Chinese ways in warfare 9780674182059, 9780674182042

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Chinese Ways in Warfare Harvard East Asian Series 74

The East Asian Research Center at Harvard University administers research projects designed to further scholarly understanding of China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and adjacent areas.

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73

Michael Loewe

the Hsiung-nu in 133 8.c., Han began to take the offensive (from 129}, while incursions by the Hsiung-nu were a matter of annual occurrence for some years. In 127 s.c. Chinese forces retook territory south of the Yellow River that had passed under the control of the Hsiung-nu and strengthened their position markedly by the establishment and fortification of two new commanderies (Shuo-fang and Wu-yiian). A conspicuous success was gained by the Chinese in 121 s.c. Following the dispatch of several expeditions against the Hsiung-nu, one of their kings, entitled Hun-hsieh, surrendered with a large body of his tribesmen. Five dependent states (shu-kuo) were established in which those peoples were to be settled and brought under the general force of Han authority,”° and the Han forces stationed in the garrisons of Lung-hsi, Pei-ti, and Shang chiin were reduced by half. Two years later a very large expedition was sent out. Although it failed to capture the Shan-yii, the leaders claimed to have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. But the main result of these campaigns was the stabilization and consolidation of the frontier line, which ran along the Yellow River, from Shuo-fang commandery to the prefecture of Ling-chii. The Han position was strengthened by irrigation works and the establishment of offices which supervised agriculture, in which 50,000 to 60,000 conscripts were engaged.** No further incursions by the Hsiung-nu are recorded until 103 B.c., with two exceptions—in 112, a Hsiung-nu raid may have been inspired by the hope of coordinated activity between the Hsiung-nu and the Western Ch’iang tribesmen,” and there was a small-scale raid in 107. No military activity is recorded for the years between 119 and 112 B.c., and thereafter it became possible to expand Han influence elsewhere. Campaigns fought in the south (against Nan-yiieh, 112—111) and the southwest (111) were followed by the pacification of the local inhabitants and the establishment of fourteen commanderies. According to the Han-shu, the population was evacuated from the coastal belt lying opposite the present island of Taiwan, but it is questionable whether this measure was actually carried out.’* In 109-108 sB.c. two expeditions were sent against Ch’ao-hsien (in the present Korea}, and four commanderies were founded there in 108; at the same time Han forces had been penetrating more deeply into the southwest, where I-chou commandery was established in 109.**

74

The Campaigns of Han Wv-ti

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125

Charles A. Peterson

capital lay effectively in the hands of provincial governors whose responsibilities in civil administration were backed by control over sizable military forces (see map}.* In the ensuing decades the central government made gradual if painful progress toward the goal of reasserting effective control over the provinces. By the end of the eighth century the majority of provinces had been returned to civilian control and top provincial posts, civil and military alike, were filled by court nominees. However, a small group of powerful provinces, some seven in number, remained completely out of government control, functioning as autonomous entities under self-appointed leaders. Six were clustered in the northeastern corner of the empire, in modern Hopei and Shantung, and a seventh, Huai-hsi {west of the Huai) was located in the southwestern part of the T’ang province of Honan on the upper waters of the Huai River system. It became the chosen task of Hsien-tsung upon his accession in 805 to bring these seven back into tow and thus restore a centralized regime. Inevitably this meant direct and usually armed confrontations with these and other provinces, which occupied his entire reign. He was largely, if not totally, successful. Upon his death in 820 the number of autonomous provinces had been reduced to two, and the empire generally had been put on a stable footing which would endure for nearly half a century.’ From its inception in the An Lu-shan rebellion, Huai-hsi had been under unadulterated military control. Its first governor, during a period when its assigned responsibilities and territory were considerably greater than later, had proved a stout loyalist in the rebellion, one of a small number of northeastern officers who did not follow An into revolt.® Though the political loyalties of this figure may not subsequently have changed in a fundamental sense, all indications are that he paid little heed to court directives in running the province. When a mutiny ousted him in 779, the province soon took on a distinctly menacing aspect toward the court which it was to retain down to 817. Under its new leadership it joined the great provincial revolts of 781-786 and, like the other rebel provinces, it remained undefeated at the end of the rebellion.’ A general with loyalist leanings gained control long enough to restore peace, but he was soon violently displaced by another general, very likely an entire clique, committed to a strongly separatist course.® For the following three decades three governors bearing the name Wu, though not all of the same family, jealously 126

The Huai-hsi Campaign, 815-817

guarded the autonomy of the province and, when necessary, defended it with force.® The first such successful defense took place in the early 780’s. A second occurred in the years 799-800 when the government launched a major military effort against the province but failed.*® Thus by 815, when plans were set in motion which would call for a third campaign, there could be no illusions at court about the difficulty of recovering Huai-hsi. In normal circumstances a fragile kind of coexistence obtained between an autonomous province such as Huai-hsi and the central government. That relations were not always starkly hostile is shown by the fact that the government made grants of grain to the province in time of distress.*' In general, there were few signs, and even fewer acts, of subordination on the part of the province. Upon the death of a governor his successor invariably sought confirmation in office from the throne, an acknowledgment of the polite fiction (if not in these cases of the fact) that all power emanated from the emperor. This proved to be a propitious time for the government to act, before the new leadership secured its hold over the province. It was precisely on such occasions that Hsien-tsung made his moves against the autonomous provinces. In 809, when this issue arose over Huai-hsi for the first time in his reign, his hands were tied by the conduct of another campaign. Accordingly, he gave his consent to the self-appointed successor. However, the province was definitely marked out as an eventual target, and when the issue of succession next emerged late in 814, the emperor was determined to act. Reports of policy differences among the province’s leaders now accompanied those of the impending change in leadership, giving the government time to prepare for military action. ” In comparison with the major autonomous provinces in the region of modern Hopei and Shantung, Huai-hsi was modest in size and resources. Where the others commonly comprised six prefectures (chou) and more, Huai-hsi embraced only three. These were Ts’ai-chou (the provincial seat], Shen-chou, and Kuang-chou, corresponding rather closely to the modern towns of Ju-nan, Hsin-yang, and Huang-ch’uan, respectively, a triangular zone located thus about half way between modern Wuhan and Kaifeng. This is an area occupying the very southwest corner of the North China Plain and watered by the Huai River system. Much of the province lay in fact on the plain, but it possessed natural boundaries of some importance on the south, the Ta-pieh Hills, and on the west, the T’ung-pai

27

Charles A. Peterson

Hills (shan being in this case better translated as hills than as mountains}. In view, however, of the development of a major north-south land route through the eastern portion of this area in Sung times** and especially of the frequency with which Chinese and foreign armies moved through the area likewise under the Sung, it would be unwise to lay great stress on any natural defensive barriers which the province enjoyed. In strategic terms the province suffered one basic disability not shared by other autonomous provinces. Whereas they were all located in the northeast where they were in a position to provide mutual aid in the face of any government initiatives, Huai-hsi lay isolated among essentially loyal provinces. By the same token, however, it occupied a very dangerous position from the point of view of the government, since it could at will launch disruptive raids east against the canal system and south and southeast against the rich Yangtze provinces. As a consequence, the government had no choice but to maintain heavy, and costly, garrisons in adjoining provinces. Then as now, this must have been a productive agricultural region, though figures to show this are lacking. Certainly the density of its contemporary population suggests its potential. On the size of Huai-hsi’s population in the early ninth century one can speculate only very roughly. The last reliable T’ang figures, from the middle of the eighth century, show a global population for the three Huai-hsi prefectures of 144,398 households or 806,541 persons,’® though it should be noted that these are tax registration, not census, figures and that throughout the T’ang the incidence of underregistration seems to have been fairly high.** Because we are dealing with a period six or seven decades after the compilation of these statistics, and because the north-south migration in progress since the beginning of the eighth century would almost certainly have benefitted this area,’ it would not be extravagant to place the population at or above a million.** In short, while no great population center, this area had significant human resources. Was the populace itself separatist like its militarist leaders or, dissatisfied with them, did it seek closer association with the throne? This is a question which can be answered only obliquely and with reserve, but in view of the specific nature of our topic it cannot be ignored. In the first place, it was explicitly acknowledged at court that the local regimes in these autonomous provinces had over the years acquired genuine legitimacy in the eyes of the local populations. Generations 128

The Huai-hsi Campaign, 815-817

had been born and had grown up since the time when these provinces were ruled from Ch’ang-an. By now interest and loyalty alike bound these people to their immediate leaders.*® Second, the tenacity of the provincial resistance to government attempts at recovery strongly suggests that local support was strong. Though there are many other cases which exemplify this point, that of Huai-hsi is one of the best. As we shall see, evidence of desertion of the provincial cause is significantly lacking until the final phase. Furthermore, whatever the precise nature of popular feelings toward them, the leaders no doubt profited from a natural conviction among the people that they were fighting to protect their homes. 2. Preparations for the Campaign Early in the summer of 814 the court received intelligence on the impending change of leadership in Huai-hsi.”° As the time for this change drew near, it initiated preparations in the eighth and ninth months” for the military confrontation which was foreseen as likely to attend its effort to select the new governor. These included the appointment of established military commanders to head key adjoining provinces, the payment of a large bounty to assure the loyalty of the army in a powerful northeastern province, and presumably a mobilization of troops.” The court then turned to diplomacy to secure the compliance of Wu Yiian-chi, who had by now succeeded his father as head of Huai-hsi. It could hardly have been surprised to see this effort meet with total failure, but it had surely overlooked the possible military repercussions of this move.”*

Now aware of the court’s intentions, Wu responded in the ninth month by launching a series of far-ranging and highly destructive raids on neighboring towns, primarily to the east, north, and northwest. Their effects are said to have been felt over an area spanning a thousand li (over 330 miles} and large numbers of refugees reportedly took to the roads in flight.” No doubt, one of Wu’s aims was precisely to throw fright into popular and official circles alike and gain a psychological advantage for the upcoming struggle. Another motive may have been to obtain supplies and stores which would be much needed in the event of a lengthy contest. But, above all, Wu was seeking specific military advantage. This action enabled him to establish strong advance positions beyond his own 129

Charles A. Peterson

borders, as a consequence of which the campaign would be long underway before any fighting reached Huai-hsi soil.” Whatever steps the government had already taken, they were clearly inadequate to prevent Wu from seizing a significant opening advantage. Indeed, only after the first of the year 815 would government forces be in any position to offer battle. The edict formally ordering specific military commanders and units into action was first issued in the first month of 815,” although one must assume that preparations, particularly of a logistic nature, had been underway at least since Wu’s raids.” Moreover, there was a standing obstacle to the government’s obtaining quick results, not only in mobilizing armies but also on the battlefield itself. This was the highly decentralized character of the military structure and the diversity of forces on which the court would have to rely. Since the An Lu-shan rebellion, the principal military component in the country had consisted of the provincial armies, under the direct control of military governors.** Though both the prestige and power of the central government had recovered immeasurably by this time, these armies were still under the immediate direction of the governors, albeit they were court-appointed. This system persisted through inertia but seems also to have been supported by the troops themselves as well as the officers. Since the 780’s the government had also built up a formidable group of Palace Armies (Shen-ts’e chitin) which were under its direct control. Though it made use of these forces in other campaigns in the interior and to some extent in this one as well, their use was restricted by their principal mission, which was to garrison key points around the capital and to participate in northwest frontier defense. Political considerations unquestionably account for the extreme diversity in composition of the government’s forces on this occasion. Past campaigns had shown how difficult it was to keep those loyalist armies which had played the most important roles from strengthening themselves still further in the eventual division of the spoils. As long as these armies were used as integral units, something of a vicious circle was bound to obtain. To meet this danger, the solution was to spread both the obligation and the opportunity for self-aggrandizement as thinly as possible. The government, therefore, drew contingents from possibly as many as twenty provinces, the largest of which may have been several thousand but many of which were no more than 2,000. These forces were 130

The Huai-hsi Campaign, 815-817

then variously placed under one of five major commands.” Possibly this policy represented an attempt to break down the established provincial army organizations as such. By mixing troops and commanders as it did, the court appears to have been trying to create a ‘‘national” force of sorts, with soldiers conscious of fighting no longer for their provincial leaders but for the throne. Unfortunately for its immediate aim of winning the war, the disadvantages which could initially have been expected from such lack of cohesion were ultimately realized in practice. The number of troops that the government put into the field against Huai-hsi is given as 90,000.*° This seems too modest a number, and quite possibly it mounted higher on occasion.** In any event it is altogether consistent with other figures we have from this period on troops and armies.** These troops, like most of their rebel adversaries, were professionals. The famous old national militia system (fu-ping) had been in desuetude for perhaps a full century, and the swing toward professionalization of the military had been completed by the An Lu-shan rebellion.** Local militia were widely used, but in the mobilization for an offensive campaign such as this, all the government troops were certainly regulars. This may have assured a certain minimum level of training and discipline, but while some of the best provincial armies were represented in this campaign, it was not necessarily by their best troops. On the Huai-hsi side the question of numbers is a good deal more difficult. This is due not only to the inadequacy of information relative to the internal circumstances of the rebels but also to the greater role which the nonprofessional element must have played. Since this was a defensive war on or around Huai-hsi soil, it was feasible, and probably imperative, to draw heavily on local militia.** There is no reliable way of assessing the size of this component, but we could without exaggeration set it at 25 percent of the total number of effectives. This would not include civilians pressed into temporary service in the defense of towns, a practice which we know was a matter of course.*° These important auxiliaries aside, the main fighting force was made up of regulars. Not one of the largest in the provinces, this was a top-notch army which had never really been beaten and which had utmost confidence in itself.** In an earlier reference and at a time when it was on the offensive, we find it numbered at 30,000. Under the circumstances this probably meant as many regulars.*” Combined with the militia, 131

Charles A. Peterson

therefore, the Huai-hsi army should have reached the neighborhood of 40,000, again a figure which corresponds well with other contemporary ones.*° The strategies which were adopted on each side, as these forces assembled for the conflict, were necessarily determined by the objectives pursued. For Huai-hsi the objective simply was survival as a political entity. It could hardly expect to overwhelm and conquer its adversaries; but it could hope to hold them off, and at a high cost to them, until the court abandoned its effort. Since there was ample precedent for this, it can by no means be counted as an unrealistic aim. In the nature of things the rebel province was obliged to leave to its attackers the overall initiative. However, as we shall see, Huai-hsi attempted to carry the battle to them as often as possible.

The government's objective was the relatively limited one of removing the present leadership of the province. That is, it had little interest in annihilating rebel forces in the field, except to the extent that such action was necessary to expose their leaders, and even less in inflicting harm on the populace.*® On the contrary, it loudly professed a policy of clemency in an effort to wean support away from the rebel camp.*® Despite this and despite its intentions, as the campaign ground on at cruel length, a war of attrition inevitably developed. To pursue the campaign the government established five separate commands on the periphery of Huai-hsi—to the north, the northeast, the east (or southeast}, the south, and the west (see map).*? Operationally, the first two seem frequently to have coordinated their movements, forming a combined northern front. Since they were assigned both the best and probably the largest number of troops, this front must generally have been considered the most critical. Nevertheless, the designation of commander in chief went to one Yen Shou, who held the western command, conceivably because the government intended to make a major drive on this flank. In any event it should be observed that Yen held no title which functionally enabled him to direct the other commanders* and that in terms of command structure the prevailing military and administrative systems permitted at best a primus inter pares. The record of the campaign would be easier to reconstruct if overall results were only somewhat commensurate with the events reported. In fact they are not, a discrepancy explained certainly by the bias of our sources. For moral reasons 132

The Huai-hsi Campaign, 815-817

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Herbert Franke

generally not more than fifteen to thirty feet high. This is indirectly corroborated by the fact that it was possible to attack a town by means of wooden structures, collapsible bridges, or “cloud ladders” from which the advancing enemies could jump on to the top of the walls. The outer walls, yang-ma-ch’eng (lit., “walls for sheep and horses”) got their name because cattle evacuated from the countryside were sometimes left between them and the town wall proper. It is said that “formerly” (before the twelfth century) they were only up to six feet high and three feet thick but that later they were raised to ten feet high and six feet thick, and provided with battlements.** The weng-ch’eng (lit., “jar-like walls’) or ylieh-ch’eng |“crescent-shaped walls”) formed a semicircle around the inner gate and thus offered additional protection against assailants who might penetrate the outer gate. The defensive and offensive role of long-range projectile weapons, later performed by artillery, was performed in Sung and Yiian times by crossbows and catapults, the most important heavy weapons before the invention of firearms. The Chinese crossbow had been technically mature at least since the Warring States and Han periods. It had assured Chinese superiority in the wars with the Hsiung-nu and other foreigners. In those early days crossbows were portable weapons, operated mostly by one archer, or more probably by a team of two or three to load, cock, and shoot. But later composite crossbows were an important innovation, particularly for attacking or defending towns. The Sung, and perhaps already the T’ang, had a crossbow artillery in which up to three single bows were combined into one, so that a considerably enhanced propelling force was produced. These weapons were mounted on a wooden structure and could be moved only with difficulty because of their weight. The composite crossbows were cocked by a windingwheel and had to be operated by as many as a hundred men in the case of the triple crossbow, or by up to ten for a double crossbow. The effective range is given as up to 300 paces (pu). The pu was apparently not a standardized measure, so that only an approximate estimate can be made. If we take two feet as a normal “pace,” the maximum range would be something like 200 yards.** This means that the besieging troops could approach their target without danger up to that distance from the walls. For the defenders this had the advantage that from the watchtowers and lookouts on the walls the enemy’s actions: 166

Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China

could be observed and that a large-scale surprise attack was more or less impossible, except perhaps at night. This is clearly demonstrated by the diaries of sieges, where we read over and over again how the defenders could prepare their counteractions before the full onslaught took place. The projectiles for crossbows were either pellets or arrows; within a certain distance they could pierce even armor and were much feared because of their penetrating power. Crossbows, being low-trajectory-firing weapons, could not be used to hit targets behind covers like walls or houses. Targets impossible for them were struck by catapults, the siege artillery par excellence in medieval China. Considerable space is devoted to these weapons in the older handbooks; many types are described in detail. They were basically all of a simple leveroperated type, that is, one or several (up to nine or ten) wooden levers strung together were kept in balance on a mount; one end of the lever carried a sort of basket for the projectile while a varying number of ropes was fastened to the other end which the crew had to pull. The range and efficiency of this kind of weapon (Needham uses the medieval term “trebuchet’’)** therefore depended upon the number of operators. It is surprising that the torsion catapult, a weapon which the Romans already had (Latin, onager) and which had the advantage that it could be wound up by comparatively few people, was apparently never invented in China. The Chinese trebuchet needed a great number of soldiers, an assemblage which of course offered an easy target to the enemy. Even a single-lever catapult in China might need forty men, pulling two each at the twenty ropes of the instrument, which could hurl a two-pound stone up to a distance of fifty pu. The biggest type of catapult had a pulling crew of 250 and 125 ropes; the levers were 2.8 chang long {about twenty to thirty feet) and could throw a ninety-pound stone over a distance of fifty pu, that is, only a hundred feet. During a siege these weapons therefore had to be moved very close to the walls of the town, and the defenders could use catapults only if the enemy had come that close. The maximum range of any type was eighty pu (about 160 feet) according to Wu-ching tsung-yao.** The ranges as given by Ch’en Kuei in his Shou-ch’eng lu, however, differ considerably from the figures given above. According to him a single lever first-class catapult has a range of 270 pu, a second-class one of 260, and a third-class one of 250 pu, with a crew of ten to fifteen men. This is more than three times as 167

Herbert Franke

much as the eleventh century handbook says, and would put catapults into the same range group as crossbows. For a “far-reaching” catapult (yiian-p’ao) he even gives 350 pu as maximum effective range.*’ It is probable that in the twelfth century, to which the Shou-ch’eng lu belongs, innovations had taken place which made this long-range shooting possible, but no structural differences from earlier types are mentioned. We can distinguish movable and fixed catapults. A type which was mounted on a vertical axis and could therefore revolve was called a ‘whirlwind catapult” (hsiian-feng p’ao) and required a crew of fifty. This weapon could hurl its projectile in any direction whereas, in the case of the catapult mounted on a fixed structure, the whole contraption had to be moved if one wished to shoot in a new direction. Others were mounted on carriages in order to make them more mobile (ch’e-p’ao).*®

In the opinion of Ch’en Kuei,*® catapults are the most efficient weapons against towns. If the enemy leader is skilled in the use of catapults, he may conquer any town, while the garrison commander who knows how to use them may check the attacking forces. With catapults the enemy can destroy the wooden watchtowers erected on top of the walls; this is why such towers are regarded as obsolete in the twelfth century. Catapults should never be placed on the wall tops but always inside the walls, yet so close to them that targets can be made out. For this purpose a soldier is placed on the walls as “forward artillery observer” from where he directs the operation by indicating how the machine should be given a certain angle and by telling what the distance of the target is. For a small difference in direction it is sufficient for the men who operate the catch mechanism to move their feet; for a greater difference the whole machine must be moved unless it is of the movable, revolving type. Range is determined by how hard the ropes are stretched. If the last projectile went too far, the pulling crew is diminished, if not far enough, men are added. One should use big machines against enemy weapons, and long-range smaller ones (yiian-p’ao) against living targets like enemy staff personnel or transport coolies. There follows a long paragraph with technical details on the construction of catapults. For the levers certain kinds of wood like the Li oak (quercus sinensis) should be used. The beams from these trees are soaked for several months in water, the bark is scraped off, and after drying the wood can be used. The ropes 168

Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China

must be made from hemp and leather twisted together, because if the weather is fine, leather shrinks and hemp distends, whereas in rainy weather leather tends to become soft and hemp shrinks. A mixture of the two materials therefore will guarantee uniform operation throughout the year. So much for the catapults themselves. A word must be added on the projectiles. They were, as we have seen, stones or clay bullets. According to Ch’en Kuei, the balls or bullets should always be of uniform size, because then a target will be hit provided the catapult has been adjusted correctly. Round bullets are better for shooting long distances. Ch’en Kuei says that even the stones hurled by a small catapult may break a person’s arms or legs, and that the effect is deadly if the thorax or head is hit. He recommends the simultaneous firing of catapults and also the use of clay bullets instead of stones. Stones might be collected later by the enemy and used against those who originally fired them, but clay bullets not hitting the target will break up into small pieces, though they have the same effect as stories.

The most important use of catapults, however, was for hurling incendiary materials either into the town or at the wooden instruments (catapults, multiple crossbows, ladders, platforms, and so on} of an assaulting force. We have mentioned above how afraid the town commanders were of a major fire. For use in incendiary bombs we find the usual material, such as burning oil-soaked hemp or cotton. But already in Sung times there also existed grenades which contained gunpowder. A recipe is given in Wu-ching tsung-yao,”° and it seems that by the twelfth century the technique of preparing exploding grenades had been perfected to a certain degree. These grenades exploded with a bang and produced smoke which could contain poisonous elements.” A recipe for a gas bomb or grenade is already given in the eleventh century. This “poison and smoke ball” (tu-yao yen-ch’iu) had a weight of five pounds; among the ingredients we find sulphur, niter, aconite, oil, powdered charcoal, resin, and wax.*? Another recipe prescribes paper, hemp-bark, resin, yellow wax, yellow cinnabar (huang-tan), and charcoal powder. This latter type of bomb was therefore not an exploding one but a simple device for producing a suffocating smoke when ignited. A similar kind of bomb or rather mine was the “thundering fire-ball” (p’i-li huo-ch’iu), said to explode with a thundering bang and used in subterranean warfare. We may be brief about the various instruments and machines 169

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which the attacker used in order either to approach the foot of the walls or to scale them. The best known and most frequent type were the “cloud-ladders” (yiin-t’i) mentioned as early as Mo-ti:* a collapsible ladder similar to those used by fire brigades. Another mechanical device was the “heaven-bridge”’ (t’ien-ch’iao), a sort of platform mounted on wheels which was rolled against the outer wall with a number of fighters on the platform. If the platform projected, they were also called ‘goose carriages” (o-ch’e). Frequent mention is made of artificial tunnels (tung-tzu), a sort of corridor built of wood and covered either with planks and boards or with leather which could protect the attackers against arrow-shots. Another device of the besiegers was to build an artificial hill or earthen ramp (t’u-shan), the height of which should reach that of the wall top.”*

All these instruments required a great number of operators, artisans, or workmen, so that in case of an attack hundreds or even thousands of enemy soldiers had to come within easy reach of the defenders on the walls. The ladders and platforms as well as the tunnels were wooden structures and could therefore be smashed by the stones hurled from catapults. Still more frequently, according to the siege diaries, they could be set afire and burned. These bulky structures seem to have become obsolescent under the Ming. Similarly, the wooden watchtowers on top of the walls, which Ch’en Kuei already thought impracticable in the twelfth century, had disappeared under the Ming. This was due not only to the spread of improved firearms but also to the universal use of incendiary warfare, to which these wooden structures were so vulnerable. Finally, a word should be said about communications and signals.*> An elaborate system of beacons and signals had existed under the Han on the walls protecting China against the Hsiung-nu and other potential invaders; basically identical principles were still used under the Sung.** A clever code system is described in Wu-ching tsung-yao. The two commanders who wished to communicate without the enemy being able to understand the exchange of signals had to agree on, say, a forty-word poem in which no word (character) was repeated. The verse had to be memorized as a key to the code. Each character was assigned to one of the forty different orders or reports such as “Advance,” “Retreat,” “Send supplies,” and the corresponding character of the poem was shown on a flag or board.*” Acoustic signals were transmitted also by trumpets 170

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(la-pa) in addition to the traditional instruments, gongs (for retreat) and drums (for advance). After the invention of firearms, gunfire was also used for communication. For example, the direction of advance and attack could be given by signal flags in different colors and a predetermined number of gunshots.*® Therefore a commanding officer always had to have at his staff quarters the necessary flags and lanterns, gongs, bells, and also rockets (ta liu-hsing p’ao).*° The survival of ancient color symbolism is shown by the fact that the colors of flags and lanterns corresponded to the four directions, east: green, south: red, west: white, and north: black; the commander himself had a yellow flag. Provision was also made for signal flags on which huge characters written on paper could be pasted. Messages could, of course, also be transmitted through messengers and couriers; therefore every commander always had to have ready-made paper slips one inch long.®° Any dispatch that had to be carried over long distances was put into wax balls so that the written orders or reports would not suffer from moisture. These wax balls (la-wan) are frequently mentioned in the siege diaries. Firearms. Much has been written on the history of firearms in China®™ and all the relevant texts seem to have come to the attention of scholars in East and West so that a summary may suffice here. It is well known that gunpowder was first used in China for bombs and grenades before its propellant properties were used for cannon. The term huo-p’ao, “fire catapult,” does not, as some authors have thought, mean a cannon or gun but simply a catapult hurling incendiary projectiles. Also the “fire-lance” (huo-ch’iang) invented by Ch’en Kuei was almost certainly not a gun but a kind of flamethrower, a bamboo tube filled with gunpowder. A kind of flamethrower seems also to have been the pumpkin-shaped iron bombard which the Jurchen used in 1221. But the “thunder which shakes Heaven” (chen-t’ien lei) which was used during the siege of Kaifeng in 1234 may already have been a firearm in the accepted sense. Another instrument was the “fire-throwing lance” (t’u-huo ch’iang) which the Sung Chinese used during the defense of Shou-ch’un against the Mongols in 1259. This weapon was, however, essentially a bamboo tube and therefore not a real gun. The “flying fire-lances” (fei-huo ch’iang) mentioned severally in the Chin dynasty history, Chin-shih, were, on the other hand, probably rockets.® It is still uncertain whether the “Mohammedan p’ao” (hui-hui p’ao}) constructed by ’Ala-ud-Din 171

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and Isma’il for the siege of Hsiang-yang in or around 1270-1271 were real guns or only very strong catapults hurling grenades at the defenders.

Therefore it seems that the thirteenth century saw in China a great deal of experimenting with gunpowder among military engineers. No archaeological evidence for guns, bombards, or cannon from the thirteenth century has been discovered yet, but there are many specimens of fourteenth century bombards that have survived. The article by Wang Jung (see note 61} has pictures of early bombards dated 1332, 1351, and 1372. They are quite short, something like fifteen inches, and cannot have been very deadly weapons at that stage of development. They resemble what in German is called a Boller, still used in the countryside for celebrations and salutes. They could not have had great importance for attacking a well-defended town with brick walls; the effect might well have been more psychological than physical. That the fourteenth century saw the development of real firearms in China is corroborated by textual evidence. During the siege of Shao-hsing in 1359 “fire tubes” (huo-tung) are mentioned on several occasions and these are almost certainly real bombards. We do not know much about the technical development of firearms in Ming China after the Hung-wu period (1368-1398], from which quite a few of the surviving bombards date.* A new period is inaugurated in the sixteenth century when European firearms were introduced into China—as is well known, they were in fact a retransmitted innovation from China. But portable guns (muskets, to use the old term) were also modeled in China after European patterns. They were called “bird guns” (niao-ch’ung).* The Ming author, Ch’i Chi-kuang, in 1571 states expressly that this type of gun was not known in China before the raids by Japanese pirates and that its deadly efficiency was greater than that of bows and arrows.® The same text gives for the Fo-lang chi (“Frankish machines,” that is, cannon) a maximum range of one li which surpasses anything known in China prior to the sixteenth century.® It is obvious that battle tactics had to be adapted to this new kind of weapon and that the defense of towns had to reckon more and more with firearms. Lii K’un, in 1607, therefore, says that firearms are the most important of all weapons.*” Among the various types of cannon he praises most highly the “big divine gun mounted on a carriage” (kun-ch’e ta shen-ch’ung) designed by a certain Yeh Meng-hsiung. This gun was 4.5 feet long, and made of 172

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iron, whereas the earlier fourteenth century bombards were cast of bronze. For the seventeenth century we may therefore say that Chinese and European artillery techniques were on a level.** The older weapons like catapults had disappeared; the crossbow again became a weapon for individual soldiers instead of the bulky instrument that was so prominent under the Sung. It remains a matter for future research how the reintroduction of artillery techniques into China actually occurred, but it was of course a development in which the Jesuits played a considerable role. Some remarks on fighting tactics. The general principles of strategy and tactics expounded in the various ancient works on the “Arts of War” (ping-fa) from Sun-tzu on were also applied to the attack on and defense of towns. There is not much in the old Mohist texts on siegecraft which could not also be fitted into the context of the Sung and Ming handbooks. But the later texts elaborated the rather loose dicta of the Sung texts to a considerable degree and are more illustrative because they offer many realistic details. Their authors had personal experience in fighting; they knew what was important and practicable. The disposition of the defenders on top of the walls, for example, is described in full. We must not forget that in case of alarm the civilian population had to provide able-bodied auxiliary soldiers who manned defense positions on the wall. All this required a considerable amount of preparation and judicious organization. The mobilized auxiliary fighters had to be informed early what their assigned positions were; for this purpose drill maneuvers are advocated, and these should take place not only in normal good weather but also on hot, stormy, or rainy days.®° Parts of the wall which are of strategic importance should, however, be guarded by professional soldiers skilled in the use of firearms and bows. The commanding officer should always have at his disposal a tactical reserve force which can be sent to critical points in case of an emergency.”° The duration of alarm duty on the walls must be regulated in great detail. If there are enough men, one may have three shifts of eight hours each during a full day and night; if not, rotation takes place every twelve hours. The commander has to see that day and night duties are equally distributed. The disposition on the wall is made according to the number of battlements. Each five battlements form a fiver-group (wu) with a chief (chang) who is responsible; twenty-five battlements form a unit the head of which is a 173

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wall-chief (ch’eng-chang). A hundred battlements, that is twenty fiver-groups or four wall-groups, are a section (ch’ih) headed by a section-chief (ch’ih-chang). Each chief of a unit has a flag on which the names of his subordinate chiefs are written. In addition, the fiver-group chief's flag must show the numbers of his battlements; these were numbered according to the system of the Thousand Character Text (Ch’ien-tzu wen) that is, the number 1 is represented by the character t’ien (heaven|, number 2 by ti (earth), number 3 by yiian (taboo form for original hstian, dark), and so on.” Another regulation concerns the just and equal distribution of duty on the walls. The poor must not be sent on duty too frequently because they have to work for their living in daytime. Of the battlement crew of five, normally four were allowed to sleep at night, with one man staying awake and acting as sentinel. But the sleepers were forbidden to take their clothes off, so that in case of alarm they would be ready for combat. Mealtimes were also regulated. The rules are that in principle there should be two meals, one in the morning (7 :00—9:00 a.m.] and one in the early afternoon (3:00-5:00 p.m.). If no imminent attack is expected, food is sent up to the top of the walls after a signal has been given with a rattle. When the rattle is sounded a second time, the food-bearers must leave the wall tops immediately. Whoever leaves the wall in order to get a meal is decapitated on the spot. In case of enemy action no food-bearers are allowed on the wall, but three meals a day are prepared at the foot of the walls and hoisted up by means of ropes. One cooking-stove has to serve for five battlements, that is, twenty-five men. On the wall tops temporary huts are erected to shelter the defenders from the weather; these are built of wooden boards and covered with mats. ” Advance observation posts and guards were important for early intelligence of enemy actions. Obviously, the disposition of these posts depended largely upon the terrain. As a rule of thumb there should be a palisaded post every ten li, manned by five soldiers who stay on duty for twenty-four hours and are relieved at noon. Each stockade should be supplied with firewood, five rifles, five lanterns, and five igniting cords. If the enemy approaches, three shots are to be fired and three fires to be made as signals, and these signals must be transmitted from post to post. This system is basically the same as that described for frontier defense under the Sung” and it had been in practice already under the Han, except of course for the rifles. The crew 174

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members of such advance posts are naturally tempted to end the war by private initiative and to disappear. This is clearly seen by our author who warns that the laws of war will be applied against those who try to desert, to hide in houses or gardens, or who just use their guard duty for a prolonged nap. Punishments are also provided for those who neglect their duties by letting the gunpowder, igniting cords, or firewood get wet.’* The harsh military penal rules were to a certain extent balanced by the constant admonitions that a military leader should always have the welfare of his subordinates in mind. In the legalist mind, punishments and rewards have to complement each other. Capital punishment has to be meted out publicly in order to deter future culprits, but rewards for bravery should be made public too. We learn that the commanding officer on the day of the attack should have on hand ready-made packages of silver, ranging from 3.5 ch’ien up to 10 liang {ounces}, or gifts of cash ranging from 100 to 10,000 cash. These should be given to brave and successful soldiers according to merit, and should be given in public.” The importance of keeping the defenders in good spirits plainly motivates a number of rules and regulations. A remarkably realistic appraisal of the chances against the enemy and the resulting fighting spirit is given by Hsii Hsiieh-fan. He states that the gifts of nature are as a rule evenly distributed among men; not every enemy is indomitably brave, and one’s own soldiers are not all cowards; the enemy are not all brilliant nor one’s own troops stupid. And one can by no means take for granted that the individual enemy despises death and is ready to risk his life more than anybody else. This should be realized by everybody in the town.”® Other hints for a successful defense concern the welfare of the soldiers and citizens. To share sorrow and joy with the masses is, indeed, an age-old cliché for military leaders, who sHould care for sick or wounded men as for their family members. The hard duty of watching day and night on top of the walls may be rendered less fatiguing if the leader sees to it that in summer umbrellas are handed out and fruit and iced drinks served to the defenders. In winter each section should have a small stove for cooking hot soup and for keeping warm. Hats and cloaks against rain should be issued.”” These are purely practical measures; a more indirect means of securing domestic peace is the advice to be given to landlords not to collect rent from indigent tenants but to wait until normal conditions

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Herbert Franke prevail.”* The chiefs of units must also constantly watch whether their subordinates are tired or fatigued and have them relieved if necessary. If the importance of morale and fighting spirit is universally stressed by all military handbooks, it is only logical that the enemy must make efforts to undermine the morale of the defenders. This sort of psychological warfare usually begins even before hostilities break out. It must have been customary at all times in Chinese history to ask a town to surrender before the first arrow was shot. In some cases, as the siege diaries show, a virtual polemic discussion between the leaders of the two sides took place. It was so difficult to take a town by force that the attempt to take it by persuasion or subversion was an obvious first choice. Intimidation or the promise of rewards, while directed in the first instance against the leaders, in effect was also addressed to the garrison and inhabitants as a whole. Frequently leaflet raids are mentioned, usually in the form of letters being shot into the town with arrows. It is difficult to say how often this method worked—it depended to a great degree upon the kind of enemy. The use of persuasion for either winning a town or lifting its siege has been traditional in Chinese warfare and was already current in the ancient Ch’un-ch’iu and Chan-kuo periods.” It appears that in the wars between the Sung and the Jurchen invaders from the north, the defense was usually very stubborn; there does not seem to have been any widespread tendency among the Sung generals to go over to the enemy. But it was very different more than a century later during the final war between the Sung and the Mongols, when not a few Sung generals took service with the conquerors instead of defending their towns to the last. Apart from the harshness of martial laws, this readiness of military leaders to change sides may be attributed, at least in the Sung period, to a persistent rivalry between civilian and military officials. This readiness to surrender when in extremis, which could well be called treason by the historians (who anyway were never military officials), had at least the merit of saving the inhabitants from the worst. Wholesale slaughter could overtake the population if their resistance had to be overcome. This is taken for granted throughout the history of traditional China, and no difference can be discerned between national enemies like the Jurchen

or Mongols and Chinese insurgents.*° It is interesting to note that at a later stage of military

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development both moral and tactical orders from the commanding officer were transmitted to each fighter in print. Hsii Hsiieh-fan recommends the distribution of printed orders; those able to read may read them, the illiterate should have them read out word for word and explained.™ The alarm, as we have seen above, should be given by firing a cannon and showing signal flags by day, at night by firing cannon and hoisting lanterns. Upon these signals both regular soldiers and civilian auxiliaries had to hasten immediately to their previously assigned posts on the wall.®’ The system of mutual supervision and responsibility applied to the fighting forces not less than to the civilian population. For example, punishment of a deserter also included the four other men in the culprit’s group—an old principle of the military penal codes of China. ‘This is done in order to show the men that he who defends [the town] will not necessarily die, but whoever retreats will certainly not survive; they should not fear the enemy but fear their own side [lit., ‘us’].’”**

Strict rules were used to enforce discipline. Nobody on duty on the wall tops was allowed to move more than five paces in one direction or the other; only the group chief was allowed to move to and fro, but he too should be decapitated if he passed an adjacent battlement.** Other regulations concerned order and quiet on the walls. Noise and clamor are strictly forbidden. If some leader wishes to call a man he has to do so by waving his hand, and all conversations should be held in a low voice, particularly at night. When the night watches are sounded every two hours by the drums posted at each of the gates, one soldier with a loud voice should cry out “Attention, everybody!” (ta-chia hsiao-hsin), and the whole force should repeat this shout in chorus. But in between these watch signals not the slightest noise should be heard. Even if a soldier or civilian suffers an injury he is not allowed to cry out or talk in a loud voice, let alone leave his post. Idle gossip during duty is punished by cutting off the ears, a punishment meant to dishonor the culprit.® We also find rules for the man-to-man combat which inevitably resulted if the enemy won access to the wall tops. If the defenders observe that enemy forces are approaching the walls they should shoot arrows at them, at the same time watching to be sure that the enemy has not put up dummies (ts’ao-jen) in order to confuse the defenders. Against enemy soldiers trying to mount the wall no arrows should be used by 177

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the defenders on the wall itself, but stones or lime pots and similar things should be thrown on their heads. Only the archers and crossbow-men posted within combat towers erected on the walls should use their weapons, not the soldiers posted at the battlements. If an enemy comes up a ladder placed against the wall, the defenders are advised to wait until the attacker’s hands show on the parapet, then they should cut them off with an axe. Stones and such should be aimed at the attackers’ heads, firearms and arrows at their bodies, lances and hooks at their hearts, axes and clubs at their necks.* Sharpshooters have the special task of singling out enemy leaders and killing them. But how to discover a leader among the masses of the enemy soldiers? There was a stratagem for this: one should let a signboard with a difficult or enigmatic inscription dangle down from the wall or shoot a letter into the enemy’s camp. If it is taken up, it will certainly be brought to a leader, and the sharpshooter can then use his weapon.* Side by side with the use of normal weapons we also find in some of our handbooks such primitive means of warding off the enemy as throwing stones and rubble. There were three kinds of stones used by the defenders. Smaller stones with a weight ranging from one and a half to five or six pounds should be placed in heaps three feet high at each battlement; also five heavier stones of fifty or sixty pounds each should be in reserve. These were used against the bodies of enemy troops. Huge stones such as millstones or rolling stones could serve to crush enemy ladders and weapons. These heavy stones could also be fastened to a rope and thus used repeatedly. Even latrines could be a potential source of stuff to be hurled in the enemy’s face. For every five battlements (twenty-five men) a huge iron pot served as container for urine and other excrement. If the enemy attacks the walls a fire is made under the container and its boiling contents are poured on the enemy soldiers with long-handled scoops.**

If the town has an outer and an inner wall and the enemy has overcome the outer walls, the room between them can be thrown full of inflammable materials (firewood, debris and so on} and ignited so that the inner wall is surrounded by a “lake of fire” (huo-ch’ih).*®®

What could be done in case the enemy soldiers overcame the walls and entered the town itself? Did this mean that fighting had to cease? How was the civilian population supposed to behave if the enemy forces succeeded? These questions are 178

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answered by Lii K’un. He gives the advice that inside as well as outside the walls pitfalls should be arranged, ten feet deep and five feet wide, if possible near the city gates. Close by, a fighting squad with ten muskets and ten bows should be held in ambush. The main streets and thoroughfares must be closed by roadblocks made of furniture (tables, chairs, beds] and watched by heavily armed soldiers, if possible equipped with cannon. Our author thinks that as a rule the invading forces will concentrate first upon the stores and magazines of the town but also on the jails (which shows that he probably has Chinese rebels in mind rather than a foreign enemy}. Only afterwards will the enemy try to plunder the civilian population’s houses. This means that there may be an interval of perhaps fifteen minutes, sufficient to allow the evacuation, or rather flight, of civilians. These should flee at once because the next day they will no longer have a chance. They are told to take with them food for five or six days, hiding during the day and traveling only at night. If this is done the enemy will find the town an empty shell which is of no use to him. Lii takes it for granted that women who cannot flee or do not commit suicide will invariably be raped. But fighting should not cease even if the enemy is already within the walls. One should take him by surprise while he is occupied with looting and arson. It is thought of no use to hide, or to shut oneself up in one’s home; one should fight to the bitter end. Lii has words of utter contempt for those who kowtow before the invaders and call them master (yeh), and for rich people who offer the enemy gold, silver, clothes, and food in order to save their precious lives. He thinks this an undignified way of surviving. A real gentleman deplores the disaster and accepts it as fate. “If one must die, one just dies” (ssu tse ssu erh).°° This is the grim picture drawn of the fall of a town, a picture which can be corroborated by numerous passages in Chinese historical literature.

3. Three Sieges of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries It is obvious that all the various techniques and disciplinary regulations described above had to be varied according to circumstances; certainly all of them were never put into action or observed simultaneously. We must not forget that the military handbooks, even if their authors had had personal military experience, offered a catalog of possible courses of 179

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action from which a commander might make his selection. The handbooks, even if teeming with realistic details, were theory, and practice might be a very different thing indeed. At times, as we have seen, armchair strategy and picturesque fantasy seem to have been included. It is therefore fortunate that the various diaries of sieges allow us to check theory against practice. They contain aspects of military action or techniques which remained unknown to the military authors and encyclopedists. Only if held up against descriptions of actual sieges may we determine how far the regulations of the handbooks remained a dead letter or were actually observed. I have singled out certain texts for this study which seem to be relevant because of their realism. They are from the Sung and Yiian periods. Two of them describe sieges that took place during the war of 1206-1207, fought between the Sung and the Jurchen state of Chin, when the Sung attempted to reconquer the territory of the ‘Central Plains” (chung yiian) of North China that had been lost to the Jurchen after 1127. Fighting began in the summer of 1206, and the Sung armies were able to score a few initial successes against towns on the Chin side of the border. The Chin, however, mobilized a huge army for a counterattack in November 1206 and advanced in several columns from the Huai River border to the Yangtze River. Two towns in particular, Hsiang-yang {in Hupeh province) and Te-an (southeast of Hsiang-yang} were in a prominent strategic position, blocking access to the Yangtze through the valleys of the Han and Wen rivers respectively.** The sieges of both towns have been described by eyewitnesses. In the end neither state was able to achieve its strategic aims. The Sung failed in their attempt to win back North China; and the Jurchen were unable to reach the Yangtze River and wipe out Sung resistance south of the Huai. The stubborn defense of garrisons like Hsiang-yang and Te-an certainly contributed to this strategic stalemate, which produced on both sides a readiness to compromise. On the Jurchen side this tendency was increased by the rise of a new and potentially dangerous power in their rear: in 1206 Chinggis Khan united the steppe tribes and was proclaimed their overlord. After prolonged negotiations a peace was concluded between Chin and Sung in 1208. The leader of the revanchist faction in Sung China, Han T’o-chou, had in the meantime been eliminated during a military coup in the capital; his head was sent to the Jurchen

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court, who had repeatedly demanded his extradition as a

“war criminal.”

The following comparison may be summarized at this point: the actual fighting for towns was not very different from what the handbooks say. This applies to the technical side as well as to the psychological and security measures and the scorched earth policy. But the diaries contain some details of interest which are not mentioned in the handbooks. A short survey will therefore be given of particular points which either corroborate what is given above or add fresh details. References to single passages will not be given, since a full translation of these diaries will be published in the near future. (1) Hsiang-yang, 1206-1207 Against this background, let us observe the siege of Hsiang-yang. Chao Ch’un, the defender of Hsiang-yang, had been appointed military commissioner (chao-fu chih) in the province Ching-hsi North in May 1206. The main attack of the Jurchen armies began in December and lasted for ninety days, to March 1207. The town walls of Hsiang-yang had a circumference of 9 li, 342 pu; they were protected by an outer wall (yang-ma-ch’eng} and by moats beyond the outer walls. The northern gate, facing the Han River, had, in addition, two flanking walls leading to the river banks. These fortifications were, moreover, reinforced by palisades and obstacles made of demolished wagons and carriages. The garrison of Hsiang-yang consisted of not much more than 10,000 men; the strength of the Jurchen army is given as 200,000, a figure which is almost certainly exaggerated. An interesting feature in the defense of Hsiang-yang is the mobilization of an auxiliary army (militia) from among the tea merchants. Hsiang-yang was a center for the tea trade between Szechwan and the rest of China and a meeting place for caravans. The tea carriers seem to have been a daring crowd for the following reasons: tea was a state monopoly and the temptation to smuggle it was great. Even legal traders needed bands of bodyguards for their own protection. It must have been hard to draw a line between smuggler gangs and legal traders; in some cases we find in the Sung period virtual rebellions of a local kind which started from among the tea smugglers. Trade was in the hands of rich merchants who formed a guild of their own and had many

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subtraders and petty shopkeepers economically dependent on them. The semilegal armed gangs that were kept by the tea merchants were an ideal recruiting ground for the authorities in case of a national emergency.** In Hsiang-yang Chao Ch’un recruited an armed force from among the tea traders and so formed an additional corps for defense which was given the name “daring and brave army” (kan-yung chiin). It seems that these people fought at least as well as the regular army (kuan-chiin) and that they were regarded as thoroughly loyal and reliable, because they very frequently took part in fighting outside the walls and in night sorties. The exact strength of this militia is not given, but we read of engagements where 6,000 of them fought. The total strength of the Hsiang-yang garrison must have been at least 16,000. But, however that may be, it is clear that the number of Jurchen and their Chinese auxiliaries in any case far exceeded the defenders of the town. The concentration of the inhabitants from the countryside in the vicinity of Hsiang-yang took place according to plan. The whole population of Fan-ch’eng on the northern bank of the Han River, altogether several thousand persons, was moved over a pontoon-bridge into safety. This bridge was demolished after the last evacuees had reached the southern bank of the river. Also the people who lived in the suburbs were moved behind the walls and their houses were torn down, the wooden parts of the buildings being transported into town to be used as fuel, which, however, did not prevent a scarcity of wood in the town. The approaching Jurchen armies had to camp on the northern bank and to cross the river before they could reach Hsiang-yang proper. Before actual fighting started the Jurchen commander, true to Chinese tradition, tried to persuade Chao Ch’un to surrender. There is a very interesting record of the speeches made—via a herald or speaker—by the Jurchen leader and the replies given by Chao Ch’un. Our main source, A Record of the Defense of Hsiang-yang (Hsiang-yang shou-ch’eng lu), is written in classical style (wen-li) but the speeches are recorded in colloquial Chinese, giving the impression that something like stenographic notes may have been made on that occasion, because of a notable absence of literary clichés. It was only after Chao strongly rejected any further negotiation that fighting began. The food situation in the town was apparently critical. In each of the four sections of the town a public market for rice 182

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was established; it was sold from the public granaries by the peck (tou) and the price was not higher than what had been paid when the authorities had bought the grain and rice. But only the poor were allowed to buy; officials were sent out to register poor and indigent families and to issue licenses entitling them to buy at the government markets. There were some attempts by rich families to obtain licenses as well, but if this was found out, the licenses were withdrawn and given to the poor, especially to refugees and evacuees. Fodder for horses was supplied by letting them graze between the inner and outer walls, where grass grew in abundance. Among the security measures enforced by the administration we find that a ban was placed on selling wine, though wine was distributed among the fighting force to warm them up if the weather was cold. Otherwise the usual enforcement of the mutual supervision system (pao-chia) is mentioned, in addition to the many precautions against fire which we already know from the handbooks. Incendiary warfare was given a prominent role both by the Jurchen and by the Sung garrison. Another feature of the fight for Hsiang-yang was the frequent sorties made by the defenders, who did not wait quietly until the Jurchen had reached the foot of the walls but tried to harass them as often as possible. Our text says that thirty-four sorties” were arranged and that altogether twelve great battles took place. The technical equipment was more or less the same on both sides: bows, crossbows, catapults. Originally there were only sixteen catapults installed on the wall tops; but an additional ninety-eight were built, including revolving catapults (hstian-feng p’ao). One hundred and fourteen machines were either on the wall tops or in defilade inside the walls. Those inside were the strongest, having up to nine or ten combined levers. The Sung troops also used clay balls as projectiles. It is interesting to note that the author of the diary states expressly that this was a technique not described in the textbooks. Chao Ch’un, as indeed most officers of the Sung, therefore cannot have read the military encyclopedia, Wu-ching

tsung-yao, nor texts like the Shou-ch’eng lu, where clay ° projectiles are repeatedly advocated. These handbooks had apparently a very limited circulation—if they ever left the rooms of the highest military council in the capital. The Sung commander of Hsiang-yang learned from his agents that the enemy feared most the arrows shot from crossbows. He therefore 183

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increased the number of crossbow-men by 3,000. This was achieved by a public announcement asking for volunteers, each of the new recruits being given three strings of cash.. The techniques used by the enemy included the attempt to divert the course of the Han River so that the town would be on a new north bank. This ambitious scheme, of course, failed, although Chao thought the idea “not bad.” The Jurchen had, however, built earthen ramps which proved a great challenge to the defenders. Since the ramp had a wooden substructure, it could be burned by incendiary warfare, and that was what actually happened. We also learn of military maps that were drawn. This was done when the enemy had retreated from Hsiang-yang and the whole region where he had camped was surveyed. The dead were cremated and the remains of the enemy camps collected. Firewood had been scarce during the siege (1,000 cash were paid for ten pounds of wood], but after the enemy army had left there was an abundance of wood lying around which was transported into the town and issued for military and civilian use. It is said that all trees in a wide circle around Hsiang-yang had been felled by the Jurchen so that the countryside was absolutely bare. It is not improbable that this contributed to the retreat of the Jurchen because so many of their wooden weapons and instruments had been destroyed or lost. They, too, may have suffered from an increasing scarcity of fuel. Finally we might mention the fate of the canine population. After the evacuation of the glacis, hundreds and thousands of stray dogs were swarming among the deserted ruins, and whenever there was a night sortie, their barking and howling warned the enemy. Chao Ch’un therefore had bamboo traps set up and within ten days all these dogs had been caught. They ended up in the kitchens. One remark is perhaps not unnecessary. If we have used the term “Jurchen” this does not mean that the whole force which attacked Hsiang-yang was composed of Jurchen only. Even if we take into account a high degree of sinicization of the Jurchen by 1200, we may take it for granted that most of the invading armies were pure Chinese. When by chance a document in Jurchen language and script was captured, nobody among the defenders could read it. On the other hand, leaflets in Chinese were shot constantly into the town in order to undermine the morale of the defenders. We may also assume

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that the technical side of the siege was largely in the hands of Chinese engineers and artisans. (2) Te-an, 1206-1207 Most if not all of the technical and military features of the Hsiang-yang siege are to be found also in the siege of Te-an. It lasted for 108 days, that is, more than two weeks longer than that of Hsiang-yang. Wang Yiin-ch’u, the commanding official in Te-an, controlled something like 6,000 men, most of them militia (min-ping) recruited from the population. A force of 2,000 was supplied by the local tea merchants. The number of regular soldiers was, in comparison, very small; only about four hundred regular soldiers were registered when the hostilities broke out. The defense had therefore to rely mostly on the mobilized “civilians,” including such informal soldiers as the tea merchants’ guards. The success of Wang’s defense shows clearly how much the outcome of a war depended on the willingness of the population to take part in the fighting. The attacking forces were much stronger in number than the defenders. Between thirteen and fifteen myriarchies (wan-hu) were launched against Te-an. Despite the designation they did not comprise 10,000 men each, but only 7,000 or 8,000, as the defenders learned from agents. The whole attacking army may therefore have consisted of about 105,000, if we adopt the figures given in our text (though they may, for obvious reasons, have been exaggerated). We are not told whether the provisions in the town were plentiful; in any case, Wang had seen to it that 30,000 shih of grain were stored inside the walls. This should have lasted for the 108 days of the siege even if we assume that the whole population of the town, military personnel included, was something like 30,000 or 40,000. But we are not given the

number of the total Te-an population any more than in the case of Hsiang-yang.

The usual evacuation of the countryside and scorched earth measures were taken in the case of Te-an too and offer no special interest. This is also true for the security measures, and to a large extent for the technological aspects. But in several instances we are informed of techniques which were not used at Hsiang-yang. The denial measures included the poisoning of wells; and the attackers made attempts to undermine the walls.

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Mine warfare was not used at Hsiang-yang, presumably because the vicinity of the Han River made the ground too swampy. But in Te-an the Jurchen undermined a part of the outer wall, so that it collapsed.” The age-old instrument for discovering mining activities is also mentioned once, the “listening jar’ (weng-t’ing, a geophone}.** Wang had installed several huge earthenware pots within the earth at the foot of the wall and manned them with blind people who were supposed to have sharper ears than seeing people. As in Hsiang-yang, incendiary warfare was responsible for much of the destruction and damage suffered by both sides. Not only was inflammable material hurled at the enemy’s machines from catapults, but also incendiary arrows were used to set the enemy’s stockpiled wood ablaze. The attackers once constructed a sort of pointed wooden tower “high as a pagoda” filled with hay and straw, which was to be drawn by dozens of horses near the wall and then set on fire. But before this device came dangerously near, incendiary arrows had already set the whole thing afire and the enemy’s trick thus failed. On the other hand we hear repeatedly that the Jurchen soldiers succeeded in burning gates; these gates or their superstructures must therefore have been built of wood only. Psychological warfare methods were used by the Jurchen besiegers against Te-an too. There were several attempts to persuade Wang Yiin-ch’u to surrender the place, and the Jurchen even offered high rewards to anybody who could capture Wang and bring him out. Leaflets were shot into the town with faked information about the general situation of the war. In one case a leaflet pretended that Wang’s messengers who had been sent for help had been taken prisoner and were about to be chopped into pieces. We also read about an attempt at subversion in which a well-known scholar from the region had placed himself at the disposal of the Jurchen (we are not told whether he acted under constraint) and sent a letter to Wang explaining that the situation of Te-an would soon be hopeless. Another psychological device was used when the Jurchen soldiers who attacked the walls once painted their face masks red so that “they looked like devils.” We also observe very crude methods of intimidation. The enemy killed prisoners and hurled their heads into the town with catapults, sometimes by the dozen. This might be a fitting occasion to remind us that, at least in medieval China, there was no equivalent to international law or military ethics which protected the defeated. To be taken prisoner meant either enslavement or slaughter, certainly for 186

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the rank and file of combatants. This was not so much a question of humanity or inhumanity, as due to the fact that both sides had more or less exigent logistical factors to consider. To either side it apparently did not make much sense to feed prisoners unless they somehow promised to be useful. If a higher enemy leader was taken prisoner he could serve as hostage or for blackmailing purposes. The fate of a general who was taken prisoner and then redeemed or exchanged was, it seems, not enviable either, since the military code in principle punished leaders who had lost a battle. During the fighting at Hsiang-yang the Sung forces had taken a Jurchen leader prisoner, a real Jurchen this time, by the name of Na-ho Tao-seng. When it came to negotiations the Jurchen side demanded his extradition. We do not know whether the Sung could still comply with this request in 1208, nor what happened to him afterwards if he had up to then survived his captivity. As at Hsiang-yang, civilians and military alike were looking out for omens; it is said, for example, that the appearance of a second sun in the sky greatly improved the spirits of the defenders. On several occasions offerings were made to the City God and to Kuan Yi, the “god of war,” and their help implored against the enemy. This is not surprising because in Sung times there existed complete rituals for prayers addressed to the protective deities. The whole chapter 20 of the military encyclopedia, Hu-ch’ien ching, is taken up by prayer texts and rituals. Among the deities who were invoked we find the King of Heaven Vaisravana (Pi-sha-men t’ien-wang), the God of Rain and Thunder, and the God of Mountains and Streams, as well as the Yellow Emperor (who figures prominently as tutelary deity and patron for military strategists) and the ancient God of War, Ch’ih-yu. Another chapter of the book is devoted to watching the ether, and particularly the clouds.® In short, the ban on fortunetelling and similar practices which the handbooks advocate during states of emergency applied only to superstitions among the population. The higher and ritualized kind of superstition continued to be practiced by the ruling class and the official leaders. It becomes clear from all this how important omina were and how their interpretation could affect actual conditions. A closer study of omens, rituals, and prayers connected with warfare would be extremely rewarding and could contribute to a deeper understanding of Chinese mentality in the Middle Ages.** It would be premature to state anything definite, but one gets the impression that this particular aspect 187

Herbert Franke , of warfare diminished somewhat in importance from the sixteenth century on. This might point to an increasing rationality in military matters. (3) Shao-hsing, 1359 The war of 1205-1207 had been to all intents and purposes a

national war of Sung China against invaders from the north who were only in part Chinese. But the civil wars toward the end of the Yiian period {1279-1368}, culminating in the overthrow of Mongol rule in China, were certainly in their initial phase popular uprisings against the ruling class as such and not a national war against the Mongols and their Central Asian confederates.°® Our next example of a siege is from this end-of-dynasty period of social turmoil. The city of Shao-hsing in Chekiang province on the south side of Hangchow Bay, in an area famous for its wine production, was besieged in 1359 by forces of the rebel Ming power based on Nanking that eventually set up the Ming dynasty (1368-1644}. The Ming forces were commanded by Hu Ta-hai and the city was defended by Lii Chen, a general in the service of Chang Shih-ch’eng, the usurper who ruled Chekiang more or less independently in the 1350’s and later declared his open allegiance to the Mongol court. The successful defense of Shao-hsing against the Ming may therefore be regarded as a typical incident in a purely Chinese conflict, not in a campaign of one warlord against another but in a civil war which shows many features of a class struggle. These conditions had their effect on the siege of Shao-hsing, in addition to other factors which resulted from the geographic situation. Shao-hsing was surrounded entirely in the fourteenth century, and still partly in the twentieth, by water. The main traffic arteries between Shao-hsing and other regions of Chekiang were waterways. The town was therefore protected not only by a narrow moat but by comparatively broad fields of water. The waterways were about fifty feet wide and had a depth of two feet so that small boats could operate. Between these waterways and the city, there were palisades that offered additional protection against an advancing enemy. We do not know how strong the garrison of Shao-hsing was, nor what the Ming army was like in numerical strength. Indirect information can be gathered from the fact that battles are described where “several thousand” enemy infantry were involved and “more than one 188

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hundred” horsemen. But one wonders what the use of cavalry was in such terrain. Perhaps horsemen were led into skirmishes on the dikes, dams, and roadways. It must remain doubtful if the besiegers numbered at any time more than 10,000, because at the same time other rebel actions were taking place all over Chekiang province. Certainly nearly all the defenders of the town must have been Chinese; and even among the officers, of whom a complete list with names is given, we find only a dozen with distinctly non-Chinese names. A special feature of the 1359 siege was that the town was never cut off and that even grain supplies could enter. This seems to show that the number of enemy soldiers was not sufficient to encircle the whole of Shao-hsing effectively. One difference from the sieges of Hsiang-yang and Te-an is remarkable. Whereas Chao Ch’un rarely fought personally and Wang Yiin-ch’u not at all, Lii Chen almost daily rode out to fight with the rebels and gave many demonstrations of his personal bravery. Perhaps he had to set an example for his subordinates in this civil war, where the danger of subversion and defection was infinitely greater than during the national wars against the Chin state in 1205-1207. The Chang Shih-ch’eng government was in a precarious situation because it was only nominally loyal to the Mongol court in Peking and had to cope with a rebellious countryside. This was evident in Shao-hsing after the rebels under Hu Ta-hai had invested the town. The administration had to be very careful not to lose the loyalty of the civilian inhabitants. Strict rationing measures were instituted to ensure social peace. Rice merchants were forbidden to transport rice out of town; their stores were confiscated against receipts which could be presented in the provincial capital of Hangchow to secure fresh rice. On the whole, the food situation was not bad. The administration could even afford on one occasion to distribute 10,000 shih of rice to the poor. In addition, the many public grounds and open spaces within the town were planted with rice. Many Chinese towns had wider areas of open territory within their walls and were, as a rule, much more extensive than contemporary towns in medieval Europe. The task of planting rice was chiefly entrusted to the refugees who had had to evacuate their homes and fields in the vicinity. Another measure taken to guarantee social peace and order was the temporary cessation of the normal corvée duties. Nevertheless we can infer from the diary that there was some social unrest in Shao-hsing. Several hundreds of workers who had lost their 189

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jobs during the civil war asked to volunteer as soldiers; but their request was declined, possibly because they were regarded as potential deserters. There were also a few cases of fifth columnists brought to light. The attackers’ propaganda with leaflets against the garrison and its leaders included personal insults aimed at Lii Chen, among other things reproaching him for being hand-in-glove with the rich and noble. This is one of the cases where a class struggle aspect of the civil war in the 1350’s is clearly visible. An attempt of the rebels to use persuasion failed. During their earlier campaigns they had captured an officer who found that one of the rebel leaders was an old friend and sworn brother. This officer asked to see Lit, who received him but could not be persuaded to surrender Shao-hsing. The officer was not treated as a spy but was released and sent back to the rebel camp; he was even given a present of textiles and silver. This, in turn, must be regarded as a propagandist maneuver by Lii Chen. Also in his treatment of prisoners Lit Chen was sometimes unorthodox. Only those who confessed to have belonged to the rebel army and to have killed people were executed; others, who had only been forced to join the enemy, were released and even presented with clothes and food. Most of the prisoners were thus released; and even if the same man was taken prisoner a second or third time, he had a chance of being sent home. The diary says that quite a few rebels surrendered in response to this treatment and declared their loyalty and allegiance. Another measure designed to bolster the morale of the inhabitants was that during the initial stages of the siege they were allowed to mount the walls and to watch in person how successfully the attackers were driven back. Only after a few weeks was this forbidden in order to prevent a general panic if something should go wrong. From that time on the inhabitants were kept uninformed about military developments. It seems that the stubborn resistance of Shao-hsing was caused partly by the many atrocities committed by the enemy forces. The Ming troops had been joined by a contingent of Miao tribesmen who had formerly been auxiliaries of the Mongols but later sided with the rebels. Their cruelty had been much feared already when they were supporting the loyalist cause.*” The fate of a town like Shao-hsing if it fell can easily be imagined. There was much man-to-man fighting because of the many sorties made by Lii Chen’s forces. He succeeded several times 190

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in bringing home ear trophies (to cut off the ears of a slain enemy was already a regular practice in Chou times},’* and Lii Chen was even wounded himself. On the whole, the degree of mechanization in the fighting at Shao-hsing seems to have been less than at Hsiang-yang and Te-an. This may have been due to the lower standards of the rebel armies, which could not compete with the skill and resources of a whole state like that of the Chin Jurchen. Within the town itself there were at first very few catapults. It is said that catapults were erected over each city gate—a small number if compared with the numerous catapults used in the other towns described above. This lack was compensated by the use of cannon or bombards. We have mentioned bombards (huo-tung) above, and it happens that some of the specimens surviving today had been cast at an earlier date under Chang Shih-ch’eng’s rule in Chekiang. Both sides used bombards, the total number of pieces employed being considerable. We read that during one engagement several dozen were fired simultaneously. It remains doubtful if these weapons were of much avail against walls or gates, but they were certainly effective against living targets or wooden structures. It seems that Hangchow was a center for the production of gunpowder, though powder was also produced in Shao-hsing itself. Our text informs us that there was at one time a shortage of charcoal; trees within the town were felled in order to produce enough charcoal for the workshops. Finally a few words should be said about religion and superstition. Our diary records an auspicious omen, a purple cloud hovering over the town shortly before the enemy army retreated. The defenders prayed to the City God and to the “Prince of Wu-an,” a local worthy who is probably identical with Kao Ch’iung (935-1006), a famous general under the founder of the Sung, T’ai-tsu.*® The rebels also performed a religious ceremony, this time in the Temple of Yii.** But we are told that the reply of the god (or rather the deified emperor] was unpropitious and that the enraged rebel soldiers overturned his statue. The inauspicious answer given by the Great Yii need not have been the sole reason for the eventual retreat of the Ming armies. It is far more probable that the epidemic caused by the summer heat in humid Chekiang was responsible for dissuading them from continuing the siege. This epidemic broke out about the middle of May 1359. 19]

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The resistance of Shao-hsing under Lii Chen made a great impression on the founder of the Ming dynasty, Chu Yiianchang (Ming T’ai-tsu), who considered Lii one of his most dangerous enemies.’ Lii Chen continued to serve the Mongols until he finally surrendered in 1366, after having fought against the Ming for many more years.

