders, as long as passports keep defining which mobility doors are open, and as long as the national citizen status is the key to accessing not only voting rights but, in many cases, a range of professions and other life choices. 10. As former Seattle mayor Mike McGinn introduced it in his attempt to spark a local debate: “We are talking about police protection, crime, parks and schools” (Stuteville 2015).

Appendix 1. David Earnest (2003, 2005) and Marc Morje´ Howard (2002) are two exceptions that must be recognized for their efforts in comparing cases of denizen enfranchisement. With more modest methodological aims than Earnest, Howard (2006) constructed a Citizenship Integration Policy Index with a scale ranging from 0 (no voting rights) to 5 (national voting rights for all denizens), covering the most important distinctions: rights granted only by subnational governments (1), local voting rights on a discriminatory basis (2), national rights on a discriminatory basis (3), local nondiscriminatory voting rights (4). In my database, I have updated and corrected his information until 2009 (what in particular affects the coding of Belgium and Spain), added other countries and registered the stage reached in the process. 2. I conducted a cross-check for this coding with data of MIPEX.eu (for those countries that are included in it) by confirming that units I coded are over the median score of all countries according to MIPEX (44 points). However, because of inaccuracies in the MIPEX index regarding the dimension that interests me—political participation and electoral rights—my ultimate validation was to check constitutional documents of each country. A further requisite considered for coding is whether double nationality exists as a recognized option for naturalizing persons (i.e., not only at birth, and not as an exception). Its existence counts toward assigning a 1, but it is not enough to assign it if residence requirements are too high. This kind of codification is compatible with Marc Morje´ Howard’s Citizenship Integration Index with its three key dimensions: (1) jus soli allowed or not, (2) length of residence required for naturalization (5 years or less being liberal), and (3) dual citizenship tolerated or not (2006: 452). I subordinate double naturalization to the length of residence. Variance in acquisition of nationality is high. I give less importance to administrative conditions despite the fact that this may be a powerful determinant in the decision of migrants to naturalize or not. The reasons are two: First, it is very difficult to obtain reliable and standardized data on these issues for my sample without the resources to conduct a cross-country survey that is at

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272 Notes to Pages 224–231 least answered by many migrants and/or migrant organizations; second, these are usually offthe-record procedures that rarely hit the tables of decision makers as an issue to be dealt with. I am, after all, more interested in the spirit of the laws of naturalization, which usually is legible in the formal requisites. Still, the cross-check with the MIPEX index, which does include in its measurement an assessment of arbitrariness, allowed me to consider such a degree of discretion to an extent. 3. Cases of insufficient legislation for implementation or of annulation before implementation by a higher instance, allows some doubt that the whole process might have been a matter of gaining political votes without having a perspective that it is possible to apply the reform. We can hypothesize that these cases try to signal a half-hearted commitment not to protect political rights of denizens and to wait until more states react to the law, though there is the risk of a loss of reputation if the implementation is cynically ignored for a long time. 4. The cases that were effective, implemented reforms coincide with the cases of easy naturalization or equal naturalization for all (A  B). If we force a reduction of consistent solutions, we may recode the only contradictory combination that is negative in the row. The solution is consistent and covers 85 percent of the cases, which means that 85 percent of implemented enfranchisement cases have either easy naturalization rules or naturalization rules that are equal for all. For this outcome, the cases considered are a subset of E—that is, only those cases that passed enfranchisement reforms then organized them into implemented or dormant reforms. That is why Estonia and Greece, which are negative cases of enfranchisement reforms (they are both e) do not create a contradictory combination in this row. The raw coverage for A is 57 percent (57 percent of implemented cases have easy and equal rules of naturalization) and a unique coverage of 21 percent (21 percent of implemented cases are uniquely covered by easy naturalization). In turn, B has a raw coverage of 64 percent and a unique coverage of 28 percent—the overlap AB is 36 percent of cases. To learn more about the remaining 25 percent, one should investigate a case of nonimplementation in detail, as was Spain for some ten years. 5. The only type that leads to particularistic franchise is aB, a combination of difficult naturalization with equal naturalization rules for all. But this solution does not cover a lot of reality. In fact, 70 percent of cases of universal denizen enfranchisement are not covered by it because they are distributed in the other three types. It is important to learn about the cases in types 2, 3, and 4 that ended up in a particularistic franchise; these include Belize, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

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REFERENCES

Primary Sources: Parliamentary Documents ´blica) Sources Used for Portugal (from the Archives of the Assembleia da Repu I follow the nomenclature used in the Portuguese parliament’s archive. DAR means Dia´rio da Assambleia da Repu´blica (Diaries of the Parliament) followed by the number of the series (I or II). The Arabic number refers to the catalogue; the Roman number refers to the legislature; the last Arabic number refers to the session. The date is mostly redundant. The last number is the page number where the document appears. Comissao especialidade. 1999–02–06. DAR II Se´rie A No. 35/VII/4 p. 942. Decreto da Assambleia 165/VI. 1994–07–09. DAR II Se´rie A No. 52/VI/3 p. 904. Decreto-Lei N. 3-A/96, 1996–01–26. DAR I Se´ria A No. 22 pp.142 a 142(2). Discussa˜o da Lei 25/94. 1994–02–24. DAR II Se´rie A No. 24/VI/3 pp. 376–378. Discussa˜o da Lei 37/VII. 1996–06–25. DAR I Se´rie A No. 86/VII/1 pp. 2891–2914. Discussa˜o da proposta 205/VII. 1999–02–19. DAR II Se´rie A No. 38/VII/4 pp. 1014–1033. Discussa˜o generalidade da proposta 47/VII. 1996–01–26. DAR I Se´rie A No. 31/VII/1 pp. 1348–1353. Discussa˜o na generalidade. 1991–04–14. DAR I Se´rie A No. 57/VI/3 pp. 498–499. Discussa˜o na generalidade. 1996–06–26. DAR I Se´rie A No. 86/VII/1 pp. 2973–3030. Discussa˜o na revisa˜o constitucional. 1997–07–24. DAR I Se´rie A No. 100/VI/2 pp. 3679–3709. Lei 2098/59. 1959–07–29. Dia´rio do Governo Se´rie I No. 172/1959 pp. 869–874. Lei 25/1994. 1994–08–19. DAR I Se´rie A No. 191 pp. 4822–4822. Lei 50/96. 1996–05–16. DAR I Se´rie A No. 114/1996 pp. 1144–1150. Lei 13/1999. 1999–03–22. DAR I Se´rie A No. 68 pp. 1594–1603. Programa do XII Governo Constitucional. 1992–21–01. DAR II Se´rie A No. 13S6/VI/1 pp. 305–352. Programa do XIII Governo Constitucional. 1995–11–08. DAR II Se´rie A No. 2/VII/1 pp. 1409–1454. Programa Do XV Governo Constitucional. 2002. Lisboa. https://www.portugal.gov.pt/media/ 464051/GC15.pdf Projecto de Lei 3/VI. 1992–01–14. DAR II Se´rie A No. 12/VI/12 p. 263. Projecto de Lei 47/VII. 1995–12–21. DAR II Se´rie A No. 11/VII/1 pp. 206–227. Projecto de Lei 510/IX. 2004–10–22. DAR II Se´rie A No. 15/IX/3 p. 5–9. Proposta de Lei 37/VII. 1996–05–31. DAR II Se´rie A No. 52/VII/1 pp. 862–865.

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274 References Proposta de Lei 37/VII. 1996–06–31. DAR II Se´rie A No. 45/VII/1 p. 862. Proposta de Lei 594/VII. 1998–12–19. DAR II Se´rie A No. 25/VII/4 pp. 619–620. Proposta de Lei 205/VII. 1999–01–15. DAR I Se´rie A No. 35/VII/4 pp. 942–961. Relato´rio Commisso˜es. 1996–01–27. DAR II Se´rie A No. 29/VII/1 p. 305. Relato´rio da Commissa˜o de Assuntos Constitucionais, Dir. Liberd. e Garantı´as. 1999–01–14. DAR II Se´rie A No. 29/VII/4 pp. 798–799. Relato´rio da Commissa˜o de Assuntos Constitucionais, Dir. Liberd. e Garantı´as. 1996–05–29. DAR II Se´rie A No. 52/VII/1 p. 1014. Relato´rio da Commissa˜o sobre a Lei 25/94. 1994–06–21. DAR II Se´rie A No. 48/VI/3 pp. 854–855. Relato´rio das Comisso˜es de especialidade. 1999–01–14. DAR II Se´rie A No. 29/VII/4 pp. 798–799. Relato´rio da proposta 205/VII. 1999–02–06. DAR II Se´rie A No. 35/VII/4 pp. 942–946. Revisa˜o Constitucional 1992. 1992–10–15. DAR II Se´rie A No. 8-RC/VI/2 pp. 131–146. Revisa˜o Constitucional 1997. 1997–07–24. DAR II Se´rie A No. 100/VI/2 pp. 5130–5196. Texto da Comissa˜o. 1999–01–14. DAR II Se´rie No. 35/VII/4 pp. 492–462. Texto da Comissa˜o. 1999–02–06. DAR II Se´rie A No. 29/VII/4 pp. 942–996. Votac¸a˜o final global. 1996–07–13. DAR II Se´rie A No. 57/VII/1 pp. 1313–1318. Votac¸a˜o na plena´ria. 1996–01–26. DAR I Se´rie A No. 31/VII/1 pp.874–890. Votac¸a˜o na plena´ria. 1996–06–25. DAR I Se´rie No. 88/VII/1 p. 2973. Votac¸a˜o na plena´ria. 1999–02–05. DAR I Se´rie No. 44/VII/4 p. 1645. Sources Used for German Cases: Hamburg (from the Hamburgische Bu ¨rgerschaft and the Parlamentsspiegel.de) For this and the subsections of the reference list on Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen, and Berlin, the nomenclature should be read as follows: Drs refers to Drucksache, which includes a range of parliamentary communications from proposals mostly, to inquiries to the government, and to committee reports. The abbreviation PlPt refers to Plenarprotokoll: stenographic versions of debates in plenum. The numbers that follow correspond to the official classification in the archival system of German La¨nder parliaments. Bu¨rgerschaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, Drs 13/3115. 12.08.89. “Fragenkatalog fu¨r die Sachversta¨ndigen Anho¨rung des Rechtsausschusses am 1 November 1988 u¨ber ein Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Wahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder zu den Bezirksversammlungen,” (Bericht des Rechtsausschusses). Drs 13/168. 27.07.87. Antrag der Gru¨ne: Gesetz u¨ber die Wahl zu den Bezirksversammlungen. Drs 13/1012. 20.01.88. Schriftliche Kleine Anfrage der CDU: Wahrnehmung demokratischer Rechte durch Ausla¨nder. Drs 13/1749. 01.06.88. Schriftliche Kleine Anfrage des SPD u¨ber den Beschluß des Senats zur Einfu¨hrung des kommunalen Wahlrechts in Hamburg zu den Bezirksversammlungen. Drs 13/2245. 24.08.88. Antrag der Gru¨nen Befreiung von der 5-Prozent-Klausel fu¨r “Ausla¨nder”-Wa¨hlervereinigungen. Drs 9/2431. 10.07.1980. Grundsatzentscheidungen des Senats und Sofortmaßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Lage ausla¨ndischer Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien in Hamburg, Hamburger Bu¨rgerschaft. Mitteilungen des Senats an die Bu¨rgerschaft.

