Citizenship and Identity in Turkey: From Atatürk’s Republic to the Present Day 9780755607464, 9781780760261

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To my parents Sabiha and Aydın İnce

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1

A picture showing Atatürk’s famous expression, ‘How happy is the one who says I am a Turk’. Figure 2 Framing Questions on Democracy, Institutions, Rights and Responsibilities. Figure 3 Framing Questions on National Identity and Relations between Nations. Figure 4 Framing Questions on Social Cohesion and Social Diversity. Figure 5 A picture showing jobs that can be done only by ‘Turks’ (published in Cumhuriyet, 27 May 1934). Figure 6 Two satirical cartoons about non-Muslim citizens living in Turkey. Figure 7 The DP’s famous poster: a raised hand with the caption Enough! Figure 8 A scene from the 6–7 September riots. Figure 9 The picture shows the slogan used at Dink’s funeral, ‘We are all Armenian’. Figure 10 The censored picture in the Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları (Citizenship and Human Rights) textbook.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP ANAP AP BP BDP CHP CKMP DBH DDKO DEHAP DEP DP DSP DTH DTP DYP EOKA FP HADEP HEP HP

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) Adalet Partisi (Justice Party) Birlik Partisi (Union Party) Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party) Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party) Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (Republican Peasant’s Nation Party) Demokratik Barış Hareketi (Democratic Peace Movement) Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları (Revolutionary Eastern Culture Hearths) Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People’s Party) Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party) Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party) Demokratik Toplum Hareketi (Democratic Society Movement) Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party) Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (People’s Democracy Party) Halkın Emek Partisi (People’s Labour Party) Halkçı Parti (Populist Party)

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International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement MDP Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party) MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party) NUC National Unity Committee PKK/KADEK Kurdistan Workers’ Party/Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress RP Refah Partisi (Islamist Welfare Party) RTÜK Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu (Radio and Television Supreme Council) SHP Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi (Social Democratic Party) SP Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) TBP Türkiye Birlik Partisi (Unity Party of Turkey) TİP Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkish Workers’ Party) TDK Türk Dil Kurumu (Society for the Study of Turkish Language) TESEV Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation TTK Türk Tarih Kurumu (Society for the Study of Turkish History) VGM Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü (Directorate General of Foundations)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the many colleagues that I was fortunate to work with at Bilkent University. I would especially like to extend my appreciation to Professor Metin Heper, Dr. Berrak Burçak, Damon Della Fave, Aycan Eren, and Dr. Nilgün Fehim Kennedy. My friends and colleagues, never far from my heart, have loved and believed in me at times when even I lost faith. Without their support, this work would not be possible. I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Ahmet İçduygu and Dr. Benjamin Fortna for their comments on the manuscript of this book. Many thanks also go to my fellow students who have, in one way or another, contributed to the articulation of my ideas and who have encouraged me throughout this study. This book is as much the achievement of the inspiration I have received from my parents as it is of my academic training. I am blessed to have two wonderful parents, Sabiha and Aydın İnce, whose support and love is very special. I can only hope they understand the gratitude that I have for the patient support they have provided me with throughout my doctoral studies. The final thanks, along my love and appreciation, go therefore to my parents and also two wonderful relatives (my grandmother Kadriye İnce and my aunt Ayhan Eryılmaz) who supported me as much as my parents and passed away during the process of writing this book.

PREFACE

This book scrutinises the evolution of the legal, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship in Turkey from 1923 to the present. The book addresses how citizenship, as defined during the single-party period – that is, on the basis of a single religion (the Sunni sect of Islam) and single language (Turkish) – withstood the various changes that Turkey has undergone, especially as a result of internal factors such as the transition to multi-party politics in 1946, military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980; and how it might be affected by more recent external factors such as the impact of globalisation and the possibility of being drawn into the European Union. In this respect, the book examines how citizenship was constructed and the changes it underwent throughout the history of the Republic of Turkey. I argue that unless Turkey changes its attitudes towards citizenship, it will not be able to overcome the challenges posed by internal and external factors and that it needs to adopt Jürgen Habermas’s concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’, which demonstrates how citizens are bound together by subscription to democratic values and human rights, rather than through the traditional pre-political ties that nation-states have appealed to. Because citizenship is so complex an issue in a society as ethnically diverse as Turkey, this book, by examining the shifting meaning of citizenship in the republican period in Turkey, will help bring to the fore theoretical and historical issues at stake in contemporary notions of citizenship as such.

I INTRODUCTION

There is not any notion more central in politics than citizenship, as well as a variable either in history or an issue contended in theory. Judith N. Shklar1 There is one universal human right, namely, ‘the right to have rights’, ‘the right of citizenship’. Hannah Arendt2 In his speech to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the founder of modern Turkey) congratulated the nation on the amount of progress it had made in such a short period of time, closing with the now famous words ‘How happy is the one who says I am a Turk’ (Ne mutlu Türküm diyene).3 These words came to embody the concept of citizenship (vatandaşlık) in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic and the phrase carries such importance that it can even be observed today from Google Earth (Figure 1).4 The concept of citizenship has begun to undergo a transformation in Turkey since the 1990s and the term citizenship has become a buzzword among politicians. In 1992, Süleyman Demirel, the Turkish prime minister at the time, reversed his previous hard-line position on the Kurdish issue, proposing instead the notion of constitutional citizenship (anayasal vatandaşlık) – a new ‘super civic identity’ for all members of society that might ensure internal peace in Turkey.5

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Figure 1 Carved into the mountains in Cizre, near the city of Şırnak, one can see the Turkish flag as well as Atatürk’s famous expression ‘How happy is the one who says I am a Turk’ (Ne mutlu Türküm diyene).

On the 1  January 1995, former Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller reformulated Atatürk’s famous words by declaring, ‘How happy is the one who says I am a citizen of Turkey’ (Ne mutlu Türkiye’nin vatandaşıyım diyene).6 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current Turkish prime minister, has taken the concept of citizenship one step further by declaring Turkish identity to be a sub-identity. He argues that being Turkish means belonging to a sub-identity encompassed by the larger supra-identity of Turkish citizenship.7 These declarations have sparked a new debate on supra/sub- identity (üst kimlik/alt kimlik). In keeping with this changed political discourse, some citizens – politicians in particular – have begun to refer to themselves as being from Turkey (Türkiyeli), rather than being Turkish (Türk). The motivation behind all these statements on citizenship stems from the challenge that powerful ethnic, religious and sectarian movements pose for the official view of Turkish citizenship, which is based on one language, one culture and one ideal. Citizenship was long a neglected subject in the social sciences,8 but in a dramatic reversal it has recently become a focal point for wide-ranging and varied discussions both in Turkey and elsewhere, as can be seen from the above discussion. Writing a generation ago, Herman van Gunsteren

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argued that ‘the concept of citizenship has gone out of fashion among political thinkers’.9 This is certainly no longer true since there has been an upsurge in research into citizenship, which has become a central concern of politicians and policy-makers. The validity of Ralf Dahrendorf’s prediction at the beginning of the 1990s, that the coming decade would be the decade of citizenship, has become increasingly apparent. Thus, as Derek Heater pointed out, citizenship has become ‘the buzzword among political thinkers on all points of the political spectrum’.10 This flowering is a reflection of a growing belief in many quarters that we are living ‘an age of citizenship’.11 There are a number of reasons why this topic has come back into vogue. The political transformation of central and Eastern Europe, the renewed challenges of globalisation and migration, and the ostensible decline of the welfare state since the 1980s have all influenced the proliferation of interest in citizenship12 and it has become one of the most important political ideas of our time. To ask ‘why should the concept of citizenship be studied?’ may be disquieting and difficult, but the histories of exclusions, inequalities, hierarchies and securitisations that have been associated with citizenship impose the question. Citizenship is a strategic concept that is central in the analysis of identity, participation, empowerment, human rights and the public interest.13 Citizenship can be succinctly defined as membership in a polity.14 The polity in question was the city-state in ancient Greece; in the modern world, however, it has been transformed into the nation-state. Citizenship as such inevitably involves a dialectical process between inclusion and exclusion, between those deemed eligible for citizenship and those who are denied the right to become members. Membership also brings reciprocal sets of rights and duties, which change by place and time, although some are universal.15 Nevertheless, when one begins to look more closely at the substance of citizenship in the world today, it becomes quite clear that there is no single answer to the question of what constitutes citizenship. Historically, the criteria for membership in a nation-state were based on assumptions about the cultural homogeneity of a people born and living within the territorial borders of a nation. In the wake of globalisation and increased geographical mobility, however, such notions of homogeneity have become increasingly difficult to sustain. Cultural diversity has become a central aspect of most modern societies, and the very nature of citizenship becomes problematic in the face of increasing incidences of dual and multiple citizenship. On the one hand, some people bereft of formal citizenship in their country of residence may nevertheless enjoy their citizenship rights on the basis of

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long-term residency or international laws;16 on the other hand, some are formally considered citizens while they are deprived of the very rights that are usually presupposed by such a status – indeed, one need but think here of the mechanisms of exclusion at work in sexism, racism or poverty. It is hardly surprising, then, that citizenship has become one of the most debated and disputed of modern phenomena among scholars and political leaders alike.17 A cursory review of the literature discloses the capacious nature of recent discussions about contemporary citizenship. There is a proliferation of adjectives describing peculiar features of citizenship today and scholars are stressing the need to devise new types of citizenship, such as multicultural citizenship,18 differentiated citizenship,19 constitutional citizenship,20 dual or multiple citizenship,21 de-nationalised citizenship,22 European citizenship,23 global citizenship,24 universal citizenship,25 cosmopolitan citizenship,26 post-national citizenship,27 transnational citizenship,28 multilayered citizenship,29 cultural citizenship,30 cyber citizenship,31 environmental citizenship,32 feminist citizenship,33 gendered citizenship,34 flexible citizenship,35 intimate citizenship,36 protective citizenship37 … and the list could go on. All of this clearly signals that citizenship today is vital, malleable, and inherently complex. The citizenship studies in the 1990s prompted a definition of citizenship ‘not simply as legal status but also as practices’. As Francis Nyamnjoh states: ‘There has been too much focus on “rights talk” and its “emancipatory rhetoric,” and too little attention accorded the contexts, meanings and practices that make citizenship possible for some and a far-fetched dream for most’.38 Citizenship is not just a legal status that is conferred, a gift from the state. Citizenship is something that is taken as much as it is given.39 The struggle is not only about legal status, but also for recognition as someone with an audible and corporeal presence that can be described as ‘political’. Engin Işın and Patricia Wood also conceive of citizenship in their prominent work, Citizenship and Identity, not only as a set of legal obligations and entitlements which individuals possess by virtue of their membership in a state, but also as the practices through which individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand or maintain existing rights. Thus, for them citizenship rights should be understood in terms of the right to an identity (i.e., the right to have rights), as opposed (or in addition) to a passive right of status.40 The book approaches the relationship between citizenship and identity from Işın and Wood’s perspective that sees modern citizenship not only as a legal and political membership in a nation-state, but also as

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an articulating principle for the recognition of minority rights. The book discusses claims of legal citizens of Turkey who are neither non-Muslim, ethnic Turk, nor Sunni Muslim, and their different religious, linguistic and cultural existence in the public realm within the territorial boundaries of the Turkish state. Questions of citizenship and national identity are closely related, since the former commands the definition and representation of the nation, that is, national identity itself, and addresses the jurisdictional process that led to specific legislation, which gradually brought about the determination of legal distinctions between citizens and foreigners, being formed.41 It is also common practice to use the words ‘citizenship’ and ‘national identity’ or ‘nationality’ synonymously in referring to membership, loyalty and allegiance to a nation-state.42 Some people, however, regard identity and citizenship as conflictual attachments. They consider questions of identity as incompatible with those of citizenship and democracy. The belief in the basic conflict between citizenship and identity arises from a specific conception of each: citizenship as universal and identity as particular. Instead of regarding themselves as citizens of sovereign nation-states, much less citizens of the world, many people have come to see themselves primarily as members of a racial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious or gender group.43 Many people assume that group identities, such as those based on racial, gender, ethnic and linguistic traits, conflict with citizenship. Indeed, while citizenship signifies universal attachments, group identities are particularistic. Nevertheless, as Işın and Wood rightly pointed out it is a mistake to regard citizenship and identity as antinomic principles and to recognise the rise of new identities and claims for group rights as a challenge to the modern interpretation of universal citizenship, which is itself a form of group identity.44 There is certainly a tension between universal aspirations of citizenship and particularistic claims of identity. However, since citizenship has never been universal, it is more appropriate to interpret different group identity formations as claims for recognition of citizenship rights.45 This book adopts the Işın and Wood approach towards the relationship between identity and citizenship and seeks a new conception of citizenship that would meet the needs of diverse societies. Citizenship can be defined as membership in a nation-state but such membership has different dimensions. At the individual level, a person’s citizenship, according to Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, is composed of three main elements or dimensions.46 The first is citizenship as legal status, defined by civil, political and social rights. Here, the citizen is the legal person free to act according to the law

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and having the right to claim the law’s protection. It need not mean that the citizen takes part in the law’s formulation, nor does it require that rights be uniform between citizens. The second dimension refers to citizenship as membership in a political community that furnishes a distinct source of identity. In many ways, the identity dimension is the least straightforward of the three elements of citizenship, as discussed above. The third dimension, civic virtue, considers citizens specifically as political agents, actively participating in a society’s political institutions. As it can be observed, these three ideas are conceptually and empirically linked in a variety of ways. Thus citizenship is not only a legal status but also it is about identity and civic virtue. For this reason, when we are talking about citizenship, these three different aspects of it should be mentioned. There are political scientists who have discussed other dimensions of citizenship,47 but this book will employ Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman’s analysis in examining the evolution and meaning of legal, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship in Turkey throughout the Republican period (1923–2010), since they were amongst the first to talk extensively about these different dimensions.Without citizens who possess political virtues, such as a capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to demand what can be paid for, the ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, and willingness to engage in public discourse, democracies become difficult to govern. Stephen Macedo,48 William Galston,49 and Eamonn Callan,50 among others, have all emphasised the importance of public reasonableness. This virtue is defined as the ability to listen to others and formulate one’s own position in a way that is sensitive to, and respectful of, the different experiences and identities of fellow citizens, acknowledging that these differences may affect political views. But how and where does one develop this and related virtues? If a differentiated model of citizenship simply allows individuals and groups to retreat into their particular enclaves, how are they to develop either the motivation or the capacity to participate in a common forum? When one thinks of the answer to these questions, one can understand the political philosophers’ renewed interest in civic education over the last twenty years. If we want citizens of diverse societies to develop the ‘right’ attitudes and dispositions, we should encourage civic education that teaches respect for differences while providing the necessary skills for democratic discussion across these differences.51 Nevertheless, since citizenship is a contested concept, education for citizenship is also an issue of debate and controversy.52

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The recent international interest in citizenship education stems from a number of political developments. First, there is the emergence of democratised states such as Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe where citizenship education is essential to enable the population to understand democracy and its basis as human rights. Second, governments in established democracies, concerned at an apparent crisis of confidence in the formal established political processes, including elections, see citizenship education as a means of restoring confidence in democracy. Third, where globalisation has led to increased migration and consequent demographic changes, citizenship education is intended to enable young people from different backgrounds to live together. We are not born citizens, but are formed through education and experience.53 Thus one of the key elements in the creation of stable nation-states has been the states’ ability to socialise their young generation into the role of citizen through a process of mass schooling.54 Education is seen as a means of conflict reduction, particularly in societies moving towards democracy, consolidating their democratic systems, or experiencing ethnic and religious strife.55 Citizens have to be educated for democracy, because ‘democrats are made, not born’.56 In Turkey, education has been vital to the modernising agenda57 and has played a crucial role in the creation of civilised citizens. I suggest that in Turkey, where there are citizens belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, civic education plays a very important role for promoting tolerance among Turkish citizens. For this reason Turkey’s civic education textbooks throughout the Republican period will be examined to determine the extent to which they promote human rights as shared values, and make positive references to ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. Hypothesis and Argument In this book I examine the evolution of the legal, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship in the Republic of Turkey within four basic time periods: first, the single-party period (1923–46); second, the period from 1946 to 1960; third, the period from the 1960 military intervention to the 1980 military intervention; and fourth, the period from the 1980 military intervention until the present. This periodisation reflects the most important developments in Turkish political history and is useful for structuring an understanding of the emergence of the notion of citizenship and the shifts it experienced during the Republican history.

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The book addresses whether citizenship, as defined during the singleparty period – that is, on the basis of a single religion (the Sunni sect of Islam) and single language (Turkish) – has been able to withstand the various changes that Turkey has undergone since the foundation of the Republic.58 Turkey’s politics has been influenced by many factors: we can distinguish internal factors such as the transition to multi-party politics in 1946, the military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980; and external factors such as the impact of globalisation and the possibility of being drawn into the European Union. With these factors in mind I examine how Turkish citizenship was constructed and the changes it underwent throughout the history of the Republic. I conclude with a consideration of whether Turkey is likely to change its attitudes towards citizenship, and the related question of whether it will be likely to overcome the challenges posed by internal and external factors. Here one possibility is considered: that, at least on some theoretical level, a shift to a model similar to Jürgen Habermas’s concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’, which refers to how citizens are bound together by subscription to democratic values and human rights, might be a better foundation for future citizenship than the current model in Turkey. Since the early 1980s one of the major topics of debate in Turkey has been the revival of various ethnic and religious identities and their association with the concept of ‘constitutional citizenship’. Previously excluded peripheral identities such as Kurds and Alevis have begun to question the fabricated and imposed monolithic citizenship identity which was the product of the single-party period.59 The most frequently declared aims of the Kurdish movement range from cultural and political rights to federalism and separate statehood; however, the basic problem seems to be Turkey’s failure to recognise Kurds as a distinct ethnic group. The Alevi community also demands accommodation of their religious identity within mainstream institutions and they wish to establish their own religious institutions, cem houses. The common point of all these demands is a search for a socio-political setting free from alienation and anonymity where these distinct identities can enjoy their social, cultural and political rights.60 For this reason the current situation in Turkey calls for the redefinition of citizenship based on constitutional rights rather than on nationality. It is within this context that the issue of ‘constitutional citizenship’ began to occupy a place in the various spheres of the Turkish public, government and state. For instance, after becoming president in 1994, Süleyman Demirel

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announced the idea of ‘constitutional citizenship’ several times, that is, the creation of a new ‘super identity’ for all the members of a society which appears increasingly fragmented into various identity groups with political demands based on their identities.61 I argue that there should be a basis for citizenship that respects diversity without undermining those social bonds of citizenship that, by helping avert social antagonism,62 can help foster Turkish democracy. Citizenship in Turkey implies belonging to a national community based on loyalty to the state; however, a redefinition of the requirements for membership, outside the framework of the nation, is necessary in order to allow for the acceptance and inclusion of different identities in a given political community. I suggest that citizenship in Turkey should be defined as a formal legal status answerable to the state rather than directly to the nation. The demands of Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslim citizens can be met through ‘constitutional citizenship’. In my reading, constitutionalism is a key for solving problems related with citizenship issues. The concept of constitutional citizenship has been proffered, frequently, as a solution to the difficult issue of political allegiance within increasingly multicultural societies. Heinz Klug has observed with regard to post-apartheid South Africa, for example, that democratic constitutionalism can bring about a certain degree of civility even in deeply divided societies.63 It is possible that constitutional citizenship in Turkey might in this way secure the loyalty of distinct identity groups who are open to the growing ‘divisive’ sentiments in society, but it will be some time before this becomes evident. Importance and Contribution Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, citizenship issues have played a pivotal role in Turkish society and have permeated the related issues of national identity, democracy and political participation. Nevertheless, most of the questions revolving around citizenship as such have yet to be addressed. Indeed, only the legal aspects of citizenship have been extensively examined, and this more for pedagogical purposes64 than for the sake of critique or actual practice. True, there has recently been a growing interest among Turkish scholars concerning other aspects of citizenship, in particular as these relate to the situation of Turkish workers and migrants living in Europe, the problem of their naturalisation in their countries of residence, and the problem of

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dual citizenship.65 There are also scholarly works that have addressed the identity aspect of citizenship while discussing national identity and democracy within the context of the early Republican period (1923– 46).66 Since ex-President Demirel mentioned it as a solution for internal peace in Turkey, the issue of constitutional citizenship has also received the attention of scholars. The debate has varied from the non-applicability of constitutional citizenship to Turkey,67 to stressing the nondemocratic character of the Turkish Constitution, which can be viewed as a barrier for constitutional citizenship.68 Yet for all these areas of interest, issues of constitutional and dual citizenship have tended to be restricted to a legal framework and this at the expense of issues of identity. The identity aspect of citizenship has, at best, been only implicitly present in debates over national identity and democracy. One area that has received little attention has been what Kymlicka and Norman call the ‘civic virtue’ aspect of citizenship, and its relation to legal and individual variables. And this is an issue that crucially needs to be addressed: indeed, political theorist Bryan Turner rightly points out that citizenship is neither a sociological concept nor purely a legal concept but a relationship between the two.69 That citizenship is an international concept has not only attracted the interest of academics, but has also become a significant issue for many countries. By addressing how citizenship operates in a society as diverse as Turkey, this book will provide some of the theoretical and historical background for a better understanding of the issues at stake in contemporary notions of citizenship. Research Details A variety of primary and secondary sources are used in this study. First and foremost, literature on theories of citizenship is used, including a historical perspective;70 two models of citizenship: liberal versus civic republicanism;71 the main dimensions of citizenship (legal, identity, and civic virtue);72 theories of civic virtue and civic education;73 and Jürgen Habermas’s renowned concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’74. Legal texts are also considered, and these include the 1924, 1961 and 1982 Constitutions and constitutional amendments.75 I discuss the Turkish Citizenship Laws No. 1312 and 403, and their related developments76 compared with the laws of European countries such as France and Germany. Finally, settlement laws and laws related to the immigration policy of the Turkish Republic are examined.

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In order to understand the state’s role in the evolution of citizenship, the election manifestos and party programmes of the main political parties in each period, such as the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP), the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP), the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) are discussed. Those political parties which claim that they are in favour of minority citizens’ rights, such as the Union Party (Birlik Partisi, BP) and the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) are also analysed. Furthermore, secondary literature on Turkish politics is examined to evaluate the evolution of citizenship and to explore the redefinition of a citizenship to one which will respect diversity in Turkey. In order to determine the state’s role in the construction of citizenship in Turkey, I look at civic education textbooks throughout the Republican period.77 Primary and secondary school civic education textbooks for each period treated in the study namely, 1923–46, 1946–60, 1960–80 and 1980–2010, are examined to see what kind of citizens the state hoped to create; these texts are compared with literature on civic education from other multicultural countries such as Greece, Cyprus, France and England. Conceptual Definitions In this section I will explain the various concepts regarding citizenship that are used throughout the book, such as ‘Turkishness’, ‘assimilation’, ‘minority’ and ‘legal equality’. Turkishness The use of the term ‘Turk’ in modern Turkey is a puzzling phenomenon78 as people in the country see all Muslims as Turks, regardless of their ethnicity or language. In Turkey, being a Turk has tangible benefits, since only Turks are full members of the nation and considered loyal citizens. Furthermore, not being regarded as a Turk leads to the stigma of being an imperfect citizen. In order to explain the dilemmas of citizenship in Turkey, it is necessary to clarify what constitutes Turkishness. The sociologist Mesut Yeğen pictures a narrative on the connections between citizenship and Turkishness. Yeğen means that Turkishness has been divided into two categories: ‘Turkishness as citizenship’ and ‘Turkishness as such’. Basically, Turkishness has been open to non-Turks

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but, as we shall see throughout the book, not all of them. Yeğen goes back to the 1924 Constitution, where Article 88 says: ‘the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race would, in terms of citizenship, be considered Turkish.79 This indicates that there is Turkishness beyond Turkishness in terms of citizenship. Hence, in the eyes of official Turkey, there has been a difference between ‘constitutional Turks’ and ‘Turks as such’. Whereas Muslim Turkish citizens such as the Kurds have mostly been invited to Turkishness as such, non-Muslims have fallen into the category of Turkishness as citizenship.80 Since then the single-party period state’s understanding of what constitutes Turkishness, enforced through many state practices, has dominated the relationship between the state and its citizens, especially the nonMuslim and non-Turkish communities. According to Soner Çağaptay, Kemalism had three overlapping, but inexact categories of Turkishness. The first was territorial, which was the most inclusive of the three. The second definition, less inclusive than the first, was religious. The third, and the least inclusive, definition of Turkishness was ethno-religious. According to the third definition, the state saw only those people who were ethnically Turkish as real citizens of the Turkish Republic; it used religion to classify non-Turks into two hierarchical categories, Muslim, and non-Muslim, and favoured the former over the latter.81 Throughout this book I will be considering which category of Turkishness is being used by the state officials. Minority The fact that citizenship is directly linked with the question of minority rights is fundamental to the theoretical framework invoked in this study and demands that we define the meaning of minority. Although, there is no universally accepted definition of the term, the most widely accepted formulation was proposed by Francesco Capotorti, who has defined minority as: A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the state – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.82

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The official minority policy in Turkey was set by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which defined minorities solely on the basis of religion, excluding linguistic and ethnic minorities.83 Thus the non-Muslim minorities such as Jews, Armenians and Greeks are recognised as minorities in accordance with the treaty, but the existence of Muslim minorities such as Kurds and Alevis has been denied. This was related to the fact that the recognition of minorities contradicted the ideological foundation on which the Republic of Turkey is based. There are indications that this is beginning to change, with improvements such as a greater respect for cultural diversity during recent years. Nevertheless, in spite of the legal recognition and the constitutional guarantee of these rights, non-Muslim citizens, Alevis and Kurdish citizens still continue to suffer a great deal of discrimination in Turkey. Turkey is home to many ethnic and linguistic communities that are predominantly Muslim, such as Kurds, Lazes, Romas, Circassians and Arabs. There are also Alevis, who belong to a denomination of Islam and constitute the largest religious minority in Turkey. While none of these groups is recognised as a minority or granted religious or linguistic rights, this book argues that only the Alevis and the Kurds qualify for national minority status and that the remaining groups constitute cultural minorities. Kurds are Turkey’s only large linguistic minority, comprising approximately one-fifth of the country’s population. Alevis, by one account, comprise one-third. Also, while most Alevis are ethnically and linguistically Turkish, about 3 million of them are also Kurdish. Despite the fact that they are legal citizens of the Turkish Republic, they are deprived of rights in regard to their cultural existence. Assimilation As the term ‘assimilation’ is used throughout the book, it is important to give its definition. The term has changing connotations in relation to a minority group’s position vis-à-vis the majority group. Baskın Oran distinguishes between two analytical categories of assimilation: natural/ voluntary and forced. A minority group may ­– naturally over time, or voluntarily, consciously and willingly ­– assimilate into the majority culture. Alternatively, it may be forced by the majority to forego its natural characteristics and to assimilate into the majority culture. This latter form of assimilation is often a product of oppressive state policies.84 As will be seen, during the Republican period the Turkish state used different forms of assimilation.

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Equality It is also necessary to clarify what equality in law and equality in fact actually mean. For the purpose of argument it is necessary to state that citizenship is not just a legal status but also it involves practices. Equality in law is a question of process, whereby minorities are guaranteed equal protection before the law. Such procedural (legal) equality is the sine qua non of citizenship status,85 but is by no means the sufficient precondition of full equality. States must also guarantee substantive equality – equality in fact – by undertaking institutional and financial arrangements to provide the ‘institutional embodiment’ of minority cultures in every aspect of social life, including in education, the media and the government.86 In the final analysis equality does not ‘mean treating everyone the same for all purposes’, but may require treating some individuals differently and in fact, more favourably, than others precisely because they are different. As Dilek Kurban rightly pointed out, the principles of equality and affirmative action are not contradictory. On the contrary, they are independent because the former justifies the latter and the latter is often a prerequisite to achieve the former.87 In Turkey, non-Muslim, Kurdish and Alevi citizens are demanding substantive equality in addition to legal equality. Chapter Overview Chapter 2 deals with citizenship theories and provides the basis for a redefinition of citizenship in the context of Turkish society. This chapter analyses citizenship in a historical perspective, liberal versus communitarian theories of citizenship, the main dimensions of citizenship (legal, identity, and civic virtue), theories of civic virtue and civic education, Jürgen Habermas’s concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’, and a new approach to citizenship theory. If the Turkish notion of modern citizenship can better help develop a broader historical understanding of citizenship issues in general, this is first of all because (in terms of Bryan Turner’s classification)88 it seems akin to both the revolutionary French tradition and the German passive tradition. Secondly, citizenship issues in Turkey – unlike those of Europe – have spanned only a few decades as opposed to several centuries. As such, the case of Turkey provides a condensed and thus more panoramic view of what is at work and at stake in issues of citizenship. Indeed, whereas aspects of citizenship in, say, the United Kingdom (as T.H. Marshall has shown)89 have sequentially

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gone through three different dimensions (the civil, political and social) over three centuries, in the case of Turkey these dimensions of citizenship have emerged, not only in an accelerated timeframe, but often simultaneously. I employ Kymlicka and Norman’s analysis in examining the evolution of citizenship in Turkey. At the individual level, a person’s citizenship, according to Kymlicka and Norman, can refer to three distinct ideas: his/ her status as a legal citizen, his/her identity as a member of one or more political communities, and his/her activity or civic virtue. Kymlicka and Norman add a fourth aspect of citizenship that is clearly in the minds of critics worried about multiculturalism and cultural rights. This is an ideal or goal of citizenship that applies, not at the individual level, but at the level of the political community as a whole: it is the ideal of social cohesion, which may include concerns about social stability, political unity and civil peace.90 Most scholars approach citizenship in terms of a dichotomy, which basically opposes the liberal tradition to the civic republican tradition. However, the concept of citizenship needs to be examined beyond the rights-based and duty-based conceptions of political inclusion. In addition to the liberal versus civic republican dichotomy, the civic versus ethnic models of citizenship ought to be discussed – after all, it does not necessarily hold that the civic model of citizenship is more tolerant than the ethnic one. Moreover, many approaches to citizenship that tackle the redefinition of political membership provide an inadequate response to issues of social cohesion. This is why other models have attempted to respond to the dilemma by theorising an inclusive civic or ‘constitutional patriotism’ based on democratic principles. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 focus on the construction of the legal, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship in Turkey from establishment of the Republic in 1923 to the present. The chapters are arranged in chronological order, using the following periodisation: 1923–46; 1946–60; 1960–80; 1980–2010. Chapter 3 covers the early Republican period starting from the formation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, until the transition to multi-party politics in 1946. The period of the Republican Peoples’ Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) is crucial for understanding the nation-building process and the basis for the construction of Turkish citizenship. During that era, territory, ethnicity and religion played significant roles in the definition of citizenship. Chapter 4 will cover the multi-party period starting from establishment of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP), in 1946, until the 1960 military

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intervention. This period contributed many changes to the understanding of citizenship by mobilising citizens living in the periphery and incorporating Islam into the identity of the citizens. Chapter 5 covers the period from the 1960s military intervention to the 1980s military intervention. The 1960s military intervention and 1961 Constitution will be covered under this period. Through the enactment of the 1961 Constitution, a more liberal understanding of citizenship emerged; however, citizenship rights were limited after the military intervention of 1971. Because of the liberal atmosphere created by the 1961 Constitution, different ideas started to be discussed in Parliament. Chapter 6 will cover the 1980s to the present, during which time the rise of identity claims from various sections of the population sparked renewed debates on citizenship. In order to explore the ‘civic virtue’ aspect of citizenship in Turkey, Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 will also examine civic education textbooks of Turkey throughout the Republican history under the title of ‘the civic virtue aspect of citizenship’. In order to understand the state’s role in the construction of citizenship in Turkey it is pivotal to analyse these textbooks. School textbooks – perhaps the most widely read books in Turkey – reflect not only the ideas of their authors but also the official views, or at least a perspective on which there is a consensus.91 In this context, civic education courses and textbooks carry a special importance. Citizens require a number of things. They need to have political knowledge concerning their democratic rights. They also need to possess an array of skills, such as the skill of listening to others in public debate, and the skills to participating in that debate. But they also need to be certain sorts of people, who exercise civic virtue, such as to care for and to be tolerant of others.92 As Derek Heater pointed out, schools are the obvious places to cultivate these virtues.93 There is, however, little empirical research that identifies how the transmission of socio-political and civic ideas has occurred through schools. There are studies which address civic education in Turkey,94 but none that uses phase one of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA)95 data and compares the Turkish case with other diverse societies. The IEA in its comparative study ‘Civic Education Across Countries’ covered twenty-four countries and was concerned with exploring and clarifying how civic education was conceptualised and understood in each participating country.96 Civics textbooks of Turkey are examined using three core framing questions taken from the phase one of the IEA study97 and the Turkish case will be compared with some of the multiethnic countries participating.

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Given that democracy is a central concept, what does it mean in the national context and what are young people expected or likely to learn about it? • •

In particular, what is most emphasised as inherent to or distinctive of democracy? What is of most substantive or symbolic importance to democracy, and what are the most salient perceived strengths and weaknesses of democracy with relation to each of the following subdomains: – Institutions and practices - Rights of citizenship - Obligations or responsibilities of citizenship

Figure 2 Framing Questions on Democracy, Institutions, Rights, and Responsibilities.

• • • • •

•

What expectations are there about acquiring a sense of national identity or loyalty? How important is the sense of belonging to the nation, to communities, to traditions and institutions? What symbols are introduced? What documents (e.g. constitution), role models, historical events, ideals are considered important for citizens to know about? What supranational and international organizations and subnational (e.g. ethnic or religious groups are considered important enough to have a place in the young person’s awareness, identity or loyalty? Are either supranational or sub-national groups thought of as presenting a threat to national identity or loyalty?

Figure 3 Framing Questions on National Identity and Relations Between Nations.

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What do young people learn about those belonging to groups that are seen as set apart or disenfranchised (e.g. by ethnicity, race, immigrant status, mother tongue, social class, religion)? What groups (if any) are viewed as subject to discrimination in contemporary society? How are instances of past oppression or discrimination dealt with in civic education? Are differences in participation rates or leadership roles (e.g. minorities) discussed or ignored? Is there tension in society between perceptions of the need for social cohesion and the need to recognise cultural, social, political or economic situation of groups? How is conflict between groups and between groups and society dealt with? Are attitudes of respect and tolerance between groups encouraged?

Figure 4 Framing Questions on Social Cohesion and Social Diversity.

Questions from the study98 dealing respectively with ‘Democracy, Institutions, Rights, and Responsibilities’ (Figure 2), ‘National Identity and Relations between Nations’ (Figure 3), and ‘Social Cohesion and Social Diversity’ (Figure 4), as shown above, will be applied to the civic education textbooks in Turkey. As Turkey was not included in the IEA study, this book provides new information for comparative studies, for the redefinition of citizenship in multicultural societies, and for the promotion of an active national citizenry in Turkey. The legal, identity and civic virtue sections of Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 look at why a certain kind of citizenship was constructed in Turkey (the official definition of citizenship). Because all the problems of citizenship in Turkey have their roots in this construction, these chapters play a significant role and will provide background information for the redefinition of citizenship in Turkey. In the final chapter comments on possible solutions to the demands for a more liberal understanding of citizenship in Turkey will be given. Ultimately, I believe that citizenship in Turkey should be studied, as it offers a prism through which the pre-eminent political questions of our time can be viewed.

2 THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

A national identity which is not based predominantly on republican self-understanding and constitutional patriotism necessarily collides with the universalist rules of mutual coexistence for human beings. Jürgen Habermas1 Citizenship has been defined as one’s participation, or membership, in a common community typically understood as a political community.2 Citizenship is one of the key institutions of contemporary societies, at the very core of both democracy and national identity. Citizenship in the modern age, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand liberalism, as the dominant ideology of citizenship, has stressed the egalitarian and universal nature of citizenship. On the other hand, from the eighteenth century onwards, citizenship has been bound closely to the institution of the nation-state and therefore in practice has acted as ‘a powerful instrument of social closure’.3 There is also de facto exclusion: in most countries, there are significant groups, usually marked by race, by ethnicity or religion, which are denied full participation as citizens. Although they may have the right to vote, social, economic and cultural exclusion denies them the chance of gaining political expression or of having any real say in the decisions that affect their lives.4 Thus, citizenship has been about exclusion from, as well as inclusion into, the polity. The reason for

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this ambiguity is the contradiction between the concept of citizenship and nationality, or between the concept of citizenship as ‘an individual abstracted from cultural characteristics’, and that of the national as ‘a member of a community with common cultural values’. As a result, the current situation calls for a redefinition of citizenship to end exclusion on the basis of race and language without damaging social cohesion. The nation-state is the combination of a political unit that controls a bounded territory (the state) with a national community (the nation or people) that has the power to impose its political will within those boundaries. A citizen is always also a member of a nation. Thus, citizenship is meant to be universalistic and above cultural difference, but it exists only in the context of a nation-state, which is based on cultural specificity. Historically, this tension has been expressed in measures to incorporate minority groups into the national culture.5 They can only belong to the nation if they reject their own language and traditions and conform to the dominant ones. Nevertheless, as Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson have pointed out, citizenship should not be connected to nationality (that is to the idea of being one people with common cultural characteristics).6 Citizenship should be a political community without any claim to common cultural identity. Therefore, there is still a need for a redefinition of citizenship based on new grounds for membership in the political community. In this respect ‘constitutional patriotism’ can be a solution. Constitutional patriotism refers to a mode of attachment wherein citizens are bound together by subscription to democratic values and human rights, rather than through the traditional pre-political ties that nationstates have appealed to. This type of identity is conducive to respect for and accommodation of difference and plurality. It is post-national and thinner than national identity. Citizenship in Historical Perspective The Extension of Citizens’ Rights: The Historical-Sociological Theory of T.H. Marshall It is impossible to discuss citizenship’s various aspects without some reference to its origins and history. ‘Citizenship and Social Class’,7 a lecture given by Thomas H. Marshall in 1949, was subsequently to become the classic theory of citizenship and its process of formation and it remains the most influential work in the contemporary literature on citizenship. Marshall defined citizenship as a status which is enjoyed by

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a person who is a full member of a community. Marshall’s analysis is crucial in the sense that he relates the development of citizenship and rights to capitalist development in England. Secondly, he shifts the definition of citizenship to a more sociological definition.8 Marshall defines citizenship as encapsulating three distinct categories of individual rights: civil, political and social. In the eighteenth century the first type emerged: civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as right to property, personal freedom and justice. The second type, political citizenship, was built primarily in the nineteenth century and encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power including the right to belong to political parties, the right to run for political office, and the right to vote. The third type, social citizenship, was constructed in the twentieth century. This type emphasised the citizen’s rights of economic and social security and gained its expression in the modern welfare state as it developed in Western Europe. Marshall’s main emphasis was on rights but towards the end of his essay he remarked on the corresponding duties that rights entail.9 Examples of duties are the obligation to pay taxes and insurance contributions, as well as mandatory schooling and, in times of war, military service. However, as has been pointed out, these duties are compulsory and no wilful action is required. Most duties are expressed in vague terms, such as the duty to work or to promote the welfare of the community. Clearly, he had a wider understanding of citizenship participation in society. However, his overly formal conception of citizenship led to a view of involvement in the community as purely passive. Marshall’s argument has subsequently been very influential in debates about citizenship, but it has not gone unchallenged. Some authors criticised him for not emphasising the struggle aspect of citizenship rights;10 some criticised him for his ‘sequence’ of rights, arguing that historically citizenship emerged in a circuitous way rather than in the linear fashion that he suggested.11 Others have argued that class was the only pattern of inequality considered in his work, which did not examine other forms of inequality such as gender and ethnicity.12 According to Marshall, however, social citizenship marked the final stage of this development. Therefore, Marshall’s perception of social citizenship marks the ‘end of the history of citizenship’. However, the notion of social citizenship as the final stage cannot be accepted. In this respect authors discuss the notion of neo-republican citizenship, cultural citizenship, active citizenship, race-neutral citizenship, gender-neutral citizenship, global citizenship, European citizenship, ecological citizenship and constitutional

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citizenship.13 Also, he ignored the salience of participation as a dimension of citizenship and his account of citizenship entailed a very passive conception of the citizen.14 In Turkey, the distinguishing feature of civil, legal, political and social rights is the fact that they were given from above, rather than acquired as rights in the aftermath of demands and struggles from below.15 Political scientist Hasan Bülent Kahraman refers to the construction of all the Marshallian aspects of citizenship in Turkey as occurring ‘at a dash’, rather than in its gradual ‘completion’ as a process.16 According to this view, and referring to Marshall, the civil element of citizenship emerged during the early republican era,17 and the political element of citizenship emerged after the transition to multi-party politics in Turkey.18 William Rogers Brubaker: Citizenship and the Nation-state in France and Germany While Marshall’s focus was England from the nineteenth century onwards and the development of the capitalist system, another historical comparative analysis, that of William Rogers Brubaker, takes France and Germany and the process of nation-building in those countries to provide us with two distinct paths for the development of citizenship. In his analysis Brubaker starts with the modern state, which he expresses as the ‘nation-state,’ especially after the French Revolution, seeing it as ‘more than a territorial organisation, as an organisation of membership or an association of citizens’.19 He claims that in every modern state citizenship functions as ‘both an instrument and object of closure’: it is inclusive internally and exclusive externally.20 Brubaker defines citizenship as membership of the nation-state. For him, each nation-state attempts to have a certain population as its own, which can be identified as more than individuals, in order that a cohesive and homogeneous nation can be constructed. By regarding the nation-state both as an idea and ideal, Brubaker delineates six membership norms for the ideal-typical model. According to this model, membership should be egalitarian, that is, there should be a status of full membership and no other; it should be sacred, that is, citizens should make sacrifices or sacred acts for the state; it should include nation membership, that is, the political community should overlap with the cultural community of shared language and character, which is acquired either by birth or through assimilation; membership should be democratic, that is, the members should participate in the ruling process; membership should be unique, people should belong to

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only one state; and finally membership should be socially consequential, that is, it should be expressed in a community of well-being, and membership should entail important privileges together with the sacralised duties.21 Brubaker distinguishes the French conception of nationalism from the German one. For him the French conception of nationhood has been universalist, rationalist, assimilationist and state-centred, whereas the German conception has been particularistic, organic, differentialist and Volk-centred. For Brubaker this gave rise to two different understandings of citizenship. The conception of citizenship in the French context is based on the principle of jus soli,22 on the other hand the conception of citizenship in the German case is based on the jus sanguinis23 principle.24 Taking into consideration the theories of nationalism, Brubaker argues that in France, where the emergence of national feeling and the formation of the nation-state coincided in the institution of citizenship, the egalitarian, democratic, nationalist and statist aspects were closely integrated. Brubaker views the French Revolution from four different viewpoints, each coinciding with certain evolutions in the understanding of citizenship. When it is taken as a bourgeois revolution, the corresponding aspect is equality before the law, with common rights and obligations. With regard to being a democratic revolution, citizenship is viewed as a general status, contrary to urban citizenship with certain rights and privileges, endowed with equal political rights and political participation. As a national revolution both the nation-state and nationalism came to the fore and the nation-state is composed of legally equal individuals. Finally, as a bureaucratic revolution, the citizen engages in a direct relation with the state, a total divergence from the structures of the ancien régime.25 Germany, on the other hand, experienced a longer nation-building process. The national feeling and formation of a nation-state did not coincide in Germany. Nationalism emerged long before national unification, which brought about a different understanding of nationalism and citizenship. German nationalism was a kind of a reaction to the French Revolution and the Enlightenment – in short it was anti-Western. It was based on an ethnic and cultural understanding and on Romantic premises. In this respect, Brubaker notes that, by drawing upon a specific ethnocultural dimension, Germany failed to integrate the egalitarian, democratic, nationalist and statist aspects of citizenship which had been realised in France. This leads him to conclude that the evolution of citizenship in Germany displayed a diversified path among formal state membership, participatory citizenship and ethno-cultural nation membership.26

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As France has jus soli or territorial understanding of citizenship, anyone born in the territory can acquire citizenship rights easily. In Germany, on the other hand, only those with Germanic origins can acquire those rights as the state has a jus sanguinis understanding of citizenship.27 Recent developments in both France and Germany,28 however, suggest that the jus soli/jus sanguinis distinction that was crystallised throughout the nineteenth century is no longer so clearly enshrined in the countries’ immigration law, leading some scholars to suggest that the distinction is no longer relevant. Certainly, the standard theoretical frameworks for evaluating citizenship and integration in these two countries must be reconsidered in the context of new national laws, as well as in light of the increasing influence of European Union policy.29 Brubaker’s views on the distinction between the French and German nationalisms and conceptualisations of citizenship are significant in order to understand the construction of citizenship and its problems in Turkey. Turkish nationalism displays the characteristics of both French and German nationalisms, because it embraces both civilisation and culture. Nevertheless, according to political scientist Ayşe Kadıoğlu, it has a paradoxical nature. This was because the concepts of culture and civilisation were not mutually exclusive but rather closely related to each other.30 For most of the ideologues of the Turkish Republic, without a cultural basis, civilisation becomes merely a matter of mechanical imitation.31 Also, it is important to point to the sequence of the emergence of the state and nation in Turkey. Whereas in the German case, it is possible to refer to a nation preceding a state (nation in search of a state),32 and in the French case there was coincidence of nation and state, in the Turkish context the historical order of things was different. In the case of the Turkish Republic, one can refer to a state preceding a nation.33 Citizenship in Turkey represents an uneasy marriage between ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity and belonging. For this reason the notion of citizenship in Turkey, when viewed from the angle of Brubaker’s classification, seems akin to both the French conception of citizenship based on territory and the German conception of citizenship based on blood. As will be seen in the following chapters, during the republican period there were periodic shifts from jus soli to jus sanguinis principles and vice versa. It should also be clarified that even if the definition of citizenship is legally based on the jus soli principle, this does not mean that it is tolerant and inclusive. For instance, as French historian Claude Liauzu pointed out, the ideological roots of the civic universalist French nation were highly exclusionary.34 Thus the notion

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of homogeneity of membership, whether based on blood or territory, represses diversity and identity claims in the polity. The assumption that there is a commonality of culture is therefore repressive and exclusionary. Bryan S. Turner: Outline of a Theory of Citizenship Bryan S. Turner, by focusing on the European context, suggests that four different forms of citizenship are based on two axes: whether citizenship is developed from above or below (active–passive) and to what extent it is developed in a public or private sphere. By applying those axes to the European context, Turner shows that the French case is a revolutionary context, where citizenship developed from below within a public sphere, whereas American liberalism is a liberal pluralism that developed from below but in a private sphere. On the other hand, England is viewed as a passive democracy where citizenship developed from above and in a public sphere, and finally Germany is viewed as a plebiscitary authoritarianism where citizenship was instituted from above and in a private sphere.35 Turner makes another distinction, between radical and formal citizenship, which highlights the active–passive and public–private distinction mentioned above. Radical citizenship is the outcome of the developments of the nineteenth century in Europe, of class struggles, wars, migration, and the emergence of new egalitarian ideologies, which paved the way for revolutionary-democratic states. Formal citizenship, on the other hand, by emphasising who qualifies as a citizen, is a criterion formed and initiated by governments with the aim of exclusion and control of the masses. Turner concludes that different historical circumstances ‘give rise to radically different forms of citizenship participation’.36 The Turkish conception of citizenship, when viewed from the angle of Turner’s classification, seems akin both to the revolutionary French tradition, because there were attacks on the private space of the family and religion, and the German passive tradition. However, the Turkish conception differs from the French one in that it was defined from above and therefore was passive. Also, since the 1990s a clash between formal and radical understandings of citizenship has been experienced in Turkey. On the one hand, there is the official definition of citizenship based on the republican understanding of obligations to the state in return for rights gained. On the other hand, there are the demands for a more liberal understanding of citizenship based on the priority of rights and recognition of differences within a new definition of citizenship.

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Two Models of Citizenship: The Liberal versus Communitarian Theories of Citizenship Discussions of citizenship usually have, as their point of reference, one of two models: the liberal or the civic republican. The former casts citizenship as a status involving primarily rights accorded to individuals; the latter casts it as a practice involving responsibilities to the wider society. Charles Taylor has described these two competing concepts of citizenship as follows: One (model) focuses mainly on individual rights and equal treatment, as well as on governmental performance which takes account of citizen’s preferences. This is what has to be secured. Citizen capacity consists mainly in the power to retrieve these rights – equal treatment – as well as to influence the effective decision-makers … These institutions have entirely instrumental significance … No value is put on participation in the rule for its own sake … The other model, by contrast, defines participation in self-rule as the essence of freedom, as part of what must be secured. This is … an essential component of citizen capacity … Full participation in self-rule is seen as being able, at least part of the time, to have some part in the forming of a rule consensus, with which one can identify along with others. To rule and be ruled in turn means that at least some of the time governors can be ‘us’ and not always ‘them’.37 The origins of the liberal model are traceable to the Roman Empire.38 Citizenship meant being protected by the law and it became an important but occasional identity, a legal status rather than a fact of everyday life.39 Thus the liberal tradition understands citizenship primarily as a legal status where there is a distant relation between the state and individual based on the acquisition of benefits and rights from the state.40 The liberal understanding gives utmost importance to rights rather than the duties. According to Adrian Oldfield, ‘rights inhere in individuals, because individuals are both logically and morally prior to society and the state’.41 Therefore, the ‘social contract’ between the individual and the state is based on the state’s role as safeguarding the rights of the autonomous individuals. However, the individual citizens do not feel any responsibility towards other citizens other than to respect other individuals’ rights. Goldwin noted that ‘what is natural for us is not to act as citizens but to act as individuals, with our own personal concerns and interests … without attention to the good of the others’.42

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In a liberal society governed by the rule of law, legal status and rights are thus seen as the most important means of inclusion in the political community. The duties, obligations or responsibilities of the citizen towards the community are quite limited. However, this rights-based conception of political integration is problematic because attribution of rights cannot be considered a sufficient basis for equality or for achievement of full citizenship, and it fails to take into consideration sociocultural underpinnings of political membership. Communitarians on the other hand reject individualism and contractualism. It is a move ‘from contract to community’.43 This conception strongly emphasises that being a citizen means belonging to a historically developed community.44 Rather than rights, it is participation and identity that is emphasised. Thus political inclusion is based on obligations and duties rather than rights. In fact the differences between communitarians are often greater than those between any particular group of communitarians and liberals. Since much of the debate on communitarianism has been confused by a failure to address the different forms that it has taken, sociologist Gerard Delanty discusses communitarian theories of citizenship under three categories:45 liberal communitarianism, conservative communitarianism and civic republicanism.46 Because most scholars analyse the conceptualisation of citizenship as a dichotomy which is basically centred on liberal tradition and the civic republican tradition,47 I will focus more on this dichotomy. Derek Heater pointed out that the ‘Republic’ stands for ‘a constitutional system with some form of sharing out of power to prevent concentrated arbitrary and autocratic government’, and ‘civic’ means ‘the involvement of the citizenry in public affairs to the mutual benefit of the individual and the community’.48 This understanding has its roots in the ancient Greek political philosophy. Aristotle defined citizens as those ‘who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in return’.49 By relying on the Greek city-states as the basis for the theory, this understanding emphasises the importance of civic virtue and common good. Citizenship in the civic republican understanding is defined not as a status, but as a practice or an activity and ‘it is by acting, by public service of fairly specific kinds, that individuals demonstrate that they are citizens’.50 In civic republicanism the responsibilities and duties of the citizen towards the state and the community are at the core. An individual becomes a citizen when he/she performs the duties of citizenship.51 Also the civic republican conception regards citizenship as practice and

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emphasises the importance of civic virtue.52 Courage, devotion, military discipline and statecraft are the republican virtues. Thus, republican virtues are uniformly masculine. Machiavelli, who emphasised the importance of the civic virtue, pointed out: The good citizen, effectively educated in the precepts of virtue, must lead an active life, whether civilian or military. In civilian life the citizen must take a positive interest in public affairs, and above all, refrain from according priority to a private life of wealth, luxury, and ease over a commitment to the general public good. Military service provides the discipline necessary to convert the naturally wicked man into a virtuous, patriotic citizen.53 In Turkey the civic republican understanding of citizenship has been prevalent during republican history.54 Accordingly, Turkish citizenship is based more on duties than on rights and disregards the privacy of the individual. Nevertheless, there were also shifts to a more liberal understanding of citizenship in certain periods of time, such as during the multi-party period.55 Neither the liberal nor civic republican understanding of citizenship, however, can solve problems related to the citizenship issue today.56 Thus, instead of opposing the two models, we should reasonably see them as complementary. For example, Herman van Gunsteren, in his article ‘Four Conceptions of Citizenship’,57 discusses the conceptions of citizenship under three headings: liberal individualistic, communitarian and republican. He argues that none of these three conceptions of citizenship can be realised in present-day societies. He combines communitarian, republican, and individualistic trains of thought and creates a ‘neo-republican’ conception of citizenship. In his view the citizen is part of a community, the republic, and bears republican traits. Virtue is not alien to the neo-republican conception of citizenship, but it is not the military virtue of the olden days. Rather, it concerns debating, reasonableness, democracy, choice, plurality and carefully limited use of violence. Citizenship is an office in the public community in the neo-republican conception of citizenship. This indicates that the citizen is not identical with the entire or ordinary person; the exercise of citizenship is linked to requirements of competence; and citizenship is an office among others in the republic depending on circumstances and modifying the fulfilment of other offices.58 His analysis shows us that neither the liberal nor the civic republican approach is satisfactory for

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solving the problems that the citizenship issue faces today. There is still a need for redefinition based on new grounds for membership in the political community. In this respect ‘constitutional patriotism’ will be evaluated in a more detail as a solution for problems faced in multicultural societies. But before discussing the concept of ‘constitution patriotism’, Kymlicka and Norman’s method of analysis, which will be employed in examining the evolution and meaning of citizenship in Turkey throughout the Republican history (1923–2008), will be examined in the next section. Main Dimensions of Citizenship: Legal, Identity, and Civic Virtue Citizenship is not only a legal status as discussed by liberals, or practices as discussed by communitarians, but also it is a combination of these elements. In this respect Kymlicka and Norman’s analysis is crucial. Within the last ten years interest in two topics has increased among political philosophers in response to developments in Western societies. These topics are the rights and status of ethno-cultural minorities in multiethnic societies, which one can call the minority rights and multiculturalism debate, and the topic of virtues, practices and responsibilities of democratic citizenship, which one can call the citizenship– civic virtue debate. Kymlicka and Norman connected these two topics in a more systematic way.59 They analyse citizenship at the individual level referring to three distinct ideas or phenomena: the citizen’s status as a legal citizen, his/her identity as a member of one or more political communities, and his/her activity or civic virtue. They pointed out that the health and stability of a modern democracy depends not only on the justice of its institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens. For instance, their sense of identity, how they view potentially competing forms of ethnic or religious identities, their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves, their desire to participate in politics, and their sense of justice.60 Without citizens who possess these qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable.61 As Habermas notes, ‘the institutions of constitutional freedom are only worth as much as population makes of them’.62 For this reason the civic virtue aspect of citizenship will be discussed next.

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Civic Virtue and Civic Education For T.H. Marshall, the fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberaldemocratic welfare state. By guaranteeing civil, political and social rights to all, the welfare state ensures that every member of society feels like a full member, able to participate in and enjoy the common life. Where any of these rights are withheld or violated, people will be marginalised and unable to participate. This is often called ‘passive’ or ‘private’ citizenship, because of its emphasis on passive entitlements, and the absence of any obligation to participate in public life.63 Many classical liberals also believed that a liberal democracy could function effectively even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry by creating checks and balances.64 Nevertheless, it has become clear that procedural institutional mechanisms to balance self interest are not enough and that some level of civic virtue and public-spiritedness is required.65 For all these reasons many commentators argue that we need to supplement (or replace) the passive acceptance of citizenship rights with the active exercise of citizenship responsibilities and virtues.66 As Habermas pointed out, it is important to overcome the ‘syndrome of civic privatism’,67 and to encourage citizens to live up to the demands of democratic citizenship, and display the civic virtues it requires. The need for discussing the civic virtue aspect of citizenship received dramatic support from Robert Putnam’s influential study of the performance of regional governments in Italy. He showed that these regional governments performed very differently, despite having more or less identical institutions. For him the best explanation for the variations was not a difference in the income of the citizens, but in their civic virtue, what Putnam calls their ‘social capital’. Putnam defines ‘social capital’ as citizens’ ability to trust, their willingness to participate, and their sense of justice.68 While Putnam’s particular study has been disputed, the general point that the virtues of citizens are important factors in democratic governance is now widely accepted. The emphasis, for the health and stability of modern democracy, is not only on the justice of its institutions but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens. For example, the citizens’ sense of identity, and how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic or religious identities; the citizens’ ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; the citizens’ desire to participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold political authorities accountable; and the citizens’ willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal

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responsibility in their economic demands, and in personal choices which affect their health and environment. Without citizens who possess these virtues democracies become difficult to govern.69 Certain virtues are needed in virtually any political order. William A. Galston points out that responsible citizenship especially requires four types of civic virtues: General virtues: such as courage, law-abidingness, loyalty. Social virtues: such as independence, open-mindedness. Economic virtues: such as work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change. Political virtues: such as a capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to demand what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse.70 Galston’s explanation of civic virtue is not like the military virtue of the civic republican understanding, since his explanation does not emphasise the masculine characteristic of civic virtue, and there is a balance between rights and duties. Rather, he emphasises the importance of being a responsive citizen not a passive one. For Galston especially the last two political virtues (the ability to evaluate the performance of those in office and the willingness to engage in public discourse) are the most important virtues that promote much more active citizens. The willingness to engage in public discourse for Galston is not only about participating in politics or to making one’s views known, but also it includes the willingness to listen seriously to a range of views even if the listener finds those ideas strange and even obnoxious.71 Kymlicka also listed basic virtues needed for democratic societies. These are: • Public-spiritedness, including the ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, and the willingness to engage in public discourse. • A sense of justice, and the capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, and to moderate one’s own claim accordingly. • Civility and tolerance. • A shared sense of solidarity or loyalty.72 In this book, however, special focus on tolerance and on a shared sense of solidarity or loyalty will be made. As will be seen in the following

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chapters, these qualities play pivotal roles in the search for solutions to problems related to citizenship in the Turkish case. The need for civic virtue amongst citizens has raised the question of where citizens can learn these virtues. The first answer emphasises the role of the organisations and institutions of civil society as the seedbed of virtue. The other broad answer focuses on the need for some kind of formal citizenship education. My focus will be on formal citizenship education. As modern nation-states and the concept of citizenship began to develop, schooling acquired much more importance. The cohesion of the population and the inculcation of the feeling and consciousness of national identity were achieved with the spread of education. Many states included civic education courses in their curricula.73 As Amy Gutmann puts it, children at school ‘must learn not just to behave in accordance with authority but to think critically about authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal of sharing political sovereignty as citizens’. People who ‘are ruled only by habit and authority ... are incapable of constituting a society of sovereign citizens’.74 By teaching tolerance and a shared sense of membership, citizenship education provides the foundation for national unity and shared principles. Citizens must have a sense of belonging to the same community, and a desire to continue to live together. Social unity, in short, requires that citizens identify with their fellow citizens, and view them as ‘one of us’. As Kymlicka rightly pointed out, this sense of shared identity helps sustain the relationships of trust and solidarity needed for citizens to accept the results of democratic decisions.75 Habermas’s Constitutional Patriotism: Towards Rational Collective Identities Constitutional patriotism refers to a mode of attachment wherein citizens are bound together by their subscription to democratic values and human rights, rather than through the traditional pre-political ties to which nation-states have appealed in the past.76 This type of identity is conducive to respect for and accommodation of difference and plurality. It is post-national and thinner than national identity. Although neither constitutionalism nor patriotism was invented by the Germans, constitutional patriotism, as a theory distinct from both liberal nationalism and republican patriotism, was invented by the Germans.77 As indicated by Habermas, the political scientist Dolf

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Sternberger invented the term Verfassungspatriotismus (constitutional patriotism).78 Sternberger first talked about ‘patriotic sentiment in the constitutional state’ as early as 1959, then he developed the notion of Staatsfreundschaft (friendship towards the state), and finally in 1979 he explicitly introduced the concept of constitutional patriotism.79 He pointed to the United States and Switzerland as ‘real world’ examples of constitutional patriotism.80 It was only in the mid-1980s, however, that Habermas appropriated the concept. He first advanced his version of ‘constitutional patriotism’ during a public debate in 1986 that came to be known as the Historikerstreit (Historians’ Debate). The participants in the dispute pointed out that German collective identity was at stake. Habermas claimed that a number of conservative historians were attempting to normalise German identity, and facilitating the return of a conventional form of national pride. In Habermas’s view, this new national consciousness was to shore up the stability of the political system. Against such a form of national pride, however, Habermas advocated constitutional patriotism as the only permissible form of political identification for West Germans.81 The concept then experienced a major renaissance in the 1990s, when observers both in and outside Germany began to view it as a normatively attractive form of civic attachment for increasingly multicultural societies.82 Moreover, in recent years it has been advanced as a way of conceptualising ‘civic identification’ at the supranational level, with some scholars explicitly calling for a ‘European constitutional patriotism’.83 Habermas’s constitutional patriotism pointed out that patriotic commitment is legitimate in so far as it is directed at universalist-oriented political constitutions and detached from particular cultural contexts.84 He noted that the ‘the universalism of legal principles is reflected in a procedural consensus, which must be embedded in the context of a historically specific political culture through a kind of constitutional patriotism’.85 The social bond in a liberal-democratic state should be, in the words of one of Habermas’s followers, ‘juridical, moral and political, rather than cultural, geographical and historical’. Therefore, allegiance to the political community is made independent of individuals’ ethnic and cultural origins, religious beliefs and social practices. By thus detaching political loyalty from the dominant culture, constitutional patriotism attractively combines the universalist and inclusive ideals of liberalism with a recognition that citizens of a liberal-democratic polity must display at least some shared dispositions and commitments.86

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Habermas suggested in his 1990 essay on ‘Citizenship and National Identity’ that multicultural and multinational societies might be unified at the level of politics by a liberal political culture supported by a constitutional patriotism. Patriotism of this kind, he says, gives its loyalty to the universal principles and practices of democracy and human rights. He adds that: One’s own tradition must in each case be appropriated from a vantage point relativised by the perspectives of other traditions, and appropriated in such a manner that it can be brought into a transnational, Western European constitutional culture. A particularistic anchoring of this kind would not do away with one iota of the universalist meaning of popular sovereignty and human rights. The original thesis stands: democratic citizenship need not be rooted in the national identity of a people. However, regardless of the diversity of different cultural forms of life, it does require that every citizen be socialised into a common political culture.87 When Habermas writes on citizenship his discussions revolve around the competing views of liberal and the civic republican models.88 According to Habermas, liberal citizenship is conceived along the lines of an organisational membership which is grounded on a legal status. In this model individuals remain outside the state. In the republican interpretation, however, citizens are integrated into the political community like the parts of a whole, in such a way that they can develop their personal and social identity only within the horizon of shared traditions and recognised political institutions.89 Although Habermas is not satisfied with either view, he argues that the republican ‘holistic’ approach has an advantage over the liberal model: ‘The holistic model makes it clear that political autonomy is an end in itself that can be realised not by the single individual privately pursuing his own interests but only by all together in an intersubjectively shared practice’.90 Furthermore, the republican model anticipates that citizens will be so oriented toward the common good that, they will not only enjoy membership in the state but will also be inclined to use their rights of participation. Thus the difference between the liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship comes down to the rights of membership (private autonomy) versus the inclination to participate (public autonomy). Nevertheless, neither analysis addresses on its own what Habermas sees as central issues: the capacity of citizens to participate in a meaningful way as well as an explanation of

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what functions such citizens should carry out. It is no wonder that little attention has been focused on the capacities and functions of citizenship. Furthermore, Habermas did not think that an unproblematic return to a pre-national and pre-modern patriotism centred on civic friendship was possible or even normatively desirable, as an unproblematic reference to quasi-sacred objects – including patria – is no longer available. Instead, in a ‘disenchanted’ world, individuals develop what Habermas, following the psychological models of Lawrence Kohlberg, called the ‘post-conventional identities’. Citizens learn to adopt as impartial a point of view as possible and step back not only from their own desires, but also from the conventional social expectations with which society and its institutions confront them. To put it differently: identity becomes ‘de-centred’, as individuals relativise what they want and what others expect from them in the light of moral concerns.91 A similar process can be observed at the level of society. The exercise of coercion of citizens can no longer be justified with reference to sacred or quasi-sacred sources. One way or another, actual popular sovereignty becomes the sole source of legitimacy. Religious legitimacy tends to be abandoned alongside traditionalism and other transcendent sources of authority. Thus emerges what Habermas has termed the ‘posttraditional society’.92 What unfolds at the level of the individual through social interaction needs a delicate web of communicative processes at the collective level. The public sphere needs to be porous so that collective identities are renegotiated and revised. Open-ended communication is thus a crucial precondition for what Habermas has termed the ‘rationalisation of collective identities’.93 Habermas added a much stronger universalist element to the original conception of constitutional patriotism. Yet he also sought to reduce the statist and some of the republican elements. Habermas argued that the traditionally German idea of state as a substantial, or even metaphysical, entity, above and beyond society, was to be replaced by the Rechtsstaat (the rule of law) on the one hand and the Sozialstaat (the social state) on the other. The former was to give force to universal norms and guarantee democratic procedures, whereas the latter was to provide a material foundation for citizens’ effective political participation.94 Habermas also focused on the public sphere as providing a space for public reasoning among citizens. In the public sphere, citizens could recognise each other as free and equally engage in a democratic learning process, subjecting each other’s claims to the very universal principles that they endorsed patriotically.95 The traditional Weberian reference points for the state,

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territory, organisation and the monopoly of legitimate violence (including the violence against constitutional enemies), were de-emphasised in favour of an open-ended process of communication. Such a process was formally underpinned by the rights guaranteed through the Rechtsstaat and materially by the welfare provided through the Sozialstaat.96 Constitutional patriotism designates the idea that political attachment ought to centre on the norms, the values, and, more indirectly, the procedure of a liberal-democratic constitution. Habermas pointed out that a democratic constitution should be supported by a political culture that satisfies various conditions. First, it must be consistent with post-conventional morality. Second, it must resonate with the ethical understanding of all cultural groups in the political community. The political culture cannot afford to be seen as an expression of the substantive and particular values of the majority culture. Finally, the political culture needs to be supported by social and welfare rights, in order that citizens can experience ‘the fair value of their rights’, so that they can feel the benefit of their participation in the common political culture.97 The issue of constitutional citizenship has received the attention of some politicians and academics in Turkey as well. As will be seen in Chapter 7, constitutional citizenship is suggested as a solution for solving the problems the regime experiences, such as identity claims coming from different sections of the society. Political scientists Ahmet İçduygu and Fuat Keyman discuss the applicability of constitutional citizenship for Turkey. As a result of globalisation and the emergence of identity politics, and multiculturalism, together with the ‘legitimacy crisis’ that most countries have experienced, certain changes occurred in the conceptualisation of the spirit of constitutionality. Rather than the protection of individual rights and liberties, constitutionality now stands for the ‘ethical code that puts into effect the cultural differences in a common denominator, a common identity code, and moves the demands of difference to the public sphere’.98 Thus, they point to a change in the definition of constitution, a transition from common identity to difference. The constitutional state now stands for both respect for individual rights and for moving the demands of difference to a democratic environment. According to İçduygu and Keyman, constitutional citizenship is ‘the recognition of different ethnic, religious or faith groups within the nation-state and safeguarding the social preservation and development of each groups’ existences socially and politically, based on a kind of social contract, like a constitution’.99 They also suggest that ‘constitutional citizenship is reconstructing the understanding of citizenship, which was

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constructed as a political identity at a meta-historical and meta-cultural level by the Kemalist modernisation will, on the basis of rights’.100 Rethinking Citizenship: Redefinition of the Constitutive Basis of Membership Political membership in the liberal and communitarian conceptions is constructed on the ideal of a universal citizenship, based on the notion that inclusion of everyone in full citizenship under equal protection of the law is possible. Nevertheless, while citizenship is a tool for integration, reinforcing a sense of community and commonality, it also operates at various levels to exclude those individuals considered strangers to the community. The ideal type of the liberal or civic republican models of citizenship, however, does not exist in reality. As citizenship regimes in different states tend to be instructed by one model or the other, most scholars analyse the conceptualisation of citizenship as a dichotomy, which is basically centred on the liberal tradition and the civic republican tradition, and some of them have suggested the combination of these traditions as a solution for recognition of difference in multicultural societies. However, the barriers to full citizenship are not inherent in the definition of citizenship but stem from the existence of a constitutive basis of political membership, which is defined as a common culture. Thus the concept of citizenship needs to be problematised beyond rights-based and duty-based conceptions of political inclusion, and the assumption of a common culture, which acts as the basis of community, needs to be discussed. The redefinition of the constitutive basis of membership outside the framework of the nation is necessary to allow for the acceptance and inclusion of different identities in a given political community. Nevertheless, reconciling unity, cohesion and inclusion of differences constitutes a daunting challenge for multicultural societies. Although a discussion of different approaches to citizenship leads us to conclude that no definitive model of citizenship ending exclusion can be articulated, a number of theoretical elements, which would lead to the elaboration of a definition of citizenship respecting human diversity while providing a solution to concerns of social cohesion, can be identified. The aim of this section is not to provide a definitive solution to the inclusion of difference in the political community, but to tackle contemporary models and approaches to assess the alternatives to the entanglement of citizenship

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and nationality, and new models of citizenship, which might end exclusion on the basis of religious and ethnic differences. The definition of citizenship has been equated with membership of a nation. Also, for the defenders of national identity, citizenship can only be a meaningful status if connected to the idea of the nation. For example, David Miller argues that citizenship is an empty idea without its association with the nation.101 Nevertheless, as Oommen rightly pointed out, citizenship must be detached from the cultural idea of nation if it is to serve as an inclusionary concept, capable of uniting diverse groups within increasingly plural societies.102 As Habermas puts it succinctly, ‘citizenship was never conceptually tied to national identity’.103 The association of the concepts of citizenship and nationality justifies the exclusion of individuals who do not belong to the common cultural community underpinning the political community. In order to end racial exclusion, citizenship must get rid of the ambiguities and exclusionary implications of nationality. The question here is whether human diversity can be respected while providing solutions to concerns of social integration. Can racially inclusive models of citizenship be reconciled with unity and cohesion in the political community? Many approaches to citizenship have tackled redefinition of political membership; however, they provide an inadequate response to the issue of unity and cohesion. This is why other models such as ‘constitutional patriotism’ attempted to respond to the dilemma by theorising an inclusive ‘civic’ or constitutional patriotism based on democratic principles. The concept of citizenship provides a lens through which many problems in political theory can be fruitfully examined.104 Constitutional patriotism refers to a mode of attachment wherein citizens are bound together by their subscription to democratic values and human rights, rather than through the traditional pre-political ties to which nation-states have appealed in the past.