4. Concluding Remarks This article has been able to offer only a few glimpses of the technical, administrative, and psychological aspects of siegecraft in medieval China. The subject is so vast and the sources so numerous and teeming with realistic details that one could easily expand this study into a long volume. I shall therefore refrain from venturing into many generalizations, but there are a number of points which impose themselves upon any reader of the military handbooks of traditional China and of the various accounts of actual sieges. As might be expected, one feature is the strong traditionalism, the continuity of military strategy and technology. The description of defense measures in the ancient Mohist canon is basically not inconsistent with what an early nineteenth century text says. Improved weapons and the invention of firearms apparently had little radical effect upon military thinking. The Sun-tzu remained a classic, as it has even into the twentieth century. This does not mean that there have been no evolution and no developments. In military science as in other fields China was not static, but it is difficult to detect turning points in her military history which have changed the picture completely. As compared with Europe, changes in China were gradual rather than abrupt. This is true even for the role of firearms. The Chinese guns and cannon of early Ming were probably not effective enough to reduce a fortress or walled town. Only from the sixteenth century, when a European type of cannon had been introduced into China, did gradual change follow. The eventual success of a besieging force depended more upon mass assault than upon technological superiority; and success was by no means assured. Another feature of warfare over towns was the dependence on civilian auxiliaries and militiamen. The mobilization of manpower from the civilian population remained of paramount importance, whether for its individual fighting capacity or for 192

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its technical skills. This in turn made strict security and police measures imperative for the authorities in charge. If the loyalty of the inhabitants was questionable, even a force of highly skilled professional soldiers had no chance to hold the town. The role of professional soldiers may have been greater in open battles than in siege situations, but even there we must reckon with a high percentage of nonprofessionals. We know that, particularly in the Northern Sung period, there were many complaints against the professional army which some of the reformers considered ineffective. The importance of locally raised militia is amply proven by our sources and indirectly supports the views of the eleventh century reformers, though we should not overlook their antimilitary bias. When we turn to the towns themselves and their permanent fortifications and compare them with European medieval towns, one interesting difference becomes obvious. Once the besiegers had mounted the city walls of a Chinese town and entered the streets, there was as a rule no other stronghold within the walls which could easily be defended. Even the major buildings in a town, the palaces, temples, or offices, were built of wood and brick, very rarely of stone,’ and we find no fortified buildings within a city proper. This is a marked difference from Europe, where even churches were sometimes made into fortresses within which small fighting forces could maintain themselves for some time and where we have medieval towns such as San Gimignano or Bologna or Ratisbonne with their numerous family seats, each of them actually fortresses. European feudalism was so multicentered that even within a town there were different political and, if necessary, military centers. The more marked the fragmentation of power was, the more we find these fortifications within fortifications. Nothing of the sort occurs in China, where the unified state and its power had long ago done away with feudalistic individualism. No power existed but that of the universal bureaucratic state, ruling through its officials over a powerless population which could help to defend the town if necessary but could not develop power centers of its own. A word must be said about the duration of sieges. Although the towns in medieval China were as a rule much more populous than those in coeval Europe, there seems to have been little chance for the besiegers to reduce a town to surrender through mere starvation. If the administration had done its duty and filled the public granaries in time, a town could hold 193

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out for a long period. According to the siege diaries, there was more often a shortage of fuel than of grain, but this problem seems to have confronted the besiegers as well as the besieged. The comparative safety of towns, together with the wide area enclosed within the walls, always gave the defender an advantage over the attacker. We must not forget that the countryside in China was not a place to keep huge stores of grain. This was done in the towns. An attacking enemy could very well plunder the whole countryside, but once everything to be found there had been used up, he faced grave problems of supply. The armies were like locusts; they consumed everything within their reach. Afterwards, however, they still had to subsist, in a barren region where even fodder for horses might become scarce. The transport problems involved in supplying an army of 100,000 were well nigh insurmountable, except perhaps in regions where water traffic allowed the transport of great quantities efficiently. But this was only possible when the waterways were well under control. I think we have here hit upon one reason why we do not find very prolonged sieges in Chinese military history: the attackers’ logistical problems and difficulties precluded a siege of more than a few months, a duration for which a well-provided town could and should have enough reserves. Only if the military and administrative machinery of a state extended over vast lands and was able to guarantee not only production but also transport, could an army be kept fed and supplied for a longer period. This was also, I think, the reason why so many popular uprisings started with promising initial successes but very soon petered out if they could not build up this administrative and logistic machinery.’”* The importance of the economic side of warfare in medieval China therefore can hardly be overrated. If the administration had kept the public granaries filled and safeguarded a minimum of social peace and order, the odds were definitely against the attacking armies. This explains why, in all texts on siege and siegecraft, the preparation for defense in every respect plays such a prominent role. Or, to quote one of our authors: “Military force may not be used during one hundred years,

but one should not be unprepared even for a single day.’

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Appendix: Sources on Chinese Military Technology and History It was obviously not possible in preparing this essay to study all the existing handbooks and military texts; the materials are abundant, as even a glance into any topically arranged bibliography will show.’ It has therefore been necessary to concentrate on a few works, ranging over the period from the eleventh to the nineteenth centuries. These are, in chronological order: Wu-ching tsung-yao (WCTY} This is a military encyclopedia compiled under the Sung Emperor Jen-tsung (r. 1023-1064] by Tseng Kung-liang (998-1078) and Ting Tu (990-1053) in the 1040’s; the work was presented to the emperor in 1044. The compilation of this comprehensive encyclopedia was occasioned by the border warfare between Sung and Hsi-hsia as we learn from the preface. The work consists of twenty chapters in a front section (ch’ien-chi) and twenty chapters in a rear section (hou-chi).

The ch’ien-chi section contains fifteen chapters entitled General Methods of Warfare (chih-tu); chapter 12 deals with the defense of towns, and chapter 13 is a detailed description of all kinds of weapons and military instruments. Chapters 16-20 are a sort of military geography of the Sung empire. The hou-chi is chiefly a collection of excerpts from earlier works on battles, strategems, military leadership, and the like (chapters 1-15); the hou-chi, moreover, has a section on prognostication in warfare which throws much light on methods of divination in Sung times and their application to military questions. This part (hou-chi, chapters 16-20) was compiled by the court astrologer Yang Wei-te and other specialists.” Shou-ch’eng lu (SCL) This is a rather heterogeneous work by Ch’en Kuei (fl. ca. 1130) and T’ang Shou (fl. ca. 1187-1193}. The book consists of

four chapters. Chapter 1 is written by Ch’en Kuei and entitled “Appendix to the Ch’ao-yeh chien-yen.” It criticizes the defense 195

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measures which Hsia Shao-tseng’s Ch’ao-yeh chien-yen® describes as taken against the Jurchen in Kaifeng during 1126-1127. Chapter 2 of SCL is entitled ‘Important Methods for Defending Towns” and was also written by Ch’en Kuei. It

describes the construction of walls, fortifications, and defense instruments, together with an outline of fighting tactics. Chapters 3 and 4 are entitled “Records of the Defense of Te-an in the Chien-yen period” (Chien-yen Te-an shou-yii lu). They describe the defense of Te-an against the Jurchen from 1127 to 1132. It seems that this part of the SCL, which was written by T’ang Shou, summarizes an earlier work by a certain Liu Hsiin in three chapters praising Ch’en Kuei’s achievements during the successive sieges of Te-an. All these texts were apparently put together prior to 1200 and have been saved from oblivion through incorporation into the great Yung-lo ta-tien collection of the early Ming period. Hu-ch’ien ching (HCC) This is a military encyclopedia of the Sung period in twenty chapters written by Hsii Tung (ca. 970-1011). In his youth the author was something of an athlete and a skilled archer; and later he entered a military career, in which he was apparently not very successful. He is also said to have been a heavy drinker after being temporarily dismissed from office. Of his numerous writings nothing seems to have survived but the HCC, a book which he presented to the emperor in 1005 after having worked on it for four years. It covers all fields of military practice and includes also a number of treatises on military prognostication and rituals. The defense of towns is repeatedly dealt with in chapter 6. In coverage and arrangement HCC and WCTY show some similarity and it must be presumed that the latter work has here and there drawn from this earlier one.* Lien-ping shih-chi (LPSC)

This is a work by the famous Ming politician and military leader Ch’i Chi-kuang {1528-1587}. The title, which could be rendered as “Practical Guide for Military Training,” reflects an emphasis on training military commanders as well as enlisted men; the book is, however, a rather comprehensive military encyclopedia. It consists of nine chapters and an appendix of six more chapters of “Miscellaneous Data” (tsa-chi). Chapters 196

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1 to 6 are chiefly concerned with tactical and strategic training; the appendix contains many valuable data on weapons and instruments. Although there is no special chapter on the defense of towns, some of the data are quite important for the study of the technological side of siegecraft in the sixteenth century.’ Chiu-ming shu (CMS) This is a short and succinct treatise on military matters written by Lii K’un (1534-1616}. The work has a preface written by the author in 1607, that is, after he retired from office. It consists of two chapters only (shang and hsia}. The shang chapter has three parts, one on defending towns in general, one on supplies, and one on emergency measures. Chapter hsia is chiefly interesting because of its description of weapons similar to those mentioned in Ch’i Chi-kuang’s LPSC. The author served as commissioner (hstin-fu) in Shansi province and as councillor (shih-lang) in the Ministry of Justice (hsing-pu).° Wu-pei chi-yao (WPCY)

The author of this work in six chapters is Hsii Hsiieh-fan (1751-1816), a native of Hangchow who was for some time a prefect in Kweichow province and who defended T’ung-jen prefecture successfully in 1795 against Miao rebels. The WPCY is chiefly concerned with the defense of towns. Chapter 1 deals with tactical measures for defending towns, chapter 2 with commands and signals, chapter 3 with preparatory measures for defense, and chapter 4 with the evacuation of the countryside and police measures thought appropriate in case of impending enemy action. Chapters 5 and 6 concern tactics in battle and general principles of military action.’ This work is particularly interesting because it was composed at a very late date and therefore might reflect the level of military thinking and technology of about 1800, just prior to the military contacts with the West which were to change the traditional patterns so drastically. But actually the WPCY, although written in the early nineteenth century, does not show the influence of Western techniques—the only direct hint is the telescope (wang-ylian ching, ‘mirror for regarding from a distance”) which “came from the Great Western Ocean” (chap. 1, 20a-b, with a rather primitive picture of the instrument}. Other traces of Western influence such as the mentioning of the Fo-lang-chi 197

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‘Frankish [that is, European] Machines” are not eighteenthcentury innovations® but were already present in late Ming works such as LPSC and CMS (from which Hsii Hsiieh-fan has quoted extensively, as a comparison of these texts shows). This raises a problem which is as apparent in military literature as in almost all other branches of Chinese literature: the dependence of later authors on previous works. The influence of the Sun-tzu and similar early “Arts of War” writings lingers on; we know that these handbooks have been studied and have served as models for thousands of years. In the technological and practical-tactical field too we can perceive a strong traditionalism. There is no basic difference between the Wu-ching tsung-yao of the eleventh century and the Wu-pei chi-yao of the nineteenth. This latter text, on the other hand, contains details, particularly regarding security measures, which cannot be found in some of the earlier Sung works, though they fit perfectly into the framework of military thinking which the early strategists laid down. We have, therefore, repeatedly made use of the WPCY rather than of the earlier handbooks, one more reason being that the WPCY, written as it is from practical experience, will show more clearly what the average commander was supposed to do. One might also ask why the huge late Ming encyclopedias such as Teng-t’an pi-chiu and Wu-pei-chih have not been used for the present study. My answer is that they were, as is well known, banned under Manchu rule for security reasons, and in any case they had only an extremely limited circulation. A late work like WPCY is therefore, in my opinion, more revealing than many of the earlier military handbooks and encyclopedias. But were the prescriptions of these handbooks always practical and practicable? Some of their contents smell strongly of armchair strategy or show traces of the time-honored military lore of hoary antiquity. It seems that theoretical ingenuity was perhaps valued more highly than practicality and that some stratagems or devices were considered more as a stimulus to resourcefulness than as actual prescriptions. We may, for example, reasonably doubt the military efficiency of a tiger let loose against the enemy. The effect may have been more on the psychological side—the tiger has always been regarded as a symbol of fierceness and bravery. A living tiger in battle would have to be taught in advance how to distinguish Chinese soldiers from enemy ones. It remains equally doubtful to what degree practical use was ever made of animals or birds to which 198

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burning torches were fastened, a stratagem which is recorded in historical literature and the military handbooks. This may have been merely a symbol of the importance of incendiary warfare, particularly against towns.° If we wish to learn about actual military practice, we must turn to a different kind of military literature, namely the diaries and descriptions of actual sieges of towns. Sources earlier than Sung are most laconic when it comes to actual fighting and rely mostly if not always on literary clichés.’° But from the Sung dynasty on we have very detailed texts from which we can learn what actually happened. The Shou-ch’eng lu mentioned above belongs in part to this genre. Hsiang-yang shou-ch’eng lu (HYSCL) This text is a description of the siege of Hsiang-yang, Hupeh province, by the Jurchen armies from December 1206 to March 1207. The commanding officer in Hsiang-yang was Chao Ch’un;

the author of the book is Chao Wan-nien, a younger relative of Chao Ch’un, who served in the latter’s staff.” K’ai-hsi Te-an shou-ch’eng lu (TASCL) This ‘‘Record of the Defense of Te-an in the K’ai-hsi period” is in many ways similar to the HYSCL. The defender of Te-an in 1206-1207 was Wang Yiin-ch’u (1154-1214); his son, Wang Chih-yiian is the author of the diary which, like the HYSCL, gives a very detailed day-to-day and even hour-to-hour account

of the action.” Pao-Ytieh lu (PYL)

Whereas the previously mentioned texts deal with the defense of towns against a foreign enemy, the struggle against Chinese rebel forces is described in detail in the Pao-Yiieh lu (Record of the defense of Yiieh [that is Shao-hsing]}. The author of this diary which covers the period between the end of February 1359 and June 13, 1359, was a Confucian schoolmaster by the name of Hsii Mien-chih.** The three diaries described above have one thing in common. Having been written by either relatives or close friends of the commanding officers, they tend to be eulogistic and aim to praise the successful defenders. This raises the question how far 199

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we may trust the contents. However, in the diaries studied above, eulogy seems to be restricted to the character and bravery of the commander; only on these topics do we find literary clichés, such as his care for aged parents or his devotion to the cardinal virtue of loyalty toward the throne. The factual information is so overwhelming and absolutely matter-of-fact that it deserves our full confidence. No tigers or elephants are here, but descriptions of fighting and weapons which are realistic throughout. What is more important, in comparison with the laconic accounts of battles in the standard histories, these authors were eyewitnesses. One aspect should of course be noted. Only a successful man can be praised. A defeat, however heroic, is not conducive to diary writing, quite apart from the fact that the diarists may not survive. It is not by chance that the existing diaries of sieges seem to concern successful defense rather than defeat. One exception is Ch’en Kuei’s criticism of the defense of Kaifeng in 1126-1127."* The

only point where the factual content of the diaries mentioned above must be treated with caution is their figures. It has been common for military writers both in China and abroad to exaggerate the strength of enemy forces.*® The numerical strength of one’s own army seems, however, to be treated more responsibly. Another feature, not devoid of interest in connection with these and other diaries, is the fact that the standard histories _ and biographical collections have next to nothing to say about the “hero” who saved the town and its population from the enemy. Evidently, such men were not considered important enough to merit a biography in a standard history. Here we see the antimilitary bias of court historiographers at work, a tendency which is quite strong in the Sung period when the imperial court and the central bureaucracy always tried to keep the military in their place. The most prominent victim of this bias is, of course, Yiieh Fei. His later rehabilitation did not preserve the life of this glorious military leader from being shrouded in a veil of legend and even myth." There is, to my knowledge, no realistic description of any of his military exploits. We are told that he was successful in warfare but do not learn how he fought his battles. Under the Mongols we must reckon with a still stronger antimilitary tendency among the Chinese literati, who, after all, were the only ones who could write diaries. No Chinese scholar could be expected to glorify in detail the victories won by the barbarian invaders, 2.00

Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China

although we find here and there educated Chinese who did collaborate with the Mongols. Finally, a word should be said about a category of sources which has not been used at all for this paper, that is, vernacular fiction. Novels like Shui-hu chuan {translated as Water margin or All men are brothers) or San-kuo chih yen-i (Tales of the Three Kingdoms) or the various fictionalized accounts of wars fought between the Sung and their adversaries should constitute a major corpus of sources, at least for popular ideas and idealizations if not for actual and realistic descriptions. But to include this material here would go far beyond the scope of a single paper, and perhaps should be left to specialists in the field of Chinese literature. The popular concepts of war and warfare are, nevertheless, an important factor, because heroes and hero-worship in China as elsewhere have been popularized through fiction and on the stage.’”

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The Poyang Campaign, 1363:

Inland Naval Warfare in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty The campaign of the summer of 1363, culminating in the naval battle of the Poyang Lake, climaxed the struggle of three Chinese contenders for the control of the Yangtze Valley. The defeat and death of Ch’en Yu-liang, ruler of the Han state centered at Wu-ch’ang, gave his lands and armies to his successful rival Chu Yiian-chang, ruler of the emerging Ming state, whose capital was at Nanking. This accretion of strength gave the Ming the necessary numerical preponderance to overcome Chang Shih-ch’eng, ruler of the Soochow-based Wu state, with whom the Ming had been deadlocked for several years in a struggle for the control of the Yangtze delta area. Before 1363 it was not clear that any one successor to the Yiian dynasty would emerge; after 1363 the theme was the unchecked expansion of Ming power, ending with Chu Yiian-chang’s rise to the imperial throne and the expulsion of the Mongols in 1368. In addition to its significance in the founding of the Ming dynasty, the 1363 campaign is important for Chinese military history as a major example of inland naval warfare. The military objectives of this period were the walled cities which were the keys to the control of their dependent agricultural regions, but the lines of communication between these cities were the Yangtze River and its tributaries. Thus the military history of this period is a story of armies being transported to sieges by fleets. The 1363 naval battle, which occurred when one fleet attempted to come to the relief of a city besieged by another, is one of the best-documented examples of this mode of warfare in Chinese history, though it has so far received little attention in Western scholarship.*

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The Poyang Campaign, 1363

1. Strategic Elements in the Contest Chu Yiian-chang had established his capital at Nanking in 1356. Chang Shih-ch’eng had occupied Soochow at nearly the same time. Both had expanded south of the Yangtze River. By 1360 Chang’s state of Wu controlled Sung-chiang, Hu-chou, Chia-hsing, Hang-chou, and Shao-hsing in addition to the Soochow area itself, and it also controlled a stretch of less densely populated territory north of the Yangtze. Three coastal cities in Chekiang—Ning-po, Wen-chou, and T’ai-chou—were under the control of Fang Kuo-chen, whose power rested on his fleet, while the rest of Chekiang and Anhwei and Kiangsu south of the Yangtze was under the rule of Chu’s state of Ming. With a population estimated at ten million, Wu had a slight edge in population over Ming {about eight million), but basically the two states were evenly matched; one could expand at the expense of the other only by increasing its armies as a result of conquests elsewhere. By 1359 Ch’en Yu-liang had gained the leadership of the peasant movement which had swept through Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi. The following year he proclaimed himself emperor with the dynastic name Han. At the peak of his power he ruled a population estimated at fourteen million, half again as great as that of Ming or Wu.” However, his regime manifested most extremely the weakness common to all the Chinese regimes of this period: local military power rested in the hands of the commandants of the individual walled cities, usually leaders of garrisons who were bound to their overlords by ties of personal loyalty. Such commanders obeyed Ch’en Yu-liang as long as he was successful, but in times of adversity they were tempted to change sides. Warfare in Central China in this period was dominated by the walled cities, each the economic and administrative center of a wide region. Once the chaos of the 1350’s had ended, these cities were fully garrisoned, usually by locally recruited troops professing allegiance to one of the three great regimes. Despite the fact that primitive cannon were coming into widespread use in this period, city fortifications gave the defense a tremendous tactical advantage over the offense, so that there was in fact no example of a well-garrisoned city falling to assault without a preliminary blockade unless treachery was

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involved. This left blockade as the only feasible way to capture a city which would not surrender of its own accord. However, since whatever reserves of grain were available in its immediate surroundings would normally have been gathered within a threatened city, a blockading army could not rely entirely on supplies drawn from the region around the city under siege. Consequently the capture of cities by blockade usually required gathering supplies from more distant regions and transporting them to the scene of the siege. In South China this logistical support in turn required fleets. By 1360 the three Yangtze powers each had a strong naval transport capability, that of the Ming being the weakest. The original purpose of the fleets was the transport of armies and supplies to the cities which were to be attacked, but the value of interdicting the enemy’s communications was soon recognized and this required fighting fleets. Here it is not a matter of a “navy” sharply distinguished institutionally from the “army”; rather, certain units—usually recruited from fishing areas whose people had turned to piracy during the 1350’s—specialized in fighting on the water. One such group, the pirates of Lake Ch’ao in Western Anhwei, had joined the Ming in 1360, providing the basis of Ming naval power in 1363. However, this element merely provided a cadre of trained seamen. It did not contribute leaders with a definite tactical doctrine, the lack of which stands in marked contrast to the clear understanding of the need for ships to transport supplies and to assist in sieges. In the latter respect, this period is marked by an important innovation: the capture of cities by assaulting their riverine walls directly from the sterns of ships. Ch’en Yu-liang captured T’ai-p’ing this way in 1360, and in 1361 the Ming repaid him by capturing Chiu-chiang using “heavenly bridges” (t’ien-ch’iao) mounted on the sterns of their ships. There are scattered references in the sources to numerous types of weapons, including cannon and weapons using gunpowder as a combustible, crossbows and ordinary bows, plus catapults and siege towers for attacking cities. Despite their widespread use, firearms were not well enough developed to dominate the battlefield completely. It seems to have been standard practice, as in Europe one or two centuries later, to combine all arms tactically at a very low organizational level, so that the larger units which came to the attention of chroniclers would be homogeneous. The sources are also never clear about the order of battle of the contending forces. The armies of this period continued the Chinese tradition of using the drum to signal the 2,04

The Poyang Campaign, 1363

advance and the gong to sound the retreat. Flag signals were also used, and on the Poyang Lake the Ming fleet was divided into squadrons whose commanders’ ships were identified by flags.*

2. The Ming State Between Its Rivals (1360-1362) Chu Yiian-chang’s abilities were sorely tested by his having enemies both upstream and downstream, between whom he was sometimes obliged to respond on two fronts at once. Equally dangerous were occasional rebellions and attempted coups d’état within the Ming state itself. These precarious conditions could be overcome only by the most vigorous efforts. Upstream at Wu-ch’ang, Ch’en Yu-liang was at the peak of his power in 1359 but had not yet consolidated his wide domains into a well-integrated state. Before he could do so he allowed himself to be drawn into the fight which Chao P’u-sheng, his follower and warlord of An-ch’ing, was having with the Ming regime. Ch’en Yu-liang murdered Chao P’u-sheng and incorporated his followers into the main Han army. In the summer of 1360 he came downstream in force, with ten times as many ships as the Ming could muster. He took T’ai-p’ing by surprise, proclaimed himself emperor, and made an alliance with Chang Shih-ch’eng at Soochow. Chu Yiian-chang could not challenge his command of the river, but was able to induce him to land north of Nanking in the jaws of a prearranged ambush. In the ensuing debacle some 30,000 men, about one-third of the main Han army, were killed or captured, including the Lake Ch’ao sailors—former followers of Chao P’u-sheng—who went over to the Ming as a group. Many of the ships were also captured. Ch’en Yu-liang himself escaped and gradually reassembled the remainder of his scattered army at Chiu-chiang. The Ming followed up their victory by sending an expedition to capture An-ch’ing; an army also marched overland from Chekiang and took Kuang-hsin. Afterwards they regarded Ch’en Yu-liang as a spent force and turned their attention back to the desultory war with Chang Shih-ch’eng. However, when the Han recaptured An-ch’ing by surprise in mid-1361, Chu Yiian-chang responded with an expedition in force against Kiangsi. The Ming fleet took Chiu-chiang by assault only to discover that Ch’en Yu-liang and the Han main body had fled upstream the night before. The Ming armies then ranged through Kiangsi, most of whose cities surrendered at the first show of force. Their commandants and garrisons were left in 205

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Poyang Lake Area in 1363 To Nanking Ching-chiang-k'ou

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The Poyang Campaign, 1363

place. Finally the commandant of Nan-ch’ang, the most important city of Kiangsi, surrendered. Chu Yiian-chang raised him in rank, but joined his forces to the main Ming army, garrisoning the city with more reliable troops. Early in 1362 Chu Yiian-chang returned to Nanking. Meanwhile, his principal commander Hsii Ta, leading the Ming fleet, blockaded Ch’en Yu-liang in Wu-ch’ang. Chu Yiian-chang’s precipitate return to Nanking allowed him to deal swiftly with a major rebellion which had broken out among the Miao soldiers of the Chekiang army. Two of the four major cities of Chekiang fell to the rebels, and the Ming hold on the province was so weakened that large forces had to be sent from Nanking to suppress the rebellion. While these forces were thus committed, a part of the former Han garrison of Nan-ch’ang, which had been ordered to join forces with Hsii Ta, instead rebelled, countermarched, and took Nan-ch’ang by surprise. Chu Yiian-chang had no alternative but to order Hsii Ta to return from Wu-ch’ang and recapture Nan-ch’ang. Hsii Ta was successful, but at the price of freeing Ch’en Yu-liang to rebuild his forces. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1362 two of the leading Ming generals nearly succeeded in a coup at Nanking. With the Ming state shaken by rebellion in the provinces and treason in the capital, 1363 opened with a major offensive from the leastexpected quarter—Chang Shih-ch’eng.* In February 1363 a Wu general (Lii Chen) stormed An-feng, west of Nanking, killing its warlord and taking prisoner Chu Yiian-chang’s nominal emperor, Han Lin-erh. The same month treachery delivered the city of Jao-chou on the Poyang Lake to the Han. Chu Yiian-chang considered the threat from Wu to be the more significant and committed his main force to meet it. The Ming army rescued the emperor Han Lin-erh and recovered An-feng, but failed to destroy the Wu army there. Chu Yiian-chang then ordered the capture of Lu-chou on Lake Ch’ao, whose warlord had cooperated with Wu. The siege began at the end of April, and the main Ming army was engaged there for over three months, just as a Han threat to Kiangsi developed.°®

3. The Han Siege of Nan-ch’ang (June-July 1363) In early June a Han fleet carrying an army said to be 600,000 strong® came down the Yangtze and crossed the Poyang Lake. © On June 5 it appeared before the walls of Nan-ch’ang and laid 207

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Nan-ch’ang in 1363

Hsin-ch'eng gate

SS Tan-t'ai gate

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gate East Lake Ch'iao-pu gate

" gate Liu-li gate Kung-pu

gate Fu-chou gate

siege to the city. Thus while the Ming forces were besieging a strategic city on their front toward the downstream state of Wu, their important outpost at Nan-ch’ang on the Kan River, which enters the south side of the great Poyang Lake, was subjected to a vigorous attack mounted from the upstream state of Han. Nan-ch’ang was a control point for much of Kiangsi province, and was closer both by land and by water to Wu-ch’ang than to Nanking. The Ming hold on it had always been precarious. Ch’en Yu-liang had picked a likely and important target for his newly rebuilt naval power. Ch’en Yu-liang had not commanded any campaign in person since 1360, and his return to the offensive by proxy in 1361 had simply led to more losses of territory, which were confirmed by the failure of the 1362 revolts against the Ming. Ch’en Yu-liang, “angry that his frontiers were contracting daily,” decided on 208

The Poyang Campaign, 1363

an all or nothing attempt to destroy the Ming regime. The withdrawal of Hsii Ta’s fleet from the vicinity of Wu-ch’ang early in 1362 left him free to devote all his energy to shipbuilding and organization. In the rest of the year he built up a new fleet larger than the one he had lost, with a transport capacity sufficient to take along horses and retainers as well as fighting men and military supplies. Then he mobilized all the able-bodied men in the territories still under his control and drove downstream.’ The sources are all consistent with the following description of Ch’en Yu-liang’s largest warships: “The height of the ships was several chang. The outside was painted with red lacquer. From top to bottom there were three decks. On the decks were erected tents for the riding horses. Below were placed several tens of oars, protected by coverings made of boards. Aboard (the ships] the sound of a man’s voice could not carry from top to bottom. The archers’ towers were covered with iron.” The description of the battle makes it clear that the rowers were covered and protected by the lowest deck and that they could not hear commands shouted from the decks. It is also clear from the battle account that tactics did not depend on the ram, so that the warships could do one another damage only by shooting arrows or other projectiles; elevated positions for the archers were a common feature of naval design before the use of cannon became widespread. Higher decks were shorter than the lower, so that the ships were three decks high at the stern and had only one deck at the bow; the tents for the horses were on the exposed forward part of each deck, reserving the sheltered after part for humans. All of this suggests a large ship of the standard junk design adapted for oars; of course no river vessel would depend entirely on sails. The few indications of the overall size of the ships and the numbers of the fleet present a consistent picture.* When he finally attempted, after the siege of Nan-ch’ang, to break out of the Poyang Lake, Ch’en Yu-liang attacked with “over one hundred” of his large ships, and the number of men who surrendered shortly afterwards is given as 50,000. Once again the description of the battles makes it clear that the faster small craft escaped while the large ships were captured; and this makes it possible to estimate the crews of the large ships at about five hundred. If about three hundred of these were rowers, this would permit the “several tens” of sweeps on each side, each pulled by perhaps five men. It is not possible to be more specific 209

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with the information given, but these indications all point to a vessel of large size with a high shooting platform which smaller ships could attack only with difficulty, but comparatively slow, of deep draught, and difficult to maneuver. Chu Yiian-chang was aware of these characteristics and so postponed naval action until the water level in the rivers was low. The sources also state that all of Ch’en Yu-liang’s men were aboard the large ships; but this cannot be, as various types of small ships are mentioned, and at a critical point in the naval campaign a raid on a minor objective was carried out by “five hundred ships,” though these must have been individually quite small. In the main Poyang Lake battle “several hundred” of the large ships were destroyed by fire. Perhaps a bare majority of the total Han personnel sailed on the large ships, which were the principal organized fighting force, while older men, families, and camp followers of all sorts sailed on a much larger number of smaller craft requisitioned from the ordinary river vessels of the upper Yangtze. The references to the unwieldy size of the ships and their coats of red paint may be partly intended to discredit Ch’en Yu-liang by pointing up his obsession with strange and useless things. However, since Ch’en Yu-liang had risen to power only after several years of intensive river fighting, it is unlikely that he was unaware of the problems his outsize ships would cause in any strictly naval engagement. It is more likely that Ch’en Yu-liang intended to repeat the successes he had achieved in 1360, capturing cities by scaling their riverine walls directly from the sterns of his ships. Chu Yiian-chang had taken precautions against this technique by extensive modifications in the fortifications of Nan-ch’ang, An-ch’ing, and T’ai-p’ing, measures which included moving the riverine walls back a certain distance from the river. Nanking had originally been built too far from the river to be vulnerable to this kind of attack. Ch’en Yu-liang’s overall plan in 1363 was to make sudden descents on the major lake and river cities, capturing them by the first assault without any protracted siege; the weakly-held hinterland would then submit to Han rule once again and the armada would sail quickly downstream to Nanking, this time in sufficient force to overpower the defenders. The Han fleet was designed to implement this strategy; consequently it was wasted during the long siege of Nan-ch’ang and its performance was poor in the pitched battles on the Poyang Lake. 2.10

The Poyang Campaign, 1363

The Ming commander at Nan-ch’ang, Chu Yiian-chang’s nephew Chu Wen-cheng, had been ordered to the city when the garrison was strengthened after the rebellion of 1362 was suppressed. The appearance of the Han fleet on June 5 did not take him by surprise. He had organized the city carefully for defense, keeping a reserve of two thousand picked troops under his personal command, and dividing the wall into sectors under his principal subordinates. The ts’an-cheng Teng Yii (see Appendix for explanation of rank system) was assigned the southern sector including the Fu-chou gate (see map above}; the ytian-shuai Chao Te-sheng commanded the Kung-pu, Shih-pu, and Chiao-pu gates in the west facing the Kan River,? the chih-hui Hsiieh Hsien took charge of the northern sector of the wall including the Chang-chiang and Hsin-ch’eng gates (the storming of the latter had led to the fall of the city in 1362); and finally the yiian-shuai Niu Hai-lung commanded the eastern sector of the wall including the Liu-li and Tan-t’ai gates.’° There were other chih-hui and ytian-shuai in the garrison, and the presence of this many high-ranking officers may indicate that there were about 30,000 Ming troops present. Only the walls of the city enabled them to hold out against the besiegers, even when the investing force was reduced by detachments sent to attack other areas.” On June 9, the fifth day of the siege, Ch’en Yu-liang personally led an assault on the Fu-chou gate. His soldiers were equipped with bamboo shields shaped like baskets to ward off arrows and stones. Cannon or other siege engines must have been present, because the first assault opened a gap of over thirty chang in the wall; Teng Yui counterattacked promptly and drove off the attackers with firearms. It was then necessary to build an earth-and-wood palisade behind the broken section of the wall, and Ch’en Yu-liang launched attack after attack trying to prevent this. While Teng Yii’s troops built the palisade, the Ming troops in other sectors of the wall made sorties so as to divert the besiegers. Eventually the reserve had to be committed to the Fu-chou gate sector, but the Ming troops worked as they fought and completed the palisade by morning.*” While Ch’en Yu-liang commanded in person at Nan-ch’ang, another Han force went up the Kan River to the south. On June 12 Chi-an fell because of rivalry among the Ming commanders there.'® On June 16 another Han force on the Yangtze’ captured Wu-wei, downstream from Hu-k’ou, the entrance from the great river to the Poyang Lake. Three days 211

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later, on June 19 (the fifteenth day of the siege) Ch’en Yu-liang assaulted Nan-ch’ang once again, this time selecting the Hsin-ch’eng gate as his point of attack. The response of the gate commander, Hsiieh Hsien, was to open the gate and counterattack. The Han forces were taken by surprise and fell back after losing two generals.** No attacks at Nan-ch’ang or other movements of the Han forces are reported for the next five weeks, as Ch’en Yu-liang attempted to force the surrender of the city by simple starvation. In the meantime he repaired his siege implements and increased his stock of weapons. On July 24, the fiftieth day of siege, the Han forces again made a general assault on Nan-ch’ang. This time they attempted to gain entrance to the city by battering down the railings of the water gates. Chu Wen-cheng placed soldiers equipped with long lances behind each railing, charged with spearing the Han soldiers as they approached it. When the Han troops countered by snatching at the lances, Chu Wen-cheng ordered that the metal spear tips be heated, so that the next time the Han soldiers attempted to seize them they burnt their hands. In this way the attack on the water gates was stopped. At this point, one source observes with noticeable self-satisfaction that ‘(Ch’en) Yu-liang had employed all the arts of siegecraft, but those within the city had responded to each one with the appropriate defense.’’**

Artifice exhausted, Ch’en Yu-liang continued with a direct assault on the Kung-pu and Shih-pu gates in Chao Te-sheng’s sector of the wall. After directing the defense successfully for the entire day, in the late afternoon Chao Te-sheng climbed the tower of the Kung-pu gate to give orders to his men. He was recognized by an enemy crossbowman and killed.” Even though Ch’en Yu-liang had failed to subdue Nan-ch’ang quickly, he had shown persistence in keeping it besieged and was sufficiently strong to send armies to restore Han authority in the surrounding regions as well. The siege of Nan-ch’ang was approaching the critical point, and some relief was necessary if the city were to hold out. Before describing the events which set this relief in motion, we must turn to the situation which had kept the Ming military r>sources committed elsewhere. 4. The Anti-Ming Rebellion in Chekiang (June—August}

The commandant of Chu-ch’iian, the shu-mi-yiian p’an-kuan Hsieh Tsai-hsing, rebelled on June 8, the fourth day of the siege Dad

The Poyang Campaign, 1363

of Nan-ch’ang. He killed the civil administrator, Luan Feng, and the latter’s wife, when she tried to protect her husband. He took the other commanders prisoner, went in person to Shao-hsing, and surrendered Chu-ch’iian to Chang Shih-ch’eng. Only one of the Ming commanders, the tsung-kuan Hu Ju-ming, was able to escape, abandoning his family and fleeing alone on horseback. The cause of this debacle was Chu Yiian-chang’s attempt to replace Hsieh Tsai-hsing as the commandant of Chu-ch’iian. Two of Hsieh’s intimates had been discovered selling military secrets to Chang Shih-ch’eng’s commander at Hang-chou. After these men were arrested and executed, Chu Yiian-chang began to suspect Hsieh Tsai-hsing, since both had been trusted subordinates in the latter’s personal troops. He summoned Hsieh Tsai-hsing to Nanking and attempted to assign his command to another officer. But Hsieh Tsai-hsing refused to obey the order and rebelled.*® Through the rebellions which shook the other cities of Chekiang during 1362, Chu-ch’iian had remained loyal but had been besieged by Chang Shih-ch’eng’s troops. The Ming commander in Chekiang, the tso-ch’eng Li Wen-chung, could send only a small relieving force under Hu Te-chi; but, by spreading a rumor that the main Ming army was coming up, he induced the attackers to retire in disorder. Now Li Wen-chung once again sent Hu Te-chi, recently promoted to ts’an-cheng, to the vicinity of Chu-ch’iian, with instructions to make camp a few miles from the city and guard against attacks from that quarter.’® Li Wen-chung, the son of Chu Yiian-chang’s sister, had participated in the conquest of Yen-chou in 1358 and had spent the five subsequent years in Chekiang. His real military abilities, combined with his close relationship to Chu Yiian-chang, had gained him supreme command of the Ming armies in Chekiang. He had married Hsieh Tsai-hsing’s eldest daughter, while Hsii Ta had married a younger daughter. Chu Yiian-chang had relied on these close family ties to keep Hsieh Tsai-hsing loyal, but the latter was quick to slip free as soon as the local basis of his military power was threatened. Hsieh Tsai-hsing’s revolt turned Chekiang into a danger area for the Ming once again, but significant military action against him could not be taken for about four months until the crisis in Kiangsi was over. By October 23, Li Wen-chung had defeated Hsieh Tsai-hsing in open battle but failed to recapture Chu-ch’iian. His aide, Hu Shen, then proposed building a

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permanent fort near Chu-ch’iian to mask it.?° By November 5 the new fort had resisted a major Wu assault, so Chu Ytian-chang gave his retroactive approval.” Events in Chekiang during 1363 had once more illustrated the deadlock which had arisen there in the war between Chu Ytian-chang and Chang Shih-ch’eng. The loss of Chu-ch’iian did not signal the collapse of the Ming regime in the province any more than previous Ming victories had shaken Chang Shih-ch’eng’s hold on the northern coastal cities. Chang Shih-ch’eng remained relatively inactive during the second half of 1363, even though it lay within his power to do Chu Ytian-chang a great deal of harm. Once again he hoped to step in and pick up the pieces after the other two powers had fought one another to the death; instead he was to find himself in 1364 facing an enemy whose strength had swollen to enormous proportions because of victory in the previous year. For the Ming the significance of the Chekiang revolt was that it reduced the availability of their Chekiang army as a force to intervene in Kiangsi. In 1360 the greater part of the Ming army in Chekiang had marched into Kiangsi and had captured Kuang-hsin. In 1363 only the garrison of Kuang-hsin itself could be employed in Kiangsi; the Chu-ch’iian revolt, added to the unstable situation resulting from the 1362 rebellions, made it necessary to reserve most of the Chekiang army for the defense of that province itself.

5. The Ming Upstream Expedition (August 15-25) During the two months of the Nan-ch’ang siege the city had been cut off from the outside world; food and replacements could not enter and, save for one exception, news did not get out. Though the besieging forces had suffered heavily, losing “sixty or seventy thousand” men,” the losses among the numerically inferior defenders were such as to make relief imperative. Finally Chu Wen-cheng resorted to a ruse to arrange a cease-fire and used the lull in the fighting to slip a messenger through the Han lines. For reasons explained below, this must have occurred shortly after Ch’en Yu-liang’s last major attack on July 24. The method Chu Wen-cheng employed to induce Ch’en Yu-liang to call off his attacks is described only in one source, as follows: ““Nan-ch’ang had been besieged for a long time. Communications with the outside had been cut. [Chu] Wen-cheng sent the ch’ien-hu Chang Tzu-ming to go to 214

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Nanking and report their plight. He also sent a soldier [now] known as ‘Wang who has given up his life’ to go to [Ch’en] Yu-liang and pretend to set a date for the surrender [of the city. Ch’en] Yu-liang was deceived by this ruse and stopped his assaults [until then. When the Ming] banners were hoisted once again over the walls on that day, [Ch’en] Yu-liang waited

until sunset. Then realizing that they had no intention of surrendering, he bound the soldier who had surrendered and killed him beneath the city wall.’’?* The sources treat Chang Tzu-ming’s downriver trip and return as the high point of the siege. Slipping out through one of the Nan-ch’ang water gates by night in a small fishing boat of the type used on the East Lake in Nan-ch’ang, he escaped into the Poyang Lake by way of a minor stream not patrolled by Ch’en Yu-liang’s ships. Thereafter, traveling by night and resting by day, he reached Nanking in “half a month.”** We already know that Han influence had reached very far downstream because of their capture of Wu-wei, but the sources are silent concerning the fate of the other riverbank cities in Anhwei. Evidently they were not captured, despite the presence of Ch’en Yu-liang’s fleet on the river. Chang Tzu-ming’s adventures are recorded under the date August 4. This date refers definitely to his arrival at Nanking, since Chu Yiian-chang’s order to Hsii Ta and others to break off the siege of the Wu strong point of Lu-chou was issued two days later, and the entry mentions the relief of Nan-ch’ang as the cause of the order. Therefore the “half month” period given as the duration of Chang Tzu-ming’s trip downstream can only refer to the eleven days between July 24 (the date of Ch’en Yu-liang’s last major assault on Nan-ch’ang} and August 4. In that case the truce mentioned previously came into effect not long after July 24 and was still in effect when Chang Tzu-ming arrived at Nanking. Chu Yiian-chang asked him to report on the situation at Nan-ch’ang. Chang Tzu-ming replied that, despite the great size of the Han armada, it had suffered heavy losses during the siege. The spring rains being long over, the water level in the rivers and lakes was dropping rapidly in the summer heat. This would cause “the great warships of the bandits” to become almost useless and increase the advantage of maneuverability which the Ming vessels already enjoyed due to their shallower draught. Chang Tzu-ming also said that the Han fleet was running low on provisions and concluded that the Ming could 215

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certainly defeat them. Chu Yiian-chang ordered him to return to Nan-ch’ang and instruct Chu Wen-cheng to hold out for one more month. Returning, Chang Tzu-ming got as far as the city of Hu-k’ou at the mouth of the Poyang Lake, where he was captured by Ch’en Yu-liang’s men. Ch’en Yu-liang asked him to “entice Nan-ch’ang to surrender” (that is, by saying that there was no possibility of relief), offering “riches and honor” in exchange. Chang Tzu-ming pretended to agree, but when he was brought beneath the walls of Nan-ch’ang he cried out: “The grand army is coming. You need only defend yourselves and wait.” He was killed on the spot, but the damage was done: Nan-ch’ang continued to resist.” The orders to Hsti Ta to raise the siege of Lu-chou against the state of Wu were issued on August 6.”° Chu Yiian-chang is quoted as observing: ‘’To lose (a) Nan-ch’ang for (a) Lu-chou is not good strategy.’””’ This is clear from a glance at the overall geographical situation, but why did he not come to this conclusion sooner? The forces assembling at Nanking were ready only eleven days after Chang Tzu-ming arrived there. The fact that the Ming leadership was able to prepare a major relief expedition so quickly, despite the total loss of a major powder magazine at Nanking (July 20),?* confirms that they had general knowledge of the situation in Kiangsi even before Chang Tzu-ming’s mission; possibly Chu Yiian-chang’s delay was deliberate, due to his hope that Lu-chou was on the point of falling. On August 15 the troops which had been besieging Lu-chou arrived at Nanking and boarded ship. There is no information concerning the route they took from Lu-chou to the capital, but the distance is about one hundred miles. Nine days (August 6-15) would have sufficed for a mounted messenger to ride to Lu-chou and for the army to break off the siege and march back on foot. The sacrifice to the banner and the departure of the Ming fleet also took place on August 15. Chu Yiian-chang addressed his assembled officers as follows: “Ch’en Yu-liang has mobilized his forces and besieged [Nan-ch’ang] without interruption. He has been tied down there and is defeated without knowing it. Now heaven has robbed him of his spirit and is driving him to destruction. I am about to set forth in person on campaign. You officers are each to set your ships in order and to follow me with your horses and men.””*

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The sources generally agree in giving a total Ming strength of 200,000 men, but one says “one thousand ships and 100,000 armored soldiers.”*° The lower figure is more likely to be correct for the Ming fleet, and the Han fleet opposing them still had about twice as many men, even after losses and detachments are taken into account. In any event the Ming fleet, like the Han, consisted of a core of larger ships which were intended to do the fighting (many of which had been captured from Ch’en Yu-liang in 1360}, supported by a great variety of smaller vessels, which were necessary for transporting supplies and for other functions such as scouting and carrying messages. The sources do not go into the routine work of garrison and supply, but it is nevertheless clear from the times involved that the Ming expedition from Nanking was entirely waterborne (though the Kuang-hsin army began to march overland toward Nan-ch’ang at about the same time). For the size of the Ming fighting ships, the unsatisfactory figures given for the 1360 campaign are the only guide, and these indicate an average crew of about one hundred. We may assume that the flagships were larger, but all the ships in the Ming fleet were overshadowed by the great ships which Ch’en Yu-liang had constructed for this campaign. Accompanying Chu Yiian-chang were the yu-ch’eng Hsii Ta and the ts’an-cheng Ch’ang Yii-ch’un, the two most important Ming field generals; Feng Kuo-sheng, the commander of Chu Yiian-chang’s guards; and Liao Yung-chung and Yii T’ung-hai, both t’ung-chih shu-mi-ytian shih, who were the two highest ranking members of the Lake Ch’ao group which provided most of the Ming naval leadership. The latter two were to have the greatest influence on the decisions in the naval battle. For the lower-ranking commanders, participation in this campaign was to become a landmark in their lives comparable in importance to the first Ming crossing of the Yangtze. The voyage upstream was accomplished with only two minor incidents. “There was a large fish with two dorsal fins which dove in and out among the waves in an unusual manner. It neared (Chu Yiian-chang’s) flagship as the latter sailed past Hsiao-ku-shan. Many took it to be a dragon.” A future emperor requires auspicious omens, particularly before battle. On August 24 Feng Kuo-sheng’s flagship was capsized by the wind, and the damage was so extensive that he was ordered back to Nanking for repairs. The following day the Ming fleet reached Hu-k’ou

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at the mouth of the Poyang Lake. The voyage of about 250 miles, upstream against the current, had taken nine days, and there had been no opposition from the Han fleet.** 6. Ch’en Yu-liang Raises the Siege of Nan-ch’ang (August 28} Between its confluence with the Yangtze River at the district city of Hu-k’ou and the actual broadening of the Poyang Lake south of the passage past the island of Sung-men-shan, there is a stretch of constricted water over thirty-five miles in length. Once on the Poyang Lake, one can get to most of the cities of Kiangsi by water, since they are located on the banks of the four great river systems (Kan, Fu, Hsin, and Hsiu} flowing into the lake. To escape from Kiangsi by water, however, one must sail down the narrow slot from Sung-men-shan to Hu-k’ou. Chen Yu-liang’s armies had garrisoned Hu-k’ou but had not improved its defenses, and the city fell to the Ming without a struggle on August 25. Chu Yiian-chang detached one force, commanded by the chih-hui Tai Te,*’ to fortify Ching-chiang-k’ou, the point where the channel leading into the Poyang Lake actually joins the Yangtze. He sent another force to fortify Nan-hu-tsui, in the narrow portion of the channel near Nan-k’ang. Orders were also sent to the Ming army at Kuang-hsin to march 150 miles west to the Wu-yang ford on the Fu River, southeast of Nan-ch’ang, in order to prevent an overland march by a Han army in the direction of Fu-chou.** Ch’en Yu-liang controlled the Kan River because he held Chi-an and Lin-chiang, and he also had large forces tied up in Tu-ch’ang and Jao-chou. In the event of a decisive Ming victory on the Poyang Lake (which did not occur immediately}, a strong Ming army on the Fu River would make it impossible for the separate Han garrisons to unite by marching overland, and such a force could also relieve Nan-ch’ang if given a favorable opportunity. However, it was important that the Kuang-hsin army of the Ming not get too far west until the main body of the Han fleet had been drawn away from Nan-ch’ang, lest it be crushed by superior Han forces. The sources do not indicate whether Ch’en Yu-liang’s failure to defend the entrance to the Poyang Lake was due to lack of information or to a simple inability to escape from his fascination with the siege of Nan-ch’ang. Of course he knew, from his capture of Chang Tzu-ming, that a Ming relief expedition was on the way. Prudence would seem to have 218

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dictated one last attempt to take Nan-ch’ang by assault, followed by a massive transfer of forces to the area of Hu-k’ou and Ching-chiang-k’ou. This bottleneck secured, the decision whether or not to let the Ming fleet into the lake would have been his to make. Even considering his losses during the three-month siege of Nan-ch’ang, he should still have had sufficient forces both to blockade that city and to hold the entrance to the lake. If his forces were in fact too weak to perform both tasks simultaneously, this made it all the more imperative for him to defeat the Ming fleet before it could unite with either the Nan-ch’ang garrison or the Kuang-hsin army; and by fighting at the mouth of the lake he could at least have guaranteed that his main fleet could retreat to Wu-ch’ang. Ch’en Yu-liang cannot have been thinking at this late date that Chu Wen-cheng would honor the previously negotiated surrender agreement, but nevertheless no assaults on Nan-ch’ang are recorded after July 24. For the following month, Ch’en Yu-liang merely blockaded the city in the hope of starving it into submission. It is most likely that Ch’en Yu-liang simply overestimated the time it would take Chu Yiian-chang to organize a major expedition and assumed that he had at least another fortnight of grace. By August 25 he had lost the initiative and was in a dangerous situation. On August 28 the Ming fleet entered the Poyang Lake through the Sung-men-shan strait. On the same day Ch’en Yu-liang responded by raising the siege of Nan-ch’ang after eighty-five days, put his troops aboard ship, and sailed down the Kan River into the lake.** His only hope now was to destroy the Ming fleet. For this purpose the open lake was preferable to either the straits or the Kan River delta, so he was eager to accept the Ming challenge to battle. One might criticize Chu Yiian-chang’s leadership in offering battle with a weaker fleet, when the enemy was bound to attempt to force his way out of the lake sooner or later, and he could then engage under extremely favorable circumstances. But in fact the Ming options remained open. The stated purpose of the expedition was to relieve Nan-ch’ang; but if this could not be achieved by destroying the Han besiegers directly, the Ming fleet could always retreat to the Sung-men-shan straits or further, leaving the Han fleet trapped within the lake, as they did later. Below Nan-ch’ang the Kan River flows into the Poyang Lake through a vast delta system. Which of the possible channels Ch’en Yu-liang took to the lake is not stated, but the location 219

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of the first battle suggests that the Han fleet found a way through the delta to the lower reaches of the Fu River, east of the Kan, and came out onto the lake through the mouth of the Fu. Perhaps they hoped to sail to Jao-chou to pick up the Han garrison there before engaging the Ming fleet. If that was their objective, they were to be disappointed. The following day (August 29) the two fleets encountered one another off the island of K’ang-lang-shan, the largest island in the southern quarter of the lake. The previous day Chu Yiian-chang had addressed his generals, stating that Ch’en Yu-liang had heard of their advance and had broken off the siege in order to deal with them. Now that he saw the Han ships lined up in opposition to the Ming fleet he spoke to his commanders once again, pointing out that the ships of the Han fleet were so close together that it was difficult for them to maneuver; and so they could be destroyed.*® This judgment invites comparison with the conventional interpretation of the campaign of Actium, in which the battle came about as a result of the Egyptian fleet’s attempt to break out of a landlocked gulf, the mouth of which was guarded by the Roman fleet. The ships of the Egyptian fleet, representing the culmination of three centuries of Hellenistic competition in shipbuilding, were gigantic and unwieldy; tactical doctrine had declined correspondingly, to the point where ships were regarded as mere fighting platforms for foot-soldiers. The Roman fleet, in contrast, had been formed by a century of campaigns against pirates; successive generations of warships had‘been built smaller and smaller, and tactical doctrine was based on the use of the ship as weapon, crippling the enemy’s oars by ramming. This model can be applied to the Poyang Lake campaign only with certain qualifications and restrictions. First of all, there is no mention of the use of ramming as a deliberate tactic, and the ships were certainly not designed for it. Being built with square transoms in the Chinese style, they lacked the heavy keel that could support a ram. The superior mobility of the Ming vessels was most important because they could gain the weather gauge, from which vantage point fire ships or flaming projectiles from catapults could be launched. Second, the Han ships were built to their excessive size for the specific purpose of serving as a highly mobile siege train, rather than to serve any definite doctrine of naval (ship versus ship) warfare. In the wars of this period, the use of fleets as an auxiliary to siegecraft 2.20

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was the rule, pitched battles between ships the exception. Similarly, the Ming could respond to the Han offensive only with the ships they had on hand at the moment. There was no time, and of course no conscious effort, to build ships specifically designed to take advantage of the weaknesses of the Han ships. Here it should be emphasized that, in building general purpose fighting vessels for operations in shallow waters, shallow draught is the attribute which must be attained even at the sacrifice of other desirable qualities. In designing ships for the specific function of assaulting cities, Ch’en Yu-liang had gambled on a short campaign which would be carried out when the Yangtze was in flood. His failure to take Nan-ch’ang upset his schedule and forced him to fight at the end of the summer when the water level was low. Chu Yiian-chang was of course happy to make use of this unexpected gift. Third, once one is in the position of commanding a fleet of large, unwieldy vessels, the best tactical procedure is to band together for mutual support; dispersal invites defeat in detail. Ch’en Yu-liang was in serious trouble at the start of the Poyang Lake naval battle, but this was due to his earlier mistakes; in the actual fighting he acquitted himself creditably. The contact of the fleets on August 29 must have occurred late in the day, since no combat is recorded until the following day. The Han fleet was disposed in a close battle array. Chu Yiian-chang divided his own fleet into eleven squadrons and ordered that the enemy vessels were to be engaged at long range with firearms, at medium range with crossbows, and at short range by boarding and hand-to-hand fighting. The references to “firearms” are ambiguous, but since on one occasion they were launched downwind, they should probably be understood as including catapults capable of hurling flaming projectiles as as well as cannon (which were just coming into use in this period).*® The two fleets anchored and faced one another during the night.*’ 7. The Naval Battle of the Poyang Lake (August 30-September 2) The battle began on the morning of August 30 with a general advance of the squadrons commanded by Hsii Ta, Ch’ang Yii-ch’un, and Liao Yung-chung, which together evidently composed at least half of the Ming fleet. Hsii Ta’s own flagship ran ahead of the fleet and was the first to encounter the Han 224

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line; after killing 1,500 men and capturing one of Ch’en Yu-liang’s great warships, Hsii Ta managed to disengage and return. While the main body of the Han fleet pressed toward the frontal battle, the experienced admiral Yii T’ung-hai gained a position to the windward of the enemy flank, whence he launched flaming missiles from catapults (huo-p’ao) and succeeded in burning up “over a score” of enemy warships.*® This attack did not break up the Han line: on the contrary the three Ming squadrons which had made the initial frontal attack were beginning to crack. Hsti Ta’s flagship caught fire, and his squadron was so weakened by losses that the Han fleet concentrated their counterattack upon it. Chu Yiian-chang went to the rescue in person, leading the reserve squadron. Hsii Ta was able to put out the fire on his own ship and his squadron “fought back so vigorously that the enemy then retreated.” One suspects that actually Chu Yiian-chang’s own entry into the battle drew off the Han attackers and left Hsii Ta temporarily more or less out of the fighting. We know from other evidence that Chu Yiian-chang’s flagship had a distinctive appearance and that flagships generally were identifiable by special banners. The Han ships involved in this counterattack were commanded by Chang Ting-pien, the most important Han commander not of the Ch’en family. As the Han ships approached Chu Yiian-chang’s flagship,*® the latter ran aground on asand bar and stuck fast. The Han ships encircled it, remaining at a distance out of a desire to avoid the same fate. Chang Ting-pien’s own flagship continued to advance, however, and the ensuing melee provided a number of martyrs for the temple subsequently established on K’ang-lang-shan. The ytian-shuai Ch’en Chao-hsien and another officer impetuously attacked Chang Ting-pien’s squadron and were killed. The ytian-shuai Sung Kuei and the chih-hui Han Ch’eng also died at this point; the latter is alleged to have declaimed concerning a subject's gratitude to his sovereign, after which he put on his cap and ceremonial robes, faced the enemy, and committed suicide by jumping into the water. Supposedly this action impressed the enemy so much that they ceased attacking, but this suggests once again that they did not approach the grounded Ming flagship in order to avoid running aground themselves. Ch’ang Yii-ch’un then led the Ming counterattack, engaging

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Chang Ting-pien, flagship to flagship, and attacking him at close range with arrows; during this time (middle and late afternoon) both Hsii Ta and Chu Yiian-chang were out of action. Yii T’ung-hai saved the situation once again by coming to the assistance of Chu Yiian-chang; his ships moved in so swiftly that the waves generated by their motion are said to have rocked Chu Yiian-chang’s flagship loose. Chang Ting-pien wished to disengage, now that the entire Ming fleet {or at least those elements which were still battle-worthy} had concentrated against him; Yii T’ung-hai and Liao Yung-chung selected their fastest galleys and pursued him, evidently without great determination.*®° Chang Ting-pien’s flagship was hit by “over

one hundred” arrows and he lost many men killed and wounded. But this was not the end of the Ming fleet’s troubles. It was Ch’ang Yii-ch’un’s turn to run aground, but before the ship he signaled for assistance could arrive, an abandoned vessel floating with the current struck Ch’ang Yii-ch’un’s ship and dislodged it. By now it was sunset and no one in either fleet had the spirit for any more fighting.*’ The most striking feature of this first day’s battle is the propensity of the Ming ships to run aground. Since the flagships of two of the five principal Ming commanders ran aground, one must assume that many other ships carrying less prominent persons suffered the same misfortune and that most of the Ming fleet ran the risk of it, yet there is no mention of the same trouble occurring to the Han ships, even those in the immediate vicinity of the grounded Ming vessels. Three conclusions follow from this fact: (1) The heavier Ming warships were those assigned to the squadrons commanded by Hsii Ta, Ch’ang Yii-ch’un, and Chu Yiian-chang personally. These commanders, whose principal experience had been in warfare on land, led squadrons whose role in battle was to stand up to the enemy and fight him and whose tactics were grappling and boarding. The other two principal commanders, Yii T’ung-hai and Liao Yung-chung, had a primarily “naval” background from the “pirates” of Lake Ch’ao, who had provided the means for Chu Ytian-chang’s crossing of the Yangtze in 1355 and who had been the backbone of Ming naval power ever since and led squadrons composed of lighter, faster vessels whose tactics stressed the use of missile weapons.*” This is evident both from the contrasting tactical employment of the squadrons belonging to the two sets of

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commanders and from the fact that Yii T’ung-hai’s ships were able to move “quickly” through the same waters in which Chu Yiian-chang and Ch’ang Yii-ch’un both ran aground. (2) Chu Yiian-chang’s plan for the day’s battle was to engage the Han fleet in a frontal holding attack with his heavy ships (which, it will be remembered, were still much smaller than the largest Han warships} followed up by a fire attack by the light vessels on the enemy flank and rear, in the hope that the resulting confusion would enable him to roll up the enemy line and destroy a good part of the enemy fleet. He calculated that the poor maneuvering qualities of the Han fleet rendered them unable to respond to the unexpected threat of the flank attack which he relied on the seamanship of his two best admirals to produce. All of the sources confuse this picture by including Liao Yung-chung in Chu Yiian-chang’s morning order to “advance forces and engage the enemy.” Yet Liao Yung-chung is not mentioned in the subsequent fighting until the late afternoon pursuit of Chang Ting-pien. Whatever he did during the rest of the day, his role in the fighting was clearly distinct from that of the heavy ships. Possibly he was on the wing opposite to Yii T’ung-hai, in which case he would have been to the leeward of the Han fleet {and therefore unable to attack) when the favorable wind sprang up which enabled Yui T’ung-hai to launch his fire attack. (3) Chu Yiian-chang’s plan did not work, not because the Ming commanders failed to execute it (as would be the case on the morrow) but simply because the Ming fleet was too weak. Yii T’ung-hai’s attack did not cause the Han line to crumple; instead they simply counterattacked and by sheer force drove the Ming fleet back, into shallow water. The Ming fleet was then inconvenienced by low water which at the same time protected them from the great Han warships. It would enhance Chu Yiian-chang’s reputation as a commander if one could prove that he deliberately chose to fight with shallow water at his back, but the effect was the same in any case: he was able to stall until the Han fleet withdrew for the night. Organized fighting at night was almost impossible, and the weaker fleet would benefit from any confusion. The Ming troops were discouraged by the results of the day’s battle and wished to withdraw rather than risk an engagement the following day. Chu Yiian-chang had to assemble his subordinate commanders aboard his flagship, explain his plans and orders for the next day, and make them all swear to fight 224

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to the death. He also sent Hsii Ta downstream to take charge of the defense of Nanking. Hsii Ta’s biography in Ming-shih states that after the first day’s battle Chu Yiian-chang “realized that this enemy could be overthrown, but feared that [Chang] Shih-ch’eng would invade, so at night he sent [Hsii] Ta back to defend [Nanking].’’** In fact the results of the first day’s battle did not justify any such optimistic assessment. The fear that Chang Shih-ch’eng would attack Nanking was logical any time

after August 15, yet by itself this fear cannot explain the | decision to send Hsii Ta downstream on the night of August 30, while the Han fleet was still undefeated. There is an alternative explanation: Hsii Ta’s own flagship was damaged by fire, and there were other damaged Ming warships; at the same time, the Ming fleet was so discouraged that it was not certain that it could stand up to another day of battle. In these circumstances the damaged ships would be merely a hindrance during battle and a positive danger in the event that a fast retreat should become necessary. This made it logical to form a squadron of damaged ships and evacuate them from the battle area as quickly as possible. This task fell to Chu’s most trusted and able subordinate, Hsii Ta, who immediately afterwards assumed command at Nanking. The battle resumed on the morning of August 31, when the sounding of the horn ordered the advance of the Ming fleet. This time Chu Yiian-chang personally directed the deployment of the several squadrons and led the attack himself. Ch’en Yu-liang had massed his largest warships together“ in a: continuous battle line (leaving his smaller ships free to maneuver), but the Ming captains were still so rattled by their experiences of the previous day that they advanced hesitantly. The Han ships were so large that they ‘‘seemed like mountains” and even the warships under Chu Yiian-chang’s own flag would not advance, while the entire right wing of the Ming fleet fell behind. Chu Yiian-chang ordered “over ten” of the culpable commanders of divisions to be beheaded on the spot. Despite this drastic measure the Ming attack was not delivered in a unified and effective manner. One source asserts that “(the Ming} soldiers attacked the enemy ships so vigorously that the enemy could not withstand them,” but in fact the heavy Ming losses in this day’s fighting occurred during the morning battle, and these losses were severe enough to put the Ming fleet out of action the following day. Those who fell in action during the morning battle included five HD hee

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Ming commanders who were prominent enough to win a place of honor in the K’ang-lang-shan temple. The ship carrying the shu-mi-yiian p’an-kuan Chang Chih-hsiung, who had arranged for the surrender to the Ming in 1360 of the remainder of the Lake Ch’ao group, had broken a mast. This became known to the Han fleet, which then made every effort to surround and destroy him. After being surrounded, Chang Chih-hsiung, seeing no way out, committed suicide by cutting his throat. The t’ung-chih shu-mi-ytian shih Ting P’u-lang suffered “over ten sword cuts” on his body but remained standing upright holding his weapons until he died, as though he were ready to do battle: ‘‘The enemy feared him as though he were divine.” Three Ming ytian-shuai were also killed. For the second day the Ming fleet was unsuccessful. The ylian-shuai Kuo Hsing then spoke to Chu Yiian-chang in the following sense: ‘Were it not for [the fact that] these people of ours have disobeyed orders, their ships, large or small, would be no match for us. [But now, I] think that if we do not attack them with fire, we cannot win.” The mechanics of making this suggestion in the midst of battle are not clear, since at his rank Kuo Hsing probably had at least a ship of his own. However, the sequence of events given in T’ai-tsu shih-lu is surely wrong: preparing the fire ships would have taken several hours at least, so that if Chu Yiian-chang had ordered them prepared only when the favorable wind sprang up in the afternoon, they would not have been ready before sunset. Kuo Hsing must have spoken to Chu Yiian-chang during or immediately after the morning battle, since he refers to the disappointing conduct of the participating Ming commanders. Chu Yiian-chang agreed with Kuo Hsing and ordered Ch’ang Yti-ch’un and others to gather fishing boats and load them with reeds stuffed with gunpowder. Aboard the boats were placed bundles of straw shaped like men, wearing helmets and armor and holding swords and spears. These elaborate measures were taken in order to deceive the enemy, since a fully manned vessel would not be taken for a fire ship. A few men “who dared to die” were put aboard to work the boats, hopefully to escape at the last moment. In the afternoon a favorable wind sprang up from the northeast (incidentally confirming that the Ming line of battle faced the enemy in a southerly or southwesterly direction, as the overall geography of the campaign would lead one to expect), and seven of the already prepared fire ships 2.2.6