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References 275 Drs 13/3115. 12.01.89. Bericht des RechstAuschußes Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Wahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder zu den Bezirksversammlungen (Senatsvorlage). Drs 13/3116. 12.01.89. Bericht des RechtsAuschußes u¨ber Drs 13/2245. Drucksache 13/2245. 24.08.1988. Mitteilungen des Senats an die Bu¨rgerschaft: Antrag zu Drucksache 13/1680 Antrag zur “Befreiung von der 5-Prozent-Klausel fu¨r Ausla¨nder¨ NE/GAL). Wa¨hlervereinigungen” (GRU Drs 13/3160. 20.01.89. Bericht des RechtsAuschußes: fu¨r die Situation und die Rechte der Ausla¨nder; u¨ber Drs 13/1680 und 13/2245. ¨ nderung des Gesetzes u¨ber die Wahl zur HamburDrs 13/3224. 01.02.89. Antrag des SPD A gischen Bu¨rgerschaft. Drs 13/3235. 01.02.89. Antrag der Gru¨nen: Einfu¨hrung des Wahlrechts fu¨r “Ausla¨nder (innen)” zu den Bezirksversammlungen. Drs 13/5620. 1.03.90. Antrag CDU: Aufhebung der Vorschriften zur Einfu¨hrung des Wahlrechtes fu¨r Ausla¨nder zu den Bezirksversammlungen. Drs 13/7060. 27.11.90. Schriftliche Kleine Anfrage der CDU und Antwort des Senats Bildungsurlaubsveranstaltungen der Volkshochschule “Kommunales Wahlrecht und Ausla¨nderpolitik” fu¨r Ausla¨nder. Drs 13/7092. 04.12.90. Schriftliche Kleine Anfrage der CDU: Kosten fu¨r die Vorbereitung der Wahlen zu den Bezirksversammlungen. Mitteilung des Senats. 06.06.88 u¨ber die Drs 13/1680. PlPt 13/7. 20.09.87. Debatte des Antrags Drs 13/168. PlPt 13/28. 22.06.88. Debatte u¨ber Drs 13/3224. PlPt 13/37. 10.11.88. Debatte u¨ber die Drs 13/2245. PlPt 13/45. 01.02.89. Erste Debatte u¨ber Drs 13/3235 und Drs 13/3224. PlPt 13/46. 15.02.89. Zweite Debatte u¨ber 13/3235 und 13/3224. PlPt 13/5580. 25.04.90. Debatte u¨ber Drs 13/5620. PlPt 13/89. 07.11.90. Debatte u¨ber das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Sources Used for the Case of Schleswig-Holstein (from Parlamentsspiegel.de) Drs 12/73. 04.09.1987. Antrag. Schaffung von Verfassungsrechtlichen Voraussetzungen fu¨r das kommunale Wahlrecht fu¨r Ausla¨nder. ¨ nderung des Gemeinde und Kreiswahlgesetzes. Drs 12/72. 18.10.1988. Gesetzentwurf zur A Drs 12/74. 25.10.1988. Antrag. Einfu¨hrung des Kommunales Ausla¨nderwahlrecht. Drs 12/194. 02.02.1989. Bericht und Beschlußempfehlung des Innen- und Rechtsausschuß zu 12/72. Drs 12/1143. 22.11.1990. Entschließung zum Tagesordnungspunkt: Kommunales Ausla¨nderwahlrecht-Konsequenzen aus dem Urteil des BverfG. Drs 12/1157. 27.11.1990. Antrag. Entschließung zum Tagesordnungspunkt: Kommunales Wahlrecht. Drs 13/2975. 06.09.1995. Gesetzentwurf des Landesregierung: EU Kreiswahlreform. Drs 13/3138. 23.11.1995. Beschlußempfehlung und Bericht u¨ber 13/2975. Drs 13/3346. 08.02.1996. Ausla¨nder Wahlrecht stoppen. Drs 14/2867. 05.04.2000. Kunstprojekt im no¨rdlichen Lichthof des Reichstagsgeba¨udes von Hans Haacke “Der Be-vo¨lkerung.” Drs 17/937. 05.10.2010. Einrichtung eines kommunalen Wahlrechts auch fu¨r Nicht-EUBu¨rger -Schleswig-Holstein (SPD).

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276 References Drs 18/748. 17.04.2013. Kommunales Wahlrecht auch fu¨r Nicht-EU Bu¨rgerinnen (SPD, Gru¨nen, SSW). Drs 18/729. 24.04.2013. Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r alle Nichtdeutschen einfu¨hren (Piraten, SPD, Gru¨nen, SSW). ¨ nderung des Gemeinde-und Kreiswahlgesetzes Gesetz 819/1989. 21.02.1989. Gesetz zur A Wahlberechtig und Ausla¨ndische die am Wahltag angeho¨rige der Staaten Da¨nemark, Niederlande, Norwegen, Schweden, Schweiz und seit 5 Jahre in Geltungsbereich des Grundgesetz sich aufhalten, eine Aufenthaltserlaubnis besitzen oder keine bedu¨rfen. PlPt 12/2. 28.06.1988. Ministerpra¨sident stellt Regierungsprogram vor. PlPt 12/9. 08.11.1988. Debatte u¨ber Drs 12/72, 12/73, und 12/74. PlPt 12/17. 14.02.1989. Debatte kommt zu Ende. PlPt 12/61. 18.09.1990. Konsequenzen von der BVerfG ziehen. PlPt 13/100. 27.09.1995. Debatte u¨ber EU regel-Umsetzung. PlPt 13/106. 06.12.1995. Wahl gegen fraktionsloser Antrag 13/3088 and Zweite Lesung des ¨ nderung Wahlrechtlicher Vorschriften. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur A PlPt 18/59. 16.05.2014. Landtagsbeschlu¨sse vom 26. April 2013 zum Kommunalwahlrecht fu¨r Nicht-EU-Bu¨rgerinnen und -Bu¨rger Drs 18/729. Sources Used for the Case of Bremen (from the Parlamentsspiegel.de) ¨ nderungsgesetz 1985. 17.12.1985. Gesetzes zur A ¨ nderung des Ortsgesetzes u¨ber BremGBl.—A Beira¨te und Ortsa¨mter im Gebiet der Stadtgemeinde Bremen (Bremer Bu¨rgerschaft). ¨ nderung des BremDrs 11/853. 23.02.1987. Antrag der Fraktion der Gru¨nen. Gesetz zur A ischen Wahlgesetzes (Wahlrecht fu¨r Ausla¨ndische Bu¨rger). Drs 12/289. 16.09.1988. Landtag. Antrag (Entschließung) des Abgeordneten Altermann ablehnt Einfu¨rung eines Wahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder an den Wahlen zu den Ortsbeiraten. Drs 12/452. 14.02.1989. Verbesserung Soziale Betreuung Aula¨nder, mehr humane Ausla¨nderpolitik, Ausla¨nder Wahlrecht, “Solidaritat mit Ausla¨ndern und Asylbewerber.” Drs 12/516. 19.04.1989. Antrag. Asyl verscha¨rfen, Flu¨chtlingdruck differenzieren zwischen Ausla¨nder, Asylbewerber und Aussiedler, neue differenzierte Ausla¨nderpolitik fu¨r jede Gruppe. Drs 14/74. 18.10.1995. Antrag Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Kommunalrecht fu¨r Unionsbu¨rger. Drs 14/78. 23.10.1995. 1 Lesung des Antrags 14/74: Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Kommunalwhalrechts fu¨r Unionsburger. Drs 14/294. 09.05.1996. Mitteilungen Senats (EU) Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinien 94/ 80 EG. Drs 14/400. 12.08.1996. Bericht zu DRS 14/78 und 14/294 nichtssta¨ndigenausschusses gema¨ß Art. 125 der Landesverfassung. Drs 14/419. 28.08.1996. Pru¨fung des Gesetzentwurfes zum Kommunalwahlrecht durch die EU Kommission. Drs 18/214. 24.01.2012. Das Wahlrecht erweitern (SPD, Gru¨nen). Drs 18/731. 16.01.2013. Bericht und Antrag des nichtsta¨ndigen Ausschusses Ausweitung des Wahlrechts. Geseztblatt 46. 16.10.1996. Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 94/80/EG. Gesetzblatt 46. 08.11.1996. Gesetz u¨ber die Einzelheiten der Ausu¨bung des Aktiven und passiven Wahlrechts bei den Kommunalwahlen fu¨r Unionsbu¨rger mit Wohnsitz in einem Mitgliederstaat, dessen Staatsangeho¨rigkeit sie nicht besitzen.

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References 277 PlPt 11/76. 11.02.1987. Debatte u¨ber Drs 11/853. PlPt 12/27. 02.11.1988. Debatte u¨ber Drs 12/289. Antrag des Angeordneten Altermann (CDU). PlPt 12/41. 11.05.1989. Asyldiskussion: Grenze von Belastbarkeit. PlPt 14/8. 09.11.1995. Landtagwahl fu¨r Unionsbu¨rger. PlPt 14/15. 20.03.1996. 1 Lesung Drs 14/294 (EU). PlPt 14/22. 13.06.1996. 1 Lesung Drs 14/294 and 14/8. PlPt 14/24. 29.08.1996. 2 Lesung Drs 14/78, Bericht, Umsetzung, Pru¨fung des Gesetzentwurf durch die EU Kommission. PlPt 14/25. 25.09.1996. 3 Lesung. PlPt 18/34. 24.01.2013. Erste Lesung Drs 18/731. St 1/13. 24.03.2014. Staatsgerichtshof der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, “Eine Ausweitung des Wahlrechts zur Bremischen Bu¨rgerschaft (Landtag) auf Unionsbu¨rgerinnen und Unionsbu¨rger und eine Ausweitung des Rechts zur Wahl der Beira¨te auf Angeho¨rige von Drittstaaten widersprechen der Bremischen Landesverfassung.” Sources Used for the Case of Berlin (from the Parlamentsspiegel.de) ¨ nderung des Landwahlgesetzes. Drs 10/465. 16.01.1986. Gesetz u¨ber A ¨ nderung des Drs 10/488. 24.01.1986. Antrag der Fraktion der AL u¨ber Gesetz u¨ber A Landeswahlgesetzes. Drs 10/489. 24.01.1986. Antrag Gesetza¨nderung des Bezirkversammlungsgesetz. ¨ nderung der Verfassung von Berlin “WahlDrs 10/1677. 04.09.1987. Antrag Gesetz zur A berechtigen deutschen -und Ausla¨nder” erga¨nzen. ¨ nderung des Bezirkverwaltunggesetzes. Drs 10/1668. 04.09.1987. Antrag Gesetz zur A ¨ nderung der Verfassung von Drs 10/1677 Antrag der Fraktion der SPD u¨ber (21.) Gesetz zur A Berlin. ¨ nderung der Verfassung von Berlin. Drs 10/2183. 29.04.1988. Antrag Gesetz zur A Drs 10/2525. 21.10.1988. Beschlußempfehlung des Rechtauschusses zum Antrag des SPD Drs 10/1677. Drs 10/2526. 21.10.1988. Beschlußempfehlung des Ausschusses fu¨r Inneres zum Antrag Drs 10/1668 der AL. Drs 11/370. 06.10.1989. Antrag u¨ber Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Wahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder zu den Bezirkverordnetenversammlungen. Drs 11/395. 17.10.1989. Antrag u¨ber Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Wahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder zu den Bezirkverordnetenversammlungen mit Begru¨ndung. Drs 11/982. 05.07.1990. Beschlußempfehlung des Ausschusses fu¨r Inneres, Sicherheit und Ordnung zum Antrag Drs 11/370 der AL. Drs 11/1187. 26.09.1990. Beschlußempfehlung des Rechtausschusses zum Antrag der AL Drs 11/370 und 11/1982. Drs 11/1332. 12.11.1990. Antrag u¨ber Aufhebung des Wahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder zu den Bezirksversammlungen. Drs 11/1350. 22.11.1990. Annahme einer Entschließung u¨ber Kommunales Ausla¨nderwahlrecht gegenu¨ber BVerfG Entscheidung. Drs 12/403. 05.06.1991. Antrag u¨ber Berliner Bundestagsinitiative zur Neudefinition des Staatsbu¨rgerbegriffes im Grundgesetz.