3 THE SINGLE-PARTY PERIOD (1923–46)

In today’s Turkish national, political and social community we have patriots and citizens who have been subjected to propaganda about Kurdish, Caucasian and even Laz and Bosnian nations. But there are misnomers, which are a result of the despotic ages of long ago, they have no influence on the individuals of this nation, except for a new enemy agents and brainless reactionaries, and have left our people in grief and sorrow. Because individuals of this nation, as members of the integrated unified Turkish community, have a common past, history, morality and law. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk1 The slogan of the Turkish Republic, during the single-party period, was ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’ (tek dil, tek kültür, tek ülkü).2 This slogan played a very significant role in assimilating the cultural differences among citizens, as well as in the construction of Turkish citizenship. During the single-party period the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP)3 distinguished between citizenship (being a Turkish citizen) and nationality (Turkishness), and tied citizenship rights to nationality. The then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü’s4 speech in the parliament, on his return from the Eastern provinces in 1932, demonstrates this idea succinctly:

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Who constitutes the Turkish citizen? We are truly sincere in the definition given to the Turkish nationalist and the Turkish citizen by the state’s legal laws. We do not ask for anything abnormal from those living in this country who wants to be a Turkish nationalist and a Turkish citizen. It is enough to choose and accept to be Turkish to acquire all those rights pertaining to the Turkish nation.5 The single-party period not only differentiated between Turkish citizenship and Turkishness but also, as the political scientist Mesut Yeğen puts it clearly, what the Turkish state understood by Turkish citizenship, which was said to be less than Turkishness.6 Some political scientists and historians argued that during the single-party period there were three categories of citizenship: Muslim ethnic Turks, non-Turkish Muslims and non-Muslim minorities.7 According to Rıfat Bali, Muslim ethnic Turks were considered to be the ‘real citizens’ or ‘first-class citizens’ of the Republic, non-Turkish Muslims, such as Kurds and Lazes, were the ‘second-class citizens’ who earned Turkish citizenship as long as they remained assimilated, and the non-Muslims, such as Christians and Jews, were the Republic’s ‘unwanted citizens’, since it was difficult to assimilate them, and they were subjected to segregationalist policies.8 Turkishness was open to non-Turks, but not to all of them. The political scientist Arus Yumul argues that the term ‘Turk’ has always been perceived as ‘Muslim’ and non-Muslims have always been included in the category of ‘non-Turk’.9 Scholars who write on citizenship have generally accepted that citizenship in Turkey was defined in terms of cultural or political principles10 rather than ethnic ones; however, the CHP used both cultural and ethnic criteria in its party manifestos, in legal documents and especially in its policies. The CHP not only tried to assimilate and homogenise citizens, but also made ethnic and religious distinctions between them.11 This idea will be discussed in the following section by examining the party manifestos during the single-party period. The CHP and Its Manifestos Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)12 officially founded the CHP on 9 September 1923, as a political expression of the Turkish War of Independence and its aim was to achieve national unity and integrity.13 The CHP was the dominant ruling political organisation in Turkey from 1923 to 1945, and ruled until the victory of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) in the

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general elections of 14 May 1950. The CHP played a prominent role in defining citizenship. To understand the CHP’s approach to national identity and to defining citizenship, the CHP programmes need to be examined. As religion, nationality and ethnicity play important roles in the definition of Turkish citizenship, the CHP’s definitions of these concepts will be analysed. Kemalist ‘secularism’ (laiklik) played an important role in establishing the political and cultural basis of Turkish citizenship. The republican elites sought to form ‘secular’ citizens, therefore the outcome of a series of secularisation processes, constituted the basis of the official concept of citizenship.14 The Turkish word for secularism is laiklik, drawn from the French laïcisme. Turkish laiklik, however, has its own peculiarities, and differs from both Anglo-Saxon secularism and French laicism. In the Turkish case secularism, or laiklik, implies, as Andrew Davison puts it clearly, ‘lay control over religion’.15 The CHP considered secularism to be the principle by which the laws, regulations, and methods of state administration were prepared and applied, in line with the needs of the modern world, and on the basis of science and technology. For the CHP, faith was a matter of individual conscience, and the party considered the separation of religion from politics essential for the success of the modernisation programme.16 During the single-party period, there was a militant definition of secularism with complete state control over the remaining religious institutions and control of religious education and publications. Nevertheless, the religion of Islam continued to be an important part of individuals’ identity and played a constitutive role in the definition of Turkish citizenship. State officials believed that nonTurkish Muslim minorities such as Kurds could be assimilated easily and would become Turkish because they were Muslim, but approached non-Muslim minorities, such as Christians and Jews, sceptically. As they were not Muslim it would be much more difficult to assimilate them. This testifies once more that Turkish citizenship was open to some nonTurks, but not all of them. Turkish culture was another factor in defining Turkish citizenship. The acceptance of Turkish culture and speaking the Turkish language were emphasised to those who wanted to be Turkish citizens. Article 3 of the CHP’s 1923 programme stated that all Turks, as well as people from different ethnic groups, who accepted Turkish citizenship and culture, could be party members.17 This was reinforced in Article 5 of the CHP’s 1927 programme, which stated that those who speak Turkish, accept Turkish culture, and accept the party’s rules could join the CHP.18

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The CHP programme reiterated this principle once more in its 1931 programme (Article 7/D).19 ‘Nationalism’, however, played a major role in the definition of Turkish citizenship. ‘The understanding of nation (millet) in the CHP programmes was not racist,20 but it was assimilationist. Article 2 of the 1931 programme defined nation as a ‘political and social community formed by citizens bound by the unity of language, culture and ideal’.21 At a university conference on 16 October 1931, party secretary Recep Peker expanded on the notion: We consider as ours all those of our citizens who live among us, who belong politically and socially to the Turkish nation and among whom ideas and feelings such as Kurdism, Circassianism, and even Lazism and Pomakism have been implanted. We deem it our duty to banish, by sincere efforts, those false conceptions, which are the legacy of an absolutist regime and the product of long-standing historical oppression. The scientific truth of today does not allow an independent existence for a nation of several hundred thousand, or even of a million individuals ... We want to state just as sincerely our opinion regarding our Jewish or Christian compatriots. Our party considers these compatriots as absolutely Turkish insofar as they belong to our community of language and ideal.22 These explanations show that at the beginning of the 1930s nationalism aimed principally at ensuring the cohesion of the Turkish Republic in spite of diversity. Thus non-Turkish Muslims and non-Muslims were considered Turkish as long as they willingly accepted the ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’ motto of the Republic. The 1931 programme defined the fatherland (vatan) as ‘the land that marks our borders and protects the Turkish nation’s noble and ancient history and our toil. Under no circumstances was this land divisible’. This definition emphasised both geographical principles and historical ones. Geographically, the fatherland of the Turks was considered to be Anatolia, whereas historically it was believed to be more than that. The 1943 party programme preceded the definition of the fatherland with the word ‘holy’.23 In terms of the public rights of citizens, the CHP programmes during the single-party period were not very promising. Article 4 of the 1931 programme listed freedom, equality, inviolability and the right to own

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property as citizens’ public rights, yet said nothing about the protection of these rights by the state. Parallel to this, the duties of citizens were more emphasised than citizenship rights. Democracy was not among the CHP’s six principles (generally called as ‘Six Arrows’) – republicanism (cumhuriyetçilik), nationalism (milliyetçilik), populism (halkçılık), statism (devletçilik), secularism (laiklik), and revolutionism (inkılâpçılık) – which represented the ideals of the party, and were added into the Constitution in 1937.24 These principles began to be formulated in the 1927 party programme25 and were declared by the 1931 party congress to be the core of Kemalism,26 sometimes described as the ‘Turkish religion’.27 The party programmes of 1935, 1939 and 1943 were largely identical. The only difference was that the 1935 programme, which emphasised the role of the state and public interest by saying ‘citizens’ individual and social rights are restricted by the authority and existence of the state’ and ‘the activities of real and legal entities cannot contradict the public interest’.28 Article 4/B also emphasised the importance of the state and individuals’ responsibility to the state. After discussing the CHP and its programmes, the next section will look at how Turkish citizenship was defined, and the fluctuation between a political and ethnic definition of Turkish citizenship will be illustrated by looking at legal texts and practices under the heading of legal and identity aspects of citizenship. The Legal Aspect of Citizenship The Constitution of 1924 (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu) On 20 April 1924, Parliament adopted a new constitution, the first constitution of the new Turkish Republic.29 Scholars working on the Turkish legal system argue that the 1924 Constitution was liberal with regard to citizenship rights and freedoms. Bülent Tanör, professor of constitutional law, for example, points out that the constitution had a liberal, individualistic approach, and that liberties were not limited by the good of the state, public or society, as was later the case especially in the the 1982 Constitution.30 Nevertheless, the constitution only listed the basic rights and liberties of citizens, while lacking any specific provisions to protect them.31 The famous Article 88 of the Constitution stated: ‘The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, are Turkish in terms of citizenship’.32 Thus it seems that Turkishness was not defined in terms of

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race or religion, but it was defined in terms of a territorial national identity. Article 88 of the Constitution was almost entirely adopted from the 1876 Constitution. Article 8 of the 1876 Constitution defined citizenship as follows: ‘People of the Ottoman Empire,33 regardless of their religion and race, are Ottoman tebaa’34 (subjects).35 The difference between the two constitutions is obvious: the ‘in terms of citizenship’ condition of the 1924 Constitution does not exist in the 1876 Constitution. The reason behind adding ‘in terms of citizenship’ was expressed in the long parliamentary debates over who would be defined as a Turk during the discussion of Article 88.36 At first the CHP deputies voted for an article saying, ‘The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, are Turkish’. The membership of the assembly, however, had differing views on who would be called a Turk, as the long debates and the issues raised make clear.37 For instance, the CHP deputy Ahmet Hamdi suggested, ‘People of Turkey who experience Turkish culture are Turkish’. In doing so he emphasised the importance of Turkish culture. In contrast, another CHP deputy, Celal Nuri, rejected the emphasis on Turkish culture, because for him it violated Article 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923),38 which stated: Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Muslims.   All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.   Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.   No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.   Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.39 Another CHP deputy, Naim Hazım, suggested using Türkiye’li (being from Turkey) instead of Türk (being ethnically Turk). Despite the

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previous comments Nuri, however, rejected this suggestion because he believed that it was not legally possible to distinguish between Turks and non-Turks living in Turkey. He described the qualifications of the ‘real Turkish citizen’ as ‘… today our real citizen is the Turkish speaking Muslim belonging to the Hanefi sect’.40 Thus, according to Nuri, nonMuslims, Muslims belonging to the Alevi sect of Islam and non-Turkish speaking groups such as Kurds, were not described as ‘real citizens’ of the Republic. This description was prevalent during the single-party period. At the end of all these discussions, Hamdullah Suphi’s proposal, ‘the people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, are Turkish in terms of citizenship’,41 was accepted. Nevertheless, Suphi preferred to use the phrase of ‘Turkish in terms of citizenship’ for the following reasons: On the one hand the government is firing Rums and Armenians working in foreign companies in Turkey because of their origin, on the other hand if we call all of them Turk then what will happen? They will say that in the law that passed in parliament you call us Turk so you cannot fire us.42 These discussions reveal that ‘being Turkish in terms of citizenship’ and ‘being Turkish in terms of nationality’ were clearly distinct. This distinction can be seen in almost all the laws passed during the singleparty period. The barrier between ‘being ethnically Turkish’ and ‘being a Turkish citizen’ constituted the basis of discriminating policies during the period. Minorities were not considered ‘Turks’, they were ‘Turkish citizens’; however, because in practice citizenship rights were just for ‘real Turks’, minorities could only be ‘half citizens’ of the Republic.43 Thus although the well-known Article 88 appeared to stress the importance of geographical and political factors rather than ethnic ones, debates in Parliament showed how ethnic parameters were constitutive in the definition of citizenship. The term ‘Turk’ had a special place in the 1924 Constitution. Instead of using the term individual or citizen, the constitution preferred using the term ‘Turk’. For example, ‘… Every Turk is born free’ (Article 68); ‘… Every male Turk has the right to choose a deputy’ (Article 10) and ‘… Every Turk can be elected as a deputy’ (Article 11). Although during the single-party period the only way of political participation was voting during the elections, it had been restricted to Muslim citizens. The minorities’ political participation was not mentioned until the 1930s and none of the minority members could take part in Parliament until 1935.44

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One of the most important citizenship duties throughout republican history has been doing military service. However, during the singleparty period the state unwillingly conscripted non-Muslims to the military. The state reiterated its mistrust of minorities in 1939, when the minorities were forbidden to practice with firearms, and it was decided that they should fulfil their military duties serving under Turkish officers. In addition, it was possible to reduce their 18-month conscription period by ‘buying themselves out’ of the military after serving 6 months.45 Moreover, until 1928 the second article of the 1924 Constitution stated that ‘The religion of the Turkish state is the religion of Islam (Din-i İslam)’. This already shows us clearly that the state took sides in matters of religion, and it is only to be expected that non-Muslims were accorded second-class citizenship. It is true that this article was removed from the Constitution in 1928, but this did not alter the fact that the Republic was built on the understanding that in practice a Turk is equal to a Muslim.46 For example, non-Muslim citizens in Turkey, just because they were non-Muslim, were kept under the surveillance of a separate unit of the General Directorate of Security.47 As the constitutional law professor Ergun Özbudun succinctly puts it, the non-Muslim minorities had equal citizenship rights under the 1924 Constitution; sociologically, however, they were not accepted as ‘Turk’, therefore they could not be ‘real citizens’ of the Republic.48 Thus, only people with ethnic Turkish roots were seen as ‘real Turks’ and ‘real citizens’. The Turkish Citizenship Law No. 1312 Laws on citizenship derive from two competing principles: jus sanguinis (literally, law of the blood), which is based on descent from a national of the country concerned, and jus soli (literally, law of the soil), which is based on birth within the territory of the country. Jus sanguinis is often linked to an ethnic or folk model of a nation-state such as Germany, while jus soli generally relates to a nation-state built through the incorporation of diverse groups in a single territory, as in the case of France and the UK. In practice, however, all modern states have citizenship rules based on a combination of jus sanguinis and jus soli, although one or the other may predominate. For instance, jus soli countries use the jus sanguinis principle to confer citizenship on children of their citizens born overseas.49

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It is possible to consider the historical development of the Turkish citizenship law under three periods on the basis of the legal regulations which were then existing: the first period is the Ottoman Nationality Regulation of 23 January 1869; the second period is the Turkish Citizenship Law No. 1312 of 23 May 1928 and the third period is the Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 of 11 February 1964. From a historical point of view, the Ottoman Nationality Regulation of 23 January 1869 appeared out of necessity. Non-Muslim Ottoman subjects were eager to acquire the nationality of the country to which the Ottoman Empire granted Capitulations (conventions granting certain rights to foreigners) in order to benefit from such Capitulations. Thus, it became necessary to enact legal regulations to stop such misuse. Although, the Ottoman Nationality Regulation recognises the principle of jus sanguinis as the principle form of obtaining nationality, it also includes the principle of jus soli as a way of obtaining nationality. In addition to this, the acquisition of nationality following the decision of an official authority is also recognised (Article 3–4). The terms and conditions for the renunciation of the Ottoman nationality are stated in Article 5 of the Regulation, and different forms of nationality losses are provided for in Article 6 and 7. The position of children of those who renounce the Ottoman nationality is stated in Article 8 and the evidence of nationality is regulated in the last Article (Article 9). The Turkish Citizenship Law No. 1312 was the first citizenship law in the Turkish Republic. It was enacted on 1 January 1929,50 and remained in force until 22 May 1964. It consisted of three parts: acquisition of nationality; loss of nationality; and impact of marriage on nationality. Although the law adopted both jus sanguinis and jus soli principles, it extensively emphasised the importance of the former. Under Article 1, ‘Children born of a Turkish father or mother either in Turkey or in a foreign country are considered as Turkish citizens’.51 Also, ‘Those children born of a Turkish father or mother out of wedlock in Turkey or in a foreign country are regarded as Turkish citizens’ (Article 2/C). The articles reflect the importance of the principle of descent, and reflected the jus soli principle only in a complementary manner, mainly in order to prevent statelessness.52 The 1924 Constitution could be considered as a liberal constitution in terms of basic rights and freedoms; however, individual rights were limited for the good of the state, and duties were emphasised more than rights. Thus the civic republican understanding of citizenship was prevalent during the single-party period. The Turkish concept of citizenship, when viewed from the angle of Bryan Turner, was defined from above

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and was therefore passive.53 As Yeşim Arat argues, ‘Citizenship in Turkey appeared not as a revolutionary social struggle from the bottom up by the masses, who asked for their rights from those who did not grant it to them, but as a number of choices made by the ruling elite intelligentsia who tried to grant rights to the masses in order to increase social integration and to empower the state’.54 The definition of citizenship in the 1924 Constitution seemed to be inclusive. However, the parliamentary debates indicate that ethnic and religious criteria played significant roles in the definition of citizenship. From Brubaker’s point of view,55 the Citizenship Law No. 1312 emphasised the principle of jus sanguinis, and used the jus soli principle only in a complementary manner. As a result, the principle of descent played a significant role in the legal definition of citizenship during the single-party period. The Identity Aspect of Citizenship: New Citizens for the New Republic This section will explore the situation of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish citizens, as well as assimilationist policies implemented with the aim of homogenising the nation during the single-party period in Turkey. The slogan of the period (especially in the second half of the 1920s and the 1930s) was ‘Turkey belongs to Turks’ (Türkiye Türklerindir).56 During this period the definition of citizenship was based on ethnic criteria, and the state wish for ‘unity in language, culture and ideal’ was replaced by the desire for ‘unity in language, culture and blood’.57 As historian Ayhan Aktar clearly stated, Turkish nationalism was reformulated during this period. Non-Muslim people were legally citizens of Turkey, but they were treated as ‘half citizens’, ‘aliens’, or ‘guests’. They were the ‘others’ in the society. During this period the Turkish ethnic identity began to be dominant at almost every level of social life, ‘from the language spoken in the streets, to the history taught in schools; from trade to state procedures for hiring personnel; from special laws to the settlement of people in specific regions’.58 Various efforts on the part of the government reflected this principle, such as the Law on Settlement, the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaign, the Thracian Jewish incidents, and the Wealth Tax. Consequently, during this era descent and cultural unity started to play pivotal roles in the definition of Turkish citizenship. In what follows the Turkification process of the single-party period will be analysed under two categories: cultural Turkification and economic Turkification.

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Cultural Turkification: ‘Turkey for the Turks’ As the historian Uriel Heyd pointed out, all the reforms during the single-party period, which established the new state and the new citizens, reflected the six principles of the CHP.59 The members of the CHP were ‘nationalist’ in the sense that they tried to discover the national genius of the Turkish people, as demonstrated in the Turkish History and Sun Language Theses. They were ‘secular’ as the new culture was based on ancient, pre-Islamic traditions. In this regard there was a complete break with the Islamic past, followed by the adaptation of the secular values of modern Western civilisation, such as the introduction of the Latin alphabet. They were ‘populist’ in that they aimed to bridge the cultural division separating the common people (halk) from the educated and the privileged. They were ‘revolutionary’ since these reforms were achieved quickly using drastic measures, rather than a slow, evolutionary process. Finally they were statist since the CHP controlled everything. However, there remained a paradox in Turkish nationalism, and consequently in the official definition of Turkish identity and citizenship. Although the new secular Turkish Republic seemed to reject the Ottoman past, and its Islamic heritage, it still continued to define Turkish identity and citizenship, albeit not explicitly, through religious elements. Paul Gentizon, a French journalist in Turkey during the War of National Independence, later wrote that ‘there still exist in the country two categories of citizens with unequal rights, namely Muslims and non-Muslims’.60 As the historian Bernard Lewis also stressed, ‘One may speak of Christian Arabs, but a Christian Turk is an absurdity and a contradiction in terms. Even after thirty years of the secular Republic, a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen, but never a Turk’.61 The state officials considered being Muslim as a key for becoming a Turkish citizen and saw being non-Muslim as the natural obstacle for becoming Turkish citizen. Immigration and Settlement Policies: Homogenisation of the Population The founders of the new Republic aspired to create a homogeneous nation-state whose citizens were Muslim, speaking Turkish, and possessing Turkish culture. Nevertheless, Turkey was multiethnic, and, to some extent, multi-religious. Aside from them, the Muslim majority of the country was hardly homogeneous. There were Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians,

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Circassians and Arabs, who spoke languages other than Turkish. Thus the central question during the single-party period was how to unify the ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diversified citizens of the Republic and create a homogeneous nation-state. This can best be observed in the immigration-settlement policies of the Republic. Immigration and settlement policies are very significant for the citizenship issue because these policies reveal that religion (Islam), language (Turkish) and ethnicity (being a Turk) were considered as necessary criteria to be a citizen of the new Republic. Only citizens who were Muslim ethnic Turks speaking Turkish were considered as ‘real citizens’ during the period. Throughout the single-party period, a significant number of official laws, decrees and regulations were issued concerning the settlement and re-settlement of immigrants, refugees, nomadic tribes and rebellious groups inhabiting the Eastern provinces. There were in general two significant themes which made their mark on Turkey’s immigration policy and brought about the promotion of the immigration flows. Firstly, Anatolia was dramatically depopulated due to war conditions, and for that reason nationalist elites viewed the influx of immigrants to the country as one of the ways to increase population. Secondly, the consideration of bringing in the remaining Muslim Turkish communities, such as Muslims living in Greece, became a nationalist slogan that was repeated by the nationalist intelligentsia.62 Muslim Turkish communities living abroad were considered as loyal members of the Turkish nation because they shared the historical heritage of the Ottoman Empire. For this reason the influx of migrants to Anatolia was perceived as a factor strengthening the cohesion and homogeneity of the Turkish nation. This consideration was not limited to Muslims living in Greece but it was believed that even those who were not aware of their Turkishness, such as Turks residing in Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania and Crimea, should be brought to Anatolia as an expression of the national ideal. As a result the period of 1923–39 witnessed a state-generated influx of immigrants especially from the Balkan countries. Around 800,000 people entered Turkey as immigrants in these years.63 A significant number of them came from Greece under the framework of the population exchange. Population Exchange The Population Exchange Agreement was signed on 30 January 1923, six months prior to the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne.64 Article 1 stated that non-Muslim Turkish citizens living in Turkish territories

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would be exchanged with Muslim Greek citizens living in Greek territories starting from May 1923, and that none of them could return to the places they formerly lived without the permission of the respective governments.65 The agreement specifically exempted from the exchange Greeks inhabiting İstanbul as well as Muslims in western Thrace. As a result about 1.2 million Anatolian Greeks left Turkey, while 400,000 Rumelian Muslims arrived in exchange.66 This constituted 61.1 per cent of the total number of immigrants between 1923–33.67 With the Population Exchange Agreement the CHP accepted religion (Islam) as a key for entering Turkey. Turkish parliamentary debates provide an extremely useful source for understanding the homogenisation policies of the CHP. Şükrü Kaya, the minister of internal affairs, stated concerning the population exchange that: The primary debt of a nation, the highest duty of a government is to assure the unity of a nation within its country. The basis of the population exchange to be implemented after Lausanne is related with this object and formed for this object ... Thanks to the Lausanne Treaty, we added 500,000 people out of the strongest elements of our race to our country.68 This discloses that Kaya considered the immigration of Muslims living in Greece to Turkey as a development reinforcing the cohesion of Turkish nation. Another CHP deputy, Rıza Nur, who was the deputy-head of the Turkish delegation in Lausanne, in his speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 2 March 1923 argued: Now in Anatolia … there will be no minority. Only İstanbul will be an exception [shouts of Armenians]. But, friends, how many Armenians are there? [Shouts of Jews] In İstanbul there are thirty thousand Jews. There are people who until now have caused us no problems. [Sounds] It is known that the Jews are a people who will go wherever they are driven. I should say it would be better if they were not subjects.69 As can be realised from the interventions by CHP deputies during Nur’s speech, the deputies were sensitive to all minorities. Another CHP deputy, Vehbi Bey, argued in the Turkish Grand National Assembly: ‘every person who comes is a treasure for us. Every person who goes

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does us a favour when they go!’70 Thus it is very obvious that state elites during the single-party period desired to create a homogeneous nationstate. This objective was mostly achieved by the population exchange. After the completion of the exchange process, the proportion of Turkey’s non-Muslim population, which had been 20 per cent before World War I, fell to 2.5 per cent.71 The population exchange policy suggests that religion, Islam, played a significant role in the definition of Turkish citizenship and that there was an attempt to minimize differences between citizens living in Turkey. Compulsory population exchange badly influenced lives of both Anatolian Greeks and Rumelian Muslims. This can best be reflected in the poem written in 1925 by Papa Neofitos Ekonomos: İsmet Pasha and Venizelos came, They decided on a bargain, When doing this did they ask any man? We’d not seen the like since the world began. They expelled us from Turkey. Tears flowed like blood from all our eyes.72 Immigration of Non-Muslim Groups The immigration of non-Muslim Turkish groups, however, was very problematic during the single-party period. For example, the demand for migration from the Orthodox Gagauz Turks (a group Turks of Christianised origin)73 was not accepted.74 Thus non-Muslim people were welcomed into Turkish citizenship only with difficulty. Of these non-Muslims, Recep Peker stressed, ‘We should express our views about Christian and Jewish citizens as well. Our party regards those citizens as Turkish so long as they participate in the unity of language and ideal’.75 Because it was more difficult to assimilate non-Muslims than non-Turkish Muslims, the non-Muslims could be regarded as Turkish only if they accepted Turkish culture and language, and not always even then. Ethnic Turkish believers in Islam, however, were the group most favoured in seeking Turkish citizenship. Under a law passed in the 1930s, ‘People belonging to the Turkish race or people bound to Turkish culture who know no language besides Turkish’ were accepted as Turkish citizens without any question.76 The Treaty of Lausanne77 had given minority status to Turkey’s nonMuslim population, i.e., its Greeks, Armenians, and Jews.78 Under this treaty, members of the minorities had freedom of worship, travel and

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migration, as well as the right to speak their own languages and form their own religious, educational, and social service associations. For instance, Article 42 of the Treaty stated that: The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards nonMuslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.   These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.   The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature.79 Contrary to this, however, the Republic intended to embrace its entire population under a single civil code. On 4 October 1926, the Swiss Civil Code was adopted as the Turkish Civil Code. Before it was promulgated, the minority representatives granted protection under Article 42 declared that they had forsaken these rights. Avner Levi argues that the reason was that ‘they [the Turkish Jews] wanted to be equal citizens before the Turkish laws’.80 Nevertheless, the minorities’ situation did not improve, as they remained ‘half citizens’, or ‘unwanted citizens’ of the Turkish Republic during the single-party period. The Law on Settlement No. 885 Aside from the Muslim-Turk population abroad, non-Turkish ethnic and linguistic groups especially from Balkans also came to Turkey. Besim Atalay, an ardent Turkish nationalist, called for the preparation of a regulation designed for the Turkification of non-Turkish elements.

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At what time will we make Turkish the language of the people we call Turk? I wonder why we do not compel, why we do not oppress. Why do the Albanians who have come here speak Albanian? Why does the Bosniak speak Bosniak and Circassian speak Circassian?81 Shortly after Atalay’s speech, the Law on Settlement (İskan Kanunu) No. 885 was adopted on 31 May 1926.82 Up to 1934, when a new and more extensive law on settlement was adopted, this law continued to be used as one of the important instruments of the Republic’s homogenisation policies. Article 2 of the law stated that people who did not belong to Turkish culture could not be admitted as immigrants or refugees. According to the ‘Memorandum of Settlement’, issued on 1 August 1926, alongside Muslim-Turk communities, Pomaks (Bulgarian Muslims), Bosnians and Tatars, who were deemed as bound to Turkish culture, were also to be admitted. The government, however, did not encourage Albanians, as they were not counted among the ethnic groups perceived as tied to Turkish culture. Albanian immigration was restricted to the families of those who had already migrated. The fact that Albanians had established their own nation-state by rising against the Ottoman Empire in 1912 can be considered as one of the reasons why the government was suspicious about their immigration. The immigration of Gypsies was also to be rejected. Once admitted, however, those groups that were categorised as people of Turkish culture were also to be subjected to settlement policies that had been designed to assimilate them. There were two major aims of the settlement policies during the single-party period. The first goal was the assimilation of Muslim immigrants speaking non-Turkish languages. By settling them among Turkish speaking populations of Anatolia, the ruling elite of the Republic aimed to assimilate non-Turkish speaking Muslim immigrants on the basis of Turkish language and culture. The second objective was the settlement of new immigrants, who were considered Turkish because of their cultural and linguistic affinities, into Kurdishpopulated areas with the aim of changing the demographic structure there in favour of the Turkish population. This reveals that the government trusted the Turkish speaking immigrants, especially of Balkan origin, and located them to regions that were sensitive with regard to national security concerns, such as Thrace and Eastern Anatolia. The Law on Settlement No. 885 also included the settlement of nomadic tribes. Article 3 of the law distinguished the Turkish and nonTurkish speaking nomads. Non-Turkish speaking nomads were settled

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in the interior regions. For instance Hemshins,83 a Muslim community speaking Armenian as their mother tongue, were transferred into the internal regions. These settlement policies disclose that language was the second crucial element in the definition of Turkish citizenship. Nevertheless, together with religion and language, as will be shown below, ethnicity also played a key role in the definition of citizenship during the single-party period. Turkification of Eastern Provinces The Kurdish citizens84 who inhabited the Eastern provinces became another target of assimilation policies starting in 1925. At the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Kurds had constituted 20 per cent of the population.85 The Kurdish opposition became a serious problem for the government with the Şeyh Sait (1925), Ağrı (1927–30), and Dersim (1936–38) revolts. As a result of these revolts Kurdish villages were closely politicised, the use of Kurdish language, dress, folklore and names was prohibited, and the area remained under martial law until 1946.86 After the Ağrı revolt İsmet İnönü announced: The revolution [the Kurdish uprising], fanned by foreign intrigue in our Eastern provinces, has lasted for five years, but today it loses half its strength. Only the Turkish nation is entitled to claim ethnic and national rights in this country. No other element has any such right.87 Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat Bozkurt reinforced this view by stating: I believe that the Turks must be the only lord, the only master of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock can have only one right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves.88 During the War of National Independence Atatürk saw Turks and Kurds as inseparable brothers (öz kardeş). Nevertheless, Kurdish insurrections continued after the establishment of Republic. For this reason Atatürk shifted his stance on the issue of the Kurds. Initially he appealed to them as fellow Muslims but as separate people (ethne).89 Thus the government tried to Turkify the Eastern provinces, by deporting Kurds to the western parts of the country, and by intending to colonize the Eastern provinces with Turkish immigrants of Caucasian, and especially, Balkan origin. The following steps were implemented for the assimilation of Kurdish citizens:

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1 By the ‘Law Concerning the Relocation of Some Individuals from the Eastern Zone to the Western Provinces’ Kurds were transferred to western provinces.90 2 Another way of dealing with disobedient Kurds was to change their places of settlement without sending them to the western regions of the country. For this purpose, the Council of Ministers issued two important decrees in 1930 and 1931.91 They regulated the relocation of the Kurds inhabiting the mountainous areas of Dersim (Tunceli) to the Elazığ plain. The reason underlying this decision was to transfer the unreliable elements from the places that were hard to control to the areas that were easier to exercise authority over. 3 The government resorted to the settlement of Turkish speaking immigrants in the Eastern Provinces in order to Turkify the region. Nevertheless, the government was careful to prevent the transfer of non-Turkish speakers such as Pomak immigrants to the east. But the promulgation of the Law on Settlement of 1934 was the turning point to Turkify the Eastern Provinces. The Law on Settlement No. 2510 The Law on Settlement No. 2510 was enacted on 14 June 1934.92 This law enabled the government to adjust the demographic composition of the country.93 The law was mainly directed against the Kurdish citizens, with the aim of dispersing the Kurds among Turks to enable assimilation. The law was also used for assimilating religious minorities, by forcing them to move from areas where their populations were concentrated.94 The law still plays a vital role in granting Turkish citizenship.95 The main objectives of the Law on Settlement are laid out in the first two articles of the law, excerpts of which follow: Article 1: The authority for the reorganisation of the democratic structure according to devotion to Turkish culture … has been given to Ministry of Internal Affairs; Article 2: ... Turkey is divided into three settlement zones: No.1 zones are the areas deemed to be where the population of Turkish culture is dense. No.2 zones are the areas separated for the migration and settlement of the population deemed to be assimilated into Turkish culture.

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No.3 zones are the areas where settlement is prohibited owing to reasons related to health, economy, culture, politics, the military and security. Dividing the country into three zones of settlement according to the degree of concentration of the Turkish population, this law was designed to ‘create a country speaking with one language, thinking in the same way and sharing the same sentiment’.96 Among the regulations and laws that were issued during the single-party period, this law is the most striking one in manifesting the assimilative mentality of the CHP government. Some of the articles of the law were designed especially for the dispersion of the Kurdish tribes. For example, Article 10 of the settlement law stated: The law does not recognise the political and administrative authority of the tribe … all previously recognised rights have been abolished even if they were officially documented. Tribal chiefdoms … sheikhdoms and all their organisations and elements have been abolished. In Article 11, the assimilation of non-Turkish minorities was safeguarded and it was stated clearly that the major aim of the law was to have unity in ‘language, culture and blood’. Article 11 had three provisions: 1 Those with a non-Turkish mother tongue were prohibited from collectively forming new villages, districts or businesses. 2 The Ministry of the Interior, upon the decision of the Council of Ministers, would take necessary measures for cultural, military, political, social and disciplinary reasons concerning those who lacked allegiance to Turkish culture or those who had this allegiance but spoke another language. Provided that it was not done wholesale, resettlement to other places and revocation of citizenship were included among these measures. 3 The number of foreigners settled in towns and villages was recommended not to exceed 10 per cent of the whole population of the municipality, and they were prohibited from forming a separate district. Article 29 added that those resettled could not move to other places even after 10 years.

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The Law on Settlement No. 2510 was another major step for the Turkification of non-Muslim and non-Turkish Muslim citizens of the new Republic of Turkey. In order to assimilate ethnic and religious minorities, one of the basic human rights, freedom of movement, was abrogated. The non-Turkish population was spread out over the country so as to be absorbed into the Turkish culture. After the Law on Settlement was passed, the pressure on non-Muslim groups to integrate into a homogenised Turkey intensified, coming to the boil with the Thracian Jewish incidents. Jewish Exodus from Thrace: The 1934 Thracian Incidents There were incidents of commercial boycotts, beatings, rapes, and plunder against Jews living in Turkey’s Thracian region in July 1934.97 These incidents were known as ‘Thrace Jewish Incidents’ or ‘Thrace Incidents’. For these events some historians blamed the CHP and its policies, while others blamed anti-Semitic policies in Europe. According to the historian Haluk Karabatak, the reasons were twofold, namely European influence and especially Germany’s anti-Semitic movement, and the Kemalist project of creating a large glorious Turkish nation.98 Haluk Karabatak argued: The events occurred at more or less the same time in different parts of Thrace. In the days which lead to them, anti-Jewish pamphlets were distributed in Kırklareli, Edirne, and Lüleburgaz. Certain people had provoked the population against the Jews, and had threatened citizens about shopping from Jewish-owned shops. This shows that the incidents were not the work of ‘a few looters’.99 Historian Ayhan Aktar also pointed out that the CHP was aware of these events, but only after the publication of articles in the foreign press did they start discussing the issue in Parliament.100 Another historian, Avner Levi, however, saw the roots of these incidents in German anti-Semitism. The İstanbul publication of the anti-Semitic journal National Reform (Milli İnkılap) – which carried Jew-baiting cartoons from Germany’s Der Sturmer with translated captions101 – was said to have influenced the emergence of such beliefs. Nevertheless, Ayhan Aktar pointed out that it was unlikely that the anti-Semitic journal

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National Reform influenced people in Thrace, as at that time the literacy rate was very low.102 The Ottoman historian Zafer Toprak argued that the CHP could not be held responsible for these events, because the party’s general secretary was not informed at that time.103 It is not possible to know with certainty whether the CHP was responsible for these events or not. However, it is clear that citizens nurtured negative prejudices about each other. When we read the memories of Minister of National Education, Hasan Ali Yücel, who served during the CHP period, these are easy to see: As for the exciting stories which I was told as a child by my mother and nursemaid, there were two things with which they used to scare us with. One was the ‘rag-and-bone’ man, mainly bearded Jews, who would wander the streets shouting ‘Let me take your old things’. These men would catch children, suffocate them with poisoned old cloths, take them to their secret lairs, and throw them in a barrel full of spikes. It was thought that the Jews would do all kinds of evil to the Muslims.104 Orhon Seyfi Orhon’s article titled ‘Jewish Citizens!’ is another telling document to read on this subject. In his article he said: ‘O Lord ... grant me some Jew-free district to live in so that I can enjoy even a little of the riches of my fatherland’.105 During this period there was also a proliferation of anti-Semitic publications. For example Cevat Rıfat Atilhan wrote conspiratorial novels such as Yahudi Dünyayı Nasıl İstila Ediyor (How the Jews Invade the World) and İğneli Fıçı (The Needled Barrel). İğneli Fıçı is a book on how Jews abducted and killed Muslim children in needled barrels to use their blood for Passover matzoh.106 The Thrace Jewish incidents demonstrated, once again, that during the single-party period the ‘real citizens’ of the Republic were Muslim ethnic Turks, whereas non-Muslims such as Christians and Jews were ‘unwanted citizens’ of the Republic. Emphasis on the Turkish Language: Citizen, Speak Turkish! Campaign One of the major tasks of the CHP during the single-party period was the Turkification of citizens belonging to different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Speaking Turkish was particularly promoted as a significant

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part of belonging to the Turkish nation and of being a ‘real Turkish citizen’, therefore; people who did not speak Turkish were called ‘fake citizens’107 of the Republic. The Turkish Hearths108 (Türk Ocakları) association played a very significant role in spreading the use of the Turkish language among the minorities. In a speech in 1923 the head of the Turkish Hearths, Hamdullah Suphi, argued that ‘People who speak Turkish, who are Muslim, and who carry the love of Turkey in their hearts are Turkish. We are looking for unity in language, religion, and will among these people’.109 His definition of who was a Turk was reflected in the policies of the Republic towards minorities. In Suphi’s view, minorities could not be accepted as citizens of Turkey without both learning Turkish and accepting Turkish culture. This idea was also addressed during the debates in Parliament over the 1924 Constitution.110 In Parliament there was an attempt to pass a law making Turkish compulsory and not speaking it punishable by a fine.111 Even as these assembly debates were going on, some municipalities, Bursa, for example, in 1925,112 followed by Balıkesir and Bergama in 1927,113 took the initiative, and began to impose fines for failing to speak Turkish in public areas. İzmir was also sensitive about Turkish being spoken in public areas. Owing to its cosmopolitan character, there were many non-Muslims speaking different languages in İzmir. The local branch of the Turkish Hearths put up Turkification signs around the city, conducted campaigns and offered courses to spread the use of Turkish among İzmir’s non-Muslims.114 The ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ (Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!) Campaign was not peculiar to İstanbul or İzmir, it was found in other cities with minority populations, such as Edirne, where one could even find threatening words written beneath the campaign’s posters.115 A major step in the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaign was taken by the student union of the Faculty of Law, in İstanbul. On 13 January, 1928, it organised a campaign aimed at preventing the use of languages other than Turkish in public places.116 Signs were hung and people speaking foreign languages were scolded. The signs declared, ‘We cannot say Turk to people who do not speak Turkish’.117 The campaign led to tension and conflict118 as it did not merely suggest that minorities should speak Turkish, but it actually threatened non-Muslims, in an attempt to make them speak Turkish. Some Turks instigated court cases against members of minorities who spoke languages other than Turkish, citing Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code about ‘insulting Turkishness’ as their legal justification.119

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There were also hardline messages in the campaign, for example, ‘Either speak Turkish or leave the country’. Another major step for emphasising the Turkish language was the Turkification of names and the Law on Surnames passed in Parliament on 21 June, 1934.120 The aim of the law, promulgated by the then Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya, was ‘to abolish differences that do not really exist’.121 This reflected the policies of the CHP towards minorities during the single-party period. Under Articles 7 and 8 of this law,122 all names that reflected rank, tribe, foreign race or nationality, as well as names deemed disgusting, funny or rude, were forbidden. Article 5 also stated that the new surnames should be in Turkish, thereby also prohibiting foreign-sounding patronymics. As a result non-Muslim citizens gave up their traditional surnames and adopted new ones.123 The Law on Surnames stressed the importance of, and was intended to advance, the assimilation of non-Turkish elements among the minority citizens of the Republic. Under the Association Law No. 3512 of 1938, the names of foreign associations in Turkey were also Turkified.124 In 1937, the decision of a number of municipalities, such as Bursa and Lüleburgaz, to punish people who did not speak Turkish in public places125 led to objections from some non-Muslims. The Jewish community leader Marsel Franko criticised the decision by arguing that questioning the Jewish people’s attachment, or devotion, to the Turkish Republic would be meaningless, as Jews wanted to attain ‘moral citizenship’ rather than ‘half citizenship’ or ‘guest citizenship’, because they felt that they deserved it.126 Other non-Muslims also reacted sharply to the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaign. They spoke non-Turkish languages directly beneath signs promoting the campaign, or else tore up the signs entirely.127 Others, however, supported the campaign. For instance, in 1928 Jewish intellectual Moiz Cohen (Tekin Alp)128 wrote a book called Türkleştirme, which declared that Turkification was a vital mission for strengthening Turkish society and preserving Turkish culture, and dedicated it to the Turkish Hearths. Inspired by the Ten Commandments, he explained how to Turkify non-Muslim minorities in Turkey through ten imperatives: 1. Turkify names! 2. Speak Turkish! 3. Pray in Turkish! 4. Turkify your schools! 5. Send your children to state schools! 6. Become involved in state affairs! 7. Mingle with Turks! 8. Uproot the spirit of separation! 9. Do your share for the national economy! 10. Know your rights!129 Moiz Cohen, in line with the assimilationist policies of the CHP that all citizens within the territory of the Turkish state are, or are to become, Turks, stated:

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Regarding the question of national minorities, the Turkish Kemalist has never admitted this principle. The New Turkey does not recognise in its citizens any but Turks. If today the New Turkey, because of factors surviving from its past, has several hundred thousand citizens who have not yet adopted Turkish culture, it is certain that in several dozen years they will have done so. The Kemalist regime is based on national unity.130 On 10 March 1928, along with two other Jews, Nissim Matsliah and Dr. Samuel Abrevaya, as well as several non-Jews, Moiz Cohen took part in the formation of the National Culture Union (Milli Hars Birliği), whose aim was to spread the Turkish language and culture.131 In 1934, Tekin Alp and two other Jews, Hanri Soriano and Marsel Franko, established the Turkish Culture Association (Türk Kültür Derneği) for the same purpose.132 Moiz Cohen was seen as being more Turkish than the Turks both by Turks and non-Muslims alike.133 Ironically, because of the Wealth Tax he sold all of his properties in Turkey and moved to Nice, France. Despite Moiz Cohen’s support for the new regime, the government rejected his request to serve as voluntary consul in Nice.134 The CHP also used the media to promote the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaign. For instance, the Minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya, made a promise about spreading the Turkish language through the CHP and People’s Houses (Halkevleri).135 During these campaigns, Edirne Deputy Şeref Aykut characterised his understanding of citizenship and expectations from minority citizens as ‘There are us, [ethnic] Turks in Turkey and also citizens who are from Turkey [who were born in Turkey but are not ethnic Turk or not Muslim]. These people from Turkey can become Turkish only by uniting through the language which brings people together’.136 Kaya also argued that ‘I do not believe that 17 million Turks cannot inculcate Turkish culture to the 150,000 people who cannot speak Turkish’.137 Schools belonging to minorities were also under the strict control of the CHP. The Ministry of Education tightly controlled the curricula of these schools. The teaching of Turkish, geography, sociology, history and civic education in Turkish was compulsory, and teachers teaching these courses had to be ethnic Turks.138 Turkish assistant directors were appointed to minority schools in 1937 ‘in order to train students according to Turkish culture properly’.139 By the end of the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaigns, some nonMuslims spoke Turkish, while others left the country. The Jewish

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communities in Bursa, Edirne and Kırklareli adopted Turkish as their ‘mother tongue’.140 The Christian community followed suit and, in 1935, Monsignor Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, then the Catholic Church’s apostolic delegate in İstanbul and later the reformist Pope John XXIII, gave a sermon in Turkish for the first time.141 During the 1940s the number of minority citizens who could be recognised from their language was decreasing sharply and only a handful of minorities resisted speaking Turkish.142 The emphasis on the Turkish language and the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaigns reveals to us that during the single-party period ethnicity-through-language emerged as one of the primary planks of citizenship. This created certain dilemmas for the citizens belonging to ethnic and religious minorities that did not want to be assimilated. The 1930s were a very significant period for the new Republic, because the decade witnessed the establishment of major institutions that played key roles in spreading the CHP’s principles to the citizens as well as creating new citizens of the Republic. These institutions included the National Schools (Millet Mektepleri), founded in 1929,143 the CHP People’s Orators Organisation (Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı) founded in 1931, the Society for the Study of Turkish History (Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti, later Türk Tarih Kurumu, TTK) in 1931, and the Society for the Study of Turkish Language (Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti, later Türk Dil Kurumu, TDK) in 1932. Founded on 19 February 1932, the People’s Houses (Halkevleri),144 however, was the most significant institution of the Kemalist regime.145 People’s Houses (Halk Evleri) For Atatürk, the purpose of establishing People’s Houses was that ‘the nation should organise as a mass of people that is conscious, understanding and devoted to an ideal’.146 As such, Atatürk hailed the opening of the People’s Houses as a social and cultural revolution.147 For his part, İsmet İnönü also justified the project by saying, ‘The People’s Houses were opened to make a space where people gather to edify and boost the morale of both themselves and the nation’.148 Similarly, the CHP General Secretary, Recep Peker, stated the People’s Houses’ purpose was ‘organising the nation as a group of people who are socially aware, love each other, and are bound to an ideal’.149 There were basically two motives for the establishment of the People’s Houses.150 The first one was economic. As a result of the Great Depression

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of the 1930s, the CHP raised taxes and limited the rights and liberties of Turkish citizens.151 Since the CHP could not directly solve the country’s economic problems, it decided to approach the situation ideologically. According to law professor Anıl Çeçen, the CHP hoped that by raising enthusiasm, it could make people forget the depression.152 The second reason was ideological. The CHP wanted to teach its principles (the Six Arrows of the Republic) – particularly populism and nationalism – to the ordinary citizens. It also wanted to research and understand the culture of ordinary people in Anatolia.153 Due to the inadequacy of the country’s education system, spreading Kemalist reforms to the masses was a difficult task. This led to a distance being created between the educated, privileged classes and the common people and the People’s Houses were founded to bridge that gap.154 The Houses were key institutions in the education of new citizens of the Turkish Republic.155 The CHP tried to create a new Turkish citizen, and this went hand in hand with the nation-building process. For instance, Aydın Deputy Adnan Menderes, who later played a significant role in closing the houses, echoed İnönü at the 1932 opening of the Aydın People’s House, stating, ‘People’s Houses will be a roof under which people come together to develop the community and nation’.156 The state officials also emphasised community over individuality as the main purpose of the People’s Houses. The best-educated citizens of the Republic would contribute to the education of its other citizens. The nation would be solidified and the community would be transformed into a rock-like mass.157 Thus the importance of citizenship duties over citizenship rights were also emphasised by the elites of the state. For example, on the first anniversary of the People’s Houses, İnönü spoke of his expectations of the citizens: We will consider the duties of the citizens to be exercised through good will and sacrifice. We exhort the citizens above all else that, if they become old enough to join the military and are called up, they should do their military service, and if the obligation of taxes is bestowed upon them, then they should consider paying their taxes an honour. The basis of our policies and our success is the explicit declaration of duties.158 There was room for citizenship rights and freedoms, however, these freedoms were ‘disciplined freedom’, which meant that citizens of the structured, secure state would be given limited freedom, but expected to

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exercise it responsibly.159 Freedom was to be earned: only citizens who were educated deserved freedom, so the people had to be educated.160 The People’s Houses published special journals in order to spread the Kemalist principles to the rest of society, though Turkey’s literacy rate at that time was very low. When we look at the names of these journals, we see very easily that they reflect the characteristics and worldview of the new regime, e.g. Ülkü (Great Ideal), Yeni Türk (New Turk), and 6 Ok (Six Arrows). Among the most important of those journals was Ülkü,161 the journal of the Ankara’s People House. The People’s House in Ankara published Ülkü uninterruptedly between 1933 and 1951. Peker explained the purpose behind Ülkü’s publication in the journal’s first issue as follows: ‘We are publishing Ülkü in order to promote the excitement of new generations who have left behind the dark ages to turn towards a bright and honourable future, to stir the demand for reforms in the community’s blood, and to quicken the pace of these steps … Ülkü will exist in order to form a unity of the mind, heart and initiative. Ülkü is being published in order to spread through its articles the spirit of the People’s Houses which are working to serve these newspapers’.162 Like the state elites, the Ülkü authors also emphasised the motto of the Republic ‘one language, one culture, and one ideal’. The meaning of Ülkü was defined by Aydoslu Sait as ‘to be sincere in the common desire and consent in living together; to sacrifice commonly to preserve the heritage as well as to have a common desire and will to continue’.163 Thus the importance of the community over the individual was stressed. For example, one of the writers argued that ‘the individual never comes before the society nor is it morally above it’.164 The Ülkü authors also underlined the importance of citizenship duties. The notion of rights was totally conceptualised as the result of duties and debts one owes to the state as well as society. Another Ülkü writer, Mehmet Saffet argued that ‘The individual rights of citizens can only rely upon the common benefit of the people and is always associated with a duty’.165 Ülkü authors contended that ‘basically, a right is a social phenomenon like freedom’. In this sense, any claim opposing the general interests could not be a right. Mehmet Saffet provides a good explanation of the CHP’s solidarist assumption of rights and duties. He argues: The sum of personal rights and duties of citizens form the moral order system which is acknowledged by state and society. For that reason, the personal rights of citizens always rely upon the

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principle of the common interest of all and at all times correspond to duty. In this sense, the notion of right is a product of and sponsored by society.166 Furthermore, another writer, Necip Ali pointed out: We claim that all the citizens were born as debtors to society, for both their material and spiritual identities, and that they are dutybound in their debts towards society with not only their state obligations but also their social obligations.167 In another article Saffet defined ‘disciplined freedom’, which was emphasised several times by the republican elites. He argued that ‘Disciplined freedom means that everyone is free in their thinking, speech and action on the condition that they do not violate the rights and duties of others that have been established by law and morality. Equal opportunity brings forth the character that freedom needs in order to be disciplined. In this definition, when the relationship between duties and rights is established we must think that every right is assured with a duty and every duty is assured with a responsibility’.168 Education of the people (halk terbiyesi) has also occupied a central position in the texts of Ülkü. Every citizen should be taught that they could be genuine citizens (hakiki vatandaş). Hence, the primary duty of schooling is ‘to instil morality and citizenship in the people’.169 Moreover, for the Ülkü authors, a sense of ‘collective responsibility’ (müşterek mesuliyet) has to be developed in order to overcome spiritual defects of individuals.170 The People’s Houses helped to create modern and secular citizens for the Republic. As Çeçen points out, all the citizens of the Republic came together under the roof of the People’s Houses, working under equal conditions. During the Ottoman Empire, people had no common gathering place other than the mosque. People gathered in the mosque as a Muslim community (ümmet), but in the People’s Houses they met as equal citizens of the secular Republic of Turkey.171 The importance of secular education was also emphasised in Ülkü. According to Saffet ‘The best secular education consists of not mentioning religion at all. Questions that asked are responded to by explaining the meaning of freedom of conscience’.172 In 1937 the CHP decided that Turkish citizens with Jewish, Armenian, and Greek origins could also work in the People’s Houses.173 This was

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a great improvement in the relationship between the state and its nonMuslim citizens; however, this may also have been done for the purpose of cultural assimilation of minorities. As Agop Martayan (Dilaçar)174 said at the People’s House in Hatay, ‘Every one whose origin is Turk is Turkish, and if he became alienated, then that person should be turned back to Turkish culture, because s(he) belongs to Turkey’.175 In 1940, with the aim of spreading CHP’s ideals to villages, the People’s Rooms (Halk Odaları) were established.176 In the People’s Rooms, as in the People’s Houses, the only newspapers and journals available were the ones deemed suitable by the CHP.177 The CHP also wanted to spread its principles abroad, and, in 1942, a People’s House was opened in London. The aim was to spread the CHP’s principles to Turkish people living in Britain, and to introduce Turkish culture to foreigners.178 People’s Houses operated from 19 February 1932 until 11 August 1951. After winning the 14 May 1950, elections, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) took over the administration and ownership including all their property, of the People’s Houses under Law No. 5830 of 1951.179 The DP argued that People’s Houses were elitist organisations promoting one-party rule and alien to the needs of the citizens.180 The military governments after 1960 reopened them; however, they remained rather passive and obscure.181 The People’s Houses played a crucial role in creating a national culture, in supporting as well as explaining the history and the language theses to citizens. People’s Houses carried missions of creating modernity, ending illiteracy, and organising social and cultural activities.182 With the People’s Houses, the CHP tried to forge a national identity, the importance of which lay largely in preventing the formation of secondary or tertiary identities among citizens.183 It was also no coincidence that the Society for the Study of Turkish History (TTK) was founded in 1931, and the Society for the Study of Turkish Language (TDK) in 1932, and the People’s Houses in 1932; three pivotal institutions in a two-year period. The institutions controlled three areas – education, history and language – essential for the creation of new citizens of the Turkish Republic. The History and Sun Language Theses: The Future Sought Through the Past The 1930s were key years for the establishment of Turkey’s new political regime, and for the construction of citizenship. The People’s Houses, TTK and the TDK, were designed to lay the groundwork of national

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identity. These institutions were the producers of the ‘Turkish History Thesis’ (Türk Tarih Tezi) and ‘Sun Language Theory’ (Güneş-Dil Teorisi) that became cornerstones of citizens’ new identity. The writing of a national history, the basis of the construction of citizenship identity, is accompanied by processes of ‘commemoration’ and ‘forgetting’.184 For this reason, each nationalist project invents and edits its own past through remembering ‘glorified’ events and heroic figures, and at the same time forgetting many ‘shameful’ episodes in the past. As Anderson puts it clearly, in writing ‘the nation’s biography … these violent deaths [exemplary suicides, poignant martyrdoms, assassinations, executions, wars, and holocausts] must be remembered/forgotten as “our own”’.185 Thus it is the invention of a suitable history for a people without a ‘national’ history.186 The Kemalist project followed exactly such a course. It constructed a new history by a complete break with the inherited near past (the Islamic-Ottoman heritage) and developed a new Turkish national identity.187 The relationship between history writing and the formation of an identity for citizens of the Turkish Republic was well portrayed in the 1935 programme of the CHP. Article 41 of the programme made it clear in the following way: Our party lays an extraordinary importance upon citizens knowing our great history. This learning is the sacred essence that nourishes the indestructible resistance of the Turks against all currents that may prejudice national existence, its capacity and power, and its sentiments of self-confidence.188 Hence the Kemalist history thesis was formed to a great extent as part of the political project.189 The history writing of the single-party rule implied that history, regarded as being ‘distorted’ at home and ‘misrepresented’ abroad, was rewritten to supplant the old Turkish culture, emphasising the Turk’s historical peculiarity even by creating myths on the role of the Turks in history.190 By doing this single-party rule wanted to provide the basis of common language, collective consciousness, selfconfidence and self-respect among the citizens of the new Republic and tried to legitimise the centralised mechanism of the nation-state. The CHP regime established the TTK, under the leadership of Afet İnan, for the purpose of writing a new history.191 The TTK’s aim was ‘to spread the history thesis to the masses and to develop new history books’.192 This association’s first book was called Türk Tarihinin

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Anahatları (The Main Lines of Turkish History).193 The ‘Turkish History Thesis’194 was presented to the people via conferences, plays, historical songs, poems, and marches. The People’s Houses and the TTK also aided in this.195 The main aim of the ‘History Thesis’ was creating a new history and at the centre of the Turkish thesis was the idea that there is a connection between history’s most important progressive events and the Turkish historical experience.196 According to the thesis, the wheel, writing, and agriculture were all invented and experienced first by Turks and thereafter spread all over the world. It argued that civilisation emerged from the Turks in Central Asia, their original homeland, and spread worldwide. The theory also claimed that all civilisations of the world originated from the Turkish civilisation,197 and, in the Near East, the Sumerians and the Hittites were really proto-Turks. It was no coincidence that the two major state banks, founded in the 1930s, were called the Sumerian Bank (Sümerbank) and the Hittite Bank (Etibank).198 In order to prove this thesis, they placed considerable weight on archaeological findings.199 The most important function of the ‘Turkish History Thesis’ was the unification of people by assimilating different identities and uniting them under the umbrella of Turkish citizenship. Dr. Reşit Galip, minister of education, also known as a revolutionary intellectual, in 1931 argued that ‘anthropological comparisons and ancient historical data leave no room to doubt ... that the Armenians have same ethnical origins as the Turks’. Then he added: ‘In expressing my conviction on this point I believe I have sufficiently indicated the logical line of conduct which the Armenians in Turkey should follow with regard to the performance of their duties as Turkish citizens’.200 As discussed above, Atatürk’s aim in his six principles of Kemalism was to create a republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular and revolutionary republic.201 This was reflected in all the reforms of the new Republic, but especially in the reform of the Turkish language.202 The year 1928 is regarded as the beginning of the ‘language revolution’. On 1 November 1928, Parliament passed Law No. 1353 on ‘Acceptance and Application of the Turkish Alphabet’.203 Newspapers and journals were now obliged to use the new Turkish letters.204 In order to inculcate the new language, civic information, and history education, National Schools (Millet Mektepleri), the first well-organised adult education centres of the Republic, were established on 1 January 1929.205 The role of the National Schools was not only to teach adult citizens how to read and write, but also to teach them how to be good citizens.206

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In July 1932, the TDK was founded in order to eliminate the innumerable Arabic and Persian words in the Turkish language, by replacing them with Turkish words. Its aim was ‘to bring out the genuine beauty and richness of the Turkish language and to elevate it to the high rank it deserves among world languages’.207 In order to mobilise citizens for the language reform,208 the TDK declared, ‘All the citizens of the republic are automatically members of the Society for the Study of Turkish Language’.209 The real reason for the establishment of the TDK, and the investigation of the origin of the Turkish language, was to provide cultural legitimacy to the new regime, eliminate Ottoman and Islamic features from the culture, and to establish a new culture based upon both old Turkish motifs and modern Western culture.210 There was a complete break with the Islamic past, along with the adoption of modern Western secular values through the introduction of the Latin script. For instance, on 27 November 1932, the traditional Arabic version of the call to prayer (ezan) was officially replaced by a Turkish version211 and the use of the Arabic version was made an offence punishable by up to three months in prison.212 Cutting ties with the Ottoman past helped establish a homogeneous, secular Turkish nation-state. In order to express the importance of Turkish language, in 1935 Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues developed another important theory: the ‘Sun Language Theory’.213 This held that all languages derived originally from Turkish, therefore making Turkish the ‘mother of all tongues’.214 The fact that Atatürk called the new Latin alphabet ‘the new Turkish letters’ reflected this belief.215 The thesis was a very important element of the Turkish History Thesis, and these two theories fascinated the people. The TDK gave several conferences in order to spread the Sun Language Theory throughout society and to encourage research into Turkish. The CHP tried to homogenise Turkish culture, and to assimilate cultures other than Turkish, through language reform. For example, in Diyarbakır, where the population is predominately ethnic Kurds, the People’s House formed a committee made up of teachers and intellectuals, and sent them to the outlying communities, in the mountains, to study the local dialects. In fact citizens living there were speaking Kurdish, however, the research committee wrote a report and argued that the locals were not speaking a non-Turkish language, such as Kurdish, but were clumsily speaking Turkish.216 This demonstrates that they denied the fact that Kurdish was a separate language from Turkish and rejected the idea that there existed different cultures in Turkey. This is also reflected in Atatürk’s words:

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One of the significant characteristics of the nation is the language. One who regards himself as a member of the Turkish nation should first of all and in every case speak Turkish. If someone who does not speak Turkish claims membership of the Turkish culture and community, it would not be right to believe this.217 Such an emphasis made language, together with ethnicity and religion, the main markers of Turkish citizenship. Economic Turkification: ‘In Turkey Work is for the Turks’ The Nationalisation of Capital and Employment As a result of the nationalisation of economy and occupation policies during the single-party period, non-citizens (Greeks living in İstanbul without Turkish citizenship) and non-Muslim citizens of Turkey were purged from the economy. These policies forced non-citizens to become citizens of Turkey, and non-Muslim citizens to accept Turkish culture and language. In İzmir, a city with a large non-Muslim population, there were efforts to drive non-Muslim brokers out of the İzmir Stock Exchange. Under the new 1925 stock exchange law, only brokers who were Turkish citizens could work at İzmir’s exchange. An even stricter regime followed, under which not only was there an effort to exclude non-citizens from the exchange, but also non-Muslims,218 demonstrating the significance of religion in the definition of Turkish citizenship. Turkish citizens lacked sufficient capital to sustain the market, so capital from nonMuslims was indispensable. There was an effort to establish a bank in İzmir, ‘İzmir Tradesman’s and People’s Bank’, using only domestic capital,219 but such initiatives were few and inadequate for Turkey’s economic development. The single-party period could nationalise some parts of the internal trade, but external trade still belonged to non-Muslims.220 At the first İzmir Economy Congress (İzmir İktisat Kongresi) of 17 February–4 March 1923, an article calling for the ‘allocation of all jobs created in the country to Turkish experts and workers only’ was passed unanimously.221 At the congress Atatürk commented, ‘In both our present factories and future factories, our workers [i.e., Muslim Turks] should work’.222 Before 1926, non-Muslims were de facto barred from civil service jobs. However, on 18 March 1926, Article 4 of the Civil Service Law (Memurin

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Kanunu) No. 788223 stated that all civil servants must be ‘Turk’. The use of the term ‘Turk,’ instead of the term ‘citizens of Turkish Republic’, shows us that during the single-party period, only ethnic Turks and nonTurkish Muslim citizens such as Kurds, Lazes, Bosnians or Circassians, were eligible to serve as civil servants.224 That law was clearly contrary to the Treaty of Lausanne, which stated that ‘Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries’. The Civil Service Law was amended by the State Civil Servants Law (Devlet Memurları Kanunu), passed in 1965.225 On 10 April 1926, Parliament passed another law stating that all companies must keep their records in Turkish, and on 22 April 1926, Law No. 805 was passed, stating that ‘Companies dealing with economics have to use the Turkish language’.226 The Great Depression of October 1929 also influenced Turkey’s economy. Before this crisis, on 29 May 1929, a law forbidding the employment of non-Muslim citizens in Turkey had been sent to Parliament.227 Although the Great Depression delayed the law’s passage, popular sentiment pushed it up the agenda. At that time, newspapers carried stories with headlines such as ‘In Turkey work is for the Turks’ (Türkiye’de iş Türklerindir) (Figure 5), and the Waiters Association appealed to the government asking that ‘the profession of waiting tables should belong to Turkish citizens’.228 After having its name changed to the ‘Allocation of Crafts and Services to the Turkish Citizens in Turkey’ (Türkiye’de Türk Vatandaşlarına Tahsis Edilen Sanat ve Hizmetler Hakkında Kanun), Parliament finally passed the bill in 1932 (Figure 5). The law had ten articles, with Article 1 listing the professions reserved for Turkish citizens.229 The second article listed jobs forbidden to noncitizens. Under Article 5, foreigners working in non-approved areas were required to quit the work within six months. By the terms ‘foreigners’ and ‘non-citizens’, the law meant Greeks living in İstanbul, who were not citizens of Turkey.230 When the law was applied in 1934, 9,000 nonMuslims living in İstanbul left the country.231 In the mid-1930s the number of people from the minorities working in public service decreased sharply. One of the journals, Milli İnkılap, announced ‘praise be to God there is no Jewish civil servant in the Turkish state’s departments’.232 As a result of the economic Turkification policies during the single-party period, foreigners living in Turkey were forced to either become citizens of Turkey, or to leave the country. A

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Figure 5 A picture showing jobs that can be done only by ‘Turks’ (published in Cumhuriyet, 27 May 1934).

famous slogan, ‘Love It or Leave It’, first appeared during those years. Another significant step towards elimination of non-Muslims from the economy was taken by the Varlık Vergisi (Wealth Tax). The Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) Turkey managed to remain neutral and stay out of World War II; however, in 1939 approximately one million peasants and agricultural workers were called up for military service. This led to rocketing agricultural prices; in 1942, for instance, prices rose approximately 350 per cent. The black market thrived due to high inflation, and some people – nonMuslims, according to the İstanbul press – profited from this.233 Thus on the one hand, the great majority of Turkish (Muslim) citizens’ standard of living dropped dramatically, while on the other, the black market granted huge profit opportunities to non-Muslim citizens who were in the position to exploit others. There was a great deal of resentment against these war profiteers, who were generally but not all non-Muslim.234 İstanbul newspapers wrote of non-Muslims dealing in thievery, the black market, and profiteering.235 The press spoke of people with ‘alien blood’, and ‘Turks only in name’, who needed to be punished for their disloyalty and ingratitude.236 Humorous magazines also published satirical cartoons (Figure 6).237

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Figure 6 The first cartoon: (Republic’s 15th anniversary). Salamon: Thanks to you I am living, I sold one thousand flags within two days. The second cartoon: Speaker: Our patria, our life, honour, our all are there ... Moiz: is he talking about Palestine? Salamon: I do not think so; I guess he is talking about the strongbox.