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were selected, pushed in front of the Ming line by fast galleys, and there set afire and adrift.*® The wind held and fanned the flames; the great Han warships, sailing close together in one long floating fortress, their natural unhandiness compounded by the fact that the wind had suddenly shifted to an unfavorable quarter, could not avoid them. In the carnage which followed “several hundred” of Ch’en Yu-liang’s ships were destroyed by fire; “smoke and flame covered the heavens and all the waters of the lake were crimsoned.” The sources insist that over half of the Han troops were killed in this one stroke. As against Ming losses of 7,000 killed, the Han fleet lost 60,000 men.** This claim is supported by the fact that two of Ch’en Yu-liang’s younger brothers, Ch’en Yu-jen and Ch’en Yu-kuei, and another of his principal | subordinates, Ch’en P’u-liieh, were burned to death. Ch’en P’u-liieh was no relation; Ch’en Yu-jen is described as “capable and brave and loving battle,” and Ch’en Yu-liang was downcast at his death. The Ming fleet took advantage of the confusion caused by the fire to attack and board some of the surviving Han warships; they took over two thousand heads in this way. Of course, this figure does not include the Han soldiers who burned to death, whose heads could not be counted.*” Even allowing for the exaggeration endemic to the sources, it is clear that the afternoon of August 31 was a great victory for the Ming fleet. The figure “several hundred” Han ships destroyed may even be correct, for in the subsequent fighting the Ming were able to engage the Han on more equal terms. However, the subsequent fighting makes two other points clear: (1) the Ming fleet itself suffered so heavily in the battle that it had to spend the whole of the following day making repairs, and (2) the ultimate Ming retreat to the mouth of the lake indicates that the Han fleet remained stronger even after its losses on August 31. No fighting is recorded on the following day, September 1. The Han fleet obviously was in need of repair and reorganization. What is more surprising is the fact that the Ming did not exercise their newly won initiative and attempt to complete the destruction of the Han fleet. Another fire-ship attack at night (only seven out of an unspecified number of fire ships had been used in the afternoon attack, so others were probably left over) would have been in order, while the enemy was still disorganized and vulnerable; at the very least an attack should have been undertaken on the following day. Instead, 227

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the T’ai-tsu shih-lu entry speaks of Chu Yiian-chang exhorting his generals. The sources also agree that by this time the fact that Chu Yiian-chang’s flagship had white masts had become generally known within the Han fleet; in fact, however, Chu Yitian-chang’s flagship had been recognized on the first day of the fighting. But the Ming had found out that Ch’en Yu-liang had devised a plan to separate Chu Yiian-chang from the main body of his fleet and that this maneuver depended on recognizing the white masts. To forestall this move, Chu Yiian-chang ordered the masts of all the Ming ships to be painted white during the night. “By dawn one could not tell them apart by sight. At this the enemy was all the more frightened.” So say the sources, but this tale raises more questions. An attempt to cut Chu Yiian-chang off from the rest of the fleet had been made on August 30 and had provided the occasion for much of the action on that day; since Chu Yiian-chang received sufficient proof then that his flagship was distinctive, it is unlikely that any intelligence report received a day later was the sole cause of his decision to adopt new measures of concealment. The masts were repainted during the night, and at dawn the enemy saw them and was frightened. Since battle did not resume until September 2, the night referred to must be the night of September 1. This is consistent with the view expressed above, that the Ming fleet spent all day September 1 making repairs. At the end of the day, the major repairs completed, Chu Yiian-chang decided on the extra measure of painting the masts white, on the chance that it might cause some consternation in the Han fleet. There is no mention this time of any detachment of damaged vessels from the fleet.** When the battle resumed on the morning of September 2, still in the vicinity of K’ang-lang-shan, there was an unusual event: “At this time Liu Chi, in attendance, was suddenly frightened and jumped up with a great cry. [Chu Ytian-chang] was startled by this, and stood up and turned around to look, but only saw [Liu] Chi pointing with both his hands and saying ‘an evil star has just gone by; we must change ships quickly.’ [Chu Yiian-chang] followed this advice and boarded another ship, and before he was comfortably settled, the ship which he had formerly been aboard was broken to pieces by a shot. [When Ch’en} Yu-liang, riding high [on the poop of his flagship] saw [Chu Yiian-chang’s] ship destroyed, he was very happy. Then he was startled to see another ship flying [Chu 228

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Yiian-chang’s] flag advance, and lost all his nerve.” Chu Yiian-chang’s flagship was not sunk, and this anecdote is merely a later interpolation into one source designed to illustrate the great influence of Liu Chi, but it shows that Chu Yiian-chang’s flagship was clearly identified by its flags: this in turn means that the business of painting the masts must have been done as an aspect of general repair, rather than from a desire to make the Ming ships all look alike. During this day’s fighting Ch’en Yu-liang did not mass his great warships so closely together. Consequently his fleet was less vulnerable to fire-ship attack, but the number of his great warships had been so reduced that it was now feasible for units of the Ming fleet to surround and attack them individually, and the Han warships were too slow to avoid this fate. In a number of instances during the morning battle, the oarsmen and steersmen of the great warships continued to operate their ships even after all the deck crews had been killed. These vessels were burned. These successes stemmed from the same cause as the Ming victory two days earlier: the failure of the Han fleet to employ a coherent tactical doctrine in which their ships could cooperate to make the best possible use of their natural advantages. Ch’en Yu-liang realized that concentration is the natural tactic of the fleet composed of larger vessels, yet grouping the ships too closely together had led to disaster. Evidently the Han fleet had had but little training in sailing together, and now the Han commanders feared any concentration of their ships, so that the latter were lost individually. These failures of employment indicate that the Han commanders did not know quite what to do with their fleet in a purely naval battle, which in turn supports the contentions that the best naval commanders had left the Han after 1360 and that the Han fleet was conceived primarily in a transport and siegecraft role. These two points are related, since the decisions, both to build the Han fleet in the first place and to design its ships as they were, had probably been taken late in 1361, well after the loss of the entire Lake Ch’ao group to the Ming. Also during the morning battle a squadron of six Ming warships, commanded by Yii T’ung-hai, Liao Yung-chung, the ts’an-cheng Chao Yung, and Wang Hsing-tsu (adopted son and successor, evidently with the rank of ch’ien-shu-mi-yiian shih, of Chang Te-sheng, the leader of the Ming fleet who was killed in 1360, and like him a member of the Lake Ch’ao group), 229

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attacked and penetrated deeply into the Han fleet. When the enemy line closed behind them, the rest of the Ming fleet feared they had been sunk. Subsequently they reappeared after sailing around the Han fleet. ‘When [the Ming] fleet saw them, their courage more than doubled and they joined battle with even greater energy. The noise of shouting shook heaven and earth, and the waves stood up until they covered the sun. From dawn until noon the enemy fleet suffered defeat; abandoned banners, drums, weapons, and equipment covered the surface and shores of the lake.” When the six ships returned, Chu Yiian-chang congratulated them on their success; this spectacular stunt was the high point of the pitched battle between the two fleets.*° 8. The End of the Naval Campaign and the Death of Ch’en Yu-liang (September 2—October 3}

Noon on September 2 marks the approximate time when both fleets came to the decision to break off the action. In the case of the Han fleet this was reasonable. Frustrated first in their attempt to take Nan-ch’ang, and thereby thrown off schedule in their plans for a rapid downriver campaign, they were now engaged in their third battle in four days. From the results of the fighting to date, it must have been clear that the trend of the action favored the Ming fleet, which was now stronger relative to the Han than it had been at the start of the campaign. Even more important than the material losses of the Han fleet was the erosion of will among the Han commanders, including Ch’en Yu-liang himself, as the possible objectives of their campaign were preempted one by one. Now, after four days in or repairing from an action which must have come as an unpleasant surprise to them, the Han leaders needed a break in the fighting, if only to give themselves time to formulate new objectives within the reach of their diminished military means. The signal of this loss of will in the Han high command was the attempt of Chang Ting-pien to kidnap Ch’en Yu-liang and retire with the Han fleet to an island®™ in the northern part of the lake to reorganize and regroup. Only T’ai-tsu shih-lu reports this, and it does not give the details of the coup, but in the outcome Chang Ting-pien did not suffer for it. However, on the morning of September 2, for the first time in these four days, a concentrated attack by the Han fleet had failed either to break through or to drive back the Ming line. Ch’en Yu-liang was constrained to follow Chang Ting-pien’s policy; the Han fleet 2.30

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broke off the action, withdrew a few miles, and thereafter did no more than defend itself. Although subsequent decisions of the Han command are attributed to Ch’en Yu-liang, it seems that he never recovered his old authority and that he had become dependent on Chang Ting-pien. This change within the leadership did not help the Han. By now the only alternative left to them was some attempt to break out of the Poyang Lake and return to Wu-ch’ang; the Han margin of strength over the Ming was not great enough to permit them to remain on the offensive. The fact that this decision had to be made by a leader who possessed less legitimacy than Ch’en Yu-liang meant that other commanders, already inclined to surrender because the Han were losing, had this resolve strengthened by their jealousy of the upstart who had once been their equal. If this reasoning is correct, then Chang Ting-pien eventually escaped to Wu-ch’ang with a Han remnant confined largely to his former personal following. In the afternoon of the same day, some of the Ming ships anchored about five li from the Han fleet*’ and attempted to incite it to give battle, without any response. Once again, the Ming were unwilling to attack the Han in the deep waters favorable to the latter. What followed requires explanation. Certain Ming commanders proposed to Chu Yiian-chang that the fleet be withdrawn in order to give the Ming troops an opportunity to rest. Chu Yiian-chang at first objected with the remark: ““‘When two armies face one another, it is bad strategy to be the first to withdraw.” Yii T’ung-hai then said that the water level in the Poyang Lake was too low, so that it would be better to move the fleet to the Yangtze River. Of course, the Ming fleet would have had a tactical advantage there also: since the Han warships were more difficult to move under oars, they were in greater danger in any sort of current. Favorable stars were also mentioned. At the end of this discussion, Chu Yiian-chang agreed to move the fleet from the lake. The reasons given in the sources for this move are not really satisfactory. Though the sources describe the Ming as being consistently more successful than their actions indicate, and Ming losses had indeed been severe,” it is also clear that their situation relative to the Han fleet had improved markedly as a result of their victory on August 31, so that they held the tactical initiative on September 2; and even though the Han fleet remained stronger, the outcome of the fighting on that day by itself could not have forced the Ming withdrawal. There is pro) |

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evidence (in the biography of Ch’ang Yii-ch’un cited below) of considerable discouragement in the Ming fleet about two weeks later, much of it no doubt generated by the Ming strategic withdrawal, but Chu Yiian-chang had never before in his career failed to force the last particle of energy from his officers when it was necessary to gain his objective, and the morale of the Han fleet at this time was even lower. Yii T’ung-hai’s argument is strange; shallow water troubled the Han fleet more than the Ming, so that the Poyang Lake should have been the preferred area of battle for the latter. However, Yii T’ung-hai was there and was a capable sailor. His judgment, that the Ming fleet could fight with equal or greater relative advantage on the Yangtze, must be accepted—if the Han fleet could be induced to follow them. This raises the crucial point. The Han fleet had to be destroyed or by-passed if the Ming were to succeed in relieving Nan-ch’ang. All of the sources concentrate on the progress upstream of the Ming fleet and the battles on the lake. Until Nan-ch’ang could be relieved and resupplied, two battles of attrition were taking place, and the question was whether Nan-ch’ang or the Han fleet would be the first to crack. If, on the other hand, Nan-ch’ang were out of danger, and securely in Ming hands blocking access to the Kan River system, Chu Yiian-chang could fall back on the preferable strategy of resisting in the long channel between the Poyang Lake and the Yangtze River. Then the Han fleet would have to fight its way past prepared Ming positions, and at every stage of the battle it would be fighting under extremely disadvantageous tactical circumstances. Even on September 2 the Han fleet remained tremendously strong and probably more numerous than the Ming. In the actual event it proved strong enough for part of it to fight its way back to Wu-ch’ang despite all obstacles. Nevertheless it is evident that the Ming fleet was not defeated in the morning battle on September 2, and if defeat is ruled out as an explanation for the Ming retreat, this leaves only the explanation that Chu Yiian-chang now knew, or at least believed, that Nan-ch’ang was out of danger. Since the Ming fleet had obviously not been able to reach Nan-ch’ang, this implies that the Kuang-hsin army had managed to get through, probably no later than September 1, to allow at least a day for word to reach Chu Yiian-chang. The fact that the Kuang-hsin army had been sent by land is clearly stated in the entry for August 25, which reads as follows: “Advancing, [the Ming fleet] arrived at Hu-k’ou. Previously, the 232.

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chih-hui Tai Te had been sent with one army to fortify Ching-chiang-k’ou, and another army was employed to fortify Nan-hu-tsui to prevent [Ch’en] Yu-liang from returning to his capital. Moreover, men were sent [with orders to] transfer the troops at [Kuang-hsin} to hold the Wu-yang ford and prevent [the enemy] from escaping.” Ching-chiang-k’ou is downstream from Hu-k’ou, where the channel from the Poyang Lake joins the Yangtze, and Nan-hu-tsui is in the channel leading from the lake to Hu-k’ou; the arrangements made at these points must have been nearly simultaneous with the arrival of the Ming fleet at Hu-k’ou. The ford at Wu-yang is southeast of Nan-ch’ang on the Fu River; this is a march of about 150 miles from Kuang-hsin, if the route of march was along the present railway line. Chinese military writers assumed that an army with foot-soldiers and baggage wagons could march overland at a rate of about thirty li per day (about ten miles}.** If the orders to the Kuang-hsin army had been issued only when the Ming fleet arrived at Hu-k’ou, the army could not have arrived in the Nan-ch’ang area before late September. However, the wording of the entry permits the more reasonable interpretation that the orders to Kuang-hsin were sent at about the same time as Chu Yiian-chang’s decision to take the fleet upstream. This was August 6, as evidenced by the orders of that date directing Hsii Ta and Ch’ang Yii-ch’un to raise the siege of Lu-chou. If the Kuang-hsin army took about a week to prepare {the fleet took only nine days}, they should have set forth from Kuang-hsin about August 15, which would have brought them to the vicinity of Nan-ch’ang as the naval battles near K’ang-lang-shan were being fought. The size of the Kuang-hsin army is not known, but it must have been even smaller than the original Ming garrison of Nan-ch’ang, as most of the Chekiang army was tied down in that province. However, Ch’en Yu-liang did not leave forces of any size to mask Nan-ch’ang; had he done so, the sources would record some fighting, and the above reasoning would not be necessary to establish the existence of the overland expedition. Even if the original purpose of the overland expedition had been merely to prevent a junction by land of the detachments of the main Han force, the commanders of the Kuang-hsin army would naturally have gone on to relieve Nan-ch’ang once they found that, contrary to expectation, there was no strong Han force besieging the city. One more piece of evidence suggests that the relief of 233

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Nan-ch’ang took place in the manner related above. Before moving downstream to attack Hu-k’ou, Ch’en Yu-liang sent five hundred boats to raid Nan-ch’ang™ for grain. Chu Wen-cheng sent a party which attacked the boats in an unguarded moment and destroyed them by fire. Ch’en Yu-liang did not get any grain as a result of this raid, but he would not have sent it had he not believed that there was grain at Nan-ch’ang, and this supply would not have been from the city’s own granaries, inaccessible in any event and nearly exhausted after the siege, or from the countryside, which had supported his own forces for three months. The camp of the Kuang-hsin army is the only remaining alternative. It is reasonably certain that the commander of the Kuang-hsin army was the same ts’an-cheng Hu Te-chi who had attempted vainly to recover Chu-ch’iian in June. He is not mentioned as participating in the campaign in the Chu-ch’iian area later in the year, which suggests that he was still in Kiangsi. This expedition did no fighting and in consequence has received only one cryptic mention in the sources. Nevertheless, it performed an extremely important function by relieving Nan-ch’ang by land and thereby permitting Chu Yiian-chang to break off his dangerous and uneven contest with the fleet of Ch’en Yu-liang. The Ming fleet abandoned its position on the night of September 2. Leaving secretly at night meant that the Han fleet would take no measures until it discovered the situation the following morning, but it also exposed the Ming fleet to the danger of running aground at many points in the shallow lake. To prevent this, Chu Yiian-chang ordered each ship to place a lamp at its stern; the fleet then sailed out in single file, each ship guided by the lamp of the ship ahead. The chronology of the following month is not clear, as all the events are recorded under two dated entries. The fleet probably took at least two days to cover the fifty miles from K’ang-lang-shan to its first anchorage at Tso-li-shan in the channel northwest of Tu-ch’ang hsien, arriving there no sooner than the night of September 4. When Ch’en Yu-liang discovered that the Ming fleet had gone north, he followed suit, eventually anchoring near the Ming fleet at Chu-chi near the mouth of the straits. Chu Yiian-chang had made no attempt to hold the Sung-men straits.” The two fleets remained anchored facing one another for three days, continuing the stand-off created on September 2. A talking war replaced the shooting war, and Ch’en Yu-liang’s 2.34

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fleet began to disintegrate. The major defections at this stage were those of the two Chin-wu generals, whose story illustrates the dilemma in which the Han generals now found themselves: Ch’en Yu-liang’s left and right Chin-wu generals came over to [the Ming fleet] leading their own divisions and surrendered. Previously, |Ch’en] Yu-liang, having fought at length without success, sought counsel with his subordinates. The right Chin-wu general said: “Now that we have been defeated in battle, sailing out of the lake is really impossible. The only thing we can do is burn our ships and go quickly back to Hunan overland. Then we may attempt to recoup our fortunes.” The left Chin-wu general replied: “Although our situation is not favorable, our fleet is still strong enough for one more battle. If we can exert all our energy, who can predict victory or defeat? To go to the extent of burning our own ships would be to manifest myriad weaknesses. Once we abandon our ships and go ashore, they will harass us with both infantry and cavalry. If we attempt to advance we will be stopped, and we will have already lost the base on which to retreat. One defeat, and we will be cast down to the dirt. How can one continue to propose this?” [Ch’en] Yu-liang’s affairs were then in a more satisfactory condition, and he could not make up his mind. Now, having been defeated in many battles, he said: ‘What the right Chin-wu [general] proposes is correct.” When the left Chin-wu [general] heard this, he feared that disaster would result, so he surrendered with his forces. When the right Chin-wu [general] saw that the other had surrendered, he also came in leading his forces and surrendered. [Ch’en} Yu-liang thus lost both of these generals; henceforth his military power declined steadily.5¢

The Han fleet was still so strong that the Ming fleet was in retreat before it, but the Han leadership, including Ch’en Yu-liang himself, was no longer confident of its power to force its way back to Wu-ch’ang against Ming opposition. Chu Yiian-chang had not yet reached his prepared positions further downstream. He was willing to fight once again in the vicinity of Tso-li, but only if the Han fleet would attack him in waters of his own choosing. This time he had recourse to the device of sending Ch’en Yu-liang an insulting letter soon after the Jatter’s arrival at Chu-chi. The letter opens with a reasonably sober review of the war between the two leaders, in which Chu Yiian-chang states that he had never desired the conflict. The insult comes at the end and is interesting for the reference to Ch’en Yu-liang’s ships: “Since you, sailing in ships whose tails are too big to be wagged, with exhausted troops and worn-out armor, [have again] opposed your forces to us.. .” This letter failed to provoke Ch’en Yu-liang into offering battle with his fleet, but he gave vent to his anger by killing the 2.35

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prisoners he had taken from the Ming. Chu Yitan-chang then released the Han troops whom he had captured, giving medical treatment to the wounded, and ordering sacrifices for the officers of Ch’en Yu-liang who had died in battle. Evidently there were other cases of defection from the Han fleet during this period, but no other specific instances are mentioned.” Chu Yiian-chang was not going to get the defensive battle he wanted at Tso-li, and there was little sense in waiting there for an attack from an increasingly desperate Han fleet. He therefore decided to move his fleet from the lake to the vicinity of Hu-k’ou. This decision cannot have been taken before September 8: perhaps it was a few days later. The Han fleet was still anchored at Chu-chi, and Ch’en Yu-liang was unable to make up his mind for fifteen days. At the end of this period, on or slightly after September 23, time had run out for him: “(Ch’en] Yu-liang had been afloat on the lake for so long that his food supplies were exhausted. He sent five hundred boats to rob grain from [Nan-ch’ang]. Chu Wen-cheng then sent his subordinate Ch’en Fang-liang secretly to burn the [enemy] boats. [Thus Ch’en} Yu-liang’s grain supplies were cut off, and his forces suffered still more.’’** The failure of this expedition implies that the combined forces of the Nan-ch’ang garrison and the relief army of Hu Te-chi were now in full control of the region surrounding Nan-ch’ang, with Chu Wen-cheng in overall command. The Han fleet was now in a position in which it had to fight or starve. The next entry, dated October 3, records their decision: ““Ch’en Yu-liang, [his forces] worn out and [their supplies] exhausted, and faced with the loss of his base whether he advanced or retreated, wished to abandon [the campaign] and retreat to Wu-ch’ang, so he led over one hundred of his great ships” and came downstream. The date October 3 refers to the results of that decision; we must allow several days for him to sail downstream from Chu-chi, fighting a distinct battle at Nan-hu-tsui, before coming to Hu-k’ou and Chingchiang-k’ou. At the same time, if the conjecture that the raid on Nan-ch’ang set out on or about September 23 is correct, they required at least four days to go and be defeated and for news of this to return. These considerations point to about September 28 as the probable date on which the Han fleet set sail. The Ming fleet had sailed from Tso-li to Hu-k’ou, arriving there about September 10. Stockades were built and a garrison 236

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placed in the vicinity of the city. The garrisons at Nan-hu-tsui and Ching-chiang-k’ou were still in place; both were to play an important role in the forthcoming battle. The Ching-chiang-k’ou force may originally have been intended to serve as a final bar to prevent the Han fleet from going downstream in the event that the Ming fleet had been seriously defeated in the Poyang Lake battles. If on the contrary Chu Yiian-chang had managed to defeat Ch’en Yu-liang decisively in the lake battles, the Nan-hu-tsui force alone would have served to prevent the escape of survivors to Wu-ch’ang. Since the Han fleet had survived the Poyang Lake battles as an organized fighting unit—probably, despite heavy losses, still superior to the Ming fleet-—Chu Yiian-chang was forced to use this force to supplement the two garrisons. Part of the fleet, under Ch’ang Yii-ch’un and Liao Yung-chung, was disposed in the channel leading to the Poyang Lake as far downstream as Hu-k’ou, and Chu Yiian-chang took the main fleet into the Yangtze, slightly upstream from Hu-k’ou. In addition to the main fleet, an expedition was sent out which captured the cities of Ch’i-chou and Hsing-kuo about seventy miles upstream. Afterwards this force returned with “over ten” seagoing vessels and was probably able to participate in the final battle with Ch’en Yu-liang.*®

The Ming fleet was now prepared to resist the Han attempt to return to Wu-ch’ang by fighting them in the area where the northern extremity of the Poyang Lake joins the Yangtze. To break out, the Han fleet had first to fight its way past prepared shore defenses at Nan-hu-tsui and then to engage the Ming fleet off Hu-k’ou. The Ming dispositions assured that the course of the battle would take both fleets down to Ching-chiang-k’ou, where their turn upstream into the Yangtze would be opposed by the Ming fleet and thrown into confusion by the circumstances of the battle. The Ming fleet could pursue the slower Han ships upstream; if the fleets drifted together downstream, locked in combat, this would take the Han fleet farther from Wu-ch’ang. This strategy had been outlined by Yui T’ung-hai when he first proposed that the Ming fleet leave the lake: ‘There are too many shallows in the lake; it is difficult for ships to maneuver. It would be best to enter the [Yangtze] River and block the enemy’s [route] upstream. Then, when his ships enter [the Yangtze River] we can capture them all.’””*°

The contention of the principal sources that the morale of the Ming fleet was high at this point is refuted by a passage in 237

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the Ming-shih biography of Ch’ang Yii-ch’un. After describing in general terms the lake battles of August 30 to September 2, it continues: “[But the Ming] generals thought that the Han fleet still was too strong, and wished to allow it to escape. Only [Ch’ang] Yii-ch’un said nothing. When they went out past Hu-k’ou, the generals wished to take their ships downstream to the east. [Chu Yiian-chang] ordered them to block [the river] upstream [instead. Ch’ang] Yii-ch’un then turned upstream against the current, and the generals followed him.’’*! The names of the defeatists are not stated, but regardless of their identity, this account suggests that the still-undefeated Ming fleet was in a state of morale almost as desperate as that of the blockaded Han armada. To give his men the courage needed for one last battle, Chu Yitan-chang had placed the fleet in a position in which it had no choice but to fight. Had his fleet had better morale, Chu Yiian-chang would have more actively resisted the Han passage across the Poyang Lake after September 2. Presumably the incident reported above occurred shortly after September 8, so that by the time of the final Han attack, the Ming fleet had had three weeks rest from combat, during which time the Han supply situation had been growing steadily worse. The Han fleet came down from Chu-chi and engaged the garrison of Nan-hu-tsui. Breaking through that position without serious trouble, they continued downstream and arrived off Hu-k’ou on the morning of October 3. The squadrons stationed off Hu-k’ou engaged them and were joined by the main body of the Ming fleet when the Han ships turned into the Yangtze River and attempted to go upstream. The Ming, mindful of their success with the same tactic a month earlier, had prepared fire ships and fire rafts which were ignited and drifted downstream, aided by a west wind,” into the approaching Han fleet. This time the Han ships scattered promptly downstream. The battle degenerated into a confused melee. Ming squadrons intercepted groups of Han warships that attempted to escape upstream; these clusters of ships drifted downstream locked in battle. By late in the afternoon some of the Han vessels had come down to Ching-chiang-k’ou, and the Ming forces there joined the attack. As the Han fleet started to pile up, Ch’en Yu-liang himself was killed.* The rumor of his death was first brought to Chu Yiian-chang by a soothsayer who enjoyed a reputation for prescience for correctly predicting the 1362 revolts. Men captured from the 238

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Han fleet afterwards confirmed that, while on board a small boat in the process of changing ships, Ch’en Yu-liang had been hit in the eye by a stray arrow, which penetrated deeply into his skull and killed him instantly. As this happy news spread through the Ming fleet, the Ming soldiers fought all the harder. Ch’en Yu-liang’s eldest son was captured at this time. The Ming fleet anchored by the river bank before sundown; most of the Han fleet followed suit. One may imagine a bitter conflict among the Han commanders. With Ch’en Yu-liang dead and his designated heir a prisoner, and with his two younger brothers, who might have held the fleet together, already dead for over a month, there was no one to whom the lesser commanders would rally. Chang Ting-pien attempted without success to make the other officers accept his authority as regent for the boy Ch’en Li, a younger son of Ch’en Yu-liang. He finally escaped during the night, together with two other important leaders. In small boats they and their followers were able to elude the Ming forces sent in pursuit by making use of shallower and more circuitous routes. Eventually they arrived back in Wu-ch’ang and maintained Han authority there; Ch’en Yu-liang’s body was buried and Chang Ting-pien installed Ch’en Li as emperor. On October 4, the morning after the escape of Chang Ting-pien, the rest of the Han fleet surrendered. Five commanders were important enough to be mentioned individually, while officers of the rank of chih-hui or lower and men who surrendered totaled over 50,000. The warships and their contents passed intact into Ming hands, including the horses, which strike one as an odd item to bring along on a do-or-die attempt at escape. The ships and men captured at the end of the naval battle were not the most important gain for the Ming state; rather, the major consequence of the Poyang campaign was that it gave Chu Yiian-chang for the first time an unchallenged control of Kiangsi, whose population at that time was more than twice that of Hunan and Hupeh combined. Once the resources of Kiangsi had been mobilized and added to the Ming armies, the next stage of Ming expansion—the conquest of Wu—would become possible. The digestion of Kiangsi and the conquest of Hunan and Hupeh occupied all of 1364 and 1365. In 1366 an all-out offensive against Wu was launched. This time the Ming armies were far too strong to be resisted. Soochow fell in 1367, and 239

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afterwards the Ming state expanded simultaneously in all directions. When Chu Yiian-chang proclaimed himself emperor in 1368 his armies were engaged in driving the Mongols from the North China plain while his fleets were capturing the cities of the South China coast. After 1363 the Ming armies were never short of troops, and this fact sets the 1363 campaign in perspective: without the 1363 victory, won by hard fighting against superior numbers, Chu Yiian-chang could not have gained control of all China, and the course of subsequent Chinese history would have been very different. In retrospect, the Ming victory was due to their more effective use of their fleet. While Han used its fleet essentially as an instrument for attacking cities, and the Wu naval forces remained passive, except for occasionally transporting armies, the Ming squadrons were versatile and capable of fighting naval battles as well. In actual combat, the Ming fleet used cannon, fire ships, and other flame weapons, as well as grappling and boarding, to accomplish its mission. When all of these failed to destroy the superior enemy fleet, Ming control of the mouth of the Poyang Lake proved to be the decisive factor.

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Appendix. Military Organization and Rank in the Ming State Chu Yuian-chang had conquered Nanking as the nominal minister of Han Lin-erh, pretender to the imperial title of the Sung dynasty, and the Ming state retained the formal character of a Sung provincial government until 1367. At Nanking Chu Yiian-chang established a hsing chung-shu-sheng (branch secretariat-chancellery, shortened to hsing-sheng or chancellery} as the highest agency of civil administration and headed it himself. Parallel to this was the hsing shu-mi-ytian (branch bureau of military affairs}, also headed by Chu Yiian-chang personally, which was nominally the highest agency of military command. However, the most important Ming generals were given titles of rank in the hsing-sheng, which meant that in practice the latter became the highest agency of military command as well. The military bureau (shu-mi-ytian) lapsed into a merely nominal existence, being important only as an institutional device for conferring rank on Ming generals below the highest level. In 1361 it was abolished and replaced by the ta-tu-tu-fu (headquarters of the grand commander in chief} headed by Chu Yiian-chang’s nephew, Chu Wen-cheng, as tu-tu. The latter’s role as commander in chief under Chu Yiian-chang was, however, equally nominal, and during 1362-1364 his actual assignment was the command of the garrison of Nan-ch’ang. Generals holding shu-mi-ytian ranks before 1361 continued to hold them afterwards. Except for Chu Wen-cheng and Feng Kuo-sheng (who held a special title as commander of Chu Yiian-chang’s guard}, the Ming generals were thus arranged in a series of seven ranks, the upper three of which were actually titles in the civilian hsing-sheng. In descending order these were: (1) tso-ch’eng (left assistant), (2) yu-ch’eng (right assistant}, (3) ts’an-chih cheng-shih (consultant in government affairs, shortened to ts’an-cheng), (4) tung-chih shu-mi-ytian shih (deputy chief of the bureau of military affairs), (5) ch’ien shu-mi-ytian shih (assistant chief}, (6) tung-ch’ien shu-mi-ytian shih {deputy assistant chief}, and (7) shu-mi-yiian p’an-kuan (staff officer of the bureau of military affairs}. Generals of ranks 1-3 headed the provincial military commands established in Chekiang and 241

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Kiangsi or held the principal positions after Chu Yiian-chang himself in the main army, while generals of ranks 4~7 either commanded the more important city garrisons or led divisions of the main army. Generals’ ranks in the other regimes were similar. The Ming armies had originated out of the local, irregular forces which had sprung up during the troubled period of the 1350’s. Ming capture of a city usually led to its garrison being reorganized as an i (wing} under a yiian-shuai (wing leader). Smaller garrisons, usually about 1,000 strong, were designated fu and placed under officers titled tsung-kuan. In addition to these individual city garrisons, there was a main army at Nanking under Chu Yiian-chang’s direct command which was about 100,000 strong in 1360 and was divided into eight i. Two of these were the garrison of Nanking, one (the Ch’in-huai i} constituted the regular Ming navy, and the remaining five (designated left, right, center, front, and rear) were the principal field army. In 1364 the i system was formally abolished, the i being redesignated wei (guards) under chih-hui (guard commanders) and the tsung-kuan-fu becoming ch’ien-hu-so (units of 1,000 men} under ch’ien-hu. The wei were supposed to be standardized at 5,000 men. The reorganization had a twofold significance: it was necessary because of the large numbers of former Han troops who had been incorporated into the Ming forces as a result of the 1363 victory, and it was possible because of the great increase in Chu Yiian-chang’s power which for the first time enabled him to promote and demote as he wished. During 1363, however, Ming military organization was much less standardized. Officers who had joined voluntarily had to be confirmed in their previous ranks and left in command of their original followers, so that the remnants of a variety of organizational systems existed side by side. Nevertheless, yiian-shuai and chih-hui along with tsung-kuan and ch’ien-hu were the most common rank designations for officers of field grade. Despite the predominance of military men in the early Ming regime, Chu Yiian-chang attempted to set up a regular civil administration in the areas he conquered, and in each city the Ming civil administrator, usually an official with some prior experience in the main chancellery at Nanking, acted to some extent as a check on the local military commander. See Dreyer (1970), pp. 98-120 and 469-479; the best treatment of the Ming military system at this time is Aoyama Jir6, “Sha Go-koku yoku gensuifu k6,” Sundai Shigaku, no. 13:91-116 (March 1963). 242

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The T’u-mu Incident of 1449 In the view of most Chinese statesmen throughout the millennium of imperial Chinese history that ended early in this century, the military was, as it should have been, peripheral to the great concerns of Chinese civilization. Yet year by year it absorbed the largest portion of the traditional Chinese state’s revenues, involved its statesmen in endless thought and policy debate, and affected the daily lives of countless millions. What did the military apparatus do? How did it come to fix upon the tasks it performed? When did it undertake offensive campaigns, and how did it arrange its defense priorities? One ridiculous incident in the middle of the fifteenth century reveals something about all of these issues. It occurred during the summer of 1449. A young emperor, his person no less than his court dominated by his chief eunuch who had extended control from the palace precincts to the whole government, led a vast army against the Mongols. Quite needlessly the eunuch allowed that army to be trapped and rendered unable to fight. It was decimated by a small forward column of the enemy. All the high officials in the imperial retinue, and the chief eunuch, were killed. The emperor was captured and held prisoner in Mongolia for a year. The crisis in domestic government might have ended the dynasty. The military threat might have lost at least North China to Mongol control. Forthright leadership in Peking managed to save both dynasty and nation, but the events so marked the consciousness of Ming statesmen, perhaps also of Ming common people, that the idea of the Mongol menace remained prominently fixed in their minds until the end of the dynasty. The actual campaign with its inglorious finale is an almost incredible event in Ming history, the more so as one learns its details. It deserves examination, for it reveals something of the way the military component of Chinese government worked and also helps to explain aspects of military history in the centuries that followed. What follows is in five parts: the first two offer a brief discussion of the background, suggesting that the debacle of 1449 was the culmination of ongoing trends in Chinese government and in Mongol life. Part three, which might be 243

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called “How to Lose an Emperor,” is a chronicle of the T’u-mu campaign reconstructed from traditional sources. Parts four and five offer speculative reflections on the events. Some of them are not justified by the evidence offered, but they seem worth raising for consideration by others interested in Ming and Ch’ing studies, and in military history.’

1. The Rise of the Mongol Nation Beyond the increasingly symbolic and merely formal tasks of defending the emperor and the tombs of his ancestors, the

central government’s armies in late imperial Chinahadtwo . quite clear-cut military tasks: to prevent disorder within the country at the high level of preventing insurrection and quelling actual rebellion and to defend the northern frontiers against alien invasion. The regular armies seldom had to assume routine police duties; domestically their order-maintaining functions were applied only to politically significant challenges to the dynasty. Against external threats, only the northern frontier seemed to the Chinese to pose problems of state significance quite regularly, decade by decade. The boundaries on the other three sides marked “soft” frontiers on which conflicts between Chinese and non-Chinese normally were manageable at the level of local militia and police activity. Even when border problems on those frontiers demanded campaigns by the central armies (as Annam had in 1406, and as the southwest frontier had, to an extravagant and strategically unjustifiable degree in the decade prior to 1449},? they never, or only very rarely, portended threats to the center; they did not topple dynasties, nor were invasions of the Chinese heartland ever in the offing. The northern frontier, from the edges of the Tibetan upland in the far northwest to the forest wilds along the Sungari and the Amur in the northeast, alone among China’s boundaries marked a dividing line between the sedentary Chinese and other peoples who had a high enough capacity for political and military organization to threaten Chinese national safety. The steppes of Central Asia were the home of many peoples throughout history who knew about the Chinese way of life but who, inexplicably in the Chinese view, were not always drawn to emulate it. Yet they were in varying degrees dependent on the Chinese source of some material essentials of their non-Chinese civilization, and frequently were capable of 2.44

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acquiring those by force, extortion, raid, and systematic exploitation. To make their exploitation more systematic, they became increasingly skilled in the middle and later centuries of the long imperial era (200 s.c. to the early twentieth century] in imposing their rule on portions of China adjacent to the northern frontier, and devising politico-military instruments for regularizing the exploitation which otherwise would have ended after single military incursions. These instruments ranged from treaties imposing heavily-indemnified peace on the frontiers to occupation and direct rule. That northern frontier, marked by the Great Wall of China, was thus the border of tension throughout Chinese history. When successful, the Chinese state could maintain firm security up to the Wall, and administer all within the Wall directly, as part of the Chinese state. When still more successful, it could interfere in power arrangements beyond the Wall in ways that weakened the steppe peoples, could forestall their organization into one cohesive enemy force, and thereby could extend Chinese influence far beyond the Wall. But although it occasionally sponsored Chinese settlement beyond the Wall, the Chinese state never had hopes of doing much more than extending its influence defensively. It did not conceive of Chinese power as extending to direct administration of territories lying much beyond the Wall, if at all; neither actually nor ideally were even the nearer steppe territories to be integral parts of the Chinese state. Nor were they to be colonies, to be conquered and maintained by force of arms, and assigned revenue quotas essential to the state, like those the Romans established along their northern frontier. Such Roman use of its military machine to expand boundaries and revenues suggests, in fact, the way the steppe peoples looked upon China, rather than the reverse. Although in the Han and T’ang eras the Chinese presence had extended farther into Central Asia, the territories of the nearer steppe became integral parts of the Chinese state only under the Manchu {Ch’ing) dynasty after the mid-seventeenth century, when a conquering northern neighbor’s steppe policies became for almost three centuries identified with China’s interests—through the accident of the Manchu conquest of China. That event allowed modern China to inherit both its own traditional Chinese territorial claims and those of its last dynastic conqueror. That Inner Mongolia, Manchuria [beyond Ming Liao-tung}, Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan}, and Tibet 245

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should become provinces of China, and to some extent begin to become culturally Chinese, is as much the fortuitous heritage of Manchu colonial history as is modern Indonesia’s inheritance of Dutch colonial achievements in all the territories of modern Indonesia beyond Java. And of course many other examples could be cited of modern nation states which have accidentally inherited the circumstances created by colonial powers in the era just prior to the hardening of modern national concepts. The purpose of mentioning this late historical development here is to induce a freer look at the map along China’s northern frontier, so that we will not project back into history the territorial dispositions we probably hold in our mind’s eye or see On modern maps. Mongol-Ming relations early in the long Ming dynasty (1368-1644) were conducted within extremely fluid circumstances. The concept of a “Mongolia” occupying virtually all the adjacent territory beyond the Wall was just coming into being. The resurgent Chinese presence along the Great Wall was being reestablished after a lapse of centuries. The structure of Mongol power had disintegrated; Chinese influence was fairly successfully extended well beyond the directly administered Chinese provinces that had their northern boundaries along the Wall. In the early decades of the dynasty Chinese armies, led by competent generals and often by emperors themselves, campaigned repeatedly against the remnants of Mongol power. They defeated Mongol armies on Mongol ground (using methods significantly imitative of Mongol military methods}, often enough so that they could then play a strong hand in the higher-level organization of Mongol military society. Although not strikingly successful in doing so, early Ming rulers appear to have hoped they could assign territories to divisions of the Mongol nation and force Mongol leaders to assume responsibilities toward the Chinese state as if anticipating the Ch’ing dynasty’s far more successful control policies. Mongol society was organized very differently from Chinese society. Groups within that essentially military society formed confederations which the Chinese tended to regard as something like provinces. They were not, though the analogy is useful in describing Mongol organization, for these province-level confederations could be linked together into nation-level structures. Under extraordinary leadership like that provided by Chinggis Khan and some of his successors, the nation-level 246

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structures could be further extended into a confederation of nations forming a vast empire. It was Chinggis’s triumph to achieve the greatest possible empire-level superconfederation and to employ its military resources in the conquest of the world. Chinggis died in 1227, but the momentum he established carried on well into the middle of the thirteenth century. It led to the conquest of China in the third quarter of the thirteenth century and to the establishment there of the Mongol Yiian dynasty under Chinggis’s grandson, Khubilai Khan. The empire-level of that Mongol power structure broke up before the Yiian dynasty fell in China, from centrifugal forces inherent in the overextended system created by the early Great Khans. The Mongol Yiian dynasty in China, although it constituted the link between Chinggis and post-Yiian Mongolia, represented only one of the nation-level components of the Mongol empire at its height. Yiian China, under Khubilai and his decreasingly competent heirs, had fallen away from its former effective integration in the larger Mongol world by the end of the thirteenth century. As China freed itself from Mongol overlordship in the third quarter of the fourteenth century, and established its new native Ming dynasty, the Mongols were driven out into the eastern steppe bordering on China. During that low point in their history they tended to lose even the nation-level of Mongol unity; their organizational structure disintegrated so that they were like a scattering of provinces. At some points even the cohesiveness of those province-level confederations threatened to disappear. Portions of the Mongol nation, especially groups living near the Great Wall or remaining within China, were ambivalently Chinese and Mongol. Those tens of thousands were not a significant segment of the entire Mongol nation numerically, but they were symptomatic of its break-up and disorder. We must remember that the Mongol nation, in both its political and its ethnic composition, was a new—although in steppe history, not an unprecedented—creation in history. It represented an amalgamation of steppe groups and societies, forged into one ethnic community under Chinggis’s leadership. It possessed a recently achieved cultural and psychological identity embracing many of the previously distinct and divided—although ethnically similar—groups and nations. The very name “Mongol” was new, not long antedating Chinggis himself and, before his calculated expansion of the Mongol nation, limited in use to a small tribal group. Only 247

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from the late fourteenth century onward, with the fall of the Mongol dynasty and the establishment of the Ming, did that name come to be identified with the vast territory we now call Mongolia. And those Mongol heirs of Chinggis gave to that territory, for the first time in history, a cultural unity and a continuity of identity that it has retained into the present. This development marked a new stage in the history of the steppe. And although the Mongol politico-military structure was in shambles in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, as the heirs of Chinggis Khan, Mongols still possessed a self-awareness that was a powerful factor in potential reintegration. Of all the Central Asian peoples who had learned to exploit systematically and continuously their relationship to China {and to other sedentary populations on the “islands” and “shores” of the great Central Asian “sea,” to use Owen Lattimore’s graphic metaphor], the Mongols were in many ways the most successful. Their capacity for military organization was the greatest, and they built the largest (if not the most enduring) of all world empires. Up to that time they alone among non-Chinese had conquered all of China, and they had ruled it from 1279 to 1368. Among all the nomad rulers of China in all history they maintained the most successful psychological resistance to the subverting influences of Chinese civilization. They had gained the most, in the shortest time, and they had paid the least for it in terms of surrendering their own cultural values. Both the Mongols and the Chinese were in some degree conscious of these things, and that affected the fluid pattern of their relations in the early fifteenth century. Thus China, though long accustomed to having dangerous neighbors in the steppe to its north, had by Ming times acquired a new kind of neighboring power there. The steppe had become culturally homogeneous and was potentially unifiable to an unprecedented degree. Its rulers had experienced their great age in history recently, in the period of their domination over China. Both the fragmented Mongol nation and the resurgent Chinese nation had to assess and respond to new conditions in their relationship. That relationship, as usual, was mainly negative as far as the Chinese were concerned. They did not covet the steppe, could not use it, and only wanted to be secure against its inhabitants. Horses were perhaps the only steppe import the Chinese ever needed, and those were needed primarily for defense against the steppe. There was only 248

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one positive feature to the Chinese attitude. They valued very highly the psychological or ideological element. Steppe submission to Chinese claims of cultural superiority and universal centrality, while not worth fighting for, was prized.* On the Mongol side, the relationship was more important and more positive. The Mongols depended on China for some essential materials and sought still others that they did not really need. The former included grain, iron and iron implements, and other craft products. Those were basic to their Mongol economy and to their success in maintaining their way of life; they were far more important than was the Chinese need for the steppe’s military horses. To gain those vital items by means acceptable to the Chinese (when they had to do it that way}, they were willing to make the gestures acknowledging Chinese self-importance, and were not totally unaffected by that acknowledgment; the Chinese view of the universe contributed to Mongol magic as well. A one-sided dependence in an uneven symbiosis lay under their facile adjustment to demands being imposed by the Chinese in the early Ming. Perhaps, for this reason, they were on the whole far more innovative and more flexible in their adjustments than were the Chinese. Yet, in the long run, during Ch’ing times, the Chinese advanced into the Mongols’ steppe world, culturally and demographically, and the Mongols were the losers. 2. Eunuchry at Court and the Campaign of 1449 In 1449 a foolish and incompetent young man sat on the Dragon Throne in Peking. He was Chu Ch’i-chen, posthumously to be known by his shrine name of Ying-tsung, and at that time by his era name as the Cheng-t’ung Emperor. He came to the throne at the age of eight on January 31, 1435, and the years of his reign are therefore numbered from the first lunar New Year thereafter, in 1436. He had been born on December 3, 1427, and thus had not yet passed his twenty-second birthday at the time of the 1449 incident. His father, the Emperor Hsiian-tsung, was an energetic and able ruler who had done everything well except the rearing of his young son, or providing for his guidance by responsible statesmen. That guidance actually fell to his grandmother, the Senior Empress Dowager (née Chang}, a shrewd and noble-minded woman.‘ But when she died in 1442, the fifteen-year-old boy emperor then came under the complete domination of the chief of his palace eunuchs, Wang 249

Frederick W. Mote Chen, one of the notorious villains of Ming history. A group of superannuated statesmen who had gloriously dominated the outer court for many years could see what was happening, but let the eunuch take over the inner court rather than make what probably could not have been a successful struggle against the emperor’s agent. For this default, they have been indicted, perhaps unjustly, for what ensued. Wang Chen was the first eunuch in the Ming period to gain control over an emperor, and thereby over the government. He wrote the script for the frivolous military encounter of 1449 and played the starring role until the action went awry and he died in the field. The leading actors on the Chinese side, the Emperor Ying-tsung and his alter ego, the eunuch Wang Chen, lacked the attributes of heroes. On the other side of the Great Wall the leading figure in the action was Esen, chieftain of the Oirat (Oyirad, Wa-la, and so forth) or Western Mongols. In 1443 he succeeded to the titles and honors borne by his father, Toghan, whom the Chinese court had hopefully enfiefed Prince Shun-ning, ‘‘The Compliant and Peaceful,” and he also assumed the Chinese title, ‘Prince of Huai.” Esen also bore the Mongol title, ‘““Tayisi’” or “Grand Marshal,’” signifying that he was the principal military assistant to the Great Khan, a nonentity in these decades although the senior lineal descendant of Chinggis and Khubilai and the other khans who had been emperors of China. The Chinese noted with concern that the Mongol authority was subject to alignments they could not anticipate, causing them difficulties in their not very perceptive relations with potential sources of trouble in Mongolia. Esen was the Tayisi, nominally the responsible military assistant to the head of the Mongol world. But the Peking court noted that he was usually not even in communication with the so-called Great Khan, that his father had warred against and killed Arughtai, chieftain of the Chahar Mongols, and that Esen now interfered in the affairs of the Three Commanderies, as the Chinese called the three divisions of the Eastern Mongols that they thought they had stabilized in the Jehol-Manchurian region. In fact, Esen aspired to follow the model of Chinggis, to arouse all the Mongols and provide them again with unified leadership in his own person. His success in extending his influence through the maze of Chinese-imposed subdivisions as far eastward as Inner Mongolia and Manchuria is proof that the Mongol nation’s former organizational structure might be reactivated, 250

The T’u-mu Incident of 1449 given a leader of dynamism and charisma. He did not succeed, but he aroused the dream that other Mongol leaders in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries again tried to realize. Henry Serruys has called Esen the “de facto ruler of all Mongolia.’’® Here we see the classic pattern of steppe power build-up. The Chinese had reason to be concerned and to attempt countermeasures. They had attempted to use one Mongol leader against another; now they felt forced to use direct measures. Yet Serruys, the leading authority on Chinese-Mongol relationships in the Ming period, makes a convincing argument that what the Mongols needed most of all was reliable economic relations with China, and that if that trade had been conducted in a manner reasonably satisfactory to them, war need not have occurred. This conclusion suggests that if the Chinese had invoked knowledge and reason, in ways for which there were precedents in their history, they could have diminished or solved their Mongol problem, not without maintaining their military presence there, but without encountering military disasters. Instead, the northern frontier garrison defense system was bureaucratically mishandled, becoming ever more expensive and less efficient. The military machine was unwisely thrown into action, its great technical competence scarcely utilized. And a frivolously-induced military disaster was allowed to harden the reliance on military actions in the north, thereafter, rather than on other means or other problems. Since the last decades of the fourteenth century the Chinese had been busily rebuilding the Great Wall in the form that we know today. It was intended to support their border garrisons, and to contro] the movement of the Mongols into China, whether as envoys, as traders, or as invaders. Despite the awesome grandeur of its physical presence, it was not a complete success. From behind it, the Chinese looked out on their threatening neighbors and gained little insight. Their defensive posture was complicated by their honest indignation over Mongol trickiness (of which there was much} and by their own irresponsibly corrupt management of the tribute relationship. To the Mongols tribute meant above all trade, and, both as a consequence of Chinese high policy and of corrupt management, they were denied a satisfactory return from it. In their urgency, their frustration, and their rising military self-confidence, they came to invade the Great Wall defense zone with ease and sometimes breached the Wall with

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impunity. A series of border clashes occurred throughout the 1440’s. The stability which the Chinese thought they had achieved among the nearer and more peaceful “provinces” of the Mongol world was undermined. To Mongol chieftains who cooperated with Chinese pacification measures, Esen sent messages saying: ‘You chieftains are heirs to titles granted your forefathers by Chinggis and Khubilai.” In effect, this was to ask: “Do you now submit to the domination of our traditional enemies and late subjects, the Chinese?” It was a powerful call. Garrison commanders along the Great Wall sent innumerable reports to Peking throughout the late 1440’s regarding border defense problems.* Much of the strength of the Great Wall garrisons had been drained off by deployment of resources to the foolishly conceived and corruptly executed Yunnan campaigns of that decade. Now, by early 1449, there was a sense of urgency about rebuilding them. The annual military reviews and tests of military prowess at the capital assumed unusual significance. Wang Chen, the eunuch who was the de facto ruler of China, used those to reward members of his faction. Eunuch underlings of his were assigned to each important garrison point and became de facto commanders there, though distinguished old soldiers held the nominal leadership positions.® The emperor, approaching maturity and increasingly aware that he was free to act in his own name, ignored the senior statesmen of the outer court. He deferred in all things to Wang Chen, whom he called by the honorific form of address used by a junior or a pupil toward a senior or a teacher. We can perhaps understand why the Chinese misused their military resources in a frontier crisis whose alien elements they chose not to understand. But how far could the Chinese system tolerate the misuse of political power on the domestic scene? How far could Wang Chen go? What motivated him, and why was he allowed to go so far? This is more difficult to understand. All eunuchs, the Chinese historians insist, despite any virtues some may have had (and Chinese historians have not been anxious to stress those}, were consumed by avarice and, next to that, by the passion to acquire status. Wang Chen was indeed avaricious; his appetite extended even to small things. His treatment of the Mongols was no different from his treatment of the Chinese. His warehouses were immense and were full of treasure that he had extorted in the day-to-day operations of Chinese domestic administration. The marginal Mongol contributions to his hoard could not have been significant to pire!

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him, though they were instrumental in forcing the Mongols to desperate attitudes. Through his network of eunuch agents he apparently cheated the Mongols in the tribute exchange year after year. When they offered 4,000 horses in tribute they expected a return gift of fifteen bolts of cloth for each horse, or its equivalent in iron, craft products, or grain.’® They often did not receive any such returns. They repeatedly requested that border trading posts be established at which they could conduct regular exchanges on a fair trading basis, but were denied them. Wang Chen’s management of the trade aspects of the tribute system, which served as their only way of acquiring certain essentials, cheated them not only to the point of solid material grievance but also of unbearable humiliation. Yet, had there been no Wang Chen, and no corruption, other Chinese administrators of that time would not have viewed the tribute relationship very differently. “How far could Wang Chen go?” we have asked. The extremes of his power are best seen in his relationship with the civil and military officials of the Chinese central government. He acquired the power to dictate all personnel decisions. Most officials despised him, and many were in passive opposition to him, but he could make his will prevail. He decided all administrative measures. He browbeat the flower of Chinese officialdom, and those who demeaned themselves and toadied to him had the best chances to advance and to profit. The palace-guard forces, operated by his male relatives, terrorized government. One anecdote displays the tone of the court by the late 1440’s. One of the civil officials who rose rapidly in those years was a pretty young man called Wang Yu. Wang Yu lacked a beard, as did, of course, Wang Chen, though not for the same reasons. Wang Chen once asked Wang Yu why he had no beard, and Wang Yu’s reply became a symbol of the humiliation to which the government submitted. “How would this humble person dare,’ Wang Yu replied, “to have anything that your revered self does not have?’”? Wang Yu was a mean man debasing himself for crass advantage; but Wang Chen was “the emperor” as an extension of the imperial person. The imperial institution by Ming times had reached the apex of a long development toward absolutism, in which emperors were elevated above all personal criticism and their personally chosen extensions of themselves, their eunuchs, could share in that elevation and that immunity. Wang Chen was a brilliant innovator in being the first eunuch pao ys:

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to realize the potential in his situation. Unfortunately neither his talent nor that of any of the later infamous eunuchs of the Ming dynasty extended very far into any understanding of the real problems of Ming government. And, unlike a number of lesser eunuchs who were competent generals, he appears totally to have lacked military talent.” As the border situation approached a stage of crisis in mid-1449, Wang Chen proposed that the emperor in person lead a campaign with Wang Chen as Generalissimo. An army of half a million would take to the field and would overwhelm the restless natives beyond the Wall. It would be a triumphal march northwest from Peking to the Great Wall garrison point of Ta-t’ung in Shansi, and from there northward into the steppe. All of the great old generals of the realm would take orders in the field from Wang Chen as the civil officials back at court had become accustomed to doing. The emperor would come trailing along to congratulate the eunuch in the field for having saved China. Then the procession would wind through Wang Chen’s home district, southeast of Ta-t’ung, where he would present the emperor, in the role of his deferential charge, to all the Wang relatives, now local magnates in that district. Wang Chen could in no way possess more wealth, but this triumph would bring the ultimate in personal status and glory.” 3. The T’u-mu Incident: A Chronicle As a military action Wang Chen’s campaign was totally frivolous and irresponsible. The following are revealing items from the record:** 1449, July 30 {seventh moon, eleventh day, VII/11, day chi-ch’ou]: For some time, daily reports coming from the Great Wall garrison points north and west of the capital have told of raids on defense outposts, scouting parties and skirmishes, indicating that Esen may be planning a major attack, expected to fall on Ta-t'ung, the anchor point in the Great Wall defense line. On this date it is reported that Esen has attacked within the Ta-t’ung region, and that other Mongol forces have attacked several other points from Liaotung to Kansu. Wang Chen has been privately persuading the emperor to lead a campaign in person that will end these attacks and punish the Mongols. When the matter was discussed in the court (on the following day?}, officials led by K’uang Yeh, the Minister of War!> remonstrate against the emperor’s participation: ‘The Six Armies must not be lightly employed.” Heeding only Wang Chen, he ignores the remonstrance.

July 31 [VII/12, day keng-yin]: no relevant information.

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August 1 [VII/13, day hsin-mao]: no relevant information. August 2 [VII/14, day jen-ch’en}: The Minister of Personnel leads a large group of officials in submitting a joint memorial which says, in essence: the emperor is overreacting, other defensive measures will prove adequate to turn back the rash attacks of the Mongols; moreover, the summer heat has not subsided, water is scarce and fodder inadequate, and preparations have not been thorough; still further, by leaving the capital the emperor will paralyze government and will expose himself to needless dangers. “Armies are instruments of violence; warfare is a dangerous business. The sages of antiquity undertook war with cautious respect, not daring to do so carelessly. The Son of Heaven, although the most exalted of men, would now go personally into those dangers. We officials, although the most stupid of men, nonetheless say that this must not occur.” Under Wang Chen’s instructions, the emperor replies: “These words of you Ministers all convey well your loyalty and patriotism. But the caitiff bandits offend against heaven and dishonor our favor to them. They have already violated our borders; they have murdered and plundered our military and civilian population there. The border garrison commanders have repeatedly asked for armies to come to their aid. We have no choice but to lead a great army in person to exterminate them.” August 3 [VII/15, day kuei-ssu]: The emperor commands his younger half-brother, Chu Ch’i-yii, Prince Ch’eng, to remain in command at the capital, and names the staff of high officials who are to form his official entourage. Departure is fixed for the following day. On this same day, word came from the commander at Hsiian-fu, reporting that their cavalry remount post has been surrounded and cut off from its water supply for three days by the marauding Mongols. And from Ta-t’ung there is news that two senior field commanders and all their troops have perished in battle at Yang-ho (modern Yang-kao hsien}, near the Great Wall northeast of Ta-t’ung. A eunuch representing Wang Chen, forcing the military commanders to take orders from him, had led disgruntled and undisciplined troops into battle; he escaped only by hiding in the tall grass until the action was over. (1)* August 4 [VII/16, day chia-wu]: Messages are sent to the Ancestral Shrine and the Temple of the State to announce that the emperor is departing at the head of the armies. Since the order to take the field was first announced, only two days have elapsed; civil and military officials are in a frenzy of confusion trying to get ready. As the imperial palanquin starts off, a supervising secretary throws himself in front of it, stops it, and implores the emperor: “Your Majesty may make light of your imperial person, but what of the dynasty, what of the state?’ Wang Chen curses the official, and the emperor is silent. The entourage goes forth, through the inner and the outer gates and walls, and northwest, toward the Shansi border. [The first night camp is made at T’ang-chia-ling, not located on any maps.] “Refers to numbered days of travel on map.

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(2) August 5 [VII/17, day yi-wei]: Second night camp is made at Lung-hu-t’ai, just south of Nan-k’ou. During the night there is an alarm in the army camp, producing disorders and confusion. (3) August 6 [VII/18, day ping-shen]: It is the birthday of the Emperor Ch’eng-tsu, the emperor’s great-grandfather (who usurped the throne in 1402 and reigned until 1424). Officials are dispatched to his tomb, located at the valley of the Ming Tombs, just a few miles away, to offer sacrifices. In the meantime the emperor calls his chief officials together and instructs them in matters of military discipline. (The entourage apparently did not travel this day, since no new stopping place is named.} (4) August 7 [VII/19, day ting-yu]: The entourage and army numbering half-a-million strong pass through the Chii-yung Pass and beyond the inner line of the Great Wall. Contrary to all norms, it has rained and stormed almost constantly. The officials of the entourage submit a joint memorial requesting that a halt of some days be made, but Wang Chen is enraged, and the memorial is ignored. The soldiers are suffering and complaining; discipline is eroding among both civil and military officers. The Minister of War, K’uang Yeh, a sixty-four-year-old veteran of a distinguished civil service career and an honorable, earnest man who has been leading the remonstrances against the emperor’s adventure, lacks however all practical military experience. He even has trouble riding a horse, and falls off several times, once injuring himself seriously. He is urged by fellow officials to remain behind in order to receive medical attention, but stoutly replies: ‘The most venerated one is also undergoing the rigors of travel; how could I use this medical complaint as an excuse to seek my own comfort?” (Some accounts place this event a few days later.] (5) August 8 [VII/20, day wu-hsti]: Word comes of an outstanding example of loyalty at the front; it is elaborately rewarded, with announcements made for the benefit of the officers’ morale. Camp is made at Yii-lin post station. (6) August 9 [VII/21, day chi-hai]: Camp is made for the night just west of Huai-lai hsien city. (7) August 10 {VII/22, day keng-tzu]: Camp is made for the night at Lei-chia-chan (not located on any maps).

(8) August 11 [VII/23, day hsin-ch’ou]: The entourage climbs through the steep Chi-ming (Cock-crow} Mountain passes. There are attack alarms, and all are in terror of immediate disaster. The emperor, as usual, refers all business to Wang Chen, who raises the level of his insolence and intimidation in order to retain control. Even the highest ranking and most senior officials must approach him on their knees as if he were the emperor in person, and if they say something that angers him they may be ordered to kneel on the bare ground for half a day in punishment. The chief official in the Directorate of Astronomy, one of Wang Chen’s men, reports privately to him that it would be “against all astronomical signs” (some sources say “the enemy’s power is too great’”’) to proceed, but Wang Chen [intervening between 2.56

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the emperor and heaven itself} callously replies: “If it is to be so, then fate has ordained it so.” Ignoring this warning, and the entreaties of many, Wang Chen orders the army to press on.*® (9) August 12 [VII/24, day jen-yin]: Hsiian-fu (modern Hsiian-hua hsien}, almost half way between Peking and Ta-t'ung, is reached, and it is still raining. Reports on the movements of the enemy are causing great concern. The assembled high officials of the entourage again urge that a stop be made within the stout walls of Hsiian-fu, but Wang Chen, in a rage, suppresses their petition. Two officials whom he considers responsible for repeating the suggestion that the whole campaign be called off are ordered to kneel on the ground for a whole day in punishment, though they are distinguished old men of ministerial rank. Even the senior generals reporting to him are now required to approach him on their knees. Certain high officials secretly discuss taking the ultimate step—having Wang Chen assassinated. Ts’ao Nai, Chancellor of the Hanlin Academy, {or Li Hsien, a censor] discusses with colleagues in the Censorate why it must be done: “If Wang Chen is not killed, the emperor will never get back to the capital. Here the emperor is forced to bear the hardships of travel; the Six Armies have lost their morale, for they have been grinding their teeth to suppress their anger at Wang Chen too long. It would require only the strength of one armed man to seize Wang Chen and smash his skull right in front of the imperial entourage, after which his crimes of usurping powers and injuring the nation all could be exposed. Then the generals could lead the army on to Ta-t’ung, but the imperial person would then return.’’ However, the censors and other civil officials could not quite find the will or the agreement to undertake so drastic a step, and the matter is dropped.17 As the Chinese armies advance, the Mongols are falling back behind the Wall, to await their opportunity for ambush.

(10) August 13 [VII/25, day kuei-mao]: Camp is made for the night at Wan-ch’iian-yii (which is taken to be identical with the former “garrison of the left,” sixty li west of Hsiian-fu on the principal military and post route); astronomical signs are ominous. (11) August 14 [VII/26, day chia-ch’en]: Camp is made to the west of Huai-an hsien city. Just before dawn an ominous black cloud is seen, more than two (or twenty?} feet thick, hovering at ten feet or so off the ground, and stretched across the sky from south to north; it slowly drifts away in a northerly direction. (12) August 15 [VII/27, day yi-ssu]: Camp is made to the west of T’ien-ch’eng {modern T’ien-chen). (13) August 16 [VII/28, day ping-wu]: Passing Yang-ho battlefield where on August 3 a large force from the Ta-t’ung garrison had gone down to disastrous defeat at the hands of Esen, the entourage views the field still strewn with thousands of unburied Chinese corpses. The chill of terror grips all hearts. Further inauspicious astronomical phenomena are observed that night.

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(14) August 17 [VII/29, day ting-wei]: The entourage reaches Chii-lo post station, one stage or sixty li away from Ta-t’ung. (15) August 18 [VIII/1, day wu-shen]: The entourage reaches Ta-t’ung, on a day made ominous by dark clouds and strange solar phenomena. Wang Chen confers secretly with the eunuch he had placed in authority there.

(16) August 19 [VIII/2, day chi-yu]: Wang Chen is reluctant to give up his plans for a glorious campaign north beyond the Great Wall and into the steppe from Ta-t’ung. However a eunuch military commander, the same who had hidden in the tall grass and thereby escaped the slaughter at Yang-ho on August 3, tells him: Give it up! If you go on, you will simply fall into Esen’s trap.” This trusted lieutenant’s opinion begins to arouse Wang Chen’s fear of the enemy. Moreover, ever since leaving the Chii-yung Pass, it has rained night and day contrary to all seasonal expectations, and now at Ta-t’ung fierce storms again assail them. Even Wang Chen begins to have a great uneasiness because of all these signs; he decides to declare the mission victoriously accomplished and return to the capital. (17) August 20 [VIII/3, day keng-hsii]: The return to Peking commences. Camp is made a mere twenty li to the east, and as soon as camp is set up, a black cloud descends precisely over it and hangs so low that it seems to press down on people’s heads, though beyond the camp on all sides clear sky can be seen on the horizons. Shortly thereafter lightning and rain commence; they last through the night, inducing fear and disorder. Wang Chen originally had planned to return by a more southerly route that would pass through Yii-chou, his native place, where he might entertain the emperor as a guest in his home. That route would then take the entourage through the Tzu-ching Pass, and into Peking from the southwest, a shorter and much safer route. Now however, after one day’s travel on the alternate route, Wang Chen concludes that the increasingly uncontrollable troops would wreak heavy damage on his extensive estates and farms there, so against all advice, he turns again to the northeast, to pick up the route by which they had come. (18) August 21 [VIII/4, day hsin-hai]: Camp is made at a place called Ti-ti-shui, or Ti-shui-yai (Dripping water) {not located on any maps, but said to be forty li southwest of Yang-ho). (19) August 22 [VIII/5, day jen-tzu]: Camp is made at Hung-chou Fang-ch’eng (not identified). (20) August 23 [VIII/6, day kuei-ch’ou]: Camp is made at Pai-teng. (21) August 24 [VIII/7, day chia-yin|]: Camp is made west of Tuai-an hsien city, back at the place where the entourage had stopped ten days earlier. (22) August 25 [VIII/8, day yi-mao]: Camp at Wan-ch’iian-yii. (23) August 26 [VIII/9, day ping-ch’en]: Camp is made north of the Yang-Ho (River), at Sha-ling-pao.

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(24) August 27 [VIII/10, day ting-ssu]: The stop is made within the walls of Hsiian-fu, and the mid-point in the return had been reached. It has been a week of foul weather and disorderly marches. Back in Peking, the annual sacrifices to Confucius are conducted. (25) August 28 [VIII/11, day wu-wu]: Camp is made “southeast of Hsiian-fu.” (26) August 29 [VIII/12, day chi-wei]: Camp is made at Lei-chia-chan (refer to August 10, above].