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278 References Drs 12/1496. 25.06.1991. Beschlußempfehlung des Rechtausschusses zum Antrag des PDRS u¨ber Berliner Bundesinitiative zur Neudefinition des Staatsbu¨rgerbegriffes im Grundgesetz. ¨ nderung des Drs 12/5499. 19.12.1994. Vorlage -zur Beschlußfassung u¨ber fu¨nftes Gesetz zur A Landeswahlgesetzes. ¨ nerung der VerDrs 12/5498. 26.04.1995. Vorlage -zur Beschlußfassung u¨ber 29 Gesetz zur A fassung von Berlin. ¨ ndeDrs 12/5650. 07.06.1995. Beschlußempfehlung des Rechtausschusses u¨ber 5 Gesetz zur A rung des Landeswahlgesetzes. ¨ ndeDrs 12/5651. 07.06.1995. Beschlußenpfehlung des Rechtausschusses u¨ber 5 Gesetz zur A rung des Landeswahlgesetzes. Drs 13/1924. 14.08.1997. Antrag u¨ber Bundesratinitiative zum Kommunalrecht fu¨r Migranten. Drs 16/0676. 26.06.2007. Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Nicht-EU-Bu¨rgerinnen und Bu¨rger (SPD und Linke). ¨ nderung der Verfassung von Berlin (Wahlrecht fu¨r Drs 16/3860. 19.02.2011. Gesetz zur A Drittstaatsangeho¨rige zu Bezirksverordnetenversammlungen) (Gru¨nen). Drs 17/0043. 30.11.2011. Kommunlaes Wahlrecht fir Nicht-EU-Bu¨rgerinnen und Bu¨rger (Gru¨nen). ¨ nderung der Verfassung von Berlin: EU-Bu¨rger. Gesetzblatt Heftnr. 30. 14.06.1995 A 3227 A ¨ nderungdes Landeswahlgesetzes (EU). Gesetzblatt Hetfnr. 33. 28.06.1995. Fu¨nftes Gesetz zur A PlPt 10/19. 16.01.1986. Debatte u¨ber Große Anfrage der AL u¨ber Einwanderungspolitik in Berlin und Antra¨ge Drs 10/488 und Drs 10/489. PlPt 10/58. 10.09.1987. Debatte u¨ber Drs 10/1528 (FDP) and Drs 10/1667 (AL Landeswahlgesetzes). PlPt. 10/58. 10.09.1987. 1 Lesung des Antrags 10/1667, and 10/1668. PlPt 10/74. 05.05.1988. 1 Lesung SPD Antrag zur Verfassunga¨nderung Drs 10/2183. PlPt 10/84. 10.11.1988. 2 Lesung 10/2525, 10/2526, und 10/2527. PlPt 11/16. 26.10.1989. 1 Lesung des Antrags 11/395 (SPD) and 11/370 (AL). PlPt 11/39. 30.08.1990. 2 Lesung des Antrages der AL u¨ber Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Wahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder 11/370. PlPt 11/48. 22.11.1990. Debatte u¨ber Drs 11/1350. PlPt 11/42. 27.11.1990. Dritte Lesung Drs 11/370. PlPt 12/85. 05.01.1995. Beschluß u¨ber Drs 12/5498 (Rechtauschuss). PlPt 12/85. 11.05.1995. Debatte u¨ber Drs 12/5498 und 12/5499. PlPt 12/86. 08.06.1995. Debatte u¨ber Drs 12/5651. PlPt 13/34. 30.10.1997. Debatte u¨ber Drs13/2034. Proposals on Denizen Enfranchisement in Other La¨nder This list presents first the rest of proposals analyzed from other La¨nder, showing the abbreviation of the state, date, name of proposal, and author. The abbreviations of the La¨nder are as follows: BR: Brandenburg; BW: Baden-Wu¨rttemberg; BY: Bavaria; HE: Hessen; MV: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; NI: Niedersachsen; NW: Nordrhein-Westfalen; RP: RheinlandPfalz; SH: Schleswig-Holstein; SL: Saarland; SN: Sachsen; and ST: Sachsen-Anhalt. ¨ nderung des Brandenburgischen KomBR. 26.09.1995. Drs 2/1517 Gesetzentwurf des zur A munalwahlgesetzes zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 94/80/EG. Landesregierung.

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References 279 BR. 26.09.1999. Umsetzung der Richtlinie. Landesregierung. BR. 10.12.2008. Große Anfrage an die Landesregierung zur Integrationspolitik des Landes Brandenburg. Die Linke. BW. 23.06.1984. Drs 9/256 Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Kommunalwahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. Gru¨nen. ¨ nderung der Verfassung des Landes BadenBW. 27.01.1995. Drs 11/5326 Gesetz zur A Wu¨rttemberg. CDU-CSU. ¨ nderung des Gemeindewahlgesetzes. BY. 19.01.1989. Drs 11/9645 Gesetzentwurf zur A Gru¨nen. ¨ nderung der Verfassung BY. 18.10.1989. Drs 11/13438 Gesetzentwurf Sechstes Gesetz zur A des Freistaates Bayern. Gru¨nen. ¨ nderung des Gesetzes u¨ber die Wahl der Gemeindera¨te, Bu¨rgerBY. 14.02.1995. Drs 13/469 A meister, Kreistag und Landesra¨te. Gru¨nen. ¨ nderung des Gemeinde- und LandkreiswahlgeBY. 28.03.1995. Sen-Drs 13/195 Gesetz zur A setzes. Staatsregierung. ¨ nderung des Gemeinde und LandeskreisBY. 29.01.1998. Drs 13/10085 Gesetzentwurf zur A wahlgesetz. Gru¨nen. BY. 04.02.98 Drs 13/10227 Dringlichkeitsantrag Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Drittstaatangeho¨rige. Gru¨nen. BY. 27.10.2010. Drs 16/6123 Demokratische Weiterentwicklung des Kommunalwahlrechts. Gru¨nen. BY. 10.02.2015. Drs 17/5204 Gesetzentwurf eines Bayerischen Partizipations und Integrations¨ nderung von Rechtsvorschriften zur Verbesserung der Partizipation geseztes und zur A und Integration von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund. SPD. HE. 08.07.1986. Drs 11/6323 Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Kommunalwahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder. Gru¨nen. HE. 20.10.1987. Drs 12/836 Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Kommunalwahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder. Gru¨nen. HE. 18.04.1989. Drs 12/4374 Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Kommunalen Wahlrechts fu¨r EGBu¨rger und Bu¨rgerinnen. SPD. HE. 19.05.1995. Drs 14/93 Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung fu¨r ein Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung. des Kommunalwahlrechts fu¨r Unionsbu¨rgerinnen und Unionsbu¨rger. Landesregierung. ¨ nderung wahlrechtlicher MV. 10.08.1995. Drs 2/674 Gesetzentwurf eines Ersten Gesetzes zur A Vorschriften. Landesregierung. MV. 17.01.2001. Drs 3/1816 Antrag: Bundesinitiative fu¨r Kommunalwahlrecht fu¨r Nicht-EUBu¨rgerinnen mit sta¨ndigen Wohnsitz im Gebiet der Bundesrepublik. PDRS und SPD. MV. 01.11.2007. Drs 5/991 Antrag Entschließung “Ja zu einem kommunalen Wahlrecht fu¨r Drittstaatenangeho¨rige in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” Linke. MV. 14.11.2007. PlPt 5/28 Debatte zu Drs 5/991. MV. 09.04.2009. Drs 5/2407 Kleine Anfrage Kommunalwahlrecht fu¨r Migrantinnen und Migranten. Linke. MV. 26.05.2010. Drs 5/3477 Kein Kommunalwahlrecht fu¨r Ausla¨nder—verfassungswidrigen Bestrebungen von Sozialdemokraten, Gru¨nen und Linken entgegentreten! NPD. ¨ nderung des Wahlgesetzes. Gru¨nen. NI. 08.09.1986. Gesetzentwurf zur A NI. 29.07.1995. Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des aktiven und passiven Wahlrecht bei den Kommunalwahlen fu¨r nichtdeutsche Staatsbu¨rger von Mitgliederstaaten der EU. Ministerpra¨sident.

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280 References NI. 10.02.2015. Entschließung: Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Drittstaatsangeho¨rige einfu¨hren. SPD und Gru¨nen. NI. 10.02.2015. Drs 17/2885 Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Drittstaatsangeho¨rige einfu¨hren. SPD und Gru¨nen. NI. 10.03.2015. Drs 17/3119 Einfu¨hrung des Ausla¨nderwahlrechts fu¨r Drittstaatsangeho¨rige bei Kommunalwahlen, Chance zur Mitgestaltung des Lebensumfeld fu¨r Menschen mit einem mindestens fu¨nfja¨hrigen rechtma¨ßigen Aufenthalts in Deutschland. FDP. NI. 10.03.2015. Drs 17/3119 Entschließung, Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Drittstaatsangeho¨rige einfu¨hren. FDP. ¨ nderung des Gesetzes u¨ber Kommunalwahlen im NW. 17.10.1990. Drs 11/535 Gesetz zur A Lande Nordrhein-Westfalen (Kommunalwahlgesetz fu¨r Ausla¨nderInnen). Gru¨nen. NW. 18.09.1995. Drs 12/175 Gesetz zur Einfu¨hrung des Kommunalrechtes fu¨r Ausla¨nder. Landesregierung. NW. 11.06.2013. Drs 16/3244 Kommunales Wahlrecht auch fu¨r Nicht-EU-Bu¨rgerinnen und Bu¨rger einfuhren. Piraten. RP. 30.11.1987. Drs 11/573 Gesetzentwurf Einfu¨hrung des Kommunalwahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder. Gru¨nen. ¨ nderung des SL. 30.08.1995. Drs 11/397 Gesetzentwurf der Regierung des Saarlandes zur A Kommunalwahlrechtes. Regierung. SL. 14.08.2008. Drs 13/2006 Antrag: Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Drittstaatangeho¨rige Einfu¨hren. Gru¨nen und unabha¨ngige Abgeordnete. SL. 20.08.2008. Drs 13/2017 Antrag: Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Drittstaatangeho¨rige Einfu¨hren. Barbara Spaniol (fraktionslos). SL. 14.08.2008. Drs 13/2006 Kommunales Wahlrecht auch fu¨r Ausla¨nderinnen und Ausla¨nder aus Drittstaaten! Gru¨nen. SL. 20.08.2008. Drs 13/2017 Antrag Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Drittstaatsangeho¨rige Einfu¨hren. Barbara Spanyol, fraktionslos. SN. 02.06.1995. Drs 2/1168 Gesetzentwurf zur Einfu¨hrung des aktiven und passiven Wahlrechts fu¨r Burger der EU im Freistaat Sachsen. SPD. SN. 14.06.1995. Drs 2/1248 Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 94/80 EG. CDU. ST. 27.04.1985. Drs 2/869 Gesetzentwurf zur Einfu¨hrung des Aktiven und Passiven Wahlrechtes bei Kommunalwahlen fu¨r ausla¨ndische Bu¨rgerinnen und Burger. PDRS. ST. 26.05.1995. Drs 2/981 Gesetzentwurf u¨ber das Kommunalwahlrecht fu¨r nichtdeutsche Unionsbu¨rger. Landesregierung. ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes mit dem ST. 18.06.2008. Drs 5/1323 Bundesratsinitiative zur A Ziel der Einfu¨hrung des kommunalen Wahlrechts fu¨r alle hier lebenden Ausla¨nderinnen und Ausla¨nder. Linke. Sources on Federal Proposals Used for the Case of Germany (from http://www .bundestag.de/dokumente/suche) This list includes the documents analyzed from the Upper and Lower Houses in Germany: the Bundesrat and Bundestag, respectively. Bundesrat Drs 69/92. 29.01.1992. Gesetzesantrag der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einfu¨hrung des passiven Wahlrechts fu¨r Ausla¨nder bei den Sozialversicherungswahlen.