Such developments served as the groundwork for the next move by the government, namely the Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) which was passed on 11 November 1942.238 The Wealth Tax had economic, political and cultural consequences. The way in which the law was applied was scandalous. Tax assessments were made by local committees, consisting of local government officials, representatives of the local councils and of the chambers of commerce. There was no fixed rate. The result was that the tax was paid almost wholly by traders in the big cities, notably İstanbul, with 55 per cent of the total bill falling on the tiny non-Muslim communities, who were subject to rates ten times higher than those imposed on Muslims. In addition, non-Muslims were required to pay their taxes in cash within 15 days; as a result they had to sell their businesses or property to Muslim businessmen at low prices to cover the bill. The law was also applied to the many poor non-Muslims (numbering 26,000) such as drivers, workers and even beggars, whereas their Muslim counterparts were not obliged to pay any tax.239 Those unable to pay had to work off their debt

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in labour camps in Aşkale, in eastern Turkey. Out of 40,000 tax debtors, about 5,000 were sent to these camps, and all of these were members of non-Muslim communities. Unfortunately, 21 people died in these camps and the government usurped their wealth and sold it to Turkish Muslims at low prices.240 Taxpayers were classified into two separate lists, the M list, for Muslims, and the G list, for non-Muslims (Gayrimuslim). Later two other categories were added, E for foreigners (Ecnebi) and D for converts (Dönme), i.e., members of the Sabetaist sect of Jewish converts to Islam. Converts paid about twice as much as Muslims while non-Muslims ended up paying up to ten times as much. A combination of poor registration and inefficient administration, however, led to the taxing of many foreigners as if they were non-Muslim Turkish citizens. This provoked the intervention of foreign embassies and consulates on behalf of their nationals.241 The stated aim was to tax previously untaxed commercial wealth and to rein in the inflationary spiral of World War II. However, the underlying reason was the elimination of minorities from the economy, and the replacement of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie by its Turkish counterpart.242 The Wealth Tax was presented in the ‘economic measures package’ by the government. Nevertheless, its object was expressed by Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu as follows: ‘This law … is a law of revolution. We have the chance to achieve economic independence. This way, we’ll break the foreigners’ tight grip over our market and put Turkish money into the hands of Turks’.243 The minority representatives, who had been informed that a tax law directed at non-Muslims was being prepared, talked to Prime Minister Saraçoğlu and said: Sir! How much tax are you planning to collect? … 300 million or 200 million. Leave this matter to us. Let us collect this tax and give it to the government. Prime Minister Saraçoğlu said: How can we accept this proposal? We are the [modern] state.244 These quotations reveal that the real reason for the Wealth Tax was the elimination of non-Muslims from the economy. An anecdote, which was told during the years of Wealth Tax, reveals that Atatürk’s famous words ‘How happy is the one who says I am a Turk’ were not realised and remained just on the level of discourse. This anecdote goes as follows:

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Mişon [Armenian] how much did you pay? – 9.575.65 kuruş. – Good money, good money. – Yorgo [Armenian] how much did you pay? – 15.487.98 kuruş. – Good money, good money. – Agop [Armenian] how much did you pay? ... – Good money, good money. Mehmet Efendi [ethnic Turk] – 2.18 kuruş. Salamon raised his hands – O great Atatürk how right you were when you said: ‘How happy is the one who says I am a Turk!’245 The Wealth Tax was withdrawn in March 1944, under the pressure of criticism from Britain and the United States, but by then irreparable damage had already been done to the confidence of minorities living in Turkey.246 Minority citizens still in the camps were sent back to their homes. Cyrus L. Sulzberger, a correspondent for the New York Times, visited Turkey to write about the tax, and in the resulting article criticised the Turkish government for effectively expelling non-Muslim tradesmen. Just after the article was published, Parliament decided to erase the remaining debts of outstanding Wealth Tax payments,247 and finally the government annulled the tax. But the lasting damage ensured that many wary members of minorities did not want to invest in Turkey, or else they emigrated after this period.248 The Wealth Tax is a key link in the Turkification chain. Due to the law, most non-Muslim merchants sold their properties and vanished from the markets. It was not until decades later, in the 1970s, that suitable Turkish replacements emerged, as during the late 1940s there were no experienced Turkish merchants.249 The law also damaged the process of integrating non-Muslim citizens into the Turkish Republic, as most non-Muslims simply left; in 1938–40, approximately 30,000 Jewish citizens left Turkey.250 The Wealth Tax once more demonstrated that being Muslim constituted a significant part of the definition of citizenship in Turkey. Many scholars have claimed that Kemalist nationalism was not racist, but rather a state-building nationalism along territorial models, which did not prosecute minority groups. For instance Bernard Lewis stated ‘Kemal’s nationalism was healthy and reasonable: there was no arrogant trampling on the rights or aspirations of other nations, no neurotic rejection of responsibility for the past’.251 Political scientist Suna Kili also argued that ‘in Kemalist ideology one’s Turkishness was not necessarily determined by one’s race or religion but by the degree a person associated himself with the ideas, ideals, and goals of the Turkish Republic and through commitment to Turkey’s independence and modernisation’.252

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The above discussion, however, would lead one to conclude that there were strong racial aspects in Kemalist nationalism and also in its understanding of citizenship. As it came to be defined and propagated in the 1930s, ‘Turkey was exclusively for the Turks’. For this reason, nonMuslims and non-Turkish Muslims living in Turkey had two options: either become Turkified or leave the country. Even if they were fully assimilated they could not acquire full citizenship rights. The most favoured citizens of the Republic were regarded as Muslim ethnic Turks. After discussing legal and identity aspects of citizenship during the single-party period, the civic virtue aspect of citizenship will now be addressed. The Civic Virtue Aspect of Citizenship during the Period 1923–1946 Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler: Official Citizenship’s Cult Text During the single-party period one of the most important projects of the CHP was to create civilised, modern citizens, who are obedient to the state. This mission was also reflected in the education policy of the CHP especially through civic education courses. The most important civic education textbook, which can be seen as the official citizenship’s cult text, was the Civic Information for the Citizen (Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler). Afet İnan, the adopted daughter of Atatürk, was commissioned to write this civic education textbook, using Atatürk’s own contributions.253 This book is crucial for understanding how the Republican elites and Atatürk perceived Turkish citizenship. The book was mainly put together using Atatürk’s discussion with the state elites, members of the military, lawyers and intellectuals.254 The book aimed to serve as a guide to the conduct of affairs between the state and its citizens. Atatürk explained the thinking behind the book’s preparation thus: ‘Under the title Civic Information has been collected information about the current duties and rights in their [citizens’] conduct of affairs among themselves and between them and the state, as well as general information on the organisation of the state’.255 Because Atatürk’s views on citizenship were of utmost importance, firstly Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler will be analysed and then other textbooks published during the single-party period will be discussed. The slogan of the single-party period, ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’, was emphasised in the civic education textbook written by Afet

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İnan. The term nation (millet) was defined in the textbook as a ‘political and social community formed by citizens bound by a unity of language, culture and ideal’.256 This definition of nation was the same as the definition of nation in the CHP manifestos. The Turkish nation was defined: ‘people who established the Turkish Republic are known as the Turkish nation’.257 The definition of nation and Turkish nation look as if they are inclusive, but when we look at Atatürk’s own views on what constituted Turkish nation we see the following: These are the historical and natural facts regarding the basis of Turkish nation: a) Political unity; b) linguistic unity; c) territorial unity; d) racial unity; e) shared history; f) shared morality.258 This discloses that together with unity in language, culture and ideal, race was also an element of Turkish nation. Also Atatürk claimed that the reason for the ethnic mix in Anatolia was actually the result of changes in Turkish stock brought about by life in different climatic regions, suggesting that: Never, anywhere, do people even from even a small family today resemble each other. It is not true to see the Turks as setting out from a narrow area, which had no climatic changes.259 Thus differences among citizens were not recognised by the Republican elite and were rather improbably seen as a result of climatic changes. The definition of nation was followed by hyperbolic praise of the Turkish nation: ‘There is no state in the world which is bigger, older, or cleaner than the Turkish nation’.260 Turning to language, it continued in a similar vein saying: ‘The Turkish language is the most beautiful, richest, and easiest language in the world ... [it] is also sacred treasure for the Turkish nation’.261 The same went for morality: ‘The Turkish nation has a noble morality unparalleled by any other nations’.262 Virtues valued in every country, such as being democratic and responsible, were treated as if they were unique to the Turkish nation alone. The Turkish History Thesis (Türk Tarih Tezi) and Sun Language Theory (Güneş-Dil Teorisi), that became cornerstones of the citizens’ new identity, were emphasised in the textbook without being given their names. The fatherland (vatan) was defined as: ‘This is the land that marks our borders and protects the Turkish nation’s noble and ancient history and our struggle. Under no circumstances is this land divisible’.263 This

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definition, just as in the 1931 CHP programme, was not expansionist or racist in terms of international relations or domestic affairs. Nevertheless, the definition emphasised not only geographical principles but also historical ones. Geographically the fatherland of the Turks was Anatolia, whereas historically it was more than that: ‘The Turkish nation lives in a great internationally recognised country demarcated by land and sea borders, one situated to the east of Europe and the west of Asia. It is called Türkeli or the Turkish fatherland’.264 The book also spoke of ‘Outside Turks’ (those who remained outside the new territory) as follows: ‘Apart from our political existence there are Turkish communities which speak the same language, belong to the same race, and so on’. Although the definition of the fatherland was not expansionist, this reference to ‘Outside Turks’ served to emphasise the ethnic aspect of nationalism and show us why the CHP welcomed ‘Outside Turks’ immigrating to Turkey during the single-party period. Non-Turkish Muslim citizens were also mentioned in the textbook. ‘In the current political and social unity of the Turkish nation, some of our citizens are being encouraged to adopt a Kurdish, Circassian, Laz or Bosnian identity’, said the book. ‘But these misnomers, which are remnants of an autocratic period from the past, have caused nothing but misery among these individuals, with the exception of a backwards and brainless few. For these members of the nation also share the same common past, history, ethics and law’.265 This reminds us of the CHP secretary Recep Peker’s speech at a university conference on 16 October 1931. Thus assimilationist policies of the CHP were justified through these textbooks. Islam was not a crucial component of being a ‘Turk’ and the absence of religion was noteworthy in the textbook. Atatürk stressed that: ‘The Turks were a great nation before adopting Islam. Indeed, Islam loosened the national ties of the Turks, and it dampened their national feelings and enthusiasm’.266 This is the paradox of Turkish nationalism, because in practice, as discussed in the identity section of this chapter, Islam was seen as fundamental part of being a member of new Turkish state. The book implicitly argued that non-Muslim citizens of the Republic were also ‘real citizens’, asking rhetorically, ‘Under the noble ethics of the Turkish nation, who could expect these citizens of christian [sic] and jewish [sic] origin to be looked down upon as “foreigner” as long as they have willingly tied themselves to the Turkish nation?’267 For this reason the book also emphasised the importance of tolerance. Tolerant citizens do not hold the faith of non-Muslim citizens against them, but on

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the contrary respect their beliefs. If citizens hate each other and regard each other with mutual disdain, then such people are not tolerant.268 Nevertheless, when we look at actual practice we cannot say that the CHP was tolerant towards ethnic and religious differences among citizens. In terms of citizenship rights and duties the book laid more emphasis on the duties and obligations of citizens towards the state. Afet İnan said that Atatürk wanted every right to be complemented by a duty. It was better for a state to have responsible citizens than responsive citizens.269 Freedom was the most important citizenship right. However, it was emphasised that freedoms could be limited by law, especially during the time of extraordinary situations.270 Moreover, by saying ‘Every Turk is born free and lives free’ and ‘Turks are democratic, free, and responsible citizens’,271 Turkish ethnicity was emphasised, and only ethnic Turks were made the subject of these rights and freedoms. The most important duties of the citizens were listed as paying taxes, participating in elections, and – for males – performing their military service, which was presented as an educational institution bringing enlightenment to the minds of the country’s sons.272 Voting was stressed as the citizen’s most important duty and holy right, because citizens should take care in making a decision involving common interests,273 as they live in a community where solidarity is crucial.274 The book also emphasised the importance of work, calling it a personal and social duty of the citizenry, citing the proverb, ‘Idleness is the mother of all vice’.275 Citizenship was defined throughout the book within the parameters of solidarity and community,276 which is a sign that the definition of citizenship in the textbook was a civic republican one. Civic virtue was also at the core of the book’s definition of citizenship, which emphasised that the state needs healthy, vigorous citizens with great understanding, national sentiment and love for their country. Having talked about Atatürk’s views on civic education, the discussion will move on to other books on civic education written during the single-party period. Other Civic Education Textbooks Published During the Period 1923–1946 The civics textbooks published before 1929 contained no definition of the Turkish ‘nation’ or ‘citizenship’. For example, although Musahabat-ı Ahlakiye ve Malumat-ı Vataniyye (Discussion of Ethics and Information about the Fatherland)277 used the word citizenship, it did not give any definition of it. The book talked about citizenship rights such as equality,

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freedom, and duties such as paying tax, doing military service, obeying laws, respecting the Turkish flag, and patriotism. The book also emphasised the community’s interests above individuals’ interest. It compared the era of the Ottoman Empire with the period since the Republic’s establishment. The Ottoman era was criticised and branded as the major enemy of the nation.278 An exception was the book Malumat-ı Vataniyye (Information about the Fatherland), which defined citizens as ‘the offspring of the fatherland. Even if there are religious and language differences among them, they are fellow citizens to each other’. The book drew a distinction between vatandaş (citizen) and milletdaş (nationals), citing Armenians, Greeks and Jews living on Turkish soil as vatandaş, and Turks living in ‘Turkistan’ as milletdaş.279 This shows us that what the Turkish state understood by Turkish citizenship was said to be less than Turkishness. The post-1929 textbooks did, however, give a definition of the Turkish ‘nation’ and then boasted of its virtues. For example, Muallim Abdülbaki in his book, Yurt Bilgisi, defined nation as ‘unity in fatherland, language, history, culture, and ideal’, and then he proceeded to boast of the virtues of the Turkish nation by saying ‘there is no nation which is cleaner, or braver, or has higher morals than the Turkish nation’.280 He added that the Turkish nation was better than European ones because it could create something from nothing. Another author, Kazım Sevinç, claimed that ‘the Turkish nation is the best and the most moral nation in the world’.281 According to other textbooks the Turkish nation is the world’s oldest,282 and largest;283 it was through Turks that civilisation was spread worldwide, and Turks were the first to conceive of living in houses rather than caves;284 even 10,000 years ago Turks were the globe’s most civilised nation, and modern civilised nations learned their civilisation from Turks;285 Turkish history is replete with heroism;286 and all Turks speak Turkish, the world’s richest, most beautiful, and sweetest287 tongue.288 These books not only exaggerated the qualities of the Turkish nation but also argued that certain universally honoured values are in fact unique to the Turkish nation. For instance, the Turkish nation is clean and sublime, does not know how to tell a lie, fears no enemies, has high morals,289 and is brave and hospitable.290 The books emphasised the importance of being born a Turk, living as a Turk, and dying as a Turk. The books quoted Atatürk periodically throughout their pages, repeating such sayings as, ‘How happy is the one who says, I am a Turk,’291 and proving to people that emulating the expression ‘strong like a Turk’ was the most important duty of the Turkish youth.292 Nevertheless, by exaggerating the qualities

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of being Turkish, prejudice against the ‘other’ was created in the minds of the younger generations. The definitions of Turkish nationalism in the books that were published during the single-party period were not expansionist in terms of national territory; however, some of the writers explicitly or implicitly referred to ‘Outside Turks’. One of the authors, Muallim Abdülbaki, pointed out that ‘the Turkish nation is a large family, one sharing identical interests’.293 Some of the books also gave a broad definition of the Turkish fatherland. For example, Kazım Sevinç asserted, ‘The boundless lands where Turks dwell is what we know as the Turkish fatherland’.294 He referred specifically to ‘Outside Turks’ living in Asia.295 For Mithat Sander, Turkey means ‘Great Turkish Homeland’ (Büyük Türk Yurdu).296 The books also talked about the importance of patriotism. This virtue, however, was briefly defined as a readiness to die for the fatherland, wholly neglecting other meanings,297 and throughout the course children were urged to learn by heart the motto, ‘I love the fatherland more than myself, even more than I love my mother’.298 Turkish citizenship was defined as: ‘those Turks who live in Turkey’.299 This informs us that in order to be a citizen one had to be a Turk. Ironically, however, the textbooks of the time also discussed equality.300 Tezer Taşkıran, author of Yurt Bilgisi I, argued that all the citizens of the country have the same rights and duties.301 Among these rights were the right to live, to freedom and equality, the right to petition, and so on. The rights of citizens, however, were defined with reference to the 1924 Constitution, which listed basic rights and freedoms of citizens, while lacking any specific provisions to protect them. Thus none of the books mentioned impediments to exercising these rights and freedoms. In the books published during the single-party period, citizens’ duties were emphasised more than their rights. There was a long list of citizenship duties in the textbooks. For example, Mithad Sadullah Sander in his book, Yurt Bilgisi Özü, pointed out that every Turkish citizen had four basic areas of duty. These were as follows: 1 Citizens have duties towards themselves, such as staying strong and having good morals. 2 Duties towards the family, such as helping it and being loyal. 3 Towards their village, nation, and all of humanity, such as working hard and other virtues. 4 Duties towards the nation and all humanity, such as doing military service, paying taxes and voting. These duties were to be done happily and willingly.302

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Even the purpose of the civic education course was defined in one of the books as ‘teaching the duties of citizenship’.303 In order to deserve rights ‘citizens should firstly fulfil their duties, because duties and rights are inseparable’.304 Nevertheless, this was even interpreted in the textbooks as ‘every duty is complemented by a right’ and it was the citizens’ duties towards the state that took up the greater part of the textbooks. Chief among these duties was performing military service (then, as now, required only of males), a duty justified by the large number of Turkey’s enemies.305 The textbooks generally concluded with the motto of ‘Dear Children, Never Forget Your Duty to the Fatherland’.306 Being a modern and civilised citizen necessitated living cleanly, being polite, and staying physically active. The importance of doing sport was emphasised by civic education textbooks. One of the books talked about modern sports such as tennis and volleyball, and national games such as playing cirit.307 The book argued that football is not a modern game and very dangerous for children,308 and that ‘We should not cause our enemies to claim that Turks are not civilised’.309 There are interesting examples about the creation of modern citizens through these textbooks. For instance, one book showed pictures of a child involved in a sports activity in unrelated parts of the book, such as in a section stressing the importance of paying taxes!310 Almost all the textbooks during the single-party period emphasised the importance of living in unity in a community,311 citizenship duties and obedience to authority,312 which show us that the definition of citizenship was civic republican. The textbooks of the period also contrasted the era of the Ottoman Empire with the period since the Republic’s establishment. The era of Padishahs was criticised, whereas the Republican period was praised. Padishahs were branded major enemies of the nation, and the Padishah era was contrasted unfavourably with the Republican period: in the latter period citizens have rights, whereas under the Padishahs they had none.313 The books treated the periods pre- and post-founding of the Republic as if divided by a sharp boundary, an immense gulf, painting a rosy picture of the latter era. After the establishment of the Republic it was as if a magic wand had touched the country, and now the citizens had everything. Therefore civics textbooks of the period tried to forge a non-Ottoman identity for the citizens of the newly established Republic and the Ottoman period was considered as ‘the dark age’. The textbooks also praised CHP rule and taught its ‘six principles’314 to the students and talked about its institutions such as Peoples’ Houses315 and Turkish Hearths316 and highly recommended going to these institutions to be a good citizen.

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Textbooks did not talk about Islam as an important part of citizenship identity. Books emphasised the importance of secularism (laiklik) and argued that in the Republic there is tolerance so no-one will interfere with whether people pray and fast or not.317 Among the things that people do during the Friday holidays there was no place for namaz (prayers). One of the books argued that citizens should vote wisely, which meant that citizens should not vote for the backward-looking parties or for the people exploiting religion.318 Apart from the Padishahs there were other enemies of the Turkish Republic, namely the French, British and Greeks. One book listed the enemies of the nation as the ‘greeks, french, and armenians [sic]’, intentionally using small letters in an apparent effort at denigration.319 This was intended to create hatred among the younger generations against non-Muslim citizens of the Republic. Non-Muslim citizens living in Turkey were specifically mentioned in the textbooks. One, written by Kazım Sevinç, argued that since the Turkish nation was very hospitable, non-Muslim citizens living within its borders were very happy. It stated that, during the Ottoman era, these people had more rights than the Turks, they had better conditions, they were traders and businessmen, yet they neither paid taxes nor obeyed Turkish laws. It added that after the Treaty of Lausanne everything changed, and henceforth since non-Muslims were now respected they would also respect Turkish laws.320 In Yurt Bilgisi, written by Muallim Abdülbaki, there is a section titled Fena Adamlar (Bad People) which talks about non-Muslim citizens of the Republic. The book branded non-Muslim citizens as ‘bad people’, who were faizciler (usurors), madrabazlar (swindlers) and muhtekirler (profiteers).321 According to this book there were moneylenders who lent to villagers, but then made them repay the loan within a year. It blasted these ‘bad people,’ arguing ‘these people are not from our nation, as there is no Turk that is so stone-hearted’.322 The book also emphasised the importance of commerce as something that makes nations rich, as well as the nationalisation of the economy. While Turks aspire to be civil servants, said the books, people in other nations are engaged in private business. Nevertheless, they added, Turks are now turning to business, and this trend should continue.323 Such themes are signs that the single-party period’s policies of nationalising the economy had influenced authors. While the definition of nationalism was not ethno-cultural, by defining non-Muslim citizens as ‘bad people’, the ethno-cultural aspect of nationalism was emphasised and helped the CHP government to justify

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their segregationalist policies towards non-Muslim citizens such as Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi). Throughout these courses, the textbooks inculcated the ‘Sevres Syndrome’324 – the sense of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state – in the minds of young people. Discussing the Treaty of Sevres, the books lambasted it as ‘death for our fatherland’,325 adding, ‘though it was called an agreement, it brought death and sought the end of the Turkish nation’.326 This caused hatred and fear against ethnic and religious differences among citizens. Political scientist Suna Kili argued that one of the fundamental tasks of Kemalist nationalism was to eliminate the inferiority complex created in the Turkish nation by the decline of the Ottoman Empire and by the several wars that it had lost in the last couple of centuries, and to give the Turkish nation the needed confidence that, if she worked hard enough, she too could become a modern nation.327 It can be argued that, for these reasons, the textbooks of the period boosted the virtues of the Turkish nation. Kili argued that school textbooks did not propagandise against other nations and nationalities328 but when we consider these civic education textbooks, we cannot say that they did not contain propaganda. They exaggerated the qualities of the Turkish nation, while non-Muslim citizens were defined as ‘bad people’ provoking hatred against non-Muslim Turkish residents. This explains why the assimilationist policies of the CHP, such as settlement policies and Wealth Tax, and racist actions against non-Muslim citizens such as Thrace Jewish incidents, were supported by huge numbers of people. It is an important question whether the same understanding of citizenship was kept up during the multi-party period or whether the transition to democracy in 1945 brought about significant changes in the understanding of citizenship. The next chapter tries to illuminate these aspects of the debate on citizenship.

4 THE TRANSITION TO THE MULTI-PARTY PERIOD (1946–60)

In many respects, the Ninth Grand National Assembly will have a unique place in our history. It is for the first time in our history that, as a result of a full and free expression of the national will, this distinguished assembly has come to a position where it can shape the nation’s destiny. We shall remember that historic day [14 May 1950] as the day of victory not only for our party but for Turkish democracy. Adnan Menderes1 The multi-party period (1946–60) ended the single-party rule and opened Turkey to a multi-party system. The most important development of the period was without doubt the establishment of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) on 7 January 1946, and the changes it brought to the concept of citizenship. Another important development was that, after the establishment of the DP, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) started to change its principles and passed more democratic laws in terms of the citizenship issue, as the DP’s democratic and liberal promises attracted massive support from the citizens. The definition of secularism, and of nationalism, which is the most important part of Turkish identity and citizenship, became much more moderate throughout the multi-party period due to the political competition that Turkey enjoyed for the first time after twenty-seven years of single-party

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rule. Thus non-Muslim citizens, unlike in the single-party period, enjoyed the most comfortable time of their lives, although this period was marred by the events of 6–7 September 1955. This chapter looks at how citizenship was reconstructed during the multi-party period (1946–60) through an analysis of civic education textbooks, party manifestos produced by the CHP and the DP, as well as legal texts of the period, and how these laws applied to the ethnic Turkish citizens, non-Muslim citizens, and non-Turkish citizens. This chapter looks at the reconstruction of citizenship during the multi-party period over three time-spans: that of DP opposition, which spans the years between 1946–50; DP rule between 1950–57; and the final years of DP rule between 1957–60. The chapter closes with the military coup of 1960, which put an end to DP rule. The Political Background, 1946–60 After World War II many factors contributed to cause the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) to democratise the regime. The first was socio-economic pressure for change. There were economic problems and social unrest due to wartime shortages and profiteering,2 as well as the economic policies of the CHP, such as the 1942 Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi),3 which caused uproar even among the Turkish bourgeoisie.4 The second factor was external pressures for democratisation. Following World War II, Turkey, faced with a Soviet threat, committed itself to democratic principles by signing the United Nations Charter in 1945, and the CHP government moved closer to the West, especially the US. The third factor was the long tradition of Westernisation, which also implied democratisation.5 The then president, İsmet İnönü, decided to allow the formation of an opposition party as a safety valve both to appease social unrest as well as to demonstrate Turkey’s commitment to the liberal principles of the West. For all these reasons on 19 May 1945, İsmet İnönü, declared that ‘as the conditions imposed by war disappear, democratic principles shall acquire gradually a larger place in the political and cultural life of the country ... The government has constantly developed the country towards democracy’.6 The DP7 was founded on 7 January 19468 by four prominent ex-CHP parliamentarians, Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü and Refik Koraltan.9 In the 14 May 1950 elections, the DP enjoyed a landslide victory and won about 53 percent of the vote. Following the elections Adnan Menderes became prime minister and Celal Bayar became

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president, and sent the CHP of İsmet İnönü into opposition. It was the turning point in Turkish political and social life. The 1950 election was tangible proof that power resided with the people, and this was the greatest revolution ever to occur to the mind of the average Turkish citizen since it set into motion a new process of leadership selection, social mobilisation and broader citizenship participation. The 1950 election brought the DP to power with 53.4 per cent of the vote and 408 seats in Parliament.10 The CHP, which had held power in Turkey for almost three decades, had only sixty-nine deputies.11 A total of 80 per cent of eligible voters cast ballots, a much higher turnout than in previous elections. The transfer of power by a free election was certainly in the words of the historian Bernard Lewis, a ‘bloodless revolution’.12 After the 1950 elections the DP felt that it represented the majority, and that the majority had given them the power and legitimacy to act in an arbitrary fashion. The DP repeatedly emphasised the ‘national will’ to underline their claim that their power derived from the vote.13 In contrast to the CHP’s long-standing elitist orientation, the glorification of the ‘national will’ also represented an attempt to bolster the DP’s image as the party of the common man. On these grounds one of the major contributions of the DP to Turkish democracy was the integration into the political process of citizens living in rural areas, Turkey’s ‘silent majority’. As the historian Dankwart Rustow remarked, Adnan Menderes was ‘the country’s first ruler dramatically to place rural interests above the urban, the first to respond to the peasants’ material needs, and the first to give them a rudimentary sense of citizenship’.14 The first years of the DP rule passed with great promises and with hope for the future. During the first four years in power, the Democrats amended and liberalised certain laws related with citizenship. On the strength of its four years in office, the Democrats won even a greater majority in the elections of 2 May 1954. Out of 541 assembly seats, the DP won 503, and the CHP won only 31.15 Thus, the DP had secured absolute power in the assembly. Nevertheless, proofs of Lord Acton’s famous observation, ‘Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’ appeared,16 especially in the second half of the 1950s. Because of the economic problems and growing authoritarianism, the DP began to lose its support in the second half of the 1950s.17 Following the 1958 elections, the DP responded to its falling support by increasing the use of authoritarian measures against the opposition. For all these reasons, on 27 May 1960, the army took control and arrested Menderes, the President of the Republic, Celal Bayar, and all the DP ministers and deputies. Both Bayar and Menderes received the death sentence, although Bayar’s

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sentence was later commuted to life in prison, due to his old age. The first Turkish experiment with political democracy had ended with military intervention.18 The Legal Aspect of Citizenship The DP in Opposition (1946–1950) After the establishment of the DP, the CHP abolished, or greatly relaxed, many of the restrictions that it had been trying to impose since the establishment of the Republic. The first signs of liberalisation were seen at the CHP congress of 10 May 1946. In the congress the CHP adopted a direct election system.19 Instead of nominating the party chairman for a lifetime, the party by-laws were amended in order to nominate and elect the party chairman. Subsequently the title ‘national chief’ or leader (milli şef) was changed into ‘party chairman’.20 Furthermore, the abolition of the ban on the formation of associations and political parties based upon class interests was lifted.21 Signs of liberalisation continued after the congress, when the press law was liberalised; the ability to close newspapers was transferred to the courts; universities received a degree of autonomy and students were given the right to establish associations. The most important of these amendments was to Article 50 of the Press Law, which had greatly restricted freedom of the press. This was amended so that the courts, not the administration, had the authority to close a newspaper. The Turkish Press Union (Türk Basın Birliği) was established and journalists were free to join such professional associations.22 The CHP also took steps toward the citizenship rights. In the CHP’s 1947 manifesto the section devoted to the rights of the citizens was extended. It reads as follows: Our party considers liberty as the basis of human existence and every civilised legal order, and as the source of political rights. Our party considers it as its duty to provide the rights and liberties of thought, conscience, speech, writing, publication, association, and the right to establish societies, trade unions, and political parties and the right to equally benefit from all other civil and political rights as a necessary and vital condition for the free development of human personality and society. The party also considers it its duty to protect the institutions of family and private property. All men and women have equal rights and duties.23

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Following these changes in the CHP manifestos, as well as the legal amendments, Turkish society saw a number of fundamental changes. Citizens started playing a much more active role in politics through the political associations which were formed throughout the country, on the basis of citizens’ political opinions and interests. Moreover under the leadership of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, the Human Rights Association was established on 16 September 1946,24 and Turkey signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1947: this pact was ratified by the Council of Ministers on 6 April 1948.25 On 13 April 1949,26 the Turkish Women’s Union (Türk Kadın Birliği) was founded to safeguard the rights of women, and citizens who criticised the government were no longer branded traitors. These liberalisation steps by the CHP were criticised by Menderes, who argued, ‘These changes are giving a single drop of water to a person’s cracked lips’. He regarded the actual Press Law as much worse than its predecessor;27 the Law on Associations (Article 9) had to be amended to allow the establishment of associations on the basis of class; and the martial law in the country effectively limited all freedoms of citizens.28 The DP was also concerned with the rights of citizens’ from its inception. The DP’s 1946 programme emphasised the importance of liberalism and democracy, and accepted both the economic and political aspects of liberalism.29 Article 1 of the DP manifesto emphasised the importance of democracy by stating, ‘The DP has been founded with the aim of realising democracy in a wider and more developed understanding, so that general politics can be conducted with a democratic view and mentality’. Article 4 emphasised the importance of basic human rights and freedoms. Furthermore, in terms of the religious freedom of citizens the DP argued the following: It should never be tolerated, however, that religion be used for political means, or religion to be the means of propaganda against other religions, so that it destroys the solidarity and love among the citizens or religion be used to enliven the feelings of fanaticism against free thinking.30 As can be seen from the above quotation, the DP pledged protection of the non-Muslim citizens’ religious freedom. At the DP’s inaugural congress of 7 January 1947, the delegates adopted the ‘Freedom Pact’ (Hürriyet Misakı)31 which stated that citizens’ rights and freedoms ought to be guaranteed, anti-democratic laws

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needed to be abolished, citizens’ votes should be protected, a new election law should be amended and the leadership of a party should be separated from the presidency to ensure impartiality.32 The DP threatened that if the principles of the Freedom Pact were not implemented, its party members would resign from the parliament and ‘return to the bosom of the people’ to continue their struggle there.33 The Freedom Pact had a significant role, as it was the first attempt to guarantee citizens’ rights and freedoms. The DP threatened the CHP that if the principles of the Freedom Pact were not implemented, then they would resign, leading to new elections in the country. At the DP’s second congress on 20 June 1949, the party took the ‘Oath of National Enmity’ (Milli Husumet Andı),34 a statement drawing parallels between violations of election law and violations of the citizens’ natural rights, and arguing that these violations justified citizens’ self-defence, and people committing such violations would be subject to national hostility.35 In response to the oath, the CHP enacted a new election law guaranteeing the secret ballot system.36 During the election campaign (the elections were called for 14 May 1950) the DP’s slogan was Enough, It’s the Nation’s Turn to Speak! (Yeter Söz Milletindir!). In order to attract votes, the DP charged the CHP with despotism using a famous poster: a raised hand with the caption Enough! (Artık Yeter!) (Figure 7). This was the first time in Turkish politics that the ‘the man on the street’ began to matter. This election campaign was also important in so far as

Figure 7 The DP’s famous poster: a raised hand with the caption Enough!

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it enabled the active participation of the citizens. Furthermore, it also altered the relations between the citizens and the candidates. In contrast to earlier elections, candidates had to go to their election districts, speak to people and promise to respond to their needs.37 The DP in Power (1950–1960) While in opposition, from 1946 to 1950, the DP had been a strong proponent of greater democracy, individual and press freedoms, and political rights for opposition parties. Thus the Democrats’ first term in 1950–54 was marked by the relative expansion of the freedoms of assembly, press, travel abroad, and individual rights, all of which had been liberalised in varying degrees by the CHP after the establishment of the DP. Nevertheless, especially after 1955, the DP deviated sharply from its earlier pledges, as we will see. As historian Feroz Ahmad rightly pointed out, Menderes viewed political power as the tool necessary for Turkey’s rapid growth. Thus he had no time for amending the anti-democratic laws or the establishment of a neutral administration that the Democrats had called for while in opposition.38 The DP government tightened its grip on the penal code adopted in the mid-1930s from the Italian model, and laws became more repressive, in keeping with the frigid political atmosphere created by the cold war. The situation worsened in the second half of the 1950s. Democracy and multi-party politics could not function with institutions inherited from the single-party period. Such institutions as the 1924 Constitution and the penal code were anachronisms and had to be amended in order to suit a Turkish society living in the second half of the twentieth century.39 During its time in opposition the DP criticised the 1924 Constitution and stated in the 1950 election manifesto the following: We are dedicated to carrying out fundamental amendments in the constitution that will secure a stable state order that rests upon the national will and safeguards the rights and freedoms of the citizens. Although today our constitution [the 1924 Constitution] has accepted the sovereignty of the people it has not been able to prevent the rule of a single-party since it rests upon the unification of powers and it is devoid of the required sanctions that secure the rights and freedoms of the citizen.40 Furthermore, Adnan Menderes, in his speech in the assembly about the 1950 government programme, declared:

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We are going to eliminate whatever remains from the single-party period in terms of understanding and beliefs. For example, we are going to make the press and penal laws and the civil servant law compatible with the spirit of democracy.41 Ironically, although the DP criticised the 1924 Constitution, the period of 1950–60 was again governed by the same Constitution of 1924 that had been in use during the one-party regime. The strong executive powers given by the Constitution to the prime minister and the president served the purpose of the DP government well in implementing its own policies. To justify their inaction, the DP argued that the 1924 Constitution, if applied correctly, was very democratic. The DP followed the same authoritarian path concerning giving workers the right to strike. The DP’s most powerful weapon against the CHP during its time in opposition had been this pledge: Bayar argued, ‘The right to strike is like a double-edged sword but even so, we believe that the citizens should be given this right in order to ensure their basic rights and freedoms’. After the Democrats came to power, however, this promise was forgotten and their attitude towards trade unions was as repressive as the previous regime’s. When Menderes was reminded of his promise, he replied: ‘Is Turkey to have strikes? Let’s have some economic development first and then we will think about this matter’. That summed up his attitude towards democracy; for the time being, it was to be sacrificed on the altar of economic growth.42 There were other restrictions. From 1953 onwards a series of laws were passed which eventually placed severe restrictions on the press, the universities, and the opposition parties. Freedom of the press was limited, many journalists were imprisoned, the right of the opposition parties to function freely was threatened, and academic freedom in the universities came under increased government pressure.43 In 1954 the first physical violence appeared between the parties in the assembly. It was the year of the first restrictive Press Law, punishing the spreading of false news or insulting or invading the privacy of public officials44 – it was not at all uncommon to see blank columns in the newspapers in the later part of the DP rule. While in power, the DP was also concerned with the concept of freedom as it affected the citizenship issue. During the 1955 assembly budget debates, Menderes defined individual freedom, which was one of the most important pledges of the DP, in the following terms: ‘Freedom is not something that one can realise solely by desiring it; one must also

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know how to use it. Freedom, like other things, ought to be given to the extent that the people know how to use it. Freedom spells disaster for people who do not know how to use it, like clowns, who put an inkwell over their heads and come onto the stage’.45 There was no place, however, for leftist ideas within such a view of freedom. For example, on 14 December 1950, left-leaning students studying abroad were prohibited access to foreign currency.46 On 20 February 1951, the Ministry of Education decided to remove the books of Russian authors from the curricula of schools and their libraries.47 Thus Turkey, during the last years of the DP government, inched towards a system that had more in common with authoritarian regimes than democracies. The definition of citizenship during the multi-party period still depended on the various duties that one had towards the homeland instead of freedoms that one was given. The DP stated ‘every individual who fulfils his legal duties is considered as a good citizen’48 but most of the rights that they promised to citizens were not enacted when they came to power, and the existing laws on citizenship rights and freedoms were particularly limited in the second half of the 1950s, when they started losing votes. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was signed during this period, stayed on paper, and the government did not apply it. It is also interesting to note that issues such as the freedom of press, the fairness of election law, the impartiality of the state radio, freedom of thought and assembly, and the independence of the universities, were almost exactly the same in 1957–60 as they were in 1946–50. It seems that from the point of view of political development, a rapid development period in 1950–57 was followed by a regression from 1957 to 1960.49 This could be due to the fact that the 1924 Constitution did not have an adequate system of checks and balances. The Identity Aspect of Citizenship, 1943–1946 Period Non-Muslim Citizens: The DP in Opposition (1946–50) The transition to multi-party politics in 1945 was a turning point for the non-Muslim citizens living in Turkey. There was more than one party and the votes of non-Muslim citizens had gained utmost importance. So the CHP began to launch a series of actions to please minorities, declaring on 21 October 1946 that non-Muslim citizens could become members of the party.50 Those non-Muslims who were university graduates were allowed to complete their military service as reserve officers in 1947

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(whereas in the past they could serve only as privates), regardless of whether or not they met the requirements for commission. In addition, members of minorities were appointed to all kinds of duty, in all the military’s units and were permitted to carry guns, which was prohibited during the single-party period.51 Greeks who had been subject to population exchange were permitted to enter Turkey to visit their relatives and Freemasons were allowed to re-open their lodges.52 Moreover, in 1948 the CHP asked Sadi Irmak, İstanbul District Inspector (İstanbul Bölge Müfettişi), to prepare a report on the problems of the Greek community living in Turkey. This report examined such problems as prevention of Greek citizens from becoming civil servants; Greeks not receiving the same treatment as Turks in property sales; Greek churches, schools, hospitals and orphanage buildings were not exempt from taxation (unlike mosques); and it was pointed out that the salaries of the teachers working in schools belonging to minorities and the principals who had been assigned by the state should not be paid by the community.53 After the preparation of the report the positive attitude shown by state officials was reflected in educational policies. For example, in 1948, classes related to Judaism and Jewish history were allowed to be included in the curriculum of Jewish schools. Furthermore, minority schools, which had been under the supervision of the Ministry of Education since 1937, became totally independent in terms of their administration from 17 July 1949. Journalist Falih Rıfkı Atay expressed the new approach of the CHP towards minority citizens in the following words: We grant all minorities in this country not only the rights of Turkish citizenship but also the right to become Turkish like ourselves without distinguishing cultural and mental differences. Furthermore we also see no difficulty in them remaining as minority citizens preserving their language and culture.54 Recep Peker also stated the following on the relationship between the state and non-Muslim citizens in a speech delivered on 28 May 1947: Our relationship with the citizens that speak another language … every individual that is one through common language, common ideal and common destiny is equal regarding right, duty and honour. The ummah-oriented outlook that regarded the Christians as reaya is long forgotten. It is also not enough to consider their religion, opinion of consciousness and race in the language of the

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law and in official practices. It is necessary for us to mingle in our personal lives.55 Nationalism had long been a significant aspect of Turkish identity, and played an important role in the construction of citizenship.56 It had been a basic tenet in the programmes of all Turkey’s political parties, including the CHP and the DP. In the seventh congress of the CHP on 17 November 1947, the definitions of fatherland and nation were put into the section on nationalism, and the understanding of nationalism was relaxed.57 It was now defined thus: Our party considers the Turkish nation as a social and political unity established by the citizens who are connected by natural and psychological ties such as the love for the nation and a belief in the common language, history and ideal. Our party considers nationalism in its respect to the greatness of the nation making the national consciousness to live and to maintain it. Our nationalism does not contain anything harmful to other nations.58 As can be seen from the above, there is a stress on the fact that there can be no separation among citizens and the separatist policies applied during the single-party period were supposed to be forgotten. The party considered all citizens to be Turks without distinctions of religion or race, all possessing equal rights.59 In a speech on the government’s new view of nationalism, the CHP premier, Recep Peker, changing his authoritarian views of the single-party period, surprisingly argued: Every individual in this group [nation] becomes part of an indivisible whole on the basis of a common language and destiny, born from living together on this land, and is equal in sharing duty, privilege, and honour. The idea of considering the Christians secondclass citizens is part of history now … It is not enough to regard as Turks only in respect to law, those whose race and religion is different. In our private lives too, we must come closer to each other with warmth, and intermingle … a [national] culture enriched by science, technology, and art owned in common by all mankind will strengthen Turkish nationalism … anti-Semitism will remain the shame of the twentieth century, and if in our legislation there are anti-minority provisions they will be amended.60

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Peker accepted that during the single-party period some of the citizens had been treated as second-class. He stated: We are to accept as natural the different [Muslim] sects such as the Shii [Alevi] and embrace [sic] the Kurds with fondness … [R]acial nationalism is irredentist and entirely anti-democratic and imperialistic … [W]e should be careful of ideologies which trespass national boundaries and penetrate into the country to seek out and subject ideas and people to the service of foreign states … [T]he best means of fighting communism is nationalism.61 Non-Muslim citizens, non-Turkish citizens (e.g., Kurds), and citizens belonging to different sects of Islam (e.g., Alevis) were no longer considered as second-class citizens. The CHP defined nationalism in this way and pledged that it would try to guarantee this understanding in practice.62 The CHP head of the executive committee of İstanbul (İstanbul İl Örgütü Başkanı), Sadi Bekter, said, concerning the CHP’s new definition of nationalism: For the CHP there is only a mass of citizens that live in this country and benefit from its resources. The CHP does not have a separatist view concerning the citizens. Our nationalism is a nationalism that does not distinguish religion and race. In a word, it is a community of rights and duties.63 Nevertheless, we cannot say that the CHP changed wholesale, and became a democratic party overnight, as it still had authoritarian tendencies. The speeches of some deputies were reminiscent of the single-party period. For example, in 1946 election campaign, the Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu stated: The CHP is nationalist, meaning it is Turk. Those who say they are Turks are treated as Turks and those who say they are not Turks are treated as guests.64 This speech was criticised by non-Muslim citizens as it reminded them of the CHP’s discriminatory policies of the single-party period. At the same time as the CHP defended liberalisation in its definition of nationalism, the DP also had its own understanding of nationalism. The 1946 programme of the DP stated the following:

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We are dedicated to an understanding of nationalism that rests upon a cultural unity and a unity of ideal created by a common history. This understanding of nationalism rejects all sorts of separatist tendencies. Our party considers all citizens as Turks regardless of ethnic and religious differences and grants them all the rights of being a Turk … We will try to practice these views. We entrust our educational institutions with the duty of carrying out such an understanding of nationalism.65 The DP’s understanding of nationalism was not ethnic and considered any citizen to be a ‘Turk’ regardless of religion or race. The president of the Republic during the DP era, Celal Bayar, said at the DP’s congress on 23 June 1949: The Turkish nation is Muslim and so it shall remain … There are also Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish, and Armenian citizens in Turkey who have had religious freedom since the Tanzimat Era (1839– 1876), but if there are impediments to their religious freedom we will also solve these.66 Bayar also pointed out that no citizen from a different religious or ethnic background should be labelled the member of a ‘minority’ (ekaliyat), because they are also true children of the nation and equally subject to the Republic’s laws.67 One of the criticisms of the DP to the CHP concerned the Wealth Tax, and during the 1946 election campaign one element of the propaganda of the DP was ‘Vote for the DP, we will return your Wealth Tax’.68 With the foundation of the DP, non-Muslim citizens began to discuss their citizenship status in Turkey and argued that non-Muslims should be accepted as citizens without any discrimination. According to Jewish journalist Avram Benaroya, while the constitution accepted all citizens as equal, there had been separatism in its application during the singleparty period. In his view, some of these separatist policies had turned into a habit and had continued until to the present day (the 1950s). For example there was no non-Muslim citizen working as civil servant,69 in part because the DP defended such a line of thought. For example, Bayar said during his speech in Hatay: When it comes to the matter of citizenship the DP considers everyone who says ‘I am a Turk’ as Turk without regard to ethnic

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and religious differences. In this respect the DP holds all citizens as equal and renders them useful to the nation. This is a matter that our party considers fundamental.70 In order to win their support, the DP nominated non-Muslim citizens as candidates well. In 1946 elections, Salamon Adato was elected as a DP deputy from İstanbul by a comfortable margin and became the first Jewish Member of Parliament. However, he represented the national interest, not the Jewish community’s interest. As the historian Rıfat Bali has also suggested, the reason of choosing people from minority groups as deputy candidates was purely symbolic.71 The Emigration of Jewish Citizens of Turkey to Israel (Aliya)72 On May 14 1948 Israel declared its independence, an event which was followed by a mass migration of Jews from Turkey to Israel between the years 1948–49. During this process a profound discussion began among the Turkish public about ‘citizenship’ and ‘loyalty to Turkey’. The public criticised the Jews of Turkey for not adopting the ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’ policy of the Turkish Republic, in another word not being Turkified and not internalising consciousness of citizenship. Against the ‘loyalty to Turkey’ discussions, the journalist Avram Benaroya stated the ‘double loyalty’ position and argued that he was ‘a Turkish Jewish citizen who was loyal and patriotic to Turkey, as well as someone who regarded Israel as his homeland and had love and loyalty to this country’. Benaroya also stressed that the notion of citizenship in Turkey should incorporate the non-Muslims.73 The Jewish citizens were also blamed for not completing their citizenship duty by doing military service, regarded as one of the most important citizenship duties in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic. The greatest criticism against non-Muslim citizens during the single-party period was that they did not ‘pay blood money’ (kan borcu), meaning die for the nation.74 It is natural to understand this sensitiveness concerning Jewish youth when one bears in mind those Jews who evaded military service. The emigration of Jews coincided with a change in the political atmosphere in Turkey. As discussed above, the CHP had let go of the segregationist policies of the single-party period and, together with DP, they had emerged in an atmosphere that no longer focused on a policy that made a distinction between ‘religion, language and race’. Thus public opinion had never expected that the Jews would one day emigrate, due

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to the friendly attitude displayed by the CHP and DP during this period. Yet democracy, and the tolerance that came along with it, could not make the Wealth Tax and Aşkale be forgotten. The separatist policies of the single-party period had not been able to change the status of non-Muslim citizens from that of ‘guest’ to that of ‘citizen’, because it was understood that Islam would continue to separate Muslim from non-Muslim citizens in daily life and in legal application. The mass migration of Jews from Turkey to Israel demonstrated that the ‘project of creating citizens’ out of the minorities and culturally Turkifying them during the single-party period had been unsuccessful, at least among this population. The CHP did not prevent the emigration of Jewish citizens. On the contrary, it was pleased that emigration decreased the Jewish population that would not Turkify. Those Jews who did not emigrate went into a rapid process of Turkification, considering themselves as more patriotic than those Jews who emigrated.75 Such a discussion on ‘citizenship’ and ‘loyalty to Turkey’ was not peculiar to the Jewish community. The same kind of discussion had been held over Armenian citizens living in Turkey. In the Soviet press on 2 December 1945, Armenians living in Diaspora were recalled. Then news came that Turkish Armenians, appealing for emigration, had gathered in front of the Soviet Embassy in İstanbul. Subsequent reports in the days following said that the number of Armenians had increased from 30 to 160 and that Russia would provide a ship to take them to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia when numbers were great enough. The Turkish press saw this as treason to the citizenship project and stated that those who wanted to leave Turkey had not become fully Turkified: they did not adopt the Turkish ideal, culture, and spirit and they were committing an unfaithful and ungrateful act.76 Statesmen, on the other hand, tried to appease the press: the prime minister of the period Şükrü Saraçoğlu stated that there was security for Armenian citizens and no enmity between them and Turkey. Similarly Nedim Veysel, the then minister of press, stated that no Armenian had actually emigrated, even though the Turkish state had facilitated things for them; ‘These Armenians are good Turkish citizens’, he said.77 The DP in Power (1950–60) Non-Muslim citizens supported the DP in the 1950 elections. They were able to relax due to the DP’s attitude which granted equal rights to all citizens. During the single-party period, the CHP’s major policy planks

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had been the nationalisation of the economy and the elimination of nonMuslim citizens from the economy. In the 1950s, this policy was replaced by the encouragement of foreign investment and the DP government did not attempt to eliminate non-Muslim citizens from the economy. In 1951, the DP government introduced the Encouragement of Foreign Investment Law. In addition, in order to attract foreign investment to Turkey, the DP government also introduced the Foreign Investment and Petrol Law in 1954, a move that led to an increase in foreign credit and private enterprise. However, despite these efforts at legislation, foreign investment remained minimal.78 The DP seemed completely opposed to racism. During the DP’s tenure in power, two ministers resigned, reportedly because they had been criticised for encouraging racist activities; and two deputies were expelled from the DP for having established an organisation called the Turkish Nationalist Association (Türk Milliyetçiler Derneği).79 The association was established on 13 April 1951, and among its founders there were indeed DP deputies. Its purpose, as described in its regulations, was: ‘To promote a Turkish nationalism based upon God, motherland, race, history, language, tradition, art, family, morals, independence, and nationally sacred concepts. To protect the elements which form the Turkish nation and organise all nationalists’. The DP, when it came to power, preferred to remain silent regarding the desires of religious and nationalist groups, and when these wishes became extremist and started to threaten the regime, the Democrats responded by muzzling the threats. Consequently, the Turkish Nationalist Association and its 73 branches throughout the country were closed on 22 January 1953. Despite the DP’s more moderate definition of nationalism, the understanding of citizenship was not changed completely during the multiparty period. For example, the DP’s regulations stated that in order to be eligible for party membership, one had to accept Turkish culture in addition to the party rules.80 Thus it was still important to accept Turkish culture as part of being a true citizen of the Republic. Salamon Adato, first Jewish deputy of Parliament, was offered the position of minister of justice only on condition that he would change his name to a Turkish one.81 Also in 1951, the minister of education complained that some non-Muslim citizens had still not learned Turkish. Adato criticised these remarks, claiming that, ‘Even during our regime’s darkest days nothing like this has been heard’. Adato drew up a bill to abolish the requirement to list religion on state-issued citizen identity cards, but Parliament rejected it.82 Most importantly, one of the most serious attacks on

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non-Muslim citizens in the Republic’s history took place during the DP time in power, and these are referred to as the 6–7 September events. The 6–7 September Events Before 1950, the existence of a Cyprus problem was not widely recognised. In fact, that year, the Interior Minister, Necmettin Sadak, declared in the parliament, ‘There is no Cyprus problem’.83 During the first half of the decade, however, this view began to change. The Turkish Student Union and Turkish National Student Union began organising nationwide meetings proclaiming, ‘Cyprus is Turkish and will stay Turkish’ (Kıbrıs Türktür ve Türk Kalacaktır).84 On 11 September 1954, Ankara also saw the establishment of the ‘Cyprus is Turkish (Kıbrıs Türktür) Committee’.85 In 1955 the tension and unrest among the people led to an increase in the riots both in Turkey and in Cyprus. On 2 April, the pro-Greek guerrilla group EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) staged a riot on Cyprus86 and on 24 August 1955, a conference was held in London between Cyprus’s three guarantor nations: the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece. Adnan Menderes, in his speech delivered immediately before the departure of the Turkish delegation to London, said: ‘In our country … we live happily due to the fact that we are the children of the same nation and with our Greek citizens in a brotherly manner’.87 Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the minister of foreign affairs, also argued ‘a slight amendment to the status quo of the island [Cyprus] would mean a change, even the abolition of, the Lausanne Treaty and this would mean as a result the reconsideration of Western Thrace, the twelve islands and the condition of the İstanbul Greeks’.88 In the aftermath of these events, minority leaders in Turkey decided to take a neutral stance. The İstanbul Patriarch Athenagoras issued a declaration saying, ‘We have strong ties with the Turkish state, and the Patriarchate, a purely religious institution, will not deal with the Cyprus issue, which belongs to politics alone’. Some were angered, because although the Patriarch – a leader traditionally tied to the Greeks – saw the ill treatment of Turks in Cyprus, he did nothing.89 There was, however, the claim that the Cypriot minority in Turkey provided financial aid to EOKA.90 Upon hearing this, some newspapers published the headlines ‘the devils within us’.91 Aleksandros Hacopulos, the İstanbul deputy of the DP and minority member, said these claims were lies and stated ‘The views of all Greek citizens concerning the Cyprus matter are the same as the view of our government’.92

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The DP government meanwhile arranged demonstrations against Greece and, to stoke anti-Greek sentiment, spread rumours that Atatürk’s house in Thessalonica (the former Ottoman province where he was born, now part of Greece) had been bombed. As a result, large-scale riots took place on 6–7 September.93 In the heat of these riots people started destroying all shops belonging to non-Muslim minorities (Figure 8).94 Even graves belonging to minorities were desecrated and their remains unearthed.95 The police did not intervene and only with the military’s help was the situation calmed.96 When the riots ended, the government declared martial law in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir, and the minister of the interior resigned.97 Following the 6–7 September events, 5,104 people were arrested, and the ‘Cyprus Is Turkish Committee’ was closed down. As some of the group’s members belonged to the CHP, the Democrats initially argued that CHP members were responsible for the 6–7 September events and riots, but this charge remained unproven and was rejected by the CHP. The Democrats next argued that the 6–7

Figure 8 A scene from the 6–7 September riots.