(27) August 30 [VIII/13, day keng-shen]: Two battles that commence the final event are fought on this day. The accounts are somewhat confused. Historians trying to reconstruct the diary, after the destruction of the traveling court and its records, may have been unclear about the deployment of forces and the location of some events. The Shih-lu states that just when the imperial entourage was about to depart, reports were received from Hsiian-fu saying that the Mongols had attacked the rear guard. Some accounts say that the entourage stopped; others say that it moved forward and that it reached T’u-mu on this date. In either case, it seems clear that the news received early in the morning altered the travel plans for the day. The rear guard, following at a distance of two days’ march, was attacked shortly after leaving Hsiian-fu, and with the outcome uncertain, the imperial entourage stopped, or hesitated. By that evening, further word was received that the rear guard had been totally wiped out, exposing the main force to attack. A new rear-guard force was quickly formed and sent back toward Hsiian-fu. This corresponds with the fragments of information found in the biographies of the principals. Assuming that this is the correct reconstruction of events, the following summarizes the important military action: . The Wu brothers, K’e-chung and K’e-ch’in,}8 are Mongols whose father surrendered to the Chinese in the Yung-lo period (1403-1424), was granted a Chinese name by the emperor, and later achieved the noble title of Duke. His sons have inherited high titles and have served with great distinction. They command the rear-guard force which is set upon in a narrow defile at Lang-shan {Wolf Mountain), southeast of Hsiian-fu. ‘The enemy forces occupy mountain tops; arrows and stones fill the air like rain. The government troops have virtually all been killed or wounded. K’e-chung gets off his horse and continues to shoot until his arrows are all used up, but still he kills many persons. Finally he and K’e-ch’in die on the battlefield.” K’e-ch’in’s son Wu Chin escapes and reports the news. (Later the Wu brothers are granted posthumous honorifics and titles.} When the news that the rear guard has been destroyed reaches the imperial entourage on that same evening, a special force is created by detaching 50,000 (or 30,000, or 40,000} cavalry troops from the main army; that is sent to the rear-guard position. It is commanded by Chu Yung?® with Hsiieh Shou as vice-commander. Chu Yung is an old man, the son of Chu Neng who had been an associate of the Ming Founder in the late fourteenth century. His biography says: “In appearance and manner he appeared to be quite heroic, but both his courage and his tactical sense were 2.60

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deficient; however, he was full of respect and courtesy toward scholars and officials.” He seems typical of Ming second-generation military men in having succumbed to civilian influences only to become incompetent, although that was not evident to a civilian-minded court. (Yet Chu Yung had been severely censured for bungling a campaign against the Eastern Mongols in 1444.) Hsiieh Shou, on the other hand, is the son of a Mongol leader who had come over to the Chinese late in the previous century and had served with distinction throughout the first quarter of the fifteenth century. Hsiieh Shou received his Chinese name from the then reigning emperor when as a youth he succeeded to his father’s rank and titles in 1425. He became a formidable fighter, renowned for all the qualities that Chu Yung seemed to lack. But he is only second in command on this fateful occasion. Both die in the battle of Yao-erh-ling?® which occurs late on this day, about thirty li from the place where the imperial entourage had stopped; Chu Yung led the new rear-guard force of 50,000 directly into an ambush on the way back to the site of Wu K’e-chung’s last stand. In the aftermath to the disaster of T’u-mu, Yii Ch’ien (who took charge of the government in Peking) charged Chu Yung with criminal malfeasance and had him posthumously stripped of rank and honors. Hsiieh Shou, on the other hand, dies a heroic figure. After the whole force has been wiped out, he alone fights on, though his bowstring is broken and his arrows all gone. Using his empty bow as a club he continues to flail away at the enemy until they chop off his limbs and kill him. But then they discover that Hsiieh Shou is also a Mongol. {An orderly may have survived to tell them.) “He is one of us, from beyond the mountains. No wonder he was so strong and so brave.” They weep for him. The Chinese court later granted him posthumous honors. (28) August 31 |VIII/14, day hsin-yu]: The imperial entourage reaches the post station called T’u-mu by afternoon; it is a scant seven or eight miles from the walled hsien city of Huai-lai. Leading officials, knowing that Esen will now quickly close in, urge that the imperial party press on to spend the night within the walls. The ailing Minister of War, crippled from falls and tormented by Wang Chen, expresses the urgent plea that the emperor go directly on with all speed to get himself back within the Chii-yung Pass, leaving a strong rear guard to slow Esen’s approach. Wang Chen however is worried only that the one thousand wagons of his personal baggage train, loaded with valuables, have been delayed; he insists that the whole party wait for the wagons to catch up. Going on only as far as Huai-lai might be tantamount to abandoning the wagons to Esen. When the faithful Minister of War sets forth forceful arguments in favor of hastening on, Wang Chen curses him: “You fool of a bookworm! What do you know about military affairs? Say another word and you will be beheaded on the spot.” Guards drag the Minister away, and he weeps through the night in his tent with other old civilian colleagues. Camp is hastily set up at T’u-mu. The rain that has plagued the whole campaign has now stopped, and this place has no water. Soldiers start to dig wells, but after going down twenty or more feet and finding no trace,

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they give up. Someone reports that a river runs only a short distance south of the camp, but before they can reach it, they see the enemy. Esen has sent a flanking force to occupy the river bank and block their access to water. A dry camp is made, as reports filter in that Esen’s main force is surrounding them. Throughout the day and the night, men and horses are without water and food, and they are suffering. Guard units blocking the defiles leading into T’u-mu fight through the night, and report that the numbers of the enemy on all sides swell beyond all expectations. (29) September 1 [VIII/15, day jen-hsii]: It is the Mid-Autumn Festival, normally a happy time of family reunion and feasting. The army has been two days without water; suffering has become intense. The imperial entourage makes motions as if about to set forth toward Huai-lai, but the surrounding enemy makes its presence obvious, and stops

that plan. Then the enemy pretends to withdraw while negotiations can be carried out. They send in a letter. The emperor orders the Chancellor of the Hanlin Academy to draft peace conditions to send to Esen’s camp. But Wang Chen ignores that and without authorization orders the imperial entourage again to move forward toward the river. In considerable confusion the army, surrounding the imperial palanquin, struggles forward a mile or so. On observing this action, the enemy now attacks in full force from all sides. The Chinese army breaks, gives ground in great disorder, becomes a mob. The Mongols shout: “Throw down your arms and armor and be spared.” Ignoring their officers, the Chinese soldiers go wild, strip off their garments, and run toward the Mongol cavalry, only to be cut to pieces. The air rains arrows, and the Mongols close in. The emperor’s personal cavalry guards surround him and try to break through but make no headway. The emperor dismounts and sits on the ground amidst a hail of arrows that kills most of his attendants. He remains unharmed and waits calmly. Mongol soldiers come forward. They try to steal the rich armor from the emperor’s person, but he refuses to relinquish it. A soldier is on the point of killing the emperor to take his armor when a Mongol officer approaches and stops him. The emperor addresses the officer asking: “Are you Prince Esen?” Then he asks if the officer is Esen’s brother, naming all the brothers by their princely ranks. The officer, a Mongol prince, is impressed, suspecting that this must be a very important person, perhaps even the Chinese emperor. Respectfully, he leads the emperor away. The following day the emperor is taken to Lei-chia-chan, the post-station between T’u-mu and Hsiian-fu; he sends a messenger to Peking to announce his capture and to get gifts for presentation to Esen. On September 3 Esen, who has been astounded to learn that the Chinese emperor is his captive, receives him in his camp near Hsiian-fu. A Mongol command council follows: What should be done with the Chinese emperor? One old Mongol says: “Great Heaven has let the emperor of China fall into our hands. He is the enemy of our Mongol khans. Kill him.” One of Esen’s brothers soundly slaps the old speaker and—according to the Chinese sources?!—says: “The Emperor of China is no ordinary 262,

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mortal. Look how he sat there unharmed through the thick of battle, the air filled with arrows. Moreover, we have all been the recipients of China’s beneficence. If we keep the emperor unharmed and return him, we will earn undying gratitude and fame.” Esen approves this speech. He orders that the emperor be shown special courtesy and care.

Wang Chen was cut down on the field of battle, according to some accounts murdered by enraged Chinese officers. Perhaps half of the half-million men of the Chinese army were killed, the rest fled, many wounded, and some struggled back to Peking or were captured. All of the high civilian and military officers of the imperial entourage were killed. Some even died fighting. It was the end of Wang Chen’s frivolous military expedition but the beginning of a new phase in Chinese-Mongol relations.

4. Mongol Failure to Exploit the Incident Esen kept his imperial captive and treated him well. The emperor was allowed a few personal attendants who had been found alive on the field of battle. Without them, he would have been unable to mount a horse, write a formal document, or keep his feet warm. He was made the special charge of Esen’s younger brother, the one Mongol prince who seemed the most impressed by having a Chinese Son of Heaven at hand. The emperor was regularly feasted and entertained, but he refused all offers of a Mongol wife, even Esen’s own sister. Rather than hurt any delicate feelings, he intimated that after his return to Peking he could undertake that with more style. It was understood from the beginning, as soon as Esen had decided not to kill the emperor, that he would be held for return to China. But how and when, and to what purpose? The emperor could be used immediately to squeeze some ransom treasure from the Chinese court, and indeed the first message from him received in Peking, confirming the disaster to Prince Ch’eng and the court, induced the Empress Dowager and the Empress, his mother and his wife, to scour the palace for gold and jewels to send for that purpose. Esen was not averse to gaining in this way from the situation. But he had not coerced and induced the military resources of all Mongolia to engage in this major military enterprise just for a few mule-loads of baubles. He clearly had not expected to capture an emperor, but having one, how could that captive best be used for Esen’s and the Mongol nation’s purposes? One can only speculate that Esen had set out hoping to test 263

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the Ming defense line along the Great Wall, impress his fellow Mongol chieftains by his success in causing a further Chinese withdrawal, and negotiate a settlement that would secure some economic advantages. That would be the first step in winning him the image of the new Mongol leader, the successor to the Great Khans of recent history. The ambitious line of outer defense points which the Ming Founder had set up in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, some more than a hundred miles north of the Great Wall, had mostly been abandoned or pulled back since the beginning of the fifteenth century. In moving those isolated and difficult-to-maintain strongpoints back closer to the Wall, the Ming court hoped to rely increasingly on political arrangements among the divisions within the Mongol world, intensifying those whenever possible, and taking whatever advantage might be gained by dealing separately with the tribal groupings. At the same time it had to depend more fully on the Great Wall chain of garrisons and on the Wall itself. The Wall served a purpose only when China was ruled by a native dynasty. Aliens from the steppe had breached that Wall early in the tenth century, and had ruled on both sides of it more or less continuously ever since, until native rule was re-established in 1368. From the early fifteenth century onward, the long-abandoned and by now discontinuous Wall was patched up and substantially rebuilt, but it was not an impregnable barrier. The Mongols frequently tore down sections of it in order to pass through at unguarded points. The two garrison points of Hsiian-fu and Ta-t’ung, about one hundred miles apart (and Hsiian-fu, the nearer, about one hundred miles west-northwest from Peking) were the two key points in the whole Great Wall line of defenses. They guarded Peking, and they were the bases from which Chinese campaigns into the steppe set out. They were also the points at which the Great Wall had first been breached five centuries earlier. On this occasion in the summer of 1449, Esen had divided his forces into four columns, the two central and largest of which were pointed at Ta-t’ung and Hsiian-fu. Another attacked further east, in Jehol, and the fourth further west, in Kansu, to prevent the Chinese from concentrating their defenses. If the attack were successful enough to make the Chinese abandon Ta-t’ung, continuing their recent pattern of withdrawing outposts back to or even behind the rim of the steppe, it would have been enough to give Esen’s build-up further impetus and to justify his claims to Mongol overlordship. Now, however, with the Chinese emperor his captive, a 2.64

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Chinese army of half a million destroyed, and great amounts of war materiel and booty to collect and use, the whole situation had unplanned-for potentialities. A eunuch by the name of Hsi-ning, himself a sinicized Mongol though one of Wang Chen’s highly-placed lieutenants, was among Esen’s captives. Hsi-ning now turned enthusiastically to supporting Esen and gave him valuable information about Chinese political and military conditions. In the following months he became a chief adviser to the Mongols. One can almost see Esen, somewhat staggered by the situation, trying to realize as much as possible from the unanticipated possibilities that Hsi-ning described to him. He was faced with a role much grander than he had yet had time to comprehend. Hsi-ning told him he could use the captive emperor to trick commanders of border garrisons into opening their gates. Hsi-ning told him what kind of messages to send in order to extort more ransom from the court. Hsi-ning told him to use the pretext of escorting the emperor back to Peking as cover for drawing his full armed forces through the Wall and up to the gates of the capital. Had Esen at any point declared his objectives realized, and withdrawn, he would have ended up a bigger victor than anyone had expected. By hesitating about what to do next, and setting his eyes at each stage of his adjustment on higher goals, he risked the possibility of dramatically failing to accomplish the new aims, and thereby losing all. That in fact is what happened. After failing to take immediate advantage of the T’u-mu victory, Esen returned to the steppe for a short period. He may have had to draw his widespread forces together; one contemporary Chinese account states that the Chinese army of half a million was destroyed by no more than 20,000 Mongol cavalry.” Even allowing for inaccuracies in that account, it may indicate that Esen was leading a portion of his army, and that a mere forward column fought at T’u-mu. After that battle he had to withdraw to rejoin his main force and plan further steps with other leaders. By the time he acted on Hsi-ning’s advice to use the emperor as cover for surrounding Peking, it was late October. Back in Peking, the crisis had served to shake the Chinese government free from its incompetent and demoralizing eunuch management and to bring able and aggressive leadership to the fore. In the month and a half that elapsed before Esen could organize to exploit his windfall, this leadership—meaning the former Vice-Minister, now Minister of War, Yii Ch’ien, and a circle of energetic officials about him—had placed Prince 265

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Ch’eng on the throne as the successor emperor {known in history by his reign-title, Ching-t’ai], greatly lessening the leverage that Esen could gain from having the Chinese emperor in his hands. The captive Ying-tsung now was remotely deferred to as ‘The Grand Senior Emperor,” meaning ex-emperor. The new leaders had also reorganized the military forces, built defenses, moved all the stores from the granaries at T’ung-chou into the city, and created a confident spirit of resistance. Esen reached Peking on October 27 and surrounded the city, keeping his captive back a bit while awaiting negotiations. He was told: “It is the altars of the Earth and of Grain [that is, the dynasty and nation] that are of great importance, while the ruler [as an individual] is unimportant.’’”* No conditions would be granted for the captive emperor's return. That diplomatic effort having failed him, Esen tested his force against the defending Chinese and was badly beaten in each encounter. After surrounding the city for five days, he withdrew on October 31, plundering and looting as he went, but taking no major defended points. The showdown proved to him, perhaps, that the T’u-mu victory had indeed been a ridiculously fortuitous event, and that in a real contest of arms he could not defeat well-organized and ably-led Chinese armies. The overwhelming Mongol military superiority of the thirteenth century no longer obtained in the fifteenth. Yet Hsi-ning, who with fitting irony might be seen as Esen’s Wang Chen, continued to plant grandiose projects in Esen’s mind. Those Mongols living in China, settled in heavy local groupings in Hopei and Shantung, would arise and support their Mongol brothers storming in from the steppe. Esen could penetrate to the south through Shansi, while a second column of Mongol cavalry rushed to the Grand Canal to cut that line of transport linking Peking to the Yangtze. He could take Nanking, and install his captive emperor there as a rival to the regime in Peking. Or, he still might force a retreat of the Chinese government from Peking to Nanking; then he could reestablish Peking as the Mongol Ta-tu, as it had been known when Khubilai Khan made it his capital. These ideas must have dazzled Esen more than they guided him. Then Hsi-ning was sent as Esen’s envoy to the Chinese, who violated his diplomatic immunity and executed him.”* Esen lost his China expert and source of grandiose plans. He retired to the steppe, reopened negotiations with Peking, and formally resumed his 2.66

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tribute relationship which had scarcely been interrupted. The following year, in September of 1450, he sent the emperor back to Peking with no conditions and the episode was ended, from his point of view. His leadership over the Mongols was discredited, his influence faded, and he was murdered by his own people a few years later. Thus ended the attempt to effect the greatest build-up of Mongol power in over a century. 5. Chinese Failure to Learn the Right Lesson The Chinese response to the crisis of 1449 was on the whole unproductive, even counterproductive. True, under the heroic leadership of Yii Ch’ien, almost immediately after the news about T’u-mu reached the capital a revitalized court emerged. It displayed remarkable capacities for meeting the crisis with very high levels of performance. Morale was quickly reestablished, and the gigantic task of rebuilding and defending was brilliantly accomplished, amidst a righteous revival of Confucian morale and morality. Accompanying this there occurred one of the most extraordinary events in the history of Chinese imperial government. It was an event at the court at which the scholar-ofticials achieved revenge against the eunuchs. Resentment against the eunuchs had been intense, and expression of it was restrained only by the Confucian literati-statesmen’s sense of propriety, and by their fear of the consequences of attacking the leading figure in a eunuch power network which controlled the palace, key agencies of government, and the Embroidered Uniform Guard—that is, the instruments of suppression and control. A week after T’u-mu, when a new set of figures had assumed control of the court and a new atmosphere strongly critical of the recent past had been created {and it was rather clear that Prince Ch’eng would soon be proclaimed the new emperor], the whole court gathered in front of Prince Ch’eng and demanded that Wang Chen be posthumously punished, his family eradicated, and his property all confiscated. They knelt before him, presented a detailed list of charges, and said they would die there, on the spot, rather than withdraw their request. Prince Ch’eng nervously accepted their comments and promised he would take action, but the officials would not be put off and remained kneeling, demanding a more specific response. Ma Shun, who had been one of Wang Chen’s party, who still commanded the Embroidered Uniform Guard, the military arm of the eunuch’s 267

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secret service, and who realized that this was an attack on all eunuch power, tried to maintain control by arrogantly declaring the action out of order. He shouted commands for the prostrate officials to clear the court. At this moment of great tension, the normal fears and restraints snapped; a censor by the name of Wang Hung jumped to his feet, rushed forward, and seized Ma Shun by his hair, shouting at him: ‘Are you then also one of the traitors?’ He began scuffling with Ma Shun, wrestled him to the ground and bit him. Immediately all the others present jumped to their feet and joined the fight. They were all unarmed. They pulled Ma Shun’s court boots off his feet and beat him with them, knocking his eyes out and splattering blood on the floor. Within minutes they had kicked and beaten him to death. Two eunuchs on the scene, known to be prominently identified with the secret police, were likewise beaten to death by the suddenly uncontrolled mob of officials. Prince Ch’eng nervously tried to escape from the court chamber, but Yii Ch’ien, realizing that the situation could turn into one of reprisals and deadly civil struggle, reached Prince Ch’eng’s side, grasped his garment, and restrained him. He told the prince that it would be fatal to leave this situation unresolved, that he must declare that Ma Shun and the others had deserved to die, that there would be no reprisals, and that Wang Chen’s family would be punished as requested.”® This brought the anti-Wang Chen faction into complete control of the government. Nonetheless, within eight years a palace coup brought the Emperor Ying-tsung back on the throne. Yii Ch’ien and others were executed as traitors, and a shrine was built to the memory of Wang Chen. T’u-mu proved that the early vigor and creativity of the Ming leadership was gone,”* Ming state and society remained very stable and strong throughout, except at the very top, where weakness and incompetence did not seem to matter so directly. The northern frontier military installation was effectively rebuilt, and for a century thereafter the Chinese congratulated themselves that their border defenses were adequate to prevent further Mongol incursions. In fact, those defenses were not seriously tested for another century, but again in the mid and late sixteenth century they failed to shield the capital region from Mongol invaders. In 1550 the Great Wall defense line was again breached, but only briefly, and no general crisis ensued. Yet the northern border remained the source of an immense psychological threat, the major focus of a defense-minded 268

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government, and an unsolved problem. As the military machine based on the Great Wall line grew in later Ming times, it became ever more expensive and more wasteful. The narrow escape which the Chinese state had experienced at T’u-mu had made the need for this particular kind of military defense unarguable, though it turned the state away from either a decisive military solution or reasonable nonmilitary alternatives. The history of Hsiian-fu and Ta-t’ung throughout the post-T’u-mu centuries of Ming rule shows what happened. These two defense commands and the regions directly administered under them comprised a number of prefectures extending for two hundred miles within the central portion of the Great Wall. The Wall became the actual and the recognized military frontier of China after 1449. T’u-mu greatly hastened the process of pulling all the outposts back from the Inner Mongolian steppe to locations just within the Wall. In his long historical review of the military status of Ta-t’ung, Ku Yen-wu, who wandered through the area repeatedly in the mid-seventeenth century to study the problems on the ground, has stressed that this disposition undermined the strategic plans of the Hung-wu and Yung-lo emperors, the two founders of Ming power. In the beginning of the dynasty, he states, the garrison posts of Tung-sheng Wei (extending northward from Ta-t’ung into Suiyuan) had been planned to extend the Ming military power far beyond the Wall into the steppe, as it had been extended in Han and T’ang times. “In the fourteenth year of the Cheng-t’ung era (that is, 1449, or T’u-mu}, pressed by the disaster which the enemy caused, all of the garrison posts attached to it were moved, on imperial orders, back within the Wall, and the Tung-sheng region was abandoned. That is why in fact the Ming never regained the former Four Commanderies. (Dating from Ch’in and Han times, these had controlled the whole central section of the northern frontier; Ku defines them in the chapter here quoted, pages 8-b/9/a.] During the Hung-hsi and Hsiian-te reigns [1425-1435] the state was happy with its stability and gave no thought to disturbances, while during the Ching-t’ai and T’ien-shun eras [1450-1464] it was absorbed in the close-at-hand and was unable to plan for distant problems.””’ On the same subject, Ku elsewhere quotes from the Ta-hsiieh yen-yi-pu”®, a political encyclopedia compiled by the eminent Ming statesman Ch’iu Chiin {1418-1495}. Ch’iu regretted that the garrisons from beyond the Wall were pulled back to it after the first decades of the dynasty, thereby relinquishing 269

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“territories belonging to our China,’”’ and exposing the capital and the northern provinces to a much more direct threat. “In the past we had the distant garrisons as an outer barrier. Later they were moved back within, and now the fence protecting the capital and the east and north is thin and insubstantial indeed.’’””? Ch’iu, on presenting his work to the throne in 1487, had strongly urged reestablishing a strong line of defense

beyond the Wall. But that did not happen. Instead, the prefectures lying within the Wall, close to the capital and to major centers of Chinese population, tended to become “regions where warfare is conducted,” as the Ta-t’ung Gazetteer of 1782 describes it.*° Although the gazetteer states: ‘That has been so since antiquity,” Ku Yen-wu indicates a process through which, by the late Ming period, every village had become a military defense point, and every hsien a nucleus in a fabric of defense installations. Building and staffing these defenses must have absorbed much of the public energy. The Mongol threat, made so apparent to everybody in 1449, developed again in the middle of the sixteenth century. At that time, if not previously, all villages and towns of any size were walled and fortified under government direction, and smaller places were encouraged to do the same on their own.*’ Ku lists more than one thousand such fortified locations (pao) in Shansi, most of them in the exposed northern prefectures, in the mid-seventeenth century. In the same work, he enumerates the fortified pao within each of the thirteen administrative subdivisions in Ta-t’ung prefecture alone, and finds a total of 918, although he surmises that the figures are not complete.*” He adds the explanatory note: ‘Some have been built by the government and some by the people themselves; some are defended by government soldiers and some by the people themselves.” Furthermore, he also lists about one hundred road barriers, “erected to inspect persons of variant speech or of variant dress,’ made necessary by the region’s border location.** In short, one gains the clear impression that in the northern portions of the provinces lying next to the Great Wall an armed society developed; it spent much of its resources on defense, and lived in an atmosphere of tension. When one compares these districts with other regions of China at that time, for example, even with those southeastern areas subject to Wako raids in the mid-sixteenth century, one can see that the Wall border zone contrasted greatly with the normally open and undefended conditions prevailing throughout central China. 270

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The impoverishment of the northern provinces in the mid and late Ming times may be in part explained by this large-scale nonproductive use of resources, and by the restrictive conditions that were created in that atmosphere. It is easy to see how the focus of defense came to be fixed on guarding a very near-at-hand region of Chinese population, within one or two days’ courier-riding time from the capital, for it was a region thought to be under constant threat from an aggressive and treacherous neighbor. In military terms, T’u-mu brought home to the Chinese how perilously exposed their northern border was, or how perilously exposed they came to think it was. Yet, it failed to give them an understanding of the enduring factors in China’s relationship with the steppe, or bring perceptive and farsighted leadership to bear on fundamental solutions of that problem. In the tensions of 1449, the large communities of Mongols that had settled in China became the object of suspicion and fear, and suffered a discrimination they had not previously known. The anti-Mongol feeling that was built up then remained to cloud permanently China’s relations with her most important neighbor.* All of the irrationalities and irritations in the relationship were aggravated. Practical solutions were more difficult than ever to achieve. It is even possible to see a general anti-alien sentiment beginning to emerge out of the anti-Mongol feelings aroused by the crisis of 1449. The Mongol conquest of China and the consequent century of rule in the Yiian period had not aroused that kind or degree of antagonism, despite discouragingly inept, crude, and exploitative Mongol rule over the whole Chinese nation. Now, after the mid-fifteenth century we begin to find traces of poisonous anti-Mongol feeling in some Chinese writings, applied not only to current problems but to reevaluations of history as well. Is it not pertinent that the first strongly racist Confucian thinker in all of Chinese history, Wang Fu-chih, is active after 1650, and the northern steppe aliens bear the brunt of his proto-nationalist, racist antipathy?”

The northern frontier became the fixation, the virtual obsession of many Chinese statesmen throughout the mid and late Ming times. In general, mutual accommodation based on intelligent understanding of the Mongols and their steppe way of life, while promoted by a few, was disdained by the majority. Policies reflecting such understanding occasionally were formulated, but seldom had a chance to be implemented. 271

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Punitive and repressive measures were the rule. Yet, in hindsight, it would seem that broad-minded diplomatic and commercial relations, for which there were ample precedents from earlier and far more genuinely threatened periods of Chinese history, would have eased tensions, lessened the dangers, and saved the Chinese state the largest single item in its ever-growing military budgets. From mid-Ming times onward, when broad-minded diplomatic and commercial relations also would have been much more realistic to meet unprecedented problems on the ocean frontier to the east, the narrowly conceived defensive and punitive measures developed on the Mongol frontier were unthinkingly, obsessively applied to the other frontiers. The poisoned Sino-Mongol relationship extended its limiting, if not crippling, influences to the whole problem of China’s relationship with the rest of the world just at the time when, vis-a-vis national defense, “the rest of the world” first came to mean significantly something other than the Inner Asian steppe. Even in the steppe, the Mongol fixation so obscured other situations there and along the Great Wall border that the Chinese allowed mismanaged border military affairs to unsettle the northern provinces, particularly the provinces in the northwest, which were poorer and farther from Peking’s surveillance. Late Ming rebellions, nurtured there by some of the by-products of the northern frontier military arrangement, grew to proportions that brought down the dynasty. The Ming dynasty was succeeded in 1644 by that of the Manchus who by 1620, if not earlier, had replaced the Mongols as the genuinely dangerous problem on the northern frontier. The Chinese, clearly limited by their Mongol defense fixation, had not assessed the Manchu threat accurately until shortly before the Manchus entered China. The Manchus, who tried to be heirs to the cultures on both sides of the Great Wall, tended to combine the heritage of Chinese solutions to the Mongol problem with their own steppe militarism. Their unnecessary and somewhat un-Chinese expansionist wars against the Oirats and other Mongol enemies detract from their record as rulers over the region in which Chinese civilization meets the steppe. One cannot relate all of these historic consequences to a single initiating causal event, to be sure, but if one event can be identified as a turning point and taken as a symbol in a long chain of consequences, it surely must be the T’u-mu Incident of 1449.8 272

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Hu Tsung-hsien’s Campaign Against Hsti Hai, 1556 In the spring and summer of 1556 a renegade Chinese named Hsii Hai led an invading group of Japanese and Chinese on a plundering foray through the northeastern sector of Chekiang province. Opposing them was a military establishment, for years past battered by coastal raiders, but now under the control of an ambitious and clever civil official named Hu Tsung-hsien. In 1556 the raiders besieged cities and ravaged the countryside, defeated and terrorized the government soldiery in a series of skirmishes and battles, and accumulated booty and captives. Hu Tsung-hsien resorted to guile more than to force, turned the marauding leaders against one another, baited them with bribes and promises, and finally cleared the area of them. The campaign was not one of the most consequential in China’s military history, even during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). But it was famous and well reported in its time, and it illustrates some of the unusual ways in which the Chinese of the imperial age coped with the often unusual military problems they faced.

1. The Nature of the Military Problem Traditional Chinese patterns of response to military threats. Over the preceding centuries the Chinese had grown accustomed to three major kinds of military challenges: (1) domestic disturbances created by discontented subjects, which at their strongest threatened and sometimes achieved changes of dynasties; (2) probing raids or occasional massive invasions of highly mobile northern nomadic peoples; and (3) resistance of southern and southwestern aboriginal tribesmen to the steady spread of Chinese settlement and sociopolitical organization. Against these potential challenges, both from within and from without, Chinese governments had come to put great faith in the suppressive influence of the awesome air of moral superiority that emanated from their 273

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sprawling civil officialdom. But behind the facade of self-righteous gentility there always were large armies in walled garrisons strung behind the Great Wall across northernmost China or spotted elsewhere at strategic points along important water and land routes. In the face of all dangers, Chinese government policy fluctuated between two types of actions: military initiatives to break up threatening confederations, to seize natural staging areas, or to keep the enemy off balance by shows of force; and diplomatic initiatives to mollify, threaten, cajole, confuse, or distract the enemy so that China’s security was not likely to be endangered. When hostilities erupted, whether on the frontiers or in the interior, the government traditionally considered two possible responses: a straightforward military solution, called “extermination” (chiao or mieh}; or an indirect politicoeconomic solution, called “pacification” (chao-an, chao-fu, or similar terms suggesting “summoning and appeasing”)}, supported by real, but muted, threats of military action. In their pragmatic way, Chinese officials seem normally to have considered direct military solutions suitable only in the last resort, when the nation’s vital interests were at stake and pacification was impossible or would yield unacceptable results. Except in the cases of notoriously bellicose Chinese leaders, pacification seems to have been greatly preferred as the normal means of coping with the disaffected. This preference no doubt reflects Chinese inclinations within the family and local community to “keep things going” at almost all costs, by mediating, compromising, and saving face all around. The unprecedented challenge of Japan-based raiders. The Japanese were the first people who posed threats to China’s security from noncontiguous territory.’ Beginning in the early part of the thirteenth century, Japanese groups began raiding Korea; and after Khubilai Khan’s unsuccessful punitive invasions of Kyushu in 1274 and 1281, they extended their raids to the coastal sectors of China. Strenuous diplomatic and defensive efforts by the early Ming emperors diminished the impact of these raids and channeled Sino-Japanese contacts into tribute missions that were acceptable in the Chinese view of how foreign people should behave. But in 1548, following a series of disturbing tribute mission incidents, these formal contacts were terminated.” Even before that time coastal raiding had been resumed on an ever increasing scale, and it reached and passed its peak in the 1550's. (This happened to be just the 274

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time when West European coasts, and especially shipping lanes, were being similarly harassed by marauders from the Barbary Coast of Africa.| China’s efforts to cope with these coastal marauders were complicated by several factors: (1) There was the practical difficulty of trying to mount and maintain an adequate military defense along the entirety of China’s long coastline.* The Ming rulers attempted to create a coastal equivalent of the Great Wall by establishing a line of walled cities, small forts, stockades, watchtowers, and beacon mounds along the whole coast from Korea to Annam. Moreover, they maintained naval fleets that were supposed to patrol the estuaries, coves, inlets, and offshore islands that abound south of the Yangtze River delta. Since Ming naval ships were superior to the vessels used by the marauders and were normally victorious in open sea battles, Ming authorities realized it was better to catch raiders at sea than to track them down once they were ashore. But there was little confidence that even a strong coastal fleet would in itself guarantee security. To catch marauders fleeing outward laden with booty was one thing; to anticipate and fend off those who were approaching was another. However well defended, the China coast was extraordinarily vulnerable to raiding attacks. (2) Denying the marauders their bases and staging areas would have required Chinese conquest and control of the Liu-ch’iu Islands, Taiwan, and even part of Japan itself. Early in the Ming dynasty, when the famous eunuch admiral Cheng Ho led huge armadas across the Indian Ocean, the establishing of an overseas Chinese empire might have seemed possible. Both T’ai-tsu (1368-1398} and Ch’eng-tsu {1402-1424} at least tried to intimidate Japan with threats of invasion.* But even these early Ming emperors were not foolhardy enough to carry out such threats, and later emperors had been so concerned about possible troubles in the north that they had allowed Chinese seapower to decline; no one could have suggested defense-by-conquest for serious consideration in the 1550’s.° At the very time when Southeast China was most harassed by sea marauders, the attention of the court was particularly riveted upon the northern frontier, where Mongo! power revitalized under Altan Khan was looming as the most serious military challenge China had faced in more than a century.® In 1550 Altan Khan plundered into the very environs of Peking, and thereafter until 1570 there were recurring alarms in North 275

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China and extraordinary expenditures to shore up the northern defenses. The 1550’s consequently were not a time for risky adventurings of any sort in other areas. (3) Moreover, the coastal marauding was by no means solely a problem in foreign relations. The marauders were generally called Wo-k’ou (Japanese Wako}, “Japanese raiders,” and it was the Japanese who had begun the raiding. But the Wako were never agents of any organized Japanese government, and in the sixteenth century (during most of which no effective central government existed in Japan} raiding groups on the China coast generally included only small proportions of adventuresome Japanese warriors. Even these were mostly led by Chinese renegades, and they were supported by other Chinese renegades, offshore islanders, foot-loose mainlanders looking for profitable adventures, and sometimes, apparently, Portuguese and their Malaysian hangers-on. By the 1550's what the Chinese government called Wo-k’ou constituted an international fraternity combining smugglers who had now been badgered into marauding and their mainland collaborators, who even included persons of considerable local and perhaps more far-reaching reputation and influence. The raiders knew local conditions on the mainland, had excellent contacts in cities and towns, and were no doubt befriended and guided by local residents as effectively as were the government troops arrayed against them. In short, there was no clear-cut division between invading “barbarians” on the one hand and a united local citizenry on the other. As in the modern suppression of guerrilla insurgents, it was difficult to plan for a decisive, direct military solution. (4) The wealth and accessibility of the threatened area in the 1550’s further complicated the problem. The focal area of Wako attack in this period, the region traditionally called Chiang-nan (south of the river) or Tung-nan (the southeast}, including the Shanghai-Soochow portion of modern Kiangsu province and the Hangchow-Ningpo portion of Chekiang province, has always been of strategic importance in China’s interregional and international relations. From T’ang and Sung times on, Ningpo and Hangchow had been centers of international trade, and in the early sixteenth century Ningpo was a center of Portuguese activity in China. Eventually the sector became an important focus of British attention in the nineteenth-century Opium War, when Chou-shan (Chusan} Island off Ningpo served as a major British naval station, from which the British 276

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captured Ningpo, its guardian city Ting-hai, and the excellent harbor of Cha-p’u near the northern border of Chekiang. Ningpo and Shanghai were among the first treaty ports opened to the modern West; and Shanghai, of course, rapidly became modern China’s busiest port and most populous city. This southeast China region was a natural target for the marauders of Ming times. Prevailing winds make it an easy voyage from Japan to Chekiang in spring and autumn. The region is a plain crisscrossed with waterways that make it easily penetrable by boats, and there are innumerable excellent anchorages on its coast. It is (and in Ming times already was} a densely populated region, intensively cultivated and highly productive of both agricultural and manufactured goods, inhabited by many rich and cultured families. In Ming times it was the breadbasket from which grain taxes were shipped along the Grand Canal from Hangchow northward to the capital at Peking and on to the northern frontiers. For sixteenth-century marauders, it was easy of access and bloated with potential plunder. Military defense in the southeast through 1555. This whole region had been repeatedly victimized by marauders through the 1540’s, and the defense organization was therefore steadily strengthened.’ In 1547 a grand coordinator (hstin-fu) had been assigned to Chekiang province for the first time, with special jurisdiction over military matters in the province and in the coastal prefectures of Fukien province to the south. In 1554, after Hangchow prefecture had been seriously despoiled, there was created in addition the post of supreme commander (tsung-tu) of Nan Chihli {modern Kiangsu and Anhwei provinces}, Chekiang, and Fukien, which placed in one man’s hands the responsibility of supervising defense against marauders throughout the whole southeastern coastal sector. In the early 1550’s many inland cities and towns of the region, after being ravaged or threatened, were walled for the first time in history.* To supplement the regular and militia forces of the area, troops from distant parts of China were deployed into the southeast, despite the concurrent drainage of troops from China’s interior to the northern frontier.® In 1555, as the military situation steadily deteriorated, the court at Peking deputed the high-ranking Minister of Works Chao Wen-hua (chin-shih 1529),?° as a special inspector of the armies in the southeast. Soon Supreme Commander Chang Ching (chin-shih 1517}"! was arrested and sentenced to death. Grand Coordinator

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Chou Yiin (chin-shih 1532)” of the Nanking area became the new supreme commander. After only one month in office Chou Yiin was dismissed, along with Chekiang Grand Coordinator Li T’ien-ch’ung {chin-shih 1538; later executed together with Chang Ching)."* The vice minister of revenues at Nanking, Yang I (chin-shih 1523},** became the third supreme commander of the year; and Hu Tsung-hsien, then the Censorate’s low-ranking regional inspector of Chekiang, was given an extraordinary promotion to succeed Li T’ien-ch’ung as Chekiang’s grand coordinator. Yang I was in turn dismissed in the second month of 1556, whereupon Hu Tsung-hsien was made supreme commander. His former post as Chekiang grand coordinator was soon filled by Yiian O (1509-1567),*° who had previously served as education intendant (t’i-tu fu-shih) in the province. By this time Inspector of the Armies Chao Wen-hua, after less than a year in the field, had returned to Peking full of assurances that the situation was at last under control. By any reckoning, 1555 had been the most disastrous year in the long history of marauding in the southeast.** Of Chekiang’s eleven prefectures (see map 1], only the three farthest inland— Chin-hua centrally located, Ch’ii-chou in the far west bordering on Kiangsi province, and Ch’u-chou in the far southwest north of Fukien province—seem to have been unscathed during the year. All of the six coastal prefectures—from north to south: Chia-hsing, Hangchow, Shao-hsing, Ningpo, T’ai-chou, and Wen-chou—were violated, as were the two inland prefectures of Yen-chou southwest of Hangchow and Hu-chou northwest of Hangchow. The inland city of Ch’ung-te in Chia-hsing prefecture was occupied and looted. Fukien to the south, the Shanghai-Soochow region to the north, and even the north shore of the Yangtze River estuary were harassed. One group of bandits plundered westward up through inland Anhwei province to the very outskirts of Nanking, the Ming dynasty’s auxiliary capital and a place of both strategic and symbolic importance. Government forces had not been idle in the face of all this raiding activity in 1555, but they were not dramatically effective except in a few instances. The most successful government action was a substantial victory at Wang-chiang-ching in northernmost Chekiang in the fifth month of the year, when raiders from a coastal base at Che-lin (north of Chin-shan Guard in Nan Chihli) were waylaid and slaughtered by a force under ill-fated Supreme Commander Chang Ching, who was so soon 278

Hu Tsung-hsien’s Campaign Against Hsii Hai, 1556

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to be executed for his failures. More than 1,900 marauders were reportedly beheaded in this action, thanks primarily to the utilization of newly-arrived aboriginal troops from Pao-ching and Yung-shun in the far northwestern sector of modern Hunan province, and thanks also to the leadership of veteran coast-defense generals such as Lu T’ang and Yii Ta-yu (1503-1579).*

Marauding operations of 1555 in the crucial SoochowHangchow area were largely led by Hsii Hai, and it was his main force that suffered heavily at Wang-chiang-ching. Hsii had been a Chinese Buddhist monk originally associated with the ancient and famous Tiger Haunt Monastery (Hu-p’ao ssu) outside Hangchow. Contemporaries often identified him by his Buddhist appellation, Ming-shan Ho-shang. How and when he became disaffected is not clear, but he seems to have won the respect of the marauders with his skills at divination and prognostication, they liked to call him “generalissimo commissioned by heaven to pacify the oceans” (ien-ch’ai p’ing-hai ta chiang-chtin). By the early 1550’s he had reportedly become an associate of the most influential of all the marauder chiefs, another Chinese renegade named Wang Chih, the so-called “king of the Wako” ensconced in the Goto archipelago off Kyushu. Hsii’s base was the Satsuma realm in southernmost Kyushu, and his main force consisted of Japanese from Satsuma and nearby realms including Izumi and Hizen. His exploits of 1555 established him as a marauder chief of

the first magnitude.** |

2. Hu Tsung-hsien: His Problems and Policies Hu Tsung-hsien, who assumed responsibility for defense against the raiders in early 1556, was a native of Hui-chou prefecture in Anhwei province and a metropolitan examination graduate (chin-shih) of 1538.’° He had served in two county magistracies in turn and had then been promoted to a post as investigating censor in the Censorate at Peking. After one censorial tour as regional inspector of the Hsiian-ta northern defense frontier, he appeared in Chekiang in 1554 in a similar role. He immediately became embroiled in the defense problems of the area and very quickly, as has been noted, rose to the exalted position of supreme commander. Hu Tsung-hsien is generally described as a clever and ambitious man. From the first, his service in Chekiang got him 280

Hu Tsung-hsien’s Campaign Against Hsii Hai, 1556

involved in political relationships that were easily interpreted as opportunism on his part, which made him a highly controversial figure both in his own time and in the judgment of later historians. The times were complicated and the careers of all officials were difficult. The reigning emperor, Shih-tsung (1521-1566), got at odds with the officialdom at the outset of his reign in a famous “Rites Controversy” and had repeatedly shown inclinations to be cruel, capricious, and irrational. In the 1550’s he was devoting himself to exotic Taoist exercises and leaving administration largely in the hands of his senior grand secretary, Yen Sung (1480—1565).?° From 1542 to 1562 Yen Sung

dominated the central government with the assistance of his notoriously corrupt son, Yen Shih-fan (1513-1565); he has been held in contempt ever since as a sycophantic, venal, and very self-seeking political manipulator. Whether this judgment is fair or not, it was a fact of life in the 1550’s that one could accomplish little in government without enjoying the favor of the Yens and helping to line their pockets. Inspector of the Armies Chao Wen-hua appeared in Chekiang in 1555 as a protégé of Yen Sung, so arrogant and avaricious that he was probably more a hindrance than a help in the defense effort. Supreme Commander Chang Ching and Grand Coordinator Li T’ien-ch’ung were not appropriately deferential to Chao, to their ultimate undoing. But Hu Tsung-hsien found (indeed, probably sought) favor with Chao and, through Chao, with the Yens; hence he prospered. His power position, however, was necessarily precarious. There were critics ready to pounce on him at any opportunity and on any pretext simply because of his association with Chao and the Yens; and pretexts were not hard to find, whatever the military situation, because Hu could not survive without “squeezing” his subordinates and the citizenry at large to maintain a satisfactory flow of “gifts” to his patrons. Thus the problems that Hu Tsung-hsien confronted in early 1556, when Hsii Hai and his marauders reappeared in force, were multifaceted. He was very vulnerable to criticism for any mistake, as the rapid turnover of his supreme commander predecessors made clear. To avert personal disaster threatened by potential critics at court, he must retain the good will of the Yens. To accomplish this, he must avert military disaster; and to accomplish that, given the record of successive disasters in prior years, he must be very clever indeed. A resounding “extermination” of the marauders in a straightforward military 281

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solution, however eagerly the government and the citizenry alike might yearn for one, had repeatedly proved elusive even when massive defense forces were assembled in the beleaguered southeast from far distant regions of China. “Pacification,” on the other hand, was not sure of acceptance either by the marauders or by the court. On the northern frontier Altan Khan apparently could have been appeased from the first, as he was eventually, by the regularization of frontier trading opportunities for the Mongols; but the court in the 1550’s was adamantly opposed to this. In the southeast, the court’s denial of regularized trading opportunities to outsiders was the root of all the coastal troubles, and the preeminent marauder chief, Wang Chih, apparently could have been appeased at any time by a reversal of the court’s policy and amnesty for those who had violated it. Hsii Hai, for his part, seems to have been quite content with the existing situation, which had apparently yielded him enormous booty in 1555. He was not so likely to find any advantage in such terms even if they could be offered. Thus, although pacification tactics short of open-trade appeasement had been proposed and tentatively authorized as early as mid-1554,”* such measures could be undertaken only at considerable risk. There were at least three major risks: (1) Trying to “pacify” marauders, without enough military strength to fall back on, could expose the southeast to military disaster. (2) ‘“Pacification” attempts that proved less than wholly successful could expose Hu Tsung-hsien to charges of “giving free rein to bandits,” which had already ruined some careers. (3) A determined “pacification” policy could further demoralize already badly demoralized subordinates, who consistently seemed convinced, no matter how disastrous the last battle had been, that the next battle would be a decisive victory. Hu Tsung-hsien’s immediate civil-service subordinate, Grand Coordinator Yiian O, and his highest-ranking military-service subordinate, Chekiang Regional Commander Yii Ta-yu, were particularly vocal arguers against appeasement.” Despite all these recognized risks, Hu Tsung-hsien in 1555, while still grand coordinator, had persuaded his patron Chao Wen-hua that marauding could not be terminated by direct military means. On the pretext of spying on the marauders’ bases in Japan and enlisting the cooperation of the Japanese authorities in marauder suppression, he had dispatched a

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mission to the Goto archipelago to initiate negotiations with Wang Chih. The consequence of these negotiations is another important and intriguing story in itself, which culminated in Wang Chih’s surrendering himself at Ningpo late in 1557.”° What is immediately relevant here is the fact that Hu Tsung-hsien, throughout his 1556 campaign against Hsii Hai, was conducting negotiations with Wang Chih, using them to advantage in his dealings with Hsii Hai, trying to keep Wang Chih ignorant of the government’s real intentions, and trying simultaneously to keep the court ignorant of promises he was making to Wang Chih. As events proved, Hu was an adept confidence man. Before Hsii Hai’s descent upon the southeast in 1556, one of Hu Tsung-hsien’s envoys to Wang Chih had already returned from Goto accompanied by several raider chiefs, among whom was particularly included Wang’s godson and intimate confidant, a Ningpo man known confusedly by the two names Wang Ao and Mao Hai-feng. Hu’s other envoys to Japan remained there more or less as Wang Chih’s hostages; the formal excuse was that Japan was fragmented without a single ruler, so that Hu Tsung-hsien’s proclamation to “the King of Japan” about marauder suppression had to be taken slowly round to the regional lords in turn. Hu earnestly entertained Wang Ao in an effort to convince Wang Chih of his own sincerity, while the court was demanding that Wang Ao engage in some active marauder suppression on his own part so as to demonstrate Wang Chih’s good faith. When Wang Ao made contact with Hu Tsung-hsien in Chekiang, probably very early in 1556, he reported {apparently with expressions of regret that Wang Chih could do nothing about the matter} that Hsii Hai and his Satsuma followers were preparing to strike the southeast once more. In the second or third lunar month of the new year Hsii Hai did indeed land in the Cha-p’u region. From then until the eighth month of the year Hu Tsung-hsien was principally occupied with the immediate need to suppress Hsii Hai, even though dealing with Wang Chih and coping with Wako challenges elsewhere in his jurisdiction could not long be out of his thoughts. Defense forces available in Che-hsi. The campaign against Hsii Hai stretched across the sector traditionally called Che-hsi, the portion of Chekiang that lies north of Hangchow and Hangchow Bay. The human resources available to Hu

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Tsung-hsien in that sector (see map 2} at the time can be considered in three categories of personnel: The first of these categories principally included the civil service officialdom of what might be called the normal administration. These were the prefects and prefectural staffs of Hangchow prefecture, of Hu-chou prefecture inland to the north, and especially of Chia-hsing prefecture to the northeast, which was the main theater of action; the magistrates of Chia-hsing prefecture’s seven counties; the provincial-level executive officials of the Provincial Administration Office, the

Provincial Surveillance Office, and the Chekiang Regional Military Commission; the Chekiang regional inspector delegated from the Censorate in Peking; and the Chekiang grand coordinator, equivalent to a provincial governor. The prefects and county magistrates had residual responsibility for local defense and for this purpose maintained local militia forces; both the regional inspector and the grand coordinator

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> Hangchow Bay i Battalion 6, had supervisory responsibilities concerning military affairs in the province. The Chekiang Regional Military Commission had administrative control over the regular military establishment of the province.” In the Che-hsi sector this permanent establishment of hereditary officers and soldiers (see map 3} included headquarters garrisons of three units of guards (wei): Hangchow Front Guard and Hangchow Rear Guard, both with headquarters in Hangchow city, and Hai-ning Guard, with headquarters at Hai-yen county seat on the northeastern coast. Theoretically, each such guard comprised 5,600 hereditary regular troops and twenty-nine officers of the hereditary military service. But by the middle of the sixteenth century all guards were notoriously understaffed. Moreover, the guard troops were actually deployed in fragments. Near-contemporary sources suggest that the normal complement of troops at Hai-yen, for example, was 1,240. Battalion (so) units of undeterminable strength, subordinate to the Hai-yen headquarters, were in flanking walled garrisons to the south at Kan-p’u harbor and to the north at Cha-p’u harbor. Another battalion unit, detached from the Hangchow guards, was regularly stationed within the walls of Hai-ning county seat between Hangchow and Kan-p’u. Other guard troops, reportedly in normal units of seventy, were assigned to each of six police offices (hsiin-chien ssu) that were maintained in fortified places along the coast by the civil service authorities of Hangchow and 285

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Chia-hsing prefectures.”* Additional guard troops must have been on detached duty, in small platoons or squads, staffing other fortifications and lookout stations that dotted the coast. One small fort was in the environs of Hangchow city; there were five more clustered around Kan-p’u, two near Hai-yen, and thirteen clustered between Cha-p’u and Chekiang’s northeastern border. Lookout stations were more evenly scattered: six between Hangchow and Hai-ning, five between Hai-yen and Cha-p’u, and nine between Cha-p’u and the northeastern border.** Manning the walls and yamens of inland cities and towns must have drained off still other regular troops from the guard garrisons. Even supposing that the three guards in the Che-hsi sector were near normal strength, so that 10,000 or 12,000 regular troops were in the sector, the large majority of them—and of the irregular militia forces as well—must have been immobilized in these positional defense assignments, which could not safely be abandoned. The number of troops who were normally available as a mobile reserve must have been a relatively small proportion of the total. Moreover, it is clear that the hereditary regular troops of the guards had long since deteriorated in quality to the point where they could hardly be relied on even for positional defense. For the pursuit and destruction of invading marauders, special forces were customarily raised.”’ The third category of personnel available in Che-hsi might appropriately be called the active tactical force.”* It included civil officials, military officers, and irregular troops. The grand coordinator and regional inspector of the province perhaps should be thought of as belonging to this tactical group more than to the normal administrative hierarchy of the province. Mote particularly, one vice commissioner (fu-shih) of the Provincial Surveillance Office was especially assigned as circuit intendant of a military defense circuit (ping-pei tao) covering Chia-hsing and Hu-chou prefectures, with concentrated supervisory responsibility for all military matters in the Che-hsi sector. The Che-hsi tactical group of military officers—who had rank status in the military administration hierarchy but were detached for special duty—principally included the Chekiang regional commander (tsung-ping kuan), who was the ranking field commander in the province; a regional vice commander (fu-tsung-ping kuan); an assistant regional commander (ts’an-chiang) for Hangchow, Chia-hsing, and Hu-chou prefectures, stationed at Hai-yen; and the Chekiang mobile 286

Hu Tsung-hsien’s Campaign Against Hsii Hai, 1556

corps commander (yu-chi chiang-chiin), stationed at Hangchow city. The contingents of tactical troops that were commanded by these officers were no doubt drawn in some part from the guard garrisons and militia units in the sector; but, probably more important, they included specially-recruited local mercenaries (mu-tsu) and military units assigned to Chekiang duty from outside the province. In the Ming tradition, aboriginal tribes from central and southwestern China were highly favored for such special deployment, although in action against Wako marauders in the 1550’s they had not proved wholly reliable. One contemporary source tells us that when Hu Tsung-hsien assumed his post as supreme commander in early 1556 he found that extra-provincial forces borrowed from Szechwan, Hukuang (that is, modern Hupeh and Hunan}, Shantung, and Honan provinces at the request of his predecessors had been disbanded and sent home on the strength of Chao Wen-hua’s assurances to the court that coastal marauders were now under control; that his main force was three thousand mercenary recruits who were in such poor condition they were unfit for action; and that his only special reserves were one thousand aboriginal tribesmen borrowed from the Jung-mei area of modern Hupeh province and eight hundred troops recruited in North China by Mobile Corps Commander Tsung Li {1510—1566).”° This

reckoning probably does not include tactical forces who were nearby under the control of Regional Commander Yii Ta-yu and Regional Vice Commander Lu T’ang, both veterans of many coastal campaigns; nor does it take account of regular and irregular forces available in other sectors of Hu’s jurisdiction, to the north in modern Kiangsu province and south of Hangchow Bay in Chekiang. For immediate marshaling against Hsii Hai within the Che-hsi sector itself, the tactical forces may have approached a total of 10,000. 3. Hu versus Hsti Hai in the Campaign of 1556 The many campaigns against marauders that were undertaken during the 1550’s were abundantly recorded by participants and their contemporaries. The Wako problem attracted great attention at court, so that official chronicles of the era abound in relevant documents. Moreover, residents of the highly cultured southeast, including such famous contemporary litterateurs as Kuei Yu-kuang {1506-1571} and T’ang Shun-chih 287

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(1507-1560), churned out essays and memoirs on the subject in even greater abundance, based on their personal experiences and observations.*° Unfortunately, these source materials are of highly variable usefulness for understanding the wide sweep of events, and they are often frustratingly vague and contradictory about the dates and sequences of particular events. Later generations of Chinese and, eventually, Japanese historians have labored to produce reliable chronicles and analyses of the Wako crises, but without by any means solving all the problems even of simple chronology.” The campaign against Hsii Hai in 1556 has not previously been studied in any detail, to the best of my knowledge, perhaps because the sources are peculiarly contradictory and confusing. In trying to pin down essential particulars of the campaign in the summary that follows, I rely primarily on two contemporary documents. One is specifically a narrative account of the campaign against Hsii Hai in particular, by Mao K’un (1512-1601), a member of Supreme Commander Hu’s secretarial staff.** The other is a broader but often more detailed chronicle of anti-Wako activities in the Che-hsi sector from 1553 through 1556, by Ts’ai Chiu-te, a resident of Hai-yen, whose preface is dated 1558.** Combining data from these documents in ways that seem to make sense and supplementing them from the court’s Veritable Records (Shih-lu) and similar sources™ gives us what I believe is a generally reliable understanding of Hsii Hai’s activities in 1556 and of Hu Tsung-hsien’s campaign against him. Since Hu Tsung-hsien’s general strategy and capabilities required that he leave the initiative to the invaders, the following phases are defined by Hsii Hai’s activities. Phase 1: Hsti Hai’s Initial Assault SUMMARY: Apparently under the strategic direction of Wang Chih in Goto, separate fleets of Wako raiders began landing in different parts of the southeast in the second lunar month of 1556. One group reportedly “several thousand” strong landed on the north bank of the Yangtze River and began plundering Yang-chou and Chen-chiang prefectures, threatening the heart of the Yangtze-Grand Canal waterways complex. A second group of similar size landed on the south bank of the Yangtze in the vicinity of Shanghai and began plundering inland along the Wu-sung River. A third group of similar size struck to the south of Hangchow Bay, in the Ningpo 288

Hu Tsung-hsien’s Campaign Against Hsii Hai, 1556

region. These three relatively small-scale invasions were soon reported to be diversionary efforts, intended to draw attention and troops away from Che-hsi. There Hsii Hai himself, with a force of “more than ten thousand,” hoped to subdue the Hangchow area and then turn north to Hu-chou and the great city of Soochow, and eventually to intimidate the dynasty’s auxiliary capital, Nanking. Hsii Hai’s force appeared in Cha-p’u harbor, easily destroyed local naval forces that opposed them, smashed their own seagoing ships as a symbol of their determination not to withdraw, and then moved northward (presumably in small boats} around Chin-shan Guard to a familiar raiders’ haunt at Che-lin. Hsii Hai was soon joined there by other Satsuma-based raiders under the leadership of Ch’en Tung and Yeh Ma (also referred to as Yeh Ming and Ma Yeh}, who had been plundering separately in the Shanghai region to the west. In the third or fourth month these groups combined and moved southward to besiege the walled garrison at Cha-p’u but broke off the siege after a week or so. Meantime, supporting columns of raiders from Che-lin and from the Shanghai area pressed inland to the vicinity of Chia-shan.

When raiders first landed at Cha-p’u and to the north, Hu Tsung-hsien had just assumed responsibility as supreme commander and was apparently at his normal headquarters in Hangchow city. He alerted all his subordinates to the danger and dispatched some of his forces northeastward along the coast to Kan-p’u and Hai-yen. The defense intendant of the Chia-hsing and Hu-chou circuit, Liu T’ao (chin-shih 1538}, apparently moved up the coast from his normal base at Hai-yen to strengthen the walled garrison at Cha-p’u, and Grand Coordinator Yiian O rushed toward Cha-p’u with what forces he could rally in the Ch’ung-te area. Hu Tsung-hsien himself accompanied a detachment northward from Hangchow into the Chia-hsing region, whence he could move either northward to meet raiders of the Wu-sung River area or eastward to close in on Cha-p’u (see map 4}.*°

The first and most direct challenge came from the north, as raiders passed through the Chia-shan region toward the Chia-hsing prefectural city. Hu, considering guile better than force in the circumstances, baited the raiders with a skiff loaded with more than a hundred jugs of poisoned wine and manned by two reliable soldiers disguised as troop victuallers, who fled 289

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at first sight of the enemy vanguard. Seizing the poisoned wine, the raiders halted and made merry. Some died. By this time a detachment of “several thousand” newly arrived aboriginal tribesmen from Pao-ching in modern Hunan province had joined Hu. They were anxious for a fight, and their chieftain, disregarding Hu’s cautions about the raiders’ wiliness, led his men straight into an enemy ambush. Hu rallied the survivors and set up an ambush of his own, which mauled the advancing enemy sufficiently to send him scurrying away northward toward Soochow.**

Already, in the third or fourth month, Liu T’ao was under siege in Cha-p’u. Liu seems to have led his troops and the townspeople in a gallant defense of the walls. Soon Hsti Hai, learning that both Hu Tsung-hsien and Yiian O were converging on him, broke off the siege.

Phase II: The Thrust Inland SUMMARY: On withdrawing from Cha-p’u early in the fourth month, Hsii Hai moved his force inland. They overcame resistance offered by government troops from Hai-yen and Hai-ning, and for a time they plundered undisturbed in the Hsia-shih and Yiian-hua areas. In mid-month, now resigned to by-passing Hangchow, Hsii Hai moved on further inland to the northwest, reappearing to plunder the market towns of Tsao-lin and Wu-chen on the eighteenth and nineteenth days of the fourth month. Wu-chen is strategically located at the 290

Hu Tsung-hsien’s Campaign Against Hsii Hai, 1556

juncture of Hu-chou and Chia-hsing prefectures of Chekiang and Soochow prefecture of Nan Chihli to the north; in 1555 Hsii Hai had used Wu-chen as a base for harassing both the Hu-chou and the Soochow regions. Plundering through this sector again, his raiders on the twentieth now encountered government forces near Tsao-lin. Three hard-fought battles followed in the region between Tsao-lin and Ch’ung-te, in which Hsii’s forces were mauled and Hsii himself was wounded. But on the twenty-third, when Hsii seemed on the verge of disengaging and fleeing in disarray, his scouts observed that the government forces were exhausted and without supplies and that no reinforcements were anywhere near; and in one more sharp encounter the raiders prevailed, slaughtering the government forces.

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prefecture to move down to the north of Wu-chen, (2) waterborne troops of Hu-chou to move across to the west of Wu-chen, and (3) North China troops then at Chia-hsing to take up a defensive position near Wu-chen. With his own reserves of mercenary recruits and Jung-mei aborigines, he also moved cautiously toward Wu-chen. Grand Coordinator Yiian O simultaneously moved northward out of Ch’ung-te, en route picking up the North China troops that were moving westward from Chia-hsing under the control of Mobile Corps Commander Tsung Li. It was Tsung Li and some nine hundred of his North China troops who came upon the much more numerous raiders near Tsao-lin and fought with them for successive days, eventually being almost totally massacred. Contemporary chroniclers called Tsung Li’s struggle with Hsii Hai the most glorious example of a few standing heroically against a multitude in the whole history of warfare.*” According to Mao K’un, Yiian O fled from the field after an initial skirmish. According to Ts’ai Chiu-te, Yiian O arrived in the vicinity only when Tsung Li’s forces were already routed. Hu Tsung-hsien had at that time advanced no farther than Ch’ung-te in his progress toward Wu-chen. During the fourth month, between Hsii Hai’s departure from Cha-p’u and his victory at Tsao-lin, other Wako raiders were busy in other areas. North of Che-hsi, marauders plundered along the north bank of the Yangtze, ravaging Wu-wei county deep inland and the important grain depot at Kua-chou, where the Grand Canal “crosses” the Yangtze. Raiders kept active in the Shanghai area, finally being routed by Chekiang Regional Commander Yii Ta-yu acting jointly with the defense intendant of the Soochow and Sung-chiang circuit, Tung Pang-cheng. South of Che-hsi, raiders freely plundered the region between Hangchow and Ningpo, twice within one week sacking the Tz'u-ch’i county seat. Another group ravaged Wen-chou prefecture in southernmost Chekiang.

Phase Ill: The Siege of T’ung-hsiang SUMMARY: Victorious over Tsung Li but wounded and with a battered force, Hsii Hai pursued Yiian O to the walled city T’ung-hsiang, where he understood there were tempting stocks of supplies. He laid siege to the city for approximately a month, using a variety of siege weapons including assault towers mounted on boats, a giant battering ram suspended in a wheeled 292

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scaffold, and a cannon of the type called ‘the general” (chiangchiin). But the city wall had been newly built in 1553 and was defended with imagination and verve by the county magistrate, Chin Yen (chin-shih 1553}. The marauders soon lost interest in costly assaults and settled down to starve out the city, meanwhile plundering freely in its environs. They became so inattentive that Grand Coordinator Yiian O was eventually able to slip out of the city by night and get away. The Wako leaders also became suspicious of one another. Hsii Hai and his powerful ally Ch’en Tung became so antagonistic that they finally broke off the siege and withdrew in separate directions, apparently between the nineteenth and twenty-third days of the fifth month. When Hu Tsung-hsien, in Ch’ung-te, learned that Tsung Li’s force had been massacred and that Yiian O was besieged in T’ung-hsiang, he was confronted with a difficult decision. Mao K’un tells us Hu considered the situation in the following terms: The North China troops have been beaten, and my own troops are so disheartened that they dare not fight. The southeast is no longer manageable! Now the bandits have got T’ung-hsiang in trouble; but if I further divide up the forces they will ravage Ch’ung-te and ruin me as well {as Yiian O}. It would be as if the two of us were to drown ourselves in each other’s arms. What would become of the country then!38

Deciding that caution was in order, Hu withdrew to his headquarters in Hangchow. But he made a show of organizing . a relief expedition (see map 6) by ordering troops to converge around T’ung-hsiang: from Chia-hsing southward, from Hu-chou to Wu-chen, from Hai-yen to Wang-tien, and from Ch’ung-te to Shih-men.*® He also ordered what remained of Tsung Li’s North China troops to gather together at Ch’ung-te. Realizing that all these troops were badly demoralized by news of the Tsao-lin massacre, he also submitted to the court an urgent request for new contingents of aboriginal tribesmen from Pao-ching and Yung-shun in Hunan. Ignoring strongly worded, denunciatory appeals for help that were smuggled out of T’ung-hsiang by his besieged colleague Yiian O,*° Hu decided that, while awaiting reinforcements, he would try the same pacification techniques on Hsii Hai that seemed to be working successfully on Wang Chih in Goto. Mao K’un cites Hu’s arguments as follows: 293

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Even though {Wang} Chih and [Hsii) Hai are not of one mind about whether to submit or to resist, they are certainly as intimate as are lips with teeth. Once Chih has repented, can Hai alone not be persuaded with talk about his patriotic duty? If not, since he is an avaricious fellow, we can try luring him with baits and perhaps delude him. It seems to me that the T’ung-hsiang city wall, though small, is strong. If we delay for a few weeks, then the frontier forces of Yung {-shun) and Pao {-ching) will arrive, and we can surely smash him.*!

So Supreme Commander Hu began negotiating with Hsti Hai through intermediaries. Hsii Hai, wounded and bogged down in an extended siege, was shaken by the news brought by Hu’s agents that Wang Chih’s godson Wang Ao had long since surrendered at Ningpo, bringing assurances that Wang Chih himself was preparing to accept pacification. (Before the T’ung-hsiang siege was ended, Wang Ao had even aided government troops to defeat Wako marauders who were withdrawing from the Tz’u-ch’i region south of Hangchow Bay.) Hu’s agents persuaded Hsii Hai that 294

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his only hope of evading ultimate ruin was to cooperate similarly with the supreme commander. Hsii Hai argued that he was not alone and could not speak for his ally Ch’en Tung; but Hu’s agents intimated that a separate agreement had been reached with Ch’en Tung, thus making Hsii Hai furiously suspicious of Ch’en. At the same time Ch’en was becoming equally suspicious of Hsii Hai as he learned that a series of government agents was visiting Hsii’s camp. Hsii Hai eventually gave his word that he would surrender himself and accept pacification, on the condition that Supreme Commander Hu would provide substantive gifts with which Hsii might mollify his Japanese followers and would memorialize requesting that Hsii’s offenses be pardoned. Hu Tsung-hsien was happy to comply with these terms. Negotiating agents carried great gifts of money and silks to Hsii Hai’s camp outside T’ung-hsiang. Hsii Hai’s messengers repeatedly expressed his gratitude, and as evidence of his good faith Hsii Hai handed over to the government some two hundred Chinese held captive by his men.*? When he ultimately withdrew from T’ung-hsiang, he maliciously warned the defenders to beware of Ch’en Tung. Enraged upon finding himself thus abandoned by his ally, Ch’en Tung assaulted the city with new energy for one more day and then himself withdrew. Meanwhile, when the court learned of the disaster at Tsao-lin and the siege of T’ung-hsiang, it ordered the calling up of troops from widespread areas of the country into a great expeditionary force for the southeast, and on the eighth day of the fifth month Chao Wen-hua was once again dispatched to supervise activities there. On the seventeenth day, in response to Hu Tsung-hsien’s request, six thousand tribesmen of Pao-ching and Yung-shun were ordered to hasten to join Hu’s command.**

Phase IV: Withdrawal to the Coast SUMMARY: When the marauders abandoned their siege of T’ung-hsiang late in the fifth month, they were heavily laden with plunder and seemed to have little heart for further hard campaigning. Ts’ai Chiu-te reports that their booty filled more than one thousand boats and that as they wound through the environs of Chia-hsing prefectural city their boats stretched out more than twenty li.** This must have been one group alone, since it appears that Ch’en Tung and Yeh Ma made their way to a coastal camp at Hsin-ch’ang north of Che-lin in Nan Chihli, whereas Hsii Hai wound his way back through the Hsia-shih 295

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area.*® His men set up separate temporary camps near Wang-tien, Yiian-hua, and Hai-yen, and he then gathered his forces together again near Cha-p’u, where Ch’en Tung and Yeh Ma soon rejoined him (see map 7}. There was some skirmishing while the raiders were returning to the coast. What was presumably the Ch’en Tung-Yeh Ma group, while passing through the Chia-hsing area, had an indecisive skirmish with a government force and lost twenty or thirty boats; and the Hsii Hai group fought off a Hai-ning Guard unit in the Hai-yen area.*® When all of the marauders reassembled at Cha-p’u, early in the sixth month, antagonisms among the leaders became steadily worse, and they schemed against one another so viciously that only Hsii Hai remained at large by the end of

the seventh month.