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References 281 Bundesrat Drs 515/97. 09.07.1997. Gesetzesantrag der La¨nder Brandenburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Saarland, Sachsen-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein fu¨r eines ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes. Gesetzes zur A ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes. Bundesrat Drs 45/99. 26.01.99. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur A Bundesrat Drs 623/07. 05.09.2007. Gesetzantrag des Landes Rheinland-Pfalz. ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes. Bundesrat Drs 13/9338, 03.12.97. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur A Bundesrat Drs 142/10. 12.03.2010. Gesetzantrag Berlin und Bremen: Entwurf eines Gesetzes ¨ nderung des Staatsangeho¨rigkeitsgesetzes. zur A Bundesrat PlPt 17/868. 26.03.2010. Debatte um die Optionsregelung abzuschaffen. Bundestag Drs 11/1974. 09.03.1988. Antrag der Fraktion des SPD Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Ausla¨nder. Bundestag Drs 11/4462. 03.05.1989. Gesetzentwurf der Gru¨nen Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur ¨ nderung des Bundeswahlgesetzes. A Bundestag Drs 12/5127. 15.06.1993. Gesetzentwurf der Gruppe der PDRS/Linke Liste Entwurf ¨ nderung des Artikels 38 des Grundgesetzes. eines Gesetzes zur A Bundestag Drs 12/5128. 15.06.1993. Gesetzentwurf Linke und PDRS Entwurf eines Zwo¨lften ¨ nderung des Bundeswahlgesetzes. Gesetzes zur A Bundestag Drs 12/5131. 15.06.1993. Gesetzentwurf der Gruppe der PDRS/Linke Entwurf eines ¨ nderung des Europawahlgesetzes. Zweiten Gesetzes zur A ¨ ndeBundestag Drs 13/3519. 17.01.1996. Gesetzentwurf der PDRS Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur A rung des Artikels 38 des Grundgesetzes. Bundestag Drs 13/3520. 17.01.1996. Gesetzentwurf der PDRS Entwurf eines Dreizehnten ¨ nderung des Bundeswahlgesetzes. Gesetzes zur A Bundestag Drs 13/3521. 17.01.1996. Gesetzentwurf der PDRS fu¨r einen Vierten Gesetzes zur ¨ nderung des Europawahlgesetzes. A ¨ NDNIS/DIE GRU ¨ NEN Entwurf Bundestag Drs 13/9301. 26.11.1997 Gesetzentwurf der BU ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes (Einfu¨hrung des kommunalen Wahleines Gesetzes zur A rechts fu¨r Ausla¨nderinnen und Ausla¨nder). Bundestag Drs 16/11815. 24.06.2009. Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Sevim Dagdelen, Wolfgang Neskovic, Ulla Jelpke, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Bundestag Drs 16/4361. 21.02.2007. Kleine Anfrage (Linke) Umsetzung des Pru¨fauftrages zur Einfu¨hrung des kommunalen Wahlrechts fu¨r Drittstaatenangeho¨rige. Bundestag, Bundestag Drs 16/5904. 03.07.2007. Antrag der LINKE Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Drittstaatenangeho¨rige einfu¨hren. ¨ NDNIS 90/DIE GRU ¨ NEN Bundestag Drs 16/6628. 10.10.2007. Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion BU ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes (Kommunales Ausla¨nderEntwurf eines Gesetzes zur A wahlrecht). Bundestag A-DRs 16(4)459. 22.09.2008. Anho¨rung des Innenausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages, “Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Ausla¨nder.” Bundestag Drs 16/11815. 28.01.2009. Große Anfrage der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Staatsangeho¨rigkeitsrecht und Einbu¨rgerungspraxis als Maßstab der Integrationspolitik. Bundestag Drs 16/13033. 14.05.2009. Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Innenausschusses ¨ NDNIS 90/DIE GRU ¨ NEN. zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion BU Bundestag Drs 16/13165. 26.05.2009. Antrag der Abgeordneten der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Teilhabe ermo¨glichen—Kommunales Wahlrecht einfu¨hren.

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282 References Bundestag Drs 16/13558. 24.06.2009. Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Bundestag Drs 17/1047. 16.03.2010. Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion der SPD Entwurf eines ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 28 Absatz 1). Gesetzes zur A Bundestag Drs 17/1146. 23.03.2010. Antrag der LINKE Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Drittstaatenangeho¨rige einfu¨hren. Bundestag Drs 17/1150. 23.03.2010. Gesetzentwurf der Gru¨nen Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 28 Absatz 1; Kommunales Ausla¨nderwahlrecht). A Bundestag Drs 17/1660. 07.05.2010. Kleine Anfrage der LINKE u¨ber die Umsetzung des Nationalen Aktionsplans gegen Rassismus. Bundestag Drs 17/1881. 28.05.2010. Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der LINKE u¨ber die Umsetzung des Nationalen Aktionsplans gegen Rassismus. ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes Bundestag Drs 17/5896. 25.05.2011. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur A und zur Reformierung des Wahlrechts (Die Linke). Bundestag 17/6712. 25.07.2011. Schriftliche Frage von Sevin Dagdelen (Die Linke) u¨ber Konsequenzen der Inkongruenz zwischen den Inhabern demokratischer politischer Rechte und den dauerhaft einer bestimmten staatlichen Herrschaft Unterworfenen. Bundestag Drs 17/7266. 04.10.2011. Kleine Anfrage zur Position der Integrationsbeauftragten des Bundes zu intergrationspolitischen Gesetzvorhaben (Gru¨nen). ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes Bundestag Drs 18/2088. 11.07.2014. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur A (Artikel 28 Absatz 1—Kommunales Ausla¨nderwahlrecht (Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen). ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes Bundestag Drs 18/3169. 12.11.2014. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur A und zur Einfu¨hrung eines allgemeinen Wahlrechts fu¨r alle Einwohnerinnen und Einwohner der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Die Linke). Bundestag PlPt 16/120. 24.10.2007. 120. Sitzung, Berlin. Bundestag PlPt 16/224. 28.05.2009. Antrag der LINKE: Teilhabe ermo¨glichen—Kommunales Wahlrecht einfu¨hren. Bundestag PlPt 17/34. 25.03.2010. Antrag der LINKE: Kommunales Wahlrecht fu¨r Drittstaatsangeho¨rige einfu¨hren. Bundestag PlPt 17/222. 21.02.2013. Zweite und dritte Beratung Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur ¨ nderung des Grundgesetzes (Art. 28 Abs. 1—Kommunales Ausla¨nderwahlrecht) Drs A 17/1150—Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Innenausschusses (4. Ausschuss) Drs 17/ 12424. Bundesverfassungsgericht Urt. v. 12.10.1989, Az.: 2 BvF 2/89, Einstweilige Anordnung; Kommunalwahlgesetz. Bundesverfassungsgericht Urt. v. 31.10.1990, Az.: 2 BvF 2, 6/89, BVerfGE 83, 37— Ausla¨nderwahlrecht I. BVerfGE. 12.10.1989. Voraussetzungen fu¨r den Erlaß einer Einstweiligen Anordnung zur Aussetzung des Vollzugs eines Kommunalwahlgesetzes, File 2 BvF 2/89. BVerfGE 04.04.1990. Wiederholung einstweiliger Anordnung: vorla¨ufige Außervollzugsetzung ¨ ndG SH 1989, File 2 BvF 2/89. des Ausla¨nderwahlrechts gem. KomWGA BVerfGE Urteil 31.10.1990. Rechtsprechung Ausla¨nderwahlrecht I, File Number 2 BvF 2, 6/ 89 (Schleswig-Holstein). Vol. 83, pp. 37–59. BVerfGE Urteil 31.10.1990. 2 Rechtsprechung Ausla¨nderwahlrecht II, File Number BvF 3/89 (Hamburg). Kommunales Ausla¨nderwahlrecht nicht verfassungsgema¨ß. Vol. 83, pp. 60–80.

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References 301 Stuteville, Sarah. 2015. “Should Seattle Give Noncitizens the Vote?” Seattle Globalist. September 18. http://www.seattleglobalist.com/2015/09/18/noncitizens-vote-elections-frus trated-voting-rights-seattle/41565. Stuurman, Siep. 2004. “Citizenship and Cultural Difference in France and the Netherlands.” In Lineages of European Citizenship: Rights, Belonging and Participation in Eleven NationStates, eds. Dario Castiglione, Emilio Santoro Castiglione, and Richard Bellamy, 167–185. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Susete, Francisco. n.d. “Revisa˜o Abre via a Voto Dos Imigrantes.” Dia´rio de Notı´cias. Taylor, Charles. 1994. “The Politics of Recognition.” In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, eds. Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann, 25–73. Princeton, N.J: Princeton Univ. Press. Teixeira, Ana, and Rosana Albuquerque. 2005. Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Portugal: Country Report Prepared for the European Research Project POLITIS. Oldenburg: POLITIS. Tharoor, Kanis. 2015. “Non-Citizens in New York City Could Soon Be Given the Right to Vote.” The Guardian, April 2, sec. US News. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/ apr/02/new-york-city-non-citizens-local-elections. Thra¨nhardt, Dietrich. 1981. “Das Eigeninteresse der Deutschen am Wahlrecht fu¨r Ausla¨nder.” In Integration ohne Partizipation? Ausla¨nderwahlrecht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen verfassungsrechtliche Mo¨glichkeit und politische Notwendigkeit, ed. Ulrich Sievering. Frankfurt a. M.: Haag und Herchen. ———. 2002. “Konflikt oder Konsens. Einwanderungs- und Integrationspolitik in Deutschland und den Niederlanden.” In Politische Kulturen im Vergleich: Beitra¨ge u¨ber die Niederlande und Deutschland seit 1945, ed. Frieso Wielenga, 17–44. Bonn: Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. ———. 2017. “Einbu¨rgerung im Einwanderungsland Deutschland: Analysen und Empfehlungen.” WISO Diskurs. FES. Tilly, Charles. 1996. Citizenship, Identity and Social History, 3rd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. ———. 2001. “Mechanisms in Political Processes.” Annual Review of Political Science 4: 21–41. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2003. Democracy in America [1889], ed. B. Frohnen. London: Regnery. Triadafilopoulos, Phil. 2012. “Non-Citizen Voting in Toronto: A Case of Too Little, Too Soon?” https://mowatcentre.ca/non-citizen-voting-in-toronto-a-case-of-too-little-too -soon/. Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Turner, Brian. 2000. “Liberal Citizenship and Cosmopoltian Virtue.” In Citizenship and Democracy in a Global Era, ed. Andrew Vandenberg. London: St. Martin’s Press. Uhlitz, Otto. 1986. “Deutsches Volk oder ‘Multikulturelle Gesellschaft.’ ” Recht und Politik 22(3): 143–152. United Nations. 2017. “International Migration Report 2017: Highlights.” ST/ESA/SER.A/ 404. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. http:// www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/ docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf.