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September events were organised by communists, as anti-communism was at its peak at that time.98 As a result, leftist intellectuals such as Aziz Nesin and Kemal Tahir were arrested, although they knew nothing of the riots and had not participated.99 The internal DP opposition to Menderes also increased after the 6–7 September events, which was highlighted when 19 DP deputies left the party and formed a new party called Hürriyet Partisi (Freedom Party).100 The government resigned on 29 November 1955. President Bayar asked Menderes to form the government once again and, on 16 December 1955, Menderes, after throwing down the gauntlet in a speech, won a vote of confidence: ‘If you [DP deputies] want, you can even bring back the Caliphate’.101 Ultimately, during the 1960 Yassıada Island trials, it became clear that the riots had been organised by the DP itself.102 The non-Muslim citizens never forgot what happened the night of 6–7 September. After these unfortunate events, public discussions emerged concerning the subject of citizenship. Non-Muslim citizens expressed their opinion clearly through their leaders and organs of the press. The message was clear enough: ‘We are not going anywhere’. Aleksandros Hacapulos gave a speech on 12 September 1955 at the general assembly: Everybody should know that these citizens of this country are neither hostages nor prisoners. When we look at the way these events unfolded it looks as an organised event. There has never been anything similar to this event in Turkish history. Turks have never burnt the houses of others from religious minorities.103 The newspaper Emvros, whose publishing house was destroyed in the 6–7 September events, gave its own interpretation of events: We are neither reaya nor hostages in this country. We are the children of this nation and we are trying to prove this in every field. We have always been citizens that were respectful to the laws of this country and we shall remain to be so ... We are going to raise our voice and cry out that we should not have to go through such a disaster ... Our cry is not a rebellion. We only want the right to live as human beings ... We do not reside in this country in an arbitrary manner. We live here because we have the right to live here … We do not want the state to protect us, however, as the citizens of this country, we do want the concept of the state to be protected … The state must reinforce the feeling of trust that we lost on the night of

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6 September … Let our prime minister say the following: ‘We are very sorry for what happened … Let us heal our wounds together. Let us make İstanbul the way it was. You are neither hostages nor slaves here. You are the equal citizens of our state and a part of our nation’.104 What was underscored in these passages was the Turkish citizenship status of the Greek population. It seems clear that they saw themselves as the members of the Turkish nation with same rights and duties as the Muslims citizens. Interestingly, among the people who supported the DP in the 1957 national elections there were non-Muslim citizens. After the 6–7 September events Bayar and Menderes had come to İstanbul to visit the Patriarch and injured non-Muslim citizens105 but historian Samim Akgönül suggests that this was not the only reason for their support: first, it had not been proven yet whether the DP was responsible for the 6–7 September events or not; second, people had not forgotten the discriminatory policies displayed by the CHP; third, the DP was the only alternative to the CHP; and finally, the liberal view of the DP at least in the economic sphere had attracted the non-Muslim citizens.106 The periodic upsurge in the trouble relating to Cyprus continued to have a negative effect on Turkey’s non-Muslim citizens. The Turkish press learned nothing from the 1955 riots, and conducted a campaign in 1957 and 1958 against the Greeks, in particular the Patriarchate.107 Just as in 1955, the press accused them of acting against Turkey’s interests, and attacked the Greeks on the assumption that they sided against the Turkish government. It was also at this time that Greeks with Greek citizenship, who had settled in Turkey after the Residence, Trade and Travel (İkamet, Ticaret ve Seyrisefain) treaty was signed in 1930, were accused of various activities and deported. For example, in August 1957 the famous journalist Theodore Markouizos was banished from the country for having written articles ‘against good Turco-Greek relations.’ In the same way, the photographer of the 6–7 September events Dimitri Kaloumenos was deported in January 1958 for ‘insulting good Turco-Greek relations’. Not only were Greek citizens living in Turkey deported, but many people seeking to enter Turkey were turned back at the border.108 The ‘İstanbul Greek Union’ (Elliniki Enosis Konstantinupoliton) was closed in 1958 for activities contrary to Turkey’s interests109 and in the same year the government considered cancelling the 1930 Residence, Trade and Travel treaty.

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Non-Turkish Citizens In 1932, when Celal Bayar was the CHP’s minister of economy, he was given the task of evaluating the government’s efficiency in the eastern parts of Turkey. The Eastern Report (Şark Raporu), which highlighted the problems of the region and suggested solutions, was submitted on 10 December 1936.110 It made such suggestions as giving land to villagers in order to win their loyalty, providing training on raising livestock and crops; preventing gendarmerie intimidation of local people, and giving and guaranteeing Kurds the right to education and civil service employment. Nevertheless, these solutions were not applied during the singleparty period. Only after the establishment of the DP did the CHP give more attention to non-Turkish citizens and relaxed the definition of nation. Following the 1947 congress of the CHP, the Law on Settlement was altered so that Kurdish tribes who had been forced to migrate to the west were allowed to move back to their homes in the east. As head of the DP, Bayar argued in 1946 for the need to establish DP branches in Eastern Turkey as soon as possible, in line with the party’s doctrine of making no distinction between the country’s east and west.111 Bayar declared that the DP considered as being Turkish anyone who said ‘I am Turkish’.112 At the DP’s first party congress on 23 June 1949, it was argued, ‘We make no distinction between Turkey’s east and west, neither de facto nor de jure, and all the country’s citizens have the same rights and freedoms’.113 In their party programme the Democrats promised to establish cultural centres appropriate to every level of education, including a university in the eastern part of Turkey.114 Bayar again proclaimed that the DP was completely opposed to any separatist movements. He added, ‘This country is our country, so we make no distinction between north and south, or east and west. All of our citizens, no matter where they live, are mature and patriotic and, if called upon, they will protect their country willingly. We are not different to each other – we’re like slices taken from one loaf of bread, kneaded from a single batch of dough. It is because of this that the DP wants to see equality across our country’.115 He supported taking opinion polls in the east to determine local needs, and address them.116 He did not recognise cultural differences between the east and west of Turkey, did not talk about education in Kurdish, and tried to assimilate differences by claiming, ‘Whoever identifies as a Turk, is a Turk’. After 1958, the DP, however, took a more authoritarian approach to non-Turkish citizens. On 17 December 1959, 49 Kurdish intellectuals were arrested on charges of ‘fomenting separatism and undermining the

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national unity with the aid of foreign states’. The case was known as ‘The Case of the 49’, but not all of the accused lived to see a conclusion as it took seven-and-a-half years to hand down a verdict. After 102 university students sent a telegram to the CHP on 14 April 1959, under the heading, ‘Kurdish youths who have been studying in İstanbul universities’, Parliament passed a law forbidding citizens from declaring themselves to be Kurdish, or publishing in Kurdish. Although Bayar’s Eastern Report pointed out most of the problems of that region, neither during the single-party period, nor during the DP’s reign, was much done to improve the conditions in the eastern provinces. The DP did not in any instance establish cultural centres for non-Turkish citizens, as it had pledged in its party programme. Notwithstanding the argument that ‘there was no difference between Kurds and Turks’, after 1957 the Democrats took a more authoritarian line against the Republic’s Kurdish citizens. As a result, the situation of Kurdish citizens remained unchanged during the multi-party period. The Civic Virtue Aspect of Citizenship During the Period 1946–60 During the multi-party period certain laws about the citizenship issue were liberalised. The influence of this liberalisation can also be seen in the civic education textbooks, which started to emphasise democracy and citizenship rights more than they had done during the previous period. Now, unlike in the single-party period, non-Muslim citizens were not written of in a pejorative way. Nevertheless, the DP did not make any revolutionary change in its educational policy, merely following the CHP’s educational policies, so that the single-party period’s education programmes continued during the DP era. Civics textbooks did feel the influence of the 1946 transition to multi-party politics and this can particularly be seen in books published after 1950, the year the DP came to power. The textbooks started by explaining the concept of democracy and the role of political parties in modern democracy.117 They defined multi-party politics as the basis of democracy, and talked about Turkey’s two major political parties, the DP and the CHP.118 They pointed out that it was very normal to have different views among citizens. Author Halit Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf III pointed out: As a result of the granting of the freedom of thought and speech among citizens there arose a difference of opinion among the

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citizens … those citizens who are of the same opinion establish political parties in order to strengthen their own wishes.119 In the second half of the 1950s textbooks started to discuss minor parties.120 This contrasts with the pre-1950 books, which confined themselves to only the CHP and its associated institutions. Moreover, unlike during the single-party period, one author mentioned the importance of establishing foundations, and being a member of foundations, as one of the basic characteristics of democracy. It was especially underlined in bold letters that these foundations were allowed as long as they did not conflict with the interest of the community.121 Citizenship rights and duties were discussed. Aksan, in Yurttaşlık Bilgisi, asserted that learning about citizenship teaches us our rights and duties towards the human community.122 Some of the textbooks gave the full text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.123 The most important right of citizens was their right to live, and unlike in the single-party period, the textbooks pointed out that citizenship rights should be under the protection of the state. Nevertheless, they also talked about martial law, a tool for limiting citizens’ rights for a certain time under extraordinary situations,124 thus normalising the limitation of citizens’ basic rights under certain circumstances. The books also mentioned citizenship rights by making reference to the 1924 Constitution, which was by no means flawless in terms of basic rights given to citizens,125 and exaggerated its qualifications in terms of citizenship rights.126 Nevertheless, citizens’ duties still took the foreground in the course books and, just as in the single-party period, it was emphasised that ‘every right is complemented by a duty’.127 In his preface to the 1950 Information about the Fatherland, the lawyer Ziya Gökalp128 argued that ‘the purpose of civics courses is to teach us our duties as citizens towards our fatherland and the nation. Citizens who fulfil these duties are good citizens, whereas those who fail to do so are bad citizens’.129 Moreover, the basic duties of citizenship were not any different than during the single-party period, i.e., obeying laws, paying taxes, doing military service, and voting.130 The saying ‘Idleness is the mother of all vice’ was again emphasised.131 In discussing duties towards the nation, textbooks stressed the importance of ‘one for all, all for one’, in order to bind citizens to one another.132 Some of the civics textbooks’ definition of nation during 1946–60 was no different from that in the books published during the single-party

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period. The nation was defined as a community living in the same fatherland, speaking the same language, and sharing the same historical connections, emotions, thoughts, and ideals.133 The motto ‘Peace at Home, Peace in the World,’ was stressed in most of the books. The standard exaggerations of the virtues of the Turkish nation could also be observed: Turkish was called the world’s oldest and richest language.134 However, this tendency to exaggerate was less pronounced than during earlier periods. Nevertheless, signs of ethnic nationalism can also be found especially in the second half of 1950s. Some of the textbooks mentioned race as one of the characteristics of the Turkish nation.135 For example, Aksan, in 1957, talked about racial unity as one of the key characteristics of the nation and exaggerated basic characteristics of the Turkish nation: Every individual of the Turkish nation consists of people who resemble one another in a general manner. The Turks who have established various states and have established their dominance on various parts of the world is a nation that is brave, generous and noble. The Turks’ character that is founded upon these high characteristics has bound the Turks together.136 Moreover he also differentiated the meaning of citizenship from dindaş (coreligionist), azınlık (minority) and yabancı tebaa (foreign subject). The DP became more authoritarian after 1957 and this was reflected in the civic education textbooks. Textbooks of the period remained silent on the subject of non-Muslim and non-Turkish citizens of the Republic. The nationalisation of the economy, a policy of the single-party period, however, was emphasised by some of the authors. The books stressed the importance of using national products instead of buying things from foreign countries.137 As in the single-party period, the major purpose of a textbook was to create modern and civilised citizens of the Republic. For this reason they talked about newspapers, books, radio programmes, conferences, cinema, theatre, and music that could serve to educate and enlighten the citizenry. Course books urged citizens to listen to classical music, adding that although Beethoven was a foreigner, when Turks listened to his symphonies they could appreciate them as much as his fellow Germans.138 Playing sports was emphasised both for the sake of health and for character-building in young people.139 Unlike the single-party period, however, the textbooks also showed a picture of women wearing

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headscarves while voting,140 which can be explained by the softening of the definition of secularism during the DP period. The authors continued to brand the Treaty of Sevres as a blueprint for dividing Turkey. Lausanne, in contrast, was lauded as an instrument of Turkey’s salvation. One book unfavourably contrasted a map of Turkey under the Treaty of Sevres with the same under Lausanne.141 These maps were placed in unrelated parts of the book.142 Thus, the authors continued to indoctrinate younger generations with their ideas. In summary, this chapter has looked at the legal, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship between 1946 and 1960. During this period, there was a transition to a multi-party period and citizens started to play a more active role, and accordingly, the issue of citizenship was of utmost importance. Yet, when we look at the period as a whole, we see that the liberal atmosphere that started in 1946 did not persist through the latter part of the period. The era ended with the 1960 military intervention, and the next chapter looks at this event and its aftermath.

5 MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1960–80)

Honourable citizens! Due to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen as well as the recent sad events and for the sake of preventing fighting among brethren, the armed forces have taken over the administration of this country ... This attempt is not against any individual or group. Colonel Alparslan Türkeş1 The main goal of the 27 May 1960 Revolution is to establish all the requirements of the democratic order as soon as possible. Bearing this purpose in mind a new constitution is being prepared. Equality of citizens, freedom of conscience and all of the other freedoms should be guaranteed. No person should be pressured or attacked in any way because of his opinions. General Cemal Gürsel2 The 1960–80 period is of great significance for Turkish political history because it spans three military interventions: the 1960 coup, the 1971 memorandum and the 1980 military intervention.3 These led to significant developments in Turkish politics. The first development involved constitutional changes. In 1960 a new constitution and a new citizenship law were enacted, and as a result, a more liberal understanding of citizenship

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emerged. Individual rights were emphasised more than duties, and the law guaranteed these rights. Although after the 1971 memorandum these rights were limited, when we compare this period with the earlier one (1945–60) there is improvement of citizenship rights and freedoms. The second major development of the period was that the circle of representation was widened. This enlargement had beneficial consequences, such as the beginning of political parties’ acceptance of the Kurdish issue, a taboo subject since the establishment of the Republic. Although the solutions proposed to the Kurdish problem were largely economic, it was a huge step towards accepting that there was a problem in Turkey’s east and south-east. The third development was that the understanding of secularism also became more moderate; as a result different sects (such as Alevis) started to claim their constitutional rights from the government. The 1980 coup also led to the promulgation of a new constitution and other developments, which will be considered in Chapter 6. The Political Background, 1960–80 The military intervention which took place in Turkey on 27 May 1960 ousted the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) Government that was the first ever directly elected by the Turkish citizens. Middle-ranking officers organised themselves into a revolutionary council, the National Unity Committee (NUC),4 and, claiming that they were safeguarding democracy and the state, as well as the Atatürk legacy, carried out a military takeover in 1960. The NUC declared that its intention was to enact a new, more democratic constitution and to return power to a freely elected civilian government.5 A new constitution drawn up by the NUC was enacted in 1961.6 After the new constitution went into effect, the ban on political activity was lifted and new parties were allowed to enter the elections. Eleven new parties were registered,7 however, only the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP), established by a former military officer, Ragıp Gümüşpala on 11 February 1961, was of real importance.8 The AP was seen as a continuation of the Democrat Party and Gümüşpala’s military background gave a positive image for the eyes of the military junta.9 Süleyman Demirel, who remained at the helm until the party was closed down by the 1980 military intervention, succeeded Ragıp Gümüşpala. Following the 1960 military intervention, the next parliamentary elections were held on 15 October 1961. The CHP managed to get 37.6 per cent of the votes, with the AP taking 34.8 per cent.10 The 1961 elections ushered in an era of coalitions and instability. In the October 1965

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parliamentary elections, Demirel’s AP emerged as the outright winner, with 52.9 per cent of the vote, while the CHP support dropped to 28.7 per cent.11 It was very clear that Demirel’s AP saw itself as the real heir of the DP. Due to legal limitations, the AP could not acknowledge this, but its election slogan was ‘If You Look in Our Eyes You Will Understand’, a veiled reference to the DP leader Menderes’ execution.12 The AP was the ruling political party from February 1965 until the 1971 military intervention.13 The most significant achievement of Demirel and the AP in the early years was to reconcile the army with civilian rule.14 This involved the AP sacrificing some degree of control to the army. Cemal Gürsel, head of the junta, contributed to the AP’s success by criticising the party, saying, ‘The head of the monster [the DP] has been destroyed but the tail remains [the AP], but the more they attacked the tail, the more people grew sympathetic to the AP’.15 Although the AP was seen as the successor to the DP, many of its members had little real sympathy for the former DP leaders, Bayar and the late Menderes, and only four of the AP’s 11 founders had any ties with the DP.16 Moreover, the AP was a mass party with very little ideological coherence.17 It represented the interest of all classes, a coalition of industrialists, small traders and artisans, peasants and large landowners, religious conservatives and Western-oriented liberals. The AP’s manifesto emphasised nationalism as a means of uniting the nation and it argued that citizens should be encouraged to work together to achieve national unity and meet the nation’s needs.18 For this reason the AP’s slogan during the 1964 election campaign was ‘Hand in Hand for the Fatherland’.19 The AP always emphasised that their understanding of democracy was different to that of the DP, as the DP became authoritarian in its later periods. Süleyman Demirel said: For all its limitations, democracy is the political system most suitable to the people’s individuality, self-respect, and honour.20 However, the AP failed to take a consistent line about the citizen’s rights and freedoms.21 Until the AP came to power they emphasised basic human rights (1961–65). Demirel declared in 1964: Today Turkish citizens still do not feel assured of their basic human rights, they feel anxious and afraid. Basic human rights are rights which give full protection to the citizen’s self- respect.22

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In the 1965 election manifesto it was also declared that: To realise and develop the issues of freedom, which the democratic constitution has provided, are among the most sacred duties guiding our actions, whether we are in power or in opposition.23 However, when the AP held the reins of power alone, from 1965–71, they began to complain that the country enjoyed too many freedoms, and that the state’s unity would be in danger if this situation continued. For Demirel, elected governments needed to have the ‘democratic authority’ that they deserved.24 For this reason the AP claimed in 1961 that it was too difficult to punish those who abused the basic rights and freedoms of the constitution. Demirel stated: It meant that the inviolability of rights was more important than the destruction of the state. This meant that the state was obliged to exercise its democratic authority against those who abused its freedoms.25 Demirel even said, ‘It is impossible to rule the country with this constitution’.26 There were also strict limits to the exercise of democracy under the AP government. They made no attempt to abolish the National Security Council,27 the institution that put the civilian government under the military’s control in important policy areas.28 Before the 1969 elections the AP suggested constitutional amendments such as strengthening the executive and limiting academic freedom and other freedoms.29 During its period in power the AP gave the impression that it sought a free, civilised and Western order; however, it gave constant messages to its conservative base by emphasising the importance of religious freedom among other freedoms. The first years of the AP government saw high economic growth, but this slowed after 1969, and inflation became a serious problem. There were also intra-party problems.30 Due to a change in the electoral system in 1969, small parties, including the extreme right and left, were unable to win seats in Parliament.31 This led to radical movements turning to terrorist activities and during the late 1960s political violence in Turkey led to a state of anarchy. On 12 March 1971, the military once again intervened in politics.32 The military urged the Demirel government to resign but civilian government remained formally in place, albeit with its actions directed, or restricted, by the military.33 The period 1973 to 1980

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saw five changes of government and neither of the two major parties, the CHP and the AP, was able to command a satisfactory majority in Parliament.34 Thus throughout the 1970s ideological polarisation and political fragmentation were exacerbated.35 The military chiefs demanded political co-operation to re-establish the country’s economic and political stability, but as none of the party leaders considered the memorandum to be addressed to them, they ignored its warning, and remained divided on crucial problems. This gave rise to terrorism and anti-secular movements, and on 12 September 1980, the military intervened once more. As in the previous two interventions, the military banned all political activities, and closed all political parties, including the CHP. The Legal Aspect of Citizenship The 1961 Constitution The 1961 Constitution36 came into effect after a referendum held on 9 July 1961.37 It differed from its 1924 predecessor in several important respects: it attached more value to individuals;38 it emphasised citizenship rights more than citizenship duties; it limited the state’s interference in the affairs of individuals; and it defined the state’s duties towards individuals. The Preamble defined the Turkish nation as follows: A nation inspired by Turkish nationalism that gathers together all individuals sharing joy and grief as an indivisible whole around the national consciousness and ideals, and that aims to raise our nation with a spirit of national unity as an honourable and equal member of the international community … It is a nation conscious of the principle, ‘Peace at home, peace in the world’, the spirit of national struggle, and national sovereignty, and devotion to the revolutions of Atatürk. This definition of the Turkish nation in the 1961 Constitution was neither ethnic, nor racist nor expansionist. Article 2 of the constitution defined the Turkish Republic as ‘national, democratic, secular and social, and respecting the rule of law, established upon a basis of human rights and the principles set out in the Preamble’.39 This article reflects the individual-oriented philosophy of the constitution and its desire for the implementation of universal principles of human rights.40 In contrast, the 1924 Constitution, as amended in 1937,

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had defined the basic qualities of the state as the principles of the CHP: nationalism, secularism, populism, revolutionism and etatism.41 The term milliyetçilik (nationalism), which had racist and negative connotations in the 1924 Constitution, was replaced in the 1961 version by milli (national), which had a more inclusive meaning.42 However, there were heated debates on the removal of the term ‘nationalism’ in the assembly.43 This suggests that although the constitution stressed a more moderate understanding of nationalism, most citizens were not ready for this interpretation. Religion is a significant part of the Turkish citizens’ identity and plays an important role in the definition of Turkish citizenship. There are non-Muslims and Alevi citizens living in Turkey, and for this reason defining secularism and religious freedom is very important. The 1961 Constitution stated that there would be devotion to Atatürk’s revolutions (Preamble); the Turkish state was a secular state (Article 2); that everybody was equal before the law regardless of language, race, gender, political creed, philosophy, religion, and sect (Article 12); that everybody had the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction; and that religious education and instruction were subject to the individual’s own wishes (Article 19). The 1961 Constitution emphasised the importance of religious freedom as a significant factor for religious minorities living in Turkey. In terms of basic rights and freedoms, the 1961 Constitution strengthened basic rights and freedoms of citizens. The second part of the Constitution listed fundamental rights and obligations. Its fifty-two rather long articles replace the twenty brief articles of the 1924 Constitution. The 1924 Constitution had not established the traditional liberties of the citizen in much detail, tending to leave this to law, which can be said to have led to abuse by the government, most notably in respect to the freedom of the press. The 1961 Constitution, however, strengthened basic rights by attempting to state the grounds on which liberties may be curtailed and how far restrictions may go.44 Article 10 of the 1961 Constitution stated that everybody had inviolable basic rights and liberties, and that the state would abolish political, economic and social limits to these liberties.45 The constitution also safeguarded these rights and liberties in Article 11, which stated that rights and liberties could only be limited through the law. The latter could not restrict the core rights even for reasons of morality, public order, social justice or national security.46 The new constitution not only gave the citizens rights and liberties but also guaranteed them.47

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Answering the question of who possessed these extensive rights and freedoms under the 1961 Constitution throws the difference between the 1924 Constitution and its 1961 successor into sharp relief. In the 1924 Constitution, basic rights were listed under the heading ‘The Public Rights of Turks’48 and throughout the document, the people with these rights were defined by ethnic identity as ‘every Turk’ or ‘Turks.’49 Yet under the 1961 Constitution the basic rights of individuals were listed in the fifth section under the heading ‘Fundamental Rights and Duties’ and throughout the new document, the possessors of these rights and freedoms were given as ‘everybody’,50 not as ‘Turks’. Thus the possessors of these rights and freedoms in the 1961 Constitution were not only ethnic Turks but also all citizens, whether ethnically Turkish or not. Although foreigners might not benefit from all the rights listed in the constitution, because Article 13 stated that fundamental rights and freedoms could be restricted by law in a manner consistent with international law,51 this restriction was subject to international law, which was then in some respects above national law. The fourth section of the constitution listed political rights and duties. The possessors of these rights and duties were the citizens of the Turkish Republic only. Article 54 of the 1961 Constitution defined Turkish citizens by saying that ‘everyone who is tied to the Turkish state through citizenship ties is a Turk’; the child of a Turkish father or a mother was a Turk, and the citizenship status of a child born of a foreign father and a Turkish mother would be arranged by law. Citizenship was acquired and lost under circumstances defined by law, and no Turk could have his or her citizenship revoked, except in cases of treason. Such revocations could be appealed. There were a number of major criticisms of the 1961 Constitution: it was too liberal, its executive was too weak and there were not enough limits on freedoms. During the second half of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, nationwide violence and polarisation gave people an excuse to criticise the constitution, and blame it for societal disorder. Nihat Erim, the Turkish prime minister, declared in 1971 that the constitution was much more liberal than the constitutions of most European countries, adding pointedly, ‘Turkey cannot afford such a luxury’.52 Although the 1961 Constitution was the Turkish Republic’s most liberal constitution to date, the document still contained many limitations of rights to guard against their misuse. A number of anti-democratic laws were not deemed contrary to its provisions. For example, Turkish Penal Code Articles 141, 142 and 143 limited freedom of thought; capital

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punishment was still legal,53 and the establishment of branches of foreign associations and associations for international purposes were forbidden.54 Political parties were barred from stating that Turkey had minorities with a different culture or language,55 civil servants were denied the right to strike, and foreigners did not have the right to enter public service.56 Before it was amended, the constitution also placed limits on rights and freedoms, to protect public order, public interest, national security and general morality. The constitution was amended seven times between 1969 and 1974.57 In particular, the amendments made after the 1971 military intervention served to circumscribe basic rights and freedoms. Such expressions as ‘the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation’58 were frequently the legal basis for actions against political opponents. Previously inviolable basic rights were also limited. For instance, before the amendments, the subtitle of Article 11 was ‘The Core Basic Rights and Freedoms’, but after the amendments the words ‘… Their Limitation and Misuse’ were added to the heading. As a result of these amendments, declaring martial law also became easier, and duties started to be emphasised more than rights. The right of movement, which is one of the basic rights of individuals, was limited, and the number of trips one could make to foreign countries within a year was limited to four. In 1978 the number of visits one could make to foreign countries within a year was cut to just two. Some lawyers interpreted these amendments as effectively creating a new constitution. The period of 1961 to 1980 saw the transition to a social welfare state with an active and liberal understanding of citizenship, even though basic freedoms were limited by the constitutional amendments following the 1971 military intervention. The understanding of citizenship was liberal and individual rights and liberties were given greater emphasis and guaranteed under the law. The active participation of citizens was supported, an elaborate system of checks and balances limited the authority of the government, and the power of the president was curtailed. The Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403,59 put into effect on 11 February 1964, still remains in force.60 Article 54 of the 1961 Constitution required certain changes to the earlier Turkish Citizenship Law No. 1312. This had shortcomings as it did not embrace universal principles of citizenship and citizenship rights, such as the principle that everyone should

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have citizenship and that no one should be forced to hold a citizenship that s(he) did not want.61 The principle of blood (descent) for the acquisition of citizenship was adopted by the Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403. The principle of territory was only used in a complementary manner, in order to prevent statelessness, as well as to guarantee the principle that everybody ought to have a citizenship.62 Thus, it explicitly stated the principle of jus sanguinis, and the principle was exercised in a much more comprehensive way when compared to the previous Turkish Citizenship Law No. 1312. Law No. 403 brought certain innovations compared with the Citizenship Law No. 1312. It gave importance to individual choice for the acquisition and revocation of citizenship. For instance, it gave freedom to women to choose their citizenship. In Law No. 1312, a foreign woman who married a Turkish man automatically became a Turkish citizen, while a Turkish woman who married a foreign man remained a Turkish citizen. In contrast, Law No. 403 gave freedom to women to choose their own citizenship. Revocation of citizenship in Law No. 403 was reserved for activities incompatible with loyalty to the state.63 In contrast to the provisions of Law No. 1312, citizens living abroad who failed to apply to a Turkish embassy at least once every five years, and citizens who published criticisms of the Turkish government abroad, had no need to fear losing their Turkish citizenship.64 Under the new law it was also possible to open a court case against decisions related to citizenship. The first Citizenship Law of the Republic was enacted as part of the nation-building process, and had many shortcomings. Citizenship Law No. 403 was prepared in order to adapt the law to changing circumstances, and to apply universal principles of citizenship. It brought certain reforms concerning the acquisition and revocation of citizenship. Nevertheless, both laws emphasised the blood principle and dealt with the principle of territory only in a complementary sense. Hence, ethnicity still played an important role in the definition of citizenship. Debates in Parliament over Citizenship Issues When compared with the 1924 Constitution, the 1961 Constitution introduced a more liberal environment and offered opportunities for greater political diversity. The new constitution accepted a wider spectrum of political activity, both on the left and right, by permitting citizens to form associations, political parties, and trade unions. Citizens started playing a much more active role in politics.

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Socialists in Parliament: The Turkish Worker’s Party After the 1960 military intervention, the first party founded in the liberal atmosphere of the 1961 Constitution was the Turkish Workers’ Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP). Twelve labour union leaders formed it on 13 February 1961.65 Left-wing intellectuals also joined the party later on, but TİP never exceeded three per cent of the vote and was never part of a governing coalition.66 Although the party neither ruled nor took part in a ruling coalition, it greatly influenced Turkish politics and played a significant role in the citizenship issue. The party accepted that there was a Kurdish problem in Turkey’s east and south-east and the solutions to this problem should not only be economic. TİP argued that constitutional rights should be given to minorities who were suffering from discrimination. By doing this, it argued, ‘second-class’ citizens of the Republic would be transformed into ‘full citizens’.67 The manifestos of TİP focused on democratisation instead of socialism. The word ‘socialism’ did not appear in their first party programme,68 as the party preferred the term ‘collectivism’.69 It was only at the third TİP congress that changes, such as adding the term ‘socialist organisation’, appeared in the programme.70 TİP’s programmes highlighted the party’s loyalty to the 1961 Constitution. Its inaugural 1961 programme stated, ‘TİP considers devotion to the Republic and the constitution to be duties of our citizens’.71 According to the party chairman, Mehmet Ali Aybar, the 1961 Constitution required a socialist system, and for this reason he used ‘Complete Application of the Constitution’ as a motto.72 TİP defined nationalism as: ‘Preventing the exploitation of Turkey internally and externally’.73 The party’s version of nationalism made no distinction between different religions, languages, races or sects.74 Mehmet Ali Aybar stated, ‘Everybody who is a patriot and has good intentions will sign onto our party programme … All citizens of Turkey, no matter what their class, should support TİP in order to achieve the goals highlighted in our programme’.75 Article 2 of TİP’s regulations stated that all citizens who accept the party’s principles could join it, no matter what their religion, race, sect, colour, gender, and class. Unlike the AP, they did not emphasise accepting Turkish culture as a prerequisite for joining TİP. TİP’s programme also emphasised the citizen’s religious freedom. It stated that TİP respected the freedom of conscience, religion, and sect. TİP interpreted secularism not as being opposed to religion but rather as ensuring that religion was not used for political purposes.76 TİP devoted attention to Turkey’s Kurdish problem, and tried to find

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solutions to the economic, political, social and cultural problems of the region. In a speech in Gaziantep on 12 May 1963, Mehmet Ali Aybar argued that there was a grave problem in Turkey’s East and South-east because there were millions of citizens who spoke Kurdish and Arabic, and belonged to the Alevi sect. These citizens had fulfilled all their duties and became martyrs in the Turkish War of Independence, said Aybar, but they had been unable properly to reap the benefits of citizenship. He added that this reality should be accepted, and that these citizens should be treated as equal citizens of the Republic. To solve these problems, TİP supported giving and guaranteeing the constitutional rights of citizens with different ethnic and religious identities.77 At TİP’s February 1964 congress, TİP’s members approved the final shape of its manifesto. Under the heading ‘The Kurdish Problem’, the party manifesto stated that most of the citizens in the south-east part of Turkey could not exercise their social, economic and cultural rights, and that for this reason developing this eastern part was among TİP’s duties. Also Kurdish and Alevi citizens should be treated as ‘full citizens’ and their citizenship rights should be guaranteed in the Constitution. In 1967 the party organised meetings referred to as ‘East Meetings’ in the Kurdish-inhabited regions.78 The first of these was organised in Diyarbakır on 16 September 1967, and was followed by meetings in Silvan, Siverek, Batman, Tunceli and Ağrı. The meetings drew attention to the economic inequality between Turkey’s east and west, calling for ‘investment instead of gendarmerie stations’. The title ‘eastern’ also made an attempt to refer to the Kurdish identity. This was the first time since the early 1920s that the existence of the Kurdish identity was accepted at a political meeting. At TİP’s third party congress in 1968, members argued that although Article 11 of the 1961 Constitution stated that there would be no distinction between citizens in terms of language, race, religion, sect, and that all citizens were equal before the law, Turkey’s Kurdish and Arabic-speaking citizens were oppressed and treated as second-class citizens.79 In its fourth congress in October 1970, the party adopted even more extensive and comprehensive policies to address the ‘eastern problem’. The party pointed out that Kurdish people were living in the eastern part of Turkey; from the very beginning, the ruling class had applied pressure, terror and assimilation policies to Kurdish citizens. This ruling class interpreted the problem as an economic problem, which reflected its chauvinistic nationalism. Kurdish citizens’ constitutional citizenship rights should be guaranteed and in order to meet the Kurdish citizens’ democratic desires Kurdish and Turkish socialists should work together

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within TİP.80 This was the first time the term ‘constitutional citizenship’ was used in the history of the Turkish Republic. The Kurdish problem had been a taboo since the establishment of the Republic, with the state refusing to even acknowledge the problem. For TİP even to talk about the problem and about ‘constitutional citizenship’ constituted an enormous step towards properly addressing the problem, and remains so to this day. The Constitutional Court dissolved TİP on 20 July 1971, a decision published in the Official Gazette on 6 January 1972. The reason for the closure was not the party’s socialist identity but rather its approach to the Kurdish problem at its fourth congress in 1970, and especially decision number six, which began with the declaration, ‘Kurdish people are living in the eastern part of Turkey’. Behice Boran, who chaired TİP after 1970, argued in her defence that they did not mean that there was a different ‘race’ called ‘Kurdish’ but rather a different ‘ethnic identity’. Moreover, during the party’s decade-long existence, TİP argued that they simply wanted to apply the constitution completely. ‘In terms of our Kurdish citizens, we just wanted to guarantee their constitutional rights as given to all ethnic and religious identities in Article 12 of the 1961 Constitution,’ said Boran. TİP, for Boran, did not seek to get rid of or weaken the consciences of being a nation; on the contrary the party wanted to make it stronger, because without social equality and justice there could be no unity. Thus she claimed that they had never put the nation’s unity into jeopardy,81 and the closure of the party was not justified. TİP was re-established on 30 April 1975 but this achieved little and the party shared the fate of its predecessor. TİP closed after the military intervention of 1980 and the party leader Boran, who left the country after TİP’s closure, lost her Turkish citizenship. The CHP Moves to the ‘Left of Centre’ The CHP of 1960–80 was slightly different to the CHP of 1946–60 in terms of its understanding of citizenship.82 During the period 1960–80 the CHP accepted that there was a Kurdish problem in Turkey’s east and south-east, though it emphasised only economic solutions, and criticised previous governments’ policies in that region. It agreed on a more moderate definition of both secularism and nationalism; it emphasised religious freedom, though it did not mention citizens belonging to different sects and non-Muslim citizens. However, as during the singleparty period, it supported nationalisation of the economy and argued that

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only Turkish citizens should be economic agents. It still had a phobia of foreigners and alleged that the Kurdish problem stemmed from foreigners seeking to seize Turkey’s national resources. Towards the mid-1960s, the CHP adopted a ‘left of centre’ political stance, in order to appeal to young voters in the face of the emergence of the leftist parties after the 1961 Constitution.83 Bülent Ecevit, then minister of labour, was the guiding spirit behind this new policy. Ecevit argued that the term ‘left of centre’ was the political term that defined the policies and programmes of the CHP, and that there was a need to use this label owing to unjust claims from the extreme right and left alike, including the accusation that the CHP was communist.84 The CHP did not change its ideology and party programme wholesale; it adapted its programme to the changing circumstances after 1960.85 The 1965 general election was a disappointment for the CHP, as its share of the vote fell to 28.7 per cent, from the 36.7 per cent gained in the 1961 election.86 Under Ecevit’s leadership, the CHP entered the 1973 general elections with a new programme, ‘Towards Bright Days’ (Ak Günlere), which was seen as part of a ‘change of order’. The new programme did not reject the heritage of the CHP before Ecevit, but it did criticise it. The ‘Towards Bright Days’ programme accepted the reality of ethnic problems in Turkey’s east and proposed solutions, giving the negligence of previous governments (including the CHP during the single-party period) as one of the reasons for backwardness in the east and south-east. According to the CHP, the establishment, fear of a separate state for Kurdish people caused other parties to exaggerate the ethnic problems in the south-east. The CHP accepted the existence of torture, a practice which had served to damage the image of Turkey in the West.87 Although the CHP accepted that there was an ethnic problem in the east and south-east, for the party the real root of this problem was social and economic, not ethnic, something which could be solved by improving the economic conditions in the south-east. If there were separatist movements based upon ethnicity in the east and south-east, the underlying reason was that foreigners wanted to seize Turkey’s resources, and, if the state controlled all the underground resources and developed this part of the country, ethnic movements incited by foreign influences would decrease.88 The CHP also adopted a more moderate understanding of secularism in its 1973 programme. It answered charges that the CHP was communist and irreligious, by arguing that they respected citizens’ religious freedom and freedom of thought.89

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Nationalists in Parliament: Republican Peasant’s Nation Party Although some of the parties accepted the existence of minority citizens in Turkey, others rejected this reality. For example, the Republican Peasant’s Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, CKMP),90 which won 14 per cent of the vote in the 15 October 1961 elections and gained fifty-four seats in Parliament, was among them.91 Alparslan Türkeş, who was a leading figure in the 1960 military intervention, joined the CKMP’s ranks on 31 March 1965 and quickly rose to become party leader on 1 August 1965. Under Türkeş a party programme called ‘A Prosperous and Strong Turkey’ was prepared.92 However, the CKMP members of longer standing than their new leader charged that Türkeş was imitating Hitler, trying to give the party a nationalist-socialist character, and they branded the new programme as ‘fascist and totalitarian’. At the outset, the CKMP’s programme was not cast in a racist way. ‘We accept everybody who says “I am a Turk” as Turkish’, read the programme. ‘We reject racism. For us, being Turk means respecting Turkish culture and the Turkish state’.93 Turkish nationalism was defined as ‘the ideal of love and connection to the Turkish nation, culture, and the state’.94 Thus, in the beginning, the CKMP’s understanding of nationalism was not racist, but it was assimilationist, because it always emphasised the importance of Turkish culture and language. The party emphasised the importance of religious freedom by stating ‘Freedom of religion and conscience is an inseparable part of human rights’.95 However, this religious freedom was only for Muslim citizens of the Republic belonging to the Sunni sect of Islam. On 9 February 1969, Türkeş changed the name of the CKMP to the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP).96 The new party’s election manifesto, entitled ‘The Fatherland and World Events’, stated that religious courses – effectively indoctrination in Sunni Islam – should be put into the curriculum of all school classes.97 In the 1977 elections,98 the party’s mottos were ‘Without the MHP, there will be an irreligious nation, and an unlawful state and government’, and ‘Religious Belief Comes First’.99 The 1977 election manifesto was entitled, ‘Turkish Nation, Wake Up!’, and the manifesto declared that the MHP would establish a great Turkish nation, where there would be unification of Islam and nationalism.100

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Alevis in Parliament: The Unity Party The Unity Party (Birlik Partisi, BP) and the Unity Party of Turkey (Türkiye Birlik Partisi, TBP) both played a significant role in Turkish politics, because they emphasised the sectarian differences among Turkish citizens. They argued that religious education should not be under the domination of the Sunni sect, and emphasised religious freedom for citizens belonging to different sects of Islam. On 17 October 1966, a group of Alevi politicians established the Unity Party (Birlik Partisi, BP). Although the party appeared to receive disproportionately greater support from Alevis, its programme and public statements did not bear the marks of a denominational party. The party had social democratic views and was, arguably, further to the left than the CHP.101 The BP regulations102 stated that the party was opposed to both the extreme right and the extreme left, emphasised the importance of Turkish culture, and said that along these lines it was ‘progressive, reformist and Kemalist’. It advocated that the language of both religion and education should be Turkish, that tolerance should be taught to students during religious education, and finally, that religious education should not be under the domination of one sect (i.e., the Sunnis).103 Its programme stressed that the BP accepted republicanism and secularism. It also urged that citizens tied to the Turkish nation, who believe in linguistic and cultural unity and who are neither racist nor separatist, should be accepted as Turks. It was emphasised that the indivisible integrity of the state and its territory should be protected. The Turkish language should be dominant in every aspect of life. Everybody should be equal before the law and religious freedom should be given the highest importance. In order to achieve these goals education should be both purged of foreign influences and appropriate to Turkish culture and customs.104 In the 1969 elections, the BP got 2.8 per cent of the votes and won eight seats in Parliament. In 1973 the party changed its name and entered that year’s elections under the title of the Unity Party of Turkey (Türkiye Birlik Partisi, TBP). The TBP’s regulations and programme laid out its principles, namely revolution, communitarianism, Kemalism, democracy, populism, etatism, republicanism, freedom, independence, secularism, equality and patriotism. It declared the TBP to be in favour of ending the inequality between the regions and it emphasised the importance of religious freedom.105 In the 1973 elections it won only 1.1 per cent of the votes, and a single seat in Parliament. In the 1977 elections the party’s representation fell to zero,

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and after the 1980 military intervention, along with all the other parties, it was closed.106 Among Alevi citizens there are ethnic minorities such as the Kurds. Nevertheless, despite acceptance of the existence of a Kurdish problem, Alevi political parties supported the Kemalist principles of the singleparty period, and emphasised the importance of the Turkish language and culture even more than the programmes of such nationalist parties as the CKMP. For this reason these political parties could not win the votes of Kurdish citizens. The Identity Aspect of Citizenship, 1960–80 Non-Muslim Citizens During the period 1960–80, the Cyprus issue continued to be an important problem. The situation of non-Muslim citizens (especially the Greeks of İstanbul) was increasingly tied to the situation in Cyprus from the second half of the 1950s.107 It was assumed that non-Muslims in Turkey, especially the Greeks, had links with the events occurring in Cyprus. Sometimes the minorities were even held responsible for some of the incidents. This was a time during which the press would differentiate between Greeks having Turkish citizenship and Greeks having citizenship of Greece, and statements were made like: ‘Those close to us are Rum, and not Greeks’.108 This was in spite of the fact that there was only one community, united by family and economic ties. As a result, every decision taken by the Turkish government concerning Greeks with Greek citizenship would also affect the Greeks with Turkish citizenship, and even the other non-Muslim citizens living in Turkey. The Greek minority in Turkey experienced relatively little trouble after 2 February 1959, when the London Agreement was signed, solving the Cyprus problem for a time.109 On 15 August 1960, Cyprus officially proclaimed its independence. On 25 December 1960, Kaloudis Laskaradis, a well-known member of the Greek minority in Turkey, Agavni Kalustyan, an Armenian, and Erol Dilek, a Jew, were all chosen as members of the Senate in Turkey.110 Since the 1961 Constitution was written in a way which protected the rights and freedoms of non-Muslims as citizens,111 until 1964, non-Muslims went through a relatively stable and calm period. However, on 16 March 1964, following violence in Cyprus against the Turkish community, the Turkish government unilaterally repealed the İkamet, Ticaret ve Seyrisefain (Residence, Commerce and Navigation)

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agreement which had been signed in 1930 and by which 12,000 Greek citizens had settled in İstanbul.112 This agreement had permitted commerce and residence to members of Greek minorities living in Turkey and Ankara’s decision created shockwaves in Athens and among the 12,000 Greeks in Turkey. The Greeks of Greece were deported, followed by the mass migration of the Greeks of Turkey. According to official government statistics, as of 16 September 1964, 7,200 of the 12,000 Greeks living in Turkey had left.113 On 17 April 1964 the bank accounts of Greeks in Turkey were blocked. Those who were expelled from Turkey were only allowed to take 200 Turkish Lira (10 dollars) and a suitcase with them.114 In the press there was rejoicing that ‘we got rid of the snakes in our bosom’.115 There was also panic among the non-Muslims: 86 Greeks with Turkish citizenship asked to change the expression Greek-Orthodox in their identity cards to Turkish-Orthodox; a whole village in Batman changed its religion and became Muslim, only some of the large number of non-Muslims who changed their names and their religion.116 This caused much comment in the press. Those Greeks that stayed in İstanbul sought to distinguish themselves from the Cypriot Greeks and expressed their loyalty to the country at every opportunity.117 The Turkish press also organised a campaign on 2 May 1965 called ‘The Nation Can Do It’ (Millet Yapar) in order to mobilise Turkish citizens to help the Turkish navy, because through US assistance Greece’s navy had become stronger than Turkey’s. The Demirel government supported the campaign, organised a commission and decided to establish a group called the Turkish Navy Association. However, such campaigns also created hatred against non-Muslim citizens living in Turkey. Pressure aimed at driving the Greeks out of Turkey increased the measures against Greek minority schools in İstanbul. During this time minority schools in Gökçeada and Bozcaada were joined to the Ministry of National Education.118 From 1964, several schools had to close because of falling pupil numbers. An Article (24/2) in the Private Education Establishments Law of 1963, including the requirement that ‘private schools opened by foreigners must appoint a Turkish deputy headmaster’, was also applied to the schools of non-Muslim citizens living in Turkey. This article’s definition of the deputy headmaster stated that he must be ‘of Turkish origin and a citizen of the Turkish Republic’, and this clearly meant that the deputy must not be from a minority, but that he must be a Turk in the ethnic sense.119 This measure had been made possible by a 1961 law which designated that minority schools were not

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‘community schools’ but ‘private schools’. In addition, from 1964, Greek teachers’ work was made more difficult, as from that date a condition was set that they had to pass a ‘competence in Turkish’ exam.120 Moreover, in 1971 Parliament passed a law that allowed only Turkish citizens to establish private schools.121 By 1974, the minorities in Turkey had begun to die out. It may be for this reason that, as events unfolded in Cyprus, no campaign was conducted by the Turkish press against non-Muslims, as had previously been the case. Their numbers were so small that they could not constitute a threat. Nonetheless, the Turkish government continued to use them as a pawn against the Greek government, and restrictions were placed on the properties owned by non-Muslims, both of individuals and belonging to communities. Every time members of the Greek minority wanted to sell a property they had to obtain permission from the government. Furthermore, two months after the Cyprus situation flared up, on 8 May 1974 the General Legal Committee of the High Court ruled that legal persons from the minorities were ‘foreigners’, and that their acquisition of property was to be viewed as ‘dangerous’.122 Limits were also placed on non-Muslim foundations. The General Director of the Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, VGM) demanded a vakıfname (foundation certification) concerning the property of non-Muslim citizens in 1972. However, many did not have a vakıfname because they were established by the sultan’s firman. Written statements from 1936, when the Foundation Law No. 2672 was implemented, were considered as a vakıfname by the VGM in 1974. Properties owned by the non-Muslim foundations after 1936 were taken over, because they did not exist in the 1936 written statement.123 This was the last step of the Turkification of the economy since the single-party period. There were also interesting examples of discrimination against Turkey’s Greek minority during this period. For instance, during the 1976 Eurovision Song Competition – traditionally a very significant competition for Turks – the state broadcaster TRT censored Greece’s entry.124 Thus during the period 1960–80, as in previous periods, non-Muslim citizens suffered from discriminatory policies. Alevi Citizens Alevi religious practices and their interpretation of Islam are strikingly different from the practices and interpretations of the Sunnis. Although Alevism is the second-largest sect in Turkey, many authors contend that

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Alevi communities have historically been oppressed and discriminated against since the founding of the Republic.125 Alevi citizens have played the role of the ‘other,’ and the political struggles of the 1960s and 1970s witnessed extreme discrimination against Alevi citizens, who were branded ‘reds,’ ‘atheists,’ ‘immoral people’ and so on. During the 1970s, the real reason for this discrimination against Alevi citizens was their support for the political left, since in that decade many Alevis abandoned their religiously defined identity and turned to socialism. A number of dramatic events and even acts of murder occurred where the victims were Alevi, such as the clashes in Malatya and Kahramanmaraş in 1978, and Çorum in 1980.126 Most Alevi citizens supported leftist ideas because political parties on the right were supporting Sunni Islam. As the 1961 Constitution introduced a liberal environment, leftist ideas gained expression. However, after the 1970s, leftist intellectuals started to be arrested, and communism was presented as the major enemy of the state. In 1975, an imam was even arrested for spreading communist propaganda.127 Demirel constantly quoted Atatürk’s rallying cry to ‘crush communism wherever you find it’128 and the conflict between left and right and Alevis and Sunnis became very brutal in the second half of the 1970s. Young people calling themselves ‘rightists’ trained in commando camps, and young self-proclaimed ‘leftists’ trained in Palestine. One small spark was enough to set off a fight. To spread terrorism, disputes were provoked between Alevis and Sunnis. The first step was taken in 1978 in Malatya, when its AP mayor was assassinated following his complaints about the pressure of idealists and his declaration that he was planning to transfer to the CHP. A rumour spread that communists were responsible which led to ‘idealists’ attacking Alevi-dominated neighbourhoods and killing some of their residents. The aftermath of this saw violence against Alevis and Alevi neighbourhoods spread to the cities of Muş, Elazığ, Erzurum, Iğdır and Sivas. In Sivas, for instance, Alevis were attacked on the grounds that they were not observing the Ramadan fast.129 The violence reached its peak in 1978. Events in Kahramanmaraş proved the most violent and can only be described as a massacre. After false rumours were spread that ‘Alevi communists’ had bombed a movie theatre, Alevi neighbourhoods found themselves under attack. As a result, on 22–23 December 1978, over 100 people died (mostly Alevis). One prayer leader exhorted: ‘You cannot be a haji [a favoured pilgrim] by fasting or doing your namaz prayers. If you kill an Alevi, then you will be five times better in the sight of God’.130 As a result of such provocations,

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Sunni citizens destroyed 300 businesses belonging to Alevis, assaulted Alevi neighbourhoods, and also attacked political parties such as the CHP, and TİP, which were supported by Alevis, while shouting slogans such as ‘Muslim Turkey’ and ‘Military and the Nation Hand in Hand’. During this unrest, martial law was declared in 13 cities. On 29 May 1980 in Çorum, where many Alevis live, a fight between Alevis and Sunnis took place which was similar to that in Kahramanmaraş. MHP supporters spread propaganda about the killing of MHP member Gün Sazak, and then started destroying shops belonging to Alevis and attacked neighbourhoods where Alevi leftists lived. Rightists called for a jihad against both Alevis and leftists. As a result, 48 people died, and others were horribly mutilated by having their noses or ears cut off. These events could only be brought under control when the military intervened. Kurdish Citizens During the period 1960–80, the existence of the Kurdish problem became accepted by some of the political parties. Within the more liberal atmosphere of the 1960s, Kurdish citizens started participating much more actively in politics and demanding basic rights and freedoms from the government. Kurdish intellectuals started publishing Kurdish journals such as Dicle-Fırat and Deng and establishing youth organisations. However, Kurdish intellectuals continued to be arrested. For instance, on 28 June 1963, 12 Kurdish intellectuals were arrested on charges of being extreme leftists and of plotting to establish a Kurdish state on Turkish soil.131 The first legal Kurdish youth organisation, the Revolutionary Eastern Culture Hearths (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları, DDKO), was established in May 1969; first in Ankara, then in İstanbul and Turkey’s east and south-east. All of the DDKO’s branches had the same regulations. The organisation aimed to organise Kurdish youth in the universities to end all racist and chauvinist behaviour, and to ensure friendly and equal life among citizens. In order to accomplish these aims, the DDKO organised conferences and seminars, dealing particularly with national self-determination. DDKO branches were significant for the issue of citizenship, because they were the first Kurdish organisations founded since the formation of the Republic which stirred the consciousness of citizens living in Turkey’s east, and encouraged them to protect their own culture. Not surprisingly, neither rightist governments nor the military officers, who feared the establishment of a separate state by Kurds in Turkey,

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welcomed the DDKO’s activities, and from 1970 onwards, the pressure on the inhabitants of Turkey’s south-east increased. The DDKO prepared a report on this and submitted it to Parliament. The report, which was discussed in the assembly, declared, ‘The genocide and pressure against citizens living in Turkey’s east and south-east are unlawful and violate humanitarian norms … If you look at Turkish history, you will recognise that these acts are not the first instance and not the last’.132 In 1971 a number of DDKO members were arrested for spreading communist and Kurdish propaganda. This case was very significant, because it was the first time in Turkey’s republican history that the courts discussed Kurds and the Kurdish question.133 Having discussed the legal and identity aspects of citizenship in Turkey during the period of 1960–80, the civic virtue aspect of citizenship will be assessed next. The Civic Virtue Aspect of Citizenship During 1960–80 With the enactment of the 1961 Constitution, a more liberal understanding of citizenship emerged in society. Although the rights given by the 1961 Constitution were limited after the military intervention of 1971, the definition of citizenship during the period was improved compared to the single-party period and that of the 1946–60. However, Muslim minorities such as Kurds, and sectarian minorities such as Alevis, as well as other non-Muslims, continued to be ‘second-class’ citizens in society and mention of them was absent from course books. The ideal citizens of the Republic during this period continued to be obedient and passive, although one could nonetheless observe small shifts towards a more active citizenship throughout the period. Although all of the textbooks published during this period emphasised the importance of democracy and multi-party politics, and they called the military intervention of the 27 May 1960 the ‘27 May Revolution’. This was hailed as a key event for the Turkish nation, one as important as the declaration of the Republic.134 The books supplied reasons for the revolution and criticised the previous DP government. There was a need for a military intervention, they said, because the DP was violating the constitution and democracy, endangering Atatürk’s reforms, manipulating the citizens’ religious feelings, stirring partisanship, and threatening citizens’ basic rights and freedoms.135 Scorn for the DP period was shown by denying it its proper name: instead of calling the DP a government, textbooks called it a ‘group’ (zümre) which held power from 1950 to 1960.136

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However, books published in the second half of the 1960s restored the DP’s name, while criticising the single-party period’s authoritarianism.137 The new citizenship studies syllabus prepared by the Education Ministry to suit the 1961 Constitution gave much attention to such topics as the duties of the state towards citizens, and respect for citizens and their rights. In addition, the new syllabus contained sub-sections under the general heading ‘My Great Nation’, and these included ‘Characteristics of the Turkish Nation’, ‘What Is Love of One’s Nation?’ and ‘The Need to Put National Above Personal Interests’.138 The textbooks published during this period gave the same definition of nation as in previous periods, namely unity in history, culture, the fatherland, language and ideals.139 The basis of Turkish nationalism was described as ‘Everybody and everything is for Turkey.’ ‘Every Turk’, said the books, should carry the feeling of ‘I am a Turk, and I am proud to be a Turk’.140 The single-party period’s policies of promoting self-confidence among the citizenry and exaggerating the virtues of the Turkish nation continued. Turkish nationalism was not expansionist, argued the books, which once again held up the motto ‘Peace at Home, Peace in the World,’ as in previous periods.141 The textbooks defined Turkish citizens as ‘anyone attached to the Turkish nation by citizenship ties’. One of the textbooks defined citizen as the following: Those who are tied to the Turkish state according to the conditions of the laws are called citizens … Everybody who is tied to the Turkish state through citizenship ties are all Turks. In this respect those citizens living in Turkey whom we call Armenian, Greek and Jews are Turks. There is no difference between them and those born of Turkish parents.142 Thus, Armenian, Greek and Jewish citizens were all Turks; no different from those whose parents were ethnically Turkish. We should respect other citizens’ rights, said the books, such as being able to believe in and freely practise their own religions. The textbook stated: Our constitution gives our citizens freedom of conscience. Based upon this it is a violation of citizenship rights to make fun of a Christian citizen who goes to church for fulfilling his religious duties.143

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The syllabus published by the Teaching and Education Committee in 1969 was one of the best syllabuses in terms of creating active citizenship. The following is a quotation from the syllabus:144 Efforts to teach our students to examine the country’s national problems, and to help them learn these thoroughly and in detail, and to seek solutions to the benefit of homeland and nation, will mean that we raise enthusiastic, committed, intelligent and enlightened citizens … The enlightened citizen is one who questions issues both at home and abroad, selects the best of the alternatives, and accepts responsibility … The motivation for the Teaching and Education Committee’s publication of such a syllabus was the European Council’s 1969 ‘General and Technical Education Report’. This report was published by the Talim Terbiye Kurulu (Training and Education Council).145 This report made proposals about ‘Citizenship Information Teaching in the Primary and Secondary Schools,’ and emphasised the importance of participatory education and critical thinking. However, this period lasted only for a short time. In 1971 the army’s intervention also affected citizenship studies books. When compared to previous periods, the textbooks published after the 1960 military intervention emphasised the importance of rights. Nevertheless, the rights and freedoms under the 1961 Constitution were restricted through amendments after the 1971 memorandum. For this reason, textbooks published after the 1971 memorandum resumed the theme of emphasising duties more than rights. For instance, one of the textbook’s definitions of individual rights is: ‘something that citizens want in return for having fulfilled their citizenship duties’.146 Also, textbooks emphasised the importance of community interests over individual interests, as in previous periods, and the motto ‘One for all, all for one’ was repeated in these books.147 During 1960–80 the understanding of citizenship was more liberal than in previous periods; however, Muslim minorities such as the Kurds, sectarian minorities such as the Alevis, and other non-Muslim citizens continued in practice to be regarded as second-class citizens. After the 1980 coup, although citizenship rights were restricted to a large degree, new problems arose with the emergence of globalisation. These problems will be treated in the next chapter.