***

During the marauders’ winding withdrawals from T’ung-hsiang to the coast, some of Supreme Commander Hu’s subordinates clamored to attack them in force. But Hu argued 296

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that available government troops were still so outnumbered that even a local victory might be disastrous to his overall position. He insisted on pursuing his pacification tactics, taking advantage of rivalries among the marauder chiefs so as to bring about their submission peaceably. Hsii Hai had already accepted pacification in word though not yet in deed. Through intermediaries who made a succession of courtesy calls on the raiders’ camps, Hu kept enticing Hsii with promises and urging him to give further evidence of good faith in the fashion of Wang Ao. Wang Ao, after his previous foray in the Tz’u-ch’i area,

continued to assist government forces to the south in the sixth month, subduing raiders on Chou-shan Island and at Li-piao Bay, both in the Ningpo sector. Requested to assist in suppressing Hsii Hai, Wang Ao demurred, saying that only his godfather, Wang Chih, had sufficient authority for that.*’ Hu Tsung-hsien memorialized about Wang Ao’s cooperation and requested that he be rewarded. The Ministry of War counseled the court that Hu should be allowed to use his own discretion in handling Wang Ao, adding, “In the practice of war one utilizes both spies and bait, sometimes summons (chao; peremptorily?} and sometimes mollifies (fu). The important thing is to accommodate to changing situations and not be rigidly bound.’’** This advice was approved. Hu consequently issued gifts to Wang Ao on his own authority and sent him back to Japan to persuade his godfather to surrender himself. The bait offered Hsii Hai and his allies was transportation. Hsii had burned his ships on arriving at Cha-p’u early in the year, and Ch’en Tung and Yeh Ma had been ashore even longer without access to seaworthy vessels. All the marauders, with great accumulations of plunder, were now anxious about being marooned on the China coast with no hope of getting away with their booty. Hu Tsung-hsien realized this and made them a tempting offer. All who wished to surrender, he promised, would be welcomed and given status in the military establishment, whereas all who wished to return to Japan would be provided with seagoing vessels for the voyage. Although the marauders were by no means obtuse, as Ts’ai Chiu-te notes, they had virtually no choice but to make at least a show of cooperation. So on the second day of the sixth month they sent word to Hu that his offer was accepted.*® Hu Tsung-hsien, apparently confident that Hsii Hai’s will was broken, now began pressing him aggressively. He sent 297

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agents to point out that Hsii’s fellow marauders in the Sung-chiang area to the north were bloated with spoils and were again heading inland. It was suggested that if Hsii Hai were to prove his sincerity by attacking the Sung-chiang raiders, he could have their spoils for himself and might even find some use for their boats. Hsii Hai, no doubt thinking he might in this way quickly get his hands on some seaworthy craft as well as some additional booty, complied. As he moved his forces westward to intercept the Sung-chiang group, Hu Tsung-hsien could not but realize that if Hsii Hai should renege on his promised cooperation and join forces with the Sung-chiang raiders for a drive southward into Che-hsi, the consequences would be disastrous. Hu had some misgivings, and no doubt several days of anxiety. But Hsii Hai kept his part of the bargain. He set upon the Sung-chiang raiders at Chu-ching north of the Chekiang border and routed them. To his dismay, however, most of his intended victims got away in the night with their boats and booty intact. Moreover, Hu Tsung-hsien had alerted Regional Commander Yii Ta-yu, who was lurking in the rear of the Sung-chiang group, to what was going on. While the marauder groups were fighting each other, Yii burned Hsii Hai’s own river boats; and then, when the Sung-chiang survivors appeared on the coast fleeing seaward, Yii’s fleet pounced on them and wiped them out.*° Hsii Hai slunk back to his Cha-p’u harbor lair with an exaggerated conception of Hu’s powers and thinking himself at Hu’s mercy. He sent Hu elaborate gifts and reassurances of his obedience; he even turned over a younger brother named Hsii Hung as a hostage.*’ At about this time Assistant Regional Commander Lu T’ang won a decisive victory over Wako raiders in T’ai-chou prefecture south of Ningpo after they had subdued the Hsien-chii county seat.®°® Thus, with Chao Wen-hua approaching the Yangtze with an army ordered up by Peking and with

marauders both north and south of Che-hsi having been dealt heavy blows, Hu Tsung-hsien was increasingly free to concentrate on Hsii Hai. He now plotted to persuade Hsii to betray and surrender his chief allies, Yeh Ma and Ch’en Tung. It happened that Hsii Hai and Yeh Ma had already developed a sullen rivalry over a certain Mistress Chu (Chu fu}, a beauty whom Yeh Ma had taken captive at Yiian-hua and made his concubine. Hsii was also angry that Yeh Ma, who had accumulated the greatest quantity of booty among the chiefs, refused to agree to an equal division of spoils as the gang 298

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prepared to break up, some expecting to stay in China and some expecting to return to Japan when ships were provided. So Hsii Hai, at Hu’s urging, arranged parleys with the prefectural authorities at Chia-hsing on the twenty-sixth day of the sixth month and again on the third day of the seventh month to discuss the government’s progress in gathering together the promised ships. Hsii got Yeh Ma to accompany him to these parleys, at which they were courteously entertained and given apologetic excuses for delays. Yeh Ma was so anxious to get out of China by this time, Ts’ai Chiu-te reports, that he was easily duped. On the second visit to Chia-hsing he got drunk and was taken into custody with no trouble. A hundred or so of his followers, outraged at his capture but having no proof that Hsii Hai had betrayed him, soon gave Hsii by their conduct an excuse for taking them also into custody and turning them over to the government. Supreme Commander Hu now pressed Hsii Hai to betray his more powerful ally, Ch’en Tung. The fate of Yeh Ma naturally had deepened the distrust of Hsii that Ch’en had nursed since the siege of T’ung-hsiang, so that Ch’en was not to be so easily duped. Moreover, Ch’en had long been secretary or tutor of the younger brother of the Lord of Satsuma, Hsii’s own patron; and the younger brother was apparently present as a member of the raiding party. Hsii Hai, while trying to keep Hu Tsung-hsien at bay with a show of cooperation, was by no means happy at the prospect of spoiling his relations with the Japanese. So he was most hesitant to make an overt move against Ch’en Tung. The supreme commander, understanding his difficulty, began sending agents with beautiful trinkets for two of Hsii’s favorite mistresses, enlisting their aid in his campaign to urge Hsii to action. Hu also made use of the captured Yeh Ma, who no doubt happily wrote a letter to Ch’en Tung, at Hu’s suggestion, explaining Hsii’s treachery and urging Ch’en to destroy him. Hu saw to it that the letter was put in Hsii’s hands rather than Ch’en’s. This served two purposes. Not only did it infuriate Hsii Hai to the point of determining that he must get rid of Ch’en; it also led him to believe that Hu was genuinely befriending and protecting him, and that he consequently owed Hu a great debt of gratitude. At this juncture, on the sixth day of the seventh month, Chao Wen-hua arrived in Chia-hsing, and units of his expeditionary force soon began taking up positions in the sector between Chia-hsing and the coast. Grand Coordinator Yiian O, 299

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who since escaping from the siege of T’ung-hsiang had been conducting defensive operations south of Hangchow Bay, now also brought his forces into Chia-hsing. Hsii Hai was increasingly overawed by the dignitaries arrayed against him, even though Hu and Chao, for their part, were not yet sure they had enough strength for an attempt at straightforward extermination. Hu could not expect to protract his pacification tactics much longer without exposing himself to severe criticism. So one of Hu’s negotiating agents was sent to Hsii Hai with a message from Chao: If you bring in your forces for submission you may escape the death penalty. But if you do not present Ch’en Tung in custody together with a thousand or so severed heads (of his supporters) I fear I shall not be able to appease the court. If you are able to do this, then I will join the supreme commander in memorializing for your pardon. Otherwise, you will be pounded into powder.*4#

In desperation, Hsii Hai now gathered up booty worth “more than a thousand gold” taels and sent it to Ch’en Tung’s patron, the younger brother of the Lord of Satsuma, asking permission to borrow Ch’en’s services. When Ch’en appeared, Hsii managed to get him delivered into government hands, no doubt by deception. Hsii now realized he could never safely return to Japan, and he knew that Ch’en Tung’s supporters would murder him at any opportunity. Hu Tsung-hsien pressed his psychological advantage ever more strongly. He now sent a personal message to Hsii Hai: I want to be lenient with you, but Minister Chao considers your crimes to be truly heinous. Why not heed me? Several tens of ships are moored on the coast. If you rally (Ch’en Tung’s followers) to make a rush for these ships on the coast (with the consequence that} a thousand or so can be captured for presentation to Chao, you might thereby save yourself.55

As Mao K’un observes, Hsii Hai might have been reluctant, but he had no alternative.** So he came to an agreement with Circuit Intendant Liu T’ao, stationed at Hai-yen. Government ships were indeed moored in Cha-p’u harbor, while Liu T’ao concealed a large force of government troops inside the Cha-p’u walls. Announcing that the long-promised government ships were at last available, Hsii Hai shepherded the whole marauder host onto the Cha-p’u beach, carefully restraining his own followers. When the others were scrambling gleefully for the ships, at a signal from Hsiti Hai, Liu T’ao led his forces out 300

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of the walled garrison and slaughtered the disorganized mob. Those who managed to get aboard the ships were quickly rounded up by a naval squadron waiting for them. The marauder lair at Cha-p’u harbor was totally laid waste, and Hsti Hai crept away to a new camp at nearby Liang-chuang to work out the best fate he could.® It was now the end of the seventh month.

Phase V: Surrender and Extermination SUMMARY: Having fulfilled all the tests of sincerity that had been imposed on him, Hsii Hai demanded that his surrender be accepted, and on the first day of the eighth month he and a hundred or so of his followers appeared for audience with the provincial authorities in P’ing-hu county seat. He was politely received and was temporarily allowed to take up residence in an estate near the city. There Hsii eventually realized that he had been totally deceived, and he tried to rally new support among his Chinese neighbors. But he was now surrounded by overwhelming government forces, which on the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth days of the month assaulted and destroyed both his temporary camp and the lair at Liang-chuang near Cha-p’u. Hsii Hai drowned himself in a stream. When the Wako raiders had been decimated in Cha-p’u harbor and Hsii Hai had settled at Liang-chuang, Hsii asked permission to present himself in formal surrender at P’ing-hu, and it was agreed that he should do so on the second day of the eighth month. Inspector of the Armies Chao Wen-hua, Supreme Commander Hu Tsung-hsien, Grand Coordinator Yiian O, and Regional Inspector Chao K’ung-chao (chin-shih 1544) all gathered at P’ing-hu to receive him. To the annoyance of these dignitaries, Hsii appeared one day early, deployed his whole force outside the city, and demanded that he be admitted with a hundred or so of his men in full armor. Marshaling a strong show of military force along the streets of the city, but with misgivings nevertheless, the dignitaries consented. Assembling on a dais in the county yamen, they gave him audience in a remarkable scene vividly described by Mao K’un as follows: (Hsii) Hai and his warriors faced north toward the four dignitaries and in succession kowtowed and cried, “O star in the firmament, we deserve death; we deserve death!” {Hsii} Hai wanted to pay special] respects to Hu

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(Tsung-hsien} but did not know him by sight. So he glanced for guidance to the intermediary agents, who signaled him with their eyes. (Hsti) Hai then faced Hu once more, kowtowed, and cried, “O star in the firmament, I deserve death; I deserve death!” Hu thereupon descended from the dais, patted (Hsti] Hai on the head with his hand, and said to him, “You have distressed the southeast for a long time! Now that you have at last submitted, the court will pardon you. But be sure not to make any further trouble!” (Hsti) Hai again kowtowed and cried, “O star in the firmament, I deserve death; I deserve death!”’ Then the four dignitaries handed out generous gifts, and (the visitors) departed.5?

Ts’ai Chiu-te describes the scene in almost identical terms but adds that Regional Inspector Chao K’ung-chao could not control his indignation and shouted at Hsii, ‘“You have slaughtered our people beyond counting. What punishment you deserve!’’°°

By this time the whole expeditionary force brought from the north by Chao Wen-hua and local forces under the control of Regional Commander Yui Ta-yu and Regional Vice Commander Lu T’ang were all in position in Che-hsi. But the authorities in P’ing-hu were still wary of Hsii Hai. “They calculated that he still had more than a thousand men under his command,” Mao K’un relates, “and they were so fierce and violent that it would be difficult to crush them.’”’*° Moreover, it would be a

while before the six thousand tribesmen coming from Pao-ching and Yung-shun could be expected to arrive. So they invited Hsii Hai to choose a campsite where he could wait comfortably while, presumably, they pleaded his case at court. He remembered having been impressed, during previous raiding visits, by a so-called ““Shen-family estate” (Shen-chia-chuang}

outside the city,“' and they rented it for him. Hsii Hai settled there on the eighth day of the month. He even suggested that once his pacification was regularized, he would like to buy the estate and three thousand nearby acres (mou) of agricultural land.** Hu Tsung-hsien persuaded him to encamp remnants of Ch’en Tung’s raider group alongside his own, assuring him that “government troops will protect you against the {Ch’en]) Tung gang; don’t be afraid.’’**

Ts’ai Chiu-te reports that Hsii Hai was not yet resigned to a disastrous fate. On the eleventh and twelfth days of the month he invited Chinese residents of his neighborhood to wine-drinking parties, and he thus enticed two or three hundred young men to join him afresh. Somewhat emboldened, he rebuffed an invitation from the authorities in P’ing-hu to 302

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attend a moon-watching party on the fifteenth, and on the seventeenth he went so far as to detain and decapitate an envoy from Hu Tsung-hsien.* Hu, for his part, was daily sending agents to urge on the approaching troops from Pao-ching and Yung-shun; and when Hsii Hai sent him two hundred gold taels for the purchase of wine Hu arranged for the wine to be delivered contaminated with poisonous drugs.® The Pao-ching and Yung-shun tribesmen apparently reached P’ing-hu on the twentieth, and peripheral skirmishing began in the area of Hsii Hai’s encampment. The government forces seem to have been none too eager for the culminating assault. So Hu persuaded his captive Ch’en Tung to write a letter to his former followers warning them that Hsii Hai was collaborating with the government forces in a plan to crush them in a pincers operation. This provoked a clash between Hsii Hai’s group and the Ch’en Tung group during the early morning of the twenty-fifth, in which Hsii Hai was wounded; and on the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth government forces moved in decisively on all sides. All marauders in the Shen estate were wiped out, and Regional Commander Yii Ta-yu also destroyed remnants in the camp at Liang-chuang. Hsii Hai’s drowned body was found in a stream, and it was decapitated. It is reported that from 1,200 to 1,600 raiders were decapitated in-all,°*

In subsequent mopping-up operations, Regional Vice Commander Lu T’ang pursued and captured a Japanese named Shingoro, whom Hsii Hai had dispatched from the Shen estate to find his way to Japan; and during the following winter Regional Commander Yii Ta-yu cleared Chou-shan Island to the south of the Wako remnants in refuge there. Reports of the victories in the P’ing-hu region from Chao Wen-hua and Hu Tsung-hsien reached the court at Peking on the nineteenth day of the ninth month. Congratulations and promotions were ordered; and on the twenty-seventh day sacrificial reports of the extermination of Wako marauders in the southeast were made in ceremonies at the imperial altars and temples in Peking.*’ The prisoners Yeh Ma, Ch’en Tung, Hsii Hung, and Shingoro, and the severed head of Hsii Hai were all subsequently displayed in imperial audience, and in the twelfth month of the year the prisoners were executed. Epilogue. The campaign against Hsii Hai in 1556 was by no means the end of China’s troubles with Wako marauders, but it did terminate the worst of the plundering in the southeast. 303

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In 1557, by means of equally complicated and intriguing negotiations, Hu Tsung-hsien disposed of Wang Chih. Thereafter the Wako raiders were less well organized, and they usually by-passed Nan Chihli and Chekiang to raid southward in Fukien and Kwangtung provinces. Hu Tsung-hsien remained in power in the southeast and in imperial favor despite the successive ruin of his patrons Chao Wen-hua in 1557 and Yen Sung in 1562, but he was repeatedly denounced for corruption and abuse of authority. At the end of 1562 he was relieved of duty and taken to Peking to answer such charges. The emperor defended him as a loyal and effective official, and he was allowed to retire more or less honorably. Denunciations continued, and in 1565, despite the emperor’s continuing sympathy for him, he was sent to prison, where he died of ill treatment.® The official history of the dynasty, the Ming-shih, says of Hu: “Tsung-hsien suffered disgrace because of his extravagance and defilement. But if he had permitted the scoundrels Hsii Hai and Wang Chih to evade death, how much more trouble would have occurred can only be guessed.’”’”° Other historians have similarly found it necessary to overlook his shortcomings. The editors of the great eighteenth century imperial catalogue Ssu-k’u ch’tian-shu tsung-mu insisted that he should not be belittled. “Although he was not an ideal man,” they judged, “his abilities certainly made him one of the heroes of the age.’”””

4. Conclusion The history of Hu Tsung-hsien’s campaign against Hsii Haiin 1556 has relevance to an almost unlimited range of important scholarly problems. Among these are problems concerning the socioeconomic development of China’s southeast, Sino-foreign and especially Sino-Japanese relations, Japan’s relations with the outside world in general and its own economic and cultural development in the sixteenth century, conditions of service generally in China’s traditional government, and the political climate and history of Emperor Shih-tsung’s reign, in addition to multifaceted problems concerning traditional China’s military history and institutions in particular. This article is hardly the place to pursue all these varied ramifications, but it might not be amiss to close here with some brief comments on the nature and exercise of Hu’s authority as a commander. In his valuable recent article, ‘Policy 304

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Formulation and Decision-Making on Issues Respecting Peace and War,” Professor Jung-pang Lo has demonstrated conclusively that important decisions arrived at by the Ming court were not dictated according to “the whim and caprice of any single individual.’’”* His study can be usefully supplemented by evidence from the 1556 campaign about military decisionmaking on lower levels, regionally and locally. One thing immediately apparent is that Supreme Commander Hu was in no sense a regional! warlord of the modern type. He was subject to the court directly and through such intermediary agents as Chao Wen-hua. Moreover, although this aspect of the situation is not explicitly shown in the foregoing narrative, his relationship with the court was vulnerable to harassment through means that by-passed the normal chain of command— for example, through personal contacts at court that could be exploited by his subordinates and by influential personages of Chekiang. He was also plied with advice by friends and acquaintances, which at any time could have been transformed into sharp criticism poured into receptive ears at court. But it is equally apparent that Shih-tsung and his court made few specific demands on Supreme Commander Hu in regard to the Wako troubles. They wanted the troubles terminated, and they ruled full pacification out of consideration as an acceptable means. But Hu was authorized, implicitly and explicitly, to achieve his goal by tactical decisions made at his own discretion (pien-i). The pattern of events in 1556 suggests that it was tactically important to Hu Tsung-hsien that Hsii Hai should at all times believe Hu to have great military force at his disposition, and that Hsii at certain times should believe Hu to be his friend. When Hu in fact lacked the resources to be militarily aggressive he unhesitatingly resorted to bribery, courteous exchanges of messages, promises of official status and even of ships, friendly albeit false warnings of plots on the part of Hsii’s colleagues, and even cordial personal receptions; and he consistently avoided decisive military confrontations. On the other hand, when circumstances warranted, Hu attempted to poison the enemy, connived with Hsii’s colleagues and mistresses against him, coercively tricked Hsii into unpalatable and disadvantageous undertakings, and made threatening shows of force. Moreover, as the military situation altered in his favor Hu became increasingly belligerent, and in the end he organized and led a military extermination of Hsii. 305

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Except for the final extermination of Hsii Hai, none of Hu Tsung-hsien’s tactical maneuvers was specifically sanctioned by the court or its agents. Moreover, for the most part, they seem not to have been supported eagerly by his subordinates. Decisions were made by Hu in response to the changing situations that confronted him. He made them in consultation with his subordinates, but he made them on his own authority and with full and heavy responsibility for them. It was no doubt gratifying to him that military extermination ultimately proved to be possible. But the evidence makes it reasonably clear that if nonmilitary pacification had proved to be politically acceptable, as well as possible, Hu in his pragmatic way would just as gladly have pursued his pacification (that is, appeasement) tactics. A similar sense of being free to act at one’s own discretion seems to have characterized Supreme Commander Hu’s subordinates. It is perhaps not surprising that the local authorities at Cha-p’u and at T’ung-hsiang apparently acted on their own initiative and with self-reliance when they were besieged and isolated. It is worthy of note, however, that Grand Coordinator Yiian O reportedly departed from Ch’ung-te to go to the aid of beleaguered Cha-p’u without waiting for Hu’s orders;"* that Mobile Corps Commander Tsung Li apparently took the initiative in engaging Hsii Hai near Tsao-lin without having orders from Hu to engage him; and that even in the coordinated final assault on Hsii Hai, Regional Commander Yui Ta-yu seems to have acted with a substantial degree of independence. It is perhaps less surprising, but no less suggestive, that the leader of the aboriginal tribesmen from Pao-ching reportedly disregarded the supreme commander’s cautions about engaging the marauders in the Chia-shan area, to the tribesmen’s regret.”* In the same degree that Supreme Commander Hu took action at his discretion when he had no contrary orders from the court or its agents, so his subordinates, sometimes even in his presence, apparently took such action as they deemed appropriate. It might be argued that the independence displayed by these various field commanders suggests not only that they were free of unreasonable constraints imposed from above but also that there was a real lack of discipline among them. It must be kept in mind, however, that the nature of the Wako threat was well understood, both locally and at court; and coping with it successfully no doubt required a degree of independence at all 306

Hu Tsung-hsien’s Campaign Against Hsii Hai, 1556

command levels that might have been wholly inappropriate in other circumstances. Whatever this analysis of the 1556 campaign may suggest in this regard, it would probably be premature to conclude that Ming armies in the field were characteristically assemblages of quasi-independent command units. It might be noted, finally, that in achieving his goal Hu Tsung-hsien seems to have been remarkably free of moralistic inhibitions, whether externally imposed or self-developed. His mandate was to get rid of Hsii Hai, and he did so with what seems like very little regard for considerations of propriety, integrity, or either personal or national honor. Surviving and winning was his mission as he conceived it; and it is apparent that Shih-tsung shared Hu’s conception, for the emperor never seriously wavered in his judgment that Hu was a loyal and effective official. Such things should not be disregarded in our continuing efforts to assess the national military style of traditional China.

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Notes, Glossary, and Index

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Notes

Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience, by John K. Fairbank 1. Walter Millis, Military History (Washington, D.C., Service Center for Teachers of History, American Historical Association, 1961). This well-informed essay makes no reference to Asia. The same is true of most other studies of military history. For example, see Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944}. 2. George Babcock Cressey, China’s Geographic Foundations (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1934), p. 38. 3. See above, essay by Frank A. Kierman, Jr., p. 27. 4. Iriye Keishiro, Chigoku koten to kokusaiho (International law in the Chinese classics; Tokyo, Seibundo, 1966}. For an earlier study see Richard L. Walker, The Multi-State System of Ancient China (Hamden, Conn., Shoe String Press, 1953).

5. Cho-yun Hsu, Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility, 722-222 B.C. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965], p. 59. 6. For information on China’s military technology in general, see Joseph Needham and others, Science and Civilisation in China. The latest in this multivolume work is vol. 4, pt. 3, Civil Engineering and Nautics (Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1971). 7. Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London, Oxford University Press, 1963} includes reference to Mao Tse-tung’s tactical doctrines. 8. On law as a means of maintaining the social order, see Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967}, pt. 1. 9. Herrlee G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, vol. 1: The Western Chou Empire (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970). 10. On the rationale of the tribute system, see John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968}. 11. On the stereotype of the bad-last ruler see Arthur F. Wright, “Sui Yang-Ti,” in A. F. Wright, ed., The Confucian Persuasion (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 62ff. 12. H. G. Creel, “The Beginnings of Bureaucracy in China: The Origin of Hsien,” Journal of Asian Studies 23.2:155-184 (February 1964). 13. For case studies of bureaucratism dominating militarism under the Ming, see Jung-pang Lo, ‘Policy Formulation and Decision-Making on Issues Respecting Peace and War,” in Charles O. Hucker, ed., Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies (New York, Columbia University Press, 1969}, pp. 41-72.

31]

Notes to Pages 10-20

14. Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957), chap. 6.

15. Herbert Franke, “‘The Omnipresent Executioner: A Note on Martial Law in Medieval China,” prepared for a 1969 conference on China’s Legal Tradition; and Zum Militdrstrafrecht im chinesischen Mittealter, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften Sitzungsberichte, 1970, vol. 5 (Miinchen, 1970). 16. H. G. Creel, “The Fa-chia: ‘Legalists’ or ‘Administrators,’ ”’ in Chung-yang yen-chiu-yiian, Li-shih yii-yen yen-chiu-so chi-k’an (Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica}, extra vol. no. 4 (Taipei, 1961}, pp. 607-636. 17. See note 7 above. 18. See note 10 above.

19. Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 2d ed. (New York, American Geographical Society, 1951 [1940]}; and Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers, 1928-1958 (London, Oxford University Press, 1962}. See also Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers: Social Forces in Medieval China, 2d ed. (Leiden, Brill, 1965). 20. Jonathan D. Spence, Ts’ao Y’in and the K’ang-hsi Emperor, Bondservant and Master (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1966) presents a fascinating case study of the Manchu use of Chinese retainers in ruling China. 21. The latest work on the Ming expeditions is that of J. V. G. Mills, trans. and intro., Ma Huan, Ying-yai sheng-lan: “The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores [1433],” {Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press for the Hakluyt Society, 1970). 22. On the movement of the local scholar-gentry elite into military leadership see the important study by Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970}. 23. See Frank Algerton Kierman, Jr., Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s Historiographical Attitude as Reflected in Four Late Warring States Biographies (Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1962) published in the series Studies on Asia (Seattle, University of Washington for the Far Eastern and Russian Institute}. 24. Michael Loewe, Records of Han Administration, vol. 1: Historical Assessment, vol. 2: Documents (Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1967), based on some 700 wooden documents selected from finds totaling about 10,000 pieces made in 1927 and later at some twenty-one sites in the prefecture of Chii-yen along the Edsen-gol river on the northwest frontier of Han China and dated mainly in the first centuries B.c. and A.p. Building on the work of Lao Kan and other scholars, and using these administrative records derived principally from the frontier, Mr. Loewe has worked out the elements of the Han military structure and its operations. He has carried this further, with a wealth of illustration, in a more general account, Everyday Life in Early Imperial China During the Han Period 202 B.c.—A.D. 220 (London, B. T. Batsford, Ltd.; New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1968}.

25. Mr. Franke’s publications include Geld und Wirtschaft in China unter der Mongolen-herrschaft: Beitrdge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Yiian-zeit (Leipzig, Otto Harrassowitz, 1949); Wissenschaftliche

312

Notes to Pages 20-26

Forschungsberichte Band 19, Sinologie (Bern, A. Francke AG, 1953}; Das chinesiche Kaiserreich (Frankfurt, Fischer Biicherei, 1968], a general history of China up to 1911, written in collaboration with Rolf Trauzettel; and a great many articles. 26. Mr. Mote’s publications include, in addition to many articles, The Poet Kao Ch’i, 1336-1374 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962); Intellectual Foundations of China |New York, Knopf, 1971]; and he is at work on a study of late Yiian and early Ming. 27. See in particular Charles O. Hucker, The Traditional Chinese State in Ming Times, 1368-1644 (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1961); The Censorial System of Ming China {Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966); and “The Tung-lin Movement of the Late Ming Period,” in J. K. Fairbank, ed., Chinese Thought and Institutions {Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957). Mr. Hucker’s first experience as a military historian was from 1944 to 1946 under the United States Fifth Air Force. He then oversaw the preparation of a history of all fighter and aircraft warning activities under the Southwest Pacific Command in World War II, producing a series of volumes that are said to be still secretly preserved for posterity in a warehouse near St. Louis. 28. For asummary analysis with references, see Kuhn, pp. 15-20. 29. See ibid., p. 125. Note also James F. Millinger, ‘“Ch’i Chi-kuang: Chinese Military Official,” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968. 30. See in particular James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yii-hsiang (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966}, chaps. 4-5. 31. The pioneer effort of Frederick J. Teggart, to correlate Chinese-Hsiung-nu conflicts with Roman-barbarian conflicts between 58 B.c. and a.p. 107, has never been followed up by a sinologist. See his Rome and China (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1939}. 32. This generalization was self-evident to nineteenth century observers, yet Needham’s latest volume (see reference in note 6 above}, pp. 476-484, reports that the Sung navy had 52,000 men in twenty squadrons, that a battle of 1161 saw 340 vessels in operation, that the Mongols brought together 4,400 vessels for their 1281 attack on Japan, that Cheng Ho’s largest ships were indeed 449 feet long with up to nine masts, and rudders (one of which has been found] twenty feet square, and that the early Ming navy had some 3,800 ships, the biggest of which carried 1,000 men.

313

Phases and Modes of Combat in Early China, by Frank A. Kierman, Jr. 1. References to the Tso-chuan in text and notes are given in numerical symbols: the first capital Roman numeral represents the reigning Duke of Lu in the Ch’un-ch’iu; the second number, in lower-case roman, gives the year of that duke’s reign; and the third gives the number of the Ch’un-ch’iu entry to which this item in the Tso-chuan has been attached. This is the system used in James Legge’s translation, The Chinese Classics, vol. 5: The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen (Hong Kong, 1872), which contains the Chinese originals as well as the translation and which can therefore furnish text for reference or comparison. Except where a specific Legge citation is given in his inimitable romanization, translations are new in text and notes, though they are obviously much indebted to the Legge version. 2. Three of the most interesting cases in which the divination is applied to military expeditions are: {1} V, xv, 13, in which the milfoil foretells Ch’in's capture of the lord of Chin; (2) VII, xiii, 3, concerning the extremely important battle of Pi; in this case the language of the trigrams is used to analyze the weakness and peril of the Chin army; and (3) XII, x, 4, in which Chin decides not to relieve Ch’eng by attacking Sung, because divinations by both tortoise shell and milfoil are inauspicious. 3. Cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 3: Shoo King, p. 63 (II, ii, 18}.

4. Not the same Tzu-yii as the Ch’eng-p’u antagonist. This one is (X, xvii, 6}.

5. His personal name. 6. The precise instrument of augury is unclear and perhaps changing from place to place and from time to time in ancient China. There may have been a progressive shift from shell to animal bone to milfoil (especially after the I Ching was compiled in early Chou times}, a progressive cheapening of the object used, possibly concomitant with a diminution of the real attention paid to the forecast. With this change there may have been a tendency to enshrine earlier usages in the way people spoke of the oracle, saying “tortoise” when they meant merely “‘augury,” however conducted. One possibility, rendered plausible both on the grounds of Ch’u’s peripheral position in the Chinese world and on its relatively greater access to tortoise shells because it was in the south, is that Ch’u genuinely preserved the ancient usage after the central states evolved to newer and slacker patterns. Yet the longer form of reference to the kuei, in the passage cited above (XII, xxiii, 2), which seems to imply at least some specific object maintained in a specific place, is not from Ch’u but from Ch’u’s traditional rival, the northern inland state of Chin. Similarly, XII, x, 4, which discusses at considerable length the specific indications received first from tortoise shell and then from “the reeds on the principles of Yih of Chow” (Legge, p. 819], certainly seems to show that both were used. Such definite words are at least hard to take as mere archaism made into a neologism, meaning “‘auguries”’ rather than ‘‘augury by both tortoise shell and milfoil.” Further evidence, and further study of what evidence is available, will be needed before we can answer such questions with certainty.

314

Notes to Pages 34-41

7. Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 78. 8. The dictionaries are vexatious on this expression, referring back always

to this passage. The term chou EX can mean “grasses” or “arrow”; and the overall sense is certainly what Legge gives with perhaps excessive looseness as “discharges a strong arrow.” An alternative interpretation would be “to shoot so as to split the last arrow, which is in the bullseye,” a good image out of our Robin Hood tradition. At any rate, it means what the passage obviously means generally: to shoot strongly, and well, and with great accuracy. 9. Yang # , often translated “martingale,” is here given a generic meaning. 10. Chih % is the standard term, though t’iao chan {EX is also used and hsiin /{f) sometimes bears this connotation. 1l. The translation of “a tight place” for hsien [RR is designed to preserve two meanings (“a narrow defile” and “danger”), without choosing which of them may have been semantically prior. 12. Another version of this process is at IX, xxvi, 7. 13. Legge translates tz’u fl as “gave,” which seems inadequate to this apparent combination of arming and ennobling. The spear is pi #& , and Legge gives it as “long spear.”” Long spears have their uses, and one can indeed imagine that in chariot warfare they would have been employed; but

in the nature of things wooden shafts vanish with the centuries, and we don’t know much about long spears of the Ch’un-ch’iu period. Catalogue No. 108 of Max Loehr’s Chinese Bronze Age Weapons {Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1956) could be the head of a pi. 14. Sun-tzu: “Therefore I say: ‘Know the enemy and know yourself; and in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.’ ” Griffith, p. 84. 15. This is very nearly a literal translation, though the “crow” is a necessary importation for efficient Englishing. Legge has “got up on a carriage with a lookout on it”: The Chinese Classics, V, 396. Yasui KO gives the equivalent Ju #8 , for which Couvreur gives, “tour de haut de laquelle les defenseurs d’une place observaient l’ennemi.” See F. S. Couvreur, Dictionnaire classique de la langue chinoise (Taipei, Book World Co., 1967} and Yasui KO, Tso-chuan chi shih (Taipei, Kwang-wen shu-chii, 1967}. 16. See p. 54, in the Ch’eng-p’u account. 17. This is in the same section of the Tso-chuan, lying before and after the above colloquy between the King of Ch’u and Po Chow-li. 18. Unfortunately, this rather seductive piece of evidence still further complicates an already knotty problem: the size of chariots as against the size of people. Chou dynasty Chinese were smaller than modern Chinese,

undoubtedly; but it is extremely unlikely that they were enough smaller to resolve the difficulty expressed by Watson: “The actual floor [of the chariot} cannot have been much bigger [than 1 meter x 80 cms.]—one would expect the wheels to be allowed good clearance—and only sufficient for warrior and driver to stand together when the chariot was in motion, certainly not spacious enough for the two men to fight from the vantage of their vehicle.” See William Watson, Early Civilization in China (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 79. Yet, as we see repeatedly in the Tso-chuan, the standard crew of a chariot was driver and two functioning warriors, the archer on the left and the spearman on the right; and they are consistently represented as

ols

Notes to Pages 41-49

fighting from the chariots. Now we have a fourth tenant, unless tien is taken as simply meaning “behind.” Obviously something must give: the chariot must have been at least twice as large as any so far unearthed, or some of the passengers must get out of the chariot for purposes of both transportation and combat. Two plates in A. Leo Oppenheim’s Ancient Mesopotamia (Chicago, Phoenix paperback, 1964) show Assyrian chariots in the age of King Assurbanipal (seventh century s.c.). One, the ninth plate, is entitled “Royal Chariot.” It shows three men in a rather large chariot, one of them evidently Assurbanipal, but the two horses are under restraint, being led by a man, and no weapons are in evidence. Another, the fourth plate, “Chariot in Action,” shows a three-horse chariot with a bowman on the right of the charioteer and a spear possibly five feet in length in a rack ready for use. No other chariots are shown. No comparable graphic materials are known for China. Oppenheim says that the horse-drawn war chariot was an efficient weapon during the second millennium B.c., but also that cavalry was developed after the ninth century (p. 46). See also IX, xxiv, 9, with its distinction of “wide chariot,” obviously one in this case made for war, and “easy one [chariot|"”’ (Legge—perhaps a better

translation would be “riding chariot’), presumably a chariot lighter and smaller than a war chariot and with provision for seating passengers. 19. Legge, The Chinese Classics, V, 383.

20. This touch of impetuousness is interesting since it shows that armor, probably of leather but of what coverage one can hardly say, was standard on at least royal chariot horses at this time. 21. Duke P’ing was his father. 22. See also the anecdote about the Duke of Sung, pp. 65-66 above. 23. General Griffith, in his Sun Tzu, pp. 6 and 7, says: “In ancient China war had been regarded as a knightly contest. As such, it had been governed by a code to which both sides generally adhered. Many illustrations of this are found in the Tso-chuan. For example, in 632 B.c. the Chin commander, after defeating Ch’u at Ch’eng P’u, gave the vanquished enemy three days’ supply of food. This courtesy was later reciprocated by a Ch’u army victorious at Pi.” Unhappily, this idyllic notion is supported neither by

the text (Chin shih san jih kuanku #EH=A RE } nor by common sense. Can one imagine the scattered host of Ch’u after Ch’eng-p’u meekly reassembling in a chow line? Or the defeated commander coming helmet in hand to get his supply wagons filled up? There is an abundance of chivalry and ceremony in Ch’un-ch’iu warfare, including much that is marvelous and strange; but this is not an instance of it. 24. Both the Ch’eng-p’u battle account and, rather more clearly, the romance of Ch’ung-erh offer striking examples of the way in which some compendium of historical chronicles, presumably something like the Chan-kuo ts’e, was snipped apart and arbitrarily repasted to fit the Ch’un-ch’iu and furnish a commentary to it. One of the major elements in such a compendium must have been an account of affairs in Chin and specifically the career of Ch’ung-erh, which is scattered in highly disordered fashion through this section of the Tso-chuan starting with the account of his parentage and birth in III, xxix, 1, and continuing through bits and pieces attached to items in the chronology of Lu, from Duke Chuang through the short-lived Duke Min and into the reign of Duke Hsi.

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Notes to Pages 49-51

25. Tzu-yii is a designation; the man’s name was Te-ch’en. Such names and sobriquets are a continuing problem for the translator, especially since they so often contain elements that appear elsewhere as honorific or quasi-official titles. Here the tzu of Tzu-yii is a case in point. One is tempted to translate it, after the pattern of Western nobilities, as Lord Yti or Sir Yui. This problem extends to other terms common in names and sobriquets in

the Tso-chuan: po {H_, for example, and such terms asfu 4 and shu & . On this whole problem of ranks see George A. Kennedy’s amusing and erudite “Philosophic Viscounts,” in Li T’ien-yi, ed., Selected Works of George A. Kennedy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964). 26. Despite the character B2 mi, Legge translates this “the marsh of Meng-chu.” The place is identified in Chung-kuo ku-chin ti-ming ta ts’e-tien (A large dictionary of ancient and modern Chinese place-names} (TMT/C}, with several variants of both characters, as a marsh northeast of Shang-ch’iu hsien, Honan. Although this is not very far from either of the potential sites of the Ch’eng-p’u battle, it is not very near, either; so we must probably abandon any idea that the River Spirit was promising him victory in that fight. A more promising guess might be that the spirit was offering him the opportunity to advance Ch’u’s frontier to the southern bank of the Chi River, which would have been a considerable accession of territory but not an unimaginable one, considering Ch’u’s strength and momentum at the time (V, xxviii, 6).

21. EKVIL 0: 28. “In all military practice, to stay for one night is called she 4 , for two nights itis hsin fa@ , and for more than two it is tz’u % ” (III, iii, 3). Legge nods in the first of these three, simply using the generic term su rf instead of she. Legge, The Chinese Classics, V, 76. 29. See ibid., p. 210. 30. The detailed composition of the two armies is highly conjectural, because the Tso-chuan is anything but clear about it. The Chin army had nobles from Ch’in, Ch’i, and Sung in its camp. It is reasonable to assume that

they had their accompanying units, but the account gives no indication where they may have fought in the array. On the Ch’u side, Ch’en and Ts’ai are specifically mentioned as being the right wing or attached to the “right army.” Takezoe Shinichiro in Tso-chuan hui chien: Saden Kaisen (The Tso-chuan with assembled commentaries; Inoue Shooku, 1907) says that Ch’en and Ts’ai were attached to the Ch’u right wing—that is, that the satellite troops were homogeneous units distinct from but subordinate to the right-hand division of the Ch’u army. Professor Yang Lien-sheng says that there were also troops of Shen and Hsi in the Ch’u order of battle and that, being older satellites, they were on the left (oral comment delivered at the Chinese Military History Research Conference, August 24-29, 1969}. This inference is supported by the Ch’u sovereign’s instruction for Tzu-yii to kill himself, in which he speaks of the commander’s ineradicable shame vis-a-vis the people of Shen and Hsi (Legge, p. 210). This implies that the men of those satellites not only were in the battle but bore the brunt of it; and since the left wing was the most heavily mauled—and since the center army under Tzu-yii made no effort to assist it—the blaming of Tzu-yii supports Professor Yang definitively. By contrast, the battle plan in the Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (A history of Chinese warfare through the ages), titular author, Chiang Kai-shek, reprinted in 1967 by the San-chiin

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Notes to Pages 51-57

lien-ho ts’an-mou ta-hsiieh-hsiao, vol. 1, chart 17, puts Hsi in the right army under Tzu-shang and Shen in the left under Tzu-hsi; so far as I can see, nothing supports that inference. 31. It is noteworthy that tornadoes (that is, large whirlwinds} are characterized by a narrow band of extreme humidity surmounted by a wide band of dry air; so the bog of the Tso-chuan text adds credibility. This item of information does not come in the basic account but later in Tso-chuan, V, xxviii, 14. See Legge, p. 212, though a crucial misreading based upon pious loyalty to Chu Hsi’s commentary makes the Legge version wildly misleading. 32. TMT/C gives both, and adds that in Ch’un-ch’iu times it was in the state of Wei 4 . Cheng Fa-jen, in his Ch’un-ch’iu Tso-shih-chuan ti-ming t’u k’ao (An investigation of maps of place names in the Ch’un-ch’iu and master Tso’s commentary; Taipei, Kwang-wen Shu-chii, 1967} identifies Ch’eng-p’u as a place in Wei, with the P’u River passing by; he says it is some sixty li south of modern P’u-hsien, Shantung, and he places it near a present-day market village, Lin-p’u chi. He also derives a ruin of Yu-hsin at Ch’en-liu, Honan, and says that the battle could not have taken place there, since these places are quite distant from one another. In addition, he derives from another source a location of Yu-hsin which is eighteen li north of modern Ts’ao-hsien, Shantung, 4 general location which he considers possible, on the basis that Chin would have been coming from the southern part of (Ch’un-ch’iu period) Ts’ao and Ch’u from the northern part of Sung, and this area would be in the Ts’ao-Sung border region. He also says that the battle was named Ch’eng-p’u because the troops of Chin and its allies spent some nights at that place before the fight, but the fighting took place at Yu-hsin, since Chin Wen-kung is recorded as having reviewed his army from the ruin just before the battle. I am still somewhat dissatisfied with this, on purely geographical grounds: by Cheng’s own measurements, going sixty li south of P’u-hsien and eighteen li north of Ts’ao-hsien, one still has a distance of about one hundred li left to be accounted for. This is, in other words, something like the “three stages” of Chin Wen-kung’s retirement. I find it difficult to imagine the Chin forces retreating ninety li and then marching back ninety li south, and of course the text says nothing at all about such a countermarch. It is necessary to remember, however, that variations in the value of the li during history make any such lines of argument risky. 33. T’ung Shu-yeh, Ch’un-ch’iu shih (The history of the Ch’un-ch’iu {period]}; Shanghai, Kaiming, 1946}, pp. 180-181. 34. VIII, vii, 7. See also the Shih-chi account, translated in E. Chavannes, Mémoires Historiques (Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1895}, V, 5.

35. Almost the only technical points we can glean from Shih-chi 7 are that Hsiang Yii carried and at various points used a crossbow and a (presumably short} sword, that he rode and was cavalierly attached to a horse, and that in his final flight he fought afoot rather than from horseback. 36. The full account of this campaign is in the Huai-yin Hou lieh-chuan, chap. 92 and lieh-chuan (biography) 32 of Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s Shih-chi. That chapter is readily available in John DeFrancis’ translation, ‘Biography of the Marquis of Huai-yin,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies (1947), pp. 193ff, and also in Burton Watson’s Records of the Grand Historian |New York,

318

Notes to Pages 57-58

Columbia University Press, 1961}, I, 208-232. References to detailed passages in the Shih-chi are to the Ku Chieh-kang edition, since that has line numbers permitting exact citation. This account of the campaign basically includes lines 45-72, though a rather lengthy coda, lines 73-89, gives a colloquy between Han Hsin and Li Tso-ch’e descanting on the action and discussing forward strategy in the new situation which the battle has produced. Other mentions of the campaign in the Historical Records (Shih-chi) add nothing to the basic account of the battle. 37. Yen-yii had been the site of a famous battle between Chao and Ch'in. See F. A. Kierman, Four Late Warring States Biographies (Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1962), pp. 31, 86-87. DeFrancis, not referring to this fact,

translates hsin #f as “recently.” 38. DeFrancis uses ‘‘shock troops” but says it should be literally “surprise

troops.” The characters are ch’i ping JL . The terms cheng and ch’i were standard in early Chinese military thought and have remained staples since. They are discussed in Benjamin J. Wallacker’s “Two Concepts in Early Chinese Military Thought,” Language 42.2:295-299 (1966). Sun-tzu’s comments on them can be found by reference to “Tactics” in the index to General Griffith’s translation of the Art of War. See also Peter A. Boodberg, “The Art of War in Ancient China,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1930, pp. (for example) xvii-xxii, 2-3, 7-9, 12-14, 17, 32-33, 36, 39-40, 45-46, 51, 53, 60-61. The most simple and central definitions might be “straightforward” for cheng and “unexpected” for ch’i; but the fact that the

two concepts interpenetrate and change into one another, in the hands of an able commander, means that a whole series of synonyms, some mutually contradictory or paradoxical, would be needed to give an adequately full idea of what they mean. For example, if your opponent expects you to function in an exotic (ch’i) manner, it then becomes ch’i for you to behave in an orthodox (cheng) fashion. 39. That is, Han Hsin and his deputy, Chang Erh, subsequently king of Chao. 40. Wang Po-hsiang, in Shih-chi hstian (Peking, People’s Cultural Publishing Co., 1962}, rather unnecessarily explicates this as meaning that

Ch’en Yii was book-bound and that he did not understand the sort of pervasive and universal change necessary in war. (See n. 38 above.) Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s portrait of Ch’en Yii is hardly flattering. He emerges as a turbulent and short-sighted opportunist, so dim-witted that at one point Liu Pang cozens him incredibly by sending him “the head of Chang Erh,” but substituting another’s head (Shih-chi 89, 1]. 109-110}. This is especially incomprehensible since (a) Ch’en accepted the head as genuine and for a time cooperated with Liu Pang although (b} Ch’en and Chang had for some years been the closest of associates. See Shih-chi 89, the lieh-chuan devoted to them, passim. 41. This translation accepts the punctuation supplied by Wang Po-hsiang, Shih-chi hstian, p. 344. 42. Ch’en may have been deceived by hearing that Liu Pang had taken away Han Hsin’s best troops or, more likely, by his own overinterpretation of that report. 43. This adopts the paraphrase of Sun-tzu which Han Hsin’s generals later use. Wang Po-hsiang traces that to the Hsing-chiin section of the

319

Notes to Pages 58-62

Sun-tzu ping-fa. I find adjurations there concerning keeping high ground to one’s right and rear, but nothing about water to the left. 44, From Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s narrative, with its built-in time frame, we have a quite specific place for the battle. In theory this should make a satisfactory identification of the battlefield fairly easy. It does not turn out to be that simple. In fact, in the present state of our knowledge and of access to China, it seems impossible. The maps are uneven and in some measure conflicting; aerial photographs offer some help but not really enough; and the written tradition is for the most part rather counterproductive. Following is a list of literary and cartographic items that have been consulted {omitting a considerable number of dry holes}: {a} DeFrancis cites TMT/C, the best known dictionary of Chinese historical geography, and the Shui-ching chu (Water classic annotated}. The first is patently wrong and the second inconclusive. (b} Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t’u chi has a small and truly fantastic map. (c) Yang Shou-ching, Li-tai yti-ti yen-ke hsien-yao t’u (Sequential maps of vital places in historical geography) is useful for a relatively broad idea but quite inconclusive for anything so detailed as our inquiry. (d) Wang Po-hsiang’s map in Shih-chi hstian follows TMT/C on a wild goose chase which would require inserting some days into Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s tight timetable. (e} Ching-hsing hsien-chih, published by Ch’eng-wen ch’u-pan-she, Taipei, 1968, presumably enshrines local traditions which are, alas, incredible. They would require Han Hsin’s troops to have marched some miles from the mouth of the gorge and to cross two streams. In the present state of our knowledge, it seems that we are best served by holding fast to what Ssu-ma Ch’ien offers. It may be a fiction, but it is at least a fiction which reinforces the other data in his Shih-chi 89. That is to say, we must assume that the battlefield was very close to the gorge and that the beheading of Ch’en Yii as well as the fighting took place right there. 45. This is again clearly an idea from the Sun-tzu ping-fa, the Chiu-ti FLHK (Nine situations) section; but the language is quite different in detail. 46. The adjectives are from Griffith’s Sun Tzu, p. 147, paragraph 13, describing the sort of commander who can use agents effectively. 47. An example of this seems to be his treatment of the Ch’u king's reinforcement of Tzu-yii before Ch’eng-p’u. Whereas the Tso-chuan specifies that Tzu-yii received “the western kuang, the eastern palace [guards], and six tsu of Jo-ao,” all of them raising philological issues, Ssu-ma Ch’ien says only that King Ch’eng gave Tzu-yii ‘a few troops” (shao shih). 48. See Kierman, pp. 32-34, 88-89, and 90. 49. The concept of the military horizon and the characterization of it are from H. H. Turney-High, Primitive War, 2d ed. (Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 21-38. Turney-High’s remarkable book ruffled many feathers when it was first published in 1949, largely because of what one reviewer styled, with a perceptible sniff of distaste, its ‘cavalier vigor.” For students of ancient Chinese military history, it suggests an interesting possibility of assessing battle accounts. In the Preface (p. xv] Turney-High says: “War is the first social science to become truly scientific, for it is the first the practice of which has been reduced to a few simple principles which are true without regard to time or place.” This offers the possibility that the principles of war can be adapted as solid criteria for

320

Notes to Pages 62-66

evaluating the credibility of battle narratives—a considerable advance upon merely feeling intuitively toward a judgment as to whether a given account seems reasonable. The metaphorical use of “horizon” as a technical archaeological term is well established. 50. Turney-High, p. 23. Certainly a consideration of the Japanese nation during the century from 1860 to 1960 seems to indicate a considerable correlation between success in war and success in peace. 51. Certainly if the Chinese did invent the stirrup, that would be a signal item in any such chain of adaptation. Lynn White, in Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962}, p. 15, says “the foot-stirrup is presumably a Chinese invention”; Charles Chenevix Trench, in A History of Horsemanship (London, Longmans, 1970}, pp. 64-68, believes otherwise. The question is still an open one. 52. Henri Maspero, La Chine Antique, new ed. (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1965], pp. 263-267, discusses in detail the militarized organization of Chin under Duke Wen. Obviously Ch’in was a highly militarized state; Ch’u showed the same pattern (the ling-yin was both prime minister and commander in chief); and, although the documentation is not always satisfactory, this seems to have been the case generally both in Ch’un-ch’iu and Warring States times. 53. E. G. Pulleyblank, The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan (London, Oxford University Press, 1955), Appendix II, furnishes proof as dramatic as tables can give of the north-to-south population shift between Sui and mid-T’ang times. The increasing barbarian presence in North China throughout Sung times meant a continual accretion of population in the south, including moves from the Yangtze Valley farther south (Herold J. Wiens, Han Chinese Expansion in South China [Hamden, Shoe String Press, 1954], p. 183). F. W. Mote has pointed out that four-fifths of the Chinese people lived in the area south of the Huai by the time the Mongols completed the subjugation of China (‘China under Mongol Domination,” forthcoming in vol. IV of The Cambridge History of China). By Ming times certain parts of the North China plain were sufficiently depopulated so that tax exemptions were offered to induce settlers to go there (P. T. Ho, Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953 {Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959], p. 263}.

54. Warring States China produced many generals of undoubted effectiveness: Yo Yi and T’ien Tan, rivals from Yen and Ch’i; the great sequence of the “generals of Chao” in Shih-chi, chap. 81: Lien P’o, Chao She, and Li Mu, not to mention that bold soldier-diplomat Lin Hsiang-ju; and the generals of Ch’in, Po Ch’i, Wang Chien, Chang Han, and so on. It is an impressive list. 55. See DeFrancis, pp. 197-198 and 201-207. 56. It is a striking testimony to the potency of Chinese hagiography that Liu Pang was eventually dry-cleaned sufficiently to become the conscious blueprint for Chu Yiian-chang. 57. The stratagem of attacking an army when it was halfway across a river was extremely common, to the point where the Duke of Sung seems rather like a caricature. Sun Tzu says: ‘‘When an advancing enemy crosses water, do not meet him at the'water’s edge. It is advantageous to allow half his force to cross and then strike” (Griffith, p. 116). At least one important

on

Notes to Page 66

battle of Ch’u-Han times pivoted on such a situation: that in which Liu Pang taunted the old cronies of Hsiang Liang into transgressing Hsiang Yti’s orders and seeking combat. Liu Pang caught them halfway across the Fan River and destroyed the army (Ku Chieh-kang, chap. 7, ll. 272~274). 58. This is an impressionistic and imprecise version of the Sun-tzu ping-fa, section mou-kung {planning the attack). See Griffith, pp. 79-80, where the formula is: Five times, attack him. Twice, divide him. Equally matched, engage him.

322.

The Campaigns of Han Wu-ti, by Michael Loewe ABBREVIATIONS

BMFEA Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities. HFHD H.H. Dubs, History of the Former Han Dynasty (Baltimore and London, Waverly Press, 1938-1955). Unless otherwise stated, references are to vol. 2. HJAS = Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies.

HS Han-shu. References are to Wang Hsien-ch’ien, Han-shu pu-chu {Ch’ang-sha, 1900).

MH E. Chavannes, Les Mémoires Historiques de Se-ma Ts’ien (Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1895-1905; reprinted Paris, Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1967}.

RHA Michael Loewe, Records of Han Administration {Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1967}.

SC Shih-chi. References are to Takigawa Kametaro, Shiki kaichti kosho (Tokyo, 1932-1934}.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

As always for the history of the Western or Former Han dynasty, the various chapters of the Historical Records (Shih-chi) and the Han History (Han-shu) provide the basic, and often the only, information. In addition to the bare statements of fact in the Basic Annals (pen-chi} chapters of both works, the biographies add considerably more detail about an individual’s part in a campaign or the circumstances in which fighting took place. However, actual descriptions of battles are rare; and, as might be expected, they are designed to persuade a reader rather than to provide him with an objective estimate of an engagement. {For descriptions of fighting see HS 55:12b ff for a battle with the Hsiung-nu in 119 B.c.; HS 54 (translated as Appendix B of this essay} for Li Ling’s fight; and HFHD, pp. 282ff for the battle with Chih-chih in 38 ..c.} In addition to the monographs that are concerned with the non-Chinese peoples (that is, SC chap. 110, 113-116, 123; HS 94-96}, the notes incorporated in Han-shu, chap. 28 (the chapter on administrative geography) are of value in showing the different stages of Han penetration that resulted from the campaigns. The tables (piao) of both these two histories include facts of an archival nature, for example, the conferment of nobilities on successful generals, which may sometimes, and with great caution, be subjected to statistical analysis. The degree of consistency between the different parts of the two histories is remarkably high. Since exceptions cannot fail to attract a reader’s attention, it is necessary to point to one instance of an omission, which may warm us that the records are not necessarily complete. According to Han-shu chap. 17 (one of the tables), in 147 s.c. nobilities were conferred on no less than seven kings of the Hsiung-nu who had surrendered to Han. However, references to this event

520

Notes to Pages 67-69

do not appear elsewhere in the Han-shu, either in the appropriate Annals chapter or in the monograph on the Hsiung-nu. In the corresponding table in the Shih-chi (chap. 19}, the entries for the seven nobilities duly appear, with some textual differences; and these are indeed partly supplemented in the appropriate chapter of the Annals of the Shih-chi {chap. 11) by the short statement that ‘In the spring two Hsiung-nu kings surrendered, bringing their followers with them, and were invested as nobles.” But apart from this terse reference we are left to speculate on the antecedents of the event and its consequences. (See SC 11:10; SC 19:45f; HS 17:4.)

For the Han period, as subsequently, historians are somewhat hampered by a lack of material bearing on the organization and performance of task forces. By contrast, the records that illustrate the administration of the garrison forces on the Wall are all but unique, fragmentary as they are, for the whole of Chinese history until the Ming period. For theoretical and technical manuals, historians of Han are not so fortunate as their colleagues who work in later periods such as Sung or Yiian, who may call on the evidence of a larger volume of material. For although the bibliographical list that is incorporated in the Han-shu as chapter 30 includes a total of over fifty works, amounting to some seven hundred chapters (p’ien), only a fraction of these texts is now extant. However, an examination of the titles of those works reveals that at the beginning of the Christian era the imperial library possessed copies of books on strategy and technical problems. There were treatises attributed to particular generals, possibly including Li Kuang, who has figured above. In addition there were specialist manuals on the use of weapons, including one in fifteen chapters which concerned the method of shooting by long-range repeater crossbows. 1. See MH, I, lxii ff; HFHD, pp. 7f; and p. 104 above. 2. For the extent of these kingdoms, see Michael Loewe, Imperial China (London, 1966; New York and Washington, Praeger, 1969}, pp. 49 and 54-55 (maps 3 and 4}.

3. See map, Expansion under Han Wu-ti, above; the original kingdom of Tai included the later commanderies of Yiin-chung (until 196 B.c.), Ting-hsiang, and Yen-men (until 144? B.c.). In 114 B.c. the kingdom was taken over by the central government directly, as the commanderies of Tai and T’ai-yiian. Until 144 B.c., Yen included the later commanderies of Liao-hsi, Liao-tung, Yu-pei-p’ing, Yii-yang, and Shang-ku. 4. That is, the so-called policy of Ho-ch’in. See Ying-shih Yii, Trade and Expansion in Han China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967], p. 41. For the revival of such an arrangement at the end of the Wu-ti period, when the terms envisaged the gift of a Chinese princess, with silks and provisions, see HS 94A:21b. 5. HS 4:15; HFHD, 1,225; HS 94A:13b. Kan-ch’iian was in the metropolitan commandery of the Tso-p’ing-i. 6. HS 94A:15b. 7. Reference has been made in the Bibliographical Note above to an incident of 147 B.c. which is not fully documented. 8. On this subject see Michael Loewe, ‘The Case of Witchcraft in 91 B.c.: Its Historical Setting and Effect on Han Dynastic History,” Asia Major, XV (1970}, pt. 2, pp. 159 ff.

9, HS 6:13, 34, and 36b; HFHD, 58, 106, and 1134. 32.4

Notes to Pages 70-78

10. For the dependent states see RHA, I, 61ff. ll. HS 6:6; HFHD, 39; HS 6:10b; HFHD, 51; HS 6:14ff; HFHD, 61; HS 6:16; HFHD, 65; for irrigational work see HS 94A:20. 12. Rebelling against Han authority, the western Ch’iang exchanged envoys with the Hsiung-nu and attacked two prefectures that were later incorporated in the commandery of Chin-ch’eng; HS 6:22b; HFHD, 81. 13. See Hans Bielenstein, The Chinese Colonization of Fukien until the End of T’ang, Studia Serica Bernhard Karlgren dedicata (Copenhagen, Einer Munksgaard, 1959), pp. 98ff. 14. For an early attempt to establish Han authority in Korea (128-127 B.c.), see HS 6:10b; HFHD, 50; and K. H. J. Gardiner, The Early History of Korea (Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1969}. For the campaigns in Nan-ytieh, Ch’ao-hsien, and the southwest of 112-111 s.c., see HS 6:21; HFHD, 79ff. For earlier attempts of the Chinese to penetrate to the southwest see Y. Hervouet, Un poéte de cour sous les Han, Sseu-ma Siang-jou (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1964}, pp. 69ff. 15. HS 96B:3b. Wu-sun was situated in the I-li valley, north of the Tarim basin. 16. HS 61:9b; see n. 3 to the Appendices. 17. HS 6:31b; HFHD, 100; HS 6:32b; HFHD, 102. 18. HS 6:32b; HFHD, 102ff. 19. HS 8:21b; HFHD, 256; HS 9:11; HFHD, 331; HS 96A:7b. See Hans Bielenstein, The Restoration of the Han Dynasty, BMFEA, no. 39:92 {1967}. The 3 vols. of this work were originally published in BMFEA. Vol. 3 has been issued separately as a reprint. 20. For the motives of Han expansion see Ying-shih Yii; RHA, I, 48ff; and A. F. P. Hulsewé, “Quelques considérations sur le commerce de la soie au temps de la dynastie des Han” (forthcoming). 21. For example, see HS 24B:6b; N. L. Swann, Food and Money in Ancient China (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950}, p. 240; HS 96B:36b ff; and Yen-t’ieh lun, p’ien 2, 15, 16, etc. In considering the evidence of the latter document it is necessary to bear in mind that the views of the ta-fu are those of Wu-ti’s government, while those of the wen-hstieh are those of the critics who objected to the government's policies. 22. For recruitment to the civil service see HFHD, 20; for some of the changes in the administrative units see HS 28A1:19b, 24b, 30b (for the metropolitan area, in 135 and 104 B.c.), and HS 28B1:1, 11 and 19b (for outlying districts in 114 and 111 s.c.); for the financial organs of Han government and their changes see S. Kat6 in Shina keizai shi kosh6 (Tokyo, Toyd bunko, 1952-1953}, 35ff; for the monopolies of state see Swann, pp. 61ff; for minting of coin see Swann, pp. 377ff. 23. For Lun-t’ai (Bugur) see HS 61:11. 24. The best example, which is actually dated after Wu-ti’s reign, concerns Lou-lan, whose king was murdered as a result of a Chinese plot in 77 B.c. (HS 96A:13).

25. For example, see HS 96B:3b-4a for the expenses involved in the marriage of a princess to the leader of Wu-sun. 26. See HS 96B:15b ff for Sang Hung-yang’s proposals to establish colonies at Lun-t’ai, and HS 96B:20b for their acceptance in the time of Chao-ti. 27. That is, Tsao-yang, in the commandery of Shang-ku. The event is dated

325

Notes to Pages 78-81

in 127 B.c. (HS 94A:17}. See also Yen-t’ieh lun, 16 (Wang Li-ch’i edition, p. 115). 28. HS 96B:30b ff.

29. This statement is amply demonstrated in the population figures, that is, figures for registered inhabitants, that are included in HS 28. 30. Violence occurred on isolated occasions; for example, see HS 95:9b for the sufferings of Ch’ang-sha and Nan chiin in the time of Wen-ti (180-157 B.c.}.

31. For example, see the appreciation made by Ch’ao Ts’o in the time of

Wen-ti (HS 49:13a-b) and HS 94A:1ff. 32. See HS 94A:6 for Mao Tun’s insistence on the importance of land, at the outset of the Han period. See also Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York, American Geographical Society, 1940}, pp. 66ff, 76ff, and 523ff. 33. HS 55:13b and 55:19. 34. HS 94A:27b.

35. The term ch’ang-ch’eng is used in the Shih-chi with reference to the defenses built by the pre-Ch’in kingdoms and to the unified lines of the Ch’in empire (for example, SC 5:49 and 88:11). In the Han-shu it is used with reference to the time of Wen-ti {HS 94A:14) and the beginning of Wu-ti’s reign (HS 94A:16),

36. The premium put on iron manufactures is seen in measures such as the ban on exports which was imposed during the reign of the Empress Lii (HS 95:8b). Silks recur in arrangements for Ho-ch’in relations between Han and the Hsiung-nu and in other negotiations (see Ying-shih Yti, passim]. For the appreciation of Chinese silks by the tribes of the southwest see HS 95:3. 37. For the need of horses see Chang Chun-shu, “Military Aspects of Han Wu-ti’s Northern and Northwestern Campaigns,” H]JAS 26:148ff (1965-1966). 38. For the military colonies and the work of conscripts there see RHA, I, 56; for Sang Hung-yang’s proposals to strengthen the effort at colonies by moving civilians there from central China see HS 96B:15b ff. 39. For example, for the use of labor on road building in the pioneer work of T’ang Meng and Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju in the southwest see HS 24B:6b-7b. For the use of convicts for this purpose see the K’ai t’ung Pao-hsieh tao inscription of a.p. 66 {Wang Ch’ang, Chin shih ts’ui pien 5:12b ff). 40. The figures are those given in HS 28 for the numbers of households and individuals registered for each of the 103 commanderies and kingdoms of the empire. 41. The figures of the next census that are available concern the year a.p. 140, and on that occasion fewer families and individuals were registered than in A.D. 1-2. Whatever the explanation may be for this reduction, the change may at least show that there was no increase in the 140 years between the two counts; and there is no immediate reason why there should have been an increase in the population in the period between the beginning of Wu-ti’s reign and the census of a.p 1-2. For an examination of the population figures see Hans Bielenstein, ‘‘The Census of China during the Period 2-742 a.p.,” and ‘The Restoration of the Han Dynasty,” BMFEA 3.19 and 39:11ff. 42. For example, the technique introduced by Chao Kuo; see Swann, pp. 58, 184ff; RHA, I, 70, II, 319; and Michael Loewe, Everyday Life in Early

326

Notes to Pages 81-83

Imperial China (London, Batsford, 1968), pp. 167. Due note should be taken of Li Chien-nung’s warning that the rate and scale of progress in agricultural development was apparently not as great as has been generally suggested. See Li Chien-nung, Hsien-Ch’in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao (Peking, San-lien shu-tien, 1957), pp. 149ff. 43. These are the corrected figures given by Bielenstein (BMFEA, no. 19:135}, being the actual addition of the individual counts for the 103

administrative units of the empire. The totals that are given in HS 28B2:49b are 12,233,062 and 59,594,978.