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302 References Varsanyi, M. W. 2005. “The Rise and Fall (and Rise?) Of Non-Citizen Voting: Immigration and the Shifting Scales of Citizenship and Suffrage in the United States.” Space and Polity 9(2): 113–134. Vink, Maarten, and Rainer Baubo¨ck. 2013. “Citizenship Configurations: Analysing the Multiple Purposes of Citizenship Regimes in Europe.” Comparative European Politics 11(5): 621–648. Vink, Maarten Peter, Arjan Schakel, David Reichel, G. R. De Groot, and Ngo Chun Luk. 2015. “The International Diffusion of Expatriate Dual Citizenship.” 22nd International Conference of Europeanists, July 8–10, Paris. Vinocur, Nicholas. 2015. “French PM Scraps Pledge to Let Foreigners Vote.” www.politico.eu, November 4, http://www.politico.eu/article/french-pm-manuel-valls-scraps-pledge-to -let-foreigners-vote-elections/; see also www.thelocal.fr. Accessed November 18, 2015. Waldrauch, Harald. 2005. “Electoral Rights for Foreign Nationals: A Comparative Overview.” In Citizens, Non-Citizens and Voting Rights in Europe, ed. H. Walrauch. Univer. of Edinburgh. Wallace Goodman, S. (2010). “Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake? Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(5): 753–772. Walzer, Michael. 1997. Las esferas de la justicia: Una defensa del pluralismo y la igualdad. Me´xico D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Econo´mica. Warmenbol, Lien. 2008. “The Embedding of Populist Radical Right Parties in Local Networks: An Ethnographic Study at the Neighborhood Level in Antwerp, Belgium.” Paper presented at the Pluralism, Inclusion and Citizenship 4th Global Conference, October 30– November 2. Salzburg. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237669160, accessed August 2011. Weber, Max. 1998. “Citizenship in Ancient and Medieval Cities.” In The Citizenship Debates, ed. Gerson Shafir, 43–49. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota. Wedeen, Lisa. 2004. “Concepts and Commitments in the Study of Democracy.” In Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics, eds. Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud, 274–307. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Weigl, Michael. 1992. Verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte Eines Wahlrechts Fu¨r Ausla¨nder in Der Bundesrepublick Deutschland Unter Besonderer Bemerkshintergrund Des Kommunalrechts. Mu¨nchen: VVF. Weil, Patrick. 2001. “Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws.” In Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, ed. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ———. 2003. “Nationalities and Citizenships: The Lessons of the French Experience for Germany and Europe.” In Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe, ed. David Cesarani, 74–87. London: Routledge. Weiss, Y. (2002). “The Golem and Its Creator or How the Jewish Nation State Became Multiethnic.” In Challenging Ethnic Citizenship: German and Israeli Perspectives on Immigration, eds. D. Levy and Y. Weiss, 82–104. New York: Berghahn Books. Wilson, F. Lee. 2002. Concepts and Issues in Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Comparative Analysis, 2nd edition. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall. Wu¨ st, Andreas M. 2003. “Das Wahlverhalten eingebu¨ rgerter Personen in Deutschland.” APuZ, B52: 29–38.

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References 303 ———. 2009. Deutsch-Tu¨rken wu¨rden SPD wa¨hlen: With data from the Berliner Markforschung Institut Data 4U. DW-world.de. March 24. Yanow, Dvora. 2006. “Thinking Interpretively: Philosophical Presuppositions and the Human Sciences.” In Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn, eds. Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, 5–26. Armonk, N.Y: M. E. Sharpe. ———. 2009. Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis (Vol. 47). Reprint, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE. ———and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, eds. 2006. Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn. Armonk, N.Y: M. E. Sharpe. Young, Iris Marion. 1998. “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship.” In The Citizenship Debates, ed. Gerson Shafir. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota. Zincone, Giovanna, and Tiziano Caponio. 2004. The Multilevel Governance of Migration: State of the Art Report Cluster C9. IMISCOE General Conference Coimbra, December 3–4. Zuleeg, M. 1981. “Ausla¨nderwahlrecht ohne Verfassungsa¨nderung?” In Integration ohne Partizipation? Ausla¨nderwahlrecht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen verfassungsrechtliche Mo¨glichkeit und politische Notwendigkeit, ed. Ulrich Sievering. Frankfurt a. M.: Haag und Herchen.

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INDEX

Abbott, 42, 167, 193 Abizadeh, 204 academics, 1, 17, 26, 111, 118, 120–21, 141, 145, 159, 170–71, 176, 181, 183, 190, 195, 254, 260, 263, 268 access to: citizenship, 28, 41–42, 65, 71, 90, 95, 116, 118, 160, 255; nationality, 10, 28, 58, 95, 160, 196, 205, 255, 267 acquisition of citizenship, 4, 51, 251 activism, 159, 193; activists, 38, 181 affectedness, 17 Africa, 58, 92, 101, 113, 259 agenda-setting, 50, 164 alien, 34, 112, 187, 223; aliens, 172, 268 Aptekar, 202 Arendt, 23, 40 Argentina, 35, 69, 109, 179–80, 220, 223, 227, 246 argumentation, 83, 146, 164, 269; arguments, 6, 10, 12, 35, 43–44, 48–52, 76–80, 82–84, 106, 109, 114–15, 121–22, 126, 129, 131–33, 135–37, 140, 144–45, 150, 157, 160–62, 165–67, 169, 171, 175, 183–84, 186, 188, 205–6, 235, 237, 242, 248–50, 255, 257, 261, 263–65, 267 Arrighi, 30 Asia, 8, 58, 63, 92, 101, 113, 150, 178, 184 associations, 93–95, 116, 126, 130, 157, 161, 173, 176, 233, 264, 268 Aussiedler, 116, 123, 130, 154, 261–62 Australia, 25, 46, 69–70, 184, 210, 213, 223, 227–29 Austria, 46, 60, 63, 66, 69, 78, 168, 210–11, 227, 229 Bader, 28, 30 Baganha, 87–88, 91, 95

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Ballin, 22, 27, 69, 203–4 Bangladesh, 91, 256 Barbados, 87, 221 Barbuda, 221, 223 battle, 138, 145, 158–59 Baubo¨ck, 2, 30, 33, 42, 64, 177, 194, 198, 200, 223, 250–52, 255, 270–71 Baumgartner, 50, 110 Beiratsgesetz, 125, 265 Belgium, 46, 50–51, 57, 60, 69, 150, 168–69, 172–74, 182, 210, 214, 227–29, 271 Belize, 46, 69, 210, 220, 223, 227–29, 272 belonging, 11, 16, 25–26, 29, 33, 47, 52, 73, 192, 195–96, 200–202, 245, 247, 250, 254–55, 270 Benhabib, 29–30, 62, 152, 205–6, 252 Berger, 73 Berlin, 46, 76, 119, 123, 132–37, 141, 143, 167, 200, 215, 235, 238–39, 241, 264 Bevo¨lkerung, 112–13, 147, 241 Bezirksverordnetenversammlungen, 133 Bezirksversammlungen, 120, 263 bilateral, 103, 261, 263 birth, 41, 48, 211, 214, 217, 255, 271; birthright, 4, 41, 195, 202, 250; birthrightbased, 270 Blatter, 41, 194, 204 Bloemraad, 203, 254 blood-based, 115 Boatca, 194, 249 Bolivia, 220 borders, 6, 17–19, 24–26, 29–30, 35, 40, 73, 116, 193, 204–5, 247, 271 Bosniak, 22, 27, 29, 188 Brazil, 62, 88, 92, 97, 99, 102, 109, 220, 257, 259

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306 Index Bremen, 46, 116, 119, 123, 125–29, 132, 134, 136–37, 143–44, 215, 235, 238–39, 241, 263–66 Brubaker, 4, 11, 33, 36, 64, 114–15, 177, 183, 249, 269 Brumat, 63 Buddhist, 71 Bulgaria, 59, 218, 223 Bundesrat, 115, 129, 136, 139–42, 144, 235, 238–39, 264, 266 Bundestag, 84, 112, 115, 118, 136–37, 139–44, 147, 235, 238–39 Burkina Faso, 87, 221, 223, 253 BVerfG, 31, 113–15, 119, 125, 131–34, 136–40, 143–44, 152, 159–60, 167, 174, 265, 267–68 Canada, 2, 46, 60, 66, 69, 109, 210, 219, 227–29, 259, 270 candidacy, 226; candidate, 24, 54, 101, 181, 226, 245, 270 cantons, 33, 87, 212, 223; cantonal, 212 Cape Verde, 59, 109, 221, 259 Carens, 2, 17, 30, 49, 189, 250 Caribbean, 58, 223, 247–48 categories of: beneficiaries, 183; immigrants, 116; people, 20, 107, 110; rights, 19 categorizations, 125, 148, 155, 176, 210, 247 categorize, 25, 148, 159 Central America, 63 Central Europe, 134 Checkel, 75, 256, 268 Chile, 33, 56, 63, 109, 184, 219, 223 China, 70, 253, 256 Chung, 178 churches, 2, 118, 141 citizenship-acquisition, 28, 250 citizenship-as-nationality, 2, 11, 29, 32, 41–42, 47, 65, 95, 195, 199, 245, 251, 271 city, 25, 60, 119, 125–26, 132–34, 181, 185, 213, 217, 247, 266, 269; city-scale, 246; city-state, 119, 132, 143, 264, 266 civic, 21–22, 31, 52, 60, 62, 101, 104, 107, 134, 178, 185, 192, 194, 197, 200–201, 203, 205, 249, 255, 267 cleavages, 75, 199, 262 clientele, 74; clients, 248 coalition, 97, 120, 123, 132–33, 136, 140–43, 146, 259, 264, 267–68; coalition-building, 166