6 REMAPPING TURKISH IDENTITY (1980–2010)

The concept of one nation, one flag, one fatherland, and one state is the essence of our policies. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 20071 This chapter analyses the 1980–2008 period in terms of the construction of citizenship’s legal, identity and civic virtue aspects. This period is crucial for the transformation in the understanding and conceptualisation of citizenship in Turkey. Since the 1980s, Turkey has witnessed a clash between the official understanding of citizenship, based on duties rather than rights, and holding that society can only be formed under the unitary identity of ‘Turkish citizen’, and demands for a more liberal understanding based on the prioritisation of rights over duties, and the recognition of differences within a new definition of citizenship. During the 1980s, the attitude of the state towards Alevi, Kurdish and non-Muslim citizens’ identity claims was not promising, as the state continued to ignore differences among citizens. Some promising improvements, however, have been taking place since the second half of the 1990s. The European Union has been one of the major determinants of reforms related to citizenship. Nevertheless, there are many problems about the application of these reforms, and the state still tries to stick to the official definition of citizenship, based on the priority of duties over rights, and the elimination of differences in society. Non-Muslims, Alevis and Kurds still feel they are second-class

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citizens of the Republic, and Sunni Muslim, ethnic Turks, who see themselves as the real citizens of the Republic, continue to be passive and obedient. The Political Background, 1980–2010 The turmoil of the 1970s ended with the military coup that took place on 12 September 1980 and marked a new era. After the coup, the National Security Council (NSC) declared that it would eventually return the democratically elected civilian authorities to power. However, the Constitution which was prepared by the NSC put restrictions on the political activities of the former political leaders, and, although during that period fifteen parties were founded, only three of them were permitted to enter the elections of 6 November 1983:2 the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, MDP), led by retired General Turgut Sunalp and closely identified with, and supported by, the generals; the Populist Party (Halkçı Parti, HP), led by Necdet Calp and the closest to the traditional Kemalist wing of the Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP); and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), led by Turgut Özal, who as deputy prime minister was responsible for the economic reform programme of 1979–80.3 The military officers clearly supported the MDP, and to a lesser extent the HP. Nevertheless, Özal’s ANAP won a landslide victory with 45.2 per cent of the votes cast and an absolute majority in the parliament. As a result of ANAP’s parliamentary majority, Turkey enjoyed political stability between 1983 and 1991. Özal claimed to unite and reconcile the four political tendencies of nationalism, Islamism, the centre-right and the centreleft,4 and, during his brief political career (1980–93), he became one of the most controversial figures in the history of the Turkish Republic.5 As the old political leaders were making political statements, running political parties from behind the scenes, and trying to influence the outcome of political game, President Özal announced a referendum on a Constitutional amendment allowing the old politicians to re-enter politics. Though Özal and the ANAP actively campaigned against the measure, these political bans were repealed by the 6 September 1987 referendum,6 and, with high inflation, political corruption, and the return of the pre-1980 political leaders, the ruling ANAP’s popularity began to ebb in the late 1980s.7 In 1991 the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) won 16.8 per cent of the votes and 62 seats in Parliament. In the general elections

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held on 25 December 1995, the RP increased its share of the vote to 21.4 per cent, making it the biggest party in Parliament. In July 1996 the RP formed a coalition government with Tansu Çiller’s True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP), with the Islamist leader, Necmettin Erbakan, becoming prime minister. The military, and much of the secular establishment, feared that Erbakan and other RP members might want to establish a state based on Islamic law, though Erbakan did not publicly embrace that objective. This fear was fed by such factors as Erbakan’s close relations with Iran and Libya, hosting a Ramadan dinner (iftar) for leaders of tarikats (Islamic brotherhoods), and similar moves.8 The Erbakan government lasted for only a year, stepping down in June 1997 after being pressured by the military in what has come to be known as the ‘28 February Process’.9 Despite its large number of seats in Parliament, the Constitutional Court closed down the RP, in 1998, for infringing the Republic’s principle of secularism, and the court banned Erbakan and other leading members of the party from politics for five years.10 The then head of the Turkish military declared, ‘28 February is a process … [that] will last a thousand years, if necessary’. Politicians such as Ecevit and Demirel also defended the NSC decree.11 December 1998, saw the founding of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), the RP’s successor, ruled from behind the scenes by Erbakan. A pattern emerged: each time an Islamist party was dissolved, its successor claimed to be more moderate and less Islamist. FP leader Recai Kutan seemed to be abandoning the hard-line Islamism of Erbakan but the party was also dissolved in June 2001 by the Constitutional Court due to its promotion of headscarves during its campaign against the secular state.12 The elections of 18 April 1999 brought a significant development as the ultra-nationalist party of the 1970s, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) passed the national representation threshold with 17.9 per cent of the votes. Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) captured a majority of the votes and formed a coalition with the MHP and the ANAP.13 The MHP won its greatest success in the 1999 elections by moving into mainstream politics, and widening its grassroots organisation. Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP’s leader since 1997, was the engineer of this electoral success.14 His adoption on the campaign trail of a more moderate style of discourse, without forsaking the party’s commitment to nationalist politics, and his emphasis on the MHP’s social and economic policies, led it to a more centrist position in the public’s mind.15

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After the Islamist FP was closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001, Erbakan’s supporters formed the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) in July of the same year. However, in August 2001, ex-FP reformists formed the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), which claimed to be secular16 and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a former mayor of İstanbul, soon became one of the most popular politicians in Turkey.17 Not unexpectedly, the winner of the 3 November 2002 elections was the new AKP led by Erdoğan, which received 34.3 per cent of the votes, making it the first party since 1987 to secure an absolute majority in Parliament.18 The CHP, with 19.4 per cent of the vote, was the only other party to pass the 10 per cent representation threshold needed to take seats in Parliament.19 The aftermath of the 2002 elections saw a single-party government formed by the AKP, the first non-coalition government since 1991.20 During the 2002 election campaign the AKP projected a reformist image promising to remove the obstacles to full democratisation in Turkey (which has comcomitant effects on citizenship). Nevertheless, the reformist zeal exhibited by the AKP during its first two years slowed perceptively in 2005 and noticeably in 2006.21 On 24 April 2007, in a surprise move, Prime Minister Erdoğan announced Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, who has roots in Turkey’s Islamist movements and whose wife wears a headscarf, as the AKP’s candidate for the presidential elections. The opposition accused the government of endangering the country’s secularist traditions by proposing a presidential candidate whose wife wears a headscarf, and the secularists, the generals, the universities and the courts mobilised to stop the process.22 When the opposition boycotted the poll for president on 26 April, the generals issued a powerful statement the next day on the official website of the Turkish Armed Forces, threatening to overthrow the government if necessary to protect the secular nature of the Republic.23 Following these developments and Parliament’s failure to select a new president, the decision was made that early elections be held on 22 July 2007, with the AKP winning a landslide victory. The elections were marked by an 84 per cent turnout. The AKP earned 46.58 per cent of the votes24 – the highest public support in 53 years25 – and formed a single-party government. The CHP, which campaigned on the threat to secularism, won 20.9 per cent of the vote, while the MHP won 14.3 per cent.26 Abdullah Gül was elected as president with the support of the MHP in the session of the new parliament on 28 August 2007.27 Turkey held general elections on 12 June

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2011. According to the election results, the AKP won 50 percent of the vote, which is a landslide victory, and Erdoğan is the only prime minister in Turkish history to win three general elections in a row, each time receiving more votes than the previous election. The AKP was followed by the CHP with 26 percent, and the MHP with 13 percent of the vote. The 327 seats won by AKP is slightly less than the 330 required to propose constitutional changes to a referendum without the support of other parties in parliament, and falls far short of the two-thirds majority needed to rewrite the 1982 military constitution unilaterally without the need for a referendum. The Legal Aspect of Citizenship The 1982 Constitution The 1982 Constitution was the product of the 1980 military intervention. Its primary aim was to restore the authority of the state and to maintain public order, rather than to protect the rights and liberties of its citizens: it aimed to protect the state from the actions of citizens, rather than protecting the fundamental rights and liberties of the citizens from the state’s encroachment.28 The 1982 Constitution29 differed from its 1961 predecessor in many respects. It was more detailed, rigid, and much longer, and the rights and liberties of citizens were more limited.30 The Preamble depicted the Turkish state as a ‘sacred’, and eventually a ‘sublime’ entity. Thus the 1982 Constitution appears to reflect the Hegelian tradition of the ‘absolute state’ rather than the liberal tradition of ‘limited state’. The Preamble also stated that ‘no protection shall be accorded to any activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its State and territory’. This provision clearly exalts some abstract values and principles which can be interpreted to violate the principle of political neutrality. The original text of the 1982 Constitution had almost no right that was not subject to limitation. According to Article 10, ‘All individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political creed, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations,’ and according to Article 12 everybody possesses ‘inherent fundamental rights and freedoms which are inviolable and inalienable’. Nevertheless, Articles 13 and 14 of the Preamble authorised the government to restrict individual rights in the

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interest of safeguarding the ‘integrity of the state with its territory and nation’ and ‘the public interest’. Moreover, the government could impose further limitations on individual rights ‘in times of war, martial law, or state of emergency’ (Article 15). The most important feature of the 1982 Constitution is its fear of political activism, and for this reason even collaboration among associations, unions, and parties is prohibited.31 The limitations of rights and freedoms in the 1982 Constitution made citizens in Turkey more passive, created a less participatory democracy, and served to depoliticise the system. The 1982 Constitution did not use the term ‘Turkish nationalism,’ preferring instead using the term ‘Atatürkist nationalism’ which believed in ‘peace at home, peace in the world’. This definition of nationalism was neither expansionist nor racist in terms of relations between countries, nor was it racist in terms of relations within the country. Article 24 guaranteed the freedom of religion, provided that the exercise of the right did not threaten the ‘indivisible integrity of the state’, and no one may be compelled to worship or to participate in religious ceremonies or rites. Nevertheless, the constitution made religious courses compulsory in the curriculum of the primary and secondary schools. State-controlled religion continued to exist in the 1982 Constitution, and religious education was limited not only to Islam but to just one of its sects, Sunnism. Alevi citizens, who do not belong to the Sunni sect of Islam, still suffer as a result of this decision. Article 66 of the 1982 Constitution defined citizenship as the following: Everyone connected to the Turkish state with ties of citizenship is a Turk.   The child of a Turkish father or mother is Turkish.   Nationality is acquired under the conditions prescribed by law and only lost under the circumstances specified by law. No Turkish person may be denaturalised, unless he/she commits an act not in conformity with allegiance to the state. No one may be barred from having recourse to legal remedies against decisions and acts concerning denaturalisation. It seems that Turkishness was defined not in terms of ethnicity, but in terms of geographical principles. In practice however, ethnicity played a significant role for the definition of citizenship in Turkey. By the 2007 national elections the 1982 Constitution had been amended several times.32 In addition to these constitutional amendments,

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a large number of ordinary laws were also modified in the same direction. The so-called ‘Harmonisation Packages’ were passed in 2002 and 2003 in seven ‘Reform Packages’33 and had the primary aim of fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria34 necessary for European Union (EU) membership. Constitutional amendments and reform packages related to the citizenship issue are very significant for understanding how the state responded to the demands for a more liberal understanding of citizenship and recognition of differences. Article 13 was amended on 17 October 2001; the original text of Article 13 enumerated general grounds for restricting all fundamental rights and liberties of citizens, namely safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation. The 2001 amendment deleted the general grounds for these restrictions. The amended text reads as follows: ‘Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and solely on the basis of the reasons set out in the relevant articles of the Constitution without infringing upon their essence. These restrictions shall not be in conflict with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, the requirements of the democratic order and the secular Republic, and the principle of proportionality.’ With this amendment fundamental rights and liberties were protected and broadened by limiting possible restrictions. Another constitutional amendment of 2001 changed Article 66 to replace the sentence ‘citizenship of a child born to foreign father and a Turkish mother shall be determined by law’ with the sentence ‘the child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk’. With this amendment gender equality has been brought under the Constitutional guarantee.35 A constitutional amendment of 2004 stipulated that in cases of conflict between domestic laws and international agreements concerning fundamental rights and liberties, international agreements should take precedence. International agreements offer greater protection of citizens’ rights in Turkey than the Turkish Constitution does, and citizens’ rights and freedoms are increasingly better protected.36 The original text of the 1982 Constitution contained severe defects, rendering it incompatible with universal democratic norms. However, constitutional and legal changes through a series of ‘Harmonisation Packages’ have provided a reduction in the authoritarian nature of the constitution, and have paved the way for democratisation in Turkey.37 Although more than a third of the original text of the Constitution was amended regarding the rights and freedoms given to minority citizens, there are still many problems in the application of these laws and especially non-Muslim, Alevi and Kurdish citizens’ demands for a more a

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liberal understanding of citizenship could not be met. This problem has been emphasised in the EU Progress Reports on Turkey since 1998.38 Accordingly, the AKP had promised to completely overhaul the 1982 Constitution and prepare a ‘civil constitution’ in its 2007 election manifesto.39 An initial draft was prepared by a group of experts,  the ‘Scientific Committee’, set up by the AKP and headed by renowned constitutional law professor Ergun Özbudun.40 To evaluate the draft, the AKP installed another committee consisting of some ministers and leading party members. Unlike the current constitution, the draft constitution adopts a liberal and rights-based approach to the relationship between individual and state. The liberal nature of the draft constitution can be seen in a number of provisions. The Preamble of the draft constitution rejects every kind of discrimination by regarding ‘differences as the source of cultural richness’. The draft also takes crucial steps towards the protection of citizenship rights and liberties. For instance, Article 4 stipulates that the principle aim and duty of the state is to remove all obstacles from the realisation of citizenship rights and liberties. The draft constitution also redefined ‘Turkishness’. Ergun Özbudun, stated ‘we did not characterise citizenship in the constitution on the basis of blood ties’.41 The phrase in Article 66 of the 1982 Constitution, ‘Everyone bound to the Turkish state with the bond of citizenship is a Turk’, is being changed to ‘Everyone bound to the Turkish Republic with the bond of citizenship is called a Turk regardless of religion or race’. This will be the turning point for the definition of citizenship in Turkey. The draft constitution was immediately confronted with a barrage of criticisms, accusing the AKP of attempting to lift the headscarf ban from universities, or by altering the national identity by installing an alien constitution. It was also suggested that the AKP was keeping the public mind in the dark by preparing the draft covertly.42 Moreover, there is not agreement even among the scientific committee members and some of the AKP deputies. For instance, some of the AKP deputies have not welcomed the move, set out in the draft constitution, towards optional religion courses – these are compulsory under the current Constitution. The commission also discussed the second paragraph of Article 24 that stipulates that people cannot be condemned or convicted because of conversion to another religion. AKP deputies said this paragraph could create problems in practice, such as an increase in missionary activities.  Worried by this possibility, the commission suggested that this reference be removed from the Constitution.43

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However, because of disagreements among the AKP members of Parliament, the AKP postponed working on a new constitution until after the 2011 general elections. In 2010, however, parliament adopted a series of important constitutional amendments. The amendments did not achieve the required twothirds majority to immediately implement the changes. But, they received a majority of votes, which was sufficient to present the amendments to the electorate in a referendum. Then a constitutional referendum on a number of changes to the constitution (26 article amendment package) was held on 12 September 2010. The opposition during the referendum campaign accused the AKP government of trying to weaken secularism in Turkey. The results showed the majority supported the constitutional amendments, with 58 per cent in favour and 42 per cent against. The referendum testified to the continuing resilience of the power of the AKP and the relative weakness of the opposition in the wake of the 2011 general elections. The Turkish Citizenship Law Since the 1980s, citizenship has been a significant issue for governments. Initially it was used to punish people, especially leftists, who opposed the regime. Starting in 1981, there was a large-scale loss of citizenship among both non-Muslims and leftists. Later, in the interest of greater democratisation as well as integration with Europe, Parliament had more democratic discussions of citizenship and enacted more democratic amendments to Turkey’s Citizenship Law. For this reason the existing Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 of 1964 has been amended four times since its first enactment.44 It would be appropriate to consider the Turkish citizenship policy within the period 1980–2010 under three themes: encouragement of dual citizenship; liberalising the conditions for permission to renounce Turkish citizenship; and reserving the rights of those renouncing Turkish nationality by way of permission.45 On 13 February 1981, amendments were made in the Turkish Citizenship Law by the Act No. 2383. Within the framework of this amendment, firstly, the wording ‘or [wish] of acquiring another state’s nationality’ has been added following the first sentence of Article 21. Thus, it is now recognised that it is possible to retain the nationality of another state in addition to demanding the renunciation of Turkish nationality. With this addition, beyond de facto cases of dual citizenship, it has

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become open for Turkish nationals to claim dual citizenship actively. The existing text of the Article 21 is as follows: The wish of renouncing Turkish nationality or of acquiring another state’s nationality shall be submitted through a letter of application to the highest administrative authority of the place where the respective person resides in Turkey, or to the relevant Turkish consulate abroad. The documents completed by these authorities shall be sent to the Ministry of Interior to finish the required procedure. Furthermore, as a result of changes made by the Act No. 2383, a provision has been added to Article 22, which provides that ‘a certificate of permission may be issued by the Ministry of Interior for the person wishing to acquire another state’s nationality in conformity with the principles specified by the Council of Ministers’. Thus, it is made clear that it is the Ministry of Interior which is authorised for issuing permission for dual nationality. This amendment is complementary to the change in Article 21. In addition to the amendments made in citizenship law, the facilities given to dual nationals in relation to military service constitute further incentives in favour of dual nationality. On the basis of principles to be determined by the decision of the Council of Ministers, those who are citizens of another state as well as of Turkey shall be exempted in Turkey from the obligation to perform military service in case they have performed military service in the other country of nationality.46 Before the enactment of the 1982 Constitution, Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 was amended. According to Article 25 of this law, people who had engaged in activities violating the internal, external or economic security of the Turkish Republic, and had fled the country for fear of being arrested, would lose their citizenship if they failed to come back after receiving a three-month notification, or in the case of martial law or an emergency, within one month. The enactment of this law deprived many people of citizenship. For instance, many leftist intellectuals, such as Turkish Worker’s Party leader Behice Boran, left the country and lost their Turkish citizenship. The reasoning was that, as they had acted against the integrity of the state, they did not deserve to hold Turkish citizenship: left-leaning citizens apparently did not deserve to be Turkish citizens. Neither, according to Article 25 of the Constitution, did people who had acquired foreign citizenship without obtaining permission; men

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who failed to report for three months without any excuse after being summoned by the authorities to do their military service, or in time of war to join the nation’s defence; and non-Muslims who left Turkish soil without permission. In January 1989, the SHP (Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi, Social Democratic Party) proposed a change to the citizenship law. They wanted to amend Article 25(g), which they charged made people lose their citizenship and was anti-democratic, with the following sentence: ‘No natural born Turkish citizen should be subject to the revocation of citizenship’. This proposal was rejected in parliament for the reason that if citizens do something contrary to loyalty to the country, they should have their citizenship revoked, and moreover the judicial process was already open to review such decisions. However, Article 25(g) was annulled 11 years after it was first introduced, on 27 May 1992, when citizenship issues started to be discussed with reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international law, and the EU. Article 25(g) had caused many to lose their citizenship, it was anti-democratic and it violated individual rights and liberties. Accordingly, its annulment was proposed and accepted, the records of people who had lost their citizenship were updated and property which had been confiscated was returned. The conditions for permission to renounce Turkish nationality stated in Article 20 have been amended twice, firstly by the Act No. 2383 and secondly by the Act No. 4112 of 7 June 1995. With the first amendment, it is in principle recognised that Turkish citizens can voluntarily acquire a foreign citizenship without losing Turkish citizenship. However, it is in principle required that the respective person makes a request either for permission to renounce Turkish citizenship or permission for dual citizenship. Otherwise, Turkish citizens who voluntarily acquire foreign citizenship without obtaining the required permission may be faced with the sanction of dismissal. With the second amendment realised by the Act No. 4112, the requirement of performing compulsory military service is no longer made a condition for permission to renounce Turkish citizenship. It is a very significant indicator of the citizenship policy to no longer require the performance of military service in relation to permission for renouncing citizenship. Taking into account the fact that a significant proportion of persons who reside abroad and may be able to request permission for renouncing citizenship will be young and male, the importance of this change may be readily appreciated. Significant changes were also made on Article 29 by the Act No. 4112 of 7 June 1995. This article of the citizenship law, which stated ‘A

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person who has lost Turkish citizenship under this law is to be treated as foreigner as from the date of such loss. Such a person may only benefit from the rights of foreigners as recognised by Turkish law in matters such as residence, acquiring and transferring real estate, and inheritance and labour’, was changed by adding this statement: ‘… However, those who held Turkish citizenship by birth, and acquired another country’s citizenship after getting permission to withdraw from a decision of the Council of Ministers, as well as their inheritors may benefit from the rights of Turkish citizens in matters such as residence, acquiring and transferring real estate, and inheritance and labour, while the provisions for the national security and public order of the Turkish Republic are reserved’.47 By looking at the legal reasoning of the Act No. 4112 changing Article 29, one could easily see the perspective lying behind the amendment. It is expressly stated in the minutes of debates that ‘our citizens abroad wish to acquire the nationality of the state where they reside and work; but the respective states require the renunciation of Turkish nationality; whereas our citizens who had to obtain permission to renounce Turkish nationality in order to be able to acquire the nationality of the state of residence are made subject to the status of a foreigner in Turkey in accordance with Article 29 of the Turkish Nationality Act; this practice however has given rise to our citizens in question giving up their desire to acquire foreign nationality and thus the Act No. 4112 has been precisely drafted for the purpose of removing this difficulty’.48 As a result of this amendment a new category of ‘foreigners having special status’ has been created. However, this new category of foreigners having special status has a different line of formation from the other categories of foreigners having special status recognised in the Turkish Foreigners Law. Looking at other categories of foreigners having special status, it appears that the rights of foreigners falling under these categories have been brought closer to the status of a citizen by means of distinguishing them from the status of a normal foreigner. Whereas here, the persons who were once Turkish citizens are placed in an intermediate status between the status of citizen and foreigner. In other words, the denizen49 status here is a progress from the status of citizen to that of foreigner, not from the status of foreigner to that of citizen. During debates in Parliament over Article 29, some deputies warned that the changes would allow non-Muslims such as Greeks, Jews and Armenians, who had lost Turkish citizenship, to re-claim this citizenship and demand that their property and former residences be returned.50 These ex-citizens were regarded as a threat to the country’s security.

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However, such non-Muslims had lost their citizenship under other articles of the Turkish Citizenship Law, such as a failure to obtain permission to withdraw before acquiring other countries’ citizenship, and the changes would not apply to their cases, which obviously reveal the fears felt about non-Muslim citizens of the Republic. The Internal Affairs Committee of Parliament accepted a draft bill that includes amendments regarding the revocation or acquisition of Turkish citizenship and alters Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 on 2 January 2008.51 The AKP minister Beşir Atalay stated that the draft bill emphasised the principle of blood and used the principle of territory only in a complementary manner to prevent statelessness.52 According to the draft bill prepared on the basis of the Treaty of the EU, conscientious objection will no longer be accepted as legal grounds for loss of Turkish citizenship. Thus, the citizenship of male conscientious objectors who do not perform or refuse to perform military service will not be rescinded. However, even though the draft will pass into law, conscientious objectors will not be able to avoid a jail sentence. They may be sentenced to imprisonment based on violation of Articles 58 and 87 of Turkish Military Law as well as for the crime of ‘disaffecting people from military service’ in the Turkish Penal Code. According to the draft bill, foreigners who establish industrial plants in Turkey as well as those that provide significant contributions to the social, cultural, economical, scientific and technological life of the country will have the right to become Turkish citizens. The decision will be made in line with a proposal from the Interior Ministry and the confirmation of the Turkish cabinet. Also, marriage to a Turkish citizen will not provide an automatic right to apply for Turkish citizenship. Foreigners who have been married to a Turkish citizen for at least three years will, if the marriage is still intact, have the right to apply for Turkish citizenship. In case of the death of the Turkish citizen after the application has been filed, the condition of being married will not be required. Any individual who wishes to become a Turkish citizen should also be in good health, speak enough Turkish, be a person of good moral character, not pose a danger to society with an extreme health condition and have sufficient financial resources to support herself/himself and family. The draft bill also encourages dual citizenship. The draft bill was passed in Parliament and then ratified by the president on 11 June 2009. During the 1980s, the problems of non-Muslim citizens, citizens belonging to different sects of Islam, and citizens belonging to different ethnic identities, were not discussed in Parliament. The assembly did not accept that there were different identities in the country or that the

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current laws failed to meet needs of these different identities. However, it was during that time that identity claims of citizens and demands for recognition reached their peak. The Identity Aspect of Citizenship: Challenges to the Official Definition of Citizenship, 1980–2010 After the 1980s, official understanding of Turkish citizenship began to be challenged, especially by non-Muslims, Kurds and Alevis. The state wanted to create modern, civilised, non-religious, egalitarian, passive and duty-oriented citizens throughout the republican period. However, this understanding of citizenship failed to meet the needs and demands of citizens, especially those belonging to different ethnic and religious identities. The post-1980 period was marked by the rise of Islamic identity and political Islam in Turkey. This was very significant in terms of the citizenship issue because it negatively influenced non-Muslim citizens and citizens belonging to Alevi sect of Islam, among which there is a large number of Kurds. The use of Islam was introduced by the military53 as an instrument for consolidating and institutionalising the post-1980 regime. After the return to parliamentary politics, the ANAP followed the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ formed by the Intellectuals’ Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı).54 Through the influence of the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’,55 religion (Sunni Islam) started to play a very significant role in the lives of citizens. This is evidenced by the fact that since the 1980s many new mosques were built; the number of schools for Imams and preachers (İmam Hatip Okulları) increased; religious education and books started to be controlled by the state; the number of Islamic publications grew; incidents such as people smoking or drinking being attacked during the month of Ramadan rose; members of the Cabinet took part in religious ceremonies; and the prime minister, Özal, was shown live on television on the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). Islam was also used by the military in order to address the Kurdish issue. Helicopters distributed thousands of flyers including verses from the Koran to small villages in Turkey’s east and south-east. One of the flyers declared, ‘Citizen! Look at what the loftiest religion, Islam, commands: “Fight against those who fight you. God does not like aggressive people (Sura of al-Bakara [The Cow], verse 190)”’.56 These messages were distributed in order to use Islam to mobilise citizens living in Kurdish-populated areas to fight terrorist groups.

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The Alevi Citizens During the second half of the 1980s and 1990s there were significant political factors that gave rise to Alevi citizens’ identity claims. The first reason for the Alevi revival was the collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s. As a result, socialism, which was a strong ideological alternative for young Alevis in place of religion, lost its importance and in the late 1980s they started to define themselves as ‘Alevi’, and rediscovered Alevism. The second reason was the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or political Islam in Turkey, and the third was the Kurdish problem. No reliable figures exist for the size of either Turkey’s Alevi population or its Kurdish one, but the proportion of Kurds among the Alevis as a whole can be estimated at around 10–20 per cent.57 However, the most important factor that gave rise to Alevi citizens’ identity claim was the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. The opposition between the Sunni majority and the Alevi minority which had traditionally supported secular politics reached its peak during the 1990s. Alevi citizens felt increasingly threatened by the militant Sunni Islamist movements, especially with the growing success of the RP. After the 1980 military intervention, many Sunni mosques were opened in Alevi regions in order to assimilate them into the dominant Sunni religion.58 Nevertheless, Alevis rejected this assimilation, and the pillar of the Alevi political agenda became the preservation and development of Turkey’s principle of secularism and the struggle against ‘Sunni fundamentalism’.59 The 1990s saw three key incidents between Alevi citizens and Sunni citizens of the Republic: the Directorate of Religious Affairs debate, the Sivas massacre, and the Gaziosmanpaşa uprising.60 Turkey’s state Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet for short), which was established in 1924, has been charged with representing only citizens belonging to the country’s Sunni majority. Some Alevi citizens have called for equal representation in the bureaucratic structure of the Diyanet, whereas others called for the total abolition of this institution. However, the state has not acknowledged these demands and in 2008 the debate continued. The ‘Diyanet Debate’ began in December 1991, following the publication of a report about the ‘secret’ meeting unofficially called by the Diyanet, to which a number of Alevi intellectuals and Alevi religious leaders had been invited. The Diyanet declared that as a result of recent publications on Alevism they felt a need to be informed about the views of the Alevis. It was declared that there were no significant differences between Sunnis and Alevis, and the existing disputes

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were the work of ‘leftists’. There were however, significant differences between Alevis and Sunnis; the Alevi citizens were demanding cem evleri (cem houses), Alevi houses of worship, the ezan (call to prayer) in Turkish, and rejected other Sunni practices such as fasting.61 Alevi citizens criticised the Diyanet for trying to assimilate their distinct Alevism into Sunnism, and demanded religious recognition from the state. Alevi citizens argued that because perhaps one-third of the population is Alevi, 30 per cent of the Diyanet’s budget should be used to serve Alevis, and 30 per cent of its personnel should be Alevi. They said that cem houses, where both men and women worship together, should be constructed and compulsory courses on religion should either be abolished, or Alevism taught on an equal basis in these courses.62 Nevertheless, the Diyanet argued that it was impartial towards all forms of Islam, therefore there was no discrimination against Alevi citizens. Moreover, they claimed that there was no need to establish an institution within the Diyanet for different sects, as there would be no end to such a practice.63 The debates grew more heated after events in Sivas in 1993, and the hostility against Sunnism became more acute. On 2 July, 1993, an Alevi Pir Sultan Abdal festival was organised by members of Turkish and Kurdish Alevi organisations in Sivas, but events took a bloody turn when thirty-seven people were murdered, all but a few of them Alevi, when the Madımak Hotel was burned by Sunni fundamentalists. This event had a very negative impact on relations between Alevi and Sunni citizens. The famous writer Aziz Nesin, who was involved in translating parts of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses into Turkish, had also been invited to the festival. In his speech he said that he did not believe in the Koran, and this was used by local fundamentalists to inflame the outrage of the Sunni community. The state took an ambivalent position; people who had incited the crowd to violence were prosecuted, but the prosecutors also asked for an investigation into Nesin, who was accused of provocation. Tension between the Alevis and the Sunni majority was on the rise at the end of 1994. That year Alevis attacked a commercial television station after derogatory remarks made by a game show host.64 The next year saw graver events still, the most violent since the Sivas massacre. On 12 March 1995, three Alevi coffee houses in İstanbul’s Gaziosmanpaşa neighbourhood were raided by unidentified attackers using submachine guns. The neighbourhood is populated by a majority of Alevi migrants, who for the most part are poor. Twenty-two lives were lost. The attackers were never caught, but it did lead to a local riot, which was suppressed

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only after the army took over from the police. The latter were the object of deep distrust among Alevis, as police had killed many of them. Politicians and high-ranking police officers produced conspiracy theories arguing that the turmoil had been organised by Greece, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, PKK), and illegal leftist groups in order to provoke an Alevi–Sunni confrontation. The riots in Gaziosmanpaşa also spread to Ümraniye, where four more people died. Alevis saw all these events as targeting their own sect, although leftist groups also played a significant role in these riots. These three incidents exacerbated the conflict between Alevi and Sunni citizens, a conflict the state was seemingly powerless to solve. In fact it just blamed its major perceived foes – the PKK, leftists, and foreign countries – for provoking Alevi–Sunni conflict instead of attempting to solve this problem by recognising the differences and demands of its Alevi citizens. Alevis also came into the spotlight in the second half of the 1990s and in 2000. In 1997 a total of 128 Alevi associations and foundations came together in the ‘First Ehlibeyt General Meeting’. Political party representatives also attended to the meeting. Three weeks beforehand, President Demirel for the first time invited an Alevi dede, a spiritual leader of the sect, together with other religious representatives, to the Çankaya Presidential Palace. Around the same time, the Islamist RP, which many would consider to be hostile to the minority sect, accepted an Alevi dede into its ranks in a ceremony. That Alevi dede’s faith became a topic of discussion among Alevi citizens after he joined the party. Nevertheless, there were also tragic events, such as that of 7 September 1994 at midnight, when the ‘unlicensed construction’ of the Karacaahmet cem house was demolished by order of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the then mayor of İstanbul and member of the RP.65 The debate between Alevis and the Diyanet did not cease after 2000. Alevis kept complaining that the state had not still recognised them and that it had continued in its efforts to assimilate them to Sunnism.66 In meetings with members of the EU Commission in 2000, Alevi representatives voiced their demands, namely that compulsory religious education and the Diyanet should be abolished and that the state ceases its efforts to assimilate them. But this meeting was harshly criticised by the Ministry of the Interior,67 on the grounds that there were other sects in Turkey and if the state gave rights to Alevis then citizens belonging to other sects might also demand certain rights. In 2002, an important Alevi umbrella group composed of some thirty organisations was closed down for violation of

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Articles 14 and 24 of the Constitution, as well as the Article 5 of the Law of Associations, which prohibits establishment of associations ‘in the name of any religion, race, social class, or sect’. The ground for dissolution was that the Association’s name contained the words ‘Alevi’ and ‘Bektaşi’ which unlawfully referred to Muslim religious minorities. The closure inflamed the debate between Alevi citizens and the state.68 Alevi citizens complained that whereas the state had permitted the opening of a Christian ‘Protestant Church Association’, it had closed down an Alevi association.69 In 2003 Alevi associations demanded state support for the cem houses, but this demand was rejected by Prime Minister Erdoğan. He stated ‘One of them [the mosque] is a place of worship, whereas the other [the cem house] is a house of culture, therefore we cannot support cem houses like mosques’.70 As a result of Erdoğan’s comments, a new discussion on the official status of cem houses was sparked. Necati Tayyar Taş, the vice president of the Religious affairs, said: ‘Alevism is not a religion’ and he argued ‘Cem houses are “cümbüş evleri”’ (carousal houses). After his speech he got angry reactions from the Alevi citizens. For this reason he was removed from his office by Mehmet Aydın, the minister responsible for religious affairs.71 Nevertheless, Aydın, while responding in the name of Prime Minister Erdoğan in Parliament concerning the issue of opening cem houses, said that ‘only mosques and mescits that were opened according to the rules of Islam can be accepted as religious places’. Not unlike Erdoğan he used the term ‘social and cultural associations’ for the cem houses and he too got an angry reaction from Alevi citizens.72 Saim Yeprem, the member of Higher Council for Religious Affairs, in response to the trial against the Department of Religious Affairs concerning the desire to consider cem houses as places of worship, said ‘in Islam the common place of worship is the mosque’ and ‘cem houses are private places of worship’.73 Yeprem’s ideas are approved by the administrative court’s decision. The administrative court unanimously rejected a cancellation request by the Cem Foundation over the Prime Ministry’s decision on the official status of cem houses. The Cem Foundation had prepared a package of requests such as granting cem houses the official status of ‘place of worship’ thus allowing them a share from the budget, and putting dedes, Alevi religious leaders, on the state payroll within the framework of the Religious Affairs Directorate.74 The administrative court rejected the case and ruled that no place other than a mosque can be deemed a ‘place of worship’ and receive a share of the budget. The court explained the decision in a statement that said, ‘the ideal state order

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is the neutral one. The principle of equality does not mean destroying the differences but to prevent making concessions to various groups in society’.75 While the administrative court gave final approval to the legal decision that cem houses cannot be granted the same official status as mosques, Erdoğan’s ‘Alevi initiative’ was launched with a Friday dinner on the occasion of the Islamic month of Muharram.76 This created controversy among Alevi citizens. Reha Çamuroğlu,77 an Alevi deputy of the AKP, organised a symbolic meeting on 11 January 2008 between the AKP leadership and the Alevis. A huge ‘Alevi iftar’ – the ritualistic dinner to break the Alevi fast, which is quite different from the Sunni fast during the month of Ramadan – was organised, and Prime Minister Erdoğan and other AKP elders accepted to join. This would be the first time that a Turkish prime minister joined an Alevi iftar, so it was an historic step. Many Alevi groups, however, boycotted the dinner and harshly criticised Çamuroğlu, saying they did not think Erdoğan was sincere in his statements about the Alevis. Erdoğan issued positive messages, and in his speech tried to reassure Alevi citizens. He told Alevis who attended the dinner ‘we all belong to this country, we are all brothers ... We must know and understand each other. We must not give ground to those who would sow division between us’. Alevi religious leaders, dedes, declared they would shun those who attend a fast-breaking dinner organised by the AKP, using the term ‘fallen’ for the Alevis who dare to think differently.78 This is a term which roughly corresponds to excommunication in Catholicism and takfir in Sunni Islam. When someone is declared fallen, he is considered an outsider to the community. He is not accepted at religious ceremonies and cannot marry another Alevi. In a joint press conference, Mehmet Beydilli, on behalf of the dedes, said that they would apply ‘depravity sanctions’, in Alevi tradition meaning to shun from society those who attended the dinner.79 Another discussion among the Alevi citizens and the state is about compulsory religious education. Alevis have long complained of discrimination and forced assimilation through mandatory courses on Sunni Islam in schools. Just before the local elections of 30 March 2004, widely perceived as a referendum on the ruling party’s popularity, the AKP promised Alevis that Alevism would henceforth be taught in high school religion courses.80 However, Alevi representatives took this pledge sceptically, arguing that it was merely a ploy to attract Alevi votes.81 In 2007 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) announced its detailed judgement in the case of Alevi Turkish citizen Hasan Zengin,82

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who appealed to them in 2004 on the grounds that mandatory religious courses in the Turkish national education system, which predominantly teach the Sunni creed of Islam, is a violation of Article 9 of the ECHR.83 The court arrived at their verdict, deciding that the current situation is against the ‘impartiality of the state’ principal and is a violation of human rights. The decision is expected to have significant repercussions such as changing the curriculum of religious courses. Selahattin Özel, who was head of the Alevi Bektaşi Federation at that time said, ‘Following this verdict the government has no choice but to annul the compulsory religious education.’84 In 2008 there was another development about the compulsory religious education in Turkey. A case had been filed by two Alevi families in İstanbul who objected to their children being forced to attend Sunni-oriented classes. The İstanbul Education Department rejected the parents’ proposal to allow their children not to attend these classes. While one lower court annulled the department’s decision another dismissed the parents’ complaint. Both decisions went to the Court of Appeals. In a major victory for Turkey’s Alevi community, the court ruled on 3 March 2008 that it is illegal to make the religious course compulsory for all students.85 The court noted that while the constitution said every citizen was free to practice their beliefs and that the religious education was conducted under state supervision, it also made religious education classes mandatory. The court also said the European Convention of Human Rights ensured that the state had to respect the parents’ belief in providing religious education. It said the discrepancy was due to the fact that the religious education class curriculum did not reflect the beliefs of a broad section of society and noted the Constitutional Court decision in 1998 that said a secular state could not make the teaching of a specific religion compulsory. It also noted the 2007 decision by the European Court of Human Rights, discussed above, that argued the religious education curriculum did not reflect the beliefs of the substantial Alevi population in the country. The court’s verdict means that the Ministry of National Education will now have to either introduce classes geared toward all faiths or make religious classes non-mandatory. There were, however, various reactions to the court’s decision. For instance, the AKP deputy leader, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, said he believed the court’s decision was wrong, arguing that the Council of State exceeded its authority.86 Hüseyin Çelik, the then minister of national education, said ‘Article 24 of the Constitution states that the religious culture and morality course is compulsory in high schools and no number of court

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decisions can turn it into an elective’. He also added that the government was not considering proposing such a change.87 Unfortunately, although there have been some reform attempts within the recent years by the government such as Alevi initiative or reform package prepared by Reha Çamuroğlu, an Alevi AKP deputy, there has not been any tangible result about the Alevi citizens’ demands. In the current Religious Culture and Learning of Ethics textbooks Alevism is still defined as a ‘Sufistic interpretation in Islam’. For all these reasons Alevi citizens argue that positive steps taken by the government are merely efforts to attract the votes of Alevi citizens before elections. Alevi Citizens’ Representation in Parliament Alevi citizens generally support the CHP, which claims to be secular and declares in its 2007 party programme that religious education should not be compulsory but should reflect different religious beliefs.88 Nevertheless, Alevi citizens have also established their own political parties.89 The Democratic Peace Movement (Demokratik Barış Hareketi, DBH) was founded on 1 September 1996 as a specifically Alevi party. The party founders declared that its doors were also open to Sunnis, echoing the Islamist RP’s declaration that its doors were open to Alevi citizens as well.90 The DBH’s slogan was ‘Our First Name is Different, Our Surname is Turkey’. As Alevi citizens belong to a different sect of Islam, the DBH’s slogan was, ‘our name is different’; however they did not say that their surname is ‘Turk’ because there are Alevis belonging to a different ethnic identity, Kurdish Alevis, instead saying their surname is ‘Turkey’. Its programme emphasised its opposition to all forms of nationalism and religious fanaticism, vowing instead to develop a new understanding of citizenship based upon patriotism and a feeling of ‘Being from Turkey’ (Türkiyelilik). It further stressed the party’s respect for religious and ethnic differences, support for dual citizenship and plans to rethink the education system and textbooks, with an eye to changing them based on different identities’ needs. It also proposed political and economic solutions to the Kurdish issue. A case was opened in the Constitutional Court seeking to close down the DBH, so a new party, the Peace Party (Barış Partisi, BP), was founded pre-emptively as its successor. The court actually rejected the case, but since by then the BP had already been established, the DBH dissolved itself. The BP’s programme supported the same principles as the DBH;91 however, the BP also could not pass the electoral threshold to enter Parliament.

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Alevi citizens demand recognition by the state and want to be real citizens of the Republic of Turkey. They claim that as a secular state Turkey should treat all religions equally and should not directly support one particular religion. Although there have been improvements Alevis are still not officially recognised religious communities, and they still have difficulties in opening places of worship, and compulsory religious instruction in schools still fails to acknowledge non-Sunni identities. The Non-Muslim Citizens There have been some improvements in terms of the state’s approach to non-Muslim citizens of the Republic, especially in the second half of the 1990s; in 1999 President Demirel celebrated Christmas with Turkey’s Christian citizens, something unthinkable during the singleparty period.92 In another example, the office of the Diyanet in Antakya established a multi-religious committee, aimed at developing a harmonious relationship between Muslims, Christians and Jews in November 2003. The dialogue between non-Muslim communities continued during the AKP government. A delegation composed of high-level officials from various Ministries visited the religious leaders of non-Muslim communities. On 19 June 2007 the Ministry of Interior issued a circular on freedom of religion for non-Muslim Turkish citizens. The circular acknowledged that there had been an increase in individual crimes against non-Muslim citizens and their places of worship. It requested governors of all provinces to take the necessary measures to prevent such incidents from happening again and to enhance tolerance towards nonMuslim citizens.93 Nevertheless, in spite of the government’s positive approach towards non-Muslim citizens and in spite of reform law packages, which have tried to improve the situation of non-Muslim citizens, there have been many problems regarding the application of reform laws, and non-Muslim citizens continue to encounter obstacles. They are still not treated as equal citizens of the Republic and there is almost no difference between non-Muslim citizens and foreign people living in Turkey. This shows us that in the definition of citizenship, religion (Islam) still plays a significant role. The most persistent problem of non-Muslim citizens, which has resisted solution, is the situation of their cultural and religious institutions, known collectively as vakıflar (foundations). These foundations are vital for non-Muslim citizens, because their financial existence is based on them, and without them they cannot protect their existence and

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culture. A law was enacted by the Empire in 1912, which granted legal personality to the foundations and enabled them to register and notarise the property they owned. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the Law of Foundations No. 2762 (hereinafter Law No. 2762), of 5 June 1935, also known as the ‘Declaration of 1936’, called upon foundations to declare and register with the state the list of all property they owned. The religious and educational institutions of non-Muslim minorities are regulated by the Directorate General of Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, VGM), a government agency that must approve the operation of churches, monasteries, synagogues, schools and charitable religious foundations, such as hospitals and orphanages. Nevertheless, this direct state interference violates Article 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne, which explicitly grants non-Muslim minorities the right to manage and control their institutions. The foundations gained legal identity in 1912, and with the Treaty of Lausanne they received legal and permanent status. The Foundation Law No. 2672 was implemented in 1936 and The Foundations Administration demanded a vakıfname (foundation certification) concerning the property of non-Muslim citizens in 1972.94 Nevertheless, many did not have a vakıfname because they were established by the sultan’s firman. The Directorate General of Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, VGM) considered written statements from 1936 as a vakıfname in 1974. For this reason, properties acquired by the non-Muslim foundations after 1936 were taken over, because they did not exist in the 1936 written statement.95 A reform law package went into force on 9 August 2002 that recognised the right of non-Muslim foundations to own immoveable properties and to dispose of them freely, which had been de facto taken away since 1936. This right was tied to the decision of the Council of Ministers. With the fourth reform package on 2 January 2003, this right was tied to the VGM reform package that went into force on 19 July 2003 recognised the right of non-Muslim communities to build places of worship subject to the approval of the competent administrative authorities. Thus non-Muslim foundations were given the right to own immoveable property to meet their own needs by these amendments. Nevertheless, these reforms could not solve the problems faced by non-Muslim foundations concerning their application. For instance, religious foundations still continue to be subject to interference by the Diyanet, which is able to dissolve the foundations, seize their properties and dismiss their trustees without a judicial decision, and also to intervene in the management of their assets and accounting. There were further problems regarding

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the administration of these foundations. A Regulation on the Methods and Principles of the Boards of Non-Muslim Religious Foundations was adopted in June 2004.96 The regulation sought to address problems concerning elections to the boards of foundations, which, if not held, or not held on time, could threaten the foundation’s existence and lead to the confiscation of the property. Since there was a scarcity of religious minorities in certain areas, the new Regulation provided the enlargement of the geographical area within which elections might be held, although only to adjacent provinces. Such a restriction, coupled with the fact that this limited enlargement is granted only at the discretion of the local authorities, means that in practice a number of foundations would still be unable to hold elections. The vakıfs were not granted by-laws. For this reason their properties could easily be appropriated. As the problems faced by non-Muslim foundations could not be solved, a new draft bill on Law of Foundations was prepared and voted by Parliament in November 2006, and subsequently vetoed by the then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Even before the veto, the final text of the law had disappointed non-Muslim citizens as it failed to address the issue of restitution and ignored certain properties such as cemeteries and school assets not registered under any foundation. Foundations were unable to acquire legal ownership of properties registered under names of third parties, including properties registered under the names of saints or archangels, during periods when foundations could not own property in their own name.97 Finally, on 20 February 2008, a new Foundations Law, which opened up a new debate, was passed in Parliament. Those opposed to the law argue that the new law is in breach of the Treaty of Lausanne. Representatives of foundations disagree though they find the new law to be insufficient in resolving all issues. The opposition parties, the CHP and MHP, strongly criticised the government for adopting a bill which they see as a threat to national interests. Onur Öymen, the CHP’s deputy leader, said his party was considering taking the law to the Constitutional Court to have it annulled. He noted that the issue of religious minorities had been regulated with the Treaty of Lausanne and even a minor change in it would cause serious problems with the fundamental principles of the state. He said that Article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty stipulates reciprocity in dealing with the foundations issue. He added ‘If one unilaterally grants rights to the Greek minority in İstanbul then this article would be violated … because you cannot ask Greece98 to do the same for the Turkish minority in Western Thrace’.99 The MHP also committed to opposing

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the law on foundations. Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the MHP, said that the new version of the foundation law would violate the founding principles of the Republic.100 In response the Minister of State, Hayati Yazıcı, said ‘The sole aim of this government is to serve every single citizen of this country equally and without discrimination’.101 Dilek Kurban, the democratisation programme officer at the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), opined that the new law was in no way breaching the Treaty of Lausanne. For her ‘this new law makes the state’s laws and applications more compatible with the treaty’.102 The revised law is a step further than the older Foundations Law. Sebu Aslangil, a lawyer representing the Armenian community, said ‘in a way [the conditions of non-Muslim foundations and other foundations] have been balanced’. He added that a very important step under the new law is that it allows for properties that are open to use by the public without charge to be used to generate income. Nevertheless, the new law has some shortcomings. Aslangil believes the biggest drawback of the new Foundations Law is the vagueness in the language it employs. One article he believes has fallen victim to the ambiguity in language is the clause concerning the properties that were passed on to third parties. He said ‘It is not sufficient. It requires that foundations apply for properties at their disposal. But they will first need to prove that these properties are at their disposal; that is they still use it. However, this is not possible in reality because [a foundation] cannot use a property that has passed out of its hands’. Aslangil believes regulations concerning the new Foundations Law will be determinant in ensuring equality so that minority foundations can benefit from the novelties the new law brings. For example, it brings important changes for foreign foundations, allowing them to acquire real estate. However, under the Land Registry Law, it is impossible for foreign foundations to acquire real estate. He said ‘Either the Land Registry Law will be amended or foreign foundations will not be able to acquire real estate’.103 Dilek Kurban also listed basic weaknesses of the new law.104 She said ‘the new law does not do away with injustices but, on the contrary, paves the way for similar injustices to continue in the future’, citing the clause under the new law that allows the management and properties of non-active foundations to be taken over by the General Management of Foundations. For her another important problem is ‘these foundations could not elect their directorial board. This was an unlawful application. But this new law ensures the continuity of this application’.105 Despite all these problems, passing a new foundation law is a major step and this law

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will bring some important arrangements in terms of non-Muslim foundations such as giving them the right to possession and the return of some of the properties that the state has taken over. Another major problem faced by non-Muslim citizens is the ban on the training of clergy. Non-Muslim citizens encounter difficulties in sustaining their communities beyond the current generation. The Orthodox Seminary on the island of Heybeliada (Halki) was closed down in 1971, which made the education of Orthodox priests in Turkey impossible. Nationality criteria restrict the ability of non-Turkish clergy to work for certain churches, such as the Syriac or Chaldean. Public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch is still banned and the election of the heads of some religious minority churches is still subject to strict conditions. Religious textbooks have been redrafted in order to address the concerns of Christian minorities; however, clergymen and graduates from theological colleges continue to be prevented from teaching religion in existing schools run by minorities. They can hold elections to choose their religious leaders only with the permission of the state. Not unlike the single-party period, schools belonging to non-Muslim minorities are also still under strict control. In all schools belonging to minorities, like the schools belonging to foreign people, only ‘ethnic Turks’ could be appointed as principals. These people are also granted more responsibility than the managers of these schools.106 Despite all these positive developments discriminatory policies towards non-Muslim citizens have persisted during the period of 1980– 2010, albeit in forms less harsh than those of the single-party period. The rise of political Islam during the 1980s and early 1990s fed such policies, as when one RP mayor denied an elderly citizen a free bus pass because he was not Muslim.107 Discriminatory policies towards non-Muslims can also be seen in the public sector. Non-Muslims are not well represented in the public sector, as evidenced by the dearth of non-Muslims among the police, judges, and high-ranking bureaucrats. Nevertheless, most serious events against non-Muslim citizens took place during the year 2007. For all these positive developments, 2006 and 2007 were not promising years for the non-Muslim citizens, as during 2007 paranoia about Armenians, Christian missionaries, and all sorts of ‘the other’ increased among citizens. Conspiracy theories in which Western missionary activities to convert Muslims in Turkey into Christians and partition Turkey were playing a central role, abounded in nationalist media and contributed to a number of incidents. For instance, Father Andrea Santaro was killed on 5 February 2006 inside his church in the Black Sea city of Trabzon.108

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Some days later, a Catholic friar in İzmir was assaulted by a group of youths, while a similar assault took place in Mersin in March 2006. On 5 July 2006, another priest was stabbed in Samsun.109 Also during 2006, Article 301 of the current Turkish Penal Code, which prohibits ‘insulting Turkishness’, was used to bring charges against Turkish intellectuals and writers. Thus, Nobel-Prize-winning novelist Orhan Pamuk110 and Hrant Dink, a Turkish citizen of Armenian origin and the chief editor of the bilingual newspaper Agos, faced similar charges.111 Actually, 2006 was indicative of the excitements that 2007 would bring. Hrant Dink became a hated figure for ultra-nationalists in Turkey and was assassinated in İstanbul on 19 January 2007.112 Following his murder the concept of citizenship began to be on the agenda. The slogans used at Dink’s funeral, ‘We are all Hrant’ and ‘we are all Armenians’, sparked a new debate about citizenship (Figure 9). The slogan ‘We are all Armenians’ was welcomed by some segments of society, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The approval of ‘We are all Hrant’ was due to its ‘identity-free’ character. Dink, at the end of the day, was known to be very decent and honest, as well as an excellent person and citizen. Most of the comments in the newspapers referred to his patriotic character, sometimes noting stories related to his citizenship duties such as his military service. Dink always said ‘This is my patria, I am its citizen’.113 Undoubtedly that portrayal

Figure 9 The picture shows the slogan used at Dink’s funeral, ‘We are all Armenian’.

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of Hrant was an ‘acceptable’ one; and if every one of us could be Hrant, there was no problem. However, Erdoğan rejected the slogan ‘We are all Armenians’. He said ‘the slogan of “We all are Armenian” is bothersome because the person who has been murdered is a citizen of the Turkish Republic, his ethnic identity is unimportant’.114 When you decide to be an Armenian, things change radically. As an Armenian you can easily be blamed for being an unfaithful traitor who constantly produces malicious ideas against Turkey and Turks. So accordingly, if one carries a banner proclaiming ‘We are all Armenians’, that should be understood and interrupted as being at least dangerous and, more importantly, as having the potential to disturb the citizens’ sensitivities. Meanwhile a separatist sentiment was valid among the citizens. To cite an example, soccer stadiums across Turkey became venues for expressing nationalist sentiments that openly defy the solidarity and sympathy Turkish citizens showed toward Armenians in the wake of Dink’s murder. Trabzonspor fans carried flags and banners that read ‘We are all Turks, we are all Mustafa Kemal’, ‘I am Turkish, I am from Trabzon’, and shouted slogans like ‘Martyrs never die, the country’s unity will always remain in place’. Elsewhere, Malatyaspor entertained Elazığspor in Dink’s hometown Malatya, and around 400 Elazığspor fans opened a banner that read; ‘We are not Armenians, We are not from Malatya, We are Elazığ, We love Turkey’.115 Three months after the murder of Dink another crime took place in Malatya. On April 18 2007, three members of a Protestant church – two Turkish citizens and one German citizen – were tortured and killed in the office of a company that publishes books on Christianity. The suspects of the killings had notes on their persons claiming, ‘we did it for our religion. This may be a lesson to the enemies of our religion’.116 Throughout 2007, activities expressing hatred towards non-Muslim citizens continued. Syriac Priest Daniel Edip Savcı, from the ancient Syriac Christian community in Midyat, a town in a south-eastern province of Mardin, was kidnapped on 1 December 2007.117 The priest was set free two days later. There was also an attack on a priest in İzmir: Andriano Francini, a priest at Church Saint Antuan in the Aegean city of İzmir, was injured on 16 December 2007.118 These sad events reveal to us that, although the laws may change, what is necessary is that the attitudes of the people should change, regarding minorities with greater tolerance. This is why education, especially civic education, plays a pivotal role.119

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Non-Turkish Citizens: The Rise of Kurdish Nationalism The rise of Kurdish nationalism was another development that challenged Turkish citizenship. The intense fear of dissolution and separatism has been a cornerstone of Turkish nationalism. Although the military regime tolerated and even supported Islam, its attitude towards the Kurdish issue was one of intolerance.120 Since the establishment of the Republic the existence of the Kurds had been denied, and no expressions of Kurdish identity were allowed. A theory was formulated claiming that Kurds were ‘mountain Turks’; their name came from the sound of the snow that crunched with a ‘kurt kart’ noise underneath their footsteps when they were walking.121 As Turkey’s gravest problem, terrorism tended to overshadow other problems. The Kurdish problem in the 1980s and until the second half of the 1990s was equated with the threat of terrorism. The most radical Kurdish movement, PKK/KADEK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party/Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress),122 was seen as the nation’s greatest enemy. Nevertheless, with the waning power of the PKK in the late 1990s, and concurrent with the government’s emphasis on EU integration, more moderate policies towards Kurdish citizens emerged. The PKK/KADEK was surely not the only Kurdish organisation, but it was the only one which emphasised armed action. There were political parties, which rejected the PKK/KADEK’s brutality while still fighting democratically for the equality of Turkey’s Kurds. Pro-Kurdish Political Parties The pro-Kurdish People’s Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP) was founded on 7 June 1990 by ex-SHP members dismissed from SHP on the grounds that they had violated party protocol by attending an international conference in Paris on Kurdish rights. The HEP sought to bring solutions to the Kurdish issue. Members of the HEP, however, were considered traitors by the majority of Turkish parties.123 The HEP had forged an electoral alliance with the SHP prior to the 21 October 1991 general elections, which enabled 22 Kurdish deputies to win seats in the parliament. Although there had been deputies of Kurdish origin before, it was the first time a group had entered parliament with a definite Kurdish agenda.124 During the swearing-in ceremony of Parliament on 6 November 1991, a number of HEP members refused to recite parts of the oath committing

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deputies to preserve the indivisible integrity of the country and the nation.125 They also spoke in Kurdish, displayed colours associated with the PKK, and on a questionnaire asking which foreign languages they knew, filled in ‘Turkish’. This served only to exacerbate tensions between hardliners on both sides, and a chance for dialogue was lost. According to Philip Robins this disastrous swearing-in ceremony of 1991 caused the ‘end of the emerging relationship between moderate Kurdish nationalism and liberal Turkish thinking’.126 The Constitutional Court dissolved the HEP on 14 July 1993 on the grounds that the party had espoused views contrary to the unitary character of the Turkish state.127 All the HEP members transferred to a new party, the Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DEP), in order not to lose their seats before the closure on 7 May 1993. The DEP faced as much legal opposition as the HEP. During its January 1994 congress PKK flags were on display and Turkey was portrayed as an occupying enemy country.128 The immunity of the DEP parliamentarians was lifted, seven were imprisoned, and the party was banned on 16 June 1994.129 Four of the imprisoned deputies – Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan and Selim Sadak – were released from prison a decade later, in 2004.130 Before the closure of the DEP a new political party, the People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP), was established. The HADEP got 4.76 per cent of the votes in the 18 April 1999 elections. However, it too was unable to pass the per cent threshold.131 HADEP was closed on 13 March 2003 on the basis of the High Court Republican Chief Defence Lawyer’s argument that ‘There is only one identity in Turkey, that identity is the Turkish identity. The demand that Kurdish identity should be recognised is a sly step to divide the country’.132 The Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP) was established as an alternative to the HADEP. The DEHAP won 6.22 per cent of the votes in the 3 November 2002 elections, below the 10 per cent threshold. The DEHAP supported democratic solutions within the Turkish state in order to solve the Kurdish issue, and especially to emphasise the importance of constitutional citizenship.133 Both the HADEP and the DEHAP argued that the Kurdish question should be solved through peaceful, democratic means; however, the exact nature of such solutions was never clearly defined. The HADEP and DEHAP followed a more moderate line on the issue, avoiding any separatist rhetoric and keeping their distance from the PKK;134 nevertheless, they were as impotent as their forerunners in gaining representation in the parliament.

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The former DEP deputies Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan and Selim Sadak established the Democratic Society Movement (Demokratik Toplum Hareketi, DTH) on 22 October 2004 with the aim of recognising and defining all ethnic differences under the supra-identity of Türkiyelilik (being from/belonging to Turkey).135 The DEHAP dissolved itself and joined the DTH in 16 August 2005 to strengthen the unity among Kurds.136 Consequently, the DTH became a political party in 25 October 2005 under the name of Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP).137 The DTP members argued that they would concern themselves with every centimetre of Turkey as well as every individual, and that they would become the party not of the Kurds but of Turkey. They pointed out that they wanted to solve the Kurdish issue democratically, peacefully and within the context of geographical unity.138 The DTP opted for independent candidates in the July 2007 elections and 20 lawmakers are affiliated to DTP in the current Parliament. However, the Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya launched a legal case on 16 November 2007 aimed at shutting down the DTP because of its alleged ties to the PKK. Yalçınkaya said: ‘Speeches and actions by party leaders have proved that the party has become a focal point of activities against the sovereignty of the state’.139 Finally the Constitutional Court banned the DTP on charges of its ties with the PKK on 11 December 2009. DTP’s lawmakers joined the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), which was established in 2008 as a backup party for the DTP, and established political group in Parliament. In the 2011 national elections, the BDP entered the elections through independent candidates, because of the 10 percent election threshold, and won a landslide victory by taking 36 seats in the government for the first time and formed a parliamentary group. The Role of Turkey’s Political Parties and Governments in the Kurdish Issue Some political parties and politicians believe that there is no Kurdish question and instead speak only of terrorism and propose military solutions. However, there have been some enlightened politicians who have recognised the need for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem. President Özal, who broke many taboos in Turkey and brought unaddressed matters onto the public agenda, including the Kurdish issue, suggested political solutions to the issue. Özal, himself half-Kurdish, had been the first member of the political establishment

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to advocate openly making concessions to the Kurds, something which most politicians considered tantamount to giving in to terrorism. Özal believed that a free discussion of the Kurdish issue in a liberal atmosphere could produce a solution. Hence, he invited HADEP deputies to talk, and once said, ‘We should discuss everything about the Kurdish issue, including federation’.140 Moreover, he invited the Iraqi Kurdish leader Jelal Talabani, which was an extraordinary event for Talabani and for the public.141 Özal also argued that allowing radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish and teaching Kurdish as a second language in schools could help the government deal with the question more effectively.142 During the 1980s, Süleyman Demirel was in favour of a military solution to the issue, not a political one. He argued that until terrorism was solved, cultural issues could not be debated;143 moreover, he said that if education in Kurdish were permitted then there would be demands for schooling in other languages too, which would undermine the country’s unity. Later, however, his position on the Kurdish issue became more moderate. On 7 December 1991, as prime minister, Demirel accepted the existence of Kurdish ethnic identity by declaring in Diyarbakır, ‘We can protect Turkey’s unity by treating people from different origins equally … We call people who speak Kurdish and people of Kurdish origins, Kurdish. Now we cannot reject this. We recognise the Kurdish reality, and this is the most important event of recent years’.144 Nevertheless, later speaking of the bloody events of 1992 in Turkey’s south-east, he showed his ignorance by saying, ‘Turkey was able to suppress the 28th rebellion, and was also able to suppress the 29th’.145 In 1992, in Budapest, Demirel for the first time proposed ‘constitutional citizenship’ as a way to ensure internal peace in Turkey, a proposal that later on became a topic of heated debate among politicians and political scientists, and in 2000 became the most-discussed solution to the Kurdish issue. He said: Constitutional citizenship is a notion which embraces all the citizens of a state with the common denominator of equality concerning rights and duties. Thanks to constitutional citizenship, all citizens of a state, regardless of differences of religion, language, race, or gender, gain the right to aspire for and fulfil their duties. Every individual regardless of ethnic origin, language, religion, and gender, is connected to a state by the constitutional citizenship ties, and shares joy and sorrow, and so by bringing his/her

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cultural heritage gains the right to both contribute to the general welfare and enjoy its benefits.146 Later, in 1996, Demirel argued that the best way to produce harmony while maintaining diversity was to establish an understanding of a nation characterised by a collective of citizens endowed with universal, democratic values. He contended that the best definition of the parameters of democratic citizenship could be found in the conceptual framework of a ‘constitutional patriotism’ and citizenship identity, which leaves no room for ethnic discrimination.147 Yet, in 1999, in Israel, Demirel suggested that Turkey already had constitutional citizenship, so what he meant by the concept was not entirely clear.148 The centre-right DYP was dominated by hardliners who did not accept the Kurdish reality. DYP leader Tansu Çiller toyed with the idea of a Basquetype model in 1993, but later, facing strong criticism from her party and the military, she retreated. She had a populist approach to the issue, like many politicians. The RP’s success in Turkey’s east and south-east caught Çiller’s attention, so during the 1994 local elections she talked about the possibility of allowing private education and broadcasts in Kurdish, in order to steal the RP’s thunder. Nevertheless, later on she made another of her U-turns and retracted these statements.149 On 31 December 1994, Çiller reformulated Atatürk’s famous statement ‘How happy is the one who says, I am a Turk’ as ‘How happy is the one who says I am a citizen of Turkey’.150 Thus she too tried to solve the issue through the concept of citizenship. The nationalist MHP was also dominated by hardliners, especially during the 1980s. MHP leader Alparslan Türkeş argued that the turmoil in the south-east was supported by foreign governments seeking to harm Turkey. For him, Kurds were overwhelmingly of Turkish descent.151 Since the MHP also emphasised the importance of the Turkish language, the party was completely opposed to education in foreign languages.152 Türkeş’s views on Turkish nationalism softened after the 1980s; he asserted emphatically that the Kurds were the brethren of the Turks, sharing the same culture, and were therefore an inseparable part of Turkey.153 Devlet Bahçeli, who succeeded Türkeş at the helm of the MHP, adopted much more centrist positions than his forerunner, thus bringing the party closer to the centre-right. The MHP’s 2000 and 2007 programmes were much more in this centrist vein. Its definition of nationalism was inclusive, it was not anti-EU, it emphasised the importance of women’s rights and the Turkish language, and talked about the duties of the state towards its citizens.154

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The centre-left DSP and its leader Bülent Ecevit155 emphasised that the problem in the south-east was economic, not ethnic, and that terrorism was the result of unemployment. In the beginning he was opposed to education in Kurdish and criticised those who advocated any form of autonomy. Ecevit argued that the Kurdish problem lay in the ‘feudal social and economic structure’ in Kurdish areas. He also argued that Kurdish was not a language but a dialect, so there was no reason to have broadcasts in Kurdish. For him no policy in the area could succeed unless it dealt with the socio-economic situation.156 Later, however, he also accepted the cultural side of the problem and, during his coalition government in 1999, a number of important constitutional amendments were passed in Parliament. The SHP and the CHP had almost identical views on the Kurdish problem before their merger in 1995, as both of them opposed military approaches to the issue. They supported giving cultural rights to the Kurds such as broadcasts and education in Kurdish. Deniz Baykal, the then leader of the CHP, took pride in the fact that his party was the first to refer to the Kurdish problem in its party programme in 1998.157 Baykal said at his party’s central executive committee meeting during his tour in the south-eastern city of Diyarbakır on 5 June 2008: ‘The state must be proud of the ethnic identities it harbors. It cannot pursue a politics of assimilation’.158 In his speech he underlined the following issues: Everyone should be able to learn their mother tongue and publication in maternal language must be allowed. The state sees only human beings; it does not see the ethnic identity behind them. Turkey gathers different ethnic groups together, and it is not a head-hunter state.159 Baykal’s speech represented a milestone in Turkey’s national identity and citizenship debate. The Islamist RP was the one of the most outspoken critics of government policies towards the Kurds. Şevket Kazan, the RP’s deputy chairman, prepared a report on the Kurdish issue suggesting solutions such as lifting emergency rule, abolishing the village guard system, and so on.160 The party’s parliamentary candidates even had their speeches translated into Kurdish and its different dialects for the elections in 1986.161 The party was supported by Kurdish citizens, as shown by the high percentage of votes it got from south-eastern

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Turkey. For instance, in the 1987 elections the RP got 28 per cent of the votes from Diyarbakır, which has a large Kurdish population, and this news became the cover story of political journals.162 According to Erbakan, the then RP leader, Kurds and Turks are a part of the Islamic nation (ümmet).163 Thus he believed that only appeals to Islamic brotherhood could solve the Kurdish question. The RP’s programme stated that there was no south-eastern problem but rather a regime problem, because previous governments had applied wrongheaded policies and put pressure on citizens living in the region.164 The RP’s use of religion made it the most popular party in Kurdish-populated provinces. At its fourth congress on 10 October 1993, the RP pledged to establish education and broadcasts in Kurdish, adding that Kurdish identity should be recognised and cultural rights be given to the Kurds. In reality this was done in order to get Kurdish citizens’ votes, since after the electoral alliance with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Work Party they spurned the RP.165 In fact, there were many individuals of Kurdish origin in the ranks of the RP’s leadership, most of whom opposed cooperation with the Nationalist Work Party.166 Erbakan divided the Kurdish issue into three parts: ‘the Kurdish issue, the south-east problem and terrorism’.167 After the RP’s closure, Erbakan was banned from active politics for life by the Constitutional Court on charges of separatism and supporting Kurdish nationalism, because of a speech he made in Bingöl in 1994.168 The successor to the RP was the FP, and Erbakan put Recai Kutan at the head of the FP instead of Oğuzhan Asiltürk, whose name and surname could be interpreted as extremely nationalistic among citizens living in the south-east.169 The AKP’s 2002 and 2007 election manifestos accepted cultural differences in the east and south-east as ‘cultural richness’ and suggested solutions apart from economic ones. It supported broadcasts and publication in languages other than Turkish, on condition that Turkish remained the official language and education continued to be in Turkish, and argued that all citizens of Turkey should be first-class citizens without any distinctions.170 When he was a member of the RP, Erdoğan prepared a Kurdish report with Islamist intellectuals criticising the official ideology. The report proposed that Kurdish identity be recognised, education and publication in Kurdish be permitted, the RP should freely speak of ‘Kurds’ and should have a Kurdish policy, and that not only PKK terrorism but also state terror in the south-east should be condemned.171 It remains to be seen whether the AKP will develop a distinct programme on the Kurdish issue.