44. That is, the figures for the following commanderies:

households individuals

Chien-wei (from 135 B.c.} 109,419 489 486 Wu-yiian (from 127 B.c.} 39,322 231,328 Shuo-fang (from 127 B.c.) 34,338 136,628 Yiieh-sui (from 111 s.c.) 61,208 408,405 Tsang-k’o (from 111 8.c.} 24,219 153,360 Yii-lin (from 111 s.c.] 12,415 71,162 Ts’ang-wu (from 111 B.c.) 24,379 146,160 Nan-hai (from 111 B.c.} 19,613 94,253 Chiao-chih (from 111 s.c.} 92,440 746,237 Ho-p’u (from 111 s.c.] 15,398 78,980 Chiu-chen (from 111 B.c.} 35,743 166,013

Jih-nan (from 111 B.c.] 15,460 69,485 I-chou (from 109 8.c.} 81,946 580,463 Chang-i (from 104? s.c.} 24,352 88,731 Chiu-ch’iian (from 104? s.c.] 18,137 76,726

Tun-huang (after 104, before 91 B.c.} 11,200 38,335 Wu-wei (from between 81 and 67 B.c.} 17,58] 76,419

Chin-ch’eng (from 81 B.c.} 38,470 149,648 Some addition should perhaps also be made in respect to the four commanderies founded in Korea and reorganized as two in 82 s.c. and for the two commanderies founded in Hai-nan in 111 and finally withdrawn in 46. 45. It need hardly be stressed that any calculation regarding population of a premodern society can only be tentative in view of the absence of certain information for such basic matters as, for example, the expectation of life or the particular age at which men became liable for conscription. I am indebted to Dr. R. S. Schofield, of the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, for these conclusions. For the Han system of conscription, see RHA, I, 79 and 162. 46. The size of the ch’ing {100 mu, each measuring 6 by 240 pu) has been calculated at 11.39 English acres. The shih (as a measure of capacity) was equal to 19.968 liters. See Swann, pp. 58 and 360. 47. See RHA, II, 67ff. 48. SC 102:16; 110:22, 27, 38. 49. HS 6:4, 7b, 10b, 32b; HFHD, 35, 43, 51, 102. 50. See p. 68 above.

51. The dates when the four commanderies of the west were founded are subject to some controversy, since the evidence is conflicting. See RHA, I, 59, where it is tentatively accepted that Chiu-ch’iian and Chang-i were founded 32,7

Notes to Pages 83-88

in 104 s.c. and that a further headquarters was needed in the west shortly, with the result that Tun-huang was established as a separate commandery, probably before 91 s.c. At first these were separated from Han China, as an “exclave,” with access by way of the defended causeway that ran through territory where Wu-wei was eventually founded, probably between 81 and 67. For the foundation of Chiu-ch’iian as a means of separating potential enemies see n. 71 below. 52. About 111-110 B.c.; see HS 24B:18, Swann, p. 307; HS 61:6. 53. HS 6:31b, 32b, HFHD, 99, 102; and HS 94A:23; see notes to HS 6:31b and 55:18a-b.

54. RHA, I, 56-57. This step in turn involved setting up agencies to supervise the agricultural work; see RHA, I, 70 and 144, n. 26. 55. See HS 94A:20 and HS 94A:21b for the extension to Hsiian-lei, which is placed either to the north of Wu-sun or in Hsi-ho commandery. 56. For example, Lun-t’ai {HS 96B:20a-b) and Ch’ii-li (HS 96B:30b). 57. HS 61:7b; HS 96A:11b. 58. HS 94A:25b; see also HS 61:9b for the dependence of a Chinese expedition in 104 B.c. on local communities for supplies and HS 96A:12b for Lou-lan being “regularly responsible for sending out guides, conveying water, bearing provisions and escorting or meeting Han envoys.” 59. HS 96B:3b and HS 96B:37b ff. 60. HS 61:7ff. 61. See HS 61:2b-3a for Chang Ch’ien’s report on trade routes to the west and the presence of Chinese commodities in India and HS 95:2b for T’ang Meng’s recognition of lines of communication from the southwest to the southeast. 62. HS 94A:18b. 63. See HS 96B:16 {for Sang Hung-yang} and 54:11 (for Li Ling}. Other references to maps are seen in SC 60:12 and 123:29; for slight evidence of the use of maps by garrison forces see RHA, I, 86 and II, 163; see also Hans Bielenstein, ‘The Restoration of the Han Dynasty,” BMFEA 2.31] :219 {1959}. 64. HS 64A:3. 65. HS 94A:6b ff. See O. Pritsak, “Die 24 Ta-ch’en—Studie zur Geschichte des Verwaltungsaufbaus der Hsiung-nu-Reiche,” Oriens Extremus, 1:178ff (1954).

66. HS 54:10b.

67. HS 55:4b ff. The difference in the results of the campaigns can probably be inferred by comparing the rewards given to the military officers concerned in the two expeditions. 69. HS 6:31b; HFHD, 100; HS 61:9b. 70. For detailed examples see n. 83 below. 71. For specific statements of Han’s appreciation of the need to separate potential enemies see HS 69:3a-4b and HS 94A:21b. For the foundation of Chiu-ch’iian see n. 51 above. 72. For the powers and status of generals see Oba Osamu, “Zen Kan no shogun,” Téydshi Kenkyii 26.4:68ff (1968). 73. HS 55:6b. 74. HS 55:13b.

328

Notes to Pages 88-92

75. HS 61:9b. 76. See HS 19A:22b ff, and the notes thereto. 77. See also HS 55:4b for participation in a campaign by the senior official (hsiang) of one of the kingdoms. 78. For the tu-wei see RHA, I, 60. For a tu-wei’s command on a campaign see HS 55:18b.

79. For a reference to the emperor’s use of this procedure for conveying the necessary authority see HS 64A:2. 80. For the organization of the garrison forces see RHA, I, 83. 81. See HS 17:11, 11b and 13b; for Chin Mi-ti see HS 68:18b; other examples include Ch’eng Wan, a Hsiung-nu king who attacked Chii-shih on behalf of Han (HS 17:23}. 82. HS 54:6. 83. For Li Kuang see HS 54:4 and HS 6:16, HFHD, 66; for Su Chien see HS 54:16; for Chang Ch’ien see HS 6:15, HFHD, 61, and HS 61:4; for Kung-sun Ao see HS 6:15, HFHD, 61; and for Chao I-ch’i see HS 6:16, HFHD, 66. 84. HS 94A:25. 85. HS 94A:8b; HFHD, I, 115. 86. HS 54:14b. 87. HS 61:9b. 88. HS 54:10a-b; HS 95:19. 69. Ho: 55:5:

90. HS 6:12; HFHD, 54. 91. A number of scholars have accepted this interpretation of the somewhat slender evidence. For other views and a fuller description see RHA, I, 79ff and 162ff. The age of call-up was brought forward from twenty-three to twenty in 155 B.c. until some point during Chao-ti’s reign (87-74 B.c.}. 92. See RHA, 1, 78 and HS 54:10 for Li Ling’s expert men from the south. 93. RHA, Il, 181f; HS 94A:25b; HS 61:9b; and HS 96A:11b. 94. HS 96B:30. 95. HS 6:22, 31b, 35; HFHD, 80, 100, 108; HS 95:4b. For a list of occasions when criminals or convicts were ordered to work as members of the armed forces, see A. F. P. Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1955), pp. 131 and 147, n. 109. 96. See Appendix B, p. 120. 97. RHA, I, 79; Hulsewé, pp. 240ff. 98. HS 6:22; HS 6:27b; HFHD, 80, 92; HS 95:19a-b. 99. In 61 B.c.; see RHA, I, 78; HS 8:16b; HFHD, II, 241. 100. See RHA, II, 261ff for fragments dated between 97 and 74, and ibid., 317ff for fragments dated 90-82 B.c. 101. Lien-sheng Yang, Numbers and Units in Chinese Economic History (reprinted in Studies in Chinese Institutional History, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961). 102. See C. Martin Wilbur, Slavery in China during the Former Han Dynasty, 206 p.c.—a.p. 25 (Chicago, Field Museum of Natural History, 1943}, p. 399, for one instance wherein the Han historian drew a distinction between a real and a propagandist set of figures. Possibly Wilbur's statement of “falsification” is somewhat strong, and the text simply means “forces numbered 400,000 actually, but 1,000,000 reputedly.”

329

Notes to Pages 92-97

103. See p. 81 above. 104. From the Han kuan i, ascribed to Ying Shao (ca. 140-200 s.c.}. For full references and bibliography for this passage see RHA, I, 162f. 105. HS 6:37b; HFHD, 115; and HS 61:14. According to HS 94A:25, a further 10,000 should be added. 106. HS 54:9. 107. RHA, I, 90. 108. For references to the forces involved in these campaigns see Appendix A (pp. 111-114}. The figures for the population are given in HS 28 under the commanderies named.

109. In 129 a.c., the kingdom of Tai still included the later commandery of T’ai-ytian. The population figure is for Tai commandery only. 110. At this time Lung-hsi extended over lands that were later administered as An-ting and T’ien-shui commanderies. The population figure is for Lung-hsi commandery only. 111. I owe this suggestion to Professor Herbert Franke. 112. HS 24B:7b; Swann, p. 246. 113. HS 6:22b; HFHD, 81. 114. HS 61:10a-b. 115. See Cambridge Ancient History, VII (Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1930), 35, 44, and 53; and X (1934}, 1O0ff.

£16: 45-0932: 117. HS 6:12; HFHD, 55 and 54:16b. 118. HS 6:12b; HFHD, 56. 119. HS 55:9b. 120. HS 6:14b; HFHD, 61 and 94A:18b. 121. HS 6:16; HFHD, 66. 122. HS 24B:12b; Swann, p. 274. The same figure is given for Han losses of horses in 123 s.c. {HS 24B:8; Swann, p. 251). 123. HS 55:16. 124. HS 61:10. 125. HS 64A:6. 126. For example, HS 61:7ff; HS 96A:25b ff; HS 96B:6. 127. HS 61:10. The passage refers to Li’s first campaign and his return to

Tun-huang, where, on Wu-ti’s orders, he was denied access to return to China. 128. HS 6:16a-16b; HFHD, 65; HS 17:13; HS 55:12b ff. 129. For schedules of mail delivery see RHA, I, 43ff. 130. For the professional standards of the Han service see RHA, I, 167ff.

Although the period covered by the fragments of administrative records runs from ca. 100 B.c. to ca. a.v. 100, and most of the material cannot be dated precisely, it is likely that the professional standards that can be inferred from that evidence were applicable to the period of Wu-ti. For an early appreciation of the need to use troops professionally see the submissions made by Ch’ao Ts’o in the time of Wen-ti (HS 49:9ff and 16ff}; for the contrasting disciplinary methods of two generals see SC 109:6. 131. HS 61:13. 132.. RHA, Il, 70. 133. For example, see HS 54:10 for the campaign of 99 B.c.

134. For details see RHA, II, 69. The calculation is based on the figure of

330

Notes to Pages 97-99

3.3 shih as the monthly ration of grain (either millet or barley}, and of 25 shih as the standard load of a wagon (see Michael Loewe, “The Measurement of Grain during the Han Period,” T’oung pao, 49.1-2:76). Salt could presumably have been delivered to the forces directly from the agencies of state (established ca. 119 s.c.) at the mines in Lung-hsi, Pei-ti, Shang chiin, Hsi-ho, Shuo-fang, Wu-yiian, or Yen-men. 135. See RHA, I, 106, 125, and, for other references to fodder, 94 and 105. 136. RHA, I, 70 (HS 69:10b ff). 137. For the allowances of grain for horses see RHA, II, 278, for a strip which gives the figure of 27.52 shih of barley for two horses for four months, that is, a daily ration of .116 shih; and RHA, 1, 94 and 154, n. 71, for the evidence of strip 65.2. (In the latter reference, the figures should be corrected to read .12 or .13.) 138. HS 24B:7; Swann, p. 247, comments on this somewhat enigmatic and

unreliable passage and concludes that ‘perhaps from 6 percent to less than one percent of each 3.616+ U.S. bushels of grains arrived.” 139. RHA, II, 261 ff.

140. For equipment in general see RHA, I, 85ff; for the use of bells and drums to control arrow-shooting by Li Ling see HS 54:11b; for the inclusion of a drum in a list of defensive equipment see RHA, I, 87. For the use of drums and flags by the Hsiung-nu and their capture by Han forces see HS 55:15b.

141. Some of these items are included in a set of inspection reports made by officers after inspecting the watchtowers of the garrison forces. See RHA, II, 151 ff.

142. See K. P. Mayer, “On Variations in the Shapes of the Components of the Chinese Nu-chi (crossbow latch},” in T’oung pao, 52.1-3:7ff and correction ibid., 53:293ff. 143. That is, shih as a unit of weight (29.3 kilograms or 64.5 pounds}. For crossbows see RHA, I, 125. 144. See RHA, II, 157. 145. See RHA, I, 153, n. 52. 146. HS 6:34; HFHD, 105; and HS 54:10. 147. See Wilbur, pp. 232 and 405, who cites from the re-collected fragments of a work on Han institutions (Han chiu-i pu-i]. In Yen Shih-ku’s note to HS 19A:12b the same passage is quoted, without the reference to slaves, as from a similar work entitled Han kuan i. Chang Chun-shu, p. 168, incorrectly gives the number of slaves as 300,000. For the establishment of breeding grounds under Ching-ti see HS 24A:15b; Swann, p. 172. 148. HS 24B:9b-10a; Swann, p. 262. 149. HS 6:32a; HFHD, II, 101. 150. Probably instituted as early as 178 b.c. See Hulseweé, p. 45. 151. For example: (1) HS 24B:4; Swann, p. 231 observes that the price rose to one hundred gold units, that is, one million cash, each, during the somewhat abnormal circumstances of the foundation of the Han empire. (2) Referring to a shortage of horses that existed, not surprisingly, in 118 B.c., HS 6:16b; HFHD, 66 records that the price of a single stallion had been standardized at 200,000 cash. A much-quoted strip from Chii-yen (37.35; see RHA, I, 72) gives the price of 4,000 cash for a “working horse,” as compared with the following prices

331

Notes to Pages 99-102

for commodities in the same document, which is undated: one nonadult male slave, 15,000; one oxcart, 2,000; one light horse-drawn vehicle, 5,000. For private transactions in horses see RHA, I, 116; and for a reference to the purchase of horses for the Han cavalry, ibid., 111. 152. HS 5:6b and 7:4; HFHD, I, 321 and II, 159. 153. HS 96B:3. 154. HS 96B:3b. 155. HS 61:8b. 156. HS 61:12 and HS 96A:37b. 157. HS 96A:38. 158. HS 24B:8 and 12b; Swann, pp. 251 and 274; HS 61:14; SC 123:42.

These figures are difficult to interpret in a full economic context, in the absence of fuller information. The accepted value of gold was 10,000 cash to one unit (that is, chin, 244 grams). 159. RHA, I, 94ff, IT, 99, 100ff, and 282ff.

160. Lynn White, Medieval Technology and Social Change {London, Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 1. 161. (1) Chariots. For limitations on the use of chariots in warfare during the Chou period see H. G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970}, I, 262ff; and Peter A. Boodberg, ‘The Art of War in Ancient China: A Study Based upon the Dialogues of Li, Duke of Wei,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1930. Cho-yun Hsu, Ancient China in Transition (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965}, pp. 68ff discusses the relationship between cavalry and infantry and describes the use of chariots in the fighting of the Ch’un-ch’iu period. Chang Chun-shu (ibid., p. 169) writes that chariots were used as the chief weapon in wars against the Hsiung-nu during the period of Wen-ti and even in 133 B.c., but that they were subsequently given up because they were inadequate. In a note to Li Ling’s use of his chariots to form a defensive barricade (HS 54:lla-b), Shen Ch’in-han (1775-1832) states expressly that chariots were not used in fighting. While the term chii-ch’i is seen in Han titles, its retention need not necessarily imply that chariots were still in use in the service. (2) Stirrups. White, pp. 14ff and 140, n. 3 summarizes the slender evidence for stirrups in the Han period. See also J. Needham, ‘Science and China’s Influence on the World,” in The Legacy of China (London, Oxford University Press, 1964}, p. 268, reprinted in The Grand Titration (London, Allen and Unwin, 1969), p. 86. 162. HS 54:12b. 163. SC 81:21 and 110:12; see also Lattimore, pp. 61-65, 387. 164. SC 7:60 and HS 31:22. 165. HS 66:1b. 166. HS 49:8. 167. Chang Chun-shu, p. 167. 168. HS 6:16; HFHD, 65. 169. HFHD, 15. 170. HS 54:12b; for textual variants see Wang Hsien-ch’ien’s note. The figure given may not necessarily be too high. Li Ling’s force numbered 3,000, and it is not impossible that each man expended 166 arrows during the day’s fight, even making allowance for the time needed to load the bows.

71S 554 and 55:5.

332

Notes to Pages 102-110

172. For example, HS 55:5. A further instance is seen in Hsiian-ti’s reign in HS 96B:5b.

173. The figure of 40,000 is given in HS 6:15; HFHD, 62. HS 17:12 gives 100,000; HS 55:11b writes “several myriads, reputedly 100,000”; and HS 94A:19 has 40,000, reputedly 100,000.” 174. For the dependent states see RHA, I, 62ff; Ying-shih Yii, pp. 72ff; HS 6:15; HFHD, 62; HS 19A:19b; and HS 55:12b. 175. HS 94A:19. 176. HS 6:24; HFHD, 84; and HS 95:18. For the failure to implement this plan see n. 13 above. 177. See Bibliographical Note above for the incident of 147 B.c. For examples of this treatment to Hsiung-nu officers see HS 17:6b ff. 178. Nobilities (how: sometimes termed marquisates} were the highest of the twenty orders of honor bestowed by Han emperors either as an act of bounty or as a reward for services rendered. They carried with them the right to levy tax from a specified number of households {hu} and to retain a proportion of that sum as the nobles’ own emoluments. 179. That is, the king of Tung-yiieh; here again the nobility was measured at 10,000 households. See HS 17:19b. 180. HS 95:4b-5a. In the case of Yeh-lang, Han gave authority for the use of a superior title (wang) to the one in use previously. Further evidence for the use of the title and seal by the king of Tien was provided recently by the seal found at Shih-chai shan. 181. HS 96B:36. Individual references to the officials concerned are to be found throughout HS 96A, B, in the descriptions of the states of the western regions. 182. HS 75:3b; Hulsewé, p. 175. 183. HS 4:21b; SC 10:39. For the question of the origin of this comment see HFHD, I, 272. 184. HS 7:10b; HFHD, 175. 185. HS 96B:39. For a further criticism see HS 63:22b ff. The same criticism, that is, that excessive expenditure was involved in relation to the return from the campaigns, was made by Huan T’an in the lost Hsin lun and by Hsiin Yiieh (see I-wen lei-chti, 12, Shanghai punctuated edition, 1965), p. 231.

186. Lii Ssu-mien, Ch’in Han shih (Hong Kong reprint, 1962), pp. 129ff. 187. MH, I, lxix. 188. For Han Kao-tsu, it is to be noted that he undertook one abortive and personally dangerous campaign against the Hsiung-nu (HS 1B:11b; HFHD, I, 115.) For Kuang-wu-ti, see Hans Bielenstein in ‘‘The Restoration of the Han Dynasty,” BMFEA, 2.31 :312ff (1959). The same point is brought out in a discussion that is reported to have taken place between T’ang T’ai-tsung and his ministers in 635 {see Chen-kuan cheng-yao 1:16a, Ssu pu, ts’ung k’an ed.}. 189. The mercenary principle may be discerned, in a somewhat restricted way, in the arrangements whereby men due for call-up were at times able to engage substitutes, for payment. There were also occasions, for example, during the eighth century, when a native Chinese government was forced to call on foreign help for survival and to make heavy payments for the military forces lent to the state. 190. For these units in the T’ang period see R. Des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires et Traité de l’armée (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1947}, pp. xlix and lvii ff.

333

Notes to Pages 111-122

NOTES TO APPENDIXES

1. See the notes to HS 6:14b for views on the identification of Chti-yen as either (1) the prefecture established at Edsen-gol, in the commandery of Chang-i or (2) a place within Hsiung-nu territory whose name was adopted for that prefecture. Edwin Pulleyblank, “Chinese and Indo-Europeans,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society {1966}, p. 21, points out that there was a further place which bore this name, that is, the seat of government of the state of Kucha, on the northern side of the Takla Makan dessert {HS 96B:14a) According to HS 96A:18b, the Han expedition advanced 2,000 li, passed beyond Chii-yen, and then attacked at the Ch’i-lien Mountains. HS 6:15; HFHD, 61, includes the statement that Kung-sun Ao, who took part in the summer campaign, was also punished for failure to reach his rendezvous; this is corroborated in HS 17:9. 2. For the number of inhabitants who surrendered with the Hun-hsieh king see n. 173 above. 3. HS 17:21 reads Chii-shih (Turfan]} in place of Ku-shih as in other passages; see notes to HS 61:7b. 4. HS 6:37b; HFHD, 115 gives the figure of 20,000 for Shang-ch’iu Ch’eng’s force.

5. A unit entitled “Che-lu of the left” was one of the subordinate platoons in a company of the garrison forces that was commanded by the commandant of Chii-yen. See RHA, II, 385. 6. That is, by clearing the vegetation from their own vicinity, they could avoid the danger of being entrapped by fires started by the enemy. 7. Lien-nu. This expression has puzzled comméntators; see HS 54:12 and notes. 8. That is, the noble of Ch’eng-an. Han Yen-nien had been ennobled thanks to the services rendered by his father, who had served as senior administrative official in Chi-nan kingdom and had been killed on active service against Nan-yiieh; HS 17:15b and 54:12b.

334

Regional Defense Against the Central Power: The Huai-hsi Campaign, 815-817, by Charles A. Peterson ABBREVIATIONS

CTS Chiu T’ang-shu, Po-na edition. CTW Ch’tian-T’ang-wen, Kuang-ya shu-chii, 1901.

HTS Hsin T’ang-shu, Po-na edition. TC Ssu-ma Kuang, Tzu-chih t’ung-chien, Ku-chi ch’u-pan, 1956. TFYK Ts’e-fu yiian-kuei, Chung-hua reprint of 1642 edition. TTCLC T’ang ta-chao ling-chi {Peking, Commercial Press, 1959). BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Sources for the study of T’ang military history fall into two categories. First are the standard materials for the period such as the official histories, collections of documents, private histories, and collected writings on which a historian working on any topic would have to rely. Second is a small but important body of specialized military literature from the T’ang-Sung periods, such as Li Ching’s Wei-kung ping-fa (seventh century), Li Ch’iian’s T’ai-po yin-ching (764?), and the Wu-ching tsung-yao (1040) of Tseng Kung-liang, noted in Herbert Franke’s essay in this volume. The basic limitation of sources in the first category is that the information they provide on military affairs tends to be highly generalized, little of it being in any respect concrete and specific. Nevertheless, it has the important advantage of being at least historical. The specialized military literature, on the other hand, offers an abundance of information, often precise and detailed, on virtually every aspect of military science. But this already suggests the problem, for military science in China bears the same relationship to the actual conduct of war that it does in the West. The two are related but they are not the same thing. Chinese military literature over the centuries developed a frame of reference of its own, but a frame of reference by no means necessarily identical with contemporary practice. We find, therefore, in these materials much information, but we cannot always be sure that it is, strictly speaking, historical. Further, characteristic Chinese humanism leaves its strong imprint on this literature. For what frequently receives stress and attention are. the more purely human aspects of individuals’ conduct rather than their military expertise or lack of it. These remarks are not intended to deny the value of works of this genre or the necessity of consulting them. Indeed, Professor Franke’s essay amply demonstrates their great utility. Yet it is well to acknowledge the presence of this central problem in research on the military history of this middle period, where the documentation appears perhaps richer than it really is. 1. See Chang Ch’i-yiin, ed., Chung-kuo chan-shih lun-chi, 2 vols. (Taipei, Chung-hua wen-hua, 1954}, T’ang section, pp. 19-20; Ch’eng Kuang-yii and Hsii Sheng-mu, comps., Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t’u, 2 vols. (Taipei, Chung-hua

335

Notes to Pages 123-126

wen-hua, 1955), I, map 92, IT, 195-196; and Wang Ching, Chung-kuo ming-chiang chuan (Nanking, 1934). 2. The following sources are available on the Huai-hsi campaign. (a) Two contemporary accounts: (1) Han Yii’s “P’ing Huai-hsi pei,” in Han Ch’ang-li chi (Kuo-hsiieh chi-pen ts’ung-shu ed.) 30:50-55 (also in CTW 561:1-5); and (2) Tuan Wen-ch’ang’s “P’ing Huai-hsi pei,” in CTW 617 :16b-22.

(b) Miscellaneous contemporary documents and writings in: {1} the TFYK (chaps. 359, 367, 374, 385, 388-390, 396, 398, 401, 405, 410, 414, 420, and 422, though probably elsewhere as well]; {2} the TT'CLC (chaps. 119, 124, and

127); and the CTW. (c) The Annals section (chap. 15} of the CTS. {d) Biographies in the CTS {above all chaps. 133 and 145 but several others as well) and the HTS (chaps. 154, 214, and others). (e) Ssu-ma Kuang’s characteristically excellent synthesis in chaps. 239-240 of his Tzu-chih t’ung chien. At least two other contemporary accounts have been lost. One is the “P’ing Huai-hsi chi” of Lu Sui, subsequently a highranking official in the 820-830’s who has biographies in CTS 159 and HTS 142. The other is the “Ping Ts’ai lu” of Cheng Hsieh who himself served on the staff of one of the principals of the campaign (see n. 88 below}. Both pieces were extant as late as the Ming according to the bibliographical catalogue in the Ming-shih. It is worth remarking that this event furnished at least eight model cases for the hou-chi part of the Sung military encyclopedia, the Wu-ching tsung-yao, chaps. 1, 2, 3, 8, 13, and 15. 3. There is no even remotely adequate treatment of this great rebellion, but see the following: O. Franke, Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches, 5 vols. (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1930-1952}, II, 451-470; Lii Ssu-mien, Sui-T’ang-Wu-tai shih, 2 vols. (Shanghai, Chung-hua shu-chii, 1959), II, 210-233; and Tanigawa Michio, “An-Shi no ran no seikaku ni tsuite,” in Nagoya Daigaku bungakubu kenkyii ronsha (1954), pp. 77-92. 4. See Hino Kaizaburo, Shina chusei no gunbatsu (Tokyo, Sanseido, 1942), pp. 39-81. 5. A recent paper of mine covers this story with some thoroughness: ‘The ‘Restoration’ Completed: Hsien-tsung and the Provinces,” in D. C. Twitchett and A. F. Wright, eds., Perspectives on the T’ang (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 151-191. The two were Yu-chou and Ch’eng-te. Of the other four, P’ing-lu, I-wu, Heng-hai, and Wei-po, the first three remained firmly under control but the latter broke away again in 822 to assume an autonomous status. 6. This was Li Chung-ch’en, who has biographies in CTS 145 and HTS 224b. It was evidently in the belief that this area would be secure in the hands of a proven loyalist that the court established a large territorial unit here. Its precise composition is extremely difficult to determine, but, known then as the province (or command} of Ju-ts’ai, it apparently included the prefectures of Ju, Ts’ai, Shen, Kuang, An, Hsii, and probably Ch’en. Li’s violent departure led the court to make significant rearrangements in this and an adjoining province, resulting eventually in Huai-hsi’s being cut back to three prefectures. 7. The most ample material on these revolts can be found in D. C. Twitchett, “Lu Chih (754-805): Imperial Adviser and Court Official,” in A. F.

336

Notes to Pages 126-129

Wright and D. C. Twitchett, eds., Confucian Personalities (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962}. Li Hsi-lieh, who was governor of Huai-hsi during this revolt, has biographies in CTS 145 and HTS 225b. 8. TC 232:7468-7470. 9. The three were Wu Shao-ch’eng, Wu Shao-yang, and Wu Yiian-chi, of whom only the latter two were related (father and son). All have biographies in CTS 145 and HTS 214. 10. See TC 235:7584—7592.

11. Asin 805; see CTS 14:5. 12. On this general issue and on these specific developments see Peterson, “The ‘Restoration’ Completed,” pp. 162-163 and 165-166. 13. See Aoyama Sadao, T6-S6 jidai no k6tsu to chishi-chizu no kenkyu (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunsha, 1963], p. 36 and map 2. 14. See map on population in Communist China Map Folio (Washington, Central Intelligence Agency, 1967); also Albert Hermann, An Historical Atlas of China, new ed., Norton Ginsberg, ed. (Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 56-57. 15. See CTS 38:26 and 40:4—5, as well as HTS 38:4 and 41 :2b-3a, respectively.

16. Hino Kaizaburo, “Temp6-izen ni okeru T6 no kok6-tdkei ni tsuite,” Shigematsu sensei kdki kinen Kyishai Daigaku Téydshi rons6 (Fukuoka, Kyushi Daigaku Bungakubu Toyoshi kenkyishitsu, 1957}, pp. 227-272. 17. See E. G. Pulleyblank, The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan (London, Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 172-177; H. Bielenstein, ‘The Chinese Colonization of Fukien until the End of T’ang,” Studia Serica Bernhard Karlgren Dedicata {Copenhagen, Munksgaard, 1959}, pp. 98-122. 18. Sung figures are of some but not of immense help. It is not until we reach the final quarter of the eleventh century that we find figures even remotely reliable. For Ts’ai-chou we find that the number of households has increased to 138,086, over 50 percent above the mid-T’ang figure of 87,061, and Kuang-chou to 69,958, doubling its T’ang total of 31,473, despite the loss of one county. (Shen-chou was administratively so severely truncated that no comparison is possible.) See Hope Wright, Geographical Names in Sung China (Paris, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1956), pp. 87, 161. 19. This point was made several times in court deliberations, though never specifically with regard to Huai-hsi. See Li Chiang’s remarks in CTW 646:4-6b (also TC 237:7659 and 238:7664).

20. See Han Yii’s remarks on the anticipations of this crisis in Han Ch’ang-li chi 40:51. See also TFYK 374:9.

21. My reference throughout this paper will be to lunar months which correspond closely, if not exactly, to those in the Gregorian calendar. The years in question will be yiian-ho 9-12 or 814-817. 22. CTS 15:6b; TC 239:7705-7706; HTS 146:6. 23. The whole episode is considerably more involved than I have indicated here. It revolves in large measure around Wu’s concealment of his father’s death for some forty days in an effort to secure his position before the question of a successor even arose. Though all points are not clear, it appears that the arrival of an official with a message of condolence revealed that the court had its own confidential sources of information, in fact one of Wu’s own officials. See CTS 145:10 and 15:6b; TC 239:7706—7707. 24. TTCLC 119:632; CTS 15:6b and 145:10; TC 239:7706. Wu's men

337

Notes to Pages 129-132

probably destroyed Wu-yang county in Hsii-chou at this time, though possibly a second time as well, and a new location for it had eventually to be found. See T’ang-hui yao (Kuo-hsiieh chi-pen ts’ung-shu ed.} 70:1257. 25. Though the names of minor locations, especially military outposts and forts, are impossible to identify, this can be safely deduced from the known sites reported where battles occurred. 26. CTS 15:7b and 145:11b-12; see especially TTCLC 119:632, which contains the entire text. 27. One might also speculate that the court hoped to conspire against Wu and have him either removed from within (as with Liu Ts’ung-shih in the province of Chao-i in 810; see CTS 132:5b-6] or assassinated (as with Li Ch’i in 807; see TFYK 374:4b). The first official pronouncement against Wu came in an edict of the tenth month of 814. It called on the officials, army, and people of the province to desert him; and it held out promise of a 2,000,000 kuan (string) bounty to the army as well as of three years’ remission of taxes to the people once matters were settled. See CTW 57:11b-12; CTS 15:7. 28. See n. 4 above. 29. On all these points, the provinces involved, the size of the contingents, the resulting diversity, and the commands to which the troops were assigned, see: TTCLC 119:632; Han Ch’ang-li chi 30:51-52 and 40:52; CTW 672:18-19 and 751:12. There is some discrepancy among these sources regarding the provinces involved. Few figures at all are given, so that one cannot calculate the numerical strength of the various armies. The small size of the contingents, however, comes in for comment more than once. In one case Han Yii’s figure of 12,000 for the Hsiian-wu contingent (Han Ch’ang-li chi 30:51) is contradicted by CTS 156:4 and HTS 158:8, which give 3,000. Actually, all his figures in this document seem inflated. 30. TC 239:7729. I have not been able to corroborate this figure in any other source, but it would be most unlikely if Ssu-ma Kuang did not take it from an authoritative document. 31. Han Yii, Han Ch’ang-li chi 40:53 proposes using armies totaling 120,000, but it is impossible to tell whether he is suggesting an increase or whether he is referring to the number actually on the scene. 32. For example, the provincial armies of Hsitan-wu and Yu-chou are said to have totaled 100,000 each, Wei-po’s 70,000, Ch’eng-te’s 50,000, and so on.

Though figures such as these have obviously been rounded off, there is no reason to question their approximate accuracy, as Michael Loewe has reason to question his Han ones (see above, pp. 80-83}. 33. Pulleyblank, pp. 61-77. 34. TFYK 122:23 mentions the establishment of local defense posts by volunteers. Though the post-An Lu-shan period remains neglected, see the following articles by Hino Kaizabur6 regarding the local militia employed upon the demise of the fu-ping: ‘Dai-T6 fuheisei jidai ni okeru danketsu hei no shdko to sono fikyi chiiki,” Shien 61:1-26 (1954); and ‘‘Dai-T6 fuheisei jidai no danketsuhei ni tsuite,” Hdseishi kenkyi 5:79-134 (1954). 35. See Professor Franke’s study in this respect, pp. 181-182. 36. CTW 751:12b. 37. CTS 145:8b. 38. At the end of the campaign 20,000 men were said still to be under arms in the various towns and posts of Huai-hsi (CTS 133:6b}. Given the attrition

338

Notes to Pages 132-134

due to casualties, captures, and desertions, this probably supports my estimate here. 39. Han Yii probably typified thinking at court on the subject when he called on the throne not to have any unnecessary slaughter (pu-hsii kuo-yu sha-lu). See Han Ch’ang-li chi 40:53. 40. CTW 57:11b-12; TTCLC 119:632. 41. See TTCLC 119:632; Han Ch’ang-li chi 30:51-52; and CTW 672:18-19. There is no specific term for “command” which J have adopted for convenience. Each “commander” essentially bore a title which placed him in charge of a province or, in one case, a lesser area. I do not, therefore, employ “command” as a translation, but, given the facts that commanders were made responsible for specific sectors and that contingents from other provinces were temporarily assigned to them, it is clearly justifiable usage. Directional designations have been determined on the basis of the locations from which the various armies were ordered to begin their advance and of where they actually fought. The commands fell under the direction of officials bearing the following titles. Northeastern: (military) governor of Ho-yang and the prefectures of Huai and Ju (Ho-yang Huai-Ju chieh-tu-shih). The attachment of Ju-chou to this area of jurisdiction was temporary, made only for the purposes of the campaign; see TC 239:7706. |The office of chieh-tu-shih had become largely institutionalized as “provincial governor,” pure and simple, by this time, though as in this case it was the title given to top-ranking military commanders in the provinces as well.] Northern: (military) governor of Chung-wu (Chung-wu chieh-tu-shih). Western: (military) governor of Shan-nan East (Shan-nan tung-tao chieh-tu-shih), later (military) governor of the prefectures of T’ang, Sui, and Teng. Eastern: defense commissioner for the prefecture of Shou (Shou-chou fang-yii-shih), a special jurisdiction created for the campaign, Shou normally coming under the province of Huai-nan. Southern: (civil) governor of O-Yiieh (O-Ytieh kuan-ch’a-shih)}. 42. That is, Yen, who was governor of Shan-nan East, was concurrently named imperial commissioner charged with the pacification of the prefectures of Shen, Kuang, and Ts’ai (Shen-Kuang Ts’ai-chou chao-fu-shih}. Occasionally used in situations of this sort, this title was largely symbolic and, in this period at least, seldom, if ever, effectively placed one governor under the command of another. Yen has biographies in CTS 146 and HTS 129. 43. TC 239:7723. 44. An alternate point at which to make the break would be upon the capture of the Ling-yiin fort in the ninth month of 816. See n. 58 below. 45. CTS 15:7b and 145:12; TC 239:7707~7708. 46. CTS 124:5; HTS 214:3b; TC 239:7708. 47. The northeastern commander, Li Kuang-yen, reported two victories in the third month {CTS 15:8; TC 239:7111], and much notice is taken in the sources of his victory near Hui-ch’ii [on which location see n. 84 below} in the fifth month (CTS 161:2; HTS 171:1b; TFYK 396:13b; and TC 239 :7712-7713]. The latter event is of particular interest in that Li, after being bottled up within his own field fortifications, recovered to win the battle. He had most likely advanced his position too far forward at this point;

339

Notes to Pages 134-136

accordingly, after a defeat here in the eighth month, he redirected his

efforts elsewhere. . 48. CTS 15:8 and 170:1b; TC 239:7712. This was P’ei Tu (biographies in CTS 170 and HTS 173), who subsequently became the dominant minister at court with respect to the war effort. 49. On Yen’s inept performance and disgrace see TFYK 445:8 and TC 239:7717. Kao (biography in CTS 162} is described as “famous” at the time of his appointment by CTS 145:12. Now at this point the court split the command of Shan-nan East, installing Kao at T’ang-chou in charge of combat operations and an experienced financial administrator at Hsiang-chou to manage logistics for this front. See CTS 15:9 and TC 239:7718. 50. Our historians are uniformly critical of Han (biographies in CTS 156 and HTS 158}, who occupied an absolutely pivotal position at Hstian-wu. CTS 156:4 makes clear the political motive behind his appointment which was, we should note, as commander in chief of the expedition against Huai-hsi (Huai-hsi hsing-ying ping-ma tu-t’ung). See CTS 15:9. 51. The major consequence of Han’s attempt was increased cooperation between the northern and northeastern commands. See CTS 145:12; HTS 214:4; and TC 239:7719. Even here, however, serious friction occurred as revealed in CTS 161:2a-b and HTS 171:1b-2. 52) TC 23937711.

53. On these events see CTS 15:8-9b; TC 239:7711-7720; CTS 124:9a-b as well as 170:2. 54. CTS 15:9b; TTCLC 119:631-632. 55. TC 239:7720-7721. 56. Victories are reported on this front in HTS 214:4, and TC 239:7719, 7722, 7725, and 7727. Li did seize one location which is designated by name

(Ao-shan), but this cannot be identified and was probably a minor position. It is significant that Li, who has no biographies in the official histories, ultimately received only modest recognition when rewards were being handed out at the end of the campaign (see CTW 617:20b}. 57. Both Wu and Li have biographies in CTS 161 and HTS 171, though those of the former are unaccountably meager. On Li’s performance in the campaign see also TFYK 359:18b-19. Victories are reported in these sectors in CTS 15:10 and TC 239 :7722-7723.

58. On the capture of the fortress at Ling-yiin see CTS 15:11 and 161:2b; TC 239:7725. Precise identification of such locations is out of the question, but, on the basis of information provided by later commentators and of the evolution of the campaign itself, we can arrive at an approximate idea of where at least the principal ones must have lain. According to Hu San-hsing’s note in TC 239:7722, Ling-yiin-cha lay northeast of Yen-ch’eng and southwest of Yin-shui (the town}. However, this does not take us very far, since by our present understanding both of these lay very nearly on the same latitude (see the T’ang volume in Yang Shou-ching’s Li-tai yti-ti t’u). Ling-ytin must in fact have been located more to the north than Hu thought, effectively to the northeast of Yen-ch’eng. For we know that, following its capture, the northern armies had to cross the (Ta-) Yin-shui (the river) in order to reach Yen-ch’eng (see especially TFYK 359:19b and n. 85 below); we also know that the Yin-shui ran north of the town of Yin-shui (see Li Chi-fu, Ytian-ho chiin-hsien t’'u-chih [Ts’ung-shu chi-ch’eng ed.] 8:230). The latter of course

340

Notes to Pages 136-138

came under the jurisdiction of Ch’en-chou. I conclude, therefore, that Huai-hsi had fortified Ling-yiin, which then formed a salient to the north, and that it was probably beyond Huai-hsi’s own frontiers. It was one of three major defensive positions on the north, though certainly the least of them, the others being Yen-ch’eng and Hui-ch’ti (on which see n. 47 above and in particular nn. 83-84 below}. 59. The initial commander on the south, Liu Kung-cho, was a civil official whose military responsibilities were delegated to a military officer (see his biography in CTS 165 as well as TFYK 389:25b and 422:23). He was replaced for lack of results in the course of 816 by a member of the royal clan, Li Tao-ku (CTS 131:6}. Until early 817 there are no reports of action, which Li's CTS biography (131:6b} attributes to his incompetence and corruption. 60. On Kao’s failure and dismissal see CTS 15:10a-b and 162:7; TC 239 :7723-7724; and TFYK 443:16b-17. Blame fell on the governor at Hsiang-chou, who was responsible for logistics as well, so that he too was replaced. On Yiian Tz’u’s conduct of the war here see TC 239:7727-7728 and TFYK 447:8b. The latter attributes his lack of success to an unwillingness to fight because of strong traditional and family ties he had with Ts’ai-chou. 61. An assertion to this effect is made in Wu’s biography in the HTS (214:4), which is in many respects less satisfactory on the whole than his CTS one.

62. CTS 145:11; HTS 214:3. It is worth noting too that, once the campaign was over, the government preserved the pasturages in Ts’ai-chou and established a regular directorate (chien) over them. See HTS 50:11b (also, R. des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires et Traité de I’ Armée, 2 vols. [Leiden, Brill, 1947], II, 902). 63. See TC 236:7609. 64. See HTS 50:11b (also, des Rotours, II, 901-902}.

65. Tung, about whom we shall shortly hear more, has a biographical note in CTS 161. 66. TFYK 396:14a-b; CTS 145:13.

67. That the court had counted on his assuming an active role in the campaign is apparent from its handling of him prior to the event. See TC 239 :7707.

68. On the subsidy system see Hino KaizaburG, “Tddai hanchin no bakko to chins6,” Tdy6 gakuho 27 :399-400 (1940); and Chao I, Nien-erh-shih cha-chi, chap. 20. A more recent piece by Makita Shichi, “To6dai hanchin no shikkai ry6 ni tsuite,” Suzuki Shun Kydju kanreki kinen Toyoshi ronso (Tokyo, Suzuki Shun Kydju kanreki kinenkai, 1964}, pp. 315-331, adds little to the discussion. One particular financial success gained by the government should be noted, namely, the considerable economies achieved through

relocation of the supply line leading to the northern front. Rather than having produce (grain and fodder) from the Yangtze provinces transported the entire length of the Pien Canal and then shipped southwards again, the government had the goods brought up the Huai River and its tributaries over locations in the prefectures of Shou and Ying. A commissionership for water transport on the Huai and Ying (Huai-Ying shui-yiin-shih) was established early in the campaign—precisely when we cannot say—and by the end of 816, after movement of some 500,000 shih of grain and 1,500,000 bales of fodder, it had saved 70,000 strings of cash. See CTS 15:lla-b; TC 239:7728.

341

Notes to Pages 138-141

Save for the administrative arrangements made on the western front (see n. 49 above}, there is very little information otherwise on logistics in this campaign. 69. Han’s most interesting analysis and proposals are contained in a memorial entitled “Lun Huai-hsi shih-i chuang,” found in Han Ch’ang-li chi 40:51-55 (and very briefly excerpted in TC 239:7712}. This was, as internal evidence makes clear, submitted in the course of 815 (and not in 816 as suggested by Hanabusa Hideki in the otherwise useful chronology of Han’s life he has included in his Kan Yu Kashi Sakuin [Kyoto, Kyoto Furitsu Daigaku jimbun gakkai, 1964], pp. 379-380}. In many ways it is a more valuable document than the official account he was ordered to compile at the end of 817 and which survives today (see n. 2 above}. The latter, when completed and submitted in the third month of 818, was rejected as biased. Specifically we are told (CTS 160:2b] that the eventual hero of the campaign, Li Su, was offended at the way in which his achievement was played down and that of P’ei Tu stressed. Indeed, one might today come to the same conclusion, and it is true that Han had been in P’ei’s service, undoubtedly remaining on close terms with him. Tuan Wen-ch’ang, who has a biography in CTS 167, was then ordered to compile an account which was in turn accepted. On balance Tuan exhibits a rather better sense of perspective than Han. While by no means underplaying P’ei’s role, he makes quite clear that it was Li who was responsible for the final stroke. 70. Han Ch’ang-li chi 40:52. 71. Tu alluded to this discussion with Tung, citing his views, in a letter to then Chief Minister Li Te-yii in 843, the purpose of which was to urge military action against the recalcitrant province of Chao-i. Entitled “Shang Li ssu-t’u hsiang-kung lun yung-ping shu,” it can be found in CTW 751:11b-16b.

72. The term I render here as “local troops,” ti-chu, is not remarkable for its clarity, but it probably refers to regulars from provinces adjoining Huai-hsi rather than new recruits or militia. 73. Biographies of both can be found in CTS 133 and HTS 154. Li Su had served as prefect on two occasions in the northwest, where such posts invariably fell to military men. Wedded to a royal princess, he maintained close ties with the inner court and was holding a largely ceremonial court position upon his appointment—at his own request—to the command at T’ang-chou. The appointment was made in the last month of 816 (CTS 15:11). 74. A point made clear in the fragment of one contemporary account (see n. 88 below} and, though ignored by Han Yii, stressed by Tuan Wen-ch’ang (CTW 617:20). Li Su’s conduct of operations at T’ang-chou on the whole is covered by a number of sources: Tuan’s account; Li’s biographies in CTS 133 and HTS 154; TFYK 359:20b-21, 367:9-10b, and 422:9-1l1b; and TC 240 passim.

There are relatively few discrepancies between them. 75. Identified as Sha-t’o Turks in CTS 145:13 and HTS 214:4b, though other sources are less specific. 76. On these recruits, called shan-ho tzu-ti, see Hu San-hsing’s note in TC 240:7333, and, on some evidence of their performance, ibid., pp. 7333-7334. The term tzu-ti was used commonly for local recruits; cf. CTS 15:9b, where they were called up in the Loyang area. 77. On the t’u-chiang see CTS 133:13; HTS 154:7; and TC 240:7736. TC 342,

Notes to Pages 141-142

240:7735 characterizes the “Six Sections” as the best troops in the army of Shan-nan East. Such elite guard units serving immediately under provincial governors were a common feature of the day. See Hino KaizaburG, Shina chusei no gunbatsu, pp. 40ff, and Hori Toshikazu, “Hanchin shineigun no kenryoku k6z6,” T6yo bunka kenkyiijo kiy6 20: esp. 111-117 {1958}. 78. This is clear from the way in which Li sounded out captives and defectors as to the key or most knowledgeable rebel officers associated with upcoming strategic targets. In this connection he made an important innovation in the treatment of captured officers, one which succeeded but which at the same time ran the risk of undermining the morale of his men. A vital distinction was made at the time between those of the enemy who defected and those who were captured, one which meant the difference between life and death. Li did away with this distinction, a step which not only brought good men into his service but also presumably encouraged more and more rebels to give themselves up. Cf. TC 240:7736; CTS 133:13; and in general the sources cited in n. 74 above. 79. TC 240:7730-7732. 80. CTS 15:12 and 133:12b; TC 240:7032. 81. See CTS 133:12b and TC 240:7736 and 7739, though the chronology of the former is confused. I interpret the battle at Wu-fang {also called Sui-p’ing} as a setback for Li’s army, though it is not described as such. It seems inconceivable to me that Li would have retired from the position he had won, as he is supposed to have done, had he not been forced to. 1he rationale we are given for this action is that by taking the town he would have alerted the Huai-hsi command to the presence of a new and dangerous army on the west, thus thwarting his hopes to achieve surprise in an attack on Ts’ai-chou. This must strike one as forced, and perhaps Li himself thought it up later at court when reminiscing about his exploits. Incidentally, the fact that there was pursuit by the enemy as Li’s men withdrew would support the contention here that they were driven out. 82. CTS 15:11; HTS 214:4; TC 240:7731-7732; and TFYK 165:12b. 83. For the victory gained in the third month, with heavy casualties for the rebels, and the surrender of the town, see CTS 15:12 and 161:2b; TC 240:7733. The victory was achieved only after a very difficult crossing of the (Ta-) Yin-shui which was defended along one bank by rebel forces; see esp. CTS 161:5b and TFYK 359:19b. Certainly the military position of Yen-ch’eng was seriously weakened by this defeat. However, in view of the judgment of imperial officers after its surrender, that its fortifications made it impregnable (see CTS 161:3 and TFYK 426:28), we must conclude that the defection of its commander was crucial. 84. CTS 145:12b and 161:3b; TC 240:7733. In the final stage of the campaign, Hui-ch’ii is said to have had a 10,000-man garrison. There is some confusion about its name, which appears sometimes as Shih-ch’ii. I consider Hu San-hsing’s remarks on the matter convincing: these are one and the same place and the correct name is Hui-ch’ii. See TC 240:7733 and 7739. Again we cannot locate this site precisely. It is said to have faced the town of Yin-shui (TC 239:7712}, but it must also have been sufficiently far to the north to be able to replace Yen-ch’eng as the rebels’ northern bastion. 85. CTS 15:12b and 145:12b; HTS 214:4b.

343

Notes to Pages 142-143

86. CTS 170:3; HTS 173:2; TC 240:7737; TFYK 389:25b-26. There was no little ambiguity in the situation. P’ei was given the title commissioner charged with the conciliation and disposition of affairs of Huai-hsi (Huai-hsi hstian-wei ch’u-chih-shih) which was intended to give him control of political matters and leave to Han Hung overall military command. In fact, unless he was prepared to make major decisions affecting the campaign, there would have been no point to his going. Cf. TC 240:7738. Some measure of popular sentiment toward this long, drawn-out war effort can be obtained from Po Chii-i’s poem “Releasing a Migrant ‘Yen’ (Wild Goose},”” which must have been written sometime in this later phase of the campaign (the text itself says 815, but this must be corrupt since later lines reveal that the war has been going on for a long time already). The second and final verse, in Arthur Waley’s translation, reads as follows:

Yen, Yen, flying to the clouds, tell me, whither shall you go? Of all things I bid you, do not fly to the land of the north-west.* In Huai-hsi there are rebel bands that have not been subdued; And a thousand thousand armoured men have long been camped in war. The official army and the rebel army have grown old in their opposite trenches; The soldiers’ rations have grown so small, they’ll be glad of even you. The brave boys in their hungry plight, will shoot you and eat your flesh; They will pluck from your body those long feathers and make them into arrow-wings! “That is, northwest of where Po was staying on the Yangtze. (Chinese Poems {London, Allen and Unwin, 1961 reprint], pp. 142-143. The poem originally appeared in 170 Chinese Poems and is used courtesy of Constable Publishers, and in Translations from the Chinese, courtesy of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.] 87. On government losses in the north see TC 240:7738. Moreover, rebel forces had the temerity to attempt to intercept P’ei Tu on his way to Yen-ch’eng as well as later to ambush him on an inspection tour. Both attempts failed, but the latter only just. See CTS 15:13 and 161:3b; HTS 171:2b; TFYK 359:20b and 414:22b-23; TC 240:7738 and 7740. On the defeat on the west see n. 81 above. Our sources bemoan Southern commander Li Tao-ku’s abject failure in the second month of 817 in not pursuing his advantage at Shen-chou after having breached the main walls, apparently a case of extremely poor generalship. Not only was the town not taken but a counterattack decimated Li’s army. As a result, Shen-chou remained intact till the bitter end and no further government pressure from the south is reported. See CTS 15:11b-12 and 131:6b; TFYK 437:18a-b and 452:23; TC 240:7731.

88. The author, whose account is lost as we noted above (n. 2), was Cheng Hsieh, who served as Li Su’s secretary (chang-shu-chi). The fragment preserved in the K’ao-i of the TC (240:7740}, if truly representative, would seem to speak well for the document as such. Ssu-ma Kuang rejects the point made in it, that Li had sounded out the court previously on his plan, on the grounds that, had Li done so, the idea would have circulated and Li could not have

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Notes to Pages 143-148

counted on any element of surprise in his attack. This does not strike me as compelling. 89. The date was hsin-wei, the fifteenth day of the month. All sources indicated above in n. 76, plus CTS 145:12b-13 and HTS 214:4b, deal with this event, but see especially CTS 133:13-14; HTS 154:7a-b; and TFYK 359 :20b-21. Li Yu, who went on to pursue a regular army career, has a brief biographical note in CTS 161. 90. Lionel Giles, trans., Sun Tzu on the Art of War (London, Luzac and Co., 1910}, pp. 122-123.

91. Ibid., p. 133. 92. A point stressed by all sources and also one instance of the valuable information imparted by Li Yu to Li Su. According to CTS 145:12b the soldiers defending Ts’ai-chou were “urban types, the sick and the old.”

93. In terms of attack unanticipated by the enemy because of the nature of the terrain, this is reminiscent of Jackson’s flanking movement at Chancellorsville in the Civil War, and more recently, the German breakthrough via the Ardennes in the Battle of the Bulge. 94. Tung Chung-chih {CTW 751:12b), for example, asserts specifically, that Li “had taken advantage of the snowstorm to capture Ts’ai.” 95. CTW 751:12b. 96. On this matter see Peterson, “The Restoration Completed,” pp. 168-170. 97. TC 240:7751; HTS 65:10b. 98. TTCLC 124:666. 99. The cases of Li Su’s attack on Wu-fang and Li Tao-ku’s on Shen-chou. 100. For two occasions in T’ang times (from the years 759 and 900) when action affecting this outer wall occurred, see TC 222:7086 and 262:8537, together with Hu San-hsing’s commentary. Often it was finished off with battlements (nti-ch’iang). See Li Ching, Wei-kung ping-fa {Ts’ung-shu chi-ch’eng ed.}, p. 43 (also, Tu Yu, T’ung-tien [Shih-t’ung ed.] 152:800a, this latter preserving major fragments of Li Ching’s work}. 101. Hu again provides a useful comment in this connection; see TC 241 :7764.

102. Li Ching, Wei-kung ping-fa, p. 42 (T’ung-tien 152:800a]}, discussing the construction of walls, takes a height of five chang, or approximately fifty feet, for granted. I hope to bring together and analyze such highly valuable specific material in a separate study in the near future. 103. Archaeology carried out in the Peking area has revealed the sites of the main town walls of the T’ang Yu-chou and of its inner fortress. See Naba Toshisada, ‘‘Todai Yishi-Keishi kyéiku ké,” Ogawa Hakase kanreki kinen shigaku chirigaku rons6 (Kyoto, Kobunsha, 1930}, pp. 153~266. 104. CTS 133:14; HTS 154:7b; TFYK 426:28a-b. 105. Ya-ch’eng and the governor’s residence within them, shih-t’o, appear frequently in the texts of period. Again see Hu’s commentary in TC 241:7764. 106. Moreover, cha comes in for use to designate battlements atop permanent (town) walls. CTS 151:3b even distinguished between two kinds, chan-cha and mu-cha {cf. parallel biography in HTS 170:3b, which uses other terms altogether, fei-cha and lien-cha). Cf. T’ung-tien 152:801a. 107. A number of examples of these have been brought together and commented upon by Hino, ‘“Tédai hanchin no bakko to chins6,” Toy6 gakuh6 27:176~196 (1940).

345

Notes to Pages 148-150

108. Cha were widely used by government forces in our campaign, hardly surprising in view of its length and of the stabilized battle lines. One prominent example is that mentioned in n. 47 above. 109. TC 236:7692-7693; see also HTS 152:7b. 110. Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Washington, Department of the Army, 1965}, p. 305.

346

Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China, by Herbert Franke ABBREVIATIONS (For editions used, see pp. 195-201.}

BEFEO Bulletin de l’Ecole Francaise d’Extréme-Orient

CMS Chiu-ming shu HCC Hu-ch’ien ching HYSCL Hsiang-yang shou-ch’eng lu LPSC _Lien-ping shih-chi

PYLE Pao-Ytieh lu

SCL Shou-ch’eng lu SK Ssu-k’u ch’tian-shu tsung-mu t’i-yao TASCL K’ai-hsi Te-an shou-ch’eng lu

WCTY Wu-ching tsung-yao WPCY Wu-pei chi-yao 1. The nearest equivalent to the European feudal “castles” which can be found in China are the fortified homes of landowners and their walled manors toward the end of the Han dynasty; see E. Balazs, ‘““Nihilistic Revolt or Mystical Escapism,” in his Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1964], p. 193. For towns in general see the illuminating article by E. Balazs, “Chinese Towns,” ibid., pp. 66-78. 2. Already in the late Chou classic, Sun-tzu ping-fa, III, 7 it is said that “the worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.” Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 78. 3. See the translation by Alfred Forke in his “Mo Ti,” Mitteilungen des Seminars fiir Orientalische Sprachen, Supplements 23-25 (Berlin, 1922), pp. 600-629, and his article ‘‘Der Festungskrieg im alten China,” Ostasiatische Zeitschrift 8:103-116 (1919). 4. The Wu-tzu has been translated into Russian by N. I. Konrad, U Czy, Traktat o voennom iskusstve (Moscow, Izdatel’stvo Vostocnoj Literatury, 1958), and into English by Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, pp. 150-168. 5. A short preliminary survey has been given by H. Franke, “Some Aspects of Warfare in Mediaeval China,” Trudy XXV Mezdunarodnogo Kongressa Vostokovedov 5:1-2 (Moscow, 1963}.

6. The technological innovations under the Sung are the subject of a collection of monographic articles, edited by Yabuuchi Kiyoshi, Sdgen jidai no kagaku gijutsushi (Science and technology under the Sung and Yiian dynasties; Kyoto, Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyisho, 1967). This volume has an article by Yoshida Mitsukuni, “Sdgen no gunshi gijutsu” (Military techniques under the Sung}, on military techniques under the Sung and Yiian, pp. 211-234. 7. WPCY 12:71a; CMS shang, 12b. 8. WPCY 4:7b and CMS shang, 12b-13a. WPCY lists altogether nine different evacuation measures.

347

Notes to Pages 153-161

9. WPCY 4:6a. 10. WPCY 4:5b. 11. WPCY 4:7a. 12. WPCY 4:7a-b. 13. WPCY 4:la-2a; CMS shang, 3a-4a. 14. Tso-chuan, Hsiang 14 (Legge, Chinese Classics, V [Hong Kong, 1872], 460).

15. Sui-shu 51:4b; see also E. Chavannes, Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux (St. Petersburg, Academy of Sciences, 1903), p.50. 16. Sung-shih 366:5a; see also WCTY 12:71]a. L7.-WGTY-12:71b; 18. HCC 6:48-49. 19. CMS shang, 2a. 20. CMS shang, 7b. 21. CMS shang, 10b-11a. 22. LPSC tsa-chi, chap. 6. 23. WCTY 12:72a. 24. WPCY 1:4b-5a. 25. WPCY 2:7a-b. 26. WPCY 3:20b-21la. The last sentence is a quotation from HCC 4:28. 27. WCTY 15:13b-16a; HCC 3:19-20. Already in the Sun-tzu the usefulness of espionage and diversion is stressed in XIII, 1-23; Griffith, pp. 144-149. 28. WPCY 1:la-2b; CMS shang, la-2a. 29. WPCY 3:18a-b. 30. WPCY 3:18b-19a. 31. WPCY 3:19b-20b.

32. For a German translation of the Sung military penal code see H. Franke, Zum Militdrstrafrecht im chinesischen Mittelalter (Mtinchen, C. H. Beck, 1970). 33. WPCY 1:6b-9a.

34. In the year 1066 a fire in Wen-chou destroyed 14,000 houses and killed 5,000 people. The 1341 fire in Hangchow destroyed 15,755 private and public buildings with a loss of seventy-four lives. 10,797 families, including 38,116 individuals, lost their homes. See Shan-chti hsin-hua (New conversations at the mountain dwelling}, by Yang Yii (Chih-pu-tsu chai ts’ung shu ed.; Shanghai, 1921}, pp. 35a-b and H. Franke, Beitrdge zur Kulturgeschichte Chinas unter der Mongolenherrschaft {Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1956), pp. 98-99. 35. WCTY 12:75b; see also HCC 6:48 for precautions against fire. 36. WPCY 3:30a-3la. 37. CMS shang, 15a-b. 38. WPCY 3:3la-b. 39. The history of weapons in China is the subject of a book by Chou Wei, Chung-kuo ping-ch’i shih-kao (A preliminary history of Chinese military weapons; Peking, San-lien shu-tien, 1957). For the Sung and Yiian periods see the article by Yoshida Mitsukuni cited in n. 6 above. 40. It must be regretted that Joseph Needham’s masterly magnum opus has not yet reached those chapters where military technology in China will be dealt with. The table of contents alone shows that we may expect a grandiose conspectus of military technology in East and West from this learned author.

348

Notes to Pages 161-171

This should be section 30 according to his Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1954], I, xxii, xxiii. 41. WCTY 12:3a-5b; 12:19b-20a. 42. Yang K’uan, Chung-kuo li-tai chih-tu k’ao {An investigation of Chinese measurements under successive dynasties; Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1938), pp. 108-117, gives numerous examples of Chinese foot-rules under the Sung. They varied considerably, between 0.22 and 0.37 meters. 43. SCL 2:la-3b. The yang-ma-ch’eng under the T’ang and Sung have been the subject of a study of Hino Kaisabur6, “Y6basei, T6-S6 yOgokai no ichi” (The yang-ma-ch’eng, a technical term of the T’ang and Sung], T6y6-shigaku 3:97-108 (1951). The height of the walls of Peking in 1125 was only thirty feet; see E. Chavannes, “Voyageurs chinois chez les Khitans et les Joutchen,” Journal Asiatique, no. 11:387, n. 2 (Paris, 1898}. 44. For pictures and descriptions of various types of crossbows, see WCTY 13:6a-12b. A table of the maximum shooting ranges is also given in Yoshida Mitsukuni, p. 218. There is a passage on crossbow mounts (nu-t’ai] in HCC 6:46, giving additional details. It seems that revolving devices for crossbow

mounts were already used under the Han; see Michael Loewe, Records of Han Administration (Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1967), II, 157. 45. Needham, vol. 4, pt. 2 (Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1965}, p. 335 and plate CCXLIV. 46. For a full description with pictures of the various instruments see WCTY 12:39a-57a. See also the table of ranges and other data in the article by Yoshida Mitsukuni, p. 223. 47. SCL 1:3b and 2:7a. Interesting notes on catapults are also to be found in Wang Tuan-li, Ch’ung-lun-wen chai pi-lu (Miscellaneous jottings from the Ch’ung-lun-wen studio}, Pi-chi hsiao-shuo ta-kuan ed. (Shanghai, Chin-pu shu-chii, n.d.}, 6:7b-9a. 48. WCTY 13:6a-12b. 49. SCL 2:7a-b. 50. WCTY 12:58a-b. 51. Needham, vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 420-421 gives an example from a civil war in the 1130's. 52. WCTY 11:27b-28a; an almost identical prescription is to be found in CMS hsia, 13b-14a. 53. Forke, “Mo Ti,” p. 609. Sung models: WCTY 10:15b-16a. See also in general HCC 6:48-50. 54. For a sixth century example of earthen ramps see the paper by Benjamin E. Wallacker, ‘Studies in Mediaeval Chinese Siegecraft: The Siege of Yii-pi, a.p. 546,” Journal of Asian Studies 28:796 (1969). 55. HCC chap. 7 has long passages on the use of flags. 56. WCTY 5:20b-24b. 57. WCTY 15:12a-13b. 58. WPCY 1:14b-15a. 59. WPCY 2:1a-2a. 60. WPCY 2:13a.

61. We draw attention here only to a few more recent works on the history of early firearms in China, in particular L.C. Goodrich and Feng Chia-sheng, “The Early Development of Fire-arms in China,” Isis 36.2:114, 123 and 36.3—4:250-251 {1946}; Wang Ling, “On the Invention and Use of Gun-powder

349

Notes to Pages 171-177

and Firearms in China,” Isis 37.3-4:160-178 (1947); Wang Jung, “Yiian-Ming huo-ch’ung ti chuang-chih fu-yiian” (On the construction of fire weapons under the Yiian and Ming dynasties], Wen-wu, no. 3:41-44 {1962); Chou Wei, pp. 269-272; and Yoshida Mitsukuni. 62. A picture of a reconstructed Sung rocket is given in Glimpses on Chinese History, supplement to China Reconstructs (April 1960), p. 3. See also Wolfgang Strubell, ‘Die Geschichte der Rakete in alten China,” NTM, Schriftenreihe fiir Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften, Technik und Medizin 5.2 :84-86 (1965).

63. Many interesting data can be found in Wolfgang Franke, ‘‘Yii Ch’ien, Staatsmann und Kriegsminister,” Monumenta Serica 11:109 {1946} on military technology of the fifteenth century. 64. A picture of the parts of a niao-ch’ung is given by Needham, vol. 4, pt..9; De 121.

65. LPSC, tsa-chi 5:239, with a picture of the weapon. 66. Ibid., p. 232. 67. CMS hsia, 12a-b. 68. On a recently discovered seventeenth century gun see L. C. Goodrich, “A Cannon from the End of the Ming Period,” Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 7:152-157 (1967). 69. WPCY 1:5b. 70. WPCY 1:13b-14a. 71. WPCY 2:6b-7b. 72. WPCY 2:10a-b; CMS shang 8a. 73. WCTY 5:20a-25b. 74. WPCY 1:11b-12a. 75. Chap. 14 of WCTY contains very detailed regulations for rewards and punishments. For the data given in the text above see WPCY 1:1Lla. 76. WPCY 2:15b-1é6a. 77. WPCY 2:14a.