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coalitions, 78, 118, 169 co-citizen, 125; co-citizens, 123, 125–26, 129, 263 co-ethnics, 56, 255 Cohen, 22, 195, 201 coherence, 45, 63, 101, 126, 178, 181, 202; coherent, 10, 13, 41, 46, 103, 118, 146, 188, 267 cohesion, 27, 182; cohesiveness, 257 collective, 94, 163, 174, 201, 248, 256, 268–70 collide, 11, 202 Colombia, 219, 223, 253 Colomer, 163 colonial, 41, 44, 50, 59, 61, 90, 98, 107, 153–54, 158, 169, 178–79, 184, 224, 226, 251, 259 colonialism, 25, 167, 195, 259; colonies, 90, 92, 95, 111, 169, 179, 259; colonized, 178 colonizers, 178–79 colony. See colonial commitment, 6, 56, 121, 126, 143, 156, 180, 191–92, 196, 200–201, 204, 271–72; commit, 26, 131, 162, 164; commitments, 2, 27, 42, 50, 58, 74, 77, 99, 162, 196, 207, 232, 236; committed, 132, 141, 216, committing, 123 communal, 13, 30, 38, 46, 56, 59, 61–62, 64, 70, 73, 88, 96, 100, 106, 117–18, 120–21, 123–25, 129–31, 133, 140–42, 144, 170–72, 176–77, 180, 192, 196, 199–201, 203, 211–13, 215–16, 219–20, 226, 237, 242, 245–46, 253–54, 257, 262, 264–66, 270–71 communitarian, 38, 45, 47–48, 201, 246 comparative, 5–8, 12, 30, 36, 41–42, 50, 53–54, 65–66, 71–73, 75, 82–83, 86, 110–11, 114, 150, 163, 165, 177–78, 185–86, 188, 193, 206, 209–10, 245, 249, 253, 255, 260 comparisons, 7–8, 10–12, 54, 68, 74–75, 78, 84, 86, 89, 98–99, 112, 114, 129, 151, 156–57, 162, 167, 176, 181, 185, 191, 199, 253, 257; compare, 5, 8, 11–12, 30–31, 36, 42, 50, 52, 58, 62, 76–77, 79, 81, 98–100, 109, 111, 120, 132, 136, 146, 148–51, 154, 160–61, 165–68, 179, 182–83, 190, 198, 210, 236–37, 246, 251, 253–54, 263–64, 271 compatible, 18, 121, 144, 262, 265, 271 complement, 156, 235, 253; complementary, 104, 202, 253

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Index 307 conceptual, 19, 25, 76, 82, 153 conditional, 20, 30, 44, 131 conditions, 4, 8, 10, 16, 34, 43, 45, 49, 57–59, 61, 65–66, 68, 72–73, 76–77, 80–81, 87, 89, 96, 103, 105–8, 124, 137, 151, 172, 174, 178, 180, 185, 187, 191–92, 209–12, 214–18, 220–22, 224–28, 232–34, 251, 253, 258, 264, 269, 271 configurations, 7, 9, 12, 65, 72, 207, 210, 225–26, 228, 255 conjunctural, 175, 210 Conley, 39 consensus, 11, 78, 88, 90, 103–4, 110, 119, 141, 145, 152, 154, 158–59, 162, 169, 172, 175–76, 179, 186, 188, 192, 236, 268 consequences, 91, 105, 120–21, 123, 131, 135, 138–39, 191, 198, 247 consequential, 158, 190; consequentialist, 56 conservative, 5, 11, 35–36, 45, 49, 51, 61, 116–17, 122, 138, 145–46, 158, 160–61, 171, 183, 201–2, 228, 249, 262, 265–66; conservatism, 47, 184, 224, 266 constellations, 52, 78, 181, 183, 199 constitutional court, 11, 31, 66, 81, 88, 113, 136, 144, 211, 215; constitutional interpretations, 127, 139; constitutionality 119, 121, 129, 137, 153, 265; constitutionally, 120, 265 construction, 56, 86, 161, 164–65, 179, 182, 268; construe, 10, 39, 43, 46, 48, 56 constructivism, 6, 73 consultative, 118, 181, 233, 259; consultative council, 118, 181, 233, 259 contingency, 76, 152, 155, 161, 175; contingent, 48, 68, 77 contract, 16, 18, 43, 133, 252; contractual, 16, 252 contradiction, 9, 25, 68, 228, 234; contradictory combination, 68, 228, 272 Cook-Martin, 254 co-optation, 95; co-opting, 94 cosmopolitanism, 41, 45, 187, 197; Cosmopolitan, 2, 33, 40–41, 47, 194; cosmopolitans, 47 Costa Rica, 31, 40, 69, 219, 223, 227, 229, 251, 254 crime, 216, 271; criminal, 26, 41, 134–35, 215, 248; criminality, 134, 211, 262 csQCA, 65, 68, 210, 226, 229–30 Cuba, 254

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cultural, 9, 11, 17, 19, 28, 31, 44, 51, 56–57, 59, 61, 88, 92, 99, 103, 111, 128, 145, 152, 167, 169, 174, 176, 178, 180, 185, 192, 224, 226, 253, 269; cultural affinity, 9, 103, 253 cultural commonalities, 57; cultural traditions, 269; cultural understanding, 167, 269 Dahl, 16–17 dataset, 209 debates on denizen enfranchisement, 1, 11, 13, 17, 54, 77, 84, 90, 98, 108, 114–15, 117, 129, 132, 136, 144–46, 148, 160, 182, 186, 191–92, 206–7, 242, 255 decolonization, 90, 92, 95, 110, 153–54, 175 deliberation, 22, 40, 80, 83, 164, 204; deliberative, 17, 80, 257 democratic: challenge, 34; challenges, 196; citizenship, 18, 31, 199, 205, 207; coherence, 126; consistency, 122, 124, 129, 132, 137; deficit, 4, 6, 9, 18, 26, 29, 33, 42, 44, 50–51, 120–21, 123, 138–39, 141, 156, 163, 181, 198, 262, 265, 269; iterations, 152, 206; legitimacy, 18, 204, 224, 255, 270; participation, 3, 121, 200, 270; polities, 13, 20, 24, 27, 30, 39, 54, 79, 82, 182, 199, 204, 207; potential, 13; principle, 6, 16, 50, 117, 120, 122, 202, 207; representation, 1, 18, 31, 143, 146, 201, 207; society, 157, 269; state, 17, 24, 26–28, 49, 250; theory, 16–17, 20, 204 demos, 4, 7, 16–17, 22, 30, 61, 164, 177, 200–201, 204, 248–50, 267; demoi, 197 denizen, 1–13, 17–20, 27, 29, 31–66, 68–82, 84–89, 91, 96–101, 103, 105–15, 117–20, 122–25, 127–29, 131–33, 135–46, 148, 150–53, 155–60, 163–70, 172–74, 176–94, 196–207, 209, 211–12, 214, 216, 218, 220, 222, 224–26, 228–31, 237, 242, 245, 247–58, 260, 263–65, 267, 269–72 Denmark, 46, 69, 97, 126, 129–31, 210–11, 227, 229 discourse, 6, 11, 13, 17, 21, 37, 64, 72, 74, 77–80, 83, 105, 110, 151–52, 155, 157, 160, 162, 164, 169, 171–73, 183, 189, 191, 207, 267 disenfranchisement, 28, 39, 69–72, 113, 179, 197, 205, 247, 250; disenfranchised, 51, 190, 213, 250 Dominica, 222

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308 Index Dominican Republic, 254 dormant, 230–31, 272 double: citizenship, 22; nationality, 96, 116, 123, 129, 139–40, 145–46, 209, 264, 266, 270–71 Dumbrava, 250, 255 dynamics, 5, 37, 68, 75, 79, 86, 146, 148, 152, 154, 169, 171, 175, 179 Dzankic, 249 Earnest, 5, 33, 81, 113, 168–69, 172, 174, 223, 249, 268, 271 Ecuador, 56, 198, 222–23 egalitarian, 32, 41, 263 electorate, 6, 18, 37, 52, 57, 66, 74, 80, 102, 104–5, 107, 117, 121, 136, 139, 160–64, 181–82, 185, 191–92, 197, 199, 205–6, 268 elite, 49, 51, 71, 80, 83, 109, 116, 156, 160, 166, 174, 176–77, 181, 190, 193, 268; eliteled, 172, 186; elite-level, 163 Elman, 68, 73, 75 El Salvador, 40, 63, 254 emancipatory, 205; emancipates, 19; emancipating, 206; emancipation, 159, 248, 268 emigrant, 27, 30, 59, 63, 78, 90–91, 93, 96, 100, 102–11, 152, 155, 158, 181, 195, 198, 236, 246, 255, 259–60; emigration, 90–91, 105, 110, 154, 180, 253 empire, 25, 108, 116–17, 167, 195, 251, 259 empirical, 3–4, 7, 9, 12, 20, 28–31, 39, 41, 43, 48, 54, 65, 72–73, 80, 89, 115, 165, 169, 181, 189, 198, 202–3, 251, 256, 271 employment, 3, 44, 62, 93, 180, 196, 219–21, 225, 232, 254 empower, 32, 159, 200 Engelen, 19, 250 England, 18, 190, 217 environment, 37, 166, 181, 195, 248, 258–59 episode, 6, 18, 50, 69, 71, 132, 159, 167, 172, 193, 198, 206 equal, 2, 16–17, 20, 22–23, 26, 37, 40, 46–47, 81, 92, 96, 103, 117, 124, 142, 176, 194–96, 199–200, 203–5, 224–25, 228, 237, 250–51, 255, 257, 259, 272; equality, 13, 19, 31, 52, 87, 113, 137, 159, 186–87, 192, 216, 232, 248, 262 Estonia, 46, 69, 109, 210, 217, 227, 229, 272 Ethics, 260 ethnic, 23, 49, 71, 75, 99, 170–71, 182, 185, 192, 205, 232, 250, 252, 267; ethnicity, 32,

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153–54, 161, 192; ethno-cultural, 115, 167, 172, 269; ethno-national, 255; ethnonationalist, 64; ethno-nationalist, 11, 145, 178, 267; ethno-nationalistic, 160; ethnocentric, 82, 178; ethno-linguistic, 174 Europe, 21, 25, 28, 61, 64, 70, 91–92, 94, 96, 101, 103, 107, 113, 115–16, 134, 154, 176, 179, 186, 196, 202, 223 European, 22, 30, 57, 61–62, 64, 69–70, 87–88, 90–91, 95, 97, 99–102, 105–7, 113, 121, 123, 137, 139–41, 153, 173, 177, 201, 217, 232, 245, 247–49, 252, 254, 258, 260, 265; citizens, 57, 87–88, 99, 113, 137, 140, 153, 217, 232, 254, 258, 265; citizenship, 254; commission, 61–62, 123, 254; council, 100, 254, 260; countries, 62, 91, 106–7, 173, 232; parliament, 62, 101, 141, 245, 254, 258, 260 facilitated naturalization, 152, 218 fail, 8, 10, 50, 156, 191, 206; failed, 30, 34, 40, 54, 60, 66, 69, 86, 95, 97, 99, 106–8, 112–13, 135, 139, 144, 148, 154–55, 161, 164, 174, 219, 224–25, 236–37, 248; failed attempt, 106, 174; failed attempts, 54, 60, 95, 164; failed reforms, 148; failure, 6, 72, 89, 106, 114, 136, 144, 146, 152, 156, 161, 172, 182, 214, 216–17 flounder. See failed: failed attempt Fairclough, 164 Faist, 177, 188, 269 feasibility, 117–18, 120–21, 141, 143, 154, 156, 179 federalism, 180; federation, 26, 35, 117, 122, 145, 235, 238–39, 252 feedback, 110, 162, 167, 192 Finland, 69, 97, 172, 176, 211, 227 Fischer, 78–79, 162 foreign 18, 33, 55–56, 60–64, 66, 91–93, 95–96, 98, 101–2, 106, 109, 111, 113, 116–17, 119–20, 122–26, 131, 133, 138–39, 157, 170–71, 173–74, 176, 180–81, 184, 210, 216, 234–36, 241, 245, 254–55, 260, 264–65; foreign residents, 18, 55–56, 62–63, 66, 91–92, 101–2, 111, 113, 117, 119–20, 126, 133, 139, 170–71, 173, 180–81, 184, 216, 235–36, 241, 254, 260 foreigner, 3, 22, 29, 33, 49, 61, 64, 87–88, 90–92, 95–96, 98–99, 103, 106–7, 116–17,