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When Erdoğan first came to power he did not identify the Kurdish problem as such. For instance, when a worker in Moscow in December 2002 asked whether Erdoğan wanted to solve the Kurdish question, Erdoğan answered with the following words: ‘We are saying that such a problem does not exist. According to you such a question exists. Thus you approach it with prejudice. I say that there is no such problem. We are all from Turkey’.172 Again, Erdoğan’s reply to another question about a possible Kurdish state in northern Iraq showed that he was not free of the separatism phobia: ‘We are against a Kurdish state even if it were established in Argentina’.173 In April 2005, in Norway, Erdoğan said; ‘For us there is no Kurdish problem. It is an imaginary issue’.174 Erdoğan named it as the ‘Kurdish issue’ for the first time in a meeting in 10 August 2005 with a group of intellectuals who favoured the disarmament of the PKK. In this historic meeting Erdoğan said, ‘If we must name every problem, the Kurdish problem … You may call it “the social demands of ethnically Kurdish citizens,” “the south-eastern problem,” “the Kurdish problem” … The problems should be solved within the constitutional framework, within a democratic republican system, with a citizenship law and through more democratisation’.175 In Diyarbakır on 12 August 2005, Erdoğan said, ‘I tell those who ask what will become of the Kurdish problem that is primarily my problem’.176 During a visit to the same region in 1991, the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel had acknowledged for the first time the existence of a ‘Kurdish reality’ in Turkey, which was a major development. However, Erdoğan, who had said that the Kurdish problem was his own problem, in his visit to New Zealand on 6 December 2005 said that ‘Kurds have no problems’, indicating that the difficulties faced by Kurdish citizens were neither more nor  less than those faced by Turks, Lazes or other ethnicities in Turkey.177 A report prepared by the Working Group on Minority and Cultural Rights,178 a committee working under the Office of the Prime Minister, sparked a wide-ranging political and intellectual debate especially on supra/sub-identity (üst kimlik/alt kimlik).179 This report, which became public on 17 October 2004,180 summarised the basic problems of mainstream Turkish national ideology and suggested daring redefinitions of Turkish national identity. The report attempted to overcome the fundamental contradiction of Turkish national identity, which already combined elements of territorial and ethnic nationalism, with a new civic territorial Turkish national identity based on citizenship of the Republic of Turkey (Türkiyeli) instead of the current ethnic one (Türk). The publication of this report represented a milestone in Turkey’s national identity

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and citizenship debate. Following this debate Erdoğan also accepted the existence of different ethnic identities, which he defined as alt kimlik (sub-identity), in Turkey. He argued that being Turkish belonged to a sub-identity. However, for him there was only one üst kimlik (supra/ dominant identity), which held all the identities under the umbrella of the citizenship of the Turkish Republic. At the fourth anniversary of the AKP’s establishment Erdoğan said, ‘There are ethnic elements. There are the Kurds, Lazes, Circassians, Georgians, Albanians, Bosnians and the Turks. These are the sub-identities in our country. There is only one supra-identity, however, that is to be a citizen of the Turkish Republic’. He also pointed out that it was wrong to force the Kurdish citizens to say that they were not Kurdish but Turkish. The same was true for other ethnic groups.181 On 20 November 2005, in Şemdinli, Erdoğan stated that ‘The Turk should be able to say that he/she is a Turk, the Kurd should be able to say that he/she is a Kurd and other ethnic groups should also be able to say who they are. But the supra-identity of all of us is same, being citizens of the Turkish Republic.’182 He pointed out that ‘Citizenship of the Turkish Republic is a security valve for 73 million. It is this supraidentity that brings together the Kurds, the Lazes and the Circassians, the southerners, the easterners, the northerners, the believers, and the unbelievers. We constitute a mosaic.’183 In view of the position taken by Erdoğan in the üst kimlik-alt kimlik debate the opposition party, the CHP, stated that to be a Turk constituted the supra-identity while a citizen of the Turkish Republic constituted a legal matter.184 Erdoğan also pointed out the role of religion, Islam, in withholding differences in Turkey. In 12 December 2005, he mentioned that there were nearly thirty ethnic elements in Turkey. In a country which was 99 per cent Muslim religion was like cement and most important factor in uniting the nation. He denied ever describing Islam as a supra-national identity, noting that he believed citizenship of Turkey was the supraidentity:  ‘Some still don’t understand what I mean. Religion has been a force of unity throughout our history. In order to understand that, one needs to read Atatürk’s Nutuk (The Speech)’.185 During the AKP government there have been legal improvements in terms of the state’s approach to the Kurdish issue. Not unexpectedly, the EU played a key role in spurring these improvements. An important change was made in Article 26 of the 1982 Constitution on 17 October 2001 by deleting the phrase ‘no language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought’, which was used to ban the use of Kurdish. Article 28 was also amended and

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the phrase ‘publication shall not be made in any language prohibited by law’ was deleted. This gave people the chance to publish in languages and dialects other than Turkish. A second reform package on 26 March 2002 lifted the ban on broadcasting in languages prohibited by law, and the third reform package on 3 August 2002 also significantly broadened the scope of freedom of expression by permitting the use of local languages other than Turkish (the exact wording of the Law is ‘different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives’)186 in radio and television broadcasting and their teaching by private language courses (two of the most controversial issues in Turkish politics). The sixth reform package on 19 June 2003 broadened this right by permitting such broadcasting both by public and private radio and television channels. The seventh reform package on 30 July 2003 made it easy to learn languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens by giving permission to open special classes in existing language courses. Before the passage of these laws, the state’s Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu, RTÜK) punished channels that showed programmes in Kurdish or even played Kurdish songs. There are, however, many problems in the implementation of these new laws, as the specific regulations laying out their practice actually made exercising some of them impossible. This can be seen by examining the radio and television broadcasting in Kurdish and Kurdish language courses. Although these reforms constituted a lifting of the taboo on broadcasting in different languages and dialects used by Turkish citizens, the regulations governing them are very problematic. A regulation was prepared by RTÜK and published in the Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete) on 24 January 2004.187 This regulation stated that these programmes can only be made by state channels, thus private local channels lack this right to broadcast;188 the programmes are for adults only, with no programme teaching these different languages and dialects to children; in every programme there should be sub-titles in Turkish or simultaneous translation in Turkish; and both radio and TV face tight programme ceilings, no more than 60 minutes, five hours a week on the former, and no more that 45 minutes a day, four hours a week on the latter.189 Moreover, radio programmes start very early in the morning (at 6:00a.m.), and the news read in these programmes is usually not current.190 Thus, although the right to broadcast in different languages and dialects was granted by law, the actual exercise of the right under the regulations is limited.

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Broadcasts in different languages began on 7 June 2004 under the name ‘Our Cultural Richness’ on the state television channel TRT 3 and the state radio Channel 1.191 The programme started with Bosnian on Monday, then followed throughout the week with shows in Arabic, Kurmancı (the main Kurdish language spoken in Turkey), Circassian, and Zaza (another dialect of Kurdish). These broadcasts consisted of news headlines, documentary, music, and sports programmes. There are a great many different languages and dialects in Turkey, so the state had to make a choice between them. The state chose Bosnian, but Bosnians living in Turkey, very interestingly, complained that ‘we are not a minority … we did not want to have programmes in Bosnian … we are first-class citizens … we do not really know why the government chose Bosnian and decided to broadcast in it’.192 However, citizens whose tongues were left out – for example, the Lazes – complained about not having programmes in their language.193 There are also a great many obstacles to establishing courses in local languages. For instance, one can open a Kurdish language course, but regulations require that the teachers must be ethnic Turks,194 and there have been other problems over trivial reasons such as a lack of fire escape stairs,195 or the names of attendees, all of which have been cited in state delays in allowing the courses. For example, in Urfa the owner of a private language school wanted to use the name ‘Private Urfa Kurdish Language Teaching Centre’; however, this was rejected and it was called ‘Private Urfa Local Dialect Language Course’.196 What is more disconcerting is the fact that, after the passage of the mother tongue law, students studying at a number of universities asked ‘for optional language classes in Kurdish to be taught in universities’ and, exercising their constitutional rights, they signed a petition.197 As a result of the administrative inquiries launched by many universities, 104 petitioning students were dismissed from their schools, 1,215 were temporarily suspended, and 44 lost their fellowships. Also 533 were arrested and accused of being members of the PKK which, it was claimed, was the terrorist group behind the action of the university students.198 Despite all these difficulties three language courses have opened and are functioning.199 There have been significant advances since 1999 in terms of the state’s approach to the recognition of different ethnic identities, in particular the Kurdish identity; however, there are still some problems in the application of these reforms. For this reason Prime Minister Erdoğan announced his government’s long-awaited South-east Action Plan to improve infrastructure and irrigation in the south-eastern region, and boost employment

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on 27 May 2008 in Diyarbakır. This action plan of the AKP government was to be based on economic and social development, substructure and developing inter-institutional capacity. Erdoğan stated that the new action plan would strengthen Turkey’s unity and social structure. The new plan also includes cultural and psychological benefits for the people living in the region. For instance, one channel of the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, or TRT, will be dedicated to broadcasting in local languages, including Kurdish. Erdoğan said: ‘The new television and radio will significantly dry out the psychological and cultural ground of terror’.200 The latest package initiated by the prime minister is very impressive, as this is the first time in years that Turkey has taken a serious step in the economic and cultural development of this region. Just after the declaration of the plan parliament approved a law that allows the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) to broadcast one of its channels solely in Kurdish.201 This gave the impression in the south-east that Erdoğan keeps his word and he will actually implement the package and follow up on it. The above discussions shows us once more that the problem faced in contemporary Turkey is the revision and redefinition of the notion of the early republican concept of citizenship, in order to respect demands coming from various sections of the society without damaging the bonds and virtues of citizenship. For this purpose education and especially civic education play a prominent role. Thus in the next section civic education during the period of 1980–2010 will be analysed. The Civic Virtue Aspect of Citizenship, 2010 Turkey has a highly centralised education system. The Board of Education under the Ministry of National Education prepares the curricula for all subjects, and its approval of textbooks is required for adoption. As textbooks have to follow the guidelines of the board, they are all more or less identical.202 For this reason there is also little difference between civic education textbooks published during the previous periods and textbooks published during the period 1980–2007. The discourse about the greatness of the Turkish nation remained the same. The Turkish history and the Sun Language thesis of the single-party period that served to build selfconfidence among the citizens were also still in evidence in the twentyfirst century. Kemalism still maintains its place in the form of quotations from Atatürk throughout the textbooks. Since the 1980s there has been a clash between official understandings of citizenship, such as the one

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based upon duties rather than rights, and a more liberal understanding of citizenship, such as the one based upon both the priority of rights over duties and the recognition of differences among citizens in Turkey. Nevertheless, one sees no trace of this in civic education textbooks. Course books were reorganised with a different idea after the 12 September 1980 coup, with their curriculum starting to favour the military’s perspective in terms of social and political events. According to author Kemal İnal, post-1980 education, both in general and in its textbooks in particular, became a tool for ideological indoctrination.203 After 1980 the military made good use of the education system to position itself as the natural guardian of the Turkish state, so that the society’s unity would no longer be endangered. The military’s education policies were also influenced by the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which was used as a tool for ideological legitimisation of the military regime after 1980. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was designed to head off democratic and leftist developments in Turkey.204 After 1980, all of Turkey’s civics textbooks began with the National Anthem, the Turkish flag, a picture of Atatürk, and his famous Address to Turkish Youth (Gençliğe Hitabı). This non-textual group of symbols, defined by historian Etienne Copeaux as a ‘Kemalist mechanism’,205 was thus enshrined at the beginning and at the end of many textbooks. This was independent of the book’s actual content, and varying little from one book to another. Civics textbooks published after 1980 defined the nation as a unity of language, religion, race, history, and culture. After 1980, the orthodox understanding of religion (Sunni Islam) began to be counted among the basic characteristics of the nation. By doing this, hatred against non-Muslim citizens and citizens belonging to different sects of Islam, e.g., Alevis, was supported. Textbooks also gave the standard exaggeration of the virtues of the Turkish nation and argued that Turkey’s nationalism was based upon Atatürk’s nationalism, and accepted everybody living in Turkey as a Turk.206 While this definition of nationalism did not seem expansionist, some of the books did talk about ‘external Turks’ and the Turkish states apart from Turkey. Turkey was mentioned as the largest state, however.207 The textbooks defined citizenship rights by making reference to the 1982 Constitution and then went on to present the constitutional limitations of these rights and freedoms without taking a critical stance. It was one of the duties of the state to limit the rights of its citizens under certain circumstances. For such a course to teach students that their rights can be limited by the Constitution while simultaneously blocking students’

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criticism of that Constitution is truly irrational. Moreover, the state and national interests are always assigned priority over citizenship rights and freedoms as illustrated by the following quotation from a textbook: ‘The citizens should believe in the superiority of the national interests over individual interests. If individual do not behave in a responsible way, this would lead to a situation that is harmful for all citizens’.208 The textbooks also presented the existing situation as perfect209 and did not mention domestic discussions of problems that citizens faced while trying to exercise their rights. While citizenship rights were mentioned briefly, the emphasis was on duties, together with a host of larger responsibilities. The duties of citizenship were listed as performing military service; paying tax; voting; having the mindset that would not allow activities of divisive or destructive nature; and securing national unity. As in previous periods, duties were emphasised over rights. For example, one of the textbooks quoted part of a poem by Ziya Gökalp:210 The road to righteous conduct is very narrow. Don’t say, I have the right. There is no right, there is only duty.211 The textbooks promoted a duty-based social order rather than a rightbased one and failed to address the importance of citizenship participation in the policy process, reducing democracy simply to the exercise of voting. Thus civic education in Turkey becomes a means of sustaining an obedient society, rather than a way to introduce tolerance for diversity. Signs of critical thinking are not to be found in these books. Turkey’s civics textbooks continued to put the stress on students’ rote memorisation of sayings such as ‘Peace at Home, Peace in the World,’ ‘Idleness is the father of all vice,’ and ‘Turkish nation! You should be proud, hardworking and confident,’ and neglected to teach critical thinking. Their aim is only to instil the state’s ideology into young people and teach them to bow to authority. Not unexpectedly, these textbooks – like those published in previous periods – created a phobia of ‘the enemy’ in the minds of young people, which led to intolerance against the ‘other’ among both individuals and groups. There was great emphasis on ‘enemies’ and ‘threat’ in the textbooks. The famous fear theme of the ‘12 September’ regime, and of the military officers in general, was that ‘Turkey is surrounded on all sides by enemies’. All the textbooks published after 1980 emphasised

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the dangers posed by threats to Turkey’s regime – traitors who want to destroy its unity. Unlike in previous periods, the textbooks warned not only of external enemies but also of internal ones who, said the books, seek to divide our nation along lines of race, class and religious sect, and use various methods towards this end, such as anarchy and terror. The books also continued to state that there were external and internal supporters of anarchy and terror who wanted to divide Turkey. The separatist terror group, the PKK, was among these organisations. It had received support from other countries. The reasons for these terrorist activities were related to Turkey’s geopolitical importance, the İstanbul Straits, and the country’s rich underground and aboveground resources, as well as its young population. External threats are listed as smuggling, international terrorism – including Armenian terrorism – the historical and ideological designs of certain countries such as Greece, Armenia, Syria and Russia, and finally espionage.212 The Turkish nation should put a halt to these activities and protect the peace, said the texts. Urging young citizens to defend the fatherland, one book quoted part of a poem, saying, ‘It is right to sink an ownerless fatherland, if you own this fatherland it will not sink’. According to these books, Turkey was surrounded by enemies.213 This mindset echoes the motive behind the establishment of the Intellectuals’ Hearth whose founders’ xenophobic and fear-driven psychology led them to establish this group at a time when the perceived major enemy was the left. The textbooks’ authors, not unlike the members of the Intellectuals’ Hearth, argued that young people should follow the principles of Atatürk and shun foreign ideologies.214 In sum, they argued that we should guard ourselves against all these internal and external threats and protect our national culture. For, as the saying goes, ‘Turks have no friends besides fellow Turks’.215 Thus, in Turkey, civic education is used as a tool to develop ‘self-sacrificing’ ‘good citizens’, who should always be alert about ‘enemies’ and be ready to protect the unity of the nation. This burdened the young citizens with a great responsibility and fostered xenophobia. Some of the textbooks emphasised the importance of Islam, while mentioning only the Sunni sect, as well as religious rules governing the individual’s relations with society. Such emphasis on the Sunni sect of Islam, however, can be very dangerous and may create hatred against non-Muslim citizens and Alevi citizens. A civics textbook, Üniversiteler İçin Vatandaşlık Bilgisi,216 intended for university students who were studying to be civics teachers, put religion forward as the most important part of Turkish culture, its sine qua non. When

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we say, ‘abdestli-namazlı’ or ‘namazında-niyazında’ (two phrases meaning practising Muslims), said the textbook, we mean people who do no harm and work for the benefit of others. The book quotes from the Prophet Mohammed’s hadiths (religious sayings) and suras from the Koran.217 It notes that apart from the small community of Gagauz Turks, no non-Muslim Turkish community exists.218 The author, Durmuş Yılmaz, also argued that Turkish nationalism is based upon a language, i.e. Turkish; a religion, namely Islam; and custom (Töre), or the Turkish way of life.219 The book aimed to pass down Turkish culture and national identity from generation to generation through education in humanities. Thus by emphasising Turkish culture, language and Sunni Islam the assimilation of different identities in Turkey was legitimised. In 1998, Citizenship and Human Rights Education was incorporated as a required civics course.220 Though textbooks bear the name Citizenship and Human Rights Education, according to author Fatma Gök these books contain points that are contrary to human rights.221 For example, under Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everybody has the right to receive an education and under Article 42 of the 1982 Constitution, ‘No one shall be deprived of the right of learning and education’. Nevertheless, according to Gök, the authors of these textbooks – which stated that education should be given only in Turkish – left the feelings and perspectives of minority citizens out of the picture completely.222 In 2000 with the incorporation of citizenship education and human rights education, the importance of human rights and international organisations started to be emphasised. Unfortunately it was done not because of moral or ethical principles, but rather because it is a mark of a civilised country. Human rights are not an end in themselves, merely a means to attain another end, namely promoting Turkey’s reputation and respectability on the international stage.223 A Ministry of Education decision is evidence of this: in 2006, Turkey’s Ministry of Education censored the Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları (Citizenship and Human Rights) textbook for year seven students as it contained a reproduction of the renowned ‘Liberty Leading the People’, by French painter Eugene Delacroix, because Liberty’s breasts were bare (Figure 10).224 This opened up a new debate on civic education in Turkey. One of the columnists said ‘This work is a symbol of the French Revolution ... and as such [is a symbol of] not only France but global democracy’.225 He suggested, tongue in cheek, that students, if they are to be protected from

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Figure 10 The censored picture in the Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları (Citizenship and Human Rights) textbook.

bared bosoms, be ‘banned from museums.’ ‘What do you say?’ he asked. ‘Should we bar students from beaches too?’ Özgür Bozdoğan, leader of a teachers’ union, stated that the ministry’s decision was ‘unacceptable’ and the Justice and Development Party was in the process of imposing its own worldview in schoolbooks and reference books.226 Since the 2008–2009 academic year Turkey’s Ministry of National Education has incorporated civic education into social studies textbooks for Grades Six and Seven. The social studies courses include history, geography, general culture, and civic information. There are several similarities between the civics textbooks published before 2008 and the social studies textbooks published after 2008. The current social studies texts emphasise duties more than rights; connect ancient civilisations and the Turkish nation; emphasise similarities between Muslim countries and Turkey. But there have also been some improvements in the

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social studies textbooks, the most important of which concerns teaching techniques. The course supports class participation rather than rote learning. Sèvres Syndrome-thinking has also been removed. There is no talk about ‘enemies of Turkey’, thus decreasing the likelihood of xenophobia. When discussing religious freedom, one text gives the example of Antakya, a city in Turkey where three different religions peacefully co-exist. However, apart from this brief mention, the textbooks still do not discuss the ethnic and religious minorities living in Turkey and their identity claims. One text mentions Nevruz, the traditional celebration of the Iranian New Year. The text reads as if Nevruz is celebrated by ethnic Turks only, however, Kurdish citizens traditionally celebrated Nevruz but could not do so openly until 2005. Although the holiday is now recognized in Turkey, there is no mention in the texts of Kurds living in Turkey. Although there have been certain improvements the current social studies textbooks do not give enough place for civic information; continue creating dutiful citizens who uncritically obey all the state’s dictates; and are not up to the task of cultivating the democratic and active citizens needed by the twenty-first century. This chapter analysed the period 1980–2010 in terms of the construction of citizenship’s legal identity and civic virtue aspects. When we compare this period with previous ones it can be argued that there has been promising improvement in terms of the state’s attitude towards Alevi, Kurdish and non-Muslim citizens’ identity claims since the second half of the 1990s. There are, however, many problems about the application of the reforms and the preparation of the new civil constitution. Non-Muslims, Alevis and Kurds still feel that they are ‘secondclass citizens’ of the Republic, and Sunni Muslim, ethnic Turks, who see themselves as the ‘real citizens of the Republic’, continue to be passive and obedient.

7 CONCLUDING REMARKS: ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A SOLUTION

Every collective identity, also a postnational one, is much more concrete than the ensemble of moral, legal and political principles around which it crystallizes. Jürgen Habermas1 Citizenship is one of the most important but elusive concepts of modern political discourse and practice. It is important because citizenship, or the lack of it, determines people’s political, legal and social rights, and defines their membership in one or more political communities. It is both a source and a result of inclusion and identification, as it demarcates groups of individuals who have certain privileges and responsibilities in common. At the same time it is also a source (and a result) of exclusion, as citizenship is not open to all but often can only be acquired by obeying elaborate rules and satisfying particular requirements. Citizenship is also an elusive concept because it has a long and complex history, stretching back at least to classical Greece and Rome. After a rather long period of relative calm, there has been a dramatic upsurge in philosophical and political interest in citizenship since the early 1990s. Two broad challenges have led theorists to re-examine the concept of citizenship: first, the need to acknowledge the internal diversity of contemporary liberal democracies; second, the pressures wrought

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by globalisation on the territorial, sovereign state. For this reason, studies on citizenship should approach the topic from perspectives that are not confined by the categories of a state-centric politics, but see citizenship as something to be ‘analysed in the context of contemporary processes involving globalisation, theories of international relations, changes to the state and political communities, multiculturalism, gender, indigenous peoples and national reconciliation, equity, social and public policy, welfare, and the reorganisation of public management’. The rationale is simple: ‘as a theoretically basic concept, citizenship provides new tools for formulating problems and providing practical analysis and advice in these fields’.2 In this regard, we should not only address the institutional and constitutional arrangements of citizenship, but also examine how citizenship operates as a lived experience. What this often reveals, however, is that for all the innovations in how we conceive of citizenship, the concept remains deeply embedded with practices that divide humanity according to race, ethnicity, gender and geography. As Bryan Turner rightly points out, whereas class was the major axis of contestation in the early stages of industrialisation, ‘citizenship struggles in early twenty-first century society are more commonly about claims to cultural identity’.3 This chapter analyses the legal, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship during the history of the Republic and discusses the possibility of ‘constitutional citizenship’ in Turkey. Analysis of the Civic Virtue Aspect of Citizenship in Turkey (1923–2010) I examined civic education textbooks throughout the Republican period using three core framing questions dealing respectively with ‘Democracy, Institutions, Rights, and Responsibilities’, ‘National Identity and Relations between Nations’, and ‘Social Cohesion and Social Diversity’, taken from a 1995 international comparative study of civic education conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA).4 Nationalism in civic education textbooks in Turkey appeared to be defined as political nationalism based upon citizenship, but in reality an ethno-cultural nationalism based upon race is promoted. The word ‘Turk’ has no racial meaning but embraces everybody who lives in Turkey, the books argued, yet throughout, the ethno-cultural definition of Turk was emphasised more than the political one. The definition of ‘Turk’ did not

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include people tied to the Turkish nation through citizenship, but rather through ethnicity. Equating ‘Turkishness’ with being ‘Sunni Muslim’ is one example of this ethno-cultural nationalism. Moreover, there are clear signs of pan-Turkism in the course books, which refer continually to ‘Turkish-originated’ countries and communities. In these textbooks peoples’ sexual, cultural and class identities were presented as unimportant. The only significant thing is national identity. Neither the variety of ethnic groups, nor different belief systems, nor different value judgements and organisational forms were mentioned. Moreover, the stories told were not neutral vis-à-vis the perspectives of various groups within society, namely Kurds, non-Muslims and Alevis. None of the course books covered such matters as religious uprisings, ethnic separatism or identity claims in Turkey. The civic education textbooks also exaggerated the virtues of the Turkish nation. Being a Turk was equated with being good and perfect. Turkish culture is unique and cannot be compared with that of any other nation. Turks were depicted as being morally upright, hardworking, tolerant, helpful and hospitable people who love humanity, love to live free, and love the younger generation while respecting their elders. By birth, said the books, Turks have high morals. Presenting a list of standard virtues, they argued that these are peculiar to Turks. Numerous quotations from Atatürk are meant to cultivate self-confidence and national pride among young citizens, but instead caused hatred against minority citizens. As Tanıl Bora stated, one of the basic characteristics of nationalist ideology is an effort to differentiate that nation from the others. In Turkey this characteristic has gone to extremes.5 The textbooks raise the spectre of threats at every turn. This ‘threat cult’ encourages hostility towards the outside world. While it warns the young generations against possible internal and external enemies, these arguments lack a rational basis and the books did not offer reasons for such great antipathy, implying rather that such countries were the enemies of Turks and Turkey by birth. Such a strong definition of enemy creates a cult of unity: citizens should always stand ready to face threats both external and internal, according to the books, but this requirement creates further paranoia among young citizens, and causes fear of identity claims coming from non-mainstream parts of society. As a result, citizens belonging to Turkey’s majority – i.e., Sunni ethnic Turks – do not want to give rights to its ethnic and religious minorities, since recognition of identity claims might mean a return to the conditions of the

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Treaty of Sevres, the dangers of which had been emphasised throughout the civics courses. The books’ definitions and treatment of such concepts as democracy and participation was poor, and they failed to demonstrate their importance. One of the most commonly used words in the books is ‘state’. In the democracy and human rights course books the word ‘right’ appeared 701 times, followed closely by ‘state’ in 678 instances; however, the word ‘democracy’ was used only 173 times.6 Multi-party politics was defined as the most significant feature of democracy. However, none of the books talked about civil society, nor did they discuss the active participation of citizens (apart from voting during elections), though together these are the most crucial features of democracy. These textbooks painted a rosy picture of Turkey, especially concerning the practice of rights and the freedoms of citizens. They made reference to the 1924 and 1982 Constitutions, both of which have been judged to be undemocratic. Textbooks did not talk about claims for positive discriminatory rights. In all societies, incorporating citizenship rights themes into school curricula is challenging for the dominant political culture. This is valid for the Turkish case, where the single-party policies of prioritising stability, unity, security and order still define the political culture. This culture is shaped by a strong state tradition, which leans on a ‘transcendentalist polity’ that endorses a moral community in which public interests transcend particularistic group interests and define the scope of individual interests. The state tradition is very sensitive about the principles of ‘unity and indivisibility,’ and citizenship education in such a context has not been translated into popular language. Instead violations are often justified by political actors by referring to the ‘special circumstances’ of Turkey. Such a political culture breeds a particular philosophy of education. In such a context the World Values Survey Association’s 2008 study results should not be surprising for us. According to this organisation, Turkey is distrustful of foreigners and minority citizens.7 For instance, in Turkey 44 per cent did not trust foreigners ‘very much’, while 29 per cent did not trust them at all. Tolerance toward minority citizens is also very low. Among Turkish respondents, 25 per cent viewed with disfavour people who speak a language other than Turkish. For the respondents the most important criterion for citizenship is obeying Turkish law. These results indicate that there is an urgent need in Turkey for the reconsideration of civic education textbooks. Today, the civic education discourse of democracy, national identity and social diversity adopted in civic education textbooks in Turkey is

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out of step with contemporary political and social reality. In this newly emerging reality, the discourse on citizenship education has to be reconsidered in terms of its aims, knowledge content and process of meaning production. Civic education is expected to foster in students appropriate attitudes (tolerance, trust, mutual understanding and solidarity) combined with the skill and knowledge that they will need to live effectively in the global village. The reality that individual identities are indeed multiple and dynamic in character, ranging across gender, religion, class, region and ethnicity must be recognised. This means that integration in Turkey should not attempt to reduce citizenship to a single identity (being Turkish) but instead combine a common framework of rights and responsibilities with what Habermas has called ‘constitutional patriotism’. This amounts to a commitment by all members of the polity to a set of political institutions and the rule of law rather than to a shared cultural identity. Against a background of considerable diversity in Turkey, it is hard to imagine such integration being possible without education for citizenship playing a central role. Before discussing the possibility of ‘constitutional citizenship’ in Turkey, the next section gives examples of civic education in some multicultural countries which participated in the IEA study. Comparisons A comparative perspective is extremely helpful to see that the Turkish case is in many senses not unique. Also such a perspective may provide information for other comparative studies, reconsideration of citizenship education in multicultural societies and promoting an active national citizenry in Turkey. Not unlike the Turkish case, civic education in France, where citizenship education has traditionally been high on the political agenda, has always been intended to help integrate a diverse population into a single national culture defined as Republican. The first statement of the curriculum of compulsory primary education published in Article 1 of the Jules Ferry Law of 28 March 1882 put instruction morale et civique even before reading, writing and literature in terms of national priorities.8 As in Turkey, citizenship in France is crucial to the whole notion of state schooling and the school is the Republic’s primary institution for socialising its citizens. The basis of state education in France is initiation into a common culture through a single curriculum. It does not recognise difference, but rather starts from the premise that, within the Republic,

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all citizens are equal. The French concept of citizenship, like the Turkish one, has always intentionally neglected social and socio-economic and cultural pluralist dimensions, because of a fear of social fragmentation leading to the destruction of the Republican ideology.9 In multicultural France, the fear is that ethnic, political, religious and economic demands might eventually take extreme forms and result in arbitrary solutions which would be imposed on other groups or on all of society; the immigrant population’s demands for cultural and religious recognition are seen as threatening Republican France.10 For this reason, like the Turkish case, in French textbooks there is a section on threats to the Republic, which highlights the armed Corsican independence movements. In France the only suggestion of cultural diversity concerns regional traditions of food and folklore and objects that may be held in local museums and art galleries; however, mosques are omitted.11 In the textbook there is little to suggest that minorities may be subject to discrimination, except at the hands of far right political parties. There is a reminder of the Vichy law excluding Jews from any public office or job but this is not matched with evidence or discussion of current discrimination against minorities in housing, policing and employment.12 The reluctance to recognise community identities, however, has signalled conflicts and difficulties for schools, as with the various headscarf debates since 1989.13 Citizenship education is now a required component of the national curriculum that must be taught by all state-funded schools in England.14 It is constantly highlighted by policy-makers as a major innovation that promotes social cohesion in general, and race equality in particular. In England, citizenship education became a compulsory15 part of the curriculum for 11 to 16-year-olds in state-maintained schools following the Crick Report.16 The Labour Government’s advisory group on the Teaching of Citizenship and Democracy was established, in November 1997, under the chairmanship of Professor Bernard Crick. The report’s recommendations appear at first sight to mark a considerable step forward given the neglect of citizenship education in England in the past. Specifically, the three strands of citizenship education advocated by Crick are: social and moral responsibility; community involvement; and political literacy. Nevertheless, there are a number of contradictions, tensions and omissions in the report which undermine its good intentions. It fails to recommend a central role for anti-discriminatory practice that needs to be at the heart of citizenship education, if important barriers to the development of mutual respect and recognition such as racism, sexism and homophobia are to be tackled. Also, nowhere does the report examine the institutional

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context through which citizenship education is to be delivered.17 David Gillborn pointed out that, in Britain, the dominant tradition has been for citizenship education that reinforces the status quo by binding students to a superficial and sanitised version of pluralism that is long on duties and responsibilities, but short on popular struggles against race inequality.18 Although the British programme of study roundly condemns racism and recognises different ethnic groups, it does not give significant weight to the perspectives of minorities.19 According to Gillborn it is in this context that the promotion of citizenship education can be seen in England as a public policy placebo, that is, a pretend treatment for institutional racism that gives the impression of action, but is, in fact, without substance or effect.20 In Greece, civic education was introduced into the secondary school curriculum in 1931.21 As in the Turkish case, there was an over-emphasis on the strengthening of national morale and national identity. Militarylike behaviour22 and attire were imposed in the textbooks and they tried to create passive and duty-oriented citizens.23 Today’s curricula and textbooks in Greece are the product of the educational reform 1981. They are characterised by an effort to reduce social and gender inequalities in school as well as to promote a sense of social equity and critical thinking. However, according to the IEA results, sensitivity in Greece towards these issues is not concretely represented in the contents of civic education courses. The issue of ethnic, linguistic, religious or other minorities is absent. Emphasis is placed on the homogeneous image (one language, one religion, one common past) of the Greek nation.24 Stereotypes continue to survive and students are not offered the appropriate tools to allow critical understanding of the mechanisms that underlie social cohesion, social relations and evolution. Textbooks exaggerate qualities of the Greek nation, describing it as ‘superior to any civilization that ever existed’.25 Textbooks emphasise the homogeneous character of Greece through time, neglecting to mention the existence of minorities, and negative representation of ‘national others’. Greece is presented as ‘one of the most homogeneous states’ in Europe.26 Textbooks talk about national enemies and create a threat culture in the minds of young generations27 by suggesting that Greece lives under threat of attack from malevolent neighbours.28 The nation is described as a commonality, characterised by unity, uniformity of biology (descent) and culture; citizens of a country are the people belonging to the polity and having certain rights and obligations, ‘irrespective of their religion or language, or even their ethnicity’.29 This expression, ‘or even’, underlined in the original

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text, probably shows a certain reluctance on the part of the authors to define citizenship, irrespective of ethnicity, especially after having stated a few pages earlier how important ethnicity, religion and language are for the definition of nation and after having referred to Greece as being one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries of Europe. The aim of the civic education in Cyprus, as defined in the curriculum of the Ministry of National Education, is to help students to develop into free, responsible and democratic citizens, who will, in turn, perform their duties according to their conscience.30 Textbooks begin with a map of Cyprus and the military boot of the Turkish invader stepping on the northern part. The text accompanying the picture is: ‘the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus were flagrantly violated by the Turkish invasion of 1974’.31 There are negative attitudes towards Greece’s neighbours (e.g., Turkey and Bulgaria) and Greeks are presented as superior to them.32 Textbooks attempt to strengthen Greek national identity for the Greek Cypriots. For this reason, the Cypriot flag is represented as the flag of their country, while the Greek flag is represented as the flag of their nation.33 Textbooks do not talk about minority groups living in Cyprus, demonstrating a lack of tolerance and creating hatred against the ‘other’ in the minds of young generations. As can be seen from the above examples, citizenship education is a difficult task. Not only Turkey, but also other countries – especially countries that have ethnic and religious minorities – should improve citizenship education in order to foster tolerance, trust, mutual understanding and solidarity among citizens. In democratic states, citizens are constitutionally entitled to equal rights to participate in and to influence government. In practice, however, this formal equality is undermined by discriminatory practices, because the nation is often portrayed as having a homogeneous cultural identity into which minorities are expected to integrate. In this respect, education for national citizenship often fails to engage with citizens, who have shifting and multiple cultural identities and a sense of belonging that is not expressed first and foremost in terms of the nation. Accordingly, citizenship education may unintentionally serve to alienate and exclude some citizens. Where public discourse and discriminatory practices serve to undermine the citizenship rights of minorities, education for national citizenship may be doubly exclusionary. We should, however, learn to imagine a nation as a diverse and inclusive community. This appears to be an essential pre-condition for the renewal of democracy in a globalised world, and citizenship education must also address national,

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regional and global issues. It is critical in preparing young people to live together in increasingly diverse local communities and an interdependent world. At the core of a revised citizenship education there should be the promotion of healthy relationships based upon the recognition of equal rights and responsibilities, mutual respect and support, open deliberation and dialogue, trust and absence of coercion. A sense of duty towards, and care for, strangers should be developed and this cannot be done without pupils learning about the dangers of stereotyping and discrimination. Education for citizenship must begin with the individual’s moral framework and their emotional and physical health. It should seek to develop a positive sense of self and sense of empathy and solidarity with others. Until national curricula and discourses on citizenship are responsive to minority as well as majority perspectives they are likely to remain to some extent exclusive and it should not be forgotten that citizenship education, poorly done, may be worse than not teaching it at all. Analysis of the Legal and Identity Aspects of Citizenship (1923– 2010) and the Possibility of Constitutional Citizenship in Turkey While legislation passed in Turkey during the Republican period demonstrated a blend of jus sanguinis and jus soli principles, in its administrative acts the state showed partiality towards jus sanguinis. Thus citizenship in Turkey represents an uneasy marriage between ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity and citizenship. The monolithic culture that would be imposed in this instance of citizenship-fromabove was to encompass modernist, secularist and nationalist ideals and in doing so to spawn a process of Turkification.34 Consistent with the top-down creation of citizenship, rights were conceived of as those that were granted by the state, and citizens were understood to be primarily in possession not of rights, but of duties and obligations towards the state.35 Thus, although there were shifts to a more liberal understanding of citizenship in certain periods, such as the transition to the multi-party period and the 1961 constitution, civic republican understanding of citizenship has been prevalent during the Republican history in Turkey. The Kemalist revolution from above had transformed the Ottoman Empire into a monistic nation-state. The empire included many subidentities such as Turkish, Kurdish, Georgian, Abkhazian, Armenian, Greek, Jewish, etc. Many were recognised by the state, but none of them coincided with the ‘Ottoman’ supra-identity. The same sub-identities continued to exist in the Republic of Turkey, but the supra-identity was

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changed to being ‘Turkish’, which coincided with the ‘Turkish’ subidentity, thus creating an imbalance in favour of ethnic Turkish citizens. It can be argued that the Turkish conception of citizenship, when viewed from Soner Çağaptay’s point of view on ‘Turkishness’,36 had three zones. These are as follows: 1 Territorial: this is the most inclusive of the three. Citizenship was defined based on territorial principles. 2 Religious: all Muslims in Turkey were seen as potential Turks and for this reason ‘real citizens’ of the Republic. This religious definition caused a number of conflicts. First, by barring the non-Muslims from citizenship it contradicted the territorial definition of citizenship. Second, it was not always consistent: although all Turks were Muslims, not all Muslims were ethnic Turks. 3 Ethno-religious: those who are ethnically Turkish are considered as real citizens of the Republic and the state used religion to classify non-Turks into two hierarchical categories, Muslim, and non-Muslim. It favoured the former over the latter. Nation-states may equate the citizen with the member of the historical or ethnic nation, thereby distinguishing what would ideally be a unitary citizen body into an inegalitarian schema of ‘first-class’ citizens and ‘second-class’ semi-citizens sorted by nationality or ethnicity. Turkey to some extent implemented this and it can be argued that as a result of the second and third zones there were three categories of citizenship: Muslim ethnic Turks, non-Turkish Muslims and non-Muslim minorities. Muslim ethnic Turks were considered to be the ‘real citizens’ or ‘first-class citizens’ of the Republic, non-Turkish Muslims, such as Kurds and Lazes, were the ‘second-class citizens’ of the Republic, earning Turkish citizenship as long as they remained assimilated, and the non-Muslims, such as Christians and Jews, were the ‘unwanted citizens’ of the Republic, since it was difficult to assimilate them. Since the 1990s, however, Bryan Turner’s view is that there has been a clash between ‘formal’ and ‘radical’ understandings of citizenship in Turkey. On the one hand, there is the official definition of citizenship based on the republican understanding of obligations to the state in return for rights gained. On the other hand, there are the demands for a more liberal understanding of citizenship based on the priority of rights and recognition of differences within a new definition of citizenship. Therefore the recent decades have witnessed identity revivals of the Kurds, Alevis

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and non-Muslim citizens. These previously excluded peripheral identities began to question the fabricated and imposed monolithic citizenship identity which was the product of the single-party period. The common point of demands coming from these distinct identities is a search for a socio-political setting free from alienation where they can enjoy their social, cultural and political rights. They want a new citizenship based on constitutional rights rather than on nationality. It is within this context that the issue of ‘constitutional citizenship’, which represents something more than a formal legal status of membership, began to be discussed in the various spheres of the Turkish public, government and state. The demands coming from different identities in Turkey can be met through constitutional citizenship. In general, the concept of constitutional citizenship designates the idea that political attachment ought to centre on the norms, the values, and, more indirectly, the procedures of a liberal-democratic constitution. Thus, political allegiance is owed, primarily, neither to a national culture, as proponents of liberal nationalism have claimed, nor to ‘the worldwide community of human beings’. Constitutional citizenship promises a form of solidarity distinct from both nationalism and cosmopolitanism. This is for the obvious reason that a concept of citizenship which is purely formal, legal and concerned with the relation of the citizen to the state, can secure the loyalty of distinct identity groups in a way that a concept of citizenship based on nationality cannot. Thus in countries like Turkey, where identity-based conflicts endanger the sense of unity, constitutional citizenship secures the loyalty of distinct identity groups. The concept of constitutional citizenship as founded on the articulation of identity claims with citizenship rights could provide an effective basis for the solution of problems that Turkey faces. We should articulate identity claims within the context of constitutional citizenship which operates not only as a legal and political membership but also as an articulating principle for the recognition of group rights. The solution should not be sought in identity but in an attempt to articulate identity claims to citizenship rights within the context of a democratic and pluralist vision of Turkish modernity.37 ��������������������������������������������������� Only such a kind of citizenship can create substantive equality in addition to legal equality in Turkey. We should articulate the identity claims of Alevis, Kurds and nonMuslims to citizenship rights and seek democratic solutions to the problems in terms of a politics of recognition, attempting a reconstruction of the republican model of Turkish citizenship in such a way as to make it more flexible, differentiated and constitutional. Fuat Keyman rightly

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pointed out that the call for citizenship in Turkey should be post-national, differential and constitutional. Post-national in the sense that it should not reduce the meaning of citizenship to the legal and political membership of a nation-state; differential in the sense that it should recognise not only individual rights but also cultural group rights, and thereby function as a point of articulation between identity and citizenship; and constitutional in the sense that it should function as a common language or ground for the constitutional guarantee and protection of both individual and group rights.38 The Turkish state, however, took a negative approach regarding the rights of religious minorities – namely all non-Muslim citizens and the Alevis – throughout the Republican period. One proposed solution for this is that a new constitution be designed which establishes true secularism, where a separation of religious and state affairs would replace current state control over religion. Secondly, it has been proposed that the existing legal rights of all non-Muslim citizens, secured under the Treaty of Lausanne, need to be enforced without conditions or delay. If enacted, these constitutional reforms would: grant religious, educational, and social institutions legal status – enabling them to fully enjoy their property rights; remove bureaucratic hurdles before the opening of new institutions, the training of religious personnel, and the publications of educational materials; and ensure non-Muslim communities full autonomy in running their own affairs. Thirdly, it has also been proposed that the abolition of the Directorate of Religious Affairs is necessary to achieve substantive equality between the Sunni majority and the Alevi minority by way of bringing an end to state sponsorship and promotion of the Sunni interpretation of Islam. An alternative system would be developed where all Alevi religious, social and cultural institutions are granted freedom of association and full property rights. During the preparation of the constitution the following steps should receive special attention: the official recognition of Alevis as a religious minority entitled to freedom of association and religion; the requirement of judicial, legislative, and executive organs to respect these rights; and the engagement with the Alevis in a meaningful dialogue towards remedying the historical discrimination to which they have been subjected. Another major problem that the new constitution is supposed to solve is the Kurdish issue. Turkey has for more than half a century unsuccessfully tried to solve the Kurdish question through policies of ethnic nationalism, compulsory assimilation, and the use of force. Nevertheless, the recognition of minority cultural rights represents a very cautious step

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towards satisfying minority needs without threatening ‘territorial integrity’. First, there is need for political dialogue for the solution of the Kurdish problem, to allow the Turkish government to gain the trust and support of its citizens. Kurds demand to be recognised as ‘real citizens’ and as partners on equal footing with the Turks. Kurds expect the state to be their friend, to truly embrace them as citizens entitled to equal treatment with Turks, and to take affirmative measures to alleviate the legacy of Turkification policies. The state has to consider how to respond to such demands, and to decide whether it is necessary to prepare the new constitution on the basis of the old concept of citizenship, or a new one. To be sure, as Jan-Werner Müller pointed out, constitutional patriotism is not meant to be a return to the traditional, and rightly discredited, ideals of assimilationism qua cultural conformity that have often been associated with civic nationalism (which, in turn, is in no way an indicator of actual cultural openness). Constitutional patriotic integration is not simply code for absorption, which itself might be code for assimilation, which might, in turn, figure as code for ‘acculturation’ – in other words, the same chain of unwarranted assumptions and expectations that liberal nationalism tends to encourage. Instead, we might imagine a shift from ‘transitive’ to ‘intransitive’ understandings of assimilation; of integration not as something done to ‘them’ but, rather, as something accomplished in common through mutual deliberative engagement (for the most part under state auspices) and, above all, done ‘with them’ – and in such a way that a reconstituted ‘we’ emerges. Integration thus understood is not normatively opposed to the value of difference or diversity but is meant, practically, to prevent marginalisation and ghettoisation and, therefore, contrasts, above all, with benign neglect.39 For Jan-Werner Müller, constitutional patriotism mediates between the universal and the particular; it requires a background theory of justice and a common form of mutual respect among free and equal citizens. Such mutual respect necessarily involves agreement on lawmaking procedures that are themselves capable of both containing disagreement and providing the basis for a common constitutional culture that generates allegiance through reflexive judgements.40 Constitutional patriotism is supposed to be reflexive. That is, it occasionally must be revised in light of the further development and refinement of the principles at the heart of our constitutional regime. In that sense, it could also be called – drawing on a very Habermasian concept – a ‘collective learning process’.41 It presumes an open future and the willingness of citizens to adjust the reasons, the object, and the mode of

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their attachment in light of new experiences; consequently, they see their constitutional culture as always open and incomplete – a project in which those in the past have been engaged and in which their descendants will invest. The constitution might be understood as a working arrangement, wherein basic rights are recognised and respected. This helps ensure that the discussion of essential questions of identity and belonging is conducted in a peaceful and respectful manner.42 Nevertheless, having ‘constitutional citizenship’ is not an easy task in diverse societies. As Ayşe Kadıoğlu pointed out, citizenship has preceded and had prevalence over the notion of the individual in Turkey. Citizenship was embedded in national identity as well as defined in accordance with duties in a rather weak public space. Hence, it is rather difficult to envision citizenship as an empty space, as non-membership in Turkey.43 Although it is a difficult task, recent political developments in Turkey may give us hope for the development of ‘constitutional citizenship’. Constitutional and legal changes through a series of ‘Harmonisation Packages’ have provided a reduction in the authoritarian nature of the constitution, and have paved the way for democratisation in Turkey. The AKP government has also prepared an initial draft of a new constitution, which adopts a liberal and rights-based approach to the relationship between individual and state and defines citizenship based on territorial principles. Nevertheless, the draft constitution was immediately confronted with a barrage of criticisms such as the accusation that the AKP was keeping the public in the dark by preparing the draft covertly. Moreover, there is no agreement even among AKP deputies on the basic principles of the draft constitution. Thus, although there are noteworthy improvements in the state’s approach towards minority citizens, it seems too early to talk about ‘constitutional citizenship’ in Turkey.

APPENDIX A

IEA Core International Framing Questions1 Core International Framing Question I: (Domain: Democracy, Institutions, Rights, and Responsibilities) Given that democracy is a central concept, what does it mean in the national context and what are young people expected or likely to learn about it by age 14 or 15? In particular, what is most emphasised as inherent to or distinctive of democracy? In other words, what is of most substantive or symbolic importance to democracy, and what are the most salient perceived strengths and weaknesses of democracy with relation to each of the following sub domains? 1 Institutions and practices: including how governing groups or leaders are selected and held accountable; how laws and regulations are established, interpreted, and enforced; how individuals and groups participate in political processes? 2 Rights of citizenship: including (a) civil and political rights, such as the right to formulate opinions on political issues and express them by voting or speaking publicly, the right to have access to different points of view in an uncensored press, the right to dissent from (and even peacefully protest against) government policies, the right to strike, the right to practice one’s religion, and (for foreigners) the right to become citizens; (b) the right to form or join political parties, unions, and other organisations; and (c) social and economic rights, such as the right to a certain minimal standard of living or to employment, medical care, and education.

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3 Obligations or responsibilities of citizenship: including voting, military/national service, and more generally expectations for adults to work, pay taxes and obey laws. To what extent is democracy with respect to these rights and obligations presented in an idealized form and to what extent in a way in which young people are given opportunities to experience what it means in a more practical sense? Are young people largely asked to memorise facts about the government structure, or are they encouraged to analyse how well these structures function? To what extent are young people allowed to discuss in school disagreements, which exist between candidates or political parties? How much opportunity and what kinds of opportunities do young people get to become directly involved in meaningful ways in the interactions, practices, rights and obligations detailed above? Are they expected or likely to believe that the government is responsive or should be responsive to citizens’ expressions of political views, and to feel confident or efficacious about their ability to make their opinions heard? Core International Framing Question II: (Domain: National Identity and Relations between Nations) What are young people expected or likely to have acquired as a sense of national identity or national loyalty by age 14 or 15? To what degree are loyalty or sense of belonging to the nation, to its various communities, and to its traditions and institutions thought to be important to develop among young people, and how is it developed? What, if any, symbols (such as the national flag) are thought particularly important for students to respect? What are the documents, role models, historical events, national stories, and ideals that are widely believed to be important for all citizens to know about – for example, constitutional principles; national liberators; decisive wars, revolutions or uprisings; national traumas or periods of oppression? Who are the heroes and role models thought to be worthy of national pride, and how are they presented to students? What point of view are young people encouraged to adopt regarding national leaders and major political events in the present and in history? Do these leaders have an almost sacred quality, or are they seen in certain ways as fallible? How much and what kinds of criticism of or scepticism about monarchs or national leaders are thought to be appropriate? Are students encouraged to study and understand, or to ignore events

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of which many people in the nation are not proud? Which countries or groups of countries do they learn about as past, present, or future threats, and what is the nature of these threats? Which countries are allies? What are young people likely to learn about the nature and appropriateness of the role their country has played and continues to play in global and regional spheres of influence? What supranational structures or international organisations and subnational groups (e.g. ethnic or religious groups) are thought to be important enough to have a place in the young person’s awareness, identity, or loyalty? How do these groups involve young people? Are either supranational or subnational groups thought of as presenting a threat to national identity or loyalty? Core International Framing Question III: (Domain: Social Cohesion and Social Diversity) What are young people expected or likely to have learned by age 14 or 15 about those belonging to groups, which are seen as, set apart or disenfranchised (as defined, for example, by ethnicity, race, immigrant, status, mother tongue, social class, religion or gender)? What groups (if any) are viewed as subject to discrimination in contemporary society? How are instances of past oppression or discrimination dealt with in civic education? If differences exist between men and women or between minority and non-minority groups in actual levels of political participation or in the extent to which they serve in positions of political leadership, are these matters discussed as issues with young people, or are these differences largely ignored? Is there tension in the society between perceptions of the need for social cohesion and the need to recognise the cultural, social, political, and economic situation of these groups? How is conflict between these groups or between these groups and the society more broadly dealt with in education? Are attitudes and behaviours of respect and tolerance between these groups encouraged explicitly or implicitly, and how? Points to be Addressed and Process The following 17 points are to be addressed for each of the internationally designated questions (Case Study Framing Questions points a) through f) and Core International Domain Framing Questions points g) through q). Note that we are especially interested in the grades in which

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11- to 15-year-olds are found. The purpose of these questions is both to obtain in-depth information about explicit attempts within the schools to transmit information and encourage related beliefs and also to get some information about more indirect learning relating to these topics (in schools and out of schools). a An explanation of why, within the country, this Framing Question or topic domain with which it deals is or is not important or valuable as a way of understanding important aspects of civic education. b What official (i.e. governmental national, regional, or local curriculum goals exist related to this topic domain in the school years up to and including the grade in which the majority of 14-year-olds are enrolled? Who (what individuals or groups decide what these goals are to be? c If this topic domain is addressed as part of the official curriculum of public elementary or secondary schools, please specify the national terminology used to designate all the subject matters and courses. If the terminology differs from the traditional historical or social science subjects (e .g. history, geography), the term should be defined (e.g. social studies, education for citizenship, ‘études du milieu’). (This topic is covered in more detail in point g); here what is required is only the course names or subject matter designations). d How much public discussion or controversy there has been, if any, over the inclusion of or nature of discussion of topics related to this question in the public school curriculum and what has been the nature of that discussion. It may be necessary to provide a historical perspective, contrasting views in different time periods (in which cases the response will be longer). e Which national organisations (non-governmental organisations), if any, currently take a particularly active or well-known interest in what 11- to 15-year-olds should know about this domain? Give both the names of these organisations and a summary of the nature of their positions. f What the best sources (documents, interviews are for obtaining necessary material to synthesize in an elaborated answer to the question? g If the topic of this Core International Framing Question is addressed as part of the official curriculum of public elementary or secondary schools indicate all the subjects and grade levels at which it is likely to be addressed and emphasised?

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h If the textbooks used in public school in the grades which include the majority of 11- to 15-year-olds address the topic domain of the Core International Framing Question, how do they usually approach it in terms of content and method? i What kind of activities during the class period and what kind of assignments to students would be most likely to be found in the grades for 11- to 15-year-olds dealing with the topic in the Core International Framing Question? Include a discussion of the role of classroom discussion of student opinions and the role of group or individual project work by students. Also include a discussion of any gaps between idealized statements about democracy, identity, or diversity and the realities of students’ experience in classrooms. j Does the public school have examinations or other formal assessments, which address in a substantial way what 11- to 15-year-olds have learned with respect to the topic domain in this Core International Framing Question? k What common extracurricular activities, ceremonies, or other occasions inside the public schools give 11- to 15-year-olds the opportunity to learn more about or gain experience relating to this topic. Please summarise the nature of these activities, ceremonies, or occasions, how they are relevant to the domain of the Core International Framing Question, what students are expected to gain from them, and what proportion of 14- to 15-year-olds are likely to have these experiences. l What common activities, ceremonies, or other occasions outside school give 11- to 15-year-olds (including any early school leavers opportunities to learn more about or gain experience relating to this topic domain (e.g. youth organisations, public ceremonies organised by national or subnational groups, museum exhibitions, religious ceremonies or education). Please summarise the nature of these activities, ceremonies, or occasions and what students are expected to gain from them. m What training (pre-service and in-service are teachers for this age group likely to have received in the content of the topic related to the Core International Framing Question and in methods for dealing with it in class? n To what extent are 11- to 15-year-olds likely to be active consumers of material presented by the media (television, radio, newspapers, and electronic communication networks with regard to this topic domain? What information and attitudes are they likely to find in those sources

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that would be especially pertinent to the various aspects of the Core International Framing Question’s topic? o How much and in what ways do political parties attempt to influence what 11- to 15-year-olds think and do with regard to the topic domain of the Core International Framing Question? p What are the most serious obstacles or problems schools face in dealing with the topic domain of this Core International Framing Question? q What changes have taken place during the last 10 years in the way this topic has been dealt with in school? Have there been any recent events that have influenced the public’s view of the topic domain of this Core International Framing Question?

APPENDIX B

LAUSANNE TREATY2 SECTION III PROTECTION OF MINORITIES ARTICLE 37. Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them. ARTICLE 38. The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals. Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order. ARTICLE 39. Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems. All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.

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Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries. No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings. Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts. ARTICLE 40. Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein. ARTICLE 41. As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools. In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes. The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned. ARTICLE 42. The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status,

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measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities. These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers. The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature. ARTICLE 43. Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act, which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest. This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order. ARTICLE 44. Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

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Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant. ARTICLE 45. The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the nonMoslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory.

NOTES

Chapter 1   1 Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 1.   2 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1967), p. 237.   3 For the full text of the Atatürk’s speech to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic, see http://www2.mkutup.gov.tr/ata10.html   4 At http://www.earth.google.com   5 Quoted in Füsun Üstel, ‘Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Kitapları ve Yurttaş Profili’, Radikal, 17 December, 1996.   6 Quoted in Ahmet İçduygu, ‘Çokkültürlülük: Türkiye Vatandaşlığı Kavramı İçin Toplumsal Bir Zemin’, Türkiye Günlüğü, vol. 33 (March–April 1995), pp. 117–27.   7 Radikal, 3 September, 2005.   8 Peter Kivisto and Thomas Faist, Citizenship: Discourse, Theory, and Transnational Prospects (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p. 1.   9 Herman van Gunsteren, ‘Notes Towards a Theory of Citizenship’, in Pierre Birnbaum, ed., Democracy, Consensus and Social Contract (London: Sage, 1978), p. 9. 10 Derek Heater, Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education (London: Longman, 1990), p. 293. 11 Former President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in 2000 used the term ‘age of citizenship’. See Kvisto and Faist, Citizenship: Discourse, Theory, and Transnational Prospects, p. 1. 12 Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration Globalization and the Politics of Belonging (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 13 See Peter Nyers, ‘Introduction: Why Citizenship Studies’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (February 2007), pp. 1–4. 14 William Rogers Brubaker, ‘Introduction’, in William Rogers Brubaker, ed., Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America (Lanham-New York: University Press of America, 1989).

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15 Kivisto and Faist, Citizenship: Discourse, Theory, and Transnational Prospects, pp. 1–2. 16 Yasemin N. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 17 For the rising concern with citizenship, the publication of new academic journals on citizenship such as Citizenship Studies might be given as an example. There is a growing literature on the issue, e.g. Bryan Turner, ed., Citizenship and Social Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1993); Bart van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sage Publications, 1994); Bryan Turner and Peter Hamilton, eds, Citizenship Critical Concepts (London: Routledge, 1994); Ronald Beiner, ed., Theorizing Citizenship (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995); Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory’, Ethics, vol. 104, no. 2 (1994), pp. 352–81; Gershon Shafir, Citizenship Debates: A Reader (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Bryan Turner, ‘Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship’, in Bryan Turner, ed., Citizenship and Social Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1993), pp. 1–8. 18 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 19 See Iris Marion Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, Ethics, vol. 99 (January 1989), pp. 250–74; Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ed., Citizenship in Diverse Societies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 20 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity’ in Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 491–517. 21 See Tomas Hammar, ‘State, Nation and Dual Citizenship’, in William Rogers Brubaker, ed., Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America (Lanham-New York: University Press of America, 1989), pp. 81–96. 22 Ayşe Kadıoğlu, ‘Denationalization of Citizenship: The Turkish Experience’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 11, no. 3 (July 2007), pp. 283–99. 23 Gerard Delanty, ‘European Citizenship: A Critical Assessment’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (February 2007), pp. 63–72; Klaus Eder and Bernhard Giesen, eds, European Citizenship: National Legacies and Transnational Projects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 24 Richard Falk, ‘The Making of Global Citizenship’, in Bart van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sage, 1994). 25 Iris Marion Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, Ethics, vol. 99 (January 1989), pp. 250–74. 26 Andrew Linklater, ‘Cosmopolitan Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 2, no. 1 (1998), pp. 23–41. 27 See Soysal, Limits of Citizenship. 28 Paul Johnston, ‘The Emergence of Transnational citizenship among Mexican Immigrants in California’, in T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, eds, Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001).

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29 Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Multi-layered Citizenship and the Boundaries of the Nation-state’, International Social Science Review, vol. 1, no. 1 (2000), pp. 112–27. 30 Nick Stevenson, ‘Globalization, Natural Cultures, and Cultural Citizenship’, The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 1 (1997), pp. 41–66. 31 Damian Tambini, ‘Universal Cyber Citizenship’, in R. Tsagarousiannou, D. Tambini, and C. Bryan, eds, Cyberdemocracy: Technology, Cities, and Civic Networks (London: Routledge, 1997). 32 Elizabeth Jelin, ‘Towards a Global Environmental Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (2000), pp. 47–63. 33 Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (New York: New York University Press, 1997). 34 Gay Seidman, ‘Gendered Citizenship: South Africa’s Democratic Transformation and the Constitution of a Gendered State’, Gender&Society, vol. 13, no. 3 (1999), pp. 287–307. 35 Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logic of Transnationality (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). 36 Ken Plummer, Intimate Citizenship: Private Decisions and Public Dialogues (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003). 37 Greta Gilbertson and Audrey Singer, ‘The Emergence of Protective Citizenship in the USA: Naturalization among Dominican Immigrants in the Post-1966 Welfare Reform Era’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 26, no. 1 (2003), pp. 25–51. 38 Franics B. Nyamnjoh, ‘From Bounded to Flexible Citizenship: Lessons from Africa’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (February 2007), pp. 73–82. 39 Bonie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 40 Engin F. Işın and Patricia K. Wood, Citizenship and Identity (London: Sage Publications, 1999), p. ix. 41 Jean-François Berdah, ‘Citizenship and National Identity in France from the French Revolution to the Present’, in Ellis, Halfdanarson and Isaacs, eds, Citizenship in Historical Perspective (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2006). 42 Kadıoğlu, ‘Denationalization of Citizenship’, p. 284. 43 Işın and Wood, Citizenship and Identity, p. 3. 44 Işın and Wood, Citizenship and Identity, p. 20. 45 Işın and Wood, Citizenship and Identity, p. 20. 46 See Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory’, Ethics, vol. 104, no. 2 (January 1994), pp. 352–81; Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ‘Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts’, in W. Kymlicka and W. Norman, eds, Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 1–41. 47 See Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship, and Community. A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); J. Cohen, ‘Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos’, International Sociology, vol. 14, no. 3 (1999), pp. 245–68; Tomas Hammar, ‘State, Nation and Dual Citizenship’, in William Rogers Brubaker, ed., Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship

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in Europe and North America (New York: The German Marshall Fund of the US, University Press of America Inc., 1989), pp.81–96. Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtues, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). See Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); H. Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Harry Brighouse, On Education (London: Routledge, 2006). Audrey Osler and Hugh Starket, ‘Learning for Cosmopolitan Citizenship: theoretical debates and young people’s experiences’, Educational Review, vol. 55, no. 3 (2003). Herman van Gunsteren, A Theory of Citizenship (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998). M. Fernanda Astiz and Gabriela Mendez, ‘Education for Citizenship the Argentine Case in Comparison’, Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, vol. 1, no. 2 (2006), pp. 176–77. See Will Kymlicka, ‘Two Dilemmas of Citizenship Education in Pluralist Societies’ in Andrew Lockyer, Bernard Crick, John Annette, eds, Education for Democratic Citizenship: Issues of Theory and Practice (London: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 47–64. Patricia White, ‘Political Education in the Early Years: the place of civic virtues’, Oxford Review of Education, vol. 25, no. 1 & 2 (1999), p. 59. Benjamin C. Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 1. This book takes the form of a historical study of the way in which early republican understanding of citizenship did withstand the various changes that Turkey has undergone since the foundation of the Republic. The question, although a historical one, of course has contemporary relevance and in the conclusion of the book, the question of whether citizenship can withstand future changes will be examined. See Ahmet İçduygu, Yılmaz Çolak and Nalan Soyarık, ‘What is the Matter with Citizenship? A Turkish Debate’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 35, no. 4 (1999), pp. 201–02. See İçduygu, Çolak and Soyarık, ‘What is the Matter with Citizenship? A Turkish Debate’, p. 202. See Füsun Üstel, ‘Anayasaya Vatandaşlık, Hangi Anayasaya Vatandaşlık?’ Radikal, 17 December, 1996. This has been called ‘neoethnic tribalism’ by Craig Ireland. See Craig Ireland, ‘The Appeal to Experience and Its Consequences: Variations on a Persistent Thompsonian Theme’, Cultural Critique, vol. 52 (Fall 2002), pp. 186–97. See Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Rona Aybay, Yurttaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basın ve Yayın Yüksek Okulu Basımevi, 1982); Ergin Nomer, Vatandaşlık Hukuku

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(İstanbul: Filiz Kitapevi, 1989); Nihal Uluocak, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku: Karşılaştırmalı Uygulamalı (İstanbul: Filiz Kitapevi, 1989); Erdoğan Göğer, Türk Tabiiyet Hukuku (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1975); Tabiiyet Klavuzu (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939); Kemal Dal, 403 Sayılı Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanununa Göre Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık, 1965); Hicri Fişek, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Güzel İstanbul Matbaası, 1959); Vahit Doğan, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 1999); İlhan Unat, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1966). Ayse Kadıoğlu ‘Citizenship, Immigration and Racism in a Unified Germany with Special Reference to the Turkish Guestworkers’, Journal of Economics and Administrative Studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (1992), pp. 199–211; Kemal Kirişçi, ‘Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices’, Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 36, no. 3 (2000), pp. 1–22; Ahmet İçduygu, ‘Citizenship at a Crossroads: Immigration and Citizenship’, in E. Kofman and G. Youngs, eds, Globalisation: Theory and Practice (London: Pinter Publications, 1996); Ahmet İçduygu, ‘Becoming a Citizen in an Immigration Country: The Case of Turks in Australia and Sweden and Some Comparative Implications’, International Migration, vol. 2 (1996), pp. 257–72; Ahmet İçduygu, ‘The International Migration and Citizenship Debate in Turkey: the individual level of analysis’, in E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, eds, Citizenship in a Global World (London: Routledge, 2005). Nuri Bilgin, ed., Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi, Kimlik (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1997); Ayşe Kadıoğlu Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1999); Artun Ünsal, ed., 75. Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaşa Doğru (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1998); Füsun Üstel, ‘Cumhuriyet’ten Bu Yana Yurttaş Profili’, Yeni Yüzyıl, 24 April 1996; Nalan Soyarık, The Citizen of The State and the State of the Citizen: An Analysis of the Citizenization Process in Turkey (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bilkent University, 2000); Ahmet İçduygu, Yılmaz Çolak and Nalan Soyarık, ‘What is the Matter with Citizenship? A Turkish Debate’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 35, no. 4 (1999), pp. 187–208; E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, eds, Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences (London: Routledge, 2005); Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas, eds, Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey (London: Routledge, 2005); Birol Caymaz, Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık: Resmi İdeoloji ve Yansımaları (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007); Ayşe Kadıoğlu, ed., Vatandaşlıgın Dönüşümü: Üyelikten Haklara (İstanbul: Metis, 2008). Nur Vergin, ‘Anayasal Vatandaşlık Ne Demektir?’ Milliyet, 26 December 1996. Füsun Üstel, ‘Anayasal Vatandaşlık, Hangi Anayasaya Vatandaşlık?’ Radikal, 17 December, 1996. Bryan Turner, ‘Postmodern Culture/Modern Citizens’, in Bart van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sage Publications, 1994). T.H. Marshall and T. Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto, 1992); William R. Brubaker, ‘Immigration, Citizenship, and the

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Nation-state’ in Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (London: Harvard University Press, 1992); Bryan S. Turner, ‘Outline of a Theory of Citizenship’, in Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of Radical Democracy (London: Verso, 1992); Bryan S. Turner, Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over Reformism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986). Charles Taylor, ‘The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, in N. Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and Modern Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Adrian Oldfield, ‘Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?’ Political Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 2 (1990), pp. 177–87; Herman van Gunsteren, ‘Four Conceptions of Citizenship’ in Bart van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sage Publications, 1994); Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000); Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: a Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,’ Ethics, vol. 104, no. 2 (January 1994), pp. 352–82; Angus Stewart, ‘Two Conceptions of Citizenship’, British Journal of Sociology, vol. 46, no. 1 (1995), pp. 63–78. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Morris Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Carol Vincent, ‘Education for the Community’, British Journal of Educational Studies, vol. 31, no.4 (December 1993), pp. 366–80; Kerry Kennedy, Citizenship Education and Modern State (London: Falmer Press, 1997); Patricia White, ‘Political Education in the Early Years: the Place of Civic Virtues’, Oxford Review of Education, vol. 25, no. 1 & 2 (1999), pp. 59–70; Carole, L. Han, ‘Citizenship Education: an empirical study of policy, practices and outcomes’, Oxford Review of Education, vol. 25, no. 1 & 2 (1999), pp. 231–50; Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State’, in Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann, eds, Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Attracta Ingram, ‘Constitutional Patriotism’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 22, no. 6 (1996), pp. 1–18; J.E. Fossum, ‘Deep Diversity Versus Constitutional Patriotism: Taylor, Habermas and the Canadian Constitutional Crisis’, Ethnicities, vol. 1, no. 2 (2001), pp. 179–206; J.E. Fossum ‘The European Charter: Between Deep Diversity and Constitutional Patriotism’, in E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum and A.J. Menendez, eds, The Chartering of Europe: The Charter of Fundamental

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Rights and its Constitutional Implications (Baden-Baden: Numos, 2003); Jan-Werner Müller, ‘A “Thick” Constitutional Patriotism for the EU? On Morality, Memory and Militancy’, at http://www.princeton.edu/~jmueller/ CP-ThickCPEurope-JWMueller.pdf; Jan-Warner Müller, ‘Three Objections to Constitutional Patriotism’, Constellations, vol. 14, no. 2 (2007), pp. 197–209; Jan-Werner Müller, ‘On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism’, Contemporary Political Theory, vol. 5 (2006), pp. 278–96; Justine Lacroix, ‘For a European Constitutional Patriotism’, Political Studies, vol. 50 (2002), pp. 944–58; Cécile Laborde, ‘From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 32, no. 4 (2002), pp. 591–612. 75 For the full text of the constitutions see Suna Kili and A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2000). 76 See Nihal Uluocak, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku: Karşılaştırmalı Uygulamalı (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1989); Kemal Dal, 403 Sayılı Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanununa Göre Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık, 1965); İlhan Unat, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1966); Nihal Erdener Uluocak, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1968); Erdoğan Göğer, Türk Tabiiyet Hukuku (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1975); Ergin Nomer, Vatandaşlık Hukuku Dersleri (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1982); Vahit Doğan, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Nobel, 1999). 77 Muallim Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi (İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1929); Muallim Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi (İstanbul: Maarif ve Şark Kitaphaneleri, 1927–1928); Halit Aksan, Orta Okul Yurttaşlık Bilgisi: 2.Sınıf (İstanbul: Güven Basımevi, 1952); Halit Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi (İstanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1957); Halit Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi III (İstanbul: AS Matbaası, 1969); Halit Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf III (İstanbul: D.K, 1956); Niyazi Akşit and Osman Eğilmez, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf IV (İstanbul: Yükselen Matbaası, 1961); Mefharet Arkın and Mükerrem Kamil Su, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Orta III (İstanbul: Bir Yayınevi, 1956); Mefharet Arkın, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi: 5. Sınıf (İstanbul: Bir Yayınevi, 1953); Nihat Bilgen, 8. Sınıf için Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları Eğitimi (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001); Emircan Ceylan, İlköğretim Vatandaşlık Bilgileri 8 (Ankara: SEK Yayınları, 1996); Kemal Dal, Orhan Çakıroğlu, Ali İhsan Özyazgan, Vatandaşlık Bilgileri Ana Ders Kitabı: Ortaokul III (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1986); Daru’ş-Şafaka Müdürü ve İçtimaiyyat Muallimi Ali Nami, Musahabat-ı Ahlakiyye ve Malumat-ı Vataniyye (Kütüphane-i Hilmi, 1928); Mehmet Emin, Yurt Bilgisi (Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930); Selman Erdem and İsmet Konuk, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi: Ortaokul II (İstanbul: Atlas Yayınevi, 1973); Selman Erdem and İsmet Konuk, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi: Ortaokul III (İstanbul: Atlas Yayınevi, 1972); Bedia Ermat and Kemal Ermat, Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri: IV. Sınıf (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1943); Bedia Ermat and Kemal Ermat, Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri: V. Sınıf (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1945); Ziya Gökalp, Yurt Bilgisi: Orta Kısım Sınıf I (İzmir: Berrin Basımevi, 1950); İbrahim Hilmi, Millet Mekteplerine ve Halka Mahsus Yurt Bilgisi (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1931); Turhan Ilgaz, ed., Dersimiz Yurttaşlık (İstanbul: Kesit Yayıncılık, 1998); İlkmektep Kitapları: Yurt Bilgisi 4.Sınıf

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(İstanbul: n.p., 1937); Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988); Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal’in El Yazıları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1969); Afet [İnan] Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931); Ahmet Kapulu, Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları Eğitimi: 7. Sınıf (Ankara: Koza Yayınları, 2001); Remzi Y. Kıncal, Vatandaşlık Bilgisi (Ankara: Mikro Basım, 2002); Nuri Korkmaz, İlköğretim Vatandaşlık Bilgileri (Ankara: Secan Yayıncılık, 1994); Osman Pazarlı, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf II (İstanbul: Yükselen Matbaası, 1964); Osman Pazarlı, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf III (İstanbul: Yükselen Matbaası, 1964); Osman Pazarlı, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf I (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1961); Tarık Rona, Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri (Ankara: Çankaya Matbaası, 1945); Mithad Sadullah Sander, Yurt Bilgisi Özü (İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi, 1945–1946); Kazım Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5 (İstanbul: Ekspres Matbaası, 1931–1932); Tezer Taşkıran, Yurt Bilgisi I (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1939); Nurhan Tezcan, ed., Atatürk’ün Yazdığı Yurttaşlık Bilgileri (İstanbul: Çağdaş, 1989); Durmuş Yılmaz, Üniversiteler İçin Vatandaşlık Bilgisi (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları, 2000); Fehmi Yılmaz and Nurettin Yanıkoğlu, İlköğretim Vatandaşlık ve İnsanhakları Eğitimi 7 (İstanbul: Okyay Yayıncılık, 2002); İpek Gürkaynak, Dilek Gözütok, Şebnem Akipek, Melike Türkan Bağlı, Tufan Erhürman, Fatma Özdemir Uluç, eds, Yurttaş olmak için… (İstanbul: Umut Vakfı, 1998); İpek Gürkaynak, Dilek Gözütok, Şebnem Akipek, Melike Türkan Bağlı, Tufan Erhürman, Fatma Özdemir Uluç, eds, Yurttaş olmak için… Eğitici El Kitabı (İstanbul: Umut Vakfı, 1998). Soner Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk? (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 1. My emphasis. This point is taken up at length in Chapter 3. Mesut Yeğen, Müstakbel Türk’ten Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), pp. 69–70. See Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey, pp. 159–61. Cited from Dilek Kurban, ‘Confronting Equality: The Need for Constitutional Protection of Minorities on Turkey’s Path to the European Union’, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, vol. 35, no. 1 (2003–2004), p. 159. Baskın Oran, ‘The Minority Concept and Rights in Turkey: The Lausanne Peace Treaty and Current Issues’, in Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, ed., Human Rights in Turkey (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 35. See Baskın Oran, Globalleşme ve Azınlıklar (Ankara: İmaj Yayınevi, 2001), pp. 77–78. See Ahmet İçduygu and Bayram Ali Soner, ‘Turkish minority rights regime: Between difference and equality’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 4, no. 3 (2006), p. 447. See Will Kymlicka, ‘Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights’, vol. 15 (1996), p. 76. See Dilek Kurban, ‘Confronting Equality’, p. 162.