78. WPCY 1:1la-b. 79. For the role of persuasion in politics see James I. Crump, Jr., Intrigues: Studies of the Chan-kuo ts’e (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1964), pp. 88-109. To Ssu-ma Ch’ien the gift of military persuasion of Lu Chung-lien

seemed so important that he included a pertinent remark in his summing up of Lu’s personality: “He was able to devise cunning phrases to lift the siege of a beleaguered city”; see Frank A. Kierman, Jr., Four Late Warring States Biographies (Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1962), p. 19. For an example in Lu’s biography see Kierman, pp. 45-47. 80. How much the Jurchen were feared is shown by the fact that Chinese insurgents tried to masquerade as Jurchen (by wearing pigtails}. SCL 3:8b. 81. WPCY 2:19a. Striking examples of what modern soldiers would irreverently call “pep talks” are to be found in the works of Ch’i Chi-kuang, LPSC, chap. 2 and Chi-hsiao hsin-shu, chap. 4. 82. WPCY 2:14b. 83. WPCY 2:14a. 84. CMS shang, 6a-b; WPCY 2:17a-b. 85. CMS shang, 7a; WPCY 2:18a. The Han Code and later codes do not list

the cutting off of ears among the mutilating punishments, but there can be no doubt that this particular kind of disfigurement was used, perhaps in analogy

350

Notes to Pages 177-187

to the treatment of prisoners of war (see n. 101 below} or to the tattoo marks inflicted on convicts. 86. CMS shang, 9b-10a {with a strange comparison between the soldiers on the walls and a woman in labor. Motto: wait for the right moment!); WPCY 2:17b-18a. 87. CMS hsia, 11a.

88. CMS shang, 8b; WPCY 2:1la-b. 89. CMS hsia, 10b; WPCY 3:8a. 90. CMS shang, 11la-12b. 91. For the strategic importance of Hsiang-yang see the article “Hsiang-yang yii Shou-ch’un tsai nan-pei chan-cheng chung chih ti-wei” (The position of Hsiang-yang and Shou-ch’un in the wars between north and south], by Hsii I-t’ang in Chung-kuo wen-hua yen-chiu hui-k’an (Bulletin of Chinese studies) 8 :53-64 (1948) and, for the Sung period, Sogabe Shizuo, “Sh6yd kdshusan ni tsuite” (On the strategic importance of Hsiang-yang}, Rekishi kdron, nos. 6-13:8 (1937).

92. This war and its consequences has, inter alia, been described by Toyama Gunji in his Kinch6shi kenkyi@ (Studies on the history of the Chin dynasty; Kyoto, Toyoshi Kenkyukai, 1964}, pp. 505-549. The book by Shen Ch’i-wei on the wars between Sung and Jurchen is rather disappointing for this particular war; see Sung Chin chan-cheng shih-ltieh (A brief history of the wars between Sung and Chin; Hankow, Hu-pei jen-min ch’u-pan she, 1958). The fullest treatment in a Western language was that of Otto Franke in his Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches (Berlin, de Gruyter, 1948), IV, 260-261, 297-299. It is now superseded by the monograph of Mrs. Corinna Hana (see n. 12 to Bibliographical Note}. For the treaties between Sung and Chin see H. Franke, “Treaties between Sung and Chin,” in Etudes Song-Sung Studies in memoriam Etienne Balazs 1.1:55-84 (Paris, 1970). 93. Interesting details on the mobilization of militia among the border population are given in the article by Shang Chung-lien, “Liang Sung chih chi-min-chung k’ang-ti shih yen-chiu” (An investigation of the resistance among the border population under the two Sung dynasties}, Hsin-ya hstieh-pao 5.2:147-238 {1963}. The fighting spirit of the Chinese against the Jurchen is the subject of an article by Teng Kuang-ming, “Nan-Sung tui Chin tou-cheng chung ti chi-ko wen-t’i” (A few problems of the struggle between Southern Sung and Chin}, Li-shih yen-chiu no. 2:21-32 {1963). The description of the role of the tea guilds as given in the text of our study is based on Saeki Tomi, “Sddai no chashdgun ni tsuite” {On the Sung dynasty tea-merchant troops}, Téydshi kenkyii 4.2:51-59 (1938). Professor Saeki refers to the tea merchants’ troops in Te-an but does not mention the identical actions at Hsiang-yang. 94. One edition has 24” for “34.” 95. Mining techniques are repeatedly described in military handbooks; see, for example, WCTY 10:4a-b and HCC 6:49. For sixth-century examples see Wallacker, p. 797. 96. Already mentioned in the Mohist canon; see Forke, ‘‘Der Festungskrieg im alten China,” p. 111. 97. HCC 17:167-174 and 20:189-195. The City God (Ch’eng-huang, lit. “God of Ramparts and Ditches’’} was a deity to whom prayers used to be addressed in public or private misfortunes. As his cult seems to have grown 0 Fa

Notes to Pages 187-194

from that of the ancient Earth God, he was considered a divine protector of each individual town. See W. Eberhard, Lokalkulturen im alten China (Peiping, The Catholic University, 1942), II, 182-183, and E. T. C. Werner, A Dictionary of Chinese Mythology (Shanghai, Kelly and Walsh, 1932}, s.v. Kuan Yiti (162-220), one of the great military figures of the Three Kingdoms, was in later times worshiped as a deity of military prowess and loyalty. In 1120 he was posthumously ennobled and finally raised to the rank of a god in 1594. As late as 1916, under Yiian Shih-k’ai, he received public worship together with Yiieh Fei. See Werner, s.v. Ch’ih-yu was the God of War in ancient China and also the patron of metal workers; see Eberhard, pp. 392-394.

98. The attitudes of Buddhism toward warfare have been brilliantly studied by Paul Demiéville, “Le Bouddhisme et la guerre,” Mélanges publiés par l’Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises 1:347~385 (Paris, 1957). Taoist sectarianism has shown over long periods of Chinese history many features connected with fighting and military activities in general. See, for example, Vincent Shih, “Some Chinese Rebel Ideologies,” T’oung pao 44:150-226 (1956). The same is true for the Taiping ideology, based on a garbled version of Christianity. For a Buddhist-inspired rebellion with some Manichaean elements see Kao Yu-kung, “A Study of the Fang La Rebellion,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 24:17-63 (1962~1963}. 99. This has been shown by Meng Ssu-ming in his Ytian-tai she-hui chieh-chi chih-tu, Yenching Monographs, vol. 12 (Peiping, 1938). 100. T’ao Tsung-i in his Ch’o-keng lu, Ts’ung-shu chi-ch’eng ed. (Shanghai, 1936), 8:127~129 gives a long description of their atrocities. 101. This occurs already in the Book of Odes where a special character meaning ‘‘to cut an enemy’s left ear off” (kuo) is used. But we read also in a TASS report on the border clashes between Soviet and Chinese forces on the Ussuri in March 1969 that the Chinese “cut the ears of some of our (Soviet] soldiers.” Stiddeutsche Zeitung {March 11, 1969], p. 2. Continuity or slander? See also n. 85 above. 102. Sung-shih 289:la-4a. See also Ta-Ch’ing i-t’ung-chih (Geographical handbook of the Ch’ing empire}, Shao-hsing-fu, p. 40a. For the City God, see n. 97 above. 103. The mythical emperor Yii was worshiped in Shao-hsing, because he was believed to have been buried there. This was already a Han tradition; see Shih-chi, chap. 6; E. Chavannes, Mémoires Historiques (Paris, 1898), II, 198: and Eberhard, II, 365-381. 104. Ming Shih-lu, year 1359, VI month, day chia-tzu. 105. It could even be argued that one of the striking contrasts between the European and Chinese medieval civilizations is that the former was a stone and iron culture, the latter a wood and bamboo culture. The role of metal industries in traditional China and the use of metals for tools and instruments should be reconsidered. Also the question why the Chinese so seldom built with solid stone merits closer study. 106. One of the first things the Yellow Turbans did was “to storm the prefectures, killing or chasing away the officials in charge and appointing others in their place, and collecting taxes and repairing roads [italics mine].” Balazs, p. 193. This shows that the Yellow Turban leaders had grasped the essentials for strengthening their role. 107. WPCY, postface by Hsii Nai-chi, pp. la-b.

ao2

Notes to Pages 195-197

NOTES TO APPENDIX

1. For example, KyGto daigaku jimbun kagaku kenkyisho kanseki bunrui mokuroku (Kyoto, Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyiisho, 1963), pp. 484-490; Chung-kuo ts’ung-shu tsung-lu (Shanghai, Chung-hua shu-chii, 1961}, pp. 768-777. These lists of titles and editions do not, however, include diaries, memoirs, and general historical works dealing with military matters, so that the

amount of source material is actually many times greater than what the bibliographies list under ping-chia. 2. The current edition of WCTY is that of Ssu-k’u ch’iian-shu chen-pen, a photolithographic reproduction of the Ssu-k’u manuscript (Shanghai, 1935). In 1959, a Ming edition of the Cheng-te period (1506-1521) was reproduced in 8 volumes by the Chung-hua shu-chii in Shanghai; this edition contains, however, only the first part of WCTY (ch’ien-chi). An early Ming edition of 1439 is listed in the catalogue of rare books in the National Central Library Taipei: Kuo-li chung-yang t’u-shu-kuan shan-pen shu-mu (Taipei, 1958}, vol. 1, chia-pien, chap. 3, p. 20. This seems to be the oldest edition extant. For bibliographical information compare Ssu-k’u ch’tian shu tsung-mu t’i-yao (SK), chap. 99, (Shanghai, 1933), Commercial Press ed. in 4 vols., vol. 2, p. 2041, and the Cheng-t’ang tu-shu chi by Chou Chung-fu (Shanghai, 1937}, Wan-yu wen-k’u ed., vol. 4, chap. 38, p. 721. Reference, if not stated otherwise, is always to the Ssu-k’u edition. I have draft translations in German of the following passages of the WCTY: from chap. 3, “Dispositions for Battle,” from chap. 5, ‘Food Rations” and ‘Fire Signals,” from chap. 9, “Local Customs,” from chap. 10, ‘Rules for Attack on Towns.” A complete translation has been made of chap. 14 containing “Rules and Discipline for Armies in Action,” “Insignia for Mobilization,” “Military Dispatches,” “Codes,” “Spies,” and “Local Guides.” For a translation of the military penal code contained in chap. 14, see n. 32 above. 3. Hsia Shao-tseng’s text is also preserved in chap. 139 of the San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (Collected records on the northern treaties under three rulers). All current editions of SCL such as Shou-shan ko ts’ung-shu (1844; the one that has been used] and Mo-hai chin-hu (1921) go back to the Ssu-k’u manuscript, which was in turn drawn from the Yung-lo ta-tien. For bibliographical information see SK, vol. 2, chap. 99, pp. 2042-2043, and Chou Chung-fu’s Cheng-t’ang tu-shu chi, vol. 4, chap. 38, pp. 721-722. A German translation of chap. 1 of SCL was made years ago. This text as well as those mentioned in n. 109 below have been discussed in seminars held at Miinchen University. 4. For a biography of Hsii Tung see Sung-shih, Po-na ed., chap. 441, pp. 5a-b. There were several Ming editions of the HCC; the current edition is that in Ylieh-ya t’ang ts’ung-shu of 1852 (reprinted in Ts’ung-shu chi ch’eng, vols. 0945-0946} (1936). For further bibliographical information see SK, vol. 2, pp. 2041-2042: Chou Chung-fu, Cheng-t’ang tu-shu chi, vol. 4, chap. 38, pp. 720-721 and the two postscripts by the nineteenth century scholar Tseng Chao (T’u-shu-chi-ch’eng ed., pp. 199-200]. There is a misprint in Hsii’s own preface, T’u-shu chi-ch’eng ed., p. 1, which has disfigured the dates. His biography in Sung-shih 441:5b makes it clear that the HCC was finished in 1005.

5. For bibliographical information see SK, vol. 2, pp. 2045-2046. The edition

353

Notes to Pages 197-199

used was that of Ts’ung-shu chi-ch’eng, vols. 0948-0950, based on the version in Mo-hai chin-hu. 6. The current edition is that in Chieh-ytieh shan-fang hui-ch’ao, printed in 1809 and reprinted in 1936 in vol. 0950 of Ts’ung-shu chi-ch’eng. For further information see Chou Chung-fu, Cheng-t’ang tu-shu chi, vol. 4, chap. 38, p. 725. References are to the 1809 Chieh-yiieh shan-fang edition. 7. The WPCY was printed in Canton in 1832 through the efforts of Hsii’s son (or nephew?}, Hsii Nai-chi, and has also been included in a ts’ung-shu on military matters compiled by another member of the Hsii family, Hsii Nai-chao, in his Min kuo chai ch’i-chung, apparently from the same blocks as the 1832 edition. See Chung-kuo ts’ung-shu tsung-lu, vol. 1, p. 185b. 8. On the Fo-lang-chi see P. Pelliot in T’oung pao 38:105, n. 39 (1947). 9. There is a picture of a grim-looking tiger fettered upon a carriage in WCTY, chap. 13, p. 26a. The use of animals as carriers of burning torches is repeatedly mentioned in historical sources and also recommended in WCTY, chap. 11, pp. 20a-21b. The semilegendary stratagem of setting a besieged town to fire through birds carrying torches has also penetrated into Mongolian traditions. Chinggis Khan is said to have used this technique against the Jurchen state of Chin; see I. J. Schmidt, Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen (St. Petersburg, 1829], p. 74, English translation by John R. Krueger in Occasional Papers Number Two of the Publications of the Mongolia Society (Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 1964], p. 50. 10. This has been made very clear by Hans Bielenstein, The Restoration of the Han Dynasty (Stockholm, 1954}, Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, no. 26:40-44, 61-62 (1954). ll. The text was, it seems, printed first in the Ylieh-ya t’ang ts’ung-shu (c. 1854) and the Chih-hai (1839-1846) from a manuscript version in the possession of Chang Tzu-kao (1794-1839). An easily accessible reprint with punctuation is the edition in Pi-chi hsiao-shuo ta-kuan, which has been used throughout. For bibliographical information see SK, vol. 2, pp. 1151-1152. The Ssu-k’u authors committed a grave mistake by mixing up the 1206 siege with that of 1268-1273 by the Mongols. See also H. Franke, “Some Aspects of Chinese Private Historiography in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries,” in Historians of China and Japan, ed. W. G. Beasley and E. G. Pulleyblank (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 124. I have a manuscript draft translation of the whole text; part of this will be published as an article, ‘‘Die Belagerung von Hsiang-yang. Eine Episode aus dem Krieg zwischen Sung und Chin 1206-1207” in the forthcoming Wittfogel Festschrift. 12. There seems to be only one edition of the text, that in Yung-chia ts’ung-shu (1872} compiled by Sun I-yen (1815-1895} after an ancient manuscript which had been preserved in the Wang family archives. For bibliographical information see the appendix to the text by Sun I-jang (1848-1908) and Sun’s Wen-chou ching-chi chih {ed. 1921, chap. 8, pp. 12b-19a]. Mrs. Corinna Hana has prepared a full translation of this text published as vol. 1 of the series Miinchener Ostasiatische Studien, Bericht liber die Verteidigung der Stadt Te-an (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1970). 13. The best edition is that in Shih-wan-ch’tian lou ts’ung-shu (1880); other editions, like that in Hstieh-hai lei-pien (1831) have been revised under the Ming dynasty so as to eliminate all those epithets for the rebel leaders which appear in the original version. For bibliographical information see SK, vol. 2,

354

Notes to Pages 199-201

p. 1293 and Paul Pelliot in BEFEO 9:223 (1909). I have prepared a full translation of the PYL which will be published together with that of HYSCL and chap. | of SCL in due time. There are, as a matter of course, numerous other descriptions of actual sieges in Sung and Yiian literature. They cannot

be enumerated here but attention should be drawn to the interesting account of battles against the Mongols in the years 1236ff in the biography (necrolog, shen-tao pei) of Tu Kao (1173-1248). See Liu K’o-chuang (1187—1269},

Collected Works (Hou-ts’un hsien-sheng ta-ch’tian chi), Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an ed., chap. 141, pp. 7a-2la. 14. Another text where the fall of a town is described are the relevant passages (chiefly chaps. 11 and 12) of the Kuei-ch’ien chih by Liu Ch’i. On this work see H. Franke, in Historians of China and Japan (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 125-126; also the translations by Erich Haenisch in “Die Ehreninschrift fiir den Rebellengeneral Ts’ui Lih,”’ Abh. der Preuss, Akademie der Wissenschaften 1944 fasc. 4 (Berlin, de Gruyter, 1944) and Zum Untergang zweier Reiche, ed. Peter Olbricht (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1968). Chan Hok-lam, Notes on Chin Historiography (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1970) published as vol. 4 of Miinchener Ostasiatische Studien contains a detailed discussion of Liu Ch’i and his work. A well-known example of a description of what happened when a town fell is the diary written by a citizen of Yang-chou after the conquest of the town by Manchu armies in 1645. This Yang-chou shih-jih chi (Records of ten days in Yang-chou) has been translated into French and German; see P. Aucourt, “Journal d’un Bourgeois de Yang-tcheou,” Bulletin de l’Ecole Francaise d’Extréme-Orient 7 :297-312 (1907), and Lucien Mao, “Meine Erinnerungen an das Zehn-TageMassaker in Yang-dschou,” Sinica 13:265-283 {1938}. 15. The peculiar attitude of Chinese sources toward figures has been very aptly described by Lien-sheng Yang, “Numbers and Units in Chinese Economic History,” Studies in Chinese Institutional History, Harvard Yenching Institute Studies, XX {Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 75~84.

16. See Hellmut Wilhelm, “From Myth to Myth: The Case of Yiieh Fei’s Biography,” in Confucian Personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 146-161. 17. See Robert Ruhlmann, ‘Traditional Heroes in Chinese Popular Fiction,” in The Confucian Persuasion, ed. Arthur F. Wright (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 141-176.

355

The Poyang Campaign, 1363: Inland Naval Warfare in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty, by Edward L. Dreyer ABBREVIATIONS

CHSL = Ch’ien Ch’ien-i, Kuo-ch’u ch’iin-hsiung shih-ltieh, in Chung-hua wen-shih ts’ung-shu, 2d series (Taipei, Hua-wen, 1968). CLHP- Ch’en Yii-t’ing, Chi-lu hui-pien, photographic reproduction of original edition (Taipei, Min-chih, 1965). CSPM Ku Ying-t’ai, Ming-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1887 printed edition; it is now known that this work was originally titled Ming-ch’ao chi-shih pen-mo}.

KC T’an Ch’ien, Kuo-ch’iieh (Peking, Hsin-hua, 1958}. KKKCL Huang Chin, Huang-Ming k’ai-kuo kung-ch’en lu, microfilm copy (Peking Library, roll 30) of original edition.

MS Chang T’ing-yii and others, Ming-shih, photographic reproduction of original 1739 edition. TTSEL Hu Kuang and others, T’ai-tsu shih-lu, vols. 1-8 of Ming Shih-lu (Taipei, Academia Sinica, 1962).

1. This article is based on chap. 6 of my dissertation, “The Emergence of Chu Yiian-chang: 1360-1365,” Harvard University, 1970, cited as Dreyer (1970). All dates have been converted to their Western equivalents. 2. For population figures of Ming, Wu, and Han in 1360, see Dreyer (1970), pp. 88-98 and 459-469. 3. Dreyer (1970), pp. 139-157. 4. These years are covered in detail in Dreyer (1970), pp. 158-280. 5. Wada Sei, “Min Taiso to kokin no zoku,” T6y6 gakuh6 13.2:278-302 {1923} shows on pp. 288-290 the veneration the Ming soldiers felt for Han Lin-erh, so that Chu Yiian-chang could scarcely be indifferent to his fate. However, there was no correspondingly clear political motive for the protracted siege of Lu-chou, though the Lake Ch’ao sailors may have urged it. 6. The upper limit for the size of the Han armada at the start of the campaign was about 300,000, so that the figure 600,000 given by all the sources must be halved. The latter figure is clearly a stereotype, which P’ing-Han lu (CLHP 28:9b]} inadvertently reveals by referring to Fu Chien’s departure from Ch’ang-an with a host of “over 600,000 soldiers.” There are three figures for parts of the Han fleet: {1) 60,000 to 70,000 lost during the siege; (2) 60,000 killed on the second day of the lake battle, which we may allow to include the 1,500 killed on the first day and the 2,000 heads actually collected on the second; and (3) 50,000 who surrendered at the end of the campaign. Only the last of these has any chance of being accurate, but the others will be exaggerated rather than understated. Yii Pen, quoted in CHSL 4:19b-20a, states that one out of every three adult males in Hukuang was conscripted for the Han armada. Hukuang had a population of about 4,700,000 individuals in 1393 and certainly less in 1363. It is unlikely that adult males were more than one-fourth of this total. On this basis

356

Notes to Pages 207-216

Hukuang might have been able to provide a force of 300,000 men but surely not one of 600,000. However, in contrast to the largely imaginary invasion of Fu Chien in 383 analyzed in M. Rogers, The Chronicle of Fu Chien {Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968), pp. 64—69, it is clear that the sources are quite accurate in describing Ch’en Yu-liang’s invasion of 1363 as an all-out effort, and that the Han fleet on the Poyang Lake was numerically much superior to that of Chu Yiian-chang. 7. TTSL 12:3a; KC 301; CSPM 3:12ab; jen-hsti = June 5. 8. The consistency is flawed by the statement of CHSL 4:19b, quoting Yii Pen, saying of Ch’en Yu-liang’s specially constructed great warships that “the largest could carry 3,000 men, the medium-sized 2,500, and the smallest 2.,000.’”’ If these figures are intended as normal complements, the ships would have been larger than the ships-of-the-line of Western navies at the beginning of the nineteenth century, whose maximum complements were about 1,000, yet which were horribly overcrowded. While the Chinese were capable at this time of building ships larger than any wooden ship ever built in the West, a ship of the size indicated could not have been moved by oars. Such other evidence as there is indicates a much smaller normal complement for the largest Han warships, even though the latter were much larger than anything the Ming could bring against them. The standard description of the Han warships given in TTSL 12:3a is repeated word-for-word in the other sources. 9. Controlling “several thousand” men; cf. MS 133:12b and KKKCL 2:11b. Presumably he did not command any more men in 1360 than he did in 1363. 10. For the gates of Nan-ch’ang see Nan-ch’ang fu-chih (1872), 9:1b-2a and Chiang-hsi t’ung-chih (1880), 65:3b. See also map on p. 206 above. Li. See 1:7; 12. TTSL 12:3b-4a; KC 301; CSPM 3:12b, ping-yin = June 9. 13. TTSL 12:4a; KC 301; chi-ssu = June 12. 14. TTSL 12:4b; KC 302; kuei-yu = June 16. 15. TTSL 12:4b; KC 302; CSPM 3:12b; ping-tzu = June 19. 16. TTSL 12:5a; KC 302; CSPM 3:12b-13a; hsin-hai = July 24. 17. TTSL 12:5a; KC 302. 18. TTSL 12:3ab; KC 301; i-ch’ou = June 8. 19. TTSL 12:3ab; KC 301. The biographies of Luan Feng and Hu Te-chi are appended to that of Hu Ta-hai in MS 133; for the subsequent disgrace of Hu Te-chi see TTSL 51:7a. 20. TTSL 13:4b; KC 307; jen-wu = October 23. 21. TTSL 13:4b; i-wei = November 5. 22. CHSL 4:18a; Yeh Tzu-ch’i, Ts’ao-mu-tzu 3:l6a. This source is very vague, referring to losses sustained in “over eighty days fighting before and after the P’o-yang Lake battles.” The length of time specified refers only to the siege itself (eighty-five days], exclusive of the month-long campaign which followed, but Yeh Tzu-ch’i himself was not present, so it is impossible to know what he really meant. The 1786 printed edition (4 ch., preface dated 1378) of Yeh Tzu-ch’i was used. 23. TTSL 12:5b; KC 302; CSPM 3:13a-14a; jen-hsti = August 4. 24. TTSL 12:5b; KC 302; CSPM 3:13a. 25. TTSL 12:5b; KC 302; CSPM 3:13a-14a. 26. TTSL 12:5b; KC 302; CSPM 3:14a; chia-tzu = August 6. 35/7

Notes to Pages 216-225

27. See Liu Ch’en, Kuo-ch’u shih-chi {Chin-sheng-yii-chen chi ed.}, 15b. “To lose the great cities of Kiangsi for the sake of Lu-chou—how is this good strategy?” 28. TTSL 12:5a; KC 302; ting-wei = July 20. 29. TTSL 12:6a; KC 302; CSPM 3:14a; kuei-yu = August 15. 30. T’ien-huang yti-t’ieh (CLHP) 12:5a. One thousand is the only figure given anywhere for the number of ships in the Ming fleet, many of which had been captured from the Han fleet, also 1,000 strong, in 1360. The Ming army at Nanking in 1360 is estimated at about 100,000 men, including the garrison of that city. In addition to the rest of the Lake Ch’ao group, which

surrendered at that time, the Ming main army had been augmented by the troops who surrendered with Hu T’ing-jui. However, much of this gain was offset by the need to place a large garrison of dependable troops at Nan-ch’ang. These considerations make it unlikely that the Ming could have formed an expeditionary force larger than 100,000 men as early as 1363. 31. TTSL 12:6a; KC 302; CSPM 3:14a; jen-wu = August 24, kuei-wei = August 25. 32. Ching-chiang-k’ou is slightly downstream from Hu-k’ou on the north bank of the Yangtze, and Nan-hu-tsui is on the narrow portion of the channel between Hu-k’ou and Hsing-tzu hsien {seat of Nan-k’ang fu). Tai Te’s biography, KKKCL 5:12b, makes no mention of this assignment. It is not stated who commanded the force at Nan-hu-tsui. 33. TTSL 12:6a; KC 302; CSPM 3:14a. 34. TTSL 12:6ab; KC 302-303; CSPM 3:14a; ping-hsii = August 28. 35. TTSL 12:6b; KC 303; CSPM 3:14ab; ting-hai = August 29. 36. TTSL has chosen to emphasize the more traditional weapons, but the Ming forces were also well supplied with firearms. CHSL 4:19a (quoting Yti Pen again} enumerates huo-p’ao, huo-ch’ung (cannon and mortars, respectively), huo-chien (this may mean rockets or flaming arrows), huo-chi-li (“fire seeds,” perhaps incendiary grenades of some kind), large and small huo-ch’iang (muskets), large and small chiang-chiin-t’ung and t’ieh-p’ao (both refer to especially impressive types of cannon} and shen-chi-chien (certainly rockets}. There was also a contraption for dropping bags of flaming gunpowder directly onto an enemy ship, from which, according to Yii Pen, there was no escape, but which must have been at least equally dangerous to the vessel attempting to employ it. 37. TTSL 12:6b; KC 303; CSPM 3:14ab. 38. The sources agree that he “took advantage of the [direction of the] wind, and loosed fire,”’ so this cannot be an instance of the use of cannon. See L. C. Goodrich and Feng Chia-sheng, ‘The Early Development of Firearms in China,” Isis 36:114—-123 (1946).

39. KC 303 states that the flagship was named Po-hai. 40. Yii T’ung-hai was hard-pressed at this point; see MS 133:4ab and 129:10b-11a.

41. TTSL 12:6b-7a; KC 303; CSPM 3:14b-15a; wu-tzu = August 30. 42. The fact that Yii T’ung-hai and Liao Yung-chung commanded the two wings of the Ming line is confirmed by CHSL 4:19a, citing Yii Pen. 43. MS 125:2b; TTSL 12:7a; KC 303; CSPM 3:15a. 44. CSPM actually says “chained”; TTSL says “closely connected.” The

point is that they were too close together to maneuver freely. In chaps. 47-49

358

Notes to Pages 225-231

of San-kuo-chih yen-i, Ts’ao Ts’ao allows himself to be persuaded to chain his ships together, which are then destroyed by a fire-ship attack; the addition of the word “chained” in CSPM probably stems from this tradition. In the later novel Ying-lieh-chuan the borrowing from the earlier novel is made even more explicit: Liu Chi is made to mount an altar on the nearby island of K’ang-lang-shan and conjure up the change in the wind which made possible the Ming fire-ship attack, just as Chu-ko Liang did in the San-kuo-chih yen-i version; cf. Chan Hok-lam “Liu Chi (1311-75) in the Ying-lieh-chuan: The Fictionalization of a Scholar-Hero,” Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia 5.1-2:25-42 (1967). For our purposes both stories are interesting primarily because they reveal the clear awareness on the part of Chinese commanders that a fire-ship attack could be launched only if the wind was right. Most probably the change in the wind was fortuitous, Chu Yiian-chang had prepared fire ships in advance, merely on the chance that it would be possible to use them, and the Han warships were massed closely together for mutual support and therefore were embarrassed by the sudden change in the direction of the wind. 45. The biographies of Yii T’ung-hai and Liao Yung-chung credit these two officers with the actual execution of the fire-ship attack; cf. MS 133:4b and 129:11]a.

46. CHSL 4:20a, quoting Yii Pen. Ming losses the previous day were probably even higher if the forces detached under Hsii Ta are included in the total. Yii Pen has confounded the first two days of battle under his entry for August 30, and states that the Red Fleet (Ch’en Yu-liang} lost twenty ships and the White Fleet (Chu Yiian-chang} only seven, but the latter obviously refers to the fire ships. Here, just as in 1360, it appears that Yii Pen took part in the campaign but not in the planning, and therefore did not realize that the seven ships were intended as fire ships. The occasional confusion of the order of events in his work, combined with the frequent vivid recall of detail, is what one would expect of an account written later from memory. P’ing-Han lu (CLHP) 28:8b gives Han losses of 20,000 or 30,000 for August 30 and only 2,000 for August 31, but here again the larger figure can only refer to the second day. J have not counted this figure separately, as it is thus included in the 60,000 given by Yii Pen. 47. TTSL 12:7ab; KC 303-304; CSPM 3:15a-16a; chi-ch’ou = August 31. 48. TTSL 12:7b; KC 304; CSPM 3:16a; keng-yin = September 1. Yii Pen, as quoted in CHSL, consistently refers to the Ming and the Han as the White Fleet and the Red Fleet, respectively. We know elsewhere that Ch’en Yu-liang’s ships were painted red. This usage supports the contention that the masts of Chu Yiian-chang’s vessels were all painted white from at least the start of the campaign, even if some repainting was done on September 1. 49. TTSL 12:7b; KC 304; CSPM 3:l6ab; hsin-mao = September 2. 50. Specifically Hsieh-shan = Ta-ku-shan in the channel south of Hu-k’ou. Both KC and CSPM state that Ch’en Yu-liang himself wanted to do this, but the sources agree that Ming control of the mouth of the lake frustrated the plan. Regardless who was behind it, the proposal amounted to abandoning the lake. 51. At Ch’ai-p’eng, which Chung-kuo ku-chin ti-ming ta-tz’u tien describes as “southeast of Tu-ch’ang hsien.”

359

Notes to Pages 231-242

52. See n. 46 above. Tota! Ming losses must have been from one-fifth to one-fourth of the fleet in four days of fighting, including those sent back to Nanking, if our estimates are correct. Wang Ch’ung-wu, Ming-pen-chi chiao-chu, reprinted edition (Hong Kong, Lung-men, 1967}, pp. 85-86, notes the limited nature of the Ming success and the continued strength of the Han fleet. 53. This is the figure given by Sun Tzu; cf. Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London, Oxford University Press, 1963}. 54. Here most of the sources say Tu-ch’ang, but CSPM says Nan-ch’ang, which must be correct, as Chu Wen-cheng would have had no power to interfere with a raid on the former. Nan-ch’ang was of course named Hung-tu at the time of the siege, but was renamed Nan-ch’ang before any of the sources was composed. 55. TTSL 12:7b; KC 304 (see n. 49 above}; CSPM 3:16b-17a. 56. TTSL 12:8ab; KC 304; CSPM 3:17a. This story, and the account of the

conversations, is credible because the two generals would have related the matter to Chu Yiian-chang, in the presence of secretaries, as soon as they defected. 57. TTSL 12:8b-9a; KC 304; CSPM 3:17 ab. 58. TTSL 12:9b; KC 304; CSPM 3:18a. 59. TTSL 12:9ab; KC 304; CSPM 3:18a. 60. MS 133:4b. 61. MS 125:13a. 62. CHSL 4:20b; quoting Yii Pen. 63. TTSL 13:lab; KC 305-306; CSPM 3:18ab; jen-hsiti = October 3. The subsequently famous Fu Yu-te (who fought in the Poyang Lake campaign and

was wounded in one of the lake battles when his ship encountered the van of the Han fleet) was with the Ching-chiang-k’ou force at the time of Ch’en Yu-liang’s death; see MS 129:6a. Possibly when Hsii Ta went back to Nanking, he left some of the less seriously wounded at Ching-chiang-k’ou. 64. TTSL 13:lab; KC 305-306; CSMP 3:18b-19a.

360

The T’u-mu Incident of 1449, by Frederick W. Mote BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

This paper embodies few new findings of original research. Rather, it is intended merely to arrange and consider some well-known facts of history. It is therefore based almost entirely on a direct reading of Ming and Ch’ing standard sources for Ming history, and surely must have overlooked valuable recent scholarship bearing on some aspects of the problems discussed. Specialists no doubt will be able to correct and refine many points of detail, but it is hoped that historians will nonetheless find interest and utility in reexamining the T’u-mu Incident from the point of view offered here. The notes call attention only to the verification relied upon for some points of unusual interest and to some further considerations of well-known facts. The standard sources most heavily relied upon, all of which are described in Wolfgang Franke, An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1968}, are the following: (1) Ying-tsung Jui-huang-ti shih-lu. The Veritable Records for the period 1435-1464. (Franke 1.1.5)

(2) Ming-shih. The standard dynastic history. (Franke, 2.1.9] (3) T’an Ch’ien, Kuo-ch’tieh. The most useful of the annalistic histories; especially pertinent are ch. 27 and 28. (Franke, 1.3.7} (4) Hsia Hsieh, Ming t’ung-chien. An excellent though much later annalistic history; most pertinent are ch. 23-25. {Franke 1.3.11} (5) Ku Ying-t’ai, Ming-shih chi-shih pen-mo. The best of all histories arranged by topics; of greatest use have been ch. 29 on the rise of Wang Chen and ch. 32 on the T’u-mu Incident. {Franke 2.2.11) (6) Liu Ting-chih, P’i-t’ai Ju. An interesting contemporary account of the events of 1449-1450. (Franke, 2.5.1) (7) Li Hsien, Ku-jang tsa-lu. Notes of a prominent official who was a member of the imperial entourage at T’u-mu and who survived to serve prominently in government thereafter. (Franke, 4.5.3] (8) Yang Ming, Cheng-t’ung lin-jung lu. The recollection of a sinicized Mongol who served as an interpreter in some of the events of 1449-1450; probably to be used with caution however as a source for Mongol attitudes and motives. See Hok-lam Chan, “Draft Biography of Yang Ming,” in Ming Biographical History Project, Columbia University, Draft Ming Biographies, no. 14, 1971. (Franke, 2.5.3.}

The geographical problems in relation to the route followed from Peking to Ta-t’ung and back have been particularly difficult to solve. Considerable use has been made of the Chi-fu t’ung-chih (Comprehensive gazetteer of the Capital region) of 1884, especially ch. 46 and 52, with their many large and relatively detailed maps of the Capital Prefecture and Hsiian-hua Prefecture, respectively, as well as ch. 65 on “mountains and rivers” and ch. 121 on “military routes” in Hsiian-hua fu. For the western end of the journey, from T’ien-ch’eng hsien (modern T’ien-chen) to Ta-t’ung, reference has been made to the Ta-t’ung-fu chih (Gazetteer of Ta-t’ung Prefecture) of 1782; its maps are much less helpful, but it lists place names rather fully. A recent book by

361

Bibliographical Note

Su T’ung-ping, Ming-tai i-ti chih-tu (The post system of the Ming period; Taipei, Hstieh-sheng Shu-chii, 1969), also has been useful, especially the map of the Hsiian-fu military district on page 161. The map accompanying this essay however remains inexact in many details, and the geographical issues await fuller study. In this connection, the seventeenth century scholar, Ku Yen-wu, in his T’ien-hsia chtin-kuo li-ping-shu (1831 ed.; Franke 8.1.10), especially the eleven chapters on Pei-chih-li and the five on Shansi Province, provides a wealth of useful military and geographical information which, although avoiding any specific discussion of the T’u-mu Incident, explains much about the local conditions and the militarization of the region which must have been a consequence of the Mongol penetration in 1449, and of the continuing threat thereafter. The Ming Biographical History’s Draft Ming Biographies {prepublication versions of biographies written for the History, issued irregularly since 1964, Columbia University} include two biographies by Wolfgang Franke that bear directly on the subject of this essay; they are his biography of Wang Chen in no. 8 and of Chu Ch’i-yii (the Ching-t’ai Emperor) in no. 7. Franke is the author of the most important modern scholarship concerning Yii Ch’ien, the Vice-Minister of War in 1449 who led the reorganization of the government in Peking after the T’u-mu Incident. See Franke’s ‘Yii Ch’ien, Staatsmann und Kriegsminister, 1398-1457,” in Monumenta Serica 11:87-122 (1946}, among other important writings by Franke on the early Ming period. The standard scholarship on Sino-Mongol relations is that produced in recent years by Henry Serruys. Most useful in the present study have been his monumental volumes on Sino-Mongol Relations during the Ming, both published in the series Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, vol. 1: The Mongols in China during the Hung-wu Period, 1368-1398 {MCB XI, Brussels, 1956-1959} and vol. 2: The Tribute System and Diplomatic Missions, 1400-1600 (MCB XIV, 1967}. The bibliographies appended to these volumes should be consulted for guidance on recent scholarship in particular. Among many Japanese scholars who have studied Sino-Mongol relations, Wada Sei must be accounted the most important; his principal writings on the subject have been reprinted in the collection Tdashi Kenkyiai: Moko hen (Researches in East Asian history: Mongolia; Tokyo, To6y6 Bunko, 1959). This includes no studies specifically concerned with the T’u-mu Incident, but has valuable studies of the Great Wall defense system and other relevant subjects. Two studies by Hagiwara Jumpei also are cited in the notes below. Recent Chinese scholarship has been meager in this field. One recent work may be mentioned: Lai Chia-tu and Li Kuang-pi, Ming-ch’ao tui Wa-la ti chan-cheng (The Ming dynasty’s wars against the Oirats; Shanghai, Jen-min ch’u-pan she, 1954]. This small book is a curious example of the new Chinese nationalistic historiography in which strong and somewhat anachronistic sentiment overlies a foundation of sound scholarship. I wish to acknowledge a heavy debt to colleagues in the Modern China History Colloquium at the University of Washington whose spirited discussion of a draft version of this article contributed much to its improvement, and to my general understanding of the problem. Dr. Frank Kierman urged me to produce this paper in the first place and has made helpful suggestions during several stages of revision. Dr. Henry Serruys read a preliminary draft and offered many useful suggestions and corrections. Dr.

362

Notes to Pages 243-252

Hok-lam Chan also read an earlier version and supplied much helpful information, not all of which is specifically noted. None of the above approved the final version, nor are they to be held responsible for the deficiencies that remain. 1. See the Bibliographical Note above. 2. The Yunnan campaigns that assumed great size and importance vis-a-vis court politics in the 1440's also should be seen in the light of Wang Chen’s military adventurism. They were to suppress the revolt of the Shan kings in the Yunnan-Burma border region. For a convenient summary see Ku Ying-t’ai (see Bibliographical Note above], Ming-shih chi-shih pen-mo, ch. 30; see also the valuable study of the situation in the biography of Ssu Jen-fa by Ray Huang, Draft Ming Biographies, no. 8 {1967}. Also relevant in a general way is Jung-pang Lo, “Policy Formulation and Decision-Making on Issues Respecting Peace and War,” in Charles O. Hucker, ed., Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies (New York, Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 41-72.

3. The essays in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968) provide the best recent overview of this problem, as well as a survey of relevant scholarship. 4. See her biography in Ming-shih, ch. 113, ‘“Jen-tsung Ch’eng-hsiaohuang-hou Chang-shih”; she has assumed considerable stature in both serious historical writings and in historical fiction, for example, Ts’ai Tung-fan, Ming-shih t’ung-su yen-i (author’s preface dated 1920), esp. chaps. 33 and 34. 5. The eminent Mongolist and historian, Professor Odaka Hidehiro, in conversation with the writer, has pointed out that the Mongols in the steppe, after the Yiian period, continued to use the title Tayisi in the sense of the Great Khan’s principal military associate, a meaning it acquired in the Mongol adaptation of the ancient Chinese title of T’ai-shih during the Ytian dynasty. T’ai-shih, senior among the Three Lords or San kung, by Yiian times had come to designate an honorary office of no functional importance in the Chinese system but one of great significance in the Mongol world. 6. Serruys, 2:8 (see Bibliographical Note}. Professor Okada Hidehiro, in conversations with the author, has referred to Esen as ‘‘the most radically disruptive influence in Mongol history after the Yiian period.” He notes that Esen killed male descendents of Chinggis except those who had Oirat mothers, as a matter of policy, and destroyed or forged Mongol genealogies, etc. Okada calls him “a revolutionary figure marking a turning point in Mongol history.” See also M. Rossabi, ‘“Notes on Esen’s Pride and Ming China’s Prejudice,” The Mongolia Society Bulletin 9:31-39 {Fall 1970}. 7. Quoted in part, with the typical Chinese historian’s comment, in Kuoch’tieh (1958 ed.), p. 1750 under day keng-yin. 8. See, for example, typical reports summarized in Kuo Ch’tieh (1958 ed.}, p. 1729, under days jen-yin and chi-yu (ninth moon, 1447). The former is of particular interest in reporting six measures proposed by the defense garrison commanders at Ta-t’ung. The purely military aspects of problems seldom are given satisfactory attention by the historians, and, as in this case, when they summarize the content of defense proposals, they tend to provide details of

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Notes to Pages 252-254

military government measures and refer to weapons, armament, tactics, and order of battle only in the briefest fashion, if at all. 9. That the eunuch faction should extend its control particularly into military affairs along the Great Wall frontier is indicative of several semiconcealed elements of the scene that warrant further study. One is that, although the trade aspects of tribute were not of fiscal significance to the Chinese state and hence not of concern to statesmen, the irregular profits from it were of great interest to the eunuchs, as to other potential individual peculators. The eunuchs controlled foreign trade {including tribute related trade) as agents operating one of the imperial household’s traditionally private preserves. A second point is that Wang Chen’s eunuch party has been described as an interest faction of northern civil and military officials. See Hagiwara Jumpei, “Mindai chuki ni okeru hopp6 b6ei to gin ni tsuite” (The northern border defenses and silver in the Mid-Ming}, T6hdgaku 16:67-79 (June 1958}. Wang Chen was a northerner himself, a native of Ta-t’ung prefecture. Third, profits could be squeezed from the immense procurement expenditures necessary to maintain the northern garrisons, and judicious sharing of this illicitly acquired silver helped the eunuch faction to solidify their control over an interest group of northern military and civil officials. 10. This is an invented illustration, not a reference to a specific instance. For a fuller discussion of the problem see: Serruys, vol. 2, chap. 3, pp. 29-43 and chap. 4, pp. 44-63. Some actual figures are discussed on pp. 30ff. Wada Sei, in Toashi Kenkyii: Moko hen, p. 670, states that T’u-mu was a direct consequence of the tribute system’s failure to meet Mongol needs. This also is the view forcefully argued by Hagiwara Jumpei; see especially his ““Doboku no hen zengo” (Before and after the T’u-mu Incident}, in Téy6shi Kenkyi 11.3:1-20 (October 1951], which stresses the urgency of the Mongols’ economic needs in their relationship to China. See also the recent study by Morris Rossabi, “The Tea and Horse Trade with Inner Asia during the Ming,” Journal of Asian History 4.2:136-168 (1970). David Farquhar’s “Oirat-Chinese Tribute Relations, 1408-1446,” in Studia Altaica: Festschrift fiir Nikolaus Poppe (Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1957) offers much detailed information on tribute and exchange of goods. 11. Cited in many of the sources; for example, Kuo-ch’iieh (1958 ed.}, p. 1748, under day keng-shen; and Ming-shih chi-shih pen-mo, chap. 29, under cheng-t’ung 6 year, summer, 4th moon. The wording of Wang’s notorious reply varies slightly from one source to another. 12. For an interesting contribution to knowledge of the actual circumstances governing the role of eunuchs in the first reigns of the Ming, see the article by Huang Chang-chien, “Lun Huang Ming Tsu-hsiin-lu so chi Ming-ch’u huan-kuan chih-tu,” in Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology 32:77-98 (Academia Sinica, July 1961]. For a more general discussion of eunuch power in Ming times, see Robert C. Crawford, “Eunuch Power in the Ming Dynasty,” T’oung pao 49:115-148 (1961). Among the eunuchs whose biographies appear in Ming-shih, ch. 304ff, are some individuals who merit considerable honor and praise, perhaps most obviously the great admiral, Cheng Ho, ca. 1371-1435. 13. Wang Chen’s proposal probably seemed more reasonable in mid-July of 1449 than it has seemed to anyone since September of that year. Eunuchs had established credibility as military figures and as competent agents of the

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Notes to Pages 254-258

throne during the previous half-century. Cheng Ho, the famous eunuch admiral who conducted maritime expeditions of vast scope in the early fifteenth century, is merely the best-known example. Also, the Cheng-t’ung Emperor’s famous great-grandfather, the Yung-lo Emperor (Ch’eng-tsu} had campaigned in person against the Mongols, earning glory at home if only somewhat illusory military victories in the field. See Wolfgang Franke, “Chinesische Feldziige durch die Mongolei in frithen 15. Jahrhundert,” Sinologica 3:81-88 (1951-1953) and his “Yung-lo’s Mongolei-Feldziige,” Sinologische Arbeiten 3:1-54 (1945). Thus, neither eunuch initiative nor imperial field campaigning had yet been discredited, and both were well within the established patterns of the dynasty’s style. 14. Although the details included in the following extracts come from the Shih-lu (Ying-tsung Shih-lu, 1964 ed., ch. 180-181, esp. pp. 3485~3510) and other sources, much of the information included in this listing can be reviewed conveniently in Kuo-ch’tieh (1958 ed.), pp. 1770-1780. 15. For K’uang Yeh see his biography in Ming-shih 167. Some sources credit this remonstrance to his vice-minister, Yii Ch’ien. K’uang had been active in stressing the need to reinforce the Great Wall defenses since the late 1430’s, as acting or as actual Minister of War. However he was opposed to aggressive military policies. His biography states: “When Wang Chen advanced the idea of the emperor leading a campaign, he did not first discuss with the outer court whether it was feasible.” When the imperial rescript announcing the event was issued, K’uang Yeh or Yii, or both, led the outer court officials in remonstrating against the idea. Both were southerners, K’uang from Yi-chang in Hunan and Yii from Hangchow. 16. The Shih-lu, and other sources following it, all state that the entourage passed Hsiian-fu on this date and passed Chi-ming Mountain on the following day. This disagrees with all of the maps and gazetteer information about the location of the two places. For example, Chi-fu t’ung-chih, 1884, ch. 65, ‘Mountains and Rivers,” no. 9, pp. 2b-3b, locates Chi-ming Mountain fifty li east of Hsiian-hua Fu (that is, the Ming Hsiian-fu]; it locates the Chi-ming post station another five li to the southeast from that. Roughly the same information is given in ch. 121, p. 6la. Although errors of this kind in the Shih-lu are very rare, I have judged this an error, and the information has been rearranged here to accord with the geography. 17. At a number of points in the T’u-mu story the problem of historicity arises. All of the high-level principals except the emperor perished on September 1, 1449. How then did something like Ts’ao Nai’s conversation with some censors about the need to assassinate Wang Chen get recorded? It does not appear in the Shih-lu or in the Ming-shih, but we would not expect this kind of information to appear in such sources. However, neither does it appear in the Kuo-ch’tieh or the Ming-shih chi-shih pen-mo, high quality works from the seventeenth century in which many supplementary items explaining the background of events have been included. It appears in Hsia Hsieh’s Ming t’ung-chien, a late Ch’ing work not published until 1873. Hsia is highly regarded as a careful historian, and he certainly had sources for this item of information, but I have not yet found what those may have been. Dr. Hok-lam Chan has drawn my attention to a passage in Ku-jang tsa-lu p. 8a by Li Hsien (See Bibliographical Note}, a junior censor present in the entourage; Li claims that he proposed assassinating Wang Chen. Dr. Chan

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Notes to Pages 259-265

believes that Hsia Hsieh in writing the Ming t’ung-chien may have inaccurately transferred the idea from Li to Ts’ao. There are two ways of arguing that this anecdote bears some relationship to fact, that is, that it took place, or that it might reasonably have taken place. One is that some persons of official rank escaped from T’u-mu, and among them were persons serving as assistants to principal figures like Ts’ao Nai, or the censors (for example, Li Hsien?) with whom Ts’ao discussed affairs. The entire diary of the trip had to be reconstructed to fill in the gap in the ch’i-chii-chu or court diary, and that appears to have been done fully and, with a few exceptions, accurately. The persons supplying that information may also have been in a position to supply other information of a kind not suited to inclusion in the shih-lu, and probably recorded many other items of information, or passed them on to others. The second line of argument is that the conversation itself may have been fabricated, to convey a real element in the situation, namely that high officials who resented Wang Chen may have considered assassinating him, perhaps even before the expedition set out. Therefore, having Ts’ao Nai discuss that but fail to bring it off (and having it reported that a military officer murdered Wang Chen on the battlefield during the fighting in order to take revenge on him) might have a kind of symbolic truth and convey a more general actual truth. 18. Ming-shih, chap. 156; Henry Serruys, ““Mongols Ennobled during the Early Ming,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 22:209-260 (1957). 19. Ibid, chap. 145. 20. Chi-fu t’ung-chih (1884 ed.}, ch. 65, p. 4b, locates Yao-erh-ling thirty li southeast from the Hsiian-fu city gate. 21. This statement and others expressing Mongol respect for the Chinese Son of Heaven all seem to be traceable to Yang Ming, Cheng-t’ung lin-jung-lu (see Bibliographical Note}, or to Chinese historical imagination. Yang Ming’s short memoir was written several decades after the event and in any case must be looked upon as the work of a culturally marginal Sino-Mongol who had made his career in the Chinese world as an expert on the Mongols. It is unlikely that it accurately represents the attitudes of Mongols on the other side who devoted their lives in the field to the struggle against China, but we have no other evidence for Esen’s and other Mongol leaders’ opinions of the Chinese emperor. Yang Ming’s essay merits careful study. The Mongol Chronicle, Altan Tobci, trans. C. R. Bawden (Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1955}, p. 172 and other accounts state that the emperor repeatedly and miraculously escaped death when first captured. 22. This figure probably comes from P’i-t’ai-lu (see Bibliographical Note}, p. 3a (in Chi-lu hui-pien ed.); it is cited in many sources, for example, Kuoch’tieh (1958 ed.), p. 1777. The figures in Chinese battle accounts are a notoriously difficult problem as are most of the specifically military details of any military engagement. A general’s farewell poems to wife or friend on leaving for a battle are usually preserved, but no satisfactory word about his route, the size and armament of his forces, or those of the enemy, and so on is likely to be available. When a figure like this one is found, it may then have been included for other reasons than to offer precise military information to the reader. In this case, of course, it helps to discredit the hated Wang Chen by describing the T’u-mu defeat in terms that allow him no excuses for failure.

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Notes to Pages 266-269

23. Ming-shih chi-shih pen-mo, chap. 33, is the source from which this statement is quoted; Ku Ying-t’ai also discusses the implications of it in the comment he appends to that chapter. The recent historians Lai Chia-tu and Li Kuang-pi (see Bibliographical Note) come close to suggesting, anachronistically, a more nationalistic interpretation of the statement. The existence of two emperors at this time put traditional concepts of loyalty to an unusual test; a careful study of the pressure engendered by the crisis of 1449 and of the varying responses would help to clarify our understanding of the imperial institution in late imperial China. See also Kuo-ch’iieh, p. 1801, under day kuei-ch’ou. (The Ying-tsung shih-lu, p. 3622, does not record this statement.| 24. The court at Peking recognized the importance of Esen’s eunuch China expert. See Kuo-ch’tieh, 1449, twelfth moon, day chia-yin (p. 1821), where it is recorded that instructions were repeated to all border garrisons not to be taken in by scouting and probing Mongols claiming that they were seeking to get through the Wall in order to deliver the emperor back to Peking. On this occasion, the instruction is added: “In case Hsi-ning appears along with [such a Mongol force], entice him into a situation in which you can kill him.” In the spring of 1450, second moon, day jen-ch’en, the same source reports (on p. 1841) that Hsi-ning was captured when he appeared on such a diplomatic mission, and was sent to Peking to be executed. The sources hint that the captive emperor on some occasions sent secret messages to Chinese border guards not to heed Mongol requests made in his name to open the gates, and in this instance planned that Hsi-ning should deliver a Mongol message so as to give the Chinese an opportunity to capture and kill him; but all that may be part of the extensive romanticization of his experiences in captivity that was an outgrowth of the event. 25. See Ying-tsung shih-lu (1964 ed.], pp. 3520ff, Kuo-ch’tieh, pp. 1783-1784. The explosiveness of the situation revealed in this unprecedented event makes it clear that hatred of the eunuchs and their underlings in the secret police organization was very close to the surface, and that an eminent scholar like Ts’ao Nai, chuang-yuan of 1433, Chancellor of the Hanlin Academy, and a man noted for his integrity and moral uprightness, might have considered whether it was not the responsibility of persons like himself to take extreme measures in a crisis situation. The lengthy charges presented against the dead Wang Chen on September 9, precipitating the attack on Ma Shun, included comments that everyone wanted to see Wang Chen dead, and that there was no one in the imperial armies, in particular, “who did not want to cut out his heart, slice up his liver.”” The charges detailed there are remarkable for the impassioned tone in which they are phrased, and in their way indicate that violent reaction against eunuch abuses was well within the range of officials’ thinking. (See also Ku-jang tsa-lu, p. 15a-b.) 26. Meng Sen, Ming-tai shih (Taipei, 1957), esp. pp. 133ff, offers extensive

reasoning for looking upon the crisis of 1449 as a watershed in Ming history. 27. Ku Yen-wu, T’ien-hsia chiin-kuo li-ping-shu, ch. 45, p. 13a. Ku’s description of the Tung-sheng situation draws on a memorial submitted by Yen Ts’ung-chien (chin-shih 1559}; as set forth in his work on geography, Shu-yti chou-tzu lu (Franke, 7.1.4}, and quoted in Kuo-ch’tieh, last item under the twelfth moon of 1449, p. 1826, where it enters the simple sentence:

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Notes to Pages 269-271

“Tung-sheng Prefecture [chou] is abandoned.”’ Yen’s comment deploring the military consequences of the abandonment is quoted there by T’an Ch’ien as comment on the event. 28. For Ch’iu Ch’iin’s work, see Franke, 9.2.1. 29. Ku Yeri-wu, ch. 9, “Pei-chih-li, 8,” pp. 22a-23b. 30. Ibid., ch. 16, p. la. 31. Ibid., ch. 49, p. 2a. 32. Ibid., ch. 49, p. 21a-b. 33. Ibid., ch. 49, p. 16b. 34. Biographies of some Mongols who served China in the early Ming appear in the Ming-shih, chap. 156. These reveal both that Mongols had the opportunity to achieve great social mobility and success within the Chinese world, especially as military specialists engaged in defending China against other Mongols, and that the Chinese were anxious to reward those who did that well, so as to prevent any ethnic community cleavage such as might develop from simplifying Chinese-Mongol relations to the detriment of the Chinese. Some Mongols mentioned there were painfully aware of the difficulties; note how the career of Mao Chung constantly skirted the deep problems of mutual distrust and suspicion, and how Wu Chin, son of Wu K’e-ch’‘in and nephew of Wu K’e-chung, the Mongol heroes of T’u-mu, refused to accept an important assignment in Kansu in the 1450’s because his status as a Mongol would make his situation too ambiguous and create misunderstandings. Henry Serruys’ study “Mongols Ennobled during the Early Ming,” cited in n. 18 above, contains biographies of the Mongols mentioned here along with others and offers valuable background information pertinent to several aspects of the present study. 35. Henry Serruys, in a private communication, has expressed the opinion that resentment against communities of Mongols within China was strong even before 1449, although anti-Mongol sentiment in general undoubtedly was intensified as a consequence of that event. Hok-lam Chan has called my attention to an article by James T. C. Liu on Yiieh Fei {in Chung-kuo hstieh-jen, no. 2:45 {1970}; not available to me) which points out that the cult of Yiieh Fei as the prototype of the military leader active against alien invasions, was first instituted officially by the Ming, within months after the T’u-mu disaster. Locating the concrete expressions of anti-Mongol sentiment that began to mark mid-Ming attitudes after T’u-mu, and analyzing them for their content and their influence, would be well worth doing. Ch’ien Mu has called attention to some of these in his article “Tu Ming ch’u k’ai kuo chu ch’en shih wen chi,” New Asia Journal 6.2:243-326 (August 1964) in the course of discussing Sung Lien and other persons whose lives spanned the change of dynasty from Yiian to Ming. Ch’ien contrasts fourteenth century tolerant attitudes with less tolerant ones of mid and late Ming times. Sources such as the Shih-lu and the Kuo-ch’tieh, in sections relevant to the immediate aftermath of T’u-mu, bristle with items expressing resentment and fear, and propose ways to lessen the danger from Mongols residing within China. See, in the latter, p. 1778 among comments appended to the report on the T’u-mu battle, pp. 1800 (under day chi-yu} and 1809 (under day jen-shen) where it is reported that obstreperous Mongols have been, or should be, executed as examples to others living among the Chinese population. On p. 1810, under

368

Notes to Pages 271-272

day yi-hai, there begins a long memorial from Hanlin Expositor Liu Ting-yi on ways of dealing with the crisis. One of his points, set forth on pp. 1811-1812, is to break up concentrations of unreliable Mongols, both in the civilian population and in the military units, disperse the civilians to new places of residence in the southern provinces, and slowly bring them by forced acculturation to Chinese ways. It starts with the sentence which in its fifteenth century context must be translated: “If they are not of our racial kind, their hearts must be different.” This phrase appears to express an ancient sentiment; actually, that is not its original import. See Tso-chuan fourth year of Duke Ch’eng or 586 a.c., translated in James Legge, The Chinese Classics {Hong Kong University reprint, Hong Kong, 1961}, vol. 5: The Ch’un-ch’iu, p. 335. Note that the word tsu, used here in the sense of “racial kind,” in ancient clan-law society had the more restricted meaning of “our kin” (as Legge translates it}. See the same memorial in somewhat different form in Ying-tsung shih-lu (1964 ed.}, pp. 3657-3658. 36. In his thorough study of the career of Altan Khan, the Mongol leader who became the threat to mid-sixteenth century China, Wada Sei points out how clearly the events of 1449 were held in people’s minds thereafter, and how automatic became the use of the analogy as later historians discussed the Mongol threat; see especially his Téashi kenkyi: Moko hen, p. 754.

369

Hu Tsung-hsien’s Campaign Against Hsii Hai, 1556, by Charles O. Hucker Names of government agencies and official titles are rendered in accordance with the system set forth in my article, “Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 21:1-66 [December 1958), and its index of terms and titles, published in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 23:127-151 {1960-1961}. Both article and index are reprinted in Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese History, ed. John L. Bishop, Harvard-Yenching Institute Studies (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University

Press, 1968). ,

1. It will be clear to any specialist that I have not exhausted all sources that relate to the campaign of 1556, much less all sources that relate to the Wako problem of Ming times more generally. An excellent discussion of Chinese works of Ming times that bear on the Wako problem is Wu Yii-nien’s article, ‘‘Ming-tai Wo-k’ou shih-chi chih-mu,” reprinted in 1968 in vol. 6, pp. 231-252, of Ming-shih lun-ts’ung, ed. Pao Tsun-p’eng (Taipei, Student Book Co., 1968); and an up-to-date bibliography of relevant Japanese materials is provided in Tanaka Takeo’s small volume, Wak6 to kang6 b6eki (Tokyo, Shibundo, 1961). A documentary chronicle of Wako activities and defense against them throughout Chinese history is Wang P’o-leng’s Li-tai cheng-Wo wen-hsien k’ao {[Shanghai?], Cheng-chung shu-chii, 1940}. Li Kuang-ming’s Chia-ching yii-Wo Chiang-Che chu-k’o chiin k’ao |Yenching Journal of Chinese Studies, Monograph Series no. 4, 1933}; Ch’en Mao-heng’s Ming-tai Wo-k’ou k’ao-ltieh (same series no. 6, 1934); Wu Ch’ung-han’s Ming-tai Wo-k’ou fan-hua shih-ltieh (Ch’ang-sha, Commercial Press, 1939); Li Kuang-pi’s Ming-tai yii-Wo chan-cheng {Shanghai, Jen-min ch’u-pan she, 1956); Ch’en Wen-shih’s Ming Hung-wu Chia-ching chien ti hai-chin cheng-ts’e (Taipei, National Taiwan University, 1966); and Ch’en’s article, “Ming Chia-ching nien-chien Che-Fu yen-hai k’ou-luan yii ssu-fan mao-i ti kuan-hsi,” in Bulletin of the Academia Sinica Institute of History and Philology 36.1:375-418 (1965) are all useful works of modern Chinese scholarship on the subject. A. Tschepe’s Japans Beziehungen zu China seit den Altesten Zeiten bis zum Jahre 1600 (Jentschoufu, Katholischen Mission Sud Schantung, 1907} is a surprisingly detailed chronicle of reference value, but without citations of sources. Relevant modern works in Western languages especially include Y. S. Kuno’s Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 2 vols. {Berkeley, University of California Press, 1937~1940); Wang Yi-t’ung’s Official Relations Between China and Japan, 1368-1549, HarvardYenching Institute Studies (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1953}; Bodo Wiethoff’s Die chinesische Seeverbotspolitik und der private Uberseehandel von 1368 bis 1567, Mitteilungen der gesellschaft fur Naturund Volkerkunde Ostasiens, vol. 45 (Hamburg, 1963); Benjamin H. Hazard’s ‘Japanese Marauding in Medieval Korea: The Wako Impact on Late Koryo,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1967; Hazard’s article, “The Formative Years of the Wako, 1223-63,” in Monumenta Nipponica 2.2:260-277 (1967); and James F. Millinger’s ‘“Ch’i Chi-kuang, Chinese Military Official,” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968.

370

Notes to Pages 273-280

2. Wang Yi-t’ung, p. 80. 3. Standard map-studded sources on Ming coastal defense are Cheng Jo-tseng’s Cheng K’ai-yang tsa-chu (photolithographic reprint, Nanking, Kiangsu Provincial Library, 1932) and Ch’ou-hai t’u-pien (1624 ed.), attributed to Hu Tsung-hsien but undoubtedly also the work principally of Cheng Jo-tseng. See Wolfgang Franke’s An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1968}, pp. 223-224, and Wang Yung, “Ming-tai hai-fang t’u-chi lu,” reprinted in vol. 6 of Ming-shih lun-ts’ung, pp. 205-230. 4. Wang Yi-t’ung, pp. 10, 16-17, 48, 50. 5. On the deterioration of Ming naval power, see the stimulating interpretive article by Lo Jung-pang, ‘The Decline of the Early Ming Navy,” Oriens Extremus 5:149-168 (1958-1959). 6. See the biography of Altan Khan by Henry Serruys and Fang Chao-ying in Draft Ming Biographies (published by the Association for Asian Studies, Inc.}, no. 1 (1964).

7. A general discussion of Ming coastal defense organization can be found in Ming-shih (Po-na ed., Shanghai, Han-chiai-lou, 1940), 91:10a ff. More specific data on defense organization in Chekiang is in Ch’ou-hai t’u-pien 5:8a-17b; and particularly in Fan Lai and others, Liang-Che hai-fang lei-k’ao hsti-pien (8-chap. ed. dated 1602), especially chap. 2. Cf. Franke, p. 227; and Wang Yung, pp. 212-213. 8. Ch’en Mao-heng, pp. 139-142. 9. Li Kuang-ming, passim; and Ch’en Mao-heng, pp. 151ff. 10. See the biography of Chao Wen-hua in Ming-shih 308:17b-21a. 11. See the biography of Chang Ching in Ming-shih 205:4a-6a. 12. See the biography of Chou Yiin in Ming-shih 205:6b-7a. 13. See the biography of Li T’ien-ch’ung in Ming-shih 205:6a-b. 14. See the biography of Yang I in Ming-shih 205:7a-b. 15. See the biography of Yiian O in Ming-shih 205:13b-14a. 16. Chronological charts of Wako activities in 1555 are provided in Ch’ou-hai t’u-pien, chap. 8, and Ch’en Mao-heng, pp. 78-81. Cf. Wu Ch’ung-han, pp. 63ff. 17. See the biographies of Yii Ta-yu and Lu T’ang in Ming-shih 212:1la-9b; and the biography of Lu T’ang by Bodo Wiethoff in Draft Ming Biographies, no. 6 (1966). For the victory at Wang-chiang-ching see Hsia Hsieh’s Ming t’ung-chien (reprint ed., Peking, Chung-hua shu-chii, 1959), chap. 61 (3:2336-2337); Wang P’o-leng, p. 189; Wu Ch’ung-han, p. 58; and Ch’ou-hai t’u-pien 9:2a-3b. 18. On the life of Hsii Hai see Ch’en Mao-heng, pp. 103-104; and Ku Ying-t’ai, Ming-shih chi-shih pen-mo {Wan-yu wen-k’u ed., Ch’ang-sha, Commercial Press, 1936}, chap. 55 (sec. 8, pp. 54-55). On Wang Chih see Ch’en Mao-heng, pp. 102-103; Ch’en Wen-shih, “Ming Chia-ching nien-chien Che-Fu yen-hai k’ou-luan yii ssu-fan mao-i ti kuan-hsi,” pp. 395-405; Tanaka Takeo, pp. 200ff; Bodo Wiethoff, Die chinesiche Seeverbotspolitik und der private Uberseehandel von 1368 bis 1567, pp. 188ff; Fu Wei-lin, Ming-shu (reprint ed., Ch’ang-sha, Commercial Press, 1937}, 162:3213-3217 {a biography of Wang Chih, reprinted in its entirety in Wang P’o-leng, pp. 209-214); and Wang Chih chuan, an early biography reprinted in Hsiian-lan-t’ang ts’ung-shu hsii-chi (1947), vol. 15, and virtually identical

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Notes to Pages 280-288

with a narrative entitled Ch’in-huo Wang Chih found in Ch’ou-hai t’u-pien 9:24a-29b.