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Index 309 foreigner (continued ) 119–29, 131, 133–35, 137–40, 142, 144, 156, 166, 180, 202, 204, 210, 232–35, 241–42, 247–48, 250, 252, 258–59, 261–66, 268–69 formal citizenship, 2–4, 13, 16, 19–29, 31–32, 34, 41, 45, 51–52, 88, 137, 150, 160–61, 170, 184, 186–87, 192–93, 195, 197, 200–202, 204, 245–47, 250, 255, 259, 270 framing, 6, 11, 64, 74, 79, 84, 86, 88–89, 99–100, 104, 106–7, 110–11, 114, 121, 135, 145, 152, 155, 157–58, 161–65, 167, 169, 175, 177–79, 183, 190, 192, 206, 237; frames, 6, 37, 79, 84, 89, 110, 112, 119, 125, 145–46, 160, 166, 169, 171, 175, 181, 231, 254, 257, 267; reframe, 7, 10, 99, 124, 140, 152, 162, 165–66, 175, 182 France, 22, 31, 46, 60, 62, 69, 109, 182–83, 210, 214, 227–29, 251, 259 free, 49, 63, 117–18, 156, 163, 180, 197, 205, 233, 246; freedom, 25–26, 49, 70, 107, 137, 200, 202, 206, 210, 247; freeing, 22; freely, 201; freely-chosen, 203 Freeman, 109, 190, 269 Germany, 8–9, 11, 31, 46, 60, 62–63, 66, 68–69, 71, 78, 81–82, 84, 86, 109, 112–20, 122, 125–26, 128, 132, 136, 139–40, 143–45, 147–48, 151–61, 166–71, 175, 180, 182–83, 188–92, 210, 215, 227, 229, 231, 237, 244, 247, 259, 261–69, 272 Gerring, 73, 75, 82 Goertz, 114 Greece, 46, 210, 220, 229, 261, 272 Groenendijk, 33, 113 Guatemala, 63, 254 guest-worker, 91, 116, 133, 173 Guinea, 253 Guinea-Bissau, 259 Guiraudon, 189–90 Guyana, 87, 222–23, 253 Haacke, 112–13, 147 Habermas, 17, 40, 269 Hailbronner, 140, 262 Hajer, 78–80, 257, 267 Halleskov, 254 Hammar, 1, 168, 176–77, 182, 186, 251–52, 269–70

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Hansen, 4, 50, 76, 114, 266 Hayduk, 50, 71, 185, 250 Helbling, 18, 202, 267, 270 heresthetics, 162, 164 Hindess, 30, 40–41, 194–95, 245, 248 Hirsch Ballin, 22, 27, 69, 203–4 Hirschman, 79, 146 historical-institutionalism, 4, 5, 11, 35, 44, 75, 77, 81–82, 86, 89, 109, 174–76, 178, 184, 192 Hoffmann, 63 Hollifield, 4, 267 Holston, 23 Honduras, 63, 254 Hooghe, 257, 269 Howard, 42, 190, 266–68, 271 Hoyo, 251 Huddleston, 201 Hungary, 59, 69, 154, 217, 227 Iberoamericans, 219 Iceland, 49, 69, 109, 210, 218, 227, 229 identity, 16, 18, 22, 27, 29, 32, 34, 38, 42, 56, 90, 128, 150, 159, 175, 184, 196, 200–202, 246, 248–49, 270 Ignatieff, 195, 267 Immigrant: inclusion, 93, 111; incorporation, 176–77, 191; integration, 32, 82, 84, 88, 93, 148, 155, 157–58, 182, 196: residents, 30, 39, 63, 65, 106, 180, 196, 203–4 Institutions, 6, 7, 11, 18, 19, 22–23, 29, 35–37, 43, 75–78, 109–111, 153, 162, 164–66, 174–77, 179, 183, 185–86, 192, 199, 204, 207, 269, 270–71; institutional, 6, 7, 10, 12, 20, 42, 74, 77–78, 80, 89, 90, 98, 110, 114–15, 137, 146, 150, 161, 163, 165–67, 171, 174, 177, 180–81, 189; institutionalist, 5, 11, 35, 37, 248; institutionalism, 4, 5, 36, 82, 178; institutionalized, 203 Ireland, 46, 59, 61, 69, 126, 172, 210, 215, 217, 225, 217, 223, 227–29, 232, 264 Italy, 31, 60, 62, 69, 116, 133, 179, 214, 227, 254 Isin, 23, 194 Jacobs, 38, 42, 47–48, 83, 168–73, 175, 267–69 Jacobson, 4, 19, 28, 34, 40, 177 Jahn, 241

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310 Index Jamaica, 222 Japan, 25, 63, 178–79, 219 Joppke, 4, 32–33, 35, 42, 112, 114, 160, 177, 186, 190, 249–50, 264, 268–69 judgment. See ruling justification, 1, 6, 11, 40, 72, 77–78, 80, 89, 100, 105, 121, 136–37, 139–42, 145, 148, 152, 160, 164–66, 182–83, 188–90, 206, 249, 262, 267 Justwan, 35, 57 Kakabadse, 196 Kalicki, 178, 267 Koehler, 50, 76, 114, 266 Koopmans, 159, 268 Korea, 59, 63–64, 178–79, 182, 210, 255 Kostakopoulou, 194 Kratochwil, 269 Kuhn memorandum, 120, 148, 263 Kymlicka, 196–97 Lakatos, 75, 184 Latvia, 46, 69, 210, 218, 227, 229, 255 Lavenex, 62 legitimacy, 17–18, 24, 29, 40, 43, 79, 104–5, 152, 199, 201, 204, 224, 255, 265, 270 liberal democracies, 4, 38, 41–42, 49–50, 58, 71, 178, 198, 249, 253 liberalism, 36, 47, 169, 187 Lithuania, 59, 69, 141, 218, 227 Lizzeri, 190 local level: locally, 60, 112, 123, 270. See also communal Lo´pez-Guerra, 18, 250 Lusophone, 87–89, 91–93, 96–98, 100, 102–5, 107–8, 111, 152–53, 168, 216, 221, 232, 236–37, 257, 259 Luxembourg, 46, 61, 69, 143, 210, 215, 227, 229, 269 Maas, 22, 86 Macau, 70, 253 Mahoney, 57, 114 Malawi, 56, 87, 221, 253 Malheiros, 91, 111 Marshall, 18–19, 31, 248–50 Martiniello, 174 Mau, 195 Mauritius, 221, 223 membership: formal membership, 16, 24, 184. See also formal citizenship

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methodology, 9, 86, 183; methodological, 6–7, 12, 34, 43, 61, 73, 75, 79, 82–83, 114, 119, 150, 184, 210, 247, 256–57, 261, 271 Mexico, 25, 168, 180–81, 254 Michalowski, 36 Milanovic, 41 Mill, 83; Millian, 7 Miller, 40, 164, 200 minorities, 51, 71, 99, 106, 119–20, 128, 130, 132, 134, 170–71, 185, 228, 232, 251, 256 Modolo, 35 Moldova, 91 Morocco, 253, 261 Mosler, 178, 255 Mozambique, 259 multicultural, 126, 135, 169, 171, 248 municipal: municipalities, 20, 31, 34–35, 87, 213, 259, 270. See also communal Munro, 18, 251 Myanmar, 70, 256 national-citizen status. See citizenship-asnationality nationalism, 18, 26, 72, 160; nationalist 33, 47, 71, 115, 269 national-level, 30–31, 99, 184, 268 nationhood, 1, 75, 80, 154, 159–61, 169, 183 naturalization, 1, 9–11, 13, 27–29, 31–33, 35, 38–39, 42–49, 51–52, 61, 65–69, 71–74, 82, 89, 95–97, 111, 113, 115–16, 120, 122, 128–29, 131, 133, 138–43, 145–46, 152–53, 155–56, 158, 162, 174, 180, 182, 185, 188–89, 191, 195–98, 201–2, 207, 209, 223–31, 246, 251, 254–56, 261–62, 264, 266, 269–72; naturalization provisions, 209; naturalization rates, 33, 96, 115, 122, 143, 196; naturalization regime, 9, 11, 45, 72; naturalization rules, 10, 28, 31–33, 44–46, 52, 65, 68–69, 72–73, 89, 120, 140, 146, 153, 155–56, 191, 197–98, 202, 224, 226, 228, 255–56, 272 Netherlands, 33, 38, 46, 50–51, 61, 69, 87, 97, 118, 126, 150, 168–73, 177, 182, 210, 212, 227–29, 251, 268, 270 New Zealand, 25, 46, 56, 61, 87, 184, 213, 223, 227–29, 269 Nicaragua, 63, 254 noncitizen. See denizen non-nationals. See denizen

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Index 311 Nordic, 33, 60–61, 82, 87, 97–98, 108, 168, 192, 211, 218, 252 Norris, 163–64 North America, 25 Norway, 46, 69, 97, 109, 210–11, 227, 229 no-taxation-without-representation, 265 Oceania, 113 Opello, 98 Owen, 271 Pakistan, 91 Palmovski, 115, 175 Palop, 63, 91–93, 255 PALOP countries, 91–93 Panama, 69, 223, 227, 254 paradox, 205; paradoxically, 94, 158 Paraguay, 219, 223, 253 parliamentary debate, 8, 66, 80, 83–84, 88–89, 122, 127, 138, 153, 165, 168, 189, 238, 249, 252, 262, 267; parliamentary discourse, 83; parliamentary discussion, 58, 88, 190 Pedroza, 3, 63, 71, 178, 180, 195, 197, 202, 246–47, 250–51, 255 Peixoto, 90, 92 peoplehood, 197 Peru, 109, 253 philosophies, 79, 167 pioneer, 1, 59–60, 97, 106, 119, 122, 125, 145, 176, 182, 186, 193, 257 pluralism, 6, 32, 45, 174, 184, 200, 203, 206–7; plural, 13, 169, 197, 202, 247, 250, 256 Pocock, 205–6 Poland, 116, 154, 218, 262 political, 1–7, 9–13, 16–22, 24–34, 36–41, 43–45, 47–52, 56–57, 59, 61–64, 71–80, 83–84, 86, 88–90, 92–96, 99–103, 105, 108–11, 114–21, 123–24, 126–29, 131–39, 145–46, 148, 150–77, 179–86, 188–94, 196–204, 206–7, 217, 224, 229, 231, 246–52, 256–58, 260–63, 265, 267–72; political community, 1, 13, 21, 24, 26–27, 29–30, 32, 47, 49, 52, 73, 172, 197–98, 246, 249; political debate, 6, 29, 90, 108, 148, 151, 189–90; political discourse, 6, 11, 13, 74, 78–80, 105, 152, 155, 160, 164, 171, 189, 191; political institutions, 165, 204, 269, 271: political membership, 13, 22, 25,