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88 Bryan Turner, ‘Outline of a Theory of Citizenship’ in Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of Radical Democracy (London: Verso, 1992). See also Chapter 2. 89 Marshall and Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class. 90 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 30–31. 91 Etienne Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında 1931–1993 Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p. 1. 92 Etienne Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında 1931–1993 Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine, pp. 61–62. 93 Derek Heater, What is Citizenship? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 174. 94 Füsun Üstel, ‘Cumhuriyet’ten Bu Yana Yurttaş Profili’ Yeni Yüzyıl, 24 April, 1996; Füsun Üstel, ‘Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Kitapları ve Yurttaş Profili’, Yeni Yüzyıl, 25 April, 1996; İsmail Kaplan, Türkiye’de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999); Füsun Üstel, Makbul Vatandaş’ın Peşinde (Ankara: İletişim Yayınları, 2004); Remzi Y. Kıncal, Vatandaşlık Bilgisi (Ankara: Mikro Basım, 2002), Fatma Gök, ‘Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları Eğitimi Ders Kitapları’ in Betül Çötüksöken, Ayşe Erzan, Orhan Silier, eds, Ders Kitaplarında İnsan Hakları Tarama Sonuçları (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2003). 95 For more information about the IEA and its projects see http://www.iea.nl 96 For more details about IEA publications and the National Reports visit www.wam.umd.edu/~iea/ 97 See Judith Torney-Punta, John Schville and Jo-Ann Amedo, Civic Education Across Countries: Twenty-four National Case Studies from the IEA Civic Education Project (Amsterdam: IEA, 1999). 98 For the complete list of the questions, see Appendix A. Chapter 2   1 Jürgen Habermas, ‘D-Mark Nationalism’, Die Zeit, 30 March 1990, translated in R. T. Gray and S. Wilke, eds, German Unification and Its Discontents: Documents from the Peaceful Revolution (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), pp. 186–205 and p. 198.   2 J. M. Barbalet, Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 2.   3 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 23.   4 Stephan Castles and Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 11.   5 Castles and Davidson, Citizenship and Migration, p. 12.   6 Castles and Davidson, Citizenship and Migration, p. 24.   7 The English version of this article is included in T.H. Marshall and T. Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto, 1992).   8 Bart van Steenbergen. ‘The Condition of Citizenship: An Introduction’, in Bart van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sage, 1994), p. 2.

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  9 Marshall and Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class, pp. 41–43, 45–46. 10 Anthony Giddens, ‘Class Division, Class Conflict and Citizenship Rights’, in Anthony Giddens, ed., Profiles and Critiques and Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1982). 11 Quoted in Engin Işın and Patricia Wood, Citizenship and Identity (London: Sage, 1999), p. 30. 12 Bryan Turner, The Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate Over Reformism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986). 13 This point is elaborated in the Introduction. 14 Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), p. 19. 15 Ayşe Kadıoğlu, ‘Citizenship and Individuation in Turkey: The Triumph of Will over Reason’, Cemoti [Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien] no. 26 (1998), pp. 23–43. 16 Cited in Kadıoğlu, ‘Citizenship and Individuation in Turkey’, p. 41. 17 This point is taken up at length in Chapter 3. 18 This argument is developed in Chapter 4. 19 William R. Brubaker, ‘Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-state’ in Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (London: Harvard University Press, 1992). 20 Brubaker, ‘Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-state’, p. 21. 21 Brubaker, ‘Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-state’, p. 380. 22 Jus soli (Latin for ‘right of the soil’ or, somewhat figuratively, ‘right of the territory’), or birthright citizenship, is a right by which citizenship can be recognised for any individual born in the territory of the related state. 23 Jus sanguinis (Latin for ‘right of blood’) is a right by which citizenship can be recognized for any individual with an ancestor who is a national of that state. 24 Brubaker, ‘Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-state’, pp. 39–49. 25 Brubaker, ‘Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-state’, pp. 39–49. 26 Brubaker, ‘Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-state’, pp. 1–27. 27 William R. Brubaker, Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America (New York: The German Marshall Fund of the US, University of America, Inc., 1989). 28 For the German Citizenship Laws see Nergis Canefe, ‘Yurttaşlık ve Daimi Misafirler: Yeniden Birleşmiş Bir Almanya’da Kültürel Bellek ve Vatandaşlık Yasaları’, in Nergis Canefe, Anavatandan Yavruvatana Milliyetçilik, Bellek ve Aidiyet (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), pp. 37–77. 29 For more information about the citizenship policies of France and Germany see Jessamyn Blau, ‘Reconsidering Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany: the integration of the 21st century’, visit http://aei.pitt. edu/6127/01/gradconf06_blau.pdf 30 Ayşe Kadıoğlu, ‘The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 32, no. 2 (April 1996), pp. 177–94. 31 See Kadıoğlu, ‘Citizenship and Individuation in Turkey’. 32 See Ulrich K. Preuss, ‘Citizenship and the German Nation’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (2003), pp. 37–55.

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33 See Ayşe Kadıoğlu, ‘Milletini Arıyan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Açmazları’, Türkiye Günlüğü, no. 33 (March–April 1995), pp. 91–101. 34 Claude Liauzu, ‘Interculturalism: new lands to discover in France’, Intercultural Education, vol. 4, no. 3 (1993), pp. 23–31. 35 Bryan S. Turner, ‘Outline of a Theory of Citizenship’, in Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of Radical Democracy (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 45–56. 36 Bryan S. Turner, Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over Reformism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986). 37 Charles Taylor, ‘The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, in N. Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and Modern Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 178. 38 Michael Walzer, ‘Citizenship’, in T. Ball, J. Far and R. L. Hanson, eds, Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 211. 39 Walzer, ‘Citizenship’, p. 215. 40 Robert E. Goldwin, ‘Rights, Citizenship and Civility’, in Edward C. Banfield, ed., Civility and Citizenship (New York: Paragon House, 1992), p. 43. 41 Adrian Oldfield, ‘Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?’ Political Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 2 (1990), p. 178. 42 See Goldwin, ‘Rights, Citizenship and Civility’, p. 45. 43 F. Dallymayr, ed., From Contract to Community: Political Theory at the Crossroads (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1978). 44 Herman Van Gunsteren, ‘Four Conceptions of Citizenship’ in Bart van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 41. 45 Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age (Buckingham, Open University Press, 2000). 46 Taking community as the defining feature of civil society, these approaches in their different ways give to citizenship a public voice based on identity and participation. It can be argued that liberal communitarians stressed the salience of identity while conservative communitarians emphasise participation. The third group, civic republicanism, also made participation central to their discourses but rather than conceive of it in terms of a model of consensus or nationhood, as in conservative communitarianism, the emphasis tends to be on a more radical kind of public commitment. A single community, namely the public community, is given the main role. See Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age, p. 35. 47 See Adrian Oldfield, ‘Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?’ Political Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 2 (1990), pp. 177–87; Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 111; Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,’ Ethics, vol. 104, no. 2 (January 1994), pp. 352–82; Angus Stewart, ‘Two Conceptions of Citizenship’, British Journal of Sociology, vol. 46, no. 1 (1995), pp. 63–78. 48 Derek Heater, What is Citizenship? (Boston: Polity Press, 1999), p. 44. 49 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity,’ in Bart van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 25.

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50 Oldfield, ‘Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?’, p. 181. 51 Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World (London: Routledge, 1990). 52 See Heater, What is Citizenship? p. 49. 53 Heater, What is Citizenship? p. 49. 54 For the elaboration of this point see see Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six. 55 See especially Chapter Four. 56 See Kymlicka and Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: a Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory’, Ethics, vol. 104, no. 2 (January 1994); Chantal Mouffe, Dimensions of Radical Democracy (London: Verso, 1992); Herman van Gunsteren, ‘Four Conceptions of Citizenship’ in Bart van Steenbergen ed., The Condition of Citizenship (London: Sage Publication, 1994). 57 Van Gunsteren, ‘Four Conceptions of Citizenship’. 58 Van Gunsteren, ‘Four Conceptions of Citizenship’, pp. 45–47. 59 Kymlicka and Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies. 60 Kymlicka and Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen’, p. 353. 61 William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 220. 62 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe’, Praxis International, vol. 12, no. 1 (1992), p. 7. 63 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 288. 64 Kymlicka and Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen’, p. 360. 65 Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 138–39. 66 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Theory, p. 288. 67 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p. 78. 68 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 69 Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 294. 70 Galston, Liberal Purposes, pp. 221–24. 71 Galston, Liberal Purposes, pp. 226–27. 72 Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, p. 296. 73 See Morris Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Carol Vincent, ‘Education for the Community’, British Journal of Educational Studies, vol.31, no. 4 (December 1993), pp. 366–80; Kerry Kennedy, Citizenship Education and Modern State (London: Falmer Press, 1997); Patricia White, ‘Political Education in the Early Years: The Place of Civic Virtues’, Oxford Review of Education, vol. 25, no. 1 & 2 (1999), pp. 59–70; Carole, L. Han, ‘Citizenship Education: an empirical study of policy, practices and outcomes’, Oxford Review of Education, vol. 25, no. 1 & 2 (1999), pp. 231–50. 74 Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p.51.

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75 Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, p. 311. 76 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State’, in Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann, eds, Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy; Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Attracta Ingram, ‘Constitutional Patriotism’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 22, no. 6 (1996), pp. 1–18; J.E. Fossum, ‘Deep Diversity Versus Constitutional Patriotism: Taylor, Habermas and the Canadian Constitutional Crisis’, Ethnicities, vol. 1, no. 2 (2001), pp. 179–206; J.E. Fossum ‘The European Charter: Between Deep Diversity and Constitutional Patriotism’, in E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum and A.J. Menendez, eds, The Chartering of Europe: The Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Constitutional Implications (Baden-Baden: Numos, 2003). 77 Jan-Werner Müller, ‘A “Thick” Constitutional Patriotism for the EU? On Morality, Memory and Militancy’. Paper presented in the conference ‘Law and Democracy in Europe’s Post-National Constellations’ hosted by the European University Institute in Florence in 22–24 September 2005, p. 4. Visit http://www.princeton.edu/~jmueller/CP-ThickCPEurope-JWMueller. pdf 78 See Jürgen Habermas, ‘Political Culture in Germany since 1968,’ in Shierry Weber Nicholsen, ed., The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historian’s Debate (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), p. 193. 79 Müller, ‘A “Thick” Constitutional Patriotism for the EU?’, p. 6. 80 Jan-Warner Müller, ‘Three Objections to Constitutional Patriotism’, Constellations, Volume 14, no. 2 (2007), p. 205. 81 Jan-Werner Müller, ‘On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism’, Contemporary Political Theory, vol. 5 (2006), p. 286. 82 Müller, ‘Three Objections to Constitutional Patriotism’, p. 195. 83 Justine Lacroix, ‘For a European Constitutional Patriotism’, Political Studies, vol. 50 (2002), pp. 944–58. 84 Cécile Laborde, ‘From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 32, no. 4 (2002), p. 592. 85 Habermas, ‘Strugles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State’, p. 135. 86 Laborde, ‘From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism’, p. 593. 87 Quoted in Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity’ in Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, p. 500 (emphasis in the original). See also Jürgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians’ Debate (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), pp. 256–81. 88 The Habermassian theory of citizenship, implicitly at least, includes the following: • Citizenship should be seen as an intersubjective enterprise, so it cannot be carried out by isolated individuals. • Citizens have to create the space in which citizenship can occur; that is, they have to move beyond their purely private networks and into more public ones, in the process creating and maintaining civil society.

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• From within this civil society, citizens need to create discursive spaces in which they address matters of common concern that is; they need to create the political public sphere. • Effective citizenship calls for the ability to ‘ferret out, identify and effectively thematise latent problems of social integration’. • Citizens will need to engage in this opinion-and-will formation process spontaneously, without the prompting of formal systems; otherwise the channels of communication would flow from centre to periphery rather than the deliberative-democrat way, from periphery to centre. • Citizens should be able to bring these issues to the attention of formal legislative bodies ‘in a way that disrupts that latter’s routines’. See Noelle McAffe, Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship (London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 95.   89 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 468.   90 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 468.   91 Müller, ‘A “Thick” Constitutional Patriotism for the EU?’, p. 6.   92 Müller, ‘A “Thick” Constitutional Patriotism for the EU?’, p. 7.   93 Müller, ‘On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism’, p. 287.   94 Müller, ‘On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism’, p. 288.   95 Müller, ‘On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism’, p. 288.   96 Müller, ‘On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism’, p. 288.   97 James Gordon Finlayson, Habermas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 128.   98 Ahmet İçduygu and Fuat Keyman, ‘Globelleşme Anayasallık ve Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık Tartışması’, Doğu Batı, no. 5 (November–December–January 1998–1999), p. 147.   99 İçduygu and Keyman, ‘Globelleşme Anayasallık ve Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık Tartışması’, p. 147. 100 E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, ‘Türk Modernleşmesi ve Ulusal Kimlik Sorunu: Anayasal Vatandaşlık ve Demokratik Açılım Olasılığı’ in Artun Ünsal, ed., 75 Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaşa Doğru (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p. 180. 101 Cited in Keith Faulks, Citizenship (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 30. 102 T.K. Oommen, Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), p. 240. 103 Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity’, p. 4. 104 Alan Patten, ‘Equality of Recognition and the Liberal Theory of Citizenship’ in Catriona McKinnon and Iain Hampsher-Monk, eds, The Demands of Citizenship (London and New York: Continuum, 2000), pp. 193–212. Chapter 3    1 Cited in Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal’in El Yazıları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1969), p. 23.    2 The 1931 programme of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) defined nation as a ‘political and social community formed by citizens bound by a unity of language, culture and ideal’. This definition of nation, ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’, then became the motto

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of the Republic. See Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Programının İzahı (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1931). For more information about the CHP see Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması (1923–1931) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999); Kemal H. Karpat, ‘The Republican People’s Party 1923–1945’, in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, eds, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991), pp. 42–64. For more information about İsmet İnönü see Metin Heper, İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Statesman (Leiden: Brill, 1998); Faruk Loğoğlu, İsmet İnönü and the Making of Modern Turkey (İnönü Foundation, n.d). Cited in Ahmet Yıldız, ‘Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene’: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919–1938) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 290. Mesut Yeğen, ‘Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 40, no. 6 (2004), pp. 51–66. See Mesut Yeğen, ‘Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 40, no. 6 (2004), pp. 51–66; Ahmet Yıldız, ‘Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene’: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919–1938) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001); Rıfat Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003). See Rıfat Bali, Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), pp. 349–73. Arus Yumul, ‘Ermeniler Millet-i Sadakat mı, Beşinci Kol mu, Geçmişin Yadigarları mı?’ in Tarih Eğitimi ve Tarihteki Öteki Sorunu (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), p. 91. For this view see Nalan Soyarık, ‘The Citizen of the State and the State of the Citizen: An Analysis of the Citizenization Process in Turkey’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bilkent University, 2000); Bülent Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001); and Kemal Kirişçi, ‘Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 36, no. 3 (2000), pp. 1–22. Mesut Yeğen, ‘Yurttaşlık ve Türklük’, Toplum ve Bilim, no. 93 (2002), p. 209. For more information about Atatürk see Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, eds, Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State (London: C. Hurst, 1981); Jacob M. Landau, ed., Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1984). Kemal H. Karpat, ‘The Republican People’s Party 1923–1945’, in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau eds, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991), pp. 42–64. Yılmaz Çolak, ‘Citizenship Between Secularism and Islamism in Turkey’ in E. F. Keyman and A. İçduygu, eds, Citizenship in a Global World (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 242. See Andrew Davison, Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998). See Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi ve Programı (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1931). For the definition of secularism see section 2, Article 1/D.

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17 Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi 1923, in Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması (1923–1931) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), pp. 375–84. 18 Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Büyük Kongresi (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1927). 19 Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Programının İzahı (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1931). 20 Racism is a belief or concept that inherent differences between people, in particular those upon which the concept of race is based, significantly influence cultural or individual achievement, and may involve the idea that one’s self-identified race or ethnic group or others’ race or ethnic group is superior. See Anıl Çeçen, Kemalizm (İstanbul: Kurtiş Matbaacılık, 2002), pp. 123–24. 21 Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Programı (Ankara: T.B.M.M. Matbaası, 1931), p. 4. 22 Recep Peker, CHP Programının İzahı (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1931), p. 10. 23 Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı (Ankara: Zerbamat Basımevi, 1943), p. 3. 24 Celal Bozkurt, Siyaset Tarihimizde C.H.P Dünü Bugünü İdeolojisi (n.p., n.d), p. 32. 25 The first article of the CHP’s 1927 programme stated that the CHP is ‘republican, populist and nationalist’. See Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1927), p. 3. 26 According to Zürcher, Kemalism can best be described as a set of attitudes and opinions rather than an ideology. As an ideology it lacked coherence and, more importantly, emotional appeal. Kemalism remained a flexible concept under which people with widely differing worldviews have been able to call themselves Kemalists. Kemalism was the basis for indoctrination in schools, the media and the army. See Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1997). For more information, see also Ergun Özbudun, ‘The Nature of Kemalist Political Regime’ in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, eds, Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State (London: C. Hurst, 1981), pp. 87–92. 27 Taha Parla, Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Ok’u (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995). 28 Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı 1935 (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935). See Article 4/A, p. 4. 29 For the original text of the 1924 Constitution see Düstur, Cilt: 5, p. 576. 30 Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, p. 308. 31 A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1995), p. 54. 32 For the full text of the 1924 Constitution see Cevdet Atay, Karşılaştırmalı Türk Anayasaları (İstanbul: Ekin Kitabevi Yayınları, 1997). 33 The introduction of the term citizenship dates back to the end of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. The underlying aim was to save the empire from collapse by gathering the religiously and ethnically fragmented subjects of the empire under the specific identity of ‘Ottoman Citizen’.

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In achieving this, a set of legal reforms were undertaken, starting with Tanzimat, continuing with the Reform Edict, Ottoman Citizenship Law (Tabiiyet-i Osmaniyye’ye dair Nizamname), and finally Kanuni Esasi, the constitution. See Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856– 1876 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963). Nihal Uluocak points to the usage of vatandaşlık (citizenship) and tabiiyet (nationality deriving from tebaa) synonymously. See Nihal Uluocak, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku: Karşılaştırmalı Uygulamalı (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1989), p. 16. Suna Kili and A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2000), p. 44. For parliamentary debates on Article 88 see Şeref Gözübüyük and Zekayi Sezgin, 1924 Anayasası Hakkındaki Meclis Görüşmeleri (Ankara: AÜSBF İdari İlimler Enstitüsü, 1957). Şeref Gözübüyük and Zekayi Sezgin, 1924 Anayasası Hakkındaki Meclis Görüşmeleri, pp. 436–41. For more information about the Treaty of Lausanne see İsmail Soysal, Türkiye’nin Siyasal Anlaşmaları 1920–1945, vol.1 (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Yayınları, 1989), pp. 95–98. See also Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar-Belgeler (İstanbul: YKY, 2001). For the full text of the treaty, visit http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/ lausanne.html İlhan Unat, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1966), p. 41. Unat, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku, p. 44. Unat, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku, p. 39. See Cultural Turkification in this Chapter. The CHP in the 1935 elections did not nominate any candidate in 16 cities. The CHP declared that they were looking for ‘genuine citizens who will work independently’. Later on they declared that among these ‘genuine citizens’ minorities were also added. After the elections four non-Muslim citizens were nominated as deputies. See M. Çağatay Okutan, Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), pp. 151–54. Okutan, Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları, p. 153. Elçin Macar, Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), p. 168. Until 1971 this unit was part of the first branch. Between the years 1971–74 it was in the General Security Divisional Headquarters (Genel Güvenlik Daire Başkanlığı). In 1989 the Minority Branch Directorate (Azınlıklar Şube Müdürlüğü) was developed as part of these headquarters. Visit www. egm.gov.tr/guvenlik/index.htm Ergun Özbudun, ‘Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyet’in Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu’ in Artun Ünsal ed., 75 Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaş’a Doğru (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p. 154. Stephan Castles and Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 85.

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50 Ergin Nomer, Vatandaşlık Hukuku Dersleri (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1982), p. 35 51 Unat, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku, p. 111. 52 Nomer, Vatandaşlık Hukuku Dersleri, p. 35. 53 This point is elaborated in Chapter 2. 54 See Yeşim Arat, ‘Türkiye’de Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Vatandaşlık’, in Artun Ünsal, ed., 75 Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaş’a Doğru (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998). 55 This point is taken up at length in Chapter 2. 56 Ayhan Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 55. 57 Yıldız, ‘Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene’, p. 17. 58 Ayhan Aktar, ‘Cumhuriyet’in İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan “Türkleştirme” Politikaları’, Tarih ve Toplum, no. 156 (December 1996), p. 324. 59 Uriel Heyd, Language Reform in Modern Turkey (Israel: Hadassah Apprentice School of Printing Jerusalem, 1954), pp. 19–20. 60 Quoted in Henry Elisha Allen, The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 82. 61 Bernard Lewis, ‘Turkey: Westernisation’ in G.E. Von Grunebaum, ed., Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 326. 62 Tanıl Bora, ‘Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik ve Azınlıklar’, Birikim, vol. 71–72 (March–April 1995), pp. 35–36. 63 According to Kemal Kirişçi the number of immigrants during the period of 1923–1939 was 823,006. See Kemal Kirişçi, ‘Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 36, no. 3 (2000), p. 8. 64 Stephen P. Ladas, Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey (New York: Macmillan Company, 1932). 65 See Kemal Arı, Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye’ye Zorunlu Göç (1923–25) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), p. 18. See also Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı, Nüfus Mübadelesi Kayıp Bir Kuşağın Hikâyesi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004). 66 See Ayhan Aktar, ‘Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi ve Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi Sürecinde Bir Aşama: Türk-Yunan Nüfus Mubadelesi 1923–1924’ in Ayhan Aktar, ed., Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp. 17–71. 67 Erol Ülker, ‘Assimilation of Muslim communities in the first decade of the Turkish Republic (1923–1934)’, European Journal of Turkish Studies, visit http://www.ejts.org/document822.html 68 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: III, Cilt: 26, İçtima: 36, pp. 60–62. 69 Cited in Ayhan Aktar, ‘Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi ve Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi Sürecinde Bir Aşama: Türk-Yunan Nüfus Mubadelesi 1923–1924’ in Renée Hirschon, ed., Ege’yi Geçerken 1923 Türk-Yunan Zorunlu Nüfus Mübadelesi (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), pp. 134–35. 70 Aktar, ‘Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi’, p. 136.

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71 Çağlar Keyder, Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989), p. 67. 72 Cited in Ayhan Aktar, ‘Türk Yunan Nüfus Mübadelesi’nin İlk Yılı: Eylül 1922–1923’, in Müfide Pekin, ed., Yeniden Kurulan Yaşamlar 1923 TürkYunan Zorunlu Nüfus Mübadelesi (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), p. 73. 73 Today the total population of Gagauz Turks is about 300,000, and they live mainly in Moldavia and Ukraine. They speak Gagauz Turkish and are Christian (most of them are Orthodox). See Harun Güngör and Mustafa Argunşah, Gagauz Türkleri (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2002). 74 Selçuk Akşin Somel, ‘Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Türk Kimliği’ in Nuri Bilgin, ed., Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), p. 81. 75 Somel, ‘Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Türk Kimliği’, p.8. 76 Soner Çağaptay, ‘Kemalist Dönemde Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma’, in Toplum ve Bilim, no. 93 (Summer 2002), p. 235. 77 It should be noted that the Treaty of Lausanne was signed before the establishment of the secular Turkish Republic. 78 Articles 37–45 of the treaty were related to minority status. See Appendix B. 79 For the full text of the treaty visit www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/ lausanne.html 80 Avner Levi, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Yahudiler (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), pp. 67–68. 81 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: 2, Cilt: 23, p. 271. 82 Düstur, Tertip: 3, Cilt:7, pp. 1441–1443. 83 For more information about Hemshins see Peter Alford Andrews, Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989), pp. 358–89. 84 For more details on the Kurds in general and Kurdish insurrections see Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State (Utrecht: Ricjswick, 1978). Also see Robert T. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989). 85 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 249. 86 David McDowall, The Kurds: A Nation Denied (London: MRG, 1992), p. 38. 87 Cited in Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), p. 120. 88 Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, p. 120. 89 Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, p. 96. 90 Kökdemir, Eski ve Yeni Toprak, pp. 28–30. 91 Kökdemir, Eski ve Yeni Toprak, pp. 165–66. 92 For the Law on Settlement no. 2510 see, Düstur, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 15, pp. 1156–1175 or İlhan Unat, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1966), pp. 156–63. 93 Mesut Yeğen, ‘The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse’ Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 34, no. 4 (1999), p. 562.

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  94 Rıfat N. Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), p. 246.   95 A new draft of the Settlement Law has been waiting in the parliament to become a law since 2003. See Kemal Kirişçi, ‘Eski ve Yeni Modelleri ile Türkiye’nin Ulusal Kimliği’, Gönül Pultar and Tahire Erman, eds, Türkiye Kültürleri (İstanbul: Tetragon, 2005), pp. 79–102.   96 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: IV, Cilt: 23, İçtima: 3 (14 June 1934), p. 141.   97 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), pp. 243–244.   98 Haluk Karabatak, ‘Türkiye Azınlık Tarihine Bir Katkı: 1934 Trakya Olayları ve Yahudiler’, Tarih ve Toplum, no. 146 (February 1996), pp. 68–80.   99 Karabatak, ‘Türkiye Azınlık Tarihine Bir Katkı’, p. 70. 100 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları, p. 80. 101 Avner Levi, ‘1934 Trakya Yahudileri Olayı: Alınamayan Ders’, Tarih ve Toplum, no. 151 (July 1996), pp. 10–17. 102 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları, p. 81. 103 Zafer Toprak, ‘1934 Trakya Olaylarında Hükümetin ve CHP’nin Sorumluluğu’, Toplumsal Tarih, no. 34 (October 1996), pp. 19–25. 104 Cited in Toprak, ‘1934 Trakya Olaylarında Hükümetin ve CHP’nin Sorumluluğu’, p. 23. 105 Orhon Seyfi Orhon, ‘Yahudi Vatandaşlar!’, Dün, Bugün, Yarın (İstanbul: Çınar Yayını, 1943), pp. 47–48. 106 Cevat Rıfat Atilhan, Tarih Boyunca Yahudi Mezalimi: İğneli Fıçı (İstanbul: n.p, 1937). 107 See Orhan Seyfi Orhon, ‘Vatandaş Türkçe Konuşma!’ Akbaba, no. 341 (1 August 1940), p. 1. 108 Founded in İstanbul on 22 March 1912, Turkish Hearths was closed and reopened several times between that date and 10 May 1949, when it was permanently closed down. In its heyday, it had branches in every city, school and major public body. It was replaced by the People’s Houses in 1932. The organisation promoted Turkish nationalism as developed by Ziya Gökalp; its target was to obliterate Ottomanism and Islamism and replace them with Turkism. It also made contacts with Turks outside the empire. The organisation urged the government to increase the use of Turkish in official business. See Füsun Üstel, İmparatorluktan UlusDevlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları (1912–1931) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997). 109 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 103. 110 See Unat, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku, pp. 38–44. 111 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 108. 112 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 108. 113 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), pp. 134–135. 114 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 109.

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115 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 145. 116 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 135. 117 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 270. 118 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), pp. 130–148. 119 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 137. 120 Düstur, Üçüncü Tertip, 2nd edn, vol. 15 (Ankara: Başvekalet Devlet Matbaası, 1955), pp. 506–507. 121 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 23 (June 21, 1934), p. 246. 122 Soyadı Kanunu, Düstur, vol. 3, no. 16, p. 353. 123 See Faik Ökte, The Tragedy of Turkish Capital Tax (London: Croom Helm, 1964). 124 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 301. 125 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 277. 126 Ayhan Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 131. 127 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 136. 128 Moiz Cohen (1883–1961) was born in Serres into an Orthodox Jewish family. An ardent Kemalist, he officially assumed the name of Munis Tekinalp (his pen name was Tekin Alp), wrote on Kemalism, and lectured at the People’s Houses. Although he was also hit by the 1942 Wealth Tax, his loyalty to the regime and to the CHP never wavered. He wrote several articles on social and economic subjects. On Tekinalp see Jacob M. Landau, Tekinalp Turkish Patriot 1883–1961 (Belgium: Nederlands HistorischArchaeologisch Instituut Te Istanbul, 1984). 129 Landau, Tekinalp Turkish Patriot 1883–1961, p. 23. 130 Cited in Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, p. 123. 131 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 151. 132 Landau, Tekinalp Turkish Patriot 1883–1961, p. 6. 133 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 154. 134 Rıfat N. Bali, Devlet’in Yahudileri ve ‘Öteki’ Yahudi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p. 26. 135 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), pp. 292–293. 136 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), pp. 292–293. 137 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), pp. 292–293.

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138 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 313. 139 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 307. 140 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 170. 141 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 273. 142 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945), p. 140. 143 See Necdet Sakaoğlu, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Eğitim Tarihi (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), pp. 190–195. 144 The Houses had the following branches of activity: language literature, fine arts, drama, sports, social assistance, adult education, library and publications, village welfare, museum and cultural exhibits. 145 Çetin Yetkin, Türkiye’de Tek Parti Yönetimi (İstanbul: Yeniacar Kitabevi, 1983), p. 87. 146 Beşir Göğüş, ‘Halkevleri ve Halk Egitimi’ in Atatürk ve Halkevleri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1974), p. 176. 147 Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri: vol. 1 (Ankara: TTK, 1961), p. 383. 148 Adem Kara, Türkiye’de Halkevleri (Ankara: Halkevleri Yayınları, 1999), p. 44 149 Recep Peker, ‘Recep Bey’in Nutku’ in Atatürk ve Halkevleri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1974), p. 11. 150 Bilgin Çelik, ‘Tek Parti Döneminde Aydın’ın Sosyo-Kültürel Yaşamında Halkevinin Rolü’, Toplumsal Tarih, no. 66 (1989), p. 40. 151 Tevfik Çavdar, ‘Halkevleri’, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 4 (1983), p. 879. 152 Anıl Çeçen, Halkevleri (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1990), pp. 106–107. 153 Çeçen, Halkevleri, p. 107. 154 Çeçen, Halkevleri, p. 117. 155 See C.H.P. Halkevleri Çalışma Talimatnamesi (Ankara: Zerbamat, 1940). 156 Kara, Türkiye’de Halkevleri, p. 44. 157 Peker, ‘Recep Bey’in Nutku’, p. 96. 158 İsmet İnönü, ‘İsmet Paşa Hazretleri’nin Nutku’, in Atatürk ve Halkevleri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1974), p. 45. 159 Nuray Bayraktar, Halkevlerinin Ülke Kültürüne İnsanın Gelişimi ve Dönüşümü Açısından Katkıları (Ankara: Halkevi Yayınları, 1999), p. 28. 160 Bayraktar, Halkevlerinin Ülke Kültürüne İnsanın Gelişimi ve Dönüşümü Açısından Katkıları, p. 28. 161 Depending on the changing politics of the People’s Houses, Ülkü had three different approaches. The first lasted until 1941, when the journal tried to spread principles of the republic to the masses. After that date, secondly, it was published as the National Culture Journal (Milli Kültür Dergisi) and focused more on art and plays. The journal’s third era began after 1947 when it started to be published as the Journal of People’s Houses and People’s Rooms (Halkevleri ve Halkodaları Dergisi) and mainly featured

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articles about democracy. See Bayraktar, Halkevlerinin Ülke Kültürüne İnsanın Gelişimi ve Dönüşümü Açısından Katkıları, p. 144. 162 Cited in Bayraktar, Halkevlerinin Ülke Kültürüne İnsanın Gelişimi ve Dönüşümü Açısından Katkıları, p. 145. 163 Aydoslu Sait, ‘Millet ve Milliyet’, Ülkü, vol. 2, no. 8 (1933), p. 283. 164 Mehmet Saffet, ‘Devlet ve Vatandaş’, Ülkü, vol. 1, no. 3 (1933), p. 183. 165 Saffet, ‘Devlet ve Vatandaş’, p. 184. 166 Saffet, ‘Devlet ve Vatandaş’, p. 184. 167 Necip Ali (Küçüka), ‘19 Şubat’, Ülkü, vol. 1, no. 1 (March 1933), pp. 4–5. 168 Mehmet Saffet, ‘İnkılap Terbiyesi’, Ülkü, vol. 2, no. 8 (1933), p. 106. 169 Saffet, ‘İnkılap Terbiyesi’, p. 108. 170 Ahmed Nesimi, ‘Mesuliyetin Hakiki Telakkileri’, Ülkü, vol. 1, no. 4 (1933), p. 265. 171 Çeçen, Halkevleri, p. 380. 172 Çeçen, Halkevleri, p. 114. 173 Quoted in Okutan, Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları, p. 118. 174 He was a Professor in the İstanbul University and worked for the purification of the Turkish language. Following the 1934 law, which had stipulated that citizens adopt Turkish last names, Atatürk gave Professor Martayan a pure Turkish last name, Dilaçar, meaning ‘tongue or language opener’. 175 Remzi Oğuz Arık, Halkevlerinde Müze, Tarih ve Folklor Çalışmaları Kılavuzu (Ankara: CHP Halkevleri Yayınlarından Kılavuz Kitapları XXI, 1947), p. 47. 176 Çavdar, Halkevleri, p. 882. 177 Bayraktar, Halkevlerinin Ülke Kültürüne İnsanın Gelişimi ve Dönüşümü Açısından Katkıları, p. 36. 178 Nurhan Karadağ, Halkevleri Tiyatro Çalışmaları (Ankara: Filiz Matbaacılık, 1988), p. 81. 179 Çeçen, Halkevleri, p. 252. 180 By 1950 a total number of 478 People’s Houses and 4.372 People’s Rooms were established throughout Turkey. See Kemal H. Karpat, ‘The People’s Houses of Turkey’, Middle East Journal (Winter–Spring, 1963), pp. 31–44. 181 Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 5. 182 Kara, Türkiye’de Halkevleri, p. 16. 183 Bayraktar, Halkevlerinin Ülke Kültürüne İnsanın Gelişimi ve Dönüşümü Açısından Katkıları, p. 171. 184 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 187–206. 185 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 206. 186 See Eric Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Eugen Weber, ‘What Rough Beast?’, Critical Review, vol. 10, no. 2 (1996), p. 289. 187 Sefa Şimşek, Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi Halkevleri 1932–1951 (İstanbul: Bogaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2002), p. 145. 188 See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı 1935, p. 13. 189 See Mesut Yeğen, ‘Türk Tarih Tezi Bir “Kaza” Anı mıdır?’ Mürekkep, no. 6 (1996), p. 23.

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190 See Bernard Lewis, ‘History-writing and National Revival in Turkey’, Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 4, no. 3 (June–July 1953), p. 218. 191 Şimşek, Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi Halkevleri 1932–1951, p. 145. 192 Büşra Ersanlı Behar, İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de Resmi Tarih Tezi’nin Oluşumu (1929–37) (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996), p. 119. 193 See Türk Tarihinin Anahatları (İstanbul: Kaynak, 1996) (original publication 1930). 194 For more information about Turkish History Thesis see Etienne Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931–1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk İslam Sentezine (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998); Ahmet Cevat Emre, Atatürk’ün İnkılap Hedefi ve Tarih Tezi (İstanbul: Ekin Basımevi, 1956). 195 See Nadir Özbek, ‘Zeki Velidi Togan ve Türk Tarih Tezi’, Toplumsal Tarih, vol. 45, no. 45 (September 1997), p. 22. 196 Şimşek, Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi Halkevleri 1932–1951, p. 147. 197 See Reşit Galip, ‘Türk Tarihi İnkılabı ve Yabancı Tezler’, Ülkü, no. 9 (Ekim 1933), pp. 167–168. 198 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 199. 199 Arık, Halkevlerinde Müze, Tarih ve Folklor Çalışmaları Kılavuzu, p. 47. 200 Cited in Soner Çağaptay, ‘Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the Minorities in the 1930s’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 40, no. 3 (May 2004), pp. 88–89. 201 See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı 1935 (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935). 202 For more information about Turkish language reform see Uriel Heyd, Language Reform in Modern Turkey, pp.19–20; Geoffrey Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 203 Resmi Gazete, 3 November, 1928. 204 Mustafa Duman, ‘Millet Mektepleri’, Toplumsal Tarih, vol. 73 (January 2000), p. 4. 205 See ‘Millet Mektepleri Talimatnamesi’, in Zeynep Korkmaz, ed., Atatürk ve Türk Dili: Belgeler (Ankara: TDK, 1992), pp. 84–102. 206 See İbrahim Hilmi, Millet Mekteplerine ve Halka Mahsus Yurt Bilgisi (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1931). 207 Heyd, Language Reform in Modern Turkey, pp. 25–26. 208 For more information about Turkish language reform see Frank Tachau, ‘Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform’, Review of Politics, vol. 26, no. 2 (1964). 209 Şerafettin Turan, Atatürk ve Ulusal Dil (İstanbul: Yenigün Haber Ajansı, 1998), p. 42. 210 Şimşek, Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi Halkevleri 1932–1951, p. 157. 211 Şimşek, Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi Halkevleri 1932–1951, p. 157. 212 Heyd, Language Reform in Modern Turkey, p. 38. 213 See Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform, pp. 57–75. 214 Heyd, Language Reform in Modern Turkey, p. 34. 215 Tanıl Bora, ‘Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik’ in Nuri Bilgin, ed., Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997), p. 54.

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216 Şimşek, Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi Halkevleri 1932–1951, p. 163. 217 Cited in Çağaptay, ‘Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the Minorities in the 1930s’, p. 89. 218 Erkan Serçe and Sabri Yetkin, ‘Cumhuriyet’in ilk Yıllarında İktisadi Hayatı Millileştirme Çabaları II’, Toplumsal Tarih, no. 69 (September 1999), p. 41. 219 Serçe and Yetkin, ‘Cumhuriyet’in ilk Yıllarında İktisadi Hayatı Millileştirme Çabaları II’, p. 43. 220 Serçe and Yetkin, ‘Cumhuriyet’in ilk Yıllarında İktisadi Hayatı Millileştirme Çabaları II’, p. 45. 221 Afet İnan, İzmir İktisat Kongresi 17 Subat-4 Mart 1923 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1982), p. 53. 222 Yüksel Akkaya, ‘Türkiye’de Türk Vatandaşlarına Tahsis Edilen Sanat ve Hizmetler Hakkında Kanun: 1929 Bunalımı, İşsizlik ve Bir Kanun’, Toplumsal Tarih, no. 68 (August 1999), pp. 42–53. 223 Düstur, Üçüncü Tertip, Cilt VII (Ankara Devlet Matbaası, 1944), p. 669. 224 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları, pp. 119–121. 225 Article 48 of this law made being a ‘Turkish citizen’ instead of being ‘Turkish’ the prerequisite of being a civil servant. See ‘Devlet Memurları Kanunu’, Resmi Gazete, No: 12056, 23 July, 1965. 226 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları, p. 117. 227 Akkaya, ‘Türkiye’de Türk Vatandaşlarına Tahsis Edilen Sanat ve Hizmetler Hakkında Kanun, p. 42. 228 Akkaya, ‘Türkiye’de Türk Vatandaşlarına Tahsis Edilen Sanat ve Hizmetler Hakkında Kanun, p. 46. 229 For the full text of the law, see Appendix C. 230 Before signing the Treaty of Lausanne, an agreement was signed on 30 January 1923 called ‘Greek and Turkish Peoples’ Exchange’. With this agreement, Greeks living in İstanbul were exempted from population exchange between Turks living in Greece, and Greeks living in Turkey and were given the status of ‘settled,’ which means they could live in İstanbul and work there without being Turkish citizens. 231 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları, p. 60. 232 Quoted in Okutan, Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları, p. 141. 233 Rıdvan Akar, Varlık Vergisi: Tek Parti Rejiminde Azınlık Karşıtı Politika (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1992), p. 48 234 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 208. 235 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları, p. 143. 236 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 299. 237 See Lauren Mallet, ‘Karikatür Dergisinde Yahudilerle ilgili Karikatürler (1936–1948)’, Toplumsal Tarih, vol. 34–36 (October 1996), pp. 26–33. 238 Düstur, Tertip: 3, Vol: 29, pp. 9–13. 239 Rıdvan Akar, Aşkale Yolcuları Varlık Vergisi ve Çalışma Kampları (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1999), p. 81. 240 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları, p. 149. 241 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 298. 242 Akar, Aşkale Yolcuları Varlık Vergisi ve Çalışma Kampları, p. 75. 243 See Ayın Tarihi, no. 108 (1942), pp. 39–41.

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244 Cited in Arus Yumul, ‘Azınlık mı Vatandaş mı?’ in Ayhan Kaya and Turgut Tarhanlı, eds, Türkiye de Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Politikaları: AB Sürecinde Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları (İstanbul: Tesev Yayınları, 2005), p. 102. 245 Cited in Yumul, ‘Azınlık mı Vatandaş mı?’, p. 103. 246 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 208. 247 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları, p. 151. 248 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları, p. 127. 249 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları, p. 209. 250 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları, p. 207. 251 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 286. 252 Suna Kili, Kemalism (İstanbul: Menteş Matbaası, 1969), p. 82. 253 It was not coincidence that Afet İnan was commissioned to write this book, as she was also commissioned to write Türk Tarihinin Anahatları (Main Lines of Turkish History), which was the main text of the Turkish History Thesis. She was teaching Yurt Bilgisi (Information about Fatherland) and History. Nevertheless when Atatürk saw the textbook for Yurt Bilgisi he did not find the book sufficient and he wanted her to translate French books on the subject. For this reason İnan translated the book, Instruction Civique that she read during her education at a French lycée. Atatürk’s general secretary, Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, searched other books on the subject and translated German civic education textbooks. Atatürk himself read French books related to the subject, and these translations, and then wrote the book himself, dictating it to Afet İnan. The book was first published in 1930 as a course book for secondary schools. İnan published a revised version with the addition of Atatürk’s own notes in 1969. See Arı İnan, Tarihe Tanıklık Edenler (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1997). 254 Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), p.5. 255 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 7. 256 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 18. 257 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 18. 258 Afet [İnan] Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931), p. 13. 259 Nurhan Tezcan, ed., Atatürk’ün Yazdığı Yurttaşlık Bilgileri (İstanbul: Çağdaş, 1989), p. 15. 260 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 18. 261 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 19. 262 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 20. 263 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 19. 264 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 19. 265 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 23. 266 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 21. 267 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 23. 268 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, pp. 56–57. 269 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 11. 270 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 53. 271 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 54. 272 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 79.

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273 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, p. 87. 274 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, pp. 71–73. 275 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, pp. 74–75. 276 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, pp. 71–73. 277 Daru’ş-Şafaka Müdürü ve İçtimaiyyat Muallimi Ali Nami, Musahabat-ı Ahlakiyye ve Malumat-ı Vataniyye (Kütüphane-i Hilmi, 1928). 278 Nami, Musahabat-ı Ahlakiyye ve Malumat-ı Vataniyye, p. 14. 279 Cited in Füsun Üstel, Yeni Yüzyıl, 24 April 1996. 280 Muallim Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi (İstanbul: Maarif ve Şark Kitaphaneleri, 1927–1928), p. 78. 281 Kazım Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5 (İstanbul: Ekspres Matbaası, 1931–1932), p. 10. 282 İlkmektep Kitapları: 4. Sınıf, Yurt Bilgisi (İstanbul: n.p. 1937), p. 4. 283 Mithad Sadullah Sander, Yurt Bilgisi Özü (İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi, 1945– 1946), p. 33. 284 Tarık Rona, Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri (Ankara: Çankaya Matbaası, 1945), p. 7. 285 Kazım Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5, p. 11. 286 Bedia Ermat and Kemal Ermat, Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri: IV. Sınıf (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1943), pp. 12–13. 287 İlkmektep kitapları: 4. Sınıf Yurt Bilgisi, p. 3. 288 Ermat and Ermat, Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri: IV. Sınıf, p. 11. 289 İlkmektep Kitapları: 4. Sınıf Yurt Bilgisi, p. 6. 290 Sander, Yurt Bilgisi Özü, p. 33. 291 Ermat and Ermat, Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri: IV. Sınıf, p. 16. 292 Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5, p. 10. 293 Muallim Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi (İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1929), p. 43. 294 Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5, p. 7. 295 Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5, p. 10. 296 Sander, Yurt Bilgisi Özü, p. 30. 297 For other meanings of patriotism see Maurizio Viroli, For Love of Country: an essay on patriotism and nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 298 Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5, p. 8. 299 Bedia Ermat and Kemal Ermat, Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri: V. Sınıf (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1945), p. 2. 300 Mehmet Emin, Yurt Bilgisi (Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930), p. 176. 301 Tezer Taşkıran, Yurt Bilgisi I (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1939), p. 34. 302 Sander, Yurt Bilgisi Özü, pp. 40–41. 303 Emin, Yurt Bilgisi, p. 13. 304 Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi, pp. 44–48. 305 Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5, p. 61. 306 Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5, p. 103. 307 Cirit (Jereed) is a national sport in which stick is used as a javelin. 308 Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi, p. 118. 309 Adbdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi, p. 197. 310 See Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5, pp. 58–60. 311 Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi, pp. 32–44.

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312 Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi, p. 65. 313 Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5, p. 41. 314 Yurt Bilgisi: V. Sınıf (İstanbul: Kültür Basımevi, 1938), pp. 18–21. 315 Tezer Taşkıran, Yurt Bilgisi II (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941), pp. 146–147. 316 Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi, p. 173. 317 Yurt Bilgisi: IV. Sınıf, p. 45. 318 Muallim Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi, pp. 155–56. 319 Yurt Bilgisi: İlkmektep Kitapları IV. Sınıf (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937), p. 21. 320 Sevinç, Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5, pp. 69–71. 321 Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi, p. 93 322 Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi, p. 94. 323 Abdülbaki, Yurt Bilgisi, pp. 136–37. 324 Since the establishment of Turkish Republic, Turkish foreign policy has been defined by what has been called the ‘Sevres Syndrome’. For more information see Kemal Kirişçi, ‘Turkey and the Mediterranean,’ in Stelios Stavridis, Theodore Couloumbis, and Thanos Veremis, eds, The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 258–59. 325 Tezer Taşkıran, Yurt Bilgisi I, p. 23. 326 Tarık Rona, Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri, p. 17. 327 Suna Kili, Kemalism, pp. 83–84. 328 Suna Kili, Kemalism, pp. 83–84. Chapter 4    1 Adnan Menderes’s speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 29 May 1950. Cited in Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950–1975 (London: C. Hurst, 1977), p. 35.    2 Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, eds, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991), p. 119.    3 Celal Bayar argued that the DP’s founding members were among those opposed to the Wealth Tax in 1942. See Özel Şahingiray, Celal Bayar’ın Söylev ve Demeçleri 1946–1950 (İstanbul: Türkiye İşbankası Yayınları, 1999), p. 73.    4 Eric J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London and New York, I.B.Tauris, 1997), p. 216.    5 Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, ‘The Democratic Party, 1946–1960’, in Heper and Landau, eds, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, p. 119.    6 Ayın Tarihi, May 1945, pp. 52–53.    7 Between 1945 and 1950, twenty-seven political parties came into existence, however, the most important was the DP. See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 384.    8 Ulus, 8 January, 1946.    9 Ayın Tarihi, no. 146 (1–31 January 1946), pp. 7–10.   10 Hikmet Bilâ, CHP 1919–1999 (İstanbul: Şefik Matbaası, 1999), p. 137.

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11 Ersin Onulduran, Political Development and Political Parties in Turkey (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1974), p. 63. 12 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 318. 13 Mehmet Yaşar Geyikdağı, Political Parties in Turkey: The Role of Islam (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 74. 14 Quoted in Sabri Sayarı, ‘Adnan Menderes: Between Democratic and Authoritarian Populism,’ in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 81. 15 Ayın Tarihi, no. 246, p. 30. . 16 Ersin Onulduran, Political Development and Political Parties in Turkey, p. 64. 17 William Hale, ‘Modern Turkish Politics: an Historical Introduction’, in Willam Hale, ed., Aspects of Modern Turkey (London: Bowker, 1976), p. 3. 18 Rıfkı Salim Burçak, 27 Mayıs Üzerine Görüşler (Ankara: Demokratlar Kulübü Yayınları, 1991). 19 After 1908, elections were two-tiered: voters elected representatives locally, who then elected the parliamentary deputies from the party list. See Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005), p. 102. 20 İnönü still remained chairman, but he would now have to be elected. See CHP Büyük Kurultayının Olağanüstü Toplantısı (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Genel Sekreterliği, 1946). 21 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler: 1859–1952 (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş, 1952), p. 575. 22 Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition To A Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 158. 23 CHP Program ve Tüzüğü (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1947), pp. 4–5. 24 Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi 1941–1960 (İstanbul: YKY, 2002), p. 95 25 Feroz Ahmad, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976), p. 135. 26 Ahmad, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, p. 152. 27 Eroğul, Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, p. 35. 28 Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System, p. 159. 29 Demokrat Parti Tüzük ve Programı (Ankara: n.p., 1946). 30 Ayın Tarihi, January 1946, pp. 8–19. 31 Fort the full text of the Hürriyet Misakı see Mustafa Albayrak, Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti (1946–1960) (Ankara: Phoneix Yayınevi, 2004), pp. 612–615. 32 Orhan Mete, Bütün Tafsilat ve Akisleriyle Demokrat Parti’nin 1. Büyük Kongresi (İstanbul: Ticaret Dünyası Matbaası, 1947), pp. 14–15. 33 Mete, Tafsilat ve Akisleriyle Demokrat Parti’nin 1. Büyük Kongresi, p. 48. 34 For the full text of the Milli Husumet Andı see Albayrak, Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti (1946–1960), p. 618. 35 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859–1952 (İstanbul: n.p. 1952), pp. 683–84. 36 Cem Eroğul, Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi (Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 2003), p. 81.

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Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System, p. 162. Ahmad, Turkey The Quest for Identity, p. 109. Ahmad, Turkey The Quest for Identity, p. 110. For the 1950 election manifesto of the DP see Ayın Tarihi, no. 198, 1–31 May, 1950, pp. 53–61. For the Programme of the 1950 government see Ayın Tarihi, no. 198, 1–31 May 1950, pp. 80–91. Ahmad, Turkey The Quest for Identity, p. 110. Sabri Sayarı, ‘Adnan Menderes: Between Democratic and Authoritarian Populism’, in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey (Lanham-Boulder, New York: Lexington Books, 2002). Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960–1961 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1963), p. 10. Faruk Sükan, Başbakan Adnan Menderes’in Meclis Konuşmaları 1950– 1960 (Ankara: Kültür Ofset Limited Şirketi, 1991), p. 228. Recep Şükrü Apuhan, Menderes (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2007), p. 99. Apuhan, Menderes, p. 104. Demokrat Parti Tüzük ve Programı (Ankara: n.p, 1952), pp. 47–48. Ersin Onulduran, Political Deveopment and Political Parties in Turkey (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1974), p. 67. Elçin Macar, İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), p. 180. Avner Levi, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Yahudiler (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), p. 153. Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System, p. 258. Macar, İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi, pp. 180–181. Bali, Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), pp. 45–46. Bali, Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü, p. 47. This point is elaborated in Chapter Three. Taha Parla, Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Ok’u (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995), p. 34. CHP Yedinci Kurultay Tutanağı (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1948), p. 427. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler: 1859–1952 (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş, 1952), p. 585. Cited in Karpat, Turkey’s Politics The Transition to a Multi-Party System, p. 257. Karpat, Turkey’s Politics The Transition to a Multi-Party System, pp. 257–58. See Article 13 of the CHP’s 1947 Programme. CHP Program ve Tüzüğü (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1947). Quted in Bali, Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü, p. 50. Quoted in Bali, Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü, pp. 54–55. Ayın Tarihi, January 1946, pp. 8–19. Nazmi Sevgen, Celal Bayar Diyor Ki … (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1951), p. 352.

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See Sevgen, Celal Bayar Diyor Ki…, pp. 408–409. See Bali, Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü, p. 55. Cited in Bali, Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü, p. 366–367. Cited in Bali, Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü, p. 366. See Rıfat Bali, Devlet’in Yahudileri ve ‘Öteki’ Yahudi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), pp. 59 and 109. Aliya literally means ‘exalted’, ‘high’ or ‘elevated’. However, figuratively it means that those Jews who live in Diaspora should return to Israel. Bali, Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü, p. 87. Bali, Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü, p. 349. Bali, Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü, pp. 369–370. See Rıfat Bali, ‘Ermenistan’ın “Anavatana Geri Dönün” Çağrısının Diaspora Ermenilerine ve Türkiye’ye Etkisi’, Tarih ve Toplum, vol. 35, no. 210 (Haziran 2001), pp. 13–19. Bali, ‘Ermenistan’ın “Anavatana Geri Dönün” Çağrısının Diaspora Ermenilerine ve Türkiye’ye Etkisi’, p. 18. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 235. See Karpat, Turkey’s Politics The Transition to a Multi-Party System, pp. 267–270. Demokrat Parti Tüzük ve Programı (Ankara: Demirkırat Alfabesi, 1992), p. 20. Bali, Devlet’in Yahudileri ve ‘Öteki’ Yahudi, p. 96. Bali, Devlet’in Yahudileri ve ‘Öteki’ Yahudi, pp. 93–94. Hüseyin Agun, Demokrat Parti İktidarının Kıbrıs Politikası 1950–1960 (Ankara: Demokratlar Klübü Yayınları, 1997), p. 2. Tevfik Çavdar, Turkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1950–1995 (Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 1996), pp. 50–51. The committee’s aim was to organise under a single roof various groups and political parties to lobby on the Cyprus issue. See Hüseyin Agun, Demokrat Parti İktidarının Kıbrıs Politikası 1950–1960, p. 11. Agun, Demokrat Parti İktidarının Kıbrıs Politikası 1950–1960, p. 20. For the full text of his speech see Ayın Tarihi, August 1955, pp. 170–73. Hürriyet, 11 August 1955. Agun, Demokrat Parti İktidarının Kıbrıs Politikası 1950–1960, p. 61. See Foti Benlisoy, ‘6/7 Eylül Olayları Öncesinde Basında Rumlar’, Toplumsal Tarih, no. 81 (Eylül 2000), pp. 28–38. Hürriyet, 25 August 1955. Cumhuriyet, 28 August 1955. Cumhuriyet, 8 September 1955. Tercüman, 9 September 1955. Hulusi Dosdoğru, 6/7 Eylül Olayları (Ankara: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1993). See Dilek Güven, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında 6–7 Eylül Olayları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), pp. 33–38. Zafer, 8 September 1955. See the DP government’s declaration after the events of 6–7 September in Ayın Tarihi, no. 262 (1–30 September 1955), pp. 68–72. Çavdar, Turkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1950–1995, p. 54.

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100 William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), p. 87. 101 Eroğul, Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, p. 178. 102 See Yüksek Adalet Divanı Kararları (İstanbul: Kobalcı Yayınevi, 2007), pp. 407–444. 103 Cited in Orhan Türker, ‘6/7 Eylül Olaylarının İstanbul Rum Basınındaki Yankıları’, Tarih ve Toplum, no. 177 (1998), p. 13. 104 Cited in Türker, ‘6/7 Eylül Olaylarının İstanbul Rum Basınındaki Yankıları’, pp. 13–16. 105 See Konstantina Andrianopulu, ‘İstanbul Rum Basınının Tepkisi ve 6/7 Eylül Olayları’, Tarih ve Toplum, vol. 40, no. 237 (Eylül 2003), pp. 24–32. 106 Samim Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), pp. 211–212. 107 Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları, pp. 226–228. 108 Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları, p. 234. 109 Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority of İstanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918–1974 (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992), p. 272. 110 For the full document, see Nurşen Mazıcı, Celal Bayar Başbakanlık Dönemi 1937–1939 (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1996), pp. 157–230. 111 Quoted in Özel Şahingiray, Celal Bayar’ın Söylev ve Demeçleri 1946–1950 (İstanbul: Türkiye İşbankası Yayınları, 1999), p. 87. 112 Vatan, 9 January, 1949. 113 Sevgen, Celal Bayar Diyor Ki …, pp. 549–550. 114 See Article 42 of the DP’s 1950 election manifesto. 115 Vatan, 6 October 1947. 116 Vatan, 12 November 1947. 117 Mefharet Arkın and Mükerrem Kamil Su, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Orta III (İstanbul: Bir Yayınevi, 1956), pp. 5–22. 118 Mefharet Arkın, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf: 5 (İstanbul: Bir Yayınevi, 1953), p. 16. 119 Halit Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf III (İstanbul: D.K, 1956), p. 15. 120 Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf III, pp. 17–18. 121 Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf III, p. 43. 122 Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi (İstanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1957), p. 2. 123 Arkın and Su, pp. 99–103. 124 Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf III, p. 46. 125 This point is elaborated in Chapter Three. 126 Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf III, p. 43. 127 Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi, p. 38. 128 This author has no relation to the sociologist Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924); there is only a coincidence of names. 129 Ziya Gökalp, Yurt Bilgisi, Orta Kısım Sınıf I (İzmir: Berrin Basımevi, 1950), p. 1. 130 Arkın, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf: 5, pp. 34–37. 131 Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi, p. 11. 132 Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi, p. 5. 133 Aksan, Orta Okul Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf II (İstanbul: Güven Basımevi, 1952), pp. 45–46.