19. See the biography of Hu Tsung-hsien in Ming-shih 205:8a-14a. 20. See the biography of Yen Sung in Ming-shih 308:10a-17b and that by K. W. So in Draft Ming Biographies, no. 9 (1968). 21. Hsia Hsieh, chap. 60 (3:2327). 22. See the biographies of Yiian O and Yii Ta-yu in Ming-shih 205:13b-14a and 212:la-8b. Also see Yiian O’s letter to Hu Tsung-hsien during the siege of T’ung-hsiang, reproduced in Ts’ai Chiu-te’s Wo-pien shih-liieh (Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu tzu-liao ts’ung-shu ed.; reprint, vol. 15, pp. 69-117), pp. 101-102. Yii Ta-yu, an excellent subject for a biographical study, had a record of successful “pacification” of rebellious southwestern aborigines prior to serving in Chekiang and in 1555 cautiously advised Supreme Commander Chang Ching against attacking marauders too hastily. But in 1557 he vigorously opposed proposals to appease Wang Chih with trading opportunities. 23. The basic sources on Wang Chih and the campaign against him are those mentioned in n. 18 above, especially Wang Chih chuan and Fu Wei-lin, chap. 162, pp. 3213-3217. See also the biography of Hu Tsung-hsien in Ming-shih 205:8a-14a and Ryuisaku Tsunoda, trans., Japan in the Chinese Dynastic Histories: Later Han through Ming Dynasties, ed. L. Carrington Goodrich (South Pasadena, P. D. and Ione Perkins, 1951), pp. 128-137. 24. For the general nature of the Ming military establishment see Hucker, “Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty,” pp. 56-63; Romeyn Taylor’s ‘‘Yiian Origins of the Wei-so System,” in Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies, ed. C. O. Hucker (New York, Columbia University Press, 1969], pp. 23-40; and Millinger, pp. 14-19. 25. For military organization in Chekiang in the 1550’s see Millinger, pp. 26-40; Ch’ou-hai t’u-pien 5:8a-17b; and Fan Lai’s Liang-Che hai-fang lei-k’ao hsti-pien, chap. 2. 26. Ch’ou-hai t’u-pien 5:1la-17b. 27. See Li Kuang-ming’s special study of the practice cited in n. 1 above. 28. Ch’ou-hai t’u-pien 5:lla-17b. 29. Mao K’un, Chi chiao Hsti Hai pen-mo (Mao Lu-men. hsien-sheng wen-chi, Wan-li ed., 30:20a-30b}, 30:20a-b. For Tsung Li see his brief biography in Ming-shih 205:9b. 30. See the biographies of Kuei Yu-kuang and T’ang Shun-chih in Ming-shih 287 :20b-21b; 205:20b-22b. See also Wu Yii-nien for Ming writings on Wako activities in the southeast. 31. See n. 1 above. 32. See the biography of Mao K’un in Ming-shih 287 :12b-13a. His chronicle of the campaign against Hsii Hai is known generally by the title Hsii Hai pen-mo. The text primarily cited in this article is titled Chi chiao Hsti Hai pen-mo {see n. 29 above}. Other early texts occur in Ch’ou-hai t’u-pien 9:12a-19a and Chekiang t’ung-chih {attributed to the sponsorship of Hu Tsung-hsien; preface dated 1561}, 60:21b-25a. The work has been republished in such collectanea as Chieh-ytieh shan-fang hui-ch’ao, Tse-ku-chai ch’ung-ch’ao, and Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu tzu-liao ts’ung-shu. See bibliographic discussions in Wu Yii-nien, p. 242, and in Franke, p. 223.

3/2

Notes to Pages 288-302

33. Ts’ai Chiu-te is sometimes referred to as Sung Chiu-te or as Chu Chiu-te. His chronicle, reportedly based on government files, is known as Wo-pien shih-liieh. The text cited in this article appears in Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu tzu-liao ts’ung-shu 15:69-117. It also appears in such collectanea as Yen-i chih-lin, Sheng-ch’ao i-shih, and Ts’ung-shu chi-ch’eng ch’u-pien. See bibliographic discussions in Wu Yti-nien, pp. 235-236, and in Franke, p. 223. 34. The 1940 photolithographic reprint is the edition of Shih-tsung shih-lu cited in this article. Other materials relied upon include the biography of Hu Tsung-hsien in Ming-shih 205:8a-14a; Hsia Hsieh’s Ming t’ung-chien; Ku Ying-t’ai’s Ming-shih chi-shih pen-mo, chap. 55; and Wang Chih chuan. 35. Mao K’un (30:20b} indicates that Hu Tsung-hsien personally took up a defensive position at the Grand Canal town T’ang-ch’i near Chia-hsing. 36. Ts’ai Chiu-te, pp. 98-99. 37. Shih-tsung shih-lu 434:7a. 38. Mao K’un, 30:22a. 39. Mao K’un, 30:24a. The text indicates that troops were ordered from Chia-hsing to Tou-men. Tou-men is a common place-name. There are several places in Chekiang so named, but I have not yet identified the place that is meant here. 40. Ts’ai Chiu-te, pp. 101-102. Cf. Wu Ch’ung-han, p. 69. 41. Mao K’un, 30:22b. 42. Shih-tsung shih-lu 435:5b. 43. Shih-tsung shih-lu 435:3a-b; Ku Ying-t’ai, chap. 55 (sec. 8, p. 53). 44. Ts’ai Chiu-te, p. 102. 45. Mao K’un reports that Hsii Hai and Ch’en Tung withdrew separately from T’ung-hsiang but gives no details about their routes of withdrawal. Ts’ai Chiu-te (pp. 102-103} is followed here, although his report is not wholly clear. 46. Ts’ai Chiu-te, p. 102; Ku Ying-t’ai, chap. 55 {sec. 8, p. 54). 47. See Fu Wei-lin, 162:3216; Wang Chih chuan (unpaginated). 48. Shih-tsung shih-lu 437:la-b; Hsia Hsieh, chap. 61 (3:2358-2359). 49. Ts’ai Chiu-te, p. 102. 50. Shih-tsung shih-lu 436:2b. 51. Mao K’un, 30:25a-b. Ts’ai Chiu-te reports that the marauders comprised three distinct groups: one led by Hsii Hai, one led by Hung Tung-kang and others, and a third led by Ch’en Tung, Yeh Ma, and others (pp. 102-103). Ts’ai also gives the impression that Hsii Hai arranged for this Hung Tung-kang to be taken into custody (p. 105}, not supporting Mao K’un’s report that the “Hung” in question was Hsii Hai’s younger brother, thus Hsii Hung. I find no support for Ts’ai’s version of this incident in other sources and no references elsewhere to anyone named Hung Tung-kang. 52. Shih-tsung shih-lu 436:3a. 53. Ts’ai Chiu-te, pp. 104-105; Mao K’un, 30:25b. 54. Mao K’un, 30:26b. 55. Mao K’un, 30:27a. Ts’ai Chiu-te suggests that the idea of baiting the marauders with boats may have originated with Hsii Hai himself (p. 104). 56. Mao K’un, 30:27a. 57. Mao K’un, 30:27a-b; Ts’ai Chiu-te, p. 107; Shih-tsung shih-lu 437 :3b-4a. 58. Mao K’un, 30:27b-28a. Cf. Ku Ying-t’ai, chap. 55 (sec. 8, p. 54}. 59. Ts’ai Chiu-te, pp. 107-108.

373

Notes to Pages 302-306

60. Mao K’un, 30:28a. 61. I have not been able to determine the precise location of the estate called Shen-chia-chuang or, sometimes, Shen-chuang. The sources make it clear that the estate could not have been far from P’ing-hu city. 62. Ts’ai Chiu-te, p. 108. 63. Ku Ying-t’ai, chap. 55 (sec. 8, p. 54). 64. Ts’ai Chiu-te, pp. 108-109. 65. Mao K’un, 30:29a. 66. Mao K’un, 30:29b; Ts’ai Chiu-te, pp. 109-112; Ku Ying-t’ai, chap. 55 (sec. 8, p. 54).

67. Shih-tsung shih-lu 439 :5b-6a, 6b-7a. 68. Ming-shih 205:10b. 69. See the biography of Hu Tsung-hsien in Ming-shih 205 :8a-14a. 70. Ming-shih 205:23a. 71. Cited in Wu Ch’ung-han, p. 88. 72. C. O. Hucker, ed., Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies, Dit Z.

73. Mao K’un, 30:20b. 74. Ts’ai Chiu-te, p. 99.

374

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Index Abd ar-Rahman, 25 Battle narratives, sequence of: Aboriginal tribes, as special troops, preliminary actions, 30, 32-42; the

287, 290, 292, 293 physical battle, 31, 42-45; after

Actium, battle of, 95, 220 the battle, 31, 45-47. See also

Africa, naval expeditions to, 15 Military handbooks; Military

Aftermath of battle, 45-47; history

ceremonial blood-letting, 45-46; Battle plan, see Strategy casting up of accounts, 46; display §Battlements, organization of crews

of correct attitudes, 47 for defense of, 173-174 Ala-ud-Din, 171 Battles: Ch’eng-p’u, 17, 29, 34, 47;

Alliances, 34-36; in battle of Talas, 25; Pi, 29, 42, 46; An, 29,

Ch’eng-p’u, 47-48 42-43; Yen-ling, 29, 36;

Allies, exploration of, 34-36; allied Ch’ang-kan, 32; Hsiao, 34, 38;

armies, 139 Ch’eng-cho, 45; Ching-hsing,

Altan Khan, 16, 275, 282 56-62; Ch’ang-p’ing, 62;

An, battle of, 29, 36-37; details of, T’sai-chou, 144; Poyang Lake,

42-43 221-230; Hu-k’ou, 238; Yang-ho,

An, King of Huai-nan, 85 258; T’u-mu, 260-263; Lang-shan

An-ch’ing, 205, 210 pass, 260-261; Yao-erh-ling,

An-i, 96 260-261; Tsao-lin, 291, 295, 306. An Lu-shan, 19 See also Campaigns; Sieges An Lu-shan rebellion, 123, 124-126, Blockade, as tactic, 204

146; professionalism of the Bologna, 193

military after, 131 Bombard, 21; iron, flame thrower,

An-ting, 70, 72-73 {map}, 94 171; specimens of, 172; use of at

Analects, the, 11 Shao-hsing, 191

278 yen-ch’iu}, 169

Anhwei, province, 277; plundered, Bombs, or grenades (tu-yao

Antony (Mark Antony], 95 Bureaucracy: place of the military Appeasement, see Pacification in, 9-11, 16; link with militarism, Arabs: naval expedition from China 26; Han, 79-80, 87; after T’u-mu,

to, 15; in warfare, 25 265-266; Ming, 273, 277, 281, 284

Archers, mounted, 100-101. See also

Cavalry; Crossbow Campaigns: of Han Wu-ti, 67-68; Art of War, see Sun-tzu ping-fa as ad hoc expedients, 109-110; of Arughtai, chieftain of the Chahar Li Ling, 119-122; of Huai-hsi,

Mongols, 250 129-145; Poyang, 202-238; of Wang

Assault troops (t’u-chiang} under Li Chen to T’u-mu, 254-263; against

Su, 141 Hsii Hai, 273-304. See also Battles; Sieges

Banner system, 24 Cannon, 172-173 Barbarian clothing, adoption of as Captives, 31, 33, 34, 45-46; slaughter

battle tactic, 63, 64 of, 61-62; Li Kuang-li as, 76,

Barbarians, border, reliance on for treatment of leaders by Han, 102;

defense, 63 lack of military ethics for

385

Index

Captives {Continued} Ch’ang-kan, battle at, 32 treatment of, 186-187; emperor Ch’ang-p’ing, battle of, 62 Ying-tsung as, 263-267. See also Ch’ang Yii-ch’un, 217, 233; at battle

Defectors of Poyang Lake, 221-224, 226

Castle, European: Chinese inner Changes in warfare: from Ch’eng-p’u

fortress similar to, 147; to Ching-hsing, 63-66; during the

unduplicated in China, as such, 151 Han, 110; from wars of movement Catapults, 20, 166, 167-169; movable to wars of position, 124 and fixed, 168; construction of, Chao, state, 47; and battle of

168-169; objects hurled by, 169; Ching-hsing, 56-62; use of

“fire” (huo-p’ao}, 171; mounted archers in, 100

disappearance of, 173; in siege of Chao Chan (of Chin}, 37 Hsiang-yang, 183; at Shao-hsing, Chao Ch’un, 189, 199; defender of

191; at Poyang, 221. See also Hsiang-yang, 181-185

Bombard; Cannon Chao Ch’ung-kuo, 97 Cavalry: introduction of, 5, 64; of Chao Hsin, 79, 90, 113 Hsiung-nu, 67; in Han forces, 91, Chao Hsiian, 38

110; of Huai-hsi, 137 Chao I-ch’i, 89, 114

Central Asia: Han allies in, 82; Han Chao K’ung-chao, 301-302

involvement in, 84-85; horses Chao Meng (of Chin}, 39 from, 99; maintenance of routes Chao P’o-nu, 85, 86, 115, 116, 117 to, 102; loss of Chinese position in, Chao P’u-sheng, 205 123; as threat to Chinese safety, Chao-ti, 104

244-249. See also Mongols Chao Wan-nien, 199 Cha, field-fort, 147-148 Chao Wen-hua, 277, 278, 281, 287, Cha-p’u harbor, 285; attacked by 295, 298, 304, 305; in Chia-hsing,

Hsii Hai, 283, 289 299-300; at surrender of Hsii Hai,

Cha-p’u, town, 306; siege of, 290; 301 assembly of marauders at, 296, Chao Yang, 33 298; intruders defeated at, 300-30! Chao Yung, 229

Chang-chai, 143 Ch’ao-hsien, 74, 86, 115 Chang Ch’ien, 84, 89, 99, 113 Ch’ao Ts’o, 100

Chang Ching, 277, 279-280, 281 Chariot: use of in war, 17, 25, 43, 54,

Chang Ch’un-shu, 101 99, abandonment of, 63, 64, 110

Chang Erh, 56 Chavannes, E., 105-106

Chang Han, 62 Che-hsi: defenses against marauders

Chang-i, 70, 72-73 {map}, 76, 78, 98 in, 283-287; civil bureaucracy of, Chang Shih-ch’eng, 188; ruler of Wu 284-285; regular military state, 202; in the Poyang campaign, establishment in, 285-286; active

203-207, 213-214, 225 tactical force in, 286-287

Chang Ting-pien, 222, 230; bid for Che-lin, raiders’ haunt, 289 leadership by, 230-231; after death Chekiang, 23; anti-Ming rebellion

of Ch’en Yu-liang, 239 in, 212-214; significance of revolt,

Chang Tzu-ming, journey to 214; Hsii Hai’s raids on, 273; pirate Nanking for help, 214-216, 218 threat to, 276; grand coordinators

Chang Tz’u-kung, 112 (hsiin-fu) of, 277-278; raids on,

Chang Wu-tzu, 33 278; regional commander

Ch’ang-an, 69, 77, 85, 89, 94, 117; (tsung-ping kuan} of, 286; regional

horses brought to, 99 vice commander (fu-tsung-ping

Ch’ang ch’eng (Great Wall}, 80 kuan) of, 286 386

Index

Chekiang Regional Military Chiang-nan {south of the river], Commission, 285. See also Che-hsi focus of Wako, 276

Chen-chiang prefecture, 288 Ch’iang tribesmen, 79, 86; revolt of,

Ch’en, state, 29 115

Ch’en Kuei, 161, 167, 168, 170; Chien-pi ch’ing-yeh (strengthen the “fire-lance” invented by, 171; as walls and clear the fields), 26

author, 195-196, 200 Chien-wei, commandery, 111 Ch’en Li, emperor, 239 Chih-chii River, 118 Ch’en Tung, 289; at siege of Chih-po, 33

T’ung-hsiang, 293, 294-295; Chin dynasty, 24, 29, 180 withdrawal to coast, 295-296; Chin, state, 29, 33, 34-35; and battle betrayal of, 299-300; letter to Hsii of Ch’eng-pu, 47-55; after the

Hai from, 303; death of, 303 battle, 55-56

Ch’en Yu-jen, 227 Chin-ch’eng, 70, 72-73 (map)

Ch’en Yu-kuei, 227 Chin Mi-ti, 89

Ch’en Yu-liang, 202; at siege of Chin-shih, rockets mentioned in, 17] Nan-ch’ang, 208-219; ships of, Chin-shih (metropolitan 209-210; strategy of, 210; at naval examination graduate}, 277, 278,

battles, 221-238; death of, 238 280

Ch’en Yii, 65; in battle of Chin Yen, 293 Ching-hsing, 57-60, 62, 66 Ch’in dynasty, 27, 67; collapse of, 68

Cheng, state, 29 Ch'in, state, 37-38

Cheng Ch’eng-kung, 26 Ching-chiang-k’ou, 233; strategic Cheng Ho, armadas led by, 275 location of, 218-219

Cheng-t’ung emperor, the, 249 Ching-hsing {Ching gorge], battle of,

Ch’eng, Prince (of Sung), 43 17, 47, 56-62; narrative account of,

Ch’eng-cho, battle at, 45 56-60; analysis of, 60-62; compared Ch’eng Pu-shih, 83, 105, 111 to battle of Ch’eng-pu, 61, 64

Ch’eng-p’u, battle of, 17, 29, 35, 42, Ching River, 154

47-56; alliances involved in, Ching-ti, and the Hsiung-nu, 69 47-48; leadership in, 48-50; Ch’ing dynasty, 24; Sino-barbarian position-taking in, 50-51; battle cooperation in, 14, 15; place of the

and aftermath, 51-57; exact military in, 16

location of, 55; significance of, Chinggis Khan, 180, 246-248, 250

55-56; compared to battle of Chiu-chiang, 204

Ching-hsing, 61, 64 Chiu-ch’ing (ministers of state}, 88

Ch’eng-te, province, 135-136, 138 Chiu-ch’iian, 70, 72-73 (map), 76, 79,

Ch’eng-tsu, 275 86, 98, 116; raids on, 118

Chi-an, 211 Chiu-ming shu, 155, 197

Ch’i, state, 29, 33, 62 Ch’iu Chiin, 269

Ch’i Chi-kuang, 24, 155, 172, 196 Chou, state, 37-38

Chia of Hsia, 35 Chou-shan {Chusan} Island, 276-277,

Chia-hsing, prefecture, 278; civil 303 , service staffs of, 284; military Chou Yiin, 278

personnel of, 286; marauders’ Chu-ai, 70, 72~—73 {map} booty at, 295; Yeh Ma betrayed Chu Ch’i-chen (Ying-tsung), the

at, 299 Cheng-t’ung Emperor, 249; in the

Chia of Wei, 49 campaign of the T’u-mu incident,

Chiang-chiin (general! officers), 88 254—-262; capture of, 262-263; made

Chiang Kai-shek, 25 “ex-emperor,” 266; returned to 387

Index

Chu Ch’i-chen (Continued) See also Conscription; Peking, 267; restored to throne, 268 Mobilization Chu Ch’i-yii, Prince Ch’eng, 255; Civility and etiquette: used with

made emperor (Ching-t’ai], nomads, 13; in early warfare, 27-28 265-266; petitioned to punish Class distinctions: distrust of the

Wang Chen posthumously, poor, 156-157; in siege of 267-268 Shao-hsing, 190 Chu-ch’iian, surrender of, 212-213 Classic of Documents (Shu-ching}, 32 Chu-hou-wang (kings}, 68 Clothing, military, changes in, 64

Chu-ko Liang, 7 “Cloud ladders” (yiin-t’i], 166, 170

Chu Wen-cheng, 211, 241 Coastal marauders: Chinese defenses Chu Yiian-chang, 14, 22, 192, 202; in against, 275; bases of, 275; Wako,

the Poyang campaign, 203-240; 276. See also Hsti Hai; Pirates;

proclaimed emperor, 240; Wang Chih

organization of the military Colonels (hsiao-wei), Han, 88-89

under, 241-242 Commandants (tu-wei} of

Chu Yung, in battle of Yao-erh-ling, commanderies, 88-89

260-261 Commanderies, established by

Ch’u, state, 29, 33-34, 35; king of, Han, 107

after battle of Pi, 46; and battle of | Communications: Han lines of, into

Ch’eng-pu, 47, 50; after the Central Asia, 83; reports on India,

battle, 56 84-85, and signals, Han, 170-171,

Ch’u-Han period, 27; changes in, 174-175. See also Intelligence

65-66 Confucius, 5-6, 46

Chii-shih, 76, 78, 84, 91, 116, 118 Confucianism: imperial, 6, 11, 16; Chii-yen (Edsen-gol}, 76, 83, 96, 97; reflected in early military conduct, wall extended to, 87; defenses of, 37, 39, 48, in moralizing before

98, 117; expeditions to, 113 battle, 39, 49; of Ch’en Yui, 57

Chuang Chu, 111 Conscription: numbers available for, Chiin (commanderies), 9 81; rate of under Wu-ti, 82; in Han Chiin-chi Mountains, 85 forces, 90-91, 92, 108-109. See also Chiin-tzu (superior man}, 7 Civilians; Mobilization

Ch’un-ch’iu (Spring and Autumn Convicts: in army, 91, 120; in defense

Annals}, 27 of walled towns, 160-161

Ch’ung-erh, Prince, 48, 50. See also Costs of war: of Han Wu-ti, 81-82,

Wen, Duke of Chin 99, 104-105; of Huai-hsi campaign,

Ch’ung-te, 306; occupied and looted, 138-139, 145

278; battles near, 291 Countryside: evacuation of, for Chusan Island (Chou-shan), 276-277, defense, 152-154; in siege of

303 Hsiang-yang, 182; in Te-an, 185;

Civil service, administrative staff in lack of resources in, 194, 234

Che-hsi, 284-285 Court, the: as center of strategy, 129,

Civil war: during T’ang dynasty, 134-136; and rebellious

123-124; siege of Shao-hsing part countryside, 189; and marauders

of, 188. See also Unification in southeast, 277-278; source of Civilians: treatment of, 142; role of orders to the field, 295; relation of

as auxiliaries, 185, 192-193; military commander to, 305-306. mobilization of in walled towns, See also Government, central 155-156, 173; directions for flight Creasy, Sir Edward, 23-24 of, 179; in tactical forces, 286-289. Creel, H. G., 7, 11

388

Index

Cressey, George, 3 Captive emperor by, 263-265;

Crossbow, 5, 20, 25, 64, 98, 121; failure to exploit opportunity, importance of, 110; of the Sung, 265-267; death of, 267 166-167; changes in use of, 173; in Erh-shih, 88 siege of Hsiang-yang, 183-184; at Essentials of Military Preparedness

Poyang, 221 (Wu-pei chi-yao}, 153

Eunuchs: tyranny of, 22,23; Wang

Declarations of hostility, as early Chen as example of, 252-254;

ceremonial, 41-42 official revenge on, 263, 267-268

Defectors: advice from, 41; Li Su’s Expeditions: for information and

policy as to, 141-142; as fifth trade, 84-85; against the columnists, 189-190; at Poyang Hsiung-nu, 112-118; against Lake, 235; Wang Ao as, 294-295, Huai-hsi, 134-145. See also

297 Campaigns

Defense: vs. offense, 25; in wars of “Extermination” (chiao or mieh):

position, 124; analysis of response to military threat, 274;

Huai-hsi’s, 145-150; “position of marauders, 281-282 defense,” 149; by walled towns,

151-179. See also Walled towns; Fa (law; method}, 10-11

Walls Family, punishment extended to, 90

Diaries, as source on sieges, 21, Fang Kuo-chen, 203

180-181, 199-201 Feng Kuo-sheng, 217, 241

Diplomacy: Han alternative to Feng Yii-hsiang, 25 warfare, 78; as adjunct to Fiction, vernacular, as source of warfare, 129; used by Li Su, 141 military history, 201 Discipline, in walled towns, 177. See Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World

also Training, military (Creasy), 23-24

Divination, 30, 51; instances from Fire: as weapon, 20, 22, 186, 221; Tso-chuan, 32-34; double, 32-33; prevention of, in walled towns, and reconnaissance, 33-34. See 159-160; at Poyang Lake, 226-227;

also Omens off Hu-k’ou, 238

Dreyer, Edward L., 21-22, 242 Firearms, 25, 192; early approaches

Dubs, H. H., 101 to, 171-172; under the Ming,

172-173; introduction of European,

Edsen-gol (Chii-yen], 76, 83 172; in 14th century, 204; at Elite forces, Li Su’s cavalry, 141 . Poyang Lake, 22] Emperor: role of, 6; use of warfare Five Dynasties period, 20

by, 7; virtuous conduct of, 8; Flags, for signals, 171 central power of, 19; influence of Flamethrowers: ‘‘fire-lance”

as individual, 67; criticism of, (huo-ch’iang), 171; ‘‘fire-throwing 104-105; not a field commander, lance” (t’u-huo ch’iang), 171 107; T’ai-tsung as warrior, 123,127, Flouting, see Provocation 145; at T’u-mu, 261-267. See also Fo-lang chi, 172

Han Wu-ti; T’ai-tsung Food supply: Han, 81-82; shortages Empress Dowager (Tz’u-hsi}, 15 of, under siege, 142; for walled

Enemy leaders, treatment of, towns, 154-155

102-104. See also Captives Forces, military: available to Han Esen, chieftain of the Western government, 81, 90-96; size of Mongols, 15, 250; and the T’u-mu Roman and Chinese compared, 95; incident, 254-263; treatment of not professional, 108-109; local, 389

Index

Forces (Continued} concept of territorial integrity for,

109; in Huai-hsi campaign, 106; problems of under T’ang, 123, 130-132, 138, 144; at Hsiang-yang, 129; Ming, 273-274. See also

181-182; at Te-an, 185; at Court, the

Shao-hsing, 188-189; naval, 204, Grain: grown in military colonies,

216-217; available in Che-hsi, 80; Han supplies of, 81-82; for

283-287 walled towns, 155

Foreign relations, Chinese: with Grand Canal, 277; raids near, 292 Inner Asia, 13, 67; Han policy, 69; Great Wall (ch’ang ch’eng}, 80;

raids by Wako as, 276, 304 influence of, 12; barrier against Fortifications: importance of, in Mongols, 245, 246, 251; function

wars of position, 124; town, of in 15th century, 264; later

described, 146-147; cha, attacks on, 268; military zone

‘“field-forts,”” 147-148; Chinese and surrounding, 269-271; coastal European contrasted, 193. See also equivalent of, 275

Walled towns; Walls “Guest units” (k’o-chiin), army, 140 Franke, Herbert, 20-21 Gunpowder, 25, 169, 191; storage of,

Fu Lu-chih, 89 160; early uses of, 171-172. See also

Fu-ping, 24 Firearms

Fu River, 218, 220

Fu-shih (vice commissioner), 286 Hai-ning Guard, 285 Fukien province, 277; plundered, 278 Hai-yen, county seat, 285, 296;

Fuller, J. F. C., 1 military personnel of, 286 Halleck, Gen. Henry, 1

Garrisons, 92; Han, in Inner Asia, Han campaigns: general course of, 83-84; number of men in {Han}, 68-77; strategy of, 82-87; conduct 93; not regularly maintained, 109; of, 87-101; consequences of, adjoining Huai-hsi, 128, 139; of 101-105; conclusions concerning,

walled towns, 155-156; at 105-110. See also Han dynasty;

Hsiang-yang, 181-182; Han Ww-ti

independent of courts, 203; Han dynasty, 67; civilian supremacy reorganization of, after capture, under, 6; bureaucracy under,

242; along the Great Wall, 251-252, 9-11; military activity in, 17-18; 264, 269-271, 274. See also Forces, compared to Roman Empire, 25;

military before consolidation, 68-69;

Generals (chiang-chtin}: Tzu-yii, 32, campaigns to northwest, 76;

49. Duke Wen of Chin, 48; Han strength and limitations of, 77-82; Hsin, 56, 64; Ch’en Yii, 57; Han strategy of, 82-87; forces of, 90-99; Wu-ti, 67-110; Han, 88; foreigners fighting methods during, 99-101 as, 89; punishment of, 89-90, 187; Han forces: recruitment of, 90-91;

Li Ling, 119-122; Li Su, 140; numbers of, 92-95; casualties in, Chao-chun, 181; Wang Yiin-ch’u, 95; supply and transport for, 96-99; 185; Hu Ta-hai, 188; Lii Chen, 188; fighting methods of, 99-101 Ch’en Yu-liang, 203, 207-212, 218, Han, state: in battle of Ching-hsing,

238; Chu Yiian-chang, 203-240; 56-62, struggle with Ming, ranks of, in Ming, 241-242; Hu 202-240; siege of Nan-ch’ang, Tsung-hsien, 278, 280-287, 305; 207-219; failure of naval strategy

Tsung Li, 292 of, 240

Goto archipelago, 280, 283 Han An-kuo, 111 Government, central imperial: Han Han Ch’eng, death of, 222 operation of, 79-80; importance of Han Hsin, Lord of Huai-yin, 65; in

390

Index

battle of Ching-hsing, 47, 56; supplies for, 97; numbers of,

prestige of, 64 98-99; stages in use of, for

Han Hung (governor of Hsiian-wu}, warfare, 99-100; capture of, 102;

135, 138 use of, 114. See also Archers, Han Lin-erh, 207 mounted; Cavalry Han-shu (Han history}, 74, 85, 88, Hsi, Duke of, 41 323; figures on Han forces in, 92, Hsi-ch’i Shu, 34-35

93, 94; casualty figures in, 95; Hsi-ho, 85, 94 supply estimates in, 97; on horses, Hsi-hsia, 195 98-99. on prisoners, 104; criticism Hsi-ning, a eunuch, 265; adviser to

of Wu-ti in, 104-105; Li Ling’s Wang Chen, 265-266; death of, 266 campaign translated from, 119-122 Hsia-hou Sheng, 104

Han T’o-chou, 180-181 Hsiang, Duke, of Sung, 65-66

Han Wang Hsin, 90 Hsiang-yang: fall of, 151-152; Han Wu-ti, 17; campaigns of, 67-68; weapons used at, 171-172; siege of,

general course of campaigns, 180, 181-185 68-77; recruitment of leaders by, Hsiang-yang shou-ch’eng lu {A

87; forces of, 94; horses sent to, Record of the Defense of 99; on fighting methods, 100; later Hsiang-yang}, 182, 199

criticisms of, 104-105; victory Hsiang Yii, 56, 62 parade of, 115; and Li Ling’s Hsiao, battle of, 34, 38 campaign, 119-122. See also Han Hsieh Tsai-hsing, rebellion of,

campaigns; Han dynasty; Han 212-213 forces Hsien {counties}, 9

Han Yen-nien, and Li Ling’s Hsien-tsung, emperor, 124; in

campaign, 122 Huai-hsi campaign, 127, 134, 142,

Han Yu, 139 145 Han Yiieh, 115, 117, 118 Hsin-yang, 127

Hangchow, 278; gunpowder Hsiung-nu tribes, 12, 67, 166; Han produced at, 191; center of campaign against, 18, 25; early international trade, 276; raids on, Han relations with, 69; raids 278; civil service staffs of, 284; during Han years, 74, 76, 111-118; military personnel of, 286-287; nomadic nature of, 79; Han

Hsii Hai’s threat to, 289 Strategy against, 82-87; numbers Hangchow Front Guard, 285 of, 95; casualties of, 95; use of Hangchow Rear Guard, 285 mounted archers by, 100;

Hannibal, 95 treatment of surrendered leaders “Heavenly bridges” (t’ien-ch’iao), 204 of, 102-104; Li Ling’s campaign

Hemp, growing of, 82 against, 119-122

Henderson, G. F. R., 1 Hsii Hai, 273; in campaign (1556),

Heng-shan, revolt of king of, 69 287; initial assault by, 288-290; Hero, military: disesteem of, 25; thrust inland by, 290-292; siege of excluded from court histories, T’ung-hsiang, 292-295; withdrawal 200; in vernacular fiction, 201 to the coast, 295-301; surrender Heroism, displays of, for ceremonial and death of, 301-303

and provocation, 31 Hsii Hsiieh-fan, 175, 177, 197-199

Ho-nei, 94 Hsti Hung, 298, 303 Homer, 17 Hsiti Mien-chih, 199

Honan, 126, 287 Hsii-po (of Ch’u}, 36, 37 Horses: soldiery mounted on, 63; Hsti Ta, 207, 213; and siege of Han shortage of, 80; losses of, 95; Lu-chou, 216; at relief of siege of 391

Index

Hsii Ta (Continued}) first phase of, 134-140; second Nan-ch’ang, 217; at battle of phase of, 140-145; career of Li Su,

Poyang Lake, 221-224; sent to 140-144

defend Nanking, 225 Huai-nan, revolt of king of, 69, 95

Hsii Tung, 196 Huai River, 78, 126, 127

Hsii Tzu-wei, 76, 83, 115, 117 Huai-yin Hou lieh-chuan (biography Hsiian-fu, 258; attack on rear guard of Marquis of Huai-yin), 56 at, 260; key point on Great Wall, Huang-ch’uan, 127

264; after T’u-mu, 269 Hucker, Charles O., 22~23

Hsiian-ti, 104 Hui, King, of Liang, 39

Hsiian-tsung, Emperor, 249 Hui-ch’ii, 142

Hsiian-t’u, 70, 72-73 {map} Hukuang, province, 287

Hsiieh Shou, at battle of Human sacrifice, 45 Yao-erh-ling, 260-261 Hun-hsieh, a king of Hsiung-nu, Hsiin Chih, 115, 116 74, 102-103; surrender of, 113 Hsiin-fu (grand coordinator), 277 Huns, 25

Hu-ch’ien ching (Sung military Huo Ch’ii-ping, 85, 88, 90, 93, 95;

encyclopaedia}, 154-155, 187; campaign to capture the Shan-yii,

described, 196 96, 101; criticism of, 105;

Hu-chou, prefecture, 278; civil expeditions of, 113, 114 service staffs of, 284; military staff Huo-p’ao, 20 of, 286

Hu-fu (“tiger tallies”), 89 I-chou, commandery, 74, 116 Hu-k’ou: fall of to Ming, 218, 233; Ili region, 12, 15; Han approaches to,

final battle near, 238 76 Hu Ta-hai, 188-192 Te-an, 186 Hu Te-chi, 213; relief of Nan-ch’ang India, 84; naval expeditions to, 15 by, 234 Infantry: development of, 63, 64; Hu Shen, 213 Incendiary warfare, 169-170; at

Hu Tsung-hsien, 23, 273, 278; Han, 92, 110; transition to cavalry, background of, 280; problems and 100-101 policies of, 281-287; personnel Informers, in walled towns, 158 available to, 283-287; in campaign ___Inner Asia: influence of, 11-16;

against Hsii Hai, 287, 289-290, China threatened by confederacies 291; and siege of T’ung-hsiang, in, 67. See also Hsiung-nu 293; pacification tactics of, Inner Mongolia, 245; garrisons 297-300; at surrender of Hsii Hai, pulled back from, 269 301-302; later years of, 304; Intelligence, military: preliminary significance of campaigns of, to battle, 30, 40-41; from defectors,

304-307 41, 84, 144; from spies, 57, 58, 61;

Hua Pao, warden of Lii, 43 from travelers, 84-85; from

Hua Yiian, 36 hostages, 84; from prisoners, 121,

Huai-hsi, 19-20; under the late by trusted officials, 134-135; by T’ang, 124-129; preparations for observation posts, 174-175; by campaign against, 129-134; forces messengers, 214-215; by scouts, of, 131-132; strategy of, 132, 137; 291

campaign of Li Sun against, Iron, use of for weapons, 5 140-144; fall of, 145; analysis of Isma’il, 172 defense of, 145-150

Huai-hsi campaign: preparations Jao-chou, 220 for, 129-134; objectives of, 132; Japan: coastal raiders from, 274-275,

392

Index

276; negotiations with Wang Chih Kuhn, P. A., 16, 24 in, 282-283; relations with China, Kung-sun Ao, 89, 93, 95;

304. expeditions of, 111-113, 116, 117, Jen Wen, 117 118 Jesuits, and techniques of warfare, Kung-sun Ho, 93, 100; expeditions of,

173 111-115

Jiro, Aoyama, 242 Kuo Ch’ang, 115, 116

Ju-nan, 127 Kuo Hsing, 226-227 Jurchen, 154, 171; wars between Kyushu, 274 Sung and, 176, 180; in siege of

Hsiang-yang, 181-185; in siege of Ladders, for scaling walls, 170

Te-an, 185-188 Lake Ch’ao: pirates of, 204; siege at Lu-chou on, 207

Kaifeng: fall of, 151, 200; firearms Lattimore, Owen, 13, 100, 248

used at siege of, 171 Leadership: in Ch’eng-p’u battle,

K’ai-hsi Te-an shou-ch’eng lu, 199 48-50; of Han campaigns, 87-90;

K’ai-ling, Noble of, 118 difficulties of, 108; of Hu

Kan River, 218 Tsung-hsien, 305-306 Kan-ch’iian, 69 Legalists, 6, 11

Kan-p’u harbor, 285 Legge, J., 41

K’ang of Liu, Duke, 35 Li (etiquette), 6

107 Li Chii, 112, 113

K’ang-hsi Emperor, the, war aims of, Li Chiang, 148-149

Kao Ch’‘iung, 191 Li Aisi 92, 11), 112,155

Kao Hsia-yii, 135, 136 Li Kuang, 83, 86, 93, 95, 105; suicide

Kao Hsien-chih, 25 of, 88, 89, 114; expeditions of, 111,

Kao Ku (of Ch’i], 36-37 | 113, 114

Kao Pu-shih, 89 Li Kuang-li, 76, 86, 87, 89-90; forces Kao-tsu, of Han, 82 of, 92, 94; casualties of, 95;

Kashgaria, 12 expeditions of, 96, 97, 116, 117,

Khubilai Khan, 247, 266, 274 118, 119; capture of horses by, 99 Kiangsi: Ming assault on, 205; Han Li Kuang-yen, 136, 140, 145 threat to, 207, 214; significance of Li Ling, 76, 85, 87, 90, 91, 93, 105, 117,

Ming victory, 239 118; use of infantry by, 101;

Kiangsu province, 276 campaign of (99 s.c.), 119-122 Kierman, Frank A., Jr., 17, 18 Li Mu, general, 100 Korea: Han expeditions to, 74, 91; Li Sheng, 140

withdrawal from, 86, 90 Li Su, 140-145

Koxinga, 26 Li T’ien-ch’ung, 278, 281 Ku Yen-wu, on the northern Li Ts’ai, 112

269-270 57, 60, 66 K’uai T’ung, 64 Li Wen-chung, Ming commander in garrisons of the Tung-sheng Wei, Li Tso-ch’e, in battle of Ching-hsing,

Kuan Kan, 121 Chekiang, 213

Kuang, music master, 34 Li Wen-t’ung, 136

Kuang-chou, 127 Li Yu, 143, 144

Kuang-hsin, army sent to relieve Liang-chuang, marauders’ camp at,

Wu-ch’ang, 232-233 303

K’uang Yeh, 254, 256, 26] Liao dynasty, 24 Kuei Yu-kuang, 287 Liao-hsi, 71, 72-73 (map}, 112

Kuei-yii, 33-34 Liao-tung, 71, 72-73 (map] 393

Index

Liao Yung-chung, 217; at battle of Manpower, see Forces, military;

Poyang Lake, 221-224, 229-230 Population Lien-ping shih-chi (‘Practical Guide Manufacture: Han, 80; of triggers,

for Military Training’), 196-197 110; of firearms under siege, 153

Lien-sheng Yang, 92 Mao Hai-feng, see Wang Ao

Ling-chii, Han prefecture, 74 Mao K’un: narrative of campaign

Ling-hu, 38 against Hsii Hai by, 288, 292,

Ling-yiin, 148 293-294, 300; on the surrender of Literati, Confucian, attitudes of Hsii Hai, 301-302

early warfare dominated by, 65 Mao Tse-tung, 11, 65

Liu Ch’e, 107 Maps: availability of, 85; used by

Liu-ch’iu (Ryukyu) Islands, 275 Li Ling, 120; at Hsiang-yang, 184

Liu I, 154 Martel, Charles, 25

Liu Pang, 56, 62, 64, 87, 107; mounted Materiel, see Weapons; individual

archers under, 100 weapons by name

Liu T’ao: in siege of Cha-p’u, 290; Mediterranean Sea, 3, 11 and “pacification” of Hsii Hai, 300 Mencius, 39

Lo, Jung-pang, 305 Mencius, 5

Lo-lang, 71, 72-73 (map) Meng T’ien, 68 Loewe, Michael, 17-18 Mercenaries {mu-tsu}, 287 Logistics: in Han campaigns, 18; a Miao Fen-huang, 40-41 military problem, 96-97, 194, 204; Militarism, and bureaucracy, 26 difficulties of in attacks on walled Military, the: role of in social order,

towns, 194, 204; naval, 204 2-8, 63; and bureaucracy, 9-11, 26; Lou-lan, 84; capture of king of, 76, under the Han, 18, 106-107; lack

93, 116 of specialized training for,

Lu, state, 34-35, 45 107-108; need for supplementing,

Lu-chou, siege of, 215-216 192-193; organizations and ranks, Lu Po-te, 85, 90, 96, 117; estimates of Ming, 241-242; role of, Ming, 244;

forces, 98; expeditions of, 114, provincial organization of,

118; and Li Ling’s campaign, 285-286

119-122 Military expansion, Han: context of,

Lu T’ang, 280, 287, 298, 303 77-79; sources of strength of,

Lii Chen, 188-192 79-82; leadership during, 87

Lii Hsiang, 41 Military handbooks: tactics for

Lui K’un, 172, 179, 197 defending walled towns, 173-179;

Lii Ssu-mien, 105 described, 195-199. See also Mo-ti; Lun-t’ai, 78, 85; massacre in, 117 Sun tzu; Wu-ching tsung-yao; Lang-hsi, commandery, 71, 72-73 Wu-pei chi-yao

(map), 93, 94,95, 113 Military history, Chinese, 16;

Lung-lo River, 85 . chronicles of battles, 42, 45, 56~57, 119-122; biases in reporting, 134;

Ma-i, 111 by Han Yii, 139; diaries as,

Ma Shun, a eunuch, 267-268 180-181, 199-201; some sources

Ma T’ung, 76, 118 described, 195-201; on the Wako

Magdeburg, 151 campaigns, 287-288

Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 1 Military threats, traditional Chinese Manchu (Ch’ing) dynasty, 245, 272 response to, 273-274

Manchuria, 245 Militia, local: in Huai-hsi campaign, Manchus: basis of rule, 14; Mongol 130-131; in Hsiang-yang, 181

threat displaced by, 272 Millis, Walter, 1

394

Index

Mines, explosive (p’i-li huo-ch’iu}, messenger from Nan-ch’ang in,

169 215; main army at, 242; threatened

Ming dynasty, 24; compared to by Hsii Hai, 289

Manchu, 14; and the Mongols, 15, Nan-yiieh, 74, 85, 86, 94, 103, 114

21, 22, 246; weakness of Naval warfare, 21, 202; fleets for leadership of, 268; failure to rule transport, 204; Ch’en Yu-liang’s the Four Commanderies, 269; ships at Wu-ch’ang, 209-210, 217; defensive northern boundary of, Chu Yiian-chang’s fleet to relieve 269-271; obsession with Mongols, siege, 216-217; tactics of, 221-222,

272; defense of coastline by, 223-224; battle of Poyang Lake, 275-277; military defenses in 221-230; strategy of Ming in, 240;

southeast, 277 of Ming against marauders, 275

Ming, state, 203; naval forces of, 204; Needham, Joseph, 167 military organization in, 241-242 Ni {rebels}, 8

Ming forces, in siege of Shao-hsing, Nien rebels, 10

188-192 Ningpo: early center for

Ming-shan Ho-shang, see Hsii Hai international trade, 276-277; Ming-shih: on Ch’ang Yii-ch’un, pirate raids on, 278, 288; surrender 238; on Hu Tsung-hsien, 304 of Wang Chih at, 283; raiders

Motrti, 152, 170 near, 297

Mobilization, for defense of walled Nobilities, conferring of to

towns, 155-156, 192-193 surrendered enemy, 102-103. See Mongol nation: rise of, 244-249; also Rewards organization of society in, 246; Nomads: effect of, 12; Hsiung-nu as, relation to China, 248-249; need 79; walls as defense against, 80 for trade, 251-253, 282; hostile North China: penetrated by

Chinese feeling toward, 271 Hsiung-nu, 67; Han defense in, Mongolia, rise of as entity, 247-248 82; Huai-hsi campaign in, 127; Mongols, 12, 171; wars with Sung, Sung attacks on Jurchen in, 180;

176; and siege of Shao-hsing, Mongol threats to, 244-245, 248, 188-192; lack of records of, 200 975

Mote, Frederick W., 22 Nurhachi, 14 “Mule corps” (lo-tzu-chiin, lo-tzu-tu), 137-138, 150

Minster, 151 Observation posts, manning of, 174 Muskets, “bird guns” (niao-ch’ung), Octavian (Augustus Caesar}, 95

172 Officers, military: under the Han, 87-90; titles of, 88; foreigners as,

Na-ho Tao-seng, 187 89; punishments of, 89-90;

Nan-ch’ang: Han siege of, 207-212; stipends of, 99; Ming, 241-242; of defense plans of, 211; isolation of, tactical forces, 286-287; 214; messenger despatched from, independence of, under Ming, 214-216; siege lifted, 219; relief of, 305-306. See also Generals; 232-234; final battles for, 236-239; Leadership new Han emperor installed in, 239 Ojirat, the (Western Mongols], 250

Nan Chihli: tsung-tu (supreme Oman, Sir Charles, 1 commander} of, 277; marauders in, | Omens in warfare, 187, 191; 295 appearance of dragon near Nan-hu-tsui, 233 Nan-ch’ang, 217; at Poyang Lake,

Nanking, 210; fall of, 151; capital of 228

the Ming, 202; arrival of Opium War, 8, 276

395

Index

Pacification (appeasement; chao-an, Nan-ch’ang, 207-212; anti-Ming chao-fu): traditional response to rebellion in Chekiang, 212-214; military threat, 274; of marauders, Ming upstream expedition, 282; of Altan Khan, 282; risks of, 214-218; siege raised, 218-221; 282; of Wang Chih, 283; of Hsii battle of Poyang Lake, 221-230;

Hai, 293-295, 297, 306 end of naval campaign, 230-238;

Pacifism, in Chinese tradition, 7, 11 death of Ch’en Yu-liang, 238: Palace Armies (Shen-t’se chiin}, 130 subsequent Ming expansion,

Pamirs, the, 76 239-240

P’an Tang (of Ch’u}, 37 Poyang Lake, battle of the, 22,

P’an-yii, 114 221-230; first day, 221-225; second Pao-ching, aboriginal troops from, day, 225-227; fireboat attack,

280, 295, 302, 303, 306 226-227; later fighting, 227-230 Pao Kuei (of Chin), 36 Practical Guide for Military Training

Pao-Yiieh lu, 199 (Lien-ping shih-chi), 155 P’ei Tu, 142 Preliminary actions of battle, 30,

Pei-ti, 95 Prayers, to protective deities, 187

Peking: early sieges of, 15-16; Esen 32-42; divination, 30, 32-34; at, 266; threatened by Altan Khan, reconnaissance, 33; exploration of

275; extermination of Wako possible allies, 30, 34-36;

reported to, 303 provocation or flouting, 36-38;

Penal code, military, 175; legalism physical preparations, 30-31,

of, 159 38-40; intelligence and security, Persia, 12 40-41; declarations of hostility,

Peterson, Charles, 19-20 41-42 ;

Pi, battle of, 29; provocation before, Prisoners, see Captives 36; details of, 42; moral tone of Provocation, as preliminary ritual,

report, 46 36-38

Pien-chou (Kaifeng}, 135 Psychological warfare, 31, 33, 176; in P’ing-hu, surrender of Hsii Hai at, Huai-hsi campaign, 129; at Te-an,

301-303 186; at Shao-hsing, 190; in Poyang

P’ing-lu, province, 135, 138; defeat campaign, 235

of, 145 P’u P’eng, 89

P’ing-yiian, commandery, 103 Punishments, military: for defeated Pirates, 23; Barbary, 275; Chinese generals, 89-90, 135, 187, 225; for coastal, 275-276; Wako, 276-277, spies and guarantors, 158; penal

292. See also Hsii Hai; Wako; codes, 159; for guards at

Wang Chih observation posts, 175, 177 Po Chou-li {of Ch’u}, 38-39, 40 ,

Poisoning of watercourses, 154 Racism, anti-Mongol feeling as, 271 Population: Han, 81; of three Han Ramming, by ships, 220 provinces, 94; of Huai-hsi, 128 Range: of crossbow, 166; of catapult,

Portuguese in China, 276 167

“Position-defense,” 149-150; Rations, army, 97. See also Food

defined, 149 supply

Position-taking in battle: moral, 50; Ratisbonne, 193

physical, 50-51 Rebellion, right of, 8

Poyang campaign, 202; strategic Records of the Defense of Towns elements of, 203-205; situation of (Shou-ch’eng Iu), 161, 167, 168; the Ming, 205-207; Han siege of described, 195~196

396

Index

Reconnaissance, combined with Shen Pu-hai, 100 divination, 33-34. See also Shih-chi (Historical Records), 27

Intelligence Shih-lu (Veritable Records}, 288 Records of Han Administration Shih-tsung, Ming emperor, 281, 304; (Loewe}, 17 attitude toward Hu Tsung-hsien’s

Recruitment: into Han forces, tactics, 307 90-91; local, 141. See also Shingoro, 303

Conscription; Mobilization Shou-ch’un, 171

Refugees, treatment of, 142. See also Shou-hsiang forts, 83, 116

Captives; Defectors Shou-kuei (tortoise shell}, 33

Rewards, system of, 6; used with the Shu-ching (Classic of Documents), 32

nomads, 13; for successful Shu-hsiang (of Chin), 39 generals, 102; for surrendered Shu-sun (of Wu}, 38 leaders, 103; for informers, 158; of Shui-hu chuan (All Men Are

silver, on day of attack, 175. See Brothers), 201

also Punishments Shun, emperor, 32 Ritual: warfare as, 28; of behavior Shuo-fang, commandery, 74, 83, 84,

in battle, 47; lacking in battle of 86, 93, 94, 112

Ching-hsing, 61 Sieges, 20-21; three described,

Rockets, “flying fire-lances” 180-192; duration of, 193-194,

(fei-huo-ch’iang), 171 of Nan-ch’ang, 207-212, 218-221,

Roman Empire: and Han, 25; size of of T’ung-hsiang, 292-295. See also

armies of, 95 Hsiang-yang; Shao-hsing; Te-an; Walled towns

San Gimignano, 193 Silk Road, Han protection of, 77, 84, San-kuo chih yen-i (Tales of the 85 Three Kingdoms}, 201 Sinkiang, 245 Sang Hung-yang, 85 “Six Sections of Foot and Horse” Satsuma, Hsii’s base at, 280 (Jiu-pu ping-ma}, 141, 143

Sea raiders, 23. See also Pirates; Social order, Chinese: attitude

Wako toward warfare, 5; hierarchic

Serruys, Henry, 251 basis of, 6; role of education in, 6; Shan-yii, the, leader of Hsiung-nu, rewards and punishments in, 6, 77; attempts to capture, 69, 74, 96, 13; physical coercion in, 6-7;

111, 114 relation of rebellion to, 8

Shang, commandery, 69, 94 Soochow, 203; fall of to Ming,

Shang-ch’iu Ch’eng, 118 239-240; focus of marauders, ° Shang-ku, commandery, 71, 72-73 276, 278, 289 {map}, 93; Hsiung-nu attacks on, Southeast China: pirate raids on,

82,, 111, 113, 118 274-275; vulnerability of, 275-276;

Shang Yang, 100 Ming defense of, 277 Shanghai, 276, 277, 278; pirates near, South Russia, 12 288, 292 Spies, 57, 58, 61; in walled cities, Shansi, fortified locations in, 270 157-158 Shantung, 287 Spring and Autumn period Shao-hsing, 172, 203; siege of, (Ch’un-ch’iu}, 4

188-192; pirate raids on, 278 Ssu-k’u ch’tian-shu tsung-mu, on Hu

She-shu (of Ch’u}, 36, 37 Tsung-hsien, 304

Shen-chou, 127 Ssu-ma Ch’ien, 27; account of battle

Shen-li, 71, 72-73 {map] of Ching-hsing by, 56, 60-61 397

Index

Ssu-ma T’an, 27 Ta-hsia, 86; horses from, 99

Stirrups, 5, 12, 25, 62, 99, 110 Ta-hstieh yen-yi-pu, 269 Strategy, 30; of Han Hsin, 60-61; Ta-pieh Hills, 127

Chinese, frontier, 106-107; against Ta-t’ung: Great Wall garrison point, Huai-hsi, 128, 132, 139-140; of Wu 254, 264; defeat of garrison from,

Yiian-chi, 129-130, 132; of 258; Emperor’s army at, 259, 261; Huai-hsi defense, 145-150; | in years afterward, 269 continuity of, 192, 198, 273-274; of |§ Ta-yiian (Ferghana}, 76, 86, 87, 94, 95,

the Poyang campaign, 203-205, 96; horses from, 99; attacks on,

210, 211, 218-219, 237, of 116, 117; King executed, 117 pacification (appeasement), 274, Tactics: of early battles, 32-42; at 306; of extermination, 274; of Hu battle of Ch’eng-p’u, 51-54; at Tsung-hsien, 280-287, 297-298, battle of Ching-hsing, 57-58;

305. See also Strategy, Han; development of infantry, 63; Han, Strategy, T’ang; Tactics; Warfare 82-87, 99, 100-101; Han and Strategy, Han, 82-87; defense lines Hsiung-nu compared, 100; of Li of, 82-84; involvement in Central Ling, 120; for defense of walled

Asia, 84-85; concentration of towns, 166-179; at Hsiang-yang, effort, 85-87; as defensive, 184; at Shao-hsing, 191; influence

106-107; maintenance of of Western, 197-198; in naval

garrisons, 109-110 warfare, 204, 210, 212, 221-224, Strategy, T’ang: siegecraft, 124; 226; of Hu Tsung-hsien, 289-290.

decentralized forces of, 130; See also Strategy

defense, 145-150; fortification of Tai, state, 56, 68, 71, 72-73 (map}, 93;

towns, 146-147 Hsiung-nu attacks on, 82, 112

Su Chien, 89, 95, 112, 113 T’ai-chou, prefecture, 278; victory

Sun shu, at Pi, 42 over Wako at, 298

Sun-tzu, 60, 144 T’ai-p’ing, 210; capture of, 204 Sun-tzu ping-fa (Art of War), 5, 11, T’ai-shou (governors of

20, 60, 64, 152, 173, 192, 198; commanderies}, 88 treatment of alliances in, 34-35 T’ai-tsu, Ming emperor, 275 Sung dynasty, 20; military tactics T’ai-tsung, T’ang emperor, 123 during, 161; weapons of, 166-170; T’ai-yiian, 71, 72-73 (map) wars with Jurchen during, 180-185 Taiping rebellion, 21 Sung-chiang area, marauders attacked Taiwan, pirate bases on, 275

by Hsii Hai in, 298 Takla Makan Desert, 83, 84, 118

Sung Kuei, 222 Talas, battle of, 25

Sung-men-shan strait: to Poyang Tan-erh, 71, 72-73 (map] Lake, 218; Ming fleet in, 219 T’ang dynasty, 19-20, 24, 123; Supplies: army, under the Han, 96, military events of, 123-124;

97-99; for walled towns, 153, emphasis on internal 154-155; shortages of fuel, 194. See developments, 124; armies of,

also Logistics 130-131. See also Huai-hsi

‘Surrender: as alternative to campaign

punishment, 89-90, 108; treatment ‘T’ang-chou, 140 of enemy after, 102-104; readiness T’ang Meng, 84, 111

to, 176 T’ang Shou, 195 Syr Tardus, 154 T’ang Shun-chih, 287-288

Szechwan, 287 T’ang T’ai-tsung, 107 Tarbaghatai, 15

Ta chiang-chiin (supreme general), Task forces, see Forces, military

88, 90 Te-an, siege of, 180, 185-188

398

Index

Tea merchants, armed forces from, Ts’ao Hsiang, 114

181, 185 Ts’ao Kuei (of Lu}, 45

Thousand Character Text Tseng Kung-liang, 195 (Ch’ien-tzu wen), 174 Tseng Kuo-fan, 10, 16, 25

Ti barbarians, 55 Tso-chuan (Tradition of Tso}, 27,

Tibet, 245 28-30; divination in, 32-34;

Tien, kings of, 104 alliances and their disruption in, T’ien-shan, 117, 118 34-36; on military preparation, T’ien-shui, commandery, 71, 72-73 38-39; declaration of hostility in,

(map], 94 41; battle of Pi, 42; battle of An,

Tiger Haunt Monastery 49-43

|Hu-p’ao ssu), 280 Tsung Li, 287, 306; battle near “Tiger tallies” (hu-fu), 89 Tsao-lin, 292, 293

Ting-hsiang, 71, 72-73 {map}, 82, 93, Tu-mu, 139

113, 114 T’u-mu incident: chronicle of,

Ting Tu, 195 254-263; aftermath of, 263-267;

Toghan (Prince Shun-ning}, 250 Chinese failure to learn from, Tou Lien, 34 967-272

Tours, battle of, 25 Tun-huang, 71, 72~73 (map}, 77, 84, Towns, refortification of by T’ang, 86, 94, 97, 116; extension of wall

146. See also Walled towns to, 87; defenses of, 93

Traditionalism in Chinese warfare, T’un-tien (agricultural colony}, 24

192, 198, 273-274 Tung Chung-chih, 137, 139, 144-145

Trade: as alternate weapon, 18-19, Tung-nan (the southeast}, focus of 22; and the Mongols, 248-249, 251 Wako, 276. See also Southeast Training, military, 196; under Li Su, China

141; of civilian auxiliaries in Tung Pang-cheng, 292

walled towns, 173 Tung-sheng Wei, garrison posts in,

Transport, see Logistics 269 Treaty ports, 277 Tung-yiieh, 103, 115

Tribute system, 13 T’ung-hsiang, 306; siege of by Hsti

Troop movements: duration of, 96; Hai, 292-295

in Huai-hsi campaign, 143-144; of |= T’ung-pai Hills, 127-128

Jurchen troops, 182; of attackers T’ung Shu-yeh, 55-56

of walled towns, 194; in Ming Turkestan, 25 state, 205. of Han, at siege of Turks, in Chinese cavalry, 141 Nan-ch’ang, 207; Ming upstream Turncoats, see Defectors expedition, 214-218; of rescuers of | Tzu-chung (of Ch’u], 40

Nan-ch’ang, 232-233; in Wang Tzu-fan, 51 Chen’s march northwest, 254-263; Tzu-lii, 41 to meet Hsii Hai, 288-292; of Hsii | Tzu-mu {of Ch’u}, 39

Hai to the coast, 295-296 Tzu-wen, 49

Ts’ai, state, 29 Tzu-yii, 32, 65; in battle of Ts’ai Chiu-te: chronicle of Ch’eng-p’u, 49, 50

anti-Wako activities by, 288, 292, Tz’u-ch’i, county seat, sack of, 292,

295, 297, 299; on surrender of Hsii 294

mahi sii cats Unification, in China, 67; problems

Ts’ai-chou, 127; Li Su’s attack on, of, 3; process of, 4; under the

143-144, 146 T’ang, 123-124

Tsang-k’o River, 85

Ts’ang-hai commandery, 86, 94, 112 Voltaire, Francois Marie Arouet, 15] Tsao-lin, battles near, 291, 295, 306 Volunteers, in Han forces, 91

399

Index

Wako (Wo-k’ou): composition of, Wang Yiin-ch’u, 185-187, 189, 199 276; focus of attacks of, 276-277; Warfare: Han attitude toward, 6;

chronicles of, 287-288; raids by, and the emperor, 7; elements of, 292. See also Hsii Hai; Wang Chih 11; and nomads, 13; disesteem of, Walled towns, Chinese, 20, 21, 147, 25; relation of to ritual, 28; 203-204; importance of, 151-152, described in Tso-chuan, 27, 30;

preparations for defense of, ritualisms of, 43-44; primitive 152-161; countryside around, separated from civilized, 62; shift

152-154; mobilization of to reliance on border peoples, 63;

manpower for, 155-156; security rationalization of, 64; under the measures for, 156-161; weapons T’ang, 123-124, 130; under the used in, 161-173; effect of firearms Sung, 161-170; traditionalism of,

on, 172-173; fighting tactics of, 192; role of civilians in, 192-193.

173-179; contrasted with See also Strategy; Tactics; European, 193; on southeast Weapons

coast, 277 Warring States, period of, 2, 5, 27, 62, numbers of troops on, 93; 67

Walls: Han manning of, 80; 63; invasion of Hsiung-nu during, significance of, 106; of fortified Warships: of Ch’en Yu-liang, 209;

T’ang towns, 147; of fortified at Poyang Lake, 222-224. See also

Sung towns, 161; tactics for Naval warfare

defending, 173. See also Garrisons; Watch towers: advantage of

Great Wall; Walled towns reconnaissance from, 166-167; Wan (myriad, “large unit’), 96 vulnerability of, 170; along coast, Wan-li Emperor, of the Ming, 15 275 Wang Ao (Mao Hai-feng}, 282; Weapons: Han, 98; Sung, 166-170; ©

pacification of, 294, 297 Ming, 170; at Hsiang-yang, 183; in

Wang Chen, 249-250; example of Poyang campaign, 204-205. See

eunuchry, 252-254; plans for also Catapults; Crossbows; campaign beyond Great Wall, Firearms; Gunpowder 254; the T’u-mu incident, Wei (guards unit], 24 254-262; death of, 263, Wei Ch’ing, general, 88, 90, 93, 94, posthumous punishment of, 95, 101, 105; expeditions led by, 267-268; shrine to memory of, 268 111-114 Wang-chiang-ching, victory over Wei Hsiang, 83

marauders at, 278 Wei I (of Chin], 37

Wang Chih: “King of the Wako,” Wei Kuang, 115 280, 282; negotiations with, 283, Wei Lii, 79

293; supervision of raids by, 288; Wei-mo, 86; surrender of, 112

rumors of surrender by, 294; Wen, Duke (of Chin}, 65; in battle Wang Ao dispatched to, 297; of Ch’eng-p’u, 47-51, 54-55

disposed of by intrigue, 304 Wen and Wu, 2-8

Wang Chih-yiian, 199 Wen-ch’eng, 142, 143, 148

Wang Fu-chih, 271 Wen-chou, prefecture, 278 Wang Hsing-tsu, 229 Wen-shan, 71, 72-73 (map) Wang Hui, 111, 116 Wen-ti, 83, 104 Wang Hung, 268 Western Han period: concentration Wang Jung, 172 in north, 78; leadership in, 87; Wang-sun Man, 37-38 territorial integrity during, 106 Wang Wen-shu, 115 White, Lynn, Jr., 99

Wang Yu, 253 Wo-k’ou, see Wako 400

Index

Women: feeding of, under siege, Yellow River, 93; Han boundary, 74,

155; for corvée duty, 156 83, 103, 112; Han influence in Wu, state, 32, 33-34, 202; conquest valleys of, 78; settlements on, 114

of by Ming, 239-240 Yen, state, 62, 68

Wu-ch’ang, headquarters of Han Yen-ch’eng, 142, 146

state, 202, 205 Yen-chih, 113 291-292 Yen-ling, battle of, 29, 36; Wu Ch’en, 56 reconnaissance before, 40 Wu-chen, plundered by Hsii Hai, Yen-chou, prefecture, 278

Wu-ching tsung-yao (Sung military Yen-men, commandery, 71, 72-73 encyclopaedia}, 154, 156, 161, 167, (map}, 93, 111, 113; Hsiung-nu 183; recipe for gunpowder in, 169; incursions into, 82, 83, 112, 117

code system described in, 170; Yen Shih-fan, 281

described, 195, 198 Yen Shou, 132-135 Wu Ch’ung-yin, 136, 140, 145 Yen Sung, senior grand secretary,

Wu K’e-ch’in, 260, 261 281, 304 Wu K’e-chung, 260, 261 Ying-ch’iu, 33 Wu-ling, King, 100 Ying River, 154

Wu-pei chi-yao (Ch’ing text, Yu-pei-p’ing, 71, 72-73 (map), 82,

Essentials of Military 86, 112, 113; raids on, 114

Preparedness), 153, 154, 156, 159, Yii Ch’ien, 261; after the T’u-mu

160; described, 197~199 incident, 265, 267, 268

from, 99 259

Wu-sun tribe, 76, 83, 84, 86; horses Yii-chou, native place of Wang Chen,

Wu-tzu, 152 Yii-huang, 32

Wu-wei, 71, 72-73 {map}; Han Yii Ta-yu, 280, 282, 287, 292, 306;

capture of, 21] Hsii Hai attacked by, 298; Wu-yang, 233 marauders wiped out by, 303

Wu-yiian, commandery, 74, 76, 83, Yui T’ung-hai, 217; at battle of 91, 94, 112, 117; raids on, 115, 118 Poyang Lake, 222, 229-230 Wu Yiian-chi, 129, 135, 137, 142; Yii-yang, 71, 72-73 {map}, 111, 112

defeat of, 144, 147 Yiian dynasty, 20, 21, 24; role of

non-Chinese in, 15; civil wars

Xenophon, 17 during, 188; as component of Mongol empire, 247

Yang-chou, prefecture, 288 Yiian O, 278, 282, 290; in battle near

Yang-ho battlefield, 258 Wu-chen, 292; in siege of

Yang I, 278 T’ung-hsiang, 293; at Chia-hsing, Yang Kai, 32 299-300; at surrender of Hsii Hai, Yang P’u, 114, 115, 116 301; independence of, 306 Yang Wei-te, 195 Yuian Tz’u, 136 Yangtze River, 21-22, 292; valley of, Yiieh-chih, 84, 86

78, 202; Jurchen attempts to Yiieh Fei, 200

reach, 180; Ming-Han battles on, Yiieh-po (of Ch’u}, 36, 37 237; pirates in estuary of, 278, 288 Yun-yang, 94

Yeh-lang, kings of, 104, 115 Yiin-chung, commandery, 68, 69, 71, Yeh Ma (Yeh Ming; Ma Yeh}, 289, 72-73 (map), 93, 111, 113;

295-296; concubine of, 298; Hsiung-nu attacks on, 82-83, 116 betrayed by Hsii Hai, 299; death Yung-shun, aboriginal troops from, of, 303 280, 295, 302, 303 Yeh Meng-hsiung, 172-173 Yung-tzu (of Chin), 38 401

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