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32, 41, 150, 161; political participation, 17, 88, 100, 120, 123, 129, 133, 163, 166, 194, 198, 202–3, 207, 247, 249, 252, 262, 271; political parties, 10, 74, 78, 90, 94, 156, 169, 173, 181, 252, 260; political process, 78–79, 83, 89, 96, 115, 139, 150–51, 153, 182, 191, 229, 231; political processes, 6–7, 37, 86, 150, 161, 164, 190–91, 224; political rights, 2, 13, 22, 24, 28, 31–32, 34, 38–39, 47, 56, 62, 64, 96, 137, 196, 201, 247, 249, 251, 257–58, 260–61, 268–69, 271–72; political science, 7, 50, 150, 257; political system, 27, 32, 49, 52, 57, 83, 89–90, 145, 154–55, 174, 176, 190, 197, 251, 258; political theory, 18, 44, 48, 156, 246; political thinkers, 18; political thought, 21–22, 200 polity, 1, 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 16, 20, 24, 28–30, 32–34, 37, 39, 49, 56, 63, 67, 70, 72, 74, 76–77, 81, 88, 125, 196–97, 199–201, 203–4, 210–12, 214, 216, 218, 220, 222, 245, 248, 250, 252, 256, 270; polities, 12, 18–20, 24, 26–27, 30–31, 34, 37, 39, 42, 46, 54, 56, 58, 60, 68, 72, 79, 82, 114, 154, 177, 180, 182, 189, 191, 193, 197, 207, 245, 252 portrait, 237, 242, 263 Portugal, 8–11, 46, 57, 59, 61, 69, 82, 86–102, 105–11, 114–15, 121, 151–59, 162, 166, 170–71, 175, 182, 188–92, 210, 216, 227–29, 231–34, 252–53, 257–61, 266–67, 272 position, 10, 45, 47, 74, 76–77, 82, 104–5, 110, 118, 123–26, 129, 132–33, 144–46, 152, 156, 160, 165, 168–70, 173, 179–81, 186, 189, 191, 198, 231, 235, 237–38, 244, 250, 254, 257–58, 260, 263, 268 postcolonial, 31, 178 post-national, 4–5, 19, 28–29, 34, 36, 76–78, 80, 88–89, 100, 109, 175, 177, 187–89, 249, 269–70; post-nationalism, 77, 188; postnationalist, 33, 61, 75, 86, 188 post-revolutionary, 89–90, 92, 96, 98 Preuß, 141, 246 process, 5–6, 9–12, 26–27, 29, 38, 41–44, 47–49, 52–54, 56–57, 62, 65, 68, 70, 72–81, 83, 86, 88–89, 94, 96, 100–101, 105, 107–8, 110, 114–15, 119, 124–25, 127–28, 134, 136, 139, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150–54, 158, 160, 165–70, 172, 175, 178–80, 182, 185–86, 190–93, 199, 205–7,

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312 Index 210, 214, 222, 225–26, 229, 231, 233, 251, 256, 263, 267, 271–72; enfranchisement processes, 1, 4–6, 8–9, 11–13, 30, 32, 42, 48, 65, 73–75, 78–82, 86, 89, 96, 119, 122, 151–52, 160, 163, 165–68, 181, 186–87, 192–94, 197–98, 206–7; process-based, 6, 185, 192; processes, 1, 4–11, 13, 17–19, 30, 32, 34–35, 37–38, 42–44, 48, 51–52, 65, 71–75, 77–83, 85–86, 89, 94, 102, 109, 119, 122, 130, 136–37, 145–46, 148, 150–52, 155, 157, 161–68, 175, 181, 186–87, 189–94, 197–98, 206–7, 224, 226, 244, 247–49, 251, 255 process-tracing, 8, 68, 162, 256, 268 Przeworski, 7, 74, 76, 177, 270 Puerto Rico, 60, 251, 254 QCA, 65, 68, 209–10, 228, 255 qualitative, 7–8, 34, 52, 65, 68–69, 88, 209–10, 237, 249, 252–53, 255, 261 quantitative, 115, 249 quasi-citizenship, 2, 29, 32, 41, 88, 92, 97–98, 232 race, 18, 30, 247, 256, 265; racial, 23, 261; racism, 174, 203; racist, 175, 265 Ragin, 65 Raskin, 34, 50, 185, 250 Rath, 249, 251, 267–68 Rea, 174 reassess, 12, 32, 61, 72, 136, 183–84, 195, 197, 202, 204, 271; reassessment, 11, 18, 188, 191, 204–5, 207; reconfiguration, 177, 186, 200; redefine, 2–4, 13, 18, 24–28, 33–34, 39, 42, 74, 140, 154, 161, 194, 198, 203; redraw, 205; reflexive, 204; revalue, 198 reciprocity, 9–10, 31, 34, 44, 49, 56, 59, 61–64, 66, 82, 87–89, 96–98, 100–101, 103–4, 106–9, 111, 121, 128–31, 152, 166, 175, 178, 191–93, 216–17, 220–21, 223–26, 232–33, 236–37, 252–53, 258–60, 263 refugees, 82, 117, 176, 183, 211, 217, 247, 254, 256 reinvigorate. See reassess repatriation. See return return, 32, 70, 90, 92, 95, 98, 153–54, 159, 196, 201, 261

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rhetoric, 26, 76, 79, 89, 108, 132, 136, 162, 166, 175, 185, 267–68 Riker, 162, 267 Rogowski, 257 Romanelli, 177, 206 Romania, 91, 130, 154, 262 Rubio-Marı´n, 27, 39, 114, 270–71 ruling, 71, 81, 113–14, 119, 133–34, 136–40, 144, 146, 152, 155, 159–60, 167, 206, 263, 265, 267–68 Russia, 91, 130 Sadiq, 39, 199 Safran, 11 San Marino, 69, 227 Sardinha, 88, 94, 110 Scandinavian, 33, 128 Schattschneider, 50, 77, 151, 157–59, 205 Schmidt, 37, 74, 79 Schuck, 71, 201, 250 Schwartz-Shea, 84 science, 4, 7, 50, 73, 150, 257; scientists, 29, 159, 163–64, 206; political scientists, 163–64, 206; social scientists, 29, 159 self-definition, 81, 196, 248, 256, 258 semi-citizenship. See quasi-citizenship Shachar, 41, 194, 249 Shaw, 153, 187, 269 Shin, 64, 178 Slovakia, 59, 69, 141, 218, 227 Slovenia, 46, 59, 69, 218, 227 Smith, 150, 197, 250, 267 solidarity, 22, 30, 32, 40, 94, 99, 127, 170, 191, 193, 200–201, 236, 246, 250; solidariedade, 234–35 Somers, 18 Song, 18 South America, 33, 62–63, 180 South Korea, 63–64, 178–79, 182, 210, 255 Soysal, 4, 19, 28, 34, 40, 64, 76, 177, 189, 249, 269–70 Spain, 46, 59, 61, 69, 82, 87, 168, 179, 210, 217, 227, 229, 252–54, 261, 271–72 Spiro, 4, 22, 201 Staatsangeho¨rigkeit, 117, 269 suffrage, 48, 98, 112, 187, 202, 205, 250, 259; suffragist, 170, 173, 267 Suriname, 254 Sweden, 46, 50–51, 60, 69, 118, 126, 131, 150, 168, 172, 176–77, 182, 186, 210–11, 227–29, 251

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Index 313 Switzerland, 35, 46, 69, 126, 210, 223, 227, 229 symbolic, 11–12, 32, 38–39, 58, 107–8, 111, 113, 158, 179, 181, 189–90, 201, 249, 254, 264, 271; symbolism, 161 taxation, 17, 23, 26; taxes, 2, 17, 23, 52, 185, 195, 221, 261, 264, 270 tit-for-tat, 107, 110, 158, 160, 172, 183, 237 Tocqueville, 177, 206–7, 256 tradition, 4–6, 9–11, 19, 24, 31, 33, 35–36, 43–46, 50, 71, 73–75, 77, 81–82, 95, 109, 142, 152–53, 159, 164, 167, 169, 173–75, 177–78, 180, 183–86, 188, 191–92, 194, 200, 206–7, 246–49, 252, 257, 268–69; traditional, 9–10, 22, 25, 33, 38, 49, 54, 58, 110, 134, 159, 173, 175, 268 trajectory, 51, 74, 76, 81, 90, 145, 150, 167, 169 transformation, 17, 186; transformed, 23, 89, 150, 261 translation, 6, 78, 80, 165, 169, 257–58 transnational, 4–5, 12, 19, 34, 36, 43, 45, 61, 75, 109, 114, 148, 166, 194, 257, 269; transnationalism, 25, 172, 177, 269 Trinidad and Tobago, 253 trust, 35, 56–57, 72, 135, 148, 184, 192, 197, 252 Tunisia, 261 Turkey, 261 Turner, 23, 40, 194, 249–50 types, 4, 7–9, 33, 65–67, 76, 78, 82, 181, 185, 206, 209, 229–30, 267, 272

universal, 8, 12, 34, 56–57, 59–60, 62, 65–67, 72, 81–82, 87–88, 98, 101–2, 108–9, 128–29, 150, 152, 168, 172, 176–78, 181, 184–85, 189, 197–98, 205, 225–27, 230–31, 249–50, 252, 255, 272; universe of cases, 7–9, 12, 37, 48, 52, 56, 58, 65, 70, 74, 80, 209, 253 update. See reassess Uruguay, 33, 56, 59, 63, 109, 179–80, 184, 219, 223, 246 USA, 67, 69 variables, 2–3, 7, 9, 23, 43, 49, 65, 84, 104, 136, 146, 164–65, 187, 210, 255, 257, 268; variance, 9, 13, 19, 34, 43, 47–48, 54, 57, 71, 187, 198, 209–10, 237, 242, 248, 256, 271; variation, 7–8, 36–37, 62, 80–81, 172, 188, 225, 248–49, 252–53, 257; variations, 3, 8–9, 34–36, 44–45, 52, 56, 77, 80–81, 150, 156, 163, 187–88 Venezuela, 69, 109, 220, 223, 227, 253 veto, 66, 88, 153–54, 175, 181, 192, 256–57, 266 Vink, 170, 201–2, 255 Volk, 112, 117, 121, 265; Volksbegriff, 117, 120, 122, 126, 137, 153 Waldrauch, 33, 42, 47–48, 223 Wallace Goodman, 249 Walzer, 17, 30, 40, 49, 200 Weber, 246 Wedeen, 162 Weil, 4, 35, 95, 114, 250, 267 women, 17, 51, 135, 190, 206 xenophobia, 129, 131, 139, 157, 170, 268

Ukraine, 91 United Kingdom, 59, 62, 217, 227–29, 247–48, 270, 272 United States, 30, 60, 71, 87, 109, 122, 151, 180, 185, 198, 210, 213, 223, 227–29, 246, 250–51, 259, 270

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Yanow, 78, 80, 84 Young, 126, 203, 246 Yugoslavia, 261 Zimmermann, 130, 264 Zincone, 197

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