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134 Aksan, Orta Okul Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf II, p. 47. 135 Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi, p. 11. 136 Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi, pp. 9–10. 137 Arkın, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf: 5, pp. 62–63. 138 Arkın, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf: 5, pp. 54–58. 139 Arkın, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf: 5, p. 71. 140 Arkın, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf: 5, p. 36 and p. 79. 141 Mefharet Arkın and Mükerrem Kamil Su, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Orta: III (İstanbul: Bir Yayınevi, 1956), pp. 28–29. 142 Mefharet Arkın, and Müharrem Kamil Su, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Orta: II (İstanbul: Bir Yayınevi, 1956), p. 42. Chapter 5    1 During the night of 26–27 May 1960, the armed forces took power to end the Democrat Party government. Colonel Alparslan Türkeş gave the quoted speech on the radio. See Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İkinci Adam, vol. III (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1975), pp. 460–61.    2 In the programme of the National Unity Government, General Cemal Gürsel made the statement quoted. Cited in İsmail Arar, Hükümet Programları (1920–1965) (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968).    3 See William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994); Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds, State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988); George Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkey: Guardians or Decision Makers?’, in Heper and Evin, eds, State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s; Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, ‘The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey’, Comparative Politics, vol. 16 (1983); Kemal Karpat, ‘Turkish Democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics and the Third Military Intervention’, International Journal of Turkish Studies, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1981); Kemal Karpat, ‘Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980’, in Heper and Evin, eds, State, Democracy and the Military, Turkey in the 1980s; Ümit Cizre, ‘The Anatomy of Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy’, Comparative Politics, vol. 31 (1997), pp. 151–66.    4 Ergun Özbudun, ‘Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations’ in Ergun Özbudun, ed., Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1988), p. 233.    5 Özbudun, ‘Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations’, p. 233.    6 Osman Doğru, 27 Mayıs Rejimi Bir Darbenin Hukuki Anatomisi (İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi 1998), p. 55.    7 Eric Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B.Tauris, 1997), p. 258.    8 See W. B. Sherwood, ‘The Rise of Justice Party in Turkey’, World Politics, vol. 20, no. 1 (1967), pp. 54–65.    9 Tevfik Çavdar, ‘Adalet Partisi’ in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 8 (Ankara: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), p. 2090.

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10 Clement H. Dood, Politics and Government in Turkey (London: Manchester University Press, 1969), p. 55. 11 Joseph S. Szyliowicz, ‘The Turkish Elections: 1965’, Middle East Journal, XX (Autumn, 1966), p. 475. 12 Tevfik Çavdar, ‘Adalet Partisi’, p. 2090. 13 Clement H. Dood, Democracy and Development in Turkey (London: Eothen Press, 1979), pp. 10–12. 14 See Ümit Cizre, AP-Ordu İlişkileri (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002). 15 Avner Levi, ‘The Justice Party’, in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, eds, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991), p.137. 16 Levi, ‘The Justice Party’, p. 137. 17 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 263. 18 Adalet Partisi Programı (İstanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1961). 19 Millet Hizmetinde Adalet Partisi 1965–1971 (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Yayınları, 1972), p. 5. 20 Süleyman Demirel, Büyük Türkiye (İstanbul: Dergah, 1977), p. 65. 21 Tanel Demirel, Adalet Partisi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p. 240. 22 Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Başkanlığına Adaylığımı Neden Koyuyorum (Ankara: n.p. 1964), pp. 10–11. 23 Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkezi Neşriyatı, 1964), p. 4. 24 Yeşim Arat, ‘Süleyman Demirel: National Will and Beyond’, in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 99. 25 Süleyman Demirel, Oniki Mart ve Sonrası (Ankara: Ayyıldız, 1972), p. 7. 26 Süleyman Demirel, Büyük Türkiye (İstanbul: Dergah, 1977), p. 127. 27 The National Security Council was introduced by the 1961 Constitution as an embodiment of the state elite’s primacy over the popularly elected parliament. See Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, ‘The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy’, Comparative Politics, vol. 31 (1997), p. 157. 28 Levi, ‘The Justice Party’, p. 145. 29 Bülent Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), p. 412. 30 The AP’s right wing voted with the opposition and forced Demirel to resign, but he was soon back at the head of a new Cabinet. In December 1970, 41 members of the AP broke away to found the Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti), its name recalling the banned Democrat Party of Bayar and Menderes. See Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 265. 31 William Hale, ‘Aspects of the Turkish General Election of 1969’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 8, no. 3 (1972), pp. 393–404. 32 Kurtuluş Kayalı, Ordu ve Siyaset (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), p. 179. 33 William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, p. 315. 34 Clement H. Dood, Crisis of Turkish Democracy (London: Eothen Press, 1990), p. 17. 35 See H. Bayram Kaçmazoğlu, 27 Mayıs’tan 12 Mart’a Türkiye’de Siyasal Fikir Hareketleri (İstanbul: Birey Yayıncılık, 2000).

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36 For the full text of the 1961 Constitution see Suna Kili and Şeref Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2000), pp. 174–233. 37 The constitution was submitted to popular referendum on 9 July 1961 and won by 60.4 per cent. The reason for the 39.4 per cent negative votes was not necessarily dislike of new constitution but rather disapproval of the military intervention and the closure of the Democrat Party. See Hikmet Özdemir, ‘Siyasal Tarih (1960–1980)’ in Çağdaş Türkiye 1908–1980 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2000), pp. 238–39. 38 Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, p. 377. 39 Kili and Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze, p. 175. 40 Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, p. 379. 41 See Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution in Kili and Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze, pp. 120–121. 42 Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, p. 389. 43 Abdulhadi Toplu, Anayasa’da Milliyetçilik Mücadelesi (Ankara: TöreDevlet Yayınevi, 1978). 44 Clement H. Dood, Politics and Government in Turkey (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969), p. 116. 45 Kili and Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze, p. 176. 46 Kili and Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze, pp. 176–77. 47 Mümtaz Soysal, Anayasaya Giriş (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1969), p. 238. 48 See Articles 68–88 of the 1924 Constitution in Suna Kili, Türk Anayasaları (Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi, 1982) pp 57–63. 49 Although the term Türk in the 1924 Constitution apparently lacks an ethnic meaning, during parliamentary debates such a meaning was in fact emphasised, as discussed in Chapter Three. 50 Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, pp. 380–81. 51 Kili and Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze, p. 177. 52 Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi 1961–1980 (İstanbul: YKY, 2002), p. 283. 53 See Article 11 of the Turkish Penal Code, no. 5237 (26 September 2004). 54 See Article 10 of the Turkish Association Law, no. 5253 (4 November 2004). 55 See Article 89 of Political Parties Law, which was passed in 1965. This article made it easy to shut down political parties. Both the Turkish Workers’ Party and the National Order Party were closed under it. 56 See Article 58 of the 1961 Constitution. 57 Kili and Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze, p. 174. 58 See Articles 11, 22, 26, 29, 46 and 57 of the 1961 Constitution. 59 Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 published in the Official Gazette no. 11638 of 22 February 1964. For the full text of the law see Nihal Erdener Uluocak, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1968), pp. 177–91.

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60 Vahit Doğan, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Nobel, 1999), p. 23. 61 Kemal Dal, 403 Sayılı Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanununa Göre Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık, 1965), p. 5. 62 Vahit Doğan, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku, p. 38. 63 See Article 26 of the Turkish Citizenship Law no. 403 in Erdoğan Göğer, Türk Tabiiyet Hukuku (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1975), p. 217. 64 See Article 25 of the Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403. 65 Kemal Karpat, ‘Socialism and the Labour Party of Turkey’, Middle East Journal, vol. 21, no. 2 (1967), p. 157. 66 In the 1965 elections it got 3.0 per cent of the votes and entered Parliament with 15 deputies. 67 TİP’li Yıllar (1961–1971) Anılar Belgeler II (Ankara: Felis Yayınevi, 2001), p. 1069. 68 Murat Belge, ‘Türkiye İşçi Partisi’, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (Ankara: İletişim Yayınları), p. 2121. 69 Artun Ünsal, Türkiye İşçi Partisi (1961–1971) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2002), p. 116. 70 Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1839–1950 (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1995), p. 141. 71 Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı 1961 (İstanbul: TİP, 1961), pp. 5–6. 72 Mehmet Ali Aybar, ‘Anayasa Sosyalisme Açıktır’ in Mehmet Ali Aybar, Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalism: Seçmeler 1945–1967 (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1968), pp. 599–601. 73 Mehmet Ali Aybar, ‘Gerçek Milliyetçiler Sosyalistlerdir’ and ‘Milliyetçilik Sömürü ile Savaşmaktır’ in Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalism Seçmeler 1945–1967, pp. 559–65 and pp. 598–83. 74 TİP Programı 1961, pp. 79–80. 75 Çavdar, ‘Adalet Partisi’, p. 139. 76 TİP Programı 1961, p. 80. 77 Mehmet Ali Aybar, Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalism Seçmeler 1945– 1967 (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi 1968), pp. 275–85. 78 Çavdar, ‘Adalet Partisi’, pp. 177–178. 79 Ünsal, Türkiye İşçi Partisi (1961–1971), p. 11. 80 Çavdar, ‘Adalet Partisi’, p.181. 81 Behice Boran, Savunma (İstanbul: Sosyalist Yayınları, 1992), pp. 128–29. 82 Rahmi Kumaş, CHP’nin Soyağacı (İstanbul: Cağdaş Yayınları, 1999), pp. 156–57. 83 Celal Bozkurt, Siyaset Tarihimizde CHP: Dünü Bugünü Ideolojisi (n.p., n.d.), p. 114. 84 Bülent Ecevit, Ortanın Solu (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1974), p. 82. 85 Frank Tachau, ‘Bülent Ecevit: From Idealist to Pragmatist,’ in Heper and Sayarı, eds, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 116. 86 Suna Kili, 1960–1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler (İstanbul: Çağlayan Basımevi, 1976), p. 220. 87 CHP XX. Kurultayı (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1970), p. 59. 88 Ak Günlere CHP 1973 Seçim Bildirgesi (Ankara: n.p., 1973) pp 44–51. 89 Ak Günlere CHP 1973 Seçim Bildirgesi, pp. 162–65.

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  90 The right wing of the Democrat Party had established the Nation Party in 1948, but it was closed in 1953 for violating the Republic’s principle of secularism. The party re-emerged the next year under the new name the Republican Nation Party, which in 1958 merged with the Peasant’s Party to become the Republican Peasant’s Nation Party. See Mehmet Yaşar Geyikdağı, Political Parties in Turkey (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 92.   91 Hakkı Öznur, Ülkücü Hareket CKMP’den MHP’ye vol.I (Ankara: Alternatif Yayınları, 1999), p. 63.   92 Müreffeh ve Kuvvetli Türkiye İçin (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası 1965).   93 CKMP Programı (Ankara: Arı Matbaası, 1965), pp. 4–5.   94 CKMP Programı, p. 9.   95 CKMP Programı, pp. 7–8.   96 Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, ‘Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi’, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 8 (1996), p. 2.   97 Memleket ve Dünya İşleri, 1969, p. 12.   98 See Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Tüzüğü (Ankara: n.p., 1977).   99 Öznur, Ülkücü Hareket CKMP’den MHP’ye, p. 413. 100 Türk Milleti Uyan 1977 MHP Seçim Beyannamesi (Ankara: n.p., 1977). 101 Ergun Özbudun, Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 57. 102 Birlik Partisi Tüzük ve Programı (İstanbul: Özgünay Basımevi, 1969). 103 See Articles 2, 18, 24, 26 and 27 of the regulation. 104 See Articles 5, 6, 7, 9 and 13 of the regulation. 105 Türkiye Birlik Partisi Tüzük ve Programı (Ankara: Birlik Partisi Yayınları, 1980), pp. 76–91, 104, 109, 122, 123. 106 Dodd, Democracy and Development in Turkey, p. 12. 107 For this discussion see Chapter 4. 108 Samim Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p. 252. 109 Şükrü Sina Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878–1960): Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Kaynak, 1985), p. 154. 110 Süleyman Yeşilyurt, Ermeni, Yahudi, Rum Asıllı Milletvekilleri (Ankara: Serajans, 1997), p. 138. 111 See especially Article 12 and 19 of the 1961 Constitution. 112 Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları, pp. 229 and 257. 113 Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları, p. 250. 114 Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları, p. 271 and p. 281. 115 Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları, p. 262. 116 Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları, p. 270 and p. 274. 117 Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları, p. 278. 118 Hülya Demir and Rıdvan Akar, İstanbul’un Son Sürgünlari (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994), p. 150. 119 This law was not amended until 14 February 2007 by Act No. 5580. 120 Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları, p. 297. 121 Baskın Oran, Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu (İstanbul: Bilgi, 1991), p. 125. 122 Akgönül, Türkiye Rumları, p. 318. 123 Baskın Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2004), pp. 100–101 and 111. This point will be elaborated in Chapter 6.

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124 Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi 1961–1980 (İstanbul: YKY, 2002), p. 410. 125 Emrah Göker, Reconstructing the Political: A Study on Contemporary Alevi Politics From a Generative Structuralist Perspective (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bilkent University, 1999), p. 98. 126 Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina Raudvere, Alevi Identity (İstanbul: Numune Matbaası, 1998). 127 Olsson, Özdalga and Raudvere, Alevi Identity, p. 384. 128 Süleyman Demirel, Yazdıkları ve Söyledikleri (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Neşriyatı, 1965), p. 168. 129 Çavdar, Türkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi, p. 250. 130 Çavdar, Türkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi, p. 251. 131 Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi 1961–1980, p. 73. 132 Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi 1961–1980, p. 189. 133 Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi 1961–1980, p. 297. 134 Osman Pazarlı, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf III (İstanbul: Yükselen Matbaası, 1964), p. 31. 135 Pazarlı, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf III, p. 32. 136 Osman Pazarlı, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf II (İstanbul: Yükselen Matbaası, 1964), pp. 72–73. 137 Halit Aksan, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi III (İstanbul: AS Matbaası, 1969), pp. 22–23. 138 T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Tebliğler Dergisi, vol. 24, no. 1158 (19 June 1961). 139 Niyazi Akşit and Osman Eğilmez, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf IV (İstanbul: Yükselen Matbaası, 1961), pp. 22–23. 140 Pazarlı, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf II, pp. 54–55. 141 Selman Erdem and İsmet Konuk, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi: Ortaokul II (İstanbul: Atlas Yayınevi, 1973), p. 27. 142 Pazarlı, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf II, p. 61. 143 Pazarlı, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf II, p. 62. 144 T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Tebliğler Dergisi, vol. 32, no. 1583 (1 December 1969), p. 436. 145 Avrupa Konseyi Strasbourg, 10 Şubat 1969, Genel ve Teknik Eğitim Komitesi (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Talim ve Trebiye Dairesi Araştırma ve Değerlendirme Bürosu, 1969). 146 Selman Erdem and İsmet Konuk, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi: Ortaokul III (İstanbul: Atlas Yayınevi, 1972), p. 16. 147 Osman Pazarlı, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Sınıf I (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1961), pp. 109–10. Chapter 6    1 Cited in the 2007 Election manifesto of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), pp. 5–7. Visit http://www.akparti.org.tr/ beyanname.asp    2 The NSC adopted a new election law, which retained the ‘D’Hondt’ version of the proportional representation system. There was also a national representation threshold; political parties getting less than 10 per cent of the votes cast will not be assigned any seats in the parliament. For more information

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16

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about the election system see Ergun Özbudun, Perspectives in Democracy in Turkey (Ankara: Sevinç Matbası, 1988), p. 239. Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2004), p. 276. Feride Acar, ‘Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation’ in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey (Lanham-Boulder, NY: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 172. Acar, ‘Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation’, p. 163. The result of the referendum was 50.24 per cent ‘yes’ votes versus 49.76 per cent ‘no’. See Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, ‘The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey’, Comparative Politics, vol. 16, no. 1 (October 1983), p. 28. Üstün Ergüder, ‘The Motherland Party, 1983–1989’ in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, eds, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991), p. 157. Niyazi Günay, ‘Implementing the “February 28” Recommendations: A Scoreboard’ (May 2001), p. 2. Visit http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ templateC04.php?CID=218 During the monthly meeting of the NSC on 28 February 1997, political Islam was on the agenda, leading to an eight-and-a-half-hour gathering, the longest ever. The NSC members with military backgrounds argued that secularism was in danger and they criticised the government very harshly. The NSC gave a series of ‘recommendations’ obliging the government to adopt a number of measures to reign in political Islam. The 28 February Process is also known by some as the ‘Post-modern Coup’. See Tanel Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 40, no. 1 (January 2004), p. 135; Ahmet Yıldız, ‘Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook’, Muslim World, vol. 93, no. 2 (April 2003). Elizabeth Özdalga, ‘Necmettin Erbakan: Democracy for the Sake of Power,’ in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 134. Niyazi Günay, ‘Implementing the “February 28” Recommendations: A Scoreboard’, p. 2. Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), pp. 172–173. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, pp. 345–46. See Metin Heper and Başak İnce, ‘Devlet Bahçeli and “far right” politics in Turkey, 1999–2002’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 42, no. 6 (November 2006), pp. 873–88. Jacob Landau, ‘Alparslan Türkeş: A Colonel Turned Politician,’ in Heper and Sayarı, eds, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey, pp. 160–61. For the AKP’s interpretation of secularism see William Hale, ‘Christian Democracy and the JDP: Parallels and Contrasts’, in M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., The Emergence of a New Turkey (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 78. For an overview of the ideological transformation of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan into a moderate politician, see Metin Heper and Şule Toktaş, ‘Islam,

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Modernity and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,’ Muslim World, vol. 93 (2003), pp. 157–85. For an analyses of the 2002 election results see Soli Özel, ‘Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 2 (2003), pp. 80–94. Ali Çarkoğlu, ‘The rise of new generation pro-Islamists in Turkey: the Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the November 2002 Elections in Turkey’, South European Society and Politics, vol. 7, no. 1 (2003). Kostas Ifantis, ‘Turkey in Transition—opportunities amidst peril?’ Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, vol. 9, no. 3 (December 2007), p. 225. Marcie J. Patton, ‘AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What has happened to the EU Process?’, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 12, no. 3 (November, 2007), p. 340. A number of civil society organisations joined their forces and organised mass rallies, called cumhuriyet mitingleri (republican meetings). Some political scientists and columnists in Turkey called the process ‘e-memorandum’. For more information see John Gorvett, ‘Turks Divided on Implications of July Parliamentary Election Results’, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, vol. 26, no. 7 (2007), p. 34; M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, ‘Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Languages’, Middle East Policy, vol. 14, no. 3 (Fall 2007), pp. 120–21. Hürriyet, 23 July 2007. In 1954 the Democrat Party was the first to increase its votes and since then all the ruling parties lost support. Kerem Öktem, ‘Harbingers of Turkey’s Second Republic’, Middle East Report Online (1 August 2007), p. 2. At http://wwww.merip.org/mero/ mero080107.html Hürriyet, 30 August 2007. Ergun Özbudun and Serap Yazıcı, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1993–2004) (İstanbul: TESEV Publications, 2004), p. 13. For the full text of the 1982 Constitution see Suna Kili and Şeref Gözübüyük, Türk Anayasa Metinleri (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2000), pp. 254–334. Ergun Özbudun, Türk Anayasa Hukuku (Ankara: Yetkin Yayınları, 2000), p. 57. Bülent Tanör, ‘Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995)’, in Türkiye Tarihi 5: Bugünkü Türkiye 1980–1995 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2000), pp. 47–48. For constitutional amendments especially between 1993–2004 see Ergun Özbudun and Serap Yazıcı, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1993–2004). These seven reform packages involved legal and constitutional amendments, and were adopted by Parliament on 6 February, 26 March, 3 August 2002, 2 January, 23 January, 15 July, and 20 July 2003. Visit http://www. belgenet.com/hukuk.html The Copenhagen European Council, which met in 1993, set out the conditions for membership to the EU, known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’. See Rona Aybay, Vatandaşlık Hukuku (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), p. 75.

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36 In the second constitutional amendment package (May 2004) a paragraph was added to Article 90/5 of the constitution: ‘Should the international treaties on the fundamental rights and freedoms that are duly put into effect and national laws contain contradictory stipulations on the same subject, the provisions of international law would prevail’. For more information see Baskın Oran, ‘The Minority Concepts and Rights in Turkey: The Lausanne Peace Treaty and Current Issues’, in Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, ed., Human Rights in Turkey (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 54. 37 See William Hale, ‘Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish accession Process’, Turkish Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 107–26. 38 For the EU Progress Reports on Turkey between 1998–2007 visit http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkey/key_documents_en.htm 39 AK Parti Nice AK yıllara: Parti Güven ve İstikrar İçince Durmak Yok Yola Devam (Ankara: n.p., 2007), p. 12. 40 For the full text of the draft see Radikal, 31 July 2007. 41 Turkish Daily News, 27 November, 2007. 42 Turkish Daily News, 27 November, 2007. 43 Turkish Daily News, 5 October, 2007. 44 The Turkish Citizenship Law has been amended by the following acts: the Act no. 2383 of 13 February 1981 (published in the Official Gazette No. 17254 of 17 February 1981); the Act No. 3540 of 20 April 1989 (published in the Official Gazette No. 20153 of 29 April 1989); the Act No. 3808 of 27 May 1992 (published in the Official Gazette No. 21248 of 4 June 1992); and the Act No. 4112 of 7 June 1995 (published in the Official Gazette No. 22311 of 12 June 1995). 45 For more information see Bülent Çiçekli, ‘Turkish citizenship policy since 1980’, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, at http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=23# 46 See the Official Gazette No. 21648 of 25 July 1993 for the principles determined by the Council of Ministers. 47 Aybay, Vatandaşlık Hukuku, p. 387–88. 48 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. LXXXVIII, no. 842, p. 1. 49 The term ‘denizen’ may be described as ‘a foreigner residing in country as possessing certain citizenship rights’. For more information see Thomas Hammar, Democracy and the Nation-state: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International Migration (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1990). 50 Aybay, Vatandaşlık Hukuku, pp. 88–109. 51 Milliyet, 2 January, 2008. 52 Milliyet, 2 January, 2008. 53 The army saw socialism and communism as Turkey’s chief enemies and a state-friendly Islam as an antidote to communism. 54 The hearth members defined the group as ‘an association defending the Turkish–Islamic synthesis, and taking sides with the state under any circumstances’. See Vecihi Timuroğlu, Türk İslam Sentezi (Ankara: Başak Yayınları, 1991), p. 138. 55 See Eric J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1997), pp. 288, 293.

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56 Fehmi Çalmuk, Erbakan’ın Kürtleri (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001), p. 19. 57 Reha Çamuroğlu, ‘Alevi Revivalism in Turkey’, in Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Özdalga, and Catharina Raudvere, eds, Alevi Identity (İstanbul: Numune Matbaası, 1998), pp. 79–80. 58 Ruşen Çakır, ‘Political Alevism versus Political Sunnism: Convergences and Divergences’ in Olsson, Özdalga, and Raudvere, eds, Alevi Identity, p. 64. 59 Çakır, ‘Political Alevism versus Political Sunnism: Convergences and Divergences’, p. 64. 60 Olsson, Özdalga and Raudvere, Alevi Identity. 61 Emrah Göker, Reconstructing the Political: A Study on Contemporary Alevi Politics From a Generative Structuralist Perspective (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bilkent University, 1999), pp. 117–18. 62 Towards this end a commission led by Şakir Keçeli and Aziz Yalçın prepared a book on religious education for Turkey’s Alevi citizens. However, this book was rejected by the state council, which reviews textbooks. See Şakir Keçeli and Aziz Yalçın, Alevilik-Bektaşilik Açısından Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi (Ankara: Ardıç Yayınları, 1996). 63 These different sects may also demand such kinds of rights. Göker, Reconstructing the Political: A Study on Contemporary Alevi Politics from a Generative Structuralist Perspective, p. 118 and p. 122. 64 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 306. 65 Ali Yalman, ‘Cumhuriyet Sonrası Aleviliğe Genel Bakış’, visit http://www. alevibektasi.org/tcumhu.htm 66 Cumhuriyet, 30 April 2000. 67 Cumhuriyet, 23 June 2000. 68 Cumhuriyet, 14 February 2002. 69 Cumhuriyet, 19 February 2002. 70 Cumhuriyet, 3 September 2003. 71 Akşam, 6 October 2003. 72 Radikal, 1 May 2005. 73 Milliyet, 22 June 2007. 74 Radikal, 14 January 2008. 75 Turkish Daily News, 14 January 2008. 76 A time of mourning and fasting marking the martyrdom of Hussein, grandson of the prophet Mohammed. 77 Çamuroğlu is one of the most prominent Alevi intellectuals in Turkey and his joining of the AKP was seen as a sign of will in this overwhelmingly Sunni party to reach out to the Alevi community. After becoming MP in the general elections of 22 July Çamuroğlu started to work on the ‘Alevi question’. Nevertheless, he resigned from his position on 12 June 2008, which put the so-called ‘Alevi Inquisition,’ of the AKP in danger. 78 Turkish Daily News, 17 January 2008. 79 Turkish Daily News, 11 January 2008. 80 Cumhuriyet, 11 February 2004. 81 Cumhuriyet, 13 February 2004. 82 Hasan Zengin first approached the Turkish courts requesting the removal of mandatory religious courses from the national education curriculum in

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2001 but he did not receive a satisfactory answer. After he exhausted available domestic remedies, Zengin appealed to the European Court of Human Rights in 2004. Turkish Daily News, 30 August 2007.   83 Turkish Daily News, 10 October 2007.   84 Turkish Daily News, 10 October 2007.   85 Radikal, 3 March 2008.   86 Turkish Daily News, 5 March 2008.   87 Turkish Daily News, 11 March 2008.   88 CHP Programı: Yeni Hedefler Yeni Türkiye, visit http://www.chp.org.tr/ index.php?module=chpmain&page=list_party_info&info_id=1&pid=146   89 This point is elaborated in Chapter 5.   90 Çakır, ‘Political Alevism versus Political Sunnism: Convergences and Divergences’, p. 65.   91 Türkiye Toplumsal Barış Projesi (Ankara: Çağdaş Matbaacılık, 1998).   92 Radikal, 24 December 1999.   93 Hürriyet, 20 June 2007.   94 This point was discussed earier in Chapter 5.   95 See Baskın Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2004), pp. 100–01 and 111.   96 See European Union ‘2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession’, p. 43. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf   97 See ‘U.S State Department Report on Religious Freedom in Turkey’, Turkish Daily News, 17 September 2007.   98 For more information about reciprocity in Turco-Greek relations see Samim Akgönül, ed., Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities Law, Religion and Politics (İstanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2008).   99 Radikal, 22 February 2008. 100 Radikal, 21 February 2008. 101 Turkish Daily News, 22 February 2008. 102 Turkish Daily News, 22 February 2008. 103 Turkish Daily News, 22 February 2008. 104 See also TESEV’s reports on Foundation Law. Visit http://www.tesev.org.tr/ TESEV_%20vakiflargorus.doc. 105 Turkish Daily News, 22 February 2008. 106 Baskın Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar p. 110. 107 Cumhuriyet, 7 January 2000. 108 Turkish Daily News, 7 February 2006. 109 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, ‘Nationalism in post-2004 Turkey’, SWP Research Paper (October 2006), p. 15. Visit http://www.armenews.com/IMG/pdf/ SWP_Studie.pdf 110 Orhan Pamuk was indicted under Article 301 for his comments on the Armenian and Kurdish question during an interview with a Swiss newspaper. His trial caused a worldwide sensation and brought to the fore limits of citizenship rights and freedoms in Turkey. 111 Hrant Dink was prosecuted because of his comments about Armenian genocide in Agos and he was sentenced to six months in jail for ‘insulting Turkishness’ in 2006.

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112 Nergis Canefe, ‘History and the Nation: The Legacy of Taner Akçam’s Work on Ottoman Armenians’, South European Society and Politics, vol. 12, no. 2 (June 2007), p. 238. 113 Radikal, 21 January 2007. 114 Radikal, 27 January 2007. 115 Turkish Daily News, 8 February 2007. 116 Turkish Daily News, 19 April 2007. 117 Turkish Daily News, 3 December 2007. 118 Turkish Daily News, 17 December 2007. 119 See section 6.4 of this chapter. 120 Nilüfer Göle, ‘Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey’, in Augustus Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), pp. 17–43 (p. 20). 121 Quoted in Eyyüp Demir, Yasal Kürtler (İstanbul: Tevn Yayınları, 2005), p. 43. 122 PKK declared it had fulfilled its historical mission and was dissolved in its eighth congress in April 2002, changing its name to KADEK. 123 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 328. 124 According to Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, the 17th, 18th and 19th Turkish Grand National Assemblies had 23 per cent, 24 per cent, and 23 per cent deputies, respectively, coming from mostly Kurdish-populated areas. See Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, ‘The Kurdish Issue in Turkish Politics’, in J. Calleja, H. Wiberg and S. Busuttil, eds, The Search for Peace in the Mediterranean Region (Malta: Mireva Publications, 1994) 125 Kemal Kirişçi, and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 136. 126 Philip Robins, ‘The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue’, International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 4 (1993), p. 667. 127 Kirişçi and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p. 147. 128 Kirişçi and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p. 147. 129 Kirişçi and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p. 138. 130 After these deputies applied to the European Court of Human Rights in 2001, the court ruled against the Turkish government and sentenced it to pay $25,000 to each deputy. The DEP deputies thus re-applied and, owing to the change in Article 90 of the 1982 Constitution, were released from prison. For the revised article stipulated that in case of a conflict between domestic law and international agreements concerning basic rights and freedoms, international law takes precedence. Cumhuriyet, 10 June 2004. 131 In the 1999 elections, the HADEP got 4.75 per cent of the votes. See Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2004). 132 Demir, Yasal Kürtler, p. 495. 133 Radikal, 24 May, 2004. 134 Kirişçi and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, pp. 146–47. 135 Radikal, 22 October 2004. 136 Radikal, 16 August 2005. 137 Visit http://www.dth-web.com 138 Hürriyet, 19 August 2005. 139 Turkish Daily News, 17 November 2007.

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140 Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalçın, The Özal (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2001), p. 455. 141 Birand and Yalçın, The Özal, p. 465. 142 Kirişçi and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p. 137. 143 Kirişçi and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p. 139. 144 Hürriyet, 8 December 1991. 145 See Ruşen Çakır, Türkiye’nin Kürt Sorunu (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2004), p. 166. 146 Füsun Üstel, ‘Anayasaya Vatandaşlık, Hangi Anayasaya Vatandaşlık?’ Radikal, 17 December 1996. 147 Üstel, ‘Anayasaya Vatandaşlık, Hangi Anayasaya Vatandaşlık?’. 148 At the time he said, ‘The nation in Turkey is the Turkish nation. Even though people come from different origins, this nation is the Turkish nation. We do not discriminate; racism or religious differences are not acted upon. We do not accept nations within a nation. Our citizens have rights and obligations, and the constitution determines everything within this framework. And this is what we call Constitutional citizenship.’ Hürriyet, 15 July 1999. 149 Ümit Cizre, ‘Tansu Çiller: Lusting for Power and Undermining Democracy,’ in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 212. 150 Quoted from Ahmet İçduygu, ‘Çokkültürlülük: Türkiye Vatandaşlığı Kavramı İçin Toplumsal Bir Zemin’, Türkiye Günlüğü, no. 33 (March–April 1995), p. 117. 151 Landau, ‘Alparslan Turkes: A Colonel Turned Politician,’ p. 160. 152 Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Programı: 24 Ocak 1993 (Ankara: n.p., 1993). 153 Landau, ‘Alparslan Türkeş: A Colonel Turned Politician,’ p. 160. 154 See Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Programı: MHP 5 Kasım 2000 (Ankara: n.p., 2000) and Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 22 Temmuz 2007 Seçim Beyannamesi: Milli Duruş ve Kararlılık Belgesi (Ankara: n.p., 2007). 155 Ecevit died on 5 November 2006. Currently Zeki Sezer is the leader of the DSP. 156 Frank Tachau, ‘Bülent Ecevit: From Idealist to Pragmatist’, in Heper and Sayarı, eds, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey, p. 120. 157 Kirişçi and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p. 144. 158 Milliyet, 5 June, 2008. 159 Turkish Daily News, 6 June, 2008. 160 Kirişçi and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p. 145. 161 Fehmi Çalmuk, Erbakan’ın Kürtleri (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001), p. 22. 162 Çalmuk, Erbakan’ın Kürtleri, p. 24. 163 Çalmuk, Erbakan’ın Kürtleri, p. 160. 164 Refah Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi 20 Ekim Genel Seçimi (Ankara: n.p., 1991). 165 The HEP sought an election alliance with the RP because of its success in the southeast, but the RP instead made an election alliance with the ‘ultranationalist’ Nationalist Work Party in the 1991 elections. It was this alliance that led voters in the southeast to punish the RP at the ballot box. Çalmuk, Erbakan’ın Kürtleri, p. 56.

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166 Özdalga, ‘Necmettin Erbakan: Democracy for the Sake of Power’, p. 133. 167 Çalmuk, Erbakan’ın Kürtleri, p. 115. 168 In this speech in Bingöl, Erbakan said the following: ‘For a long time the children of our country started their school day by saying, “In the name of God,” but later they replaced this with “I am a proper, hard-working Turk.” Well, Kurdish-origin Muslim citizens have the right to say, “I am a Kurd, more proper and harder working”.’ Çalmuk, Erbakan’ın Kürtleri, p. 8. 169 Çalmuk, Erbakan’ın Kürtleri, p. 194. 170 For the party programmes and election manifestos of the AKP, see the AKP’s webpage at http://www.akparti.org.tr/ and http://www.akparti.org.tr/ beyanname.asp respectively. 171 Fehmi Çalmuk, Erbakan’ın Kürtleri, pp. 67–70. 172 Milliyet, 24 December 2002. 173 Radikal, 1 June 2004. 174 Milliyet, 12 April 2005. 175 Milliyet, 10 August 2005. 176 Milliyet, 12 August 2005. 177 Radikal, 6 December 2005. 178 For the full text of the report see ‘Azınlık Hakları ve Kültürel Çalışma Grubu: Rapor’, Birikim, no. 188 (2004), pp. 26–30. 179 For more information about the debate see Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, ‘Türk or Türkiyeli? The Reform of Turkey’s Minority Legislation and the Rediscovery of Ottomanism’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 43, no. 3 (May 2007), pp. 423–38. 180 For the full text of the report see İbrahim Ö. Kaboğlu and Kemal Akkurt, İnsan Hakları Danışma Kurulu Raporları (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2006), pp. 287–301. 181 Radikal, 3 September 2005. 182 Milliyet, 20 November 2005. 183 Milliyet, 23 November 2005. 184 Milliyet, 23 November 2005. 185 Hürriyet, 12 December 2005. 186 This phrase was chosen carefully: languages and dialects other than Turkish could only be used in ‘private life’ not in ‘public life.’ 187 Cumhuriyet, 26 January 2004. 188 Starting from January 2006 RTÜK decided to give permission to private local channels for broadcasting programmes in the mother tongue. Fifty local television channels applied to broadcast programmes in Kurdish but only two of them, SÖZ TV and Medya FM, were given permission. Milliyet, 29 December 2005. 189 Radikal, 26 January 2004. 190 Radikal, 5 June 2004. 191 Radikal, 5 June 2004. 192 Radikal, 7 June 2004. 193 Radikal, 7 June 2004. 194 Cumhuriyet, 19 September 2002. 195 Milliyet, 18 October 2003. 196 Radikal, 22 September 2003.

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197 Under Article 74/1 of the 1982 Constitution, citizens ‘have the right to apply in writing to the competent authorities and to the Turkish Grand National Assembly with regard to the requests and complaints concerning themselves or the public’. 198 Cumhuriyet, 15, 20, and 30 January 2002. 199 Milliyet, 18 January 2004. 200 Turkish Daily News, 28 May 2008. 201 Turkish Daily News, 31 May 2008. 202 This is also true for Human Rights Education textbooks. For more information see Kenen Çayır, ‘Tensions and Dilemmas in Human Rights Education’, in Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, ed., Human Rights in Turkey (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), pp. 233–49. 203 Kemal İnal, Eğitimde İdeolojik Boyut (Ankara: Doruk Yayınları, 1996), p. 22. 204 Taha Parla, Türkiye’nin Siyasal Rejimi 1980–1989 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995) pp 217–21. 205 Etienne Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında 1931–1993 Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p. 144. 206 Emircan Ceylan, İlköğretim Vatandaşlık Bilgileri 8 (Ankara: SEK Yayınları, 1996), p. 61. 207 Nuri Korkmaz, İlköğretim Vatandaşlık Bilgileri (Ankara: Secan Yayıncılık, 1994), p. 64. 208 Ahmet Kapulu, Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları Eğitimi 7. Sınıf (Ankara: Koza Yayınları, 2001), p. 36. 209 Fehmi Yılmaz and Nurettin Yanıkoğlu, İlköğretim Vatandaşlık ve İnsanhakları Eğitimi 7 (İstanbul: Okyay Yayıncılık, 2002). 210 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), sociologist, educator, patriot and a pioneer in Turkish sociology. He defended the view that Turks should abandon Ottomanism and Islamism and adopt Turkism instead. He argued that Turks should subscribe to Western civilization but retain their own culture. 211 Kemal Dal, Orhan Çakıroğlu, Ali İhsan Özyazgan, Vatandaşlık Bilgileri Ana Ders Kitabı Ortaokul III (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1986), p. 27. 212 Nihat Bilgen, 8. Sınıf için Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları Eğitimi (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001). 213 Emircan Ceylan, İlköğretim Vatandaşlık Bilgileri (Ankara: SEK Yayınları, 1996), p. 55. 214 Ceylan, İlköğretim Vatandaşlık Bilgileri, p. 31. 215 Ceylan, İlköğretim Vatandaşlık Bilgileri, pp. 56–57. 216 The book explained the purpose of civic education as teaching the future teachers how to be good citizens, who will in turn go on to raise good citizens in Turkey. Durmuş Yılmaz, Üniversiteler İçin Vatandaşlık Bilgisi (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları, 2000). 217 Yılmaz, Üniversiteler İçin Vatandaşlık Bilgisi, pp. 36–38, and p. 71. 218 Yılmaz, Üniversiteler İçin Vatandaşlık Bilgisi, p. 111. 219 Yılmaz, Üniversiteler İçin Vatandaşlık Bilgisi, p. 109. 220 For more information on human rights education in Turkey see Deniz Ceylan and Gürol Irzık, Human Rights Issues in Textbooks: The Turkish

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Case (İstanbul: History Foundation of Turkey, 2004); Muzaffer Dartan and Münevver Cebeci, eds, Hunan Rights Education and Practices in Turkey in the Process of Candidacy to the EU (İstanbul: Lito Printing House, 2002). 221 A project conducted by the History Foundation, entitled ‘Promoting Human Rights in Primary and Secondary School Textbooks’. Undertaken between March 2001 and December 2004, the project involved the assessment of about 200 textbooks in every subject in terms of their human rights content. For more information see Fatma Gök, ‘Vatandaşlık ve İnsanhakları Eğitimi Ders Kitapları,’ in Betül Çötüksöken, Ayşe Erzan, and Orhan Silier, eds, Ders Kitaplarında İnsan Hakları: Tarama Sonuçları (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2003). 222 Gök, ‘Vatandaşlık ve İnsanhakları Eğitimi Ders Kitapları,’ p.159. 223 Gök, ‘Vatandaşlık ve İnsanhakları Eğitimi Ders Kitapları,’ p. 160. 224 Turkish Daily News, 21 October 2006. 225 Milliyet, 21 October 2006. 226 Radikal, 22 October 2006. Chapter 7    1 Quoted in Jan Werner Müller, ‘On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism’, Contemporary Political Theory, 5, (2006), p. 278.    2 See Peter Nyers, ‘Introduction: Why Citizenship Studies’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (February, 2007), pp. 1–4.    3 Bryan S. Turner, ‘Cosmopolitan Virtue: Loyalty and the City’, in Engin F. Işın, ed., Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City (London: Routledge, 2000).    4 For the complete list of questions see Appendix A.    5 Tanıl Bora, ‘Ders Kitaplarında Milliyetçilik’ in Betül Çötüksöken, Ayşe Erzan, and Orhan Silier, eds, Ders Kitaplarında İnsan Hakları: Tarama Sonuçları (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2003), pp. 69–70.    6 Bora, ‘Ders Kitaplarında Milliyetçilik’, p. 82.    7 See Radikal, 11 February 2008.    8 Quoted in Audrey Osler and Hugh Starkey, ‘Citizenship Education and National Identities in France and England: inclusive or exclusive?’ Oxford Review of Education, vol. 27, no. 2 (2001), p. 289.    9 Edwige Liliane Lefebre, ‘Republicanism and Universalism: Factors of Inclusion or Exclusion in the French Concept of Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (2003), pp. 15–36.   10 Lefebre, ‘Republicanism and Universalism: Factors of Inclusion or Exclusion in the French Concept of Citizenship’, p. 25.   11 Osler and Starkey, ‘Citizenship Education and National Identities in France and England: inclusive or exclusive?’ p. 298.   12 Osler and Starkey, ‘Citizenship Education and National Identities in France and England: inclusive or exclusive?’ p. 301.   13 Osler and Starkey, ‘Citizenship Education and National Identities in France and England: inclusive or exclusive?’ p. 290.   14 Anthony Flew, Education for Citizenship (London: IEA, 2000).   15 For more information about civic education in England before 1999 see

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David Kerr, ‘Re-examining Citizenship Education in England’, in Judith Torney-Punta, John Schville and Jo-Ann Amedo, eds, Civic Education Across Countries: Twenty-four National Case Studies from the IEA Civic Education Project (Amsterdam: IEA, 1999), pp. 203–27. See Bernard Crick, Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools: Final Report of the Advisory Group on Citizenship (London: QCA, 1998); see also Bernard Crick, Essays on Citizenship (London: Continuum, 2000). For the criticism of the Report see Keith Faulks, ‘Rethinking Citizenship Education in England: some lessons from contemporary social and political theory’, Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, vol. 1, no. 2 (2006), pp. 123–40. David Gillborn, ‘Citizenship Education as Placebo: ‘standards’, institutional racism and education policy’, Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, vol. 1, no. 1 (2006), p. 94. Osler and Starkey, ‘Citizenship Education and National Identities in France and England: inclusive or exclusive?’ p. 303. David Gillborn, ‘Citizenship Education as Placebo’, p. 83. Dimitra Makrinioti and Joseph Solomon, ‘The Discourse of Citizenship Education in Greece: National Identity and Social Diversity’, in TorneyPunta, Schville and Amedo, Civic Education Across Countries, pp. 285–311. For more on how this holds for the Turkish case, see Ayşe Gül Altınay, The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Makrinioti and Solomon, ‘The Discourse of Citizenship Education in Greece’, p. 293. Makrinioti and Solomon, ‘The Discourse of Citizenship Education in Greece’, pp. 297–298. Dimitra and Joseph, ‘The Discourse of Citizenship Education in Greece’, p. 299. Makrinioti and Solomon, ‘The Discourse of Citizenship Education in Greece’, p. 302. Makrinioti and Solomon, ‘The Discourse of Citizenship Education in Greece’, p. 300. Makrinioti and Solomon, ‘The Discourse of Citizenship Education in Greece’, p. 307. Makrinioti and Solomon, ‘The Discourse of Citizenship Education in Greece’, p. 304. See Constantinos Papanastasiou and Mary Koutselini-Ioannidou, ‘National Identity in the Civic Education of Cyprus’, in Torney-Punta, Schville and Amedo, eds, Civic Education Across Countries, pp. 162–77. Papanastasiou and Koutselini-Ioannidou, ‘National Identity in the Civic Education of Cyprus’, p. 165. Papanastasiou and Koutselini-Ioannidou, ‘National Identity in the Civic Education of Cyprus’, p. 170. Papanastasiou and Koutselini-Ioannidou, ‘National Identity in the Civic Education of Cyprus’, p. 174. See Ann Secor, ‘There Is an Istanbul That Belongs to Me: Citizenship,

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Space, and Identity in the City’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 94, no. 2 (2004), pp. 352–68. Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (London: Eothen Press, 1998). See Soner Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk? (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 159–60. Fuat Keyman, ‘Articulating Citizenship and Identity: the “Kurdish question” in Turkey’, in E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, eds, Citizenship in a Global World (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 284. Cited in Keyman, ‘Articulating Citizenship and Identity’, p. 285. Jan-Werner Müller, ‘A General Theory of Constitutional Patriotism’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 6, no. 1 (2008), p. 87. Jan-Werner Müller and Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Constitutional Patriotism: an introduction’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 6, no. 1 (2008), pp. 67–71. Jan-Werner Müller, ‘A General Theory of Constitutional Patriotism’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 6, no. 1 (2008), pp. 72–95. John Erik Fossum, ‘On the Prospects for a Viable Constitutional Patriotism in Complex Multinational Entities: Canada and European Union Compared’, paper presented at the annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association (31 May 2007), p. 17. Ayşe Kadıoğlu, ‘Can We Envision Turkish Citizenship as Non-membership?’ in Keyman and İçduygu, eds, Citizenship in a Global World, p. 120. Appendix

  1 Judith Torney-Punta, John Schville and Jo-Ann Amedo, eds, Civic Education Across Countries: Twenty-four National Case Studies from the IEA Civic Education Project (Amsterdam: IEA, 1999), pp. 616–20.   2 See http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne/part1.html

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INDEX

Abdülbaki, Muallim 81, 82 Abrevaya, Samuel 62 Adato, Salamon 100, 102 adult education (National Schools) 63, 69 Ahmad, Feroz 93 Akgönül, Samim 106 AKP (Justice and Development Party/ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) 140–41, 144–5, 171–4 Aksan, Halit 108, 109, 110 Aktar, Ayhan 48, 58–9 Albanians 54 Alevis acceptance of 98 cem houses 8, 152, 154–5 conflict with Sunnis 131–2, 151–3 demands of 8 discrimination against 13, 130–31 Diyanet debate 151–2, 153 identity claim 123, 158 political parties 127–8, 157–8 religious education 142, 155–7 suggested reforms for 194 Ali, Necip 66 Alp, Tekin (Moiz Cohen) 61–2 ANAP (Motherland Party/Anavatan Partisi) 138 anti-Semitism 58–9, 97 AP (Justice Party/Adalet Partisi) 114–17 Arat, Yeşim 48 Armenians 69, 101, 134, 163–4 Asiltürk, Oğuzhan 171 Aslangil, Sebu 161 assimilation 13, 53–8, 195 associations see foundations (vakıflar) Atalay, Besim 53–4 Atalay, Beşir 149 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal house in Thessalonica 104 and Islam 79 and the Kurds 55 nationalism 142, 177 and People’s Houses 63 quoted in textbooks 81–2, 176, 185

and Turkish citizens 39, 80 and Turkish language 70–71 and Turkish nation 77–9 minor mentions 1, 2, 39, 40, 75–6, 81, 131 see also Kemalism Atatürkist nationalism 142, 177 Atilhan, Cevat Rıfat 59 Aybar, Mehmet Ali 122–3 Aydın, Mehmet 154 Aykut, Şeref 62 Bahçeli, Devlet 139, 161, 169 Bali, Rıfat 40 Bayar, Celal 88–9, 89–90, 99, 105, 107–8 Baykal, Deniz 170 BDP (Peace and Democracy Party/Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) 167 Benaroya, Avram 99, 100 Bey, Vehbi 51–2 Boran, Behice 124, 146 Bosnians 175 Bozkurt, Mahmut Esat 55 BP (Unity Party/Birlik Partisi) 127 broadcasting 174–5, 176 Brubaker, William Rogers 22–5 Çamuroğlu, Reha 155, 157 Çağaptay, Soner 12, 192 Çeçen, Anıl 64, 66 Çelik, Hüseyin 156 cem houses 8, 152, 154–5 CHP see Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) Christians 97, 158, 162–4 see also Orthodox Church Çiller, Tansu 2, 139, 169 Citizen, Speak Turkish! campaign 60–63 citizenship 1982 Constitution definition 142 definitions of 3–6, 20–21, 80, 134 demands for change 192–3 dual citizenship 145–6, 147–9 duties see citizenship duties

288

C itizenship

and

and exclusion 19–20 foreigners with special status 148–9 gender equality 143 loss of 145–9 and marriage 149 and military service 146–7, 147, 149 for overseas citizens 121 political aspects see civic virtue and political community 20 rights see citizenship rights types of 4, 21–2 and women 121 citizenship duties 1961 Constitution 119 CHP programmes 43, 64, 65–6 civic republicanism 27–8 four basic areas 82–3 Marshall’s theory of 21 in multi-party period textbooks 109 and rights 80, 83, 137, 178 see also citizenship rights citizenship education 1969 syllabus 135 CHP textbooks 77–85 in Cyprus 190 in England 188–9 foundation for national unity 32 in France 187–8 in Greece 189–90 on human rights 180–81 international interest in 6–7 and minority groups 133, 178–9, 182, 185–6, 186, 190–91 see also textbooks Citizenship and Human Rights Education 180–81 Citizenship and Identity (Işın and Wood) 4–5 Citizenship Laws 47–8, 120–21, 145–50 citizenship rights 1961 Constitution 118–20 1982 Constitution 141–2, 143 AP inconsistent approach 115–16 CHP programmes 42–3, 65–6, 90 civil, political and social 20–22 definitions 135 DP programmes 91–2 and duties 80, 83, 137 importance in liberal society 26–7 limitations of 177–8 of movement 120 in multi-party period textbooks 109 protection of 144 restrictions 135, 143 see also citizenship duties; human rights civic education see citizenship education Civic Information for the Citizen (Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler) 77–80 civic republican citizenship 27–9, 34 civic virtue 6, 30–32, 80

I dentity

in

Turkey

civil citizenship 21 Civil Code 53 Civil Service Law 71–2 CKMP (Republican Peasant’s Nation Party/ Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi) 126 Cohen, Moiz (Tekin Alp) 61–2 communitarian citizenship 26–9 conscientious objectors 149 Constitution 1924 43–6, 93–4, 109, 119 1961 117–20, 122 1982 141–5 Article 13 143 Article 88 12, 43–4 referendum 145 constitutional citizenship advantages of 8–10, 20, 193, 195–6 solution to Kurdish issue 1, 9, 123–4, 168–9 Constitutional Court 139 constitutional patriotism 32–7 see also constitutional citizenship Crick Report 188 Cyprus citizenship education 190 and Greeks in Turkey 128 September 1955 events 103–6 DEHAP (Democratic People’s Party/ Demokratik Halk Partisi) 166–7 Demirel, Süleyman and Alevis 153 AP leader 114–17 and Christians 158 and communism 131 and constitutional citizenship 1, 8–9, 168–9 and Kurdish issue 168–9, 172 democracy 17, 29, 108, 143–4, 186 Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DEP) 166 Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) criticised in textbooks 133 definition of nationalism 98–9 electoral success 88–9 Freedom Pact 91–2 membership regulations 102 and People’s Houses 67 Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) 139, 170 Democratic Peace Movement (Demokratik Barış Hareketi, DBH) 157 Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP) 166–7 Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) 167 DEP (Democracy Party/Demokrasi Partisi) 166 Dicle, Hatip 166, 167 Dink, Hrant 163–4

I ndex Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) 151–2, 153, 154, 158, 159, 194 Doğan, Orhan 166, 167 DP see Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) DSP (Democratic Left Party/Demokratik Sol Parti) 139, 170 DTP (Democratic Society Party/Demokratik Toplum Partisi) 167 dual citizenship 145–6, 147–9 duties see citizenship duties DYP (True Path Party/Doğru Yol Partisi) 139, 169 Eastern Report 107–8 Ecevit, Bülent 125, 170 education 176–7 see also People’s Houses (Halkevleri); schools elections 1950 92–3 1950-58 88–9 1961-65 114–15 1965 125 1983-2011 138–41 Alevi political parties 127–8 and small parties 116 see also voting employment 71–3 England, citizenship 25, 188–9 equality, definition 14 Erbakan, Necmettin 139, 140, 171 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip and Alevis 153, 155 and Armenians 163–4 and citizenship 2 and Kurds 172–3 popularity 140 South-east Action Plan 175–6 Erim, Nihat 119 ethnicity 50, 63, 121, 142, 173, 184–5, 185 see also Kurdish identity European Commission 153 European Court of Human Rights 155–7 European Union and conscientious objection 149 Turkish membership 143, 144, 173 Eurovision Song Competition 130 fatherland (vatan) 42, 78–9, 82 Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) 140 foundations (vakıflar) 109, 130, 153–4, 158–62 FP (Virtue Party/Fazilet Partisi) 139 France citizenship 23–4, 25 citizenship education 187–8 Franko, Marcel 61, 62 freedom 64–5, 66, 94–5, 115–16 Freedom Pact 91–2

289

Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi) 105 French Revolution 23 Galip, Reşit 69 Galston, William A. 31 Gaziosmanpaşa uprising 152–3 Germany anti-Semitism 58–9 citizenship 23–4, 25 Gillborn, David 189 Gök, Fatma 180 Greece, citizenship education 189–90 Greeks deportation of 106, 129 Population Exchange Agreement 50–52 property ownership 130 September 1955 riots 103–6 in Turkey 96, 128–30 Turkish citizens 134 Gül, Abdullah 140 Gümüşpala, Ragıp 114 Gürsel, Cemal 115 Habermas, Jürgen 8, 19, 32–7 Hacapulos, Aleksandros 105 Halkevleri (People’s Houses) 63–7, 83 Hamdi, Ahmet 44 Hazim, Naim 44–5 headscarves 139, 140 Heater, Derek 3, 16, 27 HEP (People’s Labour Party/Halkın Emek Partisi) 165–6 HP (Populist Party/Halkçı Parti) 138 human rights 91, 95, 109, 115, 147, 180 Human Rights Association 91 İçduygu, Ahmet 36 İnal, Kemal 177 İnan, Afet 68, 77–80 İnönü, İsmet 39–40, 55, 88 İzmir Stock Exchange 71 identity Alevi 123, 158 and citizenship 5–6, 10, 20, 38 and democracy 29 IEA questionnaire 17 Islamic 150 Kurdish 8, 122–4, 125, 171 post-conventional 35 supra/sub-identity 2, 172–3, 191–2 immigration 50–55, 79 Intellectuals’ Hearth 150, 179 International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) 16–18, 184 Islam 70, 139, 140, 173 see also Sunni Islam Islamic fundamentalism 151 Islamic identity 150

290

C itizenship

and

Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) 138–9, 153, 169, 170–71 Israel, Jewish migration to 100–101 Işın, Engin 4–5 Jews anti-Semitism 58–9, 97 and CHP 51 emigration 76, 100–101 Turkish citizens 134 and Turkish language 61–3 jus sanguinis citizenship 23–5, 46–8, 121 jus soli citizenship 23–5, 46–8 Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) 140–41, 144–5, 171–4 Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) 114–17 Kadıoğlu, Ayşe 24, 196 Kahraman, Hasan Bülent 22 Karabatak, Haluk 58 Kaya, Şükrü 51, 62 Kazan, Şevket 170 Kemalism 12, 43, 49, 64, 69, 176, 177 Keyman, Fuat 36, 193–4 Kili, Suna 76, 85 Kurban, Dilek 14, 161 Kurdish identity 8, 122–4, 125, 171 Kurdish language 70, 168, 170, 173–6 Kurdish nationalism 132–3, 165 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, PKK) 153, 165, 167 Kurdistan Workers’ Party/Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (PKK/KADEK) 165 Kurds assimilation attempts 55–8 ‘Case of the 49’ 107–8 CHP’s new approach 98 and constitutional citizenship 9, 123–4, 168–9 linguistic minority 13 need for political dialogue 194–5 political attempts to solve 123–4, 167–76 political parties 165–7 and terrorism 165, 168 Kutan, Recai 171 Kymlicka, Will 5–6, 15, 29, 31 laiklik see secularism Law on Settlement 53–5, 56–8, 107 Levi, Avner 53, 58 Lewis, Bernard 49, 76, 89 liberal citizenship 26–9, 34 Malumat-ı Vataniyye 81 Marshall, Thomas H. 20–22, 30 Matsliah, Nissim 62

I dentity

in

Turkey

MDP (Nationalist Democracy Party/ Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi) 138 Menderes, Adnan 1950 government programme 93–4 death sentence 89 on freedom 94–5 and Greek citizens 103 and People’s Houses 64 Prime Minister 88–9 and September 1955 riots 103, 105 MHP (Nationalist Action Party/Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) 126, 139, 160–61, 169 military interventions 114, 116–17, 133, 138 military service 46, 95–6, 100, 146–7, 149 Miller, David 38 minority groups and civic education 133, 178–9, 182, 185–6, 186, 190–91 definition 12–13 Muslim minorities not recognised 13 and political parties 120 see also non-Muslims; non-Turkish Muslims minority schools 96, 129–30, 162 Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) 138 Müller, Jan-Werner 195 Musahabat-ı Ahlakiye ve Malumat-ı Vataniyye 80–81 Muslim ethnic Turks 40 Muslims, from Greece 50–52 names 61, 171 nation (millet) 109–110 in CHP programmes 42 and citizenship 20, 22–3 defined in 1961 Constitution 117 defined 78, 81 qualities of 81 and state 24 national identity see identity National Schools 63, 69 nationalism 97–9, 118, 122, 134 Atatürkist nationalism 142, 177 Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) 126, 139, 160–61, 169 Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, MDP) 138 Nationalist Work Party 171 navy 129 nomadic tribes 54–5 non-Muslims attacks against 162–4 ‘bad people’ 84–5 CHP’s new approach 95–8 continuing discrimination against 162–4 difficulty of assimilation 41, 52 employment 71–3 foundations 158–62

I ndex minority status 13, 40, 48, 52–3, 192 and People’s Houses 66–7 recent improvements 158 reclaim of citizenship 148–9 tolerance towards 79–80 unwanted 40, 59 Wealth Tax 74–7 see also Greeks non-Turkish Muslims 40, 41, 79, 192 Norman, Wayne 5–6, 15, 29 Nur, Rıza 51 Nuri, Celal 44–5 Oommen, T.K. 38 Orhon, Seyfi Orhon 59 Orthodox Church 106, 162 Ottoman Empire 81, 83, 191 Ottoman Nationality Regulation 47 Öymen, Onur 160 Özal, Turgut 138, 150, 167–8 Özbudun, Ergun 46, 144 Pamuk, Orhan 163 Patriarchate 103, 106, 162 Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) 167 Peace Party (Barış Partisi, BP) 157 Peker, Recep 42, 63, 65, 96–8 People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP) 166 People’s Houses (Halkevleri) 63–7, 83 People’s Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP) 165–6 People’s Orators Organisation 63 People’s Rooms 67 PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party/Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan) 153, 165, 167 Population Exchange Agreement 50–52, 96 Populist Party (Halkçı Parti, HP) 138 press freedom 90, 91, 94 property Greek ownership of 130 see also foundations (vakıflar) public sector 71–2, 162 Putnam, Robert 30 radical citizenship 25 radio broadcasting 174–5, 176 religion 1944 Constitution 46 1961 Constitution 118 Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) 151–2, 153, 154, 158, 159, 194 places of worship 159 religious freedom 122, 126, 142, 144 see also cem houses; Christians; Islam; Orthodox church; Sunni Islam religious education 126, 127, 142, 155–7

291

Republican Peasant’s Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, CKMP) 126 Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) Alevi support for 157 citizenship and nationality 39–40 democratisation and liberalisation 88, 90–91 elections 140 and foundations 160 homogenisation policies 51–8 Kurdish problem 170 manifestos 40–43 moves to ‘left of centre’ 124–6 new definition of nationalism 97–8 party membership conditions 41–2 six principles 43, 49, 64, 83 rights see citizenship rights; human rights Roncalli, Monsignor Angelo Giuseppe 63 RP (Islamist Welfare Party/Refah Partisi) 138–9, 153, 169, 170–71 Rumelian Muslims 51, 52 Rustow, Dankwart 89 Sadak, Necmettin 103 Sadak, Selim 166, 167 Saffet, Mehmet 65–6 Sander, Mithat 82 Saraçoğlu, Şükrü 75, 98 schools curricula 62 minority schools 96, 129–30, 162 National Schools 63, 69 and Russian authors 95 secularism (laiklik) 41, 49, 66, 84, 118, 125, 139, 140, 151, 194 Settlement Laws 53–5, 56–8 Sevinç, Kazım 81, 82, 84 Sezer, Ahmed Necdet 159 SHP (Social Democratic Party/ Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi) 147, 165, 170 Sivas massacre 152 social capital 30 social citizenship 21 social cohesion 18 Social Democratic Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi, SHP) 147, 165, 170 social studies textbooks 181–2 Society for the Study of Turkish History (TTK) 63, 67–9 Society for the Study of Turkish Language (TDK) 63, 67–8, 70–71 Soriano, Hanri 62 South-east Action Plan 175–6 SP (Felicity Party/Saadet Partisi) 140 sport 83 Sternberger, Dolf 32–3 strikes 94, 120

292

C itizenship

and

Sun Language Theory 67–8, 70, 78, 176 Sunni Islam and Alevis 131–2, 151–3, 155–6, 194 and religious freedom 126 and the Turkish State 8, 126, 127, 142, 150, 177 in textbooks 179–80 Turkish-Islamic synthesis 150, 177 Suphi, Hamdullah 45, 60 surnames 61, 157, 171 Talabani, Jelal 168 Taş, Necati Tayyar 154 Taşkıran, Tezer 82 Taylor, Charles 26 TBP (Unity Party of Turkey/Türkiye Birlik Partisi) 127–8 TDK (Society for the Study of Turkish Language) 63, 67–8, 70–71 television broadcasting 174–5, 176 terrorism Kurdish nationalists 165, 168, 179 in Turkey 116–17, 179 textbooks 1960-80 era 133–5 CHP era 77–85 ideological indoctrination 177 minority groups’ absence from 133, 182 multi-party period 108–111 religious 162 similarity throughout all eras 176–7 since 1980 176–82 social studies 181–2 Thrace Incidents 58–9 TİP (Turkish Workers’ Party/Türkiye İşçi Partisi) 122–4 Toprak, Zafer 59 torture 125 trade unions 94 Treaty of Lausanne 13, 44, 52–3, 72, 111, 159, 160–61 Treaty of Sevres 85, 111, 186 True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) 139, 169 TTK (Society for the Study of Turkish History) 63, 67–9 Türkeş, Alparslan 126, 169 Turkification 49, 55–8, 61, 71–7 Turkish alphabet 69, 70

I dentity

in

Turkey

Turkish Hearths 60, 83 see also Intellectuals’ Hearth Turkish History Thesis 68–9, 78 Turkish language 59–63, 69–71, 72, 78, 127 Sun Language Theory 67–8, 70, 78, 176 Turkish Nationalist Association 102 Turkish Workers’ Party (Türkiye I[.]şçi Partisi, TI[.]P) 122–4 Turkish-Islamic synthesis 150, 177 Turkishness in 1924 Constitution 44–5 in 1961 Constitution 119 defined 11–12, 192 in draft Constitution 144 and ethnicity 184–5 in textbooks 81, 184–5 Turner, Bryan S. 25, 192 Ülkü (journal) 65–6 Unity Party (Birlik Partisi, BP) 127–8 Unity Party of Turkey (Türkiye Birlik Partisi, TBP) 127–8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 91, 95, 109, 147 Üniversiteler İçin Vatandaşlık Bilgisi 179–80 van Gunsteren, Herman 2–3, 28–9 Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler 77–80 Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları 180–81 Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) 139 voting, citizens’ duty 80 Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) 73–7, 99 women 121, 143 Wood, Patricia 4–5 World War II 73–4 xenophobia 179, 182 Yeprem, Saim 154 Yeğen, Mesut 11–12, 40 Yücel, Hasan Ali 59 Yumul, Arus 40 Yurt Bilgisi 81, 84 Yurt Bilgisi I 82 Yurt Bilgisi Özü 82 Yurttaşlık Bilgisi 108–9 Zana, Leyla 166, 167 Zorlu, Fatin Rüştü 103